THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: AN INVESTIGATION OF A CONSERVATIVE ENCLAVE IN LIBERAL AMERICA.

Richard Edwin Johe

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

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An Investigation of a Conservative Enclave in Liberal America

by

Richard Edwin Johe

Department of Political Science

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University

1974

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ABSTRACT

(Political Science)

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ABSTRACT

The major problem that has remained philosophically and historically endemic to American civil-military relations has been the antithetical nature of the military establishment to its parent society. Evolving from this very complex relationship are natural limitations which are inherently present in any effort made by either the society or the military to liberalize the military establishment and at the same time to make it more relevant to its parent society. The problem is deeply rooted in seventeenth century Puritan tradition which posited military matters beyond the extent of basic self-protection as anathema to one of their basic concepts--hard earned material success. Following on from the inculcation of a basic liberal tradition in America as manifested first in the Declaration of Independence and later amplified in the Bill of Rights, the "minuteman" concept came to dominate the civil-military philosophy of nineteenth century America. There was confusion within the American philosophy first in the War of 1812 and later in the Civil War as to how dominant a role should the military, both in war and in peace, assume as a partner of the civil-military equation, specifically in view of the dominant liberal ethic of the United States.

In each instance of the United States participation in foreign and domestic wars until World War II, the societal imperative of liberalism, although compromised to some extent by the need to raise a military force in time of war, was dominant enough to cause rapid postwar military demobilization. Until World War II, the military establishment was basically assigned the functional task of exclusively engaging in battle where and when so directed by the President. In times of non-war, it was reduced to a size consistent with appropriations and otherwise neglected by the liberal society. With the ending of World War II and the onset of a new phenomenon (the cold war), past military demobilization and subsequent military neglect by the civilian sector could not be accomplished. What ensued was a new era of civil-military relations with the military being thrust into a closer relationship and partnership with the civilian society. It is basically in this era that the inherent problems in any civil-military relationship that were initially recognized by the Puritans became more manifest and acute. Beginning with the close of World War II, each society has fallen more under the influence of the other than heretofore experienced in our history. Such a relationship has witnessed philosophical problems between the two societies that have in recent times been further exacerbated by the Vietnam War and the social revolution of the 1960s. Any further accommodation between the two societies will continue to depend upon an understanding of the inherent differences that historically have dictated the limits of any accommodation.

The investigation included an analysis of historical documents, various author's interpretations, and studies and surveys. Each research method was an important link in the entire gamut of investigation. A normative base for American civil-military relations was established within both a historical and philosophical context by analyzing such documents as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights; further evidence was gathered from the pronouncements on civil-military relations by several Presidents and other important national figures. Having once established the normative base, empirical evidence in the form of surveys, polls, and studies were introduced in an attempt to balance the normative standards with pertinent statistics gathered on American civil-military relations and emphasizing the post-World War II era of civil-military relations.

The conclusion reached was that the historical attempts to liberalize the military establishment are not only tempered by but regulated and subjected to the normative nature of the American civil-military equation. Because of the basic nature of this relationship, ignoring its existence will produce inadequate and unrealistic analyses of civil-military relations. Unless any analysis of civil-military relations includes an awareness of what values can be historically and philosophically demanded by the American public from its military establishment, the process of recruiting men into this establishment and later socializing them will proceed in a philosophical vacuum.

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From the very genesis of my conceptions and ideas on civil-military relations to the long period of total "immersion" in research and writing on the American military establishment, there have been many people who have assisted me in one way or another. To the United States Navy, I owe a debt of gratitude for selecting me to re-enter academic life as a student. I also thank the members of my doctoral committee for their advice and guidance. It is with a special note of gratitude that I acknowledge the counsel and encouragement given to me by my advisor, Professor Richard H. Leach, who was always available to offer needed guidance and assistance. It is to my wife, Suzanne, and our children, Barbara and Peter, that I am forever indebted for their moral support and for bearing the many privations caused by my preoccupations of the last three years. It is to them that I dedicate this work.

R. E. J.

THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

An Investigation of a Conservative Enclave in Liberal America

INTRODUCTION

> The study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little theorizing.
>
> Samuel P. Huntington, <u>The Soldier and the State</u>

The general purpose of this study is to investigate the thesis that within the American governmental system, the values that characterize the society and its military establishment are philosophically and historically antithetical to each other. Because of this, any attempts made by society to liberalize the military establishment are immediately subjected to these original differences, which, in turn, normally govern the final outcome. Integral to this investigation is the development of a theoretical framework within which civil-military relations can be analyzed.

The source of this inquiry flows from several observations. Attempts to provide new forward looking, liberal military programs have little chance of success unless they are predicated on an awareness of these differences. Many times it seems that these differences are either forgotten or ignored. Also, the need for intra-governmental coordination necessitates that military planners continue to become more involved in

matters of national security policy that were once the perogatives of civilian statesmen. These military policy makers are finding themselves thrust into situations where they have to analyze their plans and policies in relation to those of other civilian agencies. The expanding trend of this amalgamated effort has shown few, if any, signs of abating and thus the military and civilian societies appear to be overtly converging toward a common value base. This scenario may be deceiving, because it overlooks the differences between these societies already alluded to. The literature which continues to flow from the pens of civil-military polemicists or from protagonists who claim that the United States is being ruled by a "power elite" and becoming militaristically oriented assures us that the civil-military relationship has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of all participants and interested scholars.[1]

The thrust of this investigation is to probe into the hypothesis that there are both historical and philosophical differences between the two societies that have remained unchanged throughout the country's civil-military history. If such differences do in fact exist, even a passive awareness of them may serve to alleviate some frustrations that constantly

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[1]Russett and Stepan concluded in their study of the military establishment vis-à-vis the civilian society that the role of the military in America needs to be analyzed beyond the study of behavior. "The role of ideology has been inadequately studied by conventional scholars of civil-military relations."; see Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan, eds., Military Force and American Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 14.

characterize contemporary civil-military relations. A misunderstanding or ignorance of these differences may be one cause of the polemical haranguing that constantly flows between the civilian and military sectors of society. Following on from this is an investigation to determine whether or not societal liberalization of the military establishment will in fact provide a solution to the civil-military problem. By making such a determination, national assets could be better utilized, new forward looking military programs could be grounded on firmer philosophical bases, and policies which "fly in the face of tradition" could possibly be avoided. The entire civil-military equation could be brought into a more realistic equilibrium.

This investigation must be limited by certain assumptions and caveats in order to provide both the researcher and the reader with boundaries.

1. Unless the concept of the nation-state drastically changes, a nation that intends to maintain its independence and sovereignty must maintain some form of military protection.

2. Each society must work out some accommodation with its military establishment. In an authoritarian society, where this establishment may be an integral part of the power structure, the accommodation may be different from a democratic society in which the establishment has become relatively more differentiated and a civilian-military relationship is created.[2]

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[2]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), pp. 1-2.

3. Civilian control of the military is integral to the American governmental system not only as a result of constitutional direction, but also as a requirement of the American political system as an operating institution.

4. Many writers have made critical studies on how the military establishment in the United States has come to influence or even control the civilian society. These military protagonists have become associated with what is popularly known as the "military conspiracy school."[3] This study acknowledges the existence of this school of literature, but because I am more interested in the obverse situation and because there has been so little research done there, this inquiry is directed toward investigating the effect the civilian society has on the military establishment.

5. Lastly, this study is not intended to be a comprehensive, historical analysis of American civil-military relations,[4] and the thoughts of political figures such as Burke, Locke, Jefferson, and Jackson, offered herein, are in no way to be considered comprehensive.

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[3]The following writers are well-known members of this school: Tristram Coffin, The Passion of the Hawks (New York: Macmillan Company, 1964); Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962); James A. Donovan, Militarism, U.S.A., with a Foreward by David M. Shoup (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970); Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Stuart H. Loory, Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine (New York: Random House, 1973); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1956); Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964); John M. Swomley, Jr., The Military Establishment, with a Foreward by Senator George McGovern (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

[4]This is more than adequately covered in Huntington, Soldier and the State.

Definitions

The following definitions are submitted as a means of providing a common contextuality for the whole of this study:

1. Civil-Military--is used to refer to a relationship. It is not used to indicate a dichotomous situation which one frequently visualizes when he sees reference to a phrase like "Russian-American". Civil-military relations refer to the role of the armed forces (military sector) in society (non-military sector).

2. Political-Military--is a similar relationship which refers to the role of the armed forces in making and implementing the political decisions of the government.

3. Militarism--is an enveloping ethos which permeates all of society and becomes dominant in all aspects of life. This ethos presents a vast array of customs, actions, and thoughts associated with things military (such as wars and armies) and yet transcends military purposes.[5] C. Wright Mills notes that a militaristic environment is established when military men do not remain as means but become ends within themselves.[6]

4. Military way--is a method of action attributed to the military in which there is a concentration of effort to carry out specific tasks with the least expenditure of assets.[7]

5. Liberalism--is defined in its broadest sense to mean

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[5] Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, rev. ed. (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), p. 13.

[6] Mills, Power Elite, p. 222.

[7] Vagts, History of Militarism, p. 13.

a paramount concern for the freedom and independence of the individual. This becomes more evident when contrasted to conservatism.

6. Conservatism--is a resistance to change in institutional characteristics which are accorded almost reverential and metaphysical status.

Essence of Investigation

PART I investigates the historical aspects of American civil-military relations. It is hypothesized that the philosophical differences between American society and its military establishment have historical roots. Chapter I is a historical synopsis of the place of the military establishment in American society. Chapter II investigates the American civil-military equation since World War II in view of the entry of the United States into a dominant power position among world powers. The initial model (Figure 1), formulated as a result of this investigation, could be as follows:

Figure 1. Initial Model



PART II is the focal point of this study. Having once investigated the existence of different philosophical bases in the civil-military equation, it is logical to determine whether the procedures of recruitment and socialization have any effect on the "root" differences that characterize American civil-military relations. It is hypothesized that the policies of recruitment and socialization can be interpreted in terms of their effect on the military establishment. The final model (Figure 2) reflects the essence of this investigation.

Figure 2. Final Model



Chapter III addresses the question of the effect which the concepts of conscription, which includes universal military training and selective service, and the modern volunteer army have on the recruitment of enlisted men into the armed forces. Chapter IV investigates the effect of officer recruitment on the liberalization of the military establishment. The institutions analyzed are the military academies, the Officer Candidate Schools, and

the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Chapter V investigates the effect of officer institutional socialization on the liberal-conservative ethic. Among the institutions analyzed are the military academies, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, the service colleges, and civilian colleges as far as they provide post-graduate education. All these institutions provide varying amounts of academic and professional socialization. All three chapters will include, where possible, a prognosis of the post-Vietnam War era to determine whether or not the United States can expect the creation of a modified or even a new civil-military equilibrium.

PART III completes the investigation by summarizing in both a historical and normative manner the civil-military equation as it has evolved within and applied to the American liberal tradition. The investigation will end with conclusions and recommendations.

PART I. OVERVIEW

As the ship entered the uncharted minefield,
the Captain gave the order--FULL SPEED AHEAD

Anon

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM AND THE CASE OF THE CONSERVATIVE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THEREIN

The position of influence which a military establishment attains within a democratic society is determined to a large extent by the nature of the ethos of that society. Thus, it is important in the United States, as in other democratic nations, to understand the philosophical and historical differences between the civilian society and its military establishment; both societies must be aware of the other's ethic if either is to understand the problems that are a result of this relationship.

Genesis of Civil-Military Relations

Although the Puritans, who fled from religious oppression in England in 1620 and landed at Plymouth Rock in November of that year, brought with them a pattern of life and a general body

of political thought, there began to develop upon their arrival a distinctive genus of American political thought. While neither equality nor toleration were fundamental tenets of the Puritan ethic, at least two elements of free government began to emerge from the rigid and uncompromising Puritan theocratic government. These were concepts of a covenant or compact based on free consent and the practice of local self government manifested in the local town meetings. Thus while bound, at least, by ancestral tradition to a pattern of authoritarianism, the Puritans introduced into the New World the rudimentary ideas of liberalism. Their political affairs were conducted within the parameters of a mutual covenant which they documented in the Mayflower Compact.

> . . . We, whose names are underwritten . . . covenant and combine ourselves together into a civill body politick, for our better ordering and preservation . . . to enacte, constitute, and frame such just and equall lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to time . . . .[1]

Ironically, the intolerance which the Puritans had so condemned in England remained with the new settlers and became characteristic of their "new" society. What did not remain in the Puritan ethic and which was left behind in Europe were the legacies of feudalism and clericism which had thrust the European continent into what appeared to be constant national and religious wars. Thus Louis Hartz theorizes that not being bound by the political

---

[1]John Mabry Mathews and Clarence Arthur Berdahl, Documents and Readings in American Government: National and State, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1940), p. 3. The Compact was signed on 11 November 1620 by the Pilgrims prior to their landing at Plymouth Rock.

traditions of Europe, the settlers embarked on a tradition that from the beginning was liberal in manner. This liberalism never became the captive of either Old World feudalism or socialism which is one of the reasons for the uniqueness of the American experience.[2] If one looks upon feudalism, clericism, and socialism as antithetical to individualism, Hartz's observations certainly do merit attention. M. Morton Auerbach supplements the Hartzian theory by noting additional factors such as a lack of class consciousness, the rugged idea of frontierism, and a general belief in mobility and destiny as contributing to a liberal tradition that would be the product of a dialectical process of conflict and competition that would encourage progress.[3] This "dearth" of political theory is what Daniel J. Boorstin claims accounts for the "genius of American politics." American political philosophy proceeded without the benefit of political theory, therefore, there is a "seamlessness" of culture based on the "givenness" of certain values in America. The American system is a product basically of the founding fathers and not one tied to ancestral ideology.[4]

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[2]Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1955), p. 4.

[3]M. Morton Auerbach, The Conservative Illusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 69-70.

[4]Daniel J. Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 8-12. This "seamlessness" of American politics became a cause celebre when writers such as Josiah Royce, Henry James, and Herbert Croly questioned the "aimlessness" and optimism of American political philosophy; see chap. 6 passim. For a well-balanced study of American intellectual history, refer to Boorstin's trilogy. The

The Puritans were in large part responsible for the continuing of one legacy and the creation of another legacy, both of which have carried over into contemporary civil-military relations. The intolerance which caused Puritans to dissent from Old World authorities and which eventually drove them to the shores of the New World was the same trait which they had depended upon to perpetuate themselves in England. Intolerance became a keystone of Puritan philosophy, and it was the legacy of dissent from that philosophy manifested by such historical dissenters as Roger Williams and Thomas Hooker that hastened the breaking of the Puritan theocratic hold on society and quickened the rise of a secular, democratic society. This legacy of dissent relied strongly upon the doctrine of natural rights which recognized the importance of the individual. In fact, the aspect of dissent became the "Puritan's greatest contribution to the growth of freedom in America."[5]

While continuing one legacy, the Puritans by their ethic created another legacy. This was a self-righteous affirmation that material success was a sign of divine favor. Warfare, which despoiled or impeded this steady prosperity, was therefore anathema. The experiences of the colonists in providing for their own protection and well-being led them over a period of

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Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York: Random House, 1958); The Americans: The National Experience (New York: Random House, 1965); The Americans: The Democratic Experience (New York: Random House, 1973).

[5]Alpheus Thomas Mason and Richard H. Leach, In Quest of Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 33.

time to resent the practitioners of warfare. As more and more colonists fled to America a heritage of antipathy toward a military ethic was molded within the ethos of society. They had fled from persecution and thus were loath to import military forms into the new America. This philosophy dovetailed conveniently into a larger wariness and mistrust which held all authority as suspect of infringing on individual rights. Samuel P. Huntington agrees that a motivating ethos of liberalism has been the wellspring of the American political system.[6]

Despite instances of continuing dissent and growing friction between the colonists and the British government, rebellion was certainly far from the colonist's mind. Problems continued to mount and the colonists continued to pursue the rugged frontier life which added to their remoteness from and disinterest in articulating a political philosophy. The forging of a new society and the meeting of daily problems allowed little time for political rumination. Eventually the problems began directly to affect the colonists. British efforts to have them assist in financing the French-Indian War (1756-63), the question of "taxation without representation," and such acts as the Stamp Act (1764) certainly added to the continuing alienation of the two societies. By 1776, the successive stages of pamphleteering, which witnessed Benjamin Franklin's request for parliamentary

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[6]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), p. 144. "Liberalism dominated American thinking from the Revolution through the first half of the twentieth century . . . liberalism does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the military function."

representation of the colonies and the angry Thomas Paine crying out for natural rights, had become bolder and bolder and "comprehensive enough to appeal to all mankind."[7]

Although it is historical knowledge that Richard Lee's motion at the Second Continental Congress in June, 1776 to the effect that the colonies should be free and independent was instrumental in having Jefferson express the liberalism of the American mind in the Declaration of Independence, it may not be too clear what role the English philosopher, John Locke, had in influencing Jefferson. On the one hand, it would be erroneous to cast Locke in the role as being the prime mover in influencing Jefferson and as being the "father of American liberalism" in view of Hartz's and Boorstin's claim of uniqueness of the American political system and of Locke's own justification of the Glorious Revolution. On the other hand, Locke's ideas of the rights of revolution as stated in his Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) has overtones of the "natural rights doctrine" documented in the Declaration. At least two authors, Alpheus Mason and Richard Leach, note that

> in the debates preceeding the revolution, he [Locke] supplied most of the theoretical ammunition for the colonists. Perhaps no other single person had more influence on the colonial mind in the days before 1776.[8]

Note the similarity of the natural rights doctrine as stated here in the Second Treatise and in the Declaration below, particularly in the context that both men were in some fashion

---

[7]Mason and Leach, In Quest of Freedom, p. 46.

[8]Ibid., p. 17.

apologizing for a revolution.

> Whenever, therefore the legislature shall transgress this fundamental rule of society [misuse the rights of people or property] and either by ambition, folly, or corruption, endeavor to group themselves, or put into the hands of another, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates of the people, by their breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people . . . [to] provide for their own safety and security.[9]

On the eve of the Revolutionary War, two factors dictated the general negative attitude and contempt that the colonists held for any military force. First, the relative security of the colonies by reason of their geographical isolation did not create a real need for a military establishment. Second, the constant presence of British troops and their interference in colonial matters aggravated by British demands for colonial support in the French-Indian War, spawned an ethos of anti-militarism among the colonists.

The colonial climax came in the adoption of the Declaration of Independence on 4 July 1776. The great strength of the Declaration was that it was an expression of what the American mind was thinking.[10] The overtures to liberal tenets are the paramount aspects of the Declaration which is many times called America's greatest liberal document.

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[9] John Locke, Of Civil Government, Two Treatises, ed. Ernest Rhys, with an Introduction by W. F. Carpenter, Everyman's Library (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1924), p. 229.

[10] Mason and Leach, In Quest of Freedom, pp. 65-66. Cf. Hartz notes that unlike the French Revolution, the United States did not have to endure a democratic revolution and thus was thwarted in the people a revolutionary zeal that was symbolic of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; see Liberal Tradition, pp. 38-39.

> We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . . . ., That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem more likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.[11]

Notably, the Declaration reveals an intensive dislike and distrust of things military. Thus contained in the list of grievances are the following:

> He [King George III] has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.
>
> He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power. [Implication being that it should be subordinate.]
>
> He has given consent to acts unacknowledged by our laws. For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us.

The frustrations and aspirations noted in the Declaration lay bare the facts that the British policy of maintaining standing armies on American soil, attempting to involve the colonists in subsidizing British Wars, and quartering troops within the colonist's homes exacerbated the colonist's anti-militaristic feelings. Military force was anathema to both the trends of liberalism and the principles of frontierism and rugged individualism which the colonists had learned to live by. On the other hand, the revolutionists realized they would have to fight for their self-proclaimed natural rights. Under these circumstances, and these only, the use of force was permissible.

---

[11] Mathews and Berdahl, Documents and Readings, p. 24.

If the Revolutionary War proved nothing else, it illustrated that a war, which could have directly affected the basic future of the colonies, did not inculcate in the populace a militaristic spirit.[12] What in fact appears to have been the case is that American revolutionists fought to preserve past values rather than to force the coming of an uncertain future.[13] As a result of the war, the United States found itself identifying with two different military traditions which are theoretically contradictory to each other: a liberal tradition manifested by the concept of organizing citizens into a military force to counter a threat. This was what had been done at Concord in 1775 where the colonists had been hastily organized into a "citizen army," popularly called minutemen, to thwart the British attack. This concept was further institutionalized and, though

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[12]Cf. Michael Howard, "Civil-Military Relations in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1948," Political Science Quarterly 75 (March 1960): 36-37. In those countries where, unlike the United States, the community has been cut loose from its constitutional roots and the patterns of traditional obedience to authority have been disturbed, there is danger of military intervention in civil matters caused by the impatience of military men with governments incapable of preserving order.

[13]Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 2. For several interpretations of "past values" see Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition: And the Men Who Made It (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1948), p. viii. "The society of private property, the right of the individual to dispose of and invest it, the value of opportunity and the natural evolution of self-interest and self-assertion, . . . have been staple tenets of the central faith in American political ideologues." Also see Mason and Leach, In Quest of Freedom, pp. 17-18. "Consent of the government, the right of the majority, the idea of natural rights independent of government and thus limiting government, and the right to revolt, were all adopted with enthusiasm by our revolutionary forebearers and continue to this day as an important source of American political theory."

periodically supplemented by military conscription, has stood as the principle way liberal America enlists people to fight its wars. The second tradition is based on the fact that because an army had to be raised to counter the British, the seeds for some form of military professionalism were sewn. Except in time of war, this tradition lay dormant, and it was not until after the Civil War that it became institutionalized to the point that it could no longer be treated with benign neglect.

Before the British had departed from New York at the close of the war, the Continental Congress had confirmed the release of nearly all of Washington's troops and even Washington's plea for a modest peacetime military establishment of 2,631 met with opposition. Within six months of the war's conclusion, the American army was down to seven hundred from a war time high of approximately 35,000 reached in November, 1778.[14] By June, 1784, the Continental Congress seemed to agree with Mr. Eldridge Gerry's statement that

> . . . standing armies in the time of peace, are inconsistent with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism.[15]

At least, in this spirit it passed a resolution that called for all troops now in the service of the United States to be discharged with the exception of twenty-five privates to guard the

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[14] Charles Walton Ackley, The Modern Military in American Society: A Study in the Nature of Military Power (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1972), pp. 42-43.

[15] Library of Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 27 (1928): 518.

stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point.[16]

The anti-militarism legacy, spawned by the Puritans and articulated by Jefferson in the Declaration, found its way into the American governmental system in pre-Constitutional days through the Articles of Confederation. By the very fact that the government would be a confederation of states, the Articles from their very inception in 1777 depended upon a spirit of cooperation among the states for any effectiveness they would have. The viability of the confederation depended upon this cooperation and thus the provisions for civil-military relations called for only a state and not a national militia. Article VI called for the states to ". . . always keep a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed. . . ." Article VII set forth provisions for land forces to be raised by the states. Article VIII called for the defraying of expenses for the common defense out of a common treasury supplied by the several states.[17]

The Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation together provided a noble beginning for the American experiment in liberalism. During this formulative period, the tradition of anti-militarism was accepted as an essential element in American democracy, except when the exigencies of war demanded a temporary military establishment. From the very early days of

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[16] Ibid., p. 524.

[17] Mathews and Berdahl, Documents and Readings, pp. 27-30. At the same time Richard Lee had proposed his famous resolution for independence, he had also offered a resolution to form a confederation. The Articles were an eventual outcome of his proposal.

colonial settlement, settlers were largely from the middle class. Few noblemen chose to emigrate. Thus the middle class automatically became the dominant class in American society. Therefore, at least until the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the American ethos was antithetical to the military. This ethos has spawned throughout the course of American history (at least until 1945) a feeling of general distrust and reluctance to maintain a professional military force and an emotional acceptance of the "minuteman, irregular soldier" concept.

The only incident running counter to the whole trend was the experience of Shay's Rebellion (1786), which illustrated the inadequacy of the confederation of states in coping with an insurrection. Max Farrand reasons that it was not sufficient to place the state militia under central control, but that the central government must be empowered to protect the states from internal disorders as well as external dangers.[18]

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was to witness a polarization of interests between a fear that the government would remain too weak to maintain order, and a fear that the government would become too strong and misuse its power. Whereas the Declaration of Independence had been the great liberal document, the Constitution was to be the great conservative document. The framers had learned from experience that an unqualified liberal tradition might not be enough to support a nation. That lesson was supported by their "Calvinistic sense of human evil and

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[18]Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), p. 49.

damnation and [their belief] with Hobbes that men are selfish and contentious."[19] The ideological constant stressed in the Declaration, which provided for an anti-military environment, was now supplemented by a structural constant in the Constitution, which recognized the necessity for a military component. From this time forward, the liberal ideal has had to accommodate itself to a military institution.

The various plans submitted to the convention indicated that the exact position and function of a military force within a constitutional framework was not clear to the framers. The Virginia Plan offered by Edmund Randolph set forth the following resolutions on the military:[20]

> That the articles of confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged, as to accomplish the objects . . . namely, common defense, security of liberty . . . .
>
> . . . ., that the national legislature ought to be empowered . . . to call forth the force of the union against any member of the union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.

The New Jersey Plan offered by William Patterson countered with the following resolutions on the military:[21]

> That the articles of confederation ought to be so revived . . . to render the federal constitution adequate to the . . . preservation of the union.
>
> That the executive . . . direct all military operations; provided, that none of the persons composing the federal executive shall, on any occasion, take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any military enterprise as general or in any other capacity.

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[19] Hofstadter, American Political Tradition, p. 4.

[20] Mathews and Berdahl, Documents and Readings, pp. 39-40.

[21] Ibid., pp. 41-43.

> And if any state, . . ., shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the powers of the confederated states, . . ., to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, ...

In its final form, the Constitution was a compromise; more so, it was a great conservative document that enumerated powers which were to be specifically exercised and specifically prohibited to both the state and national government.[22]

The Constitution provides for civilian control of the military by instituting a system of checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches. More specifically, Congress was given the following powers:[23]

> To raise and support armies (art. I, sec. 8(12)).
>
> To provide and maintain a navy (art. I, sec. 8(13)).
>
> To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces (art. I, sec. 8(14)).
>
> To provide for calling forth the militia (art. I, sec. 8(15)).
>
> To provide for organizing, arming, and discipling the militia (art. I, sec. 8(16)).

The President was to be the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states when called into actual service of the United States (art. II, sec. 2(1)). The civil-military provisions in the Bill of Rights (1791) prohibited the national government from infringing upon the raising of a well-regulated militia and the right of the

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[22]U. S., Constitution, art. I, sec. 8, 9, 10.

[23]Note how these articles corrected the list of grievances listed by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. See p. 17 above.

people to bear arms (Amend. II), and prohibited the quartering of soldiers in time of peace or war within any house without the owner's consent (Amend. III).[24]

It should be evident that one of the central features of the Constitution relevant to the juxtaposition of society to the military was the establishment of civilian control over the military institution. This was accomplished by dividing the command, appropriation of funds, and militia functions among the executive and legislative branches on the one hand and between the national and state governments on the other. This in effect accomplished a very important result in that it provided for "subjective" civilian control and not "objective" civilian control of the military. Subjective control describes the situation wherein the military is "civilianized" to the degree where it loses its autonomy and becomes politicized to the extent of being a "mirror image" of the state's political policies. Opposed to subjective control is objective control which describes the situation wherein the military becomes highly professionalized, maintains its autonomy, and becomes a tool of the state. Subjective control civilianizes the military; objective control militarizes the military. Thus, under the provisions of the Constitution, the military was philosophically instituted to respond to subjective civilian control.[25] The framers of the Constitution thus wrote

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[24]Jefferson, who was instrumental in having the Bill of Rights amended to the Constitution, corrected the civil-military problems he had noted in the Declaration of Independence. See p. 17 above.

[25]Huntington articulates these forms of control; see Soldier and the State, pp. 80-85.

into the document both personal and historical convictions as to what should be the proper civil-military relationship within the Republic. Some of the more evident reasons for their decisions would seem to be the following: a belief that a standing army was a threat to the Republic; the conviction that threats from foreign invasions would be countered by providing for a standing navy; the absence of any accepted requirements for a separate military class or for a high degree of professionalism; the belief that a citizen army, which proved adequate during the revolution, could again be formed to counter a foreign invasion. But what made the military acceptable at all was the provision for state militias. The founding fathers conceived of the militia as a liberal agency that would act in defense of the individual and for local liberty against the powers of the national government. Thus, on the individual level, the citizen was guaranteed the right to bear arms and to refuse to quarter troops within his home. On the organizational level, the state militia was a counterforce to a national army. Even so, in addition to these provisions to protect the individual, the national government was given power well beyond that given in the Articles of Confederation by empowering the President to federalize the militia.

As a conservative document, the Constitution subjects society to certain restraints, which seems to demonstrate within the minds of the founders a certain pessimism about society. The elements of conservatism, as they apply not only to American society in general but to the military establishment, may have as

its patron the English philosopher, Edmund Burke. Russell Kirk, who is one of the more outspoken modern advocates of conservatism, claims that in any political sense Burke is the founder of conservatism as we know it in the United States.[26] A brief investigation of Burke's civil-military philosophy, however, does need at least one caveat. Just as noted in the case of Locke's influence on American political theory, Burkian philosophy was not consciously thrust into the American political system, but in a posteriori fashion was somehow reconciled with how in fact the system had evolved. In his Reflections on the French Revolution, which is one of the few historical conservative works of political literature that reflects on civil-military relations, Burke argues that society was an organic whole composed of individuals who were incapable of functioning apart from society. He emphasized custom, tradition, and consensus of thought as opposed to individual judgment, and he constantly mounted attacks against the assertion of individuality.[27] In further alluding to the military society, Burke believed in a national hierarchy among men. Individual men were to be revered "on account of their age, and on account of those from who they are descended."[28] The evils of internal insurrection and the violations of personal rights by the military,

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[26] Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, 3d rev. ed., Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), p. 5.

[27] Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution, ed. Ernest Rhys, with an Introduction by A. J. Grieve, Everyman's Library (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1910), p. vii.

[28] Ibid., p. 32.

while harmful, are not as destructive of society as when the insurrection threatens to menace the very existence of the nation. Thus the army should never act but as an instrument for the government, for once it has acted according to its own resolutions, the government would degenerate into a military democracy, "a species of political monster, which has always ended by devouring those who have produced it."[29] Burke's emphasis on things established, consensus of judgment, partnership of men, and the instrumental nature of the army provides a model for the development of the military establishment along conservative premises.

The military system which developed within the framework of the Constitution illustrated the poignancy of the philosophical aspects of civil-military relations. The Republic did maintain a small standing army until World War II; by maintaining itself as a force-in-being, the navy did serve as a deterrent to foreign invasion; a strong reliance was placed on federalizing the state militias and utilizing volunteers when needed, both of which are aspects of the "citizen army"; an officer caste system was prevented by basing the recruitment and promotion of officers on their personal achievements and not on their social characteristics; and a system of civilian control through constitutional checks and balances was built into civil-military relations. The rise of a separate military class and the development of military professionalism, both of which began after the Civil

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[29] Ibid., p. 208.

War, reached their present position of power in time of peace basically as a result of the Cold War.[30] The military critic, C. Wright Mills, notes that the United States' ethos of individualism and acquisition of wealth has historically "favored the civilian devaluation of the military as an at-times necessary evil but always a burden."[31] By the same token, generals who have become President do so only by forsaking their military heritage because military men qua military men have never been elected to this highest office. This, notes Huntington, indicates that political power and military professionalism are incompatible in the American climate of liberalism.[32]

Within the larger framework of the Constitution, the philosophy of civil-military relations, as advocated by two of the more prominent members of the Convention, is reported in the Federalist Papers. Written for the ostensible purpose of "explaining" the Constitution to those who would pass on its ratification in New York, these papers have become famous for their analysis of the political philosophy of the Constitution. Several of these papers, written by either Alexander Hamilton or James Madison, provide one with a synthesis of the

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[30]This point is developed more in Chapter II.

[31]C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1956), p. 176.

[32]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 158. Several of the more famous generals, who have made the successful switch to being a non-military advocate, are Washington, Jackson, Grant, and Eisenhower. Scott, McClellan, Hancock, Wood, and MacArthur are among the more well-known military qua military men who were unsuccessful in their attempt to become President.

philosophical background of American civil-military relations. Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 6 that one rationale for creating a union rather than retaining separate states would be its countering effect to dangers that might arise not only from the several states but from the foreign powers. Human nature, itself, is wicked and weak and thus prone to acts of violence. In order to emphasize this particular point, Hamilton noted that even among commercial republics such as the United States the drive for mutual amnity and interest among the republics would be effectively countered by more immediate monetary and selfish interests. This is accounted for by the fact that republics, as well as monarchies, are governed by men who are captives of jealously, rage, and avarice.[33] In the same context of realizing man's weakness and leaning toward violence, Hamilton confirms in Federalist No. 8 the need for defending society with a military force in some form. What was crucial was that this force be properly instituted so as not to become too powerful.[34] Hamilton further contends in Federalist No. 23 that the national government should have the power to provide for the common defense and raise what armies and navies are needed to meet this end. These powers should be unlimited because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies.[35] This

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[33]Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, with an Introduction by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, Inc., Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 56-57.

[34]Ibid., pp. 66-71.

[35]Ibid., p. 153.

call for unlimited power is better understood as a power given to the legislature and not to the executive to create an army. In any event, standing armies are dangerous to liberty.[36] The best substitute for a standing army is a well-trained militia which would be a formidable opponent to a nationally raised army which might infringe upon the liberties of the people. The danger imposed to a people's liberty by the militia is minimal because the people who make up the militia would be so trained as to defend their own rights. In his concern for economic matters, Hamilton also noted in Federalist No. 29 the economic hardship that would be experienced in the form of removing from the market productive labor to supply the manpower for a standing army.[37]

James Madison discussed the need of a standing army in Federalist No. 41 in the context that on a large scale its consequences might be fatal to the rights of the people while on a smaller scale its presence might be a nuisance. In any instance, prudence must be exercised by society in order to reach an accommodation which is in keeping with its liberties.[38] Madison discussed in Federalist No. 46 the possibility of a clash over power between the national and state governments. He concludes that because the people are naturally closer to the state

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[36]Ibid., pp. 157-58. (Federalist No. 24.)

[37]Ibid., pp. 184-85. This economic argument has been countered by at least one argument that military professionals are now necessary because of cold war policies.

[38]Ibid., pp. 257-58.

government and more biased in that direction, the national government will only gain power that is given to them by the people acting through the state governments. Thus fears of uncontrolled national governmental growth are unfounded. In the same manner, the state, through its citizens, would control the growth of a national military force. Uncontrolled growth would obviously be detrimental to each citizen's goals. As an additional counter, state militias by their very size and claim to citizen's allegiance would prevent usurpation of power by a national militia.[39]

Both essayists present similar civil-military arguments. They were convinced that some arrangements needed to be made to provide protection to the new Republic based on man's proneness to wickedness and violence. The decision of how to institutionalize this protection has as a common denominator the actions of the people voiced through their legislative bodies. There is an acceptance of the belief that the people are the vital element in determining both their own destiny and the viability of institutionalized civil-military relations. This arrangement is essential to democratic liberalism which, through the structural constant of the Constitution, provides parameters within which the growth and influence of the military establishment is regulated.

The French aristocrat Alexis deTocqueville observed the American political system as it had evolved by the early 1830s. He noted, among other things, that even in a democracy where the

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[39]Ibid., pp. 294-300.

natural tendencies toward warlike passions become rarer as social conditions become more equal, the hazard of war is an ever present threat. The United States is blessed by its comparative isolation from other nations, and thus its need to maintain a large army is very minimal. Nevertheless, these factors do not relieve the United States, nor for that matter any democracy, from the necessity of maintaining an army. For this reason, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of the army in a democratic society.[40] Tocqueville notes that in a democracy armies are usually led by those who have the least to lose in battle. They are not the aristocratic landlords, and eventually, they become a society within themselves. He discovered a basic incompatibility between a military and a democratic society. When a man becomes an officer in the military, he breaks his relationship with the democratic society. In order for this same person to advance in rank, he must be successful at what he is trained to do best--win at war. Thus the goal of advancement by employing means, which are at odds with a democracy, sets him apart from the society he is trained to defend. Tocqueville concludes that within a democratic society there is a dichotomy. The people want peace which provides them with an environment that favors industry and gives each man a chance to succeed. Concurrently, the democratic army wants war which provides the military man with the proper environment to utilize his training and allow him to advance in

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[40]Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer and Max Lerner, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. 621.

rank.[41] The inherent differences are summarized by Tocqueville as follows:

> All citizens, being equal, constantly conceive the wish and discuss the possibility of changing their condition and increasing their well being; that inclines them to love peace, which favors industry and gives everyone a chance to bring his little undertakings to conclusion. On the other hand, the same equality makes military honors seem more valuable to those who follow the career of arms, and by making these honors within the reach of all, causes soldiers to dream of battlefields. In both cases the taste for enjoyment is equally insatiable and ambition in both cases equally great. Only the means of gratifying it are different.[42]

What in fact is being described by Tocqueville is the inherent presence of the "seeds" of militarism even in armies of a democracy like the United States. Tocqueville, like Hamilton and Madison, realized the need for a military establishment within a democracy, but all three realized the inherent incompatibility of such an establishment with liberalism. Thus with the liberal zeal manifested in the Declaration of Independence now structured in the Constitution which articulated the basic civil-military realtions that were philosophically acceptable to the new nation, the genesis of American civil-military relations was all but complete. The basic incompatibility between the two systems was incorporated into the American political system. What has happened to the civil-military equation since 1787 can best be described as a series of equilibriums that reflect the fluctuations between various modes of subjective and objective civilian control, but always being influenced by the concept of

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[41]Ibid., pp. 621-28.

[42]Ibid., p. 623.

a conservative military establishment within a liberal society. An overview of the history of civil-military relations from the eighteenth century until well into the twentieth century should illustrate the difficulty in attempting a philosophical reconciliation between the two societies.

Development of Civil-Military Relations

One of the first manifestations of how the ideas of the framers of the Constitution would be translated into policy was evident in January, 1790 when the Secretary of War, Henry Knox presented to President Washington for submission to Congress an elaborate plan for organization and training of a militia under federal control. He proposed a militia composed of all able bodied men between the ages of eighteen and sixty. Within these age limits, various groups were to be formed and trained to different degrees of readiness. The concept was based on the idea of the "citizen army" and not on a standing army. Knox's militia was to be a United States militia and not simply congeries of state forces.[43] The immediate drawback of the plan was its unpopularity with Congress. The spirit of the country was oriented toward the Revolutionary War concept of having "minutemen" spring into action without the need for formal military training. In addition, both the foreign threat to American peace and citizen interest in spending time or money on military

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[43]U. S., Congress, _American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive of the Congress of the United States, Military Affairs_, vol. 1, 1st Cong., 1st sess.--15th Cong., 2d sess., 1789-1819, pp. 6-13.

matters were minimal. The result was that neither Washington nor Knox could persuade the Congress to act on the original plan. Final action was in fact delayed until May, 1792 when a much diluted version of Knox's original plan passed Congressional approval.

The Militia Act of 1792[44] became the foundation of the permanent military policy of the United States and affirmed the basic concept of the "citizen army." All able bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five would, unless specifically exempted, be liable for military service in the state militia. The states were also given the task of organizing and training the militia. The weaknesses of the act were immediately evident. Prospective militiamen had to furnish their own weapons and ammunition. No provision was made for specifically enforcing the requirement for universal training, which had been specifically stipulated in the act. What the act did confirm was the historical philosophical antipathy toward a national military establishment. The Congress might have followed the rationale, as possibly did the founding fathers, that the state militia would act not only as a liberalizing force in military matters, but as a counterforce against both national intrusion on individual rights and the formation of a national army. The state militia would also counter any rise in militarism and conduct the defense of the nation against invasion.

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[44] Militia Act, Statutes at Large 1, 271-74 (1792).

In March, 1794 a Congressional committee reported to the House of Representatives their viewpoints on revising the Act of 1792.

> . . . they are impressed with the importance of a more energetic system . . . but in viewing this subject, as applied to the Constitution . . . they have their doubts how far Congress can . . . make any important alterations or amendments to the present law [Militia Act of 1792] . . . the right of training the militia is constitutionally reserved to the states . . . the committee are of the opinion that no amendment is necessary to act for establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States.[45]

Acting on the recommendations of the committee, Congress passed no further legislation modifying the Act of 1792. The threat of war with France prompted the passage of the Militia Act of 1798,[46] which only modified the Act of 1792 to the extent of arming the state militias at government expense. In fact, even though the Act of 1792 was amended and modified to meet the exigencies of future wars or confrontations (as it was in 1798), the act remained as the basis for American military policy until the passage of the Militia Act of 1903.

The national figures most associated with advancing a positive military policy in the last decade of the eighteenth century were Alexander Hamilton and George Washington. Both advocated the concept of a small but professional cadre of regular army men which could be expanded, when circumstances dictated, and supplemented by new recruits. Actually, they advocated what

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[45] U. S., Congress, American State Papers, p. 66.

[46] Militia Act, Statutes at Large 1, 576-77 (1798).

was to be the beginning of the expansible army concept later recommended by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, to President Monroe in 1820. One other concrete recommendation was Hamilton's plan to establish a military academy as an institution to study the art of war, a plan which came to fruition during Thomas Jefferson's tenure as President.[47]

With the election of Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency in 1800, the hopes of Washington and Hamilton for establishing an institutionalized cadre of professional soldiers would appear to be eclipsed by the Jeffersonian spirit of liberalism which was anathema to standing armies. Jefferson had been most direct in his condemnation of standing armies and the quartering of troops within the colonists' homes. Now as President, Jefferson was cast not only in the role of philosopher but also of policy maker. Paramount to Jefferson's liberalism and thus contributing to a better understanding of his civil-military philosophy was his concern for the individual. Based on his observations, the governments, constitutions, and laws that ensue from the vesting of power are entitled to respect and obedience only as they fulfill the function of aiding the freedom of the individual.[48] Within this context, his attitude toward the Constitution as a document that provides parameters would be ambivalent. He would

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[47] U. S., Congress, American State Papers, pp. 133-44.

[48] Jefferson's theories on the individual not only follow closely his ideas as documented in the Declaration of Independence, but closely parallel those of John Locke's "Second Treatise"; see Locke, Of Civil Government, especially chaps. II, IV, VII, VIII.

be a strict constructionist when he believed acts of the people were destructive of personal freedom; he would be a liberal interpreter of it when such acts threatened to impede the development of the freedom and individuality of the people. Within the ethos of Jeffersonian sanctification of the individual was developed his theory of civil-military relations. Jefferson was aware that both internal and external threats necessitated the establishment of some military institution. What form this institution was to take has become a matter of historical record.

In view of his pre-eminent regard for the individual determining his own destiny and the belief that a standing army was antithetical to the tenets of democracy and liberalism, Jefferson wanted to maintain a militia in time of peace to cope with emergencies; in time of war he advocated the creation of a regular army, but only for the immediate purpose of defeating the enemy after which time it would be disbanded. This was opposite to the philosophy of Hamilton who wanted a small, but well-trained professional force in peacetime that would be supplemented in war time by the militia. In fact, both plans are infeasible in a liberal society, but for different reasons. The basic tenets of liberalism were against having any standing army in peacetime and thus Hamilton's plan was unacceptable. The creation of a "citizen army" in time of peace was contrary to the principles of the general public and their sentiments and thus from its inception Jefferson's plan was not very popular. The result was a compromise and not a clear victory for either side. In effect it established the general relationship which the

conservative military establishment would have with its liberal society until at least 1945. The regular professional forces were to be limited in size in peacetime (usually by the amount of money appropriated for military strength) and supplemented in wartime by volunteers and militia forces. This allowed the liberal society to control the military establishment in both peacetime and wartime. Liberalism had no use for objective civilian control and Jefferson's policies were certainly no exception to this relationship.

Jefferson's liberal distaste for a professional military and his high regard for a universal militia accounted for most of his pronouncements and actions on civil-military matters during his Presidency. In a letter to Samuel Adams (26 February 1800), Jefferson noted that the lesson to be learned from Napoleon's takeover of the French Republic was the inherent danger of having standing armies.[49] Jefferson's First Inaugural Address (4 March 1801) reaffirmed his general philosophy by noting that a well-disciplined militia would provide the best safety in peacetime as it would in wartime until the regulars could relieve them.[50] Jefferson continued to reiterate his basic policy throughout his tenure as President. In his First Annual Message to Congress (8 December 1801), he observed that he did not conceive it either needful or safe to maintain a standing army involved in garrison

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[49]Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, comp. and ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 10 vols. (New York: Knickerbocker Press of G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-99), 7 (1896): 425-26.

[50]Thomas Jefferson, Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: Willey Book Company, 1944), p. 334.

duty as a defense against invasion because in essence these numbers would be inadequate to the task. Instead, the only force that would be feasible to defend against any point of attack would be the militia. Jefferson followed up both of these statements with positive action. Despite the tension with France during the early part of his administration, he allowed attrition to reduce the authorized strength of the army to fall from 5,438 to 3,794. And even though he had authorized by 1808 the strength of the army to increase to 10,000 on the eve of the War of 1812, President Madison had only 6,686 men under arms.[51] Likewise, where the army in 1802 had thirteen field grade officers for combat units, by 1809 only nine remained. As James Jacobs notes, "Jefferson believed that the army had little need of those beyond the grade of captain."[52] In his Sixth Annual Message to Congress (2 December 1806), Jefferson again indicated what his beliefs were on a standing army in the context of his time of an armed Europe.

> Our duty is, therefore, to act upon things as they are, and to make a reasonable provision for whatever they may be. Were armies to be raised whenever a speck of war is visible in the horizon, we never should have been without them. Our resources would have been exhausted on dangers which have never happened, instead of being reserved for what is really to take place.[53]

To provide for a defense, Jefferson recommended the following:

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[51] Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 28.

[52] James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S. Army, 1783-1812 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 385.

[53] Foner, Writings of Jefferson, p. 375.

> A militia so organized that its effective portions can be called to any point in the Union, or volunteers instead of them to serve a sufficient time, are means which may always be ready yet never preying on our resources until actually called into use.[54]

He reiterated this position in his Eighth Annual Message to Congress (8 November 1808) by noting that, "For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security."[55] Even after he had retired to Monticello, Jefferson still advocated a militia force. In June, 1813, he noted that in keeping with his idea of a "citizen army," military instruction should be made a regular part of college education. "We can never be safe till this is done."[56] In a letter to John Eppes in September, 1814, Jefferson proclaimed that

> . . . the truth must now be obvious that our people are too happy at home to enter into regular service, and that we cannot be defended but by making every citizen a souldier [sic] as the Greeks and Romans who had no standing armies. . . .[57]

By urging signing of legislation that provided for establishing a military academy at West Point in 1802, it would appear that Jefferson had at least tacitly agreed with Hamilton's idea of a professional army corps. This is not totally true because the Academy was conceived of as a school to produce engineers

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[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid., p. 394.

[56]Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. H. A. Washington, 9 vols. (Washington: Taylor and Maury, 1853-54), 6 (1854): 131.

[57]Ford, Writings of Jefferson, 9 (1898): 484-85.

and not military professionals. Moreover, the initial enrollment of less than a dozen cadets would hardly pose a threat to the civilian society. Before the Civil War, the Academy had become one of the top-rated engineering schools in the country, but other than preparing its students for engineering duty it did not give them any training in the liberal arts nor did it provide them with the essentials of military science.

Even though the Constitution had given Congress the powers to provide for and maintain a navy, Jefferson's naval policies followed closely those which he applied to standing armies. Both policies not only led to a reduction in government expenditures and a lightened tax burden but they manifested Jefferson's refusal to use force in international relations. In the wars with the Barbary pirates, Jefferson wanted to employ ships of the line to protect American interests in the Mediterranean, but beyond this, five of the seven frigates directed to be "mothballed" were to be brought to Washington where they could be kept under the eye of the executive.[58] When peace had been made, Jefferson withdrew American shipping from the Mediterranean. In order to forestall any future foreign naval engagements, he induced Congress to provide for 278 auxiliary gunboats, which were to replace ocean going frigates, that could be hauled up on the beach in peacetime and run into the water in time of war. Jefferson's most poignant manifestation of his refusal to become involved in international troubles may have been his self-imposed blockade in 1807.

