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
導言

國聯調查報告書者。卽國聯將據以解決我東三省問題者也。國聯解決而善。則中日糾紛可以解。世界和平。亦有一線希望。不善。則非特中日之爭益劇。或且爲世界二次大戰之導線。是則國聯調查之報告。關係甯不鉅大。東三省之存亡。旣與我全國國民俱有切膚關係。則此調查報告書。又甯能不人人注意之乎。抑研究此報告書者。又須觀察中日朝野之態度。世界各國之輿論。而後乃能測知此報告書將來能收到若何效果。故又加以各方意見之附錄。總之國難之能否打開。全視此報告書之結果。國人其毋忽。 編者識



國聯調查團——自左至右(一)克勞德將軍 H. Claudel (法) (二)李頓勳爵 Lord Lytton (英) (三)馬柯迪伯爵 Count Aldrorandi(意) (四)希尼博士 Dr. H. Schnee(德) (五)麥考益將軍 Gen. F. R. McCoy





外交部郭次長招待國聯調查團



第一章 中國近年變遷之概況

□欲瞭解現時衝突須明瞭過去情形。此次衝突之事件中

，其最先訴諸國際聯合會者。厥爲一九三一年九月十八日之事變，而該項事變實由中日兩國間年來外交緊張，時相軋轢所釀成。現欲明瞭此次之紛爭，須先將該兩國間邇來關係之原動力，加以研究。故吾人研究此問題之範圍，宜擴大於滿洲以外，並須將種種原動力。凡有足以影響目前中日間之關係者，澈底審量方可。例如中華民國國民之志願，及日本帝國與前俄帝國之擴張政策，蘇聯傳播之共產主義，暨此三國經濟上及戰略上之需要等，均爲研究滿洲問題者所應視爲重要之原動力。

滿洲爲中國之一部，而在地理上，並處於日俄兩國領土之間。故從政治上言，滿洲已成爲紛爭之中心點，且並曾爲三國之戰場。而事實上，滿洲亦爲各該國彼此經濟政治互相衝突之接觸地，此種經濟及政治之本身，必須加以研究，方能完全明瞭此次衝突之具體事實。吾人故先將此類原動力依次論之如下：

一 新中國之變遷

□中國民族在進化中。現在中國之重要原動力，即爲其

民族自身之近代化。今日之中國，實爲一正在進化中之民族。所有其國民之種種生活，均呈過渡現象。自一九一一年革命以來，中國之特點，乃爲政變，內訌，及社會上暨經濟上之恐慌。結果乃使中央政府日就衰頹。此種現狀，所有與中

國有密切關係之國，無不受其不良影響。倘不設法補救，勢必繼續危及世界和平，且爲世界上經濟不景氣之助因。

□一八四二年中國始開放。至造成此種現狀之途徑，現祇能摘要敘述，殊非完備之記載。中國與泰西人士接觸，爲時雖久，然以西方文明之影響而論，中國幾乎格格不入，歷數世紀而不渝。迨十九世紀初葉，交通設備日精，各國相距過程漸形短縮，遠東與其他諸國間往來便捷，前次之孤立地位，不得不行打破。惟事實上交接伊始，中國尙無此項動作之準備。及一八四二年，南京條約成立，戰事告終，乃開數口岸通商，並許外僑居留。因是外國風氣輸入中華。但其政府絕對不事變通，難爲同化。外商散居通商口岸，中國政府又未能爲其辦理行政法律司法教育衛生等種種適宜之設備。以供其需要。外僑乃就其素所習慣之情形與標準，自爲設備。在通商各口，次第建設西式城市，所有組織及行政暨營業均採西法。中西兩方雖屢次設法減少異點，惟收效極微。因而發生衝突及誤會情事，垂數十年。

後經戰事數次，因受外國精銳軍械之影響，中國乃創辦軍械局。並仿西法教練陸軍，以期用武力相抵抗。惟中國此項設施，範圍過狹，終歸失敗。其實中國須從根本上多方改良，方能保其固有地位而禦外侮。乃中國計不出此，欲堅守其舊文化及領域，而與泰西相頡頏。

□與日本比較。當日本與泰西通商之始，其難題與中國無異。因初與外邦人士理想接觸，不勝煩擾。彼此所持之標準大異，時有抵觸。亦遂設立外僑居留地，且訂立單方關稅協約，並予以領事裁判權之權利。惟日本之解決此種問題

其考法爲由內部改良，並將其種種新設施，使與泰西並駕齊驅，復用外交協商方式以行之。日本之吸納泰西思想，或尚非完全，故若幼齒因新舊見解之不同，而生衝突，亦所常有。惟日本同化於泰西科學及藝術，既如此神速而透澈，且能一面採納泰西標準，一面仍不使其世傳之舊文化因而減損價值，實爲世人所讚美不置者也。

中國之問題較爲困難。日本之變法及改革各問題，無論如何困難，要不及中國之困難也。緣中國領土廣闊，人民之團結之觀念，且財政制度積弊甚深，各省所收稅款，幾全不匯解國庫。夫中國所須解決之問題，其複雜容或遠出日本之上，強與比較，似未允當，然中國終須解決此項問題，實不能不沿與日本同樣之途徑。奈中國對於外國人士，不願接納，其已在華之外僑，亦加岐視，其不免造成不良之結果者勢也。其政策徒知使全國當軸專心抵抗及防範外國思潮，甚至對於各租界之種種新建設，本可借鏡者，亦橫加阻止。其結果致足以令中國應付新環境所必須之種種建設上之改革，幾完全忽略。

中國與列強抗爭之損失。關於種種權利及國際關係，中國與列強各持成見，無法融洽，勢必出於抵觸，發生戰事。經數次戰爭之結果，中國主權，逐漸損失，且割讓領土，計有向穆爾河北岸之大地暨濱海全省，餘爲琉球羣島，香港，緬甸，安南，東京，老撾，交趾支那（越南諸省），台灣，朝鮮，暨其他藩屬諸國，此外尚有長期租借地數處，且准在中國領土內設立外國法庭，行政公署，及軍警各機關，至貨物出入口稅，當時又失其自由規定之權。凡有傷害外僑之生

命財產事件，中國均須賠償，且戰敗賠款甚鉅，自此中國財政負擔日重。甚至全國領土，竟爲列強分爲若干勢力範圍，其本身之生存，亦會遭危險。

一九〇〇年拳亂後之維新運動。一八九四年中國既敗於日，一八九〇年拳匪事變，中國又大受貽累，痛定思痛，有心人士乃認定非根本改革不可。當維新運動之始，固未嘗不願保存滿洲皇朝。惟旋有人將該運動之目的及其首領洩漏於皇太后。光緒帝之百日維新，因而告終，且又身受監禁，直至一九〇八年光緒崩逝時乃止。故後之維新者，乃決意廢除有清。

清之滅亡。滿洲皇朝入主中國，垂二百五十年。清季叛變迭作，漸趨萎靡。計一八五〇年至一八六五年有太平天國之亂，一八五六年至一八七三年雲南回民叛變，一八六四、年新疆叛變。最烈者莫如太平天國，清廷危如累卵，其威信已受一致命傷，終未恢復元氣。一九〇八年，皇太后崩逝後，清朝才衰弱，隨乃傾頹。

中國革命運動，初會起事數次，旋乃於華南獲得凱報。即在南京建立共和政府，以革命首領孫中山博士爲臨時大總統。一九一二年二月十二日由當時之皇太后以幼帝名義，簽署退位諭旨。臨時立憲政體隨即成立，而以袁世凱爲總統，自幼帝退位後，所有前此由清朝所派之地方官吏，自督撫以至州縣知事均同時失其威權，變爲庶民。間有仍能使人民服從其意旨，則其本人情有實力，足資執行耳。前此之封疆大吏，本屬文員，漸假而替以武員，遂爲勢所必至之事，即中興之行政元首亦然，祇有掌握最重之兵符，或爲各省或地

袁氏政敵者，均公然為倒袁之運動。若從軍事上言之，南省本較北省為弱，迨北方軍閥於征服南方諸省之餘，將各該省

之北軍將領管轄之下，南省之勢遂更甚矣。

一九一四至一九二八年間之內訌及政潮 一九一三年

蓋革命運動，屢敗其事多賴軍隊之助力，方克平復，各將領

遂以有劫革命自危，毫無愧色，該將領等之多數，保北方軍

人領袖，互相結合，成爲所謂北洋派，此種將領，本係

出身寒微。自中日戰役之後，袁世凱教練模範陸軍，編入行

伍，旋遷官佐，以至司令。袁世凱因彼輩有效忠於一己之關

係，故信任之。蓋在中國之內，此種效忠個人之舊習，今猶

未能變其態度以效忠社會，而在泰西，則以效忠於社會，爲

其種種組織之特性也。袁世凱任用此輩爲各省督軍，而歸其

統制。地方大權，握於督軍之手，各省稅收，因而由彼輩任

意提用，以養其個人軍隊及附屬之人員。

華南情形 在南方各省，情形迥異。一因與外國接觸

較深，一因南省人民之社會情形與北方不同。南省人民，向

來厭惡軍閥專制，且不喜官廳橫加干預。孫中山博士及其他

革命領袖始終抱定憲政宗旨。惟彼輩殊少軍人援助，因清時

改練陸軍，在長江以南諸省，推行未廣，且無完備之兵工廠

也。

一九一三年倒袁運動 中華民國成立後，第一屆國會

遷延日久，方於一九一三、在北京召集。其時袁世凱已將其

在武力上之地位布置鞏固，所缺者唯須財政充足，方能保證

各省陸軍之確實效忠於己耳。於是訂借一巨額外債，名爲善

後借款，以圖其營私之活動。惟袁氏訂借此債之辦法，並未

商得國會同意，故凡在孫中山博士指導下之國民黨員，而爲

袁氏政敵者，均公然爲倒袁之運動。若從軍事上言之，南省

本較北省爲弱，迨北方軍閥於征服南方諸省之餘，將各該省

之北軍將領管轄之下，南省之勢遂更甚矣。

一九一四至一九二八年間之內訌及政潮 一九一三年

或召集變相之國會，兩次運動設立君主政體，總統閣員屢易

其人，軍閥則擁甲倒乙，朝秦暮楚，且有若干省屢屢宣布暫

時獨立。至國民黨在廣州建立政府，以孫博士爲首領，自一

九一七年以後，竟能力自保持，惟中經事變數次，偶爾不能

行使職權耳。在此變亂之數年內，中國屢遭軍閥蹂躪，且土

匪蔓延頗廣，致失業農夫，荒區災民，欠餉兵卒均被引誘入

夥，遂成大帮股匪。甚至以擁護憲法自任，在南省從事革命

之人士，亦屢有自相撻伐之虞。

國民黨之改組 一九二三年間，孫中山博士聞諸俄國

革命家謂如欲使其革命要義能獲最後勝利，務須有一定之程

序，嚴厲政黨之訓練，及有統系之宣傳方可。孫博士深然其

說，故決將國民黨改組，致國人依照其「宣言」及「三民主義」

所載之程序進行。但須有有系統之組織，方可期望有政

黨之訓練，故設中央執行委員會，代爲負責，以求步伐整齊

。並設政治訓練部，專司訓育宣傳人才，及組織各地支部之

人才。又在黃埔設立軍官學校，聘俄國軍官教練，造就國民

黨之軍事人才，以爲將來陸軍領袖，且使其在肄業期間服膺

黨義要旨。國民黨之設備如此，不久當可與全民發生密切關

係。凡與國民黨同情者，均可收納於地方支部或黨部所統

屬之農工團體，此種初步政策，殊可使國民心悅誠服。故自

一九一三年

一九一三年

一九一三年

一九一三年

一九一三年

一九一三年

一九一三年

一九一三年

一九一三年

孫博士於一九二五年逝世後，國民黨仍堅守不移。及北伐成功，於一九二八年促成名義上之南北統一，實為多年未有之事，且進而為一部分事實上之統一。延長至相當時期。

照孫博士之程序，第一時期為軍事時期，至此乃告成功。

第二時期為在國民黨統治下之訓政時期，至此乃可開始。此時期專為訓育全民自治，並進行國家建設事業也。

註（一）民族主義，民權主義，民生主義。

■建設中央政府 一九二七年設立中央政府於南京，統治於國民黨之下——實際上此政府不過係國民黨之一重要機關耳，政府設五院，（行政院，立法院，司法院，監察院，考試院），此項政府制度，係切遵孫博士之「五權憲法」——此為孟德斯鳩之三權分立，加以中國古制兩種，即都察院之彈劾權，及吏禮兩部之職掌也，——而成立。其目的在使憲政時期急於實現，屆時政府授政於人民，人民遂得直接，或間接由其所選出之代表，以執行政權焉。

在省區亦然，省政府之組織，用委員制至鄉城縣各部份之人民，現正受地方自治之訓練。國民黨深願將其政治及經濟上之建設計劃即予施行。惟目前未能如願實施者，良以內爭尙未完全消滅，各處將領間有率其統屬軍隊，而為叛變之行動。且共產主義之傳播，亦屬堪虞。其實中央政府，尙須時時奮鬥，以保其本身之生存也。

■中央政府之權威內外受敵 中國政府，在表面上業已統一，但一旦強有力之軍閥私自結合，率兵進攻南京，則統一之形式，立刻不保。自國民政府成立以來，雖尙無人能侵

入南京。惟彼輩敗退之後，尙擁有重兵，未可輕視。况向中央政府宣戰等事，自彼輩觀之，未嘗認為叛逆行為。蓋在彼輩目光中與中央政府交戰，亦不過兩軍閥爭衡，其一為其本人之黨羽，其他則適居國都，為外國所承認，而名為中央政府耳。階級關係既不存在，危險殊甚，尤因黨內各派意見紛歧，致令中央政府為孫博士當然繼任者之地位漸形衰弱，例如新近各分派別，致使有力之南方領袖，避處廣州，而該處之地方長官，及當地國民黨支部，往往任意作為，超立於中央政府之外。

綜觀上述情形，可見中國內部之分裂勢力，尙屬強盛。此種缺乏團結力之原因，實由大多數之國民祇知有家族鄉土，而不知有國，僅在其本國與他國外交情勢非常緊張時，乃稍有感覺耳。現時雖間有領袖人士，不為私人情感所繫，而以國家為前提，惟仍須有多數國民，從國家上着想，方能有真正國民團結之可言也。

■中國現狀與華盛頓會議時之情形比較 中國過渡時代之景况，及其勢所難免之政治社會文化道德各方面之紊亂，不免令其不耐煩之友人感覺失望，甚且引起嫉恨之意，致為國際和平之危害。惟雖有此種種困難，遲延及失敗，其進步之處，亦屬不少。迨此次衝突事起，論者莫衷一是，屢有人提議，謂中國「並非有組織之國家」，或謂中國內部「完全紛亂，陷於無政府狀態」，又謂中國現狀如此，應取消其國際聯合會會員國之資格，所有盟約中之保護各條款，均不適用於中國，關於此事，若將華盛頓會議時之情形，一為回溯，則頗有注意之價值。查當時所有參與會議之列強，所持之論

度，與此種論調，完全不同。然當時中國內，實有完全分離內政府兩處，一在北京，一在廣州，且籌大幫土匪所騷擾，之地交通，時被阻礙。同時軍閥方面，又急籌內戰，以致惡氛瀰漫，全國騷然。當一九二二年一月二十三日，華府會議，正值開會時期，其國內軍閥，竟致通牒於中央政府挑戰。其戰爭之結果，中央政府於五月間竟被推翻。爾後北京雖有新政府之設立，而滿洲之軍事領袖張作霖又於七月間宣布滿洲獨立。則當時中國境內，不啻有三個政府存在，其他事實上獨立之省分，更無論矣。若以現在中國之中央政府相比較，則又何如。現雖在數省內政府威力未免稍弱，惟並未敢公然否認中央政權者，若能照此現象維持下去，則各省行政軍隊，與財政等等，當能逐漸變為國家性。去年九月間國聯大會，所以選舉中國入行政院者，此類事實亦為其原因之一也。

■中國建設之努力。中國政府，現在所採之政策，乃量入為出，務使其收支平衡，而適於財政上合理之原則。其中許多稅收，均納入於統稅之內。採用化簡稅則。雖現在尚無正式預算，但其收支數目，財政部均有年報。又設立中央銀行，及組織財政委員會，其重要之銀行及商業各界均有代表充任委員會委員。至各省稅收制度，雖未良善，但財政部現已設法監督。凡此種種新政，皆為中國現政府之成績。祇因內訌未息，不能不從內債上着想，以為救濟。查自一九二七年以來，中國所增內債，大約在十萬萬銀元之譜，中國百事待舉，惟以財政未裕之故，所有各種建設計畫，均難實行。並不能完成其交通事業，而國內大多數問題，均待交通事業

完成，方能解決也。中國政府，雖有種種失敗之處，而其所成就者，亦已不少矣。

■民族主義。新中國之民族主義，為中國在此過渡期中，所應有之現象。無論何國，若在同樣地位，莫不有此國家思想與願望也。凡一個民族既有國家統一之覺悟，自然願欲脫離外界之束縛。但在此以外中國國民黨，復欲以排除外國勢力特殊色彩，引入於中國民族主義之中，並將其運動之目標擴大，期將所有亞洲之民族，尙受「帝國主義壓迫」者，盡舉而解放之。此種概念係受前與共產黨接近時所貼標語之影響。今日中國民族主義復充滿中國從前光榮偉大之記憶，而謀所以恢復之。故要求收回租界，及鐵路區域內外國所享有之行政權及非純粹商業性質之權，又租界及外僑居留地之行政權亦欲一併收回，尤欲取消有約國之領事裁判權，按照此項領事裁判權，中國法律不能適用於外僑，此種權利，若繼續有效，當為中國一般輿論所極端反對，而視為國家之羞。

■各國對領判權之態度。各國對於中國取消領事裁判權之願望，大致均取同情態度，一九二一年，至一九二二年，在華府會議，彼等均承認在原則上可以接受，惟對於最適宜之時期及實行之方法，意見頗有紛歧。有以為立時放棄此項權利，將使中國負擔備合乎某一種標準之警察及司法行政之義務，而因財政及其他內部之困難，中國現時尙未能辦到。如時機未熟，先予廢止，恐單純之法權問題，或將引起對各國無數節外之問題。又有以為如外國人民須受與在許多地方之中國人民所受之同樣不公平待遇及苛勒之稅捐，則國際關

匪特不能進步，抑將退化矣，然備有此種種保留，而成
屬不少，尤以華府會議，或該會議之結果，為最多。五
舊租借地之中，中國收回其二，並收回許多讓與權，中東鐵
路之行政權，關稅自主權，郵政權，復締結多種基於平等原
則之條約。

中國既已知在華府會議所為，採取國際合作為解決自身
困難之途徑，苟能繼續一貫，則在已往之十年中，當已有更
具體之進步。奈因採取猛烈之排外宣傳，致遭阻礙，並在兩
點特殊之處，肆意為之，以致助成發生現時衝突之形勢。斯
則利用經濟抵制，及在學校內介入排外宣傳是也。經濟抵制
在第七章中論之。

學校內之民族主義

一九三一年六月，中國所頒布之

臨時憲法內規定，(一)「三民主義為中華民國教育之基本原
則」。各學校內均教授孫中山博士之主義。其權力一等於前
世紀之經學。孫先生之言論其受人尊崇，無異於革命前之孔
子。然不幸在教育青年上，民族主義之建識方面，似不如其
破壞方面，能得較多之注意。試一翻閱各校課本，即使讀者
感覺著書之人，圖以嫉恨之火熾燃燒愛國觀念，又欲於仇害
心理之上，建樹人格。此種猛烈排外之宣傳，初起於學校，
繼用之於社會生活上之各方面，其結果引誘學生參加政治活
動，有時甚而發為攻擊各部長及其他官員之身，豪宅，或
衙署之行動，與推翻政府之企圖。此種態度，既乏有效之內
政改革，或國家程度之增進，以為之陪襯，徒使各國驚駭，
對於現時藉為唯一保障之權利，更增不顧放棄之感。

法律與秩序問題之必要

關於維持法律及秩
序問題，目前中國缺乏充分交通之必要。實為一嚴重之障礙。在交
通未能充足保證國家軍隊之迅速運輸時，則維持法律與秩序
，雖不完全，亦不得不大多付託於各省官吏。而因其與中央
相隔甚遠，又不得不容許其自作主張，以解決省內之事。在
此種情勢之下，意思與行動之獨立，頗易逾越範圍。其結果
，各省遂漸變而為私人之產業矣。其軍隊亦只認識長官，而
不知有國家矣。

地方軍隊

中央政府不能調動軍隊長官，已數見不鮮
，蓋政府無切實辦法，能使其權力迅速而永久及於全國，則
內戰之危險，勢必繼續存在。

土匪

土匪問題在中國歷史上班班可考，今日仍在存
於全國各地，其理由今古相同。中國向有土匪，政府曾未能
澈底去之。缺乏適宜交通，致政府不能除去此害，此為理由
之一。而其害乃隨時勢之變遷，自為消長。尚有另一助成之
原因，即係在中國常見之地方上變亂，尤其因失政而發生之
變亂為甚。往往變亂收平之後，叛徒加入匪羣，仍復在地方
上活動。此在太平變亂收平後由一八五〇至一八六五年間一
段時期，尤為確切。在較近時期，土匪亦來自欠餉軍隊之行
劫中，蓋兵士既無法維持生活，而在參加內戰時，業已習於
搶劫也。

其他增加土匪原因，厥為水旱災疫，旱災水災，幾為常
有之事。饑荒土匪亦隨之而來。而益以人口驟增之壓迫，
問題更加嚴重。在人煙稠密之區，通常經濟困難愈見增加。
而在僅求生存，毫無餘力以應付不測之人民中，苟其生活稍

有降者，則大多數必致流落無依。因此匪風大都受流行經濟狀況之影響。在經濟繁榮時期，或經濟繁榮地方，土匪必減。但因上述理由，而致生存競爭劇烈，或政治狀況不定，則土匪定必增加。

當一朝土匪在任何區域負固以後，以內地交通之不便，用兵剿辦每感困難。難達之地，數里之遙，或須數日行程。而大帮土匪能行動自由，來去飄忽，令人不能捉摸其蹤跡與行動。遇剿匪鬆懈，或兵匪結時，（此種情事常見不鮮）水陸大道之交通均受其擾害，此種事件只能以充分之警力制止之，在內地各縣剿匪尤難，蓋不規則之遊擊，在所不免也。

共產主義對中央政府之權力挑戰。各地軍閥之私人軍隊及通國之土匪橫行，雖足以擾亂國內治安，然不足為中央政府權力之患，但另有患源，即共產主義是也。

一九二一年中國共產主義之原始。在中國之共產運動，其發生之初，僅限於智識及勞工兩界，在一九一九至一九二四年間，其主義甚為暢行。惟是時中國農村，尙少受其影響。一九一九年七月二十五日蘇聯政府之宣言表示願意放棄前俄帝政府時代由中國強行取得之一切權利，使全中國發生好感，尤以智識階級為最。一九二一年間，中國共產黨乃正式成立，專在上海勞工界內宣傳，並組織赤色協會。一九二二年六月共產黨第二次大會（其時會員不過三百人）

結果為一九二三年一月二十日之共同宣言。由此宣言蘇聯表示對中國之統一及獨立予以同情及援助。在他一方面，則明白聲明共產組織及蘇維埃制度之政府，在彼時中國情狀之下，不能介入中國。繼此協定，莫斯科於一九二三年末派遣若干文武顧問來華。並在孫博士管理之下，担任整理國民黨及廣東軍隊之內部組織。

一九二四年三月召集之國民黨第一次全國大會正式議決容納中國共產黨入黨，但以入黨後不得再參加於籌備無產階級革命為條件。容共時期，於焉開始。

一九二四至二七年容共時期。此期自一九二四年開始，至一九二七年終止。一九二四年初間，共產黨計有附和者約三千人，赤色協會會員約六萬人，但不久即在國民黨內，取得充分勢力，使公正黨員，咸懷疑慮。一九二六年末，彼等向中央委員會有所提議。其提議中竟列有：全國土地，除工人農人或兵士所有者外，一律收歸公有；改組國民黨，剷除敵視共產主義之軍事領袖；二萬共產黨徒與五萬農工之武裝等條。但此項提議遭遇失敗。而共產黨遂不復贊助國民黨之北伐。然以前彼等固為組織國民革命軍之最活動者也。但彼等後又加入北伐，迨北伐軍已抵中國中部，並在武漢設立國民政府，（一九二七年）共產黨在政府中竟取得支配之權。蓋國民黨領袖，非俟自己軍隊已佔領南京上海後，無暇與彼等較短長也。武漢政府在湖南湖北兩省實施共產制度。國民革命，幾變為共產革命矣。

一九二七年國共分裂。最後國民黨領袖決定，共產主義為過烈，不能再事變容。故一九二七年四月廿日在南京

確立政權成立國民政府之後，當即明令軍隊及各機關立即肅清共產。武漢國民黨中央執行委員會，原與南京國民黨領袖拒絕攜手，而於七月十五日以大多數通過決議案，將國民黨中之共產黨人開除黨籍，並令蘇聯顧問離華。以此決議之結果，國民黨遂重歸統一，而在南京之政府，乃為全黨所公認。

南昌事件與廣州事件 容共期間有若干軍隊為共黨所吸收。當國民軍北上時，此項軍隊留存後方，大多數在廣西。共黨乃派員前往，加以整理，並誘勸反抗南京政府。一九二七年七月三十日，江西省會南昌警備隊連同其他軍隊變叛，荼毒居民。但至八月五日，彼等即被政府軍擊敗，乃退至南部。十二月十一日共產黨在廣州起事，據城二日，南京政府以正式蘇聯代表，曾經實行參加亂事。乃於一九二四年十二月十四日下令取消所有蘇聯共和國駐華領事之證書。

與共產軍隊繼續戰鬥 一九二八至一九三一年之間，內戰復熾，殊有利於共產勢力之增長。赤軍成立，江西福建被共化之地甚廣。直至一九三〇年十一月，斯時北方聯合軍新敗，中央政府方能從事認真剿共。共產軍隊在江西湖南各部擾亂，據報在兩三個月之間損失生命約二十萬，財產約值一萬萬元。彼時共黨勢力之強，能將政府第一第二兩次派往剿辦之軍隊擊敗，第三次剿共，係蔣總司令中正親自指揮。始將共產軍屢次挫敗。迄一九三一年七月中，共黨所據之最要巢穴，均被克復。共黨軍隊全部向福建退却。

蔣中正將軍將赤軍追逐至江西西南山中，同時在曾被赤匪蹂躪之區，設立政治委員會以改組之。

南京政府正在將重要赤軍漸次消滅之際，乃因他處事變

，不得不停止攻勢，將大部份軍隊撤回。斯時又有三變叛，而湖南省之粵軍亦起而作亂，遂為聲援。同時又有陽九月十八日之事發生。赤軍受上述情形之鼓勵，復取攻勢。為時不久，而前此戰勝之結果，均消失無遺矣。

福建江西之大部份，及廣東之一部份，據確實報告，均已全被赤化，而赤黨之勢力範圍，更為廣大。遠及揚子江南海為共黨宣傳之中心。中國各市鎮幾無處不有與共產主義表同情之人，迄今在江西福建曾經組織兩個共產省政府。但具體而微之蘇維埃制度則不下數百之多。共產政府係以當地農工大會選舉之委員會組織之。在實際上，受中國共產黨代表之管理。由該黨派出會受訓練人員以管理之。被派之人大多數曾在蘇俄國內受過訓練者。共產黨區委員會受中國共產黨中央委員會之管轄。而區委員會復管轄省委員會，省委員會管轄縣委員會，以次遞推。下至於各工廠學校軍營中所組織之共產細胞。

共黨所用之方法 共黨軍隊，既佔領一縣後，如似有久佔之可能時，即盡力使之赤化，居民如有反動，即以恐怖手段鎮懾之。上述之共產政府乃即設立。此種政府之全部組織含有：內政，辦理反革命事務，財政，農村經濟，教育，衛生，郵電，交通等委員會。又有軍事委員會及管理農工委員會。此種完備之政府組織。僅見於全部蘇維埃化之各縣。在他處則組織當為較遜。

其行為計畫包括取銷欠債，沒收大業主或宗教組織如彌宇庵寺及教堂等之地產，而分子無產階級及小農。

繁就簡。農民須獻納其地出產之一部。爲改進農務起見，發展灌溉，辦理農民借貸制度，及合作事業，並設立公共學校病院藥房。

因此，極貧苦之農民得由共產主義而享受甚多之利益。惟富豪及中等之地主商人，及本地士紳，或遭直接沒收，或被間接懲罰，均已摧毀靡遺。共產黨以實施其農業政策，希望博得民衆之贊助。關於此點，其宣傳及行動頗有成效，固無間於共產主義與中國社會制度之互相鑿柄也。因苛稅，苛捐，重利，軍，匪，肆劫所生之一切民生痛苦，盡爲共產黨利用之以爲宣傳之資料，并作成特別標語用於農民工人兵士及智識階級。其對婦女則標語特予變更，以期適用。

中國共產主義之特性 共產主義之在一般國家，（蘇聯除外）僅爲一種政黨黨員所持之政治主義，或爲一種特別黨的組織，冀與其他政黨競奪政權。但在中國則否，其在中國現已成爲國民政府之強敵，有自製之法律，及政府，以及其自身行動之土地範圍，此種情況爲他國所無。再則中國現正在建設內部之緊急關頭，再加以過去十一月中之非常嚴重之外患，共產黨事所造成之擾攘，因之更爲嚴重。國民政府似已決心恢復共產黨支配下之各縣，並於恢復之後在各該縣實行經濟善後辦法，惟于其軍事計畫上，除前述之內外困難足以削弱中央政府之地位外，尚有缺乏款項及交通不便之障礙，故共產問題之在中國，實與較大之國家建設問題，具有關

復區域之內，施行澈底的社會與行政之改組。但直至今日，尙無重要之效果宣佈。

上述情形在中日關係上之影響 夫日本既爲中國之比隣，又爲最大之顧客，故因本章所述之擾亂情形而受之損失，自較任何其他國家爲大，僑華外人三分之二爲日本人，而在滿洲之朝鮮人約計有八十萬之數，故日本人數，較任何他國爲多。設若在現狀之下，須受中國法律，司法及稅政之支配，自必感受痛苦。日本既不能希望設有滿意之安全保障以代替其條約上之權利，故自知無法可以滿足中國之願望。因其他各大國之權利漸形落後，遂使日本在華之權利尤其在滿洲者日益彰著，日本對於在中國之人民生命財產上所抱之顧慮，曾使其疊次干涉中國內戰或地方上亂事。此項行動，向爲中國人所嫉惡而以其干涉之結果釀成武裝衝突，如一九二八年濟南事件者爲尤甚。近數年中，日本之要求，在中國方面已認爲對於中國國家願望之一種嚴重挑釁，較之列強所主張之一切權利猶有甚焉。

中國建設中之國際利益 本問題影響日本之程度，雖較他國爲多，然並非一單純之中日問題，中國要求立即收回某種特別權利及利益，蓋以其有損中國尊嚴與主權也。而列強則以中國情形既不能保證充分保護僑民，即對中國此種欲望，不能不抱遲疑，蓋其僑民之利益，全恃享有特別條約權利而獲得安全也，本章所述之變化程序，爲過渡時期所不可免者，業已造成一種輿論上之勢力。如政府因不能完全統一及改建國家而顯示萎弱，則此種輿論勢力必對於其政策策上繼續予政府以難堪。中國在外交上之國際利益

聯。

一九三二年夏間，南京政府宣布重要軍事計畫，以期消滅共產黨之抵抗力。並已開始進行，如上所述，同時並擬在克

爲斷。非俟外交與內政兩者間之懸隔業經消除，則國際衝突，意外事件，排貨，及武力干涉之種種危險，勢將繼續矣。

□國際合作爲最善之解決。目前極端之國際衝突事件業經迫中國再度求國聯之干涉。如能得一圓滿解決，則應使中國確知國際合作政策之有利。此種國際合作，開始於一九二二年之華府會議，而獲有效果。現時中國缺乏資本與必要之專門人才，以完成其國家之建設。孫中山博士已見及此，并擬有國際參加發展中國經濟之偉大計畫。國民政府近來，對

於解決中國各種問題，三〇年以來之財政政策，以來，聯絡國聯專門機關以於同年辦理水災救濟事宜等等，道，當能得最確定及最迅速之進步，以達到其國家之而此種政策可使列強易於供應中央政府之需求，并迅速有效的贊助中國移去足以危害中國與其餘世界間之和平關係之任何原因。

第二章 滿洲之狀況及其與中國其他

部份及俄國之關係

一 滿洲之狀況

■緒言 滿洲，在中國稱爲東三省乃一廣袤膏腴之區域，四十年前，幾未開闢。即迄今人口仍形稀少，對於解決中日人口過剩問題，其所佔地位日見重要。山東河北兩省之貧苦農民，已經移殖於滿洲者，以數百萬計，日本則將其工業品及資本輸入於滿洲，以換取糧食暨原料，在供應中日兩國之需要上滿洲已證明兩國合作之有益。若無日本之活動，滿洲不能吸引如許鉅額之人民；若無中國農民及工人之源源而往，滿洲亦不能如此迅速發展，使日本因此得有市場，得有糧食，肥料，及原料。

■滿洲始因其形勝繼因其農礦富藏成爲覬覦之區 夫滿洲之發展，雖大多有賴於合作；然因有前述理由，已註定爲一競爭之區域。初則爲日俄競爭之區域，繼則爲中國與其兩大強鄰角逐之地方。其始也，滿洲不過以其地位關係，被捲入於逐角政策之大漩渦中，蓋以佔領該地，即含有操縱遠東政治之意義。其繼也，因其自身所蘊藏之農林鑛山之富，發現於世，遂復成爲羣雄覬覦之區。初則俄國以中國之犧牲，取得特殊條約權利；其後所有關於南滿之特殊權利，盡移轉於日本。利用如此得來之特權，以促進南滿之經濟發展，自屬更形便利。軍事之計慮，固仍居首要；然因日俄採取積極

步驟，開發滿洲，結果得有廣大之經濟利益，此項廣大之經濟利益，在日俄兩國之外交政策上，已日益增加其重要性。

■中國農民佔有滿洲土地 初，中國於開發滿洲方面所表現之活動，微乎其微，幾使滿洲坐讓俄國支配。即在重行保證中國在滿洲主權之朴資茅斯條約以後，日俄於開發此數省之經濟活動，在世界人士眼光中，較中國自身之經濟活動爲尤顯著。彼時中國數百萬農民之移殖，實決定斯土將來之佔有權。此種移殖，實係佔領，雖屬和平而不顯著，然其爲實際佔領則一也。當日俄彼此從事劃分其南北利益範圍之際，中國農民已佔有其土地；而今日之滿洲，遂爲中國人之滿洲，不可移易矣。在此種情勢之下，中國固可坐待良機，重行主張其統治權。一九一七年之俄國革命，使中國在北滿得此良機；中國於是對此久經忽視之國土，開始採取較爲積極之步驟，以從事治理與開發。最近數年間，中國亟欲減削日本在南滿之勢力，此種政策之結果，致使衝突擴大，至一九三一年九月十八日而達於頂點。

■人口 人口總數，約計三千萬；據稱其中二千八百萬爲中國人或同化之滿洲人；八十萬爲朝鮮人，鮮人大多數聚居於朝鮮邊境地方，即所謂間島區域者是；其餘則散居於滿洲各地。蒙古人部落則居於內蒙古邊境之牧場，其人數甚少。俄人之在滿洲者，或有十五萬人之譜，大多數在中東路沿線區域，尤以哈爾濱爲最多。日人約有二十三萬，大概集居於南滿鐵路沿線之居留地及關東租借地（即遼東半島）。日人俄人及其他外國人（鮮人除外）之居留於滿洲者，總計不過四十萬人。

面積 滿洲地方廣袤，其面積之大，與法德合併之幅員相等，約計三十八萬方哩，中國向稱之爲東三省，以其行政區域劃爲三省，南爲遼甯（或奉天），東爲吉林，北爲黑龍江。遼甯之面積，約計七萬方哩，吉林十萬方哩，黑龍江二十萬方哩有奇。

地理 滿洲具有大陸性之特徵，其山脈計有兩系，長白山位於東南，大興安嶺位於西北。在此兩大山脈之間，爲大滿洲平原，其北部屬於松花江流域。南部屬於遼河流域。在此兩流域之間，又有崗巒起伏之分水嶺，將滿洲平原分爲南北二部；此分水嶺自歷史方面觀之，殊爲重要。

滿洲西與河北省及內外蒙古相毗連。內蒙古昔劃爲三特別行政區，即熱河察哈爾及綏遠是也。一九二八年，國民政府予該三特別區以完全省區之地位。內蒙古，尤以熱河爲最，向與滿洲發生關係，且無不運用勢力，以干預滿洲事務之處。滿洲之西北東北暨東陲，與蘇俄之西比利亞省相毗連，其東南與朝鮮爲鄰，南以黃海爲界。遼東半島之南端，自一九零五年即爲日本所據，其面積計一千三百方哩有奇，日人視爲其租借地而管理之，不甯惟是，日人並使行某種權利於租借地以外之一段狹長地帶，將南滿鐵路包括在內，其面積總計不過一百零八方哩，而其長度竟延長至六百九十方哩。

經濟富源 滿洲之土壤，概稱肥沃，然其發展，端賴運輸便利。故河流沿岸及鐵路沿線地方，重要城市繁興。往昔之發展，實際全賴河運，今茲之運輸方法，雖則首推鐵路，然河運仍甚重要。十五年間，重要產物，如大豆，高粱，麥，黍，大麥，米，及雀麥等，收穫倍增，一九二九年，此

項收穫，計有八萬七千六百萬蒲式耳 (Bushel) 有奇 (按每 Bushel 約合中國四斗)。據一九三一年滿洲年鑑所載預計，一九二九年已經墾殖之田地僅佔全面積百分之一二·六，而其可耕之地，則佔全面積百分之二八·四。以是若經濟情形有所改進，則將來生產可望大爲增加。一九二八年滿洲農產品之價值，總計一萬三萬金鎊有奇。大部農產品係運輸出口，繭綢或野蠶絲亦爲滿洲重要出口貨物之一。

木材及鑛產 山地多森林，並富藏鑛產，尤以煤爲最多。重要鑛產，如金如鐵，亦以富藏見稱。此外並曾發現多量之火油石，白雲石，菱苦土礦，石灰石，火泥，蠟石，及品質極佳之二養化矽。因此採鑛事業，可望成爲極重要之事業。(一)

註(一) 參閱第八章暨本報告附件第二第三號專論

二 與中國其他部份之關係

滿清滅亡前之歷史 自有史以來，滿洲即爲與蒙古族鞏固人自由混雜之通古斯族各部落所居。繼而受文化較高之中國人移植之影響，始知組織之道。於是建立若干王國，間或控有滿洲大部份地方及中國北部與朝鮮北部區域，遼金及滿清三代，竟將中國大部份或中國全部征服而治理之，凡數百年。反之，中國遇有英武之主，輒能挽北來之狂瀾，依次在滿洲大部份地方，樹立主權。查中國人向滿洲移植之事，爲時極早；而各地中國城市之傳播中國文化勢力於其四週鄰近地區者，爲期之早，亦正相同。蓋中國人在滿洲之地位，根深蒂固，迄今已二千年，中國文化在滿洲極南部亦早已

活躍。當明代之時（一五六八年至一六四四年），此種文化之勢力，已極強盛；明代之威權實際已遍及於滿洲之全部。在一六一六年滿人推翻明代在滿洲之政治，雖在一六二八年滿人越長城而征服中國之前，中國之文化，實已深入於滿族之人心，而滿人已多數與中國人互相同化。在往昔滿清軍隊中，有由多數中國人組織特種軍團，稱之為漢軍旗者。

滿人於征服中國之後，派遣其守備隊駐紮於中國較爲重要之各城市，禁止滿人從事某項職業，禁止滿人與中國人互通婚媾，並制止中國人移殖於滿蒙。促成此種辦法者，政治原因實重於種族觀念；其目的在保障滿清之永久統治權。此種辦法對於與滿人實際享受同等優越地位之多數漢軍旗人，並無影響。

滿人及其同盟漢軍旗人之外遷，致使滿洲人口大爲減少。然在滿洲南部，中國人之市廛，繼續存在。少數移殖之人，即自此策源地，越奉天省中部而散居焉。中國之人，或以善能規避移民禁令，或受移民禁令時時變易之利，遂自中國源源滲入，人數有增無已。以是滿洲人與中國人愈形混雜；甚至滿族之言語，卒被淘汰，而代以漢文。至蒙人則未經同化，但進佔之移民，喧賓奪主，逼使蒙人後退。卒之，滿清政府，爲阻止俄人自北方前進計，決計鼓勵中國人之移殖。一八七八年間，滿洲各地，遂爾開放。且對移往者，往往予以各種獎勵。結果，當一九一一年中國革命之際，滿洲之人口，計有一千八百萬人。

滿清政府，在一九零七年間，時距清室退位前不過數年，曾決定改革滿洲地方政府。中國前此視滿洲三省爲關外領

地，另行設治，自具規模。所有在中國通行將各省民政交由科舉出身之文人治理之制，並不施行於滿洲。而將滿洲置諸純粹軍治之下，以維持滿族官吏及習俗。在中國，凡官吏均不得在本省服官。滿洲各省，置將軍一名，運用全權，以處理軍民政事。嗣擬將軍民政事劃分，乃其結果未見滿意，兩種權力範圍之劃分，既不完備，於是誤會滋多，詭謀疊出，卒無成效。以是於一九零七年間，此種計劃，遂爾放棄；乃將三省將軍取消，以一總督管轄滿洲全境。其目的在集中權力，尤其在外交政策方面。總督之下，置有巡撫，治理省政。後來種種行政改革，漸漸仿行中國之省政制度，實以上述之改組爲其嚆矢。滿人此項最後辦法，卓著成效，則一九零七年以後辦理滿洲事務之能員，有足多焉。

□清朝滅亡以後，當一九一一年革命爆發時，滿洲各官員之不贊成共和者，令張作霖抵抗革命軍之前進，滿洲各省遂得免牽入內戰漩渦。嗣張作霖獨裁滿洲及中國北部之政治，迨共和建立，袁世凱氏被選爲民國第一任大總統，滿洲各官員願從已成之事實，自願聽袁氏之指揮。當時各省設有軍事及民事長官，惟不久滿洲及中國其他各部之民事長官，均爲軍事長官所排擠。

□一九一六年張作霖被任爲奉天省長。一九一六年張作霖被任爲奉天省督軍，同時代理省長。其個人威權，大見擴張，當對德宣戰問題發生時，國會表示反對，張作霖加入中國督軍團，請求解散國會。該項請求，未爲總統所接受，張作霖遂向北京中央政府宣告奉天省獨立，繼復收回此種宣言。一九一八年時，張氏因有功中央，被任爲滿洲全境巡閱使。

於是滿洲雖仍保存其特殊制度，但在行政上仍歸統一。

一九二二年張作霖與北京中央政府斷絕關係。張作霖接受中央政府之榮典，惟中央當局時見易人，而張氏之態度，則時視其與操縱中央政局之軍人個人關係之性質而轉移。張氏之視彼與政府間之關係，似與私人間之結合意義相同。一九二六年七月，張氏樹立威權於長城以南之企圖失敗，並見監督北京政府之權，為對方所攫取，於是宣告與中央政府脫離關係。張氏維持其在滿洲行動之完全獨立，直至其勢力達於長城以南，並為北京主人之日始止。張氏表示願尊重外人權利，並承認中國所負義務，惟要求各國對於有關滿洲之一切事件，此後應直接與彼所統轄之行政機關相洽商。

一九二四年奉天與蘇聯之協定。故一九二四年五月三十一日之中蘇協定，於中國雖甚為有利，但張氏竟予否認，卒獲與蘇聯於一九二四年九月另訂協定。該協定與一九二四年五月三十一日蘇聯與中國中央政府所訂之協定，實際上無甚出入。該項事實適足以表明張氏不問在內政或外交方面，均主張其行動上之完全獨立也。

張作霖上將擊敗吳佩孚將軍。一九二四年張氏復侵入關內，並因馮玉祥將軍（現稱上將）在戰事緊急時，背棄其長官吳佩孚將軍（現稱上將），張氏遂得勝利。直接之結果，為推翻中央政府，並擴張張作霖上將之勢力而南達於上海。一九二五年十一月郭松齡之變。一九二五年張上將對於其昔時同盟之馮玉祥將軍，復以兵戎相見。是役也，張氏部屬中有郭松齡者，在戰事最緊急時，背棄張氏，歸順馮玉祥將軍。一九二五年十一月郭松齡之叛亂，其意義之深不僅

限於一隅，蓋此舉實為張氏之重要行動。郭松齡雖為張之僚屬，但其對於社會之改革，實贊同馮之主張。其背叛長官也，以為張之去位，為中止內戰所必要。郭氏之叛，實使張氏陷于極困難之地位。郭佔有鐵路以西之地面，張則駐節奉天，兵力單薄。是時日本為在南滿自身之利益計，將南滿鐵路兩旁各二十里之地帶（七英里），宣布為中立區域，不許任何軍隊通過。該項舉動，實所以阻止郭松齡進擊張氏，而予黑龍江援軍以時日，令其得以到達，黑龍江軍隊因蘇聯鐵路人員要求先以現款繳付運費方許乘車，故設法另取他道，到達時期，遂致延緩。上述援軍之到達，及日方若干明顯之援助，遂使戰事結束有利於張。郭松齡敗北，馮氏亦迫而撤退。棄北京於張氏。張氏對於當時中東鐵路人員之行爲，不無遺憾，嗣後對於該路權利，時加侵蝕，用盡方法，以謀報復。其建築一獨立鐵路系，聯絡滿洲三省都城，似以此事所受之經驗，為其主要原因。

滿洲獨立之意義。張作霖上將迭次宣布之獨立，絕不含有渠個人或滿洲人民情願與中國分離之意義。其軍隊侵入中國，並不視中國為外國，不過僅為參加內戰而已。張上將之于中央政府，時而擁護，時而攻擊，時而將其所轄領土，宣布獨立，與其他各省軍閥正復相同，絕未採用一種方法，足使中國分成數國者。實則所有中國內戰大致均係一種建立真正強健政府，以圖統一全國之野心計劃。故滿洲雖迭經戰事及獨立時期，但仍為中國完整之一部。

張作霖與國民黨。當張作霖上將與吳佩孚作戰時，張

虎雖會與國民黨為同盟，但張氏本身並不接受國民黨之主義。張上將不贊成孫中山博士所期望之約法，以為該項約法，與中國人民之精神不相適合。但張上將願望中國之統一。其對於蘇聯及日本在滿利益範圍所抱之政策，表示如果力能出此，渠不憚將上述二種利益範圍，一概予以掃除。要知關於蘇聯之利益範圍，張上將軍之企圖，幾近成功。張氏倡始上文所述之建築鐵路政策，其結果為斷絕南滿鐵路與供應南滿路諸區域中某某數區域之關係，張氏對於俄日在滿利益之此項態度，半由於每逢與俄日交涉時其威權常受限制，張氏不復能忍受此項限制，而半亦由於渠及中國各方輿論，對於外人在中國之特殊地位，同抱憤恨故也。一九二四年十一月間，張上將會經邀請孫中山博士開善後會議，當時孫博士欲在該會議程之中，列入改善生活程度，召集國民會議，及取消不平等條約諸端。旋孫博士因病逝世，上述會議，遂未果行。但從孫博士之建議，可以知孫博士已與張氏有某種諒解，並可知兩人之間關於中國外交政策或可達到一種可能同意之基礎也。

■張作霖之末年 張氏末年時，尤表示不願任日本坐享因各種條約協定所取之特殊利益。是以兩方關係，有時頗為緊張。日本勸告張氏不宜加入中國各黨派之紛爭，應注其全力，以圖滿洲之發達，張氏對之，殊為憤怒，不願聽從，其子繼之亦復如此。自馮玉祥氏失敗後，張氏為北方各軍人聯盟之領袖，號稱大元帥。

