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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee  
on the  
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack  
S. Con. Res. 27

December 15, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 25

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



S. Con. Res. 27

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Saturday, December 15, 1945

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Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Comm'ttee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and  
Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, if we may do so, there are one or two matters that have come up that may be of aid to the committee in connection with the further examination of General Gerow, and we could intervene for a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permission.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

The Chairman: All right, go ahead.

Mr. Gesell: The first has to do with Exhibit 21, the Winant dispatch of December 6th concerning the movement of Japanese vessels towards the Kra Peninsula. We wish to call the committee's attention to two additional messages on that subject.

The first is a message dated December 6, 1941, from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by R. E. Schuirmann, a memorandum for the State Department, dated December 6, 1941. This memorandum reads as follows:

"Following report has been received from the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet dated December 6:

"British Commander in Chief China reports a 25-ship convoy escorted by 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers in latitude 08-00 North longitude 106-00 East at 0316 Greenwich time today. A convoy of 10 ships with 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers were in latitude 07-40 North longitude 106-20 East two hours



1  
2 later. All on course West. Three additional ships in  
3 latitude 07-51 North longitude 105-00 East at 0442 course  
4 310°. This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron in  
5 latitude 10-01 North longitude 104 East.

6 "Commander in Chief Asiatic Admiral Hart's scouting  
7 force has sighted 30 ships and 1 large cruiser anchored in  
8 Camranh Bay."

9 There is also attached to this dispatch which I have just  
10 read the text of the message from the Commander in Chief  
11 Asiatic forces dated December 6, 1941, addressed to the Chief  
12 of Naval Operations, which forms the basis of the Schuirmann  
13 note to the State Department. This is dated December 6, 1941,  
14 and contains the same information and shows on its face that  
15 the dispatch was also sent for the information of the  
16 Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Com. 16 and Com. 14.  
17 The time group on the dispatch indicates that it was sent  
18 December 6th Greenwich time, at 12:55 p.m., which would be  
19 7:55 a.m. Eastern Standard time, or 2:55 p.m. Philippine time.

20 I would like to have these two documents designated  
21 Exhibit 66.

22 The Chairman: Without objection, so ordered.

23 (The documents referred to were  
24 marked Exhibit No. 66.)

25 Mr. Gesell: Now the question also arose I believe in



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connection with the examination of General Miles, but it is pertinent perhaps to the examination of General Gerow as well, at page 4190 of the transcript, as to whether the so-called parallel action messages which were delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941 by President Roosevelt were contained in magic.

We have obtained the magic messages which show that the texts of those notes were in magic, as well as the message from Tokyo to Washington dated August 17, 1941, transmitting the messages, and I think that should be marked as an exhibit. I suggest that the next exhibit number be Exhibit 67.

The Chairman: It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 67.)

Hook Follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



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2 Senator Ferguson: Could I just see them?

3 Mr. Gesell: Certainly.

4 (The documents were handed to Senator Ferguson.)

5 Mr. Gesell: We have not reproduced the letter because  
6 it is the text of the notes which are already in Volume 2.

7 The Chairman: All right.

8 Senator Ferguson: May I inquire from counsel whether  
9 or not we have all of the intercepts now between the 16th  
10 and the 28th of August, 1941, in relation to this instru-  
11 ment both ways?

12 Mr. Gesell: I cannot answer that question. We will  
13 inquire and see. I thought the question in the transcript  
14 was for the texts of these specific messages.

15 Senator Ferguson: What I would like to have now in  
16 relation to these is all of the messages in relation to  
17 them both ways. This is the one transmitted --

18 Mr. Gesell: Between what dates, Senator.

19 Senator Ferguson: Between the 16th of August and 29th.  
20 The 28th is when the reply came in.

21 Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel  
23 whether or not we will receive the material which I requested  
24 of General Marshall, namely the reasons for the 1940  
25 alert?



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1  
2 Mr. Gesell: No, Congressman Keefe, we have not re-  
3 ceived that information. We understand it is expected  
4 either later today or Monday.

5 Mr. Keefe: Have you received the action report on  
6 the log of the U.S.S. Enterprise which I asked for some  
7 time ago?

8 Mr. Gesell: The situation with respect to the ship  
9 logs is as follows, according to my understanding: A large  
10 number of ship logs were requested by the different members  
11 of the committee at different times.

12 The Navy Department has set aside a large room, and  
13 filled it with these various logs that had been requested.  
14 It is a rather difficult matter to reproduce them all,  
15 and the Navy has suggested that those logs will be there  
16 for the inspection of anyone authorized by the committee  
17 to examine them. We wrote a letter in that connection  
18 for Senator Brewster, who had asked for quite a number.  
19 We have gotten the log of the Boise, which the committee  
20 had expressed a special interest in, and we were going to  
21 make a report on that, and some of the other requests later  
22 on today.

23 Mr. Keefe: I was especially interested in the log  
24 of the Enterprise.

25 Mr. Gesell: I am sure that will be in the room along



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with the other material.

Mr. Keefe: If I am permitted to go down to this room and see it, in company with somebody, if the committee would authorize me to, I will be glad to go down there and look at it.

Mr. Gesell: We will try to get the Enterprise log for you, Mr. Congressman. I am sure it can be made available. I think so many logs were requested, however, that unless there is a special interest in a particular log, it might be more convenient to leave them in this room, which has been especially supplied with them.

The Vice Chairman: I recall a special interest has been indicated in the Enterprise and Boise.

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: I was wondering if those two could be brought up here, and if any special ones are needed, they can be examined in the room.

Mr. Murphy: If any members of the committee are going to look at the logs, I want to see them too. I want to know what they are looking at.

Mr. Gesell: They are being used by the Navy also. We will get the Enterprise and the Boise logs.

Mr. Keefe: Does that also include the action report?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, we will get that also.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Keefe: Now I also ask for the series of memoranda written by Hornbeck. I have been furnished with what purport to be two. I understand there are quite a series.

Mr. Gesell: We were advised this morning, Congressman Keefe, that the Navy had just located the file of the Hornbeck memoranda, and we expect to be able to completely meet your request and more by next week. I think I reported to the committee earlier that the Navy had not been able to find the memoranda, but they reported this morning that they at last were located. We will have those reproduced and make them available to the members of the committee.

The Chairman: Is that all?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

The Chairman: Proceed with the examination of the General.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW

(Resumed)

Senator Ferguson: General Gerow, you heard read this message from Commander Schuirmann to the Secretary of State, a memorandum for the State Department, December 6, 1941, based upon the message from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Had you ever heard of that before? Had that been called to your attention?

General Gerow: I do not recall now, sir, if the Navy



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 sent a copy over to the War Department, as they usually do,  
3 and if they had sent some document of that nature I would  
4 have seen it, or one of my subordinates in the War Plans  
5 Division would have seen it.

6  
7 Mr. Gesell: I should have stated the Navy record indi-  
8 cated that the Navy message was sent to the War Department.  
9 The War Department, however, has been unable to locate the  
0 message as yet, and is still searching for it.

10 General Gerow: I do not know, Senator, whether it would  
11 have come directly to War Plans or to G-2, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Would that come to G-2 or would it come  
13 to you, your department?

14 General Gerow: I do not know, sir, how that message was  
15 sent. It may come directly to War Plans Division, or it may  
16 go to G-2 first, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: That was very important information  
18 if it came in on the morning of the 6th?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall that now?

21 General Gerow: I do not recall that particular message,  
22 no, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall that information around  
24 the 6th?

25 General Gerow: I have a hazy recollection, Senator, of



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 a number of troop movements being made by the Japs around  
3 the Camranh Bay area, but I do not remember the details of  
4 where I received that information, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: You stated yesterday that there was  
6 some information put in the original affidavit by Colonel  
7 Clausen that you refused to sign and had him take it out and  
8 prepare a new affidavit; do you recall that?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, what was the information that  
11 he put in that you had him strike out?

12 General Gerow: I don't recall that it was information,  
13 sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: What was it?

15 General Gerow: He misunderstood, I think, some of the  
16 statements. There was no stenographer there and he tried to  
17 take it down in longhand and he misunderstood, I believe, some  
18 of the statements that I made.

19 Senator Ferguson: You don't recall what that information  
20 was?

21 General Gerow: I cannot recall now, no, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you get the regulations, over the  
23 evening, as to the drafting of messages?

24 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I have searched two or three  
25 regulations and in that connection, sir, I would like to state

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 that -- I believe you asked me about what they taught at  
3 our schools with regard to certain operational messages and  
4 my reply was directed to the 5-paragraph order which is  
5 normally an order issued to, you might say, subordinate units,  
6 such as a Division.

7 The type of order that may be issued to a theater commander  
8 in one of the larger units does not necessarily follow that  
9 detailed form. It may be included in a letter of instructions.  
10 It may be a telegram sent out by the Chief of Staff. It may  
11 be very brief or it may be very long, depending on the person  
12 that is writing it and the desire or instruction he wishes  
13 to convey.

14 Senator Ferguson: Does the rule itself, in the book,  
15 give an exception when it goes to a theater commander?

16 General Gerow: I would like to read the Field Service  
17 Regulations regarding larger units.

18 Senator Ferguson: What are you reading from?

19 General Gerow: I am reading --

20 Senator Ferguson: War Department Staff Officers Field  
21 Manual?

22 General Gerow: No, sir. That is a book that pertains  
23 primarily to the details of these subordinate orders rather  
24 than to the orders issued to the large units. I shall be  
25 very glad to have you look at this or I will read the paragraph.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Suppose you read the paragraph.

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General Gerow: This document is entitled "Field Manual 100-15, War Department, Field Service Regulations," dated June 29, 1942.

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On page 6, paragraph 15 reads:

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"The mission of the theater commander may be prescribed in an approved war plan or it may be stated in a letter of instructions or other orders from the President or the War Department. The mission assigned will usually be general in character and leave great discretion to the theater commander. Ordinarily, he is consulted prior to the promulgation of the plans. He may be called upon to prepare such plans."

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you claim that your order of the 27th followed that?

General Gerow: I don't believe, sir, that it was necessary that it should follow that manual.

Senator Ferguson: As I understand it, you don't claim it did follow that manual?

General Gerow: No, sir, I didn't make that statement. I would have to analyze the message to see whether it followed it exactly or not.

Senator Ferguson: Is there any other memoranda in that book?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, the book --



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: I mean in relation to the order.

General Gerow: That is the pertinent paragraph, I believe, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Are you familiar with the Staff Officers' Field Manual? For instance, on page 1, "Command Responsibility".

"a. The commander alone is responsible to his superior for all that his unit does or fails to do. He cannot shift this responsibility to his staff or to subordinate commanders."

