

REPORT OF MOSCOW CONFERENCE
OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

民國三十五年三月三日 莫斯科三國外長會議報告

蘇聯政府宣言（民國三十四年十一月一日）

莫斯可會議（十月）

莫斯可宣言

中國軍事委員會軍事年報

軍用運輸會議

普里戈拉爾及出口貿易會議

莫斯可會議基本點

中國對外經濟關係

國際宣傳基金及國際組織

聯合國憲章

聯合國憲章附則

聯合國憲章

中蘇友好同盟條約

蘇聯外交政策

美國對華政策（蘇聯外交政策）

莫斯可會議

羅斯福總統致蘇聯政府書

英美蘇東非問題

莫斯科三國外長會議報告

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蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦聯合王國與 美利堅合衆國外長會議報告書

蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦「蘇聯」，聯合王國「英」，與美利堅合衆國家「美」外長會議，自一九四五年十二月六日至十二月廿六日在莫斯科舉行，對左列各項問題，獲得同意：

第一 對義羅保匈芬和約之準備

如一九四五年十二月廿四日所宣布，蘇聯，英國，與美國業已同意，并邀請法國與中國參加，關於準備和約之下列程序：

(一) 外長會議起草對義大利，羅馬尼亞，保加利亞，匈牙利及芬蘭等國和平條約時，會議之會員國中，苟非且非至會議依照協定，作進一步行動，邀請會議之其他會員國參加與其有直接關係之問題，僅投降條款之簽字國，或依柏林會議所訂設立外長會議協定規定爲簽字國之會員，方得參加。此即謂：

(甲) 對義和約條款，將由英、美、蘇、法四國外長起草。

(乙) 對羅、保、匈三國之和約，將由蘇、美、英三國外長起草。

(丙) 對芬和約條款，將由蘇、英兩國外長起草。

各國外長之代表將以倫敦外長會議第一次全會對各該問題所獲得之了解爲基礎，立即在

倫敦恢復工作。

(二) 草約準備完成後，外長會議將召集一會議，以考慮對義、羅、保、匈、芬五國之和約。此會議將包括外長會議之五會員國，以及聯合國之會出兵對歐洲各敵國作戰之各會員國，即蘇聯、英國、美國、中國、法國、澳大利、比利時、白俄羅斯蘇維埃社會主義共和國、巴西、加拿大、捷克、厄提奧比亞、希臘、印度、紐西蘭、挪威、波蘭、南非聯邦、南斯拉夫、及烏克蘭蘇維埃社會主義共和國，該會議之召開，將不遲至一九四六年五月一日以後。

(三) 該會議將草約商討并考慮其建議後，對義、羅、保、匈、芬五國停戰條款之各簽字國——法國視為對義和約之簽字國——將草成和約之定本。

(四) 如是草成之各和約定本，將由與該敵國等作戰而參加該會之各國代表簽字，然後再將各約定本送交其他與有關敵國作戰之聯合國。

(五) 和約於停戰協定各簽字國——關於對義和約法國視為簽字國——批准後立即生效。和約須經有關敵國批准。

第二 遠東委員會及聯合對日理事會

甲 遠東委員會

茲經獲得協議，并經中國同意，設置一遠東委員會，以代替遠東諮詢委員會。遠東委員會之參照條款如下：

(一) 委員會之設置

茲設置遠東委員會，由蘇、英、美、中、法、荷、加、澳、印、菲及紐西蘭組織之。

(一) 職權

(甲) 遠東委員會之職權爲

(一) 制定日本於履行投降條款下義務應恪遵之政策，原則及標準。

(二) 經任何與會國家之請，檢討對聯合國最高統帥所發之任何訓示或最高統帥所採涉及本委員會管轄範圍內決策之任何行動。

(三) 考慮由參加各政府間依照後文第五款第二節規定投票程序協議提交該會之其他事項。

(乙) 該委員會對軍事行動或領土調整不得提出建議。

(丙) 該委員會對於其活動，將以下列事實爲出發點，即聯合國業已設有對日理事會，并將尊重現已在日設有之管制機構，包括自美國政府至最高統帥對佔領軍指揮權之連繫。

(三) 美國政府之職權

一、美國政府當依該委員會之決策，備就訓示，經適當之美國政府機關傳達於最高統帥。最高統帥負有實施此項發揮該委員會決策之訓示之責。

二、該委員會如依第二條甲款檢討任何訓示或行動而決定應予修改時，其決議應視同決策。

三、美國政府凡遇發生緊急事項，而不在該委員會既定政策範圍內者，得對最高統帥發臨時訓示，但關於根本改變日本憲法構造或管制制度，或關於變更整個日本政府之任何訓示，須先向

遠東委員會徵詢，獲取同意後，始行發布之。

四、所發之一切訓令均應交該委員會存卷。

(四) 其他諮商方法

該委員會之設置，應不妨碍參加各國政府用其他方法諮商遠東問題。

(五) 組織

一、遠東委員會將包含參加本協定各國代表各一人。該委員會委員名額，得視情形需要，由參加各國協議，增加地處遠東或在遠東保有領土之其他聯合國代表。該委員會處理事項，與聯合國非委員國家有特別關係者於情形需要時，應給此等國家之代表以完備而充份之諮詢。

二、本委員會採取行動，可無需全體一致通過，但須得至少全體代表過半數同意，且同意之代表，須有美、英、蘇、中四國代表在內。

(六) 地點與機構

一、遠東委員會會址設於華盛頓。若遇情形需要，經該委員會認為適宜時，得在他處舉行會議，包括東京在內。該委員會得經主席訂定可以實施之辦法，與聯合國最高統帥諮商。

二、參加委員會之每一代表得隨帶民事與軍事代表合組之適額職員。

三、該委員會應自組秘書處，委任認為合宜之委員會，并以他種方法完成其組織與程序。

(七) 終止

遠東委員會於得至少全體代表半數，包括美、英、蘇、中四國之贊同，協議停止時，即停止行使職權。在終止行使職權前，本委員會應將宜加移轉之職權，移轉於參加各國政府爲其會員之臨時或永久安全組織。

