

VII - XVII

Rejected
R. 33958

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Exhibit # _____

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

Mr. Andrew B. Puskas
Office of Strategic Services
U.S. Army



Peiping

Dear Mr. Puskas,

I hand you herewith a document dated Nov. 15th, 1945, prepared by me out of my own free will in order to answer questions put to me by the American Military Authorities in Peiping.

As I have stated at the end of this document I have prepared it from memory without the help of official papers or private notes. The dates and the exact wordings of utterances contained in it may therefore be subject to irrelevant mistakes. In all essential points, I have, however, according to my best knowledge correctly related the course of events.

Yours truly

/s/ Eugen Ott

(Major-General Eugen Ott)

S.O. 441 CIC - 29 Jan. 1946

*swearing sworn statement
mostly irrelevant*

-/-

EUGEN OTT

PEKING Nov. 18th 1945

TRANSLATION

The following statement is divided into:
the time preceeding my dispatch to Japan,
my military work in Japan 1933-1938 in its main phases,
my activity as German Ambassador in Tokyo as far as the
United States of America is concerned, up to the
outbreak of the war between the USA and Japan.

(1) The time preceeding my dispatch to Japan.

During autumn 1923 Major v. Schleicher requested me to join him in his work in the "Reichswehrministerium" and I retained his confidence throughout his career, which finally led him to become "Reichswehrminister" and "Reichskanzler". During the last two years of this career 1931 and 1932 I was chief of the "Wehrmachtsabteilung" and was therefore responsible for all inner political questions concerning the Army and Navy. Predominant amongst these questions was the relation of the armed forces to the fast growing National Socialist movement. Schleicher endeavored to incorporate the National Socialist legally into the parliamentary system of the Weimar Republic and, when this attempt failed, to destroy it. The book written by Dr. Goebbels "Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei" contains on page 212 and the following pages a description of this final development, which although one-sided yet is correct on the main points. I myself was the officer mentioned on pages 213, 214 as intermediary between the "Reichswehrminister" and Adolf Hitler.

After the removal of v. Schleicher from his office as "Reichskanzler" and after this position had been taken over by Adolf Hitler personally I was requested by the new "Reichswehrminister" v. Blomberg to remain in my position as chief of the inner political "Wehrmachtsabteilung". I made it a condition, however, that if I continued in this capacity I should not be brought into conflict with the person of General v. Schleicher or with the views held by him and this was expressly confirmed by the "Reichswehrminister": "since the 'Reichswehr' can follow no other path than the previous one of strict legality."

Beginning of March such conflicts, however, already arose. I was replaced by Captain Jodl, who subsequently as General was in the "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht", but I was allowed to make a request concerning my new employment. I requested to be attached to the Japanese army then operating on the Manchurian war theatre with the intention to get away from all political work and to be as far removed from Berlin as possible. My request was sanctioned. However, since during my journey to the Far East the war actions in Manchuria came to an end, my assignment was changed into being attached for 6 months to the Japanese home-army. I arrived in Japan during the summer of 1933, removed from Berlin on my own request and with the sanction of the leading personalities.

(2) My military work in Japan 1933-1938 in its main phases.

This work is divided into two sections:

- (a) the time when I was attached to the Japanese army in 1933
- (b) my activity as military attache to the German Embassy in Tokyo 1934-1938.

(a) When I became attached to the Japanese army I had the choice between the Guards in Tokyo or a line-regiment. I requested to be attached to the 3rd regiment of artillery garrisoned at Nagoya. My stay in this provincial town, which at that time had not yet developed into one of the main centres of Japanese armament, was meant to give me the opportunity to devote myself exclusively to the study of the Japanese army, removed entirely from all diplomatic and political circles. This study and a period extending over many weeks during which I lived in closest contact with the troops, allowed me to form an opinion on the Japanese army. My subsequent work in Japan was mainly based on this judgment. I found the following to be the main characteristics of this army:

Unflinching obedience towards the Tenno,
extreme preparedness for sacrifice,
deficiency in modern arms and combat methods,
an officers' corps, that was politically
minded to a large extent.

(b) In April 1934 I returned to Tokyo as military attache after a brief stay in Germany. I guess that two reasons secured this new position for me:

In view of the increasing tension with Russia it was the intention to send as military attache a man, who already had acquired a certain knowledge of the country and who had established contact with the Japanese officers' corps.

