lished by the Occupation, they will be closed, and if misconduct by its members or party policy dictated by its leaders is such that the Communist Party under reasonable interpretation becomes a threat to the legitimate political purposes of a free society, the protection of the Supreme Commander will be withdrawn.

"Inform your fellows that by their conduct, or their misconduct, they themselves will prescribe the duration of their party as a political influence in Japan.

"There exists today peace and tranquility in Japan. This responds to the fact that the great majority of the Japanese people are peacefully inclined, law-abiding citizens. The Supreme Commander will not permit any group in Japan, whatever its name or political affiliation, to incite violence and disrespect for Occupation directives or Japanese law. As long as the Occupation lasts, he will exact obedience to his orders and respect for the processes of representative government in all political activity. Be yourself warned and caution your fellows."

TANIGUCHI, Zentaro

Purged: 28 June 1950

Japanese Government was instructed by SCAP pursuant to TANIGUCHI's defiant statement regarding the suspension of the AKAHATA that they immediately designate him as a purgee and would consider this precedent for any similar instance of defiance of the implementation of SCAP directed action.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister Yoshida told by SCAP that dissolution of Communist Party under SCAP authority would not be authorized, but that dissolution by due process of Japanese law, Diet-enacted, would be approved (6 Mar 50)

In December 1950, the Prime Minister approached Attorney General OHASHI on the question of the dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 64. Attorney General OHASHI directed SIB Chief YOSHIKAWA to begin preparing for the dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order. YOSHIKAWA, aware from past conferences that SCAP sanction could not be obtained to dissolve the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 64, reported that he would continue study on the subject but believed such action impossible. On 5 January 1951, prior to Attorney General OHASHI's trip to Osaka to make a party policy speech he requested that Colonel Napier clear a statement to the press covering the National Police Reserve, Korean Problem, Police Law Revision, Procuratorial Agency, the Courts, and dissolution of the Communist Party.

He informed Colonel Napier that he was under pressure from the Prime Minister to take some drastic action against the Japan Communist Party; and wherefore, his proposed statement to the press covered the Japan Communist question. After reading OHASHI's proposed statement Colonel Napier informed him that the SCAP was opposed to dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 64. However, if the Japanese Government wanted to illegalize the Party by a Diet Law, SCAP had no objection.

Thereafter on 6 March 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida took the matter to SCAP in a personal conference and was advised that dissolution of the Communist Party by Cabinet Order was not advisable but that dissolution by Diet enactment could well be studied by the Japanese Government.

6 MAR '50

CONFIDENTIAL

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(3 May 50)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

1200 Hours
29 April 1950

GENERAL MacARTHUR'S STATEMENT ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

While the checks and balances against abuse of the powers of government are thus demonstratively adequate, in Japan as elsewhere there exist only broad and undefinitive constitutional safeguards against abuse of these personal liberties conferred by the bill of rights. And in Japan as elsewhere this vulnerable point in freedom's armor is under constant pressure by a small minority which through the perversive use of liberty and privilege seeks to encompass freedom's destruction. This type of minority pressure is not unknown to Japan, and its people are therefore forewarned of the dreadful consequences possible therefrom. For in Japan's very recent past an even smaller minority -- then the militarists and their collaborators -- coerced the Japanese people into a war leading to inevitable and, indeed, foreseeable disaster. Now as they still grope to regain their equilibrium following that disastrous experience, this other minority, taking advantage of still unreplenished war-born impoverishment, seeks to lull their intuitive sense of caution into an even greater disaster -- this time without even the pretense of service to legitimate national ends, but under foreign dictation to establish a domestic basis favorable to the ultimate subjugation of Japan to the political control of others.

Established in the immediate post-war era as a political party under constitutional protection and dedicated to the advance of certain political economic and social theories, the Japan Communist Party proceeded initially in moderation and thereby enlisted some public support. In its endeavor to press advantage, however, it went the way of all Communist movements, becoming increasingly intemperate in political and social activity, and in due course aroused a popular revulsion which in turn relegated the party into virtual political eclipse. More latterly its shattered remnant, in frustration born of this failure, has cast off the mantle of pretended legitimacy and assumed instead the role of an avowed satellite of an international predatory force and a Japanese pawn of alien power policy, imperialistic purpose and subversive propaganda. That it has done so at once brings into question its right to the further benefits and protection of the country and laws it would subvert and raises doubt as to whether it should longer be regarded as a constitutionally recognized political movement. Such doubts should, of course, be resolved calmly, justly and dispassionately with the same consideration and safeguards extended to any anti-social force in a peaceful and law abiding

3 MAY '50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

community. The saying that to be forewarned is to be forearmed is appropriate to this issue. For in the development of its counterparts abroad there is provided the opportunity clearly to observe the underlying objectives of this movement and the end to which it inevitably has led where it successfully has gained control over the sovereign power. Thus while here, as in the other democracies of the world, it professes championship of the workers' rights in order to enlist support within labor's ranks, events abroad demonstrate that the worker loses all rights under Communist political rule; where here as elsewhere it poses an ardent advocate of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly,of freedom to worship in accordance with conscience, and of the other freedoms which flow from the universally recognized fundamental human rights, events irrefutably disclose the complete suppression of all freedom with the ascendancy of Communist political power. Indeed, history offers no slightest evidence of increase in social stability, preservation of social justice or continuation of social progress in the spiritual vacuum which lies in the wake of Communism's advance. Any thought that Japanese Communism might preserve a more moderate domestic course than characterizes the movement abroad was thoroughly disabused by its open submission to external control, its embarkation upon the spread of false, malicious and inflammatory propaganda intended to mislead and coerce the public mind, and its public adoption of objectives both anti-Japanese and inimical to Japan's public interest. Experience, the great teacher, indeed points to no greater hyprocrisy than the preparations of those who thus align themselves with this form of international political perfidy, social deception, and territorial fraud and seek an alliance of expediency with the fundamental human rights, giving lip service to their preservation solely to provide a screen of respectable plausibility to mask a sinister subversive design to destroy liberty as the obstacle to personal power. The tragedy is that in every community it gains some converts among those citizens inherently law-abiding but mentally abnormal, frustrated, gullible or uninformed, and becomes because of this facade of respectability a seemingly responsible movement to which lawless elements may rally in order to fully exploit the vulnerable points inherent in democratic freedom.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Purge of Communist Party Central Committee
by SCAP Order

6 Jun 50

Tokyo, Japan
6 June 1950

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It has been a fundamental purpose of the Occupation to assist the Japanese people to meet their commitments under the Potsdam Declaration, foremost of which requires the establishment in Japan of a new order of peace, security and justice upon which may firmly stand a peacefully inclined and responsible government. To such end the Japanese Government is specifically enjoined in the Potsdam Declaration to "remove all obstacles to the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

In the implementation of this requirement, carried forward as one of the basic objectives of Allied policy as determined and prescribed by the Far Eastern Commission, the structure of the Japanese Government has been redesigned, its laws and institutions where undemocratic have been revised, and those persons whose public record gives warning that their continued influence would be inimical to democratic growth have been removed and excluded from Japan's public affairs.

The guiding philosophy of this phase of the Occupation has been protective, not punitive. Its purpose and effect has been to provide assurance that the aims of Allied policy in the democratization of Japan would not be thwarted by the influence and pressure of anti-democratic elements. The area of its application for the most part has embraced those persons who because of position and influence bear responsibility for Japan's totalitarian policies which led to adventure in conquest and exploitation. Recently, however, a new and no less sinister groupment hasinjected itself into the Japanese political scene which has sought through perversion of truth and incitation to mass violence to transform this peaceful and tranquil land into an arena of disorder and strife as the means of stemming Japan's notable progress along the road of representative democracy and to subvert the rapidly growing democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

Acting in common accord, they have hurled defiance at constituted authority, shown contempt for the processes of law and order, and contrived by false and inflammatory statements and other subversive means to arouse through resulting public confusion that degree of social unrest which would set the stage for the eventual overthrow of constitutional government in Japan by force. Their coercive methods bear striking parallel to those by which the militaristic leaders of the past

CONFIDENTIAL

deceived and misled the Japanese people, and their aims, if achieved, would surely lead Japan to an even worse disaster. To permit this incitation to lawlessness to continue unchecked, however embryonic it may at present appear, would be to risk ultimate suppression of Japan's democratic institutions in direct negation of the purpose and intent of Allied policy pronouncements, forfeiture of her chance for political independence, and destruction of the Japanese race.

Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to remove and exclude the following named persons, constituting the full membership of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party, from public service, and render them subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946 (SCAPINs 548 and 550) and their implementing ordinances:

HAKAMADA Satomi
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Kenichi
ITO Ritsu
KAMEYAMA Kozo
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KASUGA Shojiro
KONNO Yojiro
KISHIMOTO Shigeo
KURAHARA Korcto
MATSUMOTO Kazumi
MATSUMOTO Sanaki
MIYAMOTO Kenji
NOSAKA Ryu
NOSAKA Sanzo
SATO, Satoji
SHIDA Shigeo
SHIGA Yoshio
SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
TANAKURA Toru
TAKEUCHI Tsunesaburo
TOKUDA Kyuichi
TOSAKA Hiroshi
KASUGA Shoichi

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

Mr Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

COPY

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7 June 1950

PRESS RELEASE:

Purge of responsible Akahata editorial staff by SCAP order.

7 JUN '50

"Tokyo, Japan
7 June 1950

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"To the end that representative democracy in Japan might have the opportunity to thrive in the free atmosphere of full knowledge and public discussion, it has been one of the most fundamental of Allied policies governing the Occupation to encourage and assist the development of a truly free and responsible press. In the furtherance of this purpose, censorship was progressively lifted until finally terminated two years ago and the press left free to publish on its own responsibility, subject only to a code embodying a statement of principles and ethics patterned after the Canons of Journalism of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, supplemented by minimum restrictions essential to the safeguard of military security.

"The Japanese press has in general responded admirably to this challenge and developed a degree of responsibility which has evoked most favorable comment from many visiting journalists from abroad. The glaring exception is the Communist organ AKAHATA. This journal has for some time assumed the role of mouthpiece for the most violent of lawless elements within the Communist Party and as such has defiled its news columns and editorial page with licentious, false, inflammatory and seditious appeals to irresponsible sentiment in the effort to provoke defiance of constituted authority, disrupt the progress of economic revival and create social unrest and mass violence. All this calls for prompt corrective action to safeguard the public peace.

"One course such corrective action might take would be to close the journal and destroy for all time its propaganda making power and constant incitation to violence and revolution; another the re-institution of a pre-censorship over all material it proposes to print. Both courses, however, are repugnant to me as violative of the broad philosophy which has guided the development of press freedom in Japan and should be imposed only if other measures prove ineffective.

"As an alternative method of correction, I therefore direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to incorporate within my letter to you of 6 June 1950 the following named additional persons,

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sharing responsibility for the policies governing the content of this journal:

AIKAWA Haruki
ANEBA Saburo
AOYAMA Toshio
KAWAHURA Tatsuo
KIKUNAMI Katsumi
MIYAMOTO Taro
MORIYA Tonro
NISHIZAWA Tonio
OKAMOTO Tadashi
SAKANO Yoshiro
SHIMADA Koichi
SUITA Hidezo
SUGAWA Shosaku
TAKAHASHI Katsuyuki
TAKEI Takeo
TAKEMOTO Konzo
UCHIYO Soji

Very sincerely,

(sgd) DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."

Rt. Hon. Shigeru Yoshida,
Prime Minister of Japan,
Tokyo.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Public Information Office

COPY

26 June 1950

PRESS RELEASE:

Akahata suspended one month by SCAP order.

"Tokyo, Japan
26 June 1950.

26 Jun '50

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"In my letter to you of June 7th, I directed that certain persons therein listed as sharing responsibility for the editorial policies of the Communist organ AKAHATA be, for the reasons stated, rendered subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946 and their implementing ordinances. I took this action in the hope that through the new leadership thereby induced the paper might be reoriented toward a course of relative moderation, with due regard for the truth and avoidance of inflammatory appeals to lawlessness and violence. Examination of the paper during the period intervening discloses, however, that such hope has not materialized.

"In its latest issues, moreover, by its perversion of the truth in discussing the Korean situation, the paper gives evidence of the fact that it is not the legitimate organ of a Japanese political party but rather an instrument of foreign subversion used to disseminate among the people of Japan, and in this case particularly its large Korean minority, malicious, false and inflammatory propaganda aimed at subverting the public mind to the prejudice of the public peace and welfare. Seditious acts of this nature may not be tolerated in a peaceful and democratic society.

"Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary measures to cause publication of AKAHATA to be suspended for a period of thirty days, after which its right to continued existence will depend upon its ability to attain a position of responsibility within the ranks of Japan's free and responsible press.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."

"Mr. Shigeru Yoshida,
Prime Minister of Japan,
Tokyo.

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Permanent Suspension of Akahata and Affiliates
Ordered by SCAP

1,698 Information Organs Thus far Affected

Tokyo, Japan
18 July 1950

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Since my letter to you of June 26th designed to curb the dissemination of false, inflammatory and subversive Communist propaganda, the international forces with which the Japan Communist Party is publicly affiliated have assumed an even more sinister threat to the preservation of peace and supremacy of the rule of law in democratic society, giving clear warning to free peoples everywhere of their purpose by violence to suppress freedom. In these circumstances, it becomes obvious that the free and unrestricted use of the media of public information for the dissemination of propaganda to such end by a minority so dedicated in Japan would be a travesty upon the concept of press freedom, to be permitted only at hazard to the vast proportion of the free Japanese press faithful to its public responsibility, and jeopardy to the general welfare.

18 Jul 50

In the great struggle which is now engaging the forces of the free world all segments must accept and faithfully fulfill their share of the attendant responsibility. That share as to none is greater than such as falls upon the media of public information. For there rests the full responsibility of insuring dissemination of the truth, and based upon the truth the development of an informed and enlightened public opinion. History records no instance where a free press failed in the discharge of this responsibility without inviting its own doom.