茲經同意美國政府應代表四國將參照條款送達第一條所載之其他各國政府，并請其參加修正後之委員會。

乙 聯合國對日理事會

爲設置聯合國對日理事會，茲並獲致下列協議，俾得中國同意：

一、在東京設置聯合國理事會，以聯合國最高統帥（或其代表）任主席，其目的爲與最高統帥諮商，并向其提供關於實施投降條款，佔領與管制日本，及補充訓示之意見，并爲行使本協議所賦與之管制權。

二、聯合國對日理事會之理事爲最高統帥（或其代表），美、蘇、中各一人，英、印、及澳紐西蘭合共一人，由最高統帥（或其代表）任主席。

三、每一理事得有適當數額之軍事及民事顧問爲幕僚。

四、聯合國理事會開會不得少於兩星期一次。

五、最高統帥得頒布實施投降條款，佔領及管制日本之一切命令及補充訓示。無論在何種情形下，最高統帥爲聯合國在日本之惟一執行主官，一切命令均在其下或經其實行之。最高統帥對於實質之事項，在發布命令前，如事態之緩急情形許可，應與理事會諮商，并提示意見。其對於此等事項之決定，有主斷之權。

六、對實施遠東委員會關於變更管制制度，根本更改日本憲政體制，及改選整頓日本政府等問題之決策，如有一理事與最高統帥（或其代表）意見不同時，最高統帥當留中關於此項問題之命令，以待遠東委員會關於該問題之協議。

七、遇必要時，最高統帥於與聯合國理事會其他聯合國之代表作適當之初步磋商後，關於更換日本政府閣員或補充閣員辭職缺額得作決定。

第三 朝鮮

一、本重建朝鮮爲一獨立國，造成使該國依民主原則發展之狀況，及儘可能早日清理日本長期統治朝鮮之傷慘結果之目的，應建立朝鮮臨時民主政府，該政府應採取一切必要步驟，發展朝鮮之工業，運輸及農業，并發展朝鮮民族之文化。

二、爲協助組織朝鮮臨時民主政府，兼本初步開展適當辦法之目的，應設置一聯合委員會，由朝鮮南部之美軍司令部與朝鮮北部之蘇軍司令部代表組織之。該委員會於準備建議時，應諮商朝鮮各民主政黨及社會團體。該委員會所作成之建議案，應於參加聯合委員會之兩國政府作最後決定前，先行提交蘇、中、英、美四國政府考慮。

三、聯合委員會應與朝鮮臨時政府與朝鮮民主政黨共同訂立辦法，幫助協力謀朝鮮人民政治經濟及社會之進步，發展民主的自治政府，奠定朝鮮之國家獨立。聯合委員會之建議於諮商朝鮮臨時政府後，應交美、蘇、英、中四國政府共同考慮，以訂立由四強託管理朝鮮爲期五年之協定。

四、爲考慮關涉朝鮮南北部之緊急問題，及詳訂建立南鮮美軍司令部與北鮮蘇軍司令部行政經濟事項之永久協調辦法，駐鮮美蘇兩軍司令部應於兩星期內舉行會議。

第四 中國

三國外長對於中國局勢會交換意見，彼此同意在國民政府治下有一統一而民主之中國，各派民主份子廣泛參加國民政府各部門，并停止內戰，均屬必要。余等重申堅守不干涉中國內政之政策。

莫洛托夫與貝爾納斯爲蘇美在華軍隊一事會作數度會談。莫洛托夫稱蘇軍已將滿洲之日軍繳械並遣送出境，但蘇軍之撤退，則應中國政府之請，已展延至二月一日。貝爾納斯指出美軍之駐在華北，係應中國政府之請，并及美軍之主要責任爲執行投降條約有關解除日軍武裝并遣送出境事項。並稱一俟該項責任完成，或中國政府能執行該項責任不需美軍協助，美軍應即撤退。

兩外長對於蘇美軍隊貫徹執行其義務與責任，宜儘速撤退一節，意見完全一致。

第次 羅馬尼亞

羅王密契爾嘗於一九四五年八月廿一日函徵擴大大羅馬尼亞政府之意見，三國政府準備提供其意見，勸告羅王於政府內容納國家農民黨及自由黨黨員各一人。下文述及之委員會應於（甲）彼等實爲未參加政府之團集或政黨代表，（乙）均合於且願與政府真誠合作時，即認爲滿意。

三國政府注意經如是改組之羅馬尼亞政府應宣布舉行自由不受拘束之選舉，一切反法西斯政黨皆得參加。羅政府應保證准許新聞，言論，宗教及集會等自由。

蘇聯人民外交副委員長維辛斯基，美國大使哈里曼，英大使寇爾以委員會之身份，應立即前往布查勒斯與羅王密契爾及現政府人員諮商執行上項任務。

一俟渠等任務完成，并獲得所需之保證，對於與蘇聯已有外交關係之羅馬尼亞政府，將由美國政

府暨英國政府加以承認

第六 保加利亞

三國政府間了解蘇聯負擔向保加利亞政府貢獻友誼勸告之任務，即在目下成立之祖國陣線政府內，容納其他民主集團代表二人，此等代表（甲）應為確屬未參加政府之黨派代表，（乙）均合於且願與政府真誠合作。

一俟英美兩政府確信此項友誼勸告已由保加利亞政府接受，上述增添之代表確已獲容納入政府內，英美兩國政府即將承認與蘇聯已有外交關係之保加利亞政府

第七 聯合國設置委員會管制原子能

在討論原子能關於由聯合國設置委員會問題，蘇美英三國外長已同意向聯合國大會建議，請考慮由聯合國設置一委員會，以考慮由發現原子能所引起之各種問題及有關事項，並同意邀請安全理事會其他中法兩常任理事國及加拿大共同在一九四六年一月舉行之聯合國首屆大會中發起下列決議案：

聯合國大會茲議決設置一委員會，照下列規定之組織與權限，處理由發現原子能所引起之各種問題及其他有關事項。

一 委員會之設置

大會茲設置委員會，附帶下文第五節所規定之參照條款。

二 委員會與聯合國各機構之關係

（甲）委員會須將其報告及建議提交安全理事會，如非安全理事會為和平與安全之利益計，

另作其他指示，此類報告與建議應予公布。在適宜之情形下：安全理事會應將此類報告轉送聯合國大會及會員國，及其本身機構內之經濟暨社會理事會。

(乙) 因鑒於安全理事會在聯合國憲章下之主要責任為維持國際和平與安全，故安全理事會對有關安全之事項，應向委員會發出指導。關於此類事項，委員會之工作應對安全理事會負責。