In view of the inner political tension in Germany it was desirable to remove a man, of whom it was well known that he held the confidence of General v. Schleicher. (The General was murdered four months later.)

In my capacity as military attache I first broadened my judgment concerning the military conditions prevailing in Manchuria, particularly as regards the adaptability of the Manchurian-Russian frontier for attack and defense, even during the severest winter. I gained the conviction that taking into consideration the weapons in use at that time, the attacker, whether Russian or Japanese, would find himself in an unfavorable position and that possible war actions on Russia's far-eastern front would hardly touch Russia's heart or make themselves felt on Russia's European front. These considerations and the main characteristics of the Japanese army mentioned above led to the conclusion that the Japanese army would better be used for political means than for actual combat. I expressed this principle, which I stressed repeatedly towards the "Reichswehrminister" and the political quarters, in the words:

"The Japanese sword should be sharp, but remain unsheathed". I requested the "Reichswehrminister" to confirm this principle expressly and reported accordingly, when I heard of the negotiations that were conducted in Berlin for the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

Resulting from this opinion I told the Japanese General Staff that I considered the attack in China July 1937 to be a very severe blunder, which surprised and annoyed the General Staff extremely. Nevertheless the Japanese General Staff requested me October 1937 that I should use the occasion of a visit to the China Front to undertake the secret mission to extend a peace-feeler from the General Staff to Chiang Kai Shek. This was done at my instigation by the German Ambassador to China, Trautmann. After my return from this front-visit, I had the opportunity to explain to the War Minister and to a confidant of Prince Konoye my views on the situation and gave my advice in a most decided manner that this war should be ended, which otherwise would be endless and result in a deterioration of the Japanese position in the world. This subsequently, during the winter 1937-1938, resulted in the cooperation of the German Government when an attempt was made to establish peace between Japan and China, which however was not successful at that time.

- (3) My activity as German Ambassador in Tokyo as far as the United States of America is concerned, up to the outbreak of the war between the USA and Japan.

When Ambassador v. Dirksen was recalled from Tokyo due to illness, I received a cable-message from the Chief of the General Staff in March 1938 to the effect that the Fuehrer had the intention to dismiss me from active military service and to appoint me instead as ambassador to Tokyo. My reply to this message was solicited. I declared myself ready to accept the appointment, but requested to be permitted to remain on the active service list. I wished to retain the possibility to return to my old profession, since it might at any time be possible, that in my capacity as ambassador I might come into conflict with the instructions received from Berlin. The permission to remain on active service was not granted and my appointment as ambassador confirmed.

The confidence I enjoyed with the Japanese army, at that time the decisive political group, was probably mainly responsible for my appointment, which was completely surprising. The confidence placed in me had recently made itself particularly felt in connection with the peace-attempt with Chiang Kai Shek. On the other hand it is also not impossible that the Japanese military attache in Berlin, Major-General Oshima, used his strong influence with the Reich Foreign Minister in the expectation that my appointment might induce his government to appoint him ambassador as well. This appointment actually took place.

I was ordered to report personally to Adolf Hitler in Berlin and this coincided with the danger of war in connection with the Czechoslovakian crisis in May 1938. Hitler gave expression to his apprehension that the "necessity imposed upon him" to enlarge the German "Lebensraum" to the East until national self-sufficiency was reached might meet with the strongest opposition on the part

of England. Hitler intimated that there were no signs of understanding in England for the necessities of life of the Reich in spite of the German policy of restraint which found its expression in the Naval Agreement. Hitler vaguely hinted at the possibility of war with England and asked whether in such event Japan might diminish her tension with Russia and would change over to a policy of exerting pressure on England. I declared that I could judge this question only from Tokyo, since it was new to the German-Japanese policy, and after I had arrived at an opinion how far the war actions in China had in the meantime absorbed the strength of Japan and influenced her foreign relations. One point however I would have to make clear immediately. It would be of paramount importance for the attitude of Japan towards England, that the German Government succeeded to keep the United States neutral, because the latter had their fingers on the threat of Japan.

