

INTERR. KIDS -18 Feb. 46)

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INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

DATE AND TIME: 18 February 1946, 1400 - 1630 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

Q Let us look at your diary on June 22 wherein you write with reference to a meeting between the Emperor and the new Chinese Ambassador in those days. What was there that was so unusual about the Emperor's comments on that occasion which I take it from your diary was different than normal?

A Usually, it is a very formal affair and this particular one was surprising in the respect that political matters had been touched.

Q It is usually a formal occasion where credentials are presented and details of national foreign policy are not spoken of. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Was this particular interview indicative of the extremes to which the Emperor was willing to go in order to improve relations between the two countries?

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- A The Emperor particularly decided to have friendly relations with China and he asked or inquired of the foreign minister if he can possibly talk to the Chinese Ambassador on political/and the Foreign Minister gave the Emperor permission to do so. / matters
- Q I notice you mention Councillor TANI at a later date. Is that the same man that was head of the Asiatic Bureau?
- A The same TANI.
- Q What was his position of councillor? Was that a different position from that with the Asia Bureau?
- A He was transferred at this time. I believe he became councillor to the council in Manchuria.
- Q That was the council through which Japan controlled/affairs of Manchuria? ^{the}
- A Yes.
- Q Do you remember anything in particular he had to say on that occasion about the Manchurian affairs as a councillor?
- A I have no special recollection.
- Q I see. On June 28, you mention the prosecution of Dr. MINOBE. Who was it that was seeking to prosecute Dr. MINOBE, who as I understand it was advocating the Emperor Organ Theory for Japan?
- A I do not know exactly who made a prosecution or charges but I believe it was the Rightists group.
- Q Were you referring in your diary to a court prosecution?
- A No, I only say that this sort of a rumor was prevalent.
- Q I notice you write that the attitude of those close to the Emperor became such that they advocated he should be prosecuted. What did those close to the Emperor want Dr. MINOBE prosecuted for?
- A I am only saying that this sort of a rumor was flying around. The facts were entirely groundless.
- Q Was it the Rightists that wanted to prosecute Dr. MINOBE?

- A I believe so. It appeared in the newspaper columns and the Emperor inquired because it appeared in the newspapers.
- Q And they were against Dr. MINOBE because the Emperor Organ Theory was inconsistent with their views of the Imperial theory in the Government?
- A The Imperial Household naturally is of the Imperial organ theory.
- Q When I say "their", I mean the Rightists were opposed to him because it was inconsistent with their theory.
- A Yes, that is so.
- Q Do you remember anyone particularly in the military group being outspoken publicly against Dr. MINOBE and his teachings?
- A There were numerous persons that were against the Emperor Organ theory.
- Q Do you remember anyone of the leaders that were outspoken in their opposition?
- A Such persons as ARAKI and MASAKI are all opposed to the Emperor Organ Theory but they do not know the actual theory.
- Q But because of their opposition, they were opposed to Dr. MINOBE, personally?
- A Yes.
- Q As I understand it, he was nominated to the House of Peers and they were strenuously objecting to his appointment. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q On July 2, you mention the "election reform movement". What reform was advocated in the election system?
- A At this time, the election of the members of the Lower House has gone down to corruption and there were numerous cases of buying votes and bribery, so the former Minister SAITO tried to bring forth a clean-up in the election procedure and under that an organ to do that was formed.

Q This didn't involve any pressure on the military groups to eliminate the Diet or political parties?

A No, there is no such connection.

Q On July 11, you mention a Mr. ETO. Who was Mr. ETO?

A This is GENKURO ETO and he is a firm opponent of the Emperor Organ Theory. He made a direct petition to the Emperor and because his motive was not of a good nature, it was not taken seriously and was referred to the Cabinet.

Q This is another one of those instances of petitioning the Throne we were talking about the other day?

A Yes.

Q In his petition, what was he seeking to do with reference to the Emperor Organ Theory? What did he want the Emperor to do by virtue of his petition?

A He thought to have the Emperor take up the matter and oppose the Emperor Organ Theory.

Q He was a member of the Rightists, I take it?

A He is a Major General of the Army, and then a member of the Lower House.

Q Was he a close associate of our men, ARAKI and MASAKI in those days.

A I do not know what his connection is but he is of the same mind and of the same purpose.