一九二八年，國民黨軍隊北伐時，張氏遭逢失敗，此在

。日方標明之目的，為救滿洲於內戰禍害之中，此種禍害，為勝軍追擊，敗軍逃入境內時必然之結果也。

■張作霖之死 一九二八年六月四日，張氏對於此種勸告，頗為憤怒，然不能不予聽從。一九二八年六月三日張氏離去北平，（時稱北京）適返奉天，翌日達城外某一地點，為北甯線在橋下，南滿線在橋上互相交叉通過之處，炸藥爆發，所乘列車被炸，張氏竟爾殞命。

張氏遇害之責任，迄今尚未判明。慘案內幕仍在五里霧中；惟此事頗引起日方間諜之嫌疑，於是當時中日邦交，業已緊張之狀態，至是復多一原因。

■張學良將軍繼父之後 張上將死後，其子張學良繼而統治滿洲。張學良富於青年國家思想，願望停止內戰，並扶助國民黨統一全國之政策。日本對於國民黨之政策傾向，既有若干經驗，故並不歡迎該項勢力，侵入滿洲。張學良氏會接到此種勸告，對之殊為憤恨，與乃父相同。決意遵循一己意見，其與國民黨及南京之關係，日趨接近。

■張學良宣誓服從中央政府 一九二八年十二月，張學良氏承認易旗，宣告服從中央，受命任東北邊防總司令，而其領袖滿洲行政之地位，亦再經確定，並兼管熱河。熱河為內蒙之一部，面積約六萬方哩。

■滿洲與國民黨之關係 近名義而違事實，滿洲既加入國民政府，行政組織，必須有若干之改變，以便與中央政府行政組織相近似。委員會制度於以輸入。並設立國民政府。其實當時制度及人員，仍舊沿用與舊無異。習見之黨部干涉地方行政，在滿洲亦無異。

武官吏應為國民黨員之規定，在滿洲亦不過視同一種之具文。凡軍事，民事，財政，外交，其與中央政府之關係，純繫乎一種自願之合作。至必須嚴格服從之各項命令訓令，不若忍受於滿洲。官吏之任免，尙速背滿洲當局意願者，亦不能見於實行。此種在政務上黨務上行動之自由，中國其他各處，亦有如此者。在此類情形中，一切重要之任命，事實上均出自地方當局。中央政府則不過加以證實已耳。

加入國民政府對於滿洲對外政策之影響 就對外政策範圍而言，滿洲地方當局雖仍保有高度之行動自由，但其加入國民政府，在對外政策上實具有比較重要之影響。試觀張作霖上將對於在滿洲中東路地位，時加侵犯，且不願日本所主張之某某各種權利，可見滿洲在未加入民國以前，已採取一種「退避之政策」。惟既加入以後，國民黨富有組織紀律之宣傳，滿洲對之已經開放，國民黨利用正式黨刊及多數附屬之言論機關，一再聲稱恢復已失主權及取消不平等條約之重要，與夫帝國主義之險惡。此種宣傳，在滿洲自必有深切之影響。良以該處外來在中國領土內之利益，法院，警察，預備隊，軍隊，其尤為顯著也。國民黨之宣傳，由國民主義教科書以輸入於學校，各項會社，若連勝島民衆協會等，亦見發生。彼輩激發並傳達民族主義之思想，實行排日之運動，並以壓力施諸中國房產地主，迫其提高地租及朝鮮租戶之租金。或拒絕日本及朝鮮租戶重訂租約。當此種方會舉出類此均若于事件，報告於本調查團。朝鮮移民會受有一種有統系之期待，並會舉行各項排日性置於會令訓令。糾紛案件愈多。形勢緊張愈甚。一九二五年五月，國民政府，設

於各省會，嗣後各支部在其他城市或縣份中成立。中國黨義宣傳員，赴北方者日衆。日方聲言反日活動日益加劇。一九二一年四月，瀋陽在人民外交協會指導之下召開會議五日，出席者有東省各地代表達三百餘人。對於清除日本在東省地位是否可能，曾加以討論；收回南滿鐵路問題，載在通過之決議中。同時蘇俄及其人民，亦因同樣之風氣，感受痛苦；自俄雖無主權及特別權利可放棄，亦受凌辱與不良待遇。

註(一) 參閱本報附錄第九號

內政之影響 在內政方面，東省當局，保持其所欲保持之一切權力，對於遵從中央政府之行政規則及辦法，若不影響於其權力之最要成份者，則不表示反對。

東北政務委員會 統一未久，即設立東北政務委員會於瀋陽。該委員會名義上受中央政府監督，實為東北各省之最高行政機關，內置委員十三人，由委員中推選十人為委員長。該委員會負責指導並監督遼寧吉林黑龍江熱河四省，及自一九二二年稱為特別區域即以前中東鐵路區域之行政。該委員會亦有權處理一切未經中央政府特許保留之事項。並得採取不與中央法令相抵觸之任何行動。各省政府及特別區政府，有執行該委員會決議案之義務。

東省行政制度，與中國其他部份所採用者，並無重要區別。容許保留滿洲為一行政單位，乃為其最要異點。若無此項容許，則其自動與中央聯合，大概不能實現。故就實際言之，在東省除外表稍有更變外，一切情形仍舊。東省當局雖無其權力得之於其軍隊者，較之得之於南京政府者為多，此項情形，固與已往無異也。

在軍費中，除十毫軍費外，費用達總支出百分之八十。其事實
其詳詳解釋何以在東省方面有一千五百萬之鉅額常備軍，及據
補消費二萬萬元（銀幣）之鉅大兵工廠。軍事上之費用，在
總支出項下，佔估計達百分之八十之譜。前傳稅徵數目，以
之供給行政，警察，司法，教育等費，自感不足。倉庫方面
，對於官員不能支付相當酬勞，一切權力，集于少數軍人之
手；而各種位置須經彼等之手，方能獲得。故濫用私人，官
吏腐化，行政窳敗，乃為此種情形下不可避免之結果。關於
此種普遍的不良政治，調查團獲得重要的申訴。但此種情形
，不為東省所獨有；在中國其他各部，亦有同樣狀況，或且
過之。

為維持其鉅額軍隊計，不得不苛徵重稅。普通稅收，既
不敷應用，東省當局乃復使不能兌現之省鈔，逐漸跌價，致
人民負擔，益形加重。（一）此種情形，屢見不鮮；其尤著者
，則為「大豆官營」之舉。自一九三一年以來，已成爲壟斷
狀態。東省當局既得支配東省主要產品，希望強迫外國大豆
主顧，支付較高價格，以增加其利得；其目標尤注重於日本
顧客。此種處置，足以表現東省當局控制銀行及商業之程度
。東省官吏，同時又自由從事種種私人企業，並運用其權力
，爲其自己或爲其私人從中牟利。

註（一）參閱本報告書所附載之專論第四號及第五號

一年九月事變以前，無論有若何弊病，但在若干地方，未嘗
不努力改良行政，其成績頗有可觀。在教育市政公用事業方
面，尤多進步。其更可特別留意者，即在張作霖氏及張學良

氏統治時代，關於東省中國人民及利益，其經濟富源之發展
及組織，較從前確有顯著之進步。

如前所述，中國方面之大規模移民墾殖，使東省及中國
其他部份間經濟上及社會上關係，日益擴充。在此時期中，
除移民外，更建築與日本資本不發生關係之中國鐵路，最著
者有瀋海鐵路，打通鐵路（北甯路之一支線）齊克鐵路，及
呼海鐵路等；葫蘆島築港計劃，遼河疏濬工程，及各河流航
行事業，亦均於該時期中開始。對於各種企業，官私利益均
多參加。在鑛務方面，對於本溪湖穆稜札蘭諾爾及老頭溝各
煤礦，華人均有利益在內；其他鑛產之發展，由華人單獨負
責；其中大多數，受東北鑛務局之監督。華人更投資經營黑
龍江省金鑛。在森林方面。華人與日人合股經營鴨綠江採木
公司；從事吉黑二省森林事業。農業試驗場均在東省各地，
開始建設，關於農會及灌溉計劃，均予以獎勵。華人更投資
經營麵粉及毛織廠；在哈爾濱設立豆油，麵粉廠；並創辦蘭
絲或野蠶絲棉毛等紡織工廠等。

與中國其他部份商業關係。東省與中國其他部份之商
業，亦有進步。（二）該項商業一部份受中國各銀行金融上之
援助，最要者，爲中國銀行；其分行遍設于東省各重要城市
。中國輪船及帆船，往來于中國內部與大連營口（牛莊）及
安東間。在東省航運上，此項船舶所運貨物之數量日有增加
，其噸數僅次于日輪所載之數目。中國保險事業，亦有進步
。中國海關，由東省商業上，徵得日見增加之稅收。

註（二）參閱本報告書第八章及附載之專論第三號

註（三）參閱本報

俄國在中日衝突發生以前，東省及中國其他省份，政治上經濟上的聯絡，漸臻鞏固。此種逐漸發展之相依狀態，使中國東省及南京方面領袖，採取一種民族思想之發展政策，以與日俄既得權利相對抗。

三 與俄國之關係

■中俄關係 一八九四年至一八九五年中日戰爭。使俄國獲得出面干涉之機會；其干涉自表面上觀之，似為中國；究其實際，經以後事實之證明，乃為其本身利益。日方受外交上壓迫，不得不交還由一八九五年馬關條約所割讓之南滿遼東半島於中國，俄國更援助中國清償日方所要求之戰事賠款。一八九六年，中俄兩國間成立秘密防守同盟。

■中東鐵路 是年為酬報上文所述及之俄國援助起見，中國承認俄國建築一經過滿洲的西伯利亞鐵路支線，由赤塔直達海參威。據稱如日人再行攻擊中國，此線實為俄方運兵至遠東所必要。華俄道勝銀行（後改為俄亞銀行）即行創辦，藉以掩飾上述事業之官樣性質。該銀行即組織中東鐵路公司，從事鐵路之建築經營。

■一八九六年九月八日合同 依照一八九六年九月八日中國政府與該銀行所訂合同條款，該鐵路公司建築並經營該鐵路，以八十年為期。期滿後，無償交給中國，成為中國財產；但中國政府於三十年後，有權以雙方同意之價格，備資贖回。在合同期間，該鐵路公司有管理其土地之絕對的及除外的權利。倘有解釋該項條款異常寬泛，遠過於合同中其他各項條款所能予以證明者。中國對於俄方不斷的企圖推廣合

同之範圍，提出抗議？但不能制止之。沿路城市，迅速發展俄方逐漸在中東路區域內，行使一種與統治權相等之權利。中國更允許無償的交付鐵路所需之一切公地。私人土地，須按照時價收用。該公司更得建築并經營其本身應用上所必需之電線。

■一八九八年俄國租借遼東半島 一八九八年，俄國獲得遼東半島南部之二十五年租借權，該地即為日本于一八九五年被迫交還者；同時取得聯絡中東鐵路由哈爾濱至租借地內旅順，大連之權。並得在旅順建造軍港。在該支線經過區域內，公司有採伐木材開掘煤礦以供鐵路使用之權。一八九六年九月八日合同內規定，俱得推用於該附加的支線上。俄國得在租借地內，自訂稅則。一八九九年，宣布大連為自由港；開放外國船舶及貿易。在支線經過區域內，鐵路上之特別權利，不得給與他國之人民。在租借地以北之中立地方，未經俄方同意，不得開放與外國貿易之商埠。亦不得為讓與或特別權利之允許。

■一九〇〇年俄國佔領下之東省 一九〇〇年，俄國籍口拳匪之亂，危及其僑民，出兵佔領東省。各國提出抗議，要求其軍隊之撤退；但俄方延遲其行動。一九〇一年二月，在聖彼得堡磋商起草中俄密約；其中有下列條件：若中國欲收回東省政權，須對於基於一八九六年基本合同第六款而設立之護路警察准予存留，並約定對於東省蒙古新疆之礦產及其他利益，未經俄國同意，不得轉讓於他國或他國人民。草約中上述的及其他的條款，經發覺後，惹起中國及他國輿論之反對；一九〇一年，俄政府發出通告，聲明此項計劃，業

已撤銷。

○一九〇四年二月十日日本對俄開戰。日本對於俄國軍路，特別注意。一九〇二年一月三十日，訂立英日同盟條約；故日本自覺其地位益形穩固。但逆料俄國將侵入朝鮮及東省；不免仍懷憂慮。故與他國督促撤退在東省之俄國軍隊。

俄方聲稱願意撤兵；但須附有條件，即除俄國企業外，對於他國採取封閉滿蒙辦法。在朝鮮方面，俄國之壓迫，亦日見增加。一九〇二年七月，在鴨綠江口發現俄國軍隊。此外更有其他各項情形，使日方相信俄方已決定一種政策；該項政策，縱非威脅日本之生存，亦將威脅日本之利益。一九〇三年七月，日本開始與俄國磋商維持門戶開放，中國領土完整之政策，但毫無結果；遂於一九〇四年二月十日向俄國開戰。中國守中立。

○撲資茅斯條約。是役俄國戰敗。遂於一九〇五年九月三日訂立撲資茅斯條約，放棄其在南滿之特殊權利。并將租借地及與租借權連帶之一切權利，長春旅順間之鐵路及其支路，與在該區域內附屬於鐵路或為鐵路利益起見所經營之一切煤礦，一併轉讓於日本。雙方同意，除租借地外，將所有兩國軍隊占領及管轄之滿洲部份，交還中國單獨管理。雙方保留（在某種特定條件之下）置守備隊保護滿洲各該國鐵道路線之權。是項守備隊之人數，每一公里不得超過十五名。

○俄國勢力限於北滿。俄國之勢力範圍，至是已失其半，而限於北滿一隅。其後數年，俄國保持其在北滿之地位，且增長其勢力。但至一九一七年，俄國革命爆發之時，中國乃決意在該地恢復其主權。

○出兵西伯利亞。最初，中國之行動限於參加協約國干涉（一九一八至一九二〇年）。其時，鑒於俄國革命後在西伯利亞與北滿一帶發生之紛亂情形，美國提議協約國出師干涉，原具有二重目的，一為保護儲積於海參崴之大宗軍用材料與糧物，一為援救由東線退却經過西伯利亞之五萬餘捷克軍隊。此項提議，經協約各國接受，并約定每國應各派遣遠征軍七千人，前往西伯利亞鐵道沿線各該指定地段駐紮。而中東鐵道，則委託中國完全負責。一九一九年，為保證鐵道運用與協約國軍隊間取得聯絡起見，特別成立一協約國間鐵道特別委員會，並於該委員會之下，設技術與運輸二部。一九二〇年干涉終局，協約國軍隊相繼從西伯利亞撤退，惟日本軍隊逗留不去，且與布爾雪維克軍發生戰鬥。戰事拖延經兩年之久，至一九二二年華府會議後，日本軍隊始行撤退。而協約國間鐵道委員會及其技術部亦於同時取消。

○一九一七年俄國革命爆發後中國取消一八九六年所予俄國之特權。是時適際中東鐵路長官霍爾瓦特將軍在鐵路區域企圖創設獨立政體失敗之後，中國遂起而担負維持該區治安之責任（一九二〇年）。同年中國與會經改組之華俄道勝銀行訂立合同，並宜稱欲於與俄國新政府締結協約之前，暫時掌握該路之最高管轄權。中國並宣布欲恢復一八九六年合同及該公司原有章程所賦予中國之權利。此後公司理事會之理事長一人選舉四人，及監事會之監事二人，應由中國政府指派。俄國之優勢，嗣復因其他辦法，大受減削。鐵路區內之俄軍均經繳械解散，而代以中國軍隊。並封閉俄國法庭，取消俄人領事地位，使服從中國法律，受中國法院制裁。

貨納稅義務。當時中國警察握有大權，加以管理欠當，俄人每遭逮捕及無期拘押。

特別行政區域之成立。一九一一年俄國在該公管理下之鐵路區域改爲三省特別區，設行政區官一人，直接對奉天負責，鐵路所有土地之管理權亦同遭干預。在俄國新政府者被承認之前，張作霖上將軍實上已將俄國之勢力範圍實行清除，但於進行中，私人利益則受重大之損失。及至蘇聯政府承受其舊俄政府在滿洲之遺業時，鐵路之特權業已剝削殆盡。

一九一九至一九二〇年之中俄協定。一九一九至一九二〇年蘇俄政府對華政策之宣言，對於舊俄帝國政府在中國所獲之特殊權利尤顯著者，在老滿所獲之特殊權利，實有完全放棄之意。

一九二四年之協定。蘇俄政府依照此項政策，同意訂立一新協定，以規定俄成之事實。中東鐵路，因一九二四年五月三十一日之中俄協定，成爲一共同管理之純粹商營事業，其中中國亦獲得一部份之經濟利益。但蘇政府有指派局長之權，但局長所行使之職權廣泛而未經詳細規定。且在該協定下，蘇俄政府對於鐵路事務，佔有優越勢力，并得保持北滿經濟利益之重要部份。一九二四年五月北京中國政府所締結之協定，未得張作霖氏之接受。曾於上文提及張氏堅持應由彼個人另訂協定。是項協定關於一九二四年九月簽字，其條款，除將經營鐵路期限，由八十年縮短爲六十年外，幾與前者完全相同。

張作霖對於蘇俄利益之進取政策。此項協定並未克創

立蘇俄與滿洲國民政府間虛假關係之新紀元。中國解決一九二四年兩協定中各種懸案之會議，以各種藉口延遲舉行。中東鐵路局長於一九二五年及一九二六年，兩次拒絕該路運輸張氏軍隊。因第二次拒絕之事，致有局長之被捕，與蘇俄之最後通牒。一九二六年正月二十三日。凡此種種並非不相關連之事實。然而中國當局始終採取一反對俄國利益之政策，極爲蘇俄政府與白俄所惡憤。

一九二九年中國清除蘇俄滿洲勢力之最後努力。滿洲歸附南京政府之後，中國民族精神益見激昂，對於蘇俄維持中東鐵路優越管轄權之努力，民情憤慨，較前尤烈。一九二九年五月遂有清除俄國利益範圍最後殘餘之嘗試。着手之始，中國警察搜查蘇俄領館數處逮捕多人，並宣稱獲有證據，證明蘇俄政府及中東鐵路之雇員正在陰謀煽動共產革命。七月間，進佔鐵路電報電話機關，并強行封閉蘇俄之重要團體與企業多處。最後令該鐵路俄局長將事務移交中國繼任人員。該局長拒絕交卸，遂受禁止不得執行職務。中國當局復自由更動俄員，以自派人員替補。蘇聯人民被捕者多人，遣送出境者亦復有之。中國方面力自辯護其所取之暴力行動，責蘇俄政府以破壞信約而從事反對中國政治及社會組織之宣傳。蘇俄政府於五月三十日通牒中，對此罪名加以否認。

蘇俄政府之行動。中國既對於剩餘之俄國權利與利益強行清除，因是，蘇俄政府決定採取行動，經度度換取恢復撤回駐華之外交商務代表，以及所領之中東鐵路在俄人手中，並斷絕所有中俄間鐵路交通。中國亦自蘇俄境內撤回商務外交官吏，而斷絕與蘇俄之關係。蘇俄軍隊遂越境而入。

開始襲擊，繼續進展。至一九二九年十一月，已成武力侵略之局勢。滿洲當局，受南京政府之委託，解決中俄爭執於既遭敗北復損威望之餘，迫不得已接受蘇俄之條件。

一九二九年十二月二十二日伯利議定書。一九二九年十二月二十二日中俄議定書在伯利簽字，原狀因以恢復。當爭議之時，蘇俄政府，對於簽訂巴黎非戰公約各第三國之通牒，所採取之態度，始終自認其所取行動為合法之自衛，不得視為違犯該約。

一九〇五年以來關於滿洲之日俄關係。日本在滿洲之利益，將於下章詳細討論。但於未敘述之前，勢須於敘述俄國在滿洲地位之中，簡略提及一九〇五年來日俄兩國間之關係。

一九〇七至一九一七年之合作政策。日俄兩國能於戰爭後隨即採取一密切合作之政策，而彼此在南北滿之利益範圍能於締結和約時獲得一滿意之均勢，實為一饒有興味之事實。因其他列強之欲積極從事於開發滿洲而引起之爭執，使是項戰後遺留之創痕迅歸消滅。兩國修好之進行因恐懼其他競爭者之心而增速。一九〇七年，一九一〇年，一九一二年，與一九一六年之條約均能使兩國關係日趨密切。

俄國革命對日本之影響。一九一七年之俄國革命，與

其後一九一九年七月二十五日一九二〇年十月二十七日蘇俄政府宣布對華政策之兩次宣言，及一九二四年五月三十一日九月二十日之兩次中俄協定，將日俄在滿洲諒解與合作之基礎，根本推翻。此種政策上之根本改革，使遠東三國間之關係發生澈底之變化。加以，協約國干涉（一九一八年至一九二〇年），及日俄軍隊在西伯利亞衝突（一九二〇年至一九二二年）之結果，使日俄關係之變化，益形顯著。蘇俄政府之態度，實予中國民族之熱望以有力之興奮，蓋蘇俄政府與第三國際對於根據現存條約維持對華關係之一切帝國主義國家，既採取反對政策，則對於中國恢復主權之奮鬥，似亦有予以贊助之可能。此種情形之進展，使昔時日本對俄之憂慮與猜疑完全復活。曾經一度與日本交戰之俄國，於戰後數年中，一變而為日本同盟之友。現在此種關係業經改變，而俄國勢力越出北滿範圍之危險，竟成為日本關切之問題。在北有俄國之共產主義，在南有國民黨之反日宣傳，兩者聯合大有可能，日本於是益覺於兩者間置一與兩者無關之滿洲之為得策。日本之疑懼，益因最近數年來蘇俄政府在外蒙所得之實越勢力，以及共產主義之滋長於中國而隨以俱增。

一九二五年一月日本與蘇俄締結之協約，雖設立正式之邦交，但革命前之密切合作終未克因之恢復。

原书缺页

原书缺页

之其他部份之緩衝地。日本軍界以為依據日俄間中日間各種協定所得在南滿鐵道沿線地帶駐紮數千鐵道守備隊之權利，較之日俄戰爭日方之絕大犧牲，殊為得不償失。而欲藉此以防來自北方的攻擊之可能，尤非有力之保障。

日本在滿洲之特殊地位。愛國情緒，國防需要，非常條約權利，三者合而造成日本對滿洲境內「特殊地位」之要求。日本關於特殊地位之觀念，並不為中國日本間或日本列國間各種條約及協定上法律規定者所限制。日人因日俄戰爭而發生之情感及屬於歷史的聯想，與因最近二十五年來滿洲日本事業之成功，而發生之自尊心理，皆構成日本「特殊地位」要求之成分。是項心理成分雖屬言之鑿鑿，然實則無從加以定義，因此日本外交辭令上所用「特殊地位」一名詞，遂致涵義不明，以致其他列國對於所謂「特殊地位」用國際文件加以承認一節，雖非不可能，但終覺不無困難。

日俄戰爭以後，日本政府屢向俄法英美等國要求承認日本在滿洲之「特殊地位」，「特殊勢力及利益」或「最要利益」。

日本此項努力，祇得一部份之成功，國際間協定或諒解，間有相當承認是項要求者，例如一九〇七年一九一〇年一九一二年一九一六年日本帝俄間之密約，英日同盟條約，及一九一七年藍辛石井換文等皆是。然此等協定或諒解，大都時過境遷，因正式廢止或其他手續，業已不復存在。一九二二年二月六日華盛頓會議，簽訂九國條約。各簽字國（一）贊同「尊重中國之主權與獨立暨領土與行政之完整」維持「各國在中國之商務實業機會之均等」，不得因中國狀況「乘機營謀特別權利」，並給予中國「完全無礙之機會，以發展並維持

一有力鞏固之政府」，皆予簽字國對於在中國各部——滿洲亦在內「特殊地位」「特殊權益」之要求，以極大之打擊。

惟九國公約之規定，及上述各種條約因廢止及其他手續而失效一節，並未能使日人改變態度。石井子爵在其近著「外交餘錄」內發表其本國人之見解，極為明晰。其言曰：「藍辛石井協定雖已取消，而日本之特殊利益並未搖動。日本在中國之利益既未因國際協定而造成，故亦不能成為取消之對象」。

註（一）九國即美，比，英，中國，法，意，日本，荷蘭，葡萄牙。

日本在滿洲「特殊地位」之要求與中國主權及政策之衝突。日本關於滿洲之要求與中國之主權衝突，並與國民政府減少在華各國現有之非常權利及制止是項權利將來擴充之希望，亦不能相容。試將中日雙方在滿洲所取之政策加以考察，則雙方衝突之日甚，即灼然可見。

日本對於滿洲之一般政策。自一九〇五年迄一九三一年九月事變，日本歷屆內閣對滿之一般目標始終相同，所不同者在達到此項目標之政策耳。日本對於維持治安應負責任若何程度一節，歷屆內閣對之亦不一致。

日本歷屆內閣關於滿洲之一般目標，不外維持及發展日本之既得利益，促進日本各種事業之擴充，及取得日本人民生命財產之充分保護。至用以實現此項目標之政策，則有一共同之主要特徵，即傾向於一種趨勢，謂滿洲及東部內蒙古不得與中國其他部份一律看待，是蓋由日本人在滿洲之「特殊地位」之觀念而來。歷屆內閣所採用之特別政策無論如何不同，例如所謂幣原男爵之「親善政策」，已故陸軍大將田

中男爵之「積極政策」彼此互異。然其具有是項公共特徵則一。

「親善政策」發生于華盛頓會議之時，維持至一九二七年四月。繼起之「積極政策」維持至一九二七年七月。嗣後又仍採「親善政策」，以繼續日本外務省之正式政策，直至于一九三一年九月。以促成是二種政策之精神論，其間有極顯著之區別。「親善政策」幣原男爵會云係以「善意與睦隣之道為基礎」，「積極政策」則以武力為基礎。至就對滿應採用之具體措置而論，則關於維持滿洲治安，保護日本利益，日本究應進行至如何程度，兩派政策亦自不同。

田中內閣之積極政策對於滿洲與中國其他部分不得一律看待之必要一節，極為注重，日本會祖白聲明「萬一紛亂波及于滿蒙，治安因而蒙其影響，危及吾人在該兩區域內之特殊地位與權益時」，「無論其威脅從何處發動」，日本將起而保障之。積極之性質，至是而益形顯著。田中政策切實聲明日本負責維持滿洲之治安，此即與前此僅以保護日本利益為目的之政策不同之處也。

日本對華政策以在滿洲者尤為堅決，蓋欲保護及發展在該地方之既得利益也。日本內閣亦有側重于軍用帶有武力威嚇之干涉方法者，一九一五年對華提出二十一條，即其尤著之一例。至於二十一條及其他干涉與威脅方法是否適當，則意見亦殊不一致。

■華盛頓會議關於日本在滿洲地位及政策之影響 華盛頓會議對於中國其他部份之景况雖曾發生顯著之影響，而在滿洲則實際上絲毫無變更。一九二二年二月六號簽訂九國條

約關於中國領土完整及門戶開放政策雖有規定，然從日本在滿洲既得利益之性質與範圍觀點上立論，則九國公約對於滿洲之適用，卻受有限制，雖以該約之文字言，該約固可適用於滿洲。日本雖已正式拋棄，如上文所言，一九一五年之條約給予日本關於外債及顧問之特別權利，然而九國條約實質上並未減少日本以既得利益為根據之要求。

■日本與張作霖之關係 自華盛頓會議至一九二八年張作霖總司令身故，日本在滿洲之政策，多注意其與東三省事實上統治者之關係。日本對於張作霖曾予以相當之援助，當上章所述郭松齡倒戈事件發生時，尤然顯著，張作霖總司令雖反對日本提出之許多要求，然亦覺日本之願望不能不予以相當承認，蓋深慮日本隨時可用優越之武力強迫其承受其願望也。且張氏亦有意於利用日本與俄，以抵禦北方蘇俄之勢力。就大體論，日本與張作霖總司令之關係，自日本立場言之，尚不失為相當圓滿。惟張氏晚年不欲履行所謂允諾及協定，雙方因而時生齟齬。在張氏於一九二八年六月間因失敗而退回奉天之前數月間，日本對張氏之感情突變而反對張氏，其事亦不無佐證。

■日本主張維持滿洲之治安與秩序 一九二八年春中國國民革命軍逼近北京驅逐張作霖勢力之際，日本田中首相以政府名義，發表聲明，稱為日本滿洲有「特殊地位」，故欲維持該地方之治安。當戰事有展及關外之勢時，日本政府於五月二十八日致通牒於當時各軍事領袖，其文曰：

「滿洲之治安維持，為帝國所最重視，苟有紊亂該地方治安，或成為紊亂該地方原因之事態發生，帝國政府將

竭力阻止之。故戰亂進展至京津地方其禍亂將及滿洲之時，則帝國政府爲維持滿洲治安計，不得不取適當而且有效之措置。」

同時田中男爵發表宣言措辭尤爲肯定，謂日本政府將阻止「戰敗之軍隊或追逐之軍隊」進入滿洲。

是項關係遠大之政策宣布後，北京政府及南京政府均有抗議。南京政府之照會內云日本議擬之措置，「不獨干涉中國之內政，且與國際公法上列國相互尊重領土主權之原則顯相違反」。

田中內閣之積極政策，日本國內政黨贊成者有之，劇烈抨擊者亦有之。幣原派攻擊尤力，其所持理由爲維持滿洲全部之治安，並非日本之責任。

日本張學良間關係之緊張 一九二八年張學良繼乃父爲總司令，對日關係自始即呈逐漸緊張之概。日本希望滿洲始終脫離新成立之南京國民政府。而張學良總司令則贊成承認國民政府之權力。關於日本官吏緊急勸告不可服從中央政府一節，上文亦已述及矣。惟一九二八年十二月奉天各衙署易職時，日本政府並未曾干涉。

日本張學良間之關係繼續緊張。一九三一年九月以前之數月內，雙方衝突，益形尖銳。

三 中日關於滿洲鐵道之爭執

滿洲國際之爭大半爲鐵道之爭。最近二十五年來滿洲之國際政治，大半係關於鐵路問題。國家政策上之需要，較之純粹經濟及鐵道業務上之理由，更爲重要。故滿洲各鐵道

對於該地方之經濟發展，並未盡其最大之效用。中日鐵道當局殊鮮合作，甚至毫無合作，以共圖實現雙方有益之鐵道政策，此則吾人研究鐵道問題所發現者也。試以西加拿大及阿根廷鐵道事業爲比例，其鐵道之擴充皆以經濟關係爲前題，而在滿洲鐵道事業之發展，則竟成爲中日雙方之競爭。滿洲建築稍關重要鐵道不引起中日間或其他有關之列國交換照會互相抗議者，蓋未之有也。

南滿鐵路在滿洲對日負有「特殊使命」 滿洲之有鐵道，始予以俄資建造歸俄人管理之東清鐵路。日俄戰爭以後，東清路之南段歸日本管理，是爲南滿鐵路，以是中日間之競爭遂不可免。南滿鐵道株式會社名義上雖爲財團法人，而實際則爲日本政府之營業。該公司之職權不獨管理鐵路，且兼有一般行政上之非常權利，自該公司組織成立以來，日人從未視爲純粹經濟事業。該公司第一任總裁之已故後藤子爵以爲南滿鐵道在滿洲對日負有「特殊使命」是即該鐵道業務之根本原則也。

南滿鐵路經營二十餘年，管理極善，效率素著。對於滿洲經濟之發展，貢獻殊多。該鐵路株式會社除營業外，附設學校，實驗所，圖書館，農事試驗場，均可資中國人民之攻錯。惟該株式會社之兼有政治性質，以及與日本政黨政治之關係，亦頗足爲其障礙；而該會社之大宗支出，往往不能獲得相等之利。該株式會社成立以還，定策借款與華方建築可與南滿鐵路銜接之路線，以使用聯運辦法將大宗貨物移向南滿鐵路轉運至日本租借地內之大連港出口。該公司對於建造此類鐵路之投資，爲數甚鉅，然從純粹經濟理由着想，此

鐵路之建造，是否合算，則殊為疑問。且從大宗資本之墊借款條件上之觀點着想，其理由是否充分，尤屬可疑。

中國領土上有外人掌管之機關如南滿鐵路者，中國當局當然不表贊同，日俄戰爭以後，中國方面對於該鐵路條約及協定上之權利時時發生疑問。一九二四年以後，滿洲之中國當局，認識鐵道事業之重要，決定不惜日資自行建造鐵路，於是此項問題益呈嚴重之象。築路計畫不免與經濟軍事兩種關係，相提並論矣。

滿洲宜布服從南京政府以前華方自築鐵路之努力。打通線原為達展墾區及增加京奉線之收入而建，然因一九二五年郭松齡倒戈之役，中國獨有並自營鐵路之軍事及政治的價值，亦同時表現。華方之開始打破日本之鐵路壟斷。並阻止其將來之發展，其事在國民政府政治影響及於滿洲之前。張作霖總司令當權時代，打通線，呼海線業已築成。一九二八年張學良總司令繼承政權，當時中央政府及國民黨提倡「恢復利權」運動，聲勢甚盛。張學良總司令之政策得此項運動之聲援，遂與日本以南滿鐵路株式會社為中心之壟斷政策及拓大政策，發生衝突矣。

關於「並行線」之衝突。日本於一九三一年九月十八日以還，在滿洲採用軍事手段，其所持理由，則藉口於中國方面破壞日本之「條約權利」，且聲稱華方未履行一九〇五年十一月至十二月間中日北京會議時中國政府之承諾。此項承諾，約略如下：

「中國政府為維持東省鐵路利益起見，於未收回該路之前，允於該路附近不築並行幹路，及有損於該路利益之

枝路」。

關於滿洲地方「並行鐵路」問題之爭執，遷延已久，關係重要。一九〇七至一九〇八年間，日本政府第一次要求此項權利，阻止中國政府建築業經與英國公司訂定合同之新法鐵路。一九二四年後在滿華人重振精神，自行建造鐵路，且不惜重日資，日本政府因提出抗議，反對華人自行建造打通線及吉海線。然雖經日本之抗議，兩路工程仍告竣通車。

關於「條約權利」或「秘密議定書」之存在問題。在本調查團未到遠東以前，關於日本所稱此項承諾是否實有其事一節，疑竇滋多。本調查團鑒於此項爭執之悠久重要性，竭力收集有關之主要事實，抵東京南京北平時，曾詳閱有關之文卷。吾人現可聲明所謂一九〇五年十一月至十二月間中國出席於北京會議之全權代表關於「並行鐵路」之允諾，並未載於任何正式條約；惟一九〇五年十一月四號北京會議第十一日之會議紀錄中載有此項所謂承諾。吾等並已獲得參與本調查團之日本代表及中國代表之同意，承認除北京會議紀錄所載者外，並無其他文件載有此項承諾。

真正問題之所在。由此可知有關係之真正問題，不在日本抗爭中國政府爽約在滿洲建築某某鐵路之「條約權利」是否存在，而在一九〇五年會議錄上之紀錄，無論其為「議定書」與否，華方有無履行之義務，是否有正式條約之效力，且在適用上並不受時間及事態之限制。

此項北京會議錄上之紀錄，就國際法律觀點論，是否有效之承諾，如係有效，是否祇有一種解釋，此項問題之決，久應取決於公正法庭之判斷矣。

此項會議錄上之記錄，中日雙方均有正式譯文。以是項譯文論，則此段關於「並行鐵道」彼此爭辯之文字，實為中國全權代表之一種聲明旨意之語，是則毫無疑義者也。

中國方面並未否認聲明旨意之語之存在。惟對於此項聲明之語其性質究竟如何，自有爭執以來，雙方意見殊不一致。日方主張所用以文字論，確已不許中國建築南滿鐵路株式會社認為與南滿鐵路競爭之任何路線；而中國方面則謂此項聲明語含有之效力，僅限制中國不得建築以故意妨害南滿鐵道之商務功用及價值為目的之任何鐵路。一九〇七年新法鐵道案發生，中日雙方交換照會。慶親王代表中國政府於一九〇七年四月七日照會日本駐華公使林男爵，聲稱出席北京會議之日本全權代表雖曾拒絕承認以距離南滿鐵路之里數確定「並行綫」一名詞之定義，但亦曾聲明「中國將來凡有開發滿洲地方之舉，日本決不攔阻」。準是則中國政府當時實際上似已承認不建築顯然無理損害南滿鐵道利益之鐵道為華方之義務，但始終未承認日本有在南滿壟斷敷設鐵道之權。

究竟何者為並行鐵道，迄無定義，而中國方面極願得一定義。一九〇六年至一九〇八年間，日本政府反對建築新法鐵路時，時人有凡在南滿鐵道約三十五英里以內之鐵道日本均視為「並行」鐵道之印象。但一九二六年日本又以打通路線距離南滿鐵路「平均在七十哩以下」，視為「競爭並行綫」，而反對其建築，故十分滿意之定義，頗不易確定也。

廣汎通俗辭句解釋之困難 就鐵路業務觀點論，「並行綫」即可視為競爭綫，凡奪取其鐵路能自然吸收之運輸之一部分者，謂為競爭路線。競爭運輸包括區間運輸及聯運運

輸二者而言。故限制建築「并行綫」之規定，有時可作極廣汎之解釋。何為幹路何為枝路，中日間亦未經雙方公同認定。從鐵路業務觀點言，此項名詞亦隨時改變。京奉路線之自打虎山展向北方者原稱為枝綫。但打通綫完工以後，該段鐵路亦可認為幹綫。

情形如斯，無怪關於並行綫之承諾之解釋問題，引起中日間之劇烈爭執。華方欲在南滿自行建築鐵路，幾於無次不招致日本之抗議也。

因在南滿洲建築鐵路之日本借款而發生之爭執 第二種鐵路爭執，使在九月十八日事變前，中日邦交益趨緊張者，發生於在滿洲為建築各種中國政府鐵路而墊款之各項協定。日本資本，依照現在價格，包括到期未付之款及利息，共一五〇,〇〇〇,〇〇〇日金，業已耗用於建築下測中國鐵路：即吉長吉敦四洮洮昂等鐵路，及其他狹軌鐵路。

日本申訴中國不付上述借款，不為相當準備，又不履行協定上各項條款，例如任命日本鐵路顧問是。日方屢次要求，中國應履行其所謂中國政府之承諾，即允許日本利益得以參加吉會鐵路之建築。該項在計劃中路綫，將延長吉敦鐵路至朝鮮邊境，使日本取得由其口岸達於滿洲腹地之新海陸短路線，而與其他鐵路聯絡後，又可縮短與內地交通之路程。

中國之辨護 中國為辨護其不付借款起見，指明該項借款，與尋常金融交易不同。並稱此項借款，係南滿鐵路株式會社為壟斷南滿之鐵路建築權而出貸者，其重要目的屬於軍事及政治；且無論如何，新鐵路之資本，估價過高，故至少在目前營業上，不能獲得相當款項，以償付其建築費及償

款。又稱日方所稱任何不履行義務之情形，經公平研究後，即能發現中國方面之行動，完全合理。至於吉會鐵路，中國方面否認在道德或即在法律方面，日方所稱之協定有效。

■南滿鐵路希望成立一支線系統。有數項情形，與鐵路協定相牽連者，使之不得不發生關於債款糾紛。南滿鐵路實際上無支線，故欲開拓一培養的支線系統，以加增其運費及旅客運輸。因而南滿鐵路株式會社，願意墊款，建築此等新路。雖該項借款，未必能於短時期內償還，亦弗願也。且於舊借款未清理時，亦願意繼續墊款。

在上述情形中，只須中國新築各路能為南滿之培養線，且其經營上，在某種範圍內，受南滿勢力之支配時，則該路對於債務，似即不汲汲於強迫償還，而中國鐵路之債務，遂日益加增。但至此種鐵路中之某某線與中國新鐵路系統相聯絡，於一九三零年至一九三一年，竟開始與南滿鐵路為嚴重之競爭時，則不付借款之聲訴，立即隨之以起。

■西原借款。數種借款協定，含有政治性質，亦為發生糾紛之一種原因。因受「二十一條」之影響。吉長鐵路，始置于南滿鐵路株式會社管理之下。而將該路未還債務，改換為一九四七年期滿之長期借款。因「滿蒙四鐵道協定」而訂立之一九一八年日金二千萬元墊款，即為「西原借款」之一種；「西原借款」者乃係借給於「安福系」之軍事政府，其用途毫無限制者也。又在同樣情形之上，向安福系墊付日金一千萬元，與建築吉會鐵路之一九一八年預備借款合同協定相牽連者，亦為一種西原借款。中國國民心理，自商議西原借款後，甚為激昂。但中國政府則從未否認該項借款。因此種

種情形，中國方面，遂感覺對於履行各借款契約上之條件，並不負有何種道德上之義務。

■吉會鐵路計劃。在中日關係中，吉會鐵路計劃之爭端，特別重要。起初在吉林至敦化一段上，發生種種爭論。該段業於一九二八年建築完成。自此以後，因中國不願將建築該路之日本墊款，改為以該路收入作為担保之正式借款，日本表示不滿意；且稱中國拒絕任命鐵路上日本會計員，係違反合同之規定。

中國方面，則聲稱提出之建築價值，不特較日本工程師之估計為高，且超過單據上之數目甚鉅。中國在建築價值確定以前，拒絕正式接收路線；且稱在接收以前，並無任命日本會計員之義務。

此種種爭端，具有確定的及技術性質；並不包含原則或政策問題；宜適用公斷或司法上之判斷，甚為明顯。但迄今尚未解決；使中日雙方怨恨，益形強烈。

■敦化會甯線之計劃。其更為重要且更為複雜者則為敦化會甯線建築之問題。該段建築後，即將使長春至朝鮮邊境之鐵路，一氣呵成，而在朝鮮邊境，復可與開至鄰近的朝鮮口岸之日本鐵路相聯絡。該段鐵路之完成，得直接進入滿洲腹地；並開放富於材木及鑛產之區域，於日本經濟上及戰略上，均極重要。

日本堅持該段鐵路，必須建築；且要求建築時，必須加入日資，聲稱關於此點，中國已為條約上之担保。且謂中國政府在一九零九年九月四日中日圖們江中韓界務條款中曾允許「與日政府商定」建築該段鐵路。中國所以肯為該項允許

着，半由日本放棄在間島區域關於朝鮮方面之舊有要求之故。至一九一八年，中國政府與日本銀行簽訂建築該路之借款預備合同。日本銀行，依照協定，墊款日金一千萬於中國政府。但此為西原借款之一種，而所謂西原借款者，由中國方面視之，即為影響約定效力之事實。

但兩者皆非確定的借款合同協定，中國並無無條件的及在一定日期前，允許日本銀行家參加建築該路之義務。

○一九二八年五月之各合同 據云建築此線之正式確定的各合同，係于一九二八年五月在北京簽字，但其究屬有效與否，則甚難決定。各該合同，係于不規則之情勢下，于五月十三——十五日間，由張作霖時代北京政府交通部之代表簽字，固屬無有疑義。但中國方面，則主張，彼時張作霖正受國民軍之壓迫，將由北京退出，不獲已允許該代表簽字，實係在一種脅迫之下，緣當時日方曾向張氏威嚇，謂彼如不批准各該合同，則彼之退出關外，將有危險也。究竟張氏自身，曾否亦簽字於各該合同，至今尙屬聚訟。張氏去世後，奉天之東北政務委員會，及張學良，則均謂各該合同，形式錯誤，且係于脅迫之情形下交涉，復從未經北京內閣或東北政務委員會批准，因對於各該合同，拒絕認可。

中國反對敦化會甯線之建築，其根本原因，即在於中國方面，深懼日本將利用此線，以達其軍事上戰略上之目的。並深信中國之主權與利益，將因日本取此新道由日本海以前往滿洲，而受有威脅。

要之此路問題，非財政與商務之問題，乃中日雙方國家政策衝突之問題也。

○通運之爭議 此外又有中日各路線聯運問題，運費問題，大連與中國營口（即牛莊）等港口競爭之問題。

在一九三一年九月時，中國自力建築，享有所有權，並經營其業務之各鐵路，計長約一千啓羅米突。其重者為：奉天海龍線，海龍吉林線，齊齊哈爾克山線，呼蘭海倫線及打虎山通遼線，（此線係北平遼甯線之一支路）中國並有北平遼寧線，及以下由日資建築之各線：即吉林長春線，吉林敦化線，四平街洮南線，及洮南昂昂溪線。在東省事件未爆發以前之兩年間，中國方面，頗企圖將各該線之業務聯絡，成爲一偉大之中國鐵路系統。且努力使一切貨載，於可能範圍內，均一律由中國經營之鐵路轉運，而以營口（即牛莊）或葫蘆島爲出海之港口。於是中國方面，對於中國鐵路系統上之各港口，則制定通運聯絡之辦法。而於中國各路線及南滿鐵路間，則於重要之線段，拒絕爲同一通運聯絡之協定。日方因此遂聲稱，因有此種差別之待遇，遂使原經由南滿線——至少須經由該線之一部分——以達大連北滿的貨載，橫被剝奪。

○運費之戰爭 偕同通運之爭議而發生者，則爲中日各線間運費之苦戰。一九二九——一九三〇年間，中國於打虎山通遼吉林海龍兩線通車後，低減運費，實爲此項苦戰之開始，彼時中國各線，似享有一天然之利益，即彼時中國銀幣，價格低落，各該線依據銀幣計算之運費，自較南滿路依據日本金元計算之運費爲低廉。惟日方於此，則謂中國運費過廉，實構成一不公平之競爭。中國方面答復，則稱中國之目的，與南滿不同，主要宗旨，不在牟利，而實在於發展鄉村

運費之競爭中，又有一問題發生，即此方對彼方，互讓其實

■利用差別待遇以優待本國貨物之雙方的互話。於運費

之競爭中，又有一問題發生，即此方對彼方，互讓其實施差別運費，或秘密減折運費，以優待其本國人民是也。日本方面，則謂中國鐵路運輸，既已分別等第，使中國物產，經由中國路線轉運者，較外貨為低廉，而對於土產，及經由中國鐵路以運至中國所管海口之貨物，又復收常率以下之運費。中國方面，則謂南滿鐵路，會秘密減折運費，並特別指明日本轉運經紀，對於交其轉運之貨物，會收取較南滿路法定率為更低之運費。

凡此種種問題，均屬特別專門問題，且性質亦極為複雜。雙方之互話，究竟誰有理由，殊難斷定。實則此等問題，依照通常辦法，原應由鐵路委員會或通常司法上之判斷以解決之。(一)

註(一) 請參閱本報告附件專論第一號

■港口之爭議 滿洲中國當局之鐵路政策，原係以葫蘆島新港口之發展為焦點。營口不過為第二等港口，於葫蘆島尚未爭議完全發達前，暫充主要港口。且尚有許多新路之計畫，實際上可供滿洲全部之用。日本方面，因謂中國實行聯運及低減運費諸辦法，遂使原應運至大連之大部分貨物，橫被剝奪，且謂此項情形，尤以一九三〇年為特著。以為由南滿運至大連出口之貨物，在一九三〇年減少至一百萬米突噸，而是年營口，較之前一年，則有實際上之增益。中國方面，則指明大連貨物減少，主要之原因，係由於一般經濟之不景氣，特殊之原因，則由於素為南滿大宗貨物的大豆之滯銷

。至於營口之加增，則謂係新築各路，通至各地，交通發達之結果。

日本方面，似係對於中國各線及葫蘆島之將來可能的爭競，特別掛慮，以為中國所以計畫建築多數新路，及發展葫蘆島港口，其目的，即在使「大連港口及南滿鐵路之本身，均變為無有價值」。

今試將此種種鐵路問題，綜合觀察，即可知其中許多問題，係具有專門性質，極能由通常公斷或司法手續解決。但其餘之各問題，則係由中日劇烈之競爭所造成，而此項劇烈的競爭，則又係導源於雙方深固的國策之衝突。

