

·C H A P. with all these vices, to uncontrolled and abso-  
 XX. lute power.

**TIMON**, 'the misanthrope, formed a proper judgment of his character. Instead of shunning him, as he did the rest of mankind, "Persist, my son," says he, "in pushing thy fortune; for thy advancement will be the ruin of Athens." The subsequent events of the war, form a commentary on Timon's prediction.

THE expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were chiefly excited by Alcibiades, forms the most remarkable and important event which took place in the course of the Peloponnesian contest. "Pursue the war temperately, but with firmness and perseverance," said Pericles to his countrymen at the commencement of hostilities; "throw your chief strength into the naval line; meditate no increase to your dominions, already too extended; never leave your cities or arsenals open, or exposed to sudden attacks; and, in the course of time, you will gain the victory over your enemies." But, on the decease of that great statesman, says Thucydides\*, "the Athenians acted in every respect contrary."

\* Lib. II. sect. 65.

No sooner had Pericles paid the debt to nature, than the wild and ambitious project of subduing Sicily recurred to the people, and their eyes continually turned to that fertile and opulent island. I have already mentioned its flourishing situation under the mild and beneficent reign of Gelon. Hieron, king of Syracuse, is represented as avaricious and cruel in the early period of his reign; but, by conversing with the Grecian sages, and making philosophy the school of life, he learned to correct the errors of his mind, and to reform the vices of his reign. His sentiments and character underwent a total change, and he filled that throne with lustre which he had formerly disgraced.

HIS illustrious reign was followed by the oppressive tyranny of Thrasylulus, which produced his expulsion from the throne, and banishment from Sicily. After his expulsion, the Syracusans, that they might never again experience the odious rod of tyranny, established a republican government. The Agrigentines too, having dethroned their king Thrasideus, and banished his family, instituted a democracy, a mode of government which, notwithstanding its turbulent and tumultuous nature, appears to have been the most natural

C H A P. tural and congenial to all the Grecian tribes.

XX. They were imitated in this revolution by the inferior states. The republic of Syracuse, treading in the ambitious steps of Athens, had brought most of the Dorian settlements to be their tributaries or dependants; and, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, that aspiring state, though agitated by internal commotions, had carried their successful arms against the Ionic settlements of Leontium, Catana, and Naxos.

IN the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, and soon after the death of Pericles, the Leontines, originally from Chalcis, an Athenian colony, solicited assistance against the Syracusans, by whom they had been invaded. At the head of the embassy was Gorgias, the most celebrated orator of the age. His pathetic eloquence, the harmony of his periods, and the elegance of his diction, adorned with figures, which he is said to have introduced into the language, so much transported Attic ears and Attic imaginations, that the assembly immediately concluded an alliance with the Leontines, and sent a fleet to Rhegium to the assistance of their Ionic dependants. At the distance of two years a similar request was made, and the Athenians sent a more numerous

rous fleet, not simply with a view of relieving the cities oppressed by the Syracusans, but with the design of producing a revolution in Sicily, and of bringing that island under the dominion of Athens.

ALARMED by the repeated visits of the Athenians, the sagacious and provident Hermocrates prevailed on his countrymen to convene a general assembly of the Sicilian states at the town of Gela. Deputies were sent from all the Doric and Ionic cities. Hermocrates was deputy from Syracuse, and appears to have acted with true patriotism and sound wisdom. His eloquence, enforced by reason, at last prevailed in the assembly; and all parties agreed to terminate their domestic quarrels, and resist, with united force, the projected tyranny of Athens\*.

THE wisdom and patriotism of a popular assembly, might approve and adopt such a salutary plan of union; but in republican states, projects of peace and concord are transient in their operation, while the principles of dissension and hostility are permanent and perpetual. A few years after this amicable convention, Leontium was taken and destroyed,

\* Thucyd. p. 290.

C H A P. the miserable inhabitants driven into exile ;  
XX. and the confederated city Egesta besieged by  

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the combined armies of Syracuse and Selinus.  
The oppressed and afflicted states again sent  
ambassadors to the Athenians, pleading the  
rights of consanguinity, the habits of alliance,  
and the ties of interest. They represented,  
that if they should now be abandoned by the  
parent state, they must experience the fate of  
Leontium ; and the Syracusans, after making  
themselves masters of Sicily, would add their  
forces to the Peloponnesians, from whom they  
were descended. To these arguments the  
ambassadors added an artful amplification of  
the riches of their republic, and an offer to  
defray the whole expences of the war. The  
Athenians, who only waited for an opportu-  
nity of commencing hostilities, sent deputies  
to Egesta to enquire into the situation of  
their affairs, and the funds in their treasury.  
Carrying on the deception, the citizens of  
Egesta made an ostentatious display of gold  
and silver, which they had borrowed from  
the neighbouring states ; contributed the sum  
of sixty talents of silver, to maintain an Athe-  
nian fleet of sixty sail for a month ; and pro-  
mised to repeat monthly the same ample  
subsidy, from funds which they affirmed to be  
deposited

deposited in the public treasury, and in the temples. CHAP.  
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ALTHOUGH every consideration of wisdom, expediency, and interest, dissuaded the Athenians from undertaking a hazardous expedition against so distant and so powerful a republic, yet the popular assembly, tempted and seduced by their evil genius Alcibiades, would have ventured to atchieve impossibilities, and saw no obstacles where he pointed the way.

THIS irregular character carried the same extravagance of speculation and action into public life, which he had displayed in private. The ordinary maxims of prudence, and the established forms of policy, were little adapted to a mind that aimed at the vast and unbounded. His wild and ambitious views did not stop short at the conquest of Sicily, but looked forward to the possession of the cultivated shores of Italy and Africa, and to the establishment of super-eminent dominion both by land and sea\*.

POSSESSED of the most insinuating talents, he communicated the contagion of ambition to the Athenian people, who, blinded by these romantic and fallacious prospects, precipitately granted the demand of the Egestæans, and

\* Isocrat. de pace Andocid. Orat. 3d.

appointed

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appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus to command the fleet; with full powers, not only to relieve Egesta, and restore the Leontines to their city, but to regulate the affairs of Sicily in such a manner as was best adapted to the interest of Athens\*.

NICIAS, distinguished by his prudence, no less than by his probity, remonstrated against the Sicilian expedition with unusual warmth and vigour, and described, in strong colours, the calamities that might thence result to the republic. He represented to the people his surprize, that an affair of such importance should have been determined, almost the very moment it was taken into deliberation; that in pursuit of an airy and impracticable scheme they had gone abroad in search of enemies, when they were surrounded with them at home; and that though they were but just beginning to recover from the calamities of the late war and the pestilence, they were wantonly exposing themselves to unnecessary and greater dangers.

NICIAS, in his discourse, pointed his censure in strong terms against the luxury and extravagance of Alcibiades; vices which that

\* Thucyd. lib. vi. p. 415.

licentious youth carried to an incredible pitch. He lavished prodigious sums of money on his furniture, equipage, and retinue;—his table vied in profusion and delicacy with that of a Persian satrap; and he contended at the Olympic games with seven different sets of chariot horses. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such enormous extravagance; and Nicias insinuated, that Alcibiades was no less solicitous for conquering Sicily to repair his own ruined finances, than to extend the dominion of his country.

To a speech, that was chiefly directed against himself, Alcibiades replied with eloquence and spirit; he acknowledged, “that he wished to lead the Athenians against Sicily, and that he thought himself not unworthy of that command. The splendor in which I live,” continued the orator, “and which has been imputed to me as a crime, reflects lustre on my country. The wealth I have expended among the Athenian people, and the magnificence I have displayed at the Olympic games, convey to foreigners an idea of the glory of Athens, and shew, that the state is not ruined, nor its finances exhausted, as our enemies pretend. But dismissing this subject, let the world form a judgment of me,  
not



CHAP. not from the illiberal passions, jealousy and  
 XX. envy, but from my actions. Was it an in-  
 ————— considerab'le service I rendered to the republic, in conciliating in one day to its alliance the people of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, and in raising armies against Sparta, in the center of Peloponnesus? Employ, therefore, in order to aggrandize your empire, the youth and ignorance of Alcibiades, as well as the wisdom and experience of Nicias, and do not abandon, from chimerical apprehensions, the illustrious enterprize to which you have already given your solemn sanction, and which, if skilfully conducted, will ultimately terminate both to your advantage and renown. The Sicilian cities, fatigued and provoked with the arbitrary government of their princes, and the tyrannical authority of Syracuse, watch the first opportunity to open their gates to the deliverer, who shall offer to emancipate them from the yoke under which they have groaned so long. The expences of the expedition will be furnished by the Egestæans and their allies; nor will it be difficult to subdue a multitude of independent states, unconnected with one another, and unacquainted with military discipline \*."

\* Thucyd. p. 422—426.

THE applauses of the people followed the speech of their leader; and their favourite Nicias, no longer venturing to oppose the violence of the popular torrent, made a last effort to break or divide its strength; but his attempts to magnify the difficulties of the expedition, and to state the obstacles in their way to conquest, served only to heighten the ambition of the assembly; and instead of extinguishing their ardour, inflamed it the more. It was immediately decreed, that the generals should be invested with full powers to raise sums of money, to levy such a body of troops, and equip such a number of galleys, as should be judged necessary or adequate to the enterprise. The internal forces of the republic being insufficient for the expedition, agents were sent to demand contributions and auxiliary troops from its allies and tributary states.

WHEN the preparations were completed, and the fleet was ready to sail, evil omens and presages filled the minds of the people with apprehensions and terror. The festival of Adonis, which was celebrated annually, returned at the time of the embarkation. During this gloomy ceremony, the whole city was in mourning; statues were carried through  
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CHAP. the streets in funeral procession; and the temples resounded with the cries and groans of the women who lamented the mystical death of the favourite of Venus. From a natural association of melancholy ideas, the minds of the superstitious foreboded, that the splendid armament before them would pass away like a pageant, and wither like the flowers in the *Gardens of Adonis*, which were carried about in the hallowed procession.

To increase the general affliction, the statues of Mercury, which had been erected in the streets as the boundaries of different edifices, were all thrown down, maimed, and defaced on the night preceding the intended navigation. The licentious character of Alcibiades exposed him to suspicion as an accomplice in this act of sacrilege; but the boundless affection entertained for him by the soldiers and sailors, who declared they would leave the service if violence was offered to his person, emboldened Alcibiades to demand a trial before his departure, that he might have an opportunity of justifying his conduct. But his enemies postponed their resentment; and the people, impatient for the expedition, obliged him to set sail.

ON the day appointed for the departure of the fleet, the Athenians crowded the Piræus by day-break, to behold and admire the most magnificent armament that had ever been fitted out by any city in the antient world. It consisted of a hundred gallies, carrying six thousand two hundred and eighty soldiers, the greater part of whom was heavy armed. Thirty vessels, and a hundred barks, attended the fleet, loaded with provisions, and all things necessary for the length of the voyage. Besides the marine forces, there was a land army, and a few cavalry, to the raising of which private persons had contributed as well as the public. The grandeur and beauty of the spectacle delighted the eyes of all beholders. The gallies were decorated with every ornament of naval pomp; the troops, composed of the flower of the Athenian youth, strove to excel one another in the gaiety of their dress, and the splendor of their arms; the magnificence of the whole had the appearance of a triumphal shew, rather than a warlike expedition. But amidst this pomp and pageantry which distinguished the Athenian adventurers, the joy of their friends and kinsmen was overcast with sorrow, when, with parting tears, they considered the length of the  
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CHAP. the voyage, the dangers of the ocean, and the  
 XX. uncertainty of their success in distant regions,  
 from which they might never return.

WHEN the troops had embarked, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up to the gods for the success of the expedition; the accustomed libations were poured out from vessels of gold and silver. The people who lined the shore, shouting at the same time, lifted up their hands to heaven, to implore a prosperous voyage for their fellow-citizens. And now, the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the galleys set sail, and arrived without any accident at Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the remainder of the fleet\*.

THE armament assembled at Corcyra, consisted of a hundred and thirty-four ships of war, besides transports. Five thousand heavy armed troops were attended with Rhodian slingers, and archers from Crete. At a moderate computation, the whole land and marine strength, including slaves and attendants, amounted to twenty thousand men.

THE fleet having been prohibited from entering the harbours of Tarentum and Locres,

\* Thucyd. lib. vi. p. 432, de Plut. in Nicia.

directed its course to Rhegium. There they received information, from vessels which they had sent from Corcyra, that the citizens of Egesta possessed only thirty talents in their treasury. Nicias, who had foreseen and foretold that the Egistæans were unable to fulfil their promises, enforced his former arguments against the expedition, and gave it as his opinion, "That the Athenian fleet ought to terminate the dispute between Egesta and Selinus, by persuasion or arms; and after having displayed to the inhabitants of Sicily their power to protect their allies, should return immediately to Athens." Alcibiades maintained, "That it would be inglorious for so noble an armament to return without having performed some signal exploit; that by the prospect of immediate support, the inferior cities might be detached from their reluctant confederacy with Selinus and Syracuse; and that, after being strengthened by new alliances, the Athenians should attack Selinus and Syracuse with vigour, unless the former concluded a peace with Egesta, and the latter restored the Leontines to their city."

LAMACHUS offered a third opinion: "That they ought to sail directly for Syracuse, be-

CHAP. fore the citizens had leisure to recover from  
XX. their surprize, or prepare for their defence.

That they had thus the fairest chance of ending the war at one blow ; and that the present time was the most proper, while the courage and the hopes of the Athenians were high, and the Syracusans were unprepared and unarmed." The timidity of Nicias, and the ambitious vanity of Alcibiades, rejected this wise and spirited advice.

THE opinion of the latter prevailed. Accordingly the fleet sailed from Rhegium to Sicily, and Alcibiades took Catana by surprize. With another detachment he sailed to Naxos, and persuaded the inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. Messenè, the key of Sicily, was on the point of surrendering to his intrigues; when he heard, that he was recalled by the Athenians to stand trial before the people for his life. When he received this intelligence, such was his baseness and profligacy, that he betrayed his friends in Messenè to the party favourable to Syracuse, who immediately put them to death\*.

AFTER the departure of the fleet from Athens, the enemies of Alcibiades, intent on

\* Thucyd. p. 462.

gratifying their private resentment, without any regard to the welfare of their country, renewed against him, in his absence, the accusation of having defaced the statues of Mercury, and of having profaned the mysteries of Proserpine and Ceres. Many persons, accused of being accomplices in these crimes, were thrown into prison without being heard, and condemned to death without evidence. The ship of Salamis was dispatched to bring Alcibiades to Athens, to be tried by the judgment of the people. He went on board the galley, but on arriving at Thurium, he disappeared. From Thurium he made his escape to Argos, and hearing that the Athenians had condemned him to death, and confiscated his estate, he threw himself on the protection of Sparta, which received him with open arms. By his versatile character, intriguing disposition, and active genius, he soon gained an ascendancy in the commonwealth of Lycurgus; and yielding to the dictates of a base resentment, seized the first opportunity to employ his influence in advising and promoting those fatal measures which accelerated the ruin of his country.

THIS perfidious Athenian shewed the Spartans, that the Sicilians could only be conquered



CHAP. by want of experience and unanimity; that  
 XX. they abounded in brave and hardy citizens,  
 but wanted the assistance of veteran officers to instruct them in military discipline, and train them on to battle. He also informed them, that their own forces in Greece had been idly and unprofitably employed; that their frequent invasions of Attica had been uniformly unsuccessful, from their strange and unaccountable neglect of omitting to secure and fortify some strong hold in a province, whence they might, at leisure, harass the country, intercept parties, and keep the capital itself in constant alarm.

THE Spartans availed themselves of these important instructions. On their next incursion into Attica, they strengthened and garrisoned the fortress of Decelia, only twelve miles distant from Athens; and they immediately dispatched Gylippus, with a small force, to inspire and discipline the Syracusan armies.

FROM the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias, by his opulence and eloquence, possessed the whole authority in the fleet; for Lamachus, notwithstanding his valour, his spirit of enterprise, and his experience in the field, was held in contempt by the soldiers on account of his poverty. Such were not always the senti-

ments

ments of Athens. Finding himself invested with the sole command, he carried on his operations in that timid, irresolute, and dilatory manner which marked his character; and, instead of attempting to make a bold impression on Selinus and Syracuse, wasted the ardour of his army in laborious insignificant marches along the coasts, and in destroying the inconsiderable town of Hyccara, inhabited by barbarians. Every thing languished under his command; the bravery of the army was disgraced by their unsuccessful attempts against Hybla and Himera; their spirit declined by their obscure and inactive summer quarters at Naxos and Catana; while fresh courage was inspired into the Syracusans by the tardy measures and timid counsels of Nicias.

WHILE the Athenians murmured against these dilatory and ignominious proceedings, Nicias at last determined to gratify their ardour, and to attack Syracuse by sea and land. As the siege of this city is one of the most remarkable in the Grecian History, it will be requisite to give a detail of it at some length.

SYRACUSE, of which the magnificent ruins still form an object of admiration, was founded by Archias the Corinthian, on the eastern coast of Sicily, seven hundred and nine years

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before the Christian era. The city, which was one of the strongest and most beautiful possessed by the Greeks, was situated on a promontory, surrounded on three sides by the sea, and defended by lofty and abrupt mountains towards the west. It consisted of three principal divisions, the Island, Achradina, and Tyché. The Island, which composes the whole of modern Syracuse, formed the least extensive division of the ancient. It communicated with the main land by a bridge. Here the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace of their kings. This division of the city was of great importance, because it gave the possessors the command of the two harbours by which it was surrounded. For this reason the Romans, when they became masters of Syracuse, prohibited the Syracusans from inhabiting the island.

ACHRADINA, the most spacious, beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city, stretched along the sea to a vast extent, from the northern shore of the promontory, to the southern island Ortygia.

TYCHE', so called from the temple of fortune which adorned that part of the town, stretched along Achradina on the land side, and was crowded with industrious inhabitants.

SYRACUSE

SYRACUSE was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circumference; possessed two harbours separated by the island; and was peopled by above two hundred thousand inhabitants\*.

THE first rumours of the Athenian expedition had been regarded by the Syracusans as vague and ill-grounded reports. The fleet had arrived at Rhegium, before they could be induced by the provident Hermocrates to prepare for a danger which was no longer at a distance. But when they beheld the powerful armament covering the sea of Sicily, and ready to invade their unprepared state, they were seized with terror and trepidation, and sunk from their former presumption into despair. It required all the magnanimity and vigour of Hermocrates to restore their courage. By his spirited advice, they sent deputations to every part of the island, soliciting the assistance of their allies; they garrisoned all their castles; reviewed their troops; examined the arms in their magazines; and made serious preparations for the defence of their island.

AT the close of the summer, information was brought to Nicias, that the Syracusans,

\* Strabo, p. 266. Thucyd. lib. vi.

CHAP. having resumed' courage, intended to march  
 XX. against him, and to attack him in his camp.

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Already their cavalry harassed the Athenians, beat up their advanced posts, intercepted their convoys, and, elated by success, added sarcasm and reproach at the pusillanimous inactivity of the invaders.

THESE reproaches, and the murmurs of his own troops, roused the timid and inactive temper of Nicias; but openly to attack Syracuse, was a bold and hazardous attempt. The distance between Catana and that capital by sea, was but thirty miles; but much peril would attend a descent, as the shore was well fortified, and the enemy numerous and prepared for defence. Nor was it safer to march by land, as the Athenians were deficient in cavalry, and that of the Syracusans was numerous, which watched their motions, and with whose activity and force they were ill-qualified to contend. To extricate himself from these perplexities, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. A citizen of Catana appeared in Syracuse, as a deserter from his native city; he informed the magistrates, that a conspiracy against the Athenians was formed in Catana; and that, with the aid of the Syracusans, it would be easy to defeat an unprepared enemy.

No

No proposal could be more acceptable to the Syracusans in the present ferment of their minds. The plan of the enterprize was concerted, and the day appointed for carrying it into execution.

IN consequence of this engagement, the Syracusans marched towards Catana, and encamped near Leontium. On receiving this intelligence, the Athenians set sail for Syracuse in the evening, and arrived by day-break in the Great Harbour. They immediately disembarked their troops, and fortified a camp in a favourable situation near the temple of Olympian Jove. When the cavalry of Syracuse proceeded to the walls of Catana, they discovered, by the departure of the enemy, the stratagem by which they had been overreached. They returned with the utmost expedition to protect Syracuse; they were joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus, and Camarina; and it was determined, without delay, to give battle to the Athenians\*.

IN a few days Nicias marched out of his entrenchments, and both parties prepared for the engagement. Nicias having gone round the ranks, and exhorted his soldiers to re-

\* Thucyd. p. 445—57.

CHAP. member their antient valour, and the atchievements of their ancestors, led them on against the enemy, who did not decline the engagement.

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THE battle was long disputed with firmness and vigour on both sides. Victory hitherto continued doubtful; when a sudden thunder storm arising, decided the engagement in favour of the Athenians; they considering it merely as the effect of the season, while the inexperienced Syracusans, looking upon it as an omen of the divine displeasure, betook themselves to flight.

AFTER this indecisive battle, Nicias, abandoning all hopes of taking the town, retired with his fleet to winter at Naxos and Catana.

THE recent success of the Athenians over the Syracusan forces, emboldened them to send messengers among their allies in Sicily, and the Italian coast in the neighbourhood. They sent ambassadors also to Tuscany and to Carthage, the rival of Syracuse, soliciting assistance; large supplies of men and money were demanded from Athens; and every probable measure was pursued for opening the next campaign with vigour and success.

THE Syracusans were no less zealous and active

active in preparing for the defence of their city. Hermocrates, to whose wisdom and experience they had recourse in every moment of difficulty or danger, advised them to lessen the number of their generals, which amounted to fifteen. Accordingly they invested himself, Heraclides, and Sicanus, with unlimited authority both in civil and military affairs.

THE expected succours now arrived from Athens. Nicias, in possession of four hundred talents, and at the head of a numerous army, strengthened by the addition of six hundred and fifty cavalry, now prepared, in the eighteenth year of the war, to lay siege to Syracuse. The Athenian fleet sailed from Catana, and having disembarked the troops at the port of Trogilè, retired to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse. The land forces marched with the utmost expedition to take possession of Epipolæ, before the enemy had received information of their arrival. On the first news of their approach, seven hundred soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced in confusion to meet them; but were soon defeated, and three hundred of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after erecting a trophy, built



CHAP. a fortrefs to fecure their baggage and effects,  
 XX. on the fummit of Epipolæ, the higheft of the  
 mountains which overlook and command the  
 city. A blockade was the method adopted  
 by Nicias for gaining poffeffion of Syra-  
 cufe. He furrounded the city on the land  
 fide with a ftrong circumvallation, in order  
 to cut off all communication with the coun-  
 try; while he expected that, by his numerous  
 fleet, he fhould be able to block up the har-  
 bours, and prevent the Syracufans from re-  
 ceiving any fuccours or provifions by fea.

THE ftrength of the whole army was em-  
 ployed in building a wall, to fhut up the city  
 northward from Tyché to Trogilè; and the  
 work was carried on with fuch rapidity, as  
 ftruck the befieged with furprize and con-  
 fternation. They attempted to prevent the  
 completion of the wall; but their fallies were  
 always unfucceffful, and even their cavalry  
 was routed. After thefe recent defeats, the  
 wife counfel of Hermocrates deterred them  
 from farther hoftilities, and perfuaded them  
 to raife new bulwarks againft the walls of  
 the Athenians\*. Accordingly the projected  
 wall was begun, and carried on with vigour;

\* Thucyd. lib. vi. p. 482.

and as the works on each side drew nearer, frequent skirmishes took place between the contending parties, in one of which the gallant Lamachus fell a victim to his unguarded valour, but the Athenian troops were still victorious.

THE Athenian army was animated by these successes, but the Syracusans began to lose hopes of defending their city; and this despondency was increased by the continual supplies which arrived to the besiegers, while Syracuse was abandoned or forgotten by her perfidious or ungrateful allies. The populace, as was usual in the Grecian democracies, clamoured against the incapacity of their leaders, to whom they ascribed all the misfortunes of the war. New generals were appointed in the room of Hermocrates and his associates; and this injudicious change brought Syracuse to the brink of ruin, so that at last it prepared to surrender\*.

IN this critical moment, and while the assembly were deliberating concerning the mode of capitulation, a Corinthian vessel, commanded by Gongylus, entered the harbour. On his landing all ranks of men flocked eagerly around him. He announced the speedy

\* Thucyd. p. 487.

arrival

CHAP. arrival of Gylippus, with a considerable fleet,  
XX. to relieve Syracuse. While astonished and  

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delighted with this information, the citizens  
could scarcely give credit to what they heard,  
a courier arrived by land from Gylippus him-  
self, giving them intelligence of his arrival,  
and ordering them to meet him with all their  
troops. He had landed with four gallees on  
the western coast of the island, to avoid the  
Athenian fleet, and advanced towards Sy-  
racuse on the side of Epipolæ, where the  
line of circumvallation was still unfinished.  
Surprized and disconcerted by his arrival,  
the Athenians drew up under the walls with  
precipitation and disorder. Gylippus, lay-  
ing down his arms, sent a herald to inform  
the Athenians, that he allowed them five  
days to leave Sicily. While Nicias disdained to  
answer this insolent proposal, some of his sol-  
diers, bursting into laughter, asked the herald,  
“ Whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian  
privateer, and a petty wand, made any altera-  
tion in the state of the city ? ” Both sides  
now prepared for hostilities. The first en-  
gagement was unfavourable to the Sicilians,  
from the inadvertence of Gylippus in posting  
them between their own walls and those of  
the enemy. To remedy this error, he ar-  
ranged

ranged his army in the subsequent engagements on more spacious ground; drove the Athenians in disorder from the field; and pursued them to their camp with considerable loss, and still greater disgrace.

THE effects of this victory were sudden and important. While the Athenians were victorious or superior in the field, they were furnished with provisions in abundance from the neighbouring tribes; but after their defeat, they found the gates of every city shut against them. The foraging parties were attacked or cut off; and at length they were reduced to depend for subsistence on precarious supplies from the Italian coasts. The slaves whom they had armed, deserted in great numbers. The mercenary troops preferred the more secure and beneficial service of Syracuse; and even the Athenian citizens, worn out and disgusted with the length and hardships of the war, abandoned the care of the galleys to the young and inexperienced. In this critical situation of affairs, Nicias sent messengers to Athens, and faithfully unfolded, in a letter to the assembly, the distresses and disorders which prevailed in the army and the fleet; at the same time beseeching the assembly either to recal him  
without

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CHAP. without delay, or to give him the most speedy  
XX. and effectual succour.

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THE Athenians were strongly affected with the representation of their affairs made in his letter, and prepared to send him relief. They appointed two generals, Eurymedon and Demosthenes, to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former embarked immediately with ten gallies and a hundred and twenty talents; while the latter was employed in raising troops and contributions to set sail early in the spring.

MEANWHILE the Lacedæmonians, following the counsel of Alcibiades, entered Attica early in the spring, under the command of King Agis; and after having ravaged the country, fortified Decelia, a town on the Attic frontier, at an equal distance of fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This garrison kept Athens in a state of constant anxiety and alarm; as, instead of being harassed by the annual incursions of the Spartans, they were now infested with perpetual hostilities. The country around Athens was entirely laid waste; the communication interrupted with the island Eubœa; and vessels which brought provisions from that island, were obliged to make a circuitous voyage, and double the  
Cape

Cape of Junium. Athens was now become a kind of frontier town; a guard was mounted at the gates by day, and by night the citizens were on the walls, or under arms. Harassed by unremitting toils, and threatened with all the miseries of famine, twenty thousand slaves, chiefly artificans, deserted to the enemy.

BUT even in this depth of internal distress, the Athenian magnanimity appeared: unawed by danger, unsubdued by misfortune, the exertions of Athens strike us with wonder and astonishment, and appear as boundless as her ambition. Thirty gallies were employed against Amphipolis; twenty were stationed at Naupactus to prevent the Peloponnesian fleet from effecting the relief of Syracuse; a numerous squadron raised contributions, and levied soldiers among the Asiatic colonies; while another laid waste the coast of Peloponnesus; and preparations were making to raise an army and a fleet to assist in besieging the capital of Sicily.

HERMOCRATES, who had now resumed his authority, and Gylippus, the Spartan commander, acquainted with the present distress of the besiegers, and their future hopes of assistance from Athens, resolved to seize this opportunity of attacking them by sea and land.

CHAPTER. They persuaded the Syracufans to fit out a  
 XX. strong naval armament, and to endeavour to  
 wrefl from the enemy the empire of the feas.  
 Hermocrates obferved, " That the Athenians  
 had become a naval power from neceffity, and  
 had acquired the dominion of the fea in re-  
 pelling the Perfian invafion. The Syracufans  
 had now the fame motive for exerting their  
 marine ftrength; and as they were poffeffed  
 of equal bravery and greater power, might ex-  
 pect to become ftill more formidable and fuc-  
 ceffful\*."

THIS advice was followed, and a fleet of eighty gallies was equipped. A naval engagement foon took place, in which eleven of the Syracufan gallies were funk, and three were taken; but this defeat was compensated by their fuccefs at land, Gylippus having attacked the fortifications at Plemmyrium, which commanded the mouth of the Great Harbour, took three forts, containing naval ftores for the equipment of forty gallies, a large quantity of arms, provifions for the troops, and fums of money to a confiderable amount. Not difheartened by their defeat in the firft engagement at fea, the Syracufans

\* Thucyd. lib. vii. p. 497.

prepared for another. They corrected their former errors; built gallies of a more favourable construction; and, by their invention and activity, made such proficiency in the naval art, that at length they gained a victory at the entrance of the Great Harbour. The Athenians lost seven gallies; and Nicias, with difficulty, saved the remains of his fleet, by retiring behind his transports, from the masts of which enormous masses of lead, named Dolphins, had been suspended, capable of sinking every vessel that approached.

THIS unexpected disaster threw Nicias and his army into the utmost consternation: but while he was revolving these gloomy ideas, and past as well as present calamities were crowding on his mind, the Athenian fleet, commanded by Demosthenes and Eurymedon, appeared on the coast of Sicily. From the elegance and the gaiety of its decorations, it seemed to exhibit a spectacle of triumph; the admirals having resolved to make their approach with an air of pomp and triumph, in order to strike terror into the enemy. The fleet, besides transports, consisted of seventy-three gallies, containing five thousand pikemen, and above three thousand slingers and archers.



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THE Syracusans were alarmed and dejected beyond measure, by the appearance of this formidable armament. Notwithstanding all their former exertions and sufferings, the war was again to begin ; and they saw no prospect of a termination, or even suspension to their calamities.

DEMOSTHENES, who now assumed the chief authority in the fleet, instructed by the dilatory conduct of Nicias, proposed “ to take advantage of the alarm which the sudden arrival of such a powerful reinforcement had spread among the enemy, and, by assaulting the walls of Syracuse, at once put an end to the war ; or, if that was found to be impossible, to raise the siege, and no longer to exhaust, in indecisive engagements, the treasure and the strength of Athens, which might be better employed against the invaders of their own country.”

THIS spirited, but rash counsel, was highly approved by Eurymedon and the rest of the commanders ; Nicias, though extremely reluctant, was forced at last to acquiesce.

AFTER some fruitless attempts against the fortifications on the banks of the Anapus, Demosthenes determined to attack the fortresses in Epipolè, believing, that should he

\*

possess

possess himself of that post, the wall would be quite undefended. As he could not proceed undiscovered during the day, he marched thither in a moonshine night, with the flower of his army, accompanied by Eurymedon and Menander, Nicias remaining behind to guard the camp. Their first efforts were successful. They stormed the first entrenchment, and put to the sword those by whom it was defended. Encouraged by fortune, Demosthenes marched forward. During this interval, Gylippus led his whole forces out of their entrenchments. At the approach of Demosthenes, the Syracusans were defeated and retired; but as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to bear down whatever might oppose their arms, their tumultuary attack was checked by a body of Thebans, who repulsed them with loud shouts, made a dreadful havoc among their troops, and spread universal consternation through the rest of the army. Their ignorance of their situation, and the dubious aspect of a night, not sufficiently bright to distinguish objects, nor sufficiently dark to render them imperceptible, added to the perplexity and panic of the Athenians. Their watch word being betrayed to their enemies, they could not distinguish their allies from their foes, and fre-

**H A P.** quently imbrued their hands in the blood of  
**XX.** their friends. The confusion encreased, and  
 the route became general. Some in their flight fell from the tops of the rocks, and were dashed in pieces; others wandered into the country, and were next morning discovered and slain by the Syracusan cavalry. Upwards of two thousand men fell in this fatal engagement on the side of the besiegers.

