











THE  
WESTMINSTER  
REVIEW.

JULY AND OCTOBER,  
1874.

---

"Truth can never be confirm'd enough,  
Though doubts did ever sleep."

SHAKESPEARE.

Wahrheitsliebe setzt sich darin, daß man überall das Gute zu finden und zu schätzen weiß.  
GÜTHE.

---

NEW SERIES.

VOL. XLVI.

LONDON:  
TRÜBNER & CO., 57 & 59, LUDGATE HILL.

MDCCLXXIV.

052 WES.  
Vol. 102 (N.S. 46)

LONDON:  
SAVILL, EDWARDS AND CO., PRINTERS, CHANDOS STREET  
COVENT GARDEN.

\*\*\*corpora deidritas ruzak uoruz

8320 ~~8320~~ 13.8?75

THE  
WESTMINSTER  
AND  
FOREIGN QUARTERLY  
REVIEW.

~~~~~  
JULY 1, 1874.

ART. I.—BUTLER'S ANALOGY: ITS STRENGTH AND  
WEAKNESS.

1. *Lectures on Butler's Analogy.* By the Rt. Hon. J. NAPIER, LL.D. Dublin. Hodges, Smith and Co.
2. *Religious Thought in England from the Reformation to the End of Last Century.* 3 vols. By the Rev. JOHN HUNT, M.A. London: 1870.

THE long controversy between Orthodoxy and Free-thought has produced no book which (in England at least) has attracted more attention than Butler's "Analogy." For a time, the writings of Paley enjoyed a wider popularity, but the influence of Paley has decidedly waned, while that of Butler has been steadily increasing, during the last half-century. Little as we know of the latter's life and surroundings, yet we can gather, from stray hints, that the production of his treatise was looked forward to with great interest by such of his friends and contemporaries as had been made acquainted with his undertaking. It was instinctively felt that the youthful correspondent of Dr. Samuel Clarke, and the preacher of the "Sermons at the Rolls," would have something weighty to urge on behalf of his creed, in the conflict then raging between the Orthodox and the Deistical writers. Yet, brilliant as may have been the expectations formed by such men as Berkeley and Secker, they have been far surpassed by the success of the Analogy. We say nothing of the admiration which greeted its appearance, for praise every whit as strong has been lavished upon treatises on both sides, the



very names of which are now unknown to all but a small number of students in a particular line. We are speaking of its permanent reputation. It has taken the place of a text-book in our Universities, in conjunction with Paley, and latterly to the exclusion of Paley. More than one "Analysis" has been constructed to facilitate its study, and to spare the undergraduate some part of the headache which Sydney Smith, in his jocular way, said that the mere sight of the book never failed to give him. The compliments, sometimes of a rather hyperbolic character, which have been showered upon it by men of eminence would fill a volume. In Southey's opinion, it established the truth of revelation by "irrefragable proofs:" to Dr. Chalmers, the author was the "Bacon of Theology:" Bishop Philpotts declared that he looked upon him as "the greatest of uninspired men." Nor have these tributes to his greatness and his influence emanated solely from persons of his own religious creed. John Henry Newman, and other Roman Catholics have, as is well known, laid him under extensive contribution—for the purpose of bolstering *their* dogmas it is true, a point to be presently considered—and we learn from the lately published Autobiography of Mr. Mill how James Mill was for a long time kept in the ranks of the Orthodox by the arguments of Butler. He considered them absolutely unanswerable by the Deists to whom they were addressed. It is, however, in the present day, that is to say in the controversial literature of the last twenty years, that we find the most marked traces of Bishop Butler's influence. In the midst of the battle now being waged afresh, the champions of Orthodoxy seem to betake themselves to his construction as being, in the words of one of them, "an impregnable fortress erected for the defence of Christianity." We do not profess to have read all the Bampton and Boyle lectures which have been delivered of late years, but in those which have come under our eye, we have perpetually seen the same great name invoked. The two series of Christian Evidence Society's lectures (lately noticed in this *Review*) contain scarcely one formidable argument which is not derived from the same source. Mr. Henry Rogers, one of the ablest writers on his side, furnishes us with page after page of what is, after all, only a spirited rendering of the *Analogy*. In the Duke of Argyle's "Reign of Law," the argument of Butler is spoken of as "the greatest in the whole range of Christian philosophy;" and is elsewhere, if we remember rightly, styled by him not so much an argument as the unfolding of a new system; while Canon Liddon, preaching in St. Paul's Cathedral, boasts that Butler has "turned the Deistic position," and has shown that, unless men insist upon certain absurd conditions of belief, "they ought to accept Christianity." A Quarterly

reviewer seems to go beyond Bishop Philpotts, and to attribute something akin to infallibility to the book. "We should change a word in it, with the caution of men expounding hieroglyphics—it has a meaning, but *we* have not hit upon it—*others* may, or we ourselves may *at another time.*"\* There was a time when one of England's greatest Ministers, Mr. Pitt, said—with profound truth, as it appears to us—that "the Analogy raises more doubts than it solves," but now we find statesmen, in their speeches and letters, swelling the chorus of unmitigated eulogy. According to Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, lately speaking as Attorney-General at the Oxford Union Society Jubilee, the culminating glory of Oxford is "Bishop Butler, the glory of the Church of England, the greatest, brightest, most pregnant and original man who ever wrote on Christian philosophy." Mr. Gladstone goes a step further in a recently published letter. "Bishop Butler taught me forty-five years ago to suspend my judgment on things I knew I did not understand. Even with his aid, I may often have been wrong, *without him I think I should never have been right*"—a wild, and for the writer, characteristic way of expressing the fact that Butler has had great influence over his mind. But what induces Mr. Gladstone to add, "And oh! that this age knew the treasure it possesses in him, and neglects!" No writer that has existed, from the invention of letters to the present day, could have less cause to complain of "neglect" than Bishop Butler. What, as we shall presently see, might be said with much more justice is, that he has been unduly extolled; that great as are his achievements, he has been credited with having accomplished certain ends for Orthodoxy, which he never even professed to aim at.

What did Bishop Butler really do for the Orthodox system of belief by his Analogy? How far are the eulogies which have been heaped upon him, of which the above are mere fragmentary specimens selected at haphazard, justified in their general tone and purport, when divested of rhetorical embroidery and exaggeration? We think that in some respects they *are* justified. We think that it would be difficult to speak too highly of the manner in which he has executed his work. In logical power he has never been surpassed, and even those thinkers who do not admit his premises, and those who admitting the premises deem that the general conclusions leave the matters in dispute very much where they were, will join together in admiring the consummate skill with which the argument is conducted. His style has been objected to, but it appears to us to be the perfect model of a style for one who seeks not to dazzle but to persuade—and

\* *Quarterly Review*, No. 38 (1828) p. 307. The Italics are the writer's.

to persuade a particular class of reader ; who handles arguments which, from their very nature, require close and consecutive attention ; in whose case, then, every form of *ad captandum* writing would be quite out of place.\*

In order to form an adequate view of Butler's merit and position as an author, as also for some other purposes of literary criticism, it would be necessary to take account of the times in which he wrote. He was in a certain sense—with all respect for Chief Justice Coleridge—as far from being “original” as he was, in any sense, far from being “bright.” There is hardly an argument in the *Analogy* the *dissecta membra* of which are not to be found in some of his predecessors, in Samuel Clarke, Waterland, Colliber, and a host of others ; while the key-note to the whole work had been struck before the appearance at any rate, though perhaps not before the first conception, of the *Analogy*, by Bishop Berkeley in his “*Alciphron*.” Sometimes the author does not hesitate to draw largely from the so-called Deists, as, for instance, from Shaftesbury. If we were approaching the book from a certain side it would be necessary to take note of all this, but to do so is happily quite unnecessary for our purpose ; and we make haste to add that these considerations do not detract from the genuine originality of Bishop Butler. His treatise may be described as the summing-up by a master-hand of the theological controversies of half a century, and his originality consists in the co-ordination of the materials which he found ready to his hand. Moreover, it would be interesting, from the point of view to which we have adverted, to notice the sources from which the particular objections to revelation, which he combated, had emanated, whether from Toland, or Collins, or Tindal, or Chubb respectively. But these inquiries, again, are quite alien to our purpose. The objections in question were “in the air ;” they were handed on by one objector to another, and it does not enter into our scope to ascertain by whom each of them was first distinctly formulated in that age. Our object is simply to glance at Butler's arguments, and to test the value of certain positions which we think it must be admitted have been established by him.

There was one characteristic of the times, however, which should not be left altogether out of sight, even for our purpose. It serves to explain here and there the language, and in some degree the general scope of the *Analogy*. In the England of that

---

\* Possibly—it is but a slight criticism—if the author had lived in the present day he would have made less frequent use of the word “thing,” “things.” This word will be found every now and then employed half a dozen times in half a dozen almost consecutive sentences, and becomes well-nigh a source of irritat on to the nervous reader.

day, as in the France of a somewhat later day, to sneer at revelation had become a kind of fashionable trick. To ridicule things held sacred by the mass of his fellow countrymen, with a flippancy proportioned to his ignorance, was a favourite pastime for the bel esprit or coffee-house buck. Swift, in his "Argument against Abolishing Christianity," remarks, "What an advantage it is for great wits to be always provided with objects of scorn and contempt in order to exercise and improve their talents;" and in Addison's "Drummer" one of the characters owns to having professed unbelief in order to "show his parts." It has been suggested that Butler may have been frequently brought in contact with wittlings of this description during his attendance upon Queen Caroline, and this may well have been the case, though we can hardly ascribe to such encounters the passages we have referred to in the Analogy, inasmuch as the book was published in the same year in which he was appointed Clerk of the Closet. It is, however, certain that he must often have met with these shallow disputants in the world, and possible that he may be referring to specimens which had come under his observation at Court when he remarks in his preface:—

"It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if in the present age this was an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisal for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world.

To prove to the fashionable world "that it is not so clear a case that there is nothing in Christianity," "that it is not a subject of ridicule unless the system of nature be so too," "that to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule is an offence against natural piety," that consequently "blasphemy and profaneness with regard to it are absolutely without excuse" was part of Butler's avowed purpose in composing his treatise, and in estimating his success we must take into account the real objects which he had in view, and not credit him, as some of his injudicious admirers have not failed to do, with aims such as were indeed loudly professed by some of the apologists his contemporaries, but which are expressly repudiated in the Analogy.

What, we repeat, are the positions established by this great work? They are very clearly set forth, and most carefully limited, by the author himself in his Introduction:—

"If there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence which experience

together with reason informs us of, *i.e.*, the known course of nature, this is a presumption that they have both the same author and cause ; *at least so far as to answer objections against the former's being from God. drawn from anything which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from Him.*"

Granting an author of nature, a being expressly postulated by Butler, there can be no doubt that, subject to the limiting words which we have printed in italics, the above proposition must at once command the assent of the reasonable Deist in the present day. Further on we are told with equal truth that it is just and reasonable "from what is present to collect what is likely, credible or not *incredible* will be hereafter." This is a specimen of the way in which the conclusions to be drawn are everywhere carefully guarded. In the last paragraph of the Introduction we have a succinct account of the author's design :—

"The design, then, of the following treatise will be to show that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution or course of nature or providence ; that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive ; and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, *and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it.* This is a general account of what may be looked for in the following treatise."

Here we have very clearly set out the ground which the argument from analogy can be justly made to cover, and the limits within which its scope must necessarily be confined. It is perfectly good for upsetting a certain class of objections to Revelation, namely, those the like of which might also be raised against the scheme of nature. Because it is quite clear that if in the natural constitution of things, admittedly from the hand of God, such and such modes of proceeding are adopted, the presence of similar processes in connexion with any alleged Revelation cannot be urged as a conclusive reason against its being from God. This argument appears to us to be really "unanswerable ;" and the analogy is "undoubtedly of weight" on the side of any religion to which it can be applied.

But what then ? We cannot pretend, in the space at our command, to furnish an outline of the Analogy, and must suppose on the part of the reader some knowledge of a book which is one of the glories of our literature. This seems, however, a suit-

able place for furnishing a few illustrations of Butler's reasoning, in order to render intelligible the comments which we shall venture to make upon it, and perhaps to save trouble to a reader who may not have the original at hand. The treatise, we must remind him, is divided into two parts. The first part deals with "Natural Religion;" the second with "Revealed Religion." The first part need not detain us here, because it has often been remarked, and is indeed quite plain, that the whole of it might have been accepted by the Deists against whom Butler wrote. Indeed, if we except a few sentences, there was not one of them who would not have been proud to set his name to it. It is, in fact, a preparation for the second part, in which revelation is treated of. This latter portion may again be subdivided. The first six chapters deal chiefly with the objections to Christianity; and in the seventh the author goes on to consider the positive evidence in its favour. Our illustrations will be taken from these six chapters, in which really lies the main strength of the work, viewed as a defence of the orthodox system against the objectors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The author first proceeds to consider the objections to any kind of revelation urged on the ground of the sufficiency of the light of nature. No man, he says, can fairly take up this ground who considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation, and in those parts of the world which still derive no light from it. One might as well say that life is so happy that our condition is incapable of being bettered. There are others, again, who take up a view not wholly unlike this, to the effect that revelation is of small importance provided natural religion be kept to. Butler, in a chapter "Of the importance of Christianity," vindicates the importance of revelation as being—firstly, a republication of natural religion "with a degree of light to which that of nature is but darkness;" and secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. As for our being ignorant of the reasons for these precepts, the whole analogy of nature shows that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted. And he remarks, with great justice, that Christianity cannot be esteemed of little consequence till it be positively shown to be false. Next, the author deals "of the supposed presumption against a revelation considered as miraculous." This is a chapter which, like that in Part I., "Of a Future Life," would not have appeared in its present form, if the author had lived in the present day. Such a statement as that, "when mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power exerted totally different from the present course of nature," is put forward

as an axiom. What follows about miracles is admitted, by all commentators, to be the most difficult part of Bishop Butler's writings. Orthodox critics of great acuteness, such as Mr. Mozley and Bishop Fitzgerald, consider that the author has lapsed into fallacies, while others, such as the late Dean Mansel and Sir Joseph Napier, defend his reasoning, while admitting it to be "difficult" and the arrangement "awkward." To us, it seems that just at the very stress where the orthodox advocate's voice should be clearest he grows inarticulate. Be that as it may, we should not have now-a-days such a sentence as this from the pen of Butler—"It is by no means certain that there is any peculiar presumption at all from analogy, even in the lowest degree against miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena." In the next place the author deals—

"Of our incapacity of judging what were to be expected in a revelation, and the credibility, from analogy, that it must contain things appearing liable to objections. Since upon experience the course of nature is found greatly different from what before experience would have been expected, and liable, as men fancy, to great objections, this renders it highly credible that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand, and liable in appearance to great objections, objections against the scheme itself and against the degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was attested and carried on."

By this method almost every possible objection (except such as might be founded on immoralities and contradictions, which are specially excepted) is at once ruled out of court; a less cautious writer might have gone further, and by the use of "probable" for "credible" have enlisted the objection on the side of revelation. And since the objections to the scheme of nature are at first sight extremely strong (as is shown by the use of such expressions as that "the world is in a state of ruin") it might be urged that the stronger these objections to revelation are, the more they serve to prove revelation: in other words, that the most objectionable religion is most likely to be the true one. Butler of course keeps clear of these absurdities, yet his position is not without its dangers. In this and the following chapters Analogy is invoked to answer such difficulties as this—Is it credible that Christianity (represented as a remedy) should have been so long unrevealed, revealed to so few, and with such obscurity, &c. Quite credible, says Butler, if the light of nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are liable to diseases, for which God has provided remedies. Yet these remedies are often long unknown, known to few, perhaps yet unknown (we may now cite Vaccination and Chloroform as two

striking examples), not always accessible ; in short neither certain, perfect, nor universal. Again, such an objection as that the Gospel scheme supposes God under the necessity of adopting a long series of intricate means to accomplish His ends, is evidently futile : for this is precisely the mode of working of God in the visible universe. So, such objections as are founded on revelation not being universal, and on the evidence in its favour being doubtful, are to be met in the same way. These objections are founded on these suppositions. 1. That it cannot be thought that God would bestow a favour on any, unless he bestowed the same on all. 2. That it cannot be thought that God would have bestowed any favour on us, unless in the degree which we might imagine most to our advantage—suppositions contradicted by the general Analogy of nature. In another chapter the author appeals to nature for Analogies in favour of the divine mediation of Christ. All living creatures are brought into the world, and preserved in infancy by the instrumentality of others, &c. &c.

The above references to the Analogy can indeed convey no idea of the force of the reasoning employed, not only with regard to individual positions, but especially in summing up the effect of the whole : for, in the author's words, "The proper force of the treatise lies in the whole general analogy considered together." Yet they may serve as indications of the method pursued to those who have not read the book, and will perhaps help to recall it in the case of others whose remembrance of the argument has somewhat faded. Upon this method, upon this argument, and the way in which it is handled, we venture to make a few observations.

In a world admitted to be from the hand of an Almighty Creator, and also allowed by every one to be marked by what we must call imperfections, the reasoner is unanswerable who contends that other parts of the Almighty's work *may* be marked by similar imperfections : indeed that *all* parts of it may be full of such. As this world, in which we find ourselves, is full of difficulties, inequalities, pain, suffering, misery, and vice, so may all creation likewise be. Indeed, if any analogy at all can be drawn, this is the analogy to be drawn. And as a reply to objections it would be unanswerable, though as a positive argument it would be worth next to nothing. Nor would it be to the point to argue that the Deity is unmistakably on the side of virtue in this world, or that there is a power "working for righteousness," or that somehow virtue, as virtue, has a tendency to triumph over, and also to produce more happiness than vice—which might be admitted, and yet would



not prove that the same struggle is not going on everywhere, and is not destined to go on for ever. And, supposing any so-called revelation informed us that this was the case, the argument from Analogy in its favour would, we repeat, be every whit as unanswerable as to a certain extent Butler's is. We see no reply to this assertion of what is *possible*, except we assume as proved the goodness of God, and this term "goodness" can only be used in a human sense; to use it in a different sense is simply to use a different term. We could not call an all-powerful Deity good, on the supposition of his action being everywhere, and perpetually such as we see it in this world: hence we are driven to the conclusion that we are in the midst of "a scheme imperfectly comprehended," and that "order and regularity and right will finally prevail in the Universe." This quality of goodness the Deists assumed, and by the help of it escaped from the only Analogy which could otherwise be drawn from an observation of the present state of things, which they represented to themselves as partial and temporary. Now this quality of goodness Butler also assumes. "Our whole moral nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of Him. And this will for ever be a practical proof of his moral character to such as will consider what a practical proof is; because it is the voice of God speaking in us."\* Unfortunately for him, he finds it a terrible encumbrance as he goes on. The Deity of Revelation, whom he is called upon to defend, is not in all respects a good God. He enjoins immoral actions, and he tortures his creatures everlastingly. And if our hopes could be of avail, we should hope that "things may be now going on throughout the Universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at present upon the earth," rather than that there should be a Deity possessed of "goodness" of this kind. Now here precisely are points, the handling of which by Butler require watching. Not that, for one instant, we would accuse him of dishonesty. A more honest writer never put pen to paper. We believe that he succeeded in deceiving himself when he urged, in defence of commands to do acts evidently immoral, that although these acts would have been immoral but for the commands, yet the commands to do them made them moral—a mere equivocation. If this holds good, the most atrocious crimes enjoined on man by the most savage creeds would cease to furnish any arguments against those creeds. Nor is it of any avail to point, with some, to the fact that thousands of children perish in infancy by the hand of (or through the operation of laws set in force by) God,

---

\* Introduction and cf. Pt. I. ch. 3, p. 68; Oxford edition.

and hence to argue that there is no difficulty presented by an alleged order from Him to man to slaughter babes at the breast; since, if we knew the whole facts, their death in this way might be no more a violation of moral law than their death by an earthquake. That the Creator's laws, though carrying death and misery with them, may yet in the end and on the whole be found to be beneficent as well as moral—that in the words of Mr. Herbert Spencer "punishment may be a disguised beneficence"—this is conceivable. But for the Deity to order a man to do things which to him (a man) are immoral, is evidently immoral. A divine command to tell a barefaced lie (falsely to assert a belief in a particular proposition) might, somewhat in the above fashion, be justified on the ground that with a full knowledge of things we might find that it was not a lie. For the statement, however incredible to the utterer, might turn out to be a true one. But every one sees in a moment that this is a mere evasion. It has been well remarked on this point by Mr. Hunt, a clergyman of moderate views:—

"If they (these actions) are immoral, as we understand immorality, and yet not immoral, it is useless to speak of our having a moral sense. Butler could never get over this difficulty, which was really the difficulty presented by the Deists. . . . If revelation depended solely on external evidence, and that evidence were overwhelming, we should be bound to accept all its teaching, however immoral or vicious in our judgment it might be. But if, as Butler maintains, the contents of a revelation are to be part of the evidence, it follows that so far as it is . . . contrary to our ideas of morality so far it is deficient in evidence."  
—*Religious Thought in England*, vol. iii. p. 393.

Again—and this is a point which has not altogether escaped the notice of Mr. Hunt—Butler, starting with the conception of a good God, has to face the difficulty of eternal Hell-fire, which (especially as presented to us by the orthodox) is not really reconcilable with this conception of goodness. We may presume that the illustrious author thought a great deal upon this subject, and that, as a result of thinking a great deal, he said very little directly. But we are of opinion that the influence of these reflections may be very clearly traced in the Analogy. Butler was far too great a reasoner not to perceive that if the Heathen are to be damned everlastingly (as the Longer Catechism of the Church of Scotland distinctly affirms that they will be), or even if those in Christian countries are to be damned who are conscientiously unable to accept a Revelation, the evidence for which is admitted by him to be doubtful, the goodness of God must be given up. On the other hand, if Salvation be represented as capable of being extended to these, the dogma of the

Atonement must in some degree suffer. Butler seems to accept the latter alternative—though his treatment is faltering—and has thereby exposed himself to suspicions on the part of Evangelical writers as to whether *he* himself was in the right way. In short, the Revelation which he pleads for is not by any means the Revelation of orthodox churchmen and dissenters. Everybody is to be rewarded and punished in the end strictly according to his works. The merit of Christ's sacrifice is to enure to the benefit of those who never heard of it, who (*i.e.*, ninety-nine hundredths of the whole human family) are to be judged on the principles of the Deists whom he is opposing. It would appear from some passages as if those who have been made acquainted with Christianity, and yet disbelieve it, might benefit by the event, provided they behave virtuously and refrain from indecent sneering. In this scheme the Atonement is reduced to a comparatively small value, as a dogma to be believed. No doubt its *effect* is not diminished; and moreover, when any one has a conviction of its truth, he is bound to treat it as a matter of very great importance. But the death of Christ might almost as well have taken place on another planet. It is not *necessary* to believe in it, though it is in some mysterious way a necessary transaction for the benefit of those who live a virtuous life.

However, not to dwell further on this, we see that the general argument takes this shape—(1) “The objections which can be raised against revelation are precisely similar to those which can be raised against the constitution of nature, and are therefore worthless.” If space permitted it would not be amiss to inquire whether this is exactly so; whether, for instance, a scheme involving the infinite torture of sentient beings ceases to present difficulties as soon as account is taken of the trifling pains and aches which, at the worst, are inflicted on us here. (2) “There is a general resemblance between what is taught us by revelation and what we gather from an observation of the natural scheme; and, further, between the modes of communication and circumstances attending the imparting of what we derive from each respectively.” This second head includes the first, and the argument is carried a step further. Now if all this be good (as to some extent it is) for removing objections of a certain class against Christianity, it is also good for removing objections against any established religion under the sun. Difficulties external and internal attaching to Buddhism, Brahminism, Mahometanism may be paralleled by like difficulties in nature. And the same is true of Mormonism and Spiritualism. *Every objection which Protestants have urged against Roman Catholicism disappears under this process.* Nay more, if by

its help Butler "turned the Deistic position," so might the Deists have turned his. It furnishes an argument perfectly good for a system of pure Theism, that is to say, for a belief in a Creator who has left his existence and such of his attributes as would appear most nearly to concern ourselves, to be gathered from probable indications, in a natural way. All the objections which can be urged against such a belief may also be urged against the course of nature. For instance, "that information of such great importance to our interests should be conveyed in such a manner without any absolute proof, and so that the mind is left in some degree of uncertainty." Now upon this it is to be observed that, although the existence of God must be admitted to be a fact of the greatest importance, yet to argue that it is of primary importance that we should have absolute knowledge of it is to beg the whole question at issue. Looking at the course of nature, we think it likely that knowledge of this kind would not be given; at any rate, not unlikely that it would be withheld. In all other directions we are suffered to attain to nothing but relative or phenomenal knowledge. Of the ultimate causes of even the commonest phenomena we are left in profound ignorance. Of the universe as it is we know nothing; at any rate we cannot be sure that we know anything except the impressions which it makes upon beings possessed of senses such as ours. And even if we admit the objection, we are fairly entitled to apply to it, and to others of a like kind, the observation which is made by Butler in respect to similar difficulties raised against revelation. On the supposition, he says, of God making Himself known miraculously to mankind, it is probable that such a revelation would contain things and be attended by circumstances which would seem to us to present objections. And so, surely, on the supposition of the Deity making the probability of His existence felt by natural means. Again, it may be made an objection "that so large a portion of the world should be left in *total* ignorance on this point, with no conception whatever of an overruling power, or often with perverse and grotesque conceptions." Yet, granting revelation, such is precisely the general state of ignorance as to that revelation; and if, from the course of nature, it be argued that it might be expected a miraculous revelation would not be universal, this also holds good as to any kind of way in which the Deity may be supposed to impress a conviction of His existence on the mind of man. If you suppose, as you are obliged to do, a Deity capable of leaving the bulk of mankind in absolute ignorance of His existence, all difficulties are removed from a scheme which supposes Him to leave the whole of mankind without *proof positive* of His existence. Or it may be said that without more certain knowledge of God than is here supposed, we should be

left in ignorance of our duties. This must mean our moral duties. If so, upon any supposition, this has been the state of ninety-nine hundredths of the human family. But this objection can only be urged in a limited form by those who, like Butler, profess to derive a scheme of natural religion from an observation of the constitution of things. What they say is that Revelation *confirms* this natural scheme, and is a republication of it with additional authority. But if this be used as an argument for revelation, in the sense that such a confirmation and republication are needed, it is of a kind with the argument that the existence of God needs positive confirmation. It is merely a way of expressing what some people think would be the most comfortable plan for themselves that the Deity could pursue. Roman Catholicism, with its infallible Church, is only a somewhat stronger expression of this sort of feeling. Again, it may be urged that Christianity is the religion of all the foremost peoples in the world, and this may be cited as an objection to Theism, which has few supporters. And a Theist might fairly allow, though, indeed, adapting to his own use some of Butler's arguments, he need not do this—still he might fairly allow that Christianity is the best dogmatic system of Theology now in existence, and hence the one most likely to be accepted by, and best suited to, the highest races. But it would not at all follow from this that it contained a Divine revelation to be implicitly accepted in every particular. There was a time when the foremost nations in the world held transubstantiation, image-worship, the supremacy of the Pope; but the Reformers did not infer from this any evidence that they were true beliefs. Quite the contrary; an advance in human thought was made, and these dogmas were thrown over. So, in the future, a similar advance may be made, and the dogma of Inspiration (which is equally baseless) may be given up. To argue that the religious beliefs held by the foremost nations—and to simplify the matter, let us suppose all Catholic countries to have embraced Protestantism—to argue that these beliefs are necessarily true is like arguing that the scientific beliefs prevalent in civilized communities are necessarily perfect. We must not, however, pursue the subject further, and must remain content with having thrown out these few slight indications of the mode in which objections to Theism might be met by following the method of Bishop Butler. There is no doubt that they could be met, and a book of mark, indeed a standard work like the *Analogy*, might be produced on the subject, by a writer of sufficient power. But, like a great part of the *Analogy*, it would leave an unsatisfactory impression on the mind, unless something much more positive in defence of Theism than the mere removal of objections could be brought forward.

As Butler's arguments cover so wide a range as to be available for answering objections to schemes opposed to dogmatic Christianity, so they are perfectly good for removing objections to the various forms of that creed. For granting that the evidence in favour of Christianity is greatly stronger than that which can be alleged on behalf of any other Creed, granting indeed that we are bound in prudence to embrace some form of it, we fail to see what speculative objections can be offered to that form which passes under the name of Unitarianism, or say to the Arian doctrine. The New Testament does not clearly set forth the equality of the Son to the Father ; certainly the Synoptical Gospels do not. "The three first Gospels," says Dr. Newman, "contain no declaration of our Lord's divinity, and there are passages which tend at first sight the other way. . . . I conceive the impression left on an ordinary mind would be that our Saviour was a superhuman being, intimately possessed of God's confidence, but still a creature."\* We believe that a similar impression would result from the fourth Gospel, when closely examined : but if this be otherwise, the Arian might fairly urge that this fourth Gospel may be an instance of those corruptions, *i.e.*, amplifications of primitive doctrine such as Analogy would show it to be supposable and credible that revelation would be encumbered with. And let it be observed, in passing, that Butler's whole argument gives a rude shock to the dogma of Inspiration. Nor is it of the slightest consequence to appeal to the number of people holding Arianism and the Trinitarian dogma respectively. As we have just said, for more than a thousand years there were no persons, or scarcely any persons, calling themselves Christians, who did not hold doctrines which the Reformation at its advent pronounced to be corruptions. The dogma of the Trinity, it must be borne in mind, was not clearly formulated before the end of the second century, and the Arians were worsted only after a severe struggle. Theirs may be the true doctrine, destined once more to emerge in its purity. For we are not in any sort judges, says Butler, whether it were to be expected that revelation should be corrupted by verbal tradition, and sunk under it—a sentence in which perhaps he has Roman Catholicism in view, but which is of wider application than he seems to be aware of.

But, despite some stray allusions of this kind to the Romish system, we are of opinion that the Analogy, if it be carefully pondered, will be found to have one issue in the direction of Rome, as it certainly has another in the direction of Scepticism.

\* "Discussions and Arguments," p. 184.

The Roman Catholics indeed adopt it, we may say in its entirety. In the first chapter of the second part we have a long paragraph on the importance of a "visible church." Without such a visible Church, the "repository of the Oracles of God," the author tells us that Christianity must "in a great degree have been sunk and forgot in a very few ages." Some observations might be made upon this statement, if taken in conjunction with others contained in the book : however, the chief point to notice here is that Butler insists with great force upon the necessity and importance of a *visible Church*. This being so, where are we to look for this "city upon a hill," this "standing memorial to the world of the duty which we owe to our Maker?" Of course, it might be argued, on the principles of the Analogy, that this Church *may* be the Church of England as by law established. That is to say, objections to its being the Church of England might be shown to be inconclusive, as similar objections to Christianity have been shown to be. Or the Society of Friends, or the Unitarian body, may each be shown to be *possibly* this Church, on like principles. Now we think the claim of the Roman Catholic Church to occupy this position is one which at least merits attention ; and we should be curious to know what objections can be raised against this claim, while we are of opinion that many positive arguments of great strength might be adduced in its favour. What is the principal objection which Protestants make to the Catholic Church ? That some of its doctrines are not mentioned in the New Testament. Granting this—though it can only be granted with the reservation that all its chief doctrines, for instance, the foundation of the Church on Peter, transubstantiation, purgatory, extreme unction, are either expressly contained in or else implied in the New Testament : at least mentioned in such a way that if they are not held to be implied, so neither can many of the chief dogmas retained by Protestantism be held to be sanctioned—yet, granting this, what does the omission amount to ? We are nowhere informed that the New Testament contains the whole body of Christian doctrine. And it is clear that it does not : that it consists of a series of narratives and letters, the latter in particular referring to a body of doctrines entrusted to the keeping of a visible Church. What is required to be shown is that these Roman Catholic doctrines are *contrary* to Scripture ; and this cannot be shown. Granting even that they were not fully developed at the time when most or all of the New Testament books had been written, this, on the supposition of a visible Church having been constituted, would offer no sort of difficulty. This gradual development of doctrine is strictly in accordance with what we gather from the Analogy of Nature. We are in

no respect judges of the way in which it might have pleased God Almighty to communicate his revelation to mankind : at any rate, this is Butler's own argument. It might have been—judging from Analogy, we should infer that it would be likely to be—communicated in a gradual way. Thus, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, in no respect opposed to the text of Scripture, might very well have been left to be brought to the light, after a long process of incubation, by this same visible Church. And with regard to other doctrines formulated at an earlier period, such for example as the invocation of Saints, it is absolutely ludicrous to contend that they are unscriptural, or that they substitute another kind of mediation for that of Christ : for if Paul prayed for his converts, if the prayer of faith saves the sick, if the prayer of a righteous man avails, it is idle, and indeed wholly without warrant from Scripture to affirm positively that prayers and supplications offered up by those who have put off this temporary garb of flesh can do nothing.

Now, the Church of Rome presents herself to us not only with many of the signs and appearances which we should expect to find in a visible Church, these signs and appearances being noted in her alone, but with the positive assurance that she and she alone is *the* visible Church. She informs us, as a consequence of this, that only for those within her pale is there a reasonable hope of salvation. If this claim can be absolutely disproved, or shown to be ridiculous, there is an end to it, as under similar circumstances there would be an end to Christianity. But no reasonable man supposes that anything of the kind can be done in either case. Sane Protestants are therefore, on the grounds set forth in the Analogy, bound at least to comport themselves towards the Roman Catholic system in the same way as the author declares that sceptics are bound to comport themselves towards Christianity in general. "A doubting apprehension that it may be true" will lay them under serious obligations to it : compel "a reverend regard" to it under this doubtfulness, "a regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under." But we may go further than this. One of the strongest pleas urged by Bishop Butler with the view of inducing people to embrace Christianity is the prudential one. It is, on the whole, he says, the safer side to take. It is safer to act as though it were true, even although the judgment may be unconvinced. "A mistake on one side may be in its consequences much more dangerous than one on the other. And what course is *most safe*, and what most dangerous is a consideration thought very material, when we deliberate



not concerning events, but concerning conduct, in our temporal affair." (Pt. II. ch. 7). "For supposing it doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary manner: still that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear to unprejudiced reason of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act." (*Ib.*) Now surely, if this be so, prudence requires us to embrace not only Christianity in general, but Roman Catholicism in particular. It is not held by Protestants that all Roman Catholics will be damned: at any rate the system of Protestantism does not require this: whereas the Roman Catholic system does certainly include the converse. It is therefore by far the safest course to conform to Rome. Nor do we see any way out of this except on the supposition that the claims of the latter can be confuted with a directness of proof which (as we have just said) is not forthcoming.

There is an observation to be made on this argument from Analogy—we are not now speaking particularly of Butler, but chiefly of his numerous imitators—which appears to be worthy of serious attention, though it scarcely seems to have received any. It is taken for granted that, if a resemblance can be shown between certain dogmas and narratives contained in the Bible on the one hand, and certain sets of ideas and practices prevalent among mankind on the other, this is evidence of the supernatural character of the former. Thus, for example, the dogma of the Atonement is supposed to be greatly confirmed by an observation of the fact that propitiatory sacrifices have been so generally practised. "By the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind." (An. Pt. II. ch. 5.) Again, "the condition of this world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances." (Pt. II. conclusion.) They further believed in a fall, and this fall is related, with all its chief circumstances, in Genesis. Again there is a great natural dread of death, and, in the Scriptures we are expressly told that death is the punishment of sin. There is a desire for immortality: the New Testament sets forth a scheme of immortality. But it is unnecessary to multiply instances.

But the question arises: *May not these natural appearances and the ideas of mankind have engendered the dogmas and narratives?* Until this question can be shown to be absurd, it is useless to point to these coincidences as furnishing evidence

for revelation. Now, that it is not absurd, is proved by the following considerations:—On the supposition of man having put his own rude guesses at the mysteries of nature, and his superstitions into a so-called Revelation, we should expect that, as knowledge advanced, some of these guesses would be shown to be false, and some of the superstitions exploded. This is exactly what has happened with regard to the Scriptures. For example, the dogma that Death came into the world through Sin is false. Again, there is perhaps no superstition so deeply ingrained in the human mind as a belief in ghosts; and, with this, may be classed a belief in the prophetic character of dreams; in such beings as witches, wizards, and necromancers; in divination and the casting of lots; in demons, sprites, and spiritual possession; in abnormal earthly types such as giants, and persons who live to an extraordinary age. Now on the supposition, the absurdity of which has to be shown, we should expect that these objects of superstitious belief, now universally discarded by educated men, would figure as realities in the Bible. And, as a matter of fact, from the first page to the last, it literally teems with them. We are reduced to a choice similar to that which Hume gave the world on the subject of miracles. Is it more probable that these things, allowed to be mere delusions everywhere else, are true, in the Scriptural narratives; or that the writers inserted sincere but untrustworthy accounts of them in accordance with the prevailing unscientific spirit of their times? And, whichever choice be made, in no case can the fact that the presence of evil spirits in the Bible chimes in with a wide spread natural belief in their existence be adduced as an argument for the inspiration of the Bible: since this belief is admitted to be generally false. And similarly the idea of sacrifices of *any* kind being necessary to appease the Almighty, might, if we had the materials for arriving at a conclusion, be shown to be as complete a superstition. At any rate the dogma of the Atonement derives no weight whatever from the widely prevailing ideas as to sacrifice; since they may be as false as those quite as widely held on the subject of ghosts; and, whether true or false, they may have engendered the dogma.

It short, it should be borne in mind by those who draw analogies of any kind between revelations and the course of nature that, on the supposition of revelations so-called being merely the outcome of human reflection on certain problems submitted to it—and whether this is so or not, is precisely the point in dispute—many such analogies or correspondences must needs exist. And so their existence leads to no conclusive inference.

Those who have followed the Analogy attentively through the first six chapters of the Second Part will, we think, be anxious to

get to the seventh chapter in which the Table of Contents promises that "The particular evidence for Christianity" is to be produced. For what has preceded is only of negative value, of value in removing objections. Indeed, the impression left on some minds will possibly be of a different character from that which it was intended to produce, and such as to explain Mr. Pitt's expression, "The book raises more doubts than it solves." For, if we are no judges as to what sort of revelation God would grant us, on the supposition of his granting one at all; nor how far it might contain things seemingly objectionable, deficiencies and irregularities; nor how far the evidence for it might be satisfactory or in a high degree doubtful; nor as to the mode of its communication and the persons to whom it might be communicated; nor as to the extent to which it might be corrupted immediately upon its promulgation: then it would seem that we have no certain sign by which to recognise a revelation at all. Whoever, in this frame of mind, turns to the chapter in question for assistance, will be miserably disappointed. We present Mr. Hunt's summary:—

"On the positive evidences of Christianity Butler has nothing to offer different from the arguments of other apologists. Miracles and fulfilled prophecy are the foundation. To these are added collateral proofs, the whole producing a conviction compared to 'effect' in architecture or other works of art. The miracles and the histories of the Bible rest on the same evidence. The miracles are satisfactory accounts of events of which no other satisfactory account can be given. Scripture history may be received as authentic till the contrary is proved. The multitudes in the Apostolic age who embraced Christianity must have been convinced of the reality of the miracles. The prophecies may be sometimes obscure, and may relate to events beyond the knowledge of the prophets who uttered them. But this might be expected of prophecies indited by the Spirit of God" (vol. iii. p. 139).

The fact is, that by this time Butler has fired his shot; he has virtually concluded his case, and this seventh chapter almost looks as if it were put in to save appearances. His case takes the form of a demurrer to certain preliminary objections raised against Christianity. He has, in our opinion, shown them to be inconclusive. He has shown Christianity to be thoroughly credible. Here properly his rôle as an advocate ends. Having obtained a *locus standi* for Revelation at the tribunal of common sense, he merely casts a glance at the strength of the positive evidence which may be adduced in its favour, and retires victorious in the main. The parts of his argument in which he appears to us to have been least successful are those in which he deals with the objections to the morality of the Scriptures. His treatment of immoral commands is, as we have seen, anything but satisfactory;

and generally, in keeping eternal punishment out of view, and presenting the Gospel scheme as one by which men will be rewarded or punished strictly according to their virtuous or vicious lives, he falls short of (or rather rises above) the orthodox belief. That his arguments are good for removing objections to any established creed does not alter the fact (includes it, indeed) that they remove objections to *his* creed. His treatment of Analogy is not always satisfactory; for instance, we think that Analogy is strongly against miracles. Still, it was sufficient for his purpose to show that they were not incredible. If he attempted to show more than this and failed, his main argument remains unaffected. So neither is the general value of his arguments affected by his recommendation to people to take the safe side—however much this might lead to consequences which he did not intend—and his sensible advice not to treat Christianity as though it were a matter of ridicule.

We have heard a regret expressed by some orthodox people that Butler did not live to compose his treatise in the present day. Others have given utterance to a wish that a successor to him of equal powers might arise to recast the argument from Analogy and fit it to present requirements. But these regrets and wishes are futile. The book would have been substantially the same in 1873 as it was in 1736. To the same objections, if urged now, the same answers would have to be addressed, and the manner in which these were originally set forth does not seem capable of being improved upon. He has shown that there is nothing conclusive in the bulk of these objections, and we do not think this position could be strengthened by any modern retouching and rehandling.

Whether, if he had lived now, he would have dealt with difficulties of another kind in the way of orthodox belief which were unknown to the scoffers of George the Second's time, and what might have been his success in such a task, supposing he had undertaken it: to ask this is to inquire idly whether he would have written an entirely different book on a fresh subject. That he would have had to take some account of them, and that his language in certain places would have had to be modified, is certain. For instance, we cannot believe that he would now-a-days have written that if the principal part of the Book of Daniel could be shown to refer to events then past such a discovery might be "a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself, considering the authority which our Saviour has given to the Book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it" (Pt. II. ch. 7).

The time of Butler's death, about the middle of the eighteenth century (1752), is virtually that of the close of the Deistic con-

trovery. Neither during his lifetime, nor since, has anything which can be called an Answer to his Analogy been attempted. Nor, on principles of Theism, can we do otherwise than gratefully accept the first part as a splendid contribution to Natural Theology ; while, as to the second part, we do not think it can be successfully established that revelation is *incredible*, and therefore the author must be held to have made good his chief point, that it is "credible." The "speculative objections" against which he argued have disappeared from the pages of writers of consideration, and only find a place in such works as those of Tom Paine, who wonders why revelation was not written on the sun. Yet that people who ought to know better should speak of "the irrefragable proofs of Christianity" furnished by the Analogy, or of its being an "impenetrable bulwark against all assaults upon revelation." is to us, who are among the warmest admirers of Bishop Butler, and would be to that great man himself, if he returned to life, a marvel of absurdity. Four years after his remains were interred in Bristol Cathedral were heard the first articulate utterances of a science which has revolutionized Theology, entirely upset the account given in Genesis of Creation, and rendered in the highest degree improbable the story coupled with it, of a Fall (always assumed by Butler) upon which the Atonement, the most important doctrine of revelation, depends as a corollary ; at any rate has entitled us to ask for stronger evidence of the inspiration of the story than an objector such as Butler has in view would, perhaps, have been justified in demanding. Now it is certain, that instead of being stronger, the evidence for this inspiration amounts to much less than it might fairly be held to amount to in Butler's time. No human being can use his *reason* (upon the functions of which as a judge the greatest stress is laid in the Analogy) without admitting, on full consideration, that modern research and criticism have thrown a new light upon large portions of the Old Testament. While touching on Inspiration it may not be out of place to mention that in the very year of the publication of the Analogy an event occurred which might have given the author cause for some reflection. The laws against witchcraft were repealed. We are quite of the opinion of John Wesley, who expressed himself to the effect that giving up witchcraft was tantamount to giving up the inspiration of the Bible, because to admit that witchcraft was a delusion in 1736 was going a long way towards admitting that it *might* always have been a delusion ; that consequently the Scriptures, in which it was represented as a reality, *wight* not have been literally inspired. This is quite a different case from that of miracles. A generally prevailing belief in contemporary miracles might be given up, and this need not be fatal to a belief

that miracles had in former days been exhibited, for the reason (alleged by Paley and others) that it is of the essence of a miracle to be rare and only to be wrought on exceptional occasions for some mighty purpose. But this cannot be alleged of a function or condition which Scripture represents as common. If there were valid reasons for supposing that there was no such thing as witchcraft in the world in the year 1736 A.D., and that in point of fact it was a mere superstition, the conclusion was inevitable that it was probably a superstition in the days of the Israelites. An immense rent was made in the dogma of Inspiration, such as no patching-up can hide. A new light was thrown upon a whole class of miracles recorded of Jesus, those connected with demoniacal possession, and the inference irresistibly suggested that Jesus himself was not above the delusions of his age. This is a sample of the kind of difficulties—we have purposely avoided calling them objections—which the increase of knowledge has raised in the way of accepting the orthodox system. They are no longer theoretical difficulties presented with the express design of weakening or destroying a belief in that system. The outcome of an independent observation of nature—the fruit of a patient inquiry after truth, regardless of consequences—they have slowly forced themselves upon minds favourable to orthodoxy. Thus a belief in witchcraft was retained for years *because* it was sanctioned by the Bible, and was only given up after a struggle. The researches of modern science have rarely, if ever, been conducted with the view of undermining the edifice of orthodoxy, but the explorers, nolentes volentes, have been forced to pursue courses by which the result has been achieved. From the discovery of the motion of the earth round the sun, down to Professor Owen's recent exposure of the fable of Antediluvian longevity, Science has moved in one direction, in some cases establishing the impossibility of recorded miracles and portents, in all cases rendering them more doubtful than before. Even the critical inquiries of the great Germans, and of our own countryman Colenso, can scarcely be said to have been set in motion by a purpose distinctly hostile to revelation. They have been conducted in precisely the same spirit as that which these learned men would have carried into a discussion of Homer or Herodotus. And, granting that many of the results arrived at remain uncertain, enough remains clear to give rise to serious reflection. On the other hand, Orthodoxy has gained nothing by the advance of knowledge. To be sure some discoveries have been made at Nineveh and elsewhere, which confirm some of the statements in the Old Testament, and have accordingly been loudly trumpeted as evidence of the truth of all its stories : which is like saying that Dr. Schliemann's recent discoveries at

Troy, on the supposition that they actually consist of the treasure-chest of Priam, are evidence of the dream which Zeus sent to Agamemnon, and of the combat between Diomed and Mars.

These, and a host of similar considerations, which will not fail to present themselves to the intelligent reader, are of a nature, we say, to give rise to reflection. For, as Bishop Butler very justly remarks that the proof of Christianity "may be compared to what they call the *effect* in architecture or other works of art ; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed and taken into one view," so the same may be said of a belief in a non-miraculous ordering of the Universe. We cannot but think that a man of Butler's candour and logical power, who admitted that in his day the proof of revelation was "doubtful," would, if he lived among us now, deem that it had been rendered somewhat more doubtful. And, if he had still felt inclined to press his prudential system, viz., that in a difficult matter it is best to take the safest side, he might have been induced to take into his consideration whether those to whose minds reason seems to incline one way, may not after all be safer in following the dictates of their reason. On the contrary supposition, the justice of God vanishes. But, on the assumption of a just Deity, it is possible that not to do this will be to commit a grievous sin, and one which may entail grievous consequences. We know that this idea will be ridiculed by theologians, to whom the safe side can be no other than *their* side. But it will, none the less, perhaps indeed the more on that very account, present itself in a serious light to reflecting men conscious that they are responsible for a right use of their reason.

---

## ART. II.—EMIGRATION.

1. *Annual Reports of Commissioners of Agriculture and Emigration of the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec.* 1869, et seq.
2. *Ditto. Dominion of Canada.*
3. *Ditto. States of New York, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska.*
4. *Annual Reports Bureau of Statistics.* Massachusetts. 1870, et seq.
5. *Immigration, and the Commissioners of Emigration of the State of New York.* By FREDERICK KAPP. New York. 1870.
6. *Information for Emigrants: a Special Report on Emigration.* By EDWARD YOUNG, Ph.D., Director U.S. Bureau of Statistics. Washington. 1871.
7. *Census of the United States.* 1870.

THE problem of emigration is large and complicated, and in the correlative sciences whose laws condition the individual, the society, and the state, there is much that it absolutely controls, and little or nothing which it does not seriously affect. It is so wide-reaching, and the historical and other matters bearing upon the subject are of such vast bulk, that this article can only deal in a suggestive manner with a few of its most salient features.

Emigration is, and ever has been, a tremendous though comparatively silent force, giving birth to nations and shaping their destinies. History is full of wars, and the various tyrannical acts and conspiracies which have generally done duty in the place of statesmanship; but he who has never thought of that subject in that light before, will, on taking a comprehensive survey, be perfectly astonished to find how much of the military and political history of the world has been made or marred by the slowly acting force of emigration.

Passing by many tempting themes in ancient annals, let us glance at the history of England and France.

Two hundred and fifty years ago emigration began to take from England considerable numbers of persons of various classes, whose condition here, under the wise laws of our ancestors, made them more or less dangerous to the then existing order of things. In a few years it had gained a great impetus. The king seems



to have measured his power in some degree by the number of subjects within reach of his arm, and therefore to have stopped some of the emigrants by force. This was like sitting on the safety-valve to be able to utilize the greater amount of steam. One of the men thus retained in the kingdom against his will, became chief of the revolution which followed, and he was afterwards more than monarch of the realm. It is impossible to say how few or how many of those who were most violent opponents of the acts of the king would have gone to America had they been free to do so, but it is quite possible that the nature of the resistance would have been materially modified; and that instead of the intensity of passion which prevailed, we should have had a slower, surer, and more thoughtful resistance. This would not have thwarted the king as quickly as the revolution beheaded him, nor would it have put a still more powerful despot of a different character in his place. The revolution took about fifty years to establish any substantial good for the people of England, and one may fairly hold the opinion that the rights of the people, as well as the blood and treasure of the nation and the head of the king, would have been far safer if the attractions of New England had been allowed to prevail over a large number of those who became leaders of the revolution.

Notwithstanding all the checks that colonization received from natural and artificial causes, the political and social influence of the emigration of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can hardly be over-estimated. The year 1776 found the revolting American colonies with a population of about three millions, wholly the result directly or indirectly of emigration. The population of England at that time was about seven millions. The emigration had been mostly from the middle classes, with a sprinkling of labourers taken over by their masters, and of mechanics who had managed to save a little store for their dangerous and rather expensive voyage. From the fact that they knew and appreciated at something like their just value many of the rights to which they were entitled, and which were ignored or persistently refused, many of these people would have been sources of serious danger to the government of their times if they had remained at home. The amount of that danger is not to be measured by their number, but by their character, and by the influence which they would have been likely to exert over their fellow-subjects.

When they left the country their places here were filled by others whose position was in consequence materially improved, and who, feeling this improvement, were much less discontented subjects than they otherwise would have been. Commerce with the colonies brought wealth to the manufac-

turers and merchants, and indirectly to the landowners and the farmers; and as employers had, in a measure, to bid against the great attractions of the colonies, the material condition of all classes but the very lowest was decidedly improved by that emigration upon which many influential persons looked with the greatest disfavour.

It is difficult to imagine the extent of the difference in the condition of the lower, middle, and working classes which would have been produced if the ranks of the shopkeepers, mechanics, and labourers had constantly become more and more overstocked by the competition of these emigrants and their descendants. Under wise laws there might have been room for four times the population, but wise laws are very difficult to obtain even now, and in those circumstances they would have been most unlikely with the aid of revolution, and utterly impossible without it.

Turning to the condition of France at that time, we may obtain some crude idea of the probable results of a permanent non-emigration policy in England. That country was wealthier, and in many respects more favoured than this; it was also far more advanced in the arts and sciences. England's superiority, partly the result of her insular position, was almost entirely confined to the sea. But this superiority of England at sea was a check upon French emigration, and, about the middle of the eighteenth century, the conquest of the great French colony of Canada, by a British imperial and colonial army, virtually destroyed it. In that country, in the meantime, as the population increased, the working classes were more and more at the mercy of those above them, and the share of the fruits of their labour which they obtained became less and less. They could only manage to exist from hand to mouth, and combination for better pay would have been very generally unsuccessful, even if there had been no terribly repressive laws to insure abject submission. Their misery passed the limit of endurance, and everybody knows that the great French revolution was the result, and that the vibrations of that terrible political earthquake have not yet ceased to shake the earth.

It is easy to point to many shortcomings of the people as well as of the rulers of France, and to imagine that these were prime causes of the revolution; but a more careful scrutiny will show that the facts were otherwise. Power is blind, stupid, and self-seeking in all other countries as well as there, and the majority of any people which feels the iron heel of oppression is both deceitful and impatient. That the faults essentially French, to which it is fashionable to attribute the revolution in that country are really non-existent, can be plainly seen by the French Canadians, who undoubtedly possess all of the essentials of the

French character. They and their brethren in the United States are about a million and a half in number, and the descendants of less than ten thousand original emigrants. They have felt little oppression, and they are a people as patient and as contented with their generally humble circumstances as any other population under like conditions on the face of the earth. Nor can it be attributed to the inherent vices of Roman Catholicism, or its injurious effects on the French character, for this religion has had freer scope among the Canadians than among the people of France. No one who carefully examines and compares the whole circumstances can doubt that a large and constant stream of emigration from France would infallibly have ameliorated the condition of the humbler classes, enabling them to cope in a regular manner with the power of those above them, and that it would thus have been a force sufficient to have changed for the better the whole history of France for the last hundred years, very probably preventing the revolution, and at any rate depriving it of many of its horrors, and benefiting in a general way the blind oppressors quite as much as the people oppressed.

It is no doubt very gratifying to that self-love which we are apt to miscall patriotism to attribute to the English race and nation very special capacities for progress and self-government, but our self-glorification in these respects can only proceed from ignorance of the comparative disadvantages under which our neighbours have laboured, or from something still worse. If we examine our political history without prejudice, we shall find that our kings have seldom been very brilliant specimens of humanity. Our nobles have not often been gifted with remarkable political foresight, and the wisdom of our squirearchy and the self-denial of our bishops and benefited clergy have never been so great as to become proverbial among the nations of the earth.

Until very recent times these have been our governors; they have resisted all improvements which interfered with their pet privileges, and they have never yielded while there was a chance of standing out with success. Even with all the strength which our vast emigration has lent to the rights of the poorer classes, the rulers have frequently resisted change till we were upon the brink of a civil war. Nor can we maintain that the middle classes, which are now the foundations of power, are in any respect more unselfish and politically wise than those above them, except in so far as contact and conflict with the lower classes have taught them greater respect. They have never conceded to the lower orders any substantial advantage which the latter were not in a position to exact as the price of service or co-operation; and, indeed, it would be no more reasonable to

expect it than to expect that individual masters who are making heavy profits should hasten to divide them with their employes without pressure or hope of any reward beyond the great social and political advantage that unselfishness would confer upon the community at large. We see among them organizations in restraint of liberty and justice more reprehensible than any trades' union of the labouring classes. What shall we say, for example, of a combination of the farmers of a county totally to exclude from all employment, and therefore to starve or banish, every agricultural labourer who presumes to join a trade society of his fellows? Practically, this is a combination to reduce to slavery, or to maintain a slavery already existing. It will fail as miserably as it deserves, even more promptly than the many similar organizations have failed among other classes of employers; but it will fail only because the ameliorating effects of emigration have now reached the lowest stratum of working men, and have given them a power they could not otherwise have hoped to possess.

It is thus very evident that, in England as elsewhere, without emigration the blind selfishness of power would have overreached itself in all directions, and have crushed the lower orders till it prepared a terrible catastrophe for the nation. The working men could not rigidly and universally apply among themselves the doctrines of Malthus, of which they knew nothing; from wholesale infanticide they would ever shrink with horror, and revolution, or these impossibles, would have been the only alternatives to starvation or slavery.

The greatest example of that unselfish regard for the right, which is the foundation of true political wisdom, that we can boast of, was that afforded by the poor operatives of Lancashire, in the earnest sympathy and moral support which they accorded to the American people in their death-struggle with slavery; and, broadly speaking, it will be found that, numerous errors of ignorance or misapprehension notwithstanding, a true political instinct resides with the working masses of the people, the amelioration of whose condition by all reasonable means is as definite and real an advantage to their superiors as it is to themselves.

It is mainly through the silent working of emigration that commerce has recently attained such enormous proportions, and that public opinion is gradually becoming stronger than armies, and more powerful than governments. The commerce of the existing colonial dependencies of the European States is very great, and they exercise a very definite influence on the public opinion of the world through their connexion with the parent States. But the American Union was so recently a wilderness,

that its forty millions of people may, without a very great stretch of imagination, be considered as a nation of emigrants, whose public opinion is brought into most intimate contact with all civilized nations, and is universally felt. Germany has no colonies of her own, but in every hamlet of that country are relatives and friends of citizens of the great republic, who are frequently receiving thence letters and papers from happy and prosperous emigrants. Through the various influences thus created, the action of the most powerful and stubborn Government of Europe is more sensibly affected than by any other external agency, if we except only the warlike array of some of its neighbours. For Germany emigration is not less important than for England, and in the end it is not unlikely to mould the Government to the popular will without the aid of a revolution. Notwithstanding their friendly attitude to the United States, German rulers fear and dislike emigration for many reasons. Its action on the people remaining at home is by no means altogether approved; from an economical point of view, they consider it a great loss to the country, and worst of all, it takes no inconsiderable portion of the grist from the mill of the army.

Dr. Engel, Director of the Prussian Statistical Bureau, has considered the subject of emigration from the point of view of political economy. He assumes that on the average a man is worth to the country as much as he will cost to produce. He does not tell us how much Germany lost on this score, in packing off the King of Hanover, and in her numerous emigrant princelings, but he deals at once with the manual labourer, whose life he divides into three periods; fifteen years of unproductive youth, fifty years of labour, and the balance of life a period of unproductive senility. Whether or not the child in his first period lives at the expense of his parents, there must be means for his maintenance and education, which means are the result of labour. The productive period (1) should repay the expenses incurred by parents or others in the juvenile period; (2) should satisfy the daily wants and maintain the productive power of the individual; (3) should produce a surplus fund for sustenance during the aged period. Thus the cost of bringing up and educating a man constitutes a specific value which benefits that country which the adult individual makes the field of his exertions. Dr. Engel computes the cost of producing a manual labourer in Germany, at an average for both sexes, of forty thalers a year for five years, fifty thalers a year for five years more, and sixty thalers a year for the third term of five years, with which he completes the period of unproductive youth. He thus arrives at a total cost, and therefore, according to his theory, a total average value of seven hundred and fifty thalers for the

manual labourers of Germany, considered as working animals, and this sum of about one hundred and twelve pounds ten shillings sterling he reckons as the correct measure of the country's loss by the departure of an emigrant, irrespective of the amount of money or goods which he takes to the new field of his labours. According to Engel's theory, this sum increased by the extra percentage of the cost of sound males above the general average of the sexes would also measure the value of any such emigrants, as food for gunpowder. Taking the figures of Dr. Engel as our basis, and adding one hundred and twenty-five thalers as the minimum amount representing the cost of the passage, goods, and clothing of each emigrant, and the money taken by him,\* we find on reference to American statistics that the total German emigration to the United States is a tribute worth in Germany about three hundred and fifty millions sterling. The annual average of this tribute for the four years immediately preceding the Franco-German war was very nearly sixteen millions sterling, and it bids fair to reach twenty-five millions in a very few years.

Dr. Engel's book gives expression and definite shape to an idea fixed in the Prussian official mind, an idea which has long influenced the acts of the Government, and which is now being pushed further than ever before. It is even said that Prince Bismarck had formed the intention of increasing year by year the restrictive action of the Government until emigration should practically cease; but, bold as the German Government may be, it is not likely that it will venture to carry out its theories to any such dangerous extreme.

Notwithstanding the very high authority of Dr. Engel, and any conclusions to which a Government so astute as that of Germany may have arrived, it is not too much to say that this theory is utterly fallacious, and that very little unbiassed consideration is needed to demonstrate the fact.

The theory assumes, in the first place, that German subjects, like German cattle, come into the world in obedience to a definite law of supply and demand, that each German is born because he is in some degree wanted not merely by his parents, but in an economical sense by the nation at large. The actual facts are very different. The child is born to gratify the natural desires of his parents, or else he is, so to speak, an accident of life, which they lack either the inclination, knowledge, power or resolution to prevent. Once in the world, the affection or duty of his

---

\* This sum of one hundred thalers, exclusive of passage, is based on statistics obtained with great care by the Commissioners of Immigration at New York.

parents induces them to make very substantial sacrifices for the purpose of giving him such advantages as they can command, and from his birth to his manhood, questions of profit or loss to themselves, or of State economy, have no more to do with the matter than the law or the other circumstances compel. Children are in fact the one great luxury of the poor, which the State can neither regulate nor prohibit.

Under these circumstances the actual supply of willing hands is very much in excess of the home demand for reasonably rewarded labour, and notwithstanding whatever it may have originally cost, this excess, if retained at home, would be an element of trouble, expense, and positive danger. The economical value of the subjects of a Government depends quite as much upon quality as upon number, and any surplus of population deteriorates the rest much more than any benefit its retention can possibly confer. It is as if a farmer with sufficient pasture and forage for a hundred head of cattle should insist upon keeping a stock of a hundred and twenty, in which case the six score will be found to be worth less in the market than four score bred under proper conditions. Owing in some degree to State interference with the liberty of the subject, and to various other causes which tend to restrict emigration from Germany, its amount is probably somewhat less than what might fairly be considered the increase of surplus population. If so, the total amount of emigration is on economical as well as other grounds an advantage to the State.

It is true that every man who escapes military service by emigration renders it more irksome to those that remain, and that the influence of the republican ideas imbibed by the emigrants is so strong upon the people at home, as to give some concern to the Government, but these are evils which a semi-constitutional militarism must perforce endure, or risk others still worse; they are evils which the majority of thinkers will look upon as having the nature of medicines; a species of blessing in disagreeable guise.

Emigration conflicts very strongly with the military spirit. By raising the price of wages and making a large and effective army a very expensive machine, it has done much to place England in a reserved attitude in respect to foreign politics, and its tendency will be found the same everywhere else.

Depletion through emigration differs essentially in an economical as well as in a humanitarian point of view, from depletion by war or by an epidemic. A hundred thousand emigrants leave an over-populated country, and by so doing confer a benefit on the people remaining. But, if from a hundred thousand like people those who are suitable are selected and made the victims of war, the loss of the country is great, definite and tangible, for the strong only are taken and the weak remain a more or less

direct burden to the State. An epidemic takes both the strong and the weak, but it often breaks down many whom it does not destroy, and it has a tendency to derange trade and to demoralize the whole population. Imagine emigration from the British Isles to cease next year, and the cholera to take its place. Long before the two hundred thousand were taken away, the nation would be in a terrible panic, a large proportion of its labour would cease, and everything would be out of joint.

In France, at the present time, the number of births is artificially limited to such an extent that notwithstanding the very nominal amount of emigration there has been no very considerable increase of population for many years,\* no surplus of a character which need agitate the mind of a true economist or of a genuine statesman at the head of affairs; and therefore those who have suffered death, mutilation, incarceration or banishment in the recent war and troubles of France are the greater loss to the country. This is not the time or place to enter into a review of the doctrines of Malthus, but if there were a moderate annual surplus of population in France, and a corresponding and constant stream of emigration, the chances of good government would be far greater. Constant communications from abroad would create a moderate and wholesome agitation, geographies and histories would be more or less studied, books of travel would be sometimes read, and foreign correspondence would occasionally find its way into the most unpretending of newspapers. The stagnation of the peasants' mind would gradually diminish; they would be less and less like their own sheep, the defenceless victims of the policy of others; *coups d'état* and revolutions alike would have less chances of success, and it might be hoped that they would eventually cease.†

If emigration means the removal of inhabitants from one State or country to another for permanent residence, then Spain, with all her colonies, has had very few emigrants. Her possessions in America were military conquests, and the subject races were much more numerous than the conquerors.

The object of the military and other adventurers who went out was to enrich themselves by plundering and enslaving others.

\* Since the German war, and the terrible persecutions of the lower classes of the principal cities, partially as a revenge for the less serious excesses of the commune, the population of the provinces remaining to France has, according to the best authorities, sensibly decreased.

† While the French government still maintains the state of siege in a large part of the country, it is officially doing all it can to discourage those who have begun to look to emigration as a means of relief. It seems to us that comment on such infatuation is quite unnecessary.



Each hoped to return after a longer or shorter period to enjoy himself in his native land on the spoils of the heathen whom the Pope had delivered into the hands of true Spaniards as lawful subjects of all species of violence. Whatever there was of permanent residence or of legitimate labour, was looked upon as the misfortune of the unlucky. In addition to the millions of more or less civilized nations brought into subjection, large numbers of negroes were imported and slavery existed everywhere. Spain derived immense pecuniary resources from her colonies, but the numerous adventurers returning enriched by injustice, could not but demoralize still further a country whose virtues were already overshadowed by vices. Had her people gone forth true emigrants to conquer the forces of nature rather than their fellow-men, even though, as among the English and French colonies, many wrongs were committed, they would have had a great influence for good upon the parent state, and Spain might have held her own among the first nations of the world.

A very interesting part of this great problem is that which has to do with unequal, unjust, or inexpedient legislation. There is no nation which has not by such means banished labour and capital, for which there would otherwise have been ample room. Even the United States have, in this manner, from time to time driven out many millions of capital and with it a large aggregate of labour. English instances are numerous and will readily suggest themselves to our readers. Many English laws at present existing tend to crowd the people off the island, and it is not too much to say that if by a stroke of the pen, the laws, customs, and habits of the people could be modified in accordance with the dictates of sound economy, there would at once be room in the country for a population at least one-fourth greater, to live more comfortably than we do at present. The customs of a people have the force of laws in these respects, and monetary and trade combinations have also a widespread influence. The figures of the extra tribute that the British and foreign public have recently paid to the coal and iron men are more astonishing than the French indemnity to Prussia, and there has been in consequence of this great advance in prices, a great activity in these trades abroad. They have found that it would pay to build ocean steamers in America, and the profits of the coal and iron trades there, have attracted such vast aggregations of capital as must ultimately most seriously affect the English market, by rendering the Americans in a great measure independent of it.\*

---

\* The American iron furnaces and rolling mills are more than adequate to the probable consumption of the country for the present year, and if the duties on pig and railroad iron and steel were abolished to-morrow, they could pay.

The amount of capital and labour eventually banished from the country, will be far greater than the extra profits obtained, and the loss will justly fall very heavily on these two particular trades. Many individuals will have made fortunes, but these trades, as a whole, will have discounted their brilliant future at a great disadvantage.

But in considering the economical gain or loss by emigration from a particular country, with its wise or unwise laws or customs, and its trade combinations more or less proper or pernicious, we cannot say that because, but for these things there would be room for ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent. more, therefore there is no surplus whose emigration would be advantageous to the state; we must deal with the realities of the present, and make no attempt to discount a future which is now intangible, and which would very likely be rendered impossible by the very fact of the adventitious surplus of population remaining in the country. Every such unwise law, custom, or combination is an economical question of itself, to be measured exactly by the amount to which it tends to restrict the capacity of a country for supporting a population in comfort. Measured in this way, it will be found that more than one law has cost the United Kingdom a larger sum than the present capital of the national debt. It is possible that if statesmen would look at political and social legislation more from this pounds, shillings, and pence point of view, it would prove of great advantage to the country.

The comparative surplus or deficiency of accumulated capital in any two or more countries is usually to be measured, not by its aggregate or its *per capita* amount, but by the normal rates of interest which severally obtain, and the surplus or deficiency of population is to be measured, not by numbers or density, but by the comparative advantages or disadvantages under which the people live, the proportionate amounts of their labour, capital being duly considered. In such cases, whatever the effect upon special classes, it is to the advantage of each state considered as a whole, that freedom of trade and locomotion should be as perfect as possible, and that an equilibrium should be eventually established.

In Massachusetts, the average earnings of agricultural labourers are about forty dollars of greenback currency per month for eight months of summer, and about thirty-five dollars per month during four months of winter; equal to about thirty-

---

wages and profits decidedly higher than those now ruling in England, and yet successfully compete with the English ironmaster in the American market. These formidable rivals are far more the result of the recent enormous prices in England than of that of the American protective tariff.

three shillings and sixpence, and twenty-nine shillings and fourpence per week respectively, or an average for all seasons of thirty two shillings. This is without board and lodging, and it has a purchasing power if we duly average prices and quantities of the various articles required by the labouring classes, seventy-five to one hundred per cent. greater than the wages of the same class in England. Women seldom work in the field, but when they are so employed they receive two-thirds of a man's wages. The majority of agricultural labourers are lodged and fed by their employers. They have plenty of good substantial food, including meat *ad libitum*, and their lodgings are generally in the same house with the farmer, and quite comfortable in all respects. Under these circumstances, their average wages for the year round are about nineteen shillings and eight pence per week, or fifty-one pounds twelve shillings and eight pence for the year. Eleven pounds twelve shillings and eight pence is a sufficient allowance for clothing and incidentals, consequently a single man having steady employment and good health the year round, can save forty pounds a year if so disposed. A first-rate hand would be able to save fifty pounds. When boarding and lodging themselves and having families of four or five young children dependent upon them, labourers in Massachusetts or any other part of the Union could save little if anything, while as they grew older it would be necessary for the children to do something towards the support of the family. But taking the whole of the Northern and Western States, we shall find that the average labourer is quite as well off as the average mechanic in England.

Let us glance at the effect in England of such an emigration as should in a very few years increase the purchasing power of farm labour at least fifty per cent.

To millions of agricultural and other labourers, directly and indirectly, this would make all the difference between gnawing penury and a very considerable degree of comfort. Some would be demoralized, but the vast majority would be morally as well as materially improved by their good fortune, and the despondency, which is a fruitful source of pauperism and crime, would give place to an elation and elasticity of mind and body, which would make the labourer a very superior being to the Hodge of to-day. His capacity of production would increase fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five per cent., and his actual production would be increased not less than ten to fifteen per cent. Diminished pauperism, vice, and crime, and increased individual production, would return at least half of the extra wage to the country; and of this much the larger portion would go to the labourers' employers. If the movement were

decidedly rapid, the farmers and other employers of unskilled labour would at first be able to charge much more than their loss against the public, in the shape of higher prices for much of their produce ; but increased importations would soon check this, and in the long run there would be a certain proportion of the loss of the employers which would not be got out of the general public.

The farmers with long leases would have to bear this portion of the loss themselves till the time for renewal came round, but a small percentage of the other farmers would emigrate rather than pocket the loss. There would then be more farms than farmers, and rents would cease to rise at the normal rate, or they might even go down a little. A moderate pecuniary sacrifice on the part of the landlords would therefore be inevitable, but as they are very frequently quoting the law of supply and demand against their tenants and employés, we must assume that they will not grumble when that law makes against themselves, the more especially as their philanthropic hearts would throb with the pleasant knowledge, that both farmers and labourers, and all dependent upon them were comparatively comfortable and happy.

These trifling sacrifices might also fairly be looked upon in the light of insurances for the much greater security of their property.

Operatives in many branches of manufacture would better themselves full fifty per cent. by judicious emigration, and their case is a strong one. Mechanics, on an average, can still better themselves fully twenty five per cent. by emigration, but most of the English emigrants have been skilled workmen, and their wages are rapidly approaching the equilibrium. Farmers and many small manufacturers can materially improve the condition of themselves and their several classes by judicious emigration. The recent financial panic in America has made no substantial difference with any of these facts.

But there is no disputing that the equilibrium of wages to which everything is gradually tending, means a very great increase of prices. If the purchasing power of labour as measured in sovereigns increases forty per cent., the purchasing power of a sovereign as measured in personal and household necessaries and servants, will probably diminish on the average about twenty per cent., and the net gain of the working classes will be the difference. Profits will become more equalized. It will be more difficult for a man to amass several millions in a lifetime ; and what the public does not gain in this way and from improvements in production, will have to come out of fixed incomes. There is, however, fair reason to hope that

opportunities for profitable and sound investment abroad will rapidly increase, and materially modify what would otherwise be a very great evil. However this may be, and whether the suffering of special classes be much or little, the problem of emigration can be solved only on the principle of perfect free trade in labour; and although this solution will send large numbers of stalwart Britons to foreign shores, it will be of general advantage to the country.



### ART. III.—GOETHE AND MILL: A CONTRAST.

IN an article on John Stuart Mill, published in the last January number of this *Review*, his life and character, as interpreted by himself in his *Autobiography*, were treated, so to speak, absolutely. In the present article we propose to compare him with another great man whose life and aims were equally distinctive, and who has also left us his own account of them. We are led to the comparison by the belief that a simultaneous reading of Mr. Mill's "*Autobiography*" and Goethe's "*Wahrheit und Dichtung*" will give rise to reflections, alike interesting and instructive, upon the numerous and striking points of contrast between two minds, which resembled each other in depth and power, in entire freedom from all those prejudices and littlenesses which dwarf the natures of ordinary men—and in nothing else.

Vast indeed was the difference in quality of mind which could induce two conceptions of a work in life, each noble and true, yet so essentially unlike, not to say antagonistic, as that of the Pantheist-poet, proclaiming culture to be the one great means of salvation for a world "dead in trespasses and sins," and that of the non-religious political philosopher, preaching to the same world that gospel of Utilitarianism which seems to spring from so low a basis, yet implies an "enthusiasm of humanity" so exalted, that society, as at present constituted, sneers upon it as a mere fanatic's dream.

This contrast of aim we see distinctly in the *raison d'être* of the two works. Mill thinks the "record of an education which was unusual and remarkable," and of the "successive phases of" a "mind which was always pressing forward," may respectively be useful at a time when "education and its improvement are the subject of profound study," and opinions on most matters are in a transition state. But still more clearly does the book

owe its existence to a desire to acknowledge its writer's "intellectual and moral" obligations to "other persons"—to the father whose "eminence" was "recognised," and to the wife whom, to its great loss, "the world had no opportunity of knowing." Goethe, on the other hand, tells us that the "Wahrheit und Dichtung" is "an attempt to complete a great confession, of which his published works are but fragments."\* The egotism of the latter explanation seems to contrast unfavourably with the modesty of the former one, if we do not bear in mind the fact—which will be dwelt upon at some length below—that Goethe looked upon Art as the most important instrument of human development, and knowing himself to be, through his poetry, a great artist, considered that he was conferring a benefit upon the public in helping it to a right interpretation of his poems. He had, besides, been strongly urged to the task by his friends. A desire to benefit mankind was without doubt the motive power of both autobiographies, but it seems to work more *directly* in Mill than in Goethe; and certainly the buildings which rose from foundations so similar are in their utter diversity of plan and construction highly characteristic of their respective architects.

Deeply interesting and valuable as both these works are, they have the unavoidable defect of all autobiographies, that of not giving the whole truth about their authors. Of the two, Goethe's stands far the most in need of that "reading between the lines" which the writer's contemporaries alone can supply the means for doing. Mill, with his characteristic generosity and modesty, did himself far less, and his surroundings far more, than justice. Goethe wrote his life in old age, when the scenes to be described had lost much of their vividness. Looking down as from a height where "no sound of human sorrow mounts to mar the sacred, everlasting calm," upon his youth, like some far-off lake lying below, he saw, as it were, through a purple haze, and tranquillized by distance, those tumultuous waves which he had breasted in early manhood, and which now lay radiant in the mellow beams of sunset. In serene contemplation of the classic beauty of Helena, he could have but a dim perception of that wild time of "Sturm und Drang," when his dreams of passion and suicide had found expression in "Werther."

Mill's autobiography is continued till within a year or two of

---

\* It is important to notice that Goethe was in the habit of "translating into a poem or picture, anything that pleased or annoyed him, or particularly engaged his attention, and thus of coming to a conclusion with himself about it, so as both to set right his ideas of outward things, and to tranquillize his own mind." See "Wahrheit und Dichtung," Book 7, Part ii.

his death, while Goethe's stops at the early age of twenty-six. This, though provoking enough to us, who would fain know all that ever could be known of the greatest genius of these latter days, is really not such a deprivation as it would seem at first sight. That which we do gain a tolerably full knowledge of—though it is often intensely annoying that Goethe will give so many more details about his comparatively uninteresting friends than his superlatively interesting self—is that period of childhood and youth, of which, in its bearing upon the hereafter, Goethe himself has said:—"Altogether, the most important part of an individual's life is that of development, and mine is concluded in the detailed volumes of 'Wahrheit und Dichtung.' Afterwards begins the conflict with the world, and that is interesting only in its results."\* An utterance so profoundly true, that we shall take it as the basis of what follows, and try to show how, from the development period in the lives of Goethe and of Mill, may be deduced some of those few points of likeness, and far more numerous points of unlikeness, in their "conflict with the world and its results," which strike us so forcibly as we compare their autobiographies.

Those who, like ourselves, see in evolution and its kindred hypotheses the most satisfactory explanation of seemingly mysterious diversities of organization, will not object to our assuming that both the spiritual and material parts of a human being—supposing the two *not* to be identical—are entirely the work of circumstance. By this, however, we mean, not merely the conditions in which a child is placed from the time it comes into the world, but also the long chain of ante-natal influences, reaching back into the dim Past, far beyond our power to trace them, and which, gaining more from the length of time they have been at work than they lose from being spread over a number of objects, must, as it seems to us, be even more powerful in effect than those influences of education and general surroundings, which, though acting directly upon the creature who is their subject, do this for so short a time in comparison. We imagine that it might be proved, supposing the necessary information to be accessible, that though external influences during childhood and youth are the chief agents in turning a human being's powers into some special groove, it is to a long anterior period that the quantity and quality of those powers are due. Those who object *in toto* to this assumption will hardly expect us to enter here into an exposition of our reasons for making it, since that would involve nothing short of a summary of some of the most important works of Darwin, Spencer, Galton, &c. &c.

---

\* Eckermann's "Conversations with Goethe." Mr. Oxenford's translation.

“Vom Vater hab' ich die Statur,  
Des Lebens ernstes Führen,  
Vom Mütterchen die Frohnatur,  
Und Lust zu fabuliren.  
Urahn herr war der Schönsten hold,  
Das spukt so hin und wieder,  
Urahn frau liebte Schmuck und Gold,  
Das zuckt wohl durch die Glieder.  
Sind nun die Elemente nicht  
Aus dem Complex zu trennen,  
Was ist denn an dem ganzen Wicht  
Original zu nennen ?”

So sings Goethe about his relation to his ancestry; and though to analyse the elements of this “complex whole” would, indeed, be impossible, it *is* possible, as well as useful, to mention a few of those points in which the parents of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and John Stuart Mill resembled their sons.

Goethe the elder was a stern, upright man, punctilious and pedantic, with mediocre talents, but much industry, with a cultivated mind, an enthusiastic love of classic art and of Italy, and in such pecuniary circumstances as to be well able to gratify his tastes. His wife had a bright, merry disposition, with much natural shrewdness and talent. Thoroughly genial, tolerant, and healthy-minded, she had a dislike of agitation and scenes of any kind, so strong as almost entirely to overcome that morbid curiosity which generally has overwhelming power over persons of unsystematic education like herself. Neither of the two were possessed of anything like genius, but the combination in Goethe of some of the above-mentioned qualities of both father and mother is very striking; especially such minor traits as his father's formal manners, which decidedly grew upon him with increasing years, and his mother's abhorrence of unnecessary emotions, which appears in his invariable refusal to see any dead body, and in that strong control over his instincts which had so much to do with the reproach of heartlessness which still clings to his great name.

The elder Mill was gifted both with unusual talents and with that unusual capacity for taking trouble which, as Lord Derby has lately reminded us, has been considered by some persons to constitute genius. In coldness, severity, and integrity of character he resembled Goethe senior, but was unlike him in almost everything else; notably in that originality and unconventionality for which he was so markedly distinguished, and in “the power of influencing others by mere force of mind and character.” As we contemplate the powerful and vivid picture of this grand and rugged figure which his son has given us, we



cannot but notice the strong likeness between father and son, in almost all mental, and in many moral, qualities; but how did Stuart Mill come by his tender sympathetic nature, and that unbounded capacity for affection, which seems to have been left out of James Mill's composition, and which only showed themselves in the son after years of repression? Were they inherited from that mother of whom her son tells us absolutely nothing? We can but conjecture.

And now to consider the manner in which the natural capacities of Goethe and Mill were developed.

Those who maintain—and they are not few in number—that geniuses come into the world fully equipped, like Minerva from her parent's skull, education counting for little or nothing, ought to notice that the two men who in this century have achieved most in the domains of poetry and political philosophy, were both the subjects of careful and well-considered systems of education; and that the special place in literature occupied by each is exactly the one which an examination of the post-natal influences brought to bear upon him, would lead us to expect. The exact value of these examples this is, of course, not the place to settle, but some value they must have. Both Johann Caspar von Goethe and James Mill desired that their sons should be brought up for the most part under their own eye, and instructed as much as possible directly by themselves. That remarkable system of training to which J. S. Mill from the earliest dawn of intelligence was subjected, has of late been so exhaustively written and talked about, that to describe it would be needless. Though few persons would advocate the general adoption of such a system in all its features, many would agree with ourselves that it only needs one or two—it is true, important—modifications to become admirable. It was certainly so adapted to its subject as to produce precisely the result desired; and that result, not perhaps a "mere reasoning machine," yet not far removed from what Wordsworth describes as

"One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling  
Nor form nor feeling, great nor small;  
A reasoning self-sufficing thing,  
An intellectual all in all!"

Notice that this result could never have been attained by a system of mere cram, the mental results of which, like the physical, are first surfeit, and then exhaustion: Mill's "mental capacities were strengthened, not overlaid, by knowledge." Recollecting, too, how great those capacities were—for we entirely decline to believe, as Mill would fain have us, that "in natural gifts he was rather below than above par"—we lose in a great

measure that painful impression of overwork, though not that of excessive severity on his father's part, which the narrative of Mill's early years at first suggests. James Mill's teaching had, of course, a superabundance of "mere logic and analysis," and a lack of "poetical culture," which in some pupils would have tended to stunt that "high enthusiasm for ideal nobleness," which seems to have been innate in his son, and which his early education had probably no worse result than that of tempering by close practical thought. Although James Mill disliked all poems that in any way appealed to the emotions, and even failed to appreciate Shakspeare, he considered the power of writing *verses* to be such a useful acquirement that he imposed this sort of writing as a compulsory exercise on his son. The latter detested it; but wrote for his own amusement, at the age of eleven, a constitutional History of Rome!

How different, spite of some superficial points of likeness, were the influences that surrounded Goethe's childhood. His father had more assistance from others in the work of instruction than the elder Mill had, but was equally careful that there should be no cramming of the boy. Goethe was not systematically trained to reason and to think, logic and metaphysics entering but little, and political economy of course not at all, into his education, yet at twelve he was as great a prodigy in his own line as was Stuart Mill at the same age. Besides a fair acquaintance with Greek and Latin, in which last language some remarkably clever exercises written when he was six, seven, and eight years old, show him to have been a proficient, he knew English, French, and Italian. Italian he picked up merely from hearing his sister taught it by her father, while his knowledge of French was chiefly gained by frequenting the plays in that language which were performed at Frankfort during the French occupation. His interest in the French classic drama was so vivid and intelligent that he began at home to study the "Three Unities" in Corneille's treatise and Racine's prefaces, for which Unities he quickly conceived a profound contempt. We shall not be surprised to find him at this early age having an opinion of his own on pictures and art generally, when we recollect what his surroundings from earliest infancy had been. Out-of-doors there was the city of Frankfort, with its picturesque mediæval buildings, its wealth of historical association, its grand feudal pageantry, which last, at the coronation of one of the emperors, where Goethe "assisted," made a strong impression on the boy. Indoors he breathed an atmosphere of rare books and art-collections, copies of the finest Greek and Italian chef-d'œuvres constantly met his gaze; the "severe sublimity" of the Pantheon, the renaissance splendours of St. Peter's "vast and wondrous dome" having looked down

upon him from the walls of his father's house ever since he could remember anything. Add to this that his father was a warm patron of modern artists, that when the French were in Frankfurt, Count Thorane, one of their generals, and a great picture-fancier, was billeted upon them, and that the house was in consequence greatly frequented by artists, one of whom had a sort of studio there, where Goethe loved to spend a large part of his time. We are therefore more amused than surprised to read of the suggestions which this boy of twelve would make to some artist about the picture he was painting, suggestions which were actually adopted, as he says, "either from conviction or good nature." Hardly the latter, one would think! The mother had *her* share in stimulating the child's powers of invention. She had a remarkable faculty for story-telling, and she often found he had thought out and completed for himself some story which she had left half finished.

Of course all this was very unlike the complete and systematic teaching which John Stuart Mill received, and to this, as well as to what Mr. Lewes calls his "impatient susceptibility," was due the fragmentary nature of Goethe's knowledge of most of the subjects he had taken up in childhood. In later years he often severely blamed this defect in his own early education, indeed it is noticeable that Goethe constantly shows a want of respect and affection in his way of speaking of his father, caused probably by a certain degree of contempt for the elder Goethe's intellectual powers, as well as by the cold harsh manner under which, like Mill senior, the father thought fit to shroud his really warm affection for his son. But this want of tenderness did not prevent young Mill from being "loyally devoted" to that father whose great intellect could not fail to command his reverence. It is curious to contrast old Goethe's unconcealed admiration for the great powers of young Wolfgang—to whom he was always saying "that in his place he (the father) would have made a very different use of his talents, and not squandered them with the like prodigality," with James Mill's sober and uncomplimentary manner of assuring his son that "whatever he knew more than others could not be ascribed to any merit in him, but to the very unusual advantage that had fallen to his lot, of having a father who was able to teach him, and willing to give the necessary trouble and time."

Goethe went on developing himself till the age of sixteen at home by the study of art and literature, and by much thought upon religious matters, abroad by the society of some clever but not too respectable companions that he had secretly picked up. He got into a very unpleasant scrape, besides falling in love, and then into a state of deep despondency, caused chiefly by hearing

that his beloved—Gretchen by name,—had said “she regarded him in the light of a *little brother*.” He gradually regained his former tranquillity of mind by applying himself to the study of metaphysics, and by cultivating his newly-acquired love of natural scenery in constant walking excursions in the lovely Rhineland which lay so near his home. He became the centre of a circle of admiring comrades, who adored him, not only for his wonderful gifts, but for that indescribable fascination of manner which never left him, and which together with his kindly nature, procured him “troops of friends” to the very end of his life.

The “conflict with the world” may be said to have begun when he went to Leipzig at sixteen, though of course his “development” went on side by side with it. During the three years there, he spent more time in seeing life under the auspices of a wild fellow called Behrisch, than in study, gaining much experience which was useful to him in his works, at the expense of his health, and writing the plays “Mitschuldigen” and “Laune des Verliebten.” He returned home a wreck of his former self, went through a sort of mental and physical crisis from which he emerged stronger than before, and then went to the University of Strasburg. Here his career was, on the whole, satisfactory; he entered into the best intellectual society of the place, making friends with Herder—continued his law studies, finally taking his doctor’s degree—and became an ardent student of Shakspeare. At twenty-two, he returns to Frankfort, and throws himself fervently into the “Sturm und Drang” movement, writing “Goetz von Berlichingen” and “Werther,” under the influence of what Lewes so happily describes as “its Titanic hopes,” “its unhealthy sentimentalism, its morbid unrest.” The two latter characteristics are but too obvious in “Werther,” the writing of which seems to have afforded him much relief at a time when the idea of suicide had gained strong possession of his mind. Werther, like most of his heroes, was in great part Goethe, but in a smaller degree than was Wilhelm Meister, the infinitely finer production of his maturity. Though, like most thinkers, Goethe had his seasons of depression, he was full of vitality, with a strongly developed animal nature and impetuous passions, which, however, became gradually, in spite of a certain irresolution which was part of his nature, “trained to come to heel by a powerful will.” His wild and not always respectable mode of life seemed to have small effect on his tenacious constitution; there was always something fresh and wholesome about him, he loved cold water and fresh air, and unlike the sickly, feverish Schiller, felt himself best able to work in the morning. Goethe’s autobiography, and therewith, as he himself considers, his period of development, close on his arrival at Weimar in

1775. His life-struggle had long since begun in earnest, and out of the turbulent "Sturm und Drang" movement he was fast rising into a clearer, calmer atmosphere. The great masterpiece, "Faust," was already in progress, whose first faint dawn may be traced to that melancholy time at home, between his Leipzig and Strasburg careers, but which must go on growing through thirty years more of patient toil and thought, before it should beam in full glory and sublimity upon the world.

It is curious to notice how very slightly politics had hitherto entered into a life which had been passed in an atmosphere of art and literature, or we may leave out the word literature, since the kind of literature to which Goethe chiefly applied himself belonged as purely to the domain of art as painting and sculpture do. But were those tendencies of French eighteenth century thought, which culminated in the revolution, utterly without influence upon one who had spent two years at the University of Strasburg, in France itself? Certainly not: it was impossible for Goethe to ignore them, but they inspired him and his circle with an intense aversion, and Mephistopheles, "der Geist der stets verneint," is the embodiment of his opinions about those whose inclination in literature as in religion was to criticise and to demolish, rather than to create. He was unable to sympathize with the burning indignation against tyranny and priestcraft which animated Voltaire and his school; he had never come in contact with a powerful priesthood and its perpetually irritating and often enraging influences, while he had so far enjoyed all the social and religious freedom he needed for his own development and enjoyment. To political freedom he was simply indifferent, having never felt the need of it for himself. "In our narrow circle," he says, "we did not trouble ourselves with newspapers and news; our business was to study the natures of men: we cared little to know what was going on in the outer world." Again, "in Germany it had as yet hardly occurred to any one to envy the enormous privileges of the aristocratic class, or to grudge them their good luck as regards worldly advantage." And Goethe, among the rest, could not realize that the concentration of this artificial "good luck" upon a few heads, might cause grievous wrong to a very large number.

Goethe's feelings and opinions about religion never seem to have lacked room to expand, judging from the Autobiography, where he from time to time enters into them at considerable length. From infancy he had been carefully instructed in what are called the great truths of religion, and these he soon began to test by the results of his own childish experience. One of his first religious puzzles was in connexion with the great Earthquake of Lisbon, which happened when he was six years old.

How was the fact that good and evil men were then alike destroyed to be reconciled with the first article of the faith, which tells of God who is "the Creator and Preserver of Heaven and Earth"? The thoughtful boy next became exercised at the disunion he noticed among the faithful. Brought up himself as an orthodox Lutheran, he began to lose confidence in his church system when he realized how many sincerely religious persons had separated themselves from it through disgust at its mere "dry morality." So he determined to try and approach directly "that great God of Nature, whose early anger-manifestations had long since been forgotten in the beauty of the world, and the manifold good which falls to our lot." How he set to work to build an altar in his own room, and with the aid of a pastille, offered upon it "natural produce," *i.e.*, specimens from his father's valuable collection of minerals, is well known to all students of his life. This interest in religious matters did not flag as he grew older; for at thirteen we find him beginning to learn Greek in order thoroughly to understand the New Testament. About that time he wrote a curious summary of the early History of the Jews,\* interesting for the essentially rationalistic spirit in which it is conceived. So that, in spite of his passing through the ceremony of confirmation, and of his intimacy with Fräulein von Klettenberg—a charming religious mystic, the original of the "Fair Saint," in "Wilhelm Meister"—we are quite prepared to read that he no longer believed in the miracles and other supernatural occurrences related in the Old Testament. The words, "destitute of faith, yet terrified at scepticism," would describe his feelings on this subject for some years to come. At Strasburg we hear much of his detestation of the attitude towards religion assumed by the French encyclopædists, which was strengthened by reading the "Système de la Nature," which he spoke of with some contempt as the "quintessence of senility," though he owned that it repelled him like some "grey, death-like shadow." At the same time we see in his strong admiration for Bruno's works, that fast-growing tendency to Pantheism, which dates from his earliest childhood. However, soon after he left Strasburg, he seems to have made an attempt to settle his ideas about the Bible, taking his stand upon its value as a whole, which he contended that its obvious contradictions had no power to injure, and insisting that every lover of truth should endeavour to arrive at "its original, divine, practical, indestructible essence," by means of something like that "verifying power" which the Broad Churchmen of our day set so much store by. Yet at twenty-three he is described by a friend

as venerating the Christian religion, but far from orthodox, not going to church or sacrament, and praying seldom. For the next two years he was much under the religious influence of his two friends, Lavater and Fräulein von Klettenberg, the former of whom seems to have depended mostly on evidences, the latter on feeling, or, as Goethe himself puts it—Lavater treated his Saviour as a friend, Klettenberg hers as a lover. Charmed by the apostolic enthusiasm and sincerity of the Moravian brethren, Goethe was on the point of joining them, when he was arrested by the strong repulsion he felt for one of their cardinal beliefs—the dogma of original sin. How could the child, the lover of nature, accept the doctrine of its depravity?

“From all sides I had been drawn towards nature; she had appeared to me in her glory; I had known so many good and brave men who had endured hardship in carrying out their duty to her; to renounce them, to renounce myself, seemed impossible to me. I saw plainly how wide was the gulf that separated me from that doctrine.”

Now for the first time did he seem fully to realize the utter impossibility of his ever accepting the Christian faith. He had long been a warm admirer of the works of Spinoza, in reading whose “Ethics” he felt “his passions” calmed, and “an expansive view over the world of feeling and of morals opened out to him.” His period of religious development was over; he had finally ceased to be a Christian; and the beautiful religio-philosophy of Pantheism was henceforth to be his support during the long struggle with the world that lay before him. We shall presently see how excellently it was adapted to his nature and its needs.

Little or no allusion has so far been made to a very important part of Goethe’s life and character—namely, his relations with the female sex. Goethe had from “the cradle to the grave” the widest possible experience of women. His home education had led him, far more than is usually the case with boys, to make companions of his mother and sister, in whom he seems to have found an intelligent appreciation and sympathy such as a great genius rarely meets with in his female relatives. How affectionately he speaks of “his mother, still almost a child” (she was only eighteen when he was born) “as first growing up to (intellectual) consciousness in and with her two eldest children,” and of his sister, only a year younger than he was, as living “the same life with himself from the earliest dawn of consciousness, and thus united to him by the closest ties.” He goes on to describe this sister as a very remarkable person, “of uncommon depth of character, too little understood, though much loved, and

prematurely lost." We have already mentioned his close and long continued friendship with Fraülein von Klettenberg, whose refined mysticism we can well understand having a strong attraction for one who, like Goethe, was by nature a Pantheist—as well as his first boyish love, the beginning of a long series that ended only a few years before his death at the age of eighty-three. Then at Leipzig we hear of an affair with one Aennchen,—we fear only one of many—then at Strasburg of the two sisters who fought about him before his own eyes; and then, with fullest detail of all, of Frederika, the pastor's daughter, for his conduct to whom, in gaining her affections, and then deserting her, he has been severely blamed. This is not the place to attempt a regular vindication of him, though we think it would not be difficult to show that his error proceeded far more from "want of thought, than want of heart." His case was the very common one of a young man falling in love with a pretty amiable girl, and after a half-betrothal, discovering that he had over-estimated the strength of his affection, and under-estimated the worldly, and still more the intellectual obstacles to their union. Instead of keeping his promise in the face of everything, he broke it, very much probably to her advantage, and without doubt, immensely to his own. When we think of what might have been lost to the world, had Goethe fettered himself at the age of twenty-one with a wife and family, the support of whom must have been his first care, we cannot but feel thankful for what Lewes calls, "his intellectual egoism"—certainly it deserves no harsher name, especially when we recollect that Frederika did not in the least resent his conduct. We next hear of two platonic attachments—to "Lottchen," who was the betrothed, and to Madame Brentano, who was the wife of another man, as well as of a strong flirtation with a certain Anna Sybilla Mönch, greatly encouraged by his parents, but which ended in nothing.

The last, and next to the Frederika episode, by far the most important of the love affairs mentioned in the Autobiography, is that with "Lili," a gifted and lovely girl of aristocratic family, and sixteen years old, for whom he seems to have had a very passionate affection. Soon after entering into a real engagement with her, he began, as he had done with Frederika, to see grave objections to marrying her. The worldly position of Lili, he thought, was as much too high as that of Frederika had been too low, to be compatible with his intellectual advancement, so he rushed off to Switzerland, in order if possible to drive away all thought of the too fascinating maiden—came back again—again became her captive—at last, once for all, freeing himself. Lili too, like Frederika, does not seem to have looked upon herself as injured. Goethe had other lady-loves in those days, but



the above were the principal, and are the best known. So much for the influence of women over him during his development period.

Though the inner life of John Stuart Mill during youth and early manhood is full of interest and suggestiveness, it is so poor in external incidents that only an occasional reference to them is needed in sketching the influences which tended to develop modes of thought and action in after life in the matter of politics, women, and religion, so entirely antagonistic to those adopted by Goethe.

Of the influences which developed his ways of thinking about Art we can only speak negatively, because, until his twentieth year, all æsthetic ideas may be said to have been discouraged, or absolutely ignored, in his surroundings. In a passive sense they were discouraged, because Mill was reared "in the mean and cramped externals of English middle-class life," at a time when artistic culture of any kind was unknown, except among the aristocracy, and even with them it was but a forced, unhealthy exotic, transplanted from its fatherlands of Italy and Greece into the smoke and fog of England, where it had become untruthful and unbeautiful through its utter incongruity. What was to be seen in the streets of London of this unattractive form of Art could have little power over the truthful and vigorous mind of young Mill, compared with those ever active influences (to say nothing of an immensely strong hereditary predisposition) which from his babyhood had drawn him to the study of philosophy, science, and history in their bearing upon politics. What wonder that the absorbing nature of these pursuits should for long have excluded every other thought from his mind? That love of natural scenery which in later life strongly characterized him found, however, some nourishment in his childhood from short country expeditions with his father, as well as from a long residence at Ford Abbey, in Somersetshire, but still more from a tour in the Pyrenees at the age of fourteen. His year's stay in France, during which this tour occurred, must have given a great impulse to his education in every sense of the word, and not least that part of the time which he spent in the house of M. Say, whom he describes as "a fine specimen of the best kind of French republican." Soon after his return to England, he became an enthusiastic disciple of Bentham, whose teachings his previous education, illustrated as it had been by intercourse with such men as Bentham himself, Ricardo, Hume, Say, and his own father, had well fitted him to appreciate. Bentham's system gave food to his high aspirations, while it satisfied his strict habits of thought by its sobriety and "appearance of superiority to illusion. It gave unity to his conceptions of things,"

and during the next six years this philosophy served him as "in one among the best senses of the word, a religion." He now put his mind through a careful course of training, and studied metaphysics and logic, both in private and in discussions with congenial friends, writing articles for the Liberal journals, helping Bentham in the work of annotating and preparing for the press his "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," and joining a debating society. Like Goethe, he spent much of his time with grown-up men, whose friendship with his father was in itself a guarantee of intellectual excellence. He had besides many companions nearer his own age, several of whom have since become known to fame.\* At seventeen he got an appointment in the India Office, where, at the end of thirty-four years, he had risen to the position of Chief Examiner of Correspondence, described as "involving the responsibility, if not quite the dignity, of Secretary of State." The admirable effect which this kind of work had in giving him that thorough practicality which so eminently distinguished him among philosophers, is well explained in the Autobiography. At the age of twenty came on with Mill that painful mental state, when Feeling, which he had too long despised, or perhaps ignored, began to vindicate itself.† There can be no doubt that what he calls "the over-cultivation of the analysing spirit, without its natural complements and correctives," greatly added to the severity of that crisis which, at some period of his life, every thinking man has to pass through in one form or another. After some months of deep dejection, a casual occurrence discovered to him that he still had feelings, hopes, and aspirations; and thus consoled, he set to work to remedy those previous deficiencies which he was now quite conscious of, and to join other kinds of cultivation, especially poetry and music, to that of the intellect alone. He began to perceive all that was valuable in what he terms "the nineteenth century reaction against the eighteenth," became intimate with some of its English promoters, especially Maurice, Sterling, and afterwards Carlyle, and now first felt a decided attraction towards the St. Simonian school of socialists.

It is just worth while to remark the superficial resemblance

---

\* The simple fact that Austin, Grote, Sterling, Carlyle, were among Mill's intimate friends, now or at a later period, is a sufficient refutation of a ludicrous insinuation in a late article in *Blackwood*, to the effect that Mill only cared to have second-rate men for his friends!

† We who live in the days of pilgrimages and adorations of the Sacred Heart, of spiritualism, revivals of confession, and "missions," every variety, in fact, of hysterical emotionalism, may well feel some sympathy with the disgust of the utilitarian school for "the frequency with which feeling is made the ultimate reason and justification of conduct," even though we grant it to have been to some extent exaggerated.

between this "crisis" and that which Goethe underwent after he left Leipzig. The contrast between the kind of life which John Stuart Mill led during youth and manhood, which might be described in the words of the Church Catechism as one of "temperance, soberness, and chastity," or in those of the poet, as one of "plain living and high thinking," and that of Goethe during both the "Sturm und Drang," and what Mr. Lewes so significantly names "the Genialisch period at Weimar," is so intensely suggestive, that we dare not trust ourselves to enlarge upon it. It is instructive, as showing the very slight *necessary* connexion between the most elaborate feelings and thoughts about religion, and every-day morality. Both Goethe and Mill found recreation in natural scenery and in botany; but these simple pleasures did not alone suffice for Goethe. Of course the widely different constitutions and temperaments of the two men must in some degree be considered responsible for the difference in their modes of life. Mill had not the splendid vitality of Goethe, and was thus spared many of the sensual temptations to which the latter too often yielded. But we wholly disagree from an article in the *Spectator*, which asserts that "the general effect of Mill's nature is one of meagreness and pallor." Was his power of affection feeble or meagre? and is there any lack of light and colour in that deep indignation against oppression, which shines out of everything he wrote? Of "reason divine, red-hot with passion pure" (to quote the beautiful words of a sonnet which appeared shortly after his death) Mill was the very embodiment; and this appears not only in his exertions for the good of the human race, but also very strongly in the story of his relations with that fortunate woman who, for twenty-eight years of her life, was "all in all to him," and whose "memory was to him a religion." His friendship with her began when he was twenty-four, and she twenty-three years of age; and though it is probable that in the depth of his passionate devotion Mill has unconsciously invested his wife with greater genius than she actually possessed, there can be no doubt that she was a most remarkable woman, and that her influence upon his development was very strong and also very beneficial, both in a negative and positive sense. Mrs. Mill did *not* merely abstain from acting as "a dead weight upon every aspiration of her husband to be better than public opinion required him to be," or from "trying to lead him to become much more indulgent to the common opinion of society and the world," and keep him down in a "mediocrity of respectability," in which direction the influence of a woman generally tends. She went far beyond this. She helped to entirely free Mill from a certain hardness and coldness which always clung to the Benthamite School, and to stimulate everything that was high and noble in

his nature, that "unselfishness," that "simplicity and sincerity," that "utmost scorn of whatever was mean and cowardly," that "boundless generosity and lovingness," that "emancipation from every kind of superstition and conventionality," in all of which qualities attributed by him to his wife in the *Autobiography*, she would have been the first to own that her husband exceeded her. But what is a still more surprising feature in one of a sex whose minds have until now been systematically stunted and left untrained, while their feelings have been cultivated into an unhealthy rankness, her intellectual influence was also beneficial. Mrs. Mill contributed to bring both more practicality and more of a "human element" into his works, especially into the "*Political Economy*," thus giving it one amongst other decided points of superiority over other manuals, that, briefly stated, of treating certain "economical generalizations" not as "final," but "provisional." Mr. Mill's step-daughter, Miss Taylor, seems, after her mother's death, to have in some degree succeeded to her place of literary helper and inspirer.

Now comes the question—What had been going on in Mill's mind on the subject of religion during all these years? *Nothing at all*, would be the very natural answer of that large number of persons who plume themselves upon having reached a state of absolute certainty about religion; an answer which will nevertheless require some modification. Yet it is a fact, and a very extraordinary fact, that young Mill grew up to manhood, in Christian England, during the first twenty years of the nineteenth century, perfectly untouched by any kind of religious influence, or at least any that would be acknowledged as such by that large portion of the British public which regards Christianity and religion as convertible terms. What may strike us as stranger still, is that this method was pursued without any important collisions with the outside world, so carefully was the boy instructed to "keep his thoughts to himself," a precaution which we cannot but think might have had a very unwholesome effect upon some pupils. Strangest of all will it appear to many persons, that this negative attitude towards religion—or we prefer to say, theology—was successfully combined with a very positive attitude towards morality. The virtues of "justice, temperance (with James Mill almost 'the central point of educational precept'), veracity, perseverance, readiness to encounter pain, and especially labour; regard for the public good; estimation of persons according to their merits, and of things according to their intrinsic usefulness—a life of exertion in contradiction to one of self-indulgent ease and sloth;" all these things were inculcated upon Stuart Mill by the precept, as well as the example of a father, who himself bore a strong resemblance to some ancient

Greek philosopher. The moral and intellectual unsatisfactoriness of the common beliefs, and of these, more especially that "dreadful conception of an object of worship," which prevailed among Christians at the time of Mill's boyhood, though at present we have good reason to hope that it is rapidly ceasing to be identified with Christianity, was carefully demonstrated to the boy. The outcome of it all was, that Stuart Mill "never had religious belief : he grew up in a negative state with regard to it. He looked upon the modern exactly as he did upon the ancient religion, as something which in no way concerned him." The Autobiography is thus entirely destitute of those records of religious experience and religious doubts which occupy so important a place in the lives of most thinkers. Mill is very sparing of words on this subject, yet we may gather from various hints of his own opinions and those of his wife, occurring here and there in the Autobiography, that, though no Atheist, he, like his father, was unable to find a "halting-place in Deism."

We have now traced the progress of Mill's mind up to the commencement of "the most valuable friendship of his life," and have also dwelt upon the influence of that friendship upon after years. In doing this, we have, perhaps, gone somewhat beyond the limit marked out at the beginning. But this has been rendered necessary both by the immense importance of this friendship in modifying and developing his previous opinions, and by that peculiar readiness which he always showed "to learn and to unlearn"—a flexibility which never degenerated into volatility—which made the development-time last much longer with him than it does with most men. Of course Goethe's dictum that his own development concluded with the conclusion of the "Wahrheit und Dichtung," that is, at the age of twenty-six, though truer of him than it is of Mill, was never intended to be accepted except as an approximation to the truth. It comes, however, far nearer the truth than hard-and-fast lines generally do, and is sufficiently near it in this case to enable us to show that in that period of Goethe's life, as in the same period, though extended by a few years, of the life of Mill, we must seek the primary causes of those points of contrast which strike us most forcibly in their "conflict with the world and its results." These points of contrast, as has been hinted previously, may be roughly divided into three heads :

Their theory and practice with reference to

1. Art and Politics—best treated together.
2. Women.
3. Religion.

And we think a little consideration will quickly show how their modes of thought and action in these matters are precisely what

one would expect to be evoked by the widely different circumstances under which they had lived from their infancy to their prime.

1. *Art and Politics*.—We have seen that nature and education had made Goethe before all things an artist, and as such, the peaceful contemplation of beauty formed his idea of the best happiness, the attainment of perfection in form one of his highest aspirations. This tendency grew upon him; he became more and more wedded to the tranquil beauty of Greek art, and ever more alienated from the striving and unrest of the Gothic, the modern spirit. It is easy to see that such a man will naturally tend towards conservatism, still more when, as in his case, it coincides with his early habits and ways of thinking. What does he care for outward reform and progress? His “mind to him a kingdom is,” and so long as no tyrant disturbs him in his work of contemplation and creation, the disposition of the genuine artist is to rest and be thankful, and to keep his mind quite clear of disturbing thoughts such as would be engendered by longings after a political freedom which individually he would be little the better for. And Goethe was led to this conclusion by something stronger than the mere artist tendency, by his high idea of the proper mission of art. Schiller and he “believed that Culture would raise humanity to its full powers; and they, as Artists, knew no Culture equal to that of Art.”\* Goethe saw for himself the destructive effect upon culture of the French revolution, while his powers of prevision were not strong enough to show him that this great emancipation, being mental as well as physical, would in the end stimulate culture, by giving it width and free play, far more than it had momentarily retarded it. Goethe had felt most keenly the severity of the remedy, he did not live to realize the greatness of the cure: he said—

“Franzthum drängt in diesen verworrenen Tagen, wie chmals  
Lutherthum es gethan, ruhige Bildung zurück,”

and his advice was—

“Willst du, mein Sohn, freibleiben, so lerne was Rechtes, und halte  
Dich genügsam, und nie blicke nach oben hinauf.”

Not that he by any means lacked sympathy for the sufferings of the poor: he showed this sympathy very practically, if not always judiciously—and we must recollect that the principles of political economy were to him entirely unknown—by frequent, and we believe, often self-denying charities. Neither did he entirely fail to appreciate the benefits of political liberty. He

---

\* Lewes's “Life of Goethe.”

called himself a moderate Liberal, and went so far as to say, "if there exists an actual necessity for a great reform amongst a people, God is with it, and it prospers."\* But he was strongly of opinion that this necessity did not then exist in Germany, the time, he thought, was not yet ripe, and so he said, "Let every one according to his talents, according to his tendencies, and according to his position, do his utmost to increase the culture and development of the people . . . that the people may not lag behind other peoples, but become competent for every great action when the day of its glories arrives."† And though Goethe's political provision was at fault when he passed sentence upon the French revolution, was he far wrong in the advice that he tendered to his own nation? Now that the "day of its glories" has indeed arrived, have the German people carried on their splendid struggle any the worse—rather was it not carried on better?—for the "tranquil culture" that they had been pursuing for so long, and which their great poet had so strongly insisted on?

It must be remarked before we leave this portion of the subject, that the beneficial effect on Goethe's later writings of his growing devotion to the Greek ideal, has been much questioned; indeed a comparison of the first part of "Faust" and "Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre" with the second part of "Faust" and the "Wanderjahre," which last bear strong traces of this Greek influence—though, of course, old age must be credited with some share in their inferiority—places the matter, in our opinion, beyond dispute. This is well put in a spoken criticism of Mr. Mill's, who said:—"Goethe tried as hard as he could to be a Greek; yet his failure to produce anything perfect in form, except a few lyrics, proves the irresistible expansion of the modern spirit, and the inadequateness of the Greek types to modern needs of activity and expression."‡ In his great attempt at a reproduction of the Greek tragedy, "Iphigenia," there is something intensely cold and constrained; we miss that charm which pervaded almost everything else he wrote, and pre-eminently the first part of "Faust," which, full of vitality, and breathing out in every line the complexity of modern thought, shows plainly where Goethe's true strength lay.

Nature and Education had worked together to make Goethe an Artist; they also united to make John Stuart Mill a Radical Philosopher. There is strong ground for believing that Mill inherited almost all his father's finest qualities of head, without any of his unloveable qualities of heart; and when we add to this the

\* Eckermann's "Conversations."

† Lewes's "Life of Goethe."

‡ From Mr. J. Morley's notes of Mr. Mill's conversation during the last day they spent together. See *Fortnightly Review* for June, 1873.

facts that he possessed a rare capacity for sympathy and affection, that he was trained to love and worship Truth before all things, and carefully taught the best human means of finding out what the Truth was, is there any room for surprise that the result was a political and social reformer of the highest order? True, it was needful for him to go down into the depths, to feel all his youthful dreams and aspirations dispelled and crushed under a weight of "dry heavy dejection," before he could rise to full completeness and fitness for the great work that lay before him. Then first did he begin to "give its proper place among the prime necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual;" thus coming into collision with some of his Benthamite friends, and notably with Mr. Roebuck, who was then, whatever he is now, "the kind of Englishman who seems to regard the sympathies almost as necessary evils required for keeping men's actions benevolent and compassionate;" . . . . . seeing "little good in any cultivation of the feelings, and none at all in cultivating them through the imagination, which he thought was only cultivating illusion." One can hardly help wondering if Mr. Roebuck's career might not have been very different, and far more satisfactory, had he, like Mill, accepted while young a truer and less one-sided view of life than the one here glanced at. There is much that is characteristic in the mode of "culture of the feelings" to which Mill felt himself drawn. We can picture the disgust with which he would turn away from the "raptures and roses of vice" which Byron sang in such melting strains; while he was repelled, as we know, by the cynical spirit of these poems. It was in Wordsworth's poetry that he found "a medicine for his state of mind; . . . . in it he seemed to draw from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings; which had no connexion with struggle or imperfection, but would be made richer by every improvement in the physical or social condition of mankind." Yet though Mill was now able to perceive the "other half of the truth" to which he had hitherto been blind, he never became "a recreant to intellectual culture;" his habits of reasoning stood him in good stead, and prevented him from yielding too far to the reaction. To the very end of his life he was firm to Utilitarianism; he had a strong perception of its excellence, not as "a mere matter of abstract speculation," but in its "practical consequences." But he introduced some important modifications, which, while leaving its central principle untouched, helped to develop it into something far higher and nobler than it had ever entered into the hearts of Bentham and James Mill to conceive.

The opponents of the Experience school in philosophy and the



Utilitarian school in Ethics are naturally irate at the fervour with which Mill adhered to the tenets of these schools, even after he became aware of the need of certain modifications in them; and it is amusing to read the gentle sneer of the *Spectator* at the "curious slightness of the permanent instruction which this experience" (the crisis) "left behind." "Surely," it exclaims, "a profound sense of the inadequacy of ordinary human success to the cravings of the human spirit, was never followed by a less radical moral change."\* Slight, however, as this change may seem to some, it was, together with Mrs. Mill's influence, instrumental in leading him beyond the "democracy pure and simple" and the narrow political economy of his youth, to advocate a check upon the former by means of "proportional representation," and an enlargement of the latter so as to admit the feasibility of a kind of socialistic system which, while "energetically repudiating that tyranny of society over the individual, which most Socialistic systems are supposed to involve," should finally solve the great Socialistic problem of the future—namely, "how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour." Though he "saw clearly that to render any such social transformation either possible or desirable, an equivalent change of character must take place both in the uncultivated herd who now compose the labouring masses, and in the immense majority of their employers," he never ceased to believe in its feasibility; and his life was henceforth one consistent struggle, in deeds as in words spoken and written, for those principles whose establishment he knew could alone hasten the advent of this great change. Here we have the real clue to his Parliamentary career. During that time he succeeded in thoroughly embittering, through his vigorous advocacy of such unpopular causes as the rights of Jamaica negroes and English women, and of full liberty of thought and speech even for the professed atheist, all those social, religious, and political Conservatives, who—at any rate, the last—"had not been without hopes of finding Mill an opponent of democracy; as he was able to see the Conservative side of any question, they presumed that, like them, he could not see any other side."

Mill had in the highest degree "the enthusiasm of humanity" in the abstract, yet he certainly, in spite of his unbounded charity and forbearance, had no enthusiasm *for* humanity in the concrete. This is particularly seen in his detestation of general society, another respect in which he differs from Goethe, though

it is possible that if the circle in which Goethe moved had in any way resembled the "insipidity" and "supreme unattractiveness" to any person of a high class of intellect, of "general society as now carried on in England," the contrast between them in this respect would turn out to be only a superficial one. Let us just for one moment try to imagine either Goethe embracing semi-socialistic principles, or Mill lavishing money upon any beggar who succeeded in working upon his feelings! Our instant perception of the ludicrous impossibility of imagining either case illustrates the ground-difference between them far better than pages of analysis and description.

There has been much condemnation of Mill's exclusiveness in holding aloof from ordinary society. In defence of his practice in this matter, it is enough to notice the impossibility of a professional man like Mill entering into society at the same time that he was engaged upon such works as the "Logic" and the "Political Economy," without entire neglect of his health. To justify his theory to ourselves, we have only to reflect upon, and try to realize the enormous waste of human time and health, in the present state of English social life, upon what certainly "deserves the name of neither business nor pleasure." A more general adoption and reduction of Mill's theory to practice would probably have the desirable effect of bringing into discredit some of those weary social duties which are a labour and sorrow to almost all concerned, especially to women, who have fewer means of escape from them than men, and of gradually founding a higher type of society among those whose disgust at the "low moral tone" of the old one, had induced them to relinquish it.

2. *Women.*—Goethe's relations with women, after he attained his full intellectual stature, were of much the same character as during his time of growth. He still went on "gathering the thousand flowers which richly filled the valleys," and, as a natural result, too often left them behind to wither. Soon after he went to reside at Weimar began the most important of his numerous *liaisons*—that with Lotte von Stein, a married woman seven years older than himself, who, according to a German writer, joined "solid cultivation," "breadth and clearness of perception," and an "equable temper," to much fascination of manner and appearance. He loved her devotedly for about twelve years, though this did not prevent his consoling himself for their separation while he was in Italy, by various small *affaires de cœur*. The mere fact, that this intimate relation—being as it was throughout of a purely spiritual nature—should have lasted so long, when one of the persons concerned was a man of Goethe's temperament, is sufficient proof that Frau von

Stein must have been peculiarly suited to him. One cannot help thinking how much happier and more dignified Goethe's domestic life might have been, had she been younger and in a position to marry him. However, the actual result was a breach, caused by her discovery that Goethe had taken for his mistress a pretty, clever girl, of low birth, called Christiane Vulpius, an arrangement to which Frau von Stein very naturally objected. A modern German Goethe-worshipper says that she dismissed him in a "fit of vulgar jealousy," and evidently thinks she had ill-treated him throughout. Her reason—but of course love prevented her listening to it—ought to have taught her that some such *dénoûment* must, under the circumstances, sooner or later happen; but surely we must applaud the womanly dignity and strength of mind which made her decline to go halves for Goethe with another woman, least of all such a woman as Christiane Vulpius. And it should be recollected that the then state of morals in polite German society was by no means such as to brand a similar arrangement as the flagrant breach of decency which it would be considered now. It is unfortunate that Lotte von Stein could not afterwards restrain her feelings sufficiently to prevent an exhibition of her disappointment to the world, such as was little calculated to win its respect. There is no need here to enter into the unpleasant details of Goethe's connexion with Christiane, which ended only with her death in 1816, some years after he had made her his wife. She bore him a son, and seems to have been faithful to him, acting as a sort of good working-houskeeper. His kindness to, and forbearance with her, after her disgusting habits of intemperance had become a perpetual annoyance to him, were quite admirable—indeed, one would wish that he had practised upon this woman some of that "intellectual egoism," which had made him in early life cast away the love of a Frederika and a Lili. Probably it was only the force of habit which prevented him from doing so.

Frau von Stein being unattainable, what a pity it seems that Goethe had not long ago married Lili! It is true that Mr. Lewes and other of Goethe's biographers have come to the conclusion that he never had any deep affection for her; but great as must be our respect for Mr. Lewes's opinion, and undeniably strong as are the grounds upon which it is founded, Goethe's own testimony is still stronger, and he made use to Eckermann of the following emphatic words:—

"She was the first whom I deeply and truly loved. I may also say that she was the last; for all the little affections which I have felt, in the after part of my life, are when compared with this first one, only light and superficial. I have never been so near a happiness after my own heart, as during the time of this love for Lili. The

obstacles which separated us were not really insurmountable, and yet she was lost to me.”\*

Is not this tolerably conclusive evidence, though given when Goethe was eighty-one? We may add that the inconvenience proceeding from the above-named “obstacles” would have been slight indeed compared with the serious mental and moral injury which even the greatest of men could not but have sustained from perpetual association with a coarse-minded and uncultivated woman. But long before he met Christiane Vulpius, Goethe had passed—to quote the beautiful words of George Eliot—“the freshness of our time, when only the choice is possible which gives unity to life, and makes the memory a temple where all relics and all votive offerings, all worship and all grateful joy, are an unbroken history sanctified by one religion.” He could now only go on as he had begun. During his wife’s lifetime, as well as after her death, Goethe’s susceptible heart was touched again and again—at the age of fifty-eight by the pretty, malicious sprite, Bettina, daughter of his old flame Madame Brentano, by a young girl called Minna Herzlieb, who seems to have left a very strong impression upon him, and by one Fräulein von Lewezow, whom Goethe, when seventy-six years old, would, but for fear of the world’s ridicule, have certainly married. These are only some among several others.

Mr. Mill has “wondered how a man who could draw the sorrows of a deserted woman like Aurelia in Wilhelm Meister should yet have behaved so systematically ill to women.”† It is curious to compare this opinion with that of a recent Goethe-worshipper (the same who is so angry with Frau von Stein), who thinks Goethe’s “unfaithfulness to individual women has been condoned by the number of charming portraits of the sex with which he has adorned the sanctuary of beauty!” May we venture to suggest the following medium between the above

\* Eckermann’s “Conversations.”

† From the same conversation with Mr. Morley, mentioned above. For another charming description of the sorrows of a lonely woman, see the last Act of “Iphigenia.”

“ Der rasche Kampf verewigt einen Mann :  
 Er falle gleich, so preiset ihn das Lied.  
 Allein die Thränen, die unendlichen,  
 Der ueberbliebenen, der verlassnen Frau,  
 Zählt keine Nachwelt, und der Dichter schweigt  
 Von tausend durchgeweinten Tag-und Nächten,  
 Wo eine stille Seele den veilor’nen  
 Rasch abgeschied’nen Freund vergebens sich  
 Zurückzurufen bangt, und sich verzehrt.”

extreme opinions about Goethe's behaviour in this matter? Granting that he did ill-treat certain women, and that the exquisite female delineations which he has given to posterity would not tend very effectually to console them, we cannot allow that the ill-treatment was either heartless or "systematic." May we not find a key to his conduct in his determination that Art should, and Love should *not*, be "lord of all," which his immense power of self-restraint enabled him to carry into effect? Why should we English applaud the sentiment of the beautiful old lines—

"I could not love thee, dear, so much,  
Loved I not honour more,"

yet pass severe censure on Goethe because he preferred his Art to his Love? Why, but because the æsthetic feeling is so much rarer in England than the feeling for honour? In sacrificing himself and all he loved to Art, Goethe was only acting strictly up to his own idea of its exalted mission; and surely, if we measure things by their intrinsic value to mankind, Art and Culture ought not to occupy a *lower* place in our estimation than military honour and loyalty. Whether Goethe always judged correctly in making these sacrifices is an entirely different matter, and, as was said before, there is strong ground for believing that in one case, at any rate, he made a mistake, even taking into account only his own artistic development. His experience of women was wonderfully wide, but from the very nature of his intercourse with them he only knew (excepting, perhaps, in the case of Lotte von Stein) "one narrow department of their nature"—an important department no doubt. The only woman whose character he can have had any deep knowledge of was neither good nor worthy; and this fact alone enables us to comprehend the cynical and flippant remarks about female education, and the best mode of preserving female virtue, which we find in his "Second (poetical) Epistle to a Friend."

Yet there hardly exists any writer whose inspiration we *know* to have been so much indebted to women. When we remember that to Lili we owe, among other charming love songs, the "Herz mein Herz," wedded as it has been by Beethoven to the most exquisitely expressive music—to Lotte von Stein that beautiful dedication of the "Poems," which shows a purity of thought not always characteristic of Goethe's poems to women—to Christiane, many of the splendid Roman elegies—to Minna Herzlieb, the lovely series of sonnets, and the character of Otilie in the "Elective Affinities," we can realize how truly he, of all men, might write, both in the literal and the mystical sense,

“Das Ewigweibliche zieht uns hinan.”\*

It is impossible to imagine a greater contrast to all this than was Mill's experience of women. “He loved one only and he clave to her.” It seems to us that even as regards *quantity*, his knowledge of women was little inferior to Goethe's, for it made up in depth what it lacked in extent. Some time before the publication of the Autobiography, we had been able to draw an inference as to the *quality* of that knowledge from certain glimpses of it given in “The Subjection of Women,” where we have an ideal picture of what married life might be “in the case of two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinion and purposes, between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of powers and capacities with reciprocal superiority in them, so that each can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately the pleasure of leading and being led in the path of development.” No one can now doubt that this picture was drawn from Mill's own experience, but he justly adds, “to those who cannot conceive it, it would appear the dream of an enthusiast.” Such, we fear, it would have appeared to Goethe, and that such it appears still to the large majority of people we have a painful proof in the plentiful crop of sneers that have sprung up in the friendly soil of the *Saturday Review*, and other periodicals, now that the Autobiography has granted us the privilege of a fuller view into its writer's inner life. We need do no more than remark upon certain obvious points of resemblance between the relations of Goethe with Frau von Stein, and those of Mr. Mill with Mrs. Mill, during the lifetime of her first husband, Mr. Taylor. Although neither morally nor intellectually worthy of a comparison with Mrs. Mill, Frau von Stein seems to have been in every way superior to all the rest of the women whom Goethe loved, and to have exercised a proportionally stronger influence over him. But both externally and internally they were circumstanced far less favourably than their English counterparts, whose deep union of heart and mind, founded as it was on the rock of purity and steadfastness, enabled them to treat the slights and misconstructions of society with absolute indifference. Amid the torrent of detraction which Mrs. Grundy, constituting various reviewers her mouthpiece, pours upon the heads of these two persons who once for all declined to burn incense upon her altar, the absence (as we believe) of any attempt to throw doubt upon Mill's assertion that the twenty years' friendship between himself and Mrs. Taylor was of a purely

---

\* Translated literally, “the eternal-womanly,” or “the Eternal Womanhood draws upwards,” or “heaven-wards.” Faust, 2nd Part.

platonian nature, forms a striking illustration of the influence exerted by Mill's simple truthfulness and singleness of mind over the bitterest opponents of his system, social and political. In the course of action which Mill here pursued, he especially showed that "devotion to the two cardinal points of liberty and duty" which were so strongly insisted on by him; together with his "incomparable friend," he resolutely asserted his liberty by "declining to consider the ordinances of society binding on a subject so entirely personal" as their own friendship, and at the same time they were strictly faithful to duty.

One direct effect of Mill's singularly happy experience in women was his vigorous assumption of the championship of their right to be represented in parliament, a right which of course includes all their other "rights," or we should perhaps rather say, a redressal of all their wrongs. The germ of the idea could hardly fail to have existed, and as we know had actually long existed in a mind so peculiarly distinguished by a keen sense of justice as that of Mill; but it might for some time longer have lain dormant without the fructifying influence of that friend and wife to whom, in this matter, English women owe a debt of gratitude only second to what they owe to Mill himself.

3. *Religion.*—Nature and education had joined to make Goethe a Pantheist, as they had joined to make him an Artist. Take Mr. Ruskin's eloquent description of the great humanistic, or as he calls it, naturalistic school of artists, every word of which fits Goethe to such a nicety that we may be excused for making use of it instead of our own halting words:—

"The great naturalist takes the human being in its wholeness, in its mortal as well as its spiritual strength. Capable of sounding and sympathizing with the whole range of its passions, he brings one majestic harmony out of them all; he represents it fearlessly in all its acts and thoughts, in its . . . . anger, its sensuality, and its pride, as well as in its fortitude or faith, but makes it noble in them all; . . . . there is nothing which he is reluctant to behold, nothing that he is ashamed to confess; with all that lives, triumphing, falling, or suffering, he claims kindred, either in majesty or in mercy."\*

Is not Pantheism the religion exactly suited to such a man as this? May we not go even further, and say, is it possible for the naturalistic Artist to be of any other religion, seeing that the above description is simply Pantheism applied to Art? Already as a youth Goethe had been fascinated by the "boundless disinterestedness which shines forth from every sentence of Spinoza's 'Ethics.' The wondrous axiom—'He who truly loves God, must not ask that God should love him in return,' with all the premises upon

---

\* "Stones of Venice."

which it rests, with all the results which derive themselves from it, filled my whole thoughts." In later years, his own experience as an Artist and a man of the world, taught him the truth that "our physical as well as social life—our morals, habits, worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, even many an accidental occurrence—call us to self-sacrifice." Pantheism satisfied his physical leanings by consecrating his almost Hellenic admiration for the human body; and his moral breadth of view, which led him to trace the "soul of good" which exists even in "things evil." It taught him to regard all religions with respect, while attributing absolute perfection to none. Detesting as he did all demolition, he was far from wishing to overturn Christianity; and yet no one could see more plainly than he did some of its weak points. His theory about it was, that

"Christ thought of a God, comprising all in one, to whom he ascribed all qualities which he found excellent in himself. This God was the essence of his own beautiful soul, full of love and goodness, like himself. But as the great Being, whom we name the Deity, manifests himself not only in man, but in a rich, powerful nature, and in mighty world-events, a representation of him, framed from human qualities, cannot of course be adequate, and the attentive observer will soon come to imperfections and contradictions."\*

His faith in our Immortality was very strong.

"Man" he said, "should believe in immortality: he has a right to this belief; it corresponds to the wants of his nature, and he may believe in the promises of religion. But if the philosopher tries to deduce the immortality of the soul from a legend, that is very weak and inefficient. To me the eternal existence of my soul is proved from my idea of activity; if I work on incessantly till my death, nature is bound to give me another form of existence when the present one can no longer sustain my spirit."†

Yet he was fully conscious how great a mistake it is to make such ideas "a theme of daily meditation and thought-distracting speculation. An able man, who has something regular to do here, and must toil and struggle and produce day by day, leaves the future world to itself, and is active and useful in this."‡

The best idea of Goethe's thoughts about (to use his own words)

"Him, who, seek to name him as we will,  
Unknown within himself abideth still,"

will be given by a quotation from his "Proemium" to "Gott

---

\* Eckermann's "Conversations of Goethe."

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*



und Welt." It is an exact exposition, too, of the Pantheistic creed:—

“What were the God who sat outside to scan  
 The spheres that 'neath his finger circling ran?  
 God dwells within, and moves the world and moulds,  
 Himself and nature in one form enfolds:  
 Thus all that lives in him and breathes and is,  
 Shall ne'er his puissance, ne'er his spirit miss.  
 The soul of man, too, is an universe:  
 Whence follows it that race with race concurs  
 In naming all it knows of good and true  
 God,—yea, its own God; and with homage due  
 Surrenders to his sway both earth and heaven;  
 Fears him, and loves, where place for love is given.”\*

As Eckermann truly says:—“His opponents have often accused him of having no faith; but he merely had not theirs, because it was too small for him.”

But we can hardly imagine Pantheism being the religion of the practical Reformer. One whose inmost heart is so penetrated with the sorrows of humanity, that his life must, if he be true to himself, be one long struggle to cure them, cannot by any possibility regard this as the best of all possible worlds. And he is pretty sure to do one of two things: either he will give up as hopeless all idea of effectually curing the ills of this life, and devote himself to the task of preparing himself and his fellows to inhabit the new heavens and the new earth which he has taught himself to look upon as certainties; or he will set all his powers to work to improve the present condition of the world and its inhabitants, so as to bring them, if possible, somewhat nearer an ideal state, leaving the future to take care of itself. We need hardly say that the latter was the line actually taken by a philosophical as well as practical Reformer like Mill. He regarded speculations about the unseen world as, on the whole, unprofitable, seeing that we can never, by any possibility, arrive at the faintest approach to certainty about it, while alive. Still he could not but have opinions of some sort on the subject; and though we have as yet no complete exposition of them, we may obtain a tolerable idea what they were by piecing together various passages from his writings, especially from the Autobiography. We can discern a strong feeling of sympathy and agreement with his father's religious, or rather non-religious, views in the wonderfully powerful and striking account of them given in the latter work. His own carefully cultivated

---

\* From an admirable translation by J. A. S. in the *Spectator* of September 24, 1870.

powers of reasoning taught him, as he grew up, to see the justice of that negation of all established beliefs which from his earliest years had been infused into his mind. Yet there are certain indications that, to these negative opinions, he added some positive ones, which, through all his reticence, we can see were very precious to him. We cannot but feel that he is stating his own belief when he says "of many whose belief is far short of Deism," that

"though they may think the proof incomplete that the universe is the work of design, and though they assuredly disbelieve that it can have an author and governor who is absolute in power as well as perfect in goodness, they have that which constitutes the principal worth of all religions whatever, an ideal conception of a perfect Being, to which they habitually refer as the guide of their conscience; and this ideal of God is usually far nearer to perfection than the objective Deity of those, who think themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author of a world so crowded with suffering, and so deformed by injustice as ours."\*

We shall be better able to comprehend this passage by comparing it with the hint, given a few pages before, of a possible solution of that greatest of all difficulties, the origin of evil, in "the Sabæan, or Manichæan, theory of a Good and an Evil Principle, struggling against each other for the government of the Universe." This hypothesis James Mill regarded as a harmless one, and both intellectually and morally far preferable to that which ascribes the creation of a "world full of evil" to a being "combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness." Those who are acquainted with Miss Cobbe's writings will know that James and John Stuart Mill are not the sole modern thinkers to whom this solution has suggested itself.

Mr. Mill's later works are symptomatic of the growing influence over him of that "religion of humanity" which some of the clearest and most impartial thinkers of our day declare to be the coming creed, and that philosophers are to be its priests. But in Mill it was entirely separated from Comte's "system of spiritual and temporal despotism," which Mill pronounced to be "a monumental warning to thinkers on society and politics of what happens when once men lose sight in their speculations of the value of liberty and individuality." The most direct, if slight, enunciation of his views may be found in his last conversation with Mr. Morley (previously quoted from), where he

---

\* Our repetition of this, and one or two other quotations given in the former article on "John Stuart Mill," may be excused on the ground that they are used to illustrate points other than those for which they were required in that article.

spoke of Theism as a "useful provisional belief," and of his own opinion that "the coming religion would rest upon the solidarity of mankind." His thoroughly reasonable and thence consolatory reconciliation of the doctrines of free will and of necessity ("Autobiography," pp. 169-70), show Mr. Mill to have been no fatalist. We have as yet no intimation whatever as to Mill's belief about immortality. And yet he could not have banished all thought of it from his mind. Were there no hours of bitter agony during the long fifteen years that he lived to mourn his unspeakable loss, when the philosopher's heart would give way, and he would feel how willingly, were it possible, he would change places with "the weakest saint," who, strong in faith, could say, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and therefore I too shall live again?" Such moments of weakness, we cannot but think, there must have been, but they could only be moments. The thought that the truth makes us free would alone be sufficient to drive such vain longings from a mind which had never known the yoke of spiritual, of "other worldly" bondage, without the recollection that the Christian belief in an immortal life by no means implies the certainty of an immortality of love. We have not yet met with any explanation of the words, "They which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage," that could be really satisfactory to those who have loved and lost, most of whom would prefer absolute annihilation to an immortality combined with a separation from, or an entire change of feeling towards, their dear ones. Far better than the chance of such change is the creed of Positivism, chilling though it may seem when first presented to us. The Positivist keeps "a solemn silence" as "to the life of sensation or consciousness" hereafter, and is content to know that "not a true life really dies; not a true thought, word, or deed is wasted; not a true being ceases to be." He will be "incorporated, but not absorbed;" he will "live for ever, but in a finer, purer way, with all that is poor and mean in him passing into oblivion, and all that is solid and humane in him deepening in power."\* We have dwelt a little upon this Positivist theory of immortality, because we have a strong suspicion that it would embody Mill's own views on the subject. Of course this is merely an inference, perhaps nothing more than a guess, for, as we said before, we have nothing that deserves the name of evidence on the subject. Though Goethe felt a certainty about the existence of a future life, which Mill was far from entertaining, their

\* From "The Religion of Inhumanity," by Mr. Frederic Harrison, *Fortnightly Review*.

conclusions as to the practical inutility of constantly dwelling upon it were identical. To the students of St. Andrews Mill said : " I do not attempt to instigate you by the prospect of direct rewards, either earthly or heavenly. The less we think about being rewarded in either way the better for us."

Some critics of the Autobiography assume a tone of profound pity for the "monotonous joylessness" of its writer's life, which would be amusing, but for the irritation excited by their extreme presumption. Any solid reason for such a supposition we entirely fail to perceive. Mill certainly was not a jovial, light-hearted man. One does not look for the qualities of a Mark Tapley, a Cheeryble, or a Mr. Pickwick, in a man of such intense earnestness, and such serious views of life and its purposes, who had such deep sympathy with the sorrows, and felt such burning indignation at the wrongs of his fellow-men. But there is no cause for thinking he was an unhappy man. His profession and pecuniary means were favourable to the carrying on of his especial pursuits, and his domestic ties were such as it falls to the lot of few men to be blessed with. His influence and fame increased with his years, and he never lacked devoted friends. He did not look upon the world as an abode of misery, or he would hardly have called it "a world where there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve;" where "every one who has a moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called euviabie."\*

"Is it so small a thing  
To have enjoyed the sun,  
To have lived light in the spring,  
To have loved, to have thought, to have done,

"To have advanc'd true friends, and beat down baffling foes?"†

Finally, his oft-expressed wish, that his last illness might not be a long one, was realized; and to the very last he retained full possession of his glorious intellect. There are not many human beings who obtain a fuller share of happiness than this, though of course no argument is of much avail with those who have come to a foregone conclusion, to the effect that a belief in revealed religion is necessary to a human being's happiness. That the very highest and noblest morality may co-exist with a rejection of all revelation, Mr. Mill's life and writings have given overwhelming proof, and it is to the fact of this being brought so conspicuously before the world in the Autobiography, that we

---

\* "On Utilitarianism."

† Matthew Arnold's "Empedocles."

may attribute the mass of abuse and misrepresentation which, since its publication, have been aimed at its illustrious author.

John Stuart Mill never made Goethe's acquaintance, though they inhabited the same world for twenty-six years; and we may venture to say that they could never have become friends, had they been brought together. Goethe looked upon Bentham as a Radical madman, and Mill was but a spiritualized Bentham, while Mill had a "deep dislike of Goethe's moral character." A wide gulf, which put all sympathy out of the question, separated them on earth, and yet there was, as we have been attempting to show, between these two essentially antagonistic natures, one strong point of union—a genuine love for the human race, and a consequent desire for its improvement—a profound conviction of the truth, as Goethe has finely expressed it, that "the true man is humanity in its entirety, and that the individual can be joyous and happy, then only, when he has the courage to feel himself a part of the great All."



#### ART. IV.—THE ADMIRALTY AND THE NAVY.

*Mr. Ward Hunt's Speech on the Navy Estimates, 1874-5.*

BY chance or design the right thing may be done in the wrong way. To do evil that good may come, is always morally bad, and often worse than merely bad, because it may be a logical blunder. But the good it produces may live on for all that; while the generating evil, and the blunder it marks, may show their vitality only by recoiling on the heads of the actors.

A blunder of this nature was committed on the occasion of the introduction of the Navy Estimates for this year. "A scare" was got up ostensibly to improve the Navy, but in reality for party purposes. The evil had no vitality, but the good it effected was to draw public attention to the state of the Navy; and we hope to intensify and continue that good result by showing that although the reasons assigned were wrong, the conclusion was right.

The attempt at any time to make the Navy a *cheval de bataille* for party warfare is much to be deplored. If something of that patriotic spirit, which to the credit of English political antagonism always characterizes the discussion of our foreign relations, were allowed to enter into the consideration of a question so intimately connected with those relations, it would be as wise as it would be consistent. The clatter made by Mr.

Ward Hunt about a few worn out boilers was very effective no doubt, like stage thunder; and the changes rung upon the necessity to ask the House for a supplementary vote of 150,000*l.* for certain repairs, produced an impression like the marching and counter-marching of a few supernumeraries in a theatrical battle; but between Mr. Hunt's party pyrotechny, and Mr. Childers' personal fencing, the true cause of naval inefficiency was altogether overlooked.

In the debate to which we have alluded, we may easily sift the wheat from the chaff. We may take the political part of it as "sound and fury, signifying nothing." We may dismiss the demand of the members for Dockyard boroughs, for more ships to be built, before we really know whether our latest type will either swim or fight, with the rejoinder of Sganarelle to the goldsmith's suggestion,\* "Vous me conseillez fort bien—*pour vous.*" We may estimate the arguments of place-hunters and party hacks as Burns interpreted the overzeal of the political parson—

"For faith, the birkie wants a manse,  
Sae cannilie he hums them:"—

but we cannot overlook the fact that the whole tone of the debate was low; that it was pervaded by the mistake that the remedy for naval inefficiency is the easy one of expenditure; and that it foreshadows on the part of the Ministry a disposition to return to the heroic policy of building "numbers of ships;" good ones if possible, but under all circumstances plenty of them! Least of all can we ignore the dismal conclusion that our present fleet is only "a paper fleet," and our ironclads, in the main, merely "dummies." We concur in this conclusion, not because a few ships are temporarily laid up for repairs, but because with the exception of a few ships our first line of defence is for all practical security a mockery; and we trace this dismal result, not to the failure of boilers, but to the failure of the system under which our Navy is built, and managed.

The facts we shall adduce will, we believe, clearly prove the anomalous and defective system of the Admiralty administration. The history of the last fifteen years is the detail of failure pointing logically to inherent weakness in the constitution of the governing body. It will show that while our constructive policy has been neither bold enough to confer on the country a real security, nor experimentally cautious enough to prevent inordinate expenditure, it has been so unscientific and merely initiative, as to have left unsolved and unsettled yet, the problem of the

---

\* Molière's "L'Amour Médecin."

best type of war ship. It will show also that in the Constructive department, those who deliberate are practically irresponsible, while those technologically skilled are virtually powerless. And it brings us to the conclusion that the Board of Admiralty controls without knowledge, the Controller manages with no real authority, and that the subordinates work under no stimulus of direct self-interest; in short, that the system is cumbrous, anomalous, and defective, and the result a condition of the Navy which luckily for the future security of the country has produced "a scare"!

The active superintendence of the Admiralty extends over two distinct departments, that of building and repairing the Navy, and that of sailing the fleet—in other words, the Constructive service and the Service afloat.

The estimated expenditure for the present year may be taken as follows:—

| <i>Constructive Service.</i> |                                                                                              |            |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Vote 6.                      | Dockyards ... ..                                                                             | £1,180,326 |
| „ 10.                        | <i>Section 1.</i> —Naval Stores for building, repairing, &c. ... ..                          | 1,143,159  |
|                              | <i>Section 2.</i> —Contract ships and engines ... ..                                         | 707,904    |
| „ 11.                        | New works, machinery, &c. ... ..                                                             | 682,061    |
| „ 13.                        | Law charges (part) ... ..                                                                    | 5,000      |
| „ 14.                        | Miscellaneous (part) ... ..                                                                  | 5,000      |
| „ 3.                         | Admiralty Office (half) ... ..                                                               | 89,033     |
| „ 16.                        | Civil pensions to artificers and part of officers' pensions, being in reality "wages" ... .. | 174,536    |
|                              |                                                                                              | £3,987,019 |
| <i>Service Afloat.</i>       |                                                                                              |            |
| Vote 1.                      | Wages to seamen, &c. ... ..                                                                  | £2,602,757 |
| „ 2.                         | Victuals and clothing ... ..                                                                 | 1,064,264  |
| „ 3.                         | Admiralty Office (half) ... ..                                                               | 89,033     |
| „ 4.                         | Coast Guard, &c. ... ..                                                                      | 163,311    |
| „ 5.                         | Scientific branch ... ..                                                                     | 111,170    |
| „ 7.                         | Victualling yards ... ..                                                                     | 72,885     |
| „ 8.                         | Medical establishments ... ..                                                                | 63,701     |
| „ 9.                         | Marine divisions ... ..                                                                      | 18,720     |
| „ 12.                        | Medicines, &c. ... ..                                                                        | 70,520     |
| „ 13.                        | Martial law, Law charges ... ..                                                              | 10,605     |
| „ 14.                        | Miscellaneous (part) ... ..                                                                  | 108,510    |
| „ 15.                        | Half-pay, active list ... ..                                                                 | 172,759    |
|                              |                                                                                              | £4,548,235 |

The totals represent the portions of the annual cost of the two departments over which the Admiralty has a dispensing and controlling power. The balance of the whole sum voted is for pensions, superannuations, &c. Over this portion death alone, *equo pede*, has any immediate influence.

The importance of our fleet cannot be over-estimated ; but our appreciation of this part of our national defences must go deeper and further than traditional sentiment. The beauty of utility has over-ridden all visual prettiness in the individual ship, and we must further be content to gauge the value of the fleet by what it will do in the hour of need, and not by names, numbers, and mere show. Our position is insular ; we have the largest mercantile marine afloat ; we are the most extensive shipbuilders in the world : and our commerce penetrates to every port on the globe. Should war break out these several interests must look to the Navy for protection ; it is the buckler to guard our shores from invasion, and what else is there to turn back the tide of war to our enemies' waters, and to preserve untarnished the honour of England's flag ? Not in one, but in all respects, therefore, our chief reliance would rest upon the operations of the Navy.

But insular, maritime, and commercial England, with all her pressing necessities, and all her glorious opportunities, has been content, so far, to take a subordinate place in the race of naval improvement. The skill and energy, backed by the vast material resources of this country, have never been allowed to measure her wants and exercise their capabilities *by her own standard*. Native skill has been confined to detail, and our progress has been by fits and starts, under alternate phases of apathy and panic, with no higher aim than to better the best of our weaker neighbours !

The French set us the example of propelling war ships by steam. We, thenceforth, in hot haste, set about the task of converting the sailing ships we were then so proud of, into screw steamers. When we were about to draw breath and felt ready to congratulate ourselves that we had beaten our neighbours at their own game, they doubled upon us with a new idea, and initiated the era of ironclads by the success of *La Gloire*.

First sceptical, then startled, then reckless, we harked back, and set about superseding our new wooden steamers by enormous, but weak ironclads.

Then, having treated Captain Coles, in regard to the turret principle, as prophets are usually treated in their own country ; having no policy but imitation, and distracted by the fact that the country we usually copied clung to broadside ships, while the Americans, whose rivalry we most dreaded, cultivated the Monitor



type, we were, like Issachar, "crouching between two burdens." We dreaded to neglect either, and half-heartedly we have tried, and failed to take up both!

"Wax to receive—(in panic), and marble to retain"—(in obstinacy) our practical translation of the naval motto *semper paratus*, has been *too late*. In 1859, we were struggling to reach the French standard in the development of our steam Navy, and before the end of 1861, we had converted sixteen sailing ships into screw steamers, at a cost of 983,126*l.* But in spite of this best possible evidence of our convictions that no type would answer but steam war ships, in the programme of work for 1861, new wooden sailing vessels were actually ordered to be built.\* It would hardly have been worth while to call attention to this little episode in Admiralty management, had the infatuation stopped here; but while this process was going on, we were positively reconverting wooden screws into armour-plated ships.† Thus we were building sailing ships while we were converting sailing ships into steamers, and while we were laying down and building wooden screws, we were simultaneously pulling wooden screws to pieces to re-convert them into iron-clads, protected by armour plates, already rendered obsolete by improved artillery!

In 1859, notwithstanding our fever of "reconstruction," we were fairly committed to the building of ironclads. Experimental hesitation was for awhile discarded, and by April, 1861, we had four large ships partially protected by 4½ inch plates, completed at a cost of 1,288,788*l.*

In rapid succession followed three more partially protected ships, costing 1,147,329*l.*; and thus, before 1863 had expired, we were enabled to boast of seven huge ironclads afloat, on which we had expended a total of 2,436,117*l.*

Simultaneously we were altering four large wooden screw steamers, upon which we introduced the plan of complete protection, and one partially protected, at an expenditure of 1,419,411*l.*

We were also building three larger ships with 5½ inch armour, but with reduced backing of wood, the combined resisting efficacy of which was stated to be, by the late Chief Constructor, "in all probability at least equal to that of the *Warrior*." They therefore belong to the 4½ inch or *Warrior* class. These vessels cost 1,389,265*l.*

---

\* Eighteen sailing ships were laid down after conversion began, and cost 295,367*l.* Of this amount 165,453*l.* was returned into store. The absolute loss to the country was 129,914*l.*—Mr. Seeley's Committee "Report."

† *Caledonian*, *Ocean*, *Royal Alfred*, *Royal Oak*, and *Prince Consort* were ordered to be altered into armour-clads from May 14th to June 5th, 1861.

From 1863 to 1866 several smaller ships of Mr. Reed's designs were launched, all having 4½ inch plating, and one, the *Bellerophon*, with 6 inch, and costing, with the two small turret ships, bought from the Messrs. Lairds, and one of Captain Coles' design, 2,236,825*l.*

From the year 1859 to 1866, therefore, we built or purchased twenty-five broadsides, and three turret ships, at a total outlay of 7,481,618*l.*, all with one exception having 4½ inch plates, or their equivalent, *and every one of which was as little defended from the guns which were in use during the time of their being built as the old wooden ships were from the 68-pounder!*

The last phase of building in batches was consummated by the late Mr. Corry. In two years, 1867 and 1868, eleven ironclads were commenced. In the "disquieting debate," as it was termed by *The Times*, on the last Navy Estimates, this heroic treatment of the Navy question was pointed to with pride by the dominant party as the *ne plus ultra* of administrative wisdom. It was in this spirit that Mr. Ward Hunt triumphantly asked, "Where should we have been as regarded our fleet, had that policy not been pursued by the late Mr. Corry?" As regards the past, the exultation is harmless; but as an indication of the policy to be pursued by the party now in power, the question is a serious one indeed. Seven of the eleven ships laid down by Mr. Corry were inefficient specimens of an obsolete type. They were broadside ships, and the prevailing weight of opinion of naval architects and seamen was then in favour of turret ships. They were armoured with 6 inch plates, when 6 inch plates had been proved to be incapable of resisting the guns already afloat. They are indeed useful to swell the list of our ironclad ships. They help now to make up a goodly array of tons, guns, horse-power and men afloat. They furnish excellent material for a First Lord's annual "Song of Triumph;" but for fighting purposes they might as well be a part of Homer's catalogue of the Grecian ships.

The remaining four ships commenced by Mr. Corry are on the turret principle, one of them being the ill-fated *Captain*, another the *Hotspur*, whose turret does not revolve, and another the *Glatton*, the latter having 12 inch armour generally.

During the fever of broadside, insufficiently protected ironclad shipbuilding we have described, Captain Coles was persistently urging upon the Admiralty the advantages of his turret system, and was so successful because of his importunity that he induced the authorities to order the *Royal Sovereign* to be converted from a wooden screw into a razeed turret ship. She was finished and tried in 1864, and Captain Sherard Osborne reported her to be "the most formidable vessel of war I have ever been on

board of. She could easily destroy, if her guns were rifled (she had only smooth bore guns and the old wooden carriages) any of our present ironclads, whether of the *Warrior*, *Hector*, or *Research* class. Her handiness, speed, weight of broadside, and the small target she offers, increase tenfold her powers of assault and retreat." In 1867—Mr. Corry's red-letter year—the Controller of the Navy in reporting upon the competitive designs furnished by seven shipbuilding firms, in reply to an Admiralty circular, remarks:—"I have so repeatedly expressed my opinion as to the essential merits and qualities of the turret system of armament, that I am loth to repeat it here; but as I still hold that for coast defences, for the attack of fortresses and arsenals, for inland waters, rivers, &c. &c., the turret system of armament properly designed in vessels known as the *Monitor* type is superior to all others, and the most formidable engine of war that can well be conceived, so I still maintain that combining a sea-going vessel with masts, rigging, and sails, and this kind of armament, entails a sacrifice of a large portion of its efficiency and compels a choice to be made between serious difficulties, the solution of which in a satisfactory manner has not yet been accomplished."

Mr. Reed, in his work on "Our Ironclad Ships," concurs generally in this opinion, but intimates that he nevertheless possessed the key to the solution of the difficulty. He says (p. 229), "The only description of rigged turret ship which I believe would be at all likely to succeed sufficiently to justify its large adoption is one which I contrived at the Admiralty some years ago, but of which no example has yet been built." As to the more important question of the sea-going qualities of turret ships, the *Royal Sovereign* was, in 1864, already afloat, and in commission, and a cruise in heavy weather would have done much to solve this *questio vexata*. But the Admiralty was content to leave the point undetermined. Her calm weather trial was all she was subjected to, and with all her reported good qualities, and with the power which she alone at that time possessed to settle the turret controversy, she was laid aside, and naval architects were thus left to wrangle on.

This is not the only case of neglected opportunity as regards the turret system. The *Captain* and *Monarch*, costing 334,016l., were ordered to be built as sea-going turret ships, in spite of the strong opinions of the Controller and the Chief Constructor. It is just possible, but hardly probable (else why was the *Royal Sovereign* converted at all?) that the case of a converted ship might have been deemed to be an insufficient test. It might therefore be held that a more searching and complete experiment should be made before the important case of turrets *versus*

broadships should be decided, or at least before the best type of turret ship could be determined. The logic of Boards of Admiralty being peculiar, the country could only submit and wait. But surely self-contradiction is substituted for bad logic when, on the eve of conclusive trial of the two new turret ships, and when all controverted points were yet in doubt, the Admiralty resolved to commit the country to the expenditure of 1,000,000*l.* to build four other turret ships respecting which an ex-First Lord of the Admiralty stated at the Institution of Naval Architects (March, 1869), that they were "such as I may say with confidence have never before been heard of!" This decision (to build) seems all the more strange to the unofficial mind, because it was taken, so far as time at least was concerned, in opposition to strongly expressed professional opinion. The following extract from a "circular" addressed to a number of Naval officers, explains itself:—

"You know there is to be a debate in the House about the turret question, on Mr. Samuda's motion, to substitute two turret ships instead of two broadside ships building, without waiting to try the *Captain* and *Monarch* at sea. Mr. Corry would like to have all the information he can on the subject . . . for or against the turret as a sea-going ship."

The following replies were received. Captain Willes writes:— "I think the Admiralty quite right in not substituting two turret ships for the broadside ones in the building programme, until the *Captain* and *Monarch* have been properly tried at sea." Captain Hall "sincerely trusts that no pressure of irresponsible opinion will tempt the Board of Admiralty to order other sea-going turret ships to be built, until the *Monarch* and *Captain* have been fairly and honestly tried, their defects discovered, and improvements suggested." Admiral Yelverton says, "All things considered, I am clearly of opinion that the two turret ships *Captain* and *Monarch* ought to be fairly tested as sea-going ships before we venture on building other vessels of the sort." Rear-Admiral Warden states it to be "quite open to doubt whether it is wise at the present moment to commence building two more turret ships when there are two so near completion, and which will soon be on trial." Captain Foley writes:—"I think it would be extreme folly to do so (*i.e.*, build two more turrets), until such time as the *Captain* and *Monarch* now building have had a trial at sea."

These opinions were lessons of wisdom when they suited party purposes. They enabled a First Lord "to dish" a troublesome opponent. But when applied to purposes of practical guidance they were altogether ignored. It must be borne in mind that the *Captain* and *Monarch* were not only turret ships, but also

fully rigged sea-going turret ships. One desideratum in a sea-going war ship is obviously, that she shall efficiently combine sail power with steam propulsion. It is equally obvious that the possession of this desideratum should not compromise the essential qualities of a fighting ship, nor encounter the risk of dangerous disturbance to her seaworthiness. Coals are a limited element on shipboard, and coals ought to be economized on board a cruiser. But to neutralize the general efficiency of the vessel by the preponderance of one set of considerations, is only the beginning of that chain of reasoning which would never send the ship to sea at all.

Theoretically, we believe, the principle developed in the *Devastation* class of war ship (the four we have adverted to) as an unhampered fighting machine, to be sound. For battle at sea, masts, spars, and rigging are an anomaly. Had steam propulsion preceded that of sails, a proposition to fit up a fighting ship with a small grove of masts and spars, with their maze of ropes and complication of bits, blocks, and fittings, would be very properly scouted as a craze. The whole complication has grown with our apprehension as part of the nature of a ship, not conformable to reason, but to custom and a foregone necessity, and as little to be questioned as the mane and tail of a horse. By the trial of the two-rigged turret ships, light might have been thrown upon this question, and the trial was near at hand. And yet, notwithstanding the strongly expressed and unanimous opinions we have quoted—notwithstanding the importance and difficulty of the problem to be solved, and the imminence of its expected solution, the Admiralty determined to build four large ships dependent solely upon steam propulsion; and for two of them provision was made in the Navy Estimates in March, 1869. The verdict was thus given first and the evidence heard afterwards!\*

We have already said that we believe the theory of mastless

---

\* Sir Spencer Robinson remarks upon this point:—"The several objections made to the design are thus disposed of. They were, first, the necessity of waiting for the trial of the *Captain* and *Monarch*. It has been shown that the trial of these ships will tell us nothing about the new design."—And yet the *Captain* and *Monarch* were built to "ascertain the advantages or disadvantages of central armament in a sea-going ship." (See "Minute of First Lord of the Admiralty with reference to H.M. ship *Captain*.")—The "new design" was stated by Sir S. Robinson himself, March 24th, 1869, at a meeting of the Committee to which a design of the *Devastation* class was submitted, to be "*specially designed as powerful sea-going ships*."—Hence the *Captain* and *Monarch* and the "new design" were classes of ships similar in aim, so far as being "*sea-going*" went. The same end was, however, to be differently attained. Which means of attainment was best, a single experimental ship would have proved. To commit the nation to an outlay of 1,000,000*l.* before proof of any kind was reckless.

unhampered fighting ships to be sound. But we freely admit that in naval matters theory is apt to be disturbed by fact. The incidence of a particular law under certain circumstances may be easily and correctly estimated. But the combined result of the mutual interference of a diversity of laws under varying conditions, is not readily to be determined, if at all, by any *à priori* reasoning. Experiment, trial, experience, gathered it may be through partial success or absolute failure, are necessary steps to naval perfection. Some slight unknown cause may disturb the surest calculations, and no one can be certain of precisely similar qualities even in ships built on identical lines, and sent to sea under the same conditions. The decision, therefore, in the case of the turret ships to act independently of experience, showed an empiricism above and beyond scientific deduction; and the condemnation of this decision is to be found in the supervening caution which modified portions of the design of some, and altogether changed the conditions of others, of the four "never before heard of" ships.\*

During the fifteen years the ship building operations of which we have reviewed, we find distinct processes of building, reconstruction, conversion and supercession, *each overlapping the other*, and all crowned by waste and failure. We have noted some of the most important steps taken in direct opposition to the most competent technical and professional authorities; and we have seen in the face of doubt and controversy that the means to remove that doubt, and terminate such controversy, were overlooked and neglected. The results we may summarize in the words of Mr. Ward Hunt. We have obtained a magnificent ironclad "*paper fleet*;" our ships are "*dummies*," and not "*real and effective*." But this result is due, not as he puts it, because they are under repair, or even worn out, but because they always were intrinsically worthless for fighting purposes. His remedy is to build—build! Where should we have been (he asks) if Mr. Corry had not given us a number of 6 inch plated ships? The inference therefore is that he will, as soon as he can, lay down a number of the best ships according to the lights of Admiralty

---

\* Not only were such ships "never before heard of" as regards their absence of masts, but they also initiated a principle never before heard of amongst Boards of Admiralty—viz., "that the defensive armour, if carried at all, must be able to resist the artillery it was likely to meet!" This is a naïve confession for a Controller to make in 1869. Startling as it is, we might have ascribed the neglect of such a principle as that protected ships should be protected, to the fact that Boards of Admiralty had no technical knowledge of the subject, were it not for the astounding statement which follows—viz., "*This great and valuable concession on the part of the Admiralty was not obtained without great resistance!*"—Memorandum by Sir Spencer Robinson on New Designs for Ironclad Ships. "Appendix to Report of Committee on Designs."

experts, which ships the general experience of the last fifteen years fairly proves, will be obsolete before they are launched !

With such a result before us, and knowing Mr. Hunt's interpretation of the lesson it conveys, it is worth while to trace the cause. No argument should be needed to show that to insure an effective Navy, and to dispense economically the vast sum this branch of our service annually absorbs, a competent knowledge of the processes and results this outlay is intended to work out is required. Shipbuilding is essentially one of the most complicated and recondite of all constructive arts. It requires the artist's eye, the mathematician's analysis, and the technical skill of the mechanician. No one can direct the varied agencies employed in shipbuilding without a certain amount of professional training ; or can accomplish its aims, and utilize the materials employed, without the practical aptitude which can only be obtained from a familiarity with the details and management of a well organized establishment.

The country possesses five of the largest shipbuilding and repairing establishments in the world. The fixed capital is not far short of 10,000,000*l.*, and the average quantity of material kept in stock was four and three-quarters millions when timber which required seasoning was used ; and now in the days of iron building, about two and a half millions, for the production of work worth some 4,000,000*l.* annually.

To conduct with economy and efficiency constructive establishments so extensive, and to deal with sums so vast, common sense would surely say, "obtain at any cost the highest possible professional ability, and endow it with full and direct personal responsibility." Only the most disastrous joint-stock incapacity, or ignorance the most crass, or indifference the most fatuous, could suggest—*à priori*—the possibility of entrusting these vast, varied, and complex interests to the control of a shifting political body, bereft of all professional training !

But what is the fact ?

The absolute and responsible superintendence of the shipbuilding and repairing departments of the Navy (as distinguished from the political and financial departments and the service afloat) is put into the hands of a board, not one member of which is required to have undergone, or to possess any professional training.\* None of the members of the Admiralty has had, or was expected to acquire any practical acquaintance with the

---

\* "I never did feel at the Admiralty that I had either the knowledge, or the control, or the responsibility which I think the Minister who is the head of so great a department ought to have."—Sir John Pakington : "Evidence before Committee on the Board of Admiralty," p. 179.

designing or building of sea-going ships. The permanent practical but irresponsible head of the five gigantic shipbuilding establishments of the country—the Controller—has always been *not a naval architect, or civil engineer, or mechanician, but a seaman*. The chief superintendents of all these establishments are also seamen, whose professional training has been at sea, superintending sailors, not shipwrights; engaged in navigating, not in constructing, ships of war!

It is no answer to these statements of fact, that the highest technical skill may be, and probably is, obtained in the subordinate departments, and that this also takes place in large private establishments. Principals in private firms are, as a rule, masters of their business, which from its constitution a Board of Admiralty is not.\* They possess the digestive and assimilative function. They hire capable managers to supplement their own brains with efficient hands. They hear, and see, and at times consult, but they have the trained capacity to *form their own opinions, use their own judgments, and determine their own course*. If the members of a Board of Admiralty acted with the vigour and independence of partners in private establishments, in the exercise of their own judgments, the inevitable result would be to dislocate or deadlock the whole system. If, on the other hand, they merely endorse and register the opinions of subordinate advisers, the result is likely to be equally disastrous by taking away all responsibility to Parliament and the country from those who practically govern in Whitehall.

Mr. Goschen explained the Admiralty theory of personal responsibility (July, 1872), stating that Mr. Childers "had made every man responsible for his own work." But to whom? If a servant acts on his own conviction, he is responsible to his master for such acts; but if a servant advises his master to take or permit a certain course, and the master after inquiry and consideration adopts that advice, the servant clearly shifts the onus upon his superior. He may lose prestige in case of failure, and his opinion in future have less weight; but direct punishment or censure is out of the question. And as Mr. Childers' system was to gather the power to decide into his own hands, and as he did so decide, we cannot understand the co-existence of inferior personal responsibility under any fair interpretation of the term. On the other hand, let the theory be what it may, no one supposes that a civilian unprofessional First Lord is

---

\* We speak, of course, of the Constructive Service only. The Board of Admiralty is composed as follows:—First Lord, First Naval Lord, Third Lord and Controller (since separated), Junior Naval Lord, Civil Lord; or two Civilians, and three Naval Members. The professional constructive element is entirely absent.



responsible for the structural errors of any ship, or class of ships, and the First Lord must know it. The mind's eye rests at once upon the skilled adviser; and the colourless theoretical responsibility serves no other purpose than to round off a sentence in a party speech. It is to this absence of knowledge in those who decide, and to the elimination of responsibility from those who advise, an arrangement at once weak, irritating, and anomalous, that we may in a great measure ascribe the tissue of continuous waste and error which has produced our present costly, but useless fleet. This system we condemn, without in the remotest degree blaming the individuals who are the component parts of that system. Moreover, in justice to the naval profession, some of whose members' lines have fallen into pleasant Admiralty places, it must be said, that in general intelligence, and in the command of mental resources in emergencies, no other profession is superior. But the argument is simply this: that common sense people don't go to a clever lawyer to cure their ailments, nor to a medical celebrity to teach their children; and in the case before us the absurdity may be brought home, by supposing a smart foreman shipwright to be made captain of an ironclad, or Mr. Barnaby to be offered the command of the Channel Fleet.

But, "not to be worst, stands in some stead of praise." Bad as our case may be, we are told to take heart of grace because all other nations are worse. We have had the argument, *ad nauseam*, that our fleet is more numerous, more powerful, and more efficient than all the navies put together of all the world. We are told, to reassure the timid, and to make bolder the bold, that we have thirty-six broadside ironclads, one ram, and thirteen turret ships; in all, fifty armour-plated ships afloat, and five building. But quite independently of the boiler epidemic, there are, as we have already intimated, "disquieting" influences at work which will upset the numerical value of this imposing array. Mr. Reed was not far from the mark when in his letter to the *Times* of October 21, 1872, he said:—"In these times of rapid change, superiority lies mainly in the growing power of *individual ships*, and while even a single power may easily surpass you, the simultaneous construction of very powerful (individual) ships, in several navies, may rapidly jeopardize your position." We may add to this an opinion as to the peculiarity of that individual power—namely, that it gives not only a superiority of *aggressive force*, but of *simultaneous defensive security*. Mr. Reed has permitted his imagination to realize the possibility of the Russian "bogey"—the *Peter the Great*, when finished, and if a success, steaming into English ports. Of course, before she could penetrate our harbours, our civilian First Lord would order

out the whole of our 4½ inch plated ships, aided by our 6 inch plated ships, and backed up by our few 7 inch, 8 inch, and 9 inch plated ships. These altogether would make up a total of forty-one, out of our redoubtable fifty.

Now if we suppose the *Peter the Great* to have on board four Krupp guns, equal to our Woolwich infants—(or, as there is, according to Mr. Goschen, something bogeyish or myth-like about this formidable vessel *in posse*, let us come home to a reality like our own *Devastation*)—what could a vessel of this individual power desire more ardently than that the whole of our ironclad fleet should flock out to give her a warm reception? “*One butcher does not fear many sheep*,” says the old Greek proverb—except not to be able to catch them!—and here, like the Royalists before Cromwell’s “Ironsides”—“the Lord has delivered them into his hand.” Every time her four formidable guns were discharged, the sides, and probably the bottoms also, blown outwards, of four of our magnificent *Warriors* would be smashed like glass, and short shrift be allowed to ships and men; and every time our splendid ships concentrated their broadsides upon their enemy, all the shells which did not miss the small target she would present, would drop from her sides, to use a simile of Robert Hall’s, “like soft peas thrown against a hard rock.” And whenever such unhandy vessels attempted to ram their adversary, he would simply show them a light pair of heels (screws), get out of their way, and thank them for thus making his own shot more certain and deadly.

Let us change the scene. Suppose in the plenitude of our nominal power, and with the perversity of infatuation, we send thirty-six broadside sheep (should war break out) to blockade the ports of America, with the infallible result of keeping away their cotton from our Lancashire spindles. We should no doubt, if we succeeded, embarrass our adversaries, and renew for ourselves the fearful tragedy of the Cotton Famine. But should we succeed? Imagine our huge, weak, unwieldy broadsides, after a month’s passage over the Atlantic, and after a month’s cruise off New York; with a precarious supply of coal, and bottoms so foul as to lose two to three knots per hour of speed. Imagine also, our keen-witted, energetic opponents improvising a series of single heavy guns, mounted on small craft of the *Sturunch* type, and with a crew just sufficient to work them. On the one side would be an almost invisible speck, on the other a series of the most magnificent targets human ingenuity could put before a gunner’s aim at sea. Here we should have the modern realization of the ancient proverb—the “one butcher”—and the helpless flock of “many sheep.” Were the flock to scatter, where would be the blockade? Were they, with the devoted courage of the

British seaman, to hold on to the duties prescribed to them by British political wisdom, we have only to realize the effect of a 1000lbs. shell bursting in their weakly sides from a distance (if weather permitted) of over six miles,\* and converting first one and then another of our "powerful fleet" into the vast slaughter-houses Mr. Cobden truly said that the old wooden three-deckers would be made by the 68-pounder shells! Send our sea-going broadsides into the Baltic—pit them against Cronstadt—set them to destroy the German arsenals: could they better the effects of the fleet under Sir Charles Napier, or overcome the torpedo defences that paralysed the French fleet in 1871? Could they even seal up the war ships of our enemy, and so protect our commerce, for would not this be renewing the same farce as the supposititious blockade of New York?

We have already dealt with the argument founded upon the comparative strength of our own and foreign navies by showing (in reversion of the mechanical axiom that the weakest part of a structure is the measure of its fullest strength), that the most powerful individual ship is the co-efficient of the effective strength of a whole fleet. In other words, the multiplication of weak elements in a navy gives no practical addition of strength; or to put the case more clearly, the relative power of two antagonistic fleets would be determined *ceteris paribus* by the absence of weak ships.

So far back as 1862 the relative effect of guns and plates was well known from experiment. Mr. Scott Russell, one of the designers of the *Warrior*, summed up, in a paper read before the Institution of Naval Architects, in 1863, the evidence as follows:—

| Thickness of plate. |     | equal to | Weight of shot.       |
|---------------------|-----|----------|-----------------------|
| 4½ inches           | ... | ...      | 68 lbs.               |
| 6½ "                | ... | "        | 135 lbs.              |
| 7½ "                | ... | "        | 200 lbs.— 6½ ton gun. |
| 8½ "                | ... | "        | 270 lbs.              |
| 10 "                | ... | "        | 400 lbs.—18 ton gun.  |
| 11 "                | ... | "        | 500 lbs.              |
| 12 "                | ... | "        | 600 lbs.—25 ton gun.  |

Since that time the improvement in the making up of powder has increased the initial velocity considerably, and the relation between the two may be roughly estimated as the square of the thickness of the resisting plate. Our numerous 4½ inch armoured ships, therefore, represent a resisting capacity of 20: Mr. Corry's model broadside 6 inch batch, one of 36. The *Monarch* creeps

\* "Statement of Sir J. Whitworth."

up to 49, and the *Hercules*, a most redoubtable broadside specimen of Mr. Reed's design, gets up to 81. Then comes the "individual ship," the *Devastation*, which realizes 144. The *Fury* will reach 196; and the *Inflexible* is the commentary upon and condemnation of all of them, for she attains to a defensive capacity from her 24 inch plates of 576! Hence the resisting strength now considered safe and necessary is nearly twenty-nine times as great as that of the bulk of our ironclad fleet.

While armour is being thickened artillerists are not idle. Sir William Armstrong has stated that the Elswick Company would accept orders for rifled guns of 14 inch calibre, throwing shot of *half a ton weight*, with a charge of 224lbs., and to pledge their reputation on the success of the undertaking. Sir Joseph Whitworth has expressed his conviction that with an 11 inch bore his new breech-loader would penetrate armour 16 inches thick at 1000 yards.\*

The Report of the Committee on Designs states that "Guns able to pierce 20 inch and 24 inch armour are doubtless within the resources of science, and even the latter thickness may not continue impenetrable;" and the 80 ton gun contemplated in the Woolwich factory will no doubt bear out these opinions in practice.

To set against this witheringly conclusive evidence of the uselessness of our present fleet, we have to notice two arguments. 1st, that the ships may prove effective as rams; and 2nd, that they may effectually damage their more powerful adversaries by a "concentrated fire."

We believe the ram, whenever and wherever *it could be put to use*, would be the most effective mode of dealing with an antagonist at sea. The crushing effect of 5000 to 10,000 tons delivering a blow at a velocity of ten to fourteen miles per hour, would be enormous. The few known cases of ramming have been cases of entire destruction of the rammed ships. The essential difference of an immense weight, moving at a small velocity, as compared with one of a small weight, at a high velocity, is that of a tremendous squeeze compared with a sharp punching blow. The effect of a puncture is local; that of a crush may injure the whole ship's side; and without perforation, so damage it as to cause the ship to sink from leakage.

But "first catch your hare" is a good maxim. We believe the cases in which such ships as the *Minotaur* could catch their hare to deliver a ramming blow of full effect would be few indeed. We believe that no case of such opportunity would ever

---

\* "Letters from Sir William Armstrong and Sir J. Whitworth, addressed to Chairman of Committee to Examine the Designs upon which Ships of War have recently been constructed."—Report, 1872.

present itself, except when a ship might be so disabled that it would be cruelty to take advantage of it. Before the attack could be made, the ship must move through space enough to acquire full speed, and a vigilant adversary would have ample time to evade the blow, or escape the effects by moving *in the same direction*. A swifter and more ready vessel might even turn the tables on her foe; for ramming is a game two can play at, and victory would surely remain with the vessel which, in addition to superior manœuvring qualities, was stronger in fabric and more heavily armed. If, therefore, one of our largest iron-clads were to risk the cast of the die, and escaped being sunk by 30 ton guns *as she approached*, she inevitably would be sent to the bottom, when she had aimed and missed her blow!

To answer the second argument, we may call an experienced officer, Captain Scott, as a witness.\* He says:—

“The size of a gun is of vast importance, more than is generally assigned to it, and for this reason—twenty guns, each 1-pounder, are fired at a target of iron  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inch thick, and produced no effect; one gun, a 20-pounder, is fired and smashes it, the velocity in both cases being equal; in both cases the same amount of metal is used, and on this principle an official record of experiments at Portsmouth states that one 68-pounder produced more destruction than five 32-pounders. Arguing from this, it appears that one 150-pounder is more effective than ten 68-pounders, one 330-pounder is equal to seven 150-pounders, and a broadside of three 330-pounders is more destructive than ten and a-half *Warriors*” (then carrying twenty 68-pounders).

If this be correct, and no doubt it is so in the *principle* it enunciates, we may fairly repeat our former inference that a *Devastation*, with an all round fire of four 700-pounders, could with her speed keep out of range of, and by her strength defy if within range, the “concentrated fire” of the comparatively numerous ineffective guns of our weakly armoured ships; while, choosing her time and opportunity, she could successively smash and sink the whole lot of them. In fact, the best use of a “concentrated fire” would be to make smoke, under cover of which, like the cuttle fish, our magnificent fleet might escape!

The errors we have reviewed arising from the anomalous composition of our Naval Administration, is narrowed but intensified in the management of the Dockyards. Taking into account the constitution of the managing body, let us apply this practical test:—Would any sane capitalist think of investing his money in a private company to be so constituted and managed? What dividend would he expect? How long would bankruptcy be

---

\* “Remarks made at the Royal United Service Institution in 1863.” These remarks are quoted without being fully endorsed by Mr. Reed.

staved off? Would the "honour and glory," the "regardless of expense," or the "independence" excuse for bad management and wasteful expenditure, be admitted? Or would the idea that the business could ever be left to the effect of a conspiracy of private firms to pass off bad materials, scamped workmanship, or extravagant prices be entertained?

The "honour and glory" argument may be put at once into Carlyle's category of "dinner and wine and one cheer more." The "independent" theory is answered by the logic of facts. Government now is as dependent for the raw materials, as they would be, if they ceased entirely to be manufacturers on their own account. The notion of being "independent" of the rest of the community is only less absurd in degree than the idea that prices can be regulated otherwise than by the operation of known laws. When ships are to be built, the materials must be bought, and the quality of iron ranges from "Wednesbury sham dam" to "Swedish charcoal." Hemp must be purchased to make rope, and "Government examination" is not a phrase whereby to conjure. Wheat is not of homogeneous excellence, and the corn market must be resorted to if bakers be ever so roguish or traders generally be so cunning as to subvert economic science in the market value as to the price and quality of ship biscuit.

There are comprised in the generic term Dockyard establishment, no less than thirty-three distinct trades, so separate and unique, as to require special balance sheets. Many of them, no doubt, are legitimate and economical adjuncts to a shipbuilding and repairing establishment; but a considerable number are carried on to insure the best quality of the article required;—in other words, to evade imposition. But in these, as in all instances, the quality of workmanship and materials is a question of *efficient superintendence*; and satisfactory results may as easily be obtained outside of, as within the limits of the Dockyard walls. Human nature is the same within, as beyond those limits. Incapacity, or carelessness, or the curse of "the itching palm" are not local, nor are they class evils, nor is such corruption fastidious as to the objects whereupon it fastens. In the purchase and approval of raw materials, or in the overlooking or passing of "scamping" in contract work, equally eligible opportunities present themselves. It is, therefore, as idle as reckless to make sweeping comparisons founded upon exceptional cases, and to condemn whole classes of honourable traders, because amongst them, as everywhere, black sheep may exist.

But the argument founded upon quality is proved to be practically inapplicable by the fact that the most complicated and expensive parts of a ship's equipment, and upon the excellence of which their safety and efficiency most pressingly depend, are,

and always have been, bought from private makers, and not manufactured under the *quasi* superintendence of the Board of Admiralty. Steam engines, chronometers, ship's pumps, sailcloth, and anchors and cables might be scamped more easily than ship's hulls—but has it ever been surmised that the satisfaction expressed in the report of the Committee of Enquiry as to the supply of steam engines was false in fact, or erroneous in judgment? Is it anticipated, with respect to any of the necessaries enumerated, that in time of war, or in any period of enlarged demand, the price will not be fairly regulated by the well ascertained law of supply and demand? Is it to be credited that long established firms of high character are not to be trusted by Government as they are daily trusted by the public?

In the days of wooden ships the exigency of seasoning oak frames, and the exceptional sizes of the scantling used for ships of war, made it a matter of necessity that the Admiralty should undertake the building of such ships. But the use of iron has changed all that. No large stock is needed, no seasoning being required. The sizes of scantling can be ordered when wanted, and the quality can be specified to the makers and tested when required by private builders, as well as by Government. The quality of workmen in any trade is an average item throughout the trade. The variations of workmanship, above and below the average, depend in the long run upon management, and upon the *esprit de corps* maintained in particular establishments. As is the head of any concern, so will be the workmen, as to skill, care, honesty, and industry.\* An idle workman is, *ceteris paribus*, a bad workman, and his work becomes deteriorated—and in all particulars the searching, energetic, interested management of individuals must, in the end, produce results which may be fairly supposed to contrast favourably with Government establishments devoid of (if we may use the term) all *selfish* stimulus in superintending *the workmen*.

“My Lords” know nothing of the technicalities of the trades they are appointed to direct;—and their average official existence being only two years, they have no chance of acquiring any but a dangerous smattering of their new occupation. Their visits of inspection are solemn farces, seen through and understood by all concerned.

---

\* “The variations in the cost of labour expended upon sister ships in different dockyards, can only be thus accounted for. The *Pearl*, at Woolwich, cost 10,520*l.*; while the *Cadmus*, a precisely similar vessel, cost only 7310*l.* The *Shannon*, at Portsmouth, cost 5510*l.*, and the sister ship *Chesapeake* cost, at Chatham, no more than 3197*l.* At the same yard the *Mersey* cost 14,842*l.*, and the *Orlando*, at Pembroke, 19,503*l.* Mr. Large, Assistant-Surveyor, after inquiry, ‘could assign no cause.’”—Mr. Seeley’s Committee, 1868.

The permanent heads of each of these great congeries of workshops, have probably distinguished themselves by their courage and skill at sea; and hence the fact of their appointment is *prima facie* evidence of the prevailing idea that professional constructive skill is needless. Responsibility being effectively eliminated from all subordinates, the only self-interest at work is that of salaries paid; and promotion depends quite as much, if not more, upon the negative merit of keeping things pleasant, as upon making progress. Why should any one peril a comfortable position by a restless activity? Why should any one change smiles to frowns, from thankless attempts at improvement? *Quieta non movere* is the maxim of a subordinate public official, and the result is *stagnation*.

We have no hesitation, therefore, in saying that the Dockyard establishments, moving in the grooves of routine, complicated in details, lacking responsibility as to results, deficient in technical headship, and unstimulated by self-interest, cannot compete in economical management with the more delicately sensitive organization of private establishments, possessing as they do a mobile adaptive capacity, and pervaded by a dominant spirit of profit-making and emulative progress.

Next, there is the question of the purchase of the raw material. Can Government buy in the long run as cheaply as individuals? Any exact comparison, dealing as it must do with the shifting prices of various markets, would be difficult if not impossible. But there are certain general and significant indications which show that the tendency is much in favour of individual over corporate action. A knowledge of human nature, and a realization of the practical details of business, point very clearly to the verdict in favour of a bargain driven in favour of a man's own pocket, as compared with a system working for the remote and unacknowledged, if ever understood, advantage to that abstract, thankless entity—the public. Had it been otherwise, making due allowance for the enervating moral influence of technically ignorant headship, could it have happened that 6500*l.* would have been paid for anchors, above the known market rates of first-class fabricators, and that an unnecessarily high price would have been paid for chain cables unquestioned *for eight years*? Why did we supply coal to foreign Governments abroad at a dead loss; and what does the history of the Teak market prove when prices were, by a too sudden demand, run up from 8*l.* to 9*l.* per load, to 12*l.* to 13*l.*?\* When Mr. Baxter applied the pruning-knife to the natural but costly growth of a loose system, he reduced the staff of the Store department from

---

\* "Mr. Seeley's Committee on Admiralty Accounts, 1868."



twenty-six persons to seven, at a saving of 4752*l.* out of a total of 6443*l.*\* It by no means follows that the same excisive effect could be produced throughout the entire organization, but it does clearly prove that there is in that organization none of the self-adjusting capacity to prevent waste and to remedy abuse possessed by a private establishment. A thoroughly energetic and decisive man of business like the late Financial Secretary may make here and there a beneficial alteration ; but nothing but a radical change of constitution in an effete system can give a permanent effect to such changes, and put the cumbrous, complicated system of our Dockyards on an economical equality with private establishments. *And the principle of that change must be to narrow the area of constructive action, under a more simple arrangement of trained management.*

It is said that Government produces at cost price, and that a private firm works for a profit over and above that cost price. It is said that the cost of building similar ironclads is less in the Government yards than the price charged by contractors. No doubt the fact is so as regarded *the commencement* of iron ship-building in the Dockyards. Everything was new, and emulation and *esprit de corps* not the least novelties. But we doubt its duration. A system which is radically illogical and practically inefficient can hardly be expected to produce good fruit continuously. It may be galvanized into a temporary activity, but the old lethe of habit will steal over the body again, and in the long run that which is noted as profit to the private builder, marks simply the difference between the working of the two systems. In the one case it is waste, unproductive and mischievous. In the other it is wealth created and diffused, and the community that pays it ultimately benefits. It promotes trade, employs labour, spreads enjoyment, and becomes the productive germ under the name of Capital, acting and reacting for the creation of further wealth. On the other hand, the difference is absolutely lost. It represents unused energies, wasted means—is in effect the talent wrapped in a napkin, to the injury of the whole community.

We have already intimated that the remedy for the evils arising from the present system is radically to transmute that system into one more simple and conformable to common sense.

“The strongest pinion in wisdom’s wing  
Is the memory of past folly,”

and the sooner the technical departments of the Constructive Service are under trained professional headship, the wiser it will

---

\* “Evidence before Lords’ Committee on the Board of Admiralty, 1871.”

be. The sooner also the Lords of the Admiralty contract all subsidiary manufactures about which they know nothing whatever, ranging as they do from hemp spinning to the grinding of pepper and mustard, the better for their dignity and for the practical efficiency of the service. And the more they restrict the operations of the Dockyards to the repairing of the Navy, and the more they foster the private shipbuilding (*i.e.* ship producing) power of the country, the stronger and readier England will be to meet the exigences of war with an efficient Navy.

The functions of a marine police have been assigned to the Navy, as a duty in time of peace to be discharged in all parts of the world, principally by the use of the small wooden vessels, upon which we have been so busy of late, expending large sums of money. How little creditable to the dignity of England, and how useless for an assured protection, in cases of political difficulty, a force so constituted really is, may be gathered from the fact that a single small Spanish ironclad made Admiral Dundas "swallow the leek" at the bombardment of Callao, in 1866. Had that officer not been sensible enough to have seen that "discretion is the best part of valour," every ship of his squadron would have been sunk or burnt and the country involved in war. In the present state of naval development it is manifestly impossible that in all parts, at all times, and under all circumstances, we can maintain a superior force to that which by accident or design any truculent nation may choose to send out for any particular purpose. Whatever force we maintain will be known; and upon the hypothesis that the "individual ship" of superior offensive and defensive power is more than a match for many weaker ships, such known force (particularly if of wood) may easily be overmatched by second or third-rate powers. *Hence a force which is useless, except to be always ready for contingent action, and which, when that contingency arises, is morally certain to be powerless, is a mockery, a delusion, and a snare.*

Were England, however, *primarily*, to rely upon her moral force, sending her ships like sentries, or single policemen, as outposts and indications only of the majesty of a restrained power;—if her calm self-confidence and assertion in this respect were like Talbot's—

"I am but shadow of myself!"—

then such heraldry and foreshadowing of her pent-up might need not entail upon the country an annual charge of over 3,000,000*l.* The foreign stations and establishments, which were necessary in the days of sailing ships and before ocean telegraphic communication was invented, are unneeded when a message from the antipodes can reach this country in a few hours, and steam

propulsion can send with certainty a measured force to cope with a defined difficulty.

The click of the electric needle would thus summon the unquestioned means of reparation, or punishment, as the horn of Talbot did his hardy soldiers; and, like him, her representative might soon point to an ample force and say—

“These are my substance, sinews, arms, and strength,”

and prevent opposition as a hopeless folly. If any difficulty arose with Brazil, for example, after she has obtained the iron-clad now building for her on the Thames, how else could that difficulty be met? Not by any wooden force which any foreign station could send to uphold the dignity and majesty of this country (and to revert to the broader question)—certainly not by any of our broadside ironclads, be they at home or abroad. If we make no hollow show of force, there can be no indignity in calmly waiting the arrival of that which is real and sufficient. But before we turn remonstrance into action, let our ships be at least able to cope with those of our adversaries. Let it not be after England's flag has been trailed and soiled in dishonour, and after boast and bluster to some third or fourth-rate power;—or, a thousand times worse, when it has been steeped in the blood of her sons, self-sacrificed, because death was to them preferable to a stinging disgrace—that the might and majesty of England is to be asserted. The true spirit of the *Civis Romanus sum* is to be upheld, not by a palpable delusion, but by the illimitable reserve of a mighty nation's dormant strength. The imagination always embodies more terrible issues than the bald reality. The averted face of Aristides indicates more passionate sorrow than the ablest artist's most laboured delineation; and it would be more consonant with the traditions of England's dignity,—safer for the avoidance of petty warfare,—and better for the security of the commercial interests of her citizens, that she should exact compensation by the occasional, even if deferred putting forth, once for all, of a sufficient force. Let her build up her *moral force* by clearly showing that, although tardy, she could and would on all occasions resort to real force, if necessary.

England, in common with other nations, appoints diplomatic representatives in all European courts, and to many Governments in other quarters of the world; and in all trade emporiums she has her consular agents. But does she therefore send a military force to be near to and within the call of each and all of these representatives? Why, then, at least for any political good likely to ensue, does she think it advisable to keep on foreign stations a force of ships too large for economy and a force, when wanted for action, too small for practical use? We may with

advantage protect our commerce in Chinese waters against pirates; we may try to put down slavery; and we may look after missionaries and coerce barbarians in the Fiji Islands or elsewhere; but as regards civilized governments and established trade, the exhibition of an armed force is a menace only likely to bring matters to the worst issue with any high-spirited nation.

The tendency of scientific improvement in warships is to reduce the number of men required. This was the gist of Mr. Reed's speech on the estimates. "Ironclads cost double the money, and carry half the number of men." His facts are correct, but the conclusion that the basis ought to be the *men*, not the ships, is undoubtedly wrong. If there be a criterion, it ought to be the ships and guns required; and the number of men necessary to work them can then be adjusted. It may further be observed that a considerable number of the diminished crews now carried by the ironclads are *stokers*, not *sailors*: and stoking may be readily learnt. Gunnery is a skilled occupation, but a first-class turret ship carries only four guns, much of the handling of which may be effected by subordinates. We think lightly, therefore, of any argument that calls for additional ships to be built that the 46,000 blue jackets and 14,000 marines voted in the estimates, and costing no less than 3,666,000*l.*, may find something to do.

To man the Navy has always been a bugbear: but the new axiom that the most powerful ship, offensive and defensive, is the true index to naval superiority, will remove all anxiety as to the finding men enough in time of war. If the power of the "individual ship" will not suffice to remove doubt on this head, the torpedo, which inevitably must play an important part in the next naval war, ought to dissipate that doubt entirely. The *Inflexible*, with her 24 inch armour and possible 80 ton guns, is the *reductio ad absurdum* of our work of the past fifteen years; and the torpedo is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the projected defensive power of the *Inflexible*.

We have no desire to encumber our argument with vain speculations as to the possibility of war, or the course war would take, if it did break out, beyond this:—That if *we* declare war we shall have to solve the most puzzling State question of the last twenty years, viz., *what to attack?*\* and if war be declared

---

\* It is impossible to shut out of sight the fact that while science is perfecting, loudly and imperiously, new modes of warfare, religion and civilization are not less working silently but effectually, both to mitigate its evils and to obviate its possibility. Private property and individual life are now fairly assured *on land*; and the same humane and just feeling cannot long be inoperative as regards naval operations. The seizure of private ships and private property at sea is a remnant of barbarism and savours of piracy; bombardment, except of arsenals, is cruelty; and blockade, simply suicidal.

against us—a question second only in difficulty will arise, viz., how to preserve our 4½ inch plated broadside ironclads? In all seriousness, in regard to the latter difficulty, we venture to offer this suggestion, that they should be immediately sunk in all harbour approaches as the best defensive use to which they can be put!

We adhere unreservedly to the proposition that we should at all times be prepared for war. Our interests are too vast and vital to be left to the tender mercies of unscrupulous and encroaching nations. England is too much the object of envy and jealousy to be able to ignore the malice such envy and jealousy may engender. Without being either optimists or alarmists respecting international relations, we look upon the beautiful sentiment of universal brotherhood and peace upon earth, as we look upon the Christian injunction to offer the other cheek to the smiter. In neither case ought we to offer facilities for aggression;—in both we ought to restrain lawless and unworthy passion. We hold, therefore, that to be prepared to defend ourselves, which means also, to be ready to punish insult and injury designed to bring about war, is State wisdom, and a social duty. But what is meant by being prepared? It is because we are thoroughly impressed with the necessity to be ready for the worst, *in the best and only practical way*, that we protest against the ineffectual preparation of the last fifteen years, and doubly protest against the renewal of the farce as proposed recently in the House of Commons. The meaning of the late debates is that the Ministry, in condemning, will reverse the policy of the late Administration, as to the tentative building of ironclads. The late Admiralty had a legacy of weak broadside ships left them to finish; but besides this, their action was wise and prudent, in so far as it was cautious and experimental, in working out the problem of the best type of war ship. Under this policy, prudently carried on by Mr. Goschen, we have left the expensive, bit-by-bit improvement process, born of a bigger gun, or set in motion to imitate the French, and in the case of the projected *Inflexible*, a bolder reliance upon science was initiated, instead of precedent, to ascertain the limits of armour defence. The plates of this ship will be 24 inches thick, double those of the *Devastation*; and with her the sound principle has been acted upon, not that a thicker size of plate than the preceding ship possessed was necessary to exceed her standard, *but that the utmost limit of plate dimension, capable of being worked, should, ipso facto, be adopted.*

Mr. Barnaby, Chief Naval Architect, in describing the *Inflexible* at the Institution of Naval Architects, last March, stated: "My belief is that in the *Inflexible* we have reached the extreme limit in thickness of armour for sea-going ships." . . . . "In the

*Inflexible* provision has been made, both offensively and defensively, for an enormous increase in the powers of artillery, without any increase in the cost of the ship." She is intended to carry four guns of 80 tons each, and the provision alluded to is to enable her to carry guns of double that size. We do not agree with Mr. Barnaby that we have reached the extreme limit in thickness of armour. It may be true that twenty-four inches is the greatest thickness at which *sound* iron plates can be rolled. It may also be true that layers of iron plates do not yield the maximum effect due to the weight of material; but it is perfectly clear that two plates of twenty-four inches will resist impact better than one, and it is equally clear that if one plate of twenty-four inches can be worked on to the vessel's side, there can be nothing to baffle the power and skill of the mechanic to bend and adjust another plate of equal thickness over the first. The power to carry any thickness of armour whatever is a question of water displacement and of constructive strength, and to these there can be no assignable limits. If, therefore, any adequate motive should exist for carrying four feet or even six feet of iron, the increased size of hull and the cheapest mode of obtaining increased displacement at the least expenditure of material, may be obtained by elliptical or even circular ships. Hence on all accounts we think Mr. Barnaby too confident in his opinion as to the limit of armour protection, even for sea-going vessels. The corollary, however, from the absence of limit to the thickness of armour defence, is to give up the mad race between guns and armour, the real issue of which can only be fairly tested by a battle at sea, to *entirely discard armour, and trust to speed alone, for all sea-going vessels*. We are now precisely *parva componere magnis*, in the position in which the fighting world was placed, when the contest raged between leaden balls and steel corslets. Our ancestors were wise enough to act upon what was sufficiently clear to common sense. Activity was held to be preferable to a fictitious security, and body armour was discarded in favour of mobility. Poor Sancho Panza was tied up between two shields at the sham attack on the Island of Barataria, and he was undoubtedly very secure, but then he had no power to seek safety in retreat! How long a time must elapse, and how much money must be wasted, before we in this country will open our eyes to the lessons of experience?

And those lessons are neither slight nor obscure. So far, in our pursuit of the ship of the future, we have been chasing a phantom. We have clutched the "air-drawn dagger," and like Macbeth, at every effort, we have had to exclaim—

"I have thee not, and yet I see thee still!"

Let us be satisfied that other nations are equally deceived, and that

they like ourselves have been cheated by appearances, and that the technical reality, like Truth, is "a pursuit, and not a possession."

What, then, is to be done? Is England no longer to rely upon her Navy for the defence of her shores, and is her commerce to be abandoned to the tender mercies of her enemies? If by "her Navy" is meant the fifty ironclads we now possess, the answer is that reliance upon them for defence would be infatuation, and for protection to commerce a delusion. If by our future Navy is meant more and more batches of broadside ships laid down in Mr. Corry's vaunted style, we shall simply be spreading our weakness, and making ourselves more vulnerable by extension. If by a Navy is meant the largest number of the best ships we can get together in the most ready manner, we must turn our attention earnestly and with a single eye to foster and develop the shipbuilding capacity of this country. Looking broadly to the future, wiser and sadder from the lessons of the past, we may infer—

1st. That it will be impossible to predicate the form or mode that attack or defence will assume under the hard reality and pressing necessities of actual warfare. Hence improvised expedients will best meet unexpected difficulties, and new tactics be more effective than an ingenious and elaborate, but perhaps useless, outfit. In all probability the well devised schemes of doctrinaires will be overturned by impromptu measures, and having said thus much we may express a strong opinion that should the tide of war run in unexpected channels, another art will work out better results than a ready-made routine.

2nd. The best preparation for war will be to stimulate and encourage the ship-producing capacity of the country. Mr. Goschen truly said at the Mansion House (Nov. 13th, 1872), "Why, after all, it is the country which can build the ship that is the powerful country." And the country that can use ten times the appliances in twenty times the establishments capable of producing the latest type of floating engine, be it what it may, that does its work best to meet the requirements of actual warfare, will be the best prepared to bring a war to a successful issue. By diffusing all orders for such few experimental ships as would keep us in the van of naval improvement, amongst our private builders, we should be keeping in training many foremen and nuclei of artisans accustomed to Government work. There are at least twenty first-class shipbuilders upon whom, if fairly encouraged, we might rely to devote the entire resources of their establishments to the production of the highest developed type of ship when war arose. No doubt we should have to pay them well, and it would be for the advantage of the nation to do so, for the question would be between some possible 50,000,000*l.*

uselessly expended and some few hundreds of thousands of pounds paid in profit to private builders for really efficient engines of war. Professional energy would of course rebel against this "do nothing policy." Inaction distresses the friends of sick patients. The piteous appeal to the doctor is to *do something*; and yielding to pressure, he probably administers what in effect the Admiralty have done to panic craving—*bread pills*!

3rd. To be able to adopt this course we should always maintain so much of purely defensive appliances as will effectually keep an enemy at bay until we are ready to meet and crush him. To accomplish this, we have already, as suggested, our magnificent  $4\frac{1}{2}$  inch plated broadsides to block up harbour entrances; we have torpedoes; we have land batteries; and we have the capability to mount the heaviest guns on rafts or place them in small vessels, after the manner of the *Staunch*, to keep the enemy's ships at bay.

4th. For the protection of our commercial marine and to maintain a certain supremacy at sea, high speed combined with the highest aggressive gun power are requisite; and these can best be found in large unarmoured ships of the *Inconstant* and *Raleigh* class.

5th. It may be asked, If our dockyards cease to build ships, will they not drop into a state of inefficiency? The power to produce ships depends upon certain means and appliances, such as docks, slips, machinery, but most particularly upon skilled labour. In our national establishments the docks and slips are there, and would always be available. The chance of desuetude would apply to men and machinery alone. Now, extensive as these establishments are, their resources would not be equal to the exigences of war. Under all circumstances we should have to resort to private establishments. Every means would be taxed to add to and to maintain our defensive capability. And if so, it would surely be wiser to develop the resources and train the *personnel* of our large private shipbuilding yards, by steady orders for experimental ships during peace, to have their yards ready and efficient in time of war. The traditions of the past, in this respect, have no bearing upon the altered circumstances of the present. It was a necessity for Government to build war ships in national dockyards, pressed upon them by the difficulty to obtain in private yards seasoned timber of suitable scantling for vessels so much larger than the largest of the mercantile marine. But now, as we have already shown, the substitution of iron for wood has changed all this.

6th. As a further essential preparation for war, the call is urgent that the dry docks in the Government yards should not be occupied by half-finished new ships. When these establish-



ments are in full activity—batch building—the principal dry docks are closed against vessels needing repairs, and in time of war *the rapid repair of a damaged ship is equal to the building of a new one.*

Our policy, therefore, clearly lies in fostering that in which England's real naval superiority consists—the producing power. A fleet in itself is an adventitious and temporary affair. A single engagement may disable or annihilate it. A violent storm may turn the balance in favour of this or that side. But the producing power is a permanent and solid condition of superiority, of which no accident, no temporary reverse, no hesitating or misdirected policy in time of peace, can rob the possessor. This power—this solid enduring basis of naval supremacy, is weightier now than even the supply of seamen from our extensive commercial marine. Both together make and will keep this country mistress of the seas. If she were to build the fleets for all the world besides, she would thereby be most effectively preparing herself for war!

7th. But the Board of Admiralty organization! Herein lies the cause of failure and weakness. What that organization really is, no one can clearly tell. When it was effected, no one really knows. By what rules it moves and works, tradition and usage, a complicated *lex non scripta*, to be expounded by experts only, can alone determine. There is in the library at the Admiralty a manuscript book, by whom composed or compiled no one is aware. This document, as mysterious as the Sibylline leaves, appears to be the best authority on the mysterious subject of Admiralty administration. "It gives a most succinct and excellent account of the Lord High Admiral's powers; it then gives an account of the Commission of the Board."\* The first patent which begins to resemble the present one dates back to the time of Henry the Sixth (1430—1461). In 1692 the House of Commons came to the resolution, "That his Majesty be humbly advised to constitute a Commission of Admiralty of such persons as are of known experience in maritime affairs." This, apparently, is the origin of the present Board. The words of the statute constituting that Commission, "refer not only to the power of the Lord High Admiral, as existing under patent or by Act of Parliament, but refer to ulterior and anterior powers by the words used."† The Commission therefore supersedes the office of Lord High Admiral, but expressly confirms and transmits the power and authority of that functionary, to the present

\* "Evidence of Sir James Graham before the Committee on the Board of Admiralty, 1861."

† Ibid.

Board, as the lineal descendant of the original Commission ; in other words, the present Board inherits a power and authority which was never defined ; and as a natural consequence, moves and works without reference to the patent which called it into existence. Sir Charles Wood stated before the Committee on the Board of Admiralty, 1861, " I must say I never dreamt of reading the patent. I should very much doubt whether any officer, First Lord of the Admiralty, secretary, or any one else ever read the patent by which he was appointed. I can say for myself that I certainly never did." To carry on the duties of First Lord, he says, " I have been guided entirely by the prescriptive usage, which is a sort of tradition in every office." Sir James Graham also stated—" The more I have investigated the matter, the more I am satisfied that, like the common law in aid of the statute law, the power exercised by the Board and the different members of it, rests more upon usage than upon the patents ; and I am led to view with increased apprehension any great change that will supersede that usage and prescription." The Duke of Somerset considered the variance between the patent and the practice " an anomaly," and said, " perhaps it might be desirable to render them more consistent." A merely theoretical objection to usages undefined, and " beyond legal memory," would be gratuitous fault-finding had the results been and now were satisfactory, and that circumstances continued similar. But that " most unspiritual God and miscreator circumstance" has run away from the easy-going, smoothly-flowing, slowly changing tide of usage ; and in estimating the value of the authorities above quoted, it must be borne in mind that the reverence expressed for that usage was built upon the old *régime*. Again, an objection taken to the want of symmetry in the parts of Admiralty organization would be merely doctrinaire and sentimental if the spirit of that organization were good, and showed a conscientious, self-adjusting intention. But what is the evidence as to that spirit ? Sir Charles Wood said, " What you want is to get every member of the Board to feel himself responsible for the good working of the whole,"—which, however desirable, is simply impossible where the duties are specifically divided. . If every man is overlooking and interested in his colleagues' work, he necessarily neglects his own, and fully carried out would lose all individuality of action and of responsibility and bring about a disastrous condition of " meddling and muddling." There is at least confusion of ideas if not contradiction when a greater authority (Sir James Graham) says that " a Board only works well when the head of it makes it as unlike a Board as possible, and acts as if he alone were responsible." Sir John Pakington (Lord Hampton) took a clearer and juster view of

the responsibility of the First Lord when he said, "I never did feel at the Admiralty that I had either the knowledge (of passing events we take it) or the control or the responsibility which I think the Minister at the head of so great a department ought to have." Admiral Elliot says, "I consider that usage has completely altered the character of the Board." "I consider that there is a great deal of departmental and individual power now exercised by the separate Lords, and at the same time, that this usage and this power is all exercised on sufferance, and that there is no direct responsibility." Throughout the whole of the voluminous evidence laid before the committee, there is a hopeless chasing of the phantom of responsibility, and an impossibility to define its nature, or to fix it upon individuals. How could it be otherwise? Responsibility belongs to the performance of duty. Duty at the Admiralty is prescribed by "usage," and "usage" if defined at all, can only be defined by the responsible officer. To whom then but himself can he be made really responsible? And is it to be wondered at under such a system, that Sir Charles Wood states that it is the *fear* of responsibility, not the *want* of it, that is detrimental to the public service? Sir Spencer Robinson,\* one of the ablest officials who ever occupied the post of Controller, without the power to control, or the responsibility naturally attaching to his office, says that the duties of the Controller "are ill-defined, and may be interpreted to mean a great deal more or a great deal less according to the views of the supreme authority." He asks as to the duties of the superintendent of each dockyard—"For what is he responsible? He is only the vehicle through which orders pass to the several heads of departments." He has no responsibility if work cost 16,000*l.* which ought to have been done for 10,000*l.* "When a question is asked, he directs the master shipwright to reply." He "transmits"—in case of complaint or inquiry, the answers of the storekeeper, or the auditor, or the accountant. He is ordered to "direct the officers," "to call upon the officers," "to inform the officers." "There is no distinct and direct responsibility for anything, either done or left undone, upon him, so long as he transmits the memoranda"—*i.e.*, to and fro!

Mr. Childers set himself to amend this anomalous state of affairs. Without the experience of the three ex-First Lords we have quoted, who regarded the Admiralty administration as little short of perfection, he had the advantage of seeing the new order of things as regarded iron shipbuilding. The old school of ship-

---

\* "Evidence before Select Committee of the House of Lords on Board of Admiralty, 1871."

building was essentially one of "usage and prescription." Mild innovations were made as to the clenching of a bolt, or the driving of a treenail, or the cutting of a scarph; but any radical change, or the initiation of any new theory as to wooden ships, would have sent a thrill of horror through the well-subordinated officials of Her Majesty's dockyards. There were ships and ships as to size; and gradually and gently the "lines" were drawn finer and the bodies made "longer;" but besides such "improvements" ships were but ships, and custom was custom, to be held sacred and left untouched from age to age. The iron age has, however, violently and painfully superseded the simplicity and sobriety of the old wooden state of shipbuilding. The dockyard world has been turned upside down, and inside out: and the present order of affairs seems to have realized Shelley's paradox—

"Nought may endure but mutability."

From ramming stems to balanced rudders we have innovated until our latest types are examples of invention run riot; and inside an ironclad any ancient mariner would stand aghast at the mechanical contrivances which make a modern war ship something between Vulcan's smithy and the Elswick machine shop. The three ex-First Lords who, in 1861, deprecated and dreaded the touching of the old order of things, could little anticipate the scientific audacity of modern conceptions and war appliances; and as the architect of Noah's Ark, or the chief constructor of a Corinthian trireme, or the builder of that masterpiece—the *Henri, Grâce de Dieu*, might have discoursed about the organization that produced a modern three-decker, so the administrators, whose *chef-d'œuvre* was the *Duke of Wellington*, may be supposed to regard the designers of a *Devastation* and *Inflexible*. The evidence, no doubt, given in 1861, was (and this is all that can be said for it) the best that could be given at that time.

When Mr. Childers "new lighted," like Mercury, upon the highest place at the Admiralty, he had, at least, the advantage arising from the absence of prejudice. He had nothing to unlearn. He brought to the task of reform courage, persistency, a high sense of official responsibility, and an unbiassed mind; and, if his health had endured, in time, no doubt, would have seen that the management, which has descended from "beyond legal memory," was ill adapted to modern requirements. As it was he patched and altered the whole system enough to disturb and to irritate, but not permanently to improve. Opposition and illwill were engendered, but the root of

the mischief was left untouched. He did too little and he did it too gently.

“Tender-handed touch a nettle,  
And it stings you for your pains.”

And this, we apprehend, has been Mr. Childers' experience. When next the opportunity arises for him to complete his work of dealing with the Admiralty nettle, we have no doubt that he will recognise and act upon the completion of the advice—

“Grasp it like a man of mettle,  
And it soft as silk remains.”

Besides the absence of a clear responsibility, it is the bane of the present system that any one on the Board of Admiralty can assume to understand, and under such assumption to overrule, the purely scientific and technical proposals of a professional constructor. No one there would question the opinion of the law officers of the Crown upon a case submitted to them; and no one in his own person, if he were wise, would dispute the prescription of his chosen physician. Let us carry the case a degree nearer. A public company devises a project for supplying a town with water or gas, or intends to establish a railway communication through some particular district. They arrange the broad features of their schemes, and with general instructions they place the matter in the hands of the engineer in whom they have most confidence; and he under the influence of his responsibility to them, but more cogent still, of a responsibility imposed upon him by the maintenance of his reputation in the face of the public and of the scientific world, arranges the means to carry out their wishes and intentions. His plan may not exactly coincide with the aims of the projectors, and he may alter it; but no engineer of any eminence would for one moment brook interference with any essential principle involved in the plan, or lend his name, and so peril his character, to a mutilation forced upon him against his judgment. If any one of the directors insisted upon curtailment of relative parts, or the substitution of his own crude notions in place of those of the engineer, the latter would at once throw up his office. If he did attach his name to a mutilated plan, allowing his judgment to be warped, all we can say is that such a man would have no claim to be a first-rate engineer. Our contention is that the head of the Constructive department, by whatever name he be known, should not occupy a position less high or less responsible than an engineer at the head of his profession. On the other hand, the man who is his own lawyer is said to have a fool for his client; and we are not far from the

mark in saying, in like manner, that any First Lord or First Naval Lord who does more or less than entirely accept or reject the professional proposals of his Chief Constructor is very much in the same predicament. The head of the Constructive department, as professionally responsible for the success of his designs and the consequent efficiency of the fleet, *ought to be the foremost man in his profession, and be paid and trusted accordingly.*

How this simple, and perfectly obvious common sense arrangement, so absolutely essential to meet the requirements of 1874, can be made to fit in with, or to be stuck upon, the nebulously transmitted organization of 1692, we will not be diverted from our present aim to discuss. We advocate the change on its merits, in order to obviate proved failure and cure existing evils.

Thus much however we may say. We see no difficulty in taking the "Constructive Service," and the "Service Afloat," and giving to each an able, professional, responsible head. Ship-building and shipowning (or sailing) are two distinct businesses. There is no reason why one man should not be both if he be trained to understand both, but if his business be large enough to employ separate managers, that is no reason why the works of the two should be jumbled together to the neutralization of the responsibility of each.

We see no difficulty in the First Lord of the Admiralty (under the designation of Minister of Marine, or any other title) undertaking the political and financial arrangements of the Navy with a veto upon the proposals of the heads of the two departments. He might harmonize the action of both ; and understanding and approving the policy of both so as to explain and defend the action of all before the House of Commons, he should of course be empowered to displace both functionaries if necessary, and be obliged to justify his act in Parliament. The one point we hold to as being essential to the success of the Navy is this:—That there should be no shuffling of the cards of responsibility between him and the heads of the two departments. He might dismiss the person, and reject in toto but not mutilate the proposals, nor lessen the responsibility of the head of either department.

We see no difficulty in cutting unhesitatingly the Gordian knot of details which would, no doubt, be twisted up hard and fast by official ingenuity out of red tape. In the grasp of a "man of mettle" all accessories, all active opposition, all passive resistance, all sentimental clinging to the traditions of a bye-gone state of affairs, would at once become "soft as silk." And, devised and controlled by a skilled and responsible guidance, such as we have hinted at, we feel satisfied that the policy in regard to the simplification of Dockyard operations, the due preparation of the country for war, and the limitation of ships in commission on

foreign stations, might be smoothly effected, to the avoidance of the arrant blunders, the egregious waste, and the miserable naval results of the past fifteen years.

◆◆◆

#### ART. V.—MR. LEWES AND METAPHYSICS.

*Problems of Life and Mind.* By GEORGE HENRY LEWES.  
First Series. The Foundations of a Creed. Vol. I.  
London: 1873.

WHEN the History of Human Intellect comes to be a school-book for the young of that diviner Mammal who hereafter shall succeed mankind, it will contain no chapter to which their attention will be more carefully directed than that which narrates the sudden bursting forth and enormous expansion of Science which is taking place in this present century. For though too close to our eyes for clear vision or direct measurement, this is proved by a moment's reflection to be a phenomenon hitherto quite unexampled, and which must necessarily produce results of surpassing importance, although of a nature as to which we can only make the blindest guess. What would we not give to be allowed to read the concluding words of the chapter, and to take a single glance at the title of the next! And yet if this *Review* ever fall into the hands or prehensile appendages of one of those high Intelligences, his first feeling will no doubt be one of wonder how even a mind so imperfect as ours could ever have felt any doubt as to the true nature and limits of Science. "Surely," he will say, "this foolish creature, Homo, knew what Science was, and what Knowledge was, and therefore he must have known, if he had taken the trouble to think, whether the two were or not coextensive. How then could he have had any difficulty with regard to the future of Science, in foreseeing how far it could go, and what it could teach?" And, indeed, in respect of ninety-nine men out of every hundred, or rather of every human being except the few hundreds to whom nature has given a taste and capacity for abstract thought and accurate definition, it is perfectly true that they feel no doubt or difficulty on the subject. So absolutely is this the case, that they cannot for some time comprehend the meaning of the question. When, however, this is explained, the answer seems to them as clear as daylight.—"We know," say they, "numberless things about which Science can tell us nothing. Ourselves, our feelings, passions, sensations, thoughts, wills and actions—nay, the very fact of our

existence—all these we know ; indeed, they are the only things which we are sure that we do know ; but Science has nothing whatever to do with them. Science deals only with the external world ; and of the inner world of self, and its relation to the outer, it can never give any explanation."

Nor is this the verdict of "common sense" alone ; it is also (as common sense may be surprised to hear) that of Metaphysics, and not its verdict only, but its charter and condition of existence. Where two such enemies agree, it might well be thought that there was no room for doubt or argument. And yet, how can we rest in this conclusion and vindicate the intellectual power of humanity in the eyes of its future critic, in the presence of such a book as that which has suggested this article ?—a book written by one of our most celebrated scientific inquirers, who if not the greatest of philosophers, at least knows probably more about philosophy than any living author, and whose reputation as a thinker has been founded not only on his great and varied knowledge, but on his supposed trustworthiness to take the common sense view on difficult problems—a book written by such a man as this for the express purpose of proving that the field of Science is identical with that of Knowledge, and that all possible problems are soluble by the use of the scientific method ?

A theory such as this, which gives the lie both to Common Sense and to Metaphysics, propounded by one professing to speak in the name and with the authority of Science, cannot remain unchallenged. If true, it must of course be accepted with all its consequences ; but, if false, the appearance of invincibility which would arise from its not being refuted could not but be disastrous to every department of human knowledge, by destroying the good feeling and sense of mutual respect which should exist among them.

Apart from all curiosity as to the future of human intellect—a curiosity, however, which may well claim the respect which attends the name of Religion—the question as to the true limits of Science is one which, in the interest of Science itself, it is necessary to solve, and which happens to be just now ripe for solution. The growth of Science, which is the co-ordination of our knowledge of the external world, and that of those branches of what has been hitherto thought knowledge, which have attempted to co-ordinate internal phenomena—namely, Mental and Moral Philosophy—have hitherto followed exactly opposite courses. The former, starting from the extreme verge of nature's confines, has tended ever inwards in a gradually contracting sphere, like the crust of a planet hardening round the central core of fire. The latter, starting from the most individual



feelings of the single self, has gradually widened its area to include the family, the tribe, the nation, the human race; till at last, under the form of a philosophic Pantheism such as Spinoza's, or that of a more practical belief in an intelligent government of nature, such as that professed by Christianity, it appears to have reached the limits of the universe. These two modes of thought, starting from opposite poles of experience, and pursuing different methods, have always been antagonists: but in this antagonism we may notice a difference in their respective attitudes. The latter, which, speaking somewhat loosely, we may call the *Metaphysical Method*, has had a more rapid development,\* and has, ideally at least, reached its utmost limits of expansion. This has been due in great measure to its not having placed itself in direct opposition to Science. When the issue has been raised between them it has in general recognised the sphere and function of Science, and distinguished it from its own; and thus it has been allowed to pass. Science, on the other hand, has commonly refused to recognise any authority but its own, and has proclaimed almost ostentatiously that the war between itself and Metaphysics is a war of extermination. This irreconcilable attitude has not been of much practical importance, while the radius of the scientific sphere has been large, and the enclosing crust has not approached the central Ego, which contains the source and life of Metaphysics. There has been, indeed, an uncomfortable feeling of blockade and a presentiment of inevitable struggle, but nothing further. Within the last few years, however, the blockade has been turned into an assault, and the presentiment has given place to reality. The latest outpost of Science, Physiology, and especially that division of it which we may call Neurology, has brought the opposing forces face to face, and the battle must now be decided once for all. The result will be either that Psychology (in the old sense) and Metaphysics will be swept clean away, or that the frontier line between them and Science will be set out by metes and bounds,