■一九三一年中日鐵路交涉 在一九三一年之初，凡此種種鐵路問題，實際上均尚懸而未決。自一月開始，下至夏季，中日雙方，曾為斷斷續續之努力，冀圖開一會議，將雙方關於此項未決各問題之政策，設法調和，願彼所謂木村高交涉 (Kimura, Kao Negotiations) 者，竟未能有所成就。當一月間交涉開始之際，頗可信雙方之均具誠意。乃不幸遷延復遷延，則亦應由雙方負責。因有此迭次之遷延，遂使彼已為種種籌備之正式會議，直至東省事變發作時，迄尙未能開成。

四 一九一五年中日條約暨換文及其

關連之爭執

■二十一條與一九一五年之條約及換文 除鐵路糾葛以外，中日間在一九三一年九月最重要之懸案，厥為由一九一

五十年中日條約及其換文而生之爭執；一九一五年中日條約與換文，即所謂「二十一條」之結果也。此項爭執，多關係南滿及東內蒙古，因除漢口冷萍公司（在漢口附近）問題外，其他在一九一五年訂之協定，非經代以新協定，即經日本自動放棄。在滿洲之爭執係關於下列規定：

(一) 關東租借地之日本所有期展至九十九年（一九九七年）。

(二) 南滿及安奉鐵路之日本所有期延長九十九年（二〇〇二年與二〇〇七年）。

(三) 允准日本臣民在「南滿」內地，即在根據條約或其他開放與外人居住經商之地域以外者，有商租地畝之權；

(四) 允准日本臣民在「南滿」內地有居住往來並經營工商業之權，及在東部內蒙古有參加中日合辦農業之權。

上項允准與讓與，日人有無法律權利享受，胥視一九一五年條約與換文之效力而定，而華人固繼續否認該約與換文有束縛彼等之力。中國人民，無論其為官吏或平民，均深信「二十一條要求」一詞實際上與「一九一五年條約與換文」同義，並以為中國之目的，應為解除該約之束縛；凡是種種，無論幾何專門之解釋或理由，不能稍移其念。在一九一九年之巴黎和會中，中國會要求廢除該約，其理由為該約係簽訂于「日本哀的美敦書以戰爭為恐嚇之威脅之下」。在一九二

一——二二年之華盛頓會議中，中國代表團會提出「關於此項條約之公平與正義以及其根本效力」之問題；一九二三年三月，即中國在一八九八年租與俄國之遼東（關東）租借地原定二十五年租期行將屆滿之前，中國政府復照會日本聲明

廢止一九一五年之規定，並聲稱「此項條約換文，本國輿論始終反對」。中國方面既堅持一九一五年之條約「根本無效」，故對於該約關於滿洲之規定，除情勢必要外，不予履行。

對於中國人因此違犯日人條約上之權利，日人頗多怨言。日人以為一九一五年之條約與換文，曾經正式簽字批准，並有效力。誠然，在日本有一部分之輿論自始即不贊成「二十一條要求」；而晚近日本演說家與時論家之批評此項政策者，亦習見不鮮。但堅持該約關於滿洲之各項規定為有效，日本政府與人民，似屬一致。

遼東租借地租期與南滿及安奉鐵路讓與期之延長。一九一五年條約與換文之兩項重要規定，為關東租借地之租期由二十五年展至九十九年，及南滿與安奉鐵路之讓與同樣展至九十九年。此種延長期限，為一九一五年條約之結果，而收回昔日政府租出之土地，又為反對外人利益之民族主義的「恢復利權運動」之一部，因此兩種理由，關東租借地以及南滿鐵路時為中國人運動之對象，甚至為中國外交之對象。張學良司令之宣告滿洲服從中央政府以及允許國民黨傳播其勢力於滿洲之政策，使此種爭執在一九二八年後更尖銳化，雖其在實際政治上常隱而不露。

與一九一五年條約及換文相關者，厥為收回南滿鐵路，或廢除該路之政治性質使成爲一純粹的經濟事業之運動。然給價收回該路之最早日期既經規定爲一九三九，徒然廢止一九一五年條約，並不足以將南滿鐵路復歸中國。中國有無能力籌集資本以達此目的，亦極可懷疑之事。中國民族主義之發言人敦促收回南滿鐵路之言論，足與日人以刺激，蓋日人

之合法權利與利益因彼而感受威脅也。

對於何者爲南滿鐵路之正當任務，日方與華方之見解，自該鐵路株式會社一九〇六年組織時起，即不一致。自然，就法律論，南滿鐵路株式會社，係在日本法律下組織之一私人合股事業，實際上爲中國管轄權之所不及。尤其是自一九二七年以來，在滿洲之中國人，曾有取消南滿鐵路株式會社之政治與行政任務，而使成爲一「純粹商務事業」之運動。但中國人似尙未提出具體計劃，以完成此目的。就實際言，滿鐵會社確係一政治事業。彼係一日本政府之機關，政府操縱大多數之股份；其行政政策，受政府嚴密之管轄，以致日本一有新內閣上台，滿鐵會社之高級職員，幾無不隨之而易。抑更有進者，在日本法律之下，滿鐵會社受有廣泛之政治行政任務，包含警察，課稅與教育。如除去滿鐵會社之此種任務，不啻將南滿鐵路株式會社之最初立意與嗣後發育滋長之「特殊使命」，全部放棄。

■鐵路區域 關於日人在南滿鐵路區域以內之行政權，特別是土地取得權，課稅權，設置鐵道守備隊權，發生多數之爭執。

鐵路區域除鐵路軌道兩旁之數碼地帶外，此鐵路區域包括十五個市，名爲「日本鐵路市」，坐落於南滿鐵路之全綫，自大連以至長春，自安東以至瀋陽。有數個鐵路市，如在瀋陽，長春及安東者，包含人烟稠密之中國城市之大部份。

南滿鐵路株式會社在鐵路區域內設置實際上完全之市政府之權利，法律上係基於一八九六年中俄東省鐵路公司合同之一條款，該條款稱「凡該公司之地段……，由該公司一手

經理」。於是直至一九二四年之中俄協定時之俄國政府，與其後爲南滿鐵路取得中東鐵路原有權利之日本政府，均將此項規定解釋爲讓與鐵路區域之政治管轄權。但中國方面始終否認此種解釋，而堅謂一八九六年之合同之其他規定，足以證明該項條款之用意並非讓與如此廣泛之行政權，有如管理警察，課稅，教育與公用事業之權者。

■土地爭執 關於滿鐵會社取得土地之爭執，亦常發生。依照一八九六年原合同之條款，鐵路公司有以購買或承租之方法取得「建築經理防護鐵路所必需」之民地之權利。但中國人認爲日人會將此項權利爲不正當之運用，以冀取得更多之土地。結果南滿鐵路株式會社與中國地方當局之間，幾于有不斷的糾紛。

■鐵路區域內課稅權之糾紛 對於鐵路區域內課稅權，雙方所持之衝突的主張，引起不少之糾紛。日方之主張，係根據原合同「凡該公司之地段……由該公司一手經理」之規定；中國人之主張，係以主權國家之權利爲根據。概括言之，實際情勢，係滿鐵會社向居住滿鐵區域內之日本人中國人以及外人實行課稅，中國官廳雖亦堅持其有此種法律權利，但並未行使。

當中國人對於運往南滿鐵路市以便由日本鐵路轉運大連之物產（如大豆之屬）試行課稅時，另種糾紛，遂因之時常發生。中國人聲稱此乃一致賦稅，有于日本「鐵路市」邊境征收之必要，若不然者，將不啻特別優待南滿鐵路運載之物產。

■關於日本在南滿鐵路沿綫設置鐵道守備隊之權利問題 關於日本鐵道守備隊各項之爭執，幾于引起不斷之困難。

此項爭執，亦足以表現前述兩國政策在滿洲之根本的衝突，且常爲傷害不少人命之不幸事件之原因。日本所稱設置此種鐵道守備兵隊之權利，其法律的根據，即時爲世人引證之一八九六年原合同之條款，允准凡中東鐵路「公司之地段……由該公司一手經理」。俄國認爲——但中國否認——該條款會給與俄國以俄兵護路之權利。在一九〇五年之樸資茅斯和約中，俄日兩國，彼此保留設置護路守備兵之權利，該守備兵「每一基羅米突不得超過十五人」。但在中日兩國同年於北京簽訂之中日會議東三省事宜條約中，中國政府對於日俄和約中之此項規定，並未予以承認。然中日兩國在一九〇五年十二月二十二日中日會議東三省事宜附約之第二款中，確會有下列之規定：

「因中國政府聲明極盼日俄兩國將駐紮東三省軍隊暨護路兵隊從速撤退，日本國政府願副中國期望。如俄國允將護路兵撤退，或中俄兩國另有商訂妥善辦法，日本政府允即一律照辦。又如滿洲地方平靜，外國人生命產業中國均能保護周密，日本國亦可與俄國將護路兵同時撤退」。

日方理由 日本之條約權利，即以此條款爲根據。然俄國早已將其守備隊撤退，並於一九二四年之中俄協定中，放棄其設置守備隊之權利。但日本以爲滿洲地方並未恢復安甯，中國亦無力周密保護外人，因此堅持日本仍保有設置鐵道守備隊之有効的條約權利。

日本辯護其使用守備隊，似漸不以條約上之權利爲根據，而逐漸趨重「在滿洲現狀下有絕對的必要」之理由。

華方理由 中國政府對於日本之申辯，始終不以爲然

。中國政府堅謂在南滿設置日本鐵道守備隊，無論在法律上，或在事實上，均不能謂爲正當。且損及中國之領土與行政之完整。至于業經引證之中日會議東三省事宜附約中之規定，中國政府以爲僅係聲明一暫時的實際情勢，不能謂爲給予權利，尤其是含有永久性之權利。中國政府更謂日本在法律上有撤退其守備隊之義務，因俄國業已撤退其守備隊，滿洲地方業已恢復安甯，且祇須日本守備隊容許，中國當局亦能予南滿鐵路以充分保護，正如其保護在滿洲之其他鐵路。

日本鐵道守備隊在鐵路區域之活動 因日本鐵道守備隊而起之糾紛，不僅限于其在鐵路區以內之駐紮與活動。此種守備隊係正式日本軍隊，時常至毗連地帶行使其警察之職權，甚或已得或不得中國當局之許可，或通知或不通知中國當局，在鐵路區域以外實行操演。此種行爲，中國人民，無論官吏或平民，尤一致痛惡，認爲不獨于法律爲不當，且易惹起不幸事件。

此種操演之結果，往往引起誤會，並損害中國農作物，物質的賠償，殊不足以補救因此而生之惡感。

日本領館警察 與日本鐵道守備隊問題密切關連者厥爲日本領館警察問題。此種警察附屬於在滿洲之日本領事館及其分館，不獨在沿南滿鐵路者如是，即在哈爾濱，齊齊哈爾，滿洲里，以至多數旅滿之朝鮮人居住之所謂「間島區域」者亦莫不然。

日本在滿洲設置領館警察之理由 日本以爲設置領館警察之權利，係由領事裁判權演繹而出，且僅係推廣領事法庭之司法職權，因此種警察爲保護日本臣民與維持其紀律之

不可少者也。實際上在中國其他各地之日本領事館，亦曾設置較少之日本領館警察，恰與其他有領事裁判權條約之國家之一般習慣相反。

就實際問題觀察，日本政府顯然相信在滿洲現狀之下，尤其鑒於日本在該地利益之重要，日本居民——包括朝鮮人在內——之衆多，設置領館警察，確爲一種必要。

華方否認日人之主張，但中國政府對於日本在滿洲設置領館警察所持之理由，始終駁斥，並屢向日本提出關於此問題之抗議。中國政府以爲在滿洲任何地方均無駐紮日本警官之必要，警察問題與領事裁判權並無關係不能相提並論，領館警察之設置，絕無條約根據，確係侵犯中國之主權。無論其爲正當或非正當，領館警察之存在，確曾屢次引起該

警察人員與當地中國官廳人員之嚴重衝突。

日人在南滿內地往來居住並經營商業之權利 一九一五年中日條約會規定「日本國臣民得在南滿任便居住，往來，並經營商業等一切生意」。此爲一重要之權利，但亦爲華人所反對者；因在其他中國各地，除約開商埠而外，一切外人均不准居住及經商。蓋此乃中國政府之政策，在領事裁判權取消與外人受中國法律管轄之前，不予彼等以此項特權。然在南滿之此項權利，亦有相當限制：日人在南滿內地者，必須攜帶護照並遵守中國之法律及規則。但中國施行於日人之規則，非先「與日本領事成立諒解」，不能執行。

中國官廳之行動，常有與此條約條文不相符合者，蓋彼等始終不承認該條約爲有效。中國代表，對於中國限制日人在南滿內地居住往來與經商，及中國官吏出示禁止日人及其

他外人於商埠外居住或續租房屋之事實，在其正式提交本調查團之文件內，並未加以辯駁。官廳之壓力，間或輔以嚴厲之警廳措置，每加於日人之上，強其由南滿及東部內蒙古之市鎮退出，並加於中國人管有產業者，使之不敢出租房屋於日人。日人聲稱中國官廳並會拒絕發給護照與日人，重累彼等以不法之課稅，且在一九三〇之前數年內，未曾實行條約內之規定，即凡管理日人之規則，應先送交日本領事。

華方之解釋與答辯 中國人之目標，乃在實行其限制日本在滿洲特殊權利之政策，以增進其管轄東三省之力量。彼等以一九一五年條約「根本無效」爲理由，證明此行爲正當。彼等更進而指出日人曾企圖於滿洲全部居住並經商，雖條約上之規定，祇限於南滿。

此項糾紛爲直至九一八事件以前之不斷的刺戟物。中日兩國之政策及目標，既各背道而馳，其因此項條約規定而起連續且劇烈之糾紛，自所難免。兩國均自承認此種情勢爲直至一九三一年九月事件以前彼此關係中之日益惡化的刺戟物。

關於商租之爭執 與在南滿內地居住及營業之權利有密切之關係者，厥爲租地之權利。一九一五年之條約，曾允許日人有下項租地之權：「日本國臣民在南滿爲蓋造商工業應用之房廠，或爲經營農業，得商租其需用地畝」。當時兩國政府之換文，曾將「商租」一詞加以解釋。依照中文本，「商租」二字含有「不過三十年之長期限有無條件續租之可能」之意義。日文本則僅規定「長期租借以三十年，並得無條件續租」。究竟日人租約，能否溢其單方面的意旨，「得無

條件續租」，雙方亦發生爭執。

日人在滿洲取得土地之欲望，無論其以承租，購買，或抵押之方法，在華人眼光中，均為日本「收買滿洲」之國策之明證。故中國當局，曾設法阻礙日人之取得地畝。一九三一年八月以前之三四年。為中國「收復利權運動」極盛時期，阻礙日人在滿洲取得土地，亦以此時為最力。

中國官廳制定嚴厲條例，禁止日人購買土地，或自由保有地權，或因抵押而取得地權，顯然在其合法權利之內；蓋條約固僅予日人以租地之權利也。惟日人以爲不准以地抵押，頗與該條約之精神不合。

然中國官吏並未承認該條約爲有效，因此使盡方法，阻礙日人租地或以省政府或地方政府之命令，使租地與日人者得受刑事上處分；或向此項租約徵收特稅，規定先期繳納，或訓令地方官吏，如核准地畝之轉讓日人，必予以處分。

■日人以承租購買與抵押之方法在北滿與南滿同樣獲得地土。雖有上述種種之障礙，然實際上日人不僅租得大宗土地，且竟行收買，或用其較普遍之方法取消抵押地畝之取贖權，而取得大片土地之自由保有不動產權——雖此種地權，不爲中國法庭所承認。日本放債者，尤其是大資本之放債團，有專以取得地畝爲目的者；故抵押之土地，泰半爲彼等所得。根據日本官方報告，在全滿及熱河租與日人之土地，在一九二二，一九二三年至一九三一年內，由八〇，〇〇〇英畝左右增至五〇〇，〇〇〇英畝以上。其中一小部份，係在北滿地方——依照中國法律與國際條約，日本在該地並無租地之權。

■關於商租問題之中日交涉。因此項商租問題至爲重要，故中日雙方在一九三一年以前之十年間，至少曾有三次之直接交涉，以冀能成立一協定，一可能之解決方法——此方法深信曾經雙方予以考慮者——爲以商租問題與取消領事裁判權問題，同時討論；日本允在滿洲放棄領事裁判權，中國則許日人在滿洲自由租地。但數次之交涉，均歸失敗。

此項中日長久爭執之日人租地權問題，一如其他上述諸問題，起於兩國根本衝突之政策；隱藏於此種政策後之目標，較之彼此以違反國際條約互相攻訐之辭語之本身的意義，更爲重要。

五 滿洲之朝鮮人問題

朝鮮人在滿洲而依照日本法律有日本國籍者，爲數約八十萬，足使中日兩國政策之衝突，益形劇烈。因此爭端紛起，而朝鮮人遂成爲犧牲，蒙受痛苦與苛待（一）。

註（一）參閱附載本報告書之專論第九號

中國方面之反對朝鮮人以購買或租賃方法獲得滿洲土地，引起日本人之仇視。據日本人主張，朝鮮人爲日本國臣民，應享受一九一五年條約及換文賦予日本租地之權利。又日本人承認朝鮮人歸化爲中國人，故復發生兩重國籍之問題。至日本領館警察對朝鮮人之監視及保護，則爲中國人所深惡，中日兩國警察，遂有無數之衝突。在朝鮮邊界正北之間島地方，有朝鮮居民四十萬，三倍於中國。因之特殊問題，往往發生。及至一九二七，中國人因此種種問題採取限制朝鮮人在滿洲自由居住之政策，此種政策，日本人認爲係無

自由之壓迫。

關於朝鮮人在滿洲地位之中日協定。朝鮮人在滿洲之權利，大都在三種中日協定內確定，即一九〇九年九月四日中日圖們江中韓界務條款，一九一五年五月二十五日於南滿與東內蒙古之條約及換文，及一九二五年七月八日之所謂「三矢協定」。至朝鮮人兩重國籍之問題，並未經中日間之協定予以規定。

迨一九二七年，在滿洲之一般中國官吏漸信朝鮮人事實上已成爲日本「侵略併吞滿洲之先鋒隊」，并以爲日本人既不承認朝鮮人取得中國國籍，而日本領館警察復以監視朝鮮人爲恆事，故朝鮮人以購買或租賃獲得土地，確爲一種政治上與經濟上之危險，「危害在滿洲中國人民之生存」。

中國方面之論點。在中國人中有一種論調，即朝鮮爲日本所逼迫而自祖國移殖滿洲，因日本政府熟籌之政策，在使日本人移殖朝鮮以替代朝鮮人，或使朝鮮人於政治上及經濟上感受頗連困苦不得不移殖滿洲，其迫朝鮮人讓渡地產卽爲日本政府虐待朝鮮人之尤著者也。在中國人之意見，朝鮮人爲「被壓迫民族」，且爲一異族政府所統治，而所有重要官職均爲日本人所獨攬，故被迫而遷入滿洲，以求享政治上之自由與經濟上之生存。朝鮮墾民十九業農，且大約均能種稻，故初至滿洲時，中國人表示歡迎，認爲經濟上之資產；又因其受或有之壓迫，表示自然之同情。中國人以爲若日本人否認朝鮮人歸化中國，且不以給予朝鮮人必要之警察保護爲詞，施行追隨朝鮮人至滿洲境內之政策，則朝鮮人之移殖滿洲，不至發生政治與經濟上之重大問題。中國人對滿洲地

方當局，尤其是一九二七年以後，限制不爲佃戶及工人之朝鮮人在滿洲自由墾殖之措施，不承認爲「壓迫」之事件。

日方否認中國方面之非議。日本人承認中國人之疑忌實爲中國人「壓迫」朝鮮人之主因，但竭力否認曾實行鼓勵朝鮮人移殖滿洲之政策，聲言「朝鮮人之移殖滿洲應視爲自然趨勢之結果，日本既不鼓勵，亦不限制」，此種現象不受政治或外交動機之影響。因此日本人聲明「中國對日本以利用朝鮮人圖謀併吞兩區域之畏懼，實屬毫無根據」。

朝鮮人問題使中日敵意增劇朝鮮人自身成爲犧牲。此種不可調和之意見，使各種問題如租地

，管轄權，日本領館警察等，益形嚴重。此種問題已爲朝鮮人造成一極不幸之局面，而使中日關係更形惡化（一）。

註（一）參閱附載本報告書之專論第九號

朝鮮人與租地問題。除朝鮮人之在間島者外，並無中日協定特別規定允許或否認朝鮮人在約開商埠外居住及從事職業，或在滿洲租賃或以他法取得土地之權。但現在約有四萬朝鮮人散居間島以外之滿洲地方。此種朝鮮人分佈甚廣，特別在滿洲東半部，而尤以朝鮮以北之區域與吉林省人數爲多，并已前進至中東鐵路東部一帶，松花江下游流域及沿中俄邊界自朝鮮東北以至烏蘇里及黑河之兩旁，即在毗連之蘇俄境內，亦有居住墾殖之朝鮮人。且多數朝鮮人現在間島外之滿洲地方，均租有或購有農地，蓋朝鮮人有因其祖先遷徙滿洲在數代以前而成爲滿洲之土著者，又有因與日本脫離臣民關係而歸化中國者。但大多數爲佃戶，中國人爲其佃主，依照租約耕種稻田，以收穫爲分配之則。此種租約期限大

約自一年至三年。地主得斟酌情形，繼續允租。

■關於朝鮮人租地權中日間協定之爭執 中國人否認朝鮮人在滿洲間島地方外有購買或租賃農地之權。因涉及此問題者僅有一九〇九年之圖們江中韓界務條款，而該條款之適用，限於間島。故朝鮮人之已爲中國人民者，始得在滿洲內地享受購買或居住及租賃土地之權。中國否認朝鮮人在滿洲自由租地之主張，其理由爲一九〇九年中日圖們江中韓界務條款准許朝鮮人僅在間島一地方有居住及置地之權，并明確規定視朝鮮人應受中國之管轄。該條款爲一完全之文件「意在雙方讓步之下解決中日間關於該處之地方懸案」。上述條款包含一交換條件，即日本放棄對於朝鮮人之管轄權，中國予以置地之特權。

■中國方面之理由 自一九一〇年朝鮮歸併日本後，中日兩國繼續履行上述條約，中國方面以爲一九一五年之條約及換文，不能更易關於圖們江條款之規定。且一九一五年條約內載有一條，明言「關於東三省中日現行各條約，除本條約另有規定外，一概仍舊照行」，圖們江條款並不除外。中國政府又謂一九一五年之條約及換文不適用於間島區域，因間島區域在地理上非「南滿」之一部分，蓋「南滿」二字，地理上與政治上之定義，殊不明瞭。

■日本方面之爭點 自一九一五年以來，中國方面之論據爲日本人所否認，以爲一九一〇年朝鮮歸併日本，則朝鮮人已成爲日本臣民，而一九一五年之中日條約及換文關於南滿與東內蒙古之規定既予日本人在南滿以居住及租地之權，並准其參加東內蒙古之合辦農業，則是項規定，對於朝鮮人

同樣適用。日本政府又謂圖們江條款因與一九一五年條約之規定抵觸，已爲其所廢止。中國方面所謂該條款爲一完全之文件，實無根據，因朝鮮人在間島所得之權利，由於日本同意，承認間島爲中國領土之一部份。如日本不爲在滿洲之朝鮮人取得業已賦予其他日本人民之權利及特權，則日本不啻歧視朝鮮人。

日本贊助在滿洲之朝鮮人取得土地之理由，本爲遂其運米於日本之志願。顧此種志願未能盡償，一九三〇年產米七百萬蒲式耳(Bushel)。大約一半在當地消費，餘米之輸出，則受限制。日本以爲朝鮮佃民墾殖荒地使中國地主得蒙其利不應反遭不正當之擯斥。

■雙方爭議對於朝鮮人狀況之影響 在中國人方面，亦欲使可耕種之低田產米，但大抵雇用朝鮮人爲佃民或工人以免耕地落日人之手。多數朝鮮人遂入中國國籍，藉置田產。但朝鮮人有已購置田產而讓與日本之押產會社者，以故日本人中對朝鮮人歸化中國日本政府應否予以承認，主張頗不一致也。

■在滿洲朝鮮人之兩重國籍問題 一九一四年中國國籍法只准外國人其本國法律有歸化他國之許可者，有取得中國國籍之資格。但一九二九年二月五日修正之中國國籍法，並不規定外人須喪失其原有國籍，始能取得中國國籍。以故朝鮮人得歸化中國，雖日本堅持異議，不顧也。日本國籍法從未准朝鮮人喪失日本國籍，雖一九二四年修正之國籍法載有一條，謂「自願取得外國國籍之人，喪失日本國籍」，然此法從未經天皇特命，許其適用於朝鮮人。惟朝鮮人之在滿洲

者，自百分之五至百分之二十，已取得中國國籍，而以日本領事館勢力所不盡及之地方爲尤乘。亦有朝鮮人自滿洲邊界而至蘇俄領土，遂爲蘇俄人民者。

朝鮮人兩重國籍對於中國政策之影響 朝鮮人兩重國籍之問題，引起中國國民政府及府地方當局對於不限制朝鮮人歸化之反感，深恐朝鮮人因暫時取得中國國籍，將成爲日本取得農田政策之工具，故一九三〇年九月吉林省政府頒佈關於買賣該省土地之章程，規定「如歸化中國之朝鮮人購買土地時，應查明是否爲永久歸化人民居住之用，抑爲日本人代購」。但地方官廳之態度，以游移不定，有時實行長官之命令，惟常發暫時歸化證書，以替代正式證書。前項證書，須經省政府及南京司法部之核准。其與日本領事館距離甚遠之處，地方官往往願允給予朝鮮人證書，有時亦實行強迫朝鮮人入中國籍，否則飭其離境。此種舉措，係受日人政策及國籍證書費收入之影響。中國人聲稱日本人縱容朝鮮人歸化中國，其目的在利用朝鮮人爲名義地主，或以讓渡方法從歸化中國之朝鮮人取得土地。大概言之，日本當局不容許朝鮮人改入中國籍而盡量施行管轄之權。

關於警察管轄權中日主張衝突而發生之問題，特別嚴重，涉及朝鮮人。日本主張因領事裁判權而在滿洲領事館有駐紮警察之權，此種主張凡涉及朝鮮人時，即爲衝突不已之原因。不問朝鮮人是否切望此種表面上爲彼輩利益計之日本干涉，日本領館警察尤其是在間島者，不僅行使保護之職，抑且擅自行使查封朝鮮人住所之權，而對朝鮮人犯參加獨立運動或共產或反日工作之嫌疑者爲尤甚。中國警察當施行中

國法律維持治安或遏制不良朝鮮人之動作時，往往與日本警察發生衝突。中日警察亦曾屢次通力合作，如一九二五年「三矢協定」所規定者：照此協定，雙方同意，中國人在奉天省東部當取締「朝鮮人之會社」，並應日本人之請求，將「品行不端之朝鮮人」，送交日本人。然實際上仍有不斷之爭執與衝突。此種情勢，其不能不發生糾紛者，勢使然也。

間島之特別問題 朝鮮人問題與由此而生之中日對於間島之關係，其性質已變成極複雜而嚴重。按間島（日本文爲「Kanto」，朝鮮文爲「Kando」）包括遼甯（奉天）省之延吉和龍興汪清三縣，且實際上徵諸日本政府所持之態度，暉春亦在其內。此四縣者，與朝鮮東北隅毗連，正對圖們江。

日本對間島之態度與政策 日本人論及朝鮮人對間島之傳統態度，不願承認一九〇九年中日圖們江中韓界務條款已將此區域是否屬於中國或朝鮮之問題永遠解決；以爲此區域內大半之農地爲朝鮮人所耕種，「彼等在該處已有極深之根基，故可視爲朝鮮人之範圍」。日本政府在間島堅持行使管轄及監視朝鮮人之權，歷年來駐在該處領事館之警察，在四百名以上。日本領事館與朝鮮總督所委派之日本官吏，通力合作，在該處行使有行政性質之廣泛職權，包括維持日本學校，醫院，及受政府資助而爲朝鮮人設立之金融機關。故日人視間島爲移植朝鮮種稻人之天然尾閘。以言政治，間島尤爲重要，因間島已成爲提倡朝鮮獨立者及其產團體與其他反日之徒之逋逃藪。一九二〇年朝鮮獨立運動暴發後，朝鮮人即在暉春舉事，反抗日本，故日本在間島已有嚴重之政治問題，與統治朝鮮問題有密切關係。以言軍事，間島之重

要，亦顯而易見，蓋圖們江下游爲中國日本蘇俄三國之界線也。

■中日對於圖們江條款解釋上之衝突 中日圖們江中韓界務條款規定「中國政府仍准韓民在圖們江北墾地居住」，朝鮮人居住是項墾地者，嗣後應「服從中國法權歸中國地方官管轄裁判」；並與中國人受同等之待遇，所有民刑各案件，涉及朝鮮人者，應由「中國官員按照中國法律秉公審判」；但日本領事官特別關於人命案件得到庭觀審，並有「請求」中國官廳按照中國特別法律程序「另派員複審」之權。

但據日方之見解，一九一五年中日條約與換文已將圖們江條款涉及管轄等問題之規定予以廢止，而自一九一五年以來朝鮮人已成爲日本人，則按照中日現行條約，享受領事裁判權之權利與特權。此種論調，中國政府始終未嘗承認，且堅持如圖們江條款內關於朝鮮人有居住墾地權之規定，可以適用，則該條款內關於朝鮮人應受中國之管轄各條，亦應有效。又日本人解釋允准朝鮮人居住墾地一條爲購買租賃間島之農地，而中國人之見解，則以爲此條應從字面解釋，享受間島購地之權僅限於朝鮮人之已歸化中國者。

■朝鮮人置產實在情形之不規則 以故實在情形，極不規則，蓋在間島之朝鮮人有未曾取得中國國籍而已置地者，中國官吏亦縱容之。但大抵朝鮮人承認取得中國國籍爲間島購地必須條件。照日本官廳統計，間島過半之耕地（包括暉春）爲朝鮮人「所有」，而朝鮮人在該處者百分之十五已歸化中國。朝鮮人享有農地之所有權者，是否爲已歸化中國之人，不得而知。此種情形，往往引起而爭執，而中日兩國警察

，且常因此而發生衝突矣。

■日本對中國人壓迫朝鮮人之非議 日本人稱一九二七年將終，時苛待朝鮮移民之運動，暴發於滿洲。此種運動係受中國官吏之指使，而爲普遍反日潮流之餘波。又謂自滿洲各省歸附南京國民政府以後，苛待朝鮮人，日益劇烈。調查團接到日方所供給關於中國政府及滿洲地方當局命令之譯件多種。日方以此項譯件足以證明中國有確定之計劃，以虐待朝鮮人，如令其歸化中國，迫其出境，驅之稻田外，強其繳納苛捐雜稅，不准其簽訂租賃房地契約，並施以種種虐待。此種壓迫運動，對「親日」之朝鮮人爲尤烈，朝鮮居民會社受日政府之資助者，亦遭摧殘。而朝鮮人所設立或爲朝鮮人設立之學校，均被封閉。至於「不良之朝鮮人」，則任其敲詐並凌辱朝鮮農民。又迫令朝鮮人改著中國服裝，處此窘苦狀況之下，並令其放棄日本之保護或協助。

對於滿洲當局頒發歧視未歸化中國之朝鮮人之命令，中國人未嘗否認，此項命令之衆多及其內容，尤其是一九二七年所頒發者，足以證明滿洲當局對於朝鮮人以日本管轄權爲保障而潛入內地，視爲一種危機，應予抗拒。

■調查團對於朝鮮人問題之特別注意 鑒於日本論調之嚴重，並鑒於朝鮮人在滿洲之窘苦，調查團對此問題，予以特別注意。調查團並不信此種謠言盡與事實相符，亦不謂某種抑制朝鮮人之措置毫無正當之理由，但調查團可以證實者，中國對滿洲某部份地方之朝鮮人之措置，確有如日方之所申述。調查團在朝鮮時曾接見許多代表團，自稱爲代表朝鮮民衆者。

要，亦顯而易見。蓋圖們江下游爲中國日本蘇俄三國之界線也。

中日對於圖們江條款解釋上之衝突。中日圖們江中韓界務條款規定「中國政府仍准韓民在圖們江北墾地居住」；朝鮮人居住是項墾地者，嗣後應「服從中國法權歸中國地方官管轄裁判」；並與中國人受同等之待遇，所有民刑各案件，涉及朝鮮人者，應由「中國官員按照中國法律秉公審判」；但日本領事官特別關於人命案件得到庭觀審，並有「請求」中國官廳按照中國特別法律程序「另派員複審」之權。

但據日方之見解，一九一五年中日條約與換文已將圖們江條款涉及管轄等問題之規定予以廢止，而自一九一五年以來朝鮮人已成爲日本人，則按照中日現行條約，享受領事裁判權之權利與特權。此種論調，中國政府始終未嘗承認，且堅持如圖們江條款內關於朝鮮人有居住墾地權之規定，可以適用，則該條款內關於朝鮮人應受中國之管轄各條，亦應有效。又日本人解釋允准朝鮮人居住墾地一條爲購買租賃間島之農地，而中國人之見解，則以爲此條應從字面解釋，享受間島購地之權僅限於朝鮮人之已歸化中國者。

朝鮮人置產實在情形之不規則。以故實在情形，極不規則，蓋在間島之朝鮮人有未曾取得中國國籍而已置地者，中國官吏亦縱容之。但大抵朝鮮人承認取得中國國籍爲間島購地必須條件。照日本官廳統計，間島過半之耕地（包括暉春）爲朝鮮人「所有」，而朝鮮人在該處者百分之十五已歸化中國。朝鮮人享有農地之所有權者，是否爲已歸化中國之人，不得而知。此種情形，往往引起而爭執，而中日兩國警察

，且常因此而發生衝突矣。

日本對中國人壓迫朝鮮人之非議。日本人稱一九二七年將終，時苛待朝鮮移民之運動，暴發於滿洲。此種運動係受中國官吏之指使，而爲普遍反日潮流之餘波。又謂自滿洲各省歸附南京國民政府以後，苛待朝鮮人，日益劇烈。調查團接到日方所供給關於中國政府及滿洲地方當局命令之譯件多種。日方以此項譯件足以證明中國有確定之計劃，以虐待朝鮮人，如令其歸化中國，迫其出境，驅之稻田外，強其繳納苛捐雜稅，不准其簽訂租賃房地契約，並施以種種虐待。此種壓迫運動，對「親日」之朝鮮人爲尤烈，朝鮮居民會社受日政府之資助者，亦遭摧殘。而朝鮮人所設立或爲朝鮮人設立之學校，均被封閉。至於「不良之朝鮮人」，則任其敲詐並凌辱朝鮮農民。又迫令朝鮮人改著中國服裝，處此窘苦狀況之下，並令其放棄日本之保護或協助。

對於滿洲當局頒發歧視未歸化中國之朝鮮人之命令，中國人未嘗否認，此項命令之衆多及其內容，尤其是一九二七年所頒發者，足以證明滿洲當局對於朝鮮人以日本管轄權爲保障而潛入內地，視爲一種危機，應予抗拒。

調查團對於朝鮮人問題之特別注意。鑒於日本論調嚴重，并鑒於朝鮮人在滿洲之窘苦，調查團對此問題，予特別注意。調查團並不信此種謠言盡與事實相符，亦不認爲種抑制朝鮮人之措置毫無正當之理由，但調查團可以證明，中國對滿洲某部份地方之朝鮮人之措置，確有如日方所述。調查團在朝鮮時曾接見許多代表團，自稱爲民衆者。

六月廿六日所締結之合同，租得廣大之田地。該項合同會規定，如該項合同之條款，縣知事拒絕同意，則合同應為無效。

中國經紀人將所租之地更行轉租。未幾，郝永德即將

彼所租得之地，全部轉租于若干朝鮮人。此項轉租合同，並無官府同意始克有效之規定，且推定朝鮮人可以鑿築灌溉之水渠，並築通渠之小溝。郝永德轉租該地于朝鮮農民時，並未先將郝與原地主間所訂之合同，取得官府正式之同意。

朝鮮人橫貫華農地畝鑿築灌溉水渠，乃當地華民反對之主要原因。轉租合同締結後，鮮人即開始鑿築長數英里之水渠，引伊通河之水，以轉注于該項低濕之地域，使克適宜于種

稻。此項水渠，橫貫廣大之田地，田地所有主之華農，則既弄原約之當事人，亦非轉租此約之當事人，以彼輩田地，乃係在伊通河及此項朝鮮人所租田地之中間也。又為使渠中之水，得以充分灌溉其轉租之田地起見，鮮人乃又橫跨伊通河，從事建築堰壩。

華農停築水渠之要求及鮮人之撤退。水渠大半鑿成後，因鑿渠而田地被穿過之中國農民，遂全體起而反對，且向

萬寶山當局提出抗議，請求代為干涉。結果中國當地官憲，派警前往，令鮮人停止開鑿之工作，且令其離去該地。同時長春日本領事，亦派遣領館警察前往，保護鮮人。中日代表，曾就地交涉，未克生效。未幾，雙方更增派警察，因而更有種種抗議，答辯，及試行之交涉。

長春中日雙方當局商定共同調查。六月八日，雙方共同調查，進行共同調查。因共同調查，遂發現原租合同

，曾有一款，載明中國縣知事，如對手續不合者，則全合同為無效。並發現中國縣知事，始終未曾給予同意之意。

調查無結果。不幸雙方之共同調查員，未能同意于

此之決定。蓋中國方面，以為鑿渠以橫貫華農之田地，自不能謂為不侵犯華農之權利。日本方面，則謂應許鮮人鑿渠，以為若以彼輩并不負責的租地手續上之錯誤。遂事反對，未免有欠公允。此後逾時未久，鮮人以日本領館警察之協助，仍行繼續鑿渠。

七月一日事件。迨至七月一日，因鑿渠而田地受害之

華農四百人，遂以農具戈矛等為武器，羣起驅逐鮮人，並將一大部之水渠填塞。日本領署之警察，當即開槍轟擊，驅華農以保鮮人，但並無死傷情事。華農旋即撤退。日警則留駐彼地，直至水渠及橫跨伊通河之堰壩，均由鮮人築成而後已。

七月一日事件後，中國市政當局，對於日本領署警察及鮮人之行為，則繼續向長春日領抗議。

朝鮮排華之暴動。遠較萬寶山事件為嚴重者，則為因此事件在朝鮮所生之反響。日本及朝鮮報紙，既對於萬寶山事件，尤其對於七月一日事件，故為驚人之紀載。遂使朝鮮全境排華之暴動，層見迭出。該項暴動，係于七月三日肇始于仁川。旋即迅速蔓延，至於各地。

在鮮華僑之生命財產受重大損失。中國方面，根據正式報告，謂華僑慘遭殺死者為一百二十七，受傷者為三百九十三。財產之損失，達日金二百五十萬元。遂以為是

之日本官吏。事前既未採取適宜之步驟，從事防範，事後亦待至鑿僑生命財產受重大損失後。始事制止。對於此項暴動之結果，應負重大部分之責任。試觀日本及朝鮮之各報紙，關於七月一日事件，任意登載聳聽聞虛偽不確之消息，即未見日方篇止，而此種聳聽聞虛偽不確之記載，固係具有激動鮮人對華僑之憤恨之性質者也。

至於日本方面，則謂此種暴動，係屬種族間感情之自然的爆發，且稱日本當局，曾即時設法制止。

朝鮮暴動使中國對日經濟絕交轉趨激烈。此種種暴動之一重要結果，即為中國全國對日經濟絕交之復活。

日本政府對於排華暴動表示遺憾並提議賠償死者家屬。朝鮮排華暴動後，萬寶山事件尚未解決之時，中國政府，即因暴動事件向日本抗議，以日本未能制止，謂應由日本担負全責。日本政府，七月十五日答覆，則對於暴動發生，表示遺憾，並提議予死者家屬以賠償。

關於萬寶山事件中國抗議之理由。自七月二十二日起，至九月十五日止，關於萬寶山事件，中日雙方地方及中央之官吏，曾迭有交涉，並迭有公文之往還。中國方面，則謂萬寶山地方之困難，即在於鮮人在彼無權居住之地方居住，因按照一九〇九年九月四日之中日圖們江中韓界務條款，鮮人居住及租地之權，原不能推延至間島區域以外。

中國政府，對於日本領署警察之駐留中國，亦事抗議，以為七月一日事件之發生，乃適由派遣大批該項警察之所致。

日本之主張。日本方面，則堅持鮮人享有條約上之權利，在萬寶山居住並租地。以為鮮人之特權，並不以圖們

江條款所限制者為限，即給予一般日本臣民在南滿全部居住租地之權利，亦應包括在內。以為鮮人之地位，應與其他之日本臣民一致。日本並力稱鮮人，原係以善意從事種稻之計劃，日本當局對於中國租地經紀人之不規則行為，不能担負責任。日本政政府將日本領署之警察，自萬寶山撤回。但彼租地之鮮人，則仍居留彼地，以繼續其耕種稻田之工作。

直至一九三一年之九月，萬寶山事件，迄未得完全之解決。

七 中村上尉案件

中村事件之重要。中村上尉案件，據日方意見，謂係中國極端藐視日本在滿權益各事件中之絕頂重大的事件。該上尉係於一九三一年之仲夏，在滿洲荒僻遼遠之某地方，為中國兵士所殺。

中村係負有陸軍使命在滿洲內部活動。上尉中村震太郎，係日本陸軍現役軍官。據日本政府所承認，且係奉有日本陸軍之使命從事某種工作。當其經過哈埠中國官吏查驗其護照時，渠自稱為農事專家。中國官吏當即予以警告，謂彼所遊歷之地方，乃羣匪叢集之地，並將此項事實載入彼之護照之內。該上尉攜有武器，且帶有特許藥品，據中國方面之所述，此項藥品中，有非為醫藥用之麻醉品在內。

中村上尉及其旅伴為中國兵士所殺。六月九日，中村偕同譯員助手等三人，自中東路西段之宜力克都車站出發。迨至行抵洮南方面之內地某地點時，中村及其旅伴遂為屯墾軍第三團團長關玉衡部下之兵士所扣留，旋於數日以後，約

爲六月廿七日。中村及其同伴二人均爲中國兵士所殺，並焚尸以滅跡。

■日本方面之主張 日本方面堅稱，殺死中村及其旅伴爲無理由，且係對於日本陸軍及日本國家之大不敬。並稱中國在滿之當局，遲延正式調查，推卸事件責任，即其所稱正竭力確查此案之實情，亦係無有誠意。

■中國方面之主張 中國方面，首稱中村上尉及其旅伴，係被暫時扣留，以待查驗彼等之執照，蓋按照慣例，凡外人遊歷內地者，均須持該項執照也。並云待遇彼等甚優。至中村上尉，則係於意圖潛逃時，始爲哨兵槍殺。並稱曾於中村身上，尋出一日本軍用地圖，及日記兩本，足以證明中村，不爲一陸軍之間諜，即係一負有特殊陸軍使命之軍官。

■調查 七月十七日，中村被殺之報告，傳至駐齊齊哈爾之日本總領事。是月月杪，在奉天之日本官吏，即告當地之中國當局，謂已得有確實證據，以證明中村上尉已爲中國兵士所殺。八月十七日，在奉天之日本陸軍當局，發表中村被害之第一次報告，（參閱一九三一年八月十七日滿洲日報）。同日林久治郎總領事，及東京參謀本部派往滿洲調查此案之森赴少校，即與遼甯省長臧式毅會晤，臧氏當即應允，立即從事調查。

臧氏于會晤之後，即轉呈在北平醫院中養病之張學良司令，並轉告南京之外交部長，且派遣中國調查員兩名，即刻馳往所稱之謀害地點從事調查，該兩調查員，當於九月三日返奉。又代表日本參謀本部，獨自進行調查之日本森赴少校，則於九月四日返奉。林久治郎總領事，即於四日訪華方參

謀長榮臻，當由榮告知，兩調查員之調查結果，不能視爲確定與滿意，故尙須進行第二次調查。榮臻旋於是日前往北京，與張學良司令會商，而於九月七日返奉。

■中國圖求解決之努力 張學良既知滿洲形勢之嚴重，乃即訓令省長臧式毅及榮臻將軍，即刻就地進行第二次調查。張氏復由其日本陸軍顧問處，得悉日本陸軍方面，對於此事之重視，當復派遣日本少校柴山謙四郎前赴東京，聲明願將此案平和解決。柴山於九月十二日抵東京，按照此後報紙之報告，柴並曾聲稱，張學良司令係誠意欲將中村案件得一早日公平之結束。是時張學良司令業又已派遣高級官吏湯爾和氏，特往東京，會晤日外相幣原，以探討究將以何者爲共同立足點，俾克將滿洲之各項懸案解決。湯氏曾先後與幣原外相，南陸相，及其他高級陸軍官員會談。九月十六日，張氏向新聞界發表談話，則謂按照日方意旨。中村案件，將由省長臧式毅及滿洲當局自行處置。而不由南京之外交部辦理。

派遣就地爲第二次調查之中國調查人員，於前往中村被害地點後，當於九月十六日晨，遣返奉天。九月十八日下午，日本領事晤見榮臻時，榮稱團長關玉衡，以應負中村被害之責任，已經於十六日帶至奉天，且即將由軍事法庭審判。嗣後日人佔領奉天，並會由日方聲稱，關玉衡實係被禁於一陸軍監獄。

九月十二三日間即聞奉天日本總領事林久治郎，已報告日本外部，謂榮臻將軍，既已確實承認中村之死，應由中國軍隊負責，則「調查人員返奉後，自不難得一和平解決」。

又電通社駐奉訪員九月十二日，曾發一電訊，謂「外傳之中
國屯墾軍，殺害日本參謀本部上尉中村震太郎一案，不日可
望和平解決」但許多日本軍官之表示，而尤以土肥原上校爲
最，則以本案應負責之關團長，既已由中國當局帶至奉天收
押，審訊之期，乃宜稱在一禮拜以內，因對於中國努力以圖
本案之圓滿解決，是否具有誠意，仍事繼續懷疑。惟是中國
當局，於十八日下午正式會議之際，既對日本駐奉領事官，
承認中村之死，應由中國軍隊負責，並表示願即將本案以外
交之途徑解決，則似意圖解決本案之外交交涉，直至九月十
八日之夜，事實上均仍在順利進行之中。

■中村案件之結果 中村案件，較之其他之任何單獨事
件，實更使日人之忿恨加增，且更使日人鼓吹以強權方法解
決滿洲中日現存之困難。且是時中日關係，正因萬寶山事件
，朝鮮排華之暴動，日本陸軍越過圖們江國界之操演，以及
青島方面，以反抗當地日本愛國團體之行動中國暴民所爲之
暴行等等，特形緊張，遂以使本案自身，亦頓增其嚴重性。
中村係日本現役軍官。日方主張採用強硬迅速之陸軍動
作，即以此爲理由。在滿洲，在日本，均迭有民衆大會，冀
以使輿情結晶，一致擁護此項動作。在九月之前兩禮拜中，
日本報紙，時時宣稱，軍部已決定「此事解決應用武力」，
因此外別無他法也。

中國方面，則謂本案之重要，頗屬誇張過甚，以爲此不
過日本所利用之藉口，冀以達其陸軍佔據滿洲之目的。至於
日方所稱，中國官吏處置本案，缺乏誠意，或辦理遲緩，則
均予以否認。

因有本章所云之種種爭議及事件，在一九三一年八月之
末，中日兩方，關於滿洲之關係，遂致非常緊張。惟所謂兩
國間有三百件未決之案，又爲解決各該案件，和平方法已由
一方逐漸用盡等語，則均未能證實。實則此之所謂案件者，
無不謂爲係由較廣大之問題所發生之局勢，而此所謂較廣大
之問題，則又係植根于根本不能相容之政策。雙方互詬，中
日種種協定之規定，已爲彼方所違犯，所片面解釋，所棄置
弗顧。雙方亦自各有合法之不平。

