

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

REPORT No. **28**

XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

- (a) Target(s) and Location(s) See Below (FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK) (b) Time Over Target(s) 0630 I (Zone)
- (c) Clouds Over Target 8,000 Ft. 5/10's
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
- (d) Visibility of Target Easy to clear (e) Visibility 10
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)
- (f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide 50° Bomb Sight Used MK 23
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)
- ~~Rocket~~
~~Bomb~~ Bombs Dropped per Run 4 Spacing _____ Altitude of Bomb Release 2500 Yds
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET) Slant Range
- (g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed _____ Probably Destroyed _____ Damaged _____

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
		(k) SQUADRON			
1 Kikai A/P revetments		8 VBF-12	32 Rockets 3.25/5.00	32	
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

Photographic Intelligence showed revetted areas hidden in trees and invisible from the air, located near the S/W corner of Wan A/P and along a road used as a taxi strip extending East of the field through the village at Kikai. These areas are daily bombing, rocketing, and strafing targets for the Kikai TCAP. Results cannot be observed from the air.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? No Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

The situation at Kikai is an interesting one, and the actions of any one squadron or Air Group in regard thereto, does not give a complete picture. Overall tactics in regard to Kikai are not the subject of any printed matter aboard this ship nor of any verbal orders. That there are definite tactics cannot be doubted as the tiny island figures too prominently in the Okinawa operation to be overlooked.

The actions of the Kikai TCAP herein reported are typical of the many daily missions of similar TCAPS from dawn to dusk, and through some nights by VF(N). Where no airborne opposition is met, the TCAP drops its bombs, fires its rockets, and strafes certain wooded areas South and East of Wan Field where Photo Intelligence reveals hidden revetted areas in woods and even a possible underground hangar - latter not unlikely. Results other than fires cannot be observed. Operational planes are rarely seen on the field. A/A is heavy and accurate, but not always encountered. The main function of the TCAP is, of course, to deny the enemy the use of the field, and to fulfill that function the TCAP remains on station. Some TCAPS are relieved on station, but the majority go according to an almost regularized schedule.

Strikes have been sent to Kikai to bomb the field and revetted areas. The field, however, is a landing area, not a strip, and is some 4500 Ft x 1500 Ft. To keep the field unoperational would take constant daily strikes, and Task Force 58 is at present devoting its striking power on Okinawa. The field is daily reported operational.

That the Japs use the field and know our schedule of CAP was known to Air Group TWELVE early in the game. A pilot from VF-12 was hit by A/A on 8 April and landed in the water very near to the A/P. He was picked up on 12 April and returned to ship on 19 April. He stated that 15 minutes after his flight left the island, 6 Jap planes landed and 14 took off. His flight reported no Jap planes visible. At a later date, one VBF pilot observed a plane on a taxi strip while making a bombing run. After pull-out and rendezvous, he returned to rocket and strafe, but the plane was gone. On 22 April (See report No. 29) an 8 plane TCAP at Kikai observed seventy planes arrive in three groups: Group one, 18-20 fighter types; group two 25 Vals; group three 22-26 Nates. Our planes took on the first group leaving fewer planes and a very disrupted fighter escort for the Vals and Nates. The approach was of course reported, and F4U's intercepting the Vals shot them down by getting on their tails and cracking flaps to 30° so as not to overshoot. The Vals had no rear seat gunners - hence destruction in no time. Nates never presented a problem to any of our fighter types.

Kikai and Akami are obviously the only reference points between Tanega and Okinawa for Jap A/C coming South from Kyushu, and they have been coming and have been destroyed. Our losses compared to the loss to the Japs of A/C and pilots are, it is hoped, considered worth the price. Is it better to leave Kikai - Wan Field operational and destroy more and more Jap A/C which perhaps would come in much smaller numbers if the field and its facilities were completely denied them?

If the purpose of bombing, rocketing, and strafing is to destroy aircraft on Kikai, a much more effective armament plan would be napalm

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

- Guns, Gunsights
- Turrets
- Ammunition
- Bombs, Torpedoes
- Bomb Sights
- Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

- Radio, Radar
- Homing Devices
- Visual Signals
- Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

- IFF
- Signals
- Battle Lights
- Procedures

PROTECTION

- Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
- Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

- Parachutes
- Life Belts, Life Rafts
- Safety Belts
- Emergency Kits
- Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

- Compasses
- Driftsights
- Octants
- Automatic Pilots
- Charts
- Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

- Flight
- Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

- Airframe
- Control Surfaces
- Control System
- Dive Flaps
- Landing Gear
- Heating System
- Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

- Engines
- Engine Accessories
- Propellers
- Lubricating System
- Starters
- Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

- Auxiliary Plant
- Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

- Plane Servicing Equipment
- Personnel Facilities

No Comment.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

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A. C. I. Officer

RANK AND DUTY

E. J. PAWKA, Lt. Comdr., USNR
Commanding Officer.

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

1 May 1945

DATE