Q Was he of the Kwantung Army group or was he in Army circles of Tokyo or Japan proper?

A I don't believe he is connected with the Kwantung Army.

Q Was he a part of Staff Headquarters?

A No, he is not that high up.

Q I notice in those days the Emperor indicated he desired to visit Korea. What was his purpose in wanting to go to Korea, if you know.

- A Ever since the annexation of Korea by Japan, no Emperor has ever visited Korea. The Emperor felt that if there is no difficulties involved, he would like to visit Korea. Until now, there has been many independent movements in Korea and it was rather dangerous for the Emperor to visit it but since Korea became stabilized and calm, the Emperor felt that it would be best if he made a visit.
- Q Did it have any political or diplomatic significance?
- A No, he did not have any diplomatic or governmental motive.
- Q Do you remember what Mr. YANAI and Mr. MORISHIMA had to say with reference to the North China problem? You talked with them on July 12.
- A They were members of the Foreign Ministry. Probably they were a secretary or a section chief.
- Q What did they have to say about North China, if you remember.
- A I have no special recollection.
- Q When you refer to the North China incident in your diary, what particular incident do you have in mind.
- A It deals with the incident in which the military tried to put their hand out in North China and the incident did not develop but was solved amicably and it was feared that the military has now involved themselves into diplomatic matters.
- Q Would you say that it was true by that time, the military had become so strong, it was determining the foreign policy of Japan independent of the Foreign Office?
- A Under the system, it cannot function independently of the Foreign Office, but the militarists persecuted the Foreign Office and had come to the tendency of more or less directing it.
- Q Is it true that MASAKI and ARAKI demanded that the War Minister HAYASHI in those days advocate the abolition of the Emperor Organ Theory?
- A Yes, this is true.

- Q They wanted the Emperor to really control the Government - the Government to be incidental - rather than the Emperor to be an organ of the Government. Is that right?
- A Yes, they were opposed to the Government taking on the function only as an organ and they desired that the Emperor, himself, take on the role of Governor.
- Q Could we say that in advocating the abolition of the Emperor Organ Theory, ARAKI and MASAKI and their followers, were advocating a Fascist Government as distinguished from a constitutional monarchy?
- A The intention of the military was not to abolish the constitutional monarchy but I believe they had in mind to establish a military dictatorship.
- Q Well, then, they were advocating somewhat something similar to a Fascist administration only controlled by the military at the top through the Emperor?
- A Yes.
- Q (July 23). Mr. TAKEDA discussed with you the economic situation of Manchuria as of those days. Do you recall what he said or what the economic situation was generally?
- A TAKEDA is an economic adviser sent from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and he talked about the economic situation in Manchuria. He said that the military demand on Manchuria is so great that it is experiencing economic difficulties.
- Q In what respect was there difficulty. What was the result of these military demands?
- A I believe that the militarists made a revolutionary request asking for a great increase in the establishment of heavy industries and other products.
- Q What was their purpose in so doing - to build up the armed forces and military strength in Japan and Manchuria.

- A I believe that it sought to establish speedily productions and establishment for national defense.
- Q It is true that the military group did try to exploit Manchuria for the purpose of building up military strength as much as possible. Is that right?
- A I believe they had that intention.
- Q What reason was given by Mr. MATSUI as to why the Lord Keeper should resign, as mentioned in your diary as of July 27?
- A Because there were many fears to the extent that the Lord Keeper would be assassinated by the militarists, they felt he should resign in order to ease the situation but I explained the matter that the grounds are entirely erroneous.
- Q What was the main issue between the Lord Keeper and the militarists in those days which caused fear that he might be assassinated?
- A Because there were propaganda strongly given at that time to the effect that those near the Emperor is obstructing the Emperor and is making the judgment of the Emperor erroneous.
- Q Erroneous with reference to the maintenance of the Emperor Organ Theory and the non-military government?
- A And in relation to increase in armaments and the militarists criticized the fact that the Lord Keeper was sympathetic with the senior statesmen and sided with the Zaibatsu.
- Q Generally speaking, there was a great deal in that rumor. It wasn't rumor but true that the Lord Keeper did take that position on the one side as against the militarists' position on the other?
- A The Lord Keeper was fair in his judgment but he has always been misunderstood.
- Q Well, he was opposed to a great deal of the program of the militarists and rightists, wasn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q But the strength of the military had gotten so great that there were rumors going about that they would eliminate this opposition by assassinating the Lord Keeper. Is that right?
- A Yes.