I communicated the contents of this conversation to Secretary of State v. Weizsaecker and obtained his consent to adjust my future reports, if at all possible, to the object of preventing this war danger and to call on the ambassadors v. Dirksen and Dieckhoff on my way back via London and Washington, in order to win them over to the same procedure. Both ambassadors were found by me to be fully prepared to do this. Ambassador Dieckhoff was much perturbed, however, because his continued warnings regarding the growing estrangement of the United States were not taken seriously by Berlin. He gave me the assurance of the fighting forces, however, that both in his own reports and in those of his attaches he would stress the extreme weight that the United States could bring to bear upon Japan, both economically and militarily. I myself reported from Tokyo that the China conflict had in the meantime grown to become a matter of life and death, occupying Japan's strength completely, as it was most seriously pointed out to me by Japanese statemen after my return.

The news of the result of the Munich Conference lifted for the moment the nightmare of imminent war. I attended a luncheon which happened to take place at the time and which united all army and air-attaches accredited to Tokyo, whose doyen I had formerly been, and in a speech I gave expression to my joy over the pacification of Europe, same as this was done by the British military attache, General Figgitt.

After the conclusion of the German-Russian Agreement and after the war had broken out in Europe Japan first took up a waiting attitude, which was characterized by the declaration of Foreign Minister Arita, in which he acknowledged the status quo in the Pacific. After the collapse of France and in view of the growing aid rendered by the United States to England and Chiang Kai Shek the new Japanese Cabinet Konoye through its Foreign Minister Matsuoka attempted to establish closer contact with Germany.

In this situation special envoy Stahmer arrived in Tokyo, who was charged by the Reich Foreign Minister with the special mission to negotiate with Japan for a defensive treaty, whose main object should be to prevent the United States from entering the war. The Three-Power-Treaty resulted, which was negotiated in Tokyo, and signed in Berlin. I collaborated with all my

strength at its conclusion. The preamble to the treaty, which was drawn up by Matsuoka personally and his attitude throughout the negotiations admitted no doubt whatever that the treaty was also by the Japanese Government considered to be a means to prevent the expansion of the European war and of the war actions in China to a world conflagration and to facilitate the local settlement in Europe and Asia.

In speeches held before the German communities in Tokyo and Kobe I underlined this sense of the treaty and gave expression to the hope that through the joining of Soviet Russia and if at all possible also China as signatories the Three-Power-Pact should become a fully effective instrument of peace. The same declaration was repeatedly made by Matsuoka and myself to the Russian ambassador in Tokyo, Smetanin. The invitation to Berlin by the German Government during Spring 1941 was also used by Matsuoka in his first talk with Hitler in my presence to once again explain at length Japan's desire for peace as embodied in the Three-Power-Pact.

When Matsuoka upon his return to Japan found the proposals of the State Department, which touched upon the Three-Power-Pact, he kept me informed of the main outlines and of the counter-proposals planned by the Japanese Government and declared that Japan considered herself bound to the Three-Power-Pact. By order of the German Government I supported his intention to uphold this pact as an instrument of peace. On this occasion Matsuoka gave me a new and impressive proof of our complete agreement in the valuation of the pact, when he showed me a letter from him to the American ambassador Grew, in which with almost imploring words he gave expression to his gravest fears concerning the outbreak of a war with the United States.

When Foreign Minister Matsuoka resigned a period of active and open exchange of ideas between myself and the Japanese Government came to its close and was replaced by an attitude of restraint and secretiveness on the part of the Japanese. The further development of the negotiations with the United States, as far as such took place, became obscure, e.g. it was not even possible for me to clear up the rumor concerning a meeting in the Pacific between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt. Also the sudden dispatch to Washington of Ambassador Kurusu as negotiator was communicated to me as a fact only, without sufficient data concerning the orders given him. The situation therefore was such, that during these months, which, as was subsequently proved, were decisive in Japan's preparations for war, my personal contact with the Japanese Government was particularly restricted. The same applied to the Italian ambassador, Indelli. Up to today it has not been possible for me to find out the date when Japan actually resolved to resort to war.

During this period public feeling was running high occasioned by the coercive economic and financial measures adopted against Japan and the necessity of military counter-measures was often discussed theoretically in Japanese circles. I remember a call on me by Minister of War Tojo, when he also theoretically discussed the piercing by the Japanese army of the embargo on raw materials, and when he also talked of the oil-fields in Burma. I

warned him in the event of a military conflict not to stake the aims too far and particularly not to act as aggressor against the United States.