THIS severe and unexpected repulse subdued the spirit of the Athenians, whose numbers were continually diminishing by the diseases incident to the autumnal season, and the unwholesome vapours arising from the morass near which the army was encamped. Demosthenes urged this calamity, which was daily encreasing, as an additional reason for raising the siege, while they could with safety cross the Ionian sea before the commencement of approaching winter. But Nicias, whose ruling principle seems to have been that of delay, dissuaded them from the attempt, affirming, that an abrupt departure would betray their weakness, and that, at all events, they should wait for orders from Athens. The other generals, believing that the unusual firmness and obstinacy of Nicias proceeded from some secret discovery, or concealed ground  
 of

of confidence, assented to his opinion, and adopted his measures, which ultimately involved themselves, the army, the navy, and the city of Athens in irretrievable destruction\*.

MEANWHILE Gylippus, having made the tour of Sicily after his late victory, returned to Syracuse with a powerful reinforcement; and the troops so long expected from Peloponnesus, arrived in the harbour of Syracuse. Such an augmentation to the army and the navy of the Syracusans, with the increasing danger of the malignant distemper, threw the Athenians into the deepest dejection; and even Nicias agreed to abandon the shores of Sicily. Private orders were given for this purpose, and the hour of midnight chosen for the time of their departure, in order to avoid the immediate pursuit of the enemy. When every preparation was made, and they were just going to set sail, the moon was suddenly eclipsed. Nicias and his army were astonished and terrified at the phenomenon. The soothsayers, who were consulted, interpreted it as an inauspicious omen; and advised them to defer the voyage till the mysterious number of three times nine days was completed, and

\* Thucyd. p. 524. Plut. in Nicias:

CHAPTER. a full revolution of the moon had taken place.

XX. But before that time expired, the voyage was impracticable, as the design was discovered to the Syracufans, who resolved to attack the fugitives by sea and land. During three days they carried on their military and naval operations without intermiffion. On the first day they attacked the entrenchments of the Athenians, and gained the advantage in the conteft. On the fecond, they failed with feventy-fix gallies againft eighty-fix of the Athenians. Eurymedon having separated his Squadron from the reft of the fleet, in order to furround the enemy, was purfued by them to the bottom of the gulf and defeated. He fell in the engagement, and the gallies under his command were driven on fhore. On the third day, Gylippus having meditated an attack on the Athenian foldiers as they were efcaping from their gallies that had run'aground, was repulfed with confiderable lofs; but eighteen of thefe gallies were taken, and their crews put to the fword.

WITH a view to intercept the retreat, and totally to deftroy the fleet of the Athenians, Hermocrates prevailed on the Syracufans to place a line of veffels, fixed with anchors and chains, acrofs the mouth of the Great Harbour,

bour, which was five hundred paces wide. When the Athenians found themselves shut up in the harbour, a council of war was held to deliberate on the state of their affairs. They were in want of provisions, and none could be procured, unless they were masters of the sea. This determined them to risque a naval engagement. Nicias, whose fortitude rose in adversity, now exerted his utmost efforts to retrieve the falling fortunes of his country. He immediately refitted a hundred and ten gallies, and filled them with the flower of his infantry; having drawn up the remainder of his forces in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians had suffered much on former occasions from the firm and weighty prows of the Sicilian vessels, Nicias had provided grappling irons to lay hold on the hostile vessel, that they might come immediately to a close engagement. When the firm decks of opposing vessels were thus crowded with armed men, an engagement at sea resembled a battle at land.

THE generals on both sides employed all their eloquence and ardour to animate the courage, and heighten the exertion of their foldiers; and no commanders could ever have been prompted by stronger inducements;  
for

CHAP. for the impending battle was not only to  
XX. determine their own fate, but to decide the  
fate of their country, and the destiny of succeeding ages.

WHEN the Syracufans were acquainted with the intentions of the enemy to engage, they prepared to defend the chain of gallies at the entrance of the harbour. A narrow opening was left, on either side of which a considerable squadron was stationed\*. Sicanus and Agatharchus were appointed to command the wings; and Pythen, a native of Corinth, to command the centre of the fleet. Gylippus having given every necessary order, returned to take the command of the land forces. The Athenian fleet consisted of a hundred and ten gallies; the Syracusan of ninety; but the latter was amply provided with every necessary article for attack or defence; even the new invention of the Athenians was not overlooked; to prevent the impresson of the grappling irons, the prows of the Syracusan vessels were covered with raw hides.

THE engagement was desperate and sanguinary on both sides. When the Athenians arrived at the mouth of the harbour, they re-

\* Thucyd. p. 451.

pelled with ease the galleys that were stationed to defend it. But when they attempted to break the chain of vessels that guarded the entrance, the Syracusan fleet approached, and rushed into the harbour, which was more favourable to the form of their vessels, and their mode of fighting, than the open sea. The confusion, tumult, and havoc occasioned by the engagement of two hundred galleys in so narrow a space, strike the imagination with horror, and surpass the powers of description. From the motion of the ships by the agitation of the sea, the darts and arrows of the Athenians were spent without effect; but the frequent and furious discharges of stones from the Syracusan vessels were dreadfully destructive. The efforts of distant hostility being over, the nearest vessels came into close contact, and grappled each other. The heavy armed troops boarded the enemy's ships, and fought hand to hand; the decks were covered with blood; and nothing was to be seen around but fragments of ruined vessels, and dead bodies floating on the wave. The crash of the ships that rushed against each other, and the mingled shouts of the victors and the vanquished, occasioned such uproar and disorder, that the orders of the commanders could



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no more be heard. The object of the Athenians was to break the chain of vessels that shut the harbour, to secure their return to their own country. This the enemy endeavoured to prevent, to render their victory more decisive and complete. The two armies, which were drawn up on the neighbouring shore, saw clearly every circumstance of the engagement, and contemplated the interesting scene with solicitude and terror. Attentive to every movement of the fleet, and shuddering at every change, they discovered their hopes or their fears by shouts of exultation, or groans of despondency. Sometimes stretching out their hands towards their countrymen, as if to animate and direct their efforts; at other times raising them towards heaven, to implore the assistance and protection of the gods. At last, after an obstinate contest and a vigorous resistance, the Athenian fleet was dispersed and driven on shore. The Syracusan land army, when they beheld this event, conveyed to the whole city, by a sudden and universal shout, the news of the victory. The Athenians were protected in their landing by a small but heroic band, commanded by Nicias. The Syracusans, now the acknowledged masters of the sea, sailed to Syracuse, and erected a trophy.

phy. In this engagement the victors lost forty vessels, and the vanquished fifty.

DEFEATED by a new power, on an element in which they had not only reigned, but triumphed for half a century, the spirit of the Athenians was broke, and their courage annihilated. On this occasion they neglected the sacred duty of burying the dead; and did not so much as request that the bodies of their deceased countrymen might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last duties to their remains. Though their fleet was still more numerous than that of the enemy, they refused to meet the Syracusans a second time, and to engage with an inferior force. The dauntless Athenian spirit no longer appeared; their only wish was to escape at any rate.

THE evening after the engagement, the Syracusans celebrated the festival of Hercules, their favourite hero, and celestial protector. Nothing could be more favourable to the silent and unobserved departure of the Athenians, than the gaiety, jollity, and giddiness in which the capital of Sicily indulged itself during the greatest part of the night. Piety, as well as duty, seemed to second the double call, which a festival and a victory gave to pleasure and enjoyment. Hermocrates alone,  
who

**C H A P.** who suspected the designs of the enemy, saw  
**XX.** the necessity of intercepting or preventing  
their flight, since they might again become formidable, and renew the war. For this purpose he selected a band of horsemen, who, pretending friendship to the Athenians, were ordered to inform Nicias, "that it would be dangerous to depart till morning, as the Syracusans lay in ambush for him, and had occupied all the passes." This false intelligence suspended the march of the dilatory Nicias; and he remained two days longer to make every necessary preparation for the departure of the army.

THIS delay gave full time to the Syracusans to seize the most difficult passes, to fortify the places where the rivers were fordable, to break down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain to harass the Athenians on their march. On the third day after the battle, the Athenian army, consisting of forty thousand men, set out from their camp with a view of retiring to Catana. The lofty expectations which they had formed were now vanished; they had abandoned their fleet to the enemy; they had been conquered on their own element; had disgraced the achievements, and fallen  
from

from the fame of their ancestors. To this public dishonour was added the keenest pungency of private distress. A melancholy spectacle presented itself wherever they turned their eyes; vast numbers of the sick, the wounded, and the dying, following them with feeble steps, clinging to their garments, and imploring them with tears, and in the accents of unutterable woe, not to abandon them to the fury of wild beasts, or the more merciless rage of the enemy. But self-preservation prevailed over every other care; the miserable victims were left to perish, sending up towards heaven their plaintive and unavailing groans, invoking gods and men to hear their lamentations, and avenge their wrongs.

THE sufferings of Nicias, and his magnanimity in supporting them, form a striking part of the spectacle. Worn out with a tedious sickness; deprived of common necessaries; and pierced not only with his own grief, but that of others, which preyed upon his heart; this great man, whose courage rose in adversity, thought of nothing but how to console the sorrows, and revive the hopes of the army. He moved with alacrity among the ranks, proclaiming aloud, "That there was yet room for hope; that other armies had  
escaped

CHAP. escaped from greater evils; and that there-  
 XX. fore they ought not to yield to misfortune.

That if they had incurred the displeasure of some deity, by their invasion of Sicily, his vengeance must be satiated by the greatness and the length of their sufferings; that their numbers and their bravery rendered them still so formidable, that no city in Sicily was able to oppose them; and that, by a firm and prudent retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but their country; since the strength of a state consisted in brave and good men, not in evacuated fleets or undefended walls\*.”

THE army marched in two divisions, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx, as the most secure and commodious arrangement. The first was commanded by Nicias; the second by Demosthenes; the baggage and the slaves were placed in the centre. In this arrangement they passed the river Anapus, the ford of which was disputed by a detachment of Syracusans. Being much harassed by the cavalry and archers after they had passed the river, they proceeded only five miles in their march. Next day they were

\* Thucyd. p. 550.

exposed to the same dangers, and compelled to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not chuse to venture, an engagement against an army that despair might render invincible; whenever the Athenians offered battle, the Syracusans retired; but when the former proceeded in their march, the latter advanced, and charged them in the rear.

THE situation of the Athenian army grew more and more deplorable. On three successive days they attempted to pass the mountain Acræum, and were thrice repulsed by the enemy with considerable loss. The numbers of the wounded had been greatly increased by these unavailing attempts; the neighbouring territory could no longer furnish them with provisions; Nicias and Demosthenes now found it necessary to alter their route, and to make a circuit by the sea shore. To conceal their design from the enemy, fires were lighted in every part of the camp. The troops then marched out under covert of the night, but with confusion and disorder. The horrors of a gloomy sky, an unknown country, and the apprehension of the enemy, who were at no great distance, spread terror and consternation among the Athenians; and De-

CHAP. moſthenes, with the greater part of the troops  
 XX. under his command, loſt their way, and made  
 a fatal ſeparation from the reſt of the army.

NEXT morning, Gylippus having received intelligence of this event, marched with the utmoſt celerity to intercept the ſmaller di- viſion, and overtook them at noon near the ford of the river Erinios. Having ſurrounded them with his cavalry, he drove them into a narrow defile, where they defended themſelves with the moſt deſperate bravery. Towards the approach of evening, oppreſſed with fatigue, and faint with their wounds, they were exhausted rather than defeated. Gylippus offered indemnity and protection to all who would deſert their leaders; an offer which was accepted by the Aſiatic Greeks, and the troops from other tributary ſtates. At laſt Demoſthenes, and the remainder of his hoſt, conſented to lay down their arms, on condition that they ſhould not ſuffer death or imprifonment\*. Theſe, ſtill amounting to ſix thouſand, were ſent priſoners to Syra- cuſe.

GYLIPPUS then purſued the diſiſion of the army conducted by Nicias, which had marched

\* Thucyd. 553.

twenty miles, and was advancing towards the margin of the river Affinaros. He overtook them before they could reach the banks of the river; and sent a herald to Nicias, summoning him to imitate the example of Demosthenes, and to surrender without farther effusion of blood. Nicias, not giving credit to the intelligence of an enemy, was permitted to send a messenger for information. When the intelligence was confirmed by the return of the courier, Nicias proposed terms in the name of the Athenians, engaging to repay them all the expences of the war, and to deliver hostages for the repayment, on condition that they would permit him, with his army, to depart from Sicily.

THE Syracusans, as was to be expected, would not listen to his proposals; and Gylippus made an attack on the army of Nicias, which was sustained during the whole day with incredible bravery, the Athenians still hoping they should be able to make good their retreat in the obscurity of the night. But their intentions and movements were discovered by the wary Gylippus, and only three hundred men broke through the enemy and escaped. The rest returned with despondency to the post they had left. Next



CHAP. morning, prompted by despair, they resumed  
XX. their arms, and ran towards the river amidst  
the attacks of the Syracusan bowmen and cavalry. The feverish sensation of thirst excited them to rush with frenzy into the rapid stream; while their pursuers, who lined the rocky banks, attacked them with darts, arrows, and javelins. The Assinaros presented a new scene of danger; multitudes were borne down the stream by the rapidity and force of the current; while others joined in a body to stem its force, were butchered without mercy as they were drinking the turbid element. Nicias, unable to bear this spectacle of horror, surrendered at discretion, and implored pity and protection for the miserable remains of his army. Before the orders of the generals could be known, many of the soldiers had, according to the custom of the age, seized their prisoners, so that Athenian captives were dispersed through all the cities of Sicily. The Athenians, displeased with Nicias for surrendering at discretion, omitted his name in a public monument, on which were recorded the names of those commanders who had fallen in the battles of their country.

THE conquering army suspended the arms  
taken

taken from the vanquished, on the largest trees which adorned the banks of the river, as a trophy of their victory; then crowning themselves with garlands of flowers, and decking their horses with the richest caparisons, they returned to Syracuse in triumph, after having brought to a happy termination a war, which threatened not only their liberties, but their political existence.

ON the following day an assembly was held to deliberate on the fate of the prisoners. Diocles, a leader of great authority among the people, proposed, "That all the Athenians and the Sicilians who had joined their army, should be imprisoned, and fed with bread and water; that the slaves and allies should be publicly sold; and that the two generals should be scourged, and afterwards put to death."

THE injustice and severity of the last excited compassion, or rather horror, in every humane bosom. Hermocrates attempted to remonstrate, but notwithstanding his acknowledged and respected character for patriotism, as well as for justice and integrity, his voice was interrupted by the clamours of the multitude. At that instant a venerable old man, who had lost two sons in the war, the sole

**C H A P.** heirs to his name and estate, ordered his ser-  
**XX.** vants to carry him to the tribunal of harangues. When he appeared, a profound silence took place: "You behold in me," said the hoary-headed Nicolaus, "an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan the calamities of this war, by the death of two sons, who were the sole supports, and formed all the consolation of my old age! I cannot, indeed, cease to admire their courage and their felicity in losing, in defence of their country, a life, of which they must one day have been deprived by the course of nature; but then I cannot but strongly feel the cruel and incurable wound which their untimely death has made in the heart of a bereaved and forlorn father; nor forbear to detest the Athenians, as the authors of this unhappy war, and the murderers of my children. But, however sensible to private affliction and to domestic sorrow, I feel no less strongly for the honour of my country, and the character of my fellow-citizens, especially when I see them exposed to perpetual infamy, by the inhuman counsel which is now given you. The Athenians, indeed, merit every punishment that can be legally inflicted on them, for having so unjustly declared  
declared

clared war against us. But have not the gods, to whom vengeance belongs, punished them in an exemplary manner, and revenged our cause? When their generals laid down their arms, did they not surrender on condition of having their lives spared? And if we put them to death, how can we avoid the reproach and ignominy of having broken solemn engagements, violated the law of nations, and disgraced our valour by savage and sanguinary cruelty? What! will you suffer your glory to be sullied in the face of the whole world; and have it said, that a nation, who first dedicated a temple in their city to clemency, found none in yours? To enjoy prosperity with moderation, to exercise humanity towards a vanquished foe, and to imitate the gods in pity and in clemency, will reflect more lustre on the commonwealth than victories and triumphs. Have you forgotten that this Nicias, whose fate you are going to pronounce, was the person who pleaded your cause in the Athenian assembly, and employed all the influence of his authority, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade his country from engaging in this war? And will you pronounce sentence of death on this virtuous and unfortunate man, as a return for

C H A P. the zeal he expressed for your interest? With  
 XX. regard to myself, death would be less grievous  
 to me than such flagrant injustice and shocking  
 cruelty, committed by my countrymen and  
 fellow-citizens."

THE assembly was struck with admiration, as well as softened to compassion, by this magnanimous and pathetic speech; when the venerable and unfortunate father, instead of imprecating vengeance on the authors of the calamities that had befallen his house, preferred the honour of his country to his private resentment, and interceded for their pardon. But the party hostile to the Athenians, having represented in strong colours, the numberless miseries brought on their country by the Athenians; and the calamities in which they had involved Syracuse, where multitudes bewailed the death of their children and relations, whose manes could only be appeased by the blood of their murderers; the people resumed their sanguinary sentiments, followed the advice of Diocles, and condemned the two generals to death.

BESIDES the resentment of the Syracusans, the fears of the Corinthians, and above all, the suspicious jealousies of those traitors who had maintained a secret correspondence with  
 Nicias,

Nicias, and which they dreaded might come to light were he permitted to live, called loudly for the instant execution of the captive commanders.

THE prisoners, amounting to the number of seven thousand, were treated with the same degree of rigour. They were either doomed to a life of slavery in the mines and quarries of Sicily, or publicly sold to the highest bidder. The condition of the latter was infinitely preferable to that of the prisoners who were condemned to labour in the mines and quarries. As many of them were citizens who had concealed their condition, their talents, their probity, and the dignified melancholy of men who had seen better days, procured a kind reception and generous treatment from their masters, who soon restored most of them to their freedom.

BUT the Athenians, and such natives of Sicily as had joined their cause, were doomed to languish out life in the horrors of bondage and imprisonment. Yet even here a ray of humanity illuminated the gloom of barbarity; and many Athenian captives received from the taste of the Sicilians, a boon which their virtue would not have conferred. The name of Euripides was celebrated in Sicily; and  
the

CHAP. XX. the Syracufans had often been dissolved into tears, at the tender scenes of the most affecting and impaffioned of all the Grecian dramatic poets. The pleasure which they had derived from the pathetic and melting strains of his muse, induced the desire to hear them recited in the melodious accents of Athenian voices, modelled and corrected by the delicacy of Attic ears, and expreffed in the inimitable sweetness of the Ionic dialect, fo superior to the rudeness of their own. The melancholy fituation of the prisoners naturally turned their attention to the plaintive scenes of their pathetic poet. While the tragic tale rushed upon their minds, and they represented the fate of kingdoms and the fall of heroes, they felt the bitterness of their own fituation, and traced a faithful picture of their own sorrows. The Syracufans were transported and delighted; mutual taste and sensibility reconciled enemies, and endeared them to one another. The prisoners were received as inmates into the bosom of private families, were admitted to the honours of antient hoſpitality, and soon restored to their country, and the longing arms of their relations and friends. At their return to the Athenian capital, they walked in solemn procession to the house of Euripides, and

and hailed their deliverer from slavery and death, with strains of gratitude approaching to devotion \*. This civic crown for numbers, saved from destruction by the charms of his heaven-taught muse, was a more honourable testimony to the poet's merit, than the laurel wreath or the regal diadem. In this divine moment, Euripides must have enjoyed the highest triumph which the human heart can feel; for his superiority as a poet does not so much consist in intellectual as in moral excellence; in that tenderness and sensibility which is the finest expression of virtue, and in the dignity and purity of moral sentiment, which he studied in the school of Socrates; which shook the theatre of Athens with transient bursts of admiration, even when the people had degenerated from the virtue of their ancestors; and which established the unfading reputation of the author over the continent, and through the islands of Greece.

\* Plut. in Nic.



## S E C T I O N II.

*From the Conclusion of the EXPEDITION to  
SICILY, to the Establishment of the THIRTY  
TYRANTS.*

C H A P.  
XX.

**T**HE defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse, and the dreadful calamities which followed, when first reported at Athens, obtained no credit. The imaginations of the people had been so intoxicated with ideas of conquest, that they had never supposed the possibility of a reverse of fortune; and their minds were so totally unprepared, that the feeble accents of the wounded and meagre fugitives, who had just escaped from the scene of blood, could hardly convince them of the reality. But when the evidence could no longer be resisted, consternation and dismay universally prevailed; and the people, as if the war had not been decreed by themselves, vented their tury and resentment against the orators who had encouraged the expedition, and the diviners, whose blind predictions and fallacious oracles had flattered them with hopes of success

Never,

Never, since the commencement of the republic, had they been reduced to so deplorable a condition; without a revenue, without an army, and without a fleet; they seemed to stand on the brink of ruin, and trembled every moment lest the enemy, elated with such extraordinary success, should invade Athens both by sea and land, not only with the forces of Peloponnesus, but with the fleets of Sicily.

THESE tidings, so afflicting to the Athenians, were received with very different emotions in other parts of Greece. The states, who had not hitherto taken a side, but watched the course of events, now declared against them. Their own allies and tributaries prepared to assert their liberty. Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos, solicited the protection of the Lacedæmonians. These various commotions suggested great views to the Spartans, who thought that the time was now approaching, when they should rise on the ruins of Athens to supreme authority in Greece.

To strengthen this formidable confederacy, a new enemy remained more powerful than all the rest. Artaxerxes Longimanus, king of Persia, died in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, leaving the crown to Xerxes,  
his

CHAP. his only son by his queen. He had many  
 XX. children by his concubines; among whom  
 ————— were Sogdianus and Ochus. Xerxes, after  
 having reigned forty-five days, was assassinated  
 by Sogdianus, who usurped the throne.  
 Having become the horror of the nobility  
 and the empire by his cruelties, Ochus ad-  
 vanced against him at the head of a strong  
 army, and deprived him of his crown and life.  
 Ochus, succeeding to the sovereignty, assumed  
 the name of Darius, to which has been  
 added the surname of Nothus, or the Bastard.  
 The reign of this prince was disturbed by  
 conspiracies and commotions. In the ninth  
 year after his accession to the throne, Egypt  
 revolted, and Amyrtæus being proclaimed king,  
 reigned six years. The defection of Lydia  
 happened at the same time. The governor  
 having collected a considerable body of Gre-  
 cian troops, threw off his allegiance to the  
 Persian empire, and attempted to establish his  
 own authority over the rich provinces of  
 Asia Minor. Darius sent Tissaphernes against  
 him, who being a man of address and in-  
 trigue, by means of presents and promises,  
 brought over the army to his side. Deserted  
 by his troops, the governor surrendered  
 to Tissaphernes, who flattered him with

hopes of pardon ; but Darius put him to death.

AFTER this rebellion was quelled, Tiffaphernes was appointed to govern the southern, and Pharnabafus the northern diftricts of Lower Afia ; and the abilities of thefe generals extended the Perfian arms towards the fhores of the Egean, as well as of the Helleftpont. Thefe governors, provoked at the Athenians, becaufe they prevented them from levying the ufual contributions and taxes in their refpective provinces, promifed to furnifh the Lacedæmonians with all the neceffary expences of the war, in order to incite them to march againft the Athenians with greater alacrity and expedition.

NOTWITHSTANDING this formidable combination, the Athenians refumed their antient fpirit, and acted with wifdom as well as magnanimity. They introduced œconomy into their finances, and retrenched every unneceffary expence. They took the thoufand talents out of the treasury which had been deposited there at the commencement of the war, and referved for a cafe of exigency like the prefent. They filenced the harangues of the turbulent demagogues, and appointed a council of old and experienced  
men

CHAP. men to examine and prepare all public af-  
XX. fairs before they should be propofed to the  
popular affembly. New levies were raifed ;  
the fleet, repaired and augmented, was put  
to fea, in order to watch the motions, and  
prevent the defertion of the allies. • A train  
of favourable circumftances co-operated with  
thefe wife and vigorous meafures, to prolong  
the deftiny of Athens. The proceedings of  
the Spartan confederacy, which had been al-  
ways tardy, were now feeble and dilatory to  
an extreme. The Perfian governors were  
guided entirely by intereft, and their conduct  
was equivocal, capricious, and indecifive.  
Above all, the enterprifing genius of Alci-  
biades, full of refources, of energy, and in-  
trigue, contributed to retard the fall of the  
republic. This ftatesman, to whom change  
of political parties appeared no contradiction  
of character, and who was refolved to ruin or  
to rule his country, now exerted in its defence  
that fpirit and ability, which he had formerly  
employed for its deftruction.

THIS eccentric character had prevailed on  
the Spartans and Peloponnefians to comply  
with the request of Tiffaphernes, and to fur-  
nifh the Perfian with gallies and foldiers,  
which he victualled and paid at his own ex-  
pence.

pence. By his influence and address he had also induced several of the Ionic cities to declare for the Lacedæmonians. But his power and authority in Sparta were too great to be permanent. The magistrates and generals of Sparta, envying the fame and fortune of an exile whom they had protected, could not bear that the success of every enterprize should be imputed to Alcibiades. Agis, the king, had better reason for his resentment. The intrigue of Alcibiades with Rimea, the spouse of that monarch, was divulged by female vanity and folly. Vain of conquering and, as she imagined, fixing the heart of a character so celebrated, she privately gave the name of Alcibiades to her son Leotychides. The intemperate tongues of her female companions soon revealed the secret to the world; and Alcibiades mortified her vanity, by publicly avowing, that he paid his addresses to her, not as a woman, but as a queen, that his progeny might reign in Sparta. The cause of an injured and affronted husband was embraced by all his countrymen; and secret orders, under the sanction of the Spartan senate, were sent to the commander of the Peloponnesian army, to assassinate Alcibiades, for the commission of crimes which were pu-

CHAP. nished with death in every Grecian common-  
 XX. wealth. Alcibiades, who had faithful intel-  
 ———— ligence conveyed to him of this design against  
 his life, avoided the snares that were laid for  
 him ; but, for his more perfect security, com-  
 mitted himself to the protection of Tissapher-  
 nes, the Persian governor of Sardis. The  
 pleasing manners, the insinuating address, the  
 accommodating temper, the versatile humour,  
 joined to the great talents for business, pos-  
 sessed by this illustrious adventurer, soon gain-  
 ed the attachment as well as admiration of  
 Tissaphernes, who had studied in the same  
 school of hypocrisy, deceit, and affectation.  
 So much did he become enamoured of this  
 Athenian, notwithstanding his avowed hatred  
 to the Greeks, that he gave the name of Al-  
 cibiades to the most beautiful of his gardens,  
 the favourite scene of his pleasures, adorned  
 with all the embellishments of Asiatic taste,  
 the coolness of fountains, the verdure and fra-  
 grance of groves, and the refreshment of ro-  
 mantic retreats and solitudes. To secure his  
 protection, Alcibiades studied to flatter and  
 to gratify his avarice, the ruling passion of his  
 nature. Tissaphernes allowed the Peloponne-  
 sian sailors a drachma, or seven pence of dai-  
 ly pay. Alcibiades exclaimed against this im-  
 politic

politic profusion, and informed him that the pay given by the Athenians never amounted to more than three oboli, as experience had taught them that more would produce idleness and profligacy. If the sailors should murmur at the reduction, a bribe to the commanders, and a few venal orators accustomed to govern the multitude, he assured him, would soon hush every complaint\*.

THIS advice was too congenial to the mind of Tissaphernes not to be adopted; and so well acquainted was this Grecian with his countrymen, that Hermocrates, the Syracusan, alone refused the bribe, or to second the views of the Persian satrap.

THE seeds of jealousy and distrust were now sown in the Peloponnesian fleet; nor was it difficult for Alcibiades to detach Tissaphernes from the Spartan alliance.

HE represented to him, "That if the Persians proposed to recover their antient possessions in Asia minor, they should be cautious of giving a decided ascendancy to the Spartans. That by holding the balance even between the contending republics, by secretly exciting troubles and divisions among them,

\* Thucyd. p. 584.



CHAP. and sending pecuniary remittances, sometimes  
XX. to Athens, and sometimes to Sparta, they  
would mutually exhaust each other's strength;  
and ultimately fall an easier prey to the Per-  
sian ambition."

TISSAPHERNES adopted this plan, to the great joy of Alcibiades, who, as he was proscribed by the Spartans, saw no hopes of safety but from his native country. The Athenians, informed of his influence at the court of Tissaphernes, bitterly repented their having passed sentence of condemnation upon him; for, though they had lately reduced the revolted islands to obedience, yet they dreaded Tissaphernes, who was soon to be reinforced with a hundred and fifty vessels from Phœnicia. Alcibiades, who had intelligence of all that passed among the Athenians, applied secretly to Pisander, Theramenes, and other leading men in the camp at Samos, where, at this time, they had collected all their forces. To them he lamented the desperate situation of public affairs, expatiated on his own influence with the Persian governor, and expressed his willingness to comply with the wishes of his country in returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic was taken from the capricious and furious multitude,

multitude, and entrusted to the hands of the powerful and the noble. He insinuated, that it might be yet possible to prevent the Phœnician fleet from joining the Spartan; and at last promised to the Athenians, not only the favour of Tissaphernes, but of the Persian monarch himself, provided they would abolish their tumultuous democracy, so odious to kings, and commit the administration of government to the nobility, and to men worthy to negotiate with a sovereign.

THESE views were the more acceptable to Pisander and Theramenes, as they had adopted them before hand, and formed parties both in the camp and the city for carrying them into execution. Accordingly they, and the other leaders of the aristocratical party, warmly approved the measures of Alcibiades. The army, too, admired the valour of this illustrious exile, and longed to see him restored to the service, and fighting the battles of his country. The dangerous situation of Athens was lamented by all; many rejoiced in the prospect of an alliance with the Persians; and the recall of Alcibiades was desired by general consent.

PHRYNICHUS, the personal enemy of Alcibiades, alone opposed his return; but

CHAPTER. the measures of Pisander and his associates  
 XX. were carried into execution. An extraordinary assembly, summoned in the theatre of Bacchus, passed a decree, investing ten persons with full powers to treat with the Persian governor.

MEANWHILE, Tissaphernes concluded a new treaty with the Spartans, in which it was stipulated, that king Darius should provide for all the expences of the Peloponnesian fleet till the arrival of the Persian; and that the confederated forces should exert all their efforts to recover to the Great King the dominions of his ancestors, so long usurped by the Athenians. It was farther agreed, that they should unite their forces, and continue hostilities, or make peace, by common consent. As a step to the fulfilment of the treaty, Tissaphernes sent for the fleet of Phœnicia.

THE course of this negotiation is sufficient to prove that the deceitful Persian, however he might relish the counsel of Alcibiades to weaken both parties, never entertained a serious thought of the Athenian alliance; accordingly he shewed the utmost unwillingness to enter into any conference with the ambassadors of Athens; and it was not till after  
 he

he had long employed the humblest intreaties, and all the arts of insinuation, that Alcibiades at last obtained an audience for his fellow-citizens. At that audience, among other proposals, he demanded that Ionia and the neighbouring islands should be surrendered to the Persian king. These conditions, however ignominious, being complied with, he required permission for the Persian fleets to sail unmolested in the Grecian seas. On hearing this demand, which was equivalent to expressing a desire that Athens should become a province of Persia, the ambassadors broke up the conference with indignation, and saw that Alcibiades had deceived himself, as well as them, with regard to his influence over the Persian satrap.