- Q As to what took place in the case of SAITO, I guess he was assassinated, was he not?
- A Yes, and Mr. MAKINO at the same time.
- Q On August 3, you mention that the Government issued a statement clarifying the national structure. What was the essence of that statement?
- A Because there were so many attacks against it, the Government thought that clarification of the national structure is necessary and it made an announcement to that effect.
- Q And what did the announcement say in effect?
- A That the Government is working on the matter of clarifying the national structure.
- Q And what do you mean by national structure - this Emperor Organ Theory as distinguished from the Fascist type of Government?
- A The Government said that it was endeavoring to make the national structure clear due to the attacks made by the militarists on the Emperor Organ Theory.
- Q And what did the Government propose to do in order to clarify national structure. Did they propose to clearly establish the Emperor Organ theory or compromise with the military?
- A I believe that it was compromising in view of what happened later.
- Q Who was Major General SHIBAYAMA?
- A He is one of my classmates. He was one of the students at the same school as I was and he is rear-admiral.
- Q Do you remember what he had to say about the activities of the military in those days, or have you forgotten that?
- A Because he is a Navy man and because of the existence of the same sentiment among the Navy, he was inquired as to the condition in that respect - in the Navy.

Q What did he say - in effect?

A He handled personnel matters of the Navy at Yokosuka and he reported to the effect that there are many persons that are vigorously and radically of that mind.

Q He reported that there were many people in the Navy that were thinking along the same lines as the Rightists group and the Army? Is that right?

A Yes

Q This Mr. MATSUI we mentioned, was he in the War Ministry in those days?

A He is not a military man. He is a Ronin and he was very close to the military.

Q Did he come and talk to you quite often?

A Yes, occasionally he used to come directly with information.

Q How did he happen to come to see you if he was so closely associated with the Rightists Groups and the militarists?

A He is not exactly a Rightist because right before the outbreak of World War II, he was arrested by the Military Police for being active in promoting United States-Japan friendship in league with TETSUMA HASHIMOTO.

Q This man NAGATA that was attacked on August 12, and you mention as being the head of the Army Affairs Bureau, is that the same Bureau as Lt. Colonel SUZUKI was with, the Bureau of Military Affairs?

A He is in that section.

Q Was NAGATA the head of that Bureau and Lt. Colonel SUZUKI a lesser official?

A Yes.

Q Who was back of the NAGATA attack?

- A Lt. Colonel AIZAWA used a sword on NAGATA. The reason was that in the regular August reshuffling of Army personnel, HAYASHI made MASAKI resign and as a consequence, the group became more or less provoked and because NAGATA happened to be an advisor to one of the stooges or close persons of HAYASHI, they attacked NAGATA.
- Q In other words, the War Minister, in those days, HAYASHI, brought enough pressure to bear to cause the Vice Chief of Staff MASAKI to resign.
- A MASAKI was then the Inspector General of Military Education.
- Q Prior thereto, he had been Vice Chief of Staff, had he not?
- A That is right, he was Vice Chief of Staff.
- Q But that caused him to resign as Inspector General of Military Education.
- A Yes. At that time, in the military, there were two views; one was known as the Kodo, or "Imperial Way Faction" and the other was Tosei, or "Control Faction".
- Q What view did HAYASHI support?
- A Tosei. In the Kodo faction there was NISHIDA, KITA and others; especially MASAKI and ARAKI and it was centered on company grade officers. These persons were always plotting and they were always talking. The Tosei side, which centered on HAYASHI had numerous connections with SHUMEI OKAWA and its central officers were the field grade officers. The Tosei group became provoked because one of its key men, MASAKI, has forcibly been removed in the regular August reshuffling of the Army.
- Q Both of these groups were Rightists groups, were they? Was the division among the Rightists?
- A Yes, both of these factions were Rightists and they were radical and aggressive.
- Q What was the main difference between their two programs and philosophies other than there being a difference in personnel. What did one group want that the other didn't?

