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- 1 SWNCC 5 dated 17 January 1945. Copy 42.
- 2 SWNCC memo to Adm. Train referring SWNCC 5 to PFESC for study and report, dated 22 January 1945.
- 3 British-American Policy Toward Thailand, dated 25 January, 1945 (2 copies).
- 4 Draft - SWNCC PFESC No. 1 - 1 February 1945.
- 5 Final paper of SWNCC-PFESC #1 (Copies 3 & 9) together with covering memo dated 2 February 1945.
- 6 SWNCC 5/1 dated 3 February 1945. Copy 35.
- 7 Memo to Strong & Train re SWCNN-PFESC #1 fr Col. Fahey dated 6 February 1945.
- 8 SWNCC 5/2 dated 9 February 1945. Copy 35.
- 9 Incoming Classified Message fr CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater, New Delhi, India dated 4 January 1945.
- ~~10 SWNCC 5/3 dated 28 March 1945. Copy 28.~~
- ~~11 SWNCC 5/4/D dated 30 March 1945. Copy 28.~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ SECRET XVI

From: CG, US Army Forces India Burma Theater,
New Delhi, India

To: War Department

No. CRA 242

4 January 1945

Marshall CRA 242 from Sultan.

Chief political advisor to SEAC (Mr. Dening) has outlined following points regarding British attitude toward Thailand in conversation with Dillon Ripley of OSS:

1. It is Britain's understanding that while US supports territorial integrity of Thailand US will consider void any Thai territorial acquisitions since 1940 (puppet government grabs).

2. Britain desires for security reasons that Thai territory on Kra Isthmus be placed under some sort of protectorate status in order that adequate protective measures such as providing of military bases may be taken in that area.

3. An Allied Control Commission should be set up in Thailand during the reconstruction period.

4. There is a Thailand planning unit now functioning in London.

This forwarded for your information.

ACTION: CAD

End

INFO : OPD, G-2, G-3, G-4

CM-IV-3630 (4 Jan 45) DTG 040401Z mss

J.P.W.C.

DECLASSIFIED

NND 750065

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By CO/AF NARS, Date MAR 17 1976

JC/S

COPY NO. 49

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTTO :
FROM : Rear Admiral Train

DATE: 14 February 1945.

SUBJECT: JCS 1271 - *Malaya**File**WJ
JMS
MMW
E
H*

Rear Admiral Train telephoned Colonel Cress and answered his request about JCS 1271, paragraph 12, particularly sub-paragraph 12 g. He told Colonel Cress that paragraphs 11 and 12 of this paper were not in the original paper submitted by the Pacific Far Eastern sub-committee to SWNCC; that Lt. Col. Fahey, the alternate member to General Hildring on the above mentioned sub-committee, requested that paragraphs 11 and 12 be put in this paper after we had finished it and he was told that the Committee would not do so; that paragraph 11 added very little to the paper and paragraph 12 nothing at all and really was on a different subject.

At the meeting of the SWNCC last Friday, February 9, General Hildring submitted the recommendation that paragraphs 11 and 12 be added to the paper which was done by the SWNCC.

H.C. Train
H.C. TRAIN

SECRETCOPY NO. 35SWNCC 5/29 February 1945Pages 6 - 11 incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEBRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDReferences: a. SWNCC 5
b. SWNCC 5/1Note by the Secretaries

1. SWNCC 5/1 was considered by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in its ninth meeting on 9 February 1945. General Hilldring, acting for the Assistant Secretary of War, offered a number of amendments to the paper. The Committee approved the paper, as amended, and directed that it be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for such action as they might deem appropriate.

*Completed
9 Feb 46
smA.*

2. The paper as amended and approved by the Committee is attached as an enclosure.

WALLACE E. WHITSON
ALVIN F. RICHARDSON
RAYMOND E. COX
Secretariat

8

SECRETENCLOSUREBRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDTHE PROBLEM

1. To prepare U. S. views with respect to the current British attitude on Thailand.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. General Sultan has advised the War Department (CRA 242, CM-IN-3630, 4 January 1945) that the Chief Political Adviser (British) to the Southeast Asia Command has stated and is assuming that the U. S. will view any Thailand territorial acquisitions since 1940 as void, but that otherwise, the U. S. will back Thailand territorial integrity.
3. The cable states that for security reasons the U.K. is desirous that Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus be placed under some sort of protectorate status in order that adequate protective measures such as the provision of military bases may be undertaken in that area.
4. The cable further states that the British favor the constitution of an Allied Control Commission during the reconstruction period and that the British have established a Thai planning unit in London.
5. A paraphrase of a portion of the reply from British Foreign Secretary Eden to the U. S. Ambassador's note of 21 October 1944 is as follows:

"Siam, to us, is an enemy who must work her way before she can re-establish herself; whereas Siam, to the United States, is merely a territory occupied by the enemy and this in spite of her declaration of war.

"With respect to the ultimate freedom and independence of those who are but the satellites of our main enemies, common prudence would indicate that even they should accept special arrangements for security and economic collaboration as may be necessary to the functioning of an inter-national post-war system.

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"With respect to the Kra Isthmus, it is a matter for our respective military authorities to recommend special reservations which may be necessary in the post-war period."

6. The position of the U. S. with regard to territorial acquisitions by Thailand since 1940 has been set forth to the British Government in terms substantially as follows:

a. The U. S. does not recognize the legality of any territorial acquisitions by Thailand with Japanese assistance. The U. S. agrees that such territories must be restored in fact to Malaya, Indo-China and Burma, without prejudice, however, to the subsequent presentation of claims by any nation, Thailand included, for adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by processes which are orderly and peaceful.