就此間所云此方或被方意圖解決各案之努力觀察，即可
知一部分之努力，係欲以正則的外交交涉及和平方法，解決
各案。而此項和平方法，則要尙未用盡。但以長時期之遷延
，日人遂不復更能忍耐。陸軍方面，尤極力主張中村案件，
應立即解決，且需要求滿意之賠償。各團體，如所謂帝國在
鄉軍人會者，則尤極活躍。以從事于日本輿情之鼓盪。

九月中，日方關於中國問題之輿情，以中村案件爲焦點
，極爲激昂。且時時有一種論調，以爲容許滿洲方面，有如
許未決之懸案實已使中國當局，輕視日本。于是必要時應以
武力解決一切懸案之語，遂爲一通行之口號。凡武力解決之
決議，陸軍省參謀本部等討論武力計劃之會議，以及關於必
要時如何實行此項計畫所發致關東軍司令官及駐在奉天九月
初被召至東京且主張從速以武力解決一切懸案之土肥原上校
之確定的訓令，均在各報中，隨意引載。閱各報，關於此種
種方面及其他團體之情感之記載，即可知情勢日趨於危險的
緊張。

第四章 九月十八日及其後事變之叙

述

■事變發生前之形勢 中日兩國在滿洲稱衝突日趨嚴重之局勢，及其影響於兩國武人之態度，前章均已述及。良以日本內部各種經濟政治因素，致使日本人民對於滿洲要求重探「積極政策」者，由來已久。例如軍人之不滿，政府之經濟政策；軍隊鄉區青年及國家主義青年團所代表之新政治勢力。此項勢力對於一切政黨均表示不滿，且鄙視西方文明之協調政策，迷信舊式日本之道德，摒斥無論銀行家或政治家之自私自利行動；又因物價低落，初級製造家咸主急進的對外政策以挽救厄運；加以商業不景氣，工商界迷信採用較強之對外政策或可收事業改善之結果；——凡此種種皆為放棄幣原對華「親善政策」之張本，此項政策固曾在華獲得若干效果者。至在滿洲之日人，因鑒於本年夏季形勢日趨緊張，愈覺忍無可忍。將近九月時凡關心時事者早已料及，此種嚴重局勢早晚必須決裂。雙方報紙不特不緩和輿論，反從而鼓勵之，登載日本陸相在東京之激烈演說，主張日本在滿洲之軍隊，採取直接行動。而中國官廳對於中村上尉被刺事件偵查及救濟之遲緩，使滿洲之日本青年軍官愈形忿怒。而日本軍官對於不負責任之中國軍官在街市酒肆及公共場所所表現之不負責任舉動與侮辱，更不免有神經過敏之反感。悲劇之舞台至是乃準備開幕矣。

■九月十八日至十九日之夕 九月十九日星期六晨，瀋陽居民睡夢方醒，驚悉全城已入日軍掌握。前夜頻頻聞槍聲

，但並不以為奇，因一星期來日軍於夜間舉行操演，猛烈之槍及機關槍聲早已習聞之故。十八日夜誠有少數居民對於砲彈轟炸聲覺察有異，惟大多數仍以爲日軍大規模之演戰耳！

調查團認此事之發生極爲重要，因其爲武力佔領滿洲之初步，故對於是夜事變發生種種情形，不惜廣爲調查。其中中日雙方軍事長官之正式陳述。當然認爲最有注意之價值。日本方面陳述者爲河本中尉、島本中校及平田上校。河本爲本事件之最初證人，島本乃率隊進攻北大營北兵房之營長，平田乃佔領該城之日本上校也。此外我等更從日本關東軍司令本莊中將及其僚屬查得真相。中國方面陳述者爲駐守北大營之王以哲旅長，益以參謀長及參加戰役軍官之口頭陳述。此外我等更從張司令長官學良及其參謀長榮臻獲得若干材料。

■日本方面之陳述 根據日本方面之陳述：河本中尉於九月十八夜間率部下兵士六名巡邏，並在瀋陽城北南滿鐵路路軌旁練習防禦工作。彼等循瀋陽方向南行，其時夜光隱約，目力所及範圍甚小。彼等行至一小徑與鐵軌交叉處。陡聞巨大轟炸聲發於其後，與彼等距離不遠，乃折回行二百碼地，發現下行鐵軌被炸毀一段，其炸裂點在兩鐵軌銜處，成三十一英寸之缺段。當彼等行抵炸裂地點時，突有彈自鐵路東田野間向巡哨兵飛來，河本中尉立即指揮巡哨兵展開陣線，實行回擊。對方約有五六人，旋即停火北退。日本巡哨兵立尾其後，北進至二百碼地，復遇大隊襲擊，約三四百人。河本中尉恐受大隊包圍之危險，乃派一兵報告第三連連長，該連亦爲參加操演之伍兵，駐紮於北，約距一千五百碼，同時

實命一哨兵打電話（附近有電話機）至瀋陽營部請援。

彼時自長春南下火車車聲已輾轉可聞，日本巡哨兵深恐火車行至炸毀處出軌，乃停止射擊，置爆炸物於路中，冀火車臨時得一警告，但火車開足馬力前進，至炸毀處竟側駛逾越而過，並未停止。該列車於十時三十分準時抵瀋陽。據河本中尉云，彼最初聞炸聲時當爲十時也。

是時戰鬥重開。川島上尉比聞炸聲時率領第三連南開，中途遇河本中尉所派之信使，遂由此信使嚮導至肇事地點，時爲十時五十分。同時營長島本中校接得電話，立即下留駐瀋陽之第一第四兩連隨同向該地出發，並傳令在撫順之第二連——距離約有一小時半行程——儘速會合前進，此二連自瀋陽乘車至柳條溝下車，步行至肇事地點時已逾夜半。

此二連自瀋陽開到時，河本中尉之巡哨得川島上尉之接應，正與藏匿高粱中之中國兵士開火相持。島本中校雖明知部下僅五百人，而中國軍隊在北兵房者數達萬人，但據彼稱：「進攻爲最妙之防守，」故當時立即下令向北兵房衝鋒。自鐵路至北兵房約距二百五十碼，中多水沼，大隊人馬不易越過；同時野田中尉率領第三連一部分兵士沿鐵道而下，對於被迫後退經過此處之中國兵士攔住截擊，日軍抵北兵房時，該處電光燦耀，第三連即進攻佔據左翼之一角，兵房內之中國兵士亦奮勇相持，雙方激戰約數小時，第一連由右翼於中國兵士對面近鄰之小屋中。至六時，全部兵房爲日軍佔領。是役計死日本兵士二人，傷二十二人。一部分兵房在戰時起火。其餘爲日軍於十九日晨縱火焚燬。據日方宣稱，是

役埋葬中國兵士達三百二十人，但受傷者僅二十人。

同時在其他處所之兵事行動亦迅速而普遍。平田上校約於下午十時四十分接到島本中校電話，謂南滿鐵軌道爲中國軍隊所燬，彼（島本）正預備追擊敵軍云云。平田上校准其所請，並決定親自進攻城垣，因於十一時三十分將軍隊集中完畢，開始進攻。城內毫無抵抗，間有巷戰，多爲中國警察，計被擊死者七十五人。至二時十五分已將全城包圍，三時四十分即佔領之。上午四時四十分接報告，知第二師將佐及第十六團一部分兵士已於三時三十分離遼陽，旋於上午五時到達。至六時許東城已佔領完畢，而兵工廠及飛機場則於七時三十分克服，當即進攻東兵房，於下午一時不戰垂手而得。是役共傷日兵七名，死中國兵三十名。

是日日本莊中將出外檢閱，至翌日（十九日）始歸，於十一時許始從新聞記者電話中得悉瀋陽事變情形，其參謀長則於十一時四十六分得瀋陽特務機關派出所來電。對於戰事有詳細報告。乃飛機駐紮遼陽營口撫順之日軍直趨瀋陽，並令旅順艦隊直駛營口，一面電朝鮮駐軍司令增援。本莊於上午三時三十分離旅順，中午抵瀋陽。

中國方面之陳述 根據中國方面之陳述：日軍之進攻北大營兵房全係無故起釁，令人猝不及防。九月十八日夜第七旅全部兵士約一萬人駐紮在北兵房。九月六日奉張學良司令命令，

（一）謂鑒於現時局勢緊張，應特別注意，避免與日軍衝突。故城壕上巡哨步槍並無實彈。同一原因，環營土城通鐵道之西門亦經嚴閉。日軍於九月十四日起至十七日每夜在北兵房

四周演操，十八日下午七時則在文官屯舉行夜演操。九時據劉軍官報告：有火車一列，掛車輛三四，以特種車頭拖帶，停留該處云云。至十時忽聞一猛烈炸聲，槍聲即隨之而起。參謀長立以電報報告王以哲司令，王司令是時距北兵房南約六七英里近鐵道之私宅。參謀長打電話時，即據報告日軍襲擊北兵房，哨兵二名已受傷，十一時日軍向北兵房之西南角開始總攻擊，十一時三十分日軍已破城洞而入。當日軍開始進攻時，參謀長即令熄滅營中燈火，並再報告王司令，王司令覆以不抵抗。十時三十分又聞遠處炮聲發自西南及西北方，午夜後炮彈飛落北兵房中。第六百二十一團退至南門時日軍正在該門進攻，守衛兵士均後退，乃急避藏壕溝中，俟日軍入城始逃出南門，翌晨二時抵北兵房東之二台子。其餘軍隊由東門經東城外之空營退出，清晨三時與四時間亦抵該鎮。

註 (一)在北平時調查團會閱該電原文如下：

「中日關係現甚嚴重，我軍與日軍相處須格外謹慎。無論受如何挑釁，俱應忍耐。不准衝突，以免事端，該軍長應密飭各官長士兵遵照爲要。」

當時與日軍抵抗者僅爲駐紮東北角兵舍及南部第二號兵舍之第六百二十團。據該團團長云：日軍進南門時約在晨一時，中國軍隊即由兵舍步步撤退，任日軍攻擊退空之兵舍。中國大隊兵士撤退後，日軍轉向東路攻擊，佔據東門，第六百二十團見出路被截，不得不謀力戰奪路，五時突圍七時始完全退出。北大營中僅有此一接觸耳！結果死傷甚多。該團兵士爲最後退抵二台子者。

中國軍隊會集後，於十九日破曉離鎮赴通嶺，復取道至

近吉林省某鎮，置得冬季軍裝。乃派王上校謁熙洽將軍商准該軍進駐吉林省城。該地日僑聞中國軍隊將至，大爲驚駭，乃由長春四平街及瀋陽調大批日本援軍來吉。中國軍隊不得已折回瀋陽，在離瀋陽城外十三英里處下車分散爲九隊，晝夜向瀋陽四郊前進。王以哲司令因避免爲日軍發覺起見，喬裝農民輕騎過鎮。次晨日軍已悉中國軍隊近城，乃派飛機偵炸。於是中國軍隊日間深藏，夜間潛行，最後抵北甯路某站，得車七列，於十月四日抵山海關。

■調查團之意見 以上兩種事略爲當事人對調查團之報告，所謂九月十八日之事變，如是而已。因環境之關係，兩者內容之紛歧矛盾。固無足怪。

我人鑒於事變發生前形勢之嚴重與人心之激昂，并深知關係人所處地位不同，所述各節自難一致，尤以是夜事變經過情形最爲紛歧，因此我人在遠東時儘量接見當時在瀋陽或嗣後至瀋陽之外人代表，包括新聞記者及最先視察戰地者。暨發表日本最初正式報告者在內。調查團對於此項人士之意見及關係方面之報告詳細考慮，復對於各項文件充分研究，更對於呈送或搜集之大宗證據慎重衡量後，遂得下列之結論：

中日雙方軍隊間情緒之激昂實無容諱。本調查團會得一種證明：日方於事前確有充分計劃以應付中日間萬一發生之戰事。此計劃於九月十八日至十九日之夜見諸實行，迅速證據。中國方面遵守上峯之訓令(見一一〇頁)，既無進攻日軍之準備，在彼時或在該地亦決危害日人生命財產之計劃。對付日軍並未集中應戰，亦未奉命開火，故於日軍之突擊及其

以後之行動，莫不認爲詭異。至九月十八日下午十時至十時半在路軌上或路軌旁發生炸裂之事雖無疑義，惟鐵軌縱有破壞。實際上并未阻止長春南下列車之準時到站，斷不能引爲軍事行動之理由。故前節所述日軍在是夜所採之軍事行動，不能認爲合法之自衛手段。雖然，本調查團之爲此言，並不摒棄下列之假定，假定爲何？即當時在場之軍官或者係認爲自衛而出此也。茲更述事變後之經過於下：

○日軍之行動 九月十八日夜滿洲日軍之防地分配如下：路警營中有四連担任進攻北兵房平田上校率領之第二師第二十九團攻佔瀋陽城垣，前文已述及。此外第二師之其餘部分分配於下列地點：第四團司令部設於長春，第十六團司令部設於遼陽，第三十團司令部設於旅順。其隊伍則散駐於安東營口及南滿鐵路之長春瀋陽支綫及瀋陽安東支綫各地。另有一營路警駐長春。各隊路警及憲兵隨第二師散駐上開各地。此外更有朝鮮駐軍若干。

所有滿洲全部日軍以及若干朝鮮駐軍於九月十八日夜在南滿鐵路自長春至旅順一帶區域內幾乎同時發動，全部兵力如下：第二師凡五千四百人，野戰砲十六尊。路警凡五千九百，憲兵凡五百人。中國軍隊之在安東營口遼陽及其餘各小村鎮者均被擊敗繳械，毫無抵抗。路警及憲兵仍駐各該地。第二師各部隊則進赴瀋陽集中參加大戰。第十六團及第三十團準時趕到，聯合平田上校所部協力攻佔東兵房。第二十師之第三十九混成旅（四千步兵及砲隊）於十九日上午十時在朝鮮邊界新義州地方集合，於二十一日渡鴨綠江，夜半抵瀋陽。更從瀋陽分隊至鄭家屯，新民，於二十二日佔領之。

○九月廿八日至十九日佔領長春，二十一日佔領吉林省城。寬城子及長春南嶺之中國駐軍，人數約一萬人，砲四十門，於九月十八日晚間遭日軍第二師第四團及駐紮該地之第一鐵道守備隊（長谷部少將所統率者）之攻擊。中國軍隊曾略示抵抗，戰事於午夜開始。日軍於十九日上午十一時將南嶺兵營佔領，旋於同日下午三時佔領寬城子兵營。是役，日軍死官佐三名，兵士六十四名，傷官佐三名，兵士八十五名。瀋陽戰事甫告完畢，日軍第二師各團遂集中於長春。多門司令及其幹部軍官，率領第三十團及野砲一營隊，於二十日抵該地。天野司令所率之第十五旅則於二十二日到達，廿一日，日軍不費一彈而佔領吉林省城；中國軍隊撤退約八英里。

據當時日本半官式之刊物，亞細亞先鋒報載稱，日本政府認爲一切軍事行動，均已完成，將不再調動軍隊。但事實上軍事行動仍繼續進行，該報對此，則歸罪於中國之挑釁。如二十日間島地方之反日示威運動，龍井村車站之被毀，及九月二十三日哈爾濱所發生對於日人房屋毫無損害之炸彈事件，該報皆舉爲挑釁行爲之例證。此外，土匪及被解散軍隊之活動，亦被認爲事件發生之原因。故日方聲稱，基於上述種種原因，日軍終被迫而不得不違反其本意採取新軍事行動云。

○轟炸錦州 此種新軍事行動之開始，即十月八日之轟炸錦州，因張學良將軍已於九月底，將遼寧省政府遷至該地故也。據日本方面聲明，此次轟炸，係以該地兵營及省府所在之交通大學爲主要目標。以武力轟炸民政機關，已屬不合；而轟炸區域之範圍，事實上是是否一如日人所稱，尤不無疑

際，中國政府名譽顧問美人魯易斯君於十月廿三日抵錦州，曾致函顧維鈞博士，報告該地之情形。此函後經顧博士，以中國參與代表之資格，轉送本調查團。據魯易斯君言，該地兵營完全無恙，炸彈多落城內各處，即醫院及大學房屋亦遭波及。其後不久，日本某報，接得日本轟炸機司令官之報告，謂已於八日晨八時三十分自長春調飛機四架至瀋陽，在該地與其他飛機聯合，組成一偵察機六架轟炸機五架之飛機隊，滿載炸彈及燃料，向錦州進駛。該機等，於下午一時抵錦州，約十分鐘至十五分鐘內，投彈八十枚，旋即駛回瀋陽。據魯易斯君言，中國軍隊絕未還擊。

■嫩江橋之役 其次則為嫩江橋之役。是役始於十月中旬終於十一月十九日日軍之佔領齊齊哈爾。據日人對此事辯白，謂此次軍事行動之發生，乃因嫩江橋被馬占山將軍所毀。日軍在修理時，被華軍攻擊所致。但此事之敘述，應溯及於較早之時期，對鐵橋之被毀亦有加以說明之必要。

十月初，洮南鎮守使張海鵬，突沿洮昂鐵路，向前推進，其用意，顯係欲以武力奪取省政府；張氏以前與馬占山，萬福麟地位相埒，對於黑龍江長官一席，早具取而代之之心。此次攻擊，實為日人所煽動；不獨中國代表說帖第三號中，曾加以聲明，抑且為中立方面之報告所證明。馬占山將軍，為阻止張軍之前進，下令拆毀嫩江橋，兩軍遂隔河對峙。洮昂鐵路之建築，其資本係由南滿鐵路所供給；該路即為借款之担保。南滿鐵路當局，認為值此北滿穀物運輸需要得殷之時，不能任該路交通，繼續中斷。時馬占山將軍已於十月二十日到齊齊哈爾，日本政府乃訓令駐齊齊哈爾總領事

，向馬氏提出從速修復橋樑之請求，但未附有時間之限制。橋樑之中斷足以幫助馬氏阻止張海鵬軍之前進；日本當局明知馬氏必盡力遲延其修復。十月二十日，有洮昂鐵路及南滿鐵路職工一小隊，無軍隊之護送，企圖視察該橋損害狀況；事先雖曾向黑龍江省防軍某軍官有所說明，但終遭中國軍隊之擯擊。如是事態，益趨嚴重。十月二十八日日本駐齊齊哈爾代表林少校旋即提出限十一月三日正午修理完竣之要求，並宣稱，如屆時不克修理完竣，日本將派軍隊保護南滿鐵路工程師，担任此項工作。中國當局要求寬展時限日本置之不理，而將軍隊自四平街開赴該地，以保護修理工事之實施。

直至十一月二日，交涉尙毫無進步，亦無何等決定。是日，林少校遂達一最後通牒於馬占山及張海鵬，要求雙方均不得利用鐵路，以達軍事目的，並各將軍隊，沿河兩岸，撤退十公里。此外，並暗示，如兩軍對南滿鐵路工程師之修理工作，加以妨害，日軍將以敵人視之。最後通牒自十一月三日起，發生效力。十一月四日，日本所派保護修理工事之軍隊，奉令進駐嫩江北岸之夾與。馬占山於接到通牒後，曾提出答復，謂在未奉中央訓令以前，暫依其自身之職權，接受日本要求；關於此點，中國代表（第三號說帖），日本駐齊齊哈爾總領事，及第二師多數軍官之聲述完全一致。不過，日本方面之證人，更補充聲明；彼等不信馬占山有誠意，因彼顯然不擬橋樑得以迅速或有效的修理完竣故也。十一月四日雙方曾合組一混合委員會，兩度前赴橋樑所在地，冀免衝突之發生；參加組織者，計有林少校，日本總領事代表，及

國軍官及文官數人；中國代表要求，日軍暫緩前進。本
野砲隊二連，及工程師一隊進駐江橋，依照最後通牒之條
款，以開始其修理工事矣。在花井上尉領導之下，該工程師
等於十一月四日晨開始工作，而日步兵一連，執日本國旗二
面，於當日正午進駐大興車站。

當四日午後，前述混合委員會赴糾紛地點正再度設法使
中國軍隊撤退之際，戰事即告開始。雙方開火後，濱本上校
見所部所處地位，極形困難，乃將其所有可用的軍隊，開往
增援。經過一番迅速之偵察後，彼即深信，在此低濕之地面
上，正面攻擊，實不可能；日軍如欲脫離所處困難地位，捨
向敵軍左翼，採取包圍之形勢外，幾無他法。如是，彼立即
調集其預備隊，向中國軍隊左翼所據之小山進攻。但因人數
過少，且無法使大砲進至較近距離之故，直至午後八時半始
將該山佔領，而是日即亦無法再向前進。

關東軍司令部，接得關於此項情勢之報告後，立派大批
軍隊前往增援。是日晚間，有步兵十營開到。日軍得援，乃
於十一月五日拂曉，重取攻勢。經二小時後，到達中國軍隊
第一道障地；據該上校本人致調查團之報告，稱中國軍隊在
該地掘有極堅固之戰壕，並有自動機槍約七十架。日軍之攻
勢，至此完全停頓。中國軍隊用步兵及騎兵實行包圍式之反
攻，日軍蒙受極大之損失，而不得不向後撤退，直迨日暮，
僅足保持其原有障地。十一月五六兩日晚間，又有兩營軍隊
開到，形勢為之一變；日軍乃於六日晨，向華軍全線猛攻，
結果大興車站，於正午入日軍手。濱本上校之任務，既限於

佔領大興車站，以掩護修理橋樑之工事，故對中國軍隊亦未
追擊。但日軍仍佔據車站附近區域。

中國代表，在第三號說帖中，聲稱：林少校曾於十一月
六日向黑龍江省政府提出新的要求，內容為：(一)馬占山應
辭長官職，由張海鵬繼任，(二)組織一公安委員會。該代表
並將林少校提出此項要求之信函之照片一紙，提示本調查團
。上述說帖更稱：前項請求提出之次日，日軍不待中國答復
，即向當時駐紮大興以北約二十英里三間房地方之中國軍隊
。開始新的攻擊；十一月八日，林再函馬占山將軍，請其辭
職，以讓張海鵬，限半夜以前答復。中國報告又稱：十一月
十一日，本莊繁本人亦電馬氏，請其去職退出齊齊哈爾，並
要求日軍有進駐昂昂溪車站之權，亦限半夜以前答復。十一
月十三日，林少校更提出第三項要求，謂日軍不僅應佔據昂
昂溪車站，即齊齊哈爾車站亦應在佔據之列。馬占山對於此
點，則以齊齊哈爾車站與洮昂鐵路無關答復之。

十一月十四十五兩日，日軍各部聯合，用飛機四架協助
，繼續進攻。十六日本莊繁要求馬占山退至齊齊哈爾以北，
將中國軍隊撤至中東鐵路以北，並不得以何方法妨害洮昂
鐵路之工作及運輸；該項要求，自十一月十五日起，限十日
內履行完竣，並應將將答復送達哈爾濱日本特務機關。馬占
山拒絕接受，多門司令乃於十八日重行總攻。馬軍初退齊齊
哈爾。該地旋於十九日被日軍佔領，馬軍乃向海倫退却，同
時將省府各機關遷移該地。

據在場指揮之日軍司令所提出之證據，謂在十一月十二
日以前，日軍並未開始新軍事行動。是時馬占山將軍其部隊

約二萬人，集中於三間房以西，且調集黑龍江屯墾軍及丁

超之部隊。此種強大之軍力，顯示一種益形威嚇之形勢。日

軍與之對抗者，僅有甫經集中之多門師，其中所包者，不過

天野及長谷部分別統率之兩旅而已。為欲緩和此種緊張局勢

，本莊繁乃於十一月十二日要求黑龍江軍隊退至齊齊哈爾以

北，並允許日軍北進，俾保護洮昂鐵路。在十一月十七日以前

，日軍尙未前進，而是日中國軍隊即以騎兵繞過日軍右

側，而施以攻擊。據多門司令報告本調查團，當時彼僅有步

兵三千人，野砲二十四門，軍力雖薄，但仍冒險進擊，卒於

十一月八日將中國軍隊完全擊敗，而於十九日晨佔領齊齊哈

爾。一星期後，第二師開回原防。天野司令則率領步兵一團

及砲兵一中隊，留駐齊齊哈爾，以禦馬占山軍。此少量之日

軍，後為新組成之滿洲軍所補充。但在一九三二年五月，吾

等到齊齊哈爾時，該項新軍，尙未被認為足與馬占山軍戰。

後附軍事形勢圖第二號，表未行政院通過第一次決議案

時，雙方正式軍隊之分布。至對潰散之軍隊及當時在遼河東

西南岸與間島區域騷擾特甚之土匪，則毫無記載。中日兩國

，均以故意煽動土匪，指責對方，日本以此歸咎於中國

欲使滿洲失地發生紛亂之動機，中國則疑日人欲以此，為佔

據該地及擴大軍事行動之藉口。實則此種土匪之實力及軍事

價值，甚為曖昧。而且變化多端，欲將其軍事形勢上之重

要性，確切估定，殆不可能。從此圖中，吾人得知，東北軍

在遼甯省西南部，已組成一強有力之軍隊，在大凌河右岸，

局，一加估計，當感幾許之焦慮也。

■天津事件 十一月間 因日人為天津所發生之數項事

件而採取之行動，滿洲方面之局勢，始告和緩。關於此項不

幸事件之起源，各方報告，極不一致。該地，於十一月八日

及二十六日前後，發生暴動兩次，但全部事實，仍極不明瞭

。十一月八日之暴動；日本之說辭 關於此次事變，日

本亞細亞先鋒報所載如次：天津中國人，分擁張（學良）及反

張二派。後者組織武力，於十一月八日在中國地界，向保安

隊，施行攻擊，以造成政治示威運動。當兩方爭擾之時，日

本駐軍司令最初嚴守中立。但其後日本租界附近之中國衛隊

，向日租界胡亂開槍，日軍始被迫開火。日軍司令雖要求中

國交戰軍隊。退出租界邊境三百碼以外，但於事實，毫無

補助。十一月十一日或十二日。形勢更趨嚴重，致外國駐軍

，全部出動。

■中國之說辭 天津市政府之報告，則完全異趣。該報

告申稱，日本僱用中國暴徒及日本便衣隊，在日租界內，組

織別動隊，謀在中國地界舉事。中國警察當局，隨時接有關

於此事之報告，對於此種發自日租界之亂徒，確有撲滅之力

量。由被暴捕徒之供詞，足以證明此種暴動，實為日人所組

織，而所用鎗械彈藥，亦稱日本所製造。該報告對於日駐軍

命令於九日晨宣稱有日軍數人傷於流彈，及要求撤退三百碼

之事，並不否認，但謂該府雖已接受此項條件，日本正式軍

隊反以鐵甲車及大砲向中國地界進攻。該市府報告更稱，十一月十七日，雙方會成立協定，對

於撤退五百碼之實行，有詳細之規定。但因日方對於撤退之部分，未克履行，形勢乃更加惡劣。此項撤退之規定，係由五五五軍團，機關槍聲，及步槍聲。日本租界，電燈完全熄滅，便衣隊自內衝出，向中國地界之警察局進攻。

十一月二十六日突開一可怖之爆炸聲，繼以大砲聲，內衝出，向中國地界之警察局進攻。關於第二次騷亂，日本方面之報告，以亞細亞先鋒報所載者如次：二十六日形勢本已極為良好，日本之義勇軍亦已解散。乃中國軍隊，忽於黃昏時分，向日本兵營開火。雖經日軍抗議，砲火迄次日正午，仍未停止。日軍至此，始接受中國之挑釁而應戰外，殆無他法。戰事繼續至二十七日午後，而和平會議，召集成功。在和會中，日本要求立即停止敵抗行動，並要求中國軍警，撤至外軍駐地二十華里以外。中國對於軍隊之撤退，表示同意，至於警察，因負有保護該地外安妥之責任，則不允撤退。但據日人言，十一月二十九日，中國忽表示願將警察撤出租界附近區域，日本對於該項提議表示接受。中國武裝警察遂於二十九日晨撤退，防禦工事亦於三十日撤除焉。

天津騷亂對滿洲局勢之影響 因二十六日天津形勢之險惡，關東軍參謀官向該軍司令建議，派遣軍隊，經錦州山海關，以增援天津方面瀕於危險之少數日軍。如此事係一單純之運輸問題，則取道大連由海道增援，或可較為便捷。但自戰略上言之，則所擬議之路程，實較為有利。蓋此舉足使前進之軍隊得以沿途解決集中錦州之中國軍隊故也。同時因預料中國軍隊之抵抗必極輕微甚至毫無抵抗之故，彼等更

認定期由北滿，運至久穆時日，此項建議，旋獲批准。其間已有中車，鐵甲車，及飛機二架，渡過遼河。其中國軍隊最前哨之攻擊，即足使中國軍隊自其戰壕陣地，向後退却。同時，鐵甲車，亦變更其地位。中國軍隊稍示抵抗，日軍即增派鐵甲車步兵多列及大砲多門前往增援，並連續以炸彈轟擊錦州，旋天津形勢改善之消息傳來，該軍以原有目的已失，於十一月二十九日撤回新民，中國軍隊，不勝驚異。

此外，寓居日租界之廢帝自與土肥原一度談話之後，於十一月十三日避難旅順。此亦一奇天津騷亂之結果也。錦州之佔領 日軍撤退之區域，中國軍隊重行進據，此廣被傳播之事實也。斯時，中國軍隊，士氣稍振，不規則軍及土匪之活動，益見加增。加之，時值冬季，遼河各處冰凍，彼等乃越過遼河，攻入瀋陽近郊。日本軍事當局深覺即欲維持彼等現有之地位，亦有增兵之必要，並望能以此援兵之力，排除集中錦州中國軍隊之威脅。

日本接獲於十月十日行政院議決案時之保留 在日內瓦方面，滿洲形勢，成爲繼續討論之主題。當接受十二月十日議決案時，日本代表曾聲明：對於此項接受，「須了解此節（第二節）之用意，並非阻止日本軍隊得採取「爲直接保護日本人民之生命財產，抗拒蔓延滿洲各處之土匪及其他不法份子之活動計。勢所必須之行動」。該項行動實係一種「例外之辦法」，基於東省之特殊情形，將來該地常態，「經恢復」則此種辦法之必要性自亦將歸於消滅。中國代表對此提出下列之答覆，即：「不得擴大情勢之告誡，不得藉口於滿洲

現在事態所造成之無紀律而予以破壞。一面當時參加討論之行政院會員數人則承認「將來滿洲或將發生足以危及日人生命財產之情形，如遇此種緊急情形，日本在鄰近區域之軍隊採取行動，將爲無法避免之事。」當日本軍官在調查團面前供給證據之時，提及此事輒認爲十二月十日議決案，已賦予日本在滿洲之「駐軍權」，並課以剷除該地土匪之責任。彼等於敘述以後行動時，輒言當行使該項權利，進剿遼河附近之土匪時，彼等會偶然與錦州附近中國殘留軍隊發生衝突。結果，該項軍隊撤入長城以內。但事實之真相，爲日本在日內瓦提出保留案以後，仍繼續本其既定計劃以對付滿洲之局勢。

□援兵之開到 第二師，除駐防齊齊哈爾者外，均集中瀋陽。援兵隨即源源而來。(一)十二月十日至十五日間，第八師第四旅開到。十二月二十七日經日皇之裁可，第二十師幹部，及其他軍隊一旅亦自朝鮮開援。至當時長春，吉林，則僅由獨立鐵道守備隊防守。

註(一) 此處關於日軍單位及實力之數字，係以日本官方報告爲根據。

□關於中國軍隊之撤退談判無結果 因日軍向錦州前進，情勢急迫，中國外交部長爲防止繼續戰爭計，曾建議將華軍撤入關內；但須列強三四國保證日軍不再進攻。並在錦州之南北畫一中立區域。此項建議，並無結果。同時張學良氏又在北平與日本駐華代表，試行商洽，因有其他原因，亦無結果。據華方在其第三號說帖附件中所稱，日代表每次來(分別在七日，二十五日，及二十九日)必將其要求華軍撤條件提高；及將日方節制其軍隊行動之諾言。故以極空泛

之語句。至日方則謂華方之允許撤軍，並無誠意。

□錦州之進攻 日軍於十二月二十三日正式開始集中其兵力向前進攻；而華方之第十九旅遂被迫放棄其原有防地，自此以降，日軍即節節進攻，幾於全無抵抗，因華軍司令已下總退却令也。日軍旋於二月三日上街占據錦州。仍續推進，至山海關然後已，至是日軍遂得與其原在該處之駐軍，取得永久之聯絡。

張學良將軍之所以將其軍隊完全撤出滿洲，始終未事抵抗者，蓋與關內政情，不無關係。中國軍人，向喜從事內戰，前已言之；此時吾人之所應注意者，厥維此項內戰，自滿洲肇事後，迄未稍戢。

□哈爾濱之占據 日軍之長驅直下山海關也，未遇劇戰，而即告厥成功，用能將其原在該處之軍隊改調他處；至其第二師之主力，則因滿洲戰事，幾盡由其担任，故不得不調回遼陽，瀋陽，及長春各處之總司令部，略事休養。但在另一方面，鐵路各處，均須長川駐軍，以防土匪之來襲。致使日軍之防區延長，而戰鬥力亦銳減，是以日軍僅留其第二十師之兩旅兵力於其新占區域，而於該區域之北，另以第八師第四旅佐之。此時，日軍事當局曾向吾等保證：在此保護周密之區域內，法律與秩序，不久即已恢復；而在遼河兩岸，亦必能於數星期內將土匪掃數肅清。此係六月中事；但當吾等草撰本報告書時，據報紙所載，時有義勇軍侵入營口及海城各處，即瀋陽長春，亦皆受其威脅。

在本年春，吉黑二省府之殘餘軍隊，已退守哈爾濱之北，其所駐防之區域，

初爲以華軍對華軍，使之自相殘殺。在本年二月初旬

哈爾濱軍即準備北征，而其目的，則爲哈爾濱之占領。此時據城應戰之軍隊爲丁超李杜二將軍之部隊，即通稱反吉林軍者也。當吾等草擬初步報告之時，日本參與代表會向吾等提供材料，謂作戰之雙方本可成立某種妥協，後以北平當局之從中阻撓，而盡成泡影。就事實而言，當熙洽之軍隊在二月二十五日進抵雙城之時，雙方談判，確曾一度開始，但在翌晨，兩軍即在城南近郊，發生劇戰，熙洽軍隊之前進，因受阻止。哈爾濱原有日僑鮮僑甚多，故日方認爲此項戰局，對於該項僑民，殊有危險。自中國近年之歷史觀之，當多數非正式軍隊發生混戰之時，結果：敗北軍隊往往退據城堡固守，而當地居民，因以發生恐怖，此數見不鮮者也。據日方宣稱，當前項戰事發生之時，該處之日僑鮮僑曾呼籲於關東軍，請求保護；即華方商人，亦有參加此項舉動者，蓋恐其資產之或受劫奪也。

是月二十六日，日方以時機緊迫，乃派土肥原上校（現稱將軍）赴哈爾濱，將該處原有特務機關，收歸己手。土肥原氏曾告本查調團，謂兩軍環繞哈爾濱作戰，已有十日之久，該地日僑四千人深感生命之危險；而寄居傅家屯近郊之鮮僑一千六百人，且有橫被屠戮之虞。實則在此廣續不斷之十日戰事中，日僑鮮僑之因而遭劫者，實屬少數。未幾，日僑即自組織義勇軍，藉佐其同胞逃往他處。據傳有日僑一人鮮僑三人因欲逃走而被殺害。此外，尚有駛往該處偵查戰况之日機一架，因機件損壞而被迫降落，據傳其乘駕人員均爲丁超所殺害。

有此二事之發生，而日方軍事當局遂決計對於上項戰事，加以干涉。此次調往該處保僑者，仍爲第二師。但長春北之鐵路，乃中俄合辦之鐵路，故此時日方之所最感困難者，非作戰問題而爲運輸問題。該第二師司令，以中東路南段之車輛，已大見缺乏，故第一次只派長谷部將軍及步兵二營前赴該處，彼等隨即與鐵路當局開始交涉；但進展極遲，而日方遂決意以武力實行輸送矣。對於日方此舉，鐵路當局曾提抗議，及拒絕開車；但日方竟置之不顧。至二月二十八日，日方竟能組成三列車，向前開駛。該項列車駛至松花江第二橋而被迫停止，因該橋已被華方軍隊所毀壞也。日軍在二月二十九日，從事於該橋之修理；至三十日下午，遂得到達雙城。翌晨拂曉日方之一小部隊與丁超軍隊相遇，曾有劇戰，結果華軍被迫後退，但在是日，並無其他進展。至是中東鐵路當局已允爲日方運兵；但附帶提出條件兩項：即所運送之日軍應純以保僑爲目的；及車價應以現金給付是也。日軍自二月一日起開始到達該處；至二月三日，遂得將其軍隊集中於雙城之附近。此時日軍並會由齊齊哈爾（猶憶十一月十九日以降，第二師團曾撥兵一部，留駐齊齊哈爾）調兵增援。但日方此舉，亦有許多困難，因齊哈間之路線，已被華方截斷；而此項華軍且不時對於散駐中東路東段之獨立守備隊，加以襲擊也。

反吉林軍於二月三日退守哈爾濱之南部邊界，掘壕固守，時其兵力約有由一萬三千人，至一萬四千人之譜，共有大

砲十六門。同日、日軍即向前進；至二月三晚四晚，遂陸續開抵南城子河，約距雙城二十哩。翌晨，戰事開始；至二月四日薄暮，華軍之陣地，遂有一部陷入日軍之手；至二月五日中午，而勝敗遂決。同日下午，日軍進占哈爾濱；華軍向三姓一帶退却。

由此時迄一九三二年八月底之日方軍事行動。日方第二師之勝利，使哈爾濱入其手中；但退却之華軍並未採取其他行動，故於滿洲之全局，影響極微。哈爾濱以東及以北之鐵路及松花江之重要水路，仍在反吉林軍及馬占山部隊之手。日軍迭得援軍之助續向東北方進展，經六個月之戰鬥，遂得將其占據區域擴張，北至海倫；東至方正及海倫。據日方官報，反吉林軍及馬占山部隊業已完全潰散；而據華方報告，則謂此項軍隊，現猶健在，至是此項軍隊之實力，業已銳減，故力避與日方正式作戰；但仍能予日軍以相當之牽掣。據各報所載，中東路之東西段由海林至哈爾濱各處，時為此項軍隊所毀壞。

自二月初以來，日方之行動，可節述之如左：

第二師於三月底離哈爾濱向方正進展，其目的在征服丁，李之軍隊。該師進至三姓，遂退回哈爾濱。至是第十師乃來接防。第十師之任務有二：其一為以其駐守三姓附近之主力，向丁，李部隊繼續攻擊；第一為以其一小部份之軍隊駐防於中東路東段海林一帶。

至五月上旬，日方又調其第十四師，增援北滿，該師之一聯隊會與反吉林軍作戰，進至木蘭河，（三姓以南）將反吉林軍驅向吉省之東隅。而該師之主力，則於五月下旬，在哈

爾濱以北一帶。與馬占山將軍之部隊作戰。該師之主力，沿呼海線向哈爾濱以北進攻；而另以一小部份兵力進攻克山之東（即齊克線之原定終點）。據日方所傳，馬占山之軍隊，迄八月上旬，又已再度潰散；至馬將軍本人，則業經證實陣亡。但據華方消息，則謂馬將軍現猶健在。關於上項軍事行動，新抵該處之日本步兵亦曾參加。

在八月間，雙方並曾於奉天及熱河之交界。發生多次小戰。此次戰事，大抵集中於錦州至北票之鐵路（北甯鐵路）支線上，蓋此為由鐵路入熱河省之唯一路線也。華人認爲此舉。乃日人進佔熱河之先聲，故深引爲隱憂。考熱河爲中國本部與其滿洲軍隊之唯一聯絡路線；而熱河省又曾被『滿洲國』宣言爲其領土之一部，是以此項隱憂，當非無據。對於此項緊急情形，日本報界，議論甚多。

對於上項事件，日本參與代表曾提出如左之報告：
有名石本者，係關東軍司令部職員。於七月十七日，在北票至錦州之火車上，被義勇軍綁去。（在熱河省府轄區內）日軍步兵之一小聯軍隊會携輕砲往拯；但未得手，結果遂將熱河邊界之一小村落占領。

在由七月底至八月間，日方曾派機偵查熱境，並擲彈多枚；但所炸之處，多係『郊外無人居住之地，』曾經日方審慎挑選者。八月十九日，日方派軍官一人，前赴南嶺（係北票及熱河省境間之一小城，）洽商石本釋放事。在歸途中，忽遭襲擊，時該員率有步兵一小隊，爲自衛計，遂向對方還擊，後以日方另有步兵一聯隊來援，即能占據南嶺；但翌日即退出。

至中國參與代表所提出之節略，則係以熱河省府主席湯玉麟之報告書為根據者。此項報告謂雙方之戰事頗烈，華方之參戰者，為護路軍一營，日軍人數較多，且有鐵甲車二，以供應用。至日方報告所稱之飛機擲彈，大抵集中於朝陽（該區中較大之城）一帶，結果被害者，計有軍民三十人。至八月十九日，日方又復開始攻擊，以鐵甲車一向南嶺進攻。

日方參與代表所提供之消末謂：熱河治安之維持，原係「滿洲國之內政問題，但以熱河之治安與滿蒙之治安極有關係，熱河如發生紛擾，則滿蒙必且受其影響，故日本對之，遂亦不能採取旁觀之態度。」

至湯玉麟氏之報告書，則在結論上曾謂：倘日方仍復向前進攻，則彼決採一切可能之手段，對之為有效之抵抗。

自上項文書觀之，中日之衝突區域，殊有繼續擴大之虞，吾人固應早日為之計也。

■華方抵抗之性質 華軍之主要部份，迄一九三一年年底，雖已撤入關內；但在滿洲各處，日方尙時遭非正式之抵抗。如嫩江戰役之戰事，雖已絕跡；但此項非正式之戰事，却廣播滿洲各處，始終接連不斷。對於一切反日及反「滿洲國」之軍隊，日方往往一律目之為「土匪」；實則此項軍隊，與土匪並無關係，不能混為一談。查反日軍隊，共分二類，一為正式軍隊；一為非正式軍隊；至於此二項軍隊之人數，各有若干，則殊難核算，因本團始終未能與其躬自參戰之將官相晤；故對於下述消息之可靠性，自亦不能不稍作保留也。關於此項繼續抗日之軍隊，華方當局自不願宣洩其正確消息，至於日方當局所提之報告，則力圖將此項軍隊之人數及

其戰鬥能力減低。

■原有東北軍之殘餘勢力 原有東北軍殘餘勢力，大抵僅存於吉黑二省。至在一九三一年底錦州華軍之改組，則殊乏耐久之能力，因其均已陸續入關也。原在一九三一年九月以前駐守松花江及中東路一帶之華軍，從未與日軍熱烈交綏；但時滋騷擾，俾日軍及「滿洲國」軍疲於奔命。此項軍隊之領袖，如馬占山，丁超，李杜三氏，以其繼續抗日故，在中國頗享令名。考馬丁李三氏均係北滿護路軍旅長，大抵張學良將軍之統治權被推翻後，其部隊均能對其長官效忠及對其國家效忠，用能對日抵抗。馬占山之軍隊，因其本人會一度變志，故欲對其實力，加以估計，殊為困難。但馬氏既任黑龍江省府主席，是以該省之軍隊掃數歸其統率，據傳其實力共有七旅。自四月以降，馬氏會率其軍隊，堅決抗日及反「滿洲國」。其軍隊在呼蘭河海倫與大黑河之間者，據日方計算，只有六團，即由七千人至八千人之譜。丁李二氏原有舊日張學良軍隊六旅，後又補充三旅。當吾等草製初步報告書之時，其實力據日方當局計算，共有三萬人。自四月以來，馬丁李三氏之軍隊在人數上當已大減，迄今恐已不滿此數矣。哈爾濱被占領後，彼等之軍隊會遭日軍之集中攻擊，損失甚大。以現情而論，此項軍隊已無制止日方軍事行動之能力，故力避與日軍正式在戰場相遇。日方常用飛機，而此項軍隊則無之，其所以損失其重者，蓋以此也。

■非正式軍隊義勇軍 當吾人研究滿洲非正式軍隊之時，務須將在吉林省與丁李部隊合作之各種義勇軍之類別認清。在一九三二年四月二十九日之初步報告書中，我等曾於第

五頁「義勇軍」標題之下，言及義勇軍共有三大隊及七小隊。現在有一小隊，在敦化與萬寶山之間，仍與李丁二氏之正式軍隊互相聯結。因其所占區域全無鐵路，而其他交通工具亦告闕如，用能固守原防，始終健在，其領袖王德林聯合一切「反滿洲國」之勢力，而自任其司令。此項義勇軍，如與日軍兵力相較，自不足道；但以其現況而言，似仍能於吉省各處固守原防，以拒「滿洲國」軍隊之征剿，蓋日軍之活動，始終未及敦化以東也。當「大刀隊」與王德林取得聯絡之時，曾在間島一帶，大滋騷擾；至在最近，則消息頗沉寂，而日軍對之，亦從未作任何重要處置也。

據日本官方所提交本團之報告書所載，此項義勇軍分爲若干路或其他組織，每路兵力，約由二百人至四百人之譜。其活動範圍包括如下各區域；瀋陽左近及瀋陽安東間之鐵路，錦州及奉熱二省交界各處，中東路西段及瀋陽新民間一帶。故如將此項區域與反吉林軍所占區域合併計算，則其活動範圍，當占滿洲過半數之總面積也。

■土匪 滿洲之時有土匪出現，其情景亦正與中國內地相同。東三省各處，均有以匪爲業之非法份子；而政府中人且有利用之以推進其政治目的者；至於此項土匪之消長則與政府實力之消長成反比例。據中國政府所提交本團之文件所載，在最近二三十年間，日本曾派人予土匪以種種掖勵，俾遂行其政治上之目的，此項報告書並會引錄南滿鐵路當局所公布之「關於一九三〇年滿洲進展之第二次報告書」之一段云：專以鐵路區而論，匪案在一九〇六年祇有九件；至一九二九年，竟驟增至三百六十八件。該報告書又謂：土匪之所

以能滋生不已者，蓋由於日人自大連及關東私運軍火以資其用。華方又謂：在去年十一月，日方曾以軍火資助著名匪魁凌印清（譯音）；並有日人三，指導其組織獨立自衛軍，以爲進攻錦州之用。此計既已失敗，日方乃轉而利用其他匪首；幸而其所資匪之軍火，均入華軍之手，以其軍火均係日方所製，故深信日方有此企圖也。

至於日本當局，則其對於此項土匪之觀點，自與華方完全不同。據其所見，此項土匪之存在，完全由於中國政府無能。日方並謂：在相當程度之內，張作霖頗盼土匪之繼續存在，因彼認爲：遇有不測，此項土匪均可收歸己用也。日本當局會承認：張學良之被推翻，大足增加土匪之數目；但在另一方面，却謂日軍如繼續留滿，則在二三年之內，主要之土匪必可掃數肅清。日方希望「滿洲國」警察及各市自衛團之組織，能使土匪逐漸絕跡。彼等相信：土匪中定有不少良民，因其家財蕩然，始而加入匪類。此項由良民出身之土匪倘能得有機會重事耕耘，當必樂於恢復其固有之安靜生活也。