- A Hitherto, NISHIDA and OKAWA has been influential in military circles and their manipulation of the military has brought forth divisions because NISHIDA and OKAWA clashed together. As a consequence, two factions were formed.
- Q It was a clash of personalities more than principles, was it?
- A I believe the reasons were more emotional than principles. Both of these persons were very short-tempered and narrow-minded.
- Q So, although the War Minister HAYASHI and MASAKI both thought alike with reference to military control of the Government and expansion into Manchuria, they had personal differences? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q The relationship between the Lord Keeper and the military group was pretty strained in those days, I take it from your diary?
- A Yes, the relationship between the military and Lord Keeper was very critical.
- Q On September 3, you indicate that the War Minister HAYASHI indicated his intention to resign? What pressure was there being put on him to resign and by whom.
- A I have no recollection what the reason was.
- Q He was succeeded, according to my notes, by KAWASHIMA?
- A Yes.
- Q What group did KAWASHIMA belong in within the militarists?
- A I have no accurate recollection but I believe he may be of the HAYASHI faction.
- Q Was this resignation of the War Minister tied up with the NAGATA incident?
- A I do not have accurate recollection and because there was no illness on his part, I believe that it was due to internal dissension in the Army.

- Q This MATSUI, whom you say was a Ronin, did he favor the Emperor Organ Theory, or was he so closely associated with the militarists that he was opposed to it?
- A I don't believe he had a clear-cut opinion regarding the Emperor Organ Theory. He is more or less getting into everybody's business and carried on all sorts of news and rumors.
- Q Did the Peers Club have any governmental function, or was that a social organization?
- A It is entirely social.
- Q Who was Mr. GOTO that you mention on September 27?
- A He is a friend of Prince KONOYE and he is a liberal. He was working in the Dai Nippon Seinen Kaikan.
- Q I notice on September 30, you mention fear on the part of the Emperor that the young officers were going to get out of bounds. What was it feared they were going to do?
- A At this time, the Emperor was very much worried about the younger officers becoming too exclusive and he said that the ministers should become a sacrifice and do their utmost and the Emperor reproached the ministers in this respect and when ~~His Majesty~~, the Chief of Staff, came to see the Emperor, the Emperor notified the Chief of Staff that he had told the War Minister to that effect.
- Q He was demanding that strict discipline be enforced in Army circles. Isn't that what he insisted upon.
- A Yes, even though they were made to become a sacrifice, the Emperor said they should do their utmost.
- Q What did the Emperor fear they might do - rise up and take the Government?
- A I do not know what he was thinking in that respect. The Emperor probably feared they might conduct themselves excessively and mob violence might be resorted to
- Q Do you think he was anticipating what might actually take place on February 26 of the next year?
- A I do not think he was thinking to that extent. Every time a large group of Army personnel aggregated, we had a premonition that something of a violent nature would occur but we never did dream of the fact that the Army itself would rise up

- Q I never lived in a situation where you had to fear the Army people creating incidents all the time. It is hard for me to comprehend such a situation existing. On October 8, you mention the War Minister. It was thought that he was going to demand another statement with reference to the Emperor Organ Theory. What was the War Minister, KAWASHIMA, wanted the Government to do in its statement on the subject. What did he advocate?
- A Because they felt that nothing sufficient has been done concerning the fact that the Government has proclaimed it as doing its utmost to clarify the national structure, the militarists again petitioned the Government to clarify the national structure.
- Q What was it the militarists wanted to do in order to clarify the national structure. Did they want a military cabinet put in? Is that what they meant by wanting the clarification of the national structure.
- A Its objections was to removing those persons that were supporting the Emperor Organ Theory and its consequence, perhaps, may be military dictatorship.
- Q Did the Government issue another statement on the clarification of national structure.
- A I believe the Government did issue another statement.
- Q What was the nature of the clarification of the national structure.
- A I have no recollection but I believe the Government made a statement which was made after an agreement with the military.
- Q Do you remember the general essence of that statement. Do you remember what the statement contained?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q When you say the Government makes a statement. Is that a statement made by the Cabinet through the Premier? Who makes the statement?
- A The Cabinet.
- Q And it is announced by the Premier, I presume?
- A Yes.