Then under "Liaison".

"Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a representative -- usually an officer -- of one unit who visits or remains with another unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact."

General Gerow: May I have a reference to the page you are reading from, sir?

Senator Ferguson: I didn't know you had the same book.

General Gerow: I think I have the same book, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Page 31, paragraph 47.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when General Short used in his message the word "liaison", with the Navy, wouldn't that be what he meant in Army language?

General Gerow: No, sir, I don't think so, sir. The



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 liaison referred to is when a commander sends, such as an  
3 Army commander, sends an officer from his staff down to a  
4 corps commander's headquarters. That officer is his particular  
5 representative there at the moment. He keeps him advised of  
6 the operations of that corps. He reports back periodically  
7 to his higher commander.

8 This liaison with the Navy, as it is used in, I think in  
9 HAWAII, was meant the close association between the two  
10 commanders themselves, sir.

(2) 11 Senator Ferguson: Well, what is this definition that I  
12 read, where is the definition that you are giving?

13 General Gerow: May I read the paragraph again, sir?

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes, read it aloud.

15 General Gerow: (Reading)

16 "Liaison is the connection between units or other elements,  
17 established by a representative -- usually an officer -- of  
18 one unit who visits or remains with another unit. Its purpose  
19 is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by per-  
20 sonal contact."

21 Now, as I understand General Short's relations to Admiral  
22 Kimmel, he did not visit at headquarters and remain with that  
23 headquarters, but he was in constant touch with that particular  
24 command headquarters and exchanged views, they exchanged views  
25 between themselves.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Does this liaison definition apply only in the Army itself? Have you any definition in any of the books that would show what liaison with another branch, the Navy, would mean?

General Gerow: There may be a definition in some field manual, I don't recall, but it would be customary, and it was customary in my operations, when operating with the Navy, I would send one of my staff officers to the Admiral commanding the Fleet operating with me. He was my personal representative with that Navy commander, and he reported back to me the information he thought I should have.

Senator Ferguson: I am trying to get what the manuals or regulations show. Will you look at page 30, at the bottom of the page, under paragraph 46, "Reports".

General Gerow: Subparagraph b.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Gerow: Do you wish me to read that?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Gerow: (Reading)

"The merit of a report is not measured by its length. A concise presentation of important points usually is all that is required."

Senator Ferguson: Would General Short's reply comply with that regulation?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, on page 39, number 63, will you read that?

General Gerow: What is the number of the paragraph?

Senator Ferguson: Number 63, page 39.

General Gerow: (Reading)

"Supervision of Execution. The responsibilities of the commander and his staff do not end with the issue of the necessary orders. They must insure receipt of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood, and enforce their effective execution."

Senator Ferguson: Now, isn't there a special provision in there that when the message of the 27th was sent -- it says they must "insure", that would be the General Staff, "receipt of the orders", that is the first thing, "by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood", -- so when they report back isn't the burden on the one giving the order to ascertain if the order was understood by the one that it was sent to?

Isn't that what that provision says?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, that is what it states.

Senator Ferguson: Then:

"\*\*\* and enforce their effective execution."

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: That is a clear understanding.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, would the man in the field then be able to rely upon that, that having sent back his order, that it was understood here in Washington, because the burden was, under the rule, on the people in Washington to know what was being done there, how it was understood; isn't that the way the order reads?

General Gerow: Senator, may I have that question again?

Senator Ferguson: I will reframe it. Strike the last question.

Under this rule, where the burden is on the one who sends the order to make certain that it is understood, wouldn't the Field Officer, General Short, have a right to rely upon the fact, having sent what he had, that the interpretation was proper, having sent the order?

General Gerow: I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct, isn't it?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Not having heard anything for the number of days between the 28th and the 7th, he would have a right to rely upon that fact, that they had understood his order, and that he had properly interpreted the order of the 27th?

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Gerow: I think that is correct.

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Mr. Mitchell: You mean understood his report.

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Senator Ferguson: Yes.

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Let's go to page --

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General Gerow: But, of course, -- I haven't studied these books -- but I think you will find in some of these pamphlets that the commander on the ground that is responsible, if there is any doubt in his mind as to what the commander wants him to do, it is perfectly proper for him to come back to that commander and ask for a clarification of those instructions. If he is in doubt as to whether the action he has taken is proper he is perfectly within his rights to come back and request confirmation of his action.

Senator Ferguson: I am going to ask you, General, when we get through with the ones that I have, if you look over this and find something else that you want to bring to our attention, you may do so.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: On page 49, under paragraph 71, I wish you would read "a", and "b", under that.

General Gerow: "a" and "b" under paragraph 71?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, on page 49.

General Gerow: (Reading)

"Technique of Orders. a. Purpose. The purpose of a



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 uniform technique throughout the service in the preparation  
3 of orders is to promote clarity and to prevent misunderstand-  
4 ing. The points of technique discussed in the following sub-  
5 paragraphs have been found helpful.

6 "b. Amount of Detail. Orders should be concise.

7 Those giving missions for subordinate units should prescribe  
8 only such details or methods of execution as are necessary to  
9 insure that the actions of the subordinate unit concerned  
10 will conform to the plan of operation for the force as a whole.  
11 In many cases, brevity is governed by the state of training  
12 of the troops for whom the order is intended; for a newly  
13 organized or poorly trained unit, the orders of necessity must  
14 be more detailed than for the well-trained organization."

15 Senator Ferguson: Was that in effect at the time, on  
16 the 7th?

17 General Gerow: I will have to check up to see what date  
18 this document is, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: August 19, mine is dated.

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir. It shows the date of August 19,  
21 1940.

22 Senator Ferguson: It would be in effect?

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, on page 51, number 1 on that  
25 page, "Affirmative". Will you read that?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Gerow: Paragraph 1:

"Affirmative. In the interests of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form of expression should be used. Such an order as 'The trains will not accompany the regiment' is defective because the gist of the order depends upon the single word 'not'. A better form is 'The trains will remain at Leavenworth'. No doubt arises in the latter case."

Senator Ferguson: Now, down under "k", I think you might read it all.

General Gerow: (Reading)

"k. Avoidance of Highly Technical Language. The military profession like all other professions has developed a technical vocabulary. This vocabulary is convenient and aids in the clear and rapid transference of ideas between military persons. The use of this vocabulary in texts and instructions is natural. In combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used. With partially trained troops and staffs the use of technical military language may afford opportunities for such misunderstandings. Therefore the use in combat orders of technical expressions should be avoided if there is any danger of misunderstanding. In such cases, words of common understanding should be substituted, even at the sacrifice of brevity."

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Were you here when General Marshall spoke about the meaning of the first overt act?

General Gerow: No, sir, I was not present at the hearing, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Would you say that that was an expression that could be easily interpreted?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when you only gave the message to -- the message of the 27th, it is on page 7 of Exhibit 32 -- to "minimum essential officers" -- who would you say should have gotten that information about the first overt act?

General Gerow: I would have given it to every officer that I thought should have that information in order to carry out his mission. I may have given that information to some Second Lieutenant if I thought it was necessary. That is left to the commander's discretion, as to the people that he should disseminate that information to.

Senator Ferguson: It says:

"In combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used."

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, have you got FM-100-5, May 22, 1941, Field Service Regulations, War Department, Operations.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Gerow: No, sir, I failed to bring that document with me, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, I am going to pass it to you and ask you to read: On page 30, number 149; on page 31, 149 and 150; on page 31, 154; on page 32, 156; and the first two sentences of 157. I will indicate them for you.

General Gerow: Yes, sir. I didn't get all those numbers.

Senator Ferguson: They are marked.

(The pamphlet referred to was handed to General Gerow.)

Shefner follows

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

General Gerow: Paragraph 156.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Gerow: (Reading)

"As a rule it is desirable to keep contemplated operations secret as long as possible and to confine knowledge thereof to a few staff officers and senior commanders. However, upon entry into action no unit should be in doubt as to what the commander wants it to do. Whenever knowledge of his intentions is necessary to insure the cooperation of the units engaged, a commander does not hesitate to disclose them to all concerned. Ignorance of his intentions may often lead to inactivity on the part of subordinates."

Paragraph 157. (Reading)

"It is impossible to prescribe detailed forms of orders to fit every tactical situation. To attempt to do so would result in a rigid form and a routine style of expression which would not be in accord with the tactical requirements presented by the diverse situations that arise in war. To the extent practicable, however, it has been found efficient and convenient to classify combat orders according to their purpose and scope and, for some of these, to adopt a standard sequence of composition. This makes for ease of understanding, the



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 avoidance of omissions, and ready reference. Moreover,  
3 experience has shown that an order which can be mis-  
4 understood will be misunderstood and that, to obviate  
5 this danger, it is necessary to follow certain rules  
6 relating to the designations of boundaries, details of  
7 time and place, military terminology, abbreviations,  
8 designations of units, and the like. For details relat-  
9 ing to these matters, see FM 101-5."

10 Did you have something --

11 Senator Ferguson: I gave you a sheet there with the  
12 page numbers on it. Then I drew a line down to the paragraph.

13 General Gerow: Oh, yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: Can you make it out?

15 General Gerow: I am trying to find it now. Paragraph  
16 149 on page 30. (Reading)

17 "The authority to issue orders is an inherent func-  
18 tion of command. Orders are normally issued to next  
19 subordinate commanders. Bypassing the normal channels  
20 of command is resorted to only in urgent situations; in  
21 such cases both the commander issuing and the commander  
22 receiving the order should notify intermediate commanders  
23 of its purport as soon as possible."

24 Senator Ferguson: Is that on page 31?

25 General Gerow: That is page 30, sir.



183

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Page 30?

3 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I am reading now paragraph  
4 150 on page 30, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

6 General Gerow: (Reading)

7 "Orders may be either complete or fragmentary.

8 "The order is complete when it covers all essential  
9 aspects and phases of the operation. Complete orders  
10 include missions to all subordinate units charged with  
11 the execution of tactical operations in carrying out  
12 the commander's plan.

13 "Fragmentary orders are used when speed in delivery  
14 and execution is imperative. Fragmentary orders are is-  
15 sued successively as the situation develops and decisions  
16 are made, and consist of separate instructions to one or  
17 more subordinate units prescribing the part each is to  
18 play in the operation or in the separate phases thereof.  
19 This procedure will be usual in divisions and smaller  
20 units. Fragmentary orders may be either oral or writ-  
21 ten. They are concise but not at the expense of clarity  
22 and omission of essential information. Instructions  
23 issued in fragmentary orders may be repeated in a com-  
24 plete field order or in an annex if considered desir-  
25 able."