End of November or beginning of December Major-General Okamoto, a member of the Imperial Headquarters, approached the German military attache with the question, whether in the event of an armed conflict with the United States Japan could count on the armed support by Germany, and requested to submit this question to the ambassador. Since according to Japanese procedure this was obviously an official feeler, I passed the question on to the German Government with this characterization and received the instruction to transmit to the questioner the impression from Berlin, that one would be prepared to negotiate for armed support by Germany to be effective in the event of an American-Japanese conflict. Major-General Okamoto declared that he would communicate this reply to the Japanese Government, by order of which he had acted. In connection herewith I received, as far as I remember, the draft of an agreement drawn up by the German Government, which was presumably agreed upon with the Japanese officials in Berlin, and which was to be submitted to the Japanese Foreign Minister. After a few slight alterations by the Japanese Foreign Minister this agreement was signed in Berlin on the 11th December and published.

In the meantime the events of the 8th December had taken place. At about 7:30 in the morning I was called to the Vice-Foreign Minister, who informed me that the negotiations in Washington had resulted in a deadlock and that a clash had occurred with naval forces of the United States. At first I had the impression of a very severe incident and cabled accordingly to Berlin, until shortly afterwards I received a second declaration from the Vice Foreign Minister to the effect that the Japanese armed forces had attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. This outbreak of the war took the German Embassy in Tokyo completely by surprise, same as this was the case, according to my knowledge, with all other foreign missions. The navy had put to sea unnoticed, - on second thoughts a temporary news black-out, which however had not been enforced for the first time, and demonstrative marches of marine troops in Tokyo and surrounding districts could be considered as camouflage measures.

At a meeting which was immediately convened I informed the leaders of the German community and commercial establishments of Japan's entry into the war and laid it down that this had happened on the own free will of Japan.

Towards the world at large the Japanese Prime Minister TOJO declared in one of his first statements after the outbreak of the war in December - I do not remember exactly the date and the wording - that Japan entered into the war in accordance with her own decision and that she would conduct it as her own war.

I have prepared this document from memory without the help of official papers or private notes. The dates and the exact wording of utterances contained in it may therefore be subject to irrelevant mistakes. In all essential points I have, however, according to my best knowledge correctly related the course of events.

Translation from the original in German language
dated Peiping, 15th November 1945, and signed by
Eugen Ott.

送附文書二八五八

機密

局

北京

アメリカ合衆国陸軍

戦術局

アンドルー・ビー・ブスカ殿

北京駐屯アメリカ陸軍當局が私に質問された事項に答へるために私が自發的に作製した一九四五年十一月十五日附の一文書を私はここに呈請にお渡し致します。

本文書の最後の箇所では述べておりましたように、私は公文書又は他人の書面に依拠しないで、自分の記憶を以て本文書を作製しました。従つて、本文書に記述されてゐる日附も正確な言葉遣ひには不適切と思はれる點があるかも知れません。併し、私はすべての重複を註に於ては、自分の書面に知つてお

るごころに基づいて正確に事件の経過を述べました。

敬具

ユージェン・オット

(ユージェン・オット少将)

ブスカ殿

(エスオ！ 四四一シー・アイ・シー。昭和二十一年一月廿九日)

辯護則文書二八五八

オイゲン オット

昭和二十年十一月十八日北京に於て

詞 詞

下記の陳述は次の三項に分けられる。

一 予が日本に派遣せらるゝまで

二 昭和八年より昭和十三年に至る間軍事方面に於る予の在日軍事的任務

三 米日間戦争勃發に至るまで予の在東京並割獨逸大使としてアメリカ合衆国

關係の行動

(一) 予が日本に派遣せらるゝまで

昭和十二年秋のことフオン シュライヘル少佐は予に獨逸国防官に於る少

佐の業務に加ははらんことを求めた、そして予は彼の全生涯、それは彼を

して遂に国防大臣たらしめ宰相たらしめたのであるが、予は其の責任を

博し々のであつた。此の履歴の中最後の二年間、即ち昭和六年と昭和七年には予は国防局の局長であつたので陸海軍に關するあらゆる内部的の政治的の開明に資を有つて居た。是等諸問題のうち最も重要なるものは軍隊と領に發達した国防民社會黨運動との關係であつた。シュライヘルは国防民社會黨をワイマール共和の議會政治制度上の合法的政黨として結成しやうと努力したが、此の計畫が失敗するやこれを破壞せんとした。ゲツベルス博士の著『宮廷より宰相へ』は二百十二頁以降に此の最後の經過に關する敘流を記載して居る、それは一方的の解釋ではあるがなほ主要なる點に於ては正確である。予自身は国防省とアドルフ・ヒットラーとの間に介在する二百十三頁二百十四頁所載の特筆であつた。