THE leaders of the aristocratical party, however disappointed, were happy to get rid of a man, whose indefatigable ambition and intolerable vanity rendered him a dangerous and disagreeable associate in public affairs. They neglected not, however, to introduce the revolution into the Athenian government, which they had for some time premeditated. They gained over Phrynichus, who had opposed them only from personal animosity to Alcibiades. The most licentious and turbulent

CHAP. lent of the demagogues were assassinated ;  
XX. and the Athenians, intimidated by the numbers and authority of the conspirators, yielded without resistance. A faction acting with union and energy, whose leaders were Pisander, Theramenes, Phrynichus, and Antiphon, subverted the Athenian commonwealth, which had subsisted with splendor and celebrity for near a hundred years, and erected an aristocracy, invested with absolute power, on the ruins of the antient constitution. Five persons (nominated before hand) obtained the sanction of the people to chuse a hundred others, each of whom should nominate three associates ; and the four hundred, thus chosen, were appointed to administer the affairs of the republic without limitation or controul. To amuse the people with a phantom of liberty, it was decreed, that the four hundred should occasionally call a council of five thousand citizens, to assist them in their deliberations, when they judged it expedient. Accordingly, the assemblies of the people were held as usual ; and the antient forms of the constitution were preserved, though its spirit was lost.

THESE new rulers soon discovered their tyrannical and sanguinary disposition. They entered the senate armed with daggers, and surrounded

rounded with guards, and, after paying the members their salaries, deprived them of their office. They banished, proscribed, and put to death all who opposed them, and confiscated their estates. The reports of their cruelty and tyranny were carried to the camp at Samos, and excited the indignation of the army and the fleet, who, roused by the sufferings of their fellow-citizens, determined to strike a decisive blow for freedom and their country. Encouraged by Thrasyllus and Thrasymbulus, they attacked by surprize the supporters of the new administration, punished thirty of the most criminal with death, banished others, and bound the soldiers by an oath to maintain the antient government, against public enemies or domestic faction. By the advice of Thrasymbulus, who headed this revolution, Alcibiades was recalled. Immediately on his arrival, he was appointed general of the Athenian forces: leaving the care of his troops to Thrasymbulus and Thrasyllus, his colleagues in command, he proceeded to Miletus, to exhibit himself in his new dignity to Tissaphernes, and to convince the satrap that the power of his countrymen was still formidable. As he had formerly kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed  
Tissaphernes

CHAP. Tiffaphernes by the Athenians. Returning  
 XX. to Samos, he found ambassadors from the four hundred, who had been attempting to vindicate the revolution at Athens, and the subsequent conduct of the new government. Their attempts to justify the enormities and injustice of the four hundred, served only to exasperate the resentment of the army, who, with one voice, demanded that they might be led instantly against Athens to punish the tyrants. Alcibiades, acting with consummate wisdom on this occasion, refused to comply with this rash request, and, by his firmness and fortitude, preserved the city of Athens. For, had they sailed thither immediately, the Peloponnesian fleet would have invaded and subdued Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands; while the Athenians, by kindling a civil war in their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. But Alcibiades ordered the ambassadors to deliver to the tyrants this short and emphatic message, "That, unless they divested themselves of their illegal power, and restored the antient form of government, he would sail to Athens, and at once put an end to their lives and their authority."

THE return of the ambassadors without  
 I success,

success, and the answer of Alcibiades, added to the troubles of Athens, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the four hundred. The tumult and disorder increased to an extreme, when intelligence was brought, that the Peloponnesian squadron, commanded by Hegesandridas, the Spartan, had defeated the fleet sent out by the four hundred to oppose them, and made themselves masters of the island Eubœa.

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NEITHER the invasion of Xerxes, nor the defeat at Sicily, occasioned such terror and consternation as this alarming calamity. Since the fortification of Decelia, and the consequent desolation of the Attic territory, the Athenians had derived their chief supplies from Eubœa ; they dreaded the revolt of the islanders ; they had no more ships to launch ; and their treasury was exhausted ; the city, torn by internal commotions, was divided against the camp. If, in this moment of disorder and distraction, the conquering fleet had profited by their victory, and attacked the Athenian harbour, the army at Samos must have failed to the defence of their country ; Ionia and the Hellespont would have been abandoned to the Peloponnesians ; and the republic retained only the city of  
Athens



CHAP. Athens of all its extensive dominions. But  
 XX. the great and decisive strokes of war were  
 unknown to the enemy. The tardy mea-  
 sures and heavy movement of the Lacedæ-  
 monians, frequently checked the career of  
 their success, and lost the advantages which  
 fortune put into their hands.

THE four hundred tyrants were now de-  
 posed, to whom the people ascribed all the  
 calamities which they suffered. Alcibiades  
 was recalled, and the conduct of the ar-  
 my at Samos obtained the sanction of pub-  
 lic approbation. The democracy was re-  
 stored; the government was brought back to  
 its original principles, as established by So-  
 lon; and the Athenians resolved, with more  
 ardour than ever, to defend, to the last extre-  
 mity, their antient constitution.

ALCIBIADES, though recalled by the un-  
 animous voice of the assembly, did not im-  
 mediately return; but resolved, by perform-  
 ing some heroic achievement, to render his  
 arrival not only joyful, but triumphant. For  
 this purpose, leaving Samos with a small num-  
 ber of vessels, he cruised about the islands of  
 Cos and Cnidos, and, receiving information  
 that an Athenian fleet was on the point of  
 engaging the united squadrons of Rhodes and  
 Peloponnesus,

Peloponnesus, near Abydos, he hastened to the assistance of the former. The battle had lasted the whole day, and was still undecided, when the arrival of Alcibiades, with eighteen gallies, gave victory to the Athenians. Having taken thirty of the enemies gallies, and retaken fifteen of their own, which they had lost in a former engagement, they erected a trophy. It was next resolved to attack the enemies fleet at Cyzicus; for this purpose a detachment of eighty gallies sailed to the small island of Proconnesus, about ten miles distant from the station of the Peloponnesian fleet. A thunder-storm, followed by rain and a thick gloom, concealed their approach; and, favoured by the darkness, Alcibiades surprized sixty vessels, which had been separated from the Peloponnesian fleet. When the gloom dispersed, the rest of the fleet failed to their assistance, but were totally defeated by the Athenians, who took every vessel, except the Syracusan gallies, which were set on fire by Hermocrates in the face of a victorious enemy.

THE news of this victory elevated the Athenians as much as it depressed the Spartans. For several years the operations of the Athenians had been crowned with success, but

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but the twenty-fourth year of the war was peculiarly fortunate. The Carthaginians invaded Sicily, and prevented any effectual aid from being sent to the Peloponnesian allies from that quarter. The revolt of the Medes withheld the Persian reinforcements, which were necessary to recruit the army of Pharnabafus. The Athenians, having repeatedly defeated both the confederated Greeks and the Persians, returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, in which Alcibiades displayed the extraordinary resources of his genius. By sudden assaults or gradual approaches, by force or by stratagem, in a few months he became master of Chalcedon, Selembria, and at last of Byzantium. His fleet was no less successful than his army, and he restored to the Athenians the empire of the sea. It was computed by his friends, that Alcibiades, since he was invested with the chief command, had taken or destroyed two hundred Syracusan or Peloponnesian gallies.

AFTER so many achievements and victories, Alcibiades eagerly desired to re-visit his native country, and to enjoy the honours he had merited by his success. He set sail for the Piræus; and, on the joyful day of his arrival, the people crowded to meet him, and

to

to behold the deliverer of Athens. His fleet was adorned with the arms and spoils he had taken from the enemy. The ships which he had captured attended the triumph; and he displayed, as trophies of success, the ensigns and ornaments of those he had sunk or destroyed. He landed amidst the universal shouts and acclamations of the spectators, who, inattentive to the naval pomp, fixed their eyes on Alcibiades alone. They gazed on him with admiration as a tutelar divinity, who had brought victory in his train; reflecting on the deplorable situation of the commonwealth, when he undertook its defence, and the many illustrious achievements he had since performed, by which he had rendered her victorious both by sea and land.

As Alcibiades had been charged with a crime, and condemned in absence, it was requisite that he should be absolved in due form. Accordingly an extraordinary assembly was summoned by the magistrates, that he might explain and vindicate his conduct. He found little difficulty in making his defence before judges so strongly prepossessed in his favour. Having deplored his past misfortunes, he imputed them entirely to his evil destiny, and not to the people. He concluded  
by

CHAP. by exhorting them to pursue the war, and to  
 XX. hope every thing from its success. Charmed  
 with his eloquence, his candor, and magnanimity, the assembly decreed him a crown of gold, restored his estate, and appointed him commander in chief by sea and land. So excessive were the grateful transports of the people, that they would have offered him the sovereignty, if they had not been prevented by himself and his friends. The utmost exertions were made both in the army and the navy, a hundred galleys were fitted out, and transports prepared to carry a large body of infantry and cavalry.

WHEN these preparations were finished, he deferred his departure for some time, to celebrate the Eleusinian mysteries. Nothing in the history of heathen religion is more memorable or illustrious than the festival of Ceres Eleusina. The origin of the institution is referred to the goddess herself, who, coming to Eleusis in the reign of Erechtheus, and finding the country afflicted with famine, taught the inhabitants the culture of corn, and instructed them in the principles of justice and humanity.

THESE mysteries were divided into the greater and the lesser. Those who desired to be

be initiated into the greater mysteries, were prepared and purified by watching, temperance, sacrifices, lustrations, and prayer; and, previous to the revelation of the mysterious secrets, the most profound silence was enjoined them. When the time for their initiation arrived, they were brought into the temple; and, to inspire the greater reverence, the ceremony was performed in the night. Wonderful things passed upon this occasion; visions were seen, and voices heard of an extraordinary nature. A sudden splendor illuminated the darkness of the place, and immediately disappearing, added new horrors to the gloom. Apparitions, claps of thunder, shaking of the earth, heightened the terror and amazement, while the trembling candidate heard the mysterious volumes read to him by the hierophant. These striking ceremonies were contrived to teach, with greater efficacy, the most important principles of religion and virtue, and to express, by external emblems, the immortality of the human soul, and the rewards appointed for the virtuous in a future state of existence. "The knowledge of these mysteries," says Isocrates\*, "dispels the ter-

\* Panegy. p. 24.

C H A P. rors of death, by inspiring the initiated with  
 XX. the pleasing hopes of an eternity of happiness.”

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BESIDES the secret and awful ceremonies, the worship of Ceres was celebrated by public shows and exhibitions, and, above all, by the solemn and magnificent procession which proceeded along the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis. The Athenians, for some time past, had been obliged to conduct this procession by sea, as the Lacedæmonians were in possession of the road to the temple. Alcibiades, who had resolved to celebrate this festival in its antient lustre and solemnity, ordered the procession to go by land in the usual manner, under the convoy of an armed force. Having posted sentinels upon the hills, he placed the venerable ministers of the goddess, and the initiated, under the protection of his army. No enemy appeared to disturb the solemnity and pomp of the procession, which Alcibiades conducted to Eleusis, and back to Athens, without interruption from the enemy. No spectacle, says Plutarch, was ever more august or more worthy the majesty of the gods, than this mingled pomp of war and of religion; and even the enemies of Alcibiades were obliged to acknowledge, that

that he was no less qualified to discharge the functions of a high-priest than those of a general. The principal design of Alcibiades, in this public ostentation of his piety, was to efface from the minds of the people the suspicions of irreligion, to which the mutilation of statues and the profanation of mysteries had formerly given rise.

AFTER this effusion of religious zeal, so meritorious in the eyes of the people, and particularly acceptable to the army, Alcibiades prepared for his military expedition; and his countrymen expected every thing from his abilities.

ALARMED at the late victories of the Athenians, and apprehensive of their future success, the Spartans now thought it necessary to oppose one of their best generals to Alcibiades, and appointed Lysander, chief commander of the fleet. This general, though of noble birth, and a descendant of Hercules, was educated with all the rigour and severity of Spartan discipline. He had spent his life in arms, or in embassies to foreign states. To unabated valour he added the fruits of his experience, and knew well how to gain by policy what could not be obtained by open violence; how to join, according to his own

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expression,



C H A P. XX. expression, the cunning of the fox to the courage of the lion. Ambition was his ruling passion, to which he could sacrifice every principle, and resign every pleasure.

SINCE the remarkable defeat at Cyzicus, the Peloponnesian states had been employed in building ships and preparing a fleet. The whole armament, amounting to ninety sail, was now collected by Lyfander at Ephesus. While he was making preparations for his expedition, he was informed that Cyrus, the youngest son of the Persian monarch, was appointed governor of Sardis. As he had no permanent fund for the payment of his forces, he repaired to the Lydian capital without delay, to congratulate the arrival of the young prince. Having insinuated himself into the favour of Cyrus, he complained of the perfidious partiality of Tissaphernes to the Athenians, whose power had formerly been, and might still be, destructive to the interests of Persia. Pharnabazus, he added, had more effectually served the cause of his master; but that neither the one nor the other had furnished the stipulated pay to the Grecian seamen and soldiers, without which desertion would take place, and no vigorous measures could be pursued. Cyrus answered,

“ That

“ That he had orders from the king, his father, to assist the Lacedæmonians; that for this purpose he had brought with him five hundred talents\*; and, should that sum be found inadequate, he would coin into money the golden throne on which he sat.”

LYSANDER endeavoured to profit by the favourable dispositions of the Persian court, and requested that the pay of the seamen might be raised from three oboli to a drachma a day. The young prince replied, that on this subject too he must be guided by the instruction of his father, “ That the pay must continue on the original footing, and the allied fleet receive thirty minæ† a month for every ship.” Lysander seemed to acquiesce, but did not abandon his project.

SOON after, at a magnificent entertainment given by Cyrus, the artful Spartan, by his address and flattery, insinuated himself so far into the good graces of the young prince, that he desired him to prefer a request, with full assurance it should be granted. Lysander replied, “ That he had nothing to desire but the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the

\* Near a hundred thousand pounds.

† Above ninety pounds.

CHAP. mariners." The apparent magnanimity and  
XX. disinterestedness of this request charmed the  
youthful mind of Cyrus, and the Spartan received ten thousand darics \*. Returning with this sum to Ephesus, he paid off the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, augmented their daily allowance, and thinned the Athenian galleys by tempting the mariners to desert.

THOUGH Lyfander had considerably enfeebled the naval power of the enemy, and strengthened his own by the augmentation of the mariner's pay, yet he ventured not to hazard a battle; being apprehensive of Alcibiades, who had the superiority in number of ships, whose reputation was equally high for valour and military skill, and who had never been defeated in any engagement by sea or land. But the Athenian general was soon obliged to sail to the Ionian coast, in order to raise contributions to pay his troops, and committed the charge of the fleet to Antiochus; a favourite so unworthy of such a trust, that even Alcibiades gave him positive orders not to hazard a battle. But such was the insolence and folly of the new commander, that he

\* Above five thousand pounds.

entered the port of Ephesus with two gallies, and, having challenged Lysander to an engagement, retired with loud laughter and derision. The Spartan knew how to restrain his resentment; but, when he observed the enemy thrown into disorder, he ordered the Peloponnesian squadrons to advance. The battle was soon decided; the Athenian insolence was not supported by their valour; and, having lost fifteen gallies, retired in disgrace to Samos. Alcibiades soon returned; but Lysander, though favoured by fortune, still declined an engagement with that commander, who entered the port of Ephesus to offer him battle, and employed threats and insults, to procure an opportunity of retrieving the honours of the Athenian fleet.

IN the mean while, another revolution, with regard to him, had taken place in the minds of the Athenian people. Expecting nothing but conquests, such an ignominious defeat filled them with disappointment and rage. They had such confidence in the abilities of Alcibiades, that they began to suspect his integrity; and, as they believed nothing impossible for him to achieve, they imputed the disasters which happened in his absence to design. These suspicions, though groundless,

CHAP. were confirmed by Thraſybulus, who, jealous  
 XX. of the fame and honours that had been be-  
 stowed on a rival, accused him before the as-  
 sembly of the people. He charged him with  
 the ruin of his country, by introducing licen-  
 tiousness into the navy; with having selected  
 his friends from the most notorious libertines  
 and debauchees, and entrusting the command  
 of the fleet to such unworthy hands; while  
 he spent that time, which should have been  
 dedicated to the service of his country, in the  
 arms of Ionian courtezans, or in raising con-  
 tributions on the provinces to defray the ex-  
 pence of his castle on the Thracian coast,  
 his meditated asylum against the vengeance of  
 the state which he had betrayed.

NOTHING can more strongly illustrate the  
 levity, inconstancy, and capriciousness of the  
 Athenian democracy, than their treatment of  
 Alcibiades. The man on whom they had so  
 lately poured accumulated honours, whom they  
 had almost worshipped as a tutelar Divinity,  
 was now, in one day, accused, tried, and con-  
 demned unheard. Ten generals were chosen  
 in his stead; among whom Thraſyllus, Leon,  
 Diomedon, and Conon were entitled to the  
 honours of the commonwealth, and the con-  
 fidence of their country. Alcibiades retired  
 for

for refuge to one of his castles in the Thracian  
Chersonesus. C H A P.  
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THE new generals had scarcely arrived at Samos, when Lyfander's year of command expired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of the ancient mold, was appointed his successor. The ambitious and political Lyfander had employed his annual period of command to lay the foundation of systematic influence and permanent authority. To attach the soldiers and sailors to his service, he indulged them in licentious pleasures; he encouraged the most daring, with liberal rewards and magnificent promises; and from this faction, which was entirely devoted to his interest, he raised his favourites to the first employments and highest honours in the army. He had partizans in all the islands and cities dependent on Sparta. He established aristocracy, or rather the government of his own creatures, in all the towns he had taken. He bestowed his confidence on those who were void of fear and of shame, committed authority to their hands, and, by the influence of Persian gold, rendered them entirely devoted to his interest.

WHEN Callicratidas laid his commission before the council, the partizans of Lyfander raised

CHAP. raised an universal clamour, and declared  
XX. against yielding, on such a critical emergency,  

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a scrupulous obedience to the laws of Lycurgus. But when Callicratidas addressed the assembly, with the manly simplicity and unaffected dignity of a virtuous mind, they listened with respect and admiration, the faction of Lysander was ashamed, and all acknowledged that it was necessary to obey the orders of the Spartan government.

LYSANDER, though not without the strongest symptoms of jealousy and resentment, resigned his command, but resolved to render it more humiliating than honourable to his successor. He returned to the court of Cyrus, and restored the unexpended remains of the ten thousand darics, which that prince had given him for the augmentation of the mariner's pay; at the same time he represented Callicratidas as an ignorant, obstinate, unpolished Spartan, unworthy the conversation or confidence of a prince. On his return, he told Callicratidas, that to provide subsistence for his army, he must apply to the Great King. Compelled by necessity and duty, this high-minded Spartan at last repaired to Sardis. He was refused admission to the royal presence; making a second attempt,

tempt, he was treated with derision and scorn by the vain and insolent minions of a court. He then left Sardis with disdain, execrating the haughtiness and treachery of the Persians; lamenting the internal dissensions of the Greeks, which compelled them to solicit the assistance of such insolent allies; and vowing, if ever he returned to Sparta, to exert his utmost efforts to reconcile the Grecian states to one another.

As he had not obtained the object of his expedition, he proceeded to Miletus and other towns of Ionia; and, after unfolding the jealousy of Lyfander, and the arrogance of Cyrus, solicited contributions to carry on a war which was undertaken on their behalf. By this fair and honourable conduct he obtained considerable sums, which enabled him to return with credit to Ephesus, and, by satisfying the demands of the seamen and soldiers, to raise their spirits for the day of battle.

IN the twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, Callicratidas, having gained some advantages over the Athenians, at Lesbos, pursued Conon, the most illustrious of the ten generals, into the port of Mitylené, where he kept him blocked up.

CONON



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XX.

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CONON found means to apprise Athens of his extreme danger. Extraordinary efforts were made for his relief; and in less than a month a fleet of a hundred and ten sail was fitted out, containing all the Athenians, slaves as well as free, that were capable of bearing arms. Reinforced at Samos by the allied states, they now amounted to a hundred and fifty sail; and, steering for the islands of Arginusæ, situated near the promontory of Lesbos, they prepared to engage the enemy.

NOR was Callicratidas averse to the engagement. Having left Eteonicus at Mitylené, to continue the blockade with fifty galleys, he set sail with a hundred and twenty to the southern point of Lesbos, within four miles of the Athenian fleet. The counsellors of Callicratidas dissuaded him from hazarding a battle against such superior strength and numbers. He replied, "To fly would cover me with perpetual shame. My death is of little importance to the republic; Sparta does not depend on one man." He then gave the signal for engaging. The victory was long disputed with undaunted and persevering bravery. Callicratidas distinguished himself in the fight. At length, being opposed by the galley of Pericles, son of the celebrated statesman

lateſman and orator, his ſhip was held faſt by a grappling iron, and he was inſtantly ſurrounded by ſeveral Athenian veſſels. In this ſituation the brave Spartan fell, overpowered by numbers. The right wing, which he commanded, was put to flight. The left, composed of Bœotians and Eubœans, made a long and vigorous reſiſtance, from fear of falling into the hands of the Athenians, from whoſe authority they had revolted; at laſt they were obliged to give way, and fled in diſorder. The Athenians having gained a complete victory, erected a trophy in the iſlands Arginauſæ. They loſt twenty-five galleys in this engagement, and the enemy more than ſeventy, in the number of which were nine of the ten furniſhed by the Lacedæmonians.

AFTER the battle, the Athenian generals gave orders to Theramenes and Thraſybulus to collect the dead bodies, that they might be interred with the accuſtomed ceremonies. Fifty veſſels were appointed to diſcharge this religious and humane office. The reſt of the fleet failed in queſt of the Peloponneſians on the coaſt of Leſbos, who were ſaved by a ſtratagem of Eteonicus. Soon after the battle, a veſſel arrived at Mitylené, announcing the defeat of the Peloponneſian fleet. Eteonicus,

CHAP. nicus, who anticipated the consequences o  
 XX. that event, ordered the vessel secretly to leave  
 the harbour, and to return in a short time, the rowers crowned with wreaths of flowers, and calling out, with shouts and acclamations, that Callicratidas was victorious, and had destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. The contrivance was successful; hymns were sung, and sacrifices offered to the gods. Eteonicus took advantage of a favourable gale to send his galleys to the Isle of Chios; and, after having burned the camp, marched his land army to Methymna, which was threatened with an attack from the enemy\*.

Theramenes and Thrasylulus, who were ordered to convey home the bodies of the dead, that they might be honoured with the rites of sepulture, were prevented by a violent tempest from the execution of these orders. When the Athenians heard that the last sacred duties, on which they believed the happiness of departed spirits in a future life to depend, had not been paid to their brave and victorious countrymen who had fallen in battle, they were affected with horror, as well as the deepest sorrow, and considered the ne-

\* Xenoph. Hellen. 446. Diodor. p. 334, &c.

glect, although unavoidable, as a capital offence. The Athenians had other reasons for being offended at the ten generals; they were disappointed of the advantages which they expected from the engagement. Immediately after the battle, the commanders had sent a vessel to Athens, acquainting the magistrates that they had taken seventy gallees from the enemy, and meditated expeditions against Mitylené, Methymna, and Chios; but Methymna was too strongly fortified to be taken by assault; and when they failed to Chios, in quest of the Peloponnesian fleet, they found it carefully secured in the principal harbour of the island.

THE RAMENES returning to Athens during this popular fury, accused the other admirals of having neglected the favourable moment to save those who were perishing, or to recover the bodies of their dead countrymen. The Athenians, who listened with eagerness to this invidious calumny, dismissed the commanders in their absence, and unheard, and appointed Conon to the command of the fleet. Two of the generals, Prolomachus and Ariftogenes, went into voluntary exile; the rest returned home to justify their conduct. The cause having been brought before the senate, it

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CHAP. was there resolved, that it should be referred  
XX. to the decision of the people, and that the suffrages of each tribe should be given separately. This iniquitous decree, approved of by a majority of the senate, and received with all the clamorous applause of democratical frenzy by the people, left no room for a legal defence, or impartial hearing. From that moment the admirals had only to prepare for death. In vain did the Prytanes, who officially attended to regulate the proceedings of the assembly, endeavour to calm the minds of the people. Callixenes, the chief accuser, threatened them, if they did not desist, with the fate that awaited the accused. The voice of reason was silenced by the fury of the people, and a shameful compliance with injustice disgraced the firmness and integrity of the Athenian judges. Socrates remained a single and sublime exception. In opposition to the unanimous voice of the assembly, he sustained the dignity of a philosopher and a judge; and persisted, with a heroic boldness, in opposing a decree so contrary to every principle of justice, and subversive of all laws.

BUT his solitary opposition could not save the admirals. They were condemned and executed. The speech of Diomedon, before

his death; deserves to be recorded. I wish, Athenians, that the sentence you have passed may not prove a calamity to my country. I have one favour to ask of you, in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is, to acquit us, before the gods, of the vows we made to them for you and for ourselves, as we are not now in a condition to discharge them; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, that we acknowledge we are indebted for the beneficial and glorious victory which we gained over the enemy." The patriotism and the piety of this discourse dissolved every good citizen into tears; but the people, inflamed by the accusers, remained obstinate and unrelenting, and the commanders were put to death. This temporary madness, not uncommon to an Athenian assembly, was followed by the deepest remorse. They could make no compensation to the innocent, but they took vengeance on the guilty, and inflicted on Callixenus the punishment due to his crimes.

THE Peloponnesian confederacy having met with such a severe blow at Arginusæ, the allies, supported by the authority of Cyrus, sent ambassadors to Sparta, soliciting that the command of the fleet should again be confer-

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red on Lyſander. Although it was contrary to the Spartan inſtitutions, that the ſame perſon ſhould be twice appointed admiral of the ſame fleet, the Lacedæmonians gratified the allies, and at the ſame time, in appearance, complied with the laws, by giving the title of Admiral to Aracus, and appointing Lyſander ſecond in command, though, in fact, inveſted with ſupreme authority. This appointment gave great joy to the factious devoted to his intereſts in the different cities, who foreſaw their own elevation on the fall of democratic power. Cyrus, who was preparing for a journey to Upper Aſia, ſent for Lyſander to Sardis previous to his departure, and received him with the warmeſt demonſtrations of friendſhip. He ſupplied him with conſiderable ſums to ſatiſfy the preſent demands of his fleet; and during his abſence conſigned to him the revenues of the opulent cities in his government. With the reaſonable aid of theſe copious reſources, Lyſander augmented his fleet with Ionian and Carian ſeamen, and carried on his naval preparations with ſuch vigour and ſucceſs, that in a few months he ſailed to the Hellespont with a hundred and fifty gallies. He laid ſiege to Lampſacus,  
which

which he took by storm, and abandoned to the rapacity and licentiousness of the merciless soldiers.

DURING these operations of the enterprising Spartan, the affairs of Athens suffered from the incapacity and folly of Philocles, Adimantus, Tydeus, Menander, and Cephisodorus, the five generals who were joined as colleagues to Conon. On hearing that Lysander had taken Lampfacus, they advanced with a hundred and eighty ships, and anchored on the opposite side of the Hellespont, at the distance of near two miles from the enemy. The station which they chose was the mouth of the Ægos Potamos, or river of the Goat, so called from a cluster of small islands which rise above its surface, bearing a resemblance to that animal. They anchored in this inconvenient place, in order to provoke the enemy to an engagement, as the two fleets were in sight of each other,

ALCIBIADES, though a banished man, could not divest himself of anxiety for the success of Athens; he therefore visited the Athenian fleet, and represented to the commanders the danger of their situation on an insecure and inhospitable coast, without either harbours or cities to which they might retire in case of necessity.



CHAP. necessity. At the same time he offered to  
XX. co-operate with them, and to attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian forces. The commanders, who were still jealous of this favourite of the people, refused to accept of his services, and reproached him for presuming, while an exile, to give counsel to the admirals of Athens.

As the Peloponnesian fleet was inferior in numbers to the Athenian, Lysander employed stratagem to accomplish his designs. He drew up his land-army, in order of battle, upon the coast by break of day, and ordered the seamen to go aboard their galleys, and to hold themselves in readiness, as if an engagement were to take place. When the sun arose, the Athenian fleet advanced, and bid defiance to the enemy. Lysander pretended to decline the engagement; his ships remained at anchor, and the Athenians, who imputed this conduct to fear, returned in triumph to harbour. During four days Lysander bore the insolence and nourished the presumption of the Athenians, having stationed his fleet in a place of security, where it could not be attacked without manifest disadvantage. After this daily parade, the Athenians landed in security from their ships  
in

in the evening, indulging themselves in pleasure or repose; a circumstance well known to Lyfander, who regularly sent swift-sailing vessels to watch their motions

ON the fifth day the Athenian commanders proceeded, as usual, to offer battle to the Peloponnesian fleet. As they now counted on certain success, they yielded to all the dreams of presumption, and began to dispose of the Lacedæmonian prisoners who should fall into their power. Philocles proposed to cut off their right hands; and this cruel and unmanly proposal was sanctioned by the majority of his colleagues. After having attempted to provoke the enemy to an engagement, by more daring menaces and mortifying insults than on any former occasion, they retired with an air of triumph, as if they had obtained the victory. Lyfander detached his boats, as usual, to observe their movements, with orders to return when they saw the Athenians landed, and, as a signal, to hoist their shields in the middle of the channel.

LYSANDER, in the mean time, made every necessary preparation, and went through the whole fleet, exhorting the officers to hold the mariners and soldiers in readiness for an engagement. When the scouts, on their re-

CHAP. turn, had reached the middle of the channel,  
XX. they hoisted their shields to the top of the vessel. The signal was given from the admiral's galley, by sound of trumpet, and immediately the whole fleet was in motion. The narrow strait of the Hellespont was soon passed by the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the chief in command, first perceived the approach of the enemy, and called with a loud voice for the troops to embark. But all his efforts were in vain; the troops and their commanders, equally infatuated, had deserted their ships, were amusing themselves in the fields, indulging in the luxury of the table, or preparing to sleep in their tents. In this critical moment, Conon resolved to save himself by flight; and, carrying along with him nine galleys, set sail for Cyprus. Mean while Lyfander arrived, and his forces gave full indulgence to their resentment and animosity, which had been rendered more violent from the long restraint which their prudent commander had imposed on them. An engagement, with little resistance, was attended by a victory with little bloodshed. The ships, when taken, were either empty, or so feebly manned as to be incapable of resistance. No defeat was ever more decisive in its effects,

or more disgraceful to the vanquished, than that at *Ægos Potámoq.* Of a fleet consisting of a hundred and eighty vessels, nine only had escaped. *Lyfander*, amidst triumphal shouts and acclamations, returned to *Lampfacus*, with a hundred and seventy-one galleys, three thousand prisoners, and the plunder of the camp. It was his glory or good fortune to have performed one of the most important military exploits recorded in history, and to have terminated in an hour, a war which had lasted twenty-seven years, which had embroiled all the states of Greece with their dependencies, and which, without such a seasonable and decisive blow, might have extended its malignant effects to a longer duration. *Lyfander* immediately sent couriers to convey this welcome intelligence to *Sparta*.

THE fate of the Athenian prisoners taken in the engagement was soon decided at a hostile and a Spartan tribunal. They were all condemned to death, and massacred in cold blood. However this severe sentence may shock the feelings of humanity, it was in some measure excused by the law of retaliation, as the Athenian commanders had, of late, without the shadow of necessity, thrown the helpless crews of a *Corinthian* and an *Andrian*

C H A P. vessel from the top of a precipice into the sea ;  
 XX. and had meditated cruelties on the Spartans,  
 if they had proved victorious. Three thousand prisoners were put to death ; Adimantus alone was spared, because he had opposed the sanguinary resolution of Philocles, a merit which, it is said, was augmented by his having carried on a correspondence with the Spartans.

THIS war had been expensive, ruinous, and sanguinary from the beginning, and continued so to the end. It was their superiority at sea that enabled the Athenians to support it for such a length of time, and to recover from their frequent calamities and disasters at land ; and the Spartans prevailed at last merely by the influence of Persian gold, the distraction of the Athenian councils, and the weakness of their commanders. By the battle of Ægos Potamos, the Athenians lost the sovereignty of the sea, which they had acquired by the consent of their maritime allies, in the fourth year of the seventy-fifth olympiad. They had enjoyed that empire from the four hundred and seventy-seventh, till the four hundred and fifth year before the Christian era ; that is, during a period of seventy-two years.