---

\* Or is it in truth that its development has been incomparably slower; that the true orbit of both developments (we are not speaking of the *methods*) is the same—namely, from Induction to Deduction, and that the apparent contrast is due only to the difference of velocity? May not the real explanation be that in Metaphysics we have not yet attained such a node or turning point as in Science was marked by the discovery of the Law of Gravitation, and as may hereafter be reached in Metaphysics by the development or discovery of some form or law of consciousness which shall connect the individual with a universal mind, and thus enable Metaphysics to establish laws independent of the accidents of corporate individuality. If so, Metaphysics has not yet entered on the Deductive part of its orbit, through which Science has long been passing, and the present barrenness of metaphysical speculation becomes in some measure intelligible.

and each of the rivals forced to confine itself to its proper territory. Science, of course, from its side, flushed with the pride of recent victories, is clamorous for universal empire; and Mr. Lewes, one of its most trusted captains, has become the mouthpiece of this demand; to enforce which is the avowed object of his present work. It is because we believe this claim to be unfounded; because we think it most pernicious to the interests of Science that it should take up a false position, and by failing to maintain it incur the suspicion of universal failure; and because we are convinced that in the due guidance of scientific inquiry lies, at least in the present stage of human knowledge, the only real hope of the healthy growth and development of that knowledge, that we now propose to show wherein we consider Mr. Lewes' error to consist, and what seems to us the true boundary line between Science and Metaphysics.

For the benefit of those who have not read Mr. Lewes' book, and in order to show the occasion and significance of his attack on Metaphysics, we will first give a short sketch of the scope and purport of his work. And first of all be it remarked, that the one volume which has as yet appeared is only introductory; to the main work which is to follow, and which we most sincerely wish Mr. Lewes life and health to complete. It forms, in fact, but one half of the Introduction. This may perhaps be thought to render any review of it premature and unsatisfactory. But, as will appear in the sequel, the present volume contains a statement of the principles on which the whole work is to be based, and it is those principles and not their illustration, to which Mr. Lewes most invites our attention (p. 13), and which it is our present object to examine.

The aim of the whole work, as stated in the preface to the present volume, is one which might well fire the ambition of any philosopher. It is no less than the constitution of a Science of Psychology. Hitherto Psychology has been, in Mr. Lewes' opinion, "very much in the condition of Chemistry before Lavoisier, or of Biology before Bichat." It has been "without the fundamental data necessary to its *constitution*\* as a science."

"A science is constituted," he says—"that is, has received its definitive construction and place in the hierarchy of Philosophy, when its object is circumscribed, its phenomena defined, its Method settled, and its fundamental principles established, so that henceforward the development is progressive, the discovery of to-day enlarging and not overturning the conception of yesterday, each worker bringing his contribution to a common fund, not presenting it as a reversal of all that predecessors had done." (p. vi.)

---

\* Wherever italics occur in quotations they are Mr. Lewes' own.

To accomplish this for Psychology, to make order spring out of chaos, and light shine amid the darkness, is Mr. Lewes' aim. For thirty-eight years he has prosecuted this aim with unremitting energy; and at last has come the reward of toil, a vision of success. For he now "feels confident of having something like a clear vision of the fundamental inductions necessary to the constitution of Psychology;" and although he modestly disclaims the intention of writing a complete treatise, he "hopes to establish a firm groundwork for future labours." (p. vii.)

But for the further justification of this hope we must wait for the publication of the subsequent volumes. Before the new science can be introduced to the world with any chance of a favourable reception, much has to be done; the new advent must be prepared for, by clearing a pathway, and by driving away enemies; especially that greatest of all, the old enemy—Metaphysics. For Mr. Lewes "knows well that there is no chance of general recognition of the scientific method and its inductions while the rival method is tolerated" (*ib.*). Moreover, as Mr. Mill has already said, in words which Mr. Lewes takes for one of the mottoes to his book, "the difficulties of Metaphysics lie at the root of all Science; those difficulties can only be quieted by being resolved, and until they are resolved, positively whenever possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any knowledge, even physical, stands on solid foundations."

It is this work of preparation with which Mr. Lewes is at present engaged. At first, as he tells us, he imagined it might be accomplished in an introductory chapter; but it has apparently proved more laborious than he expected, so that even the two volumes into which it has "insensibly grown" (that is to say, the present volume and that which is to follow it), are, as he tells us, "only a portion of what has been written" (p. viii.).

The plan of the present volume is as follows:—In the First Part of an "Introduction" (which is really to the whole work an introduction to the Introduction) he sketches the main principle which he proposes to establish—namely, the applicability of scientific method to metaphysical questions. "It is towards the transformation of Metaphysics by reduction to the method of Science that these pages tend. I propose to show that metaphysical problems have, rationally, no other difficulties than those which beset all problems; and when scientifically treated, they are capable of solutions not less satisfactory and certain than those of physics" (p. 5). It was the great error of Comte in Mr. Lewes' view, that he peremptorily excluded all research into metaphysical questions. The questions exist; and if Science will

not explain them, it can never hope to displace them ; for ignoring them will not extirpate them. Now Science *can* explain any question that can be rationally stated ; and questions other than these we do not "need to know." So the great art is to choose the right question and express it in terms which admit of an answer ; and the first operation is therefore "to disengage the" unknowable, or, as he calls them, "metempirical elements, and proceed to treat the empirical elements with the view of deducing from them the unknown elements, if that be practicable, or, if the deduction be impracticable, of registering the unknown elements as transcendental" (p. 39). These transcendental elements will cause no error if we take care to eliminate them from the result ; for "the existence of an unknown quantity does not necessarily disturb the accuracy of calculations founded on the known functions of that quantity" (p. 41). This mode of inquiry is "speculative" indeed ; but "it is an error to imagine that the true scientific spirit is opposed to the speculative, because it is opposed to the metempirical" (p. 48)—an error which is illustrated by examples of the speculative greatness of Newton, in spite of his famous profession "*Hypotheses non fingo.*" The conclusion is, that "the scientific canon of excluding from calculation all incalculable data places Metaphysics on the same level with Physics" (p. 60). Then follows a chapter of "Objections to Metaphysics," which may be summed up in this, that its questions are inappropriately conceived, and are therefore incapable of being answered. True or scientific Metaphysics is only "Abstract Science, which is occupied with the general laws of Being" (p. 65). Its place among the sciences is that of a "Codification of the laws of Cause," an "Objective Logic : " and its method that of "dealing exclusively with known functions of unknown quantities, and at every stage of inquiry separating the empirical from the metempirical data" (p. 80).

The second part of the "Introduction" contains a number of practical "Rules of Philosophizing," grounded on, but extending, those of Newton in the *Principia*, and expressing the main theses of empirical philosophy in a form adapted for the regulation of research.

Then follows a kind of second Introduction, which in fact amounts to a Table of Contents of the entire prospective work—a programme of the new Psychology. The proofs are avowedly postponed, and only the questions which Mr. Lewes thinks "most pressing" are more than simply stated. In fact, one of the principal motives of this chapter seems to have been that which in one passage he does not shrink from avowing in the following words—"that the explicit commencement here will protect me against a possible anticipation on the part of some other writer "

(p. 146)—a wish which we can understand his wishing, but hardly his 'wishing to be thought to wish.' As it will be our business hereafter to discuss at length the more important of these psychological principles, we shall here merely give a brief notice of those which at once are novel, and do not primarily concern Metaphysics. These, being purely scientific, are in many cases, as might be expected from their author, both valuable and suggestive.

The most important of them, at any rate that which is worked out at the greatest length, and is made responsible for the greatest results, is the novel and as it seems to us excessive weight which Mr. Lewes attributes to social influences in the genesis of mind. "Man," he says, "is not simply an animal organism; he is also an unit in a social organism. . . . From these chiefly arise the animal sentient life, and the human intellectual and moral life" (p. 109). He looks upon the social organism as the source of all that distinguishes man from the higher animals. "Intellect and Conscience are special products of the social organism, and although animals possess in common with man the Logic of Feeling, they are wholly deficient in the Logic of Signs, which is a social, not an animal function" (p. 125). The last sentence reveals what appears to be his main foundation for this somewhat strange theory, and which may be expressed briefly in the two following propositions:—Language, he says, is indispensable to Thought (pp. 157, 167); and Language is a purely social product (pp. 124, 167, 174). Now it seems questionable whether either of these theories is true to more than a very limited extent as a statement of causation, though, no doubt, as a statement of coexistence there is sufficient to give plausibility to both. But it is clearly impossible to maintain either in its full literal meaning. For as to the first, even if we leave out of sight such cases of Aphasia as that of the late Lord Denman, where unimpaired powers of thought have coexisted with entire inability to connect thoughts with words, and the more conclusive because more ordinary instances of the existence of reasoning powers in human beings congenitally deaf, it would be sufficient answer to Mr. Lewes, that all that is required for abstract thought is *some* system of signs or symbols, and that language, though the most perfect of such systems (so far as we know), is not the only one; and it is therefore illogical to draw a distinct line between animals endowed with speech and the rest, and to say that on one side of the line abstract thought is possible, and on the other impossible. Nay, for anything we know, animals may have power of communicating with each other through some system of symbols which are quite unknown to us, because expressed in forms of sensation of which we have no receptivity.

The second branch of the argument—namely, that Language is a purely social product, is less plausible, and can hardly be more true than the first. If society has taught men to speak, why has it not taught bees or ants? It would be just as true to say that language has produced society; the real fact being that language and society, being two coexistent forces, have mutually acted and reacted on each other, so that it has become impossible to separate what in each was originally due to the other.

Another novel suggestion which finds a place among the "Psychological Principles," is that of the existence of a so-called "Psychoplasm," out of which he supposes the psychical organism to be evolved, as the vital is from the Bioplasm. It seems to represent in his mind a supposed intermediate stage, when the inorganic unconscious material of external force is transformed into organizable material capable of assimilation by consciousness. "The *sentient material* out of which all the forms of Consciousness are evolved, is the Psychoplasm, incessantly fluctuating, incessantly renewed" (p. 119). "We may represent," he says, "the molecular movements of the Bioplasm by the neural tremors of the Psychoplasm: these tremors are what I term *neural units*; the raw material of Consciousness" (p. 118). And again, "the movements of the Bioplasm constitute Vitality; the movements of the Psychoplasm constitute Sensibility" (*ib.*). The metaphysical import of this hypothesis we shall hereafter discuss: but we may here remark, that from a physiological point of view it seems at least difficult to reconcile a hypothesis of which we can hardly even form a mental picture, with one of Mr. Lewes' own canons of research—namely, that one must never attempt to explain by "unknown causes" (p. 93). And when, in addition to this psychological medium or Psychoplasm, Mr. Lewes goes on to speak of a sociological medium "forming another kind of Psychoplasm" (p. 124),\* we cannot help feeling that he has left the region of Science altogether.

A somewhat similar criticism applies to the distinction which he draws between Consciousness and Sub-Consciousness. The object of this distinction was, doubtless, metaphysical, and in this point of view we shall return to it hereafter. Physiologically it is difficult to see on what data it can be founded, and, indeed, what can be its meaning; for Consciousness can be known to Physiology only by its phenomena, and the phenomena of Consciousness and Sub-Consciousness are identical. (As to this see

---

\* If Mr. Lewes cannot bring himself to give to this strange offspring the name of "Socioplasm" (although such a word would be excellent company for "Sociology"), perhaps he will allow us to suggest "Cunoplasm" or "Politicooplasm." Let it not die for want of a name.

p. 210.) To compare it to the difference between flame and heat (p. 136) seems little more than a metaphor; and to compare it to the difference between the distinct vision at the centre of the retina and the indistinct vision at any other point (p. 142), is an illustration from the internal and not the external world; and even there is an illustration, and not an explanation. No doubt, "Sentience is always sentient, as Vision is always visual" (*ib.*); but that does not help to solve the question whether Sentience is or is not always present. It is quite true too, that " 'unfelt feelings' are inadmissible;" but the right conclusion from that is, that actions which are unfelt are not feelings, and not, as Mr. Lewes seems to argue, that *no* action can be unfelt. At any rate, to call them "sub-conscious" instead of "unfelt," cannot help the argument one way or the other.

Another curious metaphor rather than hypothesis (at least so we must call it until it is justified by further evidence), is, that of "the mass of *stationary waves*" under which Mr. Lewes "pictures" to himself Consciousness (p. 150)—a picture which to his readers is somewhat difficult of realization.

But the principle on which Mr. Lewes seems most to pride himself, is that which he calls the "Psychological Spectrum." It is this. As all light is composed of red, green, and violet, in various proportions, so all mental states are composed of Sensation, Thought, and Motion; in other words, "every psychical fact is a product of sense-work, brain-work, and muscle-work" (p. 147); and "each mental state is thus *a function of three variables.*" The name is certainly new, and somewhat sensational; but there does not seem much novelty in the principle, although it is said to "wear a paradoxical air." However, we are quite ready to believe that in Mr. Lewes' hands it will be capable of useful—as he promises that it shall have extensive—application; even to the introduction of the Differential Calculus into Psychology.

The foregoing are the principal novelties which Mr. Lewes promises to Mental Physiology; though, of course, he does not fail also to lay stress on the well-recognised principles of Association, Heredity, Irradiation, and the like. In the remarks that we have ventured to make upon them we must not forget that the evidence is avowedly reserved, and that *prima facie* difficulties may be modified or altogether removed when we come to the subsequent volumes. In any case, scientific hypotheses, even if untrue, cannot but tend to the ultimate discovery of truth, and we may confidently leave them to the discussion which they are sure to provoke.

Having thus stated his programme, Mr. Lewes proceeds to give us the first instalment of the substance of the work; in other words, he proceeds to apply in detail the before-enunciated

principles to the solution of metaphysical problems. The method of procedure depends, as we have seen, on the separation of the empirical from the metempirical elements. Hence the first question is what *are* the metempirical elements? "Here," as he says (p. 87), "we find ourselves fronting the great psychological problems of the Limitations of Knowledge and the Principles of Certitude." Accordingly, Problem I. is entitled "The Limitations of Knowledge;" and with the discussion of this problem the remainder of the volume is occupied. Of this discussion we can here indicate only the main features.

In the first place, Mr. Lewes lays down the great principle of Positive or Empirical Research—namely, that knowledge is bounded by consciousness, that is to say, by experience (p. 202, cf. p. 256); and he reconciles this with the innateness of mental laws and forms by explaining it as a truth of Psychogeny rather than of Psychology proper, thus adopting the well-known discoveries of Mr. Herbert Spencer as to the evolution of mental faculties. The whole of this statement, together with the discussions which it involves as to the nature of instinct and the supposed existence of a faculty for grasping the supra-sensible, is exceedingly able and logical; and although the conclusions have been anticipated by others, the mode of treatment is not only forcible but original. Then follows a chapter on Abstraction, which is defined as "focussing;" and this leads to a very thoughtful and suggestive chapter on Ideal Construction in Science. In this he points out the abstract and ideal nature of some physical laws, such as Kepler's First Law of Motion. "They are Types," he says (p. 293), "erected by scientific imagination, which moulds the elements of concrete observation into abstractions by getting rid of all perturbing particulars;" and the erroneous conception of the phenomena of nature being *determined by law*, "must be replaced by the more accurate conception of the *law being determined by the phenomena*" (p. 297). In this way such physical laws are not unlike the moral types which are the standards for our conduct in life. Whether Mr. Lewes is right in concluding against Mr. Mill that it is the derivative and not the ultimate laws which are most truly laws of nature (p. 312) is perhaps a mere question of words; but the distinction which he wishes to substitute for that of ultimate and derivative—namely, that of Real and Ideal Laws, seems to rest only on difference of degree, and not to point to any difference of nature. The most ideal law is ultimately based on actual phenomena; and if a real law contain no ideal construction, it becomes a mere orderless catalogue of facts, and therefore is not a law at all; for the essence of law is order. And to take Mr. Lewes' own example (p. 306), it is no more actually true that a body moves in the diagonal of two incident forces



than that it moves uniformly in a straight line under the influence of a single force. No such phenomenon as either actually ever presents itself unaccompanied, because, as Mr. Lewes says, "within real space the requisite conditions are unrealizable" (p. 291); but there is no single phenomenon of any kind which so presents itself. The universe is a tangle of phenomena, which it is the office of science to disentangle; and the utmost ingenuity of experiment can never completely isolate to sense a single phenomenon, so that the isolation is ideal only. In that sense, no doubt, *all* science is ideal; but it is also real, for it is only the rearrangement of real elements. For we cannot agree with Mr. Lewes that Science may be constructed out of elements "which never were and never could be real," and yet have a practical application (p. 289). It is not a true, although far from an original remark, that "the point, the line, the circle are elements of ideal, not of sensible space." Space, *real* space, is full of *real* points, lines, circles, spheres, and the like. They are not marked out, it is true, but surely a circle need not be a "round black line," and a sphere is a sphere none the less because it does not differ in colour or material from its surrounding medium. If not present to sense, it is at least present to what Mr. Lewes calls "Mental Vision," or Intuition, and therefore not only *can be* but *is* real (p. 376, cf. p. 261). The question of the application of the laws of these *true* spheres to such *untrue* or approximate spheres, as we find marked out or mark out artificially in nature, is an entirely different question; and the difficulty there is simply a difficulty of approximation.

The remaining chapters, which consist mainly of applications of the foregoing principles to certain special logical questions, are full of vigorous thought and reasoning. Those on Cause, on Necessary Truth, and on the Empirical Origin of Mathematics, are perhaps the best, not only for the value of their conclusions, but for their clearness of reasoning, and their wealth and felicity of illustration. All truths, he says, are equally necessary under the formulated conditions, contingency implying a possible change of conditions. There can be but one certainty, that of an identical proposition; and the superiority of mathematics lies only in the ease with which this is attained and shown (p. 433). The chapter on Kant does not add much to the strength of the previous argument, for if Kant had lived at the present day it is probable that he would not have differed much on the question of the Origin of Knowledge from Mr. Lewes and Mr. Herbert Spencer. In his day the existence of an *à priori* element in knowledge seemed conclusive against the Sensationalism of Hume, and his recognition of this was a valuable remonstrance against an imperfect theory. But now that the principle of hereditary evolution

has been established, and has shown how in a sense the Categories have both objective and subjective necessity, and have yet an empirical origin, Kant and Hume have been reconciled on the basis of a more complete empiricism; and the *à priori* school of philosophy, if such there still be, must use other arguments than those of Kant. Mr. Lewes is still further wrong in supposing that by demolishing Kant he demolishes the possibility of what he calls "Metempirics," for it is quite possible, as we hope to prove, to combine a firm belief in the empirical origin of knowledge with an equally firm belief in the independence of Metaphysics from Science. Surely it may well be that all knowledge comes from experience, and yet that all knowledge is not scientific.

The problem ends with a discussion on the place of Sentiment in Philosophy. In the next we are promised the completion of this first great preliminary question by an inquiry into the Principles of Certitude.

We have now said enough to enable our readers to appreciate the plan and object of Mr. Lewes' work; and we therefore propose at once to turn to what has been already stated to be the main purpose of this article—namely, an examination of Mr. Lewes' position towards Metaphysics. To get rid of Metaphysics as the great obstacle in the way of future philosophic progress is, as we have seen, the preliminary task which Mr. Lewes has set himself to accomplish in the two first volumes of his work. Its necessity he states as follows:—"It will be necessary to transform Metaphysics, or to stamp it out of existence. There is but this alternative. At present Metaphysics is an obstacle in our path; it must be crushed into dust, and our chariot wheels must pass over it, or its forces of resistance must be converted into motive powers, and what is an obstacle become an impulse" (p. 4). That is to say, it must either be crushed or bribed over. Now, hitherto Mr. Lewes has tried the crushing process. To the impetuosity of youth the sight of an enemy prompted nothing but immediate onslaught; and vigorous was the attack, and long and valiantly has the combat been maintained. Yet although every weapon and tactic that Science could suggest has been employed, and though at times friendly rumours of victory have appeared to justify a song of triumph, at the end of a more than Thirty Years' War Mr. Lewes is forced to confess that the enemy still lives. "Contempt, ridicule, argument, all (he says) are vain against tendencies towards metaphysical speculation" (p. 7). "Although its doctrines have become a scoff (except among the valiant few), its method still survives, still prompts to renewed research, and still misleads some men of science" (p. 8). Nay, not only is it still un-

crushed, but the energetic attacks which it has received seem to have invigorated rather than weakened it, for we now see it, according to Mr. Lewes' own testimony, "strangely agitated, and showing symptoms of a reawakened life. After a long period of neglect and contempt its problems are once more re-asserting their claims" (p. 4). Assuredly this might well have caused a less heroic spirit to despair. After almost a lifetime of effort (Mr. Lewes tells us his labours began in 1836), during which there has been no lack on his part either of skill or of daring, still "the enemy faints not nor faileth. And as things have been they remain." Nay, worse than all, Mr. Lewes mysteriously hints at signs of treason from within, from the very centre of the scientific camp. But to his honour be it remembered that he has not despaired of his country; on the contrary, while bravely accepting the situation, and acknowledging defeat, he ascribes it to mere faults of generalship, and reasserts as boldly as ever the eventual triumph of his cause. The old tactics have failed; he therefore changes them; contempt gives place to respect. "A cause which is vigorous after centuries of defeat is a cause baffled, but not hopeless; beaten, but not subdued" (p. 8). It is worth conciliating; it *must* be conciliated. So, without further delay, he sounds a parley, and after a profession of friendly intent, proposes that hostilities be dropped, and that an alliance offensive and defensive be entered into between Metaphysics and Science on the following terms. That is to say:

1. *The general charges which have been made by Science against Metaphysics, that its problems are "insoluble" and "mischievous" and "ontological chimeras," and "a mild form of insanity," and "waste of precious energies," and so forth, to be definitively abandoned and withdrawn.* "I propose to show," says Mr. Lewes, "that metaphysical problems have rationally no other difficulties, than those which beset all problems" (p. 5).

2. *Metaphysics to admit the method of Science.* If Metaphysics and Science are to enter into any real alliance, "one Method, one Logic, one canon of Truth and Demonstration must be applied to both. Which must it be? Not the one hitherto employed in Metaphysics; its incompetence is manifest in the unprogressive nature of its results" (p. 12). It must, therefore, be the method of Science.

3. *Problems which refuse the terms of the last article, to be deemed irrational, and to be definitively abandoned by Metaphysics.* The scientific method "will furnish solution to every metaphysical problem that can be rationally stated; whereas no problem, metaphysical or scientific, which is irrationally stated can receive a rational solution" (p. 5).

4. *The honour of Metaphysics to be saved by inventing for all such last-named problems the name of Metempirics.* The advantage of thus coining a new term is that "it detaches from Metaphysics a vast range of insoluble problems, leaving behind it only such as are soluble" (p. 17).

Such are the main articles of the proposed alliance. Mr. Lewes has much to say in recommendation of them to each of the contracting parties. In urging them upon Metaphysics he shows that a real friendship with Science will be more to its advantage than the false splendours of its present alliance with Theology, whose protection is "only such as is accorded to a vassal, and is changed to hostility whenever their conclusions clash, or whenever argument threatens to disturb the secular slumber of dogma" (p. 11). By the adoption of this alliance Metaphysics will escape from its present equivocal position between vassalage and contempt, and will give proof of wisdom in preferring the freedom of poverty, and the sure friendship of equals, to the luxury of slavery, and the capricious patronage of the great.

On turning to his own friends he naturally feels some mis-giving and hesitation.

"They will doubtless feel some surprise at this announcement of my present aim. I may here seem to be unsaying what it has been the chief purpose of my labours to enforce. But it is really not so. There has been no other change than this, that I now see how problems which were insoluble by the Method then in use are soluble by the Method of Science. This is not a retreat, but a change of front. Throughout my polemic against Metaphysics the attacks were directed against the irrational Method as one by which *all* problems whatever must be insoluble" (p. 6).

It is not that an extension of the scientific franchise, when you come to look at it dispassionately, is not a good liberal measure; it is the Tory way of treating such questions (in fact, their way of treating *all* questions) that disgusted me with the whole subject, and caused me to give a hasty verdict, which it will perhaps be more prudent to recal. For, after all, the rejection of Metaphysics by the Positive Philosophy

"seems to me somewhat arbitrary when the state of the case is examined; and injudicious, when we find that it not only irritates those who might be convinced, but irritates them by a misconception. All who put their trust in the Positive Philosophy must regret that it should alienate instead of alluring speculative thinkers capable of extending its reach; and it alienates them by the supercilious assertion, that they are, and have been wandering on the wrong path; which may be true, *is* true; but which would be better enforced by pointing out their point of divergence from the right path, so that their steps might be retraced" (p. 62).

Whether by these arguments Mr. Lewes succeed in allaying the suspicions of the Positivist party or not, it is impossible not to admire the ingenuity of his pleading. Though to the abler and more trusted of his followers he does not hesitate to reveal the real secret of this hated alliance—namely, that it has been rendered absolutely necessary by the ill success which has attended their chariot wheels, and their want of resources to continue the war, he well knows that to the more ardent spirits such considerations as these will bring no acquiescence in a “renegade peace ;” and he therefore appeals to their cosmopolitan sympathies, and their pity for the poor hopeless wanderers, whom nothing but kindness can bring back to the true fold. His persuasion almost deserves success ; it will be interesting to see whether it obtains it.

As regards the probability of the assent of Metaphysics to the proposed alliance there would seem to be less ground of hope ; for though in addition to the arguments referred to above, he tries to show the futility of any reason that can be given for retaining metaphysical speculation apart from science (p. 25), this only affects the question of peace or war, not the question as to the terms on which peace can be concluded. Metaphysicians have probably no objection to peace, only their idea of terms is rather different from that of Mr. Lewes. Hegel, for instance, as Mr. Lewes himself says, “is urgent for treating Metaphysics and Science on the same method. Unhappily, he has a very erroneous view of the conditions of inquiry, and, in point of fact, reverses the principle I am here proclaiming ; and instead of treating Metaphysics by the method of Science, treats Science by the method of Metaphysics” (p. 19). So it is evident that, “erroneously” or not, Hegel would not accept Mr. Lewes’ terms ; and it seems very probable that other metaphysicians will look at the matter much in the same way. Metaphysics, though hitherto as a rule not aggressive, would doubtless have no objection to annex Science, just as Science is anxious to annex Metaphysics ; but neither party is so weak or disinclined to fight as to accept terms which practically amount to extinction. And this is in effect the offer now made to Metaphysics. The name, indeed, is to be retained, because it “has had godfathers so illustrious that, if possible, it ought to be preserved” (p. 16). But it is to have an entirely new meaning assigned to it, comprehending merely that division of physics which treats of “the highest generalisations of research” (*ib.*) ; while all that was most distinctive in its old meaning is to be discarded and disgraced under a new and inglorious appellation. Surely if this were accepted all would be lost—without exception of honour.

But it is useless further to speculate on what assent this proposed treaty may meet with either from friends or opponents. What most concerns us is, to form some judgment as to its general philosophical value, and to see whether, apart from all party questions and interests, the principles which it involves are or are not likely to facilitate the solution of questions now unsolved, or to accelerate the advancement of knowledge. Our criticisms on this head will be twofold: first, as to the form in which Mr. Lewes embodies his principle; and secondly, as to the principle itself.

On the former point, the remark which most obviously presents itself is, that no real progress can be made by the mere shuffling of names. The first object of names is to be symbols for communication of ideas between one man and another; and for this object it is indispensable that the same name should always mean the same thing to all men; otherwise its utility is lost, and from a vehicle of intelligence it becomes an instrument of confusion. But the thing or idea named is not in any way affected by its name. "The rose by any other name would smell as sweet;" and if it were suddenly decreed to call all yellow roses onions, the facts of Osmology would remain unaltered, and the only result would be a confusion of tongues. Now Mr. Lewes himself admits that "what is usually meant by the word 'Metaphysics' is what he proposes to call "metempirical inquiry" (p. 19 *n.*): to what purpose then, except to confuse, can he wish to divorce it from this meaning, and to assign to it one as different (in his own view) as knowledge is from ignorance?

It is impossible to suppose that in Mr. Lewes' own mind there was any confusion. When he gives as the programme of his work "the transformation of Metaphysics by reduction to the method of Science" (p. 5), he must be taken to have full in his mind the subsequent limitation of Metaphysics to the empirical, or (as he defines it) to "the province we include within the range of Science" (p. 17). But with his readers such foresight would be nothing short of miraculous; and so when they read such a programme as that quoted above, or when they read that the object of Mr. Lewes is "to show that the method which has hitherto achieved such splendid success in Science needs only to be properly interpreted and applied, and by it the inductions and deductions from experience will furnish solutions to every metaphysical problem that can be rationally stated" (p. 5)—or that "what is here proclaimed is the possibility of finding rational solutions to questions which have hitherto baffled effort" (p. 18)—it is not unnatural that they should take these promises in their ordinary meaning, and should expect to witness some elucidation of problems which come under "what is usually

meant by the word" Metaphysics. Their hopes having thus been warmly excited, it is inevitable that they would be disappointed by the discovery, which must soon be made, that Mr. Lewes' object is, after all, only to exemplify in some detail the principle that scientific method is capable of application to all problems which come within its range. Wherefore then such flourishing of trumpets, and proclaiming of treaties? is their natural inquiry: and then arises a feeling of resentment at having been taken in and imposed upon, especially among the metaphysicians, who have been almost made to forget their own names by the flatteries and bribes and "giftless gifts" which Mr. Lewes has offered them.

This is all very unfortunate, because, as was remarked before, the confusion cannot have existed in Mr. Lewes' own mind. It has evidently arisen from no deeper source than the paternal anxiety of an author to dignify his offspring by some grand historic appellation, to whom, because the name Pisistratus suggests only Pisistratus Caxton, the child of his bosom, it never occurs to provide for any possible confusion in the mind of his hearers. For that Mr. Lewes never really dreamt of extending the scientific method beyond the very narrowest limits ordinarily assigned to it, is evident from his including under Metempirics such questions as was that of the chemical constitution of the sun's atmosphere a few years ago. "It was so obviously metempirical," he says, "that even metaphysicians abstained from speculating on it" (p. 24). As to that, they would have thought it far too scientific a question for them to dare to speculate upon; so that, if the truth is to be told, it seems as if metaphysicians would give a wider scope to scientific method than Mr. Lewes himself.

And this leads us to a point on which there is some apparent confusion. What is it exactly that Mr. Lewes would exclude from the range of his method under the term of Metempirics? Now, in the beginning of his explanation of the method which he proposes to employ, he separates three aspects of each object of research:—"1. the *positive*, or known; 2. the *speculative*, unknown though knowable; 3. the *unknowable*. The two first are empirical, the third is metempirical" (p. 29). This identification of the metempirical with the unknowable constantly recurs; and in interpreting it the natural sense to attribute to "unknowable" is "what is usually meant by the word"—namely, that which under no circumstances is capable of being known; otherwise it is not easy to see how it can be distinguished, as Mr. Lewes says it is, from the "unknown though knowable, in kind and not simply in degree" (ib.) And this impression would appear to be borne out by sundry other passages, as, for instance, where the distinction between the empirical and metempirical

worlds is identified with Kant's distinction between phenomenal and noumenal (p. 19) ; or where metempirical is made equivalent to supra-sensible (p. 253) ; or (as in another place) to "transcendent, that which is beyond all experience" (p. 44) ; or, when again, the rejection by Objective Logic of "whatever lies beyond that world of sensibles and extra-sensibles which can come within the range of experience," is held to "demarcate Metaphysics from Metempirics" (p. 74). Indeed, at the very first introduction of the word metempirical, he defines it as including "whatever lies beyond the limits of possible experience" (p. 17). However, that this is not the meaning which Mr. Lewes generally attaches to the word in his own mind, is evident from the remark quoted above, as to research into the sun's atmosphere, and from such statements as the following:—that "whenever by any means what is now transcendental becomes expressible in terms of experience, it will thereby cease to be metempirical" (p. 44 *n.*) ; or that "whenever a question is couched in terms that ignore experience, reject known truths, and invoke inaccessible data—*i.e.*, data inaccessible through our present means, or through any conceivable extension of those means—it is metempirical, and philosophy can have nothing to do with it. We need not trouble ourselves with it until in possession of the requisite means ; it is *adjourned*, not suppressed" (p. 33 ; see too, p. 371). He therefore would appear to include under Metempirics not only that which is unknowable owing to the constitution of our faculties, but that which is unknown (or, as he prefers to call it in some places "unknowable") because of the want of data ; and this is, on the whole, the explanation which appears most consistent with the whole scope of his argument. And yet, in explaining the very first rule among his "Rules of Philosophising," he says that we must examine the unknown elements in a question, "in order to determine whether—1, they are unknown, and unknowable because metempirical ; or, 2, they are unknown only because the requisite conditions of knowledge lie beyond our present data. In the former case, research ceases ; in the latter case, it proceeds" (p. 89). This passage is very discouraging to any attempt to reconcile the different expressions of Mr. Lewes' view, and perhaps such an attempt is better abandoned. Besides, as Mr. Lewes is a living author, he can write his own concordance (if it be worth while) much more easily than any one else can write it for him.

But whatever be the true solution of this last ambiguity, a further difficulty arises. For, to take first the more probable alternative that Mr. Lewes means to include under Metempirics "not only that which can never be brought within the range of experience, owing to the constitution of things, but also that which cannot at present be so brought, owing to the condition



of our knowledge" (p. 45 *n.*) ; or, in other words, not only the absolutely unknowable, but that which at present there are no means of knowing:—then, in addition to the preliminary ‘demurrer for multifariousness,’ that under one name two entirely distinct classes of things or ideas are mixed together, a gratuitous confusion for which no reason is alleged, there is this further objection, that of neither of these classes can it be truly said that it lies beyond the reach of knowledge. For as to the first class, namely, those things which we have at present no means of knowing but which may hereafter become known, how, except through scientific explanation, are the new data to be discovered from which the future knowledge is to spring? In what sense (to take Mr. Lewes’ own instance) was the chemical constitution of the sun ever “unknowable,” or “inaccessible to science?” Mr. Lewes would answer, that it was so because until the discovery of spectrum analysis there were no data to go upon. But surely the data, though unknown, were *there*, knowable and accessible enough ; and it was through scientific investigation that they, and the conclusions which were bound up in them, became actually known. To say the contrary would be to preclude Science from seeking new data at all, that is to say, would discard observation and experiment ; for what are these but the search for new data ? The truth is, that there is no fact which can ever become knowable (except, of course, future facts, with which we are not dealing) of which we have not now the data. For the ultimate datum of all future scientific knowledge must necessarily be sensation ; and therefore, if we neglect the theoretical possibility of the evolution or acquisition of fresh senses, is potentially given in our present senses. Hence it is clear that the new data which seem, according to Mr. Lewes, suddenly to spring into existence by accident, or at any rate by some cause outside scientific inquiry, are really only *recombinations of existing data* ; and it is this work of recombination which it is the special function of Science to devise and carry out.

Nor is it more true of the other division of the metempirical, namely, the absolutely unknowable, that it lies outside the sphere of knowledge : and that for this simple reason, that it is non-existent, and therefore lies nowhere. Inside and Outside and Existence are all forms or genera of Knowledge, and apart from Knowledge, have no meaning. So the negative of Knowledge is the negative of Existence. Such, at least, is the only doctrine consistent with the rudimentary principles of Positivism ; and it is therefore strange to find Mr. Lewes giving to mere negation a positive existence in the same class with such things as the solar atmosphere, and the strata of Sirius, and assigning to it definite

principles of research, and the name at least of a separate province in the empire of Nescience.

These latter remarks apply equally on the second supposition as to the intended meaning of Metempirics—namely, that it includes only the absolutely unknowable, and supply a further argument against the probability of that supposition; for the only shadow of positive existence which would suggest such language in reference to the unknowable as that used by Mr. Lewes, is that which must have been derived from its association in his mind with the simply unknown.

These are the main objections which offer themselves as to the form in which Mr. Lewes has cast his results, and they amount in summary to this—that the descriptions which Mr. Lewes gives of his intentions tend to create in the reader's mind a false impression as to the nature of these intentions; and that the new terminology which he invents and the distinctions implied thereby, tend only (so far as they are not untrue) to confuse the landmarks of philosophy and disappoint the reader's expectation. Mr. Lewes wishes to apply, and has attempted to apply, the method of Science to some of the highest and most general scientific truths, certain "Problems of Life and Mind;" and, no doubt, he has much valuable information to communicate to us on the subject, which we wait for with the brightest expectation: but, unfortunately, he has chosen to call these general truths Metaphysics (a title to which their only claim seems to be that they are *Physics*, on the principle of *lucus a non lucendo*); and hence a great deal of misapprehension has been introduced, which, unless explained, may cause worse confusion. It is hardly curious that Mr. Lewes himself seems to have foreseen this difficulty; but it is certainly curious that, having seen it, he did nothing to remedy it, except by an answer to it which is more curious still. He says—"Whatever speculative curiosity may prompt, our real and lasting interest is in ascertaining the order of things we know" (p. 28); or, in other words, Metempirics are very useless and unpractical. This, in the first place, begs the question that we can know nothing but what *Science* can teach; but even if it be true, it is hardly a sufficient reason for depriving Metaphysics of their *name*, especially as he charges them with no fresh imbecility which would make them less deserving of a respectable name than formerly. Besides, as has been said above, a name takes its character from its object, instead of giving character to it, and its value is not to the object at all (which gets on just as well without a name), but to philosophers and other folk who want to talk about the object, for which purpose they want names for bad objects as well as good, if only in order to abuse them by.

But it may be said by Mr. Lewes' defenders that 'all this criticism is about a mere question of names, which, however it be settled, is entirely unimportant; and that the real point for discussion is not whether what Mr. Lewes *excludes* from Philosophy should be called by this or that name, but whether he has succeeded in *including* under Philosophy, that is to say, under Science, any new domain; not whether he has appropriated the whole of what formerly went under the term Metaphysics, but whether he has really appropriated *any part of it*. To this suggestion we have no objection to defer, merely remarking that it would have been impossible to examine what Mr. Lewes includes under his method without trying to understand what he proposes to exclude, and that, even as a mere question of names, though it ought never to have been created, yet that is Mr. Lewes' fault and not ours, and now that it exists it is necessary not only to point it out, but to settle it *one way or the other*, in order to avoid confusion.

Let us then, without more delay, proceed to examine the value of this new principle of metaphysical research propounded by Mr. Lewes; and, in order to take the very broadest issue, let us ask whether there is any single truly metaphysical problem which by its means he has either solved or may reasonably be expected to solve. Now, an opinion has already been intimated that questions to which the scientific method is applicable are questions of Physics, and not of Metaphysics; and that to call them Metaphysics is merely an abuse of terms; from which it would follow that the true metaphysical sphere lies altogether outside the sphere of Science, and, therefore, that the method of Science is utterly incapable of dealing with it. This opinion it is now proposed to justify.

Mr. Lewes defines the sphere of Metaphysics as "the highest generalisations of research." To this there is no objection, except that of course Mr. Lewes tacitly confines research to *scientific* research—an implication which, until justified, must be rejected as begging the whole question at issue. It will perhaps be better therefore, instead of "research," to use the word "knowledge," which is less bound up with scientific associations. Now, what are the highest generalisations, the *summa genera*, of knowledge? What are its broadest, its most fundamental distinctions? Evidently, to begin with, the distinction between its two highest genera of all; a distinction recognised in every sentence, in every action, and in every thought; the distinction between Subject and Object, Mind and Matter, Self and the Universe. The relation, then, of Subject to Object is the first great problem of Metaphysics. The second is an offshoot of this, which was for a long time not separated from it, which indeed can hardly be said to have had an individual existence before

Berkeley. This is the question as to the nature of the Object, or, more definitely, as to its relation to a supposed absolutely existent, External World. For when the relation between Subject and Object had been apparently resolved into the relation between Ideas and Phenomena, a further question suggested itself, whether Phenomena were not themselves in some way related back by some similar relation to an extra-phenomenal world outside our consciousness altogether. If so this would be the real Object, and Phenomena would be simply the form in which this Object affected the Subject—would be in fact a kind of chemical product of the real Object and the Subject, differing as much from either as water differs from its constituent elements of oxygen and hydrogen. Thus the question of an External World, *Dinge an sich*, became separated from the old question of Subject and Object, and the two answers which can be given to it have taken the names of Realism and Idealism respectively. It may be remarked in passing, that a similar question will probably at some future time present itself more distinctly than hitherto in relation to the *Subject*; namely, as to the possible relation of individual states of consciousness to an absolutely existent mind entirely independent of the individual states, and of which such states are merely “phenomena;”—a question which will probably be found to be intimately bound up with the problem of the connexion of individual minds with one another and with a universal mind, and so with the problem of Personal Identity, just as the analogous question as to the *Object* has important bearing on the difficulty of the continuity of external existence. And indeed such a question has never been unknown in philosophy; but inasmuch as it has not yet taken so definite a shape as the corresponding question in respect of the Object, and also because it is still further removed than the latter from the purview of Science, its further discussion would only confuse our argument without adding to its value. The two questions above referred to—namely, that of the relation of Subject and Object, and that of the nature of the External World, may be taken as the two typical questions of Metaphysics, and it will be therefore wise to confine the discussion to them.

Let us take, therefore, the three genera which we have found to be three of the highest generalisations of knowledge; two actually known to exist, the third as yet problematical—namely, Subject, Phenomenon, and Noumenon. Here then is the kingdom of Metaphysics; for it is with the relations of these highest genera that Metaphysics professes to deal. Now, among these, where do we find the province of Science? For if metaphysical problems are to be capable of scientific treatment, it is evident that Science must embrace *all* these *summa genera*. Let us see, therefore, whether this is so. Mr. Lewes would admit at once

the contrary. He would admit what the least consideration will prove, that Science is wholly confined to the second of the three genera, namely, *Phenomena*.\* The method of Science is by treating all Phenomena as feelings actual or virtual, after a principle exemplified in the method of Virtual Velocities in Mechanics, and thus eliminating the common factor of the individual subjectivity, to arrive at the comparison of Phenomena with each other, and the ascertainment of their relations *inter se*; its proximate end is the arranging of Phenomena under certain general "laws;" and its ultimate ideal is by these means to render the mind an exact copy of Phenomena, and so rethink the Universe. Hence, seeing that by its very nature, Science is confined to the relations of Phenomena *inter se*, it cannot entertain the question of their relation to something of quite a different nature, whether such thing be conscious Subject, or extra-conscious Noumenon. These latter relations are *assumed* by Science at every step, and without such assumption Science can never use words which imply either Consciousness on the one hand, or things apart from Phenomena on the other. Therefore we may be sure beforehand that if a man profess to explain either facts of Consciousness or the nature of Things-in-themselves, he does so not by Science, or by the use of the scientific method, but by Metaphysics and the method of Metaphysics. Now this is in direct contradiction to Mr. Lewes, for not only does he profess by the method of Science alone to give definite explanations of the two problems which have been referred to, but he sees absolutely no difficulty in the matter. "When rationally stated," he says, "there is no greater mystery in the existence of an external world, or the relation between Object and Subject, than in the relation between activity and waste in the tissues, the relation between heat and expansion, or the relation between an arc and its chord" (p. 38). It is therefore interesting to examine the answers which he gives; and it is at his own suggestion that these two questions may be selected as the test. Now the very words in which he proclaims his freedom from difficulty will, if closely examined, suggest the explanation, which is this: that the questions which Mr. Lewes thinks himself able, and in fact *is* able to solve, are not the real questions at issue at all, but are questions relating solely to Phenomena, and therefore though undoubtedly within the range of Science, are entirely alien to Metaphysics. Let us remember to begin with, that according to one of Mr. Lewes'

---

\* If it were necessary to confirm this by quotations, the following would suffice:—"Physics and Metaphysics (*i.e.*, Mr. Lewes' Metaphysics) deal with things and their relations as these are known to us and as they are believed to exist in our universe" (p. 18). "What is the object of each science? It is to detect the general order of things as manifested in particular groups of phenomena" (p. 65).

own rules, "no proof can be valid beyond the range of its data; no conclusion exact which shuts in what is not included in its premisses" (Rule VII. p. 95). Hence, if the premisses be phenomena, the conclusions must be about phenomena, and the only "external world" and "subject" which Science can deal with, or obtain conclusions about, must be *phenomenal* only; that is to say, the "external world" of Science must be simply the world of phenomena, and the "subject" of Science must be merely the vital organism and its "neural tremors;" and any supposed argument from these to the "external world" of Noumena and the "subject" of Consciousness must be an argument based on a metaphysical not a scientific basis. Let us justify this augury by closer examination of Mr. Lewes' reasoning. In doing so, it will be convenient to separate as far as possible the two questions referred to above, though Mr. Lewes does not always seem to bear in mind the distinction between them, and at times mixes them together in the most confusing manner, so that it is impossible to tell for many consecutive sentences with which of the two he supposes himself to be dealing. And first let us examine his treatment of the relation of Subject to Object.

The real difficulty of this question from a scientific point of view is that the two are heterogeneous; that phenomena can only tell us of phenomena; that the phenomena which are supposed to indicate the presence of consciousness differ totally from consciousness itself, and that it is possible to pass from one to the other only by a method which comprehends both, and which is therefore not scientific, but extra-scientific, metaphysical. Now (strange to say, when we consider his pretensions, though not otherwise) Mr. Lewes at times seems to admit this. He says (p. 74), "Only on the assumption of the invariability of relations objective and subjective is philosophy possible. No arithmetical operation would be valid were there not this accord between the internal and external: and the assumption of such an accord runs through Science." In strict accordance with this he says that Psychology being "the science of psychological phenomena, has to seek its data in Biology and in Sociology" (p. 109); and again, he calls it, "a section of Biology" (p. 135). Hence the elements with which it has to deal are wholly derived from the outside world, and in accordance with the rule that "no proof can be valid beyond the range of its data" (p. 95), the conclusions at which it arrives must refer wholly to the external world. Therefore when Mr. Lewes speaks of feeling, consciousness, sensation, perception, and so forth, these ought to be simply names for certain nervous phenomena, "neural tremors," as he calls them. Now at times this is clearly avowed by Mr. Lewes: and it will perhaps be well to give a few instances of such avowal. In discussing the relation of Psychology to Biology (which is shortly

expressed in the aphorism that "mind is only one of the forms of life") (p. 114), and having shown how the vital organism is derived from the Bioplasm, he says, in a passage of which part has been already quoted (p. 118), "If instead of considering the whole vital organism, we consider solely its sensitive aspects, and confine ourselves to the Nervous System, we may represent the molecular movements of the Bioplasm by the neural tremors of the Psychoplasm: these tremors are what I term *neural units*: the raw material of Consciousness;" and a few lines afterwards, "The movements of the Bioplasm constitute Vitality; the movements of the Psychoplasm constitute Sensibility." This same Psychoplasm he afterwards defines as "the mass of potential Feeling, derived from all the sensitive affections of the organism" (p. 120). Again he says, "Every feeling being a group of neural units has its particular mark in Consciousness" (p. 121): and that from Sensibility, one of the "fundamental modes of the organism," "issue the general laws of Feeling, using that term in its widest sense, including Sensation, Perception, Emotion, Volition, and Intelligence and also Instinct" (p. 130). Again, "We may consider the gradations of Sensation, After-sensation, Imagination and Hallucination, as the varying energies of the same neural tracts" (p. 149): and so "Sensations are groups of neural tremors; perceptions are groups of sensations" (p. 169). Again, Experience is defined as "the Registration of Feeling;" and to the question, "What is Feeling?" the answer given is, that "it is the reaction of the sentient Organism under stimulus" (p. 210). The above quotations might be multiplied at pleasure, but are sufficient for the purpose. What then, from this point of view, is the relation of Subject to Object? Simply the relation of the nervous system to its medium. And this also is at times clearly admitted by Mr. Lewes. For instance, he says (p. 122; also cf. p. 118 sub fin.) that the primary law of Biology that "every vital phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Organism and its Medium" is expressed in Psychology "in the equivalent formula" that "Every psychical phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Subject and the Object;" and again (p. 189, cf. p. 127), "I regard Perception as the assimilation of the Object by the Subject in the same way that Nutrition is the assimilation of the Medium by the Organism." Now from this point of view all is consistent; and with this explanation of what is to be meant by Subject and Object, Science is perfectly competent to explain the relation between them. But, in the name of all that is most wonderful, what has this to do with the question of the relation between Subject and Object in the ordinary or metaphysical meaning of the words? or in other words, between the subjective *Consciousness* and the objective world of *Phenomena*? It is merely another shuffling of names which explains nothing at all. However, if the new meanings

thus assigned to Subject and Object were consistently maintained, the objection to Mr. Lewes' conclusion would be confined to this, that it is an *ignoratio elenchi*, and proves nothing; and the justice of such an objection would be so clear that argument would be unnecessary. But alas! this is not so. Mr. Lewes doubtless felt that if Consciousness is to be confined to "neural tremors" no conclusion with respect to it would touch the metaphysical question which he has promised to answer. For though in one curious passage (p. 151) he seems to think that it is possible to "exhibit how sentient phenomena may be explained by neural phenomena" by simply making "a new anatomy of the nervous system" in which particular attention is to be paid to "Vascular Irrigation" and "the calibre of the cerebral and carotid trunks," yet it can hardly be supposed that such an explanation was completely satisfactory to his mind. At any rate he is perpetually using a less elaborate and quicker method of passing from one to the other; a method which consists in introducing into arguments which deal merely with "neural tremors" considerations applicable only to Consciousness in its ordinary subjective sense; so that by a covert departure from his original definition he appears to have dealt with the metaphysical relation of Subject and Object. Consider the following passage, remembering Mr. Lewes' definition of Consciousness as "a group of neural units" or as "the mass of stationary waves formed out of the individual waves of neural tremors" (p. 150). "Neural processes which formerly were accompanied by Consciousness sink into Sub-Consciousness, and on occasion re-emerge into distinct light of day. But even in the sub-conscious stage they are always *sentient*. The practice, too frequent, of speaking of actions as *unconscious*, is more than a contradiction in terms." Unfelt feelings "are altogether inadmissible. On the other hand, to speak of Consciousness (meaning thereby a particular aspect) as the *substance* of Mind, the universal condition of psychical phenomena, is also misleading. What is universal is the neural process, which on the subjective side is the sentient process. Sentience may assume the form of Consciousness or the form of Sub-Consciousness" (p. 141); a passage which ends with the already quoted oracular utterance, of which the wisdom must surely be too deep for the words which attempt to convey it, that "Sentience is always sentient, as Vision is always visual." Or take again the following passage (p. 135), "What on the physiological side is simply a neural process, is on the psychological side a sentient process. We may liken Sentience to Combustion, and then the neural units will stand for the oscillating molecules. Sentience may manifest itself under the form of Consciousness, or under that of Sub-Consciousness—which may be compared to Combustion manifesting



itself in flame and in heat." Or again, "Cut off an animal's leg and stimulate the sciatic nerve, the leg will move, but no sensation will have been produced. Nor is this all. Unless the excitation is *assimilated* by the psychological medium it does not become *sentient*; and unless it becomes sentient it cannot become a sensation" (p. 131).

In the passages quoted above, and in countless others,\* Mr. Lewis speaks of "consciousness," "sentience," "subject," and so forth, in words which are inapplicable to "groups of neural tremors," but can only refer to the natural or metaphysical meaning of the words, and so while starting from nerves and medium (the only starting-point which Science allows him) he professes to arrive at the relation of Subject and Object. This then, forsooth, is the meaning of applying scientific data to metaphysical questions. It would be well if Mr. Lewes had borne in mind one of his own "rules of philosophizing"—namely, that "the validity of conclusions rests on the preservation of homogeneity in the terms and the identity of their ratios" (Rule X. p. 99). That he has forgotten it is the more surprising as he censures in others what he calls the "common fallacy" of "the unconscious substitution of new terms in place of the old" (p. 407),—a fallacy of which his own argument is a most forcible illustration.

Indeed it would seem that every now and then a vague suspicion does float in his mind that all is not right, for at times he throws out dim metaphysical phrases in the hope, as it would seem, that they may congeal and stiffen into some phantom bridge to span the gulf between the consciousness which consists in "neural tremors," and the real consciousness of the inner life. Such is the following:—that "the axioms of Logic and the axioms of Science, are the concave and convex aspects of the same curve" (p. 75, cf. p. 202); a relation which he afterwards (p. 76) somewhat flatteringly calls "intelligible," and repeats in another form as follows,—that "every mental phenomenon has its corresponding neural phenomenon (the two being as the convex and concave surfaces of the same sphere, distinguishable yet identical)" (p. 112). Such, too, is the expression that "the Object is the *other side* of the Subject" (p. 195); and that the external world is "*reflected* in Sentience" (p. 184). Surely never were such instances of what Mr. Lewes calls a phrase "doing duty for an explanation" (p. 152). Note too, that even the phrases (such as they are) though expressed in scientific language, do not even

---

\* See, for instance, p. 123 (where the psychoplasm is identified with experience), p. 126 (where he criticises the "introspection of consciousness"), pp. 133, 151, 202 (where phenomena are called "affections of consciousness with external signs"). The confusion between the two senses of consciousness cannot be better exemplified than on p. 249, where they occur in two consecutive lines.

profess to be based on scientific data, or to be arrived at by scientific method ; they are, in fact, nothing more than awkward expressions of a *metaphysical* guess.

So on this first point our augury is fulfilled. Mr. Lewes' promised explanation of the relation between Object and Subject turns out, as was expected, to be nothing more than an exposition of the physical dependence of nervous tremors on the surrounding medium, ingeniously expressed in language which conveys an entirely different meaning, and which can only be connected with the meaning arbitrarily assigned to it by assuming the metaphysical fact which is the whole question at issue.

Let us now turn to the second question, that of the nature of an External World. We have already said that the discussion of this is so mixed up by Mr. Lewes with that of the question which we have just considered, that it is almost impossible to disentangle from his words any connected thread of either. Nor is the reason of this far to seek. For seeing that Science can deal only with Phenomena, it is evident that all questions of which it is to treat must be reduced to phenomenal relations ; and therefore if it try to solve questions relating to other than Phenomena, this can only be done (even in appearance, not at all really) by expressing them in such phenomenal language as bears the closest analogy to them, and thus treating them as if they were phenomenal relations. This is equally necessary whether the non-phenomenal term of the relation be on the one side of Phenomena or on the other ; whether it be the conscious Subject or the extra-conscious Noumenon. And the connexion of nerve and medium having been dressed up to do duty for the former relation, will do just as well for the latter also, especially as it is an easy metaphor to describe Phenomena as lying halfway between Subject and Noumena, so that their relation to the one might seem to be merely the inversion of their relation to the other. However this may be, it remains certain that if the question of Realism and Idealism is to be passed off as capable of scientific treatment, it must be counterfeited by *some* phenomenal question ; and the phenomenal question which Mr. Lewes has chosen to counterfeit it, is, as in the case of Subject and Object, the relation of nerve to medium ; and by mixing up the three questions together in the way mentioned above, there is no doubt quite a sufficient degree of confusion introduced to mislead even the careful inquirer.

This identification of the question of nerve and medium with that of Realism and Idealism leads to very curious results ; more curious even than those which followed from its identification with the question of Subject and Object. For whereas Mr. Lewes is strictly speaking, by the mere fact of his denial of

Metempirics an Idealist ; and though whenever the question presents itself distinctly to his mind he enunciates Idealist doctrines, yet such a hold has the confusion referred to obtained over him that he is led to call himself a "Realist," and to propound a form of "Realism" peculiar to himself, which (with Herodotean rather than Socratic irony) he designates by the name of "Reasoned Realism." Let us first verify the former assertion that Mr. Lewes' real belief is that which ever since Berkeley has been called Idealism—namely, that the external world has no existence, so far as we know, apart from phenomena ; in other words, that its *esse* is *percipi*, or at most *sentiri*. "From subjective differences," he says (p. 191, cf. p. 192), "it has been concluded that there is an objective existence independent of all and *unlike* each ; I hold, on the contrary, that the objective existence *is* to each what it is felt to be." Again he says, "We conclude then that a thing *is* what it *appears*" (p. 361, cf. pp. 170, 178) ; and, going even a step further, "Speculation craves for a vision of the thing or event *in itself*, i.e. *unrelated* ; in other words, as it does not and cannot exist" (p. 362 : cf. too, the whole discussion as to the "extra-sensible" and "supra-sensible world," pp. 257—268). Never was Idealism more distinctly expressed.

We are far from saying that Mr. Lewes consistently maintains this view, even where he is confining himself strictly to this question. There are passages which seem to imply at least that modification of Idealism which asserts the possible or even actual extension of existence to relations to forms of consciousness other than our own ; and others which contain the *language* at least of crude Realism. As an instance of the latter, he says (p. 149, cf. pp. 186, 187), that "the sensation is fitly considered *real* because it has objective reality (*res*) for its antecedent stimulus." As an instance of the former, he asserts "the possibility of the external factor in perception having *another* existence in relation to *other* factors" (p. 193). And again he says, "I am far from implying that a supra-sensible does not exist. I only affirm that it does not exist *for us* as an object of positive knowledge, though forced upon us as a negative conception" (p. 252, cf. p. 192).

But, on the whole, it would seem that he would maintain that which a system which rejects inquiry into the "otherness" of things as metempirical and impossible (cf. pp. 18, 182) necessarily implies, namely, that the Noumenon or Thing in itself, whether it exist in other relations or not, does not exist as far as we are concerned. "All that we can know of the external," he says (p. 178), "is what we have felt or might feel," so that *to us* at least the Phenomenon is the Real, and "the object felt exists precisely *as* it is felt ; existing for us only in Feeling, its reality is what we feel" (p. 192). And this no one, except by a

complete inversion of terms, could call anything but Idealism; the Reasoned and Reasonable Idealism of Berkeley.

And yet Mr. Lewes calls himself a Realist, a "Reasoned Realist." What then is the meaning of this? Simply that he mistakes the question at issue. He represents it to himself as a question not between phenomena and noumena, but between phenomena and ideas, between sense and reason; in other words, he treats it as another aspect of the question between Subject and Object, Organism and Medium. Listen to his proclamation of the "doctrine of this work," "Reasoned Realism." "It is a doctrine," he says (p. 177), "which endeavours to rectify the natural illusion of Reason when Reason attempts to rectify the supposed illusion of Sense I call it Realism, because it affirms the reality of what is given in Feeling;" (mark that this is in opposition not to noumena, but to reason or ideas), and Reasoned Realism, because it justifies that affirmation through an investigation of the grounds and processes of Philosophy, when Philosophy explains the facts given in Feeling. The reality of an external existence, a Not-self, is a fact of Feeling, so indissolubly woven into Consciousness that the very terms in which Idealism seeks to disprove it are themselves derived from it." Now, so far is Idealism from seeking to disprove this, that it is the one fact which Idealism undertakes to prove; for it is the very point of difference between Idealism and Realism that the former maintains that the reality of an external world consists in feeling and in feeling alone, while the latter holds that it is something outside feeling altogether. The question as to the relation of feeling to reason is one which is not in dispute between them, and which neither of them is concerned to answer. Mr. Lewes says (p. 181) that "the original fact given to all is that of an external reality present in Feeling, the fact that a Not-self exists." No doubt; but such a Not-self is exactly the Not-self of Idealism, for it is Not-self as opposed, not to the self of Consciousness or Feeling (the correlative of the Not-self of Realism), but to the self of Reason only. We will quote but one more passage, and that will conclusively demonstrate what Mr. Lewes imagines to be the question by solution of what he calls himself a Reasoned Realist (p. 185).

"Between Realism and Idealism I should say that the question must be rendered more definite by a preliminary settlement as to whether we ask a question of Psychogeny or a question of Psychology. If it is the genesis of our modes of sentient reaction and their relation to the external which we consider, then the answer will take the realistic form; since Psychogeny, tracing the evolution of Sensibility in the organic world, must conclude that it is the external order which *determines* the internal order, by determining the organic structure of which Sensibility is the property: the evolution of perceptions,

instincts, volitions, conceptions, is through successive adaptations of the successively modified structure. But if the question be not one of genesis, if it assume the existence of the organized structure with its developed aptitudes, the answer will be a sort of compromise between the realistic and idealistic answers. Psychology accepting the developed organism as one of the factors in the fact of perception, estimates the influence of this co-operant, and concludes that since the organism necessarily reacts according to its modes, it may be said to colour objects, although this mode of reaction is itself a mode *originally* due to the action of objects."

And after some further discussion of the same kind he states his own position in the following terms, which have been already quoted, but are sufficiently striking to bear repetition: "I regard Perception as the assimilation of the Object by the Subject in the same way that Nutrition is the assimilation of the Medium by the Organism" (p. 189). Could there be a more complete justification of the statements which have been made above, that Mr. Lewes, while professing to deal with the metaphysical questions of the relation of Subject and Object, and of the nature of an external world, never even touches upon either of them, but deals instead with the totally different question of the relation of Organism to Medium, a question of neural tremors, and nutrition, and psychoplasm? The relation of Subject to Object is first mixed up with that of phenomena to noumena, and then both are identified with the relation of nerve to medium. Such is at once the result and the explanation of the promised application of scientific method to Metaphysics. We cannot wonder that metaphysical problems seemed to offer no difficulties to Mr. Lewes.

We have now tested Mr. Lewes' treatment of these two metaphysical questions, selected not only for their testing value but at his own suggestion, and we can have no hesitation in affirming that he has not advanced a single step towards the solution of either of them by the use of the method which he has proposed. We may add, that neither he nor any other writer will ever do so. The reason of this has been already implied, but as it is apparently so easily lost sight of, it may be well to restate it. It is this:—Science deals with phenomena, and its method is the comparison of phenomena *inter se*; Metaphysics, on the contrary, deals with the relations of phenomena as a whole to other genera of existence. (This is not indeed its whole sphere, but is the only part of it which is concerned with phenomena.) Hence it is impossible that either the results or the method of Science should lead to the discovery of any metaphysical truth; as impossible as it would be by the study of Optics to infer the relation of light to sound or electricity.

We must conclude, therefore, that metaphysical questions are beyond the range of scientific investigation. Does it follow that they are metempirical? Mr. Lewes would say that this is the only alternative; for, according to him, whatever does not admit of scientific treatment is metempirical and unknowable. But if by metempirical be meant what Mr. Lewes defines it to mean (p. 17), namely, "that which lies beyond the limits of experience" (whether actual or possible), then it is not true that the problems of Metaphysics are metempirical. Mr. Lewes' error lies in the supposition that the sphere of Science embraces the whole of experience: whereas, as has been already shown, it includes only one portion of it, the objective; while there is another portion, equally extensive, namely, the subjective, which lies altogether outside it. By this subjective experience is meant not any organ of intellectual intuition or faculty of grasping the supra-sensible, such as Mr. Lewes sets up (in order to knock down) as the only possible source of experience besides phenomena; but simply the succession of conscious states, of pains and pleasures, volitions and emotions, thoughts and memories, which form the personal or inner life of each individual, and which are to him quite as integral a portion of experience as the sensuous or phenomenal succession, which, though in a sense part of the same consciousness, yet by certain marks of independence he separates from the former succession, of which all the terms are apparently present in consciousness, and therefore subject to volitional control, and classes apart as a succession of which only certain scattered terms present themselves to him, and that according to laws which are only partially within his own control; and so projects as it were out of himself as an external world. It is with the latter alone that Science deals, and its mode of operation is that which its origin and subject matter imply, namely, by neglecting the accident of what particular terms are present in consciousness in each individual instance, and by varying the circumstances from time to time by means of observation and experiment, to eliminate consciousness from the result, and so, in Mr. Lewes' phraseology, to calculate known functions of an unknown quantity in terms of other known functions. In this way it can use data involving unknown and even irrational quantities, and yet arrive at an ultimate equation in which all the terms are both known and rational. But this being so, it is evidently quite extraneous to the function of Science to inquire into the nature of these unknown quantities themselves. The science of colour can never even give a blind man a sensation of sight, much less give him direct consciousness of the sight of others. Nor can the *method* of Science be of any avail in this subjective branch, except in so far as all methods of comparison

and registration of results must be identical. The method of Science is confined to the objective side, and the subjective has a method of its own; a method perhaps little understood and imperfectly developed, but which may for distinctness' sake be called the introspective method, because its materials are derived from introspection or reflection, and the general scope of which must be to eliminate external factors, and express the result in a form independent of the accidents of an external medium, just as Science eliminates the internal factors and gets rid of the accidents of the individual consciousness. Here then is a branch of experience entirely independent of Science; but even this is not the sphere of Metaphysics, it is that of Subjective Psychology. The sphere of Metaphysics lies still higher: it embraces the whole of experience; not the objective or the subjective division alone, but the *whole*: it therefore includes both Science and Subjective Psychology. Its method must therefore be not either the scientific or the introspective; it must be a method embracing both, and harmonizing both. Thus at last in a higher sense than that implied by Mr. Lewes, Metaphysics does indeed include "the highest generalizations of research." But it is not confined to the highest truths of Science, nor to the highest truths of the inner consciousness; it embraces all truth, all possible knowledge. So too, its method is not the "objective logic" of Mr. Lewes, nor the "subjective logic" of the introspective school, but the universal logic, the organization formula of the whole of human experience.

The object of the preceding remarks having been to disprove the claim advanced by Mr. Lewes on behalf of Science to control, and, in fact, abolish metaphysical research, it has been necessary to point out what appear to us to be the due bounds of each, and to claim for Metaphysics the right to the exclusive and undisturbed possession of its own territory. In doing so we may seem to have been speaking in the interests of Metaphysics, and some of our readers may wonder at our apparent conversion to a belief in the fruitfulness of metaphysical inquiry. In conclusion, therefore, we will repeat that our criticisms have been made purely in the interests of Science, and to prevent any misconception or misdirection which might retard its progress; and will add that we still retain the opinion which has been often previously expressed in this *Review*, that the field of Metaphysics, though held by a title not to be disputed, though possibly containing in its depths the elements of extraordinary future fertility, and though even now broad and level and well suited for an arena of athletes, is yet in the present stage of human development a barren and unprofitable soil. What may be the duty of future ages it does not concern us to speculate; *our* duty lies in the present, and a

religion which denies the supreme importance of the present, and would have men try to live in the future, should be shunned as one of the most dangerous, because one of the most seductive of delusions. *At present* it seems to us that Science offers the only field for intellectual toil which brings a sure and adequate return to labour, and that for that reason it is the duty of the present race of mankind to apply themselves to its cultivation with their utmost energy. So far as this involves the comparative neglect of Metaphysics we have been and are still advocates of such neglect; and it is exactly because we do not wish that neglect to be prematurely or injudiciously terminated that we protest against its being turned into aggression. Further than this, we have no ill-will to Metaphysics.

Towards Mr. Lewes and his earnestness in the cause of Science we have the most cordial goodwill, and it is in all sincerity that we address to him the following parting words of advice:—

“Heat not a furnace for your foe so hot  
That it do singe yourself. . . . Know you not  
The fire that mounts the liquor till’t run o’er  
In seeming to augment it wastes it? Be advised.”

---

#### ART. VI.—THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN.

1. *Women's Need of Representation.* By Miss A. L. ROBERTSON, Dublin.
2. *Our Policy.* An Address to Women concerning the Suffrage. By FRANCES POWER COBBE.
3. *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* By T. W. HIGGINSON, New York and London.
4. *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.* A Reply to Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, &c. By LYDIA E. BECKER.

WHAT is the position of women in England at this day? It has, doubtless, risen with advancing civilization at war with old traditions; it has been improved by very slowly improving education; it is ornamented and disguised by masculine compliments; and it is surrounded, in drawing-rooms, by chivalrous homage, meaning thereby politeness, as well as by an abundance of outward comfort and luxuries. Yet—legally, and therefore, more or less, socially—it is merely a modification of ancient barbarism, ordered on barbarian principles,



mitigated in their working but still barbarian. The progress made in other directions, the changes other institutions have undergone, make this fact still more conspicuous, the position of women still more exceptional.

In the early ages of the human race advantage was taken of woman's physical weakness to make her literally a slave; she is now—in civilized nations, that is—merely in "subjection." In old times—and not such very old times either—she was reviled and despised for the defects fostered in her by slavery; she is now more gently branded by the law as an "inferior," in company with "criminals, lunatics, and idiots;" and complacently told by men—seriously, with the most complimentary intentions it may be, and with full conviction—that this legal inferiority, this positive subjection, implies and results in a social superiority, first formulated by "chivalry" (only women of the drawing-room class being recognised under this theory) and form, the safeguard of that higher moral excellence she is credited with along side of a lower mental capacity.

But this legal position of women does, we think, tell on herself and on society in general, in quite a different way, the unconscious, or half-conscious, efforts she has herself made hitherto, according to her more or less of education to resist these evil influences, producing, the while, the strangest incongruities. It has fostered grievous private and individual wrongs; and, worse still, it helps yet, as the principle on which it was founded has helped for ages, to lower the tone of that society it is supposed to benefit. Many thinking men and women, in continually increasing numbers, have begun to perceive this; and a good many others have been from time to time aware that there was something a little wrong in matters of detail—something here and there that might be amended. To these latter, and, we believe, to English legislators in general, it has always seemed easier to modify the evil workings of a vicious principle than to abolish it altogether. Such minds do not even seek to distinguish the authority of old-established prejudice from the sanction of nature and reason. It seems to them more natural to grant privileges than justice, indulgence than liberty. It has not occurred to them to ask themselves whether, after all, woman may not be allowed a voice, or at least the fraction of a voice, in the ordering of her own position in the world, of her own dearest interests and liberties.

It would be useless, most unjust, most unphilosophical, to bring a railing accusation against men on this account—especially unphilosophical because such, or such like, has been the course of action of all irresponsibly dominant classes since the world

began, until the eyes of both ruler and ruled have been at last opened to a sense of its injustice. And, further, it would be most ungrateful to those noble and generous minds amongst them whose hearty sympathy and active efforts to obtain justice for women—that is, in fact, justice to all society—deserve the most ample acknowledgment. It requires—and this is true of every one of us, man or woman—much imagination, much sympathy, much reflection in the first instance, to shake off the influence of ancient prejudice instilled into us from birth and inherited from ages. Many minds are wholly incapable of this effort. How many unconscious and even benevolent oppressors, throughout the long history of class and race-dominations, down to the modern slave-holder (for there have been kindhearted slave-holders, we doubt not), have been able to comprehend, or to how many has it even occurred, that traditional acquiescence on the part of the subjected does not necessarily constitute a natural or religious sanction; that a time may come when it is actually not enough to tell the subject-class that they have everything they want or ought to want, that they ought to be thankful to be taken care of, for they cannot take care of themselves, that they are by nature inferior? There comes a time when irresponsible power appears in a different light to those on whom it is exercised from that in which it is seen by those exercising it. It is long, indeed, before both parties become equally aware that *both* are injured by it; that justice, in such cases as these, “blesses both him that gives and him that takes,” much in the moment of giving, more in its after results.

This domination of one sex over the other—that is, of one half the mature human race over the other half—has lasted longer than most others, because the physical force is permanently on the side of the first. And this, indeed, is sometimes itself considered as a decisive reason why women should not plead right and justice: they cannot enforce them; therefore nature means that they should not have them any further than man finds it convenient to allow. But to refuse justice because it cannot be enforced is not in other relations of life reckoned the highest morality.

To many men, conscious in their hearts of nothing but kindness, indulgence, and generosity to the women they associate with; to many who see, or think they see, fairly happy marriages all round them; who see how often women “get their own way,” as it is called, by the good nature of their own particular rulers, by cajolery, by unconscionable teasing, by temper, by the obstinacy of their prejudices—those prejudices that men have fostered in women as “so feminine”—or even by superior good sense; to

those who have perceived that society, even as it is, can produce noble-minded women, and have possibly worshipped such in their hearts, or who ask for nothing better than to be allowed tenderly to protect some tender creature whom they love—to these it may seem exaggerated, unreal, and ridiculous to talk of the domination of men over women—at least in England and in most civilized countries. We think, with all deference to the feelings of such men, it is because the evils it has produced and is still producing are so deep-seated and complex, and extend so far beyond their own especial social surroundings, that they have escaped their notice; their very position of legal superiority, of which they are scarcely conscious, so habituated are they to it, having blinded their eyes.

And so are many, many women's eyes blinded; many who, happy in their own circumstances, have never dreamed, any more than their masters, of questioning the authority of old tradition; have never connected the vices of the society around them, or their own shortcomings, in any way, however indirect, with the position women hold in it. These will generally seem unconscious that their contentment with their own condition, their ignorance how far even it might be higher or more useful, do not necessarily constitute an argument for other women in other circumstances. They will perhaps protest, when female suffrage is spoken of, against women "stepping out of their right place." The question, however, is, what, after all, *is* woman's right place, the precise line beyond which it is profanation for her to step? Is it necessarily, precisely, and only the line pointed out by men—the point fixed by them in different ages, countries, and even classes, being different? Obediently as such women have adopted the traditional teaching of men, yet the question will arise, is it not just possible that men too have a little stepped out of *their* place in imposing these limits on women? It is allowed that they have done so, in more barbarous times, are they not doing so still?

Others again—multitudes—married and single, and of all classes, are conscious of something wrong in their own and others' lots, are pained by a vague uneasiness or suppressed bitterness, whilst without the culture needed to guide them clearly to *one* source of the evils,—we say *one*, for we are of course aware that the countless inequalities and iniquities growing up with a complicated civilization, and pressing so hardly even on many men, must have many sources. The evils however from which women suffer are especially aggravated by their legal position being essentially unchanged, whilst all things are changed around them.

In arguing for the principle of female citizenship, we must observe that the suffrage has no inherent magical or divine property in it to remove as by a charm all the evils of which we complain; yet, under our present institutions, the extension of it to women is the only way of expressing that principle, and is, we believe, an absolutely necessary balance to the increasing number of men now admitted. We are not, however, anxious to dwell much in this article on the directly political aspect of the question, nor yet on the terrible wrongs and miseries of women under its legal aspects, but rather to call the attention of candid minds to various social considerations deeply affected by their political and legal position. For all these, we maintain, are interdependent, acting and reacting on each other.

In carrying out this view, we may seem sometimes to be wandering rather far afield; but we hope that some few, both of men and women, will perceive that these apparent wanderings do in fact all lead up very directly to the point at which we are aiming.

Before going further in this direction, however, we will just notice the chief objections that have been raised to the emancipation of women, objections mostly of detail, raised by those who, unable to grasp a large general idea, instinctively fix their eyes successively on the supposed difficulties in carrying it out. Some of these objections—most of them, in fact—serve to display the curious ingenuity of the human mind in imagining hindrances to any alteration of an established order of things, the first feeling being always, not, how can we see our way to grant this? but, how shall we discover a sufficient number of objections to justify our refusal?

The objections in question have been answered over and over again; and it is a curious fact that in this discussion masculine opponents to the emancipation of women seem to have changed their traditional parts with women. Women urge a principle, men stumble at the details. Or they do acknowledge the principle, but decline to carry it to its legitimate results. Women ask for justice, men offer privileges: women advance reasons, men answer with their own feelings and instincts; women meet assertions with evidence in disproof, men re-assert them without attempting further proof.

Here, however, is the first, perhaps only, objection which really deserves attention, that the majority of women do not desire the suffrage.

We answer, that the minority which does desire it is a constantly increasing one (not adequately represented even by the increasing number of signatures to petitions). We must further point out

that a large portion of the majority, which does not desire it, has simply not been educated to think about it, and has passed a great part of life without the subject having been brought before it at all; whilst the minority, that does desire it, includes very many women of the highest intellect and cultivation, who have thought deeply on the subject, and many who, feeling for themselves and their neighbours the need of better protection than masculine legislation has hitherto allowed them, gladly welcome the faintest hope of emancipation. Next, as to those who desire the suffrage without signing petitions for it, few men can realize, without some effort of the imagination, the pressure put upon women in all cases where their views differ from those of the masculine public. There is, to begin with, their own tenderness for the prejudices of those with whom they live, not to say positive prohibition by fathers and husbands—such arbitrary interference with the independence of mature minds being so sanctioned by law and custom that it is hard, even for those who suffer from it, to resist it. Next, we must take into account that intense shrinking from masculine sarcasm and mockery which has been so carefully fostered in women that they have justly been said to “live under a gospel of ridicule.” And it is part of our argument that this moral coercion *has* been lavishly employed to supplement the legal subjection of women, much of their boasted acquiescence in what *we* consider a faulty state of things having been thus produced. Few can realize, we repeat, without some reflection, some sympathetic insight, how much silent revolt goes on in subjected classes before they openly rebel. In men this silent revolt is generally held to be dangerous, and worth inquiring into; in women, for obvious reasons, it is not. And with women it will be longest maintained, and with more corroding bitterness in proportion, in spite of the persuasions, half contemptuous, half flattering, which now, more frequently than before, alternate with sneers.

Others again—thinking and conscientious women—are still undecided to put their names to the movement, deterred by an overstrained sense of their responsibility; but these may at any moment conclude in its favour, and cannot be reckoned in the majority against it.

We are ready to allow that there are women—and doubtless even some thinking and cultivated ones amongst them—(oftenest, however, such as profess no knowledge and reason on the subject, only “instincts” and “feelings”) who deprecate female suffrage altogether; many more who are absolutely indifferent, and all of these are apt to conceive that their own individual dislike or indifference is argument enough against

extending the suffrage to those who *do* desire it, reason enough for withholding even their sympathy. Of all such women we would speak with respect and sympathy; yet may we not point out to them, and to the men who appeal to their authority, that it is scarcely reasonable that numbers of the thinking, the cultivated, the sensible, the practical, the suffering and oppressed amongst women, should be denied their desire in deference to the "feelings and instincts," the individual disinclination or indifference of the others? Many, too, of these others are precisely those whom the present bill for the female franchise would not affect personally. We hold, nevertheless, that even these, the indifferent—all in fact—would be directly or indirectly benefited in time by the change. Those who do not want the franchise need not exercise it—that is their own affair, as it is of men, who in like manner may decline to vote, though we hold that the choice ought to be given to them nevertheless. We doubt, however, whether these very female dissentients will not be glad, when the time comes, to use their own votes, after seeing how easily and quietly other women have used theirs before them. And what is more, we suspect the masculine objectors will be equally glad to profit by these votes.

Finally, the argument that women do not want the franchise and would be better without it, is in spirit the same as that by which slaveholders have always justified slavery. We do not hold that the negro's ignorance of the moral evils of his position was an argument for keeping him in it.

Of the other objections it may almost be said, that to state them is to refute them. First of these we will take men's "instincts and feelings." To us it does not seem more fair to decide the question of justice by the "instincts and feelings" of men than, as we have said, by the "instincts and feelings" of some women, as against the reason and practical needs of the others. And these "instincts and feelings" have been cited as authoritatively in sanction of restrictions which would *now* be thought barbarian, as of those still enforced and not yet thought barbarian.

Again, it is said that women are unfit for the vote, because they are women. It is true that the training enforced upon women, directly and indirectly, for ages, by men, whereby their characters and minds are in some sort the artificial creation of men, has seemingly had for its object to make them unfit for the powers men exercise. Women have, in consequence, for ages made no combined effort for emancipation; but exactly as they become aware of the real nature of this traditional training, does this supposed unfitness lessen, and the best way at this moment

completely to fit them to exercise those powers is to grant them.

What mental or moral "fitness" is sought for as a qualification for the masculine voter, except by that rough sort of classification which does not exclude the drunkard, the wife-beater, the illiterate, the liberated convict, and the semi-idiot? And when you place beside these Harriet Martineau, Florence Nightingale, George Eliot, and many more whose names we all know, as well as the numbers of women who show every kind of practical fitness in common life—to say that *these* are unfit because they are women, and *those* are fit because they are men, is very like begging the question.

But there are special unfitnesses urged against women. We cannot condescend to dwell on the argument that they are incapable of giving their vote for want of physical strength, or that the chronic state of "blushing and fear" prescribed for them by Mr. Bouverie would make it improper and impossible for even a middle-aged woman to face the bustle of polling-places, otherwise than by observing that if it were wished to grant women votes, means might easily be found for making it possible to deliver them. But we will mention one other (we think the only special) unfitness alleged against them (except indeed their want of training in political and official life, which they share with a large number of franchise-holding men). This special unfitness resides in their greater "impulsiveness," "excitability," and "sympathy," which are supposed to include and imply "unreasonableness" and "injustice." Till, however, it is argued that Ireland, for example, is naturally disqualified for the suffrage because the Celt is more "excitable," "impulsive," and "sympathetic" than the Saxon—or indeed till, as we must repeat, moral or intellectual qualifications are made a *sine quâ non* in any class of masculine voters whatever, this objection can hardly stand. We will, therefore, only suggest that the co-operation of impulse and sympathy with the more solid and matter-of-fact element in legislation may not be wholly without its political advantages.\*

Next, it has been alleged that already too many *men* have the suffrage, as a reason for withholding it from women. Even

---

\* It has been argued that the supposed excitability of women will drive them downright mad, if they are allowed to vote. Mrs. Anderson has met this droll suggestion by affirming, from her own professional experience, the good effect, more interesting occupations, more important objects in life have on women's health, bodily and mental. If a woman finds her interest in politics bringing her to the brink of insanity, she will perhaps, under proper medical advice, be able to refrain; but that is her own affair. We do not legislate to prevent *men* from going mad if they choose.

granting the fact, it is not just to say that, because A has had too much given him of a good thing, therefore B shall have none at all, especially when B even requires it as a protection against A. At all events, the extended suffrage has been granted, and cannot now be withdrawn—one reason the more, as we have implied, why women should desire it in their turn, since they now see the drunkard, the wife-beater, the illiterate called, in much larger numbers than before, to legislate indirectly for their dearest and the most delicate domestic concerns, those alike of the most refined and cultivated as of the most helpless and uneducated of their sex.

Here, naturally, comes the assertion, that “women are virtually represented by men.” Indeed, on every proposed extension of political rights, it has been usual for the classes who thought their interests opposed to it to urge that *they* virtually represented the others. This assertion is disproved by the whole course of class legislation in all ages and everywhere; and the harshness of masculine legislation for women certainly forms no exception to the rule.\*

If we are reminded that some classes of men are still unrepresented, we answer (putting aside the probably near approach of household suffrage), that *all* women of *all* classes are unrepresented, are all declared to labour under an irremediable birth-disqualification. Individual *men* of the unenfranchised classes can rise to acquire a vote: a woman never can. And women only ask for the vote on the same conditions as those on which it is conferred upon men.

Let us consider here the confessed difficulty of protecting wives in certain classes against the violence of their husbands, as bearing on the plea of “virtual representation.” We would not brand any class of our countrymen with hard names, least of all those who have so long suffered, in common with women, such grievous legislative wrongs, such cruel deprivation of education, and are even now struggling to emancipate themselves, scarcely conscious yet that the women’s cause rests on the same ground as theirs. But it is too sadly notorious to be denied that, in these working and labouring classes, public opinion and the growth of education have not yet banished drunken habits and consequent brutality, and that the difficulties in the way of adequate legal interposition are almost insuperable. Compare the penalties inflicted in these cases with those

---

\* Take, as one instance, the laws of the custody and guardianship of children, whereby the married (only the *married*) mothers, they whose sex’s special and highest function is said to be the maternal, are denied any legal right over their own offspring past the first few years of infancy, as against the will of the father, whatever or whoever he may be, living or dead.



in which a wife has assaulted a husband, or one man another man. *Here* there is no difficulty in carrying out the full severity of the law. We do not assert that those who administer it do not *wish* to enforce it in behalf of women, though judges and juries do sometimes give us cause to suspect them of considering an assault by the inferior on the superior, by the weaker on the stronger, as more heinous than one with the conditions reversed.

The wife is, in these classes, so helplessly in her husband's power, so trained to feel the violence of her master as a part of his conjugal superiority, that she very often dares not, perhaps actually does not, resent his brutality. It seems to us that at least one approach towards remedying this state of things would be to surround her social status with every equal right and dignity the law can give her. Law should not aim at rendering her *more* helpless, *more* dependent than inferior strength would naturally make her. The same barbarian prejudice which excludes all women from every political right also subjects the wife to a law which has been called "the most barbarous in Europe." It has naturally taken its full effect on the uneducated classes, that is, it has degraded both man and woman together. That almost superstitious, dog-like patience and loyalty which lead a wife to submit to a beating without complaint, and which some men tenderly praise as the *ne plus ultra* of wife-like excellence, might, we think, be exchanged for a nobler form of devotion by making her her husband's legal and social equal; and one indirect step towards this will be giving women some share in making the laws which concern themselves.\*

A favourite objection is, that the exercise of the suffrage will interfere with women's duties. It cannot be seriously meant by this that the taking up of a few hours every few years in delivering a vote will hinder a woman—even the most hard-working—in her daily duties more than it would a hard-working man. Indeed, in the present case, it is only asked for unmarried women and widows, many of them possessed of ample leisure and sufficient means. But is it meant that the possession of this franchise would so much more excite and unsettle their minds, and throw them so much more violently into political agitation in the quiet intervening years, than men, as to unfit them for those duties which we are assured it is their nature to perform, and which they find their chief happiness in? This argument rests on the following assumptions:—That it is the business of the legislature to provide more rigorously for the performance of women's private duties than men's; that their

---

\* This is the more needful since legislation for women, whether so called protective or other, is more and more taking the shape of restrictions on their personal liberty.

good sense and conscience will be found less trustworthy in proportion as they have liberty to exercise them ; that whilst we legislate to prevent the race in general from following blindly their natural instincts, we must also legislate to prevent women from *forsaking* theirs at the first opportunity ; and, finally, that women (unlike men) have no rights, only duties. Assuredly to a noble soul the word "duties" has a higher inspiration than the word "rights ;" only some of the highest duties cannot be so well performed without rights. The circle of a slave's duties is very small, and that of a woman's—though she is no longer in England a slave—has been restricted to a point that future generations will view with wonder.

Again, some who do not so much object to the admission (taken by itself) of the unmarried possessing the legal qualifications, cannot see their way to the admission of wives, and consider that objection conclusive against the admission of any, as this would be granting privileges to the recognised "failures" of society while they are withheld from their recognised superiors. We can but say, that if to grant the suffrage be an act of justice, you ought not to refuse it to some because you cannot yet see your way to extending it to all. This theory of the inferiority of women in general to men, and the special inferiority to be enforced by legal subjection on the married amongst them, who are yet declared to be the superiors of the single, involves some curious contradictions.

Further, these objectors will add that if you grant the suffrage to the single having the proper qualification, wives will by-and-by demand it as well, either by a change in the qualification for a vote, or in the marriage law. We answer, let that question be discussed when the time comes. It is neither just nor generous to refuse a rightful concession for fear other concessions may be asked for. Meanwhile the supposed moral difficulty of granting the suffrage to wives still rests mainly on the old assumption that women only wait the opportunity to discard their natural duties and affections ; that men can be safely trusted with absolute authority over their families, but women not even with the exercise of an independent opinion ; that wives at present neither have, nor in fact ought to have, any difference of opinion from their husbands (except on trivial points), but certainly would, if they were once permitted to act on their opinions ; and that they will necessarily seize the vote as an occasion for quarrel ; also on the assumption that it is the business of the State to provide against these little domestic difficulties in married life (but only, of course, by laying restrictions on the wife). We can scarcely suppose, however, that any man blessed with an affectionate wife seriously anticipates

that, once possessed of a vote, she would make it her business to thwart and oppose him. If his wife is not an affectionate one, we fear the legislature cannot help him, and we are very sure it is not its business to do so. We think this fancied difficulty would be best met in the case of a wife not quarrelsome disposed, but having an independent mind, by her husband's good humouredly reconciling himself to her possible difference of opinion in politics as he often has to do in matters of theology. But if such differences of opinion do so seriously affect the happiness of married life, let them be more carefully considered before marriage.

There is also the contradictory assumption that the wife's vote will be merely a double of her husband's, thus giving him two votes instead of one. Between these last two assumptions of perverse opposition on the one hand, and undue submission on the other, we may fairly strike a balance, and hope the State will fare none the worse in the end for the female married vote, should it be granted.

To be serious, we do not believe the harmony and dignity of married life—not even the dignity of the husband—can be best promoted by legislation to prevent quarrels; or by the theory that, as has been said, husband and wife are one, that the husband is *the* one, and that the two ought to have only one opinion in politics between them—viz., the husband's. If we are accused of overlooking the practical difficulties which might arise in adjusting the votes of husband and wife, we answer that we may leave these to the moment when it is actually proposed to extend the franchise so far: if the principle is once conceded, a way will be found of carrying it out; for the rest, husbands and expectant husbands may defend their rights hereafter when they are attacked.

Having said thus much, we must add our own distinct opinion that the sooner this notion of marriage in any way disqualifying women for the exercise of personal rights or responsibility to the State is got rid of, the better for all parties. And we believe, moreover, that, when once the vote is granted to single women, married men will themselves begin to perceive this, and will desire that liberty for their wives which has been attained to by others.\*

The same answer will apply to the objection that women, when once admitted to the vote, will (logically) be eligible to a seat in Parliament. We think we may confidently leave this question also to be decided on its own merits by some future generation, and by the constituencies concerned.

---

\* This part of the question has since been further complicated by the needless insertion in Mr. Forsyth's bill of a statutory disqualification of wives.

Lastly, there is the objection—the most formidable of all to some minds—that all female aspirants to the suffrage are “strong-minded women,” and that “strong-minded women are very disagreeable.” If by “strong-minded women,” is meant women of masculine character and idiosyncrasies, we believe as many of these might be found on one side as on the other, if it were worth while to inquire. If “strong-minded” means having a highly enlightened understanding, large ideas, and an ardent desire for the improvement of other women, we may suggest that these objectors would often be surprised to find how very charming such persons can make themselves. We dare say that the agitators for the abolition of slavery made themselves very disagreeable when urging their engrossing topic in season and out of season. People engaged in a great struggle will not always pause to consult the conventional rules of good taste, yet the cause may be a good one nevertheless. But we cannot gravely discuss this objection any further.

And now come two more serious reproaches addressed to women. “They have done so much mischief.” “They are agitating from a love of power.”

The accusation of “doing mischief” means, we imagine, only that women are not infallible in their judgment, any more than men (why is a human liability to mistake *more* disqualifying to women than to men?), or that there are points on which the objectors differ from some women, or that there always will be points on which some men will differ from some women, it being assumed, of course, that women will always be in the wrong. If the objectors mean that women, having power given them by the legislature to do mischief, will do a great deal more than men in the same position have ever done, that is in fact begging the whole question. No past experience can be appealed to as decisive, since women have never been placed in the position supposed; although the absolute denial of all direct legitimate exercise of power sometimes drives intense and ardent natures into exercising it by methods less wholesome than a recognised responsibility would employ. But even granting this—alas! have men never done mischief, terrible mischief, during the long ages of masculine domination? Take, as one instance, the legislation for Ireland up to this century, and more recent times still; could any female legislation be more blind, unjust, inhuman, and—mischievous?

Is the world, as governed by men, a thing even now to congratulate ourselves upon? and may not women think that even a slight co-operation of their own with the other sex in the councils of the nation—we are not now speaking of admission to Parliament—might have prevented, might still prevent, some of this mischief?

The reproach that "women are agitating from love of power," does not come with quite a good grace from that sex which has hitherto monopolized all power, exercised, as we think, with such grievous injustice to the other. But, in fact, the reproach is undeserved. Those who make it show such a misunderstanding of the deeply conscientious feelings and convictions on which this new movement is founded, as almost disqualifies them from discussing this question with us at all. Power to protect themselves from injustice women may be allowed to desire. But a still stronger motive is the belief that the welfare of society requires a different position for their whole sex.

Finally, recurring from all these details to the broad principle with which we started, that justice to woman is morally the same as justice to man, we will only add, let this be acknowledged in the full meaning of the word, and all these ingeniously devised objections founded on woman's assumed inferiority to man fall at once to the ground. In the original fallacy, other false principles are involved, as that absolute perfection, moral and mental, is more needful in female than in male electors, and that to guard against possible inconvenience to men is a more pressing obligation than to remove an actual wrong to women.

We now come to those selfish inducements held out to woman herself to acquiesce in her present subjection, first glancing, however, at the half-triumphant warning that, with the privileges of citizenship, she must accept its burdens. That special burden which, we believe, the true Briton regards as the weightiest, that of taxation, she bears already, without the very privilege attached to it by divine right, as understood in Britain—to wit, the electoral franchise. This, though a flagrant departure from a cherished principle, we do not complain of as her hardest practical grievance; because in this case men, in fighting their own battle, must necessarily also fight that of women, and in some sort, therefore, do really represent them.

We must also advert to that appeal to women themselves on which men seem most triumphantly to rely. They say, that, if they are obliged to grant women equal social and legislative rights, *i.e.*, justice, they will no longer receive from men that so-called "chivalrous homage" which they regard apparently as sufficient compensation for every disadvantage and every humiliation attending the whole sex, in and out of drawing-rooms, and which they think women cannot reasonably look for except as a tribute to their legal inferiority and helplessness—that, in short, every virtue of which we can imagine woman possessed, every gift of grace, beauty, and intelligence, joined, too, as they must *still* inevitably be, to inferiority of physical strength, will fail to secure for her man's respect and tenderness, unless she will accept him as her master and irresponsible political ruler. How

is this? Is the spirit of "chivalry" a spirit of bargain? and a very one-sided bargain? Or, putting aside the idea of deliberate bargain, is this a faithful picture of man's nature—at least of Englishmen's, which is our chief present concern? Is it contrary to his nature, for instance, to yield kindly aid to inferior strength unless it will meekly confess to mental inferiority and will promise obedience? Is it contrary to his nature to be just and generous at the same time? We believe that men do themselves injustice in affirming this.

As for those outward symbols of "chivalrous homage" with which we are all familiar in drawing-rooms and such-like scenes, it is certainly, at first sight, hard to connect the forfeiture of these with the elevation of some women, or all women, to citizenship. But though it might be quite possible to do without these little privileges for so great an object, yet, truth to speak, the force of custom in regard to social etiquettes, even those generally felt to be burdensome and absurd, is so great that probably such harmless ones as these will long survive. We incline to think it will be long before all gentlemen remember to press out of drawing-rooms before their lady-acquaintances, to help themselves first at table, to stand by whilst the objects of their former homage step out of their carriages, or into boats, without offering a hand, or in railway travel to remember not to be charmed by the looks or conversation of a lady fellow-passenger till they have satisfied themselves that she has not a vote. Seriously, we incline to think that men will observe all this innocent little ceremonial—which is partly a civilized regulation to secure orderliness in social intercourse, partly an assumption of a difference in physical strength, which, false or true, will not be affected by the possession of a vote—till women forfeit men's respect by forfeiting their own, a result not certain to follow from their acquiring a sense of higher responsibility to the State. These things will last probably till all society is placed on a different, perhaps simpler and nobler footing, by other concurrent changes in civilization and education still far distant. But what is best in our social humanity need never disappear—mutual courtesy, kindness, such consideration between the sexes, and such help and sympathy from each to each, as are surely no more to be grudged from men to women, in any case, than from the younger and stronger man to the old, and infirm, and respected of his own sex, however his equal in political rights and political intelligence.

On the other hand, there is surely something more real, more trustworthy in manly heroism, manly devotion to duty, than even in that "chivalrous homage" so admired as the most perfect compensation for female subjection, the most satisfactory modification possible of barbaric female slavery, and which generally

expects in return some natural little gratification to its own self-love or vanity. We are not going to quarrel with it for thus seeking its reward—only it must not boast itself too much. We may be sure, too, that the spectacle of any brave, honest work, whether of the hand or the brain, done for love or duty, kindles the heart and imagination of the true woman, and exalts her respect for her partner, far more than that other spectacle of man making or upholding laws to secure to himself his wife's obedience, the possession of her property, and his own undivided control over his and her children, far more than his assurance that he classes her politically with idiots, lunatics, and criminals, in order to increase his own respect for her, and because she likes it—or, at least, ought to do so.

If these "chivalrous" opponents have the faith they profess in woman's native grace and refinement; if they do not believe these qualities to be entirely the creation of certain artificial restrictions on her liberty of action, which no education of thought and reason can supply the place of; if they do not believe she is dignified and refined solely by accessories and surroundings, having *within herself* under no circumstances the power to dignify and refine *them*; if they do not hold this strangely "unchivalrous" and dishonouring doctrine of woman's nature, then how is it that they suppose all these precious attributes can be got rid of so very easily? They can scarcely believe she will lose them by learning to take an interest in the concerns of her country, and to express that interest every few years by a conscientious vote, in the delivering of which she may be as well protected as in witnessing the procession of a royal bride, a race, a play, or an opera. If there should appear, in any woman's ardour on these subjects, anything ungraceful or exaggerated, there is probably some such defect in her natural organization manifesting itself alike in all her doings. On the whole, a woman will be in politics pretty much what she is—by her natural temperament—in all other spheres. If she is uneducated, and therefore irrational, she will be violent and personally prejudiced in politics, even as Captain Basil Hall relates of the usually elegant and agreeable Spanish ladies of South America—that they became perfect furies when they talked of the revolt of the native population, not because they had political rights, but because that in politics they had personal passions.

But in fact such objectors, however "chivalrous," however kind-hearted—as many of them truly are—*have no faith* in woman, no faith in the goddess they worship with flattery, incense and gay pageantry; and it would be well if they would frankly confess this. Then we should know exactly where to

meet them. In the meanwhile, till man can acquire this faith, this generous trust, society will make small moral progress—and need we remind the shallowest student of human nature that to make human beings trustworthy, you must take courage to trust them?

That women's tender interest in those they love would be deadened by these enlarged views of political and social life, that they would thus grow somehow more selfish and less useful to men in consequence, is a prejudice such as has been held to justify even harsher restrictions, and one we think unworthy to influence for a moment a generous mind. That the blind idolatry with which they have often injured, sometimes ruined, their idols, will be exchanged for a feeling more elevated and elevating, is very likely; but we need not regret *this* transformation.

There is a refined and tender side, as we shall again and again admit, to these remonstrances. The ideal of graceful, clinging weakness, the "smiling domestic goddess"-ship (divorced indeed both from intellect and good sense), so admired by Thackeray, the sacred pedestal-worship of poetic theories, have such a charm for some manly imaginations, that the suggested introduction of some newer type is as terrifying to them as the threat of a new railway or row of houses to the inhabitants of a rural paradise. We predict, however, that amongst the many varieties of the female type we hope to see developed, whatever is really good and beautiful in their own favourite one is likely still to "abound;" what is not so good and beautiful will be less easily rooted out than we could wish, and many a "fair defect" will long remain to rejoice their hearts and fancies. Such will be as the childish element in the race, and, as such, worthy of all indulgence and tenderness.

But we must also remind the "chivalrous" that their ideal is, and always has been, the monopoly of a small privileged class. For "chivalrous homage" has nothing to say to the poor, hard-working wives and mothers outside that, nor to the thousands of courageous single women who are too strenuously fighting the battle of life—often for others as well as for themselves—to have time to cultivate graceful clingingness, or to stand on pedestals. It would be hard, truly, to withhold citizenship, and whatever dignity and support it may confer, from these "lonely, unadmired heroines," for the sake of keeping up a special feminine ideal as the monopoly of a special class.\*

We see, indeed, where this long subjection of women, most

---

\* The number of women supporting themselves by manual labour, alone, is stated at three millions.



favourably exhibited in the placing of some of them on a fancied pinnacle, has landed us at last. It finds us confronted by a glaring discrepancy between profession and performance, which must make the very word "chivalry," if they even heard it, seem a cruel mockery to the rest.

Some theorists, we know, will say, "True, all is not right as it now is; but there is a remedy. She is now *too* independent, she has got *one* hand free; bind *both* again, bind her hand and foot—put her more completely in men's power; but educate men and women better, so that man may be less likely to abuse his power, and woman may know her proper place; protect her exactly as you would a child, by stringent legislation, leaving her no discretion, no option, and then trust the rest to man's generosity, and the perfect dignity this perfect subjection and perfect powerlessness will give her." But women have a right to a voice before this theory of a dominant sex can be forced on them.

Moreover, let us remind the upholders *par excellence* of "feminine delicacy and refinement" how very different are and have been the ideas attached to these words in other ages and other countries, and maintained with obstinate persistence, and confidence that they rest on the immutable sanction of nature and religion. Ask the respectable Turkish father of a family what will happen to society when the harem doors are unlocked, and the women allowed to go forth unveiled—nay, ask the respectable Turk's ladylike wife and daughter—and their answer will be the same. Go back to the days, not so very long ago, when in all countries, Christian and pagan, a woman was married without her consent being asked; when worthy fathers of families would have been shocked at the indelicacy of a girl presuming to have a choice, or even a veto on her parents' choice. Nay, when the bold idea was first started of teaching women to read, "Fancy," can we not see it said in some popular journal of those mythical days? "fancy a woman forsaking the spindle and frying-pan, her own peculiar science, to plunge into the unfeminine mysteries of the alphabet!" Not to mention some *very* civilized European countries where, even in the present day, if a girl (of the drawing-room class, we mean) were known to have once walked out in town unattended, it would destroy her chance of marriage, and where it is with difficulty believed that such liberty in England is not abused.

Why, then, is it so certain that we here, in England and now, have reached that exact point of feminine freedom beyond which we cannot go without contradicting nature—that exact type of refinement which admits of no further modification?

Let us remember that with every fresh instalment of liberty and independence granted to women by advancing civilization, every step forward from her primitive condition of slavery to her present position of legal subjection, she has received not less, but more, kindness and respect from men, and the masculine ideal has not ruinously suffered thereby. Women have attained to far more self-reliance and liberty of movement in the United States of America than in England; but no one has asserted that they are as a consequence of less importance to men, or treated with less deference. To say that their manners are not to the taste of those Englishmen who know them only by hearsay is beside the argument, nor is this distaste generally shared by Englishmen who know them by personal acquaintance.

Why, then, should we fear that one step further in the same path of independence would do all that the others have failed to do—at once revolutionize all the natural relations of the sexes, and transform, as we are so often told, women into men?

The truth is, social circumstances in all civilized communities, and notably in this, have outgrown the old theory of women's proper place in the world. The increased difficulty of living, felt in all classes, the 800,000 women in excess of men, the exclusion of women from all but one or two modes of gaining a precarious livelihood, the increased importance of education with so small an increase of the facilities offered to women, making it impossible for them to cope with men in the struggle for actual existence, and all these causes rendering marriage for women at once more necessary and too often more impossible, such realities have reduced to a mere figment the theory of universal protection, dependence, and homage.

The men of the past did what seemed the best in those days; the men of the present are not to blame for the altered conditions which have made it the worst. But they will be to blame if they persist in upholding it and in regarding attempted reforms as attempts to "remove the landmarks of society;" if, in a word, they endeavour to force the life of successive generations of women into the old Chinese shoe of subjection and restraint, fancying that if they just make it a little easier, all will be right. The shoe must be made to fit perfectly, and women themselves must decide whether it does so.

And now comes the question of the influence actually exercised by women, in the cultivated and comfortable classes that is, for no other female influence over men is generally spoken of as of any importance. Gentlemen, when they speak of women, mean "ladies." And as "ladies" are the wives, mothers, and sisters of the class which at present governs us, their influence *is* important,

fearfully important; though this is no reason for casting aside so much as, in common parlance, we are too wont to do, the interests of women in the sphere beneath that recognised by "chivalry," and the influence which they too *ought* to be able to exercise.

But let us see what this influence of "ladies" is. We are told that it is very great, and those who say so are apt to go further, and fling all responsibility for social vices on the women of society. Let women humbly acknowledge to themselves their own shortcomings; they could not do much, but some of them, perhaps, might have done more. Capable, it may be, of better things, too many have been led ignobly astray by vanity and frivolity, too many by precept and example have done harm where they might have done good, thus rendering back to man the ill that the long domination of masculine ideas has wrought upon them. But while it is safe to be severe on themselves individually, it is not so safe to be blind to the faults of the social system under which they live. The fact remains that the influence of women is very small, compared with what it is said to be, and might be, if men so willed it. No influence worth naming such can be exercised but by an independent mind, and such independence is made tenfold more difficult to women at the present day, not only by men's prejudices, but by the difficulty of marriage resulting from the conditions before alluded to. This, an evil over which neither men nor women have any immediate control, is no doubt in great part the secret of the humble attitude which women are apt to take towards men, and the triumphant scorn of the sex so frequently displayed by popular journals.

This dependence acknowledged, for men to lay the blame of their own weaknesses on their so-called "weaker" sisters, to seek to silence their remonstrances by assuring them that *they* are the guilty party, or at least equally guilty with their masters, of those social corruptions we all cannot but see around us, is an unconscious baseness which even good men sometimes fall into when judging of the other sex.

In order that woman may really exercise that wholesome and purifying influence ascribed to her as her natural attribute, she should herself be left free and unbiassed by fear or favour. If she is to inspire men with a refinement and morality a little deeper than drawing-room decorum, she must not herself have first to learn by rote from him the lesson she is to teach him again; she must not be cheated into taking all the rules of life unquestioning on man's traditional authority, and mistaking the dread of his reproach and ridicule for the voice of innate womanly conscience. She must not be coaxed, from earliest girlhood, by ball-room admirers, and even the gravest philosophers,

into preferring her own (so-called) "feminine instincts," that is, prejudices, to the dictates of reason, sense, and duty, to find in later life "feminine unreasonableness" a bye-word in men's mouths, to find herself exposed to the good humoured contempt of the placid husband and the scolding of the irritable one, and to hear—no longer as the delighted tribute to youthful charms, but as a grave disqualification—that women have "no sense of justice." She must not be taught that narrow views of religion are especially becoming to women, and the only safeguard to their virtue in the eyes of the laxer sex. She must not, as the mother of a family, have always that warning voice in her ear that "men hate learned women," or that "men don't want intellect in their wives" (which indeed is not so surprising in those who themselves have neither intellect nor learning) till her very schoolboy sons catch up the cry. She must not be brought up utterly to ignore all great social and national interests, all enlightened views of politics; she must not be taught that the one great object of woman's life is marriage, and, to obtain it, pleasing men, when every day the social obstacles in the way of marriage are increasing; and, above all, she must not be forced or hoodwinked into accepting from masculine dictation two distinct moral codes—one for men and the other for women.

Where these teachings have not been perfectly enforced, as of course will often be the case, either from partial enlightenment in the teacher or instinctive revolt in the taught, they will be found to have caused in simple and noble minds more mental and moral suffering than actual moral deterioration. But what society has lost, still loses, by the waste of such good material, it has not yet attempted to reckon up. A movement has now been set on foot and is slowly gaining strength to repudiate these teachings, which have, as we have said, found rebels scattered here and there at all times; yet while legislation, man's legislation for woman, still represents the ideas embodied in them, still ignores the incongruity between the theory and the facts of woman's position in the world, so long will it be, not the elevating and purifying influence of women upon men (the theory of "chivalrous" moralists), but the depressing and deteriorating influence of man upon woman, that regulates society. Let men, even philosophers, repeat as they will that "women have everything in their own power, that it is their own fault if men are not better than they are," we affirm that the more we look below the surface, the more we shall be convinced that whilst man remains the irresponsible legislator for women, these things will be as we have said.

The social phenomena developed by man's domination in women's education, ideas and character, are so numerous and

complex as almost to defy classification. We are far from classing the women, even of the sphere which we have taken for our text, "all in one," but this seems evident, that the general result has been a most disheartening mediocrity. We have hopes, it is true, that the efforts now being made by those social benefactresses, who are so earnestly fighting the educational battle for their sisters, powerfully aided by like-minded and generous men, will greatly mitigate this state of things for a fortunate part of the younger generation. But, for the present, though "the softening influence of domestic life," "the purity of English homes" are pretty phrases, yet, all the same, men and women are doing their best to degrade each other to a pitiful mediocrity. Not all the prettiness of blooming girlhood (and a pretty English girl is a charming object, whether one is in a moralizing mood or not), not all the brightness, activity and kind-heartedness of narrowly-educated women, however "clever" they may be, can hide this sad truth from our eyes.

Let us begin—working upwards from seeming trifles—with one time-honoured social institution, through which the wholesome and refining influence of one sex over the other is supposed to make itself felt. We tremble as we approach this sacred field, and find ourselves compelled in sober sadness to drop disrespectful words on the privileged flirtations of the young. We would not be severe either on those who encourage or those who practise this favourite diversion. Yet, after all, in spite of the glamour thrown by youthful excitement and inexperience, by the regretful and sympathetic retrospect of age, and by the imagination of poets and painters over the ball, the croquet, the picnic, and all the other playgrounds of "society," it must be owned that the prospect is not encouraging to our hopes of the young. The "flirtation" which reigns here between the two sexes, encouraged by all social customs, provided for at the cost of time, money, health and mental improvement, has in it mischief which lies deeper than at first appears. It is more than "matter for a flying smile." Many will agree with us so far, but will strenuously resist the application of radical remedies to the whole position of society. Palliatives, not prevention, not cure, have ever been the favourite study of English philanthropy.

It is at this point of transitory, counterfeit courtship (in itself damaging to the freshness of youthful affections) that we first trace the effect of that low standard of excellence required from women. Man in general requires little from the woman he loves, still less from the woman he flirts with: we all know that a pretty face, a pretty dress and a few "womanly" coquetries generally suffice for him in either case, and he takes his chance of finding other qualities behind these when it is too late to

make a fresh choice ; while woman, dwarfed to meet these small requirements, requires little from him in return. And so the taste is formed, so marriages are made, and so society and the race are deteriorated.

The last thing we would wish to disparage is the natural, light-hearted, innocent enjoyment of each other's society, in the young of the two sexes. We wish it were far more easily come by and begun earlier too, and were freed from that uneasy self-consciousness which is so often and so needlessly substituted for the frank courage of innocence. From that morbidly-watchful egotism which, under the name of "propriety," used to be so much enjoined, and which would be ill exchanged for the "fastness" of which, in certain circles, one hears so much, we turn with relief to that artless enjoyment of life and society which characterizes unspoiled girlhood, accompanied by a really strong interest in some pursuit. It finds its salvation in those genuine tastes which carry us out of ourselves (not necessarily "learned" or "intellectual")—it may be gardening, or music, or painting, or some kindred art—only, for Heaven's sake, let it be *real*, let it be good of its kind, let it be honestly followed ; and the more of such the better.

On such common ground of genuine tastes and pursuits, young men and women may healthfully meet each other, and prepare for the closer partnership and co-operation of after-life ; and much, very much, we trust, will this common ground be enlarged by wider education. But what has this happy, true-hearted sympathy, which we long to see prevail everywhere, purged more and more from vanity and *arrière-pensée*, to do with the artificial sentimentalities, the unmeaning personalities, and empty rattle of flirtation, either between two equally trifling beings, or a so-called sensible man and a poor girl taught that to be admired she must "flirt" prettily, and dress prettily, and need not be well-informed ? *These* have nothing in common but the common interest of vanity ; and whether such a flirtation end in marriage or not, they who pursue it are equally injuring their own tastes and characters, and unfitting themselves for true marriage.

Sometimes indeed, as we all know, great misery follows from this playing with fire—especially in the woman, where an untrained, unoccupied mind is joined to a warm heart or vivid imagination. But how much of this suffering might be saved to either party if a frankness, now thought impossible between men and women, could be cultivated. Were this united to a more trained judgment and more engrossing occupations for women, we might less often see the sensational coquette followed by trains of admirers, her heart ever half-touched, and only half-satisfied, her frivolous vanity never satiated ; we might less often see truer

and more passionate hearts racked by the ignoble indecision or still more ignoble insincerity and heartlessness of a counterfeit lover. Women would then oftener see through the unworthiness of such a nature before it was too late, and the irretrievable waste of many a precious year of life be averted. The coquette, too, and even the much-abused "fast girl," would find better fields for their love of power (as natural to some women as to some men), as well as for the restless animal spirits and healthy untrained energies which are perhaps chiefly answerable for those vagaries to which the world is so severe.

And what must the marriages be to which this style of social intercourse leads up—putting aside for the moment moral questions of a more tragic significance? Will not this account partly for the falling off of youthful love and all the poetry of life which is thought almost inevitable in marriage? And may not much of the ignobleness of society, of class selfishness, national selfishness, have something to do with these commonplace impulses by which marriages are brought about and families are formed?

In this discouraging view, it must be observed, that we are speaking of what are considered the better kind of average marriages—that is, those which are more or less of choice (perhaps they might just as well be called of chance); not of the many which are in great measure dictated by motives of interest or convenience, which latter, on the woman's side, is too often the supposed desperate necessity of being married at all. And this too is the result of our social arrangements!

It seems wonderful how that prevalent taste among men for female mediocrity is shared even by such as appear fit for better things. Negatives seem to attract, as if woman were to be admired rather for what she is without than what she has; the absence of some power or intellectual gift being constantly mentioned as a positive quality, not to say merit, rather than as a deficiency—a mode of estimation never used with men. And the qualities which do attract are too often superficial attributes, often those semi-childish prejudices and conventionalities, the result of a narrow education for generations, which are generally called "feminine instincts," and considered charming. This is partly the result of a prevalent idea that tenderness of feeling and good household management can seldom be found apart from these, and that the clinging subjection to man which is thought the natural position, the crowning grace of woman, is incompatible with a cultivated mind and original views. As often as not, however, his fancy invests with this poetic charm some nature below even the low standard he prefers; since whenever we limit our aspirations after excellence, we are liable to fall short even of that limit. Even these limited ideals vary, how-

ever ; some profess to be content with the ideal of the intelligent cook and housekeeper, and hold that a woman cannot and ought not to have time for anything else.

Yet do not those men of sense and intellect who seek for attractive mediocrity, if they think about it at all, expect their sons to inherit their own masculine superiority, and their daughters to renew the maternal type? But there is no natural law forbidding—what in fact we so frequently see—the descent of intellectual gifts to the daughters, and the more commonplace attributes to the sons. These sons will probably marry their likes ; the daughters, not finding their natural mates, and not able to seek for them, as probably as not remain unmarried.

Fortunately there are various types between the extremes we have mentioned, some, if rare, yet beautiful—tender, sympathetic, refined female natures, incapable of initiative, but appreciative and reverent of true superiority, by associating with which they gradually educate themselves, and in whose society a man tender and refined enough to appreciate their charm, may well feel himself blest. Yet even such beloved and tender beings feel too often a vague, painful sense of incompleteness and inferiority never quite absent—the greater because of its instinctive admiration of what is excellent. These, too, need a higher education.

We can understand and respect the man of uncultivated intellect who has the manly humility to acknowledge that a highly educated woman would not be a fit mate for him, and that tenderness, simplicity, and purity of heart, without even the perfecting grace of intellect, are enough for his needs. But what does fill us with regretful wonder is, that this incapacity to appreciate the best and completest should be ever made a boast by men, and expressed with the evident feeling that men's preference for the mediocre is a crushing sentence against the woman of trained intellect. Our most popular novelist, whilst sneering at the "heroic female character," bids us regard as the standard to which women should most aspire, the having "all the men in a cluster round her chair, all the young fellows battling to dance with her." According to this judgment, this special court of appeal to which the loftiest-minded woman must bow—her wisest policy, her most womanly grace, will be to disguise, at least, if she cannot extinguish, her superiority.

No woman of real refinement and right sympathies can wish to disparage *true* grace, beauty, and sweetness. They form together a power worthy of respectful homage. But they can hardly exist—at least, hardly last—without a certain strength and elevation of character. True sweetness means strength, not servility, not indiscriminating devotion (beautiful and com-



mendable in a dog we allow, but not quite an adequate expression of womanly affection), not characterless goodnature, not the mere liveliness of youth, nor silliness; true grace implies a harmonizing artistic faculty and a moral balance which can scarcely belong to a commonplace nature, guided only by conventional laws. As for true beauty, how little do we yet realize what glorious types of form and feature are in store for the world, when strength of body and mind, health, courage, and freedom have been developed by generations of enlightened culture—what radiance and fulness of life, what new intelligence and ardour of expression, what splendour of frame, such as we should now look on as fitter for another planet! These are dreams as yet, but they have a practical value if they preserve us from seeking our ideal in a direction contrary to true progress.

But to descend from these poetic heights—at least since the young, pretty, and lively have an influence over men's acts and wishes at present quite out of proportion to their power to use it well, they should be trained, if only with a view to the welfare of their own households, to a more enlightened sense of their responsibilities than men can at present appreciate. If any modest man is alarmed at the prospect of an era of learned and splendid women, let him be assured that it will be long, very long before it comes, and that when it does, by the necessity of the case, men will have risen too. There will long be a supply of the women whom men emphatically call "feminine"—a word which has been for ages the engine of women's oppression. Its meanings have varied, but having been all imposed, directly or indirectly, by man, they are all so many badges of female subjection, both material and moral. Here we know we shall be contradicted by most men and by many women. Men will confidently appeal to the "instincts" of some female friend—perhaps some pretty young girl—and be confirmed by her positiveness, or her flippancy, or her timid acquiescence, in his belief that all true womanhood is on his side. It is much as if a slaveholder should appeal to some faithful, ignorant slave, born on his estate, as to the divinely-appointed necessity of slavery, and the virtues proper to his condition, and be quite satisfied with his "Yes, massa," in reply. It is quite possible that the slave does believe in the divine origin of slavery; it will not be the fault of his master's theological teachings if he does not. Women have been taught to do more than this—not merely to acquiesce, but to glory in their subjection.

One feature of this subjection is, as has been somewhere pointed out, that a double code of laws has been imposed on

woman—one supposed to be common to all humanity, the other containing special regulations for herself—not merely supplementary of, but sometimes even contradicting, the other. These seem devised to keep up an enfeebling self-consciousness, and to turn the simple government of a healthy conscience into a sort of Lord Chamberlain's office of etiquettes. But there is, or ought to be, only one law for men and women; and such a "codification" will be, we trust, the great moral work of our age. One conscience, one education, one virtue, one liberty, one citizenship for men and women alike. It will not force them to do the same work, but it will enable them freely to choose their work. It will not make them the same, but it will help to make them perfect of their kind, and the world twice as great, and twice as happy.

Would it not, to begin with, be well first to instruct girls that weakness, cowardice, and ignorance cannot constitute at once the perfection of womankind and the imperfection of mankind—to cease, in short, to impress upon her the lesson epitomized in Mr. Charles Reed's short dialogue—

*She.* I feel all my sex's weakness.

*He.* And therein you are invincible.

May they not be led to cultivate grace, refinement, taste, and beauty, because these things are good in themselves and make the world pleasanter; not because men admire this, that, and the other in women, and are disgusted at its absence, and that therefore this, that, and the other are feminine attributes, and will get them partners at a ball, and perhaps for life. The original motive to this cultivation of grace and charm colours the whole of the after-life and character. On this depends whether she is to be a truthful free woman, the equal, sympathetic, and ennobling partner of man, or be a sort of virtuous courtesan, as man so often likes to picture her, to coax him by her personal charms into tenderness and morality without any trouble of his own.

"Female instincts," the favourite idea of unphilosophical minds, are called "feelings" as opposed to "reason;" and some mysterious moral advantage is supposed to accrue to the more "rational" sex from the presumed incapacity of their partners in life to look beyond personal and family interests, to draw rational inferences from facts, and to be just as well as generous. The "sacred nonsense" of mothers' talk to the child at their knee, recalled in Parliamentary utterances as one blessing to be destroyed by female suffrage, is a good illustration of this theme.

A good many sensible men, whilst unprepared to grant women equal rights and citizenship with themselves, will advocate a better education for them generally, will by no means confess to

admiring ignorance and prejudice, and will even enjoy the conversation of a clever woman, if she be not *too* clever, and too much in earnest. But these notwithstanding, the view of woman's supposed defects, which we have stated before, defects either charming or provoking as you choose to take them, or as the subject of them is fifteen or fifty years old, is what has met and thwarted enlightened women at every turn.

Now, as regards "feeling" and "instinct," held, as they often are, as preferable respectively to "reason" and "judgment," let us compare that untrained, unenlightened maternal instinct which leads the mother to indulge her child to its own future injury, with that instinct trained and enlightened, which leads her for its future good not to shrink from its present suffering. Compare "feeling" which, in the shape of ignorance and prejudice, leads to narrow views of religion and to intolerance of some of the noblest and wisest of human thoughts and sentiments, with that "feeling," founded on knowledge and reason which leads to enthusiasm for what is noblest and wisest, whilst yet it can be kindly indulgent to that very ignorance which despises knowledge. The obstruction to social progress, caused by the fostering of these theological prejudices in women through the indulgence of even those husbands and fathers who have them not themselves, can only be glauced at here. It is not a question of reason against feeling, but of allying the two, instead of keeping them apart by an irreligious divorce. To some minds the voice of reason is as the voice of conscience, and such, once awake to their responsibilities, can no more disobey the one voice than the other. These seem absolute truisms; yet how few there are, even of those who cannot contradict them, who will accord them practical recognition!

"Good Heavens! a young lady reason!" was once the exclamation of an educated Roman Catholic when mildly argued with by one of the angelic sex. Of course, as we were told in Parliament, "women's minds are absolutely closed to logic,"—this said in the face of an ever-increasing number of women who can reason, and reason well, and whom men have not yet been able to answer. And why should it be "unfeminine" and "ungraceful," and all the rest of it, to appreciate the æsthetic beauty of a well-woven chain of reasoning? Partly, perhaps, because women have not the monopoly of reasoning ill. It is the superficially dexterous arguers, possibly, rather than deep and sincere thinkers amongst men who find a charm in female perverseness and irrationality in religion, politics, and subjects of thought generally. We can no more regard the power of right reasoning as a mental luxury, a privilege to be kept for the enjoyment of one sex, than we can regard correct drawing or correct intonation in music as perfections necessary in professionals, but merely unpleasing pedantry in amateurs.

Yes, surely the ardour of reason, so nearly akin to the passion for justice, is as proper for a woman as any other ardour looked upon as feminine *par excellence*. And there is an earnest vein in women which, as far as we have been able to observe, is opposed to the sophistications of the *merely* logical intellect, the cold-hearted amusement of arguing an important question without any real convictions. Such conscientious sincerity, even from a man's point of view, cannot be unwomanly.

"Unfeminine"—Alas, how much of good and great has that word blighted at its birth! On women's sensibilities, artificially fostered to an intense tenderness to the lightest sting, it does fall like the cut of a lash. But after all the government of the lash can only make slaves. As woman takes larger and loftier views of duty, she will learn to dread the stings of her conscience more than the lash of man's ridicule. She will look at the sun itself with undazzled eyes, not through the smoke-dimmed glass man has handed her for her special use. As it is, this fear, inculcated through ages, haunts women from the cradle (and men cannot realize the effort it costs, even those who seem bravest, to shake it off), this fear which holds them back from expressing their real opinions, hinders woman herself, as much as it hinders man, from knowing what she really is.

It is too true that a very large number of the women of one class, the comfortable drawing-room class, have ranged themselves with well-meaning docility in the ranks of this social police, have been the unconscious agents of a social terrorism, which man himself exercises almost unconsciously, while they innocently repeat the warning words of "feminine delicacy" and "ladylike propriety" which men have put into their mouths, and which they believe are the utterances of nature and religion, and the immutable conditions of civilized life.

Let us think how much we need a counteracting influence against those base motives of personal and class-selfishness which now honeycomb and almost threaten to destroy society, and how little women's "instincts" and "feelings" have done to supply this. We do not forget that, in all ages, at times of temporary excitement, there have been women found to sustain a man in the sacrifice of those whom he loves to duty, even when she and her children are to be the sacrificed; but we long to see something of this spirit in everyday life and in peaceful times. The same woman who will cheerfully destroy her own health in nursing one she loves, who will uncomplainingly share with him his involuntary poverty, or even deserved disgrace, would on the other hand discourage him with all her powers of persuasion from risking his worldly fortune or bringing on himself the world's reproach, at some call of conscience with which she has not been taught to sympathize. Again, a husband should be ashamed

before his wife for a mean public action, a vote given through self-interest, or class-interest, or faction, as he would for cheating his neighbour, for official falsification as he would for perjury in a court of justice, for conniving at the bribery of an elector as he would for receiving stolen goods, for taking an unfair advantage in trade as he would for picking a pocket. But we hear nothing of the value of feminine influence in such matters as these.

We turn now to the married state as affected in England by the marriage law, "the most barbarous," it has lately been said, "in Europe." "A woman," as has also lately been said, "loses when she marries, her name, her freedom, her individuality, her property, her vote" (municipal and other). A man takes from the woman he marries everything she has, yet is not bound to maintain her while she lives with him, can use the forms of law to force back a reluctant wife in spite of her aversion to live with him, and finally can take her children from her and give them to the care of some other woman if he pleases. This law, of which these are some of the most striking features—though, more or less, of course, a dead letter in affectionate marriages, but an easy instrument of iniquity in the hands of the unscrupulous—would almost seem indeed to be maintained for the special use of the bad. This law which, however modified in its practical workings by individual character, cannot but lower the whole conception of marriage for all but the exceptional few, even good men will tell us somehow helps to secure the happiness of married life generally! In its remote origin it was doubtless a valuable modification of worse evils, and in the days when no personal freedom was allowed to any woman, married or unmarried, when marriage was therefore merely an exchange of one servitude for another, there was at least no glaring incongruity in the theory of a wife's subjection.\* But now, when she is supposed, once arrived at the years of discretion, to be a free agent, and to have a free choice in marriage, the position has become an antiquated anomaly. It would seem still to be upheld on the principle that because woman is weak, she should therefore be made helpless,—because man is strong, he shall have additional protection against the weak. In the classes where this law is most abused, because there education has done least to counteract its brutalizing effect on public opinion, there has been found a tendency in women (notably in manufacturing towns), to prefer unmarried unions to legitimate ones, for the sake of the greater

---

\* Those who lay stress on particular texts of Scripture bearing on this subject should remember that there is sanction for domestic slavery in the New Testament, and the conclusion is that the first teachers of Christianity took social institutions as they found them.

protection of their self-earned contributions to the household, and the greater willingness of their partners to contribute their share, instead of spending all on themselves. Here, at least, is one natural result of a degrading and tyrannical law of marriage on those who suffer from it most helplessly. Before this new form of union tends universally to supplant the other, it might be better, instead of vaguely deploring the immorality of the "lower classes," or contriving such piecemeal mitigations as have lately been enacted—to see if a radical reform of the old constitution be not worth considering.

The truth is, our ideas are still perverted by the old fetish worship of husbands, so ludicrously expressed in the literature of past generations—that curious religion which made it a wife's highest virtue to pay the obedience of a slave to a master, however cruel, capricious, or irrational he was, however noble and wise she, might be—in short, the greater his mental and moral inferiority to her, the greater the merit of her absolute submission. This doctrine, which turned him into a monstrous idol to be propitiated by an abject ceremonial—this ideal of wifehood, maintained by men with astonishing complacency, was carried to its highest perfection in the legend of "Patient Griselda," in which many men, we believe, still see a kind of pathetic beauty. It really exhibits the most repulsive perversion of moral feeling on both sides to which such a grotesque theory of marriage is capable of leading. This fetishism continues in a modified shape to be represented by the law of the land, and it colours more or less the ordinary ideal of marriage. There is, to be sure, a sort of humility in insisting on this right divine of husbands, since no more than the divine right of kings does it require any inherent superiority in the individual possessing it. But this kind of humility has in neither case proved beneficial to the governing or governed. Mr. Herbert Spencer has observed in the "Social Statics" that even as we loathe the custom which in savage nations forbids women to eat in company with men, so shall we come to loathe the civilized theories of the wife's subjection to her husband. The wonder is that any man can endure it.

Till absolute social and legal equality is the basis of the sacred partnership of marriage (the division of labours and duties in the family, by free agreement, implying no sort of inequality), till no superiority is recognised on either side but that of individual character and capacity, till marriage is no longer legally surrounded with penalties on the woman who enters into it as though she were a criminal,—till then the truest love, the truest sympathy, the truest happiness in it, will be the exception rather than the rule, and the real value of this relation, domestic and

social, will be fatally missed. People may get on pretty well together, and be fairly fond of each other, without their married life presenting a spectacle particularly worthy of admiration, or suggesting a very excellent development of human nature. Of course, in numberless cases, a wife will find it her best wisdom as well as comfort in the conduct of life (especially as society is now constituted) to yield to the judgment of a husband who may probably be her superior in age, experience of life, and knowledge of the world; but this accidental part of marriage, if we may call it so, has nothing to do with the theory of divine right on the one side, and indelible inferiority on the other.

Connected with this faulty view of the marriage relations, is that other difficulty with which woman has been burdened by immemorial prejudice, grievously overweighted as she is already without it—we mean the stigma of conventional humiliation attached to those women who pass their lives unmarried. It is, no doubt, like the fetish-worship of husbands, a relic of barbarism, but it is still strongly felt, and has been impressed by men on women themselves to their great detriment. It is not simply the opinion that, as a general rule, women are happier married than single; but that the unmarried woman, when she has ceased to be young, is an object not merely for pity, but more or less for contempt, though it is not always held good taste to express it, and some men are too sensible and manly to feel it. Apparently this notion rests on three assumptions, all of barbaric origin—namely, that a woman's highest glory and merit is to please men, that if she has not married she has failed to please men, and that her whole *raison d'être* is wifehood and motherhood. A *man* who has not become a husband and father may feel himself an honoured and important member of society; and till it is universally understood that a woman who from choice or chance is not a wife and mother, may fill an equally honoured and important position, true respect will not be paid to woman in any capacity, whether married or single. For the rest, the fact—not, we hope, without a possible good result on her general position as time goes on—of the eight hundred thousand women in excess of men in England, who must of necessity remain unmarried (and the disproportion continues, we believe, to increase) justifies us still further in protesting against this old world prejudice.

But the spectral difficulty it has raised is already diminishing. Women have done much for themselves towards that result, and if they will persevere it will be removed from their path altogether. The dignity and independence of womanhood must be maintained by an upright scrupulousness of choice in the first instance, to help which a much larger variety of occupation

should be opened to women; and by faith in themselves, whether married or single. But in fighting this battle, as in so many others, she has been too often hindered rather than encouraged by the stronger sex.

“It is nonsense,” Hawthorne remarks in the “Blithedale Romance,” “and a miserable wrong—the result, like so many others, of masculine egotism—that the success or failure of a woman’s existence should be made to depend wholly on the affections, and on one species of affection, while man has such a multitude of other chances, that this seems but an incident. For its own sake, if it will do no more, the world should throw open all its avenues to the passport of a woman’s bleeding heart.”

Before quitting the subject of the married relations, we must say a few words on the typical and most painful exemplification of the different moral codes imposed on men and women—one having a most important bearing on these relations and the family and social influences which spring from them. We allude to the prevalent assumption that man is not bound by the same rule of moral purity as woman. An obvious development of the primitive barbaric notion of woman as the natural property of man, it is still held as a moral axiom, we believe, by the large majority of men. Unacknowledged in so many words by good men, abhorred, we doubt not, by many, denounced by the religion in whose dogmas the vicious still generally profess belief, it receives practical and almost universal recognition in the most civilized countries. Virtuous women, even, are perverted by conventional custom, persuaded, or tricked by their carefully-maintained ignorance, into assenting to it—and legislation is based upon it, as witness, amongst other examples, the law of divorce. Yet what does this distinction mean—unless it be wholly *un-meaning* and self-contradictory—except that *some* women are bound to lead purer lives than men, but *not all*?—That is, by man’s traditional doctrine, the women of his own family, the women of the class he intends to marry into, are bound to be of unblemished purity, whilst the degradation in his behalf of less privileged classes is to be acquiesced in, nay, almost desired, as a social necessity. And is it at *this* price we purchase the boasted purity of English homes, with all its graceful accompaniments of chivalrous homage—by the maintenance, in a sort of pretended secrecy, of an unparalleled humiliation and slavery of woman, in a so-called free country, by those who profess to honour her the most?

Even good men, with consciences individually clear as to this matter, will shake their heads and say it *must* be—that this evil cannot be expelled from society;—indeed some say it ought not



to be expelled, lest a greater evil take its place. And the good, by their silence, their acquiescence, play into the hands of the majority. But those women who think for themselves on this terrible subject, indignantly ask—By what right does any society exist on such a foundation? What right have certain classes of women to enjoy, safe and untempted, an aristocracy of virtue at the expense of the poor, the ignorant, the young, orphaned, helpless and thoughtless, the desolate and deserted, yearly, daily bribed, entrapped, tempted, goaded and betrayed into a Hell upon earth—that men may go on talking about the “purity of English homes”—the beautiful result of high civilization and feminine subjection? Upon the seething surface of this infernal region men build their own happy households, content if no sound from below rises up to shock the ears of unconscionable wives and daughters! The denizens of that region are not waiting at leisure till it shall please them to forsake their evil lives, and become the happy and honoured heads of families: that crowning reward is reserved for the men who have profited by, and shared in, their degradation, whose easy repentance is gloried in as one more tribute to the moralizing influence of women, and in whose persons the sacred names of husband and father are thus daily and triumphantly profaned. For when they are weary of base dissipation, there is always some ignorant girl ready to confer these names upon them, to learn, probably, by degrees, that men are not bound to be as pure as women, to resign herself to her sons leading the same lives as their father before them, and to her daughters marrying men who lead the same lives as their brothers. But if this is what is meant by the “purity of English homes,” are we so very sure that even this one-sided purity will always be maintained? Is it certain that no moral contamination from men’s earlier associations ever enters there? Are we sure that the house built on such a foundation will always stand firm?

This brand upon society, this blight on every effort at true reform in any direction, will not be removed by sentimentalism, by costly subscriptions to churches, refuges, and reformatories, nor any other of the palliatives society seems to prefer to prevention, and which so often tend to maintain the original evil—no, nor by efforts to keep the women of one class ignorant of the degradation of women in another. The jealous trades-unionism of men which meet women at every turn in the struggle for existence, does not close the avenues of *this* trade to her. All the restrictions on her honest industry which well-meaning masculine philanthropy can devise, on the theory that she is a grown-up child, do not debar her from *this* calling. The romantic homage of the chivalrous does not shield her from *this* dishonour.

Many influences, no doubt, not directly traceable to masculine domination, tend to swell this evil. Against these the two forces of the human race should be brought to bear in combination, as they have never yet been brought. The single government of man has proved unequal to the task. Till woman has an equal or something more like an equal share in the councils of humanity, till she ceases to be the submissive subject of man, the two will not be brought to agree together on one standard of moral purity for both; and till then, man will not learn to reverence and desire purity, not in the women of one class only, but in all women—and not in woman only, but in himself as well.

In what we have just said we shall have, we are sure, some sort of sympathy and agreement from many who can in no ways go along with us as to the proposed radical treatment of social mischiefs. Some of these have set before them a never yet realized and unrealizable ideal, in which we must once again acknowledge, with all sincerity and respect, a certain refinement, tenderness, and artificial beauty, nay, a kind of generosity gone astray. Such we oppose with regret. These would fain crystallize for all time the whole system of sentimental and sublimated injustice embodied in the chivalry theory. For them woman is always to be a glorified, but well-educated invalid, who is to influence man for his good by her physical imperfections, as much as by her ethereal and intuitive morality and docile affections. She is to guard this physical incapacity as well as her supposed incapability of sharing in the highest national concerns, and her unfitness for any social business beyond the precincts of home, as sacred treasures, because man, it is said, requires this contrast to himself as a moralizing element in his life. In his own particular walk of life, which is apparently to be kept as separate from hers as possible, it would almost seem he may be hard and coarse with a safe conscience because the woman he leaves at home remains soft and delicate.

And so on. To us the whole theory seems a morbid one. One longs to take off these golden chains, open the hothouse doors, and turn the ethereal prisoner into free fresh air, to develop her moral and intellectual muscle and stature at her will. The proposed arrangement consistently carried out, as we know it never has been, and we believe never can be, seems to us much as if we mortals should invite an angel from heaven to cast in his lot with us, to purify our morals and affections by his example and sympathy, to educate our children, and housekeep for us, on condition of strictly acknowledging our absolute authority and his own unalterably subordinate position, renouncing as unangelic all independent action and opinion, all share in deciding those

earthly laws under which he is to live amongst us, and promising to *stay at home*, we on our side engaging to pay the obedient angel semi-divine honours, and in general to treat him with every indulgence and consideration. But then, if the angel should not like the bargain, he would at least be free to stay in heaven—whilst woman is here, and has no neutral ground to retire to, pending the negotiation. It seems scarcely fair to take advantage of her necessary presence amongst us, to impose on her conditions more stringent than with absolutely free choice, and full comprehension of the state of the case, she would care to accept.

No, let her have as free play for her natural capacities as man; not necessarily, as we have said before, to do always the same things as man, but to try fairly what she can do, and possibly thus greatly widen the sphere and vary the details of what she ought to do. If *then* she is willing to forego all the new, natural, healthful and legitimate ambitions and aspirations (as we hold them to be), growing up within her, and lightening even that burden of glorified invalidhood, thought to be her divinely appointed portion (except indeed in the working classes); if, after full and intelligent consideration, she decides she is not fit to share any of the higher responsibilities of citizenship with man; if, after trying what liberty of thought, conscience and action means; if, after enjoying a free field for those gifts and faculties which are as various, and as imperatively cry out for exercise in women as in men; if, after learning to look on marriage as the happy alternative to other happy and satisfying occupations—not a social necessity; if after finding her voice in all that concerns the morals and welfare of society, deserving of, and listened to, with as much respect as man's; if after feeling herself a part of the state, not a servant, submitting by compulsion to the will of the men in it, whether or no her judgment concurs in theirs; if after experiencing the blessing of having some little control over the laws by which the most sacred concerns of her life are to be governed; if, in one word, after being grown up, and after enjoying the privileges of a free woman, she is willing to become a child once more, and to fall back again into absolute subjection to an irresponsible sex—well and good. But the fair opportunity of choice—of understanding even the nature of the choice—has not yet been given her. If her instincts and characteristics are really as indelible as the “*meta-physical*” chivalry-theory makes them, then, with all freedom of choice possible, she will of course renounce the new life opening upon her. But we shall see.

For ourselves we fervently believe that generations of a nobler and freer culture will ennoble and liberate her very bodily frame (as we have before said) into a health, strength and beauty

hitherto undreamt of; not transform her into man—why was such a senseless misrepresentation ever dragged in to degrade a serious discussion into burlesque?—but into glorified womanhood. This change, alone, would in time revolutionize the whole race, and man himself would grow to a greatness he denies himself whilst he ignorantly insists on stunting woman. Hitherto nature has always been brought into court as a hostile witness whenever it has been a question of elevating her condition in any one direction. We shall see whether nature, allowed to speak freely, is not *the* irresistibly conclusive witness on woman's side.

We must now add a remark the truth of which is, indeed, obtaining general recognition—viz., that men themselves are often, as might be expected, the victims of the faulty social system of which we complain, and are as unconscious as the majority of women are of the causes and possible remedy of its evils. Certainly many a hard-worked father who wears out health and spirits in an irksome profession that his daughters may enjoy amusements and luxuries in which he has little share, and to the earning of which they contribute nothing, might well be confounded at finding himself classed amongst the oppressors of women, and the women of his family as victims. Assuredly, it is not these latter whom we pity, except for that melancholy conventionality fostered by false views of woman's position in society which has so long sanctioned such contented idleness in young ladies' lives, and for the possibly bitter regrets of after years. Women, too, have their own class-privileges over other women; they, too, have to be constantly on their guard against a consequent blindness to the claims of others. These are class-abuses, class-difficulties, which it will take the whole united strength of society to sweep away. But of all class-reforms in store for the future we can still conceive of none so vitally important to the whole human race as the emancipation of woman. It will be the beginning of a new world era, a new revelation, a new religion to man.

We will conclude our whole subject with a quotation from the American writer already named at the head of this article, who having made a successful practical protest, during the late war, against the theory of indelible race-inferiority by the training of a negro regiment, has since generously taken up the case of sex-domination. He thus writes:—

“Thus far my whole argument has been defensive and explanatory. I have shown that woman's inferiority in special achievements, so far as it exists, is a fact of small importance, because it is merely a corollary from her historic position of degradation. She has not excelled because she has had no fair

chance to excel. Man, placing his foot on her shoulder, has taunted her with not rising. But the ulterior question remains behind—How came she into this attitude originally? Explain this explanation, the logician fairly demands. Granted that woman is weak, because she has been systematically degraded; but why was she so degraded? This is a far deeper question—one to be met only by a profounder philosophy and a positive solution. We are coming on ground almost wholly untrod, and must do the best we can.

“I venture to assert, then, that woman’s social inferiority in the past has been to a great extent a legitimate thing. To all appearance history would have been impossible without it, just as it would have been impossible without an epoch of war and slavery. It is simply a matter of social progress—a part of the succession of civilizations. The past has been inevitably a period of ignorance, of engrossing physical necessities, and of brute force—not of freedom, of philanthropy, and of culture. During that lower epoch, woman was necessarily an inferior, degraded by abject labour even in time of peace—degraded uniformly by war, chivalry to the contrary, notwithstanding. . . . The truth simply was, that her time had not come. Physical strength must rule for a time, and she was the weaker . . . and the degradation of woman was simply a part of a system which has indeed had its day, but has bequeathed its associations. . . . The reason, then, for the long subjection of woman has been simply that humanity was passing through its first epoch, and her full career was to be reserved for the second. . . . Woman’s appointed era, like that of the Teutonic races, was delayed but not omitted. It is not merely true that the empire of the past has belonged to man, for it was an empire of the muscles, enlisting, at best, but the lower parts of the understanding. There can be no question that the present epoch is initiating an empire of the higher reason, of arts, affections, aspirations; and for that epoch the genius of woman has been reserved. Till the fulness of time came, woman was necessarily kept a slave to the spinning-wheel and the needle; now higher work is ready; peace has brought invention to her aid, and the mechanical means for her emancipation are ready also.”



## ART. VII.—LAMARCK.

1. *Philosophie Zoologique*. 2 vols. Paris : 1809.
2. *Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres*. 7 vols. Paris : 1815—1822.

THE reception which Lamarck's writings have met with in this country has been somewhat peculiar. The views contained in his work, the "*Philosophie Zoologique*," were strongly opposed to the opinions on theology and philosophy generally prevailing here at the time of its publication, and the work was in consequence for some fifty years attacked or ridiculed by nearly every author who noticed it. After the publication of Mr. Darwin's work on the Origin of Species, theories of evolution, from being denounced as irreligious, or ridiculed as fantastic, came into favour with a large and influential number of scientific men ; some who had been loudest in condemning Lamarck being as forward in supporting Darwin. Lamarck's position was, however, little improved by the change. The opponents of Darwinism often directed their blows against Lamarck, but its adherents seldom cared to defend him, but rather passed over his speculations as unimportant or erroneous. They naturally did not wish to have their own views confounded with those of one who had been so frequently attacked. It is true that Lamarck can have no claim to be considered as even foreshadowing Mr. Darwin's theories on Natural Selection, atavism (the recurrence to the form of a remote ancestor), cross-breeding, or many other principles adduced to explain the origin of the animals now existing. Yet, on the other hand, Lamarck must be considered as the first great naturalist who believed and endeavoured to prove that all animals now living are descended from those previously existing, however different the forms of the two may be. While Cuvier and most of the naturalists and geologists of his times were continually inventing cataclysms, convulsions, and separate creations, to account for the actual condition of the globe and the races which inhabit it, Lamarck steadfastly refused to believe in any such general catastrophe, and ascribed the formation both of modern species and the features presented by the earth's crust to the continuous and slow operation of the natural agents which he saw still working. By slight modifications, and in conformity with a regular law of progress, highly organized beings had, he declared, been moulded and developed out of the simplest forms. The laws which Lamarck laid down, the causes to which he referred these changes and modifications, were real and active ;

and, although he may have exaggerated their importance and power of producing the results he attributed to them, yet this is an error which he shares with nearly every great discoverer. Not only is every one tempted to overrate the importance and sphere of operation of a principle first discovered by himself, but unless principles were overrated there would be but little chance of the real importance of many of them being recognised. It is frequently only by endeavouring to explain every phenomenon by a single cause that phenomena not to be so explained are investigated, and that the existence of other causes becomes apparent; so that errors in our conception of the nature of the cause first known are detected.

But Lamarck's merit is not confined to his early perception of the uniformity and gradual upward progress of nature. He first arranged the animal kingdom in two great branches, one comprising annulate animals, or those whose bodies are divided into segments, such as insects, worms, prawns, and the like; and the other branch comprising polyps, mollusks, and vertebrate animals, which last he believed to be derived from the mollusks. With proper allowance for the great advance of our knowledge of the lower forms of animals made since the days of Lamarck, this arrangement is substantially the same as that adopted by Professor Huxley, in his treatises on "Comparative Anatomy," London: 1864; and "Classification," *ibid.* 1869; with, however, some important exceptions. In these works the vertebrates stand by themselves, instead of being placed in the molluscan branch. The theory that vertebrates are descended from mollusks had, however, even before the publication of the last work, been advanced by Hæckel, in Germany, in consequence of the researches of the Russian naturalist, Kowalevsky, which showed a great resemblance to exist between vertebrates and ascidians in the early stages of their development. These last are a family of animals of low organization, which were at first classed with polyps, but afterwards placed by Lamarck in a class intermediate between the latter and the mollusks with bivalve shells. Lamarck himself, however, looked for forms intermediate between mollusks and vertebrates in a much more highly organized order, the naked-gilled sea-slugs.

In geology, although Lamarck's views are often extremely speculative, yet he always insisted on the continuous nature of geological changes, and attributed the present forms of hill and valley to the continual wearing action of rain and atmospheric changes, a theory which, in a modified form, finds advocates among many of the ablest living geologists. Physics and meteorology were treated by him with even greater boldness

and industry, although but little success. He seems to have believed in an atomic theory, but to have been led by the old doctrines of phlogiston and caloric to indulge in many rash speculations on the nature and effects of those imponderable fluids, by the action of which he, like most physicists and chemists of that time, endeavoured to explain the phenomena presented by heat, electricity, and the other natural forces. He built on the theories of chemistry in vogue when he began his scientific studies, and persistently refused to recognise the merit of the admirable reasoning and researches of Lavoisier and his followers. In Botany, Lamarck's works are numerous, and were, when published, of considerable value. The first scientific work he published was the "Flore Française:" in it he altogether abandoned the prevailing system of Linnæus, and established another equally artificial, but which, by the principle of dual or dichotomous division, led more quickly to the determination of the species and genus of any particular plant. This system, which is said to have been created in six months, was in its turn abandoned by its author, who afterwards adopted the views of Jussieu, the founder of the Natural System of botany, by whom the later additions of the "Flore Française" were brought out, either alone or in conjunction with Lamarck. The other botanical works of Lamarck consist chiefly in descriptions of genera and species. (See the "Dictionnaire de Botanique," and the "Illustration des Genres," both parts of the "Encyclopédie Méthodique"), in which he seems to have displayed some of the ability he afterwards showed in the "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres."

It is this last work, and that on the fossil shells found in the beds round Paris, that have chiefly kept alive the reputation of Lamarck. His great contemporary, Cuvier, considers the determination of the genera and species in these works as his great and peculiar merit, and affects to pity him for being led to the conclusion that, after all, these genera and species were but artificial creations useful to systematists, but not existing in nature. (Eloges iii. 199.) It is certainly impossible not to admire Lamarck when we consider that the publication of this great and laborious work was only begun when he had already reached his seventieth year; and that he was in his fiftieth year when he began the study of the invertebrata, which he undertook, not because he was particularly attracted by it, but because, as the last appointed in the Cabinet du Roi, he had, on its reconstruction, to content himself with the subject least pleasing to his colleagues. When once he had entered upon it he pursued it with unflagging energy in spite of old age and failing sight. Always ready to



improve and modify his theories and classifications, he continued, year after year, to introduce such new groups and divisions as were suggested by the researches of Cuvier, or other anatomists, while he laboured by studying the forms preserved on the various museums to subdivide these groups into natural families and genera; and at the same time he constantly struck out more distinct and bolder theories on the general nature of living beings. The same indomitable resolution and calm courage which made him, at seventeen, abandon his prospects in the church, and set out to join the French army; which made him, immediately after his arrival (when the death of all the officers around him had placed him in command), refuse to retreat from the post assigned to him on the battle-field until he had received the order from his general; which afterwards led him a second time to abandon his career, and endeavour, in a humble position to gain the means for a medical education, sustained him in the penury and blindness which were the lot of his old age. If the same qualities have sometimes led him to too daring flights of imagination, or too great confidence in the correctness of his own views, or if they have given an air almost of arrogance to his statements, we must remember that without them Lamarck would never have accomplished his splendid achievements in science.

It is but a small part of his voluminous writings that we now propose to examine. The discussion of the details of the characters of families and genera which he founded is unsuited for these pages. His divisions and distributions have lost much of their value. It is of the essence of such arrangements that they should, by increasing our knowledge of the forms comprised in them, serve as a foundation on which to build yet better distributions, by which after a time they are superseded. The enormous number of new forms which have been recognised, and the great advance in our knowledge of anatomy made in consequence of the improved microscopes and means of observation at our disposal, have rendered Lamarck's divisions inadequate to represent the animals and plants of which he treated as we now know them; and a critical examination of his system would be interesting only to persons studying the forms described in Lamarck's writings. On biology, however, Lamarck has written much which must always be interesting to students of the history of science as a part of human progress, and is perhaps particularly so at present. He was one of the first to recognise the importance of studying biology as a whole, which he speaks of in his "*Histoire Naturelle*" (vol. i. p. 49), as "*une science particulière qui n'est encore fondée, qui n'a pas même de nom, dont j'ai proposé quelques bases dans ma Philosophie Zoologique, et à laquelle je*

donnerai le nom de Biologie." His views on this subject were first published in two volumes—one published in 1797, under the title of "*Mémoires de Physique et d'Histoire Naturelle*;" and the other published in 1802, under the title of "*Recherches sur l'Organisation des Corps Vivans*." They were afterwards much expanded and developed in his "*Philosophie Zoologique*," published in 1809, which he refers to as a new edition of the "*Recherches*," and in the introduction, forming the greatest portion of the first volume of the "*Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres*," published in 1815. It is to these two last works that we shall refer.

Like other evolutionists Lamarck considers that living beings for several series, the different individuals composing which, vary insensibly one from another, so that all divisions—such as classes, orders, and genera, and even species—are products not of nature, but of art. The best of such divisions have artificial limits, and none are really isolated, although from our ignorance of the connecting forms they may appear so to us; but if all races of living beings were known to us, all our present classes, orders, and genera would be merely families of different sizes, and it would be very difficult to assign limits to these divisions. So far therefore art is an essential element in the construction even of a natural system. But besides this necessary use of convention, many systematic distributions (such as the systems of Linnæus in Botany, of Fabricius in Entomology, and the distribution of Birds and Fishes in Lamarck's own time), are entirely artificial, and not in conformity with nature, whose order is single, unique, and essentially without division in each organic kingdom.

Lamarck might have mentioned his own classification of plants as one of the most striking instances of an artificial distribution. He does not define an artificial distribution, nor does he explain what he means by conformity to nature. Several of his expressions convey the idea that he inclined to the views of Bonnet and the Greek philosophers, who believed in a single, uninterrupted chain of beings. These views, however, he in the "*Histoire Naturelle*" (vol. i. p. 129), when pressed by Cuvier, distinctly disavows. In fact, he does not seem to have considered what principles ought to govern a natural distribution. Most systematists since Lamarck have adopted one of the three principles following:—(1) Conformity to a general type or plan of organization; (2) relationship or descent; (3) complexity of structure. Agassiz, in his "*Essay on Classification*" (ch. ii.), discusses the subject at some length. He lays down, that conformity to type is the principle which should determine the division of the animal kingdom into primary branches or sub-regna; while the division

into classes ought to be regulated by the different ways in which the type of each branch is worked out in the animals composing it; and the further subdivision into orders should depend on the complexity of organization in each class. He thus considers that there are three different kinds of large divisions of animals proper to be made, and differing from each other in essence, and not merely in the extent or number of species comprised in them. Lamarck, on the other hand, considers all divisions larger than genera to be merely families of greater or less extent, and agrees with Agassiz only in considering that external form should be the criterion of specific difference.

Cuvier, Oken, Von Baer, and Owen, all endeavour, more or less, to arrange animals according to type; while Huxley, Hæckel, and most of the zoologists who have adopted the views of Darwin, found their systems on a different principle—that of relationship, or nearness in descent; and they generally assume that uniformity of type, even in small details, can only exist in closely-related animals. This certainly cannot be considered as proved, and is opposed to the views of Owen, Mivart, and Bastian. Lamarck himself gives two tables of relationship according to descent—one at the end of his “*Philosophie Zoologique*,” and the other in the supplement to the introduction to his “*Histoire Naturelle*” (vol. i. p. 457). They differ considerably from each other, but altogether from the classification he adopted; and, as this classification was sketched out by him in his courses of lectures long before the publication of either of these works, and was retained in them, it is clear that he did not consider genealogy to be the true principle on which to found a natural system. While absolutely rejecting, at least in the “*Histoire Naturelle*,” the theory of a single uninterrupted chain of beings, he still appears to found his system on it. He nowhere recognises anything like a type or plan of organization, and is generally guided merely by the principle of complexity of organization. Agassiz (“*Essay on Classification*,” p. 134), well observes of his system, that it combines abstract conceptions with structural considerations, and an artificial endeavour to arrange all animals in a continuous series. He himself seems to have felt the artificial nature of his method, and to have become somewhat dissatisfied with the results. (See the supplement to the introduction to his *Hist. Nat.*, vol. i. p. 451.)

Lamarck considers all classifications formed by reasoning from a single organ to be unsatisfactory, and that the variations of the most important organs ought to carry the greatest weight in determining the relationship of animals. Thus the organs of sensation and respiration are better guides than those of circulation; and the organs of sensation, which give rise to the most eminent

faculties, are to be preferred to those of respiration. He criticises Aristotle's division of animals into those with blood and those without blood; and while approving of the division, thinks the characters ill chosen. In his doctrine as to the importance in classification of the organs of feeling, he agrees with Dr. Grant and Professor Owen, who also found their divisions of the Animal Kingdom on the characters of the nervous system. Lamarck's division into Apathetic, Sentient, and Rational animals, is really founded, however, not on the organs of sensation themselves, but on their functions or faculties.

In the *Hist. Nat.* i. 324, Lamarck gives further explanations of his views of the art of making fit divisions of animals. The principles he lays down are, first, that animals must be grouped according to some system which is not an arbitrary one, that the series must then be divided, and the proper rank of each division determined; secondly, that in performing these operations, attention must be paid to the following relationships:—(1) The relations between individuals of the same species. These are the closest, and consist in peculiarities of form. (2) The relations between animals of the same group. These must be determined by considering, not the external form only, but also the whole interior organization in every part. (3) The relations between the groups themselves, which must be arranged in order according as they differ more or less from man. (4) The relations between unmodified organs. The commonest organs are the most important for fixing the rank of the division. Of two different plans of the same organ, the one most analogous to the plan of the organ in a superior group entitles its possessor to a rank superior to that of the possessor of the organ formed with less analogy to such plan. Thus, as gills have a greater analogy to lungs than the branching air tubes or tracheæ by which insects breathe, it follows that animals breathing by gills have a higher rank than those breathing by tracheæ, but a lower rank than those breathing by true lungs. (5) The relations between organs modified by use or circumstance, so that the plan of nature is disguised. Everything done by nature has a higher value than what has been effected by external circumstances. The distinction here drawn between nature and circumstances is one that Lamarck continually dwells on; and we shall recur to it hereafter. The third principle is that we ought to begin with the lowest organism, with the object of making the order of our distribution conformable to that of Nature, who works upwards by degrees from the lowest forms.

The artificial nature of these principles clearly appears, and has to a considerable extent influenced Lamarck's arrangement. However, like all persons who have laid down principles for clas-

sifying animals, he does not attempt to follow out strictly his own theories. He appears inclined to adopt a genealogical arrangement, but to have been beguiled by a wish to carry out his principles, and also by vague ideas of the tendency and designs of Nature.

The following is the arrangement given by Lamarck, both in the "Philosophie Zoologique" and the first volume of the "Histoire Naturelle."

|                                                                                                                                                                                                           |   |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------------|
| <p>APATHETIC ANIMALS.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Infusoria.</li> <li>2. Polyps.</li> <li>3. Radiaria.</li> <li>4. Worms.<br/>(Epizoa.)</li> </ol>                                      | } | Invertebrate Animals. |
| <p>SENTIENT ANIMALS.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Insects.</li> <li>6. Arachnida.</li> <li>7. Crustacea.</li> <li>8. Annelids.</li> <li>9. Cirrhipods.</li> <li>10. Mollusks.</li> </ol> |   |                       |
| <p>INTELLIGENT ANIMALS.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11. Fish.</li> <li>12. Reptiles.</li> <li>13. Birds.</li> <li>14. Mammals.</li> </ol>                                                  | } | Vertebrate Animals.   |
|                                                                                                                                                                                                           |   |                       |

The true principles on which a natural system should be founded must of course depend on the connexion between the beings to be classified. If Lamarck be correct in his doctrine that animals form a series on a number of branching series, each consisting of broadly distinguishable forms, it is difficult to see how any other principle than that of relationship or descent can be applied; and the lower limits at least of the divisions instituted must, in such a case as Lamarck has pointed out, be arbitrary. The higher limits, however, of many divisions would be strictly marked out conformably to nature by the extent to which development has advanced. Man would still mark out one of the boundaries of the class Mammalia, although, if all connecting forms were known, it might be impossible to draw any but a conventional boundary between reptiles and mammals. If, however, Mr. Mivart's view of the nature of the Animal Kingdom be the more correct one, type must be a leading principle in natural systems, though even in this case it might be difficult to assign

due limits to the divisions. It might be found that many forms partook of more than one type, and could only be arranged in one class rather than another, according to which type appeared to preponderate. In order to judge of Lamarck's classification we must, therefore, examine his theory of living beings.

Species and varieties, he considers, are like other divisions of animals, arbitrary and not natural. All forms have their origin in the simplest organized bodies which Nature is continually producing by spontaneous generation, and are derived from them by insensible alterations, so that animals make a branching series, which is continuous, except where forms are lost. The organs of an animal are modified by time and favourable circumstances. New species arise when the surroundings are changed, as when a plant, originally a native of a moist plain, comes to grow on a dry hill-side. They may also, in some cases, be derived from hybrids. These changes of circumstances are not, however, the only cause of the formation of new species, for Lamarck in many places attributes to nature a continual power or tendency to develop new and more highly organized bodies. Thus he says (*Phil. Zool.* p. 221):—

“ Il sera en effet évident que l'état où nous voyons tous les animaux est d'une part le produit de la composition croissante de l'organisation, qui tend à former une gradation régulière ; et de l'autre part qu'il est celui des influences d'une multitude de circonstances très différentes, qui tendent continuellement à détruire la régularité de la composition de l'organisation.”

Some passages might even lead one to suppose that Lamarck looked on nature as working by insensible gradations to a pre-appointed end, and as being hindered, and the symmetry of her plan impaired, by circumstances. Thus he explains the absence of a hard external skeleton in mollusks by the supposition that Nature in them is preparing to form the internal skeleton of vertebrates ; and therefore lays aside the hard shell provided for insects and crustaceans (*Phil. Zool.* p. 316 ; *Hist. Nat.* i. 147). He puts forward similar hypotheses to explain the absence of articulated limbs among annelids, or red-blooded worms (which, like Cuvier, he places above insects), and the absence of a double gangliated cord in mollusks (*Phil. Zool.* 313, *n.* 316). In the *Hist. Nat.* i. 133, he says :—

“ Le plan des opérations de la Nature à l'égard de la production des animaux, est clairement indiqué par cette cause première et prédominante qui donne à la vie animale le pouvoir de composer progressivement l'organisation, et de compliquer et perfectionner graduellement, non seulement l'organisation dans son ensemble, mais encore chaque système d'organes particulier, à mesure qu'elle est parvenu à les établir . . . . Mais une cause étrangère à celle-ci, cause accidentelle et par conséquent variable, a traversé çà et là l'exécution de ce plan sans néanmoins le

détruire, comme je vais le prouver. Cette cause effectivement a donné lieu, soit aux lacunes, réelles de la série, soit aux ramaux finis qui en proviennent dans divers points et en altèrent la simplicité, soit, enfin, aux anomalies qu'on observe parmi les systèmes d'organes particuliers des différentes organisations."

This second cause is found in the very different circumstances in which the various animals are placed.

On the other hand, an even greater number of passages from Lamarck's writings might be adduced to show that both his primary and his secondary causes are alike due to the effect of circumstances. The increasing complexity of organism being perhaps, as in Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory, caused by the residual, and, to borrow an image from astronomy, secular effects of numerous opposing circumstances. Lamarck's general theory of life as dependent on the action of subtle fluids is given elsewhere, but there is nothing in it to show anything like an intention in nature to pass from one type to another, or to explain her disuse of organs already brought to a high degree of complication. On the contrary, he generally speaks (*Hist. Nat. Introd. Part 3*) as if all changes, and consequently all advance, were due to the effect of circumstances, new wants, and the action of his subtle fluids, caloric and electricity. Nor is there anything in his account of nature to countenance the theory of intelligence or design in her. Although in other parts of his works he appears to regard her as a Demiurgus, an intelligent but subordinate and finite being, fashioning the world, both animate and inanimate, according to her will; yet when he comes to treat of nature herself (*Hist. Nat. Intr. Part 6*) it appears that she is nothing but motion and a collection of laws. But a law in physics is really nothing but a way of grouping or describing, more or less accurately, all the similar phenomena presented by bodies; and however general it may be, and however many apparently different effects it may explain, still always remains nothing but a statement, that different bodies behave or move in a similar manner. Lamarck's definition of nature, in fact, amounts to saying that she is a collection of facts or phenomena presented by bodies.

Life, again, is described by him (*l.c. p. 311*) as having neither intention, end nor will, as blind and limited, and existing only by the will of a superior and infinite Power. Nature is distinct from the material universe (*p. 314*), and consists (*p. 319*), first, of motion, and, secondly, of all the constant and immutable laws which regulate the movements and changes of bodies. He attacks the notion (which he says is that of most persons), that nature and God are the same, and declares that God is the all-powerful Creator of nature, while nature is not a being or an

intelligence, but an order of things everywhere subjected ; and that design or will is not to be attributed to her, but that the appearance of it is derived from the operation of fixed laws originally combined for the purpose or end which her Supreme Author had in view. This is the case among animals, in whose formation he refuses to admit the action of Cuvier's final causes. He says :—

“ En effet dans chaque organisation particulière de ces corps, un ordre de choses préparé par les causes qui l'ont graduellement établi, n'a fait qu'amener par des développemens progressifs de parties, régis par les circonstances, ce qui nous paraît être un but, et ce qui n'est réellement qu'une nécessité. Les climats, les situations, les milieux habités, les moyens de vivre et de pourvoir à sa conservation, en un mot les circonstances particulières dans lesquelles chaque race s'est rencontrée ont amené les habitudes de cette race ; celles-ci y ont plié et approprié les organes des individus ; et il en est résulté que l'harmonie que nous remarquons partout entre l'organisation et les habitudes des animaux, nous paraît une fin prévue, tandis qu'elle n'est qu'une fin nécessairement amenée” (p. 324).

It appears on the whole, therefore, that if Lamarck did in any way, like Mr. Mivart, conceive a vital force working independently of, and often against circumstances, his views were ill-defined and confused. Though he often mentions nature as a force which gradually perfects the organs of animals, yet he dwells at greater length and more clearly on the power of circumstances in modifying them. He lays down, that circumstances create new wants in the intelligent animals, and produce changes in the nutrition and other vital actions of plants. Thus, changes in the latter are brought about by differences in the amount of moisture in meadows, or by cultivation in gardens. The leaves of the *Ranunculus aquatilis*, which grow under water, are of a quite different character to those growing in the air. In the higher animals new wants are created by changed circumstances, and produce new actions ; and, as the employment of an organ strengthens and enlarges it, while the disuse of an organ makes it deteriorate, the organs become thus altered in an individual subjected to a different set of external circumstances, and these alterations are (at least, if both parents be affected in a similar way) preserved in the offspring. It is therefore, according to Lamarck, an error to suppose that the nature or condition of an organ has led to its employment for a particular purpose ; the real fact being that its employment has modified the organ, and fitted it better to perform the duty required of it. He gives (*Phil. Zool.* vol. i. p. 248), several instances of organs modified by use or disuse. Thus the teeth of whales, the eyes of the mole, the feet of serpents, have been deteriorated or lost by dis-



use. The head of accephalous mollusks has on the other hand been lost by a somewhat different cause, the excessive development of the mouth. The shortening of the intestines of drunkards he also attributed to disuse. On the other hand, the webs between the toes of water birds, the feet of perchers, the long legs of waders, the tongue of the woodpecker, the legs and neck of the giraffe, and the hind legs of the kangaroo, are all instances of organs augmented and developed by excessive use; while the hoofs of many quadrupeds, the formation of the sloth, and the peculiar position of the eyes of the flat fish, are examples of the modifications of organs produced by the peculiar manner in which they are used.

It is not at first evident how use could furnish webs to the toes of swimming birds or animals, as the immediate effect of the resistance of the water would rather be to wear away and destroy all excrescences or webs on the foot. Perhaps Lamarck considered their development as an effect of over-nutrition, or as produced by continual streams of nervous fluid directed to the toes in swimming, producing a swelling or turgescence of the tissues, and forming channels, and thus pushing out the tissues covering the toes.

Lamarck extended his views to men, whom he considered as descended from the quadrumana. The difference in their structure was caused by men losing their habit of climbing trees, and being compelled during many generations to walk on their hind legs. Having obtained the mastery over other races, men took possession of all the spots which suited them, drove other animals into deserts, and thus arrested their development, while they multiplied their own wants, and, consequently, their mechanical powers (*industrie*) and faculties; and thus increased the distance between themselves and other animals. An erect position, he says, is sometimes assumed by the chimpanzee, and does not seem even now altogether natural to man, as is shown by the unwillingness of a fat, paunchy child to walk or stand. This is, we believe, the only place where Lamarck shows any perception of the law established by Mr. Darwin—that the young animal seems often not to have acquired the characteristics separating the adult from the neighbouring forms from which it has been developed.

The argument in favour of the fixity of species drawn from the fact that the mummies of animals found in Egypt present the same characters as existing animals, is not, according to Lamarck, conclusive. It proves only that species in Egypt have not varied for the last three or four thousand years, which is not surprising; as the climate and external circumstances affecting the animals in question have remained unaltered, and it is only

by changes of circumstances and length of time that new species or varieties are produced. Lamarck thinks that no species have been actually lost, except some large land animals extirpated by man. Other species, which seem to have disappeared, have really left descendants, but they, owing to continual changes of level and climate in different parts of the earth, have assumed forms different from those of their ancestors. There is therefore no evidence of any general catastrophe by which all the species in existence at one time were destroyed, although there have been many local catastrophes.

Lamarck gives two tables showing the origin and descent of animals. The one in the "*Philosophie Zoologique*," ii. 463, the other, six years later, in the "*Histoire Naturelle*," i. p. 457. In the first, Lamarck makes two branches of the animal kingdom, which are, however, of very different importance. The first branch comprises the Infusoria, Polyps, and Radiaria (sea urchins, star fish, jelly fish, &c.) or nearly all the forms classed by Cuvier as Radiata, with the exception of intestinal worms. These, together with Planaria, Gordius and Nais, make up Lamarck's class of worms, which forms the root of his second branch, and from which he derives all the higher forms of animals. These again make two branches, one composed of insects, spiders, lobsters, and other segmented animals with jointed limbs, the other of the annelids or ring-worms, the cirripeds or barnacles, and the mollusks. From the last the vertebrates spring. First fishes, then reptiles, then birds, and from these the mono-treme mammals, the duck-bill and echidna. The other mammals, however, he derives, not from birds, but from reptiles, from which he considers amphibious mammals, such as the seal and the manatee to have sprung; while they in their turn gave rise to the three remaining divisions—the unguiculate or clawed, the ungulate or hoofed, and the cetacea or whales. It is obvious, therefore, that Lamarck did not consider the lowest mammals to be necessarily the earliest developed, since he derived cetaceans by a process of degradation from amphibious mammals.

The view presented of the probable descent of animals in Lamarck's second table is a great improvement on the first. He still keeps two great series of animals, but they are better connected than those of the first table. The first series commences with Infusoria, from which Lamarck supposes the Polyps to have sprung. These give rise to two different classes. First, the Radiaria; and, secondly, Ascidians, and through them to the acephalous and other Mollusks. Except that Lamarck includes Cuvier's Echinoderms in his Radiaria, instead of giving a position near the worms, a modern evolutionist could object but little to this part of the table. The second, or articulate series, is

not in such close conformity with modern ideas. The worms give rise to two classes, Annelids (ringed red-blooded worms) and Epizoa (parasites generally found attached to the eyes or gills of fish). These Epizoa Lamarck believed to be the source from which insects and the other Articulates with jointed limbs were derived. The Cirrhipeds (Barnacles) Lamarck rightly places with these animals, although Cuvier long after continued to class them among Mollusks, in consequence of the resemblance of their shells to those of Bivalves. Lamarck himself so far gives importance to this resemblance as to place Cirrhipeds above Crustaceans, in accordance with his theory of the importance of organs analogous to those of a superior class. The Vertebrates are here placed by themselves, unconnected with either series of invertebrate animals, although from several passages of the "Histoire Naturelle" it appears that Lamarck had not abandoned his theory that they were derived from the Mollusca.

In the first chapter of the second book of his "Phil. Zool." Lamarck endeavours to define the class of inanimate bodies. He recurs to the subject of the difference between them and living beings in the first volume of his "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres," where his views are given at greater length, and in some respects with more precision. In the "Philosophie Zoologique" he considers that inorganic substances are distinguished by having no individuality, by many of them being homogeneous (wholly solid, liquid or fluid), by their having no need of movement or nutrition, by their increasing by juxtaposition, and not by intussusception, and by their not originating from germs or being subject to death. From this definition it is impossible to know whether or not Lamarck intended to include substances derived from living beings, such as wood, wax, &c., in the class he was defining. All the characters he mentions are mere negations of characters of living beings, and might be more forcibly and concisely expressed by the words "inorganic" and "not living." Homogeneity, while it cannot be predicated of all inorganic substances, is a property (so far as our present knowledge extends) of some organic beings. An Amœba has all the appearance of a particle of animated jelly, and has a better claim to be called homogeneous than granite or most rocks, and as good a claim as wax or butter. In fact, it is evident that Lamarck, at the time he was writing this definition, had living beings in view, and would, had he cared to frame a logical work, have defined them instead of inorganic bodies. It would perhaps be as easy to make a satisfactory definition of unelectrified bodies as of inanimate or inorganic bodies. Many of the latter are subject to forces producing crystallization, but this, though a positive character, cannot be predicated of colloids such as gum, &c. One

common character is indeed attributed to all minerals by Lamarck—that of being derived from dead animals or plants. Stated broadly, as by him, this is an impossibility. He shows himself that the material constituents of all living beings were once inorganic. So that the old problem of the hen and the egg appears in an insoluble form.

In the second chapter of the *Philosophie Zoologique*, book ii., Lamarck attempts a definition of life, which he represents as producing various phenomena that yet do not constitute it. Life, he says (p. 403), in the parts of a body which possesses it, is an order and state of things which allows organic movements therein; these movements, which constitute active life, result from the action of a stimulative cause which excites them. This is not very clear. He goes on to lay down that active life requires stimuli, and a state of things which bestows the faculty of obeying them. This state of things consists in the existence of supple parts formed of cellular tissue and of liquid parts. The necessary exciting causes are to be found in the various subtle (imponderable) fluids which permeate all things, and which are in a continual state of agitation, produced by the motion of the earth, the varying positions of the heavenly bodies, and the seasons. Of such fluids the most important, perhaps the only ones concerned in producing life, are caloric and the electric fluid. To plants and to the lower animals the fluids in the surrounding media are sufficient to furnish the necessary stimuli; but in higher animals a continual production and renewal of the exciting fluids goes on. Some change even seems to take place in the nature of the fluids, the electric fluid being, as it were, animalized and converted into galvanic and nervous fluids. In plants only the liquid portions are acted on by the exciting causes, and their movements are probably due to caloric. In animals, however, the caloric produces swellings and contractions of the soft tissues as well as movements of the liquid parts. The caloric of higher animals is, according to Lamarck, derived from arterial blood.

It is to the important part played by heat that Lamarck attributes the great development of living beings in summer-time and in tropical climates. Water, light, and air, in addition to heat, are essential to the production of living beings. The phenomena of torpidity and hybernation are due to a loss of caloric; but in hibernating animals this loss is only partial, as is shown by the fact that, if the cold be increased, the animal awakes and becomes very restless. The chief effect of caloric on animated beings is to produce "orgasme"—a sort of tension or swelling, perhaps allied to tonicity. This "orgasme" exists in the soft parts of animals, and also, though obscurely, in plants, in which, however, it never gives rise to irritability, which is a power of moving in answer to

an external stimulus, rapidly and repeatedly, or as often as the stimulus is applied. The want of irritability is the great mark by which plants are to be distinguished from animals, but they also differ in having no digestive faculty, in their mode of growth, and in their chemical characters.

In the first volume of the *Histoire Naturelle* Lamarck again takes up the subject, and defines vegetables as being (1) unable to contract suddenly and repeatedly as often as a stimulus is applied to them; (2) unable to displace themselves; (3) having only their liquid parts capable of motion; (4) being without special internal organs, although possessing a number of vessels and canals; (5) without digestion, but only elaboration of the fluids which nourish them; (6) having displacement of fluid, but no circulation; (7) having two growths, one ascending, the other descending, from a vital nodus (nœud vital), situated at the origin of the root; (8) tending to grow perpendicular to the plane of the horizon; (9) being generally compound.

The motions of plants he considers to be due to mechanical causes, such as the action of elastic fluids, of springs (as in the action of certain plants in discharging their pollen), or to the action of the sun in drying up or driving away the fluids in particular parts. Some of the motions, like those of *Confervæ* and *Oscillatoriæ*, are slow, and not altered by external stimuli; while others, as in the case of the sensitive plant, can only be repeated after long intervals.

The facts established since the time of Lamarck show the futility of his theories. It is impossible to distinguish the movements of the ciliæ of *Zospores*, or of the amœbiform poisonous matter of the nettle from those of the ciliæ of infusoria or of *Amœba*. The second and third of Lamarck's characters are incorrect; the fifth and sixth are only verbal. How does elaboration differ from digestion, or circulation from displacement? The other characters are neither true of all plants, nor peculiar to them; and even if they were, they are not sufficiently important to separate plants from animals.

Animals, according to Lamarck, are distinguished by nine characters, generally corresponding to the characters of plants already enumerated. The first and second, fifth and eighth, consist in the possession of irritability and the power of moving. The third character is that animals execute no movements without stimulus, and can repeat such movements as often as the stimulus is employed; while, according to the fourth character, the movements show no comprehensible relation to their cause. The other characters are that animals are nourished by foreign compound substances, which they generally have the power of digesting; that they present great disparities in the composition

of their organization, and that they have no tendency to grow vertically.

It appears to us that definitions, in order to be useful, should consist either in a short explanation or description of the essential characters of the class, or in a description of one or more characters to be found in each member of the class, and serving as a test whether a given object does or does not belong to the class. In the second case it is important that the test should be accurate, but not that the character chosen should be important. Of this nature are the characters serving to discriminate between neighbouring genera in Zoology. In the first case, however, the characters chosen should be important; and if possible should disclose the essence, the actual nature and reason for existence of the class. This can hardly ever be done, except in pure mathematics and artificial or verbal sciences, such as Grammar, Heraldry, or Rhetoric. Our definitions share in the imperfections of our knowledge; and all we can do, when seeking to define a class of the components of which we know as little as we do of animals, is to take the characters which seem to be the most important and most universal, and state them as clearly and concisely as is possible. So long as the real nature of matter, of space, and of force is unknown, it is impossible to understand properly or define adequately life or feeling. The definitions can be but provisional, and in such it is not absolutely necessary that the characters chosen should be accurately coextensive with the class.

Judged from this point of view some of Lamarck's characters are, for his time, as important and indicative of the real nature of the class as any that could be chosen. In particular, the character which attributes to animals the power of executing movements, not communicated but excited, and bearing no comprehensible relation to their exciting cause, and the character which lays stress on the stream of matter continually flowing through the bodies of living beings, appear to us especially good. It is interesting to compare Lamarck's definition of animals with Mr. Herbert Spencer's definitions of Life, which he says ("Principles of Biology," p. 74) consists in "the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences;" or (p. 80) "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." These definitions are very ingenious, but do not throw much light on the nature of life, or of the effects produced by it; nor do they afford a test by which to decide whether a given substance is or not endued with life. Mr. Spencer himself admits that the characters are not strictly coextensive with the class; indeed he holds that no characters can be strictly coextensive consistently with the doctrine of Evolution.

Living beings are produced by generation, which Lamarck holds may be either spontaneous or from parents similar to the offspring. Direct or spontaneous generations take place continually among the simple forms to be found at the beginning of the animal and vegetable series, and most other animals and plants are derived from these earliest forms. Being ignorant of the eggs both of Polyps and Infusoria, he argues in favour of the occurrence of direct generations from the destruction which, during a rigorous winter, must overtake all the inhabitants of freshwater pools. He at one time considered that direct generation occurred only among the lowest forms, but he was later induced to believe that intestinal worms, and even external parasites of comparatively high organization, might be generated directly from corpuscles formed in the animals infested, and analogous in some degree to the corpuscles which reproduce the form of the parent. He thus recognises the two sorts of direct generation which Dr. Bastian has called respectively Abiogenesis, generation from inorganic matter; and Heterogenesis, or generation of a new and distinct animal or plant from organic matter or living bodies. Dr. Grant in his "Tabular View of the Animal Kingdom" (London, 1861), declares it is impossible to draw any definite line of demarcation between the various cells which build up one of the higher animals such as blood corpuscles, bone cells, &c., and the lowest isolated and independent animals. Mr. H. Spencer also propounds a somewhat similar theory, considering higher animals to be aggregates of the second or even third order, built up out of cells or aggregates of the first order. (Principles of Biology, ii. p. 77-112.) These views, however, are by no means the same as those of Lamarck, whose parasites spring from germs and not from cells. According to the observations of Pouchet and Bastian, a germ-like period of quiescence is the invariable precursor of every great heterogenetic change in any living body, and the particles from which the new being will arise are at first aggregated together so as to present the appearance of an egg or germ, which Pouchet calls the spontaneous egg. If the correctness of these observations were established, it would be a curious corroboration of Lamarck's surmise.

Lamarck goes on to explain the production of the simplest organic forms by direct generation. Gelatinous and mucilaginous bodies are alone fitted to receive life. Into the mass of these the ambient subtle fluids penetrate, increase the interstices, and produce a cellular tissue, in which various fluids and liquids can enter and move. Caloric here plays the most important part. The lower animals are entirely formed of this cellular tissue. In the higher animals and plants this tissue is modified. Vessels are wrought in it by the motion of fluids; membranes, such as

bark and skin, are formed by its compression; and all other organs are derived from and developed by it. Lamarck in forming his theory seems to have confounded the areolar or fibrous tissue enveloping the muscles and other organs with the primordial cells from which many organs originate.

New combinations of matter are being continually formed by living bodies, by means of their organic movements, with the aid of the affinities or relations of matter, and the tendency which all compound bodies have to self-destruction, a tendency which arises from some of the combined principles in such bodies requiring to be fixed by the restraint of an external force. Hence come secretions and assimilations. In youth the parts of the body are soft; nutrition is consequently more than sufficient to supply the waste of the tissues, and the animal increases in size. As time goes on, the softer portions of the tissues are more easily lost or dissipated in the continual flux of matter than the harder portions; while in the repairs effected by nutrition, the harder portions are comparatively more numerous. Thus the tissues gradually harder, and further growth becomes impossible. At first the surplus nutriment collected by every part of the body serves the reproductive faculty, and goes to form a small but similar body. As the hardness still increases, nutrition is carried on with greater difficulty, and at length ceases to be sufficient to maintain the body in a state in which vital movements can be carried on, and the animal dies. This view, which accounts for the resemblance between parents and their offspring by supposing that organs in the latter are formed out of particles derived from the corresponding organ in the former, was probably suggested to Lamarck by Buffon's theory of organic molecules. It is reproduced, although with many improvements and additions, in Mr. Darwin's theory of Pangenesis, but is much older than any of these authors. Lucretius (Bk. iv. l. 1212), reproducing the atomic theory of the Greeks, says:—

Fit quoque, ut intendum similes existere avorum  
 Possint, et referant proavorum sæpe figuras,  
 Propterea, quia multa modis primordia multis  
 Mista suo celant in corpore sæpe parentes,  
 Quæ patribus patres tradunt a stirpe profecta;  
 Inde Venus varia producit sorte figuras,  
 Majorumque refert voltus, vocesque, comasque.

The theories all seem to rest on some materialistic idea, that a particular force can be transmitted from one body to another by a transmission of some of the actual particles impressed with or moving in obedience to such force.



After giving this account of the general effect of life, Lamarck proceeds to discuss the principal faculties peculiar to different animals. He commences with his usual serene conviction of the truth of his own theories, and all facts to be deduced therefrom, by inveighing against the folly of expecting to find organs in animals lower in the scale of life than those in which rudimentary organs appear. As circulation is first sketched out in the class of insects, it is useless to seek for anything of the sort in Radiaria. It is equally absurd to attribute anything like respiratory functions to the leaves of plants. After this rather unfortunate beginning, he examines seven of the chief faculties. He defines—1. *Digestion*, as consisting in the destruction of the state of aggregation of the particles of aliment, and in a change of state and quality fitting the aliment, to form chyle and to repair the essential fluid: and 2. *Respiration*, as the process by which the essential fluid is repaired, after sudden alterations of it, where nutrition is too slow a process. The alterations intended are those arising from the supposed sudden dissipation of caloric, electricity, and nervous or other subtle fluids necessary for producing motion and other vital functions. Lamarck, however, while he recognises oxygen as the most important principle of this reparation, makes no allusion to any development of heat from the combination of such oxygen. He divides the special systems of respiratory organs into four sorts, which are Lungs and Tracheæ, fitted for breathing air; and Branchiæ and Aquiferous Tracheæ, adopted for breathing water: the last being found in Radiaria (echinoderms and jelly-fish). In animals not having a definite circulation, respiration is effected in organs diffused over the whole body, the respired fluid carrying its influence to every part, and the essential fluid not travelling further than the respired fluid. In animals having a circulation, on the other hand, the respired fluid is admitted into a special organ, and there is a special circulation of the essential fluid, either complete or incomplete, within such organ. A very slow movement of the essential fluid takes place among the infusoria, and probably a more rapid one among the polyps. In higher animals a separate system of organs is required to carry on the definite circulation which these obtain. This system is first sketched out in the Arachnida (spiders, mites, &c.), and formed in the Crustacea. The theory—that respiration is intended to effect changes in the circulating fluid—seems open to some question. The ultimate object is to provide the organs of the body with the oxygen necessary to enable them to carry on the vital functions, and the alteration which undoubtedly takes place in the blood seems generally to be but a means of carrying the oxygen to these organs. The other functions

Lamarck mentions are those of the muscles, of sensation, of sex, of circulation and intelligence.

In the third part of his *Phil. Zool.* Lamarck develops at some length his theory of sensation, instinct, thought and will, as dependent on the motions of a subtle fluid, which he considers to be probably an animalized form of electricity. He believes that the fluids to which he attributed irritability and motion in animals may, like their blood, become more complex and retainable—“*contenable*”—in the higher animals, although still remaining invisible. A special fluid traverses the nerves, and being used and lost in them, is continually being separated from the blood of the arteries to make up the loss. The blood itself, as we have seen, is restored by means of respiration to its former state. The great separation of this fluid from the blood takes place in the grey matter of the brain, and other nervous centres, which is in a great measure composed of small arteries.

The nervous system always consists of two parts. (1) A central mass, from which, the fluid necessary to excite the muscles to contract, starts, and to which, the fluid conveying sensation comes. In vertebrata this centre is probably the ring (*Pons Varolii*?) of nervous matter round the continuation of the spinal cord into the brain, the medulla oblongata, or the medulla oblongata itself. In insects, the first bilobed ganglion is also a centre; but these animals may have several centres. The centres are the parts first formed, and though other parts may be larger and more developed, this is only the effect of the general law that exercise promotes growth. (2.) The nerves are the second portion. They consist of a medullary pulp, covered by a sheath, which retains the subtle fluid continually traversing them. They are, however, open at their extremities to enable the fluid to communicate with the various parts of the body. The pulp is secreted from the blood, or essential fluid of the animal. A special sheath covers every nerve-fibre, in addition to the fibrous envelope of the whole. The nerves were produced after the formation of the various centres by the movements of the special subtle fluid, working out channels and passages by which more easily to arrive at the place where it was required.

This view of the origin of nerves is not unlike the one given by Mr. Herbert Spencer (*Biology*. Section 302).

Movements, when effected by irritability in the lowest animals, are, as has been seen, due entirely to external stimuli; but Lamarck repeatedly lays down that muscular action is always accompanied by nervous action, of which it is the earliest and commonest effect. In higher animals sensation or feeling is also produced in the nervous system, and in higher animals still, which have a

special organ (the hemispheres of the brain or hyper-cephalon, as Lamarck terms it)—consciousness, thought, moral feeling, and will, also result. The precise action of the nervous system in those animals, in which it subserves muscular action only, is not laid down with any accuracy by Lamarck. He states that such action may be produced in three ways—(1) by external action; (2) by the internal feeling not regulated by the will; and (3) by such feeling regulated to a greater or less extent by the will. In all animals in which a nervous system exists, he considers it probable that the internal feeling exists. Its action, however, will be best understood by first taking the phenomena of feeling.

The soft character of the nerves, and especially of their medullary pulp, renders it impossible to adopt Hartley's view, and to consider them as vibrating cords, or transmitting impressions by vibrations of their component matter. They, however, all contain a portion of the subtle nervous fluid, which, by its movements or compressions and the shocks it receives, gives rise both to sensation and the emotions of the internal feeling. Every impression given to any particular part produces a shock to the whole amount of nervous fluid contained in the nervous system. This shock is propagated along the nerve to the centre, and thence to every part of the system, and afterwards produces a reaction, which comes from every part of the system except the particular nerve first affected, and is consequently propagated along such nerve, the only one not reacting. This causes the sensation to be referred to the extremity of this nerve, in the part originally impressed. On the other hand, the internal feeling is due to a general shaking of the nervous fluid, not accompanied by any reaction. The continual small impressions such fluid receives give rise to the feeling of personal identity, "*le moi*," while the more violent impressions produce actions and thoughts by sending portions of the nervous fluid to the brain, or directly to the muscles. By this automatic or involuntary actions are produced, as when a man starts at a loud sound, or flings down a hot iron. Consciousness only arises when a part of the nervous fluid traverses the special organ (the hyper-cephalon), in which its movements leave traces of its currents. These traces produce alterations in the currents which afterwards traverse the same part, and by these means feelings and moral sensibilities are produced, which by such alteration or modification of the movements of the nervous fluid give rise to corresponding actions. Habits in man and the higher animals, and instincts in the lower ones, (especially remarkable in insects,) are actions produced by the nervous fluid moving along courses which have been worn out by repeated currents flowing in the same or similar directions. The internal

feeling has thus a threefold faculty. First, to give notice of sensations whereby physical sensibility is produced ; secondly, to give consciousness of ideas and thoughts by sending portions of the nervous fluid to move in the channels or courses already worn in the hyper-cephalon, whereby moral sensibility is produced, as hereafter mentioned ; and, thirdly, to make the animal act instinctively or involuntarily. Only a small part of the nervous fluid is at the disposition and will of the animal, and this part is speedily used up in continual movements or intellectual operations, and requires to be reproduced before the animal can go on acting or thinking. It is thus that the sense of fatigue arises, the muscles not being themselves altered.

Conscious will and ideas arise from the motion of the nervous fluid in the organs of intelligence, the cerebral lobes or hyper-cephalon. This organ does not react on the nervous fluid. It is composed of innumerable cavities, to which the nerve fibres lead. The act of attention is necessary to prepare the organ to be impressed ; without such act, an impression will be perceived, but not felt ; but when attention has prepared the channel, the agitation of the nervous fluid originally produced by an external object is communicated to nervous fluid which traverses the hyper-cephalon, and engraves traces of its course on that organ. A simple idea is thus produced, which can be recalled by the nervous fluid being directed on the traces of the original sensation, and with the aid of attention bringing back the features of such traces to the notice of the internal consciousness. Lamarck denies the existence of any innate ideas, though they would almost seem to be a necessary consequence of his theories. If the offspring bears the close resemblance to the parent which he attributes to it, and ideas are the results of channels actually sculptured in the brain, it would appear at least highly probable that the child would be born with the power of reproducing all the ideas of its parent. Lamarck considers dreams and madness caused by disturbed currents of the nervous fluid traversing various parts of the hyper-cephalon, and the traces of many ideas uncontrolled by the internal feeling.

In forming judgments, a stream of fluid is divided and directed by the internal feeling on to different traces of ideas already engraved in the brain, after tracing which, the different portions acquire as many modifications of their original motions as there are traces of simple ideas, and then reuniting, these different motions are combined into one complex movement which produces the judgment ; complex ideas are derived from judgments, and complex ideas and judgments of the second order are obtained from complex ideas of the first order, in a manner similar to that in

which the complex ideas of the first order are derived from simple ideas.

Will is a determination by thought, and always the effect of a judgment. It is not really free, but the necessary result of the previous operation, as the quotient is in an arithmetical process. The appearance of irregularity in the workings of the will and the enormous variations in the results obtained from different people and at different times, arise from differences in the organ, produced by disposition, age, health, and other elements, all of which take part in the formation of the judgment. Attention is an act of the internal feeling acted on by a want or desire which directs a part of the nervous fluid which is at the disposition of the individual, on to the organ of intelligence. Preoccupation prevents this act, and then ideas or feelings do not engrave themselves on this organ.

The first thing that strikes one after reading Lamarck's attempted explanation of the processes of feeling, thought, and other acts of intelligence, is that even if it were true, it would explain nothing. There is the same difficulty, neither diminished nor increased, in the mind being conscious of a stream of nervous fluid in the hyper-cephalon, as in its being conscious of the pressure of a solid substance on the finger. It is possible, or at least conceivable, that such a stream may be an essential link in the chain connecting external phenomena with consciousness. It is certain that some operation in the lobes of the brain is such a link, but it is highly improbable that Lamarck's fanciful sketch represents what really takes place, and if it did, it would throw no light soever on the problem of consciousness. Lamarck has described a sort of hydraulic calculating machine which requires both to be originally set in motion and also to have its final results read off and interpreted by an intelligent mind. Such a mind he seems sometimes to attribute to what he calls the internal feeling, which, however, he often treats as only a sort of valve. In one respect he is particularly unfortunate. He has based all his explanations of life and intellect on theories of imponderable fluids, like the caloric invented by Black, and the various electric fluids. These theories had, even before Lamarck wrote his *Philosophie*, been assailed by Count Rumford. (*Phil. Trans.*, A.D. 1798, and Sir Humphry Davy, *Chemical Philosophy*, 1812.) They were not, however, really overthrown till Joole and Mayer, respectively, published their views and experiments on the nature of heat, about 1842-3. Lamarck was so fond of imponderable fluids that he even considered sound to be propagated not by air, but by a peculiar imponderable fluid, which he elsewhere represents as a modified form of caloric. He based his theory on the discrepancy between the observed velocity of sound and

that calculated for it by Newton, and refused to admit the explanation of Lagrange and Laplace, who showed Newton's calculations to be defective in not taking account of the action of heat in increasing the elasticity of the air. These physical theories of Lamarck now impart to his biological speculations a much greater air of falseness and fancifulness than they really deserve. In order properly to do justice to them when comparing them with modern speculations on the same subject, they should be as it were translated out of the language of subtle fluids into that of transmutable forces. Lamarck has in several cases anticipated theories which have since been advocated with great ingenuity, but he has in such cases often disguised them in phraseology borrowed partly from ideas now exploded, and partly from his own imagination. His views of life generally agree with those of Mr. Darwin and Mr. H. Spencer in so far as they all endeavour to explain the phenomena of life by the action of ordinary physical forces, and refuse to recognise any special vital force or fluid. On the other hand, he held the doctrine of the daily recurrence of spontaneous generation, which doctrine is at the present day advanced chiefly by the advocates of the principle that some special form of force is necessary to produce vital phenomena. In mental philosophy, as we have seen, Lamarck altogether rejected the doctrine of the freedom of the will, while in religion his views seem to have been a curious mixture of Pantheism and Deism.



## INDEPENDENT SECTION.

*[Under the above title a limited portion of the Westminster Review is occasionally set apart for the reception of able articles, which, though harmonizing with the general spirit and aims of the work, contain opinions at variance with the particular ideas or measures it may advocate. The object of the Editor, in introducing this department, is to facilitate the expression of opinion by men of high mental power and culture, who, while they are zealous friends of freedom and progress, yet differ widely on special points of great practical concern, both from the Editor and from each other.]*

### ART. VIII.—THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH.

**F**OLLOWING that essential principle of Liberalism which requires that all questions of common interest and concern be treated from a common and universal point of view, I propose in this paper to treat of the Established Church neither as a Churchman nor as a Nonconformist, but simply as a member of the State. It is as a citizen that I see with regret an ancient and noble department of the State, endowed with vast wealth of resource, high prestige, a wide-spreading and magnificent organization, and, in short, every appliance for promoting in the highest degree the highest welfare of the whole nation, and yet restricting its benefits to a moiety of the nation, and conferring even upon that moiety but a doubtful good, while to the rest it is a fountain of perpetual bitterness.

That the position of the Established Church of England should be regarded as a grievance by the Unestablished, or Nonconformist Church in England, will appear natural and inevitable when we consider that, of the immense property set apart by the piety of many generations for promoting the moral and spiritual welfare of the whole English people under State supervision, the entire control and disposal are in the hands of a body which comprises only about one-half of the nation.

It might be supposed from this statement of the case that the party most aggrieved were the Nonconformists; and, to judge from the demeanour of that party, the supposition would appear to be justified. But there are very many within the Established Church who find the preponderance of grievance to be with themselves, inasmuch as they are affected by the causes which

have led to its limitation far more seriously than any can be who are without its pale.

But while we may reasonably take this view of the case as between the two parties referred to, there is yet a third party which suffers more seriously than either, and one to whose grievances the citizen is bound to attach a paramount importance. This is the nation itself. In a vast variety of ways, all springing from the causes which have so disastrously affected the Church, the development of the nation in every direction, social, political, religious, intellectual, and moral, in which development is desirable, is arrested, retarded, or diverted. For the most fatal element that can be introduced into a nation, as into a family, is the spirit of dogmatism—the spirit that leads a man to believe that he is in exclusive possession of all truth; and it is this spirit, with its accompanying host of malignant sprites, that our Church has inherited from Rome, and retained in all its intensity, thereby fostering bigotry, intolerance, jealousy, dissension, insincerity, and lowering the standard of morality generally by exalting authority above reason, assertion above proof, profession above conviction, and opinion above conduct.

The modes whereby some of the parties concerned have attempted to account for the evils they cannot fail in some measure to perceive are characteristic of their respective standpoints. Thus the Nonconformists are unanimous in charging all the blame upon the connexion of the Church with the State. Drawing a rigid line of demarcation between things sacred and things secular, they contend that the union is one of Christ with Belial, and call loudly for the “liberation of religion from State control.”

In the Establishment itself the conviction is universal that the present position cannot long be maintained, and opinion on the subject is mainly of two kinds, the party holding one desiring to be separated from the State, solely in order, apparently, to be free to return upon the doctrine and practice of Rome, and thus become more exclusive, and recede still further from the catholicity incumbent upon an institution claiming to be national; and the other party desiring to retain the State connexion, but at the same time to obtain various degrees of relaxation in the conditions of membership.

For the simple unattached citizen, who views things from a standpoint at once practical and ideal, and disregards both tradition and authority, none of these parties have lighted upon either the true grievance or the true remedy. Bringing the achromatic light of reason and experience to bear upon the question, he hesitates not to apply to things claiming to be divine the same principles and tests which he finds indispensable for



things secular. For him the faculty of truthfulness is sacred, whatever it be applied to, and he knows of but one set of faculties whereby truth is to be ascertained. These are the mind and conscience of the living generations of men—faculties which must be left to operate freely, if their verdict is to be rendered in accordance with the facts.

It is, therefore, to the limitations placed by the Church upon opinion and expression, that the citizen finds himself compelled to ascribe, not only its own shortcomings, but also a large share of the defects under which we labour as a people and nation.

It appears, then, to the citizen that the desired end is to be attained only by applying afresh the principles of the Reformation, and completing that great movement by emancipating the Church from all its trammels. Those trammels are not what the Nonconformist imagines, nor is the end precisely that which the High Churchman desires. Those who come nearest to the citizen's view belong to the third party, described as the Broad Church. It has not yet spoken out very clearly; but this may be because its spokesmen have been clergymen, and under bondage. Perchance these will not refuse to let a layman formulate for them the wishes they are debarred from expressing.

While freedom is what, in the view of all the parties concerned, the Church requires, the freedom which alone the citizen can reasonably grant is not of the kind imagined by the others.

It is somewhat remarkable that, while professing the greatest veneration for the Reformation, the Nonconformists should have failed to comprehend its spirit and intention. It does not seem to have occurred to them, while calling for the liberation of religion from State-control, that it is not the religion, but the ecclesiastical organization, of the Establishment which is really controlled by the State. The State has no interest whatever in narrowing the intellectual boundaries of the Church or restricting its sphere of action. The limitations under which the Church suffers are really self-imposed; and though they have the sanction of the State, and are enforced by the law, in common with the conditions of other corporate bodies, as constituting a contract, they were specified and insisted on by those whom we may regard as the officials of the department. The State, to which the Reformation was originally due, would, doubtless, have readily acquiesced in complete freedom but for the action of those Churchmen whose influence was paramount, and who used it to arrest and subvert the movement.

By demanding the separation of the Church from the State, while failing to object to the imposition of dogmatic limitations, the Unestablished or Nonconformist sections of the Church in England have betrayed their ignorance of the real significance of

the Reformation, as well as of the point where the pressure really falls. Had they raised their voices on behalf of freedom of opinion and expression, and shown by example their faith in the power of truth to win its way in a fair field, they might then indeed claim to be true children of the Reformation, and worthy to aid in completing it by striving for the emancipation of the National Church from its fetters.

This section of our countrymen, however, as I have said, has not yet learnt what the Reformation meant. For it has not yet learnt that, though fighting Rome with its own weapons, and using Dogma to combat Dogma, the Reformation was essentially a repudiation of all dogma. Using the dogma of Biblical Infallibility as an engine of destruction against the dogma of Papal Infallibility, the Reformation, by its very assertion of the right of private judgment in the choice of Infallibilities, struck at the root of all Infallibility, and consequently of all dogma whatever. And it is through their failure to comprehend and accept the spirit of the Reformation, that the Nonconforming communions have subjected their own religion to precisely the same bondage that religion suffers from in the Established Church; and in their confusion and distress they cry out for the liberation of religion from State control, when all that the State is interested in controlling is the Ecclesiastical organization, and not religion at all.

It is only a superficial view of our recent School legislation that could obtain for the Nonconformists credit for having reached any sound principle in respect of dogmatic teaching. They insist only that such teaching shall not in any way proceed from the State. And so far from objecting to the imposition itself of definite theological tenets, they, with scarce an exception, rival Rome in enforcing their own favoured dogmas among themselves. The fact is notorious that the children of Nonconformists are not permitted to grow up unbiased in respect of their religious conclusions, or left free to form them for themselves, any more than in the most sacerdotally governed communions.

Having, however, by the part they have taken in promoting the School-board system, consented to, or rather insisted on, State-interference on behalf of the education of the young, they have cut from under themselves the ground of their objection to the principle of a State Church.

In more ways than one is the establishment of the School Boards an attempt to create an institution nearly corresponding to the Church. In fact, the affinity between the Church and the School is so close, both in design and function, that it is impossible to draw a rigid line between them,—as impossible as between youth and age. For, rightly considered, what the School is to

youth, that the Church is, or ought to be, to maturity—the continual developer of the mind and spirit in a continually ascending progression, as co-architects of the fabric of man. If thus far man be but a squat and distorted figure, it is because, for the most part, instead of building him up, his architects have been content to sit upon him.

Our recent School legislation, in which may be included our University reforms, is based on the recognition of two broad well-defined principles. One, that the State, as a State, should provide facilities for the development of the faculties, moral, intellectual, and spiritual, of its members. The other, that it should not control the direction or limit the extent of that development.

Now, as it is impossible to draw a line between the rudimentary education of the youth and the higher education of the adult, it is impossible consistently to call upon the State to provide the School, and at the same time forbid it to establish the Church. For what but a part of the higher or highest education of man is the teaching that an enlightened Church ought to afford?

This, then, is our position at present. The Nonconformists concede the principle of the Established State Church as a teaching institution, but refuse to the State any right to impose dogmatic tenets. In other words, if the Established Church were made a dogmaless institution, and freed from limitation upon opinion and expression, the Nonconformists would be able to accept it as the crown and completion of the system of education whereof our National Schools constitute the base.

Having thus shown that the Nonconformist half of the Church and Nation cannot consistently object to the liberation of religion from its dogmatic limitations, let us see what reception the measure is likely to receive in the Establishment itself.

It is certainly not from the large class of highly educated laymen who, nominally at least, belong to the Church, that opposition is to be apprehended. It is a matter notorious to all who mix with these that whatever their vocation, philosophic, literary, scientific, artistic, or in any other way professional, they are unanimous in favour of the most extended relaxation of the terms of Church membership. The effect of the existing limitations is to cut them off, not only from the benefit of its ministrations, but also from one of the most coveted of careers; and year by year we see them flocking more and more to other professions, owing solely to these limitations, until the Church is fairly starving for lack of men of ability to minister in it.

Judging from the experience of other departments of the State when a re-construction is proposed, we might expect the officials

of this one to be unanimous and strenuous in their opposition. But so far from this being the case, a large and influential party among the clergy of the Establishment are avowedly eager for the change. While there is a multitude of others who, without openly avowing their desire, indirectly betray their approval by habitually making for themselves a selection from the dogmas they have sworn to, and explaining away, rejecting, or ignoring the rest.

By the imposition of tests, not only did the Church make itself responsible for innumerable immoralities, but it laid within itself the seeds of mortal disease. By persisting in their retention, it will commit suicide outright, for, claiming to lay down a pathway of approach for the soul towards God, it virtually inculcates Atheism. By relegating all revelation of truth to a distant past, it insists that the world should be governed by the dead and not by the living. By requiring that we shape our conceptions of the Universe by the conceptions of men who lived and died ages ago, it requires of the Almighty that he limit his manifestation of truth to us, to the kind and degree vouchsafed to them. The creed or belief of any age is but the index to the height of the Divine presence of truth in that age. And the design of the religious test is to limit all perception and expression of truth to the standard of some one age. The whole principle of religious tests, therefore, whether in Church established or in Church independent, involves the wild presumption of dictating to God as well as to all future generations of men. For it not only prohibits further progress to man, but it prohibits to God further manifestation of himself. This is nothing less than an assumption of infallibility on the part of those who practise it. And involving as it does the banishment of God and truth from the living world, it is essentially an atheistic principle.

To come to that party within the Established Church whose members implicitly receive all its dogmas, and believe that without them it would be no Church at all. Even to these the change we are considering would in some respects be a boon. For, where opinion and expression are free, there will be no impediment to the utterance of their convictions, and their utterances will have the additional weight of unimpeachable sincerity. Granting them their position, that the traditional dogmatic system is necessary to the constitution of a true Church, they will still have the satisfaction of believing themselves to be that Church, even though constituting a portion of a dogmaless Establishment; and they will still be free to strive to increase their following.

This, if I mistake not, is precisely the position assumed by the members of the High Church party in the Establishment at

the present moment. They regard themselves as alone the true Church within the Church of England. The main difference in their position would consist in the fact, that their limitations would be purely and avowedly self-imposed, and devoid of any recognition by the State. But as they already repudiate the authority of the State, both in doctrine and practice, this would not signify to them.

Of course the question does not fail to suggest itself—Are they right in defining a Church as a dogmatic institution? It would be no easy task to produce evidence proving that it was the intention of its Founder to make it so, or that it should for ever continue to be so. History exhibits dogma itself as capable of development. Why should it not develop into something beyond and above dogma; even as the seed originally buried in the ground loses itself by developing into the roots and stem of a fair plant patent to all?

So far from the assumption, that dogma constitutes the essence of the Christian Church being obligatory, they are surely not without justification, who find in the history of its Founder indications—that for him life was more than belief, conduct more than opinion, practice more than theory, love more than knowledge; and that he would Himself, could he be consulted afresh, be foremost in reprobating the importance attached to what at best are but human deductions from his imperfectly reported utterances. This is far from being an untenable or unreasonable view; and for those who hold it, there is little difficulty in believing that, so far from dogma being necessary to a true Church, it is precisely in proportion as the Christian dogma has been brought forward, and the Christian life withdrawn into the background, that the Church has lost sight of its mission, and failed to be a true Church.

But whatever the convictions of any party in a body claiming to be national, it must be content with the liberty to hold and teach them, without requiring that they be authoritatively imposed on others. It is equal justice that we require of the State, and equal justice forbids the selection and imposition of any set of opinions, no matter how strongly their adherents may be attached to them.

Dogma at best is but a slippery basis. There are few dogmas of which the terms are not capable of various interpretations. We all know what became of it in the domain of Astronomy. True, this is an exact science. But Theology is by no means secure from peril through it. It is notorious that numbers of the most highly educated and intelligent of the clergy receive in a merely subjective sense dogmas which they allow their uneducated congregations to regard in a very different way. When people

generally become aware that multitudes of clergymen, High as well as Broad Church, consider themselves justified in reciting creeds without having a particle of belief in their objective or historical truth, and are content if they can find in them a subjective or spiritual meaning, and that herein consists the sole barrier that divides them from what is vulgarly regarded as perjury; a barrier, however, which, slender as it is, many of their brethren are without—the fate of the Church as a dogmatic, or any other kind of institution, will be sealed, and much that might be made profitable for spiritual culture be indignantly rejected.

With feelings of profound commiseration should we regard the men who occupy the positions last described. It is because the spirit of truthfulness in them is too strong to be quenched, but strives ever against the exigences of a state of society whose morality is in conflict with that of nature, that they find themselves exposed to the charge of apparent insincerity. Not upon them, caught young, as most of them have been, and fettered in a position from which they can in nowise escape; but upon the system we have retained from Rome must the blame be cast. For centuries has our entire social system been on all sides enclosed by a quickset hedge of tests, subscriptions, vows, and oaths. At every turn we have been met by oaths political, oaths social, oaths ecclesiastical, oaths religious, oaths theological. Everywhere have men been bribed by privileges, honours, and emoluments, to swear that they will maintain the existing fabric of opinion and custom, rather than endeavour to ascertain and teach what is truest and best. And so, truthfulness and improvement have been authoritatively suppressed, until of England it may emphatically be said—"Because of swearing the land mourneth."

It is true that some clergymen agree with the late Frederick Denison Maurice in regarding the Athanasian Creed as a valuable expression of the highest truth, and the conviction is one with which a thoughtful layman may sympathize. But what a layman cannot endure is that any, claiming to be teachers of the people, should conceal the real significance which that or any other symbol of their faith possesses for them, and leave their hearers under the impression that it is other than it really is. The age of mystery and its complement deceit, has for ever passed away; and the Church will not be the less a true Church for abandoning its traditions in respect thereto.

The abolition of tests would involve the abolition of prosecutions for heresy, and of those hybrid institutions the ecclesiastical courts. No small boon would this be to the bishops, whose chief function then would consist in providing congregations with

teachers likely to work in profitable accord with them on the basis of free speech and free expression.

It has been asserted that such a reconstruction would have the effect of turning the "Church" out of the Establishment; but it seems to me that rather would it give admission to that half of the Church which is now out of it. Most gladly would the Nonconformists, I believe, return to it as to an inheritance from their portion in which they have long been unjustly excluded. The admission to the function of minister of any man who, by ability, attainments, and character, has shown himself worthy to instruct his fellows, combined with liberty for the ministers and their congregations to determine their own formularies, will leave no pretext for Nonconformity. If under a régime so expanded as to allow of every able cultivated man presenting the best the universe has revealed to him of itself, we fail to find that chief good which is the ultimate object of all earnest striving, we cannot be expected to be more successful under a continuance of the limitations prevailing hitherto.

The general Christian consciousness, of which dogma in its best sense, is regarded as the formulated expression, is identical in kind with other consciousness. Any difference, arising as it does from difference of cultivation, must be in direction and degree. Let all have adequate culture, and then, if dogma be true, the consciousness of all will be adequate for the recognition of its truth.

With freedom in place of dictation as the basis of the reconstructed Establishment, and consequently no harassing "Act of Uniformity" to be appealed to in behalf of interference, the lamentable bitterness and hostility which now animate each section against the others, will disappear. We have lately seen on our walls placards proclaiming Disestablishment as the best cure for Ritualism. Probably a better cure for that, or for any system of doctrine or practice which is based upon erroneous or partial views, would be found in the freedom of treatment that must result from throwing open the doors to the entire intellect of the country. But it is not for the sake of "curing" some peculiarity which we ourselves do not happen to have, that we should aim at the Church's emancipation; but for the sake of more justice, more truth, more charity, all of which will come with more liberty.

But so far from regarding Disestablishment as a "cure for Ritualism," there is good reason to consider whether the propounders of such remedy have ever tried to realize in their minds the spectacle which would be presented by the English Church after its removal from the tempering influences of the State. Let us endeavour to anticipate it.

Rich and powerful in its splendid and wide-reaching organization, its multitude of cathedrals, churches, chapels, and school-houses, and endowments of manifold variety, this great sect will overshadow the land, to the extinction of all rivals; gaining vigour and boldness as it becomes oblivious of the long nightmare of secular influence; ranging itself more firmly than ever around its traditional dogmas; and, strong in its new-found unity, dictating terms to the State itself, as a new monster to a new Frankenstein. Scarcely a year passes without some incident that reveals the tremendous amount of unreasoning enthusiasm that is pent-up in the English breast, longing for some object on which to exercise itself. Let the Church, as it is, be set loose to fight the battle of life for itself, and its members, forgetting their differences, will manifest on its behalf an enthusiasm that will utterly defy reason, and perchance carry the country captive to a new Rome, with its head-quarters in our midst. Farewell then, will it be, to freedom and the hoped-for civilization of the future; and farewell to the supremacy of the State; for of little avail will be its resistance to fierce and wide-spread fanaticism backed by such union and wealth of resource as the Church disestablished will command. Farewell, in short, to man's mind and conscience as the ultimate court of appeal for truth and right. By suffering the Church to have a dogmatic basis at all, the State put the knife to its own throat. By fostering it into power and greatness, and then disestablishing it, leaving that basis unimpaired, the State will inflict upon itself the fatal wound. It was a mere jingle of words that Count Cavour uttered and that has so attracted our Nonconformists. "A free Church in a free State"—where the Church is possessed of overwhelming wealth, prestige, and power—is an impossibility. We might as well try to imagine a free army in a free State. The Italian statesman mistook the point where alone freedom can be accorded to a national Church.

With such a vision before them, it is no wonder that numbers of the national clergy, caring all for the Church and nothing for the State, are as eager for disestablishment as any Nonconformist. It is to them but another name for supremacy. They know that the legislature would not turn them adrift portionless. They know that all the other religious bodies together could not vie with them in prestige and influence. And they know that the more daring their assumption, the more resistless would be their fascination for those who constitute the bulk of every community, the semi-educated and the emotional. In the Church disestablished the majority will rule; not the majority of a community already free, enlightened, and given to healthy disputation, but a majority wedded to tradition, and eager to



justify their independence by consolidating their newly-gained empire. It seems impossible to over-estimate the damage which the creation of such a power within the State will inflict upon the State—a power whose fundamental principles are in direct antagonism to those of the State. The citizen, therefore, can recognise but one condition on which the State can turn the Church adrift and allow it to retain a particle of national property—namely, the condition that the Establishment be given up to the nation, and not to a section of it merely.

So far from discerning the effect of separating the Establishment from the State, the body calling itself the "Society for the Liberation of Religion" proposes to appropriate the property of the Establishment to the endowment in perpetuity of the very system of dogma to which alone religion is really in bondage. Ignoring the self-evident proposition, that religion cannot be free when opinion is biased and fettered, and consequently that the endowment of opinion is equally immoral and pernicious, whether it proceed from the State or from a private source, the Society I have named reserves all its indignation for the State connexion alone. Whereas, if it were consistent in its professions, it would call upon the State to exercise once again the power which it wielded at the Reformation, and itself set "religion" free, abolishing the articles, tests, creeds, and whatever else serves to fetter religion in the Establishment. The abolition of the restrictions at present imposed upon opinion, alone is requisite to make the Establishment available for all classes of thinkers and teachers, and convert it into a really national institution. If, then, the nationalization of the Establishment is what the Nonconformists really aim at, why do they not propose such an abolition of its limitations, instead of proposing to take it out of the hands of the State altogether? They must know that it is only under the pressure of the State that such a reform can be accomplished; and that, left to itself, the "Church" would fasten the fetters upon "Religion" tenfold more firmly than before. For the experience of all dogmatic religious organizations proves how delusive would be any expectation that "the Church," when "liberated from State control," would or could reform itself. Its property and its traditions would constitute a nucleus around which its constituents would cling with the indomitable persistency of a mechanical attraction. Indeed, so far from putting an end to the endowment of dogma by the State, the scheme propounded by the Liberation Society would actually put it out of the power of the State ever to withdraw such endowment. It is as if, grudging the payment of an annual income the Society insisted on