三 委員會之組織

委員會由安全理事會理事國代表各一人——加拿大如非為理事國亦應有代表一人——組成之。參加委員會之每一代表得用其所欲用之助理人員。

四 程序規則

委員會得任其所認為必需之職員，并向安全理事會提出程序規則之建議由安全理事會核定之。

五 委員會之參照條款

委員會應從速進行，并調查原子問題之各方面，隨時提出其認為可能之建議。委員會尤應提出下列各項建議：

(甲) 擴大國際間交換以和平為目的之科學情報；

(乙) 管制原子能保證其被運用於和平之目的；

(丙) 自國家軍備中消除原子武器及其可改造作大量毀滅之其他重大武器；

(丁) 以視察及其他方法，有效保障守約國不受違約及規避之危險。

委員會之工作，應分段進行，每一段之順利完成，引起世人之信仰，然後從事第二階段。

委員會不得侵犯聯合國任何機構之責任，但應向各機構提出建議，供其考慮執行聯合國憲章規定下之任務。

關於三國外長會議

美國務卿貝爾納斯一九四五年十二月卅日廣播

本人今晚談話之目的，爲提出關於英美蘇三外長在莫斯科會議之報告。余在杜魯門總統之核准與鼓勵之下，力促召集此一會議，以實踐雅爾達會議中所成立之諒解，即英美蘇三外長應每隔三四個月舉行一次會議。余深知未有確切保證，三國政府對於所討論之各點，能成立協議，即建議召集此一會議，實爲冒險之事。余知此一會議，有重蹈倫敦外長會議覆轍之危險。但余覺此險非冒不可。正因成立協議之不易，故必須舉行外長會議，力圖明瞭彼此之間與困難。近代世界各種事件之行動，其速率猶似閃電，吾人實不能憑外交函電來往之迂緩辦法，以期達到協議。吾人應明瞭，在國際事務中，討論與當面接觸，即使不能立即完成協議，亦甚有用，以其能有助於思想交接及調和異見也。九月間在倫敦舉行之外長會議，對於草擬歐洲和平條約的程度問題，意見未能一致，蘇聯堅持和約須由簽署停戰協定之各大國簽訂，其他代表則主張凡參戰之國家均應得參加和議，吾人在倫敦雖未能獲得協議，若干人且指倫敦會議爲完全失敗，余意對於和平機構之能在莫斯科獲得協議，倫敦之討論實有大助。莫斯科協議迎合吾人堅持凡參戰國家皆應參與和議之主張，同時亦坦白承認大國佔有締造和平之負責地位。吾人之協議爲和平條約先應由各停戰協定之簽字國起草，但亦決定和約擬就後，即應提交構成外長會議，亦即聯合國安全理事會常任理事中之英美法五國所召集之和平會議，凡會出兵對歐洲軸心國作戰之各國，均將被邀參加會議。和平會議遲將於五月一日召開。該會議將考慮各停戰協定

簽字國所草擬之和約，然後再擬定和會本身之建議，各簽字國將考慮和會之建議，然後準備最後之和約條文，山對敵積極參戰之各國簽字，余並不認爲此種辦法完全合乎理想，但不合理想標準者乃爲形式而非實質，所保存者爲大國之建議須受各積極參戰國之判斷與公開批評。程序規定此等參戰國家，須正式公開發表其建議。大國並不受此等建議之束縛，但必須同意，以便草擬最後之和平條約。美國當然不同意武斷拒絕此種建議之最後條約。在敦巴頓橡樹會議代聯合國草擬憲章之各大國，當然並不忽視各小國在舊金山會議所提議之修改建議。成功之和平，其試驗並不在於方式，而在於是否能迎合關心正義與智慧之國家，及是否能獲得若干國家之擁護，此等國家之統一，對於和平之維持，極爲重要。莫斯科會議所同意決定之方法，具有此種成功之條件。前衛星國之承認問題，亦曾加以討論。自倫敦會議之後，吾人發現承認奧國與匈牙利，已有可能，該處自由選舉已在舉行。然吾人對於羅馬尼亞與保加利亞政府，意見仍大相懸殊，蓋此等國家之民主體制，並未依照吾人所習知之傳統進行工作。蘇聯認爲此等國家之政府，尙稱滿意，其情形並不需要吾人在雅爾達協定下之一致行動，而一致行動固須經過共同之協議也。

吾人對羅馬尼亞與保加利亞兩政府之非議，不但由於各該政府拒絕參加重要之民主集團，參加政府，且由於各該政府以抑制之方法，執行其權力。直至現在，吾人之非議，向不爲此等政府或蘇聯政府所注意。吾人必須承認蘇聯政府對於此等國家之政府體制，殊有利害關係。此等國家爲蘇聯之隣國，而會捲入對蘇戰爭之漩渦中，故預料蘇軍之撤離此等國家，或將視蘇政府是否信任各該國政之和平性質而定。余力勸史達林委員長與莫洛托夫外長，爲彼等及吾人本身之利益計，應使此等國家之人民及政府，和平傾向蘇聯。余力言使此等政府較能代表各派，吾人願與蘇政府合作而決不反對。自雅

爾達會議以來，蘇政對於此層。始第一次同意與吾人合作。羅馬尼亞國王曾請求蘇英美三聯合國，就擴大羅馬尼亞政之代表額一點，貢獻意見，吾人在倫敦會議中曾以此相辯，但未能成立協議，現已成立委員會，即將前往羅馬尼亞提供意見。英美政府同意「一」俟羅馬尼亞政府擴大代表額容納在野重要政黨之真正代表二人，並保證允許選舉自由，言論自由，報導自由及宗教自由，認為滿意後，即將承認該政府。此為吾人承認羅馬尼亞之條件，而此等條件之是否允從，須由吾人判斷之，保加利亞之情形更為複雜。因該國已舉行選舉，蘇聯認其為自由選舉。而吾人則不認其為自由選舉。但蘇政府已自願担任勸告保加利亞新政府，容納真正代表在野重要政黨之黨員二名。英美政府聲明一俟對此事認為滿意後，即將承認保加利亞新政。關於保羅二國之協定，并不盡如余意，但希望該兩國政府之民主性，將因此協定成立之結果而大見改善。