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[58] Foner, Writings of Jefferson, p. 339.

What is evident in Jefferson's pronouncements and actions is his penchant to maintain a non-involvement attitude which could possibly preclude infringement upon the rights of the individual. This could account for his aversion to standing armies and belligerent navies. His citizen-soldier concept reaffirmed the founding father's ideas about the pre-eminence of the militia as a firm counter to a standing army. At the basis of his civil-military philosophy was his underlying emphasis on natural rights, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, subsumed in the rubric of liberalism and manifested in his never ending quest to protect the individual. Citizen-soldiers and gunboat-sailors provided the proper protection for the United States. Jeffersonian democracy provides the interpreter of American political history with philosophic ideas by which to judge the future course of civil-military relations.

The geographical isolation of the United States complemented by Jefferson's liberal civil-military policy of non-involvement in foreign affairs, a small standing army, and a gunboat navy, possibly added to the legend, spawned in the Revolutionary War, that America enters its wars unprepared and then only when provoked. Within the context of this overall liberal ideology, which dictated to a large extent the nature of civil-military relations, the conservative Constitution through its checks and balances made objective control of the military virtually dependent upon excluding the military from political

power.[59] Other than expanding its size to meet the exigencies of the time (War of 1812, Mexican War, Civil War), the military establishment of the pre-industrialized era remained both small and under the subjective control of the larger society. Thus because of a lack of external threat, being isolated from the wars and problems of Europe, and in receipt of meager Congressional appropriations, few problems arising as a result of civil-military relations developed prior to the Civil War in the American political system.

During the pre-Civil War period, there were perhaps two other persons, John C. Calhoun and Andrew Jackson, who in their own way challenged the existing state of civil-military relations which had been developed under Jefferson.

The expansible regular army concept as proposed by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun to Congress in 1820 was not an original idea but had been part of George Washington's sentiments on post-Revolutionary War military policy in 1783.[60] The concept received little or no popular support when it was first proposed by Washington nor was it made part of the Militia Act of 1792. As noted by Russell Weigley, the War of 1812 brought few successes for the regular army and even in these cases military

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[59]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 143. Huntington does note one major exception (p. 147) to this dominant philosophy which was founded in the conservatism of the South. Here, prior to the Civil War, the idea of military professionalism was fostered.

[60]Weigley, Towards an American Army, pp. 11-14.

policy had to be improvised to meet the situation.[61] Against this background, Calhoun offered the expansible army concept to Congress on 12 December 1820 for national defense based on a regular army. In his famous "Report on the Readiness of the Army" Calhoun set forth his concept. The army had two tasks--garrison duty in peacetime and defense of the nation in wartime. Calhoun considered the latter was the more important of the two tasks. On this premise, he proposed the establishment of a small peacetime army with provisions for an organization for a wartime army. At the outbreak of war, the professionals would form the cadre of the army that would be expanded by the filling in the ranks with volunteers and militia.[62] Calhoun's plan ran counter to not only the sentiments of the time but to basic philosophical differences. The wars in Europe had ended; the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 had largely vindicated the concept of the "citizen army"; and the American people were not only unwilling to support a regular army but they also had a basic distrust for a professional officer corps. Against this background, the dominant liberals in Congress rejected Calhoun's plan. As Huntington notes, Calhoun's concept ran counter to the basic tenet of American liberalism "that professional military officers are permissible only when they command small military

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[61] Russell F. Weigley, ed., The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 9.

[62] John C. Calhoun, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, ed. W. Edwin Hemphill, 7 vols. (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1959-73), 5 (1971): 480-90.

forces and that large military forces are permissible only when they are commanded by non-professional soldiers."[63] In 1821, as a possible indication of added rebuttal to Calhoun's efforts, the army was reduced by two regiments.

Andrew Jackson's philosophy of popularistic democracy carried Jefferson's liberal civil-military policy practically to the point of liberal indifference to military affairs. In his First Inaugural Address (4 March 1829), Jackson reiterated Jefferson's liberal civil-military policy by noting that armies were dangerous to free government in time of peace. The bulwark of our defense lay in the national militia. As long as the government is administered for the good of the people and regulated by their will, it could be defended by a patriotic militia.[64] But Jackson was more interested in matters other than military problems and to these matters he seemed to direct the national attention. Under Jackson's tenure as President the country witnessed westward expansion, further decentralization of American life, and the beginnings of industrialism. Jackson's indifference to military affairs has been described by Samuel Huntington.

> Jefferson wanted to educate all citizens to be soldiers; the Jacksonians assumed that all citizens could be soldiers without training. Technical competence was required of the good Jeffersonian officer; militant enthusiasm of his Jacksonian counterpart. In contrast to

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[63]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 217.

[64]James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 10 vols. (Washington: n.p., 1896-99), 2 (1896): 437-38. Note the similarity with Madison's Federalist No. 46 on pp. 30-31 above.

> Jeffersonian technicism, the Jacksonian approach to military officership was distinctly anti-intellectual.[65]

Jackson's attitude found a natural target in an institution established by Jefferson--the Military Academy at West Point. His quarrel was with the method of cadet selection which he claimed fostered and perpetuated an elitist group of officers. His popularistic philosophy led him to attempt to close the Academy, and although this failed, Jackson was successful in originating the concept, which was eventually formalized in 1843, that led to the Congressional appointment system still in effect at all three military academies. Although President Jackson's role in articulating American civil-military policy is not as prominent as that of Jefferson's, it should be noted that as the President who expanded liberalism in the growing Republic he demonstrated the effectiveness of subjective civilian control. Carried to its logical conclusion, Jackson came as close as any President in effectively eliminating the military from the power structure of society.

Only the South seemed to be outside the ethos of liberalism as epitomized by Jefferson and Jackson. Here the conservative attitude, an agrarian economy, and a tacit allegiance to feudal romanticism helped to support a professional military ethic.[66] The South was in many ways an illiberal island in a liberal society. The combination of these factors led the South to be more sympathetic to the military profession than the North,

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[65]Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 203-04.

[66]Ibid., pp. 211-12.

and possibly helps to explain how the South in pre-Civil War days came to dominate the ranks of the military. While Southern dominance over pre-Civil War military professionalism did not alter the basic American liberal attitudes of Jefferson and Jackson, the Northern victory in the Civil War, which allowed the liberals to once again revert to the policy of ignoring military policy also allowed Southern conservatism to slowly re-emerge to help pave the way for post-Civil War military reform. The Southern contribution was in the form of ideas shaped within the Jefferson-Jackson liberal institutions of organization, education, and advancement. As Huntington notes, "The roots of American military professionalism go back to mid-nineteenth-century Southern conservatism."[67]

While the Civil War had only temporarily halted Southern influence on military professionalism, the prevalence of business pacificism made the postwar era one which witnessed almost universal American hostility toward all things military. This syndrome, which had its origins in Puritan hostility to warfare as anathema to prosperity, resurfaced on the eve of the industrial revolution and was articulated by such business pacifists as William Graham Sumner and Andrew Carnegie. The hostility of American society to the military establishment resulted in the isolation of the military from the society they served. Concurrently, the resurgence of the growth of military professionalism was conducted in an isolated, and conservative atmosphere

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[67] Ibid., p. 214.

which remained basically untouched by societal inputs. Within this environment of isolation and absence of political power, the age of military professionalism was born. Troubled by neither war nor politics, the profession was able to develop a distinctive military orientation.

The creative core of this professional growth included such famous military officers as General William Sherman, General Emory Upton, and Admiral Stephen Luce. William Sherman (1820-91) made such institutionalized reforms as introducing liberal education into the West Point curriculum and establishing professional training schools. Of equal importance was his overall influence on the army as its commanding general from 1869-83, during which time he set the tone of tough-minded professionalism. Emory Upton (1839-81) was a great reformer who was instrumental in increasing professionalism through the establishment of a strong regular army. Stephen Luce (1827-1917) was the forerunner of the creation of naval professionalism and the founder of the Naval War College. These officers were not only assisted in their efforts to institutionalize military professionalism by their isolation from society but by the emergence of a new era of industrialism. The nation was experiencing a technological revolution which could dictate to a large extent the way future wars would be fought. The military professionals saw in this a need to create a new concept of professionalism. This era of professional growth and its dominant syndrome of objective control may have been a reaction by a conservative group against a liberal society. Huntington described

it as

> a reaction of an inherently conservative group against a liberal society, rather than the product of a great conservative reform movement within society. . . . *In these origins lie much of the reason for American hostility to the profession as an essentially alien body.*[68] (Italics mine.)

An aura of estrangement and alienation from civilian society settled over the military community. Concurrent with the rise of technology and industrialism was a rise in commercialism and an accompanying laissez faire attitude. The antithetical attitudes which laissez faire presented to military professionalism compounded the already isolated situation that marked civil-military relations. Laissez faire was a competitive system which glorified in the seeking of an economic operating level through individual competition. On the other hand, conservative professional military beliefs glorified subordination, loyalty, duty, discipline, and obedience. Opposed to the Social Darwinists was the concept of group as advocated by the military professionals. What was in fact developing was the modern day problem of civil-military relations. This appeared in the form of a struggle for an accommodation between subjective control which was so evident in pre-Civil War days and objective control that was thrust upon the American military establishment because of its post-Civil War isolation from society. As the United States entered the twentieth century, the question of which control should be dominant to the exclusion of the other was no longer germane. The problem became one of defining a proper

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[68] Ibid., p. 233.

equilibrium between the two.[69] While the military strove toward a more professional institution, personnel strength of the armed services continued to decline in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. On the eve of the Spanish-American War, the army numbered less than 25,000.

The war thrust the United States into an era of expansionist and international policies that did not permit immediate postwar demobilization as had been the case after previous wars. Congress raised the authorized strength of the army from 65,000 in 1899 to 100,000 in 1901. Americans were being brought to the realization that internationalism demanded a comparable military force. Military reform measures in the postwar era further conflicted with reform liberal ideas of military subjective control. In 1903, Congress passed the "Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia,"[70] which was the first major military reform legislation passed since the Militia Act of 1792. Part of then Secretary of War Elihu Root's efforts to modernize the military establishment led to the passage of this act which, among other things, provided for an increase in the size of the regular army, creation of a general staff, and federalizing of the state

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[69] Louis Morton, "Civilians and Soldiers: Civil Military Relations in the United States," in _Theory and Practice in American Politics_, ed. William H. Nelson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press for William Marsh Rice University, 1964), p. 130.

[70] _Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia_, _Statutes at Large_ 32, Part I, 775-80 (1903). Events in the Spanish-American War such as the dispatching of winter uniforms to the troops in Cuba led to Root's concerted effort to have the military exert more control over military policy. This act, more popularly known as the "Dick Act," was one such result.

militia (now called the National Guard) in time of war and making them an organized reserve force of the army in time of peace. By passage of a single act, the professional military now exercised control over virtually the entire military manpower force of the nation. In effect, a standing army was created without increasing public resentment because by utilizing the state militia, the historical imperative of a "citizen army" was honored. Arthur Ekrich notes that by 1920 the peace time citizen army based on the concept of state militia under local control had been converted into a federalized militia and reserve force.[71] One reason for this quiet but fundamental change was the possible relationship which existed between the need for the development of a new military technology and a need for a new "breed" of trained and educated military men to master the new weapons of war. If the holocasts of the World War I Verduns did not lay to rest the romantic American idea of the revolutionary minuteman being a latter day Cincinnatus, they certainly spawned a necessity for the combining of technology with professionalism. By viewing the Act of 1903 in the context of the post-Civil War era rise in military professionalism exercised through objective control, it seems to explain the retreat of the military, with its newly found force and power, further into itself as it developed a more extensive professional ethic. All the time this retreat was going on, the military became more and more isolated from the society it was designed to defend.

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[71]Arthur A. Ekrich, Jr., "The Idea of a Citizen Army," Military Affairs 17 (Spring 1953): 35.

With the entry of the United States into World War I, American liberalism, under its leader Woodrow Wilson, again entered the international political arena. The liberalism of a Jefferson and a Jackson did not embody any real security function. The Spanish-American War was too one-sided to make this omission obvious. Liberalism in relation to civil-military relations had, until this era, been concerned with countering a rise in militarism within the state. But in the twentieth century the threat had been given a second dimension, that of a threat to national security. Although it was not made readily apparent until World War II, the functional imperative of security was beginning to oppose the societal imperative of liberalism. One observation of why American liberalism faltered when applied by Wilson to the international setting after World War I was because the elements of American liberalism were incapable of implementation in international relations. Liberalism had not been given a security function because it had presupposed external security. This assumption, while valid in the United States for at least a century, had little applicability in Europe. Because the Americans had been successful at solving domestic problems with liberal solutions, an attempt was made to reduce international problems to domestic problems. Once again there were too many premises that were assumed in domestic affairs that could not be assumed in international affairs. Finally, the use of American liberal standards in the conduct of foreign policy led to unreal evaluation of foreign situations.[72] Wilsonian efforts at promoting a

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[72]Huntington, Soldier and the State, pp. 149-51.

lasting peace guided by American liberal tenets were headed for failure. When the United States refused to enter the League of Nations, the nation entered an era of isolation, and the military establishment retreated even further into a more isolated enclave. The National Defense Act of 1916[73] made every adult, in effect, a militiaman with a primary national obligation; by the 1933 amendment to this Act,[74] all distinction of control between the army and the militia was basically abolished. While the world stood on the precipice of war in the late 1930s, the American military and civilian societies were struggling for some type of mutuality.

At least one observer of civil-military relations saw a definite problem in providing for an equilibrium between the imperatives of liberalism and security. Harold Lasswell saw within the confines of the Sino-Japanese conflict, started by the Mukden incident in September, 1931, the rise of the "garrison state." He may well have been the first to recognize and report this phenomenon, which was to further deepen the military split with the liberals. Within Lasswell's model, the specialist in violence (the military) would become the dominant group in society. This position was not actively sought by the military but was the result of an attitudinal configuration in the population which is supportive of a vastly larger role for the

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[73]National Defense Act, Statutes at Large 39, Part I, 166-217 (1916). See especially sec. 57 on the composition of the militia.

[74]National Defense Act Amendments, Statutes at Large 48, Part I, 153-62 (1933-34).

military in segments of national life. It would not come about by military seizure of power but rather as the result of an accretion to power brought about by prolonged international tension, as was the case in the Sino-Japanese conflict. Economic and scientific investigation was to be an integral concomitant to military consumption.[75] For obvious reasons, it is difficult to forecast or predict who and how many considered Lasswell's model a trenchant prediction for the future. World War I had not been very receptive of Wilson's liberalism and it appeared to take a gargantuan effort on behalf of President Roosevelt to awaken the nation to military threats on the eve of World War II. Despite the potential threat to the United States, how could the liberals condone and participate in another basic irrational, inhuman act as they had already done in World War I?

By liberal standards, there is paradoxically enough a compatibility between liberalism and war. In effect, when all efforts have failed to produce peace, the liberals look to the military to conduct the war to total victory by using the resources available in a rational manner. Once victory is achieved, the power given to the military is to return to the liberals.[76] The war vindicates the mutual exclusion and division

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[75]Harold D. Lasswell, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State," China Quarterly 2 (Fall 1937): 643-49.

[76]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 317. The unconditional surrender policy announced at Casablanca in 1943 would be compatible to both the liberals and the conservatives in explaining the war to the general public. To the liberals, the mission to eradicate the threat to freedom must be made in the most rapid and efficient manner possible; to the conservatives, the elimination of evil and errant men was the cause for using military force.

of labor which is present in the pre- and postwar eras between the civilian engaged in politics and the military engaged in war. The bombing of Pearl Harbor made the liberal crusade credible by giving liberals cause to invoke such tenets as survival and remaking the world safe for democracy. Once the crusade had been properly conducted and the power reverted to the liberals, the familiar scenario once again stipulates either the elimination of the military establishment in the societal power structure (extirpation) or for a return of the military to a structure of subjective control (transmutation). The liberals entered the post-World War II era with hopes of recreating a Jeffersonian type of liberalism in a world that was militarily speaking "light years" removed from what it had been in 1940. The cold war and the atomic bomb cast immediate shadows over the liberal hopes for a return to a pre-World War II civil-military relationship.

The twentieth century is not without its observers and critics of civil-military relations. A survey analysis of the viewpoints of several of the more notable writers will serve to show how the dichotomy initially noted by the Puritans has remained an enigmatic problem since. In addition, such a survey will demonstrate how the problems of civil-military relations have persisted over the years. One should note the great similarity in the following observations even though they speak from different professions or disciplines. Also each of the following writers is convinced of the irreconcilability of societal and military traits the modern world creates:

Samuel Huntington (political scientist)[77]

A conclusion is drawn that a conservative label has been affixed to the political orientation of the military which emphasizes irrationality, weakness, evil in human nature, continuing war, the cautious and conservative view of state policy, the supremacy of society over the individual, and obedience as the highest military order. The military ethic is pessimistic, collectivist, historically oriented, power oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, and pacifist. (pp. 69, 79)

Liberalism's hostility to the military ethic includes individualism (dignity) vs. group (man is weak); peace (natural) vs. conflict (natural); self-expression vs. obedience; reason vs. experience; war permissible (universal principles) vs. war permissible (abstract principles). If the military is necessary, civilians must control liberal principles because the national defense is the responsibility of all. (pp. 90-94)

Conservatism's accommodation with the military elite includes the theory of group, recognition of history, acceptance of existing institutions, distrust of grand designs. (pp. 90-94)

Liberalism is united in its hostility toward the military profession. Neither the pacifist nor the crusader like the function of the military, which is the security of the state. The military contaminates the pacifist's peace and the crusader's crusade. (p. 153)

Some of the major components of conservatism as it is relevant to the military are--truth exists in concrete experience and not in universal propositions; community is superior to the individual; evil is rooted in human nature.[78]

Allen Guttmann (political scientist)[79]

No matter how much the American soldier departs from the conservative model, the ideals of military discipline are basically antithetical to the Jefferson tradition of individual rights. A soldier may have many liberal beliefs, but when he is commanded to fight against the enemy, he must. (p. 114)

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[77]Huntington, Soldier and the State.

[78]Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism as an Ideology," American Political Science Review 51 (June 1957): 456.

[79]Allen Guttmann, The Conservative Tradition in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Clinton Rossiter (political scientist)[80]

> The humanitarian function of government under the conservative ethic will always remain secondary to the duties to insure tranquility, secure property rights, establish justice, and raise the level of morality. (p. 35)
>
> The conservative places the society before the individual. (p. 36)
>
> Conservatism is a thankless persuasion because it counsels caution rather than adventure and reacts rather than acts. (p. 63)
>
> It is easy to be a conservative of temperment but hard to be a conservative of the intellect. (p. 239)

Morris Janowitz (sociologist)[81]

> The military officers in the United States have tended to have conservative ends concerning the military establishment. This is manifested in a belief in the inevitability of interstate conflict and the lack of concern for the social and political consequences of war. (p. 22)
>
> On the basis of a single question asking officers to identify themselves as conservative, semi-conservative, semi-liberal, or liberal, Janowitz found that the basic orientation was predominantly conservative. He also found that conservatism increased with higher positions in the military hierarchy and concluded "the higher rank means longer organizational experience, greater commitment to the organization, and more selecting out of deviant perspectives." (pp. 236-39)

Adam Yarmolinsky (political scientist)[82]

> The military group-oriented value system runs counter to the egalitarian, individualistic, humanistic ideals of American civil society. (p. 398)

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[80] Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion, 2d ed., rev. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962). Rossiter's thesis is that the United States is a country liberal in political thought and conservative in political practice; see p. 269.

[81] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971).

[82] Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971).

In summary, the above authors all view the tenets and values of the military ethic as conservative in nature and thus oriented toward such general concepts as group solidarity, natural conflict within human nature, recognition of history, obedience as the highest order, and reliance on experience. Opposed to these concepts is the liberal ethic which primarily emphasizes the concept of the free individual which is basically contrary to the conservative nature of the military ethic.

It has been over three hundred years since the Puritans demonstrated their antipathy toward a military ethic and almost two hundred years since Jefferson sanctified the individual in the Declaration of Independence. The current literature on civil-military relations, as exemplified by the above writers tends to confirm the initial views of the Puritans and Jefferson on the philosophical dichotomy that has historically existed between the civilian society and its military establishment. The passage of time has not altered this basically incompatible relationship.

One additional viewpoint of contemporary liberalism was reported by the President's Commission on National Goals in its 1960 study. The commission reaffirmed the Jeffersonian tradition by noting the paramount goal of the United States "is to guard the rights of the individual, to ensure his development, and to enlarge his opportunity."[83] In being more definitive, the commission commented:

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[83] President's Commission on National Goals, Report (New York: Columbia University Press for the American Assembly, Spectrum Books, 1960), p. 1.

> The status of the individual must remain our primary concern. All our institutions--political, social, and economic--must further embrace the dignity of the citizen, promote the maximum development of his capabilities, stimulate their responsible exercise, and widen the range and effectiveness of opportunities for individual choice.[84]

Of course the viability of the credo of liberalism is not beyond the realm of questioning,[85] but assuming that the concept of individualism remains as the foremost element of liberalism, then the basic philosophical differences with the military ethic remain intact.

In conclusion, a historical investigation of the philosophical differences between the liberal American society and its conservative military establishment have revealed that such differences have exacerbated civil-military relations throughout American history. Because the mission of the military is to protect society, the carrying out of this effort presupposes that the military will take on certain institutional characteristics that are traditionally conservative and thus per se will come into conflict with the liberal society. Among the other consequences of World War II was the realization of the need for a new

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[84] Ibid., p. 3.

[85] For several viewpoints on the dismay facing liberals see Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York: New American Library, Inc., Mentor Books, 1955) in which he surveys the decay of natural rights and admonishes the American public to reassert them; Henry Kariel, "The Ideological Vacuum," Nation, 18 April 1966, pp. 449-52, in which he notes that the ideology which Locke, Adam Smith, and Madison articulated as a guide to our public sector has not carried over into the private sector and thus there is a "vacuum" created between private actions and public goals; Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969) in which Lowi notes that the evils spawned within the liberal ethic by interest groups can have a fatal effect unless we restore the rule of law.

civil-military equation. The functional imperative of security made this a task with a high priority. Chapter II analyzes this new scenario in the context of recognizing that the military, while an illiberal island in a historically liberal society, must be an active partner to any accommodation made with that society.

CHAPTER II

POST-WORLD WAR II CIVIL-MILITARY EQUATION

The political scenario within which World War II was fought was in consonance with the general philosophies of both liberal and conservative Americans. To liberals, the war was a crusade against fascism to be fought to a rapid and hopefully successful conclusion with the least expenditure of national resources. This had previously been the historical hopes of American liberals in wartime, and World War II was no exception. The crusading nature of the war was made evident by such slogans as "Remember Pearl Harbor" and "I Shall Return." Following on from victory, liberals would then hopefully preside over the dismantling of the military force. Eventually their hopes would include that any remaining military force would be brought under the subjective control of society. Likewise, the conservative tenet that man was evil and irrational was borne out in the American's belief about the enemy, and thus the elimination of these evil forces could be legitimized through the conservative institution of the military establishment.

As in previously fought wars, the liberal idea of crusade again was successfully amalgamated with the conservative viewpoint

on man's irrationality, and once again the exigencies of war were able to bridge the historical and philosophical differences between a liberal America and its conservative military establishment. The unconditional surrender policy announced by the allies at the Casablanca Conference in 1943 pleased both liberals and conservatives.

Although liberals were satisfied with the philosophical ramifications of the war, there was one factor of the wartime environment which concerned them. This was the presence of military control over virtually the entire civilian sector of government. Both Robert Sherwood, the biographer of Roosevelt and Hopkins, and Cordell Hull, wartime Secretary of State, noted the trend toward militarism, possibly not in the classic Lasswellian sense of turning the country into a garrison state, but to a degree never before experienced in American history. Sherwood noted Roosevelt's penchant for military solutions and his complete confidence in the Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall.[1] Hull was piqued at being ignored by Roosevelt who turned to the military and not to the State Department for wartime advice.[2] In retrospect, historical facts belied the liberal fears about the postwar military influence based on World War II experiences. However, what liberals, as well as most other Americans, could not have anticipated was the genesis of the cold

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[1] Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 11.

[2] Cordell Hull, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), II: 1109-11.

war and the effect it would have on the future of American civil-military relations.

As had happened at the conclusion of other wars in which American forces were directly involved, demobilization of the military establishment proceeded at a rapid pace after the surrender of Japan in September, 1945. Of a wartime high of 11.6 million military personnel on active duty when the war ended in the summer of 1945, 3.8 million were on duty as of June, 1946 and only 1.7 million as of June, 1947. The rapid postwar military demobilization could serve to alleviate the fears that American liberals might have had about the postwar American society. What many Americans could not have predicted was that the world in the postwar era was to be a vastly different one than that which had been the scene of the bloodiest conflict in history. The war had spawned, among other things, immense technological changes, a world wide realization of human rights and human needs, and the belated entry of the United States into a position of power within the international community. Thus the combination of these factors produced new international commitments and responsibilities in a nation which, in a historical context, was basically committed to a policy of liberalism within its own boundaries. As Chapter I noted, one of the failures of American liberalism in World War I was the absence of a security function in the liberal ethic.[3] Now after World War II the security function had to be recognized and rendered effective.

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[3]For a detailed discussion of this matter see p. 53 above.

For the first time in American history, a return to the status quo ante bellum was not possible as far as military policy was concerned. If the United States, either by choice or by default, was to enter into international politics and agreements, it had to have a military force-in-being to make its position of influence legitimate.

Although an institutional reorientation between society and the military establishment was an immediate postwar task, the historical, philosophical question would remain basically the same. How was the liberal society to provide for its military security when this required the maintenance of a military force fundamentally at odds with liberalism? The war had obviously changed, at least, peripheral civil-military relationships. It had produced a civil-military interdependence that Walter Millis notes generated a mutual interdependence between the two societies. The soldier realized his dependence on industrial production, scientific effort, and public support of the war. The civilian became aware of his dependence on the soldier not only in conducting the war but in arriving at decisions that were now both political and military in nature.[4] Whatever hopes the liberal had in returning to a prewar arrangement of a small military force under objective civilian control, which would ignore the problem of security, were slowly frustrated first, by the international implications of the United States' monopoly of atomic weapons, then the political confrontation between capitalism and communism in the cold war, and finally the passing

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[4]Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), pp. 140-41.

of the United States' monopoly of atomic weapons. Before analyzing the postwar events that either directly or indirectly affected civil-military relations, an investigation of the civil-military options available to a liberal democratic country committed to internationalism will illustrate the dilemma faced when liberalism confronts the institution of a standing and influential military force.

The growth of the military establishment in World War II to great strength and power (on both the domestic and international scenes) seemed to convince some liberals that the garrison state model, first posited by Lasswell in 1937, was an actual possibility in the United States as the conflict became more and more protracted. This possibility was incorporated in the claim that the wartime military-industrial complex was but the first step toward a final garrison state. To those liberals, it came to seem quite possible that society might be dominated by the military, an arrangement antithetical to liberal tenets. Other liberals drew from the war the hope of eliminating the military forces as a force-in-being in peacetime.[5] Such hopes, for the most part, were overtaken by the events of the cold war. Within the two extreme options of a garrison state and having no military force at all, two models have evolved which depict different ways of addressing the dual imperatives of maintaining both national security and a liberal society. One model (proposed by Huntington) excludes the military from any integration with society because of basic theoretical differences; the second model

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[5]Samuel Huntington has called this procedure extirpation.

(proposed by Janowitz) proposes a closer integration between the two societies premised on the fact that the military must be aware of and support the norms of society.

Samuel Huntington argues that when society is predominantly liberal in its orientation,

> military professionalism and civilian control are maximized by the military renouncing authority and influence and leading a weak, isolated existence, divorced from the general life of society.[6]

To protect the liberal society from military threat, Huntington believes that the military should be isolated from the rest of society. By isolating the military, a society protects its values. The ideological problems of the American attitude of attempting to impose liberal solutions in military as well as in civil matters constitutes the gravest threat to American military security.[7]

Opposition to Huntington's viewpoint is voiced by Morris Janowitz, whose view is that the military must be more closely integrated with society in a type of constabulary effort.[8] This effort recognizes that the protection of the society is a product of both the professional officer's defense of his nation and his commitment in the role of a citizen-soldier to the democratic values of society. The military establishment, as a social

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[6]Samuel P. Huntington, _The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), p. 94.

[7]Ibid., p. 457.

[8]Morris Janowitz, _The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait_ (New York: Free Press, 1971), chap. 20 passim.

system, must be able to adapt itself to its environment, sustain its existence, and adjust to change within the environment. In a developmental context, the professional soldier must be accorded a position in the democratic society under the assumption that his fundamental difference from the civilian is recognized. If we destroy the differences between the two societies, we run the risk of creating new forms of hostility and unanticipated militarism.[9]

Both models recognize the requirement that a realistic civil-military relationship must consider in simultaneous fashion both factors of national security and liberalism. Janowitz advocates subjective control and the fashioning of the military to "mirror" society. Huntington prefers a military separate from society and thus given to objective control and the development of military professionalism. As events of post-World War II have indicated, the fusion of political-military relations within the American governmental system has precluded to a great extent the objective control advocated by Huntington. Thus what has been spawned by the exigencies of security and the cold war is a fusion model that has tended to blend military and political policy while at the same time attempting to adjust or "civilianize" the military to the norms of society. Talcott Parsons recognized that when external environments of the system change, in this case the international involvements of the United States, there

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[9]Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 125.

must be an interchange between the environment and the organizations within the environment.[10] In the analagous situation, the military establishment must also change and seek adjustment to affect a new equilibrium with the changing society. Because of the nature of the conservative military ethic vis-à-vis the liberal society, any adjustments must be made with full awareness and understanding of the philosophical differences between the two societies. The extreme of integration is a solution that borders on an irresponsible analysis of historical differences. The extreme of exclusion has not been possible in view of the cold war. Military adjustment to societal norms must be considered in the light of philosophical reasons and not based on expedient policies. The events of the post-World War II era will verify the problems manifest in any American civil-military equilibrium and should illustrate that any adjustment to this equilibrium must fall within the Huntington-Janowitz models. The closer one adhers to Janowitz's theory, the more aware one must be of the historical differences that symbolize American civil-military relations. Likewise, adherence to Huntington's theory is contrary to the present state of affairs.

Liberal hopes to return to prewar civil-military relations were at one time buoyed by hopes that the United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons would lead to demobilizing to a prewar level of military strength. However, these expectations were soon overtaken by the course of events. The uncertainties

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[10]Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951), p. 482.

of internationalism appeared initially to produce in the pre-Korean War era an uneven pattern of results that could not entirely satisfy either the military or the civilian societies. Russia drew down the iron curtain in Eastern Europe (1946) and overthrew a duly elected government in Czechoslovakia (1948). The United States instituted the Marshall Plan (1948), airlifted supplies to Berlin (1948-49), and entered into its first major peacetime alliance by entering into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949). All these events took place against a background of the demobilization of the United States' military machine (1946), a thwarted effort at establishing Universal Military Training (1947-48), and a temporary end to conscription (1947). This seemingly paradoxical situation, which witnessed the increase in cold war tensions with simultaneous reduction in the American military force and posture, is partially explained by the liberals determination to return civil-military relations to one of subjective civilian control from the wartime relationship which had produced a military establishment that had virtual autonomy.

A postwar attempt, other than demobilization and ending conscription, to return the military to subjective control and to make the military more like and possible "mirror" societal norms, was contained in a report which was the result of an investigation ordered by the Secretary of War Robert Patterson in 1946 to study officer and enlisted relationships.[11] The

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[11]U. S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships, S. Doc. 196, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, pp. 1-23.

investigatory board, named the Doolittle Board after its chairman, retired Lieutenant General James Doolittle, was convened for the purpose of investigating complaints which enlisted men made against officers in World War II. One of the areas of complaint and subsequent examination was the lack of democracy in the army. The board recognized that democracy was not part of the military establishment because order and discipline, which may at times subvert democratic principles, were essential to military operations. The real problem which the board noted was not to change the ethos of the military but was centered in the disappointing quality, in some cases, of professional officer leadership. In its report, the board recommended certain liberalization policies, such as the elimination of some rank distinction and privileges based on rank. The recommendations were never implemented into the military organization in the spirit with which they were proposed, and thus an attempt in the postwar period to inject egalitarian policies into the military establishment was generally unsatisfactory. Whether the military believed it could conduct its duties apart from the influence of civilian society, as manifested in its ignoring of the Doolittle recommendations, and return to an objective control syndrome remained a subject of concern in the future. By the time Congress commenced its debate on the proposed National Security Act of 1947, the cold war had reached the point where objective control would have questionable viability as a policy and the thrust of subjective control and its concomitant political-military fusionist policy were becoming dominant.

In view of the lessons learned in World War II, the command and organizational structure for conducting future wars, which involved American military forces, was in need of review. Thus in the spring of 1947 hearings began before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the proposal to establish a consolidated national military establishment. The tenor of the hearings was directed toward the purpose of examining the pragmatics of defense, the implementation of specifics which included the proposed unification of the armed services under a single civilian head, and the creation of ancillary institutions (such as the Central Intelligence Agency) to assist in the execution of a national defense policy.[12] Even though the act proposed to consolidate the armed forces and subject them to a more direct civilian control, the hearings, which extended from March to May, did not evoke any discussion or considerations about the philosophical implications of creating a single military establishment from the viewpoint of the effect it would have on civil-military relations. While leading military officers (including Eisenhower, Nimitz, Marshall, and Halsey) all agreed on the philosophy of civilian control, not one officer, nor for that matter one civilian, referred to the historical dichotomy that has existed between civilian and military core values. The passage of the National Security Act in July, 1947 injected into the American governmental system for the first time in its history a

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[12] U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Establishment, Hearings before the Armed Services Committee on S. 758. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.

civil-military doctrine that would confine all future civil-military relations within the concept of subjective civilian control. Even the reassertion of professionalism and its objective control factor, which is periodically undertaken by military commanders, would still be limited by the guidelines established by the act.

Liberals were encouraged by the provisions of the National Security Act and its main provisions for subjective civilian control. Their hopes for a "controlled" military establishment were short-lived, however, because with the intensification of the cold war, the establishment would grow in size from an average pre-Korean size of 1.6 million men under arms to a post-Korean War average of 2.5 million. With the growth of the military forces, the military again became the major spender of national resources, resources which liberals had always wanted to deny the military in peacetime. Any hopes the liberal had placed in the National Security Act as an effective control over military influence were confounded first by the expansionist policy of Russia, then by her development of nuclear weapons, and finally by the Korean War. The shift to protracted wartime conditions, the maintenance of a standing army as a factor in international politics, and an economy becoming more dependent on wartime conditions were all antithetical to liberal beliefs. Despite these basic anti-liberal conditions, liberals understood that the functional imperative of security had to be recognized in addition to their concern for maintaining a societal imperative of liberalism. To liberals, if a military

force had to be maintained, the National Security Act provided adequate fusion of political-military policy which was controlled by the civilian society. The polarization and alienation of the two societies that occurred after the Civil War and World War I was now replaced by a "fused" society caused by the exigencies of national security. The two societies, which had always dealt with each other at arms length, were now cast as partners in providing national security. This partnership of convenience spawned an alliance in which the legally controlling civilian society had sought to inject its liberal tenets into the military establishment, and which had seen develop a military institution that has been influenced by various degrees of "civilianization" and professionalism. The relationship brought about as a result of the cold war had exposed the military establishment to closer scrutiny by society than it had heretofore experienced. Likewise, subjective civilian control, which had been clearly evident in liberalization and civilianization attempts, has presented a civil-military dilemma that has constantly surfaced for re-examination.

One of the first instances of that dilemma happened with the occurrence of the Korean War, a war the United States fought for various reasons, including retaining "prestige," protecting "vital" interests, and maintaining "national security." These objectives contain certain factors which are subject to varying interpretations, some of them irrational. The rational policy of carrying war to its logical conclusion, which had been up to this time victory in the American ethos, was what the military

establishment had been trained to follow. In the Korean War, the hiatus between civilian and military societies became evident when the two warring powers entered into negotiations. It was possibly at this juncture that the military realized that its "fighting" autonomy was no longer sacred and that the combat function of the military had been merged with political negotiations. This may have been evidenced by the fact that after the cease fire, military operations became a bargaining instrument for political negotiations. Destruction of the enemy or unconditional surrender were no longer objectives. The Korean War settlement was a milestone in American civil-military relations because at this juncture the fusionist relationship appeared to be completely institutionalized. The military rubric of national defense was being replaced by the new and apparent idea of national security and vital interests. Once we had replaced victory--known in the military lexicon as exercising complete control over the enemy--by thrusting such factors as vital interests and prestige into the concept of national security, we limited the effectiveness of the military establishment. Bernard Brodie notes that in this case initial goals of victory or the use of flexible response is threatened by the "dogma of prestige."[13] In Korea, and later in Vietnam, the policy of applying restraints on the battlefield, limiting the rules of engagement, granting sanctuaries, and restricting the use of nuclear weapons while it may be correct political doctrine may

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[13] Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1973), p. 354.

be costly vis-à-vis military effectiveness. The Korean War satisfied neither the liberal society nor the military establishment. The war violated the liberal dichotomy of war or peace, and the negotiations and sporadic fighting which followed the cease fire in July, 1951 further aggravated liberal tenets. Concerning the military dissatisfaction with the war, Huntington noted that, except for Ridgway, virtually all field commanders--MacArthur, VanFleet, Stratemeyer, Almond, Clark, and Joy--shared a feeling of frustration and a "conviction that political considerations had overruled the military."[14]

The Korean War, while not ending in the liberal hopes of total victory or unconditional surrender, did satisfy liberals in that it ended total reliance on American foreign policy on President Truman's conservative doctrine of "containment" (conservative in the sense of not being the liberal idea of total war or total peace). The war was the culmination of the public's indignation at a policy that had been pursued since World War II and which was basically anti-liberal. What liberals were critical of was the utilization of a considerable amount of the national resources to continue a policy of containment which emphasized stalemate and not crusading standards. The Korean War was fought, as noted by Huntington, according to a Clausewitz scheme rather than by a Ludendorff style.[15] In the former case, the war would have been the extension of politics while the

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[14]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 390.

[15]Ibid., p. 388.

latter would have opted for total victory followed by a return to the imperative of subjective control or complete extirpation of the military. The fusionist policy pursued in the Korean War, a policy which produced great morale issues at home, was to come back to produce similar problems in the Vietnam War.

Unlike President Truman's, President Eisenhower's approach to foreign policy was of a liberal nature in that he believed there should be a distinct dichotomy between absolute war and absolute peace. His administration was against persistent limited engagements and in pursuance of this policy he made a radical change from the conservative policy of containment to the liberal policy of massive retaliation. Although liberal hopes were obviously encouraged by Eisenhower's liberal foreign policy and his reduction of military personnel during his term in office from a Korean War high of 3.6 million in 1953 to a low of 2.5 in 1959, the aspect of massive retaliation did not reduce military preparedness. The combination of the ever present threat of future "brush wars,"[16] the continuing cold war threat, and the need for an adequate military force to legitimize massive retaliation forced the United States to maintain the largest peacetime military force in a constant state of war readiness it had heretofore witnessed.[17] While liberals welcomed the status of fusion and its subjective civilian control,

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[16]The Eisenhower administration narrowly escaped becoming involved in the ongoing conflict in Indochina in 1954.

[17]Within the period 1954-65, the United States maintained an average of 2.8 million men under arms.

the military establishment was becoming more and more the target of civilianization and in the process was witnessing a decline in professional standards.

An indication of the magnitude of officer dissatisfaction was noted in the report by Admiral J. P. Womble to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel in October, 1953.[18] The report was the product of a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense to study the growing concern of many officers as to whether they would make the military service a career. The problem was stated as--why had the military lost its attractiveness as a lifetime career? Several of the more relevant findings of the committee corresponded directly to the effects of subjective civilian control. The committee noted that public respect for authority had declined and was further assisted in that direction by the Korean War. Also popular and political reform measures had resulted in a reduction of the distinction between ranks and percipitated a drop in espirit de corps.[19] There was an overall reduction in professional standards. For example, authority and responsibility was being shifted from commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the lower grades and centralized in higher grade officers; incompetent personnel were being promoted

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[18]J. P. Womble, Jr., "The Womble Report on Service Careers," Army Information Digest, 9 February 1954, pp. 24-36. One must read the report in the context that the Korean War was still fresh in the minds of the committee.

[19]Cf. with the egalitarian recommendations of the Doolittle Report; see pp. 70-71 above.

to positions in which they performed inadequately. Because of this, officers were no longer being attracted to the military as a lifetime occupation. Professional autonomy had been subsumed into a civilian ethos.

To illustrate how liberals would view a return to service autonomy and perogatives, Morris Janowitz notes that any return to past perogatives and traditions recommended by the Womble committee would cause the military to lose its most creative intellects. Using all means available, a return to the past must be blocked; the role of ceremony, exaggerated professionalism, and organizational rigidity are responses more identified with an isolated military establishment than one which had become a part of society and depended more on manipulation than command ability. In concluding his criticism, Janowitz proposed a fraternal type organization to replace the hierarchy structure of military command.[20]

Further effects of subjective control and the exercise of fusionist policy which directly affected civil-military relations because of basic philosophical differences were manifested in the fact that the more civilianized the military became, the more it began to adopt the bureaucratic principles of civilian society. The obvious conflict with any extensive bureaucratization is that the mission unique to the military is to combat the enemy physically, a task which does not adhere to the bureaucratic model. Despite the conflict, the military adoption of

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[20]Morris Janowitz, "Changing Patterns of Organizational Authority," Administrative Science Quarterly 3 (March 1959): 486.

bureaucratic methods was not without major consequences affecting the authority structure of the military. There was a trend away from the military system based on traditional authority to one placing greater emphasis on persuasion and individual incentive. The change in organizational authority witnessed a shift from a concern for rigid discipline to one for individual initiative. Coupled with the shift in authority structure was the adoption of manipulative techniques which to a great extent depended on lateral relationships rather than the formal chain of command responsibility. Manipulation engenders a certain amount of arbitrary action which may eventually be destructive of the highly structured command relationships. Janowitz noted that such manipulation could be destructive of professional standards.[21]

Another indication of the result of fusionist policy, which was closely associated with bureaucratic methods, was the shift in post-Korean War days of the military stress from a preparation for battle to that of a deterrence of violence, which automatically involved the military in the business of political warfare. Military specialists schooled in international affairs and trained to work on joint military staffs were being sought throughout the services. There was an obvious attempt to have the military achieve a parity with civilian counterparts on the subject of national security and in the process acquire a penchant for accommodation, bargaining, and manipulation--all

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[21]Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. 12-13.

traits normally not connected with the military mode of operation. The decision-making process of arriving at a solution through compromising and bargaining is for the most part alien to a mind trained to give clear and unequivocal answers. Thus according to one source, the politics of bargaining may strike the military mind as inefficient or even immoral.[22] The problem which the military faces if it adopts the tactics of manipulation and bargaining is that the decision-making authority is removed to the lowest level and will eventually undermine the authority structure.[23]

In addition to the bureaucratic interpenetration caused by the fusion of military and political policies in the cold war, the military realized by the early 1950s that it had not only to produce combat commanders and specialists, but a "whole corps of military statesmen, capable of filling . . . innumerable political-military staff positions. . . ."[24] The war colleges and staff schools turned more and more away from the function of training commanders for success in battle and more in producing men capable of filling staff positions. The fusion of military and civilian organizations tended to play down the traditional military approach and in effect created a need for military bureaucrats and managers who began to look like civilian

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[22]Michael Howard, "Civil-Military Relations in Great Britain and the United States, 1945-1958," Political Science Quarterly 75 (March 1960): 37.

[23]Janowitz, "Changing Patterns," pp. 483-84.

[24]Millis, Arms and the State, pp. 360-61.

organization men. Adam Yarmolinsky notes that in this situation the syndrome of the military hero was replaced by the military manager.[25] Included in this civilian influence is the practice now engaged in by all services of attempting to provide the officer with an extramilitary professional identification and with it a secondary specialty beyond his primary task of command. The eventual effect of this, as Yarmolinsky noted, was a policy that might encourage shorter military careers, an effect which is "antithetical to the professionalizing developments of the military that have evolved in the near past."[26]

The process of civilianization and subjective control continued on into the 1960s and was exemplified by the flexible response doctrine and the systems analysis approach to military problems. The military sacrifice of professionalism made in the 1950s in response to becoming more politically adept did not cease in the early 1960s. Concern about the low level to which military professionalism had declined in deference to the rise of the military commitment to political-military forms normally can be stated in the rubric that the fusionist challenge must be countered by making the military more professionally expert. To accomplish this, the military schools would have to assume a key role and seek to develop within the service a professionalism which can

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[25]Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 70.

[26]Ibid., p. 72.

compete with the lay specialist.[27] The American military establishment entered the decade of the 1960s well aware that its professionalism had been impaired by the trends of civilianization that had gone unabated since the end of the Korean War. In fact, the basic problem confronting civil-military relations since 1945 had been the difficulties experienced by the military in becoming subjectively controlled by society. Many of these difficulties focused around the difference in how each society carried out its tasks, each with a different value system. Following the example of past American civil-military history, the era again illustrated the philosophical dichotomy that dictates the limits of a civil-military accommodation. While the external factors of the cold war had generated the post-World War II civil-military relationship, the decade of the 1960s introduced into the civil-military equation the domestic variable of a "social revolution" in which the military establishment found itself the very target of societal unrest and disillusion.

Societal changes in the 1960s, some of which were directly related to the Vietnam War, were to affect directly the civil-military equation in a way never before experienced. The decade of the sixties was one which some believed witnessed a change in society's order of priorities and values. Such changes in turn challenged the philosophy of civil-military relations. It was an era of "self," epitomized by an explosive quest for consciousness. Charles Reich in The Greening of America notes

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[27] Robert N. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," Foreign Affairs 42 (January 1964): 263.

that if the new consciousness were allowed to proceed to its natural end, the corporate state of the pre-1960s era would be replaced by a new system which typified non-adversary and non-hierarchy. The new consciousness was seen as an attempt to escape from the conformity of the old consciousness--the corporate state. As Reich put it, ". . . our whole system of hierarchy, authority, and law depends upon a consciousness that accepts the system; it all collapses the moment people refuse to obey."[28] The generation of the sixties was attempting to escape from the conformity of previous generations. At the heart of the revolution were doubts expressed by youth that large bureaucracies can respond to the needs of the people, and although the revolution did not initially have the Vietnam War as its prime mover, the war both accelerated and exemplified the complaints of the revolutionists. There were questions asked about the morality of the use of force; the military was often depicted among other things as an insensitive institution; there was a great desire for personal freedom and a rejection of obedience and symbolism based on "establishmentarianism." Much of the revolt and dissent, though directed for the most part toward society in general, was anathema to the military syndrome of conformity, symbolism, obedience, responsibility, and bureaucratic exactness. The same society from which the military enlisted its personnel to fill its ranks was evidencing a revolt against the basic elements upon which the military establishment

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[28]Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America (New York: Random House, Bantam Books, 1970), p. 340.

depended for its effectiveness. The question was not whether the military establishment would cease to exist because of the societal state of affairs but whether the new generation of military personnel would instill the new consciousness into the military system, and would the institutionalized policies of recruitment and socialization reduce, for the most part, any cataclysmic effect this new consciousness might have on the military? PART II will investigate the ramifications of these possibilities. In a similar vein, Alvin Toffler's concept of future shock, which is defined as the human response to overstimulation and which is characterized by a society caught up in transience, novelty, and diversity, provides an ominous future for a military ethos that by its very nature is vitally concerned with the concepts of duty, honor, and country.[29]

One manifestation of intra-service difficulties spawned by the cold war and magnified by the social revolution and the Vietnam War of the 1960s is noted by Sam Sarkesian in his classification of officer groups since World War II. One group is called the traditionalists who were the senior service officers who saw duty in World War II and in Korea. The orientation of this group was toward conventional wisdom with emphasis on the heroic role, traditional techniques, and unquestioned legitimacy of the military role. This group was possibly the most isolated from the youth of the day. The middle group were the transitionalists who were commissioned after the Korean War and who

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[29]Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, Bantam Books, 1970).

witnessed military involvement in political-military operations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Republic affair, and Vietnam. Their careers were wedded to unconventional experiences. There was a much greater degree of flexibility in their intellectual approach, with closer ties to academic circles intermingled with professional experience. The last group were the modernists who were the product of the Vietnam War and were characterized by domestic dissent, youth culture, anti-military sentiments, and campus disturbances.[30] The common factor in the social revolution and its effects on the military establishment is the decline in public authority, which may be harmful to both civilian and military values.