AFTER

AFTER this battle, which left him without an enemy to engage, Lyfander did not immediately attack Athens. He knew, that from the strength of the fortifications, as well as from the valour of the inhabitants, heightened by despair, the siege would be an arduous undertaking. He proposed, therefore, after he had extended his conquests, to reduce it by famine. Having now the command of the sea, he employed his naval force to establish the Lacedæmonian empire over the extensive coasts of Greece and Asia. He attacked the flourishing cities of Chalcedon and Byzantium, and easily subdued them during the panic into which they were thrown by the total defeat of the Athenians. He soon after took Mitylené, and all the neighbouring islands, as well as the sea-ports of Lydia and Caria, submitted to his arms. In the mean while a squadron, commanded by Eteonicus, laid waste the shores of Macedon and Thrace, and met no opponent in all the Grecian seas. In about seven months after the defeat of Conon and his colleagues, the finest provinces of Europe and Asia became either the tributaries or allies of Sparta.

BUT the main object of Lyfander was the conquest of Athens. For this purpose his

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fleet

CHAP. fleet prevented all supplies from reaching that  
XX. city, and every Athenian prisoner was compelled, under pain of death, to return home. By thus keeping back all supplies, and by the accumulation of inhabitants, the Lacedæmonian commander expected that famine would reduce the Athenians to surrender.

NOTHING can be conceived more deplorable than the situation and the prospects of the Athenians. Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced towards the city with all their forces; Lysander, with a hundred and fifty sail, blocked up their harbour. Surrounded by sea and land; without an army or a fleet, an ally or a friend; destitute of provisions and resources, they represented to themselves the cruel calamities of a siege, the horrors of famine, the ruin of the republic, the destruction of the city, and the unknown, though miserable and ignominious, fate of its inhabitants! But even then their ancient spirit did not forsake them. They defended their walls and ramparts with unabated courage, endured fatigue and hunger with patience, and, amidst the ravages of disease and death, punished with severity a citizen who proposed, that they should capitulate; but when their provisions were almost exhausted,

exhausted, and the famine had made dreadful progress, necessity prompted them to send deputies to Agis, to propose a treaty with Sparta. Agis informed them, that ambassadors must be sent to the Lacedæmonian capital, to consult the Ephori. The fickle and treacherous Theramenes, with nine colleagues, were appointed to this office, and invested with full powers. During four months the negotiation was purposely protracted, till the progress of famine and disease, and the daily depopulation of Athens, should compel the inhabitants to submit to any terms. Theramenes at last returned with the fruits of his embassy. The conditions of peace were these, “ That the fortifications of the Piræus, together with the walls that communicated with Athens, should be demolished; that the Athenians should deliver up all their ships, twelve only excepted; that they should abandon all their foreign possessions, and remain satisfied with their own territories; that they should recall the surviving members of the aristocracy; that they should enter into a treaty offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, and in war should march under their standard; and lastly, that their adored commonwealth



CHAPTER. commonwealth should be subverted, and the  
XX. odious oligarchy imposed; that oligarchy which

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the Athenians had spent so much blood and treasure to overturn in every city of Greece! The period of twenty-seven years had now elapsed, which had been marked out by frequent oracles as the term of the Peloponnesian war, and of the Athenian empire. The chief leaders of the democracy had been cut off by the stratagems of the opposite party, who, regardless of the interest or honour of their country, only thought of being subordinate tyrants under the conquerors. Superstition, therefore, and necessity pressed equally on the feeble and dispirited Athenians, and produced a reluctant submission to the decisions of Sparta.

ON the same day in which the Athenians had gained the celebrated victory at Salamis, they fell a victim to the confederacy of their countrymen. The walls and fortifications of the city, sacred to Minerva, were rased to the foundation, and, amidst every wanton and exulting display of triumph, the tyranny of Athens was execrated, and her fall declared to be the revival of Grecian freedom.

LYSANDER immediately changed the form  
of

of the Athenian government, established thirty archons or tyrants over the city, and bribed to their interest three thousand, collected from the refuse of the people, to spoilt the more securely with the lives and property of the rest.

C H A P.

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XX.

## C H A. P. XXI.

*From the Conclusion of the PELOPONNESIAN  
WAR, to the Peace of ANTALCIDAS.*

C H A. P.  
XXI.

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**A**T the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartan empire revived on the ruins of the Athenian, and the Lacedæmonians became the leading people in Greece. Lyfander having reduced Samos, the last of the Athenian settlements which submitted to his arms, governed the islands and cities of Asia Minor with arbitrary and oppressive sway. He had a party in every little state, with a Spartan Harmostes, or governor, at their head, who were the ready instruments of his ambition, avarice, or resentment. The contributions, of which the Asiatic Greeks had so much complained, under the stern dominion of Athens, appeared no longer exorbitant under the cruel tyranny of Sparta. Lyfander imposed on these exhausted communities the enormous tribute of a thousand talents.

THE thirty archons established at Athens,  
soon

soon shewed themselves to be the fit instruments of Spartan oppression and cruelty. With a guard always attending them, and three thousand armed men at their command, they kept the whole city in terror and dismay. At first, the people rejoiced when they saw that informers and turbulent demagogues were delivered over to condign punishment, without considering that this gave the last blow to their liberties, and was intended to introduce a scene of rapine and bloodshed\*. Their private enemies became the first victims of their cruelty, on pretence of their being enemies to the state. Power was considered as a crime, because it might be dangerous; riches induced a sentence of death on the possessors, which was followed by a confiscation of estates, which the thirty tyrants divided among themselves. In short, says Xenophon, they put more people to death in eight months of peace, than the enemies had done in a war of thirty years.

THE abandoned Critias, whose vices had raised him to the head of this council, carried his oppression and cruelty to such an extreme, that Theramenes, who, in fact, had been the

\* Xenoph. p. 462. Sallust. de Bell. Catalin. cap. 51.

**CHAP.** author of the usurpation, either prompted by  
**XXI.** virtue, or the suggestions of inconstancy, re-  
 solved to demolish the fabric which he had  
 reared. He<sup>t</sup> became the protector of his  
 countrymen against the injustice and violence  
 of his colleagues; and the citizens, consider-  
 ing his influence over the foreign troops, as  
 well as the Athenians, looked up to him alone  
 for deliverance from their present state of hu-  
 miliatio*n* and distress.

CRITIAS, who knew the precarious tenure  
 of his own authority, and that of his col-  
 leagues, accused Theramenes before the se-  
 nate of conspiring to disturb the tranquillity  
 of the state, and to subvert the government.  
 After an able and artful accusation by Critias,  
 Theramenes made his defence, which was  
 managed with such strength of argument, that  
 the senators, notwithstanding the presence of  
 Critias and his associates, could not restrain  
 the murmurs of their applause. The san-  
 guinary tyrant, afraid that he might be ac-  
 quitted, introduced privately into the senate  
 armed men, who, from time to time, discovered  
 to the eyes of the judges the points of their  
 daggers. The astonished and intimidated se-  
 nators condemned him to death. Amazed  
 at this atrocious sentence, Theramenes sprang  
 upon

upon the altar of the senate-house, and implored the assistance of the surrounding spectators, who, in permitting his execution, he warned them, were establishing a precedent for their own. But the terror of the tyrants, and their armed associates prevented any exertion in his behalf: he was torn from the altar by the ministers of public justice, and dragged to execution. Of all the senators, Socrates alone, in whose school he had studied philosophy, opposed the sentence with the wisdom of a sage, and the magnanimity of a patriot; and even when his efforts were unsuccessful, exhorted the senate and the people to avenge themselves of their insolent oppressors. When the hemlock was presented to Theramenes, he drank it with tranquillity, and made some atonement for the inconsistencies and contradictions in his life, by his fortitude in the hour of death.

DELIVERED from the only associate who ventured to oppose their measures, the Athenian tyrants indulged themselves in every species of oppression without resistance or controul. Accusations, imprisonments, murders, succeeded each other. Every one trembled for himself or his friends. The antient Athenian spirit seems entirely to have deserted

CHAP. Athens; and the pusillanimous citizens ventured not to utter the voice of complaint.

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Socrates alone remained firm and intrepid; he preserved his independence, sustained his dignity, and discoursed with boldness against the government of the thirty.

THE most considerable citizens of Athens, who retained any sentiments of freedom, at last resolved to withdraw from their native city, now become a scene of cruelty and oppression, and to seek an asylum in different parts of Greece. At the head of these was Thrasylbulus, a person of extraordinary merit, who beheld, with the most lively sorrow, the calamities of his country. The savage resentment and inhuman cruelty of the Spartans, not yet gratified by all the sufferings of the Athenians, endeavoured to deprive the miserable wanderers of this last refuge. The senate issued a decree prohibiting the Grecian cities to receive the unfortunate fugitives. Most of the states obeyed this cruel injunction; but in some the sacred laws of humanity and hospitality prevailed. Argos, Thebes, and Megara opened their gates to the Athenian exiles. The Thebans, with unwonted generosity, made a decree to punish every citizen who beheld an Athenian attacked

tacked by his enemies, without exerting his utmost efforts to assist him. C H A P.  
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By continual acts of injustice, rapine, and cruelty, the thirty tyrants had rendered themselves so odious and detested, that nothing but a leader of abilities and spirit was wanting to shake the foundations of their power, and precipitate their downfall. Such a leader appeared in Thraſybulus; who, collecting the scattered exiles in Thebes and Megara, to the number of seventy, seized the fortress of Phyla, on the Athenian frontier. The tyrants, alarmed at this enterprize, hastened, at the head of three thousand men, to dislodge the new garrison. But the natural strength of the place, with the uncommon violence of a tempest, aided the efforts of Thraſybulus's little army, and compelled the enemy to return, without success, to Athens. The garrison at Phyla, by the concurrence of Athenian exiles, was soon augmented to seven hundred men.

APPREHENSIVE that this determined and daring band might attack the capital, the tyrants sent a detachment of cavalry and Lacedæmonian auxiliaries to encamp near Phyla, as a check upon the garrison; but Thraſybulus made a sudden and unexpected attack by



CHAPTER. night on the Lacedæmonian camp, put the  
XXI. enemy to flight, and slew a hundred and  
7 twenty men in the pursuit.

ALARMED at this defeat, the tyrants withdrew from the defenceless city of Athens to Eleufis. As a proof of their atrocious and unrelenting cruelty, the very first step they took was to put to death all the Eleufinians, whom they suspected of difaffection to their interest.

THE garrison at Phyla was reinforced by five hundred men, raised by Lyfias the orator at his own expence, in order to take vengeance on the tyrants for the murder of his brother, and his own expulfion from his country.

ENCOURAGED by this acceffion of ftrength, Thrafybulus refolved to march towards Athens, and attack the Piræus. The tyrants opposed him with all their forces, but were defeated by his fuperior abilities. The enemy, drawn up in deep and clofe array, were obliged to afcend an eminence, which had been wifely occupied by the general of the exiles. The javelins thrown from the rear could not reach beyond their own van; while, on the contrary, from the advantage of the ground, every weapon difcharged from the army of Thrafybulus

sybulus did execution. The battle was short but decisive; Critias and Hippomachus, the two most sanguinary and violent of the tyrants, were in the number of the slain. C H A P.  
XXI.

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THRASYBULUS restrained the ardour of his troops, and stopped them from pursuing the fugitives. He then ordered a herald to proclaim, with a loud voice, "Athenians, wherefore do you fly from your countrymen? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; we have the same origin, country, religion, and laws; we have often jointly fought to defend our common liberty; we have declared war, not against the city, but against the tyrants; and we come not as conquerors to load you with new chains, but as friends to avenge your wrongs, and assert your liberties."

THIS seasonable proclamation aided the effects of the victory to raise a general abhorrence of the tyrants; who were next day deprived of their dignity, and ten magistrates (one elected from each tribe) appointed in their stead. The surviving members of the council of thirty, with their chief accomplices in guilt, fled to Eleufis.

THE council of ten, who now assumed the government, were no sooner invested with the badges of authority, than they followed the

CHAP. track of the thirty, adopted, in like manner,  
 XXI. the Lacedæmonian policy, and equally op-  
 pressed their fellow-citizens. Thraſybulus,  
 who ſtill kept poſſeſſion of the Piræus,  
 ſtruck terror into the Decemvirs; who, in  
 conjunction with the remains of the thirty,  
 ſent meſſengers to Lyſander, to implore aſ-  
 ſiſtance from Sparta. He ſoon arrived to  
 their aſſiſtance, with a powerful army and a  
 ſquadron of gallies, and inveſted the Piræus  
 by ſea and land.

NOTHING could have defeated the projects  
 of Lyſander to ſubdue Athens a ſecond time,  
 and to extirpate the laſt roots of the demo-  
 cracy, but his own overbearing demeanour,  
 and the boundleſs rapacity of his dependants.  
 A powerful party was formed againſt him,  
 and Pauſanias, the moſt popular of the Spar-  
 tan princes, ſuddenly raiſed an army, and  
 marched with celerity to Athens, to thwart  
 or defeat the operations of Lyſander. After  
 ſome ſkirmiſhes, in which the army of Thra-  
 ſybulus defended the Piræus with more va-  
 lour than ſucceſs, Pauſanias conveyed to them  
 his favourable intentions, and his deſign to  
 reſtore their liberties. Theſe tidings were  
 received with univerſal joy. Pauſanias entered  
 into a negociation with the ſenate of Sparta,  
 and

and the Ephori, which was traversed by Lyfander and the ten tyrants; but notwithstanding their opposition, fifteen commissioners were appointed, who, in conjunction with the Spartan king, were empowered to settle the government, and fix the security of Athens.

FACTIONS now ceased to contend with each other; the tyrants were degraded from their rank, and, amidst the exultation of the Athenians, their beloved democracy was re-established. This revolution was as remarkable for its clemency and gentleness, as the former usurpation had been for its cruelty and oppression. The tyrants, with the despicable tools of their oppression, were allowed to retire in safety to Eleusis, and, by the influence and persuasion of Thrasylbulus, an enthusiasm of generosity and a spirit of forgiveness pervaded all orders of the people.

THE tyrants of their country, who had fled to Eleusis, might have shared the benefits of indemnity and forgiveness, if the consciousness of former guilt had not involved them in new crimes. They again collected troops, and attempted to reinstate themselves in the government. But the unprepared efforts of rage and resentment were of no avail; the

CHAPTER. remaining tyrants expiated their crimes with  
XXI. their blood, and thus established the safety and  
tranquillity of the new republic. Their adherents, upon their submission, were received to mercy, all the exiles were restored, and the wise and generous Thrasybulus obtained a decree of the people for reinstating them in their former rank and fortunes, and for burying in perpetual oblivion the remembrance of their delinquency. This law, equally prudent and generous, was not, however, strictly adhered to; the remembrance of injuries could not be totally effaced; and many of the adherents of the tyrants were afterwards condemned and punished, in violation of the public faith.

THUS, in less than two years after the subversion of the Athenian commonwealth by a Spartan general, the same form of government was re-established with new lustre by the authority and assistance of a Spartan king. To understand this historical phenomenon, it is requisite to review the character and conduct of Lysander. After the siege and surrender of Athens, he was in the zenith of his glory. He had the principal share in those celebrated engagements and victories which raised Sparta to her former pre-eminence in Greece; and, assuming the conse-

quence

quence which he thought due to his merit, he began to display the pomp and parade of state, and to court the flattery and adoration which were conferred on eastern princes. Poets, enriched by his bounty, employed their talents to celebrate his achievements; a venal tribe of flatterers continually furrounded him, who studied to excel one another in the licentious strains of panegyric. He ordered his own statue to be cast in brass. He permitted the Grecian cities to erect altars to him as to a divinity, to offer sacrifices to him, and to sing hymns in his honour. The Samians ordained, by a public decree, that the feasts sacred to Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess, should be called the *Feasts of Lyfander*.

THE ambition of this general was not satisfied with pomp, ostentation, and flattery; he had acquired a degree of power and authority, prohibited by the laws of Lycurgus, and of which there had been no example in Sparta. The states and cities annexed to the dominion of Sparta, were governed by his dependants, over whom he possessed absolute power. He knew no bounds in resenting injuries and punishing his enemies. Whoever incurred his displeasure was punished with death; and,  
in

CHAP. in accomplishing his plans, whether of am-  
 XXI. bition or revenge, he employed, without he-  
 ———— sitation or remorse, treachery, perjury, and  
 the worst of crimes. He massacred eight  
 hundred inhabitants of Miletus, though he  
 had solemnly sworn to preserve their lives.  
 The multitudes that he caused to be murdered  
 in the other cities is almost incredible; for  
 he had not only his own resentments to sa-  
 tisfy, but those of his friends and dependants,  
 to whom he gave unlimited power to gratify  
 their malice and avarice, by the destruction of  
 their enemies, and the confiscation of their  
 effects.

THERE was no kind of injustice, violence, or  
 cruelty, which the people did not suffer under  
 the government of Lyfander and his depu-  
 ties. Frequent complaints were made by the  
 cities of the intolerable vexations and op-  
 pressions which they endured; but he had  
 found out a method to render the Lacedæ-  
 monians deaf to the voice of petition or re-  
 monstrance.

BEFORE Lyfander returned to Sparta, after  
 the reduction of Athens, he sent Gylippus be-  
 fore him, with the gold and spoils which he  
 had amassed in the course of his last campaign.  
 This wealth, besides the presents of golden

crowns and ornaments received from the cities, amounted to fifteen hundred talents \*. Gylippus converted a fifth part of this treasure to his own use, by opening the bottom of the bags in which it was contained; but the treachery being detected, to avoid punishment, he went into voluntary exile. On this occasion it was debated in the senate, whether it were not a violation of the laws of Lycurgus to admit gold and silver into Sparta. Those who were attached to the ancient constitution, condemned Lyfander for introducing that pernicious metal, which had always proved the bane and corruption of morals; and presented a strong remonstrance to the Ephori, who ordered it to be carried out of the city. But this sentence was over-ruled by the party of Lyfander, who proposed, as a conciliating measure, that the iron money should be employed in ordinary currency, and that the gold and silver should be deposited in the treasury, and applied solely to the service of the state.

SUCH a debate, in the present situation of Sparta, carried more of the ostentation than the reality of public virtue. As the Lacedæmonians had adopted a new plan of

\* £. 337,000.



CHAP. administration, a public treasure was become  
 XXI. absolutely necessary. It was impossible to  
 support a fleet, or carry on offensive war, without a revenue. Hence they applied so frequently to the Persian viceroys and governors for money. As the situation of the republic had changed, it was requisite that its customs should also change. A law passed, prohibiting private persons from receiving this new coin, as if individuals could long neglect what formed the strength and sinews of the state, or laws prevent money from penetrating into houses where avarice had gone before. Lyfander's wealth did not remain in the treasury. By the influence of this secret but powerful persuader, he found means to defend himself against the complaints and accusations of desolated cities and plundered provinces.

THE prohibition of the precious metals had the usual effect in rendering them more eagerly and passionately coveted. Sensible to the attractions of gold and silver, the Lacedæmonians employed the most unjust and violent means to obtain them; avarice and corruption being late introduced, made the more rapid advances; and the Spartan governors imposed exactions and tributes on the dependent

pendent states, more arbitrary and oppressive than either the Athenians or Persians. C H A P.  
XXI.

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BUT although the arm of Spartan authority was feeble, and slow to punish offences when the accusers were in the rank of subjects or dependents, it acquired new nerves and sinews when a person of rank and dignity solicited its execution. Pharnabazus, one of the governors of Lower Asia, harassed by the perpetual ravages committed in his provinces by the rapacious Lyfander, sent deputies to Sparta to complain of his conduct. He was immediately reculed by the Ephori. He was astonished at the order, but obeyed, and endeavoured to defend his conduct before the senate. He was neither condemned nor acquitted. Accustomed to command at the head of armies, and to enjoy the secondary attributes and prerogatives of sovereignty in Asia, he could not endure this banishment to his native country, nor descend to the simplicity of private life. He therefore solicited the permission of the Ephori, to make a journey to the temple of Jupiter Hammon to discharge a vow.

AFTER his departure, the kings, senate, and Ephori, considering that he held the cities in dependence by means of his own  
partizans,

**CHAP.** partizans, whom he had raised to be magistrates and governors, and that, by blending the  
**XXI.** aristocratical authority with that of his own creatures, he had become, in some measure, lord and master of Greece, resolved to destroy this system of tyranny, by re-establishing democracy in the Grecian states. Hence the efforts of Pausanias to restore Athens to its liberty, in opposition to the plots of Lyfander. Of such casual incidents, the code of Athenian and Spartan policy is composed; of such unconnected links the chain of their history consists.

THE concluding year of the Peloponnesian war terminated the prosperous reign of Darius Nothus. He appointed Arfaces, his eldest son, to be his successor; who, upon ascending the throne, assumed the name of Artaxerxes, from his great memory. Cyrus, his younger brother, was then at court, and, as he was the peculiar favourite of his mother, she employed all her influence over her husband to obtain the kingdom for her younger son. This produced a rivalry between the two princes, which naturally ended in jealousy and hatred. The claim of Cyrus to the throne was not without authority and precedent in the Persian history; for, though he was the  
second

second son of Darius, yet, being born after his accession to the throne, he was the eldest son of the king. This distinction had induced the first Darius to bequeath his crown to Xerxes, in preference to his elder brother Artabazanes.

ARTAXERXES succeeded to the throne according to the appointment of his father, and set out from his capital for the city of Páragades to be crowned, according to custom, by the priests of Persia. Cyrus, whose dangerous ambition was inflamed by that of his mother, could not behold the scepter, which he claimed as his right, transferred into the hands of another; and conceived the criminal design of assassinating his brother in the temple, while he was assuming the robe of Cyrus, previous to the coronation\*. His intention being discovered, he was seized and condemned to death. His mother Paryfatis, who doated on him to distraction, interceded for his pardon with shrieks and lamentations. Artaxerxes, who was a generous and merciful prince, yielded to the prayers and tears of his mother, forgave the wild ambition of Cyrus, but

\* Plutar. in Artaxerx.

CHAP. sent him to his government in Asia, where he  
XXI. had been appointed hereditary satrap by the  
will of his father.

No sooner had he arrived at Sardis than he bent all his thoughts to revenge the supposed affront he had received from his brother, and to expel him from the throne. All the talents which he had received from nature, and improved by art, were exerted by him to forward this ungrateful and unnatural attempt. Whoever came from the court of Susa found a welcome reception at Sardis; and every artifice was put in practice to attach them to the side of Cyrus. He gained the affections, or secured the obedience of his Asiatic subjects, who, though inferior to the Greeks, excelled the effeminate troops of Upper Asia both in valour and military skill; but his chief confidence was in his Grecian forces, particularly in the assistance of Sparta. The maritime situation of his provinces connected him with the Greek states, whose favour he was solicitous to gain; and, as he had raised the Lacedæmonians to their present superiority in Greece, he had every thing to expect from their gratitude. Nor was he deceived in his expectations. He was allowed to recruit his army with the best soldiers of Peloponnesus;

nefus; and, with the assistance of Clearchus the Spartan, he augmented his army with thirteen thousand Greeks. In order to disguise his policy, and draw a veil over his treason, he enticed the cities under the government of Tissaphernes, to revolt from his authority, and transfer their allegiance to himself. He then assembled his troops openly, under the pretence of arming against that governor, and filled the ear of his brother with complaints against Tissaphernes. That generous and humane, but weak and credulous prince, believed the representation of Cyrus, and was lulled into his usual security.

THE friends of Cyrus at the Persian court, by disseminating rumours and opinions, endeavoured to prepare the minds of the people for the intended revolution. They hinted, that the vast dominions of Persia required a prince of abilities, valour, and activity; a king magnificent, brave, and generous; who, fired with a noble ambition, would emulate his ancestors, by extending the boundaries, or augmenting the glory of the empire which was founded by the great Cyrus.

THE formidable preparations of this aspiring prince, did not escape the vigilant eye of Alcibiades. This singular man, whose history

CHAP. now draws near to a conclusion, then resided  
XXI. at Grynium, a Phrygian town under the protection of Pharnabafus. Ambitious of conciliating the favour of the Persian monarch, he desired a guard from Pharnabafus to escort him with safety to Susa, that he might apprise Artaxerxes of the meditated rebellion. At this very time the Athenians, groaning under the cruel government of the Thirty, proposed to recal Alcibiades to his native country, and appoint him their leader against the tyrants. The reputation of this active and successful commander was still so formidable, that Lyfander informed Pharnabafus the death of Alcibiades was equally necessary to Persia and the Spartans. The satrap, who wished that the Athenian should not have the merit of discovering the treachery of Cyrus, paid immediate attention to this sanguinary counsel. A troop of assassins was sent to seize him; but were so intimidated by the terror of his name, that they durst not attack him by open force. In the darkness of the night, they surrounded his house, to which they set fire. Alarmed by the noise, Alcibiades drew his sword, and rushed through the flames, followed by the affectionate Timandra. His cowardly exe-

cutioners retired from his presence, but, discharging their darts at a distance, he fell, covered with wounds. No outrage was offered to Timandra; she was even permitted to bestow the last duties on the remains of her illustrious and unfortunate friend. Thus fell Alcibiades, who had so frequently embroiled the affairs of Europe and Asia, whose contradictory life had been almost equally beneficial and pernicious, honourable and ignominious to himself and his country.

CYRUS completed his army without interruption or molestation; and, in the beginning of the fourth century before the Christian era, began his march from Ionia to Upper Asia, at the head of thirteen thousand Greeks, and a hundred thousand Asiatics.

CLEARCHUS, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates for their leader. The Theffalians were conducted by Menon, and the Bœotians by Proxenes the Theban, who introduced Xenophon to the service of Cyrus. Their fleet, consisting of sixty vessels, was commanded by Samius, who was appointed successor to Lyfander in the government of the Ionian coast. It was or-



CHAP. dered to keep near the shore, and co-operate  
XXI. with the land army.

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CYRUS, apprehensive that the boldness of his enterprize, and the length as well as dangers of the march, would intimidate the Grecian officers, as well as soldiers, had imparted his design only to Clearchus. The troops knew not into what countries they were going to march, nor with what enemies they were to engage. Cyrus had only caused it to be given out to the army, that they were to act against the Pisidians, who had infested Ionia by their incursions.

TISSAPHERNES, at last acquainted with the real intentions of Cyrus, and the object of his expedition, posted to the court of Susa, and informed Artaxerxes of the danger with which he was threatened. In consequence of this information, that monarch assembled a numerous army, and prepared to resist his rebellious brother.

HAVING at length set out from Sardis, Cyrus advanced with rapid marches towards the upper provinces of Asia; passed through Lydia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, and the high grounds of Cilicia; crossed the river Euphrates at Thapsacus; and, having traversed the  
desert,

desert, reached the confines of Chaldæa. After having passed, not without opposition, the narrow defile of Cilicia, he arrived at Tarsus. Here the Grecian troops refused to continue their march. As the design of advancing to Babylon, and making war against the Persian king had never been communicated to them, they complained with loud clamours of the deceit, accused their generals of treachery, and even insulted the dignity of Cyrus. It required all the address and insinuation of Clearchus to quell this commotion. He publicly espoused the cause of the soldiers, affected to sympathize with all their grievances, and to approve their measures for redress and relief. He openly declared, that he considered his interest as inseparable from theirs, and advised them to send deputies to treat with the prince, that he might either, by granting the demands of the Greeks, induce them to follow him, or permit them to return home. The tumult was thus appeased, and all differences adjusted, by adding half a daric to their monthly pay.

LEAVING Tarsus, the army continued their march to Issus, the last town of Cilicia, on the borders of Syria. Two fortresses, called the gates of Syria and Cilicia, defended

this narrow pass between the mountain and the sea. The Lacedæmonian fleet, commanded by Pythagoras the Spartan, who had succeeded Samius, prepared to land the Greeks beyond the Syrian works, so that their fortifications must have been assaulted on both sides; but the commander, Abacamas, abandoned his forts and fled. After this feeble opposition, Cyrus proceeded unmolested to the banks of the Euphrates. That river at Thapsacus extends in breadth to more than half a mile, but is remarkably shallow, especially in autumn, which was the season when Cyrus and his army forded it. This afforded an opportunity for Asiatic flattery to the inhabitants of Thapsacus, who scrupled not to declare to the prince, that the Euphrates knew and submitted to its sovereign\*.

HAVING passed the Euphrates, Cyrus continued his route through Mesopotamia; and having crossed the desert in seventeen days, arrived at the fertile and opulent plains of Babylon. After a march of five days, he came to a ditch five fathoms broad and three deep, extending twelve leagues in length from

\* Xenoph. 253. Xen. p. 263, &c.

the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the ditch, was a road twenty feet broad, by which, as it was left unguarded and unprotected, Cyrus passed with his whole army. From the neglect of the Persian monarch to dispute this pass, it was generally believed that he had laid aside the design of risking a battle. Confiding in this conjecture, the troops of Cyrus no longer observed any order of march, deposited their arms in the waggons, and proceeded negligently along, as if they had no enemy to encounter. But when they arrived at the plain of Cynaxa, a day's journey from Babylon, a confidential friend of Cyrus rode up to them with full speed, and called aloud in the Persian language, that the king was at hand with a great army.

CYRUS, leaping from his car, in which he rode carelessly in the van, put on his armour, mounted his horse, and prepared his troops for engaging. He was obeyed with alacrity; and the army soon advanced in order of battle. A little past noon-day, a thick cloud of dust announced the approach of the royal host. The army of Artaxerxes was commanded by Tissaphernes, Gobrias, and Arbaces. In the front were a hundred and fifty chariots,

CHAP. armed with scythes. The cavalry, under the  
 XXI. command of Tissaphernes, were distinguished  
 by white corselets; the Persians by bucklers  
 made of wicker; and the Egyptians by wooden  
 shields, which covered their whole body.

THESE formed the principal strength of the regal army; the rest consisted of a multitude without discipline, and almost without arms. Cyrus gave orders to Clearchus to attack the centre of the enemy, where, according to the Persian custom, the king had taken his station, surrounded by the flower of his army, assuring him that victory would inevitably follow the defeat of that body; but Clearchus, from a fear of being surrounded by the Persians, who, from their numbers, greatly outflanked him, disobeyed the orders, and kept his post near to the Euphrates. To this, and the blind impetuosity of Cyrus, must be ascribed the defeat which ensued.

WHEN the armies were within four hundred paces of each other, the Greeks began to sing their sacred pæans, intermixed with the martial sound of their spears against their brazen bucklers. Then moving at once, they sprung forwards upon the enemy, who fled with precipitation. While the Greeks were occupied in the pursuit, Artaxerxes com-  
 manded

manded his centre to wheel to the left, to attack the rear of the enemy. Cyrus at this moment rode with eagerness and impatience to meet him at the head of six hundred horse. He threw the guards of the king, consisting of six thousand cavalry, into confusion, and killed Artagerfes, their leader, with his own hand. When he discovered his brother amidst the ranks, his eyes sparkled with rage. Rushing forward with the instinctive fury of revenge, he cried out, "I see him," and opening a way through the attendants, aimed a javelin at the king, which killed his horse, and brought him to the ground. Artaxerxes having mounted another steed, Cyrus aimed a second dart, and wounded him in the breast; but his eagerness for revenge rendered him inattentive to his own preservation. He was overwhelmed by a shower of darts during the furious conflict between the king's attendants and his own; eight of his confidential friends having fallen round the dead body of their lord.

ARTAXERXES, having caused the head and right hand of Cyrus to be struck off, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus, who commanded the forces of Lower Asia, led them off in dejection and despair for the loss  
of

CHAP. of their prince; nor did they stop at their  
XXI. camp, but continued their flight to the place  
where the army had encamped the day before, at the distance of four leagues.

MEANWHILE Clearchus had defeated the left wing of the enemy, and pursued the fugitives to the distance of three miles from the field of battle. Upon his return, he found that the Persians were in possession of the camp, and perceived, that satiated with plunder, they advanced to attack his rear. Apprehensive of being surrounded on all sides, he wheeled about, and halted with the river in his rear. The remainder of the day was spent without any decisive action, the Persians constantly retiring with precipitation from the charge of the Greeks. Clearchus at last returned to his camp, which he found plundered by the enemy, and all the provisions either carried off or destroyed.

NEXT morning he prepared to decamp, when messengers arrived from Ariæus, informing him that Cyrus was slain; that the new general, with the Asiatic troops, would wait for that day, and no longer, in their camp, for the junction of the Greeks, intending on the next to march for Ionia.

CLEARCHUS replied, " We lament the  
death

death of Cyrus ; but acquaint Ariæus that we have compelled the king and his army to fly before us, and assure him, that if he will join his forces with ours, we will place him on the Persian throne."