I am not concerned over any destructive influence Communist propaganda may have upon the great mass of Japan's responsible citizenry, for it has already given ample evidence of its devotion to the cause of right and justice and its ability to penetrate the mask of Communist hypocrisy. But passing events warn of distinct danger in the use by Communism of the media of public information to propagate its tenets of subversion and violence as a means of inciting the irresponsible and lawless minority elements of society to oppose law, disturb order, and subvert the general welfare. Therefore, so long as Communism in Japan continues in the abuse of freedom of expression through incitation to such lawlessness, its free use of the media of public information must be denied in the public interest.

Accordingly, I direct that your government vigorously continue the measures being taken in the implementation of my aforesaid letter, and maintain indefinitely the suspensions heretofore imposed upon publication of AKAHATA and its successors and affiliates employed in the dissemination in Japan of inflammatory Communist propaganda.

Very sincerely,

(sgd) DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

Mr. Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

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Permanent suspension of AKAHATA and affiliates ordered by SCAP.
1698 information organs thus far affected (18 Jul 50)

Publications	Beginning Date	Affected No.
AKAHATA	27 June 1950	1
Regional, Prefectural and Certain Ward Committee Organs (Tokyo)	28 June 1950	110
District Committees and Large Cell Organs	11 July 1950	655
Cell Organs	20 July 1950	932
Total as of 30 April 1951		1,698

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Particular Rebellious Elements of Communist
Party Dissolved under SCAPIN 548
(21 July 50)

Where Communist Party organizations have evidenced resort to terroristic activities such organs have been ordered dissolved by the Attorney General's Office under SCAPIN 548, with SCAP approval. Examples are: The Shinjuku Ward Committee of Japan Communist Party; the Dai Nippon Printing Company Cell of Japan Communist Party dissolved on 21 July 1950 with resultant purge of 32 individuals.

21 JUL '50

CONFIDENTIAL

24 July 1950

Red Purge of Public Information Media Began under SCAP Order

Communists in public information organs slanted the news through control of various sensitive positions. Recognizing this evil, the heads of the great information media companies of Japan met in Tokyo in the office of Colonel Napier on 24 July 1950 to determine proper response to SCAP's letter of 18 July 1950. Present were:

TSUDA Masao	President, Japan Newspaper Association
FURUGAKI Tetsuro	President, Broadcasting Corps., Japan
MATSUKATA Gisaburo	Managing Director, KYODO Newspaper
HASEGAWA Saiji	Managing Director, JIJI TSUSHIN
KOYAMA Nobuo	Director, TOKYO SHIMBUN
HASEBE Tadasu	President, ASAHI Newspaper
SUZUKI Kenzo	Assistant to the President, ASAHI Newspaper
KOBAYASHI Kamechio	General Manager, Tokyo Branch-MAINICHI
HIRANO Taro	General Manager, Osaka Branch-MAINICHI
KUDO, Shinichiro	Assistant Managing Editor-MAINICHI
YASUDA Kyoji	Vice President, YOMIURI
OTAJIMA Tadakichi	President NIHON Keizai
ITAKURA Takuzo	President, JIJI Shimpo

At this meeting, information media organ executives decided to act independently and on their own responsibility to sever from employment all communists and their fellow travelers who worked to thwart accurate presentation of the news. Following is a list of subsequent action:

Public Information Media	No. Dismissed as of 24 October 50	Date (1950)
Broadcasting Facilities	121	July-Aug
News Agencies (2)	50	July-Aug
Newspaper Companies (46)	519	July-Aug
Total	690	

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10 August 1950

Red Purge in Critical Industry Began on SCAP Suggestion

Industries	No. Employed	No. Dismissed	Percent
Banking Firms	111,700	27	.02
Chemical Industry	170,000	1,432	.84
Coal Mining	395,000	1,924	.48
Electrical Industry	204,000	2,137	1.04
Express Companies	110,000	516	.46
Heavy Industry (iron & steel)*	190,000	2,164	1.13
Life Insurance Industry	12,300	10	.08
Mining (other than coal)	70,000	219	.31
Motion Picture Companies	8,000	122	1.52
Oil Industry	105,000	91	.08
Printing Industry	12,000	160	1.33
Private Railway	134,000	519	.38
Pulp Industry	30,000	110	.36
Spinning & Textile Industry	200,000	83	.04
Total:	1,752,000	9,514	8.07

*Includes automobile manufacturing and shipbuilding companies.

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10 January 1951

Prime Minister Advised by SCAP that Dissolution of Communist Party Would be Disadvantageous

10 January 1951, the Prime Minister again sought the Supreme Commander's advice concerning dissolution of the Communist Party, this time as to the timeliness of action, and was advised: (1) that the Government might lose more than it gained by such action since the Communists as a party are politically impotent, and so long as they have legal status are likely to stay within the pale of legal activity; (2) their subversive potential in Japan has been effectively minimized through the weeding out of Communists and fellow-travellers from sensitive positions in government, public utilities, information media, and other critical enterprises which took place in 1950; (3) while there is a strong desire in influential government party circles to outlaw the Communist Party, there appears to be a disinclination to do so by legislative means under the Constitution because of the fear that measures to that effect would have difficulty in passing the Diet; (4) the continuing effort to secure SCAP support either in the form of a clearance to use Cabinet Order No. 64 or explicit or implicit approval of Diet legislation which could then be used to overcome political opposition is useless, for the Occupation sees no urgency here demanding that the SCAP take political responsibility for action in Japan which the Allied countries have either found politically undesirable or of doubtful constitutionality (as in Australia).

CONFIDENTIAL

10 February 1951

Administrative Investigation Committee Established in House to succeed Diet Special Examination Committee in Investigation of Subversives and the Agencies of their Control

The Administrative Investigation Committee was established in the House of Representatives as a permanent Committee to succeed in the work of the Special Examination Committee which had questioned TOKUDA and other Communist Party leaders.

"The Special Committee for Administrative Investigation shall be established in this House . . . . in order to contribute to legislation and deliberations on national government by inspecting whether or not national administration is conducted properly and efficiently. This Committee shall conduct a consolidated investigation into various circumstances which constitute obstacles to administrative management and shall fix responsibility therefor. The first project to be undertaken by the new House of Representatives Committee for Administrative Investigation shall be an investigation into the management of the public peace preservation administrative organs (Attorney General's Office, Procurator General's Office, National Rural Police Headquarters, National Public Safety Commission, Immigration Agency), with special reference to the problems of smuggling, illegal entry and exit, etc."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

Lt. Col. Napier
26-6962

COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST THE SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN JAPAN - 1946 to 1951 INCLUSIVE

15 May 46 - Ambassador George Atcheson, Jr., U. S. Member and Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan made it plain in a statement before the Council that the U. S. does not favor Communism in Japan. (TAB A)

20 May 46 - SCAP warned the Japan Communist Party against incitation to mass violence. (TAB B)

13 Jun 46 - SCAP prohibited use of the Production Control Strike. attached (Tab C)

31 Jan 47 - General Strike forbidden by SCAP. (TAB D)

8 Apr 48 - Finance Minister instructed by SCAP to fire subversive personnel of Tax Office.

22 Jul 48 - Strikes by Government workers prohibited:

(1) Cabinet Order 201;

(2) NPSL - includes loyalty provision.

4 Apr 49 - Organization Control Order - modified to encompass undemocratic organizations, in accordance with SCAP concept that the Japanese Government must assume responsibility for such control in preparation for sovereignty after the peace treaty. Special Investigative Bureau of Attorney General's Offices established as responsible agency:

1 - SIB - Established 17 Dec 47;

2 - SIB - 1st expansion - 1 Jun 49;

3 - SIB - 2nd expansion - 18 Aug 50.

27 Jun 49 - Repatriates - Communist indoctrination counteracted as they learned the truth at home. (Asource)

21 Jul 49 - Release of Communists and fellow travelers from Government service begun on SCAP suggestion.

24 Feb 50 - Communist Party warned through Dietman Sunama of penalty for excesses.

Taniguchi Zentaru purged 28 Jun 50.

6 Mar 50 - Prime Minister Yoshida told by SCAP that dissolution of Communist Party under SCAP authority would not be authorized, but that dissolution by due process of Japanese law, Diet-enacted, would be approved.

3 May 50 - SCAP statement denounced Communist Party as possible illegal organ.

30 May 50 - Plaza Incident brought modification by Japanese communities of ordinances governing public assembly, to conform with strong SCAP suggestion.

6 Jun 50 - Purge of Communist Party Central Committee by SCAP order.

7 Jun 50 - Purge of responsible Akahata editorial staff by SCAP order.

26 Jun 50 - Akahata suspended one month by SCAP order.

18 Jul 50 - Permanent suspension of Akahata and affiliates ordered by SCAP. 1,698 information organs thus far affected.

21 Jul 50 - Particularly rebellious elements of Communist Party dissolved under SCAPIN 548.

24 Jul 50 - Red purge of public information media began under SCAP order.

10 Aug 50 - Red purge in critical industry began on SCAP suggestion.

21 Aug 50 - Draft of principles of a law to proscribe Communist Party began by LS and GS.

Handed to Japanese Government 15 March and ready for Diet.

10 Jan 51 - Prime Minister advised by SCAP that dissolution of Communist Party would be disadvantageous.

1 Feb 51 - Deportation of undesirable aliens discussed with Japanese Government. Draft of Principles of a law handed to Government in May.

10 Feb 51 - Administrative Investigation Committee established in House to succeed Diet Special Examination Committee in investigation of subversives and the agencies of their control.

27 Mar 51 - Nation-wide raid on Jimmin Shimbun approved by SCAP - 700 arrested.

F.R.

TAB A
(5 PAGES)

Ambassador George Atcheson, Jr., U. S. Member and Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan made it plain in a statement before the Council that the U. S. does not favor Communism in Japan. (15 May 46)

SCAP through George Atcheson, Jr., clarified the American position on the Communist Party at the Allied Council meeting, 15 May 46, in a statement of which the pertinent excerpt follows.

"I do not need to tell you that the United States does not favor Communism either in the United States or in Japan but it has been our firm belief that in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration the Japanese people should be as free as possible to develop their political activities. The Communist Party has not been suppressed in the United States. It has not been suppressed in Japan. It has been allowed in Japan the same rights as other political parties, and members of the Communist Party have been elected to the Diet in Japan."

SCAP warned the Japan Communist Party against incitation to mass violence. (20 May 46)

TAB 6
20 May 46

Communist leaders called mass demonstrations and incited aggressive physical solution of political problem. Therefore, SCAP on 20 May 46 issued the following warning to Japanese people.

"I find it necessary to caution the Japanese people that the growing tendency towards mass violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organized leadership, present a grave menace to the future development of Japan. While every possible national freedom of democratic method has been permitted and will be permitted in the evolution now proceeding in the transformation from a feudalistic and military state to one of democratic process, the physical violence which undisciplined elements are now beginning to practice will not be permitted to continue. They constitute a menace not only to orderly government but to the basic purposes and security of the occupation itself. If minor elements of Japanese society are unable to exercise such self restraint and self respect as the situation and conditions require, I shall be forced to take the necessary steps to control and remedy such a deplorable situation, I am sure the great mass of the people condemn such excesses by disorderly minorities, and it is my sincere hope that the sane views of this predominate public opinion will exert sufficient influence to make it unnecessary to intervene."

SCAP prohibited use of the Production Control Strike. (13 Jun 46)

TAB C
13 Jun 46

The production control strike, a device conceived in Italy, is very effective when government mechanisms are uncertain in action. Immediate postwar Japan was an ideal field for such techniques, which were first used in the Yomiuri Press Strike, 24 October 1945, and the Keisei Dentetsu Strike of 1 December 1945. It appeared that the communist leaders of Japan labor could gain control over any industry by this method.

To perfect the application of the production strike technique, the Communist Party decided to concentrate on single industry organization. Recognizing that control of public information media meant virtual control of public thinking under the existing chaotic conditions, the party concentrated first on organization of newspaper and communication workers' unions. Their gains were impressive here and in other industry-wide unions. On 10 March 1946 they set up a National Labor Unions' Liaison Council. May Day 1946, the Council directed a demonstration in which more than two million workers throughout Japan participated.

Political party purpose rather than the welfare of the worker was apparent. Demonstrations were directed at national and local government offices in show of force to intimidate officials and soften their resistance to the demands of the Communist Party. SCAP pointed out the dangers of the situation. Thereafter the Japanese Government, on 13 June 1946, prohibited the Production Control Strike. The Japanese worker, glad of sane guidance, responded admirably and the first crisis was past.

CONFIDENTIAL

General Strike forbidden by SCAP. (31 Jan 47)

On 31 January 1947, General MacArthur issued the following public statement, as an order from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to the Communist controlled Committee of General Strike Organizers.

TAB D
31 Jan 47

"....I have informed the labor leaders whose unions have federated for the purpose of conducting a general strike that I will not permit the use of so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and emaciated condition of Japan, and have accordingly directed them to desist from the furtherance of such action."

. . . . . .

"A general strike crippling transportation and communication would prevent the movement of food to feed the people and of coal to sustain essential utilities, and would stop such industry as is still functioning. The paralysis which inevitably would result might reduce large masses of the Japanese people to the point of actual starvation and would produce dreadful consequences upon every Japanese home regardless of social strata or direct interest in the basic issue...."

. . . . . .

"While I have taken this measure as one of dire emergency, I do not intend otherwise to restrict the freedom of action heretofore given to labor in the achievement of legitimate objectives. Nor do I intend in any way to compromise or influence the basic social issues involved. These are matters of evolution which time and circumstances may well orient without disaster as Japan gradually emerges from its present distress."