In the 1960s, a growing number of people, including adults, discovered the attractiveness of "direct action" as a means of coping with events or conditions of which they disapproved.[31] Depending upon one's own values, this phenomenon may be seen as a sign of healthy democracy in which individuals who feel they have been unfairly treated have the alternative of acting on their complaints. This activism serves to underscore the likelihood that traditional authority is much less reliable as a means for accomplishing goals than it was before. As

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[30] Sam C. Sarkesian, "Political Soldiers: Perspectives on Professionalism in the U. S. Military," Midwest Journal of Political Science 16 (May 1972): 242-43.

[31] National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968). Note Chapter 4 wherein the commission members concluded that one of the major causes of the civil disturbances was the prevailing societal environment which encouraged violence as a proper method for articulating dissatisfaction.

Theodore Lowi notes, "the requirement of standards has been replaced by the requirement of participation."[32] He also noted a decaying respect for symbols and a crisis of public authority which were at the root of the problem of a liberal state which failed to cope with the social revolution.[33] Whether the decline of liberalism is as complete as Lowi leads us to believe it is, the combination of the decline and the social revolution could well affect the military ethos which constantly stresses obedience and the requirement of standards noted by Lowi. As an authority-oriented institution, the military could be adversely affected by both the declining legitimacy of authority in American society and society's declining interest in socializing its youth into at least some acceptance of the need for authority in a balanced relationship of rights and authority.

A natural result of a crisis of authority compounded by the United States involvement in unpopular wars produced a rise in anti-militarism among the youth of America. Some of the impacts of this anti-militarism have a bearing on the armed forces of the future. Richard Rosser notes that even those who are pro-military may think twice before joining the military because of certain trends which include the following:[34]

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[32]Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 85.

[33]Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.

[34]Richard Rosser, "American Civil-Military Relations in the 1980's," Naval War College Review 24 (June 1972): 19-20.

> The shift in societal values toward increased individualism, equality, and cultural and educational opportunities.
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> The nature of the commitment and the question of loyalty is in conflict with a profession that demands a degree of commitment, professionalism, sacrifice, and leadership which increasingly diverges from that demanded by other sectors of an advanced democratic society.

What the social revolution of the 1960s has injected into the military ethic is a certain amount of skepticism, which is a healthy check in any democratic society, including the military sector. The cause of the skepticism is most likely the result of societal pressures which forced the military establishment to subject itself to both external and internal examination of how it can adapt itself to the behavioral patterns of a changed civilian society. The military thus stands on the threshold of possibly the greatest pressures in its history to adopt many of the liberal standards of society. While the adoption of selected societal traits may prove to be the most popular course of action for the military to follow, its very standards and purpose for existing may be compromised to the level of rendering the institution functionally ineffective. Once again the solution to the dilemma of the civil-military relationship of the 1970s lies somewhere in between the earlier solution proposed by Huntington and Janowitz. For that matter, while the exact solution has yet to be devised, the parameters remain the same as always: return to traditional professionalism and affect some withdrawal from society, or discard traditional values and embark on a course that may severely impair or negate cohesiveness and discipline.

One of the final products of skepticism was the effort made by the military to "humanize" itself in view of the criticism leveled against it by both the opponents to the Vietnam War and the protagonists of the rising ethos of societal self-consciousness. All services, have taken some steps to eliminate regulations that the services believed were either demeaning or irrelevant to combat effectiveness and troop morale. Many of the better known innovations consist in allowing new modes of dress and personal appearance, allowing beer in the barracks, installing "hot lines" for complaints, and posting recruiting ads that are directed to appeal to the recruits, such as "Today's Army Wants to Join You." Without becoming semantically involved, these innovations are directed to making the services more "human," but they do little or seemingly little to negate the conservative military tenets of obedience and duty. Thus with the appearance of these innovations, it appeared that the military establishment was going "mod" and becoming liberated. Some believed that the tenets of the 1960's era--permissiveness, dissent, self--were now part of the "liberal" military ethic. Liberalization was confused with humanization. Much of the literature decrying the demise of the military institution confused these two ideas. In the wake of the humanizing effort there was dissent which indicated that well-known persons were confused over the difference. Admiral James Calvert, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, 1968-72, believed in the humanizing changes but did not want the academy to adopt in a wholesale fashion the ideas outside the academy's world. Admiral John

Hyland, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, 1967-70, questioned how far can the system permit absolute freedom of dress, speech, and still maintain discipline. S. L. A. Marshall, a noted army historian, contended that if the army continued to take a relaxed route, it would rapidly approach, if it had not already, the reduction of discipline to the danger point.[35] Many of the humanistic changes which the military made as a result of the 1960s and the Vietnam War raise the question whether allowing beer to be consumed in the barracks is different from allowing beer in the foxholes or at the front lines where military effectiveness is truly measured. Until the "humanizing" efforts of the services are placed in their proper perspective and not equated with liberal tenets that would question such basic concepts as military obedience and loyalty, the military establishment will be constantly plagued with misconceptions about the trend of the changes.

While skepticism produced humanizing factors within the military establishment, the impact of the Vietnam War in concert with the movement of the 1960s introduced the element of dissent into the armed forces in the form of soldiers refusing to go into combat, military personnel passing out anti-war literature, recruits refusing to go overseas, military men deserting to foreign countries, and the practice of articulating one's dissent in the war zone by "fragging" those in command or refusing to go on combat missions.

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[35]"Humanizing the U. S. Military," _Time_, 21 December 1970, p. 22.

What has compounded the problem of humanizing the military is the process by which the military tends to adopt societal norms in a selective manner and not knowing in many cases whether the selective process will detract from the combat effectiveness of the military. Once the liberal elements of dissent and permissiveness are confused with the humanizing elements of treating the individual other than as a statistic, the fighting effectiveness of the armed forces may be impaired. What must be examined and resolved is what is considered discipline. Adam Yarmolinsky does not believe discipline encompasses the military salute or the white glove inspection, but rather whether it produces an awareness of the rules of engagement.[36] The military should review the demands of discipline which center around appearance, cleanliness, respect for tradition, and rank. Often these requirements conflict with constitutional rights. First amendment freedoms may be abridged when servicemen are prohibited from attending off-duty political rallies. When an enlisted man is forced by a superior's order to settle a financial debt, the serviceman may be denied his individual freedom on a matter that has little if any military interest. Here, as in the case of the military confusing humanization and liberalization, the military must further distinguish between what is and is not important to discipline. Discipline must always be a means toward combat efficiency and morale. It must never be used as an end in itself.

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[36] Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society, abr. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973), pp. 360-61.

The Vietnam era as well as the era following it have been the subject of both studies and pronouncements, but there is little consensus about the future civil-military equation. Thus to predict what it will be, one must extrapolate such a relationship from the profile of the military establishment as of the early 1970s. One indication of future civil-military relations was the idea voiced by President Nixon in his statement on the foreign policy for the 1970s. His central theme was a more complete explanation of his Guam doctrine of 1969:

> The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but . . . America can not and will not conceive all plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.[37]

In the same document there was no indication that strategic planning for the 1970s would decrease military spending or the importance of the military establishment. Thus while attempting to strike a parity with Russia on weapons control, the country would not be allowed to fall prey to weakness. Preparations must be made for the unannounced and unsuspected as well as for the possible battles of the future.[38]

Such statements possibly portend a major shift in United States military doctrine. Samuel Huntington supports the need for re-examination of American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era because, as he notes, the strategy of deterrence adopted as a counterpart to the foreign policy of containment

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[37]Richard M. Nixon, U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 6.

[38]Ibid., pp. 111-30.

after World War II is in need of revision due to the decrease of public support for military burdens and an achievement of parity by the major powers.[39] Foreign policy pronouncements do reflect the mood of the country and elicit responses, particularly by institutions such as the military establishment, which is charged with providing the national defense input to national security policy.

One of the first in-depth studies conducted by the military which attempted to look at the 1970s civil-military equation was conducted by the Army War College in 1972 at the request of the Army Chief of Staff. The completed study was appropriately entitled Army Tasks for the Seventies.[40] The officers who composed the study group recognized the spirit of the 1970s by noting that the life style of American society would require basic adjustments within the army. Among the more basic changes suggested were greater personal freedom, additional privacy, and enhanced job satisfaction. It was also noted that growing affluence had changed attitudes toward work and education which necessitated adjustments in training.[41] The army, it suggested, had to understand the society it was pledged to defend in order to maintain its institutional legitimacy. Likewise, the army should

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[39]Samuel P. Huntington, "After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 406 (March 1973): 1.

[40]U. S., Department of the Army, Army War College, Army Tasks for the Seventies (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U. S. Army War College, [1972]).

[41]Ibid., p. 31.

not question societal values because the army qua army is amoral and is only concerned with being an instrument of governmental policy. To allow otherwise would allow the army to become an instrument of its leaders and not of the nation. The group noted, in conclusion, that the professional army of the 1970s must mold itself to fit the world as it will be and must remain relative to the norms of the time.[42] While the group more than likely was aware of the dominance of "self" as a prime motif of the 1960's social revolution, the study did not distinguish between humane and liberal factors as they pertain to the military. As a result of this, one is led to believe that the army--and the entire military establishment--should adopt to the ethos of the time. What elements of this ethos they should adopt and still maintain their viability were not made specific in this study. This is basically the problem that perplexes the military establishment of the 1970s. Without attempting to be critical of the study, it is evident that the group did not consider their recommendations in light of the historical differences between the societies that limits the degree of accommodation. This problem is recognized by academic as well as by military writers. Adam Yarmolinsky states that

> Military training and discipline clash with the democratic and egalitarian values of civilian society at many points. The military's group-oriented value system based on rank consciousness, unit loyalty, desire for combat, unquestioning patriotism, and instant response to command runs counter to the egalitarian, individualistic, inquiring humanistic ideals of American civil society.[43]

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[42]Ibid., p. 131.

[43]Yarmolinsky, Military Establishment, p. 398.

One facet of the Army War College study considered in a positive manner what should be the role of the army in the 1970s, assuming that it is not involved in a war. The group received 3,900 responses to 4,200 inquiries from a broad sample of the army officer corps, which included eight training schools, two ROTC units, and West Point. The survey asked twelve questions, all of which dealt with the Army tasks for the 1970's. The following is the rank ordering of the replys to the question as to how much should the Army become involved. Rank orderings were also made on how much will the Army become involved, and how important to you is this issue. It is considered that the should reply is a proper indicator of future desires.

Rank Ordering	Question
1	Function as a force capable of performing both as a force in being and as a cadre.
2	Participate directly in the solution of social problems within the Army through programs such as drug abuse rehabilitation centers and race relations programs.
3	Function as a force in being to deal with mid-intensity situations not so obviously critical as to require mobilization.
4	Function as a cadre for skeleton formations designed to be brought up to strength in the event of general or partial mobilization.
5	Provide advisory groups or training assistance to developing countries to assist them in improving their indigenous military capability to deal with local low-intensity warfare.
6	Provide Army forces to man the nation's ABM defenses.
7	Participate directly through use of troops and equipment in the solution of the nation's environmental problems such as pollution control, restoration of land destroyed by strip mining, and reforestation.

8. Provide in-service remedial education for individuals who could not otherwise meet the Army's educational requirements.

9. Provide additional high school ROTC programs.

10. Participate directly by providing assistance in the solution of the nation's law-and-order problems by working directly with local law enforcement agencies in riot control and related matters.

11. Participate directly in the solution of social problems in the civilian community.

12. Participate directly in the solution of the nation's educational problems by direct involvement in existing civilian educational systems.

Note that the respondees ranked as the number 2 priority that the army should participate directly in the solution of social problems within the army through programs such as drug abuse, rehabilitation centers, and race relation programs and that they ranked as number 11 that the army should participate directly in the solution of social problems in the civilian community.[44] In conclusion, the group noted that whereas there may be a balance between using the army as an instrument of both foreign and domestic policy, the latter role should not jeopardize the former. The army was not to engage in any domestic program that could in any way deter or erode combat effectiveness.[45]

The Army study is basically the manifestation of the armed services philosophy of avoiding civilian involvement, except in exceptional humanitarian instances, in such efforts as pollution abatement or civic action for the needy. While seeing the

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[44] Army War College, Army Tasks, Appendix IV-18-20.

[45] Ibid., p. 104.

need of remaining sensitive to societal norms, the services for the most part have resisted being placed in a civic action role because it would not only divert its resources to missions other than that of military security, but it would be exposed to politization which could further confuse its mission. What one may not realize is that the professional soldier is in the last analysis a military commander and not a business manager. Morris Janowitz observed late in the Vietnam War (1971) that although the difference between the military and civilian bureaucracies had narrowed, there are the following limits to civilianization:[46]

> Self-conception and professional ideology are counter-forces to civilianization. The preparation for battle and the actual battle remain a central military value.
>
> With a dependence on nuclear deterrence and the maintenance of a force-in-being, civilianization efforts do have natural limits and boundaries. The incorporation of such weapons into defense policy creates an organizational climate which is military and distinct from non-military institutions.
>
> The influx of civilian behavioral standards can lead to results that could modify considerably the traditions, ceremonies, and rituals of the military.

With the termination of hostilities in Vietnam and the movement away from a conscription based army to the all-volunteer concept, the civilianization trend and the concept of subjective control has been lessened by a general societal disinterest in military forms. Historically, Huntington notes that in the decade following World War I

> it was only slowly that officers were disabused of the illusion [that their views were reflective of the true will of the American people]. By the end of the decade,

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[46]Janowitz, Professional Soldier, pp. xi-xxi.

> however, it had become impossible for them to maintain their identification with the community.[47]

Some of the more obvious manifestations of the post-Vietnam era "inward" turn of the military include the all-volunteer concept, which shifts the basis of recruitment from a broad-based population to a narrower one.[48] Very likely the anti-militaristic ethos which expanded to great proportions in the Vietnam War will subside but will not disappear because society has always looked upon the military with some disdain. If the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the United States detente with Russia and China reach an accord which is satisfactory to all parties, the prospects of continued future peace could well lessen public interest in military forms. Thus the military may again face the social isolation which could well signal the military retreat into a professional enclave and the concomitant development of a new professionalism.

A result of the development of a new professionalism could be a reaffirmation of the historical dichotomy between societal and military values which could negate the "humanizing" gains made by the military during the Vietnam War era. The risk of returning to a period of complete restoration of "pre-humanization" values is noted by Robert Gard, who observes a willingness on behalf of the military to interpret "current reality to find familiar prescriptions appropriate to a different situation which blocks a willingness to meet the challenge of social

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[47]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 287.

[48]PART II discusses the all-volunteer army in more detail.

change."[49] Possibly the best analysis of the problem which challenges the post-Vietnam civil-military reformers is stated by Sam Sarkesian:

> The military is aware of the changing environment in which it must operate, but as yet there does not appear to be an established institutional response to the problems that have emerged. A number of military men have been struggling to reconcile traditional techniques and orientations with the new environment. Some new institutional frameworks have been developed, but in the main there appears to be no agreement as to the most effective way to maintain institutional efficiency while recognizing individuality and responding to a changing domestic political culture. Undoubtedly, guidelines will be established and institutional characteristics will be changed only with individual orientation, but the eventual outcome is not yet clear.[50]

It is possible that the factors which will determine the outcome of the new civil-military relationship were recognized in early American history but which for the most part have been neglected or ignored by those who want to change or adjust the civil-military equation. The liberal factor of individualism has remained philosophically opposed to the conservative military factors of reverence for the group and the past.

In summary, the military establishment in the post-Vietnam era again finds itself in search for a proper equilibrium with society. Any such equilibrium must consist of a respect for the historical difference in the institutional core values. Neglect of these values can only lead to arbitrary and expedient actions which will only continue to waste national resources without coming to grips with the real problem of civil-military relations.

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[49]Robert G. Gard, Jr., "The Military Profession," Naval War College Review 26 (July-August 1973): 14.

[50]Sarkesian, "Political Soldiers," p. 241.

PART II. RECRUITMENT AND SOCIALIZATION

By and large, the American people get the kind of military establishment they deserve.

Adam Yarmolinsky,
The Military Establishment

CHAPTER III

ENLISTED RECRUITMENT AND THE LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE EQUATION

Introduction

Having investigated and established in PART I the existence of different philosophical bases in the civil-military equation, PART II will investigate whether the factors of recruitment and socialization have any effect on the "root" differences that characterize American civil-military relations. The investigation is focused primarily on the post-World War II era but will of necessity include material of past history and events. This is done with the intention of showing that the liberal civil and conservative military dichotomy has basically remained constant throughout United States history. It is the purpose of PART II to indicate the presence of this dichotomy throughout the spectrum of recruitment and socialization

functions rather than to make a thorough historical investigation of each element of recruitment and socialization.

Policies of recruitment and socialization can be interpreted in terms of their effect on the military establishment. The policy of conscription, as operationalized through both universal military training and selective service, while acceptable to the military establishment as a valid way of recruiting enlisted military manpower, has never been generally acceptable to liberal America. Universal military training has never been established in the United States, and selective service has been, of necessity, the product of several wars (Civil, World Wars I and II). Only from 1945 to 1973 was it offered as part of the American governmental system as a way of recruiting military manpower, then it was accepted only because it was considered necessary as a way to maintain adequate military manpower in view of cold war hostilities. With the termination of the selective service system in 1973 and the establishment of the volunteer army concept, a method was finally found that is in consonance with the maintenance of the historical dichotomy between the conservative military establishment and the liberal civil society. The volunteer army concept is obviously in consonance with Samuel Huntington's concept of objective control which encourages the growth of military professionalism. Such a return to military professionalism would re-establish the concept of objective civilian control in which the military would become more a "tool" of society rather than being a "mirror" of society. In the process, the conservative traits of the military establishment

would become more evident as they became more removed from the liberalizing effects of civilian society.

Chapter IV investigates the recruitment of officers into the armed forces through the procurement sources of the military academies, Officer Candidate Schools, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Although the recruitment process is carried on in a liberal environment, the liberalization of the officer's political attitudes has not taken place to the degree one would expect.

Indeed, it is likely that the recruitment methods used to secure both enlisted and officer personnel are integrally subjected to the historical philosophical differences that continue to separate the military establishment from the civilian society and which, to a large extent, dictate any accommodation and thus the resultant equilibrium between the two societies. That accommodation lies somewhere between the integration model of Janowitz and the segregated model of Huntington. Within the factor of recruitment, initial independent observation will serve to illustrate how certain preconceptions about recruitment per se are relevant to the individual factors of enlisted and officer recruitment which are then analyzed in more detail.

Morris Janowitz, writing in The Professional Soldier in 1960, noted that in relation to the change in military technology which brought many civilians into the military sector, the constant flow of civilians into and out of the military is a powerful influence against military traditionalism and the

authoritarian spirit.[1] To Janowitz, such a trend has modified the military profession in that it has democratized the officer and enlisted personnel recruitment base. There is little, if any, evidence to refute the observation noted by Janowitz that in the American military system, skill and not social class has been the base for recruitment.[2] In a similar vein, Janowitz notes that political attitudes among the military officers have become more representative of the larger society because of the changes not only in social composition of the services but of the increased contact between civilian and military personnel. Political beliefs of these officers are a "refraction of civilian society wrought by the recruitment system. . . ."[3]

Against this pattern of seeming homogeneity of civil-military interests is the argument that although the military establishment is a very "open" profession (open in the context of having recruitment based on a broad population base and premised on skill and not social background), this does not produce officers and enlisted men who, though part of society, are going to always reflect the principles of that society. In fact, the services place restraints upon this "open" recruitment by requiring certain minimum standards such as a definite amount of formal education as a prerequisite for induction into the armed forces.

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[1]Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 32.

[2]Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 117-19.

[3]Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 234.

Concomitant with such prerequisites is the possibility that the military way of life may appeal to a prospective member and thus one's "self-selection" into the armed forces could bear more relevance in the determination of attitudes than would the impact of the institution whose duty it is to socialize prospective members.[4] As William Lucas notes, before any officer puts on a uniform, he already has implanted within him the values of the society from which he is drawn.

> Popular American attitudes toward the armed forces are both an element in the formation of the attitudes of individual military men, and the environment in which the military community must operate.[5]

There is no reason to believe that the same would not hold true for enlisted servicemen. Supplementing the formation of this attitude is the concept that the intellectual heritage of the United States is basically in favor of the citizen-soldier and against a standing army and military professionals. This is basically the product of the liberal concept of the military establishment, which includes a general distrust of the professional soldier and a belief in the positive, crusading nature of the military in time of war followed by its decline after peace is achieved.

These observations are part of the inquiry into the factor of recruitment and thus provide pertinent parameters within which

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[4]Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 223.

[5]William Ashley Lucas, II, "The American Lieutenant: An Empirical Investigation of Normative Theories of Civil-Military Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1966), p. 34.

proper research can be made of the recruitment function. The argument by Janowitz is in agreement with his concept of a military closely integrated with society in a type of constabulary force.[6] The arguments by both Yarmolinsky and Lucas on the other hand are in consonance with Huntington's concept of a military establishment that does not "mirror" society and is the product of objective control.[7] In this situation, the military establishment becomes a highly refined professional force that functions as a "tool" of society. The accommodation established between the civilian and military sectors of society determines whether the military will more likely "mirror" or be a "tool" of the civilian society.

Conscription

Conscription is the process whereby members of a political entity or other population are selected and compulsorily inducted into the enlisted ranks of an armed force organization.

Within the United States there are two major types of conscription--universal military training and selective service. Each will be investigated in the context of its effect on the civil-military equation.

Universal Military Training

Universal military training (hereafter referred to as UMT) is the process whereby the males of a civilian population,

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[6]For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 67-68 above.

[7]For a detailed discussion of this matter see p. 67 above.

upon reaching a certain age--usually eighteen--are compelled to undergo a period of military training of perhaps from four to twelve months. Following this training, the trainee is placed in the military reserve force for a period of time, from six to seven years, and is required to attend periodic training sessions. Of the fifty-four foreign nations which had military organizations in 1947, only two countries, Switzerland and the Union of South Africa, had compulsory military service in that both nations utilized a militia system based on universal military training. It would be similar to what George Washington would have called a "well-organized militia." Of the remaining fifty-two countries, forty-six had compulsory military service in the form of a selective service system and six countries utilized an all-volunteer concept.

In the United States, however, although there have been three major periods when UMT has been a national issue (colonial times and preceding and during World Wars I and II), there has never been a tradition of UMT. In periods of war, the nation has traditionally relied upon the use of volunteers, supplemented, on occasion, by a selective service method for providing additional needed manpower. A system of UMT by its very nature has seemed antithetical to the American liberal tradition, which calls for the expenditure of sufficient national resources in wartime to ensure victory as rapidly as possible and once victory is achieved, military demobilization and utilization of the same resources for programs providing for the relief of man's social, political, and economic problems. To liberals, while wartime

conditions may demand that a nation resort to the mobilization of its manpower for military service through a conscription system, peacetime conditions call for total reliance on volunteers to man the ranks of the armed forces. Liberals singly reject the idea that all male citizens have an obligation to serve in the armed forces. Conservatives recognize the need to maintain a level of military readiness, either by maintaining a large standing army or by training a large reserve force.

A number of critics of UMT have emerged from the civilian sector of society, more specifically, from labor, farm, education, and religious organizations, many of which are more liberal than conservative. Several of these more well known organizations are as follows: labor--National Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, International Association of Machinists, American Federation of Labor--Congress for Industrial Organizations; farm--National Grange, National Farmers' Union, American Farm Bureau; education--American Association of University Professors, National Education Association, American Council on Education; religion--Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, denominational church bodies, including Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregational, Friends, and Latter Day Saints. Two other organizations of national importance opposing UMT have been the Womens Christian Temperance Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Liberals customarily voice the following complaints about the idea of UMT: the existence of UMT in peacetime not only can lead a nation into a false sense of security about itself but may prompt a nation

into being militaristic and thus prone to becoming involved in war; UMT is basically un-democratic;[8] the costs of maintaining a UMT system would be prohibitive; UMT is contrary to the traditional American "minuteman" concept; UMT will result in a predominance of the military in government, whose growing influence would affect the social structure of the country; discipline, which is thrust upon the American youth in a military institution, is antithetical to the self-disciplinary ethos of liberalism; the concept of utilizing the military establishment to educate youth in matters other than those of direct military interest is contrary to the American educational system; UMT is inconsistent with membership in international peace keeping organizations such as the United Nations; the total destruction now available through nuclear warfare makes mass armies trained under UMT unnecessary.

What advocates there have been of UMT have been from the military complex itself, veterans' associations, federal administrative officials connected with security or defense matters, and big business associations. More specifically, these have included the following: veterans--Disabled American Veterans, American Legion, National Guard Association, Veterans of Foreign Wars; big business--National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce. Conservative proponents of UMT counter with the following arguments: preparedness, not

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[8]Most critics, in this case, are prone to confuse the concept of democracy with liberalism. It would definitely be democratic in that <u>all</u> would serve; it would be anti-liberal in that UMT prefers a <u>group</u> over an individual ethos.

unpreparedenss, is the best defense against war; bringing the young males of America together for a specified period of training will not only have military benefits but will benefit youth in such non-military areas as morality, health, and character building; having the young male population spend a period of time in military training will not lead to a militaristic state, anymore than having millions of soldiers under arms in World War II led to militarism; because a large standing army is both expensive to maintain and unacceptable to many Americans, a large reserve force established through UMT is vital to military preparedness.

Of the two opposing arguments herein developed, neither has squarely addressed itself to the responsibility of the American citizen to the state. Under the liberal tradition, the state is the servant and not the master of the people. Whether this concept has led liberals to preclude the institutionalization of UMT in the American system is difficult to determine. One of the main considerations given to the institution of UMT should be the realization that its passage into law would make it a permanent feature of American life, and thus that it would affect every group and every individual life. But the complete thrust of this philosophical change has seldom been considered. In the final analysis, the liberal ethos of the American political system has somehow influenced any debate over whether to install a UMT system as part of the American governmental system. An examination of the three major periods of American history will confirm that UMT has not affected the "root" differences in

civil-military relations because it has been adverse to the liberal tradition and thus never adopted.

The first colonists coming to America in the seventeenth century maintained within each colony military forces for the purpose of providing home defense.[9] There were at least 777 provisions in the acts of the thirteen colonies that required military training or service of the male colonists.[10]

> Compulsory acts were passed in emergency [emergencies], similar acts [were] passed in peacetime to be put into effect in wartime, and acts requiring military training in peacetime when hostilities threatened and when hostilities did not threaten [were also passed].[11]

What in fact evolved from the need to provide for a home defense was what has commonly been called the common militia to which men were compelled to join by their colonial governments. The belief was commonly held that service to their colonies was an "essential unquestioned incident of their citizenship."[12] Service included irregular drills, two to six training days per year, and muster drills where the citizen was inspected for his fitness for duty. According to historian Herbert Osgood, the Puritan ethic encouraged the maintenance of the common militia because the "Puritan belonged to the militant type of humanity, and considered the defense of his inheritance, by force of arms

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[9] "Voluntary and Compulsory Military Service in England and America," Congressional Digest 20 (August-September 1941): 194.

[10] Selective Service System, Military Obligation: The American Tradition, comp. Arthur Vollmer, Special Monograph no. 1, vol. II, part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 15.

[11] Ibid., p. 4.

[12] Ibid., p. 10.

if necessary, as nothing less than a religious duty."[13] The Puritan ethic also posited the belief that material success was a sign of divine favor. Warfare which would impede this progress was thus anathema. The Puritans, while believing in a modicum of effort at colonial self-defense, had fled from the persecutions of the Old World and were loath to import military forms into America.[14]

The colonist's participation in any militia activity was limited by the fact that the maintenance of even the most modest livelihood demanded most of the colonist's time and effort. Under these circumstances the colonists had little option other than to organize a crude stand-by militia force for basic self-protection and survival. Within this context it may be a misconception to consider the colonial period of military self-protection as the genesis of an American tradition of an implied military obligation. Colonial history has confirmed the fact that where military training periods interfered with making a living, the training was simply reduced or omitted. Farmers who lived a great distance from the training camps of their companies were excused from attending drills. Training periods were limited to six days per year in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and the other colonies had much the same limitations.[15]

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[13]Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, vol. 1: The Chartered Colonies. Beginnings of Self Government (New York: Macmillan Company, 1904), p. 497.

[14]For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 13-14 above.

[15]Osgood, The Chartered Colonies, pp. 498-503.

In view of these requirements, the small portion of one's life dedicated to military duties, which were designed for one's own self-protection, does not support the claim that the colonial period generated acceptance or use of an obligatory military tradition to defend even their own immediate domiciliary area, to say nothing of going outside it.

Thus the existence of a loosely organized militia in colonial times for the purpose of self-defense did not *ipso facto* provide the basis for a tradition of obligatory military service. It is through the anti-militaristic attitude spawned by the Puritans and articulated in the Declaration of Independence that one can comprehend the strength of the liberal tradition in America. There was no legacy which justified military forms beyond those needed for immediate self-defense measures. Even under the Articles of Confederation protection to colonists was exercised under the concept of voluntary cooperation and in the extreme the use of the state militia.

This could account for the fact that traditional American involvement in war comes only after the nation is attacked or given no other option by the warring power. This could also account for the fact that America fights this year's wars with the last war's weapons, the implication being that once the war is over, peace again becomes the focal point for all national efforts. Both are basic liberal tenets.

The apparent anti-conscription ethos which was part of the colonist's life style did not however, deter future efforts by the advocates of UMT to establish UMT as part of the American

military establishment. An early post-Revolution statement on military service was made by George Washington in 1783. His proposal was later made part of the Knox Plan of 1790.

> It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it, and consequently that the Citizens of America (with a few legal and official exemptions) from 18 to 50 years of Age should be borne on the Militia Rolls. . . .[16]

Although the Knox Plan provided only for compulsory summer military training over a three year period, the Militia Act passed by Congress in 1792 provided no such compulsory service, but merely stated that male citizens between eighteen and forty-five shall be enrolled in the militia.[17] Liberals could take comfort in the fact that Congress viewed military duty in a non-conscriptive, individualistic terms. As Emory Upton noted,

> during the Revolution the Government shifted upon the States the responsibility of providing men, arms, and even the daily supplies for the troops; but under the provisions of this law [Militia Act of 1792], both Government and States went one step further, and shifted upon individual citizens the responsibility of providing their own arms, horses, and equipment. No penalty was enacted for a failure to procure such supplies, Congress having no power to enforce it, and the States were therefore left to apply such penalties by way of fines as their legislatures might see fit to impose. Even had the citizen been willing to furnish at his own cost that which it was the unmistakeable duty of the Government to provide, the further execution of the law depended wholly on the voluntary and concurrent

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[16]George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-44), 26 (1938): 389. For a more detailed discussion of the Knox Plan of 1790 and the Militia Act of 1792 see pp. 34-35 above.

[17]Militia Act, Statutes at Large 1, 271-74 (1792).

> action of the States, without which a uniform solution throughout the United States would be impossible.[18]

Although the Congress at this time was more than likely aware of the past military legislation of the colonies, there was little reference made to it during the debate on the Militia Act. Two plausible explanations for this omission could be that the legislators focused their attention more on the provisions of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution under which they were formed rather than on the history of colonial legislation. The Revolutionary War and the Constitutional convention were fresh in the memories of those who possibly had misgivings as to the constitutionality of something like a UMT system.

Even though the Presidential pronouncements of both Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson fall outside the period of colonial history, it is important to understand that these liberal Presidents both advocated the enrollment of youthful males in some sort of a UMT program. It would appear from the following message of President Jefferson that he was interested in having all males required to serve in the militia. In his annual message to Congress on 3 December 1805, he said,

> In the meantime you will consider whether it would not be expedient, for a state of peace as well as of war, so to organize or class the militia, as would enable us on a sudden emergency, to call for the services of the younger portions, unencumbered with the old and those having families. Upwards of three hundred thousand able bodied men, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six years, which the last census shews [sic] we may now count

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[18] Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, 4th impression (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 85.

> within our limits, will furnish a competent number for offense or defense, in any point where they may be wanted, and will give time for raising regular forces after the necessity of them shall become certain, and the reducing to the early period of life all its active service, cannot but be desirable to our younger citizens of the present as well as future times, inasmuch as it engages to them in more advanced age a quiet and undisturbed repose in the bosom of their families. I cannot then but earnestly recommend to your early consideration the expediency of so modifying our militia system as, by a separation of the more active part from that which is less so we may draw from it, when necessary, an efficient corps fit for real and active service, and to be called to it in regular rotation.[19]

President Jackson was not as specific as Jefferson on the necessity for the citizen-soldier, but he still advocated to a lesser degree the need for a popular militia.[20] In his annual message to Congress on 7 December 1835, Jackson stated his views.

> A large standing military force is not consonant to the spirit of our institutions. . . . That just medium which avoids an inadequate preparation on one hand and the danger and expense of a large force on the other is what our constituents have a right to expect from their Government. This object can be attained only by the maintenance of a small military force. . . . A classification of the population offers the most obvious means of effecting this organization. Such a division may be made as will be just to all by transferring each at a proper period of life from one class to another and by calling first for the services of that class, whether for instruction or action. . . .[21]

None of the attempts made by Jefferson and Jackson to have UMT

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[19]Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, comp. and ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 10 vols. (New York: Knickerbocker Press of G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-99), 8 (1897): 392.

[20]For a detailed discussion of Jackson's views on the military ethic see pp. 46-47 above.

[21]James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 10 vols. (Washington: n.p., 1896-99), 3 (1897): 170.

institutionalized as part of the governmental system were successful. It was not until the World War I era that UMT again became a national issue.

In the summer of 1913 the army commenced a movement designed to encourage UMT legislation by establishing volunteer citizen training camps in Plattsburg, N. Y. By the summer of 1915, attendance had reached 12,000, most of the trainees being either professional men or businessmen. Walter Millis notes that these camps were not practical schools for teaching the rudiments of warfare, but were "seminaries whence propagandists for preparedness might be distributed through the civil population."[22] The "Plattsburg Movement," as it was called, did not of itself succeed in establishing UMT, but it did encourage future congressional attempts to pass legislation on the subject.

In his annual message to Congress on 8 December 1914, President Woodrow Wilson, while confirming the liberal tenet of a volunteer military service, advocated such training as good for discipline and the physical development of its participants. Such a conviction, if placed in practice, would have extended military training into an area that was basically anti-liberal because it infringed upon the rights of the individual in non-military matters. Wilson reaffirmed the principle of not having a large standing army by noting, "we shall not turn America into a military camp. We will not ask our young men to spend the

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[22] Walter Millis, Road to War: America 1914-1917 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), p. 95.

best years of their lives making soldiers of themselves."[23] In true liberal fashion, Wilson then stated that the American policy would be to provide

> a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline which our young men will learn to value. It is a right that we should provide it not only, but that we should make it as attractive as possible, and so induce our young men to undergo it at such times as they can command a little freedom and can seek the physical development they need, for mere health's sake, if for nothing else.[24] (Italics mine.)

In December, 1915, Senator George Chamberlain (D-Ore.) introduced S. 1695 which provided for the military and naval training of the citizen forces of the United States. Contained in the bill was a provision that all males between the ages of twelve and twenty-three were liable for training. Congress was obviously not in the mood to accept any form of conscription, and the bill was never favorably reported to the Senate by the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Another abortive attempt to establish UMT was contained in the National Defense Act of 1916, Section 54 of which authorized the Secretary of War to maintain training camps for the

> military instruction and training of such citizens as may be selected for such instruction and training, upon their application and under such terms of enlistment and

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[23] U. S., Congress, Senate, Annual Address of the President of the United States to Congress, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess., 8 December 1914, Congressional Record 52: 20.

[24] Ibid.

> regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.[25]

Citizens were never selected to attend the training camps.

The last attempt in the World War I era to settle the issue of whether or not to establish UMT was made in the immediate postwar period of 1919-20. No less than eight bills were introduced in both the 65th and 66th Congresses that called for the establishment of UMT.[26] Although the bills varied in respect to their mandatory training periods from between three and twelve months, the essential issue remained the same--should military training be made compulsory in peacetime? The question was hotly debated along the lines similar to those debated in the era of Washington, Jefferson, and Jackson. Again the proponents called UMT democratic, it constituting the equivalent to a citizen army. Again the critics called UMT un-democratic, un-American, wholly unnecessary in peacetime, and charged that it could not but result in making militarism a way of life in the United States. The final debate over UMT began on 5 April 1920 and centered around Section 51 of the proposed Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916, which called for all male citizens between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to be

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[25] National Defense Act, Statutes at Large 39, sec. 54, 194 (1916).

[26] S. 5485 introduced by Senator Harry New (R-Ind.), 31 January 1919; S. 2691-H.R. 8068 introduced by Senator George Chamberlain (D-Ore.) and Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.), 31 July 1919; S. 2715-H.R. 8287 introduced by Senator James Wadsworth, Jr. (R-N.Y.) and Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.), 5 August 1919; S. 3423 introduced by Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.), 13 November 1919; S. 3792 introduced by Senator James Wadsworth, Jr. (R-N.Y.), 28 January 1920; H.R. 12775 introduced by Representative Julius Kahn (R-Cal.), 26 February 1920.

inducted into the army or navy for four months training. Senator William Kirby (D-Ark.), who led the debate against UMT, moved to strike out the provision.[27] In order to move the debate to a vote, Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.), who was an avid proponent of UMT, moved on 8 April 1920 to amend the bill to provide that the training be voluntary instead of compulsory.[28] On 9 April 1920 by a vote of 46 to 9 with 41 not voting, the Frelinghuysen amendment was passed.[29] The Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 (referred to as the National Defense Act of 1920), which were approved on 4 June 1920, did not change any of the basic provisions of the 1916 act in reference to voluntary military training.[30]

Universal military training had for the first time in the era of modern warfare been considered and rejected. Even though its proposal followed closely the most widely spread war known to man up to that date, the fact that it was again peacetime and the era of "normalcy" had returned could have led to its defeat. In a post-mortem of the UMT defeat in 1920 former Senator and then Representative James Wadsworth (R-N.Y.), who had himself

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[27] U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Kirby speaking for the Army Reorganization Bill, S. 3792, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 8 April 1920, Congressional Record 59: 5318.

[28] U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Frelinghuysen speaking for the Army Reorganization Bill, S. 3792, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 8 April 1920, Congressional Record 59: 5329.

[29] U. S., Congress, Senate, Vote on Senator Frelinghuysen's amendment to the Army Reorganization Bill, S. 3792, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 9 April 1920, Congressional Record 59: 5402.

[30] Amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916, Statutes at Large 41, sec. 55, 780 (1920).

proposed two bills in favor of UMT, S. 2715 in 1919 and S. 3792 in 1920, testified in 1945 about the political atmosphere surrounding the legislation in 1919 and 1920. As Wadsworth reflected,

> it was a Presidential year, 1920. . . . The political leaders of both parties in the Congress of that day came to me and came to my colleagues of both parties on the Military Affairs Committee [Senator Wadsworth was then the Chairman] and stated that if we dared propose such a thing to the Senate, it would be kicked around as a political football by both parties and would be so discredited that it would not have a chance of adoption by either the Senate or the House. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, we were subdued primarily from political considerations, not as a result of innermost convictions, and the proposal was dropped.[31]

But it is equally likely that the vote on 9 April 1920 resulted from the ideological commitment of the United States to what by then had become traditional civil-military policy. Liberals had not yet been confronted with the imperative of having to provide for a nation secure from foreign threat. Once again the United States in 1920, as it had in all previous postwar eras, did not turn to peacetime conscription as a way to replace the large standing army. Within the liberal ethic of total war or total peace, the nation once again disarmed the military establishment. From a manpower level which had numbered 199,573 in 1916, it had risen to 4,791,172 by 11 November 1918, and by 30 June 1922 had again been reduced to 257,623.

After the World War I era, the nation again followed its historical philosophy of maintaining a conservative military

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[31] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Universal Military Training, Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 515. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, pp. 152-53.

enclave manned by volunteers from the liberal civilian society. From 1922 to 1939, the nation maintained an armed force of between 225,000 and 300,000 personnel, and the issue of UMT was seldom, if ever, discussed either in or out of government circles.

It was during World War II that the UMT issue again became a national topic of debate, only this time the magnitude of the war effort and the prognosis of the postwar era indicated that the United States might have to maintain a larger military force than it had heretofore been accustomed to in peacetime. Thus for the first time in United States civil-military history, liberals were to be confronted with the task of not only attempting to maintain a peacetime liberal ethic but of trying to operationalize the fact that the nation now had a security function to perform. Despite the massive effort by the advocates of UMT, who for the first time used the argument that the system was necessary for national security reasons, the congressional hearings that extended sporadically from 1945 to 1948 over whether to institute UMT ended in defeat for UMT. Instead, the nation turned to a selective service system for supplying military manpower in peacetime.

Universal military training received support from such persons of power as Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Marshall, in a War Department circular dated 25 August 1944, told his staff to

> assume for purposes of planning, that the Congress will enact legislation (as an essential foundation of an

> effective national military organization), that every able-bodied young American shall be trained to defend his country. . . .[32]

President Roosevelt in his State of the Union message to a joint session of Congress on 6 January 1945 noted, "I am clear in my own mind that as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace in the future, we must have universal military training after the war. . . ."[33]

In June, 1945, even before the cessation of hostilities in August, Congress had commenced its first of what were to be eventually five hearings on the basic issue of UMT--should the United States adopt as a matter of broad policy a system of universal training in the postwar period? The last of the hearings was conducted prior to the passage of the Selective Service Act on 24 June 1948. In addition to these hearings, a Presidential Advisory Commission on Universal Military Training submitted a report to President Truman on 29 May 1947 urging the adoption of universal training, and on at least two separate occasions later, President Truman spoke in favor of universal training. It is of interest to note that for the first time in the legislative history of compulsory training the concept of UMT was being made a part of a larger concept called universal training. It is possibly upon this very point that universal training and with

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[32]George C. Marshall, War Department Circular No. 347 of 25 August 1944 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 4.

[33]U. S., Congress, House, State of the Union message from the President of the United States, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 6 January 1945, Congressional Record 91: 95-96.

it UMT was eventually defeated in 1948. President Truman in his Memoirs noted that on 22 October 1945 he sent to the Congress his recommendations on one aspect of a program on national military security. This was a universal training plan for peacetime. What it was not may be extremely important.

> This was not a military training program in the conventional sense. The military phase was incidental to what I had in mind. While the training was to offer every qualified young man a chance to perfect himself for the service of his country in some military capacity, I envisioned a program that would at the same time provide ample opportunity for self-improvement. Part of the training was calculated to develop skills that could be used in civilian life, to raise the physical standards of the nation's manpower, to lower the literacy rate, to develop citizenship responsibilities, and to foster the moral and spiritual welfare of our young people.[34] (Italics mine.)

What President Truman's universal training plan proposed was obviously an indoctrination and training in matters of both military and non-military value. The fact that the government was to become involved in promoting certain non-military interests may have given the critics of UMT just cause to widen the parameters of their criticism to include the government's intervention into the spiritual and moral lives of every eligible male trainee.

In addition to the new criticism, critics again made complaints that were similar to those voiced many times before by every generation of Americans. But unlike all past postwar situations, the critics encountered an entirely new problem of how to counter the UMT argument now that the new world wide

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[34] Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1: Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 511.

commitments and internationalism of the United States are in fact a reality necessitated in part by the cold war atmosphere. This imperative of national security prompted the protagonists of UMT to claim that an adequate military force had to be maintained in order to fulfill United States commitments. To the proponents of UMT, postwar political conditions were more favorable than ever before in United States history for the adoption of a universal training system. Opposed to this was the view that any such drastic change to the political system and heritage had to be viewed with great concern. The adoption of any universal training program would affect the very fabric of traditional American culture. Furthermore, the effects, while not immediately visible would in the course of generations, "become cumulative even if they have grown imperceptibly."[35] To the protagonist of UMT, the thrust of postwar military policy, considering the world situation, could be countered by either a large standing army which would not be in accord with American tradition or by the maintenance of an adequate reservoir of reserves through a universal training program. The lay public was not given any other options. It appeared that the proponents of UMT would at last be successful in having the training made part of the American governmental system.

Thus with the beginning of a new era in national defense, the "battle lines" were again drawn between the critics and the

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[35]Halford L. Hoskins, "Universal Military Training and American Foreign Policy," _Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_ 241 (September 1945): 61.

proponents of universal training or, to put it another way, between liberal and conservative views.

From the very first congressional hearing held by the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy on Universal Military Training from 4-19 June 1945 to the last one held by the Senate Armed Services Committee in March-April 1948, groups that have been previously mentioned either criticized or supported the UMT concept.[36] The issue again, as before, was over whether the United States should adopt peacetime conscription by a universal training system. In thousands of pages of testimony conducted over a three year period, the common factor that prevailed was that neither group changed its position nor did their arguments vary from those they had previously put forth.

The House Select Committee recommended[37] that, based on the future needs of national security, Congress should adopt a system of UMT which should only provide training and not require any military service.[38] In November-December, 1945 the House Military Affairs Committee conducted hearings on H.R. 515,[39] which proposed that military and naval training be provided to all male citizens who had attained the age of eighteen years.

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[36]For a listing of these groups see pp. 107-08 above.

[37]U. S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, Universal Military Training, Hearings before the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy on H. Res. 465. 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945.

[38]U. S., Congress, House, Report of the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, H.R. Doc. 857, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, pp. 2-3.

[39]U. S., Congress, House, Hearings on H.R. 515. 1945.

Although the hearings produced favorable support for UMT legislation, no action was taken on any recommendation for UMT, and the 79th Congress (3 January 1945 - 2 August 1946) was unable to produce any UMT legislation. The 80th Congress (3 January 1947 - 31 December 1948) held five hearings on UMT matters. Two of these hearings were devoted to investigating the War Department's publicity and propaganda campaign in relation to UMT. The hearings inquired into the criticism that certain civilian groups made over the funds being spent by the Army in publicizing its views in support of UMT.[40] The House Armed Services Committee held hearings on UMT in June, 1947,[41] and though the mood of the committee seemingly favored UMT, no report was made. In July, 1947 a House Subcommittee on the Armed Services held hearings on H.R. 4121[42] and favorably endorsed a proposal for UMT. No

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[40] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Investigation of War Department Publicity and Propaganda in Relation to Universal Military Training, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Publicity and Propaganda of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947. U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Investigation of War Department Publicity and Propaganda in Relation to Universal Military Training, Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948. The criticism centered around the money spent by the Army in developing its Fort Knox Experimental Unit which was to be the prototype of how the Army would operate UMT. The unit was disbanded once the legislation was defeated in 1948.

[41] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee Hearings on Universal Military Training. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.

[42] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 4121. 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.

action was taken on the recommendations of either committee.

Just prior to the above hearings, the President's Advisory Commission of Universal Training reported. It seemed to base its findings on the presupposition that in the American democratic system there is an obligation of service which can be fulfilled by adopting universal military training. The commission concluded that

> the only basis on which universal training should be accepted, in our opinion, is a demonstration that it is needed to insure our safety in a world in which peace is not yet secure. We are convinced that such training is an essential element in an integrated program of national security. . . .[43]

Evidently President Truman's concept of universal training embraced the commission's idea of a much larger security program whose essential elements included the following: a strong, healthy, educated population; a coordinated intelligence service; scientific research and development; industrial mobilization and stock piling; regular armed forces; and universal training.[44] Universal training was not to be given a priority over the other elements, but conceivably it would give young men training in the traditional aspects of military life, teach them to work as a group, allow them to fulfill an obligation to their country, and fill the depleted ranks of the national guard and the military reserve, all at the same time.[45] One of the major

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[43]President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 2.

[44]Ibid., pp. 19-30.