ARTAXERXES, on the other hand, flushed with what he esteemed a complete victory, sent heralds to the Greeks, commanding them to deliver up their arms. " Let him come and take them," replied an unknown voice from the midst of a multitude, which heard the demand with indignation. " It is better to die, than to surrender our arms," said another intrepid Greek. Xenophon delivered the following answer : " All we now have are our arms and our valour ; while we have courage and our swords we are free ; we are slaves as soon as we lay down our arms. Expect not therefore, that we shall throw away our sole advantage ; but be assured, on the contrary, that, confiding in our arms and our valour, we will dispute with you all your boasted advantages." Clearchus added, " That if the Great King would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve him with fidelity and valour ; but if he imagined to reduce them to slavery, he should find that they had the means of defence in their



CHAP. their hands, and were determined that the  
XXI. same moment should put an end to their liberty and their lives." After this unsuccessful attempt, the heralds returned to the Persian camp.

ARIÆUS replied to the Grecian deputies, "That there were many Persians of greater consideration than himself, who would never permit him to ascend the throne; that he should certainly set out next morning on his return to Ionia; and that, if they intended to march along with him, they should join him in the night." This proposal was adopted; the army marched in order of battle, and arrived at midnight in the camp of Ariæus. The Grecian and Asiatic commanders entered into a treaty, and bound themselves by oaths to mutual fidelity and attachment. They confirmed this engagement by a solemn sacrifice, the Greeks dipping their swords, and the Asiatics the point of their javelins in the blood of the victims. After consulting on their intended march, it was determined to alter their route; and, instead of returning by the desert, where they had formerly marched seventeen days amidst a barren wild, that they should direct their course towards the north, where they would find provisions in abundance,

dance, and cross the great rivers nearer their source. CHAP.  
XXI.

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ARTAXERXES was, or pretended to be, so delighted with the courage and magnanimity of the Greeks, that he sent heralds to them the following day, with conciliatory propositions. Soon after Tissaphernes paid them a visit, to acquaint them with the clemency of the king, who, compassionating their situation, and foreseeing the dangers to which they were about to expose themselves, had given him permission to conduct them back to their own country. Clearchus replied, that the Greeks were led into Persia by Cyrus, without being acquainted with his intentions; that by his death their engagements with him were at an end; that they had undertaken this expedition without any view of making war against the Persian king; and that all they desired was a safe passage to Greece. Tissaphernes having departed to report their answer, returned on the third day to inform them, that the king was pleased with their declarations, and would favour their return; that as he himself was soon to set out for his province, he would accompany them in their journey, and supply them with provisions, on condition that they committed

CHAP. no disorders on their march. These conditions were sworn to on both sides, and Tiffaphernes withdrew to settle his affairs, previous to his departure for Lower Asia.

XXI.

DURING the absence of Tiffaphernes, which continued for twenty days, the Persians had full opportunity of attempting the fidelity of Ariæus and his officers. His kinsmen and brothers warmly solicited his return to the allegiance which he owed to his natural sovereign, with full assurances of entire oblivion with regard to the past, and promises of future favours. Henceforth the affections of Ariæus appear to have been entirely alienated from his Grecian allies; and a visible coolness and distrust prevailed between the two armies.

ON the return of Tiffaphernes, they all set forward under the conduct of that satrap, who, according to his engagement, supplied the Greeks with provisions; but Ariæus and his troops no longer encamped with the Greeks, but with the forces of Tiffaphernes. Yet, though the armies were mutually suspicious, for three weeks there were no open hostilities, except some inconsiderable skirmishes between the parties sent out to provide wood or forage.

After

After having traversed the deserts of Media, they arrived at Cœnæ, a rich and populous city, and thence to the river Zabates, which, flowing westward from the Median mountains, pours its waters into the Tigris.

THE occasions of distrust and aversion increasing every day between the Greeks and Persians, Clearchus proposed a mutual conference between the commanders, in order to remove every ground of suspicion or complaint, and bring matters to an amicable explanation. A motion so acceptable to both parties, though from very different motives, was readily carried into execution. The five generals, and twenty captains, went to the quarters of the Persian commander; two hundred soldiers followed, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp. Clearchus, with his four colleagues, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, were conducted into the tent of Tissaphernes; the captains were not permitted to enter. The darkest suspicions were now entertained, and a silent interval of terror took place. On a signal given, those within the tent were seized, and those without were put to the sword; while a party of Persian horse cut to pieces the Greeks who had followed their officers.

CHAP. officers. The five generals were sent to the  
XXI. Great King, who ordered them to be be-  

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headed.

THE astonishment and consternation of the Greeks at this tragic catastrophe, soon gave place to the horrors of their own situation. They were twelve hundred miles distant from their native country; they were surrounded by the dreary deserts, steep mountains, and dangerous rivers of an unknown and hostile country; they were exposed to famine, depredation, and the treachery of their Persian allies; and they were without a guide to conduct them through the multitude of dangers that opposed their progress.

IN this general dependency, Xenophon, who had hitherto served in an inferior station, displayed an uncommon spirit of enterprize and energy of mind. Assembling the captains belonging to the division of his friend Proxenus, he represented to them that their valour was now their sole resource; that however small their number, they might render themselves formidable by their resolution and their fortitude; that the treachery of their enemies was the strongest proof of their timidity, of their dread of Grecian valour,  
that

that it would draw down upon them the vengeance of heaven, and enable the Greeks to baffle their numbers and their perfidy.

C H A P.  
XXI.

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THE magnanimous emotions of Xenophon, roused the desponding spirits of his friends; and a council of the principal officers, to the number of a hundred, was summoned. In this council, Xenophon warmly exhorted them to break off from the insidious alliance of the impious Ariæus and Tissaphernes, and to expect success from their virtue, valour, and the protection of the gods.

HE advised them to appoint new officers in the room of their late commanders; to burn their superfluous baggage; to begin their march with all expedition towards the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates; and to advance in the form of a hollow square, that they might be prepared on every side to resist the enemy. The approbation of Cheirisophus the Spartan, gave weight to the counsels of Xenophon; his proposals were unanimously approved of, and carried into immediate execution.

THIS retreat of the ten thousand Greeks to their native country, has been celebrated by judges in the art of war, as one of the best conducted exploits to be found in antient history. It is recorded by Xenophon himself

CHAP. with an eloquent simplicity, much beauty of  
XXI. description, and a profound knowledge of the  
military art; but as it forms an episode in  
the history of Greece, rather than a part of it,  
I must refer the reader to his elegant and in-  
genious production.

SUCH was the catastrophe of an audacious and criminal enterprise, suggested by extravagant ambition, and violent revenge. Xenophon has given us a highly-finished picture of the younger Cyrus. According to his account, he surpassed his cotemporaries in bodily exercises, and exterior accomplishments. When he was appointed satrap of Lydia, instead of oppressing his subjects by extortion and rapacity, he preferred the interest of the provinces to his own; alleviated the load of taxes in order to encourage industry; set an example of rural labour with his own hands, and introduced a regularity of police, never before known in the Asiatic peninsula. By his integrity in performing promises, and fulfilling engagements; by his generosity in rewarding merit, and bestowing favours, he conciliated affection to his person, as well as respect to his authority. By his character and conduct he gained the attachment both of the Greeks and Asiatics; and there have been few princes whom their people were more afraid

afraid to offend, or for whose sake they were more ready to sacrifice their fortunes and their lives.

BUT in this favourable portrait, Xenophon has omitted to mark the dark shades by which it was disfigured and disgraced. An ambition which was ready to sacrifice every thing to its own gratification, and to wade through blood to a throne; rebellion against his brother and his sovereign, who had spared his life when it was forfeited to justice and the laws; and the horrors of a civil war, in which he plunged the countries over which he proposed to reign, reflect an indelible stain on the memory of Cyrus, and, though not uncommon in the annals of Asia, ought not to have been passed over without censure by a philosophical historian. A letter which Cyrus wrote to the Spartan senate when he solicited their assistance, conveys some traits of his real character. There he boasts that his heart was more noble than that of his rival, that he was better instructed in religion and philosophy, and that he could drink more wine without being intoxicated.

THE cities of Lesser Asia, that had espoused the cause of Cyrus, apprehending the resentment of Tissaphernes, applied to the Lacedæmonians for their protection and assist-



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ance\*. The successful retreat of the ten thousand had lessened the character of the Persian monarch, and inspired through all Greece an enthusiasm for martial achievements and military glory. Accordingly, Sparta armed at once to defend the liberty of the Asiatic states, and declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabafus. They immediately levied a body of five thousand Peloponnesian troops, and obtained three hundred horse from the Athenians. Thimbron, the Spartan, was appointed to the command of these forces, and had orders to offer employment to the Greeks who had returned from the expedition of Cyrus, and who, tired out by the perfidy of Seuthes, a Thracian prince, quitted his service and joined the Lacedæmonian army with six thousand men, the remains of those hardy veterans who had experienced every species of distress, had seen danger in every form, and had returned unconquered by all the powers of the Great King.

STRENGTHENED by such a powerful reinforcement, Thimbron commenced hostilities with considerable success, and gained possession of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Myrina, Cymé, and Gryniûm; but was repulsed at Larissâ.

THE licentious and seditious spirit of troops,

\* Xenoph. Hellen. p. 479, &c.

collected from different and hostile communities, rendered them, during the intervals of war, formidable to each other, and to the cities they were appointed to protect. They even plundered the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who complained to the senate; and, in consequence of this complaint, Thimbron was recalled. The command was conferred on Dercyllidas, celebrated for his fertility in resources, and his ingenuity in inventing and improving machines of war. By joining the talents of an engineer to the abilities of a general, he soon became master of Larissa; and, in the space of a week, became master of eight other cities in the province of Pharnabafus.

IN the spring, the Lacedæmonians sent commissioners to inspect the affairs of Asia, and to continue, for another year, the authority of Dercyllidas, if they approved of his conduct. The commissioners, finding that the conduct of Dercyllidas was in every respect irreproachable and meritorious, that he was popular in the army, and that the cities of Æolis and Ionia flourished under his administration, confirmed him in his command.

THE Spartan deputies, before their departure, solicited the protection of Dercyllidas to the inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonesus,

CHAPTER. who were infested by the barbarous tribes  
XXI. that occupied the adjacent regions. Highly  
favour'd by nature, the Chersonesus was cultivated by an industrious people; it was therefore rich and populous, but expos'd, by the neck of land which connect'd it with Thrace, to the irruptions and depredations of the barbarians. Dercyllidas employ'd the labour of his soldiers to shut up the isthmus, and built a strong wall, which secur'd the cities in the Chersonesus from the predatory inroads of the Thracians.

THE Spartans, now considering themselves as the protectors and sovereigns of Greece, zealously employ'd every opportunity of asserting their superiority, and displaying their influence. Offended with the Eleans, they resolv'd to make them striking examples of their vengeance. In the course of the Peloponnesian war, they had not only desert'd the alliance of Sparta, but, with the Mantineans and Argives, had taken arms against that republic, excluded the Spartans from consulting the oracle, or disputing the prizes at the Olympic games, and even prevent'd Agis, their king, from sacrificing in the temple of Jupiter Olympius. That monarch was appointed to inflict the vengeance of Sparta on the devoted

devoted Eleans. Admonished by repeated shocks of an earthquake, he refrained, for a year, from ravaging the sacred territories; but having appeased the wrath of heaven, as he imagined, by prayers and sacrifices, he laid waste the country during the two following summers, plundered the villages, spoiled the sacred edifices of their ornaments, and reduced to ruins many of the porticos and temples which adorned the city Olympia.

AFTER the Spartans had plundered and laid waste the territory of Elis, they vouchsafed to suspend their ravages, and offered peace, on condition that the Eleans relinquished their authority over the villages originally independent, and accepted of the form of government which they should impose\*.

AGIS fell sick in his return from this expedition, and died soon after his arrival at Sparta. He acknowledged on his death-bed, the legitimacy of his son Leotychides; but a death-bed acknowledgment of a son, whom he had formerly disowned, was far from satisfactory to the party of Agesilaus, the brother of Agis, and failing Leotychides, the heir to the crown. The diminutive stature and

\* Xenoph Hellen. lib. iii. cap. 4.

CHAPTER. lameness of Agefilaus were amply compensated by the virtues of his mind, a courage superior to danger, a noble elevation of character, and a generous ambition for the glory of Sparta. As the throne was the inheritance of his elder brother, he had been educated like a private person in all the strictness and severity of the Spartan discipline. Hence he had learned to obey, before he rose to command; and acquired, by living among his equals, the virtues of self-command, candour, and a respectful attention to others. Charmed with his extraordinary merit, notwithstanding his corporeal defects (more ignominious at Sparta than in any country) the majority of the Spartans supported his title, and esteemed it a singular advantage to have a king, who was educated like themselves, in a rigorous submission to the laws of Lycurgus. Lyfander in particular, whose own ambitious prospects were now blasted, employed all his eloquence and address in behalf of his public favourite; and, chiefly owing to his exertions, Agefilaus succeeded to the throne of Sparta.

OF all the Spartan kings, he was the most esteemed and loved by his subjects. Nature had endowed him with an heroic spirit, and talents for command; and his education had united

united to these the virtues of humanity and condescension. When he was declared king, the estate and effects of Agis, his brother, devolved to him by law, Leotychides being declared a bastard; but, finding the relations of that prince, on the mother's side, in poverty, he divided the inheritance with them. By these, and similar actions, his reputation and popularity increased. The Ephori conferred on him the highest panegyric under the form of a punishment, and imposed a fine upon him for monopolizing the hearts and affections of all the citizens, which were the common property of the republic. His power was equal to his popularity. This arose from the respect and deference which he paid to the Ephori. As the authority of these magistrates was an innovation on the institutions of Lycurgus, the Spartan kings had retained an hereditary aversion for them, and looked upon them as rivals. On the contrary, Agefilaus, knowing that without their consent he could undertake no business of importance, endeavoured to conciliate their good opinion, and communicated to them the resolutions and enterprizes which he was forming.

AT the distance of two years after the accession of Agefilaus to the throne, information

was

CHAP. was received, that the Persian monarch had  
 XXI. fitted out a formidable fleet, in order to de-  
 prive the Lacedæmonians of their empire at  
 sea. By the influence of Lyfander, the Spar-  
 tan king was appointed commander in chief  
 of the Grecian forces in Asia. He set out  
 in the spring with three thousand emanci-  
 pated helots, and six thousand troops collect-  
 ed from the allies. Since the illegal conduct  
 of Agis in his expedition, the Spartan kings  
 were usually attended in the field by a coun-  
 cil of ten senators, invested with powers to  
 sanction or controul their measures. Agefi-  
 laus got their number augmented to thirty.  
 By this artful stroke of policy he lessened the  
 consequence of the whole, and brought them  
 more easily to submit to his direction.

THE celebrated retreat of the ten thousand  
 under the conduct of Xenophon, had, at this  
 period, inspired the Greeks with a confi-  
 dence in their own valour, and a contempt  
 for the Persians. The Lacedæmonians re-  
 solved to improve so favourable a conjuncture  
 for the delivering the Greeks in Asia from  
 their subjection to a foreign yoke, and the op-  
 pressions of tyranny.

WHEN Agefilaus arrived at Ephesus, Tif-  
 saphernes sent an embassy, demanding the rea-  
 son

fon of his coming to Asia with such hostile preparations. The Spartan king replied, “ That he came to assist the Asiatic Greeks to recover their antient liberty.” The deputies of Tiffaphernes were prepared for this reply, and answered, that Artaxerxes was ready to acknowledge the independence of the Asiatic Greeks; and that ambassadors were soon expected from the Great King, invested with full powers to establish a lasting peace between the Persians and all the Grecian states. Meanwhile, the satrap desired a continuation of the truce; to which request Agesilaus, although suspicious of treachery, agreed, and the truce was sworn to on both sides. The perfidious Persian, who had no other intention but to amuse and deceive the Spartan general, continued to assemble forces and prepare for hostilities.

AGESILAUS employed this interval in making a tour through the principal cities, in order to redress injuries, and establish the government on a proper foundation.

LYSANDER, whose power in Asia had been absolute, and whose name was still illustrious or formidable, rivalled and eclipsed the Spartan king in the eyes of the Ionians. They believed, that Agesilaus was general only in name



**C H A P.** name and appearance, and that the whole au-  
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thority was still vested in Lyfander. Hence they paid their homage to him in crowds, and augmented his train when he went abroad, while Agefilaus remained almost in solitude. A general and a king could not but feel such a diminution, or rather annihilation of his authority ; but Agefilaus, on this occasion, proceeded too far in humbling a rival, to whom he owed his throne, and his present command. He took every opportunity to diminish the influence, and mortify the pride of Lyfander ; and while he raised private officers to the highest commands and honours, appointed the man who had been celebrated as a conqueror in the east, a commissary of stores. Lyfander required an explanation, and a pretended reconciliation took place ; but there can be no cordial union between minds equally ambitious. He was appointed to the command of the Lacedæmonian squadron on the Hellespont, an honourable kind of exile, in which he nourished his resentments, but discharged his duty. Ashamed of a situation in which there were no laurels to gather, he returned in a few months to Sparta, inflamed by resentment, and stung with the ingratitude of his friend, whom he had first raised to the

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throne,

throne, and afterwards to the chief command of the army.

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WHEN Tissaphernes had collected his forces, and received his auxiliary troops from Persia, he sent heralds to Agesilaus, commanding him to retire from the coast of Asia, and threatening him with the vengeance of the Great King in the event of disobedience. While his officers were alarmed at this message, and the prospect of hostilities, the Spartan commander, with all the appearance of cheerfulness and satisfaction, desired the heralds to tell their master, "That he had laid him under a signal obligation for having made the gods, by his perfidy and perjury, the enemies of Persia, and the friends of Greece."

To the treachery of the Persian, he opposed a successful stratagem. He made a feint of marching his army into the province of Caria, the residence of the satrap, and where his treasures were deposited. Tissaphernes, believing that he intended to make Caria the scene of military operations, encamped on the plains of the Meander, in order to oppose his passage; but Agesilaus, having left a strong garrison in Ephesus, advanced with rapidity into Phrygia, captured many towns, and divided the rich spoil among his army. The ungenerous  
satrap

CHAP. satrap made no effort to relieve Phrygia, which  
XXI. was the province of Pharnabafus; accordingly the Spartan army ravaged it, during the summer, almost without resistance, and returned to Ephesus crowned with victory, and loaded with plunder.

DURING the winter, Agefilaus was occupied in military preparations or martial exercises. The spoils of Phrygia were expended in fabricating all the implements of war. Horses were disciplined to the field, and the men trained to arms. The whole city was in motion, and Ephesus seemed to be a palæstra, and a school of war. Agefilaus not only encouraged the martial games of the Greeks among his soldiers, but contended also for the prize himself; and as often as he obtained the crown of victory, devoted it to the gods, and placed it in the celebrated temple of the Ephesian Diana.

WHEN the season for taking the field returned, Agefilaus declared, that he would march into Lydia. Tissaphernes, suspecting this to be a second stratagem, advanced with his forces immediately towards Caria, which he concluded to be the real destination of the Spartan army. But he found himself deceived; Agefilaus entered Lydia, and approached

proached towards Sardis. Thither the satrap hastened with his cavalry, to relieve the place. Agefilaus, knowing that his infantry had not arrived, gave him battle on the banks of the Pactolus, made a great slaughter of his troops, and plundered his camp. Tissaphernes, as if foreseeing a defeat, had taken refuge within the walls of Sardis, where he passed his time in Asiatic pomp and luxury, while the army of Agefilaus was ravaging the territories, and plundering the cities of Lydia. After the unsuccessful event of this engagement, he was accused of treason to the king, who dispatched Tithraustes from court, with the sentence of his fate. The new satrap, on his arrival in Lydia, desired a conference with Tissaphernes, who, suspecting nothing, went with a guard only of three hundred men. Tithraustes, having seized him while bathing, ordered his head to be struck off, and sent to the Persian king. He suffered the punishment due to his crimes; and, to aggravate his misery, these crimes had been committed in the service, and for the benefit of that sovereign who was the author of his death.

TITHRAUSTES succeeded to the government of Lower Asia, and the command of

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the

**C H A P. XXI.** the army. Having assumed his dignified station, he sent an embassy to Agefilaus with presents from the king his master. The ambassadors were commissioned to declare, "That Tissaphernes had suffered deserved punishment; that the Great King, having now discovered his artifices which had produced the war, was ready to acknowledge the independence of the Greek cities in Asia, provided that Agefilaus withdrew his troops and returned to Greece." The Spartan commander replied, "That he was not master of peace or war; of these the senate must determine; nor could he withdraw his forces from Asia without the authority of the Lacedæmonian republic." The satrap, wishing at least to divert the course of hostilities, proposed to Agefilaus to attack Phrygia, the province of Pharnabafus, and offered him thirty talents to defray the expences of the expedition. This proposal, shameful to both parties, was accepted.

IN his march towards Phrygia, a messenger from Sparta delivered him a mandate from the senate, prolonging the term of his military rule, and adding to it the command of a numerous fleet, consisting of ninety gallies. By these new powers, he found himself commander

commander in chief of the forces both by sea and land; an honour which Sparta had never before conferred on any of her generals or kings. During the victorious career of Agefilaus in Asia, Pharax, who was then at the head of that fleet, had performed signal services to his country. Forgetting, or wishing to forget, his important merits, Agefilaus superseded him, and appointed in his stead Pisander, his brother-in-law, who, indeed, possessed the rough and masculine courage of a Spartan, but none of the talents of a commander.

AGESILAUS, having entered Phrygia, levied heavy contributions on the cities, and ravaged the country at his pleasure. The same and terror of the Grecian name pervaded the neighbouring regions. The oppressed subjects of despotism counted the protection of a new and unknown power; galled by the weight of the Persian yoke, they hoped to gain by the change of masters. Colys, the prince of Paphlagonia, who had refused the proffered alliance of the Persian king, requested to associate his numerous cavalry with the army of Agefilaus. Ariæus, and the numerous Asiatic forces who had followed the standard of Cyrus, might easily be inflamed into a second revolt against a master, who probably viewed

CHAP. them with the eyes of jealousy and distrust.

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Egypt was in a state of rebellion. All the Lower Asia was discontented, and wished to deliver itself into the hands of Agesilaus; who, encouraged by these favourable circumstances, resolved and prepared to carry the war into the heart of Persia, and, by crushing the power of the Great King at the center, prevent him in future from involving Greece in the crimes and calamities of war.

THIS ambitious and splendid project was defeated in its origin by the influence of Persian intrigue, and the power of Persian gold. Tithraustes, who knew that, from the mercenary temper, constant jealousies, and unsteady politics of the Grecian states, it would be easy to set them at variance with one another, sent Timocrates, a man of boldness and address, with fifty talents \*, into Greece, among the cities which opposed the oppressive dominion and imperious pre-eminence of Sparta. The negotiation of Timocrates succeeded to his wishes. He bribed to the Persian interest the leading men in Argos, Corinth, and Thebes, who, in their respective cities, declaimed with the most vehement eloquence against the

\* Above nine thousand pounds.

injustice,

injustice, oppression, unbounded ambition, and insolent tyranny of Sparta. They recalled to the remembrance of the people the recent devastation of the consecrated territory of Elis, and predicted the same desolation to every community that incurred their displeasure. The Spartans, continued they, have emancipated their helots, that they may have no slaves but their allies, and aspire to dominion in Asia, in order to subjugate Greece.

THESE severe accusations acquired double weight from their being founded on truth, and addressed to men who not only believed, but felt their reality. Since the close of the Peloponnesian war, the domineering authority of Sparta had rendered her equally odious to her old and her new allies; and both were disposed for a revolution. The Athenians, on this occasion, displayed the virtues of their ancestors, and refused to admit the ministers of corruption within their walls\*; but the occasion was too favourable to be lost of attempting to regain their former power, with Asia as well as Greece on their side. As Thebes had opened her gates to the Athenians in exile, the Athenians voted, from gra-

\* Xen. Hellen. lib. iii.



CHAPTER. titude, an alliance offensive and defensive with  
 XXI. Thebes, which was devoted to the interest of  
 Persia.

As suspicions and animosities already prevailed on both sides, an occasion soon presented itself of coming to an open quarrel. A dispute having arisen between the Phocians and Locrians, concerning the property of a small piece of ground, the Phocians, who were the allies of the Spartans, took arms to attack the Locri, while the Thebans, their friends, prepared to defend them. Without enquiring into the cause of the quarrel, or condescending to remonstrate, the haughty and vindictive Spartans immediately flew to arms, and sent Lyfander to invade Bœotia. Having assembled the northern confederates, he marched into the Theban territory, took Lebadea, and prepared to attack Haliartus, one of the most considerable cities of Bœotia. He sent dispatches to Pausanias, the Spartan king, requesting his co-operation on this critical occasion with his Peloponnesian troops; and fixed next morning at sun-rise as the time to attack the city with their united forces: but the messenger was intercepted by the Thebans; and at the same time a powerful body of Athenian troops arrived to the assistance of  
 their

their Theban allies. The care of the city was committed to the Athenians, while the flower of the Theban army set out in the dead of night, and reached the gates of Haliartus long before the break of day. When the citizens of Haliartus had recognized their friends, and were made acquainted with the cause of this unexpected visit, they mutually concerted measures to defeat the stratagem of Lyfander, and amply to avenge themselves on the Spartan invaders.

A DETACHMENT of Thebans was placed in ambush without the walls. The remainder, together with the citizens of Haliartus, stood ready armed within the city. Lyfander, as he had proposed in his letter, arrived in the morning; but Pausanias, who was ignorant of his intentions, remained at Platæa. The soldiers, animated by their recent victories, requested their commander to lead them to the attack; and he, willing to reap all the glory of the conquest, readily yielded to their request.

DECEIVED by the apparent unguarded state of the city, he began the assault with great boldness. But while his army were attempting to make a breach in the wall, the Thebans and Haliartians rushed from the

CHAP. gates, and attacked their astonished foes. Ly-  
XXI. sander fell in the beginning of the action.

His troops attempted to rally, but were prevented by the Thebans, who lay in ambush. The invaders were completely defeated; more than a thousand were left dead in the field, besides those who fell in the disorderly retreat.

INFORMED of this unexpected calamity, Pausanias marched to the field of battle, to celebrate the funeral obsequies of the slain. A herald was accordingly sent to Haliartus, intreating permission to bury the dead. The request was granted, on condition that the Peloponnesian army should immediately withdraw from Bœotia. From the want of success attending this expedition, Pausanias, on his return to Sparta, was tried, and condemned to death, but avoided the execution of the sentence, by flying to Tegea, where he soon afterwards died, transmitting his scepter to his son Agefipolis, an infant.

THE defeat of Lyfander's army at Haliartus, and the death of that renowned general, emboldened the enemies of Sparta, and accelerated the desertion of her allies. The republics of Thebes, Argos, Athens, and Corinth, now openly avowed their hostility to the Lacedæmonians. The island Eubœa, the provinces  
of

of Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia, the cities of Chalcis, and the principalities of Thessaly, revolted from the alliance, or rather the yoke of Sparta. The consequence, and power which she had acquired, by her success in the Peloponnesian war seemed now in the utmost danger; and no resource remained to save her from the brink of ruin, but that of recalling Agesilaus from pursuing his victories in Asia. Accordingly, the orders of the republic were sent, commanding his return to the defence of his country, at the critical moment when he had assembled all his forces for marching into Upper Asia, in order to shake or overturn the throne of the Persian king.

WITHOUT deliberating a moment, Agesilaus obeyed. His answer, transmitted to us by Plutarch, expresses the character of the Spartan government. "We have reduced part of Asia, put the barbarians to flight, and made great preparations for a Persian war: but, as you order me to return, I am already on my march. I received the command, not for myself, but for my country; and I know that a general does not deserve that name, but as he submits to the laws, and obeys the Ephori, and the magistrates."

CHAP. XXI. WHEN he communicated his resolution to the army, they expressed their grief and reluctance at being torn from the promised spoils of Asia; but declared with tears, that they would never forsake the standard of a general, under whom they had so often fought and conquered. Agesilaus encouraged this ardour and attachment, and, to secure its continuance, proposed to reward such officers as should join him with bodies of foot or cavalry in the Thracian Chersonesus. The wealth of Lydia and Phrygia enabled him amply to fulfil his promises, to defray the expences of the war, and to return to Greece with above a thousand talents\*.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians had collected an army, and given the command of it to Aristodemus, tutor to their infant king. The confederated army, consisting of twenty thousand men, proposed to attack the Lacedæmonian capital; but the Spartan vigilance prevented this attempt, which, in the absence of Agesilaus, was a master-stroke of policy. Having assembled fourteen thousand men, of whom the greater part was furnished by the allies, they attacked the enemy near Nemæa,

\* A hundred and ninety-three thousand pounds.

a city on the frontier of Corinth. The engagement was obstinate and bloody, but not decisive; the Spartans remained masters of the field.

AFTER Agefilaus had assembled his forces in the Chersonesus, he proceeded with all expedition towards Greece, and in one month accomplished what had been the labour of a year to Xerxes and his army. Instead of pursuing his journey through the hostile territories of Locris, he marched through Doris and Phocis, that were in alliance with Sparta, that he might not be detained by unimportant skirmishes from attacking the Theban army. The recent engagement at Nemæa had inflamed, rather than depressed, their spirits. They still amounted to twenty thousand men, the forces of Agefilaus were superior in number, as he had received considerable reinforcements from Sparta and Phocis, from Archomenus in Bœotia, and Epidaurus in Argolis. While the armies were approaching to engage on the plains of Coronæa, Agefilaus was alarmed by very unwelcome intelligence from Asia.

AFTER the engagement at Ægos Potamos, which terminated the Peloponnesian war, Conon, the Athenian admiral, made his escape

CHAP. cape, with a few ships into the harbour of  
XXI. Salamis. Evagoras, a prince who counted his  
lineage from Teucer, reigned at that time in  
Salamis.

A PHENICIAN adventurer had usurped the throne, under whose reign Evagoras was born. This tyrant was dethroned and murdered by another usurper. When grown up to the age of maturity, Evagoras was obliged to fly to Cilicia, to avoid the attempts of the new tyrant against his life: returning soon after, with a small but devoted band, he deposed the usurper, and ascended the throne with the approbation of his fellow citizens.

FROM the commencement of his reign he confirmed the promise of his youth, and unfolded the valuable talents, and excellent dispositions, which render princes a blessing to their subjects. He soon raised his little kingdom to a flourishing condition; rendered his subjects active and industrious, and encouraged an emulation among them to excel in agriculture, commerce, and navigation. Conon, who deserved his esteem, and acquired his affection, encouraged and assisted him in these patriotic pursuits; and, in a  
short

short time, Salamis annexed to her dominion several of the neighbouring communities, and was able to raise a naval power that rendered her respectable at sea.

THE attachment of Evagoras to the Athenians, in whose language and arts he had been instructed, was increased by his virtuous sensibility and grateful affection, when he beheld the fall of their republic, from power and renown, to depression and slavery, under the Spartan yoke. The suggestions of Conon concurred with the sentiments of his own mind; and they concerted a plan for weakening the power of Sparta, and restoring Athens to its pristine splendor. The conquests of Agesilaus in Asia forwarded the execution of their plan. Evagoras and Pharnabazus had already made the Persian monarch acquainted with the merits of Conon. In consequence of these testimonials of his merit, he had been formerly employed in the naval service against Pharaoh; and he embraced this opportunity of travelling to Babylon, and representing to Artaxerxes the necessity of opposing the Lacedæmonians on that element, in which they had acquired, and still preserved the command of the Ionian coast. A decisive victory at sea would shake the  
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the whole fabric of their power, and expel them from Asia. Under the auspicious conduct of Pharnabazus, nothing was necessary to accomplish this undertaking, but a body of seamen, equal to those in the service of the Spartans. If the Great King would furnish the necessary supplies, he would engage to collect such a number of Grecian sailors as would give Persia the decided superiority at sea, and compel Agesilaus to relinquish his conquests in the east.

ARTAXERXES, delighted with the proposal, ordered the sum of money required to be paid from his treasury; and Conon returned to Cilicia, to carry his design into execution. From the Greek cities and seaports in Asia and Europe, he soon assembled a marine force, which, when joined to the squadrons commanded by Pharnabazus, enabled him to engage the Spartan admiral with superior numbers. The combined armament set sail in quest of the enemy; and, as they advanced beyond the northern extremity of Rhodes, discovered the Lacedæmonian fleet, consisting of a hundred gallies, in the spacious bay which is formed by the group of scattered islands called Sporades, and the Dorian coast. Pisander did not decline the  
unequal

unequal engagement. He ordered his men to prepare for battle, and advance against the enemy. The greater number, however, despairing of success against such superior numbers, withdrew from the engagement, and retreated towards the shore of Cnidus. Pisander, who possessed the courage of a soldier, without the sagacity of a commander, after fighting bravely, died with honour in the cause of his country. The conquerors, after destroying vast numbers of the enemy, captured fifty gallees; a memorable and irreparable blow, which deprived the Lacedæmonians of their empire at sea, and of their dominions at land from Cnidus to Byzantium.