在遠東方面，吾人之政策向為創造永久和平之條件，對吾人盟國合作，為此項政策之重要部份。擊敗日本之軍事力量，美國固負荷甚重，然吾人始認對日戰爭。乃對軸心戰爭之一部份，自始即計劃使管制日本之專成為各盟國之責任。早於八月二十日，吾人即邀請中英蘇三國與吾人共同執行波茨坦宣言及日本之投降條件。遠東諮詢委員會成立於十月間，但英國對於諮詢之性質有所保留，而蘇聯則要求對東京管制機構先作決定後，方允加入委員會。在莫斯科會議中，英美蘇三政，獲得中國之贊同，已同意設立一遠東委員會，包含中，蘇，英，美，法，荷，澳，紐西蘭，加拿大，印度，菲律賓之代表。遠東委員會將有權擬定管制日本之原則，依多數之表決而行動，但必須有中美英蘇四國之同意。該委員會之決議將由美政府納入對最高統帥所發之訓示內。

依據設置之協議，在遠東委員會未有決議以前，不得我國贊同，決不通過任何有關日本之基本政

策。在必要時，我可就各重要事件，頒佈過渡時期之訓示。僅有三項問題，我國無權被過渡之訓示，保留由委員會行動——仍須我國同意——之問題爲（一）關於日本管制之變更，（二）日本憲法組織之根本變動，（三）整個日本政府之更易。

若欲獲得共同之盟國政策，上述問題本質上即須主要盟國之協議。保留以待委員會之決定，並不影响最高統帥執行盟國管制之行政。

對於整個日政府施行改革，吾人之政策本非獨斷獨行。就內閣人事之更易或補缺一點而言，最高統帥之力並未削弱。

三國政 又同意。并經中國贊同，設置盟國對日理事會，由中蘇美英代表組織之，主席一職則由麥帥以盟國最高統帥資格担任。實施投降條件，該委會將與最高統帥如何磋商實施投降條款并提供意見。除上述保留之三項問題外，最高統帥之決定將爲最後之決定。

理事會，對於執行遠東委員會有關上述三項問題任何一項之決策若有爭執發生時，最高統帥在遠東委員會未表明其決定前，將暫不採取行動。但必要時，最高統帥於與理事會作適當諮詢後，得更易閣員，并填補遺缺。

我人所提出關於日本之建議，表明吾人願與我盟友合作，同時亦希望彼等能與吾人合作。但同時我人之協議，仍保障在日業已設立由盟國最高統帥指揮具有效率之行政機構，該項協議保證麥帥之權力，不致因遠東委員會之不能決定政策，或盟國理事會之不能協議實施政策之方法而受阻礙。

由麥帥所組成之效能超衆的行政機構，我人決心保證其不受阻礙。
自日本投降以來朝鮮之行政，亦甚爲煩雜。爲便利軍事行動起見，朝鮮之佔領會分爲緯度三十八

度南北蘇美兩區。投降後此種劃分之繼續存在，不能令人滿意。朝鮮人民與物資之移動及全國公共服務之實施，均受阻礙。依據我人在莫斯科所獲之協議，兩國指揮部將組織蘇美聯合委員會，以解決急迫之經濟及行政問題，該委員會將向中英美蘇四國建議成立朝鮮臨時民主政府，及四強託管制度，以準備朝鮮於五年內獨立，在蘇美共同委員會與朝鮮臨時民主政府密切合作之下，或可使託管制度成爲不需要。我人之目標，願加速促成韓國之獨立，使其成爲聯合國之一員。

在莫斯科所獲之協議及諒解中，中國之利益曾予以充分之考慮，中國將參加：（一）外長會議；（二）遠東委員會；（三）四強對日理事會；（四）組織朝鮮臨時國民政府；（五）朝鮮的託管制度。

但爲內戰分裂之中國，決不能在盟國間佔得其應有之地位而履行其國際責任。若杜羅門總統最近所宣佈我國對華政策（註）亦已在莫斯科予以討論。我人發現英蘇對於此項政策之意見，完全一致。三國政府認爲：中止內戰及廣納各民主份子參加國民政府，實爲保證在國民政府下促成團結和平與民主中國之必要條件。三國政府重申不干涉中國內政之政策。

莫洛托夫先生與本人曾討論美蘇駐華軍隊問題。蘇聯爲遵照中蘇所訂之協定，計劃於二月一日前撤退其在華軍隊。而在日軍解除武裝與離華後，或中國已能單獨担任此項工作後，我國亦將自華北撤退我國之陸戰隊。三國關對華政策所獲之諒解，將助於馬歇爾元帥完成其在華之任務。

此次英方與本人抵達莫斯科，携有極確定之建議，以美總統及英加首相所發表之聲明爲根據，由聯合國設置（一）關於原子能及有關事項之委員會。在蘇聯請求之，我方此項建議列入議程最末之一項。我人之討論，僅限於建議中所註明之各點，並未討論技術或科學問題，同時蘇聯政府亦未向我

人查詢此種新武器，蘇聯政府與我人之見解相同，亦認爲此項包含如此革命性之武器，應由聯合國委員探討其國際共管之方法，對於此點，吾人至爲愉快。

我人應明瞭該委員會之任務，乃在研究因原子能之發現而引起之問題，並提出建議，不論安全理事會或該委員會均無權強迫任何政府接受其建議。在擬具設置委員會之決議案中，會提供四種目標，但我人並不以目標次第之先後爲作其被考慮之順序。我人之意，乃在保障該委會對該項問題每一方面每一階段之建議。事實上，此事之最基本原則，即在於提供應有之保障。非至確定我人共同安全已獲保障，不能望吾人或任何國家咸知武器之祕密也。

蘇聯政府對我所提出之建議，僅提出少數之修正，其目的乃在表明委員會與安全理事會之關係，經過若干修改後，我人已予以接受。將蘇方修正謹慎審閱，當發現各該修正之目的乃在使安全理事會能履行其維持和平與秩序之職責。