[45]Ibid., pp. 31-32.

objectives of the program was to integrate into the program, without sacrificing military objectives, the maximum advantages in terms of health, education, character development, and training for citizenship.[46] Citizenship training was to be considered as important as the military training phase.[47]

The commission report, which was favorable to the establishment of UMT, reflected the public's sentiment as expressed in public opinion polls. In March, 1947, 66.5 percent of those questioned by the Gallup Poll favored UMT. The highest percentage registered by Gallup on the same question was 75 percent in November, 1945. The National Opinion Research Center in March, 1946 registered 73 percent in favor of UMT. In the Purdue Poll conducted in February, 1946, among 8,000 high school students in thirteen states, 69 percent favored a UMT program.[48]

By the time that the next hearings were held on UMT in March-April, 1948,[49] the question confronting the Senate Armed Services Committee was whether to establish UMT and concurrently re-establish the selective service system which had expired on 31 March 1947 or have either UMT or selective service. Once again, the sides polarized around historical arguments with the military interest groups favoring UMT and civilian groups

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[46]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[47]Ibid., p. 61.

[48]Ibid., pp. 225-39.

[49]U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948.

favoring its defeat. President Truman, in an address to a joint session of Congress on 17 March 1948, requested among other things prompt enactment of universal training legislation because of the critical situation in Western Europe. The President left no doubt as to his desires. "Universal training is the only feasible means by which the civilian components of our armed forces can be built up to the strength required if we are to be prepared for emergencies."[50] The mat ter which attracted the most attention and consumed most of the time of the 80th Congress involved the overall problem of how to provide manpower for the armed forces. The debate had begun in the first session with a bill introduced on 18 July 1947 by Representative Harry Towe (R-N.J.) and approved eight days later by the House Armed Service Committee. The measure provided for six months of training in the National Security Training Corps for every qualified youth between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. The Towe bill was blocked by the House Rules Committee and was never sent to the House for a vote. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator George Malone (R-Nev.) and was rejected by a voice vote on 9 June 1948. Thus after three years of debate, the move to establish UMT was effectively defeated. What eventually was voted into law and was signed by President Truman on 24 June 1948 was the Selective Service Act of 1948,[51] which provided for

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[50]U. S., Congress, House, Address of the President of the United States, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 17 March 1948, Congressional Record 94: 2997.

[51]Selective Service Act, Statutes at Large 62, 604-44 (1948).

peacetime conscription by use of the selective service system, but it did not provide for any UMT system. Section 1.(c) of the Act stated that

> the Congress further declares that in a free society, the obligation and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve components thereof shall be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just, and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective national economy.[52]

With the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1948, the hopes of the advocates of UMT were thwarted but not ended. The expiration date of selective service under the Act was 1950 and thus during the Korean War a further opportunity was present for change. Instead, new legislation extended the draft until 1951. In 1951, the Universal Military Training and Service Act[53] was passed which further institutionalized the draft by extending it until 1955. One of the provisions of the Act provided for the establishment of a National Security Training Commission, whose purpose was to submit within four months to both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees a plan for a National Security Training Corps which was the operationalization of the concept of UMT. If the plan were to be approved, then the commission would exercise general and continuing supervision over the corps. The commission did not hold public hearings over the merits and drawbacks of a UMT program because it believed that the principle of UMT had already been accepted by Congress in the

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[52]Ibid., p. 605.

[53]Universal Military Training and Service Act, Statutes at Large 65, 75-89 (1951).

Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 and thus there was no further need to entertain any further debate.[54] Likewise, the commission believed that whereas the obligation to bear arms in defense of the country had always been implied, it had by the Act become explicit.[55]

The initial report submitted by the commission to Congress in October, 1951, contained much of the rhetoric which had been used to support UMT in previous congressional hearings. The commission believed that the societal imperative of security could best be provided for through a UMT program. In summarizing its beliefs, the commission stated that UMT provided the country with an in-depth trained military manpower force which could preclude the need for maintaining a large standing army.[56]

Neither this report nor any future reports submitted by the commission produced any congressional legislation that concerned UMT. Possibly the internal conflict between military and societal values hindered the commission's investigation from its outset, but it was not until its 1953 report that such a conflict surfaced in its report. Whether the commission realized it or not, statements made by the commission in regard to its beliefs were historically antithetical to each other. In one instance, the commission seemed to confuse the difference between individual rights and military discipline.

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[54] National Security Training Commission, Universal Military Training: Foundation of Enduring National Strength (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 6.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., p. 68.

> The individual is our highest value. Accordingly, we believe that when the individual submits to military discipline he does so not as a means to the military end, but to help maintain his own and his Nation's liberty.[57]

The trainee would be accorded basic rights and any program for defense must be fully aware of the dignity of the value of individuals.

> At no point do we suggest that the military training be altered. It must be realistic, unvarnished, and well-disciplined. We speak here only of the rights which will not intrude on military discipline. The trainee will be under military discipline 24 hours a day.[58]

The very presence of military discipline at all times and the concept of group solidarity are both antithetical to what the commission proclaimed was its highest value--the individual. No amount of rhetoric can alter the differences between the military and civilian philosophies. Contained within this philosophy are the very seeds of ineffectiveness which plagued the commission's work. Unable to reconcile these basic differences, its charter was drastically altered by the passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, Chapter 8, Section 262(e).[59] The commission was now to report to Congress with respect to the welfare of members of the Ready Reserve Forces undergoing six months active duty for training. In its final report, dated 30 June 1957, the commission concluded that the reserve program was a success and thus, with the concurrence of President Eisenhower that its objectives were

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[57]National Security Training Commission, Twentieth Century Minutemen: A Report to the President on a Reserve Forces Training Program (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 101.

[58]Ibid.

achieved, it was terminating its existence.[60] In retrospect, the commission never accomplished its initial goal of getting congressional approval of a UMT program. This can be credited possibly to the mood of the post-Korean War era, but some credence must be given to the fact that the historical dichotomy between the liberal society and its military establishment must have been a major factor that contributed to the demise of any attempt to establish UMT.

The most recent review of the UMT concept was conducted as part of the investigation on military manpower by the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service in 1967. That commission considered the possible use of UMT as a supplier of manpower for the Vietnam War. There was some support among its members to use it as a method for correcting the fact that from one-half to two-thirds of the eligible population did not experience military service under the selective service system. But when it tested its proposal against its charter to determine the most fair and workable way of providing the nation with military manpower, universal training was rejected because the commission believed that there was no military requirement for it. Even though the present system needed change, the commission concluded that "compulsory service should not be the means for

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[59] Reserve Forces Act, Statutes at Large 69, sec. 262(e), 601-02 (1955).

[60] National Security Training Commission, Final Report to the Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 1, 3.

its correction."[61]

The Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, formed under the chairmanship of retired General Mark Clark to investigate the various sources of available manpower for military use, in a report made to the House Armed Services Committee on 28 February 1967, noted its view on the feasibility of instituting a UMT system as an alternative to the current selective service system. Its opinion was that

> the term 'universal' embodied far-reaching implications that should be faced, and that universal military training envisioned every qualified American male serving actively in the military establishment. The Panel felt that the public would not look with favor on, nor long tolerate maintaining the mammouth training base that universal military training would entail, and that the public would sharply resist maintaining on active duty infinitely more men than were required for all military commitments short of all-out war.[62]

Thus, it appears now as in the past that UMT, as a method for providing military manpower, remains adverse to liberal tenets which have historically precluded its establishment as part of the American governmental system. The adoption of a UMT system, by its very nature, is still seen as affecting the "root" differences between the civilian and military societies and for this reason it has never been accepted as part of the American political system or its resultant liberal society.

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[61]National Advisory Commission on Selective Service, In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When Not All Serve? (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.

[62]Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 28 February 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 17.

While liberal America has never resorted to using UMT as a peacetime measure for maintaining a military force, it has resorted to, on occasion, the utilization of a selective service system, at first to enlist manpower for wars as they arose and since 1945 to provide the needed manpower for a standing military force that has been deemed vital to continuing national security interests. How acceptable is the selective service system to liberal America is the next topic of concern.

Selective Service

Selective service is a process whereby, under law, the manpower needed for the military forces of the United States is selected from the population in accordance with a prescribed plan and inducted into the armed forces. Like universal military training, the concept of selective service is antithetical to the American liberal tradition; but unlike universal military training, it has been normally utilized to raise military manpower for wars since the nineteenth century. In this analysis of selective service, the term conscription will be used interchangeably with the term selective service because of the popular acceptance of either term as meaning basically the same thing. If the reader remembers that selective service is technically a form of conscription, this should present no problem in the analysis of selective service.

From 1940 until 1973, Americans grew up in an era of military selective service. The argument was advanced that selective service was essential to the preservation of the American

system. The thrust of this investigation is to place the concept of selective service in its proper perspective by showing the political history of selective service. If the institution had become acceptable to most Americans, then the endless debate that it has produced at critical junctures in American history would have seemed senseless. In fact the institution of selective service has always provoked debate, most of which has centered around it as antithetical to individualism. One of the first issues to examine in any investigation of selective service is whether or not selective service is part of the American tradition.

In a general overview, one can say that it seems after the fact that in 1814 that the nation would rather have perished than accept selective service; in 1863, with the national survival again at stake, a conscription law was passed, but it was bitterly and violently resisted; again in 1917 and 1940, conscription was instituted but only as a temporary measure and again with stormy opposition. After World War II, it became institutionalized on the grounds of national security, and that institutionalization only ended in 1973. Many of the factors that caused the reluctance to accept selective service while either in the throes of war or on the verge of becoming involved in war have remained historically constant. Protagonists of selective service have for the most part been aligned against the liberal tenets of American society. To the protagonists, selective service is a sine qua non of citizenship. Following on from this are the individual claims that citizen's rights and

duties are inseparable; there is nothing undemocratic about utilizing selective service which in fact "spreads" the responsibility for national defense evenly among the population; defense must be a concern of every citizen, and the military draft is a necessity particularly when the armed forces are unable to obtain volunteers in the quantity needed. The advocates of selective service have only to point to the Civil War and World Wars I and II for proof of their claims. Conscription had to be resorted to in all these wars because no matter how strongly the people may have been imbued with the liberal ideology and the horrors of war, that attitude could not be sustained during war. Even though the South and the North seemed to have sufficient volunteers at the beginning of the Civil War (1861), both had eventually to resort to conscription, the South in 1862 and the North in 1863. Woodrow Wilson's pronouncements on the purpose of World War I, such as "make the world safe for democracy," did not deter the establishment of a selective service system within a month after the United States entered the war. An awareness of past history may have helped President Roosevelt to convince a reluctant Congress to establish a selective service fifteen months before the United States entered World War II.

The anti-conscription forces on the other hand have historically countered with a philosophy of the anti-military ethic of the American political and social system. This is normally manifested in the issue of the individual's obligation to support and defend the state versus his personal freedom. The historical genesis of an anti-militaristic ethos, discussed in

Chapter I, has been closely associated with the history of selective service.[63] The adversaries of conscription claim that conscription, in general, abridges the rights of the citizen, and in more specific terms it has the following faults: it does not teach democracy because in the military, decisions are made in a chain of command situation where people are told what to do and what not to do; conscription overlooks the paramount goals of the citizen's heritage of individual rights and democratic ideals; one of the hallmarks of a citizen's freedom is that he not be subjected to conscription; the claim made by the apologists that the military teaches cooperation is countered by the critics, noting that this cooperation is usually "optionless" or "forced"; the claim that the military builds strong character and good habits is often challenged for its validity; the claim that the military teaches obedience and discipline are countered by questioning whether these are relevant in all respects to civilian life; finally the claim that the military matures people is often questioned by its critics.

Thus the civil-military rivalry spawned by the history of selective service has been the result of the same old conflict between the advocates of a societal imperative of liberalism and the advocates of the imperative of security and victory in war. The dichotomy between the two is not nearly so evident as one may be led to believe, and in the final analysis the liberal concept of maintaining the liberty of the individual has remained

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[63]For a detailed discussion of the historical matters concerning universal military training, see pp. 110-16 above.

constant, only to be changed in times of great wartime crisis where the "crusade" becomes synonomous with liberalism. Liberal acceptance of the duty to render personal military service has been accepted, but only under certain circumstances. Acceptability does not mean desirability, and thus the institution of selective service has been formulated not as an acceptable and desirable way of life but as being necessary in time of war. When selective service has been enacted in the United States, it has normally been under conditions of existing or impending war, and when it was continued after World War II it was claimed as being necessary for national security under the then perceived cold war conditions. Within this context, the tradition of selective service being part of the American ethos is subject to question.

While in both world wars, the United States has seen the necessity of resorting to a selective service principle, in peacetime the right to retain such a system has been vigorously disputed. In essence, the existence of selective service has been based on pragmatics. Likewise, the promptness with which the draft was either terminated or debated after the termination of hostilities in both world wars indicates that it was basically used as a wartime measure and was not accepted as a permanent way of American life. Even with the future of the Union at stake in the Civil War, Northern citizens successfully resisted conscription until it became evident in 1863 that the critical shortage of volunteer manpower made conscription mandatory. Aversion to conscription has been tempered with the involvement of the

United States in external wars, where the pragmatics of the situation have demanded the utilization of a selective service system. The advocates of selective service note that compulsory service is not a departure from traditional American philosophy; it has been tolerated from early colonial times in times of both war and peace. In colonial times, the enemy was the Indian, and later on international confrontations and wars provided the justification.[64] The tenuousness of the position held by the advocates of selective service is the obvious impossibility of equating the conscription of men to fight internal wars with conscripting troops to settle international disputes. A militia formed of local citizens to defend one's property or to restore peace locally is different from an army conscripted to engage in overseas warfare.

Having viewed the arguments both for and against selective service, and keeping in mind the American liberal commitment to individuality and the realization that some mandatory method is needed to raise manpower to fight wars, attention is now directed to the political history of selective service in the United States in an attempt to accentuate the philosophical differences that have characterized its existence and to show that it affects the "root" differences between a liberal society and its conservative military establishment.

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[64]Selective Service System, Military Obligation, pp. 1-3. For a further discussion of colonial statutes which were relevant to compulsory military service see pp. 110-12 above.

Russell Weigley, in his History of the United States Army, noted that

> in general the colonial militias [made up of volunteers and draftees] were not a reliable instrument of offensive war distant from their own firesides. The reasons are evident. Few men came to America to be soldiers. More likely, they came in part to escape soldiering.[65]

The history of the Puritan ethic in the United States would certainly confirm to a large extent the anti-militaristic nature of the colonists, particularly when it came to going beyond defending their own homes and safety. During the course of the Revolutionary War, despite the encouragement of bounties, it was difficult for the states to fill the militia quotas in the continental army. Although a militia draft was authorized by the Congress and by several states, it was a highly distasteful measure and opposed by the majority of eligible draftees. As Arthur Ekirch notes, once the soldier entered the continental army, he was too imbued with "ideas of individual liberty and equalitarian democracy to take kindly to strict military discipline."[66]

Possibly the first reference made in the post-Revolutionary era to the draft was that of George Washington on 2 May 1783 in his "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment." In that statement, Washington considered a large standing army as dangerous, but felt that a few troops are "not only safe, but indispensably necessary."[67] These troops, distributed about the

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[65]Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 12.

[66]Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 15.

[67]Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26 (1938): 375.

colonial frontiers and consisting of four regiments of infantry and one regiment of artillery (a total of 2,631 officers and non-commissioned officers), would be for all intents and purposes considered continental troops who were enlisted for three years from the ranks of eligible male citizens.[68] Washington did not use the word "drafted" and did not argue for national conscription as a means for filling the ranks of the army. In the post-war era, the Continental Congress did little to encourage the maintenance of a continental army and it was not until the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that the issue was again made part of the public debate.

At the Constitutional Convention, no direct reference was made to any type of compulsory national military service. So far as can be implied from James Madison's notes of the convention, it is neither assumed nor implied that the military powers given to Congress really included the authority to force a person into the national army. Madison's comments touched on only several of the military powers given to Congress.[69] Additional analysis was provided by Madison and the other authors of The Federalist. Possibly the first affirmative action taken at the Convention which was relevant to the clause "to raise armies" occurred on 18 August 1787, when Nathanial Gorham of Massachusetts moved that the phrase "and support" be added after the "raise." The

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[68] Ibid., pp. 378-79, 381, 390.

[69] The military powers granted to Congress and defined in the Constitution are found in Article 1, section 8 (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), and (16).

amendment was approved without opposition.[70] After the Convention agreed that the phrase "to provide and maintain a navy" was preferable to the phrase "build and equip fleets," they agreed to use the existing Articles of Confederation phrase, "to make such rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."[71] Likewise, on 18 August, George Mason moved that the Congress be given authority "to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the Militia of the several States reserving to the States the appointment of the Officers."[72] Arguments by Oliver Ellsworth and John Dickinson opposed the idea on the ground that the states should not relinquish their power over the militia. In turn, their arguments were opposed by Pierce Butler and James Madison, both of whom thought the central government should be responsible for the common defense. The argument was resolved in favor of the dual arrangement provided for in Article 1, section 8 (16) of the Constitution. Although the debate on various clauses respecting the militia continued into September, there was little debate on the clauses that would indicate any basis for the implied power to conscript.

After the Convention, in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton (Federalist No. 23) argued that the power of raising armies should be without limitations; that the government, in

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[70]Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, rev. ed., 4 vols. (New York: Yale University Press, 1937), 2: 329.

[71]Ibid., p. 330.

[72]Ibid.

carrying out the task of national defense, should not be tied down with constitutional shackles.[73] Again in Federalist No. 24 Hamilton argued that it would be improper, even in peacetime, to restrain congressional discretion over the military establishment.[74] James Madison in Federalist No. 41 posed the question as to whether it was essential to give "an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE as well as in WAR?" He answered in the affirmative in both instances.[75] Beyond these few statements by those members of the Convention, there is nowhere any discussion of national conscription.

The first militia plan was submitted by Secretary of War Henry Knox to both President Washington and the Congress on 18 January 1790. His intention was to produce the most efficient system of defense compatible with the intent of a free people. The answer was not a standing army which could not in peace "be considered as friendly to the rights of human nature . . . but an energetic national militia is to be regarded as the capital security of a Free Republic."[76] To supply manpower for this militia, Knox proposed

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[73]Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, with an Introduction by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, Inc., Mentor Books, 1961), p. 153.

[74]Ibid., p. 160.

[75]Ibid., pp. 256-57.

[76]U. S., Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 1st Cong., 1789-91, appendix, p. 2143.

> that every man of the proper age and ability of body, is firmly bound by the social compact to perform, personally, his proportion of military duty for the defense of the state . . . all men of the legal military age should be armed, enrolled, and held responsible for different degrees of military service.[77]

On 26 April 1790, the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union was discharged from any further consideration of the Knox Plan.[78] It was not until the War of 1812 that one finds the first instance where the national government attempted to claim authority to enlist, without regard to state boundaries, men to enter a national army. This was a claim that went beyond Knox's concept of "citizen obligation" and was the first time that Congress gave really serious attention to the possibility of conscripting men into the military service.

There was bitter internal opposition to the War of 1812. This opposition was shared by the New England Federalists, who feared that the war would destroy their maritime commerce, and by the Jeffersonian Republicans, who could not forget the traditions of their party. One of the lessons to be learned from the war was that a nation should realize the internal problems generated when the war is not given real support by the populace. When the vote was taken to declare was in June, 1812, the House of Representatives voted 74-49 in favor, with 14 abstaining, and the Senate voted 19-12 in favor. Clearly this did not indicate a mandate for President Madison to pursue the war. Further

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[77]Ibid., p. 2146.

[78]U. S., Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 1st Cong., 2d sess., 1790, p. 1597.

reluctance to back the war was indicated in the difficulty which the government had in recruiting volunteers to fill the depleted ranks of the military. Against this background and with the war at somewhat of a stalemate, Madison called the Thirteenth Congress into its third session on 19 September 1814 to discuss such measures as must "be deemed meet for the welfare of the United States."[79] One such measure was the matter of raising manpower to supplement the military force of 38,000, whose recent accomplishments did not give prospect to new military victories. Adding to the downward turn of events of the war was the fact that Congress had to meet in temporary offices since its usual accommodations had been destroyed when the British destroyed the Capitol on 24-25 August 1814. By 17 October, the Acting Secretary of War, James Monroe, had submitted to Congress what was to be the first reasoned statement on national conscription.[80] Monroe attached explanatory statements which set forth four alternate plans. Plan One--have the free male population of the United States between the ages of eighteen and forty-five formed into classes of one hundred men with each class furnishing so many men. This in essence was direct national conscription. Plan Two--classify the whole militia of the United States and give the President the power to call into service whatever classes,

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[79]U. S., Congress, Proclamation by President Madison calling the Thirteenth Congress into its third session, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., 19 September 1814, Annals 3: 8.

[80]U. S., Congress, A Bill to provide for the further defense of the frontiers of the United States by authorizing the President to augment the present military establishment, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., 27 October 1814, Annals 3: 482-83.

or portions thereof, he considered necessary for periods of not more than two years. Plan Three--exempt from military duty every five men who together could provide one substitute. Plan Four--raise the bounty in land for those volunteering. Monroe recommended adoption of either Plan One or Two and commented on both. Monroe commented that in Plan One, Congress was given power by the Constitution to raise armies and that no restraint should be imposed on the exercise of this power. Continuing, he noted

> the idea that the United States cannot raise a regular army in any other mode than by accepting the voluntary service of individuals, is believed, to be repugnant to the uniform construction of all grants of power. . . .[81]

In commenting on Plan Two, Monroe noted that drafting men from the militia would not be unconstitutional because the

> men are not drawn from the militia, but from the population of the country; when they enlist voluntarily, it is not as militiamen that they act, but as citizens. If they are draughted [sic] it must be in the same sense.[82]

On 22 November 1814, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 19-12, and on 14 December, the House also passed it by a vote of 83-73. The bill in its final form utilized the guidelines of Plan Two in that it authorized the President to call upon the states and territories for their respective quotas of militia to defend the United States against invasion. The differences between Senate and House amendments could not be resolved, and on 15 February 1815 the Committee of the Whole of the House was

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[81]Ibid., p. 486.

[82]Ibid., p. 487.

discharged from any further action on the bill. The last move, in retrospect, was only academic, because on 20 February President Madison announced that the Treaty of Peace and Amity had been signed in Ghent on 24 December 1814.

The introduction of Monroe's plans brought heated debate in both the Senate and the House chambers. For the most part, the debate centered around the issues as articulated by Senators Joseph Varnum of Massachusetts, David Daggett of Connecticut, and Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire. All three senators seem to capture the true feeling of the dissenting minority in the Senate. Varnum noted that "this mode of draughting [sic] men from the militia for two years, I must confess is a novel idea to me, and I do believe it will be so to the nation."[83] The bill utilizes arbitrary principles "never before attempted to be imposed on the militia of this country."[84] Senator Daggett was more precise about the antithetical nature of conscription when he noted that the provisions of the Constitution which called for raising and supporting armies had to employ means consistent with the

> great principles of civil liberty, known to the people of this country, and adopted and deemed sacred in all free Governments. But it is utterly inconsistent with those principles to compel any man to become a soldier for life, during a war, or for any fixed time.[85]

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[83]U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Varnum speaking on the drafting of militiamen, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 November 1814, Annals 3:59.

[84]Ibid., p. 69.

[85]U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Daggett speaking on the drafting of militiamen, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 November 1814, Annals 3: 72.

Senator Mason voiced similar observations in noting that the power to raise armies, unless confined to voluntary enlistment, is without any guard or restrictions and thus the exercise of it must depend wholly on arbitrary discretion. "In my opinion, this system of military conscription . . . is not only inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution, but also with all the principles of civil liberty."[86] Possibly the most articulate and philosophically grounded denouncement of the proposed conscription legislation was made in the House of Representatives by Daniel Webster. His speech manifested the classical liberal complaint against conscription, because the tenor of his address is for civil liberties and the concept of individualism. Quotations from this speech are among the best anti-conscription statements of all time.[87]

> What is there, Sir, that makes it the duty of this people . . . to surrender their most important rights to its discretion?
>
> The administration asserts the right to fill the ranks of the regular Army by Compulsion. . . . Is this, Sir, consistent with the character of a Free Government? Is this civil liberty? Is this the real character of our Constitution? No, Sir, indeed it is not.
>
> Who will show me any constitutional injunction, which makes it the duty of the American people to surrender everything valuable in life, and even life itself, not when the safety of their country and its liberties may demand the sacrifice, but whenever the purpose of an ambitious and mischievous Government may require it? Sir, I almost disdain to go to quotations and references to

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[86]U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Mason speaking on the drafting of militiamen, 13th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 November 1814, Annals 3: 83.

[87]Daniel Webster, The Letters of Daniel Webster, ed. C. H. VanTyne (New York: McClure, Phillips and Company, 1902), pp. 59-68.

> prove that such an abominable doctrine has no foundation in the Constitution of the country.
>
> . . . the power contended for is incompatible with my notion of personal liberty.
>
> In my opinion, Sir, the sentiments of the free population of this country are greatly mistaken here. The nation is not yet in a temper to submit to conscription. The people have too fresh and strong a feeling of civil liberty to be willing thus to surrender it.
>
> If the Administration has found that it can not form an army without conscription, it will find, if it ventures on these experiments, that it can not enforce conscription without an army. The Government was not constituted for such purposes.

It is difficult to expand on Webster's argument, and few liberals since have gone into the philosophical ramifications of the conscription system to the extent that Webster did. The one additional effort to bring group opposition to bear was voiced by the Hartford Convention on 15 December 1814, where a joint statement issued by its members condemned Monroe's plan on the basis that conscription was not delegated to the Congress by the Constitution.

> The exercise of it [conscription] would be not less dangerous to their liberties, than hostile to the sovereignty of the state . . . the armies of the United States have always been raised by contract, never by conscription. . . .[88]

The failure of conscription to gain formal acceptance in the War of 1812 was probably the result of many variables. The anti-militarism basic to the Revolutionary War may have strongly influenced those anti-conscription advocates who remembered the war. The role given to the militia under the

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[88]Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention (New York: N. and J. White, 1833), p. 359.

Constitution and the possible infringement on state sovereignty if a national conscripted militia were formed may have influenced the policy makers. The fact that conscription would have been a departure from the traditions of civil liberties and individuality, as so aptly noted by Webster, must have been considered. Even when these basic liberal variables were countered by the vital need to fill the ranks of an army depleted of manpower or by the recent burning of the city of Washington by the British, the American people did not turn to conscription, even after President Madison warned about the lack of other options, because of its general antithetical nature to individualism and individual choice. Conscription was in fact anathema to the principles of American liberalism as first battled for in the Revolutionary War and then forged as part of the American political system in the Bill of Rights. Even in the darkest days of the War of 1812, the Americans still put their constitutional rights first.

When darker days were to beset the nation in the Civil War, conscription was for the first time adopted in the United States, first by the South in 1862, then by the North in 1863. But as political history has revealed, adoption never really grew into acceptance. The Civil War was important in the history of national conscription in that it illustrated how antithetical conscription was to the American ideal of liberalism and the criterion of individual liberty. The war was fought largely to uphold the central government, and in pursuit of this a national draft was enacted for the first time in American

history.[89] Both the North and the South had to suspend habeas corpus proceedings in connection with the draft protestors, so that the infringement of one's liberty, self-determination, led directly to the removal of a legal right. Although this is the result of conscription, such was not the case at the beginning of the war.

The firing on Fort Sumter in April, 1861 brought forth such a flood of volunteers in the North[90] that on 3 April 1862, the War Department ceased all recruiting. By June, this order was rescinded because volunteering had declined to an all time low. There is possibly no simple answer to this decline, but it probably stemmed in part from the relatively poor performance by the Union army caused in the main by a lack of leadership. This triggered a slackening of enthusiasm in the people. Once the initial volunteers had quit fighting for one reason or another, the depleted ranks were filled by those to whom volunteering meant a great personal sacrifice because of their families, businesses, or farms. Compounding this recruitment problem was the general rise in the wages and profit scales in the North, which lured potential soldiers away from an army whose pay was meager in comparison. To provide additional troops, the Congress passed the Militia Act of 17 July 1862, which authorized President Lincoln to call on the states for 300,000 militiamen

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[89]An analysis will be made only of the draft in the Union and not in the Confederacy.

[90]By the spring of 1862, it was estimated that over 600,000 had volunteered for military duty.

to serve for a nine month term. One of the basic aspects of this law was that it was an attempt by the Congress and the President to use the Constitutional power of calling on the states to furnish the nation with sufficient militiamen. It in effect relied on the state's power of compulsion to furnish militia troops.[91]

From the beginning, the plan appeared doomed to failure. There were requests for exemptions from such diverse groups as professional engineers and railroad employees. For one reason or another, delays were encountered in executing the call for militiamen. One obvious result, as chronicled in the Official Records of the War, was that it engendered in eligible militiamen the desire to leave the country. In a letter from Governor Richard Yates of Illinois to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on 7 August 1862 Yates noted,

> since receiving the orders for drafting, large numbers of citizens are leaving this city [Chicago] to escape the draft, and it is strongly urged upon me to ask you for authority to declare martial law again.[92]

Stanton issued General Order Number 104 dated 8 August 1862 in hopes of stemming the flow of citizens out of the country.

> By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that until further order no citizen liable to be drafted into the militia shall be allowed to go to a foreign country.[93]

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[91] Militia Act, Statutes at Large 12, 597-600 (1862).

[92] Secretary of War, The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, series III, 5 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899-1900), 2 (1899): 316.

[93] Ibid., p. 370.

In a letter from Governor A. Bradford of Maryland to Stanton on 2 September 1962, he declared that "in several of the counties of this State the enrolling officers are menaced with personal violence and are applying to me for protection."[94] By the winter of 1862, it was obvious that the call for militiamen was not going to provide sufficient manpower for the Union armies. Of the 300,000 men requested, less than one-third, or approximately 88,000, were furnished by the states and even then an undetermined number of these deserted. Resistance to involuntary conscription was a prime reason, particularly where a militiaman would be called upon to fight outside his immediate neighborhood for a cause which did not seem to involve his own personal safety or that of his family or property.

In order to prevent a breakdown in the war effort caused by a manpower shortage, President Lincoln, in a speech before Congress on 1 December 1862, urged Congress to take the necessary action to correct the serious defects noted by Secretary of War Stanton in the Militia Act of 1862.[95] Congressional action was not long in coming, and on 9 February 1863, Senator Henry Wilson (R-Mass.) introduced a national conscription bill (S. 511). Debate started on the bill in the Senate on 16 February 1863.[96] From the beginning, the debate centered around the dual issues

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[94]Ibid., p. 506.

[95]James D. Richardson, A Compilation of Messages, 7 (1897): 3332.

[96]U. S., Congress, Senate, Debate on the Conscription Law, 37th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 February 1863, Congressional Globe, pt. 2, pp. 976-1002 passim.

of who should be exempted from any draft and provisions that would provide for a substitute or commutation option. The latter issue was thought to be a key factor in determining whether or not conscription would be passed or defeated. Senator Edgar Cowan (D-Pa.) believed that men should be allowed to pay a fine in lieu of serving because without it, the conscription measure would in practice become a dead letter. Draft officials would encounter widespread resistance in trying to enforce the law, and in fact it might create such a furor that the draft might have to be abandoned. Cowan noted that without Section Thirteen, it would be an anomaly to compel a free citizen of a democratic nation to serve in the army under any circumstances.[97] The section referred to by Cowan and which was eventually accepted as part of the Conscription Act states,

> . . . any person drafted and notified to appear as aforesaid, may, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place in the draft, or he may pay to such person as the Secretary of War may authorize to receive it such sum, not exceeding $300, as the Secretary may determine, for the procuration of such substitute. . . .[98]

Unless this substitution and commutation clause were accepted, Cowan warned that an army might be produced that would compel service from any man in our system of government.

> Our whole theory [recruitment] has gone upon a different hypothesis heretofore, and all our provisions of law looked to the perfect freedom of the soldier in his entry into the service of the country.[99]

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[97]Ibid., p. 981.

[98]Ibid., p. 1000.

[99]Ibid., p. 981.

The Senate passed S. 511 on 16 February 1863 by a voice vote with Section Thirteen intact, and sent the bill to the House, where on 21 February 1863 debate started.[100] Here the anti-conscription debate centered around the following issues: the bill did not follow the traditional methods of raising troops; state sovereignty would be destroyed; unwarranted power would be given to the President. Representative Charles Biddle (D-Pa.) objected to the bill in that it turned the militia of the United States into a regular army, it set up provost marshals as informers in congressional districts, and it threw a vast network of military authority over the whole of society. Biddle continued by noting,

> I feel a personal interest, an interest as a citizen, that things should not go on thus; for I believe it is at the constant risk of lighting up the flame of social revolution. . . .[101]

Representative Robert Malloy (D-Ky.) was even more succinct in his assessment of the proposed legislation. "No people that will patently submit to this system [conscription] can long retain its freedom."[102] The House passed the bill on 25 February 1863 by a vote of 115 to 48 and on 3 March the President signed into law "An Act for Enrolling and Calling out the National Forces."[103] This act, was, so far as United States military history is concerned, one of the most revolutionary steps ever taken by the national government. By assigning such overpowering

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[100] Ibid., pp. 1175-1293 passim.

[101] Ibid., p. 1215.

[102] Ibid., p. 1250.

[103] Act for Enrolling and Calling out the National Forces, Statutes at Large 12, 731-37 (1863).

authority to the national government and its military component, the concept was abandoned that the battlefield and the homefront could operate efficiently if every individual could freely chose his own occupation. Section One of the Act describes the power thus thrust upon the national government.

> . . . all able-bodied male citizens . . . between the ages of twenty and forty-five years . . . are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States when called out by the President for that purpose.[104]

Section Thirteen, as previously noted, remained intact in the Conscription Act.

By the signing of the act, the battle over the rights of the individual versus the concept of involuntary conscription was not over but was taken up by dissenters in every state in the Union. Possibly the most famous of the ensuing draft riots took place in New York City in July, 1863.[105] In a word, General James Fry the Provost Marshal General of the Army, who had the responsibility for administering the draft, declared in his final report of 17 March 1866 that the draft was unpopular and very difficult to administer.[106] Furthermore, in retrospect, the

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[104] Ibid., p. 731.

[105] For an excellent description of this riot see Lawrence Lader, "New York's Bloodiest Week," American Heritage 10 (June 1959): 44-49, 95-98.

[106] U. S. Army, Provost Marshal General, Final Report made to the Secretary of War of the Operation of the Bureau of the Provost Marshal General of the United States, March 17, 1863 to March 17, 1866, part I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), p. 4.

Provost Marshal General noted that concerning conscription,

> it was not easy to convince the public mind at once of the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty, contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation. The people had become more accustomed to the enjoyment of privileges than to the fulfillment of duties under the general government, and hence beheld the prospect of compulsory service in the army with an unreasonable dread.[107]

If General Fry had been candid about the entire matter, he would have noted that the extension of government power over the private lives of people was deeply resented. It must be remembered that Americans are highly individualistic and were essentially frontier and hard-working people, proud of their freedom and suspicious of authority. They resented federal provost marshals, draft boards, and enrolling officers, who seemed to pry into their personal affairs and make them do something which they did not freely choose to do even when it may have meant in this case the preservation of the Union. Americans and their liberal traditions were not about to submit to the overarching power of the government in giving up the basic tenet of individualism. The precedent of national conscription was an innovation that was hardly received with any great enthusiasm. Even Section Thirteen of the Act, which provided certain classes with an alternative to conscription and thus in an overt fashion would seem to be in consonance with the liberal tradition of choice, became the target of such slogans as "rich man's war and poor man's fight." As one observer put it, the substitution and commutation provisions of this section "excited more

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[107]Ibid., p. 12.

opposition to conscription than any other [clause] and constituted most powerfully to incite the masses against the law."[108] Not only was the draft considered antithetical to individual choice, it was considered by the poorer classes as unfair discrimination.[109]

Shortly after the passage of the Conscription Act, of the 292,441 names drawn for the draft, 9,880 were inducted, 26,002 found substitutes, and 52,288 paid the three hundred dollar commutation fee. Thus a total of 35,882 were conscripted in the national draft.[110] By the end of the war, of the 2,213,365 individuals who served in the Union military, 51,516 were inducted as conscripts (approximately two percent) and 117,133 were substitutes (approximately five percent). Thus a total of 168,649 (approximately seven percent) of the total Union forces were secured through the conscription law. These figures do not reflect the number of draft-inducted volunteers. From the results of the Conscription Act, one could speculate that even though the Union military manpower eventually overpowered the Confederate forces, the draft by itself provided a small segment of those who served. Furthermore, its invocation

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[108]Jack Franklin Leach, Conscription in the United States: Historical Background (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Publishing Company, 1952), p. 310.

[109]Even when selective service was institutionalized in the post-World War II era, one of the continuing problems which plagued the system was the question of fairness in selection of draftees. This became particularly acute when the supply of available manpower became greater than those needed to serve in the armed forces; see pp. 172-75 below.

[110]Provost Marshal General, Final Report, p. 28.

triggered riots and alienated a large segment of the population because it was not accepted as part of the American political and social system because of its antithetical nature to liberalism. The Puritan ethic greatly influenced American negative reaction to Civil War conscription.

The monumental failure of conscription in the Civil War passed into history, and it was not until April, 1917 that the halls of Congress again heard debate on whether or not to conscript. Much had changed in the ensuing years in American political history between Lee's surrender at Appomattox on 9 April 1865 and President Wilson's speech before Congress on 2 April 1917 calling for war with Germany. To Wilson, this "last" war was a liberal crusade to make the world safe for democracy.

This crusade was legitimized to a large extent first, by an act of Congress and second, by a decision of the Supreme Court. Congress, though spending several months in debating the complete reorganization of the military establishment in order to make it more efficient, seemed to express the consensus of the people in view of the war in Europe, by passing the National Defense Act of 1916 by a strong majority vote. Although the Senate's vote was by voice and thus not recorded on 17 May 1916, the House on 20 May 1916 voted in favor of the measure by a vote of 351 to 25 with 55 not voting. The act made every male adult, in effect, a militiaman with a national obligation.[111] A synthesis of the congressional debate on the act can be found in

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[111]National Defense Act, Statutes at Large 39, 166-217 (1916).

Representative Frank Greene's (R-Vt.) statement in the House on 17 March 1916. Here, as before, the arguments both for and against a standing army in time of peace were articulated. Some of the historical arguments, that were once again reiterated, were as follows: to the protagonists, the Republic had to be protected by a standing army, particularly in view of the war in Europe, which seemed to involve the United States more and more; there was a need to train the youth of the nation into a ready force, and a need to develop a comprehensive plan for organizing the state militia to react to a federal call-up when and if needed. The anti-militarists again relied on the basic argument that the principle of a standing army, particularly in time of peace, was antithetical to the democratic and liberal policy of the United States.[112]

The second event was an adjudication by the Supreme Court in 1918 upholding the constitutionality of the draft. Chief Justice Edward White, in overrulling in the Selective Service Draft Cases the contentions of the plaintiff's claim that (1) the Constitution did not confer on the Congress the power to compel military service by a selective draft, and (2) even if so done, such a power was repugnant to the spirit of the Bill of Rights, remarked that

> the possession of authority to enact the statute [conscription law] must be found in the clauses of the Constitution giving Congress power to 'declare wars', 'to raise

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[112] U. S., Congress, House, Representative Greene debating the measure to improve the efficiency of the Military Establishment, H.R. 12766, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 17 March 1916, Congressional Record 53: 4330-39.

> and support armies', 'to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces', and to 'make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers'.[113]

Justice White thus upheld congressional power to conscript. What may have been as important as this decision was the *obiter dictum* rendered by White when he noted that the conception of a just government and its duty to its citizens included the "reciprocal obligation of the citizens to render military service in case of need and the right to compel it."[114] Thus, in one sense, the power to draft was settled in that Congress could call upon citizens to serve in time of need. What could obviously not be settled was whether the citizen would freely accept such an obligation in time of war or peace, and even though the legality of the draft was adjudicated, the philosophical acceptance of it has met resistance from the early days of the Republic.

The Supreme Court ruling pleased the conservative military establishment, permitting as it did access to all male citizens, and liberals, who were concerned by the crusading nature of the war. In essence, it seemed that society was beginning to accept conscription under very limited circumstances--a war of foreseeable length and specific purpose, i.e., the defeat of the enemy quickly in order to return to the real problems of life. Thus though liberals failed in postwar

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[113]Selective Service Draft Cases, 245 U.S. 377 (1918).

[114]Ibid., p. 378.

attempts to establish international security concepts, they were beginning to realize that some of their beliefs entailed the necessary periodic use of military force. Thus in World Wars I and II the conscription system confronted relatively few problems because in both instances there was a national commitment to the short-term task of defeating a threatening enemy.

The World War I history of conscription is a study of vast contrasts with Civil War conscription. The enemy and the mission were certainly different. The Union had been saved and the enemy now was a foreign power that threatened liberal America. The "Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States" (commonly called the Conscription Act)[115] of 18 May 1917 reflected the lessons learned from Civil War experiences. Enrollment was done with local draft boards, who had the authority to draft, and consisted of civilian officials; deferments were for the most part equitable; there were no provisions for either substitution or commutation. Because of these changes, agitation against the draft were minimized. Public opinion either had come to support the war or possibly feared the threat of prosecution under the Espionage Act of 15 June 1917 and its Amendments of 16 May 1918.[116] Section Three of the Espionage Act provided for a $10,000 fine or twenty years imprisonment, or both, to those who

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[115] Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States, Statutes at Large 40, 76-83 (1917).

[116] Espionage Act, Statutes at Large 40, 217-31 (1917); Amendments to the Espionage Act of 1917, Statutes at Large 40, 553-54 (1918).

> . . . shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.[117]

The 1918 Amendments expanded the parameters of Section Three of the Act of 1917 by further defining what shall be obstruction of the recruitment and enlistment policies of the United States.[118]

When Senator George Chamberlain (D-Ore.) introduced S. 1871 on 18 April 1917, which authorized the President temporarily to increase the military establishment of the United States, he followed it with a speech which was to become the basis of agreement for all but a few of the dissenting congressmen.

> It is manifest, I think, that when we are about to wage war with what is probably the strongest military force the world has yet seen, we can no longer rely in its entirety or mainly on the volunteer system. Now that we are engaged in war with one of the greatest powers in the world, the adoption of the application of the principle of universal service becomes all the more imperative . . . this Nation can make no headway unless we adopt a system in waging war which will enable us to utilize to the fullest possible extent our entire resources in men and material. . . .[119]

That was a speech that would appeal to both liberals (total commitment to a crusade) and conservatives (commitment of a universal nature) alike. Most of the Senate and House debate centered about such issues as how long it would take to install

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[117]Ibid., p. 219.

[118]Ibid., p. 553.

[119]U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Chamberlain speaking on the bill to increase temporarily the Military Establishment, S. 1871, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 21 April 1917, <u>Congressional Record</u> 55: 909.

the draft system; what would be the military pay; and what would be the age limit on draftees and volunteers. Senator Charles Thomas (D-Col.) voiced the belief of the minority of dissenters as to the place of conscription within the American governmental system.

> But we are now told that compulsory military service is democratic. . . . It is as repugnant to democracy as any despotic principle which can be conceived. . . . Democracy means liberty, and liberty is wholly at war with the autocratic weapons of compulsory service.[120]

On 28 April 1917, S. 1871 passed the Senate by a vote of 81 to 8 and the House by a vote of 397 to 24 with 10 not voting. Conference committee procedures delayed the signing of the bill by the President until 18 May 1917. Interestingly enough, two of the eight Senators voting against the draft also voted against declaring war. Likewise, fifteen of the twenty-four Representatives who voted against the draft also voted against the war. Eventually, twenty-four million men were registered under the Conscription Act and of the 4.7 million men who saw service, 2.8 million were draftees, an increase indicative of the difference in national attitude between the Civil War and World War I.

With the cessation of hostilities in November, 1918 came a slowdown in but not a termination of conscription. It was at this juncture that the army, although releasing draftees at a rapid rate, believed that postwar conditions necessitated the maintaining of the largest peacetime army in United States

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[120]U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Thomas speaking on the bill to increase temporarily the Military Establishment, S. 1871, 65th Cong., 1st sess., 24 April 1917, Congressional Record 55: 996.

history. In order to maintain this force, the army requested that Congress sanction the army's continued use of postwar conscription. For the first time in the history of the United States, conscription was maintained in operation after the cessation of hostilities. It was not until Congress, expressing the mood of the country, ordered the Secretary of War on 5 January 1921 by H. J. Resolution 440 to cease drafting men into the army of the United States.[121] The Resolution passed the House on 17 January by a vote of 285 to 4 with 141 not voting and in the Senate by a voice vote on 22 January. The President's veto of 5 February was overridden in the House on 5 February by a 271 to 16 vote with 141 not voting and on 7 February by a 67 to 1 vote with 28 not voting in the Senate. Thus with approximately the same deliberate speed with which Congress instituted the conscription system did it dismantle it after the war.

World War I thus for the first time in American history institutionalized the draft, but it did so only under the threat of total national emergency; and though liberals had to shift their emphasis in the matter of recognizing the necessity of a military establishment from a strict concern for the societal imperative of liberalism to a concern of how to make liberalism compatible with national security, liberals have never lost sight of the historical fact that conscription per se is antithetical to the individual's liberty. The continuing debate between the liberal society and the conservative military establishment since

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[121]U. S., Congress, Senate, Introduction of Resolution to direct the Secretary of War to cease enlisting men, H.J. Resolution 440, 66th Cong., 3rd sess., 5 January 1921, Congressional Record 60: 1019.

World War I remains centered around the issue of how much military force should exist effectively to protect American society without destroying American liberalism. In the midst of the debate and in less than a quarter of a century after the war had been fought to save democracy, the United States, for the first time in its history instituted conscription in peacetime by passing "An Act to Provide for the Common Defense by Increasing the Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and Providing for its training" (commonly called the Selective Training and Service Act) on 16 September 1940.[122]

Although the American Institute of Public Opinion Poll conducted from December, 1938 to August, 1940 showed a definite increase in public sentiment for compulsory military service, the debate over whether or not to institute peacetime conscription was sometimes accentuated by anger. Table 1 indicates the tabulation of the answers to the following question: Do you think that every able-bodied man twenty years old should be made to serve in the army, navy, or air force for one year?

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[122] Act to Provide for the Common Defense by Increasing the Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and Providing for its training, Statutes at Large 54, 885-97 (1940).

TABLE 1

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE (Percentages)

Year	Favoring	Opposing
December, 1938 (after Munich)	37	63
October, 1939 (after war began)	39	61
2 June 1940 (after Battle of Flanders)	50	50
23 June 1940 (after French surrender)	64	36
July, 1940	67	33
August, 1940	66	34

Source: V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 277.

Within this context of rising support, Senator Edward Burke (D-Neb.) introduced S. 4164 "To Protect the integrity and institutions of the United States through a system of selective compulsory military training and service" on 20 June 1940. After more than two months of intense debate, covering more than 3,500 pages of the Congressional Record, the Senate passed the conference committee report on 14 September by a vote of 47 to 25 with 23 not voting, and the House on the same day by a vote of 233 to 124 with 70 not voting sustained the desire of those advocating the draft. On 16 September 1940, President Roosevelt signed the Selective Training and Service Act which in Section 1 (b) manifested the historical change in the American acceptance of selective service.

> The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligation and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of selective compulsory military training and service.[123] (Italics mine.)

Furthermore, Section 3 (b) set the induction period at a maximum of twelve months.[124] In congruence with the acceptance of compulsory service in a national emergency, congressional debate on the act centered noticeably around such issues as the acceptable induction ages and the number to be inducted under the act. Debates still included the historical anti-conscription pleas, but no longer was the issue one of how to preserve liberalism but how to preserve the nation. As indicated by the congressional debates and vote, the passage of the Selective Service Act was not the result of the disappearance of anti-militarism and the anti-conscription forces from the American scene. Its passage was bitterly fought. As John Graham noted, the 1940 Act was only a temporary expedient.[125] When comparing this situation to the World War I era of conscription, there is no evidence to indicate that Congress intended that the Conscription Act of 1917 be anything more than a wartime measure. The desire of the army to continue conscription after the war was over in 1918 seems to have been an attempt by the army to expand while the

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[123] Ibid., sec. 1 (b), 885.

[124] Ibid., sec. 3 (b), 886. The renewal of the Selective Training and Service Act in 1941 extended the period for six months. Further wartime extensions became automatic until the debate over whether to continue it at all began in May, 1945.