CONFIDENTIAL

Finance Minister instructed by SCAP to fire subversive personnel of Tax Office. (8 Apr 48)

In late 1947 and the first months of 1948, the Communist Party organized an intensive tax struggle to appeal to small and medium enterprisers. Communist committees were organized in various neighborhoods to coordinate tax protests. Cases mediated in the tax collectors' offices by these committees were usually productive of tax adjustments.

Communist propaganda advertised this preferential service. Investigations disclosed the explanation that control of the All-Japan Tax Collectors' Union was in the hands of the Communist Party and tax officials were favoring communist sponsored tax protests.

Kitamura, Tekutaro

Finance Minister, IKEDA Hayato, acting under SCAP instruction transmitted through Colonel Napier, broke the back of this conspiracy by moving with decision to discharge tax officials misusing public position in the interest of the Communist Party. These discharges which took place in the spring of 1948 were for legally justifiable disciplinary reasons. They were significant as the first moves of any Japanese agency to combat illegal communist manipulation of unionized workers by release of communist agitators from the employment which made them eligible for official participation in local union affairs.

Strikes by Government workers prohibited. (22 Jul 48)

The communist leaders of the unions which included public servants were aware that unless they acted soon the chance to disrupt governmental process by strike of the government workers would be gone.

On 1 March 1948, they called a series of rallies calculated to unite all workers in a common front opposing regulation of the public servant. At the same time, they called for a communication workers' strike. Had GHQ not intervened forbidding "coordinated work stoppages", the country's mail, telegraph and telephone communications would have been hopelessly disrupted in early April with inevitable unfavorable impact upon economic recovery and the welfare of all Japanese. On 17 May 1948, they endeavored to incite government railway employees to strike by calling out 30,000 private railway workers, but control of the government railway workers' unions was shifting away from them and they were unsuccessful.

TAB F
22 Jul 48

These tactics aroused such apprehension among political leaders and appeared to have such strong support from other labor organizations, including electrical workers, metal workers and mine workers, that the Japanese Government considered it impossible without SCAP support to secure legislation necessary to the control of the peoples' servants. SCAP therefore, on 22 July, directed the Japanese Government that legislation be enacted prohibiting strikes or similar labor tactics by government employees. He further directed that (pending passage by the Diet of adequate legislation) measures immediately be taken under Potsdam authority to effect this order.

The Japanese Government responded on 31 July 1948 by issuing Cabinet Order No. 201 embodying temporary rules for the control of governmental workers. This Cabinet Order remained controlling over national government employees' activities until the National Public Service Law was promulgated on 3 December 1948 and will continue controlling on local government servants until the promulgation of a local government service law.

The National Public Service Law incorporates adequate loyalty provisions patterned in U.S. precedents.

I hereby promulgate the Organizations Control Order.
Signed: HIROHITO, Seal of the Emperor
This fourth day of the fourth month of the twenty-fourth year of Showa (April 4, 1949)
Prime Minister
YOSHIDA Shigeru

Cabinet Order No. 64

The Organizations Control Order

In accordance with the Ordinance (Imperial Ordinance No. 542 of 1945) concerning the Orders to be issued in consequence of the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Cabinet establishes this Cabinet Order for amendments to the Ordinance (Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946) concerning the Prohibition, etc. of the Formation of Political Party, Association, Society or Other Organization in accordance with the former Imperial Ordinance.

TAS C
4 APR 49

(Purpose of the present Cabinet Order)

Article 1. This Cabinet Order aims to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations and to prohibit the formation and leading of secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and anti-democratic organizations and such activities of organizations or individuals, in order to attain the healthy development and promotion of pacifism and democracy.

2. This Cabinet Order shall not be interpreted nor shall it be applied in such a manner as to interfere with freedom of assembly, speech or religion, except with respect to the purposes and activities specifically mentioned in this Cabinet Order.

(Prohibition of formation and leading of organizations)

Article 2. It shall be prohibited to form or lead any political party, association, society or other organization whose purpose or activity comes under any of the following items:

(1) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in response to directions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

(2) Support of justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad;

(3) Arrogation by Japan of leadership or other Asiatic Indonesian or Malayan peoples;

(4) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions;

(5) Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries;

(6) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits greater than similar civilian benefits or special representation for persons, formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan;

(7) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such terroristic methods.

(Prohibited activities)

Article 3. It shall be prohibited to take part in any activity which comes under any of the items of the preceding Article.

(Dissolution of organization)

Article 4. Any organization which falls under any of the following items and is designated by the Attorney-General shall be dissolved by the said designation:

(1) Organizations which fall under Article 2 (including those regarded as organizations mentioned in Article 2 in accordance with the provisions of Article 5);

(2) Organizations which have taken part in any activity coming under any of the items of Article 2;

(3) Organizations which fail to make the declaration mentioned in Article 6.

2. The Attorney-General may also designate an organizations which falls under any of the items of the preceding paragraph and has already been dissolved without the designation mentioned in the said paragraph (including one dissolved prior to the enforcement of this Cabinet Order) in accordance with the said paragraph. In this case the organization shall be regarded as being dissolved by the said designation.

3. The designation by the Attorney-General mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs shall be made by public notice in the Official Gazette.

(Organizations regarded as those mentioned in Article 2)

Article 5. Any organization which falls under any of the following items shall be regarded as one mentioned in Article 2, unless otherwise designated by the Attorney-General:

(1) In case any of its principal officers falls under any of the categories listed below:

(a) Formerly constituent member of an organization dissolved in

accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article;

(b) Former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy, or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who have been on active duty since January 1, 1930;

(c) Any person who has served in or cooperated with the military police (Kempei-tai), the "Tokumu Kikan", "Kaigun Tokumubu" or other special or secret intelligence of military or naval police organizations.

(2) In case more than one-fourth of its whole constituent membership is occupied by persons who were formerly constituent members of any organization dissolved under the provisions of preceding Article.

(Declaration of organization)

Article 6. As for a political party, association, society or other organization whose purpose or activity falls under any of the following items, the representative or superintendent of such organization shall make declaration in accordance with the provisions of Article 7:

(1) Proposing or supporting candidates for public office;

(2) Making an activity influencing the policy of Government or local public entities;

(3) Discussing the relations between Japan and foreign powers.

Article 7. The declaration mentioned in the preceding Article shall be made, in case an organization falling under the said Article has newly been formed or existing organization has been reorganized to such an organization, on the matters enumerated in the following items within three days from the date of the formation or reorganization, and in case there has been any alteration on the matters for declaration or the organization has been dissolved, to that effect within twenty days from the date of the alteration or dissolution, to the mayor of a city, or headman of a town or village (including headman of a special ward; the same shall apply hereinafter) in which its principal office is located:

(1) Its name;
(2) Its purpose;
(3) The address of its principal office;
(4) The names and addresses of its officers and the names of all organizations of which they are or have once been members, together with a statement as to their military or police service;
(5) The names and addresses of substantial financial supporters and the amounts of their respective contributions;
(6) The names and addresses of its constituent members, and the names of all political or ideological organizations with which they were previously affiliated.

2. The provisions of the sixth item of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to trade unions and similar kinds of organizations of

workers or employees.

3. The necessary matters relating to the declaration mentioned in the preceding Article shall be provided for by Attorney-General's Office Ordinance, except those prescribed in the preceding two paragraphs.

(Notification and publicity of declaration)

Article 8. The city mayor, town or village headman who receives the declaration mentioned in Article 6 shall notify the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture and the Attorney-General of the declaration, as prescribed by the Attorney-General's Office Ordinance.

2. The city mayor, town or village headman, the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture and the Attorney-General shall make the declaration mentioned in the preceding paragraph open to general public respectively, as prescribed by the Attorney-General's Office Ordinance.

(Presentation of its organ)

Article 9. In case any organization mentioned in Article 6 publishes its organ magazine or paper, the representative or superintendent of the organization shall, within twenty days from the date of publication, present one copy thereof to the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture in which its principal office is located and two copies to the Attorney-General through the said governor.

(Investigation by the Attorney-General)

Article 10. The Attorney-General shall be authorized to make necessary investigations in order to ascertain whether or not the provisions of the present Cabinet Order are observed.

2. The Attorney-General may authorize the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture to transact a part of the business prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

3. The Attorney-General or the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture shall be authorized, if necessary for conducting investigation prescribed in Paragraph 1, to summon the persons concerned, or to cause competent governmental or public officials to hear their explanations and to request the submission of data and other articles to them.

4. The competent governmental or public officials prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall carry with him the identity card and, upon request of the persons concerned, shall show it to them.

(Removal from public offices in consequence of the dissolution of organization)

Article 11. Any person who had such connection as coming under any of the following items, regardless of the length of period, with any of the head office, branch office or other subordinate organs of the organization dissolved after May 11, 1948 in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 and has been designated by the Attorney-General shall be removed from public office, following the example of "those falling under the Memorandum" in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial Ordinance concerning Exclusion, Removal, Retirement, etc. from Public Office (Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947; hereinafter called the Imperial Ordinance No. 1):

(1) Founder, officer or director;

(2) Holder of important office;

(3) Compiler of all publications or the organ magazine or paper;

(4) Voluntary contributor of a large sum of money.

2. The designation by the Attorney-General mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be made by public notice in the Official Gazette.

Article 12. Any person coming under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of the preceding Article shall be regarded, by the designation mentioned in the said paragraph, as designated as "one falling under the Memorandum" in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, and if he is at present in public office stipulated by the said Ordinance, he must retire from the public office in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the said Ordinance. The said Ordinance shall also apply to the person in respect to other matters. However, the authority prescribed in the proviso of Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the said Ordinance shall be exercised by the Attorney-General.

(Penal regulations)

Article 13. Any person mentioned below shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years. However, he may, taking the extenuating circumstances into consideration, be punished with a fine not exceeding 75,000 yen:

(1) Persons who contravene the provisions of Article 2 or 3;

(2) Persons who fail to file the declaration stipulated in Article 6 or make a false declaration;

(3) Persons who do not comply with the request for their appearance, explanation or submission of data or other articles in accordance with the provisions of Article 10, Paragraph 3;

(4) Persons coming under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 11 who fail to take steps to retire from public office in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article or take any public office mentioned in the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 by concealing the fact of their coming under the said paragraph.

Article 14. Any person who was formerly a principal officer or substantial financial supporter of the organization dissolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, or who is "one coming under the Memorandum" mentioned in the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 and was formerly an adviser, councillor (including positions of similar and equivalent authority; the same shall apply hereinafter) or constituent member of such organization shall, if he newly forms an organization as mentioned in Article 2, supports its formation, leads such organization or supports the leading thereof, be punished with a penalty not exceeding twice the maximum penalty stipulated in the preceding Article.

2. In case any person mentioned in the preceding paragraph becomes a principal officer, adviser, councillor, constituent member or substantial financial supporter of a new organization mentioned in the said paragraph, he shall be presumed to have formed a new organization mentioned in the said paragraph, have supported its formation, have led such organization or have supported the leading thereof.

Article 15. In case representatives of a juridical person, or proxies, employees or other workers of a juridical or natural person have committed acts of violation mentioned in Article 13 in connection with the business of the juridical or natural person concerned, not only the offenders shall be punishable but also the juridical or natural person in question be liable to the fine penalty provided for in the said Article.

Supplementary Provisions:

1. The present Cabinet Order shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

2. The designation previously made in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 or Item 1 (a) of Article 4 of the Ordinance concerning the Prohibition, etc. of the Formation of Political Party, Association, Society or other Organization in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 542 of 1945 concerning the Orders to be issued in consequence of the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration (Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946; hereinafter called the old Ordinance) shall be deemed as the designation made in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of this Cabinet Order.

3. The declaration made in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the old Ordinance shall be deemed declaration made in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of this Cabinet Order.

4. The designation made in accordance with the provisions of Article

5-(3) of the old Ordinance shall be deemed designation made in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of this Cabinet Order.

5. The punishments against acts of violation committed prior to the enforcement of this Cabinet Order shall be governed by the old Ordinance.

6. A part of the Cabinet Order concerning the Custody and Disposition, etc. of the Properties of the Dissolved Organizations (Cabinet Order No. 238 of 1948) shall be amended as follows:

Article 1 shall read as follows:

Article 1. The "dissolved organization" in this Cabinet Order shall mean the organization dissolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Organizations Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 64 of 1949).

In Article 4, Par. 1, Article 6 and Article 15, Par. 1, "Article 2 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946 or Item 1 (a) of Article 4 of the said Ordinance" shall read "Article 4 of the Organizations Control Order", and in Article 23, Par. 1, "Article 2 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946" shall read "Article 4 of the Organizations Control Order."

7. A part of the Law for the Establishment of the Attorney-General's Office (Law No. 193 of 1947) shall be amended as follows:

In Article 1, Par. 3, "matters concerning prohibition. etc. of the formation of a political party, association, society or other organization made in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946" shall read "matters concerning prohibition, etc. of the formation of a political party, association, society or other organization made in accordance with the provisions of the Organizations Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 64 of 1949), matters concerning the custody, etc. of the properties vested in the National Treasury in accordance with the provisions of the Cabinet Order concerning the Custody and Disposition, etc. of the Properties of Dissolved Organizations (Cabinet Order No. 238 of 1948)".

In Article 6, Par. 2, Item 1 and Article 10, Par. 1, Item 9, "Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946" shall read "Organizations Control Order", and Article 10, Par. 1, Item 10 shall read as follows:

(10) Matters concerning the custody and disposition, etc. of the properties vested in the National Treasury in accordance with the provisions of the Cabinet Order concerning the Custody and Disposition, etc. of the Properties of Dissolved Organizations.

8. A part of the Cabinet Order concerning Special Remission for Persons Designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the

provisions of the Imperial Ordinance concerning the Exclusion, Removal, Retirement, etc. from Public Offices (Cabinet Order No. 39 of 1949) shall be amended as follows:

In Article 1, "in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 (4) of the Ordinance concerning the Prohibition., etc. of the Formation of Political Party, Association, Society or Other Organization (Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946)" shall read "in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Organizations Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 64 of 1949)".