7. The territories referred to in paragraph 6 above include the following:

a. That part of Laos west of the Mekong River and approximately one-third of Cambodia which were ceded to Thailand by Indo-China under Japanese pressure in March 1941. These are part of the territory that France required Thailand to relinquish in the series of treaties and agreements between 1863 and 1907.

b. The four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were transferred to Thailand in July 1943. For several centuries these states were nominal dependencies of Thailand, but in 1909 Thailand transferred her rights of sovereignty to Great Britain in exchange for the abandonment by Great Britain of certain extra-territorial rights and a loan to the Thailand Government by Great Britain.

c. The Shan states of Kengtung and Mong Pan were transferred to Thailand by the Japanese Government in July 1943.

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8. The position of the U. S. is that, although it does not recognize the legality of the transfers to Thailand of the territories above indicated and will require the restoration of the status quo ante, it neither denies nor supports the validity of any claim which Thailand might have to the territories mentioned in sub-paragraphs 7 a and 7 b above.

9. The Department of State on 20 March 1944 handed a U. S. statement on policy on Thailand to Lord Halifax as follows:

"The United States has not declared war on Thailand and is not at war with Thailand, although the Thai Government, after Japanese occupation of Thailand, declared war on the United States. We look forward to an early expulsion from Thailand of the Japanese invaders. Until the Japanese are expelled from Thailand, we shall treat Thailand for various purposes, including economic and psychological warfare, as enemy-occupied territory. In any situation in which Thai nationals or groups actively engage in or cooperate with the Japanese in military operations, whether offensive or defensive, against the forces of the United States or of other of the United Nations, and in any situation in which presence of Thai armed forces obstructs the operations or threatens the security of forces of the United Nations, we shall treat those Thai forces as enemies.

"The United States continues to regard Thailand as an independent state We favor restoration to Thailand of complete freedom as a sovereign state and we favor creation in Thailand of a government which will represent the free will of the Thai people."

10. Paragraph 4 of JCS 819/5, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department is as follows:

"In Burma, Malaya and Thailand administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the U. S. except that if U. S. forces are employed, the extent of U. S. civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the JCS by the U. S. commander concerned."

amendment

11. On 13 July 1944, the Commander, British Army Staff in Washington, requested the Assistant Secretary of War to clarify the War Department's position on civil affairs admin-

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istration in the Southeast Asia Command, including the provision of civilian supplies. On 21 September 1944, the Assistant Secretary of War replied in part as follows:

"Civil affairs administration in the Southeast Asia Command is not considered to be a responsibility of the United States, except that if United States forces are employed in areas other than those over which His Majesty's Government exercised authority prior to enemy occupation, the extent of United States civil affairs administration in such areas shall be a matter of recommendation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

"Requests for essential civilian supplies desired by His Majesty's Government in Southeast Asia Command, if desired under lend-lease, must be submitted for consideration through established channels and in accordance with established procedures."

12. Representatives of the British Army Staff have recently raised the question of the proper channel through which requests should be presented for lend-lease supplies. Conferences on this subject have been held between representatives of the State and War Departments and the Foreign Economic Administration. It has been agreed:

a. That U. S. military authorities will not provide essential civilian supplies in support of military operations in those areas of the Southeast Asia Command over which the British Government exercised authority prior to Japanese occupation.

b. That requests by the British Government for such essential civilian supplies from the U. S., including those

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required in support of military operations will be processed through the Foreign Economic Administration.

amendment
c. That War Department concurrence in this arrangement was made expressly conditional upon approval of a and b above by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CONCLUSIONS

*#11
ms/1*
13. The British contention that security reasons in the post-war era necessitate the placing of Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus under some sort of a protectorate status is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.

*#12
ms/1*
14. In the light of the present military situation, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Thailand during the reconstruction period is a matter which in the first instance is political in character.

*#13
ms/1*
15. Participation in civil affairs in Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless U. S. forces are employed there. In the event of operations involving the use of U. S. forces, the extent of participation by the U. S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U. S. commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.

*#14
ms/1*
16. The United States is opposed to the use of United Nations military operations against the common enemy in the SEAC area as a basis for prejudging in any way the solution of post-war problems, or to the use of such operations as a vehicle to further the economic, political or territorial ambitions of any nation at the expense of any other nation.

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#15
ms/1
17. The United States is opposed to participation in any form of Allied control machinery in Thailand designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. That the report of the Far Eastern Sub-Committee be approved and transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for [such action as they may deem appropriate.]

mind num

SWNCC 5/2

-11-

ENCLOSURE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25

MEMORANDUM

Date 2-6-45

To: General Strong and Admiral Train

Subject: British Proposal with respect to Thailand.

Col. Fahey was sitting with Mr. Dooman when I entered. I was not present for the discussion but Col. Fahey handed me this memo, and Mr. Dooman affixed his "I agree" while I was there. As I recall, Mr. Dooman did say that Paragraph 2 under "2" of Col. Fahey's memo was not pertinent to our paper, but would not object to its being included if Col. Fahey wanted it that way.

Col. Fahey stated he wanted to put through a corrigendum. I suggested that since there was considerable changing to be done if the ~~paper~~ memorandum of Col. Fahey was approved, that it would be better perhaps to withdraw the paper, and resubmit it. Mr. Dooman agreed with this latter procedure.

Col. Fahey is coming over at 2, as per your direction.

McD

Mary:

The change Col. Fahey proposed is going to be put into the State, War and Navy Committee Friday by General Hilldring. In other words, they wont change the report of the subcommittee. This is an agreement between General Hilldring and Gen. Strong.