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Now page 31, paragraph 154.

3 General Gerow: (Reading)

4 "Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as  
5 is consistent with clarity; short sentences are easily  
6 understood. Clarity is more important than technique.  
7 The more urgent the situation, the greater the need for  
8 conciseness in the order. Any statement of reasons for  
9 measures adopted should be limited to what is necessary  
10 to obtain intelligent cooperation from subordinates.  
11 Detailed instructions for a variety of contingencies,  
12 or prescriptions that are a matter of training, do not  
13 inspire confidence and have no place in an order. Triv-  
14 ial and meaningless expressions divide responsibility  
15 and lead to the adoption of half measures by subordi-  
16 nates. Exaggerated and bombastic phrases invite ridicule  
17 and weaken the force of an order. Expressions such as  
18 'attack vigorously,' if used in orders, are not only ver-  
19 bose and meaningless, but tend to weaken the force of  
20 subsequent orders in which such expressions do not ap-  
21 pear."

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 S Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the Army Board  
3 classified or described the order of November the 27th from  
4 General Marshall to General Short, on page 7 of exhibit 32,  
5 as a "do-don't" order?

6  
7 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I know they classified it as  
8 such, but I do not know the reasons therefor.

9 Senator Ferguson: But under the instructions that you  
10 have just read would you classify it as a "do-don't" order?

11 General Gerow: No, sir, I would not, sir. I do not  
12 think we find in this message any definite don'ts. May I --

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, what about the --

14 Mr. Murphy: May the witness finish his answer?

15 The Vice Chairman: Let the General finish his answer,  
16 Senator.

17 Senator Ferguson: Pardon me. Go ahead, General.

18 General Gerow: The first sentence I would like to read  
19 with reference to that is as follows:

20 "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States  
21 desires that Japan commit the first overt act."

22 That is a desire.

23 "This policy should not, repeat not, be construed  
24 as restricting you to a course of action that might  
25 jeopardize your defense."

That sentence gives him the right to do anything that he



Sb

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 considers necessary in his discretion to safeguard the Island  
3 of Oahu and carry out his mission.

4 There is another sentence, sir, which I would also like  
5 to read, if I may, sir:

6 "You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance  
7 and other measures as you deem necessary but these  
8 measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not,  
9 to alarm civil population or disclose intent."

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, isn't that a do-don't, do some-  
11 thing at first but don't do the other? Don't you think they  
12 were correct when they described it that way?

13 General Gerow: The message does not state, sir, that  
14 "you will definitely not alarm the civil population."

15 Senator Ferguson: Under the first one that you read  
16 you have got this word "unpredictable." That is not a very  
17 definite term, is it?

18 General Gerow: I did not read that sentence, Senator.

19 Senator Ferguson: No. I want you to read it.

20 General Gerow: All right, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: I will read it and pick out the word  
22 that I want and ask you about the word.

23 General Gerow: All right, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

25 "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated."



1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 You helped to draft this order, did you not, General?

3 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Where did you get the word "appears"  
5 from? You had already sent a message on the 24th, the joint  
6 message that they were broken off.

7 General Gerow: What date is that message you refer to,  
8 sir?

9 Senator Ferguson: I think it is the 24th.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Page 5 of exhibit 32.

11 General Gerow: Page 5?

12 Senator Ferguson: That does not use the language I  
13 had in mind. It was another message. "Chances of favor-  
14 able outcome" is the language of that.

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

17 "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with  
18 Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with state-  
19 ments of Japanese government and movements their naval  
20 and military forces indicate in our opinion that a sur-  
21 prise aggressive movement \* \* \*."

22 Do you know whether or not this language of "appears" --

23 General Gerow: I did not understand you.

24 Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- was used because the  
25 Secretary of War had talked with the Secretary of State?



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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General Gerow: Yes, sir. I think I testified previously, as I recall my testimony, I was called to the office of the Secretary of War about 9:30 on the morning of November the 27th. I went up there for a second conference with him later on in the morning. During that conference it is my recollection now that the Secretary of War talked to the Secretary of State on the telephone with regard to the question as to whether or not negotiations with Japan had actually terminated. As a result of that conversation the Secretary of War directed that the sentence as written in this message cover the statement as to the status of negotiations with Japan at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then it was in your first draft of this message that you had a definite term that they were broken off?

General Gerow: I cannot recall exactly that message, sir, but it is my impression now that I took a message in, sir, which stated "negotiations are terminated."

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Instead of doing it, - or instead of being in the joint message it was in your original message?

General Gerow: I believe it was, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

General Gerow: I have tried to find a copy of that



1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 message, sir, and I cannot locate it and I am relying now  
3 on memory four years old.

4 Senator Ferguson: That is a long time.

5 General Gerow: Yes.

6 Senator Ferguson: Then the next words is "barest pos-  
7 sibilities." That is pretty indefinite, isn't it?

8 General Gerow: Well, sir, I would not say it was  
9 pretty indefinite. I think it means exactly what it says,  
10 that there is the barest possibility of it being resumed. It  
11 is perfectly clear to me, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Then the words "Japanese government  
13 might come back."

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: And then this "unpredictable, but  
16 hostile action possible."

17 General Gerow: But, sir, "Japanese future action un-  
18 predictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

19 Just what that action would be and where it would be  
20 was not clear to any of us at that time, sir, but we felt  
21 that hostile action was possible at any moment and particu-  
22 larly against our possessions in the Pacific.

23 Senator Ferguson: When did you first think or come to  
24 the conclusion that hostile action would be directed against  
25 Hawaii?



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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General Gerow: Senator, I participated in the preparation of this message and I state in that message, sir, or it is stated in the Chief of Staff's message that "Japanese future action is unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

I do not think I ever came to the conclusion, sir, that the Japs were going to attack Hawaii and no other place. I felt that they would attack any one of our possessions bordering on the Pacific. That was a possibility, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you ever have a mental conclusion then prior to actual notice of the attack that Japan would attack Hawaii? Did you ever think that they would attack Hawaii? Was that within your thoughts?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, I considered it as one of the possibilities in the event war occurred with Japan.

Senator Ferguson: Now, "possibility" is a very weak expression, isn't it, in the possibilities?

General Gerow: No, sir, I do not think it is weak under the circumstances, Senator. There were several possibilities there.

Senator Ferguson: You did not even say it was a probability. You say it was only a possibility.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is that what I understand?



Sg

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2           General Gerow: It was a possibility that they might at-  
3 tack any one of our possessions in the Pacific.

4           Senator Ferguson: But it did not get the dignity of a  
5 probability in your opinion?

6           Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

7           General Gerow: Well, I think, Senator, I would say it  
8 was probable that they might attack any one of our four major  
9 areas bordering on the Pacific, sir.

10          Senator Ferguson: General, one of your duties as I  
11 understand you was to send out messages for action, keeping  
12 the field informed.

13          General Gerow: No, sir, Senator. I think I stated, sir,  
14 that my responsible was to prepare messages and submit them  
15 to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War for their ap-  
16 proval. In an emergency, if the Chief of Staff was not there  
17 I would assume the responsibility for sending them and accept  
18 the consequences if I made a mistake.

19          Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, one of your duties,  
20 then, was to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief of  
21 Staff?

22          General Gerow: Yes, sir.

23          Senator Ferguson: And those messages would be what is  
24 known as action messages, not information but action?

25          General Gerow: That is correct, sir.



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: Therefore, it would be necessary for  
3 you to determine the time when such a message ought to go?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Isn't that correct?

6 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you at any time make up your  
8 mind that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor so  
9 that you could have determined to prepare a message?

10 General Gerow: Senator, I think I testified here before,  
11 sir, that I never made up my mind that Hawaii was the only  
12 place that the Japs might attack. My thinking was that we  
13 had certain possessions in the Pacific; that if war with Japan  
14 occurred that Japan might attack any one or all of those  
15 possessions.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, I am not including the words  
17 "or others". I want to know just about Hawaii, that is, Pearl  
18 Harbor.

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I concluded that an attack on  
20 Pearl Harbor, among others, was possible or probable.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, can you answer it without "and  
22 others"?

23 General Gerow: No, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: I want to know just whether or not--

25 General Gerow: No, sir, I cannot.



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: All right.

3 General Gerow: I tried to be as positive as I can on it.

4 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

5 General Gerow: I tried to picture my thoughts at the  
6 time, which was that Japan might attack any one of our pos-  
7 sessions in the Pacific. I did not pick out any one of them  
8 and give it first priority.

9 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

10 Senator Ferguson: The next question is --

11 The Chairman: Will the Senator yield?

12 Senator Ferguson: No, not at this time.

13 The Chairman: All right, proceed.

14 Senator Ferguson: The next question is, General Bryden,  
15 did he confer with you on any of these messages?

16 General Gerow: General Bryden accompanied me when I  
17 went in to the office of the Secretary of War on the morning  
18 of November the 27th. Later on the messages that had been  
19 prepared were presented to him for his approval and I think  
20 he initialed them, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Where is General Bryden now? Is he  
22 in Washington?

23 General Gerow: I believe he is retired, sir. I do not  
24 know where he is living.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did you help to prepare the memo to

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



SJ

1 Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 the President of the 5th of November? I think it is exhibit  
3 16.

4 General Gerow: As I recall now, sir, the War Plans  
5 Division of the Army and the War Plans division of the Navy  
6 cooperated in the preparation of that message, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did you personally help to prepare  
8 it?

9 General Gerow: The original drafts were perhaps pre-  
10 pared by the committees that worked under my supervision and  
11 these were then presented to me for my approval or change.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that there was an A-B-C-D,  
13 the basic military policies on strategy agreed to in the  
14 United States-British staff conversations, did you know about  
15 that?

16 General Gerow: You are referring now, sir, to the A-D-B  
17 Singapore conference?

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I knew about that, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: And did you know that there was a  
21 certain line fixed as indicated on pages 4 and 5. (Reading)

22 "Until such time as Japan attacks or directly  
23 threatens territories whose security to the United  
24 States is of very great importance. Military action  
25 against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more



Sk

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

of the following contingencies."

General Gerow: May I ask, Senator, where you are reading from, sir?

Senator Ferguson: On the bottom of page 4.

General Gerow: And the paragraph?

Senator Ferguson: (b)

General Gerow: Paragraph (b). May I take a moment to read that?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I want you to take a moment.

General Gerow: May I have the question again, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Now, I want to know whether you were familiar with the terms of that agreement. It says:

"Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies", -

not in that agreement, but under those contingencies.

Were you familiar with that?

General Gerow: I was familiar, yes, sir, with the staff conversations in Singapore and the recommendations of the members who participated in that conference, as to what they considered should be done in the event the Japanese did certain things, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were they in effect on the 5th of November 1941?