[125] John Graham, The Universal Military Obligation (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958), p. 4.

machinery of conscription was still in effect. The tenuousness of the peacetime acceptability of conscription in 1940 is made even more evident when one realizes that Congress spent almost three months debating whether or not to adopt conscription while in the background both France and the Low Countries had fallen victim to Hitler's onslaught, and the Battle for Britain was imminent.

Toward the end of World War II, Congress in accepting selective service as the means for maintaining the strength of the army for the proposed invasion of Japan, extended the draft law until 15 May 1946 or until the hostilities were declared terminated by the President.[126] Again in 1946, the draft was extended, only this time as a measure to counter Soviet aggression.[127] The date for termination was set for 31 March 1947, and at this time the draft expired after being in operation for almost seven consecutive years. At this juncture, Congress was involved in the debate over whether to institute universal military training.[128] The action taken on this would affect any future selective service legislation. What emerged was the defeat of UMT and the passage of the Selective Service Act of 24 June 1948,[129] which was renewed three years later and renamed

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[126] Act to Extend the Provisions of the Act of July 11, 1941, Statutes at Large 59, 168 (1945).

[127] Act to Extend the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Statutes at Large 60, 341-43 (1946).

[128] For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 125-30 above.

[129] Selective Service Act, Statutes at Large 62, 604-44 (1948).

the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951.[130] This latter act became the basis for selective service and was renewed, with debate, every four years (1955, 1959, 1963, 1967). It is interesting to note that the dates of renewal coincide with non-election years. This kept selective service out of election year debates and until its last renewal in 1967, the major issue quadrennially debated was centered about the order of induction and the number of persons involved in a draft call. The existence of selective service was tacitly accepted by the liberals as long as national resources were not being wholesalely diverted for war efforts.[131] The Korean War, which was a military stalemate after 1951, discouraged liberals who believed that wars of attrition are antithetical to the only true nature of war--a crusade that utilizes total resources to a quick victory. The settlement of the war in 1953 and the adoption by President Eisenhower of a foreign policy that posited a "massive retaliation" doctrine was in consonance with the liberal theory that a nation should not waste its resources in wars of attrition. The massive retaliation doctrine provided an answer to this dilemma. Thus Eisenhower's "war or peace" policy brought into historical perspective the dichotomy of liberal hopes of total war or total peace. The security policy of the late 1950s and 1960s prior to the United States intervention in Vietnam in 1965

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[130] Universal Military Training and Service Act, Statutes at Large 65, 75-89 (1951).

[131] For a discussion of the national security policies of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower vis-à-vis liberal tenets see pp. 76-78 above.

manifested a switch to "optional responses" and the regeneration of conventional forces.[132] As a vital concomitant to this or any national security policy, the selective service system operated to support the military section of this policy. With a nation determined to have a military "second to none" as dictated by choice or cold war conditions, conscription continued to support the functional imperative of national security.

Aided by the growing dissatisfaction of the Vietnam War, the selective service system was drastically changed in November, 1969 by the introduction of a lottery system and was finally replaced by the volunteer army concept in July, 1973. In the last years of its operation, the system became the target of criticism which was not aimed at the overall concept, but at how it was administered. In most instances, the matter was one of a system that had come to disregard the concept of equality, a vital tenet of liberalism. More and more the system came under fire for not being fair. Claims of favoritism (particularly among students) and discrimination (among the poor and the black) were common complaints. A Louis Harris and Associates Poll completed in 1966 found support for drafting young men among seventy-nine percent of those polled but only forty-nine percent thought the way the system worked was fair.[133] In December, 1966

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[132]For one author's explanation of this change see Maxwell D. Taylor, _The Uncertain Trumpet_ (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).

[133]June A. Willenz, ed., _Dialogue on the Draft: Report of the National Conference on the Draft, 11-12 November 1966_ (Washington: American Veterans Committee, 1967), pp. 64-65.

a Gallup Poll showed the percentage who thought it fair to be only forty-three percent.[134] Many of the claims of inequitable treatment can be traced to the problem of what to do with all the people who were entering the selective service system. The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service noted in their 1967 report that of the nearly two million men now reaching draft age each year, the armed forces are only likely to need one-half to one-third of them and only a portion of these must be selected for non-voluntary induction (recent years indicated a range of ten to forty percent).[135] Note in Table 2 the increase in the number of men available.

TABLE 2

MEN REACHING AGE 18

Year	Numbers (Thousands)	Increase (Percent)
1955	1,150	---
1960	1,330	15.7
1965	1,720	49.6
1970	1,930	67.8
1974	2,120	84.3

Source: U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service System. 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, p. 10003.

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[134] Donald Jackson, "Evading the Draft: Who, How, and Why," Life, 9 December 1966, p. 43.

[135] National Advisory Commission, In Pursuit, p. 3.

To the Commission, the problems now facing the selective service system was "Who Serves when not All serve? It was an enduring problem, but floodlighted . . . by the war in Vietnam."[136]

Additional problems also confronted the system, in addition to the continuing attempts to determine "who serves." An increase in the realization of self (a paramount tenet of liberalism), manifested by the social revolution of the 1960s basically runs counter to the concept of a coherent national society, which was provided for in one way by the selective service system.[137] Additionally, it was charged that the system of deferment and induction through the more than four thousand local draft boards was based "on the assumption of a rural America long extinct."[138] The demographic shift in population from rural to urban (see Table 3 below) affected the localism of the selective service system. Thus the selective service system which might have been attuned to the American ethos in the 1940s and 1950s was now finding itself in theoretical opposition to the concept of "self" and the urbanization of the American public. The uneasy alliance between the system and civil society was torn asunder by the social revolution of the 1960s and the Vietnam War. Once the system became out of

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[136]Ibid.

[137]For an incisive view of liberalism and the national society see Samuel H. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," Public Interest 5 (Fall 1966): 70-83.

[138]James W. Davis, Jr. and Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System, Markam Series in Public Policy Analysis (Chicago: Markam Publishing Company, 1968), p. 3.

TABLE 3

RURAL TO URBAN POPULATION CHANGE (Percentages)

Year	Urban	Rural
1950	64	36
1960	69.9	30.1
1970	73.5	26.5

Source: U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. A, sec. 1, United States, Alabama-Mississippi.

harmony with the political culture of liberalism, it was no longer popularly supported, and at this point existing only until a better solution for manpower recruitment could be formulated.

Against this background, the opponents of the selective service system began to articulate their arguments and did so coincidentally with the rising unpopularity of the war. Conscription once again was said to be a serious invasion of individual liberty; it led to regimentation and militarism; the draft had a deleterious effect on the individual's personality. The debate appeared to rise to a high pitch on the eve of the quadrennial review of the draft law in 1967. The Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement in a report to the House Armed Services Committee (February, 1967), seemed to have developed in the whole context of the report the assumption that the panel was supposed to reassure Congress that only minor

adjustments to the selective service system were necessary.[139] By contrast, the National Advisory Commission's report made recommendations that questioned some of the basic facets of the selective service system. Two of its more important suggestions were the possibility of instituting a lottery system and the ending of many deferments.[140] The outcome was a victory for the congressional supporters of selective service. A Selective Service Act to "Amend the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951"[141] was passed, which had among its provisions the prohibition of any lottery system.[142]

As the Vietnam War grew more unpopular and initial investigations were being made into the feasibility of a postwar volunteer army, President Nixon in a message to Congress on 13 May 1969, appeared to sense the growing unrest with the present system and in a reaction to this, proposed recruitment by a lottery system.

> Ultimately we should end the draft. I am hopeful that we can soon restore the *principle of no draft in peacetime*. But until we do so, let us be sure that the operation of the Selective Service System is as equitable and as reasonable as we can make it. By drafting the youngest first . . . by randomizing the selection process . . . we can do much to achieve these important interim goals.[143] (Italics mine.)

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[139] Civilian Advisory Panel, *Report*, pp. 21-25.

[140] National Advisory Commission, *In Pursuit*, pp. 5-6.

[141] *Act to Amend the Universal Military Training and Service Act*, *Statutes at Large* 81, 100-06 (1967).

[142] Ibid., p. 100.

[143] U. S., Congress, Senate, President Nixon's message on draft reform, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 13 May 1969, *Congressional Record* 115: 12248.

The House of Representatives, acting on this proposal, introduced H.R. 14001 on 25 September 1969, which would allow modification to the system of selecting armed forces personnel. Hearings were held by a special subcommittee on the draft,[144] and the bill was favorably reported to the House. Passage came on 30 October by an overwhelming vote of 382 to 13 with 35 not voting.[145] The Senate Armed Services Committee disposed of the hearings on H.R. 14001 in less than three hours on 14 November, and the bill passed the Senate by a voice vote on 19 November. On 26 November President Nixon signed the "Amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,"[146] which simply repealed Section 2, section 5 (a)(2) of the 1967 Act to allow modification to the system of selecting persons for induction into the armed forces. In December, 1969, the first lottery was held, and with this the unfairness that had plagued the selective service system in later years, particularly when the excessive manpower produced inequitable exemptions, for the most part disappeared. By July, 1973, the lottery system had performed its interim function, and the President's goal stated in May, 1969, was realized. The selective service system came to an end after almost thirty-three

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[144] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military Selective Service System, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee on the Draft on H.R. 14001 and H.R. 14015. 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969.

[145] U. S., Congress, House, Vote on modifying the Selective Service System, H.R. 14001, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 30 October 1969, Congressional Record 115: 32468.

[146] Amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Statutes at Large 83, 220 (1969).

years of continuous operation, interrupted by only a fifteen month lapse.

With the ending of the selective service system, an equilibrium was re-established between the military establishment and its liberal society very similar to the change from the containment doctrine of President Truman to the massive retaliation doctrine of President Eisenhower. Both situations saw a reshaping of the imperative of the liberal doctrine of total war or total peace. Morris Janowitz saw the end of conscription as the "clearest index of the end of the mass-army format of the first half of the twentieth century."[147] It is not within the realm of the impossible that with this change, wars of attrition became unpopular with both the civil and military leaders. The appearance of liberalism through international detentes and the overt softening of cold war attitudes provides the background within which liberal tenets can again be reasserted. The waning of the war atmosphere which has prevailed in the United States for over three decades may be the environment within which the military establishment finds its eventual accommodation with the liberal society. Predictions that either objective civilian control, in which the military will again assert maximum professionalism and possibly become the isolated institution as witnessed in the 1920s and the 1930s, or subjective civilian control, in which the military establishment will continue to "mirror" society, will chart the course of the

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[147]Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. x.

future civil-military equation abound on both sides. In either case, the historical antithetical nature of the values of the military establishment vis-à-vis those of the liberal society which eventually forced the selective service system first to alter its concept (to the lottery system) and then to cease to exist will continue to exert the determining factors which produce the final civil-military equilibrium. The "root" differences between the two societies are still antithetical to each other, and the political history and nature of selective service in liberal America has not changed the differences. With the liberal side of the civil-military equation again in ascension as manifested by the volunteer army concept, attention could now be directed to the place of the modern volunteer army in a liberal society.

Modern Volunteer Army

> The United States has relied throughout its history on a voluntary armed force except during major wars and since 1948. A return to an all-volunteer force will strengthen our freedoms, remove an inequity now imposed on the expression of the patriotism that has never been lacking among our youth, promote the efficiency of the armed forces, and enhance their dignity. It is the system for maintaining standing forces that minimizes government interference with the *freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accord with his values.*[148] (Italics mine.)

This quote taken from the 1970 report of the Presidential Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (commonly called the Gates Commission) reveals in a succinct manner the main thrust of the all-volunteer armed force concept. With the commission

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[148] President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, *Report* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 6.

stating its argument in such profound terms, the dichotomy between the then existing conscription system and the proposed voluntary system was made more evident in philosophical terms. From 1940 to 1973, the American society was exposed to conscription. It was considered by its proponents to be a part of the American heritage generated mainly from the Jeffersonian concept of the citizen-soldier. What these advocates neglected to mention is that the United States had experienced grave difficulties with its first conscription law enacted during the Civil War[149] and had thereafter resorted to conscription only in time of war, particularly where the war was of a crusading nature, as was the case in World Wars I and II. History has revealed that the attempt to return to an all-volunteer armed force after World War II[150] as manifested in the long congressional debates over universal military training and the continuation of selective service was unsuccessful mainly because the cold war precluded a return to the status quo ante bellum volunteer system.

Until near the end of the thirty-three year era of conscription which also corresponded closely with the end of the Vietnam War and the defusing in many instances of international confrontations, the United States seldom questioned the philosophical basis for continuing the selective service system. If the congressional debates and votes on the quadrennial extension of the draft are any indication of the nation's attitudes and

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[149]For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 156-60 above.

[150]This had been successfully accomplished after World War I.

beliefs on selective service, one could be led to believe that it had become part of the permanent ethos. In passing the Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1951,[151] the House of Representatives spent four days on debate before passing the bill by a vote of 372 to 44. The Senate debated for seven days before voting 79 to 5 in favor of passage. In 1955 the draft renewal was debated for one day each in both the House and the Senate and was passed by a 394 to 4 vote in the House and by a voice vote in the Senate. In 1959, 1963, and 1967 one day each was spent in each congressional chamber on debate, and the House voted for passage in each case by votes of 381-20, 388-3, and 362-9, respectively. The Senate voted in favor by votes of 90-1, voice vote, and 70-2, respectively. In retrospect, it seems that the national crises of the 1950s and 1960s (Korean War, Suez, Lebanon, Berlin, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam War) precluded any determined arguments against the historical and antithetical nature of the draft vis-à-vis the American liberal ethos. The threat to the American political system and way of life made any other course than selective service impossible to consider.

It was not until after the United States had become deeply involved in the Vietnam War that the issue of a volunteer armed force was again brought before the public as a social and political issue. Even then, the return to the use of such a force was based on its feasibility and not on its philosophical

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[151] Universal Military Training and Service Act, Statutes at Large 65, 75-89 (1951).

consonance with the liberal society. One of the first re-examinations of the possible return to a volunteer system came in 1967 as a result of the National Advisory Commission (commonly monly called the Marshall Commission) investigation into the entire selective service system from the viewpoint of manpower procurement for the Vietnam War.[152] That commission reported that volunteers had constituted two-thirds of the military forces since 1950 and with few exceptions the Navy, Marines, and the Air Force had depended fully on volunteers.[153] Despite what may appear to be a favorable sign for pursuing the all-volunteer concept, the commission recommended against the concept because it basically allowed no flexibility in time of crisis. Other than maintaining a "force-in-being," the military would have no large reserve force from which to draw the necessary forces in time of war.[154] No other reasons were given for its stand on the all-volunteer concept. The question of its applicability to the American political tradition was not made an issue.

In addition to the traumatic moral and social effects which the Vietnam War had on American society, it spawned another ancillary issue which was related to the continuation of selective

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[152]National Advisory Commission, In Pursuit. Neither President Johnson nor Nixon resorted to implementing total mobilization of reserve forces in the Vietnam War but resorted instead to call up of selected reserve units. This could in a large measure account for such a study.

[153]Ibid., p. 6.

[154]Ibid., p. 12.

service. The nearly two million men reaching draft age each year produced a "pool" of personnel of which only one-third to one-half would be needed.[155] The Marshall Commission was very specific about this point and made fundamental recommendations to alleviate the unfair practices of the deferment system.[156] By the time of the Presidential election campaigns of 1968, the Vietnam War had become such a public issue that both the candidates, Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon, advocated review of the whole selective service process. It appears paradoxical to think that in the post-Tet era of the War, when the United States had nearly one-half million troops committed to a war, that the issue of a volunteer army should surface as a campaign issue. Such an issue would have normally been more appropriately considered under peacetime conditions. Although it was an issue well suited to political campaign rhetoric, it was also an issue not being debated at this stage because of its feasibility but because of its compatibility with the American tradition. Though no one at this time could accurately predict that the cold war would be reduced to a lower level of confrontation than experienced in the 1950s, the candidates were capitalizing on an issue which they hoped could eventually be an appropriate civil-military accommodation.

The concept of a modern volunteer army (MVA) was surfacing as a possible post-election policy at the most adverse

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[155] Ibid., p. 3.

[156] Ibid., pp. 4-10.

time under the most adverse situation, but in the proper perspective it was a return to the historical civil-military relationship prevailing in American history. When the domestic and international political conditions were favorable, an MVA would be in the best interests of the nation in that it would recognize the historical dichotomy between the conservative military establishment and the liberal civilian society, the latter of which recognized the rights of the individual to determine his own destiny. Thus the consideration of feasibility which had dominated the reasons for utilizing selective service for over twenty years was being replaced by the consideration of the historical civil-military equation that called for an army composed of volunteers. It appears that instead of the selective service system supplying in an efficient manner the personnel needed to fight the war, both the war and the system were mutually exacerbating the very continuation and existence of selective service. Gary Wamsley theorized that the selective service system from its inception in 1940 had sought to meet the functional demands arising from the national defense needs without violating values of American political culture, mainly having government work at the lowest level possible, which is in keeping with the Jeffersonian tradition of decentralized control. Thus the function of the local draft boards was in consonance with this theory. But, as Wamsley contends, because of changes within American society generated by the unpopular war in Vietnam and the social revolution of the 1960s, which clashed with the institutional rigidities of the selective service system, it had

become difficult to maintain an equilibrium that satisfied both society and the individual.[157] During the period from inception to adoption (1969-1973), the complaints lodged against an all-volunteer military were in fact only realizations that there are "root" differences between the two societies that exist because of the nature of the two societies. In essence, the frustration which the American society witnessed with its military sector's role in the War, whether warranted or not, resulted in a public opinion that was searching for some alternative to the selective service system. A universal military training system offered many of the same generic qualities of the present system. It seemed that an all-volunteer concept offered the best solution.

The genesis of the MVA program rests with the creation of the Gates Commission by President Nixon on 27 March 1969. Its task was to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force. President Nixon's charge to the commission directed it

> to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving toward an all-volunteer armed force. The Commission will study a broad range of possibilities for viewing the supply of volunteers for service, including increased pay, benefits, recruitment incentives and other practicable measures to make military careers more attractive to young men. It will consider possible changes in selection standards and in utilization policies which may assist in eliminating the need for induction. It will study the estimated costs and savings resulting from an all-volunteer force, as well as the broader social and economic implications of this program.[158]

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[157]Gary L. Wamsley, Selective Service and a Changing America: A Study of Organizational Environmental Relationships, Merrill Political Science Series (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969).

[158]President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, p. vii.

It was evident at its inception that the commission was basically told to find ways to return to a volunteer concept. The issue of its propriety within the American political system had been settled, at least as indicated by the President, and the only issue to be investigated was the feasibility of such a program. In two additional messages on the all-volunteer armed force, President Nixon reaffirmed his philosophy in terms which were in consonance with American liberalism. In a message to the Senate on 13 May 1969, the President noted that

> it is my contention that the disruptive impact of the military draft on individual lives should be minimized as much as possible. . . . Ideally, of course, minimum interference means no draft at all. I continue to believe that under more stable world conditions and with an armed force that is more attractive to volunteers, the ideal can be realized in practice.[159]

After receiving the Gates report, the President was even more lucid about his convictions and in turn the policy of his administration. On 23 April 1970 in a message to Congress, President Nixon endorsed the Gates report for an all-volunteer force and stated that

> ultimately the preservation of the free society depends upon . . . the willingness of government to guarantee the freedom of the individual. With an end to the draft, we will demonstrate to the world the responsiveness of republican government--and our continuing commitment to the maximum freedom for the individual, enshrined in our earliest tradition and founding documents. By upholding the cause of freedom without conscription we will have demonstrated in one more area the superiority of a society

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[159] U. S., Congress, Senate, President Nixon's message on draft reform, 12247.

> based upon the belief in the dignity of man over a society based on the supremacy of the state.[160]

The President's comments were a reflection of the unanimous endorsement by the Gates Commission that the nation move toward

> . . . an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft . . .; and that the first indispensable step is to remove the present inequity of pay of men serving their first term in the armed forces.[161]

In essence, the volunteer concept places the selective service system in a stand-by status for use during mobilization or national emergency, whereas during peacetime the military services were to rely on the procurement of manpower on a voluntary basis in a "zero-draft" environment. The commission accepted the parameters of the investigation to exclude all but feasibility factors and thus conducted their investigation believing that "the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft. . . ."[162]

Once the administration had pledged to re-establish the all-volunteer system endorsed by both the President and the Gates Commission as being in consonance with American liberal tradition, the debate on the issue, heard in both the media and in Congress, centered around factors of its feasibility in present day society. Very seldom was the issue debated on the question of whether the program was consistent with the liberal

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[160]U. S., Congress, Senate, President Nixon's message on the draft, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 23 April 1970, Congressional Record 116: 12661.

[161]President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, p. 6.

[162]Ibid., p. iii.

tenet of individualism and the autonomous individual making a choice without the direct or indirect features of a conscription system. This issue was for all intents and purposes settled by both the historical and consistent pronouncements of the President and the contemporary mood of the American public over its disenchantment with the Vietnam War. Certainly a move to end the war would please all political factions, and an adoption of an all-volunteer armed force would, as far as liberals were concerned, re-establish the proper civil-military equilibrium within modern day America. It would once again recognize the dichotomy that exists between the two societies.

Once the Gates report was endorsed by the President, the political, economic, and social factors involved in instituting a MVA became the center of the biggest congressional debate on draft legislation since 1951. The congressional hearings on all aspects of the draft, including the lottery system established in 1969 and the new MVA proposal, were conducted at sporadic intervals from 23 July 1970[163] until 13 March 1972.[164] During the course of these hearings, all the attributes and detriments of a volunteer system were discussed in terms of their political, social, and economic effects on American society. Both

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[163]U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Administration and Operation of the Draft Law, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services. 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970.

[164]U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Volunteer Armed Forces and Selective Service, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Volunteer Armed Force and Selective Service. 92nd Cong., 2d sess., 1972.

congressional Armed Service Committees heard both praise for and complaints against the proposed system. In fact, the complaints authenticated the "root" differences in American society and are basically countered by a reaffirmation of the American liberal ethos and its differences with the military establishment. In addition to the complaints voiced in congressional debate, the MVA became part of the continuing debate over the Vietnam War which was carried on by most citizens.

Although the feasibility aspects of instituting a MVA concept were the primary subject of discussion in both the congressional hearings and debates, the more normative issues of whether the system would change the American governmental system were also addressed. Among its merits, the MVA was considered as a basis for producing a greater consensus in a society divided by a range of social and political issues. Those who would voluntarily enlist would form a somewhat coherent group not subjected to dissenters. The Gates Commission claimed that one of the primary faults of conscription is that it "has weakened the political fabric of our society and impaired the delicate web of shared values that alone enables a free society to exist."[165]

One of the reasons, which had popular support from all political factions, for enacting the MVA concept is that it was a return to the basic liberal tenet of individualism and individual choice. This was possibly the one factor, particularly after the President had spoken of it in his various messages endorsing

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[165] President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, pp. 9-10.

the MVA concept, that all proponents of the MVA continually stressed. At the House Armed Service Committee hearings on 23 February 1971, the philosophical merits of a MVA centered about the discussion of individualism. Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) noted that the modern volunteer army would not infringe on individual liberties as did the draft.[166] Representative Frederick Schwengel (R-Iowa) stated that ". . . whatever protects the rights of the individuals, also protects the basic security of the Nation."[167] In testimony before the House on 30 May 1971, Representative Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.) stated

> . . . most of you [representatives] who are here continue to support a practice [conscription] that violates the basic tradition of our country . . . everyone of you would normally support the great American right to be free, the right to be independent, the right to human dignity--every right except the right to avoid being forced into wars, into conscription, and into the army.[168]

Milton Friedman, a nationally known economist who served on the Gates Commission and advocated the all-volunteer force, has remarked independently of the Gates report that the MVA would preserve the freedom of the individual to serve or not to serve. This free choice would lead to an elimination of arbitrary

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[166]U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Extension of the Draft and Bills Related to the Voluntary Force Concept and Authorization of Strength Levels, Hearings before the Committee on the Armed Services. 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971.

[167]Ibid., p. 342.

[168]U. S., Congress, House, Representative Abzug speaking on Amending the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, H.R. 6531, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 30 March 1971, Congressional Record 117: 8644.

discrimination among different groups and would also terminate military interference with ones' life or career.[169] The Gates Commission unanimously endorsed the concept of individuality which the MVA preserved. It concluded that conscription undermined respect for the government regardless of the individual's own values.[170] Peter Barnes, writing in the New Republic, argued that the MVA would consist of those who voluntarily chose to serve which would enhance the dignity and prestige of the services.[171] In an independent study conducted by Scott Cunningham and based on 1,500 interviews conducted with enlisted and officer personnel in 1971 and 1973 in both the United States and Europe, he concluded that the MVA concept would be a success if (1) the soldier were treated as a volunteer whose individuality was respected and whose time were used in a productive and interesting manner, and if (2) the army provided the soldier with an environment which allowed maturity and an acquisition of skills or education.[172] In conclusion, Cunningham contended that the caliber of those volunteering would be adequate for most military assignments and thus their actual performance would depend on how the army recognized the individuality of each

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[169] Milton Friedman, "The Case for a Voluntary Army," New Guard 7 (May 1967): 12-13.

[170] President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, p. 14.

[171] Peter Barnes, "All-Volunteer Army?" New Republic, 9 May 1970, p. 20.

[172] Scott M. Cunningham, The Volunteer Soldier: His Needs, Attitudes and Expectations (Cambridge, Mass.: Cinecom Corp., [1972]), pp. vii-viii.

enlistee and utilized his skills accordingly.[173] Thus individuality would be protected in one sense by allowing a greater degree of individual freedom through free choice of whether or not to enlist in the military. Once the choice is made to enter military service, the factor of individualism would be continued to cover a new level and range of living and working conditions that would include a fair and comparable standard which recognized the worth of the individual.

One method which the Gates Commission thought would improve both the quality and quantity of personnel entering military service was through a pay increase. Conscription was in essence a tax in that by drafting men to serve at levels of compensation below what they would normally be paid, they were being underpayed and thus being taxed unfairly. Increased pay would eliminate this inequity while at the same time recognizing the worth of the individual.[174] Conscription further produced a "channeling" effect in that it caused the potential draftee to distort his personal or career plans to the advantage of the opportunity to postpone or avoid the draft. "Channeling young men into colleges, occupations, marriage, or fatherhood is not in their best interests nor those of society as a whole."[175] Thus the case for recognizing the individual as a concomitant part of the MVA concept is an extremely valid and forceful

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[173]Ibid., p. 1.

[174]President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, p. 31.

[175]Ibid.

argument. It was an argument in consonance with both the American liberal tradition and the proponents of the MVA concept.

In contrast to the merits of the MVA system, certain other issues, pertinent to the MVA concept, were debated. In essence, these issues became complaints that manifested a realization of the "root" differences between the two societies.

One of the complaints made is that under the selective service system, draftees guard against the growth of a separate military ethos which could threaten democratic institutions. The MVA would lessen civilian concern about the use of military forces, which would come under less public scrutiny.[176] Representative William Steiger (R-Wis.) remarked at the congressional hearings that he was concerned whether the all-volunteer force would lead to the "development of a military establishment with values and goals different from the rest of society."[177] One can say that by its very nature, the MVA concept would lead to the alienation of the military establishment from the rest of society. The military would not have its broad base for recruitment, as it did under selective service, and its members might not be in as frequent contact with society as were members conscripted under selective service. Adam Yarmolinsky notes that whereas the draftee might not complain, volunteers might never complain if they had a long term career to protect.[178] Peter

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[176]Ibid., pp. 14, 17.

[177]U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Extension of the Draft, 1971, p. 256.

[178]Yarmolinsky, Military Establishment, pp. 399-400.

Barnes claimed that the MVA would allow the attention of the public, press, and Congress to drift from the aspects of military life.[179] Complaints of a "gulf" growing between the civilian and the military became common. In the study conducted by Cunningham, he described the modus vivendi of the normal volunteer as one of a self-selective process in which the perspective volunteer selected the military because of certain characteristics--a traditional value system that is of a non-counter culture nature, an interest in personal security needs, a seeking of peer group acceptance and active group participation, and a highly structured arrangement similar to the life he left to enlist in the military.[180] Thus, the self selective process by itself might produce a separate society that has conservative characteristics similar to those from which the enlistee left.

A more self-contained and isolated military society, produced by adopting MVA, say the critics of the MVA, would be unacceptable. In fact, without an understanding of the historical dichotomy between the civilian and the military societies, one might not be aware of the ramifications of this isolation. Many critics hold the false concept that by having eighteen and nineteen year olds enlist in the armed services, the entire military establishment per se is going to be isolated from society. This is in fact not true based on several observations. The enlistee under the MVA system will be accorded the same official

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[179] Barnes, "All-Volunteer Army?" p. 23.

[180] Cunningham, Volunteer Soldier, pp. 3-5.

channels for articulating complaints as were accorded his draftee predecessor. These are normally through the chain of command and in specific instances through congressional correspondence. In addition to this, the past insensitiveness of the armed forces to many enlisted complaints and requests has for the most part been corrected by both policy and administrative changes. The enlistee's rights are protected by written procedures, and arbitrary actions taken against him have for the most part been eliminated. This protection against isolating the enlistee is further aided by the interdependence between the military and civilian societies in matters of technology and educational resources. Years of civilian control are not going to end with the ending of the draft and the inception of the MVA. A further inhibiter of an isolation ethic is that a MVA would have to be aware of the opinion of its potential enlistees, who if they disapproved of the nation's military policy or practices would not volunteer. If enough refused to volunteer and enlisted quotas were always unfulfilled, then military policies that were so antithetical to an enlistee's perceptions would have to be changed.

The Gates Commission in one of its conclusions noted that

> the officer corps exercises the dominant influence on military values. Elimination of the draft will not significantly alter its composition. Officers will continue to be recruited from all over the nation and from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. Further, the

> change to an all-volunteer force will have no effect on top leadership, since these men have always been professionals.[181]

The injection of true volunteers at the lower officer and enlisted levels makes the threat of isolation seem even more remote. The commission furthered countered the isolation charge by projecting that the turnover of voluntary force personnel will only be three-fourths as large as if conscription were retained. With a projected force level of 2.5 million, the MVA needs to attract 325,000 new enlistees per year as compared to the 440,000 needed under conscription each year. Further, the men who join the MVA will not all become long service professionals. As estimated 215,000 men will leave after a single tour (three years). As a result, about one-half of the personnel in the MVA will be in their first tour of duty.[182] William Rae in an independent study noted that an overall first-term re-enlistment rate after the November, 1971 pay raise and the completion of plans to inject both professionalism and an improved life style into the army may be as high as thirty-eight percent. However, these factors do not entirely determine re-enlistment rates since other factors such as withdrawal from Vietnam and civilian job employment produce variable influences on re-enlistment.[183] The Gates Commission added that evidence shows that military service does

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[181]President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, p. 138.

[182]Ibid., p. 135.

[183]William R. Rae, Evaluation of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) Program, 4 vols. (McLean, Va.: Research Analysis Corporation, [1972]), III: 3.

not necessarily alter one's opinions because the pre-enlistment factors of region, education, age, family, and community are significant in shaping a person's way of thinking.

Much of this evidence tends to disprove the threat of a military totally isolated from the civilian society and thus immune and insensitive to the needs of society. But, by the same token, the MVA concept presupposes a military force that will be isolated to some extent because of the nature of its tasks and the values it holds vis-à-vis civilian society. Few predict that the military will be forced to retreat within itself to the extent that it did after every war until 1940. What the mood of the present era indicates is that the trend toward subjective civilian control exhibited in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s will subside, and in the institutionalization of the MVA a move will be made toward a model of objective civilian control where the military, while separated from society, is a "tool" of society. Objective control is the sine qua non of the MVA concept, and while the MVA will be isolated from the civilian society in recognition of the "root" differences, the isolation will only be a manifestation of the neo-professionalism of the military. The threat posed to civilian society in the nature of an isolated military is at most philosophically minimal.

Another complaint often voiced against the MVA concept is that an all-volunteer armed force will appeal especially to certain groups. Those groups normally mentioned are the poorly educated, the poor, and the blacks, who by enlisting heavily will thence come to dominate the military ranks. Thus to the

MVA critics the appeal of a conscription system is that it injects a cross-section of the American population into the military without any one group becoming dominant or subservient. Such a complaint was voiced by Representative Steiger in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in February, 1971 when he raised the issue "that an end to the draft would create an Army of the poor and the black."[184] The extreme of this complaint leads one to speculate and project the possibility of having the poor and the black fight a white man's war or take over the state!

Statistics and surveys made for the armed forces tend to confirm the belief that a shift to a concept of true volunteerism tends to attract enlistees who are poor and black. In an extensive survey made in 1971 by the Rand Corporation for the United States Air Force, it was shown that

> 1. Recruits who have entered the military service without draft pressure (true volunteers) are on the average of lower mental quality, have lower levels of educational attainment, and have lower preservice earnings.
>
> 2. True volunteers have higher re-enlistment intentions and a higher proportion of re-enlistment than the draft-induced recruit population.[185]

In a study conducted by John Drexler on the comparative profiles of true volunteers in 1973, he concluded that true volunteers, on the whole, have lower levels of education than did the draft

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[184] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Extension of the Draft, 1971, p. 255.

[185] G. L. Brunner, The Importance of Volunteer Status: An Analysis and Reliability Test of Survey Data (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand Corp., [1971]), p. v.

motivated respondents.[186] The 1967 Marshall report stated that the conscription system enlistment rates for both blacks and whites were about the same, but that re-enlistments for blacks was almost double that of the whites.[187] The Gates report refutes the claim that blacks will dominate the services by projecting that a black MVA percentage will be around fifteen percent or about two to four percentage points above the national black population percentage.[188] Figures released by the Department of Defense in February, 1974, indicate that since the last draft call in December, 1972 and with the advent of the MVA in July, 1973, there are 308,245 blacks in an armed forces of 2,201,750, or approximately fourteen percent of the total.

Although the statistics are an indication of trends, they do not provide any rational reasons for refuting the continuation of a MVA system. While admitting on one hand that socio-economic conditions may channel the less well-educated, the poor, and the black into a volunteer army, such conditions may channel most people into any occupation. To select the armed forces as the sole repository of a channeling effect is erroneous. The total black percentage of federal workers (excluding the military) according to 1972 statistics was 11.9

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[186] John A. Drezler, Jr., Comparative Profiles of True Volunteers and Draft-Motivated Navy Men (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, Institute of Social Research, [1973]), p. 29.

[187] National Advisory Commission, In Pursuit, pp. 9-10.

[188] President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, p. 15.

percent or 278,000 out of 2,335,000 workers.[189] This percentage is close to the eleven percent total black population recorded in the 1970 census.[190] This percentage by itself is within five percentage points of the number of blacks in the armed forces. Additional census figures indicate that of the total 109,943 federal employees working in the District of Columbia, 76,453 or seventy percent are black.[191] Written or voiced concern about the black dominating the federal government is seldom recorded. One of the obvious causes of this channeling effect is that the federal government in both the civilian and military sectors provides in general a realistic and workable non-discriminatory policy for employment. Thus to complain that the military ranks will be manned by the poor and the black may in fact happen,but is at this juncture as realistic an appraisal of the situation as saying that the blacks will dominate the federal government. In either case, any results produced by these statistics are purely speculative and in the case of the military almost inconsequential. In fact, they indicate a lack of racial discrimination and a payment of wages that are attractive to blacks and the poor. The higher percentage of black and poor white

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[189] U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, _Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1973_, 94th ed.

[190] U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, _United States Census of Population: 1970_, vol. 1, _Characteristics of the Population_, pt. 1, United States Summary. Out of a total population of 203.2 million, 22.6 million were black.

[191] U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, _United States Census of Population: 1970_, _Subject Reports: Government Workers_, pp. 1, 7, 270-71.

re-enlistments may indicate that these particular servicemen have found a life in the armed forces which is distinctively preferable to available civilian alternatives. In either case of initial enlistment or re-enlistment, individual choice is accorded the soldier as much as it is accorded to the worker in the civilian society. In specific refutation to the fear of an all-black army, James Miller notes that the complainant is saying that

> since we [public] have failed to open all the doors of society at large to the Negro, we should close the door of opportunity in the military sector also. . . . Why shouldn't the Negro be allowed to enter the armed forces voluntarily if it represents a chance to better himself and to serve his nation more productively.[192]

In another vein, the making of military policy is still entrusted to civilian and military officers, both of whom are as representative now of a cross-section of American life as they were in the era of conscription. Self-selection into such employment is as much a factor in present times as it was in past eras.[193] Thus the fact that the military is now composed of fourteen percent black or could become ninety percent black is irrelevant to the military posture of the United States as long as the leadership of the forces and the forces themselves continue to carry out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and adhere to the tenets of conservatism, which includes and demands

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[192] James C. Miller, III, ed., Why the Draft? The Case for a Volunteer Army, with an Introduction by Senator Edward W. Brooke (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1968), p. 158.

[193] The concept of self-selection and socialization is discussed in some detail in Chapters IV and V.

adherence to such traits as group solidarity, obedience, patriotism, and duty. There is no indication that the MVA will subvert any of the historical characteristics of the military sector of society and thus a return to an all-volunteer concept after a thirty-three year period of conscription will not be the cataclysmic venture feared by the critics of the MVA but will in fact be a restoration of the historical civil-military equation which will be in the nature of objective civilian control.

The third of the major complaints voiced against the MVA is that it will undermine patriotism by weakening the traditional belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his country. Such a complaint has been voiced by, among others, the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement and by Representative John Dellenback (R-Ore.). The panel contended that MVA would abandon the unifying influence of the nation placing its faith in its own citizenry to rally to its defense when national security was threatened.[194] Representative Dellenback, in testifying before the House Special Subcommittee on the Draft in 1970, stated that by having a volunteer professional military defend the country, it would "eliminate the democratizing effect created by the infusion of a large number of volunteers from varying backgrounds and for short periods of time."[195]

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[194] Civilian Advisory Panel, Report, p. 18.

[195] U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Review of the Administration and Operation of the Draft Law, 1970, p. 12835.

The underlying concept of this complaint lies in the pronouncements of persons such as Thomas Jefferson, who advocated the citizen-soldier concept as the most fair and effective means for recruiting manpower to wage wars. Jefferson's concept has been interpreted by those protagonists of the draft to mean that conscription is part of the American tradition and citizen obligation. Critics of this viewpoint, which includes liberals, allow for a citizen army only when the national security or ideology is threatened, as in World Wars I and II. At all other times, conscription is antithetical to the historical evolution of American civil-military relations. A more definitive liberal answer to the criticism voiced by Representative Dellenback, who noted the non-democratizing effect of the MVA, is that it is better than conscription, which undermines respect for government because it coerces people to serve involuntarily in the armed forces. The draft in effect is not totally democratic in that it arbitrarily selects some and defers others because of such factors as health and intelligence. The Gates study issued concurrently with the Gates report noted that the exclusion and deferment policies which became part of the selective service system deterred any real democratic or "melting pot" theory from taking effect.[196] What must be understood is that the re-establishment of the volunteer system did not eliminate the selective service system, because in keeping with the liberal tenet of

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[196] President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Studies, 2 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), II: I-38-39.

total war or total peace, the President can re-establish induction in case of an emergency.

If one is of the belief that the military must be reflective of the larger society and thus is a proponent of subjective civilian control and of the Janowitz school of civil-military relations, then a move to MVA would appear to be antithetical to such democratization. But such a view can be nullified by the fact that as previously noted about fifty percent of the MVA would be first term volunteers and thus representative of the larger society. Also as in the draft, the MVA would represent beyond first term enlistment the character of American society particularly associated with elements that continue to be carriers of the traditional military ethos. This is in essence a self-selective process that lends itself under conditions of both the draft and MVA to a professional military force that is a tool of society.

The position that the military has to be democratized and reflect the larger civilian society ignores certain basic philosophical facts. The draft does in fact do little to democratize the services when it is considered that the enlistee has little philosophical input into the services. Even with the establishment of the MVA and its continued demand for new recruits, the impact which the enlistee will have in changing service policy will be similar to that which he had under the draft system. Such a claim also ignores the fact that, historically, civilian control has been continuously and successfully exercised over the military establishment. Any such relationship

affords some degree of democratization even if it is in a "watch-dog" status. The critics assume that the MVA will be fully career military when in fact it will have a high turnover rate as did the selective service system.[197] They also underestimate the importance of having a professional military, which historically has been the case but which has recently been seen as a threat to American society. Such a military force is assured of civilian control and thus can better utilize its manpower for a more productive and efficient national security policy. Finally, the whole concept of being representative is questioned from the viewpoint of whether this representation means more than having a representation of a cross-section of people in the National Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, or in the state and local police units. These organizations also have the means to incite a coup d'ètat, the prevention of which is assumed to be one of the reasons for being so fanatical about having civilian control over the federal military forces.

The drafting or volunteering of men for the lower echelons of the armed forces is little affected by any great concern for democratization. The armed forces by their very nature are humane but not democratic. Where democratization is meant to mean having the larger society carry out the burden of national defense, liberals would endorse this only in time of general crisis or war, and historical precedent would refute it as being antithetical to American civil-military relations.

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[197]See p. 196 for the statistics supporting this fact.

Where democratization means an input by draftees from the larger society, this is in fact negligible because of the basic autocratic nature of the military society. In conclusion, the MVA critics' position that military service can be justified solely on the ground that it is a universal and democratic responsibility is unfounded from both a philosophical and pragmatic viewpoint. Democratization and representation will continue under the MVA concept to the extent that both concepts are products of the realization that "root" differences have always existed between the two societies.

One final complaint voiced by the critics of the MVA is that by appealing to the lower class and black population, the armed forces will be manned by mercenaries. Representative James Burke (D-Mass.) in speaking on H.R. 6531 (Amendments to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967[198]) noted that

> despite all the claims to the contrary . . . I still am not entirely convinced . . . that we have to replace the draft, with all its inequities, with a system which will see rich man's wars fought by poor men--poor men who are attracted to battle and risk their lives simply because of an attractive pay.[199]

The Gates Commission anticipated this complaint and in its studies noted that American history offers no proof that volunteer armies are a danger to democratic policies. As it noted, volunteers like draftees, would never be "in a policy-making position

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[198] Amendments to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Statutes at Large 85, 348-62 (1971).

[199] U. S., Congress, House, Representative Burke speaking on Amending the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, H.R. 6531, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 30 March 1971, Congressional Record 117: 8643.

in the armed forces" because of the short-term of his enlistment. Even the inference that by sheer weight of numbers they would have something to say about military policy cannot be maintained, the commission thought, and its conclusion is equally applicable to volunteers.[200] There thus seems to be little credence to the claim of the MVA becoming a band of mercenaries. The civilian control exercised over the military since the founding of the Republic shows little sign of accommodating mercenaries. While the pros and cons of the MVA system were being discussed in all sectors of society, President Nixon's pledge of directing the nation toward a MVA, which started in the 1968 Presidential election campaign, moved closer to becoming a national policy through congressional action in 1971.

On 1 April 1971 the House passed H.R. 6531 by a vote of 293 to 99 which expressed the largest negative vote on draft legislation since 1951. On 24 June 1971 the Senate also passed the bill by a vote of 72 to 16. Many of the negative votes were cast in symbolic disagreement with the war and with the draft system. The President signed the legislation into law on 28 September 1971. H.R. 6531 extended the draft for two years to expire on 1 July 1973, which was acceptable to the anti-MVA critics, and substantial pay raises were granted first-term draftees, which was the first recommended step toward an MVA and acceptable to MVA proponents. Representative F. Edward Hébert (D-La.), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, seemed

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[200] President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Studies, II: III-1-37.

to express the feeling of Congress and the Administration by stating that the merit of H.R. 6531 was that basically the

> bill gives the President the tools to do the job by increasing substantially the basic pay for men with less than two years service. If an all-volunteer force is feasible, the bill does all that we can do legislatively to move, over a reasonable period of time, toward that objective.[201]

With the passage of the draft extension, the army issued its master plan for a MVA with the stated objective "to expedite the development of a capably led, highly competent fighting force which attracts motivated, qualified volunteers."[202] At the heart of the program was the effort to strengthen the army as an institution in two ways: (1) strengthen professionalism, and (2) improve army life. The first is a definite manifestation of a return to objective civilian control where the military becomes a professional instrument of national security policy. It is a realization that the voluntary armed forces will bring the civil-military equation again into its proper equilibrium. The second effort is a humanizing effort that will help to maintain an armed force relevant to society but still separate in its mission. In accordance with Section 211 of the draft extension law, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird issued a one-time report to Congress and the President in August, 1972 on the progress toward an MVA. He

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[201]U. S., Congress, House, Representative Hebert speaking for the Amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, H.R. 6531, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 30 March 1971, Congressional Record 117: 8634.

[202]U. S., Department of the Army, The Army's Master Program for the Modern Volunteer Army: A Program for Professionals (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 1.

was more than optimistic about the success of a MVA mainly because in a peacetime environment, the armed forces will function best when they can compete with other institutions for manpower. He coupled this attitude with the fact that volunteers tend to be more efficient than ones that are forced into the military.[203] The Secretary was depending on philosophical attitudes as the main factors in MVA's success. Concurrent with the hopeful development of a successful MVA was the rapid turn of events in the Vietnam War in late 1972. With the signing of the Paris accords on 27 January 1973, which brought an announced cease fire policy in Vietnam, Secretary Laird announced the ending of the draft and the exclusive dependence of the armed forces on volunteers for its manpower.[204]

Whether the MVA will be successful is the subject of discussion within all levels in the armed forces. Published statistics indicate that enlistment quotas are being met at the rate of ninety-two percent. What is more important is that the historical dichotomy between the two societies was re-established by a Congress and President that obviously believed that conscription had outlived its intended purpose and that a voluntary method was more in keeping with American tradition. It is in accordance with both traditions in that it satisfies the liberal

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[203] U. S., Department of Defense, Report to the President and the Chairman of the Armed Service Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 7.

[204] New York Times, 28 January 1973, p. 1.

tradition of individuality and individual choice while at the same time satisfying the military establishment by giving it more stability in manpower requirements that allows it to become more professional.

Now that the recruitment of the enlisted ranks has been brought under an all-volunteer concept, it is of importance to investigate the effect officer recruitment has on the "root" differences between the civilian and military societies. Chapter IV is thus devoted to an investigation of this effect as it pertains to officer recruitment through the military academies, the Officer Candidate Schools, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

CHAPTER IV

OFFICER RECRUITMENT

This chapter is devoted to an investigation of the effect which officer recruitment has on the "root" differences between the civilian and military societies. Although the recruitment process is carried on in a liberal environment and is directed toward the procurement of potential career officers, who are a product of this environment, the recruited officer has not had the liberalizing effect on the military establishment that one would commonly expect. Although recruitment is the only factor discussed in this chapter, it is not the only factor which is related to determining the political ethos of the military establishment via the officer ranks. Once the officer is recruited into the military, professional socialization then becomes an important factor in deciding the career motivation of the officer. This factor will be discussed in Chapter V.

Within the recruitment process, the three major sources of officer recruitment and thus training--the military academies, Officer Candidate Schools (OCS)/Officer Training Schools (OTS), and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)--will be investigated with the intent of possibly defining a general trend that

juxtaposes the liberal ethic of American society against the conservative ethic of the military establishment. The pattern to be investigated is one in which the main source of career military officers is the product of the most conservative institutions (military academies), while the fewest career officers are the product of the most liberal institutions, i.e., OCS/OTS candidates selected from colleges and universities. Between the two extremes is the officer procurement source which many military planners claim combines the best of the military and the civilian ethic--the ROTC program. The retention rate of officers whose commissioning source is ROTC is higher than OCS but lower than the military academies. Thus the most conservative institutions produce the most career officers while the most liberal institutions (colleges), which graduate ROTC students and is normally the source for OCS/OTS candidates, produce the fewest career officers. Such a pattern may not be surprising, but as the investigation will reveal, the cause of such a pattern has not been the result of chance alone.