Col. Fahey would like you to notify **(Mr. Dooman)** and Col. Babcock.

done

"Rae"

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6 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EUGENE DOGMAN
✓ MAJOR GENERAL STRONG
✓ ADMIRAL TRAIN
COLONEL BAIRD

SUBJECT: British Proposals with respect to Thailand

1. In the preparation of SWNEC-FJSC No. 1, a significant fact bearing on the problem has been overlooked.

2. On 13 July 1944, the Commander, British Army Staff in Washington, requested the Assistant Secretary of War to clarify the War Department's position on civil affairs administration in the Southeast Asia Command, including the provision of civilian supplies. On 21 September 1944, the Assistant Secretary of War replied in part as follows:

"Civil affairs administration in the Southeast Asia Command is not considered to be a responsibility of the United States, except that if United States forces are employed in areas other than those over which His Majesty's Government exercised authority prior to enemy occupation, the extent of United States civil affairs administration in such areas shall be a matter of recommendation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

"Requests for essential civilian supplies desired by His Majesty's Government in Southeast Asia Command, if desired under lend-lease, must be submitted for consideration through established channels and in accordance with established procedures."

3. Mr. McCloy's position was taken after the approval of JCS 819/5 and is stronger than the position taken by paragraph 13 as now drafted. In his letter to the British, the U.S. would not be responsible for the administration of civil affairs in Burma and Malaya. As we wrote paragraph 13, the U.S. could become responsible for participation in civil affairs in Burma and Malaya if U.S. forces were employed.

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4. Representatives of the British Army Staff have recently raised the question of the proper channel through which requests should be presented for lend-lease supplies. Conferences on this subject have been held between representatives of the State and War Departments and the Foreign Economic Administration. It has been agreed:

a. That U.S. military authorities will not provide essential civilian supplies in support of military operations in those areas of the Southeast Asia Command over which the British Government exercised authority prior to Japanese occupation.

b. That requests by the British Government for such essential civilian supplies from the U.S., including those required in support of military operations will be processed through the Foreign Economic Administration.

c. That War Department concurrence in this arrangement was made expressly conditional upon approval of a and b above by the JCS.

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. That paragraph 2 above be added to SNECC-FESC No. 1 as paragraph 11 under the Facts Bearing on the Problem.

6. That paragraph 4 above be added to SNECC-FESC No. 1 as paragraph 12 under the Facts Bearing on the Problem.

7. That paragraph 13 of SNECC-FESC No. 1 be modified as follows:

"13. Participation in civil affairs in ~~Burma, Malaya or~~ Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless U.S. forces are employed there ~~in these areas~~. In the event of operations involving the use of U.S. forces, the extent of participation by the U.S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U.S. commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations."

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D. C. FAHEY, JR.
Lt. Colonel, GSC

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SWNCC 5/1

3 February 1945

Pages 2 - 5 incl.

COPY NO. 35

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

BRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILAND

Reference: a. SWNCC 5

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by the Tri-Departmental Sub-Committee for the Pacific and Far East is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

WALLACE E. WHITSON

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

SECRETSWNCC 5/1E N C L O S U R EBRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDTHE PROBLEM

1. To prepare U.S. views with respect to the current British attitude on Thailand.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. General Sultan has advised the War Department (CRA 242, CM-IN-3630, 4 January 1945) that the Chief Political Adviser (British) to the Southeast Asia Command has stated and is assuming that the U.S. will view any Thailand territorial acquisitions since 1940 as void, but that otherwise, the U.S. will back Thailand territorial integrity.

3. The cable states that for security reasons the U.K. is desirous that Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus be placed under some sort of protectorate status in order that adequate protective measures such as the provision of military bases may be undertaken in that area.

4. The cable further states that the British favor the constitution of an Allied Control Commission during the reconstruction period and that the British have established a Thailand planning unit in London.

5. A paraphrase of a portion of the reply from British Foreign Secretary Eden to the U.S. Ambassador's note of 21 October 1944 is as follows:

"Siam, to us, is an enemy who must work her way before she can re-establish herself; whereas Siam, to the United States, is merely a territory occupied by the enemy and this in spite of her declaration of war.

With respect to the ultimate freedom and independence of those who are but the satellites of our main enemies, common prudence would indicate that even they should

SECRET

accept special arrangements for security and economic collaboration as may be necessary to the functioning of an inter-national postwar system.

With respect to the Kra Isthmus, it is a matter for our respective military authorities to recommend special reservations which may be necessary in the postwar period."

6. The position of the U.S. with regard to territorial acquisitions by Thailand since 1940 has been set forth to the British Government in terms substantially as follows:

a. The U.S. does not recognize the legality of any territorial acquisitions by Thailand with Japanese assistance. The U.S. agrees that such territories must be restored in fact to Malaya, Indo-China and Burma, without prejudice, however, to the subsequent presentation of claims by any nation, Thailand included, for adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by processes which are orderly and peaceful.

7. The territories referred to in paragraph 6 above include the following:

a. That part of Laos west of the Mekong river and approximately one third of Cambodia which were ceded to Thailand by Indo-China under Japanese pressure in March 1941. These are part of the territory that France required Thailand to relinquish in the series of treaties and agreements between 1863 and 1907.

b. The four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were transferred to Thailand in July 1943. For several centuries these states were nominal dependencies of Thailand, but in 1909 Thailand transferred her rights of sovereignty to Great Britain in exchange for the abandonment by Great Britain of certain extra-territorial rights and a loan to the Thailand Government by Great Britain.

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c. The Shan states of Kengtung and Mong Pan were transferred to Thailand by the Japanese Government in July 1943.