フォン シュライヘルが宰相としての職を去り更に此の地位がアドルフヒツトラー自身により占められてから、予は新国防大臣フォン プロムベルクから内政の国防局長官たる地位に留任するやう求められた。然し乍ら予は現職に止まるならばフォン シュライヘル將軍個人乃至は將軍の抱懐する見解に對する紛争に巻き込まれることを條件とした。そして此の條件は國務大臣により明白に確認せられたのである。『されば國防は真正なる合法の下從來と同等變らざる途を歩むことが出来たのである』

然し乍ら斯る紛争は三月上旬早くも起つた。予は後に陸軍大將として國防軍司令部にあつたヨードル大尉と更迭させられたが、予は新しい職に關して要求をなすことを許された。予はあらゆる政治上の仕事から離れ又伯林から出来るだけ遠くへ離れたい考へから當時滿洲の戰場に作戦中の日本陸軍附となりたいたと要求した。予の要求は允せられた。然し予が滿蒙に向つてゐる間に滿洲に於る戦争は併んで了つたので予の任務は六ヶ月間内地の日本陸軍附といふことに變つた。予は昭和八年夏日本に到着、首腦者等の許可を得て予自らの需めてより伯林を去つたのである。

辭讓則文書二八五八

(2) 一九三三年より一九三八年間の日本に於ける主要軍務

右軍務は二部に分れる

(a) 一九三三年日本陸軍に所屬してゐた期間

(b) 一九三四年より一九三八年まで東京勸進大使館附武官としての活動

(a) 日本陸軍に所屬する時私は東京の近衛隊或いは神隊いづれかを選擇する事も出来た。私は名古屋守備の砲兵第三聯隊附を希望した。當時ははまだ日本の軍備中心地の一とまでは覺達してゐなかつた之の田舎町に滞在する事により私はすべての外交的政治的接觸より脱出し専ら日本陸軍の研究に没頭する積りであつたこの研究及軍隊と幾週間にも亘つて緊密に接觸しつつ生活する事により私は日本陸軍に關しある見解を養成する事が出来た。その後の日本に於ける私の仕事は主としてこの當時事を見解に基くものであつた。私は以下が日本軍隊の主要特色である事を見出した。

天皇に対する絶對的従順

義性に對する極端なる覺悟

近代兵隊及武官方法の缺陷

非常に政治的關心を有するある將校のグループ

(b)

一九三四年四月獨逸に於ける短期間の滞在後私は武官として東京に舞ひ戻つて來た。二つの原因が私をしてこの新しい任務につかしめたものと想像して居る。

ソ聯との關係益々切迫するに鑑み、武官としてソ聯に關し若干の知識を有する者で日本の將校連中と確固たる接觸を有する者を武官として送る意圖であつた事。

獨逸國內の政治的緊迫に鑑みシユライヘル將軍の信任を有するとして著名な男を除去する事は好ましかつた事、將軍は四ヶ月後暗殺せられた。

武官たる資格に於いて私は元づつ滿洲に於ける直隸の一般狀況に就き、殊に
 威震の頃迄さえおけるソ兩國境の攻守の適應に就きし自分の見解を應じた
 當時使用せられてのた武器を考慮に入れぬは、攻撃曲はソ聯であらうと日
 本であらうとを同はす不利な立場になる事及びもしソ聯の遼東鐵線に同
 き行ふとしてもそれはソ聯の心腹部を損する事は殆んどあるまいし、ソ聯
 のヨーロッパ鐵線に何等の影響も及ぼさぬであらうとの確信を懐いた。之等
 の考察と前述の如きは日本陸軍の主要特色に依り、日本陸軍は實戦よりも政
 治的手段として用ふる方がよいと云ふ結論に達した。私はこの方策を以下
 のやうな言葉で「内務大臣」及び外務に對し繰返し強調した。
 「日本力は直しく威利たるべし、併し輔に收めてあつてはならぬ」私は此
 主義を特に確認するやうに「ナチ國」の大臣に要請せ、而して亦共協定締結の
 交渉談「ベルリン」に於いて進行してゐることを聞いた時、この趣旨に従
 つて報告した。
 この意見の結果として私は殊に本部に申入れた。昭和十二年（一九一七）
 七月（七月）の支那鐵線は重大なる誤りであると思ふと、これを聞いた時
 本部は驚き且つ非常に困惑した。併し參事本部が昭和十二年（一九一七）
 七月（七月）十月私に伺つて要求いたし、支那鐵線觀察の機曾を利用し