making over the capital from which the income is derived; and this is precisely the course we have pursued in Ireland.

But when fitted for the reception of the nation by being released from its dogmatic limitations, there will no longer be any plea for its severance from the State. For it will then be the dogmaless National Church that is the natural and necessary complement of unsectarian national education in primary school and university.

For the citizen, then, there is but one way of adapting the Church Establishment to the national needs; and that is by freeing, not its organization from State-control, but its formulas and teaching from all limitation by Article, Test, and Creed, and whatever serves to make it an exclusive and sectarian body; so that the whole spiritual and intellectual life of the country may have room to develop freely within its pale, without rebuke or dictation from any quarter whatever. With our Established Church thus widened to the utmost dimensions of thought and knowledge, and the religion of the country no longer at odds with its intelligence, the national edifice of our higher uses will at length be happily completed, and of a piece throughout; having our new unsectarian, and therefore national, system of elementary instruction for its basis, our thoroughly reformed and no longer sectarian endowed schools and universities for its centre, and our reconstructed and nationalized Church Establishment for its crown; the whole capable of fulfilling for us higher and wider uses than ever did church or school that the world has yet seen.

To conclude with some words I have used elsewhere:—"Let us complete the Reformation by freeing our Church from its limitations, which are of the nursery. Let us release our teachers from the corner in which they have so long been cramped, and they will soon learn to take greater delight in exploring the many mansions which compose the whole glorious house of the universe, and unfolding in turn to their hearers whatever they can best tell, whether of science, philosophy, religion, art, or morality, not necessarily neglecting those spiritual metaphysics to which they have in great measure hitherto been restricted, and the consequence of which restriction has been but to distort them and all else from their due proportion. In the church thus reformed, all subjects that tend to edification will be fitting ones for the preacher. But whatever the subject, the method will have to be but one, always the scientific, never the dogmatic method. The appeal will be to the intellects, the hearts, and the consciences of the living; never to mere authority, living or dead. There will be no heresy, because no orthodoxy; or rather, the

question of heresy as against orthodoxy will be a question of method, not of conclusions. From the pulpits of such a church no genuine student or thinker will be excluded, but will find welcome everywhere from congregations composed, not of the women only and the weaker brethren, but of men, men with brains and culture! Who knows what edifices of knowledge may be reared, what reaches of spiritual perception may be attained, upon a basis from which all the rubbish of ages has been cleared away, and where all that is useful and true in the past is built into the foundations of the future! Who can tell how nearly we may attain to the perfections of the blessed when, no longer straitened in heart and mind and spirit by a narrow sectarianism, but with the scientific and the *verifiable* everywhere substituted for the dogmatic and the incomprehensible, the veil which has so long shrouded the universe as with a thick mist shall be altogether withdrawn; when the All is revealed without stint to our gaze in such degree as each is able to bear, and Theology no longer serves but to paint and darken the windows through which man gazes out into the infinite!

“Thus reformed, amended, and enlarged, the established churches of Great Britain will be no exclusive corporations, watched with jealous eyes of less favoured sects. Nonconformity will disappear, for there will be nothing to nonconform to: Fanaticism, for there will be no Dogma; Intolerance and Bigotry, for there will be no Infallibility. Comprehensive, as all that claims to be national and human ought to be, no conditions of membership will be imposed to entitle any to a share of its benefits; but every variety of opinion will find expression and a home precisely in the degree to which it may commend itself to the general intelligence.

“The bitterness of sectarian animosity thus extinguished, and no place found for dogmatic assertion or theological hatred, it will seem as if the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and a new heaven and new earth had come, in which there was no more sea of troubles or ought to set men against each other and keep them from uniting in aid of their common welfare. Lit by the clear light of the cultivated intellect, and watered by the pure river of the developed moral sense, the State will be free to grow into a veritable city of God, where there shall be no more curse of poverty or crime, no night of intolerant stupidity, but all shall know that which is good for all, from the least to the greatest.”\*

In these remarks I have confined myself mainly to principles, and said little about details, confident that when the former are

---

\* How to complete the Reformation. Thomas Scott, publisher.

settled there will be no insuperable difficulty about determining the latter. Only let the question be recognised as within the sphere of practical politics, and the man who can carry it to a triumphant solution will not be wanting. Such an one, I may confess, I have sometime had in my eye; one who loveth both our Church and nation, and has in his earlier days written us a book, though a book not tending precisely in the direction I have indicated. But he has grown much since then. Once let him see that there is no other right way, and that Church and country are alike ready to own the touch of a hand that shall bring them together again in the bond of a common need, and he will surely not refuse once more to wave the wand of his eloquence to charm away an evil not less than those which have already owned the force of his enchantment, and thus accomplish a good at once surpassing and crowning all his other achievements. He is asleep now, enjoying a well earned rest; but in that sleep who knows what dreams may come to him?

In the meantime why should not a society be formed having for its object and designation *The Nationalization of the Established Church*?

EDWARD MAITLAND.



## CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

## THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

THE writer of "Supernatural Religion"<sup>1</sup> has conferred a boon on all students of theology. Calm and judicial in tone, fully acquainted with the facts of the case, and scrupulously exact in stating the arguments of adversaries,—no more formidable assailant of orthodoxy could well be imagined. Whenever the history of Christian theology in the nineteenth century shall be written, a place of honour will belong to the anonymous author of "Supernatural Religion." We are informed in the preface that the book "is the result of many years of earnest and serious investigation, undertaken in the first instance for the regulation of personal belief, and now published as a contribution towards the establishment of Truth in the minds of others who are seeking for it. The author's main object has been conscientiously and fully to state the facts of the case, to make no assertions the grounds for which are not clearly given, and as far as possible to place before the reader the materials from which a judgment may be intelligently formed regarding the important subject discussed." Before entering on the details of the book, it is simple justice to the author to say, that his acquaintance with the critical literature of his subject is as nearly as possible exhaustive. For instance, in discussing the Muratorian Fragment, he has made use of the latest German monograph on the subject, published only last year; and in touching on subjects slightly more remote, he has shown a correct judgment as to the authorities to be cited. The only important lacunæ in the author's critical apparatus are perhaps Lipsius "On the Peter-legend" (Kiel, 1872), and Kucnen's "History of the Religion of Israel." It is true that the latter work is referred to in a note on page 90, but the statements about the repeated apostacies of the Israelites in the text must surely have been written prior to a perusal of Dr. Kucnen's "admirable inquiry." After a brief but candid and weighty introduction, in which the author remarks that "the time is now ripe for arriving at a definite conviction as to the character of Christianity," we are launched at once on the discussion of Miracles, which forms Part I. of the work. Miracles as Evidence; Miracles in Relation to the Order of Nature; Reason in Relation to the Order of Nature; the Age of Miracles; the Permanent Stream of Miraculous Pretension; Miracles in Relation to Ignorance and Superstition;—such are the subjects which occupy the first place in the inquiry. Two points in this *d priori* part of the work have struck us as possibly open to exception. First, that there is no philosophical definition of "super-

---

<sup>1</sup> "Supernatural Religion." An Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation. In Two Volumes. London: 1874.

natural." Not a few readers, who sympathize with the author in his tendencies, will regret this absolute surrender of a term capable of still doing good service, if properly explained. But we leave such matters to the philosophers. As against Dr. Mozley and his school, the refutation of supernaturalism is complete. The other point we referred to is the absence of any treatment of prophecy. And yet "the fulfilment of prophecy" counts for one of the chief evidences of "supernatural religion." Possibly the author may yet be induced to supplement his work in this important respect. Unless this is done there will still be a loophole of escape for the supernaturalist. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the latest work of Ewald, "Die Lehre der Bibel von Gott," which is indeed referred to by our author at the foot of page 30, but in a way likely somewhat to mislead the reader. For Ewald clearly shows that, in spite of his sympathy on many points with the Rationalists, he is still at bottom a Supernaturalist, admitting as he does a specific distinction between the prophetic revelation of Israel and that of other nations. It is unnecessary for us to point out the confusedness of such a theory, which, however, will probably be highly acceptable to many *soi-disant* liberals among ourselves. We have no space to follow the author through the mazes of his controversy with Archbishop Trench and Canon Mozley. So far as the former is concerned, one is half inclined to repeat what Goethe said of Lessing and his controversy with the "Hauptpastor Goeze." But Dr. Mozley is certainly, so far as ability is concerned, a foeman worthy of any steel, and we can only regret that so much dialectic power has not been expended in a better cause. The chapter on "The Age of Miracles" strikes us as particularly useful. Its contents are excellently summed up in the quotation from Dean Milman on p. 87, where it is remarked how important it is to seize the singularly credulous spirit of the primitive Christian age. In the discussion of the post-Christian miracles, reference might have been made to Mr. Twistleton's examination of the best-attested of them in his work, "The Tongue not Essential to Speech," published last year. We have been told that the received view in the Theological School or Tripos of one of our universities is that of Bishop Kaye—viz., that the thaumaturgic power died out with those on whom the apostolic hands had been laid! Yet the certificates in support of the miracles of the Curé of Ars, forgotten, it appears, by our author, are sufficient, one would have thought, to convince any one who believed in the Gospel miracles. Before quitting the first part of the book we desire to call attention to the author's correction of Dr. F. W. Farrar's misconception of Hume's argument from experience at the end of Chapter vi. In Part I. the author has shown the futility of the *à priori* argument in favour of miracles. In Parts II. and III. he examines the evidence as to the date and authenticity of the records on which the miracles depend. His result, as regards the first three Gospels, is, that there is not "a single distinct trace of any one of those Gospels during the first century and a half after the death of Jesus." The same statement applies to the Fourth Gospel, and is fully confirmed by the in-

ternal evidence. This part of the work is even better than the first, and will give Canon Westcott, whose book on the Canon is constantly referred to, much trouble to answer. The exposure of the assumptions of that learned and amiable, but most prejudiced, scholar was greatly needed. Its value to the student is, however, diminished by an evident bias towards scepticism. Thus, insufficient allowance is made for the inaccuracies of memory. Verbal differences, or even the jumbling of passages from different Gospels, do not *necessarily* prove that the writers were not quoting our Gospels. Even the Old Testament, which was considered almost automatically inspired, is quoted (from memory) very incorrectly, *e.g.* by Athenagoras; and there are several instances in Justin, in which a wrong reference to the Old Testament is given. Perhaps the impossibility of Justin having known the Fourth Gospel might have been pointed out more effectively. Now and then the knowledge of the reader is assumed on points where the ordinary reader is hopelessly ignorant—*e.g.* why Ignatius's martyrdom must have been in Antioch, Dec. 20th, 115, or upon what grounds Keim and Scholten doubt St. John's residence in Asia Minor. But these, mostly slight, defects do not prevent the book from being a most valuable contribution to the liberal side of this great controversy, and we look forward with interest to the continuation promised in the last chapter. We are bound to add that the concluding chapters prove the author to be a warm friend of spiritual, though not, in the ordinary sense of the word, of supernatural, religion.

Whatever else the author of "Supernatural Religion" may be, one thing is certain, that he is a scientifically trained critic. He has learned to argue, and to weigh evidence. This cannot be said of the author of "Jewish History and Politics in the Times of Sargon and Sennacherib."<sup>2</sup> In spite of its high moral tone, and appreciation of Isaiah's literary qualities, the book, so far as it is original, is utterly valueless to the critical student of Hebrew prophecy. The author has learned much from Ewald, but has revolted from that brilliant scholar's always dogmatic and sometimes arbitrary combinations, and charges the faults of Ewald upon collective German criticism. We have never read so much nonsense on the subject of Biblical criticism as in a few sentences on pages 16 and 161. The attempt at a comparison between German and English criticism, as if the former had all the genius and the latter the common sense, is too absurd to be repeated. The book has its good points, as we have said already. If about fifty pages of it could be cut out, they would furnish the germs of excellent expository lectures. Many interpretations borrowed from Ewald and Alexander (an unequal pair) have received a new and attractive setting in thoughts of Wordsworth and Maurice. But the audacity of the author's attempt to bolster up the unity of Isaiah on the basis of the cuneiform inscrip-

---

<sup>2</sup> "Jewish History and Politics in the Times of Sargon and Sennacherib." An Inquiry into the Historical Meaning and Purpose of the Prophecies of Isaiah. By Sir Edward Strachey, Bart. Second Edition, Revised with Additions. London: W. Isbister & Co. 1874.

tions, not one of which has he read, is only equalled by the tenuity of his Hebrew scholarship (a Hebraist will easily find the proofs of this). To prove this to the satisfaction of the author, would be impossible in a few sentences, but the reader may be warned not to trust the judgment of one who *may* be a politician (though his defence (p. 137) of the "divine right" of the Israelites to Canaan and the Normans to England inclines us to doubt it), but is certainly in no sense a Biblical scholar or an Orientalist. It is nothing to the point to quote the opinion of the late Mr. Maurice, "that the description in the 14th chapter exactly answers to Sennacherib, and not the least to Nebuchadnezzar or Belshazzar," or the observation of the Dean of Westminster that Sir E. Strachey's argument "seems to be very strong for supposing that by the 'King' in Isaiah xiv. 4 is meant the King of Assyria." For whatever other merits these eminent persons may have, a talent for historical criticism is not one of them, and nothing can be more disastrous to the view of Biblical literature maintained by Dr. Stanley than the concession so unwisely made in the passage referred to. It is true that Sargon calls himself "King of Assyria, and viceroy (of the gods) of Babylon," but this is no justification of the view that the "King of Babylon" in Isaiah xiv. 4 is really equivalent to "King of Assyria." It would be quite as absurd to assert that "Toi King of Hameth," in 2 Sam. viii. 9, was a King of Assyria, and as for the passage Micah iv. 10, it simply shows that Babylon was at this time in the possession of the Assyrians (comp. v. 5); nothing *can* possibly prove that the words "King of Babylon" by themselves can mean "King of Assyria." The fact seems to be that Sir Edward Strachey has not yet persuaded himself to apply the ordinary laws of psychology to the Old Testament. The very best test of a critical theory is this, is the place which it assigns to this or that book of the Canon consistent with a belief in the natural development of human beliefs? Now if anything is miraculous, the sudden attainment of a Babylonian standpoint both in history and in doctrine, which, on Sir Edward Strachey's theory, must be ascribed to Isaiah, is doubly and trebly miraculous. And yet Sir Edward Strachey proposes to explain Isaiah without recourse to miracles! His view of prophecy is equally inconsistent with a genuine belief in the laws of psychology. He seems to agree with Delitzsch that it is impossible to determine the compass of prophetic revelation, and with Tholuck that the Hebrew prophets had a sort of natural predictive faculty. But, so far as historical facts are forthcoming, they are entirely opposed to such theories. A thorough examination of Old Testament prophecy has proved that the form assumed by the vaticinations of a prophet is conditioned by his historical circumstances (see papers by Dr. Riehm, of Halle, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1865). And certainly Isaiah himself distinctly claimed the possession of a supernatural faculty (see Isaiah vii. 11, viii. 11). A choice specimen of Sir E. Strachey's theology is to be found in his remarks on the Trinity (p. 91), where, essentially at one with the orthodox, he sees "in the language which combines the plural Elohim with the singular Jehovah, the prelude of that revelation of the



Trinity in Unity which the spirit of man was not yet educated to receive in its spiritual meaning." He believes too that "there is evidence of the anticipation of a personal Messiah by the Hebrews from very early times" (p. 105), a belief which stultifies the historical criticism of the Bible. On page 73, he takes the "law" referred to in Isaiah for the law "given by Moses," and on page 101 he even cites a passage of Deuteronomy as "the words of Moses." It is painful to have to speak so disparagingly of a work which has evidently cost its author much labour, and which has been so carefully revised in the second edition, but Sir E. Strachey is but one of the most conspicuous (Mr. Matthew Arnold is another) in a large number of *dilettanti* critics, the hollowness of whose pretensions is a sore impediment to true progress. What would Mr. Darwin have said if he had been compelled to review a book of the same calibre on the Origin of Species? But we willingly admit that a purely literary critic might find as much to commend as we have found to condemn.

The second best theological work which has been translated for many a long day (Ewald's "History of the People of Israel" being the first) is Kuenen's "Religion of Israel,"<sup>3</sup> of which the first volume has just appeared. Though known for some time to a few indefatigable students, and of late talked about by two or three popular English writers, its contents have been sealed to the great majority of English readers by the accident of its Dutch origin. It may now be confidently predicted that Kuenen will be, not only referred to, but studied, not only by theologians, but by all who take any interest in the origin of religions. For Dr. Kuenen does not write primarily for a learned public. His style is clear to a fault and free from all appearance of pedantry, though he has poured out a rich stream of learning in the numerous appendices. His work is one of a series of histories of "the principal religions" (note the phrase), designed for the general educated public, and written by scholars who are authorities in their several departments. Dr. Kuenen, in particular, is, after Ewald, the most profound Christian student of the Old Testament, and he has the advantage of Ewald, as has been remarked by a recent English critic, in his "strict subordination of theories to facts, and absolute freedom from critical prepossessions." It would be easy to multiply proofs of this assertion, and the tendency, from which some even advanced liberals are not exempt, to accept Ewald as a kind of infallible authority, would supply a fair excuse for doing so, did the space at our disposal permit it. But a slow and thoughtful perusal of the work will be the best means of protecting the reader from the unwholesome influences of this self-constituted pope. Dr. Kuenen's truly critical spirit is nowhere more conspicuous than in his arrangement. He takes for his starting-point, not the hazy period of the so-called "patriarchal history," but

---

<sup>3</sup> "The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State." By Dr. A. Kuenen. Translated from the Dutch by Alfred Heath May. Vol. I. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate. 1874.

the eighth century B.C., for which materials of undoubted authenticity are supplied by the contemporary prophets. From these he endeavours, "but as yet only in a general and preliminary manner," to determine what must have been the course of the religious development of the Israelites. He is thus led to the conclusion that "the Israelitish religion, originally closely related to that of many other Semitic tribes, gradually and under the influence of Israel's peculiar fortunes assumed in the minds of the prophets another and more elevated character." He now ventures to sketch the outlines of the history, beginning with the residence of the tribes of Israel in Goshen, and arrives in the present volume at the end of the eighth century B.C. In the succeeding volumes he will continue to trace the religious development of Israel in chronological sequence down to the close of the Jewish state. The points on which Dr. Kuenen's work comes into sharpest contrast with its predecessors are the origin of Hebrew prophecy and the development of monotheism. We can give but a faint sketch of Dr. Kuenen's hypothesis. According to him, Samuel is the true founder of prophecy. Before his time the prophetic ecstasy was associated, not with the religion of Yahweh, but with the nature-worship of the Canaanites. But towards the end of the period of the Judges a religious revival took place among the worshippers of Yahweh. Some, like Samson (?) and Samuel, took the Nazarite vow of asceticism; others, of whom Samuel was the leader, banded themselves together to cultivate an ecstatic enthusiasm. Samuel, in fact, enlisted a tendency which he saw to be at once fascinating and dangerous, in the service of a sterner religion. He also formed schools for the creation of an artificial prophetic enthusiasm. By degrees Yahwism grew in spirituality, and this ecstatic element fell into the shade. Then came the age of the great orator-prophets, Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, who were conscious of an inner call, but free, or all but free, from the accessions of ecstasy which characterized the earlier period. As to the development of monotheism, Dr. Kuenen ascribes an important share in it to "the influence of the war between Baal and Jahveh upon the minds of those who had remained loyal to Jahveh." In other words, the persecution of the stricter adherents of Yahweh in the reign of Ahab produced a strong counter-movement in the minds of the prophets. "Why Jahveh and not Baal? Why should they die rather than renounce Jahveh? These questions were laid before them by the very circumstances of their position. For those who endeavoured to answer them a new light was thrown on Jahvism" (p. 361). And so arose the deep gulf of separation between Yahweh, the only true God, and the heathen "non-entities," as the Hebrew prophets call them. Is this theory sufficient to account for the spiritual religion of Isaiah? This is what Dr. Kuenen's critics, orthodox as well as liberal, may contribute to determine. Does the author allow sufficient place to the intuitions of genius? And were the results of Israel's higher religious development really so far superior in spirituality to those of the development of Egyptian and Assyrian religion? No doubt there is a sad confusion of the spiritual

and the unspiritual in the latter. But was not this chiefly owing to the want of an anti-sacerdotal party, such as was formed in Israel by the prophets? We content ourselves with throwing out these questions for consideration. But there can be no doubt whatever among impartial critics on the value of Dr. Kuenen's researches, and in particular on the great light which he has thrown on the popular religion of Israel. He has completely overthrown the traditional notion, borrowed, it must be confessed, from the Biblical narratives, of the deliberate apostacies of the Israelites. What the writers of the "historical books" describe as apostacy and rebellion was really either opposition to religious innovations, or, in the earlier period, the natural consequence of the altered circumstances in which Israel was placed. We trust this may be sufficient to whet the reader's appetite for one of the few satisfactory books in theology to which we can point. It must be added, however, that the work is offered to the English public in the same form in which it was published in 1869-70. The restless progress of archæological inquiry will probably have modified the author's opinion on several points of detail, but the main results of the inquiry have not been affected. The translation is thoroughly admirable, and in every way superior to its predecessors in the same series.

Bishop Colenso has sent us the sixth part of his "Critical Examination" of the so-called "Speaker's Commentary."<sup>4</sup> He is sarcastic on the inconsistencies of Mr. Espin, the commentator on Joshua, who accepts all the other miracles in that book, but not the sun and moon standing still at Joshua's word. Not that Mr. Espin is troubled by the scientific objections, but, simply because there is no collateral evidence of the miracle, he adopts the theory that the words of Joshua are poetic, thereby agreeing with Ewald, the liberal, and Hengstenberg, the orthodox, critic. It seems he is not unwilling to rationalize, if he can do so in good company. Our limits forbid us to go at any length into the details of the bishop's criticism, especially as we shall be able to supplement them directly from an unexpected source. Suffice it to say that he has shown grave reasons to question Mr. Espin's competence and accuracy. In one place, however, the bishop's answer to Mr. Espin seems to rest on a misconception (p. 9). The term "Great Sidon" is not equivalent to "capital of Phœnicia," but is simply opposed to "Little Sidon." That Sidon was divided into two towns, called respectively "Great" and "Little," is proved by an inscription of Sennacherib, *Brit. Mus. Coll.*, vol. i. pl. 38, line 38.

Mr. Driver, an Oxford Fellow, has brought out a little work on "The Use of the Tenses in Hebrew,"<sup>5</sup> which is doubly welcome as coming from such a hot-bed of the unhistorical view of the Hebrew Scriptures. No better foundation can be laid for an accurate study of the documents of the Old Testament than this most lucid, most trust-

<sup>4</sup> "The New Bible Commentary, &c." Critically Examined by the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Part VI: Introduction to Joshua—The Book of Joshua. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

<sup>5</sup> "A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew." By S. R. Driver, M.A., Fellow of New College. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1874.

worthy and most complete exposition of a subject so obscure to many Hebraists. Though primarily intended for beginners, for whose difficulties it shows an intelligent sympathy, it may be read with pleasure by all, from the traces of individuality and independent judgment which abound throughout. It is no disparagement to say that the most valuable part of the work is derived from Ewald, for it was Ewald who revolutionized Hebrew grammar, and all his successors must perforce build upon his foundation. But the author has shown great judgment in re-casting existing materials, and has added contributions of his own, which have at least the merits of sound sense and simplicity. These are to be found in the chapters on the Cohortative and Jussive, and the Hypotheticals, together with Appendix II. on the Original Signification of the Jussive, though some may think that in the latter the author has done insufficient justice to the remarks of Olshausen in his unhappily still incomplete *Lehrbuch*. Readers of the "Speaker's Commentary" will be amused, as well as instructed, by his examination of a note in that work, in which a most sweeping assertion is made as to the biblical use of the imperfect for pluperfect. Mr. Driver is strongly of opinion, and he will not be alone in thinking so, that the "Vau conversive" never introduces a pluperfect:—the result is not unimportant, even from a theological point of view (see the orthodox commentators on Gen. ii. 19). Canon Cook, at any rate, has shown an utter want of philological conscience in stating that "no grammatical objection is made to this construction [imperfect for pluperfect], which is *common* in the Old Testament." Other instances of the "Speaker's" grammatical blunders are noticed on pp. 249, 250. Not the least useful part of the work is the appendix on "Arabic as Illustrative of Hebrew," which, though containing nothing new to the scholar, and slightly too apologetic in tone, will, we hope, do something to promote the application to Hebrew of the comparative method. An excellent index facilitates the use of the volume, which from the large number of references may be used to some extent as a grammatical commentary on the Old Testament.

Dr. Oehler is well-known to German students by his valuable articles on the theological ideas of the Old Testament in Herzog's "Realencyclopädic."<sup>6</sup> The present work is posthumous, and mainly based on University lectures. It is a valuable collection of the facts of the subject, but presents no material advance on the views already expressed by the author, who is much hampered by his orthodox, or at least semi-orthodox position. We are glad to hear that a translation has been put in hand by Messrs. T. and T. Clark of Edinburgh, though we should have been still more glad if H. Schulz's *Alttestamentliche Theologie* (2 vols., Frankfurt on the Maine, 1869), a work of a much broader and more progressive theology, though not quite so full of facts, had been the handbook selected. We have only to add that the work demands a careful and critical study, and should be always at the side of the Old Testament student.

<sup>6</sup> "Theologie des alten Testaments." Von Dr. Gust. Fr. Oehler. Zwei Bände. Tübingen: Heckenhauer. 1874.

An important contribution to our historical theology (Mr. Max Müller has naturalized the term in England) is Mr. Bosworth Smith's lectures on "Mohammed and Mohammedanism."<sup>7</sup> It gives us a clear, accurate, and in the best sense popular account of the leading facts in Mohammed's life, with such a broad and impartial judgment as might be expected from a lecturer at the Royal Institution. The first lecture is introductory. It is there shown that the historical as opposed to the primeval religions of the world are moral in their origin, not theological; that the great value of Islam to the student consists in the fact that it was born and grew up in the full light of history; that religions differ in degree, rather than kind; and that only in the broadest and vaguest sense is it possible or desirable that the world should be Christianized. An interesting sketch is given of the progress constantly being made by Islam in Africa, and the moral and social blessings it brings in its train. Of the other lectures we must content ourselves with referring to the fourth, in which the spirituality of Islam receives full justice, in opposition to a popular error, and the opinion is finally expressed that "Mohammed comes next to Christ in the long roll of the great benefactors of the human race." The passages to which we should take most exception are those in which the author borrows from Mr. Matthew Arnold, whose eminence as a Biblical critic he singularly exaggerates. Will the author allow us further to point out that the formula "appropinquante mundi termino" was not peculiar, as he supposes, to the tenth century, though some eminent writers have repeated the baseless assertion?

Among recent works on the history of the Church, the first place belongs of right to Dr. Newman's collected tracts (Causes of Arianism, Heresy of Apollinaris, &c.),<sup>8</sup> with which may be grouped the new edition of his Lectures on Justification,<sup>9</sup> a work of historical importance, designed to show that there is little but a verbal difference between Catholic and Protestant views on Justification. "The Church and the Empires"<sup>10</sup> contains some agreeably written essays on such subjects as the formation of Christendom, Champagny's works on the Roman Empire, the Church and Napoleon I., &c., with brief memoir of the author, Mr. H. W. Wilberforce, from the pen of Dr. Newman. Mr. Lupton deserves great credit for his affectionately careful edition of Dean Colet's Lectures on Corinthians,<sup>11</sup> now first published.

<sup>7</sup> "Mohammed and Mohammedanism." Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution in February and March, 1874. By R. Bosworth Smith, M.A. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1874.

<sup>8</sup> "Tracts, Theological and Ecclesiastical." By John Henry Newman, D.D., of the Oratory. London: B. M. Pickering. 1874.

<sup>9</sup> "Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification." By John Henry Newman, sometime Fellow of Oriel College. Third Edition. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1874.

<sup>10</sup> "The Church and the Empires." *Historical Periods*. By Henry William Wilberforce. Preceded by a Memoir of the Author, by J. H. Newman, D.D. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1874.

<sup>11</sup> "An Exposition of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians." By John Colet, M.A., &c. Now first published, with a Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by J. H. Lupton, M.A., Sub-Master of St. Paul's School. London: George Bell & Sons. 1874.

Dr. Kelle traces the baleful effects of Jesuit teaching on the Austrian gymnasia, from information derived from contemporary documents.<sup>12</sup> The Jesuits have had a reputation for being skilful educators. But so far as Austria is concerned, this should be entirely destroyed by the present work. "One must bring grammar itself," says a Jesuit writer, "into the service of 'Gottseligkeit' (an untranslatable word), and pursue it in a godly manner." And here, though somewhat out of its place, may be mentioned the fifth volume of the excellent translation of Ewald's "History of Israel,"<sup>13</sup> containing the history of Ezra and of the Hagiocracy in Israel to the time of Christ. Bound as we are to protest against the growing tendency to idolize Ewald, it would be wrong to disparage the deep learning and enthusiasm conspicuous in every volume of this great work. The period between the so-called Captivity and the rise of Christianity is one of the most important and most obscure periods of religious history, and here Ewald is perhaps seen at his best.

We regret extremely that we can only draw attention to Mr. Stopford Brooke's very interesting lectures on "Theology in the English Poets."<sup>14</sup> It is indeed a sign of the times that theology of such a broad and humanizing character can be preached without opposition in a Church of England pulpit. Considered merely from a literary point of view, the work has a very high value; the nine lectures on Wordsworth are evidently based on a familiar and sympathetic acquaintance of many years with that poet of philosophers. The book would have been more complete had Mr. Brooke brought the poets whom he describes into closer connexion with the great European movement, of which Rousseau and Goethe are the two most prominent representatives. But his object was not so much historical or critical as to exhibit English natural theology in its purest form, as it is to be found in the poetical, which often differs widely from the prose, works of our greatest recent poets. Blake, Shelley, Keats, and Byron are reserved for another volume.

"Catholic Thoughts on the Bible and Theology"<sup>15</sup> is the sequel to the volume noticed in our last number. Its value would have been greater ten years ago, but it will still find access to many troubled hearts within the pale of the orthodox churches.

Our sermons this quarter come from Mr. Haweis<sup>16</sup> (who has invented a new kind of apologetics based on magnetism and spiritualism!), Dr.

---

<sup>12</sup> "Die Jesuiten Gymnasien in Oesterreich." Vom Anfange des vorigen Jahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart. Von Dr. Johann Kelle. Prag: 1873.

<sup>13</sup> "The History of Israel." By Heinrich Ewald. Translated from the German by J. Eastlin Carpenter, M.A. Vol. V. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

<sup>14</sup> "Theology in the Christian Poets: Cowper, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Burns." By the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, M.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>15</sup> "Catholic Thoughts on the Bible and Theology." By the late Frederic Myers, M.A., Perpetual Curate of St. John's, Keswick. London: Isbister & Co. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "Speech in Season." By the Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

Lee<sup>17</sup> (whose importance it is difficult for a southern liberal adequately to appreciate), Mr. Baldwin Brown<sup>18</sup> and Mr. Maclaren,<sup>19</sup> both full as ever of highly-toned Christian feeling, and, lastly, Archbishop Manning,<sup>20</sup> whose chastened eloquence shows no signs of diminution.

We have also received Sir Bartle Frere's weighty letters on Eastern Africa<sup>21</sup> (he thinks the energy of Mohammedan missionaries is the energy of despair); Dr. Holtzmann's lecture on the rise of Christianity in Rome,<sup>22</sup> illustrated by the buildings and monuments; Lord Robert Montagu's answer to some Protestant objections;<sup>23</sup> a book of well-meant and, in part, well-thought "Cautions," by Mr. Titcomb;<sup>24</sup> a good documentary account of the history and mode of the papal elections;<sup>25</sup> Oosterzee's "Christian Dogmatics"<sup>26</sup> (ponderous and commonplace, as even orthodox *scholars* must admit); Dean Church's agreeable, but superficial, lectures on ancient religious poetry;<sup>27</sup> a "Golden Treasury" edition of that exquisite religious classic, the "Theologia Germanica";<sup>28</sup> Mr. Kingston's attempt at a theory of creation in harmony with the facts of science;<sup>29</sup> Mr. Scott's examination of texts on the existence of a Devil;<sup>30</sup> Mr. Suckling Browne's reply to Evolutionism;<sup>31</sup> Canon Bright's hymns;<sup>32</sup> Dean Howson against Sacramental

<sup>17</sup> "Sermons by the late Robert Lee, D.D., Minister of Old Grayfriars Church, Edinburgh." Edited from his Manuscripts. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1874.

<sup>18</sup> "The Higher Life: its Reality, Experience, and Destiny." By James Baldwin Brown, B.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>19</sup> "Sermons Preached in Manchester." By Alex. Maclaren. Third Series. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> "Sin and its Consequences." By Henry Edward, Archbishop of Westminster. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

<sup>21</sup> "Eastern Africa as a Field for Missionary Labour." By the Right Hon. Sir Bartle Frere, G.C.S.I., K.C.B., D.C.L. London: John Murray. 1874.

<sup>22</sup> "Die Ansiedelung des Christenthums in Rom." Von Dr. H. Holtzmann. Berlin. 1874.

<sup>23</sup> "On Some Popular Errors concerning Politics and Religion." By the Right Hon. Lord Robert Montagu, M.P. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

<sup>24</sup> "Cautions for Doubters." By the Rev. J. H. Titcomb, M.A. London: Religious Tract Society.

<sup>25</sup> "Die Pabst-Wahl nach ihrer geschichtlichen Gestaltung und dem gelten den Rechte." Prag: 1874.

<sup>26</sup> "Christian Dogmatics." (Theological and Philosophical Library.) By J. J. Van Costerzee, D.D. Translated from the Dutch. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1874.

<sup>27</sup> "The Sacred Poetry of Early Religions." Two Lectures. By R. W. Church, M.A., Dean of St. Paul's. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>28</sup> "Theologia Germanica." Translated from the German by Susanna Winkworth. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>29</sup> "The Unity of Creation: a Contribution to the Solution of the Religious Question." By Francis K. Kingston. London: Trübner & Co. 1874.

<sup>30</sup> "Christianity and a Personal Devil." An Essay. By Patrick Scott. London: Pickering. 1874.

<sup>31</sup> "Divine Revelation, or Pseudo-Science." An Essay. By R. G. Suckling Browne, B.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

<sup>32</sup> "Hymns and Other Verses." By William Bright, D.D., Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Second Edition Enlarged. London, Oxford and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1874.

Confession;<sup>33</sup> and a highly-jejune "Catechism," translated from the German by Colonel Ouvry,<sup>34</sup> which entirely ignores the phenomena of religious experience.

Mr. Monck's "Introduction to the Critical Philosophy"<sup>35</sup> is an excellent little manual, admirably adapted to its aims, which deserves the gratitude of the students for whom it is intended. We regret that it is deformed by a preface which trenches almost upon the law libel, because such things, though they may have their proper place, seem to be out of place at the beginning of a philosophical treatise. While the Kantians refute people who resolve "understanding" into a modification or product of "sensibility," they either never dream or else refuse to believe that recent discoveries in physiology, physics, and biology, are destined to cast important light upon the relations of sense to reason. They suppose new light to be both superfluous and impossible. Kant, we believe, would have judged differently. If modern opportunities had been within his reach, the *Kritik* would have taken a different shape. To investigate this problem, and thus to make their philosophy progressive, should be the aim of his followers. Three things are conspicuous in what they proudly term "modern philosophy;"—the contentiousness of the Kantians, the variety of the derivative schools, and the strong inclination now shown in many quarters to fall back upon Kant as a safeguard against multiform vagary. These things are ominous: it is for them to interpret the omen. We observe with pleasure in Mr. Monck some hints of a suspicion, that lines of investigation do exist in the despised sciences which are capable of throwing light upon his master. Speaking of the *First Analogy of Experience*, he says: "How far this Analogy is connected with the modern theory of the Conservation of Force, I leave it to others to trace out" (p. 54). If he will undertake this inquiry and the kindred problems which it suggests, and can pursue it with success, he will do more than the Kantians have yet done to show the true value of the Transcendental Philosophy. We believe that a very important part is to be played by that philosophy; we hope that the Kantians will assist in its development.

Only a very small part of Mr. Mahaffy's work<sup>36</sup> is before us. This displays him in his usual character of an acute and well-informed writer and an eminently contentious Kantian. But he might find language quite capable of expressing his meaning and less "vivacious"

<sup>33</sup> "Sacramental Confession." By the Very Rev. John S. Howson, D.D., Dean of Chester. London: Isbister & Co. 1874.

<sup>34</sup> "An Unsectarian Catechism of Christian and Social Instruction, for the Use of Parents and Schools." Translated from the German by Col. H. A. Ouvry, C.B. London: Frederic Norgate. 1874.

<sup>35</sup> "An Introduction to the Critical Philosophy, Intended for the Use of Students." By W. H. S. Monck, Barrister-at-Law. Dublin: William McGee. 1874.

<sup>36</sup> "Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers." By John P. Mahaffy, A.M., Fellow and Tutor, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Dublin. Vol. I. Part III. London: Longmans. 1874.



than that used by him in the following passage. "Even now, the German Kantians are in the dark on the subject, and the last edition of Kuno Fischer's Commentary, published in 1869, repeats its former blunder, which I had corrected in my translation of the book" (p. 329). We have noticed several other flowers of speech, some of which are not much inferior in rudeness to the foregoing.

The "Mental Physiology"<sup>37</sup> of Dr. Carpenter is a highly entertaining and instructive treatise. But it is rather a contribution to the popularization of knowledge, than, as he styles it himself, a contribution to the science of Human Nature (p. viii.). Viewed in this light, we think it excellent; and qualities which would be faults if it were taken at its own estimate, become merits. The application of "unconscious cerebration" and "ideo-motor action" to explain the doings of planchette, table-turning and rapping, spiritualism, mesmerism, and the host of such like "phenomena," is especially interesting. We do not doubt that this gives the right clue to the division between what is mere imposture and what is startling fact in them. At present the "spiritualistic world" is such a heterogeneous mass, where dupes and impostors, dolts and intelligent but puzzled spectators, are so inextricably mingled, that anything which can be called investigation is hardly possible, and anything which can be called evidence is drowned in the din and hubbub. We think that if the last mentioned class will give serious heed to Dr. Carpenter, he will supply them with a basis for sober inquiry of which they stand in great need. On the question, how far narratives of wonders can be believed, even when coming from honest witnesses, the following passage (quoted by Dr. Carpenter from Miss Cobbe) is very edifying:—

"It once happened to the writer to hear a most scrupulously conscientious friend narrate an incident of table-turning, to which she appended an assurance that the table rapped when *nobody was within a yard of it*. The writer being confounded by this latter fact, the lady, though fully satisfied of the accuracy of her statement, promised to look at the note she had made ten years previously of the transaction. The note was examined, and was found to contain the distinct statement that the table rapped when *the hands of six persons rested on it!* The lady's memory as to all other points proved to be strictly correct; and in this point she had erred in entire good faith" (p. 457).

This is followed by another passage equally to the purpose but too long for quotation. Dr. Carpenter is far more happy when engaged strictly upon his own subject, than when he strays into philosophical criticism or theory. Thus, he has much that is excellent upon "volition," but his remarks upon "the will" are confused and unsatisfactory.

"It will, I doubt not, be considered by many, that there is a palpable inconsistency between the two fundamental doctrines which are here upheld;—

<sup>37</sup> "Principles of Mental Physiology, with their Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of its Morbid Conditions." By William B. Carpenter, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., &c. &c. London: 1874.

that of the dependence of the Automatic activity of the Mind upon conditions which bring it within the *nexus* of Physical Causation; and that of the existence of an independent Power, controlling and directing that activity, which we call Will" (Preface p. ix.).

The note upon this passage, in which he quotes Hartley, and his allusion to "John S. Mill, the most powerful advocate of Automatism," make it plain that Dr. Carpenter here meant in some sense to assert the doctrine of "Free-will." But all his facts are perfectly consonant with Determinism. The truth is that Dr. Carpenter erroneously supposes Determinism to confine the will psychologically within the limits which he physiologically defines as the mind's "Automatic activity;" and that he confuses Determinists with the "Modified Fatalists" of Mr. Mill. Though this mistake has been often corrected, there is some excuse for Dr. Carpenter. The physiological analysis of volition is of later date than the psychological analysis to which he refers; and a man unversed in abstract speculation might fail to perceive the coincidence of the lines, by failing, as Dr. Carpenter has done, to grasp the psychological analysis.

Mr. Sully's volume of essays<sup>33</sup> is somewhat lacking in condensation and point, by which it falls short of the excellence which seems to be within his reach. It is an error to use more words than are needed; especially when the matter is made no clearer by the superfluity. But Mr. Sully is deserving of substantial praise. His speculations and criticisms are highly ingenious, and the topics which he treats are of modern interest. We quote the following passage as an example of his acuteness.

"When we look back regretfully on some unalterable actions in our past life, we are apt in imagination to recolour that past, giving it the moral tint which our present wishes suggest. And by vividly imagining to ourselves the aspect it would wear if it could be so transmuted, we easily lapse into the illusion that it might have been other than it was without the interference of any new impulse" (p. 135).

There is a smack of affectation and conceit in everything about Mr. Woodward's book,<sup>34</sup>—even in the typography, where one word is printed "spirit[ual]" and another word "reason[ably]," with many like freaks,—which stirs the bile and provokes to the use of harsh language. Therefore we hope to be pardoned for saying roundly, that it is abjectly foolish and unworthy of a moment's attention. The volume is pre-faced by a fragment of "The Hermit," a poem by Mr. Woodward. If we may judge by this short specimen, his poetry is even worse trash than its brother prose,—

"Si minus esse potest quam quod nil esse videmus."

<sup>33</sup> "Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics." By James Sully, M.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>34</sup> "A Treatise on the Nature of Man, regarded as Triune; with an Outline of a Philosophy of Life." By Thomas Best Woodward. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1874.

We do not dismiss Dr. Hamilton's "Autology"<sup>40</sup> with the contemptuous brevity which we use to Mr. Woodward's theory of man's "spirit[ual constitution]," because he seems to be a respectable divine of owl-like gravity, and not a conceited popinjay. But we fear that his excellent intentions can do no good in the line which has brought him under our notice. He tells us that "intelligent and candid criticism will be thoughtfully considered;" and candour compels us unwillingly to tell him that there is no meaning whatever in the jumble of words which he mistakes for the exposition of a philosophy. Pious persons, with their heads full of Scripture, conscience, the devil, and so forth, are apt to undergo a kind of mental perturbation or rumbling which they mistake for thought. This sometimes issues in an attempt to justify the ways of God to man. Hence we have Autologies and the like. The absurdity of Dr. Hamilton's talk about Kant, whom he presumes to criticise, almost passes belief.

"The points of beginning from which the inquiries of this book set out in search of truth, were the work of Jonathan Edwards on the 'Freedom of the Will,' and that of Immanuel Kant, entitled the 'Critique of the Pure Reason' . . . . The works of Edwards and Kant are the cooled and hardened masses of lava thrown out from the volcanic depths of the human mind by the eruptions of its own metaphysical forces. In these vast masses, strown roughly along the rugged steeps of study and inquiry, are found many precious stones and valuable metals, with much of baser matter, such as mere cinders, ashes, and débris" (p. 1).

This jargon prepares us for something funny.

"Of the many fundamental errors of Kant it is necessary here to note only this one: viz.. The division of judgments, or knowings, into the two kinds of Analytical and Synthetical. It is a totally false and artificial division, and one that is mischievous in all its results. There can be no such division in nature; for all judgments, or knowings, are, of necessity, analytical knowings" (p. 470).

We advise Dr. Hamilton to read Mr. Monck's little book. The result, we fear, will put him to some considerable expense for alterations, because he has stereotyped his ponderous volume.

Mr. T. H. Green's General Introduction to Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature"<sup>41</sup> is a valuable contribution to philosophical criticism and the history of philosophy. Its method is rather critical than historical, though it follows historical arrangement. Starting with Locke, it passes through Berkeley, to trace the filiation of Hume.

<sup>40</sup> "Autology: an Inductive System of Mental Science, whose Centre is the Will, and whose Completion is the Personality. A Vindication of the Manhood of Man, the Godhood of God, and the Divine Authorship of Nature." By the Rev. D. H. Hamilton, D.D. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1873.

<sup>41</sup> "A Treatise on Human Nature: being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects; and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion." By David Hume. Edited, with Preliminary Dissertations and Notes, by T. H. Green, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, and T. H. Grose, Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Oxford. In Two Volumes. London: Longmans. 1874.

The key to the whole is the application of a critical analysis; and the pivot of the analysis is, in a word, the Kantian distinction between "understanding," and "sensibility." Locke is convicted of a perpetual equivocation in his "simple ideas," between mere feeling on the one hand and a thing or a quality of a thing on the other. This equivocation reproduces itself in the double meaning of existence, taken either as momentary consciousness or as reality. The examination is carried out in great detail along every line indicated by Locke; and in every direction, as we pursue the antithesis between reality and the work of the mind, we find that it eludes our grasp. Thereby he is pushed through a series of inconsistencies and difficulties which cannot be surmounted.

"In the history of subsequent philosophy two typical methods have appeared of dealing with this chaos of autonomies. One, which we shall have to treat at large in writing of Hume, affects to dispose of both the outward and the inward synthesis—both of the unity of feelings in a subject matter and of their unity in a subject mind—as 'fictions of thought.' This method at once suggests the vital question whether a mind which thus invents has been effectively suppressed—whether, indeed, the theory can be so much as stated without a covert assumption of that which it claims to have destroyed. The other method, of which Kant is the parent, does not attempt to efface the apparent contradictions which beset the 'relation between mind and matter;' but regarding them as in a certain sense inevitable, traces them to their source in the application to the thinking Ego itself of conceptions, which it does indeed constitute in virtue of its presence to phenomena given under conditions of time, but under which for that very reason it cannot itself be known. It is in virtue of the presence of the self-conscious unit to the manifold of feeling, according to this doctrine, that the latter becomes an order of definite things, each external to the other; and it is only by a false inclusion within this order of that which constitutes it that the Ego itself becomes a 'thinking thing' with other things outside it" (p. 112).

In such a sketch there is room for difference of opinion, as to how much is history and how much is the result of the critical apparatus used to group and co-ordinate the facts. If we have not mistaken Mr. Green's estimate, we should put the historical connexion between Locke and Berkeley at a lower level than he does. Nothing is over-coloured or unduly pressed by Mr. Green. He is careful to point out (p. 133) that Berkeley was a mere theologian with a theological motive, and indicates this motive with great felicity (p. 139). Perhaps, however, he underrates the fragmentariness and shortsightedness of Berkeley. The truth is, we believe, that the different phases noticed by Mr. Green in different works of Berkeley, were the shifts of a conjuror likely to be worried by the fiend whom he had summoned to help him. To put it otherwise, the stick which he had snatched up to beat his dog, showed signs of turning to a red-hot poker in his fingers. And his difficulties were pressed upon him, not by philosophy or systematic criticism, but by his own dogmatic theology. He began to suspect in secret, that he had been playing a dangerous game; and he showed his soreness by the unique display of bad temper which marks his *Vindication of the Theory of Vision*. Another point which makes

for the same conclusion is this. The phrase "mathematical atheism" contains two terms; and Berkeley was not content to attack the "atheist" through Locke, but also attacked the "mathematician" by vehemently asserting and trying to prove the Differential Calculus to be mere nonsense. We think that his overt criticism of Locke was an afterthought: he had picked up his stick first. This does not abolish the historical connexion; but it materially affects the view to be taken of it. In the Introduction to the second volume, Mr. Green pursues a similar criticism of Hume's ethics with a similar result; namely, to show "that the philosophy based on the abstraction of feeling, in regard to morals no less than to nature, was with Hume played out, and that the next step forward in speculation could only be an effort to re-think the process of nature and human action from its true beginning in thought." His object has been to divert the attention of the young "from the anachronistic systems hitherto prevalent among us to the study of Kant and Hegel" (p. 71). The dissection of the dog was perhaps well worth the trouble, viewed as a "Propædeutik" to Kant and Hegel. Viewed in itself, the carcase is hardly worth kicking. The intellectual activity of Young England will not care to mumble the dry bones. Whether it will betake itself to Kant and Hegel, is a question of the future; and prophecy, says George Eliot, is of all forms of error the most gratuitous.

We have received a copy of Mr. Wallace's translation of the "Logic of Hegel,"<sup>42</sup> but too late for us to do more than to mention it to our readers, some of whom may be glad to know that the work is now to be had in an English version executed by a scholar of eminent talents and acquirements.

---

#### POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, VOYAGES AND TRAVELS.

**M**R. DUDLEY BAXTER<sup>1</sup> has done good service in disentangling the very intricate question of Local Taxation, and presenting in a brief and compact form not only the main points involved in the controversy, but some highly useful suggestions for the direction of legislation. The work contains the substance of a speech on Local Government and Taxation, delivered at the Social Science Congress at Norwich, in September last, and four letters respecting Mr. Goschen's Report on the Increase of Local Taxation, which have been published in several of the leading London daily papers. Mr. Baxter notes how, of late years, in the place of the old Poor Law system there has sprung up "an active system of local self-government by representative institutions, applying all the new ideas of relief of the poor, and the neces-

---

<sup>42</sup> "The Logic of Hegel, translated from the Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences; with Prolegomena." By William Wallace, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. At the Clarendon Press. 1874.

<sup>1</sup> "Local Government and Taxation, and Mr. Goschen's Report." By R. Dudley Baxter, M.A. London: R. J. Bush. 1874.

sity of improved roads and drainage, and lighting and police, and of educational and sanitary reform. But according to the usual habit of the Anglo-Saxon mind, each of these objects was pursued independently by the creation of a new jurisdiction and governing body, regardless of all existing institutions." Mr. Dudley Baxter's leading suggestion is to consolidate all the different kinds of districts into one kind of district, which should be a subdivision of the county, and itself be subdivided into parishes and townships. Local Government would then be reduced to its old triple and harmonious gradation of county, district and parish areas and authorities, which the experience of olden time in our own country, and of the present time in continental countries, shows to be the most symmetrical and practical system of management of local affairs.

Professor Fawcett,<sup>2</sup> in the new edition of his "Manual of Political Economy," has introduced a fresh chapter, specially devoted to the subject of local taxation. It might be doubted whether it is well to flood what is intended to be a purely educational treatise with topics so redolent of excited controversy at the present moment as local taxation and the "Nationalization of Land." This is, however, more excusable in the region of political economy than elsewhere, as that science depends for its constant nutrition upon facts which every day's experience is bringing to light for the first time, and therefore a purely abstract mode of treatment would not only be undesirable, but impossible. One serious charge made by Professor Fawcett against the existing system of local taxation and government is the amount of local indebtedness which is being rapidly accumulated throughout the country, and yet which has hitherto attracted so little notice. "Every facility," says the writer, "seems to be given to local authorities to get into debt, and, what makes the matter still more serious is, that, the circumstances under which these loans are contracted are frequently involved in inextricable confusion."

We are furnished with a precise statement of the sources of revenue for the year 1870 of the town of Pesth. The work is prepared by Herr Josef Körösi,<sup>3</sup> and is translated from the Hungarian. The analysis of productive manufactories and commercial statistics is very exhaustive, and will afford highly serviceable *data* to those in search of such information.

A curious specimen of a really valuable, and original economic treatise is supplied by a pamphlet on Salt, in its economical and financial aspects. The writer is Dr. Alfred Schmidt.<sup>4</sup> He reviews the history of legislation on the subject, as it is presented in all countries, and notices that, besides England, there are only two European States which enjoy complete exemption from salt duties: Norway, since 1844, and Portugal since 1846.

<sup>2</sup> "Manual of Political Economy." By Henry Fawcett. Fourth Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London: Macmillan. 1874.

<sup>3</sup> "Untersuchungen über die Einkommensteuer der Stadt Pest für das Jahr 1870." Von Josef Körösi. Pest. 1873.

<sup>4</sup> "Das Salz: Eine volkswirtschaftliche und finanzielle Studie." Von Dr. Alfred Schmidt. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig. 1874.

A little book published by Mr. King as one of the series of important military works he has recently been bringing out, and entitled the "Volunteer, the Militiaman, and the Regular Soldier,"<sup>5</sup> deserves special attention. It is written by a "Public-School Boy," and, perhaps on that account, shows a trifle more military enthusiasm than we altogether approve. But it is a good and compact little work, and treats the whole topic in a clear, intelligible and rational way. There is an interesting chapter styled "Historical Retrospect," which very briefly traces all the main steps in the growth of the English army from the time of the Anglo-Saxons. The writer is at great pains to examine the real facts concerning enlistment into the different branches of the army at the present day. His main suggestions concern the decentralization of the army, so far as to make each military district self-governed and subject to (1) a staff-officer to issue orders to the troops; (2) a staff-officer to direct the administrative (or civil) work; (3) a financial officer to issue money and credit accounts. Each department in a district would be represented by its head at the central office. It will be seen that the basis of this reform is an improved organization of what either already exists or has recently been adopted.

It is a great improvement to the new edition of Gaius, by Drs. Abdy and Walker, to have appended to it the text and a scholarly translation of the Rules of Ulpian.<sup>6</sup> Roman law is not only becoming generally recognised as the only avenue to the effectual study of foreign law, but it is taking its true place as the essential basis of legal education wherever conducted. It is, however, scarcely possible to understand and grasp the true spirit of Roman law without a familiar acquaintance with the actual language and terms of the original and native exponents of that law. The gradual popularization of Gaius' Institutes has done a good deal in this direction, but the rules of Ulpian might advantageously be ranked side by side with the Institutes of Gaius and of Justinian. The true position of Ulpian considered both from an historical and educational point of view, is excellently described in a preface to the present edition, which even exceeds in erudition, breadth of view and precision of criticism, the somewhat remarkable preface prefixed to the original edition. Ulpian's aim was, in the opinion of his present editors, entirely different from that of Gaius. Ulpian wished to draw up a handbook for the use of practising lawyers. "Now that a book of practice is improved by a systematic arrangement is obvious. Ulpian, therefore, writing in the reign of Caracalla, took, as a model, the educational treatise which his brother lawyer had published a few years previously, introducing into it important and necessary modifications. Whilst, then, on the one hand, he omitted all antiquarian disquisitions as out of place in a book of practice, on the

<sup>5</sup> "The Volunteer, the Militiaman, and the Regular Soldier." A Conservative View of the Armies of England, Past, Present, and Future, as seen in January, 1874. By a Public-School Boy. London: Henry S. King. 1874.

<sup>6</sup> "The Commentaries of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian." Translated, with Notes, by J. T. Abdy, LL.D., and Bryan Walker, M.A., LL.D. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1874.

other he introduced large interpolations on such matters as *dos* and its *retentiones*. These topics Gaius (writing for beginners) had passed over unnoticed, because they involved more detail than principle; because, also, a student could very well comprehend the general scheme of the Roman law, without any special acquaintance with them." The Editors also notice that the very title prefixed to Ulpian's work bears out their view. Principles (*institutiones*) are for beginners, but rules (*regulæ*) aid the memory of those who have passed through their course of study, and are now engaged in the active business of their profession.

The purpose of the "International Scientific Series" is to provide a set of treatises from the hands of competent authorities in all countries on a great variety of scientific topics with the view of coordinating the different branches of Science by common methods of treatment, and of making students conversant, as far as may be, with one another's work. Most of the topics hitherto handled have, naturally enough, been connected with the strictly physical sciences, but Professor Sheldon Amos, following Mr. Walter Bagehot and Mr. Herbert Spencer, has added to the series a work on a branch of moral science. The "Science of Law" necessarily covers much of the same ground as that covered by the writer's "Systematic View of the Science of Jurisprudence," though the mode of approach employed in; as well as the objects kept in view by, the two works is very different. In the new work, the deeper relations of Law to the foundations of Society are subjected to more laborious analysis, and the technical part of the subject, though constantly borne in mind and used either as illustrations or as lines for marking out the limits of the different portions of the whole topic, are kept more in the background. The object of the present work is to enable every scientific thinker to apprehend the universal and permanent ideas in law, without being perplexed by the jargon of some particular system which is often presented as the only notion of Law, and which therefore goes a long way to repel persons from the study of it. Indeed Law has, proverbially, but most unjustly, acquired a special reputation for being dry, abstruse, inhuman, and suitable to be studied only by its unhappy devotees. It is from such a reputation as this that Professor Sheldon Amos has done his best to redeem Law by establishing it, once for all, on its platform of Science, and compelling it by the use of exact conceptions, accurate terminology, and precise classificatory divisions to rival all other sciences in its method as it yields to none in its importance and its interest.

Mr. Jenkins<sup>8</sup> glances somewhat askew at England. A native of England, as he assures his audience, he has imported into his public appearances both as a litterateur and as a dealer in politics, a certain undignified self-assertion which carries upon it an indelible stamp of American bringing-up. This idiosyncrasy is added, in the present

<sup>7</sup> "The Science of Law." By Sheldon Amos, M.A. Being Vol. X. of the International Scientific Series. London: Henry S. King. 1874.

<sup>8</sup> "Glances at Inner England." A Lecture delivered in the United States and Canada by Edward Jenkins, M.P. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.



volume, to a very conspicuous—perhaps a resultant—impotency to understand or describe even the English movements and questions with which Mr. Jenkins has most cared to identify his name. Not that the exclamations to which he gives utterance are untrue, except as being outside the inner truth of the things which are their subjects. Numbered paragraphs, with marginal notes, on Vested Interests, on Mr. Whittier's poem against Established Churches, on Privilege, Education, the English Poor, and other topics, are spiced with quotations and semiquotations which may or may not be profane both to the humanity Mr. Jenkins professes to respect, and to the Book to which he professes fealty. At the same time some of Mr. Jenkins' ideas are ludicrously incorrect. It would have seemed impossible, for instance, that anyone with his experience of elections could say that America needs to take warning from a decay of political interest prevalent in English society. It is unnecessary to allude to the uselessness and folly of trying to make himself popular in a foreign country and in a British dependency by enlarging upon, and exaggerating by isolating, the evils which infest our body politic, instead of straining every nerve and muscle in patient and unobtrusive labour, both in and out of Parliament, to amend the present and avert impending ill.

The third volume of Mr. Herbert Spencer's collected Essays<sup>9</sup> will be received by the public with much satisfaction. Mr. Spencer's philosophy is so homogeneous and consistent and yet so subtle and comprehensive that a copious use of illustration cannot be dispensed with. And no more effective or lively mode of illustration exists than what is supplied by well-sustained controversy. It is not true that controversial writing is always the most favourable medium for the enucleation of truth in all its proportions; and therefore in every controversy it usually happens that he gains the most by it who is the greatest adept in the use of logical weapons, offensive and defensive; that the living prospers at the expense of the dead; and the one who is nearest at hand and talks loudest and speaks last has no small advantage over his adversary who is at a distance, or who is over-gentle or feeble in debate, or who does not care to reply. Whatever may be the fate of M. Comte and Professor Huxley, certainly Mr. Spencer makes good capital out of their real or alleged opinions when brought into rivalry or contrast with his own. Mr. Spencer's points of difference with M. Comte are exhibited in the very intelligible form of parallel passages arranged side by side. Of course, as the selection and arrangement of the passages is in Mr. Spencer's hands and not in M. Comte's, this itself must weigh heavily against the latter. Mr. Spencer, too, can qualify and explain his own language as he goes: M. Comte cannot. This is no allegation against the perfect fairness and candour of Mr. Spencer, but is only a subtraction from the value of the comparisons of two systems of philosophy founded upon the production of such isolated materials.

---

<sup>9</sup> "Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative." By Herbert Spencer. Vol. III. London: Williams and Norgate. 1874.

Nevertheless this mode of exhibiting some of Mr. Spencer's most characteristic opinions will be found very interesting to his readers. For instance, to the assertion on one side of the page that M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which *government* is developed to the greatest extent, Mr. Spencer opposes his own conviction that "the form of society towards which we are progressing is one in which *government* will be reduced to the smallest amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible—one in which human nature will have become so moulded by social discipline into fitness for the social state that it will need little external restraint, but will be self-restrained." Our own recollection of M. Comte's teaching, as a whole and not as expressed in fragmentary passages, leads us to believe that his ideal in the future did not differ widely from Mr. Spencer's; that the field of temporal government in M. Comte's, as in Mr. Spencer's scheme, was to be constantly restricted; and that what Mr. Spencer means by "social discipline" M. Comte really meant by the "spiritual power." The Essay on "Specialized Administration" will also be read with great interest.

Among the most curious features of the day, though it be one as yet little noted, is the extreme variety in all respects of the persons who are favourable to the opinions on Cremation so ably and succinctly brought together by Sir Henry Thompson's<sup>10</sup> pamphlet on the subject. The last few years have been fruitful in questions which have been hitherto thought too delicate or indelicate for public discussion, but upon which as soon as they were once put before the public it has been found that there existed already an immense mass of private individual conviction directly opposed to the common practice of all ranks of society. Among these questions is that as to the best mode of disposing of the body after death. The present fashion of burial,—with all the ghastly train of hidden processes which the mind refuses to follow either for its own body's case or for that of others, and which Sir Henry Thompson properly refuses to do more than hint at—has been growing increasingly unpopular for a long time in so far as it has become almost indissolubly mixed up with a pompousness, a fussiness, and an extravagance equally repugnant to the feeling of those who are really mourning, to the good sense of the practical, and to the wisdom of the philanthropic labourer among the poor. We are all beginning to see the evils of ruining a family for the funeral of its breadwinner, of exhausting the savings of years in crape and feathers, and of turning away from all the solemn lessons of bereavement in order to secure that dress shall be becoming and fashionable enough to deprive it of all real expression of anything except the wealth and vanity of the wearers or of their abject subjection to the vulgarest caprices of dressmakers and milliners. To break off these galling and offensive chains would in itself be a sufficient argument for a change of our mode of burial; but there are others of at least equal cogency. That the health of large towns has been affected by the existence of burial grounds in their

<sup>10</sup> "Cremation: the Treatment of the Body after Death." By Sir Henry Thompson, F. R. C. S., M. B. Lond. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

midst is an uncontroverted fact ; and the precaution which the present day has introduced of compelling all burials to take place outside the limits of the more populated districts does nothing but secure to our immediate descendants a like legacy of disease and death. The very beauty of the spots so sacred to the sentiment of many is an outcome of unmentionable loathsomeness and a source of death. The inspectors of cemeteries insist upon the necessity of planting trees and flowers and shrubs—the quicker growing the better—to neutralize the gases that escape at every pore of the teeming graveyard, and houses are advertised as overlooking the lovely plantations without mention of that share of those gases which find their way out into the atmosphere unaffected by the insufficient number of vegetable growths. A common stumblingblock to those who start at the thought of burning the dead in ancient Saxon fashion is the idea that so quickly to do away with the outward semblance—hidden from sight though it be—is a sort of irreverence ; and yet it is probable that no one person would personally prefer to become, so far as the body is concerned, a source of mischief or an object on which the thoughts of survivors cannot rest, instead of being, if not positively utilized, at all events neutralized, and made such as the tenants of the funeral urns which ancient taste has made the form for even our most modern sentiment to assume both in verse and in many monuments. And what we would others should do to us, we should do to them. Even in the service of the Church which it seems most difficult to alter, what is the meaning, or is there any meaning, under our present system, of the phrase, “Earth to earth, *ashes to ashes*, dust to dust?” Sir Henry Thompson answers all questions as to the possibility of burning the dead without the horrible and unhealthy effects produced in India by the custom, and indicates the sort of mechanism by which a few ounces or pounds of dry white ash may be returned to the reverent care of survivors, without any possible injury or annoyance to any part of the population, at the end of an hour. The dread, felt more frequently than acknowledged, of premature burial and a horrible awakening would be put an end to by cremation ; partly because the introduction of the new system would be a good opportunity for the much needed appointment of officers to certify the fact and cause of death in every case by personal inspection, and partly because, in the then highly improbable case of mistake, the process itself would secure instantaneous and painless death. Again, it has been warmly argued that the impossibility of exhumation in cases of suspected poisoning would tend to increase that form of murder ; but the appointment of such officers as those named, would be a far greater safeguard than the chance of exhumation, and Sir Henry Thompson points out other precautions which might—were it thought worth while—easily be adopted. There seems small reason to doubt that either our own or a future more sensible generation will change the present repulsive and extravagant mode of dealing with “the ashes of the dead” for a more ancient and reasonable one, and Sir Henry Thompson earns the hearty thanks of all who wish to see the day and share the benefit.

Mr. Heath<sup>11</sup> is quite right in his belief that such a book as he now publishes is much needed. The fugitive paragraphs in newspapers,—whether in leaders or in reports of speeches—which have been a chief source of information as to the condition of our agricultural population, for most people lack the solidity of information and authority which Mr. Heath has carefully gathered together out of tedious blue-books, and by personal and minute investigations in the Western counties of England. The degradation he found usual among the cottagers was extreme, or rather perhaps it should be said that the deprivation was so; for the degraded minds seem to have abounded more among the landlords and farmers, than among the noble and uncomplaining labourers, who have so bravely and forbearingly acquitted themselves under the guidance of Mr. Joseph Arch. An account of the great migration system, set on foot by Canon Girdlestone, is well-timed, since it is easy, now that the district under his influence is—through the obstinacy of employers—becoming almost too thinly populated, to say that his system was a mistaken one. There can be no doubt that to him belongs the high honour of having been the first remote mover in the great regeneration of the agricultural labouring classes of England. The actual rising did not, as is largely believed, originate with Mr. Arch. He was invited by a dozen men who lived in his neighbourhood to address them and their friends; but things were so ripe for progress that the secretly convened meeting numbered some fourteen hundred men. That dozen of men, again, were incited to their action by a letter sent to a local paper by two or three farm labourers of Weston-under-Weatherley, near Leamington, complaining of the hard conditions of their lives. Mr. Heath is most fair in his endeavour to point out to what degree the farmers are accountable, and to what degree blameless, in regard to the condition of their labourers. He gives many instances of extreme cruelty and hard dealing; but he also enlarges upon the difficulties which beset a man holding his land without any security of tenure. There are very useful chapters in the volume on agricultural children; on the National Agricultural Labourers' Union; on the depopulation of our western counties; on emigration, past, present, and future; and on the possibilities that lie before our peasantry. The whole work is singularly free from dry statistics, and will be welcomed by all classes of readers anxious to be easily informed on the subject of which it treats.

Mr. Cave Thomas<sup>12</sup> is anxious to put in a strong plea, in these days of theoretical education, for a system of education which shall not so much seek to develop individual capacity as to supply defects and so produce a real symmetry of mind. It is at once an obvious thought that this desirable end calls for a clear-sightedness and wisdom in parents and teachers which is not too commonly to be found. But

---

<sup>11</sup> "The English Peasantry." By F. G. Heath. London: Frederick Warne & Co. 1874.

<sup>12</sup> "Symmetrical Education." By W. Cave Thomas. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1873.

the protest is not without its use,—if indeed any thoughtful theory can be useless on so vexed a subject as education; since the revulsion from old formulæ is showing some tendency to carry society into the opposite extreme of cultivating chiefly that which appears on the surface of a child's nature, and so frequently leaving untouched all the depths which would give strength and solidity.

Mr. Symonds<sup>13</sup> papers on various Greek and Italian cities are some of them reprints of magazine articles, and bear the impress of their origin in the close packing of classical and mediæval allusion which characterizes them. The volume would be useful as a guide book in Corsica and Sicily, and is somewhat pleasant reading in England; but it is overweighted with long, florid descriptions of scenery and natural beauty. In a chapter on the songs of Tuscany, and at the end of the volume, are some graceful translations. Mr. Symonds remarks on the absence, in the popular songs of Tuscany, of ballads and of any element of magic or witchcraft—an absence accounted for possibly by the intensely practical and realistic nature of the Italian people.

Miss Kortwright<sup>14</sup> has begun to think about the position, rights, duties, and opportunities of women in a very shallow and conservative vein, but with so much genuine kindliness of heart and sincerity of purpose that there is a fair chance of her coming, like those she inclines to revile for their larger efforts and aims, to see that the objects she would incite all women to strive for, are not the highest attainable, nor the only or most desirable, and also that even they must result from or necessarily involve that freedom from legislative or social restriction which is sought for by the women whom she denounces as unfeminine and misguided. It is a well-meant little book.

In attacks upon an enemy whose forces are of every variety, disciplined and undisciplined, regular and utterly wild and barbarous, forces and weapons of all sorts may without disadvantage be used. Therefore, Luke Limner's<sup>15</sup> vague sentences and haphazard hits at the absurdities of women's dress may be welcomed, though they are perhaps more valuable as straws showing which way some puffs of wind are blowing. Until the whole subject of modern dress, both men's and women's, is taken up and dealt with thoroughly as in opposition to all the dictates of propriety, usefulness, economy, and artistic culture, nothing much will be done by passing and partial declamation against temporary enormities.

Mrs. Hooper<sup>16</sup> is Professor of Domestic Economy in the Crystal Palace School of Art, and so has a claim to respectful attention from a public which is awaking to the importance to health and comfort of

<sup>13</sup> "Sketches in Italy and Greece." By John Addington Symonds. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1874.

<sup>14</sup> "A Little Lower than the Angels." By Fanny A. Kortwright. London: Sampson Low & Co. 1874.

<sup>15</sup> "Madre Natura versus the Moloch of Fashion." By Luke Limner. Chatto and Windus, Piccadilly. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "Little Dinners, How to Serve Them." By Mary Hooper. London: H. S. King & Co. 1874.

good cooking in the sense of economical ways of preparing digestible and various foods. The tide is setting so strongly in this direction as to make it quite unnecessary to do more than say that these receipts appear to be not extravagant and to be somewhat novel and promising. Indeed, the danger is greater that,—what with those enemies of the higher education of women who insist on cooking as the true feminine function, the doctors who write so largely on foods and diets, and the overwhelming mass of Englishmen who quarrel with their very bread and butter,—Britons may fall into the error of not simply eating to live—as they fain would do—but into the opposite extreme, and simply live to eat.

A native of Mysore<sup>17</sup> is anxious to arouse public attention to the state of affairs in his native country in the prospect of that country being shortly handed over to a native ruler. The young Maharajah is being educated with the express purpose of restoring to him his hereditary honours, and it would seem a matter of course that his territories should be handed over to him in the condition most certain to conduce to his prosperous government of them. That is to say, that either the certain future result should be anticipated, and trained native officials and employés of all grades should be appointed in all branches of State service, or there should be as large an admixture of natives under English superintendence as is compatible with the interests of the province. At the same time all possible economy should be practised, both in order so to fill the exchequer as to give the young ruler a good start, and in order to set him a good example. How different the facts are this pamphlet shows in a most temperate and cautious way, doing full justice to the good intentions of Government and to the abilities of the officers to whose hands the administration of Mysore has, during nearly half a century, been entrusted. At first instructions were issued that the agency employed should be exclusively native, and that native institutions should be carefully maintained; and the administration was, in fact, conducted upon practical rules intended to meet actual wants and which were in accordance with the habits of the people. But when the administration fell into fresh hands the somewhat crude system, which was suited to the stage of education then attained by the people, seemed too disorderly, and departments were organized for all manner of things; fresh divisions made fresh places for European officers; and each new want was felt to be supplied by the creation of a new department and new posts, until the superior grade officers have increased from thirty to a hundred and thirty-five, of whom less than thirty, not of the first grade, are natives. And the arrangements are in a curious state of disorder. Revenue officers are vested with judicial functions, and this avowedly for the sake of training them and not for the public interest; while throughout the whole judicial system there is no original or appellate court with assessor judges. That it might be well to secure the help of

---

<sup>17</sup> "The British Administration of Mysore." By a Native of Mysore. Part I. London: Longmans. 1874.

native experience as well as to train the future race of native judges is beyond question. Fresh legislation is imposed from time to time without due modification for the present condition of the population, and of a sort so complicated and intricate as to be most unsuited to that condition. This is as true of the criminal as of the civil law, and is productive of grave evils. A new police system having proved a terrible failure, an effort was made to organize the native system; but the instructions issued were incomprehensible to the uneducated police, and the whole thing does not work. Gaols on the reformatory system have been built all over the country, the cost—exclusive of the money for building—of supporting each prisoner being twice as great as the wages of labourers. A land survey and revenue settlement was organized in 1862 under good agency imported from Bombay, and it is at work, but it is in danger of being erroneously carried out from a want of due consideration of the position and condition of the country. It was intended to be a settlement for thirty years; but the people are so deeply imbued with a belief in the practical permanency of their ancient annual assessments that this term of thirty years would, did they at all comprehend it, be rather an unsettling; and, again, as it was calculated that the first settlement would not be made in less than thirty years there would seem to be a prospect of the department becoming a permanent one. At the same time it is difficult to say what is to become of the purely European staff when the whole government falls into native hands. The department has professed to train young Englishmen, but it should have trained young natives. The native of Mysore enumerates the various sources of revenue, and points out both calamities resulting from the adoption of foreign systems and ideas and those resulting from government monopoly—as, for instance, in the farming out of the right to sell arrack. The forests and jungles needed special supervision, but instead of a well-trained small body of foresters a host of inexperienced men without special knowledge have been allowed to make experiments, a number of new offences have been created, some of the most valuable timber is practically prohibited on private ground, and this department is another failure in every sense. But absurdity and mismanagement perhaps reach their culminating point in the department of Public Works, in which various bodies of officials have tried their hands and have done very little, and now the thing to be done is to repair and conserve, by European agency, the tanks and roads and irrigation which owe their existence to previous native work; and all this is estimated to cost sums totally out of proportion to the work. The making of the Mysore State Railway, long ago surveyed, is now indefinitely postponed in favour of irrigation works, while much irrigated land lies waste for want of enterprise and the means of communication. The education department seems also to need a complete revision, as well as the army; but for details both of these and of the departments already spoken of, the inquirer cannot do better than refer to this most able pamphlet. The second part, "Suggestions for the Future," will be welcomed by all who are interested in the great population of Mysore.

A Governor of the Royal Hospital for Incurables<sup>18</sup> writes of elective charities—or rather of the opponents of election to charitable institutions—in a tone which shows him to have the deepest sympathy with the receivers of the charity he is to help to administer. He is most royal in his disdain of the Charity Organization Society, corporately and individually, and of all who think that anything charitable might be mended; and he is to all appearances quite incurable in his habit of taking all that his foes say to be unfounded or grossly fabricated, and all that his co-operators assert as irrefragable proofs of the justice of their cause. The brochure is scarcely worth notice, except as a specimen of the indignant vested interest encouraged to speak freely under the shadow of a Tory Government. It may well be that such publications will serve a useful end.

"Prince Florestan" may possibly be intended as a satire upon Radical opinion; or upon the state of public opinion which makes Radical opinions incapable of being carried into practice; or upon half-a-dozen other things. But it is in reality a very good comment upon the result of Eton and Cambridge education. It is to be doubted whether anything in the world, called by the name of a system, or plan, or theory of education, except our English Public School and University "system" could produce so raw and thoughtless a young man as this Prince Florestan. And yet how good a description it is of "just what you would have expected" of an undergraduate. The unceremonious way in which he packs up and goes to receive his dignities without a thought of civil leave-taking of any one but his tutor; his jaunty jokes with the first "subject" he meets with; his light-hearted advances to the keeper of the greatest hell in Europe, and his desire that they should work together in unity; his quick conclusions as to his chief adviser's character; his purely comic view of the population he had to control and educate just on the ground of its paucity of numbers; his whole aspect of mind towards the politics of his dominions, as though politics were a game, and it did not signify one tittle to himself or anybody else whether he played at them or not;—are not these the familiar, everyday correlatives of the jaunty, good-humoured selfishness and ignorance which is the armour with which our young men come forth to fight, or to run away from and leave unassailed, the whole mass of misery and wrong by which, blinded or seeing, they are surrounded even in the nursery, the school, and the University?

The second edition of Mr. Matthew Arnold's<sup>20</sup> important work on the Higher Schools and Universities in Germany derives an access of interest over and above that properly due to the original edition from the remarkable theory of Church and State which Mr. Arnold contrives

---

<sup>18</sup> "Elective Charities and their Opponents." A Review. By a Governor of the Royal Hospital for Incurables. Unwin Brothers: Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London. 1874.

<sup>19</sup> "The Fall of Prince Florestan of Monaco." London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> "Higher Schools and Universities in Germany." By Matthew Arnold, D.C.L. London: Macmillan. 1874.



to enunciate in his new preface. *Apropos* of education in Germany, Mr. Arnold is naturally led on to comment upon the recent ecclesiastical laws in Prussia as affecting education. This comment affords Mr. Arnold the opportunity of criticising with his usual skill and delicacy of diction the policy of England in the disestablishment of the English Church in Ireland, and the claims of the English Nonconformists in the matter of national education. We very much doubt whether Mr. Arnold's view of the Prussian policy is the correct one, or can even be substantiated by facts. He seems to decry in that policy not, as we think, what is alone there, the support of the State in its purely secular aspect, and of the Government as its instrument, against the insidious assaults and machinations of Rome, but a defence of a national religion and of its representatives against those who would warp the purely national tendencies into artificial directions. Starting with this theory, which we hold to be purely gratuitous, not to say imaginary, Mr. Arnold goes on to argue that it is the duty of English "Dissenters" to devote their energies rather to improving and broadening the national religion than to banishing religion altogether from the region of public action. Mr. Arnold has a very great faith in the virtue of numerical majorities, and he evidently holds that if the large majority of the nation hold, or profess to hold, certain opinions, it is no hardship on the minority to have those opinions enforced by public endowments and compulsory education. Mr. Arnold's language indeed is always so refined, and his manner of speaking of his opponents is so courteous and complimentary (though tinged with lurking contempt) that it is peculiarly hard to fix him with the responsibility of any opinions whatever. But this is what it comes to, and in Mr. Arnold's view, the test of rationality, beneficence, and truthfulness of doctrine is to be applied by the amount of attainable acquiescence. Of course, on this principle, an older system of belief has an invincible superiority of position over a newer one. What is spontaneously believed, and never questioned, is always to those who hold it full of "sweetness and light." No doubt, at one time, to the overwhelming majority of the Roman and Jewish world, Christianity seemed nothing but offensive to every sense and to be a darkness that might be felt.

Herr Emil Friedberg<sup>21</sup> has published a laboriously prepared treatise on the recent history of the conflicting claims of the German States and the Papal authority in respect of the appointment of bishops. The work is enriched by a collection (published in a separate volume) of original documents, in all languages, on which the rival claims are founded. The subject is one of somewhat a technical, and especially a German nature, but the importance of stating in a compendious form the real facts of the case, and producing all the evidence on which they rest, cannot be rated too highly.

Swiss Allmends are common or commonable lands, and Mr.

---

<sup>21</sup> "Der Staat und die Bischofswahlen in Deutschland mit Actenstücken." Von Emil Friedberg, Das Neunzehnte Jahrhundert. Leipzig: 1874.

Zincke<sup>22</sup> follows up his previous discourses on Swiss communal life by a very useful and interesting collection of information on the common lands, their origin, political significance, privileges, and adaptability to former and to present conditions of life in Switzerland. That he gained his information during a month's excursion in Switzerland, partially planned for the express purpose of gaining it, merely secures to his readers a very fresh and bright little volume of travel sketches; while those who only seek the fruit of his inquiries may confine themselves to the last chapter in the book, although much collateral talk with fellow-travellers and with himself is pleasant and instructive. The Allmends include common land of all kinds, pasture, forest, or garden ground, generally each commune possessing some of all kinds. In the earliest days, before intercommunication between the valleys or intercourse with the rest of the world was made possible; before cereals or potatoes were grown or even known, "the Switzer was the parasite of the cow," and on the well-being of the cows all interests must have concentrated. Unless a family could pasture a cow on a bit of prairie ground during some part of the year, and during the summer weeks could drive it up to the mountain pasture while the prairie patch produced hay for the winter, that family could not live. Also without a sufficiency of fuel life could not be maintained. Under such hard conditions superfluity could fall to no man's lot; and so the best that could happen was for the village to hold in common the mountain pastures for summer use, because these were not capable of improvement by industry, while the prairie pastures, being capable of such improvement, were held in such permanent possession as made it worth a man's while to make the best of his patch. The forests were held in common, and fuel and timber were dealt out in proportion to the size—that is, to the needs of each house. This was obviously a perfectly fair arrangement in early days; but when money could be earned outside the mountains, and so labour could be purchased to make the prairie land more productive and capable of sustaining more cows, the old permission to send as many cows to the common summer pasture as had been maintained during the winter began to tell very unfairly in favour of the hirer and against the labourer, whose patch of pasture was necessarily less productive than when he gave his time to it. And so with capital came the first step in the inevitable destruction of the Swiss common land system. The theory of these Allmends well accounts for and excuses the old jealousy of "foreigners" existing in the Swiss Cantonal laws to our own day. Each incomer would decrease by so much the available property of each original burgher; and even now he is not admitted to rights in the common property of the commune or of its adherent or excrescent corporations. These corporations are not political entities, and, though varying greatly throughout Switzerland, they may generally be taken to mean "a section of the burghers possessed of landed property held for a definite object. For instance, they had at Lindthal a corporation for educational purposes

---

<sup>22</sup> "Swiss Allmends, and a Walk to See Them." By F. Barham Zincke, Vicar of Wherstead and Chaplain to the Queen. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1874.

possessed of four alpes, or rights to portions of mountain pasture, and another for the encouragement of singing." It is at once clear that the Allmend system no longer answers the end which all land tenure systems must subserve or be changed for others more adapted to the time; it no longer secures that the land shall produce as much food as it might produce if held by a smaller number of persons possessed of capital enough to introduce improved methods of cultivation. And it breaks down under the strain of temptation which employs all able-bodied men in the service of tourists just during those months in which they should otherwise be devoting themselves to their land. Without being tempted to discourse on English interests, Mr. Zincke insists on the fact that anything in any state of society must be swept away which interferes with (1) the utmost possible productiveness of land; (2) such property in land as is requisite to secure that utmost productiveness; and (3) association for the protection of that property.

The authoress of "South by West"<sup>23</sup>—presumably a member of Mr. Kingsley's family circle—has the family gift of pleasant fluency with her pen. A visit to America, under the auspices of a well-known Church dignitary, gave her a favourable chance of seeing much of the country and of one class of society in Canada and New York in a very short time, and though she is not so democratic as some of her family, she makes up for some regrettable sentences by the fresh ardour with which she receives, and transmits to her pages, the impressions of each day. From the States she went westward to meet her brother, and the two young people seem to have led a pleasant rough and ready life, among the pioneer inhabitants of the city of Colorado, identifying themselves to the utmost with the interests of their temporary abode, and making the most of their opportunities for seeing the known and exploring the unknown wonders of nature in their neighbourhood. The descriptions of scenery throughout are terse and vivid. The latter part of the volume is much more exciting, containing the history of a perilous journey taken with some other English friends into Mexico, during a decidedly warm outbreak of revolutionary fires there. The party went for the purpose of ascertaining the best routes for the railways on the construction of which so much of the hope for a speedy pacification of Mexico must depend, and their route could not be merely chosen for security. The consequence was that they had various encounters with outlaw troops or banditti. A stay of some length in Mexico, with intimate acquaintance with most of the chief people of the city, gave the writer materials for chapters of special interest, and a final dozen pages sums up the resources of the country.

The sort of necessity under which newspapers appear to feel themselves placed, of sending correspondents to all quarters of the globe to report upon anything which may be happening there, is one which entails some results much to be deprecated in the interests of the manly straightforwardness on which Englishmen used to pique them-

---

<sup>23</sup> "South by West, or Winter in the Rocky Mountains and Spring in Mexico." Edited, with a Preface, by the Rev. Charles Kingsley. London: W. Isbister & Co. 1874.

selves. The love of adventure seems to be now in the ascendant, and people merely smile to themselves while special correspondents and travellers jauntily confess to or boast of the disguises, the assumptions of other nationality, and the blank, downright, or implied untruths, to which they have had recourse in order to attain their end. It is to be doubted whether the game is worth the candle. Mr. Ker<sup>24</sup> was suspected, during his absence in Central Asia, of not going there at all, a charge to which he gives distinct denial, and offers proofs of his veracity; secondly, he was accused of sending wilfully false news of the fall of Khiva, but he says he was himself mistaken, and the natural conclusion is that he would have been just as well at home; a third charge about the dates of certain letters and magazine articles, he totally denies; for a fourth, of putting extracts from former writings in his letters to the *Daily Telegraph*, the readers of that journal will probably readily accept his excuse of want of fresh matter. But it seems a pity to ask a gentleman to go and deny his native country, and get into great difficulties in the effort to conceal the fact that he was spying on forbidden ground, at great pecuniary expense to his employers, and at great risk to his own life and health, without some greater and more certainly attainable result than in this case. Mr. Ker's style is that of the *Daily Telegraph*, and his book will be found amusing by many.

African travellers are invariably infected with the disregard of time characteristic of African races, and their books are either thicker or in more volumes than those of travellers in other lands. Mr. Skertchley<sup>25</sup> makes no exception to this rule. He has, however, an exceptional excuse for his long-windedness, inasmuch as he is bound to try to convey to his readers a vivid sense of the weariness with which he endured the eight months of friendly imprisonment inflicted on him by the king of Dahomey. Mr. Skertchley went out to Africa to make entomological collections, and was tempted by an invitation from the king to visit Abomey, the capital, and a region generally inaccessible to Europeans. On the understanding that he was to be free to return to Whydah after eight days, Mr. Skertchley ventured into the power of Gelelé, the king of Dahomey, but found that he was anxious to detain an Englishman during various sorts of "customs," in order that some misrepresentations of Dahoman fashions might be corrected. Mr. Skertchley was made a prime favourite and well treated during eight months, and saw all that there was to see. He reports that the human beings slaughtered at customs are either prisoners of war or criminals worthy of death by Dahoman law; but his testimony is made less valuable by his expressed conviction that negroes are of a race inferior to men, that they should be used for forced labour in our tropical possessions, that all missionaries to the Gold Coast have been canting and hypocritical, that all "old maids" are spiteful and vicious and might advantageously be enrolled in the army, and so on. The

---

<sup>24</sup> "On the Road to Khiva." By David Ker, late Khivan Special Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>25</sup> "Dahomey as It Is." By J. A. Skertchley. London: Chapman & Hall. 1874.

merit of this volume is that it contains a detailed account of Dahoman life during the period of Mr. Skertchley's detention.

Herr Robert Weisse<sup>26</sup> publishes a few pages of geographical, ethnographical, and critical notices, intended to accompany and to increase the comprehensibility and value of a second series of chromo-lithographed fac-similes of Herr Hildebrand's water-colour sketches of Eastern life and scenery. That the work is that of an enthusiastic admirer needs not to be said, but it need not necessarily have been such as would raise any such desire as it awakens to see the pictures to which its office is that of showman. Herr Hildebrand is said by Herr Weisse to be the second Columbus of Art, and to have revealed a new world of subjects to the artist and of interest to the public. It may be somewhat puzzling to the English mind to know what this may mean, but there is always the probability that a German means something by what he says. Otherwise, sketches in Japan, at Rangoon, Singapore, at the mouth of the Peiho, or in the Ladrone Islands—or, at least, their geographical equivalents—are not rare among us.

In sixty pages of tolerably close print Herr Herrmann Cohn<sup>27</sup> sums up what is to be said by an oculist from his point of view as to the merits of the specimens and sketches of school seats and tables, and of school-room windows exhibited at the Vienna Exhibition. It is to be feared that some time must elapse before an Englishman will gain the information, or care to print it, or hope to find a publisher or an audience for so apparently minute a piece of the infinite ramifications of educational questions. And yet Dr. Cohn successfully endeavours to convey a sense of the importance of the matter. Serious injury to the eyesight of masses of children is doubtless wrought by arrangements which throw the light on their books from the front or the right hand side when they are writing, or which provide seats in which it is impossible for them to sit properly for the needful time, and which are either so far from the desks they write on that they must stoop forward, or so near to the desks their reading-books lie upon that the eyes cannot get the natural focus. What the different requisites are, what inventions most nearly fulfil them, and what is left yet undone, are subjects clearly and altogether admirably treated in this little pamphlet. It is much to be wished that all members of school boards had to pass an examination in this and co-ordinate German monographs.

A very enterprising and valuable series of political pamphlets is in course of publication in Berlin under the superintendence of Professors Holzendorff and Oncken.<sup>28</sup> The pamphlets treat all the pressing political problems of the day, are written by men of the highest capacity, and are sold for a few pence each. The subjects are such as "The Old and the New German Empire," "The Five Millions," "The Reform of the Zollverein Tariff," "Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism," and the

<sup>26</sup> "Um die Erde Erläuternder Text zu den Chromofacsimiles der Hildebrand'schen Reise-Aquarelle." Von Robert Weisse. Berlin.

<sup>27</sup> "Die Schulhäuser und Schultische auf der Wiener Weltausstellung." Von Hermann Cohn. Breslau. 1873.

<sup>28</sup> "Deutsche Zeit-und-Streit-Fragen Klugschriften zur Kenntniss der Gegenwart." Herausgegeben von Fr. v. Holzendorff und M. Oncken. Berlin: 1874.

like. No better mode could be conceived of giving political instruction to the people of a more deliberate, continuous, and responsible sort than is given even by the best of our daily papers. Indeed, the reckless speed with which our political life is run, through the action of Parliamentary institutions in this country, render thoughtful writing and reading almost out of the question.

A most useful series of Reports<sup>29</sup> is issued every two years by the State of Illinois on its "Public Charities." These reports not only convey information of the most reliable sort on the social condition of Illinois, but also serve to throw light on questions which are becoming matters of discussion everywhere. In one interesting passage, for instance, in the Report for 1870, Dr. M'Farland gives a brief historical review of the treatment of insanity from the earliest ages. The organization of an asylum suggested by Dr. M'Farland is well deserving of attention. The foundation of the whole is industry, and the male servants are not attendants but fellow-labourers. The description of the county gaol and almshouse system will also be read with especial interest. One chapter in the Report for 1872 has the comprehensive heading, "Misfortune, its Extent and General Statistics." Another chapter in the same volume is on "Crime and Criminals," and another on "Prison Reforms." It will thus be seen that the little "Public Charities" to which these reports alone profess to extend covers all matters of great social significance.

In a volume making no pretence to the character of a work of fiction, though it wears much of its aspect, Captain Johnstone<sup>30</sup> has published a most interesting picture of Maori life as it was before the advent of Europeans into New Zealand. All the incidents which he has so skilfully interwoven into his work have trustworthy authority for their reality, and both characters and traditions are *bonâ fide* native Maori. The tone in which Captain Johnstone writes is far pleasanter than that of most colonists' writings: he is laudatory of the natives; nor is he, on the other hand, defamatory of the Colonial Government, though he points out with great regret the strange stupidity which made the rising of the Maories against Europeans in 1860 a quite feasible plan and entailed upon us the long war which must end in the extermination of the native population of the islands. The secret of the strength of the Maori organization lies in the fact that it is a race "truthful, brave, honourable," giving "willing obedience to the fundamental rule of Maori society which taught that the first duty of every citizen is to be prepared to bear arms in behalf of the commonwealth; and that far beyond the selfish luxury of the rich man, or the petty greed of the trader, is the simple patriotism which is ready to fight, and, if necessary, to die in defence of its country." If this be somewhat exclusively a military idea of virtue, there may be a deeper reason for Maori strength found in the fact that the race is descended from ten canoe-loads of people who

---

<sup>29</sup> "First and Second Biennial Report of the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities of the State of Illinois." 1871 and 1872.

<sup>30</sup> "Maories." By Captain J. C. Johnstone. London: Chapman & Hall. 1872.

came four thousand miles across the ocean as emigrants from an island where luxury and vice had made life intolerable to the vigorous and virtuous minority.

We have a curious antiquarian delight in reading the new series of the "Annual Register." The general order and plan of the great original series is, of course, imitated as closely as possible, and yet the lapse of time since the early numbers of the first work appeared makes itself strongly felt. There is something almost grotesque in the formal parallelism observed throughout. Thus, in the "Annual Register" for 1873,<sup>31</sup> among the remarkable trials is, of course, the Tichborne case, and in the chapters on English History the debates on the Supreme Court of Judicature Bill. The chapters on Foreign History, including those on France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, are especially important, as the matter is not otherwise accessible to the general reader.

### SCIENCE.

ONE of the most important scientific works of our time will probably be the *Mathematical Physics*, by Professor Kirchhoff,<sup>1</sup> the celebrated physicist, of which the first instalment of the first volume has just reached this country. The custom of German publishers to publish any large work on scientific subjects in almost infinitely small portions and subdivisions cannot be too much deprecated. This work, as indicated by a short notice of the publisher's, is intended to give in the main Professor Kirchhoff's lectures at the university, and it is therefore difficult to see any reason for giving us in dribblets what must be now quite ready, having been elaborated by the illustrious Kirchhoff during so many years of his lecturing, which has attracted students to Heidelberg from all parts of the world. We have here in all little more than 100 pages, and as nothing enables us to form some idea of the probable extent of the whole, and the general plan even of the mechanical portion, we must confine ourselves to state here simply the subject matter of this first instalment, leaving a more critical review of the whole until such time as the work will have sufficiently advanced for critical purposes. In general, this first part embodies the mechanics of material points and the differential equations of motion of liquids and elastic solids. The integration of these equations for special cases is not to be found in this part, but will, without doubt, be given in the proper places as the work proceeds. To enter now more specially into the order in which the subject is treated, we may mention that Kirchhoff has preferred the following plan. He first of all develops Lagrange's fundamental equations of dynamics. From these he derives as a consequence D'Alembert's and Hamilton's

<sup>31</sup> "The Annual Register: a Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, for the Year 1873." New Series. London: Rivingtons. 1874.

<sup>1</sup> "Vorlesungen über Mathematische Physik." Von Dr. Gustav Kirchhoff, Professor zu Heidelberg. Mechanik. Erste Lieferung. Leipzig: Teubner. 1874.

principles, and again from the former he deduces as a special case the principle of virtual velocities. This leads now naturally to the statements and proofs of the theorems on energy and conservation of energy, the motion of centres of gravity, and the conservation of areas. Next follow the discussion of the possible motion of a rigid body, and the differential equations of this motion under given forces, which are integrated for the special case of no forces, as well as for the particular supposition of the action of gravity; the theory of the measurement of gravity by pendulum observations, and the inquiry into the influence of the earth's rotation upon the motion of heavy bodies, forms in itself a very exhaustive essay on the subject. The part is then brought to a close by preparing the reader in the first instance for the development of the equations of motion of continuous bodies which permit a relative displacement of their particles, and by investigating the change which an infinitely small particle undergoes during the motion; finally the equations themselves are formed after introducing the conception of pressure, and we obtain the values of the components of pressure in liquids and elastic solids; in the former also for the cases in which friction takes place. While refraining in the meantime, as we have stated, from a more exhaustive criticism, it is yet necessary to point out that the originality of the treatment of the subject by the distinguished author arises from an obvious desire to remove some of the obscurity which still clings round the primary conceptions of physical mechanics in the usual mode of treatment. The author considers it justly a main object of mechanics that the motions which are proceeding in nature should be *described* in as simple a manner as possible, and thus he has succeeded, by starting solely from our ideas of time, space and matter, to establish Lagrange's equations by mere mathematical reasoning. It is true that these equations have afterwards the appearance of leading to no real information on the actual motions of bodies; but in reality they form a kind of schematic outline for these motions, and it must be the aim of observation of real phenomena to fit the special facts into the general plan, while their principal advantage is that they render a language possible which, as proved by experience, is singularly well adapted for a description of motions in the most simple manner.

A work closely allied to the former, although totally different in the mode of treating the subject, is Dr. Proell's<sup>2</sup> attempt of treating dynamics graphically. It is certainly remarkable that in England, the country *par excellence* of mechanics and great mechanicians, the graphical statics of Continental physicists has up to very recently received very little attention, and still less application in the solution of statical problems by graphical methods. It is a well-known fact, that while the purely analytical treatment of mechanical problems has led in many branches, for example in physical astronomy, to the grandest triumphs of the human intellect, the methods of analysis have not rarely refused assistance in many problems proffered by Nature herself or by the in-

---

<sup>2</sup> "Versuch einer graphischen Dynamik." Von Dr. R. Proell. Leipzig: Arthur Felix. 1874.



geny of man. The practical engineer of higher aims has often from various causes to resign all hope of real help from pure analysis, and methods which lead to a rapid and sure evaluation of numerical results or to a clear diagram of a mechanical process should certainly receive that attention in this country which they receive elsewhere. The Continental literature of the last few years is already rich in classical works on graphical statics, and Dr. Proell has now added a first attempt on graphical dynamics. The work is divided, as it seems, into three main divisions. In the first the action of external forces upon a freely moveable material point is graphically represented. The author shows in the commencement a geometrical relation between the three magnitudes: acceleration, velocity, and time. The constructions given by Dr. Proell form a striking parallel to the usual constructions in graphical statics where the curve of moments is determined from the curve of forces. The great value of the graphical method and its wide applicability is, however, specially visible in the constructions for the motions in a curve, and the application to the motions of planets with the help of the hodograph, will probably be for every reader a treat of the highest order. The second part treats of the actions of external forces upon a freely moveable but unchangeable system of masses. The contents of this portion are of the greatest interest, especially Chapter V., headed "Applications." Here the new constructions correspond especially to the progress of modern geometry. The third portion forms a complete whole by itself. It is the most useful and practical of all, showing the effects of external forces in machines, simple and complex. Here the engineer of every branch of the craft will find treasures of graphical constructions, which will open a new world to him, as we may say without exaggerating enthusiasm. The vast amount of calculation required for even a simple piece of mechanism can be easily replaced by a neat diagram, or a velocity-curve, which requires really a very small amount of skill. The text is accompanied by an "atlas" of plates, which, although in the main free from errors, do not appear to be executed with the usual elegance of German productions of this kind.

Professor Pickering's<sup>3</sup> work on physical manipulation is written on a similar plan to Professor Kohlrausch's Practical Physics, which has been reviewed in a previous issue of the *Westminster Review*. It has also great resemblance in its arrangement with a work recently published by Professor Kulp of Darmstadt. Professor Pickering's book contains a great deal of valuable matter, which will secure for it a grateful reception among teachers and students of practical physics. Nevertheless it has the great fault of being too little cosmopolitan in its tone, and too much a guide for particular students in a particular laboratory, with a particular set of experimental apparatus. There is a great deal of space unnecessarily given to explanations on matters which are usually found in every text-book of physics, while as a consequence of this the space given to directions is comparatively small, and

<sup>3</sup> "Elements of Physical Manipulation." By Edward C. Pickering, Professor of Physics in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Part I. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

these are in many cases very mcagre, and render the book somewhat useless for students without a teacher. What student possessing the necessary apparatus could, from merely reading this book, perform one-half of the experiments described? Yet when we are to learn "physical manipulations," we expect to see them described in detail, so that with sufficient care we may be able to do what has been described. Fewer experiments, and much minuter directions for every one of them, with all precautions necessary—that is what we have a right to expect from a book of this kind, and this expectation Professor Pickering's book does not quite fulfil.

Professor George Forbes,<sup>4</sup> of Glasgow, probably with a view of settling a somewhat useless and unseemly quarrel between Professor Tyndall and the biographers of the late Principal Forbes as to the respective claims of the latter and Canon Rendu as to certain discoveries, has published a translation of Rendu's original memoir, entitled "Théorie des Glaciers de la Savoie," together with supplementary articles by Professors Tait and Ruskin. Rendu's memoir is certainly written in a most fascinating style, and whatever his merits as an original discoverer—merits on which neither Professor Tyndall nor the Scotch philosophers are yet quite competent to judge finally—his mode of calmly and yet enthusiastically stating his conclusions bears the stamp of genius and of a great mind.

Mr. Proctor's<sup>5</sup> new book on the universe and the coming transits is a collection of previously published articles. Those on the universe embody chiefly his well-known views on the distribution of stars in space—which we cannot disprove; while the second part of the book appears to be a collection of Mr. Proctor's contributions to the Monthly Notices of the Astronomical Society on the best method of observing the coming transit of Venus—which we have every desire to recommend as valuable contributions to science. The work is chiefly important on account of the excellent maps and diagrams which accompany it, and from which every one can learn a great deal. The first part of the work can be well mastered by every educated man, but the second part should in our opinion have been preceded by a somewhat popular essay on the whole subject, starting with the very elements of the geometry involved in the transit. In the present form this portion will, we fear, be unintelligible to the majority of Mr. Proctor's admirers.

We have rarely seen a more excellent work on trilinear co-ordinates than this little book by M. Schendel.<sup>6</sup> The work is, besides, thoroughly original. Instead of taking as co-ordinates of the point the three perpendicular distances from the sides of a triangle, he starts with the triangular areas enclosed between point and corners of a triangle as co-ordinates, and obtains at once a novel and more general basis for

<sup>4</sup> "Theory of the Glaciers of Savoy." By M. le Chanoine Rendu. Edited, with Introductory Remarks, by George Forbes, B.A. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>5</sup> "The Universe and the Coming Transits." By Richard A. Proctor. London: Longmans & Co. 1874.

<sup>6</sup> "Elemente der Analytischen Geometrie der Ebene." Von Leopold Schendel. Jena: Costenoble. 1874.

analytical geometry. The duality of point and line is thus made apparent with great completeness, while the conic sections admit by this method of a very uniform and compact mode of investigation. The whole theory of conic sections is treated very originally, and many interesting questions are suggested during the progress of the discussion. The work may be altogether characterized as a most valuable contribution to modern geometry.

A small but most useful work by Dr. Kubel<sup>7</sup> on the various methods of analysing and testing the quality of natural waters, and especially those used for domestic purposes, is extremely welcome at a time when the importance of this particular branch of analytical chemistry is daily more and more recognised. It is well known that the relative merit of the various methods of determining the hardness of water, the quantities of sulphuric and sulphurous acid, ammonia, and organic matter present—that is, the presence of admixtures which originate from drains or sewers, and are either by themselves noxious impurities, or indicate the existence of sources of danger—have been for a long time subjects of controversy and inquiry. The author has therefore done great service by giving not only the various modes of proceeding, but also comparative reviews of the value of each method, as far as regards accuracy of obtained results, simplicity of the required operations, and corresponding limitation of the necessary apparatus and reagents. Methods which, *a priori*, do not fulfil these three conditions of a generally useful method of analytical investigation have been at once rejected by the author, and we cannot blame him for it, although the book is thus wanting in scientific completeness, and places the selective judgment of the author himself above that of every reader. On the other hand, the work has thus gained in brevity, and as it is written for, and may be very readily used by the manufacturer, the physician, and in fact every educated man, who has no great knowledge of scientific chemistry, we may well overlook this shortcoming of the book. The methods are mostly volumetric. These are easily performed, and give at once results quite sufficiently accurate for every general purpose. Nevertheless, the quantitative determinations are described in a great many cases, and where volumetric analysis is not sufficiently simple, the quantitative operations with the balance are the only ones given, as for example in the determination of silicic acid, the alkalies, &c. It is to be regretted that for the detection of lead we can only find qualitative methods, and no quantitative ones whatever. This is in our opinion a serious error, for although the professional chemist may easily refer to other sources of information, it is not so with the particular class of readers for which the book is specially designed. The chemical computations have received clear and satisfactory treatment, and there is also a very excellent chapter on the requirements and properties of wholesome water for drinking. We should very much like to see this little work translated into English with the addition of a small chapter on the quantitative determination of lead, and of manganese if possible.

---

<sup>7</sup> "Anleitung zur Untersuchung von Wasser." Von Dr. Wilhelm Kubel. Braunschweig: Vicweg & Sohn. 1874.

Professor Josiah P. Cooke,<sup>8</sup> of Harvard University, has enriched the "International Scientific Series," by what is in our opinion by far the most valuable and original work which has yet appeared in that series. For several years it has been a constant complaint of even advanced students, but particularly of educated men with scientific tastes, that to obtain clear logical insight into the theories which form the basis of modern chemical research, is a matter of exceeding difficulty. The student has either to work his way through many original writings of Laurent, Gerhardt, Williamson, Wurtz, and others, or he has to take in the "introductions" of various larger textbooks, which are hardly ever clear and complete, and generally presuppose the very knowledge which they teach in the part following the introduction. Professor Cooke has most happily discussed the old and new systems so as to show exactly the transition from one to the other. He does hardly ever assume a single reaction as already known, but he simply describes it, and shows cause, effect, and conclusion in harmonious sequence. The book is a great absolute gain to scientific literature, and will be read with like profit by the student and by the man of ripe chemical knowledge, to whom it presents a complete picture of the present state of chemical theories.

The "Smithsonian Institution" has at various times presented to men of science most valuable and elaborate works of reference. The present one is of extreme importance, and embodies an enormous amount of labour, which Mr. Clarke has accomplished with great fidelity. The tables are printed very clearly, and we have taken the trouble to check a number of data by comparing them with the original publications, without detecting a single error. The uncertainty of scientific determinations strikes one painfully in looking over such a work. Most considerable discrepancies, which cannot be explained by any of the usual shortcomings of experimental work, still exist almost throughout the whole range of facts. As an example, we may refer to the specific gravity of solid mercury; we have for this four determinations, varying in the result between 14.0 and 15.19. For common phosphorus there are eight determinations, varying between 1.77 and 2.09. It is quite similar with a great many other bodies. It would, in our opinion, have been much more convenient for reference if the substances had been arranged alphabetically. Any chemical classification is at present liable to become antiquated at some time or other, and in the present shape of the book we have often first to refer to the alphabetical list at the end, and then again to the tables themselves, before we obtain the desired information. The vast value of the work, whatever little objections may be raised against the arrangement, will appear from the fact, that it contains the names of no less than 2572 distinct bodies; there are given the specific gravities

<sup>8</sup> "The New Chemistry." By Josiah P. Cooke, Professor in Harvard University. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>9</sup> "The Constants of Nature." Part I.: Specific Gravities; Boiling and Melting Points, and Chemical Formula. Compiled by Frank Wigglesworth Clarke, S.B. Washington: Smithsonian Institution. 1873.

of 2263 substances, with over 5000 determinations; further, 2000 determinations of boiling point, representing 1205 different substances, and nearly 500 of melting point, for 326 different substances.

Mr. Perry's<sup>10</sup> preface is not in agreement with the book he has written. He says that it is mainly intended for the use of students who can solve simple equations in algebra, and who know the simple definitions in trigonometry and the simpler facts in physics. We doubt whether such students would derive much advantage from his book, which is replete with formulæ, often without any proof whatever, which even for their mere numerical working by the practical student require certainly more than the "definitions" in trigonometry. The whole has made upon us the impression of a rather hasty putting together of lectures and lecturer's notes. Some parts are quite unnecessarily elementary for such a book—for instance, the examples on the mutual conversion of thermometric readings, on expansion, on calorimetry, &c., while in the most important parts too much is expected from the intelligence of the student, and the teaching is therefore defective.

---

Professors Virchow and von Holtzendorff, of Berlin, are bringing out a long series of popular scientific essays,<sup>11</sup> of which we have just received two. Each paper is separately paged, and may be separately purchased; but regular subscribers gain an advantage in the price. Of those now before us, one (No. 195) is by Professor Perty, and treats of the boundaries of the visible creation according to the present results of microscopic and telescopic research. The author gives a short historical account of the origin of the microscope and telescope, and indicates briefly the results obtained by those instruments in the investigation of the "infinitely small and the infinitely great," devoting, however, the greater part of his space to the latter section of his subject. His final conclusion is that "we do not know overmuch of the world of the small, and only a very little of the macrocosmic world." The second of these essays (No. 197) strikes us as of a more practically useful nature than Prof. Perty's paper—it is a short treatise on the general characteristics and vital phenomena of the Ferns, by Dr. C. Luerssen, of Leipzig. The author gives a good general view of this group of plants, and describes their curious mode of reproduction very clearly.

The "Elemente der Mineralogie" of Dr. Carl Friedrich Naumaun,<sup>12</sup> the first edition of which appeared in 1846, taking the place of a still

<sup>10</sup> "An Elementary Treatise on Steam." By John Perry, B.E. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>11</sup> "Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge." Herausgegeben von R. Virchow und F. von Holtzendorff. Heft 195. "Ueber die Grenzen der sichtbaren Schöpfung, nach den jetzigen Leistungen des Mikroskops und Fernrohre," von Maximilian Perty; and Heft 197. "Die Pflanzengruppe der Farne," von Dr. C. Luerssen. 8vo. Berlin: Carl Habel. 1874.

<sup>12</sup> "Elemente der Mineralogie." Von Dr. Carl Friedrich Naumaun. Neunte, vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. 8vo. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1873-4.

older work by the same author, has, ever since its publication, been the principal text-book for students of mineralogy in Germany. We have now to record the publication of a ninth edition of this valuable book—an edition, the preparation of which must have been almost the final labour of its distinguished author, who died at the close of last year. Of such a book it is hardly necessary to say more than that in this edition the results of the newest investigations have evidently been carefully worked into their proper places. The characteristics of the book which render it peculiarly valuable to German readers are the extreme compendiousness of the special descriptions, which include in a very small space a most complete account of the different species of minerals, and the great fulness of what the author calls the "preparative part" of the work—that, namely, which gives an account of the general phenomena presented by minerals. The section on Crystallography in this part is especially valuable, the author having been perhaps the highest authority in Germany in this department. The book is illustrated with an immense number of woodcuts.

Dr. Oscar Peschel's "Völkerkunde,"<sup>13</sup> is the result, as he tells us in his preface, of an engagement into which he entered some years ago with General von Roon to assist in preparing an edition of the latter's "Völkerkunde als Propädeutik der politischen Geographie." The bad health of Count von Roon having prevented his taking any share in the production of the work, it has been published independently by its author. In an introductory section, Dr. Peschel discusses the general questions of anthropology—the position of man in nature, the unity or multiplicity of the human species, the place of origin of man, and his antiquity. He speaks dogmatically upon none of these points, but indicates very fairly the arguments on various sides; his own opinion seems to be that man is a member of the same order of mammalia as the apes, and that he forms a single species which probably made its first appearance on the surface of a great continent now submerged by the Southern Ocean. The discussion of the nature and origin of species is remarkably good, and the author, while recognising certain defective points in the evidence supporting the Darwinian theory, finally comes to the conclusion that it furnishes the best explanation of the relations of existing to pre-existent organisms. Upon the question of the antiquity of man we find a good summary of the now familiar evidence. This general section must be regarded as a mere introduction to the body of the work, in which the author first discusses at great length the principles of ethnology, and then applies them to the investigation of the various races of man. The former he treats under three heads—those of the bodily characters, the linguistic characters, and the technical, social, and religious developments. It is impossible in our space to analyse the author's views upon these matters, which are discussed under numerous sections, and with a perfect freedom from all prejudices. As a final result of his work the author describes the varieties of mankind, which he arranges under seven "groups, races,

<sup>13</sup> "Völkerkunde." Von Oscar Peschel. 8vo. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1874.

subspecies or species," leaving the reader to choose which term he will adopt. These seven primary groups are as follows:—1. The Australians and Tasmanians; 2. The Papuans of New Guinea, &c.; 3. The Mongolian peoples, including the inhabitants of the Asiatic Continent, the Malayo-Polynesians, and the aborigines of America, and divided into an infinity of subordinate groups which are here described in more or less detail; 4. The Dravida or non-Aryan inhabitants of India; 5. The Hottentots and Bosjesmans; 6. The Negroes; and 7. The Mediterranean, or so called Indo-European peoples.

Professor Gegenbaur's "*Grundriss der vergleichenden Anatomie*"<sup>14</sup> is really a new and somewhat abridged edition of his well-known and admirable "*Grundzüge*," the abridgment being effected by the omission of some details and especially of the greater part of the notes. The general arrangement and treatment of the subject are the same as in the earlier work, the publication of the second edition of which in 1870 was noticed in this Review, but the author has incorporated with his work the more important results of the newer literature. Like its predecessor, the book is abundantly illustrated, and it is certainly the best compendium of comparative anatomy that we possess.

Professor Adolf Fick has brought out a second thoroughly revised edition of his "*Compendium of Human Physiology*."<sup>15</sup> His object in this book is to give a connected picture of the bodily life of man. Commencing with the physiology of the muscles as such, he proceeds to explain their action as a means of moving the bones, and then passing to the nervous system he describes the physiology of nerve-tissue, of the system which it composes, and of the senses. Passing from these animal activities to the vegetative functions, he describes the physiology of the circulatory system and of the connected functions of circulation and secretion, and finally discusses the assimilative processes in connexion with the new formation of blood, and the general effects of the interchange of matter in the organism. The history of reproduction and development is, for some reason, relegated to an appendix. The physiology of the voice is treated of under the head of muscular work. The book, which is illustrated with a considerable number of wood-engravings, furnishes a good readable guide to the knowledge of the general physiology of the human body.

Dr. Pettigrew, in his "*Physiology of the Circulation*,"<sup>16</sup> treats only of a small section of the science, but he describes the phenomena as presented in vertebrate animals in considerable detail, dwelling to a great extent upon the mechanism by which circulation is effected. As regards the lower invertebrate animals his statements are rather confused. With regard to the identity between the circulation in

<sup>14</sup> "*Grundriss der vergleichenden Anatomie*." Von Carl Gegenbaur. 8vo. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1874.

<sup>15</sup> "*Compendium der Physiologie des Menschen, mit Einschluss der Entwicklungsgeschichte*." Von Dr. Adolf Fick. Zweite gänglich neu bearbeitete Auflage. 8vo. Vienna: Braumüller. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "*The Physiology of the Circulation in Plants, in the Lower Animals and in Man*." By J. Bell Pettigrew, M.D., &c. 8vo. London: Macmillan. 1874.

plants and animals, which it would appear to be the chief object of the book to establish, we do not think that the author by any means succeeds in making out his case.

Under the title of "Organologische Studien," Professor Leopold Auerbach, of Breslau,<sup>17</sup> has commenced the publication of a series of physiological memoirs. The first number of this work now before us contains the first and second sections of an elaborate investigation of the characters and vital history of the cell-nuclei of animal tissues. The first section is devoted to the consideration of the structure of nuclei in the natural state and under the influence of various reagents; the second treats of the formation and increase of the nucleoli. The author adopts and argues strongly in favour of the endogenous theory of cell-formation, regarding the nucleoli as true daughter-cells, and even apparently as elementary organisms. In opposition to generally received opinions, he maintains that cell-nuclei generally contain many nucleoli (sometimes more than 100), although occasionally young embryonal cells may be found in which the nucleus is "enucleolar." In his view, as we understand it, the nucleolus is the most important element in cell-multiplication.

---

We took up these small volumes<sup>18</sup> with an indifference tempered only by the name of the editor, a name which is in itself a guarantee against commonplace or ill done work. There did not seem to us to be much room for a small book on physiology as currently known; original physiological work is always going on and is always more than welcome, but popular handbooks are numerous enough, and several of them are written so well as to need no successors for the present. But when we come to look into the work before us we find that it differs somewhat from books like Lewes' "Physiology of Common Life" in that it is hortatory rather than descriptive; and being, as we see it is, the work of different hands, we might describe it as a collection of Sermons on Physiology. The various preachers lay down a groundwork of scientific instruction, and then draw wholesome counsel from this and exhort us to beware of physiological sins and follies. The Essays or Sermons are very various in merit, and while none of them come up to the highest level, some remind us in point of knowledge and perspicacity of their prototypes of the pulpit. The intention of the book is good, and its results cannot be without value, if not always as fresh and as pointed as may be. We could wish that there was a little less disposition to twaddle—that is, to repeat current ideas in half-considered words. For instance, the common statement is repeated, that "Unfortunately an absurd belief prevails that night air is dangerous." Now "dangerous" is perhaps a strong word; but we do not hesitate to say that night air, especially in the damper climates, is very liable to cause pulmonary irritation in persons thereto

<sup>17</sup> "Organologische Studien." Von Dr. Leopold Auerbach. Erstes Heft. 8vo. Breslau: Morgenstern. 1874.

<sup>18</sup> "Physiology for Practical Use." Edited by James Hinton. London. 1874.  
[Vol. CII. No. CCI.]-NEW SERIES, Vol. XLVI. No. I. S



disposed, and that much circumspection should be used in permitting the windows of bedrooms to remain open at night. The chapter on the use of the bath, on the other hand, is written more thoughtfully, and warns the reader against the indiscriminate cold tubbing which is often depressing or exhausting even to strong persons who lead the sedentary life of citizens. On the whole, though these *Essays* have no great distinction of thought or style, yet they are intelligently and adequately written, and we hope they will prove useful to those for whom they are designed.

Mr. Hinton's Introductory Lecture at Guy's Hospital<sup>19</sup> is very properly issued in its present form, as the address is one which, having great merits, has merits of a kind which are least adapted for oral exposition. Unless the audience at Guy's Hospital is a very exceptional gathering, Mr. Hinton's abstruse utterances would win a hearing rather on account of the respect due to a speaker of known ability than on account of the matter which he delivered. Very little, indeed, can the ordinary Guy's man have taken into his mind of the words as they fell from the speaker's lips, but many of the more thoughtful of his hearers have read them, no doubt, with interest by their own firesides. Indeed, as a certain imposing vagueness appeals to the open and generous brains of young men, it may be that Mr. Hinton's address has excited intense interest among the members of his own society. Nor can this little book fail to make its way to a larger and more critical public, for its chapters are concerned with great matters, and are conceived in a broad and imaginative spirit. The first part of the discourse is devoted to a consideration of the place of the physician, the second part offers for acceptance a particular law, deduced from the observed facts of progress in society and in the individual, which we cannot now discuss, and the third and last part is a discussion of the relation between the inorganic and the organic worlds. These subjects are handled by a man of high education and of a certain degree of imaginative power, but they are scarcely set forth by the hand of a master. There is a kind of mysticism in the manner of the writer too, which is not wholly different from magniloquence, and which makes us ask ourselves from time to time whether anything is really being added to our conceptions, or whether we are not receiving old things in new parcels. Be this as it may, writers of real speculative power are not common enough to be treated lightly, and we welcome Mr. Hinton's address for its many fine thoughts, for its comprehensive and scientific conceptions, and above all for its really high tone and style which, even if it be at times a little overstrained, is always high-minded and fastidious in purpose.

A book which should give wholesome counsel to persons of advanced years who, while not ill enough to submit to medical rule, are nevertheless liable to many little ailments which tend alone or together to diminish the sum of their days would be of real value. Dr. Gardner's attempt<sup>20</sup> is in the right direction, but it is so imperfect that we can

<sup>19</sup> "The Place of the Physician." By James Hinton. London. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> "Longevity." By John Gardner, M.D. London. 1874.

scarcely welcome it with more than bare courtesy. It is not an intruder, but we do not anticipate much from its company. Dr. Gardner is the author of a work on "Domestic Medicine;" we are not familiar with the individual book, but the genus we know well, and there is a strong likeness to that genus in the volume before us. The reader will find in all alike a few shrewd and really useful hints, chiefly in the way of homely receipts the importance of which, however, is somewhat exaggerated; we find in them also a sublime faith in certain drugs which do not command so exclusive an attention from the profession at large, and we also find in them a great deal of very doubtful physiology, and warmed up fragments from the more antiquated standard authorities on medicine. Such is Dr. Gardner's present publication, and we are not prepared to say that it is wholly bad. Unfortunately, writers of this calibre are very fond of airing their scientific knowledge, or rather are very fond of declaiming their quasi-scientific prejudices, and in this particular again Dr. Gardner keeps true to the class to which he belongs. He is very angry with those unhappy men who cannot see that Life with a capital L, is something far higher and better than "its mere material envelope." He can comfort the doubting too by the following assurance on p.150. "Before the flood men are said to have lived five, and even nine hundred years; and as a physiologist, I can assert positively, that there is no fact reached by science to contradict or render this improbable."

Mr. Maclaren of Oxford is known as a successful trainer and gymnast wherever training and gymnastics are known. The first edition of his treatise on the subject<sup>21</sup> was received with the favour which it so well deserved, and the appearance of this second and enlarged edition will, we trust, give a new impetus to the scientific treatment of the physical man, and a further discredit to the foolish and even brutal customs which so long have held their ground among trainers, in defiance even of common sense. If Mr. Maclaren's physiology leaves something to be desired in the matter of accuracy, yet it is mainly sound, and the mistakes we discover are scarcely such as to interfere materially with the rules which experience will justify. One of the best features in the book is the estimate of the comparative values of different kinds of exercise, and the author very properly condemns the fashion of exclusive devotion to one form of exercise to the neglect of others. For instance, Mr. Maclaren has often observed that in boating men the chest, so far from increasing, has positively diminished during the ordinary course of training for the oar, and he draws from this and other facts that to gain the highest advantage in this as in other sports the body must be trained all round on a well-reasoned plan, so that no parts are developed at the expense or to the neglect of others. It would be difficult to improve on this little book, which is written in a sensible tone and with a wholesome defiance of time-honoured prejudices which cannot be too highly commended.

---

<sup>21</sup> "Training in Theory and Practice." By A. Maclaren. Second Edition London. 1874.

This little book<sup>22</sup> consists of two lectures delivered by the author to an audience not specified. In them he treats of the chief facts relating to health from a popular point of view. It may be that the more people are pelted with sanitary tracts the better is the chance that they may take some notice of the subject. On no other ground can we see any reason for the multiplication of pamphlets like the present, which have not always the negative merit of accuracy in detail. We do not find any grave mistakes in Dr. Stocker's lectures, nor on the other hand anything which could be of the smallest use to an educated reader.

This is a gossiping book,<sup>23</sup> written by one of those rather whimsical beings who think that no truth has much force unless some great man has stood sponsor to it. We have every authority for the varied and somewhat incoherent statements in these few pages, ranging from Hippocrates and Ovid down to "a learned authority in Switzerland." Every page bristles with quotations from writers whose names appear in capital letters, and we are astonished to find that we have distinguished persons to help us to a belief in the most trivial as well as in the profoundest of maxims. Dr. Budgett thinks "life is a mystery;" Ovid, it appears, agrees in this striking sentiment; Dr. Watts, moreover, tells us how to improve its few but shining hours. Other eminent persons think a complete bath should be taken "at least once a month," and in the same paragraph it is said to be "sound philosophy" to attach a physician to a school and to pay him regularly,—so we presume that a great part of his duties will be to see that the young ladies do not hurt their constitutions by injudicious tubbing. In the course of his large experience the author seems to have noticed that "there are some so naturally constructed that there is a great development of the intellect, or the contrary;" and the same thing seems to have been more or less explicitly acknowledged by no less men than Dr. Johnson, Lavater, Voltaire and Rousseau. Dr. Budgett has a happy knack of unexpectedly combining the most unlike ideas, which of course is wit, as we have often heard on the best authority. Dr. Budgett is therefore a very witty writer. What he must be in private conversation we can scarcely imagine, for, to use his own quotation, "Colonel Oudet eloquently wrote, 'That human thought loses all that it has divine when it is imprisoned in a quill and drowned in an inkstand!'" What must Dr. Budgett's thought be when freed from such bondage?

We so recently expressed our high opinion of Dr. Maudsley's writings<sup>24</sup> that we need not now repeat it. Dr. Maudsley has done more perhaps than any living man to bring Mind and its diseases into the light of modern scientific thought. In his present work the author has touched upon more delicate ground—namely, upon the relations of insane persons to law—and he has written on the whole a very fair book upon a difficult and hotly contested subject. Lawyers and doctors

<sup>22</sup> "Hints for Health." By J. S. Stocker, M.D. London. 1874.

<sup>23</sup> "The Hygiene of Schools." By J. B. Budgett, M.D. London. 1874.

<sup>24</sup> "Responsibility in Mental Disease." By H. Maudsley, M.D. London. 1874.

have been almost open enemies upon this subject; each camp has fought over the body of the lunatic, and each party has often been extravagantly wide of justice in its assertions and in its demands. If in this *Review* we have for the most part seemed to side with the lawyer rather than with the physician in the matter, we have done so, not because the lawyer has more abstract reason on his side, but because in our opinion a certain rude legality is at the present time less dangerous to society than the irregular sentiment of doctrinaires. If a Lord Chancellor condemned "not long ago 'the evil habit which had grown up of assuming that insanity is a physical disease,'" this Lord Chancellor must have been a very ignorant person; very ignorant, that is, of that degree of modern scientific psychology which has of late become the property of almost every well-educated man. On the other hand, the great bulk of alienists who fearlessly propose to place every insane person, as such, out of fear of law, are equally in error, for they lose sight of quite as much of the other side of the question. Disease of the brain, in itself, is no more a passport to immunity than is Bright's disease, unless it can be shown that such cerebral disease had certain special results in a given case. It must surely be the duty of a physician in all such cases to ascertain whether his patient's state is one which was at a particular time susceptible to the ordinary influence of the laws of his country or not, and if so then in what degree. It is the physician's business to give such evidence to this point as may be comprehensible to a jury, and not to act as if his own diagnosis of unsound mind were equivalent to an acquittal. Yet this latter is the line which is far too often taken by the medical expert. We are not sure that even Dr. Maudsley is always fully aware of the true relation of the medical expert to the Court, which, as we may say once more, is not that of an umpire but of a witness whose duty it is to state clearly certain facts which his training enables him best to observe and to set forth; these facts of course must take their place with the rest of the evidence, and like the rest submit to the ruling of the Court and to the ordinary measures of probability. At the same time we admit that Dr. Maudsley can not only offer an opinion which commands the highest respect, but his whole tone of mind and his calm impartiality make error in him far less likely than in most other writers on lunacy. His present volume is indispensable to the lawyer as well as to the physician, and it will keep up the high character of the *International series*.

Dr. Cunningham's volume,<sup>25</sup> which is published as a thin folio to receive illustrations, contains the results of observations on the nature of the particles present in the atmosphere of Calcutta and the neighbourhood. It contains also a summary of the literature of atmospheric micrography. The author's observations must not be despised because his results are chiefly negative. The work was needed, and it seems to have been carried out with very creditable industry and care. The illustrations are numerous and well executed.

Whatever be Dr. Blanc's power as a speculative thinker, we cannot

---

<sup>25</sup> "Microscopic Examinations of Air." By D. D. Cunningham, M.B., n.d.

but be glad that one who has enjoyed such exceptional advantages for seeing the actual side of cholera should be disposed to give us some "practical notes"<sup>26</sup> and to "avoid all theories and hypotheses." Cholera, in Dr. Blanc's experience, has always appeared as something local and specific, and communicated from man to man, generally by means of drinking water, and not dependent on more general telluric or atmospheric movements. In support of this opinion Dr. Blanc relates certain facts within his own observation which strongly uphold such a view. On the other hand he shows that, so far as could be ascertained, no constancy whatever has been noticed in the wider cosmical changes which accompanied the various epidemics. If this be so, the prophylaxis of cholera should offer no great difficulties, and Dr. Blanc ventures to assert, and no man has a better right to make an assertion on this subject, that "few epidemics can be so easily warded off as those of cholera, if only we set earnestly to work to do so." As regards medicines, Dr. Blanc expresses himself most strongly against purgatives, for "their action is very liable to be followed by rice water stools and collapse," "whilst during the previous stage of diarrhoea few medicines are found more beneficial than opiates and anodynes." Dr. Blanc would endeavour to neutralize the poison in the intestines by the internal administration of chloralum. He seems, however, to have had no experience of this latter medication which is deserving of the name. Dr. Blanc's book is small but well worth reading.

The discovery and the tracing out of the nervous affections, which are now known to owe their origin to syphilis, are among the most honourable achievements of modern medicine. Not only, too, have modern physicians thus proved their clinical acumen, but in this instance they can boast of a corresponding therapeutical triumph. But too often the detection of obscure diseases and the interpretation of their inmost ways are but a revelation of the impotence of our art. With our growing knowledge of syphilitic nervous diseases, however, we have gained the power of curing some of the most distressing and fatal ills to which the body is heir. Although English observers have not been behind those of other nations in this branch of their study, yet it so happened that in England there existed no manual specially devoted to the subject. The observations of Reid, Wilks, Jackson, Allbutt, Moxon and many others, lay scattered in the files of many journals, and Dr. Buzzard<sup>27</sup> has done a good service in bringing this matter together, in enriching it with the farther results of foreign study, and in enlarging and controlling the whole by extensive personal investigation. The thirty-seven cases taken from his own practice, are very judiciously selected and very fortunately obtained; it is not every man who is in a position to produce an apposite instance of almost every variety of the disease. Dr. Buzzard not merely discusses for instance the insanities which belong to syphilis, but he has cases of his own to illustrate them; so again with respect to ophthalmic

---

<sup>26</sup> "Cholera: How to Avoid and Treat It." By H. Blanc, M.D. London. 1873.

<sup>27</sup> "Syphilitic Nervous Affections." By Thomas Buzzard, M.D. London. 1874.

reference to mechanical injuries as the occasional exciting causes of syphilitic disease of the brain or spine, as has been asserted by Dr. Clifford Allbutt. A few cases are not sufficient to prove so important an assertion, and we should have been glad to learn whether Dr. Buzzard had met with any experience of the kind. We hope that Dr. Buzzard will be called upon for a new edition of this excellent and unpretending little book. Its price is within the means of every one, and no one can afford to neglect the reading of it.

Dr. Külz's "Lectures on Diabetes"<sup>28</sup> follow very seasonably upon the work of Seegen which we lately noticed in this *Review*. Among other valuable researches Dr. Külz has laboriously investigated the action of Karlsbad water upon the disease, and has presented us with some materials which are worked out with the accuracy without which all talk about diabetes is vain. It is worse than vain for physicians to discourse upon the virtues of this, that and the other remedy in diabetes without minute daily analyses, and without the utmost caution in the discrimination of cases and in the regulation of conditions. Dr. Külz satisfies the most rigorous requirements in this respect, and we therefore accept his conclusions with some confidence. At the outset of his volume the author presents to us the careful records of the cases upon which his researches were made, and he distinguishes broadly between the mild and the severe kinds of the malady. One or two cases he describes as being of a "Mischform." In some cases autopsies were obtained, but with no important results. He agrees with other German observers and some English ones in withholding assent to Dickenson's belief in the constant occurrence of abnormal (perivascular) spaces in the central nervous organs. The second chapter is devoted to an impartial inquiry into the grounds of the great reputation which the Karlsbad waters have enjoyed as a cure for diabetes since they were recommended by Hufeland. The investigation is conducted upon one case only, but it is carried out with a thoroughness which gives it great value. We have not space to enter into detail, but we may say briefly that Dr. Külz thinks that the Karlsbad physicians have two factors at work in their cure—diet and the water—and he thinks that they can make no statements about the effects of the latter until they have thoroughly estimated the effects of the former alone. The third chapter deals with the observed effects of other reputed remedies, such as bicarbonate of soda, bromide of potassium and Fowler's solution of arsenic. From bicarbonate of soda in doses of one drachm to half an ounce daily, Külz says that decided benefit was obtained, but nothing like a cure; from bromides he gained nothing, nor did arsenic do much more. The chapter on the effects of sundry hydrocarbons separately investigated is of much interest and importance. Perhaps the fact of greatest interest to the diabetic is that inosite in the guise of young green beans

---

<sup>28</sup> "Beiträge z. Diabetes Mellitus." Von E. Külz, M.D. Marburg. 1874.

may be added to their scanty diet without fear of consequences. In the fourth chapter Dr. Külz gives the results of his inquiries into the effects of exercise as seen in his patients. In accordance with Dr. Brunton and other eminent authorities, he pronounces that exercise has certainly a most beneficial effect, and determines that the good is due to the muscular activity, and not only to increased rapidity of breathing. We have said enough to show that this small treatise is not only indispensable to all earnest workers on the subject, but in its minuteness and thoroughness is a good lesson to those who on scanty and imperfect observations attempt to foist remedies upon the public which have no real claim to consideration. We are glad to observe that Dr. Külz will publish some further results at a future time.

---

### HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

PROFESSOR STUBBS' first volume of the "Constitutional History of England" is, we think, the best book that has reach us this quarter. It is unpretentious, and is issued as one of the Clarendon Press series, a series that has given to the world some good books and some exceedingly bad ones. It has given us "Veitch's Greek Verbs," "Brachet's Historical French Grammar," but it is also responsible for such books as Mr. Lee Warner's "Livy," and Mr. Simcox's "Juvenal." It is, indeed, a series which furnishes no guarantee for excellence. It is almost a pity that Professor Stubbs has allowed his valuable work to appear in such company; but the Clarendon Press series has one good guarantee, a guarantee against bad printing. Professor Stubbs, however, stands higher than most of those who adorn the list of Clarendon Press editors, and his book will win its own way. Constitutional history must necessarily be less attractive to the general reader than most of the matter which passes under the name of history. Mr. Stubbs has well said that constitutional history reads "the exploits and characters of men by a different light from that shed by the false glare of arms, and interprets positions and facts in words that are voiceless to those who only listen to the trumpet of fame." The slow and secular growth of institutions does not allow of the personal interest which attaches to the brilliant career of an individual. The student of constitutional history cannot permit himself to be recreated by those pleasant details of character which awake or sustain the interest of the general student of history. He moves in a higher atmosphere. On such students Professor Stubbs has conferred a real benefit by the publication of this first volume of his history. Of how many volumes the work is to consist we are not told, but those who have mastered the first, will be impatient for the second. This first volume brings the

<sup>1</sup> "The Constitutional History of England in its Origin and Development." By William Stubbs, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

history down to the end of the twelfth century. In a brief introductory chapter, Mr. Stubbs proves the fact that the German element is the paternal element of the English polity, and upon this basis the rest of his work is founded. The Celtic element, Mr. Stubbs practically eliminates, and passes on with a celerity, which scarcely convinces us of his thoroughness on this point, to the Anglo-Saxon system. In this he is more at home, and his chapter upon the allotment and division of land is better than anything that has preceded it, except the introduction. Mr. Stubbs does not consider that the Danish influence is this country was of great permanent influence. In this matter, he may, perhaps, not be quite right; but his chapters on the Norman Conquest are extremely valuable—the last one in the book being especially so. Here the constitutional history is traced down to the signing of Magna Charta (or “Carta,” as Mr. Stubbs prefers to call it). This is a starting-point with which a new volume may well commence. Mr. Stubbs’ book neither attracts nor repels the ordinary reader, and that is saying much. The subject can scarcely be adorned with the tropes and literary decorations of ordinary history, but it is one which itself lends dignity to the historian—in other words, it is a subject whereof, if the writer is not very dull, he is very successful. Mr. Stubbs is not very dull, and he is very learned. The book can be read, though we do not think it will be, by those who are not specialists, but to the student in the history-school at Oxford, for whose use it is probably designed, it will be indispensable. Unfortunately, the history-school is not much crowded, but the present book is so good that we wish it a public larger than that which ordinarily calls for the well-printed books of the Clarendon Press.

Two new volumes complete Mr. Froude’s account of that saddest episode in our history which is connected with Ireland.<sup>2</sup> It is gloomy, but fascinating reading, and is an episode not to the credit of either England or Ireland. Mr. Froude deals with both English and Irish in a spirit of historical impartiality; perhaps he metes out more blame to the English. The second volume begins with the year 1767 and Lord Townshend’s administration. This was indeed a dismal time. Mr. Froude shows how the old Irish parties, stirred by the American Declaration and the French Revolution, took fresh names and retained old vices; he traces with effect the growth of the delusive belief, which has never entirely left the Irish, that if once they were released from English influence, and had an Irish parliament assembled, they would be an united and glorious people, untouched by religious and political animosities. The means, however, which were taken for the realization of this dream, the history of the Society of United Irishmen under Wolfe Tone, the gradual sinking of the revolutionary party into impotent anarchy, and the internecine enmity of the Catholics and Protestants, fill up the pages of a dreary record. It is a gloomy and sickening record, in spite of Mr. Froude’s artistic skill and mastery of literary material. No one can read even a few pages

<sup>2</sup> “The English in Ireland.” By James Anthony Froude. London: Longmans & Co. Vols. II. and III.



without becoming at least a sadder man. It would have been less dismal if it had been written by a partizan of one side or the other, if it had been touched by some little colouring of belief, or enthusiasm, or love; but it is brightened by none of these. Mr. Froude, like a passionless recording writer, unfolds the wretched programme of misery, ignorance, brutality, and injustice, and leaves his readers to draw appropriate inference. So sad a story in anything but Mr. Froude's faultless style would be intolerable. In that, too, it is intolerable, and calls for earnest attention. We trust that even a Government whose first minister attributes every misery of Ireland to its contiguity to "a melancholy ocean," may learn something from these accusing, damnatory chapters.

An inferior work,<sup>3</sup> upon a somewhat kindred subject, is pleasanter reading. Mr. Burns gives us the history of the Scottish War of Independence. "Every thinking mind," he says, "should be open to consider the question, what would have been the state of matters had Scotland become a second Ireland?" Happily this has not been the case. Mr. Burns quarrels with English historians who have touched upon Scotch, or, as he prefers to call it, "Scottish" subjects, and is very keen in detecting "Anglo-Saxonism" even in native writers, but he adds that some of the warmest tributes to Wallace's memory are from English writers. It is therefore rather difficult to understand his grievance. He has one, however; and being fired by the movement for the erection of a national monument to the memory of the Scottish hero, William Wallace, he has written a wordy, but not uninteresting history of the War of Independence. The book, in truth, needs compression. Scotch writers must learn the lesson that Scotland is only one valuable, but fragmentary part of a great empire. She has, wisely for herself and happily for us, not played the part of Ireland, and to insist now upon national dignity is to sink to a low level of provincialism, which is unworthy of a great and admirable section of the British Empire. Mr. Burns, however, expends four hundred of his pages before he brings his hero Wallace upon the stage. After this the history marches along fairly enough; the story of Bannockburn is well told; and, after all, it is not difficult to forgive a Scot for that tinge of vainglory which is inseparable from provincialism, perhaps from patriotism. But there can be no question now-a-days that a historian must be, like Mr. Froude, above provincialism, if he is to reach a rank of consideration. To search in London journals for remarks depreciatory of Scotland, and to treasure such remarks as an insult, betokens a spirit which is unworthy of a historian, and which renders even his narrative suspicious. Mr. Burns' style is easy and unaffected. We only wish that he would remember that the glory of Scotland is the glory of England, that the interests of both countries are inseparable, and that no great name stirs a Scotch (we beg his pardon, a Scottish) heart which has not equal influence in the south; and when he issues the next edition of his work, we would beg of him

---

<sup>3</sup> "The Scottish War of Independence, its Antecedents and Effects." By William Burns. Two vols. Glasgow: James Maclehose.

to omit his references to the "Anglo-Saxon" theory, and to compress the book into one volume, and we venture to predict that it will meet with admiring readers amongst those whose ethnical connexion with himself Mr. Burns is most anxious to disprove.

Lord Cockburn's journal<sup>4</sup> belongs to a very interesting class of books, and is an interesting specimen of the class. Lord Cockburn wrote an unbroken narrative of contemporary events to the close of the year 1830, which was published in 1856. After that period he went on recording circumstances as they occurred, but often at large intervals. "This habit," he says, "of making a note of things worth observing at the time coincided with the change of life implied in my becoming Solicitor-General." It is fortunate that Lord Cockburn continued this habit, for the result to us is the present work, which is extremely readable. The first volume commences with the Reform Bill. Lord Cockburn was in personal intercourse with the Cabinet Ministers, and in constant communication with Lord John Russell, and says that he was much struck with the acuteness, brevity, and clearness of the Cabinet. When the Bill was passed he says of Scotland: "It is impossible to exaggerate the ecstasy; we are indeed to be brought out of the house of bondage, out of the land of Egypt." But we cannot go through these two volumes in detail. The first closes with 1843, and is full of interesting anecdotes and subjects of contemporary interest. On May 16th, 1836, there was an eclipse of the sun. Dr. Chalmers postponed his service that his congregation might see it. Lord Cockburn witnessed the obscuration, and was much interested. He is pleased with Lockhart's "Life of Scott;" he has a vivid remembrance of Scott himself. "I see him in the Court, and on the street, in company, and by the Tweed. The plain dress, the guttural burred voice, the lame walk, the thoughtful heavy face, with its mantling smile, the honest hearty manner, the joyous laugh, the sing-song, feeling recitation, the graphic story—they are all before me a hundred times a day." The second volume records events from 1843 to 1854. The subjects generally treated of are of local Scotch interest. Lord Cockburn has a high opinion of Thomas Guthrie, whose biography we noticed last quarter. He is throughout a Scotchman, everything Scotch interests him from the death of a Scotch physician in London (vol. ii. p. 201) to the vagaries of Glasgow students at home (p. 231). Of course he is enchanted with Sir A. Alison's "History of Europe," though he admits that that important work is occasionally "heavily copious." The two volumes are of considerable importance to those who concern themselves with Scotch feeling upon public events during the later part of the first half of this century, and any one who cares to know the opinion of a cultivated contemporary upon political matters during that period could not find it better or more pleasingly set out than in Lord Cockburn's Journal.

The life of Queen Louisa of Prussia<sup>5</sup> has been written by Miss (?)

<sup>4</sup> "Journal of Henry Cockburn." Being a Continuation of the Memorials of Hi Time, 1831-54. Two vols. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas.

<sup>5</sup> "The Life and Times of Louisa Queen of Prussia." By Elizabeth Harriot Hudson. Two vols. W. Isbister & Co.

Hudson. Our authoress writes with enthusiasm, but her book wants compression, and it is difficult to draw from her wordy episodes a clear consistent idea of the Queen. Yet the benevolent and gentle disposition of the Queen is apparent. Briefly her history is this: She was born in 1776 at Hanover, and lost her mother at an early period of her life. Owing to the French Revolution she retired with her sister to Heldburghausen where she remained till 1793. In Frankfort she met the Crown Prince of Prussia, to whom she was married in 1793. In 1795 she became the mother of the Crown Prince, Frederick William, and two years later became the Queen of Prussia. As Queen of Prussia she won unbounded popularity by her kindness, gentleness, and her care for her people. After the Battle of Jena she went to Königsberg. She sickened at her father's castle Hohenzieritz, and died in 1810. The national grief was great, and her memory is preserved by several institutions in Berlin which bear her name. Such is the story into which the authoress has woven a great deal of German history. The book is disproportionate both to its subject and the literary power of the authoress, but for readers who have unbounded time, and considerable German enthusiasm, the perusal may repay the labour which must be given to it. Otherwise it is scarcely *tanti* at this time to hold up to excessive admiration a Queen who did little more than her duty, and who possessed in a high rank virtues which are commonplace enough in a lower.

Mr. Hosack's defence of another queen,<sup>6</sup> Mary Queen of Scots, has reached a second edition. We have not much to say of it. It probably puts all that can be said in her favour as forcibly as it can be put. Unless the reader shares, for private reasons, Mr. Hosack's convictions, the book will not convert him. We know the character of the Scottish Queen; and though Mr. Hosack is eloquent and laborious, his work will not to any considerable extent affect English opinion, so long as Mr. Froude remains upon the other side. But the book is very elegant, and has fac-similes from the Bodleian library of two sonnets—if they may so be called—written by the Scottish Queen. Mr. Hosack finds comfort in the thought that, with all her faults, this beautiful, detestable lady was true to her religion. We will not grudge him this consolation, but will merely add—so much the worse for the religion.

The present *Life of Lord Strafford*<sup>7</sup> is a good one. The lady who has written it has a dignified and powerful style, and must win the credit of having written the best biography of a life well deserving such a memorial. She has given us a series of vivid pictures which have cost her much research, and which are full of valuable information. The book, too, is good from an artistic point of view, and advances to the last catastrophe with the sweeping dignity of a classic tragedy. It includes, also, touches of domestic detail which do not

<sup>6</sup> "Mary Queen of Scots, and her Accusers." By John Hosack. Vol. II. W. Blackwood and Sons.

<sup>7</sup> "The Life of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford." By Elizabeth Cooper. Two vols. London: Tinsley Brothers.

detract from its dignity, and which waken or intensify the reader's sympathy.

Mr. Morris's story of the French Revolution<sup>8</sup> fills up a real gap in the ordinary history of European events. There are many histories of the French Revolution, told from many points of view, and of different degrees of excellence. Mr. Carlyle's is possibly the best, but it is a large work; and Mr. Carlyle's style, and Mr. Carlyle's personality, which is never absent from his best books, are factors of his history which are not pleasing to all readers. It requires a special education to become an enthusiast for Mr. Carlyle's style; and unless one be an enthusiast for that style, his books are hard reading. Moreover such enthusiasts are becoming more rare, though those who wish to have a concise and trustworthy knowledge of the French Revolution are not decreasing in number. Possibly, as we have said, Mr. Carlyle's book is the best; indeed, probably it is; but the English students of history who wish to read about the French Revolution in a clear, simple, trustworthy volume, will value Mr. Morris's unpretending book. With such knowledge as they can acquire from him, they will be able to approach the works of Mr. Carlyle with a greater likelihood of enjoying his astringent writings.

Count de Montalembert's "Letters to a Schoolfellow"<sup>9</sup> have been circulating throughout France for more than a year. They are certainly very wonderful letters to be written by a schoolboy, and reveal a depth of feeling and a power of language which one does not ordinarily associate with a boy in his teens. At the age of seventeen he writes of "Romeo and Juliet"—"How simple, how true to nature; and, at the same time, what sublimity in the ideas! What an abundance of admirable simplicity! How far does this tragedy rise above the masterpieces of our own stage!" The friend to whom Montalembert writes is the yet surviving M. Cornudet, whose letters must have been equally worth publishing, if we may judge from the enthusiasm which they awaken in Montalembert. Such publication his modesty forbids. Some people will remember that M. Cornudet was the man who boldly declared the injustice of the measure, urged by Napoleon III., to oblige the Orleans family to sell their property in France. For this declaration M. Cornudet was dismissed from the Imperial Council. We are, however, more concerned with the letters before us. They are fervent, clever, and affectionate; and, if they have not been tampered with, as we have not the slightest reason to believe they have been, they are indeed a remarkable instance of precocious ability. At the age of eighteen Montalembert met at Killarney the Irish agitator O'Connell. Later in life he did full justice to that patriot, but his first impressions were not favourable. He says (p. 259):—

"Out it must come—I was utterly disappointed. He is but a demagogue,

---

<sup>8</sup> "The French Revolution and First Empire." By W. O'Connor Morris, *Oriel College, Oxford*. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

<sup>9</sup> "Count de Montalembert's Letters to a Schoolfellow, 1827-30." Translated by C. F. Audley. London: Burns and Oates.

and by no means a great orator. He is declamatory, inflated, full of bombast; his arguments are loosely strung together; his fancy is devoid of any charm of freshness; his style harsh, rough and droppy, as it were. The more I see of him, the more I hear him, the more I am confirmed in my first opinion—to wit he is not stamped with the mark of genius or true greatness. But he defends the finest of all causes.”

These are hard words, and are not corroborated by later convictions, but they are extraordinary words from a boy's pen. The whole book is full of such surprises, but we should like to know with what feelings it would be read by boys of our public schools. We venture to say that very few of them will be induced to read it at all, and that two-thirds of those who do will not understand it, and the remaining third will not care for it. And upon the whole we are not displeased that it should be so.

Professor Burrows' history of All Souls' College, Oxford,<sup>10</sup> will be interesting to the members of that college, and perhaps to other students of history. He traces its fortunes from its foundation by Archbishop Chichele down to the present time, through the vicissitudes of the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Revolution. With such an eventful period to treat of, and copious libraries at hand, it was not difficult for Professor Burrows to make a book. The importance of the work, however—if it has any—is due to the fact that many of the sources of his information lie unpublished in All Souls' Library, and in the Bodleian, and that it is well to have such documents brought together and made accessible. But Professor Burrows does not seem to have made the best possible book with his materials. With the names of Laud, Wood, Tillotson, Jeremy Taylor, and Wren to adorn his pages, he might have written a book which would be willingly read beyond the college walls. We doubt if he has done this. One good service he has certainly accomplished for his college; he has disposed of the malicious anecdote which used to assert, that by the statutes of All Souls the fellows of that Society were to be "*bene nati, bene vestiti, et mediocriter docti.*" Chichele's statutes contain no such clause. The only authority for "*bene nati*" is "*de legitimo matrimonio nati.*" The words "*bene vestiti*" are not found at all, and for the words "*mediocriter docti*" there is no authority. The expression is, "*grammatica sufficienter, et in plano cantu competenter eruditi,*" a standard of learning which, though low enough, is not quite so bad as that which popular belief has substituted for it.

The ethnological history of the British people by Dr. Nicholas<sup>11</sup> has reached a fourth edition, and is not unworthy of the popularity it has achieved. It is true that Dr. Nicholas believes the Celtic element to prevail more largely in the national composition than do most historians; but he brings a weight of learned argument to support his theory. The argument is fivefold, and consists of the historical and

<sup>10</sup> "Worthies of All Souls." Four Centuries of English History, illustrated from the College Archives. By Montague Burrows, Chichele Professor of Modern History, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co.

<sup>11</sup> "The Pedigree of the English People." By Thomas Nicholas, M.A., Ph.D., F.G.S. Fourth Edition. London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Co.

philological evidence, the evidence from topographical names, from the development of law, and from physical characteristics of the people. Dr. Nicholas makes most use of the philological argument, and he uses it well; his remarks upon the names of places are also good. From the wide admixture of Saxon and Celtic names he infers that they testify not only to the *previous* occupation of the island by the British, but to its *conjoint* occupation for a great length of time. Dr. Nicholas asserts that the name "Jones" is now more prevalent than "Brown" or "Robinson," and is closely followed by the "Scotts" and "Murphys," and only eclipsed by "Smith." If this be so, it is a fact which fits in with his theory—that the Celtic race have had a greater share in forming the British character than one ordinarily remembers. Dr. Nicholas is, however, an enthusiast; he sees Welsh faces under English hats. "Look the English in the face," he says, with amiable eagerness; "scan their features, *measure their skulls*" (and he gives some drawings of skulls), "watch the rapid and profound operations of their minds, and pious actions of their lives," and then of course you will know them to be Welsh. We are not by any means inclined to agree with all Dr. Nicholas' etymological assertions. We think him overbold, for instance, in deriving the English word "*could*" from the Welsh "*gallu*," "to be able;" "*cringe*" from "*crynu*," or "*crone*" from "*crino*;" but we give him up at once his claim to "*basket*," "*coracle*," and "*cromlech*;" though we do not think those words will do him much good, as they have long since been acknowledged to be Celtic. The words "*denizen*," "*bastard*," "*poke*," and "*shriek*," may be doubtful; but words like "*whole*," "*through*," "*torch*," "*rule*," certainly did not come to us, as he would have us believe—from the Celtic. The book is, however, a good one, and if its author wished to prove that there was a large unsuspected element of Celtic in the British character he has proved it. Dr. Nicholas is probably a Welshman; we infer the fact from his thorough acquaintance with the Welsh language, and certainly not from his English style. If this be so, he is, it may be, the man whose name became rather well-known from its connexion with the Welsh University at Aberystwith. The present book is a further claim which he possesses to the gratitude of the Principality; we ought, perhaps, to say, to the gratitude of the British people.

Another work on English Ethnology takes a different view from that which Dr. Nicholas supports. The anonymous author of "The Norman people"<sup>13</sup> thinks that the Norman settlement at the Conquest consisted of something more than a slight infusion of a foreign element; that it involved, in his own words, "the addition of a numerous and mighty people, equalling probably a moiety of the conquered population; that the people thus introduced has continued to exist without merger (?) or absorption in any other race; that, as a race, it is as distinguishable now as it was a thousand years since." We shall

---

<sup>13</sup> "The Norman People and their Existing Descendants in the British Dominions." London: H. S. King & Co.

leave Dr. Nicholas to "measure the skull" of this anonymous writer, who is an antagonist to his theory. Our own remarks, meanwhile, shall be confined to the subject of his book. We have had several works this quarter which carry on what we may call the battle of the races. Mr. Burns is very anxious to prove that the "Scottish" race and the Anglo-Saxon are different; Dr. Nicholas endeavours to show that the Celtic race has so permeated the Anglo-Saxon that it is difficult to find a face which is not Welsh; and now the author of the "Norman people" sees a Norman aristocracy everywhere. Even our friend Mr. Arch, the illustrious head of the agricultural movement, is a Norman aristocrat; and is descended from "De Arches or De Arques, Viscounts of Arques and Rouen." Be it so; Mr. Arch does not need a Norman name to recommend his zeal or his integrity. Nor yet, on the other hand, is the author's mention of this name an incongruous allusion; the alphabetical series of Norman names which forms the body of the book will show many which are as little suspected of being aristocratic Norman names. We have not ourselves met a "Sneezum" or a "Snart;" we have not seen a "Quebe" or a "Mopsey," a "Lobb," a "Sass," or a "Windebanks;" but we are quite prepared to meet those gentlemen, if need be, and to admit their claims to aristocratic descent. The book is certainly a laborious one, and contains much to interest genealogists, and those whose pleasure it is to trace modern from mediæval families. The alphabetical series of Norman names alone from the London Post Office Directory contains nearly ten thousand names, and the articles attached to some of them testify to considerable research. Upon the whole we think the book one of merit, and well adapted to the purpose for which it was designed. The introductory article is good.

Mr. Planché's two volumes<sup>13</sup> deal with a similar subject—the companions of William the Conqueror, our first Norman aristocracy. He has collected numberless scattered notices of the principal persons, has connected them chronologically, and arranged them under separate heads. The result is that Mr. Planché has furnished a useful book of historical reference for the archæologist. But the book is something more than this. Mr. Planché carefully tells us, with a pleasing anecdote, that he is not addressing a learned assembly, and that he means to be popular. That he can never fail to be. So good-tempered and amusing a writer must win readers. He fears lest he should be misjudging the amount of interest which his subject has for the general reader; but if he is wrong, then the book by Dr. Nicholas, and the "Norman People," need not have been written either. "Apart from my own demerits as a writer," he very modestly says, "I may have miscalculated on the popularity of the subject—measured, to use a familiar proverb, other people's corn by my own bushel." But pedigree is a bushel which a vast number of people are constantly in the habit of using. We will not now blame them for this, but let at any rate the bushel

---

<sup>13</sup> "The Conqueror and his Companions." By J. R. Planché (Somerset Herald). Two vols. London: Tinsley Brothers.

they use be a well-made one. Mr. Planché's bushel is of its kind an exceptionally good one.

Herr Von Hellwald's book on the "Russian Policy in Central Asia"<sup>14</sup> is in some respects an unpleasing work. It is written, the translator tells us, in a censorious tone, approaching to a hostile spirit against England. The author does not think that it would be a misfortune to the Khanates of Central Asia, to Persia, or to Afghanistan if they fell under the rule of Russia. He believes that in India we govern the people like beasts, and that our empire there is not destined to be long lasting. Upon the whole, he concludes that we have not acquired the art of governing foreign races, and that our talk at home about humanity and freedom are "hollow phrases." So far does he carry this censorious spirit, that the translator paused at one time in his work, fearing lest the indignation which the work might arouse would traverse the good which it was likely otherwise to effect. It is, however, fortunate for our ministers and statesmen, who do not read German (if there be any such), that Lieutenant Wirgman decided to continue his very admirable translation: *fas est ab hoste doceri*, and the information which this book contains is important, whether it comes from an actual enemy, or concerns a possible one. There is no doubt, anyhow, that the author is a keen observer. Professor Vámbéry says of him that he has a thorough knowledge of his subject, though his zeal for Russian interest has led him occasionally into unfairness towards England. Let us, however, examine the information we may gain without considering the spirit in which it is given. Herr Hellwald openly asserts that Russia will not be satisfied until she gains the Golden Horn. By way of the Danube she has failed to reach Constantinople; she will reach it, therefore, from Asia. Persia will fall and become one of her earliest dependencies, and the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal will be at her command. There is no doubt that in China Russia is making rapid advances, and Herr Hellwald believes that unless some reform is begun by the young emperor, China will "come piecemeal" into her hands. Nor is her influence less in Japan, where a short time ago she concluded a treaty, by virtue of which, in case of war between one of the contracting parties and a third Power, the other party is in duty bound to close forthwith its ports against all ships of that Power. In case of a war with Russia, Japan would thus be closed against us. "Nothing is wanting," says Herr Hellwald, "to make it an offensive and defensive alliance but the name." If all this is true, it is well we should know it. The book before us is certainly the best upon the subject which has appeared in English. The last chapter, upon the rivalry between Russia and England, *must* be read by all who wish to have a competent knowledge of the Asiatic question. To some of the assertions made we demur. Is it, for instance, correct to say that since the year 1828, the Shah of Persia has been "a mere puppet pulled by Russian wire"? But, upon the

---

<sup>14</sup> "The Russians in Central Asia." By Frederick von Hellwald. Translated by Lieut.-Col. Theodore Wirgman, LL.B. Trinity College, Cambridge. Henry S. King.



whole, we venture to think that the book is important, if not alarming, and that whether with good-will or ill-will towards us, the author has done us signal service in bringing the facts so forcibly before us that they must arrest our attention. Nor is our debt a slight one to Lieutenant Wirgman, who has accomplished his task of translation thoroughly well.

Mr. Piggott's work on Persia<sup>15</sup> is a useful and unpretending work. Mr. Piggott does not disguise the fact that his book has been called forth by the recent visit of the Shah to our country. It is none the less useful on that account. It is not a work of original research, but it occupies the position of a really good and complete handbook of its subject. A brief history of the country, well told, is followed by an account of the religion, literature, arts, and sciences, which will make the reader understand better than any other book the position of the people who are subjects of the Shah. There are also given hints to intending travellers in Persia, accounts of the best routes, expenses, social habits of the natives, and other necessary information which it would be hard to find elsewhere. The book is a compilation, and a careful one, from other writers, but so much concise information with regard to Persia has not been brought together in a popular form before. We can especially recommend Chapter XI., which gives a bird's-eye view of the language and literature of the country.

The present *History of French Literature* is one of the series of historical handbooks edited by Mr. Oscar Browning, of Eton.<sup>16</sup> The series hitherto has been a good one, and the present volume will give the practised student a fair insight into the connexion of the different periods of French literary history. The notices of individual writers are brief but good. Brief they must be when so wide a subject as that of this volume has to be treated of in 300 small pages, but perhaps more space should have been allotted to the more important authors. Molière, for instance, finds but meagre treatment. The criticism upon Voltaire is fairer, and is perhaps as good as so brief a notice could be. The chief fault we find with the book is that it is dull. It is sound, but it is dreary. It is impossible to imagine any one reading it for pleasure. Those who know anything of French literature would certainly not go to this English adaptation with a view of knowing more, and those who know nothing of French literature would not be much benefited by the perusal of its pages, which presuppose some knowledge of the subject. The fact is that a history of literature can only be of one kind, and is only useful to one class of readers. What earthly good is it to a boy or man to read a history of, let us say, Chinese literature, unless he is acquainted in some degree with Chinese literature? and if he is acquainted with the literature, the book should be a thorough one. Put a history of English literature written in Hindostanee before a Hindoo who has never read a word

---

<sup>15</sup> "Persia, Ancient and Modern." By John Piggott, F.S.A., F.G.S., F.R.G.S. Henry S. King & Co.

<sup>16</sup> "History of French Literature, from the French of Demogeot." By Christiana Bridges. Rivingtons.

of English—suppose that he has thoroughly mastered the handbook, what is the intellectual gain he has made? It is minute. Now if the present handbook is intended for those who are acquainted with French literature, then it is poor, inadequate, and jejune; if it is intended for those who have no knowledge of the literature, then it will add very little to their mental stock. We candidly confess that we think a history of literature can only be written for one class of persons—persons, namely, who are familiar with the literature in hand. The history, therefore, which is written for students of a language is practically useless. When a student is ready to study the history of a literature he should go at once to the fountain head. Those students of French who are capable of proceeding to a history of its literature ought certainly to be forbidden to study it in an English adaptation, though the adaptation be as well done as this is by Mrs. Bridges.

Mr. Bascom, in his "Philosophy of English Literature,"<sup>17</sup> has at least taken the right view of his subject. His remarks are addressed to persons familiar with the literature of which he treats. His readers are supposed to be familiar with the authors who form what he calls "a network of forces" covering the whole field of English literature. But though Mr. Bascom has taken the right view of his subject, we are not convinced that he has dealt with it in the best possible manner. Mr. Bascom's style is not quite a pleasing one. He is fond of similes, and they are generally violent. We are told that the French "glide gracefully along on a surface sentiment," while an Englishman is "to the native born Frenchman what a skating rink is to the mountain lake" (p. 147). Byron is like the rocket, "driven aloft by the reaction, the spurn of its own spiteful forces" (p. 253). There are many instances of this kind of thing, and we get tired of them. Moreover, Mr. Bascom has not any very keen insight into literature. His remarks upon Chaucer contrast with the loving, patient appreciation bestowed upon him by Professor Lowell. Take this sentence (p. 43):—"I confess to a certain shame in speaking of Chaucer to the healthy and pure, so far as he is from wholesome companionship;" and it must be admitted that Mr. Bascom has not yet put himself into a position to write a "philosophical" history of English literature. In his judgment of modern writers he is not very wise, and unpardonable slips render his book intensely offensive. One instance will be sufficient. On page 274 he speaks of "Romola and Middlemarch by George Eliot;" on page 275 he speaks of "Romola by Mrs. Lewes;" on page 277 he says, that "Bulwer, Charlotte Brontë, Mrs. Lewis, are not likely soon to be equalled." His language is moreover affected, and, at times, ridiculous. Books, like landscapes, owe their expression to the "floating, unbraided beam of morning," or to the "brilliant, long-lined cirri of evening, fading, trembling into night." This is not even "excellent fooling;" it is still less the "philosophy of English literature." Mr. Bascom, however, says that it will be sufficient "if the lines of thought struck out

<sup>17</sup> "Philosophy of English Literature." A Course of Lectures delivered in the Lowell Institute. By John Bascom. New York: G. B. Putnam's Sons.

and the considerations brought forward are those which interlace and occupy the field." Whilst we are in complete ignorance of what this may mean, it would be unfair to assert that the book has not accomplished its purpose.

Mr. Forsyth has collected and published the essays<sup>18</sup> which at different times during the last sixteen or seventeen years he has contributed to various quarterlies and periodicals. He has been led to do this from a desire to rescue his anonymous productions from "the wave of oblivion which so soon passes over ephemeral literature." Mr. Forsyth's essays make a large volume really worth reading; and there is a fascinating odour of literature about all that he writes, that makes the volume thoroughly acceptable. The more ambitious essays are legal or political, and were written for the *Quarterly* or the *Edinburgh Review*. They are all good, especially that on "Criminal Procedure in Scotland and England," which was first published in 1858. But we confess to liking the shorter essays best. The article from *Fraser's* on literary style will perhaps most repay the general reader. Even that has faults; no one acquainted with German will agree with Mr. Forsyth when he says (p. 171) that the German word for "translation" means "upsetting;" but the essay is both amusing and instructive, and the advice imparted sound and good. The papers contributed to *Fraser's* and to *Good Words* are bright and taking, and worth perusal. Of the whole of them we may say that, though they do not make up a great work, or form the basis for a lasting literary reputation, they are yet clever intellectual efforts with which we are glad to be acquainted. They resemble, to some extent, the conversation of refined and intellectual society, which delights and exhilarates, which uses and does not exhaust the interest of a subject, and which fills the canvas of a picture with a subdued and grateful light.

Mr. Forsyth has sent us also a paper<sup>19</sup> of his read before the Victoria Institute. We confess we like him less in the capacity of lecturer than in that of essayist. Nor are we attracted by the Victoria Institute before whom this paper was read. This institute is one of "professed Christians," and its chief object is to investigate the questions of philosophy and science that bear upon the "great truths revealed in Holy Scripture." A society so limited in its action, and practically so limited in its conclusions, is one to which we can give but little confidence. However, Mr. Forsyth's lecture was a good one. It is full of that aroma of literature of which we have already spoken; and though it shows Mr. Forsyth at something of a disadvantage, it shows also the diversity and facility of his ability and the fluency of his pen. His list of unsolved historical difficulties (p. 19) is capital. Mr. Forsyth's writings ought to be better known.

In 1826 Dr. Channing sent to Miss Aikin his work on the character

<sup>18</sup> "Essays, Critical and Narrative." By William Forsyth, Q.C., LL.D., M.P. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

<sup>19</sup> "The Rules of Evidence as applicable to the Credibility of History." A Paper read before the Victoria Institute. By W. Forsyth, Q.C., LL.D., M.P. London, R. Hardwicke.

and writings of Milton. Miss Aikin had previously met Dr. Channing at her aunt's, Mrs. Barbauld's, house in Stoke Newington; and from this receipt of the book on Milton is dated the commencement of a correspondence which lasted nearly twenty years. An agreement was made between the correspondents that all the letters should belong to the survivor. They were given upon Miss Aikin's death to the present editor,<sup>20</sup> her niece. The representatives of both families have now given their consent that the letters should be published, and the present volume is the result. It may be read with pleasure, as giving the views of two liberal-minded persons of culture upon important subjects in the first half of this century. The first Reform Bill, the accession of Queen Victoria, the Slave Question, the Lake Poets, Miss Martineau, the social and political differences of England and America, are topics which engage the writers. But the interest which the book awakens is circumscribed by several modifying circumstances—*e.g.*, the long intervals between the letters; the fact that Dr. Channing did not highly estimate his portion of the correspondence, nor intend it for publication (Preface, viii.); and the fact that most readers will probably not estimate very highly Miss Aikin's portion of the correspondence. But the publication of private letters is always attractive to some minds, and the present collection is better than the average.

A brief but interesting memoir of Mr. Lynch,<sup>21</sup> gives us in a small volume the story of his uneventful life. Mr. Lynch was the author of a selection of hymns which, twenty years ago, under the title of the "Rivulet," awakened much controversy. They were not hymns of great merit, nor were they hymns which could be by any means accused of heterodoxy, but they were without the ordinary catchwords of Evangelism, and they drew down upon their author a storm of sectarian abuse. They were not worthy of the attention they attracted, nor of the abuse they received. Mr. Lynch's attitude during the tempest was dignified; indeed, he exhibited upon the occasion a talent for controversy which we can only regret he did not make more use of. To the excited crowd of religious papers that attacked him he replied:—

"By the frequent perusals of *Records, Banners, Advertisers, Watchmen, &c.*, I have learnt the whole 'trick' of religious newspapers. I could set up one myself if I were only wicked enough. . . . The *Morning Advertiser* daily celebrates, in the queerest way, the nuptials of Jerusalem and Newmarket: 'Life in Jesus' and death in the 'ring,' are presumed to have equal interest to its readers. In one page fifteen divines are insulted, all for the glory of God and the *Morning Advertiser*; and in another more than forty horses have their merits or demerits meritoriously discriminated. I fear the Editor of the *Advertiser* does more to jockey the saints than to sanctify the jockeys."

This extract will illustrate Mr. Lynch's peculiar power, which, we think, really lies rather in the line of caustic controversy than in that

<sup>20</sup> "Correspondence of W. E. Channing, D.D., and Lucy Aikin, from 1826 to 1842." Edited by A. L. Le Breton. Williams and Norgate.

<sup>21</sup> "Memoir of T. T. Lynch." Edited by W. White. London: W. Isbister & Co.

of sacred song. But those who wish to read a brief and good account of the "Rivulet" controversy will find it in this volume.

We may here mention that Dean Alford's *Life*<sup>22</sup> has reached a third edition. Some time ago we foretold a wide popularity for the book; this it has found, and we have nothing to add to our previous remarks.

The "Life of Cherubini,"<sup>23</sup> by Mr. Bellasis, is one which fills a void in musical literature. The information about Cherubini lies for the most part in scattered pamphlets, periodicals, and dictionaries. Mr. Bellasis has brought all this together, and his own earnest love of his subject makes a unity in the mass of musical criticism with which he deals. The introduction of musical passages into his text gives the book something of the appearance of a concert programme; but it is not upon the whole objectionable, and we infer that Mr. Bellasis is writing for musical readers. The main incidents of Cherubini's life are these. He was born in 1760, at Florence, and produced several operas while still very young. His great triumph was "Les Deux Journées," written about the year 1800, in Paris. In 1805 he wrote "Faniska" for the opera at Vienna. In 1806 he returned to Paris, and became one of the directors of the Conservatoire. In the latter part of his life he devoted his talents to ecclesiastical music, and confirmed his reputation by several masses and a requiem. He also continued to write operas, of which, perhaps, "Pygmalion" is the best known. Mr. Bellasis does not describe Cherubini as an agreeable man; he was brusque to rudeness. We must not omit one anecdote (p. 272): "One day he was walking along the boulevards, when it began to rain. A gentleman driving by recognised the maestro, and alighting, placed his vehicle at Cherubini's disposal, who got in. The gentleman, who was going a different way, said, 'M. Cherubini, will you lend me your umbrella?' 'No, I never lend my umbrella,' was Cherubini's reply, and he drove off." But Mr. Bellasis says that Cherubini was not so bad as he has been painted. We hope this is so. Mr. Bellasis has written a careful and good biography.

We wish that it were possible for us to devote more space than we have at our disposal to Mr. Russell's estimate of Mr. Mill's *Autobiography*.<sup>24</sup> The position of this *Review* to Mr. Mill cannot be mistaken; and we assert that it would be impossible for a more generous, loyal, and appreciative perception of the merits of Mr. Mill's calumniated *Autobiography* to be attained than that which is made manifest in Mr. Russell's essay. It is a right noble utterance. Of Mr. Russell we knew nothing before we read this pamphlet. It is certain that he is a writer of clear and keen insight, and the master of a pure, restrained style. Nothing that has been

<sup>22</sup> "Life, Journal, and Letters of H. Alford, D.D." Edited by his Widow. Third Edition. London: Rivingtons.

<sup>23</sup> "Cherubini: Memorials of his Life." By Edward Bellasis. London: Burns & Oates.

<sup>24</sup> "On the Autobiography of John Stuart Mill." Read before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool. By E. R. Russell. Liverpool.

written in reference to the Autobiography has so struck us with the conviction of the writer's power. The literary society of Liverpool, if it appreciates this essay, as we believe it deserves, may be well proud of its production. We only ask that the pamphlet should be read. It is the testimony of an honest and clear intellect to the brightest and greatest that has been amongst us for many years.

The "Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland"<sup>25</sup> during the years 1606-1608," are preceded by a preface of 122 pages, in which the contents of the State Papers themselves are freely discussed by the editors. This preface deals also with the papers calendared in the entire series of papers from the beginning of the reign of James I. It is followed by the calendar, and by a good general index.

Sir Thomas Hardy has edited the second volume of the "Registrum Palatinum Dunelmense."<sup>26</sup> This "register" is to end in a third volume, for which volume the editor reserves his remarks and illustrations. The present volume has a general index.

Mr. Piazzi Smith, Astronomer Royal for Scotland, has published a new and enlarged edition of his work, "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid."<sup>27</sup> It contains some beautiful topographical and mathematical views of the great pyramid. Mr. Smith believes that he has discovered the secret of that mysterious monument, and argues his theory with much learning and ingenuity. Unfortunately for those who are not specialists, Mr. Smith does not succeed in convincing those who are, of the correctness of his views. The result is a pamphlet,<sup>28</sup> wherein Mr. Smith sets forth his grievance against the Royal Society. It appears that he has resigned his Fellowship in that Society, owing to the Society's refusal to listen to his paper "On the Length of a Side of the Base of the Great Pyramid." Mr. Smith has shown a great amount of zeal in investigating the question at issue, and we are sorry that he should be at variance with the Society. The Royal Society is one, however, in which we must have supreme confidence; but we cordially commend his book to those who are capable of estimating its merits; they need not, however, read the pamphlet, for it does not exhibit Mr. Smith at his best.

We wish to acknowledge the receipt of the fourth volume of M. Taine's "History of English Literature,"<sup>29</sup> in Mr. Van Laun's excellent translation; a Memoir of Count Ottavio Tusca,<sup>30</sup> an Italian Old Catholic;

<sup>25</sup> "Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, of the Reign of James I. 1606-1608." Edited by Rev. C. W. Russell, D.D., and John P. Prendergast, Esq. Under the Direction of the Master of the Rolls. London: Longman & Co.

<sup>26</sup> "The Register of Richard de Kellawe, Bishop of Durham, 1314-1316." Edited by Sir T. D. Hardy, D.C.L. Published under the Direction of the Master of the Rolls. Vol. II. London: Longman & Co.

<sup>27</sup> "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid." By Piazzi Smith, F.R.S.E., F.R.A.S., Royal Astronomer for Scotland.

<sup>28</sup> "The Great Pyramid and the Royal Society." By the Same. London: W. Isbister & Co.

<sup>29</sup> "History of English Literature." By H. A. Taine, D.C.L. Translated by H. Van Laun. Edinburgh: Edmonston.

<sup>30</sup> "Memoir of Count Ottavio Tusca, an Italian Old Catholic." By the Rev. L. M. Hogg, M.A. London: Rivingtons.

Mr. Sime's History of Germany,<sup>31</sup> which seems good; and of another number of Mr. Black's translation of M. Guizot's History of France.<sup>32</sup>

Our notice of the German literature which has reached us is necessarily brief. Herr Von Reumont's Life of Lorenzo de' Medici<sup>33</sup> is perhaps the most noteworthy book. Herr Von Reumont looks upon Lorenzo de' Medici as the result and symbol of the latter half of the fifteenth century, a time when production and enjoyment reached its highest and most spiritual perfection. Our author will not separate Lorenzo from the times and circumstances with which he was surrounded, and his book gives us pictures of that time. He shows us in a clear way how Lorenzo, as head of the great house of the Medici, surpassed his father in magnanimity, prudence, and generosity, no less than in his zeal for art and science; how he brought into an equilibrium of power the States of Italy, and by his honourable policy maintained them in a just equipoise of peace and security. Florentine air and Florentine beauty pervade this graceful work.

Herr Trenkle's History of the Industries of the Black Forest<sup>34</sup> is full of information for the student of industrial economy. The chief occupations of this district are divided by Herr Trenkle into two classes: the first comprises mining and ironworking; the second includes timber-floating, brush-making, straw-binding, weaving, &c. Of all these trades the book gives complete statistics.

We have also received a Sketch of the Life of Bishop Hurdalek of the Bohemian Church;<sup>35</sup> and a very admirable Manual of Ancient Geography,<sup>36</sup> which we should like to see translated. Also some Reports of the Proceedings of the Geographical Society at Berlin.<sup>37</sup>

The Early English Text Society has sent us this quarter some volumes of considerable value. Mr. Furnivall's "Holy Grail"<sup>38</sup> is re-edited from the unique MS. in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. The poem is an excessively dull one, but it forms part of that series of English Arthur romances which the committee have undertaken to print.

The great work of the Society during the present year is the publication, for the first time, of the *Cursor Mundi*.<sup>39</sup> The Society tell us that the text "sparkles with quaintness of phrase and thought." Dr. Falck has conferred a great benefit on the Society by allowing them the use of the Göttingen MS. for a year. Four versions are printed

<sup>31</sup> "History of Germany." By James Sime, M.A. London: Macmillans.

<sup>32</sup> "History of France." By H. Guizot. Translated by R. Black, M.A. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low, and Searle.

<sup>33</sup> "Lorenzo de' Medici," Von Alfred von Reumont. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot.

<sup>34</sup> "Geschichte der Schwarzwälder Industrie." Von J. B. Trenkle. Karlsruhe: Verlag der G. Braunschen Hofbuchhandlung.

<sup>35</sup> "Bischof Hurdalek." Von Dr. J. A. Ginzler. Prag.

<sup>36</sup> "Geographie der alten Welt." Von Dr. A. C. Müller. Berlin: Lüdertitz'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

<sup>37</sup> "Verhandlungen der Gesellschaften für Erdkunde zu Berlin."

<sup>38</sup> "The Holy Grail." By Herry Lonelich, Skynner. Re-edited by F. J. Furnivall, Esq., M.A. Part I.

<sup>39</sup> "Cursor Mundi: a Northumbrian Poem of the XIVth. Century." Edited by Rev. R. Morris, LL.D.

side by side, and the book will be invaluable to students of the early English language.

The Alliterative Troy Book,<sup>40</sup> known as the "Gest Historiale," is described as "a gain both to literature and linguistics." One of the editors, the Rev. Mr. Panton, has lately died.

The Blickling Homilies<sup>41</sup> has the rare merit of being a dated MS. The writer is looking forward to the end of the world, even in this present age, "whereof the greatest portion has already elapsed, even nine hundred and seventy-one years." The Society chiefly value these Homilies as illustrating the difference between the English of that date and the Alfredian English of a date fifty years previous. The Homilies will have an introduction, notes, and index. The translation which accompanies them is clear and dignified.

Messrs. Macmillan have sent us a small volume of parallel extracts<sup>42</sup> from Latin and English writers, which seem to us to throw more light upon that subtle accomplishment the writing of Latin prose than any book we have seen. It is, of course, intended for advanced scholars, and demands a certain insight and perception of scholarship; but the chief lines of elegant expression are well marked out for those who are capable of following them. Good Latin prose has certainly both a "method" and a "secret." The method can be acquired by patient and laborious observation; the secret can be learnt from syntactic instruction. The peculiar merit of Mr. Nixon's book is, that while the "Notes on Idiom" reveal the secret, its admirable disposition of parallel passages renders the acquisition of the "method" of Latin writing far less laborious to the intelligent student than it would be if he trusted to himself alone. We can well believe, *e.g.*, that the following rules which Mr. Nixon gives in his "Notes," will be light-giving to many students:—

"Arrange clauses in Latin chronologically—*e.g.*, put the aim before the action, the cause before the effect."

"Many verbs disappear altogether in translation, as 'succeeded in,' 'managed to,' 'failed to,' 'continued,' 'ended in,' 'keep,' 'cease,' 'begin,' 'get,' 'find,' &c."

"Conjunctions have no inborn predilection for indicative or subjunctive."

The whole section on this subject (pp. xxx.—xxxii.) is admirable.

"Before translating English prepositions paraphrase their meaning; sometimes the substantive will disappear."

There are many more admirable rules, which doubtless are familiar to all those who have acquired a good Latin style; but for those who are acquiring it, we know no book where students may find the

<sup>40</sup> "The 'Gest Historiale' of the Destruction of Troy." Edited from the Hunterian MS., Glasgow. By Rev. G. A. Panton and D. Donaldson, Esq. Part II.

<sup>41</sup> "The Blickling Homilies." Edited by the Rev. R. Morris. Part I. Published for the Early English Text Society by N. Trübner.

<sup>42</sup> "Parallel Extracts; arranged for Translation into English and Latin. With Notes on Idioms." By J. E. Nixon, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Part I. London: Macmillan & Co.



“secret” so well and so briefly told. The book has also considerable literary merit. The aptness of the parallel passages is at times striking. What a light to the translator is given by the juxtaposition of these letters for instance:—“*I wish I may be able to come, but I doubt. Will you come to a philosophical breakfast on Saturday—ten o'clock precisely? Nothing taken for granted! Everything (except the Thirty-Nine Articles) called in question—real philosophers! Affectionately yours.*”—This is from Sydney Smith to Dickens. The next is from Pliny to Catilius Severus:—“*Veniam ad cœnam, sed jam nunc paciscor sit expedita, sit parca, Socraticis tantum sermonibus abundet, in his quoque teneat modum. Vale.*”—The eruption of Vesuvius, as described by Pliny, is set side by side with Davy's account of the Lisbon earthquake. And in each pair throughout the book, where the turns of expression are not to be gathered from one language, the spirit of the composition will be found most useful in deciding the key to which the translation may be set. If we are to find fault with the book, we should complain of the frequent references and interruptions, which are likely to fret and disturb the student, and of the arrangement of the idiomatic notes, which at first sight seem an algebraic chaos of references. But we may add of the book, that he who has fairly and thoroughly worked through it, will have attained a degree of excellence in Latin composition such as he is not likely to acquire by the use of any other book as brief and unpretentious.

Mr. Holmes has briefly summarized<sup>43</sup> the rules for that Latin pronunciation which has been recommended by some professors of both universities. If this system be adopted (which we sincerely hope it never may) Mr. Holmes' manual will be most useful, and boys will learn with little trouble to pronounce “*acies*” “*äh-këë-ëhs*,” and “*texo*” “*tehks-aw*,” under Mr. Holmes' instruction.

“The Attic Primer,”<sup>44</sup> by Mr. Wright, is intended to confine the attention of learners to the Attic dialect. It is arranged according to the method of Dr. Curtius. This is what is called the crude-form system, and is a good and scientific system, but the question which must occupy a teacher is this: Is it worth while to dismiss a system of teaching which has a good working traditional power, for a new system, which must start without a tradition? Is the practical gain of a more scientific method sufficient to counterbalance that which is lost? The answer to this question has not yet been made. If it be made in the affirmative, then Mr. Wright's little book is a very good one ready to the teacher's hand.

From the “Attic Primer” to the “Slang Dictionary”<sup>45</sup> is a sufficiently wide step, but it is very well that the vagaries and eccentricities of language should be chronicled and recorded. Nothing is

<sup>43</sup> “Latin Pronunciation for Beginners.” By A. Holmes, M.A. London: Rivingtons.

<sup>44</sup> “The Attic Primer for Beginners.” By J. Wright, M.A. London: Macmillan.

<sup>45</sup> “The Slang Dictionary.” New Edition. London: Chatto & Windus.

common or unclean to the philologist. The editor has drawn strange and uncouth words into the sheet which he has let down, but his preface will dispose the reader to take an interest even in the colloquial monstrosities which he has gathered from "gaff," and "alley," and "crib."

Mr. Barrow's Word-book of the Gipsy language<sup>46</sup> is a really valuable contribution to philology. The glossary is brief. The gipsy people are not likely to have an opulent vocabulary, but such as it is it bears tokens of good descent. Hindu and Sanscrit, Persian and Wallachian seem to have supplied its now meagre stores. Mr. Barrow has given some specimens of the language in verse and prose and some accounts of the English tribes.

We must notice the receipt of Mr. Nichol's commendatory account of M. Paris's method of editing in his "Vie de Saint Alexis,"<sup>47</sup> Mr. Nichol objects to certain points, but, upon the whole, his criticism is laudatory. The paper was read before the Philological Society.

---

#### BELLES LETTRES.

TO say that novel writing has become a trade, is merely to repeat a commonplace. But it may be worth while to consider who constitute the bulk of our novelists. Taking away a few well-known names, they appear, as far as we can judge by the substance of their writings, to be composed of two classes—tutors who have drifted into literature, and governesses who have also drifted into literature. Judging too by internal evidence, by the evident want of knowledge of the world, we should say that the vast majority of novels which appear are written by very young persons. It is obvious too that the profession of a tutor, or a governess, or a literary man, does not afford much scope for large observation. The consequence is, that the majority of these novels run precisely in one groove. It is the same old story over and over again, with the exception that it is each time weaker. The author can only draw upon his own limited resources. He has no fund of observation upon which to fall back. Scott was forty-three years old before he wrote a single novel. As his latest and best critic well observes, Scott had for years been accumulating stores of knowledge, which then flowed forth at his bidding. He was scholar, poet, antiquarian, and, in a certain sense, a naturalist. He drew from many sources. When one was exhausted he could without difficulty draw from another. He appealed to the tastes of many widely different classes of readers. But the literary men and the literary women of the present day come to us without any stock of knowledge. They can only give us sketches of their own lives and the small world in

---

<sup>46</sup> Romano Lavo-lil. Wordbook of the Romany, or English Gipsy Language." By George Barrow. London: John Murray.

<sup>47</sup> "Account of M. Gaston Paris's Method of Editing in his 'Vie de Saint Alexis.'" By Henry Nichol, Esq. Philological Society.

which they live. Now it must be apparent that a quiet, studious, literary life does not present many salient points for the novelist. If he endeavours to become picturesque, and to introduce us to the stir and bustle of active life, then the most interesting part of his study, the mental struggles, and the artistic triumphs of his principal characters, are thrown into the background. If he tries to be witty, his attempt probably ends in a very weak imitation of Thackeray's characters, Pendennis and Warrington, and he sinks into Bohemianism. There is only one way by which it is possible to endow a literary or artistic story with lasting interest—to make the hero a character whom we can really respect and admire. He may be Utopian, a dreamer of dreams, a Blake or a Shelley, but as long as we can admire him for his sincerity, for his loyalty to his art, the story can never lack life nor interest. In "Thornicroft's Model"<sup>1</sup> we had hoped that we had found such a novel. Our expectations were certainly raised when, whatever may be our own views on the truth or untruth of the theory, we read such a passage as this: "Painters," so Thornicroft held, "had no business to marry; heart and soul, they ought to live for art, and not disturb the unruffled calm, which is essential to the pursuit of it by the thousand-and-one cares such a state brings." (Vol. i. p. 48.) But if the artist should by any possible means think of marrying, the hero goes on to explain what kind of wife he should choose, and presents us with a picture, to which we can certainly make no objection. The hero, we need not say, does marry. His wife too is the ideal character whom he has painted as only suitable to the artist. Our hopes were again raised by the following dialogue between the hero and his wife:—

" 'I wish we were rich,' sighed Helen.

" 'So we shall be some day. By-the-bye Mr. Duncomb wants a copy of *Perdita*—that would be five hundred pounds into my pocket, for I could soon do it; and if living up here, and being in a manner disowned, makes you miserable, by Jove I *will* do it.' 'Then it is something you did not quite like doing?' 'Well, I have never yet made a replica—copy, I mean. I always think the man who buys the picture has a right to the copyright of the idea, and never quite fancy doing it over again for another person; but that is not the way to get rich. Most fellows sell two or three copies of the same thing, under the disguise of sketches, studies, or small replicas; but upon my word it is hardly fair.' 'Then do not do it on any account. I should be miserable if you did anything for my sake you disapproved of. It is nonsense thinking I am unhappy up here. How could I be so?' 'You are just the wife for an artist,' cried Thornicroft. 'No, I will not make any copies.'"—(vol. i. pp. 118, 119.)

Our hopes, we repeat, of meeting a really fine artistic novel were certainly raised by the two passages which we have quoted, but doomed only to disappointment. A man marries unfortunately not only his wife, but his wife's family. The hero soon finds out the truth of the old proverb—that a man's mother-in-law is his natural enemy. We cannot enter into all the complications and entanglements which arise

<sup>1</sup> "Thornicroft's Model." By Averil Beaumont. Author of "Magdalen Wyngard." London: Chapman and Hall. 1873.

between Thornicroft and his wife, which are mainly caused by a fussy, well-meaning, vulgar, odious mother-in-law. In short, Thornicroft behaves most unjustly to his wife. He falls away completely from his high ideal of what an artist's life should be. Now Thornicroft's fall might have been made quite as interesting as his triumph. We are tempted, therefore, to ask, why "Thornicroft's Model" should so nearly approach a first-rate novel, and yet just fail? The reason, we think, is very obvious. The writer did not dare to trust himself to his own resources. He therefore sought extraneous help, and introduced a number of characters utterly out of keeping with the main purpose of the story. Not content with introducing us to a number of wealthy commonplace characters, some of whom, however, are really very cleverly done, the author has sought to give a false interest to his story by vulgar spasmodic sensation scenes of the Braddon and Wilkie Collins type. Had he been content to rely upon quiet drawing, upon his own power of portraying the gradual downfall of Thornicroft, and the nobility of his wife's character, the book would have been an undoubted success. The author has a very keen eye for character. Thornicroft and his wife are most carefully and lovingly painted. The good-meaning, but odiously offensive mother-in-law, is an admirable study. The story too is full of delicate touches. Here is a reflection upon woman's love:—"Thornicroft thought that a woman would bear any treatment, however bad, if she thought it was intended as a trial of her love." (Vol. i. p. 76.) Here again is another:—"No woman can endure to see the man she loves depart from the high line of truth;" and once more, "Most women have a half tender feeling for any one who has loved them." (Vol. i. p. 118.) Equally delicate too are the touches of satire with which the three volumes are filled. Thus, when Thornicroft is angry with Hannah for admitting Lord Alfred Dartmore into the drawing-room, that servant wonderingly replies, "If lords are not to be admitted, what kind of a person is?" Hannah's reply reminds us of the story of the Lincolnshire squire, who, when the late Duke of Devonshire wanted to see over his new hall, answered, "If I allow the Duke of Devonshire to come, I shall have all the Dukes in England coming." Admirable too, in their way, are the remarks which the vulgar old mother-in-law makes about the pictures and the large sums of money which are paid for them:—"Well, it beats everything, Helen! But there's always fools in the world, honey, and always will be, and real glad I am of that, for your sake;" a remark which may pair off with that of the betting man's, in his evidence before the committee in the House of Commons: "There's a fool born every minute, and thank God some of them live." But "Thornicroft's Model" is full of good things. Of a certain English baronet it is remarked that in every picture gallery abroad, "He exhibited a distinct gift of finding out the very worst picture in each room, and singling it out for admiration with happy, unerring instinct." (Vol. ii. p. 59.) Of Captain Wymondham's Italian, it is noticed, "He only knew about twenty words, but they were all of an overbearing and condemnatory character." The author, probably, does not take the general optimist view of his countrymen, which is so commonly held by novelists, for he makes Thornicroft say,

with a good deal of truth as far as art is concerned, "For coarseness, vulgarity, and bad taste, I'll back the English against all in the world." (Vol. i. p. 156.) Here we must stop quoting, though we should like to have given an account of the way in which a modern young lady keeps her accounts, her first entry being, "N.B. I will enter the *d.* department next time; it is hard enough to do the £ and *s.* at first;" who buys a second fan at nearly the same price as the first, because the first was much too expensive and she would like a cheaper one; who, when she does not know how the money has been spent, puts down "Bonbons, say, 5*l.*;" who regrets that she can only have one birthday a year, not that she wishes to be older, but to have more presents of money; and who, in utter despair, finally gives up keeping any further accounts, with the remark, "I have 20*l.*, and must have done something with the rest." "Thornicroft's Model," we repeat, is sparkling with wit and humour. The workmanship is in places nearly perfect. The style—and we mean this as a high compliment—reminds us of Mr. Wedmore's. The way too in which the author manages the North Country dialect in the speeches of the mother-in-law is excellent. He just gives us the right flavour. "Thornicroft's Model" only just fails of rising into the very highest order of novels for the reasons which we have given. Let us, however, most strongly recommend it as presenting a very true picture of certain phases of artistic life. Many of the characters are evidently drawn from well-known personages. There is no mistaking the great art-critic Mr. R——, who discovers the most wonderful beauties in a patch of colour which nobody else has even observed in the picture. We fancy too that many of the members of the "Clique," as a certain Art Club is called, may be easily recognised. But there is not a single touch or a single stroke at which any one, however sensitive, can justly take offence. We deeply regret that the author should have been led astray into regions which really have nothing to do with art, for the purpose of gaining a little ephemeral popularity of the publisher's kind. He can so manifestly do so much higher work than "Thornicroft's Model," that we shall look forward with real interest to his next work. He has high conceptions of art and the duties of an artist. He has too the power of setting forth his views in language of not merely great beauty, but also of great strength. It rests entirely with himself whether he chooses to become the novelist of art or a mere teller of stories in Bohemia.

A novelist may be judged in two ways—by comparing him with other novelists or comparing him with himself. If we were to compare Mrs. Pender Cudlip's "No Alternative"<sup>2</sup> with such a book as "Thornicroft's Model," we shall find it utterly wanting in many of the qualities which make even a second-rate novel of the higher class. Of style there is absolutely none. Of literary workmanship, of that subtle touch which reveals the true artist, there is also absolutely none.

---

<sup>2</sup> "No Alternative." A Novel. By Annie Thomas (Mrs. Pender Cudlip). Author of "Denis Donne," "Played Out," &c. &c. London: Chapman and Hall. 1874.

The author of "Thornicroft's Model," if not a painter, has evidently studied art; but the author of "No Alternative" appears to have studied nothing but the merest conventionalities or unconventionalities, as they often happen to be, of modern society. Judged, however, by Mrs. Cudlip's own standard, "No Alternative" is a very great improvement upon some of its predecessors. There is not so much padding as is usual in Mrs. Cudlip's novels. The slang is not so loud, and the characters are not so fast. Upon all these improvements we heartily congratulate Mrs. Cudlip.

The reviewers have so emphatically pronounced that Dr. Dasent<sup>3</sup> has mistaken his calling in turning novelist, that it would require a very bold critic to enter the lists in his defence. Dr. Dasent is probably at home in compiling or editing Icelandic Dictionaries, but he is quite out of his element in writing novels. Of course a clever man, like Dr. Dasent, is sure to say a number of clever things. And there are plenty of clever things in "Half a Life," but in spite of them all the story is unmistakably very heavy reading.

We are glad to see that Miss Parr<sup>4</sup> has returned to the South Country. She knows and loves the South. She understands the people and the ways of the peasantry. Woldshire is no imaginary county. Beechhurst, we suspect, has a real existence, and is marked in the maps. The Great Ash Ford, at Beechhurst, we are half inclined to think is the celebrated Mark Ash Wood in the New Forest. Here, writes Miss Parr, were "such beeches and vast oaks as are nowhere else in England. The Great Ash was a storm-riven fragment, but its form continued, and its beauty in sufficient picturesqueness for artistic purposes." Miss Parr then proceeds to describe a farm-house "thatched with reeds, very old, and weather-stained, of all golden-brown and orange tints," where many a painter had come down for the summer to paint the fine old beeches in the Great Ash Wood. The whole of the descriptions of the Forest of Beechwood are particularly well done—the rows of silver firs, the long sweeps of grass, and the cattle at evening coming home to be milked, and crossing the ford under the branches of the beeches. We quite agree with what one of the characters, Mr. Fairfax, says of Beechwood Forest: "This is very lovely—it is a series of delightful pictures. To live here must be a sort of education." When Miss Parr leaves the forest, her hand somewhat forgets its cunning, and we certainly do not care for the French scenes so much as those in Beechwood. Still, "The Vicissitudes of Bessie Fairfax" is a thoroughly enjoyable book, which may be recommended to any one who does not know how to pass an idle afternoon.

"Ingram Place"<sup>5</sup> is a very difficult book to review justly.

<sup>3</sup> "Half a Life." By George Webbe Dasent, D.C.L. Author of "Annals of an Eventful Life," "Three to One," &c. London: Chapman and Hall. 1874.

<sup>4</sup> "The Vicissitudes of Bessie Fairfax." By Holme Lee. Author of "Basil Godfrey's Caprice," "The Beautiful Miss Barrington," &c. &c. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1874.

<sup>5</sup> "Ingram Place." A Novel. By A Cape Colonist. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1874.

Publishers, we believe, hold that either a very good or a very bad novel takes best with the public. "Ingram Place," if it is not very good, is certainly a very great way off from being very bad. It is precisely one of those novels whose merits are likely to be overlooked by both the critics and the reading public. The closely-printed type, after the large print to which we have been so long accustomed in novels, rather repels one at first. But when this preliminary difficulty is got over, we find the novel considerably above the average. The author excels most in descriptions of scenery, and in his female characters.

Mrs. Brotherton's "Old Acquaintance"<sup>6</sup> will be welcomed by everybody. One of the most charming papers is that upon Landor. Landor used to say, "I suppose some half-dozen persons in England possess my books, and perhaps three are capable of understanding them." Mrs. Brotherton is certainly one of the three. Her short analysis of "Pericles and Aspasia," which she justly considers Landor's finest work, is admirable. As she justly remarks, we find none of that heavy learning which so encumbers the pages of most classical romances. Instead of "local colouring," as it is falsely called, Landor gives us the Greek Spirit. "He compresses," says Mrs. Brotherton, "whole idylls of Theocritus into half a page." Mrs. Brotherton too very rightly adds that the real reason why Landor places his scenes in another age and in a foreign land was because that although he was evidently a freethinker, yet his mind was of a deeply solemn and religious cast. Another excellent paper is that on Sensation Novels. Here is a little bit of criticism for critics, "Coleridge, I think, called turnips the First Cause of boiled mutton. Critics appear to me to be the First Cause of sensation novels." No one who remembers how persistently the *Times* some years ago praised the sensation novels of the day, will consider Mrs. Brotherton's criticism unjust. Critics and publishers have really written the sensation novels. But sensation novels, in spite of the *Times*, can only last their short hour. Only true art lives.

We also give a hearty welcome to Mr. Cooper's "Old Fashioned Stories."<sup>7</sup> Mr. Cooper's is a name which deserves to be honoured. He was imprisoned in Stafford Jail for holding opinions many of which the Tory Government has by a well-known process of "education" passed into law. If we are not mistaken, Mr. Cooper suffered at the time when the notorious Colonel Sibthorp was M.P. for Lincoln. His book now, however, is dedicated to the present member, Mr. Seely. This one fact will show what a great change has taken place in politics. To all Liberals, and especially to Lincolnshire men, Mr. Cooper's work will have a peculiar interest.

Amongst reprints of novels we must especially notice Mrs. George Hooper's powerfully written story "The House of Raby."<sup>8</sup> Mr.

<sup>6</sup> "Old Acquaintance." By Mrs. Brotherton. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1874.

<sup>7</sup> "Old Fashioned Stories." By Thomas Cooper. Author of "The Purgatory of Suicides." London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1874.

<sup>8</sup> "The House of Raby; or Our Lady of Darkness." By Mrs. George Hooper. Author of "Arbell," "A Young Man's Love." London: Henry S. King and Co. 1874.

Moy Thomas's well-known novel of "A Fight for Life,"<sup>9</sup> also reappears in a handsome volume. Mr. Miller, who ought to be classed with Mr. Cooper, partly for his political sympathies and partly because he has in some of his tales dealt with the same Lincolnshire scenery, gives us a new edition of "Royston Gower, or the Days of Robin Hood."<sup>10</sup> We have always considered this to be Mr. Miller's finest work. We have been praising Miss Parr's descriptions of the beeches in "Beechwood," which were evidently taken from the beeches in the New Forest, but we must give the palm to Mr. Miller's description of the oaks of Sherwood. Mr. Miller has many competitors in the same field. Every one will remember Scott's description of the old weird, gnarled oaks of Sherwood in "Ivanhoe," a description which has always struck us as one of Scott's best bits of nature painting. But Mr. Miller holds his own. His descriptions, too, of Newstead Abbey are equally vigorous. "Royston Gower" is utterly unknown to the present generation of novel-readers. We can, however, recommend it as a thoroughly good, healthy, out-of-door romance, the last of a forgotten school, describing many scenes of forest and woodland, which have actually passed out of existence since the book was written, and describing them, too, with the taste and feeling of a poet.

We are always glad to meet Canon Kingsley,<sup>11</sup> if he will but keep off the east wind, the Athanasian Creed, and "God's own green grass." He never has anything particularly original to tell us, but he always sets forth old truths in a forcible way. He is not quite so bloodthirsty as his master Carlyle, nor so hysterical as his fellow-disciple Ruskin. People will read Canon Kingsley when they will not read anybody else. For our own part we consider Canon Kingsley's style far too "loud," and far too gushing to be really beautiful. His style, however, appears to make an impression on the minds of some people, especially the great mass of semi-educated men and women, utterly deficient in literary instinct, taste and refinement, who abound in our large manufacturing towns. In Canon Kingsley's newest work they may find plenty of their favourite rhetoric, not unalloyed with a great deal of good common sense. If they will but leave the rhetoric alone, and stick to the common sense, the book may do a great deal of good. The best papers are decidedly those respectively entitled, "The Science of Health," "The Two Breaths," "Nausicaa in London," "On Bio-Geology," and "Heroism." And of these papers the best is "On Bio-Geology." There is less rhetoric and more knowledge. Canon Kingsley deals with a special subject which he has studied, and stands upon ground which, if limited, he knows. The paper is very charming. We shall make one quotation from it, and leave to Canon Kingsley's

<sup>9</sup> "A Fight for Life." By Moy Thomas. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1874.

<sup>10</sup> "Royston Gower; or, the Days of Robin Hood." By Thomas Miller. Author of "Gideon Giles, the Roper;" "Fair Rosamond," &c. &c. London: Ward, Lock and Tyler. 1874.

<sup>11</sup> "Health and Education." By the Rev. Charles Kingsley, F.L.S., F.G.S. Canon of Westminster. London: W. Isbister and Co. 1874.



admirers the task of reconciling the statement with the idea of a beneficent Almighty.

“ ‘Woe to the weak’ seems to be Nature’s watchword. The Psalmist says, ‘The righteous shall inherit the land.’ If you go to a tropical forest, or indeed if you observe carefully a square acre of any English land, cultivated or uncultivated, you will find that Nature’s text at first sight looks a very different one. She seems to say—Not the righteous, but the strong shall inherit the land. Plant, insect, bird, what not — Find a weaker plant, insect, bird than yourself, and kill it and take possession of its little vineyard, and no Naboth’s curse shall follow you; but you shall inherit, and thrive therein, you, and your children after you, if they will be only as strong and as cruel as you are. That is Nature’s Law”—(p. 195).

Of course a man who loves the East wind and admires the Athanasian Creed, will have no difficulty in reconciling these views with the idea of a Beneficent Creator. Credit, however, must be given to Canon Kingsley for his thorough honesty. He is always willing to admit facts. He does not, like most of his fellow-clergy, blink them. His writings in spite often of his conclusions, are therefore most valuable. Educated Germans often say, we don’t care what views on Revelation are held at our schools as long as Science is properly taught; for we are quite sure that our children, when they come to manhood, will think for themselves. So we say of Canon Kingsley’s writings. We care not one straw about his views on the Atonement or the Athanasian Creed. As long as he teaches sound science we are quite content. We are fully satisfied that in due time the world will draw its own conclusions. We hope, therefore, that Canon Kingsley may give us many more such admirable lectures as “The Science of Health” and “The Two Breaths.” They will help to counteract some of the ill effects of some of the sermons of his fellow-clergymen. Here is a passage from “The Two Breaths,” which cannot be too widely circulated:—

“Every organ of the body is formed out of the blood, and if the blood be vitiated, every organ suffers in proportion to its delicacy; and the brain, being the most delicate and highly specialised of all organs, suffers most of all and soonest of all, as every one knows who has tried to work his brain when his digestion was the least out of order. Nay, the very morals will suffer. From ill-filled lungs, which signify ill-repaired blood, arises year by year an amount not merely of disease, but of folly, temper, laziness, intemperance, madness, and, let me tell you fairly, crime”—(p. 41).

We have not given the whole of this passage, because we by no means agree with Canon Kingsley’s conclusion, which we have, therefore, omitted. But a man holding the position in the Church which Canon Kingsley does, who dares to speak the truth so plainly and so boldly, wins our admiration and sympathy. Not many years ago it was the fashion for the clergy to denounce Combe as a materialist and atheist; but the whirligig of time has brought round its revenges, and we find that most sensible of physiologists quoted and recommended in Canon Kingsley’s pages. Here, again, is another passage from “The Science of Health:”—

"We can no more mend men by theories than we can by coercion—to which, by the by, almost all those theorists look longingly as their final hope and mainstay. We must teach men to mend their own matters, of their own reason, and their own free-will. We must teach them that they are the arbiters of their own destinies; and, to a fearfully great degree, of their children's destinies after them. We must teach them, not merely that they ought to be free, but that they are free, whether they know it or not, for good and for evil. And we must do that in this case by teaching them sound practical science; the science of physiology as applied to health"—(pp. 9, 10).

We should like, however, to know accurately how far it is true what Canon Kingsley states twice over, though in very general and hazy terms, that the present generation is so much inferior to former generations in physical strength and stature; for this is what we suppose he means by his rather big terms "degrading process" (p. 8) and "degradation" (p. 10). We are quite aware of the popular proverb, which says "each generation grows wiser and weaker," and that the recruiting sergeant has increasing difficulties each year in the manufacturing districts in finding recruits with the proper chest-measurement. But, on the other hand, large limitations and qualifications will have to be made. We have seen it stated that at the Eglinton Tournament it was found to be an impossibility to wear the armour of our ancestors, so much larger-limbed had their descendants become. This is a subject which is worthy the attention of Mr. Galton. Some of Canon Kingsley's papers, however, in this volume are very poor. The greater portion of "The Tree of Knowledge" is mere theological twaddle, and of "The Air-Mother" mere literary rant; whilst "The Study of Natural History" is quite unworthy of its author. We go back with pleasure to "The Science of Health;" and shall conclude our notice of an interesting volume with a practical suggestion, which we trust we may see before long carried into effect in many of our large towns:—

"Why, then—to come to practical suggestions—should there not be opened in every great town in these realms a public school of health? It might connect itself with—I hold that it should form an integral part of—some existing educational institute. But it should at least give practical lectures for fees small enough to put them within the reach of any respectable man or woman, however poor. . . . Why should not the experiment be tried, far and wide, of giving lectures on health, as supplementary to those lectures on animal physiology which are, I am happy to say, becoming more and more common? Why should not people be taught—they are already being taught at Birmingham—something about the tissues of the body, their structure and uses, the circulation of the blood, respiration, chemical changes in the air respired, amount breathed, digestion, nature of food, absorption, secretion, structure of the nervous system—in fact, be taught something of how their own bodies are made and how they work?"—(pp. 12, 13).

Mr. Leslie Stephen's<sup>12</sup> style is exactly the opposite to Canon Kingsley's. We have no fizzes of fine writing for fine writing's sake, or for the sake of anything else. God is not adjured nor complimented in every other page. Christianity and muscles find their proper places. It is a per-

<sup>12</sup> "Hours in a Library." By Leslie Stephen. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1874.

fect relief after the flabby, effeminate rhetoric with which we are now deluged, to read Mr. Leslie Stephen's terse and masculine style. His is English, such as Swift, if he had lived now, might have written. He is, too, what is so rare, not only a humourist, but also a consummate master of satire. He is, further, what is also equally rare amongst the popular essayists of the day, thoroughly consistent and logical. He gives us no declamation. He never shrieks. He presents us with good, plain, solid reasoning. There is more substance in "Hours in a Library" than in twenty volumes of modern essays which lumber Mudie's shelves. Of the eight essays which make up the work, all are excellent. We shall select one—"Some Words about Sir Walter Scott"—as it treats upon a point which is especially interesting, when novel writing is fast becoming a regular trade. The essay makes no attempt to rehabilitate Scott, but rather endeavours to take off the edge of Carlyle's well-known criticism upon the author of "Waverley." Mr. Stephen fully admits that public opinion has of late years undergone a remarkable change with regard to the merits of Scott. As Mr. Stephen asks, how many of the ladies who appeared in character at the Waverley Ball on the celebration of the Scott Centenary, could have passed an examination without being crammed, in the events of the lives of the persons whom they were supposed to represent? Arthur Orton, in his favourite character of Roger Tichborne, would have probably succeeded quite as well. Again, Mr. Stephen admits that in private conversations—for, of course, people do not utter such things publicly—he has heard it said that Scott is dull. Now there is a very great difference between worshipping Scott as "the Ariosto of the North" and denouncing him, as Landor did, as a "great Pothouse writer." Mr. Leslie Stephen tries to hold a fair balance between the two extreme views, and so far we think he succeeds admirably. As he truly says, if Scott is called dull, whose reputation is safe? Will our descendants yawn over "Pickwick," and find Mrs. Gamp a bore? It is, however, when Mr. Leslie Stephen directly meets Carlyle that we feel most interested. Amongst various charges Carlyle urges, what is most undoubtedly very true, that Scott regarded literature rather as a trade than an art. "He coined his brains into money to buy farms." He, in short, wrote only what paid. This, as Carlyle says, is, without doubt, hurtful and degrading. Mr. Leslie Stephen's reply is so well put, that we prefer to give it in his own words, rather than weaken it by any amplification—"No good work is done when the one impelling motive is the desire of making a little money; but some of the best work that has ever been done has been indirectly due to the impecuniosity of the labourers." Now this is certainly the truth; but it is not the whole truth. On the one hand, the old proverb, "Vexatio dat intellectum"—that is to say, "the want of pence which vexes public men," holds good; but on the other hand, the finest and sublimest works which the world knows—the Greek Drama and the Hebrew Scriptures—were wrought without fee or reward. The other defence which may be made for Scott, is one Mr. Leslie Stephen does not overlook—namely, that if he had taken ever so much pains, he would not have written so very much better. He would

probably have corrected many blunders, for Scott is a most careless writer in matters of detail; but by no possible labour would he have ever reached the highest realms of art. We do not think so much of the defence which Mr. Leslie Stephen urges from the case of Shakspeare. Even supposing that Shakspeare did, as Pope alleges, write merely for gain, his weakness does not extenuate Scott's conduct. Shakspeare's anxiety about a coat of arms and crest has always appeared to us as very small and contemptible. Milton certainly would not have cared for such baubles. We cannot, however, pursue the controversy any further between Carlyle and Mr. Leslie Stephen, but we most strongly advise every one to read for themselves what the able critic has to say in answer to the charges, and strictures of the moralist. Mr. Leslie Stephen, very fairly, we think, sums up Scott's merits. Lockhart, he tells us, remarks that Scott hated whitewash, and all quaker-like uniformity. His eye loved the picturesque; so the roof and the walls at Abbotsford were adorned with carved oak and coats-of-arms; but the carved oak was imitation, and the coats-of-arms were stucco. And Mr. Leslie Stephen adds—

“This anecdote, recounted by the admiring Lockhart, gives the true secret of all Scott's failures. This plaster looks as well as the carved oak—for a time; but the day speedily comes when the sham crumbles into ashes, and Scott's knights and nobles, like his carved cornices, become dust in the next generation. It is hard to say it, and yet we fear it must be admitted, that the whole of those historical novels, which once charmed all men, and for which we have still a lingering affection, are rapidly converting themselves into mere débris of plaster of Paris.”

And yet Mr. Leslie Stephen is by no means unjust to Scott, nor insensible to his great charms. He can admire his poetry; above all, too, he can sympathize with that love for the country which breathes through all Scott's writings—that hearty, joyous feeling for open-air life, which made him exclaim, he “should die if he did not see the heather once a year.” Novelists should by all means study Mr. Leslie Stephen's pages. In the matter of novels he is thoroughly an art-critic. Novelists will learn more from him as to the art of constructing a novel than from any work which we know. He has given us papers upon such utterly different novelists as De Foe, Hawthorne, Balzac, Scott, and Richardson. In these papers he incidentally treats of many other novelists. In one place he gives a catalogue of all the various sorts of novels which have been composed. His criticisms are full of good sense. Here is a criticism which cannot be too strongly impressed upon young novelists:—“The common saying, that truth is stranger than fiction should properly be expressed as an axiom, that fiction ought not to be so strange as truth.” Now most young writers, when they are criticised for detailing some incident which is utterly incongruous and out of keeping, reply to the critic, “but it really did happen precisely as I stated.” Most true, but this is not art, but photography, which has been well called “the antithesis to art.” As Mr. Leslie Stephen goes on to observe: “A marvellous event is interesting in real life simply because we know that it happened. In a fiction we know that it did

not happen ; and therefore it is interesting only so far as it is explained ;" and, as we also would add, made natural and suited, by the writer's artistic tact, to the immediate circumstances in the novel, either to the development, or to what the Germans call the "retarding nature," which so few novelists can comprehend, of the story. We hope that our realistic novelists may study Mr. Stephen's pages. Excellent is the remark which he quotes from Balzac : "It is the mission of genius to search through the accidents of the time for that which must appear probable to all the world." As French critics are so constantly insisting, it is the duty of the novelist to give us not so much the *vrai* as the *vraisemblable*. Here, again, is another piece of criticism, upon which it might be worth while for our new realistic school to ponder :—"The highest triumph of style is, to say what everybody has been thinking in such a way as to make it new ; the greatest triumph of art is to make us see the poetical side of the commonplace life around us" (p. 347). We cannot too strongly insist upon what seems to be entirely forgotten, except by one great living novelist, that novels should be not only *σκιὰ τῶν ὄντων*, but also *φαντάσματα θεία*, that they should blend reality with "the light that never was on sea or shore." This has been said over and over again in different ways by critics in every language, but it has never been necessary to repeat it so often as just at the present moment ; and we sincerely thank Mr. Stephen for so emphatically calling attention to the subject. One more brief remark, and we have done. Speaking on this very point, Mr. Leslie Stephen remarks : "There are scoffers, though I am not of them, who think that the tittle-tattle which Miss Austen gathered at the country-houses of our grandfathers is worth more than the showy but rather flimsy eloquence of the 'Ariosto of the North'" (p. 260). Now we think that here Mr. Leslie Stephen labours under some mistake. The admirers of Miss Austen, who are not necessarily the "scoffers" of Scott, do not reverence the tittle-tattle of Miss Austen, but her marvellous power of dramatic representation—of dramatic ventriloquism, as it might be termed. In this power she is, her admirers say, and we think, in a certain sense, rightly, only second to Shakspeare. Scott acknowledged her wonderful dramatic power, and in a well-known passage speaks about his own "big bow-wow style," compared to her delicate and exquisite touches. The admirers of Miss Austen regret that such wonderful dramatic power was wasted on such unworthy themes. We were very careful when noticing Miss Thackeray's estimate of Jane Austen in the last number of this *Review*, to point out how very many and how very great were the limitations of the author of "Emma" and "Pride and Prejudice." Let us repeat, it is not the tittle-tattle of Mr. Collins or Miss Bates, amusing as it is, but the wonderful life-like way in which Mr. Collins and Miss Bates and a dozen more characters are brought before us and made to act and talk like real living people, which takes Miss Austen's admirers captive. Hers is the very triumph of dramatic art, but unfortunately shorn of all the glories which accompany "the consecration and the poet's dream." Lastly, let us say that "Hours in a Library" should find its proper home, not on Mudie's

shelves, but really and truly in each reader's library, so that it may grace the place from whence it takes its name.

We do not say that Lord Neaves has produced the best amongst the many excellently edited volumes of the series of "Ancient Classics for English Readers,"<sup>13</sup> but we think he has produced the one which ought to be the most popular. Lord Neaves has enriched his collection by an excellent Introduction. The general idea of an epigram in the public mind is that it is one of those impudent vulgar personal rhymes which we see week after week in our comic journals. Lord Neaves is careful to explain that the Greek epigram does not aim at flippancy, but studiously avoids it. The best Greek epigram knows no meretricious tricks. It does not seek to startle by surprise, much less by absurd personalities. Beauty only is its aim. And this is the characteristic of all good poetry in all ages, whether it is an epigram or in four lines, or an Idyl of Theocritus, or a Paradise Lost. Here, for instance, is a good example of the best class of Greek epigram—lines from a lover to his mistress:—

"My star, thou viewest the stars on high;  
Would that I were that spangled sky,  
That I, thence looking down on thee,  
With all its eyes thy charms might see."

Here is another to one who is no longer amongst the living—

"Aster, in life our Morning star, a lovely light you shed,  
And now you shine as Hesperus, a star among the dead."

Both these exquisite epigrams are said to be by Plato. We have only one fault to find with Lord Neaves' Introduction. It is not full enough. He should have said far more about the many excellent anthologies which are totally unknown to the public. He has done a great deal, but not enough. He should have given, for those who cared to follow up the subject, a list not only of standard works, like Jacobs and Brunk, but referred us to those still less known to the British public. It would indeed be a most useful undertaking to catalogue all the works which have appeared bearing on the subject of Greek epigrams, with short notices of their respective merits. Further we should have been glad if Lord Neaves would have shown for us, and he would evidently have done the work with great taste and judgment, how thoroughly imbued some of our own Elizabethan poets were with Greek simplicity and taste, and how thoroughly they united condensation of thought with perfect beauty of expression. The English Philistine has got an idea into his head that Moore is the ideal of a Greek Anacreon. No poetry is so utterly alien to the Greek mind as Moore's soulless fancies. If we would find the echo of the Greek epigram in our own literature, we must look for it in Ben Jonson's "Drink to me only with thine eyes," and "Queen and Huntress, chaste and fair;" in Shakspeare's "Take, oh! take those

---

<sup>13</sup> "The Greek Anthology. Ancient Classics for English Readers." By Lord Neaves, one of the Senators of the College of Justice in Scotland. London and Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons. 1874.

lips away;" in Lily's "Cupid and my Campaspe played at cards for kisses;" in Herrick's "Gather ye roses, while ye may," and in Carew, and Suckling and Lovelace. We have also another little quarrel with Lord Neaves. We wish he would give us far more examples. *Meleager*, the half is not so good as the whole. His next edition will, we hope, be considerably enlarged and enriched. We wish, too, that he would at times, if merely as a treat to the classical reader, give us the originals of some of our favourite pieces. No man knows better than he does the truth of the old saying that translation is the reverse side of the tapestry. And as we read the English versions—admirable as some of them are—we long to refresh ourselves with the original. As a rule Lord Neaves' translations are excellently chosen. Once or twice we think that we have seen better versions. For instance, "Drinking Cupid," by Julian the Prefect, given by Lord Neaves at page 84, was lately rendered, if not so literally, with far more spirit, by a contributor to *Notes and Queries*. We should have much liked to have given some specimens from Lord Neaves' collection, more especially *Meleager's* very beautiful lament upon *Heliadora's* death, and *Meleager's* exquisite "Hue and Cry after Cupid," to adopt, as Lord Neaves has done, *Ben Jonson's* title, but they are both unfortunately too long. We must content ourselves with a shorter one by *Rufinus* on a garland which he sent to *Rhodoclea*.

"This crown of fairest flowers, my *Rhodoclé*,  
Which my own hands have wreathed, I send to thee :  
The lily—the anemone, moist with dew,  
The rose, narcissus, and the violet blue.  
Thus crowned, let no vain thoughts thy mind invade,  
Thou and the wreath both bloom—and both must fade."

This little poem appears to us to unite perfect simplicity, perfect beauty, and perfect pathos. We hope the English reader will say to himself, If the translation is so lovely, what must the original be? The best argument for learning Greek is to be found in the existence of such beauty as this. We strongly recommend all English readers to at once add Lord Neaves' collection to their libraries, and to judge from it for themselves of the grace and dignity of the Greek Anthology—such grace and such dignity as the world has never before or since seen.

The only objection which we have seen urged against Mr. Swinburne's "*Bothwell*"<sup>14</sup> is its length. As we have also often heard precisely the same objection brought against the "*Iliad*" and "*Paradise Lost*," we are not disposed to regard it as of much importance. Considering, however, that this is really the only objection which Mr. Swinburne's critics can allege against him, he must have by this great poem not only exceeded the hopes of his friends but disappointed the expectations of his enemies. It may, however, be just worth while to glance at the real meaning of the criticism. If it means anything

---

<sup>14</sup> "*Bothwell*." A Tragedy. By Algernon Charles Swinburne. London : Chatto & Windus. 1874.

it comes to this, that Mr. Swinburne has broken a well-known canon, and given us too much matter and not enough art. Now Mr. Swinburne is not only a poet, but he is a first-rate critic. He has proved this abundantly by his essays. Now to impute this fault to him, is to impute to him ignorance of the very first principles of his art. If Mr. Swinburne is lengthy, he is so wilfully and of set purpose. He at all events knows what he is doing a great deal better than most of his critics. The only answer which can be made to the charge, is that which Hazlitt made to a similar charge against "Paradise Lost"—take "Bothwell" down and read it. We cannot here at the close of this section, give a long quotation, and by analysis show how thoroughly organic the speech is, and how every part is linked together. We must now content ourselves with a very general verdict. "Bothwell" appears to us to be in some respects, as far as the poetry of passion goes, the finest poem which has been published since Byron's death. We are not quite sure whether Mr. Swinburne was right in casting his poem in a dramatic instead of an epic form. By adopting the latter form he would have taken the most formidable weapon out of his critics' hands. On the whole, however, we think that Mr. Swinburne is right. What he would have gained in one direction, he would have more than lost in another. Briefly let us say that by "Bothwell" Mr. Swinburne has placed himself in the van of modern poets. There will now be no questioning his position. We speak in general terms, because to give a thorough estimate of the poem itself, to point out its defects and shortcomings, is in this place quite beyond our power.

When some two years ago the first series of "Songs of Two Worlds,"<sup>15</sup> by a new writer, appeared, we did not join the loud chorus of praise with which the volume was hailed. We purposely stayed our hand. We could of course see in it much that was beautiful, but also much which was vague and crude. We thought time might do much to ripen the writer's powers, but should have been glad if he had allowed a longer period than he has done to elapse before he had given us a second venture. Still we are bound to say that the second series is a very great improvement upon the first. The writer has gained a greater mastery over the mere mechanism of verse. He has acquired, too, a vigour of style without losing any of the tenderness and mystic feeling which distinguished his earlier poems.

We must briefly say of "Borland Hall"<sup>16</sup> that it is worthy of the reputation of the author of "Olig Grange." It opens up for us a question which has often been asked, how far would a modern novel in the shape of a poem succeed? This we think the writer of "Borland Hall" has partially answered. We believe he might, if he would only set himself to the task, solve the problem. The difficult part would be to say in poetry those commonplaces which have hitherto been con-

---

<sup>15</sup> "Songs of Two Worlds." Second Series. By a New Writer. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "Borland Hall." By the Author of "Olig Grange." Glasgow: James Maclehose. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.



fined to prose. The writer possesses, what is essential for such an undertaking, not only the mere poetical faculty, but deep humour and knowledge of the world. "Borland Hall" is as entertaining as the brightest novellete ever written.

As usual, we have an enormous quantity of small volumes of verse. In nearly every case the writers mistake the wish for the power to write poetry. By far the best are "Song Drifts,"<sup>17</sup> published anonymously, and Mr. Malden's "Philip Ashton."<sup>18</sup> This last, however, shows the greatest promise. We do not know that there is the slightest use in going through the remainder. To name them would simply be to condemn them.

Amongst the miscellaneous books which crowd our table the first place must be given to Mr. Marshall's learned "Early History of Woodstock Manor."<sup>19</sup> The work has evidently been a labour of love. The only critic of such a laborious work can be the author himself. No one else can possibly know anything about the small details into which he enters with such minute care. Two children's books<sup>20</sup> may here be recommended to parents who happen to be wanting such things.

Last of all we must welcome the new edition of Mr. Rosetti's "Dante and his Circle,"<sup>21</sup> and two handsome reprints of Elizabethan literature.<sup>22</sup> Both of the last are excellently edited, and will be a great boon to all students who live in the country, and who cannot be constantly running up to the British Museum or Bodleian Libraries. It is no exaggeration to say, since American buyers have come into the market, that the original editions of Elizabethan works are quite beyond the reach of any but the very longest purses. Our thanks are therefore especially due to such enterprising and public-spirited publishers as Mr. Pearson and Messrs. Reeves and Turner for undertaking these reprints.

<sup>17</sup> "Song Drifts." Glasgow: Thomas Murray & Son. 1874.


<sup>18</sup> "Philip Ashton, and other Poems." By Henry Elliot Malden. Cambridge: E. Johnson. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1874.

<sup>19</sup> "The Early History of Woodstock Manor and its Environs." By E. Marshall, M.A. London and Oxford: James Parker. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> I. "What Can She Do?" Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas. 1874. II. "Cassy." By Hesba Stretton, Author of "Lost Gip." Six Illustrations. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>21</sup> "Dante and his Circle." With the Italian Poets preceding him (1100, 1200, 1300). A Collection of Lyrics. Edited and Translated in the Original Metres, by Dante Gabriel Rosetti. Revised and Re-arranged Edition: London: Ellis & White. 1874.

<sup>22</sup> I. "The Dramatic Works of Thomas Heywood. Now First Collected, with Illustrative Notes and a Memoir of the Author." In Six Volumes. London: John Pearson. 1874. II. "Old English Plays, a Select Collection of." Originally published by Robert Dodsley in the year 1744. Fourth Edition. Now First Chronologically Arranged, Revised, and Enlarged, with the Notes of all the Commentators and New Notes. By W. Carew Hazlitt. London: Reeves & Turner. 1874.



**BROWNING'S  
NEW BINOCULARS.**

**BROWNING'S NEW "PANERGETIC" OPERA,  
FIELD, AND RACE GLASS,**

For general use, brilliant light, extensive field of view, and sharp definition.

**THE "POLYCRATIC" OPERA,**

For distant objects, has 18 Lenses, and possesses great power, with portability.

**THE "EURYSCOPIC" OPERA,**

For the Theatre, has the largest field of view, giving delightfully easy vision.

**ACHROMATIC BINOCULARS,**

From 15s., Cases included.

*New Illustrated List Free.*

NOTICES OF THE PRESS.

**THE "PANERGETIC."**

"Brings out figures with marvellous distinctness, and has a very large field of view, and so very many advantages over the other BINOCULARS that we have seen, that we confidently award very high praise indeed."—*Popular Science Review.*

"Exhibits objects with remarkable brightness and sharpness."—*The Observer.*

"A wide extension of the field of view is attained, while even in misty weather objects are exhibited with wonderful clearness."—*Naval and Military Gazette.*

"A very extensive field of view is obtained, and objects in the distance are shown with great distinctness."—*English Churchman.*

---


**JOHN BROWNING,**

OPTICIAN TO THE ROYAL OBSERVATORY, THE ROYAL SOCIETY, &c.

**63, STRAND, W.C.**


ESTABLISHED 100 YEARS.

THE  
**"PISTON" FREEZING MACHINE**  
 (ASH'S PATENT).



The "Piston" Freezing Machine  
 Freezing and Moulding Dessert  
 Ices, Icing Wines, and making  
 Block Ice.

ASH'S PISTON FREEZING MACHINE is the most effective and economical method of freezing known. It is rapidly becoming a part of the "cuisine" in the establishments of the Aristocracy of this country; it has received the highest patronage, and is used in all parts of the world. By this process Ice Creams are frozen in shapes ready for table—an operation never before accomplished—entirely superseding the use of ice pots and moulds; it also forms a Wine Cooler and produces blocks of Ice. When not used with the usual ice and salt mixture, as on board ships, in the Tropics, &c., ASH'S Freezing Powders are most effective, and guaranteed to succeed.




The "Piston" Freezing Machine (without the Fittings) forming a complete Wine Cooler.

Price of the Machines from 50s. each.

Ash's Freezing Powders, 34s. per cwt., or in Boxes at 11s., 22s., and 40s. each.

THE SELF-FEEDING REFRIGERATOR,



Patented by MR. CLARKE ASH, 1872. By this invention *Economy in Ice, increased space, an uniform low temperature, and a ventilated dry atmosphere* is attained. Whether the ice placed in these safes be much or little, the same low temperature is produced, and moreover, the *lowest temperature* generated by any given quantity of ice is maintained day by day until the ice is dissolved.

*Descriptive Catalogue free per Post.*

PERFECTION IN THE ART OF MAKING COFFEE.  
 ASH'S "KAFFEE-KANNE"

Is an entirely new invention for making Coffee in perfection  
*hitherto unknown.*

PRICES IN BLOCK TIN:—1½ pint, 6s. 6d.;  
 2-pint, 8s. 6d.; 3-pint, 10s. 6d.; 4-pint, 12s. 6d.;  
 6-pint, 15s.

**In Electro-Plate, from 40s.**



ELECTRO-PLATE.

THE ABOVE PATENTED INVENTIONS ARE MANUFACTURED SOLELY BY

**THE PISTON FREEZING MACHINE AND ICE COMPANY,**

THE  
WESTMINSTER  
AND  
FOREIGN QUARTERLY  
REVIEW.