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 General Gerow: In effect, sir?

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

4 General Gerow: They could not be put into --

5 Senator Ferguson: So far as you knew.

6 General Gerow: They could not be put into effect with-  
7 out the approval of our respective governments. They were  
8 purely staff conversations between military personnel.

9 Senator Ferguson: All right. As far as you knew, then,  
10 they were not in effect, is that correct?

11 General Gerow: They had never been approved by our  
12 government, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: That is what I wanted to find out.

14 General Gerow: Yes.

15 Senator Ferguson: That is what you knew.

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Were you at the meeting, - in the  
18 minutes of the meeting of November 3, 1941 that were attached  
19 to that? I do not see your name on it.

20 General Gerow: I do not know what the document is, what  
21 meeting you refer to, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Will you show him the first page?

23 General Gerow: What date is that, sir?

24 Senator Ferguson: This is on November 3, 1941.

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir, my name is on the list as be-



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 ing present, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Is it? Oh, yes, it is, "Acting Chief  
4 of Staff, War Plans Division."

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I think you stated, Senator,  
6 that this document was attached to the memorandum that went  
7 to the President.

8 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, will you straighten it  
9 out?

10 General Gerow: As far as I know it was not attached,  
11 sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: You know it was not?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: On the bottom of page 2, then, did  
15 you hear Captain Schuirmann give that statement to the Board  
16 meeting?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, at that time he pointed out what  
19 on August 17th, following the President's return from the  
20 meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued  
21 an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the  
22 United States to take action in case of further Japanese  
23 aggression. You heard that?

24 General Gerow: Oh, yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did you understand it?



S.n

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I think I did.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you agree with it?

4 General Gerow: I was not asked to agree with it, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

6 General Gerow: I was not asked to agree with it.

7 Senator Ferguson: I ask you now did you agree to it?

8 General Gerow: I cannot recall now that I agreed to it  
9 at the time or made any statement regarding it.

10 Senator Ferguson: Was it a fact or not a fact?

11 General Gerow: I cannot testify as to whether it was a  
12 fact or not a fact. Captain Schuirmann is, as I understand,  
13 presenting his views as to what happened at a State Depart-  
14 ment meeting at which I was not present.

15 Senator Ferguson: No, I am asking you whether or not  
16 you were of the same opinion at that time?

17 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I submit that question is  
18 not a fair question.

19 General Gerow: I do not quite understand --

20 Mr. Murphy: I would like to state my reasons for it.

21 General Gerow: I cannot quite understand the question,  
22 sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: I will put it this way: Were you of  
24 the opinion that when the President returned from a meeting  
25 at sea with Mr. Churchill the President had issued an ulti-



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 matum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United  
3 States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression?

4 Now, I have read what Schuirmann said.

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Were you of that opinion?

7 General Gerow: I have no first-hand knowledge, sir,  
8 if the President issued such a statement, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then you did not even  
10 know at that time that the President had issued such a state-  
11 ment?

12 General Gerow: No, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Or any statement?

14 General Gerow: No, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right.

16 General Gerow: I do not say that. I stated I had no  
17 first-hand knowledge that came to my memory that the Presi-  
18 dent had issued it. I had seen, I believe, information con-  
19 cerning it.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, what was your mental reaction  
21 on what you had seen? What conclusion did you draw? Schuir-  
22 mann tells us here what he drew. What did you draw?

23 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering.

24 Will the Senator yield?

25 Senator Ferguson: I decline to yield.



Sp

Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 The Chairman: I think there is a parliamentary question  
3 here and the chair ought to hear it.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, I withdraw it.

5 The Chairman: All right. Go ahead, if you please.

6  
7 General Gerow: Will you repeat that question again,  
8 Senator?

9 Senator Ferguson: Will you read the question, please?

10 Senator Lucas: You are trying to trap a great General  
11 in these inconsistencies.

12 (Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as  
13 follows: "Well, what was your mental reaction on  
14 what you had seen? What conclusion did you draw?  
15 Schuirmann tells us here what he drew. What did you  
16 draw?")

17 Senator Ferguson: Do you understand my question?

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir, but a conclusion as to what,  
19 sir, - as to whether the President had issued an ultimatum  
20 or as to whether we should go to war in case of further ag-  
21 gression?

22 Senator Ferguson: Whether or not he had issued an ulti-  
23 matum.

24 General Gerow: Well, I have stated, Senator, that to  
25 my own knowledge, to my own personal knowledge I do not know  
26 that he issued an ultimatum.



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: All right, that is all I wanted to know. Now, the next question: On the 27th -- that is exhibit 17 -- did you help to prepare that?

General Gerow: I believe this document was prepared, sir, by the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy working together.

Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with it?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any conversations in relation to the modus vivendi?

General Gerow: As I recall, sir, I attended a conference in the State Department on November the 21st in which a paper setting out tentative proposals to Japan were discussed. I do not know whether that was known as a modus vivendi or what name the State Department gave it, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know whether when the State Department had decided to send their message, which changed his meaning of the message to try to get Jap consent, whether you remember that term "modus vivendi" in it?

General Gerow: No, sir, I do not recall definitely where I received that information or if I did. If the Chief of Staff had it he probably informed me of that fact, sir, but I cannot recall at this time just when he did or if he did.



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: You do not have that in mind?

3 General Gerow: No, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you know upon whose orders the  
5 words were put in the message of the 27th about the first  
6 overt act? Did you have any knowledge of that?

7 General Gerow: I think I received instructions from  
8 General Marshall to include a statement of that sort in the  
9 message.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did he advise you where he had received  
11 anything about it?

12 General Gerow: I do not recall definitely at this time,  
13 no, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: You do not recall?

15 General Gerow: No, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you take exhibit 45? That  
17 is a letter or memorandum to General Marshall on the 27th,  
18 your memorandum.

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: You say there that: "The Secretary  
21 of War sent for me at 9:30" on that morning and "he wanted  
22 to know" -- "The Secretary wanted to know what warning mes-  
23 sages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were pro-  
24 posed."

25 Do you remember that conversation?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Was there at that time anything said  
4 about sending one to General Short?

5 General Gerow: Not at that particular time. I think  
6 later on in my second conference with the Secretary of War  
7 that sending messages to all of our overseas possessions in  
8 the Pacific were discussed.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, isn't this a memo of your con-  
10 versation with the Secretary of War?

11 General Gerow: Yes, sir, and may I go on to paragraph  
12 2? There is a statement in paragraph 2 which reads: "The  
13 various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr.  
14 Sayre were discussed."

15 Senator Ferguson: You recall those?

16 General Gerow: I wrote this, sir, on the day that it  
17 happened. I think this is more accurate than my memory, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: And does that refresh your memory,  
19 though, as to whether or not any to General Short was dis-  
20 cussed, the fact that a warning message for General MacArthur--  
21 no: "The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders  
22 and to Mr. Sayre were discussed."

23 General Gerow: Yes, that indicates to me that they were  
24 discussed.

25 Senator Ferguson: It indicates definitely that there



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 was something said about sending one to General Short.

2 General Gerow: To all of our Pacific commanders.

3  
4 Senator Ferguson: Now, I will come down to the  
5 language: "The Secretary of War" -- in the same exhibit --  
6 "wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed  
7 as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan  
8 to reopen the conversations."

9 Do you remember that?

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Where did you get that language?  
12 Did the Secretary of War actually tell you that?

13 General Gerow: I imagine he did, sir, because I wrote it.

14 Senator Ferguson: You wrote it right in here?

15 General Gerow: I wrote it on the 27th and that is the  
16 only place I could have gotten it was to have the Secretary  
17 tell me, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you discuss it with the Secretary  
19 of War as to why that was in there?

20 General Gerow: No, sir, I do not recall any such dis-  
21 cussion. I might have, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what your conversation  
23 with General Marshall on that point was?

24 General Gerow: I do not believe I had a conversation  
25 with General Marshall on that. This memorandum went in to him



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 on the evening of the 27th and I believe that he read it when  
2 he returned to the office on the morning of the 28th. I can  
3 not recall whether he sent for me on that morning and dis-  
4 cussed it with me or not. I was in and out of his office  
5 daily, sometimes once, sometimes four or five times during  
6 the day, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: You prepared the statement on the  
9 27th for General Marshall or did someone else prepare it?

10 General Gerow: Which statement now are you referring to?

11 Senator Ferguson: The one of November 27th. It is  
12 exhibit 17. Is that the instrument that they were talking  
13 about that was not to contain a recommendation to the Presi-  
14 dent that he request Japan to reopen the conversations?

15 General Gerow: I think I stated, sir, that this docu-  
16 ment was prepared by the War Plans Division of the Army and  
17 the War Plans Division of the Navy working together, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you check, it for that item,  
19 do you know, as to whether or not it did contain or did not  
20 contain any request to Japan?

21 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: You checked it for that?

23 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right.

25 General Gerow: And I think the statement in my memo-



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 random is to the effect that I reassured the Secretary on  
3 that point, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: You reassured him later?

5 General Gerow: That is in the memorandum, sir. There  
6 is a sentence which I would like to read from that memo-  
7 randum.

8 Senator Ferguson: All right.

9 General Gerow: That said: "He" -- meaning the Secre-  
10 tary -- "was reassured on that point."

11 Senator Ferguson: You reassured him?

12 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: After you had checked the memorandum?

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir. I had the memorandum with me,  
15 sir, I believe, at the time.

16 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that there were Jap  
17 scouting planes over the Philippines, over Clark Field and  
18 the other fields, prior to the time of the attack at Pearl  
19 Harbor? Did you get any word on that?

20 General Gerow: I have a very hazy recollection of hear-  
21 ing someone state that the Japanese had sent planes over some  
22 of our areas. I cannot recall definitely, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Were you of the opinion that if a  
24 proper alerted condition existed at Pearl Harbor that the  
25 Japanese should have been defeated in their attack?



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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General Gerow: I think our losses out there, sir, would have been much less had the command been completely alerted.

Senator Ferguson: That is the only answer you want to make?

General Gerow: I cannot quite interpret what you mean, sir, by "defeated." There are all degrees of defeat, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, how much of a defeat, or what qualification?

General Gerow: Well, they would have lost some planes. They may have lost some carriers, they may have lost some of their other major vessels.

Senator Ferguson: Did you hear what General Marshall had said on that same question?

General Gerow: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Or similar question?

General Gerow: Sir?

Senator Ferguson: A question along that same line?

General Gerow: No, sir. I was not here when he testified, only one afternoon, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You never came to any conclusion as to what would have happened there if we had been properly alerted?