The officer who is a voluntary and not draft-induced product of the recruitment process is one who more likely than not has an affinity for military life.[1] Thus the belief that the military is liberalized by the officers recruited into the ROTC and OCS/OTS programs is suspect. If this is true, then the detractors of the product produced by the military academies,

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[1]Draft-induced, as used in the context of this investigation, is used to refer to one who joins a military program as a result of the direct pressure of conscription.

who are at the same time protagonists of the citizen-soldier supposedly produced by non-academy sources, may be better understood.[2] Liberalizing the "root" differences between the military establishment and its civilian society by recruiting officers from a liberal environment may prove to be an illusion even to its most ardent supporters.

Military Academy

The concept in the United States of having a nation whose militia or military are trained in an academy or other educational institutions is basically an old notion dating back to the establishment of the government under the Constitution. In a speech before Congress in December, 1796, President George Washington recommended the establishment of two separate institutions as being vital to the conduct of good government. First, a national university should be established to provide for a common, liberal education of American youth in the service of government. A second institution, a military academy, should likewise be established because it would not only provide a place where students could study the art of war but could serve as a central repository for the knowledge and techniques of war.[3] Even if other

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[2]Peter Karsten and others are examples of writers who conclude that those who want to drive ROTC units from the liberal arts campuses should have some second thoughts, because there is a real need for these liberalized officers to serve in the armed forces; see "ROTC, MYLAI and the Volunteer Army," Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971): 155.

[3]George Washington, The Writings of George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-44), 35 (1940): 314-17.

factors than Washington's recommendation were instrumental in the founding of America's first military academy at West Point in 1802, his concept of such an institution as providing a place for the study of war was, in fact, basically ignored. Instead the Military Academy, established under the aegis of President Thomas Jefferson, was founded as a technical school, designed, as Samuel Huntington notes, "to serve the entire nation as a practical scientific school, not a professional academy for the military vocation."[4] Jefferson's interest in scientific matters rather than military matters was obviously present in the action. The establishment of a military institution which stressed technology has influenced the entire history of the educational programs not only at West Point, but at the Naval Academy at Annapolis, which was established in 1845. The establishment of the Air Force Academy in 1954 broke tradition when the policy makers and administrators placed great emphasis on the study of the humanities and social sciences, to the detriment, so thought some, of the technological aspects of the military profession.[5]

Thomas Jefferson's grand design was to formulate a program that produced engineers who would work in both the public and private sectors to help expand and develop the United States. Thus he recognized the public nature of the institutions as well

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[4]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), p. 198.

[5]The curriculum issue brought a liberal reaction from both West Point and Annapolis and helped spawn the Hébert investigation of 1967-68; for a more complete discussion of this matter see pp. 221-23 below.

as the public service of its graduates. Though the stress on scientific matters has declined somewhat over the years, the public nature of the first academy was made manifest in the mission assigned all the academies as they developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The common mission, basically identical for all three academies, was thus publicly oriented. Each academy provides academic instruction and military training which seeks to develop the motivation and ideals of duty, honor, and country which are essential to the development of a career military officer. More specifically, as stated in the catalogues for each academy, the missions are as follows:

> Military Academy-"To instruct and train the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate will have the qualities and attitudes essential to his progressive and continued development throughout his career as an officer in the Regular Army."
>
> Naval Academy-"To prepare young men morally, mentally, and physically to be professional officers in the naval service."
>
> Air Force Academy-"To educate and train career officers for the United States Air Force."

Thus as we view the academies in contemporary terms, their mission is stated in unequivocal terms--to produce career officers for the military services. To carry out this mission, the academies have under instruction a yearly total of approximately 13,500 students, evenly distributed among the three institutions, who are taught a four-year course combining academic and military education along with a vigorous physical education program and summer training exercises. All academy graduates receive a Bachelor of Science degree. As a general principle and without

analyzing the sociological profile of a prospective academy student,[6] the selective process at one particular academy, West Point, is based on a "whole man" concept score, which places sixty percent of the emphasis on academic matters, thirty percent on leadership potential, and the remaining ten percent on physical proficiency.[7] This concept corresponds favorably with the other academies' admission standards.

Injected into the academy educational process are such factors as leadership potential, physical proficiency, and career officer motivation, all of which have no equivalent value in the civilian academic world. In addition to these factors and peculiar to the military ethic is the idea of training vis-à-vis educating to carry out the mission of the academies. Education is the broader term commonly used to describe the general learning process in a liberal environment. Contrariwise, training is a concept that is basically job oriented. In the liberal arts environment, training and education are understood to be completely separate functions, but the "education programs of the armed services are conceptually and administratively part of the

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[6]For two introductory works that more than adequately analyze the sociological implications of military academy students see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971) and Laurence I. Radway, "Recent Trends at American Service Academies," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, ed. Charles C. Moskos, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971).

[7]Leo J. Kotula and Helen R. Haggerty, Research on the Selection of Officer Candidates and Cadets (Washington: U. S. Army Personnel Research Office, [1966]), pp. 10-11.

training function."[8] The academies' mission may best be carried out in an environment that stresses a positive training process that is goal oriented to the commissioning of career military officers.

Prior to World War II (1920-1940), the execution of the academies' mission was made easier by the presence of many factors: the small size of the student body (less than 2,000 at each of the academies); the stiff competition for appointments to the academies; the expense of colleges vis-à-vis economic factors of the era; and the respect accorded those who pursued a career as a military officer. This era also witnessed the isolation from society of the military establishment because it was not only antithetical to liberal tradition, but was a burden on a society that had no real world security commitment that could not be literally handled by landing a detachment of marines on foreign shores. The mission and function of the academies was in consonance with the historical philosophical dichotomy between the military and civilian societies. The military ethos was isolated from the mainstream of American thought, and a sort of benign neglect was characteristic of the relationship between society and its military establishment because of the latter's small size and small budgetary requirements. The concept of the "militarization of the military," as defined by Samuel Huntington's theory of objective civilian control, was the

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[8] John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, <u>Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 51.

prevalent civil-military policy.

Just as World War II changed the structure of most of the world's institutions, it also brought the military establishment into a new position of power within the American political and social system. One of the first indications of how the postwar military academies would continue to carry out the function for which they were established was contained in a Report of the Board to Study the Methods of Educating Naval Officers of July, 1944. The Navy committee responsible for the report rejected a proposal to combine both academies. A separate Naval Academy was essential, the committee noted, because while any one of many technical schools and colleges could provide a proper education, "none . . . can provide the equivalent training, discipline, and indoctrination and character building."[9] The Department of the Army staff arrived at basically the same conclusion. In testimony before a House of Representatives subcommittee on appropriations on 27 May 1946, General Maxwell Taylor, then Superintendent of the Military Academy, testifying in reference to a proposal to make West Point a two year graduate institution, stated that ". . . we must have these young men in their formative years if we are to implant the principles in them which we try to implant."[10] A historical summary of

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[9]U. S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Report of the Board to Study the Methods of Educating Naval Officers (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 1.

[10]U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1947, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, p. 620.

postwar academy policies, in fact, confirms that academies did return to a full four year program from a war time imposed two-three year program and did return to basically training students to become future military officers. Education in non-military subjects continued to be relegated to a secondary position of importance. This educational policy was short lived in that the civil-military relations of the era rapidly changed.

Because of post-World War II cold war considerations, the historical military policy of objective control was changed, and the military sector gradually emerged as co-partners with the civilian in policy making. The policy of subjective control became the dominant civil-military relationship in that the military became more of a "mirror" of society and an extension of civilian policy rather than a "tool" of society. Such historical changes brought the military into the closest contact, outside wartime conditions, it had ever had with the civilian sector and produced a new interest in civilian matters which generated the era of political-military policy making. This new-found coordination and response of the military to the civilian ethic in turn spawned an awakening in the academies of the need to re-evaluate their curricula. With the establishment of the Air Force Academy in 1954 and its relative freedom from tradition, an innovative educational experience was generated which placed more emphasis on the humanities and social sciences than had heretofore been experienced at the two other academies. Both these academies followed shortly (early 1960s) with their own academic revolutions, with the Naval Academy being

more innovative than the Military Academy.

Such a liberal revolution would have been more than welcome at most liberal arts colleges, but its applicability to the academies' unchanged mission of producing career military officers produced inherent conflict. Because the military academy graduate provides the most institutionalized professional input into the military establishment, any reduction in the professional standards of academy graduates could possibly lower and even compromise overall service standards, which included such military characteristics as the conservative traits of loyalty, group integrity, courage, and obedience. These qualities are not necessarily acquired by long study or reasoned argument but by discipline, symbols, and personal example. What was happening was that the military academies were attempting to liberalize their image, procedures, and curricula while at the same time attempting to continue to instill into their students the conservative traits of the "heroic" military officer. The Vietnam War, aided by the social revolution of the 1960s, spawned an anti-military bias that produced an added impetus, at least at the Naval Academy, to become, as a Superintendent once remarked, "a Harvard on the Severn River."[11] The result of this trend toward a more liberal academy brought forth a one-time review, which up to this point was unique among the academies, of the entire military and academic program at the

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[11]Comment made by Admiral Draper Kauffman, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, to the faculty forum at the Naval Academy on 18 November 1967.

Academy. On 20 November 1967, an ad hoc Professional Training and Education committee submitted its final report on the professional training and education of midshipmen at the Naval Academy in which they unanimously concluded that the present professional (military) training and education program at the Academy did not satisfy the mission of the Academy, which is to train and educate career officers of the Navy. Their conclusion was based on the premise that the Academy had shifted both teaching and credited course emphasis to academic courses to the detriment of professional training.[12]

This report, coupled with the numerous complaints about the quality of academy graduates in general, generated a Congressional investigation (1967-68) by a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and chaired by Representative F. Edward Hébert (D-La.) with the purpose of making a thorough

> inquiry into the operation of the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Air Force Academy to . . . assure a professional military force truly representative of a cross-section of the American people.[13]

Thus ensued an independent investigation into whether within the new liberal environment the service academies had lost sight of the fact that their mission was to train future career officers. The message that they exist only for this purpose was made

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[12]The Report of the U. S. Naval Academy Professional and Education ad hoc committee is included as an appendix to U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Administration of the Service Academies, Report and Hearings of the Special Subcommittee on Service Academies. 90th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1967-68, 10224a-10974.

[13]Ibid., p. 10224a.

quite clear in a session which officials at the Naval Academy had with subcommittee chairman Hébert, in which he acknowledged both his pleasure with how the Military Academy was performing its function of "training" officers and his displeasure with the Air Forces' seemingly cavalier attitude toward the same goal. As Hébert noted,

> what would you think of a school [referring to the Air Force Academy] that had 70 percent of its students on some type of dean's list? It must have a lot of intelligent students or it must be academically ineffective. I am inclined to believe it is the latter.[14]

Hébert believed that the methods used to carry out the Naval Academy's mission were not as good as the Military Academy's but better than the Air Force Academy's. His belief about the Air Force's performance of its mission was later confirmed in the hearings.

> The reason this committee sits is because of information that has come to us which indicated particularly in the area of the Air Force it was concentrating on academics and subordinating military training.[15]

Admiral Draper Kauffman, then Superintendent of the Naval Academy, noted in his testimony that the top specific task of the Naval Academy is first and foremost moral and character development, and second to conduct military training with the initial emphasis on discipline, willingness, and ability to follow orders. The fourth priority of six was an academic education. As Kauffman related to the subcommittee, "as you know our

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[14]Interview with Representative F. Edward Hébert (D-La.), U. S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., 2 February 1968.

[15]U. S., Congress, House, Administration of the Service Academies, p. 10892.

graduate has a 5-year obligated service, but we never talk about that here at the Academy because we are in the business of producing 30- or 40-year men, not 5 year men."[16] Similar testimony and statements of their respective academy's mission were heard from General Thomas Moorman, Superintendent of the Air Force Academy at the time, and General Donald Bennett, then Superintendent of the Military Academy.[17] One of the conclusions made by the Hébert subcommittee directly reflected the committee's concern with the mission of the academies. As Hébert put it, the review of academy operations and administration enabled members of all academies to "fully appreciate the determination of the Congress to insure that our future career officers will, in truth, understand and wholeheartedly accept the precept of 'duty, honor, country'."[18]

Little doubt thus remains that the historic mission of the military academies remains as conceived by the Hébert investigation and particularly accentuated in its overall conclusions. The historical dichotomy between education and training manifested in the difference between college/universities and military academies restricts how liberal a military academy can become and still train its students to fight a war. The conservative element of the military establishment remains dominant in setting forth the academies' mission.

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[16] Ibid., pp. 10395-96.

[17] Ibid., pp. 10680-81, 10547.

[18] Ibid., p. 10224e.

Once the institution defines its parameters and thus by its very nature the extent of any liberalization, then any external liberalization is subjected to the type of student who seeks and is admitted to a military academy. This process will be referred to as the self-selection process. Just as the function of the academy limits, for all practical purposes, the extent of any effective civilianization and liberalization, so does the professional ideology and self-selection of the military officer serve as a powerful counterforce to liberalization. In fact, they assist in reinforcing the limits of an academy's liberalization efforts. What may differentiate the military from other bureaucratic institutions is that as managers of violence, the notion of combat, either preparation for or actual battle, remains a central value unique to the military profession. Another unique characteristic that typifies military self-selection is noted by Mayer Zald and William Simon.

> Historically, military career choices in American society have not competed in the marketplace of occupational opportunities. On the one hand, to a greater extent than is true of most occupations, military career choices have been nourished in family and regional traditions. . . . Furthermore, whereas entrance into most occupations of middle-class status is usually relatively voluntary, entrance into the officer corps is in some cases one step from coercion, representing avoidance of conscription or of enlisted-man status rather than a positive choice.[19]

Such an observation, while partly appropriate to describing academy recruitment, is directed more toward ROTC and OCS

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[19] Mayer N. Zald and William Simon, "Career Opportunities and Commitments Among Officers," in The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, ed. Morris Janowitz (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964), p. 270.

students when conscription is in effect.

A more accurate assessment of the recruitment function as it pertains to the self-selection of academy students is one that realizes that the military attracts people whose motives, habits, values, and images of life have the greatest chance of fulfillment within the military establishment. In this sense a military career, as any other career, can be considered as a set of choices. In either case, if the civilian or military occupation allows a certain gratification of values relative to other possible choices, the person is likely to remain in the profession. Thus in the case of the military, its conservative ethos would appeal to those of similar social and political traits. Laurence Radway believes that self-selection into the academies is a more important determinant of future attitudes and values than the kinds of experiences that the students undergo through the in-service socialization process.[20] John Lovell in his extensive study of the impact of West Point training on officer attitudes concluded that "socialization at West Point produces only slight impact upon professional orientations and strategic perspectives of the cadet."[21] Adam Yarmolinsky believes that self-selection into the officer corps is more important in determining attitudes than the impact of life in the military academies.[22] Morris Janowitz calculates that since 1945 more and

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[20] Radway, "Recent Trends," p. 4.

[21] John P. Lovell, "The Professional Socialization of the West Point Cadet," in Janowitz, The New Military, p. 145.

[22] Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 223.

more cadets entering the academies are doing so through a self-selection process. By the 1960s more than one-fourth of entering cadets came from career military families,[23] the implication of such a statistic being that such families influence self-selection. More recent statistics indicate that entering students at the academies are becoming more self-selectively oriented. The Class of 1972 at West Point, for example, was comprised of 13.4 percent officer's sons and 46.4 percent enlisted men sons.[24] Only 14.7 percent of the fathers did not serve in the military in some capacity. Statistics for the Classes of 1973 and 1974 at West Point show a similar emphasis on self-recruitment, particularly of sons of enlisted men.[25] Thus is established a possible causal relationship within the family whereby the father's occupation influences to a great degree the occupation of the son. This may be particularly evident in the military which provides upward mobility, particularly for the sons of enlisted men.

Recent research has shown that interest in the military profession was the most frequently reported reason given by those who selected the Military Academy, and that the most important

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[23]Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. xxv.

[24]Office of Institutional Research, United States Military Academy: Characteristics of the Class of 1972 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1968]), p. 9.

[25]Office of Institutional Research, United States Military Academy: Characteristics of the Class of 1973 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1969]); Office of Institutional Research, United States Military Academy: Characteristics of the Class of 1974 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1970]).

intrinsic factors that influenced selection of West Point were parents and contact with the military.[26] In research conducted in the autumn of 1968 on the Military Academy Classes of 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972, cadets were requested to report the extrinsic/intrinsic factors that influenced their decision to attend the Military Academy. Fifty-one percent gave as the most important reason for seeking an appointment the desire for a military career. Likewise, the major reasons given for declining the appointment were as follows: lack of desired curriculum at the Academy, acceptance by the college of their first choice, and length of mandatory service obligation.[27] Although similar statistics were not available at either the Naval Academy or the Air Force Academy, there is no reason to believe that the same observations would not be generally true at these schools. This is based on the fact that the admission standards, missions, and overall ethos of the three academies would attract similar applicants and similar responses.

Another indicator of the self-selection process is illustrated by the announced political attitudes of freshmen entering the academies as compared to freshmen entering four-year private universities that could generally be considered the most liberal of higher educational institutions. It is not surprising that the entering academy freshmen in 1970 tended to

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[26]Gerald W. McLaughlin, Jr., A Multidimensional View of Cadets' Decision to Seek a USMA Nomination (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1970]), pp. 2-3.

[27]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

perceive of themselves as being more conservative in their political preferences than the national norms. In fact, the academy students' political identification compared favorably with that of the nation's technical institutions, which have tended to have the most conservative orientation. The following data is collated to indicate the differences between the current political beliefs of freshmen entering the three academies and seventy-two private, four-year colleges and universities. Table 4 indicates a line comparison and Figure 3 indicates the differences in a more graphic manner.

TABLE 4

CURRENT POLITICAL PREFERENCES (Percentages)

School	Far Left	Liberal	Middle of Road	Conservative	Far Right
Academies	0.5	26.5	39.3	32.3	1.4
Private	4.6	42.7	36.9	15.0	0.8

Source: American Council on Education, National Norms for Entering College Freshmen--Fall 1970 (Washington: American Council on Education, Office of Research, [1970]), p. 25; Charles L. Cochran, "Midshipmen and Cadet Profiles and National Norms: A Comparison," Naval War College Review 24 (May 1972): 43; Gerald W. Medsger, A Comparison of New Cadets at United States Military Academy with Entering Freshmen at Other Colleges, Class of 1974 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Institutional Research, [1971]), p. 20.

FIGURE 3

GRAPHIC COMPARISON OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES



One can conclude that the academies through both their functional restrictions and self-selection process attract significantly fewer liberal and more conservative students than would possibly be expected due to chance.

One additional result of this pattern of self-selection works to the detriment of recruitment. Historically speaking, Andrew Jackson was instrumental in having the base for recruitment into the military academy changed in 1843 to a more representative system based on congressional appointments. This system is basically the one in use today at all the academies. The point is that regardless of the broadening of the base in social recruitment, it seems that the officers recruited into the academies have political attitudes that remain in consonance with the conservative military establishment. More succinctly, broadening the social base in officer recruitment has not been accompanied by a concomitant process of democratization in the officer's

political beliefs. The political orientation of the officer corps seems more contingent upon organizational expectations and less on the pattern of recruitment.

With the end of conscription in 1973 and the introduction of the all-volunteer concept, combined with the social developments of the 1960s, a new factor has been introduced into the possible liberalization of the service academies. This is the growing unpopularity of things military among American youth, in part spawned by the Vietnam War and the social revolution which generated an awareness and ethos of an anti-military "self" ethic in the 1960s. This could well mean that the historical concept of having the military academies attended by students who are representative of the country-at-large may have changed. With the advent of the modern volunteer army, it is likely that a narrower range of individuals is likely to apply for admission to and opt for a service academy education. Increasingly it would seem that such a person would be predominantly the highly motivated, self-selected individual from a distinctly conservative background who was willing and able to ignore peer-group pressure and choose a military career. In this sense, the anti-military bias of the youth culture may in fact ironically produce a more militaristic military by the very fact that only those individuals whose values closely resemble the conservative military establishment will enter the military profession of the future. How extensive this polarization will become is unknown at this juncture, but in any case the continuing trend toward a more conservative student body at the service academies may run

counter to the overt attempts at liberalization by its faculty and administration. Such a trend certainly confirms the inherent conservative nature of both the institution and the students who attend.[28]

One of the best indicators of how self-selection determines to a large extent the composition of the officer corps is the factor of retention on active military duty of officers who graduate from the academies vis-à-vis those who graduate from other recruitment sources. Relying on the observations made by John Lovell in his investigation of the Military Academy cadets, in which he concluded that the Military Academy does not have the comprehensive impact of implanting the traditional values on its student body one might believe,[29] and noting that self-selection does, in fact, play a major role in determining whether one attends an academy or not, academy graduates tend to be more committed than graduates of other procurement sources at least as far as retention statistics indicate. The percentages noted in Table 5 are representative of one particular year group and are submitted only to indicate representative retention rates relative to commission source. Variables such as the modern volunteer army, war, and domestic social and economic conditions will alter

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[28]Conclusions are based on the author's observations made at the Naval Academy, September, 1966 through May 1968, August 1973, and at the Military Academy, January 1973.

[29]Lovell, "Professional Socialization," p. 120. Lovell's observations may be modified by the observations made by Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. 170 in which they note that the academies are the "repositories of service ethos. It is at the academies that the services define the ideals to which they expect their officers, from whatever source derived, to aspire."

TABLE 5

SERVICE RETENTION vs. SOURCE OF COMMISSION
(Year Group 1963--Percentages)

Service	5 Years (1968)			7 Years (1970)			9 Years (1972)		
	MA	ROTC	OCS	MA	ROTC	OCS	MA	ROTC	OCS
Army	96.4	77.9	13.5	83.0	60.4	12.0	75.0	56.0	10.4
Navy	78.4	59.6	16.1	50.0	24.6	12.3	46.8	22.6	12.0
Air Force	78.5	51.8	28.9	58.0	37.0	18.0	54.0	36.7	15.0

Source: U. S., Department of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 1 July 1973.

Note: Intervals were picked to correspond with "mile-stones" in ones career: 5 year--initial obligation over for all commissioning sources; 7 year--seventy to eighty percent of all officers who leave the service do so within two years after their initial military obligation expires; 9 year--promotion to Major (Army and Air Force) and Lieutenant Commander (Navy) is close to the midway point in a twenty-year career.

percentages within each particular commissioning source over a span of years, but such conditions will not greatly affect the relationship among the three sources. The statistics indicate rather conclusively that more academy graduates devote their career to a military profession while most non-military academy officers do not. The figures also verify Representative Hébert's praise for the career officer produced at West Point.[30]

The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force reported in 1970 that although the military academies

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[30]For a further discussion of this matter see pp. 221-22 above. West Point has consistently retained more of its graduates on active duty than the other two academies.

produced only three percent of all newly commissioned officers in the selected fiscal year 1968, these academy graduates have in the past and will continue in the future to set the standards for the services and are far more likely to be career officers. They eventually hold the predominant share of responsibility and power within the military service.[31]

In conclusion, the attempt to liberalize the academies is to a large extent thwarted by the very nature of the institutions, of the mission they are to carry out, and of the students who opt to attend an academy. Although the ROTC, OCS, and OTS programs furnish from ninety to ninety-five percent of the annual officer input into the military services and with it the hopes for liberalization of the military establishment, low self-selection rates, a high resignation rate, and the nature of the conservative institution vis-à-vis the political beliefs of their students diminish to a large extent any thrust toward liberalization of the military establishment that might result therefrom. The post-Vietnam ethos of anti-militarism manifested somewhat in the establishment of the all-volunteer military concept will likely tend to further amplify the self-selective process. Since liberalization of the military establishment through the recruitment of individuals from a liberal environment into the military academies has proven to be more of an illusion than fact, an examination of the remaining major sources of officer procurement (OCS/OTS and ROTC) will be made to determine whether

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[31]President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 72, 77.

or not they provide an infusion of liberalism into the military establishment.

Officer Candidate School

Officer Candidate School, conducted by all three services and mainly open to college graduates and some enlisted men, and Officer Training School, conducted by the Air Force for college graduates only, are officer procurement programs designed basically to train, not educate, within a short period of time, usually three to four months, reserve officers to fill particular billets that are vacant because of a shortage of active duty regular officers.[32] Under wartime conditions, the OCS programs expand to become the largest source of officer procurement. For example, in 1967 and 1968 at the height of the Vietnam War, while West Point produced 558 and 667 graduates and Army ROTC produced 10,727 and 14,176 graduates, Army OCS produced 19,226 and 18,355 officers, respectively. By 1973 and with the military withdrawal from the Vietnam War nearing completion, Army OCS was annually training, 1,000 or less officers, which was a sufficient number needed to maintain a much lower officer manning level. Although the Air Force and Navy manpower needs in the war were of a lesser magnitude than the Army's and thus their requirements for OCS graduates not nearly so high as the Army's, all three services, as they had done in the past, utilized the program as a method to expand the officer corps manning level

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[32]The OTS program is considered for purposes of this investigation part of the OCS program.

rapidly.[33] From all outward appearances, the OCS program would appear to be the best source and method for liberalizing the military establishment because most personnel accepted into the program have completed college or finished some college work. When demand levels for officers are high, the quality and quantity of education requirements decrease and vice versa.

Despite the appearances of potential liberal input, particular when the demand level is high, philosophical "root" differences between the two societies precludes any great liberalization for several reasons. The high resignation rate shown in Table 5 of OCS students indicates to a large extent the desire of students to fulfill an involuntary or draft-induced military obligation in the fashion best suited to their needs. Avoidance of serving as an enlisted man is another factor. The relatively short obligation (two to three years) period serves as another influence in having young men join the military through OCS. Thus OCS students who remain on active duty beyond their initial obligation, particularly as noted in Table 5, are then viewed as objects of initial self-selection and subsequent professional socialization. In the "draft free" environment under the all-volunteer concept, and particularly in peacetime, officer entry into the military establishment via the OCS program will be minimal.

Thus the program which provided the majority of military manpower for World War II and in the interim years until the

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[33]Quotas in the program vary from month to month depending on the need for officers on active duty.

establishment of the modern volunteer army on 1 July 1973 supplied the largest initial input into the officer corps, will be almost ineffective from the viewpoint of providing a steady input of liberally educated officers into the military establishment for what has been statistically speaking mainly one obligated tour of duty. Thus while any liberal input would be minimum from officers of lower rank, those officers graduated through the OCS program who reach upper or general/flag ranks are a small minority of the total officer manning level. With the operation of the modern volunteer army and the drastic reduction in OCS officer procurement, future liberal input will be further restricted. The pragmatic reasons for having an OCS program (training quantities of students in the shortest period of time to fill an immediate need) seems to outweigh the philosophical nature of the input of the program on the military establishment. Once again retention statistics confirm that any OCS input is considered temporary and transient.

Reserve Officer Training Corps

The other major recruitment source of officers is the ROTC program which is organized to bring college students into the program who are then concurrently trained in military subjects and educated in the arts and sciences. To many, such a program combines the qualities that Thomas Jefferson spoke of as the citizen-soldier. To others, ROTC remains more attached to the principles of the military academies than the other extreme of OCS. Whereas the OCS program is in many ways a "stop-gap" measure designed to supply officers when demand exceeds

institutional supply either through the academy or ROTC program, the ROTC program has been institutionalized as a regular source of officer procurement since the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. This Act created the organized reserve force for which officers would be mainly trained in and procured from the ROTC program conducted in civilian colleges and universities. The act authorized a reserve commission to be awarded to those who successfully completed a four-year curriculum at civilian educational institutions.[34]

The history of the American experience with ROTC may have philosophically begun with the Militia Act of 1792, which affirmed the concept of the citizen army,[35] and with Thomas Jefferson's later hopes for a citizen army.[36] In fact, the actual manifestation of such a concept began with the founding of the American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy (now called Norwich University in Vermont) in 1819. Its mission was partially to provide officers for the national defense who would be identified with the interests of the community. To accomplish this mission, the academy provided courses in professional military training. The next civilian military colleges to be established were Virginia Military Institute in 1839 and The Citadel in 1842. The lack of trained and experienced officers in the Civil War was in part responsible for the inclusion of military

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[34]National Defense Act, Statutes at Large 39, sec. 49, 193 (1916).

[35]For a further discussion of this matter see p. 35 above.

[36]For a further discussion of this matter see p. 41 above.

instruction in the curricula of colleges and universities under the terms of the Morrill Act of 1862.[37]

Justin Morrill (Whig-Vt.) noted in Congress that he did not consider the expansion of West Point to be an operational solution to the problem of providing adequately prepared officers, because a centrally-controlled standing army was a danger to a free society. By his reasoning, having military training in a civilian educational institution was a means by which a democratic people could gain a competent officer corps without endangering their basic liberties.[38] In brief, the Morrill Act offered to each state tracts of federally owned public lands or script in lieu thereof. The funds derived from the land sale (or the holding of script) were to be devoted to

> the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding the scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts.[39]

Between 1862 and 1916, neither the Congress nor the War Department made any serious attempts to define exactly how military instruction was to be carried out at the Land-Grant Colleges. There was no machinery established to administer the program nor was there much enthusiasm for such military training. It was

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[37] Act Donating Public Lands to the Several States and Territories which may provide Colleges for the Benefit of Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts, Statutes at Large 12, 503-05 (1862).

[38] U. S., Congress, House, Representative Morrill speaking on the donation of land to states and territories to provide colleges, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 6 June 1862, Congressional Globe 4 (Appendix E): 256.

[39] Act Donating Public Lands, p. 504.

really not clear in the early years of the act whether the military training was to be a compulsory or optional course of study. Although several supplemental acts were later amended to the original act and specifically detailed military officers to land-grant campuses, very few arrived because of the Army's basic indifference to the program. Colleges and universities were left to decide for themselves what role military training was to play in the life of students. Some made military instruction a four year requirement, others for three years, others for two, and still others did not require it at all. By 1898, there were organized military departments in forty-two institutions. It was not until the National Defense Act of 1916, which created the organized reserve corps for which officers would be largely trained in a Reserve Officer Training Corps, that the teaching of military subjects at Land-Grant Colleges experienced a vast expansion, and equally important, it became institutionalized.

Following the stated need for reserve officers in the National Defense Act of 1916, the ROTC program continued to expand on campuses until by 1972 there were a total of 517 Army, Navy, and Air Force ROTC units at the colleges and universities in the United States and Puerto Rico, with an enrollment of approximately 109,000 cadets and midshipmen. Although there have been numerous and continuing policy and administrative changes made to the original ROTC concept to make it more responsive to the needs of the student and the military, the philosophy under which the program was founded has not changed, except for the fact that more emphasis is now placed on producing regular and

career oriented officers rather than on commissioning reserve officers, if only because of the expense of the time and money spent in attracting and training students in the program.

Through the years the mission of the ROTC has been to train selected college students for reserve commissions, and then since World War II, for long-term career purposes. More specifically, it is to bring together the military and the academic world so that there is a better understanding between them. But more important, it is a process wherein the military is provided with an input that reflects a side of the military other than that found at the military academies. Thus what we have been witnessing has been the historic evolution of the Jeffersonian concept of the citizen-soldier. Before examining more closely the validity of the citizen-soldier concept, other questions depict the larger philosophical dilemma that confronts the ROTC program. Such rhetorical questions can be thus stated: Can the military expect the ROTC program to produce a liberal citizen-soldier? Does the ROTC program in fact attract potential officers that will eventually liberalize the military establishment? These questions are very different and are considered equally important to the commonly asked questions as to whether or not ROTC, a military institution, is compatible with the purpose of a university, or whether the ROTC institution is academically acceptable or even belongs on a college campus. These questions are addressed in Chapter V. Instead, as noted, this inquiry into the recruitment function is directed to an investigation of whether the combination of a liberal college or

university and a ROTC student produces a liberalized officer. Once the quality of the student produced by the program is determined, then the parameters of its policy are established on what it can and can not accomplish on a college campus. From this, the proper relationship of the program with the academic community can be established. If the program is found to be ineffective in producing a liberalized ROTC student, then its removal from prestigious liberal campuses and subsequent establishment on campuses more willing to accept the military should be considered. The geographical shift of ROTC units in the 1970s, as discussed in the latter part of the chapter, is an obvious manifestation of this observation.

There are many protagonists of the ROTC program who contend that educating military officers on civilian campuses strengthens the civilian control and influence over the military. These same advocates believe that ROTC is a link between higher education and the federal government and thus there is a bridge established between the two that tends to add legitimacy to the education carried on at campuses. The university is perceived as an institution that transmits knowledge and values, and therefore training of ROTC students in a liberal atmosphere can be viewed as an extension of that educational process. In this particular situation, the military is possibly lured into believing that the factors of linkage and legitimacy will produce an officer who is a combination of a career officer and liberalized student. Other outcomes are also expected of the amalgamation of the college student with the prospective military officer.

The leadership of the nation should come from the brightest, best educated, and most motivated of the nation's young men. One of the reasons for the ROTC is that there is always the chance that military academies will contribute to undue service parochialism and thus another, more liberal, source is needed to balance the officer corps. Over-reliance on academy graduates can create an inbred military elite. Thus by having the continued presence of a substantial number of military officers from a wide variety of civilian educational institutions and backgrounds is a guarantee against the establishment of a military caste system in the United States. Such a position was expressed by the Special Committee of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on ROTC in its report to the Secretary of Defense in September, 1969, wherein the committee called for the continuance of ROTC based on its compatibility with the primary function of institutions of higher learning.[40] A more meaningful observation was made by the advisory panel on ROTC to the Secretary of Defense in their comments on the special committee's report. The panel believed that the main purpose of the ROTC program was officer education, which is a form of professional education, to be conducted at the highest level.[41] The ROTC is thus pictured to be a proper amalgamation between citizen and soldier which is the _raison d'etre_ for ROTC. But does this supposed relationship in fact

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[40]Special Committee on ROTC, _Report to the Secretary of Defense_ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 8.

[41]Ibid., p. 1.

exist?

There are basically three main characteristics that distinguish the ROTC program from regular on-campus educational activities. First, the absolutist vision of the military distinguishes it from other professions in that as Harold Lasswell noted, military people deal in the "management of violence." This has prompted some military men to question the need for a general liberal education to develop these unique characteristics. Second, the development of the characteristics (leadership, loyalty, obedience to name a few) to enhance the above is not exactly the function of civilian institutions. Students do not feel as bound to these "core" values and the obedience to certain standards of conduct and performance that are strictly military in nature. Third, as long as ROTC remains on civilian campuses, it will, as Gene Lyons and John Masland note, mean that the "ROTC will continue to be regulated and operated by the separate services as essentially a training and recruitment device rather than as an educational program."[42] To carry this third characteristic to a logical conclusion, training is concerned with the specifics of a military system, which is related to roles and missions, all of which is related to strategy and tactics. The overall educational process of colleges and universities does not perceive of its function in exactly the light of training for roles and missions, strategy and tactics.

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[42]Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the ROTC, with a Forward by John Sloan Dickey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. vii.

Despite the arguments for and against the institution of ROTC, much of the debate is focused on the image of whether the program has in fact produced the citizen-soldier. As William Lucas has succinctly stated,

> if the products of the ROTC are significantly different from members of American society in general, or more specifically different from comparable college students, then the citizen-soldier does not operate as it was intended.[43]

If one accepts Lucas' observation as a factually true picture of a citizen-soldier, then the basic process of self-selection into the ROTC program and peer-group pressure make the citizen-soldier model hopelessly impractical. In the case of self-selection, like attitudes (military and ROTC student) attract and then reinforce each other. Peer-group pressure reinforces the pledge to serve with others who hold the same pre-dispositions.[44] In addition to Lucas' observations, it is likely that Jefferson believed that if the methods of entering the military and training the military force were democraticized, then the force per se would represent society and be democratic as well. What Jefferson may have neglected to consider was that the elimination of the differential access to the military, basically through a competitive and not an ascriptive system, does not remove the self-selective desire to enter the military. The data compiled below should help to clarify the citizen-soldier/self-

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[43]William Ashley Lucas, II, "The American Lieutenant: An Empirical Investigation of Normative Theories of Civil-Military Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1966), p. 52.

[44]Ibid., p. 53.

selection syndrome by comparing father-son occupations.

The data in Table 6 was gathered from three separate sources--a 1959 survey of the occupations of high ranking (elite) officer's fathers, a 1964 National Opinion Research Center survey of all army officers vis-à-vis their father's occupations, and the 1960 and 1970 characteristics of the United States population. Same year data was not available.

TABLE 6

OCCUPATIONS OF THE OFFICERS' FATHERS AND THE UNITED STATES MALE POPULATION (Percentages)

Occupation	1959 Elite Military Officers	1964 NORC Army Officer Corps	1960 U.S. Male Population	1970 U.S. Male Population
White Collar	62.2	49.4	34.8	34.5
Blue Collar	18.9	29.4	46.3	45.9
Farmer	9.7	9.1	8.3	8.3
Military	8.5	4.8	- -	- -

Source: W. Lloyd Warner et al., The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 323; Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), p. 195; U. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census of Population: 1960, 1970, vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 1, United States Summary.

One obvious conclusion regarding the social origins of officers is that when compared with the white and blue collar populations of the United States, fathers with white collar jobs are clearly overrepresented in the officer corps while fathers with blue

collar jobs are underrepresented. Thus the sons are in fact not that representative of the characteristics of the male population.

Self-selection appears to result in patterns of ROTC attitudes that are significantly more characteristic of the professional soldier than the citizen-soldier. Robert Gage, in conducting a series of tests with 145 midshipmen at the Naval ROTC unit at Northwestern University to determine the effect of military training on discipline, arrived at the conclusion that students who joined the Naval ROTC program accepted military discipline more fully before they joined the program than did the college students who did not join.[45] Further tests revealed that those who preferred association with the military in college (basically cadets and midshipmen who more readily accepted military discipline) also exhibited greater patriotic sentiment.[46] To confirm further that self-selection is also partly established in family relationships, James Montgomery conducted a survey of all ROTC students at Ohio State University in 1971 by asking where the students had received their information on ROTC. By far the most common response, from 33 percent of the students, was from a member of the family. The next common reply, 19.1 percent, was from college friends and peer-groups enrolled in ROTC.[47] The latter is in essence similar to the

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[45]Robert Gage, "Patriotism and Military Discipline as a Function of Degree of Military Training," Journal of Social Psychology 64 (October 1964): 106.

[46]Ibid., p. 109.

[47]James Montgomery, "Lost Opportunity: Army ROTC" (Course paper, U. S., Army War College, 1972), p. 15.

findings of William Lucas in his survey at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.[48] All the above observations, when viewed separately, obviously are not conclusive. But when viewed in a total context, they tend to confirm the presence of a self-selection process in the recruitment of students into ROTC, a situation that was previously noted as being evident in the recruitment process into the military academies. Likewise, the self-selection process, if it does not refute the idea of the citizen-soldier, tends to place the historic Jeffersonian concept in a new context. The citizen-soldier may be in fact more a rhetorical symbol than an active participant in the military service.

While the nation depended upon conscription as the main method for providing military manpower between 1940 and 1973, the self-selection process, which by the observations made so far, limited the amount of liberalization one could expect to be transferred from the liberal society to the military establishment through the student. Students who during this era entered the ROTC program did so for reasons in addition to a voluntary self-selection process.

Nona Malbin, in analyzing the ROTC on college campuses, concludes that surveys of college students clearly support the conclusion that the draft was a major reason for student enrollment in ROTC because it was a way to be deferred from military

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[48]Lucas, "American Lieutenant."

service.[49] Robert Nichols concluded in a study published in 1971 that the threat of the draft was then "the strongest motivating force currently influencing college youth to volunteer for officer training programs."[50] Mayer Zald and William Simon claim that in 1964 more than fifty percent of the officer corps consisted of officers who had not made a positive career choice but instead joined to fulfill a military obligation (ROTC) or joined after serving as an enlisted man through the OCS program.[51] In a study published by Glenn Griffin in 1972 for the United States Air Force of a survey conducted of 579 Air Force ROTC cadets, the following results are significant: forty-two percent responded that the draft was the most significant reason for enrollment in ROTC; forty-five percent responded that the draft was the second most important reason for ROTC enrollment; sixty-one percent said that the draft influenced their friends to enroll in ROTC.[52] Nancy Guinn in a study for the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory on the impact of the all-volunteer force on Air Force officer personnel, had 3,201 advanced Air Force cadets from non-compulsory ROTC detachments complete a questionnaire. Cadets were classified as being either

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[49] Nona Glazer Malbin, "The ROTC: Military Service on the College Campus," in Moskos, Public Opinion, p. 86.

[50] Robert L. Nichols et al., "The Officer Corps in an All-Volunteer Force: Will College Men Serve?" Naval War College Review 23 (January 1971): 45.

[51] Zald and Simon, "Career Opportunities," p. 283.

[52] Glenn R. Griffin, A Comparison of Attitudes of Black and White Cadets in AFROTC (Washington: Department of the Air Force, [1972]), pp. 48-51.

draft-motivated (those cadets who indicated that they would not have entered an ROTC program in the absence of a draft) and self-selected cadets (those true volunteers who would have joined despite the draft). The results are tabulated in Table 7.

TABLE 7

COMPARISON OF SELF-MOTIVATED AND DRAFT-MOTIVATED AIR FORCE ROTC CADETS (Percentages)

	Self-Motivated (N = 556)	Draft-Motivated (N = 442)
Desire to become a pilot or navigator	49	11
Patriotism or desire to serve country	11	2
Avoid draft pressure	0	50
Attitude toward military career compared to civilian career:		
More desirable	27	2
Equally desirable	46	24
Less desirable	12	54
No opinion	15	20
Expressed career intent:		
Definitely yes	10	0
Probably yes	28	5
Undecided	50	44
Probably no	10	36
Definitely no	2	15

Source: Nancy Guinn, William E. Alley, and Byron C. Farmer, Impact of an All-Volunteer Force on Air Force ROTC Officer Procurement (Brooks Air Force Base, Texas: Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, [1971]), p. 4.

Conclusions to be drawn from the Guinn study are as follows: First, the enrollment in Air Force ROTC does not reveal per se that the liberal environment of the college or university will affect in any great way the attitude of Air Force ROTC cadets. The draft-motivated cadet obviously joins ROTC for different reasons than the self-motivated cadet, and at least fifty-four percent of the former believed that the military career was less desirable than a civilian career. Compare this percentage to those self-selected cadets who not only believe a military career is more or equally desirable (seventy-three percent) but who intend, either definitely or probably, to make the service a career (thirty-eight percent). One can see a pattern that confirms the trend of self-selecting cadets having traits, of which patriotism is the most evident, that are easily identified with military tenets. These percentages suggest that a majority of potential volunteer Air Force ROTC cadets enter the Air Force with a positive outlook toward a military career. One would expect a higher retention rate to be the result of such a favorable attitude. Second, with the self-motivated officer entering the military with such "positive" military conceptions, socialization will add to and reinforce these tenets as the officer assumes more responsible positions and becomes involved in policy making. Contrariwise, any liberal influence expected from the draft-motivated cadet will be minimal because of his initial attitude and his probable one-tour service in the Air Force, during which his liberal input affects basically a low level of the decision-making process if it affects it at all.

With conscription being terminated in the United States on 1 July 1973, copious analyses of how the modern volunteer army concept will affect officer recruitment programs have been made. Most of this literature is obviously biased by those who either support or criticize the various programs. Despite the varying viewpoints, the abolition of the draft and the establishment of the modern volunteer army will affect all officer procurement programs, the ROTC and OCS programs possibly more than others.

With the need for a more professionalized officer in view of the lesser numbers of officers being commissioned by all the services, and with the need for a force-in-being as a necessary adjunct of the modern volunteer army, the ROTC and OCS, to a lesser extent, may be looked upon more and more to provide career officers rather than reserve officers, and the military service will become more of an initially chosen career field. Concomitant to this may be a more vigorous self-selective process than heretofore experienced. Making the goal of these programs to produce career officers will in essence disrupt and further dilute the basic philosophical premise for which ROTC exists--to produce liberally educated officers trained in the rudiments of military science. This in turn lessens liberal input into the military services. More military dedicated individuals will be attracted into the officer procurement programs. Much of the literature on the effects of the modern volunteer army on procurement programs addresses the issue from the viewpoint of numbers of officers produced. Little is said about its affect

on the liberalization of the services, other than the prediction that the modern volunteer army will isolate the military from civilian society, which will spawn a growth of military professionalism.

In the special committee report on ROTC in September, 1969, the committee realized that if the active forces were reduced in size to any great extent and were to be basically volunteer in nature, there would be tremendous implications for the ROTC program. "Indeed its very existence might be called into question."[53] The President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force addressed the question of the effect of the modern volunteer army on the officer corps in the context of quantity and not quality of officers produced from the ranks of college graduates. The commission asserted that about ninety percent of the officers entering the service each year will be college graduates. Service academies will normally provide less than five percent of the yearly officer requirements. With a projected number, by 1980, of male college graduates of 490,000 annually, with a projected armed force manning level of 2.5 million, and with an annual requirement for new officers projected at 30,000, only seven percent of the yearly graduating males need to be recruited for military service.[54] This low percentage reinforces the assertion that a more self-selective process will occur within the ROTC program, which will in effect

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[53]Special Committee on ROTC, Report, p. 7.

[54]President's Commission on All-Volunteer, Report, pp. 69-70.

further undermine the liberalizing effect which the program is claimed to inject into the armed services.

In addition to the decline in ROTC enrollment (from a total of 212,417 in 1969 to 109,598 in 1971), the geographical shift in location of active ROTC units further narrows the recruitment base and the liberalizing influence. Morris Janowitz observes that the geographical distribution of ROTC units has altered significantly the number of units at prestigious liberal colleges and universities, with a subsequent increase in units at southern and southwestern colleges of lesser known academic qualities. This trend would seem to reinforce the selectivity of officer recruitment.[55] Reasons for the disestablishment of many ROTC units at well-known colleges and universities in the 1970-74 era includes student dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War, questioned academic quality of ROTC courses, and compatibility of units with the college environment. Reasons for the establishment of units since 1970 include the acceptability of ROTC on certain campuses, and the need to extend ROTC to predominantly black or Mexican-American campuses. Table 8 is a compilation of the colleges and universities where ROTC units have been established and disestablished since 1970 and includes schools where ROTC programs will be disestablished by 1975.

The defenders of ROTC continue to claim that the erosion of ROTC will lead to the enrollment of more officers from the

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[55] Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. xxix.

TABLE 8

ROTC UNITS--ESTABLISHED/DISESTABLISHED (1970-1975)

Established	Disestablished
Weber State, Utah (A)	Harvard, Mass. (A,N,AF)
Wisconsin State (A)	Princeton, N.J. (N,AF)
Missouri Western (A)	Brown, R.I. (N,AF)
U. of Tampa, Fla. (A)	Columbia, N.Y. (N)
Campbell College, N.C. (A)	Yale, Conn. (A,N)
Alabama A&M (A)	Stanford, Cal. (A,N,AF)
Southwestern State, Okla. (A)	Tufts, Mass. (N,AF)
East Central State, Okla. (A)	Dartmouth, N.H. (A,N.AF)
Austin-Peay, Tenn. (A)	Boston College, Mass. (A)
Alcorn A&M, Miss. (A)	New York U. (A,AF)
U. of Wisconsin, Plattville (A)	CCNY (A)
U. of Wisconsin, LaCrosse (A)	Boston U., Mass. (A)
Columbus College, Ga. (A)	Colgate, N.Y. (AF)
Carson-Newman, Tenn. (A)	Kenyon, Ohio (AF)
Fort Valley State, Ga. (A)	Grinnel, Iowa (AF)
St. Augustine, N.C. (A)	Trinity, Conn. (AF)
Bishop College, Texas (A)	Union, N.Y. (AF)
Indiana Institute of Technology (A)	SUNY (Buffalo), N.Y. (AF)
N.W. State College, Okla. (A)	Lawrence, Wis. (AF)
Southern State College, Ark. (A)	Ball State, Ind. (AF)
Prarie View A&M, Texas (N)	Case Western, Ohio (AF)
Virginia Military Institute (N)	Denison, Ohio (AF-75)
SUNY (Bronx), N.Y. (N)	Emory, Ga. (AF-75)
Maine Maritime (N)	California Tech. (AF-75)
Florida A&M (N)	Georgetown, D.C. (AF-75)
U. of Western Florida (N)	Colby, Maine (AF-75)
North Carolina Central (N)	St. Olaf, Minn. (AF-75)
Texas A&M (N)	Ohio Wesleyan (AF-75)
U. of Florida (N)	Drake, Iowa (AF-75)
Southern A&M, La. (N)	Otterbein, Ohio (AF-75)
Savannah State, Ga. (N)	
University of Jacksonville, Fla. (N)	
Citadel, S.C. (N)	
Livingston U., Ala. (AF)	
Sanford U., Ala. (AF)	
Troy State, Ala. (AF)	
Alabama State (AF)	
N. Arizona U. (AF)	
U. of Arkansas (Monticello) (AF)	
Embry-Riddle, Fla. (AF)	
Florida Tech. (AF)	
Valdosta State, Ga. (AF)	
Southern Illinois U. (AF)	

TABLE 8--Continued

Established	Disestablished
Parks College, Ill. (AF)	
Grambling, La. (AF)	
U. of Southern Mississippi (AF)	
Missouri Valley State (AF)	
S. E. Missouri State U. (AF)	
U. of Missouri (Rollo) (AF)	
College of Sante Fe, N.M. (AF)	
Fayetteville State, N.C. (AF)	
Wilkes College, Pa. (AF)	
U. of Puerto Rico (AF)	
Baptist College, S.C. (AF)	
Newberry, S.C. (AF)	
Pan-American, Texas (AF)	
Lamar, Texas (AF)	
Angelo State, Texas (AF)	
Sul-Ross State, Texas (AF)	
S. Utah State (AF)	
Norwich, Conn. (AF)	

Source: U. S., Department of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 1 June 1974.