8. The position of the U.S. is that, although it does not recognize the legality of the transfers to Thailand of the territories above indicated and will require the restoration of the status quo ante, it neither denies nor supports the validity of any claim which Thailand might have to the territories mentioned in sub-paragraphs 7 a and 7 b above.

9. The Department of State on 20 March 1944 handed a U.S. statement on policy on Thailand to Lord Halifax as follows:

"The United States has not declared war on Thailand and is not at war with Thailand, although the Thai Government, after Japanese occupation of Thailand, declared war on the United States. We look forward to an early expulsion from Thailand of the Japanese invaders. Until the Japanese are expelled from Thailand, we shall treat Thailand for various purposes, including economic and psychological warfare, as enemy occupied territory. In any situation in which Thai nationals or groups actively engage in or cooperate with the Japanese in military operations, whether offensive or defensive, against the forces of the United States or of other of the United Nations, and in any situation in which presence of Thai armed forces obstructs the operations or threatens the security of forces of the United Nations, we shall treat those Thai forces as enemies.

The United States continues to regard Thailand as an independent state. We favor restoration to Thailand of complete freedom as a sovereign state and we favor creation in Thailand of a government which will represent the free will of the Thai people."

10. Paragraph 4 of JCS 819/5, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department is as follows:

"In Burma, Malaya and Thailand administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the U.S. except that if U.S. forces are employed, the extent of U.S. civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the JCS by the U.S. commander concerned."

SECRETCONCLUSIONS

11. The British contention that security reasons in the post war era necessitate the placing of Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus under some sort of a protectorate status is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.

12. In the light of the present military situation, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Thailand during the reconstruction period is a matter which in the first instance is political in character.

13. Participation in civil affairs in ^{omitted in 5/2} Burma, Malaya or Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless U.S. forces are employed ^{"there" in 5/2} in those areas. In the event of operations involving the use of U.S. forces, the extent of participation by the U.S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U.S.

commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.

14. The United States is opposed to the use of United Nations military operations against the common enemy in the SEAC area as a basis for prejudging in any way the solution of post-war problems, or to the use of such operations as a vehicle to further the economic, political or territorial ambitions of any nation at the expense of any other nation.

15. The U.S. is opposed to participation in any form of Allied control machinery designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. That the report of the Far Eastern Sub-committee be approved and transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval or comment.

SWNCC 5/1



JOINT POST-WAR COMMITTEE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
TRI-DEPARTMENTAL SUB-COMMITTEE
FOR THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

2 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEESubject: British Proposals with Respect to
ThailandReferences: a. SWNCC 5
b. Memorandum from Secretary,
State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee, on "British Proposals
with Respect to Thailand",
dated 22 January 1945.

1. In compliance with reference b., the enclosed memorandum prepared by the Sub-Committee for the Pacific and Far East of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is submitted for consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

For the SWNCC-PFESC:

M. E. McDONALD

Secretary.

*approved 9 Feb by Source
is amended by Gen. Gillingham (SWN 5/2)
transmitted to JCS for such
action as they deem necessary
net.*

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
TRI-DEPARTMENTAL SUB-COMMITTEE
FOR THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

2 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

Subject: British Proposals with Respect to
Thailand

References: a. SWNCC 5
b. Memorandum from Secretary,
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with Respect to Thailand",
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mitted for consideration of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee.

For the SWNCC-PFESC:

M. E. McDONALD

Secretary.

FILE

SECRETCopy No. 9SWNCC-FESC No. 11 February 1945ENCLOSUREBRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDTHE PROBLEM

1. To prepare U.S. views with respect to the current British attitude on Thailand.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. General Sultan has advised the War Department (CRA 242, CM-IN-3630, 4 January 1945) that the Chief Political Adviser (British) to the Southeast Asia Command has stated and is assuming that the U.S. will view any Thailand territorial acquisitions since 1940 as void, but that otherwise, the U.S. will back Thailand territorial integrity.

3. The cable states that for security reasons the U.K. is desirous that Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus be placed under some sort of protectorate status in order that adequate protective measures such as the provision of military bases may be undertaken in that area.

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b. The four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were transferred to Thailand in July 1943. For several centuries these states were nominal dependencies of Thailand, but in 1909 Thailand transferred her rights of sovereignty to Great Britain in exchange for the abandonment by Great Britain of certain extra-territorial rights and a loan to the Thailand Government by Great Britain.

c. The Shan states of Kengtung and Mong Pan were transferred to Thailand by the Japanese Government in July 1943.

8. The position of the United States is that, although it does not recognize the legality of the transfers to Thailand of the territories above indicated and will require the restoration of the status quo ante, it neither denies nor supports the validity of any claim which Thailand might have to the territories mentioned in sub-paragraphs 7 a and 7 b above.

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12-

CONCLUSIONS

11. The British contention that security reasons in the post war era necessitate the placing of Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus under some sort of a protectorate status is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.

12. In the light of the present military situation, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Thailand during the reconstruction period is a matter which in the first instance is political in character.

X
13. Participation in civil affairs in Burma, Malaya or Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless U.S. forces are employed in those areas. In the event of operations involving the use of U.S. forces, the extent of participation by the U.S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U.S. commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.

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in any way the solution of post-war problems, or to the use of such operations as a vehicle to further the economic, political or territorial ambitions of any nation at the expense of any other nation.

15. The U.S. is opposed to participation in any form of Allied control machinery designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. That the report of the Far Eastern Subcommittee be approved and transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval or comment.