General Gerow: You say I never came to any conclusion?

Senator Ferguson: I say have you?



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2           General Gerow: Yes, sir. I just stated if we had been  
3 properly alerted that our losses there would probably have  
4 been much less.

5           Senator Ferguson: What about their losses?

6           General Gerow: Their losses would have been much great-  
7 er, the Japanese losses.

8           Senator Ferguson: But you would not want to classify it  
9 as to whether or not they would be defeated in that en-  
10 counter or not?

11           Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I submit that question has  
12 been answered twice in the last five minutes.

13           General Gerow: Well, sir, I --

14           The Chairman: The chair sustains the point of order.

15           Senator Ferguson: Do you claim, General, that you have  
16 answered that question?

17           Mr. Murphy: All right, go ahead.

18           General Gerow: I think I answered it, Senator. I will  
19 be very glad, sir, to have the question repeated and attempt  
20 to answer it again, sir.

21           Senator Ferguson: No, I just want to know whether or  
22 not you feel that you did answer it?

23           General Gerow: I thought I did, sir, but if I did not  
24 make myself clear I would like to have the opportunity of  
25 making myself clear, sir.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: It was not clear to me, General, or I would not be asking the question again.

General Gerow: All right. I am here, sir, to clear up any points that I can. I have no desire to be vague on anything that I am certain of.

Senator Ferguson: I realize that. It has been along time since this happened.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that is the reason I have asked you the number of questions that I have, to let you have time to think about them and to see whether or not we could get what was known at that time.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And what was not known, that is all.

General Gerow: If I can clarify anything, Senator, if you will ask me the question I will do my best to, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: No, that is all.

The Chairman: Congressman Keefe?

Mr. Keefe: General Gerow, I shall not detain you very long.

General Gerow: Thank you, sir. I am very grateful.

Mr. Keefe: I think you are a great officer, that is all I can say.

General Gerow: Thank you again, sir.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: There are just one or two things that I am  
3 not clear on.

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: You testified before the Army Board under  
6 oath?

7 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: And you told them what you knew about this  
9 whole situation?

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Then Major Clausen came over to France some  
12 time in 1945, as I recall, where you were stationed?

13 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: And talked to you about the testimony you  
15 had given before the Army Board?

16 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: Is that right?

18 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: And I presume before the affidavit that you  
20 signed finally was drawn you had considerable discussions  
21 with Major Clausen about your testimony?

22 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

23 Mr. Keefe: And the testimony of others that had testi-  
24 fied before that Board?

25 General Gerow: Primarily directed towards two or three



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 people. I think Colonel Bratton's testimony and Colonel  
2 Sadtler's testimony.

3 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

4 General Gerow: I don't think we went into the details  
5 of the others, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: And I presume you had a considerable talk  
7 with Colonel Clausen before an affidavit was finally drawn?

8 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: He made some longhand notes, did he, and  
10 then went some place and prepared an affidavit?

11 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: And asked you to sign it?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir. He took down the penciled  
14 notes. I gave him my testimony rather formally. He made the  
15 notes and I had no office facilities there, I was living in a  
16 sort of villa place and I had no typist or anything, so he  
17 took the notes of the testimony, sir, and typed them himself.

18 Mr. Keefe: And then when he brought the typed affidavit  
19 back you read it over?

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: You found some things in it that you did not  
22 think you had stated, or that he had misunderstood?

23 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: And you decided that you would draw your own  
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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 affidavit?

2 General Gerow: Yes. I went over it fully, sir, and re-  
3 vised it and out out things and added things.

4 Mr. Keefe: Did you draw the new affidavit yourself or  
5 did Colonel Clausen redraft it under your instructions?

6 General Gerow: No, sir. I sat there and took the draft  
7 that he had there and went through it and changed it and  
8 scratched things out and put in in pencil the things that I  
9 thought should go in there as presenting the facts.

10 Mr. Keefe: And then it was re-drawn ?

11 General Gerow: It was re-typed.

12 Mr. Keefe: And you signed it?

13 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: And he swore you to it?

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Did you know the purpose for which he was  
17 asking you to make this affidavit? Did he disclose that to  
18 you?

19 General Gerow: I think he stated, sir, that after I had  
20 made my testimony there was other testimony which I did not  
21 have an opportunity to reply to and that involved me and that  
22 he was trying to get my testimony on those particular points,  
23 particularly, as I say, that had reference to Colonel Bratton  
24 and Colonel Sadtler's testimony.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Mr. Keefe: Did he call your attention to the testimony that Colonel Bratton had given before the Army Board?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, I think he gave it to me in a brief summary form. I do not believe, sir, that he had a transcript of the testimony. I do not believe I have ever seen that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did he tell you also what Sadtler testified to before the Army Board?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And did he indicate that their testimony was in conflict with the testimony that you had given before the Board?

General Gerow: No, sir, he did not indicate that. As I recall now, it was testimony that had come out subsequently that was not in conflict, as I now understand, with anything I had stated but I did not cover magic.

Mr. Keefe: I see.

General Gerow: In my first statement before the Army Board, or in my only statement before the Army Board, because I never had an opportunity to appear before it again.

Mr. Keefe: Now, when you were in before the Army Board, or after you testified, were you furnished a copy of the transcript of your testimony and given an opportunity to correct it?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

General Gerow: Yes, sir, I was furnished a transcript and I read it over and turned it in to the Board, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And whatever corrections you had to make in your testimony that you gave before the Army Board were made before it was finally accepted by the Board?

General Gerow: I imagine they were, sir. I never saw a copy of that Board's report until I came back here for this committee hearing, sir. I was never furnished a copy and I never saw it until I --

Mr. Keefe: Pardon me, but in your testimony before the Army Board, of course, you made no reference whatever to magic?

General Gerow: No, sir. In my testimony, I think I stated yesterday, that I began to get on magic and I realized that I should not talk about it and I stopped myself and they allowed me to paraphrase. That is the only time we got into it at all, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Now, one other thing I would like to get clear in my mind. I will admit some confusion still exists in the face of all you said about this message of the 27th.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: General Marshall testified that he left at one o'clock on the 26th and went down to the maneuvers.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And did not get back until the evening of the



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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 27th.

3 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: Isn't that correct, he was not here on the  
5 afternoon of the 26th nor all day of the 27th?

6 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Now, any conversations that you had with  
8 General Marshall in respect to this message of the 27th,  
9 therefore, must have been had before one o'clock on the 26th?

10 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: That is true?

12 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: And any instructions that General Marshall  
14 had given you as to the language in the proposed alert mes-  
15 sage to go to the Pacific outposts must have been had on the  
16 morning of the 26th?

17 General Gerow: Either on the 25th or the 26th, the morn-  
18 ing of the 26th.

19 Mr. Keefe: The 25th or the 26th?

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: So when it came to actually drafting the message, when was it actually drafted, the first drafting, the afternoon of the 26th or morning of the 27th, or when?

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General Gerow: Sir, I tried to remember exactly what happened on that morning. I notice in my memorandum here it stated -- I state here, sir, "I then showed him a copy of the draft message discussed at the Joint Board meeting."

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This is a memorandum of November 27th, sir, that I sent in to the Chief of Staff. I think, in making that statement, I was trying to fix in General Marshall's mind the place that he had discussed this message with me. I did not intend to state positively that that message was actually discussed formally at the Joint Board meeting. I have a very hazy recollection, sir, that General Marshall was in a hurry to get away, that the Joint Board meeting had been quite a long one, that he had told me earlier on the morning of the 26th about the message prepared for him, and perhaps to finish up this memorandum that was to go to the President.

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I had, I believe, Colonel Bundy and one or two of my best officers working on it. I think when the Joint Board meeting was over, had been formally concluded, General Marshall turned to me and said with respect to this message and memorandum, we went from the Joint Board room into my office, which was quite close there, and Colonel Bundy came to the door



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 of the Joint Board room with this message, and General Marshall  
3 scanned it very quickly and either told me it was all right,  
4 or all wrong, or to do something else with it.

5 I walked down the hall, as I recall now, and he was in  
6 quite considerable hurry, and I believe he read either the  
7 memorandum or the message as I walked down the hall with him  
8 to his office and finished it before he got there. That was  
9 on the morning of the 26th, sir, before he left at 1:00 o'clock.

10 Mr. Keefe: In that conversation, as he walked down the  
11 hall, did he suggest some changes in the message?

12 General Gerow: I cannot recall that, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Did the original draft of the message con-  
14 tain the provision as to Japan committing the first overt act?

15 General Gerow: I have tried to find that message, Mr.  
16 Congressman. I cannot locate it, and I cannot say positively  
17 that it did. I believe that General Marshall had told me to  
18 prepare that message and I think he probably told me about  
19 including the overt act at the same time, and that I had  
20 prepared with those instructions in that first draft of the  
21 message, which I cannot locate, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Now on the afternoon of the 26th was it  
23 discussed with anybody else, or was it redrafted?

24 General Gerow: Not to my recollection. I imagine I  
25 sat down with Colonel Bundy and these other officers and between



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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us we worked out the message, sir.

Mr. Keefe: It was dated the 27th, the next day?

General Gerow: The next morning, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: It was sent on the 27th?

General Gerow: It was sent on the 27th, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: When you sat down with Colonel Bundy, or any of these other people, did you have the Navy message before you as to what they proposed to send?

General Gerow: I tried to remember that, sir. From my memory I cannot definitely say I did, but Admiral Turner, whom I haven't had a chance to talk to, can state whether we did or not. I just cannot say when the Navy message was prepared.

I regret I cannot remember more than that, sir, but I just simply cannot.

Mr. Keefe: General Gerow, may I say to you, sir, for anybody that has been through the service that you have and rendered the magnificent service that you have during the war, I, for one, can well appreciate that there are a lot of these details that you cannot remember.

I thank you, sir.

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: The Chair would like to ask one question. In regard to your statement a while ago, General, that it is your opinion that if the forces had been alerted in Hawaii, or at Pearl Harbor, that the degree of success by the Japanese would have been lessened. That is the effect of what you have stated?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: You could not, of course, tell what Japanese ship or plane might have been destroyed, if our forces had been alerted, nor what ship or plane we might have saved.

General Gerow: No, sir.

The Chairman: But taking the whole situation into consideration, your opinion is that if that had happened, if that had been the status of affairs, the degree of Japanese success against our materiel, our forces and men, would have been considerably less; is that correct?

General Gerow: Yes, sir, that is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: General Gerow, as the head of the War Plans Division, I take it you were familiar with the plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Do you know at what time the Japs struck the Philippine Islands?