第五章 上海

■上海事件 一月底，上海戰事發生，關於自戰雲開始至二月二十日止其經過情形之梗概，國聯所委派之領團委員會已有報告。二十九日，本調查團行抵東京時，戰事仍在進行中，曾與日本政府中人，對於日本以武力干涉上海事件之起因，動機及結果，作數次之討論。三月十四日，我等抵上海，是時戰爭已息，但停戰談判，殊感困難。調查團適於此時蒞止恰合時機，對於順利空氣之產生，或能有所神助，我等瞭悉最近戰爭所造成之緊張情緒且對於有關於此次爭執之困難與焦點，且能得一種更親切與明確之印象。調查團並未奉命繼續領團委員會之工作，或對於上海最近事件作一特別研究。國際聯合會秘書長且曾通知本調查團謂中國政府曾表示反對，足使調查團因研究上海戰事情形，而致延期前往滿洲之任何建議。

我等已獲得中日兩國政府對於上海事件之意見，並接到由雙方交來有關本題之大宗文件。我等亦曾視察為戰事所毀壞之區域，並聆日本海陸軍官對於戰事之申述。又曾以個人名義，與上海各界代表談話，以探察各方輿論，蓋凡上海居民對於此事均有親切詳明之記憶也。但我等並未以調查團之名義，正式查究上海事件，是以對於有關係之爭點，不表示意見。但為完成紀錄起見，我等對於自二月二十日起至日軍撤退日止之戰爭經過，應予以記載。

■上海事件自二月二十日以後之紀述 領團委員會之最後報告，稱日軍於二月二十日在江灣與吳淞區域開始新攻擊

，當為吾人所能回憶，此次進攻於日軍並無甚大勝利，雖續攻數日，仍屬徒然，但日軍因此得知十九路軍及中國警衛軍之一部（即第八十七師與第八十八師）已與之抵抗，此項抵抗事實，及上海地方情形，所產生之困難使日本決定增加第十一與第十四兩師團之生力軍。

二月二十八日，日本軍隊佔據江灣西部中國軍隊所退出之區域。是日又有日本海空軍轟炸吳淞砲台及長江一帶要塞。其擲彈飛機則參與前線之全部戰爭，炸毀虹橋飛機場與京滬鐵路。日本所派之日軍總司令白川將軍，於二月二十九日抵滬。自此以後，日軍司令部乃有真實進展之報告。在江灣方面，日軍前進甚緩，據日本海軍司令部稱在開北之對方軍隊，以每日受砲攻之結果，顯有退讓之現象。同日距滬百哩之杭州飛機場亦遭日空軍之轟炸。

三月一日前線攻擊漸見進展，但仍遲緩，日軍司令官，為開始包抄並襲擊中國軍隊之左翼起見，飭令第十一師團之主要部份，在長江右岸濟雅口（譯音）附近登陸。此種策略頗見成功，中國軍隊被迫後退至日軍司令官於二月二十日哀的美敦書中所要求之二十公里之外。吳淞砲台因迭經日本海空軍之轟擊，中國軍隊乃於三月三日退出，同時日本軍隊進佔該處，先一日日本空軍之轟炸會及於距京滬鐵路崑山車站以東七公里之地方，其目的在制止中國之後方軍隊之運往前線助戰。

三月三日下午日軍司令官下令停戰，四日華軍司令官亦發出同樣號令。自停戰後，日軍第十四師團於三月七日至十七日之間在上海登陸，約一月之後，該師團開拔至滿洲，以

續充駐彼之日軍，中國人民對之深為憤慨。

是時因友邦與國際聯合會之協助，驟停戰爭之努力繼續進行。二月二十八日英國海軍提督克萊在彼旗艦上接見雙方代表，當經提出一基於雙方同時退兵與暫時性質之協定。旋以雙方對於談判根據之意見不同，會議遂無結果。

二月二十九日國際聯合會行政院長，提出建議組織「一共同會議，在以有關係各國代表之前力謀結束戰事，並確實制止戰鬥行為，其辦法可就地商議之」。雙方表示接受，惟因日本代表提出苛刻條件，致談判無良好結果。日本代表要求：(一)中國軍隊應先行撤退；(二)日本軍隊俟中國軍隊確定撤退後，方始後退，惟不退至以前所聲稱之公共租界與越界築路等處，而退至自上海至吳淞之一帶區域。

三月四日，國聯大會重提行政院之建議：(一)催促兩國政府實行停止戰鬥行為；(二)請求其他有關係之各國以上項之執行情形通知大會；(三)建議此項談判由其他列強予以協助，俾能締結協定使戰鬥行為確定停止；又規定日本軍隊之撤退，並願各國以關於該項談判之進展情形通知國聯大會。

三月九日，日本當局將節略交由英國公使轉送中國當局，該節略內稱日本準依據國聯大會所提出各點，開始談判。

三月十日，中國當局，送由英國公使轉致答復，表示亦願依此原則準備談判，但以確實停止戰鬥行為，及完全且無條件的撤退日本軍隊為限。三月十三日，日方表示，對於中國方面之保留條件不認為得以變更國聯議決案之意義，並不認有束縛日方之性質，日方並稱雙方應以議決案為會晤之根據。

三月二十四日，中日開停戰會議，此時日本陸海軍隊，亦實行開始撤退。三月二十日其海空後備隊離開上海使所留軍隊之實力「不比尋常為多」。日本司令部於三月二十七日又將軍隊撤回，並聲稱此與前面所述之和會或國際聯合會無關，是為日本帝國陸軍司令部之單獨決議，認為上海毋須多留軍隊故決定自動撤回。

三月三十日和會報告：在前一日關於確實停戰之協定，業經決定。惟他種困難繼之而起，至五月五日全部和議協定，方準備簽字。該協定規定確實停止戰鬥行為，劃定上海以西一帶，為中國軍隊前進之暫時界限，以待恢復常態辦法之決定，又規定日本軍隊撤退至公共租界及越界築路，一如一月二十八日以前之情形。又因日本軍隊之數量過多，租界內不能容納，租界以外之某數地段暫時包括在日軍暫駐區域之內，此類地段現在可以不必提及，因日軍已早從該處撤退矣。又設一共同委員會，由英美法義四國友邦及中日雙方之各代表組織之，以監視雙方撤兵。該委員會並得協助佈置由日軍移交於中國警察接管之事宜。

中國方面對於該協定，附加二種聲明：第一，聲明此協定內並無對於中國軍隊在上海境內之行動有任何永久之限制；第二，在日本軍隊暫時駐紮之區域內，一切市政職務包含警察在內，仍歸中國官廳辦理。

該協定之條件，大體已見諸實行。日本軍隊退出之區域，於五月九日與三十日之間，已移交與中國特別保安隊接防。然該四區域之移交已較遲於原定時間。中國房主廠主與鐵路店舖職員及其他居民等當其回至兵災區域時，每見有搶奪

劫掠，故意燬壞財產擄走什物等事，以為均須訴之於日軍司令部，此殆為戰後之當然情形，依照中國人之意見，全部賠償問題，應容後再行談判，彼等計算軍民人等之傷亡，及失蹤者達二萬四千一百人之多，物質損失約計十五萬萬元。關於越界築路區域之草案業經上海工部局代表與市政府代表簽押，但工部局與市政府尚未核准，工部局已將該草案交由領袖領事轉送領事團察閱矣。

上海中國軍隊之抵抗對於滿洲情勢之影響 上海事件自大有影響於滿洲之情勢。日軍能不費力而佔據滿洲之大部分與中國軍隊之毫不抵抗，不特使日本海陸軍界相信中國軍隊戰鬥力之極為薄弱，且使全中國人民亦大為沮喪。自十九路軍在上海開始奮勇抵抗繼以警衛軍第八十七師與第八十八師之助戰，一旦戰情披露，舉國狂熱。原有之三千日本海軍加以三師團與一混成旅之補充，血戰六星期後，始得將中國軍隊擊退，此足以予中國民氣以一種深切之印象。於是全國均覺中國非自救不可。中日衝突之事，傳佈全國，各處輿論緊張，抵抗精神增加，以前所抱之悲觀主義忽而變為同等過甚之樂觀主義。上海消息傳入滿洲，使其仍在抵抗中之散漫軍隊增加勇氣。馬占山亦因是而再起抵抗，並激起寰球華人愛國之心，義勇軍之抵抗力亦由此而增加。日方遣軍遠征，亦無勝利可言，在數處，日軍每反取守勢，且在時受攻擊之各鐵路不得不加意佈防。

一九三二年二月一日之南京事件 自上海戰事發生後，他處事件繼之以起，如南京受短時間砲擊即其一端，此事造成非常驚慌，即國外亦受其影響。此事發生於二月一日午

夜，幸不到一小時即停止。該事之發生，或為誤會所致，結果使中國政府，由南京暫遷洛陽。

中日兩國所解釋之原因與事實，相差懸殊。我等由日本方面所得之解釋有二點：第一，自上海戰事發生後，中國方面已將獅子山砲台擴大。沿長江之城門口及對江，掘戰壕，設砲壘。以擴大軍事準備，惹起江面泊有軍艦之日人之注意；第二，本地報章曾宣傳上海方面中國勝利之不確實消息，更使南京之華人非常緊張。據稱凡日人所雇之華人亦因受恐嚇而被迫離職，華商拒絕賣給食物與日人包括領事館員與兵艦上之水手在內。

關於以上之煩言，中國方面並未批評，祇稱彼時之不安定與空氣之緊張，由於日本方面在滬事發生後增加兵艦，先自二艘增至五艘，最後增至七艘（日本當局稱共六艦，其中三艦為砲艦，三艦為驅逐艦）。軍艦司令官派水兵若干名登陸，在日清輪船公司碼頭，任保衛之職，以保護避居蘆船上之日本領事館員與日本居民。上海之事，尚深印一般腦海，所以此種舉動使已受驚之南京人民，復感同樣恐慌之經驗。

我等於首都警察廳致外交部之報告書中得悉對於中國人民與外國僑民安全負完全保護責任之南京地方當局，對於日本海軍之登岸，深為憤激，曾向日本副領事提出抗議，據其答復，謂無力干預此事，同時又特別令飭上述日本船碼頭，所在地之下關警察廳分局，靠近日本兵艦碇泊之地點，與阻止華人與日人在該區域內互相接觸，尤其在夜間。依照日方正式報告，避難之日本人，已於一月二十九日以後之數日內

登日清輪船公司之某輪船，且大部份已送往上海。日人申說在二月一日夜，其砲艦三艘，忽受砲擊，其聲顯然為獅子山砲台所發。同時中國軍隊攻擊江邊之日本海軍衛兵，致傷二人，其中一人因傷斃命。日軍當即還擊，但祇向海軍登陸之附近地點還擊，至岸上停止轟擊為止。此乃日本方面之說辭。中國方面，絕對否認有任何開火之事，但稱獅子山砲台，下關及其他地點，遭炮轟擊有八響之多，繼則以機關槍步槍掃射。是時兵艦上之探險燈直向岸上探射，使一般居民受莫大驚慌，因此均向城內奔命，幸無死傷，物質損失亦不大。此事件之發生，最初或係起於一般興奮之中國人民之燃放爆竹亦未可知，因彼等藉燃放爆竹以慶祝上海戰事之假定的勝利也。

第六章 滿洲國

第一節 建設「新國家」之歷程

□由於日本佔領瀋陽所生之紛亂。由於一九三一年九月十八日事變所生之結果，如上章所述，瀋陽城與遼甯省（奉天）之民政，盡行解組，即其他兩省之民政，在較小範圍內，亦受影響。瀋陽非惟為滿洲政治之中心，且除大連而外，並為南滿商業最要之中心；突然襲擊瀋陽，對於中國民衆，實引起一大恐怖。重要官員與教育界商業界之領袖分子，能走避者，大半皆倉皇攜眷遠離。在九月十九日之後，有十萬以上之中國居民，由北甯鐵路離去瀋陽，其不能離者，則多潛匿；即警察與監獄看守，亦皆不見。瀋陽市縣省府之行政，完全推翻，公用事業公司，供給電燈飲水之類者，及公共汽車電車電話電報之類，停止其職務；銀行與店舖，緊閉大門。

□恢復瀋陽城之秩序與民政。目前急要之事，即為組織市政府，與恢復該城之市民日常生活，此舉由日人担任，進行頗為敏捷。土肥原上校任瀋陽市長，在三日內，民政即恢復常態。並因該省主席臧式毅氏之助，數百警察與大半監獄看守人員，概行招回；公共事業之效用，亦回復原狀。土肥原氏任職一月，設有緊急委員會，內多日人，以資贊助。迄是年十月二十日，市政府之治權，移交於有相當資格之中國團體，以趙欣伯氏為市長（趙係律師，在日本求學十一年，為東京帝國大學之法學博士）

□改組省政府。遼甯省。其次問題，即為改組三省之省行政。此舉在遼甯，較其他兩省為艱。因瀋陽為該省行政之中心，重要人物，多已逃避，且一時有中國之省行政，繼續在錦州進行，故經三月後，改組始完成。

□臧將軍拒絕組織獨立省政府。中將臧式毅為當時之遼甯省政府主席；於九月二十日，首先與之接洽；請其組織離中國中央政府而獨立之省政府；事為臧氏所拒，致受逮捕；迄十一月十五日釋放。

□九月二十五日設立自治委員會以袁金鎧為主席。臧式毅將軍拒絕贊助建設獨立之政府後，另與其他有力之官吏袁金鎧氏接洽；袁為前任省長東北政務委員會副會長。日本軍事當局邀袁及他中國居民八人，組成所謂「維持治安委員會」。該會宣布於九月二十四日成立。日本報紙遂宣稱該會為獨立派運動之第一步；但袁金鎧氏於十月五日公然否認有此種用意。據云「該會設立於舊行政組織瓦解後。藉以維持地方治安秩序；並協助救濟難民，恢復金融市場，及處理其他事件，專為預防過分之損害。然無意於組織省政府或宣布獨立也」。

□十月十九日設立財政局。十月十九日該委員會設立財政局。決派日本顧問數人，協助中國職員。財政局長在實行該局決議以前，須先取得軍事機關之同意。在縣之收稅公署，受日本憲兵隊或他項機關之監督。有時須將其賬簿，逐日呈請憲兵隊稽查；凡支給警察司法教育等類之公用款項，須得其允許。有匯寄稅款於錦州「敵黨」者，須即報告於日本當局。同時組織財政整理委員會以改組課稅制度為主要任務。

日人代表與中國同業公會之代表，准予參加討論課稅事宜。依據一九三二年五月三十日所編由在長春「外交公署」交於本調查團之『滿洲國獨立史』所載，因該會討論之結果，遂於一九三一年十一月十六日，廢除稅捐六種，稅率減半者四種，改歸地方政府者八種，並禁止一切無法律根據之徵稅。

十月二十一日設立實業局。十月二十一日，該會設立實業局；該會之名稱改稱為「遼甯省自治公署」。此事曾經取得日本軍事當局之同意，並派有日本顧問多人。該局長欲發命令，事先須取得日本軍事當局之許可。

東北交通委員會。最後遼甯省自治公署組織一新東北交通委員會；該會逐漸管轄各方鐵路，不特以在遼甯省者為限，即在吉林黑龍江者亦包括在內。該會於十一月一日與遼甯自治公署分離。

十一月七日之宣言與十一月十日設立省政府。十一月七日遼甯省自治公署改為臨時遼甯省政府，發表宣言，與前東北省政府及南京中央政府脫離關係。且要求遼甯各地方政府須遵守其所發布之命令，並宣稱自今以後將行使省政府職權。於十一月十日公開舉行成立典禮。

最高顧問部之職務。同時與遼甯省自治公署改為臨時遼甯省政府而開幕者，有最高顧問部，以于冲漢為主席；于氏曾任維持治安委員會副會長。該局之目的，據于氏宣稱，在維持秩序，取消惡稅，減輕稅率，及改良生產貿易之組織，藉以改善行政。該部並指導及監督臨時省政府，與扶助地方自治之發展，適合於地方民衆之習慣及現代之需要。該部內設各司，分掌總務調查文約指導監督等事，並設一自治訓

練所。其重要職員幾全為日本人。

十一月二十日改省名為奉天十一月十五日以威式毅為省長。十一月二十日該省之名改為奉天，即為一九二八年以前該省未歸國民政府統治時之舊名；且於十二月十五日，以被禁新釋之威式毅氏，接替袁金鎧為奉天省長。

(二)吉林省。設立省政府於吉林省，為事較易。是月二十三日第二師司令多門少將與中將熙洽會晤；時張作相將軍不在，由其代理該省行政長官；因邀之担任該省政府主席。會晤之後，熙洽將軍召集各機關及法團於九月二十五日開會，有日本軍官參加。對於建設新省政府之意思。並無反對表示，遂於九月三十日宣布成立。吉林之新省政府之組織法，旋即宣佈。委員制之政府即行廢止；政務由省長熙洽負責進行。數日後由其委派新政府主要官吏，並添派日本職員數人。總務處長為一日人。各縣亦有行政上之改組與人員之更換。四十三縣中，有十五縣經改組後，撤去中國官員。有十縣之官員，宣示忠於將軍熙洽，仍行留任。其他諸縣，仍為效忠於舊政府之軍事領袖所保持，或對於爭鬥各方超然不加干預。

(三)中東鐵路之特別行政區。特區行政長官中將張景惠。係一親日派。雖未帶領軍隊，而有舊勢力能指揮吉林與黑龍江多數軍隊及特區之護路軍。九月二十七日由其在哈爾濱公署召集會議討論該特區緊急委員會之組織。該委員會以張景惠將軍為主席，其餘人員中，有王瑞華將軍及丁超將軍。丁氏嗣於一九三二年正月，成為「反吉林」之領袖，抵抗熙洽將軍。十一月五日，反吉林軍在張作相將軍指揮之下，設

立新吉林省政府於哈爾濱。張景惠將軍於一九三二年正月一日，被任爲黑龍江省長；一月七日即以職權宣佈該省獨立。一月二十九日丁超將軍佔據特區行政長官公署，監禁張將軍於其私宅。迫日本軍隊向北進攻，於二月五日佔領哈爾濱，擊敗丁超將軍後，始恢復其自由。自是而後，日本在特區之勢力，益見強盛。

（四）黑龍江。在黑龍江省因有張海鵬將軍與馬占山將軍之衝突，情形較爲複雜；此層已述於上章。十一月十九日日人占領齊齊哈爾後，一照例式之自治會隨之成立，號稱代表民意，邀特區張景惠將軍兼充黑龍江省長官。惟時因哈爾濱附近情勢未定，且與馬占山將軍尙未訂立確定的協定，猶未妥協，延至一九三二年一月初始行就職。此際馬將軍之態度，一時仍無明顯之表示。馬氏與丁超合作，迄丁氏於二月敗退後，始與日本協議取張景惠之黑龍江長官之職而代之；繼與他省長官合作，參加「新國家」之建立。一月二十五日在齊齊哈爾設立自治指導部；而與其他二省同樣之省政府，亦逐漸成立焉。

（五）熱河。熱河省向來保持超然態度，迄未參加滿洲之政變。此省爲內蒙古之一部，有中國居民三百萬，漸將素以遊牧爲生部落爲制之蒙古民族，向北推出。該族號稱百萬，與在奉天西之蒙古諸旗，仍相聯絡。在奉天與熱河之蒙古人；皆聯爲「盟」，其最有力者，爲錫林盟。該盟參與獨立運動，其他蒙古人如在黑龍江西之巴加區（譯音）或稱呼倫貝爾者，亦嘗思脫離中國而獨立。此項蒙古人不易與中人同化，頗自驕大，常不忘成吉思汗之偉績，與中國被蒙古戰士

之克服，憤中國之統治，而尤怨中國人民之移植，漸侵佔其疆土。熱河之昭烏達盟及卓索圖盟，與現受治於委員制之奉天諸旗，互相聯絡。熱河省主席湯玉麟將軍，聞自九月二十九日起，對於該省，負擔全責，並與其在滿洲之同僚之通聲氣。三月九日舉行「滿洲國」之成立典禮時，熱河亦包括於「新國家」之中，實則該省政府未取確定之步驟。關於該省最近之情事，見前章末段。

創建「獨立國家」。各省所設地方自治行政機關，如上所述者，隨後聯合而自成爲一獨立「國家」。欲明瞭此事所以成功之情形，與夫中國人贊成其事之證據分量之多寡，須先審察中國社會生活之特殊狀況，該項特別狀況，有時成爲一種力量，有時成爲一種弱點。公共義務爲中國人所認識者，爲對於家族，對於某地或某人，較之對於國家爲優，已如第一章所述。愛國主義如西方人所了解者，僅方在萌芽。舉凡公會，社團，旗盟，及軍隊，莫不習於追隨某人領袖。故若能以勸導或脅制方法，取得助某領袖之擁護，則在該領袖勢力下全區域中之徒衆，自亦一致擁護無疑。由是以觀，可見中國之特點，被巧於利用，以組織各處省政府；且仍藉此少數之人爲工具，以完成其最後一局焉。

自治指導部。造成獨立之主要機具，厥爲自治指導部，其總事務所設在瀋陽，據本調查團所得之可靠證言，該部爲日人所組織，雖有一中國人爲領袖，但其中職員多爲日人，其功用在爲關東陸軍總司令部第四部之機關，以扶助獨立運動爲主要目的，奉天省之各縣，分設地方自治執行委員會，受中央部之指導與監督，各縣遇有必要情形，中央部即由

多數並富有經驗之職員中派出稽查員，指導員，及演講員等，其中多為日本人，且編輯發行報紙一種，以供利用。

一月七日瀋陽發表自治指導部之佈告。此項中央部所發訓令之性質於一月七日所頒之一月一日佈告中顯然可以見之。佈告稱東北急待發展，須有大規模之公眾運動，以建設新獨立國於滿洲及蒙古，並敘述其在奉天省各縣之工作，又略示進展其活動於他縣，及他省之計劃。且復訴請東北人民，推翻張學良將軍加入自治會，協助廉潔政治之建設，改良人民之生活，而終結之詞為：「統一東北之組織，擁護新國家，擁護獨立」此項佈告計分散五萬份。

一月間該部長官之計劃。一月間，自治指導部之部長子冲漢，即已與省長臧式毅計劃建設新「國」，使於二月十日成立，第一月二十九日哈爾濱之暴變，及馬占山將軍與丁超衝突時，態度之不顯明，似實為當時暫停進行他種步驟之要因。

追丁超敗退後，張景惠中將軍與馬將軍接洽，成立二月十四日之協議，以馬將軍為黑龍江之省長，二月十六日及十七日在瀋陽開會，以佈置新國家之建立，三省省長，特別區之行政長官，及担任一切重要預備工作之趙欣伯博士，均親自出席。

在此五人會議中，決定設立新國家，組織東北行政院，暫握最高政權，以統轄諸省及特別區，且立即進行建立「新國家」之一切預備工作會議之第二日，有二蒙古王子到會，一係代表黑龍江西部之巴加區即呼倫貝爾，其一，為支旺（譯音）王子，屬於錫林盟代表諸旗，此人為諸旗所最信仰之

領袖。

二月十七日之最高行政院。最高行政院，即於是日成立。其中人員為該院主席張景惠中將，奉天，吉林，黑龍江，熱河之省長及代表蒙古諸地，支旺王子與林鮮王子，該院第一次議決為：新「國家」採取共和制，尊重組成新「國」各省之自治權，予行政長官以執政之名號，及發表獨立宣言，由四省省長，特別區行政長官，代表諸旗之支旺王子，與代表黑龍江呼倫貝爾居以福王子（譯音）署名，是夜，關東軍總司令設備公宴，以慶賀「新國家之領袖」，祝其成功，且表示遇必要時，必為協助。

二月十八日宣布獨立。獨立宣言，發表於二月十八日，叙及人民之熱望永久和平，並請彼所稱之民選各省長，負責以應此項願望。此項宣言，並陳述建立新國家之必要，並認東北行政院，即本此目的而組織，現既與國民黨及南京政府脫離關係，允許人民享善良政府之利益，並會將宣言內容，通電於滿洲各地，於是馬將軍與熙洽省長遂分返其各人之省垣，但派定代表，往與臧式毅省長張景惠省長及趙欣伯市長接洽，以進行計劃中之詳細工作。嗣於二月十九日，復由諸人開會，決定建立共和國，於憲法中確定分權之原則，遂廢帝宣統為行政長官。此後又決議首都應設在長春，定政府之新年號，為「大同」，國旗之形色，亦並經決定。二月二十五日，遂將此種種決議，通知諸省。

「新國家」之計劃。（包括熱河）及呼倫貝爾，錫林，昭烏達，及卓索圖諸盟之蒙古行政公署，上文所稱諸盟，設立於熱河，諸盟不能對於該省政府主席，有反抗其意志之行為

如前所述。

■促進新國成立之運動。宣佈獨立與通告新國家之計劃後，自治指導部，首先領導組織民衆示威運動，以爲援助，並進行組織「新國成立促進會」且訓令奉天各縣之地方自治執行委員會盡力設法，以增進與促成獨立之運動。其結果，則此種新「促進」會，如雨後春筍，環自治執行委員會而發生。

二月二十日以後，此種新立之「促進會」，積極活動，預備標語，印刷口號，發行書本小冊，編輯「東北文化半月刊」並分配紅紙對聯且由郵局分送傳單于各重要人物，請其贊助助宣傳，在瀋陽則此種紅紙對聯即由商會分散，以黏貼於門柱。

■民衆贊成獨立之組織。同時自治執行委員會，則在各縣當地紳士，及商會，農會，實業會與教育會之主席，及其重要分子以開民衆代表會議。此外復組織民衆大會，及遊行大會，在各縣城之大街要道遊行，在各地人民及民衆之集會，通過許多之決議，號稱有數千人之參加，出於人民共同，或特種團體之意思，此項決議，當然呈送於瀋陽之自治指導部。

■二月二十八日瀋陽決議贊成新國家。自促進會與自治執行委員會，活動於奉天各縣之後，於是復在瀋陽組織一全省大會，藉以具體表示民衆之意欲欲建立國家，于是在二月廿八日，因即開一會議，參加者爲該省各縣官吏及各階級各團體之代表，爲數約六百人。此項會議，當并發一宣言，謂「前歷迫人民，舊軍閥而開一新紀元，實足爲奉天之一

千六百萬人民慶幸。就奉天而論，所謂民衆運動者，遂即以

此結局。

■吉林省之獨立運動。至于在吉林省之贊成新國之運動，亦係有組織，有指揮，當二月十六日瀋陽會議之際，照治會發出通電於彼所轄之各縣官吏，令其呈明人民公意所趨之政策俾新國家有所遵循，並令各縣官吏協力指導其舉動。業公會及各會社，各地響應通電羣起做獨立運動，二月二十日吉林省政府遂設立國家創建委員會，以指導各種組織，進行其獨立運動，二月二十四日，人民協會在長春召集民衆大會。據稱到會者約有四千人，彼等要求促進新「國家」之建立。其他各縣，及哈爾濱亦召集同樣之集會，五月二十五日，開全省民衆大會於吉林城，據稱到場者約萬人，並發表正式宣言，其內容則與二月二十八日在瀋陽所通過者相同。

■在黑龍江省。在黑龍江省內，瀋陽自治指導部負担重要部份之工作。一月七日張景惠將軍就黑龍江省長職後，即宣告該省獨立。

該部對於黑龍江促進運動之進行曾予協助。特派遺指導員四人，由瀋陽赴齊齊哈爾，其中二人爲日人。彼等既到該處二日之後，時在二月二十二日，即在省府接待室內，召集會議，公團代表出席者頗衆，稱爲全黑龍江會議，以議定籌備建設國家之方法，並決議於二月二十四日，召開民衆大會。

參加民衆大會者有數千人，標語旗幟，滿布齊齊哈爾，以誌紀念。日軍炮隊鳴禮炮一百零一響。日本海軍亦在

責任內閣制，以總統為國家元首。所有政權集中於中央政府，取消省政府，以縣及市為地方政府之單位。

二月底時，奉天吉林黑龍江及特別區中省縣發表宣言之一階段，即已過去。蒙古諸旗，因知新國行將劃出蒙古特別自治區域並保障蒙古人民之權利，對於新國，亦表示歸服，回教徒則早於二月十五日，在瀋陽集會，表示歸依。少數未經同化之旗人，因悉清廢帝或將出任行政官，亦泰半擁護新國。

二月二十九日瀋陽之全滿洲大會，各縣各省正式表示擁護新國計畫之後，自治指導部即發起召集全滿洲會議。於二月二十九日，在瀋陽開會，各省及奉天省各縣以及蒙古各地，均有官方代表出席。此外尚有團體代表，如吉林及特別區之朝鮮人與滿蒙青年同盟會各分會等，均有代表到會。總計出席者，在七百人以上。

會場上有若干人之演說，全體通過宣言及決議各一，前者指摘舊政府，後者歡迎「新國家」。復通過第二議決，推舉廢帝宣統，即今以其私名亨利溥儀君稱者，為新國之臨時總統。

廢帝亨利溥儀出任「滿洲國」元首。東北行政院，隨即召集緊急會議，推舉代表六人前赴旅順，邀請廢帝，蓋廢帝自去年十一月離津後，即住居該地。溥儀初則拒絕。三月四日，復有二十九人之代表團往邀，得其全意，但允任職以一年為限。行政院遂推舉該院院長張景惠中將，及其他九人，組織迎驛委員會，於三月五赴日旅順，當賜覲見。三月六日，廢帝應彼等之請求，而離旅順，赴通江子。八日起，受賀

為「滿洲國」執政。

三月九日長春舉行就職典禮。三月九日就職典禮舉行於新都長春，溥儀以執政名義，發出宣言，聲稱新國政策，基於「道德仁慈與博愛」。同月十日，任命政府重要官員，如內閣閣員，立法院監察院院長，參議府正副參議長及參事，各省及特區之省長或長官，各省警衛軍軍長，及其他高級官員。並於三月十二日通電列強報告「滿洲國」之成立。該通電之用意在於通告列強組織「滿洲國」之基本目的，及其外交政策之主義，並請列強承認新國。

執政未來以前，多數法規即早已由趙欣伯博士先期預為制定，以待採用頒布。三月九日，於政府組織法施行時，此種現成法規，亦同時施行。以前適用之法律，凡不與新法律或新國之基本政策相抵觸者，亦於同日以特別命令，暫准援用。

報告事實之來源。此項關於建立「滿洲國」過程之記載，乃由來自各方之報告集合而成。諸事件之發生，日本報紙，有較詳之登載，尤以日本人主辦之「滿洲日報」為最詳盡。至於現政府於五月三十日在長春所撰之兩文，一曰「滿洲國獨立之歷史——滿洲國之外交部」，一曰「滿洲國概要——滿洲國外交部」，及調查團中國代表所撰之「東三省所謂獨立運動之說帖」，亦經詳細研討，除此之外。凡中立者方面所得之報告，亦均經利用。

九月十八日以來之民政。自九月十八日至「滿洲國政府」成立為止，日本軍事當局，關於民政方面之行動，其最顯著者，如銀行之監管，公用事業之行政，鐵路之管理，均

在在足以表現其自採取軍事行動以還，其目的固不僅爲暫時之軍事占據。自九月十九日佔領瀋陽之後，所有中國之銀行，鐵路辦事處所，公用事業之局所，礦務管理局之事務所，及其他類似房屋之內外均一律有軍警監守，嗣即進而調查此等事業之經濟及普通狀況，迨至准許其復業時，則必須聘請日人爲顧問，專家，秘書等官職，且大半挾有行政權。至於東三省之前政府，及前各省所有之事業，因前既被政府認爲戰時之敵人，其銀行，礦業，農業，工商業，鐵路，公用事業，凡前政府以公家或個人資格，得沾利益之一切稅收事業，無一不受監視。

■鐵路 至于鐵路方面，日本當局於軍事佔據開始時起所採之行動，欲在有利於日人利益狀況之下，確切解決中日間久相爭持之鐵路問題，該項問題，業經在第三章內述及。日方曾以敏捷手段，爲下列之行動：

(一)長城以北，中國所有之鐵路，及其存於滿洲各銀行之銀錢，均予以扣留。

(二)爲欲求諸鐵路與南滿鐵路和調起見，在瀋陽及其附近路軌之安置，加以變更；使北甯鐵路路軌，在南滿鐵路棧橋地方之下穿過；俾遼甯中車站奉天東車站，奉天北門車站等相連接，並與通吉林之中國國有鐵路之連絡斷絕。(嗣後另有更動)

(三)在吉林將海龍吉林路線，吉林敦化路線，及吉林長春路線，實行聯絡。

(四)在鐵路各部份中，設置專門顧問。

(五)中國當局所採用之「特別價目」概行廢止，恢復原

來價額，使中國鐵路之運貨額，與南滿鐵路之價額，更相符合。自九月十八日，東北交通委員會停止工作時起，至設立「滿洲國交通部」之日爲止，對於鐵路之上行政，日本當局負完全責任。

■其他公用事業 關於瀋陽及安東之公共電力之供給，日本採取與上述情形相類似的處分；該項處分，超過保護其僑民生命財產所需要之程度。自九月十八日起，至建立「滿洲國」止，日本當局對於中國政府之電話電報及無線電之行政及管理，加以變更，使與日本在滿洲之電話電報事業，爲密切的調和。

■結論 自一九三一年九月十八日以後，在日本軍事當局之行動中，不論在軍事或民政方面，政治意味，特爲濃厚。日方逐步以武力佔據東三省，使齊齊哈爾，錦州，哈爾濱，及最後滿洲境內一切重要城市，脫離中國之統治；並於每次佔據之後，即將該地民事行政機關改組。故獨立運動，於一九三一年九月以前，在滿洲從未聽得；所以能有此項運動者，僅由於日本軍隊之在場；甚爲明顯。

與第四章所述之日本新政治運動有密切關係之現任或已退職之日本文武官吏，曾考量，組織，並實行此項運動，認爲一種解決九月十八日事變後滿洲局面之方法。

該官吏等利用某種華人之名義及舉動，並利用不滿從前政府之少數居民，企圖達到上述目的。

日本參謀本部，自始或至少在短時期內，明瞭此項自治運動之可以利用，又毫無疑義。故該部對於獨立運動之組織份子，予以援助及指導。

調查團認為滿意者，即依各方所得一切證據，確信助成滿洲國成立之原動力，雖有若干種，但其中兩種，即一為日本軍隊之在場，一為日本文武官吏之活動；兩者聯合，發生之效力最大；依我等之判斷，若無此兩者，新國家不能成立。

基此理由，現在政體，不能認為由真正的及自然的獨立運動所產生。

第二節 現在「滿洲國」政府

■基本法 「滿洲國」依照其基本法與公民權保證法而統治之，基本法規定政府機關之基本組織。該法於大同元年（一九三二）三月九日，以命令第一號公佈之。

執政為國家之元首，有一切行政之權，及否決立法院決議之權。執政由參議府輔佐之，以備關於重要事件之諮詢。基本法之特點，為畫分統治權為四部份；行政，立法，司法，及監察是也。

■行政之部 行政部份之職務，由國務總理及各部總長，組織國務院或內閣，於執政指揮之下執行之。國務總理監督各部事務，並有以權力之總務廳，直接管轄各部機要事項，職員之任用，會計及供給事項。隸屬於國務院者，有諮議局及立法局等。故行政權大部集中於國務總理與執政。

■立法之部 立法權屬於立法院，一切法律及預算案，須得其核准。但立法院否決任何法案時，執政得令其再議，如仍否決，執政得於諮詢參議府後，裁決可否。現在立法院組織法尙未制定通過，一切法律由國務院起草，經諮詢參議

府及經執政核准後，即生効力，故在立法院未組成前，國務總理之地位，實甚重要。

■司法之部 司法機關包括許多法院。法院分三級；即最高法院，高等法院，及地方法院是也。

■監察之部 監察院監察公務員之行為，並審核政府機關之收支簿記。監察官及審計官，除受刑事或懲戒處分外，不得撤職，亦不得違反其意志，停職，調任，或減俸。

■各省及特區 為地方自治便利起見，「滿洲國」畫為五省二特區。五省即奉天，吉林，黑龍江，熱河，興安是也，興安包括蒙古區域，故復分成三區或附省，以符旗制，及聯旗為盟之制度。二特區，即前中東鐵路或稱哈爾濱區，及新成立之間島或朝鮮區。依此行政區畫，凡重要之少數人如蒙古人，朝鮮人，及俄人，均於可能範圍予以保證，即設立特別行政機關，以應彼等之需要。調查團雖屢次索觀所謂屬於「滿洲國」疆土之地圖，但迄未獲得，僅曾接得一函，內述該「國」之地界如下：

「新國南以長城為界，蒙古旗盟包括呼倫貝爾與錫林昭烏達卓索圖及盟旗。」

各省之長官為省長。但因欲集中行政權於中央政府，省長對於軍隊與財政，均無權處理。在省府一如在中央政府，總務廳實處監督之地位，管轄機要事宜，官員之任用，會計文書及不屬於其他各廳之事宜。

■縣與市 省復畫分為縣，其行政權大半操諸縣自治機關，在其指揮之下，復有若干縣。尤以總務課為最顯著。在瀋陽哈爾濱及長春，有市政府。在哈爾濱方面，現擬建設大

包括俄國及中國境。特別鐵路區將取消，其一部將
歸入大青濱，其餘部分之在中東鐵路東西兩旁者，將併入
黑龍江及吉林兩省。

「滿洲國政府」以省為行政區域，而以縣與市為財政單位。
中央政府釐定其稅額及審核其預算。地方稅收，均交中央
國庫，由國庫管理適當之支出，地方當局，不得如舊日習慣
，將稅收之全部或一部截留。當然，此種制度，尙未能完滿
的施行。

日本官員及顧問。在「滿洲國政府」中，日本官員甚為
顯要，各部均有日本顧問。國務總理及各部總長，雖均為華
人，但在新國組織中實際上擁有最大權力之各總務廳，其廳
長，則均屬日人。其初命名為顧問，但最近職位之最重要者
，已被實授為政府官員，一如華人。僅計中央政府方面，而
不計地方政府，軍政部軍隊，以及政府經營事業中之日人，
日人之為「滿洲國」官員者，為數已近二百。

日本人控制事實上等於國務總理衙門之總務廳，法制局
，諮議局，及各部各省之總務廳，各縣區之自治指導委員會
，以及奉天吉林及黑龍江省之警察廳。日本顧問參議及秘書
，各局大率有之。

日人在鐵路局及中央銀行者，為數亦衆。監察院方面，
總務局主任，監督局主任，及審計局主任之職位，均為日人
所據。立法院秘書長，亦為日人。最後凡執政府中最重要官
員，如國務處長，及執政禁衛軍司令等，亦為日人充當。

政府之目的。依據二月十八日東北行政委員會，及三

月一日「滿洲國政府」之宣稱，政府之目的，欲以「王道」基本
原則治國。英文殊乏「王道」之相同名詞。「滿洲國」當局之通
譯員，譯為「博愛」，而學者則謂「王道之道」。但「王者之道
」，其義廣泛而不一。按中國舊時之因襲，其意以為人民幸
福為懷之善良政治。中國人常以「王道」為「霸道」之反。「霸
道」者，孫中山博士於「三民主義」中，指為基於武力與強制
。故孫博士解釋「王道」乃「強權即是公理」之反面。

註(一) 較重要之任命已同時於滿洲國政府公報上發表。

自治指導會，曾為造成新國家之主要機關，其政策由代
替該會之諮議局，繼續施行之。軍事當局，不准干涉行政事
務。制定政府官員資格條例，凡公務員之任用，悉依本人才
能而定等。

賦稅。賦稅應行減低，並使之有法律根據，而按經濟
及行政之良好原則，予以改善。直接稅收，轉交縣區及市政
府，間接賦稅之所入，則由中央政府保管。

長春當局所供給之文件中聲稱，有若干稅捐，業已取消
，其餘悉已減徵。並表示希望政府事業及政府所有財源，如
實行整頓後，能增加收益，將來減縮軍備後，亦能節省經費
。但現時新國之財政情形，不能認為滿意。因義勇軍戰事，
軍費浩繁。但同時對於通常稅源，政府無所收入。第一年之
支出，約計八千五百萬元，而稅收不過六千五百萬元，不敷
之數，達二千萬元，此數擬向新設之中央銀行借貸，下文當
再說明(一)

政府宣稱，於財政情形較好時，將儘量移款充教育公益
開發內地之用，包括屯墾荒地，開發林礦富源，及擴大交通

方法，並聲稱歡迎外人投資協助，以發展其國家，遵循機會均等門戶開放之原則。

註(一) 參閱本報告書所附之專論第四號

■教育 政府現已恢復初高級小學校，並將訓練大批能切實了解新國精神及政策之教員。採取新學制，編訂新教科書，廢除排外教育。新教育制度，注意初級小學之改善，重視職業教育，小學教員之訓練，及教授關於康健生活之健全思想。中等學校，務須教授英日文，在小學校內並不強制教授日文。

■司法及警察 「滿洲國」當局決定，凡屬司法事項，不容行政當局之干預。法官之地位，有法律爲之保障，俸給從優。司法官之資格，亦行提高。領事裁判權，暫時遵守。政府正擬於現行制度實施改良後，向各國交涉廢止。警察之遴選，訓練，及給養，尤須妥慎適宜，與軍隊全然分離，不准軍隊僭行警權。

■陸軍 改組陸軍，亦在籌劃之中，但因現時陸軍，泰半爲舊時滿洲軍隊，爲避免增加不滿及叛變起見，殊有審慎之必要。

■一九三二年七月一日「滿洲國」中央銀行在長春設立總行在滿洲其他城市設立分行。「滿洲國」中央銀行，於六月十四日成立，七月一日，正式開張營業。總行設於「滿洲國」國都長春。分行支行，有百七十處，分散於滿洲境內之城市內。

中央銀行之組織，爲股份公司，依其特許證，得繼續營業三十年。其重要職員，爲中日銀行家及金融家。其權力得「調節國內貨幣之流通，維持其穩定，管理金融服務」。銀行

之資本，准有三千萬元(銀元)，並許其留存準備庫至少百分之三十，發行紙幣。

■中央銀行合併舊有省立銀行包括邊業銀行在內。舊有之一切省立銀行，包括邊業銀行在內，均合併於新設之中央銀行，各銀行之全部營業，包括其附帶事業在內，均行歸併。並規定舊有省立銀行在滿洲外分行之清理辦法。

除於舊銀行方面所獲得之餘資外，中央銀行向日人借款之數，據報有日幣二千萬元。(一)及「滿洲國」政府之集資七百五十萬元。(二)該銀行會擬統一滿洲幣制，依照一九三二年七月一日正式公布之價額，買回舊幣，易以新紙幣。

註(一) 此款或係舊幣之元

註(二) 按照一九三二年五月五日「滿洲國」財部專向調查團提出之初步預算表。

■新幣以銀元爲本位，但能否換現則未明白規定。新紙幣以銀元爲本位，須以最少足抵百分之三十之銀，金，外幣，或存款爲準備。至於新紙幣能否無限制憑票換現，官方佈告中，並未明言。舊鈔於通過變幣法後二年內，仍得通用，過時無效。

■現在滿洲幣制大體與一九三一年九月十八日以前者無異。中央銀行新鈔定單，已經存放於日本政府，但至今鈔幣及新銀幣，尙未見諸流通。現在滿洲幣制，除鈔幣上必須於經過各銀行時，加蓋榮厚(新中央銀行行長)簽署外，概與一九三一年九月十八日以前之制度無異。

■「滿洲國」統一計劃以供給不敷之現款爲基礎。新「滿洲國」銀行，以有限之資本可供使用，如何能成就其統一及其穩固全滿洲幣制之偉大計劃，實不明瞭。承襲舊有省立銀

行方面之財源，加之向日本銀行界所借之款及募自「滿洲國」政府之資本，似乎完全不足以達其目的。且銀行與「滿洲國」政府間之財政關係，究依何標準而設定，亦不明瞭。按其財政總長向調查團所提之初步「滿洲國」預算表，「滿洲國」於第一一年內，即將短少二千萬元。(一)據該總長言，中央銀行(彼時尚未成立)將貸款，以資彌補。以一政府，出資七百五十萬元與銀行，而貸款超過二千萬元之數，以使其預算表收支相等，中央銀行及政府之預算表，均乏健全之財政基礎，概可想見。

(註一) 調查團某委員接見滿洲國財政部長時，預算表內此項及以下各項均用「日圓」，但於滿洲國外交部所提「滿洲國概要」之英文譯本中，則又用「華元」。故調查團於指此項及預算表中以下各項時，實用「華元」而不用「日圓」。其以中文指元之字，與日文指圓之字，寫法有時相混，故於研究中日雙方所提之英文譯本時，備見困難。

中央銀行似能統一幣制而不能兌現。除非中央銀行，能集得比諸現在似有之現款較多外，殊難希望全滿洲幣制之統一及穩固，而使新幣能兌現。即使其能建立一幣制雖統一而不能兌現，亦可謂有多少成就。但幣制雖統一，如因不能兌現，而不能保持其穩固性，仍不具備健全錢幣制之要件。

日人擴張其勢力於中國之公用機關。關於各種公用事業及鐵路，曾議定辦法，冀使中日兩方之機關有所聯絡。瀋陽事變前，日人極望此事能早實現，但華人始終未允所請。

於是自九月十八日迄於「滿洲國」成立，在此期間，刻進行期達其目的，此中經過已於本報第一節中述之。「新國」成立後，「滿洲國交通部」之政策似欲與南滿鐵路株式會社訂約，准其利用若干主要之鐵路線。

中國電話電報及無線電機關。中國在滿洲之電話電報及無線電等機關以其係完全國有，各有其本國主管人員，並隸屬於東北電話電報及無線電行政機關統一管轄之下。自九月十八日以後，所有此三種機關，均與在滿洲之日本機關進行更密切之合作。日人與東北電報行政機關又訂約辦理滿洲各地間，及關東租界地，日本，朝鮮，台灣，及南洋羣島各地間來往之直達通報事宜。北滿各主要城市與大連，瀋陽，及長春之日本郵局間，更建有直接電線以速電信之傳達。

用日文字母(一)通電，索價特別低廉。而報局內之華員現受特別訓練，以習運用日文字母之方法。在各主要城市中，擬逐漸添加日人職員，俾與華人職員一同工作。滿洲與日本帝國間之電報交通，遂得各種之便利，因而兩國間之商業關係自然益臻穩固。

(註一) 一種日本注音符號

鹽稅。日本軍事實局於一九三一年九月管理鹽稅基金。九月十八日至十九日之事件發生後，日本當局命令保管鹽稅之各官署及銀行，嗣後凡未經彼等允許不得動用該項稅款。

關於鹽稅之管理權，所以堅持主張者，其理由為鹽稅雖名為國稅，而實際上其大部之收入均被張學良將軍之政府所扣留。一九三〇年鹽稅之收入大約共有銀洋二五，〇〇〇，

〇〇〇元，其中之二四，〇〇〇，〇〇〇元，均被扣留於滿洲，匯交上海鹽務稽核總所者不過一，〇〇〇，〇〇〇元而已。

張學良於一九二八年允許呈繳滿洲應付之鹽稅。一九二八年十二月張學良將軍加入國民政府後，彼曾允許按月付銀八六，六〇〇元以爲償還鹽稅抵押借款時滿洲應付之部分。嗣於一九三〇年四月重訂新章，滿洲每月應付之總數增爲二二七，八〇〇元。但張學良將軍以滿洲當地財政上發生困難，請求暫緩實行。瀋陽事變時彼之欠款已達五七六，二〇〇元。第一次按新章所匯之二一七，八〇〇元實爲一九三一年九月二十九日所匯，經日本陸軍軍官允許者也。自是而後，直至一九三二年三月底爲止，滿洲新組織之政府，曾匯款與中央政府，其所匯非僅爲每月應付之定額，即張學良將軍時代所欠之應付定額，亦予匯寄。惟彼等以爲鹽稅之盈餘乃滿洲的而非國家的收入，故爲扣留鹽餘作地方之用爲正當。

一九三一年十月及十一月牛莊鹽稅之擄奪。瀋陽維持治安委員會改爲臨時省政府後，曾命令牛莊鹽務稽核分所將所有款項交與省銀行，以便財政支配。據中國官方報告：牛莊中國銀行內所存之鹽款，共計銀洋六七二，七〇九。五六元，亦於十月三十日被迫交出，並未得原存款人之允許。由遼甯財政局出名，給與收據一紙，其上僅有該局日人顧問之簽名。