- Q You mention the War Councillors on October 8. Who were the War Councillors and what was their function in the Japanese Government?
- A It is the highest military adviser.
- Q Is that the same thing as the Supreme War Council?
- A Yes, it is the same thing.
- Q I see on October 15, you mention that you received a copy of the second statement on the clarification of the National structure. You don't remember what it contained?
- A No, I have no recollection of this part but because this statement was issued after agreement with the military, I believe that it was completely swept by the military.
- Q You think that the statement adopted as a policy for Japan was the use of military cabinets thereafter?
- A I don't believe such a concrete thing. I believe it was a very abstract thing.
- Q On October 22, you mention some new hostilities in North China. What took place in North China on or about that time?
- A I have made no accurate recollection because I have made no subsequent notation on it. I believe it was a false rumor.
- Q Did the Japanese troops move into North China in those days or was that later on?
- A There were naturally Japanese troops stationed at Tientsin but the Aide-de-Camp said that no Tientsin troops were involved.
- Q About that time, Lord Keeper Makino decided to resign, did he not?
- A It wasn't decided so at this time, but he always felt like resigning.
- Q Was that because of all this great pressure being put on him by the military?
- A One reason is that his health became poor and the other reason was that because he was persecuted so vigorously, he felt any insufficiency on his part would be harmful.

- Q On December 4, about the middle or towards the end, you mention the contemplated resignation of the Lord Keeper and also the Imperial Household Ministry might result in a drive for the other party. Whom did you have in mind when you referred to the other party?
- A The other party is those persons that were criticizing or opposed the Emperor Organ Theory and the militarists.
- Q It was the Rightists groups and militarists, generally. Is that what you had in mind?
- A Yes.
- Q On December 19, who was KUHARA?
- A KUHARA is a member of the Diet and he is of the Seiyukai and he is reputed to be close to the military.
- Q Had things gotten to the point, according to the way you write in your diary, that the Cabinet was threatening to resign rather than make a statement on the national structure, such as was advocated by the military?
- A Yes, KUHARA is one of these persons that wanted the clarification of the national structure and he was, of course, siding with the militarists. KUHARA is a plotter and I believe he had the intention of bringing forth a change in the Government at this time by taking advantage of this incident.
- Q My question was whether or not the abolition of the Emperor Organ Theory had become such an issue that the Cabinet threatened to resign in connection with the solution of the issue?
- A Yes, because the handling of it would decide to some extent the fate of the Cabinet.
- Q I still don't understand what the situation would be if the Cabinet had unanimously announced that it favored the abolition of the Emperor Organ Theory. Does that mean that the constitutional form of Government would be eliminated?
- A No, the abolition of the Emperor Organ Theory would imply a criticism of the constitutional system.
- Q The Constitution recognizes the Emperor as an organ of the Government, doesn't it?
- A It is because under the Constitution, these two problems were being debated.

- Q Without abolishing the Constitution? Is that right?
- A Yes, these two divisions arose in the matter of interpretation under the Constitution. I believe they were trying to interpret it so that they can carry out the wishes as they please.
- Q Assuming that the Emperor Organ Theory of Government was abolished, what general change would there have been in the manner in which the Government was conducted.
- A That isn't clear, even to me. It is an academic question.
- Q It would involve considerably more power in the Emperor, would it not?
- A I believe they had the object of giving the Emperor power and then doing everything as they pleased.
- Q That necessitated winning the Emperor over on their side, did it not and wasn't he opposed to the change in the Government?
- A Yes.
- Q They weren't even waiting for the Emperor to agree with them. They were trying to force that kind of Government on the Emperor. Would you say that was true?
- A No, it doesn't mean that they are forcing it on the Emperor.
- Q Well, they desired to force it on the Emperor, if they could, did they not?
- A Yes, but that actually cannot be done.
- Q You mention on one or two occasions in your diary about the possible inability of the Cabinet to resign because the War Minister might refuse to resign. By that do you mean if one of the Ministers in the Cabinet refuses to resign, the Cabinet can't fall?
- A If the Cabinet members did not agree, the Cabinet would not be able to function and as a consequence, the Cabinet would collapse.