Prime Minister
YOSHIDA Shigeru
Attorney-General
UEDA Shunkichi

CONFIDENTIAL

Repatriates - Communist indoctrination counteracted as they learned the truth at home. (27 Jun 49)

The repatriates had been subject to strenuous indoctrination while under Russian control. They had been told that living conditions in Japan under the Occupation were so miserable that no worker or farmer could be sure of daily rice and that a reign of terror was being perpetrated by the Occupation Forces and their collaborators of the Japanese Government.

Having no other channels of information and being daily subject to this propaganda and to praise of the communist line - and in order to alleviate their own circumstances and secure release from imprisonment - these repatriates agreed to accept communism, pledging themselves to work for the communist cause. Upon their return, they ignored their friends, refused to see members of their families who had come to meet them, marched in groups to demonstrations arranged by the communists, and conducted themselves in such unseemly fashion that the whole Japanese people were disgusted with them and their communist mentors.

Many of them were expected to join the Communist Party, and it was International Communism's hope to use them as shock troops in terrorism and violence when the time was ripe for revolution. The program however failed when the repatriates by their own observation learned how they had been deceived.

TAB H
27 Jun 49

The question of counter-propaganda indoctrination of these repatriates was often raised in the period immediately after their return. Such action was deliberately avoided. Its value in counter-indoctrination would have been doubtful, and it would have required segregation of these men in schools or camps, contrary to the Potsdam provision that the Japanese military force after being completely disarmed be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

The course selected by the Japanese Government under guidance of SCAP was to return the repatriates as quickly as possible to their homes where, under the healing influence of normal community life, they could discover the hollowness of their previous indoctrination and settle into normal, useful lives. As time has proved, this course was the practical as well as the honest one, and the Communist Party plan for the absorption of the repatriates and their conversion into active party members has completely failed.

Indication that the party recognizes this is found in a directive issued by the Central Committee to Prefectural Committees at the time the repatriates were being returned to Japan, which contains the following:

> "As the families of the repatriates are nearly all anti-Soviet and anti-communist, and as it will be difficult to absorb them into our organization after they settle down, because of the strained condition of their livelihood, efforts must be made this year to absorb them into the party before they return to their homes."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Release of Communists and Fellow Travelers from Government Service Begun on SCAP Suggestions (21 Jul 49)

On 21 July 1949, final conference was held between Colonel Napier, representing SCAP, and the Attorney General, representing the Japanese Government. Plans for the release of subversives and a statement by the Prime Minister to the Cabinet in launching the program were approved by Colonel Napier in these words:

> "If the plan is carried out expeditiously in a careful, routine manner, the Japanese Government will rid itself of those elements threatening its existence. However, after the execution of this plan, should there be any recurrence of these subversive activities within any Japanese Government agency, the responsible Minister and his principal subordinates will be suspected themselves of being subversive."

Prime Minister YOSHIDA's implementing statement to the Cabinet was as follows:

> "In view of the serious situation in the rehabilitation of the country, in order to insure impartial, sound, and democratic operation of national organs, it is requested that plans for personnel adjustment be drafted and decided and that reports on them be submitted immediately in accordance with the following outline:
>
> > "Those employees of national public service (employees of public corporations included), public enterprises (the monopoly corporations and the State-owned railroads) and local entities who are members of the Japan Communist Party (members of secret political parties included), sympathetic and cooperate with the said party, and all the subversive elements who are believed to accept Communism should be investigated and measures to dismiss them uniformly should be enforced."

COMMUNISTS DISCHARGED FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICES

Government Office	Employees	Dismissed	Percent	Dates of Action
Attorney General's Office	30,856	73	0.23	Jul 49 - Feb 50
Board of Audit	1,247	8	0.63	Aug 49
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	30,986	237	0.76	Aug 49 - Oct 50
Ministry of Construction	10,866	71	0.65	Aug 49
Ministry of Education	1,764	20	1.12	Sep 49
Schools (under Ministry of Education)	61,847	167	0.27	

CONFIDENTIAL

Government Office	Employees	Dismissed	Percent	Dates of Action
Ministry of Finance	13,373	380	2.84	Jul 49 - Aug 50
MITI	13,533	101	0.74	Aug - Oct 49
Ministry of Labor	20,705	76	0.36	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Postal Admin.	260,640	1,664	0.63	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Telecommunication	144,642	1,077	0.74	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Transportation	16,068	612	3.81	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Welfare	44,073	183	0.41	Aug -Nov 49
Prime Minister's Office	2,269	8	0.35	Aug 49
Autonomous Police	95,000	170		Aug 49 - Oct 50
Courts	19,536	16	0.01	Jul - Sep 49
Local Public Entities	248,320	1,650	0.66	Oct 49 - Feb 50
NPA	1,262	6	0.47	Sep 49
National Railroads	482,837	2,591	0.53	Jul - Aug 49
NRP	46,036	96	0.20	Aug - Sep 49
Price Control	330	3	0,90	Sep 49
Public Schools	572,864	1,583	0.30	Dec 49 - Oct 50
Special Procurement Board	6,825	1	0.01	Sep 49
Totals	2,125,879	10,793		

As a result of this action, Communist control of the public servants was lost and that basic domestic tranquility upon which the new democracy of Japan strengthens was enhanced. Gradually, however, additional Communists infiltrated the ranks of the public servants and to interfere with the administration of public business; therefore, the Government in connection with further personnel adjustment scheduled the discharge during the latter part of 1950 of about 1,100 known troublemakers. These Communists were given the opportunity to correct their errors. None was listed for release who had not committed overt illegal act.

The Ministry of Education is discussing the rescreening of school teachers in order to discover and remove Communists and their fellows from the field of education. The Ministry, as yet, has found no effectual plan by which such action can be accomplished. Until the administration of the various schools is strengthened and taught to take a properly responsible attitude it must be presumed that there will be no positive solution to undesirable teacher activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

Communist Party Warned Through Dietman Sunama of
Penalty for Excesses
(24 Feb. 50)

SCAP Warnings

Communist Diet members began to attack the Occupation from the floor of the Diet. General Whitney, SCAP's Chief of Government Section, moved at once to warn the Communists that such tactics would not be permitted. On 24 February 1950, he summoned Communist Diet member SUNAMA Ichiro, who was guilty of a particularly vicious attack and through him warned the Communist Party in the following words:

> "I have summoned you to give you warning, and through you to warn your associates in the Communist Party that lying statements concerning the Occupation will not be tolerated. Your statement was in direct violation of a long standing Occupation directive with which you and your fellow party members are fully familiar. Its obvious purpose is to use the legislative forum as an instrument of propaganda directed against the Occupation. The AKAHATA, newspaper of the Communist Party, likewise is moving steadily toward that line beyond which it cannot go without similarly violating the Occupation directive.
>
> "You, your leaders, and hundreds of your fellows were released from prison where you had long been incarcerated by the Civil Liberties Directive issued by the Supreme Commander immediately following the surrender. Since then, the Supreme Commander has fed you, clothed you and your families and protected your right to organize as a lawful political party in Japan. He has literally saved Japan from the brink of impending disaster. Have you no intelligence or gratitude? How do you justify that recently a tendency has been noted on the part of you and some of your associates to avail yourselves of your liberty in licentious disregard of the very purposes for which protection in the exercise of liberty is extended by the Supreme Commander?
>
> "My purpose is to warn you and through you the members of your party that any further statements of this kind, either on the floor of the Diet, in your newspapers, or any place in Japan, defaming and criticizing the Occupation will be cause for your immediate arrest. If your newspapers trans-

TAB J
24 Feb 50

CONFIDENTIAL

lished by the Occupation, they will be closed, and if misconduct by its members or party policy dictated by its leaders is such that the Communist Party under reasonable interpretation becomes a threat to the legitimate political purposes of a free society, the protection of the Supreme Commander will be withdrawn.

"Inform your fellows that by their conduct, or their misconduct, they themselves will prescribe the duration of their party as a political influence in Japan.

"There exists today peace and tranquility in Japan. This responds to the fact that the great majority of the Japanese people are peacefully inclined, law-abiding citizens. The Supreme Commander will not permit any group in Japan, whatever its name or political affiliation, to incite violence and disrespect for Occupation directives or Japanese law. As long as the Occupation lasts, he will exact obedience to his orders and respect for the processes of representative government in all political activity. Be yourself warned and caution your fellows."

TANIGUCHI, Zentaro

Purged: 28 June 1950

Japanese Government was instructed by SCAP pursuant to TANIGUCHI's defiant statement regarding the suspension of the AKAHATA that they immediately designate him as a purgee and would consider this precedent for any similar instance of defiance of the implementation of SCAP directed action.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister Yoshida told by SCAP that dissolution of Communist Party under SCAP authority would not be authorized, but that dissolution by due process of Japanese law, Diet-enacted, would be approved (6 Mar 50)

In December 1950, the Prime Minister approached Attorney General OHASHI on the question of the dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 64. Attorney General OHASHI directed SIB Chief YOSHIKAWA to begin preparing for the dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order. YOSHIKAWA, aware from past conferences that SCAP sanction could not be obtained to dissolve the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 64, reported that he would continue study on the subject but believed such action impossible. On 5 January 1951, prior to Attorney General OHASHI's trip to Osaka to make a party policy speech he requested that Colonel Napier clear a statement to the press covering the National Police Reserve, Korean Problem, Police Law Revision, Procuratorial Agency, the Courts, and dissolution of the Communist Party.

He informed Colonel Napier that he was under pressure from the Prime Minister to take some drastic action against the Japan Communist Party; and therefore, his proposed statement to the press covered the Japan Communist question. After reading OHASHI's proposed statement Colonel Napier informed him that the SCAP was opposed to dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 64. However, if the Japanese Government wanted to illegalize the Party by a Diet Law, SCAP had no objection.

Thereafter on 6 March 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida took the matter to SCAP in a personal conference and was advised that dissolution of the Communist Party by Cabinet Order was not advisable but that dissolution by Diet enactment could well be studied by the Japanese Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3 May 50)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

1200 Hours
29 April 1950

GENERAL MacARTHUR'S STATEMENT ON
THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

While the checks and balances against abuse of the powers of government are thus demonstratively adequate, in Japan as elsewhere there exist only broad and undefinitive constitutional safeguards against abuse of those personal liberties conferred by the bill of rights. And in Japan as elsewhere this vulnerable point in freedom's armor is under constant pressure by a small minority which through the perversive use of liberty and privilege seeks to encompass freedom's destruction. This type of minority pressure is not unknown to Japan, and its people are therefore forewarned of the dreadful consequences possible therefrom. For in Japan's very recent past an even smaller minority -- then the militarists and their collaborators -- coerced the Japanese people into a war leading to inevitable and, indeed, foreseeable disaster. Now as they still grope to regain their equilibrium following that disastrous experience, this other minority, taking advantage of still unreplenished war-born impoverishment, seeks to lull their intuitive sense of caution into an even greater disaster -- this time without even the pretense of service to legitimate national ends, but under foreign dictation to establish a domestic basis favorable to the ultimate subjugation of Japan to the political control of others.

Established in the immediate post-war era as a political party under constitutional protection and dedicated to the advance of certain political economic and social theories, the Japan Communist Party proceeded initially in moderation and thereby enlisted some public support. In its endeavor to press advantage, however, it went the way of all Communist movements, becoming increasingly intemperate in political and social activity, and in due course aroused a popular revulsion which in turn relegated the party into virtual political eclipse. More latterly its shattered remnant, in frustration born of this failure, has cast off the mantle of pretended legitimacy and assumed instead the role of an avowed satellite of an international predatory force and a Japanese pawn of alien power policy, imperialistic purpose and subversive propaganda. That it has done so at once brings into question its right to the further benefits and protection of the country and laws it would subvert and raises doubt as to whether it should longer be regarded as a constitutionally recognized political movement. Such doubts should, of course, be resolved calmly, justly and dispassionately with the same consideration and safeguards extended to any anti-social force in a peaceful and law abiding

THIS L
3 MAY 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

community. The saying that to be forewarned is to be forearmed is appropriate to this issue. For in the development of its counterparts abroad there is provided the opportunity clearly to observe the underlying objectives of this movement and the end to which it inevitably has led where it successfully has gained control over the sovereign power. Thus while here, as in the other democracies of the world, it professes championship of the workers' rights in order to enlist support within labor's ranks, events abroad demonstrate that the worker loses all rights under Communist political rule; where here as elsewhere it poses an ardent advocate of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly,of freedom to worship in accordance with conscience, and of the other freedoms which flow from the universally recognized fundamental human rights, events irrefutably disclose the complete suppression of all freedom with the ascendancy of Communist political power. Indeed, history offers no slightest evidence of increase in social stability, preservation of social justice or continuation of social progress in the spiritual vacuum which lies in the wake of Communism's advance. Any thought that Japanese Communism might preserve a more moderate domestic course than characterizes the movement abroad was thoroughly disabused by its open submission to external control, its embarkation upon the spread of false, malicious and inflammatory propaganda intended to mislead and coerce the public mind, and its public adoption of objectives both anti-Japanese and inimical to Japan's public interest. Experience, the great teacher, indeed points to no greater hyprocrisy than the preparations of those who thus align themselves with this form of international political perfidy, social deception, and territorial fraud and seek an alliance of expediency with the fundamental human rights, giving lip service to their preservation solely to provide a screen of respectable plausibility to mask a sinister subversive design to destroy liberty as the obstacle to personal power. The tragedy is that in every community it gains some converts among those citizens inherently law-abiding but mentally abnormal, frustrated, gullible or uninformed, and becomes because of this facade of respectability a seemingly responsible movement to which lawless elements may rally in order to fully exploit the vulnerable points inherent in democratic freedom.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Press Relase

Purge of Communist Party Central Committee
by SCAP Order

Tokyo, Japan
6 June 1950

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It has been a fundamental purpose of the Occupation to assist the Japanese people to meet their commitments under the Potsdam Declaration, foremost of which requires the establishment in Japan of a new order of peace, security and justice upon which may firmly stand a peacefully inclined and responsible government. To such end the Japanese Government is specifically enjoined in the Potsdam Declaration to "remove all obstacles to the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

In the implementation of this requirement, carried forward as one of the basic objectives of Allied policy as determined and prescribed by the Far Eastern Commission, the structure of the Japanese Government has been redesigned, its laws and institutions where undemocratic have been revised, and those persons whose public record gives warning that their continued influence would be inimical to democratic growth have been removed and excluded from Japan's public affairs.