新吉林省政府亦擄奪鹽稅。新吉林省政府對吉林及黑龍江之鹽運署，亦採取相同之步驟。據中國官方報告，該省政府令將鹽款轉交省庫。該署鹽運使因拒絕其請求，被拘禁

數日，旋由省長熙洽派員接替。並於十月二十二日強佔該署，鹽務稽核所亦由熙洽命令封閉。中國銀行及交通銀行所存之鹽款亦爲新吉省政府所索取，於十一月六日移交省銀行。自此以後，鹽款由地方當局隨時提取使用，惟其應繳部分，仍按月匯送上海。一九三一年十月三十日至一九三二年八月二十五日之間，有中國官方報告數目可稽。鹽稅之被扣留於滿洲者，共計銀洋一四，〇〇〇，〇〇〇元。

滿洲之鹽務行政，雖在上述之限制及監督下，仍然繼續進行。直至三月二十五日「滿洲國政府」之財政總長始命令將存款，賬目，文件，及其他財產之屬於鹽務督辦者，於翌日悉數移交「滿洲國」之鹽務管理專員。前由中國銀行經營之鹽稅徵收事務，亦改屬東三省銀行。該財政總長聲言：鹽務職員之願繼續在「滿洲國」鹽政機關服務者，須先將其姓名呈報管理鹽務專員公署，若能先行脫離中華民國政府之關係，自當鄭重考慮，予以錄用。

滿洲國政府取得鹽稅之管理權。牛莊之鹽務稽核分所於四月十五日被迫解散。正副所長均被解職，官署被佔，箱櫃，文件及印章等均被查封。其他職員雖被請求留任，但聞彼等均拒絕不允。一部鹽務人員隨同所長赴天津，靜候上海總所命令。自是東三省鹽務稽核所之事務，遂完全屬於「滿洲國」之鹽務管理署矣。但新政府曾謂關於以鹽稅担保之外債，仍願繼續繳付其應繳部分云。

海關。滿洲之關稅，一向匯寄中央政府，故日本軍事當局並未干涉海關行政，亦未干涉匯往上海之款項。第一次干涉關稅者却爲「滿洲國政府」，以爲彼等「國家」乃「獨立之

國家。

■滿洲之海關收入 東北政務委員會（即二月十七日成立之「滿洲國臨時政府」）首先諭知滿洲各商埠之海關監督，謂從權利上，關稅雖屬於「滿洲國」，且不久將歸委員會管理，但目前各海關監督及稅務司須照常工作。監督及稅務司等探悉滿洲之各商埠，均派有日人海關顧問一名，以監察海關之行政爲目的。所稱之商埠，即龍井村，安東，牛莊，及哈爾濱及其他分關，一九三一年上列各地之稅收爲海關兩五七四，〇〇〇兩三，六八二，〇〇〇兩，三，七九二，〇〇〇兩，及五，二七二，〇〇〇兩。愛瑋商埠現仍在滿洲政府管轄勢力之外，故仍在中國海關管理下工作焉。至關東租界地沿下之大連，則有特殊之地位，滿洲各埠（大連在內）徵收之關稅，一九三〇年在全中國之稅收爲百分之十四。七，在一九三一年爲百分之十三。五。於此，則可知滿洲在中國關務行政上所佔地位之重要矣。

「滿洲國」當局奪取滿洲全部海關行政之步驟，可於安東地方之行動見之，茲將總稅務司描寫該地之情形錄之如次：「滿洲國政府」於一九三二年三月至六月取得海關之管理權及關稅。三月間一日人海關顧問奉派赴安東海關公署，但並未積極工作。至六月中旬傳達「滿洲國」財政部命令：中國銀行應停止將關稅匯寄上海。六月十六日武裝滿洲國警察四人借警察副官一人（日人），同至中國銀行，通知經理，謂彼等乃爲看守關稅而來。六月十九日中國銀行交與東三省銀行銀七八三，〇〇〇兩，並通知稅務司此實乃威脅下不得不

六月二十六日及二十七日。「滿洲國」之日本顧問一人要求安東之海關須交付與彼。稅務司不許。「滿洲國」警察（均爲日人）遂強使稅務司離去海關。該稅務司仍圖在其家中繼續辦理關務，蓋以安東關稅百分之八十，均由鐵路區域內所徵收，所望日本當局不准在此區域內任加干涉耳。乃「滿洲國」警察竟入日本之鐵路區域，捕獲海關職員若干人，對其他職員施以威嚇，並強迫停止中國海關工作。

■大連之海關狀況 在六月十七日以前，每隔三四日即將大連之海關收入匯至上海，但至六月九日，「滿洲國政府」通知：不准繼續匯款。停止向上海匯款，後海關監督猶以電報命大連之日本稅務司照常進行。但該稅務司拒絕將收據交與海關，其理由爲日本租借地政府之外交處長勸彼勿再匯款，恐對日本之利益有重大之妨害也。總務稅司因大連稅務司故意抗命，遂於六月二十四日將其免職。

六月二十七日「滿洲國政府」委派此免職之稅務司及其僚屬爲「滿洲國」官吏，仍在原職服務。設如日本當局阻止彼等管理大連海關時，彼等擬在關東租借地邊境之瓦房店地方設立新關，以威脅之。租借地之日本當局並未反對將海關行政權交與新派之「滿洲國」官吏。彼等認爲此問題與日本無關，其癥結乃在一方面之滿洲國及另一方面之中國政府與其大連關稅務司而已。

■「滿洲國政府」對海關之態度 「滿洲國政府」之主張：爲滿洲國既爲獨立國，則從權利上應有全權管理其境內之關務。但該政府曾請多數外債及賠款皆以中國之關稅爲担保，故願每年交納應付之部分以償債務。除將此項的款儲於橫

渣正金銀行外，希望能於一九三二年至一九三三年得關餘銀洋一九、〇〇〇、〇〇〇元以供地方之需。

■滿洲之郵政 九月十八日以後日本軍事當局在滿洲除檢查新聞紙及信件外，對郵政並無何種極端干涉。「滿洲國」成立之後，其「政府」即欲接收境內之郵政。四月十四日委派專員辦理接收郵政事宜，四月二十四日請求加入萬國郵政協會，但尙無加入該會之資格。

各郵政局郵務長均拒絕交代，一時只得保持現狀，但「滿洲國」曾在數郵局中派有監察員實行管理權。最後「滿洲國政府」決定印行郵票不再通用中國之郵票，七月九日其交通部命令通知各地於八月一日即可售賣新郵票及明信片。中國政府於此時命令各郵政局郵務長將滿洲之各郵局全體停辦，郵局之職員或給薪俸三月，或調往中國他處服務，均聽自擇。在「滿洲國」方面，對郵局職員之願留任者仍繼續聘請，並允許担保郵局職員得享有在中國郵政管理下所享之報酬及其他權利。七月二十六日「滿洲國政府」遂將滿洲郵政之全部接收完畢。

■私有財產之待遇 「滿洲國政府」會宣稱對私有財產及中國中央政府或前滿洲政府所給之特許權利均將尊重，但此特許權利只以用合法手續依當時法規所給予者爲限。以前行政當局之合法借款及債務亦允爲償還，並指定委員會清理債務，至於張學良將軍及其他昔日重要領袖之財產將如何處置則迄無表示。據中國官方報告，張學良將軍萬福麟將軍鮑毓麟將軍及其他官員之財產均被沒收。「滿洲國」當局爲前政府之官吏盡力搜括金錢以飽私囊，故不能承認如此取得之財產

爲私有財產。前政府之產業均經詳細調查。關於銀行存款一項據聞業已調查完畢。

■評語 吾人既已詳述滿洲國政府之組織，計劃，及其表示與中國分立之行爲矣，當就吾人對於其工作及其特質之結論一陳述之。

此政府之計劃中列有若干開明之改革，其實行不僅適宜於滿洲亦且適宜於中國之其他部分，而在事實上此種改革已多見於中國政府計劃之中。此「政府」之代表與本調查團會晤時曾宣稱：彼等有日人之輔助，足能於相當期間內恢復治安與秩序，並能使之永遠如此。彼等深信若能建設廉潔有力之政府，担保捕滅盜匪，減少軍費藉以減輕賦稅，改革錢幣制度，改良交通並實行人民政治代表制，則人民方面必肯起而擁護。

「滿洲國」在此短期間雖得自由實施其計劃，並對於其已施步驟，雖已予以相當注意，然仍無象徵足以證明該「政府」在事實上能實施甚多改革。試舉一例言之，（一）彼業經頒布之預算及錢幣改革計劃，其實施之前途似有嚴重之阻礙。在一九三二年之不安定及擾亂情形之下，澈底的改革計劃，安定情況，及經濟繁榮，決難實現。

至於該「政府」及行政機關，其各部名義上之領袖雖係居住滿洲之中國人，但其重要之政治行政權，則仍操諸日本官吏及日人顧問之手。該「政府」之政治的及行政的組織，不僅予此項官吏及顧問以供獻專家意見之權，抑且予以實行管理及指揮行政之機會。此輩固不受東京政府之訓令，其政策亦非與日本政府或關東軍司令部之政策相符合。但遇重要問題

發生時，該官吏及顧問等（其中有於新組織成立之初期可以自主行動者）均漸受脅迫，遵照日本當局之旨行事。此當局者因其軍隊佔領滿洲土地，而「滿洲國政府」又依賴該軍隊維持其對內對外之權威，同時「滿洲國」管轄下之鐵路，又委託南滿鐵路株式會社代行管理，最後又有日本領事駐在重要城市以通聲氣，是以無論遇何時機，彼日本當局者，均有運用其絕大力量之方法。「滿洲國政府」與日本當局間之聯絡自最近派遣專使後更覺密切。此事使雖未經政府正式授權，但已駐在滿洲都城，以關東租借地總督之名義管轄南滿鐵路株式會社，同時兼行外交代表，首席領事及駐軍總司令之職權。

（註一）參閱本報告附載之專論第四第五號

「滿洲國」與日本之關係前此頗不易解說，但據調查團所得之最近消息，日本政府有不久即將此項關係加以確定之意向。今年八月二十七日日本代表會致函調查團謂武藤專使已於八月二十日離東京赴滿洲。武藤抵滿後即將開始談判以便締結日本與滿洲間之基本友誼條約。日本政府認此項條約之締結為對「滿洲國」之正式承認。

第二節 滿洲居民之態度

□滿洲居民之態度 調查團目的之一即為欲確知滿洲居民對新「國家」之態度。在當時調查團情況之下搜集此項證據頗多困難。盜匪，朝鮮共產黨，及新「政府」之擁護者為恨中國代表之到滿及其批評該政制之言論因而發生不利於調查團實在的或想像的危險，均成為使調查團蒙受特殊保護之理由

。在此不安定之地方，實際上誠時有危險發生之可能。吾等對於沿途得力保護，表示感謝。但警戒之結果，徒使一般證人，不得接近，甚至有多數華人，不敢與調查團人員一觀面者。吾人在某地接得消息謂在吾人達到之前官方布告，凡未得政府之允許者皆不得與調查團會面。以故與各界接談殊匪易易，且須秘密行之。雖然如此，多數人猶告吾人，雖秘密會晤，亦極危險也。

調查團仍排除萬難，除與「滿洲國」官員及日本領事與軍官作公開會晤外，仍得設法與商人銀行家，教員，醫師，警察販夫各色人等作私人之談叙。吾人尚接到書信文件一千五百餘起，其中有為親手交來者，但大多數則為由郵局展轉遞到。對於所接書件中之報告均盡量與中立方面之報告比較參證。

□代表團體及書面意見 本調查團會接見各公共團體及會社之代表，彼等常以書面之陳述交閱。各代表大都由日本或「滿洲國」當局介紹而來。吾人深信彼等所交來之陳述，均係先經日人同意者。實際上，彼給予陳述之人有時於事後來告我等謂斯項意見係日人所作或經日人將主要部份修改者，並謂斯項意見不得視為彼等真意之表示云。此項文件頗值注意蓋以其中對日本參與「滿洲國」行政權之成立或維持一層故示疏略不加可否也。大概言之，此項意見書，皆係不滿於舊時中國行政之種種怨語，並對於新「國家」之未來表示希望及信仰而已。

□書信 收到書信悉為農民，小織工，城市工人，及學生所投寄者，其中詳述作者之感想及經歷。六月間本調查團

東北平後，此種書信均經特選之專家，加以繕譯，分析並整理，在此一千五百五十件之書信，除二件外，均對「滿洲國政府」及日人深表仇視。此種信件，皆甚誠懇，並足為民意之表現。

○「滿洲國」之官吏。「滿洲國政府」之高級中國官吏，所以能任職者，却有甚多原因，多數官吏為昔日之官吏，其留任或因利誘或因各種方法之威脅，其中有人寫信與調查團謂彼等係威嚇而留任，所有政權均操之於日人之手，彼等忠於中國，並謂彼等在日人監視下與調查團所談之話，不足信。有數官吏之留任乃為避免財產之被充公，蓋彼之逃往中國者其財產有被沒收者焉。其他享有名望之人亦多加入。彼等希望能有改良行政之權力，並希望日人能踐行約言許其自由行動。有數滿洲人加入，係因希望為滿洲族人謀幸福。此項人員多已失望，並訴稱彼等從未獲得真實之權力。至另有一部份官吏，其留任則因彼等個人對以前政府表示失意，並希望能稍留任而獲利。

○下級及地方官吏。下級及地方官吏大部均在新政治下留任，或因維持生活及供給家庭之不得不然，或因彼等深恐離去之後，繼任失人。當地縣官大都留職，或因對治下人民之責任心所驅使，或因壓迫所致。若請名譽超著之中國人任高級官吏殊屬困難，但使中國人任低級及地方官吏則甚容易。不過在此情形下，其服務之忠實如何，頗屬問題。

○警察。「滿洲國」警察。一部為舊日之中國警察，一部為新募者。在較大之城市中事實上均有日人為警察官長，在其他地方亦有日人顧問。警察中有個人來與吾人談話者，彼

輩表示對新政府不滿，並稱為謀生活起見，不得不繼續工作。

○陸軍。「滿洲國陸軍」之大部，亦為昔日之滿洲軍隊，惟曾經日人指導改編。初時為此項軍隊以職責僅限於維持地方治安尚願在新政制下服務。然日後調此軍隊與中國軍隊正式戰爭，並聽從日人命令與日本軍隊聯合攻擊。「滿洲國陸軍」遂漸不可靠。日人方面報告「滿洲國」軍隊時常投降中國，而中國方面則宣稱「滿洲國陸軍」為接濟軍需之最可靠最有效之來源。

○商人及銀行家。與吾人會面之中國商人及銀行家對「滿洲國」均極仇視。彼等深惡日人；彼等為生命及財產而生懼心，且常稱「吾等不願變為朝鮮人」。九月十八日以後到中國之商人為數極多，但彼不甚富裕之商人現在仍復歸去。概言之，較小之商家希望與日人競爭時所受損失不致如大商賈之大，因後者會與昔日官吏常有利益關係故也。吾人前往調查時尚有多數商店未曾復業。盜匪之增加對鄉間之商業頗有影響。信用制度亦大部動搖。日人預備經濟侵略滿洲之明白表示，及前數月內日本經濟調查會之屢次來滿，使中國商人頓生疑慮。惟聞此經濟調查會等於回日本後亦均表示失望云。

○職業階級：醫師，教員，學生。職業階級，教員及醫師對「滿洲國」亦均極仇視。彼等指稱常被監視並受威脅。干涉教育，停辦大學及其他學校，改換學校教科書，凡此均因愛國心之激動而增加敵對之心。新聞紙，郵件及言論之檢查，與中國印行之新聞紙之不得入「滿洲國」境，同為一般人所

憤恨。但亦有中國人在日本留學回國者，不在此一般人之列。吾人尚接到學生及青年送來之許多書信，其中均為反對滿洲國。

四 農民及城市工人

關於農民及城市工人之態度其證據均甚散漫，搜集自屬不易。外國人及受過教育之中國人之意見以為彼等對滿洲國或為仇視或不過問。農民及工人缺乏政治知識，尋常不甚識字，普通對政府亦漠不相關。農民對「滿洲國」仇視之理由，可於下列證人所述之意見中得之。此項理由已於農工階級所送來之信件中證實。農民深信新政治勢力能使朝鮮甚至日本人之移民增加。朝鮮移民與中國人不能同化，彼等耕種之方亦異。中國農民大部分種豆，高粱及麥，而朝鮮人種稻。勢必致修溝渠以灌溉田地。設有大雨，朝鮮人所造之溝渠必為沖毀，並流過中國鄰地，而損其收穫。

彼等在昔日亦常因土地所有權及地租問題引起糾紛。自滿洲國成立後中國人宜稱朝鮮人常不付地租，並從中國人手中攫取土地，日人強迫中國人以低價售賣土地。在鐵路及城市附近之農民不許於距鐵路及城市五百米遠內之區域種植高粱，因高粱長成時高約十尺便於盜匪之行動也。中國每季出關之移民，因經濟衰落及政治紊亂關係，已逐漸減少。昔日中國移民可以傾用之公地現時亦為「滿洲國」所有。

自一九三一年九月十八日以來，鄉間之匪禍與不法事件滋長更甚。其原因半出被裁之軍隊，半出受匪毀害之農民因家產毀盡不得不流而「嗟以維生計」。至正式有組織之戰爭多年來滿洲已較中國各地為少，今則在東三省各部又開始有日本軍隊與滿洲國軍隊以及其他仍効忠於中國之散漫隊伍之作

戰。此種戰爭自予農民以極大之苦楚。而尤其在日人憂慮有「滿洲國」軍隊埋伏時，任意以飛機擲彈毀滅鄉村。其一種之結果即為廣漠之田畝無法耕種，次年納稅之時農民當更難應付。自此種擾亂發生，多數中國之最近遷來者又逃回國內。有此種實際上之理由重以深惡日人之心理，致多數證人俱異口同聲告吾等以中國農民在新政府下之受害與其不滿意，並謂此輩農民係滿洲居民之大多數，其態度多抱消極的仇視。

至城市居民亦常受害於日本軍隊，憲兵，與警察之行動。就大體言日本軍隊之行為尚佳，雖我等所接信件中有訴述個人之殘暴行為者，但各處尚無擴大之搶奪或殘殺。在另一方面個人對於其縣有敵意之份子壓制甚厲。中國人民謂有無數殺戮之事發生，且有許多囚犯在日本憲兵派出所受盡威嚇與酷刑。

據吾人所知「滿洲國」之開幕典禮，嘗欲使各城居民作熱烈表示，乃未能辦到。就大體論城市居民之態度係一種消極的默認與仇視之混合性。

少數民族

吾人已知大多數之中國人民對於「滿洲國」或表示敵意或漠不關心，然尚有少數在滿洲之各民族對新政府與以贊助，如蒙古人，朝鮮人，白俄人，以及滿洲人等。彼等或因以前政府之壓迫，或因近數十年中國移民之增加使彼等多少各蒙經濟上之不利。彼等中雖無一能十分熱忱，但頗希望由新政府給予能得較善之待遇，而新政府之政策亦以鼓勵此等少數民族為能事。

蒙古人

蒙古人與中國人顯然別為一族，如上所述彼

持有堅強之民族自覺心，並保持其部落制度，貴族政治，語言，服裝，以及其特殊之生活習尚，風俗宗教等。雖大都仍屬游牧民族，但亦漸事耕種，並亦常用畜類或車以運輸出產物。住居滿洲邊境之蒙古人近以中國移民而痛苦增加。中國移民佔用並耕種彼輩之田地因之彼輩將漸被排擠。此足引起不能避免之惡感。吾人接見之蒙古代表會所述其所受昔日中國官吏及徵稅員蹂躪之苦楚。內蒙古人見外蒙古已受蘇俄

之支配，深畏其勢力將侵入內蒙古。彼等願於中國及蘇俄兩方侵略之下保持其民族獨立之生存。處此不安全之狀態，彼等以為若圖在新政府下保持獨立之生存希望較多。但吾人須知此輩王公大都依其不動財產及特殊權利為生，故彼等對此事實上之當局亦願附和也。惟在北平時，本調查團曾接見蒙古王公代表，彼等對新政局則深表反對。現在住居滿洲邊境蒙古人與「滿洲國」之關係尚不明瞭，「滿洲國」迄今亦尚未干涉蒙古人之行政。對於蒙古人倘能謹慎應付，則其現時之贊助當屬真實，設一旦日人有危害其獨立或經濟利益時彼等必立即取消其贊助。

■滿洲人 滿洲人民幾已全部與中國人民同化。在吉林及黑龍江雖尚有少數政治上不甚重要之滿洲人居留地，其人民雖用兩種語言，而仍顯然為滿洲民族。自民國成立後殘餘之滿洲民族失去其特權地位。雖民國仍繼續允與津貼然均付以低價之貨幣。因此彼輩不得已而經營向無經驗之農商事業。其他少數特殊之滿洲民族仍持有無限希望以為「滿洲國」之成立必能使彼等立時恢復向來之特權地位，因彼等之主使者常述及滿洲之住民與其他中國人民顯然有別，且謂滿洲最後

之帝皇當為其民族中之元首。滿洲族人民之在位者均具有如是希望，惟在滿洲之中國人民則謂此輩官員見日人之把持一切而彼等之建議全被忽視現已如夢初覺。雖其中仍不免有少數份子效忠於廢帝，但絕無重要之滿洲民族醒覺運動。彼等既已大多數與中國人民同化，雖經努力使登用滿洲人民主持行政，努力鼓勵滿洲民族自覺，然此項新政府之援助之源，殊不足當代表人民之任何名義。

■朝鮮人 在過去，朝鮮農民受日本當局之指使，與中國官吏地主及農民會有許多衝突。當時朝鮮農民確受盡凶暴敲詐之苦。朝鮮代表在調查團前大都表示歡迎新政府，但吾人殊不知彼等所能代表其社會者究至若何之程度。不過無論如何，此等朝鮮人係政治逋逃者既為日人專制而逃亡在外當不至再歡迎日人專制之擴張。向彼等宣傳共產主義實易生效。彼等並常與朝鮮內部之革命團體相聯絡（一）

（註一）參閱本報告書第三章及專論第九號

■白俄 在滿洲最少數之居民為白色俄民。其人數至少亦在十萬。近年來在哈爾濱內外之白俄受禍最烈。因彼等係最少數之居民又無政府為之保護。彼等曾受中國官吏警察之各種屈辱，又與其本國之政府有衝突，即在滿洲亦時為此而不安。在彼等居民中之比較富有而受有教育者得自謀生活，但亦常受苦楚，無論何時中國當局思從蘇俄政府獲得利益，即以彼等為犧牲品。彼比較窮困者又覺謀生為難，且又時受中國警察與中國法庭之苦。在此稅收不依法律而可自由論價之省，俄國居民所納之稅率常較中國居民為高。而在商業或各種運動上彼等受許多限制，常以請查護照，請簽合同或

轉賣田地均須施賄於中國官吏。此等居民其生活之苦無以復加，吾人自無怪其欲歡迎日人，以期在新政之下得以改進彼等之生活也。

當吾人在哈爾濱時曾接見一白俄代表並接有許多函件，總括其意皆願贊助能給下列各種保障之任何政府：

- (一) 享受庇護之權；
- (二) 施行誠實而有效之警察行政；
- (三) 法院之公正；
- (四) 公平之稅則制度。
- (五) 經商居住之權，無須用賄賂得來；

(六) 教育兒童之便利。

彼等此項要求，大半關於外國語之教授須增加效率，以使彼等得以向外移殖，以及完美之專門教育使彼等得在中國營商；

(七) 關於土地居住及向外移民之援助。

□ 調查團之結論 以上所述為我等在滿洲旅行期間本地居民所報告之意見。細心研究各方所獲得之證據，無論公私談話或書信文件，吾人得一結論：即一般中國人對「滿洲國政府」均不贊助，此所謂「滿洲國政府」者在當地中國人心目中直是日人之工具而已。

第七章 日本之經濟利益與中國人之

經濟絕交 (一)(11)

中國人之抵制日貨爲中日衝突之重要原因。前三章以專述一九三一年九月十八日以後軍事及政治事件爲主旨，願欲使中日衝突之敘述，臻于準確或完備之程度，猶須論及另一重要衝突原因，即中國人之抵制日貨是。茲爲了解此種抵貨運動所用之方法，及此類方法及于日本商業之影響起見，對於日本之概括的經濟地位，與其在中國之經濟暨財政利益，及中國之對外貿易，亦應略爲敘述；且爲了解次章所述中國與日本在滿洲所有經濟利益之範圍及性質計，此亦有敘述之必要。

日本人口之過剩。當一千八百六十餘年明治復興之際，日本以二世紀閉關自守之國家，嶄然露其頭角，不及五十年，竟一躍而爲世界之一等強國。其往日幾無增減之人口，乃開始爲迅速之增加，當一八七二年之際，其人口之總數，不過三千三百萬，及至一九三〇年，竟達六千五百萬；此種人口之激增，現仍繼續不斷；其每年之平均率約爲九十萬人。

以日本之人口與其土地面積之總數相比較，每方哩約合四百三十七人；其在美國則每方哩約爲四十一人，在德國爲三百三十人，在意大利爲三百四十九人，在大不列顛爲四百六十八人，在比利時爲六百七十人，在中國爲二百五十四人。

註(1) Boycott 一字(譯者按即抵貨一字)：按此字初用于愛爾蘭，係自船主(Captain) Charles Cunningham Boycott(生于一八三三年歿於一八九三年)之名而來，該船主保愛爾蘭(Barl of Erne)管理梅由郡(County Mayo)農業之代理人。當一八

八零年時，因該船主拒絕收受租戶依自定標準所繳之租金，有人欲謀害其生命，致其僕人被逼他去，離障被毀，函件被截，食物之來源被阻。此字不久遂通常沿用，于英語之中，而迅即爲多種外國語言所採用。(見一九二九年第十四版大英百科全書)

註(2) 關於此點之專論，見附錄第八號

若以日本可耕土地每方哩可容之人口與他國相比較，則日本島國因地理上特殊結構之關係，其人口之密度特高：

日本	二七七四	德國	八〇六
大不列顛	二一七〇	法國	四六七
比利時	一七〇九	美國	二二九
義大利	八一九		

因農業區域內有集中甚密之人口，故每人所佔之土地異常狹小，每農人耕種不滿一英畝之地者，佔百分之三十五，其耕種不滿二英畝半者，佔百分之三十四。就可耕土地之開拓及其耕種之集約而言，均已達最高之限度，總之，日本之土地，既不能希望其生產較今日更爲多量之增加。亦不能望其能再行容納多量之備工。

土地上之困難。再者，因耕種之集約，肥料之廣施，致使生產費用高漲。土地價格之高，遠過於亞洲其他各都，即較諸歐洲人口最密之地方，亦有過之無不及。在此債台高築之人民中，似有諸多不滿意之表現，租戶與地主之衝突，方興未艾。嘗以向外移民爲可行之救濟方法，但以次章所述之種種原因，直至今日尙未見其能解決此困難也。

日本於採行工業主義之初，即意在扶植都市人口之發達，以期得一銷售農產品之本國市場，並利用勞力，製造貨物以供國內外之用。自是以後，迭經變遷。就糧食而論，日本往昔本係自給而有餘，茲則其進口貨物中食料已佔進口貨總數百分之八至百分之十五。其進口食料之所以或多或少者，乃由於國內五穀收穫之情形時有變化，尤以米為最甚。夫食料既須由國外輸入，而國內對於此類進口貨之需要，復有繼長增高之勢，故不得不設法增加出口工業品，使本國已經失利之進出口貿易，得以維持平衡。

■進一步發展工業之必要 日本如欲對於工業為更進一步之發展，俾其增添之人口有僱傭之機會，則出口貿易之發展，與開拓能以吸收數量增添之製造品及半製造品之國外市場，益見重要。此種市場，同時亦可為供給原料及食料之淵源。

■中國及日本出口貿易之市場 日本之出口貿易，就已往之發展情形而論，其主要之趨向有二：奢侈品及生絲運銷於美國，而大宗以棉織物為主之製造品則銷售于亞洲各國。

美國所銷者，佔出口貨物百分之四二點五。亞洲全部所銷者，佔百分之四二點六。銷售于亞洲之貨物中，其百分之二四點七，為中國關東租借地及香港所吸收，其餘部分中為亞洲別部之中國人所經售者亦屬不少。（按一九二九年數額之記載見一九三一年之日本年鑑）

一九三零年間，是年為有完全可稽字數之最近一年，日本出口貨物之總額，為十四萬萬六千九百八十五萬二千元日金；其進口貨物之總額，為十五萬萬四千六百〇七萬一千元

日金。而出口貨物中之運往中國（關東租借地及香港除外）者，價值二萬萬六千零八十二萬六千元日金，或合全數百分之十七點七。至其進口貨物中之運自中國（關東租借地及香港除外）者，價值一萬萬六千一百六十六萬七千元日金，或合全數百分之十點四。

茲就自日本運往中國之主要貨物分析之，則知中國所銷日本之流質物品佔其出口流質物品百分之三二點八；煉粉佔百分之八四點六；煤佔百分之七五點一；棉紗佔百分之三一點九；平均計算共合百分之五一點六。

若就運自中國之進口貨物加以同樣之分析，則知日本進口之豆及豌豆運自中國者，佔百分之二四點五；油餅佔百分之五三；蔬菜乾佔百分之二五；平均計算共合百分之三四點五。

以上之數額，既係專指中國而言，至香港及關東租借地並不包括在內，故對於以大連為主要口岸之日本與滿洲間貿易之數額，尙未予以說明。

■中日貿易關係之重要 上述事實及統計足以明示中日通商對於日本之重要。願日本在中國之利益，並不限于通商一端；其在實業，鐵路，航業，銀行各方面所投之資本，亦為數甚鉅。且於最近三十年中，所有此類財政經濟之活動，其發達之概況，已呈突飛猛進之趨勢。

■日本在中國之投資 一八九八年間，日人唯一重要投資，厥為在上海與華人合股經營之小軋棉機一架，約值銀十萬兩。至一九一三年，日人國外投資之總額，計有五萬三千五百萬元日金之多，而其中投於中國及滿洲者，竟達四萬三

千五百萬元日金。歐戰告終之時，日本在中國及滿洲之投資，較諸一九一三年增至一倍有餘，而其增加之投資，大部分與著名之西原借款有關，該項借款之成立，一部分係含有政治作用。顧雖經此曲折，日本在中國及滿洲之投資，於一九二九年幾佔其二十一萬萬元日金國外投資總額中之二十萬萬元日金。(一)見註此足證日本在國外之投資，幾全部集中於中國及滿洲，而尤以滿洲所吸收之資本，居極多數，(尤以投於鐵路者爲甚)。

注(一) 依照另一統計，日本在中國投資之總滿洲包括在內約合十八萬

萬日金。

除上述之投資外，中國尙積欠日本各種中央及省市之借款。於一九二五年總計爲二萬另四百四十五萬八千元日金(大半係無担保者)，另有利息一千八百另三萬七千元日金。查日本之大宗資本，雖係投於滿洲，然其投於中國本部之實業，航業及銀行等事業者，亦爲數甚鉅。當一九二九年時，中國紡織工業所用之紡錘，幾有百分之五十爲日本人所有者。就中國之航運業而言，日本在中國居第二位。至於日本在中國之銀行，在一九三二年間，計有三十所之多，其中有少數係中日合資經營者。

■中日貿易之發展對中國之利害關係 上述之總計，雖以日本爲主體，然其對於中國方面關係之重要，亦屬顯而易見。迄一九三二年止，中國對外貿易總額中，中日貿易尚居第一位。一九三另年間，中國出口貨中百分之二四點一係運往日本，而同年之進口貨中，亦有百分之二四點九係運自日本。茲與日本方面之統計相對照，可見中日貿易在中國對外

貿易總額中所佔之百分位，高於中日貿易在日本對外貿易總額中所佔之百分位。惟中國在日本並無投資，亦無銀行或航業之利益。中國尤須能增加其物產之出口額，俾有款購買其所需之製成物品，並在信用方面，建立一穩固之基礎，藉以告貸資本，以應進一步發展工業之要求。

■中日之經濟及財政關係受任何紛擾原因之影響 由前述論據觀之，中日經濟及財政關係之廣複，因此易受任何紛擾原因之影響並易爲其所紊亂，乃明顯之事。就大體言之，日本所仰賴于中國者，較諸中國所仰賴于日本者爲多。故遇有關係紊亂情事，日本較易受害，且損失亦較多。

由是可知自一八九五年中日戰爭以來，兩國間所發生之種種政治糾紛，均曾一一影響相互間之經濟關係，且兩國間商業之屢經紛擾而仍繼續增進，足證相互間實隱伏爲政治衝突所不能割斷之經濟關係。

■經濟絕交之起源 就中國商人銀行家及手工匠同業公所之組織而言，中國人素習於抵制之方法，已數百年于茲矣。此類同業公所，爲適應近代情形起見，雖正在改革之中，但爲數仍屬甚多，且于維護同業共同利益方面，對於同業人員具有偉大之勢力。此種由數百年同業團體生活所養成之訓練與態度，在今日之經濟絕交運動中，實與國民黨所代表之近代熱烈民族主義相混合。

■晚近抵制外貨之運動 晚近利用全國抵制外貨以爲對抗外國之政治武器一事，(與中國商人用爲職業上互相對抗之工具不同)其時期自一九零五年始。當年因中美商約經延長及修訂後，內有條款一項，規定對華人赴美之限制，較前

為嚴，故有抵制美貨事件發生。自是以降，以迄於今，顯著之經濟絕交，其範圍之廣遍於全國者，（局部之排外運動除外），計有十次之多。十次之中，對日者計有九次，而對英者僅一次而已。

註(一) 茲將歷次經濟絕交之日期及其因近分別如左：

- 一九〇八年 工展九事件
- 一九〇九年 安奉鐵路問題
- 一九一五年 二十一條事件
- 一九一九年 山東問題
- 一九二三年 交還膠順大連問題
- 一九二五年 五卅慘案
- 一九二七年 出兵山東事件
- 一九二八年 濟南慘案
- 一九三一年 滿洲事件(萬寶山及瀋陽事件)

此種經濟絕交運動之原因

如將此種經濟絕交運動，詳加研究，則知每一運動之發生，與某項確定事實，事件，或事變有關。此類事件，概屬政治性質，且常為中國所認為與其實質之利益有礙，或與其民族之威望有損。是以一九三一年之經濟絕交，係直接因同年六月間萬寶山事件及七月間韓人之屠殺，方始發生，而同年九月之瀋陽事件一九三二年一月之上海事件，復使之變本加厲。每次經濟絕交均有其本身可稽之近因，但苟非第一章所述民衆心理為之背景，則該項原因之本身，無一足以引起如此大規模之經濟報復。查構成此種心理之原因，厥為：不公平之感（無論對與不對），中國文化優於外人之傳統信仰，及西洋式之熱烈民族主義，論其性質，大都以防禦為目的，但亦間有攻擊之趨勢。

一九二五年前之經濟絕交運動 為國民黨先趨之與中

會，曾於一八九三年即告成立，所有自一九〇五年至一九二五年之經濟絕交，雖均揭有民族主義之標題，毫無意義，然並無具體之證據，足以證明最初民族主義之團體及以後之國民黨，曾經直接參與該項經濟絕交運動之組織者，商會及學生聯合會，因有百年來之秘密會社與職業團體之經驗與心理為之引導，一旦受孫中山先生新信條之感動，辦理此事，極能勝任。商人則供給專門之知識，組織之方法，及進行之規則。學生則以新得之感想與堅決之精神，以赴國事，熱烈從事運動，以促其實現。學生大都純為民族情緒所驅使，至商會雖則同具此種情緒然以為參加運動，應以能操縱經濟絕交之運動為目的。初期經濟絕交之實施規則，原以防止購買被抵制國家之貨物為目的。繼而抵制之範圍逐漸擴張，至拒絕將中國貨物運往該國，或拒絕為該國駐華僑民服役。終至於最近之經濟絕交，其明顯之目的，遂進而至於欲與「敵國」完全斷絕一切經濟關係。

茲應表而出之者，即因此制定之規則，絕未充分予以實行，其種種理由，已詳述於本報告附錄之專論。概括言之，經濟絕交，在南方因有民族情緒率先依附，熱烈贊助，故其觸發之機，恆較北方為多。其在山東，此事絕鮮贊助。

一九二五年以來之經濟絕交運動與國民黨行動 自一九二五年以來，經濟絕交運動之組織，確有變更。國民黨自始即係贊助此種運動者，故每次經濟絕交發生，國民黨輒增加其控制之能力；時至今日，國民黨遂為組織，促進，聯絡，及監督此項示威運動之真正原動力矣。

就本調查團所有之證據而言，國民黨於進行此項運動時

，非獨未將往日於經濟絕交運動負指導責任之團體，拚棄不用，抑且贊助其行動，整理統一其方法，並坦然以其強有力之黨部組織所有精神與實質之力量，為該運動之後援。該黨支部遍於全國，且有大规模之宣傳及通訊機關，又受強烈民族情緒之激勵，故能迅速組成並激起迄當時幾為空前未有之運動。自是以後，雖各抵貨團體同時留有相當自由行動之權衡，而經濟絕交之組織者，對於商人及一般羣衆之強制力，則較前為強。

■使用之方法 經濟絕交之規章，以地方情形之不同，經繼續予以變更，乃抵貨團體所用之方法，則愈歸一律，愈形嚴密，亦愈着效能，與其組織之益臻穩固，可稱並行不背。同時國民黨布發通告，禁止毀壞日人商店，或傷害日人身體，此非謂在華日人之生命，在經濟絕交期間，從未遭受威嚇；顧就大體而言，在最近經濟絕交運動中，反抗日人之暴行，較往昔已屬減少而趨緩和耳。

茲就經濟絕交所用之方法，研究其抵制之術，然後知其所採行者，要不外以一種可畏之宣傳，一致遍佈於全國，藉精選之標語，以激發羣衆心理，使反抗「敵」國，於以造成羣情憤激之空氣；蓋非此則經濟絕交不能有功也。

■抗日宣傳 據調查團所見，現正進行之對日經濟絕交，其種種有效方法均用以使人民對於不購日貨之愛國義務有深切之觀念。中國報紙篇幅中，充滿此類宣傳文字。城市房屋牆垣之上，遍貼標語，其語氣，每趨於極端激烈。(一)抗日口號，亦有印於鈔幣，書信，電報紙之上者，亦有以連索信，互相傳授者。凡此種種，不一而足。上舉各例，藉示所

用方法之性質而已。此項宣傳方法，與一九一四年至一九一八年世界大戰時，歐美某某等國所用者，大致相同，適足以證明兩國間政治下之緊張狀態所引致中國人對日惡感之程度。

(註一) 凡調查團所過城市，大都已將此種標語事先除去。但據當地可據之目報者所言，則上述事實，已足證明；且彼等每持有此種標語之標張。標語標張，在調查團檔案中亦有之。

■抗日團體所通過之對日經濟絕交規則 經濟絕交之最後勝利，雖以政治環境為主要成分，但抗日團體之程序規則，如不能一致，此種運動斷難有效。一九三一年七月十七日上海抗日會第一次會議所通過之四項原則，足以說明此項規則之主要目標。其原則如下：

- (甲) 凡已定日貨，應即撤回定單。
- (乙) 凡已定日貨，而尚未交貨者，應即停止載運。
- (丙) 凡已到貨棧，而尚未付款之日貨，一概拒絕收受。
- (丁) 凡已買日貨，應向抗日會登記，暫停出售。登記手續另行規定。

報告書附件內所載該會其後所通過之決議，益形詳盡，且對於一切可能及或能之事件均有規定。

強制中國商人登記其所備存之日貨，為實施經濟絕交最有力之方法。抗日會檢查員注意日貨之運輸，查驗來路可疑之貨物，以斷定其是否日貨，搜查有貯存未登記日貨嫌疑之商店及棧房，並將所發見違反規則之案件，報告主事者注意。被認為確係違犯規則之商人，逕受經濟絕交團體之罰金處分，並公布於衆俾其受輿論之制裁。至其所有貨物，則充公拍賣，將賣價充抗日會之經費。

經濟絕交，並不限於商業。中國人並被警告勿乘日本船，勿與日本銀行往來，不論商業家居，勿以任何名義供日人使用。不顧此等勸告者，將受各種指斥與威脅。

此項經濟絕交且有另一特點，前此之經濟絕交亦然，蓋其願望不獨在於破壞日本之實業，同時且鼓勵製造向自日本運來之某種物品，以圖提倡中國實業。其主要結果，為中國紡織工業之發展，上海地方之日華紗廠因之大受打擊。

一九三一年至一九三二年間經濟絕交運動之起伏。一九三一年之經濟絕交，依上述途徑而組織，繼續進行。迨至同年十二月間，已見鬆懈。一九三二年一月，當上海市長與日本總領事，在上海進行談判之時，中國甚至自動解散當地之抗日團體。

在上海戰事期間，及日軍撤退數月中，經濟絕交，雖從未完全放棄。而形勢趨於和緩。春末夏初時，日本商業似已能在中國各處，漸形恢復。嗣於七月終八月初，適熱河邊境，傳聞有軍事行動之說，經濟絕交運動，突形復活。勸國人勿購日貨之文字，重見于中國報紙之中。上海市商會，發表一函，提議恢復經濟絕交。該市煤業公會決議限制日本煤之輸入，減至最低限度。同時採用更激烈之手段，例如，向有銷運日煤嫌疑商人之屋地上，拋擲炸彈，向店主投遞恫嚇信，告以如不停賣日貨，即將毀滅其財產。轉載于報紙之信，其中有具名爲「鐵血團」或「血魂劍好團」者。

作本報告書之情形，大約如此。上海日本總領事對於經濟絕交運動之復興，已向地方當局，提出正式抗議。

經濟絕交運動物質上之影響。歷次經濟絕交運動，對

于中日關係，在物質上，心理上，均有重要之影響，而尤以此次之經濟絕交爲更甚。

茲就物質上之影響，即商業上之損失而言，中國方面，爲欲表現經濟絕交爲一種精神之抵抗，并非經濟上之侵害行爲，所言自不免有將此項商業損失低估之趨勢。至於日本方面，則對於某種商業統計，亦未免過於重視。關於此事雙方所持之理論，將于上述所附專論中加以研究。該專論內有日人商業上損失總計之詳細紀載，此種損失，實屬可觀。

問題之另一面亦應提及者。則爲中國人本身所受之損失，如借款已付因未向抗日會登記而被扣拍賣之貨物；因違背經濟絕交規則而繳付之罰款。中國海關所減損之稅收；總而言之，貿易之衰落；此類損失，爲數亦屬不貲。

對於中日關係心理上之影響。經濟絕交，對於中日關係心理上之影響，較諸物質上之影響，更難評斷。但以其所引起日本大部份民意對於中國不幸之度響而言，其嚴重之程度，則不稍遜。調查團在日本時，東京及大阪商會，對於此點均極注重。

日本民情因感所蒙損害，欲抵禦而無從，倍增憤慨。吾等在大阪接見之商人，對於經濟絕交所用方法不當之處，如暴行恫嚇等等，均有言過其實之傾向。但對於日本最近之對華政策，與中國持爲對抗武器之經濟絕交，兩者間之密切關係，則加以忽視，或竟完全否認。此輩日本商人不認經濟絕交爲中國之自衛武器，反力持其爲侵略行爲，謂日本之軍事行動係對此之報復。總之，近年來中日間關係之日趨惡劣，經濟絕交爲其原因之一，則要無疑義。

關於經濟絕交爭論之點 關於經濟絕交之政策及方法

，其爭論之點有三。

(一)此種運動是否出於自動抑係組織而成。第一點問題所在，爲此種運動是否如中國人所稱，純係出於自動，抑或如日本人所述，係國民黨利用人民，有組織之運動，所用手段，有時且等於威脅。關於此點，雙方各有其辭。就一方面言之，設無一堅強之民衆意識爲基礎，欲一民族表現爲支持一地區廣闊時間久長之經濟絕交，所必具有之犧牲與合作精神，顯爲不可能之事。就一方面而言之，國民黨利用中國人民舊時同業會館及秘密團體傳統之心理與方法，以指揮最近之經濟絕交，尤其在現時之此項運動中，其指揮至於若何程度，已經顯露無遺。他如所適用之規則，紀律，以及制裁「漢奸」之方法，在現時經濟絕交中，固佔主要部份，在在均可表現此項運動，無論其若何出於自動，實具有嚴密之組織。

一切民衆運動，總須賴有一種組織，方能有效。蓋羣衆擁護一共同目的，其忠誠斷難一致堅強，胥賴紀律以求目的與行動之一致。吾人之結論，認爲中國之經濟絕交，既出於民衆復具有組織，雖係強烈之民族情緒所產生，爲強烈之民族情緒所擁護，然操縱之指揮之者，大有能發能收之團體在。至於實施之方法，誠有等於威嚇之處。在組織方面，雖包括多數各別之團體，而重要支配之機關，厥爲國民黨。

(二)經濟絕交之方法是否合法。第二點之問題，爲在經濟絕交運動之行爲中，所採用之方法，是否始終合法。調查團就所搜集證據而得之結論，除認爲不法舉動，常有施行

，而當局與法院，本加以盡量之制止外，殊難另下其他斷語。若謂此種方法，與舊時中國所運用者，大致相同，此說作一種說明則可，不能視爲正當之理由。蓋舊時同業公會，公議宣告經濟絕交時，搜查可疑同業之房屋，將其解至同業法庭，懲處違背規則之行爲，令繳罰金，并拍賣搜獲之貨物，此種舉動，與當時習俗固屬相符。且此係中國社會之內部事件，并不涉及外國人民。現時情勢則異，中國業已制定新法典，其法律與中國相襲之經濟絕交方法，不能兩立。中國代表之說帖，爲本國關於經濟絕交之立場辯護，對於此點，未有異說。但辯稱「經濟絕交……就大體而言，係依合法之方式而進行」。但調查團所得之證據，對於此說未能證實。關於此點，應將直接妨害外籍居民之非法行爲例如，對於日人者，與妨害中國人而顯具侵害日人利益之目的者，劃爲兩事。就前者而言，此項行爲，非獨在中國法律之下顯屬非法，亦且違反條約上，保護生命財產，維持貿易居住行動自由之義務。對於此點，中國人亦無異說，而排貨會以及國民黨，對於此種情事，雖制止有時無效，然確曾設法制止。且現在此種行爲，已如上文所述，亦不若前此之屢見矣。(一)

關於妨害中國人之非法行爲，中國代表，已於其關於經濟絕交之說帖內，第十七頁上，加以詳論：「吾人首欲提請注意之點，爲一國之國內法律問題外國無權提出。其實，吾人亦自覺遇有此項斥爲非法行爲之問題。但此係中國人民對中國人民之侵害行爲，其制止係屬中國當局之事。加害人與被害人既同屬中國國籍，中國刑法對此若何適用，似非他人有權所得過問，總之，一國純粹國內事件之治理，不論何國

無干涉之權，此即所謂互相尊重主權與獨立原則之真義」。

照此說法，其理論自屬頗撲不破。但其疏忽之點，在於日本人所持為稱訴之證據者，並非中國人民被另一中國人民非法侵害之事，乃係因所採用之方法，害及日本人之利益，而此種方法，復違反中國法律。在此種情形之下，而不能執行其法律，則應視為中國政府，對於日本所受之損害，負有責任。

(註一)

據最近日本方面之消息，自一九三一年七月至一九三一年十二月，為日本人所有之貨物，被上海抗日會會員截奪扣留之事件，共有三十五起之多，價值估計，約有二〇八萬七千元之數。截至一九三二年八月間，此類事件，止有五起尚未解決。