AGESILAUS, dreading the impression that the news of so severe a blow might have upon his troops, gave out in the army, that the Lacedæmonians had gained a considerable victory at sea; and, appearing in public with a garland of flowers upon his head, offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the gods.

THE two armies, nearly equal in numbers, now advanced towards each other on the plains of Coronæa. The Thebans, raising an universal shout, ran furiously to the charge, and soon put the left wing to flight, chiefly

**CHAP.** consisting of the Orchomenians; while Age-  
**XXI.** filaus repelled the Argives, who composed  
the left wing of the enemy. The Thebans  
having totally routed the Orchomenians, ad-  
vanced to take possession of the baggage, and  
to reassemble their allies, who had fled to-  
wards Mount Helicon; but Agefilaus, by a  
masterly manœuvre, intercepted them. The  
Thebans observing this movement, formed a  
hollow square, and waited his approach. The  
Spartan king, guided rather by the impetu-  
osity of a soldier, than the calm prudence of  
a general, attacked them in front, instead of  
allowing them to pass, that he might assail  
them in flank, or harass their rear. The  
shock was terrible, bloody, destructive; and,  
of all the battles which happened in his time,  
Xenophon says, that this was fought with  
the most desperate fury. Finding it impos-  
sible to break the Thebans in front. The  
Spartans at last opened their phalanx to this  
unconquerable band, and permitted them to  
join their friends; but no persuasions of the  
Thebans could prevail on their allies to renew  
the engagement. The Spartans thus re-  
mained masters of the field, which was a  
scene of carnage, havoc, and horror.

AGESILAUS, though he had received several  
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ral wounds in the engagement, would not retire to his tent, till he had seen the dead carried off on their shields. Being informed that about fourscore of the enemy had taken refuge in a temple of Minerva, he sent a guard to escort them to a place of safety. The day following the battle was employed in erecting a trophy, as a monument of this important victory; while the enemy sent heralds to demand permission to bury their dead. Notwithstanding his wounds, and weakness in consequence of them, Agesilaus travelled to Delphi, where the Pythian games were then celebrating, in order to dedicate the tenth of his Asiatic spoils, amounting to a hundred talents, in the celebrated temple of Apollo. Returning towards the Peloponnesus, he then disbanded his troops, and set sail for Sparta.

HE was received by his country with every demonstration of joy and gratitude. They beheld with admiration the same simplicity of manners, frugality of life, and attachment to Spartan customs, by which he had been formerly distinguished: In his Asiatic expedition he had shared the toils of the meanest soldier; nor was he to be distinguished from the rest of the army, by his dress,

CHAP. drefs, his food, or his accommodations, by  
XXI. day or night. He returned from Asia too uninfected with its corruptions; untainted with the love of pleasure, luxury, and pomp, which characterise the manners of the natives, and which former generals had introduced into Sparta. He made no alteration in his table, drefs, equipage, or furniture. Instead of the pride and presumption of a victorious commander, he displayed the modesty of a private citizen; and was only to be distinguished from other Spartans by a greater submission to the laws, and attachment to the customs of his country.

THE Theban or Corinthian war lasted eight years; but was not distinguished by any celebrated or important actions, except the engagement at sea between Conon and Pisander, and the battle of Coronæa.

IN the partial and undecisive engagements which followed, the Athenians were generally successful by sea, and the Spartans by land. Telcutias, the brother of Agefilaus, it is true, surpris'd the Piræus with twelve gallies, and destroyed several ships of war; and Iphicrates, the Athenian, gained some advantages by land, which announced those great talents for war, which rendered him afterwards so conspicuous:

conspicuous: but, for the most part, superiority and success attended the operations of the Spartan army, and the Athenian fleet.

THE Lacedæmonians reaped no real or lasting advantages from their victory at Coronæa; but serious and irretrievable calamities arose from their defeat at Cnidus. One day destroyed the fruit of many laborious campaigns; deprived them of the command at sea, which devolved to Conon and Pharnabazus, who, in the space of three months, detached for ever from their dominions the whole western coast of Asia Minor. The important and meritorious services of these commanders were not overlooked or neglected by the Persian monarch, who, after loading Pharnabazus with wealth and honours, gave him his daughter in marriage.

THE noble ambition of Conon neither desired or solicited rewards or honours for himself. To raise his fallen country from her ruins was the generous and patriotic motive, which was the source of all his actions. By his suggestion and persuasion, a naval armament had been fitted out, which retaliated the ravages, and revenged the conquests of Agesilaus. To depress still farther the pride of Sparta, he now proposed to

CHAP. the Persian king, and his viceroy, the re-esta-  
XXI. blishment of Athens. The proposal was  
favourably received; liberal supplies of money were given; and Pharnabazus conferred on Conon the command of the naval armament; which immediately set sail, and, after reducing the Cyclades and Cythera, and ravaging the coast of Laconia, assembled in the harbours of Phalerus, Munichia, and Piræus. No time was lost in the important work of rebuilding the harbours and fortifications of Athens. Besides artificans, who were allured by gain, the soldiers and sailors contributed their efforts; the voluntary exertions of the allies, particularly the Thebans, accelerated the progress of the undertaking; while the zealous labours of the natives were never intermitted, in restoring their celebrated capital to its antient strength and splendor. The work was completed with astonishing rapidity; and, by a singular combination of vicissitudes, the Athenian capital, after having been formerly reduced to ashes by the Persians, was now rebuilt by their own hands; and, after having been dismantled and demolished by the Lacedæmonians, was restored at their expence, and by the spoils taken from their fleet.

WHEN these tidings were conveyed to Sparta, they were received with the deepest disappointment and vexation, and excited in their minds every invidious and malignant passion. They looked upon the restoration of that city as the overthrow of their own; and would rather have been swept from the face of Greece, than have allowed the Athenians to enjoy their antient independence and prosperity. From these base motives, they adopted the timid and treacherous resolution of avenging themselves upon their Athenian rivals, by making a disadvantageous and dishonourable peace with the king of Persia. They were ready to sacrifice every thing, provided the Great King would withdraw his fleet from co-operating to the re-establishment of the Athenian power. To accomplish this purpose, they sent Antalcidas to Teribazus, who had succeeded Tithraustes as satrap of the southern provinces, and afterwards to Babylon. The previous history of this ambassador is unknown; he appears, however, to have had nothing of a Spartan but the name; but to have possessed all the arts of complaisance and insinuation, and to have been versed in all the vices of dissimulation, flattery, and seduction, which qualify a man



CHAP. for such an employment, and facilitate his  
 XXI. success. To please the Persian king and his  
 satraps, he laid aside the dignity of office,  
 and acted the buffoon; he publicly derided  
 the institutions of Lycurgus, and in a mimic  
 dance ridiculed the heroism of Leonidas at  
 Thermopylæ \*.

SUCH a character, at such a court, could hardly fail to accomplish his ends, though his success had not been precipitated by the imprudent patriotism of Conon. After rebuilding the fortifications of Athens, this illustrious commander requested Pharnabazus to permit him, for a few months, to employ the combined fleet in ravaging the territories of Sparta and her allies. The unsuspecting governor readily granted his desire. But Conon neglected his promise, and meditated only to promote the interest and glory of his country. He displayed at Chios, at Lesbos, and along the Eolian and Ionian coasts, the numbers and the strength of his naval armament, and, describing the happy revolution that had raised Athens to her former power and splendor, invited the Asiatics and islanders to recognise the authority

\* Athenæus, lib. ii.

of their antient sovereign, and share with her the government of Greece. C H A P  
XXI.

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SUCH a visionary project could have no effects, but to bring ruin or disgrace on the head of the contriver. The sagacious and artful Antalcidas immediately represented him as guilty of the most aggravated treachery, ingratitude, and rebellion, in violating his engagements as soon as they were made; in forgetting the signal obligations received by himself and his country, and attempting to conquer the Persian dominions by the assistance of the Persian troops. Conon was now abandoned, even by his friend Pharnabazus, and Antalcidas carried on his intrigues, if not without opposition, at least with triumphant success. Neither the remonstrances of Conon, and the other Athenian ambassadors, nor those of the Theban and Argive deputies, were attended to, while the Spartan negotiator obtained every thing he desired. Antalcidas proposed terms that seemed to have been dictated by the Persian monarch:—  
 “The Spartans resign all pretensions to the sovereignty of the Greek cities in Asia, which they acknowledge is the right of the Great King. They are ready to declare all the cities and islands reciprocally independent;

F f 3                      which

CHAP. which will henceforth prevent any one of  
 XXI. them from acquiring sufficient power to dispute the supremacy of Persia.”

These conditions, which the most insolent minister of the most insolent monarch could hardly have solicited or desired, awakened no jealousy or suspicion in the mind of Teribazus, who was lulled into profound security by the arts of the Spartan ambassador. The fate of the patriotic Conon must excite emotions of sorrow and regret in every mind of sensibility. After having sacrificed every thing, even justice and integrity, to the service of his country, he was condemned either to death or perpetual imprisonment\*. The successful Antalcidas, on the contrary, was amply rewarded.

Although the conditions of the alliance between Persia and Sparta were in the highest degree advantageous and honourable to Artaxerxes, the negociation remained unaccomplished for several years. Teribazus incurred the displeasure of his lord, and was succeeded in his government by Struthas, who adopted, with warmth, the interest of the Athenians. The powerful efforts of the Argive and

\* Xenoph. Gr. Hist. l. 4.

Bœotian deputies contributed likewise to this end, as they raised suspicions against the Spartans, by discovering the real object they had in view.

MEANWHILE the military operations of the contending states were carried on by those sallies and incursions that irritate without enfeebling, and contribute to provoke, rather than to terminate hostilities. The Lacedæmonians ravaged the country, and plundered the villages of their enemies in Peloponnesus. The Thebans and Argives, on the other hand, laid waste the territories of Laconia; and the Athenians employed the renovated vigour of their republic in regaining the empire of the sea.

THE death or captivity of Conon again called forth the abilities of Thrasylbulus, whose vigour and patriotisim had twice rescued his country from the yoke of tyranny. The Athenian fleet, consisting of forty gallies, was entrusted to this commander; who, having sailed towards the Hellespont, induced the inhabitants of Byzantium, and several other cities of Thrace, to accede to the Athenian alliance. He next landed in the isle of Lesbos, and, having engaged the enemy near Methymna, defeated the Lacedæmonian

CHAP. troops, and slew, with his own hand, Therimachus, the general. From this island he  
 XXI. drew considerable reinforcements to his fleet, and, with this accession of strength, proceeded towards Rhodes, to assist the Athenian party in that island. To provide himself with resources for this expedition, he raised supplies from the sea-ports of Asia; and, entering the mouth of the Eurymedon, exacted a heavy contribution from Aspendus, the capital of Pamphylia. This act of power would, perhaps, as usual, have been submitted to, but the unrestrained enormities of the sailors and soldiers provoked the Pamphylians to resistance. The Grecian camp was attacked in the night, a considerable slaughter ensued, and Thrasylbulus himself fell a sacrifice to his unbounded rapacity and avarice.

THESE unjust and oppressive exactions on the capital of Pamphylia presented another opportunity for the vigilant Antalcidas to work on the passions of the Persian king, and inflame his resentment against the Athenians.

ARTAXERXES at last determined to embrace the cause of the Spartans; and thus dictated the terms of a general pacification:—"It is the pleasure of Artaxerxes, the king, that the  
 island

island of Cyprus, and Clazomene, belong to him; that the other Grecian states be severally enfranchised and independent, with exception to Lemnos, Imbroş, and Scyros, which, as of old, shall be subject to the Athenians; and, whatever state accepts not these terms, I will go to war with it and its adherents, by sea and land\*.”

WHEN the deputies of the Grecian cities were summoned by Teribazus to hear the conditions of peace, they were astonished to find, instead of an equitable treaty, the imperious mandate of the Great King, who, by their dissensions and hostilities, had become the sovereign arbiter of Greece.

THE greater part of the Grecian states rejected with horror terms of pacification so humiliating and so infamous. But, as they were enfeebled and exhausted by their internal divisions and animosities, and were unable to support a war against a prince so opulent and powerful, it was expected that prudence, as well as necessity, would soon induce them to accept the conditions of peace. Thebes, Argos, and Athens, made the only vigorous opposition to a treaty that was equal-

\* Xenoph. p. 550.

CHAPTER. ly destructive to the interest, and disgraceful  
XXI. to the fame of Greece. The Thebans were  
averse to resign their authority over the inferior communities of Bœotia: the Argives were reluctant to withdraw their forces from Corinth, and leave that capital in the power of the Lacedæmonian party: and the Athenians could not relinquish, without regret, the fruits of their late conquests, and their hopes of future prosperity and renown. The sagacious Antalcidas had foreseen and prevented the opposition of these states. A fleet of eighty sail, fitted out with Persian gold, was ready to awe them into compliance. Teribazus had collected a squadron, and was prepared to attack the isle of Cyprus, if Evagoras should revolt. The Persian governor had also raised an army, which was ready at the first summons to embark for Greece, and to co-operate with the Lacedæmonians against all who might venture to refuse the terms of peace which had been dictated by Persia. These formidable preparations alarmed the fears of the confederates, and obliged them to submit, though with sullen reluctance, to the terms of accommodation. The resistance of the Thebans was the most obstinate;

nate; but, at length, yielded to the menaces of Sparta. Open hostilities ceased, the armies on both sides were disbanded, a sort of forced tranquillity was established, but it was like that gloomy stillness which precedes and announces a storm,

C H A P.  
XXI.

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## C H A P. XXII.

*From the Peace of Antalcidas to the Fall of the Theban Empire.*

C H A P.  
XXII.

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THE famous and shameful treaty of Antalcidas, owed its origin and completion to the artifice and address of the Lacedæmonians. The success which attended the arms of Agesilaus, in Asia; the rapidity and the splendor of his victories, and his long-concerted plan of carrying the war into the heart of Persia, struck terror into the regions of despotism, and made the Great King tremble on his throne. The arrival of Conon, at the court of Babylon, at this critical conjuncture, relieved the fears of the monarch, and wrought a revolution in his councils. He solicited the command of a powerful fleet, and undertook to deprive the Spartans, at one blow, of their empire at sea, and compel them to relinquish their conquests in Asia. In the celebrated sea-fight with Pisander, he fully accomplished his promise; when he crushed the strength of the Peloponnesian fleet

fleet, took fifty of their ships, and blasted in one day the fruit of all the victories that had been gained by Agesilaus. CHAP.  
XXII.

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SPARTA, though subject to an aristocracy, was less governed by system, and discovered less political consistency, than any of the Grecian republics. The rival passions of jealousy, envy, imperious ambition, and revenge, with an inveterate and eternal antipathy against Athens, were the prime movers of all their actions. Hence, when they were informed of the assistance which the Great King had given to that republic, and in particular, when they heard that the Athenian walls and harbours had been rebuilt by Conon, they were torn by the cruellest conflict of contending passions. They were willing to solicit an accommodation with Artaxerxes, on the most mortifying conditions; they were ready to resign all the advantages they had gained, and to abandon all views of foreign conquest, provided the Persian king would cease to open his treasury, and to commission his fleets to raise and aggrandise the growing and dangerous power of their Athenian rivals.

They found too, that while they were endeavouring to extend their conquests abroad, their acquisitions at home were sliding from their

their

**C H A P.** their possession. Athens had risen from its  
**XXII.** ruins with new lustre. Thebes and Argos  
 had become formidable, and assumed political  
 importance. Many of the Peloponnesian  
 cities had shaken off their authority; their  
 colonies in Thrace and Macedon no longer  
 obeyed them; and they were deprived of all  
 their Ionian acquisitions. During a war of  
 twenty-seven years, they had fought and con-  
 quered both in Europe and in Asia, and were  
 now in a worse condition than at the com-  
 mencement of hostilities.

THEY now began to abandon all thoughts  
 of distant expeditions, and relinquished all  
 concern with Asiatic affairs. In return, they  
 obtained many substantial advantages from the  
 Persian monarch. To them it was given in  
 charge to see that the articles of the peace  
 were strictly adhered to; and, for this pur-  
 pose, they were supplied with money from  
 the Persian treasury to raise troops in Greece.  
 While, in consequence of the peace of An-  
 talcidas, the Thebans had been compelled to  
 permit the cities of Bœotia to enjoy their li-  
 berty, and the Argives to withdraw their gar-  
 rison from Corinth, the Lacedæmonians, on  
 their part, discovered no intention of comply-  
 ing with the articles of the treaty.

HAVING

HAVING found their power already increased, they resolved to extend it farther by policy and arms. They employed their emissaries to encourage the aristocratical factions in the inferior cities; to enflame the reciprocal animosity of the citizens; and, under the semblance of protecting the injured and oppressed, decided every appeal to their senate in such a manner as turned to the advantage and aggrandisement of Sparta.

THE republic of Mantinæa, situated in the center of Arcadia, which, from a few hamlets of shepherds, was now a powerful state, was the first object of their unjust ambition.

HARDLY a year had elapsed since the peace of Antalcidas, when Spartan ambassadors were dispatched to Mantinæa, with one of the most unjust and imperious commissions that is recorded in history. The Mantinæans were commanded, by these emissaries of aristocratic despotism, to raze their fortifications, to forsake their city, and to descend again into the humble and dispersed state of villagers; because, during the late war, they had supplied the Argives with corn, and, though apparently in friendship with Sparta, had rejoiced at her misfortunes.

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THIS insolent request met with the answer it deserved; the ambassadors returned without success, and Sparta declared war. King Agesipolis, with a powerful army, ravaged the territory of the Mantinæans, and laid siege to the city. After an ineffectual siege for several months, he at last contrived a scheme which proved fatal to the brave Mantinæans. The river Ophis flowed through the city of Mantinæa. With much labour and difficulty the course of the stream was stopped below the city, and the foundation of the walls laid under water. The unburnt bricks, of which the fortifications were built, dissolved in the water by which they were overflowed, and the citizens beheld their crumbling walls with sorrow and despair. Perceiving that all farther defence was impossible, the inhabitants sent to capitulate on conditions; but the Spartan king would grant them no other terms than those which had been originally proposed. They were therefore obliged to destroy their city; to separate again into four distinct communities, and return to their original habitations in the villages and hamlets.

THE Lacedæmonians next displayed their tyranny and severity against the republic of

Phlius. This little community was not exempted from that state of ferment which prevailed throughout Greece: it was divided into factions, and the party opposite to Sparta had expelled their opponents. The authority of Agefilaus procured their return from exile; but new quarrels having arisen, commissioners were appointed to try and punish those who were termed the most obnoxious citizens. By condemning to death almost every man of eminence or abilities in the democratical party, these infamous executioners secured the permanent and invariable attachment of Phlius to the interests of Sparta.

AT this period the cities of Acanthus and Apollonia solicited the assistance of the Spartans, against the growing and dangerous power of Olynthus, which was inhabited by Greeks, originally from Chalcis in Eubœa. The Athenians, after their victories in the Persian war, had annexed to their dominion many cities in the Thracian territories and neighbourhood, which threw off the yoke at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Olynthus was of this number. To secure themselves against the encroaching tyranny of Sparta, no less dangerous than that of Athens,

CHAP. the Olynthians had raised troops, and fortified  
 XXII. their city. The state of affairs in Greece,

and the weakness of their neighbours, enabled the citizens of Olynthus, not only to establish their independence, but to extend their dominions by conquest, till, by their power and wealth, they became formidable, and objects of jealousy and alarm to the adjacent communities. On the southern shores of Macedon, they had made themselves masters of Chalcis and Pieræa, which, blessed with a natural fertility, invited the operations of agriculture; and, at the same time, by its maritime situation, was favourable to the pursuits of trade: they grasped at still more valuable acquisitions, and would have extended their dominions on the side of Thrace and Macedon, if the ambassadors of Acanthus and Apollonia had not interested the Spartan ambition to break the strength of this new confederacy, and give an effectual check to their rising greatness.

WHEN Cleigenes, the Acanthian, had delivered, in the name of his colleagues, their complaint and petition before the greater assembly at Sparta, the Lacedæmonians, with their usual affectation of impartiality, desired the opinion of the confederates; who, know-  
 ing

ing the inclinations of the assembly, unanimously resolved, that it was necessary to declare war against the Olynthians. War being determined on, it was agreed that the confederates should raise ten thousand troops, with liberty to such states as were unable to furnish the full complement of soldiers, to pay an equivalent in money, at the rate of half a drachma \* a day for each foot soldier, and four times as much for the horse.

CLEIGENES, the ambassador, informed the assembly, that the critical situation of Acanthus and Apollonia demanded immediate aid; and proposed that, with the troops they had in arms, they should instantly set out on the expedition. The Lacedæmonians consented, and ordered two thousand men to march to Macedon without delay, under the command of Eudamidas; and that his brother Phœbidas should follow him as soon as the remainder of the forces could be collected.

WHEN Eudamidas arrived in Thrace, he placed garrisons in such cities as were most exposed to the enemy; but, as his forces were not yet assembled, he did not commence open hostilities. Potidæa, a city in alliance with

\* Three pence halfpenny.



CHAP. the Olympians, and of considerable import-  
 XXII. ance, in the isthmus of Pallènè, surrendered to  
 him without making any defence.

MEANWHILE Phœbidas began his march, at the head of eight thousand men, and encamped in the neighbourhood of Thebes, near the Gymnasium. Thebes, like all the cities of Greece, was at that time agitated by the contentions of a popular and an aristocratical or Spartan faction. Ismenias was at the head of the democratical party; Leontiades of the Spartan; both were polemarchs, that is, generals of the army, and chief magistrates in the commonwealth. It is probable that Phœbidas had orders from the senate, or from king Agefilaus, to take a decided part in the Theban divisions, which made him listen with the greater alacrity to the proposal of Leontiades, “to seize the citadel, to expel the adherents of Ismenias, and take possession of it with his troops in the name of the Lacedæmonians.” He represented to him, “that nothing would be more easy, and at the same time more honourable, than to make himself master of Thebes, a greater and more important prize than the capital of the Olympians.”

PHŒBIDAS received the proposal with transports

transports of joy. The plan of operations was soon settled between the conspirators. The Thebans, confiding with perfect security in the late treaty of peace, were preparing to celebrate the feast of Ceres. It was in the midst of summer, and, during the intense heat of noon, few passengers were to be seen in the streets. Phœbidas, who, to conceal his intentions, had made preparations for continuing his march, was at the favourable moment called by his confederate to the scene of action. At this festival, the Theban matrons went in procession to the Cadmæa, or citadel, to acknowledge the past, and implore the future favours of the beneficent goddess who presides over the harvest. For them the gates of the Cadmæa were left open, and, as no male was admitted to this mystic solemnity, the place was without defence. Accordingly Phœbidas and his army, conducted by Leontiades, took possession of the citadel without opposition. The senate was then sitting in the market-place, Leontiades took his place among the senators, and avowed that the Lacedæmonians had acted by his authority, not as enemies, but to preserve the public tranquillity. He then seized Ismenias, with the leaders of the opposite party, and sent them

CHAP. to the citadel. Many were thrown into pri-  
XXII. son, and about four hundred fled with precipitation to Athens.

WHEN the Spartan senate received information of this atrocious enterprize, that one of their generals had, by open violence and force of arms, taken possession of a city in alliance with, their republic, complaints and accusations against the conduct of Phœbidas resounded from all quarters. The opponents of Agefilaus, who suspected his being the contriver of this shameful transaction, demanded by whose authority a Spartan commander had committed such a flagrant violation of public faith, such a shocking act of perfidy as would have disgraced the rudest barbarians. Agefilaus found no difficulty in vindicating the conduct of Phœbidas, and publicly declared to the senate that the sole question was concerning the utility of the action. Whatever was beneficial and expedient for Sparta, a general was not only permitted but commanded to perform, by his own authority, and without waiting for orders. Such corrupted maxims of policy have been often adopted and pursued, but seldom avowed, except by the Lacedæmonians. The senate, after a long discussion, and mature deliberation,

beration, resolved, according to their usual hypocrisy, “ That Phœbidas should be deprived of his command, and fined in a hundred thousand drachmas \*; but that the citadel should be retained, and defended by a strong garrison.” The Lacedæmonians, not satisfied with this act of injustice and perfidy, sent commissioners from the cities in their alliance to try, or rather to condemn Ismeniās, who, upon their arrival, was immediately put to death.

TELEUTIAS, the brother of Agesilaus, was appointed, in the place of Phœbidas, to command ten thousand troops destined against Olynthus. By the assistance of Amintas, king of Macedon, he compelled the Olynthians to retire within the inclosure and protection of their walls. Many sallies were made, with uncertain success; but Teleutias, beholding a party of his cavalry cut to pieces by the Olynthians, advanced against them at the head of his heavy-armed troops, with greater precipitation than prudence. The Olynthians never halted till they arrived under the fortifications. The townsmen then mounted the battlements, and assaulted the enemy with darts, arrows, and other missile

\* Above two thousand pounds. •

C. H A P. weapons. At the same time the Olynthian  
 XXII. army, which were in readiness within the  
 walls, sallied forth with impetuosity: the  
 Spartan general fell in the first attack; the  
 army was repulsed with great slaughter, and  
 fled to Acanthus and Apollonia.

THIS check served only to animate the  
 ardour of the Lacedæmonians. In the third  
 year of the war, king Agefipolis marched into  
 Macedon with a strong reinforcement. After  
 ravaging the Olynthian territories, he took  
 by storm the strong city of Torona; but in  
 the midst of his success he was seized with a  
 calenture, and died in the seventh day of the  
 disease. Cleombrotus, his brother, succeeded  
 to the throne of Sparta; and Polybiades was  
 appointed to command the forces against  
 Olynthus.

THIS general surrounded the city by land,  
 while a squadron of Lacedæmonian vessels  
 blocked up the adjacent harbour of Mecy-  
 berna. The Olynthians were now cut off  
 from all supplies both by sea and land; and  
 were at last compelled by famine to capitu-  
 late. They relinquished all claim to the  
 Chalcidicè, gave up the cities of Macedon to  
 their former sovereign, and bound themselves  
 to obey, on all occasions, the mandates of their  
 Spartan

Spartan allies.\* After the submission of the Olynthians, Amintas re-established his court at Pella, which thenceforth continued to be the residence of the Macedonian kings.

THE Spartans, after they had seized with a strong arm the Theban citadel, maintained possession of it during five years, with a garrison of fifteen hundred men. The partizans of aristocracy and Sparta now acquired an entire ascendancy in the government, and the Thebans experienced every species of oppression. Not satisfied with the exercise of despotism in Thebes, they persecuted the unhappy exiles from their country, till at last both those in the city, and those who had fled from it, driven to the last extremities, and deriving courage from despair, were determined to hazard every thing rather than to groan any longer under the Lacedæmonian yoke.

AT this time the prosperity of Sparta appeared to be in its greatest splendor, and its power so firmly established as to bid defiance to accident or opposition. Thebes, and all the cities of Bœotia, had lately submitted to their authority. They had contrived measures to humble the pride of Argos, and to retain it in a state of dependence. \*Corinth acknowledged

CHAPTER. acknowledged their jurisdiction, and was ready  
 XXII. to obey their commands. The Athenians,  
 ——— deprived, by the late treaty, of their allies, and  
 reduced to their individual strength, were not  
 in a condition to contend for dominion with  
 their powerful rival. If any state or city at-  
 tempted to shake off their authority, imme-  
 diate and severe punishment reduced them to  
 obedience, and struck terror into the neigh-  
 bouring communities. While thus they ty-  
 rannized over Greece, the Great King was  
 their ally, and the wealth and power of Persia  
 were pledged and prepared to give vigour  
 and success to their measures.

BUT, notwithstanding this apparent tran-  
 quillity, a revolution was preparing in a quar-  
 ter where they had inflicted the deepest in-  
 juries, but whence they neither expected nor  
 apprehended any attempt towards retaliation.  
 The four hundred Thebans, who had fled to  
 Athens after Phœbidas had taken the citadel,  
 were banished by a public decree of their  
 country. The Lacedæmonians, to give a  
 presumptuous proof of their tyrannical and  
 domineering spirit, ordered the Athenians to  
 withdraw their protection from these unhappy  
 exiles, and to expel them from their city.  
 The humanity and generosity, natural and pe-  
 culiar

cular to the Athenians, as well as their gratitude towards the Thebans, for affording them an asylum when they were banished by the thirty tyrants, prompted them to reject the infamous proposal. At the same time, Leontiades sent some of his devoted creatures to assassinate the chief of the exiles; but Androclides alone fell a victim to his iniquitous machinations. Pelopidas, the son of Hippocles, who acted a distinguished part in the deliverance of Thebes, was among the exiles who had sought protection in Athens. Elevated with the native courage of his mind, and fired with resentment against the late instances of Spartan treachery and cruelty, he exhorted his fellow-exiles no longer to suffer in silence, but to take up arms at once to avenge their own cause, and assert the liberty of their country. "Let us follow," continued he, "the example of Thrasylbulus, who, with heroic magnanimity, set out from Thebes with a handful of brave men to crush the oppressors of Athens. So let us, by one blow, for glory and revenge, expel the tyrants of our country, and restore it to its antient freedom."

THIS discourse made a deep impression on the banished Thebans; and, while they deliberated by night on this important subject,

Mello,



CHAP. Mello, one of their number, introduced Phyl-  
 XXII. lidas, his friend, who had just arrived from  
 Thebes: a man whose situation, boldness, and  
 address, fitted him for the enterprize they  
 meditated.

THOUGH strongly attached to the republic-  
 an cause, he followed the changes of go-  
 vernment, and, by his complaisance, officiousness, and adulation, had insinuated himself into the good graces and the confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other Theban oppressors. He was secretary to the council, and no less subsidiary to the pleasures, than necessary to the business of his masters.

THE exiled patriots having concerted the plan, and fixed the time of their enterprize, communicated it to their friends at Thebes. When they had assembled, on the confines of Attica, seven \* of the youngest and most daring, with Pelopidas at their head, disguised themselves like huntsmen, and, arriving at the gates towards evening, passed unsuspected. They were concealed in the house of Charon that night and the following day.

ON the eventful evening that summoned them to strike for Thebes and independence,

\* Xenoph. p. 566,

the crafty Phyllidas had prepared a magnificent entertainment for two of the tyrants, Archias and Philip; and promised to render the repast more exquisite and alluring by the company of the most beautiful women in the city.

THE banquet of Phyllidas contained the most luxurious viands to gratify the senses; and the richest wines to dissolve the soul in pleasure. But in the height of their festivity and voluptuous expectations, a messenger arrived from Athens, with letters that contained a circumstantial account of the whole conspiracy. The courier, with marks of haste and agitation, desired to see Archias, and, having delivered the packet into his hand, informed him, that his Athenian friend desired he would read the letters immediately, for they related to *serious affairs*. Archias replied, smiling, "*Serious affairs to-morrow*;" and, putting them unopened under his pillow, continued the debauch. Phyllidas now retired to introduce the conspirators, disguised like women of pleasure. Their arms were concealed by their female vestments, and their faces overshadowed by wreaths of pine and poplar. At their arrival, the tyrants, intoxicated with voluptuousness and wine, sent up  
loud

**CHAP.** loud shouts of joy; when, at a given signal,  
**XXII.** the conspirators drew their daggers, and laid  
the tyrants at their feet. Charon and Mello had been the chief actors in this scene; but an important part of the work remained behind; to dispatch Leontiades, and the other supporters of the usurpation. Conducted by Phyllidas, who was still unsuspected, the conspirators found the houses of the magistrates open to receive them. Leontiades, who was asleep, awaked at the tumult, and, arming himself with his sword, boldly fought in his own defence; it was reserved to Pelopidas to rid the earth of this early contriver and chief abettor of the Theban calamities and disgrace. His associates fell by the hands of the other conspirators.