The guiding philosophy of this phase of the Occupation has been protective, not punitive. Its purpose and effect has been to provide assurance that the aims of Allied policy in the democratization of Japan would not be thwarted by the influence and pressure of anti-democratic elements. The area of its application for the most part has embraced those persons who because of position and influence bear responsibility for Japan's totalitarian policies which led to adventure in conquest and exploitation. Recently, however, a new and no less sinister groupment has injected itself into the Japanese political scene which has sought through perversion of truth and incitation to mass violence to transform this peaceful and tranquil land into an arena of disorder and strife as the means of stemming Japan's notable progress along the road of representative democracy and to subvert the rapidly growing democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

Acting in common accord, they have hurled defiance at constituted authority, shown contempt for the processes of law and order, and contrived by false and inflammatory statements and other subversive means to arouse through resulting public confusion that degree of social unrest which would set the stage for the eventual overthrow of constitutional government in Japan by force. Their coercive methods bear striking parallel to those by which the militaristic leaders of the past

TAB N
6 Jun 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

sharing responsibility for the policies governing the content of this journal:

AIKAWA Haruki
ANEBA Saburo
AOYAMA Toshio
KAWAHURA Tatsuo
KIKUNAMI Katsumi
MIYAMOTO Taro
MORIYA Tenro
NISHIZAWA Tonio
OKAMOTO Tadashi
SAKANO Yoshiro
SHIMADA Koichi
SUITA Hidezo
SUGAWA Shosaku
TAKAHASHI Katsuyuki
TAKEI Takeo
TAKEMOTO Konzo
UCHIHO Soji

Very sincerely,

(sgd) DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."

Mr. Shigeru Yoshida,
Prime Minister of Japan,
Tokyo.

CONFIDENTIAL

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C O P Y

7 June 1950

PRESS RELEASE:

Purge of responsible Akahata editorial staff by SCAP order.

" Tokyo, Japan
7 June 1950

" Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

" To the end that representative democracy in Japan might have the opportunity to thrive in the free atmosphere of full knowledge and public discussion, it has been one of the most fundamental of Allied policies governing the Occupation to encourage and assist the development of a truly free and responsible press. In the furtherance of this purpose, censorship was progressively lifted until finally terminated two years ago and the press left free to publish on its own responsibility, subject only to a code embodying a statement of principles and ethics patterned after the Canons of Journalism of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, supplemented by minimum restrictions essential to the safeguard of military security.

" The Japanese press has in general responded admirably to this challenge and developed a degree of responsibility which has evoked most favorable comment from many visiting journalists from abroad. The glaring exception is the Communist organ AKAHATA. This journal has for some time assumed the role of mouthpiece for the most violent of lawless elements within the Communist Party and as such has defiled its news columns and editorial page with licentious, false, inflammatory and seditious appeals to irresponsible sentiment in the effort to provoke defiance of constituted authority, disrupt the progress of economic revival and create social unrest and mass violence. All this calls for prompt corrective action to safeguard the public peace.

" One course such corrective action might take would be to close the journal and destroy for all time its propaganda making power and constant incitation to violence and revolution; another the re-institution of a pre-censorship over all material it proposes to print. Both courses, however, are repugnant to me as violative of the broad philosophy which has guided the development of press freedom in Japan and should be imposed only if other measures prove ineffective.

" As an alternative method of correction, I therefore direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to incorporate within my letter to you of 6 June 1950 the following named additional persons,

TAB N

CONFIDENTIAL

deceived and misled the Japanese people, and their aims, if achieved, would surely lead Japan to an even worse disaster. To permit this incitation to lawlessness to continue unchecked, however embryonic it may at present appear, would be to risk ultimate suppression of Japan's democratic institutions in direct negation of the purpose and intent of Allied policy pronouncements, forfeiture of her chance for political independence, and destruction of the Japanese race.

"Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to remove and exclude the following named persons, constituting the full membership of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party, from public service, and render them subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946 (SCAPINs 548 and 550) and their implementing ordinances:

NAKANADA Satomi
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Kenichi
ITO Ritsu
KAMEYAMA Kozo
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KASUGA Shojiro
KONNO Yojiro
KISHIMOTO Shigeo
KURAHARA Koreto
MATSUMOTO Kazumi
MATSUMOTO Saneki
MIYAMOTO Kenji
NOSAKA Ryu
NOSAKA Sanzo
SATO, Satoji
SHIDA Shigeo
SHIGA Yoshio
SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
TANAKURA Toru
TAKEUCHI Tsunesaburo
TOKUDA Kyuichi
TOSAKA Hiroshi
YASUGA Shoichi

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR W

Mr Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Public Information Office

C O P Y

26 June 1950

PRESS RELEASE:

Akahata suspended one month by SCAP order.

"Tokyo, Japan
26 June 1950.

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"In my letter to you of June 7th, I directed that certain persons therein listed as sharing responsibility for the editorial policies of the Communist organ AKAHATA be, for the reasons stated, rendered subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946 and their implementing ordinances. I took this action in the hope that through the new leadership thereby induced the paper might be reoriented toward a course of relative moderation, with due regard for the truth and avoidance of inflammatory appeals to lawlessness and violence. Examination of the paper during the period intervening discloses, however, that such hope has not materialized.

"In its latest issues, moreover, by its perversion of the truth in discussing the Korean situation, the paper gives evidence of the fact that it is not the legitimate organ of a Japanese political party but rather an instrument of foreign subversion used to disseminate among the people of Japan, and in this case particularly its large Korean minority, malicious, false and inflammatory propaganda aimed at subverting the public mind to the prejudice of the public peace and welfare. Seditious acts of this nature may not be tolerated in a peaceful and democratic society.

"Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary measures to cause publication of AKAHATA to be suspended for a period of thirty days, after which its right to continued existence will depend upon its ability to attain a position of responsibility within the ranks of Japan's free and responsible press.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd) DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."

"Mr. Shigeru Yoshida,
Prime Minister of Japan,
Tokyo.

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COPY

Permanent Suspension of Akahata and Affiliates
Ordered by SCAP

1,698 Information Organs Thus far Affected

Tokyo, Japan
18 July 1950

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Since my letter to you of June 26th designed to curb the dissemination of false, inflammatory and subversive Communist propaganda, the international forces with which the Japan Communist Party is publicly affiliated have assumed an even more sinister threat to the preservation of peace and supremacy of the rule of law in democratic society, giving clear warning to free peoples everywhere of their purpose by violence to suppress freedom. In these circumstances, it becomes obvious that the free and unrestricted use of the media of public information for the dissemination of propaganda to such end by a minority so dedicated in Japan would be a travesty upon the concept of press freedom, to be permitted only at hazard to the vast proportion of the free Japanese press faithful to its public responsibility, and jeopardy to the general welfare.

In the great struggle which is now engaging the forces of the free world all segments must accept and faithfully fulfill their share of the attendant responsibility. That share as to none is greater than such as falls upon the media of public information. For there rests the full responsibility of insuring dissemination of the truth, and based upon the truth the development of an informed and enlightened public opinion. History records no instance where a free press failed in the discharge of this responsibility without inviting its own doom.

I am not concerned over any destructive influence Communist propaganda may have upon the great mass of Japan's responsible citizenry, for it has already given ample evidence of its devotion to the cause of right and justice and its ability to penetrate the mask of Communist hypocrisy. But passing events warn of distinct danger in the use by Communism of the media of public information to propagate its tenets of subversion and violence as a means of inciting the irresponsible and lawless minority elements of society to oppose law, disturb order, and subvert the general welfare. Therefore, so long as Communism in Japan continues in the abuse of freedom of expression through incitation to such lawlessness, its free use of the media of public information must be denied in the public interest.

Accordingly, I direct that your government vigorously continue the measures being taken in the implementation of my aforesaid letter, and maintain indefinitely the suspensions heretofore imposed upon publication of AKAHATA and its successors and affiliates employed in the dissemination in Japan of inflammatory Communist propaganda.

Very sincerely,

(sgd) DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

Mr. Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

TAB F
18 Jul 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Permanent suspension of AKAHATA and affiliates ordered by SCAP.
1698 information organs thus far affected (18 Jul 50)

Publications	Beginning Date	Affected No.
AKAHATA	27 June 1950	1
Regional, Prefectural and Certain Ward Committee Organs (Tokyo)	28 June 1950	110
District Committees and Large Cell Organs	11 July 1950	655
Cell Organs	20 July 1950	932
Total as of 30 April 1951		1,698

CONFIDENTIAL

Particular Rebellious Elements of Communist
Party Dissolved under SCAPIN 548
(21 July 50)

Where Communist Party organizations have evidenced resort to terroristic activities such organs have been ordered dissolved by the Attorney General's Office under SCAPIN 548, with SCAP approval. Examples are: The Shinjuku Ward Committee of Japan Communist Party; the Dai Nippon Printing Company Cell of Japan Communist Party dissolved on 21 July 1950 with resultant purge of 32 individuals.

TAB Q
21 Jul 50

CONFIDENTIAL

24 July 1950

Red Purge of Public Information Media Began under SCAP Order

Communists in public information organs slanted the news through control of various sensitive positions. Recognizing this evil, the heads of the great information media companies of Japan met in Tokyo in the office of Colonel Napier on 24 July 1950 to determine proper response to SCAP's letter of 18 July 1950. Present were:

TSUDA Masao	President, Japan Newspaper Association
FURUGAKI Tetsuro	President, Broadcasting Corps., Japan
MATSUKATA Gisaburo	Managing Director, KYODO Newspaper
HASEGAWA Saiji	Managing Director, JIJI TSUSHIN
KOYAMA Nobuo	Director, TOKYO SHIMBUN
HASEBE Tadasu	President, ASAHI Newspaper
SUZUKI Kenzo	Assistant to the President, ASAHI Newspaper
KOBAYASHI Kamechio	General Manager, Tokyo Branch-MAINICHI
HIRANO Taro	General Manager, Osaka Branch-MAINICHI
KUDO, Shinichiro	Assistant Managing Editor-MAINICHI
YASUDA Kyoji	Vice President, YOMIURI
OTAJIMA Tadakichi	President NIHON Keizai
ITAKURA Takuzo	President, JIJI Shimpo

At this meeting, information media organ executives decided to act independently and on their own responsibility to sever from employment all communists and their fellow travelers who worked to thwart accurate presentation of the news. Following is a list of subsequent action:

Public Information Media	No. Dismissed as of 24 October 50	Date (1950)
Broadcasting Facilities	121	July-Aug
News Agencies (2)	50	July-Aug
Newspaper Companies (46)	519	July-Aug
Total	690	

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 August 1950

Red Purge in Critical Industry Began on SCAP Suggestion

Industries	No. Employed	No. Dismissed	Percent
Banking Firms	111,700	27	.02
Chemical Industry	170,000	1,432	.84
Coal Mining	395,000	1,924	.48
Electrical Industry	204,000	2,137	1.04
Express Companies	110,000	516	.46
Heavy Industry (iron & steel)*	190,000	2,164	1.13
Life Insurance Industry	12,300	10	.08
Mining (other than coal)	70,000	219	.31
Motion Picture Companies	8,000	122	1.52
Oil Industry	105,000	91	.08
Printing Industry	12,000	160	1.33
Private Railway	134,000	519	.38
Pulp Industry	30,000	110	.36
Spinning & Textile Industry	200,000	83	.04
Total:	1,752,000	9,513	7.97

*Includes automobile manufacturing and shipbuilding companies.

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 January 1951

Prime Minister Advised by SCAP that Dissolution of Communist Party Would be Disadvantageous

10 January 1951, the Prime Minister again sought the Supreme Commander's advice concerning dissolution of the Communist Party, this time as to the timeliness of action, and was advised: (1) that the Government might lose more than it gained by such action since the Communists as a party are politically impotent, and so long as they have legal status are likely to stay within the pale of legal activity; (2) their subversive potential in Japan has been effectively minimized through the weeding out of Communists and fellow-travellers from sensitive positions in government, public utilities, information media, and other critical enterprises which took place in 1950; (3) while there is a strong desire in influential government party circles to outlaw the Communist Party, there appears to be a disinclination to do so by legislative means under the Constitution because of the fear that measures to that effect would have difficulty in passing the Diet; (4) the continuing effort to secure SCAP support either in the form of a clearance to use Cabinet Order No. 64 or explicit or implicit approval of Diet legislation which could then be used to overcome political opposition is useless, for the Occupation sees no urgency here demanding that the SCAP take political responsibility for action in Japan which the Allied countries have either found politically undesirable or of doubtful constitutionality (as in Australia).

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

Lt. Col. Napier
26-6962

COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST THE SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN JAPAN - 1946 to 1951 INCLUSIVE

15 May 46 - Ambassador George Atcheson, Jr., U. S. Member and Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan made it plain in a statement before the Council that the U. S. does not favor Communism in Japan.

20 May 46 - SCAP warned the Japan Communist Party against incitation to mass violence.

13 Jun 46 - SCAP prohibited use of the Production Control Strike.

31 Jan 47 - General Strike forbidden by SCAP.

8 Apr 48 - Finance Minister instructed by SCAP to fire subversive personnel of Tax Office.

22 Jul 48 - Strikes by Government workers prohibited:

(1) Cabinet Order 201;

(2) NPSL - includes loyalty provision.