INITIAL:

General George V. Strong _____

Admiral H. C. Train HC TrainMr. Eugene H. Dooman E.H.D.~~Colonel G. S. Babcock~~ _____Lt. Colonel D. C. Fahey Fahey

SECRETSWNCC-FESC No. 11 February 1945Gen. J. Tracy
Adm. Train
Copy No. 3ENCLOSUREBRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDTHE PROBLEM

1. To prepare U.S. views with respect to the current British attitude on Thailand.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. General Sultan has advised the War Department (CRA 242, CM-IN-3630, 4 January 1945) that the Chief Political Adviser (British) to the Southeast Asia Command has stated and is assuming that the U.S. will view any Thailand territorial acquisitions since 1940 as void, but that otherwise, the U.S. will back Thailand territorial integrity.

3. The cable states that for security reasons the U.K. is desirous that Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus be placed under some sort of protectorate status in order that adequate protective measures such as the provision of military bases may be undertaken in that area.

4. The cable further states that the British favor the constitution of an Allied Control Commission during the reconstruction period and that the British have established a Thailand planning unit in London.

5. A paraphrase of a portion of the reply from British Foreign Secretary Eden to the U.S. Ambassador's note of 21 October 1944 is as follows:

"Siam, to us, is an enemy who must work her way before she can re-establish herself; whereas Siam, to the United States, is merely a territory occupied by the enemy and this in spite of her declaration of war.

With respect to the ultimate freedom and independence of those who are but the satellites of our main enemies, common prudence would indicate that even they should accept special arrangements for security and economic collaboration as may be necessary to the functioning of an inter-national postwar system.

With respect to the Kra Isthmus, it is a matter for our respective military authorities to recommend special reservations which may be necessary in the postwar period."

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6. The position of the U.S. with regard to territorial acquisitions by Thailand since 1940 has been set forth to the British Government in terms substantially as follows:

a. The U.S. does not recognize the legality of any territorial acquisitions by Thailand with Japanese assistance. The U.S. agrees that such territories must be restored in fact to Malaya, Indo-China and Burma, without prejudice, however, to the subsequent presentation of claims by any nation, Thailand included, for adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by processes which are orderly and peaceful.

7. The territories referred to in paragraph 6 above include the following:

a. That part of Laos west of the Mekong River and approximately one third of Cambodia which were ceded to Thailand by Indo-China under Japanese pressure in March 1941. These are part of the territory that France required Thailand to relinquish in the series of treaties and agreements between 1863 and 1907.

b. The four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were transferred to Thailand in July 1943. For several centuries these states were nominal dependencies of Thailand, but in 1909 Thailand transferred her rights of sovereignty to Great Britain in exchange for the abandonment by Great Britain of certain extra-territorial rights and a loan to the Thailand Government by Great Britain.

c. The Shan states of Kengtung and Mong Pan were transferred to Thailand by the Japanese Government in July 1943.

8. The position of the United States is that, although it does not recognize the legality of the transfers to Thailand of the territories above indicated and will require the restoration of the status quo ante, it neither denies nor supports the validity of any claim which Thailand might have to the territories mentioned in sub-paragraphs 7 a and 7 b above.

9. The Department of State on 20 March 1944 handed a United States statement on policy on Thailand to Lord Halifax as follows:

"The United States has not declared war on Thailand and is not at war with Thailand, although the Thai Government, after Japanese occupation of Thailand, declared war on the United States. We look forward to an early expulsion from Thailand of the Japanese invaders. Until the Japanese are expelled from Thailand, we shall treat Thailand for various

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purposes, including economic and psychological warfare, as enemy occupied territory. In any situation in which Thai nationals or groups actively engage in or cooperate with the Japanese in military operations, whether offensive or defensive, against the forces of the United States or of other of the United Nations, and in any situation in which presence of Thai armed forces obstructs the operations or threatens the security of forces of the United Nations, we shall treat those Thai forces as enemies.

The United States continues to regard Thailand as an independent state. We favor restoration to Thailand of complete freedom as a sovereign state and we favor creation in Thailand of a government which will represent the free will of the Thai people."

10. Paragraph 4 of JCS 819/5, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department is as follows:

"In Burma, Malaya and Thailand administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the U.S. except that if U.S. forces are employed, the extent of U.S. civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the JCS by the U.S. commander concerned."

CONCLUSIONS

11. The British contention that security reasons in the post war era necessitate the placing of Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus under some sort of a protectorate status is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.

12. In the light of the present military situation, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Thailand during the reconstruction period is a matter which in the first instance is political in character.

13. Participation in civil affairs in Burma, Malaya or Thailand should not become a responsibility of the United States unless U.S. forces are employed in those areas. In the event of operations involving the use of U.S. forces, the extent of participation by the U.S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U.S. commander to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.

14. The United States is opposed to the use of United Nations military operations against the common enemy in the SEAC area as a basis for prejudging

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in any way the solution of post-war problems, or to the use of such operations as a vehicle to further the economic, political or territorial ambitions of any nation at the expense of any other nation.

15. The U.S. is opposed to participation in any form of Allied control machinery designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. That the report of the Far Eastern Subcommittee be approved and transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval or comment.

SECRETDRAFTSWNCC-FESC No. 11 February 1945.

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not the final one*

Ken Strong

*Col Fahy
74769*

38912

OPA.

ENCLOSUREBRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDTHE PROBLEM

1. To prepare U.S. views with respect to the current British attitude on Thailand.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. General Sultan has advised the War Department (CRA 242, CM-IN-3630, 4 January 1945) that the Chief Political Adviser (British) to the Southeast Asia Command has stated and is assuming that the U.S. will view any Thailand territorial acquisitions since 1940 as void, but that otherwise, the U.S. will back Thailand territorial integrity.