THE tyrannicide being thus accomplished, with equal celerity and success, couriers were sent to the Thracian plain, to inform the Theban exiles, who immediately set out for the scene of action. The conspirators next opened the different prisons, which were filled with the unhappy victims of tyrannical oppression. Five hundred captives were released, who formed a considerable accession of strength to their deliverers. They furnished themselves with arms from the arsenals, which  
they

they broke open. The whole city was now in a state of agitation, uncertainty, and terror. The houses, though at midnight, were illuminated with torches; the streets were crowded with multitudes passing and repassing, without knowing whither they went; and all longed, with impatience and anxiety, for the return of the dawn, that they might learn the cause of these disorders, and know what destiny awaited them. In the midst of this tumult, a herald announced, with a loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and invited the friends of freedom to arm in the glorious cause. Among the first who obeyed this summons to liberty was the celebrated Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis. The philosophy of Pythagoras, which he had studied, forbade him to take an active part in the conspiracy, lest he might pollute his hands with the blood of his fellow-citizens. But, after the revolution in favour of liberty was accomplished, he armed with alacrity in the cause of his country; and his example gave new animation to the Theban youth, who, like him, had borne, with indignant reluctance, the oppressive yoke of the Spartan government.

NEXT morning the exiles arrived from the  
Thracian

CHAP. Thracian plain, and the people were summoned to assemble. Surrounded with a numerous band of adherents, which continued to increase from all quarters, Pelopidas and his friends went to the market-place; explained to the people the necessity of the revolution; and, with the unanimous consent of their fellow-citizens, restored the antient and republican form of government. At the same time, a solemn sacrifice was offered to the gods, by the sacred ministers of religion, for the restoration of the public liberty. At the close of the solemnity, the people rose up with loud acclamations, and received the confederated patriots as the avengers and deliverers of their country. Pelopidas, Mello, and Charon, were then elected *bœotarchs*, or chief magistrates.

ON the night of the conspiracy, the Lacedæmonian garrison, which held possession of the citadel, by unaccountable negligence, cowardice, or infatuation, beheld the scene of tumult and disorder, without interposing to prevent the revolution from taking place. Three thousand Thebans had taken refuge in the *Cadmæa*, which was garrisoned by fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians; yet they made no efforts to defend the Spartan governors or government;

government; but only dispatched couriers to the capital, to relate the news of the conspiracy, and to demand an immediate reinforcement.

VERY different was the conduct of Pelopidas and his associates, on the same memorable occasion; not blinded by success, they neglected no precaution that could ensure the accomplishment of their measures, and the re-establishment of the commonwealth. They ordered the messengers, whom they had sent to acquaint the Theban exiles with the destruction of their oppressors, to proceed with all expedition to Athens, to communicate the tidings of the revolution, and to implore the immediate aid of the Athenians. This request was instantly complied with; the Athenians embraced the precious opportunity of depressing their enemies and elevating their friends. A considerable army was ordered to the relief of the Thebans, which arrived at Thebes the day after Pelopidas had completed the revolution.

ANIMATED by this reinforcement, the Thebans resolved to attack the Cadmea with the combined army. According to Xenophon, whose narrative appears the most authentic

CHAP. XXII. thentic, the garrison surrendered in the course of a few days, on condition of being permitted to retire in safety, and to retain their arms. But, while they provided for their own security, agreeably to that strong and unconquerable barbarity which marked the character of their countrymen, they totally abandoned, to the resentment of the conquerors, those wretched Thebans who had devoted themselves to the interest of Sparta, and taken refuge in the citadel. Many of them fell victims to the vengeance of the opposite faction; a few only were saved by the intercession of the Athenians\*, the only nation of antient Europe, except the Sicilians, who seem to have had any feelings of pity, or tincture of humanity.

WHEN the garrison marched from the Cadmæa, and arrived at Megara, they found Cleombrotus coming to their assistance, at the head of a powerful army. If he had arrived a day earlier, he might have preserved the citadel; but the tardy measures of the Lacedæmonians frequently defeated their enterprizes. The three commanders who had surrendered the citadel were brought to trial; two of them were condemned to death, and so great

\* Xenoph.

a fine imposed upon the third, that, unable to pay it, he went into voluntary banishment.

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PELOPIDAS obtained the honour of this revolution, which, for the wisdom and magnanimity with which it was concerted, the admirable, though simple address, by which it was conducted, and the intrepid courage by which it was accomplished, is scarcely to be paralleled in the annals of the Grecian republics. It gave a new political existence to the Thebans, led them to a train of heroic achievements, and rendered their history as illustrious as it had formerly been obscure.

THE rebellion of the Thebans, as it was called at Sparta; wounded the pride, and provoked the resentment of that tyrannical republic. The Ephori and the senate immediately resolved to punish their revolted subjects with exemplary severity. Agefilæus, under pretence of his great age, declined the command, which was conferred on Cleombrotus, who had lately succeeded to king Agesipolis. In the midst of winter he entered Bœotia, at the head of a strong army; but his operations were neither vigorous nor decisive. Nothing was performed worthy of the Spartan name. At the end of the campaign he returned to Sparta, having sent a



CHAP. considerable detachment of his army to the  
 XXII. garrison at Theſpiæ, which was commanded  
 by Sphodrias.

MEANWHILE, the Athenians, partly from their natural fickleneſs, partly from their dread of the Spartans, againſt whoſe forces they thought themſelves unable to take the field, renounced their alliance with the Thebans, and puniſhed, by imprisonment or exile, ſuch of the citizens as had favoured their cauſe. The Theban chiefs, who foreſaw the ruinous effects of this deſertion, contrived, according to Xenophon, a ſingular ſtratagem to recover the Athenian alliance. They ſent emiſſaries to Sphodrias, who commanded the garrison at Theſpiæ, “to propoſe to him, as an exploit that would aggrandiſe his name, to ſeiſe the Piræus by ſurprize, the principal ornament and defence of Athens; an action which would tranſmit his memory to future times, and raiſe his fame above the glory of Phœbidas, who became ſo illuſtrious and renowned at Sparta, by ſurprizing, in a ſimilar manner, the citadel of Thebes.”

SPHODRIAS, whoſe vanity and ambition prompted him to wiſh for an opportunity of performing a ſplendid action, undertook the enterprize with alacrity and confidence. He ſet

set out from Thespiæ early in the morning, in expectation to reach the Piræus before the dawn of the next day. But, as the distance between Thespiæ and Athens exceeded forty miles, the morning overtook him in the Thracian plain near Eleufis, whose astonished inhabitants conveyed the intelligence to Athens. Finding his plan discovered, he made a shameful retreat, after having ravaged the country. This perfidious design, and the atrocious conduct of Sphodrias in plundering the peaceful villages, enraged the Athenians; who immediately sent ambassadors to Sparta, loudly complaining of the injustice and the insult. The Spartans, according to custom, disavowed the conduct of Sphodrias. He was summoned before the council, and tried; but was preserved from death by the influence of Agefilaus. A tender friendship, we are told, had long joined, in the most cordial union, Archidamus, the son of the Spartan king, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias; and, that the intercession and tears of the former, for the father of his friend, induced Agefilaus to interpose with authority in his behalf.

SUCH is the account of Xenophon, who has too often employed the artful and eloquent

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simplicity of his style to disguise and embellish some of the most criminal transactions of the Lacedæmonians. From the conduct of Agesilaus, it is evident, that the unjust and perfidious plan of Sphodrias proceeded upon his authority, or at least with his knowledge; and the absurdity of the tale, related by Xenophon, to account for the acquittal of the criminal commander, is so gross and glaring, that one is amazed to think how it could impose even on the credulity of the Greeks. The Athenians beheld it in its true light; and, considering the acquittal of Sphodrias as a participation of his crime, resolved immediately to renew their alliance with Thebes, and made the most vigorous preparations for war.

AGESILAUS now assumed the command of the army against Thebes, which amounted to eighteen thousand foot, and fifteen hundred horse. He engaged in frequent skirmishes with the enemy, but performed nothing important, or adequate to his former reputation. By these frequent, but undecisive hostilities, he instructed the Thebans in the art of war, and disciplined them for greater services. Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, offered him battle near Thebes; but such was the

the

the advantageous position of his troops, and the excellent order in which they were drawn up, that the Spartan king, notwithstanding his superiority of numbers, declined the combat, and retreated with his army from Thebes. After his retreat, the Thebans proved victorious in every encounter with the enemy. When he returned to Sparta to be cured of his wounds, Antalcidas said to him in raillery, "These are the rewards you have obtained for teaching the Thebans to conquer." The other Spartan generals were equally unfortunate: Phœbidas, who had succeeded to the command of Thespiæ, was totally defeated and slain; and the Lacedæmonian commander fell by the hand of Pelopidas, in the battle of Tanagra.

WHILE hostilities were thus carried on successfully at land, the Athenians again proved victorious at sea. Chabrias, who was equally qualified to discharge the duties of admiral and general, attacked the Lacedæmonian fleet, commanded by Pollis, near the isle of Naxos, and, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, gave them a total defeat. Timotheus, the son of Conon, and who sustained, by his valour and exploits, the fame of his illustrious father, commanded the

CHAP. largest division of the fleet in the Ionian sea.  
 XXII. After having destroyed the chief naval armá-  
 ————— ment of the Spartans, he ravaged the coasts  
 of Laconia, and laid the islands of Corcyra,  
 Zacynthus, and Leucádia, under heavy con-  
 tributions. A general desertion prevailed  
 among the Lacedæmonian dependencies:  
 Chios and Bizantium, with many other states,  
 abandoned the Spartan connexion, and once  
 more placed themselves under the protection  
 of Athens.

LYCURGUS, in one of the three laws  
 which he called *Rhætra*, forbade the Lacedæ-  
 monians to make war frequently on the  
 same enemy, lest, by compelling them to de-  
 fend themselves, they should teach them to  
 be expert soldiers. It was by this war of  
 skirmishes, in frequent, though undecisive  
 campaigns, that Pelopidas trained his soldiers  
 to the use of arms, and taught them to front  
 the Spartans in the field without terror or  
 dismay.

THE action at Tegyra was of a more im-  
 portant nature, and served as a prelude to the  
 battle at Leuctra. The Theban army were  
 returning from Archomenos, they found the  
 Lacedæmonians posted to intercept them near  
 Tegyra. 'One of the soldiers ran with tre-  
 pidation;

ridation to Pelopidas, calling out, "We have fallen into the hands of the enemy." "Say rather," replied the general, "that the enemy have fallen into ours." Immediately he ordered his cavalry to advance to the front, and begin the combat. He knew that the sacred battalion, which was all his infantry, would break through the enemy, though much superior in number. After a fierce and violent onset, the two generals of the Lacedæmonians were killed, and their troops were dispersed, and fled in disorder.

THIS little encounter was, in some measure, the source of the great events which followed. It had never been known in any former engagement, either against the Persians or Greeks, that the Lacedæmonians were defeated with the superiority of numbers on their side. They now lost that honourable distinction, and the Thebans, in their turn, struck terror into those who had intimidated all Greece.

BEFORE this period, the Thebans had been considered in an inferior and contemptible light, and were held in detestation by the Greeks on account of their former alliance with Xerxes. While the other states of Greece struggled for pre-eminence, or contended for glory,

CHAP. glory, the Thebans devoted themselves to  
XXII. their interest. The appearance of two extraordinary men, Pelopidas and Epaminondas, is supposed to have given an elevation to their natural character, and to have rendered them as ambitious of conquest and renown as they had formerly been for quiet and preservation. But although the uncommon abilities and virtues of two great men, and the still more uncommon union and friendship which prevailed between those who were naturally rivals, might be of considerable consequence in rousing the spirit of their countrymen, yet it does not seem reasonable to concur with the general opinion in ascribing to this circumstance alone the ascendancy which Thebes had acquired over republics, which had formerly beheld her with contempt. An accidental cause seems inadequate to produce permanent effects. Victory in an engagement may be owing to the superior skill, and activity of the commander; a system of public measures, highly beneficial to a nation, may be adopted and carried into execution by one illustrious man; but to ensure a continued course of success during a war which lasted for several years; to bestow resources on a people who were totally deprived of them; to elevate a republic above  
rivals

rivals as superior to her in courage as in power; are operations far beyond the abilities and influence of single men. If we examine philosophically the revolutions of Greece, other causes will appear to account for the elevation which Thebes now assumed above the neighbouring republics.

THE calamities which the Athenians and Spartans occasioned to one another, as well as to their neighbours, by their ambitious struggles for pre-eminence; the perpetual contests which, for more than half a century, had been exhausting the strength of these republics, augmented the relative importance of the surrounding states, some of whom, by a felicity rare in that age, were so fortunate as to enjoy long intervals of tranquillity.

THEBES, in particular, had, by sure but silent steps, arrived at power, and gradually extended her authority over the smaller communities in Bœotia\*. Neither Athens nor Sparta had been alarmed by her progress, and, vigilant to check the encroachments of each other, they had neglected to prevent the increase of a republic, whose reputation and

\* By the peace of Antalcidas, the Bœotian cities were declared independent; but in two campaigns after the war of the allies commenced, Pelopidas recovered them all to the dominion of Thebes.



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lustre long continued inferior to her real power. When the Spartans at length became sensible of their error, they acted with such injustice, violence, and oppression, as drove the Thebans to despair; and, having spurned an odious and ignominious yoke, they threw it off for ever.

THE Thebans were more remarkable for strength of body than ingenuity of mind; and though, Pindar excepted, they were little addicted to the pursuit of intellectual excellence or literary fame, yet they cultivated, with peculiar care, the gymnastic exercises, which gave the address and dexterity of art to the strength of their gigantic members. The tyranny and oppression of Sparta first roused their passions and their feelings, and the collision of opposing bodies kindled that spark which animated them with a new existence, and inspired them with the love of freedom and of fame. They pursued every method to render their ambition successful. They had introduced a rigid system of military discipline; had made considerable improvements in the exercise of cavalry, and in the general arrangement and manœuvres of an army.

PERSONAL friendship, emulation, and that spirit of association often inspired by the necessity

cessity

cessity of self-defence, produced a combination, where each came under the most sacred engagements to defend his companions to his last breath. This combination, which was called "the sacred band," consisted originally of three hundred men, in the prime of life, and of tried fidelity, and was long conspicuous in the annals of Greece.

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AT this critical time two illustrious men started up to improve the favourable incidents of the times, and give a direction to the affairs of their country.

THESE were Pelopidas and Epaminondas. A severe persecution, to which the disciples of Pythagoras had been exposed in Italy, compelled the few, who could escape from the barbarity of their enemies, to take shelter in Greece. In this native soil of science they found protection and respect, and were employed to instruct youth in the tenets of their philosophy. Hence the Theban-pair, as these heroes have been called, found preceptors, who pointed out the path which leads to virtue and to glory. Pelopidas was descended from one of the chief families of Thebes, and educated in the greatest affluence; but even in early youth he applied his fortune to the noblest purposes, in raising the worthy, who were de-  
pressed,

CHAP. pressed, to their proper rank and station in life.  
 XXII. He excelled in the gymnastic exercises, so much  
 esteemed by the Greeks; and, from qualities more meritorious and more estimable, was early marked out by his country as the person most worthy of administering the affairs of the government. He was six times elected to the first dignities in the republic, and always sustained the reputation which he early acquired for patriotism, courage, and good conduct.

EPAMINONDAS was born and educated in that honourable poverty, which, in those ages, was associated with the ideas of integrity and virtue. He applied to the martial and manly exercises, which were held in such high reputation by his country, only so far as to prepare him for the labours and occasions of a military life. He studied the Pythagorean philosophy under Lysis; a philosophy which did not train its votaries to barren and abstracted speculation, but formed them to public life, and the service of their country. Placed at first in a subordinate station, he verified his own maxim, that the office derives dignity from the man, not the man from the office. A love of veracity and virtue, tenderness, humanity, and an exalted patriotism, were the genuine offspring of his nature or education;

\* and

and to these qualities he added uncommon penetration and sagacity, a felicity in improving incidents, a consummate skill in the art of war, and unconquerable patience of toil and distress; a boldness in enterprise, vigour, and magnanimity. All these talents he adorned with that eloquence which was then the great engine of power, and which gave him the same ascendancy in council, which his valour and superior conduct did in the field. By these heroes, who, though rivals, were always friends, Thebes rose to power and dominion.

ABOUT this time Egypt revolted from the Persian yoke, and Artaxerxes made powerful preparations to reduce that province. Well acquainted with the martial fame of the Greeks, he sent his emissaries to raise soldiers in Greece; and neither Athenians nor Spartans disdained to become his mercenaries; driven from their country, either by necessity or the spirit of adventure, twenty thousand men forsook their families, and embarked in the expedition against Egypt. Iphicrates, at the request of Pharnabazus, the commander of that expedition, was placed at the head of the Greek troops. Besides the twenty thousand Greeks, Pharnabazus had two hundred thousand Persians, and five hundred ships; but

CHAP. but this mighty armament effected nothing  
 XXII. of importance. The kings of Persia, in  
 those times, pretended to direct from their  
 cabinet all the transactions of a distant cam-  
 paign; and traced out to their generals, plans  
 of military operations; from which they were  
 not to depart without new orders from court.  
 Whatever abilities a commander might pos-  
 sess, his hands were bound; he was afraid  
 to exceed his powers, for, by gaining a vic-  
 tory, he might lose his head. If the councils  
 of Iphicrates had been followed, Memphis  
 might have been taken by surprize, and all  
 Egypt recovered; but, as Pharnabazus waited  
 for the instructions of a distant court, his  
 tardy measures prolonged the dominion of  
 the Egyptian king. Iphicrates withdrew to  
 Athens with disgust and disdain.

THE Thebans, who refused to follow the  
 standard of Artaxerxes, about this time totally  
 destroyed Thespia and Platæa, and expelled  
 the inhabitants. The Platæans implored the  
 protection of the Athenians, though in alli-  
 ance with Thebes. Their past services and  
 present sufferings, their intreaties and their  
 tears, prevailed on the humanity of the Athe-  
 nians to grant them an asylum in their city.

ALL Greece now began to grow weary of a  
 war,

war, which had its origin in the injustice and oppression of Sparta, and which had no other tendency than to confirm the ascendancy of ~~the~~ state, whose tyranny and insolence had been long intolerable; or to elevate another to a pre-eminence which would be dangerous to her neighbours, and destructive to herself. The Athenians, disgusted with the insolence and cruelty of the Thebans, in destroying the cities of Thespiæ and Platæa, and in their recent attempt to commit depredations in Phocis, were disposed to renew their alliance with the Spartans. Acquainted with this state of the Grecian affairs, and needing new supplies to reduce his revolted subjects in Egypt, Artaxerxes sent a new embassy to the several states of Greece, desiring them to lay down their arms, and to accommodate all differences according to the treaty of Antalcidas.

A CONVENTION of deputies was held at Sparta. The orators, Callistratus and Antocles, were sent by the Athenians; Agesilaus appeared on the part of Sparta; while Epaminondas was appointed by the Thebans to support the dignity and the interests of their republic. After deploring those unhappy animosities, which had led to civil bloodshed,

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and the general degradation of Greece, it was proposed to renew the peace of Antalcidas, which was equally favourable to all the Grecian communities. To this proposal all parties concerned unanimously agreed. When Epaminondas offered to sign the treaty in the name of the Bœotian confederacy, Agesilaus asked, whether the Thebans intended to comply with the treaty, by granting independence to Bœotia? On the other side, Epaminondas demanded, whether Sparta had determined to grant independence to Laconia? "Shall the Bœotians be free?" said the Spartan king, rising in wrath; "Yes," replied Epaminondas, "whenever you restore liberty to the Lacedæmonians and Messenians."

THEN, addressing the deputies of the confederates, he exposed, in its true light, the nature of the treaty they were about to sanction. "Convened to establish the general freedom of Greece, you are going to confirm the despotism of a tyrant. The treaty, in appearance, restores liberty to every community, small and great;" but its real object is, that Thebes should diminish her own strength by giving freedom to the Bœotian states, while Sparta, retained in subjection its numerous allies, whose services she would demand on the first

first occasion. If you now consent to the destruction of the Theban power, while that of Sparta remains unimpaired, you destroy your sole defence against Lacedæmonian tyranny, and place the yoke of subjection upon your own necks. But if any portion of Grecian spirit remains, if the memory of your ancestors still lives within you, you will protect rather than destroy this new temple to liberty, and will follow the auspicious example of its votaries, who have nobly asserted their freedom, and confirmed it by their swords.

THIS firm and animated discourse, founded on principles of truth and justice, sunk deep into the hearts of the deputies. Though they APPEARED to be convinced by the long and laboured reply \* of Agesilaus, and were REALLY intimidated by the power of Sparta, yet they carried with them from the assembly the sentiments of the patriotic Epaminondas, and disseminated them in Greece.

THEBES, now excluded from the treaty of peace, was exposed to all the vengeance of the Spartans; and, without friend or ally, had,

\* It was on this occasion that Epaminondas said, "I have compelled the Spartans to lengthen their monosyllables."



CHAPTER. to all appearance, armed against itself the general confederacy of Greece. But Epaminondas and the Thebans well knew, that this confederacy was more nominal than real. The Spartan allies were, by no means cordial in their cause; and the Athenians, although they might endeavour to depress the pre-eminence, would not desert the distresses of Thebes. The Spartans too had degenerated from their antient character; and the strength of the state was impaired by their frequent and almost uninterrupted hostilities. The laws of Lycurgus had, in a great measure, ceased to govern them; wealth and luxury had been introduced, and become general; and such of the antient institutions as still remained in force, tended, upon a change of circumstances, to produce pernicious instead of beneficial effects. While the Spartans remained satisfied with their simplicity of manners, poverty, and heroic virtue, the law which discouraged all intercourse with strangers, and prohibited them from being admitted to the rank of citizens, was in strict conformity to the peculiar spirit and character of the Lacedæmonian constitution. But when they departed from their antient maxims, became ambitious, opulent, victorious, almost always engaged in war, not for defence, but for conquest and domi-

nion, the idea of preserving the citizens a body separate and detached from the rest of mankind, was absurd and impolitic. As they never thought of incorporating the conquered nations, or associating their allies with their citizens, it was impossible for them to continue constantly employed in war, without being at length exposed to inevitable destruction. Not only the defeat, but even the victory, which deprived them of their valuable citizens, was a public calamity; every loss was irreparable; and notwithstanding their expedients to prevent this effect, the numbers of the Spartans gradually decreased.

A LONG course of hostilities had deprived them of the best half of their citizens; their ancient renown was tarnished in the battle of Tegyra; and neither their allies, whom they oppressed, nor their subjects, whom they enslaved, were likely to be formidable antagonists in the field.

THIS great contest, which involved the fate of two powerful republics, was soon brought to the decision of the sword. It was determined in the Spartan senate to invade Bœotia without delay. Agesilaus was prevented by sickness from taking the command, which, by his advice, was entrusted to his

CHAP. colleague Cleombrotus, who marched with-  
 XXII. out delay into the enemies country, with an  
 ——— army of twelve thousand men, levied chiefly  
 from the Lacedæmonian allies, who followed  
 him with reluctance. They penetrated into  
 Bœotia, by the way of Phocis, and encamped  
 near the village of Leuctra. Their numbers  
 were greatly increased by the arrival of Ar-  
 chidamus with a strong reinforcement. The  
 united forces now amounted to twenty-four  
 thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse.  
 The Theban cavalry were nearly as numerous,  
 and far superior in valour and in discipline;  
 but their infantry, we are told, scarcely ex-  
 ceeded six thousand.

The Thebans, who were encamped on the  
 mountains which overlooked the plain, were  
 seized with terror when they beheld the pro-  
 digious extent of the Spartan camp. Of the  
 six generals who shared with Epaminondas  
 in the command, several strongly opposed  
 engaging an enemy so superior in number,  
 and endeavoured to intimidate the troops by  
 the arts of superstition: all the omens, they  
 declared, were inauspicious. The philosophi-  
 cal and high minded commander replied by  
 a verse of Homer:

Without a sign, his sword the brave man draws,  
 And asks no omen but his country's cause.

At

At the same time, to revive the courage of the soldiers, he opposed superstition to superstition. Messengers were said to have come from Thebes, reporting omens and auguries of a more fortunate kind: the former impression was effaced, and an ardour for battle, and the hopes of victory, succeeded to panic and despondency.

BEFORE the engagement, Epaminondas gave permission to all those who preferred ignoble safety to the cause of Thebes, to retire from the field. The Thebians availed themselves of this permission, together with that herd of attendants which always follow an army. The Lacedæmonians, deceived by the appearance of an army, exhibited by these fugitives, opposed them with a numerous body of forces, and obliged them to return to the Thebans. Their return had at least the appearance of a reinforcement, and gave additional confidence to the Bœotian troops.

THE Lacedæmonian army was disposed, as usual, in the form of a crescent. Cleombrotus placed himself at the head of the native troops of Sparta, in the right wing of the army, in the front of which he had posted his cavalry. The allies formed the left wing, led on by Archidamus. Epaminondas, having attentively

CHAP. considered the arrangement of the enemy,  
XXII. wisely determined to point his warmest at-  
tack against the Spartans and their king, knowing that success in that quarter would probably insure victory to the Thebans. As the event of the battle was therefore to be decided by the exertions of his left wing, he formed it into a battalion of fifty deep, that it might bear down all opposition by the weight of its charge, and placed in it the flower of his heavy-armed troops. The sacred battalion, commanded by Pelopidas, was upon his left, and flanked the whole. The cavalry were placed in the van, to oppose the Spartan horse. To prevent the Theban army from being surrounded by the enemy, he extended his right wing.

THE cavalry on both sides first rushed to the engagement; but those of the Lacedæmonians were soon repulsed, and in their precipitate retreat disordered the foremost ranks of their own army. Thrown into confusion by their own cavalry, and at the same time attacked by the sacred band, a temporary rout took place. In this critical moment the Theban general formed the division, which he commanded, into a wedge-like phalanx, for the purpose of piercing the Lacedæmonian battalions,

battalions, as soon as they should charge, as he expected they would, his right wing, which, from its extension, and consequent thinness of the ranks, he imagined would invite their attack. The Lacedæmonians, as he had expected, attacked his right wing, and were, in their turn, charged in flank by the massy body under the command of Epaminondas, which pierced with irresistible impetuosity to the place where Cleombrotus fought in person with his Spartans. The occasion demanded the utmost exertions of their valour. Nor did they, in this instance, dishonour the Spartan name: they surrounded him on every side, and opposed their bucklers, their swords, their breasts in his defence. For awhile they resisted all the weight of the Theban phalanx, and at last fell with their king, covered with honourable wounds.

ALL that the Spartans could now do was to preserve the corpse of their monarch from falling into the hands of the Thebans. After the utmost efforts of valour, they kept possession of the body; but were obliged to yield the glory of the day to the intrepid coolness and consummate skill of Epaminondas.

THE allies, apprised of the defeat of the Lacedæmonians, and the death of the king, betook.

CHAP. betook themselves to flight, were pursued  
XXII. with considerable slaughter, and the bravery  
of the Thebans, under the guidance of Epaminondas, obtained a complete victory.

THEIR loss in this battle amounted only to three hundred men. Of seven hundred Spartans who fought in the engagement, four hundred fell in the field; the Lacedæmonians lost one thousand, and the allies two thousand six hundred men.

As soon as the Lacedæmonians had reached their camp, they began to be astonished at their overthrow. Sparta had never received such a blow. The defeat was disgrace, and the loss of the battle was the loss of all they held dear, of a character for pre-eminent bravery, which they had acquired, and hitherto supported. A council of war was called to deliberate whether they should permit the Thebans to erect a trophy, or, returning to the field, should venture a second engagement. Revolving the losses which they had sustained, and distrusting their allies, who followed them only through fear, and whose ill-concealed joy at the defeat gave them little confidence in their assistance, they at last reluctantly sent a herald to request leave to bury their dead, and to acknowledge the right of the

the Thebans to erect a trophy of their victory.

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WHEN the messenger of these unfortunate events reached Sparta, and had acquainted the Ephori with the unexpected public calamity, true to the iron institutes of Lycurgus, they ordered the public games, which the inhabitants were then celebrating, to go on without interruption; and the individuals, not to deviate from the Spartan character, received the news of the death of fathers, brothers, sons, and kinsmen, with every outward mark of joy and exultation, while the relations of those who had fled, either concealed themselves from public view, or appeared as the only real mourners.

THE institutions of Lycurgus tended chiefly to inspire military courage. The Lacedæmonian who fled in battle was commanded either to retire into perpetual banishment, or, if he could bear the alternative, might remain despicable at home. There he was excluded for ever from the public assemblies, was rendered incapable of all offices, was unprotected by the laws, disavowed by his country, being equally solitary and contemptible, and noticed only for his infamy. On occasion of the calamitous overthrow at Leuctra, the stern



**C H A P.** stern severity of Sparta yielded to expediency ;  
**XXII.** Agefilaus was invested with full powers to  
 carry the laws into execution ; but the vast numbers of valuable citizens, who would thus be lost to the state, obliged him to sacrifice the letter of the laws to the benefit of the republic. “ We must suppose,” said he “ our revered institutions to have slept for one day, henceforth to resume their former power and energy ;” a sentence which appeared to secure the authority of the laws, while it preserved the lives of the citizens.

THE overthrow at Leuctra instantly produced the most important consequences. The Eleans, Arcadians, and Argives, almost every state which had been oppressed by the tyranny of Sparta, rejoiced at the misfortune of their tyrant, and prepared to profit by the present weakness of the Lacedæmonians.

ATHENS alone displayed an unusual and unexpected example of moderation : but it was only an apparent moderation. The Athenians, indeed, publicly founded their conduct on the former merits of the Spartans ; and asserted, that the noble defenders of Greece, against the Persian invasion, were not to be extirpated ; but the real cause may be attributed to more selfish considerations.

Sparta,

Sparta, in her present state of humiliation, was no longer an object of jealousy or dread; Thebes, now in the zenith of her power, and still more formidable by her vicinity to Athens, was considered as a most dangerous rival, against whom some balance was to be preserved. From these motives, the Theban herald, who came to announce the victory at Leuctra, and to invite the Athenians to join in totally crushing the Lacedæmonians, was received with coolness, and even with disrespect. Perceiving that the defeat of the Spartans had placed the balance of power in their hands, they determined, if possible, to preserve it. For this purpose, the states of Peloponnesus were detached from the Lacedæmonian confederacy; and, to prevent any people from again acquiring a dangerous ascendancy in Greece, war was denounced against all who would not promise strictly to adhere to the peace of Antalcidas.

Two years had not elapsed since the defeat at Leuctra, till the Spartan confederacy in Peloponnesus was entirely dissolved; while the alliance of the Thebans extended on all sides. They were joined by the Eleans, Argives, and Arcadians, and even some of the inhabitants of Laconia: and their authority and influence

were .

CHAP. were soon augmented by the accession of the  
 XXII. Acarnanians, Locrians, Phocians, and the inhabitants of Eubœa. The Peloponnesians, after being emancipated from the Spartan yoke, seem not to have known how to enjoy or preserve their liberty. The most cruel and sanguinary factions prevailed in every city, that, alternately, as they obtained power, expelled or butchered each other. From this general censure we must except the Mantinæans, who, wisely profiting by the occasion, rebuilt their walls with all expedition, and unanimously concurred in re-establishing their republican form of government.

SEVERAL circumstances prevented the Thebans from immediately pursuing the blow which they had given to Sparta in the field of Leuctra; but, after some time, having collected the flower of their own forces and those of the allies, they entered Laconia at the head of sixty or seventy thousand men\*. So great an army had never been assembled in Greece under one standard. Resentment against Sparta, and the high reputation of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, induced the allies, without any

\* The Greek historians, Xenophon, Diodorus, Plutarch, differ with regard to the numbers in the Theban army.

public order or decree, to obey their summons with alacrity, and follow their standard with confidence. Six hundred years had elapsed since the Dorians had taken possession of Lacedæmon, and, in all that time, no enemy had ever invaded their territories, nor attacked their city, which, though without walls or fortifications, had been defended by the valour of the citizens. But now they had to repel the enemy from the banks of the Eurotas, and to defend their capital from hostile assailants.

To oppose the numerous forces of Thebes, they employed the aged and infirm; and armed six thousand of their helots, promising to emancipate them at the close of the war. The factious adherents to aristocratical government, from Achaia, Argolis, and Arcadia, at this critical period, took refuge in Sparta, and afforded a powerful and seasonable reinforcement.