4 Apr 49 - Organization Control Order - modified to encompass undemocratic organizations, in accordance with SCAP concept that the Japanese Government must assume responsibility for such control in preparation for sovereignty after the peace treaty. Special Investigative Bureau of Attorney General's Offices established as responsible agency:

1 - SIB - Established 17 Dec 47;

2 - SIB - 1st expansion - 1 Jun 49;

3 - SIB - 2nd expansion - 18 Aug 50.

27 Jun 49 - Repatriates - Communist indoctrination counteracted as they learned the truth at home.

21 Jul 49 - Release of Communists and fellow travelers from Government service begun on SCAP suggestion.

24 Feb 50 - Communist Party warned through Dietman Sunama of penalty for excesses.

Taniguchi Zentaro purged 28 Jun 50.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 Mar 50 - Prime Minister Yoshida told by SCAP that dissolution of Communist Party under SCAP authority would not be authorized, but that dissolution by due process of Japanese law, Diet-enacted, would be approved.

3 May 50 - SCAP statement denounced Communist Party as possible illegal organ.

30 May 50 - Plaza Incident brought modification by Japanese communities of ordinances governing public assembly, to conform with strong SCAP suggestion.

6 Jun 50 - Purge of Communist Party Central Committee by SCAP order.

7 Jun 50 - Purge of responsible Akahata editorial staff by SCAP order.

26 Jun 50 - Akahata suspended one month by SCAP order.

18 Jul 50 - Permanent suspension of Akahata and affiliates ordered by SCAP. 1,698 information organs thus far affected.

21 Jul 50 - Particularly rebellious elements of Communist Party dissolved under SCAPIN 548.

24 Jul 50 - Red purge of public information media began under SCAP order.

10 Aug 50 - Red purge in critical industry began on SCAP suggestion.

21 Aug 50 - Draft of principles of a law to proscribe Communist Party began by LS and GS.

Handed to Japanese Government 15 March and ready for Diet.

10 Jan 51 - Prime Minister advised by SCAP that dissolution of Communist Party would be disadvantageous.

1 Feb 51 - Deportation of undesirable aliens discussed with Japanese Government. Draft of Principles of a law handed to Government in May.

10 Feb 51 - Administrative Investigation Committee established in House to succeed Diet Special Examination Committee in investigation of subversives and the agencies of their control.

27 Mar 51 - Nation-wide raid on Jimmin Shimbun approved by SCAP - 700 arrested.

F.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 MAY '46

Ambassador George Atcheson, Jr., U. S. Member and Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan made it plain in a statement before the Council that the U. S. does not favor Communism in Japan. (15 May 46)

SCAP through George Atcheson, Jr., clarified the American position on the Communist Party at the Allied Council meeting, 15 May 46, in a statement of which the pertinent excerpt follows.

"I do not need to tell you that the United States does not favor Communism either in the United States or in Japan but it has been our firm belief that in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration the Japanese people should be as free as possible to develop their political activities. The Communist Party has not been suppressed in the United States. It has not been suppressed in Japan. It has been allowed in Japan the same rights as other political parties, and members of the Communist Party have been elected to the Diet in Japan."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SCAP warned the Japan Communist Party against incitation to mass violence. (20 May 46)

20 MAY '46

Communist leaders called mass demonstrations and incited aggressive physical solution of political problem. Therefore, SCAP on 20 May 46 issued the following warning to Japanese people.

"I find it necessary to caution the Japanese people that the growing tendency towards mass violence and physical processes of intimidation, under organized leadership, present a grave menace to the future development of Japan. While every possible national freedom of democratic method has been permitted and will be permitted in the evolution now proceeding in the transformation from a feudalistic and military state to one of democratic process, the physical violence which undisciplined elements are now beginning to practice will not be permitted to continue. They constitute a menace not only to orderly government but to the basic purposes and security of the occupation itself. If minor elements of Japanese society are unable to exercise such self restraint and self respect as the situation and conditions require, I shall be forced to take the necessary steps to control and remedy such a deplorable situation, I am sure the great mass of the people condemn such excesses by disorderly minorities, and it is my sincere hope that the sane views of this predominate public opinion will exert sufficient influence to make it unnecessary to intervene."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SCAP prohibited use of the Production Control Strike. (13 Jun 46)

13 JUN 46

The production control strike, a device conceived in Italy, is very effective when government mechanisms are uncertain in action. Immediate postwar Japan was an ideal field for such techniques, which were first used in the Yomiuri Press Strike, 24 October 1945, and the Keisei Dentetsu Strike of 1 December 1945. It appeared that the communist leaders of Japan labor could gain control over any industry by this method.

To perfect the application of the production strike technique, the Communist Party decided to concentrate on single industry organization. Recognizing that control of public information media meant virtual control of public thinking under the existing chaotic conditions, the party concentrated first on organization of newspaper and communication workers' unions. Their gains were impressive here and in other industry-wide unions. On 10 March 1946 they set up a National Labor Unions' Liaison Council. May Day 1946, the Council directed a demonstration in which more than two million workers throughout Japan participated.

Political party purpose rather than the welfare of the worker was apparent. Demonstrations were directed at national and local government offices in show of force to intimidate officials and soften their resistance to the demands of the Communist Party. SCAP pointed out the dangers of the situation. Thereafter the Japanese Government, on 13 June 1946, prohibited the Production Control Strike. The Japanese worker, glad of sane guidance, responded admirably and the first crisis was past.

CONFIDENTIAL

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General Strike forbidden by SCAP. (31 Jan 47)

On 31 January 1947, General MacArthur issued the following public statement, as an order from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to the Communist controlled Committee of General Strike Organizers.

31 JAN 47

"....I have informed the labor leaders whose unions have federated for the purpose of conducting a general strike that I will not permit the use of so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and emaciated condition of Japan, and have accordingly directed them to desist from the furtherance of such action.

. . . . . .

"A general strike crippling transportation and communication would prevent the movement of food to feed the people and of coal to sustain essential utilities, and would stop such industry as is still functioning. The paralysis which inevitably would result might reduce large masses of the Japanese people to the point of actual starvation and would produce dreadful consequences upon every Japanese home regardless of social strata or direct interest in the basic issue....

. . . . . .

"While I have taken this measure as one of dire emergency, I do not intend otherwise to restrict the freedom of action heretofore given to labor in the achievement of legitimate objectives. Nor do I intend in any way to compromise or influence the basic social issues involved. These are matters of evolution which time and circumstances may well orient without disaster as Japan gradually emerges from its present distress."

CONFIDENTIAL

Finance Minister instructed by SCAP to fire subversive personnel of Tax Office. (8 Apr 48)

In late 1947 and the first months of 1948, the Communist Party organized an intensive tax struggle to appeal to small and medium enterprisers. Communist committees were organized in various neighborhoods to coordinate tax protests. Cases mediated in the tax collectors' offices by these committees were usually productive of tax adjustments.

Communist propaganda advertised this preferential service. Investigations disclosed the explanation that control of the All-Japan Tax Collectors' Union was in the hands of the Communist Party and tax officials were favoring communist sponsored tax protests.

Finance Minister, IKEDA Hayato, acting under SCAP instruction transmitted through Colonel Napier, broke the back of this conspiracy by moving with decision to discharge tax officials misusing public position in the interest of the Communist Party. These discharges which took place in the spring of 1948 were for legally justifiable disciplinary reasons. They were significant as the first moves of any Japanese agency to combat illegal communist manipulation of unionized workers by release of communist agitators from the employment which made them eligible for official participation in local union affairs.

8 APR '48

Strikes by Government workers prohibited. (22 Jul 48)

The communist leaders of the unions which included public servants were aware that unless they acted soon the chance to disrupt governmental process by strike of the government workers would be gone.

On 1 March 1948, they called a series of rallies calculated to unite all workers in a common front opposing regulation of the public servant. At the same time, they called for a communication workers' strike. Had GHQ not intervened forbidding "coordinated work stoppages", the country's mail, telegraph and telephone communications would have been hopelessly disrupted in early April with inevitable unfavorable impact upon economic recovery and the welfare of all Japanese. On 17 May 1948, they endeavored to incite government railway employees to strike by calling out 30,000 private railway workers, but control of the government railway workers' unions was shifting away from them and they were unsuccessful.

22 Jul 48

These tactics aroused such apprehension among political leaders and appeared to have such strong support from other labor organizations, including electrical workers, metal workers and mine workers, that the Japanese Government considered it impossible without SCAP support to secure legislation necessary to the control of the peoples' servants. SCAP therefore, on 22 July, directed the Japanese Government that legislation be enacted prohibiting strikes or similar labor tactics by government employees. He further directed that (pending passage by the Diet of adequate legislation) measures immediately be taken under Potsdam authority to effect this order.

The Japanese Government responded on 31 July 1948 by issuing Cabinet Order No. 201 embodying temporary rules for the control of governmental workers. This Cabinet Order remained controlling over national government employees' activities until the National Public Service Law was promulgated on 3 December 1948 and will continue controlling on local government servants until the promulgation of a local government service law.

The National Public Service Law incorporates adequate loyalty provisions patterned in U.S. precedents.

I hereby promulgate the Organizations Control Order.
Signed: HIROHITO, Seal of the Emperor
This fourth day of the fourth month of the twenty-fourth year of Showa (April 4, 1949)
Prime Minister
YOSHIDA Shigeru

Cabinet Order No. 64

The Organizations Control Order

In accordance with the Ordinance (Imperial Ordinance No. 542 of 1945) concerning the Orders to be issued in consequence of the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Cabinet establishes this Cabinet Order for amendments to the Ordinance (Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946) concerning the Prohibition, etc. of the Formation of Political Party, Association, Society or Other Organization in accordance with the former Imperial Ordinance.

(Purpose of the present Cabinet Order)

Article 1. This Cabinet Order aims to secure public knowledge of the character of political organizations and to prohibit the formation and leading of secret, militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and anti-democratic organizations and such activities of organizations or individuals, in order to attain the healthy development and promotion of pacifism and democracy.

2. This Cabinet Order shall not be interpreted nor shall it be applied in such a manner as to interfere with freedom of assembly, speech or religion, except with respect to the purposes and activities specifically mentioned in this Cabinet Order.

(Prohibition of formation and leading of organizations)

Article 2. It shall be prohibited to form or lead any political party, association, society or other organization whose purpose or activity comes under any of the following items:

(1) Resistance or opposition to the Occupation Forces or to orders issued by the Japanese Government in response to directions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

(2) Support of justification of aggressive Japanese military action abroad;

(3) Arrogation by Japan of leadership or other Asiatic Indonesian or Malayan peoples;

(4) Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, commerce or the exercise of their professions;

accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article;

(b) Former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy, or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who have been on active duty since January 1, 1930;

(c) Any person who has served in or cooperated with the military police (Kempei-tai), the "Tokumu Kikan", "Kaigun Tokumubu" or other special or secret intelligence of military or naval police organizations.

(2) In case more than one-fourth of its whole constituent membership is occupied by persons who were formerly constituent members of any organization dissolved under the provisions of preceding Article.

(Declaration of organization)

Article 6. As for a political party, association, society or other organization whose purpose or activity falls under any of the following items, the representative or superintendent of such organization shall make declaration in accordance with the provisions of Article 7:

(1) Proposing or supporting candidates for public office;

(2) Making an activity influencing the policy of Government or local public entities;

(3) Discussing the relations between Japan and foreign powers.

Article 7. The declaration mentioned in the preceding Article shall be made, in case an organization falling under the said Article has newly been formed or existing organization has been reorganized to such an organization, on the matters enumerated in the following items within three days from the date of the formation or reorganization, and in case there has been any alteration on the matters for declaration or the organization has been dissolved, to that effect within twenty days from the date of the alteration or dissolution, to the mayor of a city, or headman of a town or village (including headman of a special ward; the same shall apply hereinafter) in which its principal office is located:

(1) Its name;
(2) Its purpose;
(3) The address of its principal office;
(4) The names and addresses of its officers and the names of all organizations of which they are or have once been members, together with a statement as to their military or police service;
(5) The names and addresses of substantial financial supporters and the amounts of their respective contributions;
(6) The names and addresses of its constituent members, and the names of all political or ideological organizations with which they were previously affiliated.

2. The provisions of the sixth item of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to trade unions and similar kinds of organizations of

(5) Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual exchange between Japan and foreign countries;

(6) Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits greater than similar civilian benefits or special representation for persons, formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan;

(7) Alteration of policy by assassination or other terroristic programs, or encouragement or justification of a tradition favoring such terroristic methods.

(Prohibited activities)

Article 3. It shall be prohibited to take part in any activity which comes under any of the items of the preceding Article.

(Dissolution of organization)

Article 4. Any organization which falls under any of the following items and is designated by the Attorney-General shall be dissolved by the said designation:

(1) Organizations which fall under Article 2 (including those regarded as organizations mentioned in Article 2 in accordance with the provisions of Article 5);

(2) Organizations which have taken part in any activity coming under any of the items of Article 2;

(3) Organizations which fail to make the declaration mentioned in Article 6.

2. The Attorney-General may also designate an organizations which falls under any of the items of the preceding paragraph and has already been dissolved without the designation mentioned in the said paragraph (including one dissolved prior to the enforcement of this Cabinet Order) in accordance with the said paragraph. In this case the organization shall be regarded as being dissolved by the said designation.

3. The designation by the Attorney-General mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs shall be made by public notice in the Official Gazette.