~~~~~  
JULY 1, 1874.

ART. I.—BUTLER'S ANALOGY: ITS STRENGTH AND  
WEAKNESS.

1. *Lectures on Butler's Analogy.* By the Rt. Hon. J. NAPIER, LL.D. Dublin. Hodges, Smith and Co.
2. *Religious Thought in England from the Reformation to the End of Last Century.* 3 vols. By the Rev. JOHN HUNT, M.A. London: 1870.

THE long controversy between Orthodoxy and Free-thought has produced no book which (in England at least) has attracted more attention than Butler's "Analogy." For a time, the writings of Paley enjoyed a wider popularity, but the influence of Paley has decidedly waned, while that of Butler has been steadily increasing, during the last half-century. Little as we know of the latter's life and surroundings, yet we can gather, from stray hints, that the production of his treatise was looked forward to with great interest by such of his friends and contemporaries as had been made acquainted with his undertaking. It was instinctively felt that the youthful correspondent of Dr. Samuel Clarke, and the preacher of the "Sermons at the Rolls," would have something weighty to urge on behalf of his creed, in the conflict then raging between the Orthodox and the Deistical writers. Yet, brilliant as may have been the expectations formed by such men as Berkeley and Secker, they have been far surpassed by the success of the Analogy. We say nothing of the admiration which greeted its appearance, for praise every whit as strong has been lavished upon treatises on both sides, the [Vol. CII. No. CCI.]—NEW SERIES, Vol. XLVI. No. I. B

very names of which are now unknown to all but a small number of students in a particular line. We are speaking of its permanent reputation. It has taken the place of a text-book in our Universities, in conjunction with Paley, and latterly to the exclusion of Paley. More than one "Analysis" has been constructed to facilitate its study, and to spare the undergraduate some part of the headache which Sydney Smith, in his jocular way, said that the mere sight of the book never failed to give him. The compliments, sometimes of a rather hyperbolical character, which have been showered upon it by men of eminence would fill a volume. In Southey's opinion, it established the truth of revelation by "irrefragable proofs:" to Dr. Chalmers, the author was the "Bacon of Theology:" Bishop Philpotts declared that he looked upon him as "the greatest of uninspired men." Nor have these tributes to his greatness and his influence emanated solely from persons of his own religious creed. John Henry Newman, and other Roman Catholics have, as is well known, laid him under extensive contribution—for the purpose of bolstering *their* dogmas it is true, a point to be presently considered—and we learn from the lately published Autobiography of Mr. Mill how James Mill was for a long time kept in the ranks of the Orthodox by the arguments of Butler. He considered them absolutely unanswerable by the Deists to whom they were addressed. It is, however, in the present day, that is to say in the controversial literature of the last twenty years, that we find the most marked traces of Bishop Butler's influence. In the midst of the battle now being waged afresh, the champions of Orthodoxy seem to betake themselves to his construction as being, in the words of one of them, "an impregnable fortress erected for the defence of Christianity." We do not profess to have read all the Bampton and Boyle lectures which have been delivered of late years, but in those which have come under our eye, we have perpetually seen the same great name invoked. The two series of Christian Evidence Society's lectures (lately noticed in this *Review*) contain scarcely one formidable argument which is not derived from the same source. Mr. Henry Rogers, one of the ablest writers on his side, furnishes us with page after page of what is, after all, only a spirited rendering of the Analogy. In the Duke of Argyle's "Reign of Law," the argument of Butler is spoken of as "the greatest in the whole range of Christian philosophy;" and is elsewhere, if we remember rightly, styled by him not so much an argument as the unfolding of a new system; while Canon Liddon, preaching in St. Paul's Cathedral, boasts that Butler has "turned the Deistic position," and has shown that, unless men insist upon certain absurd conditions of belief, "they ought to accept Christianity." A Quarterly

reviewer seems to go beyond Bishop Philpotts, and to attribute something akin to infallibility to the book. "We should change a word in it, with the caution of men expounding hieroglyphics—it has a meaning, but *we* have not hit upon it—*others* may, or we ourselves may *at another time*."\* There was a time when one of England's greatest Ministers, Mr. Pitt, said—with profound truth, as it appears to us—that "the Analogy raises more doubts than it solves," but now we find statesmen, in their speeches and letters, swelling the chorus of unmitigated eulogy. According to Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, lately speaking as Attorney-General at the Oxford Union Society Jubilee, the culminating glory of Oxford is "Bishop Butler, the glory of the Church of England, the greatest, brightest, most pregnant and original man who ever wrote on Christian philosophy." Mr. Gladstone goes a step further in a recently published letter. "Bishop Butler taught me forty-five years ago to suspend my judgment on things I knew I did not understand. Even with his aid, I may often have been wrong, *without him I think I should never have been right*"—a wild, and for the writer, characteristic way of expressing the fact that Butler has had great influence over his mind. But what induces Mr. Gladstone to add, "And oh! that this age knew the treasure it possesses in him, and neglects!" No writer that has existed, from the invention of letters to the present day, could have less cause to complain of "neglect" than Bishop Butler. What, as we shall presently see, might be said with much more justice is, that he has been unduly extolled; that great as are his achievements, he has been credited with having accomplished certain ends for Orthodoxy, which he never even professed to aim at.

What did Bishop Butler really do for the Orthodox system of belief by his Analogy? How far are the eulogies which have been heaped upon him, of which the above are mere fragmentary specimens selected at haphazard, justified in their general tone and purport, when divested of rhetorical embroidery and exaggeration? We think that in some respects they *are* justified. We think that it would be difficult to speak too highly of the manner in which he has executed his work. In logical power he has never been surpassed, and even those thinkers who do not admit his premises, and those who admitting the premises deem that the general conclusions leave the matters in dispute very much where they were, will join together in admiring the consummate skill with which the argument is conducted. His style has been objected to, but it appears to us to be the perfect model of a style for one who seeks not to dazzle but to persuade—and

---

\* *Quarterly Review*, No. 38 (1828) p. 307. The Italics are the writer's.

to persuade a particular class of reader ; who handles arguments which, from their very nature, require close and consecutive attention ; in whose case, then, every form of ad captandum writing would be quite out of place.\*

In order to form an adequate view of Butler's merit and position as an author, as also for some other purposes of literary criticism, it would be necessary to take account of the times in which he wrote. He was in a certain sense—with all respect for Chief Justice Coleridge—as far from being “original” as he was, in any sense, far from being “bright.” There is hardly an argument in the *Analogy* the *dissecta membra* of which are not to be found in some of his predecessors, in Samuel Clarke, Waterland, Colliber, and a host of others ; while the key-note to the whole work had been struck before the appearance at any rate, though perhaps not before the first conception, of the *Analogy*, by Bishop Berkeley in his “*Alciphron*.” Sometimes the author does not hesitate to draw largely from the so-called Deists, as, for instance, from Shaftesbury. If we were approaching the book from a certain side it would be necessary to take note of all this, but to do so is happily quite unnecessary for our purpose ; and we make haste to add that these considerations do not detract from the genuine originality of Bishop Butler. His treatise may be described as the summing-up by a master-hand of the theological controversies of half a century, and his originality consists in the co-ordination of the materials which he found ready to his hand. Moreover, it would be interesting, from the point of view to which we have adverted, to notice the sources from which the particular objections to revelation, which he combated, had emanated, whether from Toland, or Collins, or Tindal, or Chubb respectively. But these inquiries, again, are quite alien to our purpose. The objections in question were “in the air ;” they were handed on by one objector to another, and it does not enter into our scope to ascertain by whom each of them was first distinctly formulated in that age. Our object is simply to glance at Butler's arguments, and to test the value of certain positions which we think it must be admitted have been established by him.

There was one characteristic of the times, however, which should not be left altogether out of sight, even for our purpose. It serves to explain here and there the language, and in some degree the general scope of the *Analogy*. In the England of that

---

\* Possibly—it is but a slight criticism—if the author had lived in the present day he would have made less frequent use of the word “thing,” “things.” This word will be found every now and then employed half a dozen times in half a dozen almost consecutive sentences, and becomes well-nigh a source of irritat on to the nervous reader.

day, as in the France of a somewhat later day, to sneer at revelation had become a kind of fashionable trick. To ridicule things held sacred by the mass of his fellow countrymen, with a flippancy proportioned to his ignorance, was a favourite pastime for the bel esprit or coffee-house buck. Swift, in his "Argument against Abolishing Christianity," remarks, "What an advantage it is for great wits to be always provided with objects of scorn and contempt in order to exercise and improve their talents;" and in Addison's "Drummer" one of the characters owns to having professed unbelief in order to "show his parts." It has been suggested that Butler may have been frequently brought in contact with wittings of this description during his attendance upon Queen Caroline, and this may well have been the case, though we can hardly ascribe to such encounters the passages we have referred to in the Analogy, inasmuch as the book was published in the same year in which he was appointed Clerk of the Closet. It is, however, certain that he must often have met with these shallow disputants in the world, and possible that he may be referring to specimens which had come under his observation at Court when he remarks in his preface:—

"It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if in the present age this was an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisal for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world.

To prove to the fashionable world "that it is not so clear a case that there is nothing in Christianity," "that it is not a subject of ridicule unless the system of nature be so too," "that to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule is an offence against natural piety," that consequently "blasphemy and profaneness with regard to it are absolutely without excuse" was part of Butler's avowed purpose in composing his treatise, and in estimating his success we must take into account the real objects which he had in view, and not credit him, as some of his injudicious admirers have not failed to do, with aims such as were indeed loudly professed by some of the apologists his contemporaries, but which are expressly repudiated in the Analogy.

What, we repeat, are the positions established by this great work? They are very clearly set forth, and most carefully limited, by the author himself in his Introduction:—

"If there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of Providence which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of Providence which experience



together with reason informs us of, *i.e.*, the known course of nature, this is a presumption that they have both the same author and cause ; *at least so far as to answer objections against the former's being from God. drawn from anything which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged to be from Him.*"

Granting an author of nature, a being expressly postulated by Butler, there can be no doubt that, subject to the limiting words which we have printed in italics, the above proposition must at once command the assent of the reasonable Deist in the present day. Further on we are told with equal truth that it is just and reasonable "from what is present to collect what is likely, credible or not incredible will be hereafter." This is a specimen of the way in which the conclusions to be drawn are everywhere carefully guarded. In the last paragraph of the Introduction we have a succinct account of the author's design :—

"The design, then, of the following treatise will be to show that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution or course of nature or providence ; that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive ; and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, *and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it.* This is a general account of what may be looked for in the following treatise."

Here we have very clearly set out the ground which the argument from analogy can be justly made to cover, and the limits within which its scope must necessarily be confined. It is perfectly good for upsetting a certain class of objections to Revelation, namely, those the like of which might also be raised against the scheme of nature. Because it is quite clear that if in the natural constitution of things, admittedly from the hand of God, such and such modes of proceeding are adopted, the presence of similar processes in connexion with any alleged Revelation cannot be urged as a conclusive reason against its being from God. This argument appears to us to be really "unanswerable ;" and the analogy is "undoubtedly of weight" on the side of any religion to which it can be applied.

But what then ? We cannot pretend, in the space at our command, to furnish an outline of the Analogy, and must suppose on the part of the reader some knowledge of a book which is one of the glories of our literature. This seems, however, a suit-

able place for furnishing a few illustrations of Butler's reasoning, in order to render intelligible the comments which we shall venture to make upon it, and perhaps to save trouble to a reader who may not have the original at hand. The treatise, we must remind him, is divided into two parts. The first part deals with "Natural Religion;" the second with "Revealed Religion." The first part need not detain us here, because it has often been remarked, and is indeed quite plain, that the whole of it might have been accepted by the Deists against whom Butler wrote. Indeed, if we except a few sentences, there was not one of them who would not have been proud to set his name to it. It is, in fact, a preparation for the second part, in which revelation is treated of. This latter portion may again be subdivided. The first six chapters deal chiefly with the objections to Christianity; and in the seventh the author goes on to consider the positive evidence in its favour. Our illustrations will be taken from these six chapters, in which really lies the main strength of the work, viewed as a defence of the orthodox system against the objectors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The author first proceeds to consider the objections to any kind of revelation urged on the ground of the sufficiency of the light of nature. No man, he says, can fairly take up this ground who considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation, and in those parts of the world which still derive no light from it. One might as well say that life is so happy that our condition is incapable of being bettered. There are others, again, who take up a view not wholly unlike this, to the effect that revelation is of small importance provided natural religion be kept to. Butler, in a chapter "Of the importance of Christianity," vindicates the importance of revelation as being—firstly, a republication of natural religion "with a degree of light to which that of nature is but darkness;" and secondly, as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. As for our being ignorant of the reasons for these precepts, the whole analogy of nature shows that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted. And he remarks, with great justice, that Christianity cannot be esteemed of little consequence till it be positively shown to be false. Next, the author deals "of the supposed presumption against a revelation considered as miraculous." This is a chapter which, like that in Part I., "Of a Future Life," would not have appeared in its present form, if the author had lived in the present day. Such a statement as that, "when mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power exerted totally different from the present course of nature," is put forward

as an axiom. What follows about miracles is admitted, by all commentators, to be the most difficult part of Bishop Butler's writings. Orthodox critics of great acuteness, such as Mr. Mozley and Bishop Fitzgerald, consider that the author has lapsed into fallacies, while others, such as the late Dean Mansel and Sir Joseph Napier, defend his reasoning, while admitting it to be "difficult" and the arrangement "awkward." To us, it seems that just at the very stress where the orthodox advocate's voice should be clearest he grows inarticulate. Be that as it may, we should not have now-a-days such a sentence as this from the pen of Butler—"It is by no means certain that there is any peculiar presumption at all from analogy, even in the lowest degree against miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena." In the next place the author deals—

"Of our incapacity of judging what were to be expected in a revelation, and the credibility, from analogy, that it must contain things appearing liable to objections. Since upon experience the course of nature is found greatly different from what before experience would have been expected, and liable, as men fancy, to great objections, this renders it highly credible that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand, and liable in appearance to great objections, objections against the scheme itself and against the degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was attested and carried on."

By this method almost every possible objection (except such as might be founded on immoralities and contradictions, which are specially excepted) is at once ruled out of court; a less cautious writer might have gone further, and by the use of "probable" for "credible" have enlisted the objection on the side of revelation. And since the objections to the scheme of nature are at first sight extremely strong (as is shown by the use of such expressions as that "the world is in a state of ruin") it might be urged that the stronger these objections to revelation are, the more they serve to prove revelation: in other words, that the most objectionable religion is most likely to be the true one. Butler of course keeps clear of these absurdities, yet his position is not without its dangers. In this and the following chapters Analogy is invoked to answer such difficulties as this—Is it credible that Christianity (represented as a remedy) should have been so long unrevealed, revealed to so few, and with such obscurity, &c. Quite credible, says Butler, if the light of nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are liable to diseases, for which God has provided remedies. Yet these remedies are often long unknown, known to few, perhaps yet unknown (we may now cite Vaccination and Chloroform as two

striking examples), not always accessible ; in short neither certain, perfect, nor universal. Again, such an objection as that the Gospel scheme supposes God under the necessity of adopting a long series of intricate means to accomplish His ends, is evidently futile : for this is precisely the mode of working of God in the visible universe. So, such objections as are founded on revelation not being universal, and on the evidence in its favour being doubtful, are to be met in the same way. These objections are founded on these suppositions. 1. That it cannot be thought that God would bestow a favour on any, unless he bestowed the same on all. 2. That it cannot be thought that God would have bestowed any favour on us, unless in the degree which we might imagine most to our advantage—suppositions contradicted by the general Analogy of nature. In another chapter the author appeals to nature for Analogies in favour of the divine mediation of Christ. All living creatures are brought into the world, and preserved in infancy by the instrumentality of others, &c. &c.

The above references to the Analogy can indeed convey no idea of the force of the reasoning employed, not only with regard to individual positions, but especially in summing up the effect of the whole : for, in the author's words, "The proper force of the treatise lies in the whole general analogy considered together." Yet they may serve as indications of the method pursued to those who have not read the book, and will perhaps help to recall it in the case of others whose remembrance of the argument has somewhat faded. Upon this method, upon this argument, and the way in which it is handled, we venture to make a few observations.

In a world admitted to be from the hand of an Almighty Creator, and also allowed by every one to be marked by what we must call imperfections, the reasoner is unanswerable who contends that other parts of the Almighty's work *may* be marked by similar imperfections : indeed that *all* parts of it may be full of such. As this world, in which we find ourselves, is full of difficulties, inequalities, pain, suffering, misery, and vice, so may all creation likewise be. Indeed, if any analogy at all can be drawn, this is the analogy to be drawn. And as a reply to objections it would be unanswerable, though as a positive argument it would be worth next to nothing. Nor would it be to the point to argue that the Deity is unmistakably on the side of virtue in this world, or that there is a power "working for righteousness," or that somehow virtue, as virtue, has a tendency to triumph over, and also to produce more happiness than vice—which might be admitted, and yet would

not prove that the same struggle is not going on everywhere, and is not destined to go on for ever. And, supposing any so-called revelation informed us that this was the case, the argument from Analogy in its favour would, we repeat, be every whit as unanswerable as to a certain extent Butler's is. We see no reply to this assertion of what is *possible*, except we assume as proved the goodness of God, and this term "goodness" can only be used in a human sense; to use it in a different sense is simply to use a different term. We could not call an all-powerful Deity good, on the supposition of his action being everywhere, and perpetually such as we see it in this world: hence we are driven to the conclusion that we are in the midst of "a scheme imperfectly comprehended," and that "order and regularity and right will finally prevail in the Universe." This quality of goodness the Deists assumed, and by the help of it escaped from the only Analogy which could otherwise be drawn from an observation of the present state of things, which they represented to themselves as partial and temporary. Now this quality of goodness Butler also assumes. "Our whole moral nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of Him. And this will for ever be a practical proof of his moral character to such as will consider what a practical proof is; because it is the voice of God speaking in us."\* Unfortunately for him, he finds it a terrible encumbrance as he goes on. The Deity of Revelation, whom he is called upon to defend, is not in all respects a good God. He enjoins immoral actions, and he tortures his creatures everlastingly. And if our hopes could be of avail, we should hope that "things may be now going on throughout the Universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at present upon the earth," rather than that there should be a Deity possessed of "goodness" of this kind. Now here precisely are points, the handling of which by Butler require watching. Not that, for one instant, we would accuse him of dishonesty. A more honest writer never put pen to paper. We believe that he succeeded in deceiving himself when he urged, in defence of commands to do acts evidently immoral, that although these acts would have been immoral but for the commands, yet the commands to do them made them moral—a mere equivocation. If this holds good, the most atrocious crimes enjoined on man by the most savage creeds would cease to furnish any arguments against those creeds. Nor is it of any avail to point, with some, to the fact that thousands of children perish in infancy by the hand of (or through the operation of laws set in force by) God,

---

\* Introduction and cf. Pt. I. ch. 3, p. 68; Oxford edition.

and hence to argue that there is no difficulty presented by an alleged order from Him to man to slaughter babes at the breast; since, if we knew the whole facts, their death in this way might be no more a violation of moral law than their death by an earthquake. That the Creator's laws, though carrying death and misery with them, may yet in the end and on the whole be found to be beneficent as well as moral—that in the words of Mr. Herbert Spencer "punishment may be a disguised beneficence"—this is conceivable. But for the Deity to order a man to do things which to him (a man) are immoral, is evidently immoral. A divine command to tell a barefaced lie (falsely to assert a belief in a particular proposition) might, somewhat in the above fashion, be justified on the ground that with a full knowledge of things we might find that it was not a lie. For the statement, however incredible to the utterer, might turn out to be a true one. But every one sees in a moment that this is a mere evasion. It has been well remarked on this point by Mr. Hunt, a clergyman of moderate views:—

"If they (these actions) are immoral, as we understand immorality, and yet not immoral, it is useless to speak of our having a moral sense. Butler could never get over this difficulty, which was really the difficulty presented by the Deists. . . . If revelation depended solely on external evidence, and that evidence were overwhelming, we should be bound to accept all its teaching, however immoral or vicious in our judgment it might be. But if, as Butler maintains, the contents of a revelation are to be part of the evidence, it follows that so far as it is . . . contrary to our ideas of morality so far it is deficient in evidence."—*Religious Thought in England*, vol. iii. p. 393.

Again—and this is a point which has not altogether escaped the notice of Mr. Hunt—Butler, starting with the conception of a good God, has to face the difficulty of eternal Hell-fire, which (especially as presented to us by the orthodox) is not really reconcilable with this conception of goodness. We may presume that the illustrious author thought a great deal upon this subject, and that, as a result of thinking a great deal, he said very little directly. But we are of opinion that the influence of these reflections may be very clearly traced in the Analogy. Butler was far too great a reasoner not to perceive that if the Heathen are to be damned everlastingly (as the Longer Catechism of the Church of Scotland distinctly affirms that they will be), or even if those in Christian countries are to be damned who are conscientiously unable to accept a Revelation, the evidence for which is admitted by him to be doubtful, the goodness of God must be given up. On the other hand, if Salvation be represented as capable of being extended to these, the dogma of the

Atonement must in some degree suffer. Butler seems to accept the latter alternative—though his treatment is faltering—and has thereby exposed himself to suspicions on the part of Evangelical writers as to whether *he* himself was in the right way. In short, the Revelation which he pleads for is not by any means the Revelation of orthodox churchmen and dissenters. Everybody is to be rewarded and punished in the end strictly according to his works. The merit of Christ's sacrifice is to enure to the benefit of those who never heard of it, who (*i.e.*, ninety-nine hundredths of the whole human family) are to be judged on the principles of the Deists whom he is opposing. It would appear from some passages as if those who have been made acquainted with Christianity, and yet disbelieve it, might benefit by the event, provided they behave virtuously and refrain from indecent sneering. In this scheme the Atonement is reduced to a comparatively small value, as a dogma to be believed. No doubt its *effect* is not diminished; and moreover, when any one has a conviction of its truth, he is bound to treat it as a matter of very great importance. But the death of Christ might almost as well have taken place on another planet. It is not *necessary* to believe in it, though it is in some mysterious way a necessary transaction for the benefit of those who live a virtuous life.

However, not to dwell further on this, we see that the general argument takes this shape—(1) “The objections which can be raised against revelation are precisely similar to those which can be raised against the constitution of nature, and are therefore worthless.” If space permitted it would not be amiss to inquire whether this is exactly so; whether, for instance, a scheme involving the infinite torture of sentient beings ceases to present difficulties as soon as account is taken of the trifling pains and aches which, at the worst, are inflicted on us here. (2) “There is a general resemblance between what is taught us by revelation and what we gather from an observation of the natural scheme; and, further, between the modes of communication and circumstances attending the imparting of what we derive from each respectively.” This second head includes the first, and the argument is carried a step further. Now if all this be good (as to some extent it is) for removing objections of a certain class against Christianity, it is also good for removing objections against any established religion under the sun. Difficulties external and internal attaching to Buddhism, Brahminism, Mahometanism may be paralleled by like difficulties in nature. And the same is true of Mormonism and Spiritualism. *Every objection which Protestants have urged against Roman Catholicism disappears under this process.* Nay more, if by

its help Butler "turned the Deistic position," so might the Deists have turned his. It furnishes an argument perfectly good for a system of pure Theism, that is to say, for a belief in a Creator who has left his existence and such of his attributes as would appear most nearly to concern ourselves, to be gathered from probable indications, in a natural way. All the objections which can be urged against such a belief may also be urged against the course of nature. For instance, "that information of such great importance to our interests should be conveyed in such a manner without any absolute proof, and so that the mind is left in some degree of uncertainty." Now upon this it is to be observed that, although the existence of God must be admitted to be a fact of the greatest importance, yet to argue that it is of primary importance that we should have absolute knowledge of it is to beg the whole question at issue. Looking at the course of nature, we think it likely that knowledge of this kind would not be given; at any rate, not unlikely that it would be withheld. In all other directions we are suffered to attain to nothing but relative or phenomenal knowledge. Of the ultimate causes of even the commonest phenomena we are left in profound ignorance. Of the universe as it is we know nothing; at any rate we cannot be sure that we know anything except the impressions which it makes upon beings possessed of senses such as ours. And even if we admit the objection, we are fairly entitled to apply to it, and to others of a like kind, the observation which is made by Butler in respect to similar difficulties raised against revelation. On the supposition, he says, of God making Himself known miraculously to mankind, it is probable that such a revelation would contain things and be attended by circumstances which would seem to us to present objections. And so, surely, on the supposition of the Deity making the probability of His existence felt by natural means. Again, it may be made an objection "that so large a portion of the world should be left in *total* ignorance on this point, with no conception whatever of an overruling power, or often with perverse and grotesque conceptions." Yet, granting revelation, such is precisely the general state of ignorance as to that revelation; and if, from the course of nature, it be argued that it might be expected a miraculous revelation would not be universal, this also holds good as to any kind of way in which the Deity may be supposed to impress a conviction of His existence on the mind of man. If you suppose, as you are obliged to do, a Deity capable of leaving the bulk of mankind in absolute ignorance of His existence, all difficulties are removed from a scheme which supposes Him to leave the whole of mankind without *proof positive* of His existence. Or it may be said that without more certain knowledge of God than is here supposed, we should be



left in ignorance of our duties. This must mean our moral duties. If so, upon any supposition, this has been the state of ninety-nine hundredths of the human family. But this objection can only be urged in a limited form by those who, like Butler, profess to derive a scheme of natural religion from an observation of the constitution of things. What they say is that Revelation *confirms* this natural scheme, and is a republication of it with additional authority. But if this be used as an argument for revelation, in the sense that such a confirmation and republication are needed, it is of a kind with the argument that the existence of God needs positive confirmation. It is merely a way of expressing what some people think would be the most comfortable plan for themselves that the Deity could pursue. Roman Catholicism, with its infallible Church, is only a somewhat stronger expression of this sort of feeling. Again, it may be urged that Christianity is the religion of all the foremost peoples in the world, and this may be cited as an objection to Theism, which has few supporters. And a Theist might fairly allow, though, indeed, adapting to his own use some of Butler's arguments, he need not do this—still he might fairly allow that Christianity is the best dogmatic system of Theology now in existence, and hence the one most likely to be accepted by, and best suited to, the highest races. But it would not at all follow from this that it contained a Divine revelation to be implicitly accepted in every particular. There was a time when the foremost nations in the world held transubstantiation, image-worship, the supremacy of the Pope ; but the Reformers did not infer from this any evidence that they were true beliefs. Quite the contrary ; an advance in human thought was made, and these dogmas were thrown over. So, in the future, a similar advance may be made, and the dogma of Inspiration (which is equally baseless) may be given up. To argue that the religious beliefs held by the foremost nations—and to simplify the matter, let us suppose all Catholic countries to have embraced Protestantism—to argue that these beliefs are necessarily true is like arguing that the scientific beliefs prevalent in civilized communities are necessarily perfect. We must not, however, pursue the subject further, and must remain content with having thrown out these few slight indications of the mode in which objections to Theism might be met by following the method of Bishop Butler. There is no doubt that they could be met, and a book of mark, indeed a standard work like the *Analogy*, might be produced on the subject, by a writer of sufficient power. But, like a great part of the *Analogy*, it would leave an unsatisfactory impression on the mind, unless something much more positive in defence of Theism than the mere removal of objections could be brought forward.