■中國政府對於經濟絕交所負之責任 至此，勢須進而討論關於經濟絕交政策爭論中最後之一點，即中國政府所負責任至何地步是也。中國官方態度，認為「購買選擇之自由。為私人之權利，政府不能干涉，政府雖負有保護生命財產之責任，但未見有任何公認之規章原則，謂政府須禁止懲處每一公民基本權利之行使」。調查團所得之書面證據，該項證據，見於報告書附件專論第八號中，顯示中國政府對於現時之經濟絕交之參加，較上文引句中所表示者，更為直接。吾人并非暗示謂政府各部份援助經濟絕交運動有何不當之處，惟所欲指明者，即官方之鼓勵，不無含有政府之責任耳。於此，勢須審察政府與國民黨間之關係。關於後者之責任，自屬毫無問題。國民黨為整個經濟絕交運動後籌指揮聯絡之機關。國民黨固可謂為政府之創造者，與主人翁，然而，欲決定該黨責任之終點，與政府責任之起點何在，則係一憲法上之複雜問題，調查團自覺不應有所表示。

■評語 中國政府宣稱，經濟絕交，為抵禦強國武力侵略之合法武器，尤以在仲裁方法未經事先利用之事件中為然

此說引起一性質更廣之問題。中國人民，在不違反國家法律之條件下，其個人拒絕購買日貨，使用日本銀行，乘坐日本船舶，為日本雇主工作，賣給日本人貨物，與日本人發生社交關係，或以個人行動或團體行動宣傳此項意見之權，無人可予否認，然而單獨對於某一國家之貿易，實行有組織之抵制，是否合於睦誼，抑或與條約義不相抵觸，乃係一國際法之問題，而不在調查團調查範圍之內，但為舉世各國之利益計，調查團希望此項問題，應及早加以討論，並以國際協約加以規定。

於本章中，已述明者，第一，日本為其人口問題，正在設法增加工業產量，並為此求獲可靠之海外市場。其次，日本除生絲運銷美國外，以中國為出口貨物之主要市場，同時賴中國大宗原料與食品之供給。再者，中國吸收日本之向外投資幾佔其全部，雖在今日不安定不發達情形之下，仍不失為日本各種經濟財政活動之沃土，最後，如將自一九〇八年迄於今日，日本在中國之利益，因屢次經濟絕交，所受之損失，一加分析，則可知是類利益之易於摧殘矣。

日本依賴中國市場固為日本人所完全承認。一方面，中國又為一急需發展各種經濟生活之國，在一九三一年，雖有經濟絕交之事，而日本仍佔中國國外貿易總額之第一位，似可見日本與中國在經濟方面之聯絡，實較他國尤密也。

以中日貿易之互相依賴，及雙方之利益而言，經濟接近實有必要。但兩國間政治關係一日不圓滿，以至於一方採取武力，一方則採取經濟抵制力量以相扼持，則一日無接近之可能。

第八章 在滿洲之經濟利益(二)

(註一) 關於本章各論點專論第二三六七號

如前章所述及，中日兩國經濟上之需要，除非受政治原因之影響，當祇有引至互相諒解與合作，而不至發生衝突。即就中日間在滿洲經濟利益相互關係之本身而研究之，而不涉及近年來政治上之事變，亦可得同樣之結論。蓋兩國在滿洲之經濟利益並非不可調和者；實則欲充分開發滿洲現有之富源暨致力於將來經濟之發展，兩國經濟利益之調和，甚屬必要也。

關於日本。輿論所稱滿洲之富源，不論其為現實的與將來可能的，均於日本經濟命脈，極關重要一節，已於第三章中詳討論。本章之目的在考慮此種稱述，核與經濟實況究竟符合至若何之程度。

■投資 日本為在南滿一帶外人中之最大投資家與蘇俄之在北滿相同。就東三省全部而論，日本所投之資本雖因無可靠之數目足資比較。不能斷言其重要究至若何程度，然視蘇俄所投者較為重要，蓋無疑義。關於投資問題，本報告書之附件中當有詳論，茲略舉幾項重要數目即足以表明日本蘇俄及其他參與滿洲經濟開發各國間之相互比例矣。

依據日人方面之報告，一九三二年日本在滿洲之投資約計十五萬萬日金，此項數額如果確實，則現時當可增至十七萬萬日金。(一)惟據俄人方面之調查，現時日本在滿洲全部之投資包括關東租借地在內，約值十五萬萬日金，其中東三省約佔十三萬萬日金，日本資本之大部份係集中於遼甯一省。

(註一) 另一日本專家估計一九二九年日本在中國全境之投資總額包括滿洲在內約值十五萬萬日金。

至從各項投資之性質而論，大部分資本係用於運輸事業(以鐵路為主要)，其次則為農業採鑛及森林。依事實言，日本在滿洲投資大部分均集中於南滿鐵路；而蘇俄之在北滿投資，無論直接或間接，大半均與中東鐵路有連帶關係。

日本以外之外人投資數額，更難估計，吾人雖承有關係各方之援助，然所得之報告極少，至日方所供給之數字，大半均係元一七年以前者，現時自不適用。關於蘇俄，如上所述，亦不能得確實之估計。至於其他各國，據新近俄國方面在北滿一帶之調查估計，以英國為第二大投資家，計金洋一千一百十八萬元，其次為日本，計金洋九百二十二萬九千四百元，再次為美國，計金洋八百二十二萬元，又波蘭計金洋五百〇二萬五千元，法國計金洋一百七十六萬元，德國計金洋一百二十三萬五千元，此外零星投資計金洋一百十二萬九千六百元，總計金洋三千七百七十八萬四千四百元。但此項估計無法證實，且在南滿方面欲求一類似之報告而不可得。

■日本與滿洲之經濟關係 現應將滿洲在日本經濟生命中佔之地位加以分析。本報告書之附件中，對於本題有詳細之研究，從此項研究中可知滿洲在日本經濟生命中之地位雖屬重要，但同時受情勢之限制，此亦不可忽視者也。

依據已往之經驗滿洲似非一適於日本大規模移民之區域，因近數十年來，自山東直隸兩省移往之農民與勞工已據有土地，現時日人之移住者均為商人官吏暨僱傭，彼等均為管理其所投資本，發展各種企業，及開發天然富源而來，此種

形恐多年後仍將如是。

■農業 從滿洲農產物之供給而論，日本現賴滿洲之主妻接濟者爲大豆及以大豆所製之物品，此項農產物在食品與飼料上之用途恐將日增。用爲肥料在現時雖亦爲主要用途之一，然嗣後恐將因日本化學工業之發達而減少其重要。但關於糧食接濟問題，日本在現時並不嚴重。因日本既佔有朝鮮及台灣，至少在最近期內可以助其解決食米問題也。如將來日本帝國對於此項物產需要孔亟時，滿洲亦可成爲一新來源。但在此種情形之下，恐將需鉅大資本以從事於充分灌溉計劃之建設。

■重工業 如日本因欲利用滿洲富源而與辦重工業，以期日後能脫離外國而自謀經濟獨立，則所需之資本恐將更鉅。現日本正在東三省設法鼓勵爲日本國防上不可缺少之各種原料之生產，滿洲雖能以煤，油，及鐵，供給日本，然該項供給在經濟上之利益尙難確定，因煤之一物日本僅能利用其產額中之一較小部分。油亦祇能從泥石中採獲極有限之數量，至於鐵之生產實屬得不償失。但日本之爲此並非專在經濟方面着想。實欲藉滿洲之富源以助其獨立冶金制度之發展也。無論如何，日本所需用之焦炭及不含矽酸之鑛砂必須大部份仰給於國外。東三省雖確能供給日本國防上不可缺少之農產物，然欲達此目的，恐非有財政上之鉅大犧牲不可。在本問題中有關之日本在滿之軍事策略，則已於本報告書中他處說明矣，再滿洲似不能供給日本紡織業所必需之各種主要原料。

■滿洲爲日本貨物之市場 東三省爲日本製造品之一長

年市場。該市場之重要將與該處之繁榮同驅並進，惟曩昔大阪貿易賴於上海者較賴於大連者爲多。滿洲市場雖或較爲穩固，然較之中國市場則狹小多矣。

自「經濟區域」說由西歐傳入日本後，日人自以爲該項可能之轄區應包括日本帝國及滿洲。此種論調時可於日本政治家大學教授及新聞記者之著作中見之。即日本之現任商工省大臣，在彼未就職之前，亦曾作一文，論及世界各國如美國蘇俄歐洲及英國等之經濟轄區，並聲稱日本亦應與滿洲成立一類似區域。

現在尙無事實表示該項制度可以實行；日本近已有人對於此種幻想，發表言論以警告其國人。蓋日本大部份商業，依賴美國，中國本部，及英屬印度者，遠過於其依賴滿洲也。

滿洲對於人口過剩之日本，將來或可大有裨助之處，但不審明其可能性之有限，其爲危險，與低估其效用之危險，正復相同。

■中國與滿洲之經濟關係 我人研究中國其他部份與東三省之經濟關係，即見與前述日本在滿洲情形顯然不同，中國早期發展滿洲之主要助力，即爲遣送臨時工人及永久移民徙入滿洲，而滿洲農業之重大發展，及出於彼輩之努力。最近尤其在近十年中。中國參預建築鐵路，開發鑛產森林，擴充工業貿易銀行，其進步甚爲可觀；惟該項進步，因缺乏確切材料，不能充分說明。以大概論之，滿洲與中國其他部份間之主要結合，與其謂爲屬於經濟的，毋寧謂屬於種族的社會的。滿洲人民，大都爲近來移民所組成；業經在第二章提

及。該項移民出於自動，大足以表示移民之舉。確已滿足實際之需要。移民雖在某種程度內，由於中日兩方之鼓勵；但實際為饑荒之一種結果也。

日本為撫順煤礦，大連港務工程，及建築鐵路等事項，曾在數年中，招募華工；但募得之數常甚有限，招工事宜，於一九二七年遂告停止；蓋斯時當地工人之供給，似尙足用故也。

滿洲各省當局，亦曾屢次扶助安置中國移民；惟實際上東省當局之措施足以影響移民者，頗屬有限。華北當局及慈善機關，在某時期內，亦曾努力鼓勵人民移居滿洲。

移民所受之主要幫助，即有南滿鐵路中國鐵路及中東鐵路之減價運送；此種給與新來者之鼓勵表示，至少在一九三一年年底以前，南滿鐵路，滿洲各省當局，及中國政府，對於此種遷徙加以贊許。雖彼等對於移殖運動之關係，未能一致；惟東省殖民，於彼等有利則同。

移殖於滿洲之人民，居定之後仍保持其與中國本部原籍省分之關係。此種事實，一經考查移民匯往彼等誕生村落內家中之款項即可瞭然。該項匯款，或從銀行及郵政局匯出，或由移民返鄉時帶回，其總數不能估計，大約每年寄往山東及河北兩省者。計洋兩千萬元。一九二八年郵政局統計，表明遼甯吉林兩省匯往山東之匯票，其款額與中國其他一切省分匯至山東之總數相等，此項匯款，構成滿洲與中國本部間一種重要的經濟連鎖，殆無疑義，此項匯款，即為移民與其原籍省分家屬間保持接觸之標誌，此種接觸，亦甚容易，因長城內外情況，原無甚區別；土地出產物，大致相同，農業

方法亦無差異。滿洲與山東間農業狀況最顯著之區別，在於氣候，人口多寡，及經濟發展各種情形之不同。但此種異點，並不妨礙東三省農業有逐漸接近山東農業之趨勢。遼甯為一久經開墾之區，其農業狀況，較土地新近開放之黑龍江省，更與山東農業情形相接近。

在滿洲與農人直接交易之組織，亦與中國本部情形相同。此種貿易，在東三省握於中國人手，只有中國人可自農家直接購買。在東三省此種本地交易中，掛賬辦法，具有重要功用；正與在中國本部者相同。更進一步言之，滿洲與中國本部商業組織之相似，不僅在當地鄉村交易中，可以看出，即在城市交易中，亦可見之。

事實上在滿洲之中國社會的及經濟的組織，等於一自關內移植而來之社會；仍保持其家鄉風俗語言及動作。其唯一的變更，僅為適合此土地較廣居民較稀及對外來勢力開放較多之各種情形上之需要而已。

此種大隊遷移，是否僅為一種偶然之事，抑將來仍得繼續進行，不無疑問。當計算南滿洲及南部東部諸流域如松花江遼河及牡丹江流域之面積時，即見單就農業方面觀察，滿洲尚能吸收多數移民，甚為明顯，據中東鐵路職員中最高專門家宣稱：滿洲人口，在四十年內，能達到七千五百萬人之數。

但將來經濟狀況或將限制滿洲人口之迅速增加，實則經濟狀況，能單獨使將來耕種大豆事宜；入於不安穩狀態。由他方面觀之，新近輸入滿洲之種植，頗有發展希望，尤以種稻為最。日人中有希望發展種棉事業者，但種棉似受一定的

限制。故經濟上及技術上種種要素，或將在某種範圍內限制移民入東三省。

近來政治上事變，並非爲國中移民入滿洲低落之唯一原因。一九三一年上半年經濟恐慌，已使臨時的移民減縮。世界不景氣，加增不可避免而地方恐慌之影響，俟經濟恐慌終了，秩序恢復時，滿洲仍將爲中國本部人民之出路。華人爲最適宜於移殖滿洲之人民，若用武斷的政治手段，爲不自然的移民限制，則不特妨害山東河北利益，而滿洲利益亦咸受損害也。

滿洲與中國其他部份主要的結合，屬於種族與社會方面，同時經濟聯絡，亦日益鞏固；滿洲與中國其他部份商業關係，逐漸發展。但據海關報告，日本爲滿洲最良顧客及最要供給者，中國本部反居第二位。

滿洲輸入中國其他部份之主要貨物，爲大豆及由大豆製成物品，煤，少量落花生，生絲，雜糧，極少量鐵，玉蜀黍，羊毛，及木材等。中國本部輸入滿洲之主要貨物，爲棉織物，烟葉，絲織品，其他織物，茶葉，穀類，種子，生棉，紙，及麵粉等。

故中國本部依賴於滿洲者，爲食品原料；其中最要者，爲大豆及由大豆製成物品，但除煤外，由滿洲輸入之礦物，木材，獸產，其供製造用之原料等，在過去時期內，並不重要。此外中國本部，利用滿洲盈餘之一部份，抵銷其自身之虧短，中國所以能爲此者，並非由於政治上之結合，如一般人所想像者；而實因滿洲郵局海關爲獲利最豐之機關，又因中國移民匯交鉅款於其山東及河北之家屬之故耳。

□ 評論

滿洲富源雄厚，倘尙未能完全估定。其發展有賴於人民，資本，技能，組織，及內部安定。人民幾完全由中國供給；現有人民大多數生於華北數省，仍與其原籍家族，維持密切關係，至今日，資本，技能，及組織等，在南滿者多由日本供給；在長春以北者多由俄國供給，其他各國在東三省各處，亦有利益，主要在大城市中，但較之日俄相差遠矣。該各國代表，在近年政治緊張中，努力運用和解勢力。倘掌握重要經濟權力之日本，不爲壟斷該項活動區域之企圖，彼等仍將繼續其和解努力。現在最要問題，即爲設立一能爲人民所樂於接受之行政機關，須能供應最低限度之需要，需要維何？即法律及秩序之維持是也。

華人佔滿洲人口之大部份，從事耕種土地；實際上在滿洲各種企業中，供給其勞力。故任何外國，如不得華人好感及誠意的合作，不能在從事支配滿洲之嘗試中，開發其富源，或獲取任何利益。在東三省停止爲強隣野心之逐鹿場以前，中國亦將不能常免憂慮與危險。故中國須滿足日本在滿洲之經濟利益，日本亦須承認滿洲人民具有不可變易之中國特性。


□ 門戶開放之維持

如欲使有關係各國合作，發展滿洲，則維持門戶開放原則，似屬必要，該項原則之維持，應與上述之中日諒解相輔而行，不僅在法律方面觀察，應當如是；即就商業，工業，與銀行業之實際情形而言，亦當如是。在滿洲各國商人，除日本人外，抱持一種恐懼。即恐日本商行，利用現在政治上地位，採取自由競爭以外之方法，獲取利益，若此種恐懼果屬正確，則各國利益將受打擊，而滿洲

人民首蒙其害。故在商業，投資，及金融各界中，以自由競爭方法表現真正之門戶開放，於中日兩國，俱屬有益。(右)

(註一) 關於此節有須說明者，即大宗貨物正在私運入滿洲者甚多，尤以在朝鮮邊境及經過大連者為最，此種私運，不特損害海關收

入，抑且破壞商業組織；且引起一種揣測，謂實際管理海關行政之國家，竟實行歧視其他各國商業，該項揣測之當否，姑勿具論也。



第九章 解決之原則及條件

■前章之復述。中日問題之本身，用公斷方式，非無解決之可能，然因各該國政府，處理此問題，尤其滿洲問題，使兩國關係益臻惡化，遂致衝突，遲早不能避免，業於本報告書之前數章述明。中國乃一由政治上之糾紛，社會上之紊亂，與夫因過渡時代所不可避免之分裂趨勢而進展之國家，亦經陳其梗概。日本所主張之權利與利益，如何因中國中央政府權力薄弱，致受重大之影響，及日本如何急欲使滿洲與中國政府分離，亦經闡明。又對於中俄日三國政府之對滿政策，為簡略之考察，足以證明以前東三省地方政府對中國中央政府，曾屢次宣布獨立，願其人民大半為中國人，未嘗有與中國脫離之意。最後：我等曾悉心詳查一九三一年九月十八日及自是日以後所發生之真確事件，並曾發表我等對此之意見。

■問題之複雜。現在我等可對於過去之感想作一結束，而集中注意點於將來。凡閱過前章者必明瞭現在衝突中之問題，並不如尋常所擬議者之簡單。此項問題實屬異常複雜，而惟深悉一切事實及其歷史背景者，始足以表示一正確之意見。良以此案既非此國對於彼國不先利用國際聯合會盟約所定和解之機會而遽行宣戰之事件，亦非此一鄰國以武力侵犯彼一鄰國邊界之簡單案件，實因滿洲具有許多特點，非世界其他各地所可確切比擬者也。

此項爭議係發生於國際聯合會會員國間，涉及一領土其遼闊與法德兩國相埒，雙方均認有權利與利益於其間，而

其權益中為國際公法所明白規定者，僅有數端耳。又該領土在法律上雖為中國不可分之一部，其地方政府實具有充分自治性質，足與日本直接談判構成此次衝突根源之事件。

■滿洲情況非他地所可比擬。日本管有一條鐵路，及由海口直達滿洲中心之一段土地，約有一萬兵力保護該地，日本並主張依照條約於必要時有增兵至一萬五千之權。該國對於在滿洲之日僑，行使法權，並遍設領館警察於東三省。

■解釋之不同。上述各節為辯論此問題者所必須考慮之事實。日本軍隊未經宣戰，將向來毫無疑義屬於中國領土之一大部分地面，強奪佔領，使其與中國分離並宣布獨立，事實具在。此事經過所採之步驟，日本謂為合於國際聯合會盟約，非戰公約，及華盛頓九國條約之義務，而實則各該約之意義正在防止此種行為。且此種行為開始於本案提出於國際聯合會之初，而完成於嗣後之數月。乃日本政府以為此種行為與九月三十日及十二月十日其代表在日內瓦所提出之保證相符合。其為此項行動辯護之理由，謂一切軍事行動為合法之自衛行為，該項自衛權利，在上述各項國際條約中既均已默認，而國聯行政院各項決議亦未加以取消。至於替代中國在東三省之行政組織之新組織，則謂係當地人民之行動，蓋當地人民因自願獨立，遂與中國脫離關係，另組政府。日方聲稱，此種真正之獨立運動，自不為任何國際條約或國聯行政院之任何決議所禁止。且是項事實之發生，已將九國條約之適用，予以重大之改易，並將國聯正在調查之事件之性質，完全變更。

此種辯護論調實使該項衝突噴形複雜與嚴重。本調查團

之任務，並不在就該案作辯論；但欲設法供給充分之材料，使國聯能得一適合於爭議國雙方之榮譽，尊嚴，暨國家利益之解決辦法。僅恃批評不足以達此目的，必須從事于調解之切實努力。我等曾力求過去滿洲事件之真相，而坦白說明之；並承認此僅為一部分之工作，且非最要部分。我等在調查期間，曾迭告雙方政府，願以國聯之力，助兩國調解爭端，且決定向國聯建議，以適合於公道與和平之法，保持中日兩國在滿洲之永久利益。不能認為滿意之解決辦法：

不能認為滿意之解決辦法。 (一) 恢復原狀由上述各節觀之，可以明瞭，如僅恢復原狀，並非解決辦法。因此次衝突原係發生于在去年九月前所存在之各種情形之下，故今日如將各該情形恢復原狀，亦徒使糾紛重見，且有僅僅顧及全案之理論方面，而忽略其局勢之真相之弊。

(二) 維持「滿洲國」

從前述兩章觀之，維持及承認滿洲之現時組織，亦屬同樣不適當。我等認為此種解決辦法與現存國際義務之基本原則不合，並與遠東和平所繫之兩國好感有礙，且違反中國之利益，不願滿洲人民之願望，兼之此種辦法，最後是否利於日本永久之利益，至少亦屬疑問。

滿洲人民對於現時組織之情感如何，可無疑義；中國亦決不願接受東三省之完全分離，作為一種最後之解決。至以遠處邊陲之外蒙古與滿洲相比擬亦欠切當，因外蒙古與中國並無經濟上與社會上之密切關係；且人口稀少，大部分均非漢人。滿洲之情形，與外蒙古大異。自各方面言之，現今在滿洲耕種之數百萬漢人早已使滿洲成為中國領土由關內向關

外之延長，且從種族文化及國民情緒各方面言之；東三省之為中國東三省，直與其大部分移民所自來之鄰省河北山東無異。

且就以往之經驗，可以證明從前支配滿洲之當局，曾對於中國其他各部，——至少華北——之事務有重大之影響，且佔有毫不容疑之軍事上與政治上之便利。無論在法律上事實上將該省等自中國他部割離，日後恐將造成一嚴重之「未收回領土」問題，使中國常存敵意，以致危及和平，且有引起繼續抵制日貨運動之可能。

本調查團曾接到日本政府關於該國在滿洲重大利益之明晰，而有價值之聲明書。關於日本對於滿洲經濟上之依賴，前章已經論及，本調查團不必再為之鋪張；本調查團亦不主張日本因經濟關係即可操縱東三省經濟上乃至政治上之發展；但我等仍承認滿洲在日本經濟發展上之重要性。日本為謀滿洲之經濟發展，要求建設一能維持秩序之堅固政府；此項要求，我等亦不以為無理。但此種情況，惟有一合於當地民意而完全順乎德等之情感及志願之行政機關，始能為安全的與切實的担保。抑尤有進者，惟有一種外有信仰內有和平而與遠東現有情形完全不同之空氣中，為滿洲經濟迅速發展所必要之投資始可源源而來。

日人現雖備受激進人口過剩之壓迫，然彼等尚未充分使用其現有之便利，以從事於移民，而日本政府迄今猶無大規模移民滿洲之計劃。但日本確欲利用再進一步之實業計劃，以謀農村農業危機及人口問題，此種實業計劃需要更大經濟出路，而此種廣大而比較可靠之市場，日本僅能在亞洲尤其

中國獲得之。日本不僅需要滿洲市場，即全中國市場亦在需要之列，而中國之鞏固與近代化自能使生活程度抬高，因而使貿易興奮，並增加中國市場之購買力。

中日間此種經濟上之接近，固於日本有重大之利益，即於中國亦有同等之利益，蓋中國因與日本有經濟上及技術上較為密切之合作而可獲得建設國家基本工作上之助力。中國若能抑制其民族主義難堪之趨勢，並俟友好關係恢復後切實担保有組織之抵貨運動不再發生，則於此項經濟接近大有裨助。在日本方面，若不求單獨解決問題，使其脫離日本對華關係之整個問題，致令中國友誼及合作成爲不可能，則此項經濟接近亦當易於實現。

但日本在滿洲之動作及政策，其取決於經濟原因之處或較少於其自身安全之顧慮。日本政治家及軍事當局常稱滿洲爲「日本之生命線」，職此故也。常人對於此種顧慮可表同情，且亦能諒解日本担负國防重任之當局所採取之行動及意旨。日本之欲謀阻止滿洲被利用爲攻擊日本之根據地，以及在某種情形之下滿洲邊境被外國軍隊衝過時，日本欲有採取適當軍事行動之能力，吾人均可承認，但同時吾人以爲置滿洲於無期限之軍事佔領之下，勢必負財政上之重担，是否確係抵制外患之最有效方法，仍不無疑問。又設遇外患侵襲之時，日本在滿軍隊受時懷反側之民衆包圍，其後又有包含敵意之中國，日本軍隊能否不受重大之困難，亦殊難言。爲日本利益計，對於安全問題，似應考量其他可能的解決方法，使更能符合現時國際和平機關之基本原則，而與世界其他列強間所定之辦法相同。日本甚或可因世界之同情與善意，

不須代價而獲得安全保障，較現時以鉅大代價換得者爲更佳。

■國際利益 中日兩國以外，世界其餘各國在中日爭執中，亦有應予維持之重大利益。例如現行各種多方面條約，前已提及。又此問題之真正及最後之解決，必須適合世界和平組織所依賴之基本條約。華府會議時驅使各國代表之意旨，現仍有效。扶助中國建設，維持中國主權及領土與行政之完整爲保持和平之必要條件，今日此項政策之與列強利益相脗合，亦正與一九二二年無異。各種分解中國之行爲，必致立即引起國際間之競爭，此種國際競爭，如與相異的社會制度間之衝突同時發生，則將更形激烈。要之：維持和平之旨趣，舉世相同。倘國聯盟約及非戰公約原則之實施，在世界任何部分失其信仰，則此項原則之價值及效能將無往而不受減損。

■蘇俄之利益 調查團對於蘇俄在滿洲之利益範圍未能獲得直接之報告，而對於蘇俄政府關於滿洲問題之意見亦未能確定。但雖無直接報告，而蘇俄在滿洲之地位，及其因領有中東路暨中國國境外北部及東北部之領土而獲得之重要利益，均不容忽視，故解決滿洲問題時倘忽略蘇俄之重大利益，則此項解決必將引起將來和平之決裂，且不能持久，事極顯然。

■結論 倘中日兩國政府均能承認彼此主要利益之相同性質，並願以維持和平與夫樹立睦誼爲彼此利益之部分，則上述各節足以指示問題之解決途徑。至恢復一九三一年九月以前狀態之不可能。前已述及之矣。由現時組織，毋須經過

極端之變更或可產生一種滿意之組織。我等將在次章提出若干種建議，以貫徹斯旨，茲先規定任何圓滿解決所應依據之原則如下：

■圓滿解決之條件

(一)適合中日雙方之利益 雙方均爲國聯會員國，均有要求國聯同樣考慮之權利，某種解決，苟雙方均不能獲得利益，則他種解決必無補於和平之前途。

(二)考慮蘇俄利益 倘僅促進相鄰二國間之和平，而忽略第三國之利益，則匪特不公，抑且不智，更非求和平之道。

(三)遵守現行之多方面條約 任何解決必須遵守國聯盟約，非戰公約，及華盛頓九國條約之規定。

(四)承認日本在滿洲之利益 日本在滿洲之權利及利益乃不容漠視之事實，凡不承認此點或忽略日本與該地歷史上關係之解決，不能認爲滿意。

(五)樹立中日間之新條約關係 中日二國如欲防止其未來衝突，及回復其相互信賴與合作，必須另訂新約，將中日兩國之權利利益與責任，重加聲敘。此項條約應爲雙方所同意之解決糾紛辦法之一部份。

(六)切實規定解決將來糾紛之辦法 爲補充上開辦法以圖便利迅速解決隨時發生之輕微糾紛起見，有特訂辦法之必要。

(七)滿洲自治 滿洲政府應加以變更，俾其在適合中國主權及行政完整之範圍內，獲得足以適應該三省地方情形與特性之高度自治權。新民政機關之組織與管理，務須滿足良好政府之要件。

(八)內部之秩序與免於外來侵略之安全 滿洲之內部秩序，應以有效的地方憲警維持之；至爲實現其免於外來侵略之安全起見，則須將憲警以外之軍隊，掃數撤退，並須與關係各國，訂立互不侵犯條約。

(九)獎勵中日間之經濟協調 爲達到此目的，中日二國宜訂新通商條約。此項條約之目的，須爲兩國間之商業關係，置於公平基礎之上；並使其與兩國間業經改善之政治關係相適合。

(十)以國際合作，促進中國之建設，現時中國政局之不一，既爲中日友好之障礙，並爲其他各國所關懷，因遠東和平之維持，爲國際間所關懷之事件；而上述條件，又非待中國具有強有力之中央政府時，不能滿足，故其圓滿解決之最終要件，厥惟依據孫中山博士之建議，以暫時的國際合作，促進中國之內部建設。

■條件滿足後之結果

現在情勢如能改變，至足以滿足上述條件及包括上述意見之程度，則中日二國當可將其困難解決，而兩國間之密切諒解及政治合作之新時代，或將由此開始。如二國間不能成立此項協調，則無論具有何種條件之解決辦法，必將毫無效果可言。然則際此險象環生之時，上項新關係果真無實現之可能歟？少年日本現正力主對中國採取強硬政策及在滿洲採取澈底政策。凡作此項要求之人靡不對於九月十八日以前之延宕及刺激，表示厭倦。彼輩現甚急燥並亟欲求其目的之達到。但即在日本，爲達到任何目的，亦有尋求適當方法之必要。經與主張積極政策最力之輩——尤其一般富於理想及個人信仰之造成「滿洲國」之先鋒隊——

最近之後，本調查團遂不得不承認；日人方面問題之核心，純爲日人對於新中國之政治發展及此種發展之未來趨勢所表示之焦慮。此種焦慮，已使日人採取行動，其目的冀以支配上項發展並領導之使之趨向於日人經濟利益，得以安全，及其帝國國防戰略上之需要，得以滿足之途徑。

但日本輿論已微覺日本對滿洲及對中國其他各部採取兩個單獨政策之不復合於實際。故日本擬以其滿洲利益爲目標，其對於中國民族精神之復興，亦當表示承認與同情的歡迎；與之爲友，引導其趨向，而畀之以扶助，使其不必另求他助。

中國有識之士亦已承認建設與國家之近代化爲該國之重要問題，亦即該國之真正國家問題，而彼等不能不確認爲完成此種業已開始且有如許成功希望之建設及近代化政策起見，必須與一切國家，尤其與其距離最近之鄰國，培植友好之關係。在政治上，及經濟上，中國均需要列強之合作，而日本政府之友善態度及在滿洲方面之中日經濟合作，尤爲可貴。中國政府應將其新醒之民族主義之一切要求——縱屬正當而且急切——置於此項國家內部有效的建設之最高需要之下。

第十章 考慮及對於行政院之建議

便利最後解決之建議。以解決現時糾紛之建議，向中日兩國政府直接提出，非本調查團之職責。但如白里安君向行政院說明組織本調查團之決議時所言，「爲便利兩國間目前糾紛原因之最後解決起見，」本調查團特以我等研究之結果向國際聯合會提出建議，期於聯合會適當機關，因欲提交於爭議兩方而起草確定方案時有所裨助。此項建議，意在表明前章所設各條件，足以適用之一端，故其性質僅涉廣泛原則，各項細目留待補充。如爭議兩方願意接受基於此種原則之解決方法時，亦儘有修正之餘地。

即使日本在日內瓦討論本報告以前，即已正式承認滿洲國——此爲不容忽視之可能的事實——吾等工作亦不致因此而喪失其價值。吾等深信行政院如欲爲滿足中日兩方在滿洲之重大利益，而有所決定或向兩國有所提議，則對於本報告書所載建議，終將認爲不無裨助。

吾等懸此目標，故一方面以國聯原則，及關於中國一切條約之精神及文字，以及和平之一般利益，存諸胸中，而在另一方面，並未忽視現存之事實，即對於正在演化中之東三省行政機關，亦曾加以注意。爲世界和平之最高利益計，行政院之職責，應不問結局如何，毅然決定如何始能使本報告書中之建議推行并適用於現尙日在發展中之事件；以期利用現正在滿洲醞釀之一切正當勢力，無論爲理想或人力，無論爲思想或行動，藉謀獲得中日間持久之瞭解。

請當事雙方討論解決辦法 吾等首先建議國聯行政院

應請中國政府暨日本政府依照前章所開之綱領，討論兩國糾紛之解決。

顧問會議 此項邀請，如經接受，第二步即應及早召集一顧問會議，討論並提出一種特殊制度之設立，以治理東三省之詳密議案。

此項會議，可由中日兩國政府之代表，暨代表當地人民之代表團兩組組成之。該兩代表團，一由中國政府規定之方法選出之，一由日本政府規定之方法選出之。如經當事雙方同意，顧問會議可得中立觀察員之協助。

如該會議有任何特殊之點不克互相同意時，該會議可將此意見參差之點提出於國聯行政院，行政院對此當設法覓得一同意之解決辦法。

同時於顧問會議開會期中，所有中日間關於各該國權利利益所爭論之事件，應另行討論，倘經當事雙方同意，亦可得中立觀察人員之協助。

吾等未復提議此項討論與談判之結果，應包括於下列四種文件之中：

一、中國政府宣言，依照顧問會議所提辦法，設立一種特殊制度治理東三省；

二、關於日本利益之中日條約；

三、中日和解公斷不侵犯與互助條約；

四、中日商約。

在顧問會議集會之前，應由當事雙方，以行政院之協助，對於該會議應行考量之行政制度之方式，先行協定其大綱。當事雙方此際所應考慮之事件如下：

顧問會議之集會地點，代表之性質，是否願有中立觀察人員；

維持中國領土行政完整之原則及准許東省有高度之自治

以一種特殊憲警爲維持內部治安唯一辦法之政策；

以所擬各種條約解決所爭各項事件之原則；

對於所有曾經參加東省最近政治運動人員之准予特赦。

此種原則大綱，既經事前同意，關於其詳細辦法，當以最充分可能之選擇權，留諸參加顧問會議或磋商條約之代表。

至再行訴諸國聯行政院之舉，僅得於不能同意時行之。

■此項程序之優點 在此項程序各種優點之中，應稱述者爲此項程序既與中國主權不相違反，仍可採取實際有效之辦法，以適應滿洲現存之局勢，同時復留以後修改之餘地。

此類修改將視中國內部情形之變遷而定。例如：在滿洲最近所已提議，或已實際施行之某種行政上與財政上之變更，如省政府之改組，中央銀行之設立，以及外國顧問之雇用等等，皆本報告書所已注意及之者。此類特點，顧問會議或可因其利便而予以保留。又如依照吾等所提議之方法而選擇滿洲居民代表出席顧問會議，亦足以便利現政體之轉入新政體。

此項爲滿洲而設之自治制度，擬僅施行於遼甯，(奉天)吉林，黑龍江三省。日本現時在熱河(東內蒙古)所享有之權利，當於關係日本利益之條約中，加以規定。

茲將四項文件依次討論如下：

一、宣言

顧問會議之最後議案，當送交中國政府，由中國政府以該項議案列入宣言之內，而以此宣言轉送國際聯合會及九國條約之簽字各國。國聯會員國，及九國條約之簽字國對於此宣言當表示知悉，而此項宣言將被認爲對於中國政府有國際協定之約束性質。

此項宣言嗣後倘須修改，其條件當依照前述之程序彼此同意後，於宣言本身中，預爲規定。

此項宣言當對於中國中央政府，在東三省之權限與該地方自治政府之權限，加以劃分。

■保留於中央政府之權限 茲提議保留於中央政府之權限應如下列：

(一)除特別規定外，有管理一般的條約及外交關係之權，但中央政府不得締結與宣言條款相違反之國際決定。

(二)有管理海關，郵政，鹽稅之權，併或可有管理印花稅及烟酒稅行政之權。關於此類稅款之純收入，中央政府與東三省政府間如何公平分配。當由顧問會議規定之。

(三)有依照宣言所規定之程序，任命東三省政府行政長官之權，至少初步應當如此。至出缺時，當以同樣方法補充，或以東三省某種選舉制度行之，此則應由顧問會議合意議定，並列入宣言之內。

(四)有對於東三省行政長官頒發某種必要訓令，以保證履行中國中央政府所締結關於東三省自治政府管轄下各事項之國際協定之權。

(五)顧問會議所合意議定之其他權限。

■地方政府之權限 一切其他權限均屬於東三省自治政

府。

□地方民意之表現 應計劃切實可行之制度，期使人民對於政府政策得表示其意見。或即襲用自昔相沿各機關如商會，公所，及其他各市民機關亦可。

□少數民族 應訂立某種規定，以保護白俄及其他少數民族之利益。

□憲警 茲提議以外國教練官之協助，組織特別憲警，為東三省境內之唯一武裝實力。該項憲兵之組織，或於一預定時期內完成之，或在宣言內，預定程序，規定其完成時期。該項特別隊伍，既為東三省境內唯一武裝實力，故一俟組織完成，其他一切武裝實力，即應退出東三省境內。所謂其他一切武裝實力，包括中國方面或日本方面之一切特別警隊或鐵路守備隊。

□外國顧問 自治政府行政長官得指派相當數額之外國顧問，其中日本人應佔一重要之比例。至細目應依前述程序訂定，並於宣言內聲明之。小國人民有被選之權，與大國人民同。

行政長官得就國聯行政院所提名單中，指派國籍不同之外籍人員二名，監督（一）警察及（二）稅收機關，該二員在新政制草創及試行期內，當享有廣泛之權限。顧問權限當在宣言中規定之。

行政長官當就國際清理銀行董事會提出之名單中，指派一外國人為東三省中央銀行之總顧問。

至于僱用外籍顧問及官員一節，實與中國國民黨總理及現今國民政府之政策相符，東省方面實際狀況，及外人在彼

才益與勢力之複雜。為謀和平及善良政治起見，不能不有特殊之辦法，吾人希望中國輿論對此，不難予以認識。惟此間所謂外籍顧問及官員，及在新制度草創期內應有特別廣泛權限之顧問，亦不能認為僅係代表一種國際合作之方式。蓋此項人員之選出，必須在中國政府所能接受之狀態內行之，且須與中國主權不相抵觸。經指派後，此項人員，應自視為應用國政府之公僕，與在過去時期內關稅及郵政或國聯與中國合辦之專門機關所雇用之外籍人員相同。

關於此節，內田伯爵于一九三二年八月二十五在日本會議演說中之一段，頗堪注意。

「我國政府自明治維新以後，雇用多數外籍人員為顧問或正式官吏；在一八七五年前後，其數目超過五百人之多。」茲有應注意之點者，即在中日合作空氣中指派較多日籍顧問，可使此項官員，貢獻其特別適合于當地情形之訓練與學識。在此過渡期內所應抱之目標，乃為造成一種完全中國人之吏治，終使雇用外人，不復需要。

二、關係日方利益之中日條約

中日間擬議之三種條約商訂人。自應有完全審擇之權。但于此處略示訂約時所應議之事項，亦不為無益。

此項條約既須提及東省方面之日本利益，及熱河方面之日本一部分利益，自必首要涉及日僑之某種經濟利益及鐵路問題。

□條約目的 此項條約之目的應為：

（一）東省經濟上之開發，日本得自由參加，但不得因

此而取得經濟上或政治上管理該地之權。

(二)日本在熱河現在享有之權利，予以維持。

(三)居住及租地之權，推及于東省全境；同時對於領事裁判權之原則，酌予變更。

(四)關於鐵路之使用，訂一協定。

■日人之居住南滿權 在與北滿間雖未曾訂有固定界線，但日本人民之居住權向僅限於南滿及熱河。日本人民行使此項權利之態度，常使中國方面認為不能容受，因是而發生不斷之齟齬與衝突。在納稅及司法方面，日本人民及朝鮮人民俱認為享有領事裁判權之待遇。關於鮮民方面，實另有特殊規定，不過此項規定未能釐訂明確，致常為爭執之焦點。就調查團所得證明，吾等相信，若不附有領事裁判權，中國或願將現在有限制之居住權推及于東省全境。因附帶領事裁判權之結果；認為可使在中國境內造成一日本民族之國家也。

居住權與領事裁判權關係密切，至為明顯。而在東三省司法行政及財務行政未達到較前此更高之程度以前。日本不欲放棄領事裁判權地位，其事亦同樣明顯。

於是有調和方法二種：其一，現有之居住權及其附帶之領事裁判權地位，應予以維持，其居住權範圍應加以擴大，俾在北滿及熱河之日本人民及朝鮮人民，均得享受，但無領事裁判權。其二，在東三省及熱河之任何地方，日本人民應予以居住權及領事裁判權，而朝鮮人民則僅有居住權而無領事裁判權。是兩項建議各有優點，亦各有可以嚴重反對之處。倘能將東北各省之行政效率增高，使領事裁判權不復需要

，此則本問題最滿意之解決方法也。吾等以是建議該地方之最高法院應延用外國顧問，至少二人，其一須為日本國籍。其他法院延用顧問，亦殊為有利。法院審理涉及外國人之案件時，顧問對於各條之意見，不妨公布。吾等又以為在改組期間，財務行政方面參以外人之監督，亦頗相宜。關於此節，吾人於討論中國宣言時業已有所提議矣。

更進一步之保障，可依和解條約，設立公斷法院，以處理中國政府或日本政府，以政府名義或其人民名義所提出之任何聲訴。

此項複雜而困難之問題，其決定必須歸諸議訂條約之當事雙方，自行酌奪。但現時所取之保護外國人制度，苟施於多如朝鮮人之少數民族，在朝鮮人數目繼續增加，及其與中國人民密接雜處情形之下，其將發生刺激之機會，因而引致地方意外及外國干涉，殆為必然之事。為和平利益計，此項衝突之源，應予消弭。

日本人民之居住權利，如有任何推廣，應在同樣條件之下，適用於其他一切享有最惠國條款利益之國家之人民，祇須此類享有領事裁判權人民之國家，與中國訂立同樣條約。

■鐵路 關於鐵路問題，在過去期中，中國與日本之鐵路建造者及當局者，缺乏合作，不知成就一廣大而互利之鐵路計劃，此在第三章中已論之矣。將來苟欲免除衝突，則在現所擬議之條約中，必須加以規定，使已往之競爭制度，歸於消滅，而代以關於各路運費及價目之共同諒解。此項問題在本報告書之附件特別研究第一號內，另有討論。在本調查團之意以為有兩種可能之解決。此兩種解決可擇一而行，或

可視為達到最後解決之步驟。

第一種方法，範圍較為限制，為中日鐵路行政之一種業務協定，足以便利彼此合作者。中日兩國可協議在合作原則之下管理其各在滿洲所有之鐵路，並設一中日鐵路聯合委員會，至少有一外國顧問一人參加。鐵路聯合委員會行使之職務，則類若他國現行之理事會然。至於更澈底之救濟方策，莫若將中日兩國之鐵路利益合併。如雙方能同意於此種合併辦法，實為中日兩國經濟合作之真實標記，而中日兩國經濟合作，乃本報告書所祈求之目的之一也。此種合併辦法一方面既可保障中國之利權，一方面又可使滿洲一切鐵路得利用南滿鐵路專門經驗之利益，而將近數月來應用於滿洲鐵路之制度，引伸推用，當亦無甚困難。且將來可藉此關一範圍較廣之國際協定之新徑途，將中東鐵路亦包含在內。此種合併方法之詳細說明雖已載在附件之內，惟祇能視為一種舉例，其詳細計劃惟有由當事雙方直接談判，始可產生耳。鐵路問題如此解決，則南滿鐵路將成為純粹的營業性質，特別憲警隊一旦完全組成，鐵路得有保障，則護路隊可以撤退，藉可節省一宗極大開支。此項辦法如果實行，特別地產章程及特別市政制度，應即在鐵路區域範圍內，預先制定成立，俾南滿鐵路與日本人民之既得利益得有保障。

如能依照以上大綱，議訂條約，則日本在東三省與熱河之權利，可有法律根據，其有益於日本至少當與現有之條約及協定相同，而在中國方面，則當較易接受。如一九一五年條約與協定所給予日本之一切確定讓與，苟未為此項新條約所變更者，中國方面對之當不致再有承認之困難。

至於日本所要求之一切較為次要之權利，其效力問題如有爭執，應提出協商。如不能同意時，應照和解條約中所載之辦法補救之。

二、中日和解公斷不侵犯及互助條約

本條約之內容，因已有許多先例及現行成案可稽，自可不必詳細敘述。

此項條約應設一和解委員會，其職務當為協助中日兩方解決兩政府間隨時發生之任何困難。並設一公斷庭，以具有法律經驗及明瞭遠東情形者組織之。凡中日兩國間關於宣言或新條約解釋上之爭執，以及和解條約中所列舉之其他爭執，均應歸諸公斷庭辦理。

最後依照約文內不侵犯及互助各規定，締約雙方應同意滿洲應逐漸成為一無軍備區域。以此為目的，應即規定俟憲警組織完竣後，締約國之一方或第三者，如對無軍備區域有任何侵犯，即成為一種侵略行為，其他一方，——或遇第三者攻擊時，則締約雙方——有採取其所認為適當之任何辦法，以防衛無軍備區域之權，但並不妨礙國聯行政院依照盟約而為處理之權。

倘蘇聯共和國政府願意參加此種條約之不侵犯及互助部份，則此項相當之條款可另行列入一種三方協定。

四、中日商約

商約自應以造成可以鼓勵中日兩國盡量交易貨物，而同時並可保護他國現有條約權利之情形為目的。在此項條約內

，並應由中國政府担認在其權力之內，採取一切辦法以禁止並遏抑有組織之抵制日貨運動，但不妨害中國買主之個人權利。利。

滿之解決，不特有裨於遠東兩大國之利益，即世界人類，亦胥受其賜焉。

□ 評論。以上關於宣言，及各項條約之目的，吾等所為之建議與理由，係備提供國聯行政院之考慮。無論將來協定之細目為何，最要之點，在儘早開談判，並應以互信之精神行之。

吾等工作現已告竣。

滿洲素稱天府之國，沃野萬里，一年以來，疊經擾攘，當地人民，創鉅痛深，恐為前此所無。

中日關係已成變相戰爭，瞻念前途，可勝憂慮。

其造成此種景况之情形，吾等於本報告書中已言之矣。國聯當前問題之嚴重，及其解決之困難，盡人皆知。本調查團正在結束報告之際，報章適載中日兩國外交部長之宣言。披閱之餘，各有要旨一點，茲特為揭出：

八月二十八日羅文幹先生在南京宣稱：

『中國深信解決現在時局之合理辦法，必以不背國聯盟約，非戰公約及九國條約之文字與精神，與夫中國之主權，同時又確能鞏固遠東永久之和平者，為必要條件。』

八月三十日據報內田伯爵在東京宣稱：

『政府認中日關係問題較滿蒙問題，更為重要。』

吾等以為結束報告，莫妙於重述此兩項宣言所隱伏之意思。此種意思與本調查團所搜集之證據，及本調查團對本案之研究暨其判斷，其確切相合，竟若符節，故敢信此種宣言所表示之政策，倘迅為有效之應用，當能使滿洲問題達到圓

世界各國人士之意見

中日兩國之態度

中國

●政府之表示

○羅外長發表宣言。羅文幹三日發表對於國聯調查報告書之宣言云。國聯調查團報告書。業經公布。此乃李頓爵士與其同事諸君數月來爲國際和平。而不辭勞瘁堅苦工作之結果也。吾人猶憶去年十二月十日。國聯之所以決定派遣調查團。乃欲對於因日本侵犯中國領土而引起之局面。貢獻一最後根本解決之辦法。當白里安氏於是日提出派遣調查團之決議案於國聯行政院。以備其考慮並採納時。曾言。「調查團職務範圍。在原則上極爲廣泛。任何問題；足以影響國際關係而有擾亂中日兩國間和平。或和平所賴以維繫之兩國間諒解之虞。經調查團認爲須加研究者。均不得除外」故就調查團之職務而言。調查團所稱得審查一有關係之事實。並得以此和平解決辦法建議於國聯云云。固爲完全正確之解釋。試將報告書略加瀏覽。即覺有最顯明呈現之兩點。一爲九一八日及九一八以後之一切日本軍事動作。均無正當之理由。不能認爲自衛之手段。一爲所謂滿洲國者。並非真正及自然之獨立運動所產生。爲日本軍隊及日本文武官吏操縱造作之結果