安全理事會可指示該委員會，並可限制發表任何有礙和平與安全之報告，但此種行動，僅可在其常任理事國同意下實施之，安全理事會之拒絕採取行動，決不能妨礙該委員會之工作。

三國政府已延請中、法、加參加，將議決案送交聯合國大會討論。

除伊朗問題之外，各外長對於議程所列各項問題，均已獲致諒解。在會議中某一時期，我人似將同意成立三國委員會，以考慮盟軍留駐而發生之伊朗問題。不幸我人未能獲致協議。對於此問題之嚴重性，本人不願諱言之，但本人並不因之而沮喪。本人甚盼我人之交換意見，可導致對此嚴重問題進一步之考慮，因而獲得解決。除對三國政府代表所發之訓令，以便利成立協議外，凡成立協議之各問題，均已見之於星期五所公佈之公報中，所成立之協議，當以希望帶給各地厭棄戰爭之人民，此等

協議將便利和平條約之簽訂，和約訂立後，才可撤退佔領區之軍隊，然後人民方有經濟復興之機會。吾人亦惟有等待他國人民之經濟恢復後，方能希望吾人在此彼此相依之世界中勞工全部獲得工作，資金能有充份應用。

吾人必須認清者，國際會議之舉行，并非予政治家以在外交上獲致成功之機會，其用意乃在有若干利益相同，若干利益相歧之國家間，調整其微妙之社會與人羣關係。在國際事件中，亦與國內事件相同，衝突之利益可由討論以尋出一共同途徑及較清楚之了解。莫斯科會議確曾造成較清楚之了解。吾人對此等努力應勿懈勿怠，持以耐心，出以善意，再處以寬容，吾人必須建立并維持一公正而恆久之和平。

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REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

At the meeting, which took place in Moscow from December 16 to December 26, 1945, of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom, agreement was reached on the following questions:

PART I. PEACE TREATIES.

As announced on the 24th of December 1945, the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States have agreed, and have requested the adherence of the Governments of France and China, to the following procedure with respect to the preparation of peace treaties:

(1) In the drawing up by the Council of Foreign Ministers of treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, only members of the Council who are, or under the terms of the agreement establishing the Council of Foreign Ministers adopted at the Berlin Conference are deemed to be, signatory to the surrender terms, will participate unless and until the Council takes further action under the agreement to invite other members of the Council to participate on questions directly concerning them. That is to say:

(A) The terms of the peace treaty with Italy will be drafted by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France.

(B) The terms of the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

(C) The terms of the peace treaty with Finland by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

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The deputies of the Foreign Ministers will immediately resume their work in London on the basis of understandings reached on the questions discussed at the first plenary session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

(2) When the preparation of all those drafts has been completed, the Council of Foreign Ministers will convoke a conference for the purpose of considering treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. The conference will consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers, together with all members of the United Nations which actively waged war with a substantial military force against European enemy states, namely, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, China, France, Australia, Belgium, the Byelo-Russian (White Russian) Soviet Socialist Republic, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Union of South Africa, Yugoslavia, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The conference will be held not later than May 1, 1946.

(3) After the conclusion of the deliberations of the conference and upon consideration of its recommendations, the states signatory to the terms of armistice with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland—France being regarded as such for the purposes of the peace treaties, will draw up the final texts of the peace treaties.

(4) The final texts of the respective peace treaties as so drawn up will be signed by representatives of the states represented at the conference which are at war with the enemy states in question. The texts of the respective peace treaties will then be submitted to the other United Nations which are at war with the enemy states in question.

(5) The peace treaties will come into force immediately after they have been ratified by the Allied states signatory to the respective armistices, France being regarded as such in the case of the peace treaty with Italy. These treaties are subject to ratification by the enemy states in question.

PART II. FAR EASTERN COMMISSION AND ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN.

Agreement was reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to take the place of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The terms of reference for the Far Eastern Commission are as follows:

A. FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

I. Establishment of the commission

A Far Eastern Commission is hereby established composed of the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth.

II. Functions

(A) The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be: (1) to formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished,

(2) To review, on the request of any member, any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the commission,

(3) To consider such other matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the participating Governments in accordance with the voting procedure provided for in Article V, Section 2 hereunder.

(B) The commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with regard to territorial adjustments.

(C) The commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan and will respect existing control machinery in Japan including the chain of command from the United States Government to the Supreme Commander's command of the occupation forces.

III. Functions of the U. S. Government

1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with policy decisions of the commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United States Government agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the commission.

2. If the commission decides that any directive or action reviewed in accordance with Article II A should be modified, its decision shall be regarded as a policy decision.

3. The United States Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the commission, provided that any directive dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in the regime of control, or dealing with a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, will be issued only following consultation and following the attainment of agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.

4. All directives issued shall be filed with the commission.

IV. Other methods of consultation

The establishing of the commission shall not preclude the use of other methods of consultation on Far Eastern issues by the participating Governments.

5. Composition

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall consist of one representative of each of the states party to this agreement. The membership of the commission may be increased by agreement among the participating powers as conditions warrant by the addition of representatives of other United Nations in the Far East or having territories therein. The commission shall provide for full and adequate consultations, as occasion may require, with representatives of the United Nations not members of the commission in regard to matters before the commission which are of particular concern to such nations.

2. The commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives, including the representatives of the four following powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China.

VI. Location and organization

1. The Far Eastern Commission shall have its headquarters in Washington. It may meet at other places as occasion requires, including Tokyo, if and when it deems it desirable to do so. It may make such arrangements through the chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

2. Each representative on the commission may be accompanied by an appropriate staff comprising both civilian and military representatives.

2. The commission shall organize its secretariat, appoint such committees as may be deemed advisable, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

VII. Termination

The Far Eastern Commission shall cease to function when a decision to that effect is taken by the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of the four following powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China. Prior to the termination of its functions, the commission shall transfer to any interim or permanent security organization of which the participating Governments are members those functions which may appropriately be transferred.

It was agreed that the Government of the United States, on behalf of the four powers, should present the terms of reference to the other Governments specified in Article I and invite them to participate in the commission on the revised basis.

B. ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

The following agreement was also reached, with the concurrence of China, for the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan:

1. There shall be established an Allied Council with its seat in Tokyo under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (or his deputy) for the purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and of directives supplementary thereto, and for the purpose of exercising the control authority herein granted.