General Gerow: I should think it was probably ten or twelve hours after they struck Hawaii. I state that because I telephoned to the Philippines shortly after the attack on Hawaii, and the Philippines had not been attacked at that time, sir.

Senator Lucas: To whom did you talk in the Philippines?

General Gerow: I talked to General MacArthur, sir.

Senator Lucas: Do you recall what time it was on Sunday, December 7, that you talked to General MacArthur?

General Gerow: No, sir. I think probably the telephone log will show that, sir. It was in the afternoon, sir, and I recall the conversation quite distinctly, sir.

Senator Lucas: Just briefly, what did you tell General MacArthur.

General Gerow: I told General MacArthur, sir, that Hawaii had been attacked by the Japs, and he asked me what damage had been done, and I told him, sir, that the telephone was not secret, and I could not divulge that information to him, and I asked him if anything had happened out in his area, and he said "no," but there were a group of planes approaching the Philippines at that time that had not been identified, and he was sending up his planes



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 to meet them. Then he asked me to convey to General  
3 Marshall the statement that they were on the alert out  
4 there, and ready to meet any emergency. That is in sub-  
5 stance, the conversation as I now recall it, sir.

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7 Senator Lucas: How many air fields did they have in  
8 the Philippines, do you recall?

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10 General Gerow: Sir, I remember Clark Field, and  
11 Nichols Field, and I think there was one at a place called  
12 Eba. I do not remember how many more they had, sir:

13  
14 Senator Lucas: Can you give to the committee the  
15 number of airplanes that were in the Philippines at that  
16 time?

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18 General Gerow: I do not have those figures with me  
19 sir. The War Department, I am sure, will be very glad to  
20 give that to you, sir.

21  
22 Senator Lucas: Will you get that for us?

23  
24 General Gerow: I will see that they are given to  
25 the committee.

26  
27 Senator Lucas: Do you recall getting any information  
28 from the Philippines as to what happened to our bombers on  
29 Clark Field the following day, after the war started?

30  
31 General Gerow: I do not know, sir, whether we ever  
32 received an operations report from the Philippines or not,  
33 with regard to that, sir. I cannot recall at this time.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Will you look for that also for me and see whether or not any report was made from the Philippines with respect to the number of bombers that were lost on Clark Field the following day, after the Japs struck, or that afternoon?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: General Gerow, a lot of information has come to this committee during this hearing about the messages that were intercepted and decoded and translated. You are, of course, familiar with all that.

Senator Lucas: You were one of the high officers in the military branch of the Government who saw these magic messages from day to day?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: General Marshall testified that it was through magic that we really won the Battle of Midway, and the Coral Sea, and he also testified it was magic that caused the damage to Yamamoto, I believe.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Those are just a few examples that he gave to us of what magic had done in the way of security and information to this nation.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: You are familiar with all of those,



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 of course.

3 General Gerow: I was not in Washington at that time.  
4 I left, you see, in February of 1942. I have heard that  
5 statement made, sir.

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7 Senator Lucas: Now, I take it that you agree that  
8 the keeping of magic secret was a high and top military  
9 secret all through that war.

10 General Gerow: Yes, sir, I think it was vital that  
11 we preserve that secrecy, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: There were only a few men in Washington  
13 that knew anything about magic at that time, isn't that  
14 true?

15 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Lucas: For the sake of the record, can you  
17 give to this committee now, the number of officers in  
18 Washington who knew the secret of magic, who knew of the  
19 breaking of this Japanese code?

20 General Gerow: No, sir. I think I can speak only for  
21 the War Department, sir, at the time I was here, and G-2  
22 will know better than I know whom they delivered them to,  
23 but my recollection is they were given to the Secretary of  
24 War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2,  
25 and Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, and I  
got permission at some time during 1941 from General Marshall



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 to show it to my No. 1 assistant, Colonel Bundy, so in  
3 the event that anything happened to me there would be con-  
4 tinuity in the War Department in the War Plans Division,  
5 sir.

6  
7 Senator Lucas: Was Colonel Bundy the only officer  
8 in the War Plans Division outside of yourself who knew  
9 the secret of magic?

10 General Gerow: He was the only one, sir, to whom magic  
11 was shown. Now, some of the others may have guessed that  
12 we were doing something of the kind, sir, but I do not  
13 know that fact.

14 Senator Lucas He was the only officer that possessed  
15 actual knowledge of it?

16 General Gerow: Who actually saw the magic, yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: Now, General Gerow, there was quite  
18 a little speculation in the autumn of 1944 about a leak  
19 in magic from somewhere. Do you recall at that time --  
20 Oh, you were not here at that time.

21 General Gerow: No, sir, I was overseas in 1944, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: Well, what would have been the military  
23 course that would have been pursued against an individual  
24 who knew the secret of magic and had that individual given  
25 that secrecy to the public, what would have been the course  
pursued by the military under those circumstances?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2       General Gerow: I think he would have been court  
3 martialled, sir, and if the evidence was sufficient, if  
4 they found him guilty, he would probably -- I do not know  
5 what the penalty would have been -- dismissal or confine-  
6 ment.

7       Senator Lucas: Here is one of the top secrets that  
8 involved our national defense and our security. Just as-  
9 suming now that one of these officers would have given me,  
10 for instance, that top secret, and it would have become  
11 thereafter a matter of public property, everybody would  
12 have known it, do you care to hazard a guess as to the  
13 penalty that might have been attached to the officer that  
14 had given away the highest top military secret in the  
15 nation?

16       General Gerow: Well, sir, of course I do not know  
17 what the officers of a court would decide. I can give  
18 you my own personal opinion, sir.

19       Senator Lucas: That is what I want, sir. I would  
20 like to ask you, before you give your personal opinion,  
21 one more question. Can you give to the committee, from  
22 your knowledge of military life, what the officer would  
23 have been charged with in the first instance had he given  
24 away a top secret of that character? Maybe that is a  
25 legal question.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Senator Lucas  
Mr. Murphy

h8

1  
2 General Gerow: There are quite a lot of articles  
3 of war that we operate under, and there are general arti-  
4 cles, such as conduct prejudicial to the good order and  
5 interest of the United States.

6 If he deliberately gave it away, he might be tried  
7 for treason. There are probably any number of articles of  
8 war under which he could be tried, sir. There would be no  
9 question about an article of war that would fit it, sir.

10 Senator Lucas You started to answer another question,  
11 that was as to what was your opinion.

12 General Gerow: Well, sir, if the evidence showed that  
13 that officer had deliberately given out that information,  
14 with full knowledge of what it meant and its effect, I, as  
15 a member of the court, would have voted the death penalty,  
16 sir.

17 Senator Lucas: I think that is all.

18 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just  
19 one question.

20 The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

21 Mr. Murphy: General Gerow, in the message of the  
22 27th, there is the language, "Japanese future action unpredict-  
23 able, but hostile action possible at any moment."

24 As I understand you, when you sent that to the Pacific  
25 theatres, you wanted to put all of the Pacific theatres on



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 the alert, because the action of the Japanese was un-  
3 predictable. That is correct, isn't it?

4 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: As far as General Short at Hawaii was  
6 concerned, when he got that message, he did not have to  
7 concern himself with other matters but only with the de-  
8 fense of Hawaii?

9 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

10 The Chairman: Does counsel have any further ques-  
11 tions?

12 Mr. Mitchell: General Gerow, I would like to clear  
13 up one thing, and that has to do with the responsibilities  
14 and powers of the Commander in the field.

15 The record shows here that in Washington, on the basis  
16 of all of the accumulated information they had, the Secre-  
17 tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Staff,  
18 Chief of Naval Operations, and in part, the President,  
19 along with officers like yourself, had evaluated the informa-  
20 tion they had, and their conclusion was that war might come  
21 at any moment, that action was unpredictable, but hostile  
22 action in any direction might be expected. That was the  
23 conclusion.

24 Then, they put that evaluation in the form of a dispatch  
25 to a field commander. Now, there has been a great deal of



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 inquiry as to whether this and that bit of information was  
3 er was not sent out to the commanders in Hawaii to make  
4 their own evaluation, and the inference I get from it is  
5 the commanders in the field were in a position and were  
6 entitled, when they got an evaluation like that from Wash-  
7 ington by their superiors, before they accepted it and  
8 acted on it, they had a right to demand that the original  
9 source of material which had been acted on here, should  
10 be given to them, so that they could form their own judgment  
11 as to whether the people in Washington knew what they were  
12 doing.

13 Now, is that a permissible practice in the Army?

14 General Gerow: No, sir. The commanders did not have  
15 that right to demand the information on which the Chief of  
16 Staff based a decision. I think if the officer insisted on  
17 demanding that information, he would have probably been  
18 relieved from that command.

19 Mr. Mitchell: At the time this warning message was  
20 sent on November 27, 1941, did you have any army posts in  
21 other areas other than the Pacific?

22 General Gerow: Yes, sir, we had garrisons on some of  
23 our Atlantic bases, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: What were they?

25 General Gerow: I think we had troops in Iceland at



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

hll

1  
2 the time. We had some, probably, on Bermuda, and some  
3 on the other Caribbean Islands. I do not remember the  
4 exact bases we had in the Atlantic at that time.

5 Mr. Mitchell: When you formed the judgment about the  
6 imminence of war with Japan, did you send warning messages  
7 to Iceland and these other posts in the Atlantic that you  
8 mentioned?

9 General Gerow: No, sir, I do not believe such messages  
10 were sent. Our thinking was about Japan at the time and  
11 we did not anticipate that Japan would operate in the  
12 Atlantic Ocean right away, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Then you did come to the conclusion  
14 that Iceland was not a possibility for an attack?

15 General Gerow: Not for an attack by Japan.

16 Mr. Mitchell: That is what I mean.

17 General Gerow: No, sir, that was not a possibility.

18 Mr. Mitchell: When do I understand you to say, in  
19 sending the message, your state of mind was to send a  
20 warning to any post that was within the possibility of an  
21 attack from Japan?

22 General Gerow: That was the purpose, sir, to send  
23 warning messages to those areas that Japan would be in a  
24 position to attack.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Suppose you had been convinced at that



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 time that there was not a shade of possibility of any  
3 Japanese attack on Panama, or call it the Pacific Coast  
4 command, at Seattle, or wherever it was, if you had been  
5 in that state of mind and felt there was no possible chance  
6 of anything being done on the Pacific Coast, to the bases  
7 there, would you have sent them a warning message?

8 General Gerow: I do not believe, sir, I could quite  
9 get in that frame of mind.

10 Mr. Mitchell: I know it was something you did not do,  
11 but I am trying to get your distinction, your state of  
12 mind as to your judgment at the time, as to whether there  
13 was a chance or a possibility of an attack, and you told  
14 me you did not think there was, in Iceland.