3. The cable states that for security reasons the U.K. is desirous that Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus be placed under some sort of protectorate status in order that adequate protective measures such as the provision of military bases may be undertaken in that area.

4. The cable further states that the British favor the constitution of an Allied Control Commission during the reconstruction period and that the British have established a Thailand planning unit in London.

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With respect to the ultimate freedom and independence of those who are but the satellites of our main enemies, common prudence would indicate that even they should accept special arrangements for security and economic collaboration as may be necessary to the functioning of an inter-national postwar system.

With respect to the Kra Isthmus, it is a matter for our respective military authorities to recommend special reservations which may be necessary in the postwar period."

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6. The position of the U.S. with regard to territorial acquisitions by Thailand since 1940 has been set forth to the British Government in terms substantially as follows:

a. The U.S. does not recognize the legality of any territorial acquisitions by Thailand with Japanese assistance. The U.S. agrees that such territories must be restored in fact to Malaya, Indo-China and Burma, without prejudice, however, to the subsequent presentation of claims by any nation, Thailand included, for adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by processes which are orderly and peaceful.

✓ 7. The territories referred to in paragraph ⁶ above include the following:

a. That part of Laos west of the Mekong River and approximately one third of Cambodia which were ceded to Thailand by Indo-China under Japanese pressure in March 1941. These are part of the territory that France required Thailand to relinquish in the series of treaties and agreements between 1863 and 1907.

b. The four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu were transferred to Thailand in July 1943. For several centuries these states were nominal dependencies of Thailand, but in 1909 Thailand transferred her rights of sovereignty to Great Britain in exchange for the abandonment by Great Britain of certain extra-territorial rights and a loan to the Thailand Government by Great Britain.

c. The Shan states of Kengtung and Mong Pan were transferred to Thailand by the Japanese Government in July 1943.

✓ 8. The position of the United States is that, although it does not recognize the legality of the transfers to Thailand of the territories above indicated and will require the restoration of the status quo ante, it neither denies nor supports the validity of any claim which Thailand might have to the territories mentioned in sub-paragraphs 7 a and 7 b above.

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"The United States has not declared war on Thailand and is not at war with Thailand, although the Thai Government, after Japanese occupation of Thailand, declared war on the United States. We look forward to an early expulsion from Thailand of the Japanese invaders. Until the Japanese are expelled from Thailand, we shall treat Thailand for various

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purposes, including economic and psychological warfare, as enemy occupied territory. In any situation in which Thai nationals or groups actively engage in or cooperate with the Japanese in military operations, whether offensive or defensive, against the forces of the United States or of other of the United Nations, and in any situation in which presence of Thai armed forces obstructs the operations or threatens the security of forces of the United Nations, we shall treat those Thai forces as enemies.

The United States continues to regard Thailand as an independent state. We favor restoration to Thailand of complete freedom as a sovereign state and we favor creation in Thailand of a government which will represent the free will of the Thai people."

10. Paragraph 4 of JCS 819/5, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department is as follows:

"In Burma, Malaya and Thailand administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the U.S. except that if U.S. forces are employed, the extent of U.S. civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the JCS by the U.S. commander concerned."

CONCLUSIONS

11. The British contention that security reasons in the post war era necessitate the placing of Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus under some sort of a protectorate status is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.

12. In the light of the present military situation, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission in Thailand during the reconstruction period is a matter which in the first instance is political in character.

✓ 13. Participation in civil affairs in Burma, Malaya or Thailand ^{should not} ~~cannot~~ become a responsibility of the United States unless U.S. forces are employed in those areas. ✓ In the event of operations involving the use of U.S. forces, ~~the~~ extent of participation by the U.S. in civil affairs should be the subject of recommendations by the U.S. commander ^{to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,} and should be limited to that necessary to the furtherance of military operations.

14. The United States is opposed to the use of United Nations military operations against the common enemy in the SEAC area as a basis for prejudging

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in any way the solution of post-war problems, or such operations ^{to the use of} ~~being used~~
as a vehicle to further the economic, political or territorial ambitions of
any nation at the expense of any other nation.

15. The U.S. is opposed to participation in any form of Allied control machinery designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. That the report of the Far Eastern Subcommittee be approved and transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval or comment.

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With reference to paragraph 1, SWNCC 5, 17 January 1945:

5 The position of the United States with regard to territorial acquisitions by Thailand since 1940 has been set forth to the British Government in terms substantially as follows:

a. The United States does not recognize the lawfulness of any territorial acquisitions by Thailand with Japanese assistance. The United States agrees that such territories must be restored in fact to Malaya, Indo-China and Burma, without prejudice, however, to the presentation of claims by any nation, Thailand included, for adjustments of boundaries or transfers of territories by processes which are orderly and peaceful.

6 ~~new para.~~ The territories referred to above include the following:

a
(1) Under Japanese pressure, Indo-China ceded to Thailand in March 1941 that part of Laos west of the Mekong River and approximately one third of Cambodia. These are part of the territory that France required Thailand to relinquish in the series of treaties and agreements between 1863 and 1907.

b
(2) In July 1943 Japan transferred to Thailand the four Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu. For several centuries these states were nominal dependencies of Thailand, but in 1909 Thailand transferred her rights of ^{sovereignty} suzerainty to Great Britain in exchange for the abandonment by Great Britain of certain extraterritorial rights and a loan to the Thai Government by Great Britain.

c
(3) In July 1943 the Japanese Government also transferred to Thailand the Shan states of Kengtung and Mong Pan.

7 The position of the United States is thus, that although it does not recognize the legality of the transfers to Thailand of the territories above indicated and will require the restoration of the status quo ante, it does not thereby deny (or support) the validity of any claim which Thailand might have to the territories mentioned in sub-paragraphs ^a (1) and ^b (2) above.

