# RESTRICTED HEADQUARTERS U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY (PACIFIC) APO # 234

C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 375 U.S.S.B.S.	PLACE:	The second liverage of	
0&C No. 89.	DATE: 16	November	1945
Division of Origin: Oil, Chemicals, and Rubbe	r Divisio	1.	
Subject: Organization of the Munitions Ministry	у.	7	
Personnel interrogated and background of each: Suginomori, Shotaro - Member of Chem of Commerce and Industry.	icals Bur	eau, Mini	stry
Where interviewed: Room No. 810, Meiji Buildin	g		
Interrogator: Mr. L. S. Galstaun.			
Interpreter: Mr. Baba.			
Allied Officers Present: None.			,

#### Summary:

- 1. The interview developed in detail the organization of the Chemicals Bureau, including all changes since August, 1940.
- 2. For the period prior to this time the informant suggested questioning Mr. Sayeda, now Head of the Organic Chemicals Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, in regard to allocations, plans, shortages, and imports. All of the information developed at this interview substained the previously developed picture.

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#### ALLOCATION OF MATERIALS:

As has been determined in other interrogations, the Munitions Ministry was in general control of allocations of military materials, including chemicals of all types, to the Army, the Navy, and civilian economy. The various control associations would divide the civilian allocations among the various producers in proportion to the production capacity of each. On a formal basis military explosives were produced only by the Army and Navy in its Arsenals or directly owned plants. However, in order to take care of fluctuating demands, occasional direct contracts would be negotiated between the Army or Navy and civilian producers. Records of these contracts are not available in the Munitions Ministry, since the raw materials used for such production were taken out of the original Army-Navy allocations. Records, however, should be available in the accounting bureaus of the Army and Navy. 

#### PLANS:

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Mr. Suginomori was questioned extensively on the subject of long-range plans. He was quite clear that nolong-range plans, per se, were formulated, although every effort was made to expand production of critical war materials. He gave as an example the expansion of nitric acid during his term of service in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Two principal reasons were given for what he considered an insufficient expansion in chemicals:

1. Shortage of steel and other construction materials:

2. The feeling of Government Officials, particularly in other bureaus than the Chemicals Bureau, that the whole chemical industry was on a lower plane of importance than other industries such as light metals, aviation and others.

Financing of war materials plants was through Sangvo Setsubi Eidan, a kind of RFC in the Japanese economy. Funds were obtained partially from the Government budget and partially from special bond issues. Sangyo Setsubi Eidan was under the supervision of the Government, but the actual administration was by civilians. These civilians ordinarilly were the heads of large corporations. The first president was Mr. Fujiwara, Gingiro, who was followed by Mr. Hirose. The expansion of nitric acid in particular was started just after the formation of the Munitions Ministry in 1943. It was Mr. Suginomori's opinion that the lateness of this start was a contributing factor in the relatively small success of the expansion program.

#### SHORTAGES:

While shortages developed in virtually every commodity in the Japanese industrial picture, the pinch was particularly tight in the case of soda, coal, coal machinery and rubber. As has been explained earlier, the soda shortage was a direct consequence of the virtual cutting off of salt imports. The problem of coal was concerned mainly with transportation, and the shortage of machinery developed out of obsolescence and wearing-out of industrial machinery, which

became practically unreplaceable. The labor shortage was due principally to an unwise, draft bolicy. In a general way, prior to the heavy bombing offensive, transportation was the principal bottle-neck. Subsequent difficulties were a direct effect of the bottle-neck.
bombing offensive.

# PROTECTION OF INDUSTRY FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS:

The Munitions Ministry formally requested the Army and Navy to install protective devices around critical plants. A dispersal program was ordered, but in practically all the cases theywar was over before any effective measures were taken. The plans for dispersal were formulated by Seisan Boei. Hombu (Production Protection Headquarters). This bureau was headed by the Minister of Munitions and was operated by the vice-minister, Mr. Minobe. The Commerce and Textile bureaus had represenatives who exercised a directing control

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS: The volume of imports and exports was planned by a tri-partite group which included the Army-Navy, the Munitions Minister and the Finance Minister. The actual plans were carried out by Koeki Eidan. Figures for actual imports and exports should be available through

Koeki Eidan.

The attached charts show schematically the Government organization, as particularly referred to chemicals, since August 1940. Mr. Suginomori recommended contacting Mr. Sayeda, presently the Head of the Organic Chemicals Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as the man most likely to have information on the organization prior to August 1940. 

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· GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION: CHART ]

#### A. As of August - 1940

#### CABINET

The Several Ministries including Sho Ko Sho (Ministry of Commerce and Industry)

#### SHO KO SHO

- 1. Somu Kyoku (General Affairs)
- 2. Senyi Kyoku (Textile Bureau) (Would handle Rayon Pulp)
- 3. Kozan Kyoku (Mining Bureau)
- 4. Kikai Kyoku (Hachinery Bureau)
- 5. Kagaku Kyoku (Chemical Bureau)
- 6. Nenyo Kyoku (Fuel Bureau) (Includes Alchol)
- 7. Tokkyo Kyoku (Patents and Standards Bureau)

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## CHART I. ( Detail of Kagaku-Kyoku (Chemical Bureau)

as of August - 1940

KAGAKU KYOKU
(Chemical Bureau)

Muki-ka
(Inorganic Chemicals)
All Inorganic Chemicals
including
Synthetic Ammonia
Fertilizers
Phosphorus
Sulphuric Acid
Nitric Acid
Caustic Soda

Yuki-ka
(Organic Chemicals)
Leather
Oils and Fats
Soap and Glycerine
Rubber

Gosei-ka
(Organic Synthetics)
including
Coal Tar Products
Methanol
Acetone
Carbide
Acetylene
Glycol
Carbon Bisulfide

This section was headed by Mr. Suginomori at this time.

November, 1941, Mr. Suginomori became head of Muki-ka

CHART II. - NOVEMBER, 1943

MUNITIONS MINISTRY

A. Ministry of Commerce and Industry

Munitions Minister, Gen. Tojo, Hideki.

Vice Munitions Minister, Mr. Kishi (Previous Minister of Commerce and Industry)

- B. Organization remained unchanged.
- C. No change in Chemical Bureau.

MAY 1944

## REORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL BUREAU

Mr. Suginomori (Chief)

Muki-ka (Inorganics)
Fertilizers
Phosphorus Sulphuric Acid Nitric Acid

Kasei-ka · Yuki-ka (Scientific Administra-(Organics) Leather tion)
Oils and Fats Ammonia () Transferred tion) Soap and Glycerine Caustic Soda) from old Rubber All others handled by Gosei-ka retained

ORDER SEC ARMY

BY TAG PER

Newly added Dyestuffs Explosives

On November 18, 1944, Mr. Suginomori stated that he was transferred to the Cabinet.

Mr. Ogasa, present head of General Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, replaced Mr. Suginomri.

Between May, 1944 and November 18, 1944, there were no changes in the Chemical Bureau.