15 General Gerow: Yes.

16 Mr. Mitchell: I am asking you if -- that is not the  
17 case, of course -- but if you had supposed that the Pacific  
18 Coast was totally out of reach of Japan, that it was a  
19 waste of time to put them on the alert, would you have  
20 sent them a message?

21 General Gerow: No, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Then, the gist of it is, as I understand  
23 it, that you picked out the spots that you thought Japan  
24 might reach?

25 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h13

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: Now, I notice that the alert that you  
3 sent to Hawaii was in identical terms with the one you  
4 sent to the commander of the Pacific Coast

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Not a word of difference. The Pacific  
7 Coast was 2,000 miles or more further away from Japan than  
8 Hawaii?

9 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Then I notice that your message to  
11 MacArthur, who was right under the main islands of Japan  
12 differs in no respect from the one you sent to Hawaii,  
13 except in one or two immaterial respects, about disturbing  
14 the population.

15 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

16 Mr. Mitchell: You did not make any distinction in the  
17 nature of your warning to any one of them; did you?

18 General Gerow: No, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: That was deliberate on your part?

20 General Gerow: Yes, sir, because we did not know which  
21 one of them would be attacked.

22 Mr. Mitchell: There has been something said here and  
23 you have been asked about impregnable fortresses, and  
24 whether Pearl Harbor was the greatest fortress in the world.

25 In forming your judgment as to whether a fortress was



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 supposed to be immune to attack, or completely capable  
3 of defense, or impregnable, whatever you want to call it,  
4 is that judgment formed on the assumption that the fortress  
5 will be attacked when she is asleep, and her command is  
6 not alert?

7 General Gerow: No, sir, it could still be alerted and  
8 would not be impregnable, I do not believe, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: You haven't got my question. What I  
10 meant was, in judging whether a fortress is safe from attack,  
11 do you assume, in judging her safety, that her garrison is  
12 going to be prepared and ready, alerted to meet an attack  
13 that comes to it?

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Is any fort impregnable, or safe from  
16 attack, however powerful it is, if the garrison is asleep  
17 at the switch?

18 General Gerow: No, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: I think Fort Ticonderoga in the American  
20 Revolution was considered the next largest or strongest  
21 fortress in the country.

22 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: She was captured in the nighttime by a  
24 crowd of ragged militiamen without firing a shot.

25 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

h14

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h15

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: The commander, as I remember it, was  
3 caught in bed. Is that an illustration of a case where  
4 an impregnable fortress is captured because the garrison  
5 is not prepared?

6 General Gerow: I think that is a very good illustra-  
7 tion, sir.

8 Mr. Mitchell I think he even had his trousers in his  
9 hands.

10 The Chairman: Was he about to put them on, or take  
11 them off?

12 (Laughter)

13 Mr. Mitchell: Now, on this question of judgment as  
14 to the likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor, you have  
15 been asked a good deal about that, as to whether your judg-  
16 ment was that it was possible or likely, and so forth.

17 Now, there was great risk to the Japs in that expedi-  
18 tion. It had considerable hazards, did it not?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: And the hazards had to be measured  
21 against the importance of the objective?

22 General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: I assume in measuring the hazards and  
24 chances of success, the fact that the Japs knew our state  
25 of alertness, or lack of it, would be an important factor,



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1  
2 would it not?

3 General Gerow: Yes, sir, that would greatly lessen  
4 the hazard.

5 Mr. Mitchell: It is a matter of record here that the  
6 Japs knew from day to day everything we were doing and not  
7 doing in Pearl Harbor and that information was transmitted  
8 from day to day by their spies in Honolulu to the Government  
9 in Japan, so if we had been on the alert on November 27  
10 to the 7th of December, the Japs would have known it,  
11 would they not?

12 General Gerow: I believe they would have known it,  
13 sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: And although it was an impregnable fortress, if we were not on the alert in that period and the Japs knew that, it would be a great factor in their decision as to whether the attack was worth while?

General Gerow: I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: You knew here in Washington, I think the record fairly shows, that they did have a spy system, that these reports were going out almost daily from their spys, you were intercepting them, you knew that the Japs had every means open to the public to communicate with their Government, so you were aware here, at least, that the Japs knew everything that was going on in Hawaii?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: The next question is whether you had a clear idea as to whether we were alerted out there. The people on the ground had this advantage over you, did they not, that they knew whether they were alerted or not?

General Gerow: Yes, sir. It never occurred to me that they were not on the alert, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: The commander in the field, under those circumstances, at that place, had at least this advantage over the Washington end, that is, they knew the same things you did, but that the Japs knew everything they were doing and not doing -- both ends knew that?



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: The people in Hawaii were in a better position to know the extent of their preparations, to know whether or not the Japs knew that they were not taking any steps against an air attack.

General Gerow: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: So the judgment of the people here, and it seems rather clear that there is a great deal of evidence here, that at least officers in Washington did not expect an attack, their judgment was necessarily formed with a less and certainly a hazier picture of whether there was an alert necessary out there than the local commanders had?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, there has been a good deal of discussion about the order in your command of November 27 to Hawaii and other points as to an overt act. It may be irrelevant because nobody was ever called upon to make a decision as to what an overt act was until the Japs appeared over Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop bombs, but as a matter of discussion of the sufficiency of the order, whether it says we want the Japs to commit the first overt act but do not let this induce you to fail to take measures or jeopardize your defense, let me ask you, if the Jap carrier fleet had been spotted at sea the night of the 6th or the morning of



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 the 7th driving toward Honolulu with six carriers in the  
3 fleet, and the question had arisen whether that was an overt  
4 act under your message or whether it would jeopardize the  
5 defense to wait until they got to Pearl Harbor and commenced  
6 to drop bombs, what was your idea about that?

7 General Gerow: I think the commander would have attacked  
8 that Japanese force and I think he should have done so, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: If he had seen the Jap carriers 300 miles  
10 at sea and had done nothing but sail around in the air until  
11 they commenced to drop bombs, what would have happened to  
12 him under this order?

13 General Gerow: It would have jeopardized his defense  
14 to permit that outfit to approach any closer.

15 Mr. Mitchell: That would amount to a disobedience of  
16 the order, would it not?

17 General Gerow: Yes, sir; or a failure to obey the order.

18 Mr. Mitchell: You draw a distinction there?

19 General Gerow: Yes, sir. Direct disobedience of an  
20 order is something that is intentional. Failure to obey may  
21 be due to any number of causes, error of judgment, or absence,  
22 or something else.

23 Mr. Mitchell: I have just one more question. It is  
24 submitted by counsel, Captain Ford, for General Short. I am  
25 asked to put this question to you:



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 How should General Short have worded his reply on the  
3 27th of November 1941, his reply to your message of the 27th,  
4 to make clear to you and to your staff that his alert was  
5 to prevent sabotage only?

6 General Gerow: Well, I think, sir, if the message had  
7 read simply "alerted against sabotage only", it would have  
8 been perfectly clear.

9 Mr. Mitchell: I notice that in these war plans, Exhibit  
10 44, the Operational Order of November 5 which you have testified  
11 did not arrive in the War Department --

12 General Gerow: May I get the page of that, sir?

13 Mr. Mitchell: It is Tab 9.

14 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: General Short on November 5 put into  
16 effect an Operational Order out there which had these three  
17 alerts. No. 1 Alert was this:

18 "This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and  
19 uprisings within the Islands with no threat from without."

20 Now, you never saw that in fact until after the 1st  
21 of January, 1942, you testified?

22 General Gerow: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Mitchell: But you did see this preliminary draft he  
24 had sent in the previous year, did you not?

25 General Gerow: I don't recall having seen that preliminary



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

draft either.

Mr. Mitchell: That had substantially the same alert, the alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands with no particular threat from without, the way that read that was Alert No. 3 according to his then system. This later became Alert No. 1.

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Now, if General Short had this on file in the War Department on November 27, this Operational Order of November 5, so that you could have known what Alert No. 1 was, and he reported alerted against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands with no threat from without, that would have made it clear to you what he was doing?

General Gerow: Yes, it would have made it quite clear.

Mr. Mitchell: And if he hadn't this on file, as he didn't, and couldn't use the specific reference to Alert No. 1, which would have meant nothing to you at that time, if he had used the same expression in his report that he did in phrasing his alert, defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands with no threat from without, that would have been clear?

General Gerow: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Take the message as he put it, if he had said alerted against sabotage and left out the words "liaison



Witness Gerow

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 with the Navy", do you think that would have made you aware  
3 of his being alerted for sabotage only? It is asking a good  
4 deal of you, but it would certainly be likely.

5 General Gerow: Yes, sir, it would be likely. I didn't  
6 have to make that decision, sir.

7 Mr. Mitchell: I know you didn't. It's, ands, and buts  
8 aren't worth much.

9 I think that is all.

10 The Chairman: General, is there any further information  
11 within your knowledge which is pertinent to this inquiry which  
12 you have that you could submit to the committee that has not  
13 been drawn out by the interrogation of you as a witness?

14 General Gerow: No, sir, I have nothing.

15 The Chairman: Well, the committee thanks you, General,  
16 for your forthright cooperation in trying to develop the  
17 facts in this inquiry. You have demeaned yourself before  
18 this committee in a manner befitting your record in the Army.  
19 You have the grateful appreciation of this committee for  
20 your services in that connection.

21 Thank you very much.

22 General Gerow: Thank you, sir, and I wish to thank the  
23 committee.

24 The Chairman: You may be excused.

25 (Witness excused)



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The Chairman: The Chair understands counsel have some documents that they wish at this time to put in which have been received in response to requests of various members of the committee.

Mr. Gesell: Yes, Mr. Chairman. If the committee will indulge us for a few minutes past 12 o'clock I think we can put into the record with some dispatch the material in response to certain requests and that would permit us to avoid any session this afternoon.

The Chairman: The Chair might announce that Admiral Wilkinson is the next witness, but he will not be before us until 10:00 o'clock on Monday.

Mr. Gesell: The first item that we wish to present has to do with the United States ship BOISE.

The committee will recall that Congressman Gearhart at pages 274 and 560 of the record asked for the log of the BOISE and indicated that he had knowledge or information to the effect that the cruiser had sighted the Japanese task force on its way to attack Pearl Harbor.

I have here in my hand a photostatic copy of the entries in the log of the United States ship BOISE for the period November 25, 1941 to December 7, 1941, inclusive.