Note: A-Army; N-Navy; AF-Air Force.

enlisted ranks and from the military academies, the implication being that each of these sources has a low degree of liberal ethic and a high degree of authoritarian attitude. Peter Karsten believes that the ROTC produces a possible "leavening" effect as a possible counterbalance to the more aggressive academy and enlisted ranks.[56] The question can be asked--How flexible are ROTC students vis-à-vis non-ROTC students and academy students? A random survey of 90 Naval Academy students, 177 Air Force, Army, and Navy ROTC students, and 117 non-ROTC college undergraduates was made and the results are reported in Tables 9 through 11.

[56]Karsten, "ROTC, MYLAI," p. 136.

TABLE 9

MEASURE OF AGGRESSIVENESS (Percentages)

	Offer physical response to insult to girl friend	Offer verbal response or ignore insult	Prefer combat duty	Prefer administrative or technical service
Annapolis (N = 90)	49.9 (44)	16.1 (29)	66.7 (60)	25.5 (23)
ROTC (N = 177)	31.6 (56)	57.6 (102)	32.0 (57)	64.0 (113)
Non-ROTC (N = 117)	23.0 (27)	62.4 (73)	7.7 (9)	69.0 (81)

Source: Peter Karsten et al., "ROTC, MYLAI and the Volunteer Army," Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971): 141.

TABLE 10

AGGRESSIVE PROPENSITIES (Percentages)

	Agree that war is the inevitable result of man's nature	Disagree	Military takeover might be justified
Annapolis	77.0 (68)	22.0 (20)	33.3 (30)
ROTC	55.3 (98)	37.0 (65)	19.5 (34)
Non-ROTC	39.0 (46)	47.8 (56)	18.0 (20)

Source: Peter Karsten et al., "ROTC, MYLAI and the Volunteer Army," Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971): 142.

TABLE 11

REASONS IMPORTANT IN DECISION TO SEEK COMMISSION
(Percentages)

	Desire to make military a career	Belief in military traditions	Desire training for future civilian life	Prefer to be officer than enlisted man
Annapolis	48.0 (43)	26.0 (23)	36.5 (31)	56.0 (49)
ROTC	17.0 (29)	19.2 (34)	47.5 (84)	73.0 (130)

Source: Peter Karsten et al., "ROTC, MYLAI and the Volunteer Army," Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971): 147.

The data is valuable in that it makes a vital comparison between the Naval Academy, which for all intent and purpose may be representative of the other military academies, and the ROTC. The statistics tend to reaffirm that the aggressive nature of the Annapolis midshipmen is in consonance with the aggressive ethos of the profession that he has chosen (Table 9). Table 10 tends to confirm the concept that like values between person and chosen career attract. In this case the inevitability of war due to man's nature, a tenet of conservatism and the reason for the very existence of the military institution, attracts a high Academy response (seventy-seven percent). Table 11 indicates that the desire to join the military depends largely on a self-selective process. This is further confirmed by the relatively low percentage of non-ROTC students who showed tendencies of aggressiveness (Tables 10 and 11). One final observation which may verify what has been contended in the overall tenor of this investigation is that when comparing ROTC students with non-ROTC

students a greater percentage of ROTC students make an aggressive, military response. Thus one could conclude that whereas ROTC may not militarize the campus environment, there is evidence to indicate that the liberal environment of academe does not necessarily liberalize the ROTC student.

In conclusion, this broad investigation of officer recruitment programs has revealed in a general manner that the major sources of officer procurement--military academies, OCS, and ROTC--are basically influenced and subscribed to by rising college students (college graduates in the case of OCS), who for the most part pre-select the program which is most in consonance with their own pre-conceptions and values. Thus the liberalization process that could be transferred from the liberal society to the military establishment is diluted in a direct manner. The most self-selective group chooses the most conservative institution (the academies), which historically has produced the elite group of officers, while the most liberal group (college students) chooses the most liberal program (OCS) which has produced the fewest career officers. While this syndrome operated within a draft environment, the product of officer recruitment may in retrospect be now considered liberal when one speculates what may be the officer produced in a non-conscription, all-volunteer society.

If the philosophical reasoning and the empirical evidence are any indication of the past results which witnessed the questionable transfer of liberalization into the military establishment by various recruitment methods, then a prognosis of the

future "draft free" environment may reveal the following: the recruitment of officers within this environment will lead to a widening of the gap between the military and civilian society. Furthermore, it will lead to a more professional and objectively controlled military, i.e., one that is a "tool" of the government, and a further reaffirmation of the historical "root" differences between the military and civilian societies.

CHAPTER V

OFFICER SOCIALIZATION

The professional socialization of the military officer is a process by which the officer incorporates into his value system those values and perceptions essential for a military occupation. Within this general definition, this chapter will investigate, (1) several factors that affect the socialization process and (2) the ramifications of formal education conducted in the non-technical and professional areas at the military academies, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, the service colleges, and civilian colleges and its relevance to the socialization of the officer.

It is through formal academic education conducted at the military academies and the ROTC that the prospective officer is initially exposed to the philosophical tenets of the military establishment that, as previously noted throughout this investigation, are in conflict with the liberal tenets of civilian society. Having once been exposed to the initial formal academic socialization process, the officer at various times during his career is normally sent for advanced education to either the service colleges or graduate education at civilian colleges and universities, or both. Essentially, these institutions are more

open-ended and more exposed to liberal influences than are the academies. Furthermore, the educational socialization carried on in a liberal environment must by its very nature influence to some degree the relationship of the civilian society to the militray establishment and affect the "root" differences between the two.

The process of training and intra-service socialization is not part of this investigation because it is not expected to give the officer the in-depth theoretical capability which is the hallmark of formal academic education. Also, because Officer Candidate Schools are basically training and not academic institutions, they will not be considered in this investigation as part of the socialization process. Likewise, technical education such as that experienced in the physical sciences and in the legal, religious, business, and medical areas is not considered here because the education in these areas at the primary and advanced levels is normally directed toward the technical and not the liberal aspects of education.

To a great extent, the determinants of formal academic instruction are the various factors that influence to a great degree the substantive material taught at the above noted institutions. Thus an understanding of these factors will better delineate the direction to be taken by officer educational socialization. The very fact that the military operates and staffs three military academies and eight professional service

colleges,[1] and by General Accounting Office statistics, spent seventy million dollars on 4,200 officers enrolled in full-time graduate education programs during fiscal year 1969[2] points out the importance of investigating the academic socialization process of the military officer.

Factors Affecting Socialization

Among the various factors that affect any socialization process, three vital ones are applicable to the process as it applies to the military officer--fusion, conflict, and attitude.

Fusion

The historical evolution of the fusion of political and military matters as it applies to United States foreign policy was the subject of an extensive investigation earlier in this study.[3] Also as was earlier noted, the exigencies of the cold war, supplemented by the reorganization of the defense establishment after World War II, made the making and execution of foreign policy a matter of interest to both the civilian and military sectors of society. While Chapter II discussed in some detail the ramifications of this post-World War II fusionist policy in

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[1]The colleges are as follows: National War College; Armed Forces Staff College; Army, Navy, Air Force War Colleges; Army, Navy, Air Force Command and Staff Colleges. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is not considered in this study because of its singular emphasis on the management aspects of national resources.

[2]U. S., Controller General, Report to the Congress on Improvements Needed in Determining Graduate Education Requirements for Military Officer Positions, 28 August 1970, p. 1.

[3]For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 65-83 above.

terms of its effect on the overall civil-military equation, it is the intent of this section to discuss the effect of this fusionist policy on the socialization process of the military officer to show the problem experienced when the professional military officer is trained and educated in both military and non-military subjects.

Concurrent with the isolation of the military establishment from civilian society in the era preceding World War II was a military educational policy that defined the parameters and extent of military education in terms which were oriented toward strictly military matters.[4] The military academies utilized a core curriculum that emphasized, along with professional subjects, scientific and engineering courses that were oriented to the pragmatics of the military profession. With the possible exception of having a choice as to which foreign language to study, all students at each academy, for the most part, were required to take the same four-year professional course. Likewise, because the objective control model dominated civil-military relationships in this era, the service colleges taught an almost completely military-oriented curriculum. When ROTC courses were offered at state universities, they were at times made a mandatory course requirement because of the provisions of the Morrill Act of 1862 and given full academic credit by the host institution. The professional subjects were generally confined

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[4]John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 96.

to the teaching of military "nuts and bolts" subjects, and ROTC graduates were offered reserve commissions and assigned to inactive military reserve components. Military officers utilizing civilian institutions for graduate education studied exclusively in the engineering, science, and business areas. Thus the unidirectional policy of pre-World War II complemented the prevailing civil-military policy of objective control wherein the military was a highly trained professional "tool" of the civilian sector.

The total amalgamation of the civilian and military efforts in World War II brought realization of the fact, whether the military liked it or not, that the military officer needed additional preparation outside the purview of military subjects in order to consider matters beyond conventional military affairs. Furthermore, as John Masland and Laurence Radway posited, there was then a need for the development of an educational program that stressed the problems resulting from the unification of the armed forces.[5] In addition to the unification factor was the problem of institutionalizing the cooperative efforts between the military and civilian sectors.

Out of the post-World War II cold war situation developed a fusionist policy that manifested itself in a civil-military model of subjective control. This fusionist policy was antithetical to the historical liberal concept of a separate military establishment which becomes involved in societal matters only in

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[5]Ibid., p. 104.

the context of participating in total war.[6] Despite this historical fact, the military establishment began to become more and more involved in making foreign policy and national security policy that had heretofore been the province of civilian statesmen. Concurrently, the objective control model became weakened as the military became more involved in technological matters and cold war policy making. Military policy became a vital input to national security policy. The civilian sector, in addition to always having controlled the military, became more involved in the everyday policy making and operations of the military establishment, both of which produced further tension between the two societies. For example, whereas the military sector might be guided and influenced in a situation by the conservative tenet of relying on past experience and past history, the liberal society under the same circumstances might perceive of the situation as being unique and not amenable to past solution or experience. Under these circumstances, the civilian, who has now possibly become an amateur military strategist, can offer any number of novel and possibly unproved solutions with the idea that doing something is better than doing nothing.

In an attempt to bridge the expertise gap which the military experienced as a result of the fusionist policy, the military used the educational process as a mechanism for imbuing the military officer with civilian-oriented expertise. In this process,

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[6]As discussed in Chapter II, this policy exacerbated the historical dichotomy between the liberal civilian society and its conservative military establishment.

that has spanned the era since World War II, the military has provided in its educational institutions numerous academic subjects that are relevant to both the general area of political-military relations and the specific area of national security policy. For the most part, the emphasis on such subject matter is stressed least in ROTC courses, more in the primary education received at the academies, and most at the service colleges, where the development of an officer's career is believed to require an in-depth knowledge of political-military matters. Within each institution, the emphasis is subject to such variables as funding, conditions of war or peace, external social conditions, current civil-military relations, and current need for such expertise. Thus the educating of the officer in professional, political-military, civil-military, and other relevant courses has taken on varied emphases over time. For the most part, the issue of military education has been resolved into the question of what subject matter should be emphasized within any military-sponsored education. Such an investigation will be made in the section of this chapter on Education and Socialization. One indication of the magnitude of this problem is found in the aforementioned House Subcommittee investigation of the military academies in 1967-68.[7]

In addition to the general instruction in political-military matters at military educational institutions, the services have attempted to bridge the fusionist gap by forming

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[7]For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 221-23 above.

their own coterie of intellectuals educated in the general area of political-military affairs who not only attempt to balance the civilian expertise but who provide a somewhat unique military-civilian input into military planning. Any complete return to a pre-World War II situation where professional education was normally restricted to military subjects in a military environment, which some believe will again occur because of the modern volunteer army concept, is highly unlikely if for only the reason that because the military function is so deeply intermingled with the political function, any non-specialized education conducted under military auspices must by the very nature of current civil-military relations include matter that is not of an exclusive military nature. Also, the society of today is relatively speaking more open-ended than it was in the pre-World War II era and thus subject to more of a liberal influence.

Despite the obvious potential conflict in policies that attempt to "civilianize" the military establishment through either bureaucratic structures or educational policies, the concept of an a-political military is still seen as a viable possibility in a civil-military association. Samuel Huntington believes that politics deal with the goals of state policy and thus is beyond the scope of military competence. Military officers should remain politically neutral.[8] If this is acceptable as a fundamental tenet of American civil-military relations,

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[8]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1967), p. 71.

it is difficult to adhere to it in view of post-World War II fusionist policy for several reasons. First, the military in essence participates in policy making as advocates of particular policies and as executors of final military decisions. A clearer view of the political involvement of the military establishment is manifested when one sees Congress asking it for military advice and when choices arise between military and non-military programs and military programs are chosen at the expense of needed social programs. Second, with the entry of the military into the educational areas of political-military matters, it is naive to believe that the educational process will perpetuate a-political officers. If this were the case, they would be educated in but exempted and restricted from questioning or making value judgments on political decisions.

Thus the fusionist policy has produced a dilemma in the civil-military equation as far as it concerns military educational policy. It has certainly produced policy statements, the rhetoric of which clouds the issue of military education. Amos Jordon, Chairman of the Political Science department at West Point, noted that today's and tomorrow's military education system should be devoted to developing "the management and application of military resources in deterrent, peacekeeping, and combat roles in the context of rapid technological, social, and political change."[9] Jordon and co-author William Taylor, a military officer

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[9]Amos A. Jordon, Jr., "Officer Education," in Handbook of Military Institutions, ed, Roger W. Little (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 212.

teaching social science at West Point, more recently stated that the modern military man must not only develop the traditional competence of training, deploying, and fighting but must develop a competence in the political-military dimension and/or the scientific/technical dimension and/or advising foreign military establishments.[10]

The conflict becomes more obvious when we note that if we train officers in political-military subjects and at the same time ignore teaching professional subjects, then a certain amount of expertise is lost, and the officer could become unsympathetic to the military point of view as well. The military officer must certainly be able to communicate with his superiors and subordinates, both military and civilian, but placing the military man in competition with the civilian trained man should be avoided. Likewise, there is danger in making the military professional a part-time statesman in that he may be deterred from his main mission of protecting society. Edward Katzenbach believes that it was understandable to assume that at the end of World War II the military would become involved in requirements of policy making. There was then a need of the military to understand the civilian point of view. But by the 1960s, the civilian group still controlled the military curriculum-making, which Katzenbach notes should have been turned back to the military for teaching professional subjects. There is enough

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[10]Amos A. Jordon, Jr. and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Military Man in Academia," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 406 (March 1973): 130.

military literature, he thought, to be understood to preclude introducing extraneous subject matter that had no bearing whatsoever on military professionalism.[11]

The entire evolution of fusionist policy has thus produced first, basic rhetorical normative questions that must be acknowledged--is the intellectual process of educating the military officer in fact a bona fide attempt to liberalize the military society? do the processes of socialization intend to maintain a military apart from its society?; second, basic conflicts between the military and civilian societies, the content of which is the next subject of investigation.

Conflict

With the evolution of the fusionist policy, the amalgamation of civilian and military oriented educational policies revealed and magnified the inherent conflict between education in a civilian environment and that conducted at service institutions. Once this educational process had become institutionalized, new conflicts were created basically because of the new role now cast on the military by the civilian society. Both the inherent and resultant conflicts were exacerbated by problems in determining whether or not to stress the teaching of nontechnical, social science subjects instead of professional subjects.

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[11]Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 91 (March 1965): 34-36.

Possibly the inherent conflict is a legacy which might have generally been the product of the historical evolution of the conservative military establishment within the liberal society. More specifically, Samuel Huntington notes that after the Civil War, there was a trend in military education institutions, particularly at the service academies, away from technical knowledge to the professional aspects of the military but that the relationship between liberal and professional elements of the curricula were left unresolved, particularly in the primary eucational system.[12] The conflict in educational socialization still for the most part remains basically unresolved for the simple reason that no successful bridge has been developed to rationalize the purpose of a liberally educated military officer in the military establishment.

One of the first inherent conflicts is that in the United States, higher education is usually likely to lead to liberal rather than to conservative tendencies if for no other reason than education exposes one to a basic liberal tradition. This educational process can run counter to and present problems for the military establishment, whose entire ethos is basically conservative in nature. The entry of liberal factors into the officer educational process may not only dilute his professional beliefs but may be antithetical to the basic mission of the military, which rests on the requirement of combat. If the investment in officer education is designed to produce career officers,

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[12]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 239.

then the liberalization of the officer may generate internal conflicts which may in extreme cases of ideological conflict cause him to voluntarily leave the military service. Samuel Huntington submits that in general the better educated an officer is, the less likely he is to be motivated toward a professional military career.[13] It is difficult for men of intellect and liberal views to reconcile the spirit of authority and discipline in the military with the concept and spirit of inquiry which is essential to a liberal education. As Gene Lyons and John Masland note, "it is this very reconciliation that is a key to the survival of democracy today."[14]

In addition to this apparent dichotomy, there are mixed opinions on whether or not higher civilian education is either necessary or desirable for military officers. Is there danger of the military becoming too overeducated? One answer noted by Amos Jordon is that it is hard to consider this question seriously because military men are skeptical of the intellectual and anti-military community; they are also aware of the differences between the thinkers and the doers.[15] Thus by one man's observation, the military seem to partake of education but never to become serious intellectual scholars. Amos Jordon and

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[13]Samuel P. Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession," Daedalus 92 (Fall 1963): 789.

[14]Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the ROTC, with a Forward by John Sloan Dickey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 63.

[15]Jordon, "Officer Education," pp. 239-40.

William Taylor make this same argument by noting that it is hard to visualize an officer resigning over a clash of values because in the final judgment the tenets of the profession outweigh any position he may have taken on values.[16] Such a view again affirms the inherent dichotomy of values between the military and civilian societies. Herbert McClosky in believing that education fosters liberal traditions notes that education demands of people precision in speech and thought, open-mindedness and tolerance, and intellectual flexibility.[17] In a general sense, these traits are not normally those thought to be indigenous to the military ethic. Morris Janowitz notes that although higher education is associated with liberal attitudes, such higher education within the military does not weaken the conservative military tenets.[18] By making the military establishment open-ended to the liberal influence of society, the military may suffer more internal conflict by the very fact that it is influenced by the socialization efforts of a liberal society and opened to public scrutiny of its values and beliefs.

Another inherent conflict is that the mission of the military requires, in addition to management and leadership qualities, a heroic trait which is distinctive of the military establishment. Even with the extensive civilianization effort

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[16] Jordon and Taylor, "Military Man in Academia," pp. 142-43.

[17] Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality," American Political Science Review 52 (March 1958): 41.

[18] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 238.

of the post-World War II era, Janowitz contends that

> the narrowing distinction between military and non-military bureaucracies has not resulted in an elimination of fundamental differences . . . the need for heroic fighters persists. The pervasive requirements of combat set the limits to civilianization tendencies.[19]

Bernard Brodie believes that the whole training of the military is vindicated in battle and training and that the "skills developed in the soldier are those of a fighter, and not of a reflective thinker on ultimate purposes."[20] The distinctive purpose of the military establishment is to conduct combat operations, and the most important function of the officer corps is to train and direct combat forces. To socialize the officer in non-military subjects may "rob" him of the chance to develop professional expertise and heroic qualities which could eventually deny the military its very reason for being.

Within the inherent conflicts are certain limits of socialization established because of the very nature of the profession and the theoretical precepts of the civil-military equation. The military officer usually follows a career pattern that stresses military competence at the junior officer level and then a move away from this in his later career to the analysis of matters in the political-military context. By the time the officer becomes a flag/general rank officer, his values are far removed from his technical ability and are seated in his understanding of civil-military and political-military matters.

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[19]Ibid., p. 33.

[20]Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1973), p. 492.

During this same period of time, the socialization process must also change from instilling within him the concept of command and obedience to instilling the desirability of cooperation and manipulation. Along with this may occur a demand that military policies and procedures be a product of reasoned analysis and not dogmatic conclusions. This might produce a tendency to weaken traditional authority based on obedience and ritual. The growth of a rational or reasoned approach within the military establishment could mean the growth of a critical attitude, which if left uncontrolled could undermine the very existence of the military establishment. This rationality could weaken the very support upon which the military depends, for example, in the matters of ceremonies, rituals, honors, and obedience. Obviously, education may create a rationality that would be anathema to the core values of the military establishment. The military like other professions has a specialized body of knowledge that is acquired by training and experience. It has a defined set of standards and a group identity, and like other bureaucratic institutions, it is highly structured. How it differs is that it is a uniquely public institution whose members are committed to unlimited service which involves the risk of life.

The very nature of the military profession has limited the accommodation with the academic profession. The military has not been made into a learned profession as in the case of law and medicine. Military science has not been accepted with the same respect on the university campus because as Christopher Jencks and David Riesman note the art of exercising authority so

vital in the military is not effectively taught in an academic atmosphere.[21] Another reason for its non-acceptance is the questionable academic caliber of military science courses vis-à-vis other academic courses. The historical mission of the military, which is to provide for national defense, determines to a large extent the pragmatic limits of professional educational socialization. The nature of the profession, in effect, determines the parameters within which the educational function is executed. Education outside these limits may have a divisive effect on the system and detract from the degree of professionalization attained by the military officer. Thus when the military claims that its "new" and more liberal educational program is directed toward the training of a "new" military professional, there is a paradox created. The reference to a new military is inaccurate unless the entire ethos and values of the military have been changed, which is factually not true. Thus by knowing what product the socialization process should produce, a better determination can be made of what should be the substantive material taught in military academic institutions. One of the major limits of military education as noted by John Masland and Laurence Radway is that the preparation for war is not conducive to the relaxed atmosphere of a liberal education.[22] In addition, the training for combat which is so much a part of any military education is basically antithetical to a liberal

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[21]Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968), p. 220.

[22]Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. 236.

education which exposes one to numerous humanistic aspects of life. P. H. Partridge, an Australian social scientist, believes that the vital normative issue can be condensed to the question--how does the quality of education on the humanistic and social science side affect the morale and ideas inculcated on the professional side?[23] As Lyons and Masland state the issue, it is a question of how to achieve a balance between learning to become an officer and equipping the same person with a general education which will allow him to grow intellectually.[24] "Education for a profession can be sensibly discussed only in terms of its function in preparing those being educated for roles in that profession."[25]

Along with the inherent conflicts are the factual differences between civilian and military education. Some of the more obvious characteristics of military education are as follows: there is a tendency toward conformity in teaching and subject matter because standardization allows an interchange of personnel between duty assignments and also makes job description more uniform; there is a general tendency to identify and associate education with training, and with this there is more often than not greater stress placed on teaching technique than on substantive material; there is a further tendency to emphasize

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[23]P. H. Partridge, Educating for the Profession of Arms: Comments on Current Thinking and Practice in Britain and the United States, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense, no. 5 (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University Press, 1969), p. 17.

[24]Lyons and Masland, Education and Military Leadership, pp. 204-05.

[25]Jordon, "Officer Education," p. 211.

"need to know" material rather than "nice to know" material. One of the major consequences of this educational process is that it does not cultivate the creative and imaginative mind.

While these conflicts exist in a general pattern throughout military schools, possibly the best comparison of military vis-à-vis civilian education can be viewed through the institution of the ROTC. Possibly the major criticism leveled against ROTC is that it violates the principles of academic freedom in that the federal government imposes part of a curriculum and a group of instructors upon a university. Also objected to is that the methods normally used to develop traits that are consistent with the military code may amount to indoctrination. In its method and purpose, indoctrination is alien to the best ideals and objectives in American higher education. It raises a basic conflict over the compatibility of having a military institution on a college campus. Thus, as Joseph Scott notes, the military establishment and most educational institutions are separated by vast differences in values, structure, style, and function. "Anathema to the university, with its long standing tradition of humanism, are the trappings of the military life. . . ."[26] In an attitude survey conducted by Peter Karsten of 117 male college students at the University of Pittsburgh and Ohio State University in 1970 and reported in Tables 12 and 13 below, the observations of Scott are basically confirmed.

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[26] Joseph W. Scott, "ROTC Retreat," in The American Military, ed. Martin Oppenheimer (n.p.: Aldine Publishing Company, Transaction Books, 1971), p. 58.

TABLE 12

COLLEGE MALE RESPONSE TO FOUR BASIC NATIONAL ISSUES
(Percentages)

Academic majors	Agree with my country "right or wrong"	Disagree with my country "right or wrong"	Military budget too high	Feel military "most dangerous to U.S."
Humanities (29)	14	72.5	72.5	55
Social Sciences (100)	39	46	51	14
Natural Sciences (102)	37	43	41	8
Engineering (117)	48	38.5	24	2

Source: Peter Karsten, "Professional and Citizen Officers: A Comparison of Service Academy and ROTC Officer Candidates," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, ed. Charles C. Moskos, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 58.

In fact, by the statistics gathered by Karsten, if one wants to inject liberalism into the military establishment through the institution of ROTC, the humanities major should be most encouraged to become military officers. It is not surprising to find that by his surveys less than five percent of the ROTC students were, in fact, humanities majors. Thus in essence the humanities majors were generally least willing to do what the stereotyped military man would customarily do.

Finally to be considered as part of the analysis of conflict caused by socialization are those roles and norms created

TABLE 13

COLLEGE MALE RESPONSE TO FOUR BASIC SITUATIONS
(Percentages)

Academic majors	Willing to obey morally repugnant orders	Willing to respond physically to insult to girl	Willing to use nuclear weapons	Military takeover might be justified some day
Humanities (29)	14	14	37	14
Social Sciences (100)	30	33	65	23
Natural Sciences (102)	37	40	75	26
Engineering (117)	42.5	30.5	76	22

Source: Peter Karsten, "Professional and Civilian Officers: A Comparison of Service Academy and ROTC Officer Candidates," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, ed. Charles C. Moskos, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 58.

for the military because of this conflict. In the case of the ROTC, as it has evolved toward an increasingly "demilitarized" curriculum, the officer produced by the system is possibly less prepared for military occupational specialities than his academy counterpart. Dilution of his training on campus has necessitated further training after commissioning. To counteract the aforementioned closing of ROTC units at more liberal colleges and universities, there will have to be a further liberalization of the ROTC curriculum as a result of the demands of the students.[27] If the campuses no longer take an interest in and

[27]Ibid., pp. 65-67.

for one reason or another reject the ROTC program, the result could well be that the academic profession will have less and less influence on military policy matters. As, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said in May, 1970, with reference to the future of ROTC on college campuses,

> I have been continually mystified by those who on the one hand oppose the so-called militarization of our society and on the other hand seem determined to dry up an important source of civilian-trained officers of our armed forces.[28]

This opposition to military things may be happening at a time when the military profession is intellectually best prepared to work closely with the academic community. Otherwise, the military may turn more and more to its own "think tanks" and officers for conceptual thinking.

The conflict factor thus determines to a large extent the limit and extent of any socialization effort connected with military education. The practical limits of socialization are determined by their effect on the viability of the military establishment. The final and possibly most unique factor affecting socialization is the element of attitude as it pertains to the socialization process.

Attitude

The content of the substantive material contained in the curricula of military educational institutions depends in a large measure on what values and attitudes are expected by the society-

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[28] Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution, 31 May 1970.

at-large from the military officer in order for him to carry out his mission of national defense. One of the vital pillars, notes Amos Jordon and William Taylor, upon which the military must justify its needs for civilian schooling programs, and I would hasten to add programs at the military academies, ROTC units, and service colleges as well, is an assessment of the values and attitudes which the nation wants its military officers to have. "This is an important issue which needs broader airing in American society."[29] Whether the education conducted at the primary and advanced levels in military educational institutions produces an officer better qualified for command and overall professional service than one who has not had the benefits of this educational experience is a question difficult if not impossible to answer. In any case, unless a certain attitude, which in the military lexicon can be referred to as the "military way," is instilled by design into the officer at military educational institutions, then the extensive education carried on at these establishments could possibly be better accomplished at civilian colleges. It is the instilling of this military attitude that defines to a great extent the mission of military academic institutions.

The military way, which is essentially a method of action characteristic of the military society, has in a historical sense been referred to as producing the military mind, a term that has been characterized pejoratively as a monolithic

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[29]Jordon and Taylor, "Military Man in Academia," p. 143.

mind impervious to change. Although it is important to establish a proper military attitude in the educational process, it is equally important to understand that the military mind must be viewed in the context of its attitudes and characteristics and not as to its quality, which would concern itself with intelligence levels. In this context, a military mind would be viewed as one would view a medical or legal mind. The military mind is conditioned as in other professions by the functional imperative of its profession. The outside observer must be cognizant that because the military has operated in a detached and antithetical nature to its parent society, it has been the target of many novels which portray in general the military establishment and more specifically the military mind in anti-liberal and even anti-humane terms.[30] Hopefully, it is not the nature of any institution to instill into any officer or prospective officer such a military mind, but likewise it is imperative that a military attitude and its corollary military way are made a vital part of the military curriculum. It would seem that one of the possible explanations for the broadening of the parameters of military education is in fact an effort by the military to

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[30]There have been many American novels written either about garrison or war experiences that normally portrays the main character of the novel as one who possesses military characteristics. To the layman, such characters lack humane instincts. Of the numerous novels on the military life, the following seem to best portray the military mind syndrome: James Jones, From Here to Eternity (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951); Norman Mailer, The Naked and the Dead (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1948); William Styron, The Long March (New York: Random House, Modern Library Paperback, 1952); Herman Wouk, The Caine Mutiny (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1951).

eliminate the civilian contempt for the military mind. If such an effort continues without either direction or analysis, the military may someday find it has an institution of scholars but not an establishment composed of professional military officers.

As in the socialization factor of conflict, the attitude factor is largely determined by the historical and theoretical difference of attitudes between the civilian and military societies. The recognition of the heritage of the American military establishment takes note of the fact that historically the military has been performing a function that was almost destined to develop, over a period of time in the American liberal environment, distinct and persistent characteristics that were in many ways the product of the historical anti-military bias of American society. The military establishment was founded for the specific purpose of applying controlled violence while in the process of effectuating national defense. Thus the resort to the application of power through a national and controlled source has reduced the operation of the system to one of order, discipline, and generally fixed routine. Such characteristics produce an institution that is dedicated to the proper conduct of war whose execution has placed a high premium on the following attitudes: decisiveness, patriotism, courage, certainty, punctuality, standardization, and obedience. The socialization process in the military is realistically appraised for its ability to create these attitudinal characteristics in order for it to carry out effectively the mission of national defense. Thus the traditional concept of military professionalism is dependent upon a

set of values that is different from those of society. What has evolved is a service ideology which is used as part of the indoctrination program of those entering the military profession. The task of the military is to develop and instill an attitude within its officer corps not with the purpose of competing with the civilian society but of complementing the civilian ethic. The military educational institutions which carry out this function are the military academies, the ROTC units, and the service colleges.

Obviously at the military academies, the "whole-man" concept encourages the creation and proliferation of a military attitude in order to produce career military officers. Here, as in no other program that involves military education, ideals are not only proffered as the roots of the total military ethic, but they are institutionalized and perpetuated. Also, it is here that any divisive efforts which could dilute the overall mission of professional preparation of career officers would keenly affect the entire ethos of the military. The academies are repositories of service traditions and values. As Morris Janowitz notes,

> the academies set the standards of behavior for the whole military profession. They are the source of the pervasive likemindedness about military honor and for the sense of fraternity which prevails among military men . . . the purpose of an academy education is to transform him into a member of a professional fraternity.[31]

As John Masland and Laurence Radway note, service academies may be better compared to medical and theological schools which are

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[31]Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 127.

attempting to "prepare young men for a lifetime career of dedicated service."[32] Correlli Barnett claims that at the military academies it is a conditioning in the myths, habits, and attitudes that together with drill and discipline turn civilians into soldiers. In actual terms of creating a military elite it is the indoctrinal factor--i.e. attitudinal change--that is of greater importance than the changing emphasis on academic curriculum.[33] The academies are the institutions that convey an attitude considered appropriate for members of the profession. Cadets and midshipmen acquire attitudes by sharing a common experience, institutional history, and cultural values. As Carl Guelzo has observed, there is a place for the intellectual in the military profession, but it is not at the academy level because of the recognized need for indoctrination in the early years of a professional career. In this light, the proliferation of subjects in the liberal arts at academies will not insure expanded intellectual horizons.[34] C. Wright Mills believes that procedures and rites at the academies tend to isolate the person from civilian life while they lead him to conform and accept the military society.[35]

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[32]Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. 231.

[33]Correlli Barnett, "The Education of Military Elites," Journal of Contemporary History 2 (July 1967): 22-23.

[34]Carl M. Guelzo, "The Long, Hard Climb to Professionalism," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 93 (February 1967): 87-91.

[35]C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books, 1956), p. 193.

To those who believe that the academies have a primary role to produce students with high scholarly achievement, there is disappointment in the student produced at the academies. In three separate articles written on his impression of the academies, David Boroff found the intellectual quality of the institutions lacking. At West Point, he found more stress placed on precision than on critical ability. The cadets were so immersed in routine and unquestioned obedience that they had no time to devote to intellectual pursuits. The atmosphere at the Naval Academy was termed "puerile"; there was a need to reduce naval training aspects. Similar observations were made at the Air Force Academy.[36] To the outside observer, there is a common "thread" that seems to be prevalent in all three academies, a stress on the "completed mission," wherein the student appraises the situation and works out a complete answer with no "loose ends." To maintain a lengthy doubt is foreign to the military personality. The indecisiveness of a Hamlet would be an intolerable situation to be placed in. The academies tend to make the student think in terms of individual mission rather than in a never-ending continuum. To the liberal educator, the academies might seem to be "second-rate" institutions, but the mission of preparing future career officers is best identified with the creation of an attitude.

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[36]David Boroff, "West Point: A New Breed," _Harpers_, December 1962, pp. 51-59; "Annapolis: Teaching Young Sea Dogs Old Tricks," _Harpers_, January 1963, pp. 46-52; "Air Force Academy: A Slight Gain in Altitude," _Harpers_, February 1963, pp. 86-98.

While discontent may be expressed about the product produced by the academies, there are also critics who express discontent with the professional military aspects of the academy education. In addition to the critical report made by the Naval Academy's Professional Training and Education committee in 1967, which concluded that the professional training program at the Academy did not adequately train career officers for the Navy,[37] the Congressional investigation conducted by a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and chaired by Representative F. Edward Hébert (D-La.) in 1967-68 was generally concerned whether the service academies were being responsive to their parochial mission of

> producing a commissioned officer with a properly balanced background of both academic and professional military training, an officer who as a cadet or midshipman has been provided with an environment which enables him to develop morally, physically, and mentally, an officer equipped in both mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.[38]

Note that two of the three attributes to be developed--the moral and physical--are not really applicable to the role of a civilian college. The subcommittee was more specific on this matter when it cited that the academies were to "develop the motivation which is essential to the young man's subsequent progress as a career

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[37]For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 220-21 above.

[38]U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Administration of the Service Academies, Report and Hearings of the Special Subcommittee on Service Academies. 90th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1967-68, pp. 10226-27. For a detailed discussion of the Hébert subcommittee investigation as it relates to officer recruitment see pp. 221-23 above.

officer and as a future leader in one of the military services."[39] (Italics mine.) Representative Hébert was concerned that the academies were not only getting away from the "whole-man" concept and developing individuals, but that because of the expense involved,[40] it owed an obligation to the public to see that the professional aspects of the academy were not being compromised. Otherwise, why not train all officers at ROTC units?[41] Representative Charles Grubser (R-Cal.) concluded that the academies are to produce military officers and not academic, civilian-type students who are given an option of participating in military matters.[42]

Thus the demands for attaining both academic and professional excellence places the academies in the position of attempting to do both simultaneously, but as the critics note, to the possible diminishing of each effort. Having investigated the norms of socialization, which included critical comments from both sides on what attitudes are created, it may well serve the investigation to view how many students are affected by the socialization process. If we accept the fact that the student, for the most part, pre-selects himself into the academies,[43] then

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[39]Ibid., p. 10229.

[40]It costs on the average approximately $45,000 to educate a cadet/midshipman in contrast to a cost of $7,500 to educate an ROTC student.

[41]U. S., Congress, House, Administration of the Service Academies, pp. 10341, 10368.

[42]Ibid., p. 10881.

[43]Somewhat confirmed by the higher retention rate vis-à-vis ROTC and OCS as tabulated in Table 5. See p. 232 above.

an indication of how academy students and graduates feel about the academy may be indicative of the socialization process. Carl Lauterbach and David Vielhaber in a study of the educational climate at West Point compared West Point to thirty-two undergraduate institutions. In the results, West Point, more than other colleges, encouraged obedience, academic organization, student supervision, order, propriety, planning for the future, achievement, and persistent striving. The survey found less encouragement of reflective contemplation, change, and intellectual freedom on the one hand and less interest in natural science and the arts-humanities-social science on the whole.[44] The socialization process is even more evident when the seniors were compared with freshmen. Seniors reflected concern for organization, dominance, energy output, and athletics. Freshmen were more aesthetic, more attention seeking, and encouraged to a lesser extent than seniors an attitude of affiliation.[45] The subtle shift from the freshman to the senior year to the tenets of a military attitude are rather evident. Further research conducted by Walter Hecox on the West Point Class of 1973 pointed to such indicators as their lesser inclination than similar civilian college students to abolish capital punishment, liberalize divorce, legalize marijuana, and their smaller interest in federal protection for the consumer--all traits which are

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[44]Carl G. Lauterbach and David P. Vielhaber, The Educational Climate at West Point as Reported by First and Fourth Class Cadets (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Institutional Research, [1965]), p. 10.

[45]Ibid., p. 11.

deemed basically liberal.[46] Data collected for the Class of 1974 indicated similar results.[47]

In a questionnaire answered by 5981 male graduates of seventy-five colleges and universities including West Point in 1950, the statistics tabulated and shown in Tables 14 and 15 confirm the fact that the officer graduate of West Point has both a higher sense of loyalty and satisfaction with his college choice than graduates of other colleges and universities.

TABLE 14

LOYALTY TOWARD UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE (Percentages)

Colleges and Universities	Strong attachment to it	Pleasantly nostalgic but no strong feeling
West Point (active duty)(135)	75	23
West Point (inactive duty)(39)	72	18
West Point (total)(139)	69	23
Engineering and Science (1060)	32	45
National Norm (5651)	29	49

Source: Office of Institutional Research, U. S. Military Academy: Comparison of USMA Graduates from the Class of 1950 with Graduates From Other Colleges on Selected Variables (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1971]), p. 38.

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[46] Walter E. Hecox, A Comparison of New Cadets at USMA with Entering Freshmen at Other Colleges, Class of 1973 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1970]), pp. 24, 27.

[47] Gerald W. Medsger, A Comparison of New Cadets at USMA with Entering Freshmen at Other Colleges, Class of 1974 (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Institutional Research, [1971]), pp. 21-22.

TABLE 15

SATISFACTION WITH COLLEGE CHOICE (Percentages)

Colleges and Universities	Yes, definitely	Probably no
West Point (active duty)(133)	59	11
West Point (inactive duty)(38)	42	13
West Point (total)(326)	56	13
Engineering and Science (1060)	37	16
National Norm (5651)	30	21

Source: Office of Institutional Research, U. S. Military Academy: Comparison of USMA Graduates from the Class of 1950 with Graduates From Other Colleges on Selected Variables (West Point, N.Y.: Office of Research, [1971]), p. 39.

The percentages noted in Tables 14 and 15 possibly indicate the culmination of the initial self-selection (recruitment) process and the inculcation of the military attitude substantiated by the relative high percentage of those who remain on active duty. From this group eventually emerges the elite corps of army leaders. As the officer output decreases in ROTC and OCS, the influence within the services of academy officers can be expected to increase. Thus if the military services are to depend on the academies for their leaders, they must remain the repositories of service tradition.

While the military attitude created in ROTC programs is nowhere near as intensive as that created at the academies because of the basic part-time nature of the ROTC student, who is additionally immersed within college surroundings, the attempt to

instill an attitude sets the program off from normal academic endeavors. Because the participation of the ROTC student in the program is usually comparable to the time spent on other academic subjects, the ROTC must utilize the little time it has with the student to concentrate on instilling an attitude and a desire for a military career into the cadet or midshipman.[48] Because the ROTC program is being more and more utilized for training career and not reserve officers, it, like the academies, must be particularly concerned with motivating students toward a military profession. But career motivation within the ROTC program is made difficult by the very fact that it is set within and affiliated with colleges and universities whose concepts are not in consonance with the military ideals. One isolated investigation conducted by William Lucas at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1966 and reported here in Table 16 shows the relationship between the socialization of a random sample of college students and ROTC students over a four-year period. Many variables are obviously present in any such survey, including the initial recruitment factor of self-selection and the liberalization influence of the college vis-à-vis the conservative influence of the ROTC program. In any case, the statistics indicate that the student who joins ROTC becomes more conservative during his college career than one who does not join the program, thus lending credence to the belief of the establishment of a military attitude within the student during his college career.

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[48]Lyons and Masland, Education and Military Leadership, pp. 170-71.

TABLE 16

SOCIALIZATION OF STUDENTS/ROTC CADETS/ROTC MIDSHIPMEN (Percentages)

Random Sample

Subjective Identification	Academic Year			
	Freshman (39)	Sophomore (23)	Junior (16)	Senior (19)
Conservative	17.9	13.0	12.5	15.8
A little on the conservative side	33.3	17.4	31.3	26.3
A little on the liberal side	41.1	39.2	43.7	26.3
Liberal	7.7	30.4	12.5	31.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Navy ROTC

Subjective Identification	Academic Year		
	Freshman (49)	Junior (13)	Senior (36)
Conservative	24.5	15.4	36.1
A little on the conservative side	26.5	61.5	27.8
A little on the liberal side	32.7	15.4	27.8
Liberal	16.3	7.7	8.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 16--Continued

Air Force ROTC

Subjective Identification	Academic Year		
	Freshman (51)	Junior (36)	Senior (38)
Conservative	7.8	11.1	15.8
A little on the conservative side	25.5	30.6	42.1
A little on the liberal side	45.1	38.9	36.8
Liberal	21.6	19.4	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: William Ashley Lucas, II, "The American Lieutenant: An Empirical Investigation of Normative Theories of Civil-Military Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1966), pp. 75-76.

The remaining institution which has an attitudinal input into the officer's career is the service college. Several authors are of the opinion that the war colleges tend to implement and develop a service point of view.[49] Bernard Brodie notes that as far as changing attitudes are concerned, the service college education comes too late in one's career and is too brief and too casual to be effective.[50] More will be noted on the performance of the service college in the section on Education and Socialization, but suffice it to say here there should be no great expectations for the creation of a liberal attitude in the

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[49]Janowitz, Professional Soldier, p. 142; Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, pp. 479-80.

[50]Brodie, War and Politics, p. 486.

service colleges. What is more surprising is that they have not produced any great theorists or strategists since the days of Alfred T. Mahan.

The final attitudinal element as presented might appear as a refutation of the logic of an indoctrinated service point of view. Despite the obvious need for the socialization of an attitude at the military educational institutions, there is an argument for the value of a liberal education within the military framework because as Samuel Huntington notes, the officer is required in his profession to have a deeper understanding of human attitudes, motivations, and behavior, all of which can be better understood by having a liberal education.[51] The officer can neither be isolated from the needs of his subordinates nor can he likewise lose contact with the needs of the nation he serves. To Russell Kirk, the leaders of a society require a liberal education which allows them to have better judgment "against the ephemeral and vulgarizing solicitations of the hour."[52] John Masland and Laurence Radway claim that something was lost when the courses in moral philosophy fell into disrepute at the academies.[53] James Stockdale, who was a prisoner of war for over seven years in North Vietnam, when asked what education best prepared men for capture, replied that it was a broad

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[51]Huntington, Soldier and the State, p. 14.

[52]Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, 3rd rev. ed., Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1960), p. 497.

[53]Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. 239.

liberal education that gave man enough of a historical perspective properly to analyze the various aspects of life.[54]

Thus the experiences and personal relationships of life evaluated in the rubric of a liberal education seem to clash with the military attitude which is necessary for the survival of the military establishment. How can humanism be adjusted to and rationalized in the same arena with such elements as obedience, command, and group? The fact is they can never be fully reconciled, and herein lies the eternal problem that faces the military as it operates within the civilian society. The command and obedience structure which might on any given day recognize the worth of the individual can the very next day order that same individual into battle and possible death as part of a total group effort.

The difficulty in this basic reconciliation of liberal views and a conservative military establishment has been examined in terms of the three factors that have affected military socialization, mainly, fusion, conflict, and attitude. In the section that follows, an investigation will be made of the relationship between education as it is carried out in the military academic institutions and the socialization of the military officer.

Education and Socialization

Because of the total institutional nature of the military academies and service colleges, one could be led to believe that

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[54]James B. Stockdale, "Experiences as a POW in Vietnam," Naval War College Review 26 (January-February 1974): 3-4.

there is an effective indoctrinational process that assures the military establishment a certain and effective hegemony over the content and magnitude of the education of its members. But to at least two noted political scientists, Adam Yarmolinsky and Laurence Radway, the loosening of this hegemony is very evident at the institutions of primary socialization--the military academies. Yarmolinsky notes that as late as 1971 the military academies were becoming more and not less like civilian schools basically because of the high incidence of non-professional courses being taught.[55] Radway also noted in 1971 that included among the recent trends at the service academies has been the continuing change to being more civilian oriented.[56] Neither author would predict the impact of this on the future of military leaders. What has obviously been created is a dilemma being experienced primarily at the academies, but also at the service colleges, where the historical mission in both cases has remained the "preparation" of the military officer for military duties, but the method of carrying out this duty has become the product of, as previously noted, the post-World War II fusionist policy. Both institutions in an apparent attempt to prepare the officer in both military and civilian areas have at times divided their efforts to the extent of not only confusing the officer as to

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[55]Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 73.

[56]Laurence I. Radway, "Recent Trends at American Service Academies," in Public Opinion and the Military Establishment, ed. Charles C. Moskos, Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 26, 28.

what he should be prepared for but also confusing the mission of the military establishment. Testimony taken at and the conclusions of the Hébert subcommittee in its investigation of the military academies lends credence to this dilemma. The creation of this dilemma is not without cause, of which several of the more apparent are noted.