- Q I still don't understand what you meant when you write on December 20, near the end, with reference to the possible inability of the Cabinet to resign because the War Minister was objecting. How could he prevent the Cabinet from falling if everyone else decides to resign?
- A In the dissolution of the Diet, the Imperial Rescript must be signed by all the Cabinet members and if any one member of the Cabinet refuses to resign, it would be impossible to carry out the dissolution.
- Q You were referring to the dissolution of the Diet and not the formation of a new cabinet?
- A Yes.
- Q While we are on the subject, did the Diet, under your procedure, meet at certain designated intervals or was it upon the call of the Emperor or Cabinet or some such agency? Does it have regularly defined meeting times?
- A There is, under the Constitution, an ordinary session of the Diet which is summoned on December and it continues in session until March and whenever necessary an extraordinary session of the Diet is called.
- Q But it can be dissolved in between by a unanimous vote of the Cabinet? Is that right?
- A And, whenever necessary, the Lower House can be dissolved.
- Q By dissolved, you mean that brings about the necessity for a new election?
- A Yes.
- Q As distinguished from merely adjourning - or, the same Diet might adjourn but if it is dissolved, a new election is held. Then the member of the Lower House is not in for a definite term but in for a period of time until it is decided by the Cabinet that a new election should be held?
- A When the Lower House is dissolved, the members of the Lower House lose the confidence of the people, and, therefore, a new election is carried out.

- Q Whenever a cabinet fails, does that necessitate a new election of the Diet. Is the Diet dissolved concurrently with the fall of the Cabinet?
- A No.
- Q A dissolution of the Diet and a new election comes about through special action on the part of the Cabinet.
- A Yes.
- Q And the falling of the Cabinet and appointment of a new Premier, wouldn't necessarily affect membership in the Diet. A member of the Lower House in the Diet might continue in office in several cabinets. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q So, when you are elected as a member of the Lower House in the Diet, there is no specific term of office in that it generally depends upon the action of the Cabinet in dissolving the particular Diet.
- A The term of office of the Diet members is set as four years.
- Q So, the term might be less than four years but not more than four years?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you remember on January 22, 1936, you mentioned you reviewed a Nazi propaganda film. Do you recall the nature of it. What were they trying to establish? Was the propaganda for Japan or some other kind of propaganda?
- A I believe it was German propaganda and it was propaganda that was being disseminated throughout the world.
- Q Do you remember the nature of it. What was it trying to accomplish or establish?
- A I have no accurate recollection. I believe it was such things as showing aerial power and industrial development and things like that.
- Q Do you know whether it advocated cooperation between Japan and Germany and putting over the military program the Germans were attempting to accomplish?

- A I don't believe there was such a thing at this time.
- Q On the next day, you refer to Ambassador ARITA and his opinions concerning China. Do you remember what he had to say about China in those days?
- A No, I have no recollection.
- Q This new Education Minister in the OKADA Cabinet by the name of KAWASAKI, is he related to the KAWASAKI family we mentioned the otherday?
- A This is absolutely a different person.
- Q Is it the same family?
- A No, no relation whatsoever.
- Q On that occasion, you discuss two or three items, mentioning among them, the Aizawa charge. What do you have in mind when you discussed the Aizawa charge.
- A AIZAWA was the man that murdered NAGATA and it involved his trial.
- Q What did you have in mind when you referred to the recent activities of Admiral YAMAMOTO?
- A Admiral YAMAMOTO was a very active man and there were rumors to the effect that he was active in trying to bring forth internal reconstruction.
- Q What type of internal reconstruction did he advocate - the same as the Army leaders?
- A There were rumors to the effect that he advocated those things.
- Q Did he also advocate as to the military, the increase of military strength and armaments?
- A Admiral YAMAMOTO is a very eccentric man and when SAITO became Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, he dispatched a letter to SAITO saying that if he is ever made Prime Minister, he would solve every problem of the Nation.

- Q Do you think he really aspired to be a Prime Minister and would like to have become one?
- A No, he is not that sort of a man. On the other hand, he was supported in that respect.
- Q When MASAKI was removed from office, do you remember what military position he next moved into?
- A I believe he became member of the Supreme War Council.
- Q One of the main things that the Army group, headed by MASAKI and ARAKI, and others, advocated in these days, was great increase in armaments. Isn't that true?
- A Yes.
- Q What was their reason for wanting more armaments. What reason did they give?
- A Because the Army at this time was very mindful that the quality of its officers were very inferior and that they had an insufficient number of personnel. Secondly, it was inferior to Russia in the matter of aerial power and in new weapons. This matter became one of the causes of the February 26th Incident.
- Q But what reason did they assign - the Army people - for having need for such a great increase in armaments and military supplies?
- A It was because they actually were fearful of Russia attacking Japan.
- Q Had Soviet Russia threatened any attack on Japan in those days?
- A Because military preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia became more and more complete and their strength along the Soviet-Manchurian border had become increased.
- Q Didn't the military group also advocate and argue in favor of increase of arms in order to consolidate their position in Manchuria and assert whatever desires they had in China?
- A The Army was very much worried about the problems arising on the Soviet-Manchurian border but it publicly did not say it.