2. The memberships of the Allied Council shall consist of the Supreme Commander (or his deputy) who shall be the chairman and the United States member, a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics member, a Chinese member, and a member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India.

3. Each member shall be entitled to have an appropriate staff consisting of military and civilian advisers.

4. The Allied Council shall meet not less often than once every two weeks.

5. The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the terms of surrender, the occupation and control of Japan, and directives supplementary thereto. In all cases, action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan. He will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decision upon these matters shall be controlling.

6. If, regarding the implementation of policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on question concerning a change in the regime of control, fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, and a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, a member of the Council disagrees with the Supreme Commander (or his deputy), the Supreme Commander will withhold the issuance of orders on these questions pending agreement thereon in the Far Eastern Commission.

7. In cases of necessity, the Supreme Commander may make decisions concerning the change of individual Ministers of the

Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual cabinet members, after appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the other Allied Powers on the Allied Council.

PART III. KOREA.

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

2. In order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a joint commission, consisting of representatives of the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals, the commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the joint commission.

3. It should be the task of the joint commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic parties to work out measures also for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the joint commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and China for the working out of agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative and economic matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

PART IV. CHINA.

The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation by democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for a cessation of civil strife. They reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in internal affairs of China.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes had several conferences concerning the Soviet and American armed forces in China. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet forces had disarmed and deported Japanese troops in Manchuria, but that withdrawal of Soviet forces had been postponed until February 1 at the request of the Chinese Government. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that American forces were in North China at the request of the Chinese Government, and referred also to the primary responsibility of the United States in the implementation of the terms of surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of Japanese troops. He stated that the American forces would be withdrawn just as soon as this responsibility was discharged or the Chinese Government was in a position to discharge the responsibility without the assistance of American forces.

The two Foreign Secretaries were in complete accord as to the desirability of withdrawing the Soviet and American forces from

China at the earliest practicable moment consistent with the discharge of their obligations and responsibilities.

PART V. RUMANIA

The three governments are prepared to give King Michael the advice which he has asked in his letter of August 21, 1945, on the broadening of the Rumanian government. The King should be advised that one member of the National Peasant Party and one member of the Liberal Party should be included in the Government. The commission referred to below shall satisfy itself that:

(a) they are truly representative of the groups of parties not represented in the Government, and

(b) they are suitable and will work loyally with the Government.

The three governments take note that the Rumanian Government, thus reorganized, should declare that free and unfettered elections will be held as soon as possible on the basis of a universal and secret ballot. All democratic and anti-fascist parties should have the right to take part in these elections and to put forward candidates. The reorganized government should give assurances concerning granting of freedom of press, speech, religion and association.

A. Y. Vyshinski, Ambassador W. Averill Harriman, and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to proceed to Bucharest immediately to consult with King Michael and members of the present Government with a view to the execution of the above-mentioned tasks.

As soon as these tasks are accomplished and the required assurances have been received, the Government of Rumania, with which the Soviet Government maintains diplomatic relations, will be recognized by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom.

PART V. BULGARIA

It is understood by the three Governments that the Soviet Government takes upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice

to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the desirability of inclusion in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, now being formed, of two additional representatives of other democratic groups, who,

(a) are truly representative of the groups or parties which are not participating in the Government, and

(b) are really suitable and will work loyally with the Government.

As soon as the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are convinced that this friendly advice has been accepted by the Bulgarian Government, and the said additional representatives have been included in its body the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom will recognize the Bulgarian Government, with which the Government of the Soviet Union already has diplomatic relations.

PART VII. ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL.

In a discussion of the subject of atomic energy, related to the question of the establishment of a commission by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and United Kingdom have agreed to recommend, for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment by the United Nations of a commission to consider the problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters. They have agreed to invite other permanent members of the Security Council, France and China, together with Canada to join with them in assuming the initiative in sponsoring the following resolution at the first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1946:

Resolved, by the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a commission, with composition and competence set out hereunder, to deal with problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters.

Firstly, the establishment of a commission.

The commission is hereby established by the General Assembly with terms of reference set out under section five below.

Secondly, relations of the commission with organs of United Nations.

⊗ (a) The commission shall submit its reports and recommendations to the Security Council, and such reports and recommendations shall be made public unless the Security Council, in the interests of peace and security, otherwise directs. In appropriate cases the Security Council should transmit these reports to the General Assembly and members of the United Nations, as well as an economic and social council within the framework of its operations.

(b) In view of the Security Council's primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council shall issue directions to the commission in matters affecting security. On these matters the commission shall be accountable for its work to the Security Council.

Thirdly, composition of the commission.

The commission shall be composed of one representative from each of those not a member of the Security Council, and Canada, when that state is not a member of the Security Council. Each representative on the commission may have such assistants as he may desire.

Fourthly, rules of procedure.

The commission shall have whatever staff it may deem necessary and shall make recommendations for its rules of procedure to the Security Council, which shall approve them as a procedural matter.

Fifthly, terms of reference of the commission.

The commission shall proceed with utmost dispatch, and enquire into all phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from time to time with respect to them as it finds possible. In particular, the commission shall make the specific proposals:

(a) For extending between all nations an exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purpose;

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction,

(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. The work of the commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.

The commission shall not infringe upon the responsibilities of any organs of the United Nations but should present recommendations for the consideration of those organs in the performance of their tasks under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

ON MOSCOW CONFERENCE

BY U. S. STATE SECRETARY JAMES F. BYRNES
(In a Radio Address made in Washington, December 30, 1945.)

The purpose of my talk tonight is to render a report on the recent meeting of the foreign secretaries of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union at Moscow.

With President Truman's approval and encouragement I had urged the calling of this meeting in fulfilment of the understanding reached at Yalta, that the three foreign secretaries should meet every three or four months.

I was well aware of the risk involved in suggesting this meeting without any definite assurance that the three governments would be able to reach an agreement on the points under discussion. I know the risk of another impasse, such as occurred in London.* I felt this risk had to be taken.

It is just when there are genuine difficulties in reaching agreement that foreign secretaries should meet, in an effort to understand each other's problems and troubles.

In this modern world where events move with lightning speed, there is not time to wait for agreement to be reached by the slow exchange of diplomatic communications.