As Butler's arguments cover so wide a range as to be available for answering objections to schemes opposed to dogmatic Christianity, so they are perfectly good for removing objections to the various forms of that creed. For granting that the evidence in favour of Christianity is greatly stronger than that which can be alleged on behalf of any other Creed, granting indeed that we are bound in prudence to embrace some form of it, we fail to see what speculative objections can be offered to that form which passes under the name of Unitarianism, or say to the Arian doctrine. The New Testament does not clearly set forth the equality of the Son to the Father ; certainly the Synoptical Gospels do not. "The three first Gospels," says Dr. Newman, "contain no declaration of our Lord's divinity, and there are passages which tend at first sight the other way. . . . I conceive the impression left on an ordinary mind would be that our Saviour was a superhuman being, intimately possessed of God's confidence, but still a creature."\* We believe that a similar impression would result from the fourth Gospel, when closely examined : but if this be otherwise, the Arian might fairly urge that this fourth Gospel may be an instance of those corruptions, *i.e.*, amplifications of primitive doctrine such as Analogy would show it to be supposable and credible that revelation would be encumbered with. And let it be observed, in passing, that Butler's whole argument gives a rude shock to the dogma of Inspiration. Nor is it of the slightest consequence to appeal to the number of people holding Arianism and the Trinitarian dogma respectively. As we have just said, for more than a thousand years there were no persons, or scarcely any persons, calling themselves Christians, who did not hold doctrines which the Reformation at its advent pronounced to be corruptions. The dogma of the Trinity, it must be borne in mind, was not clearly formulated before the end of the second century, and the Arians were worsted only after a severe struggle. Theirs may be the true doctrine, destined once more to emerge in its purity. For we are not in any sort judges, says Butler, whether it were to be expected that revelation should be corrupted by verbal tradition, and sunk under it—a sentence in which perhaps he has Roman Catholicism in view, but which is of wider application than he seems to be aware of.

But, despite some stray allusions of this kind to the Romish system, we are of opinion that the Analogy, if it be carefully pondered, will be found to have one issue in the direction of Rome, as it certainly has another in the direction of Scepticism.

\* "Discussions and Arguments," p. 184.

The Roman Catholics indeed adopt it, we may say in its entirety. In the first chapter of the second part we have a long paragraph on the importance of a "visible church." Without such a visible Church, the "repositary of the Oracles of God," the author tells us that Christianity must "in a great degree have been sunk and forgot in a very few ages." Some observations might be made upon this statement, if taken in conjunction with others contained in the book : however, the chief point to notice here is that Butler insists with great force upon the necessity and importance of a *visible Church*. This being so, where are we to look for this "city upon a hill," this "standing memorial to the world of the duty which we owe to our Maker?" Of course, it might be argued, on the principles of the Analogy, that this Church *may* be the Church of England as by law established. That is to say, objections to its being the Church of England might be shown to be inconclusive, as similar objections to Christianity have been shown to be. Or the Society of Friends, or the Unitarian body, may each be shown to be *possibly* this Church, on like principles. Now we think the claim of the Roman Catholic Church to occupy this position is one which at least merits attention ; and we should be curious to know what objections can be raised against this claim, while we are of opinion that many positive arguments of great strength might be adduced in its favour. What is the principal objection which Protestants make to the Catholic Church ? That some of its doctrines are not mentioned in the New Testament. Granting this—though it can only be granted with the reservation that all its chief doctrines, for instance, the foundation of the Church on Peter, transubstantiation, purgatory, extreme unction, are either expressly contained in or else implied in the New Testament : at least mentioned in such a way that if they are not held to be implied, so neither can many of the chief dogmas retained by Protestantism be held to be sanctioned—yet, granting this, what does the omission amount to ? We are nowhere informed that the New Testament contains the whole body of Christian doctrine. And it is clear that it does not : that it consists of a series of narratives and letters, the latter in particular referring to a body of doctrines entrusted to the keeping of a visible Church. What is required to be shown is that these Roman Catholic doctrines are *contrary* to Scripture ; and this cannot be shown. Granting even that they were not fully developed at the time when most or all of the New Testament books had been written, this, on the supposition of a visible Church having been constituted, would offer no sort of difficulty. This gradual development of doctrine is strictly in accordance with what we gather from the Analogy of Nature. We are in

no respect judges of the way in which it might have pleased God Almighty to communicate his revelation to mankind : at any rate, this is Butler's own argument. It might have been—judging from Analogy, we should infer that it would be likely to be—communicated in a gradual way. Thus, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, in no respect opposed to the text of Scripture, might very well have been left to be brought to the light, after a long process of incubation, by this same visible Church. And with regard to other doctrines formulated at an earlier period, such for example as the invocation of Saints, it is absolutely ludicrous to contend that they are unscriptural, or that they substitute another kind of mediation for that of Christ : for if Paul prayed for his converts, if the prayer of faith saves the sick, if the prayer of a righteous man avails, it is idle, and indeed wholly without warrant from Scripture to affirm positively that prayers and supplications offered up by those who have put off this temporary garb of flesh can do nothing.

Now, the Church of Rome presents herself to us not only with many of the signs and appearances which we should expect to find in a visible Church, these signs and appearances being noted in her alone, but with the positive assurance that she and she alone is *the* visible Church. She informs us, as a consequence of this, that only for those within her pale is there a reasonable hope of salvation. If this claim can be absolutely disproved, or shown to be ridiculous, there is an end to it, as under similar circumstances there would be an end to Christianity. But no reasonable man supposes that anything of the kind can be done in either case. Sane Protestants are therefore, on the grounds set forth in the Analogy, bound at least to comport themselves towards the Roman Catholic system in the same way as the author declares that sceptics are bound to comport themselves towards Christianity in general. "A doubting apprehension that it may be true" will lay them under serious obligations to it : compel "a reverend regard" to it under this doubtfulness, "a regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under." But we may go further than this. One of the strongest pleas urged by Bishop Butler with the view of inducing people to embrace Christianity is the prudential one. It is, on the whole, he says, the safer side to take. It is safer to act as though it were true, even although the judgment may be unconvinced. "A mistake on one side may be in its consequences much more dangerous than one on the other. And what course is *most safe*, and what most dangerous is a consideration thought very material, when we deliberate

not concerning events, but concerning conduct, in our temporal affair." (Pt. II. ch. 7). "For supposing it doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a contrary manner: still that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear to unprejudiced reason of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act." (*Ib.*) Now surely, if this be so, prudence requires us to embrace not only Christianity in general, but Roman Catholicism in particular. It is not held by Protestants that all Roman Catholics will be damned: at any rate the system of Protestantism does not require this: whereas the Roman Catholic system does certainly include the converse. It is therefore by far the safest course to conform to Rome. Nor do we see any way out of this except on the supposition that the claims of the latter can be confuted with a directness of proof which (as we have just said) is not forthcoming.

There is an observation to be made on this argument from Analogy—we are not now speaking particularly of Butler, but chiefly of his numerous imitators—which appears to be worthy of serious attention, though it scarcely seems to have received any. It is taken for granted that, if a resemblance can be shown between certain dogmas and narratives contained in the Bible on the one hand, and certain sets of ideas and practices prevalent among mankind on the other, this is evidence of the supernatural character of the former. Thus, for example, the dogma of the Atonement is supposed to be greatly confirmed by an observation of the fact that propitiatory sacrifices have been so generally practised. "By the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind." (An. Pt. II. ch. 5.) Again, "the condition of this world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances." (Pt. II. conclusion.) They further believed in a fall, and this fall is related, with all its chief circumstances, in Genesis. Again there is a great natural dread of death, and, in the Scriptures we are expressly told that death is the punishment of sin. There is a desire for immortality: the New Testament sets forth a scheme of immortality. But it is unnecessary to multiply instances.

But the question arises: *May not these natural appearances and the ideas of mankind have engendered the dogmas and narratives?* Until this question can be shown to be absurd, it is useless to point to these coincidences as furnishing evidence

for revelation. Now, that it is not absurd, is proved by the following considerations :—On the supposition of man having put his own rude guesses at the mysteries of nature, and his superstitions into a so-called Revelation, we should expect that, as knowledge advanced, some of these guesses would be shown to be false, and some of the superstitions exploded. This is exactly what has happened with regard to the Scriptures. For example, the dogma that Death came into the world through Sin is false. Again, there is perhaps no superstition so deeply ingrained in the human mind as a belief in ghosts ; and, with this, may be classed a belief in the prophetic character of dreams ; in such beings as witches, wizards, and necromancers ; in divination and the casting of lots ; in demons, sprites, and spiritual possession ; in abnormal earthly types such as giants, and persons who live to an extraordinary age. Now on the supposition, the absurdity of which has to be shown, we should expect that these objects of superstitious belief, now universally discarded by educated men, would figure as realities in the Bible. And, as a matter of fact, from the first page to the last, it literally teems with them. We are reduced to a choice similar to that which Hume gave the world on the subject of miracles. Is it more probable that these things, allowed to be mere delusions everywhere else, are true, in the Scriptural narratives ; or that the writers inserted sincere but untrustworthy accounts of them in accordance with the prevailing unscientific spirit of their times ? And, whichever choice be made, in no case can the fact that the presence of evil spirits in the Bible chimes in with a wide spread natural belief in their existence be adduced as an argument for the inspiration of the Bible : since this belief is admitted to be generally false. And similarly the idea of sacrifices of *any* kind being necessary to appease the Almighty, might, if we had the materials for arriving at a conclusion, be shown to be as complete a superstition. At any rate the dogma of the Atonement derives no weight whatever from the widely prevailing ideas as to sacrifice ; since they may be as false as those quite as widely held on the subject of ghosts ; and, whether true or false, they may have engendered the dogma.

It short, it should be borne in mind by those who draw analogies of any kind between revelations and the course of nature that, on the supposition of revelations so-called being merely the outcome of human reflection on certain problems submitted to it—and whether this is so or not, is precisely the point in dispute—many such analogies or correspondences must needs exist. And so their existence leads to no conclusive inference.

Those who have followed the Analogy attentively through the first six chapters of the Second Part will, we think, be anxious to

get to the seventh chapter in which the Table of Contents promises that "The particular evidence for Christianity" is to be produced. For what has preceded is only of negative value, of value in removing objections. Indeed, the impression left on some minds will possibly be of a different character from that which it was intended to produce, and such as to explain Mr. Pitt's expression, "The book raises more doubts than it solves." For, if we are no judges as to what sort of revelation God would grant us, on the supposition of his granting one at all; nor how far it might contain things seemingly objectionable, deficiencies and irregularities; nor how far the evidence for it might be satisfactory or in a high degree doubtful; nor as to the mode of its communication and the persons to whom it might be communicated; nor as to the extent to which it might be corrupted immediately upon its promulgation: then it would seem that we have no certain sign by which to recognise a revelation at all. Whoever, in this frame of mind, turns to the chapter in question for assistance, will be miserably disappointed. We present Mr. Hunt's summary:—

"On the positive evidences of Christianity Butler has nothing to offer different from the arguments of other apologists. Miracles and fulfilled prophecy are the foundation. To these are added collateral proofs, the whole producing a conviction compared to 'effect' in architecture or other works of art. The miracles and the histories of the Bible rest on the same evidence. The miracles are satisfactory accounts of events of which no other satisfactory account can be given. Scripture history may be received as authentic till the contrary is proved. The multitudes in the Apostolic age who embraced Christianity must have been convinced of the reality of the miracles. The prophecies may be sometimes obscure, and may relate to events beyond the knowledge of the prophets who uttered them. But this might be expected of prophecies indited by the Spirit of God" (vol. iii. p. 139).

The fact is, that by this time Butler has fired his shot; he has virtually concluded his case, and this seventh chapter almost looks as if it were put in to save appearances. His case takes the form of a demurrer to certain preliminary objections raised against Christianity. He has, in our opinion, shown them to be inconclusive. He has shown Christianity to be thoroughly credible. Here properly his rôle as an advocate ends. Having obtained a *locus standi* for Revelation at the tribunal of common sense, he merely casts a glance at the strength of the positive evidence which may be adduced in its favour, and retires victorious in the main. The parts of his argument in which he appears to us to have been least successful are those in which he deals with the objections to the morality of the Scriptures. His treatment of immoral commands is, as we have seen, anything but satisfactory;

and generally, in keeping eternal punishment out of view, and presenting the Gospel scheme as one by which men will be rewarded or punished strictly according to their virtuous or vicious lives, he falls short of (or rather rises above) the orthodox belief. That his arguments are good for removing objections to any established creed does not alter the fact (includes it, indeed) that they remove objections to *his* creed. His treatment of Analogy is not always satisfactory; for instance, we think that Analogy is strongly against miracles. Still, it was sufficient for his purpose to show that they were not incredible. If he attempted to show more than this and failed, his main argument remains unaffected. So neither is the general value of his arguments affected by his recommendation to people to take the safe side—however much this might lead to consequences which he did not intend—and his sensible advice not to treat Christianity as though it were a matter of ridicule.

We have heard a regret expressed by some orthodox people that Butler did not live to compose his treatise in the present day. Others have given utterance to a wish that a successor to him of equal powers might arise to recast the argument from Analogy and fit it to present requirements. But these regrets and wishes are futile. The book would have been substantially the same in 1873 as it was in 1736. To the same objections, if urged now, the same answers would have to be addressed, and the manner in which these were originally set forth does not seem capable of being improved upon. He has shown that there is nothing conclusive in the bulk of these objections, and we do not think this position could be strengthened by any modern retouching and rehandling.

Whether, if he had lived now, he would have dealt with difficulties of another kind in the way of orthodox belief which were unknown to the scoffers of George the Second's time, and what might have been his success in such a task, supposing he had undertaken it: to ask this is to inquire idly whether he would have written an entirely different book on a fresh subject. That he would have had to take some account of them, and that his language in certain places would have had to be modified, is certain. For instance, we cannot believe that he would now-a-days have written that if the principal part of the Book of Daniel could be shown to refer to events then past such a discovery might be "a stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself, considering the authority which our Saviour has given to the Book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it" (Pt. II. ch. 7).

The time of Butler's death, about the middle of the eighteenth century (1752), is virtually that of the close of the Deistic con-



troversy. Neither during his lifetime, nor since, has anything which can be called an Answer to his Analogy been attempted. Nor, on principles of Theism, can we do otherwise than gratefully accept the first part as a splendid contribution to Natural Theology ; while, as to the second part, we do not think it can be successfully established that revelation is *incredible*, and therefore the author must be held to have made good his chief point, that it is "credible." The "speculative objections" against which he argued have disappeared from the pages of writers of consideration, and only find a place in such works as those of Tom Paine, who wonders why revelation was not written on the sun. Yet that people who ought to know better should speak of "the irrefragable proofs of Christianity" furnished by the Analogy, or of its being an "impenetrable bulwark against all assaults upon revelation," is to us, who are among the warmest admirers of Bishop Butler, and would be to that great man himself, if he returned to life, a marvel of absurdity. Four years after his remains were interred in Bristol Cathedral were heard the first articulate utterances of a science which has revolutionized Theology, entirely upset the account given in Genesis of Creation, and rendered in the highest degree improbable the story coupled with it, of a Fall (always assumed by Butler) upon which the Atonement, the most important doctrine of revelation, depends as a corollary ; at any rate has entitled us to ask for stronger evidence of the inspiration of the story than an objector such as Butler has in view would, perhaps, have been justified in demanding. Now it is certain, that instead of being stronger, the evidence for this inspiration amounts to much less than it might fairly be held to amount to in Butler's time. No human being can use his *reason* (upon the functions of which as a judge the greatest stress is laid in the Analogy) without admitting, on full consideration, that modern research and criticism have thrown a new light upon large portions of the Old Testament. While touching on Inspiration it may not be out of place to mention that in the very year of the publication of the Analogy an event occurred which might have given the author cause for some reflection. The laws against witchcraft were repealed. We are quite of the opinion of John Wesley, who expressed himself to the effect that giving up witchcraft was tantamount to giving up the inspiration of the Bible, because to admit that witchcraft was a delusion in 1736 was going a long way towards admitting that it *might* always have been a delusion ; that consequently the Scriptures, in which it was represented as a reality, *wight* not have been literally inspired. This is quite a different case from that of miracles. A generally prevailing belief in contemporary miracles might be given up, and this need not be fatal to a belief

that miracles had in former days been exhibited, for the reason (alleged by Paley and others) that it is of the essence of a miracle to be rare and only to be wrought on exceptional occasions for some mighty purpose. But this cannot be alleged of a function or condition which Scripture represents as common. If there were valid reasons for supposing that there was no such thing as witchcraft in the world in the year 1736 A.D., and that in point of fact it was a mere superstition, the conclusion was inevitable that it was probably a superstition in the days of the Israelites. An immense rent was made in the dogma of Inspiration, such as no patching-up can hide. A new light was thrown upon a whole class of miracles recorded of Jesus, those connected with demoniacal possession, and the inference irresistibly suggested that Jesus himself was not above the delusions of his age. This is a sample of the kind of difficulties—we have purposely avoided calling them objections—which the increase of knowledge has raised in the way of accepting the orthodox system. They are no longer theoretical difficulties presented with the express design of weakening or destroying a belief in that system. The outcome of an independent observation of nature—the fruit of a patient inquiry after truth, regardless of consequences—they have slowly forced themselves upon minds favourable to orthodoxy. Thus a belief in witchcraft was retained for years *because* it was sanctioned by the Bible, and was only given up after a struggle. The researches of modern science have rarely, if ever, been conducted with the view of undermining the edifice of orthodoxy, but the explorers, nolentes volentes, have been forced to pursue courses by which the result has been achieved. From the discovery of the motion of the earth round the sun, down to Professor Owen's recent exposure of the fable of Antediluvian longevity, Science has moved in one direction, in some cases establishing the impossibility of recorded miracles and portents, in all cases rendering them more doubtful than before. Even the critical inquiries of the great Germans, and of our own countryman Colenso, can scarcely be said to have been set in motion by a purpose distinctly hostile to revelation. They have been conducted in precisely the same spirit as that which these learned men would have carried into a discussion of Homer or Herodotus. And, granting that many of the results arrived at remain uncertain, enough remains clear to give rise to serious reflection. On the other hand, Orthodoxy has gained nothing by the advance of knowledge. To be sure some discoveries have been made at Nineveh and elsewhere, which confirm some of the statements in the Old Testament, and have accordingly been loudly trumpeted as evidence of the truth of all its stories: which is like saying that Dr. Schliemann's recent discoveries at

Troy, on the supposition that they actually consist of the treasure-chest of Priam, are evidence of the dream which Zeus sent to Agamemnon, and of the combat between Diomed and Mars.

These, and a host of similar considerations, which will not fail to present themselves to the intelligent reader, are of a nature, we say, to give rise to reflection. For, as Bishop Butler very justly remarks that the proof of Christianity "may be compared to what they call the *effect* in architecture or other works of art; a result from a great number of things so and so disposed and taken into one view," so the same may be said of a belief in a non-miraculous ordering of the Universe. We cannot but think that a man of Butler's candour and logical power, who admitted that in his day the proof of revelation was "doubtful," would, if he lived among us now, deem that it had been rendered somewhat more doubtful. And, if he had still felt inclined to press his prudential system, viz., that in a difficult matter it is best to take the safest side, he might have been induced to take into his consideration whether those to whose minds reason seems to incline one way, may not after all be safer in following the dictates of their reason. On the contrary supposition, the justice of God vanishes. But, on the assumption of a just Deity, it is possible that not to do this will be to commit a grievous sin, and one which may entail grievous consequences. We know that this idea will be ridiculed by theologians, to whom the safe side can be no other than *their* side. But it will, none the less, perhaps indeed the more on that very account, present itself in a serious light to reflecting men conscious that they are responsible for a right use of their reason.



## ART. II.—EMIGRATION.

1. *Annual Reports of Commissioners of Agriculture and Emigration of the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec.* 1869, et seq.
2. *Ditto. Dominion of Canada.*
3. *Ditto. States of New York, Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska.*
4. *Annual Reports Bureau of Statistics.* Massachusetts. 1870, et seq.
5. *Immigration, and the Commissioners of Emigration of the State of New York.* By FREDERICK KAPP. New York. 1870.
6. *Information for Emigrants : a Special Report on Emigration.* By EDWARD YOUNG, Ph.D., Director U.S. Bureau of Statistics. Washington. 1871.
7. *Census of the United States.* 1870.

THE problem of emigration is large and complicated, and in the correlative sciences whose laws condition the individual, the society, and the state, there is much that it absolutely controls, and little or nothing which it does not seriously affect. It is so wide-reaching, and the historical and other matters bearing upon the subject are of such vast bulk, that this article can only deal in a suggestive manner with a few of its most salient features.

Emigration is, and ever has been, a tremendous though comparatively silent force, giving birth to nations and shaping their destinies. History is full of wars, and the various tyrannical acts and conspiracies which have generally done duty in the place of statesmanship ; but he who has never thought of that subject in that light before, will, on taking a comprehensive survey, be perfectly astonished to find how much of the military and political history of the world has been made or marred by the slowly acting force of emigration.

Passing by many tempting themes in ancient annals, let us glance at the history of England and France.

Two hundred and fifty years ago emigration began to take from England considerable numbers of persons of various classes, whose condition here, under the wise laws of our ancestors, made them more or less dangerous to the then existing order of things. In a few years it had gained a great impetus. The king seems

to have measured his power in some degree by the number of subjects within reach of his arm, and therefore to have stopped some of the emigrants by force. This was like sitting on the safety-valve to be able to utilize the greater amount of steam. One of the men thus retained in the kingdom against his will, became chief of the revolution which followed, and he was afterwards more than monarch of the realm. It is impossible to say how few or how many of those who were most violent opponents of the acts of the king would have gone to America had they been free to do so, but it is quite possible that the nature of the resistance would have been materially modified; and that instead of the intensity of passion which prevailed, we should have had a slower, surer, and more thoughtful resistance. This would not have thwarted the king as quickly as the revolution beheaded him, nor would it have put a still more powerful despot of a different character in his place. The revolution took about fifty years to establish any substantial good for the people of England, and one may fairly hold the opinion that the rights of the people, as well as the blood and treasure of the nation and the head of the king, would have been far safer if the attractions of New England had been allowed to prevail over a large number of those who became leaders of the revolution.

Notwithstanding all the checks that colonization received from natural and artificial causes, the political and social influence of the emigration of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can hardly be over-estimated. The year 1776 found the revolting American colonies with a population of about three millions, wholly the result directly or indirectly of emigration. The population of England at that time was about seven millions. The emigration had been mostly from the middle classes, with a sprinkling of labourers taken over by their masters, and of mechanics who had managed to save a little store for their dangerous and rather expensive voyage. From the fact that they knew and appreciated at something like their just value many of the rights to which they were entitled, and which were ignored or persistently refused, many of these people would have been sources of serious danger to the government of their times if they had remained at home. The amount of that danger is not to be measured by their number, but by their character, and by the influence which they would have been likely to exert over their fellow-subjects.

When they left the country their places here were filled by others whose position was in consequence materially improved, and who, feeling this improvement, were much less discontented subjects than they otherwise would have been. Commerce with the colonies brought wealth to the manufac-

turers and merchants, and indirectly to the landowners and the farmers; and as employers had, in a measure, to bid against the great attractions of the colonies, the material condition of all classes but the very lowest was decidedly improved by that emigration upon which many influential persons looked with the greatest disfavour.

It is difficult to imagine the extent of the difference in the condition of the lower, middle, and working classes which would have been produced if the ranks of the shopkeepers, mechanics, and labourers had constantly become more and more overstocked by the competition of these emigrants and their descendants. Under wise laws there might have been room for four times the population, but wise laws are very difficult to obtain even now, and in those circumstances they would have been most unlikely with the aid of revolution, and utterly impossible without it.

Turning to the condition of France at that time, we may obtain some crude idea of the probable results of a permanent non-emigration policy in England. That country was wealthier, and in many respects more favoured than this; it was also far more advanced in the arts and sciences. England's superiority, partly the result of her insular position, was almost entirely confined to the sea. But this superiority of England at sea was a check upon French emigration, and, about the middle of the eighteenth century, the conquest of the great French colony of Canada, by a British imperial and colonial army, virtually destroyed it. In that country, in the meantime, as the population increased, the working classes were more and more at the mercy of those above them, and the share of the fruits of their labour which they obtained became less and less. They could only manage to exist from hand to mouth, and combination for better pay would have been very generally unsuccessful, even if there had been no terribly repressive laws to insure abject submission. Their misery passed the limit of endurance, and everybody knows that the great French revolution was the result, and that the vibrations of that terrible political earthquake have not yet ceased to shake the earth.

It is easy to point to many shortcomings of the people as well as of the rulers of France, and to imagine that these were prime causes of the revolution; but a more careful scrutiny will show that the facts were otherwise. Power is blind, stupid, and self-seeking in all other countries as well as there, and the majority of any people which feels the iron heel of oppression is both deceitful and impatient. That the faults essentially French, to which it is fashionable to attribute the revolution in that country are really non-existent, can be plainly seen by the French Canadians, who undoubtedly possess all of the essentials of the

French character. They and their brethren in the United States are about a million and a half in number, and the descendants of less than ten thousand original emigrants. They have felt little oppression, and they are a people as patient and as contented with their generally humble circumstances as any other population under like conditions on the face of the earth. Nor can it be attributed to the inherent vices of Roman Catholicism, or its injurious effects on the French character, for this religion has had freer scope among the Canadians than among the people of France. No one who carefully examines and compares the whole circumstances can doubt that a large and constant stream of emigration from France would infallibly have ameliorated the condition of the humbler classes, enabling them to cope in a regular manner with the power of those above them, and that it would thus have been a force sufficient to have changed for the better the whole history of France for the last hundred years, very probably preventing the revolution, and at any rate depriving it of many of its horrors, and benefiting in a general way the blind oppressors quite as much as the people oppressed.

It is no doubt very gratifying to that self-love which we are apt to miscall patriotism to attribute to the English race and nation very special capacities for progress and self-government, but our self-glorification in these respects can only proceed from ignorance of the comparative disadvantages under which our neighbours have laboured, or from something still worse. If we examine our political history without prejudice, we shall find that our kings have seldom been very brilliant specimens of humanity. Our nobles have not often been gifted with remarkable political foresight, and the wisdom of our squirearchy and the self-denial of our bishops and benefited clergy have never been so great as to become proverbial among the nations of the earth.

Until very recent times these have been our governors; they have resisted all improvements which interfered with their pet privileges, and they have never yielded while there was a chance of standing out with success. Even with all the strength which our vast emigration has lent to the rights of the poorer classes, the rulers have frequently resisted change till we were upon the brink of a civil war. Nor can we maintain that the middle classes, which are now the foundations of power, are in any respect more unselfish and politically wise than those above them, except in so far as contact and conflict with the lower classes have taught them greater respect. They have never conceded to the lower orders any substantial advantage which the latter were not in a position to exact as the price of service or co-operation; and, indeed, it would be no more reasonable to

expect it than to expect that individual masters who are making heavy profits should hasten to divide them with their employes without pressure or hope of any reward beyond the great social and political advantage that unselfishness would confer upon the community at large. We see among them organizations in restraint of liberty and justice more reprehensible than any trades' union of the labouring classes. What shall we say, for example, of a combination of the farmers of a county totally to exclude from all employment, and therefore to starve or banish, every agricultural labourer who presumes to join a trade society of his fellows? Practically, this is a combination to reduce to slavery, or to maintain a slavery already existing. It will fail as miserably as it deserves, even more promptly than the many similar organizations have failed among other classes of employers; but it will fail only because the ameliorating effects of emigration have now reached the lowest stratum of working men, and have given them a power they could not otherwise have hoped to possess.

It is thus very evident that, in England as elsewhere, without emigration the blind selfishness of power would have overreached itself in all directions, and have crushed the lower orders till it prepared a terrible catastrophe for the nation. The working men could not rigidly and universally apply among themselves the doctrines of Malthus, of which they knew nothing; from wholesale infanticide they would ever shrink with horror, and revolution, or these impossibles, would have been the only alternatives to starvation or slavery.

The greatest example of that unselfish regard for the right, which is the foundation of true political wisdom, that we can boast of, was that afforded by the poor operatives of Lancashire, in the earnest sympathy and moral support which they accorded to the American people in their death-struggle with slavery; and, broadly speaking, it will be found that, numerous errors of ignorance or misapprehension notwithstanding, a true political instinct resides with the working masses of the people, the amelioration of whose condition by all reasonable means is as definite and real an advantage to their superiors as it is to themselves.

It is mainly through the silent working of emigration that commerce has recently attained such enormous proportions, and that public opinion is gradually becoming stronger than armies, and more powerful than governments. The commerce of the existing colonial dependencies of the European States is very great, and they exercise a very definite influence on the public opinion of the world through their connexion with the parent States. But the American Union was so recently a wilderness,



that its forty millions of people may, without a very great stretch of imagination, be considered as a nation of emigrants, whose public opinion is brought into most intimate contact with all civilized nations, and is universally felt. Germany has no colonies of her own, but in every hamlet of that country are relatives and friends of citizens of the great republic, who are frequently receiving thence letters and papers from happy and prosperous emigrants. Through the various influences thus created, the action of the most powerful and stubborn Government of Europe is more sensibly affected than by any other external agency, if we except only the warlike array of some of its neighbours. For Germany emigration is not less important than for England, and in the end it is not unlikely to mould the Government to the popular will without the aid of a revolution. Notwithstanding their friendly attitude to the United States, German rulers fear and dislike emigration for many reasons. Its action on the people remaining at home is by no means altogether approved; from an economical point of view, they consider it a great loss to the country, and worst of all, it takes no inconsiderable portion of the grist from the mill of the army.

Dr. Engel, Director of the Prussian Statistical Bureau, has considered the subject of emigration from the point of view of political economy. He assumes that on the average a man is worth to the country as much as he will cost to produce. He does not tell us how much Germany lost on this score, in packing off the King of Hanover, and in her numerous emigrant princelings, but he deals at once with the manual labourer, whose life he divides into three periods; fifteen years of unproductive youth, fifty years of labour, and the balance of life a period of unproductive senility. Whether or not the child in his first period lives at the expense of his parents, there must be means for his maintenance and education, which means are the result of labour. The productive period (1) should repay the expenses incurred by parents or others in the juvenile period; (2) should satisfy the daily wants and maintain the productive power of the individual; (3) should produce a surplus fund for sustenance during the aged period. Thus the cost of bringing up and educating a man constitutes a specific value which benefits that country which the adult individual makes the field of his exertions. Dr. Engel computes the cost of producing a manual labourer in Germany, at an average for both sexes, of forty thalers a year for five years, fifty thalers a year for five years more, and sixty thalers a year for the third term of five years, with which he completes the period of unproductive youth. He thus arrives at a total cost, and therefore, according to his theory, a total average value of seven hundred and fifty thalers for the

manual labourers of Germany, considered as working animals, and this sum of about one hundred and twelve pounds ten shillings sterling he reckons as the correct measure of the country's loss by the departure of an emigrant, irrespective of the amount of money or goods which he takes to the new field of his labours. According to Engel's theory, this sum increased by the extra percentage of the cost of sound males above the general average of the sexes would also measure the value of any such emigrants, as food for gunpowder. Taking the figures of Dr. Engel as our basis, and adding one hundred and twenty-five thalers as the minimum amount representing the cost of the passage, goods, and clothing of each emigrant, and the money taken by him,\* we find on reference to American statistics that the total German emigration to the United States is a tribute worth in Germany about three hundred and fifty millions sterling. The annual average of this tribute for the four years immediately preceding the Franco-German war was very nearly sixteen millions sterling, and it bids fair to reach twenty-five millions in a very few years.

Dr. Engel's book gives expression and definite shape to an idea fixed in the Prussian official mind, an idea which has long influenced the acts of the Government, and which is now being pushed further than ever before. It is even said that Prince Bismarck had formed the intention of increasing year by year the restrictive action of the Government until emigration should practically cease; but, bold as the German Government may be, it is not likely that it will venture to carry out its theories to any such dangerous extreme.

Notwithstanding the very high authority of Dr. Engel, and any conclusions to which a Government so astute as that of Germany may have arrived, it is not too much to say that this theory is utterly fallacious, and that very little unbiassed consideration is needed to demonstrate the fact.

The theory assumes, in the first place, that German subjects, like German cattle, come into the world in obedience to a definite law of supply and demand, that each German is born because he is in some degree wanted not merely by his parents, but in an economical sense by the nation at large. The actual facts are very different. The child is born to gratify the natural desires of his parents, or else he is, so to speak, an accident of life, which they lack either the inclination, knowledge, power or resolution to prevent. Once in the world, the affection or duty of his

---

\* This sum of one hundred thalers, exclusive of passage, is based on statistics obtained with great care by the Commissioners of Immigration at New York.

parents induces them to make very substantial sacrifices for the purpose of giving him such advantages as they can command, and from his birth to his manhood, questions of profit or loss to themselves, or of State economy, have no more to do with the matter than the law or the other circumstances compel. Children are in fact the one great luxury of the poor, which the State can neither regulate nor prohibit.

Under these circumstances the actual supply of willing hands is very much in excess of the home demand for reasonably rewarded labour, and notwithstanding whatever it may have originally cost, this excess, if retained at home, would be an element of trouble, expense, and positive danger. The economical value of the subjects of a Government depends quite as much upon quality as upon number, and any surplus of population deteriorates the rest much more than any benefit its retention can possibly confer. It is as if a farmer with sufficient pasture and forage for a hundred head of cattle should insist upon keeping a stock of a hundred and twenty, in which case the six score will be found to be worth less in the market than four score bred under proper conditions. Owing in some degree to State interference with the liberty of the subject, and to various other causes which tend to restrict emigration from Germany, its amount is probably somewhat less than what might fairly be considered the increase of surplus population. If so, the total amount of emigration is on economical as well as other grounds an advantage to the State.

It is true that every man who escapes military service by emigration renders it more irksome to those that remain, and that the influence of the republican ideas imbibed by the emigrants is so strong upon the people at home, as to give some concern to the Government, but these are evils which a semi-constitutional militarism must perforce endure, or risk others still worse; they are evils which the majority of thinkers will look upon as having the nature of medicines; a species of blessing in disagreeable guise.

Emigration conflicts very strongly with the military spirit. By raising the price of wages and making a large and effective army a very expensive machine, it has done much to place England in a reserved attitude in respect to foreign politics, and its tendency will be found the same everywhere else.

Depletion through emigration differs essentially in an economical as well as in a humanitarian point of view, from depletion by war or by an epidemic. A hundred thousand emigrants leave an over-populated country, and by so doing confer a benefit on the people remaining. But, if from a hundred thousand like people those who are suitable are selected and made the victims of war, the loss of the country is great, definite and tangible, for the strong only are taken and the weak remain a more or less

direct burden to the State. An epidemic takes both the strong and the weak, but it often breaks down many whom it does not destroy, and it has a tendency to derange trade and to demoralize the whole population. Imagine emigration from the British Isles to cease next year, and the cholera to take its place. Long before the two hundred thousand were taken away, the nation would be in a terrible panic, a large proportion of its labour would cease, and everything would be out of joint.

In France, at the present time, the number of births is artificially limited to such an extent that notwithstanding the very nominal amount of emigration there has been no very considerable increase of population for many years,\* no surplus of a character which need agitate the mind of a true economist or of a genuine statesman at the head of affairs; and therefore those who have suffered death, mutilation, incarceration or banishment in the recent war and troubles of France are the greater loss to the country. This is not the time or place to enter into a review of the doctrines of Malthus, but if there were a moderate annual surplus of population in France, and a corresponding and constant stream of emigration, the chances of good government would be far greater. Constant communications from abroad would create a moderate and wholesome agitation, geographies and histories would be more or less studied, books of travel would be sometimes read, and foreign correspondence would occasionally find its way into the most unpretending of newspapers. The stagnation of the peasants' mind would gradually diminish; they would be less and less like their own sheep, the defenceless victims of the policy of others; *coups d'état* and revolutions alike would have less chances of success, and it might be hoped that they would eventually cease.†

If emigration means the removal of inhabitants from one State or country to another for permanent residence, then Spain, with all her colonies, has had very few emigrants. Her possessions in America were military conquests, and the subject races were much more numerous than the conquerors.

The object of the military and other adventurers who went out was to enrich themselves by plundering and enslaving others.

---

\* Since the German war, and the terrible persecutions of the lower classes of the principal cities, partially as a revenge for the less serious excesses of the commune, the population of the provinces remaining to France has, according to the best authorities, sensibly decreased.

† While the French government still maintains the state of siege in a large part of the country, it is officially doing all it can to discourage those who have begun to look to emigration as a means of relief. It seems to us that comment on such infatuation is quite unnecessary.

Each hoped to return after a longer or shorter period to enjoy himself in his native land on the spoils of the heathen whom the Pope had delivered into the hands of true Spaniards as lawful subjects of all species of violence. Whatever there was of permanent residence or of legitimate labour, was looked upon as the misfortune of the unlucky. In addition to the millions of more or less civilized nations brought into subjection, large numbers of negroes were imported and slavery existed everywhere. Spain derived immense pecuniary resources from her colonies, but the numerous adventurers returning enriched by injustice, could not but demoralize still further a country whose virtues were already overshadowed by vices. Had her people gone forth true emigrants to conquer the forces of nature rather than their fellow-men, even though, as among the English and French colonies, many wrongs were committed, they would have had a great influence for good upon the parent state, and Spain might have held her own among the first nations of the world.

A very interesting part of this great problem is that which has to do with unequal, unjust, or inexpedient legislation. There is no nation which has not by such means banished labour and capital, for which there would otherwise have been ample room. Even the United States have, in this manner, from time to time driven out many millions of capital and with it a large aggregate of labour. English instances are numerous and will readily suggest themselves to our readers. Many English laws at present existing tend to crowd the people off the island, and it is not too much to say that if by a stroke of the pen, the laws, customs, and habits of the people could be modified in accordance with the dictates of sound economy, there would at once be room in the country for a population at least one-fourth greater, to live more comfortably than we do at present. The customs of a people have the force of laws in these respects, and monetary and trade combinations have also a widespread influence. The figures of the extra tribute that the British and foreign public have recently paid to the coal and iron men are more astonishing than the French indemnity to Prussia, and there has been in consequence of this great advance in prices, a great activity in these trades abroad. They have found that it would pay to build ocean steamers in America, and the profits of the coal and iron trades there, have attracted such vast aggregations of capital as must ultimately most seriously affect the English market, by rendering the Americans in a great measure independent of it.\*

---

\* The American iron furnaces and rolling mills are more than adequate to the probable consumption of the country for the present year, and if the duties on pig and railroad iron and steel were abolished to-morrow, they could pay

The amount of capital and labour eventually banished from the country, will be far greater than the extra profits obtained, and the loss will justly fall very heavily on these two particular trades. Many individuals will have made fortunes, but these trades, as a whole, will have discounted their brilliant future at a great disadvantage.

But in considering the economical gain or loss by emigration from a particular country, with its wise or unwise laws or customs, and its trade combinations more or less proper or pernicious, we cannot say that because, but for these things there would be room for ten, fifteen, or twenty per cent. more, therefore there is no surplus whose emigration would be advantageous to the state ; we must deal with the realities of the present, and make no attempt to discount a future which is now intangible, and which would very likely be rendered impossible by the very fact of the adventitious surplus of population remaining in the country. Every such unwise law, custom, or combination is an economical question of itself, to be measured exactly by the amount to which it tends to restrict the capacity of a country for supporting a population in comfort. Measured in this way, it will be found that more than one law has cost the United Kingdom a larger sum than the present capital of the national debt. It is possible that if statesmen would look at political and social legislation more from this pounds, shillings, and pence point of view, it would prove of great advantage to the country.

The comparative surplus or deficiency of accumulated capital in any two or more countries is usually to be measured, not by its aggregate or its *per capita* amount, but by the normal rates of interest which severally obtain, and the surplus or deficiency of population is to be measured, not by numbers or density, but by the comparative advantages or disadvantages under which the people live, the proportionate amounts of their labour, capital being duly considered. In such cases, whatever the effect upon special classes, it is to the advantage of each state considered as a whole, that freedom of trade and locomotion should be as perfect as possible, and that an equilibrium should be eventually established.

In Massachusetts, the average earnings of agricultural labourers are about forty dollars of greenback currency per month for eight months of summer, and about thirty-five dollars per month during four months of winter ; equal to about thirty-

---

wages and profits decidedly higher than those now ruling in England, and yet successfully compete with the English ironmaster in the American market. These formidable rivals are far more the result of the recent enormous prices in England than of that of the American protective tariff.

three shillings and sixpence, and twenty-nine shillings and fourpence per week respectively, or an average for all seasons of thirty two shillings. This is without board and lodging, and it has a purchasing power if we duly average prices and quantities of the various articles required by the labouring classes, seventy-five to one hundred per cent. greater than the wages of the same class in England. Women seldom work in the field, but when they are so employed they receive two-thirds of a man's wages. The majority of agricultural labourers are lodged and fed by their employers. They have plenty of good substantial food, including meat *ad libitum*, and their lodgings are generally in the same house with the farmer, and quite comfortable in all respects. Under these circumstances, their average wages for the year round are about nineteen shillings and eight pence per week, or fifty-one pounds twelve shillings and eight pence for the year. Eleven pounds twelve shillings and eight pence is a sufficient allowance for clothing and incidentals, consequently a single man having steady employment and good health the year round, can save forty pounds a year if so disposed. A first-rate hand would be able to save fifty pounds. When boarding and lodging themselves and having families of four or five young children dependent upon them, labourers in Massachusetts or any other part of the Union could save little if anything, while as they grew older it would be necessary for the children to do something towards the support of the family. But taking the whole of the Northern and Western States, we shall find that the average labourer is quite as well off as the average mechanic in England.

Let us glance at the effect in England of such an emigration as should in a very few years increase the purchasing power of farm labour at least fifty per cent.

To millions of agricultural and other labourers, directly and indirectly, this would make all the difference between gnawing penury and a very considerable degree of comfort. Some would be demoralized, but the vast majority would be morally as well as materially improved by their good fortune, and the despondency, which is a fruitful source of pauperism and crime, would give place to an elation and elasticity of mind and body, which would make the labourer a very superior being to the Hodge of to-day. His capacity of production would increase fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five per cent., and his actual production would be increased not less than ten to fifteen per cent. Diminished pauperism, vice, and crime, and increased individual production, would return at least half of the extra wage to the country; and of this much the larger portion would go to the labourers' employers. If the movement were

decidedly rapid, the farmers and other employers of unskilled labour would at first be able to charge much more than their loss against the public, in the shape of higher prices for much of their produce ; but increased importations would soon check this, and in the long run there would be a certain proportion of the loss of the employers which would not be got out of the general public.

The farmers with long leases would have to bear this portion of the loss themselves till the time for renewal came round, but a small percentage of the other farmers would emigrate rather than pocket the loss. There would then be more farms than farmers, and rents would cease to rise at the normal rate, or they might even go down a little. A moderate pecuniary sacrifice on the part of the landlords would therefore be inevitable, but as they are very frequently quoting the law of supply and demand against their tenants and employés, we must assume that they will not grumble when that law makes against themselves, the more especially as their philanthropic hearts would throb with the pleasant knowledge, that both farmers and labourers, and all dependent upon them were comparatively comfortable and happy.

These trifling sacrifices might also fairly be looked upon in the light of insurances for the much greater security of their property.

Operatives in many branches of manufacture would better themselves full fifty per cent. by judicious emigration, and their case is a strong one. Mechanics, on an average, can still better themselves fully twenty five per cent. by emigration, but most of the English emigrants have been skilled workmen, and their wages are rapidly approaching the equilibrium. Farmers and many small manufacturers can materially improve the condition of themselves and their several classes by judicious emigration. The recent financial panic in America has made no substantial difference with any of these facts.

But there is no disputing that the equilibrium of wages to which everything is gradually tending, means a very great increase of prices. If the purchasing power of labour as measured in sovereigns increases forty per cent., the purchasing power of a sovereign as measured in personal and household necessaries and servants, will probably diminish on the average about twenty per cent., and the net gain of the working classes will be the difference. Profits will become more equalized. It will be more difficult for a man to amass several millions in a lifetime ; and what the public does not gain in this way and from improvements in production, will have to come out of fixed incomes. There is, however, fair reason to hope that



opportunities for profitable and sound investment abroad will rapidly increase, and materially modify what would otherwise be a very great evil. However this may be, and whether the suffering of special classes be much or little, the problem of emigration can be solved only on the principle of perfect free trade in labour; and although this solution will send large numbers of stalwart Britons to foreign shores, it will be of general advantage to the country.

---

### ART. III.—GOETHE AND MILL: A CONTRAST.

IN an article on John Stuart Mill, published in the last January number of this *Review*, his life and character, as interpreted by himself in his *Autobiography*, were treated, so to speak, absolutely. In the present article we propose to compare him with another great man whose life and aims were equally distinctive, and who has also left us his own account of them. We are led to the comparison by the belief that a simultaneous reading of Mr. Mill's "Autobiography" and Goethe's "Wahrheit und Dichtung" will give rise to reflections, alike interesting and instructive, upon the numerous and striking points of contrast between two minds, which resembled each other in depth and power, in entire freedom from all those prejudices and littlenesses which dwarf the natures of ordinary men—and in nothing else.

Vast indeed was the difference in quality of mind which could induce two conceptions of a work in life, each noble and true, yet so essentially unlike, not to say antagonistic, as that of the Pantheist-poet, proclaiming culture to be the one great means of salvation for a world "dead in trespasses and sins," and that of the non-religious political philosopher, preaching to the same world that gospel of Utilitarianism which seems to spring from so low a basis, yet implies an "enthusiasm of humanity" so exalted, that society, as at present constituted, sneers upon it as a mere fanatic's dream.

This contrast of aim we see distinctly in the *raison d'être* of the two works. Mill thinks the "record of an education which was unusual and remarkable," and of the "successive phases of" a "mind which was always pressing forward," may respectively be useful at a time when "education and its improvement are the subject of profound study," and opinions on most matters are in a transition state. But still more clearly does the book

owe its existence to a desire to acknowledge its writer's "intellectual and moral" obligations to "other persons"—to the father whose "eminence" was "recognised," and to the wife whom, to its great loss, "the world had no opportunity of knowing." Goethe, on the other hand, tells us that the "Wahrheit und Dichtung" is "an attempt to complete a great confession, of which his published works are but fragments."\* The egotism of the latter explanation seems to contrast unfavourably with the modesty of the former one, if we do not bear in mind the fact—which will be dwelt upon at some length below—that Goethe looked upon Art as the most important instrument of human development, and knowing himself to be, through his poetry, a great artist, considered that he was conferring a benefit upon the public in helping it to a right interpretation of his poems. He had, besides, been strongly urged to the task by his friends. A desire to benefit mankind was without doubt the motive power of both autobiographies, but it seems to work more *directly* in Mill than in Goethe; and certainly the buildings which rose from foundations so similar are in their utter diversity of plan and construction highly characteristic of their respective architects.

Deeply interesting and valuable as both these works are, they have the unavoidable defect of all autobiographies, that of not giving the whole truth about their authors. Of the two, Goethe's stands far the most in need of that "reading between the lines" which the writer's contemporaries alone can supply the means for doing. Mill, with his characteristic generosity and modesty, did himself far less, and his surroundings far more, than justice. Goethe wrote his life in old age, when the scenes to be described had lost much of their vividness. Looking down as from a height where "no sound of human sorrow mounts to mar the sacred, everlasting calm," upon his youth, like some far-off lake lying below, he saw, as it were, through a purple haze, and tranquillized by distance, those tumultuous waves which he had breasted in early manhood, and which now lay radiant in the mellow beams of sunset. In serene contemplation of the classic beauty of Helena, he could have but a dim perception of that wild time of "Sturm und Drang," when his dreams of passion and suicide had found expression in "Werther."

Mill's autobiography is continued till within a year or two of

---

\* It is important to notice that Goethe was in the habit of "translating into a poem or picture, anything that pleased or annoyed him, or particularly engaged his attention, and thus of coming to a conclusion with himself about it, so as both to set right his ideas of outward things, and to tranquillize his own mind." See "Wahrheit und Dichtung," Book 7, Part ii.

his death, while Goethe's stops at the early age of twenty-six. This, though provoking enough to us, who would fain know all that ever could be known of the greatest genius of these latter days, is really not such a deprivation as it would seem at first-sight. That which we do gain a tolerably full knowledge of—though it is often intensely annoying that Goethe will give so many more details about his comparatively uninteresting friends than his superlatively interesting self—is that period of childhood and youth, of which, in its bearing upon the hereafter, Goethe himself has said :—“ Altogether, the most important part of an individual's life is that of development, and mine is concluded in the detailed volumes of ‘ Wahrheit und Dichtung.’ Afterwards begins the conflict with the world, and that is interesting only in its results.”\* An utterance so profoundly true, that we shall take it as the basis of what follows, and try to show how, from the development period in the lives of Goethe and of Mill, may be deduced some of those few points of likeness, and far more numerous points of unlikeness, in their “ conflict with the world and its results,” which strike us so forcibly as we compare their autobiographies.

Those who, like ourselves, see in evolution and its kindred hypotheses the most satisfactory explanation of seemingly mysterious diversities of organization, will not object to our assuming that both the spiritual and material parts of a human being—supposing the two *not* to be identical—are entirely the work of circumstance. By this, however, we mean, not merely the conditions in which a child is placed from the time it comes into the world, but also the long chain of ante-natal influences, reaching back into the dim Past, far beyond our power to trace them, and which, gaining more from the length of time they have been at work than they lose from being spread over a number of objects, must, as it seems to us, be even more powerful in effect than those influences of education and general surroundings, which, though acting directly upon the creature who is their subject, do this for so short a time in comparison. We imagine that it might be proved, supposing the necessary information to be accessible, that though external influences during childhood and youth are the chief agents in turning a human being's powers into some special groove, it is to a long anterior period that the quantity and quality of those powers are due. Those who object *in toto* to this assumption will hardly expect us to enter here into an exposition of our reasons for making it, since that would involve nothing short of a summary of some of the most important works of Durwin, Spencer, Galton, &c. &c.

---

\* Eckermann's “ Conversations with Goethe.” Mr. Oxenford's translation.

“Vom Vater hab' ich die Statur,  
Des Lebens ernstes Führen,  
Vom Mütterchen die Frohnatur,  
Und Lust zu fabuliren.  
Urahn herr war der Schönsten hold,  
Das spukt so hin und wieder,  
Urahn frau liebte Schmuck und Gold,  
Das zuckt wohl durch die Glieder.  
Sind nun die Elemente nicht  
Aus dem Complex zu trennen,  
Was ist denn an dem ganzen Wicht  
Original zu nennen ?”

So sings Goethe about his relation to his ancestry; and though to analyse the elements of this “complex whole” would, indeed, be impossible, it *is* possible, as well as useful, to mention a few of those points in which the parents of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and John Stuart Mill resembled their sons.

Goethe the elder was a stern, upright man, punctilious and pedantic, with mediocre talents, but much industry, with a cultivated mind, an enthusiastic love of classic art and of Italy, and in such pecuniary circumstances as to be well able to gratify his tastes. His wife had a bright, merry disposition, with much natural shrewdness and talent. Thoroughly genial, tolerant, and healthy-minded, she had a dislike of agitation and scenes of any kind, so strong as almost entirely to overcome that morbid curiosity which generally has overwhelming power over persons of unsystematic education like herself. Neither of the two were possessed of anything like genius, but the combination in Goethe of some of the above-mentioned qualities of both father and mother is very striking; especially such minor traits as his father's formal manners, which decidedly grew upon him with increasing years, and his mother's abhorrence of unnecessary emotions, which appears in his invariable refusal to see any dead body, and in that strong control over his instincts which had so much to do with the reproach of heartlessness which still clings to his great name.

The elder Mill was gifted both with unusual talents and with that unusual capacity for taking trouble which, as Lord Derby has lately reminded us, has been considered by some persons to constitute genius. In coldness, severity, and integrity of character he resembled Goethe senior, but was unlike him in almost everything else; notably in that originality and unconventionality for which he was so markedly distinguished, and in “the power of influencing others by mere force of mind and character.” As we contemplate the powerful and vivid picture of this grand and rugged figure which his son has given us, we

cannot but notice the strong likeness between father and son, in almost all mental, and in many moral, qualities; but how did Stuart Mill come by his tender sympathetic nature, and that unbounded capacity for affection, which seems to have been left out of James Mill's composition, and which only showed themselves in the son after years of repression? Were they inherited from that mother of whom her son tells us absolutely nothing? We can but conjecture.

And now to consider the manner in which the natural capacities of Goethe and Mill were developed.

Those who maintain—and they are not few in number—that geniuses come into the world fully equipped, like Minerva from her parent's skull, education counting for little or nothing, ought to notice that the two men who in this century have achieved most in the domains of poetry and political philosophy, were both the subjects of careful and well-considered systems of education; and that the special place in literature occupied by each is exactly the one which an examination of the post-natal influences brought to bear upon him, would lead us to expect. The exact value of these examples this is, of course, not the place to settle, but some value they must have. Both Johann Caspar von Goethe and James Mill desired that their sons should be brought up for the most part under their own eye, and instructed as much as possible directly by themselves. That remarkable system of training to which J. S. Mill from the earliest dawn of intelligence was subjected, has of late been so exhaustively written and talked about, that to describe it would be needless. Though few persons would advocate the general adoption of such a system in all its features, many would agree with ourselves that it only needs one or two—it is true, important—modifications to become admirable. It was certainly so adapted to its subject as to produce precisely the result desired; and that result, not perhaps a "mere reasoning machine," yet not far removed from what Wordsworth describes as

"One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling  
Nor form nor feeling, great nor small;  
A reasoning self-sufficing thing,  
An intellectual all in all!"

Notice that this result could never have been attained by a system of mere cram, the mental results of which, like the physical, are first surfeit, and then exhaustion: Mill's "mental capacities were strengthened, not overlaid, by knowledge." Recollecting, too, how great those capacities were—for we entirely decline to believe, as Mill would fain have us, that "in natural gifts he was rather below than above par"—we lose in a great

measure that painful impression of overwork, though not that of excessive severity on his father's part, which the narrative of Mill's early years at first suggests. James Mill's teaching had, of course, a superabundance of "mere logic and analysis," and a lack of "poetical culture," which in some pupils would have tended to stunt that "high enthusiasm for ideal nobleness," which seems to have been innate in his son, and which his early education had probably no worse result than that of tempering by close practical thought. Although James Mill disliked all poems that in any way appealed to the emotions, and even failed to appreciate Shakspeare, he considered the power of writing *verses* to be such a useful acquirement that he imposed this sort of writing as a compulsory exercise on his son. The latter detested it; but wrote for his own amusement, at the age of eleven, a constitutional History of Rome!

How different, spite of some superficial points of likeness, were the influences that surrounded Goethe's childhood. His father had more assistance from others in the work of instruction than the elder Mill had, but was equally careful that there should be no cramming of the boy. Goethe was not systematically trained to reason and to think, logic and metaphysics entering but little, and political economy of course not at all, into his education, yet at twelve he was as great a prodigy in his own line as was Stuart Mill at the same age. Besides a fair acquaintance with Greek and Latin, in which last language some remarkably clever exercises written when he was six, seven, and eight years old, show him to have been a proficient, he knew English, French, and Italian. Italian he picked up merely from hearing his sister taught it by her father, while his knowledge of French was chiefly gained by frequenting the plays in that language which were performed at Frankfort during the French occupation. His interest in the French classic drama was so vivid and intelligent that he began at home to study the "Three Unities" in Corneille's treatise and Racine's prefaces, for which Unities he quickly conceived a profound contempt. We shall not be surprised to find him at this early age having an opinion of his own on pictures and art generally, when we recollect what his surroundings from earliest infancy had been. Out-of-doors there was the city of Frankfort, with its picturesque mediæval buildings, its wealth of historical association, its grand feudal pageantry, which last, at the coronation of one of the emperors, where Goethe "assisted," made a strong impression on the boy. Indoors he breathed an atmosphere of rare books and art-collections, copies of the finest Greek and Italian chef-d'œuvres constantly met his gaze; the "severe sublimity" of the Pantheon, the renaissance splendours of St. Peter's "vast and wondrous dome" having looked down

upon him from the walls of his father's house ever since he could remember anything. Add to this that his father was a warm patron of modern artists, that when the French were in Frankfurt, Count Thorane, one of their generals, and a great picture-fancier, was billeted upon them, and that the house was in consequence greatly frequented by artists, one of whom had a sort of studio there, where Goethe loved to spend a large part of his time. We are therefore more amused than surprised to read of the suggestions which this boy of twelve would make to some artist about the picture he was painting, suggestions which were actually adopted, as he says, "either from conviction or good nature." Hardly the latter, one would think! The mother had *her* share in stimulating the child's powers of invention. She had a remarkable faculty for story-telling, and she often found he had thought out and completed for himself some story which she had left half finished.

Of course all this was very unlike the complete and systematic teaching which John Stuart Mill received, and to this, as well as to what Mr. Lewes calls his "impatient susceptibility," was due the fragmentary nature of Goethe's knowledge of most of the subjects he had taken up in childhood. In later years he often severely blamed this defect in his own early education, indeed it is noticeable that Goethe constantly shows a want of respect and affection in his way of speaking of his father, caused probably by a certain degree of contempt for the elder Goethe's intellectual powers, as well as by the cold harsh manner under which, like Mill senior, the father thought fit to shroud his really warm affection for his son. But this want of tenderness did not prevent young Mill from being "loyally devoted" to that father whose great intellect could not fail to command his reverence. It is curious to contrast old Goethe's unconcealed admiration for the great powers of young Wolfgang—to whom he was always saying "that in his place he (the father) would have made a very different use of his talents, and not squandered them with the like prodigality," with James Mill's sober and uncomplimentary manner of assuring his son that "whatever he knew more than others could not be ascribed to any merit in him, but to the very unusual advantage that had fallen to his lot, of having a father who was able to teach him, and willing to give the necessary trouble and time."

Goethe went on developing himself till the age of sixteen at home by the study of art and literature, and by much thought upon religious matters, abroad by the society of some clever but not too respectable companions that he had secretly picked up. He got into a very unpleasant scrape, besides falling in love, and then into a state of deep despondency, caused chiefly by hearing

that his beloved—Gretchen by name,—had said “she regarded him in the light of a *little brother*.” He gradually regained his former tranquillity of mind by applying himself to the study of metaphysics, and by cultivating his newly-acquired love of natural scenery in constant walking excursions in the lovely Rhineland which lay so near his home. He became the centre of a circle of admiring comrades, who adored him, not only for his wonderful gifts, but for that indescribable fascination of manner which never left him, and which together with his kindly nature, procured him “troops of friends” to the very end of his life.

The “conflict with the world” may be said to have begun when he went to Leipzig at sixteen, though of course his “development” went on side by side with it. During the three years there, he spent more time in seeing life under the auspices of a wild fellow called Behrisch, than in study, gaining much experience which was useful to him in his works, at the expense of his health, and writing the plays “Mitschuldigen” and “Laune des Verliebten.” He returned home a wreck of his former self, went through a sort of mental and physical crisis from which he emerged stronger than before, and then went to the University of Strasburg. Here his career was, on the whole, satisfactory; he entered into the best intellectual society of the place, making friends with Herder—continued his law studies, finally taking his doctor’s degree—and became an ardent student of Shakspeare. At twenty-two, he returns to Frankfort, and throws himself fervently into the “Sturm und Drang” movement, writing “Goetz von Berlichingen” and “Werther,” under the influence of what Lewes so happily describes as “its Titanic hopes,” “its unhealthy sentimentalism, its morbid unrest.” The two latter characteristics are but too obvious in “Werther,” the writing of which seems to have afforded him much relief at a time when the idea of suicide had gained strong possession of his mind. Werther, like most of his heroes, was in great part Goethe, but in a smaller degree than was Wilhelm Meister, the infinitely finer production of his maturity. Though, like most thinkers, Goethe had his seasons of depression, he was full of vitality, with a strongly developed animal nature and impetuous passions, which, however, became gradually, in spite of a certain irresolution which was part of his nature, “trained to come to heel by a powerful will.” His wild and not always respectable mode of life seemed to have small effect on his tenacious constitution; there was always something fresh and wholesome about him, he loved cold water and fresh air, and unlike the sickly, feverish Schiller, felt himself best able to work in the morning. Goethe’s autobiography, and therewith, as he himself considers, his period of development, close on his arrival at Weimar in



1775. His life-struggle had long since begun in earnest, and out of the turbulent "Sturm und Drang" movement he was fast rising into a clearer, calmer atmosphere. The great masterpiece, "Faust," was already in progress, whose first faint dawn may be traced to that melancholy time at home, between his Leipzig and Strasburg careers, but which must go on growing through thirty years more of patient toil and thought, before it should beam in full glory and sublimity upon the world.

It is curious to notice how very slightly politics had hitherto entered into a life which had been passed in an atmosphere of art and literature, or we may leave out the word literature, since the kind of literature to which Goethe chiefly applied himself belonged as purely to the domain of art as painting and sculpture do. But were those tendencies of French eighteenth century thought, which culminated in the revolution, utterly without influence upon one who had spent two years at the University of Strasburg, in France itself? Certainly not: it was impossible for Goethe to ignore them, but they inspired him and his circle with an intense aversion, and Mephistopheles, "der Geist der stets verneint," is the embodiment of his opinions about those whose inclination in literature as in religion was to criticise and to demolish, rather than to create. He was unable to sympathize with the burning indignation against tyranny and priestcraft which animated Voltaire and his school; he had never come in contact with a powerful priesthood and its perpetually irritating and often enraging influences, while he had so far enjoyed all the social and religious freedom he needed for his own development and enjoyment. To political freedom he was simply indifferent, having never felt the need of it for himself. "In our narrow circle," he says, "we did not trouble ourselves with newspapers and news; our business was to study the natures of men; we cared little to know what was going on in the outer world." Again, "in Germany it had as yet hardly occurred to any one to envy the enormous privileges of the aristocratic class, or to grudge them their good luck as regards worldly advantage." And Goethe, among the rest, could not realize that the concentration of this artificial "good luck" upon a few heads, might cause grievous wrong to a very large number.

Goethe's feelings and opinions about religion never seem to have lacked room to expand, judging from the Autobiography, where he from time to time enters into them at considerable length. From infancy he had been carefully instructed in what are called the great truths of religion, and these he soon began to test by the results of his own childish experience. One of his first religious puzzles was in connexion with the great Earthquake of Lisbon, which happened when he was six years old.

How was the fact that good and evil men were then alike destroyed to be reconciled with the first article of the faith, which tells of God who is "the Creator and Preserver of Heaven and Earth"? The thoughtful boy next became exercised at the disunion he noticed among the faithful. Brought up himself as an orthodox Lutheran, he began to lose confidence in his church system when he realized how many sincerely religious persons had separated themselves from it through disgust at its mere "dry morality." So he determined to try and approach directly "that great God of Nature, whose early anger-manifestations had long since been forgotten in the beauty of the world, and the manifold good which falls to our lot." How he set to work to build an altar in his own room, and with the aid of a pastille, offered upon it "natural produce," *i.e.*, specimens from his father's valuable collection of minerals, is well known to all students of his life. This interest in religious matters did not flag as he grew older; for at thirteen we find him beginning to learn Greek in order thoroughly to understand the New Testament. About that time he wrote a curious summary of the early History of the Jews,\* interesting for the essentially rationalistic spirit in which it is conceived. So that, in spite of his passing through the ceremony of confirmation, and of his intimacy with Fräulein von Klettenberg—a charming religious mystic, the original of the "Fair Saint," in "Wilhelm Meister"—we are quite prepared to read that he no longer believed in the miracles and other supernatural occurrences related in the Old Testament. The words, "destitute of faith, yet terrified at scepticism," would describe his feelings on this subject for some years to come. At Strasburg we hear much of his detestation of the attitude towards religion assumed by the French encyclopædists, which was strengthened by reading the "Système de la Nature," which he spoke of with some contempt as the "quintessence of senility," though he owned that it repelled him like some "grey, death-like shadow." At the same time we see in his strong admiration for Bruno's works, that fast-growing tendency to Pantheism, which dates from his earliest childhood. However, soon after he left Strasburg, he seems to have made an attempt to settle his ideas about the Bible, taking his stand upon its value as a whole, which he contended that its obvious contradictions had no power to injure, and insisting that every lover of truth should endeavour to arrive at "its original, divine, practical, indestructible essence," by means of something like that "verifying power" which the Broad Churchmen of our day set so much store by. Yet at twenty-three he is described by a friend

---

\* "Wahrheit und Dichtung," Part i. Book 4.

as venerating the Christian religion, but far from orthodox, not going to church or sacrament, and praying seldom. For the next two years he was much under the religious influence of his two friends, Lavater and Fräulein von Klettenberg, the former of whom seems to have depended mostly on evidences, the latter on feeling, or, as Goethe himself puts it—Lavater treated his Saviour as a friend, Klettenberg hers as a lover. Charmed by the apostolic enthusiasm and sincerity of the Moravian brethren, Goethe was on the point of joining them, when he was arrested by the strong repulsion he felt for one of their cardinal beliefs—the dogma of original sin. How could the child, the lover of nature, accept the doctrine of its depravity?

“From all sides I had been drawn towards nature; she had appeared to me in her glory; I had known so many good and brave men who had endured hardship in carrying out their duty to her; to renounce them, to renounce myself, seemed impossible to me. I saw plainly how wide was the gulf that separated me from that doctrine.”

Now for the first time did he seem fully to realize the utter impossibility of his ever accepting the Christian faith. He had long been a warm admirer of the works of Spinoza, in reading whose “Ethics” he felt “his passions” calmed, and “an expansive view over the world of feeling and of morals opened out to him.” His period of religious development was over; he had finally ceased to be a Christian; and the beautiful religio-philosophy of Pantheism was henceforth to be his support during the long struggle with the world that lay before him. We shall presently see how excellently it was adapted to his nature and its needs.

Little or no allusion has so far been made to a very important part of Goethe’s life and character—namely, his relations with the female sex. Goethe had from “the cradle to the grave” the widest possible experience of women. His home education had led him, far more than is usually the case with boys, to make companions of his mother and sister, in whom he seems to have found an intelligent appreciation and sympathy such as a great genius rarely meets with in his female relatives. How affectionately he speaks of “his mother, still almost a child” (she was only eighteen when he was born) “as first growing up to (intellectual) consciousness in and with her two eldest children,” and of his sister, only a year younger than he was, as living “the same life with himself from the earliest dawn of consciousness, and thus united to him by the closest ties.” He goes on to describe this sister as a very remarkable person, “of uncommon depth of character, too little understood, though much loved, and

prematurely lost." We have already mentioned his close and long continued friendship with Fraülein von Klettenberg, whose refined mysticism we can well understand having a strong attraction for one who, like Goethe, was by nature a Pantheist—as well as his first boyish love, the beginning of a long series that ended only a few years before his death at the age of eighty-three. Then at Leipzig we hear of an affair with one Aennchen,—we fear only one of many—then at Strasburg of the two sisters who fought about him before his own eyes; and then, with fullest detail of all, of Frederika, the pastor's daughter, for his conduct to whom, in gaining her affections, and then deserting her, he has been severely blamed. This is not the place to attempt a regular vindication of him, though we think it would not be difficult to show that his error proceeded far more from "want of thought, than want of heart." His case was the very common one of a young man falling in love with a pretty amiable girl, and after a half-betrothal, discovering that he had over-estimated the strength of his affection, and under-estimated the worldly, and still more the intellectual obstacles to their union. Instead of keeping his promise in the face of everything, he broke it, very much probably to her advantage, and without doubt, immensely to his own. When we think of what might have been lost to the world, had Goethe fettered himself at the age of twenty-one with a wife and family, the support of whom must have been his first care, we cannot but feel thankful for what Lewes calls, "his intellectual egoism"—certainly it deserves no harsher name, especially when we recollect that Frederika did not in the least resent his conduct. We next hear of two platonic attachments—to "Lottchen," who was the betrothed, and to Madame Brentano, who was the wife of another man, as well as of a strong flirtation with a certain Anna Sybilla Mönch, greatly encouraged by his parents, but which ended in nothing.

The last, and next to the Frederika episode, by far the most important of the love affairs mentioned in the Autobiography, is that with "Lili," a gifted and lovely girl of aristocratic family, and sixteen years old, for whom he seems to have had a very passionate affection. Soon after entering into a real engagement with her, he began, as he had done with Frederika, to see grave objections to marrying her. The worldly position of Lili, he thought, was as much too high as that of Frederika had been too low, to be compatible with his intellectual advancement, so he rushed off to Switzerland, in order if possible to drive away all thought of the too fascinating maiden—came back again—again became her captive—at last, once for all, freeing himself. Lili too, like Frederika, does not seem to have looked upon herself as injured. Goethe had other lady-loves in those days, but

the above were the principal, and are the best known. So much for the influence of women over him during his development period.

Though the inner life of John Stuart Mill during youth and early manhood is full of interest and suggestiveness, it is so poor in external incidents that only an occasional reference to them is needed in sketching the influences which tended to develop modes of thought and action in after life in the matter of politics, women, and religion, so entirely antagonistic to those adopted by Goethe.

Of the influences which developed his ways of thinking about Art we can only speak negatively, because, until his twentieth year, all æsthetic ideas may be said to have been discouraged, or absolutely ignored, in his surroundings. In a passive sense they were discouraged, because Mill was reared "in the mean and cramped externals of English middle-class life," at a time when artistic culture of any kind was unknown, except among the aristocracy, and even with them it was but a forced, unhealthy exotic, transplanted from its fatherlands of Italy and Greece into the smoke and fog of England, where it had become untruthful and unbeautiful through its utter incongruity. What was to be seen in the streets of London of this unattractive form of Art could have little power over the truthful and vigorous mind of young Mill, compared with those ever active influences (to say nothing of an immensely strong hereditary predisposition) which from his babyhood had drawn him to the study of philosophy, science, and history in their bearing upon politics. What wonder that the absorbing nature of these pursuits should for long have excluded every other thought from his mind? That love of natural scenery which in later life strongly characterized him found, however, some nourishment in his childhood from short country expeditions with his father, as well as from a long residence at Ford Abbey, in Somersetshire, but still more from a tour in the Pyrenees at the age of fourteen. His year's stay in France, during which this tour occurred, must have given a great impulse to his education in every sense of the word, and not least that part of the time which he spent in the house of M. Say, whom he describes as "a fine specimen of the best kind of French republican." Soon after his return to England, he became an enthusiastic disciple of Bentham, whose teachings his previous education, illustrated as it had been by intercourse with such men as Bentham himself, Ricardo, Hume, Say, and his own father, had well fitted him to appreciate. Bentham's system gave food to his high aspirations, while it satisfied his strict habits of thought by its sobriety and "appearance of superiority to illusion. It gave unity to his conceptions of things,"

and during the next six years this philosophy served him as "in one among the best senses of the word, a religion." He now put his mind through a careful course of training, and studied metaphysics and logic, both in private and in discussions with congenial friends, writing articles for the Liberal journals, helping Bentham in the work of annotating and preparing for the press his "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," and joining a debating society. Like Goethe, he spent much of his time with grown-up men, whose friendship with his father was in itself a guarantee of intellectual excellence. He had besides many companions nearer his own age, several of whom have since become known to fame.\* At seventeen he got an appointment in the India Office, where, at the end of thirty-four years, he had risen to the position of Chief Examiner of Correspondence, described as "involving the responsibility, if not quite the dignity, of Secretary of State." The admirable effect which this kind of work had in giving him that thorough practicality which so eminently distinguished him among philosophers, is well explained in the Autobiography. At the age of twenty came on with Mill that painful mental state, when Feeling, which he had too long despised, or perhaps ignored, began to vindicate itself.† There can be no doubt that what he calls "the over-cultivation of the analysing spirit, without its natural complements and correctives," greatly added to the severity of that crisis which, at some period of his life, every thinking man has to pass through in one form or another. After some months of deep dejection, a casual occurrence discovered to him that he still had feelings, hopes, and aspirations; and thus consoled, he set to work to remedy those previous deficiencies which he was now quite conscious of, and to join other kinds of cultivation, especially poetry and music, to that of the intellect alone. He began to perceive all that was valuable in what he terms "the nineteenth century reaction against the eighteenth," became intimate with some of its English promoters, especially Maurice, Sterling, and afterwards Carlyle, and now first felt a decided attraction towards the St. Simonian school of socialists.

It is just worth while to remark the superficial resemblance

---

\* The simple fact that Austin, Grote, Sterling, Carlyle, were among Mill's intimate friends, now or at a later period, is a sufficient refutation of a ludicrous insinuation in a late article in *Blackwood*, to the effect that Mill only cared to have second-rate men for his friends!

† We who live in the days of pilgrimages and adorations of the Sacred Heart, of spiritualism, revivals of confession, and "missions," every variety, in fact, of hysterical emotionalism, may well feel some sympathy with the disgust of the utilitarian school for "the frequency with which feeling is made the ultimate reason and justification of conduct," even though we grant it to have been to some extent exaggerated.

between this "crisis" and that which Goethe underwent after he left Leipzig. The contrast between the kind of life which John Stuart Mill led during youth and manhood, which might be described in the words of the Church Catechism as one of "temperance, soberness, and chastity," or in those of the poet, as one of "plain living and high thinking," and that of Goethe during both the "Sturm und Drang," and what Mr. Lewes so significantly names "the Genialisch period at Weimar," is so intensely suggestive, that we dare not trust ourselves to enlarge upon it. It is instructive, as showing the very slight *necessary* connexion between the most elaborate feelings and thoughts about religion, and every-day morality. Both Goethe and Mill found recreation in natural scenery and in botany; but these simple pleasures did not alone suffice for Goethe. Of course the widely different constitutions and temperaments of the two men must in some degree be considered responsible for the difference in their modes of life. Mill had not the splendid vitality of Goethe, and was thus spared many of the sensual temptations to which the latter too often yielded. But we wholly disagree from an article in the *Spectator*, which asserts that "the general effect of Mill's nature is one of meagreness and pallor." Was his power of affection feeble or meagre? and is there any lack of light and colour in that deep indignation against oppression, which shines out of everything he wrote? Of "reason divine, red-hot with passion pure" (to quote the beautiful words of a sonnet which appeared shortly after his death) Mill was the very embodiment; and this appears not only in his exertions for the good of the human race, but also very strongly in the story of his relations with that fortunate woman who, for twenty-eight years of her life, was "all in all to him," and whose "memory was to him a religion." His friendship with her began when he was twenty-four, and she twenty-three years of age; and though it is probable that in the depth of his passionate devotion Mill has unconsciously invested his wife with greater genius than she actually possessed, there can be no doubt that she was a most remarkable woman, and that her influence upon his development was very strong and also very beneficial, both in a negative and positive sense. Mrs. Mill did *not* merely abstain from acting as "a dead weight upon every aspiration of her husband to be better than public opinion required him to be," or from "trying to lead him to become much more indulgent to the common opinion of society and the world," and keep him down in a "mediocrity of respectability," in which direction the influence of a woman generally tends. She went far beyond this. She helped to entirely free Mill from a certain hardness and coldness which always clung to the Benthamite School, and to stimulate everything that was high and noble in

his nature, that "unselfishness," that "simplicity and sincerity," that "utmost scorn of whatever was mean and cowardly," that "boundless generosity and lovingness," that "emancipation from every kind of superstition and conventionality," in all of which qualities attributed by him to his wife in the Autobiography, she would have been the first to own that her husband exceeded her. But what is a still more surprising feature in one of a sex whose minds have until now been systematically stunted and left untrained, while their feelings have been cultivated into an unhealthy rankness, her intellectual influence was also beneficial. Mrs. Mill contributed to bring both more practicality and more of a "human element" into his works, especially into the "Political Economy," thus giving it one amongst other decided points of superiority over other manuals, that, briefly stated, of treating certain "economical generalizations" not as "final," but "provisional." Mr. Mill's step-daughter, Miss Taylor, seems, after her mother's death, to have in some degree succeeded to her place of literary helper and inspirer.

Now comes the question—What had been going on in Mill's mind on the subject of religion during all these years? *Nothing at all*, would be the very natural answer of that large number of persons who plume themselves upon having reached a state of absolute certainty about religion; an answer which will nevertheless require some modification. Yet it is a fact, and a very extraordinary fact, that young Mill grew up to manhood, in Christian England, during the first twenty years of the nineteenth century, perfectly untouched by any kind of religious influence, or at least any that would be acknowledged as such by that large portion of the British public which regards Christianity and religion as convertible terms. What may strike us as stranger still, is that this method was pursued without any important collisions with the outside world, so carefully was the boy instructed to "keep his thoughts to himself," a precaution which we cannot but think might have had a very unwholesome effect upon some pupils. Strangest of all will it appear to many persons, that this negative attitude towards religion—or we prefer to say, theology—was successfully combined with a very positive attitude towards morality. The virtues of "justice, temperance (with James Mill almost 'the central point of educational precept'), veracity, perseverance, readiness to encounter pain, and especially labour; regard for the public good; estimation of persons according to their merits, and of things according to their intrinsic usefulness—a life of exertion in contradiction to one of self-indulgent ease and sloth;" all these things were inculcated upon Stuart Mill by the precept, as well as the example of a father, who himself bore a strong resemblance to some ancient



Greek philosopher. The moral and intellectual unsatisfactoriness of the common beliefs, and of these, more especially that "dreadful conception of an object of worship," which prevailed among Christians at the time of Mill's boyhood, though at present we have good reason to hope that it is rapidly ceasing to be identified with Christianity, was carefully demonstrated to the boy. The outcome of it all was, that Stuart Mill "never had religious belief: he grew up in a negative state with regard to it. He looked upon the modern exactly as he did upon the ancient religion, as something which in no way concerned him." The Autobiography is thus entirely destitute of those records of religious experience and religious doubts which occupy so important a place in the lives of most thinkers. Mill is very sparing of words on this subject, yet we may gather from various hints of his own opinions and those of his wife, occurring here and there in the Autobiography, that, though no Atheist, he, like his father, was unable to find a "halting-place in Deism."

We have now traced the progress of Mill's mind up to the commencement of "the most valuable friendship of his life," and have also dwelt upon the influence of that friendship upon after years. In doing this, we have, perhaps, gone somewhat beyond the limit marked out at the beginning. But this has been rendered necessary both by the immense importance of this friendship in modifying and developing his previous opinions, and by that peculiar readiness which he always showed "to learn and to unlearn"—a flexibility which never degenerated into volatility—which made the development-time last much longer with him than it does with most men. Of course Goethe's dictum that his own development concluded with the conclusion of the "Wahrheit und Dichtung," that is, at the age of twenty-six, though truer of him than it is of Mill, was never intended to be accepted except as an approximation to the truth. It comes, however, far nearer the truth than hard-and-fast lines generally do, and is sufficiently near it in this case to enable us to show that in that period of Goethe's life, as in the same period, though extended by a few years, of the life of Mill, we must seek the primary causes of those points of contrast which strike us most forcibly in their "conflict with the world and its results." These points of contrast, as has been hinted previously, may be roughly divided into three heads:

Their theory and practice with reference to

1. Art and Politics—best treated together.
2. Women.
3. Religion.

And we think a little consideration will quickly show how their modes of thought and action in these matters are precisely what

one would expect to be evoked by the widely different circumstances under which they had lived from their infancy to their prime.

1. *Art and Politics*.—We have seen that nature and education had made Goethe before all things an artist, and as such, the peaceful contemplation of beauty formed his idea of the best happiness, the attainment of perfection in form one of his highest aspirations. This tendency grew upon him; he became more and more wedded to the tranquil beauty of Greek art, and ever more alienated from the striving and unrest of the Gothic, the modern spirit. It is easy to see that such a man will naturally tend towards conservatism, still more when, as in his case, it coincides with his early habits and ways of thinking. What does he care for outward reform and progress? His "mind to him a kingdom is," and so long as no tyrant disturbs him in his work of contemplation and creation, the disposition of the genuine artist is to rest and be thankful, and to keep his mind quite clear of disturbing thoughts such as would be engendered by longings after a political freedom which individually he would be little the better for. And Goethe was led to this conclusion by something stronger than the mere artist tendency, by his high idea of the proper mission of art. Schiller and he "believed that Culture would raise humanity to its full powers; and they, as Artists, knew no Culture equal to that of Art."\* Goethe saw for himself the destructive effect upon culture of the French revolution, while his powers of prevision were not strong enough to show him that this great emancipation, being mental as well as physical, would in the end stimulate culture, by giving it width and free play, far more than it had momentarily retarded it. Goethe had felt most keenly the severity of the remedy, he did not live to realize the greatness of the cure: he said—

"Franzthum drängt in diesen verworrenen Tagen, wie ehemals  
Lutherthum es gethan, ruhige Bildung zurück,"

and his advice was—

"Willst du, mein Sohn, freibleiben, so lerne was Rechtes, und halte  
Dich genügsam, und nie blicke nach oben hinauf."

Not that he by any means lacked sympathy for the sufferings of the poor: he showed this sympathy very practically, if not always judiciously—and we must recollect that the principles of political economy were to him entirely unknown—by frequent, and we believe, often self-denying charities. Neither did he entirely fail to appreciate the benefits of political liberty. He

---

\* Lewes's "Life of Goethe."

called himself a moderate Liberal, and went so far as to say, "if there exists an actual necessity for a great reform amongst a people, God is with it, and it prospers."\* But he was strongly of opinion that this necessity did not then exist in Germany, the time, he thought, was not yet ripe, and so he said, "Let every one according to his talents, according to his tendencies, and according to his position, do his utmost to increase the culture and development of the people . . . that the people may not lag behind other peoples, but become competent for every great action when the day of its glories arrives."† And though Goethe's political prevision was at fault when he passed sentence upon the French revolution, was he far wrong in the advice that he tendered to his own nation? Now that the "day of its glories" has indeed arrived, have the German people carried on their splendid struggle any the worse—rather was it not carried on better?—for the "tranquil culture" that they had been pursuing for so long, and which their great poet had so strongly insisted on?

It must be remarked before we leave this portion of the subject, that the beneficial effect on Goethe's later writings of his growing devotion to the Greek ideal, has been much questioned; indeed a comparison of the first part of "Faust" and "Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre" with the second part of "Faust" and the "Wanderjahre," which last bear strong traces of this Greek influence—though, of course, old age must be credited with some share in their inferiority—places the matter, in our opinion, beyond dispute. This is well put in a spoken criticism of Mr. Mill's, who said:—"Goethe tried as hard as he could to be a Greek; yet his failure to produce anything perfect in form, except a few lyrics, proves the irresistible expansion of the modern spirit, and the inadequateness of the Greek types to modern needs of activity and expression."‡ In his great attempt at a reproduction of the Greek tragedy, "Iphigenia," there is something intensely cold and constrained; we miss that charm which pervaded almost everything else he wrote, and pre-eminently the first part of "Faust," which, full of vitality, and breathing out in every line the complexity of modern thought, shows plainly where Goethe's true strength lay.

Nature and Education had worked together to make Goethe an Artist; they also united to make John Stuart Mill a Radical Philosopher. There is strong ground for believing that Mill inherited almost all his father's finest qualities of head, without any of his unloveable qualities of heart; and when we add to this the

\* Eckermann's "Conversations."

† Lewes's "Life of Goethe."

‡ From Mr. J. Moiley's notes of Mr. Mill's conversation during the last day they spent together. See *Fortnightly Review* for June, 1873.

facts that he possessed a rare capacity for sympathy and affection, that he was trained to love and worship Truth before all things, and carefully taught the best human means of finding out what the Truth was, is there any room for surprise that the result was a political and social reformer of the highest order? True, it was needful for him to go down into the depths, to feel all his youthful dreams and aspirations dispelled and crushed under a weight of "dry heavy dejection," before he could rise to full completeness and fitness for the great work that lay before him. Then first did he begin to "give its proper place among the prime necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual;" thus coming into collision with some of his Benthamite friends, and notably with Mr. Roebuck, who was then, whatever he is now, "the kind of Englishman who seems to regard the sympathies almost as necessary evils required for keeping men's actions benevolent and compassionate;" . . . . . seeing "little good in any cultivation of the feelings, and none at all in cultivating them through the imagination, which he thought was only cultivating illusion." One can hardly help wondering if Mr. Roebuck's career might not have been very different, and far more satisfactory, had he, like Mill, accepted while young a truer and less one-sided view of life than the one here glanced at. There is much that is characteristic in the mode of "culture of the feelings" to which Mill felt himself drawn. We can picture the disgust with which he would turn away from the "raptures and roses of vice" which Byron sang in such melting strains; while he was repelled, as we know, by the cynical spirit of these poems. It was in Wordsworth's poetry that he found "a medicine for his state of mind; . . . . in it he seemed to draw from a source of inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be shared in by all human beings; which had no connexion with struggle or imperfection, but would be made richer by every improvement in the physical or social condition of mankind." Yet though Mill was now able to perceive the "other half of the truth" to which he had hitherto been blind, he never became "a recreant to intellectual culture;" his habits of reasoning stood him in good stead, and prevented him from yielding too far to the reaction. To the very end of his life he was firm to Utilitarianism; he had a strong perception of its excellence, not as "a mere matter of abstract speculation," but in its "practical consequences." But he introduced some important modifications, which, while leaving its central principle untouched, helped to develop it into something far higher and nobler than it had ever entered into the hearts of Bentham and James Mill to conceive.

The opponents of the Experience school in philosophy and the

Utilitarian school in Ethics are naturally irate at the fervour with which Mill adhered to the tenets of these schools, even after he became aware of the need of certain modifications in them ; and it is amusing to read the gentle sneer of the *Spectator* at the "curious slightness of the permanent instruction which this experience" (the crisis) "left behind." "Surely," it exclaims, "a profound sense of the inadequacy of ordinary human success to the cravings of the human spirit, was never followed by a less radical moral change."\* Slight, however, as this change may seem to some, it was, together with Mrs. Mill's influence, instrumental in leading him beyond the "democracy pure and simple" and the narrow political economy of his youth, to advocate a check upon the former by means of "proportional representation," and an enlargement of the latter so as to admit the feasibility of a kind of socialistic system which, while "energetically repudiating that tyranny of society over the individual, which most Socialistic systems are supposed to involve," should finally solve the great Socialistic problem of the future—namely, "how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour." Though he "saw clearly that to render any such social transformation either possible or desirable, an equivalent change of character must take place both in the uncultivated herd who now compose the labouring masses, and in the immense majority of their employers," he never ceased to believe in its feasibility ; and his life was henceforth one consistent struggle, in deeds as in words spoken and written, for those principles whose establishment he knew could alone hasten the advent of this great change. Here we have the real clue to his Parliamentary career. During that time he succeeded in thoroughly embittering, through his vigorous advocacy of such unpopular causes as the rights of Jamaica negroes and English women, and of full liberty of thought and speech even for the professed atheist, all those social, religious, and political Conservatives, who—at any rate, the last—"had not been without hopes of finding Mill an opponent of democracy ; as he was able to see the Conservative side of any question, they presumed that, like them, he could not see any other side."

Mill had in the highest degree "the enthusiasm of humanity" in the abstract, yet he certainly, in spite of his unbounded charity and forbearance, had no enthusiasm *for* humanity in the concrete. This is particularly seen in his detestation of general society, another respect in which he differs from Goethe, though

---

\* *Spectator*, October 25, 1873.

it is possible that if the circle in which Goethe moved had in any way resembled the "insipidity" and "supreme unattractiveness" to any person of a high class of intellect, of "general society as now carried on in England," the contrast between them in this respect would turn out to be only a superficial one. Let us just for one moment try to imagine either Goethe embracing semi-socialistic principles, or Mill lavishing money upon any beggar who succeeded in working upon his feelings! Our instant perception of the ludicrous impossibility of imagining either case illustrates the ground-difference between them far better than pages of analysis and description.

There has been much condemnation of Mill's exclusiveness in holding aloof from ordinary society. In defence of his practice in this matter, it is enough to notice the impossibility of a professional man like Mill entering into society at the same time that he was engaged upon such works as the "Logic" and the "Political Economy," without entire neglect of his health. To justify his theory to ourselves, we have only to reflect upon, and try to realize the enormous waste of human time and health, in the present state of English social life, upon what certainly "deserves the name of neither business nor pleasure." A more general adoption and reduction of Mill's theory to practice would probably have the desirable effect of bringing into discredit some of those weary social duties which are a labour and sorrow to almost all concerned, especially to women, who have fewer means of escape from them than men, and of gradually founding a higher type of society among those whose disgust at the "low moral tone" of the old one, had induced them to relinquish it.

2. *Women.*—Goethe's relations with women, after he attained his full intellectual stature, were of much the same character as during his time of growth. He still went on "gathering the thousand flowers which richly filled the valleys," and, as a natural result, too often left them behind to wither. Soon after he went to reside at Weimar began the most important of his numerous *liaisons*—that with Lotte von Stein, a married woman seven years older than himself, who, according to a German writer, joined "solid cultivation," "breadth and clearness of perception," and an "equable temper," to much fascination of manner and appearance. He loved her devotedly for about twelve years, though this did not prevent his consoling himself for their separation while he was in Italy, by various small *affaires de cœur*. The mere fact, that this intimate relation—being as it was throughout of a purely spiritual nature—should have lasted so long, when one of the persons concerned was a man of Goethe's temperament, is sufficient proof that Frau von

Stein must have been peculiarly suited to him. One cannot help thinking how much happier and more dignified Goethe's domestic life might have been, had she been younger and in a position to marry him. However, the actual result was a breach, caused by her discovery that Goethe had taken for his mistress a pretty, clever girl, of low birth, called Christiane Vulpius, an arrangement to which Frau von Stein very naturally objected. A modern German Goethe-worshipper says that she dismissed him in a "fit of vulgar jealousy," and evidently thinks she had ill-treated him throughout. Her reason—but of course love prevented her listening to it—ought to have taught her that some such *dénoûment* must, under the circumstances, sooner or later happen; but surely we must applaud the womanly dignity and strength of mind which made her decline to go halves for Goethe with another woman, least of all such a woman as Christiane Vulpius. And it should be recollected that the then state of morals in polite German society was by no means such as to brand a similar arrangement as the flagrant breach of decency which it would be considered now. It is unfortunate that Lotte von Stein could not afterwards restrain her feelings sufficiently to prevent an exhibition of her disappointment to the world, such as was little calculated to win its respect. There is no need here to enter into the unpleasant details of Goethe's connexion with Christiane, which ended only with her death in 1816, some years after he had made her his wife. She bore him a son, and seems to have been faithful to him, acting as a sort of good working-housekeeper. His kindness to, and forbearance with her, after her disgusting habits of intemperance had become a perpetual annoyance to him, were quite admirable—indeed, one would wish that he had practised upon this woman some of that "intellectual egoism," which had made him in early life cast away the love of a Frederika and a Lili. Probably it was only the force of habit which prevented him from doing so.

Frau von Stein being unattainable, what a pity it seems that Goethe had not long ago married Lili! It is true that Mr. Lewes and other of Goethe's biographers have come to the conclusion that he never had any deep affection for her; but great as must be our respect for Mr. Lewes's opinion, and undeniably strong as are the grounds upon which it is founded, Goethe's own testimony is still stronger, and he made use to Eckermann of the following emphatic words:—

"She was the first whom I deeply and truly loved. I may also say that she was the last; for all the little affections which I have felt, in the after part of my life, are when compared with this first one, only light and superficial. I have never been so near a happiness after my own heart, as during the time of this love for Lili. The

obstacles which separated us were not really insurmountable, and yet she was lost to me.”\*

Is not this tolerably conclusive evidence, though given when Goethe was eighty-one? We may add that the inconvenience proceeding from the above-named “obstacles” would have been slight indeed compared with the serious mental and moral injury which even the greatest of men could not but have sustained from perpetual association with a coarse-minded and uncultivated woman. But long before he met Christiane Vulpius, Goethe had passed—to quote the beautiful words of George Eliot—“the freshness of our time, when only the choice is possible which gives unity to life, and makes the memory a temple where all relics and all votive offerings, all worship and all grateful joy, are an unbroken history sanctified by one religion.” He could now only go on as he had begun. During his wife’s lifetime, as well as after her death, Goethe’s susceptible heart was touched again and again—at the age of fifty-eight by the pretty, malicious sprite, Bettina, daughter of his old flame Madame Brentano, by a young girl called Minna Herzlieb, who seems to have left a very strong impression upon him, and by one Fräulein von Lewezow, whom Goethe, when seventy-six years old, would, but for fear of the world’s ridicule, have certainly married. These are only some among several others.

Mr. Mill has “wondered how a man who could draw the sorrows of a deserted woman like Aurelia in Wilhelm Meister should yet have behaved so systematically ill to women.”† It is curious to compare this opinion with that of a recent Goethe-worshipper (the same who is so angry with Frau von Stein), who thinks Goethe’s “unfaithfulness to individual women has been condoned by the number of charming portraits of the sex with which he has adorned the sanctuary of beauty!” May we venture to suggest the following medium between the above

\* Eckermann’s “Conversations.”

† From the same conversation with Mr. Morley, mentioned above. For another charming description of the sorrows of a lonely woman, see the last Act of “Iphigenia.”

“Der rasche Kampf verewigt einen Mann:  
Er falle gleich, so preiset ihn das Lied.  
Allein die Thränen, die unendlichen,  
Der ueberbliebenen, der verlassenen Frau,  
Zählt keine Nachwelt, und der Dichter schweigt  
Von tausend durchgeweinten Tag-und Nächten,  
Wo eine stille Seele den verlornen  
Rasch abgeschied’nen Freund vergebens sich  
Zurückzurufen bangt, und sich verzehrt.”



extreme opinions about Goethe's behaviour in this matter? Granting that he did ill-treat certain women, and that the exquisite female delineations which he has given to posterity would not tend very effectually to console them, we cannot allow that the ill-treatment was either heartless or "systematic." May we not find a key to his conduct in his determination that Art should, and Love should *not*, be "lord of all," which his immense power of self-restraint enabled him to carry into effect? Why should we English applaud the sentiment of the beautiful old lines—

"I could not love thee, dear, so much,  
Loved I not honour more,"

yet pass severe censure on Goethe because he preferred his Art to his Love? Why, but because the æsthetic feeling is so much rarer in England than the feeling for honour? In sacrificing himself and all he loved to Art, Goethe was only acting strictly up to his own idea of its exalted mission; and surely, if we measure things by their intrinsic value to mankind, Art and Culture ought not to occupy a *lower* place in our estimation than military honour and loyalty. Whether Goethe always judged correctly in making these sacrifices is an entirely different matter, and, as was said before, there is strong ground for believing that in one case, at any rate, he made a mistake, even taking into account only his own artistic development. His experience of women was wonderfully wide, but from the very nature of his intercourse with them he only knew (excepting, perhaps, in the case of Lotte von Stein) "one narrow department of their nature"—an important department no doubt. The only woman whose character he can have had any deep knowledge of was neither good nor worthy; and this fact alone enables us to comprehend the cynical and flippant remarks about female education, and the best mode of preserving female virtue, which we find in his "Second (poetical) Epistle to a Friend."

Yet there hardly exists any writer whose inspiration we *know* to have been so much indebted to women. When we remember that to Lili we owe, among other charming love songs, the "Herz mein Herz," wedded as it has been by Beethoven to the most exquisitely expressive music—to Lotte von Stein that beautiful dedication of the "Poems," which shows a purity of thought not always characteristic of Goethe's poems to women—to Christiane, many of the splendid Roman elegies—to Minna Herzlieb, the lovely series of sonnets, and the character of Otilie in the "Elective Affinities," we can realize how truly he, of all men, might write, both in the literal and the mystical sense,

“Das Ewigweibliche zieht uns hinan.”\*

It is impossible to imagine a greater contrast to all this than was Mill's experience of women. “He loved one only and he clave to her.” It seems to us that even as regards *quantity*, his knowledge of women was little inferior to Goethe's, for it made up in depth what it lacked in extent. Some time before the publication of the Autobiography, we had been able to draw an inference as to the *quality* of that knowledge from certain glimpses of it given in “The Subjection of Women,” where we have an ideal picture of what married life might be “in the case of two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinion and purposes, between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of powers and capacities with reciprocal superiority in them, so that each can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately the pleasure of leading and being led in the path of development.” No one can now doubt that this picture was drawn from Mill's own experience, but he justly adds, “to those who cannot conceive it, it would appear the dream of an enthusiast.” Such, we fear, it would have appeared to Goethe, and that such it appears still to the large majority of people we have a painful proof in the plentiful crop of sneers that have sprung up in the friendly soil of the *Saturday Review*, and other periodicals, now that the Autobiography has granted us the privilege of a fuller view into its writer's inner life. We need do no more than remark upon certain obvious points of resemblance between the relations of Goethe with Frau von Stein, and those of Mr. Mill with Mrs. Mill, during the lifetime of her first husband, Mr. Taylor. Although neither morally nor intellectually worthy of a comparison with Mrs. Mill, Frau von Stein seems to have been in every way superior to all the rest of the women whom Goethe loved, and to have exercised a proportionally stronger influence over him. But both externally and internally they were circumstanced far less favourably than their English counterparts, whose deep union of heart and mind, founded as it was on the rock of purity and steadfastness, enabled them to treat the slights and misconstructions of society with absolute indifference. Amid the torrent of detraction which Mrs. Grundy, constituting various reviewers her mouthpiece, pours upon the heads of these two persons who once for all declined to burn incense upon her altar, the absence (as we believe) of any attempt to throw doubt upon Mill's assertion that the twenty years' friendship between himself and Mrs. Taylor was of a purely

\* Translated literally, “the eternal-womanly,” or “the Eternal Womanhood draws upwards,” or “heaven-wards.” Faust, 2nd Part.

platonian nature, forms a striking illustration of the influence exerted by Mill's simple truthfulness and singleness of mind over the bitterest opponents of his system, social and political. In the course of action which Mill here pursued, he especially showed that "devotion to the two cardinal points of liberty and duty" which were so strongly insisted on by him; together with his "incomparable friend," he resolutely asserted his liberty by "declining to consider the ordinances of society binding on a subject so entirely personal" as their own friendship, and at the same time they were strictly faithful to duty.

One direct effect of Mill's singularly happy experience in women was his vigorous assumption of the championship of their right to be represented in parliament, a right which of course includes all their other "rights," or we should perhaps rather say, a redressal of all their wrongs. The germ of the idea could hardly fail to have existed, and as we know had actually long existed in a mind so peculiarly distinguished by a keen sense of justice as that of Mill; but it might for some time longer have lain dormant without the fructifying influence of that friend and wife to whom, in this matter, English women owe a debt of gratitude only second to what they owe to Mill himself.

3. *Religion.*—Nature and education had joined to make Goethe a Pantheist, as they had joined to make him an Artist. Take Mr. Ruskin's eloquent description of the great humanistic, or as he calls it, naturalistic school of artists, every word of which fits Goethe to such a nicety that we may be excused for making use of it instead of our own halting words:—

"The great naturalist takes the human being in its wholeness, in its mortal as well as its spiritual strength. Capable of sounding and sympathizing with the whole range of its passions, he brings one majestic harmony out of them all; he represents it fearlessly in all its acts and thoughts, in its . . . . anger, its sensuality, and its pride, as well as in its fortitude or faith, but makes it noble in them all; . . . . there is nothing which he is reluctant to behold, nothing that he is ashamed to confess; with all that lives, triumphing, falling, or suffering, he claims kindred, either in majesty or in mercy."\*

Is not Pantheism the religion exactly suited to such a man as this? May we not go even further, and say, is it possible for the naturalistic Artist to be of any other religion, seeing that the above description is simply Pantheism applied to Art? Already as a youth Goethe had been fascinated by the "boundless disinterestedness which shines forth from every sentence of Spinoza's 'Ethics.' The wondrous axiom—'He who truly loves God, must not ask that God should love him in return,' with all the premises upon

---

\* "Stones of Venice."

which it rests, with all the results which derive themselves from it, filled my whole thoughts." In later years, his own experience as an Artist and a man of the world, taught him the truth that "our physical as well as social life—our morals, habits, worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, even many an accidental occurrence—call us to self-sacrifice." Pantheism satisfied his physical leanings by consecrating his almost Hellenic admiration for the human body; and his moral breadth of view, which led him to trace the "soul of good" which exists even in "things evil." It taught him to regard all religions with respect, while attributing absolute perfection to none. Detesting as he did all demolition, he was far from wishing to overturn Christianity; and yet no one could see more plainly than he did some of its weak points. His theory about it was, that

"Christ thought of a God, comprising all in one, to whom he ascribed all qualities which he found excellent in himself. This God was the essence of his own beautiful soul, full of love and goodness, like himself. But as the great Being, whom we name the Deity, manifests himself not only in man, but in a rich, powerful nature, and in mighty world-events, a representation of him, framed from human qualities, cannot of course be adequate, and the attentive observer will soon come to imperfections and contradictions."\*

His faith in our Immortality was very strong.

"Man" he said, "should believe in immortality: he has a right to this belief; it corresponds to the wants of his nature, and he may believe in the promises of religion. But if the philosopher tries to deduce the immortality of the soul from a legend, that is very weak and inefficient. To me the eternal existence of my soul is proved from my idea of activity; if I work on incessantly till my death, nature is bound to give me another form of existence when the present one can no longer sustain my spirit."†

Yet he was fully conscious how great a mistake it is to make such ideas "a theme of daily meditation and thought-distracting speculation. An able man, who has something regular to do here, and must toil and struggle and produce day by day, leaves the future world to itself, and is active and useful in this."‡

The best idea of Goethe's thoughts about (to use his own words)

"Him, who, seek to name him as we will,  
Unknown within himself abideth still,"

will be given by a quotation from his "Proemium" to "Gott

\* Eckermann's "Conversations of Goethe."

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

und Welt." It is an exact exposition, too, of the Pantheistic creed:—

“What were the God who sat outside to scan  
 The spheres that 'neath his finger circling ran?  
 God dwells within, and moves the world and moulds,  
 Himself and nature in one form enfolds:  
 Thus all that lives in him and breathes and is,  
 Shall ne'er his puissance, ne'er his spirit miss.  
 The soul of man, too, is an universe:  
 Whence follows it that race with race concurs  
 In naming all it knows of good and true  
 God,—yea, its own God; and with homage due  
 Surrenders to his sway both earth and heaven;  
 Fears him, and loves, where place for love is given.”\*

As Eckermann truly says:—“His opponents have often accused him of having no faith; but he merely had not theirs, because it was too small for him.”

But we can hardly imagine Pantheism being the religion of the practical Reformer. One whose inmost heart is so penetrated with the sorrows of humanity, that his life must, if he be true to himself, be one long struggle to cure them, cannot by any possibility regard this as the best of all possible worlds. And he is pretty sure to do one of two things: either he will give up as hopeless all idea of effectually curing the ills of this life, and devote himself to the task of preparing himself and his fellows to inhabit the new heavens and the new earth which he has taught himself to look upon as certainties; or he will set all his powers to work to improve the present condition of the world and its inhabitants, so as to bring them, if possible, somewhat nearer an ideal state, leaving the future to take care of itself. We need hardly say that the latter was the line actually taken by a philosophical as well as practical Reformer like Mill. He regarded speculations about the unseen world as, on the whole, unprofitable, seeing that we can never, by any possibility, arrive at the faintest approach to certainty about it, while alive. Still he could not but have opinions of some sort on the subject; and though we have as yet no complete exposition of them, we may obtain a tolerable idea what they were by piecing together various passages from his writings, especially from the *Autobiography*. We can discern a strong feeling of sympathy and agreement with his father's religious, or rather non-religious, views in the wonderfully powerful and striking account of them given in the latter work. His own carefully cultivated

---

\* From an admirable translation by J. A. S. in the *Spectator* of September 24, 1870.

powers of reasoning taught him, as he grew up, to see the justice of that negation of all established beliefs which from his earliest years had been infused into his mind. Yet there are certain indications that, to these negative opinions, he added some positive ones, which, through all his reticence, we can see were very precious to him. We cannot but feel that he is stating his own belief when he says "of many whose belief is far short of Deism," that

"though they may think the proof incomplete that the universe is the work of design, and though they assuredly disbelieve that it can have an author and governor who is absolute in power as well as perfect in goodness, they have that which constitutes the principal worth of all religions whatever, an ideal conception of a perfect Being, to which they habitually refer as the guide of their conscience; and this ideal of God is usually far nearer to perfection than the objective Deity of those, who think themselves obliged to find absolute goodness in the author of a world so crowded with suffering, and so deformed by injustice as ours."\*

We shall be better able to comprehend this passage by comparing it with the hint, given a few pages before, of a possible solution of that greatest of all difficulties, the origin of evil, in "the Sabæan, or Manichæan, theory of a Good and an Evil Principle, struggling against each other for the government of the Universe." This hypothesis James Mill regarded as a harmless one, and both intellectually and morally far preferable to that which ascribes the creation of a "world full of evil" to a being "combining infinite power with perfect goodness and righteousness." Those who are acquainted with Miss Cobbe's writings will know that James and John Stuart Mill are not the sole modern thinkers to whom this solution has suggested itself.

Mr. Mill's later works are symptomatic of the growing influence over him of that "religion of humanity" which some of the clearest and most impartial thinkers of our day declare to be the coming creed, and that philosophers are to be its priests. But in Mill it was entirely separated from Comte's "system of spiritual and temporal despotism," which Mill pronounced to be "a monumental warning to thinkers on society and politics of what happens when once men lose sight in their speculations of the value of liberty and individuality." The most direct, if slight, enunciation of his views may be found in his last conversation with Mr. Morley (previously quoted from), where he

---

\* Our repetition of this, and one or two other quotations given in the former article on "John Stuart Mill," may be excused on the ground that they are used to illustrate points other than those for which they were required in that article.

spoke of Theism as a "useful provisional belief," and of his own opinion that "the coming religion would rest upon the solidarity of mankind." His thoroughly reasonable and thence consolatory reconciliation of the doctrines of free will and of necessity ("Autobiography," pp. 169-70), show Mr. Mill to have been no fatalist. We have as yet no intimation whatever as to Mill's belief about immortality. And yet he could not have banished all thought of it from his mind. Were there no hours of bitter agony during the long fifteen years that he lived to mourn his unspeakable loss, when the philosopher's heart would give way, and he would feel how willingly, were it possible, he would change places with "the weakest saint," who, strong in faith, could say, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and therefore I too shall live again?" Such moments of weakness, we cannot but think, there must have been, but they could only be moments. The thought that the truth makes us free would alone be sufficient to drive such vain longings from a mind which had never known the yoke of spiritual, of "other worldly" bondage, without the recollection that the Christian belief in an immortal life by no means implies the certainty of an immortality of love. We have not yet met with any explanation of the words, "They which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage," that could be really satisfactory to those who have loved and lost, most of whom would prefer absolute annihilation to an immortality combined with a separation from, or an entire change of feeling towards, their dear ones. Far better than the chance of such change is the creed of Positivism, chilling though it may seem when first presented to us. The Positivist keeps "a solemn silence" as "to the life of sensation or consciousness" hereafter, and is content to know that "not a true life really dies; not a true thought, word, or deed is wasted; not a true being ceases to be." He will be "incorporated, but not absorbed;" he will "live for ever, but in a finer, purer way, with all that is poor and mean in him passing into oblivion, and all that is solid and humane in him deepening in power."\* We have dwelt a little upon this Positivist theory of immortality, because we have a strong suspicion that it would embody Mill's own views on the subject. Of course this is merely an inference, perhaps nothing more than a guess, for, as we said before, we have nothing that deserves the name of evidence on the subject. Though Goethe felt a certainty about the existence of a future life, which Mill was far from entertaining, their

---

\* From "The Religion of Inhumanity," by Mr. Frederic Harrison, *Fortnightly Review*.

conclusions as to the practical inutility of constantly dwelling upon it were identical. To the students of St. Andrews Mill said: "I do not attempt to instigate you by the prospect of direct rewards, either earthly or heavenly. The less we think about being rewarded in either way the better for us."

Some critics of the Autobiography assume a tone of profound pity for the "monotonous joylessness" of its writer's life, which would be amusing, but for the irritation excited by their extreme presumption. Any solid reason for such a supposition we entirely fail to perceive. Mill certainly was not a jovial, light-hearted man. One does not look for the qualities of a Mark Tapley, a Cheeryble, or a Mr. Pickwick, in a man of such intense earnestness, and such serious views of life and its purposes, who had such deep sympathy with the sorrows, and felt such burning indignation at the wrongs of his fellow-men. But there is no cause for thinking he was an unhappy man. His profession and pecuniary means were favourable to the carrying on of his especial pursuits, and his domestic ties were such as it falls to the lot of few men to be blessed with. His influence and fame increased with his years, and he never lacked devoted friends. He did not look upon the world as an abode of misery, or he would hardly have called it "a world where there is so much to interest, so much to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve;" where "every one who has a moderate amount of moral and intellectual requisites is capable of an existence which may be called enviable."\*

"Is it so small a thing  
To have enjoyed the sun,  
To have lived light in the spring,  
To have loved, to have thought, to have done,

"To have advanc'd true friends, and beat down baffling foes?"†

Finally, his oft-expressed wish, that his last illness might not be a long one, was realized; and to the very last he retained full possession of his glorious intellect. There are not many human beings who obtain a fuller share of happiness than this, though of course no argument is of much avail with those who have come to a foregone conclusion, to the effect that a belief in revealed religion is necessary to a human being's happiness. That the very highest and noblest morality may co-exist with a rejection of all revelation, Mr. Mill's life and writings have given overwhelming proof, and it is to the fact of this being brought so conspicuously before the world in the Autobiography, that we

---

\* "On Utilitarianism."

† Matthew Arnold's "Empedocles."



may attribute the mass of abuse and misrepresentation which, since its publication, have been aimed at its illustrious author.

John Stuart Mill never made Goethe's acquaintance, though they inhabited the same world for twenty-six years; and we may venture to say that they could never have become friends, had they been brought together. Goethe looked upon Bentham as a Radical madman, and Mill was but a spiritualized Bentham, while Mill had a "deep dislike of Goethe's moral character." A wide gulf, which put all sympathy out of the question, separated them on earth, and yet there was, as we have been attempting to show, between these two essentially antagonistic natures, one strong point of union—a genuine love for the human race, and a consequent desire for its improvement—a profound conviction of the truth, as Goethe has finely expressed it, that "the true man is humanity in its entirety, and that the individual can be joyous and happy, then only, when he has the courage to feel himself a part of the great All."



#### ART. IV.—THE ADMIRALTY AND THE NAVY.

*Mr. Ward Hunt's Speech on the Navy Estimates, 1874-5.*

BY chance or design the right thing may be done in the wrong way. To do evil that good may come, is always morally bad, and often worse than merely bad, because it may be a logical blunder. But the good it produces may live on for all that; while the generating evil, and the blunder it marks, may show their vitality only by recoiling on the heads of the actors.

A blunder of this nature was committed on the occasion of the introduction of the Navy Estimates for this year. "A scare" was got up ostensibly to improve the Navy, but in reality for party purposes. The evil had no vitality, but the good it effected was to draw public attention to the state of the Navy; and we hope to intensify and continue that good result by showing that although the reasons assigned were wrong, the conclusion was right.

The attempt at any time to make the Navy a *cheval de bataille* for party warfare is much to be deplored. If something of that patriotic spirit, which to the credit of English political antagonism always characterizes the discussion of our foreign relations, were allowed to enter into the consideration of a question so intimately connected with those relations, it would be as wise as it would be consistent. The clatter made by Mr.

Ward Hunt about a few worn out boilers was very effective no doubt, like stage thunder; and the changes rung upon the necessity to ask the House for a supplementary vote of 150,000*l.* for certain repairs, produced an impression like the marching and counter-marching of a few supernumeraries in a theatrical battle; but between Mr. Hunt's party pyrotechny, and Mr. Childers' personal fencing, the true cause of naval inefficiency was altogether overlooked.

In the debate to which we have alluded, we may easily sift the wheat from the chaff. We may take the political part of it as "sound and fury, signifying nothing." We may dismiss the demand of the members for Dockyard boroughs, for more ships to be built, before we really know whether our latest type will either swim or fight, with the rejoinder of Sganarelle to the goldsmith's suggestion,\* "Vous me conseillez fort bien—*pour vous.*" We may estimate the arguments of place-hunters and party hacks as Burns interpreted the overzeal of the political parson—

"For faith, the birkie wants a manse,  
Sae cannilie he hums them:"—

but we cannot overlook the fact that the whole tone of the debate was low; that it was pervaded by the mistake that the remedy for naval inefficiency is the easy one of expenditure; and that it foreshadows on the part of the Ministry a disposition to return to the heroic policy of building "numbers of ships;" good ones if possible, but under all circumstances plenty of them! Least of all can we ignore the dismal conclusion that our present fleet is only "a paper fleet," and our ironclads, in the main, merely "dummies." We concur in this conclusion, not because a few ships are temporarily laid up for repairs, but because with the exception of a few ships our first line of defence is for all practical security a mockery; and we trace this dismal result, not to the failure of boilers, but to the failure of the system under which our Navy is built, and managed.

The facts we shall adduce will, we believe, clearly prove the anomalous and defective system of the Admiralty administration. The history of the last fifteen years is the detail of failure pointing logically to inherent weakness in the constitution of the governing body. It will show that while our constructive policy has been neither bold enough to confer on the country a real security, nor experimentally cautious enough to prevent inordinate expenditure, it has been so unscientific and merely initiative, as to have left unsolved and unsettled yet, the problem of the

---

\* Molière's "L'Amour Médecin."

best type of war ship. It will show also that in the Constructive department, those who deliberate are practically irresponsible, while those technologically skilled are virtually powerless. And it brings us to the conclusion that the Board of Admiralty controls without knowledge, the Controller manages with no real authority, and that the subordinates work under no stimulus of direct self-interest; in short, that the system is cumbrous, anomalous, and defective, and the result a condition of the Navy which luckily for the future security of the country has produced "a scare"!

The active superintendence of the Admiralty extends over two distinct departments, that of building and repairing the Navy, and that of sailing the fleet—in other words, the Constructive service and the Service afloat.

The estimated expenditure for the present year may be taken as follows:—

*Constructive Service.*

Vote 6. Dockyards ... ..	£1,180,326
" 10. Section 1.—Naval Stores for building, repairing, &c. ... ..	1,143,159
Section 2.—Contract ships and engines ... ..	707,904
" 11. New works, machinery, &c. ... ..	682,061
" 13. Law charges (part) ... ..	5,000
" 14. Miscellaneous (part) ... ..	5,000
" 3. Admiralty Office (half) ... ..	89,033
" 16. Civil pensions to artificers and part of officers' pensions, being in reality "wages" ... ..	174,536
	<hr/>
	£3,987,019

*Service Afloat.*

Vote 1. Wages to seamen, &c. ... ..	£2,602,757
" 2. Victuals and clothing ... ..	1,064,264
" 3. Admiralty Office (half) ... ..	89,033
" 4. Coast Guard, &c. ... ..	163,311
" 5. Scientific branch ... ..	111,170
" 7. Victualling yards ... ..	72,885
" 8. Medical establishments ... ..	63,701
" 9. Marine divisions... ..	18,720
" 12. Medicines, &c. ... ..	70,520
" 13. Martial law, Law charges ... ..	10,605
" 14. Miscellaneous (part) ... ..	108,510
" 15. Half-pay, active list ... ..	172,759
	<hr/>
	£4,548,235

The totals represent the portions of the annual cost of the two departments over which the Admiralty has a dispensing and controlling power. The balance of the whole sum voted is for pensions, superannuations, &c. Over this portion death alone, *equo pede*, has any immediate influence.

The importance of our fleet cannot be over-estimated ; but our appreciation of this part of our national defences must go deeper and further than traditional sentiment. The beauty of utility has over-ridden all visual prettiness in the individual ship, and we must further be content to gauge the value of the fleet by what it will do in the hour of need, and not by names, numbers, and mere show. Our position is insular ; we have the largest mercantile marine afloat ; we are the most extensive shipbuilders in the world : and our commerce penetrates to every port on the globe. Should war break out these several interests must look to the Navy for protection ; it is the buckler to guard our shores from invasion, and what else is there to turn back the tide of war to our enemies' waters, and to preserve untarnished the honour of England's flag ? Not in one, but in all respects, therefore, our chief reliance would rest upon the operations of the Navy.

But insular, maritime, and commercial England, with all her pressing necessities, and all her glorious opportunities, has been content, so far, to take a subordinate place in the race of naval improvement. The skill and energy, backed by the vast material resources of this country, have never been allowed to measure her wants and exercise their capabilities *by her own standard*. Native skill has been confined to detail, and our progress has been by fits and starts, under alternate phases of apathy and panic, with no higher aim than to better the best of our weaker neighbours !

The French set us the example of propelling war ships by steam. We, thenceforth, in hot haste, set about the task of converting the sailing ships we were then so proud of, into screw steamers. When we were about to draw breath and felt ready to congratulate ourselves that we had beaten our neighbours at their own game, they doubled upon us with a new idea, and initiated the era of ironclads by the success of *La Gloire*.

First sceptical, then startled, then reckless, we harked back, and set about superseding our new wooden steamers by enormous, but weak ironclads.

Then, having treated Captain Coles, in regard to the turret principle, as prophets are usually treated in their own country ; having no policy but imitation, and distracted by the fact that the country we usually copied clung to broadside ships, while the Americans, whose rivalry we most dreaded, cultivated the Monitor

type, we were, like Issachar, "crouching between two burdens." We dreaded to neglect either, and half-heartedly we have tried, and failed to take up both!

"Wax to receive—(in panic), and marble to retain"—(in obstinacy) our practical translation of the naval motto *semper paratus*, has been *too late*. In 1859, we were struggling to reach the French standard in the development of our steam Navy, and before the end of 1861, we had converted sixteen sailing ships into screw steamers, at a cost of 983,126*l.* But in spite of this best possible evidence of our convictions that no type would answer but steam war ships, in the programme of work for 1861, new wooden sailing vessels were actually ordered to be built.\* It would hardly have been worth while to call attention to this little episode in Admiralty management, had the infatuation stopped here; but while this process was going on, we were positively reconverting wooden screws into armour-plated ships.† Thus we were building sailing ships while we were converting sailing ships into steamers, and while we were laying down and building wooden screws, we were simultaneously pulling wooden screws to pieces to re-convert them into iron-clads, protected by armour plates, already rendered obsolete by improved artillery!

In 1859, notwithstanding our fever of "reconstruction," we were fairly committed to the building of ironclads. Experimental hesitation was for awhile discarded, and by April, 1861, we had four large ships partially protected by 4½ inch plates, completed at a cost of 1,288,788*l.*

In rapid succession followed three more partially protected ships, costing 1,147,329*l.*; and thus, before 1863 had expired, we were enabled to boast of seven huge ironclads afloat, on which we had expended a total of 2,436,117*l.*

Simultaneously we were altering four large wooden screw steamers, upon which we introduced the plan of complete protection, and one partially protected, at an expenditure of 1,419,411*l.*

We were also building three larger ships with 5½ inch armour, but with reduced backing of wood, the combined resisting efficacy of which was stated to be, by the late Chief Constructor, "in all probability at least equal to that of the *Warrior*." They therefore belong to the 4½ inch or *Warrior* class. These vessels cost 1,389,265*l.*

---

\* Eighteen sailing ships were laid down after conversion began, and cost 295,367*l.* Of this amount 165,453*l.* was returned into store. The absolute loss to the country was 129,914*l.*—Mr. Seeley's Committee "Report."

† *Caledonian*, *Ocean*, *Royal Alfred*, *Royal Oak*, and *Prince Consort* were ordered to be altered into armour-clads from May 14th to June 5th, 1861.

From 1863 to 1866 several smaller ships of Mr. Reed's designs were launched, all having  $4\frac{1}{2}$  inch plating, and one, the *Bellerophon*, with 6 inch, and costing, with the two small turret ships, bought from the Messrs. Lairds, and one of Captain Coles' design, 2,236,825*l.*

From the year 1859 to 1866, therefore, we built or purchased twenty-five broadsides, and three turret ships, at a total outlay of 7,481,618*l.*, all with one exception having  $4\frac{1}{2}$  inch plates, or their equivalent, *and every one of which was as little defended from the guns which were in use during the time of their being built as the old wooden ships were from the 68-pounder!*

The last phase of building in batches was consummated by the late Mr. Corry. In two years, 1867 and 1868, eleven ironclads were commenced. In the "disquieting debate," as it was termed by *The Times*, on the last Navy Estimates, this heroic treatment of the Navy question was pointed to with pride by the dominant party as the *ne plus ultra* of administrative wisdom. It was in this spirit that Mr. Ward Hunt triumphantly asked, "Where should we have been as regarded our fleet, had that policy not been pursued by the late Mr. Corry?" As regards the past, the exultation is harmless; but as an indication of the policy to be pursued by the party now in power, the question is a serious one indeed. Seven of the eleven ships laid down by Mr. Corry were inefficient specimens of an obsolete type. They were broadside ships, and the prevailing weight of opinion of naval architects and seamen was then in favour of turret ships. They were armoured with 6 inch plates, when 6 inch plates had been proved to be incapable of resisting the guns already afloat. They are indeed useful to swell the list of our ironclad ships. They help now to make up a goodly array of tons, guns, horse-power and men afloat. They furnish excellent material for a First Lord's annual "Song of Triumph;" but for fighting purposes they might as well be a part of Homer's catalogue of the Grecian ships.

The remaining four ships commenced by Mr. Corry are on the turret principle, one of them being the ill-fated *Captain*, another the *Hotspur*, whose turret does not revolve, and another the *Glatton*, the latter having 12 inch armour generally.

During the fever of broadside, insufficiently protected ironclad shipbuilding we have described, Captain Coles was persistently urging upon the Admiralty the advantages of his turret system, and was so successful because of his importunity that he induced the authorities to order the *Royal Sovereign* to be converted from a wooden screw into a razeed turret ship. She was finished and tried in 1864, and Captain Sherard Osborne reported her to be "the most formidable vessel of war I have ever been on

board of. She could easily destroy, if her guns were rifled (she had only smooth bore guns and the old wooden carriages) any of our present ironclads, whether of the *Warrior*, *Hector*, or *Research* class. Her handiness, speed, weight of broadside, and the small target she offers, increase tenfold her powers of assault and retreat." In 1867—Mr. Corry's red-letter year—the Controller of the Navy in reporting upon the competitive designs furnished by seven shipbuilding firms, in reply to an Admiralty circular, remarks:—"I have so repeatedly expressed my opinion as to the essential merits and qualities of the turret system of armament, that I am loth to repeat it here; but as I still hold that for coast defences, for the attack of fortresses and arsenals, for inland waters, rivers, &c. &c., the turret system of armament properly designed in vessels known as the *Monitor* type is superior to all others, and the most formidable engine of war that can well be conceived, so I still maintain that combining a sea-going vessel with masts, rigging, and sails, and this kind of armament, entails a sacrifice of a large portion of its efficiency and compels a choice to be made between serious difficulties, the solution of which in a satisfactory manner has not yet been accomplished."

Mr. Reed, in his work on "Our Ironclad Ships," concurs generally in this opinion, but intimates that he nevertheless possessed the key to the solution of the difficulty. He says (p. 229), "The only description of rigged turret ship which I believe would be at all likely to succeed sufficiently to justify its large adoption is one which I contrived at the Admiralty some years ago, but of which no example has yet been built." As to the more important question of the sea-going qualities of turret ships, the *Royal Sovereign* was, in 1864, already afloat, and in commission, and a cruise in heavy weather would have done much to solve this *questio vexata*. But the Admiralty was content to leave the point undetermined. Her calm weather trial was all she was subjected to, and with all her reported good qualities, and with the power which she alone at that time possessed to settle the turret controversy, she was laid aside, and naval architects were thus left to wrangle on.

This is not the only case of neglected opportunity as regards the turret system. The *Captain* and *Monarch*, costing 334,016*l.*, were ordered to be built as sea-going turret ships, in spite of the strong opinions of the Controller and the Chief Constructor. It is just possible, but hardly probable (else why was the *Royal Sovereign* converted at all?) that the case of a converted ship might have been deemed to be an insufficient test. It might therefore be held that a more searching and complete experiment should be made before the important case of turrets *versus*

broadships should be decided, or at least before the best type of turret ship could be determined. The logic of Boards of Admiralty being peculiar, the country could only submit and wait. But surely self-contradiction is substituted for bad logic when, on the eve of conclusive trial of the two new turret ships, and when all controverted points were yet in doubt, the Admiralty resolved to commit the country to the expenditure of 1,000,000*l.* to build four other turret ships respecting which an ex-First Lord of the Admiralty stated at the Institution of Naval Architects (March, 1869), that they were "such as I may say with confidence have never before been heard of!" This decision (to build) seems all the more strange to the unofficial mind, because it was taken, so far as time at least was concerned, in opposition to strongly expressed professional opinion. The following extract from a "circular" addressed to a number of Naval officers, explains itself:—

"You know there is to be a debate in the House about the turret question, on Mr. Samuda's motion, to substitute two turret ships instead of two broadside ships building, without waiting to try the *Captain* and *Monarch* at sea. Mr. Corry would like to have all the information he can on the subject . . . for or against the turret as a sea-going ship."

The following replies were received. Captain Willes writes:— "I think the Admiralty quite right in not substituting two turret ships for the broadside ones in the building programme, until the *Captain* and *Monarch* have been properly tried at sea." Captain Hall "sincerely trusts that no pressure of irresponsible opinion will tempt the Board of Admiralty to order other sea-going turret ships to be built, until the *Monarch* and *Captain* have been fairly and honestly tried, their defects discovered, and improvements suggested." Admiral Yelverton says, "All things considered, I am clearly of opinion that the two turret ships *Captain* and *Monarch* ought to be fairly tested as sea-going ships before we venture on building other vessels of the sort." Rear-Admiral Warden states it to be "quite open to doubt whether it is wise at the present moment to commence building two more turret ships when there are two so near completion, and which will soon be on trial." Captain Foley writes:—"I think it would be extreme folly to do so (*i.e.*, build two more turrets), until such time as the *Captain* and *Monarch* now building have had a trial at sea."

These opinions were lessons of wisdom when they suited party purposes. They enabled a First Lord "to dish" a troublesome opponent. But when applied to purposes of practical guidance they were altogether ignored. It must be borne in mind that the *Captain* and *Monarch* were not only turret ships, but also



fully rigged sea-going turret ships. One desideratum in a sea-going war ship is obviously, that she shall efficiently combine sail power with steam propulsion. It is equally obvious that the possession of this desideratum should not compromise the essential qualities of a fighting ship, nor encounter the risk of dangerous disturbance to her seaworthiness. Coals are a limited element on shipboard, and coals ought to be economized on board a cruiser. But to neutralize the general efficiency of the vessel by the preponderance of one set of considerations, is only the beginning of that chain of reasoning which would never send the ship to sea at all.

Theoretically, we believe, the principle developed in the *Devastation* class of war ship (the four we have adverted to) as an unhampered fighting machine, to be sound. For battle at sea, masts, spars, and rigging are an anomaly. Had steam propulsion preceded that of sails, a proposition to fit up a fighting ship with a small grove of masts and spars, with their maze of ropes and complication of bits, blocks, and fittings, would be very properly scouted as a craze. The whole complication has grown with our apprehension as part of the nature of a ship, not conformable to reason, but to custom and a foregone necessity, and as little to be questioned as the mane and tail of a horse. By the trial of the two-rigged turret ships, light might have been thrown upon this question, and the trial was near at hand. And yet, notwithstanding the strongly expressed and unanimous opinions we have quoted—notwithstanding the importance and difficulty of the problem to be solved, and the imminence of its expected solution, the Admiralty determined to build four large ships dependent solely upon steam propulsion; and for two of them provision was made in the Navy Estimates in March, 1869. The verdict was thus given first and the evidence heard afterwards!\*

We have already said that we believe the theory of mastless

---

\* Sir Spencer Robinson remarks upon this point:—"The several objections made to the design are thus disposed of. They were, first, the necessity of waiting for the trial of the *Captain* and *Monarch*. It has been shown that the trial of these ships will tell us nothing about the new design."—And yet the *Captain* and *Monarch* were built to "ascertain the advantages or disadvantages of central armament in a sea going ship." (See "Minute of First Lord of the Admiralty with reference to H.M. ship *Captain*.")—The "new design" was stated by Sir S. Robinson himself, March 24th, 1869, at a meeting of the Committee to which a design of the *Devastation* class was submitted, to be "specially designed as powerful sea-going ships."—Hence the *Captain* and *Monarch* and the "new design" were classes of ships similar in aim, so far as being "sea-going" went. The same end was, however, to be differently attained. Which means of attainment was best, a single experimental ship would have proved. To commit the nation to an outlay of 1,000,000*l.* before proof of any kind was reckless.

unhampered fighting ships to be sound. But we freely admit that in naval matters theory is apt to be disturbed by fact. The incidence of a particular law under certain circumstances may be easily and correctly estimated. But the combined result of the mutual interference of a diversity of laws under varying conditions, is not readily to be determined, if at all, by any *à priori* reasoning. Experiment, trial, experience, gathered it may be through partial success or absolute failure, are necessary steps to naval perfection. Some slight unknown cause may disturb the surest calculations, and no one can be certain of precisely similar qualities even in ships built on identical lines, and sent to sea under the same conditions. The decision, therefore, in the case of the turret ships to act independently of experience, showed an empiricism above and beyond scientific deduction; and the condemnation of this decision is to be found in the supervening caution which modified portions of the design of some, and altogether changed the conditions of others, of the four "never before heard of" ships.\*

During the fifteen years the ship building operations of which we have reviewed, we find distinct processes of building, reconstruction, conversion and supercession, *each overlapping the other*, and all crowned by waste and failure. We have noted some of the most important steps taken in direct opposition to the most competent technical and professional authorities; and we have seen in the face of doubt and controversy that the means to remove that doubt, and terminate such controversy, were overlooked and neglected. The results we may summarize in the words of Mr. Ward Hunt. We have obtained a magnificent ironclad "*paper fleet*;" our ships are "*dummies*," and not "*real and effective*." But this result is due, not as he puts it, because they are under repair, or even worn out, but because they always were intrinsically worthless for fighting purposes. His remedy is to build—build! Where should we have been (he asks) if Mr. Corry had not given us a number of 6 inch plated ships? The inference therefore is that he will, as soon as he can, lay down a number of the best ships according to the lights of Admiralty

---

\* Not only were such ships "never before heard of" as regards their absence of masts, but they also initiated a principle never before heard of amongst Boards of Admiralty—viz., "that the defensive armour, if carried at all, must be able to resist the artillery it was likely to meet!" This is a naïve confession for a Controller to make in 1869. Startling as it is, we might have ascribed the neglect of such a principle as that protected ships should be protected, to the fact that Boards of Admiralty had no technical knowledge of the subject, were it not for the astounding statement which follows—viz., "*This great and valuable concession on the part of the Admiralty was not obtained without great resistance!*"—Memorandum by Sir Spencer Robinson on New Designs for Ironclad Ships. "Appendix to Report of Committee on Designs."

experts, which ships the general experience of the last fifteen years fairly proves, will be obsolete before they are launched !

With such a result before us, and knowing Mr. Hunt's interpretation of the lesson it conveys, it is worth while to trace the cause. No argument should be needed to show that to insure an effective Navy, and to dispense economically the vast sum this branch of our service annually absorbs, a competent knowledge of the processes and results this outlay is intended to work out is required. Shipbuilding is essentially one of the most complicated and recondite of all constructive arts. It requires the artist's eye, the mathematician's analysis, and the technical skill of the mechanician. No one can direct the varied agencies employed in shipbuilding without a certain amount of professional training ; or can accomplish its aims, and utilize the materials employed, without the practical aptitude which can only be obtained from a familiarity with the details and management of a well organized establishment.

The country possesses five of the largest shipbuilding and repairing establishments in the world. The fixed capital is not far short of 10,000,000*l.*, and the average quantity of material kept in stock was four and three-quarters millions when timber which required seasoning was used ; and now in the days of iron building, about two and a half millions, for the production of work worth some 4,000,000*l.* annually.

To conduct with economy and efficiency constructive establishments so extensive, and to deal with sums so vast, common sense would surely say, "obtain at any cost the highest possible professional ability, and endow it with full and direct personal responsibility." Only the most disastrous joint-stock incapacity, or ignorance the most crass, or indifference the most fatuous, could suggest—*à priori*—the possibility of entrusting these vast, varied, and complex interests to the control of a shifting political body, bereft of all professional training !

But what is the fact ?

The absolute and responsible superintendence of the shipbuilding and repairing departments of the Navy (as distinguished from the political and financial departments and the service afloat) is put into the hands of a board, not one member of which is required to have undergone, or to possess any professional training.\* None of the members of the Admiralty has had, or was expected to acquire any practical acquaintance with the

---

\* "I never did feel at the Admiralty that I had either the knowledge, or the control, or the responsibility which I think the Minister who is the head of so great a department ought to have."—Sir John Pakington : "Evidence before Committee on the Board of Admiralty," p. 179.

designing or building of sea-going ships. The permanent practical but irresponsible head of the five gigantic shipbuilding establishments of the country—the Controller—has always been *not a naval architect, or civil engineer, or mechanician, but a seaman*. The chief superintendents of all these establishments are also seamen, whose professional training has been at sea, superintending sailors, not shipwrights; engaged in navigating, not in constructing, ships of war!

It is no answer to these statements of fact, that the highest technical skill may be, and probably is, obtained in the subordinate departments, and that this also takes place in large private establishments. Principals in private firms are, as a rule, masters of their business, which from its constitution a Board of Admiralty is not.\* They possess the digestive and assimilative function. They hire capable managers to supplement their own brains with efficient hands. They hear, and see, and at times consult, but they have the trained capacity *to form their own opinions, use their own judgments, and determine their own course*. If the members of a Board of Admiralty acted with the vigour and independence of partners in private establishments, in the exercise of their own judgments, the inevitable result would be to dislocate or deadlock the whole system. If, on the other hand, they merely endorse and register the opinions of subordinate advisers, the result is likely to be equally disastrous by taking away all responsibility to Parliament and the country from those who practically govern in Whitehall.

Mr. Goschen explained the Admiralty theory of personal responsibility (July, 1872), stating that Mr. Childers “had made every man responsible for his own work.” But to whom? If a servant acts on his own conviction, he is responsible to his master for such acts; but if a servant advises his master to take or permit a certain course, and the master after inquiry and consideration adopts that advice, the servant clearly shifts the onus upon his superior. He may lose prestige in case of failure, and his opinion in future have less weight; but direct punishment or censure is out of the question. And as Mr. Childers’ system was to gather the power to decide into his own hands, and as he did so decide, we cannot understand the co-existence of inferior personal responsibility under any fair interpretation of the term. On the other hand, let the theory be what it may, no one supposes that a civilian unprofessional First Lord is

---

\* We speak, of course, of the Constructive Service only. The Board of Admiralty is composed as follows:—First Lord, First Naval Lord, Third Lord and Controller (since separated), Junior Naval Lord, Civil Lord; or two Civilians, and three Naval Members. The professional constructive element is entirely absent.

responsible for the structural errors of any ship, or class of ships, and the First Lord must know it. The mind's eye rests at once upon the skilled adviser; and the colourless theoretical responsibility serves no other purpose than to round off a sentence in a party speech. It is to this absence of knowledge in those who decide, and to the elimination of responsibility from those who advise, an arrangement at once weak, irritating, and anomalous, that we may in a great measure ascribe the tissue of continuous waste and error which has produced our present costly, but useless fleet. This system we condemn, without in the remotest degree blaming the individuals who are the component parts of that system. Moreover, in justice to the naval profession, some of whose members' lines have fallen into pleasant Admiralty places, it must be said, that in general intelligence, and in the command of mental resources in emergencies, no other profession is superior. But the argument is simply this: that common sense people don't go to a clever lawyer to cure their ailments, nor to a medical celebrity to teach their children; and in the case before us the absurdity may be brought home, by supposing a smart foreman shipwright to be made captain of an ironclad, or Mr. Barnaby to be offered the command of the Channel Fleet.

But, "not to be worst, stands in some stead of praise." Bad as our case may be, we are told to take heart of grace because all other nations are worse. We have had the argument, *ad nauseam*, that our fleet is more numerous, more powerful, and more efficient than all the navies put together of all the world. We are told, to reassure the timid, and to make bolder the bold, that we have thirty-six broadside ironclads, one ram, and thirteen turret ships; in all, fifty armour-plated ships afloat, and five building. But quite independently of the boiler epidemic, there are, as we have already intimated, "disquieting" influences at work which will upset the numerical value of this imposing array. Mr. Reed was not far from the mark when in his letter to the *Times* of October 21, 1872, he said:—"In these times of rapid change, superiority lies mainly in the growing power of *individual ships*, and while even a single power may easily surpass you, the simultaneous construction of very powerful (individual) ships, in several navies, may rapidly jeopardize your position." We may add to this an opinion as to the peculiarity of that individual power—namely, that it gives not only a superiority of *aggressive force*, but of *simultaneous defensive security*. Mr. Reed has permitted his imagination to realize the possibility of the Russian "bogey"—the *Peter the Great*, when finished, and *if a success*, steaming into English ports. Of course, before she could penetrate our harbours, our civilian First Lord would order

out the whole of our 4½ inch plated ships, aided by our 6 inch plated ships, and backed up by our few 7 inch, 8 inch, and 9 inch plated ships. These altogether would make up a total of forty-one, out of our redoubtable fifty.

Now if we suppose the *Peter the Great* to have on board four Krupp guns, equal to our Woolwich infants—(or, as there is, according to Mr. Goschen, something bogeyish or myth-like about this formidable vessel *in posse*, let us come home to a reality like our own *Devastation*)—what could a vessel of this individual power desire more ardently than that the whole of our ironclad fleet should flock out to give her a warm reception? “*One butcher does not fear many sheep*,” says the old Greek proverb—except not to be able to catch them!—and here, like the Royalists before Cromwell’s “Ironsides”—“the Lord has delivered them into his hand.” Every time her four formidable guns were discharged, the sides, and probably the bottoms also, blown outwards, of four of our magnificent *Warriors* would be smashed like glass, and short shrift be allowed to ships and men; and every time our splendid ships concentrated their broadsides upon their enemy, all the shells which did not miss the small target she would present, would drop from her sides, to use a simile of Robert Hall’s, “like soft peas thrown against a hard rock.” And whenever such unhandy vessels attempted to ram their adversary, he would simply show them a light pair of heels (screws), get out of their way, and thank them for thus making his own shot more certain and deadly.

Let us change the scene. Suppose in the plenitude of our nominal power, and with the perversity of infatuation, we send thirty-six broadside sheep (should war break out) to blockade the ports of America, with the infallible result of keeping away their cotton from our Lancashire spindles. We should no doubt, if we succeeded, embarrass our adversaries, and renew for ourselves the fearful tragedy of the Cotton Famine. But should we succeed? Imagine our huge, weak, unwieldy broadsides, after a month’s passage over the Atlantic, and after a month’s cruise off New York; with a precarious supply of coal, and bottoms so foul as to lose two to three knots per hour of speed. Imagine also, our keen-witted, energetic opponents improvising a series of single heavy guns, mounted on small craft of the *Stuunch* type, and with a crew just sufficient to work them. On the one side would be an almost invisible speck, on the other a series of the most magnificent targets human ingenuity could put before a gunner’s aim at sea. Here we should have the modern realization of the ancient proverb—the “one butcher”—and the helpless flock of “many sheep.” Were the flock to scatter, where would be the blockade? Were they, with the devoted courage of the

British seaman, to hold on to the duties prescribed to them by British political wisdom, we have only to realize the effect of a 1000lbs. shell bursting in their weakly sides from a distance (if weather permitted) of over six miles,\* and converting first one and then another of our "powerful fleet" into the vast slaughter-houses Mr. Cobden truly said that the old wooden three-deck-ers would be made by the 68-pounder shells! Send our sea-going broadsides into the Baltic—pit them against Cronstadt—set them to destroy the German arsenals: could they better the effects of the fleet under Sir Charles Napier, or overcome the torpedo defences that paralysed the French fleet in 1871? Could they even seal up the war ships of our enemy, and so protect our commerce, for would not this be renewing the same farce as the supposititious blockade of New York?

We have already dealt with the argument founded upon the comparative strength of our own and foreign navies by showing (in reversion of the mechanical axiom that the weakest part of a structure is the measure of its fullest strength), that the most powerful individual ship is the co-efficient of the effective strength of a whole fleet. In other words, the multiplication of weak elements in a navy gives no practical addition of strength; or to put the case more clearly, the relative power of two antagonistic fleets would be determined *ceteris paribus* by the absence of weak ships.

So far back as 1862 the relative effect of guns and plates was well known from experiment. Mr. Scott Russell, one of the designers of the *Warrior*, summed up, in a paper read before the Institution of Naval Architects, in 1863, the evidence as follows:—

Thickness of plate.		equal to	Weight of shot.
4½ inches	...	...	68 lbs.
6½ "	...	"	136 lbs.
7½ "	...	"	200 lbs.— 6½ ton gun.
8½ "	...	"	270 lbs.
10 "	...	"	400 lbs.—18 ton gun.
11 "	...	"	500 lbs.
12 "	...	"	600 lbs.—25 ton gun.

Since that time the improvement in the making up of powder has increased the initial velocity considerably, and the relation between the two may be roughly estimated as the square of the thickness of the resisting plate. Our numerous 4½ inch armoured ships, therefore, represent a resisting capacity of 20: Mr. Corry's model broadside 6 inch batch, one of 36. The *Monarch* creeps

\* "Statement of Sir J. Whitworth."

up to 49, and the *Hercules*, a most redoubtable broadside specimen of Mr. Reed's design, gets up to 81. Then comes the "individual ship," the *Devastation*, which realizes 144. The *Fury* will reach 196; and the *Inflexible* is the commentary upon and condemnation of all of them, for she attains to a defensive capacity from her 24 inch plates of 576! Hence the resisting strength now considered safe and necessary is nearly twenty-nine times as great as that of the bulk of our ironclad fleet.

While armour is being thickened artillerists are not idle. Sir William Armstrong has stated that the Elswick Company would accept orders for rifled guns of 14 inch calibre, throwing shot of *half a ton weight*, with a charge of 224lbs., and to pledge their reputation on the success of the undertaking. Sir Joseph Whitworth has expressed his conviction that with an 11 inch bore his new breech-loader would penetrate armour 16 inches thick at 1000 yards.\*

The Report of the Committee on Designs states that "Guns able to pierce 20 inch and 21 inch armour are doubtless within the resources of science, and even the latter thickness may not continue impenetrable;" and the 80 ton gun contemplated in the Woolwich factory will no doubt bear out these opinions in practice.

To set against this witheringly conclusive evidence of the uselessness of our present fleet, we have to notice two arguments. 1st, that the ships may prove effective as rams; and 2nd, that they may effectually damage their more powerful adversaries by a "concentrated fire."

We believe the ram, whenever and wherever *it could be put to use*, would be the most effective mode of dealing with an antagonist at sea. The crushing effect of 5000 to 10,000 tons delivering a blow at a velocity of ten to fourteen miles per hour, would be enormous. The few known cases of ramming have been cases of entire destruction of the rammed ships. The essential difference of an immense weight, moving at a small velocity, as compared with one of a small weight, at a high velocity, is that of a tremendous squeeze compared with a sharp punching blow. The effect of a puncture is local; that of a crush may injure the whole ship's side; and without perforation, so damage it as to cause the ship to sink from leakage.

But "first catch your hare" is a good maxim. We believe the cases in which such ships as the *Minotaur* could catch their hare to deliver a ramming blow of full effect would be few indeed. We believe that no case of such opportunity would ever

---

\* "Letters from Sir William Armstrong and Sir J. Whitworth, addressed to Chairman of Committee to Examine the Designs upon which Ships of War have recently been constructed."—Report, 1872.



present itself, except when a ship might be so disabled that it would be cruelty to take advantage of it. Before the attack could be made, the ship must move through space enough to acquire full speed, and a vigilant adversary would have ample time to evade the blow, or escape the effects by moving *in the same direction*. A swifter and more ready vessel might even turn the tables on her foe; for ramming is a game two can play at, and victory would surely remain with the vessel which, in addition to superior manœuvring qualities, was stronger in fabric and more heavily armed. If, therefore, one of our largest iron-clads were to risk the cast of the die, and escaped being sunk by 30 ton guns *as she approached*, she inevitably would be sent to the bottom, when she had aimed and missed her blow!

To answer the second argument, we may call an experienced officer, Captain Scott, as a witness.\* He says:—

“The size of a gun is of vast importance, more than is generally assigned to it, and for this reason—twenty guns, each 1-pounder, are fired at a target of iron  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inch thick, and produced no effect; one gun, a 20-pounder, is fired and smashes it, the velocity in both cases being equal; in both cases the same amount of metal is used, and on this principle an official record of experiments at Portsmouth states that one 68-pounder produced more destruction than five 32-pounders. Arguing from this, it appears that one 150-pounder is more effective than ten 68-pounders, one 330-pounder is equal to seven 150-pounders, and a broadside of three 330-pounders is more destructive than ten and a-half *Warriors*” (then carrying twenty 68-pounders).

If this be correct, and no doubt it is so in the *principle* it enunciates, we may fairly repeat our former inference that a *Devastation*, with an all round fire of four 700-pounders, could with her speed keep out of range of, and by her strength defy if within range, the “concentrated fire” of the comparatively numerous ineffective guns of our weakly armoured ships; while, choosing her time and opportunity, she could successively smash and sink the whole lot of them. In fact, the best use of a “concentrated fire” would be to make smoke, under cover of which, like the cuttle fish, our magnificent fleet might escape!

The errors we have reviewed arising from the anomalous composition of our Naval Administration, is narrowed but intensified in the management of the Dockyards. Taking into account the constitution of the managing body, let us apply this practical test:—Would any sane capitalist think of investing his money in a private company to be so constituted and managed? What dividend would he expect? How long would bankruptcy be

---

\* “Remarks made at the Royal United Service Institution in 1863.” These remarks are quoted without being fully endorsed by Mr. Reed.

staved off? Would the "honour and glory," the "regardless of expense," or the "independence" excuse for bad management and wasteful expenditure, be admitted? Or would the idea that the business could ever be left to the effect of a conspiracy of private firms to pass off bad materials, scamped workmanship, or extravagant prices be entertained?

The "honour and glory" argument may be put at once into Carlyle's category of "dinner and wine and one cheer more." The "independent" theory is answered by the logic of facts. Government now is as dependent for the raw materials, as they would be, if they ceased entirely to be manufacturers on their own account. The notion of being "independent" of the rest of the community is only less absurd in degree than the idea that prices can be regulated otherwise than by the operation of known laws. When ships are to be built, the materials must be bought, and the quality of iron ranges from "Wednesbury sham dam" to "Swedish charcoal." Hemp must be purchased to make rope, and "Government examination" is not a phrase whereby to conjure. Wheat is not of homogeneous excellence, and the corn market must be resorted to if bakers be ever so roguish or traders generally be so cunning as to subvert economic science in the market value as to the price and quality of ship biscuit.

There are comprised in the generic term Dockyard establishment, no less than thirty-three distinct trades, so separate and unique, as to require special balance sheets. Many of them, no doubt, are legitimate and economical adjuncts to a shipbuilding and repairing establishment; but a considerable number are carried on to insure the best quality of the article required;—in other words, to evade imposition. But in these, as in all instances, the quality of workmanship and materials is a question of *efficient superintendence*; and satisfactory results may as easily be obtained outside of, as within the limits of the Dockyard walls. Human nature is the same within, as beyond those limits. Incapacity, or carelessness, or the curse of "the itching palm" are not local, nor are they class evils, nor is such corruption fastidious as to the objects whereupon it fastens. In the purchase and approval of raw materials, or in the overlooking or passing of "scamping" in contract work, equally eligible opportunities present themselves. It is, therefore, as idle as reckless to make sweeping comparisons founded upon exceptional cases, and to condemn whole classes of honourable traders, because amongst them, as everywhere, black sheep may exist.

But the argument founded upon quality is proved to be practically inapplicable by the fact that the most complicated and expensive parts of a ship's equipment, and upon the excellence of which their safety and efficiency most pressingly depend, are,

and always have been, bought from private makers, and not manufactured under the *quasi* superintendence of the Board of Admiralty. Steam engines, chronometers, ship's pumps, sailcloth, and anchors and cables might be scamped more easily than ship's hulls—but has it ever been surmised that the satisfaction expressed in the report of the Committee of Enquiry as to the supply of steam engines was false in fact, or erroneous in judgment? Is it anticipated, with respect to any of the necessaries enumerated, that in time of war, or in any period of enlarged demand, the price will not be fairly regulated by the well ascertained law of supply and demand? Is it to be credited that long established firms of high character are not to be trusted by Government as they are daily trusted by the public?

In the days of wooden ships the exigency of seasoning oak frames, and the exceptional sizes of the scantling used for ships of war, made it a matter of necessity that the Admiralty should undertake the building of such ships. But the use of iron has changed all that. No large stock is needed, no seasoning being required. The sizes of scantling can be ordered when wanted, and the quality can be specified to the makers and tested when required by private builders, as well as by Government. The quality of workmen in any trade is an average item throughout the trade. The variations of workmanship, above and below the average, depend in the long run upon management, and upon the *esprit de corps* maintained in particular establishments. As is the head of any concern, so will be the workmen, as to skill, care, honesty, and industry.\* An idle workman is, *cæteris paribus*, a bad workman, and his work becomes deteriorated—and in all particulars the searching, energetic, interested management of individuals must, in the end, produce results which may be fairly supposed to contrast favourably with Government establishments devoid of (if we may use the term) all *selfish* stimulus in superintending *the workmen*.

"My Lords" know nothing of the technicalities of the trades they are appointed to direct;—and their average official existence being only two years, they have no chance of acquiring any but a dangerous smattering of their new occupation. Their visits of inspection are solemn farces, seen through and understood by all concerned.

---

\* "The variations in the cost of labour expended upon sister ships in different dockyards, can only be thus accounted for. The *Pearl*, at Woolwich, cost 10,520*l.*; while the *Cadmus*, a precisely similar vessel, cost only 7310*l.* The *Shannon*, at Portsmouth, cost 5510*l.*, and the sister ship *Chesapeake* cost, at Chatham, no more than 3197*l.* At the same yard the *Mersey* cost 14,842*l.*, and the *Orlando*, at Pembroke, 19,503*l.* Mr. Large, Assistant-Surveyor, after inquiry, 'could assign no cause.'"—Mr. Seeley's Committee, 1868.

The permanent heads of each of these great congeries of workshops, have probably distinguished themselves by their courage and skill at sea; and hence the fact of their appointment is *prima facie* evidence of the prevailing idea that professional constructive skill is needless. Responsibility being effectively eliminated from all subordinates, the only self-interest at work is that of salaries paid; and promotion depends quite as much, if not more, upon the negative merit of keeping things pleasant, as upon making progress. Why should any one peril a comfortable position by a restless activity? Why should any one change smiles to frowns, from thankless attempts at improvement? *Quieta non movere* is the maxim of a subordinate public official, and the result is *stagnation*.

We have no hesitation, therefore, in saying that the Dockyard establishments, moving in the grooves of routine, complicated in details, lacking responsibility as to results, deficient in technical headship, and unstimulated by self-interest, cannot compete in economical management with the more delicately sensitive organization of private establishments, possessing as they do a mobile adaptive capacity, and pervaded by a dominant spirit of profit-making and emulative progress.

Next, there is the question of the purchase of the raw material. Can Government buy in the long run as cheaply as individuals? Any exact comparison, dealing as it must do with the shifting prices of various markets, would be difficult if not impossible. But there are certain general and significant indications which show that the tendency is much in favour of individual over corporate action. A knowledge of human nature, and a realization of the practical details of business, point very clearly to the verdict in favour of a bargain driven in favour of a man's own pocket, as compared with a system working for the remote and unacknowledged, if ever understood, advantage to that abstract, thankless entity—the public. Had it been otherwise, making due allowance for the enervating moral influence of technically ignorant headship, could it have happened that 6500*l.* would have been paid for anchors, above the known market rates of first-class fabricators, and that an unnecessarily high price would have been paid for chain cables unquestioned *for eight years*? Why did we supply coal to foreign Governments abroad at a dead loss; and what does the history of the Teak market prove when prices were, by a too sudden demand, run up from 8*l.* to 9*l.* per load, to 12*l.* to 13*l.*?\* When Mr. Baxter applied the pruning-knife to the natural but costly growth of a loose system, he reduced the staff of the Store department from

---

\* "Mr. Seeley's Committee on Admiralty Accounts, 1868."

twenty-six persons to seven, at a saving of 4752*l.* out of a total of 6443*l.*\* It by no means follows that the same excisive effect could be produced throughout the entire organization, but it does clearly prove that there is in that organization none of the self-adjusting capacity to prevent waste and to remedy abuse possessed by a private establishment. A thoroughly energetic and decisive man of business like the late Financial Secretary may make here and there a beneficial alteration ; but nothing but a radical change of constitution in an effete system can give a permanent effect to such changes, and put the cumbrous, complicated system of our Dockyards on an economical equality with private establishments. *And the principle of that change must be to narrow the area of constructive action, under a more simple arrangement of trained management.*

It is said that Government produces at cost price, and that a private firm works for a profit over and above that cost price. It is said that the cost of building similar ironclads is less in the Government yards than the price charged by contractors. No doubt the fact is so as regarded *the commencement* of iron ship-building in the Dockyards. Everything was new, and emulation and *esprit de corps* not the least novelties. But we doubt its duration. A system which is radically illogical and practically inefficient can hardly be expected to produce good fruit continuously. It may be galvanized into a temporary activity, but the old lethe of habit will steal over the body again, and in the long run that which is noted as profit to the private builder, marks simply the difference between the working of the two systems. In the one case it is waste, unproductive and mischievous. In the other it is wealth created and diffused, and the community that pays it ultimately benefits. It promotes trade, employs labour, spreads enjoyment, and becomes the productive germ under the name of Capital, acting and reacting for the creation of further wealth. On the other hand, the difference is absolutely lost. It represents unused energies, wasted means—is in effect the talent wrapped in a napkin, to the injury of the whole community.

We have already intimated that the remedy for the evils arising from the present system is radically to transmute that system into one more simple and conformable to common sense.

“ The strongest pinion in wisdom’s wing  
Is the memory of past folly,”

and the sooner the technical departments of the Constructive Service are under trained professional headship, the wiser it will

---

\* “Evidence before Lords’ Committee on the Board of Admiralty, 1871.”

be. The sooner also the Lords of the Admiralty contract all subsidiary manufactures about which they know nothing whatever, ranging as they do from hemp spinning to the grinding of pepper and mustard, the better for their dignity and for the practical efficiency of the service. And the more they restrict the operations of the Dockyards to the repairing of the Navy, and the more they foster the private shipbuilding (*i.e.* ship producing) power of the country, the stronger and readier England will be to meet the exigences of war with an efficient Navy.

The functions of a marine police have been assigned to the Navy, as a duty in time of peace to be discharged in all parts of the world, principally by the use of the small wooden vessels, upon which we have been so busy of late, expending large sums of money. How little creditable to the dignity of England, and how useless for an assured protection, in cases of political difficulty, a force so constituted really is, may be gathered from the fact that a single small Spanish ironclad made Admiral Dundas "swallow the leek" at the bombardment of Callao, in 1866. Had that officer not been sensible enough to have seen that "discretion is the best part of valour," every ship of his squadron would have been sunk or burnt and the country involved in war. In the present state of naval development it is manifestly impossible that in all parts, at all times, and under all circumstances, we can maintain a superior force to that which by accident or design any truculent nation may choose to send out for any particular purpose. Whatever force we maintain will be known; and upon the hypothesis that the "individual ship" of superior offensive and defensive power is more than a match for many weaker ships, such known force (particularly if of wood) may easily be overmatched by second or third-rate powers. *Hence a force which is useless, except to be always ready for contingent action, and which, when that contingency arises, is morally certain to be powerless, is a mockery, a delusion, and a snare.*

Were England, however, *primarily*, to rely upon her moral force, sending her ships like sentries, or single policemen, as outposts and indications only of the majesty of a restrained power;—if her calm self-confidence and assertion in this respect were like Talbot's—

"I am but shadow of myself!"—

then such heraldry and foreshadowing of her pent-up might need not entail upon the country an annual charge of over 3,000,000*l.* The foreign stations and establishments, which were necessary in the days of sailing ships and before ocean telegraphic communication was invented, are unneeded when a message from the antipodes can reach this country in a few hours, and steam

propulsion can send with certainty a measured force to cope with a defined difficulty.

The click of the electric needle would thus summon the unquestioned means of reparation, or punishment, as the horn of Talbot did his hardy soldiers ; and, like him, her representative might soon point to an ample force and say—

“ These are my substance, sinews, arms, and strength,”

and prevent opposition as a hopeless folly. If any difficulty arose with Brazil, for example, after she has obtained the iron-clad now building for her on the Thames, how else could that difficulty be met ? Not by any wooden force which any foreign station could send to uphold the dignity and majesty of this country (and to revert to the broader question)—certainly not by any of our broadside ironclads, be they at home or abroad. If we make no hollow show of force, there can be no indignity in calmly waiting the arrival of that which is real and sufficient. But before we turn remonstrance into action, let our ships be at least able to cope with those of our adversaries. Let it not be after England's flag has been trailed and soiled in dishonour, and after boast and bluster to some third or fourth-rate power ;—or, a thousand times worse, when it has been steeped in the blood of her sons, self-sacrificed, because death was to them preferable to a stinging disgrace—that the might and majesty of England is to be asserted. The true spirit of the *Civis Romanus sum* is to be upheld, not by a palpable delusion, but by the illimitable reserve of a mighty nation's dormant strength. The imagination always embodies more terrible issues than the bald reality. The averted face of Aristides indicates more passionate sorrow than the ablest artist's most laboured delineation ; and it would be more consonant with the traditions of England's dignity,—safer for the avoidance of petty warfare,—and better for the security of the commercial interests of her citizens, that she should exact compensation by the occasional, even if deferred putting forth, once for all, of a sufficient force. Let her build up her *moral force* by clearly showing that, although tardy, she could and would on all occasions resort to real force, if necessary.

England, in common with other nations, appoints diplomatic representatives in all European courts, and to many Governments in other quarters of the world ; and in all trade emporiums she has her consular agents. But does she therefore send a military force to be near to and within the call of each and all of these representatives ? Why, then, at least for any political good likely to ensue, does she think it advisable to keep on foreign stations a force of ships too large for economy and a force, when wanted for action, too small for practical use ? We may with

advantage protect our commerce in Chinese waters against pirates; we may try to put down slavery; and we may look after missionaries and coerce barbarians in the Fiji Islands or elsewhere; but as regards civilized governments and established trade, the exhibition of an armed force is a menace only likely to bring matters to the worst issue with any high-spirited nation.

The tendency of scientific improvement in warships is to reduce the number of men required. This was the gist of Mr. Reed's speech on the estimates. "Ironclads cost double the money, and carry half the number of men." His facts are correct, but the conclusion that the basis ought to be the *men*, not the ships, is undoubtedly wrong. If there be a criterion, it ought to be the ships and guns required; and the number of men necessary to work them can then be adjusted. It may further be observed that a considerable number of the diminished crews now carried by the ironclads are *stokers*, not *sailors*: and stoking may be readily learnt. Gunnery is a skilled occupation, but a first-class turret ship carries only four guns, much of the handling of which may be effected by subordinates. We think lightly, therefore, of any argument that calls for additional ships to be built that the 46,000 blue jackets and 14,000 marines voted in the estimates, and costing no less than 3,666,000*l.*, may find something to do.

To man the Navy has always been a bugbear: but the new axiom that the most powerful ship, offensive and defensive, is the true index to naval superiority, will remove all anxiety as to the finding men enough in time of war. If the power of the "individual ship" will not suffice to remove doubt on this head, the torpedo, which inevitably must play an important part in the next naval war, ought to dissipate that doubt entirely. The *Inflexible*, with her 24 inch armour and possible 80 ton guns, is the *reductio ad absurdum* of our work of the past fifteen years; and the torpedo is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the projected defensive power of the *Inflexible*.

We have no desire to encumber our argument with vain speculations as to the possibility of war, or the course war would take, if it did break out, beyond this:—That if *we* declare war we shall have to solve the most puzzling State question of the last twenty years, viz., *what to attack?*\* and if war be declared

---

\* It is impossible to shut out of sight the fact that while science is perfecting, loudly and imperiously, new modes of warfare, religion and civilization are not less working silently but effectually, both to mitigate its evils and to obviate its possibility. Private property and individual life are now fairly assured *on land*; and the same humane and just feeling cannot long be inoperative as regards naval operations. The seizure of private ships and private property at sea is a remnant of barbarism and savours of piracy; bombardment, except of arsenals, is cruelty; and blockade, simply suicidal.



against us—a question second only in difficulty will arise, viz., how to preserve our 4½ inch plated broadside ironclads? In all seriousness, in regard to the latter difficulty, we venture to offer this suggestion, that they should be immediately sunk in all harbour approaches as the best defensive use to which they can be put!

We adhere unreservedly to the proposition that we should at all times be prepared for war. Our interests are too vast and vital to be left to the tender mercies of unscrupulous and encroaching nations. England is too much the object of envy and jealousy to be able to ignore the malice such envy and jealousy may engender. Without being either optimists or alarmists respecting international relations, we look upon the beautiful sentiment of universal brotherhood and peace upon earth, as we look upon the Christian injunction to offer the other cheek to the smiter. In neither case ought we to offer facilities for aggression;—in both we ought to restrain lawless and unworthy passion. We hold, therefore, that to be prepared to defend ourselves, which means also, to be ready to punish insult and injury designed to bring about war, is State wisdom, and a social duty. But what is meant by being prepared? It is because we are thoroughly impressed with the necessity to be ready for the worst, *in the best and only practical way*, that we protest against the ineffectual preparation of the last fifteen years, and doubly protest against the renewal of the farce as proposed recently in the House of Commons. The meaning of the late debates is that the Ministry, in condemning, will reverse the policy of the late Administration, as to the tentative building of ironclads. The late Admiralty had a legacy of weak broadside ships left them to finish; but besides this, their action was wise and prudent, in so far as it was cautious and experimental, in working out the problem of the best type of war ship. Under this policy, prudently carried on by Mr. Goschen, we have left the expensive, bit-by-bit improvement process, born of a bigger gun, or set in motion to imitate the French, and in the case of the projected *Inflexible*, a bolder reliance upon science was initiated, instead of precedent, to ascertain the limits of armour defence. The plates of this ship will be 24 inches thick, double those of the *Devustation*; and with her the sound principle has been acted upon, not that a thicker size of plate than the preceding ship possessed was necessary to exceed her standard, *but that the utmost limit of plate dimension, capable of being worked, should, ipso facto, be adopted.*

Mr. Barnaby, Chief Naval Architect, in describing the *Inflexible* at the Institution of Naval Architects, last March, stated: "My belief is that in the *Inflexible* we have reached the extreme limit in thickness of armour for sea-going ships." . . . . "In the

*Inflexible* provision has been made, both offensively and defensively, for an enormous increase in the powers of artillery, without any increase in the cost of the ship." She is intended to carry four guns of 80 tons each, and the provision alluded to is to enable her to carry guns of double that size. We do not agree with Mr. Barnaby that we have reached the extreme limit in thickness of armour. It may be true that twenty-four inches is the greatest thickness at which *sound* iron plates can be rolled. It may also be true that layers of iron plates do not yield the maximum effect due to the weight of material; but it is perfectly clear that two plates of twenty-four inches will resist impact better than one, and it is equally clear that if one plate of twenty-four inches can be worked on to the vessel's side, there can be nothing to baffle the power and skill of the mechanic to bend and adjust another plate of equal thickness over the first. The power to carry any thickness of armour whatever is a question of water displacement and of constructive strength, and to these there can be no assignable limits. If, therefore, any adequate motive should exist for carrying four feet or even six feet of iron, the increased size of hull and the cheapest mode of obtaining increased displacement at the least expenditure of material, may be obtained by elliptical or even circular ships. Hence on all accounts we think Mr. Barnaby too confident in his opinion as to the limit of armour protection, even for sea-going vessels. The corollary, however, from the absence of limit to the thickness of armour defence, is to give up the mad race between guns and armour, the real issue of which can only be fairly tested by a battle at sea, to *entirely discard armour, and trust to speed alone, for all sea-going vessels*. We are now precisely *parva componere magnis*, in the position in which the fighting world was placed, when the contest raged between leaden balls and steel corslets. Our ancestors were wise enough to act upon what was sufficiently clear to common sense. Activity was held to be preferable to a fictitious security, and body armour was discarded in favour of mobility. Poor Sancho Panza was tied up between two shields at the sham attack on the Island of Barataria, and he was undoubtedly very secure, but then he had no power to seek safety in retreat! How long a time must elapse, and how much money must be wasted, before we in this country will open our eyes to the lessons of experience?

And those lessons are neither slight nor obscure. So far, in our pursuit of the ship of the future, we have been chasing a phantom. We have clutched the "air-drawn dagger," and like Macbeth, at every effort, we have had to exclaim—

"I have thee not, and yet I see thee still!"

Let us be satisfied that other nations are equally deceived, and that

they like ourselves have been cheated by appearances, and that the technical reality, like Truth, is "a pursuit, and not a possession."

What, then, is to be done? Is England no longer to rely upon her Navy for the defence of her shores, and is her commerce to be abandoned to the tender mercies of her enemies? If by "her Navy" is meant the fifty ironclads we now possess, the answer is that reliance upon them for defence would be infatuation, and for protection to commerce a delusion. If by our future Navy is meant more and more batches of broadside ships laid down in Mr. Corry's vaunted style, we shall simply be spreading our weakness, and making ourselves more vulnerable by extension. If by a Navy is meant the largest number of the best ships we can get together in the most ready manner, we must turn our attention earnestly and with a single eye to foster and develop the shipbuilding capacity of this country. Looking broadly to the future, wiser and sadder from the lessons of the past, we may infer—

1st. That it will be impossible to predicate the form or mode that attack or defence will assume under the hard reality and pressing necessities of actual warfare. Hence improvised expedients will best meet unexpected difficulties, and new tactics be more effective than an ingenious and elaborate, but perhaps useless, outfit. In all probability the well devised schemes of doctrinaires will be overturned by impromptu measures, and having said thus much we may express a strong opinion that should the tide of war run in unexpected channels, another art will work out better results than a ready-made routine.

2nd. The best preparation for war will be to stimulate and encourage the ship-producing capacity of the country. Mr. Goschen truly said at the Mansion House (Nov. 13th, 1872), "Why, after all, it is the country which can build the ship that is the powerful country." And the country that can use ten times the appliances in twenty times the establishments capable of producing the latest type of floating engine, be it what it may, that does its work best to meet the requirements of actual warfare, will be the best prepared to bring a war to a successful issue. By diffusing all orders for such few experimental ships as would keep us in the van of naval improvement, amongst our private builders, we should be keeping in training many foremen and nuclei of artisans accustomed to Government work. There are at least twenty first-class shipbuilders upon whom, if fairly encouraged, we might rely to devote the entire resources of their establishments to the production of the highest developed type of ship when war arose. No doubt we should have to pay them well, and it would be for the advantage of the nation to do so, for the question would be between some possible 50,000,000*l.*

uselessly expended and some few hundreds of thousands of pounds paid in profit to private builders for really efficient engines of war. Professional energy would of course rebel against this "do nothing policy." Inaction distresses the friends of sick patients. The piteous appeal to the doctor is to *do something*; and yielding to pressure, he probably administers what in effect the Admiralty have done to panic craving—*bread pills*!

3rd. To be able to adopt this course we should always maintain so much of purely defensive appliances as will effectually keep an enemy at bay until we are ready to meet and crush him. To accomplish this, we have already, as suggested, our magnificent  $4\frac{1}{2}$  inch plated broadsides to block up harbour entrances; we have torpedoes; we have land batteries; and we have the capability to mount the heaviest guns on rafts or place them in small vessels, after the manner of the *Staunch*, to keep the enemy's ships at bay.

4th. For the protection of our commercial marine and to maintain a certain supremacy at sea, high speed combined with the highest aggressive gun power are requisite; and these can best be found in large unarmoured ships of the *Inconstant* and *Raleigh* class.