ア参証本部から蔭介石へ和平の脚手をさし伸べる使節派遣方を内密に行つ
 て呉れとのことであつた。このことは私の是議に依つて中ロ駐在特使
 トラウトマンによつて實行された。私は該總視察から歸つてから、陸
 相及び近衛公の一側近者に対し情勢に關する私見を述べらる機会があつた。
 私は、今にしてこの戦争を廢めないと何時迄戦争が續くか分らないし、又
 世界に於ける日本の立場が悪化する結果になるから、今戦争を廢めなければ
 ならずぬ旨を回すとして通告した。この事は後になりまして、昭和十二年
 (一九一七年)から昭和十三年にかけての冬期間に日支兩國の樹立が
 試みられた時特使政府の助力となつて表化された。併し和平の樹立はその
 時には成功しなかつた。
 日 正日「ドイツ」大使として、日本開戦に至るまでの私の對米日活動一
 フォン・テイルクセン大使が病氣のため東京より召還された時に、私
 は昭和十三年(一九一八年)三月、參謀總長から次の通旨の電報を受
 けた。總統は私を現役から引かせて正日大使に任命する意圖である。こ
 の電文に對して私の回答が求められてゐた。それで私は任命を受諾する用意
 はあるが、現役の儘で就任を計されたとき旨を回答した。これは私が再び元
 の職務に戻れる可能を認めて直したからである。と申し及すの
 は、私は大使を務めてゐるとその職務上の關係から「ベルリン」條の訓令

と衝突するような場合か何時起らないとも限らなかつたからである。現役
の儘といふ許可は遂に與へられず、大使としての任命が確定された。

私が漸く大使に任命された事情は恐らく私が當時絶対的政治力を有していた団体である日本の軍隊から享けていた信任がその主なる原因ではなかつたかと思はれるが、これは全く私には意外の事でした私に對するこの信任は上記蔣介石氏に對する和平工作に懸連して待にその頃が意識されて居た。併し他方から見れば駐獨日本大使館附武官たる大島少將が私の大使就任が以て日本政府を馳つて彼大島を大使に任命せしむるに至るべしとの期待を以て「ドイツ」外相に對し有力なる運動を試みたのであるといふことも有り得ない處ではない而かもこの任命は實現化した。私は「ベルリン」の「アドルフ・ヒツトラー」に直接報告のため露國命令を受けたが、この命令の出たのは丁度昭和十三年（一九百三十八年）五月「チエコスロバキヤ」問題に懸連して戦争危機の時上つた時と同時であつた。「ヒツトラー」は彼自身に課せられたる必絶的使命、即ち「ドイツ」の國家的自給自足が達せられる迄は東方に向つて「ドイツ」生活圏を擴大すること、これは英國側から最も鋭刀なる反對を受くるやも知れぬとの懸念を表現した。

ヒツトラーは、獨逸が自肅方針をとり之が海軍増定に表明されてゐ

るにも拘らず、英國は獨逸の生死を決する必需品に對して何等理解を示してをらないと厭めかした。彼はまた、獨英戰爭勃發の可能性をそれとなく、暗示し斯かる事態の發生した場合は日本はロシヤとの緊張を緩和して對英強迫政策に導じて呉れないだらうかと私に訊ねた私はこの問題は日獨外交にとつてはじめての事であるから私が東京に歸任するのを待ち而して又日本が中國に於ける軍事行動にどれ程その助力を授じ且つそれが日本の對外關係に如何なる影響を與へたかについて自分が一つの見解に到達した上でなければ解答致し兼ねると答へた。然し私は茲で一つの事を明瞭にして置き度いと附け加へた。即ち當時英國は日本に對し威嚇的態度をとつてゐたのであるから獨逸政府が英國をして中立状態を保たしめる事は日本の對英態度決定上非常な重要性を有してゐると述べた。