We must realize that discussion and personal contact in international affairs are useful and helpful, even though they do not at once lead to agreement. They contribute to a meeting of the minds and the reconciliation of differences.

In September the Council of Foreign Ministers at London had been unable to agree upon the procedure to be followed by the European peace treaties. The Soviet Union took the position that the treaties should be made only by the principal powers who had signed the respective armistices. The other delegations took the view that

*See "U.S. and Britain's Stand in the Council of Foreign Ministers" under separate cover.

all states which took an active part in the war should be allowed to participate in the peace.

While we could not agree at London, and many referred to the London conference as a complete failure, it was, I think, the discussions at London that helped us greatly to reach agreement on the peace machinery at Moscow.

The agreement at Moscow meets our insistence that all states which took an active part in the war should participate in the peace. It also frankly recognizes the responsible role of the larger powers in the making of peace.

Our agreement is that the terms of peace, in the first instance, should be drawn by the principal powers which were signers of the respective armistices. But it was decided that as soon as these terms were drawn up, they should be submitted to a peace conference called by the five states—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China, who constitute the Council of Foreign Ministers, and are the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. All states which actively waged war with a substantial military force against the European members of the Axis will be invited to participate in the conference.

The peace conference is to be called not later than May 1.

The conference will consider the draft treaties prepared by the states that signed the respective armistices. The peace conference will then draw up its own recommendations. After that states which prepared the preliminary texts will consider recommendations of the peace conference and prepare final texts of treaties to be signed by all states actively at war with the enemy states in question.

I do not consider this solution ideal. But the departure from the ideal standard is more in form than substance. What is preserved is that the proposals of the larger powers are subjected to the judgment and public criticism of all nations which took an active part in the war. The procedure contemplates and requires that these nations formally and publicly make their recommendations.

The larger powers are not bound by these recommendations, but they must agree in order to draw up the final treaties. Certainly the

United States would not agree to a final treaty which arbitrarily rejected such recommendations. Certainly the great powers which drew up the draft charter for the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks did not ignore the changes suggested by the smaller powers at San Francisco.

The test of a successful peace is not in the form of its making, but whether it both commends itself to the nations concerned by its justice and wisdom, and also commands the support of those nations whose unity is essential to preserve the peace. The method agreed upon at Moscow gives ample scope for the achievement of these essential results.

The question of the recognition of the ex-satellite states was discussed. Since the London conference we have found it possible to recognize Austria and Hungary, where free elections have occurred. There is still a wide divergence in our viewpoints on the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. That divergence is accentuated by the fact that in those countries democratic institutions have not functioned in accordance with traditions familiar to us.

The Soviet Union contends that governments of those countries are satisfactory and conditions do not warrant concerted action under the Yalta Agreement.* And concerted action is possible only by common agreement.

Our objections to the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments have been not only to the exclusion of important democratic groups from those governments, but to the oppressive way in which those governments exercise their powers. Until now, our objections have been little heeded by those governments, or by the Soviet government.

It must be recognized that the Soviet government has very real interest in the character of government of those states. Those countries are neighbors of the Soviet Union and were involved in war against the Soviet Union. It is therefore to be expected, that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from those countries may depend upon the Soviet government's confidence in the peaceful character of these governments.

I urged upon Generalissimo Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov that it was in their interest as well as ours, that the peoples of those

*Published under separate cover.

countries, as well as their governments, should be peacefully disposed towards the Soviet Union. I stressed the fact that it was our desire to work with the Soviet government, and not against it, in making these governments more representative. And for the first time since Yalta, the Soviet government has agreed to cooperate with us to this end.

A commission is to proceed immediately to Rumania to advise the King, who has sought the advice of the three allied governments, on broadening the representation in the Rumanian government. At London we asked this, but were unable to secure agreement.

The British and American governments have agreed that they will recognize the Rumanian government as soon as they are satisfied that the government has been broadened to include two truly representative members of two important political parties not now represented in the government, and assurances have been given regarding free elections, freedom of speech, press, religion, and association. These are the terms under which we will recognize this government. It is for us to say, whether the terms have been complied with.

The situation in Bulgaria is complicated by the fact that an election has already occurred there, which the Soviet government regards as a free election, and we do not. Nevertheless, the Soviet government has undertaken to advise the new Bulgarian government to include in the government two members truly representative of important political parties not now included. The British government and the American government have stated that as soon as they are satisfied that this has been done, they will recognize the new Bulgarian government.

The agreements regarding Rumania and Bulgaria do not go as far as I should have liked, but I am hopeful that they will result in a substantial improvement in the democratic character of these governments.

In the Far East, it has been our policy to work for the creation of conditions that make for lasting peace. Cooperation with our allies is an essential part of that policy.

While the United States sustained the major burden in crushing the military power of Japan, we have always considered the war against

Japan a part of the war against the Axis. From the outset, we have planned to make the control of Japan an allied responsibility.

As early as August 20, we invited the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China to join with us in carrying out the objectives of the Potsdam declaration and the terms of surrender for Japan. The Far Eastern Advisory Commission was established in October, but Great Britain had reservations regarding its advisory character, and the Soviet Union requested a decision regarding the control machinery in Tokyo before joining the work of the commission.

At Moscow the three governments, with the concurrence of China, agreed on a Far Eastern Commission. It will consist of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, the United States, France, Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India and the Philippines.

The Far Eastern Commission will have authority to formulate principles to the government control of Japan. It will act by a majority vote, which, however, must include the concurring votes of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and the United States. The decisions of the commission will be incorporated into directives to the Supreme Commander by the United States government.

Under the agreement establishing the commission, no basic allied policy for Japan may be adopted without our concurrence, pending agreement in the Far Eastern Commission. In case of need we are free to give interim directives on all urgent matters. Only three questions are excepted from our authority to give interim directives. The questions reserved for action by the commission — which action requires our concurrence — are questions dealing with changes in the control of Japan as set forth in the surrender terms, or with fundamental changes in the Japanese constitutional structure, or with changes in the Japanese government as a whole.

These are questions which by their nature require agreement among the principal allies if there is to be a common allied policy. To reserve them for decision by the commission does not affect the administration of allied control by the Supreme Commander.