5th. It may be asked, If our dockyards cease to build ships, will they not drop into a state of inefficiency? The power to produce ships depends upon certain means and appliances, such as docks, slips, machinery, but most particularly upon skilled labour. In our national establishments the docks and slips are there, and would always be available. The chance of desuetude would apply to men and machinery alone. Now, extensive as these establishments are, their resources would not be equal to the exigences of war. Under all circumstances we should have to resort to private establishments. Every means would be taxed to add to and to maintain our defensive capability. And if so, it would surely be wiser to develop the resources and train the *personnel* of our large private shipbuilding yards, by steady orders for experimental ships during peace, to have their yards ready and efficient in time of war. The traditions of the past, in this respect, have no bearing upon the altered circumstances of the present. It was a necessity for Government to build war ships in national dockyards, pressed upon them by the difficulty to obtain in private yards seasoned timber of suitable scantling for vessels so much larger than the largest of the mercantile marine. But now, as we have already shown, the substitution of iron for wood has changed all this.

6th. As a further essential preparation for war, the call is urgent that the dry docks in the Government yards should not be occupied by half-finished new ships. When these establish-

ments are in full activity—batch building—the principal dry docks are closed against vessels needing repairs, and in time of war *the rapid repair of a damaged ship is equal to the building of a new one.*

Our policy, therefore, clearly lies in fostering that in which England's real naval superiority consists—the producing power. A fleet in itself is an adventitious and temporary affair. A single engagement may disable or annihilate it. A violent storm may turn the balance in favour of this or that side. But the producing power is a permanent and solid condition of superiority, of which no accident, no temporary reverse, no hesitating or misdirected policy in time of peace, can rob the possessor. This power—this solid enduring basis of naval supremacy, is weightier now than even the supply of seamen from our extensive commercial marine. Both together make and will keep this country mistress of the seas. If she were to build the fleets for all the world besides, she would thereby be most effectively preparing herself for war!

7th. But the Board of Admiralty organization! Herein lies the cause of failure and weakness. What that organization really is, no one can clearly tell. When it was effected, no one really knows. By what rules it moves and works, tradition and usage, a complicated *lex non scripta*, to be expounded by experts only, can alone determine. There is in the library at the Admiralty a manuscript book, by whom composed or compiled no one is aware. This document, as mysterious as the Sibylline leaves, appears to be the best authority on the mysterious subject of Admiralty administration. "It gives a most succinct and excellent account of the Lord High Admiral's powers; it then gives an account of the Commission of the Board."\* The first patent which begins to resemble the present one dates back to the time of Henry the Sixth (1430—1461). In 1692 the House of Commons came to the resolution, "That his Majesty be humbly advised to constitute a Commission of Admiralty of such persons as are of known experience in maritime affairs." This, apparently, is the origin of the present Board. The words of the statute constituting that Commission, "refer not only to the power of the Lord High Admiral, as existing under patent or by Act of Parliament, but refer to ulterior and anterior powers by the words used."† The Commission therefore supersedes the office of Lord High Admiral, but expressly confirms and transmits the power and authority of that functionary, to the present

\* "Evidence of Sir James Graham before the Committee on the Board of Admiralty, 1861."

† Ibid.

Board, as the lineal descendant of the original Commission ; in other words, the present Board inherits a power and authority which was never defined ; and as a natural consequence, moves and works without reference to the patent which called it into existence. Sir Charles Wood stated before the Committee on the Board of Admiralty, 1861, "I must say I never dreamt of reading the patent. I should very much doubt whether any officer, First Lord of the Admiralty, secretary, or any one else ever read the patent by which he was appointed. I can say for myself that I certainly never did." To carry on the duties of First Lord, he says, "I have been guided entirely by the prescriptive usage, which is a sort of tradition in every office." Sir James Graham also stated—"The more I have investigated the matter, the more I am satisfied that, like the common law in aid of the statute law, the power exercised by the Board and the different members of it, rests more upon usage than upon the patents ; and I am led to view with increased apprehension any great change that will supersede that usage and prescription." The Duke of Somerset considered the variance between the patent and the practice "an anomaly," and said, "perhaps it might be desirable to render them more consistent." A merely theoretical objection to usages undefined, and "beyond legal memory," would be gratuitous fault-finding had the results been and now were satisfactory, and that circumstances continued similar. But that "most unspiritual God and miscreator circumstance" has run away from the easy-going, smoothly-flowing, slowly changing tide of usage ; and in estimating the value of the authorities above quoted, it must be borne in mind that the reverence expressed for that usage was built upon the old *régime*. Again, an objection taken to the want of symmetry in the parts of Admiralty organization would be merely doctrinaire and sentimental if the spirit of that organization were good, and showed a conscientious, self-adjusting intention. But what is the evidence as to that spirit ? Sir Charles Wood said, "What you want is to get every member of the Board to feel himself responsible for the good working of the whole,"—which, however desirable, is simply impossible where the duties are specifically divided. If every man is overlooking and interested in his colleagues' work, he necessarily neglects his own, and fully carried out would lose all individuality of action and of responsibility and bring about a disastrous condition of "meddling and muddling." There is at least confusion of ideas if not contradiction when a greater authority (Sir James Graham) says that "a Board only works well when the head of it makes it as unlike a Board as possible, and acts as if he alone were responsible." Sir John Pakington (Lord Hampton) took a clearer and juster view of

the responsibility of the First Lord when he said, "I never did feel at the Admiralty that I had either the knowledge (of passing events we take it) or the control or the responsibility which I think the Minister at the head of so great a department ought to have." Admiral Elliot says, "I consider that usage has completely altered the character of the Board." "I consider that there is a great deal of departmental and individual power now exercised by the separate Lords, and at the same time, that this usage and this power is all exercised on sufferance, and that there is no direct responsibility." Throughout the whole of the voluminous evidence laid before the committee, there is a hopeless chasing of the phantom of responsibility, and an impossibility to define its nature, or to fix it upon individuals. How could it be otherwise? Responsibility belongs to the performance of duty. Duty at the Admiralty is prescribed by "usage," and "usage" if defined at all, can only be defined by the responsible officer. To whom then but himself can he be made really responsible? And is it to be wondered at under such a system, that Sir Charles Wood states that it is the *fear* of responsibility, not the *want* of it, that is detrimental to the public service? Sir Spencer Robinson,\* one of the ablest officials who ever occupied the post of Controller, without the power to control, or the responsibility naturally attaching to his office, says that the duties of the Controller "are ill-defined, and may be interpreted to mean a great deal more or a great deal less according to the views of the supreme authority." He asks as to the duties of the superintendent of each dockyard—"For what is he responsible? He is only the vehicle through which orders pass to the several heads of departments." He has no responsibility if work cost 16,000*l.* which ought to have been done for 10,000*l.* "When a question is asked, he directs the master shipwright to reply." He "transmits"—in case of complaint or inquiry, the answers of the storekeeper, or the auditor, or the accountant. He is ordered to "direct the officers," "to call upon the officers," "to inform the officers." "There is no distinct and direct responsibility for anything, either done or left undone, upon him, so long as he transmits the memoranda"—*i.e.*, to and fro!

Mr. Childers set himself to amend this anomalous state of affairs. Without the experience of the three ex-First Lords we have quoted, who regarded the Admiralty administration as little short of perfection, he had the advantage of seeing the new order of things as regarded iron shipbuilding. The old school of ship-

---

\* "Evidence before Select Committee of the House of Lords on Board of Admiralty, 1871."

building was essentially one of "usage and prescription." Mild innovations were made as to the clenching of a bolt, or the driving of a treenail, or the cutting of a scarph; but any radical change, or the initiation of any new theory as to wooden ships, would have sent a thrill of horror through the well-subordinated officials of Her Majesty's dockyards. There were ships and ships as to size; and gradually and gently the "lines" were drawn finer and the bodies made "longer;" but besides such "improvements" ships were but ships, and custom was custom, to be held sacred and left untouched from age to age. The iron age has, however, violently and painfully superseded the simplicity and sobriety of the old wooden state of shipbuilding. The dockyard world has been turned upside down, and inside out: and the present order of affairs seems to have realized Shelley's paradox—

"Nought may endure but mutability."

From ramming stems to balanced rudders we have innovated until our latest types are examples of invention run riot; and inside an ironclad any ancient mariner would stand aghast at the mechanical contrivances which make a modern war ship something between Vulcan's smithy and the Elswick machine shop. The three ex-First Lords who, in 1861, deprecated and dreaded the touching of the old order of things, could little anticipate the scientific audacity of modern conceptions and war appliances; and as the architect of Noah's Ark, or the chief constructor of a Corinthian trireme, or the builder of that masterpiece—the *Henri, Grâce de Dieu*, might have discoursed about the organization that produced a modern three-decker, so the administrators, whose *chef-d'œuvre* was the *Duke of Wellington*, may be supposed to regard the designers of a *Devastation* and *Inflexible*. The evidence, no doubt, given in 1861, was (and this is all that can be said for it) the best that could be given at that time.

When Mr. Childers "new lighted," like Mercury, upon the highest place at the Admiralty, he had, at least, the advantage arising from the absence of prejudice. He had nothing to unlearn. He brought to the task of reform courage, persistency, a high sense of official responsibility, and an unbiassed mind; and, if his health had endured, in time, no doubt, would have seen that the management, which has descended from "beyond legal memory," was ill adapted to modern requirements. As it was he patched and altered the whole system enough to disturb and to irritate, but not permanently to improve. Opposition and illwill were engendered, but the root of



the mischief was left untouched. He did too little and he did it too gently.

“Tender-handed touch a nettle,  
And it stings you for your pains.”

And this, we apprehend, has been Mr. Childers' experience. When next the opportunity arises for him to complete his work of dealing with the Admiralty nettle, we have no doubt that he will recognise and act upon the completion of the advice—

“Grasp it like a man of mettle,  
And it soft as silk remains.”

Besides the absence of a clear responsibility, it is the bane of the present system that any one on the Board of Admiralty can assume to understand, and under such assumption to overrule, the purely scientific and technical proposals of a professional constructor. No one there would question the opinion of the law officers of the Crown upon a case submitted to them; and no one in his own person, if he were wise, would dispute the prescription of his chosen physician. Let us carry the case a degree nearer. A public company devises a project for supplying a town with water or gas, or intends to establish a railway communication through some particular district. They arrange the broad features of their schemes, and with general instructions they place the matter in the hands of the engineer in whom they have most confidence; and he under the influence of his responsibility to them, but more cogent still, of a responsibility imposed upon him by the maintenance of his reputation in the face of the public and of the scientific world, arranges the means to carry out their wishes and intentions. His plan may not exactly coincide with the aims of the projectors, and he may alter it; but no engineer of any eminence would for one moment brook interference with any essential principle involved in the plan, or lend his name, and so peril his character, to a mutilation forced upon him against his judgment. If any one of the directors insisted upon curtailment of relative parts, or the substitution of his own crude notions in place of those of the engineer, the latter would at once throw up his office. If he did attach his name to a mutilated plan, allowing his judgment to be warped, all we can say is that such a man would have no claim to be a first-rate engineer. Our contention is that the head of the Constructive department, by whatever name he be known, should not occupy a position less high or less responsible than an engineer at the head of his profession. On the other hand, the man who is his own lawyer is said to have a fool for his client; and we are not far from the

mark in saying, in like manner, that any First Lord or First Naval Lord who does more or less than entirely accept or reject the professional proposals of his Chief Constructor is very much in the same predicament. The head of the Constructive department, as professionally responsible for the success of his designs and the consequent efficiency of the fleet, *ought to be the foremost man in his profession, and be paid and trusted accordingly.*

How this simple, and perfectly obvious common sense arrangement, so absolutely essential to meet the requirements of 1874, can be made to fit in with, or to be stuck upon, the nebulously transmitted organization of 1692, we will not be diverted from our present aim to discuss. We advocate the change on its merits, in order to obviate proved failure and cure existing evils.

Thus much however we may say. We see no difficulty in taking the "Constructive Service," and the "Service Afloat," and giving to each an able, professional, responsible head. Shipbuilding and shipowning (or sailing) are two distinct businesses. There is no reason why one man should not be both if he be trained to understand both, but if his business be large enough to employ separate managers, that is no reason why the works of the two should be jumbled together to the neutralization of the responsibility of each.

We see no difficulty in the First Lord of the Admiralty (under the designation of Minister of Marine, or any other title) undertaking the political and financial arrangements of the Navy with a veto upon the proposals of the heads of the two departments. He might harmonize the action of both; and understanding and approving the policy of both so as to explain and defend the action of all before the House of Commons, he should of course be empowered to displace both functionaries if necessary, and be obliged to justify his act in Parliament. The one point we hold to as being essential to the success of the Navy is this:—That there should be no shuffling of the cards of responsibility between him and the heads of the two departments. He might dismiss the person, and reject in toto but not mutilate the proposals, nor lessen the responsibility of the head of either department.

We see no difficulty in cutting unhesitatingly the Gordian knot of details which would, no doubt, be twisted up hard and fast by official ingenuity out of red tape. In the grasp of a "man of mettle" all accessories, all active opposition, all passive resistance, all sentimental clinging to the traditions of a bye-gone state of affairs, would at once become "soft as silk." And, devised and controlled by a skilled and responsible guidance, such as we have hinted at, we feel satisfied that the policy in regard to the simplification of Dockyard operations, the due preparation of the country for war, and the limitation of ships in commission on

foreign stations, might be smoothly effected, to the avoidance of the arrant blunders, the egregious waste, and the miserable naval results of the past fifteen years.

---

ART. V.—MR. LEWES AND METAPHYSICS.

*Problems of Life and Mind.* By GEORGE HENRY LEWES.  
First Series. The Foundations of a Creed. Vol. I.  
London: 1873.

WHEN the History of Human Intellect comes to be a school-book for the young of that diviner Mammal who hereafter shall succeed mankind, it will contain no chapter to which their attention will be more carefully directed than that which narrates the sudden bursting forth and enormous expansion of Science which is taking place in this present century. For though too close to our eyes for clear vision or direct measurement, this is proved by a moment's reflection to be a phenomenon hitherto quite unexampled, and which must necessarily produce results of surpassing importance, although of a nature as to which we can only make the blindest guess. What would we not give to be allowed to read the concluding words of the chapter, and to take a single glance at the title of the next! And yet if this *Review* ever fall into the hands or prehensile appendages of one of those high Intelligences, his first feeling will no doubt be one of wonder how even a mind so imperfect as ours could ever have felt any doubt as to the true nature and limits of Science. "Surely," he will say, "this foolish creature, Homo, knew what Science was, and what Knowledge was, and therefore he must have known, if he had taken the trouble to think, whether the two were or not coextensive. How then could he have had any difficulty with regard to the future of Science, in foreseeing how far it could go, and what it could teach?" And, indeed, in respect of ninety-nine men out of every hundred, or rather of every human being except the few hundreds to whom nature has given a taste and capacity for abstract thought and accurate definition, it is perfectly true that they feel no doubt or difficulty on the subject. So absolutely is this the case, that they cannot for some time comprehend the meaning of the question. When, however, this is explained, the answer seems to them as clear as daylight.—"We know," say they, "numberless things about which Science can tell us nothing. Ourselves, our feelings, passions, sensations, thoughts, wills and actions—nay, the very fact of our

existence—all these we know ; indeed, they are the only things which we are sure that we do know ; but Science has nothing whatever to do with them. Science deals only with the external world ; and of the inner world of self, and its relation to the outer, it can never give any explanation.”

Nor is this the verdict of “common sense” alone ; it is also (as common sense may be surprised to hear) that of Metaphysics, and not its verdict only, but its charter and condition of existence. Where two such enemies agree, it might well be thought that there was no room for doubt or argument. And yet, how can we rest in this conclusion and vindicate the intellectual power of humanity in the eyes of its future critic, in the presence of such a book as that which has suggested this article ?—a book written by one of our most celebrated scientific inquirers, who if not the greatest of philosophers, at least knows probably more about philosophy than any living author, and whose reputation as a thinker has been founded not only on his great and varied knowledge, but on his supposed trustworthiness to take the common sense view on difficult problems—a book written by such a man as this for the express purpose of proving that the field of Science is identical with that of Knowledge, and that all possible problems are soluble by the use of the scientific method ?

A theory such as this, which gives the lie both to Common Sense and to Metaphysics, propounded by one professing to speak in the name and with the authority of Science, cannot remain unchallenged. If true, it must of course be accepted with all its consequences ; but, if false, the appearance of invincibility which would arise from its not being refuted could not but be disastrous to every department of human knowledge, by destroying the good feeling and sense of mutual respect which should exist among them.

Apart from all curiosity as to the future of human intellect—a curiosity, however, which may well claim the respect which attends the name of Religion—the question as to the true limits of Science is one which, in the interest of Science itself, it is necessary to solve, and which happens to be just now ripe for solution. The growth of Science, which is the co-ordination of our knowledge of the external world, and that of those branches of what has been hitherto thought knowledge, which have attempted to co-ordinate internal phenomena—namely, Mental and Moral Philosophy—have hitherto followed exactly opposite courses. The former, starting from the extreme verge of nature's confines, has tended ever inwards in a gradually contracting sphere, like the crust of a planet hardening round the central core of fire. The latter, starting from the most individual

feelings of the single self, has gradually widened its area to include the family, the tribe, the nation, the human race; till at last, under the form of a philosophic Pantheism such as Spinoza's, or that of a more practical belief in an intelligent government of nature, such as that professed by Christianity, it appears to have reached the limits of the universe. These two modes of thought, starting from opposite poles of experience, and pursuing different methods, have always been antagonists: but in this antagonism we may notice a difference in their respective attitudes. The latter, which, speaking somewhat loosely, we may call the Metaphysical Method, has had a more rapid development,\* and has, ideally at least, reached its utmost limits of expansion. This has been due in great measure to its not having placed itself in direct opposition to Science. When the issue has been raised between them it has in general recognised the sphere and function of Science, and distinguished it from its own; and thus it has been allowed to pass. Science, on the other hand, has commonly refused to recognise any authority but its own, and has proclaimed almost ostentatiously that the war between itself and Metaphysics is a war of extermination. This irreconcilable attitude has not been of much practical importance, while the radius of the scientific sphere has been large, and the enclosing crust has not approached the central Ego, which contains the source and life of Metaphysics. There has been, indeed, an uncomfortable feeling of blockade and a presentiment of inevitable struggle, but nothing further. Within the last few years, however, the blockade has been turned into an assault, and the presentiment has given place to reality. The latest outpost of Science, Physiology, and especially that division of it which we may call Neurology, has brought the opposing forces face to face, and the battle must now be decided once for all. The result will be either that Psychology (in the old sense) and Metaphysics will be swept clean away, or that the frontier line between them and Science will be set out by metes and bounds,

---

\* Or is it in truth that its development has been incomparably slower; that the true orbit of both developments (we are not speaking of the *methods*) is the same—namely, from Induction to Deduction, and that the apparent contrast is due only to the difference of velocity? May not the real explanation be that in Metaphysics we have not yet attained such a node or turning point as in Science was marked by the discovery of the Law of Gravitation, and as may hereafter be reached in Metaphysics by the development or discovery of some form or law of consciousness which shall connect the individual with a universal mind, and thus enable Metaphysics to establish laws independent of the accidents of corporate individuality. If so, Metaphysics has not yet entered on the Deductive part of its orbit, through which Science has long been passing, and the present barrenness of metaphysical speculation becomes in some measure intelligible.

and each of the rivals forced to confine itself to its proper territory. Science, of course, from its side, flushed with the pride of recent victories, is clamorous for universal empire; and Mr. Lewes, one of its most trusted captains, has become the mouthpiece of this demand; to enforce which is the avowed object of his present work. It is because we believe this claim to be unfounded; because we think it most pernicious to the interests of Science that it should take up a false position, and by failing to maintain it incur the suspicion of universal failure; and because we are convinced that in the due guidance of scientific inquiry lies, at least in the present stage of human knowledge, the only real hope of the healthy growth and development of that knowledge, that we now propose to show wherein we consider Mr. Lewes' error to consist, and what seems to us the true boundary line between Science and Metaphysics.

For the benefit of those who have not read Mr. Lewes' book, and in order to show the occasion and significance of his attack on Metaphysics, we will first give a short sketch of the scope and purport of his work. And first of all be it remarked, that the one volume which has as yet appeared is only introductory, to the main work which is to follow, and which we most sincerely wish Mr. Lewes life and health to complete. It forms, in fact, but one half of the Introduction. This may perhaps be thought to render any review of it premature and unsatisfactory. But, as will appear in the sequel, the present volume contains a statement of the principles on which the whole work is to be based, and it is those principles and not their illustration, to which Mr. Lewes most invites our attention (p. 13), and which it is our present object to examine.

The aim of the whole work, as stated in the preface to the present volume, is one which might well fire the ambition of any philosopher. It is no less than the constitution of a Science of Psychology. Hitherto Psychology has been, in Mr. Lewes' opinion, "very much in the condition of Chemistry before Lavoisier, or of Biology before Bichat." It has been "without the fundamental data necessary to its *constitution*\* as a science."

"A science is constituted," he says—"that is, has received its definitive construction and place in the hierarchy of Philosophy, when its object is circumscribed, its phenomena defined, its Method settled, and its fundamental principles established, so that henceforward the development is progressive, the discovery of to-day enlarging and not overturning the conception of yesterday, each worker bringing his contribution to a common fund, not presenting it as a reversal of all that predecessors had done." (p. vi.)

---

\* Wherever italics occur in quotations they are Mr. Lewes' own.

To accomplish this for Psychology, to make order spring out of chaos, and light shine amid the darkness, is Mr. Lewes' aim. For thirty-eight years he has prosecuted this aim with unremitting energy; and at last has come the reward of toil, a vision of success. For he now "feels confident of having something like a clear vision of the fundamental inductions necessary to the constitution of Psychology;" and although he modestly disclaims the intention of writing a complete treatise, he "hopes to establish a firm groundwork for future labours." (p. vii.)

But for the further justification of this hope we must wait for the publication of the subsequent volumes. Before the new science can be introduced to the world with any chance of a favourable reception, much has to be done; the new advent must be prepared for, by clearing a pathway, and by driving away enemies; especially that greatest of all, the old enemy—Metaphysics. For Mr. Lewes "knows well that there is no chance of general recognition of the scientific method and its inductions while the rival method is tolerated" (*ib.*). Moreover, as Mr. Mill has already said, in words which Mr. Lewes takes for one of the mottoes to his book, "the difficulties of Metaphysics lie at the root of all Science; those difficulties can only be quieted by being resolved, and until they are resolved, positively whenever possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any knowledge, even physical, stands on solid foundations."

It is this work of preparation with which Mr. Lewes is at present engaged. At first, as he tells us, he imagined it might be accomplished in an introductory chapter; but it has apparently proved more laborious than he expected, so that even the two volumes into which it has "insensibly grown" (that is to say, the present volume and that which is to follow it), are, as he tells us, "only a portion of what has been written" (p. viii.).

The plan of the present volume is as follows:—In the First Part of an "Introduction" (which is really to the whole work an introduction to the Introduction) he sketches the main principle which he proposes to establish—namely, the applicability of scientific method to metaphysical questions. "It is towards the transformation of Metaphysics by reduction to the method of Science that these pages tend. I propose to show that metaphysical problems have, rationally, no other difficulties than those which beset all problems; and when scientifically treated, they are capable of solutions not less satisfactory and certain than those of physics" (p. 5). It was the great error of Comte in Mr. Lewes' view, that he peremptorily excluded all research into metaphysical questions. The questions exist; and if Science will

not explain them, it can never hope to displace them ; for ignoring them will not extirpate them. Now Science *can* explain any question that can be rationally stated ; and questions other than these we do not "need to know." So the great art is to choose the right question and express it in terms which admit of an answer ; and the first operation is therefore "to disengage the" unknowable, or, as he calls them, "metempirical elements, and proceed to treat the empirical elements with the view of deducing from them the unknown elements, if that be practicable, or, if the deduction be impracticable, of registering the unknown elements as transcendental" (p. 39). These transcendental elements will cause no error if we take care to eliminate them from the result ; for "the existence of an unknown quantity does not necessarily disturb the accuracy of calculations founded on the known functions of that quantity" (p. 41). This mode of inquiry is "speculative" indeed ; but "it is an error to imagine that the true scientific spirit is opposed to the speculative, because it is opposed to the metempirical" (p. 48)—an error which is illustrated by examples of the speculative greatness of Newton, in spite of his famous profession "*Hypotheses non fingo.*" The conclusion is, that "the scientific canon of excluding from calculation all incalculable data places Metaphysics on the same level with Physics" (p. 60). Then follows a chapter of "Objections to Metaphysics," which may be summed up in this, that its questions are inappropriately conceived, and are therefore incapable of being answered. True or scientific Metaphysics is only "Abstract Science, which is occupied with the general laws of Being" (p. 65). Its place among the sciences is that of a "Codification of the laws of Cause," an "Objective Logic : " and its method that of "dealing exclusively with known functions of unknown quantities, and at every stage of inquiry separating the empirical from the metempirical data" (p. 80).

The second part of the "Introduction" contains a number of practical "Rules of Philosophizing," grounded on, but extending, those of Newton in the *Principia*, and expressing the main theses of empirical philosophy in a form adapted for the regulation of research.

Then follows a kind of second Introduction, which in fact amounts to a Table of Contents of the entire prospective work—a programme of the new Psychology. The proofs are avowedly postponed, and only the questions which Mr. Lewes thinks "most pressing" are more than simply stated. In fact, one of the principal motives of this chapter seems to have been that which in one passage he does not shrink from avowing in the following words—"that the explicit commencement here will protect me against a possible anticipation on the part of some other writer "



(p. 146)—a wish which we can understand his wishing, but hardly his ‘wishing to be thought to wish.’ As it will be our business hereafter to discuss at length the more important of these psychological principles, we shall here merely give a brief notice of those which at once are novel, and do not primarily concern Metaphysics. These, being purely scientific, are in many cases, as might be expected from their author, both valuable and suggestive.

The most important of them, at any rate that which is worked out at the greatest length, and is made responsible for the greatest results, is the novel and as it seems to us excessive weight which Mr. Lewes attributes to social influences in the genesis of mind. “Man,” he says, “is not simply an animal organism; he is also an unit in a social organism. . . . From these chiefly arise the animal sentient life, and the human intellectual and moral life” (p. 109). He looks upon the social organism as the source of all that distinguishes man from the higher animals. “Intellect and Conscience are special products of the social organism, and although animals possess in common with man the Logic of Feeling, they are wholly deficient in the Logic of Signs, which is a social, not an animal function” (p. 125). The last sentence reveals what appears to be his main foundation for this somewhat strange theory, and which may be expressed briefly in the two following propositions:—Language, he says, is indispensable to Thought (pp. 157, 167); and Language is a purely social product (pp. 124, 167, 174). Now it seems questionable whether either of these theories is true to more than a very limited extent as a statement of causation, though, no doubt, as a statement of coexistence there is sufficient to give plausibility to both. But it is clearly impossible to maintain either in its full literal meaning. For as to the first, even if we leave out of sight such cases of Aphasia as that of the late Lord Denman, where unimpaired powers of thought have coexisted with entire inability to connect thoughts with words, and the more conclusive because more ordinary instances of the existence of reasoning powers in human beings congenitally deaf, it would be sufficient answer to Mr. Lewes, that all that is required for abstract thought is *some* system of signs or symbols, and that language, though the most perfect of such systems (so far as we know), is not the only one; and it is therefore illogical to draw a distinct line between animals endowed with speech and the rest, and to say that on one side of the line abstract thought is possible, and on the other impossible. Nay, for anything we know, animals may have power of communicating with each other through some system of symbols which are quite unknown to us, because expressed in forms of sensation of which we have no receptivity.

The second branch of the argument—namely, that Language is a purely social product, is less plausible, and can hardly be more true than the first. If society has taught men to speak, why has it not taught bees or ants? It would be just as true to say that language has produced society; the real fact being that language and society, being two coexistent forces, have mutually acted and reacted on each other, so that it has become impossible to separate what in each was originally due to the other.

Another novel suggestion which finds a place among the "Psychological Principles," is that of the existence of a so-called "Psychoplasm," out of which he supposes the psychical organism to be evolved, as the vital is from the Bioplasm. It seems to represent in his mind a supposed intermediate stage, when the inorganic unconscious material of external force is transformed into organizable material capable of assimilation by consciousness. "The *sentient material* out of which all the forms of Consciousness are evolved, is the Psychoplasm, incessantly fluctuating, incessantly renewed" (p. 119). "We may represent," he says, "the molecular movements of the Bioplasm by the neural tremors of the Psychoplasm: these tremors are what I term *neural units*; the raw material of Consciousness" (p. 118). And again, "the movements of the Bioplasm constitute Vitality; the movements of the Psychoplasm constitute Sensibility" (*ib.*). The metaphysical import of this hypothesis we shall hereafter discuss: but we may here remark, that from a physiological point of view it seems at least difficult to reconcile a hypothesis of which we can hardly even form a mental picture, with one of Mr. Lewes' own canons of research—namely, that one must never attempt to explain by "unknown causes" (p. 93). And when, in addition to this psychological medium or Psychoplasm, Mr. Lewes goes on to speak of a sociological medium "forming another kind of Psychoplasm" (p. 124),\* we cannot help feeling that he has left the region of Science altogether.

A somewhat similar criticism applies to the distinction which he draws between Consciousness and Sub-Consciousness. The object of this distinction was, doubtless, metaphysical, and in this point of view we shall return to it hereafter. Physiologically it is difficult to see on what data it can be founded, and, indeed, what can be its meaning; for Consciousness can be known to Physiology only by its phenomena, and the phenomena of Consciousness and Sub-Consciousness are identical. (As to this see

\* If Mr. Lewes cannot bring himself to give to this strange offspring the name of "Socioplasm" (although such a word would be excellent company for "Sociology"), perhaps he will allow us to suggest "Cœnoplasm" or "Politicoplasm." Let it not die for want of a name.

p. 210.) To compare it to the difference between flame and heat (p. 136) seems little more than a metaphor; and to compare it to the difference between the distinct vision at the centre of the retina and the indistinct vision at any other point (p. 142), is an illustration from the internal and not the external world; and even there is an illustration, and not an explanation. No doubt, "Sentience is always sentient, as Vision is always visual" (*ib.*); but that does not help to solve the question whether Sentience is or is not always present. It is quite true too, that "'unfelt feelings' are inadmissible;" but the right conclusion from that is, that actions which are unfelt are not feelings, and not, as Mr. Lewes seems to argue, that *no* action can be unfelt. At any rate, to call them "sub-conscious" instead of "unfelt," cannot help the argument one way or the other.

Another curious metaphor rather than hypothesis (at least so we must call it until it is justified by further evidence), is, that of "the mass of *stationary waves*" under which Mr. Lewes "pictures" to himself Consciousness (p. 150)—a picture which to his readers is somewhat difficult of realization.

But the principle on which Mr. Lewes seems most to pride himself, is that which he calls the "Psychological Spectrum." It is this. As all light is composed of red, green, and violet, in various proportions, so all mental states are composed of Sensation, Thought, and Motion; in other words, "every psychical fact is a product of sense-work, brain-work, and muscle-work" (p. 147); and "each mental state is thus *a function of three variables.*" The name is certainly new, and somewhat sensational; but there does not seem much novelty in the principle, although it is said to "wear a paradoxical air." However, we are quite ready to believe that in Mr. Lewes' hands it will be capable of useful—as he promises that it shall have extensive—application; even to the introduction of the Differential Calculus into Psychology.

The foregoing are the principal novelties which Mr. Lewes promises to Mental Physiology; though, of course, he does not fail also to lay stress on the well-recognised principles of Association, Heredity, Irradiation, and the like. In the remarks that we have ventured to make upon them we must not forget that the evidence is avowedly reserved, and that *prima facie* difficulties may be modified or altogether removed when we come to the subsequent volumes. In any case, scientific hypotheses, even if untrue, cannot but tend to the ultimate discovery of truth, and we may confidently leave them to the discussion which they are sure to provoke.

Having thus stated his programme, Mr. Lewes proceeds to give us the first instalment of the substance of the work; in other words, he proceeds to apply in detail the before-enunciated

principles to the solution of metaphysical problems. The method of procedure depends, as we have seen, on the separation of the empirical from the metempirical elements. Hence the first question is what *are* the metempirical elements? "Here," as he says (p. 87), "we find ourselves fronting the great psychological problems of the Limitations of Knowledge and the Principles of Certitude." Accordingly, Problem I. is entitled "The Limitations of Knowledge;" and with the discussion of this problem the remainder of the volume is occupied. Of this discussion we can here indicate only the main features.

In the first place, Mr. Lewes lays down the great principle of Positive or Empirical Research—namely, that knowledge is bounded by consciousness, that is to say, by experience (p. 202, cf. p. 256); and he reconciles this with the innateness of mental laws and forms by explaining it as a truth of Psychogeny rather than of Psychology proper, thus adopting the well-known discoveries of Mr. Herbert Spencer as to the evolution of mental faculties. The whole of this statement, together with the discussions which it involves as to the nature of instinct and the supposed existence of a faculty for grasping the supra-sensible, is exceedingly able and logical; and although the conclusions have been anticipated by others, the mode of treatment is not only forcible but original. Then follows a chapter on Abstraction, which is defined as "focussing;" and this leads to a very thoughtful and suggestive chapter on Ideal Construction in Science. In this he points out the abstract and ideal nature of some physical laws, such as Kepler's First Law of Motion. "They are Types," he says (p. 293), "erected by scientific imagination, which moulds the elements of concrete observation into abstractions by getting rid of all perturbing particulars;" and the erroneous conception of the phenomena of nature being *determined by law*, "must be replaced by the more accurate conception of the *law being determined by the phenomena*" (p. 297). In this way such physical laws are not unlike the moral types which are the standards for our conduct in life. Whether Mr. Lewes is right in concluding against Mr. Mill that it is the derivative and not the ultimate laws which are most truly laws of nature (p. 312) is perhaps a mere question of words; but the distinction which he wishes to substitute for that of ultimate and derivative—namely, that of Real and Ideal Laws, seems to rest only on difference of degree, and not to point to any difference of nature. The most ideal law is ultimately based on actual phenomena; and if a real law contain no ideal construction, it becomes a mere orderless catalogue of facts, and therefore is not a law at all; for the essence of law is order. And to take Mr. Lewes' own example (p. 306), it is no more actually true that a body moves in the diagonal of two incident forces

than that it moves uniformly in a straight line under the influence of a single force. No such phenomenon as either actually ever presents itself unaccompanied, because, as Mr. Lewes says, "within real space the requisite conditions are unrealizable" (p. 291); but there is no single phenomenon of any kind which so presents itself. The universe is a tangle of phenomena, which it is the office of science to disentangle; and the utmost ingenuity of experiment can never completely isolate to sense a single phenomenon, so that the isolation is ideal only. In that sense, no doubt, *all* science is ideal; but it is also real, for it is only the rearrangement of real elements. For we cannot agree with Mr. Lewes that Science may be constructed out of elements "which never were and never could be real," and yet have a practical application (p. 289). It is not a true, although far from an original remark, that "the point, the line, the circle are elements of ideal, not of sensible space." Space, *real* space, is full of *real* points, lines, circles, spheres, and the like. They are not marked out, it is true, but surely a circle need not be a "round black line," and a sphere is a sphere none the less because it does not differ in colour or material from its surrounding medium. If not present to sense, it is at least present to what Mr. Lewes calls "Mental Vision," or Intuition, and therefore not only *can be* but *is* real (p. 376, cf. p. 261). The question of the application of the laws of these *true* spheres to such *untrue* or approximate spheres, as we find marked out or mark out artificially in nature, is an entirely different question; and the difficulty there is simply a difficulty of approximation.

The remaining chapters, which consist mainly of applications of the foregoing principles to certain special logical questions, are full of vigorous thought and reasoning. Those on Cause, on Necessary Truth, and on the Empirical Origin of Mathematics, are perhaps the best, not only for the value of their conclusions, but for their clearness of reasoning, and their wealth and felicity of illustration. All truths, he says, are equally necessary under the formulated conditions, contingency implying a possible change of conditions. There can be but one certainty, that of an identical proposition; and the superiority of mathematics lies only in the ease with which this is attained and shown (p. 433). The chapter on Kant does not add much to the strength of the previous argument, for if Kant had lived at the present day it is probable that he would not have differed much on the question of the Origin of Knowledge from Mr. Lewes and Mr. Herbert Spencer. In his day the existence of an *à priori* element in knowledge seemed conclusive against the Sensationalism of Hume, and his recognition of this was a valuable remonstrance against an imperfect theory. But now that the principle of hereditary evolution

has been established, and has shown how in a sense the Categories have both objective and subjective necessity, and have yet an empirical origin, Kant and Hume have been reconciled on the basis of a more complete empiricism; and the *à priori* school of philosophy, if such there still be, must use other arguments than those of Kant. Mr. Lewes is still further wrong in supposing that by demolishing Kant he demolishes the possibility of what he calls "Metempirics," for it is quite possible, as we hope to prove, to combine a firm belief in the empirical origin of knowledge with an equally firm belief in the independence of Metaphysics from Science. Surely it may well be that all knowledge comes from experience, and yet that all knowledge is not scientific.

The problem ends with a discussion on the place of Sentiment in Philosophy. In the next we are promised the completion of this first great preliminary question by an inquiry into the Principles of Certitude.

We have now said enough to enable our readers to appreciate the plan and object of Mr. Lewes' work; and we therefore propose at once to turn to what has been already stated to be the main purpose of this article—namely, an examination of Mr. Lewes' position towards Metaphysics. To get rid of Metaphysics as the great obstacle in the way of future philosophic progress is, as we have seen, the preliminary task which Mr. Lewes has set himself to accomplish in the two first volumes of his work. Its necessity he states as follows:—"It will be necessary to transform Metaphysics, or to stamp it out of existence. There is but this alternative. At present Metaphysics is an obstacle in our path; it must be crushed into dust, and our chariot wheels must pass over it, or its forces of resistance must be converted into motive powers, and what is an obstacle become an impulse" (p. 4). That is to say, it must either be crushed or bribed over. Now, hitherto Mr. Lewes has tried the crushing process. To the impetuosity of youth the sight of an enemy prompted nothing but immediate onslaught; and vigorous was the attack, and long and valiantly has the combat been maintained. Yet although every weapon and tactic that Science could suggest has been employed, and though at times friendly rumours of victory have appeared to justify a song of triumph, at the end of a more than Thirty Years' War Mr. Lewes is forced to confess that the enemy still lives. "Contempt, ridicule, argument, all (he says) are vain against tendencies towards metaphysical speculation" (p. 7). "Although its doctrines have become a scoff (except among the valiant few), its method still survives, still prompts to renewed research, and still misleads some men of science" (p. 8). Nay, not only is it still un-

crushed, but the energetic attacks which it has received seem to have invigorated rather than weakened it, for we now see it, according to Mr. Lewes' own testimony, "strangely agitated, and showing symptoms of a reawakened life. After a long period of neglect and contempt its problems are once more re-asserting their claims" (p. 4). Assuredly this might well have caused a less heroic spirit to despair. After almost a lifetime of effort (Mr. Lewes tells us his labours began in 1836), during which there has been no lack on his part either of skill or of daring, still "the enemy faints not nor faileth. And as things have been they remain." Nay, worse than all, Mr. Lewes mysteriously hints at signs of treason from within, from the very centre of the scientific camp. But to his honour be it remembered that he has not despaired of his country; on the contrary, while bravely accepting the situation, and acknowledging defeat, he ascribes it to mere faults of generalship, and reasserts as boldly as ever the eventual triumph of his cause. The old tactics have failed; he therefore changes them; contempt gives place to respect. "A cause which is vigorous after centuries of defeat is a cause baffled, but not hopeless; beaten, but not subdued" (p. 8). It is worth conciliating; it *must* be conciliated. So, without further delay, he sounds a parley, and after a profession of friendly intent, proposes that hostilities be dropped, and that an alliance offensive and defensive be entered into between Metaphysics and Science on the following terms. That is to say:

1. *The general charges which have been made by Science against Metaphysics, that its problems are "insoluble" and "mischievous" and "ontological chimeras," and "a mild form of insanity," and "waste of precious energies," and so forth, to be definitively abandoned and withdrawn.* "I propose to show," says Mr. Lewes, "that metaphysical problems have rationally no other difficulties, than those which beset all problems" (p. 5).

2. *Metaphysics to admit the method of Science.* If Metaphysics and Science are to enter into any real alliance, "one Method, one Logic, one canon of Truth and Demonstration must be applied to both. Which must it be? Not the one hitherto employed in Metaphysics; its incompetence is manifest in the unprogressive nature of its results" (p. 12). It must, therefore, be the method of Science.

3. *Problems which refuse the terms of the last article, to be deemed irrational, and to be definitively abandoned by Metaphysics.* The scientific method "will furnish solution to every metaphysical problem that can be rationally stated; whereas no problem, metaphysical or scientific, which is irrationally stated can receive a rational solution" (p. 5).

4. *The honour of Metaphysics to be saved by inventing for all such last-named problems the name of Metempirics.* The advantage of thus coining a new term is that "it detaches from Metaphysics a vast range of insoluble problems, leaving behind it only such as are soluble" (p. 17).

Such are the main articles of the proposed alliance. Mr. Lewes has much to say in recommendation of them to each of the contracting parties. In urging them upon Metaphysics he shows that a real friendship with Science will be more to its advantage than the false splendours of its present alliance with Theology, whose protection is "only such as is accorded to a vassal, and is changed to hostility whenever their conclusions clash, or whenever argument threatens to disturb the secular slumber of dogma" (p. 11). By the adoption of this alliance Metaphysics will escape from its present equivocal position between vassalage and contempt, and will give proof of wisdom in preferring the freedom of poverty, and the sure friendship of equals, to the luxury of slavery, and the capricious patronage of the great.

On turning to his own friends he naturally feels some misgiving and hesitation.

"They will doubtless feel some surprise at this announcement of my present aim. I may here seem to be unsaying what it has been the chief purpose of my labours to enforce. But it is really not so. There has been no other change than this, that I now see how problems which were insoluble by the Method then in use are soluble by the Method of Science. This is not a retreat, but a change of front. Throughout my polemic against Metaphysics the attacks were directed against the irrational Method as one by which *all* problems whatever must be insoluble" (p. 6).

It is not that an extension of the scientific franchise, when you come to look at it dispassionately, is not a good liberal measure; it is the Tory way of treating such questions (in fact, their way of treating *all* questions) that disgusted me with the whole subject, and caused me to give a hasty verdict, which it will perhaps be more prudent to recal. For, after all, the rejection of Metaphysics by the Positive Philosophy

"seems to me somewhat arbitrary when the state of the case is examined; and injudicious, when we find that it not only irritates those who might be convinced, but irritates them by a misconception. All who put their trust in the Positive Philosophy must regret that it should alienate instead of alluring speculative thinkers capable of extending its reach; and it alienates them by the supercilious assertion, that they are, and have been wandering on the wrong path; which may be true, *is* true; but which would be better enforced by pointing out their point of divergence from the right path, so that their steps might be retraced" (p. 62).



Whether by these arguments Mr. Lewes succeed in allaying the suspicions of the Positivist party or not, it is impossible not to admire the ingenuity of his pleading. Though to the abler and more trusted of his followers he does not hesitate to reveal the real secret of this hated alliance—namely, that it has been rendered absolutely necessary by the ill success which has attended their chariot wheels, and their want of resources to continue the war, he well knows that to the more ardent spirits such considerations as these will bring no acquiescence in a “renegade peace ;” and he therefore appeals to their cosmopolitan sympathies, and their pity for the poor hopeless wanderers, whom nothing but kindness can bring back to the true fold. His persuasion almost deserves success ; it will be interesting to see whether it obtains it.

As regards the probability of the assent of Metaphysics to the proposed alliance there would seem to be less ground of hope ; for though in addition to the arguments referred to above, he tries to show the futility of any reason that can be given for retaining metaphysical speculation apart from science (p. 25), this only affects the question of peace or war, not the question as to the terms on which peace can be concluded. Metaphysicians have probably no objection to peace, only their idea of terms is rather different from that of Mr. Lewes. Hegel, for instance, as Mr. Lewes himself says, “is urgent for treating Metaphysics and Science on the same method. Unhappily, he has a very erroneous view of the conditions of inquiry, and, in point of fact, reverses the principle I am here proclaiming ; and instead of treating Metaphysics by the method of Science, treats Science by the method of Metaphysics” (p. 19). So it is evident that, “erroneously” or not, Hegel would not accept Mr. Lewes’ terms ; and it seems very probable that other metaphysicians will look at the matter much in the same way. Metaphysics, though hitherto as a rule not aggressive, would doubtless have no objection to annex Science, just as Science is anxious to annex Metaphysics ; but neither party is so weak or disinclined to fight as to accept terms which practically amount to extinction. And this is in effect the offer now made to Metaphysics. The name, indeed, is to be retained, because it “has had godfathers so illustrious that, if possible, it ought to be preserved” (p. 16). But it is to have an entirely new meaning assigned to it, comprehending merely that division of physics which treats of “the highest generalisations of research” (*ib.*) ; while all that was most distinctive in its old meaning is to be discarded and disgraced under a new and inglorious appellation. Surely if this were accepted all would be lost—without exception of honour.

But it is useless further to speculate on what assent this proposed treaty may meet with either from friends or opponents. What most concerns us is, to form some judgment as to its general philosophical value, and to see whether, apart from all party questions and interests, the principles which it involves are or are not likely to facilitate the solution of questions now unsolved, or to accelerate the advancement of knowledge. Our criticisms on this head will be twofold: first, as to the form in which Mr. Lewes embodies his principle; and secondly, as to the principle itself.

On the former point, the remark which most obviously presents itself is, that no real progress can be made by the mere shuffling of names. The first object of names is to be symbols for communication of ideas between one man and another; and for this object it is indispensable that the same name should always mean the same thing to all men; otherwise its utility is lost, and from a vehicle of intelligence it becomes an instrument of confusion. But the thing or idea named is not in any way affected by its name. "The rose by any other name would smell as sweet;" and if it were suddenly decreed to call all yellow roses onions, the facts of Osmology would remain unaltered, and the only result would be a confusion of tongues. Now Mr. Lewes himself admits that "what is usually meant by the word 'Metaphysics' is what he proposes to call "metempirical inquiry" (p. 19 *n.*): to what purpose then, except to confuse, can he wish to divorce it from this meaning, and to assign to it one as different (in his own view) as knowledge is from ignorance?

It is impossible to suppose that in Mr. Lewes' own mind there was any confusion. When he gives as the programme of his work "the transformation of Metaphysics by reduction to the method of Science" (p. 5), he must be taken to have full in his mind the subsequent limitation of Metaphysics to the empirical, or (as he defines it) to "the province we include within the range of Science" (p. 17). But with his readers such foresight would be nothing short of miraculous; and so when they read such a programme as that quoted above, or when they read that the object of Mr. Lewes is "to show that the method which has hitherto achieved such splendid success in Science needs only to be properly interpreted and applied, and by it the inductions and deductions from experience will furnish solutions to every metaphysical problem that can be rationally stated" (p. 5)—or that "what is here proclaimed is the possibility of finding rational solutions to questions which have hitherto baffled effort" (p. 13)—it is not unnatural that they should take these promises in their ordinary meaning, and should expect to witness some elucidation of problems which come under "what is usually

meant by the word" Metaphysics. Their hopes having thus been warmly excited, it is inevitable that they would be disappointed by the discovery, which must soon be made, that Mr. Lewes' object is, after all, only to exemplify in some detail the principle that scientific method is capable of application to all problems which come within its range. Wherefore then such flourishing of trumpets, and proclaiming of treaties? is their natural inquiry: and then arises a feeling of resentment at having been taken in and imposed upon, especially among the metaphysicians, who have been almost made to forget their own names by the flatteries and bribes and "giftless gifts" which Mr. Lewes has offered them.

This is all very unfortunate, because, as was remarked before, the confusion cannot have existed in Mr. Lewes' own mind. It has evidently arisen from no deeper source than the paternal anxiety of an author to dignify his offspring by some grand historic appellation, to whom, because the name Pisistratus suggests only Pisistratus Caxton, the child of his bosom, it never occurs to provide for any possible confusion in the mind of his hearers. For that Mr. Lewes never really dreamt of extending the scientific method beyond the very narrowest limits ordinarily assigned to it, is evident from his including under Metempirics such questions as was that of the chemical constitution of the sun's atmosphere a few years ago. "It was so obviously metempirical," he says, "that even metaphysicians abstained from speculating on it" (p. 24). As to that, they would have thought it far too scientific a question for them to dare to speculate upon; so that, if the truth is to be told, it seems as if metaphysicians would give a wider scope to scientific method than Mr. Lewes himself.

And this leads us to a point on which there is some apparent confusion. What is it exactly that Mr. Lewes would exclude from the range of his method under the term of Metempirics? Now, in the beginning of his explanation of the method which he proposes to employ, he separates three aspects of each object of research:—"1. the *positive*, or known; 2. the *speculative*, unknown though knowable; 3. the *unknowable*. The two first are empirical, the third is metempirical" (p. 29). This identification of the metempirical with the unknowable constantly recurs; and in interpreting it the natural sense to attribute to "unknowable" is "what is usually meant by the word"—namely, that which under no circumstances is capable of being known; otherwise it is not easy to see how it can be distinguished, as Mr. Lewes says it is, from the "unknown though knowable, in kind and not simply in degree" (ib.) And this impression would appear to be borne out by sundry other passages, as, for instance, where the distinction between the empirical and metempirical

worlds is identified with Kant's distinction between phenomenal and noumenal (p. 19) ; or where metempirical is made equivalent to supra-sensible (p. 253) ; or (as in another place) to "transcendent, that which is beyond all experience" (p. 44) ; or, when again, the rejection by Objective Logic of "whatever lies beyond that world of sensibles and extra-sensibles which can come within the range of experience," is held to "demarcate Metaphysics from Metempirics" (p. 74). Indeed, at the very first introduction of the word metempirical, he defines it as including "whatever lies beyond the limits of possible experience" (p. 17). However, that this is not the meaning which Mr. Lewes generally attaches to the word in his own mind, is evident from the remark quoted above, as to research into the sun's atmosphere, and from such statements as the following:—that "whenever by any means what is now transcendental becomes expressible in terms of experience, it will thereby cease to be metempirical" (p. 44 *n.*) ; or that "whenever a question is couched in terms that ignore experience, reject known truths, and invoke inaccessible data—*i.e.*, data inaccessible through our present means, or through any conceivable extension of those means—it is metempirical, and philosophy can have nothing to do with it. We need not trouble ourselves with it until in possession of the requisite means ; it is *adjourned*, not suppressed" (p. 33 ; see too, p. 371). He therefore would appear to include under Metempirics not only that which is unknowable owing to the constitution of our faculties, but that which is unknown (or, as he prefers to call it in some places "unknowable") because of the want of data ; and this is, on the whole, the explanation which appears most consistent with the whole scope of his argument. And yet, in explaining the very first rule among his "Rules of Philosophising," he says that we must examine the unknown elements in a question, "in order to determine whether—1, they are unknown, and unknowable because metempirical ; or, 2, they are unknown only because the requisite conditions of knowledge lie beyond our present data. In the former case, research ceases ; in the latter case, it proceeds" (p. 89). This passage is very discouraging to any attempt to reconcile the different expressions of Mr. Lewes' view, and perhaps such an attempt is better abandoned. Besides, as Mr. Lewes is a living author, he can write his own concordance (if it be worth while) much more easily than any one else can write it for him.

But whatever be the true solution of this last ambiguity, a further difficulty arises. For, to take first the more probable alternative that Mr. Lewes means to include under Metempirics "not only that which can never be brought within the range of experience, owing to the constitution of things, but also that which cannot at present be so brought, owing to the condition

of our knowledge" (p. 45 *n.*); or, in other words, not only the absolutely unknowable, but that which at present there are no means of knowing:—then, in addition to the preliminary ‘demurrer for multifariousness,’ that under one name two entirely distinct classes of things or ideas are mixed together, a gratuitous confusion for which no reason is alleged, there is this further objection, that of neither of these classes can it be truly said that it lies beyond the reach of knowledge. For as to the first class, namely, those things which we have at present no means of knowing but which may hereafter become known, how, except through scientific explanation, are the new data to be discovered from which the future knowledge is to spring? In what sense (to take Mr. Lewes’ own instance) was the chemical constitution of the sun ever “unknowable,” or “inaccessible to science?” Mr. Lewes would answer, that it was so because until the discovery of spectrum analysis there were no data to go upon. But surely the data, though unknown, were *there*, knowable and accessible enough; and it was through scientific investigation that they, and the conclusions which were bound up in them, became actually known. To say the contrary would be to preclude Science from seeking new data at all, that is to say, would discard observation and experiment; for what are these but the search for new data? The truth is, that there is no fact which can ever become knowable (except, of course, future facts, with which we are not dealing) of which we have not now the data. For the ultimate datum of all future scientific knowledge must necessarily be sensation; and therefore, if we neglect the theoretical possibility of the evolution or acquisition of fresh senses, is potentially given in our present senses. Hence it is clear that the new data which seem, according to Mr. Lewes, suddenly to spring into existence by accident, or at any rate by some cause outside scientific inquiry, are really only *recombinations of existing data*; and it is this work of recombination which it is the special function of Science to devise and carry out.

Nor is it more true of the other division of the metempirical, namely, the absolutely unknowable, that it lies outside the sphere of knowledge: and that for this simple reason, that it is non-existent, and therefore lies nowhere. Inside and Outside and Existence are all forms or genera of Knowledge, and apart from Knowledge, have no meaning. So the negative of Knowledge is the negative of Existence. Such, at least, is the only doctrine consistent with the rudimentary principles of Positivism; and it is therefore strange to find Mr. Lewes giving to mere negation a positive existence in the same class with such things as the solar atmosphere, and the strata of Sirius, and assigning to it definite

principles of research, and the name at least of a separate province in the empire of Nescience.

These latter remarks apply equally on the second supposition as to the intended meaning of Metempirics—namely, that it includes only the absolutely unknowable, and supply a further argument against the probability of that supposition; for the only shadow of positive existence which would suggest such language in reference to the unknowable as that used by Mr. Lewes, is that which must have been derived from its association in his mind with the simply unknown.

These are the main objections which offer themselves as to the form in which Mr. Lewes has cast his results, and they amount in summary to this—that the descriptions which Mr. Lewes gives of his intentions tend to create in the reader's mind a false impression as to the nature of these intentions; and that the new terminology which he invents and the distinctions implied thereby, tend only (so far as they are not untrue) to confuse the landmarks of philosophy and disappoint the reader's expectation. Mr. Lewes wishes to apply, and has attempted to apply, the method of Science to some of the highest and most general scientific truths, certain "Problems of Life and Mind;" and, no doubt, he has much valuable information to communicate to us on the subject, which we wait for with the brightest expectation: but, unfortunately, he has chosen to call these general truths Metaphysics (a title to which their only claim seems to be that they are *Physics*, on the principle of *lucus a non lucendo*); and hence a great deal of misapprehension has been introduced, which, unless explained, may cause worse confusion. It is hardly curious that Mr. Lewes himself seems to have foreseen this difficulty; but it is certainly curious that, having seen it, he did nothing to remedy it, except by an answer to it which is more curious still. He says—"Whatever speculative curiosity may prompt, our real and lasting interest is in ascertaining the order of things we know" (p. 28); or, in other words, Metempirics are very useless and unpractical. This, in the first place, begs the question that we can know nothing but what *Science* can teach; but even if it be true, it is hardly a sufficient reason for depriving Metaphysics of their *name*, especially as he charges them with no fresh imbecility which would make them less deserving of a respectable name than formerly. Besides, as has been said above, a name takes its character from its object, instead of giving character to it, and its value is not to the object at all (which gets on just as well without a name), but to philosophers and other folk who want to talk about the object, for which purpose they want names for bad objects as well as good, if only in order to abuse them by.

But it may be said by Mr. Lewes' defenders that all this criticism is about a mere question of names, which, however it be settled, is entirely unimportant; and that the real point for discussion is not whether what Mr. Lewes *excludes* from Philosophy should be called by this or that name, but whether he has succeeded in *including* under Philosophy, that is to say, under Science, any new domain; not whether he has appropriated the whole of what formerly went under the term Metaphysics, but whether he has really appropriated *any part of it*. To this suggestion we have no objection to defer, merely remarking that it would have been impossible to examine what Mr. Lewes includes under his method without trying to understand what he proposes to exclude, and that, even as a mere question of names, though it ought never to have been created, yet that is Mr. Lewes' fault and not ours, and now that it exists it is necessary not only to point it out, but to settle it *one way or the other*, in order to avoid confusion.

Let us then, without more delay, proceed to examine the value of this new principle of metaphysical research propounded by Mr. Lewes; and, in order to take the very broadest issue, let us ask whether there is any single truly metaphysical problem which by its means he has either solved or may reasonably be expected to solve. Now, an opinion has already been intimated that questions to which the scientific method is applicable are questions of Physics, and not of Metaphysics; and that to call them Metaphysics is merely an abuse of terms; from which it would follow that the true metaphysical sphere lies altogether outside the sphere of Science, and, therefore, that the method of Science is utterly incapable of dealing with it. This opinion it is now proposed to justify.

Mr. Lewes defines the sphere of Metaphysics as "the highest generalisations of research." To this there is no objection, except that of course Mr. Lewes tacitly confines research to *scientific* research—an implication which, until justified, must be rejected as begging the whole question at issue. It will perhaps be better therefore, instead of "research," to use the word "knowledge," which is less bound up with scientific associations. Now, what are the highest generalisations, the *summa genera*, of knowledge? What are its broadest, its most fundamental distinctions? Evidently, to begin with, the distinction between its two highest genera of all; a distinction recognised in every sentence, in every action, and in every thought; the distinction between Subject and Object, Mind and Matter, Self and the Universe. The relation, then, of Subject to Object is the first great problem of Metaphysics. The second is an offshoot of this, which was for a long time not separated from it, which indeed can hardly be said to have had an individual existence before

Berkeley. This is the question as to the nature of the Object, or, more definitely, as to its relation to a supposed absolutely existent, External World. For when the relation between Subject and Object had been apparently resolved into the relation between Ideas and Phenomena, a further question suggested itself, whether Phenomena were not themselves in some way related back by some similar relation to an extra-phenomenal world outside our consciousness altogether. If so this would be the real Object, and Phenomena would be simply the form in which this Object affected the Subject—would be in fact a kind of chemical product of the real Object and the Subject, differing as much from either as water differs from its constituent elements of oxygen and hydrogen. Thus the question of an External World, *Dinge an sich*, became separated from the old question of Subject and Object, and the two answers which can be given to it have taken the names of Realism and Idealism respectively. It may be remarked in passing, that a similar question will probably at some future time present itself more distinctly than hitherto in relation to the *Subject*; namely, as to the possible relation of individual states of consciousness to an absolutely existent mind entirely independent of the individual states, and of which such states are merely “phenomena;”—a question which will probably be found to be intimately bound up with the problem of the connexion of individual minds with one another and with a universal mind, and so with the problem of Personal Identity, just as the analogous question as to the *Object* has important bearing on the difficulty of the continuity of external existence. And indeed such a question has never been unknown in philosophy; but inasmuch as it has not yet taken so definite a shape as the corresponding question in respect of the Object, and also because it is still further removed than the latter from the purview of Science, its further discussion would only confuse our argument without adding to its value. The two questions above referred to—namely, that of the relation of Subject and Object, and that of the nature of the External World, may be taken as the two typical questions of Metaphysics, and it will be therefore wise to confine the discussion to them.

Let us take, therefore, the three genera which we have found to be three of the highest generalisations of knowledge; two actually known to exist, the third as yet problematical—namely, Subject, Phenomenon, and Noumenon. Here then is the kingdom of Metaphysics; for it is with the relations of these highest genera that Metaphysics professes to deal. Now, among these, where do we find the province of Science? For if metaphysical problems are to be capable of scientific treatment, it is evident that Science must embrace *all* these *summa genera*. Let us see, therefore, whether this is so. Mr. Lewes would admit at once



the contrary. He would admit what the least consideration will prove, that Science is wholly confined to the second of the three genera, namely, *Phenomena*.\* The method of Science is by treating all Phenomena as feelings actual or virtual, after a principle exemplified in the method of Virtual Velocities in Mechanics, and thus eliminating the common factor of the individual subjectivity, to arrive at the comparison of Phenomena with each other, and the ascertainment of their relations *inter se*; its proximate end is the arranging of Phenomena under certain general "laws;" and its ultimate ideal is by these means to render the mind an exact copy of Phenomena, and so rethink the Universe. Hence, seeing that by its very nature, Science is confined to the relations of Phenomena *inter se*, it cannot entertain the question of their relation to something of quite a different nature, whether such thing be conscious Subject, or extra-conscious Noumenon. These latter relations are *assumed* by Science at every step, and without such assumption Science can never use words which imply either Consciousness on the one hand, or things apart from Phenomena on the other. Therefore we may be sure beforehand that if a man profess to explain either facts of Consciousness or the nature of Things-in-themselves, he does so not by Science, or by the use of the scientific method, but by Metaphysics and the method of Metaphysics. Now this is in direct contradiction to Mr. Lewes, for not only does he profess by the method of Science alone to give definite explanations of the two problems which have been referred to, but he sees absolutely no difficulty in the matter. "When rationally stated," he says, "there is no greater mystery in the existence of an external world, or the relation between Object and Subject, than in the relation between activity and waste in the tissues, the relation between heat and expansion, or the relation between an arc and its chord" (p. 38). It is therefore interesting to examine the answers which he gives; and it is at his own suggestion that these two questions may be selected as the test. Now the very words in which he proclaims his freedom from difficulty will, if closely examined, suggest the explanation, which is this: that the questions which Mr. Lewes thinks himself able, and in fact *is* able to solve, are not the real questions at issue at all, but are questions relating solely to Phenomena, and therefore though undoubtedly within the range of Science, are entirely alien to Metaphysics. Let us remember to begin with, that according to one of Mr. Lewes'

---

\* If it were necessary to confirm this by quotations, the following would suffice:—"Physics and Metaphysics (*i.e.*, Mr. Lewes' Metaphysics) deal with things and their relations as these are known to us and as they are believed to exist in our universe" (p. 18). "What is the object of each science? It is to detect the general order of things as manifested in particular groups of phenomena" (p. 65).

own rules, "no proof can be valid beyond the range of its data; no conclusion exact which shuts in what is not included in its premisses" (Rule VII. p. 95). Hence, if the premisses be phenomena, the conclusions must be about phenomena, and the only "external world" and "subject" which Science can deal with, or obtain conclusions about, must be *phenomenal* only; that is to say, the "external world" of Science must be simply the world of phenomena, and the "subject" of Science must be merely the vital organism and its "neural tremors;" and any supposed argument from these to the "external world" of Noumena and the "subject" of Consciousness must be an argument based on a metaphysical not a scientific basis. Let us justify this augury by closer examination of Mr. Lewes' reasoning. In doing so, it will be convenient to separate as far as possible the two questions referred to above, though Mr. Lewes does not always seem to bear in mind the distinction between them, and at times mixes them together in the most confusing manner, so that it is impossible to tell for many consecutive sentences with which of the two he supposes himself to be dealing. And first let us examine his treatment of the relation of Subject to Object.

The real difficulty of this question from a scientific point of view is that the two are heterogeneous; that phenomena can only tell us of phenomena; that the phenomena which are supposed to indicate the presence of consciousness differ totally from consciousness itself, and that it is possible to pass from one to the other only by a method which comprehends both, and which is therefore not scientific, but extra-scientific, metaphysical. Now (strange to say, when we consider his pretensions, though not otherwise) Mr. Lewes at times seems to admit this. He says (p. 74), "Only on the assumption of the invariability of relations objective and subjective is philosophy possible. No arithmetical operation would be valid were there not this accord between the internal and external: and the assumption of such an accord runs through Science." In strict accordance with this he says that Psychology being "the science of psychical phenomena, has to seek its data in Biology and in Sociology" (p. 109); and again, he calls it, "a section of Biology" (p. 135). Hence the elements with which it has to deal are wholly derived from the outside world, and in accordance with the rule that "no proof can be valid beyond the range of its data" (p. 95), the conclusions at which it arrives must refer wholly to the external world. Therefore when Mr. Lewes speaks of feeling, consciousness, sensation, perception, and so forth, these ought to be simply names for certain nervous phenomena, "neural tremors," as he calls them. Now at times this is clearly avowed by Mr. Lewes: and it will perhaps be well to give a few instances of such avowal. In discussing the relation of Psychology to Biology (which is shortly

expressed in the aphorism that "mind is only one of the forms of life" (p. 114), and having shown how the vital organism is derived from the Bioplasm, he says, in a passage of which part has been already quoted (p. 118), "If instead of considering the whole vital organism, we consider solely its sensitive aspects, and confine ourselves to the Nervous System, we may represent the molecular movements of the Bioplasm by the neural tremors of the Psychoplasm: these tremors are what I term *neural units*: the raw material of Consciousness;" and a few lines afterwards, "The movements of the Bioplasm constitute Vitality; the movements of the Psychoplasm constitute Sensibility." This same Psychoplasm he afterwards defines as "the mass of potential Feeling, derived from all the sensitive affections of the organism" (p. 120). Again he says, "Every feeling being a group of neural units has its particular mark in Consciousness" (p. 121): and that from Sensibility, one of the "fundamental modes of the organism," "issue the general laws of Feeling, using that term in its widest sense, including Sensation, Perception, Emotion, Volition, and Intelligence and also Instinct" (p. 130). Again, "We may consider the gradations of Sensation, After-sensation, Imagination and Hallucination, as the varying energies of the same neural tracts" (p. 149): and so "Sensations are groups of neural tremors; perceptions are groups of sensations" (p. 169). Again, Experience is defined as "the Registration of Feeling;" and to the question, "What is Feeling?" the answer given is, that "it is the reaction of the sentient Organism under stimulus" (p. 210). The above quotations might be multiplied at pleasure, but are sufficient for the purpose. What then, from this point of view, is the relation of Subject to Object? Simply the relation of the nervous system to its medium. And this also is at times clearly admitted by Mr. Lewes. For instance, he says (p. 122; also cf. p. 118 sub fin.) that the primary law of Biology that "every vital phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Organism and its Medium" is expressed in Psychology "in the equivalent formula" that "Every psychical phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Subject and the Object;" and again (p. 189, cf. p. 127), "I regard Perception as the assimilation of the Object by the Subject in the same way that Nutrition is the assimilation of the Medium by the Organism." Now from this point of view all is consistent; and with this explanation of what is to be meant by Subject and Object, Science is perfectly competent to explain the relation between them. But, in the name of all that is most wonderful, what has this to do with the question of the relation between Subject and Object in the ordinary or metaphysical meaning of the words? or in other words, between the subjective *Consciousness* and the objective world of *Phenomena*? It is merely another shuffling of names which explains nothing at all. However, if the new meanings

thus assigned to Subject and Object were consistently maintained, the objection to Mr. Lewes' conclusion would be confined to this, that it is an *ignoratio elenchi*, and proves nothing; and the justice of such an objection would be so clear that argument would be unnecessary. But alas! this is not so. Mr. Lewes doubtless felt that if Consciousness is to be confined to "neural tremors" no conclusion with respect to it would touch the metaphysical question which he has promised to answer. For though in one curious passage (p. 151) he seems to think that it is possible to "exhibit how sentient phenomena may be explained by neural phenomena" by simply making "a new anatomy of the nervous system" in which particular attention is to be paid to "Vascular Irrigation" and "the calibre of the cerebral and carotid trunks," yet it can hardly be supposed that such an explanation was completely satisfactory to his mind. At any rate he is perpetually using a less elaborate and quicker method of passing from one to the other; a method which consists in introducing into arguments which deal merely with "neural tremors" considerations applicable only to Consciousness in its ordinary subjective sense; so that by a covert departure from his original definition he appears to have dealt with the metaphysical relation of Subject and Object. Consider the following passage, remembering Mr. Lewes' definition of Consciousness as "a group of neural units" or as "the mass of stationary waves formed out of the individual waves of neural tremors" (p. 150). "Neural processes which formerly were accompanied by Consciousness sink into Sub-Consciousness, and on occasion re-emerge into distinct light of day. But even in the sub-conscious stage they are always *sentient*. The practice, too frequent, of speaking of actions as *unconscious*, is more than a contradiction in terms." Unfelt feelings "are altogether inadmissible. On the other hand, to speak of Consciousness (meaning thereby a particular aspect) as the *substance* of Mind, the universal condition of psychical phenomena, is also misleading. What is universal is the neural process, which on the subjective side is the sentient process. Sentience may assume the form of Consciousness or the form of Sub-Consciousness" (p. 141); a passage which ends with the already quoted oracular utterance, of which the wisdom must surely be too deep for the words which attempt to convey it, that "Sentience is always sentient, as Vision is always visual." Or take again the following passage (p. 135), "What on the physiological side is simply a neural process, is on the psychological side a sentient process. We may liken Sentience to Combustion, and then the neural units will stand for the oscillating molecules. Sentience may manifest itself under the form of Consciousness, or under that of Sub-Consciousness—which may be compared to Combustion manifesting

itself in flame and in heat." Or again, "Cut off an animal's leg and stimulate the sciatic nerve, the leg will move, but no sensation will have been produced. Nor is this all. Unless the excitation is *assimilated* by the psychological medium it does not become *sentient*; and unless it becomes sentient it cannot become a sensation" (p. 131).

In the passages quoted above, and in countless others,\* Mr. Lewis speaks of "consciousness," "sentience," "subject," and so forth, in words which are inapplicable to "groups of neural tremors," but can only refer to the natural or metaphysical meaning of the words, and so while starting from nerves and medium (the only starting-point which Science allows him) he professes to arrive at the relation of Subject and Object. This then, forsooth, is the meaning of applying scientific data to metaphysical questions. It would be well if Mr. Lewes had borne in mind one of his own "rules of philosophizing"—namely, that "the validity of conclusions rests on the preservation of homogeneity in the terms and the identity of their ratios" (Rule X. p. 99). That he has forgotten it is the more surprising as he censures in others what he calls the "common fallacy" of "the unconscious substitution of new terms in place of the old" (p. 407),—a fallacy of which his own argument is a most forcible illustration.

Indeed it would seem that every now and then a vague suspicion does float in his mind that all is not right, for at times he throws out dim metaphysical phrases in the hope, as it would seem, that they may congeal and stiffen into some phantom bridge to span the gulf between the consciousness which consists in "neural tremors," and the real consciousness of the inner life. Such is the following:—that "the axioms of Logic and the axioms of Science, are the concave and convex aspects of the same curve" (p. 75, cf. p. 202); a relation which he afterwards (p. 76) somewhat flatteringly calls "intelligible," and repeats in another form as follows,—that "every mental phenomenon has its corresponding neural phenomenon (the two being as the convex and concave surfaces of the same sphere, distinguishable yet identical)" (p. 112). Such, too, is the expression that "the Object is the *other side* of the Subject" (p. 195); and that the external world is "*reflected* in Sentience" (p. 184). Surely never were such instances of what Mr. Lewes calls a phrase "doing duty for an explanation" (p. 152). Note too, that even the phrases (such as they are) though expressed in scientific language, do not even

---

\* See, for instance, p. 123 (where the psychoplasm is identified with experience), p. 126 (where he criticises the "introspection of consciousness"), pp. 133, 151, 202 (where phenomena are called "affections of consciousness with external signs"). The confusion between the two senses of consciousness cannot be better exemplified than on p. 249, where they occur in two consecutive lines.

profess to be based on scientific data, or to be arrived at by scientific method ; they are, in fact, nothing more than awkward expressions of a *metaphysical* guess.

So on this first point our augury is fulfilled. Mr. Lewes' promised explanation of the relation between Object and Subject turns out, as was expected, to be nothing more than an exposition of the physical dependence of nervous tremors on the surrounding medium, ingeniously expressed in language which conveys an entirely different meaning, and which can only be connected with the meaning arbitrarily assigned to it by assuming the metaphysical fact which is the whole question at issue.

Let us now turn to the second question, that of the nature of an External World. We have already said that the discussion of this is so mixed up by Mr. Lewes with that of the question which we have just considered, that it is almost impossible to disentangle from his words any connected thread of either. Nor is the reason of this far to seek. For seeing that Science can deal only with Phenomena, it is evident that all questions of which it is to treat must be reduced to phenomenal relations ; and therefore if it try to solve questions relating to other than Phenomena, this can only be done (even in appearance, not at all really) by expressing them in such phenomenal language as bears the closest analogy to them, and thus treating them as if they were phenomenal relations. This is equally necessary whether the non-phenomenal term of the relation be on the one side of Phenomena or on the other ; whether it be the conscious Subject or the extra-conscious Noumenon. And the connexion of nerve and medium having been dressed up to do duty for the former relation, will do just as well for the latter also, especially as it is an easy metaphor to describe Phenomena as lying halfway between Subject and Noumena, so that their relation to the one might seem to be merely the inversion of their relation to the other. However this may be, it remains certain that if the question of Realism and Idealism is to be passed off as capable of scientific treatment, it must be counterfeited by *some* phenomenal question ; and the phenomenal question which Mr. Lewes has chosen to counterfeit it, is, as in the case of Subject and Object, the relation of nerve to medium ; and by mixing up the three questions together in the way mentioned above, there is no doubt quite a sufficient degree of confusion introduced to mislead even the careful inquirer.

This identification of the question of nerve and medium with that of Realism and Idealism leads to very curious results ; more curious even than those which followed from its identification with the question of Subject and Object. For whereas Mr. Lewes is strictly speaking, by the mere fact of his denial of

Metempirics an Idealist ; and though whenever the question presents itself distinctly to his mind he enunciates Idealist doctrines, yet such a hold has the confusion referred to obtained over him that he is led to call himself a "Realist," and to propound a form of "Realism" peculiar to himself, which (with Herodotean rather than Socratic irony) he designates by the name of "Reasoned Realism." Let us first verify the former assertion that Mr. Lewes' real belief is that which ever since Berkeley has been called Idealism—namely, that the external world has no existence, so far as we know, apart from phenomena ; in other words, that its *esse* is *percipi*, or at most *sentiri*. "From subjective differences," he says (p. 191, cf. p. 192), "it has been concluded that there is an objective existence independent of all and *unlike* each ; I hold, on the contrary, that the objective existence *is* to each what it is felt to be." Again he says, "We conclude then that a thing *is* what it *appears*" (p. 361, cf. pp. 170, 178) ; and, going even a step further, "Speculation craves for a vision of the thing or event *in itself*, i.e. *unrelated* ; in other words, as it does not and cannot exist" (p. 362 : cf. too, the whole discussion as to the "extra-sensible" and "supra-sensible world," pp. 257—268). Never was Idealism more distinctly expressed.

We are far from saying that Mr. Lewes consistently maintains this view, even where he is confining himself strictly to this question. There are passages which seem to imply at least that modification of Idealism which asserts the possible or even actual extension of existence to relations to forms of consciousness other than our own ; and others which contain the *language* at least of crude Realism. As an instance of the latter, he says (p. 149, cf. pp. 186, 187), that "the sensation is fitly considered *real* because it has objective reality (*res*) for its antecedent stimulus." As an instance of the former, he asserts "the possibility of the external factor in perception having *another* existence in relation to *other* factors" (p. 193). And again he says, "I am far from implying that a supra-sensible does not exist. I only affirm that it does not exist *for us* as an object of positive knowledge, though forced upon us as a negative conception" (p. 252, cf. p. 192).

But, on the whole, it would seem that he would maintain that which a system which rejects inquiry into the "otherness" of things as metempirical and impossible (cf. pp. 18, 182) necessarily implies, namely, that the Noumenon or Thing in itself, whether it exist in other relations or not, does not exist as far as we are concerned. "All that we can know of the external," he says (p. 178), "is what we have felt or might feel," so that *to us* at least the Phenomenon is the Real, and "the object felt exists precisely *as* it is felt ; existing for us only in Feeling, its reality is what we feel" (p. 192). And this no one, except by a

complete inversion of terms, could call anything but Idealism; the Reasoned and Reasonable Idealism of Berkeley.

And yet Mr. Lewes calls himself a Realist, a "Reasoned Realist." What then is the meaning of this? Simply that he mistakes the question at issue. He represents it to himself as a question not between phenomena and noumena, but between phenomena and ideas, between sense and reason; in other words, he treats it as another aspect of the question between Subject and Object, Organism and Medium. Listen to his proclamation of the "doctrine of this work," "Reasoned Realism." "It is a doctrine," he says (p. 177), "which endeavours to rectify the natural illusion of Reason when Reason attempts to rectify the supposed illusion of Sense I call it Realism, because it affirms the reality of what is given in Feeling;" (mark that this is in opposition not to noumena, but to reason or ideas), and Reasoned Realism, because it justifies that affirmation through an investigation of the grounds and processes of Philosophy, when Philosophy explains the facts given in Feeling. The reality of an external existence, a Not-self, is a fact of Feeling, so indissolubly woven into Consciousness that the very terms in which Idealism seeks to disprove it are themselves derived from it." Now, so far is Idealism from seeking to disprove this, that it is the one fact which Idealism undertakes to prove; for it is the very point of difference between Idealism and Realism that the former maintains that the reality of an external world consists in feeling and in feeling alone, while the latter holds that it is something outside feeling altogether. The question as to the relation of feeling to reason is one which is not in dispute between them, and which neither of them is concerned to answer. Mr. Lewes says (p. 181) that "the original fact given to all is that of an external reality present in Feeling, the fact that a Not-self exists." No doubt; but such a Not-self is exactly the Not-self of Idealism, for it is Not-self as opposed, not to the self of Consciousness or Feeling (the correlative of the Not-self of Realism), but to the self of Reason only. We will quote but one more passage, and that will conclusively demonstrate what Mr. Lewes imagines to be the question by solution of what he calls himself a Reasoned Realist (p. 185).

"Between Realism and Idealism I should say that the question must be rendered more definite by a preliminary settlement as to whether we ask a question of Psychogeny or a question of Psychology. If it is the genesis of our modes of sentient reaction and their relation to the external which we consider, then the answer will take the realistic form; since Psychogeny, tracing the evolution of Sensibility in the organic world, must conclude that it is the external order which *determines* the internal order, by determining the organic structure of which Sensibility is the property: the evolution of perceptions,



instincts, volitions, conceptions, is through successive adaptations of the successively modified structure. But if the question be not one of genesis, if it assume the existence of the organized structure with its developed aptitudes, the answer will be a sort of compromise between the realistic and idealistic answers. Psychology accepting the developed organism as one of the factors in the fact of perception, estimates the influence of this co-operant, and concludes that since the organism necessarily reacts according to its modes, it may be said to colour objects, although this mode of reaction is itself a mode *originally* due to the action of objects."

And after some further discussion of the same kind he states his own position in the following terms, which have been already quoted, but are sufficiently striking to bear repetition: "I regard Perception as the assimilation of the Object by the Subject in the same way that Nutrition is the assimilation of the Medium by the Organism" (p. 189). Could there be a more complete justification of the statements which have been made above, that Mr. Lewes, while professing to deal with the metaphysical questions of the relation of Subject and Object, and of the nature of an external world, never even touches upon either of them, but deals instead with the totally different question of the relation of Organism to Medium, a question of neural tremors, and nutrition, and psychoplasm? The relation of Subject to Object is first mixed up with that of phenomena to noumena, and then both are identified with the relation of nerve to medium. Such is at once the result and the explanation of the promised application of scientific method to Metaphysics. We cannot wonder that metaphysical problems seemed to offer no difficulties to Mr. Lewes.

We have now tested Mr. Lewes' treatment of these two metaphysical questions, selected not only for their testing value but at his own suggestion, and we can have no hesitation in affirming that he has not advanced a single step towards the solution of either of them by the use of the method which he has proposed. We may add, that neither he nor any other writer will ever do so. The reason of this has been already implied, but as it is apparently so easily lost sight of, it may be well to restate it. It is this:—Science deals with phenomena, and its method is the comparison of phenomena *inter se*; Metaphysics, on the contrary, deals with the relations of phenomena as a whole to other genera of existence. (This is not indeed its whole sphere, but is the only part of it which is concerned with phenomena.) Hence it is impossible that either the results or the method of Science should lead to the discovery of any metaphysical truth; as impossible as it would be by the study of Optics to infer the relation of light to sound or electricity.

We must conclude, therefore, that metaphysical questions are beyond the range of scientific investigation. Does it follow that they are metempirical? Mr. Lewes would say that this is the only alternative; for, according to him, whatever does not admit of scientific treatment is metempirical and unknowable. But if by metempirical be meant what Mr. Lewes defines it to mean (p. 17), namely, "that which lies beyond the limits of experience" (whether actual or possible), then it is not true that the problems of Metaphysics are metempirical. Mr. Lewes' error lies in the supposition that the sphere of Science embraces the whole of experience: whereas, as has been already shown, it includes only one portion of it, the objective; while there is another portion, equally extensive, namely, the subjective, which lies altogether outside it. By this subjective experience is meant not any organ of intellectual intuition or faculty of grasping the supra-sensible, such as Mr. Lewes sets up (in order to knock down) as the only possible source of experience besides phenomena; but simply the succession of conscious states, of pains and pleasures, volitions and emotions, thoughts and memories, which form the personal or inner life of each individual, and which are to him quite as integral a portion of experience as the sensuous or phenomenal succession, which, though in a sense part of the same consciousness, yet by certain marks of independence he separates from the former succession, of which all the terms are apparently present in consciousness, and therefore subject to volitional control, and classes apart as a succession of which only certain scattered terms present themselves to him, and that according to laws which are only partially within his own control; and so projects as it were out of himself as an external world. It is with the latter alone that Science deals, and its mode of operation is that which its origin and subject matter imply, namely, by neglecting the accident of what particular terms are present in consciousness in each individual instance, and by varying the circumstances from time to time by means of observation and experiment, to eliminate consciousness from the result, and so, in Mr. Lewes' phraseology, to calculate known functions of an unknown quantity in terms of other known functions. In this way it can use data involving unknown and even irrational quantities, and yet arrive at an ultimate equation in which all the terms are both known and rational. But this being so, it is evidently quite extraneous to the function of Science to inquire into the nature of these unknown quantities themselves. The science of colour can never even give a blind man a sensation of sight, much less give him direct consciousness of the sight of others. Nor can the *method* of Science be of any avail in this subjective branch, except in so far as all methods of comparison

and registration of results must be identical. The method of Science is confined to the objective side, and the subjective has a method of its own; a method perhaps little understood and imperfectly developed, but which may for distinctness' sake be called the introspective method, because its materials are derived from introspection or reflection, and the general scope of which must be to eliminate external factors, and express the result in a form independent of the accidents of an external medium, just as Science eliminates the internal factors and gets rid of the accidents of the individual consciousness. Here then is a branch of experience entirely independent of Science; but even this is not the sphere of Metaphysics, it is that of Subjective Psychology. The sphere of Metaphysics lies still higher: it embraces the whole of experience; not the objective or the subjective division alone, but the *whole*: it therefore includes both Science and Subjective Psychology. Its method must therefore be not either the scientific or the introspective; it must be a method embracing both, and harmonizing both. Thus at last in a higher sense than that implied by Mr. Lewes, Metaphysics does indeed include "the highest generalizations of research." But it is not confined to the highest truths of Science, nor to the highest truths of the inner consciousness; it embraces all truth, all possible knowledge. So too, its method is not the "objective logic" of Mr. Lewes, nor the "subjective logic" of the introspective school, but the universal logic, the organization formula of the whole of human experience.

The object of the preceding remarks having been to disprove the claim advanced by Mr. Lewes on behalf of Science to control, and, in fact, abolish metaphysical research, it has been necessary to point out what appear to us to be the due bounds of each, and to claim for Metaphysics the right to the exclusive and undisturbed possession of its own territory. In doing so we may seem to have been speaking in the interests of Metaphysics, and some of our readers may wonder at our apparent conversion to a belief in the fruitfulness of metaphysical inquiry. In conclusion, therefore, we will repeat that our criticisms have been made purely in the interests of Science, and to prevent any misconception or misdirection which might retard its progress; and will add that we still retain the opinion which has been often previously expressed in this *Review*, that the field of Metaphysics, though held by a title not to be disputed, though possibly containing in its depths the elements of extraordinary future fertility, and though even now broad and level and well suited for an arena of athletes, is yet in the present stage of human development a barren and unprofitable soil. What may be the duty of future ages it does not concern us to speculate; *our* duty lies in the present, and a

religion which denies the supreme importance of the present, and would have men try to live in the future, should be shunned as one of the most dangerous, because one of the most seductive of delusions. *At present* it seems to us that Science offers the only field for intellectual toil which brings a sure and adequate return to labour, and that for that reason it is the duty of the present race of mankind to apply themselves to its cultivation with their utmost energy. So far as this involves the comparative neglect of Metaphysics we have been and are still advocates of such neglect; and it is exactly because we do not wish that neglect to be prematurely or injudiciously terminated that we protest against its being turned into aggression. Further than this, we have no ill-will to Metaphysics.

Towards Mr. Lewes and his earnestness in the cause of Science we have the most cordial goodwill, and it is in all sincerity that we address to him the following parting words of advice:—

“Heat not a furnace for your foe so hot  
That it do singe yourself. . . . Know you not  
The fire that mounts the liquor till't run o'er  
In seeming to augment it wastes it? Be advised.”

---

#### ART. VI.—THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN.

1. *Women's Need of Representation.* By Miss A. L. ROBERTSON, Dublin.
2. *Our Policy.* An Address to Women concerning the Suffrage. By FRANCES POWER COBBE.
3. *Ought Women to learn the Alphabet?* By T. W. HIGGINSON, New York and London.
4. *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.* A Reply to Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, &c. By LYDIA E. BECKER.

**W**HAT is the position of women in England at this day? It has, doubtless, risen with advancing civilization at war with old traditions; it has been improved by very slowly improving education; it is ornamented and disguised by masculine compliments; and it is surrounded, in drawing-rooms, by chivalrous homage, meaning thereby politeness, as well as by an abundance of outward comfort and luxuries. Yet—legally, and therefore, more or less, socially—it is merely a modification of ancient barbarism, ordered on barbarian principles,

mitigated in their working but still barbarian. The progress made in other directions, the changes other institutions have undergone, make this fact still more conspicuous, the position of women still more exceptional.

In the early ages of the human race advantage was taken of woman's physical weakness to make her literally a slave; she is now—in civilized nations, that is—merely in "subjection." In old times—and not such very old times either—she was reviled and despised for the defects fostered in her by slavery; she is now more gently branded by the law as an "inferior," in company with "criminals, lunatics, and idiots;" and complacently told by men—seriously, with the most complimentary intentions it may be, and with full conviction—that this legal inferiority, this positive subjection, implies and results in a social superiority, first formulated by "chivalry" (only women of the drawing-room class being recognised under this theory) and form, the safeguard of that higher moral excellence she is credited with along side of a lower mental capacity.

But this legal position of women does, we think, tell on herself and on society in general, in quite a different way, the unconscious, or half-conscious, efforts she has herself made hitherto, according to her more or less of education to resist these evil influences, producing, the while, the strangest incongruities. It has fostered grievous private and individual wrongs; and, worse still, it helps yet, as the principle on which it was founded has helped for ages, to lower the tone of that society it is supposed to benefit. Many thinking men and women, in continually increasing numbers, have begun to perceive this; and a good many others have been from time to time aware that there was something a little wrong in matters of detail—something here and there that might be amended. To these latter, and, we believe, to English legislators in general, it has always seemed easier to modify the evil workings of a vicious principle than to abolish it altogether. Such minds do not even seek to distinguish the authority of old-established prejudice from the sanction of nature and reason. It seems to them more natural to grant privileges than justice, indulgence than liberty. It has not occurred to them to ask themselves whether, after all, woman may not be allowed a voice, or at least the fraction of a voice, in the ordering of her own position in the world, of her own dearest interests and liberties.

It would be useless, most unjust, most unphilosophical, to bring a railing accusation against men on this account—especially unphilosophical because such, or such like, has been the course of action of all irresponsibly dominant classes since the world

began, until the eyes of both ruler and ruled have been at last opened to a sense of its injustice. And, further, it would be most ungrateful to those noble and generous minds amongst them whose hearty sympathy and active efforts to obtain justice for women—that is, in fact, justice to all society—deserve the most ample acknowledgment. It requires—and this is true of every one of us, man or woman—much imagination, much sympathy, much reflection in the first instance, to shake off the influence of ancient prejudice instilled into us from birth and inherited from ages. Many minds are wholly incapable of this effort. How many unconscious and even benevolent oppressors, throughout the long history of class and race-dominations, down to the modern slave-holder (for there have been kindhearted slave-holders, we doubt not), have been able to comprehend, or to how many has it even occurred, that traditional acquiescence on the part of the subjected does not necessarily constitute a natural or religious sanction; that a time may come when it is actually not enough to tell the subject-class that they have everything they want or ought to want, that they ought to be thankful to be taken care of, for they cannot take care of themselves, that they are by nature inferior? There comes a time when irresponsible power appears in a different light to those on whom it is exercised from that in which it is seen by those exercising it. It is long, indeed, before both parties become equally aware that *both* are injured by it; that justice, in such cases as these, “blesses both him that gives and him that takes,” much in the moment of giving, more in its after results.

This domination of one sex over the other—that is, of one half the mature human race over the other half—has lasted longer than most others, because the physical force is permanently on the side of the first. And this, indeed, is sometimes itself considered as a decisive reason why women should not plead right and justice: they cannot enforce them; therefore nature means that they should not have them any further than man finds it convenient to allow. But to refuse justice because it cannot be enforced is not in other relations of life reckoned the highest morality.

To many men, conscious in their hearts of nothing but kindness, indulgence, and generosity to the women they associate with; to many who see, or think they see, fairly happy marriages all round them; who see how often women “get their own way,” as it is called, by the good nature of their own particular rulers, by cajolery, by unconscionable teasing, by temper, by the obstinacy of their prejudices—those prejudices that men have fostered in women as “so feminine”—or even by superior good sense; to

those who have perceived that society, even as it is, can produce noble-minded women, and have possibly worshipped such in their hearts, or who ask for nothing better than to be allowed tenderly to protect some tender creature whom they love—to these it may seem exaggerated, unreal, and ridiculous to talk of the domination of men over women—at least in England and in most civilized countries. We think, with all deference to the feelings of such men, it is because the evils it has produced and is still producing are so deep-seated and complex, and extend so far beyond their own especial social surroundings, that they have escaped their notice; their very position of legal superiority, of which they are scarcely conscious, so habituated are they to it, having blinded their eyes.

And so are many, many women's eyes blinded; many who, happy in their own circumstances, have never dreamed, any more than their masters, of questioning the authority of old tradition; have never connected the vices of the society around them, or their own shortcomings, in any way, however indirect, with the position women hold in it. These will generally seem unconscious that their contentment with their own condition, their ignorance how far even it might be higher or more useful, do not necessarily constitute an argument for other women in other circumstances. They will perhaps protest, when female suffrage is spoken of, against women "stepping out of their right place." The question, however, is, what, after all, *is* woman's right place, the precise line beyond which it is profanation for her to step? Is it necessarily, precisely, and only the line pointed out by men—the point fixed by them in different ages, countries, and even classes, being different? Obediently as such women have adopted the traditional teaching of men, yet the question will arise, is it not just possible that men too have a little stepped out of *their* place in imposing these limits on women? It is allowed that they have done so, in more barbarous times, are they not doing so still?

Others again—multitudes—married and single, and of all classes, are conscious of something wrong in their own and others' lots, are pained by a vague uneasiness or suppressed bitterness, whilst without the culture needed to guide them clearly to *one* source of the evils,—we say *one*, for we are of course aware that the countless inequalities and iniquities growing up with a complicated civilization, and pressing so hardly even on many men, must have many sources. The evils however from which women suffer are especially aggravated by their legal position being essentially unchanged, whilst all things are changed around them.

In arguing for the principle of female citizenship, we must observe that the suffrage has no inherent magical or divine property in it to remove as by a charm all the evils of which we complain; yet, under our present institutions, the extension of it to women is the only way of expressing that principle, and is, we believe, an absolutely necessary balance to the increasing number of men now admitted. We are not, however, anxious to dwell much in this article on the directly political aspect of the question, nor yet on the terrible wrongs and miseries of women under its legal aspects, but rather to call the attention of candid minds to various social considerations deeply affected by their political and legal position. For all these, we maintain, are interdependent, acting and reacting on each other.

In carrying out this view, we may seem sometimes to be wandering rather far afield; but we hope that some few, both of men and women, will perceive that these apparent wanderings do in fact all lead up very directly to the point at which we are aiming.

Before going further in this direction, however, we will just notice the chief objections that have been raised to the emancipation of women, objections mostly of detail, raised by those who, unable to grasp a large general idea, instinctively fix their eyes successively on the supposed difficulties in carrying it out. Some of these objections—most of them, in fact—serve to display the curious ingenuity of the human mind in imagining hindrances to any alteration of an established order of things, the first feeling being always, not, how can we see our way to grant this? but, how shall we discover a sufficient number of objections to justify our refusal?

The objections in question have been answered over and over again; and it is a curious fact that in this discussion masculine opponents to the emancipation of women seem to have changed their traditional parts with women. Women urge a principle, men stumble at the details. Or they do acknowledge the principle, but decline to carry it to its legitimate results. Women ask for justice, men offer privileges: women advance reasons, men answer with their own feelings and instincts; women meet assertions with evidence in disproof, men re-assert them without attempting further proof.

Here, however, is the first, perhaps only, objection which really deserves attention, that the majority of women do not desire the suffrage.

We answer, that the minority which does desire it is a constantly increasing one (not adequately represented even by the increasing number of signatures to petitions). We must further point out



that a large portion of the majority, which does not desire it, has simply not been educated to think about it, and has passed a great part of life without the subject having been brought before it at all; whilst the minority, that does desire it, includes very many women of the highest intellect and cultivation, who have thought deeply on the subject, and many who, feeling for themselves and their neighbours the need of better protection than masculine legislation has hitherto allowed them, gladly welcome the faintest hope of emancipation. Next, as to those who desire the suffrage without signing petitions for it, few men can realize, without some effort of the imagination, the pressure put upon women in all cases where their views differ from those of the masculine public. There is, to begin with, their own tenderness for the prejudices of those with whom they live, not to say positive prohibition by fathers and husbands—such arbitrary interference with the independence of mature minds being so sanctioned by law and custom that it is hard, even for those who suffer from it, to resist it. Next, we must take into account that intense shrinking from masculine sarcasm and mockery which has been so carefully fostered in women that they have justly been said to “live under a gospel of ridicule.” And it is part of our argument that this moral coercion *has* been lavishly employed to supplement the legal subjection of women, much of their boasted acquiescence in what *we* consider a faulty state of things having been thus produced. Few can realize, we repeat, without some reflection, some sympathetic insight, how much silent revolt goes on in subjected classes before they openly rebel. In men this silent revolt is generally held to be dangerous, and worth inquiring into; in women, for obvious reasons, it is not. And with women it will be longest maintained, and with more corroding bitterness in proportion, in spite of the persuasions, half contemptuous, half flattering, which now, more frequently than before, alternate with sneers.

Others again—thinking and conscientious women—are still undecided to put their names to the movement, deterred by an overstrained sense of their responsibility; but these may at any moment conclude in its favour, and cannot be reckoned in the majority against it.

We are ready to allow that there are women—and doubtless even some thinking and cultivated ones amongst them—(oftenest, however, such as profess no knowledge and reason on the subject, only “instincts” and “feelings”) who deprecate female suffrage altogether; many more who are absolutely indifferent, and all of these are apt to conceive that their own individual dislike or indifference is argument enough against

extending the suffrage to those who *do* desire it, reason enough for withholding even their sympathy. Of all such women we would speak with respect and sympathy; yet may we not point out to them, and to the men who appeal to their authority, that it is scarcely reasonable that numbers of the thinking, the cultivated, the sensible, the practical, the suffering and oppressed amongst women, should be denied their desire in deference to the "feelings and instincts," the individual disinclination or indifference of the others? Many, too, of these others are precisely those whom the present bill for the female franchise would not affect personally. We hold, nevertheless, that even these, the indifferent—all in fact—would be directly or indirectly benefited in time by the change. Those who do not want the franchise need not exercise it—that is their own affair, as it is of men, who in like manner may decline to vote, though we hold that the choice ought to be given to them nevertheless. We doubt, however, whether these very female dissentients will not be glad, when the time comes, to use their own votes, after seeing how easily and quietly other women have used theirs before them. And what is more, we suspect the masculine objectors will be equally glad to profit by these votes.

Finally, the argument that women do not want the franchise and would be better without it, is in spirit the same as that by which slaveholders have always justified slavery. We do not hold that the negro's ignorance of the moral evils of his position was an argument for keeping him in it.

Of the other objections it may almost be said, that to state them is to refute them. First of these we will take men's "instincts and feelings." To us it does not seem more fair to decide the question of justice by the "instincts and feelings" of men than, as we have said, by the "instincts and feelings" of some women, as against the reason and practical needs of the others. And these "instincts and feelings" have been cited as authoritatively in sanction of restrictions which would *now* be thought barbarian, as of those still enforced and not yet thought barbarian.

Again, it is said that women are unfit for the vote, because they are women. It is true that the training enforced upon women, directly and indirectly, for ages, by men, whereby their characters and minds are in some sort the artificial creation of men, has seemingly had for its object to make them unfit for the powers men exercise. Women have, in consequence, for ages made no combined effort for emancipation; but exactly as they become aware of the real nature of this traditional training, does this supposed unfitness lessen, and the best way at this moment

completely to fit them to exercise those powers is to grant them.

What mental or moral "fitness" is sought for as a qualification for the masculine voter, except by that rough sort of classification which does not exclude the drunkard, the wife-beater, the illiterate, the liberated convict, and the semi-idiot? And when you place beside these Harriet Martineau, Florence Nightingale, George Eliot, and many more whose names we all know, as well as the numbers of women who show every kind of practical fitness in common life—to say that *these* are unfit because they are women, and *those* are fit because they are men, is very like begging the question.

But there are special unfitnesses urged against women. We cannot condescend to dwell on the argument that they are incapable of giving their vote for want of physical strength, or that the chronic state of "blushing and fear" prescribed for them by Mr. Bouverie would make it improper and impossible for even a middle-aged woman to face the bustle of polling-places, otherwise than by observing that if it were wished to grant women votes, means might easily be found for making it possible to deliver them. But we will mention one other (we think the only special) unfitness alleged against them (except indeed their want of training in political and official life, which they share with a large number of franchise-holding men). This special unfitness resides in their greater "impulsiveness," "excitability," and "sympathy," which are supposed to include and imply "unreasonableness" and "injustice." Till, however, it is argued that Ireland, for example, is naturally disqualified for the suffrage because the Celt is more "excitable," "impulsive," and "sympathetic" than the Saxon—or indeed till, as we must repeat, moral or intellectual qualifications are made a *sine quâ non* in any class of masculine voters whatever, this objection can hardly stand. We will, therefore, only suggest that the co-operation of impulse and sympathy with the more solid and matter-of-fact element in legislation may not be wholly without its political advantages.\*

Next, it has been alleged that already too many *men* have the suffrage, as a reason for withholding it from women. Even

---

\* It has been argued that the supposed excitability of women will drive them downright mad, if they are allowed to vote. Mrs. Anderson has met this droll suggestion by affirming, from her own professional experience, the good effect, more interesting occupations, more important objects in life have on women's health, bodily and mental. If a woman finds her interest in politics bringing her to the brink of insanity, she will perhaps, under proper medical advice, be able to refrain; but that is her own affair. We do not legislate to prevent *men* from going mad if they choose.

granting the fact, it is not just to say that, because A has had too much given him of a good thing, therefore B shall have none at all, especially when B even requires it as a protection against A. At all events, the extended suffrage has been granted, and cannot now be withdrawn—one reason the more, as we have implied, why women should desire it in their turn, since they now see the drunkard, the wife-beater, the illiterate called, in much larger numbers than before, to legislate indirectly for their dearest and the most delicate domestic concerns, those alike of the most refined and cultivated as of the most helpless and uneducated of their sex.

Here, naturally, comes the assertion, that “women are virtually represented by men.” Indeed, on every proposed extension of political rights, it has been usual for the classes who thought their interests opposed to it to urge that *they* virtually represented the others. This assertion is disproved by the whole course of class legislation in all ages and everywhere; and the harshness of masculine legislation for women certainly forms no exception to the rule.\*

If we are reminded that some classes of men are still unrepresented, we answer (putting aside the probably near approach of household suffrage), that *all* women of *all* classes are unrepresented, are all declared to labour under an irremediable birth-disqualification. Individual *men* of the unenfranchised classes can rise to acquire a vote: a woman never can. And women only ask for the vote on the same conditions as those on which it is conferred upon men.

Let us consider here the confessed difficulty of protecting wives in certain classes against the violence of their husbands, as bearing on the plea of “virtual representation.” We would not brand any class of our countrymen with hard names, least of all those who have so long suffered, in common with women, such grievous legislative wrongs, such cruel deprivation of education, and are even now struggling to emancipate themselves, scarcely conscious yet that the women’s cause rests on the same ground as theirs. But it is too sadly notorious to be denied that, in these working and labouring classes, public opinion and the growth of education have not yet banished drunken habits and consequent brutality, and that the difficulties in the way of adequate legal interposition are almost insuperable. Compare the penalties inflicted in these cases with those

---

\* Take, as one instance, the laws of the custody and guardianship of children, whereby the married (only the *married*) mothers, they whose sex’s special and highest function is said to be the maternal, are denied any legal right over their own offspring past the first few years of infancy, as against the will of the father, whatever or whoever he may be, living or dead.

in which a wife has assaulted a husband, or one man another man. *Here* there is no difficulty in carrying out the full severity of the law. We do not assert that those who administer it do not *wish* to enforce it in behalf of women, though judges and juries do sometimes give us cause to suspect them of considering an assault by the inferior on the superior, by the weaker on the stronger, as more heinous than one with the conditions reversed.

The wife is, in these classes, so helplessly in her husband's power, so trained to feel the violence of her master as a part of his conjugal superiority, that she very often dares not, perhaps actually does not, resent his brutality. It seems to us that at least one approach towards remedying this state of things would be to surround her social status with every equal right and dignity the law can give her. Law should not aim at rendering her *more* helpless, *more* dependent than inferior strength would naturally make her. The same barbarian prejudice which excludes all women from every political right also subjects the wife to a law which has been called "the most barbarous in Europe." It has naturally taken its full effect on the uneducated classes, that is, it has degraded both man and woman together. That almost superstitious, dog-like patience and loyalty which lead a wife to submit to a beating without complaint, and which some men tenderly praise as the *ne plus ultra* of wife-like excellence, might, we think, be exchanged for a nobler form of devotion by making her her husband's legal and social equal; and one indirect step towards this will be giving women some share in making the laws which concern themselves.\*

A favourite objection is, that the exercise of the suffrage will interfere with women's duties. It cannot be seriously meant by this that the taking up of a few hours every few years in delivering a vote will hinder a woman—even the most hard-working—in her daily duties more than it would a hard-working man. Indeed, in the present case, it is only asked for unmarried women and widows, many of them possessed of ample leisure and sufficient means. But is it meant that the possession of this franchise would so much more excite and unsettle their minds, and throw them so much more violently into political agitation in the quiet intervening years, than men, as to unfit them for those duties which we are assured it is their nature to perform, and which they find their chief happiness in? This argument rests on the following assumptions:—That it is the business of the legislature to provide more rigorously for the performance of women's private duties than men's; that their

---

\* This is the more needful since legislation for women, whether so called protective or other, is more and more taking the shape of restrictions on their personal liberty.

good sense and conscience will be found less trustworthy in proportion as they have liberty to exercise them ; that whilst we legislate to prevent the race in general from following blindly their natural instincts, we must also legislate to prevent women from *forsaking* theirs at the first opportunity ; and, finally, that women (unlike men) have no rights, only duties. Assuredly to a noble soul the word "duties" has a higher inspiration than the word "rights;" only some of the highest duties cannot be so well performed without rights. The circle of a slave's duties is very small, and that of a woman's—though she is no longer in England a slave—has been restricted to a point that future generations will view with wonder.

Again, some who do not so much object to the admission (taken by itself) of the unmarried possessing the legal qualifications, cannot see their way to the admission of wives, and consider that objection conclusive against the admission of any, as this would be granting privileges to the recognised "failures" of society while they are withheld from their recognised superiors. We can but say, that if to grant the suffrage be an act of justice, you ought not to refuse it to some because you cannot yet see your way to extending it to all. This theory of the inferiority of women in general to men, and the special inferiority to be enforced by legal subjection on the married amongst them, who are yet declared to be the superiors of the single, involves some curious contradictions.

Further, these objectors will add that if you grant the suffrage to the single having the proper qualification, wives will by-and-by demand it as well, either by a change in the qualification for a vote, or in the marriage law. We answer, let that question be discussed when the time comes. It is neither just nor generous to refuse a rightful concession for fear other concessions may be asked for. Meanwhile the supposed moral difficulty of granting the suffrage to wives still rests mainly on the old assumption that women only wait the opportunity to discard their natural duties and affections ; that men can be safely trusted with absolute authority over their families, but women not even with the exercise of an independent opinion ; that wives at present neither have, nor in fact ought to have, any difference of opinion from their husbands (except on trivial points), but certainly would, if they were once permitted to act on their opinions ; and that they will necessarily seize the vote as an occasion for quarrel ; also on the assumption that it is the business of the State to provide against these little domestic difficulties in married life (but only, of course, by laying restrictions on the wife). We can scarcely suppose, however, that any man blessed with an affectionate wife seriously anticipates

that, once possessed of a vote, she would make it her business to thwart and oppose him. If his wife is not an affectionate one, we fear the legislature cannot help him, and we are very sure it is not its business to do so. We think this fancied difficulty would be best met in the case of a wife not quarrelsome disposed, but having an independent mind, by her husband's good humouredly reconciling himself to her possible difference of opinion in politics as he often has to do in matters of theology. But if such differences of opinion do so seriously affect the happiness of married life, let them be more carefully considered before marriage.

There is also the contradictory assumption that the wife's vote will be merely a double of her husband's, thus giving him two votes instead of one. Between these last two assumptions of perverse opposition on the one hand, and undue submission on the other, we may fairly strike a balance, and hope the State will fare none the worse in the end for the female married vote, should it be granted.

To be serious, we do not believe the harmony and dignity of married life—not even the dignity of the husband—can be best promoted by legislation to prevent quarrels; or by the theory that, as has been said, husband and wife are one, that the husband is *the* one, and that the two ought to have only one opinion in politics between them—viz., the husband's. If we are accused of overlooking the practical difficulties which might arise in adjusting the votes of husband and wife, we answer that we may leave these to the moment when it is actually proposed to extend the franchise so far: if the principle is once conceded, a way will be found of carrying it out; for the rest, husbands and expectant husbands may defend their rights hereafter when they are attacked.

Having said thus much, we must add our own distinct opinion that the sooner this notion of marriage in any way disqualifying women for the exercise of personal rights or responsibility to the State is got rid of, the better for all parties. And we believe, moreover, that, when once the vote is granted to single women, married men will themselves begin to perceive this, and will desire that liberty for their wives which has been attained to by others.\*

The same answer will apply to the objection that women, when once admitted to the vote, will (logically) be eligible to a seat in Parliament. We think we may confidently leave this question also to be decided on its own merits by some future generation, and by the constituencies concerned.

---

\* This part of the question has since been further complicated by the needless insertion in Mr. Forsyth's bill of a statutory disqualification of wives.

Lastly, there is the objection—the most formidable of all to some minds—that all female aspirants to the suffrage are “strong-minded women,” and that “strong-minded women are very disagreeable.” If by “strong-minded women,” is meant women of masculine character and idiosyncrasies, we believe as many of these might be found on one side as on the other, if it were worth while to inquire. If “strong-minded” means having a highly enlightened understanding, large ideas, and an ardent desire for the improvement of other women, we may suggest that these objectors would often be surprised to find how very charming such persons can make themselves. We dare say that the agitators for the abolition of slavery made themselves very disagreeable when urging their engrossing topic in season and out of season. People engaged in a great struggle will not always pause to consult the conventional rules of good taste, yet the cause may be a good one nevertheless. But we cannot gravely discuss this objection any further.

And now come two more serious reproaches addressed to women. “They have done so much mischief.” “They are agitating from a love of power.”

The accusation of “doing mischief” means, we imagine, only that women are not infallible in their judgment, any more than men (why is a human liability to mistake *more* disqualifying to women than to men?), or that there are points on which the objectors differ from some women, or that there always will be points on which some men will differ from some women, it being assumed, of course, that women will always be in the wrong. If the objectors mean that women, having power given them by the legislature to do mischief, will do a great deal more than men in the same position have ever done, that is in fact begging the whole question. No past experience can be appealed to as decisive, since women have never been placed in the position supposed; although the absolute denial of all direct legitimate exercise of power sometimes drives intense and ardent natures into exercising it by methods less wholesome than a recognised responsibility would employ. But even granting this—alas! have men never done mischief, terrible mischief, during the long ages of masculine domination? Take, as one instance, the legislation for Ireland up to this century, and more recent times still; could any female legislation be more blind, unjust, inhuman, and—mischievous?

Is the world, as governed by men, a thing even now to congratulate ourselves upon? and may not women think that even a slight co-operation of their own with the other sex in the councils of the nation—we are not now speaking of admission to Parliament—might have prevented, might still prevent, some of this mischief?



The reproach that "women are agitating from love of power," does not come with quite a good grace from that sex which has hitherto monopolized all power, exercised, as we think, with such grievous injustice to the other. But, in fact, the reproach is undeserved. Those who make it show such a misunderstanding of the deeply conscientious feelings and convictions on which this new movement is founded, as almost disqualifies them from discussing this question with us at all. Power to protect themselves from injustice women may be allowed to desire. But a still stronger motive is the belief that the welfare of society requires a different position for their whole sex.

Finally, recurring from all these details to the broad principle with which we started, that justice to woman is morally the same as justice to man, we will only add, let this be acknowledged in the full meaning of the word, and all these ingeniously devised objections founded on woman's assumed inferiority to man fall at once to the ground. In the original fallacy, other false principles are involved, as that absolute perfection, moral and mental, is more needful in female than in male electors, and that to guard against possible inconvenience to men is a more pressing obligation than to remove an actual wrong to women.

We now come to those selfish inducements held out to woman herself to acquiesce in her present subjection, first glancing, however, at the half-triumphant warning that, with the privileges of citizenship, she must accept its burdens. That special burden which, we believe, the true Briton regards as the weightiest, that of taxation, she bears already, without the very privilege attached to it by divine right, as understood in Britain—to wit, the electoral franchise. This, though a flagrant departure from a cherished principle, we do not complain of as her hardest practical grievance; because in this case men, in fighting their own battle, must necessarily also fight that of women, and in some sort, therefore, do really represent them.

We must also advert to that appeal to women themselves on which men seem most triumphantly to rely. They say, that, if they are obliged to grant women equal social and legislative rights, *i.e.*, justice, they will no longer receive from men that so-called "chivalrous homage" which they regard apparently as sufficient compensation for every disadvantage and every humiliation attending the whole sex, in and out of drawing-rooms, and which they think women cannot reasonably look for except as a tribute to their legal inferiority and helplessness—that, in short, every virtue of which we can imagine woman possessed, every gift of grace, beauty, and intelligence, joined, too, as they must *still* inevitably be, to inferiority of physical strength, will fail to secure for her man's respect and tenderness, unless she will accept him as her master and irresponsible political ruler. How

is this? Is the spirit of "chivalry" a spirit of bargain? and a very one-sided bargain? Or, putting aside the idea of deliberate bargain, is this a faithful picture of man's nature—at least of Englishmen's, which is our chief present concern? Is it contrary to his nature, for instance, to yield kindly aid to inferior strength unless it will meekly confess to mental inferiority and will promise obedience? Is it contrary to his nature to be just and generous at the same time? We believe that men do themselves injustice in affirming this.

As for those outward symbols of "chivalrous homage" with which we are all familiar in drawing-rooms and such-like scenes, it is certainly, at first sight, hard to connect the forfeiture of these with the elevation of some women, or all women, to citizenship. But though it might be quite possible to do without these little privileges for so great an object, yet, truth to speak, the force of custom in regard to social etiquettes, even those generally felt to be burdensome and absurd, is so great that probably such harmless ones as these will long survive. We incline to think it will be long before all gentlemen remember to press out of drawing-rooms before their lady-acquaintances, to help themselves first at table, to stand by whilst the objects of their former homage step out of their carriages, or into boats, without offering a hand, or in railway travel to remember not to be charmed by the looks or conversation of a lady fellow-passenger till they have satisfied themselves that she has not a vote. Seriously, we incline to think that men will observe all this innocent little ceremonial—which is partly a civilized regulation to secure orderliness in social intercourse, partly an assumption of a difference in physical strength, which, false or true, will not be affected by the possession of a vote—till women forfeit men's respect by forfeiting their own, a result not certain to follow from their acquiring a sense of higher responsibility to the State. These things will last probably till all society is placed on a different, perhaps simpler and nobler footing, by other concurrent changes in civilization and education still far distant. But what is best in our social humanity need never disappear—mutual courtesy, kindness, such consideration between the sexes, and such help and sympathy from each to each, as are surely no more to be grudged from men to women, in any case, than from the younger and stronger man to the old, and infirm, and respected of his own sex, however his equal in political rights and political intelligence.

On the other hand, there is surely something more real, more trustworthy in manly heroism, manly devotion to duty, than even in that "chivalrous homage" so admired as the most perfect compensation for female subjection, the most satisfactory modification possible of barbaric female slavery, and which generally

expects in return some natural little gratification to its own self-love or vanity. We are not going to quarrel with it for thus seeking its reward—only it must not boast itself too much. We may be sure, too, that the spectacle of any brave, honest work, whether of the hand or the brain, done for love or duty, kindles the heart and imagination of the true woman, and exalts her respect for her partner, far more than that other spectacle of man making or upholding laws to secure to himself his wife's obedience, the possession of her property, and his own undivided control over his and her children, far more than his assurance that he classes her politically with idiots, lunatics, and criminals, in order to increase his own respect for her, and because she likes it—or, at least, ought to do so.

If these "chivalrous" opponents have the faith they profess in woman's native grace and refinement; if they do not believe these qualities to be entirely the creation of certain artificial restrictions on her liberty of action, which no education of thought and reason can supply the place of; if they do not believe she is dignified and refined solely by accessories and surroundings, having *within herself* under no circumstances the power to dignify and refine *them*; if they do not hold this strangely "unchivalrous" and dishonouring doctrine of woman's nature, then how is it that they suppose all these precious attributes can be got rid of so very easily? They can scarcely believe she will lose them by learning to take an interest in the concerns of her country, and to express that interest every few years by a conscientious vote, in the delivering of which she may be as well protected as in witnessing the procession of a royal bride, a race, a play, or an opera. If there should appear, in any woman's ardour on these subjects, anything ungraceful or exaggerated, there is probably some such defect in her natural organization manifesting itself alike in all her doings. On the whole, a woman will be in politics pretty much what she is—by her natural temperament—in all other spheres. If she is uneducated, and therefore irrational, she will be violent and personally prejudiced in politics, even as Captain Basil Hall relates of the usually elegant and agreeable Spanish ladies of South America—that they became perfect furies when they talked of the revolt of the native population, not because they had political rights, but because that in politics they had personal passions.

But in fact such objectors, however "chivalrous," however kind-hearted—as many of them truly are—*have no faith* in woman, no faith in the goddess they worship with flattery, incense and gay pageantry; and it would be well if they would frankly confess this. Then we should know exactly where to

meet them. In the meanwhile, till man can acquire this faith, this generous trust, society will make small moral progress—and need we remind the shallowest student of human nature that to make human beings trustworthy, you must take courage to trust them?

That women's tender interest in those they love would be deadened by these enlarged views of political and social life, that they would thus grow somehow more selfish and less useful to men in consequence, is a prejudice such as has been held to justify even harsher restrictions, and one we think unworthy to influence for a moment a generous mind. That the blind idolatry with which they have often injured, sometimes ruined, their idols, will be exchanged for a feeling more elevated and elevating, is very likely; but we need not regret *this* transformation.

There is a refined and tender side, as we shall again and again admit, to these remonstrances. The ideal of graceful, clinging weakness, the "smiling domestic goddess"-ship (divorced indeed both from intellect and good sense), so admired by Thackeray, the sacred pedestal-worship of poetic theories, have such a charm for some manly imaginations, that the suggested introduction of some newer type is as terrifying to them as the threat of a new railway or row of houses to the inhabitants of a rural paradise. We predict, however, that amongst the many varieties of the female type we hope to see developed, whatever is really good and beautiful in their own favourite one is likely still to "abound;" what is not so good and beautiful will be less easily rooted out than we could wish, and many a "fair defect" will long remain to rejoice their hearts and fancies. Such will be as the childish element in the race, and, as such, worthy of all indulgence and tenderness.

But we must also remind the "chivalrous" that their ideal is, and always has been, the monopoly of a small privileged class. For "chivalrous homage" has nothing to say to the poor, hard-working wives and mothers outside that, nor to the thousands of courageous single women who are too strenuously fighting the battle of life—often for others as well as for themselves—to have time to cultivate graceful clingingness, or to stand on pedestals. It would be hard, truly, to withhold citizenship, and whatever dignity and support it may confer, from these "lonely, unadmired heroines," for the sake of keeping up a special feminine ideal as the monopoly of a special class.\*

We see, indeed, where this long subjection of women, most

---

\* The number of women supporting themselves by manual labour, alone, is stated at three millions.

favourably exhibited in the placing of some of them on a fancied pinnacle, has landed us at last. It finds us confronted by a glaring discrepancy between profession and performance, which must make the very word "chivalry," if they even heard it, seem a cruel mockery to the rest.

Some theorists, we know, will say, "True, all is not right as it now is; but there is a remedy. She is now *too* independent, she has got *one* hand free; bind *both* again, bind her hand and foot—put her more completely in men's power; but educate men and women better, so that man may be less likely to abuse his power, and woman may know her proper place; protect her exactly as you would a child, by stringent legislation, leaving her no discretion, no option, and then trust the rest to man's generosity, and the perfect dignity this perfect subjection and perfect powerlessness will give her." But women have a right to a voice before this theory of a dominant sex can be forced on them.

Moreover, let us remind the upholders *par excellence* of "feminine delicacy and refinement" how very different are and have been the ideas attached to these words in other ages and other countries, and maintained with obstinate persistence, and confidence that they rest on the immutable sanction of nature and religion. Ask the respectable Turkish father of a family what will happen to society when the harem doors are unlocked, and the women allowed to go forth unveiled—nay, ask the respectable Turk's ladylike wife and daughter—and their answer will be the same. Go back to the days, not so very long ago, when in all countries, Christian and pagan, a woman was married without her consent being asked; when worthy fathers of families would have been shocked at the indelicacy of a girl presuming to have a choice, or even a veto on her parents' choice. Nay, when the bold idea was first started of teaching women to read, "Fancy," can we not see it said in some popular journal of those mythical days? "fancy a woman forsaking the spindle and frying-pan, her own peculiar science, to plunge into the unfeminine mysteries of the alphabet!" Not to mention some *very* civilized European countries where, even in the present day, if a girl (of the drawing-room class, we mean) were known to have once walked out in town unattended, it would destroy her chance of marriage, and where it is with difficulty believed that such liberty in England is not abused.

Why, then, is it so certain that we here, in England and now, have reached that exact point of feminine freedom beyond which we cannot go without contradicting nature—that exact type of refinement which admits of no further modification?

Let us remember that with every fresh instalment of liberty and independence granted to women by advancing civilization, every step forward from her primitive condition of slavery to her present position of legal subjection, she has received not less, but more, kindness and respect from men, and the masculine ideal has not ruinously suffered thereby. Women have attained to far more self-reliance and liberty of movement in the United States of America than in England; but no one has asserted that they are as a consequence of less importance to men, or treated with less deference. To say that their manners are not to the taste of those Englishmen who know them only by hearsay is beside the argument, nor is this distaste generally shared by Englishmen who know them by personal acquaintance.

Why, then, should we fear that one step further in the same path of independence would do all that the others have failed to do—at once revolutionize all the natural relations of the sexes, and transform, as we are so often told, women into men?

The truth is, social circumstances in all civilized communities, and notably in this, have outgrown the old theory of women's proper place in the world. The increased difficulty of living, felt in all classes, the 800,000 women in excess of men, the exclusion of women from all but one or two modes of gaining a precarious livelihood, the increased importance of education with so small an increase of the facilities offered to women, making it impossible for them to cope with men in the struggle for actual existence, and all these causes rendering marriage for women at once more necessary and too often more impossible, such realities have reduced to a mere figment the theory of universal protection, dependence, and homage.

The men of the past did what seemed the best in those days; the men of the present are not to blame for the altered conditions which have made it the worst. But they will be to blame if they persist in upholding it and in regarding attempted reforms as attempts to "remove the landmarks of society;" if, in a word, they endeavour to force the life of successive generations of women into the old Chinese shoe of subjection and restraint, fancying that if they just make it a little easier, all will be right. The shoe must be made to fit perfectly, and women themselves must decide whether it does so.

And now comes the question of the influence actually exercised by women, in the cultivated and comfortable classes that is, for no other female influence over men is generally spoken of as of any importance. Gentlemen, when they speak of women, mean "ladies." And as "ladies" are the wives, mothers, and sisters of the class which at present governs us, their influence *is* important,

fearfully important; though this is no reason for casting aside so much as, in common parlance, we are too wont to do, the interests of women in the sphere beneath that recognised by "chivalry," and the influence which they too *ought* to be able to exercise.

But let us see what this influence of "ladies" is. We are told that it is very great, and those who say so are apt to go further, and fling all responsibility for social vices on the women of society. Let women humbly acknowledge to themselves their own shortcomings; they could not do much, but some of them, perhaps, might have done more. Capable, it may be, of better things, too many have been led ignobly astray by vanity and frivolity, too many by precept and example have done harm where they might have done good, thus rendering back to man the ill that the long domination of masculine ideas has wrought upon them. But while it is safe to be severe on themselves individually, it is not so safe to be blind to the faults of the social system under which they live. The fact remains that the influence of women is very small, compared with what it is said to be, and might be, if men so willed it. No influence worth naming such can be exercised but by an independent mind, and such independence is made tenfold more difficult to women at the present day, not only by men's prejudices, but by the difficulty of marriage resulting from the conditions before alluded to. This, an evil over which neither men nor women have any immediate control, is no doubt in great part the secret of the humble attitude which women are apt to take towards men, and the triumphant scorn of the sex so frequently displayed by popular journals.

This dependence acknowledged, for men to lay the blame of their own weaknesses on their so-called "weaker" sisters, to seek to silence their remonstrances by assuring them that *they* are the guilty party, or at least equally guilty with their masters, of those social corruptions we all cannot but see around us, is an unconscious baseness which even good men sometimes fall into when judging of the other sex.

In order that woman may really exercise that wholesome and purifying influence ascribed to her as her natural attribute, she should herself be left free and unbiassed by fear or favour. If she is to inspire men with a refinement and morality a little deeper than drawing-room decorum, she must not herself have first to learn by rote from him the lesson she is to teach him again; she must not be cheated into taking all the rules of life unquestioning on man's traditional authority, and mistaking the dread of his reproach and ridicule for the voice of innate womanly conscience. She must not be coaxed, from earliest girlhood, by ball-room admirers, and even the gravest philosophers,

into preferring her own (so-called) "feminine instincts," that is, prejudices, to the dictates of reason, sense, and duty, to find in later life "feminine unreasonableness" a bye-word in men's mouths, to find herself exposed to the good humoured contempt of the placid husband and the scolding of the irritable one, and to hear—no longer as the delighted tribute to youthful charms, but as a grave disqualification—that women have "no sense of justice." She must not be taught that narrow views of religion are especially becoming to women, and the only safeguard to their virtue in the eyes of the laxer sex. She must not, as the mother of a family, have always that warning voice in her ear that "men hate learned women," or that "men don't want intellect in their wives" (which indeed is not so surprising in those who themselves have neither intellect nor learning) till her very schoolboy sons catch up the cry. She must not be brought up utterly to ignore all great social and national interests, all enlightened views of politics; she must not be taught that the one great object of woman's life is marriage, and, to obtain it, pleasing men, when every day the social obstacles in the way of marriage are increasing; and, above all, she must not be forced or hoodwinked into accepting from masculine dictation two distinct moral codes—one for men and the other for women.

Where these teachings have not been perfectly enforced, as of course will often be the case, either from partial enlightenment in the teacher or instinctive revolt in the taught, they will be found to have caused in simple and noble minds more mental and moral suffering than actual moral deterioration. But what society has lost, still loses, by the waste of such good material, it has not yet attempted to reckon up. A movement has now been set on foot and is slowly gaining strength to repudiate these teachings, which have, as we have said, found rebels scattered here and there at all times; yet while legislation, man's legislation for woman, still represents the ideas embodied in them, still ignores the incongruity between the theory and the facts of woman's position in the world, so long will it be, not the elevating and purifying influence of women upon men (the theory of "chivalrous" moralists), but the depressing and deteriorating influence of man upon woman, that regulates society. Let men, even philosophers, repeat as they will that "women have everything in their own power, that it is their own fault if men are not better than they are," we affirm that the more we look below the surface, the more we shall be convinced that whilst man remains the irresponsible legislator for women, these things will be as we have said.

The social phenomena developed by man's domination in women's education, ideas and character, are so numerous and



complex as almost to defy classification. We are far from classing the women, even of the sphere which we have taken for our text, "all in one," but this seems evident, that the general result has been a most disheartening mediocrity. We have hopes, it is true, that the efforts now being made by those social benefactresses, who are so earnestly fighting the educational battle for their sisters, powerfully aided by like-minded and generous men, will greatly mitigate this state of things for a fortunate part of the younger generation. But, for the present, though "the softening influence of domestic life," "the purity of English homes" are pretty phrases, yet, all the same, men and women are doing their best to degrade each other to a pitiful mediocrity. Not all the prettiness of blooming girlhood (and a pretty English girl *is* a charming object, whether one is in a moralizing mood or not), not all the brightness, activity and kind-heartedness of narrowly-educated women, however "clever" they may be, can hide this sad truth from our eyes.

Let us begin—working upwards from seeming trifles—with one time-honoured social institution, through which the wholesome and refining influence of one sex over the other is supposed to make itself felt. We tremble as we approach this sacred field, and find ourselves compelled in sober sadness to drop disrespectful words on the privileged flirtations of the young. We would not be severe either on those who encourage or those who practise this favourite diversion. Yet, after all, in spite of the glamour thrown by youthful excitement and inexperience, by the regretful and sympathetic retrospect of age, and by the imagination of poets and painters over the ball, the croquet, the picnic, and all the other playgrounds of "society," it must be owned that the prospect is not encouraging to our hopes of the young. The "flirtation" which reigns here between the two sexes, encouraged by all social customs, provided for at the cost of time, money, health and mental improvement, has in it mischief which lies deeper than at first appears. It is more than "matter for a flying smile." Many will agree with us so far, but will strenuously resist the application of radical remedies to the whole position of society. Palliatives, not prevention, not cure, have ever been the favourite study of English philanthropy.

It is at this point of transitory, counterfeit courtship (in itself damaging to the freshness of youthful affections) that we first trace the effect of that low standard of excellence required from women. Man in general requires little from the woman he loves, still less from the woman he flirts with: we all know that a pretty face, a pretty dress and a few "womanly" coquetries generally suffice for him in either case, and he takes his chance of finding other qualities behind these when it is too late to

make a fresh choice ; while woman, dwarfed to meet these small requirements, requires little from him in return. And so the taste is formed, so marriages are made, and so society and the race are deteriorated.

The last thing we would wish to disparage is the natural, light-hearted, innocent enjoyment of each other's society, in the young of the two sexes. We wish it were far more easily come by and begun earlier too, and were freed from that uneasy self-consciousness which is so often and so needlessly substituted for the frank courage of innocence. From that morbidly-watchful egotism which, under the name of "propriety," used to be so much enjoined, and which would be ill exchanged for the "fastness" of which, in certain circles, one hears so much, we turn with relief to that artless enjoyment of life and society which characterizes unspoiled girlhood, accompanied by a really strong interest in some pursuit. It finds its salvation in those genuine tastes which carry us out of ourselves (not necessarily "learned" or "intellectual")—it may be gardening, or music, or painting, or some kindred art—only, for Heaven's sake, let it be *real*, let it be good of its kind, let it be honestly followed ; and the more of such the better.

On such common ground of genuine tastes and pursuits, young men and women may healthfully meet each other, and prepare for the closer partnership and co-operation of after-life ; and much, very much, we trust, will this common ground be enlarged by wider education. But what has this happy, true-hearted sympathy, which we long to see prevail everywhere, purged more and more from vanity and *arrière-pensée*, to do with the artificial sentimentalities, the unmeaning personalities, and empty rattle of flirtation, either between two equally trifling beings, or a so-called sensible man and a poor girl taught that to be admired she must "flirt" prettily, and dress prettily, and need not be well-informed ? *These* have nothing in common but the common interest of vanity ; and whether such a flirtation end in marriage or not, they who pursue it are equally injuring their own tastes and characters, and unfitting themselves for true marriage.

Sometimes indeed, as we all know, great misery follows from this playing with fire—especially in the woman, where an untrained, unoccupied mind is joined to a warm heart or vivid imagination. But how much of this suffering might be saved to either party if a frankness, now thought impossible between men and women, could be cultivated. Were this united to a more trained judgment and more engrossing occupations for women, we might less often see the sensational coquette followed by trains of admirers, her heart ever half-touched, and only half-satisfied, her frivolous vanity never satiated ; we might less often see truer

complex as almost to defy classification. We are far from classing the women, even of the sphere which we have taken for our text, "all in one," but this seems evident, that the general result has been a most disheartening mediocrity. We have hopes, it is true, that the efforts now being made by those social benefactresses, who are so earnestly fighting the educational battle for their sisters, powerfully aided by like-minded and generous men, will greatly mitigate this state of things for a fortunate part of the younger generation. But, for the present, though "the softening influence of domestic life," "the purity of English homes" are pretty phrases, yet, all the same, men and women are doing their best to degrade each other to a pitiful mediocrity. Not all the prettiness of blooming girlhood (and a pretty English girl *is* a charming object, whether one is in a moralizing mood or not), not all the brightness, activity and kind-heartedness of narrowly-educated women, however "clever" they may be, can hide this sad truth from our eyes.

Let us begin—working upwards from seeming trifles—with one time-honoured social institution, through which the wholesome and refining influence of one sex over the other is supposed to make itself felt. We tremble as we approach this sacred field, and find ourselves compelled in sober sadness to drop disrespectful words on the privileged flirtations of the young. We would not be severe either on those who encourage or those who practise this favourite diversion. Yet, after all, in spite of the glamour thrown by youthful excitement and inexperience, by the regretful and sympathetic retrospect of age, and by the imagination of poets and painters over the ball, the croquet, the picnic, and all the other playgrounds of "society," it must be owned that the prospect is not encouraging to our hopes of the young. The "flirtation" which reigns here between the two sexes, encouraged by all social customs, provided for at the cost of time, money, health and mental improvement, has in it mischief which lies deeper than at first appears. It is more than "matter for a flying smile." Many will agree with us so far, but will strenuously resist the application of radical remedies to the whole position of society. Palliatives, not prevention, not cure, have ever been the favourite study of English philanthropy.

It is at this point of transitory, counterfeit courtship (in itself damaging to the freshness of youthful affections) that we first trace the effect of that low standard of excellence required from women. Man in general requires little from the woman he loves, still less from the woman he flirts with: we all know that a pretty face, a pretty dress and a few "womanly" coquetries generally suffice for him in either case, and he takes his chance of finding other qualities behind these when it is too late to

make a fresh choice ; while woman, dwarfed to meet these small requirements, requires little from him in return. And so the taste is formed, so marriages are made, and so society and the race are deteriorated.

The last thing we would wish to disparage is the natural, light-hearted, innocent enjoyment of each other's society, in the young of the two sexes. We wish it were far more easily come by and begun earlier too, and were freed from that uneasy self-consciousness which is so often and so needlessly substituted for the frank courage of innocence. From that morbidly-watchful egotism which, under the name of "propriety," used to be so much enjoined, and which would be ill exchanged for the "fastness" of which, in certain circles, one hears so much, we turn with relief to that artless enjoyment of life and society which characterizes unspoiled girlhood, accompanied by a really strong interest in some pursuit. It finds its salvation in those genuine tastes which carry us out of ourselves (not necessarily "learned" or "intellectual")—it may be gardening, or music, or painting, or some kindred art—only, for Heaven's sake, let it be *real*, let it be good of its kind, let it be honestly followed ; and the more of such the better.

On such common ground of genuine tastes and pursuits, young men and women may healthfully meet each other, and prepare for the closer partnership and co-operation of after-life ; and much, very much, we trust, will this common ground be enlarged by wider education. But what has this happy, true-hearted sympathy, which we long to see prevail everywhere, purged more and more from vanity and *arrière-pensée*, to do with the artificial sentimentalities, the unmeaning personalities, and empty rattle of flirtation, either between two equally trifling beings, or a so-called sensible man and a poor girl taught that to be admired she must "flirt" prettily, and dress prettily, and need not be well-informed ? *These* have nothing in common but the common interest of vanity ; and whether such a flirtation end in marriage or not, they who pursue it are equally injuring their own tastes and characters, and unfitting themselves for true marriage.

Sometimes indeed, as we all know, great misery follows from this playing with fire—especially in the woman, where an untrained, unoccupied mind is joined to a warm heart or vivid imagination. But how much of this suffering might be saved to either party if a frankness, now thought impossible between men and women, could be cultivated. Were this united to a more trained judgment and more engrossing occupations for women, we might less often see the sensational coquette followed by trains of admirers, her heart ever half-touched, and only half-satisfied, her frivolous vanity never satiated ; we might less often see truer

and more passionate hearts racked by the ignoble indecision or still more ignoble insincerity and heartlessness of a counterfeit lover. Women would then oftener see through the unworthiness of such a nature before it was too late, and the irretrievable waste of many a precious year of life be averted. The coquette, too, and even the much-abused "fast girl," would find better fields for their love of power (as natural to some women as to some men), as well as for the restless animal spirits and healthy untrained energies which are perhaps chiefly answerable for those vagaries to which the world is so severe.

And what must the marriages be to which this style of social intercourse leads up—putting aside for the moment moral questions of a more tragic significance? Will not this account partly for the falling off of youthful love and all the poetry of life which is thought almost inevitable in marriage? And may not much of the ignobleness of society, of class selfishness, national selfishness, have something to do with these commonplace impulses by which marriages are brought about and families are formed?

In this discouraging view, it must be observed, that we are speaking of what are considered the better kind of average marriages—that is, those which are more or less of choice (perhaps they might just as well be called of chance); not of the many which are in great measure dictated by motives of interest or convenience, which latter, on the woman's side, is too often the supposed desperate necessity of being married at all. And this too is the result of our social arrangements!

It seems wonderful how that prevalent taste among men for female mediocrity is shared even by such as appear fit for better things. Negatives seem to attract, as if woman were to be admired rather for what she is without than what she has; the absence of some power or intellectual gift being constantly mentioned as a positive quality, not to say merit, rather than as a deficiency—a mode of estimation never used with men. And the qualities which do attract are too often superficial attributes, often those semi-childish prejudices and conventionalities, the result of a narrow education for generations, which are generally called "feminine instincts," and considered charming. This is partly the result of a prevalent idea that tenderness of feeling and good household management can seldom be found apart from these, and that the clinging subjection to man which is thought the natural position, the crowning grace of woman, is incompatible with a cultivated mind and original views. As often as not, however, his fancy invests with this poetic charm some nature below even the low standard he prefers; since whenever we limit our aspirations after excellence, we are liable to fall short even of that limit. Even these limited ideals vary, how-

ever ; some profess to be content with the ideal of the intelligent cook and housekeeper, and hold that a woman cannot and ought not to have time for anything else.

Yet do not those men of sense and intellect who seek for attractive mediocrity, if they think about it at all, expect their sons to inherit their own masculine superiority, and their daughters to renew the maternal type? But there is no natural law forbidding—what in fact we so frequently see—the descent of intellectual gifts to the daughters, and the more commonplace attributes to the sons. These sons will probably marry their likes ; the daughters, not finding their natural mates, and not able to seek for them, as probably as not remain unmarried.

Fortunately there are various types between the extremes we have mentioned, some, if rare, yet beautiful—tender, sympathetic, refined female natures, incapable of initiative, but appreciative and reverent of true superiority, by associating with which they gradually educate themselves, and in whose society a man tender and refined enough to appreciate their charm, may well feel himself blest. Yet even such beloved and tender beings feel too often a vague, painful sense of incompleteness and inferiority never quite absent—the greater because of its instinctive admiration of what is excellent. These, too, need a higher education.

We can understand and respect the man of uncultivated intellect who has the manly humility to acknowledge that a highly educated woman would not be a fit mate for him, and that tenderness, simplicity, and purity of heart, without even the perfecting grace of intellect, are enough for his needs. But what does fill us with regretful wonder is, that this incapacity to appreciate the best and completest should be ever made a boast by men, and expressed with the evident feeling that men's preference for the mediocre is a crushing sentence against the woman of trained intellect. Our most popular novelist, whilst sneering at the "heroic female character," bids us regard as the standard to which women should most aspire, the having "all the men in a cluster round her chair, all the young fellows battling to dance with her." According to this judgment, this special court of appeal to which the loftiest-minded woman must bow—her wisest policy, her most womanly grace, will be to disguise, at least, if she cannot extinguish, her superiority.

No woman of real refinement and right sympathies can wish to disparage *true* grace, beauty, and sweetness. They form together a power worthy of respectful homage. But they can hardly exist—at least, hardly last—without a certain strength and elevation of character. True sweetness means strength, not servility, not indiscriminating devotion (beautiful and com-

mendable in a dog we allow, but not quite an adequate expression of womanly affection), not characterless goodnature, not the mere liveliness of youth, nor silliness; true grace implies a harmonizing artistic faculty and a moral balance which can scarcely belong to a commonplace nature, guided only by conventional laws. As for true beauty, how little do we yet realize what glorious types of form and feature are in store for the world, when strength of body and mind, health, courage, and freedom have been developed by generations of enlightened culture—what radiance and fulness of life, what new intelligence and ardour of expression, what splendour of frame, such as we should now look on as fitter for another planet! These are dreams as yet, but they have a practical value if they preserve us from seeking our ideal in a direction contrary to true progress.

But to descend from these poetic heights—at least since the young, pretty, and lively have an influence over men's acts and wishes at present quite out of proportion to their power to use it well, they should be trained, if only with a view to the welfare of their own households, to a more enlightened sense of their responsibilities than men can at present appreciate. If any modest man is alarmed at the prospect of an era of learned and splendid women, let him be assured that it will be long, very long before it comes, and that when it does, by the necessity of the case, men will have risen too. There will long be a supply of the women whom men emphatically call "feminine"—a word which has been for ages the engine of women's oppression. Its meanings have varied, but having been all imposed, directly or indirectly, by man, they are all so many badges of female subjection, both material and moral. Here we know we shall be contradicted by most men and by many women. Men will confidently appeal to the "instincts" of some female friend—perhaps some pretty young girl—and be confirmed by her positiveness, or her flippancy, or her timid acquiescence, in his belief that all true womanhood is on his side. It is much as if a slaveholder should appeal to some faithful, ignorant slave, born on his estate, as to the divinely-appointed necessity of slavery, and the virtues proper to his condition, and be quite satisfied with his "Yes, massa," in reply. It is quite possible that the slave does believe in the divine origin of slavery; it will not be the fault of his master's theological teachings if he does not. Women have been taught to do more than this—not merely to acquiesce, but to glory in their subjection.

One feature of this subjection is, as has been somewhere pointed out, that a double code of laws has been imposed on

woman—one supposed to be common to all humanity, the other containing special regulations for herself—not merely supplementary of, but sometimes even contradicting, the other. These seem devised to keep up an enfeebling self-consciousness, and to turn the simple government of a healthy conscience into a sort of Lord Chamberlain's office of etiquettes. But there is, or ought to be, only one law for men and women; and such a "codification" will be, we trust, the great moral work of our age. One conscience, one education, one virtue, one liberty, one citizenship for men and women alike. It will not force them to do the same work, but it will enable them freely to choose their work. It will not make them the same, but it will help to make them perfect of their kind, and the world twice as great, and twice as happy.

Would it not, to begin with, be well first to instruct girls that weakness, cowardice, and ignorance cannot constitute at once the perfection of womankind and the imperfection of mankind—to cease, in short, to impress upon her the lesson epitomized in Mr. Charles Reed's short dialogue—

*She.* I feel all my sex's weakness.

*He.* And therein you are invincible.

May they not be led to cultivate grace, refinement, taste, and beauty, because these things are good in themselves and make the world pleasanter; not because men admire this, that, and the other in women, and are disgusted at its absence, and that therefore this, that, and the other are feminine attributes, and will get them partners at a ball, and perhaps for life. The original motive to this cultivation of grace and charm colours the whole of the after-life and character. On this depends whether she is to be a truthful free woman, the equal, sympathetic, and ennobling partner of man, or be a sort of virtuous courtesan, as man so often likes to picture her, to coax him by her personal charms into tenderness and morality without any trouble of his own.

"Female instincts," the favourite idea of unphilosophical minds, are called "feelings" as opposed to "reason;" and some mysterious moral advantage is supposed to accrue to the more "rational" sex from the presumed incapacity of their partners in life to look beyond personal and family interests, to draw rational inferences from facts, and to be just as well as generous. The "sacred nonsense" of mothers' talk to the child at their knee, recalled in Parliamentary utterances as one blessing to be destroyed by female suffrage, is a good illustration of this theme.

A good many sensible men, whilst unprepared to grant women equal rights and citizenship with themselves, will advocate a better education for them generally, will by no means confess to



admiring ignorance and prejudice, and will even enjoy the conversation of a clever woman, if she be not *too* clever, and too much in earnest. But these notwithstanding, the view of woman's supposed defects, which we have stated before, defects either charming or provoking as you choose to take them, or as the subject of them is fifteen or fifty years old, is what has met and thwarted enlightened women at every turn.

Now, as regards "feeling" and "instinct," held, as they often are, as preferable respectively to "reason" and "judgment," let us compare that untrained, unenlightened maternal instinct which leads the mother to indulge her child to its own future injury, with that instinct trained and enlightened, which leads her for its future good not to shrink from its present suffering. Compare "feeling" which, in the shape of ignorance and prejudice, leads to narrow views of religion and to intolerance of some of the noblest and wisest of human thoughts and sentiments, with that "feeling," founded on knowledge and reason which leads to enthusiasm for what is noblest and wisest, whilst yet it can be kindly indulgent to that very ignorance which despises knowledge. The obstruction to social progress, caused by the fostering of these theological prejudices in women through the indulgence of even those husbands and fathers who have them not themselves, can only be glanced at here. It is not a question of reason against feeling, but of allying the two, instead of keeping them apart by an irreligious divorce. To some minds the voice of reason is as the voice of conscience, and such, once awake to their responsibilities, can no more disobey the one voice than the other. These seem absolute truisms; yet how few there are, even of those who cannot contradict them, who will accord them practical recognition!

"Good Heavens! a young lady reason!" was once the exclamation of an educated Roman Catholic when mildly argued with by one of the angelic sex. Of course, as we were told in Parliament, "women's minds are absolutely closed to logic,"—this said in the face of an ever-increasing number of women who can reason, and reason well, and whom men have not yet been able to answer. And why should it be "unfeminine" and "ungraceful," and all the rest of it, to appreciate the æsthetic beauty of a well-woven chain of reasoning? Partly, perhaps, because women have not the monopoly of reasoning ill. It is the superficially dexterous arguers, possibly, rather than deep and sincere thinkers amongst men who find a charm in female perverseness and irrationality in religion, politics, and subjects of thought generally. We can no more regard the power of right reasoning as a mental luxury, a privilege to be kept for the enjoyment of one sex, than we can regard correct drawing or correct intonation in music as perfections necessary in professionals, but merely unpleasing pedantry in amateurs.

Yes, surely the ardour of reason, so nearly akin to the passion for justice, is as proper for a woman as any other ardour looked upon as feminine *par excellence*. And there is an earnest vein in women which, as far as we have been able to observe, is opposed to the sophistications of the *merely* logical intellect, the cold-hearted amusement of arguing an important question without any real convictions. Such conscientious sincerity, even from a man's point of view, cannot be unwomanly.

"Unfeminine"—Alas, how much of good and great has that word blighted at its birth! On women's sensibilities, artificially fostered to an intense tenderness to the lightest sting, it does fall like the cut of a lash. But after all the government of the lash can only make slaves. As woman takes larger and loftier views of duty, she will learn to dread the stings of her conscience more than the lash of man's ridicule. She will look at the sun itself with undazzled eyes, not through the smoke-dimmed glass man has handed her for her special use. As it is, this fear, inculcated through ages, haunts women from the cradle (and men cannot realize the effort it costs, even those who seem bravest, to shake it off), this fear which holds them back from expressing their real opinions, hinders woman herself, as much as it hinders man, from knowing what she really is.

It is too true that a very large number of the women of one class, the comfortable drawing-room class, have ranged themselves with well-meaning docility in the ranks of this social police, have been the unconscious agents of a social terrorism, which man himself exercises almost unconsciously, while they innocently repeat the warning words of "feminine delicacy" and "ladylike propriety" which men have put into their mouths, and which they believe are the utterances of nature and religion, and the immutable conditions of civilized life.

Let us think how much we need a counteracting influence against those base motives of personal and class-selfishness which now honeycomb and almost threaten to destroy society, and how little women's "instincts" and "feelings" have done to supply this. We do not forget that, in all ages, at times of temporary excitement, there have been women found to sustain a man in the sacrifice of those whom he loves to duty, even when she and her children are to be the sacrificed; but we long to see something of this spirit in everyday life and in peaceful times. The same woman who will cheerfully destroy her own health in nursing one she loves, who will uncomplainingly share with him his involuntary poverty, or even deserved disgrace, would on the other hand discourage him with all her powers of persuasion from risking his worldly fortune or bringing on himself the world's reproach, at some call of conscience with which she has not been taught to sympathize. Again, a husband should be ashamed

before his wife for a mean public action, a vote given through self-interest, or class-interest, or faction, as he would for cheating his neighbour, for official falsification as he would for perjury in a court of justice, for conniving at the bribery of an elector as he would for receiving stolen goods, for taking an unfair advantage in trade as he would for picking a pocket. But we hear nothing of the value of feminine influence in such matters as these.

We turn now to the married state as affected in England by the marriage law, "the most barbarous," it has lately been said, "in Europe." "A woman," as has also lately been said, "loses when she marries, her name, her freedom, her individuality, her property, her vote" (municipal and other). A man takes from the woman he marries everything she has, yet is not bound to maintain her while she lives with him, can use the forms of law to force back a reluctant wife in spite of her aversion to live with him, and finally can take her children from her and give them to the care of some other woman if he pleases. This law, of which these are some of the most striking features—though, more or less, of course, a dead letter in affectionate marriages, but an easy instrument of iniquity in the hands of the unscrupulous—would almost seem indeed to be maintained for the special use of the bad. This law which, however modified in its practical workings by individual character, cannot but lower the whole conception of marriage for all but the exceptional few, even good men will tell us somehow helps to secure the happiness of married life generally! In its remote origin it was doubtless a valuable modification of worse evils, and in the days when no personal freedom was allowed to any woman, married or unmarried, when marriage was therefore merely an exchange of one servitude for another, there was at least no glaring incongruity in the theory of a wife's subjection.\* But now, when she is supposed, once arrived at the years of discretion, to be a free agent, and to have a free choice in marriage, the position has become an antiquated anomaly. It would seem still to be upheld on the principle that because woman is weak, she should therefore be made helpless,—because man is strong, he shall have additional protection against the weak. In the classes where this law is most abused, because there education has done least to counteract its brutalizing effect on public opinion, there has been found a tendency in women (notably in manufacturing towns), to prefer unmarried unions to legitimate ones, for the sake of the greater

---

\* Those who lay stress on particular texts of Scripture bearing on this subject should remember that there is sanction for domestic slavery in the New Testament, and the conclusion is that the first teachers of Christianity took social institutions as they found them.

protection of their self-earned contributions to the household, and the greater willingness of their partners to contribute their share, instead of spending all on themselves. Here, at least, is one natural result of a degrading and tyrannical law of marriage on those who suffer from it most helplessly. Before this new form of union tends universally to supplant the other, it might be better, instead of vaguely deploring the immorality of the "lower classes," or contriving such piecemeal mitigations as have lately been enacted—to see if a radical reform of the old constitution be not worth considering.

The truth is, our ideas are still perverted by the old fetish worship of husbands, so ludicrously expressed in the literature of past generations—that curious religion which made it a wife's highest virtue to pay the obedience of a slave to a master, however cruel, capricious, or irrational he was, however noble and wise she, might be—in short, the greater his mental and moral inferiority to her, the greater the merit of her absolute submission. This doctrine, which turned him into a monstrous idol to be propitiated by an abject ceremonial—this ideal of wifehood, maintained by men with astonishing complacency, was carried to its highest perfection in the legend of "Patient Griselda," in which many men, we believe, still see a kind of pathetic beauty. It really exhibits the most repulsive perversion of moral feeling on both sides to which such a grotesque theory of marriage is capable of leading. This fetishism continues in a modified shape to be represented by the law of the land, and it colours more or less the ordinary ideal of marriage. There is, to be sure, a sort of humility in insisting on this right divine of husbands, since no more than the divine right of kings does it require any inherent superiority in the individual possessing it. But this kind of humility has in neither case proved beneficial to the governing or governed. Mr. Herbert Spencer has observed in the "Social Statics" that even as we loathe the custom which in savage nations forbids women to eat in company with men, so shall we come to loathe the civilized theories of the wife's subjection to her husband. The wonder is that any man can endure it.

Till absolute social and legal equality is the basis of the sacred partnership of marriage (the division of labours and duties in the family, by free agreement, implying no sort of inequality), till no superiority is recognised on either side but that of individual character and capacity, till marriage is no longer legally surrounded with penalties on the woman who enters into it as though she were a criminal,—till then the truest love, the truest sympathy, the truest happiness in it, will be the exception rather than the rule, and the real value of this relation, domestic and

social, will be fatally missed. People may get on pretty well together, and be fairly fond of each other, without their married life presenting a spectacle particularly worthy of admiration, or suggesting a very excellent development of human nature. Of course, in numberless cases, a wife will find it her best wisdom as well as comfort in the conduct of life (especially as society is now constituted) to yield to the judgment of a husband who may probably be her superior in age, experience of life, and knowledge of the world; but this accidental part of marriage, if we may call it so, has nothing to do with the theory of divine right on the one side, and indelible inferiority on the other.

Connected with this faulty view of the marriage relations, is that other difficulty with which woman has been burdened by immemorial prejudice, grievously overweighted as she is already without it—we mean the stigma of conventional humiliation attached to those women who pass their lives unmarried. It is, no doubt, like the fetish-worship of husbands, a relic of barbarism, but it is still strongly felt, and has been impressed by men on women themselves to their great detriment. It is not simply the opinion that, as a general rule, women are happier married than single; but that the unmarried woman, when she has ceased to be young, is an object not merely for pity, but more or less for contempt, though it is not always held good taste to express it, and some men are too sensible and manly to feel it. Apparently this notion rests on three assumptions, all of barbaric origin—namely, that a woman's highest glory and merit is to please men, that if she has not married she has failed to please men, and that her whole *raison d'être* is wifehood and motherhood. A *man* who has not become a husband and father may feel himself an honoured and important member of society; and till it is universally understood that a woman who from choice or chance is not a wife and mother, may fill an equally honoured and important position, true respect will not be paid to woman in any capacity, whether married or single. For the rest, the fact—not, we hope, without a possible good result on her general position as time goes on—of the eight hundred thousand women in excess of men in England, who must of necessity remain unmarried (and the disproportion continues, we believe, to increase) justifies us still further in protesting against this old world prejudice.

But the spectral difficulty it has raised is already diminishing. Women have done much for themselves towards that result, and if they will persevere it will be removed from their path altogether. The dignity and independence of womanhood must be maintained by an upright scrupulousness of choice in the first instance, to help which a much larger variety of occupation

should be opened to women; and by faith in themselves, whether married or single. But in fighting this battle, as in so many others, she has been too often hindered rather than encouraged by the stronger sex.

“It is nonsense,” Hawthorne remarks in the “Blithedale Romance,” “and a miserable wrong—the result, like so many others, of masculine egotism—that the success or failure of a woman’s existence should be made to depend wholly on the affections, and on one species of affection, while man has such a multitude of other chances, that this seems but an incident. For its own sake, if it will do no more, the world should throw open all its avenues to the passport of a woman’s bleeding heart.”

Before quitting the subject of the married relations, we must say a few words on the typical and most painful exemplification of the different moral codes imposed on men and women—one having a most important bearing on these relations and the family and social influences which spring from them. We allude to the prevalent assumption that man is not bound by the same rule of moral purity as woman. An obvious development of the primitive barbaric notion of woman as the natural property of man, it is still held as a moral axiom, we believe, by the large majority of men. Unacknowledged in so many words by good men, abhorred, we doubt not, by many, denounced by the religion in whose dogmas the vicious still generally profess belief, it receives practical and almost universal recognition in the most civilized countries. Virtuous women, even, are perverted by conventional custom, persuaded, or tricked by their carefully-maintained ignorance, into assenting to it—and legislation is based upon it, as witness, amongst other examples, the law of divorce. Yet what does this distinction mean—unless it be wholly *un-meaning* and self-contradictory—except that *some* women are bound to lead purer lives than men, but *not all*?—That is, by man’s traditional doctrine, the women of his own family, the women of the class he intends to marry into, are bound to be of unblemished purity, whilst the degradation in his behalf of less privileged classes is to be acquiesced in, nay, almost desired, as a social necessity. And is it at *this* price we purchase the boasted purity of English homes, with all its graceful accompaniments of chivalrous homage—by the maintenance, in a sort of pretended secrecy, of an unparalleled humiliation and slavery of woman, in a so-called free country, by those who profess to honour her the most?

Even good men, with consciences individually clear as to this matter, will shake their heads and say it *must* be—that this evil cannot be expelled from society;—indeed some say it ought not

to be expelled, lest a greater evil take its place. And the good, by their silence, their acquiescence, play into the hands of the majority. But those women who think for themselves on this terrible subject, indignantly ask—By what right does any society exist on such a foundation? What right have certain classes of women to enjoy, safe and untempted, an aristocracy of virtue at the expense of the poor, the ignorant, the young, orphaned, helpless and thoughtless, the desolate and deserted, yearly, daily bribed, entrapped, tempted, goaded and betrayed into a Hell upon earth—that men may go on talking about the “purity of English homes”—the beautiful result of high civilization and feminine subjection? Upon the seething surface of this infernal region men build their own happy households, content if no sound from below rises up to shock the ears of unconscionous wives and daughters! The denizens of that region are not waiting at leisure till it shall please them to forsake their evil lives, and become the happy and honoured heads of families: that crowning reward is reserved for the men who have profited by, and shared in, their degradation, whose easy repentance is gloried in as one more tribute to the moralizing influence of women, and in whose persons the sacred names of husband and father are thus daily and triumphantly profaned. For when they are weary of base dissipation, there is always some ignorant girl ready to confer these names upon them, to learn, probably, by degrees, that men are not bound to be as pure as women, to resign herself to her sons leading the same lives as their father before them, and to her daughters marrying men who lead the same lives as their brothers. But if this is what is meant by the “purity of English homes,” are we so very sure that even this one-sided purity will always be maintained? Is it certain that no moral contamination from men’s earlier associations ever enters there? Are we sure that the house built on such a foundation will always stand firm?

This brand upon society, this blight on every effort at true reform in any direction, will not be removed by sentimentalism, by costly subscriptions to churches, refuges, and reformatories, nor any other of the palliatives society seems to prefer to prevention, and which so often tend to maintain the original evil—no, nor by efforts to keep the women of one class ignorant of the degradation of women in another. The jealous trades-unionism of men which meet women at every turn in the struggle for existence, does not close the avenues of *this* trade to her. All the restrictions on her honest industry which well-meaning masculine philanthropy can devise, on the theory that she is a grown-up child, do not debar her from *this* calling. The romantic homage of the chivalrous does not shield her from *this* dishonour.

Many influences, no doubt, not directly traceable to masculine domination, tend to swell this evil. Against these the two forces of the human race should be brought to bear in combination, as they have never yet been brought. The single government of man has proved unequal to the task. Till woman has an equal or something more like an equal share in the councils of humanity, till she ceases to be the submissive subject of man, the two will not be brought to agree together on one standard of moral purity for both; and till then, man will not learn to reverence and desire purity, not in the women of one class only, but in all women—and not in woman only, but in himself as well.

In what we have just said we shall have, we are sure, some sort of sympathy and agreement from many who can in no ways go along with us as to the proposed radical treatment of social mischiefs. Some of these have set before them a never yet realized and unrealizable ideal, in which we must once again acknowledge, with all sincerity and respect, a certain refinement, tenderness, and artificial beauty, nay, a kind of generosity gone astray. Such we oppose with regret. These would fain crystallize for all time the whole system of sentimental and sublimated injustice embodied in the chivalry theory. For them woman is always to be a glorified, but well-educated invalid, who is to influence man for his good by her physical imperfections, as much as by her ethereal and intuitive morality and docile affections. She is to guard this physical incapacity as well as her supposed incapability of sharing in the highest national concerns, and her unfitness for any social business beyond the precincts of home, as sacred treasures, because man, it is said, requires this contrast to himself as a moralizing element in his life. In his own particular walk of life, which is apparently to be kept as separate from hers as possible, it would almost seem he may be hard and coarse with a safe conscience because the woman he leaves at home remains soft and delicate.

And so on. To us the whole theory seems a morbid one. One longs to take off these golden chains, open the hothouse doors, and turn the ethereal prisoner into free fresh air, to develop her moral and intellectual muscle and stature at her will. The proposed arrangement consistently carried out, as we know it never has been, and we believe never can be, seems to us much as if we mortals should invite an angel from heaven to cast in his lot with us, to purify our morals and affections by his example and sympathy, to educate our children, and housekeep for us, on condition of strictly acknowledging our absolute authority and his own unalterably subordinate position, renouncing as unangelic all independent action and opinion, all share in deciding those



earthly laws under which he is to live amongst us, and promising to *stay at home*, we on our side engaging to pay the obedient angel semi-divine honours, and in general to treat him with every indulgence and consideration. But then, if the angel should not like the bargain, he would at least be free to stay in heaven—whilst woman is here, and has no neutral ground to retire to, pending the negotiation. It seems scarcely fair to take advantage of her necessary presence amongst us, to impose on her conditions more stringent than with absolutely free choice, and full comprehension of the state of the case, she would care to accept.

No, let her have as free play for her natural capacities as man; not necessarily, as we have said before, to do always the same things as man, but to try fairly what she can do, and possibly thus greatly widen the sphere and vary the details of what she ought to do. If *then* she is willing to forego all the new, natural, healthful and legitimate ambitions and aspirations (as we hold them to be), growing up within her, and lightening even that burden of glorified invalidhood, thought to be her divinely appointed portion (except indeed in the working classes); if, after full and intelligent consideration, she decides she is not fit to share any of the higher responsibilities of citizenship with man; if, after trying what liberty of thought, conscience and action means; if, after enjoying a free field for those gifts and faculties which are as various, and as imperatively cry out for exercise in women as in men; if, after learning to look on marriage as the happy alternative to other happy and satisfying occupations—not a social necessity; if after finding her voice in all that concerns the morals and welfare of society, deserving of, and listened to, with as much respect as man's; if after feeling herself a part of the state, not a servant, submitting by compulsion to the will of the men in it, whether or no her judgment concurs in theirs; if after experiencing the blessing of having some little control over the laws by which the most sacred concerns of her life are to be governed; if, in one word, after being grown up, and after enjoying the privileges of a free woman, she is willing to become a child once more, and to fall back again into absolute subjection to an irresponsible sex—well and good. But the fair opportunity of choice—of understanding even the nature of the choice—has not yet been given her. If her instincts and characteristics are really as indelible as the “*meta-physical*” chivalry-theory makes them, then, with all freedom of choice possible, she will of course renounce the new life opening upon her. But we shall see.

For ourselves we fervently believe that generations of a nobler and freer culture will ennoble and liberate her very bodily frame (as we have before said) into a health, strength and beauty

hitherto undreamt of; not transform her into man—why was such a senseless misrepresentation ever dragged in to degrade a serious discussion into burlesque?—but into glorified womanhood. This change, alone, would in time revolutionize the whole race, and man himself would grow to a greatness he denies himself whilst he ignorantly insists on stunting woman. Hitherto nature has always been brought into court as a hostile witness whenever it has been a question of elevating her condition in any one direction. We shall see whether nature, allowed to speak freely, is not *the* irresistibly conclusive witness on woman's side.

We must now add a remark the truth of which is, indeed, obtaining general recognition—viz., that men themselves are often, as might be expected, the victims of the faulty social system of which we complain, and are as unconscious as the majority of women are of the causes and possible remedy of its evils. Certainly many a hard-worked father who wears out health and spirits in an irksome profession that his daughters may enjoy amusements and luxuries in which he has little share, and to the earning of which they contribute nothing, might well be confounded at finding himself classed amongst the oppressors of women, and the women of his family as victims. Assuredly, it is not these latter whom we pity, except for that melancholy conventionalty fostered by false views of woman's position in society which has so long sanctioned such contented idleness in young ladies' lives, and for the possibly bitter regrets of after years. Women, too, have their own class-privileges over other women; they, too, have to be constantly on their guard against a consequent blindness to the claims of others. These are class-abuses, class-difficulties, which it will take the whole united strength of society to sweep away. But of all class-reforms in store for the future we can still conceive of none so vitally important to the whole human race as the emancipation of woman. It will be the beginning of a new world era, a new revelation, a new religion to man.

We will conclude our whole subject with a quotation from the American writer already named at the head of this article, who having made a successful practical protest, during the late war, against the theory of indelible race-inferiority by the training of a negro regiment, has since generously taken up the case of sex-domination. He thus writes:—

“Thus far my whole argument has been defensive and explanatory. I have shown that woman's inferiority in special achievements, so far as it exists, is a fact of small importance, because it is merely a corollary from her historic position of degradation. She has not excelled because she has had no fair

chance to excel. Man, placing his foot on her shoulder, has taunted her with not rising. But the ulterior question remains behind—How came she into this attitude originally? Explain this explanation, the logician fairly demands. Granted that woman is weak, because she has been systematically degraded; but why was she so degraded? This is a far deeper question—one to be met only by a profounder philosophy and a positive solution. We are coming on ground almost wholly untrod, and must do the best we can.

“I venture to assert, then, that woman’s social inferiority in the past has been to a great extent a legitimate thing. To all appearance history would have been impossible without it, just as it would have been impossible without an epoch of war and slavery. It is simply a matter of social progress—a part of the succession of civilizations. The past has been inevitably a period of ignorance, of engrossing physical necessities, and of brute force—not of freedom, of philanthropy, and of culture. During that lower epoch, woman was necessarily an inferior, degraded by abject labour even in time of peace—degraded uniformly by war, chivalry to the contrary, notwithstanding. . . . The truth simply was, that her time had not come. Physical strength must rule for a time, and she was the weaker . . . and the degradation of woman was simply a part of a system which has indeed had its day, but has bequeathed its associations. . . . The reason, then, for the long subjection of woman has been simply that humanity was passing through its first epoch, and her full career was to be reserved for the second. . . . Woman’s appointed era, like that of the Teutonic races, was delayed but not omitted. It is not merely true that the empire of the past has belonged to man, for it was an empire of the muscles, enlisting, at best, but the lower parts of the understanding. There can be no question that the present epoch is initiating an empire of the higher reason, of arts, affections, aspirations; and for that epoch the genius of woman has been reserved. Till the fulness of time came, woman was necessarily kept a slave to the spinning-wheel and the needle; now higher work is ready; peace has brought invention to her aid, and the mechanical means for her emancipation are ready also.”

---

## ART. VII.—LAMARCK.

1. *Philosophie Zoologique*. 2 vols. Paris : 1809.
2. *Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres*. 7 vols. Paris : 1815—1822.

THE reception which Lamarck's writings have met with in this country has been somewhat peculiar. The views contained in his work, the "*Philosophie Zoologique*," were strongly opposed to the opinions on theology and philosophy generally prevailing here at the time of its publication, and the work was in consequence for some fifty years attacked or ridiculed by nearly every author who noticed it. After the publication of Mr. Darwin's work on the Origin of Species, theories of evolution, from being denounced as irreligious, or ridiculed as fantastic, came into favour with a large and influential number of scientific men ; some who had been loudest in condemning Lamarck being as forward in supporting Darwin. Lamarck's position was, however, little improved by the change. The opponents of Darwinism often directed their blows against Lamarck, but its adherents seldom cared to defend him, but rather passed over his speculations as unimportant or erroneous. They naturally did not wish to have their own views confounded with those of one who had been so frequently attacked. It is true that Lamarck can have no claim to be considered as even foreshadowing Mr. Darwin's theories on Natural Selection, atavism (the recurrence to the form of a remote ancestor), cross-breeding, or many other principles adduced to explain the origin of the animals now existing. Yet, on the other hand, Lamarck must be considered as the first great naturalist who believed and endeavoured to prove that all animals now living are descended from those previously existing, however different the forms of the two may be. While Cuvier and most of the naturalists and geologists of his times were continually inventing cataclysms, convulsions, and separate creations, to account for the actual condition of the globe and the races which inhabit it, Lamarck steadfastly refused to believe in any such general catastrophe, and ascribed the formation both of modern species and the features presented by the earth's crust to the continuous and slow operation of the natural agents which he saw still working. By slight modifications, and in conformity with a regular law of progress, highly organized beings had, he declared, been moulded and developed out of the simplest forms. The laws which Lamarck laid down, the causes to which he referred these changes and modifications, were real and active ;

and, although he may have exaggerated their importance and power of producing the results he attributed to them, yet this is an error which he shares with nearly every great discoverer. Not only is every one tempted to overrate the importance and sphere of operation of a principle first discovered by himself, but unless principles were overrated there would be but little chance of the real importance of many of them being recognised. It is frequently only by endeavouring to explain every phenomenon by a single cause that phenomena not to be so explained are investigated, and that the existence of other causes becomes apparent; so that errors in our conception of the nature of the cause first known are detected.

But Lamarck's merit is not confined to his early perception of the uniformity and gradual upward progress of nature. He first arranged the animal kingdom in two great branches, one comprising annulate animals, or those whose bodies are divided into segments, such as insects, worms, prawns, and the like; and the other branch comprising polyps, mollusks, and vertebrate animals, which last he believed to be derived from the mollusks. With proper allowance for the great advance of our knowledge of the lower forms of animals made since the days of Lamarck, this arrangement is substantially the same as that adopted by Professor Huxley, in his treatises on "Comparative Anatomy," London: 1864; and "Classification," *ibid.* 1869; with, however, some important exceptions. In these works the vertebrates stand by themselves, instead of being placed in the molluscous branch. The theory that vertebrates are descended from mollusks had, however, even before the publication of the last work, been advanced by Hæckel, in Germany, in consequence of the researches of the Russian naturalist, Kowalevsky, which showed a great resemblance to exist between vertebrates and ascidians in the early stages of their development. These last are a family of animals of low organization, which were at first classed with polyps, but afterwards placed by Lamarck in a class intermediate between the latter and the mollusks with bivalve shells. Lamarck himself, however, looked for forms intermediate between mollusks and vertebrates in a much more highly organized order, the naked-gilled sea-slugs.

In geology, although Lamarck's views are often extremely speculative, yet he always insisted on the continuous nature of geological changes, and attributed the present forms of hill and valley to the continual wearing action of rain and atmospheric changes, a theory which, in a modified form, finds advocates among many of the ablest living geologists. Physics and meteorology were treated by him with even greater boldness

and industry, although but little success. He seems to have believed in an atomic theory, but to have been led by the old doctrines of phlogiston and caloric to indulge in many rash speculations on the nature and effects of those imponderable fluids, by the action of which he, like most physicists and chemists of that time, endeavoured to explain the phenomena presented by heat, electricity, and the other natural forces. He built on the theories of chemistry in vogue when he began his scientific studies, and persistently refused to recognise the merit of the admirable reasoning and researches of Lavoisier and his followers. In Botany, Lamarck's works are numerous, and were, when published, of considerable value. The first scientific work he published was the "Flore Française:" in it he altogether abandoned the prevailing system of Linnæus, and established another equally artificial, but which, by the principle of dual or dichotomous division, led more quickly to the determination of the species and genus of any particular plant. This system, which is said to have been created in six months, was in its turn abandoned by its author, who afterwards adopted the views of Jussieu, the founder of the Natural System of botany, by whom the later additions of the "Flore Française" were brought out, either alone or in conjunction with Lamarck. The other botanical works of Lamarck consist chiefly in descriptions of genera and species. (See the "Dictionnaire de Botanique," and the "Illustration des Genres," both parts of the "Encyclopédie Méthodique"), in which he seems to have displayed some of the ability he afterwards showed in the "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres."

It is this last work, and that on the fossil shells found in the beds round Paris, that have chiefly kept alive the reputation of Lamarck. His great contemporary, Cuvier, considers the determination of the genera and species in these works as his great and peculiar merit, and affects to pity him for being led to the conclusion that, after all, these genera and species were but artificial creations useful to systematists, but not existing in nature. (Eloges iii. 199.) It is certainly impossible not to admire Lamarck when we consider that the publication of this great and laborious work was only begun when he had already reached his seventieth year; and that he was in his fiftieth year when he began the study of the invertebrata, which he undertook, not because he was particularly attracted by it, but because, as the last appointed in the Cabinet du Roi, he had, on its reconstruction, to content himself with the subject least pleasing to his colleagues. When once he had entered upon it he pursued it with unflagging energy in spite of old age and failing sight. Always ready to

improve and modify his theories and classifications, he continued, year after year, to introduce such new groups and divisions as were suggested by the researches of Cuvier, or other anatomists, while he laboured by studying the forms preserved on the various museums to subdivide these groups into natural families and genera; and at the same time he constantly struck out more distinct and bolder theories on the general nature of living beings. The same indomitable resolution and calm courage which made him, at seventeen, abandon his prospects in the church, and set out to join the French army; which made him, immediately after his arrival (when the death of all the officers around him had placed him in command), refuse to retreat from the post assigned to him on the battle-field until he had received the order from his general; which afterwards led him a second time to abandon his career, and endeavour, in a humble position to gain the means for a medical education, sustained him in the penury and blindness which were the lot of his old age. If the same qualities have sometimes led him to too daring flights of imagination, or too great confidence in the correctness of his own views, or if they have given an air almost of arrogance to his statements, we must remember that without them Lamarck would never have accomplished his splendid achievements in science.