(Organizations regarded as those mentioned in Article 2)

Article 5. Any organization which falls under any of the following items shall be regarded as one mentioned in Article 2, unless otherwise designated by the Attorney-General:

(1) In case any of its principal officers falls under any of the categories listed below:

(a) Formerly constituent member of an organization dissolved in

accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article;

(b) Former commissioned officers of the Imperial Japanese Regular Army or Navy, or the Special Volunteer Reserve, who have been on active duty since January 1, 1930;

(c) Any person who has served in or cooperated with the military police (Kempei-tai), the "Tokumu Kikan", "Kaigun Tokumubu" or other special or secret intelligence of military or naval police organizations.

(2) In case more than one-fourth of its whole constituent membership is occupied by persons who were formerly constituent members of any organization dissolved under the provisions of preceding Article.

(Declaration of organization)

Article 6. As for a political party, association, society or other organization whose purpose or activity falls under any of the following items, the representative or superintendent of such organization shall make declaration in accordance with the provisions of Article 7:

(1) Proposing or supporting candidates for public office;

(2) Making an activity influencing the policy of Government or local public entities;

(3) Discussing the relations between Japan and foreign powers.

Article 7. The declaration mentioned in the preceding Article shall be made, in case an organization falling under the said Article has newly been formed or existing organization has been reorganized to such an organization, on the matters enumerated in the following items within three days from the date of the formation or reorganization, and in case there has been any alteration on the matters for declaration or the organization has been dissolved, to that effect within twenty days from the date of the alteration or dissolution, to the mayor of a city, or headman of a town or village (including headman of a special ward; the same shall apply hereinafter) in which its principal office is located:

(1) Its name;
(2) Its purpose;
(3) The address of its principal office;
(4) The names and addresses of its officers and the names of all organizations of which they are or have once been members, together with a statement as to their military or police service;
(5) The names and addresses of substantial financial supporters and the amounts of their respective contributions;
(6) The names and addresses of its constituent members, and the names of all political or ideological organizations with which they were previously affiliated.

2. The provisions of the sixth item of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to trade unions and similar kinds of organizations of

workers or employees.

3. The necessary matters relating to the declaration mentioned in the preceding Article shall be provided for by Attorney-General's Office Ordinance, except those prescribed in the preceding two paragraphs.

(Notification and publicity of declaration)

Article 8. The city mayor, town or village headman who receives the declaration mentioned in Article 6 shall notify the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture and the Attorney-General of the declaration, as prescribed by the Attorney-General's Office Ordinance.

2. The city mayor, town or village headman, the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture and the Attorney-General shall make the declaration mentioned in the preceding paragraph open to general public respectively, as prescribed by the Attorney-General's Office Ordinance.

(Presentation of its organ)

Article 9. In case any organization mentioned in Article 6 publishes its organ magazine or paper, the representative or superintendent of the organization shall, within twenty days from the date of publication, present one copy thereof to the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture in which its principal office is located and two copies to the Attorney-General through the said governor.

(Investigation by the Attorney-General)

Article 10. The Attorney-General shall be authorized to make necessary investigations in order to ascertain whether or not the provisions of the present Cabinet Order are observed.

2. The Attorney-General may authorize the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture to transact a part of the business prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

3. The Attorney-General or the governor of the Metropolis, Hokkaido or each prefecture shall be authorized, if necessary for conducting investigation prescribed in Paragraph 1, to summon the persons concerned, or to cause competent governmental or public officials to hear their explanations and to request the submission of data and other articles to them.

4. The competent governmental or public officials prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall carry with him the identity card and, upon request of the persons concerned, shall show it to them.

(Removal from public offices in consequence of the dissolution of organization)

Article 11. Any person who had such connection as coming under any of the following items, regardless of the length of period, with any of the head office, branch office or other subordinate organs of the organization dissolved after May 11, 1948 in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 and has been designated by the Attorney-General shall be removed from public office, following the example of "those falling under the Memorandum" in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial Ordinance concerning Exclusion, Removal, Retirement, etc. from Public Office (Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947; hereinafter called the Imperial Ordinance No. 1):

(1) Founder, officer or director;

(2) Holder of important office;

(3) Compiler of all publications or the organ magazine or paper;

(4) Voluntary contributor of a large sum of money.

2. The designation by the Attorney-General mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be made by public notice in the Official Gazette.

Article 12. Any person coming under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of the preceding Article shall be regarded, by the designation mentioned in the said paragraph, as designated as "one falling under the Memorandum" in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, and if he is at present in public office stipulated by the said Ordinance, he must retire from the public office in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the said Ordinance. The said Ordinance shall also apply to the person in respect to other matters. However, the authority prescribed in the proviso of Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the said Ordinance shall be exercised by the Attorney-General.

(Penal regulations)

Article 13. Any person mentioned below shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years. However, he may, taking the extenuating circumstances into consideration, be punished with a fine not exceeding 75,000 yen:

(1) Persons who contravene the provisions of Article 2 or 3;

(2) Persons who fail to file the declaration stipulated in Article 6 or make a false declaration;

(3) Persons who do not comply with the request for their appearance, explanation or submission of data or other articles in accordance with the provisions of Article 10, Paragraph 3;

(4) Persons coming under the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 11 who fail to take steps to retire from public office in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article or take any public office mentioned in the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 by concealing the fact of their coming under the said paragraph.

Article 14. Any person who was formerly a principal officer or substantial financial supporter of the organization dissolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, or who is "one coming under the Memorandum" mentioned in the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 and was formerly an adviser, councillor (including positions of similar and equivalent authority; the same shall apply hereinafter) or constituent member of such organization shall, if he newly forms an organization as mentioned in Article 2, supports its formation, leads such organization or supports the leading thereof, be punished with a penalty not exceeding twice the maximum penalty stipulated in the preceding Article.

2. In case any person mentioned in the preceding paragraph becomes a principal officer, adviser, councillor, constituent member or substantial financial supporter of a new organization mentioned in the said paragraph, he shall be presumed to have formed a new organization mentioned in the said paragraph, have supported its formation, have led such organization or have supported the leading thereof.

Article 15. In case representatives of a juridical person, or proxies, employees or other workers of a juridical or natural person have committed acts of violation mentioned in Article 13 in connection with the business of the juridical or natural person concerned, not only the offenders shall be punishable but also the juridical or natural person in question be liable to the fine penalty provided for in the said Article.

Supplementary Provisions:

1. The present Cabinet Order shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

2. The designation previously made in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 or Item 1 (a) of Article 4 of the Ordinance concerning the Prohibition, etc. of the Formation of Political Party, Association, Society or other Organization in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance No. 542 of 1945 concerning the Orders to be issued in consequence of the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration (Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946; hereinafter called the old Ordinance) shall be deemed as the designation made in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of this Cabinet Order.

3. The declaration made in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the old Ordinance shall be deemed declaration made in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 of this Cabinet Order.

4. The designation made in accordance with the provisions of Article

5-(3) of the old Ordinance shall be deemed designation made in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of this Cabinet Order.

5. The punishments against acts of violation committed prior to the enforcement of this Cabinet Order shall be governed by the old Ordinance.

6. A part of the Cabinet Order concerning the Custody and Disposition, etc. of the Properties of the Dissolved Organizations (Cabinet Order No. 238 of 1948) shall be amended as follows:

Article 1 shall read as follows:

Article 1. The "dissolved organization" in this Cabinet Order shall mean the organization dissolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Organizations Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 64 of 1949).

In Article 4, Par. 1, Article 6 and Article 15, Par. 1, "Article 2 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946 or Item 1 (a) of Article 4 of the said Ordinance" shall read "Article 4 of the Organizations Control Order", and in Article 23, Par. 1, "Article 2 of the Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946" shall read "Article 4 of the Organizations Control Order."

7. A part of the Law for the Establishment of the Attorney-General's Office (Law No. 193 of 1947) shall be amended as follows:

In Article 1, Par. 3, "matters concerning prohibition. etc. of the formation of a political party, association, society or other organization made in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946" shall read "matters concerning prohibition, etc. of the formation of a political party, association, society or other organization made in accordance with the provisions of the Organizations Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 64 of 1949), matters concerning the custody, etc. of the properties vested in the National Treasury in accordance with the provisions of the Cabinet Order concerning the Custody and Disposition, etc. of the Properties of Dissolved Organizations (Cabinet Order No. 238 of 1948)".

In Article 6, Par. 2, Item 1 and Article 10, Par. 1, Item 9, "Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946" shall read "Organizations Control Order", and Article 10, Par. 1, Item 10 shall read as follows:

(10) Matters concerning the custody and disposition, etc. of the properties vested in the National Treasury in accordance with the provisions of the Cabinet Order concerning the Custody and Disposition, etc. of the Properties of Dissolved Organizations.

8. A part of the Cabinet Order concerning Special Remission for Persons Designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the

CONFIDENTIAL

Repatriates - Communist indoctrination counteracted as they learned the truth at home. (27 Jun 49)

The repatriates had been subject to strenuous indoctrination while under Russian control. They had been told that living conditions in Japan under the Occupation were so miserable that no worker or farmer could be sure of daily rice and that a reign of terror was being perpetrated by the Occupation Forces and their collaborators of the Japanese Government.

Having no other channels of information and being daily subject to this propaganda and to praise of the communist line - and in order to alleviate their own circumstances and secure release from imprisonment - these repatriates agreed to accept communism, pledging themselves to work for the communist cause. Upon their return, they ignored their friends, refused to see members of their families who had come to meet them, marched in groups to demonstrations arranged by the communists, and conducted themselves in such unseemly fashion that the whole Japanese people were disgusted with them and their communist mentors.

Many of them were expected to join the Communist Party, and it was International Communism's hope to use them as shock troops in terrorism and violence when the time was ripe for revolution. The program however failed when the repatriates by their own observation learned how they had been deceived.

The question of counter-propaganda indoctrination of these repatriates was often raised in the period immediately after their return. Such action was deliberately avoided. Its value in counter-indoctrination would have been doubtful, and it would have required segregation of these men in schools or camps, contrary to the Potsdam provision that the Japanese military force after being completely disarmed be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

The course selected by the Japanese Government under guidance of SCAP was to return the repatriates as quickly as possible to their homes where, under the healing influence of normal community life, they could discover the hollowness of their previous indoctrination and settle into normal, useful lives. As time has proved, this course was the practical as well as the honest one, and the Communist Party plan for the absorption of the repatriates and their conversion into active party members has completely failed.

Indication that the party recognizes this is found in a directive issued by the Central Committee to Prefectural Committees at the time the repatriates were being returned to Japan, which contains the following:

> "As the families of the repatriates are nearly all anti-Soviet and anti-communist, and as it will be difficult to absorb them into our organization after they settle down, because of the strained condition of their livelihood, efforts must be made this year to absorb them into the party before they return to their homes."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Release of Communists and Fellow Travelers from Government Service Begun on SCAP Suggestions (21 Jul 49)

On 21 July 1949, final conference was held between Colonel Napier, representing SCAP, and the Attorney General, representing the Japanese Government. Plans for the release of subversives and a statement by the Prime Minister to the Cabinet in launching the program were approved by Colonel Napier in these words:

> "If the plan is carried out expeditiously in a careful, routine manner, the Japanese Government will rid itself of those elements threatening its existence. However, after the execution of this plan, should there be any recurrence of these subversive activities within any Japanese Government agency, the responsible Minister and his principal subordinates will be suspected themselves of being subversive."

Prime Minister YOSHIDA's implementing statement to the Cabinet was as follows:

> "In view of the serious situation in the rehabilitation of the country, in order to insure impartial, sound, and democratic operation of national organs, it is requested that plans for personnel adjustment be drafted and decided and that reports on them be submitted immediately in accordance with the following outline:
>
> > "Those employees of national public service (employees of public corporations included), public enterprises (the monopoly corporations and the State-owned railroads) and local entities who are members of the Japan Communist Party (members of secret political parties included), sympathetic and cooperate with the said party, and all the subversive elements who are believed to accept Communism should be investigated and measures to dismiss them uniformly should be enforced."

21 Jul '49

COMMUNISTS DISCHARGED FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICES

Government Office	Employees	Dismissed	Percent	Dates of Action
Attorney General's Office	30,856	73	0.23	Jul 49 - Feb 50
Board of Audit	1,247	8	0.63	Aug 49
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry	30,986	237	0.76	Aug 49 - Oct 50
Ministry of Construction	10,866	71	0.65	Aug 49
Ministry of Education	1,764	20	1.12	Sep 49
Schools (under Ministry of Education)	61,847	167	0.27	

CONFIDENTIAL

Government Office	Employees	Dismissed	Percent	Dates of Action
Ministry of Finance	13,373	380	2.84	Jul 49 - Aug 50
MITI	13,533	101	0.74	Aug - Oct 49
Ministry of Labor	20,705	76	0.36	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Postal Admin.	260,640	1,664	0.63	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Telecommunication	144,642	1,077	0.74	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Transportation	16,068	612	3.81	End of Sep 49
Ministry of Welfare	44,073	183	0.41	Aug -Nov 49
Prime Minister's Office	2,269	8	0.35	Aug 49
Autonomous Police	95,000	170		Aug 49 - Oct 50
Courts	19,536	16	0.01	Jul - Sep 49
Local Public Entities	248,320	1,650	0.66	Oct 49 - Feb 50
NPA	1,262	6	0.47	Sep 49
National Railroads	482,837	2,591	0.53	Jul - Aug 49
NRP	46,036	96	0.20	Aug - Sep 49
Price Control	330	3	0.90	Sep 49
Public Schools	572,864	1,583	0.30	Dec 49 - Oct 50
Special Procurement Board	6,825	1	0.01	Sep 49
Totals	2,125,879	10,793		

As a result of this action, Communist control of the public servants was lost and that basic domestic tranquility upon which the new democracy of Japan strengthens was enhanced. Gradually, however, additional Communists infiltrated the ranks of the public servants and to interfere with the administration of public business; therefore, the Government in connection with further personnel adjustment scheduled the discharge during the latter part of 1950 of about 1,100 known troublemakers. These Communists were given the opportunity to correct their errors. None was listed for release who had not committed overt illegal act.