It has not been our policy to dictate changes in the Japanese

government as a whole, and in so far as it is necessary to make individual changes in the cabinet or to fill vacancies created by the resignation of individual members, the authority of the Supreme Commander to act remains unimpaired.

The three governments also agreed, with the concurrence of China, on the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan, to be composed of representatives of the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, China and the United States, under the chairmanship of General MacArthur, as the Supreme Allied Commander. The Council is to advise and consult with the Supreme Commander in carrying out the terms of surrender. His decision will be controlling on all but the three reserved questions I have just mentioned.

If any disagreements arise in the Council regarding the implementation of a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission upon any of these three points, the Supreme Commander will withhold action pending a clarification of its decision by the Far Eastern Commission. But when necessary, as I have already explained, the Supreme Commander, after appropriate consultation with the Council, may change individual ministers and fill vacancies.

The proposals we offered regarding Japan make it clear that we intend to cooperate with our allies, and we expect them to cooperate with us. But at the same time, our agreement safeguards the efficient administration which has been set up in Japan under the Supreme Allied Commander. It assures that the authority of General MacArthur will not be obstructed by inability of the Far Eastern Commission to agree on policies, or by inability of the Allied Council to agree upon the methods of carrying them out.

We were determined to assure that the outstanding and efficient administration set up and executed by General MacArthur should not be obstructed.

The administration of Korea has been a trying problem since the surrender of Japan. For purposes of military operations, the occupation of Korea was divided north and south of latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas. The continuation of this division after the surrender, has been unsatisfactory. The movement of persons and

the functioning of public services on a nationwide scale has been hampered.

Under our agreement at Moscow, the two military commands are to form a joint Soviet-American Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems. They will make recommendations to the governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China for the formation of a Korean provisional democratic government. They will also make proposals to these governments regarding a four-power trusteeship to prepare Korea for its independence within five years.

The joint Soviet-American Commission, working with the Korean provisional democratic government, may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship. It is our goal to hasten the day when Korea will become an independent member of the society of nations.

In the various agreements and understandings reached in Moscow, the interests of China were taken into full account. China is to participate in the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Far Eastern Commission, in the four-power Allied Council in Tokyo, in the formation of a Korean provisional national government, and in any trusteeship for Korea.

But China, divided by civil strife, will not be able to take its rightful place among its allies, and discharge properly its international responsibilities. Our policy toward China, as recently announced by President Truman,* was discussed at Moscow. We found our allies in substantial accord with that policy. The three governments agreed that cessation of civil strife and broad participation, through the National Government, of democratic elements, are necessary to assure a unified, peaceful and democratic China under the National Government. The three governments reaffirmed adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

Mr. Molotov and I discussed the problem of Soviet and American armed forces in China. The Soviet Union, pursuant to their agreement with the National Government of China, plans to remove its

*See separate volume by the title "U.S. Policy towards China."

forces from Manchuria by February 1. We will move our marines from North China when the Japanese troops are disarmed and departed from China, or when China is able to complete the task unassisted by us.

The understanding of the three powers as to policy toward China should assist General Marshall in the mission he has undertaken.

The British and ourselves came to Moscow with a very definite proposal for the establishment by the United Nations of a commission on atomic energy and related matters, based on the Washington declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada on that subject. At the request of the Soviet government the discussion of our proposal was placed at the end of our agenda. Our discussions were limited to this proposal. At no time did we discuss any technical or scientific matters, nor were we asked by the Soviet government about the new weapon. I was happy to find that the Soviet government feels as we do, that this particular weapon is of such revolutionary nature that we should explore through a United Nations commission the methods of international control.

It should be understood that the task of the commission is to inquire into the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and related matters, and to make recommendations. Neither the Security Council nor the commission, has authority to bind any government to act on its recommendations.

The four objectives set forth in the proposed resolution establishing the commission, are not intended to indicate the order in which they are to be considered. In particular, it was intended, and is understood, that the matter of safeguards will apply to the recommendations of the commission in relation to every phase of the subject, and at every stage. Indeed, at the root of the whole matter lies the problem of providing the necessary safeguards.

Neither we, nor any other nation, would be expected to share armament secrets until it was certain that effective safeguards had been developed to insure our mutual protection.

The Soviet government offered only a few amendments to the

proposal submitted by us. Those amendments were designed to clarify the relations of the commission to the Security Council. With some revisions, we accepted them.

Carefully examined, these amendments will be found to go no further than appropriate to enable the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

The Security Council can give directions to the commission and restrain publication of reports detrimental to peace and security, but such action can be taken only with the concurrence of all its permanent members. Failure of the Security Council to act cannot block the work of the commission.

The three governments have invited France, China and Canada to join us in submitting the proposed resolution to the Assembly of the United Nations.

The foreign ministers reached understanding on all important terms placed on the agenda with the exception of Iran. At one time it looked as if we might agree on a tripartite commission to consider Iranian problems, which have been accentuated by the presence of allied troops in Iran. Unfortunately, we could not agree. I do not wish to minimize the seriousness of the problem. But I am not discouraged. I hope that the exchange of views may lead to further consideration of the grave issues involved and out of such consideration a solution may be found.

There was no subject as to which an agreement was reached that was not covered in the communique published Friday, apart from instructions to the representatives of the three governments to facilitate the agreements in the field.

The agreements reached should bring hope to the war-weary people of many lands. They will facilitate the signing of peace treaties, which is necessary to permit the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories. Only by the withdrawal of the armies of occupation can the people have an opportunity to start on the long road to economic recovery. Only by economic recovery of the other countries, can we in America hope for the full employment of our capital in this interdependent world.

We must realize that international conferences are not held to give individual statesmen the opportunity to achieve diplomatic successes. They are intended to be useful in the adjustments of delicate social and human relations between countries with many common interests and many divergent interests.

In international affairs, as in national affairs, conflicting interests may find a common way by discussion and better understanding. The meeting in Moscow did serve to bring about better understanding. We must not slacken in our efforts. With patience, good will, and tolerance, we must strive to build and maintain a just and enduring peace.

莫斯三科外國長會議報告

REPORT OF MOSCOW CONFERENCE

of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of U. S. S. R.,
U. S. A. and the United Kingdom

*With a Speech on the Conference
by U. S. State Secretary Byrnes*

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