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2. In regard to par. 2 of the enclosure of SWNCC 5, 17 January 1945, it appears that:

(a) The contention that for security reasons the "control" of the Thailand territory on the Kra Isthmus so that adequate protection measures may be taken in that area such as providing military bases, is without merit. The establishment of bases either for the reconquest of Singapore or for the clearance of Thailand from enemy occupation is purely incidental to military operations and should be governed by military operational requirements.

(b) The establishment of an Allied Control Commission during the reconstruction period is a matter essentially political in character and in so far as Burma, Malaya and Thailand are concerned the administration of Civil Affairs is not considered to be a responsibility of the United States and will not be a responsibility of the United States unless United States forces are employed to accomplish military objectives in that area. If United States forces are so employed, then the extent of United States Civil Affairs administration should be limited to the furtherance of the military effort which question should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the United States Commander concerned when that question arises.

3. Reference par. 3 of the subject paper, the United States policy in the premises should be as follows:

✓ 14.

"The United States is opposed to ^{the use of} ~~per~~mitting United Nations military operations against the common enemy in the SEAC area ~~being~~ ^{as a} ~~the~~ basis ^{for} ~~of~~ prejudging in any way the ^{solutions} ~~settlement~~ ^{of} ~~in~~ the post-war ^{problems,} ~~one~~ ~~of any questions in fields other than those necessary for the accomplishment of military objectives, or such operations being used as a vehicle to further the economic political or territorial ambitions of any nation at the expense of any other nation.~~

"The United States is opposed to the participation in any form of Allied Control machinery designed to accomplish anything beyond the immediate defeat of the common enemy."

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Extract from Enclosure, J.C.S. 819/5

Dated 8 June 1944

4. In Burma, Malaya and Thailand administration of civil affairs is not considered to be the responsibility of the United States except that if United States forces are employed, the extent of United States civil affairs administration shall be a matter of recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the United States commander concerned.

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25 January 1945

BRITISH-AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THAILAND

I. THE PROBLEM

To attempt to persuade the British Government to harmonize its policy toward Thailand with our own.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended:

- A. That the Department inform the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff of the disparity between American and British views in regard to Thailand, request them to use their influence on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to prevent the adoption of measures inconsistent with American policy toward Thailand, and ask them to furnish the Department with such pertinent information as they may deem consistent with military security and which might be of value to the Department in its further discussions with the British Government on the subject of Thailand. (There is attached a memorandum for possible use by the Department's representative on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.)
- B. That we make a further approach to the British Government in which we suggest in general that agreements be sought between the Thai Government on the one side and the British, Chinese and United States Governments on the other, which would include at least the following basic considerations:
1. The Thai Government would agree:
 - a. To render military cooperation at such times and in such manner as may be requested by the appropriate military authorities.
 - b. To accept the territorial boundaries of Thailand as of January 1941 without prejudice to later peaceful negotiations for possible boundary adjustments and territorial transfers.
 - c. To assume the responsibilities of a sovereign nation in the pattern of an international security organization.
 2. The British, Chinese and United States Governments would agree:
 - a. To respect the sovereignty and independence of Thailand.

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- b. To regard Thailand as an Ally, liberated or in process of being liberated from the enemy. (The Thai Regent as head of the state declares that the declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States is unconstitutional and hence null and void.)
- c. To restrict military government to combat zones occupied by Allied troops and to restore such areas to the control of the Thai Government as rapidly as military operations permit.

III. BASIC FACTORS

A. The American Position

The United States has adopted the policy of treating Thailand as an enemy-occupied state, and favors the restoration of pre-war Thailand as a sovereign state under an independent government.

B. The British Position

Great Britain regards Thailand as an enemy and favors an extended occupation of the country after liberation from the Japanese, the establishment of an Allied Control Commission, and the imposition of economic and military conditions within an international system which might substantially impair Thai administrative control.

C. Urgency of the Problem

The problem is urgent because of the developing military situation in Burma and because daily American contact with the Thai Regent at Bangkok brings the information that the Thai underground (headed by the Regent himself) is well organized, and that the Thai desire to give military cooperation to the United Nations in the war against Japan, to be recognized as an Ally, and to be a sovereign independent nation again. A high Thai official representing the Regent is now in Chungking on the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss the establishment of a committee or a provisional government at Chungking which, if recognized by China, would seek recognition from Great Britain and the United States. (The Thai Regent is reported to believe that the Japanese are preparing to take over the Government in Thailand and for this reason is considering a provisional government-in-exile.) Another representative of the Regent is shortly to be brought to the United States, and it is reported that a third agent is to be sent to London.

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D. Occasion of the Problem

General Sultan has telegraphed the War Department for a statement of broad United States policies with respect to participation in matters involving Thailand to serve as a basis for the guidance of American officers in their negotiations with the British. (For additional basic factors see Annexes A, B and C.)

TOP SECRETJanuary 25, 1945AMERICAN AND BRITISH VIEWS IN REGARD TO THAILAND(Draft Memorandum for State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee)

United Nations forces in the SEAC are drawing constantly nearer to the borders of Thailand, making it increasingly easy to establish relations with Thai civil and military authorities within Thailand. For some weeks American contact has been established with the Thai Regent, Pradist, at Bangkok and messages received from him and from other sources indicate that the Thai underground (headed by the Regent himself) is well organized, and that the Thai desire to give military cooperation to the United Nations in the war against Japan, to be recognized as an Ally, and to be a sovereign independent nation again. Important Thai bearing a letter of authorization from the Regent have escaped from Thailand into China and are probably now in Chungking. The Chinese Foreign Office has notified the American and British Embassies that opportunity will be given to talk with them shortly. In view of these developments, the divergent attitudes and plans of the British and the United States Governments in regard to Thailand may cause serious difficulties in the immediate future.