- Q They told the public that it was necessary to increase arms to defend Japan against Russia, I presume. Is that right?
- A I believe they did not make a public issue because that more or less stimulates or gets on the nerves of Russia.
- Q In Governmental circles, in attempting to get additional money for Army equipment, it argued that it was necessary to build up Army equipment to defend Russia.
- A I believe so.
- Q Didn't this group also argue and state that if Japan were going to hold on to Manchuria and promote this Asia program, they would have to have a greater military force?
- A At this time, we were not aware of any aggressive attitude toward China and I believe that it was entirely a passive fear of Russia. The success of the Five-Year Plan of Russia was a fearful shock to Japan.
- Q Well, there no doubt were those in military circles that thought that armaments should be increased to defend Japan against Russia but there were groups that decided to build up the military strength of Japan in order to acquire additional living space and territory on the continent, didn't they?
- A I believe that Japan had its hands full in trying to solve the Manchurian problem.
- Q You don't think they were thinking in terms then of North China and the South Pacific. You think that thought came into prominence later?
- A Yes, that was later - way later. Right after the end of the First World War, the feeling of disarmament was strong throughout the world and during while UGAKI was War Minister, he reduced the standing Army of Japan by four divisions. In place of that, they were to mechanize but later on financial matters became difficult and it was not able to carry out that program so this became the sore point of the military toward the political parties.
- Q It is only natural that when you start building up your Army or armaments, sooner or later, there is a good likelihood you are going to fight somebody. Isn't that true?

- A Because Japan did not actively participate in the First World War, its development of war methods and mechanization of its Army was very much inferior and was backward in contrast with other nations and it tried to gain a good position and be active in that respect. In contrast, Japan was unable to carry out its program as against the Five-Year Plan of Russia. As a consequence, Japan was fearful and very much concerned.
- Q You think the activities of the Army in Manchuria after the various incidents started the campaign there, was stimulated by the desire to sort of give practice to its military forces and see what they were able to accomplish?
- A I do not know if it had that much significance.
- Q Anyway, after the Manchurian Incident, and before the start of the China war, you think that this great increase in armaments was thought of pretty generally, as a defensive measure?
- A Yes.
- Q In those days, did you hear the military leaders discussing any plan for expansion into China or into French-Indo-China or the South Pacific?
- A There wasn't any such feeling at all at that time and because Japan had its hands full in Manchuria, even in the military, there were divisions of opinion with respect to becoming involved in China.
- Q Also, there was the over-all philosophy in certain quarters of Asia for the Asiatics.
- A That was existing from a long time ago in Japan.
- Q That was generally subscribed to by all factions of the Government, both military and non-military, was it not, that Japan felt in her foreign relations that Asia should be for the Asiatics and other powers should not participate there.
- A The military and the Rightists had such an idea. The Government never had such ideas. The Government always tried to join hands with England and America and tried to work together with the rest of the world.
- Q I am not saying there is anything wrong with Japan for having a foreign policy of Asia for the Asiatics. I'm wondering if it was universal in Japan or whether it was the Rightists groups that just felt that way.

- A Although such a sentiment may have been prevalent on the one hand, the intelligentsia did not feel so. They felt that the sentiment of the militarists in that respect would bring Japan into a clash with England and America because the financial and business circles of Japan were very closely tied with England and American interests. Their sentiment were much more strongly on the financial and economic side than on the basis for Asia for the Asiatics. It was more practical than abstract.
- Q I suppose there were extremists in Japan in those days that went so far as to advocate the actual throwing out of British and American influence by physical force, such as out of Hongkong, for example?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you know who those people were who advocated the use of military force, if necessary, to move out non-Asiatics out of the continent?
- A There may be some in the military that had such an idea but the rest of the people thought that was impossible.
- Q Who, among the military, would you say, was so extreme in those days as to advocate use of force?
- A I cannot fathom the fact that there were some militarists who were thinking to the extent of clearing every British and American interest from East Asia. I don't believe they were radical to that extent.
- Q They were radical, let us say, to the extent of wanting to stop any further encroachment of American and British influence into Asia. Is that right?
- A I believe it was only to the extent of Japan gaining a superior position in East Asia.
- Q And some of them, no doubt, were sufficiently imbued with that program that they advocated the use of force, if necessary, to accomplish it?
- A Perhaps there may have been such a sentiment within the military.