It is but a small part of his voluminous writings that we now propose to examine. The discussion of the details of the characters of families and genera which he founded is unsuited for these pages. His divisions and distributions have lost much of their value. It is of the essence of such arrangements that they should, by increasing our knowledge of the forms comprised in them, serve as a foundation on which to build yet better distributions, by which after a time they are superseded. The enormous number of new forms which have been recognised, and the great advance in our knowledge of anatomy made in consequence of the improved microscopes and means of observation at our disposal, have rendered Lamarck's divisions inadequate to represent the animals and plants of which he treated as we now know them; and a critical examination of his system would be interesting only to persons studying the forms described in Lamarck's writings. On biology, however, Lamarck has written much which must always be interesting to students of the history of science as a part of human progress, and is perhaps particularly so at present. He was one of the first to recognise the importance of studying biology as a whole, which he speaks of in his "*Histoire Naturelle*" (vol. i. p. 49), as "*une science particulière qui n'est encore fondée, qui n'a pas même de nom, dont j'ai proposé quelques bases dans ma Philosophie Zoologique, et à laquelle je*

donnerai le nom de Biologie." His views on this subject were first published in two volumes—one published in 1797, under the title of "Mémoires de Physique et d'Histoire Naturelle;" and the other published in 1802, under the title of "Recherches sur l'Organisation des Corps Vivans." They were afterwards much expanded and developed in his "Philosophie Zoologique," published in 1809, which he refers to as a new edition of the "Recherches," and in the introduction, forming the greatest portion of the first volume of the "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres," published in 1815. It is to these two last works that we shall refer.

Like other evolutionists Lamarck considers that living beings for several series, the different individuals composing which, vary insensibly one from another, so that all divisions—such as classes, orders, and genera, and even species—are products not of nature, but of art. The best of such divisions have artificial limits, and none are really isolated, although from our ignorance of the connecting forms they may appear so to us; but if all races of living beings were known to us, all our present classes, orders, and genera would be merely families of different sizes, and it would be very difficult to assign limits to these divisions. So far therefore art is an essential element in the construction even of a natural system. But besides this necessary use of convention, many systematic distributions (such as the systems of Linnæus in Botany, of Fabricius in Entomology, and the distribution of Birds and Fishes in Lamarck's own time), are entirely artificial, and not in conformity with nature, whose order is single, unique, and essentially without division in each organic kingdom.

Lamarck might have mentioned his own classification of plants as one of the most striking instances of an artificial distribution. He does not define an artificial distribution, nor does he explain what he means by conformity to nature. Several of his expressions convey the idea that he inclined to the views of Bonnet and the Greek philosophers, who believed in a single, uninterrupted chain of beings. These views, however, he in the "Histoire Naturelle" (vol. i. p. 129), when pressed by Cuvier, distinctly disavows. In fact, he does not seem to have considered what principles ought to govern a natural distribution. Most systematists since Lamarck have adopted one of the three principles following:—(1) Conformity to a general type or plan of organization; (2) relationship or descent; (3) complexity of structure. Agassiz, in his "Essay on Classification" (ch. ii.), discusses the subject at some length. He lays down, that conformity to type is the principle which should determine the division of the animal kingdom into primary branches or sub-regna; while the division



into classes ought to be regulated by the different ways in which the type of each branch is worked out in the animals composing it ; and the further subdivision into orders should depend on the complexity of organization in each class. He thus considers that there are three different kinds of large divisions of animals proper to be made, and differing from each other in essence, and not merely in the extent or number of species comprised in them. Lamarck, on the other hand, considers all divisions larger than genera to be merely families of greater or less extent, and agrees with Agassiz only in considering that external form should be the criterion of specific difference.

Cuvier, Oken, Von Baer, and Owen, all endeavour, more or less, to arrange animals according to type ; while Huxley, Hæckel, and most of the zoologists who have adopted the views of Darwin, found their systems on a different principle—that of relationship, or nearness in descent ; and they generally assume that uniformity of type, even in small details, can only exist in closely-related animals. This certainly cannot be considered as proved, and is opposed to the views of Owen, Mivart, and Bastian. Lamarck himself gives two tables of relationship according to descent—one at the end of his “*Philosophie Zoologique*,” and the other in the supplement to the introduction to his “*Histoire Naturelle*” (vol. i. p. 457). They differ considerably from each other, but altogether from the classification he adopted ; and, as this classification was sketched out by him in his courses of lectures long before the publication of either of these works, and was retained in them, it is clear that he did not consider genealogy to be the true principle on which to found a natural system. While absolutely rejecting, at least in the “*Histoire Naturelle*,” the theory of a single uninterrupted chain of beings, he still appears to found his system on it. He nowhere recognises anything like a type or plan of organization, and is generally guided merely by the principle of complexity of organization. Agassiz (“*Essay on Classification*,” p. 134), well observes of his system, that it combines abstract conceptions with structural considerations, and an artificial endeavour to arrange all animals in a continuous series. He himself seems to have felt the artificial nature of his method, and to have become somewhat dissatisfied with the results. (See the supplement to the introduction to his *Hist. Nat.*, vol. i. p. 451.)

Lamarck considers all classifications formed by reasoning from a single organ to be unsatisfactory, and that the variations of the most important organs ought to carry the greatest weight in determining the relationship of animals. Thus the organs of sensation and respiration are better guides than those of circulation ; and the organs of sensation, which give rise to the most eminent

faculties, are to be preferred to those of respiration. He criticises Aristotle's division of animals into those with blood and those without blood; and while approving of the division, thinks the characters ill chosen. In his doctrine as to the importance in classification of the organs of feeling, he agrees with Dr. Grant and Professor Owen, who also found their divisions of the Animal Kingdom on the characters of the nervous system. Lamarck's division into Apathetic, Sentient, and Rational animals, is really founded, however, not on the organs of sensation themselves, but on their functions or faculties.

In the *Hist. Nat.* i. 324, Lamarck gives further explanations of his views of the art of making fit divisions of animals. The principles he lays down are, first, that animals must be grouped according to some system which is not an arbitrary one, that the series must then be divided, and the proper rank of each division determined; secondly, that in performing these operations, attention must be paid to the following relationships:—(1) The relations between individuals of the same species. These are the closest, and consist in peculiarities of form. (2) The relations between animals of the same group. These must be determined by considering, not the external form only, but also the whole interior organization in every part. (3) The relations between the groups themselves, which must be arranged in order according as they differ more or less from man. (4) The relations between unmodified organs. The commonest organs are the most important for fixing the rank of the division. Of two different plans of the same organ, the one most analogous to the plan of the organ in a superior group entitles its possessor to a rank superior to that of the possessor of the organ formed with less analogy to such plan. Thus, as gills have a greater analogy to lungs than the branching air tubes or tracheæ by which insects breathe, it follows that animals breathing by gills have a higher rank than those breathing by tracheæ, but a lower rank than those breathing by true lungs. (5) The relations between organs modified by use or circumstance, so that the plan of nature is disguised. Everything done by nature has a higher value than what has been effected by external circumstances. The distinction here drawn between nature and circumstances is one that Lamarck continually dwells on; and we shall recur to it hereafter. The third principle is that we ought to begin with the lowest organism, with the object of making the order of our distribution conformable to that of Nature, who works upwards by degrees from the lowest forms.

The artificial nature of these principles clearly appears, and has to a considerable extent influenced Lamarck's arrangement. However, like all persons who have laid down principles for clas-

sifying animals, he does not attempt to follow out strictly his own theories. He appears inclined to adopt a genealogical arrangement, but to have been beguiled by a wish to carry out his principles, and also by vague ideas of the tendency and designs of Nature.

The following is the arrangement given by Lamarck, both in the "Philosophie Zoologique" and the first volume of the "Histoire Naturelle."

<p>APATHETIC ANIMALS.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Infusoria.</li> <li>2. Polyps.</li> <li>3. Radiaria.</li> <li>4. Worms. (Epizoa.)</li> </ol>	}	Invertebrate Animals.
<p>SENTIENT ANIMALS.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Insects.</li> <li>6. Arachnida.</li> <li>7. Crustacea.</li> <li>8. Annelids.</li> <li>9. Cirrhipods.</li> <li>10. Mollusks.</li> </ol>		
<p>INTELLIGENT ANIMALS.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11. Fish.</li> <li>12. Reptiles.</li> <li>13. Birds.</li> <li>14. Mammals.</li> </ol>	}	Vertebrate Animals.

The true principles on which a natural system should be founded must of course depend on the connexion between the beings to be classified. If Lamarck be correct in his doctrine that animals form a series on a number of branching series, each consisting of broadly distinguishable forms, it is difficult to see how any other principle than that of relationship or descent can be applied; and the lower limits at least of the divisions instituted must, in such a case as Lamarck has pointed out, be arbitrary. The higher limits, however, of many divisions would be strictly marked out conformably to nature by the extent to which development has advanced. Man would still mark out one of the boundaries of the class *Mammalia*, although, if all connecting forms were known, it might be impossible to draw any but a conventional boundary between reptiles and mammals. If, however, Mr. Mivart's view of the nature of the Animal Kingdom be the more correct one, type must be a leading principle in natural systems, though even in this case it might be difficult to assign

due limits to the divisions. It might be found that many forms partook of more than one type, and could only be arranged in one class rather than another, according to which type appeared to preponderate. In order to judge of Lamarck's classification we must, therefore, examine his theory of living beings.

Species and varieties, he considers, are like other divisions of animals, arbitrary and not natural. All forms have their origin in the simplest organized bodies which Nature is continually producing by spontaneous generation, and are derived from them by insensible alterations, so that animals make a branching series, which is continuous, except where forms are lost. The organs of an animal are modified by time and favourable circumstances. New species arise when the surroundings are changed, as when a plant, originally a native of a moist plain, comes to grow on a dry hill-side. They may also, in some cases, be derived from hybrids. These changes of circumstances are not, however, the only cause of the formation of new species, for Lamarck in many places attributes to nature a continual power or tendency to develop new and more highly organized bodies. Thus he says (*Phil. Zool.* p. 221) :—

“ Il sera en effet évident que l'état où nous voyons tous les animaux est d'une part le produit de la composition croissante de l'organisation, qui tend à former une gradation régulière ; et de l'autre part qu'il est celui des influences d'une multitude de circonstances très différentes, qui tendent continuellement à détruire la régularité de la composition de l'organisation.”

Some passages might even lead one to suppose that Lamarck looked on nature as working by insensible gradations to a pre-appointed end, and as being hindered, and the symmetry of her plan impaired, by circumstances. Thus he explains the absence of a hard external skeleton in mollusks by the supposition that Nature in them is preparing to form the internal skeleton of vertebrates ; and therefore lays aside the hard shell provided for insects and crustaceans (*Phil. Zool.* p. 316 ; *Hist. Nat.* i. 147). He puts forward similar hypotheses to explain the absence of articulated limbs among annelids, or red-blooded worms (which, like Cuvier, he places above insects), and the absence of a double gangliated cord in mollusks (*Phil. Zool.* 313, *n.* 316). In the *Hist. Nat.* i. 133, he says :—

“ Le plan des opérations de la Nature à l'égard de la production des animaux, est clairement indiqué par cette cause première et prédominante qui donne à la vie animale le pouvoir de composer progressivement l'organisation, et de compliquer et perfectionner graduellement, non seulement l'organisation dans son ensemble, mais encore chaque système d'organes particulier, à mesure qu'elle est parvenue à les établir . . . . Mais une cause étrangère à celle-ci, cause accidentelle et par conséquent variable, a traversé çà et là l'exécution de ce plan sans néanmoins le

détruire, comme je vais le prouver. Cette cause effectivement a donné lieu, soit aux lacunes, réelles de la série, soit aux rameaux finis qui en proviennent dans divers points et en altèrent la simplicité, soit, enfin, aux anomalies qu'on observe parmi les systèmes d'organes particuliers des différentes organisations."

This second cause is found in the very different circumstances in which the various animals are placed.

On the other hand, an even greater number of passages from Lamarck's writings might be adduced to show that both his primary and his secondary causes are alike due to the effect of circumstances. The increasing complexity of organism being perhaps, as in Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory, caused by the residual, and, to borrow an image from astronomy, secular effects of numerous opposing circumstances. Lamarck's general theory of life as dependent on the action of subtle fluids is given elsewhere, but there is nothing in it to show anything like an intention in nature to pass from one type to another, or to explain her disuse of organs already brought to a high degree of complication. On the contrary, he generally speaks (*Hist. Nat. Introd. Part 3*) as if all changes, and consequently all advance, were due to the effect of circumstances, new wants, and the action of his subtle fluids, caloric and electricity. Nor is there anything in his account of nature to countenance the theory of intelligence or design in her. Although in other parts of his works he appears to regard her as a Demiurgus, an intelligent but subordinate and finite being, fashioning the world, both animate and inanimate, according to her will; yet when he comes to treat of nature herself (*Hist. Nat. Intr. Part 6*) it appears that she is nothing but motion and a collection of laws. But a law in physics is really nothing but a way of grouping or describing, more or less accurately, all the similar phenomena presented by bodies; and however general it may be, and however many apparently different effects it may explain, still always remains nothing but a statement, that different bodies behave or move in a similar manner. Lamarck's definition of nature, in fact, amounts to saying that she is a collection of facts or phenomena presented by bodies.

Life, again, is described by him (*l.c. p. 311*) as having neither intention, end nor will, as blind and limited, and existing only by the will of a superior and infinite Power. Nature is distinct from the material universe (*p. 314*), and consists (*p. 319*), first, of motion, and, secondly, of all the constant and immutable laws which regulate the movements and changes of bodies. He attacks the notion (which he says is that of most persons), that nature and God are the same, and declares that God is the all-powerful Creator of nature, while nature is not a being or an

intelligence, but an order of things everywhere subjected; and that design or will is not to be attributed to her, but that the appearance of it is derived from the operation of fixed laws originally combined for the purpose or end which her Supreme Author had in view. This is the case among animals, in whose formation he refuses to admit the action of Cuvier's final causes. He says:—

“En effet dans chaque organisation particulière de ces corps, un ordre de choses préparé par les causes qui l'ont graduellement établi, n'a fait qu'amener par des développemens progressifs de parties, régis par les circonstances, ce qui nous paraît être un but, et ce qui n'est réellement qu'une nécessité. Les climats, les situations, les milieux habités, les moyens de vivre et de pourvoir à sa conservation, en un mot les circonstances particulières dans lesquelles chaque race s'est rencontrée ont amené les habitudes de cette race; celles-ci y ont plié et approprié les organes des individus; et il en est résulté que l'harmonie que nous remarquons partout entre l'organisation et les habitudes des animaux, nous paraît une fin prévue, tandis qu'elle n'est qu'une fin nécessairement amenée” (p. 324).

It appears on the whole, therefore, that if Lamarck did in any way, like Mr. Mivart, conceive a vital force working independently of, and often against circumstances, his views were ill-defined and confused. Though he often mentions nature as a force which gradually perfects the organs of animals, yet he dwells at greater length and more clearly on the power of circumstances in modifying them. He lays down, that circumstances create new wants in the intelligent animals, and produce changes in the nutrition and other vital actions of plants. Thus, changes in the latter are brought about by differences in the amount of moisture in meadows, or by cultivation in gardens. The leaves of the *Ranunculus aquatilis*, which grow under water, are of a quite different character to those growing in the air. In the higher animals new wants are created by changed circumstances, and produce new actions; and, as the employment of an organ strengthens and enlarges it, while the disuse of an organ makes it deteriorate, the organs become thus altered in an individual subjected to a different set of external circumstances, and these alterations are (at least, if both parents be affected in a similar way) preserved in the offspring. It is therefore, according to Lamarck, an error to suppose that the nature or condition of an organ has led to its employment for a particular purpose; the real fact being that its employment has modified the organ, and fitted it better to perform the duty required of it. He gives (*Phil. Zool.* vol. i. p. 248), several instances of organs modified by use or disuse. Thus the teeth of whales, the eyes of the mole, the feet of serpents, have been deteriorated or lost by dis-

use. The head of acephalous mollusks has on the other hand been lost by a somewhat different cause, the excessive development of the mouth. The shortening of the intestines of drunkards he also attributed to disuse. On the other hand, the webs between the toes of water birds, the feet of perchers, the long legs of waders, the tongue of the woodpecker, the legs and neck of the giraffe, and the hind legs of the kangaroo, are all instances of organs augmented and developed by excessive use; while the hoofs of many quadrupeds, the formation of the sloth, and the peculiar position of the eyes of the flat fish, are examples of the modifications of organs produced by the peculiar manner in which they are used.

It is not at first evident how use could furnish webs to the toes of swimming birds or animals, as the immediate effect of the resistance of the water would rather be to wear away and destroy all excrescences or webs on the foot. Perhaps Lamarck considered their development as an effect of over-nutrition, or as produced by continual streams of nervous fluid directed to the toes in swimming, producing a swelling or turgescence of the tissues, and forming channels, and thus pushing out the tissues covering the toes.

Lamarck extended his views to men, whom he considered as descended from the quadrumana. The difference in their structure was caused by men losing their habit of climbing trees, and being compelled during many generations to walk on their hind legs. Having obtained the mastery over other races, men took possession of all the spots which suited them, drove other animals into deserts, and thus arrested their development, while they multiplied their own wants, and, consequently, their mechanical powers (*industrie*) and faculties; and thus increased the distance between themselves and other animals. An erect position, he says, is sometimes assumed by the chimpanzee, and does not seem even now altogether natural to man, as is shown by the unwillingness of a fat, paunchy child to walk or stand. This is, we believe, the only place where Lamarck shows any perception of the law established by Mr. Darwin—that the young animal seems often not to have acquired the characteristics separating the adult from the neighbouring forms from which it has been developed.

The argument in favour of the fixity of species drawn from the fact that the mummies of animals found in Egypt present the same characters as existing animals, is not, according to Lamarck, conclusive. It proves only that species in Egypt have not varied for the last three or four thousand years, which is not surprising; as the climate and external circumstances affecting the animals in question have remained unaltered, and it is only

by changes of circumstances and length of time that new species or varieties are produced. Lamarck thinks that no species have been actually lost, except some large land animals extirpated by man. Other species, which seem to have disappeared, have really left descendants, but they, owing to continual changes of level and climate in different parts of the earth, have assumed forms different from those of their ancestors. There is therefore no evidence of any general catastrophe by which all the species in existence at one time were destroyed, although there have been many local catastrophes.

Lamarck gives two tables showing the origin and descent of animals. The one in the "Philosophie Zoologique," ii. 463, the other, six years later, in the "Histoire Naturelle," i. p. 457. In the first, Lamarck makes two branches of the animal kingdom, which are, however, of very different importance. The first branch comprises the Infusoria, Polyps, and Radiaria (sea urchins, star fish, jelly fish, &c.) or nearly all the forms classed by Cuvier as Radiata, with the exception of intestinal worms. These, together with Planaria, Gordius and Nais, make up Lamarck's class of worms, which forms the root of his second branch, and from which he derives all the higher forms of animals. These again make two branches, one composed of insects, spiders, lobsters, and other segmented animals with jointed limbs, the other of the annelids or ring-worms, the cirrhipeds or barnacles, and the mollusks. From the last the vertebrates spring. First fishes, then reptiles, then birds, and from these the mono-treme mammals, the duck-bill and echidna. The other mammals, however, he derives, not from birds, but from reptiles, from which he considers amphibious mammals, such as the seal and the manatee to have sprung; while they in their turn gave rise to the three remaining divisions—the unguiculate or clawed, the unguulate or hoofed, and the cetacea or whales. It is obvious, therefore, that Lamarck did not consider the lowest mammals to be necessarily the earliest developed, since he derived cetaceans by a process of degradation from amphibious mammals.

The view presented of the probable descent of animals in Lamarck's second table is a great improvement on the first. He still keeps two great series of animals, but they are better connected than those of the first table. The first series commences with Infusoria, from which Lamarck supposes the Polyps to have sprung. These give rise to two different classes. First, the Radiaria; and, secondly, Ascidians, and through them to the acephalous and other Mollusks. Except that Lamarck includes Cuvier's Echinoderms in his Radiaria, instead of giving a position near the worms, a modern evolutionist could object but little to this part of the table. The second, or articulate series, is



not in such close conformity with modern ideas. The worms give rise to two classes, Annelids (ringed red-blooded worms) and Epizoa (parasites generally found attached to the eyes or gills of fish). These Epizoa Lamarck believed to be the source from which insects and the other Articulates with jointed limbs were derived. The Cirrhipeds (Barnacles) Lamarck rightly places with these animals, although Cuvier long after continued to class them among Mollusks, in consequence of the resemblance of their shells to those of Bivalves. Lamarck himself so far gives importance to this resemblance as to place Cirrhipeds above Crustaceans, in accordance with his theory of the importance of organs analogous to those of a superior class. The Vertebrates are here placed by themselves, unconnected with either series of invertebrate animals, although from several passages of the "Histoire Naturelle" it appears that Lamarck had not abandoned his theory that they were derived from the Mollusca.

In the first chapter of the second book of his "Phil. Zool." Lamarck endeavours to define the class of inanimate bodies. He recurs to the subject of the difference between them and living beings in the first volume of his "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres," where his views are given at greater length, and in some respects with more precision. In the "Philosophie Zoologique" he considers that inorganic substances are distinguished by having no individuality, by many of them being homogeneous (wholly solid, liquid or fluid), by their having no need of movement or nutrition, by their increasing by juxtaposition, and not by intussusception, and by their not originating from germs or being subject to death. From this definition it is impossible to know whether or not Lamarck intended to include substances derived from living beings, such as wood, wax, &c., in the class he was defining. All the characters he mentions are mere negations of characters of living beings, and might be more forcibly and concisely expressed by the words "inorganic" and "not living." Homogeneity, while it cannot be predicated of all inorganic substances, is a property (so far as our present knowledge extends) of some organic beings. An Amœba has all the appearance of a particle of animated jelly, and has a better claim to be called homogeneous than granite or most rocks, and as good a claim as wax or butter. In fact, it is evident that Lamarck, at the time he was writing this definition, had living beings in view, and would, had he cared to frame a logical work, have defined them instead of inorganic bodies. It would perhaps be as easy to make a satisfactory definition of unelectrified bodies as of inanimate or inorganic bodies. Many of the latter are subject to forces producing crystallization, but this, though a positive character, cannot be predicated of colloids such as gum, &c. One

common character is indeed attributed to all minerals by Lamarck—that of being derived from dead animals or plants. Stated broadly, as by him, this is an impossibility. He shows himself that the material constituents of all living beings were once inorganic. So that the old problem of the hen and the egg appears in an insoluble form.

In the second chapter of the *Philosophie Zoologique*, book ii., Lamarck attempts a definition of life, which he represents as producing various phenomena that yet do not constitute it. Life, he says (p. 403), in the parts of a body which possesses it, is an order and state of things which allows organic movements therein; these movements, which constitute active life, result from the action of a stimulative cause which excites them. This is not very clear. He goes on to lay down that active life requires stimuli, and a state of things which bestows the faculty of obeying them. This state of things consists in the existence of supple parts formed of cellular tissue and of liquid parts. The necessary exciting causes are to be found in the various subtle (imponderable) fluids which permeate all things, and which are in a continual state of agitation, produced by the motion of the earth, the varying positions of the heavenly bodies, and the seasons. Of such fluids the most important, perhaps the only ones concerned in producing life, are caloric and the electric fluid. To plants and to the lower animals the fluids in the surrounding media are sufficient to furnish the necessary stimuli; but in higher animals a continual production and renewal of the exciting fluids goes on. Some change even seems to take place in the nature of the fluids, the electric fluid being, as it were, animalized and converted into galvanic and nervous fluids. In plants only the liquid portions are acted on by the exciting causes, and their movements are probably due to caloric. In animals, however, the caloric produces swellings and contractions of the soft tissues as well as movements of the liquid parts. The caloric of higher animals is, according to Lamarck, derived from arterial blood.

It is to the important part played by heat that Lamarck attributes the great development of living beings in summer-time and in tropical climates. Water, light, and air, in addition to heat, are essential to the production of living beings. The phenomena of torpidity and hibernation are due to a loss of caloric; but in hibernating animals this loss is only partial, as is shown by the fact that, if the cold be increased, the animal awakes and becomes very restless. The chief effect of caloric on animated beings is to produce "orgasme"—a sort of tension or swelling, perhaps allied to tonicity. This "orgasme" exists in the soft parts of animals, and also, though obscurely, in plants, in which, however, it never gives rise to irritability, which is a power of moving in answer to

an external stimulus, rapidly and repeatedly, or as often as the stimulus is applied. The want of irritability is the great mark by which plants are to be distinguished from animals, but they also differ in having no digestive faculty, in their mode of growth, and in their chemical characters.

In the first volume of the *Histoire Naturelle* Lamarck again takes up the subject, and defines vegetables as being (1) unable to contract suddenly and repeatedly as often as a stimulus is applied to them; (2) unable to displace themselves; (3) having only their liquid parts capable of motion; (4) being without special internal organs, although possessing a number of vessels and canals; (5) without digestion, but only elaboration of the fluids which nourish them; (6) having displacement of fluid, but no circulation; (7) having two growths, one ascending, the other descending, from a vital nodus (*nœud vital*), situated at the origin of the root; (8) tending to grow perpendicular to the plane of the horizon; (9) being generally compound.

The motions of plants he considers to be due to mechanical causes, such as the action of elastic fluids, of springs (as in the action of certain plants in discharging their pollen), or to the action of the sun in drying up or driving away the fluids in particular parts. Some of the motions, like those of *Confervæ* and *Oscillatoriæ*, are slow, and not altered by external stimuli; while others, as in the case of the sensitive plant, can only be repeated after long intervals.

The facts established since the time of Lamarck show the futility of his theories. It is impossible to distinguish the movements of the ciliæ of *Zospores*, or of the amœbiform poisonous matter of the nettle from those of the ciliæ of infusoria or of *Amœba*. The second and third of Lamarck's characters are incorrect; the fifth and sixth are only verbal. How does elaboration differ from digestion, or circulation from displacement? The other characters are neither true of all plants, nor peculiar to them; and even if they were, they are not sufficiently important to separate plants from animals.

Animals, according to Lamarck, are distinguished by nine characters, generally corresponding to the characters of plants already enumerated. The first and second, fifth and eighth, consist in the possession of irritability and the power of moving. The third character is that animals execute no movements without stimulus, and can repeat such movements as often as the stimulus is employed; while, according to the fourth character, the movements show no comprehensible relation to their cause. The other characters are that animals are nourished by foreign compound substances, which they generally have the power of digesting; that they present great disparities in the composition

of their organization, and that they have no tendency to grow vertically.

It appears to us that definitions, in order to be useful, should consist either in a short explanation or description of the essential characters of the class, or in a description of one or more characters to be found in each member of the class, and serving as a test whether a given object does or does not belong to the class. In the second case it is important that the test should be accurate, but not that the character chosen should be important. Of this nature are the characters serving to discriminate between neighbouring genera in Zoology. In the first case, however, the characters chosen should be important; and if possible should disclose the essence, the actual nature and reason for existence of the class. This can hardly ever be done, except in pure mathematics and artificial or verbal sciences, such as Grammar, Heraldry, or Rhetoric. Our definitions share in the imperfections of our knowledge; and all we can do, when seeking to define a class of the components of which we know as little as we do of animals, is to take the characters which seem to be the most important and most universal, and state them as clearly and concisely as is possible. So long as the real nature of matter, of space, and of force is unknown, it is impossible to understand properly or define adequately life or feeling. The definitions can be but provisional, and in such it is not absolutely necessary that the characters chosen should be accurately coextensive with the class.

Judged from this point of view some of Lamarck's characters are, for his time, as important and indicative of the real nature of the class as any that could be chosen. In particular, the character which attributes to animals the power of executing movements, not communicated but excited, and bearing no comprehensible relation to their exciting cause, and the character which lays stress on the stream of matter continually flowing through the bodies of living beings, appear to us especially good. It is interesting to compare Lamarck's definition of animals with Mr. Herbert Spencer's definitions of Life, which he says ("Principles of Biology," p. 74) consists in "the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences;" or (p. 80) "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." These definitions are very ingenious, but do not throw much light on the nature of life, or of the effects produced by it; nor do they afford a test by which to decide whether a given substance is or not endued with life. Mr. Spencer himself admits that the characters are not strictly coextensive with the class; indeed he holds that no characters can be strictly coextensive consistently with the doctrine of Evolution.

Living beings are produced by generation, which Lamarck holds may be either spontaneous or from parents similar to the offspring. Direct or spontaneous generations take place continually among the simple forms to be found at the beginning of the animal and vegetable series, and most other animals and plants are derived from these earliest forms. Being ignorant of the eggs both of Polyps and Infusoria, he argues in favour of the occurrence of direct generations from the destruction which, during a rigorous winter, must overtake all the inhabitants of freshwater pools. He at one time considered that direct generation occurred only among the lowest forms, but he was later induced to believe that intestinal worms, and even external parasites of comparatively high organization, might be generated directly from corpuscles formed in the animals infested, and analogous in some degree to the corpuscles which reproduce the form of the parent. He thus recognises the two sorts of direct generation which Dr. Bastian has called respectively Abiogenesis, generation from inorganic matter; and Heterogenesis, or generation of a new and distinct animal or plant from organic matter or living bodies. Dr. Grant in his "Tabular View of the Animal Kingdom" (London, 1861), declares it is impossible to draw any definite line of demarcation between the various cells which build up one of the higher animals such as blood corpuscles, bone cells, &c., and the lowest isolated and independent animals. Mr. H. Spencer also propounds a somewhat similar theory, considering higher animals to be aggregates of the second or even third order, built up out of cells or aggregates of the first order. (Principles of Biology, ii. p. 77-112.) These views, however, are by no means the same as those of Lamarck, whose parasites spring from germs and not from cells. According to the observations of Pouchet and Bastian, a germ-like period of quiescence is the invariable precursor of every great heterogenetic change in any living body, and the particles from which the new being will arise are at first aggregated together so as to present the appearance of an egg or germ, which Pouchet calls the spontaneous egg. If the correctness of these observations were established, it would be a curious corroboration of Lamarck's surmise.

Lamarck goes on to explain the production of the simplest organic forms by direct generation. Gelatinous and mucilaginous bodies are alone fitted to receive life. Into the mass of these the ambient subtle fluids penetrate, increase the interstices, and produce a cellular tissue, in which various fluids and liquids can enter and move. Caloric here plays the most important part. The lower animals are entirely formed of this cellular tissue. In the higher animals and plants this tissue is modified. Vessels are wrought in it by the motion of fluids; membranes, such as

bark and skin, are formed by its compression; and all other organs are derived from and developed by it. Lamarck in forming his theory seems to have confounded the areolar or fibrous tissue enveloping the muscles and other organs with the primordial cells from which many organs originate.

New combinations of matter are being continually formed by living bodies, by means of their organic movements, with the aid of the affinities or relations of matter, and the tendency which all compound bodies have to self-destruction, a tendency which arises from some of the combined principles in such bodies requiring to be fixed by the restraint of an external force. Hence come secretions and assimilations. In youth the parts of the body are soft; nutrition is consequently more than sufficient to supply the waste of the tissues, and the animal increases in size. As time goes on, the softer portions of the tissues are more easily lost or dissipated in the continual flux of matter than the harder portions; while in the repairs effected by nutrition, the harder portions are comparatively more numerous. Thus the tissues gradually harden, and further growth becomes impossible. At first the surplus nutriment collected by every part of the body serves the reproductive faculty, and goes to form a small but similar body. As the hardness still increases, nutrition is carried on with greater difficulty, and at length ceases to be sufficient to maintain the body in a state in which vital movements can be carried on, and the animal dies. This view, which accounts for the resemblance between parents and their offspring by supposing that organs in the latter are formed out of particles derived from the corresponding organ in the former, was probably suggested to Lamarck by Buffon's theory of organic molecules. It is reproduced, although with many improvements and additions, in Mr. Darwin's theory of Pangenesis, but is much older than any of these authors. Lucretius (Bk. iv. l. 1212), reproducing the atomic theory of the Greeks, says:—

Fit quoque, ut intendum similes existere avorum  
 Possint, et referant proavorum sæpe figuras,  
 Propterea, quia multa modis primordia multis  
 Mista suo celant in corpore sæpe parentes,  
 Quæ patribus patres tradunt a stirpe profecta;  
 Inde Venus varia producit sorte figuras,  
 Majorumque refert voltus, vocesque, comasque.

The theories all seem to rest on some materialistic idea, that a particular force can be transmitted from one body to another by a transmission of some of the actual particles impressed with or moving in obedience to such force.

After giving this account of the general effect of life, Lamarck proceeds to discuss the principal faculties peculiar to different animals. He commences with his usual serene conviction of the truth of his own theories, and all facts to be deduced therefrom, by inveighing against the folly of expecting to find organs in animals lower in the scale of life than those in which rudimentary organs appear. As circulation is first sketched out in the class of insects, it is useless to seek for anything of the sort in Radiaria. It is equally absurd to attribute anything like respiratory functions to the leaves of plants. After this rather unfortunate beginning, he examines seven of the chief faculties. He defines—1. *Digestion*, as consisting in the destruction of the state of aggregation of the particles of aliment, and in a change of state and quality fitting the aliment, to form chyle and to repair the essential fluid: and 2. *Respiration*, as the process by which the essential fluid is repaired, after sudden alterations of it, where nutrition is too slow a process. The alterations intended are those arising from the supposed sudden dissipation of caloric, electricity, and nervous or other subtle fluids necessary for producing motion and other vital functions. Lamarck, however, while he recognises oxygen as the most important principle of this reparation, makes no allusion to any development of heat from the combination of such oxygen. He divides the special systems of respiratory organs into four sorts, which are Lungs and Tracheæ, fitted for breathing air; and Branchiæ and Aquiferous Tracheæ, adopted for breathing water: the last being found in Radiaria (echinoderms and jelly-fish). In animals not having a definite circulation, respiration is effected in organs diffused over the whole body, the respired fluid carrying its influence to every part, and the essential fluid not travelling further than the respired fluid. In animals having a circulation, on the other hand, the respired fluid is admitted into a special organ, and there is a special circulation of the essential fluid, either complete or incomplete, within such organ. A very slow movement of the essential fluid takes place among the infusoria, and probably a more rapid one among the polyps. In higher animals a separate system of organs is required to carry on the definite circulation which these obtain. This system is first sketched out in the Arachnida (spiders, mites, &c.), and formed in the Crustacea. The theory—that respiration is intended to effect changes in the circulating fluid—seems open to some question. The ultimate object is to provide the organs of the body with the oxygen necessary to enable them to carry on the vital functions, and the alteration which undoubtedly takes place in the blood seems generally to be but a means of carrying the oxygen to these organs. The other functions

Lamarck mentions are those of the muscles, of sensation, of sex, of circulation and intelligence.

In the third part of his *Phil. Zool.* Lamarck develops at some length his theory of sensation, instinct, thought and will, as dependent on the motions of a subtle fluid, which he considers to be probably an animalized form of electricity. He believes that the fluids to which he attributed irritability and motion in animals may, like their blood, become more complex and retainable—"contenable"—in the higher animals, although still remaining invisible. A special fluid traverses the nerves, and being used and lost in them, is continually being separated from the blood of the arteries to make up the loss. The blood itself, as we have seen, is restored by means of respiration to its former state. The great separation of this fluid from the blood takes place in the grey matter of the brain, and other nervous centres, which is in a great measure composed of small arteries.

The nervous system always consists of two parts. (1) A central mass, from which, the fluid necessary to excite the muscles to contract, starts, and to which, the fluid conveying sensation comes. In vertebrata this centre is probably the ring (*Pons Varolii*?) of nervous matter round the continuation of the spinal cord into the brain, the medulla oblongata, or the medulla oblongata itself. In insects, the first bilobed ganglion is also a centre; but these animals may have several centres. The centres are the parts first formed, and though other parts may be larger and more developed, this is only the effect of the general law that exercise promotes growth. (2.) The nerves are the second portion. They consist of a medullary pulp, covered by a sheath, which retains the subtle fluid continually traversing them. They are, however, open at their extremities to enable the fluid to communicate with the various parts of the body. The pulp is secreted from the blood, or essential fluid of the animal. A special sheath covers every nerve-fibre, in addition to the fibrous envelope of the whole. The nerves were produced after the formation of the various centres by the movements of the special subtle fluid, working out channels and passages by which more easily to arrive at the place where it was required.

This view of the origin of nerves is not unlike the one given by Mr. Herbert Spencer (*Biology*. Section 302).

Movements, when effected by irritability in the lowest animals, are, as has been seen, due entirely to external stimuli; but Lamarck repeatedly lays down that muscular action is always accompanied by nervous action, of which it is the earliest and commonest effect. In higher animals sensation or feeling is also produced in the nervous system, and in higher animals still, which have a



special organ (the hemispheres of the brain or hyper-cephalon, as Lamarck terms it)—consciousness, thought, moral feeling, and will, also result. The precise action of the nervous system in those animals, in which it subserves muscular action only, is not laid down with any accuracy by Lamarck. He states that such action may be produced in three ways—(1) by external action; (2) by the internal feeling not regulated by the will; and (3) by such feeling regulated to a greater or less extent by the will. In all animals in which a nervous system exists, he considers it probable that the internal feeling exists. Its action, however, will be best understood by first taking the phenomena of feeling.

The soft character of the nerves, and especially of their medullary pulp, renders it impossible to adopt Hartley's view, and to consider them as vibrating cords, or transmitting impressions by vibrations of their component matter. They, however, all contain a portion of the subtle nervous fluid, which, by its movements or compressions and the shocks it receives, gives rise both to sensation and the emotions of the internal feeling. Every impression given to any particular part produces a shock to the whole amount of nervous fluid contained in the nervous system. This shock is propagated along the nerve to the centre, and thence to every part of the system, and afterwards produces a reaction, which comes from every part of the system except the particular nerve first affected, and is consequently propagated along such nerve, the only one not reacting. This causes the sensation to be referred to the extremity of this nerve, in the part originally impressed. On the other hand, the internal feeling is due to a general shaking of the nervous fluid, not accompanied by any reaction. The continual small impressions such fluid receives give rise to the feeling of personal identity, "*le moi*," while the more violent impressions produce actions and thoughts by sending portions of the nervous fluid to the brain, or directly to the muscles. By this automatic or involuntary actions are produced, as when a man starts at a loud sound, or flings down a hot iron. Consciousness only arises when a part of the nervous fluid traverses the special organ (the hyper-cephalon), in which its movements leave traces of its currents. These traces produce alterations in the currents which afterwards traverse the same part, and by these means feelings and moral sensibilities are produced, which by such alteration or modification of the movements of the nervous fluid give rise to corresponding actions. Habits in man and the higher animals, and instincts in the lower ones, (especially remarkable in insects,) are actions produced by the nervous fluid moving along courses which have been worn out by repeated currents flowing in the same or similar directions. The internal

feeling has thus a threefold faculty. First, to give notice of sensations whereby physical sensibility is produced ; secondly, to give consciousness of ideas and thoughts by sending portions of the nervous fluid to move in the channels or courses already worn in the hyper-cephalon, whereby moral sensibility is produced, as hereafter mentioned ; and, thirdly, to make the animal act instinctively or involuntarily. Only a small part of the nervous fluid is at the disposition and will of the animal, and this part is speedily used up in continual movements or intellectual operations, and requires to be reproduced before the animal can go on acting or thinking. It is thus that the sense of fatigue arises, the muscles not being themselves altered.

Conscious will and ideas arise from the motion of the nervous fluid in the organs of intelligence, the cerebral lobes or hyper-cephalon. This organ does not react on the nervous fluid. It is composed of innumerable cavities, to which the nerve fibres lead. The act of attention is necessary to prepare the organ to be impressed ; without such act, an impression will be perceived, but not felt ; but when attention has prepared the channel, the agitation of the nervous fluid originally produced by an external object is communicated to nervous fluid which traverses the hyper-cephalon, and engraves traces of its course on that organ. A simple idea is thus produced, which can be recalled by the nervous fluid being directed on the traces of the original sensation, and with the aid of attention bringing back the features of such traces to the notice of the internal consciousness. Lamarck denies the existence of any innate ideas, though they would almost seem to be a necessary consequence of his theories. If the offspring bears the close resemblance to the parent which he attributes to it, and ideas are the results of channels actually sculptured in the brain, it would appear at least highly probable that the child would be born with the power of reproducing all the ideas of its parent. Lamarck considers dreams and madness caused by disturbed currents of the nervous fluid traversing various parts of the hyper-cephalon, and the traces of many ideas uncontrolled by the internal feeling.

In forming judgments, a stream of fluid is divided and directed by the internal feeling on to different traces of ideas already engraved in the brain, after tracing which, the different portions acquire as many modifications of their original motions as there are traces of simple ideas, and then reuniting, these different motions are combined into one complex movement which produces the judgment ; complex ideas are derived from judgments, and complex ideas and judgments of the second order are obtained from complex ideas of the first order, in a manner similar to that in

which the complex ideas of the first order are derived from simple ideas.

Will is a determination by thought, and always the effect of a judgment. It is not really free, but the necessary result of the previous operation, as the quotient is in an arithmetical process. The appearance of irregularity in the workings of the will and the enormous variations in the results obtained from different people and at different times, arise from differences in the organ, produced by disposition, age, health, and other elements, all of which take part in the formation of the judgment. Attention is an act of the internal feeling acted on by a want or desire which directs a part of the nervous fluid which is at the disposition of the individual, on to the organ of intelligence. Preoccupation prevents this act, and then ideas or feelings do not engrave themselves on this organ.

The first thing that strikes one after reading Lamarck's attempted explanation of the processes of feeling, thought, and other acts of intelligence, is that even if it were true, it would explain nothing. There is the same difficulty, neither diminished nor increased, in the mind being conscious of a stream of nervous fluid in the hyper-cephalon, as in its being conscious of the pressure of a solid substance on the finger. It is possible, or at least conceivable, that such a stream may be an essential link in the chain connecting external phenomena with consciousness. It is certain that some operation in the lobes of the brain is such a link, but it is highly improbable that Lamarck's fanciful sketch represents what really takes place, and if it did, it would throw no light soever on the problem of consciousness. Lamarck has described a sort of hydraulic calculating machine which requires both to be originally set in motion and also to have its final results read off and interpreted by an intelligent mind. Such a mind he seems sometimes to attribute to what he calls the internal feeling, which, however, he often treats as only a sort of valve. In one respect he is particularly unfortunate. He has based all his explanations of life and intellect on theories of imponderable fluids, like the caloric invented by Black, and the various electric fluids. These theories had, even before Lamarck wrote his *Philosophie*, been assailed by Count Rumford. (*Phil. Trans.*, A.D. 1798, and Sir Humphry Davy, *Chemical Philosophy*, 1812.) They were not, however, really overthrown till Joole and Mayer, respectively, published their views and experiments on the nature of heat, about 1842-3. Lamarck was so fond of imponderable fluids that he even considered sound to be propagated not by air, but by a peculiar imponderable fluid, which he elsewhere represents as a modified form of caloric. He based his theory on the discrepancy between the observed velocity of sound and

that calculated for it by Newton, and refused to admit the explanation of Lagrange and Laplace, who showed Newton's calculations to be defective in not taking account of the action of heat in increasing the elasticity of the air. These physical theories of Lamarck now impart to his biological speculations a much greater air of falseness and fancifulness than they really deserve. In order properly to do justice to them when comparing them with modern speculations on the same subject, they should be as it were translated out of the language of subtle fluids into that of transmutable forces. Lamarck has in several cases anticipated theories which have since been advocated with great ingenuity, but he has in such cases often disguised them in phraseology borrowed partly from ideas now exploded, and partly from his own imagination. His views of life generally agree with those of Mr. Darwin and Mr. H. Spencer in so far as they all endeavour to explain the phenomena of life by the action of ordinary physical forces, and refuse to recognise any special vital force or fluid. On the other hand, he held the doctrine of the daily recurrence of spontaneous generation, which doctrine is at the present day advanced chiefly by the advocates of the principle that some special form of force is necessary to produce vital phenomena. In mental philosophy, as we have seen, Lamarck altogether rejected the doctrine of the freedom of the will, while in religion his views seem to have been a curious mixture of Pantheism and Deism.

## INDEPENDENT SECTION.

*[Under the above title a limited portion of the Westminster Review is occasionally set apart for the reception of able articles, which, though harmonizing with the general spirit and aims of the work, contain opinions at variance with the particular ideas or measures it may advocate. The object of the Editor, in introducing this department, is to facilitate the expression of opinion by men of high mental power and culture, who, while they are zealous friends of freedom and progress, yet differ widely on special points of great practical concern, both from the Editor and from each other.]*

### ART. VIII.—THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH.

**F**OLLOWING that essential principle of Liberalism which requires that all questions of common interest and concern be treated from a common and universal point of view, I propose in this paper to treat of the Established Church neither as a Churchman nor as a Nonconformist, but simply as a member of the State. It is as a citizen that I see with regret an ancient and noble department of the State, endowed with vast wealth of resource, high prestige, a wide-spreading and magnificent organization, and, in short, every appliance for promoting in the highest degree the highest welfare of the whole nation, and yet restricting its benefits to a moiety of the nation, and conferring even upon that moiety but a doubtful good, while to the rest it is a fountain of perpetual bitterness.

That the position of the Established Church of England should be regarded as a grievance by the Unestablished, or Nonconformist Church in England, will appear natural and inevitable when we consider that, of the immense property set apart by the piety of many generations for promoting the moral and spiritual welfare of the whole English people under State supervision, the entire control and disposal are in the hands of a body which comprises only about one-half of the nation.

It might be supposed from this statement of the case that the party most aggrieved were the Nonconformists; and, to judge from the demeanour of that party, the supposition would appear to be justified. But there are very many within the Established Church who find the preponderance of grievance to be with themselves, inasmuch as they are affected by the causes which

have led to its limitation far more seriously than any can be who are without its pale.

But while we may reasonably take this view of the case as between the two parties referred to, there is yet a third party which suffers more seriously than either, and one to whose grievances the citizen is bound to attach a paramount importance. This is the nation itself. In a vast variety of ways, all springing from the causes which have so disastrously affected the Church, the development of the nation in every direction, social, political, religious, intellectual, and moral, in which development is desirable, is arrested, retarded, or diverted. For the most fatal element that can be introduced into a nation, as into a family, is the spirit of dogmatism—the spirit that leads a man to believe that he is in exclusive possession of all truth; and it is this spirit, with its accompanying host of malignant sprites, that our Church has inherited from Rome, and retained in all its intensity, thereby fostering bigotry, intolerance, jealousy, dissonance, insincerity, and lowering the standard of morality generally by exalting authority above reason, assertion above proof, profession above conviction, and opinion above conduct.

The modes whereby some of the parties concerned have attempted to account for the evils they cannot fail in some measure to perceive are characteristic of their respective standpoints. Thus the Nonconformists are unanimous in charging all the blame upon the connexion of the Church with the State. Drawing a rigid line of demarcation between things sacred and things secular, they contend that the union is one of Christ with Belial, and call loudly for the “liberation of religion from State control.”

In the Establishment itself the conviction is universal that the present position cannot long be maintained, and opinion on the subject is mainly of two kinds, the party holding one desiring to be separated from the State, solely in order, apparently, to be free to return upon the doctrine and practice of Rome, and thus become more exclusive, and recede still further from the catholicity incumbent upon an institution claiming to be national; and the other party desiring to retain the State connexion, but at the same time to obtain various degrees of relaxation in the conditions of membership.

For the simple unattached citizen, who views things from a standpoint at once practical and ideal, and disregards both tradition and authority, none of these parties have lighted upon either the true grievance or the true remedy. Bringing the achromatic light of reason and experience to bear upon the question, he hesitates not to apply to things claiming to be divine the same principles and tests which he finds indispensable for

things secular. For him the faculty of truthfulness is sacred, whatever it be applied to, and he knows of but one set of faculties whereby truth is to be ascertained. These are the mind and conscience of the living generations of men—faculties which must be left to operate freely, if their verdict is to be rendered in accordance with the facts.

It is, therefore, to the limitations placed by the Church upon opinion and expression, that the citizen finds himself compelled to ascribe, not only its own shortcomings, but also a large share of the defects under which we labour as a people and nation.

It appears, then, to the citizen that the desired end is to be attained only by applying afresh the principles of the Reformation, and completing that great movement by emancipating the Church from all its trammels. Those trammels are not what the Nonconformist imagines, nor is the end precisely that which the High Churchman desires. Those who come nearest to the citizen's view belong to the third party, described as the Broad Church. It has not yet spoken out very clearly; but this may be because its spokesmen have been clergymen, and under bondage. Perchance these will not refuse to let a layman formulate for them the wishes they are debarred from expressing.

While freedom is what, in the view of all the parties concerned, the Church requires, the freedom which alone the citizen can reasonably grant is not of the kind imagined by the others.

It is somewhat remarkable that, while professing the greatest veneration for the Reformation, the Nonconformists should have failed to comprehend its spirit and intention. It does not seem to have occurred to them, while calling for the liberation of religion from State-control, that it is not the religion, but the ecclesiastical organization, of the Establishment which is really controlled by the State. The State has no interest whatever in narrowing the intellectual boundaries of the Church or restricting its sphere of action. The limitations under which the Church suffers are really self-imposed; and though they have the sanction of the State, and are enforced by the law, in common with the conditions of other corporate bodies, as constituting a contract, they were specified and insisted on by those whom we may regard as the officials of the department. The State, to which the Reformation was originally due, would, doubtless, have readily acquiesced in complete freedom but for the action of those Churchmen whose influence was paramount, and who used it to arrest and subvert the movement.

By demanding the separation of the Church from the State, while failing to object to the imposition of dogmatic limitations, the Unestablished or Nonconformist sections of the Church in England have betrayed their ignorance of the real significance of

the Reformation, as well as of the point where the pressure really falls. Had they raised their voices on behalf of freedom of opinion and expression, and shown by example their faith in the power of truth to win its way in a fair field, they might then indeed claim to be true children of the Reformation, and worthy to aid in completing it by striving for the emancipation of the National Church from its fetters.

This section of our countrymen, however, as I have said, has not yet learnt what the Reformation meant. For it has not yet learnt that, though fighting Rome with its own weapons, and using Dogma to combat Dogma, the Reformation was essentially a repudiation of all dogma. Using the dogma of Biblical Infallibility as an engine of destruction against the dogma of Papal Infallibility, the Reformation, by its very assertion of the right of private judgment in the choice of Infallibilities, struck at the root of all Infallibility, and consequently of all dogma whatever. And it is through their failure to comprehend and accept the spirit of the Reformation, that the Nonconforming communions have subjected their own religion to precisely the same bondage, that religion suffers from in the Established Church; and in their confusion and distress they cry out for the liberation of religion from State control, when all that the State is interested in controlling is the Ecclesiastical organization, and not religion at all.

It is only a superficial view of our recent School legislation that could obtain for the Nonconformists credit for having reached any sound principle in respect of dogmatic teaching. They insist only that such teaching shall not in any way proceed from the State. And so far from objecting to the imposition itself of definite theological tenets, they, with scarce an exception, rival Rome in enforcing their own favoured dogmas among themselves. The fact is notorious that the children of Nonconformists are not permitted to grow up unbiassed in respect of their religious conclusions, or left free to form them for themselves, any more than in the most sacerdotally governed communions.

Having, however, by the part they have taken in promoting the School-board system, consented to, or rather insisted on, State-interference on behalf of the education of the young, they have cut from under themselves the ground of their objection to the principle of a State Church.

In more ways than one is the establishment of the School Boards an attempt to create an institution nearly corresponding to the Church. In fact, the affinity between the Church and the School is so close, both in design and function, that it is impossible to draw a rigid line between them,—as impossible as between youth and age. For, rightly considered, what the School is to



youth, that the Church is, or ought to be, to maturity—the continual developer of the mind and spirit in a continually ascending progression, as co-architects of the fabric of man. If thus far man be but a squat and distorted figure, it is because, for the most part, instead of building him up, his architects have been content to sit upon him.

Our recent School legislation, in which may be included our University reforms, is based on the recognition of two broad well-defined principles. One, that the State, as a State, should provide facilities for the development of the faculties, moral, intellectual, and spiritual, of its members. The other, that it should not control the direction or limit the extent of that development.

Now, as it is impossible to draw a line between the rudimentary education of the youth and the higher education of the adult, it is impossible consistently to call upon the State to provide the School, and at the same time forbid it to establish the Church. For what but a part of the higher or highest education of man is the teaching that an enlightened Church ought to afford?

This, then, is our position at present. The Nonconformists concede the principle of the Established State Church as a teaching institution, but refuse to the State any right to impose dogmatic tenets. In other words, if the Established Church were made a dogmaless institution, and freed from limitation upon opinion and expression, the Nonconformists would be able to accept it as the crown and completion of the system of education whereof our National Schools constitute the base.

Having thus shown that the Nonconformist half of the Church and Nation cannot consistently object to the liberation of religion from its dogmatic limitations, let us see what reception the measure is likely to receive in the Establishment itself.

It is certainly not from the large class of highly educated laymen who, nominally at least, belong to the Church, that opposition is to be apprehended. It is a matter notorious to all who mix with these that whatever their vocation, philosophic, literary, scientific, artistic, or in any other way professional, they are unanimous in favour of the most extended relaxation of the terms of Church membership. The effect of the existing limitations is to cut them off, not only from the benefit of its ministrations, but also from one of the most coveted of careers; and year by year we see them flocking more and more to other professions, owing solely to these limitations, until the Church is fairly starving for lack of men of ability to minister in it.

Judging from the experience of other departments of the State when a re-construction is proposed, we might expect the officials

of this one to be unanimous and strenuous in their opposition. But so far from this being the case, a large and influential party among the clergy of the Establishment are avowedly eager for the change. While there is a multitude of others who, without openly avowing their desire, indirectly betray their approval by habitually making for themselves a selection from the dogmas they have sworn to, and explaining away, rejecting, or ignoring the rest.

By the imposition of tests, not only did the Church make itself responsible for innumerable immoralities, but it laid within itself the seeds of mortal disease. By persisting in their retention, it will commit suicide outright, for, claiming to lay down a pathway of approach for the soul towards God, it virtually inculcates Atheism. By relegating all revelation of truth to a distant past, it insists that the world should be governed by the dead and not by the living. By requiring that we shape our conceptions of the Universe by the conceptions of men who lived and died ages ago, it requires of the Almighty that he limit his manifestation of truth to us, to the kind and degree vouchsafed to them. The creed or belief of any age is but the index to the height of the Divine presence of truth in that age. And the design of the religious test is to limit all perception and expression of truth to the standard of some one age. The whole principle of religious tests, therefore, whether in Church established or in Church independent, involves the wild presumption of dictating to God as well as to all future generations of men. For it not only prohibits further progress to man, but it prohibits to God further manifestation of himself. This is nothing less than an assumption of infallibility on the part of those who practise it. And involving as it does the banishment of God and truth from the living world, it is essentially an atheistic principle.

To come to that party within the Established Church whose members implicitly receive all its dogmas, and believe that without them it would be no Church at all. Even to these the change we are considering would in some respects be a boon. For, where opinion and expression are free, there will be no impediment to the utterance of their convictions, and their utterances will have the additional weight of unimpeachable sincerity. Granting them their position, that the traditional dogmatic system is necessary to the constitution of a true Church, they will still have the satisfaction of believing themselves to be that Church, even though constituting a portion of a dogmaless Establishment; and they will still be free to strive to increase their following.

This, if I mistake not, is precisely the position assumed by the members of the High Church party in the Establishment at

the present moment. They regard themselves as alone the true Church within the Church of England. The main difference in their position would consist in the fact, that their limitations would be purely and avowedly self-imposed, and devoid of any recognition by the State. But as they already repudiate the authority of the State, both in doctrine and practice, this would not signify to them.

Of course the question does not fail to suggest itself—Are they right in defining a Church as a dogmatic institution? It would be no easy task to produce evidence proving that it was the intention of its Founder to make it so, or that it should for ever continue to be so. History exhibits dogma itself as capable of development. Why should it not develop into something beyond and above dogma; even as the seed originally buried in the ground loses itself by developing into the roots and stem of a fair plant patent to all?

So far from the assumption, that dogma constitutes the essence of the Christian Church being obligatory, they are surely not without justification, who find in the history of its Founder indications—that for him life was more than belief, conduct more than opinion, practice more than theory, love more than knowledge; and that he would Himself, could he be consulted afresh, be foremost in reprobating the importance attached to what at best are but human deductions from his imperfectly reported utterances. This is far from being an untenable or unreasonable view; and for those who hold it, there is little difficulty in believing that, so far from dogma being necessary to a true Church, it is precisely in proportion as the Christian dogma has been brought forward, and the Christian life withdrawn into the background, that the Church has lost sight of its mission, and failed to be a true Church.

But whatever the convictions of any party in a body claiming to be national, it must be content with the liberty to hold and teach them, without requiring that they be authoritatively imposed on others. It is equal justice that we require of the State, and equal justice forbids the selection and imposition of any set of opinions, no matter how strongly their adherents may be attached to them.

Dogma at best is but a slippery basis. There are few dogmas of which the terms are not capable of various interpretations. We all know what became of it in the domain of Astronomy. True, this is an exact science. But Theology is by no means secure from peril through it. It is notorious that numbers of the most highly educated and intelligent of the clergy receive in a merely subjective sense dogmas which they allow their uneducated congregations to regard in a very different way. When people

generally become aware that multitudes of clergymen, High as well as Broad Church, consider themselves justified in reciting creeds without having a particle of belief in their objective or historical truth, and are content if they can find in them a subjective or spiritual meaning, and that herein consists the sole barrier that divides them from what is vulgarly regarded as perjury; a barrier, however, which, slender as it is, many of their brethren are without—the fate of the Church as a dogmatic, or any other kind of institution, will be sealed, and much that might be made profitable for spiritual culture be indignantly rejected.

With feelings of profound commiseration should we regard the men who occupy the positions last described. It is because the spirit of truthfulness in them is too strong to be quenched, but strives ever against the exigences of a state of society whose morality is in conflict with that of nature, that they find themselves exposed to the charge of apparent insincerity. Not upon them, caught young, as most of them have been, and fettered in a position from which they can in nowise escape; but upon the system we have retained from Rome must the blame be cast. For centuries has our entire social system been on all sides enclosed by a quickset hedge of tests, subscriptions, vows, and oaths. At every turn we have been met by oaths political, oaths social, oaths ecclesiastical, oaths religious, oaths theological. Everywhere have men been bribed by privileges, honours, and emoluments, to swear that they will maintain the existing fabric of opinion and custom, rather than endeavour to ascertain and teach what is truest and best. And so, truthfulness and improvement have been authoritatively suppressed, until of England it may emphatically be said—"Because of swearing the land mourneth."

It is true that some clergymen agree with the late Frederick Denison Maurice in regarding the Athanasian Creed as a valuable expression of the highest truth, and the conviction is one with which a thoughtful layman may sympathize. But what a layman cannot endure is that any, claiming to be teachers of the people, should conceal the real significance which that or any other symbol of their faith possesses for them, and leave their hearers under the impression that it is other than it really is. The age of mystery and its complement deceit, has for ever passed away; and the Church will not be the less a true Church for abandoning its traditions in respect thereto.

The abolition of tests would involve the abolition of prosecutions for heresy, and of those hybrid institutions the ecclesiastical courts. No small boon would this be to the bishops, whose chief function then would consist in providing congregations with

teachers likely to work in profitable accord with them on the basis of free speech and free expression.

It has been asserted that such a reconstruction would have the effect of turning the "Church" out of the Establishment; but it seems to me that rather would it give admission to that half of the Church which is now out of it. Most gladly would the Nonconformists, I believe, return to it as to an inheritance from their portion in which they have long been unjustly excluded. The admission to the function of minister of any man who, by ability, attainments, and character, has shown himself worthy to instruct his fellows, combined with liberty for the ministers and their congregations to determine their own formularies, will leave no pretext for Nonconformity. If under a régime so expanded as to allow of every able cultivated man presenting the best the universe has revealed to him of itself, we fail to find that chief good which is the ultimate object of all earnest striving, we cannot be expected to be more successful under a continuance of the limitations prevailing hitherto.

The general Christian consciousness, of which dogma in its best sense, is regarded as the formulated expression, is identical in kind with other consciousness. Any difference, arising as it does from difference of cultivation, must be in direction and degree. Let all have adequate culture, and then, if dogma be true, the consciousness of all will be adequate for the recognition of its truth.

With freedom in place of dictation as the basis of the reconstructed Establishment, and consequently no harassing "Act of Uniformity" to be appealed to in behalf of interference, the lamentable bitterness and hostility which now animate each section against the others, will disappear. We have lately seen on our walls placards proclaiming Disestablishment as the best cure for Ritualism. Probably a better cure for that, or for any system of doctrine or practice which is based upon erroneous or partial views, would be found in the freedom of treatment that must result from throwing open the doors to the entire intellect of the country. But it is not for the sake of "curing" some peculiarity which we ourselves do not happen to have, that we should aim at the Church's emancipation; but for the sake of more justice, more truth, more charity, all of which will come with more liberty.

But so far from regarding Disestablishment as a "cure for Ritualism," there is good reason to consider whether the propounders of such remedy have ever tried to realize in their minds the spectacle which would be presented by the English Church after its removal from the tempering influences of the State. Let us endeavour to anticipate it.

Rich and powerful in its splendid and wide-reaching organization, its multitude of cathedrals, churches, chapels, and school-houses, and endowments of manifold variety, this great sect will overshadow the land, to the extinction of all rivals; gaining vigour and boldness as it becomes oblivious of the long nightmare of secular influence; ranging itself more firmly than ever around its traditional dogmas; and, strong in its new-found unity, dictating terms to the State itself, as a new monster to a new Frankenstein. Scarcely a year passes without some incident that reveals the tremendous amount of unreasoning enthusiasm that is pent-up in the English breast, longing for some object on which to exercise itself. Let the Church, as it is, be set loose to fight the battle of life for itself, and its members, forgetting their differences, will manifest on its behalf an enthusiasm that will utterly defy reason, and perchance carry the country captive to a new Rome, with its head-quarters in our midst. Farewell then, will it be, to freedom and the hoped-for civilization of the future; and farewell to the supremacy of the State; for of little avail will be its resistance to fierce and wide-spread fanaticism backed by such union and wealth of resource as the Church disestablished will command. Farewell, in short, to man's mind and conscience as the ultimate court of appeal for truth and right. By suffering the Church to have a dogmatic basis at all, the State put the knife to its own throat. By fostering it into power and greatness, and then disestablishing it, leaving that basis unimpaired, the State will inflict upon itself the fatal wound. It was a mere jingle of words that Count Cavour uttered and that has so attracted our Nonconformists. "A free Church in a free State"—where the Church is possessed of overwhelming wealth, prestige, and power—is an impossibility. We might as well try to imagine a free army in a free State. The Italian statesman mistook the point where alone freedom can be accorded to a national Church.

With such a vision before them, it is no wonder that numbers of the national clergy, caring all for the Church and nothing for the State, are as eager for disestablishment as any Nonconformist. It is to them but another name for supremacy. They know that the legislature would not turn them adrift portionless. They know that all the other religious bodies together could not vie with them in prestige and influence. And they know that the more daring their assumption, the more resistless would be their fascination for those who constitute the bulk of every community, the semi-educated and the emotional. In the Church disestablished the majority will rule; not the majority of a community already free, enlightened, and given to healthy disputation, but a majority wedded to tradition, and eager to

justify their independence by consolidating their newly-gained empire. It seems impossible to over-estimate the damage which the creation of such a power within the State will inflict upon the State—a power whose fundamental principles are in direct antagonism to those of the State. The citizen, therefore, can recognise but one condition on which the State can turn the Church adrift and allow it to retain a particle of national property—namely, the condition that the Establishment be given up to the nation, and not to a section of it merely.

So far from discerning the effect of separating the Establishment from the State, the body calling itself the "Society for the Liberation of Religion" proposes to appropriate the property of the Establishment to the endowment in perpetuity of the very system of dogma to which alone religion is really in bondage. Ignoring the self-evident proposition, that religion cannot be free when opinion is biased and fettered, and consequently that the endowment of opinion is equally immoral and pernicious, whether it proceed from the State or from a private source, the Society I have named reserves all its indignation for the State connexion alone. Whereas, if it were consistent in its professions, it would call upon the State to exercise once again the power which it wielded at the Reformation, and itself set "religion" free, abolishing the articles, tests, creeds, and whatever else serves to fetter religion in the Establishment. The abolition of the restrictions at present imposed upon opinion, alone is requisite to make the Establishment available for all classes of thinkers and teachers, and convert it into a really national institution. If, then, the nationalization of the Establishment is what the Nonconformists really aim at, why do they not propose such an abolition of its limitations, instead of proposing to take it out of the hands of the State altogether? They must know that it is only under the pressure of the State that such a reform can be accomplished; and that, left to itself, the "Church" would fasten the fetters upon "Religion" tenfold more firmly than before. For the experience of all dogmatic religious organizations proves how delusive would be any expectation that "the Church," when "liberated from State control," would or could reform itself. Its property and its traditions would constitute a nucleus around which its constituents would cling with the indomitable persistency of a mechanical attraction. Indeed, so far from putting an end to the endowment of dogma by the State, the scheme propounded by the Liberation Society would actually put it out of the power of the State ever to withdraw such endowment. It is as if, grudging the payment of an annual income the Society insisted on

making over the capital from which the income is derived; and this is precisely the course we have pursued in Ireland.

But when fitted for the reception of the nation by being released from its dogmatic limitations, there will no longer be any plea for its severance from the State. For it will then be the dogmaless National Church that is the natural and necessary complement of unsectarian national education in primary school and university.

For the citizen, then, there is but one way of adapting the Church Establishment to the national needs; and that is by freeing, not its organization from State-control, but its formulas and teaching from all limitation by Article, Test, and Creed, and whatever serves to make it an exclusive and sectarian body; so that the whole spiritual and intellectual life of the country may have room to develop freely within its pale, without rebuke or dictation from any quarter whatever. With our Established Church thus widened to the utmost dimensions of thought and knowledge, and the religion of the country no longer at odds with its intelligence, the national edifice of our higher uses will at length be happily completed, and of a piece throughout; having our new unsectarian, and therefore national, system of elementary instruction for its basis, our thoroughly reformed and no longer sectarian endowed schools and universities for its centre, and our reconstructed and nationalized Church Establishment for its crown; the whole capable of fulfilling for us higher and wider uses than ever did church or school that the world has yet seen.

To conclude with some words I have used elsewhere:—"Let us complete the Reformation by freeing our Church from its limitations, which are of the nursery. Let us release our teachers from the corner in which they have so long been cramped, and they will soon learn to take greater delight in exploring the many mansions which compose the whole glorious house of the universe, and unfolding in turn to their hearers whatever they can best tell, whether of science, philosophy, religion, art, or morality, not necessarily neglecting those spiritual metaphysics to which they have in great measure hitherto been restricted, and the consequence of which restriction has been but to distort them and all else from their due proportion. In the church thus reformed, all subjects that tend to edification will be fitting ones for the preacher. But whatever the subject, the method will have to be but one, always the scientific, never the dogmatic method. The appeal will be to the intellects, the hearts, and the consciences of the living; never to mere authority, living or dead. There will be no heresy, because no orthodoxy; or rather, the



question of heresy as against orthodoxy will be a question of method, not of conclusions. From the pulpits of such a church no genuine student or thinker will be excluded, but will find welcome everywhere from congregations composed, not of the women only and the weaker brethren, but of men, men with brains and culture! Who knows what edifices of knowledge may be reared, what reaches of spiritual perception may be attained, upon a basis from which all the rubbish of ages has been cleared away, and where all that is useful and true in the past is built into the foundations of the future! Who can tell how nearly we may attain to the perfections of the blessed when, no longer straitened in heart and mind and spirit by a narrow sectarianism, but with the scientific and the *verifiable* everywhere substituted for the dogmatic and the incomprehensible, the veil which has so long shrouded the universe as with a thick mist shall be altogether withdrawn; when the All is revealed without stint to our gaze in such degree as each is able to bear, and Theology no longer serves but to paint and darken the windows through which man gazes out into the infinite!

“Thus reformed, amended, and enlarged, the established churches of Great Britain will be no exclusive corporations, watched with jealous eyes of less favoured sects. Nonconformity will disappear, for there will be nothing to nonconform to: Fanaticism, for there will be no Dogma; Intolerance and Bigotry, for there will be no Infallibility. Comprehensive, as all that claims to be national and human ought to be, no conditions of membership will be imposed to entitle any to a share of its benefits; but every variety of opinion will find expression and a home precisely in the degree to which it may commend itself to the general intelligence.

“The bitterness of sectarian animosity thus extinguished, and no place found for dogmatic assertion or theological hatred, it will seem as if the first heaven and the first earth had passed away, and a new heaven and new earth had come, in which there was no more sea of troubles or ought to set men against each other and keep them from uniting in aid of their common welfare. Lit by the clear light of the cultivated intellect, and watered by the pure river of the developed moral sense, the State will be free to grow into a veritable city of God, where there shall be no more curse of poverty or crime, no night of intolerant stupidity, but all shall know that which is good for all, from the least to the greatest.”\*

In these remarks I have confined myself mainly to principles, and said little about details, confident that when the former are

---

\* How to complete the Reformation. Thomas Scott, publisher.

settled there will be no insuperable difficulty about determining the latter. Only let the question be recognised as within the sphere of practical politics, and the man who can carry it to a triumphant solution will not be wanting. Such an one, I may confess, I have sometime had in my eye; one who loveth both our Church and nation, and has in his earlier days written us a book, though a book not tending precisely in the direction I have indicated. But he has grown much since then. Once let him see that there is no other right way, and that Church and country are alike ready to own the touch of a hand that shall bring them together again in the bond of a common need, and he will surely not refuse once more to wave the wand of his eloquence to charm away an evil not less than those which have already owned the force of his enchantment, and thus accomplish a good at once surpassing and crowning all his other achievements. He is asleep now, enjoying a well earned rest; but in that sleep who knows what dreams may come to him?

In the meantime why should not a society be formed having for its object and designation *The Nationalization of the Established Church*?

EDWARD MAITLAND.



## CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

## THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

THE writer of "Supernatural Religion" has conferred a boon on all students of theology. Calm and judicial in tone, fully acquainted with the facts of the case, and scrupulously exact in stating the arguments of adversaries,—no more formidable assailant of orthodoxy could well be imagined. Whenever the history of Christian theology in the nineteenth century shall be written, a place of honour will belong to the anonymous author of "Supernatural Religion." We are informed in the preface that the book "is the result of many years of earnest and serious investigation, undertaken in the first instance for the regulation of personal belief, and now published as a contribution towards the establishment of Truth in the minds of others who are seeking for it. The author's main object has been conscientiously and fully to state the facts of the case, to make no assertions the grounds for which are not clearly given, and as far as possible to place before the reader the materials from which a judgment may be intelligently formed regarding the important subject discussed." Before entering on the details of the book, it is simple justice to the author to say, that his acquaintance with the critical literature of his subject is as nearly as possible exhaustive. For instance, in discussing the Muratorian Fragment, he has made use of the latest German monograph on the subject, published only last year; and in touching on subjects slightly more remote, he has shown a correct judgment as to the authorities to be cited. The only important lacunæ in the author's critical apparatus are perhaps Lipsius "On the Peter-legend" (Kiel, 1872), and Kuenen's "History of the Religion of Israel." It is true that the latter work is referred to in a note on page 90, but the statements about the repeated apostacies of the Israelites in the text must surely have been written prior to a perusal of Dr. Kuenen's "admirable inquiry." After a brief but candid and weighty introduction, in which the author remarks that "the time is now ripe for arriving at a definite conviction as to the character of Christianity," we are launched at once on the discussion of Miracles, which forms Part I. of the work. Miracles as Evidence; Miracles in Relation to the Order of Nature; Reason in Relation to the Order of Nature; the Age of Miracles; the Permanent Stream of Miraculous Pretension; Miracles in Relation to Ignorance and Superstition;—such are the subjects which occupy the first place in the inquiry. Two points in this *d priori* part of the work have struck us as possibly open to exception. First, that there is no philosophical definition of "super-

---

<sup>1</sup> "Supernatural Religion." An Inquiry into the Reality of Divine Revelation. In Two Volumes. London: 1874.

natural." Not a few readers, who sympathize with the author in his tendencies, will regret this absolute surrender of a term capable of still doing good service, if properly explained. But we leave such matters to the philosophers. As against Dr. Mozley and his school, the refutation of supernaturalism is complete. The other point we referred to is the absence of any treatment of prophecy. And yet "the fulfilment of prophecy" counts for one of the chief evidences of "supernatural religion." Possibly the author may yet be induced to supplement his work in this important respect. Unless this is done there will still be a loophole of escape for the supernaturalist. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the latest work of Ewald, "Die Lehre der Bibel von Gott," which is indeed referred to by our author at the foot of page 80, but in a way likely somewhat to mislead the reader. For Ewald clearly shows that, in spite of his sympathy on many points with the Rationalists, he is still at bottom a Supernaturalist, admitting as he does a specific distinction between the prophetic revelation of Israel and that of other nations. It is unnecessary for us to point out the confusedness of such a theory, which, however, will probably be highly acceptable to many *soi-disant* liberals among ourselves. We have no space to follow the author through the mazes of his controversy with Archbishop Trench and Canon Mozley. So far as the former is concerned, one is half inclined to repeat what Goethe said of Lessing and his controversy with the "Hauptpastor Goeze." But Dr. Mozley is certainly, so far as ability is concerned, a foeman worthy of any steel, and we can only regret that so much dialectic power has not been expended in a better cause. The chapter on "The Age of Miracles" strikes us as particularly useful. Its contents are excellently summed up in the quotation from Dean Milman on p. 87, where it is remarked how important it is to seize the singularly credulous spirit of the primitive Christian age. In the discussion of the post-Christian miracles, reference might have been made to Mr. Twistleton's examination of the best-attested of them in his work, "The Tongue not Essential to Speech," published last year. We have been told that the received view in the Theological School or Tripos of one of our universities is that of Bishop Kaye—viz., that the thaumaturgic power died out with those on whom the apostolic hands had been laid! Yet the certificates in support of the miracles of the Curé of Ars, forgotten, it appears, by our author, are sufficient, one would have thought, to convince any one who believed in the Gospel miracles. Before quitting the first part of the book we desire to call attention to the author's correction of Dr. F. W. Farrar's misconception of Hume's argument from experience at the end of Chapter vi. In Part I. the author has shown the futility of the *à priori* argument in favour of miracles. In Parts II. and III. he examines the evidence as to the date and authenticity of the records on which the miracles depend. His result, as regards the first three Gospels, is, that there is not "a single distinct trace of any one of those Gospels during the first century and a half after the death of Jesus." The same statement applies to the Fourth Gospel, and is fully confirmed by the in-

ternal evidence. This part of the work is even better than the first, and will give Canon Westcott, whose book on the Canon is constantly referred to, much trouble to answer. The exposure of the assumptions of that learned and amiable, but most prejudiced, scholar was greatly needed. Its value to the student is, however, diminished by an evident bias towards scepticism. Thus, insufficient allowance is made for the inaccuracies of memory. Verbal differences, or even the jumbling of passages from different Gospels, do not *necessarily* prove that the writers were not quoting our Gospels. Even the Old Testament, which was considered almost automatically inspired, is quoted (from memory) very incorrectly, *e.g.* by Athenagoras; and there are several instances in Justin, in which a wrong reference to the Old Testament is given. Perhaps the impossibility of Justin having known the Fourth Gospel might have been pointed out more effectively. Now and then the knowledge of the reader is assumed on points where the ordinary reader is hopelessly ignorant—*e.g.* why Ignatius's martyrdom must have been in Antioch, Dec. 20th, 115, or upon what grounds Keim and Scholten doubt St. John's residence in Asia Minor. But these, mostly slight, defects do not prevent the book from being a most valuable contribution to the liberal side of this great controversy, and we look forward with interest to the continuation promised in the last chapter. We are bound to add that the concluding chapters prove the author to be a warm friend of spiritual, though not, in the ordinary sense of the word, of supernatural, religion.

Whatever else the author of "Supernatural Religion" may be, one thing is certain, that he is a scientifically trained critic. He has learned to argue, and to weigh evidence. This cannot be said of the author of "Jewish History and Politics in the Times of Sargon and Sennacherib."<sup>2</sup> In spite of its high moral tone, and appreciation of Isaiah's literary qualities, the book, so far as it is original, is utterly valueless to the critical student of Hebrew prophecy. The author has learned much from Ewald, but has revolted from that brilliant scholar's always dogmatic and sometimes arbitrary combinations, and charges the faults of Ewald upon collective German criticism. We have never read so much nonsense on the subject of Biblical criticism as in a few sentences on pages 16 and 161. The attempt at a comparison between German and English criticism, as if the former had all the genius and the latter the common sense, is too absurd to be repeated. The book has its good points, as we have said already. If about fifty pages of it could be cut out, they would furnish the germs of excellent expository lectures. Many interpretations borrowed from Ewald and Alexander (an unequal pair) have received a new and attractive setting in thoughts of Wordsworth and Maurice. But the audacity of the author's attempt to bolster up the unity of Isaiah on the basis of the cuneiform inscrip-

---

<sup>2</sup> "Jewish History and Politics in the Times of Sargon and Sennacherib." An Inquiry into the Historical Meaning and Purpose of the Prophecies of Isaiah. By Sir Edward Strachey, Bart. Second Edition, Revised with Additions. London: W. Isbister & Co. 1874.

tions, not one of which has he read, is only equalled by the tenuity of his Hebrew scholarship (a Hebraist will easily find the proofs of this). To prove this to the satisfaction of the author, would be impossible in a few sentences, but the reader may be warned not to trust the judgment of one who *may* be a politician (though his defence (p. 137) of the "divine right" of the Israelites to Canaan and the Normans to England inclines us to doubt it), but is certainly in no sense a Biblical scholar or an Orientalist. It is nothing to the point to quote the opinion of the late Mr. Maurice, "that the description in the 14th chapter exactly answers to Sennacherib, and not the least to Nebuchadnezzar or Belshazzar," or the observation of the Dean of Westminster that Sir E. Strachey's argument "seems to be very strong for supposing that by the 'King' in Isaiah xiv. 4 is meant the King of Assyria." For whatever other merits these eminent persons may have, a talent for historical criticism is not one of them, and nothing can be more disastrous to the view of Biblical literature maintained by Dr. Stanley than the concession so unwisely made in the passage referred to. It is true that Sargon calls himself "King of Assyria, and viceroy (of the gods) of Babylon," but this is no justification of the view that the "King of Babylon" in Isaiah xiv. 4 is really equivalent to "King of Assyria." It would be quite as absurd to assert that "Toi King of Hameth," in 2 Sam. viii. 9, was a King of Assyria, and as for the passage Micah iv. 10, it simply shows that Babylon was at this time in the possession of the Assyrians (comp. v. 5); nothing *can* possibly prove that the words "King of Babylon" by themselves can mean "King of Assyria." The fact seems to be that Sir Edward Strachey has not yet persuaded himself to apply the ordinary laws of psychology to the Old Testament. The very best test of a critical theory is this, is the place which it assigns to this or that book of the Canon consistent with a belief in the natural development of human beliefs? Now if anything is miraculous, the sudden attainment of a Babylonian standpoint both in history and in doctrine, which, on Sir Edward Strachey's theory, must be ascribed to Isaiah, is doubly and trebly miraculous. And yet Sir Edward Strachey proposes to explain Isaiah without recourse to miracles! His view of prophecy is equally inconsistent with a genuine belief in the laws of psychology. He seems to agree with Delitzsch that it is impossible to determine the compass of prophetic revelation, and with Tholuck that the Hebrew prophets had a sort of natural predictive faculty. But, so far as historical facts are forthcoming, they are entirely opposed to such theories. A thorough examination of Old Testament prophecy has proved that the form assumed by the vaticinations of a prophet is conditioned by his historical circumstances (see papers by Dr. Riehm, of Halle, in *Studien und Kritiken*, 1865). And certainly Isaiah himself distinctly claimed the possession of a supernatural faculty (see Isaiah vii. 11, viii. 11). A choice specimen of Sir E. Strachey's theology is to be found in his remarks on the Trinity (p. 91), where, essentially at one with the orthodox, he sees "in the language which combines the plural Elohim with the singular Jehovah, the prelude of that revelation of the

Trinity in Unity which the spirit of man was not yet educated to receive in its spiritual meaning." He believes too that "there is evidence of the anticipation of a personal Messiah by the Hebrews from very early times" (p. 105), a belief which stultifies the historical criticism of the Bible. On page 73, he takes the "law" referred to in Isaiah for the law "given by Moses," and on page 101 he even cites a passage of Deuteronomy as "the words of Moses." It is painful to have to speak so disparagingly of a work which has evidently cost its author much labour, and which has been so carefully revised in the second edition, but Sir E. Strachey is but one of the most conspicuous (Mr. Matthew Arnold is another) in a large number of *dilettanti* critics, the hollowness of whose pretensions is a sore impediment to true progress. What would Mr. Darwin have said if he had been compelled to review a book of the same calibre on the Origin of Species? But we willingly admit that a purely literary critic might find as much to commend as we have found to condemn.

The second best theological work which has been translated for many a long day (Ewald's "History of the People of Israel" being the first) is Kuenen's "Religion of Israel,"<sup>3</sup> of which the first volume has just appeared. Though known for some time to a few indefatigable students, and of late talked about by two or three popular English writers, its contents have been sealed to the great majority of English readers by the accident of its Dutch origin. It may now be confidently predicted that Kuenen will be, not only referred to, but studied, not only by theologians, but by all who take any interest in the origin of religions. For Dr. Kuenen does not write primarily for a learned public. His style is clear to a fault and free from all appearance of pedantry, though he has poured out a rich stream of learning in the numerous appendices. His work is one of a series of histories of "the principal religions" (note the phrase), designed for the general educated public, and written by scholars who are authorities in their several departments. Dr. Kuenen, in particular, is, after Ewald, the most profound Christian student of the Old Testament, and he has the advantage of Ewald, as has been remarked by a recent English critic, in his "strict subordination of theories to facts, and absolute freedom from critical prepossessions." It would be easy to multiply proofs of this assertion, and the tendency, from which some even advanced liberals are not exempt, to accept Ewald as a kind of infallible authority, would supply a fair excuse for doing so, did the space at our disposal permit it. But a slow and thoughtful perusal of the work will be the best means of protecting the reader from the unwholesome influences of this self-constituted pope. Dr. Kuenen's truly critical spirit is nowhere more conspicuous than in his arrangement. He takes for his starting-point, not the hazy period of the so-called "patriarchal history," but

---

<sup>3</sup> "The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State." By Dr. A. Kuenen. Translated from the Dutch by Alfred Heath May. Vol. I. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate. 1874.

the eighth century B.C., for which materials of undoubted authenticity are supplied by the contemporary prophets. From these he endeavours, "but as yet only in a general and preliminary manner," to determine what must have been the course of the religious development of the Israelites. He is thus led to the conclusion that "the Israelitish religion, originally closely related to that of many other Semitic tribes, gradually and under the influence of Israel's peculiar fortunes assumed in the minds of the prophets another and more elevated character." He now ventures to sketch the outlines of the history, beginning with the residence of the tribes of Israel in Goshen, and arrives in the present volume at the end of the eighth century B.C. In the succeeding volumes he will continue to trace the religious development of Israel in chronological sequence down to the close of the Jewish state. The points on which Dr. Kuenen's work comes into sharpest contrast with its predecessors are the origin of Hebrew prophecy and the development of monotheism. We can give but a faint sketch of Dr. Kuenen's hypothesis. According to him, Samuel is the true founder of prophecy. Before his time the prophetic ecstasy was associated, not with the religion of Yahweh, but with the nature-worship of the Canaanites. But towards the end of the period of the Judges a religious revival took place among the worshippers of Yahweh. Some, like Samson (?) and Samuel, took the Nazarite vow of asceticism; others, of whom Samuel was the leader, banded themselves together to cultivate an ecstatic enthusiasm. Samuel, in fact, enlisted a tendency which he saw to be at once fascinating and dangerous, in the service of a sterner religion. He also formed schools for the creation of an artificial prophetic enthusiasm. By degrees Yahwism grew in spirituality, and this ecstatic element fell into the shade. Then came the age of the great orator-prophets, Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, who were conscious of an inner call, but free, or all but free, from the accessions of ecstasy which characterized the earlier period. As to the development of monotheism, Dr. Kuenen ascribes an important share in it to "the influence of the war between Baal and Jahveh upon the minds of those who had remained loyal to Jahveh." In other words, the persecution of the stricter adherents of Yahweh in the reign of Ahab produced a strong counter-movement in the minds of the prophets. "Why Jahveh and not Baal? Why should they die rather than renounce Jahveh? These questions were laid before them by the very circumstances of their position. For those who endeavoured to answer them a new light was thrown on Jahvism" (p. 361). And so arose the deep gulf of separation between Yahweh, the only true God, and the heathen "non-entities," as the Hebrew prophets call them. Is this theory sufficient to account for the spiritual religion of Isaiah? This is what Dr. Kuenen's critics, orthodox as well as liberal, may contribute to determine. Does the author allow sufficient place to the intuitions of genius? And were the results of Israel's higher religious development really so far superior in spirituality to those of the development of Egyptian and Assyrian religion? No doubt there is a sad confusion of the spiritual



and the unspiritual in the latter. But was not this chiefly owing to the want of an anti-sacerdotal party, such as was formed in Israel by the prophets? We content ourselves with throwing out these questions for consideration. But there can be no doubt whatever among impartial critics on the value of Dr. Kuenen's researches, and in particular on the great light which he has thrown on the popular religion of Israel. He has completely overthrown the traditional notion, borrowed, it must be confessed, from the Biblical narratives, of the deliberate apostacies of the Israelites. What the writers of the "historical books" describe as apostacy and rebellion was really either opposition to religious innovations, or, in the earlier period, the natural consequence of the altered circumstances in which Israel was placed. We trust this may be sufficient to whet the reader's appetite for one of the few satisfactory books in theology to which we can point. It must be added, however, that the work is offered to the English public in the same form in which it was published in 1869-70. The restless progress of archæological inquiry will probably have modified the author's opinion on several points of detail, but the main results of the inquiry have not been affected. The translation is thoroughly admirable, and in every way superior to its predecessors in the same series.

Bishop Colenso has sent us the sixth part of his "Critical Examination" of the so-called "Speaker's Commentary."<sup>4</sup> He is sarcastic on the inconsistencies of Mr. Espin, the commentator on Joshua, who accepts all the other miracles in that book, but not the sun and moon standing still at Joshua's word. Not that Mr. Espin is troubled by the scientific objections, but, simply because there is no collateral evidence of the miracle, he adopts the theory that the words of Joshua are poetic, thereby agreeing with Ewald, the liberal, and Hengstenberg, the orthodox, critic. It seems he is not unwilling to rationalize, if he can do so in good company. Our limits forbid us to go at any length into the details of the bishop's criticism, especially as we shall be able to supplement them directly from an unexpected source. Suffice it to say that he has shown grave reasons to question Mr. Espin's competence and accuracy. In one place, however, the bishop's answer to Mr. Espin seems to rest on a misconception (p. 9). The term "Great Sidon" is not equivalent to "capital of Phœnicia," but is simply opposed to "Little Zidon." That Sidon was divided into two towns, called respectively "Great" and "Little," is proved by an inscription of Sennacherib, Brit. Mus. Coll., vol. i. pl. 38, line 38.

Mr. Driver, an Oxford Fellow, has brought out a little work on "The Use of the Tenses in Hebrew," which is doubly welcome as coming from such a hot-bed of the unhistorical view of the Hebrew Scriptures. No better foundation can be laid for an accurate study of the documents of the Old Testament than this most lucid, most trust-

<sup>4</sup> "The New Bible Commentary, &c." Critically Examined by the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Part VI. : Introduction to Joshua—The Book of Joshua. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

<sup>5</sup> "A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew." By S. R. Driver, M.A., Fellow of New College. Oxford : At the Clarendon Press. 1874.

worthy and most complete exposition of a subject so obscure to many Hebraists. Though primarily intended for beginners, for whose difficulties it shows an intelligent sympathy, it may be read with pleasure by all, from the traces of individuality and independent judgment which abound throughout. It is no disparagement to say that the most valuable part of the work is derived from Ewald, for it was Ewald who revolutionized Hebrew grammar, and all his successors must perforce build upon his foundation. But the author has shown great judgment in re-casting existing materials, and has added contributions of his own, which have at least the merits of sound sense and simplicity. These are to be found in the chapters on the Cohortative and Jussive, and the Hypotheticals, together with Appendix II. on the Original Signification of the Jussive, though some may think that in the latter the author has done insufficient justice to the remarks of Olshausen in his unhappily still incomplete *Lehrbuch*. Readers of the "Speaker's Commentary" will be amused, as well as instructed, by his examination of a note in that work, in which a most sweeping assertion is made as to the biblical use of the imperfect for pluperfect. Mr. Driver is strongly of opinion, and he will not be alone in thinking so, that the "Vau conversive" never introduces a pluperfect:—the result is not unimportant, even from a theological point of view (see the orthodox commentators on Gen. ii. 19). Canon Cook, at any rate, has shown an utter want of philological conscience in stating that "no grammatical objection is made to this construction [imperfect for pluperfect], which is *common* in the Old Testament." Other instances of the "Speaker's" grammatical blunders are noticed on pp. 249, 250. Not the least useful part of the work is the appendix on "Arabic as Illustrative of Hebrew," which, though containing nothing new to the scholar, and slightly too apologetic in tone, will, we hope, do something to promote the application to Hebrew of the comparative method. An excellent index facilitates the use of the volume, which from the large number of references may be used to some extent as a grammatical commentary on the Old Testament.

Dr. Oehler is well-known to German students by his valuable articles on the theological ideas of the Old Testament in Herzog's "Realencyclopädie."<sup>6</sup> The present work is posthumous, and mainly based on University lectures. It is a valuable collection of the facts of the subject, but presents no material advance on the views already expressed by the author, who is much hampered by his orthodox, or at least semi-orthodox position. We are glad to hear that a translation has been put in hand by Messrs. T. and T. Clark of Edinburgh, though we should have been still more glad if H. Schulz's *Alttestamentliche Theologie* (2 vols., Frankfurt on the Maine, 1869), a work of a much broader and more progressive theology, though not quite so full of facts, had been the handbook selected. We have only to add that the work demands a careful and critical study, and should be always at the side of the Old Testament student.

---

<sup>6</sup> "Theologie des alten Testaments." Von Dr. Gust. Fr. Oehler. Zwei Bände. Tübingen: Heckenhauer. 1874.

An important contribution to our historical theology (Mr. Max Müller has naturalized the term in England) is Mr. Bosworth Smith's lectures on "Mohammed and Mohammedanism."<sup>7</sup> It gives us a clear, accurate, and in the best sense popular account of the leading facts in Mohammed's life, with such a broad and impartial judgment as might be expected from a lecturer at the Royal Institution. The first lecture is introductory. It is there shown that the historical as opposed to the primeval religions of the world are moral in their origin, not theological; that the great value of Islam to the student consists in the fact that it was born and grew up in the full light of history; that religions differ in degree, rather than kind; and that only in the broadest and vaguest sense is it possible or desirable that the world should be Christianized. An interesting sketch is given of the progress constantly being made by Islam in Africa, and the moral and social blessings it brings in its train. Of the other lectures we must content ourselves with referring to the fourth, in which the spirituality of Islam receives full justice, in opposition to a popular error, and the opinion is finally expressed that "Mohammed comes next to Christ in the long roll of the great benefactors of the human race." The passages to which we should take most exception are those in which the author borrows from Mr. Matthew Arnold, whose eminence as a Biblical critic he singularly exaggerates. Will the author allow us further to point out that the formula "appropinquante mundi termino" was not peculiar, as he supposes, to the tenth century, though some eminent writers have repeated the baseless assertion?

Among recent works on the history of the Church, the first place belongs of right to Dr. Newman's collected tracts (*Causes of Arianism, Heresy of Apollinaris, &c.*),<sup>8</sup> with which may be grouped the new edition of his *Lectures on Justification*,<sup>9</sup> a work of historical importance, designed to show that there is little but a verbal difference between Catholic and Protestant views on Justification. "The Church and the Empires"<sup>10</sup> contains some agreeably written essays on such subjects as the formation of Christendom, Champagny's works on the Roman Empire, the Church and Napoleon I., &c., with brief memoir of the author, Mr. H. W. Wilberforce, from the pen of Dr. Newman. Mr. Lupton deserves great credit for his affectionately careful edition of Dean Colet's *Lectures on Corinthians*,<sup>11</sup> now first published.

<sup>7</sup> "Mohammed and Mohammedanism." Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution in February and March, 1874. By R. Bosworth Smith, M.A. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1874.

<sup>8</sup> "Tracts, Theological and Ecclesiastical." By John Henry Newman, D.D., of the Oratory. London: B. M. Pickering. 1874.

<sup>9</sup> "Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification." By John Henry Newman, sometime Fellow of Oriel College. Third Edition. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1874.

<sup>10</sup> "The Church and the Empires." *Historical Periods.* By Henry William Wilberforce. Preceded by a Memoir of the Author, by J. H. Newman, D.D. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1874.

<sup>11</sup> "An Exposition of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians." By John Colet, M.A., &c. Now first published, with a Translation, Introduction, and Notes, by J. H. Lupton, M.A., Sub-Master of St. Paul's School. London: George Bell & Sons. 1874.

Dr. Kelle traces the baleful effects of Jesuit teaching on the Austrian gymnasia, from information derived from contemporary documents.<sup>12</sup> The Jesuits have had a reputation for being skilful educators. But so far as Austria is concerned, this should be entirely destroyed by the present work. "One must bring grammar itself," says a Jesuit writer, "into the service of 'Gottseligkeit' (an untranslatable word), and pursue it in a godly manner." And here, though somewhat out of its place, may be mentioned the fifth volume of the excellent translation of Ewald's "History of Israel,"<sup>13</sup> containing the history of Ezra and of the Hagiocracy in Israel to the time of Christ. Bound as we are to protest against the growing tendency to idolize Ewald, it would be wrong to disparage the deep learning and enthusiasm conspicuous in every volume of this great work. The period between the so-called Captivity and the rise of Christianity is one of the most important and most obscure periods of religious history, and here Ewald is perhaps seen at his best.

We regret extremely that we can only draw attention to Mr. Stopford Brooke's very interesting lectures on "Theology in the English Poets."<sup>14</sup> It is indeed a sign of the times that theology of such a broad and humanizing character can be preached without opposition in a Church of England pulpit. Considered merely from a literary point of view, the work has a very high value; the nine lectures on Wordsworth are evidently based on a familiar and sympathetic acquaintance of many years with that poet of philosophers. The book would have been more complete had Mr. Brooke brought the poets whom he describes into closer connexion with the great European movement, of which Rousseau and Goethe are the two most prominent representatives. But his object was not so much historical or critical as to exhibit English natural theology in its purest form, as it is to be found in the poetical, which often differs widely from the prose, works of our greatest recent poets. Blake, Shelley, Keats, and Byron are reserved for another volume.

"Catholic Thoughts on the Bible and Theology"<sup>15</sup> is the sequel to the volume noticed in our last number. Its value would have been greater ten years ago, but it will still find access to many troubled hearts within the pale of the orthodox churches.

Our sermons this quarter come from Mr. Haweis<sup>16</sup> (who has invented a new kind of apologetics based on magnetism and spiritualism!), Dr.

<sup>12</sup> "Die Jesuiten Gymnasien in Oesterreich." Vom Anfange des vorigen Jahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart. Von Dr. Johann Kelle. Prag: 1873.

<sup>13</sup> "The History of Israel." By Heinrich Ewald. Translated from the German by J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A. Vol. V. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

<sup>14</sup> "Theology in the Christian Poets: Cowper, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Burns." By the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, M.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>15</sup> "Catholic Thoughts on the Bible and Theology." By the late Frederic Myers, M.A., Perpetual Curate of St. John's, Keswick. London: Isbister & Co. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "Speech in Season." By the Rev. H. R. Haweis, M.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

Lee<sup>17</sup> (whose importance it is difficult for a southern liberal adequately to appreciate), Mr. Baldwin Brown<sup>18</sup> and Mr. Maclaren,<sup>19</sup> both full as ever of highly-toned Christian feeling, and, lastly, Archbishop Manning,<sup>20</sup> whose chastened eloquence shows no signs of diminution.

We have also received Sir Bartle Frere's weighty letters on Eastern Africa<sup>21</sup> (he thinks the energy of Mohammedan missionaries is the energy of despair); Dr. Holtzmann's lecture on the rise of Christianity in Rome,<sup>22</sup> illustrated by the buildings and monuments; Lord Robert Montagu's answer to some Protestant objections;<sup>23</sup> a book of well-meant and, in part, well-thought "Cautions," by Mr. Titcomb;<sup>24</sup> a good documentary account of the history and mode of the papal elections;<sup>25</sup> Oosterzee's "Christian Dogmatics"<sup>26</sup> (ponderous and commonplace, as even orthodox *scholars* must admit); Dean Church's agreeable, but superficial, lectures on ancient religious poetry;<sup>27</sup> a "Golden Treasury" edition of that exquisite religious classic, the "Theologia Germanica";<sup>28</sup> Mr. Kingston's attempt at a theory of creation in harmony with the facts of science;<sup>29</sup> Mr. Scott's examination of texts on the existence of a Devil;<sup>30</sup> Mr. Suckling Browne's reply to Evolutionism;<sup>31</sup> Canon Bright's hymns;<sup>32</sup> Dean Howson against Sacramental

<sup>17</sup> "Sermons by the late Robert Lee, D.D., Minister of Old Grayfriars Church, Edinburgh." Edited from his Manuscripts. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1874.

<sup>18</sup> "The Higher Life: its Reality, Experience, and Destiny." By James Baldwin Brown, B.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>19</sup> "Sermons Preached in Manchester." By Alex. Maclaren. Third Series. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> "Sin and its Consequences." By Henry Edward, Archbishop of Westminster. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

<sup>21</sup> "Eastern Africa as a Field for Missionary Labour." By the Right Hon. Sir Bartle Frere, G.C.S.I., K.C.B., D.C.L. London: John Murray. 1874.

<sup>22</sup> "Die Ansiedelung des Christenthums in Rom." Von Dr. H. Holtzmann. Berlin. 1874.

<sup>23</sup> "On Some Popular Errors concerning Politics and Religion." By the Right Hon. Lord Robert Montagu, M.P. London: Burns & Oates. 1874.

<sup>24</sup> "Cautions for Doubters." By the Rev. J. H. Titcomb, M.A. London: Religious Tract Society.

<sup>25</sup> "Die Pabst-Wahl nach ihrer geschichtlichen Gestaltung und dem gelten den Rechte." Prag: 1874.

<sup>26</sup> "Christian Dogmatics." (Theological and Philosophical Library.) By J. J. Van Costerzee, D.D. Translated from the Dutch. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1874.

<sup>27</sup> "The Sacred Poetry of Early Religions." Two Lectures. By R. W. Church, M.A., Dean of St. Paul's. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>28</sup> "Theologia Germanica." Translated from the German by Susanna Winkworth. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>29</sup> "The Unity of Creation: a Contribution to the Solution of the Religious Question." By Francis K. Kingston. London: Trübner & Co. 1874.

<sup>30</sup> "Christianity and a Personal Devil." An Essay. By Patrick Scott. London: Pickering. 1874.

<sup>31</sup> "Divine Revelation, or Pseudo-Science." An Essay. By R. G. Suckling Browne, B.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1874.

<sup>32</sup> "Hymns and Other Verses." By William Bright, D.D., Canon of Christ Church, Oxford. Second Edition Enlarged. London, Oxford and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1874.

Confession;<sup>33</sup> and a highly-jejune "Catechism," translated from the German by Colonel Ouvry,<sup>34</sup> which entirely ignores the phenomena of religious experience.

---

Mr. Monck's "Introduction to the Critical Philosophy"<sup>35</sup> is an excellent little manual, admirably adapted to its aims, which deserves the gratitude of the students for whom it is intended. We regret that it is deformed by a preface which trenches almost upon the law libel, because such things, though they may have their proper place, seem to be out of place at the beginning of a philosophical treatise. While the Kantians refute people who resolve "understanding" into a modification or product of "sensibility," they either never dream or else refuse to believe that recent discoveries in physiology, physics, and biology, are destined to cast important light upon the relations of sense to reason. They suppose new light to be both superfluous and impossible. Kant, we believe, would have judged differently. If modern opportunities had been within his reach, the *Kritik* would have taken a different shape. To investigate this problem, and thus to make their philosophy progressive, should be the aim of his followers. Three things are conspicuous in what they proudly term "modern philosophy;"—the contentiousness of the Kantians, the variety of the derivative schools, and the strong inclination now shown in many quarters to fall back upon Kant as a safeguard against multiform vagary. These things are ominous: it is for them to interpret the omen. We observe with pleasure in Mr. Monck some hints of a suspicion, that lines of investigation do exist in the despised sciences which are capable of throwing light upon his master. Speaking of the *First Analogy of Experience*, he says: "How far this Analogy is connected with the modern theory of the Conservation of Force, I leave it to others to trace out" (p. 54). If he will undertake this inquiry and the kindred problems which it suggests, and can pursue it with success, he will do more than the Kantians have yet done to show the true value of the Transcendental Philosophy. We believe that a very important part is to be played by that philosophy; we hope that the Kantians will assist in its development.

Only a very small part of Mr. Mahaffy's work<sup>36</sup> is before us. This displays him in his usual character of an acute and well-informed writer and an eminently contentions Kantian. But he might find language quite capable of expressing his meaning and less "vivacious"

---

<sup>33</sup> "Sacramental Confession." By the Very Rev. John S. Howson, D.D., Dean of Chester. London: Isbister & Co. 1874.

<sup>34</sup> "An Unsectarian Catechism of Christian and Social Instruction, for the Use of Parents and Schools." Translated from the German by Col. H. A. Ouvry, C.B. London: Frederic Norgate. 1874.

<sup>35</sup> "An Introduction to the Critical Philosophy, Intended for the Use of Students." By W. H. S. Monck, Barrister-at-Law. Dublin: William McGee. 1874.

<sup>36</sup> "Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers." By John P. Mahaffy, A.M., Fellow and Tutor, Professor of Ancient History in the University of Dublin. Vol. I. Part III. London: Longmans. 1874.

than that used by him in the following passage. "Even now, the German Kantians are in the dark on the subject, and the last edition of Kuno Fischer's Commentary, published in 1869, repeats its former blunder, which I had corrected in my translation of the book" (p. 329). We have noticed several other flowers of speech, some of which are not much inferior in rudeness to the foregoing.

The "Mental Physiology"<sup>37</sup> of Dr. Carpenter is a highly entertaining and instructive treatise. But it is rather a contribution to the popularization of knowledge, than, as he styles it himself, a contribution to the science of Human Nature (p. viii.). Viewed in this light, we think it excellent; and qualities which would be faults if it were taken at its own estimate, become merits. The application of "unconscious cerebration" and "ideo-motor action" to explain the doings of planchette, table-turning and rapping, spiritualism, mesmerism, and the host of such like "phenomena," is especially interesting. We do not doubt that this gives the right clue to the division between what is mere imposture and what is startling fact in them. At present the "spiritualistic world" is such a heterogeneous mass, where dupes and impostors, dolts and intelligent but puzzled spectators, are so inextricably mingled, that anything which can be called investigation is hardly possible, and anything which can be called evidence is drowned in the din and hubbub. We think that if the last mentioned class will give serious heed to Dr. Carpenter, he will supply them with a basis for sober inquiry of which they stand in great need. On the question, how far narratives of wonders can be believed, even when coming from honest witnesses, the following passage (quoted by Dr. Carpenter from Miss Cobbe) is very edifying:—

"It once happened to the writer to hear a most scrupulously conscientious friend narrate an incident of table-turning, to which she appended an assurance that the table rapped when *nobody was within a yard of it*. The writer being confounded by this latter fact, the lady, though fully satisfied of the accuracy of her statement, promised to look at the note she had made ten years previously of the transaction. The note was examined, and was found to contain the distinct statement that the table rapped when *the hands of six persons rested on it!* The lady's memory as to all other points proved to be strictly correct; and in this point she had erred in entire good faith" (p. 457).

This is followed by another passage equally to the purpose but too long for quotation. Dr. Carpenter is far more happy when engaged strictly upon his own subject, than when he strays into philosophical criticism or theory. Thus, he has much that is excellent upon "volition," but his remarks upon "the will" are confused and unsatisfactory.

"It will, I doubt not, be considered by many, that there is a palpable inconsistency between the two fundamental doctrines which are here upheld;—

---

<sup>37</sup> "Principles of Mental Physiology, with their Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of its Morbid Conditions." By William B. Carpenter, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., &c. &c. London: 1874.

that of the dependence of the Automatic activity of the Mind upon conditions which bring it within the *nexus* of Physical Causation; and that of the existence of an independent Power, controlling and directing that activity, which we call Will" (Preface p. ix.).

The note upon this passage, in which he quotes Hartley, and his allusion to "John S. Mill, the most powerful advocate of Automatism," make it plain that Dr. Carpenter here meant in some sense to assert the doctrine of "Free-will." But all his facts are perfectly consonant with Determinism. The truth is that Dr. Carpenter erroneously supposes Determinism to confine the will psychologically within the limits which he physiologically defines as the mind's "Automatic activity;" and that he confuses Determinists with the "Modified Fatalists" of Mr. Mill. Though this mistake has been often corrected, there is some excuse for Dr. Carpenter. The physiological analysis of volition is of later date than the psychological analysis to which he refers; and a man unversed in abstract speculation might fail to perceive the coincidence of the lines, by failing, as Dr. Carpenter has done, to grasp the psychological analysis.

Mr. Sully's volume of essays<sup>38</sup> is somewhat lacking in condensation and point, by which it falls short of the excellence which seems to be within his reach. It is an error to use more words than are needed; especially when the matter is made no clearer by the superfluity. But Mr. Sully is deserving of substantial praise. His speculations and criticisms are highly ingenious, and the topics which he treats are of modern interest. We quote the following passage as an example of his acuteness.

"When we look back regretfully on some unalterable actions in our past life, we are apt in imagination to recolour that past, giving it the moral tint which our present wishes suggest. And by vividly imagining to ourselves the aspect it would wear if it could be so transmuted, we easily lapse into the illusion that it might have been other than it was without the interference of any new impulse" (p. 135).

There is a smack of affectation and conceit in everything about Mr. Woodward's book,<sup>39</sup>—even in the typography, where one word is printed "spirit[ual]" and another word "reason[ably]," with many like freaks,—which stirs the bile and provokes to the use of harsh language. Therefore we hope to be pardoned for saying roundly, that it is abjectly foolish and unworthy of a moment's attention. The volume is pre-faced by a fragment of "The Hermit," a poem by Mr. Woodward. If we may judge by this short specimen, his poetry is even worse trash than its brother prose,—

"Si minus esse potest quam quod nil esse videmus."

---

<sup>38</sup> "Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Æsthetics." By James Sully, M.A. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>39</sup> "A Treatise on the Nature of Man, regarded as Triune; with an Outline of a Philosophy of Life." By Thomas Best Woodward. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1874.



We do not dismiss Dr. Hamilton's "Autology"<sup>40</sup> with the contemptuous brevity which we use to Mr. Woodward's theory of man's "spirit[ual constitution]," because he seems to be a respectable divine of owl-like gravity, and not a conceited popinjay. But we fear that his excellent intentions can do no good in the line which has brought him under our notice. He tells us that "intelligent and candid criticism will be thoughtfully considered;" and candour compels us unwillingly to tell him that there is no meaning whatever in the jumble of words which he mistakes for the exposition of a philosophy. Pious persons, with their heads full of Scripture, conscience, the devil, and so forth, are apt to undergo a kind of mental perturbation or rumbling which they mistake for thought. This sometimes issues in an attempt to justify the ways of God to man. Hence we have Autologies and the like. The absurdity of Dr. Hamilton's talk about Kant, whom he presumes to criticise, almost passes belief.

"The points of beginning from which the inquiries of this book set out in search of truth, were the work of Jonathan Edwards on the 'Freedom of the Will,' and that of Immanuel Kant, entitled the 'Critique of the Pure Reason' . . . . The works of Edwards and Kant are the cooled and hardened masses of lava thrown out from the volcanic depths of the human mind by the eruptions of its own metaphysical forces. In these vast masses, strown roughly along the rugged steeps of study and inquiry, are found many precious stones and valuable metals, with much of baser matter, such as mere cinders, ashes, and débris" (p. 1).

This jargon prepares us for something funny.

"Of the many fundamental errors of Kant it is necessary here to note only this one: viz.. The division of judgments, or knowings, into the two kinds of Analytical and Synthetical. It is a totally false and artificial division, and one that is mischievous in all its results. There can be no such division in nature; for all judgments, or knowings, are, of necessity, analytical knowings" (p. 470).

We advise Dr. Hamilton to read Mr. Monck's little book. The result, we fear, will put him to some considerable expense for alterations, because he has stereotyped his ponderous volume.

Mr. T. H. Green's General Introduction to Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature"<sup>41</sup> is a valuable contribution to philosophical criticism and the history of philosophy. Its method is rather critical than historical, though it follows historical arrangement. Starting with Locke, it passes through Berkeley, to trace the filiation of Hume.

<sup>40</sup> "Autology: an Inductive System of Mental Science, whose Centre is the Will, and whose Completion is the Personality. A Vindication of the Manhood of Man, the Godhood of God, and the Divine Authorship of Nature." By the Rev. D. H. Hamilton, D.D. Boston: Lee & Shepard. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1873.

<sup>41</sup> "A Treatise on Human Nature: being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects; and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion." By David Hume. Edited, with Preliminary Dissertations and Notes, by T. H. Green, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, and T. H. Grose, Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Oxford. In Two Volumes. London: Longmans. 1874.

The key to the whole is the application of a critical analysis; and the pivot of the analysis is, in a word, the Kantian distinction between "understanding," and "sensibility." Locke is convicted of a perpetual equivocation in his "simple ideas," between mere feeling on the one hand and a thing or a quality of a thing on the other. This equivocation reproduces itself in the double meaning of existence, taken either as momentary consciousness or as reality. The examination is carried out in great detail along every line indicated by Locke; and in every direction, as we pursue the antithesis between reality and the work of the mind, we find that it eludes our grasp. Thereby he is pushed through a series of inconsistencies and difficulties which cannot be surmounted.

"In the history of subsequent philosophy two typical methods have appeared of dealing with this chaos of autonomies. One, which we shall have to treat at large in writing of Hume, affects to dispose of both the outward and the inward synthesis—both of the unity of feelings in a subject matter and of their unity in a subject mind—as 'fictions of thought.' This method at once suggests the vital question whether a mind which thus invents has been effectively suppressed—whether, indeed, the theory can be so much as stated without a covert assumption of that which it claims to have destroyed. The other method, of which Kant is the parent, does not attempt to efface the apparent contradictions which beset the 'relation between mind and matter;' but regarding them as in a certain sense inevitable, traces them to their source in the application to the thinking Ego itself of conceptions, which it does indeed constitute in virtue of its presence to phenomena given under conditions of time, but under which for that very reason it cannot itself be known. It is in virtue of the presence of the self-conscious unit to the manifold of feeling, according to this doctrine, that the latter becomes an order of definite things, each external to the other; and it is only by a false inclusion within this order of that which constitutes it that the Ego itself becomes a 'thinking thing' with other things outside it" (p. 112).

In such a sketch there is room for difference of opinion, as to how much is history and how much is the result of the critical apparatus used to group and co-ordinate the facts. If we have not mistaken Mr. Green's estimate, we should put the historical connexion between Locke and Berkeley at a lower level than he does. Nothing is over-coloured or unduly pressed by Mr. Green. He is careful to point out (p. 133) that Berkeley was a mere theologian with a theological motive, and indicates this motive with great felicity (p. 139). Perhaps, however, he underrates the fragmentariness and shortsightedness of Berkeley. The truth is, we believe, that the different phases noticed by Mr. Green in different works of Berkeley, were the shifts of a conjuror likely to be worried by the fiend whom he had summoned to help him. To put it otherwise, the stick which he had snatched up to beat his dog, showed signs of turning to a red-hot poker in his fingers. And his difficulties were pressed upon him, not by philosophy or systematic criticism, but by his own dogmatic theology. He began to suspect in secret, that he had been playing a dangerous game; and he showed his soreness by the unique display of bad temper which marks his *Vindication of the Theory of Vision*. Another point which makes

for the same conclusion is this. The phrase "mathematical atheism" contains two terms; and Berkeley was not content to attack the "atheist" through Locke, but also attacked the "mathematician" by vehemently asserting and trying to prove the Differential Calculus to be mere nonsense. We think that his overt criticism of Locke was an afterthought: he had picked up his stick first. This does not abolish the historical connexion; but it materially affects the view to be taken of it. In the Introduction to the second volume, Mr. Green pursues a similar criticism of Hume's ethics with a similar result; namely, to show "that the philosophy based on the abstraction of feeling, in regard to morals no less than to nature, was with Hume played out, and that the next step forward in speculation could only be an effort to re-think the process of nature and human action from its true beginning in thought." His object has been to divert the attention of the young "from the anachronistic systems hitherto prevalent among us to the study of Kant and Hegel" (p. 71). The dissection of the dog was perhaps well worth the trouble, viewed as a "Propædæutik" to Kant and Hegel. Viewed in itself, the carcase is hardly worth kicking. The intellectual activity of Young England will not care to mumble the dry bones. Whether it will betake itself to Kant and Hegel, is a question of the future; and prophecy, says George Eliot, is of all forms of error the most gratuitous.

We have received a copy of Mr. Wallace's translation of the "Logic of Hegel,"<sup>42</sup> but too late for us to do more than to mention it to our readers, some of whom may be glad to know that the work is now to be had in an English version executed by a scholar of eminent talents and acquirements.

---

#### POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, VOYAGES AND TRAVELS.

**M**R. DUDLEY BAXTER<sup>1</sup> has done good service in disentangling the very intricate question of Local Taxation, and presenting in a brief and compact form not only the main points involved in the controversy, but some highly useful suggestions for the direction of legislation. The work contains the substance of a speech on Local Government and Taxation, delivered at the Social Science Congress at Norwich, in September last, and four letters respecting Mr. Goschen's Report on the Increase of Local Taxation, which have been published in several of the leading London daily papers. Mr. Baxter notes how, of late years, in the place of the old Poor Law system there has sprung up "an active system of local self-government by representative institutions, applying all the new ideas of relief of the poor, and the neces-

---

<sup>42</sup> "The Logic of Hegel, translated from the Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences; with Prolegomena." By William Wallace, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. At the Clarendon Press. 1874.

<sup>1</sup> "Local Government and Taxation, and Mr. Goschen's Report." By R. Dudley Baxter, M.A. London: R. J. Bush. 1874.

sity of improved roads and drainage, and lighting and police, and of educational and sanitary reform. But according to the usual habit of the Anglo-Saxon mind, each of these objects was pursued independently by the creation of a new jurisdiction and governing body, regardless of all existing institutions." Mr. Dudley Baxter's leading suggestion is to consolidate all the different kinds of districts into one kind of district, which should be a subdivision of the county, and itself be subdivided into parishes and townships. Local Government would then be reduced to its old triple and harmonious gradation of county, district and parish areas and authorities, which the experience of olden time in our own country, and of the present time in continental countries, shows to be the most symmetrical and practical system of management of local affairs.

Professor Fawcett,<sup>2</sup> in the new edition of his "Manual of Political Economy," has introduced a fresh chapter, specially devoted to the subject of local taxation. It might be doubted whether it is well to flood what is intended to be a purely educational treatise with topics so redolent of excited controversy at the present moment as local taxation and the "Nationalization of Land." This is, however, more excusable in the region of political economy than elsewhere, as that science depends for its constant nutrition upon facts which every day's experience is bringing to light for the first time, and therefore a purely abstract mode of treatment would not only be undesirable, but impossible. One serious charge made by Professor Fawcett against the existing system of local taxation and government is the amount of local indebtedness which is being rapidly accumulated throughout the country, and yet which has hitherto attracted so little notice. "Every facility," says the writer, "seems to be given to local authorities to get into debt, and, what makes the matter still more serious is, that, the circumstances under which these loans are contracted are frequently involved in inextricable confusion."

We are furnished with a precise statement of the sources of revenue for the year 1870 of the town of Pesth. The work is prepared by Herr Josef Körösi,<sup>3</sup> and is translated from the Hungarian. The analysis of productive manufactories and commercial statistics is very exhaustive, and will afford highly serviceable *data* to those in search of such information.

A curious specimen of a really valuable, and original economic treatise is supplied by a pamphlet on Salt, in its economical and financial aspects. The writer is Dr. Alfred Schmidt.<sup>4</sup> He reviews the history of legislation on the subject, as it is presented in all countries, and notices that, besides England, there are only two European States which enjoy complete exemption from salt duties: Norway, since 1844, and Portugal since 1846.

<sup>2</sup> "Manual of Political Economy." By Henry Fawcett. Fourth Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London: Macmillan. 1874.

<sup>3</sup> "Untersuchungen über die Einkommensteuer der Stadt Pest für das Jahr 1870." Von Josef Körösi. Pest. 1873.

<sup>4</sup> "Das Salz: Eine volkswirtschaftliche und finanzielle Studie." Von Dr. Alfred Schmidt. Zweite verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig. 1874.

A little book published by Mr. King as one of the series of important military works he has recently been bringing out, and entitled the "Volunteer, the Militiaman, and the Regular Soldier,"<sup>5</sup> deserves special attention. It is written by a "Public-School Boy," and, perhaps on that account, shows a trifle more military enthusiasm than we altogether approve. But it is a good and compact little work, and treats the whole topic in a clear, intelligible and rational way. There is an interesting chapter styled "Historical Retrospect," which very briefly traces all the main steps in the growth of the English army from the time of the Anglo-Saxons. The writer is at great pains to examine the real facts concerning enlistment into the different branches of the army at the present day. His main suggestions concern the decentralization of the army, so far as to make each military district self-governed and subject to (1) a staff-officer to issue orders to the troops; (2) a staff-officer to direct the administrative (or civil) work; (3) a financial officer to issue money and credit accounts. Each department in a district would be represented by its head at the central office. It will be seen that the basis of this reform is an improved organization of what either already exists or has recently been adopted.

It is a great improvement to the new edition of Gaius, by Drs. Abdy and Walker, to have appended to it the text and a scholarly translation of the Rules of Ulpian.<sup>6</sup> Roman law is not only becoming generally recognised as the only avenue to the effectual study of foreign law, but it is taking its true place as the essential basis of legal education wherever conducted. It is, however, scarcely possible to understand and grasp the true spirit of Roman law without a familiar acquaintance with the actual language and terms of the original and native exponents of that law. The gradual popularization of Gaius' Institutes has done a good deal in this direction, but the rules of Ulpian might advantageously be ranked side by side with the Institutes of Gaius and of Justinian. The true position of Ulpian considered both from an historical and educational point of view, is excellently described in a preface to the present edition, which even exceeds in erudition, breadth of view and precision of criticism, the somewhat remarkable preface prefixed to the original edition. Ulpian's aim was, in the opinion of his present editors, entirely different from that of Gaius. Ulpian wished to draw up a handbook for the use of practising lawyers. "Now that a book of practice is improved by a systematic arrangement is obvious. Ulpian, therefore, writing in the reign of Caracalla, took, as a model, the educational treatise which his brother lawyer had published a few years previously, introducing into it important and necessary modifications. Whilst, then, on the one hand, he omitted all antiquarian disquisitions as out of place in a book of practice, on the

---

<sup>5</sup> "The Volunteer, the Militiaman, and the Regular Soldier." A Conservative View of the Armies of England, Past, Present, and Future, as seen in January, 1874. By a Public-School Boy. London: Henry S. King. 1874.

<sup>6</sup> "The Commentaries of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian." Translated, with Notes, by J. T. Abdy, LL.D., and Bryan Walker, M.A., LL.D. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1874.

other he introduced large interpolations on such matters as *dos* and its *retentiones*. These topics Gaius (writing for beginners) had passed over unnoticed, because they involved more detail than principle; because, also, a student could very well comprehend the general scheme of the Roman law, without any special acquaintance with them." The Editors also notice that the very title prefixed to Ulpian's work bears out their view. Principles (*institutiones*) are for beginners, but rules (*regulæ*) aid the memory of those who have passed through their course of study, and are now engaged in the active business of their profession.

The purpose of the "International Scientific Series" is to provide a set of treatises from the hands of competent authorities in all countries on a great variety of scientific topics with the view of coordinating the different branches of Science by common methods of treatment, and of making students conversant, as far as may be, with one another's work. Most of the topics hitherto handled have, naturally enough, been connected with the strictly physical sciences, but Professor Sheldon Amos, following Mr. Walter Bagehot and Mr. Herbert Spencer, has added to the series a work on a branch of moral science. The "Science of Law"<sup>7</sup> necessarily covers much of the same ground as that covered by the writer's "Systematic View of the Science of Jurisprudence," though the mode of approach employed in, as well as the objects kept in view by, the two works is very different. In the new work, the deeper relations of Law to the foundations of Society are subjected to more laborious analysis, and the technical part of the subject, though constantly borne in mind and used either as illustrations or as lines for marking out the limits of the different portions of the whole topic, are kept more in the background. The object of the present work is to enable every scientific thinker to apprehend the universal and permanent ideas in law, without being perplexed by the jargon of some particular system which is often presented as the only notion of Law, and which therefore goes a long way to repel persons from the study of it. Indeed Law has, proverbially, but most unjustly, acquired a special reputation for being dry, abstruse, inhuman, and suitable to be studied only by its unhappy devotees. It is from such a reputation as this that Professor Sheldon Amos has done his best to redeem Law by establishing it, once for all, on its platform of Science, and compelling it by the use of exact conceptions, accurate terminology, and precise classificatory divisions to rival all other sciences in its method as it yields to none in its importance and its interest.

Mr. Jenkins<sup>8</sup> glances somewhat askew at England. A native of England, as he assures his audience, he has imported into his public appearances both as a litterateur and as a dealer in politics, a certain undignified self-assertion which carries upon it an indelible stamp of American bringing-up. This idiosyncrasy is added, in the present

<sup>7</sup> "The Science of Law." By Sheldon Amos, M.A. Being Vol. X. of the International Scientific Series. London: Henry S. King. 1874.

<sup>8</sup> "Glances at Inner England." A Lecture delivered in the United States and Canada by Edward Jenkins, M.P. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

volume, to a very conspicuous—perhaps a resultant—impotency to understand or describe even the English movements and questions with which Mr. Jenkins has most cared to identify his name. Not that the exclamations to which he gives utterance are untrue, except as being outside the inner truth of the things which are their subjects. Numbered paragraphs, with marginal notes, on Vested Interests, on Mr. Whittier's poem against Established Churches, on Privilege, Education, the English Poor, and other topics, are spiced with quotations and semiquotations which may or may not be profane both to the humanity Mr. Jenkins professes to respect, and to the Book to which he professes fealty. At the same time some of Mr. Jenkins' ideas are ludicrously incorrect. It would have seemed impossible, for instance, that anyone with his experience of elections could say that America needs to take warning from a decay of political interest prevalent in English society. It is unnecessary to allude to the uselessness and folly of trying to make himself popular in a foreign country and in a British dependency by enlarging upon, and exaggerating by isolating, the evils which infest our body politic, instead of straining every nerve and muscle in patient and unobtrusive labour, both in and out of Parliament, to amend the present and avert impending ill.

The third volume of Mr. Herbert Spencer's collected Essays<sup>9</sup> will be received by the public with much satisfaction. Mr. Spencer's philosophy is so homogeneous and consistent and yet so subtle and comprehensive that a copious use of illustration cannot be dispensed with. And no more effective or lively mode of illustration exists than what is supplied by well-sustained controversy. It is not true that controversial writing is always the most favourable medium for the enucleation of truth in all its proportions; and therefore in every controversy it usually happens that he gains the most by it who is the greatest adept in the use of logical weapons, offensive and defensive; that the living prospers at the expense of the dead; and the one who is nearest at hand and talks loudest and speaks last has no small advantage over his adversary who is at a distance, or who is overgentle or feeble in debate, or who does not care to reply. Whatever may be the fate of M. Comte and Professor Huxley, certainly Mr. Spencer makes good capital out of their real or alleged opinions when brought into rivalry or contrast with his own. Mr. Spencer's points of difference with M. Comte are exhibited in the very intelligible form of parallel passages arranged side by side. Of course, as the selection and arrangement of the passages is in Mr. Spencer's hands and not in M. Comte's, this itself must weigh heavily against the latter. Mr. Spencer, too, can qualify and explain his own language as he goes: M. Comte cannot. This is no allegation against the perfect fairness and candour of Mr. Spencer, but is only a subtraction from the value of the comparisons of two systems of philosophy founded upon the production of such isolated materials.

---

<sup>9</sup> "Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative." By Herbert Spencer. Vol. III. London: Williams and Norgate. 1874.

Nevertheless this mode of exhibiting some of Mr. Spencer's most characteristic opinions will be found very interesting to his readers. For instance, to the assertion on one side of the page that M. Comte's ideal of society is one in which *government* is developed to the greatest extent, Mr. Spencer opposes his own conviction that "the form of society towards which we are progressing is one in which *government* will be reduced to the smallest amount possible, and freedom increased to the greatest amount possible—one in which human nature will have become so moulded by social discipline into fitness for the social state that it will need little external restraint, but will be self-restrained." Our own recollection of M. Comte's teaching, as a whole and not as expressed in fragmentary passages, leads us to believe that his ideal in the future did not differ widely from Mr. Spencer's; that the field of temporal government in M. Comte's, as in Mr. Spencer's scheme, was to be constantly restricted; and that what Mr. Spencer means by "social discipline" M. Comte really meant by the "spiritual power." The Essay on "Specialized Administration" will also be read with great interest.

Among the most curious features of the day, though it be one as yet little noted, is the extreme variety in all respects of the persons who are favourable to the opinions on Cremation so ably and succinctly brought together by Sir Henry Thompson's<sup>10</sup> pamphlet on the subject. The last few years have been fruitful in questions which have been hitherto thought too delicate or indelicate for public discussion, but upon which as soon as they were once put before the public it has been found that there existed already an immense mass of private individual conviction directly opposed to the common practice of all ranks of society. Among these questions is that as to the best mode of disposing of the body after death. The present fashion of burial,—with all the ghastly train of hidden processes which the mind refuses to follow either for its own body's case or for that of others, and which Sir Henry Thompson properly refuses to do more than hint at—has been growing increasingly unpopular for a long time in so far as it has become almost indissolubly mixed up with a pompousness, a fussiness, and an extravagance equally repugnant to the feeling of those who are really mourning, to the good sense of the practical, and to the wisdom of the philanthropic labourer among the poor. We are all beginning to see the evils of ruining a family for the funeral of its breadwinner, of exhausting the savings of years in crape and feathers, and of turning away from all the solemn lessons of bereavement in order to secure that dress shall be becoming and fashionable enough to deprive it of all real expression of anything except the wealth and vanity of the wearers or of their abject subjection to the vulgarst caprices of dressmakers and milliners. To break off these galling and offensive chains would in itself be a sufficient argument for a change of our mode of burial; but there are others of at least equal cogency. That the health of large towns has been affected by the existence of burial grounds in their

---

<sup>10</sup> "Cremation: the Treatment of the Body after Death." By Sir Henry Thompson, F. R. C. S., M. B. Lond. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.



midst is an uncontroverted fact ; and the precaution which the present day has introduced of compelling all burials to take place outside the limits of the more populated districts does nothing but secure to our immediate descendants a like legacy of disease and death. The very beauty of the spots so sacred to the sentiment of many is an outcome of unmentionable loathsomeness and a source of death. The inspectors of cemeteries insist upon the necessity of planting trees and flowers and shrubs—the quicker growing the better—to neutralize the gases that escape at every pore of the teeming graveyard, and houses are advertised as overlooking the lovely plantations without mention of that share of those gases which find their way out into the atmosphere unaffected by the insufficient number of vegetable growths. A common stumblingblock to those who start at the thought of burning the dead in ancient Saxon fashion is the idea that so quickly to do away with the outward semblance—hidden from sight though it be—is a sort of irreverence ; and yet it is probable that no one person would personally prefer to become, so far as the body is concerned, a source of mischief or an object on which the thoughts of survivors cannot rest, instead of being, if not positively utilized, at all events neutralized, and made such as the tenants of the funeral urns which ancient taste has made the form for even our most modern sentiment to assume both in verse and in many monuments. And what we would others should do to us, we should do to them. Even in the service of the Church which it seems most difficult to alter, what is the meaning, or is there any meaning, under our present system, of the phrase, “Earth to earth, *ashes to ashes*, dust to dust?” Sir Henry Thompson answers all questions as to the possibility of burning the dead without the horrible and unhealthy effects produced in India by the custom, and indicates the sort of mechanism by which a few ounces or pounds of dry white ash may be returned to the reverent care of survivors, without any possible injury or annoyance to any part of the population, at the end of an hour. The dread, felt more frequently than acknowledged, of premature burial and a horrible awakening would be put an end to by cremation ; partly because the introduction of the new system would be a good opportunity for the much needed appointment of officers to certify the fact and cause of death in every case by personal inspection, and partly because, in the then highly improbable case of mistake, the process itself would secure instantaneous and painless death. Again, it has been warmly argued that the impossibility of exhumation in cases of suspected poisoning would tend to increase that form of murder ; but the appointment of such officers as those named, would be a far greater safeguard than the chance of exhumation, and Sir Henry Thompson points out other precautions which might—were it thought worth while—easily be adopted. There seems small reason to doubt that either our own or a future more sensible generation will change the present repulsive and extravagant mode of dealing with “the ashes of the dead” for a more ancient and reasonable one, and Sir Henry Thompson earns the hearty thanks of all who wish to see the day and share the benefit.

Mr. Heath<sup>11</sup> is quite right in his belief that such a book as he now publishes is much needed. The fugitive paragraphs in newspapers,—whether in leaders or in reports of speeches—which have been a chief source of information as to the condition of our agricultural population, for most people lack the solidity of information and authority which Mr. Heath has carefully gathered together out of tedious blue-books, and by personal and minute investigations in the Western counties of England. The degradation he found usual among the cottagers was extreme, or rather perhaps it should be said that the deprivation was so; for the degraded minds seem to have abounded more among the laudlords and farmers, than among the noble and uncomplaining labourers, who have so bravely and forbearingly acquitted themselves under the guidance of Mr. Joseph Arch. An account of the great migration system, set on foot by Canon Girdlestone, is well-timed, since it is easy, now that the district under his influence is—through the obstinacy of employers—becoming almost too thinly populated, to say that his system was a mistaken one. There can be no doubt that to him belongs the high honour of having been the first remote mover in the great regeneration of the agricultural labouring classes of England. The actual rising did not, as is largely believed, originate with Mr. Arch. He was invited by a dozen men who lived in his neighbourhood to address them and their friends; but things were so ripe for progress that the secretly convened meeting numbered some fourteen hundred men. That dozen of men, again, were incited to their action by a letter sent to a local paper by two or three farm labourers of Weston-under-Weatherley, near Leamington, complaining of the hard conditions of their lives. Mr. Heath is most fair in his endeavour to point out to what degree the farmers are accountable, and to what degree blameless, in regard to the condition of their labourers. He gives many instances of extreme cruelty and hard dealing; but he also enlarges upon the difficulties which beset a man holding his land without any security of tenure. There are very useful chapters in the volume on agricultural children; on the National Agricultural Labourers' Union; on the depopulation of our western counties; on emigration, past, present, and future; and on the possibilities that lie before our peasantry. The whole work is singularly free from dry statistics, and will be welcomed by all classes of readers anxious to be easily informed on the subject of which it treats.

Mr. Cave Thomas<sup>12</sup> is anxious to put in a strong plea, in these days of theoretical education, for a system of education which shall not so much seek to develop individual capacity as to supply defects and so produce a real symmetry of mind. It is at once an obvious thought that this desirable end calls for a clear-sightedness and wisdom in parents and teachers which is not too commonly to be found. But

---

<sup>11</sup> "The English Peasantry." By F. G. Heath. London: Frederick Warne & Co. 1874.

<sup>12</sup> "Symmetrical Education." By W. Cave Thomas. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1873.

the protest is not without its use,—if indeed any thoughtful theory can be useless on so vexed a subject as education; since the revulsion from old formulæ is showing some tendency to carry society into the opposite extreme of cultivating chiefly that which appears on the surface of a child's nature, and so frequently leaving untouched all the depths which would give strength and solidity.

Mr. Symonds<sup>13</sup> papers on various Greek and Italian cities are some of them reprints of magazine articles, and bear the impress of their origin in the close packing of classical and mediæval allusion which characterizes them. The volume would be useful as a guide book in Corsica and Sicily, and is somewhat pleasant reading in England; but it is overweighted with long, florid descriptions of scenery and natural beauty. In a chapter on the songs of Tuscany, and at the end of the volume, are some graceful translations. Mr. Symonds remarks on the absence, in the popular songs of Tuscany, of ballads and of any element of magic or witchcraft—an absence accounted for possibly by the intensely practical and realistic nature of the Italian people.

Miss Kortwright<sup>14</sup> has begun to think about the position, rights, duties, and opportunities of women in a very shallow and conservative vein, but with so much genuine kindness of heart and sincerity of purpose that there is a fair chance of her coming, like those she inclines to revile for their larger efforts and aims, to see that the objects she would incite all women to strive for, are not the highest attainable, nor the only or most desirable, and also that even they must result from or necessarily involve that freedom from legislative or social restriction which is sought for by the women whom she denounces as unfeminine and misguided. It is a well-meant little book.

In attacks upon an enemy whose forces are of every variety, disciplined and undisciplined, regular and utterly wild and barbarous, forces and weapons of all sorts may without disadvantage be used. Therefore, Luke Limner's<sup>15</sup> vague sentences and haphazard hits at the absurdities of women's dress may be welcomed, though they are perhaps more valuable as straws showing which way some puffs of wind are blowing. Until the whole subject of modern dress, both men's and women's, is taken up and dealt with thoroughly as in opposition to all the dictates of propriety, usefulness, economy, and artistic culture, nothing much will be done by passing and partial declamation against temporary enormities.

Mrs. Hooper<sup>16</sup> is Professor of Domestic Economy in the Crystal Palace School of Art, and so has a claim to respectful attention from a public which is awaking to the importance to health and comfort of

<sup>13</sup> "Sketches in Italy and Greece." By John Addington Symonds. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1874.

<sup>14</sup> "A Little Lower than the Angels." By Fanny A. Kortwright. London: Sampson Low & Co. 1874.

<sup>15</sup> "Madre Natura versus the Moloch of Fashion." By Luke Limner. Chatto and Windus, Piccadilly. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "Little Dinners, How to Serve Them." By Mary Hooper. London: H. S. King & Co. 1874.

good cooking in the sense of economical ways of preparing digestible and various foods. The tide is setting so strongly in this direction as to make it quite unnecessary to do more than say that these receipts appear to be not extravagant and to be somewhat novel and promising. Indeed, the danger is greater that,—what with those enemies of the higher education of women who insist on cooking as the true feminine function, the doctors who write so largely on foods and diets, and the overwhelming mass of Englishmen who quarrel with their very bread and butter,—Britons may fall into the error of not simply eating to live—as they fain would do—but into the opposite extreme, and simply live to eat.

A native of Mysore<sup>17</sup> is anxious to arouse public attention to the state of affairs in his native country in the prospect of that country being shortly handed over to a native ruler. The young Maharajah is being educated with the express purpose of restoring to him his hereditary honours, and it would seem a matter of course that his territories should be handed over to him in the condition most certain to conduce to his prosperous government of them. That is to say, that either the certain future result should be anticipated, and trained native officials and employés of all grades should be appointed in all branches of State service, or there should be as large an admixture of natives under English superintendence as is compatible with the interests of the province. At the same time all possible economy should be practised, both in order so to fill the exchequer as to give the young ruler a good start, and in order to set him a good example. How different the facts are this pamphlet shows in a most temperate and cautious way, doing full justice to the good intentions of Government and to the abilities of the officers to whose hands the administration of Mysore has, during nearly half a century, been entrusted. At first instructions were issued that the agency employed should be exclusively native, and that native institutions should be carefully maintained; and the administration was, in fact, conducted upon practical rules intended to meet actual wants and which were in accordance with the habits of the people. But when the administration fell into fresh hands the somewhat crude system, which was suited to the stage of education then attained by the people, seemed too disorderly, and departments were organized for all manner of things; fresh divisions made fresh places for European officers; and each new want was felt to be supplied by the creation of a new department and new posts, until the superior grade officers have increased from thirty to a hundred and thirty-five, of whom less than thirty, not of the first grade, are natives. And the arrangements are in a curious state of disorder. Revenue officers are vested with judicial functions, and this avowedly for the sake of training them and not for the public interest; while throughout the whole judicial system there is no original or appellate court with assessor judges. That it might be well to secure the help of

---

<sup>17</sup> "The British Administration of Mysore." By a Native of Mysore. Part I. London: Longmans. 1874.

native experience as well as to train the future race of native judges is beyond question. Fresh legislation is imposed from time to time without due modification for the present condition of the population, and of a sort so complicated and intricate as to be most unsuited to that condition. This is as true of the criminal as of the civil law, and is productive of grave evils. A new police system having proved a terrible failure, an effort was made to organize the native system; but the instructions issued were incomprehensible to the uneducated police, and the whole thing does not work. Gaols on the reformatory system have been built all over the country, the cost—exclusive of the money for building—of supporting each prisoner being twice as great as the wages of labourers. A land survey and revenue settlement was organized in 1862 under good agency imported from Bombay, and it is at work, but it is in danger of being erroneously carried out from a want of due consideration of the position and condition of the country. It was intended to be a settlement for thirty years; but the people are so deeply imbued with a belief in the practical permanency of their ancient annual assessments that this term of thirty years would, did they at all comprehend it, be rather an unsettling; and, again, as it was calculated that the first settlement would not be made in less than thirty years there would seem to be a prospect of the department becoming a permanent one. At the same time it is difficult to say what is to become of the purely European staff when the whole government falls into native hands. The department has professed to train young Englishmen, but it should have trained young natives. The native of Mysore enumerates the various sources of revenue, and points out both calamities resulting from the adoption of foreign systems and ideas and those resulting from government monopoly—as, for instance, in the farming out of the right to sell arrack. The forests and jungles needed special supervision, but instead of a well-trained small body of foresters a host of inexperienced men without special knowledge have been allowed to make experiments, a number of new offences have been created, some of the most valuable timber is practically prohibited on private ground, and this department is another failure in every sense. But absurdity and mismanagement perhaps reach their culminating point in the department of Public Works, in which various bodies of officials have tried their hands and have done very little, and now the thing to be done is to repair and conserve, by European agency, the tanks and roads and irrigation which owe their existence to previous native work; and all this is estimated to cost sums totally out of proportion to the work. The making of the Mysore State Railway, long ago surveyed, is now indefinitely postponed in favour of irrigation works, while much irrigated land lies waste for want of enterprise and the means of communication. The education department seems also to need a complete revision, as well as the army; but for details both of these and of the departments already spoken of, the inquirer cannot do better than refer to this most able pamphlet. The second part, "Suggestions for the Future," will be welcomed by all who are interested in the great population of Mysore.

A Governor of the *Royal Hospital for Incurables*<sup>18</sup> writes of elective charities—or rather of the opponents of election to charitable institutions—in a tone which shows him to have the deepest sympathy with the receivers of the charity he is to help to administer. He is most royal in his disdain of the Charity Organization Society, corporately and individually, and of all who think that anything charitable might be mended; and he is to all appearances quite incurable in his habit of taking all that his foes say to be unfounded or grossly fabricated, and all that his co-operators assert as irrefragable proofs of the justice of their cause. The brochure is scarcely worth notice, except as a specimen of the indignant vested interest encouraged to speak freely under the shadow of a Tory Government. It may well be that such publications will serve a useful end.

"Prince Florestan" may possibly be intended as a satire upon Radical opinion; or upon the state of public opinion which makes Radical opinions incapable of being carried into practice; or upon half-a-dozen other things. But it is in reality a very good comment upon the result of Eton and Cambridge education. It is to be doubted whether anything in the world, called by the name of a system, or plan, or theory of education, except our English Public School and University "system" could produce so raw and thoughtless a young man as this Prince Florestan. And yet how good a description it is of "just what you would have expected" of an undergraduate. The unceremonious way in which he packs up and goes to receive his dignities without a thought of civil leave-taking of any one but his tutor; his jaunty jokes with the first "subject" he meets with; his light-hearted advances to the keeper of the greatest hell in Europe, and his desire that they should work together in unity; his quick conclusions as to his chief adviser's character; his purely comic view of the population he had to control and educate just on the ground of its paucity of numbers; his whole aspect of mind towards the politics of his dominions, as though politics were a game, and it did not signify one tittle to himself or anybody else whether he played at them or not;—are not these the familiar, everyday correlatives of the jaunty, good-humoured selfishness and ignorance which is the armour with which our young men come forth to fight, or to run away from and leave unassailed, the whole mass of misery and wrong by which, blinded or seeing, they are surrounded even in the nursery, the school, and the University?

The second edition of Mr. Matthew Arnold's<sup>20</sup> important work on the Higher Schools and Universities in Germany derives an access of interest over and above that properly due to the original edition from the remarkable theory of Church and State which Mr. Arnold contrives

---

<sup>18</sup> "Elective Charities and their Opponents." A Review. By a Governor of the Royal Hospital for Incurables. Unwin Brothers: Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London. 1874.

<sup>19</sup> "The Fall of Prince Florestan of Monaco." London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> "Higher Schools and Universities in Germany." By Matthew Arnold, D.C.L. London: Macmillan. 1874.

to enunciate in his new preface. *Apropos* of education in Germany, Mr. Arnold is naturally led on to comment upon the recent ecclesiastical laws in Prussia as affecting education. This comment affords Mr. Arnold the opportunity of criticising with his usual skill and delicacy of diction the policy of England in the disestablishment of the English Church in Ireland, and the claims of the English Nonconformists in the matter of national education. We very much doubt whether Mr. Arnold's view of the Prussian policy is the correct one, or can even be substantiated by facts. He seems to decry in that policy not, as we think, what is alone there, the support of the State in its purely secular aspect, and of the Government as its instrument, against the insidious assaults and machinations of Rome, but a defence of a national religion and of its representatives against those who would warp the purely national tendencies into artificial directions. Starting with this theory, which we hold to be purely gratuitous, not to say imaginary, Mr. Arnold goes on to argue that it is the duty of English "Dissenters" to devote their energies rather to improving and broadening the national religion than to banishing religion altogether from the region of public action. Mr. Arnold has a very great faith in the virtue of numerical majorities, and he evidently holds that if the large majority of the nation hold, or profess to hold, certain opinions, it is no hardship on the minority to have those opinions enforced by public endowments and compulsory education. Mr. Arnold's language indeed is always so refined, and his manner of speaking of his opponents is so courteous and complimentary (though tinctured with lurking contempt) that it is peculiarly hard to fix him with the responsibility of any opinions whatever. But this is what it comes to, and in Mr. Arnold's view, the test of rationality, beneficence, and truthfulness of doctrine is to be applied by the amount of attainable acquiescence. Of course, on this principle, an older system of belief has an invincible superiority of position over a newer one. What is spontaneously believed, and never questioned, is always to those who hold it full of "sweetness and light." No doubt, at one time, to the overwhelming majority of the Roman and Jewish world, Christianity seemed nothing but offensive to every sense and to be a darkness that might be felt.

Herr Emil Friedberg<sup>21</sup> has published a laboriously prepared treatise on the recent history of the conflicting claims of the German States and the Papal authority in respect of the appointment of bishops. The work is enriched by a collection (published in a separate volume) of original documents, in all languages, on which the rival claims are founded. The subject is one of somewhat a technical, and especially a German nature, but the importance of stating in a compendious form the real facts of the case, and producing all the evidence on which they rest, cannot be rated too highly.

Swiss Allmends are common or commonable lands, and Mr.

---

<sup>21</sup> "Der Staat und die Bischofswahlen in Deutschland mit Actenstücken." Von Emil Friedberg, Das Neunzehnte Jahrhundert. Leipzig: 1874.

Zincke<sup>23</sup> follows up his previous discourses on Swiss communal life by a very useful and interesting collection of information on the common lands, their origin, political significance, privileges, and adaptability to former and to present conditions of life in Switzerland. That he gained his information during a month's excursion in Switzerland, partially planned for the express purpose of gaining it, merely secures to his readers a very fresh and bright little volume of travel sketches; while those who only seek the fruit of his inquiries may confine themselves to the last chapter in the book, although much collateral talk with fellow-travellers and with himself is pleasant and instructive. The Allmends include common land of all kinds, pasture, forest, or garden ground, generally each commune possessing some of all kinds. In the earliest days, before intercommunication between the valleys or intercourse with the rest of the world was made possible; before cereals or potatoes were grown or even known, "the Switzer was the parasite of the cow," and on the well-being of the cows all interests must have concentrated. Unless a family could pasture a cow on a bit of prairie ground during some part of the year, and during the summer weeks could drive it up to the mountain pasture while the prairie patch produced hay for the winter, that family could not live. Also without a sufficiency of fuel life could not be maintained. Under such hard conditions superfluity could fall to no man's lot; and so the best that could happen was for the village to hold in common the mountain pastures for summer use, because these were not capable of improvement by industry, while the prairie pastures, being capable of such improvement, were held in such permanent possession as made it worth a man's while to make the best of his patch. The forests were held in common, and fuel and timber were dealt out in proportion to the size—that is, to the needs of each house. This was obviously a perfectly fair arrangement in early days; but when money could be earned outside the mountains, and so labour could be purchased to make the prairie land more productive and capable of sustaining more cows, the old permission to send as many cows to the common summer pasture as had been maintained during the winter began to tell very unfairly in favour of the hirer and against the labourer, whose patch of pasture was necessarily less productive than when he gave his time to it. And so with capital came the first step in the inevitable destruction of the Swiss common land system. The theory of these Allmends well accounts for and excuses the old jealousy of "foreigners" existing in the Swiss Cantonal laws to our own day. Each incomer would decrease by so much the available property of each original burgher; and even now he is not admitted to rights in the common property of the commune or of its adherent or exrescent corporations. These corporations are not political entities, and, though varying greatly throughout Switzerland, they may generally be taken to mean "a section of the burghers possessed of landed property held for a definite object. For instance, they had at Lindthal a corporation for educational purposes

---

<sup>23</sup> "Swiss Allmends, and a Walk to See Them." By F. Barham Zincke, Vicar of Wherstead and Chaplain to the Queen. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1874.



possessed of four alpes, or rights to portions of mountain pasture, and another for the encouragement of singing." It is at once clear that the Allmend system no longer answers the end which all land tenure systems must subserve or be changed for others more adapted to the time; it no longer secures that the land shall produce as much food as it might produce if held by a smaller number of persons possessed of capital enough to introduce improved methods of cultivation. And it breaks down under the strain of temptation which employs all able-bodied men in the service of tourists just during those months in which they should otherwise be devoting themselves to their land. Without being tempted to discourse on English interests, Mr. Zincke insists on the fact that anything in any state of society must be swept away which interferes with (1) the utmost possible productiveness of land; (2) such property in land as is requisite to secure that utmost productiveness; and (3) association for the protection of that property.

The authoress of "South by West"<sup>23</sup>—presumably a member of Mr. Kingsley's family circle—has the family gift of pleasant fluency with her pen. A visit to America, under the auspices of a well-known Church dignitary, gave her a favourable chance of seeing much of the country and of one class of society in Canada and New York in a very short time, and though she is not so democratic as some of her family, she makes up for some regrettable sentences by the fresh ardour with which she receives, and transmits to her pages, the impressions of each day. From the States she went westward to meet her brother, and the two young people seem to have led a pleasant rough and ready life, among the pioneer inhabitants of the city of Colorado, identifying themselves to the utmost with the interests of their temporary abode, and making the most of their opportunities for seeing the known and exploring the unknown wonders of nature in their neighbourhood. The descriptions of scenery throughout are terse and vivid. The latter part of the volume is much more exciting, containing the history of a perilous journey taken with some other English friends into Mexico, during a decidedly warm outbreak of revolutionary fires there. The party went for the purpose of ascertaining the best routes for the railways on the construction of which so much of the hope for a speedy pacification of Mexico must depend, and their route could not be merely chosen for security. The consequence was that they had various encounters with outlaw troops or banditti. A stay of some length in Mexico, with intimate acquaintance with most of the chief people of the city, gave the writer materials for chapters of special interest, and a final dozen pages sums up the resources of the country.

The sort of necessity under which newspapers appear to feel themselves placed, of sending correspondents to all quarters of the globe to report upon anything which may be happening there, is one which entails some results much to be deprecated in the interests of the manly straightforwardness on which Englishmen used to pique them-

---

<sup>23</sup> "South by West, or Winter in the Rocky Mountains and Spring in Mexico." Edited, with a Preface, by the Rev. Charles Kingsley. London: W. Isbister & Co. 1874.

selves. The love of adventure seems to be now in the ascendant, and people merely smile to themselves while special correspondents and travellers jauntily confess to or boast of the disguises, the assumptions of other nationality, and the blank, downright, or implied untruths, to which they have had recourse in order to attain their end. It is to be doubted whether the game is worth the candle. Mr. Ker<sup>24</sup> was suspected, during his absence in Central Asia, of not going there at all, a charge to which he gives distinct denial, and offers proofs of his veracity; secondly, he was accused of sending wilfully false news of the fall of Khiva, but he says he was himself mistaken, and the natural conclusion is that he would have been just as well at home; a third charge about the dates of certain letters and magazine articles, he totally denies; for a fourth, of putting extracts from former writings in his letters to the *Daily Telegraph*, the readers of that journal will probably readily accept his excuse of want of fresh matter. But it seems a pity to ask a gentleman to go and deny his native country, and get into great difficulties in the effort to conceal the fact that he was spying on forbidden ground, at great pecuniary expense to his employers, and at great risk to his own life and health, without some greater and more certainly attainable result than in this case. Mr. Ker's style is that of the *Daily Telegraph*, and his book will be found amusing by many.

African travellers are invariably infected with the disregard of time characteristic of African races, and their books are either thicker or in more volumes than those of travellers in other lands. Mr. Skertchley<sup>25</sup> makes no exception to this rule. He has, however, an exceptional excuse for his long-windedness, inasmuch as he is bound to try to convey to his readers a vivid sense of the weariness with which he endured the eight months of friendly imprisonment inflicted on him by the king of Dahomey. Mr. Skertchley went out to Africa to make entomological collections, and was tempted by an invitation from the king to visit Abomey, the capital, and a region generally inaccessible to Europeans. On the understanding that he was to be free to return to Whydah after eight days, Mr. Skertchley ventured into the power of Gelelé, the king of Dahomey, but found that he was anxious to detain an Englishman during various sorts of "customs," in order that some misrepresentations of Dahoman fashions might be corrected. Mr. Skertchley was made a prime favourite and well treated during eight months, and saw all that there was to see. He reports that the human beings slaughtered at customs are either prisoners of war or criminals worthy of death by Dahoman law; but his testimony is made less valuable by his expressed conviction that negroes are of a race inferior to men, that they should be used for forced labour in our tropical possessions, that all missionaries to the Gold Coast have been canting and hypocritical, that all "old maids" are spiteful and vicious and might advantageously be enrolled in the army, and so on. The

---

<sup>24</sup> "On the Road to Khiva." By David Ker, late Khivan Special Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>25</sup> "Dahomey as It Is." By J. A. Skertchley. London: Chapman & Hall. 1874.

merit of this volume is that it contains a detailed account of Dahoman life during the period of Mr. Skertchley's detention.

Herr Robert Weisse<sup>26</sup> publishes a few pages of geographical, ethnographical, and critical notices, intended to accompany and to increase the comprehensibility and value of a second series of chromo-lithographed fac-similes of Herr Hildebrand's water-colour sketches of Eastern life and scenery. That the work is that of an enthusiastic admirer needs not to be said, but it need not necessarily have been such as would raise any such desire as it awakens to see the pictures to which its office is that of showman. Herr Hildebrand is said by Herr Weisse to be the second Columbus of Art, and to have revealed a new world of subjects to the artist and of interest to the public. It may be somewhat puzzling to the English mind to know what this may mean, but there is always the probability that a German means something by what he says. Otherwise, sketches in Japan, at Rangoon, Singapore, at the mouth of the Peiho, or in the Ladrone Islands—or, at least, their geographical equivalents—are not rare among us.

In sixty pages of tolerably close print Herr Herrmann Cohn<sup>27</sup> sums up what is to be said by an oculist from his point of view as to the merits of the specimens and sketches of school seats and tables, and of school-room windows exhibited at the Vienna Exhibition. It is to be feared that some time must elapse before an Englishman will gain the information, or care to print it, or hope to find a publisher or an audience for so apparently minute a piece of the infinite ramifications of educational questions. And yet Dr. Cohn successfully endeavours to convey a sense of the importance of the matter. Serious injury to the eyesight of masses of children is doubtless wrought by arrangements which throw the light on their books from the front or the right hand side when they are writing, or which provide seats in which it is impossible for them to sit properly for the needful time, and which are either so far from the desks they write on that they must stoop forward, or so near to the desks their reading-books lie upon that the eyes cannot get the natural focus. What the different requisites are, what inventions most nearly fulfil them, and what is left yet undone, are subjects clearly and, altogether admirably treated in this little pamphlet. It is much to be wished that all members of school boards had to pass an examination in this and co-ordinate German monographs.

A very enterprising and valuable series of political pamphlets is in course of publication in Berlin under the superintendence of Professors Holzendorff and Oncken.<sup>28</sup> The pamphlets treat all the pressing political problems of the day, are written by men of the highest capacity, and are sold for a few pence each. The subjects are such as "The Old and the New German Empire," "The Five Millions," "The Reform of the Zollverein Tariff," "Cosmopolitanism and Patriotism," and the

<sup>26</sup> "Um die Erde Erläuternder Text zu den Chromofacsimiles der Hildebrand'schen Reise-Aquarelle." Von Robert Weisse. Berlin.

<sup>27</sup> "Die Schulhäuser und Schultische auf der Wiener Weltausstellung." Von Hermann Cohn. Breslau. 1873.

<sup>28</sup> "Deutsche Zeit-und-Streit-Fragen Klugschriften zur Kenntniss der Gegenwart." Herausgegeben von Fr. v. Holzendorff und M. Oncken. Berlin: 1874.

like. No better mode could be conceived of giving political instruction to the people of a more deliberate, continuous, and responsible sort than is given even by the best of our daily papers. Indeed, the reckless speed with which our political life is run, through the action of Parliamentary institutions in this country, render thoughtful writing and reading almost out of the question.

A most useful series of Reports<sup>29</sup> is issued every two years by the State of Illinois on its "Public Charities." These reports not only convey information of the most reliable sort on the social condition of Illinois, but also serve to throw light on questions which are becoming matters of discussion everywhere. In one interesting passage, for instance, in the Report for 1870, Dr. M'Farland gives a brief historical review of the treatment of insanity from the earliest ages. The organization of an asylum suggested by Dr. M'Farland is well deserving of attention. The foundation of the whole is industry, and the male servants are not attendants but fellow-labourers. The description of the county gaol and almshouse system will also be read with especial interest. One chapter in the Report for 1872 has the comprehensive heading, "Misfortune, its Extent and General Statistics." Another chapter in the same volume is on "Crime and Criminals," and another on "Prison Reforms." It will thus be seen that the little "Public Charities" to which these reports alone profess to extend covers all matters of great social significance.

In a volume making no pretence to the character of a work of fiction, though it wears much of its aspect, Captain Johnstone<sup>30</sup> has published a most interesting picture of Maori life as it was before the advent of Europeans into New Zealand. All the incidents which he has so skilfully interwoven into his work have trustworthy authority for their reality, and both characters and traditions are *bonâ fide* native Maori. The tone in which Captain Johnstone writes is far pleasanter than that of most colonists' writings: he is laudatory of the natives; nor is he, on the other hand, defamatory of the Colonial Government, though he points out with great regret the strange stupidity which made the rising of the Maories against Europeans in 1860 a quite feasible plan and entailed upon us the long war which must end in the extermination of the native population of the islands. The secret of the strength of the Maori organization lies in the fact that it is a race "truthful, brave, honourable," giving "willing obedience to the fundamental rule of Maori society which taught that the first duty of every citizen is to be prepared to bear arms in behalf of the commonwealth; and that far beyond the selfish luxury of the rich man, or the petty greed of the trader, is the simple patriotism which is ready to fight, and, if necessary, to die in defence of its country." If this be somewhat exclusively a military idea of virtue, there may be a deeper reason for Maori strength found in the fact that the race is descended from ten canoe-loads of people who

---

<sup>29</sup> "First and Second Biennial Report of the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities of the State of Illinois." 1871 and 1872.

<sup>30</sup> "Maories." By Captain J. C. Johnstone. London: Chapman & Hall. 1872.

came four thousand miles across the ocean as emigrants from an island where luxury and vice had made life intolerable to the vigorous and virtuous minority.

We have a curious antiquarian delight in reading the new series of the "Annual Register." The general order and plan of the great original series is, of course, imitated as closely as possible, and yet the lapse of time since the early numbers of the first work appeared makes itself strongly felt. There is something almost grotesque in the formal parallelism observed throughout. Thus, in the "Annual Register" for 1873,<sup>31</sup> among the remarkable trials is, of course, the Tichborne case, and in the chapters on English History the debates on the Supreme Court of Judicature Bill. The chapters on Foreign History, including those on France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, are especially important, as the matter is not otherwise accessible to the general reader.

---

### SCIENCE.

ONE of the most important scientific works of our time will probably be the *Mathematical Physics*, by Professor Kirchhoff,<sup>1</sup> the celebrated physicist, of which the first instalment of the first volume has just reached this country. The custom of German publishers to publish any large work on scientific subjects in almost infinitely small portions and subdivisions cannot be too much deprecated. This work, as indicated by a short notice of the publisher's, is intended to give in the main Professor Kirchhoff's lectures at the university, and it is therefore difficult to see any reason for giving us in dribblets what must be now quite ready, having been elaborated by the illustrious Kirchhoff during so many years of his lecturing, which has attracted students to Heidelberg from all parts of the world. We have here in all little more than 100 pages, and as nothing enables us to form some idea of the probable extent of the whole, and the general plan even of the mechanical portion, we must confine ourselves to state here simply the subject matter of this first instalment, leaving a more critical review of the whole until such time as the work will have sufficiently advanced for critical purposes. In general, this first part embodies the mechanics of material points and the differential equations of motion of liquids and elastic solids. The integration of these equations for special cases is not to be found in this part, but will, without doubt, be given in the proper places as the work proceeds. To enter now more specially into the order in which the subject is treated, we may mention that Kirchhoff has preferred the following plan. He first of all develops Lagrange's fundamental equations of dynamics. From these he derives as a consequence D'Alembert's and Hamilton's

---

<sup>31</sup> "The Annual Register: a Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, for the Year 1873." New Series. London: Rivingtons. 1874.

<sup>1</sup> "Vorlesungen über Mathematische Physik." Von Dr. Gustav Kirchhoff, Professor zu Heidelberg. Mechanik. Erste Lieferung. Leipzig: Teubner. 1874.

principles, and again from the former he deduces as a special case the principle of virtual velocities. This leads now naturally to the statements and proofs of the theorems on energy and conservation of energy, the motion of centres of gravity, and the conservation of areas. Next follow the discussion of the possible motion of a rigid body, and the differential equations of this motion under given forces, which are integrated for the special case of no forces, as well as for the particular supposition of the action of gravity; the theory of the measurement of gravity by pendulum observations, and the inquiry into the influence of the earth's rotation upon the motion of heavy bodies, forms in itself a very exhaustive essay on the subject. The part is then brought to a close by preparing the reader in the first instance for the development of the equations of motion of continuous bodies which permit a relative displacement of their particles, and by investigating the change which an infinitely small particle undergoes during the motion; finally the equations themselves are formed after introducing the conception of pressure, and we obtain the values of the components of pressure in liquids and elastic solids; in the former also for the cases in which friction takes place. While refraining in the meantime, as we have stated, from a more exhaustive criticism, it is yet necessary to point out that the originality of the treatment of the subject by the distinguished author arises from an obvious desire to remove some of the obscurity which still clings round the primary conceptions of physical mechanics in the usual mode of treatment. The author considers it justly a main object of mechanics that the motions which are proceeding in nature should be *described* in as simple a manner as possible, and thus he has succeeded, by starting solely from our ideas of time, space and matter, to establish Lagrange's equations by mere mathematical reasoning. It is true that these equations have afterwards the appearance of leading to no real information on the actual motions of bodies; but in reality they form a kind of schematic outline for these motions, and it must be the aim of observation of real phenomena to fit the special facts into the general plan, while their principal advantage is that they render a language possible which, as proved by experience, is singularly well adapted for a description of motions in the most simple manner.

A work closely allied to the former, although totally different in the mode of treating the subject, is Dr. Proell's<sup>2</sup> attempt of treating dynamics graphically. It is certainly remarkable that in England, the country *par excellence* of mechanics and great mechanicians, the graphical statics of Continental physicists has up to very recently received very little attention, and still less application in the solution of statical problems by graphical methods. It is a well-known fact, that while the purely analytical treatment of mechanical problems has led in many branches, for example in physical astronomy, to the grandest triumphs of the human intellect, the methods of analysis have not rarely refused assistance in many problems proffered by Nature herself or by the in-

---

<sup>2</sup> "Versuch einer graphischen Dynamik." Von Dr. R. Proell. Leipzig: Arthur Felix. 1874.

geny of man. The practical engineer of higher aims has often from various causes to resign all hope of real help from pure analysis, and methods which lead to a rapid and sure evaluation of numerical results or to a clear diagram of a mechanical process should certainly receive that attention in this country which they receive elsewhere. The Continental literature of the last few years is already rich in classical works on graphical statics, and Dr. Proell has now added a first attempt on graphical dynamics. The work is divided, as it seems, into three main divisions. In the first the action of external forces upon a freely moveable material point is graphically represented. The author shows in the commencement a geometrical relation between the three magnitudes: acceleration, velocity, and time. The constructions given by Dr. Proell form a striking parallel to the usual constructions in graphical statics where the curve of moments is determined from the curve of forces. The great value of the graphical method and its wide applicability is, however, specially visible in the constructions for the motions in a curve, and the application to the motions of planets with the help of the hodograph, will probably be for every reader a treat of the highest order. The second part treats of the actions of external forces upon a freely moveable but unchangeable system of masses. The contents of this portion are of the greatest interest, especially Chapter V., headed "Applications." Here the new constructions correspond especially to the progress of modern geometry. The third portion forms a complete whole by itself. It is the most useful and practical of all, showing the effects of external forces in machines, simple and complex. Here the engineer of every branch of the craft will find treasures of graphical constructions, which will open a new world to him, as we may say without exaggerating enthusiasm. The vast amount of calculation required for even a simple piece of mechanism can be easily replaced by a neat diagram, or a velocity-curve, which requires really a very small amount of skill. The text is accompanied by an "atlas" of plates, which, although in the main free from errors, do not appear to be executed with the usual elegance of German productions of this kind.

Professor Pickering's<sup>3</sup> work on physical manipulation is written on a similar plan to Professor Kohlrausch's Practical Physics, which has been reviewed in a previous issue of the *Westminster Review*. It has also great resemblance in its arrangement with a work recently published by Professor K lp of Darmstadt. Professor Pickering's book contains a great deal of valuable matter, which will secure for it a grateful reception among teachers and students of practical physics. Nevertheless it has the great fault of being too little cosmopolitan in its tone, and too much a guide for particular students in a particular laboratory, with a particular set of experimental apparatus. There is a great deal of space unnecessarily given to explanations on matters which are usually found in every text-book of physics, while as a consequence of this the space given to directions is comparatively small, and

<sup>3</sup> "Elements of Physical Manipulation." By Edward C. Pickering, Professor of Physics in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Part I. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

these are in many cases very meagre, and render the book somewhat useless for students without a teacher. What student possessing the necessary apparatus could, from merely reading this book, perform one-half of the experiments described? Yet when we are to learn "physical manipulations," we expect to see them described in detail, so that with sufficient care we may be able to do what has been described. Fewer experiments, and much minuter directions for every one of them, with all precautions necessary—that is what we have a right to expect from a book of this kind, and this expectation Professor Pickering's book does not quite fulfil.

Professor George Forbes,<sup>4</sup> of Glasgow, probably with a view of settling a somewhat useless and unseemly quarrel between Professor Tyndall and the biographers of the late Principal Forbes as to the respective claims of the latter and Canon Rendu as to certain discoveries, has published a translation of Rendu's original memoir, entitled "Théorie des Glaciers de la Savoie," together with supplementary articles by Professors Tait and Ruskin. Rendu's memoir is certainly written in a most fascinating style, and whatever his merits as an original discoverer—merits on which neither Professor Tyndall nor the Scotch philosophers are yet quite competent to judge finally—his mode of calmly and yet enthusiastically stating his conclusions bears the stamp of genius and of a great mind.

Mr. Proctor's<sup>5</sup> new book on the universe and the coming transits is a collection of previously published articles. Those on the universe embody chiefly his well-known views on the distribution of stars in space—which we cannot disprove; while the second part of the book appears to be a collection of Mr. Proctor's contributions to the Monthly Notices of the Astronomical Society on the best method of observing the coming transit of Venus—which we have every desire to recommend as valuable contributions to science. The work is chiefly important on account of the excellent maps and diagrams which accompany it, and from which every one can learn a great deal. The first part of the work can be well mastered by every educated man, but the second part should in our opinion have been preceded by a somewhat popular essay on the whole subject, starting with the very elements of the geometry involved in the transit. In the present form this portion will, we fear, be unintelligible to the majority of Mr. Proctor's admirers.

We have rarely seen a more excellent work on trilinear co-ordinates than this little book by M. Schendel.<sup>6</sup> The work is, besides, thoroughly original. Instead of taking as co-ordinates of the point the three perpendicular distances from the sides of a triangle, he starts with the triangular areas enclosed between point and corners of a triangle as co-ordinates, and obtains at once a novel and more general basis for

<sup>4</sup> "Theory of the Glaciers of Savoy." By M. le Chanoine Rendu. Edited, with Introductory Remarks, by George Forbes, B.A. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>5</sup> "The Universe and the Coming Transits." By Richard A. Proctor. London: Longmans & Co. 1874.

<sup>6</sup> "Elemente der Analytischen Geometrie der Ebene." Von Leopold Schendel. Jena: Costenoble. 1874.



analytical geometry. The duality of point and line is thus made apparent with great completeness, while the conic sections admit by this method of a very uniform and compact mode of investigation. The whole theory of conic sections is treated very originally, and many interesting questions are suggested during the progress of the discussion. The work may be altogether characterized as a most valuable contribution to modern geometry.

A small but most useful work by Dr. Kubel' on the various methods of analysing and testing the quality of natural waters, and especially those used for domestic purposes, is extremely welcome at a time when the importance of this particular branch of analytical chemistry is daily more and more recognised. It is well known that the relative merit of the various methods of determining the hardness of water, the quantities of sulphuric and sulphurous acid, ammonia, and organic matter present—that is, the presence of admixtures which originate from drains or sewers, and are either by themselves noxious impurities, or indicate the existence of sources of danger—have been for a long time subjects of controversy and inquiry. The author has therefore done great service by giving not only the various modes of proceeding, but also comparative reviews of the value of each method, as far as regards accuracy of obtained results, simplicity of the required operations, and corresponding limitation of the necessary apparatus and reagents. Methods which, *a priori*, do not fulfil these three conditions of a generally useful method of analytical investigation have been at once rejected by the author, and we cannot blame him for it, although the book is thus wanting in scientific completeness, and places the selective judgment of the author himself above that of every reader. On the other hand, the work has thus gained in brevity, and as it is written for, and may be very readily used by the manufacturer, the physician, and in fact every educated man, who has no great knowledge of scientific chemistry, we may well overlook this shortcoming of the book. The methods are mostly volumetric. These are easily performed, and give at once results quite sufficiently accurate for every general purpose. Nevertheless, the quantitative determinations are described in a great many cases, and where volumetric analysis is not sufficiently simple, the quantitative operations with the balance are the only ones given, as for example in the determination of silicic acid, the alkalies, &c. It is to be regretted that for the detection of lead we can only find qualitative methods, and no quantitative ones whatever. This is in our opinion a serious error, for although the professional chemist may easily refer to other sources of information, it is not so with the particular class of readers for which the book is specially designed. The chemical computations have received clear and satisfactory treatment, and there is also a very excellent chapter on the requirements and properties of wholesome water for drinking. We should very much like to see this little work translated into English with the addition of a small chapter on the quantitative determination of lead, and of manganese if possible.

---

<sup>7</sup> "Anleitung zur Untersuchung von Wasser." Von Dr. Wilhelm Kubel. Braunschweig: Vieweg & Sohn. 1874.

Professor Josiah P. Cooke,<sup>8</sup> of Harvard University, has enriched the "International Scientific Series," by what is in our opinion by far the most valuable and original work which has yet appeared in that series. For several years it has been a constant complaint of even advanced students, but particularly of educated men with scientific tastes, that to obtain clear logical insight into the theories which form the basis of modern chemical research, is a matter of exceeding difficulty. The student has either to work his way through many original writings of Laurent, Gerhardt, Williamson, Wurtz, and others, or he has to take in the "introductions" of various larger textbooks, which are hardly ever clear and complete, and generally presuppose the very knowledge which they teach in the part following the introduction. Professor Cooke has most happily discussed the old and new systems so as to show exactly the transition from one to the other. He does hardly ever assume a single reaction as already known, but he simply describes it, and shows cause, effect, and conclusion in harmonious sequence. The book is a great absolute gain to scientific literature, and will be read with like profit by the student and by the man of ripe chemical knowledge, to whom it presents a complete picture of the present state of chemical theories.