The British are at war with Thailand and it has become apparent that they intend to treat Thailand as a conquered enemy and to occupy the country for some time; that they desire to establish an Allied Control Commission to enforce armistice terms upon the Thai and to control the Thai Government in the post-combat period; and that they desire to impose post-war economic and military conditions to Thai independence "within an international system" which might substantially impair Thai administrative control, particularly with respect to peninsular Thailand.

3 The United States, on the other hand, does not consider Thailand an enemy but as an enemy-occupied state to be liberated from the Japanese. Although we do not recognize the present Thai Government, we continue to recognize as "Minister of Thailand" the Thai Minister at Washington. We regard with sympathy the Free Thai Movement, although we have made no political commitment which might prejudice the future political situation.

4 We favor restoration of Thailand's rights as a sovereign independent state but we do not recognize the lawfulness of the acquisition of territories from Indochina, Malaya and Burma by Thailand under Japanese pressure.

Accordingly, we believe that military government or civil affairs administration, except in combat zones, would be undesirable, and that a control commission should not be established. Similarly, we believe that there should be no military occupation of the country beyond strict security requirements.

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Rather, we believe that authority should be restored to the Thai Government as fully and as rapidly as military conditions permit.

It is therefore desirable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff endeavor, so far as military considerations permit, to secure approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of only those measures relating to Thailand which are consistent with American political objectives.

It is further desirable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish the Department with such pertinent information as may be consistent with military security and which may be of value in further conversations with the British Government. It is hoped that we may be able to persuade the British Government to harmonize its policy toward Thailand with our own.

There are attached more detailed papers on American and British policies toward Thailand and on conditions within that country.

TOP SECRET

25 January 1945

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- B. That we make a further approach to the British Government in which we suggest in general that agreements be sought between the Thai Government on the one side and the British, Chinese and United States Governments on the other, which would include at least the following basic considerations:
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TOP SECRET

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III. BASIC FACTORS

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The problem is urgent because of the developing military situation in Burma and because daily American contact with the Thai Regent at Bangkok brings the information that the Thai underground (headed by the Regent himself) is well organized, and that the Thai desire to give military cooperation to the United Nations in the war against Japan, to be recognized as an Ally, and to be a sovereign independent nation again. A high Thai official representing the Regent is now in Chungking on the invitation of Chiang Kai-shek to discuss the establishment of a committee or a provisional government at Chungking which, if recognized by China, would seek recognition from Great Britain and the United States. (The Thai Regent is reported to believe that the Japanese are preparing to take over the Government in Thailand and for this reason is considering a provisional government-in-exile.) Another representative of the Regent is shortly to be brought to the United States, and it is reported that a third agent is to be sent to London.

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(Draft Memorandum for State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee)

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We favor restoration of Thailand's rights as a sovereign independent state but we do not recognize the lawfulness of the acquisition of territories from Indochina, Malaya and Burma by Thailand under Japanese pressure.

Accordingly, we believe that military government or civil affairs administration, except in combat zones, would be undesirable, and that a control commission should not be established. Similarly, we believe that there should be no military occupation of the country beyond strict security requirements.

TOP SECRET

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It is further desirable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish the Department with such pertinent information as may be consistent with military security and which may be of value in further conversations with the British Government. It is hoped that we may be able to persuade the British Government to harmonize its policy toward Thailand with our own.

There are attached more detailed papers on American and British policies toward Thailand and on conditions within that country.

SECRETSTATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
STATE DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D.C.22 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Department of State (453).
Rear Admiral Harold C. Train, U.S.N. (62495).
Lieutenant Colonel Fred W. Sladen, Jr., U.S.A.
(2273).
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel C. Fahey, Jr., U.S.A.
(74769) (Alternate).

Subject: British Proposals with Respect to Thailand.

By direction of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, SWNCC 5, "British Proposals with Respect to Thailand," is referred to the Tri-Departmental Sub-Committee for the Pacific and the Far East for study and report.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

Wallace E. Whitson
WALLACE E. WHITSON

Secretary

SECRETSWNCC 5

42

17 January 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
BRITISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THAILAND

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure has been submitted by the Assistant Secretary of War for consideration by the Committee.

WALLACE E. WHITSON

KELVIN L. NUTTING

HAROLD W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

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17 January 1945

ENCLOSUREMemorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War

1. General Sultan has advised the War Department (CRA 242, CM-IN-3630, 4 January 1945) that the Chief Political Adviser (British) at the Southeast Asia Command has stated and in his planning is assuming that the U. S. will view any Thailand territorial acquisitions since 1940 as void, but that otherwise the U. S. will back Thailand's territorial integrity.

2. The cable also states that for security reasons (a) the U. K. is desirous that the Thailand territory on [] the Kra Isthmus be controlled so that adequate protective measures may be taken in that area, such as providing military bases, (b) an Allied Control Commission should be [] installed during the reconstruction period. The U. K. have a planning staff for Thailand in London.

3. Because these questions may involve the participation of the U. S. military in the controls, if any, which are established over Thailand territory, it is recommended that the entire problem be considered by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee with a view to the [] formulation of broad U. S. policy with respect to participation in matters involving Thailand. [] Such policy will serve as a basis for decisions on problems such as those raised in General Sultan's cable and will also serve as a basis for the guidance of U. S. representatives in their negotiations with the British.