Because of the fusionist policy that has waxed and waned in its intensity since World War II, coupled with the social revolution of the 1960s and the divisiveness produced by the Vietnam War, the academies had an "academic" revolution which started with the establishment of the Air Force Academy in 1954 and continued on into the early 1960s.[57] The revolution was an obvious and basic attempt to update and upgrade instruction at the academies with a major emphasis being placed on the academic subjects. The ostensible reason given was that this was necessary to keep the academies within the mainstream of American life and that such changes would produce a "new" breed of military officer. Not so often heard was the assertion that in order for the academies to compete with civilian colleges and universities for students, they had to make their curricula more attractive and thus civilian oriented. In addition to having always basically emphasized a science-engineering curriculum which made academy graduates competitive with many contemporary engineering schools, the academies began to offer an undergraduate curriculum that permitted students to concentrate their studies in the

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[57]For a detailed discussion of this matter see pp. 219-21 above.

humanities and social sciences, at the same time allowing them to compete favorably with civilian college graduates. This was manifested by the introduction of the academic majors program into the academies' curricula, the policy of which was that in addition to completion of the required professional courses, a student also had an academic major and many times a minor. This policy continues to be the overall academic policy at the academies today. Results of this policy change have produced academy graduates who have been competitive in the humanities and social sciences with graduates of other liberal arts colleges and universities as evidenced by selected statistics. The Air Force Academy graduates from 1959-62 had comparable Graduate Record Examination scores with 230 college-level institutions. The West Point Class of 1963 had a mean in the eighty-first percentile in the Educational Testing Service examination on foreign affairs. The Naval Academy Class of 1964 had a higher Graduate Record Examination composite than the national norm.[58]

During the era of academic change at the academies, the service colleges were experiencing a similar shift from the pre-World War II curriculum of basically teaching strategy and tactics to a postwar emphasis on national security policy and political-military issues. The overall subjective control model which governed the postwar civil-military equation brought about a great civilianization of the service college curricula. Such

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[58] William E. Simons, Liberal Education in the Service Academies (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University for the Institute of Higher Education, 1965), p. 198.

a change, although tempered by a re-emphasis on professional subjects in recent years, has not been without its critics. Edward Katzenbach represents the critics' point of view. In decrying the demotion of professionalism at the war colleges, Katzenbach recommends that the curriculum should be oriented to allow for the discussion of military problems as central to the course, with national and international problems peripheral to this.[59] From John Masland and Laurence Radway comes the suggestion that the services could possibly close the war colleges and

> yet succeed in producing more effective national security administrators than these colleges can ever hope to graduate. . . . It could make better use of the natural skills and practical experience of officers without special schooling.[60]

The authors were referring to the "on the job" training, which all officers acquire, as being an invaluable education within itself when attempting to cope with the problems of national security. The authors also claim that the American military schools, particularly the service colleges, are not pushing out the frontiers of knowledge in their professional fields and that there is a lack of notable contributions to advanced study and research. Where, they ask, are the contemporary Luces, Mahans, and Uptons?[61] Robert Ginsburgh suggests that the professional military be withdrawn from all save professional military

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[59]Katzenbach, "Demotion of Professionalism," pp. 40-41.

[60]Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. x.

[61]Ibid., p. 509.

subjects.[62] The obverse of these arguments is argued by Samuel Huntington, who urges the general recognition of the fact that there are no purely military aspects of a problem and that the military man must be a citizen first and an officer second.[63]

Before investigating the curricula of the service educational institutions, several of the general issues concerning the nature of education at these institutions should be examined. Because of the elaborate curriculum changes made particularly at the academies and the service colleges, the question is asked as to what should be the military investment in the teaching of the humanities and the social sciences? What is really the purpose of providing such studies to people who are being trained to spend the rest of their productive years in the military service? P. H. Partridge brings the question into focus by noting that such education may very well be a functionless educational extravagance because it is questionable whether the different dimensions of education at the service academies (professional versus intellectual) can lie comfortably side by side.[64] The Army War College in drawing up its Long Range and Development Plan in 1972 admitted that the persistent problem is that of finding an optimum mix of military and non-military

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[62]Robert N. Ginsburgh, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," Foreign Affairs 42 (January 1964): 266.

[63]Samuel P. Huntington, ed., Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc. of the Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 1962), p. 237.

[64]Partridge, Educating for the Profession, pp. 13, 16.

courses.[65] In two separate reviews of the Army officer educational system, conducted in 1966 and again in 1971, the Department of the Army concluded that the education program of the Army should be composed primarily of a core of professional military subjects.[66] To verify the magnitude of these questions, the most recent (1974) cost-effectiveness study conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense asks whether the one billion dollars currently being spent on military education is producing the educated military man best suited for the defense of the country. Obviously a major thrust of any such investigation will be directed toward answering what should be the educational process for the "generalized" officer. Is it to be directed toward a more liberal base, a more theoretical approach, more emphasis on the humanities and social sciences, more emphasis in the professional military area, or a combination of all of these?

Since the service schools impart to the students the functional imperative required for national defense, the empirical investigation of the socialization process will include an analysis of the curricula used at the military academies, ROTC, and the service colleges for the general purpose of determining where the academic emphasis is placed. Cooperative civilian

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[65]U. S., Department of the Army, Army War College, Long Range Development Plan (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, [1972]).

[66]U. S., Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, 4 vols. (Washington: Department of the Army, [1966]), 1: 1. U. S. Department of the Army, Report of Army Officer Educational System, 3 vols. (Washington: Department of the Army, [1971]), 1: 5-3.

education conducted with several of the service colleges is not analyzed because the programs are considered as an "extra-academic" matter and not part of the service college mission of curriculum. Service utilization of civilian schools will be discussed separately. In each institution, the curriculum will be divided into the following general areas: professional courses--courses that are specifically military-oriented and not normally taught in a civilian college outside of ROTC (example --strategy and tactics); political-military courses--those courses that emphasize the role of the military in implementing political decisions (example--courses in international relations that stress national security matters and military policy making); civil-military courses--those courses that emphasize the role of the armed forces in civilian society (example--courses oriented toward civil-military compatibility and not policy implementation); American government/political theory courses--courses considered essential to the understanding of the American governmental system; non-professional/non-academic courses--physical activities conducted outside the classroom which carry no academic credit (example--physical education, military drill and training). The specific reasons for analyzing the curriculum in a general manner is that it is important to posit the present academic and professional emphasis of these institutions vis-à-vis the philosophical and historical dichotomy between the civilian society and the military establishment.

In all four institutions, the general mission is basically to prepare the officer better for future military duties.

While preparation can mean exposure to a totally military-professional oriented curriculum, it can not mean exposure to a totally civilian oriented curriculum, which would not be effective in carrying out the basic mission of these institutions. Thus within these extremes is a curriculum area that has been the result of the fusionist policy of post-World War II, i.e., the political-military area which stresses such subject areas as international relations, military decision-making, and area studies. Figure 4 illustrates the concept of preparation vis-à-vis the four education institutions.

FIGURE 4

THE RANGE OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONAL CURRICULUM EMPHASIS



Possibly the socialization effort of the three types of institutions--military academies, ROTC, and service colleges--should remain oriented to the left portion of the spectrum in order that a more professional military can develop within the environment determined by the historical and philosophical nature of civil-military relations. Obviously a curriculum oriented more to the right of the spectrum might prove to be increasingly distractive or even antithetical to the professional socialization

of the military officer. In this area, the academic work done by military officers at civilian colleges may prove highly detrimental to professional socialization when one analyzes the course work relative to the overall military socialization objective of instilling values and perceptions essential for a military profession.

Because the curricula over the years at the three types of institutions have for the most part been designed with the idea of attempting to balance the teaching of professional subjects with civilian subjects, there is no gain to be made in the present investigation by comparing old curricula with new curricula because this will not produce normative values. For this reason, only the recent curricula will be investigated with the purpose of analyzing them in the context of the inherent nature of the institution and the applicability of the curriculum to both historical and philosophical civil-military relations.

Any analysis of the curricula at the military academies must consider the environment within which the subject matter is taught. Normally in a civilian college, courses are taught in an environment where there is no hierarchical structure and a great dependence is placed on student participation and input. Unlike this environment, courses are taught at the academies under very different conditions. There is always present a hierarchical relationship between the officer-instructor and the student. The style of teaching often borders on a briefing-lecture method structured to cover certain quantities of material at any given classroom session. While the instructor's teaching

knowledge and ability may be on a par with his contemporary civilian counterpart, it is the general anti-liberal atmosphere that precludes an in-depth liberalization process. John Masland and Laurence Radway note that in a military institution, open controversy is rarely valued because it might jeopardize teamwork.[67] If the liberal environment were not such an important factor in producing liberal-minded students, then one could read books, never set foot on a college campus, or participate in class, and get a liberal education.

While the academies may produce quality graduates, the very nature of the academies' mission limits any extensive liberalization process. The liberal university requires its graduates to have general education requirements which normally require major and minor areas. At the academies, in addition to this requirement, the student has to take professional military courses and participate in non-academic matters such as physical education and drill. Thus his interests are automatically channelled into several directions. Add to this a "dawn-to-dusk" mandatory schedule with little time left for necessary rumination, and further detraction from any liberalization effect is evident.

Possibly the most realistic appraisal of academy education was made by the often-noted Hébert subcommittee, which realized that the academies were in the business of producing career officers; thus its investigation was to determine "whether

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[67] Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. 244.

or not the curriculum provides a background for the professional officer commensurate with the technological advances in the weapons of war and military and naval techniques."[68] Personal affiliation with the Naval Academy as an instructor has led me to believe that the inclusion of the liberal arts at all academies may not have an especially heavy impact on the student, i.e., he very seldom has time to do in-depth research simply because he normally finds the immediate demands of his profession are more closely attuned to the scientific, engineering, and military studies than to the humanities and social sciences. Thus with these factors basically determining the context of any academy liberalization policy, the present curricula are discussed in an effort to illustrate the emphasis between professional subjects, political-military subjects, civil-military subjects, and American government/theory subjects, the latter two of which provide the normative basis for determining the realistic extent of any liberalization in any military educational institution.

If one turns first to the service academies, it is immediately evident in Table 17 that a required definitive course in civil-military relations is absent, though it can be considered vital to an initial understanding of the milieu in which the graduate will move for at least five years. Equally as evident is the nominal emphasis placed on courses in American government and American political theory, an understanding of

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[68] U. S., Congress, House, Administration of the Service Academies, p. 10225.

TABLE 17

SERVICE ACADEMY CURRICULA

	Professional	Pol-Mil.	Civ-Mil.	Am. Gov/ Theory	Non-Prof.
Army	10	0 (1)	0	2 (3)	8
Navy	14	0 (2)	0 (1)	0 (10)	8
Air Force	9	4 (3)	0 (4)	1 (7)	13

Source: U. S., Department of the Army, U. S. Military Academy, Catalog, 1973-74 (West Point, N.Y.: U. S. Military Academy, 1973); U. S., Department of the Navy, U. S. Naval Academy, Catalog, 1973-74 (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Academy, 1973); U. S., Department of the Air Force, U. S. Air Force Academy, 1973-74 Catalog (Colorado Springs, Col.: U. S. Air Force Academy, 1973).

Note: Because the curricula at the academies are divided between required and elective courses, they were analyzed in terms of courses required in the sub-curriculum areas over a four year period. Elective courses are indicated in parentheses. Course offerings outside the sub-areas are not included.

which provides one with the normative background which again can be considered vital to an understanding of the American political process. Likewise, one should not be surprised with the stress placed on professional subjects and non-professional, non-academic matters, such as physical education and drill. The fact that the academies allow academic majors and minors in areas outside of the professional area is evidence of the fusionist policy which overtook military professionalism and thence military curricula after World War II. There has not been a great increase in subjects that would provide the normative bases for what could be considered any real liberalization in civil-military

relations, the one area that touches on the role of the military within society.

In its unique position in military education, the general ROTC curriculum indicated in Table 18 represents a rather small portion of a student's overall course requirements in college.[69]

TABLE 18

ROTC CURRICULA

	Professional	Pol-Mil.	Civ-Mil.	Am. Gov/ Theory	Non-Prof.
Army	6	0	1	0	3
Navy	8	1	0	0	4
Air Force	6	1	0	0	1

Note: Courses noted are those required for a military commission and are representative of general ROTC requirements.

The larger requirement for the Navy ROTC in both the professional and non-professional course areas is the product of the full scholarship program, which requires more emphasis on professional subjects and which is now only becoming more available in the Army and Air Force ROTC programs because of the need for a greater percentage of regular career officers from the ROTC program. Even though there is this change in emphasis toward

[69]Most military, naval, and air science courses carry reduced credit or no credit vis-à-vis regular academic courses. For example, in a college which has an academic course requirement of thirty-two courses for the baccalaureate level, the ROTC is normally granted credit for between two and four courses.

training more career than reserve officers, the ROTC program cannot be considered comparable to the service academy programs. Even so, here, as in the academies' programs, there is a lack of both civil-military and American government/theory courses to familiarize the graduate with the rudiments of these important areas. Again, as at the academies, the perspective officer is not provided with the normative basis for understanding his professional relationship with society. For those who resign after their initial tour of duty, which is true of more graduates of the ROTC programs than the military academies, this requirement may seem peripheral. But for those who remain in the military and never possibly attend any military or civilian college thereafter, ignorance of these normative factors may prove somewhat of a professional liability. For those who attend one of the service junior command and staff courses (after service of between eleven and fifteen years) and one of the three service senior courses (after service of between sixteen and twenty-two years), length of service and professional socialization may render worthless any attempt to teach the basic conceptual idea of civil-military relations and American government/theory. Without this basis, the mental analytical process does not analyze the selected life occupation in normative terms. The pragmatics of the occupation seem to dominate the ethos of the profession. The last level of formal military education is received by the officer at the military service colleges, of which there are basically eight. Generally an officer must attend one of the command and staff schools before he attends

one of the war college courses. Inter-service schooling at both levels is quite common.

The service colleges do provide a definite upward mobility for future military leaders of the United States, and because approximately twelve percent of the total officer time in the military service is devoted to education and training, with much of this time spent at the junior and senior service colleges,[70] the colleges should be the culmination of a professional officer's academic education. In one sense, selection to flag or general rank may be helped by attendance at the war colleges; in some cases attendance at one may seem to be more advantageous than attendance at another. Table 19 represents such selection opportunity of senior service college graduates of the Classes 1951-60, inclusive. The years selected were the most representative because the Vietnam War years (1964-73) were years when war college attendance was given a different emphasis in terms of promotion.

As at the academies, the service colleges have had continually to evaluate their curriculum in order to appraise which type of education is best provided at the service college level. John Masland and Laurence Radway are of the belief that the service colleges should display a greater concern for intellectual vigor and search for critical analysis. The school should be education and not training oriented and thus better equipped to develop basic principles and habits of thought.[71] There is a

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[70]Huntington, "Power, Expertise," p. 789.

[71]Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, pp. 417-18.

TABLE 19

FLAG/GENERAL PROMOTION SCHEDULE

War College	U.S. Army	U.S. Navy	U.S. Air Force
National	336/225/67	263/109/41	321/148/46
Naval	118/6/5	981/81/8	68/9/13
Army	1665/390/23	22/1/5	45/7/16
Air	113/15/13	54/27/50	1261/202/16

Source: Edward R. Day, "Impact of Senior Service College Education on Naval Officer Promotion," Naval War College Review 22 (September 1969): 65.

Note: Figures are read left to right as follows: number graduates/number selected for flag-general rank/percentage selected.

general belief that, in fact, the service colleges reinforce the images of the various services and thus not only lean more in the direction of training than of education but in the process hinder the cultivation of bold, independent, and imaginative thinking in their students. While apparent indications show that academic freedom may exist in a technical sense, such a factor is normally the victim of conformity.[72] Because of this possible parochialism, manifested by the lack of original thought in the fields of military strategy and tactics, civil-military relations, and national security matters, it is possible that the military educational system, and more specifically the service schools which are the repository for advanced military education, have

[72]Ibid., pp. 389-91.

failed as centers for original thought.

Other criticism leveled against the service colleges includes what Masland and Radway classify as a lack of appreciation of an intellectual approach to problems of military and national strategy.[73] There is also an absence of concern for the historical and theoretical aspects of problems, which leads to a low level of analytical abstraction. Theoretical propositions are sacrificed for a great interest in the operational aspects of policy issues.[74] Edward Katzenbach notes that "the high demand for war college graduates derives more from the professional qualifications that led to their initial selection than from the instruction they receive."[75]

On the other hand, the service colleges have been criticized for concentrating on numerous subject areas to the exclusion of professional training. Because these colleges offer what is basically a year-long course on the problems of national defense, some criticism of the past curricula was made of the lack of professional subjects at the service colleges. Since the senior military schools are designed to meet the needs of both the government as a whole and the armed services, these proponents of professionalism believe that there should be a return to emphasis on professional subject matter. One of the leaders of this change is Admiral Stansfield Turner, now President of

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[73] Ibid., p. 440.

[74] Ibid., pp. 381-82.

[75] Katzenbach, "Demotion of Professionalism," p. 35.

the Naval War College, who restructured the entire curriculum of both the senior and the junior courses along more professional lines. Concurrent with this, Admiral Turner terminated (1973) the war college cooperative graduate program with George Washington University because he thought it detracted from the professional aspects of the war college courses. The National War College is also phasing out its cooperative program in international relations with George Washington University. The Department of the Army in reviewing Army officer schools in 1966 recommended that both the Army Command and Staff and the Army War College reconsider its cooperative graduate programs with the possible motive of eliminating these programs because of their incursion into the students' time.[76]

These numerous changes have resulted in a composite service college curriculum which has been summarized in Table 20 below.

What is readily apparent from Table 20 is the wide range of professional course emphasis both overall and at the command and staff levels. Also evident is the low percentage of instruction time allocated to the study of civil-military relations and American government/theory areas, in neither area ever exceeding six percent of the total academic time. This is too low a percentage for a profession whose basis is necessarily a proper understanding of the normative issues that characterize the relationship of the military to its parent society. An

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[76]Department of the Army, Report of the Army Board (1966), 1: 76-77.

TABLE 20

SERVICE COLLEGE CURRICULA

College	Professional	Pol-Mil.	Civ-Mil.	Am.Gov.	Non-Prof.	Other
National War	13	79	1	6	1	0
Armed Forces Staff	83	8	0.8	1	0	7.2
Army War	73	3 (2)	3 (1)	6 (3)	0	15
Army Command and Staff	71	4 (6)	3 (3)	0	0	22
Navy War	42	16	6	0	0	36
Navy Command and Staff	41	16	4	0	0	39
Air War	33	21 (1)	0.3 (1)	4 (1)	0	41.7
Air Command and Staff	22	5	2 (2)	0.1	6	64.9

Source: U. S., Department of Defense, National War College, _Curriculum Outline 1974-75_ (Washington: National War College, 1974); U. S., Department of Defense, Armed Forces Staff College, _Catalog-Class 54_ (Norfolk, Va.: Armed Forces Staff College, 1973); U. S., Department of the Army, Army War College, _Curriculum Pamphlet-Academic Year 1975_ (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1974); U. S., Department of the Army, Army Command and Staff College, _Catalog, 1974-75_ (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Army Command and Staff College, 1974); U. S., Department of the Navy, Naval War College, _Syllabus for College of Naval Warfare_ (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1973); U. S., Department of the Navy, Naval War College, _Syllabus for the College of Naval Command and Staff_ (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1973); U.S., Department of the Air Force, Air War College, _Curriculum Catalogue, 1973-1974_ (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University, 1973); U. S., Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, _Curriculum Catalog: Class ACSG-74_ (Montgomery, Ala.: Air University, 1973).

Note: Because all students generally take the same basic course at the service colleges, the curricula was analyzed in terms of percentage of course work emphasis in each of the subcurriculum areas. In each case, the designation of _Other_

generally includes course instruction in such areas as economics and decision making. Elective course offerings in the sub-areas are indicated by parentheses.

understanding of these issues seems to be required in order for the most benefit to be gotten from all other course offerings in the service colleges. Without this background, studying the other sub-areas is conducted in somewhat of an intellectual vacuum.

Little has been mentioned thus far about officer graduate education conducted at civilian institutions and its overall impact on the military. From the very nature of the program, either at the masters level or the doctoral level, it is evident that there are relatively fewer professional courses studied under this program than at the service colleges, and thus the evaluation of the program is made on the basis of the utilization of these officers within the military establishment, the logic being that if the military funds the studies for selected officers, it must intend to utilize the officers produced through this program, even though the education received may be antithetical to military culture. The validity of such an inquiry might be made more evident by the money spent on such education, which is summarized in Table 21 below.

The purpose of sending officers to non-military graduate programs is to educate military officers to fill validated positions within the defense establishment. Where graduate education is needed to prepare officers for teaching at the military academies, ROTC, or at the service colleges, then the process of

TABLE 21

OFFICER POSTGRADUATE EDUCATION COSTS (Millions)

	Fiscal Year 1973		Fiscal Year 1974	
	Participants	Cost	Participants	Cost
Graduate Education at Civilian Institutions	4,595	80.6	4,611	82.0
Graduate Education at Military Institutions	1,916	49.3	2,143	60.4
Total	6,511	129.9	6,754	142.4

Source: U. S., Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Officer Graduate Education Study (n.p., 1973), p. 7.

validation is made quite simple. In areas outside of teaching, the process of validation is many times made the subject of a personal judgment. It is generally in the latter areas that the education requirement is not institutionalized and thus made victim of annual appropriation battles. Other problems experienced by the utilization of non-military graduate program are that despite the fact that the main criteria for selection to civilian education subscribed to by all services is alleged to be promotability, performance, and academic record, officer availability and interest in advanced education continues to outweigh the factor of the value of the officer's education to the service. Also the relationship between promotion and educational experience is neither legislated nor predetermined. Even if it were, it would necessarily change from time to time because of the

needs of the service.

Because the program is subject to congressional funding and is extremely costly as indicated in Table 21, most investigations of the program are conducted on a cost-effective basis. The latest investigation was conducted by the General Accounting Office in 1970. During its investigation, the GAO cited the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy established in 1964, which promulgated criteria for determining officer graduate education requirements. The report criticized the military for the following reasons: validating criteria of positions requiring graduate degrees had become so broad that almost any officer position could be validated; positions being validated may not require the education called for or could be filled by utilizing qualified civilian or military officers, who did not have the academic credentials but had the necessary experience; of the approximately 33,000 officers with graduate degrees, many were not being adequately utilized in their assignments.[77] In more specific terms, the GAO reported in one instance on 714 validated billets at 14 military installations. Of the 506 officers at these installations who had a masters degree or higher, only 162 were assigned to validated positions. Thus 344 officers or 68 percent of those with advanced degrees were not being utilized in jobs consistent with their education.[78] One of the implications to be drawn from this under-utilization is that there is, in fact,

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[77] U. S., Controller General, Report to Congress, pp. 1-3.

[78] Ibid., p. 22.

in progress an inter-service "numbers" game in which the prestige of the officer corps is determined by the number of academic credentials which can be displayed. Thus it seems doubtful that in many cases, where education in the humanities and social sciences is concerned, that the supposed education is, in fact, required for validated positions.

As a result of the GAO investigation of 1970, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs conducted an Officer Graduate Education Study in 1973. Some of the more significant conclusions reached are noted as follows: significant numbers of officers educated through fully-funded graduate programs are apparently not being utilized by the services; utilization and career management of graduate educated officers needs to be improved; seventy-five percent of the participants surveyed indicated that they undertook off-duty education programs for personal reasons not directly related to their military jobs; fourteen percent of the officers who took graduate education in the humanities found that their advanced education had no impact on making them more effective officers.[79] In a survey conducted by Cecil Hurst and James Shaddix in 1973 of 1265 naval officers who had received a Navy-sponsored postgraduate degree, 817 responded. Of this number, 322 or 39.4 percent indicated that their basic reason for attending graduate school was to remain competitive for future assignment and

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[79] U. S., Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Officer Graduate Education Study (n.p., 1973), pp. 17, 63, 81.

promotion, or as the authors noted, to have their "tickets punched." Only 218, or 26.7 percent, indicated as the reason for taking graduate studies to become a more capable officer, and only 199, or 24.4 percent, indicated as their reason to fulfill educational aspirations.[80] Thus the demands of the profession and the parameters of the military established the reasons for socialization which stressed promotion over capability or educational aspirations. From all the evidence noted, it is apparent that the very factor of under-utilization of officers with advanced degrees indicates the military's reluctance to allow the results of an education attained in a liberal environment to bring about any major philosophical changes within the military establishment.

With the return to an objective control model in the post-Vietnam War era brought about largely by the modern volunteer army concept, the military will likely become relatively more isolated from the civilian society than it has since World War II, and thus it is very likely that the military educational curriculum, which is an integral part of the officer socialization process, will become even more professionally oriented than civilian oriented in the future. This should not be the least surprising in view of the historical and theoretical nature of the dichotomy of the civilian society and the military establishment in the civil-military equation in American society.

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[80]Cecil Roy Hurst, Jr. and James Delano Shaddix, "Opinion Survey of Naval Officers Who Have Received a Navy Sponsored Graduate Degree" (M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1973), pp. 32-33.

PART III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

> To prophesy is extremely difficult--especially with respect to the future.
>
> Anon

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The major problem which has remained philosophically and historically endemic to American civil-military relations has been the antithetical nature of the military establishment to its parent civilian society. Evolving from this relationship are natural limitations placed on the efforts to make the military more relevant to society. These limitations continue, as they have in the past, to affect any attempted liberalization of the military establishment.

The problem is deeply rooted in the seventeenth century Puritan tradition which among other beliefs posited that material success was indicative of divine favor. Warfare, which would either impede or reduce prosperity, was considered anathema to Puritan society. Couple this Puritan belief with their flight

from Old World persecution and we find implanted within the American governmental system the rudimentary ideas of both liberalism, which was manifested in the overtones of John Locke's "natural rights doctrine," and its corollary concept of an anti-military ethos. By not being "tied" to Old World institutions, such as feudalism, clericism, and socialism, the American government developed into a "unique" system, which as Daniel Boorstin notes had a "seamlessness" about its culture. Both Boorstin and Louis Hartz recognized that the American experience had been unique in its conception with the subsequent evolution of a distinct genus of American political thought.

The result of the Puritan experience was manifested in America's greatest liberal document, the Declaration of Independence, which declared America's orientation toward the free individual along with its dislike and distrust of things military. Following the Revolutionary War, the colonists continued to identify themselves with the "citizen army" concept, while at the same time realizing that the seeds of military professionalism had been sewn by the very fact that an army had to be raised to fight the Revolutionary War. Thus was spawned a double but unequal military legacy that was articulated first in the Articles of Confederation under the rubric of the spirit of state cooperation, and second in the Constitution of 1787, which institutionalized the role of the military establishment within a federal system (Art. 1 sec. 8, 12-16). Subsequent to the Constitution came the Bill of Rights, which again reaffirmed the basic liberal rights of the American people as juxtaposed to the

limiting nature of the ethos of the Constitution. Amendments II and III are specifically directed toward civil-military relations.

Within the restrictions of the Constitution and basically until the United States entered World War II, the basic model of American civil-military relations was designed around the concept of a subjective civilian control model and the lack of an external security function, both of which led to a military establishment that was small and completely responsive to the American liberal tradition. Except for singular occasions where armies were temporarily raised to meet the enemy threat in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War, the American liberal tradition remained paramount with little if any fear of an expanding military establishment which could interfere with the liberal ethic. This civil-military relationship conceived by the Puritans and institutionalized through such documents as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights was to remain basically unchanged until World War II. Without an external threat to national security, the security function was assigned mainly to the state militias. Such an arrangement was incorporated into the Militia Act of 1792, which remained as the basic national military policy until 1903, when the "Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia" was passed by Congress. Among other provisions, the 1903 Act provided for the federalization of the state militia (now called the National Guard) in time of emergency or war. This was undoubtedly a radical policy change, in

that it gave the professional military control over all the military manpower of the nation and created a de facto standing army for the first time in American history.

Nineteenth century America found the military establishment completely subordinate and responsive to the liberal imperative. The occasion of war necessitated the use of force, but once the hostilities were terminated, military demobilization quickly followed, and the military once again was relegated to a state of benign neglect. Although the Spanish-American War was the first major war in which American troops fought overseas, it was not until World War I that liberalism was given a security function which necessitated the raising of an army to launch the crusade that, in Woodrow Wilson's words, would make "the world safe for democracy." What happened, first in World War I and then in World War II and thereafter, is that the historically rooted societal imperative of liberalism was being challenged by the functional imperative of security.

The second major turning point in American civil-military relations, the first being the National Defense Act of 1903, came after World War II, when the cold war and nuclear weapons necessitated the eventual abandonment of a complete military demobilization, the instituting for the first time in United States history after the cessation of hostilities of conscription, and the maintaining of a military force-in-being. The result of this major realignment of civil-military relations, institutionalized first in the National Security Act of 1947, was a fusion of military and political functions, necessitated by cold

war exigencies and the intensification of the policy of subjective civilian control, wherein the military was becoming more of a "mirror" of society. Out of this fusionist policy came the problem of rectifying the inherent, dichotomous values of the civilian and military ethic. More specifically, it was at this juncture that the problems encountered when the military establishment is exposed to a high degree of civilianization became manifest. These are the problems that have been investigated in the pages above under the function of recruitment and socialization.

While both the military and civilian societies could co-exist under conditions in which the military establishment was maintained at a minimum manning level and subjected to the societal imperative of liberalism, once they began to function as co-partners in the making and execution of national security policy, conflict between them became inevitable because of the theoretical and historical differences in values and tenets. As a result of this new civil-military relationship, the military fell more and more under the influence of civilianization and in the process its military professionalism suffered. The decade of the 1960s found the civil-military equation further exacerbated by the social revolution that was part of the larger unrest of the American populace spawned in part by the Vietnam War. Thus by the latter half of the 1960s the military establishment, which had largely ignored the tenets of the historical dichotomy between itself and civilian society, found itself the primary target of societal dissent over the war and the victim of methodical civilianization efforts that had gone on unabated

since World War II. In addition to this, the military was divided into many factions over whether the proper reaction was to revitalize its professional military posture or to continue to "humanize" its policies, always under the threat of further compromising military standards.

One possible result of the unsettling effect of the war was that in 1967 Congress was amenable to the suggestion that conscription had possibly outlived its effectiveness and that some form of lottery system might be more feasible for recruiting military manpower to fight the Vietnam War. Following on from this were President Nixon's policy statements favoring an all-volunteer military (1969) and foreign policy statement of 1970 which further delineated his Guam doctrine of 1969, noting that the United States will not unilaterally defend the free nations of the world. Both statements in effect aided the military establishment, in that reduced commitments would generate a reduced, but more professional, military force free of conscription. A prognosis of the 1970s would tend to indicate that the fusionist, civilianization trend of military policy is at least being re-examined, if not reversed. The normative values thus far discussed, which define the parameters of American civil-military relations, seem best to describe a governmental system in which the relationship between the civilian and the military society is governed by a pattern of co-existence and not co-partnership. The historical and contemporary nature of American civil-military relations confirms the fact that the theoretical differences between the two societies continue to

dominate this relationship.

To understand better the civil-military equation, the functions of recruitment and socialization as they occur within the military establishment must be examined in order to determine whether they have any effect on the "root" differences between the two societies. The institution of UMT, which compels civilians to undergo military training for a specified period of time, is by far the most extreme anti-liberal recruitment method. This fact alone may explain why the American people have rejected it on three separate occasions when it became a national issue--in colonial times, and in the periods bracketing World Wars I and II. Although there were numerous colonial laws and regulations which required male colonists to perform military service within the colonies, the laws were enforced with discretion depending greatly on the amount of time that a colonist could spare from making a living to provide for local defense. There was no traditional military obligation created under these conditions, a legacy that was carried over into the Constitution. The Knox Plan of 1790 and the Militia Act of 1792 both indicated that males should be borne on the rolls of the militia. Such an obligation was seldom observed, however, and if it was it was at the convenience of the male population.

The concept of UMT was seldom mentioned in the nineteenth century, and it was not until the establishment of volunteer citizen training camps in 1913 that the UMT concept was again made a national issue. For the first time in the era of modern warfare UMT was considered by the Congress and rejected, first

in 1916 at the height of wartime sentiment and again in 1920 under the more sober conditions of peacetime in which normalcy and the liberal ethic again became dominant political factors. The last debate over the concept of UMT began in the waning days of World War II, when it became evident that the United States had to consider in the future a security dimension to its defense policy. The concept of UMT was then thrust into congressional debate and presented to the American people as the hope for future national defense. Five separate congressional hearings were held on UMT legislation and by June, 1948, the final proposed UMT legislation was defeated. Every defeat was based on the historical fact that UMT was antithetical to the nature of American liberal society. The UMT issue lay dormant for almost twenty years until 1967 when both the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service and the Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement concluded that UMT was not the way to enlist manpower for the Vietnam War. Both groups again followed the basic American belief about UMT--the public simply would not tolerate its use. It is now very likely a dead issue in America.

Unlike UMT, selective service has had a varied and at times a violent history of use in the United States. Like UMT, the institution of selective service has polarized the public debate on conscription around such issues as, is it part of the American heritage, what are citizen's duties versus citizen's rights under the Constitution, and, is it democratic to conscript? The utilization of conscription in America can best be

described as initially provoking violent internal reactions and later being used because the pragmatics of the situation left no other option for raising armies to counter an enemy threat or attack. The Constitution is vague on whether the Congress has authority to "force" one into military service, and until the national debate on conscription surfaced for the first time in the War of 1812, it had never been a national issue. Even when that war was going badly and the British had destroyed the Capital and burned the White House in August, 1814, Congress was reluctant to authorize national conscription. Legislation to do so which it had drawn up and debated was rendered moot by the ending of the War in December, 1814.

When conscription was introduced into the Civil War by the North in 1863, after the failure of the Militia Act of 1862 to provide adequate numbers of military manpower, it provoked such a violent reaction from the public because of its invasion into the privacy and rights of the citizens, that riots broke out in many cities, and the desertion rate soared to an unprecedented high level. In retrospect, Section Thirteen of the Conscription Act of 1863, which provided for an acceptable substitute or cash payment in lieu of service, may have prevented the conscripting of troops from being a total national disaster. In the summary total of troops who served in the Northern armies in the Civil War, approximately 160,849 out of 2,213,365 troops, or seven percent, were conscripts.

When the nation decided to wage a crusade in World War I to preserve democracy, it accepted the National Defense Act of

1916, which made every male adult a militiaman with a national obligation. A Supreme Court decision (1918) upheld the right of the national government to draft military manpower, and the Espionage Act (1917) and Amendments (1918) made, among other provisions, refusal to serve in the military a punishable offense. In conscripting citizens, the government had the cooperation and blessings of liberals to fight a crusade against an enemy that threatened democracy. Thus in time of national peril, conscription was finally successfully utilized. On the other hand, in keeping with the liberal American tradition, by 1921 the military machine was again dismantled for lack of a function, and the military establishment once again took up its garrison duties.

The history of World War II conscription begins with the passage of the first peacetime conscription law in September, 1940, and continues for all intents and purpose until 1 July 1973. Within this thirty-three year period, conscription was institutionalized first as a necessity to carry out the liberal crusade against world fascism and then in response to the cold war policy as a force-in-being preparedness policy against communism. Through the decades of the 1940s, 1950s, and into the 1960s, the draft was seldom debated in Congress, and a pro forma renewal was seen every four years. Over the years, the liberals tacitly agreed with the national conscription policy vis-à-vis its military commitments, but as national assets became more and more diverted to military purposes and the nature of war grew "colder," liberals began to become more vocal in their dissent over the draft. Such dissension and disenchantment reached a

crescendo in the 1960s, assisted by the social revolution and the Vietnam War. The system, which had been based on the Jeffersonian concept that the best government is that which operates at its lowest feasible level (nearly 4,100 draft boards), finally became a victim of change. This happened when inequality was injected into the system through what many viewed as an inequitable deferment system. The system, by following such a policy, was in effect violating the basic liberal tenet of equality. President Nixon's policy statement in 1969 that he would propose the lottery system as a means that would hopefully lead to the "principle of a no draft in peacetime," indicated the possibly numbered days of the conscription system. In December, 1969, the lottery system was instituted, and it corrected the inequities that had plagued the old draft system. By July, 1973 the selective service system was terminated after over thirty years of almost continuous use and was replaced by a system more in keeping with American liberalism--the modern volunteer army.

The appeal of the modern volunteer army (MVA) to the American political system and more specifically to American civil-military relations is that it is based on the realization that such a concept is in consonance with the basic theoretical and historical civil-military relationship as it was established in early colonial times and has remained as part of the normative American tradition. When it was established in July, 1973, MVA was a return to the basic liberal tenet of individualism and individual choice. Complaints leveled against the MVA by its

critics, in essence, manifested a realization that there are "root" differences between the civilian and military societies. The charge that the MVA will produce a more self-contained and thus isolated military establishment is only a realization that the two societies have dissimilar values and tenets because of historical and theoretical reasons. The exception stated is no more than a realization of the rule governing civil-military relations. The additional complaint that under the MVA concept the military will eventually be largely comprised of minority groups, particularly the blacks, is not a rational reason for refuting the utilization of the MVA. It is in fact an indication that the military establishment is open to any who may be denied access to other sectors of society. The last complaint normally lodged against the MVA is that it further weakens every citizen's obligation to serve his country. Whether this obligation is as valid in peacetime as in wartime is a matter of debate, but under the MVA concept the selective service system remains in existence, to be reinstated in time of national emergency.

In the area of officer recruitment, the investigation delved into the effect of different methods of officer recruitment on the "root" differences between the civilian and military societies. It was hypothesized that the recruitment of officers within the liberal environment has not had the liberalizing effect on the military establishment that one would expect. The pattern analyzed was that the source of officer procurement (and retention), the military academies, the Reserve Officer Training

Corps, and Officer Candidate Schools in that order, is inversely related to providing the most liberal input into the military establishment. Added to this pattern is the factor of self-selection, in which the prospective officer, by voluntarily choosing a recruitment source in effect reinforces his military ethic with the conservative tenets of the military institution. The liberal input into the military from the sources of ROTC and OCS is not only limited by the self-selection factor but is further restricted by the draft-avoidance factor which, prior to the MVA, literally forced a great percentage of future officers "involuntarily" to join one or the other programs. Other than the attitudes and motivations of the student who is recruited into one or the other officer programs, the very nature and mission of each program and the military establishment as a whole establish the parameters which limit to a very great degree the extent of liberalization within the military establishment. In opposition to the theoretical limits established by its missions, the military academies, and to a lesser extent the ROTC program, started to add in the late 1950s and early 1960s non-professional courses to their curricula in a mass effort to become relevant to changing American society and to attract their share of prospective college students. In the process, the military academies were investigated in 1967-68 by a House subcommittee to determine whether the academies were carrying out their mission of producing career military officers. Although the academies were commended for their efforts in this direction, they were reminded that the American people expects

no less than a maximum effort by the academies in producing career officers and not intellectual philosophers.

Concerning the OCS and ROTC programs, the recruitment of officers through the former does not produce large numbers of career officers but instead an officer who usually serves one tour of military duty (2-3 years) and then resigns his commission. Such a source, though often considered the best liberal input into the services, produces, in reality, a small part of the total career officer corps. The liberalization efforts of the ROTC program are not only hampered by the self-selection syndrome but by the operation of the program on college campuses as essentially a training and recruitment device rather than as an educational program. These tenets are antithetical to the nature of liberal academe. The shift of ROTC programs, for various reasons, from more liberal, established colleges to ones which have less renouned academic credentials further dilutes any liberal influence which the college has over the ROTC program. Because of both internal (self-selection) and external (mission of the program and the entire military establishment) factors, the liberalization process that could be transferred from the liberal society to the military establishment is more of an illusion than a fact.

The final area of investigation concentrated on the professional socialization of the military officer in the context of three factors that vitally affect that socialization and the overall ramifications of formal education as it is conducted at the military academies, ROTC, service colleges, and

civilian institutions. The factor of fusion is concerned with an analysis of the quandary experienced when the professional military is trained in both military and non-military subjects. Out of World War II came a recognition of the need to reorganize both the defense establishment and its involvement in American society at-large. Concurrent with this was a reorganization of all military academic curricula in order to emphasize the substantive matter of political-military relations, national security policy, and international relations. With greater emphasis being placed on the teaching of what had heretofore been considered non-military subjects, the military began to suffer a "professionalization gap" and a loss of a certain amount of expertise. Thus what has continued on almost unabated since World War II has been an attempt by the civilian society to exert extensive subjective control over the military establishment to the degree of confusing its identity with other bureaucratic institutions. The one who suffers in this situation is the officer who becomes confused as to what is his mission--prepare for battle or administer a bureaucracy?

Between the military establishment and its civilian society is an inherent conflict. From the very nature of American society education is more than likely to instill liberal tendencies within officers and thus naturally conflict with the conservative nature of the military establishment. The fusion factor has certainly exacerbated this situation. Differences that are manifested by this conflict include the creation of a heroic model by the military versus the education of the

individual by the civilian college; the dependence on ceremonies, rituals, and honors by the military versus the instilling of rationality by the civilian institution; the conflict with liberal standards when the military education exceeds its fixed parameters; conformity in military instruction versus the free spirit of a liberal education; incompatibility of ROTC with the other functions of a liberal college campus. In essence, the conflict factor determines to a large extent the limits of any socialization effort connected with a military education.

The final factor discussed was the role which military education played in developing a "proper" attitude necessary for the officer to carry out the mission of national defense. Such an attitude must not be confused with the military way, the particular method by which the military carries out its mission, nor with the military mind, a term pejoratively used to generalize about the military manner of thought rather than describing a mind conditioned by the functional imperative of the military profession. As in the cases of fusion and conflict, the attitude factor is largely determined by the historical and theoretical differences between the two societies. Thus if the military attitude is to be perpetuated, there is no better institution ready to act as the repository for military ideals than the military academies. It is normally through these institutions rather than through ROTC and OCS that the military elite rise to the top of the military hierarchy. If a proper attitude is not instilled within the cadet or midshipman, then the very foundations of military tradition could be considered to be in danger.

The creation of such an attitude is not part of a liberal educational experience nor does it reflect an image of academic excellence. Attempts to supplement this attitude with an academic curriculum has often brought the criticism that the professional aspects of the academies' education are being neglected. The creation of an attitude is equally important in the ROTC, whose task is made more difficult by its very location within an academic atmosphere.

Once the factors which influence any military educational institution were noted, then the ramifications of education at the various service schools and colleges were examined to determine its impact on officer socialization. The fusionist policy, followed since the end of World War II, has certainly influenced socialization, in that academic curricula became more and more civilian oriented in the area of political-military matters, international relations, and defense economics. Such a shift was balanced by either an elimination of or de-emphasis on the teaching of professional subjects such as strategy and tactics as well as teaching courses in American government, American political theory, and civil-military relations, all three of which are considered important for an understanding of the relationship of the profession which the officer is about to enter to its parent civilian society. Such a long term trend produced a "backlash" in the 1960s from both the military policy makers and civilian planners as to the value to be gained from instruction in subjects that have no bearing on military professionalism. It is obvious from my comments that I consider the areas of civil-

military relations, American government, and political theory to have a tangible effect on such professionalism. The educational policies have in turn spawned an almost continual investigation of the entire military educational system on the basis of determining what should be its purpose.

Concomitant to this was a major concern about the curricula used in military education. The results of the curricula investigation revealed the following: while the military academies' curricula indicate a fair amount of training in professional subjects and military drill and training, there is a marked absence of any mandatory definitive course in civil-military relations and little preparation in the area of American government and political theory--all areas that are important for any rational understanding of the military establishment within its parent society. In the ROTC programs, as at the academies, there is a similar lack of required courses in the three areas and thus an inadequate background is provided for the officer who may elect to make the military his career. While the service colleges have within the last three years begun to emphasize the teaching of more professional subjects, there continues to remain a dearth of instruction in the three areas of American government, American political theory, and civil-military relations, all of which are vital to the officer, who at this stage in his career is being prepared for greater responsibility within the military establishment, for which it is almost imperative that he have a grounding in these three basic substantive fields.

A final area of military education to be investigated was that conducted at civilian colleges and universities. It is here that the civil-military conflict manifests itself in the total envolvement of a military officer in true academic pursuit. Realization of the impact of such an education on the officer is made evident by the very fact that subsequent utilization of officers with this education is often minimal. In this case, true liberalization of the military establishment is thwarted through non-utilization of educated officers. Such a syndrome indicates the tacit acknowledgement that the military establishment in fact does not opt to be liberalized--a realization that has its theoretical "roots" in the early Puritan tradition, one that has dictated the future course of American civil-military relations.

Conclusions

The historical attempts to liberalize the military establishment are not only tempered by but regulated and subjected to the normative nature of the American civil-military equation. Because of the basic nature of this relationship, ignoring its existence will produce inadequate and unrealistic analyses of civil-military relations. Unless any analysis of civil-military relations includes the concepts indicated in the model noted in Figure 2 (p. 8), the continual re-examination of American civil-military relations will proceed in a philosophical vacuum. Such a conclusion is based on the fact that there are inherent differences between the military and civilian societies in the United States, which are beyond the realm of any major

reconciliation. Indeed, if such a reconciliation were undertaken, it would necessitate changing either the basic nature of American liberalism or the conservative posture of its military establishment, or both. In both situations, the former is a way of life chosen in the Declaration of Independence and the latter is necessitated by the nature of the military task. Possibly the most evident manifestation of the problem created by ignoring this historical relationship occurred after World War II, when the civilian society successfully invaded the domain of the military establishment and inculcated it with civilian values and methods. Although this was possibly a necessary adjunct of cold war policy making, both the civilian and military societies neglected to realize that any civil-military accommodation had its philosophical limits. The realization of such limits may be only now surfacing with the slow but perceptible shift from the extreme utilization of subjective civilian control to one more attuned to objective control and realization of the true civil-military equation.

Recommendations

With the United States entering on what I consider a new era of civil-military relations conditioned in a large measure by (1) the negation of any further unilateral intrusion of the United States into foreign domestic problems without sufficient cause, (2) Congressional indication of limiting in the future the President's war making powers, and (3) the ending of conscription and the creation of a modern volunteer army, there are new and

hopeful opportunities for effectuating a more valid civil-military equation than the one that has been in operation since World War II. Much of the success of any revitalized civil-military relationship depends to a great extent on a realization that the two societies, in order to continue to function in the way they were created to function, must realize and respect each other's theoretical bases. Such a realization can precipitate a limited accommodation between the tenets of the two societies. Necessary for any accommodation is resolving the confusion between a civilian-controlled military and a civilian-oriented military. The former concept is found in the Constitution and has been an accepted keystone of American civil-military relations by both civilian and military. The latter concept has been the subject of not only this investigation but one which has continually plagued the observers of civil-military relations.

Much of the empirical evidence used in this investigation has indicated at least a definite if not a conclusive pattern that the two societies are best analyzed in a co-existence context and not a co-partner context. Such a pattern would tend to disprove the concept proposed by Morris Janowitz that the two societies must operate in a closer, uniform effort. Likewise, it would tend to lend credence to Samuel Huntington's concept that there are differences between the two societies which must be recognized and respected. Whether, as Huntington notes in The Soldier and the State, "America can learn more from West Point than West Point from America," is a point that may or may not support his contention. It depends on the vantage point

of the observer.

This investigation has delved into American civil-military relations from the viewpoint of what effect the liberal society has on the military establishment, and has concluded that whenever civilian society has attempted to change the delicate philosophical balance, the society and the military profession have suffered dire consequences. Either society ignoring the other will not resolve the conflict. In addition to each side understanding the other's ethos, the following recommendations are submitted on what the military can do to better the relationship.

1. Continue to reinstitute the teaching of professional subjects at all levels of military instruction to the end of creating viable professional career officers, not professional dilettantes.

2. Educate all military officers in every recruitment source in the rudiments of civil-military relations, American government, and American political theory so as to create a normative base for the officer to use in analyzing his role within the larger American society. Reinforce this education at all levels of academic socialization with the hope of producing future military leaders who have a sound philosophical basis on which to direct the American military establishment.

3. Direct both the professional and academic educational standards to the goal of producing "in-house" authors who could contribute more to the field of seminal military literature.

In conclusion, it is through the educational process that the military can best learn its proper relationship with the civil society. By institutionalizing such an effort, the proper relationship between the American military establishment and its parent society can be assured for years to come.

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

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

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

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BIOGRAPHY

Richard Edwin Johe was born on 4 May 1932 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He attended Dickinson College, from which he received the B.A. degree in 1954, and the University of Idaho, from which he received an M.A. degree in 1963. From 1961-63, he was Assistant Professor of Naval Science at the University of Idaho, and from 1966-68 was Instructor of Political Science at the United States Naval Academy. From 1971-74, he was awarded a scholarship under the Navy Doctoral Studies Program for study in political science at Duke University. Since 1956, he has been on active duty in the United States Navy and at present holds the rank of Commander.

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