- Q Could we say that ARAKI was of that mind, or MASAKI?
- A ARAKI and MASAKI were radical strategists against Soviet Russia so I don't believe they were involved in matters of China. I don't believe they felt that they could soon carry out the program of expulsion of Anglo-American influence.
- Q You don't think that they were anticipating later events to that extent? In other words, that you could say they advocated what finally took place with reference to China?
- A I believe they might have had such a long-range plan.
- Q By that, you mean that ARAKI and MASAKI hoped and planned that if they were successful, they eventually might acquire additional territory in China?
- A I don't believe they had lust of territory against China.
- Q You think it was more for desire for influence rather than for territory?
- A Rather, his thought was to take a Government position in China.
- Q You think their plan involved, if they got sufficiently strong, the use of military force to bring that about if it couldn't be accomplished by economics?
- A I do not know to what extent they would have considered it in the event they had gotten the power.
- Q Did ARAKI and MASAKI continue to be leaders and active after the China incident broke out in 1937, or did they move into the background?
- A I believe at that time, they weren't much of a leader.
- Q Is there an Army man by the name of MITSUI in addition to the Ronin we talked about a little while ago by that name. I see, he is mentioned near the end of February 2.
- A Yes, he is a military man. He is about a Lt. Colonel and he is one of the ARAKI and MASAKI and ISHIWARA gang.
- Q That is a different man from MITSUI we talked about earlier today?
- A This is the first time I came across the name.

- Q Was MITSUI a member of the Kwantung Army?
- A No, I believe he was in Tokyo.
- Q What was his connection or position with the military, if you recall in those days?
- A I believe he handled the coal mine in Kyushu. Upon viewing the situation there, he became very indignant with the Zaibatsu.
- Q What complaint did he have against the Zaibatsu upon the completion of his trip.
- A He thought that the coal mine which was operated by the Zaibatsu - Mitsui, as being very unfavorable to the workers and working conditions there were terrible and as a consequence, he stirred up trouble and even brought forth a strike.
- Q What was his Army rank in Tokyo?
- A I believe he was probably attached to some military organization in Kyushu.
- Q What was Japan's policy toward China in those days, about which you write on February 7?
- A At this meeting, the financial circles were represented, and ARITA, who returned as serving as Ambassador to China gave views on the Government measures of a forceful nature to be taken in regard to China. I have no recollection of a concrete nature.
- Q What do you have in mind on February 9, when you say the "handsome kind of treatment toward General MASAKI?"
- A At this time, TOKAI, who is the official of the Army said that the punishment meted out to AIZAWA has brought forth all sorts of unrest within the Army. He advised that leniency should be exercised against MASAKI in order to ameliorate the situation.
- Q Was MASAKI accused of being directly involved in the NAGATA killing?
- Q It was said that MASAKI was behind AIZAWA and also AIZAWA was always visiting MASAKI.

- Q Was it after the NAGATA killing that MASAKI was removed as Inspector General of Military Education?
- A The removal ^finfluenced the incident, so, it came before.
- Q What was MASAKI doing in those days in order to get back in the good graces of the War Ministry.
- A There were movements trying to better the relationship with the War Minister but the relationship actually was not/because relationship was bad, these stories cropped up. and
- Q What do you have in mind on February 13, when you mention the general sentiments of the Supreme War Council?
- A TOKI inquired of members of the Supreme War Council how things went concerning the relationship of M ASAKI and the War Minister because he was very much concerned about it.
- Q And what did he ascertain from this inquiry?
- A I do not have any accurate recollection but he asked the members of the Supreme War Council individually.
- Q You don't remember what he said?
- A Because several members were inquired of, I do not know.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 25 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xxx~~) Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~xxx~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 18th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xxx~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan. *[Signature]*
Place

18 February 1946
Date