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私はこの會談内容を國務大臣ヴァイツァー宛傳達し爾後自分の報告は能ふ限り戰爭回避目的の線に沿はしめること並に自分がロンドン及びワシントン經由で歸任の途上デイルクゼン及びデイークホフの兩大使を訪ひ同様方針を以て臨まれるやう説得する事について、彼の贊同を得た。そして私はこの兩大使とも十分この方針に従ふ心遣えのあ

る事を見出した。然しデイークホフ大使は、彼が英米兩國疎隔の形勢に對し納えず警告を與へてもベルリンが之を重要視しないといふことを非常に心配してゐた。だが彼は、彼自身の調査報告書及び大使館附武官の調査報告書のどちらにも米國は經濟的軍事的に日本に極度の壓迫を加へ得る點を強調すると言つてその戦力に關し私に保證した。私自身は歸任後私に對して日本の政治家達が眞剣になつて指摘した如く日本はこの間の對支國争の爲に國力を傾けつくし正に一國死活の問題に立到らんとしてゐる状態を東京から報告した。

ミューニツヒ會議の結果が傳へられて、緊迫せる戦雲の悪夢が暫く消滅した。私は丁度その時催されてゐた午餐會に出席してゐた。之はかつて私が首席を占めてゐた東京派遣の全陸空軍武官達の會合であつたが英國陸軍武官ピヂェット中將と私は、こゝで歐洲平和到來の喜の意を表した演説を行つた。

獨逸條約締結後並に歐洲戰勃發後、日本は最初日和見的态度をとつた。之は太平洋に於ける現状維持を承認した有田外相の聲明に現れてゐる。フランス没落後、アメリカの對英國及對蔣介石援助の進展に鑑み日本の近衛新内閣は松岡外相を通して日獨關係の緊密化を計つた。このやうな狀勢下にスターリマ特使が東京に着任した。彼はアメリカの參戰防止を主眼とする防禦條約締結の爲日本と交渉を爲すべき特務を獨逸外相から受けてゐた。三國條約は東京で交渉が行はれベルリンで調印されて成立した。私は全力をあげてその締結に協力した。松岡自身の手になる條約前文と、交渉中を通じての彼の態度に徴して、日本政府も亦此の條約を以て、ヨーロッパ戰爭の擴大を防ぎ、支那に於ける戰爭行爲が世界大戰へと發展するのを喰ひ止め、且歐洲と亞細亞に於て事變の局部的終結を容易ならしむる手段として考へていたことは毫も疑ひの餘地がない。東京及び神戸に於て獨逸在留民に對し余が爲した演説には、該條約の此の意義を強調し、且ソ聯も之に参加することに依

り、尙お出来るなら支那も亦此の三國協定の署名國と成るなら、是が完全有效なる和平の方便となるであろうと云ふ希望を述べた。松岡と余は東京駐劄のソ聯大使スメタニンに對し繰り返えし之と同様のことを言明した。一九四一年の春獨逸政府が松岡を柏林に招いた時も、松岡は此の機を利用してヒットラーの最初の覷見に於て余の面前で、又もや三國協定に盛られた和平に對する日本の要望を詳細に言つて説明した。

松岡が日本に歸つて來て、三國協定に關聯してアメリカ國務省から提言のあつたことを知つた時に、彼はその概綱と、之に對する日本政府の對案を余に示し、そして日本は三國協定に對して責を負ふべきだと考へていると言明した。獨逸政府の命に依り余は和平の手段として此の協定を確認する彼の意圖を支持した。この際松岡は此の協定の價值に對する彼我の間の完全なる意見の一致を示す新らしき、そして感銘的な證左を余に與えた。それは彼がアメリカ大使グルーに宛てた彼の書翰を余に示した時であつた。その書翰には、合衆國との間の戦争の勃發に就き彼が抱く重大なる危惧の念を殆んど哀願的な言辭を以て云ひ現はしていたのである。

