

No. 3301

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: YAMAWAKI, Masataka

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I, YAMAWAKI, Masataka, am an ex-General and now living at 348 KANBARA, KITAHARA-MURA, TAKAOKA-GUN, KOCHI Prefecture.
2. On the 10th of December, 1938 I was transferred from the post of Chief of General Affairs Department, Inspectorate-General of Military Training to that of Vice-Minister of War and held that position till the middle of October 1939; subsequently I went to Central China to take over the position of Commander of the 3rd Division. Lieutenant General ITAGAKI was War Minister when I was appointed Vice-Minister of War. With the resignation of the Cabinet at the end of August 1939, he resigned his office. As mentioned above, while I was assisting War Minister ITAGAKI as Vice-Minister of

War, I became quite familiar with his ideals, executive ability, behaviour, personality, and ability to understand.

3. When I was appointed Vice-Minister of War, War Minister ITAGAKI expressed orally his fundamental principles of administration in regard to state affairs. The essentials of what he told me, which still remain in my memory were as follows:

"Japan and China ought not to quarrel with each other, but should cooperate. We must devote ourselves most ardently to bring about peace between Japan and China as speedily as possible by putting an end to the present unfortunate state of hostilities. Toward foreign countries, we should adjust diplomatic relations and promote friendship; and toward the Soviet Russia, we must gain a sense of security from the standpoint of national defense and remain absolutely calm. Within the nation we must enforce military discipline and tighten the unity within the Army, and at the same time we must endeavor to increase our national strength, taking into consideration a possibility that the restoration of peace with China might not be realized in the immediate future."

While in office, War Minister ITAGAKI's efforts were concentrated along these principles, and in assisting him these principles were also my principles.

4. In establishing peace between China and Japan, War Minister ITAGAKI approached the problem from a broad point of view, his fundamental idea being mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial right and mutual cooperation in the fields of culture and economy.

As the so-called "KONOE's Three Principles", made public on the 22nd of December 1938, were synonymous with his contention, the War Minister made every effort to carry them out.

He cooperated with Premier KONOE, who was eager to seek peace and co-operation with Messrs. Tang Shoo-i and Wu Fei-fu, and shared enthusiasm with Mr. Wang Chao-ming and the rest of the Kuomintang officials in their hope to set up a new central government consisting of both Wang Chao-ming and Chiang Kai-shek.

5. War Minister ITAGAKI was for strengthening the Japan-Germany-Italy Anti-Comintern Agreement on the grounds that Japan might be freed from her international isolation through close cooperation with Germany; that Germany might be induced to act as an intermediary in bringing about peace between Japan and China; and that at the same time the Soviet's threat from the north might be mitigated.

According to the information given to me by War Minister ITAGAKI, the Japanese Government's basic condition regarding the said Pact was: ---

"Soviet is primarily the object, but Britain and France might also become our object if the situation changes. In the latter case, whether or not Japan would go so far as to give armed assistance to her allies depends upon the circumstances. To the outside world this new agreement will be explained as an appendix to the Anti-Comintern Agreement".

However, in attempting to utilize this pending agreement for

political purposes, and in spite of her knowledge that Japan could not afford to participate in an armed conflict, Germany maintained that Britain and France would be outwardly the object of fighting and refused to assent to the proposal of including secret clauses in the agreement. Such being the situation, many days had elapsed without any definite conclusion. In the meantime the Japanese Government officials discussed and argued to reach a happy medium by technically changing the forms and words of the agreement without affecting Japan's basic conditions. And Germany had begun to doubt Japan's sincerity in this matter, adding much to the difficulty in concluding the agreement.

The Army wished a speedy conclusion of the pact in order to attain peace with China and to insure a sense of security toward Soviet Russia. Some men in the Army even maintained that outwardly it may be unavoidable to conclude the agreement unconditionally if that will help Germany to understand Japan's sincerity.

Nevertheless : on the 8th of August, 1938, War Minister ITAGAKI stated before the Five Ministers' Conference as follows:---

"In order to conclude the agreement we, as representative of the Army, consider that it is unavoidable to make certain changes in the form provided our true spirit remains embodied. However, since it is impossible to change our established Government policy, I will endeavour to conclude the agreement in line with the policy set forth by the government. In case Germany does not meet our terms, I will be glad to take the political responsibility there of".

As a State Minister, he thus clarified his position to follow the established Government policy, and successfully controlled the Army circles.

The above is what I heard directly from him on that day after the Five-Ministers' Conference.

6. As for the blockade of the British concession in Tien tsin, which occurred on June 14, 1938, negotiations were in progress locally since it was a matter connected with the Japanese Army in North China. On the 20th of June British Ambassador Craigie made proposal to have the Japanese-British Conference transferred to Tokyo. But our local military authorities did not quite favor the proposal, and at home an anti-British movement was in the making and consequently rightist-led riots were feared. In spite of all this War Minister ITAGAKI, who desired a speedy settlement of the China Incident, gave consent to the British proposal in hopes that it would be a good opportunity to prove to the British the true intention of Japan and to bring the negotiation to a successful conclusion and that it would be also a step toward peace between Japan and China.

7. Gen. ITAGAKI was sincere, gentle, broad-minded, just and fair in dealing with official matters, and entirely unselfish. All this I did fully realize while I was in office and I could not help respecting him for what he was.

On this 2nd day of September, 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: /s/ YAMAWAKI, Masataka (seal)

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I hereby certify that the above statement, signature, and seal
were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,

on the same date.

Witness: /s/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth,
withholding nothing, and adding nothing.

/s/ YAMAWAKI, Masataka (seal)