The Ministry of Education is discussing the rescreening of school teachers in order to discover and remove Communists and their fellows from the field of education. The Ministry, as yet, has found no effectual plan by which such action can be accomplished. Until the administration of the various schools is strengthened and taught to take a properly responsible attitude it must be presumed that there will be no positive solution to undesirable teacher activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

Communist Party Warned Through Dietman Sunama of
Penalty for Excesses
(24 Feb. 50)

SCAP Warnings

Communist Diet members began to attack the Occupation from the floor of the Diet. General Whitney, SCAP's Chief of Government Section, moved at once to warn the Communists that such tactics would not be permitted. On 24 February 1950, he summoned Communist Diet member SUNAMA Ichiro, who was guilty of a particularly vicious attack and through him warned the Communist Party in the following words:

"I have summoned you to give you warning, and through you to warn your associates in the Communist Party that lying statements concerning the Occupation will not be tolerated. Your statement was in direct violation of a long standing Occupation directive with which you and your fellow party members are fully familiar. Its obvious purpose is to use the legislative forum as an instrument of propaganda directed against the Occupation. The AKAHATA, newspaper of the Communist Party, likewise is moving steadily toward that line beyond which it cannot go without similarly violating the Occupation directive.

"You, your leaders, and hundreds of your fellows were released from prison where you had long been incarcerated by the Civil Liberties Directive issued by the Supreme Commander immediately following the surrender. Since then, the Supreme Commander has fed you, clothed you and your families and protected your right to organize as a lawful political party in Japan. He has literally saved Japan from the brink of impending disaster. Have you no intelligence or gratitude? How do you justify that recently a tendency has been noted on the part of you and some of your associates to avail yourselves of your liberty in licentious disregard of the very purposes for which protection in the exercise of liberty is extended by the Supreme Commander?

24 FEB 50

"My purpose is to warn you and through you the members of your party that any further statements of this kind, either on the floor of the Diet, in your newspapers, or any place in Japan, defaming and criticizing the Occupation will be cause for your immediate arrest. If your newspapers transgress the bounds of free expression which have been estab-

CONFIDENTIAL

lished by the Occupation, they will be closed, and if misconduct by its members or party policy dictated by its leaders is such that the Communist Party under reasonable interpretation becomes a threat to the legitimate political purposes of a free society, the protection of the Supreme Commander will be withdrawn.

"Inform your fellows that by their conduct, or their misconduct, they themselves will prescribe the duration of their party as a political influence in Japan.

"There exists today peace and tranquility in Japan. This responds to the fact that the great majority of the Japanese people are peacefully inclined, law-abiding citizens. The Supreme Commander will not permit any group in Japan, whatever its name or political affiliation, to incite violence and disrespect for Occupation directives or Japanese law. As long as the Occupation lasts, he will exact obedience to his orders and respect for the processes of representative government in all political activity. Be yourself warned and caution your fellows."

TANIGUCHI, Zentaro

Purged: 28 June 1950

Japanese Government was instructed by SCAP pursuant to TANIGUCHI's defiant statement regarding the suspension of the AKAHATA that they immediately designate him as a purgee and would consider this precedent for any similar instance of defiance of the implementation of SCAP directed action.

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister Yoshida told by SCAP that dissolution of Communist Party under SCAP authority would not be authorized, but that dissolution by due process of Japanese law, Diet-enacted, would be approved (6 Mar 50)

In December 1950, the Prime Minister approached Attorney General OHASHI on the question of the dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 84. Attorney General OHASHI directed SIB Chief YOSHIKAWA to begin preparing for the dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order. YOSHIKAWA, aware from past conferences that SCAP sanction could not be obtained to dissolve the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 84, reported that he would continue study on the subject but believed such action impossible. On 5 January 1951, prior to Attorney General OHASHI's trip to Osaka to make a party policy speech he requested that Colonel Napier clear a statement to the press covering the National Police Reserve, Korean Problem, Police Law Revision, Procuratorial Agency, the Courts, and dissolution of the Communist Party.

He informed Colonel Napier that he was under pressure from the Prime Minister to take some drastic action against the Japan Communist Party; and therefore, his proposed statement to the press covered the Japan Communist question. After reading OHASHI's proposed statement Colonel Napier informed him that the SCAP was opposed to dissolution of the Japan Communist Party under Cabinet Order No. 84. However, if the Japanese Government wanted to illegalize the Party by a Diet Law, SCAP had no objection.

Thereafter on 6 March 1950, Prime Minister Yoshida took the matter to SCAP in a personal conference and was advised that dissolution of the Communist Party by Cabinet Order was not advisable but that dissolution by Diet enactment could well be studied by the Japanese Government.

6 MAR 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3 May 50)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

1200 Hours
29 April 1950

GENERAL MacARTHUR'S STATEMENT ON
THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

While the checks and balances against abuse of the powers of government are thus demonstratively adequate, in Japan as elsewhere there exist only broad and undefinitive constitutional safeguards against abuse of these personal liberties conferred by the bill of rights. And in Japan as elsewhere this vulnerable point in freedom's armor is under constant pressure by a small minority which through the perversive use of liberty and privilege seeks to encompass freedom's destruction. This type of minority pressure is not unknown to Japan, and its people are therefore forewarned of the dreadful consequences possible therefrom. For in Japan's very recent past an even smaller minority -- then the militarists and their collaborators -- coerced the Japanese people into a war leading to inevitable and, indeed, foreseeable disaster. Now as they still grope to regain their equilibrium following that disastrous experience, this other minority, taking advantage of still unreplenished war-born impoverishment, seeks to lull their intuitive sense of caution into an even greater disaster -- this time without even the pretense of service to legitimate national ends, but under foreign dictation to establish a domestic basis favorable to the ultimate subjugation of Japan to the political control of others.

Established in the immediate post-war era as a political party under constitutional protection and dedicated to the advance of certain political economic and social theories, the Japan Communist Party proceeded initially in moderation and thereby enlisted some public support. In its endeavor to press advantage, however, it went the way of all Communist movements, becoming increasingly intemperate in political and social activity, and in due course aroused a popular revulsion which in turn relegated the party into virtual political eclipse. More latterly its shattered remnant, in frustration born of this failure, has cast off the mantle of pretended legitimacy and assumed instead the role of an avowed satellite of an international predatory force and a Japanese pawn of alien power policy, imperialistic purpose and subversive propaganda. Tant it has done so at once brings into question its right to the further benefits and protection of the country and laws it would subvert and raises doubt as to whether it should longer be regarded as a constitutionally recognized political movement. Such doubts should, of course, be resolved calmly, justly and dispassionately with the same consideration and safeguards extended to any anti-social force in a peaceful and law abiding

3 MAY 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

community. The saying that to be forewarned is to be forearmed is appropriate to this issue. For in the development of its counterparts abroad there is provided the opportunity clearly to observe the underlying objectives of this movement and the end to which it inevitably has led where it successfully has gained control over the sovereign power. Thus while here, as in the other democracies of the world, it professes championship of the workers' rights in order to enlist support within labor's ranks, events abroad demonstrate that the worker loses all rights under Communist political rule; where here as elsewhere it poses an ardent advocate of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly,of freedom to worship in accordance with conscience, and of the other freedoms which flow from the universally recognized fundamental human rights, events irrefutably disclose the complete suppression of all freedom with the ascendancy of Communist political power. Indeed, history offers no slightest evidence of increase in social stability, preservation of social justice or continuation of social progress in the spiritual vacuum which lies in the wake of Communism's advance. Any thought that Japanese Communism might preserve a more moderate domestic course than characterizes the movement abroad was thoroughly disabused by its open submission to external control, its embarkation upon the spread of false, malicious and inflammatory propaganda intended to mislead and coerce the public mind, and its public adoption of objectives both anti-Japanese and inimical to Japan's public interest. Experience, the great teacher, indeed points to no greater hyprocrisy than the preparations of those who thus align themselves with this form of international political perfidy, social deception, and territorial fraud and seek an alliance of expediency with the fundamental human rights, giving lip service to their preservation solely to provide a screen of respectable plausibility to mask a sinister subversive design to destroy liberty as the obstacle to personal power. The tragedy is that in every community it gains some converts among those citizens inherently law-abiding but mentally abnormal, frustrated, gullible or uninformed, and becomes because of this facade of respectability a seemingly responsible movement to which lawless elements may rally in order to fully exploit the vulnerable points inherent in democratic freedom.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Purge of Communist Party Central Committee
by SCAP Order

Tokyo, Japan
6 June 1950

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It has been a fundamental purpose of the Occupation to assist the Japanese people to meet their commitments under the Potsdam Declaration, foremost of which requires the establishment in Japan of a new order of peace, security and justice upon which may firmly stand a peacefully inclined and responsible government. To such end the Japanese Government is specifically enjoined in the Potsdam Declaration to "remove all obstacles to the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

In the implementation of this requirement, carried forward as one of the basic objectives of Allied policy as determined and prescribed by the Far Eastern Commission, the structure of the Japanese Government has been redesigned, its laws and institutions where undemocratic have been revised, and those persons whose public record gives warning that their continued influence would be inimical to democratic growth have been removed and excluded from Japan's public affairs.

The guiding philosophy of this phase of the Occupation has been protective, not punitive. Its purpose and effect has been to provide assurance that the aims of Allied policy in the democratization of Japan would not be thwarted by the influence and pressure of anti-democratic elements. The area of its application for the most part has embraced those persons who because of position and influence bear responsibility for Japan's totalitarian policies which led to adventure in conquest and exploitation. Recently, however, a new and no less sinister groupment hasinjected itself into the Japanese political scene which has sought through perversion of truth and incitation to mass violence to transform this peaceful and tranquil land into an arena of disorder and strife as the means of stemming Japan's notable progress along the road of representative democracy and to subvert the rapidly growing democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

Acting in common accord, they have hurled defiance at constituted authority, shown contempt for the processes of law and order, and contrived by false and inflammatory statements and other subversive means to arouse through resulting public confusion that degree of social unrest which would set the stage for the eventual overthrow of constitutional government in Japan by force. Their coercive methods bear striking parallel to those by which the militaristic leaders of the past

6 JUN '50

deceived and misled the Japanese people, and their aims, if achieved, would surely lead Japan to an even worse disaster. To permit this incitation to lawlessness to continue unchecked, however embryonic it may at present appear, would be to risk ultimate suppression of Japan's democratic institutions in direct negation of the purpose and intent of Allied policy pronouncements, forfeiture of her chance for political independence, and destruction of the Japanese race.

Accordingly, I direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to remove and exclude the following named persons, constituting the full membership of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party, from public service, and render them subject to the prohibitions, restrictions and liabilities of my directives of January 4, 1946 (SCAPINs 548 and 550) and their implementing ordinances:

NAKAMADA Satomi
HASEGAWA Hiroshi
ITO Kenichi
ITO Ritsu
KAMEYAMA Kozo
KAMIYAMA Shigeo
KASUGA Shojiro
KONNO Yojiro
KISHIMOTO Shigeo
KURAHARA Koreto
MATSUMOTO Kazumi
MATSUMOTO Saneki
MIYAMOTO Kenji
NOSAKA Ryu
NOSAKA Sanzo
SATO, Satoji
SHIDA Shigeo
SHIGA Yoshio
SHIRAKAWA Seiichi
TANAKURA Toru
TAKEHAKA Tsunesaburo
TOKUDA Kyuichi
TOSAKA Hiroshi
KASUGA Shoichi

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

Mr Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

CONFIDENTIAL

C O P Y

7 June 1950

PRESS RELEASE:

Purge of responsible Akahata editorial staff by SCAP order.

" Tokyo, Japan
7 June 1950

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"To the end that representative democracy in Japan might have the opportunity to thrive in the free atmosphere of full knowledge and public discussion, it has been one of the most fundamental of Allied policies governing the Occupation to encourage and assist the development of a truly free and responsible press. In the furtherance of this purpose, censorship was progressively lifted until finally terminated two years ago and the press left free to publish on its own responsibility, subject only to a code embodying a statement of principles and ethics patterned after the Canons of Journalism of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, supplemented by minimum restrictions essential to the safeguard of military security.

"The Japanese press has in general responded admirably to this challenge and developed a degree of responsibility which has evoked most favorable comment from many visiting journalists from abroad. The glaring exception is the Communist organ AKAHATA. This journal has for some time assumed the role of mouthpiece for the most violent of lawless elements within the Communist Party and as such has defiled its news columns and editorial page with licentious, false, inflammatory and seditious appeals to irresponsible sentiment in the effort to provoke defiance of constituted authority, disrupt the progress of economic revival and create social unrest and mass violence. All this calls for prompt corrective action to safeguard the public peace.

"One course such corrective action might take would be to close the journal and destroy for all time its propaganda making power and constant incitation to violence and revolution; another the re-institution of a pre-censorship over all material it proposes to print. Both courses, however, are repugnant to me as violative of the broad philosophy which has guided the development of press freedom in Japan and should be imposed only if other measures prove ineffective.

"As an alternative method of correction, I therefore direct that your government take the necessary administrative measures to incorporate within my letter to you of 6 June 1950 the following named additional persons,

7 JUN 50

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

sharing responsibility for the policies governing the content of this journal:

AIKAWA Haruki
ANEBA Saburo
AOYAMA Toshio
KAWAHURA Tatsuo
KIKUNAMI Katsumi
MIYAMOTO Taro
MORIYA Tonro
NISHIZAWA Tonio
OKAMOTO Tadashi
SAKANO Yoshiro
SHIMADA Koichi
SUITA Hidezo
SUGAWA Shosaku
TAKAHASHI Katsuyuki -
TAKEI Takeo
TAKEMOTO Kenzo
UCHINO Soji

Very sincerely,

(sgd) DOUGLAS MacARTHUR."

...r. Shigeru Yoshida,
...ime Minister of Japan,
...kyo.

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