松岡外務大臣が辞職した時余と日本政府との間には活発な且率直な意見の交換を爲す時期が終りを告げ、それに代つて日本側の態度は控へ目で秘密的になつた。アメリカとの其の後の交渉はそれがあつたとしてもその結果は不明と成つた。例へば太平洋上に於ける近衛公とルトズヴェルト大統領との意見に關する風説などの眞疑を確めることすら余に取つては不可能であつた。又交渉員として來栖大使が突如ワシントンに派遣された時も只事實として余に通報されたのみで彼に與えられた命令事項など充分に判らなかつた。斯るか故に當時の事情はこうである、即ち彼は判明した通り、此の數ヶ月の間は、日本の戦争準備に決定的の期間であつたので余の日本政府との個人的接觸は特に制限されるに至つた。同様のことが伊太利大使インテリにも適用された。日本が戦争に訴えることを現實に決定したのは何時であつたかその日附を見出すことは余に取つては今日に至るまで不可能であつた。此の期間に於いて日本に對して執られた經濟的並に財政的強壓手段の結果として公衆の感情は高度に刺戟された。そして軍事對策の必要は屢々日本人間に理論的に論議された。余は東條首相が余を來訪した時彼も亦、日本の軍に依る原料資材の對鎖突破を理論的に論じ又ピルマの油田に就いても語つたことを記憶する

私は彼に、武力衝突あつたときには目標を余り遠方に置き過ぎないよう
に、殊に合衆國に對する侵略者となるような行動をせぬようにと警告し
た。

十一月の末であつたか、それとも十二月の初であつたか大本營の岡本
少將が合衆國と武力衝突した際に日本はドイツからの武力支持を期待し
て居てもいゝかどうかといふ問題をドイツ大使館附注在武官の許に持込み
之を大使に取次いで呉れるように求めた。

日本風のやり方に従へば之は明らかか一種の正式な打診と見るべきもの
であつたから、私は此意味を附記して此問題をドイツ政府に進達し且つ
日米衝突の際效力を發生すべきドイツの武力支持に就いて交渉を行ふの
用意ある旨のベルリンの意向を岡本少將に傳へるようかといふ政府の訓
令を受取つた。政府の命令によつて動いて居た岡本少將は此回答を日本
政府に傳達すべき旨を聲明した。私の記憶する處では、之に關聯して私
はドイツ政府が起草し恐らく院獨日本官憲と協議済みだと思はれる協定
案で日本の外務大臣に交附すべきものを受取つた。日本の外務大臣の手
で二三の極輕微な修正をした上此協定は十二月十一日ベルリンに於て調
印公表せられた。

そうこうして居る間に十二月八日の出來事が起つた。同日朝七時三十
分頃、私は外務次官に招かれ、ワシントンに於ける交渉が益々行詰りと

なつた事並に合衆國海軍との衝突があつた事を告げられた。最初私は或る非常に重大な事件だといふ印象を受けたので、その通りをベルリンに打電して書いたが、間もなく外務次官の二回目の聲明があり日本軍は眞珠灣とフィリッピンを攻撃したといふ事であつた。此戦争の勃發は三日ドイツ大使館を全く驚かしたが、私の知つて居る限りでは之は他のすべての外國使臣達も全く同様であつた。海軍は氣附かれず海上に出で行つて居たのだ。次いで氣が附いて見ると今になつて初めて行はれた事でもなかつたのだが、一時的な濫隊行動の完全な隠蔽があり、又東京及び其附近に於ける海軍の示威行進はカムフラージュの手段であつたのだ。

直ちに開かれた會合の席上私は在任ドイツ人並に南米の主だつた人々（¹⁰）に對して日本の参戰を告げ、之が日本自身の自由意思による事を斷じた。一般世間に對し日本の東條首相は十二月開戰後最初の決つかの聲明の中でその日附と用語とを私は正確に記憶して居ないが、日本は日本自身の決意に従つて開戦し日本自身の戦争として之を遂行する旨を聲明した。私は公文書にも私的な書にも頼らずに自分の記憶だけで此書類を作成した。それ故その中の日附についても發言の正確な用語についても見當違ひの間違が無いとは言へない。然しすべての重要な點では私の知つて居る限りを盡して正確に事件の経過を述べて居る。

（一九四五年十一月十五日附北平に於てオイゲン・オット署名のドイツ語原文より翻譯したるもの）