The "Smithsonian Institution"<sup>9</sup> has at various times presented to men of science most valuable and elaborate works of reference. The present one is of extreme importance, and embodies an enormous amount of labour, which Mr. Clarke has accomplished with great fidelity. The tables are printed very clearly, and we have taken the trouble to check a number of data by comparing them with the original publications, without detecting a single error. The uncertainty of scientific determinations strikes one painfully in looking over such a work. Most considerable discrepancies, which cannot be explained by any of the usual shortcomings of experimental work, still exist almost throughout the whole range of facts. As an example, we may refer to the specific gravity of solid mercury; we have for this four determinations, varying in the result between 14.0 and 15.19. For common phosphorus there are eight determinations, varying between 1.77 and 2.09. It is quite similar with a great many other bodies. It would, in our opinion, have been much more convenient for reference if the substances had been arranged alphabetically. Any chemical classification is at present liable to become antiquated at some time or other, and in the present shape of the book we have often first to refer to the alphabetical list at the end, and then again to the tables themselves, before we obtain the desired information. The vast value of the work, whatever little objections may be raised against the arrangement, will appear from the fact, that it contains the names of no less than 2572 distinct bodies; there are given the specific gravities

---

<sup>8</sup> "The New Chemistry." By Josiah P. Cooke, Professor in Harvard University. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>9</sup> "The Constants of Nature." Part I.: Specific Gravities; Boiling and Melting Points, and Chemical Formula. Compiled by Frank Wigglesworth Clarke, S.B. Washington: Smithsonian Institution. 1873.

of 2263 substances, with over 5000 determinations; further, 2000 determinations of boiling point, representing 1205 different substances, and nearly 500 of melting point, for 326 different substances.

Mr. Perry's<sup>10</sup> preface is not in agreement with the book he has written. He says that it is mainly intended for the use of students who can solve simple equations in algebra, and who know the simple definitions in trigonometry and the simpler facts in physics. We doubt whether such students would derive much advantage from his book, which is replete with formulæ, often without any proof whatever, which even for their mere numerical working by the practical student require certainly more than the "definitions" in trigonometry. The whole has made upon us the impression of a rather hasty putting together of lectures and lecturer's notes. Some parts are quite unnecessarily clementary for such a book—for instance, the examples on the mutual conversion of thermometric readings, on expansion, on calorimetry, &c., while in the most important parts too much is expected from the intelligence of the student, and the teaching is therefore defective.

---

Professors Virchow and von Holtzendorff, of Berlin, are bringing out a long series of popular scientific essays,<sup>11</sup> of which we have just received two. Each paper is separately paged, and may be separately purchased; but regular subscribers gain an advantage in the price. Of those now before us, one (No. 195) is by Professor Perty, and treats of the boundaries of the visible creation according to the present results of microscopic and telescopic research. The author gives a short historical account of the origin of the microscope and telescope, and indicates briefly the results obtained by those instruments in the investigation of the "infinitely small and the infinitely great," devoting, however, the greater part of his space to the latter section of his subject. His final conclusion is that "we do not know overmuch of the world of the small, and only a very little of the macrocosmic world." The second of these essays (No. 197) strikes us as of a more practically useful nature than Prof. Perty's paper—it is a short treatise on the general characteristics and vital phenomena of the Ferns, by Dr. C. Luerssen, of Leipzig. The author gives a good general view of this group of plants, and describes their curious mode of reproduction very clearly.

The "Elemente der Mineralogie" of Dr. Carl Friedrich Naumaun,<sup>12</sup> the first edition of which appeared in 1846, taking the place of a still

<sup>10</sup> "An Elementary Treatise on Steam." By John Perry, B.E. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

<sup>11</sup> "Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge." Herausgegeben von R. Virchow und F. von Holtzendorff. Heft 195. "Ueber die Grenzen der sichtbaren Schöpfung, nach den jetzigen Leistungen des Mikroskops und Fernrohre," von Maximilian Perty; and Heft 197. "Die Pflanzengruppe der Farne," von Dr. C. Luerssen. 8vo. Berlin: Carl Habel. 1874.

<sup>12</sup> "Elemente der Mineralogie." Von Dr. Carl Friedrich Naumaun. Neunte, vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. 8vo. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1873-4.

older work by the same author, has, ever since its publication, been the principal text-book for students of mineralogy in Germany. We have now to record the publication of a ninth edition of this valuable book—an edition, the preparation of which must have been almost the final labour of its distinguished author, who died at the close of last year. Of such a book it is hardly necessary to say more than that in this edition the results of the newest investigations have evidently been carefully worked into their proper places. The characteristics of the book which render it peculiarly valuable to German readers are the extreme compendiousness of the special descriptions, which include in a very small space a most complete account of the different species of minerals, and the great fulness of what the author calls the “preparative part” of the work—that, namely, which gives an account of the general phenomena presented by minerals. The section on Crystallography in this part is especially valuable, the author having been perhaps the highest authority in Germany in this department. The book is illustrated with an immense number of woodcuts.

Dr. Oscar Peschel’s “*Völkerkunde*,”<sup>13</sup> is the result, as he tells us in his preface, of an engagement into which he entered some years ago with General von Roon to assist in preparing an edition of the latter’s “*Völkerkunde als Propädeutik der politischen Geographie*.” The bad health of Count von Roon having prevented his taking any share in the production of the work, it has been published independently by its author. In an introductory section, Dr. Peschel discusses the general questions of anthropology—the position of man in nature, the unity or multiplicity of the human species, the place of origin of man, and his antiquity. He speaks dogmatically upon none of these points, but indicates very fairly the arguments on various sides; his own opinion seems to be that man is a member of the same order of mammalia as the apes, and that he forms a single species which probably made its first appearance on the surface of a great continent now submerged by the Southern Ocean. The discussion of the nature and origin of species is remarkably good, and the author, while recognising certain defective points in the evidence supporting the Darwinian theory, finally comes to the conclusion that it furnishes the best explanation of the relations of existing to pre-existent organisms. Upon the question of the antiquity of man we find a good summary of the now familiar evidence. This general section must be regarded as a mere introduction to the body of the work, in which the author first discusses at great length the principles of ethnology, and then applies them to the investigation of the various races of man. The former he treats under three heads—those of the bodily characters, the linguistic characters, and the technical, social, and religious developments. It is impossible in our space to analyse the author’s views upon these matters, which are discussed under numerous sections, and with a perfect freedom from all prejudices. As a final result of his work the author describes the varieties of mankind, which he arranges under seven “groups, races,

---

<sup>13</sup> “*Völkerkunde*.” Von Oscar Peschel. 8vo. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. 1874.

subspecies or species," leaving the reader to choose which term he will adopt. These seven primary groups are as follows:—1. The Australians and Tasmanians; 2. The Papuans of New Guinea, &c.; 3. The Mongolian peoples, including the inhabitants of the Asiatic Continent, the Malayo-Polynesians, and the aborigines of America, and divided into an infinity of subordinate groups which are here described in more or less detail; 4. The Dravida or non-Aryan inhabitants of India; 5. The Hottentots and Bosjesmans; 6. The Negroes; and 7. The Mediterranean, or so called Indo-European peoples.

Professor Gegenbaur's "*Grundriss der vergleichenden Anatomie*"<sup>14</sup> is really a new and somewhat abridged edition of his well-known and admirable "*Grundzüge*," the abridgment being effected by the omission of some details and especially of the greater part of the notes. The general arrangement and treatment of the subject are the same as in the earlier work, the publication of the second edition of which in 1870 was noticed in this Review, but the author has incorporated with his work the more important results of the newer literature. Like its predecessor, the book is abundantly illustrated, and it is certainly the best compendium of comparative anatomy that we possess.

Professor Adolf Fick has brought out a second thoroughly revised edition of his "*Compendium of Human Physiology*."<sup>15</sup> His object in this book is to give a connected picture of the bodily life of man. Commencing with the physiology of the muscles as such, he proceeds to explain their action as a means of moving the bones, and then passing to the nervous system he describes the physiology of nerve-tissue, of the system which it composes, and of the senses. Passing from these animal activities to the vegetative functions, he describes the physiology of the circulatory system and of the connected functions of circulation and secretion, and finally discusses the assimilative processes in connexion with the new formation of blood, and the general effects of the interchange of matter in the organism. The history of reproduction and development is, for some reason, relegated to an appendix. The physiology of the voice is treated of under the head of muscular work. The book, which is illustrated with a considerable number of wood-engravings, furnishes a good readable guide to the knowledge of the general physiology of the human body.

Dr. Pettigrew, in his "*Physiology of the Circulation*,"<sup>16</sup> treats only of a small section of the science, but he describes the phenomena as presented in vertebrate animals in considerable detail, dwelling to a great extent upon the mechanism by which circulation is effected. As regards the lower invertebrate animals his statements are rather confused. With regard to the identity between the circulation in

<sup>14</sup> "*Grundriss der vergleichenden Anatomie*." Von Carl Gegenbaur. 8vo. Leipzig: Engelmann. 1874.

<sup>15</sup> "*Compendium der Physiologie des Menschen, mit Einschluss der Entwicklungsgeschichte*." Von Dr. Adolf Fick. Zweite gänglich neu bearbeitete Auflage. 8vo. Vienna: Braumüller. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "*The Physiology of the Circulation in Plants, in the Lower Animals and in Man*." By J. Bell Pettigrew, M.D., &c. 8vo. London: Macmillan. 1874.

plants and animals, which it would appear to be the chief object of the book to establish, we do not think that the author by any means succeeds in making out his case.

Under the title of "Organologische Studien," Professor Leopold Auerbach, of Breslau,<sup>17</sup> has commenced the publication of a series of physiological memoirs. The first number of this work now before us contains the first and second sections of an elaborate investigation of the characters and vital history of the cell-nuclei of animal tissues. The first section is devoted to the consideration of the structure of nuclei in the natural state and under the influence of various reagents; the second treats of the formation and increase of the nucleoli. The author adopts and argues strongly in favour of the endogenous theory of cell-formation, regarding the nucleoli as true daughter-cells, and even apparently as elementary organisms. In opposition to generally received opinions, he maintains that cell-nuclei generally contain many nucleoli (sometimes more than 100), although occasionally young embryonal cells may be found in which the nucleus is "enucleolar." In his view, as we understand it, the nucleolus is the most important element in cell-multiplication.

---

We took up these small volumes<sup>18</sup> with an indifference tempered only by the name of the editor, a name which is in itself a guarantee against commonplace or ill done work. There did not seem to us to be much room for a small book on physiology as currently known; original physiological work is always going on and is always more than welcome, but popular handbooks are numerous enough, and several of them are written so well as to need no successors for the present. But when we come to look into the work before us we find that it differs somewhat from books like Lewes' "Physiology of Common Life" in that it is hortatory rather than descriptive; and being, as we see it is, the work of different hands, we might describe it as a collection of Sermons on Physiology. The various preachers lay down a groundwork of scientific instruction, and then draw wholesome counsel from this and exhort us to beware of physiological sins and follies. The Essays or Sermons are very various in merit, and while none of them come up to the highest level, some remind us in point of knowledge and perspicacity of their prototypes of the pulpit. The intention of the book is good, and its results cannot be without value, if not always as fresh and as pointed as may be. We could wish that there was a little less disposition to twaddle—that is, to repeat current ideas in half-considered words. For instance, the common statement is repeated, that "Unfortunately an absurd belief prevails that night air is dangerous." Now "dangerous" is perhaps a strong word; but we do not hesitate to say that night air, especially in the damper climates, is very liable to cause pulmonary irritation in persons thereto

---

<sup>17</sup> "Organologische Studien." Von Dr. Leopold Auerbach. Erstes Heft. 8vo. Breslau: Morgenstern. 1874.

<sup>18</sup> "Physiology for Practical Use." Edited by James Hinton. London. 1874.  
[Vol. CII. No. CCI.]—NEW SERIES, Vol. XLVI. No. I. S

disposed, and that much circumspection should be used in permitting the windows of bedrooms to remain open at night. The chapter on the use of the bath, on the other hand, is written more thoughtfully, and warns the reader against the indiscriminate cold tubbing which is often depressing or exhausting even to strong persons who lead the sedentary life of citizens. On the whole, though these Essays have no great distinction of thought or style, yet they are intelligently and adequately written, and we hope they will prove useful to those for whom they are designed.

Mr. Hinton's Introductory Lecture at Guy's Hospital<sup>19</sup> is very properly issued in its present form, as the address is one which, having great merits, has merits of a kind which are least adapted for oral exposition. Unless the audience at Guy's Hospital is a very exceptional gathering, Mr. Hinton's abstruse utterances would win a hearing rather on account of the respect due to a speaker of known ability than on account of the matter which he delivered. Very little, indeed, can the ordinary Guy's man have taken into his mind of the words as they fell from the speaker's lips, but many of the more thoughtful of his hearers have read them, no doubt, with interest by their own firesides. Indeed, as a certain imposing vagueness appeals to the open and generous brains of young men, it may be that Mr. Hinton's address has excited intense interest among the members of his own society. Nor can this little book fail to make its way to a larger and more critical public, for its chapters are concerned with great matters, and are conceived in a broad and imaginative spirit. The first part of the discourse is devoted to a consideration of the place of the physician, the second part offers for acceptance a particular law, deduced from the observed facts of progress in society and in the individual, which we cannot now discuss, and the third and last part is a discussion of the relation between the inorganic and the organic worlds. These subjects are handled by a man of high education and of a certain degree of imaginative power, but they are scarcely set forth by the hand of a master. There is a kind of mysticism in the manner of the writer too, which is not wholly different from magniloquence, and which makes us ask ourselves from time to time whether anything is really being added to our conceptions, or whether we are not receiving old things in new parcels. Be this as it may, writers of real speculative power are not common enough to be treated lightly, and we welcome Mr. Hinton's address for its many fine thoughts, for its comprehensive and scientific conceptions, and above all for its really high tone and style which, even if it be at times a little overstrained, is always high-minded and fastidious in purpose.

A book which should give wholesome counsel to persons of advanced years who, while not ill enough to submit to medical rule, are nevertheless liable to many little ailments which tend alone or together to diminish the sum of their days would be of real value. Dr. Gardner's attempt<sup>20</sup> is in the right direction, but it is so imperfect that we can

<sup>19</sup> "The Place of the Physician." By James Hinton. London. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> "Longevity." By John Gardner, M.D. London. 1874.

scarcely welcome it with more than bare courtesy. It is not an intruder, but we do not anticipate much from its company. Dr. Gardner is the author of a work on "Domestic Medicine;" we are not familiar with the individual book, but the genus we know well, and there is a strong likeness to that genus in the volume before us. The reader will find in all alike a few shrewd and really useful hints, chiefly in the way of homely receipts the importance of which, however, is somewhat exaggerated; we find in them also a sublime faith in certain drugs which do not command so exclusive an attention from the profession at large, and we also find in them a great deal of very doubtful physiology, and warmed up fragments from the more antiquated standard authorities on medicine. Such is Dr. Gardner's present publication, and we are not prepared to say that it is wholly bad. Unfortunately, writers of this calibre are very fond of airing their scientific knowledge, or rather are very fond of declaiming their quasi-scientific prejudices, and in this particular again Dr. Gardner keeps true to the class to which he belongs. He is very angry with those unhappy men who cannot see that Life with a capital L, is something far higher and better than "its mere material envelope." He can comfort the doubting too by the following assurance on p.150. "Before the flood men are said to have lived five, and even nine hundred years; and as a physiologist, I can assert positively, that there is no fact reached by science to contradict or render this improbable."

Mr. Maclaren of Oxford is known as a successful trainer and gymnast wherever training and gymnastics are known. The first edition of his treatise on the subject<sup>21</sup> was received with the favour which it so well deserved, and the appearance of this second and enlarged edition will, we trust, give a new impetus to the scientific treatment of the physical man, and a further discredit to the foolish and even brutal customs which so long have held their ground among trainers, in defiance even of common sense. If Mr. Maclaren's physiology leaves something to be desired in the matter of accuracy, yet it is mainly sound, and the mistakes we discover are scarcely such as to interfere materially with the rules which experience will justify. One of the best features in the book is the estimate of the comparative values of different kinds of exercise, and the author very properly condemns the fashion of exclusive devotion to one form of exercise to the neglect of others. For instance, Mr. Maclaren has often observed that in boating men the chest, so far from increasing, has positively diminished during the ordinary course of training for the oar, and he draws from this and other facts that to gain the highest advantage in this as in other sports the body must be trained all round on a well-reasoned plan, so that no parts are developed at the expense or to the neglect of others. It would be difficult to improve on this little book, which is written in a sensible tone and with a wholesome defiance of time-honoured prejudices which cannot be too highly commended.

---

<sup>21</sup> "Training in Theory and Practice." By A. Maclaren. Second Edition London. 1874.



This little book<sup>22</sup> consists of two lectures delivered by the author to an audience not specified. In them he treats of the chief facts relating to health from a popular point of view. It may be that the more people are pelted with sanitary tracts the better is the chance that they may take some notice of the subject. On no other ground can we see any reason for the multiplication of pamphlets like the present, which have not always the negative merit of accuracy in detail. We do not find any grave mistakes in Dr. Stocker's lectures, nor on the other hand anything which could be of the smallest use to an educated reader.

This is a gossiping book,<sup>23</sup> written by one of those rather whimsical beings who think that no truth has much force unless some great man has stood sponsor to it. We have every authority for the varied and somewhat incoherent statements in these few pages, ranging from Hippocrates and Ovid down to "a learned authority in Switzerland." Every page bristles with quotations from writers whose names appear in capital letters, and we are astonished to find that we have distinguished persons to help us to a belief in the most trivial as well as in the profoundest of maxims. Dr. Budgett thinks "life is a mystery;" Ovid, it appears, agrees in this striking sentiment; Dr. Watts, moreover, tells us how to improve its few but shining hours. Other eminent persons think a complete bath should be taken "at least once a month," and in the same paragraph it is said to be "sound philosophy" to attach a physician to a school and to pay him regularly,—so we presume that a great part of his duties will be to see that the young ladies do not hurt their constitutions by injudicious tubbing. In the course of his large experience the author seems to have noticed that "there are some so naturally constructed that there is a great development of the intellect, or the contrary;" and the same thing seems to have been more or less explicitly acknowledged by no less men than Dr. Johnson, Lavater, Voltaire and Rousseau. Dr. Budgett has a happy knack of unexpectedly combining the most unlike ideas, which of course is wit, as we have often heard on the best authority. Dr. Budgett is therefore a very witty writer. What he must be in private conversation we can scarcely imagine, for, to use his own quotation, "Colonel Oudet eloquently wrote, 'That human thought loses all that it has divine when it is imprisoned in a quill and drowned in an inkstand!'" What must Dr. Budgett's thought be when freed from such bondage?

We so recently expressed our high opinion of Dr. Maudsley's writings<sup>24</sup> that we need not now repeat it. Dr. Maudsley has done more perhaps than any living man to bring Mind and its diseases into the light of modern scientific thought. In his present work the author has touched upon more delicate ground—namely, upon the relations of insane persons to law—and he has written on the whole a very fair book upon a difficult and hotly contested subject. Lawyers and doctors

<sup>22</sup> "Hints for Health." By J. S. Stocker, M.D. London. 1874.

<sup>23</sup> "The Hygiene of Schools." By J. B. Budgett, M.D. London. 1874.

<sup>24</sup> "Responsibility in Mental Disease." By H. Maudsley, M.D. London. 1874.

have been almost open enemies upon this subject; each camp has fought over the body of the lunatic, and each party has often been extravagantly wide of justice in its assertions and in its demands. If in this *Review* we have for the most part seemed to side with the lawyer rather than with the physician in the matter, we have done so, not because the lawyer has more abstract reason on his side, but because in our opinion a certain rude legality is at the present time less dangerous to society than the irregular sentiment of doctrinaires. If a Lord Chancellor condemned "not long ago 'the evil habit which had grown up of assuming that insanity is a physical disease,'" this Lord Chancellor must have been a very ignorant person; very ignorant, that is, of that degree of modern scientific psychology which has of late become the property of almost every well-educated man. On the other hand, the great bulk of alienists who fearlessly propose to place every insane person, as such, out of fear of law, are equally in error, for they lose sight of quite as much of the other side of the question. Disease of the brain, in itself, is no more a passport to immunity than is Bright's disease, unless it can be shown that such cerebral disease had certain special results in a given case. It must surely be the duty of a physician in all such cases to ascertain whether his patient's state is one which was at a particular time susceptible to the ordinary influence of the laws of his country or not, and if so then in what degree. It is the physician's business to give such evidence to this point as may be comprehensible to a jury, and not to act as if his own diagnosis of unsound mind were equivalent to an acquittal. Yet this latter is the line which is far too often taken by the medical expert. We are not sure that even Dr. Maudsley is always fully aware of the true relation of the medical expert to the Court, which, as we may say once more, is not that of an umpire but of a witness whose duty it is to state clearly certain facts which his training enables him best to observe and to set forth; these facts of course must take their place with the rest of the evidence, and like the rest submit to the ruling of the Court and to the ordinary measures of probability. At the same time we admit that Dr. Maudsley can not only offer an opinion which commands the highest respect, but his whole tone of mind and his calm impartiality make error in him far less likely than in most other writers on lunacy. His present volume is indispensable to the lawyer as well as to the physician, and it will keep up the high character of the International series.

Dr. Cunningham's volume,<sup>25</sup> which is published as a thin folio to receive illustrations, contains the results of observations on the nature of the particles present in the atmosphere of Calcutta and the neighbourhood. It contains also a summary of the literature of atmospheric micrography. The author's observations must not be despised because his results are chiefly negative. The work was needed, and it seems to have been carried out with very creditable industry and care. The illustrations are numerous and well executed.

Whatever be Dr. Blanc's power as a speculative thinker, we cannot

<sup>25</sup> "Microscopic Examinations of Air." By D. D. Cunningham, M. B., n. d.

but be glad that one who has enjoyed such exceptional advantages for seeing the actual side of cholera should be disposed to give us some "practical notes"<sup>26</sup> and to "avoid all theories and hypotheses." Cholera, in Dr. Blanc's experience, has always appeared as something local and specific, and communicated from man to man, generally by means of drinking water, and not dependent on more general telluric or atmospheric movements. In support of this opinion Dr. Blanc relates certain facts within his own observation which strongly uphold such a view. On the other hand he shows that, so far as could be ascertained, no constancy whatever has been noticed in the wider cosmical changes which accompanied the various epidemics. If this be so, the prophylaxis of cholera should offer no great difficulties, and Dr. Blanc ventures to assert, and no man has a better right to make an assertion on this subject, that "few epidemics can be so easily warded off as those of cholera, if only we set earnestly to work to do so." As regards medicines, Dr. Blanc expresses himself most strongly against purgatives, for "their action is very liable to be followed by rice water stools and collapse," "whilst during the previous stage of diarrhœa few medicines are found more beneficial than opiates and anodynes." Dr. Blanc would endeavour to neutralize the poison in the intestines by the internal administration of chloralum. He seems, however, to have had no experience of this latter medication which is deserving of the name. Dr. Blanc's book is small but well worth reading.

The discovery and the tracing out of the nervous affections, which are now known to owe their origin to syphilis, are among the most honourable achievements of modern medicine. Not only, too, have modern physicians thus proved their clinical acumen, but in this instance they can boast of a corresponding therapeutical triumph. But too often the detection of obscure diseases and the interpretation of their inmost ways are but a revelation of the impotence of our art. With our growing knowledge of syphilitic nervous diseases, however, we have gained the power of curing some of the most distressing and fatal ills to which the body is heir. Although English observers have not been behind those of other nations in this branch of their study, yet it so happened that in England there existed no manual specially devoted to the subject. The observations of Reid, Wilks, Jackson, Allbutt, Moxon and many others, lay scattered in the files of many journals, and Dr. Buzzard<sup>27</sup> has done a good service in bringing this matter together, in enriching it with the farther results of foreign study, and in enlarging and controlling the whole by extensive personal investigation. The thirty-seven cases taken from his own practice, are very judiciously selected and very fortunately obtained; it is not every man who is in a position to produce an apposite instance of almost every variety of the disease. Dr. Buzzard not merely discusses for instance the insanities which belong to syphilis, but he has cases of his own to illustrate them; so again with respect to ophthalmic

<sup>26</sup> "Cholera: How to Avoid and Treat It." By H. Blanc, M.D. London. 1873.

<sup>27</sup> "Syphilitic Nervous Affections." By Thomas Buzzard, M.D. London. 1874.

signs, the author is not only well read upon this subject, but he has also used the ophthalmoscope extensively, and has formed his own conclusions as to its great value. We notice that Dr. Buzzard makes no reference to mechanical injuries as the occasional exciting causes of syphilitic disease of the brain or spine, as has been asserted by Dr. Clifford Allbutt. A few cases are not sufficient to prove so important an assertion, and we should have been glad to learn whether Dr. Buzzard had met with any experience of the kind. We hope that Dr. Buzzard will be called upon for a new edition of this excellent and unpretending little book. Its price is within the means of every one, and no one can afford to neglect the reading of it.

Dr. Külz's "Lectures on Diabetes"<sup>28</sup> follow very seasonably upon the work of Seegen which we lately noticed in this *Review*. Among other valuable researches Dr. Külz has laboriously investigated the action of Karlsbad water upon the disease, and has presented us with some materials which are worked out with the accuracy without which all talk about diabetes is vain. It is worse than vain for physicians to discourse upon the virtues of this, that and the other remedy in diabetes without minute daily analyses, and without the utmost caution in the discrimination of cases and in the regulation of conditions. Dr. Külz satisfies the most rigorous requirements in this respect, and we therefore accept his conclusions with some confidence. At the outset of his volume the author presents to us the careful records of the cases upon which his researches were made, and he distinguishes broadly between the mild and the severe kinds of the malady. One or two cases he describes as being of a "Mischform." In some cases autopsies were obtained, but with no important results. He agrees with other German observers and some English ones in withholding assent to Dickenson's belief in the constant occurrence of abnormal (perivascular) spaces in the central nervous organs. The second chapter is devoted to an impartial inquiry into the grounds of the great reputation which the Karlsbad waters have enjoyed as a cure for diabetes since they were recommended by Hufeland. The investigation is conducted upon one case only, but it is carried out with a thoroughness which gives it great value. We have not space to enter into detail, but we may say briefly that Dr. Külz thinks that the Karlsbad physicians have two factors at work in their cure—diet and the water—and he thinks that they can make no statements about the effects of the latter until they have thoroughly estimated the effects of the former alone. The third chapter deals with the observed effects of other reputed remedies, such as bicarbonate of soda, bromide of potassium and Fowler's solution of arsenic. From bicarbonate of soda in doses of one drachm to half an ounce daily, Külz says that decided benefit was obtained, but nothing like a cure; from bromides he gained nothing, nor did arsenic do much more. The chapter on the effects of sundry hydrocarbons separately investigated is of much interest and importance. Perhaps the fact of greatest interest to the diabetic is that inosite in the guise of young green beans

---

<sup>28</sup> "Beiträge z. Diabetes Mellitus." Von E. Külz, M.D. Marburg. 1874.

may be added to their scanty diet without fear of consequences. In the fourth chapter Dr. Külz gives the results of his inquiries into the effects of exercise as seen in his patients. In accordance with Dr. Brunton and other eminent authorities, he pronounces that exercise has certainly a most beneficial effect, and determines that the good is due to the muscular activity, and not only to increased rapidity of breathing. We have said enough to show that this small treatise is not only indispensable to all earnest workers on the subject, but in its minuteness and thoroughness is a good lesson to those who on scanty and imperfect observations attempt to foist remedies upon the public which have no real claim to consideration. We are glad to observe that Dr. Külz will publish some further results at a future time.

---

### HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

PROFESSOR STUBBS' first volume of the "Constitutional History of England"<sup>1</sup> is, we think, the best book that has reach us this quarter. It is unpretentious, and is issued as one of the Clarendon Press series, a series that has given to the world some good books and some exceedingly bad ones. It has given us "Veitch's Greek Verbs," "Brachet's Historical French Grammar," but it is also responsible for such books as Mr. Lee Warner's "Livy," and Mr. Simcox's "Juvenal." It is, indeed, a series which furnishes no guarantee for excellence. It is almost a pity that Professor Stubbs has allowed his valuable work to appear in such company; but the Clarendon Press series has one good guarantee, a guarantee against bad printing. Professor Stubbs, however, stands higher than most of those who adorn the list of Clarendon Press editors, and his book will win its own way. Constitutional history must necessarily be less attractive to the general reader than most of the matter which passes under the name of history. Mr. Stubbs has well said that constitutional history reads "the exploits and characters of men by a different light from that shed by the false glare of arms, and interprets positions and facts in words that are voiceless to those who only listen to the trumpet of fame." The slow and secular growth of institutions does not allow of the personal interest which attaches to the brilliant career of an individual. The student of constitutional history cannot permit himself to be recreated by those pleasant details of character which awake or sustain the interest of the general student of history. He moves in a higher atmosphere. On such students Professor Stubbs has conferred a real benefit by the publication of this first volume of his history. Of how many volumes the work is to consist we are not told, but those who have mastered the first, will be impatient for the second. This first volume brings the

---

<sup>1</sup> "The Constitutional History of England in its Origin and Development." By William Stubbs, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press.

history down to the end of the twelfth century. In a brief introductory chapter, Mr. Stubbs proves the fact that the German element is the paternal element of the English polity, and upon this basis the rest of his work is founded. The Celtic element, Mr. Stubbs practically eliminates, and passes on with a celerity, which scarcely convinces us of his thoroughness on this point, to the Anglo-Saxon system. In this he is more at home, and his chapter upon the allotment and division of land is better than anything that has preceded it, except the introduction. Mr. Stubbs does not consider that the Danish influence in this country was of great permanent influence. In this matter, he may, perhaps, not be quite right; but his chapters on the Norman Conquest are extremely valuable—the last one in the book being especially so. Here the constitutional history is traced down to the signing of *Magna Charta* (or "*Carta*," as Mr. Stubbs prefers to call it). This is a starting-point with which a new volume may well commence. Mr. Stubbs' book neither attracts nor repels the ordinary reader, and that is saying much. The subject can scarcely be adorned with the tropes and literary decorations of ordinary history, but it is one which itself lends dignity to the historian—in other words, it is a subject whereof, if the writer is not very dull, he is very successful. Mr. Stubbs is not very dull, and he is very learned. The book can be read, though we do not think it will be, by those who are not specialists, but to the student in the history-school at Oxford, for whose use it is probably designed, it will be indispensable. Unfortunately, the history-school is not much crowded, but the present book is so good that we wish it a public larger than that which ordinarily calls for the well-printed books of the Clarendon Press.

Two new volumes complete Mr. Froude's account of that saddest episode in our history which is connected with Ireland.<sup>2</sup> It is gloomy, but fascinating reading, and is an episode not to the credit of either England or Ireland. Mr. Froude deals with both English and Irish in a spirit of historical impartiality; perhaps he metes out more blame to the English. The second volume begins with the year 1767 and Lord Townshend's administration. This was indeed a dismal time. Mr. Froude shows how the old Irish parties, stirred by the American Declaration and the French Revolution, took fresh names and retained old vices; he traces with effect the growth of the delusive belief, which has never entirely left the Irish, that if once they were released from English influence, and had an Irish parliament assembled, they would be an united and glorious people, untouched by religious and political animosities. The means, however, which were taken for the realization of this dream, the history of the Society of United Irishmen under Wolfe Tone, the gradual sinking of the revolutionary party into impotent anarchy, and the internecine enmity of the Catholics and Protestants, fill up the pages of a dreary record. It is a gloomy and sickening record, in spite of Mr. Froude's artistic skill and mastery of literary material. No one can read even a few pages

---

<sup>2</sup> "The English in Ireland." By James Anthony Froude. London: Longmans & Co. Vols. II. and III.

without becoming at least a sadder man. It would have been less dismal if it had been written by a partizan of one side or the other, if it had been touched by some little colouring of belief, or enthusiasm, or love; but it is brightened by none of these. Mr. Froude, like a passionless recording writer, unfolds the wretched programme of misery, ignorance, brutality, and injustice, and leaves his readers to draw appropriate inference. So sad a story in anything but Mr. Froude's faultless style would be intolerable. In that, too, it is intolerable, and calls for earnest attention. We trust that even a Government whose first minister attributes every misery of Ireland to its contiguity to "a melancholy ocean," may learn something from these accusing, damnatory chapters.

An inferior work,<sup>3</sup> upon a somewhat kindred subject, is pleasanter reading. Mr. Burns gives us the history of the Scottish War of Independence. "Every thinking mind," he says, "should be open to consider the question, what would have been the state of matters had Scotland become a second Ireland?" Happily this has not been the case. Mr. Burns quarrels with English historians who have touched upon Scotch, or, as he prefers to call it, "Scottish" subjects, and is very keen in detecting "Anglo-Saxonism" even in native writers, but he adds that some of the warmest tributes to Wallace's memory are from English writers. It is therefore rather difficult to understand his grievance. He has one, however; and being fired by the movement for the erection of a national monument to the memory of the Scottish hero, William Wallace, he has written a wordy, but not uninteresting history of the War of Independence. The book, in truth, needs compression. Scotch writers must learn the lesson that Scotland is only one valuable, but fragmentary part of a great empire. She has, wisely for herself and happily for us, not played the part of Ireland, and to insist now upon national dignity is to sink to a low level of provincialism, which is unworthy of a great and admirable section of the British Empire. Mr. Burns, however, expends four hundred of his pages before he brings his hero Wallace upon the stage. After this the history marches along fairly enough; the story of Bannockburn is well told; and, after all, it is not difficult to forgive a Scot for that tinge of vainglory which is inseparable from provincialism, perhaps from patriotism. But there can be no question now-a-days that a historian must be, like Mr. Froude, above provincialism, if he is to reach a rank of consideration. To search in London journals for remarks depreciatory of Scotland, and to treasure such remarks as an insult, betokens a spirit which is unworthy of a historian, and which renders even his narrative suspicious. Mr. Burns' style is easy and unaffected. We only wish that he would remember that the glory of Scotland is the glory of England, that the interests of both countries are inseparable, and that no great name stirs a Scotch (we beg his pardon, a Scottish) heart which has not equal influence in the south; and when he issues the next edition of his work, we would beg of him

---

<sup>3</sup> "The Scottish War of Independence, its Antecedents and Effects." By William Burns. Two vols. Glasgow: James Maclehose.

to omit his references to the "Anglo-Saxon" theory, and to compress the book into one volume, and we venture to predict that it will meet with admiring readers amongst those whose ethnical connexion with himself Mr. Burns is most anxious to disprove.

Lord Cockburn's journal<sup>4</sup> belongs to a very interesting class of books, and is an interesting specimen of the class. Lord Cockburn wrote an unbroken narrative of contemporary events to the close of the year 1830, which was published in 1856. After that period he went on recording circumstances as they occurred, but often at large intervals. "This habit," he says, "of making a note of things worth observing at the time coincided with the change of life implied in my becoming Solicitor-General." It is fortunate that Lord Cockburn continued this habit, for the result to us is the present work, which is extremely readable. The first volume commences with the Reform Bill. Lord Cockburn was in personal intercourse with the Cabinet Ministers, and in constant communication with Lord John Russell, and says that he was much struck with the acuteness, brevity, and clearness of the Cabinet. When the Bill was passed he says of Scotland: "It is impossible to exaggerate the ecstasy; we are indeed to be brought out of the house of bondage, out of the land of Egypt." But we cannot go through these two volumes in detail. The first closes with 1843, and is full of interesting anecdotes and subjects of contemporary interest. On May 16th, 1836, there was an eclipse of the sun. Dr. Chalmers postponed his service that his congregation might see it. Lord Cockburn witnessed the obscuration, and was much interested. He is pleased with Lockhart's "Life of Scott;" he has a vivid remembrance of Scott himself. "I see him in the Court, and on the street, in company, and by the Tweed. The plain dress, the guttural burred voice, the lame walk, the thoughtful heavy face, with its mantling smile, the honest hearty manner, the joyous laugh, the sing-song, feeling recitation, the graphic story—they are all before me a hundred times a day." The second volume records events from 1843 to 1854. The subjects generally treated of are of local Scotch interest. Lord Cockburn has a high opinion of Thomas Guthrie, whose biography we noticed last quarter. He is throughout a Scotchman, everything Scotch interests him from the death of a Scotch physician in London (vol. ii. p. 201) to the vagaries of Glasgow students at home (p. 231). Of course he is enchanted with Sir A. Alison's "History of Europe," though he admits that that important work is occasionally "heavily copious." The two volumes are of considerable importance to those who concern themselves with Scotch feeling upon public events during the later part of the first half of this century, and any one who cares to know the opinion of a cultivated contemporary upon political matters during that period could not find it better or more pleasingly set out than in Lord Cockburn's Journal.

The life of Queen Louisa of Prussia<sup>5</sup> has been written by Miss (?)

<sup>4</sup> "Journal of Henry Cockburn." Being a Continuation of the Memorials of Hi Time, 1831-54. Two vols. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas.

<sup>5</sup> "The Life and Times of Louisa Queen of Prussia." By Elizabeth Harriot Hudson. Two vols. W. Isbister & Co.



Hudson. Our authoress writes with enthusiasm, but her book wants compression, and it is difficult to draw from her wordy episodes a clear consistent idea of the Queen. Yet the benevolent and gentle disposition of the Queen is apparent. Briefly her history is this: She was born in 1776 at Hanover, and lost her mother at an early period of her life. Owing to the French Revolution she retired with her sister to Heldburghausen where she remained till 1793. In Frankfort she met the Crown Prince of Prussia, to whom she was married in 1793. In 1795 she became the mother of the Crown Prince, Frederick William, and two years later became the Queen of Prussia. As Queen of Prussia she won unbounded popularity by her kindness, gentleness, and her care for her people. After the Battle of Jena she went to Königsberg. She sickened at her father's castle Hohenzieritz, and died in 1810. The national grief was great, and her memory is preserved by several institutions in Berlin which bear her name. Such is the story into which the authoress has woven a great deal of German history. The book is disproportionate both to its subject and the literary power of the authoress, but for readers who have unbounded time, and considerable German enthusiasm, the perusal may repay the labour which must be given to it. Otherwise it is scarcely *tanti* at this time to hold up to excessive admiration a Queen who did little more than her duty, and who possessed in a high rank virtues which are commonplace enough in a lower.

Mr. Hosack's defence of another queen,<sup>6</sup> Mary Queen of Scots, has reached a second edition. We have not much to say of it. It probably puts all that can be said in her favour as forcibly as it can be put. Unless the reader shares, for private reasons, Mr. Hosack's convictions, the book will not convert him. We *know* the character of the Scottish Queen; and though Mr. Hosack is eloquent and laborious, his work will not to any considerable extent affect English opinion, so long as Mr. Froude remains upon the other side. But the book is very elegant, and has fac-similes from the Bodleian library of two sonnets—if they may so be called—written by the Scottish Queen. Mr. Hosack finds comfort in the thought that, with all her faults, this beautiful, detestable lady was true to her religion. We will not grudge him this consolation, but will merely add—so much the worse for the religion.

The present *Life of Lord Strafford*<sup>7</sup> is a good one. The lady who has written it has a dignified and powerful style, and must win the credit of having written the best biography of a life well deserving such a memorial. She has given us a series of vivid pictures which have cost her much research, and which are full of valuable information. The book, too, is good from an artistic point of view, and advances to the last catastrophe with the sweeping dignity of a classic tragedy. It includes, also, touches of domestic detail which do not

<sup>6</sup> "Mary Queen of Scots, and her Accusers." By John Hosack. Vol. II. W. Blackwood and Sons.

<sup>7</sup> "The Life of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford." By Elizabeth Cooper. Two vols. London: Tinsley Brothers.

detract from its dignity, and which waken or intensify the reader's sympathy.

Mr. Morris's story of the French Revolution<sup>8</sup> fills up a real gap in the ordinary history of European events. There are many histories of the French Revolution, told from many points of view, and of different degrees of excellence. Mr. Carlyle's is possibly the best, but it is a large work; and Mr. Carlyle's style, and Mr. Carlyle's personality, which is never absent from his best books, are factors of his history which are not pleasing to all readers. It requires a special education to become an enthusiast for Mr. Carlyle's style; and unless one be an enthusiast for that style, his books are hard reading. Moreover such enthusiasts are becoming more rare, though those who wish to have a concise and trustworthy knowledge of the French Revolution are not decreasing in number. Possibly, as we have said, Mr. Carlyle's book is the best; indeed, probably it is; but the English students of history who wish to read about the French Revolution in a clear, simple, trustworthy volume, will value Mr. Morris's unpretending book. With such knowledge as they can acquire from him, they will be able to approach the works of Mr. Carlyle with a greater likelihood of enjoying his astringent writings.

Count de Montalembert's "Letters to a Schoolfellow"<sup>9</sup> have been circulating throughout France for more than a year. They are certainly very wonderful letters to be written by a schoolboy, and reveal a depth of feeling and a power of language which one does not ordinarily associate with a boy in his teens. At the age of seventeen he writes of "Romeo and Juliet"—"How simple, how true to nature; and, at the same time, what sublimity in the ideas! What an abundance of admirable simplicity! How far does this tragedy rise above the masterpieces of our own stage!" The friend to whom Montalembert writes is the yet surviving M. Cornudet, whose letters must have been equally worth publishing, if we may judge from the enthusiasm which they awaken in Montalembert. Such publication his modesty forbids. Some people will remember that M. Cornudet was the man who boldly declared the injustice of the measure, urged by Napoleon III., to oblige the Orleans family to sell their property in France. For this declaration M. Cornudet was dismissed from the Imperial Council. We are, however, more concerned with the letters before us. They are fervent, clever, and affectionate; and, if they have not been tampered with, as we have not the slightest reason to believe they have been, they are indeed a remarkable instance of precocious ability. At the age of eighteen Montalembert met at Killarney the Irish agitator O'Connell. Later in life he did full justice to that patriot, but his first impressions were not favourable. He says (p. 259):—

"Out it must come—I was utterly disappointed. He is but a demagogue,

<sup>8</sup> "The French Revolution and First Empire." By W. O'Connor Morris, Oriol College, Oxford. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

<sup>9</sup> "Count de Montalembert's Letters to a Schoolfellow, 1827-30." Translated by C. F. Audley. London: Burns and Oates.

and by no means a great orator. He is declamatory, inflated, full of bombast; his arguments are loosely strung together; his fancy is devoid of any charm of freshness; his style harsh, rough and droppy, as it were. The more I see of him, the more I hear him, the more I am confirmed in my first opinion—to wit he is not stamped with the mark of genius or true greatness. But he defends the finest of all causes.”

These are hard words, and are not corroborated by later convictions, but they are extraordinary words from a boy's pen. The whole book is full of such surprises, but we should like to know with what feelings it would be read by boys of our public schools. We venture to say that very few of them will be induced to read it at all, and that two-thirds of those who do will not understand it, and the remaining third will not care for it. And upon the whole we are not displeased that it should be so.

Professor Burrows' history of All Souls' College, Oxford,<sup>10</sup> will be interesting to the members of that college, and perhaps to other students of history. He traces its fortunes from its foundation by Archbishop Chichele down to the present time, through the vicissitudes of the Civil War, the Commonwealth, and the Revolution. With such an eventful period to treat of, and copious libraries at hand, it was not difficult for Professor Burrows to make a book. The importance of the work, however—if it has any—is due to the fact that many of the sources of his information lie unpublished in All Souls' Library, and in the Bodleian, and that it is well to have such documents brought together and made accessible. But Professor Burrows does not seem to have made the best possible book with his materials. With the names of Laud, Wood, Tillotson, Jeremy Taylor, and Wren to adorn his pages, he might have written a book which would be willingly read beyond the college walls. We doubt if he has done this. One good service he has certainly accomplished for his college; he has disposed of the malicious anecdote which used to assert, that by the statutes of All Souls the fellows of that Society were to be "*bene nati, bene vestiti, et mediocriter docti.*" Chichele's statutes contain no such clause. The only authority for "*bene nati*" is "*de legitimo matrimonio nati.*" The words "*bene vestiti*" are not found at all, and for the words "*mediocriter docti*" there is no authority. The expression is, "*grammatica sufficienter, et in plano cantu competenter eruditi,*" a standard of learning which, though low enough, is not quite so bad as that which popular belief has substituted for it.

The ethnological history of the British people by Dr. Nicholas<sup>11</sup> has reached a fourth edition, and is not unworthy of the popularity it has achieved. It is true that Dr. Nicholas believes the Celtic element to prevail more largely in the national composition than do most historians; but he brings a weight of learned argument to support his theory. The argument is fivefold, and consists of the historical and

<sup>10</sup> "Worthies of All Souls." Four Centuries of English History, illustrated from the College Archives. By Montague Burrows, Chichele Professor of Modern History, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co.

<sup>11</sup> "The Pedigree of the English People." By Thomas Nicholas, M.A., Ph.D., F.G.S. Fourth Edition. London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Co.

philological evidence, the evidence from topographical names, from the development of law, and from physical characteristics of the people. Dr. Nicholas makes most use of the philological argument, and he uses it well; his remarks upon the names of places are also good. From the wide admixture of Saxon and Celtic names he infers that they testify not only to the *previous* occupation of the island by the British, but to its *conjoint* occupation for a great length of time. Dr. Nicholas asserts that the name "Jones" is now more prevalent than "Brown" or "Robinson," and is closely followed by the "Scotts" and "Murphys," and only eclipsed by "Smith." If this be so, it is a fact which fits in with his theory—that the Celtic race have had a greater share in forming the British character than one ordinarily remembers. Dr. Nicholas is, however, an enthusiast; he sees Welsh faces under English hats. "Look the English in the face," he says, with amiable eagerness; "scan their features, *measure their skulls*" (and he gives some drawings of skulls), "watch the rapid and profound operations of their minds, and pious actions of their lives," and then of course you will know them to be Welsh. We are not by any means inclined to agree with all Dr. Nicholas' etymological assertions. We think him overbold, for instance, in deriving the English word "*could*" from the Welsh "*gallu*," "to be able;" "*cringe*" from "*crynu*," or "*crone*" from "*crino*;" but we give him up at once his claim to "*basket*," "*coracle*," and "*cromlech*;" though we do not think those words will do him much good, as they have long since been acknowledged to be Celtic. The words "*denizen*," "*bastard*," "*poke*," and "*shriek*," may be doubtful; but words like "*whole*," "*through*," "*torch*," "*rule*," certainly did not come to us, as he would have us believe—from the Celtic. The book is, however, a good one, and if its author wished to prove that there was a large unsuspected element of Celtic in the British character he has proved it. Dr. Nicholas is probably a Welshman; we infer the fact from his thorough acquaintance with the Welsh language, and certainly not from his English style. If this be so, he is, it may be, the man whose name became rather well-known from its connexion with the Welsh University at Aberystwith. The present book is a further claim which he possesses to the gratitude of the Principality; we ought, perhaps, to say, to the gratitude of the British people.

Another work on English Ethnology takes a different view from that which Dr. Nicholas supports. The anonymous author of "The Norman people"<sup>12</sup> thinks that the Norman settlement at the Conquest consisted of something more than a slight infusion of a foreign element; that it involved, in his own words, "the addition of a numerous and mighty people, equalling probably a moiety of the conquered population; that the people thus introduced has continued to exist without merger (?) or absorption in any other race; that, as a race, it is as distinguishable now as it was a thousand years since." We shall

<sup>12</sup> "The Norman People and their Existing Descendants in the British Dominions." London: H. S. King & Co.

leave Dr. Nicholas to "measure the skull" of this anonymous writer, who is an antagonist to his theory. Our own remarks, meanwhile, shall be confined to the subject of his book. We have had several works this quarter which carry on what we may call the battle of the races. Mr. Burns is very anxious to prove that the "Scottish" race and the Anglo-Saxon are different; Dr. Nicholas endeavours to show that the Celtic race has so permeated the Anglo-Saxon that it is difficult to find a face which is not Welsh; and now the author of the "Norman people" sees a Norman aristocracy everywhere. Even our friend Mr. Arch, the illustrious head of the agricultural movement, is a Norman aristocrat; and is descended from "De Arches or De Arqucs, Viscounts of Arqucs and Roucn." Be it so; Mr. Arch does not need a Norman name to recommend his zeal or his integrity. Nor yet, on the other hand, is the author's mention of this name an incongruous allusion; the alphabetical series of Norman names which forms the body of the book will show many which are as little suspected of being aristocratic Norman names. We have not ourselves met a "Sneezum" or a "Snart;" we have not seen a "Quebe" or a "Mopsey," a "Lobb," a "Sass," or a "Windebank;" but we are quite prepared to meet those gentlemen, if need be, and to admit their claims to aristocratic descent. The book is certainly a laborious one, and contains much to interest genealogists, and those whose pleasure it is to trace modern from mediæval families. The alphabetical series of Norman names alone from the London Post Office Directory contains nearly ten thousand names, and the articles attached to some of them testify to considerable research. Upon the whole we think the book one of merit, and well adapted to the purpose for which it was designed. The introductory article is good.

Mr. Planché's two volumes<sup>13</sup> deal with a similar subject—the companions of William the Conqueror, our first Norman aristocracy. He has collected numberless scattered notices of the principal persons, has connected them chronologically, and arranged them under separate heads. The result is that Mr. Planché has furnished a useful book of historical reference for the archæologist. But the book is something more than this. Mr. Planché carefully tells us, with a pleasing anecdote, that he is not addressing a learned assembly, and that he means to be popular. That he can never fail to be. So good-tempered and amusing a writer must win readers. He fears lest he should be misjudging the amount of interest which his subject has for the general reader; but if he is wrong, then the book by Dr. Nicholas, and the "Norman People," need not have been written either. "Apart from my own demerits as a writer," he very modestly says, "I may have miscalculated on the popularity of the subject—measured, to use a familiar proverb, other people's corn by my own bushel." But pedigree is a bushel which a vast number of people are constantly in the habit of using. We will not now blame them for this, but let at any rate the bushel

---

<sup>13</sup> "The Conqueror and his Companions." By J. R. Planché (Somerset Herald). Two vols. London: Tinsley Brothers.

they use be a well-made one. Mr. Planché's bushel is of its kind an exceptionally good one.

Herr Von Hellwald's book on the "Russian Policy in Central Asia"<sup>14</sup> is in some respects an unpleasing work. It is written, the translator tells us, in a censorious tone, approaching to a hostile spirit against England. The author does not think that it would be a misfortune to the Khanates of Central Asia, to Persia, or to Afghanistan if they fell under the rule of Russia. He believes that in India we govern the people like beasts, and that our empire there is not destined to be long lasting. Upon the whole, he concludes that we have not acquired the art of governing foreign races, and that our talk at home about humanity and freedom are "hollow phrases." So far does he carry this censorious spirit, that the translator paused at one time in his work, fearing lest the indignation which the work might arouse would traverse the good which it was likely otherwise to effect. It is, however, fortunate for our ministers and statesmen, who do not read German (if there be any such), that Lieutenant Wirgman decided to continue his very admirable translation: *fas est ab hoste doceri*, and the information which this book contains is important, whether it comes from an actual enemy, or concerns a possible one. There is no doubt, anyhow, that the author is a keen observer. Professor Vámbéry says of him that he has a thorough knowledge of his subject, though his zeal for Russian interest has led him occasionally into unfairness towards England. Let us, however, examine the information we may gain without considering the spirit in which it is given. Herr Hellwald openly asserts that Russia will not be satisfied until she gains the Golden Horn. By way of the Danube she has failed to reach Constantinople; she will reach it, therefore, from Asia. Persia will fall and become one of her earliest dependencies, and the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal will be at her command. There is no doubt that in China Russia is making rapid advances, and Herr Hellwald believes that unless some reform is begun by the young emperor, China will "come piecemeal" into her hands. Nor is her influence less in Japan, where a short time ago she concluded a treaty, by virtue of which, in case of war between one of the contracting parties and a third Power, the other party is in duty bound to close forthwith its ports against all ships of that Power. In case of a war with Russia, Japan would thus be closed against us. "Nothing is wanting," says Herr Hellwald, "to make it an offensive and defensive alliance but the name." If all this is true, it is well we should know it. The book before us is certainly the best upon the subject which has appeared in English. The last chapter, upon the rivalry between Russia and England, *must* be read by all who wish to have a competent knowledge of the Asiatic question. To some of the assertions made we demur. Is it, for instance, correct to say that since the year 1828, the Shah of Persia has been "a mere puppet pulled by Russian wire"? But, upon the

---

<sup>14</sup> "The Russians in Central Asia." By Frederick von Hellwald. Translated by Lieut.-Col. Theodore Wirgman, LL.B. Trinity College, Cambridge. Henry S. King.

whole, we venture to think that the book is important, if not alarming, and that whether with good-will or ill-will towards us, the author has done us signal service in bringing the facts so forcibly before us that they must arrest our attention. Nor is our debt a slight one to Lieutenant Wirgman, who has accomplished his task of translation thoroughly well.

Mr. Piggott's work on Persia<sup>15</sup> is a useful and unpretending work. Mr. Piggott does not disguise the fact that his book has been called forth by the recent visit of the Shah to our country. It is none the less useful on that account. It is not a work of original research, but it occupies the position of a really good and complete handbook of its subject. A brief history of the country, well told, is followed by an account of the religion, literature, arts, and sciences, which will make the reader understand better than any other book the position of the people who are subjects of the Shah. There are also given hints to intending travellers in Persia, accounts of the best routes, expenses, social habits of the natives, and other necessary information which it would be hard to find elsewhere. The book is a compilation, and a careful one, from other writers, but so much concise information with regard to Persia has not been brought together in a popular form before. We can especially recommend Chapter XI., which gives a bird's-eye view of the language and literature of the country.

The present History of French Literature is one of the series of historical handbooks edited by Mr. Oscar Browning, of Eton.<sup>16</sup> The series hitherto has been a good one, and the present volume will give the practised student a fair insight into the connexion of the different periods of French literary history. The notices of individual writers are brief but good. Brief they must be when so wide a subject as that of this volume has to be treated of in 300 small pages, but perhaps more space should have been allotted to the more important authors. Molière, for instance, finds but meagre treatment. The criticism upon Voltaire is fairer, and is perhaps as good as so brief a notice could be. The chief fault we find with the book is that it is dull. It is sound, but it is dreary. It is impossible to imagine any one reading it for pleasure. Those who know anything of French literature would certainly not go to this English adaptation with a view of knowing more, and those who know nothing of French literature would not be much benefited by the perusal of its pages, which presuppose some knowledge of the subject. The fact is that a history of literature can only be of one kind, and is only useful to one class of readers. What earthly good is it to a boy or man to read a history of, let us say, Chinese literature, unless he is acquainted in some degree with Chinese literature? and if he is acquainted with the literature, the book should be a thorough one. Put a history of English literature written in Hindostanee before a Hindoo who has never read a word

---

<sup>15</sup> "Persia, Ancient and Modern." By John Piggott, F.S.A., F.G.S., F.R.G.S. Henry S. King & Co.

<sup>16</sup> "History of French Literature, from the French of Demogeot." By Christiana Bridges. Rivingtons.

of English—suppose that he has thoroughly mastered the handbook, what is the intellectual gain he has made? It is minute. Now if the present handbook is intended for those who are acquainted with French literature, then it is poor, inadequate, and jejune; if it is intended for those who have no knowledge of the literature, then it will add very little to their mental stock. We candidly confess that we think a history of literature can only be written for one class of persons—persons, namely, who are familiar with the literature in hand. The history, therefore, which is written for students of a language is practically useless. When a student is ready to study the history of a literature he should go at once to the fountain head. Those students of French who are capable of proceeding to a history of its literature ought certainly to be forbidden to study it in an English adaptation, though the adaptation be as well done as this is by Mrs. Bridges.

Mr. Bascom, in his "Philosophy of English Literature,"<sup>17</sup> has at least taken the right view of his subject. His remarks are addressed to persons familiar with the literature of which he treats. His readers are supposed to be familiar with the authors who form what he calls "a network of forces" covering the whole field of English literature. But though Mr. Bascom has taken the right view of his subject, we are not convinced that he has dealt with it in the best possible manner. Mr. Bascom's style is not quite a pleasing one. He is fond of similes, and they are generally violent. We are told that the French "glide gracefully along on a surface sentiment," while an Englishman is "to the native born Frenchman what a skating rink is to the mountain lake" (p. 147). Byron is like the rocket, "driven aloft by the reaction, the spurn of its own spiteful forces" (p. 253). There are many instances of this kind of thing, and we get tired of them. Moreover, Mr. Bascom has not any very keen insight into literature. His remarks upon Chaucer contrast with the loving, patient appreciation bestowed upon him by Professor Lowell. Take this sentence (p. 43):—"I confess to a certain shame in speaking of Chaucer to the healthy and pure, so far as he from wholesome companionship;" and it must be admitted that Mr. Bascom has not yet put himself into a position to write a "philosophical" history of English literature. In his judgment of modern writers he is not very wise, and unpardonable slips render his book intensely offensive. One instance will be sufficient. On page 274 he speaks of "Romola and Middlemarch by George Eliot;" on page 275 he speaks of "Romola by Mrs. Lewes;" on page 277 he says, that "Bulwer, Charlotte Brontë, Mrs. Lewis, are not likely soon to be equalled." His language is moreover affected, and, at times, ridiculous. Books, like landscapes, owe their expression to the "floating, unbraided beam of morning," or to the "brilliant, long-lined cirri of evening, fading, trembling into night." This is not even "excellent fooling;" it is still less the "philosophy of English literature." Mr. Bascom, however, says that it will be sufficient "if the lines of thought struck out

<sup>17</sup> "Philosophy of English Literature." A Course of Lectures delivered in the Lowell Institute. By John Bascom. New York: G. B. Putnam's Sons.



and the considerations brought forward are those which interlace and occupy the field." Whilst we are in complete ignorance of what this may mean, it would be unfair to assert that the book has not accomplished its purpose.

Mr. Forsyth has collected and published the essays<sup>18</sup> which at different times during the last sixteen or seventeen years he has contributed to various quarterlies and periodicals. He has been led to do this from a desire to rescue his anonymous productions from "the wave of oblivion which so soon passes over ephemeral literature." Mr. Forsyth's essays make a large volume really worth reading; and there is a fascinating odour of literature about all that he writes, that makes the volume thoroughly acceptable. The more ambitious essays are legal or political, and were written for the *Quarterly* or the *Edinburgh Review*. They are all good, especially that on "Criminal Procedure in Scotland and England," which was first published in 1858. But we confess to liking the shorter essays best. The article from *Fraser's* on literary style will perhaps most repay the general reader. Even that has faults; no one acquainted with German will agree with Mr. Forsyth when he says (p. 171) that the German word for "translation" means "upsetting;" but the essay is both amusing and instructive, and the advice imparted sound and good. The papers contributed to *Fraser's* and to *Good Words* are bright and taking, and worth perusal. Of the whole of them we may say that, though they do not make up a great work, or form the basis for a lasting literary reputation, they are yet clever intellectual efforts with which we are glad to be acquainted. They resemble, to some extent, the conversation of refined and intellectual society, which delights and exhilarates, which uses and does not exhaust the interest of a subject, and which fills the canvas of a picture with a subdued and grateful light.

Mr. Forsyth has sent us also a paper<sup>19</sup> of his read before the Victoria Institute. We confess we like him less in the capacity of lecturer than in that of essayist. Nor are we attracted by the Victoria Institute before whom this paper was read. This institute is one of "professed Christians," and its chief object is to investigate the questions of philosophy and science that bear upon the "great truths revealed in Holy Scripture." A society so limited in its action, and practically so limited in its conclusions, is one to which we can give but little confidence. However, Mr. Forsyth's lecture was a good one. It is full of that aroma of literature of which we have already spoken; and though it shows Mr. Forsyth at something of a disadvantage, it shows also the diversity and facility of his ability and the fluency of his pen. His list of unsolved historical difficulties (p. 19) is capital. Mr. Forsyth's writings ought to be better known.

In 1826 Dr. Channing sent to Miss Aikin his work on the character

<sup>18</sup> "Essays, Critical and Narrative." By William Forsyth, Q.C., LL.D., M.P. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

<sup>19</sup> "The Rules of Evidence as applicable to the Credibility of History." A Paper read before the Victoria Institute. By W. Forsyth, Q.C., LL.D., M.P. London, R. Hardwicke.

and writings of Milton. Miss Aikin had previously met Dr. Channing at her aunt's, Mrs. Barbauld's, house in Stoke Newington; and from this receipt of the book on Milton is dated the commencement of a correspondence which lasted nearly twenty years. An agreement was made between the correspondents that all the letters should belong to the survivor. They were given upon Miss Aikin's death to the present editor;<sup>20</sup> her niece. The representatives of both families have now given their consent that the letters should be published, and the present volume is the result. It may be read with pleasure, as giving the views of two liberal-minded persons of culture upon important subjects in the first half of this century. The first Reform Bill, the accession of Queen Victoria, the Slave Question, the Lake Poets, Miss Martineau, the social and political differences of England and America, are topics which engage the writers. But the interest which the book awakens is circumscribed by several modifying circumstances—*e.g.*, the long intervals between the letters; the fact that Dr. Channing did not highly estimate his portion of the correspondence, nor intend it for publication (Preface, viii.); and the fact that most readers will probably not estimate very highly Miss Aikin's portion of the correspondence. But the publication of private letters is always attractive to some minds, and the present collection is better than the average.

A brief but interesting memoir of Mr. Lynch,<sup>21</sup> gives us in a small volume the story of his uneventful life. Mr. Lynch was the author of a selection of hymns which, twenty years ago, under the title of the "Rivulet," awakened much controversy. They were not hymns of great merit, nor were they hymns which could be by any means accused of heterodoxy, but they were without the ordinary catchwords of Evangelism, and they drew down upon their author a storm of sectarian abuse. They were not worthy of the attention they attracted, nor of the abuse they received. Mr. Lynch's attitude during the tempest was dignified; indeed, he exhibited upon the occasion a talent for controversy which we can only regret he did not make more use of. To the excited crowd of religious papers that attacked him he replied:—

"By the frequent perusals of *Records, Banners, Advertisers, Watchmen, &c.*, I have learnt the whole 'trick' of religious newspapers. I could set up one myself if I were only wicked enough. . . . The *Morning Advertiser* daily celebrates, in the queerest way, the nuptials of Jerusalem and Newmarket: 'Life in Jesus' and death in the 'ring,' are presumed to have equal interest to its readers. In one page fifteen divines are insulted, all for the glory of God and the *Morning Advertiser*; and in another more than forty horses have their merits or demerits meritoriously discriminated. I fear the Editor of the *Advertiser* does more to jockey the saints than to sanctify the jockeys."

This extract will illustrate Mr. Lynch's peculiar power, which, we think, really lies rather in the line of caustic controversy than in that

<sup>20</sup> "Correspondence of W. E. Channing, D.D., and Lucy Aikin, from 1826 to 1842." Edited by A. L. Le Breton. Williams and Norgate.

<sup>21</sup> "Memoir of T. T. Lynch." Edited by W. White. London: W. Isbister & Co.

of sacred song. But those who wish to read a brief and good account of the "Rivulet" controversy will find it in this volume.

We may here mention that Dean Alford's *Life*<sup>22</sup> has reached a third edition. Some time ago we foretold a wide popularity for the book; this it has found, and we have nothing to add to our previous remarks.

The "Life of Cherubini,"<sup>23</sup> by Mr. Bellasis, is one which fills a void in musical literature. The information about Cherubini lies for the most part in scattered pamphlets, periodicals, and dictionaries. Mr. Bellasis has brought all this together, and his own earnest love of his subject makes a unity in the mass of musical criticism with which he deals. The introduction of musical passages into his text gives the book something of the appearance of a concert programme; but it is not upon the whole objectionable, and we infer that Mr. Bellasis is writing for musical readers. The main incidents of Cherubini's life are these. He was born in 1760, at Florence, and produced several operas while still very young. His great triumph was "Les Deux Journées," written about the year 1800, in Paris. In 1805 he wrote "Faniska" for the opera at Vienna. In 1806 he returned to Paris, and became one of the directors of the Conservatoire. In the latter part of his life he devoted his talents to ecclesiastical music, and confirmed his reputation by several masses and a requiem. He also continued to write operas, of which, perhaps, "Pygmalion" is the best known. Mr. Bellasis does not describe Cherubini as an agreeable man; he was brusque to rudeness. We must not omit one anecdote (p. 272): "One day he was walking along the boulevards, when it began to rain. A gentleman driving by recognised the maestro, and alighting, placed his vehicle at Cherubini's disposal, who got in. The gentleman, who was going a different way, said, 'M. Cherubini, will you lend me your umbrella?' 'No, I never lend my umbrella,' was Cherubini's reply, and he drove off." But Mr. Bellasis says that Cherubini was not so bad as he has been painted. We hope this is so. Mr. Bellasis has written a careful and good biography.

We wish that it were possible for us to devote more space than we have at our disposal to Mr. Russell's estimate of Mr. Mill's *Autobiography*.<sup>24</sup> The position of this *Review* to Mr. Mill cannot be mistaken; and we assert that it would be impossible for a more generous, loyal, and appreciative perception of the merits of Mr. Mill's calumniated *Autobiography* to be attained than that which is made manifest in Mr. Russell's essay. It is a right noble utterance. Of Mr. Russell we knew nothing before we read this pamphlet. It is certain that he is a writer of clear and keen insight, and the master of a pure, restrained style. Nothing that has been

<sup>22</sup> "Life, Journal, and Letters of H. Alford, D.D." Edited by his Widow. Third Edition. London: Rivingtons.

<sup>23</sup> "Cherubini: Memorials of his Life." By Edward Bellasis. London: Burns & Oates.

<sup>24</sup> "On the Autobiography of John Stuart Mill." Read before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool. By E. R. Russell. Liverpool.

written in reference to the Autobiography has so struck us with the conviction of the writer's power. The literary society of Liverpool, if it appreciates this essay, as we believe it deserves, may be well proud of its production. We only ask that the pamphlet should be read. It is the testimony of an honest and clear intellect to the brightest and greatest that has been amongst us for many years.

The "Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland"<sup>25</sup> during the years 1606-1608," are preceded by a preface of 122 pages, in which the contents of the State Papers themselves are freely discussed by the editors. This preface deals also with the papers calendared in the entire series of papers from the beginning of the reign of James I. It is followed by the calendar, and by a good general index.

Sir Thomas Hardy has edited the second volume of the "Registrum Palatinum Dunelmense."<sup>26</sup> This "register" is to end in a third volume, for which volume the editor reserves his remarks and illustrations. The present volume has a general index.

Mr. Piazzi Smith, Astronomer Royal for Scotland, has published a new and enlarged edition of his work, "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid."<sup>27</sup> It contains some beautiful topographical and mathematical views of the great pyramid. Mr. Smith believes that he has discovered the secret of that mysterious monument, and argues his theory with much learning and ingenuity. Unfortunately for those who are not specialists, Mr. Smith does not succeed in convincing those who are, of the correctness of his views. The result is a pamphlet,<sup>28</sup> wherein Mr. Smith sets forth his grievance against the Royal Society. It appears that he has resigned his Fellowship in that Society, owing to the Society's refusal to listen to his paper "On the Length of a Side of the Base of the Great Pyramid." Mr. Smith has shown a great amount of zeal in investigating the question at issue, and we are sorry that he should be at variance with the Society. The Royal Society is one, however, in which we must have supreme confidence; but we cordially commend his book to those who are capable of estimating its merits; they need not, however, read the pamphlet, for it does not exhibit Mr. Smith at his best.

We wish to acknowledge the receipt of the fourth volume of M. Taine's "History of English Literature,"<sup>29</sup> in Mr. Van Laun's excellent translation; a Memoir of Count Ottavio Tusca,<sup>30</sup> an Italian Old Catholic;

<sup>25</sup> "Calendar of the State Papers relating to Ireland, of the Reign of James I. 1606-1608." Edited by Rev. C. W. Russell, D.D., and John P. Prendergast, Esq. Under the Direction of the Master of the Rolls. London: Longman & Co.

<sup>26</sup> "The Register of Richard de Kellawe, Bishop of Durham, 1314-1316." Edited by Sir T. D. Hardy, D.C.L. Published under the Direction of the Master of the Rolls. Vol. II. London: Longman & Co.

<sup>27</sup> "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid." By Piazzi Smith, F.R.S.E., F.R.A.S., Royal Astronomer for Scotland.

<sup>28</sup> "The Great Pyramid and the Royal Society." By the Same. London: W. Isbister & Co.

<sup>29</sup> "History of English Literature." By H. A. Taine, D.C.L. Translated by H. Van Laun. Edinburgh: Edmonston.

<sup>30</sup> "Memoir of Count Ottavio Tusca, an Italian Old Catholic." By the Rev. L. M. Hogg, M.A. London: Rivingtons.

Mr. Sime's History of Germany,<sup>31</sup> which seems good; and of another number of Mr. Black's translation of M. Guizot's History of France.<sup>32</sup>

Our notice of the German literature which has reached us is necessarily brief. Herr Von Reumont's Life of Lorenzo de' Medici<sup>33</sup> is perhaps the most noteworthy book. Herr Von Reumont looks upon Lorenzo de' Medici as the result and symbol of the latter half of the fifteenth century, a time when production and enjoyment reached its highest and most spiritual perfection. Our author will not separate Lorenzo from the times and circumstances with which he was surrounded, and his book gives us pictures of that time. He shows us in a clear way how Lorenzo, as head of the great house of the Medici, surpassed his father in magnanimity, prudence, and generosity, no less than in his zeal for art and science; how he brought into an equilibrium of power the States of Italy, and by his honourable policy maintained them in a just equipoise of peace and security. Florentine air and Florentine beauty pervade this graceful work.

Herr Trenkle's History of the Industries of the Black Forest<sup>34</sup> is full of information for the student of industrial economy. The chief occupations of this district are divided by Herr Trenkle into two classes: the first comprises mining and ironworking; the second includes timber-floating, brush-making, straw-binding, weaving, &c. Of all these trades the book gives complete statistics.

We have also received a Sketch of the Life of Bishop Hurdalek of the Bohemian Church;<sup>35</sup> and a very admirable Manual of Ancient Geography,<sup>36</sup> which we should like to see translated. Also some Reports of the Proceedings of the Geographical Society at Berlin.<sup>37</sup>

The Early English Text Society has sent us this quarter some volumes of considerable value. Mr. Furnivall's "Holy Grail"<sup>38</sup> is re-edited from the unique MS. in Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. The poem is an excessively dull one, but it forms part of that series of English Arthur romances which the committee have undertaken to print.

The great work of the Society during the present year is the publication, for the first time, of the *Cursor Mundi*.<sup>39</sup> The Society tell us that the text "sparkles with quaintness of phrase and thought." Dr. Falck has conferred a great benefit on the Society by allowing them the use of the Göttingen MS. for a year. Four versions are printed

<sup>31</sup> "History of Germany." By James Sime, M.A. London: Macmillans.

<sup>32</sup> "History of France." By H. Guizot. Translated by R. Black, M.A. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low, and Searle.

<sup>33</sup> "Lorenzo de' Medici," Von Alfred von Reumont. Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot.

<sup>34</sup> "Geschichte der Schwarzwälder Industrie." Von J. B. Trenkle. Karlsruhe: Verlag der G. Bräunschen Hofbuchhandlung.

<sup>35</sup> "Bischof Hurdalek." Von Dr. J. A. Ginzler. Prag.

<sup>36</sup> "Geographie der alten Welt." Von Dr. A. C. Müller. Berlin: Lüderitz'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

<sup>37</sup> "Verhandlungen der Gesellschaften für Erdkunde zu Berlin."

<sup>38</sup> "The Holy Grail." By Henry Lonelich, Skynner. Re-edited by F. J. Furnivall, Esq., M.A. Part I.

<sup>39</sup> "Cursor Mundi: a Northumbrian Poem of the XIVth. Century." Edited by Rev. R. Morris, LL.D.

side by side, and the book will be invaluable to students of the early English language.

The Alliterative Troy Book,<sup>40</sup> known as the "Gest Historiale," is described as "a gain both to literature and linguistics." One of the editors, the Rev. Mr. Panton, has lately died.

The Blickling Homilies<sup>41</sup> has the rare merit of being a dated MS. The writer is looking forward to the end of the world, even in this present age, "whereof the greatest portion has already elapsed, even nine hundred and seventy-one years." The Society chiefly value these Homilies as illustrating the difference between the English of that date and the Alfredian English of a date fifty years previous. The Homilies will have an introduction, notes, and index. The translation which accompanies them is clear and dignified.

Messrs. Macmillan have sent us a small volume of parallel extracts<sup>42</sup> from Latin and English writers, which seem to us to throw more light upon that subtle accomplishment the writing of Latin prose than any book we have seen. It is, of course, intended for advanced scholars, and demands a certain insight and perception of scholarship; but the chief lines of elegant expression are well marked out for those who are capable of following them. Good Latin prose has certainly both a "method" and a "secret." The method can be acquired by patient and laborious observation; the secret can be learnt from syntactic instruction. The peculiar merit of Mr. Nixon's book is, that while the "Notes on Idiom" reveal the secret, its admirable disposition of parallel passages renders the acquisition of the "method" of Latin writing far less laborious to the intelligent student than it would be if he trusted to himself alone. We can well believe, *e.g.*, that the following rules which Mr. Nixon gives in his "Notes," will be light-giving to many students:—

"Arrange clauses in Latin chronologically—*e.g.*, put the aim before the action, the cause before the effect."

"Many verbs disappear altogether in translation, as 'succeeded in,' 'managed to,' 'failed to,' 'continued,' 'ended in,' 'keep,' 'cease,' 'begin,' 'get,' 'find,' &c.

"Conjunctions have no inborn predilection for indicative or subjunctive."

The whole section on this subject (pp. xxx.—xxxii.) is admirable.

"Before translating English prepositions paraphrase their meaning; sometimes the substantive will disappear."

There are many more admirable rules, which doubtless are familiar to all those who have acquired a good Latin style; but for those who are acquiring it, we know no book where students may find the

<sup>40</sup> "The 'Gest Historiale' of the Destruction of Troy." Edited from the Hunterian MS., Glasgow. By Rev. G. A. Panton and D. Donaldson, Esq. Part II.

<sup>41</sup> "The Blickling Homilies." Edited by the Rev. R. Morris. Part I. Published for the Early English Text Society by N. Trübner.

<sup>42</sup> "Parallel Extracts; arranged for Translation into English and Latin. With Notes on Idioms." By J. E. Nixon, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. Part I. London: Macmillan & Co.

"secret" so well and so briefly told. The book has also considerable literary merit. The aptness of the parallel passages is at times striking. What a light to the translator is given by the juxtaposition of these letters for instance:—"I wish I may be able to come, but I doubt. Will you come to a philosophical breakfast on Saturday—ten o'clock precisely? Nothing taken for granted! Everything (except the Thirty-Nine Articles) called in question—real philosophers! Affectionately yours."—This is from Sydney Smith to Dickens. The next is from Pliny to Catilius Severus:—"Veniam ad cœnam, sed jam nunc paciscor sit expedita, sit parca, Socraticis tantum sermonibus abundet, in his quoque teneat modum. Vale."—The eruption of Vesuvius, as described by Pliny, is set side by side with Davy's account of the Lisbon earthquake. And in each pair throughout the book, where the turns of expression are not to be gathered from one language, the spirit of the composition will be found most useful in deciding the key to which the translation may be set. If we are to find fault with the book, we should complain of the frequent references and interruptions, which are likely to fret and disturb the student, and of the arrangement of the idiomatic notes, which at first sight seem an algebraic chaos of references. But we may add of the book, that he who has fairly and thoroughly worked through it, will have attained a degree of excellence in Latin composition such as he is not likely to acquire by the use of any other book as brief and unpretentious.

Mr. Holmes has briefly summarized<sup>43</sup> the rules for that Latin pronunciation which has been recommended by some professors of both universities. If this system be adopted (which we sincerely hope it never may) Mr. Holmes' manual will be most useful, and boys will learn with little trouble to pronounce "*acies*" "*âh-këë-êhs*," and "*tero*" "*tehks-aw*," under Mr. Holmes' instruction.

"The Attic Primer,"<sup>44</sup> by Mr. Wright, is intended to confine the attention of learners to the Attic dialect. It is arranged according to the method of Dr. Curtius. This is what is called the crude-form system, and is a good and scientific system, but the question which must occupy a teacher is this: Is it worth while to dismiss a system of teaching which has a good working traditional power, for a new system, which must start without a tradition? Is the practical gain of a more scientific method sufficient to counterbalance that which is lost? The answer to this question has not yet been made. If it be made in the affirmative, then Mr. Wright's little book is a very good one ready to the teacher's hand.

From the "Attic Primer" to the "Slang Dictionary"<sup>45</sup> is a sufficiently wide step, but it is very well that the vagaries and eccentricities of language should be chronicled and recorded. Nothing is

<sup>43</sup> "Latin Pronunciation for Beginners." By A. Holmes, M.A. London: Rivingtons.

<sup>44</sup> "The Attic Primer for Beginners." By J. Wright, M.A. London: Macmillan.

<sup>45</sup> "The Slang Dictionary." New Edition. London: Chatto & Windus.

common or unclean to the philologist. The editor has drawn strange and uncouth words into the sheet which he has let down, but his preface will dispose the reader to take an interest even in the colloquial monstrosities which he has gathered from "gaff," and "alley," and "crib."

Mr. Barrow's Word-book of the Gipsy language<sup>46</sup> is a really valuable contribution to philology. The glossary is brief. The gipsy people are not likely to have an opulent vocabulary, but such as it is it bears tokens of good descent. Hindu and Sanscrit, Persian and Wallachian seem to have supplied its now meagre stores. Mr. Barrow has given some specimens of the language in verse and prose and some accounts of the English tribes.

We must notice the receipt of Mr. Nichol's commendatory account of M. Paris's method of editing in his "Vie de Saint Alexis."<sup>47</sup> Mr. Nichol objects to certain points, but, upon the whole, his criticism is laudatory. The paper was read before the Philological Society.

---

#### BELLES LETTRES.

TO say that novel writing has become a trade, is merely to repeat a commonplace. But it may be worth while to consider who constitute the bulk of our novelists. Taking away a few well-known names, they appear, as far as we can judge by the substance of their writings, to be composed of two classes—tutors who have drifted into literature, and governesses who have also drifted into literature. Judging too by internal evidence, by the evident want of knowledge of the world, we should say that the vast majority of novels which appear are written by very young persons. It is obvious too that the profession of a tutor, or a governess, or a literary man, does not afford much scope for large observation. The consequence is, that the majority of these novels run precisely in one groove. It is the same old story over and over again, with the exception that it is each time weaker. The author can only draw upon his own limited resources. He has no fund of observation upon which to fall back. Scott was forty-three years old before he wrote a single novel. As his latest and best critic well observes, Scott had for years been accumulating stores of knowledge, which then flowed forth at his bidding. He was scholar, poet, antiquarian, and, in a certain sense, a naturalist. He drew from many sources. When one was exhausted he could without difficulty draw from another. He appealed to the tastes of many widely different classes of readers. But the literary men and the literary women of the present day come to us without any stock of knowledge. They can only give us sketches of their own lives and the small world in

<sup>46</sup> Romano Lavo-lil. Wordbook of the Romany, or English Gipsy Language." By George Barrow. London: John Murray.

<sup>47</sup> "Account of M. Gaston Paris's Method of Editing in his 'Vie de Saint Alexis.'" By Henry Nichol, Esq. Philological Society.



which they live. Now it must be apparent that a quiet, studious, literary life does not present many salient points for the novelist. If he endeavours to become picturesque, and to introduce us to the stir and bustle of active life, then the most interesting part of his study, the mental struggles, and the artistic triumphs of his principal characters, are thrown into the background. If he tries to be witty, his attempt probably ends in a very weak imitation of Thackeray's characters, Pendennis and Warrington, and he sinks into Bohemianism. There is only one way by which it is possible to endow a literary or artistic story with lasting interest—to make the hero a character whom we can really respect and admire. He may be Utopian, a dreamer of dreams, a Blake or a Shelley, but as long as we can admire him for his sincerity, for his loyalty to his art, the story can never lack life nor interest. In "Thornicroft's Model"<sup>1</sup> we had hoped that we had found such a novel. Our expectations were certainly raised when, whatever may be our own views on the truth or untruth of the theory, we read such a passage as this: "Painters," so Thornicroft held, "had no business to marry; heart and soul, they ought to live for art, and not disturb the unruffled calm, which is essential to the pursuit of it by the thousand-and-one cares such a state brings." (Vol. i. p. 48.) But if the artist should by any possible means think of marrying, the hero goes on to explain what kind of wife he should choose, and presents us with a picture, to which we can certainly make no objection. The hero, we need not say, does marry. His wife too is the ideal character whom he has painted as only suitable to the artist. Our hopes were again raised by the following dialogue between the hero and his wife:—

" 'I wish we were rich,' sighed Helen.

" 'So we shall be some day. By-the-bye Mr. Duncomb wants a copy of *Perdita*—that would be five hundred pounds into my pocket, for I could soon do it; and if living up here, and being in a manner disowned, makes you miserable, by Jove I *will* do it.' 'Then it is something you did not quite like doing?' 'Well, I have never yet made a replica—copy, I mean. I always think the man who buys the picture has a right to the copyright of the idea, and never quite fancy doing it over again for another person; but that is not the way to get rich. Most fellows sell two or three copies of the same thing, under the disguise of sketches, studies, or small replicas; but upon my word it is hardly fair.' 'Then do not do it on any account. I should be miserable if you did anything for my sake you disapproved of. It is nonsense thinking I am unhappy up here. How could I be so?' 'You are just the wife for an artist,' cried Thornicroft. 'No, I will not make any copies.'"— (vol. i. pp. 118, 119.)

Our hopes, we repeat, of meeting a really fine artistic novel were certainly raised by the two passages which we have quoted, but doomed only to disappointment. A man marries unfortunately not only his wife, but his wife's family. The hero soon finds out the truth of the old proverb—that a man's mother-in-law is his natural enemy. We cannot enter into all the complications and entanglements which arise

<sup>1</sup> "Thornicroft's Model." By Averil Beaumont. Author of "Magdalen Wyngard." London: Chapman and Hall. 1873.

between Thornicroft and his wife, which are mainly caused by a fussy, well-meaning, vulgar, odious mother-in-law. In short, Thornicroft behaves most unjustly to his wife. He falls away completely from his high ideal of what an artist's life should be. Now Thornicroft's fall might have been made quite as interesting as his triumph. We are tempted, therefore, to ask, why "Thornicroft's Model" should so nearly approach a first-rate novel, and yet just fail? The reason, we think, is very obvious. The writer did not dare to trust himself to his own resources. He therefore sought extraneous help, and introduced a number of characters utterly out of keeping with the main purpose of the story. Not content with introducing us to a number of wealthy commonplace characters, some of whom, however, are really very cleverly done, the author has sought to give a false interest to his story by vulgar spasmodic sensation scenes of the Braddon and Wilkie Collins type. Had he been content to rely upon quiet drawing, upon his own power of portraying the gradual downfall of Thornicroft, and the nobility of his wife's character, the book would have been an undoubted success. The author has a very keen eye for character. Thornicroft and his wife are most carefully and lovingly painted. The good-meaning, but too obviously offensive mother-in-law, is an admirable study. The story too is full of delicate touches. Here is a reflection upon woman's love:—"Thornicroft thought that a woman would bear any treatment, however bad, if she thought it was intended as a trial of her love." (Vol. i. p. 76.) Here again is another:—"No woman can endure to see the man she loves depart from the high line of truth;" and once more, "Most women have a half tender feeling for any one who has loved them." (Vol. i. p. 118.) Equally delicate too are the touches of satire with which the three volumes are filled. Thus, when Thornicroft is angry with Hannah for admitting Lord Alfred Dartmore into the drawing-room, that servant wonderingly replies, "If lords are not to be admitted, what kind of a person is?" Hannah's reply reminds us of the story of the Lincolnshire squire, who, when the late Duke of Devonshire wanted to see over his new hall, answered, "If I allow the Duke of Devonshire to come, I shall have all the Dukes in England coming." Admirable too, in their way, are the remarks which the vulgar old mother-in-law makes about the pictures and the large sums of money which are paid for them:—"Well, it beats everything, Helen! But there's always fools in the world, honey, and always will be, and real glad I am of that, for your sake;" a remark which may pair off with that of the betting man's, in his evidence before the committee in the House of Commons: "There's a fool born every minute, and thank God some of them live." But "Thornicroft's Model" is full of good things. Of a certain English baronet it is remarked that in every picture gallery abroad, "He exhibited a distinct gift of finding out the very worst picture in each room, and singling it out for admiration with happy, unerring instinct." (Vol. ii. p. 59.) Of Captain Wymondham's Italian, it is noticed, "He only knew about twenty words, but they were all of an overbearing and condemnatory character." The author, probably, does not take the general optimist view of his countrymen, which is so commonly held by novelists, for he makes Thornicroft say,

with a good deal of truth as far as art is concerned, "For coarseness, vulgarity, and bad taste, I'll back the English against all in the world." (Vol. i. p. 156.) Here we must stop quoting, though we should like to have given an account of the way in which a modern young lady keeps her accounts, her first entry being, "N.B. I will enter the *d.* department next time; it is hard enough to do the £ and *s.* at first;" who buys a second fan at nearly the same price as the first, because the first was much too expensive and she would like a cheaper one; who, when she does not know how the money has been spent, puts down "Bonbons, say, 5*l.*;" who regrets that she can only have one birthday a year, not that she wishes to be older, but to have more presents of money; and who, in utter despair, finally gives up keeping any further accounts, with the remark, "I have 20*l.*, and must have done something with the rest." "Thornicroft's Model," we repeat, is sparkling with wit and humour. The workmanship is in places nearly perfect. The style—and we mean this as a high compliment—reminds us of Mr. Wedmore's. The way too in which the author manages the North Country dialect in the speeches of the mother-in-law is excellent. He just gives us the right flavour. "Thornicroft's Model" only just fails of rising into the very highest order of novels for the reasons which we have given. Let us, however, most strongly recommend it as presenting a very true picture of certain phases of artistic life. Many of the characters are evidently drawn from well-known personages. There is no mistaking the great art-critic Mr. R—, who discovers the most wonderful beauties in a patch of colour which nobody else has even observed in the picture. We fancy too that many of the members of the "Cligue," as a certain Art Club is called, may be easily recognised. But there is not a single touch or a single stroke at which any one, however sensitive, can justly take offence. We deeply regret that the author should have been led astray into regions which really have nothing to do with art, for the purpose of gaining a little ephemeral popularity of the publisher's kind. He can so manifestly do so much higher work than "Thornicroft's Model," that we shall look forward with real interest to his next work. He has high conceptions of art and the duties of an artist. He has too the power of setting forth his views in language of not merely great beauty, but also of great strength. It rests entirely with himself whether he chooses to become the novelist of art or a mere teller of stories in Bohemia.

A novelist may be judged in two ways—by comparing him with other novelists or comparing him with himself. If we were to compare Mrs. Pender Cudlip's "No Alternative"<sup>2</sup> with such a book as "Thornicroft's Model," we shall find it utterly wanting in many of the qualities which make even a second-rate novel of the higher class. Of style there is absolutely none. Of literary workmanship, of that subtle touch which reveals the true artist, there is also absolutely none.

---

<sup>2</sup> "No Alternative." A Novel. By Annie Thomas (Mrs. Pender Cudlip). Author of "Denis Donne," "Played Out," &c. &c. London: Chapman and Hall. 1874.

The author of "Thorncroft's Model," if not a painter, has evidently studied art; but the author of "No Alternative" appears to have studied nothing but the merest conventionalities or unconventionalities, as they often happen to be, of modern society. Judged, however, by Mrs. Cudlip's own standard, "No Alternative" is a very great improvement upon some of its predecessors. There is not so much padding as is usual in Mrs. Cudlip's novels. The slang is not so loud, and the characters are not so fast. Upon all these improvements we heartily congratulate Mrs. Cudlip.

The reviewers have so emphatically pronounced that Dr. Dasent<sup>3</sup> has mistaken his calling in turning novelist, that it would require a very bold critic to enter the lists in his defence. Dr. Dasent is probably at home in compiling or editing Icelandic Dictionaries, but he is quite out of his element in writing novels. Of course a clever man, like Dr. Dasent, is sure to say a number of clever things. And there are plenty of clever things in "Half a Life," but in spite of them all the story is unmistakably very heavy reading.

We are glad to see that Miss Parr<sup>4</sup> has returned to the South Country. She knows and loves the South. She understands the people and the ways of the peasantry. Woldshire is no imaginary county. Beechhurst, we suspect, has a real existence, and is marked in the maps. The Great Ash Ford, at Beechhurst, we are half inclined to think is the celebrated Mark Ash Wood in the New Forest. Here, writes Miss Parr, were "such beeches and vast oaks as are nowhere else in England. The Great Ash was a storm-riven fragment, but its form continued, and its beauty in sufficient picturesqueness for artistic purposes." Miss Parr then proceeds to describe a farm-house "thatched with reeds, very old, and weather-stained, of all golden-brown and orange tints," where many a painter had come down for the summer to paint the fine old beeches in the Great Ash Wood. The whole of the descriptions of the Forest of Beechwood are particularly well done—the rows of silver firs, the long sweeps of grass, and the cattle at evening coming home to be milked, and crossing the ford under the branches of the beeches. We quite agree with what one of the characters, Mr. Fairfax, says of Beechwood Forest: "This is very lovely—it is a series of delightful pictures. To live here must be a sort of education." When Miss Parr leaves the forest, her hand somewhat forgets its cunning, and we certainly do not care for the French scenes so much as those in Beechwood. Still, "The Vicissitudes of Bessie Fairfax" is a thoroughly enjoyable book, which may be recommended to any one who does not know how to pass an idle afternoon.

"Ingram Place"<sup>5</sup> is a very difficult book to review justly.

<sup>3</sup> "Half a Life." By George Webbe Dasent, D.C.L. Author of "Annals of an Eventful Life," "Three to One," &c. London: Chapman and Hall. 1874.

<sup>4</sup> "The Vicissitudes of Bessie Fairfax." By Holme Lee. Author of "Basil Godfrey's Caprice," "The Beautiful Miss Barrington," &c. &c. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1874.

<sup>5</sup> "Ingram Place." A Novel. By A Cape Colonist. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1874.

Publishers, we believe, hold that either a very good or a very bad novel takes best with the public. "Ingram Place," if it is not very good, is certainly a very great way off from being very bad. It is precisely one of those novels whose merits are likely to be overlooked by both the critics and the reading public. The closely-printed type, after the large print to which we have been so long accustomed in novels, rather repels one at first. But when this preliminary difficulty is got over, we find the novel considerably above the average. The author excels most in descriptions of scenery, and in his female characters.

Mrs. Brotherton's "Old Acquaintance" will be welcomed by everybody. One of the most charming papers is that upon Landor. Landor used to say, "I suppose some half-dozen persons in England possess my books, and perhaps three are capable of understanding them." Mrs. Brotherton is certainly one of the three. Her short analysis of "Pericles and Aspasia," which she justly considers Landor's finest work, is admirable. As she justly remarks, we find none of that heavy learning which so encumbers the pages of most classical romances. Instead of "local colouring," as it is falsely called, Landor gives us the Greek Spirit. "He compresses," says Mrs. Brotherton, "whole idylls of Theocritus into half a page." Mrs. Brotherton too very rightly adds that the real reason why Landor places his scenes in another age and in a foreign land was because that although he was evidently a freethinker, yet his mind was of a deeply solemn and religious cast. Another excellent paper is that on Sensation Novels. Here is a little bit of criticism for critics, "Coleridge, I think, called turnips the First Cause of boiled mutton. Critics appear to me to be the First Cause of sensation novels." No one who remembers how persistently the *Times* some years ago praised the sensation novels of the day, will consider Mrs. Brotherton's criticism unjust. Critics and publishers have really written the sensation novels. But sensation novels, in spite of the *Times*, can only last their short hour. Only true art lives.

We also give a hearty welcome to Mr. Cooper's "Old Fashioned Stories." Mr. Cooper's is a name which deserves to be honoured. He was imprisoned in Stafford Jail for holding opinions many of which the Tory Government has by a well-known process of "education" passed into law. If we are not mistaken, Mr. Cooper suffered at the time when the notorious Colonel Sibthorp was M.P. for Lincoln. His book now, however, is dedicated to the present member, Mr. Seely. This one fact will show what a great change has taken place in politics. To all Liberals, and especially to Lincolnshire men, Mr. Cooper's work will have a peculiar interest.

Amongst reprints of novels we must especially notice Mrs. George Hooper's powerfully written story "The House of Raby." Mr.

<sup>6</sup> "Old Acquaintance." By Mrs. Brotherton. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1874.

<sup>7</sup> "Old Fashioned Stories." By Thomas Cooper. Author of "The Purgatory of Suicides." London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1874.

<sup>8</sup> "The House of Raby; or Our Lady of Darkness." By Mrs. George Hooper. Author of "Arbell," "A Young Man's Love." London: Henry S. King and Co. 1874.

Moy Thomas's well-known novel of "A Fight for Life,"<sup>9</sup> also reappears in a handsome volume. Mr. Miller, who ought to be classed with Mr. Cooper, partly for his political sympathies and partly because he has in some of his tales dealt with the same Lincolnshire scenery, gives us a new edition of "Royston Gower, or the Days of Robin Hood."<sup>10</sup> We have always considered this to be Mr. Miller's finest work. We have been praising Miss Parr's descriptions of the beeches in "Beechwood," which were evidently taken from the beeches in the New Forest, but we must give the palm to Mr. Miller's description of the oaks of Sherwood. Mr. Miller has many competitors in the same field. Every one will remember Scott's description of the old weird, gnarled oaks of Sherwood in "Ivanhoe," a description which has always struck us as one of Scott's best bits of nature painting. But Mr. Miller holds his own. His descriptions, too, of Newstead Abbey are equally vigorous. "Royston Gower" is utterly unknown to the present generation of novel-readers. We can, however, recommend it as a thoroughly good, healthy, out-of-door romance, the last of a forgotten school, describing many scenes of forest and woodland, which have actually passed out of existence since the book was written, and describing them, too, with the taste and feeling of a poet.

We are always glad to meet Canon Kingsley,<sup>11</sup> if he will but keep off the east wind, the Athanasian Creed, and "God's own green grass." He never has anything particularly original to tell us, but he always sets forth old truths in a forcible way. He is not quite so bloodthirsty as his master Carlyle, nor so hysterical as his fellow-disciple Ruskin. People will read Canon Kingsley when they will not read anybody else. For our own part we consider Canon Kingsley's style far too "loud," and far too gushing to be really beautiful. His style, however, appears to make an impression on the minds of some people, especially the great mass of semi-educated men and women, utterly deficient in literary instinct, taste and refinement, who abound in our large manufacturing towns. In Canon Kingsley's newest work they may find plenty of their favourite rhetoric, not unalloyed with a great deal of good common sense. If they will but leave the rhetoric alone, and stick to the common sense, the book may do a great deal of good. The best papers are decidedly those respectively entitled, "The Science of Health," "The Two Breaths," "Nausicaa in London," "On Bio-Geology," and "Heroism." And of these papers the best is "On Bio-Geology." There is less rhetoric and more knowledge. Canon Kingsley deals with a special subject which he has studied, and stands upon ground which, if limited, he knows. The paper is very charming. We shall make one quotation from it, and leave to Canon Kingsley's

<sup>9</sup> "A Fight for Life." By Moy Thomas. London: Henry S. King and Co. 1874.

<sup>10</sup> "Royston Gower; or, the Days of Robin Hood." By Thomas Miller. Author of "Gideon Giles, the Roper;" "Fair Rosamond," &c. &c. London: Ward, Lock and Tyler. 1874.

<sup>11</sup> "Health and Education." By the Rev. Charles Kingsley, F.L.S., F.G.S. Canon of Westminster. London: W. Isbister and Co. 1874.

admirers the task of reconciling the statement with the idea of a beneficent Almighty.

“‘Woe to the weak’ seems to be Nature’s watchword. The Psalmist says, ‘The righteous shall inherit the land.’ If you go to a tropical forest, or indeed if you observe carefully a square acre of any English land, cultivated or uncultivated, you will find that Nature’s text at first sight looks a very different one. She seems to say—Not the righteous, but the strong shall inherit the land. Plant, insect, bird, what not — Find a weaker plant, insect, bird than yourself, and kill it and take possession of its little vineyard, and no Naboth’s curse shall follow you; but you shall inherit, and thrive therein, you, and your children after you, if they will be only as strong and as cruel as you are. That is Nature’s Law”—(p. 195).

Of course a man who loves the East wind and admires the Athanasian Creed, will have no difficulty in reconciling these views with the idea of a Beneficent Creator. Credit, however, must be given to Canon Kingsley for his thorough honesty. He is always willing to admit facts. He does not, like most of his fellow-clergy, blink them. His writings in spite often of his conclusions, are therefore most valuable. Educated Germans often say, we don’t care what views on Revelation are held at our schools as long as Science is properly taught; for we are quite sure that our children, when they come to manhood, will think for themselves. So we say of Canon Kingsley’s writings. We care not one straw about his views on the Atonement or the Athanasian Creed. As long as he teaches sound science we are quite content. We are fully satisfied that in due time the world will draw its own conclusions. We hope, therefore, that Canon Kingsley may give us many more such admirable lectures as “The Science of Health” and “The Two Breaths.” They will help to counteract some of the ill effects of some of the sermons of his fellow-clergymen. Here is a passage from “The Two Breaths,” which cannot be too widely circulated:—

“Every organ of the body is formed out of the blood, and if the blood be vitiated, every organ suffers in proportion to its delicacy; and the brain, being the most delicate and highly specialised of all organs, suffers most of all and soonest of all, as every one knows who has tried to work his brain when his digestion was the least out of order. Nay, the very morals will suffer. From ill-filled lungs, which signify ill-repaired blood, arises year by year an amount not merely of disease, but of folly, temper, laziness, intemperance, madness, and, let me tell you fairly, crime”—(p. 41).

We have not given the whole of this passage, because we by no means agree with Canon Kingsley’s conclusion, which we have, therefore, omitted. But a man holding the position in the Church which Canon Kingsley does, who dares to speak the truth so plainly and so boldly, wins our admiration and sympathy. Not many years ago it was the fashion for the clergy to denounce Combe as a materialist and atheist; but the whirligig of time has brought round its revenges, and we find that most sensible of physiologists quoted and recommended in Canon Kingsley’s pages. Here, again, is another passage from “The Science of Health:”—

"We can no more mend men by theories than we can by coercion—to which, by the by, almost all those theorists look longingly as their final hope and mainstay. We must teach men to mend their own matters, of their own reason, and their own free-will. We must teach them that they are the arbiters of their own destinies; and, to a fearfully great degree, of their children's destinies after them. We must teach them, not merely that they ought to be free, but that they are free, whether they know it or not, for good and for evil. And we must do that in this case by teaching them sound practical science; the science of physiology as applied to health"—(pp. 9, 10).

We should like, however, to know accurately how far it is true what Canon Kingsley states twice over, though in very general and lazy terms, that the present generation is so much inferior to former generations in physical strength and stature; for this is what we suppose he means by his rather big terms "degrading process" (p. 8) and "degradation" (p. 10). We are quite aware of the popular proverb, which says "each generation grows wiser and weaker," and that the recruiting sergeant has increasing difficulties each year in the manufacturing districts in finding recruits with the proper chest-measurement. But, on the other hand, large limitations and qualifications will have to be made. We have seen it stated that at the Eglinton Tournament it was found to be an impossibility to wear the armour of our ancestors, so much larger-limbed had their descendants become. This is a subject which is worthy the attention of Mr. Galton. Some of Canon Kingsley's papers, however, in this volume are very poor. The greater portion of "The Tree of Knowledge" is mere theological twaddle, and of "The Air-Mother" mere literary rant; whilst "The Study of Natural History" is quite unworthy of its author. We go back with pleasure to "The Science of Health;" and shall conclude our notice of an interesting volume with a practical suggestion, which we trust we may see before long carried into effect in many of our large towns:—

"Why, then—to come to practical suggestions—should there not be opened in every great town in these realms a public school of health? It might connect itself with—I hold that it should form an integral part of—some existing educational institute. But it should at least give practical lectures for fees small enough to put them within the reach of any respectable man or woman, however poor. . . . Why should not the experiment be tried, far and wide, of giving lectures on health, as supplementary to those lectures on animal physiology which are, I am happy to say, becoming more and more common? Why should not people be taught—they are already being taught at Birmingham—something about the tissues of the body, their structure and uses, the circulation of the blood, respiration, chemical changes in the air respired, amount breathed, digestion, nature of food, absorption, secretion, structure of the nervous system—in fact, be taught something of how their own bodies are made and how they work?"—(pp. 12, 13).

Mr. Leslie Stephen's<sup>12</sup> style is exactly the opposite to Canon Kingsley's. We have no figzigs of fine writing for fine writing's sake, or for the sake of anything else. God is not adjured nor complimented in every other page. Christianity and muscles find their proper places. It is a per-

<sup>12</sup> "Hours in a Library." By Leslie Stephen. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1874.



fect relief after the flabby, effeminate rhetoric with which we are now deluged, to read Mr. Leslie Stephen's terse and masculine style. His is English, such as Swift, if he had lived now, might have written. He is, too, what is so rare, not only a humourist, but also a consummate master of satire. He is, further, what is also equally rare amongst the popular essayists of the day, thoroughly consistent and logical. He gives us no declamation. He never shrieks. He presents us with good, plain, solid reasoning. There is more substance in "Hours in a Library" than in twenty volumes of modern essays which lumber Mudie's shelves. Of the eight essays which make up the work, all are excellent. We shall select one—"Some Words about Sir Walter Scott"—as it treats upon a point which is especially interesting, when novel writing is fast becoming a regular trade. The essay makes no attempt to rehabilitate Scott, but rather endeavours to take off the edge of Carlyle's well-known criticism upon the author of "Waverley." Mr. Stephen fully admits that public opinion has of late years undergone a remarkable change with regard to the merits of Scott. As Mr. Stephen asks, how many of the ladies who appeared in character at the Waverley Ball on the celebration of the Scott Centenary, could have passed an examination without being crammed, in the events of the lives of the persons whom they were supposed to represent? Arthur Orton, in his favourite character of Roger Tichborne, would have probably succeeded quite as well. Again, Mr. Stephen admits that in private conversations—for, of course, people do not utter such things publicly—he has heard it said that Scott is dull. Now there is a very great difference between worshipping Scott as "the Ariosto of the North" and denouncing him, as Landor did, as a "great Pothouse writer." Mr. Leslie Stephen tries to hold a fair balance between the two extreme views, and so far we think he succeeds admirably. As he truly says, if Scott is called dull, whose reputation is safe? Will our descendants yawn over "Pickwick," and find Mrs. Gamp a bore? It is, however, when Mr. Leslie Stephen directly meets Carlyle that we feel most interested. Amongst various charges Carlyle urges, what is most undoubtedly very true, that Scott regarded literature rather as a trade than an art. "He coined his brains into money to buy farms." He, in short, wrote only what paid. This, as Carlyle says, is, without doubt, hurtful and degrading. Mr. Leslie Stephen's reply is so well put, that we prefer to give it in his own words, rather than weaken it by any amplification—"No good work is done when the one impelling motive is the desire of making a little money; but some of the best work that has ever been done has been indirectly due to the impecuniosity of the labourers." Now this is certainly the truth; but it is not the whole truth. On the one hand, the old proverb, "Vexatio dat intellectum"—that is to say, "the want of pence which vexes public men," holds good; but on the other hand, the finest and sublimest works which the world knows—the Greek Drama and the Hebrew Scriptures—were wrought without fee or reward. The other defence which may be made for Scott, is one Mr. Leslie Stephen does not overlook—namely, that if he had taken ever so much pains, he would not have written so very much better. He would

probably have corrected many blunders, for Scott is a most careless writer in matters of detail; but by no possible labour would he have ever reached the highest realms of art. We do not think so much of the defence which Mr. Leslie Stephen urges from the case of Shakspeare. Even supposing that Shakspeare did, as Pope alleges, write merely for gain, his weakness does not extenuate Scott's conduct. Shakspeare's anxiety about a coat of arms and crest has always appeared to us as very small and contemptible. Milton certainly would not have cared for such baubles. We cannot, however, pursue the controversy any further between Carlyle and Mr. Leslie Stephen, but we most strongly advise every one to read for themselves what the able critic has to say in answer to the charges, and strictures of the moralist. Mr. Leslie Stephen, very fairly, we think, sums up Scott's merits. Lockhart, he tells us, remarks that Scott hated whitewash, and all quaker-like uniformity. His eye loved the picturesque; so the roof and the walls at Abbotsford were adorned with carved oak and coats-of-arms; but the carved oak was imitation, and the coats-of-arms were stucco. And Mr. Leslie Stephen adds—

“This anecdote, recounted by the admiring Lockhart, gives the true secret of all Scott's failures. This plaster looks as well as the carved oak—for a time; but the day speedily comes when the sham crumbles into ashes, and Scott's knights and nobles, like his carved cornices, become dust in the next generation. It is hard to say it, and yet we fear it must be admitted, that the whole of those historical novels, which once charmed all men, and for which we have still a lingering affection, are rapidly converting themselves into mere débris of plaster of Paris.”

And yet Mr. Leslie Stephen is by no means unjust to Scott, nor insensible to his great charms. He can admire his poetry; above all, too, he can sympathize with that love for the country which breathes through all Scott's writings—that hearty, joyous feeling for open-air life, which made him exclaim, he “should die if he did not see the heather once a year.” Novelists should by all means study Mr. Leslie Stephen's pages. In the matter of novels he is thoroughly an art-critic. Novelists will learn more from him as to the art of constructing a novel than from any work which we know. He has given us papers upon such utterly different novelists as De Foe, Hawthorne, Balzac, Scott, and Richardson. In these papers he incidentally treats of many other novelists. In one place he gives a catalogue of all the various sorts of novels which have been composed. His criticisms are full of good sense. Here is a criticism which cannot be too strongly impressed upon young novelists:—“The common saying, that truth is stranger than fiction should properly be expressed as an axiom, that fiction ought not to be so strange as truth.” Now most young writers, when they are criticised for detailing some incident which is utterly incongruous and out of keeping, reply to the critic, “but it really did happen precisely as I stated.” Most true, but this is not art, but photography, which has been well called “the antithesis to art.” As Mr. Leslie Stephen goes on to observe: “A marvellous event is interesting in real life simply because we know that it happened. In a fiction we know that it did

not happen ; and therefore it is interesting only so far as it is explained ;" and, as we also would add, made natural and suited, by the writer's artistic tact, to the immediate circumstances in the novel, either to the development, or to what the Germans call the "retarding nature," which so few novelists can comprehend, of the story. We hope that our realistic novelists may study Mr. Stephen's pages. Excellent is the remark which he quotes from Balzac : "It is the mission of genius to search through the accidents of the time for that which must appear probable to all the world." As French critics are so constantly insisting, it is the duty of the novelist to give us not so much the *vrai* as the *vraisemblable*. Here, again, is another piece of criticism, upon which it might be worth while for our new realistic school to ponder :—"The highest triumph of style is, to say what everybody has been thinking in such a way as to make it new ; the greatest triumph of art is to make us see the poetical side of the commonplace life around us" (p. 347). We cannot too strongly insist upon what seems to be entirely forgotten, except by one great living novelist, that novels should be not only *σκιὰ τῶν ὄντων*, but also *φάντάσματα θεία*, that they should blend reality with "the light that never was on sea or shore." This has been said over and over again in different ways by critics in every language, but it has never been necessary to repeat it so often as just at the present moment ; and we sincerely thank Mr. Stephen for so emphatically calling attention to the subject. One more brief remark, and we have done. Speaking on this very point, Mr. Leslie Stephen remarks : "There are scoffers, though I am not of them, who think that the tittle-tattle which Miss Austen gathered at the country-houses of our grandfathers is worth more than the showy but rather flimsy eloquence of the 'Ariosto of the North'" (p. 260). Now we think that here Mr. Leslie Stephen labours under some mistake. The admirers of Miss Austen, who are not necessarily the "scoffers" of Scott, do not reverence the tittle-tattle of Miss Austen, but her marvellous power of dramatic representation—of dramatic ventriloquism, as it might be termed. In this power she is, her admirers say, and we think, in a certain sense, rightly, only second to Shakspeare. Scott acknowledged her wonderful dramatic power, and in a well-known passage speaks about his own "big bow-wow style," compared to her delicate and exquisite touches. The admirers of Miss Austen regret that such wonderful dramatic power was wasted on such unworthy themes. We were very careful when noticing Miss Thackeray's estimate of Jane Austen in the last number of this *Review*, to point out how very many and how very great were the limitations of the author of "Emma" and "Pride and Prejudice." Let us repeat, it is not the tittle-tattle of Mr. Collins or Miss Bates, amusing as it is, but the wonderful life-like way in which Mr. Collins and Miss Bates and a dozen more characters are brought before us and made to act and talk like real living people, which takes Miss Austen's admirers captive. Hers is the very triumph of dramatic art, but unfortunately shorn of all the glories which accompany "the consecration and the poet's dream." Lastly, let us say that "Hours in a Library" should find its proper home, not on Mudie's

shelves, but really and truly in each reader's library, so that it may grace the place from whence it takes its name.

We do not say that Lord Neaves has produced the best amongst the many excellently edited volumes of the series of "Ancient Classics for English Readers,"<sup>13</sup> but we think he has produced the one which ought to be the most popular. Lord Neaves has enriched his collection by an excellent Introduction. The general idea of an epigram in the public mind is that it is one of those impudent vulgar personal rhymes which we see week after week in our comic journals. Lord Neaves is careful to explain that the Greek epigram does not aim at flippancy, but studiously avoids it. The best Greek epigram knows no meretricious tricks. It does not seek to startle by surprise, much less by absurd personalities. Beauty only is its aim. And this is the characteristic of all good poetry in all ages, whether it is an epigram or in four lines, or an Idyl of Theocritus, or a Paradise Lost. Here, for instance, is a good example of the best class of Greek epigram—lines from a lover to his mistress:—

"My star, thou viewest the stars on high;  
Would that I were that spangled sky,  
That I, thence looking down on thee,  
With all its eyes thy charms might see."

Here is another to one who is no longer amongst the living—

"Aster, in life our Morning star, a lovely light you shed,  
And now you shine as Hesperus, a star among the dead."

Both these exquisite epigrams are said to be by Plato. We have only one fault to find with Lord Neaves' Introduction. It is not full enough. He should have said far more about the many excellent anthologies which are totally unknown to the public. He has done a great deal, but not enough. He should have given, for those who cared to follow up the subject, a list not only of standard works, like Jacobs and Brunk, but referred us to those still less known to the British public. It would indeed be a most useful undertaking to catalogue all the works which have appeared bearing on the subject of Greek epigrams, with short notices of their respective merits. Further we should have been glad if Lord Neaves would have shown for us, and he would evidently have done the work with great taste and judgment, how thoroughly imbued some of our own Elizabethan poets were with Greek simplicity and taste, and how thoroughly they united condensation of thought with perfect beauty of expression. The English Philistine has got an idea into his head that Moore is the ideal of a Greek Anacreon. No poetry is so utterly alien to the Greek mind as Moore's soulless fancies. If we would find the echo of the Greek epigram in our own literature, we must look for it in Ben Jonson's "Drink to me only with thine eyes," and "Queen and Huntress, chaste and fair;" in Shakspeare's "Take, oh! take those

---

<sup>13</sup> "The Greek Anthology. Ancient Classics for English Readers." By Lord Neaves, one of the Senators of the College of Justice in Scotland. London and Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons. 1874.

lips away;" in Lily's "Cupid and my Campaspe played at cards for kisses;" in Herrick's "Gather ye roses, while ye may," and in Carew, and Suckling and Lovelace. We have also another little quarrel with Lord Neaves. We wish he would give us far more examples. Here the half is not so good as the whole. His next edition will, we hope, be considerably enlarged and enriched. We wish, too, that he would at times, if merely as a treat to the classical reader, give us the originals of some of our favourite pieces. No man knows better than he does the truth of the old saying that translation is the reverse side of the tapestry. And as we read the English versions—admirable as some of them are—we long to refresh ourselves with the original. As a rule Lord Neaves' translations are excellently chosen. Once or twice we think that we have seen better versions. For instance, "Drinking Cupid," by Julian the Prefect, given by Lord Neaves at page 84, was lately rendered, if not so literally, with far more spirit, by a contributor to *Notes and Queries*. We should have much liked to have given some specimens from Lord Neaves' collection, more especially Meleager's very beautiful lament upon Heliadora's death, and Meleager's exquisite "Hue and Cry after Cupid," to adopt, as Lord Neaves has done, Ben Jonson's title, but they are both unfortunately too long. We must content ourselves with a shorter one by Rufinus on a garland which he sent to Rhodoclea.

"This crown of fairest flowers, my Rhodoclé,  
Which my own hands have wreathed, I send to thee :  
The lily—the anemone, moist with dew,  
The rose, narcissus, and the violet blue.  
Thus crowned, let no vain thoughts thy mind invade,  
Thou and the wreath both bloom—and both must fade."

This little poem appears to us to unite perfect simplicity, perfect beauty, and perfect pathos. We hope the English reader will say to himself, If the translation is so lovely, what must the original be? The best argument for learning Greek is to be found in the existence of such beauty as this. We strongly recommend all English readers to at once add Lord Neaves' collection to their libraries, and to judge from it for themselves of the grace and dignity of the Greek Anthology—such grace and such dignity as the world has never before or since seen.

The only objection which we have seen urged against Mr. Swinburne's "Bothwell"<sup>14</sup> is its length. As we have also often heard precisely the same objection brought against the "Iliad" and "Paradise Lost," we are not disposed to regard it as of much importance. Considering, however, that this is really the only objection which Mr. Swinburne's critics can allege against him, he must have by this great poem not only exceeded the hopes of his friends but disappointed the expectations of his enemies. It may, however, be just worth while to glance at the real meaning of the criticism. If it means anything

---

<sup>14</sup> "Bothwell." A Tragedy. By Algernon Charles Swinburne. London : Chatto & Windus. 1874.

it comes to this, that Mr. Swinburne has broken a well-known canon, and given us too much matter and not enough art. Now Mr. Swinburne is not only a poet, but he is a first-rate critic. He has proved this abundantly by his essays. Now to impute this fault to him, is to impute to him ignorance of the very first principles of his art. If Mr. Swinburne is lengthy, he is so wilfully and of set purpose. He at all events knows what he is doing a great deal better than most of his critics. The only answer which can be made to the charge, is that which Hazlitt made to a similar charge against "Paradise Lost"—take "Bothwell" down and read it. We cannot here at the close of this section, give a long quotation, and by analysis show how thoroughly organic the speech is, and how every part is linked together. We must now content ourselves with a very general verdict. "Bothwell" appears to us to be in some respects, as far as the poetry of passion goes, the finest poem which has been published since Byron's death. We are not quite sure whether Mr. Swinburne was right in casting his poem in a dramatic instead of an epic form. By adopting the latter form he would have taken the most formidable weapon out of his critics' hands. On the whole, however, we think that Mr. Swinburne is right. What he would have gained in one direction, he would have more than lost in another. Briefly let us say that by "Bothwell" Mr. Swinburne has placed himself in the van of modern poets. There will now be no questioning his position. We speak in general terms, because to give a thorough estimate of the poem itself, to point out its defects and shortcomings, is in this place quite beyond our power.

When some two years ago the first series of "Songs of Two Worlds,"<sup>15</sup> by a new writer, appeared, we did not join the loud chorus of praise with which the volume was hailed. We purposely stayed our hand. We could of course see in it much that was beautiful, but also much which was vague and crude. We thought time might do much to ripen the writer's powers, but should have been glad if he had allowed a longer period than he has done to elapse before he had given us a second venture. Still we are bound to say that the second series is a very great improvement upon the first. The writer has gained a greater mastery over the mere mechanism of verse. He has acquired, too, a vigour of style without losing any of the tenderness and mystic feeling which distinguished his earlier poems.

We must briefly say of "Borland Hall"<sup>16</sup> that it is worthy of the reputation of the author of "Olig Grange." It opens up for us a question which has often been asked, how far would a modern novel in the shape of a poem succeed? This we think the writer of "Borland Hall" has partially answered. We believe he might, if he would only set himself to the task, solve the problem. The difficult part would be to say in poetry those commonplaces which have hitherto been con-

---

<sup>15</sup> "Songs of Two Worlds." Second Series. By a New Writer. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>16</sup> "Borland Hall." By the Author of "Olig Grange." Glasgow: James Maclehose. London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

fined to prose. The writer possesses, what is essential for such an undertaking, not only the mere poetical faculty, but deep humour and knowledge of the world. "Borland Hall" is as entertaining as the brightest novellete ever written.

As usual, we have an enormous quantity of small volumes of verse. In nearly every case the writers mistake the wish for the power to write poetry. By far the best are "Song Drifts,"<sup>17</sup> published anonymously, and Mr. Malden's "Philip Ashton."<sup>18</sup> This last, however, shows the greatest promise. We do not know that there is the slightest use in going through the remainder. To name them would simply be to condemn them.

Amongst the miscellaneous books which crowd our table the first place must be given to Mr. Marshall's learned "Early History of Woodstock Manor."<sup>19</sup> The work has evidently been a labour of love. The only critic of such a laborious work can be the author himself. No one else can possibly know anything about the small details into which he enters with such minute care. Two children's books<sup>20</sup> may here be recommended to parents who happen to be wanting such things.

Last of all we must welcome the new edition of Mr. Rosetti's "Dante and his Circle,"<sup>21</sup> and two handsome reprints of Elizabethan literature.<sup>22</sup> Both of the last are excellently edited, and will be a great boon to all students who live in the country, and who cannot be constantly running up to the British Museum or Bodleian Libraries. It is no exaggeration to say, since American buyers have come into the market, that the original editions of Elizabethan works are quite beyond the reach of any but the very longest purses. Our thanks are therefore especially due to such enterprising and public-spirited publishers as Mr. Pearson and Messrs. Reeves and Turner for undertaking these reprints.

<sup>17</sup> "Song Drifts." Glasgow: Thomas Murray & Son. 1874.

<sup>18</sup> "Philip Ashton, and other Poems." By Henry Elliot Malden. Cambridge: E. Johnson. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1874.

<sup>19</sup> "The Early History of Woodstock Manor and its Environs." By E. Marshall, M.A. London and Oxford: James Parker. 1874.

<sup>20</sup> I. "What Can She Do?" Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas. 1874. II. "Cassy." By Hesba Stretton, Author of "Lost Gip." Six Illustrations. London: Henry S. King & Co. 1874.

<sup>21</sup> "Dante and his Circle." With the Italian Poets preceding him (1100, 1200, 1300). A Collection of Lyrics. Edited and Translated in the Original Metres, by Dante Gabriel Rosetti. Revised and Re-arranged Edition: London: Ellis & White. 1874.

<sup>22</sup> I. "The Dramatic Works of Thomas Heywood. Now First Collected, with Illustrative Notes and a Memoir of the Author." In Six Volumes. London: John Pearson. 1874. II. "Old English Plays, a Select Collection of." Originally published by Robert Dodsley in the year 1744. Fourth Edition. Now First Chronologically Arranged, Revised, and Enlarged, with the Notes of all the Commentators and New Notes. By W. Carew Hazlitt. London: Reeves & Turner. 1874.



## BROWNING'S NEW BINOCULARS.

### **BROWNING'S NEW "PANERGETIC" OPERA, FIELD, AND RACE GLASS,**

For general use, brilliant light, extensive field of view, and sharp definition.

### **THE "POLYCRATIC" OPERA,**

For distant objects, has 18 Lenses, and possesses great power, with portability.

### **THE "EURYSCOPIC" OPERA,**

For the Theatre, has the largest field of view, giving delightfully easy vision.

### **ACHROMATIC BINOCULARS,**

From 15s., Cases included.

*New Illustrated List Free.*

### NOTICES OF THE PRESS.

#### **THE "PANERGETIC."**

"Brings out figures with marvellous distinctness, and has a very large field of view, and so very many advantages over the other BINOCULARS that we have seen, that we confidently award very high praise indeed."—*Popular Science Review.*

"Exhibits objects with remarkable brightness and sharpness."—*The Observer.*

"A wide extension of the field of view is attained, while even in misty weather objects are exhibited with wonderful clearness."—*Naval and Military Gazette.*

"A very extensive field of view is obtained, and objects in the distance are shown with great distinctness."—*English Churchman.*

---

## JOHN BROWNING,


OPTICIAN TO THE ROYAL OBSERVATORY, THE ROYAL SOCIETY, &c.

**63, STRAND, W.C.**

ESTABLISHED 100 YEARS.




THE  
**"PISTON" FREEZING MACHINE**  
 (ASH'S PATENT).



The "Piston" Freezing Machine  
 Freezing and Moulding Dessert  
 Ices, Icing Wines, and making  
 Block Ice.

ASH'S PISTON FREEZING MACHINE is the most effective and economical method of freezing known. It is rapidly becoming a part of the "cuisine" in the establishments of the Aristocracy of this country; it has received the highest patronage, and is used in all parts of the world. By this process Ice Creams are frozen in shapes ready for table—an operation never before accomplished—entirely superseding the use of ice pots and moulds; it also forms a Wine Cooler and produces blocks of Ice. When not used with the usual ice and salt mixture, as on board ships, in the Tropics, &c., Ash's Freezing Powders are most effective, and guaranteed to succeed.




The "Piston" Freezing Machine (without the Fittings) forming a complete Wine Cooler.

Price of the Machines from 50s. each.

Ash's Freezing Powders, 34s. per cwt., or in Boxes at 11s., 22s., and 40s. each.

**THE SELF-FEEDING REFRIGERATOR,**



Patented by MR. CLAREK ASH, 1872. By this invention *Economy in Ice, increased space, an uniform low temperature, and a ventilated dry atmosphere* is attained. Whether the ice placed in these safes be much or little, the same low temperature is produced, and moreover, the *lowest temperature* generated by any given quantity of ice is maintained day by day until the ice is dissolved.

*Descriptive Catalogue free per Post.*

**PERFECTION IN THE ART OF MAKING COFFEE,  
 ASH'S "KAFFEE-KANNE"**

Is an entirely new invention for making Coffee in perfection *hitherto unknown.*

PRICES IN BLOCK TIN:—1½ pint, 6s. 6d.;  
 2-pint, 8s. 6d.; 3-pint, 10s. 6d.; 4-pint, 12s. 6d.;  
 6-pint, 15s.

**In Electro-Plate, from 40s.**



IN ELECTRO-PLATE.

THE ABOVE PATENTED INVENTIONS ARE MANUFACTURED SOLELY BY

**THE PISTON FREEZING MACHINE AND ICE COMPANY,**  
 314 & 315c, OXFORD STREET, LONDON.

## INDEX.

\* \* *All Books must be looked for under the Author's name.*

- ABDY, J. T., LL.D., and Bryan Walker, M.A., "The Commentaries of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian," 232
- Abendroth, Wilhelm, Dr., "Ueber electrisirte Fluessigkeitstrahlen," 549
- Achilles, The Character of, 327-348; the Iliad regarded not as a patchwork of ballads but a single poem, 327; Achilles regarded as its central subject, 327; analysis of the Iliad, 328; the Iliad compared with the chief epical poems of European literature, 329; the Orlando Furioso and Paradise Lost, 329; the passion, the ΜΗΝΙΣ of Achilles the subject of the Iliad, 330; Dante's account of Achilles, 330; heroic anger and measureless love the two passions of Achilles, 330, 331; the character of Achilles under this double aspect, 331; the scene between Agamemnon and Achilles in the first book, 331, 332; analysis of, 333; scene in the ninth book, 334; the choice offered to Achilles, 334; the death of Patroclus, 335; its effect on Achilles, 335, 336; the appearance of Achilles in the eighteenth book, 336; the dialogue between Achilles and Xanthus, 337; the death of Hector, 338; the funeral rites paid to Patroclus, 339; the interview between Achilles and Priam, 340; death of Achilles, 340; Achilles in Elysium, 341; Achilles as the type of character in a particular period, 341; as an allegory of the Hellenic genius, 342; the friendship of Achilles for Patroclus analysed, 342; plays of Æschylus and Sophocles on Achilles, 343, 344; Alexander and Achilles, 345; Alexander at the tomb of Achilles, 345; Alexander on the death of Hephestion, 346; other correspondences between Alexander and Achilles, 347; the magnetic fascination of the character of Achilles, 347; in what light it is to be studied, 347, 348
- Adams, F. O., F.R.G.S., "History of Japan from the Earliest Period to the Present Time," 566
- Admiralty, The, and the Navy, 70-104; the Navy estimates this year, 70; a party manœuvre, 71; the low tone of the debate, 71; the defective system of the Admiralty administration, 71; the estimated expenditure for the present year, 72; the French screw steam men-of-war, 73; Captain Coles, 73; our policy, 74; our fever of "reconstruction," 74; the last phase of building in batches, 75; Mr. Corry's ships, 75; Captain Coles' turret system, 75; *The Royal Sovereign*, 75; Mr. Reed on turret ships, 76; Captain Willes on turret ships, 77; Admiral Yelverton and others on, 77; the principle of the *Devastation* sound, 78; Sir Spenser Robinson, 78, 79 (foot-notes); Mr. Ward Hunt on our navy, 79; the state of our ship-building establishments, 80; the Admiralty theory of personal responsibility, 81; Mr. Reed on the superlory of individual ships, 82; *Peter the Great*, 82, 83; our ironclads off New York, 83; Mr. Scott Russell on the effects of gun and plates, 84; power of guns, 85; the ram, 85; Captain Scott on the size of a gun, 86; the management of the dockyards, 86, 87; cost of labour at different dockyards, 88 (foot-note); permanent heads of the dockyards, 89; purchase of the raw material, 89; private firms, 90; Admiral Dundas at the bombardment

- of Callao, 91; our position, 91; suggestions, 93; manning the navy, 93; our duty as a nation; Mr. Barnaby on the *Inflexible*, 94; the thickness of iron plates, 95; limit of, 95; the best preparation for war, 96; various suggestions, 96, 97; the organization of the Board of Admiralty, 98, 99; want of responsibility, 100; Mr. Childers, 100, 101; his experience, 102; reform of what sort needed, 103
- Aiken, M. C., "Scottish Song," 589
- "Aileen Ferrers," 577
- "Alford, H., D.D., Life, Journal, and Letters of," 278
- American Women: their Health and Education, 456-499; Dr. Clarke's Book, 456; quotations from, 457; further quotations from, 458; Dr. Clarke on the deterioration of American women, 459; the American woman's neglect of her own organization, 460; the American system of "co-education," 460; Dr. Clarke on, 461; Dr. Maudsley on, 461; statement of the use, 462; the chief medical writers on the subject, 463, 464; Doctress Putnam-Jacobi and Doctress Garrett-Anderson, 464, 465; Dr. Clarke's book in the United States, 465; Edna Cheney's "A Mother's Thought," 466; the Mount Holyoke Female Seminary, 466, 467; relative mortality at, 467; Dr. Homer's testimony, 468; Vassar College, 468; state of health at, 468, 469; Oberlin College, 469; state of health at, 470; Dr. Mahan on Oberlin College, 471; Antioch College, 471; statistics of, 472; the University of Michigan, 472; female students at, 472; general health of, 473; further remarks on, 474; Kalamazoo College, 474, 475; testimony of Lucinda H. Stone, 475; Doctress A. C. Avery on Vassar College, 476, 477; further quotations from, 477; Dr. Clarke's witnesses, 478; Dr. Clarke's patients, 479; list of patients continued, 480; analysis of, 480, 481; the question of American climate considered, 482, 483; constitutional modification in the American, 483; further considerations with regard to the American climate, 484, 485; its effects on Germans and Irish, 485; the Anglo-Saxon in India, 485; dissipation in the States, 486; social habits, 486, 487; American children, 487; German children, 488; American ladies and dress, 489; time spent on, 490; American literature, 491, 492; the American stage, 492; Dr. Clarke on the child-bearing of American women, 493; Dr. Clarke's statements, 494; criticisms on Dr. Clarke's statements, 494; criticisms on Dr. Clarke's book, 494, 495; further criticisms on his arguments, 495, 496; his remarks on the female organization, 496, 497; conclusion, 498, 499
- Amos, Sheldon, A.M., "The Science of Law," 233
- "Lectures on International Law," &c., 534
- "Annual Register, The, 1873," 248
- Arnold, John Murchison, "Islam: Its History, Character, and Relation to Christianity," 520
- Matthew, "Higher Schools and Universities in Germany," 241
- Auerbach, Berthold, "Waldfried," 581
- D. T., "Organologische Studien," 257
- BARROW, George, "Romano Lavo-lli. Wordbook of the Romany, or English Gipsy Language," 233
- Bascom, John, "Philosophy of English Literature," 275
- Baxter, R. D., M.A., "Local Government and Taxation," 230
- Beaumont, Averil, "Thornicroft's Model," 284
- Bellasis, Edward, "Cherubini: Memorials of his Life," 278
- Beste, Rev. H. Digby, M.A., "A Sermon on Priestly Absolution," 523
- Blackie, Professor L. S., "Horse Hellenics," 558
- Blanc, H., M.D., "Cholera: How to Avoid and Treat It," 262
- Böhringer, F., "Athanasius und Arius, &c.," 519
- Boichorst, P. Sheffer, "Florentiner Studien," 570
- "Borland Hall," by the Author of "Obrig Grange," 297
- Boult, J., "Glimpses of Pre-Roman Civilization in England," 574
- Boy, A Public-School, "The Volunteer, the Militiaman, and the Regular Soldier," 282
- Brackenbury, Capt. H., "The Ashanti War," 563
- Brentano, Dr. F. "Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte," 529
- Breton, A.L. *see* Channing
- Bridges, C., "History of French Literature," 274

- Bright, W., D.D., "Hymns and other Verses," 224
- "Britain, The Danish Invasion into South," 574
- Brook, Rev. S. A., M.A., "Theology in the Christian Poets," 223
- Brotherton, Mrs., "Old Acquaintance," 288
- Brown, R., "A Manual of Botany," 551
- Brown, J. B., B.A., "The Higher Life," 224
- "Brown, Young, or the Law of Inheritance," 579
- Browne, Suckling, R. G., B.D., "Divine Revelation, or Pseudo-Science," 224
- Brunton, Dr., "On the Pathology of Shock and Syncope," 556
- Brunton, Dr., "On the Poison of Indian Snakes, &c.," by, and Dr. Fayrer, 555
- Budgett, J. B., M.D., "The Hygiene of Schools," 260
- Bunsen, Ernest de, "The Chronology of the Bible," &c., 521
- Burns, W., "The Scottish War of Independence," 266
- Burrows, M., "Worthies of All Souls," 270
- Bushnell, H., D.D., "Forgiveness and Law," 525
- Busk, R. H., "The Valleys of Tirol," 540
- Butler's Analogy: its Strength and Weakness, 1-24; Butler's reputation, 1; general eulogy of the "Analogy," 2; more recent testimony, 2, 3; the reviewer's opinion of the "Analogy," 3; how far the "Analogy" is original, 4; opinions regarding Christianity in Butler's day, 4, 5; the positions in the "Analogy," 5, 6; quotations from the "Introduction," 6; the two parts of the "Analogy" considered, 7; Butler on Miracles, 8; some of Butler's analogies, 8, 9; the goodness of the Deity, Butler and the Deists, 9, 10; the morality of, 11; the eternal punishment difficulty, 11; Butler on the Atonement, 12; Butler's general argument, 12, 13; these arguments applicable to other religions, 12, 13; how Butler's argument may be met, 13, 14; the first three gospels on the Divinity of the Saviour, 15; Butler and Catholicism, 15, 16, 17; the Church of Rome as a Visible Church, 17; the Church of Rome and safety, 17, 18; the dogmas of the Bible and the vague ideas and custom of mankind, 18; the position turned, 18, 19; are what are superstitious elsewhere verities in the Bible? 19; Mr. Hunt on Butler's positive evidence for Christianity, 20; summary of Butler's arguments, 20, 21; would the "Analogy," have been different if written in 1874 instead of 1736? 21; Science and its effects upon Biblical criticism, 22; Wesley and witches, 22; the bearing of witchcraft upon the Bible, 23; orthodoxy has gained nothing by the advance of knowledge, 23; the safe-side-in-religion argument, 24
- Buzzard, T., M.D., "Syphilitic Nervous Affections," 262
- C., M. A., "Malcolm and Clara," 588
- Cairnes, Professor: Principles of Political Economy, 348-361; the use of Political Economy, 348; the question of strikes, 349; Ruskin on Political Economists, 349; Cairnes's works, 349; meaning of the term "wages-fund," 350; Mill on, 350; Cairnes on, 350, 351; further explanations, 352, 353; the case of Ireland, 353; Dr. Playfair on Ireland, 353; quotation from Mr. Thornton, 353; Professor Cairnes's reply, 354, 355; Mr. Thornton on Trades Unions, 355; Professor Cairnes on, 356; Trades Unions and the power of determining the rate of wages, 356, 357; the rise of coals not caused by the rise of wages, 357; Cairnes on the high wages in America, 358; Mr. Brassey on the average cost of railways, 358; Mr. Lothian Bell on high wages, 359; do wages constitute the cost of production? 360; Adam Smith on the value of labour, 361; Mr. Thornton on, 361, 362; refutation of Mr. Thornton by Cairnes, 362; the anti-industrial rules of certain Trades Unions, 363; their effect, 363; how far is the labourer's condition altered by improvements of the day? 364; Cairnes's answer, 364; improvement of the labourer, 365; Co-operative societies, 365; Cairnes on Co-operative societies, 366; Co-operative Stores, 366; benefits of the Co-operative movement, 367; Cairnes on the causes of high rates in certain trades, 368; on the rate between two things so different in kind as a desire and a quantity of a material article, 369; Cairnes on demand and supply, 370; meaning of the "proper" price, 371; Cairnes on international trade, 371, 372; trade

- between the Atlantic and Pacific States of America, 372; trade between Australia and Europe, 372; trade between the State of New York and the Isle of Barbadoes, 373; the advantages of international trade, 374; Cairnes on, 375; exports and imports, 375; of the United States, 376; Mr. Carey on Cobden's death, 376; Protectionists in the United States, 377; M. Alb on Protection, 377; Cairnes's criticism on, 378; wages and price of commodities in the States, 379; Mr. Wells on, 380; general scope of Professor Cairnes's book, 381
- Cape Colonist, A, "Ingram Place," by, 287
- Carpenter, Alfred, M.D., "On Malignant Pustule, on Acute Farcy, and on cases of Muscular Anæsthesia," 557
- W. B., M.D., "Principles of Mental Physiology, &c.," 226
- "Channing, W. E., D.D., Correspondence between, and Lucy Aikin," edited by A. L. Le Breton, 277
- Church, The Nationalization of the Established, 200-213; the writer's stand-point, 200; the Nonconformists and those in the Established Church, 200; a third party, the nation, 201; the two parties in the Church, 201; their views, 201; views of the Broad Church party, 202; the Nonconformists and the Reformation, 202, 203; School-Boards, 203; the two principles of recent School legislation, 204; the position of the Nonconformists, 204; the Established Church and its imposition of tests and dogmas, 205; the position of the High Church party, 205, 206; the difference of views between the educated clergy and their uneducated congregations, 206, 207; the question of the abolition of tests, 207; its benefits, 208; the Church without the State, 208, 209; the picture of "A Free Church in a Free State," 209; results of Disestablishment, 209, 210; "The Society for the Liberation of Religion," 210; its aim, 210; the real reform necessary, 211; the writer's own views, 211, 212; proposal for a society to be called "The Nationalization of the Established Church," 213
- Church, R. W., M.A., "The Sacred Poetry of Early Religions," 224
- Clarke, F. W., "The Constants of Nature," 263
- "Classics, English School," 539
- "Cookburn, Henry, Journal of," 267
- Cohn, H., "Die Schulhatzer und Schultische auf der Wiener Weltausstellung," 246
- Colenso, Right Rev. J. W., "The New Bible Commentary, &c.," 220
- Colet, J., M.A., "An Exposition of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians," 222
- Compton, T., "Life and Correspondence of Rev. J. Clowes, M.A.," 562
- Congreve, Richard, "Essays, Political, Social and Religious," 535
- "Cook's Tourist Handbook," 539
- Cooke, J. P., Professor, "The New Chemistry," 253
- Cooper, E., "Life of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford," 268
- T., "Old Fashioned Stories," 288
- Costerzee, J. J. Van, "Christian Dogmatics," 224
- Cox, G. W., "The Crusades," 565
- Cunningham, D.D., M.B., "Microscopic Examinations of Air," 261
- Cuthbertson, F., M.A., "Euclidian Geometry," 550
- DARWIN, Charles, "The Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs," 553
- Dasent, George Webbe, D.C.L., "Half a Life," 287
- "Deutschen Knaben Handwerksbuch des," 544
- Dobson, H. A., "Civil Service Handbook of English Literature," 587
- Donaldson, James, LL.D., "Lectures on Education," 542
- Dowden, John, B.D., "The Knowledge of God, a Spiritual Knowledge," 526
- Drechsel, Dr. E., "Leitfaden in das Studium der Chemischen Reactionen," 546
- Driver, S. R., M.A., "A Treatise on the Use of the Tenses in Hebrew," 220
- EDWARDS, H. Sutherland, "The Germans in France," 534
- "Elementary School Series," 573
- Eliot, George, "The Legend of Jubal, and other Poems," 582
- Elliot, Robert H., "Our Indian Difficulties," 541
- Emigration, 25-38; its force and power in history, 25; emigration in England two hundred and fifty years ago, 25, 26; prevented by the king, 26; results of such prevention, 26; the American colonies in 1776, 26; popu-

- lation of the colonies and of England, 26; facts deduced from these figures, 26; the state of France at that period, 26; effects produced by want of emigration, 27; character of the governing classes in England, 28; our middle-classes, 29; the political instinct of the working classes, 29; German emigration and its effects on the German government, 30; Dr. Engel on emigration, 30; his statistics, 30, 31; Bismarck on German education, 31; Dr. Engel's theory examined, 31; the effects of emigration on Germany, 32; emigration opposed to the military spirit, 32; the population of France at the present moment, 33; emigration and Spain, 33; its effects upon Spain, 34; effects of unjust legislation, 34; in England and America, 34; the cost of unwise legislation, 35; earnings of an agricultural labourer in Massachusetts, 35, 36; his position, 36; effects in England of a large emigration, 36; consequences to farmer and landlord, 37; mechanics and emigration, 37; effect of the equilibrium of wages, 37; free-trade in labour, 38
- "English School Classics," 539
- Erdmann, H., "Zur orthographischen Trage," 572
- Evans, C., "A Strange Friendship. A Story of New Zealand," 582
- Ewald, H., "The History of Israel," 223
- FARRAR, F. W., D.D., "The Life of Christ," 515
- Fawcett, H., M.P., "Manual of Political Economy," 231
- Fazy, James, "Cours de Législation Constitutionnelle," 538
- Fick, Dr. A., "Compendium der Physiologie des Menschen," 256
- Flint, Robert, M.A., "The Philosophy of History in Europe," 526
- "Florestan of Monaco, the Fall of Prince," 241
- Food, the Best, for Man, 500-514; the scope of the article, 500; the masticatory organs of the orang and man, 501; other correspondences between the orang and man, 501; is a vegetable diet less strengthening than mixed food? 502; albumen in vegetables, 502; Dr. Lankester on animal food, 503; a vegetable diet more digestible than an animal one, 503; Liebig on the nutritious matter contained in each, 503, 504; Dr. Forbes on, 504; Sir Francis Head on the diet and the strength of the South American miners, 504; Mr. Catherwood on the boatmen of the Nile, 505; Mr. Twining and Dr. Capel Brooke on the Norwegians, 505; Mr. Lambe on the L. oplanders, 505; the diet of the ancient Greeks, 505; the diet of the soldiers of the Roman Republic, 505; Professor Newman's testimony, 506; the bearing of a vegetarian diet on the population, 506, 507; quotation from Mr. W. R. Greg, 507; Dr. Lyon Playfair on a vegetarian diet, 507; quotation from Mr. W. Hoyle, 508; quotations from the Government Agricultural Returns of Great Britain, 508, 509; the cultivation of orchards and fruit gardens recommended, 509; the moral aspects of vegetarianism, 510; Slaughter-houses, 511; field sports, 511; Mr. Edward A. Freeman on field-sports, 511; the state of our slaughter-houses as described in the Tichborne trial, 512; Ouida on animal food, 512, 513; Mr. Samuel A. Barnett on slaughter-houses, 513; Rev. Brooke Lambert on, 513; conclusion, 514
- Forsyth, W., Q.C., "Essays Critical and Narrative," 276
- "Rules of Evidence as applicable to the Credibility of History," 276
- Foster, M., "Science Primers," 553
- Frere, Right Hon. Sir B., "Eastern Africa as a Field for Missionary Labour," 224
- Fresenius, R., "Anleitung zur qualitativen chemischen Analyse," 547
- Frewer, T., "The Philosophy of Revelation," &c., 524
- Friedberg, Emil, "Der Staat und die Bischofswahlen in Deutschland," 242
- Froude, J. A., "The English in Ireland," 265
- Furnival, F. J., "The Holy Grail," edited by, 280
- GARDNER, John, M.D., "Longevity," 258
- Gardner, Rev. R., B.A., "Life of Christ," 525
- Garrett, E., "By Still Waters," 581
- Gegenbaur, Dr. C., "Grundriss der vergleichenden Anatomie," 256
- "Gesellschaften für Erdkunde zu Berlin, Verhandlungen," 280
- Gibson, Rev. C. B., M.A., "Philosophy, Science, and Revelation," 524

- Ginzler, Dr. J. A., "Bischof Hurdalek," 280
- Girard, Jules, "Le Monde Microscopique des Eaux," 553
- Glaphorne, Henry, "Plays and Poems," 590
- Goethe and Mill: a Contrast, 38-70; Goethe's gospel of culture Mill's gospel of utilitarianism, 38; the aim of Mill's "Autobiography," 38, 39; of Goethe's "Wahrheit und Dichtung," 38, 39; Mill's account of the "Autobiography," 38, 39; Goethe's account of his "Wahrheit und Dichtung," 38, 39; the two works compared, 39; ante-natal influences, 40; in Goethe's case, 41; Goethe's father and mother, 41; the elder Mill, 41; early education of Mill and Goethe, 42; the character of James Mill's teaching, 43; Goethe's early education, 43; how Mill and Goethe each speak of their fathers, 44; Goethe at sixteen, 44, 45; at Leipzig, 45; at Strasburgh, 45; returns to Frankfort, 45; "Sturm und Drang" period, 45; Goethe and politics, 46; Goethe's opinions on religion, 46; early religious influences, 47; his acceptance of Pantheism, 48; love affairs, 48, 49; Lili, 49; Mill and Art, 50; in France, 50; influence of Bentham on him, 50, 51; appointment in the India Office, 51; mental crisis, 51; his friends, 51 (*foot-note*); Goethe and Mill contrasted at this particular epoch of their lives, 52; Mrs. Mill, 52; her effect upon his writings and character, 53; Miss Taylor, 53; Mill's religious belief, 53, 54; Goethe and Art, 55; Goethe and politics, 56; Greek influences on Goethe, 56; contrast between Mill and Rosbeck, 57; effect of Wordsworth on Mill, 57; Mill and Socialism, 58; Mill's detestation of society, 58, 59; Goethe and Frau von Stein, 59; Goethe and Christiane Vulpius, 60; Goethe and Lili, 60; Goethe and Bettina Brentano, Minna Herzlieb, and Fräulein von Lewezow, 61; and the explanation of Goethe's conduct to women, 62; Mill and his relations to women, 63; Mrs. Mill, 63; Mill's championship of Woman's Rights, 64; Goethe's Pantheism, 64, 65; his views on Christianity, 65; on Immortality, 65; on God, 65, 66; Mill's religious opinions, 66, 67; Mill and the "Religion of Humanity," 67; Mill on Immortality, 68; the Positivist theory of Immortality, 68; Mill's views on the world, 69; Mill's life a new proof that the highest morality may exist without any belief in Revelation, 69; conclusion, 70
- Grimm, Dr. Wilibald, "Die Lutherbild und Ihre Textes-Revision," 524
- Guizot, H., "History of France," translated by R. Black, M.A., 280
- HALL, William Edward, M.A., "The Rights and Duties of Neutrals," 534
- Hamilton, D. H., D.D., "Autology: an Inductive System of Mental Science, &c.," 228
- Harcourt, Capt. A., "The Shakspeare Argosy," 587
- Hartmann, E., "Erläuterung zur Metaphysik des Unbewussten," &c., 531
- Hartsen, F. A., "Grundzüge der Psychologie," 529
- Haweis, Rev. H. R., M.A., "Speech in Season," 228
- Haslitt, W. C., "Old English Plays," edited by, 298, 590
- Heath, F. G., "The English Peasantry," 287
- Hellwald, Friedrich von, "The Russians in Central Asia," 273
- Heywood, Thomas, "Dramatic Works" of, 298
- "Hints to Church Workers," 523
- Hinton, James, "Physiology for Practical Use," 257
- "The Place of the Physician," 258
- Hirsche, K., "Imitatio Christi nach dem Autograph des Thomas von Kempen," 518
- Hoffbauer, Capt., "German Artillery, &c.," 565
- Hogg, L. M., "Memoir of Count Ottavio Tusca," 279
- Hole, Rev. H., "Young Christian Armed," 525
- Holmes, A., "Latin Pronunciation, &c.," 282
- Holtzmann, Dr. H., "Die Ansiedelung des Christenthums in Rom," 224
- Holsendorff, *see* Oncken
- Hooper, Mary, "Little Dinners, &c.," 238
- Mrs. G., "The House of Raby," 288
- Hosack, J., "Mary Queen of Scots," 268
- Howson, Rev. J. S., D.D., "Sacramental Confession," 225
- Hudson, E. H., "The Life and Times of Louisa Queen of Prussia," 267
- Hume, David, "A Treatise on Human

- Nature;" edited by T. H. Green, M.A., and T. H. Grosse, M.A., 228
- "ILLINOIS, First and Second Biennial Report of the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities of the State of," 247
- Incurables, a Governor of the Royal Hospital for, "Elective Charities and their Opponents," 241
- Indian Public Works: the Non-Responsibility of the Indian Government Officials, 439-456; Sir John Strachey's pamphlet, 439; on what the future of India depends, 410; a Minister of Public Works, 410; the Madras Government, the Marquis of Salisbury, and the Duke of Argyle, 440, 441; Mr. Grant Duff, Sir S. Fitzgerald, and Sir B. Frere, 442; Sir H. Maine on Local Government, 443; Sir A. Cotton on Indian Public Works, 444; the Lawrence Asylum, 445; correspondence between the Duke of Argyle and the Government of India, 446; Government House near the City of Poona, 447; the High Court of Calcutta, 448; the Madras Waterworks, 448; reply of the Madras Government to the Duke of Argyle, 449; Moota Valley Irrigation Works, 450; enlarging the Chemburambaukum Tank, 451; the Duke of Argyle and the Government of India, 452; the Kanhan Bridge at Kamptee, Central Provinces, 453; Lord Salisbury's correspondence with the Government of India, 454; necessary reforms, 455, 456
- "Ireland, Calendar of State Papers relating to, 1606-1608," 279
- "Ireland, Some Time in," 540
- "Italia, Statistica del Regno d'," (Italian Blue-Books), 536, 537
- JANNETAZ, Edward, "Les Roches, description de leurs éléments," 551
- Jeffries, R., "The Scarlet Shawl," 581
- Jenkins, Edward, M.P., "Glances at Inner England," 233
- Jerrold, B., "The Life of Napoleon III.," 560
- D., "The Barber's Chair," and "The Hedgehog Letters," 590
- Johnstone, Captain I.C., "Maories," 247
- Jos, Hermann, "Natur-Ethik," 530
- "KELLAWAY, The Register of Richard de, Bishop of Durham 1314-1316." Edited by Sir T. D. Hardy, D.C.L., 279
- Kelle, Dr. Johann, "Die Jesuiten Gymnasien in Oesterreich," 223
- Ker, David, "On the Road to Khiva," 245
- Kingsley, Rev. C., "South by West, or Winter in the Rocky Mountains," 244
- "Health and Education," 289
- Kingston, F. K., "The Unity of Creation," 224
- Kirchhoff, Dr. Gustav, "Vorlesungen über Mathematische Physik," 248
- Kirkman, Rev. T. P., "Orthodoxy from the Hebrew Point of View," 525
- Kürbsl, "Untersuchungen über die Einkommensteuer der Stadt Pest für das Jahr 1870," 231
- Kortwright, Fanny A., "A Little Lower than the Angels," 238
- Kubel, Dr. W., "Anleitung zur Untersuchung von Wasser," 252
- Kuenen, Dr. A., "The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State," 218
- Külz, Dr. E., "Beiträge zur Diabetes Mellitus," 263
- LAMARCK, 175-199; the reception of Lamarck's writings in England, 175; Lamarck and Darwin, 175; Cuvier and Lamarck, 175; Lamarck's arrangement of the animal kingdom, 176; Lamarck's geological views, 176; his "Flore Française," 177; his other botanical works, 177; his "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres," 177; his biological views, 178; the chief principles held since Lamarck's day, 179; Lamarck's classification, 180; his further explanations, 181; Lamarck's arrangement, 181, 182; table of, 182; Mr. Mivart's view, 182; Lamarck's theory of living beings, 183; quotations from, 183, 184; Lamarck's general theory of life, 184; his views on God and Nature, 184, 185; his further views on Nature, 185; exemplified in his account of various animals, 185, 186; his views on man, 186; on the fixity of species, 186; Lamarck's tables on the origin and descent of animals, 187; analysis of, 187, 188; his classification of inanimate bodies, 188; his definition of life, 189; Lamarck on the effects of heat, 189; on the motions of plants, 190; on the nine characters of animals, 190; remarks on Lamarck's characters, 191; Lamarck on generation, 192; views since Lamarck's



- day, 192; Lamarck's further views, 192, 193; Buffon's theory of organic molecules, 193; Lamarck's examination of the seven chief faculties of living beings, 194; Lamarck's theory of sensation, instinct, thought, and will, 195; his view of the origin of nerves, 195, 196; his views on will and ideas, 197; criticism on Lamarck's explanation of the processes of feeling and thought, 198; general summary of Lamarck's views, 199
- Lamb, Charles and Mary: their Editors and Biographers, 419-439; the essays of Elia, 419; how Lamb's life was affected, 420; Lamb as Mr. Guy, 421; joint productions of Lamb and his sister, 421; Mary Lamb's insanity, 422; Talfourd's life of Lamb, 422, 423; Talfourd, Hazlitt, and Procter, in relation to Lamb, 423; Talfourd's editing, 424; Babson's edition of *Eliana*, 424; Hazlitt and Mr. Procter, 425; Mr. Craddock's essay on Lamb, 426; Mr. Sala's essay, 426; Mr. Purnell's, 426; Charles Lamb's Toryism, 427; Emma Isola, 427; blemishes of Mr. Hazlitt's edition, 427; blunders in, 428; the Lamb-Stoddart correspondence, 428; interest of, 429; Mary Lamb's poems for children, 429; Mr. Hazlitt's blunders upon, 430; "Recollections of a Royal Academician," 430, 431; Lamb's letters to Allsop, 431; was Lamb of Lincolnshire origin? 431, 432; had Lamb a share in the "Falstaff Letters"? 432; the Roast Pig episode, 433; Lamb's health, 434; Lamb's love of drink, 436; Lamb as a critic, 436; extract from the "Chimney Sweep Essay," 436, 437; Lamb's review of "The Excursion," 437; Talfourd's and Moxon's edition, 437; suggestions for an edition of Charles and Mary Lamb's conjoint works, 438, 439
- Language, origin of, 381-418; the old French lady and the Psalms, 381; instances of our abuse of language, 382; our general incorrect use of words, 382, 383; especially of metaphorical words, 383; our use of "Sir," "October," &c., 383, 384; language imperfect as an instrument of thought, 384; its cumbrousness, 384; the elasticity of language, 385; its deceitfulness, quotation from Pyc-Smith, 385; further illustrations, 386; the origin of language, 387; association, 388; Professor Max Müller, 388; Professor Key's "Origin and Development of Language," 388; its value, 389; Professor Key on Prosthesis, Epenthesis, Paragoge, 389, 390; Grimm's Law, 390; Professor Key on the Indo-European languages, 391, 392; Professor Key and the German Philologists, 392; Professor Max Müller on the origin of language, 393; Mr. Farrar's "Chapters on Language," 394; quotation from, 394; quotation from his "Voice of Conscience," 394, 395; analysis of the quotation, 395, 396; Haeckel's supposition, 396; Dr. Farrar and the human origin of language, 396, 397; the evolution doctrine and atheism, 398, 399; the development of language, 399; Professor Key and Dr. Donaldson, 400; Professor Max Müller and the evolution doctrine, 401; Professor Max Müller and Mr. Darwin, 402; Professor Max Müller's argument, 403; his further arguments, 404; illustration from the pike, 404, 405; Professor Max Müller and the dog, 406; criticism on Professor Max Müller's theory, 407; further criticisms on, 408; what the development theory really does, 409; Professor Max Müller on "insensible graduation," 410; criticism on, 411; will animals ever learn to speak? 412; language an instrument for giving the mastery, 413; quotation from Dr. Farrar, 413; Dr. Farrar's innate idea of language, 414; the development theory explains why infants do not speak, 415; how Professor Max Müller misapprehends the development theory, 415; aphasia, 416; illustrations from Mr. Wood, 416, 417; conclusion, 418
- Lalor, D. S., "Centulle, a Tale of Pau," 581
- Laun, H. Van, "First French Reader," by, and V. Pleignier, 573
- Laurencin, Paul, "Le Pluie et le Beau Temps, Météorologie usuelle," 550
- Leathes, Rev. Stanley, M.A., "The Gospel its own Witness" (Hulsean Lectures, 1873), 522
- Lee, Holme, "The Vicissitudes of Beasy Fairfax," 287
- Lee, Robert, D.D., "Sermons," 224
- Leech, John, M.A., "The Epistle to the Hebrews," &c., 522
- Lefevre, G. Shaw, M.P., "The Game Laws," 533

- Legg, J. W., M.D., "The Liver in Jaundice," 557
- Leonard, W. A., "A Summary of Mr. Herbert's First Principles," 528
- Lewes, Mr., and Metaphysics, 104—137; Science in the future, 104; Metaphysics, 105; the growth of Science and of Mental and Moral Philosophy, 106; the Metaphysical Method, 106; the Scientific, 106; the present position of Science and Metaphysics, 106, 107; the purport of Mr. Lewes's book, 107; plan of the present volume, 108; the first part of the Introduction, 108, 109; second part, 109; Mr. Lewes on social influences in the genesis of the mind, 110; language a purely social product, 111; "Psychoplasm," 111; Consciousness and Sub-Consciousness, 111, 112; "The Psychological Spectrum," 112; Mr. Lewes on Ideal Construction in Science, 113; Mr. Lewes's chapters on Cause, Necessary Truth, and Empirical Origin of Mathematics, 114; Mr. Lewes's position towards Metaphysics, 115; proposed terms between Metaphysics and Science, 116, 117; how these terms are likely to be accepted, 117, 118; the form in which Mr. Lewes embodies his principle, 119; meaning of Metempirics, 120, 121; the intended meaning of Metempirics, 122; summary of objections to the form in which Mr. Lewes has cast his results, 123; Mr. Lewes's new principle of metaphysical research, 124; his definition of the sphere of metaphysics, 124, 125; the real kingdom of metaphysics, 125, 126; Mr. Lewes's treatment of Subject to Object, 127, 128; Mr. Lewes on neural processes, 129; Mr. Lewes's own doubts, 130; Mr. Lewes on the Nature of an External World, 131; Mr. Lewes and Idealism, 132; Mr. Lewes as a "Reasoned Realist," 133; quotation from Mr. Lewes, 133, 134; the difference between Science and Metaphysics, 134; metaphysical questions beyond the range of scientific investigation, 135; in what Mr. Lewes's error consists, 135; criticism on, 135, 136; concluding remarks, 136, 137
- Libloy, F. Schuler-, "Abriss der Europäischen Staats und Rechtsgeschichte," 572
- Limner, Luke, "Madre Natura versus the Moloch of Fashion," 238
- Linton, E. Lynn, "The True History of Joshua Davidson," 539
- MACLAREN, A., "Sermons preached in Manchester," 224  
"Training in Theory and Practice," 259
- Macmillan, Rev. H., "First Forms of Vegetation," 552
- Mahaffy, J. P. A. M., "Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers," 225
- Malden, H. E., "Philip Ashton, and other Poems," 298
- Manning, H. E., D.D., "Sin and its Consequences," 224
- Marshall, E., M.A., "Early History of Woodstock Manor, &c.," 298
- "Mary's Vision," 583
- Masson, David, "Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats," 589
- Masson, G., "Dictionary of French Language," 588
- Maudsley, H., M.D., "Responsibility in Mental Disease," 260
- "Mill, John Stuart, on the Autobiography of," by E. R. Russell, 278
- Miller, Thomas, "Royston Gower," 289
- "Milton, the Lycidas and Epitaphium Damonis of," edited by C. G. Leman, M.A., 583
- Mohr, F., "Chemische Toxicologie," 545
- Monck, W. H. S., "An Introduction to the Critical Philosophy," &c., 225
- Montagu, Right Hon. Lord R., M.P., "On some Popular Errors concerning Politics and Religion," 224
- Montalembert, Count de, "Letters to a Schoolfellow," 269
- Morris, Rev. R., "The Blickling Homilies," edited by, 281
- Morris, W. O'Connor, "The French Revolution and First Empire," 269
- Mousson, Dr. A., "Die Physik auf Grundlage der Erfahrung," 548
- Müller, Dr. A., "Geographie der alten Welt," 280
- "Mundi, Cursor; a Northumbrian Poem of the XIVth Century," 270
- Murray, J. O., LL.D., "Ballads and Songs of Scotland," 589
- Myers, F., M.A., "Catholic Thoughts on the Bible and Theology," 223
- "My Mother and I," 581
- Mysore, a Native of, "The British Administration of Mysore," 239
- NAUMAUN, Dr. C. F., "Elemente der Mineralogie," 254

- Neaves, Lord, "The Greek Anthology," 295
- Newman, J. H., D.D., "Tracts, Theological and Ecclesiastical," 222
- "Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification," 222
- Nichol, H., "Account of M. Gaston Paris's Method of Editing in his 'Vie de Saint Alexis,'" 283
- Nicholas, T., M.A., "The Pedigree of the English People," 240
- Nixon, J. E., M.A., "Parallel Extracts; arranged for Translation into English and Latin," 281
- "Norman People, The, and their Existing Descendants in the British Dominions," 271
- Norris, John Pilkington, M.A., "Manuals of Religious Instruction for Pupil Teachers," 523
- OEHLER, Dr. G. Fr., "Theologie des alten Testaments," 221
- Oettingen, Alexander von, "Die Moral Statistik in ihrer Bedeutung für eine Christliche Social Ethik," 538
- Olmstead, D. H., "De l'Autorité ou La Philosophie du Personnalisme," 530
- Oncken, Professor, "Deutsche Zeit- und Streit-Fragen," Herausgegeben von Fr. v. Holzendorff und, 246
- Oppenheim, Samuel, "Die Natur des Capitals und des Credits," 537
- Ouvry, Col. H. A., C.B., "An Unsectarian Catechism," &c., translated from the German, 225
- "Owen's College, Essays and Addresses by Professors and Lecturers of the," 533
- "PABST-WAHL, Die, nach ihrer geschichtlichen Gestaltung und dem gelten den Rechte," 224
- Parville, Henri de, "Causeries Scientifiques," 550
- Payne, E. J., "Burke: Select Works," 539
- Perry, John, B.E., "An Elementary Treatise on Steam," 254
- Perty, M., "Die Anthropologie als die Wissenschaft von dem körperlichen und geistigen Wesen des Menschen," 554
- Peichel, Oscar, "Volkerkunde," 355
- Pettigrew, J. Bell, M.D., "The Physiology of the Circulation in Plants, in the Lower Animals, and in Man," 256
- Phillips, J. A., M.I.C.E., "Elements of Metallurgy," 548
- Pickering, E. C., Professor, "Elements of Physical Manipulation," 250
- Piggott, John, F.S.A., "Persia, Ancient and Modern," 274
- Planché, J. R., "The Conquerer and his Companions," 272
- Poetter, F. C., "Die Geschichte der Philosophie im Grundriss," 528
- Proctor, Richard A., "The Universe and the Coming Transits," 251
- Proell, Dr. R., "Versuch einer graphischen Dynamik," 249
- "Public School Series," 539, 573
- Purnell, C. W., "An Agrarian Law for New Zealand," 533
- RAE, W. F., "Westward by Rail," 536
- Reade, Winwood, "The Story of the Ashantee Campaign," 564
- Reid, D., "Natural Science, Religious Creeds, and Scripture Truths," 524
- Rendu, M. le Chanoine, "Theory of the Glaciers of Savoy," 251
- Revere, Luke, "I Will Be Heard," &c., 582
- Residuum, The Revolt of the, 299-327; Mr. Gladstone's letter, 299; the mistake of, 299, 300; analysis of, 300; the working man and the income-tax, 300; Mr. Gladstone's fall, 301; the causes of it, 301, 302; quotation from Mr. Brodriok, 302; how the illiterates voted, 302, 303; why the illiterates were furious against Mr. Gladstone, 304; the election of 1868, 305; deductions from, 306; causes of Mr. Gladstone's unpopularity with the masses, 307; his disestablishment of the Irish Church, 307, 308; effects of, 308; Mr. Gladstone's Education Act, 309; his abolition of purchase in the army, 309; Mr. Cardwell, 310; the University Tests Act, 311; how far this affected the illiterates, 312; the Gladstone government and retrenchment, 312; the illiterates and the National Debt, 313; Mr. Childers and the dockyard labourers, 313; Mr. Lowe's match-tax, 314; the ballot, 314, 316; results of, 315; Mr. Disraeli and the ballot, 315; present and future effect of the ballot on the Liberal party, 316; Mr. Bruce's Licensing Bill, 317; the United Kingdom Alliance, 317; its effect on the late Home Secretary, 318; effect of Mr. Bruce's Bill, 318, 319; the Irish Education Bill, 320; the illiterates and the Roman Catholic religion, 320, 321; Mr. Gladstone's government and Scotland, 321, 322; the illiterates and roughs and the present Tory government, 322, 323; analogy

- from France, 322, 323; the tenure of the present Tory government, 323; Toryism and Education, 324; can the Tories play Liberal cards? 324, 325; Toryism and the Church, 325, 326; benefits from a Conservative Ministry, 326, 327
- Reumont, Alfred von, "Lorenzo de' Medici," 280
- Röbrieh, R., "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge," 566
- Rosetti, D. G., "Dante and his Circle," 298
- Russel, E. R., *see* Mill, J. S.
- Rutley, F., "Mineralogy," 551
- SALMON, Dr., "Analytische Geometrie des Raumes," 549
- Saville, Rev. B. W., "Apparitions: a Narrative of Facts," 525
- Schendl, L., "Elemente der Analytischen Geometrie der Ebene," 251
- Scheve, G., "Phrenologische Bilder," 529
- Schmidt, Dr. A., "Das Salz: Eine volkswirtschaftliche und finanzielle Studie," 231
- "Shakspeare-Lexicon," 585
- Schneider, D., "Beiträge zur Kenntnis der griechisch-orthodoxen Kirche Aegyptens," 524
- Scott, P., "Christianity and a Personal Devil," 224
- Seebohm, F., "The Era of the Protestant Revolution," 524
- "Seven Years of a Life," 581
- "Sheridan, Richard B., Works of." Edited by F. Stainforth, 590
- Shuttleworth, M.P., Sir T. Kay, "Dwellings of Working People in London," by, and Sir S. Waterlow, Bart., M.P.
- Sime, J., M.A., "History of Germany," 280
- Skertchley, J. A., "Dahomey as It Is," 245
- "Slang Dictionary," 282
- Smith, G. Vance, B.A., "The Spirit and the Word of Christ," 528
- Smith, R. B., M.A., "Mohammed and Mohammedanism," 222
- Piazz, F.R.S.E., "Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid," 279
- "The Great Pyramid and the Royal Society," 279
- "Song Drifts," 298
- "Songs of Two Worlds," 297
- Spedding, J., "The Letters and Life of Francis Bacon," 564
- Spencer, Hubert, "Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative," 234
- Stadler, August, "Kant's Teleologie," 532
- Stephen, Leslie, "Hours in a Library," 291
- Stocker, J. S., M.D., "Hints for Health," 260
- Strachey, Sir E., Bart., "Jewish History and Politics in the Times of Sargon and Sennacherib," 216
- Strange, T. Luusden, "The Legends of the Old Testament," 522
- Strecker, A., "Lehrbuch der organischen Chemie," 547
- Stretton, Hesba, "Cassy," 298
- Strodsmann, A., "Burgur," 567
- Stubbs, W., M.A., "Constitutional History of England," 264
- Stumm, Hugo, "Russia's Advance Eastward," 540
- Sully, J., M.A., "Sensation and Intuition," 227
- "Supernatural Religion," 214
- Swinburne, Algernon Charles, "Bothwell," 296
- Symonds, J. A., "Sketches in Italy and Greece," 238
- TAINÉ, H. A., D.C.L., "History of English Literature," 279
- "Tennyson, Alfred, D.C.L., Works of," 590
- Thomas, Annie (Mrs. Pender Cudlip), "No Alternative," 286
- Moy, "A Fight for Life," 289
- W. Cave, "Symmetrical Education," 237
- Thomson, J. T., "Translations from the Hakazit Abdulla," 567
- Thompson, Sir Henry, F.R.C.S., "Cremation: the Treatment of the body after Death," 235
- Titcomb, Rev. J. H., M.A., "Cautions for Doubters," 224
- Trenkle, J. B., "Geschichte der Schwarzwälder Industrie," 280
- "Troy, the 'Gest Historiale' of the Destruction of," edited by Rev. G. A. Pantou and D. Donaldson, 281
- Twining, T., "Technical Training," 537
- Tytler, C. C. Fraser, "Mistress Judith," 580
- "UNDER Seal of Confession," 74
- VENETIANER, Moritz, "Der Allgeist," 531
- Vivenot, A. Ruter von, "Quellen zur Geschichte der Deutschen Kaiser-

- politik Oesterreichs während der Französischen Revolutions Kriege, 1790-1801," 571
- Vivenot, "Zur Genesis zur Zweiten Theilung Polens, 1792-1793," 571
- Virchow, R., "Sammlung gemeinverständlicher, wissenschaftlicher Vorträge," herausgegeben von F. von Holtzendorff und, 254
- WALLACE, W., M.A., "The Logic of Hezel, translated from the Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences," 230
- "Wallbridge Miscellanies, The," 588
- Weisse, R., "Um die Erde," 246
- "What Can She Do?" 298
- White, W., "Memoir of T. T. Lynch," 277
- Wilberforce, H. W., "The Church and the Empires," 222
- Right Rev. Samuel, D.D., "Speeches on Missions," 523
- Winkworth, S., "Theologia Germanica," translated by, 224
- Women, The Emancipation of, 137-174; the present position of women in England, 137; in its legal aspect, 137, 138; condition of women in early ages, 138; woman's voice in her own interests, 138; irresponsibility of the dominant classes, 138, 139; sex rule and sex legislation, 139; women upon women's rights, 140; female citizenship, 141; objections raised to the emancipation of women, 141; do the majority of women desire the suffrage? 141, 142; how women truly live "under a gospel of ridicule," 142; the argument that women would be better without the franchise, 143; the "instincts and feelings" argument, 143; the argument that women are unfit for the vote because they are women, 143; the peculiar mental fitness of the masculine voter, 144; the argument that a vote will drive women downright mad, 144 (*fact-note*); how far are women "virtually represented by men?" 145; wife-beating among the lower orders, 145, 146; how far will the exercise of the suffrage interfere with women's duties? 146; unmarried women and the suffrage, 147; married women and the suffrage, 147; women and a seat in Parliament, 148; meaning of "strong-minded" women, 149; the argument that "women have done so much mischief," 149; the reproach that women are agitating from "love of power," 150; selfish appeals made to women, 150; man's so-called "chivalrous homage" to women, 151; the exact meaning of the term and its advocates, 152; how far "chivalrous homage" touches the working-man's wife, 153; "feminine delicacy and refinement," meaning of, 154; social circumstances connected with women, 155; female influence over men, 155, 156; its real import, 156, 157; social phenomena developed by man's domination over women, 157, 158; the modern custom of flirtation, 158; opposed to real love, 159; results of, 160; love of men for mediocre women, 160, 161; "the heroic female character" at present unpopular, 161, 162; "feminine" women, 162, 163; "female instincts," 163; higher education required, 164; the meaning of "unfeminine," 164, 165; feminine influence on man's conscience, 165, 166; woman's married state in England, 166; the model Griselda, 167; Herbert Spencer on a wife's subjection to her husband, 167; unmarried women, 168; more occupations should be opened to women, 168, 169; the morals of men and the morals of women, 169; the "social evil" question, 170; its cure, 170, 171; free play for woman's natural capacities, 172; the result of such a change, 172, 173; quotation from Professor Higginson, 173, 174
- Wood, A., "Ecclesiastical Antiquities of London and its Suburbs," 566
- Woodward, T. B., "A Treatise on the Nature of Man, regarded as Triune," 227
- Wordsworth, Dorothy, "Recollections of a Tour made in Scotland," 544
- Wright, J., M.A., "The Attio Primer for Beginners," 282
- Wülner, Dr. A., "Lehrbuch der Experimentalphysik," 549
- ZINCKE, F. Barham, M.A., "Swiss Allmends, and a Walk to See Them," 243