IN approaching towards the Lacedæmonian territories, the Theban army marched in four divisions, which were to unite at Sellasia, and thence to proceed to Sparta. The Bœotians, Argives, and Elians, reached the place appointed without difficulty or opposition. But when the fourth division of the army, consisting

CHAP. sitting of the Arcadians, attempted to traverse  
XXII. Sciritis, Ischolaus, who commanded at an im-

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portant pass in that district, formed the resolution, in imitation of Leonidas, of devoting himself and his party for the good of his country. This heroic band, after having made a dreadful slaughter of the enemy, at last yielded to superior numbers, but not till the last Spartan had expired.

THE army having assembled at Sellasia, marched forward to Sparta, ravaging the country, and setting fire to the towns and villages as they advanced. A mixture of astonishment, alarm, and indignation, prevailed in that city, when they beheld, for the first time, an enemy before their walls. The women were terrified at the unusual spectacle, while the men glowed with rage and resentment at the sight; and desired to be led instantly against the invaders, in order to repulse them, or to die on the spot. It was with the utmost difficulty that their eager transports could be restrained, even by the authority of Agefilaus; who, amidst these calamities that threatened his country with ruin, resolved to avoid a general engagement, and confine his preparations to the defence of the capital. He acted, in this emergency, with that coolness

ness and decision which distinguish the truly great man. He considered this irruption of the enemy as an impetuous torrent, which it was equally vain and dangerous to oppose; whose rapid course would be but of short duration, and after some ravages, subside of itself. He was determined not to quit the city, nor to hazard a battle; and persisted in that determination, notwithstanding the insults and menaces of the Thebans, who called upon him to come forth and defend his country, which he alone had involved in all the calamities of war. Epa<sup>m</sup>inondas finding it impossible to draw Age<sup>s</sup>ilaus from the city, retired with his army. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Sparta, unwall<sup>e</sup>d and unfortified, to have defended itself long against his victorious arms: but the Theban general apprehend<sup>d</sup> that he should arm against him the confederacy of Pelopon<sup>e</sup>nesus, and excite the jealousy of the Greeks, if by destroying the Spart<sup>a</sup>n capital, he was *to lop off one of the arms, and pluck out one of the eyes of Greece.* He was satisfied, therefore, with humbling the pride of the Spartans, by bidding them defiance in their capital, and ravaging their country before their eyes.

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IN this hour of her depression and distress, Sparta sent deputies to implore the aid of the Athenians. The ambassadors recalled to the attention of the assembly, the antient alliance and friendship between the two republics in a season of calamity and danger, and observed, that the most illustrious era of their history was that in which they united their councils and arms against the Persians, their common enemy. They took notice, that by the interposition of Sparta, the Athenians had been delivered from the oppression of the Pisistratidæ. They enlarged upon the insolent ambition of the upstart Thebans, who had concerted a plan for extending their dominion over all Greece. They concluded by urging, that the hereditary renown of Athens should induce her to protect the miserable; that gratitude for the merit of past services, called upon her to assist an antient friend and ally; and, that justice demanded that she should maintain the conditions of the recent treaty, which had been renewed by her authority, and which the Thebans, after accepting, had so grossly violated.

ALTHOUGH the Athenians had not forgotten the injuries and indignities which they had suffered from the Spartans on various oc-

casions, especially after their defeat in Sicily, yet compassion for their present misfortunes prevailed over the sense of past offences; and they resolved unanimously to assist the Lacedæmonians. An army of twelve thousand men was raised, and the command given to Iphicrates. The usual sacrifices were offered, the omens were propitious, and the troops entered into the service with all the ardour of enthusiasm.

At the same time the Theban general, after having laid waste the Lacedæmonian territory, meditated a design, which, if carried into execution, would prove a more lasting detriment to Sparta. Messenê was an ancient city bordering on Laconia, and its inhabitants were, as the Spartans, of the Doric race. Mutual injuries, which arose between these neighbouring nations, gradually produced an inveterate antipathy; and hostilities were carried on with such barbarous fury, that the one people determined no longer to exist, unless they could exterminate the other. This fatal event happened to the Messenians; their city was demolished by the Spartans, and the inhabitants who escaped from the sword, were obliged to wander as fugitives over Peloponnesus. Some of them sought



CHAP. XXII. refuge in Sicily, where they founded the city  
 Messina, which still retains the name of their  
 antient metropolis. The remainder, who  
 continued in Greece, had still kept them-  
 selves distinct from every other community,  
 and after more than three centuries, spoke  
 their antient Doric dialect; retained all the  
 prejudices of their nation; detested the name  
 of Sparta, and still expected to avenge them-  
 selves of her cruelties. It is probable that  
 the scattered Messenians would flock sponta-  
 neously from every quarter to the standard of  
 Epaminondas, and embrace the favourable  
 opportunity of retaliating the cruelties of the  
 Spartans, and inflicting the injuries which  
 they had sustained. Epaminondas encour-  
 aged their ardour, rebuilt their city, and re-  
 established them in their possessions. This  
 act of humanity and liberal policy, inflicted a  
 stroke equally unexpected and severe on the  
 Spartans. They beheld their antient foe,  
 whom they had considered as prostrate for  
 ever, rise into consequence under the foster-  
 ing protection of Thebes; and ready on every  
 occasion to take vengeance for the numberless  
 injuries she had received.

AFTER having given this fatal blow to  
 the power and ambition of Sparta, Epami-  
 nondas

nondas turned his attention towards the Athenian army. Their general, Iphicrates; from what motive cannot now be ascertained, instead of yielding to the ardour of his soldiers, who demanded to be led to action, avoided every occasion of encountering an enemy. Perhaps he thought, that every purpose of the expedition might be answered without an engagement; and that the news of the march of the Athenians into Arcadia, would recal the Thebans and their allies from the Lacedæmonian territories.

IF such were his expectations, they were gratified. Epaminondas, abandoned by the Arcadians, who had returned to defend their own country, perceiving that the other allies wished also to retire, saw that he could no longer expect to make himself master of the Lacedæmonian capital. The conduct too of the Athenians, who, though the jealous rivals of the Spartans, yet had, armed in their defence, taught him that Greece in general would never permit the total overthrow of Sparta. He therefore evacuated Laconia, after having made it feel to the uttermost all the horrors of war. The Athenian army at the same time quitted Arcadia, and both returned home without any hostile attempt,

CHAP. neither general seeming to wish for an en-  
 XXII. gagement.

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PELOPIDAS and Epaminondas, on their return to Thebes, instead of receiving the applauses and honours which they had merited from their country, were summoned to appear before the assembly of the people, for having retained the command of the army four months beyond the term limited by law. The vigilant and jealous spirit of freedom produced similar regulations in all the larger republics, lest generals invested with authority might be tempted to employ it in subverting the liberties of their country. The Theban demagogues might represent, on this occasion, that though the violation of the law in the present instance had been the occasion of many memorable actions in Messenia, Arcadia, and Laconia, yet the example might prove pernicious, in authorising some future commander to retain his authority beyond the legal term, and turn his arms against the republic.

PELOPIDAS was first cited before the tribunal. He discovered none of that vigour and courage which might have been expected from the greatness of his mind, and which he had often displayed in the field. It was with difficulty that he was acquitted. The appearance of Epaminondas corresponded to the  
 dignity

dignity of his character, and the splendor of his actions. He displayed that collected and philosophical fortitude, which springs from mental excellence and conscious virtue. Without descending to a regular and minute vindication of his conduct, he recalled to the remembrance of his audience all the exploits he had performed for their sakes, all the services he had rendered to his country; and declared, that he would lay down his life with pleasure, provided his judges would express in their sentence, "that his having conquered in the cause of his country without their consent, was the crime for which he suffered." The boldness and the truth of this defence confounded the demagogues, and restored the Thebans to their senses: Epaminondas was unanimously acquitted, and acquired new glory from the ineffectual malice of his enemies.

THE Spartans, apprehensive of an enemy, whom recent success had rendered bolder and more enterprising than ever, without delay dispatched supplicatory deputies to Athens, to intreat the continuance of friendship and assistance. The humiliation of Sparta appeared strongly from the language which the ambassadors held at the conference, and from the concessions they made. All the boasted

CHAP. pre-eminence of Sparta was abandoned; they  
 XXII. not only gave up the empire of the sea to the  
 Athenians, but agreed, that the combined  
 forces of the republics should be alternately  
 commanded by a Spartan and Athenian ge-  
 neral; a concession beyond all precedents of  
 former times, and which strongly marked the  
 fallen condition of the Lacedæmonian state.

SUCCESSFUL in their negotiations at Athens,  
 the Spartans next negotiated with Diony-  
 sius, tyrant of Sicily, and with the Persian  
 monarch. An application from the most  
 renowned of the Dorians met a welcome re-  
 ception from the former, who boasted of his  
 Doric extraction, and Artaxerxes was easily  
 prevailed upon to follow the Persian system,  
 of exhausting the strength of Greece by per-  
 petuating the civil wars of that country.

SUPPORTED by a new accession of strength  
 from these important alliances, the Spartans  
 were for some time in a situation to check  
 the progress of the opposite confederacy.

THIS did not prevent the Arcadians from  
 entering the territory of Pallènè, from ravag-  
 ing the country, and taking the city by storm;  
 nor their junction soon after with the Eleans,  
 Argives, and Thebans, under the command of  
 Epaminondas. To oppose this formidable  
 army, the Athenians sent Chabrias, their fa-  
 vourite

avourite general, whose troops, when joined with those of the Spartans and Sicilians, composed an army of twenty-two thousand men. Epaminondas attempting to penetrate into Peloponnesus, advanced to the isthmus, and found it defended and fortified by a strong wall, which the enemy had raised to prevent the junction of the Theban general with his southern allies. But that commander discerning a weak part in the wall, forced a passage through it, after a warm engagement; and having ravaged the country, and taken Sicyon, he laid siege to Corinth. Chabrias soon marched to its relief, and attacked the Thebans with so much vigour and effect, that Epaminondas withdrew his army from Peloponnesus, and retired to Thebes. He experienced once more that cruel and capricious ingratitude which characterises all popular governments; he was accused of partiality to the Lacedæmonians, and under that pretext deprived of the chief command.

THE confederates were astonished and disgusted at the retreat of the Thebans, while the general dissatisfaction inspired Lycomedes, the leader of the Arcadians, with schemes of ambition. He represented to his countrymen, "That though they were the most antient and powerful community in Peloponnesus, yet they had  
had

CHAP. had hitherto acted only a secondary part. That  
 XXII. by their assistance the Spartans had triumphed  
 in the Peloponnesian war, and afterwards exercised the most intolerable tyranny in Greece; and that now they were assisting the Thebans to acquire the superiority over their countrymen, and to follow the example of Sparta.” “Why,” said he, “should the Arcadians march in the train of any other state? we are numerous, we are brave, and ought to be independent.”

THE speech met with the applauses of his countrymen; and the resolution was instantly formed, not only to keep possession of the cities they had taken, but to extend their conquests in Elis, Achaia, and the adjacent provinces.

IN the commencement of the following year, the Spartans being reinforced from Sicily, and having obtained a subsidy, with a body of Grecian mercenaries from Persia, ventured to take the field to oppose the Arcadians. The advanced age of Agesilaus prevented him from assuming the command, which was conferred on his son Archidamus; a prince of whom Sparta formed the highest expectations. From the remarkable success which attended his arms, he seemed destined to restore the falling fortunes of his country. Having expelled the enemy from

from

from the Lacedæmonian territories, he entered the southern frontier of Arcadia, and was making preparations to attack the city of Parthasia, when the Arcadians, reinforced by the Argives, marched to oppose him. After an interval of some days, the hostile armies prepared to engage. On this occasion Archidamus exhorted his troops to emulate the glory of their fathers, and once more to re-establish the antient renown of Sparta.

IN the midst of this exhortation, a peal of thunder burst from the right, and the soldiers at the same time discovered an altar and statue of Mercur, the illustrious ancestor of the Spartan kings. Elevated to an enthusiasm of courage by this assemblage of happy omens, they marched with ardour and confidence to the attack. The Arcadians, who had counted upon a bloodless victory, when they discerned the intrepidity and valour of their opponents, being seized with a panic before a sword was drawn, fled in confusion, and were slaughtered with impunity by the pursuers. This engagement is called by the antient historians, *the battle without tears*, as the Spartans, it is said, lost not a man\*.

\* Xenoph. lib. vii. p. 620. Diodorus.



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FOR some time past the Lacedæmonians had been so much accustomed to disasters and defeats, that when the tidings of this battle arrived, and they saw Achidamus return victorious from the field, they could not contain their joy, nor keep within the boundaries of their city. His aged father and the senators went out to meet him, shedding tears of tenderness and joy; and the multitude lifting up their hands to heaven, joined in acclamations and praises to the gods, as if this event had cancelled the ignominy of years, and they had beheld the arrival of those happy days when Sparta gave law to Greece\*.

THE fame of the victory at Leuctra, and the rise of a new power in Greece, had, by this time, reached the extremities of Asia, and attracted the attention of Artaxerxes, the Persian monarch. The Lacedæmonians had sent deputies, among whom was Antalcidas, to the Great King, to accelerate the supplies which were expected from Persia. The Thebans too thought it necessary to appoint Pelopidas on their side, in order to counteract the hostile negotiations of their enemies.

\* The defeat at Leuctra, we are told, had affected the Lacedæmonians so much, that the men were ashamed to look the women in the face.

Ambassadors were likewise sent from Argos, Arcadia, and Elis; nor did Athens herself disdain to appear, by deputy, at the foot of the Persian throne. C H A P.  
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UPON their arrival, Artaxerxes and his court could not conceal their admiration of Pelopidas, who, in conjunction with Epaminondas, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of their empire in Greece, and had compelled that republic to confine itself between the Eurotas and the Taygetus, which, a few years before had threatened, under its king Agefilaus, to carry its conquering arms to Upper Asia, and besiege the capital of the Persian empire.

THE Theban ambassador represented, that it was the interest of the Great King to protect an infant power which had never borne arms against Persia; that in all the wars between the Greeks and Persians, the Thebans had uniformly supported the interests of the latter; that their patriotic opposition to Spartan tyranny had drawn upon them the present war; that the Lacedæmonians had attacked them with the grossest injustice, but that they had reaped the fruits of their perfidy; and that the field of Leuctra would be a permanent monument of Theban valour, and Spartan degeneracy. Timagoras the Athenian,

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nian, next addressing the king, to the astonishment of his colleague Leon, and the other deputies, spoke with the utmost warmth in favour of the Thebans. Artaxerxes, without paying attention to the confusion and altercation that arose from this circumstance, desired the Theban deputy to communicate the propositions he had to offer as the ambassador of Thebes. Pelopidas then proposed, "that Messenè should continue independent, and exempted from the yoke of Sparta; that the Athenian fleet which had failed to infest the coast of Bœotia should be recalled, and if opposition was made to the treaty by these states or their allies, they should be compelled to submit to it by the united force of Persia and Thebes." The court of Persia appears to have been pre-determined in favour of the Thebans; their propositions met with the approbation of the king, and the treaty was sanctioned without delay by the royal signet. Leon, the Athenian ambassador, is said, on this occasion, to have exclaimed with the true spirit of his country, "Well, we must find another ally, for the king of Persia is no longer our friend."

ON the return of Pelopidas to Thebes, the public assembly was convened, and his successful negotiation was rewarded by the  
thanks

thanks, and applause, of his countrymen. A convention of the Grecian states \* met at Thebes, the articles of the treaty were read, and the representatives of the different states were required to ratify and confirm it with the usual solemnities.

THE greater number of the deputies refused to ratify the treaty, till the different articles had been previously discussed in the assembly of each state. Lycomedes and Antiochus, the representatives from Arcadia, went still farther; they expressed their dislike to the treaty in the language of indignation and disdain. The latter, who had been ambassador at the court of Persia, blended, with his reprobation of the treaty, the highest contempt for the riches and power of the Great King, and the most galling sarcasms against Asiatic luxury and effeminacy.

SUCH being the general temper of the assembly, nothing propitious to the views of Thebes was to be expected, and she beheld the dissolution of the convention with disappointment and regret. But eagerly solicitous to accomplish a scheme which tended to her own aggrandisement, she next endeavoured,

\* No representatives were sent either from Sparta or Athens.

CHAP. by secret machinations in each particular state,  
 XXII. to procure that compliance from them singly,  
 which she had in vain attempted from the whole. Here too disappointment followed all her endeavours. Corinth, which she first attempted to influence, as one of the weakest and most corrupt of the Grecian confederacy, spurned at the Persian alliance, and the example was uniformly followed by the other states.

MEANWHILE a formidable power started up in Thessaly, of which Alexander of Pheræ had made himself master, by assassinating Polyphron, the brother of Jason, who was commander of the Thessalians. Alexander, with an army of twenty thousand men, made war on the states around him with astonishing success, and subjected most of them to his dominion. The Thessalians took arms against their tyrant, and implored the assistance of the Thebans, who sent them an army under the conduct of Pelopidas, as Epanonidas was employed in Peloponnesus. The arrival of the Theban forces struck terror into the breast of the tyrant; Pelopidas soon made himself master of Larissa, and compelled Alexander to sue for peace. The Theban general attempted to inspire this ferocious prince

prince

prince with sentiments of justice and humanity; but finding him incorrigible, and hearing every day new complaints of his cruelty, avaricè, and debauchery, he threatened him with his resentment. The tyrant alarmed, withdrew in secret; and Pelopidas leaving the Theſſalians in security from his future attempts, set out by invitation for Macedon, where Ptolemy, the natural son of Amyntas II. had usurped the regal power, in defiance of the rights of his legitimate children. Alexander, the eldest of these children, dying, after a short reign of one year, Ptolemy assumed at first the government of the country under the modest title of guardian to Perdicas, the second son, but soon after, tired of subordinate authority, he threw off all disguise, and seized the throne. The supporters of the legal heir implored the assistance of Pelopidas, who, entering Macedon with an army, replaced the sceptre in the hands of Perdicas, and restored the tranquillity of the kingdom. On his return to Thebes, he carried with him thirty children, sprung from the noblest families of Macedonia, to shew the Greeks how far the authority of the Thebans extended, from their reputation for justice and fidelity, as well as valour. Among these was

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Philip, the younger brother of Perdiccas, who afterwards succeeded to the throne of Macedon, and laid the foundation of a new empire in Greece, which his son Alexander the Great extended to the remote regions of Asia.

IN his march homewards, Pelopidas imprudently divided his army. The Macedonian hostages were escorted by a strong detachment, which was sent on before the division he led in person. While he was pursuing his route through Thessaly with this remainder of his forces, he received information, that Alexander of Pheræ was at hand to oppose him. Notwithstanding every hostile appearance, Pelopidas could not be persuaded that the tyrant had any intentions but to apologize for his conduct, to reply before him as a judge to the numerous complaints which were brought against him from every quarter. Under this impression, he went to meet the tyrant, accompanied only by Ismenias; both were immediately seized, and carried prisoners to Pheræ.

WHEN the Thebans were informed of this perfidious transaction, incensed at such an indignity offered to one of their generals, they immediately sent an army into Thessaly. The command was not given to Epaminondas, as

the Thebans had not yet forgiven him for his retreat from Chabria's the Athenian. But the love of his country, and affection to his friend, the two noblest passions that belong to human nature, extinguished all resentment in the heart of that great man; and Epaminondas, though excluded from the chief command, served in the ranks as a private soldier.

THE new generals from Thebes, who had entered Theffaly, did nothing but discover their ignorance of military affairs, and their incapacity for command. The victorious army of Alexander soon discerned that their enemies were no longer conducted by Epaminondas or Pelopidas. The Theban soldiers, beholding themselves robbed of all their former military glory by an enemy which they despised, openly accused the conduct of their commanders, and, with one consent, elected Epaminondas their general. No sooner had he assumed the command, than the Thebans were every where victorious, the tyrant was defeated in every engagement, and was obliged at last to purchase a short truce, by delivering up Pelopidas and Ismenias.

BUT the restless ambition of Alexander would not suffer him to remain long at peace; for soon after, with a numerous body of mer-



C H A P. cenaries, he broke into Thessaly, and made  
 XXII. almost a total conquest of the country. Under the yoke of oppression, the Thessalians again implored the protection of Thebes. The Thebans, whose interest they had always pursued with fidelity and alacrity, resolved to assist them with a powerful army, and invested Pelopidas with the command. On the day appointed for his march, there happened a sudden eclipse of the sun, when the city of Thebes was darkened at noon-day. Among a people ignorant and superstitious, the dread and consternation were general. Unwilling to exact the reluctant obedience of men dispirited by religious terrors, Pelopidas departed with three hundred horse, and such Thebans and strangers as chose to follow him. He was incited to this enterprize by personal resentment against Alexander, who had perfidiously seized his person, and cruelly detained him in captivity. But he was chiefly influenced by a superior motive, the propriety and dignity of the action itself. He was prompted by a laudable ambition to display to all Greece, that while the Lacedæmonians were paying court to Dionysius the tyrant, and the Athenians were in the pay of Alexander, to whom they had erected a statue of praise, the Thebans

bans) were the only people who asserted the general liberty of the Greeks, and declared open war against tyranny and tyrants.

PELOPIDAS, and his Theban detachment being joined by seven thousand Thessalians, marched to Cynocephalus, a place surrounded with high hills, and there pitched his camp. The tyrant advanced with an army of twenty thousand men, and trusting to his numbers, courted an engagement. The impetuous attack of the Theban cavalry was irresistible at the first onset; but the infantry of Alexander, which were posted upon the heights, pouring down upon the Thebans and Thessalians, compelled them to give ground. Pelopidas then advanced with a detachment of his cavalry, and rallying the troops, so animated them by his voice and example, that the enemy, believing they were attacked by fresh forces, were intimidated, and retreated in disorder. In this engagement Pelopidas seems to have sacrificed his life to the blind pursuit of personal vengeance. Enraged by the remembrance of indignities offered to him by the tyrant, he sought for Alexander in every quarter of the field. Having at last descried his adversary, he called aloud to him by name, now to meet bravely with his sword the man

CHAP. he had basely injured. But Alexander, pru-  
 XXII. dently withdrew behind the ranks of his  
 guards. Thither, burning with all the fury  
 of revenge, did Pelopidas, at the head of a  
 small party of horse, pursue him, and fell,  
 oppressed by numbers, rather like a brave sol-  
 dier, than a prudent commander. The Thef-  
 salian horsemen rushed to the assistance of  
 their expiring general, and dispersed the  
 guards of the tyrant: the Thebans, roused to  
 fury, fell with impetuosity on the main body  
 of the enemy, put them to flight, and pur-  
 sued them with great slaughter. The plain  
 was covered with carcases, and more than  
 three thousand of Alexander's mercenaries fell  
 on the field of battle, or in the pursuit.

No general ever met with more sincere and  
 universal lamentation and regret than Pello-  
 pidas. The victory seemed to be turned into  
 a defeat; a deep silence and general grief pre-  
 vailed through the army. According to the  
 expressions of sorrow in antient times, the  
 soldiers cut off their locks, the manes of their  
 horses, and shut themselves up in their tents,  
 abstaining from every kind of nourishment.  
 When his body was carried to Thebes, it was  
 attended by a train of real mourners; and in  
 every town through which it passed, the ma-  
 gistrates

gistrates and priests came out to meet the procession, bringing crowns and trophies. The Thessalians and Thebans contended for the honour of celebrating his funeral; but at last, the zealous gratitude of the former was indulged with the mournful office of performing the obsequies of a commander who had devoted himself to their protection from danger, and preservation from slavery. The people, recollecting the eclipse which took place on the day which was appointed for his departure, and which, according to their superstitious creed, predicted his calamities, exclaimed "that the sun of Thebes was set."

THE Thebans were not satisfied with lamenting the death of their hero, but determined to revenge it. An army, consisting of seven thousand foot, and seven hundred horse, was sent to Thessaly, under the command of Malcitas and Diogeston. Alexander, who had not recovered from the terror of his defeat, was stripped of all his conquests, compelled to restore to the Thessalians the cities he had taken from them, to give liberty to the Magnesians, Achæans, and Phthians, and to bind himself by a solemn oath to follow the standard of the Thebans against all their enemies,

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WHILE the Thebans were employ'd in these foreign expeditions, or in civil dissensions, the Arcadians, confident in their strength and numbers, as well as in their new allies the Athenians, form'd the most ambitious projects. They began by attacking their neighbours the Elians, who were repeatedly defeated, though assisted by the Spartans and Achæans; and were at last obliged to yield the sacred city of Olympia to the rapacious invaders. The time for the celebration of the hundred and fourth olympiad now drew near; and, notwithstanding the late revolution in Elis, Greece assembled from every quarter. A suspension of animosities took place, and all parties united in celebrating the religious ceremonies, and the accustomed games. During the celebration of the games, the Elians attempted to recover possession of the city, but were repuls'd by the Arcadians and Argives, and forced to leave their enemies still masters of the place.

THE Arcadians, finding themselves in possession of the temple of the Olympian Jove, and of the accumulated treasures of past ages, were not deterred, either by religion or justice, from employing the sacred deposit to pay their mercenary troops. The Mantinæans

alone remonstrated against this sacrilegious robbery, and raised a tax upon themselves to defray their proportion of the expences of the war. This event gave rise to much internal commotion. The ten thousand, or general assembly of Arcadia, highly disapproved of the seizure; while the Archons, and all who had shared in the Olympic spoils, dreading the being obliged to refund, formed a strong party in defence of the measure. The ten thousand restored Olympia to the Elians, and concluded a peace with that state. The deputies from Elis and the cities of Arcadia, being assembled at Tegea, for the ratification of this treaty, were seized and imprisoned by the opposite faction, assisted by the Bœotian garrison; and, though afterwards released, yet the violation of their representatives by the Theban soldiery, highly irritated the minds of the Arcadians, already sufficiently disposed to suspect and counteract the ambitious views of Thebes. Epaminondas having declared to their ambassadors, that the Thebans were determined to march into Arcadia, to the assistance of their friends and allies, they prepared with the utmost expedition for a vigorous resistance, and besought the Athenians and Spartans to hasten to their aid, that with  
their

CHAPTER. their united forces they might at once crush  
 XXII. the oppressors of Greece.

So formidable a combination against a single state, seemed to threaten its immediate destruction; but the Thebans met the gathering storm with intrepidity, and marched, under the conduct of Epaminondas, into the Peloponnesus. In this concluding scene of his life, the Theban hero displayed all the address of the most consummate general: and, though a combination of circumstances equally unexpected, and impossible to have been foreseen, robbed him, in some measure, of the fruits of his skill; yet his masterly arrangements, his numerous expedients, his bravery and unwearied perseverance, appear to have deserved the most brilliant success.

His first object was to prevent the junction of the Athenian forces with the Spartans and Arcadians; for this purpose he pitched his camp near Nemea, situated on the road from Attica to Arcadia: but the Athenians wisely avoided an engagement with a superior enemy, by embarking their troops, and landing in the territory of Lacedæmon.

HAVING failed in this, he next formed the design of surprising Sparta a second time.

He

He knew that Agefilæus, with the Lacedæmonians, had already reached the frontiers of Arcadia, and that the city was not in a state to resist an unexpected attack; he therefore made a forced march of thirty miles in the night, and the capital of Lacedæmon would probably have fallen into his hands, had not Agefilæus been apprized of the design by the treachery of a deserter. By this means a detachment, under the command of Archidamus, entered the city before the arrival of the Thebans; and Epaminondas beheld, with surprize and disappointment, instead of the confusion, alarm, and terror of a defenceless city, every preparation for a vigorous resistance. Yet, trusting to the superior number and tried bravery of his troops, he still hoped to carry the place by storm. But in this too his expectations were frustrated; the Thebans, who had so often before foiled the Spartans, did not on this critical occasion support their former martial fame; they permitted themselves to be shamefully repulsed by Archidamûs, at the head of only one hundred Spartans.

THE fertile mind of the Theban general next projected the surprisal of Mantinæa; rightly supposing that the general alarm for Sparta



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Sparta, and the not expecting him in Arcadia, would draw the whole strength of the enemy towards the Lacedæmonian territories. He therefore made a rapid march to Tegea, and from thence detached his cavalry to take possession of the town. The unexpected arrival of the Athenian horse, under the command of Hegelochus, defeated this well-concerted measure; the Thebans were repulsed, and Mantinæa saved.

BAFFLED in every attempt to make an impression on the confederates by superior address, nothing now remained to Epaminondas but to decide the fate of the war by a general engagement. Marching his troops from Tegea along the range of hills which run from that city to Mantinæa, he so perplexed the enemy by his various evolutions, that they found themselves forced to engage, at the time they least expected an attack. He charged the Spartans and Mantinæans at the head of his left wing, which he had ranged as at Leuctra, in the form of a wedge, and which was composed of chosen veterans. The conflict was obstinate and bloody; the Spartans were determined to regain the honour they had lost in their late defeats, and the Thebans to preserve their superiority.

The

The weight and impetuosity of the Theban battalion, under the command of Epaminondas, at length bore down all resistance, and the enemy's cavalry being at the same time dispersed, victory declared for the Thebans. In this important moment, Epaminondas was mortally wounded by a javelin, and removed from the field. An universal consternation seized the Bœotians; it appeared as if all had depended upon the general. Having lost their animating and directing mind, they stopped short in the career of conquest; they knew not what to do; they looked on with a stupid languor and imbecility, while the enemy was rallying in different quarters, and routing in detail their broken forces. After some time this tumultuary engagement ceased, each party retreated, claiming the victory, and each acting as if it had been conquered:

THE last moments of the Theban general did not obscure the splendor of a life which had been spent in the acquisition of knowledge, in acts of beneficence, and in the aggrandisement of his country. Amidst the agonies of dissolution, his only solicitude was for his own military glory, and the prosperity of Thebes. "Is my shield safe? Are the Thebans victorious?" were questions he repeated.

CHAPTER XXII. peated with the utmost anxiety. Viewing his shield, which was brought to him, and — being informed that the Lacedæmonians were defeated, a gleam of joy prevailed for a moment over the languor of death: “ Mine,” said he, “ is a glorious departure; I die in the arms of victory; tell me not that I am childless, for Leuctra and Mantinæa are immortal children.” He then commanded the javelin to be extracted, which he knew was to occasion immediate death, and expired in the arms, and amidst the groans of his surrounding friends. His body was deposited in the field of battle, where a monument to his memory remained to the time of Pausanias.

WITH Epaminondas expired the splendor of the Theban name. To him, and to Pelopidas the Thebans owed that pre-eminence they had acquired in Greece; and for a time they did not entirely lose the consequence they enjoyed while their affairs were directed by these great men; but it was a consequence derived from their former exploits, rather than from their after exertions. The vital spark was gone which had roused their latent energy, and an universal languor seems henceforward to have pervaded all their transactions.

AFTER

AFTER the battle of Mantinæ, the exhausted state of all the hostile powers produced a temporary peace, under the mediation of Artaxerxes. Sparta would not accede to this treaty, because it was stipulated that each state should retain its possessions and independence; and the Spartans wanted to recover the sovereignty of Messenia. But, unable to succeed without the assistance of their allies, who had signed the treaty, they did not venture to disturb the peace of Greece; yet, irritated against the Persian king, they embarked a large force, under the conduct of Agesilaus, to assist his rebellious subjects in Egypt. That aged monarch, now on the verge of the grave, scrupled not to become the mercenary of rebels, and placed first Tachæ, and then Nectanebus on the Egyptian throne. He did not live to revisit his native land: after a life of eighty-four years, and a reign of forty-one, he died on the coast of Africa, whither he had been driven by a storm; leaving Sparta, which he had found powerful and triumphant, in a state of weakness and degradation, notwithstanding all his talents, and indefatigable activity.

AT this period, the state was agitated by their civil wars,

CHAP. and enervated by luxury, exhibited a melancholy reverse of what they were in the age of Thermopylae and Marathon. Divided, without public spirit, without solid political views, without virtue, the good of the whole was totally neglected: each state beheld its neighbour with eyes of envy or rapacity; the bosom of each, from Athens, Sparta and Thebes, to the most insignificant republic, was torn by dissension and cabal, where the contending parties, as they triumphed in their successes, expelled or murdered their opponents.

In the meanwhile, Philip of Macedon was rising into consequence, and watching every opportunity to avail himself of their weakness and dissension; while Greece numbered in security, while it entered not into the mind of an Athenian or a Spartan, that the conquerors of the Great King could ever wear the chains of one whom they considered as only the petty chief of a barbarian tribe.