This log shows that on two occasions during that period the BOISE sighted a strange ship. The first occasion was on



1 November 27 and I will read into the record the brief entry  
 2 concerning that. On November 27, 1941, during the 18 to 20  
 3 watch, according to an entry by F. G. Dierman, Lieutenant (JG),  
 4 U.S. Navy, there was the following that occurred:

5 "Steaming as before. 1840 sighted darkened ship, bearing  
 6 240° T. estimated range 16,000 yards. Went to general quarters.  
 7 1845 set material condition affirm. 1851 challenged ship.  
 8 Received no reply. 1852 changed speed to 20 knots. 1854  
 9 changed speed to 14 knots."

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Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman --

The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: May I inquire what time of day that was?

Mr. Gesell: 18 to 20. That would be between 6 and 10 p. m., I take it, and 1840 was when they sighted the ship. That would be 6:40 p. m.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: May I inquire whether the log shows where the Boise was at that time?

Mr. Gesell: I am coming to that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Pardon me.

Mr. Gesell: I wanted to develop this so that the committee has all of the information.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: On the 28th of November, 1941, there is an entry by D. S. Edwards, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy, in the 16 to 20 watch, that is Friday, November 28, 1941:

"steaming as before, on various courses at various speeds. \* \* \* 1733 darkened ship. 1743 sighted ship bearing 325 t, hull down. Changed course to 260 degrees t, changed speed to 15 knots. Manned battle stations. 1750 cut in boilers No. 3 and No. 4 on main steam line. 1752



h2

1  
2 set condition affirm. On various courses at various speeds  
3 keeping between ship sighted at 1743 and convoy. Ship  
4 appeared to be H.I.J.N.S. 'ATAGO' type, steaming darkened  
5 at 14 knots on various courses toward convoy. 1800 ship  
6 turned to course about 090 degrees t. 1804 on various  
7 courses closing convoy. 1835 unset condition affirm."

8 Now, from the information presented by Admiral Inglis,  
9 it appears that there were no cruisers of the ATAGO type  
10 in the Japanese striking force.

11 The Navy has plotted on the basis of the log, the posi-  
12 tions of the U. S. S. Boise at the various times mentioned  
13 in the log.

14 With respect to the entries on November 27, 1941, the  
15 Boise at 1840 was at latitude 16° - 46'.5 N

16 Longitude 153° - 55' E

17 1851 on November 27, 1941 - Latitude 16° - 45'.5 N

18 Longitude 153° - 52'.5 E --

19 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

20 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

21 Senator Ferguson: Does counsel know where that would  
22 be on the map?

23 Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir, I am coming to that, if I may  
24 present this, please, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Pardon me.



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Mr. Gesell (continuing):

3

On November 27, 1941 at 1927, it was -

4

Latitude  $16^{\circ}$  -  $43'$  N.

5

Longitude  $153^{\circ}$  -  $44'.5$  E

6

1743 - 28 November 1941 - Latitude  $14^{\circ}$  -  $56'.15$  N

7

Longitude  $148^{\circ}$  -  $48'$  E

8

1920 - 28 November 1941 - Latitude  $14^{\circ}$  -  $49'$  N.

9

Longitude  $148^{\circ}$  -  $26'$  E

10

We asked the Navy to state in simple terms what that meant in terms of the position of the Boise in relation to the Japanese force, and were advised as follows:

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

"The position of the USS Boise with relation to the track of the Japanese striking force on the 27th and 28th of November, 1941, from the best information available appears, that the USS Boise on those dates was not less than 1400 miles from the Japanese striking force."

18

19

Now, in this connection the committee has also asked to have the log of the SS American Leader - -

20

21

Senator Lucas: Before you proceed, the SS American Leader was in the convoy with the Boise?

22

23

Mr. Gesell: The Navy reports as follows with respect to the American Leader:

24

25

With further reference to your request dated 17 November 1945 for the log of SS American Leader, the SS American



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Leader was one of the ships in the convoy which the USS Boise escorted to the Philippines November 7, 1941.

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The log of the SS American Leader is not immediately available to the Navy Department since this ship was in the U. S. Maritime Service."

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1 I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, to conclude this matter  
2 on the BOISE we should ask to have the log for the periods  
3 indicated designated as an exhibit. It would be Exhibit 68.

4 We also would like to accompany it, as part of the same  
5 exhibit, a map on which the plot of the Japanese task force  
6 appears and the position of the BOISE on the dates when it  
7 sighted the darkened ships also appears.

8 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement  
9 about the BOISE and the AMERICAN LEADER?

10 Mr. Gesell: That concludes the matter on the BOISE.

11 The Vice Chairman: Exhibit 68 will be received.

12 (The documents referred to were  
13 marked Exhibit No. 68.)

14 The Vice Chairman: Are there any questions about the  
15 BOISE and AMERICAN LEADER?

16 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question.

17 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

18 Senator Lucas: Does the plot show just about how far  
19 the BOISE was from the Hawaiian Islands when this first ship  
20 was sighted?

21 Mr. Gesell: It was near Guam. It appears on the map  
22 just where it was.

23 Senator Lucas: I see.

24 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

25 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.



1 Senator Ferguson: Does counsel know where this convoy  
2 had been picked up by the BOISE? That is not shown on the log.

3 Mr. Gesell: I don't think on these days, but I believe  
4 that was covered by the testimony of Admiral Inglis. My  
5 recollection is it was a convoy proceeding to the Philippines.  
6 Where it started I don't know.

7 Senator Ferguson: You don't know whether it was from  
8 Hawaii or not. What I am trying to find out is whether or  
9 not the commanders at Hawaii knew they were convoying.

10 Mr. Gesell: I guess there is no question about that.  
11 My recollection is that Admiral Inglis said this convoy did  
12 start in the Hawaiian area, but I am not certain of that.

13 The Vice Chairman: You are referring to a United States  
14 convoy?

15 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

16 The Vice Chairman: Did you start to say something,  
17 General Mitchell?

18 Mr. Mitchell: No.

19 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry?

20 The Vice Chairman: The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.  
21 Keefe.

22 Mr. Keefe: Do the records with respect to the BOISE  
23 show the action orders or the action report of what orders  
24 they were sailing under? I notice that that says that the  
25 ship was cleared for action and battle stations manned, and



1 so on. Does it disclose what the orders were to this ship  
2 escorting this convoy to the Philippines on the 27th of  
3 November?

4 Mr. Gesell: No, sir. The request was based upon a  
5 statement by Congressman Gearhart that he had information  
6 that the BOISE had sighted the Japanese task force. We were  
7 attempting to answer that question. It appears now that the  
8 BOISE was 1400 miles from the task force. So I guess it  
9 didn't sight it.

10 Now, if the Congressman wants information as to the  
11 orders under which the convoy was proceeding, where it started  
12 from and where it was going, that would be a separate request  
13 and we would have to get that information separately.

14 Mr. Keefe: Could you get that information?

15 Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir. We will ask the Navy Department  
16 for it.

17 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

18 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

19 Mr. Murphy: At the time the request was made for the  
20 log of the BOISE, in order to be prepared to discuss the  
21 matter in the event that it were pertinent, I requested that  
22 we have present the commanding officer of the BOISE. I now  
23 cancel that request in view of the information supplied.

24 The Vice Chairman: Are there any other questions about  
25 the BOISE?



All right, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. Gesell: A request was made to show the dates of arrival of the vessels that were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack on the 7th of December 1941.

I have in my hand a schedule showing the arrival of all the vessels, the dates they came in, and I think the most appropriate means of handling this would be to ask the reporter to spread this two-page schedule on the daily transcript.

The Vice Chairman: That may be done. Do you desire to read it?

Mr. Gesell: I don't see any need of that. It shows they came in at different times.

The Vice Chairman: Is there any request that it be read? If not, it will be spread in full in the record at this point.

(The schedule above referred to is as follows:)

ARRIVALS OF VESSELS IN PORT (PEARL HARBOR) JUST PRIOR TO

7 DECEMBER 1941

BATTLESHIPS:

PENNSYLVANIA	-	Drydock 1 December 1941
ARIZONA )		
OKLAHOMA )	-	5 December 1941
NEVADA )		
CALIFORNIA )		
WEST VIRGINIA )		
MARYLAND )	-	28 November 1941
TENNESSEE )		

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



HEAVY CRUISERS:

SAN FRANCISCO )

NEW ORLEANS )

- Prior to 1 December 1941,  
exact time not known.LIGHT CRUISERS:

HONOLULU - 28 November 1941

DETROIT - 5 December 1941

RALEIGH - 28 November 1941

PHOENIX - 28 November 1941

HELENA - 28 November 1941

ST. LOUIS - 28 November 1941

DESTROYERS:

PATTERSON - 5 December 1941

HELM - "

BLUE - "

BAGLEY - 4 December 1941

JARVIS - "

MUGFORD - "

RAMSAY - "

BREESE - "

CONYNGHAM - "

PHELPS - Prior 1 December 1941

FARRAGUT - "

MONOGHAN - "

ALWIN - "

HULL - "



WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DEWEY	-	Prior 1 December 1941
WARDEN	-	"
McDONOUGH	-	"
TUCKER	-	"
CUMMINGS	-	"
ZANE	-	6 December 1941
SELFRIE	-	"
REID	-	Prior 1 December 1941
CASE	-	"
MONTGOMERY	-	4 December 1941
HENLEY	-	5 December 1941
GAMBLE	-	5 December 1941
RALPH TALBOT	-	"
DALE	-	"
WASMUTH	-	"
TREVER	-	"
<u>AUXILIARIES:</u>		
NEOSHO	-	6 December 1941
RAMAPO	-	5 December 1941
CURTISS	-	"

(Note: Tenders remained in harbor to carry out repair schedules)

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Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

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The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

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Mr. Murphy: In connection with that, I understand that in the two documents we have been furnished of the Navy story that there is a discussion as to how the Fleet got into Pearl Harbor and how the ships got there, and the periodic orders from time to time covering matters of that nature.

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Mr. Gesell: This is in reponse only to the request as to the dates when they entered the Harbor.

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The Vice Chairman: Are there any other questions on that point? If not, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

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Mr. Gesell: We have been asked also to furnish information concerning the condition of water-tight integrity of the major vessels that were in the Harbor. Under date of December 11, we received from the Navy a table showing scheduled inspection of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November, and December, and I am going to ask that that schedule be inserted in the record.

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It will be noted from the table that it does not contain all the ships which were in Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. The explanation for that is that ships which are not shown on this schedule, the Navy advises, were not scheduled for inspection during the period October-December,



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1941.

The Vice Chairman: That will be admitted, and spread on the record.

Mr. Gesell: I think that should be made an exhibit, and perhaps the reporter can arrange to have photostats accompany the transcript for the information of the members of the committee. That will be Exhibit 69.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 69

(Exhibit No. 69 is as follows:)

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