。報告書包含許多性質極重要之問題。現正在中國政府當局悉心考量之中。

●西南之通電

○駁斥調查團報告書。西南執行部國府西南政委會通電云。各報館均鑒。自九一八事變發生，當局不圖抵抗。而倚賴國聯。日本則蔑視國聯。一再限令撤兵之決議。而積極擴張其侵略之範圍。不聞國聯依照盟約。執行有效之處置。而於舉世共見共聞之事實。乃藉派遣調查團以遷延時日。遂使日本軍閥。橫行益無顧忌。對我渥淞爲空前之蹂躪。對我東北襲用亡韓之故智。以造成傀儡之組織。近更悍然對此傀儡組織。加以承認。而自訂立等於合併之條約。亦不聞國聯有一言之糾正。我國受此深鉅之創痛。而猶事隱忍。將以期待調查團工作之完竣。冀國聯根據其報告。或有公正之解決。不料昨閱報載。本月一日公布之調查團報告書摘要。該團提出所謂能令滿意解決滿案之基礎原則及辦法。乃不惜自拋棄其所根據之公約，及所認定之事實。不顧立言之矛盾。以遷就強權。如對於九一八事變之責任。既知日方係擬有一種精密預備之計劃。中國並未進擊日軍作危害日僑之企圖。日方之軍事行動。不能視爲合法自衛之辦法。則日本顯爲破壞國聯盟約非戰公約及九國公約之戎首。應受相當之制裁。非先

俄國聯歷次決議。恢復九一八以前原狀。當無解決可言。乃竟謂恢復舊狀並非解決辦法。舍所謂該案全部之理論。而顧及非法造成之局勢。對於東北政治之改革。既知東三省完全爲中國之領土。無論如何。法律上事實上均不可分離。則東三省政治之如何改善。屬於中國內政範圍。中國政府自有其一貫之對內政策。豈容外國之干涉。乃竟主張在顧問會議之下。組織一種特殊制度之政府。以一種特殊憲兵。維持內部之治安。東三省行政長官之任命。稅收之分配。中國之中央政府。均無過問之權。特殊憲兵須由外人訓練。稅收機關。須由外人監督。東三省之中央銀行。須以外人爲總顧問。自治政府更須聘相當數額之外國顧問。而以日本人佔重要之比例。在現時之情勢。所謂顧問會議之組織亦必由日人操縱。如此而美其名曰自治。直與國際共管而由日本代管無異。猶曰維持中國主權獨立及領土之完整。其將誰欺。該報告書所謂。樹立中日之新條約關係。對於日本則主張得自由參加有助經濟上之開發。推廣居住及租地之權益。擴大領事裁判權之範圍。至現未被日本佔據之熱河。亦包括在內。對於中國。則主張滿洲應逐漸成爲一無軍備區。以條約規定。對無軍備區不得侵犯。並在商約內擔認禁止國內之抵制日貨運動。夫國聯盟約非戰公約及九國公約。尙不能制止日本之侵犯。則所謂對無軍備區不得侵犯者制止中國之駐兵防衛而已。買賣貨物。純出於人民之自由。非政府所能干涉。卽有抵制運動。况對暴力之和平抵禦各國不乏其例。豈有在條約上斷負禁止義務之理。往者日本對我提出之二十一條件。所要求關於滿蒙之特殊權利。不及此次調查團所列舉之苛酷。如此而

曰適合中日雙方之利益。尤爲滑稽。至稱解決滿洲問題。須考慮第三方面蘇聯之利益。更不知其意義何在。當日本未佔東北以前。中國何嘗有損及蘇聯之利益。若依調查團之建議。維持日本在東北之特殊勢力。致此問題不能解決。而至擴大。則將成爲整個太平洋問題之一。非祇爲日本與所謂第三方面之問題而已。該報告書又謂。政治適當辦法之最終要件。當如孫逸仙博士之主張。由國際共同合作。以完成中國之內部復興。不知孫總理係主張。由國際共同投資。發展中國實業。並非所謂政治適當辦法之最終要件。發展實業必須權操在我。亦並非他人所能越俎代謀。若藉是以爲主張國際共管東北之掩護。不特誤解總理遺教。且與民族主義顯相背戾。綜觀該報告書對於日本侵略中國之事實觀察。非不明晰。而竟爲此委曲遷就之建議。不敢作公正之主張。吾人於此。益見所謂國聯所謂公約者。實無倚賴之可言。東北問題祇有憑我民族之力量。乃可以自決。中國領土之完整主權之獨立。亦祇有憑我民族之力量。乃可以維持。今後惟有負下堅決之意志。本犧牲之精神。以爲繼續之抵抗。而求失地之恢復。事機急迫。絕無徘徊瞻顧之餘地。願我政府與人民共起圖之。中國國民黨執行委員會西南執行部國民政府西南政務委員會叩其印。

各報之批評

李頓報告書發表後。李頓調查報告書發表後。所引起不滿意之印象。多於讚譽之印象。一部分則淡漠視之。中日兩當事國對報告書之態度如何。姑且勿論。卽以歐美各強國

同。主張不無稍異。然大體皆於擁護李頓報告之中。屬有不
言。其政府尙取緘默態度。輿論方面。雖各以利害黨派之不
足以解決東方難局之意。法報謂調查團顯然未用法律制止衝
突之權。英報謂報告書所擬之條陳。不適合於公斷人之合法
形式。德報對報告書。則極力抨擊。甚至謂爲國聯之又一騙
局。德報雖爲自身問題。不免發過分之牢騷。然料國聯不能
制止強暴者之行爲。則亦實情也。其最表同情於報告書者爲
美報。惟美報則以其政府尙在研究。故亦未下確切之批評。
至國聯集中地之日內瓦輿論。尤爲吾人所注意。而其報紙之
評論報告書。則謂「報告書能發現兩重要事。一爲九一八事
變。純屬托詞。並未示明日人在滿用兵具有合法自衛之性質
。二爲東三省人民。一致否認新邦。惟報告書之條陳。殊未
能與之相合。」以我人觀察。此論最爲平允。蓋既認明九一
八事變爲日軍人所造成。僞滿洲國爲地方人民所否認。則其
結論。當然應課日本以擾亂東三省之責任。限令其撤退軍隊
。乃何以反承認其已成之事實。并保障其利益。而使東三省
成爲各國共管之特殊自治區。此其主張之矛盾。誠不能不令
人惋惜者也。

報告書所以有此矛盾之現象。因李頓等急欲成就和平。
既須顧全面子。又須顧全事實。既須顧全中國領土行政之完
整。又須顧全日本以武力奪得之利益。除中日而外更須顧全
蘇聯利益。各強國利益。即美國利益。亦隱然包含在兼顧之
中。李頓等欲八面圓通。以冀東亞和平之速成。而不料其結
果。乃至多數表示不滿。昨李頓在倫敦語路遜訪員。謂「凡讀
報告書者。一定知調查團爲篤愛和平之觀念所感動。而不斤

斤斷定孰是孰非。一李頓等篤念和平之意。固甚可感。然李
頓等所負使命。正在調查中日兩方之是非。使國聯有所依據
。以下適當之評判。今乃曰「不斤斤斷定孰是孰非。」將何以
間執強權者之口乎。何以消弭兩方之爭而合世界之公理乎。
彼強權者果稍有篤念和平之心。當早不勞諸調查員半載餘之
奔馳矣。李頓等不顧慮及此。而僅欲遷就各方面之利益。冀各
得遂其所欲。以俯就調解之範圍。此則李頓等最大之誤點也。

且李頓等亦嘗爲將來國聯大會計乎。今既不斤斤斷定是
非。則必以斷定是非之責。諉之將來之國聯大會也。以斷定
是非之責。諉之國聯大會。固爲理所當然。但所敷陳調查所
得之事實。必須預示以是非所在。乃觀報告書內容。一方面既
承認東三省擾亂之局。爲日人所造成。一方又以我國內政治
不甯。爲促成變動之因。復牽強附會。而有改東三省爲廣大
自治區之建議。其所以必設自治區者。原因爲日本擾亂。欺
抑爲中國內政不甯歟。既不承認滿洲已成之局面。又不承認
恢復九一八前之局面。不問孰是孰非。而以此變相共管爲其
替代物。其理由究安在。且此變相之自治區。既承認日本強
佔之權利。又承認其所派之顧問。不啻爲日人張目。無怪我
國人已今日共管爲日本代管之慮。然而日本猶囂囂然表示
反對。則試問我中國處此無論何人皆可宰割之境地。而反能
表示同情耶。我今姑不作激烈之反對論。即以第三者之目光
表示同情耶。我今姑不作激烈之反對論。即以第三者之目光
。批評李頓等之報告書。將來國聯若據此以謀解決東三省事
件。必更掀起重大之紛爭。結果恐將辜負李頓等一片篤念和
平之熱心。空費數閱月調查之勞力。并使此苦心經營所成一
百六十頁之優美溫和之文字。成爲廢紙。而中日之爭。依然

存在也。(申報)

■國聯調查團報告書之價值 國聯調查團六閱月調查之結果。能使我含憤忍辱之中國人民。得如何之安慰乎。抑更增加其情緒之刺戟乎。此一問題。因調查報告之正式發表。已有正確之答案。給與吾人矣。

國人倘認此項報告書之所陳述。有使中國立於失敗地位之危機者。則當知調查團派遣之時不使監視日本之踐諾撤兵。乃使研究任何足以影響國際關係。而有擾亂中日兩國和平所維繫之諒解之虞之情形。中國之於此項調查。蓋已有先天的失敗危險之豫伏矣。回憶去年十二月國聯決議案發表之時。國內輿論。顯分兩派。甲為積極反對者。主張堅決拒絕。乙為欲藉以傳達日本暴行於世界者。主張循禮招待。用作宣傳途徑。其後李頓爵士等五委員負國聯艱巨之使命東來。滬戰雖停。日勢猶盛。中國政府與人民乃依上述乙派之主張。優禮款待。冀盡宣傳之能事。然李頓爵士於三月二十八日。在行政院長汪精衛招待席上。曾明確表示「國聯決不能幫助一會員國。而損害其他一會員國。」此已無異以今日之結果。豫示於吾人矣。因是吾人倘非曾對調查團作過分之奢望者。今日亦不必為過分之失望。去年十二月國聯決議案進行時。有勸慰中國代表者。謂國聯之所準備。已屬現狀下所能提出之最好解決方案。今李頓爵士等又以彼等心目中所能提出之最好解決方案。呈諸國聯矣。李頓爵士等於報告書第十章。用「如爭議國願意接受基於此種原則之解決方法時。儘有修正之餘地。」之字句。其反面顯有爭議國不願接受之餘地。而報告書之真正的價值。換言之。即其可以實現其建議之

程度者。於此可見。

調查報告之使命。第一為審查中日間之爭議。吾人細讀報告書全文。於前八章見其對於中日爭議之審查。如第四章述九一八事變。謂「是晚日方之軍事行動。不能視為合法自衛之辦法。」第六章述偽組織之成立。為「一羣日本文武官吏。現任與退職者均有。圖謀組織並實施此項運動以為解決九月十八日以後滿洲局面之辦法」認定「現在之政權。不能認為有真正及自然之獨立運動所產生。」謂「此所謂滿洲國政府者。在當地華人心目中。真是日人之工具而已。」此種公正之審查。使吾人對於調查團。不得不佩服其目光之銳利與態度之確當。倘使其能不為被派遣時決議案中之文句所牽累。即就此依國際公理國際公法公約而定正確之解決方案者。則其解決方案。當較現在之所建議。更能有裨於實際。此可斷言者。惟其必欲於「擾亂中日兩國和平維繫之諒解」等方面。強求材料。故於第三章追述中日舊有爭執。第七章述日人之經濟利益與華人之經濟絕交。反致使其實明確之認識。為此性質複雜之數章所障蔽。結果。反使世人對於調查團之審查。嘆其認識不足。此吾人於評定報告書價值之時。所不能不為之扼腕者也。

報告書最後兩章。述解決爭案之原則及條件。並向國聯行政院提出建議。問題龐雜。非此短篇所能罄。容於明日續論之。調查報告之第二使命。為考慮中日爭議之可能的解決辦法。其第九第十兩章。即就完成此種使命之立場而敷陳者。李頓爵士等之此項敷陳。先之以解決問題之原則。繼之以適當解決之條件。最後乃向國聯行政院提出其建議。本文即依

此程序而評駁之。

東北事件。爲甲國以武力襲佔乙國領土。並由甲國以武力分化乙國政治主權完整之事件。此本有顯著之事實。昭示於世界。毋庸辨析而自明者。乃報告書必欲以「此案既非此國對於彼國不先利用國際聯合會盟約所定和平處理之機會而遽行宣戰之事件。亦非此一鄰國以武力侵犯彼一鄰國邊界之簡單案件。」等詞句。斷言問題之複雜。更另以一節陳述滿洲情況非他地所可比擬。吾人倘就報告原文。去其外交修辭而爲赤裸裸之觀察。則日本人所主張之特殊問題。赫然現於紙面。李頓爵士所深悉之「一切事實及其歷史背景。」竟將中國之領土主權問題。完全掩蔽。原則之基本如此。無怪其浪費筆墨於日方解釋之敘述。無怪其認恢復舊狀爲非解決辦法。更無怪其雖明言維持僞組織之不適當而終不得不爲變相之維持。及其顯明承認滿洲在日本經濟發展上之重要性。欲以抵貨運動不再發生。求中日經濟之接近。並特別注意國際利益與蘇聯利益。而全部原則之真正意義。始透露於吾人之前。李頓爵士等認定。(一)日本需要經濟出路。而可廣大可靠之市場。須在亞洲。尤其在中國。始能獲得。(二)此市場中列強重大利益。亟應維持。甚至蘇聯利益。亦不容忽視。(三)至於中國。則只須使之鞏固與近代化。生活程度抬高。貿易興奮。市場購買力增加。吾人就此三點。認清此項原則之原則。則立於中國人之地位。以空言估量報告書之價值。自知其將不免爲世界明達所竊笑。

復次。試觀察依上述原則而來之所謂適當解決條件報告書所列條件十項。其前四項係關於各方利益者。乃於第一項

「適合中日雙方之利益」以外。第四項更重言以。「承認日本在滿洲之利益。」是無異表示日本利益之可掩蓋中國利益矣。五六兩項爲「樹立中日間之新條約關係。」「解決將來之有效辦法。」容於討論其所建議之辦法時併論之。第七項「滿洲自治。」則使吾人細讀其解說之文句後。不得不發生一重大之疑問。滿洲之須自治。原因在於其曾經被人侵佔乎。抑在於各方利益之關係乎。日人所製造之僞獨立運動。可用作改變中國行政組織之根據乎。大多數愛國義軍之活動。其意旨可以一筆抹殺之乎。使此項自治運動而爲真正大數住民所發起。吾人不欲反對。若以國際勢力造成之自治。無論如何。爲全中國人民所不能承認。因此。其第八條件。亦只能適合於日軍之撤退。日軍撤退而地方原狀恢復。始可談秩序問題與安全問題。此亦一定不易之程序也。第九條件之中日間經濟協調。提出於今日。未免時機過早。其第十一以國際合作促進中國之建設。其最後之說明。爲以暫時的國際合作。促進中國之內部建設。而其起首之說明。則有「中國政府之不穩定。既爲中日友好之障礙。及爲其他各國所關懷。遠東和平之維持。既爲有關國際之事件。而上述辦法。又非待中國具有強有力之中央政府時。不能實現」等語。此使中國人民讀之。不能不肌膚起粟。寒顫而不敢道謝矣。

調查團向國聯行政院提出之建議。欲以顧問會議。造成(一)治理東三省之特殊制度。(二)中國對日屈服之三種條約。此所謂特殊制度。其性質及組織。具如報告書所述。凡讀報告書者。均加以注意而有相當之明瞭。中國對日應訂立之三種條約。其內容所應規定之日本利益。建議中亦全爲之作

具體的說明。不必有所贅述。吾人就此加以審察以後。所欲問者。爲(一)此種特殊制度之真正意義何在。蓋如所建議之制度。不啻改變偽組織之形式。而使成爲合法的存在。並於許多操縱現在東北政權之日顧問中加入若干西籍顧問。中國則宣言承認實際管理權。換得名義上之領土行政完整及若干稅款之收入。依吾人觀察。決非真正解決爭端之道也。(二)將來東北之實際勢力之爲何人所握持。蓋於現在日人勢力下訓練特別憲兵。其結果亦必爲現在偽滿洲軍之變相。於真正特別憲兵之作用。必難獲得。雖有外國教練官。亦不過現在偽組織之西顧問之類耳。(三)中國對日三種條約之訂立。如所擬議。是否合於中日經濟合作之意義。蓋中國既以條約承認。並讓予日本以廣大之權利。並須負阻遏抵制日貨運動之責任。而中國所得。幾等於零。以此言經濟合作。直等貓鼠間之合作耳。

最後。吾人於調查團全部報告。作一總評。可斷言其欲以國際複雜之關係。附以日人所造成之既存事實。代替中國之收回東三省失地。所謂兩國爭議之審查。兩國根本利益之調和。不過掩蔽廬山真面之外交修辭耳。(申報)

□國聯調查團報告發表。舉世注目之國聯調查團報告書。今日公布矣。自東北事變發生。我國所以應付者。唯一之途徑爲倚賴國聯。而國聯在一年餘之中。惟一之成績。即此報告書。今此書公布。我政府當局讀之。作何感想。我全國人民讀之。作何感想。

近時日本方面。盛傳調查團報告書不利於日。舉國譁然。相驚伯有。國人聞之。不知其如何主持正義。甚至有認爲

國際形勢已有轉機者。及今觀之。果如何乎。

報告書原文甚長。今公布者僅爲節要。但重要之結論九十章。均公布全文。則吾人觀此節要。亦與見全文無異。今就此中所載。吾人認爲可注意者。列舉數端如左。望政府當局及國民審慎研究。其得失究竟如何。

結論中規定適當解決所採之原則。甚十條。(一)「如某種解決雙方均不能取得利益。對於和平前途。毫無善果。」解決爭端。當以正義公理爲準。不能專求平均。譬如甲之田產。爲乙所奪。我決爭端。但當查明田產所有權。確屬於何方。不能將所爭之田。令甲乙平分。東北乃中國土地。日人之舉動。完全爲侵略。今所謂雙方均須得利益。是否認侵略者亦有應得之權利乎。(二)「遵守現行多方面之條約。」即指國聯盟約非戰公約九國公約等而言。各種公約。誠當尊重。但自去年以來。破壞公約之種種行爲。將作何判斷。若置之不問。以後尙有尊重可言乎。(三)「承認日本在滿洲之利益。」此所謂日本利益。究竟何指。就通商往來之利益言乎。則日之利益。從未被侵害。即報告書中。亦經證明。若黑夜進兵逐我官吏。佔我土地。殺我人民。亦將認爲應有之利益一一承認乎。(四)「滿洲內部秩序。應以有效的地方憲警維持之。須將憲警以外軍隊掃數撤退。」所指軍隊。據後文云。包括中日軍隊而言。日軍應撤。乃不移之理。中國軍隊。何以不能駐紮中國境內。如此則所謂中國獨立之主權安在。若但爲解決爭端。世界各國接壤之區發生爭執者多矣。曾否有國家適用此種方法(十)「以國際合作促進中國之建設。」此條下雖有解釋之語甚多。但如何合作。殊難捉摸。此事影

響於中國主權者如何。尤堪注意。與國際共管之說。有何異同。

此外如對於行政院之建議。及解釋程序優點中。可注意者尙多。限於篇幅。容俟他日論之。但就上列者言。吾人已感覺此問題蓋甚嚴重也。

吾人自救。須賴自力。不可依賴外人。故聞其利於我者之言。本無所謂可喜。聞其祖日之言。亦無所謂可悲。但此項報告。詳列辦法。非空言可比。國聯大會討論後。即轉入實施區域。故不能不注意今後之形勢。此報告中。關係我國主權根本者甚多。我當局對此等辦法。是否認為完全可以接受。如有認為不可者。將以何法應付。此其一。日本對於報告書。久有反對之說。今復力言不許第三者干涉。日本若不承受。國聯將如何。是否將再增加迎合日本意旨之程度。以圖速了。若竟如是我國將如何。此其二。日人對討論報告。要求展期六星期。國聯特會。已經照允。日人要求展緩討論。當然不僅為預備答辯計。據外間所傳。或將利用此時期。更造成一種新局勢。使大會討論此問題時。與事實又發生不同之點。則彼即可藉口推翻報告。或變更其中辦法。使更有利於彼。我國關於此點。究竟有無應付之準備。此其三。以上三端皆關係國家存亡之要鍵。亦即國難已達最重要時期之表現。願當局及國民急起圖之。(新聞報)

告書。乃竟有根本上之錯誤。此根本上之錯誤。非獨不顧中國之地位。亦且不顧國聯所應處之地位與其所應負之責任。斯不可以不辨也。

我所謂根本之錯誤。即在第十章之建議。平心論之。報告書全文。對於東省事變是非曲直之所在。與夫責任之誰屬。雖措辭極圓渾。極婉轉。似隱然受日本方面強硬空氣之所籠罩。而未肯振筆直書。但字裏行間。亦已指出日本之突然發難。實為一種不正當之侵略行爲。茲試就報告書之所述。分析言之。(記者作此文時除第九章第十兩章外尙祇見節要)

(一)九一八事件。係日本甘爲戎首。不能視爲合法自衛之辦法。(第四章)(二)東省確爲中國領土。在歷史上未嘗與本國分離。在事實上不能與本國分離。(第二章及第九章)(三)偽組織非當地人民自動。實由日本軍隊之在場與日本文武官吏之活動。始構成此所謂「滿洲國」(第六章)以上三點。既已判明。則東省事變之發生。以及此後種種事實之演進。在中國爲無端受人侵害。在日本爲有意破壞遠東和平。固已毫無疑義。爲維持各項公約之威信計。爲保障中國領土完整計。固應由國聯本身。負起責任。實施盟約。對於違約行暴者。加以適當之制裁與懲戒。即令退一步言。不得不顧及國際形勢。與目前事實。而出於委曲求全之道。亦應根據公道和平之原則。別定一適當處置之辦法。或猶可望有解決之途徑。然而報告書第十章之建議。則似完全未考慮及此。而一方面使國聯卸除責任。一方面又希冀抑制中國強令就範。其立論實足令人驚異。本報昨日南京電。述某法學家之表示。謂報告書中既云依照公約。尊重中國

主權。而又謂滿洲恢復舊日狀況爲不可能。公然主張組織顧問會議。治理東省。實爲絕大矛盾。誠爲確切不移之論也。第十章之建議。根據於第九章之解決原則。報告書所提解決原則。已至空洞而含渾。而第十章建議。竟以組織顧問會議。爲解決東省事件之不二辦法。尤爲失當。豈中國所能接受。按其所謂顧問會議。係以中日兩國政府代表及當地人民之代表團組成之。如經當事雙方同意。可得中立國觀察員之協助。試問依此辦法。將置中國主權於何地。不特此也。中日兩國。各選代表。爲對等之會議。有同等之權限。已甚背乎事理。而况所謂當地人民之代表。依目前之事實。東省人民。久處日本暴力之下。其有優秀分子。心懷祖國。不甘爲日人鷹犬者。非被誅夷。亦早遠引。結果所選出之代表。無非爲漢奸之代表耳。以日人與漢奸混合組成之會議。而謂可由此會議。產生和平公道之解決辦法。其誰信之。至於所謂中立國觀察員。其名義既標明「中立」。其任務又指定爲「協助」。至多不過遇事調解。以求敷衍終局已耳。尙有何種力量。建議原文。又謂

「如該會議。有任何特殊之點。不克同意時。可將此意見參差之點。提出於國聯行政院。行政院對此。當設法覓得一同意之解決辦法」

行政院之責任。乃僅僅設法覓得一同意之解決辦法。細玩「設法覓得」四字。其爲委曲遷就。而不能有確定之主張。與堅決之方法。顯然可見。尙安望其能根據盟約。維持公道。以處理此極繁複極重大之糾紛耶。

總之此項建議。直截言之。不啻對此次東省事變。仍歸

結於中日直接交涉。直接交涉。固日人所求之不得者。若千迴百折。而仍變相以遂日人之願。則中國又何必提出此案於國聯。而國聯之迭次召集會議。討論遠東問題。與夫調查團之奉命來華。爲長時間之探討。甯非徒亂人意。等於多事。調查團諸公。對於此點。太欠考慮。謂爲根本錯誤。非過甚之談也。

顧問會議之組織與前提。既已失當。而論其權限。尤爲廣泛。充第十章建議之主旨。直欲使中國此後在東省之設置軍隊。任命官吏。以及一切司法行政。悉受日本之操縱。或成爲改換局面的國際共管。關於此點。就第十章所述各條。顯然可見不復列舉。此非吾人神經過敏。好爲惡意的推測。實亦勢所必至者也。報告書之建議。其不能令人之滿意也至此。吾國今日且不必問國聯之作何措置。亦不必問日本之持何態度。但須整頓全神。決定步驟。以應付此嚴重之局勢。既不能再作倚賴他人之想。亦更無遲迴却顧之餘地矣。

(新聞報)

□談報告書節要 今日我人獲讀之「國際聯盟調查團對於中日問題報告書節要」除第九第十兩章乃其全文而外。其餘言及前八章。以時間空間所限。僅得知其要旨至憾事也。調查團之任務。蓋爲

(一)審查中日間之爭議。(包括此項爭議之原因發展及在調查時之現狀)

(二)考慮中日爭議之可能的解決辦法(務須對於兩國之根本利益予以調和)

是以調查團所製報告書。即以右列二端爲出發點。而對

此世界絕大之糾紛。演成種種絕大之罪惡。其間應有之是非。應有之責任問題。皆不從正面作顯明之斷案。是報告書之絕大闕憾。亦產生調查團之國際聯盟。不敢追求是非與責任之所致。雖然求之報告書之字裏行間。日本應負其責。固證據鑿鑿也。

讀報告書前八章節要。隨處發見可議之言辭。如第一章「中國近來發展之述要。」語及我國之民族主義。則以抗外之空氣與日本受較他國更鉅之影響為言。第二章「滿洲之狀況及其與中國其他部份及俄國之關係」。以我國計劃減削日本在東省勢力之政策。使衝突益形擴大為言。此類敘述。在未獲讀其全文之今日。無從斷言其是否含有代日本解脫嚴重責任之意義。

第三章「一九三一年九月十八日以前中日關於滿洲之爭執」。第四章「一九一八以後滿洲事變之序述」。第五章「上海」。第六章「滿洲國」。此四章。以事實為骨幹。事實所在。故為軒輊之機會固亦較少。第七章「日人之經濟利益與華人之經濟絕交」忽以對於經濟絕交運動。中國政府應負責任為言。此項敘述與論斷。茲無從知其報告書全文中居何地與分量。然在節要之中。則獨見稜角者也。第八章「在滿洲之經濟利益」以中日合作及門戶開放為結論。

報告書最足引人注意之部分。為第九第十二章。此二章者。調查團將以完成其第二項任務。即所謂考慮中日爭議之可能的解決辦法是也。國聯派遣調查團之正目的在此。八個月以來。舉世期待調查團者在此。依恃信仰國聯。所謂解決中日問題之關鍵者在此。今後國聯關於中日問題所決辦法之

基礎亦在此。此而能否為中日雙方所接受。行且歸宿於世界和戰。人類禍福。以及國聯本身之存廢問題。

第九章「解決之原則及條件」。明確敘述東省為我國之領土。而以為僅求恢復九一八以前之舊狀。並非解決糾紛之辦法。蓋必對於各種關係。面面顧到。調查團乃建議原則十端。一適合中日雙方之利益。二考慮蘇聯利益。三遵守現行多方面之條約。四承認日本在滿洲之利益。五樹立中日間之新條約關係。六對於將來隨時解決糾紛。特訂辦法。七東省自治。八東省須安全而有秩序。憲警外不駐軍隊。九掖勵中日間經濟協調之成立。十以國際合作。促進中國之建設。此十者。彼所謂適當解決之條件也。

第十章「審查意見及對於行政院之建議」。即調查團關於解決中日問題之方法與途徑之條陳也。歸納其說。第一步由國聯請中日兩政府接受前章原則。討論解決糾紛。第二步召集顧問會議。由中日兩政府代表。及中日兩國各自規定產生之當地人民代表組織之。或更加以中立之觀察員。由於會議。創設特殊制度。以治理東三省。而由中國政府宣言承認會議之結果。並轉知各國。視為有國際協定之約束性質。本章所附辦法。並極重要。但讀全文。躍然紙上也。

綜讀報告書節要。調查團將不能諱言其草就報告書時。其心理狀態蓋陷於日本暴力佔據中國領土之事實之黑影中。是以所條陳之辦法。雖實現之日。差勝於強佔下之今茲。然求之國際盟約第十條。九國公約第一條各款之精神。乃至中日現有條約之規定。則絕無是處。蓋自事實追溯。一切約章。以期勉強保全約章之體面。而非以一切約章衡量事實。宜

素不免於矛盾矣。

舉世期待之報告書。今日竟與世共見。國聯其將據爲處理中日問題之繩準乎。我國政府其將無以拒絕國聯根據報告書之決議乎。日本其將繼續其暴戾之態度乎。胥待五旬內之事實爲答案。控制未來之事實者。血戰東省之義勇軍也。

(時事新報)

■我國現狀與日本侵略 國聯調查團報告書對於我國現狀。不免惡意攻擊之嫌。顧又前後矛盾。無以自圓其說。如第一章關於中國近年發展之述要。指摘「大多數民衆側重於家族或地方觀念。而不重國家觀念。」僅承認「若干領袖不復拘拘於此種狹窄之思想。」又指陳「真正國家之統一。必以大多數民衆具有國家觀念爲前提」。其意蓋謂目前未具備此前提也。我人茲不必自行辨白其言之是非。蓋報告書第七章之論經濟絕交。既謂「係導源於一世紀以來之習慣。其因此所得之訓練及心理態度。與國民黨所代表之現代羣族主義相混合」又謂「既屬普遍。且有組織。發端於強烈之民族情緒。而強烈之民族情緒又從而鼓舞之。」夫國家觀念與民族情緒。信爲異辭。然謂前者「不重」。而後者「強烈」。不太費解歟。抑又不必問其說之可解不可解。然調查團於報告中日問題之際。何爲而指摘及於國家觀念與國家統一。亦豈不可已歟。是則無非取爲闡明日本亟欲使東省與中國政府分離之一端(見第九章)。然其第二章固又明明謂「張學良不顧日本之勸告。與南京方面及國民黨更爲密切聯絡。一九二八年十二月。宣告服從中央政府」準是以言。不問我國上下一般的國家觀念如何。統一狀態如何。而中日問題焦點所在之東省情

形。初不以不重國家觀念與不統一而自取召致日本分裂詭計之咎也。咎不在此乃復取爲報告資料。謂無惡意之嫌歟。

我人何欲斷言調查團之竟懷惡意。報告書全文之中。或別有完整之文辭字句。足以避免惡意嫌疑。然就節要所撮陳之資料。至少應有莊嚴之結論曰。中國人民之國家觀念與時俱進。民族情緒日趨強烈。東省當局復能棄其地方觀念而服從中央。以不甘爲日本之傀儡而不顧日本之勸告。中國國家統一之大業。將見完成。於是日本知侵略之不可再緩。乃亟以迅雷不及掩耳之手段。使強佔東省。使與中國分離。此真相也。此要點也。亦正論也。報告書節要中所未有。亦爲報告書全文中所必無。夫闕漏要點。既可譏矣。益以不必要不準確之指摘。何歟。

日本之所以破壞我國者。無所不用其極。彼國要人屢屢發表不負責任之談話。其宣傳機關之多方誣蔑。即彼國聯代表在國聯會議席上。亦公然指我爲無國家組織。指中國爲地理名辭。是爲國人所沒齒不忘之恥辱。而世人於日本宣傳浸潤麻醉之餘。所將疑將信者也。今報告書乃超越必要之範圍。指摘我國現狀。雖以事實所在。無以掩其矛盾。然狂妄之日本。必欣然於張目有人。益肆其鼓簧之舌。以惑世人聽聞。此則報告書發表以後。所可逆觀者也。(時事新報)

■經濟絕交與日本侵略 報告書以所謂可能的解決辦法爲結論。爲結論之基礎者。應爲中日紛爭之原因與經過也。雙方之證據與是非也。乃求之節要之中。關於最主要之若干問題。皆隱約其辭。甚難發見明確之答案。而摭拾我國一二事端。大書特書。尤有周內之形跡。調查團於取舍資料之際

。誠不知何所準則也。請以經濟絕交例言之。

自來我國之對日抵貨運動。無一而非遭受侵凌後之反應。此次自萬寶山農田案。朝鮮屠殺華僑案相繼發生。抵貨運動乃接踵而起。及九一八之變。舉國當然憤慨至於極度。苟在他國。必且國交破裂而宣戰。經濟絕交乃為不在話下之當然現象。願我國民間雖主張破釜沈舟。決一死戰。徒以政府之審慎遲迴而移本問題於國聯。國聯方面既無堅決強毅之辦法。日本暴行復變本加厲而日亟。我國人民在此情況之下。從事經濟絕交，自屬最起碼之抵抗行為。以此擬之國家民族求生存之一切手段。真可謂輕微之不足道。調查團理解及此。則漠然視之。以待中日問題根本解決後之自然消滅可也。不謂報告書中一再牽連及此。其意謂非舉以為強暴分謗歟。

其綜述中國之現狀。既是認「一國國民既有國家統一之覺悟。則當然具有一種對外解放之願望。」而我國於華會之後。經十年而絕鮮具體之進步者。謂以「不幸因排外宣傳之熱烈。遂頓使進步遲滯。其中如經濟抵制。及將排外宣傳導入學校兩事進行太猛。遂以造成本案發生時之特殊空氣。」（語見第一章）對外解放之願望。誠普遍域內。然宣傳之斬求之者。亦惟求貫徹此願望而已。安在有所謂排外耶。各國之斬而不與。又何嘗以我國之排外耶。進一步說。國人而自始不敢作對外解放之願望。但外侮如本案者。於其發生之日。任何國家。豈猶得保持其「普通空氣」耶。因果倒置。莫此甚矣。

其敘述東省狀況與中俄日之關係焉。則曰「北方共產黨說及南方國民黨反日宣傳或相聯絡。益使日本渴望在兩者之

間。介以一與兩者不生關係之滿洲」又謂東省「在國民黨勢力之下。黨義宣傳及抗日活動。更為緊張。」（見第二章）不言日本侵略。而言我國抗日反日。是實繼續其倒因為果之謬誤。願有更應體認明白。分別言之者。日本渴望於滿洲者。果為北與蘇俄共產學說。南與中國國民黨。兩無關係耶。謂日本求兩無關係者。是日本意在以東省為屏障為緩衝也。信若是。或且為日本原諒。然證以日本進佔東省。而築路。而移民。是日本非求屏障而自為之障也。非求緩衝而身當其衝也。此以事實反證調查團之錯覺。亦可知日本之有大慾於東省者。曾與所謂國民黨之反日宣傳無與也。

報告書第七章。謂中日間之鬭爭。不僅屬於軍事性質抑且屬於經濟性質。如是云云。不以二者為因果。不以二者相後先。乃相提而並論之。於是知調查團非有成見。即為日本蒙蔽者深矣。報告書明指世人以我之紊亂。獨於經濟絕交則曰「有團體主使之。指揮之。該項團體能審之。亦能收之。……而重要支配之機關厥為國民黨」謂有不能統一之國家。乃有步伐整齊之社會。是非古今中外之奇觀歟。調查團非不自知甚矛盾。顧不若是者。將無以得「不無含有政府之責任耳」一語為斷案。指為周內。夫豈過言哉。求之實際。國民黨誠中國最大之組織。然其滋長與力量。尙未進步至對於社會能發能收之程度。故以此責國民黨乃至責政府。實為過譽而極冤。揆之報告書「強烈之民族情緒」之說尤見全章之支離滅裂。抑更進數步言之。報告書對於經濟絕交發生之疑問。在乎「單獨對於某一國之貿易。實行有組織之抵制。是否合於睦誼。抑或與條約義務不相抵觸」誠不知所謂睦誼與條約

義務者。可以責之片面乎。日本國家政府作九一八以後之行為。陸誼與條約義務之謂何。以彼例此。雖中國政府及國民黨竟為經濟絕交之中心。謂有負日本耶。有負國聯盟約。有負國際道義耶。(時事新報)

李頓調查報告之原則。歷地數萬里。費時六閱月。舉世仰望。各方矚目之李頓調查報告。已於昨晚同時正式公布於日內瓦及中日之首都矣。是項報告。不特瀾天之遠東巨禍。國聯將資以為率循解決之南針。即今後之國際爭議。亦將顯示其維繫疏解之作用。其關係豈不重哉。

李頓調查報告之目的。在獲取東北問題之解決方法。吾人在評述其建議的解決方法之前。首當探究其解決之原則。蓋原則為方法之前提。果原則而不明。則論斷其奚自。依次述評。請自此始。

綜觀調查報告之原則。其要旨(一)則為中日雙方利益之並存。(二)則為蘇俄利益之顧慮。(三)則為現有條約之遵守。而探致擁護於非戰公約九國公約及國聯盟約。(四)則為承認日本在東省之利益。而示現實之未可漠視。(五)則為中日間新條約關係之成立。(六)則為未來爭執之有效的規定。而為創設一顧問會議之建議。(七)則為確認東三省之高度的自治。(八)則為撤退任何方面之武裝而代以憲兵。(九)則為中日間經濟合作之提倡。而殿以(十)賴國際合作。促進中國建設之發展。

平情論之。凡上所陳。自國聯之立場言。自尙不失為「允當」(一)之辦法。而尤以遵守國際條約。承認日本利益。一方顧全國聯之立場。一方啓示解決之途徑。殊見李頓爵士

及調查諸君政治眼光外交手腕之敏銳。蓋前者為中國政府及世界公正人士一致之主張。而後者則為日本大慾之所在而在合法之限度內。中國政府與國民亦未嘗加以否認或排除。「九一八」前彼日閱所信信致嘗於日本權益之受威脅而引為軍事侵略之口實者。固已由調查報告證明其為無據之謬言矣。至顧問會議之創設及東省高度自治之允可。實為建議本體之焦點。惟當記者握管時。全稿正在排印。提要又有出入。(外國通訊社之譯件。與原意頗有出入。即路透社亦不能免。)未窺全豹。不敢妄斷。其詳自唯有俟諸明日。茲特酌述其概括的觀感以發其凡焉。

夫國與國間不幸發生爭議解決之道。除從事戰爭外。自惟斡旋。調停。國際交涉及國際裁判之是賴。遼變之作。時逾一年。斡旋調停之道既以日本之頑抗國聯而窮。直接交涉之途。復以非法之承認偽國而絕。至國際裁判。事偏於法律性的爭議。且日本亦決不願。方途盡塞。迴旋無自。而調查報告乃有所謂顧問會議之建議。使由中日兩國分別規定選舉之政府代表暨當地人民代表。介以中立之觀察者。混合組織。斯自吾國家之利害着想。雖多流弊。而未許為無條件之承認。顧自「方法論」論之。自國聯之立場論之。則誠不得不深佩其設計之工而且巧也。

至解決東北問題之方策。時論所趨。非謂消極的棄以資敵。即欲積極的復吾國土。而中外實際之政治家。則皆探索折中妥協之方案。於是或則暗示宗主權與自治領之例。或則主張中日共同經營之說。或着眼於承認權益。或心儀於直接交涉。而此次李頓報告之建議。則遺其名而擯其要。試觀其

於中央政府之權限。(尤以外交權爲最。)則列舉而保留之。於東省地方政府之權限。則概括而付予之。謂爲自治領與宗主國。雖屬擬於不倫。顧夷考其實。曾何稍異於聯邦國家之所謂「邦」？以吾單一完整之國而突欲更易其政制。不獨依法不合。且東北爲中國不可分之一部。在事實上即調查報告亦稱其「中國化」之程度初未嘗稍異於冀魯。若東北三省可以日本之一度非法劫奪而脫離中央政府之統治。則此例一開。他日冀魯等省亦何嘗不可因某種外力之干涉而爲「高度」之自治。寢假而受帝國主義者之劫持也。調查報告之爲調查報告。於此可見其廬山真面目矣。(晨報)

■再論李頓調查報告 李頓調查報告之原則。既已具詳於昨論。蓋其秉折衷妥協之精神。一方遵守現行條約。顧全國聯立場。一方承認日本利益。啓示解決途徑。輕於既往事變責任之追求。重於今後防止糾紛之辦法。揆以國聯之傳統的態度。勢則然也。是故吾人對於調查團諸君之顧全大體。仗義執言。固不勝其欽遲。而於其遷就現實曲意規避之處。則又不勝其遺憾。茲請得而深論之。

夫東北傀儡組織。俘虜集團。釜底游魂。此而可稱爲國。此而可加承認。則武力將永爲國策之工具。平和將盡爲暴力所摧毀。國聯生命。自茲而斬。國際禍亂。欲避無從矣。故調查報告對於摘奸發伏。不稍假借。試觀其於僞國之產生也。直指爲日本軍隊之在場及日本文武官吏活動之所致。而示此非法組織之非爲當地人士真正及自然之獨立運動。其於暴日續施其亡韓的顧問政治於我東北也。則指使傀儡組織之重要政治行政權。則操於日本官吏及日本顧問之手。若輩不

獨有技術的建議之權。抑且直接管理員司。指揮行政。西洋鏡一律戳穿。閻胡盧完全打破。彼日人方自慶其設計之工。以所謂「日本系的滿洲人」如駒井大橋之流。操縱政治。徐圖兼併。今乃突被犀照。悉現原形。使日人不能復售其欺。不可謂非大快人心之事也。

至九一八事變之作。執行侵略。誰爲戎首。法理事實。兩俱顯然。調查報告。能不屈伏於暴力。不見惑於鬪言。直書此爲日方充分準備敏捷實行之計劃。即就鐵路損害之本身言。亦殊不足以證明日本軍事行動之正當。而力斥其爲非自衛的行爲。誠可謂詞嚴而義正矣。所惜者。調查報告既明言九一八晚之事變。爲日本軍人之非自衛的暴舉。則對罪惡昭彰之戎首。胡爲獨斬「侵略者」之稱號而不與。而輕輕解脫其破壞盟約公約之責任。即對摧毀上海震驚舉世之一二八事變。胡爲亦僅予以輕微之記述。此非調查團有意避重就輕。使日本得倖免於盟約第十六條之制裁。並不允滿洲之恢復原狀而使中國領土行政保全之義實質的減殺於無形乎。

至於經濟絕交既爲吾國人民有激而發之自救行爲。則在不逾越規範之前提下。豈如報告書第七章「並以國際協定加以規定」之得以輕輕禁絕。且事有因果。勢有順逆。論衡須得其平。客觀勝於主觀。以調查團諸君之明。胡爲不揣其本而齊其末。而惴惴於抵貨之甚耶。法報稱報告書富於英國色彩。其信然歟。

要之。主持正義。國聯雖有責任。而收復失土則仍有待於吾國之人人。世蓋未有倚賴他國而可以自復其國土之完整與國家之光榮者。今調查報告已揭布矣。是非曲直已較過去

更爲顯著矣。國際對我之觀感或將因是而漸趨優勢。此打破僵局之大好機會也。國人乎。其善用此機會以求中日問題之有利的解決。(晨報)

■國聯調查報告發表矣。東三省調查報告書。已發表矣。報告書中之內容。國人皆欲先觀爲快。而記者所最注意者。發表後之效力果何如也。自去歲九一八日本稱兵犯境以來。吾國始終信仰國聯。國聯開會已非一次。最後決定有調查之舉。調查報告書。至最近始發表。是國聯之威望。將於此次確立。而吾國之信仰。將於此次確慰也。

但事實上告訴我們。日本侵占。由瀋陽而吉林而黑龍江。由組織偽滿洲國而承認之。初不因國聯之調查。稍止其進行。國聯之力量。既不能阻止於調查報告書未發表之前。而謂日本之軍閥。必屈伏於調查報告書發表之後。真要看國聯之自處如何。雖據國際法律家意見。日本即退出國聯。必須有兩年之先期通知。且即令退出國聯以後。國際義務。仍應履行。法律固應當如是。法律可戰勝武力乎。假使法律有效。無故破壞中國領土之完整。在國際上是何種法律。日本軍閥。不講法。既不顧一切。侵占東三省。又不顧一切組織偽滿洲國。又不顧一切而承認之。設到底不顧一切退出國聯。或即不退出國聯而不履行國際義務。則國聯將如之何。將強制執行乎。抑聽之乎。如強制執行。將用何種方法以達目的乎。將引起世界絕大之和平乎。如聽之。一任日本之橫行於東三省乎。馴致橫行於世界乎。此皆國聯本身之威望問題。且亦國聯本身之責任問題。又且國聯本身之利害問題。惟是中國一年餘之信仰。不能不於此報告書發表時更覺端

端也。

至於中國本身賴此奄奄無生氣之公理。呼號至一年之久。其失敗已處於必然之勢。日本侵佔之初。不過瀋陽一隅。中國政府與人民。欲恃國聯仗義執言。使寸土尺地之不失。今竟如何。即使調查報告書發表以後。日本帖耳服從國聯之判斷。中國所受之損失。恐亦由政府與人民最初企望之外。是國聯一年來之工作。並未能稍有裨益於中國。稍有節制於日本。而況日本桀傲不服判斷之勢。時時宣揚於軍閥之口。設國聯仍無切實辦法。國聯空擲虛牝之工作。吾人可以不問。而中國政府與人民。一年來信仰國聯之真心。豈不適予日本之利。而增中國之害乎。

西方有言「天助自助者」。中國有言「夫人必自侮然後人侮之」。言雖相反。意則一致。吾不能自助。希望人之助我。結果必爲人所侮。其侮也。即不啻自侮之也。中國與日本。能戰則戰。不能戰則和。戰和皆我自主。不過利用外交以爲護助。己不能戰。而希望引起日美或日俄戰爭。己不能和。而匍伏聽命國聯判斷之和。此自失其獨立之資格也。一戰而強。一戰而亡。視人民最後之決心。一和而存。一和而弱。視政府善後之政策。要之強亡弱存。皆自我主之。無論如何。不失洋洋乎偉大民族之風。鞏固中央。統一全國。日本雖橫。其如我何。(民報)

■國聯調查團報告書發表。昨晚八時。發表李頓報告書摘要。天津獨落後。在本文起草時。(今晨零時)尙未到津。僅由北平電話及南京廣播無線電。知第九第十兩章結論之要點。因此尙不能對該報告書作詳細評論。僅先述吾人簡單

之感想。

第一。東三省事件。中國自始恪守國聯決議。而國聯決議。保促日本儘速撤兵。恢復兩國通常關係。今調查團報告書結論。乃謂恢復原狀之不宜。夫自九一八以來。一年餘矣。國聯決議。勿令事態惡化及軍事擴大。而日本益惡化之。擴大之。今調查團報告書。乃幸就日軍侵占後造成之現狀。建議作薄弱中國統治權之解決。此爲吾人所遺憾。

第二。調查團報告書。係五國委員數月苦心之結晶。吾人對諸委員之勞苦。自表敬意。且報告書中有充分表示該團之公正精神者。如證明九一八事變出於日方預定之精密計畫。及偽獨立運動由日本參謀部之援助指揮。國聯所派五大國代表。於實地調查半年之後。鄭重研究而爲此言。此當然爲世界輿論之指歸。足彰日本軍閥欺瞞世界之罪惡。

第三。該團建議。中日應訂新約。解決糾紛。互保親睦。此點本吾人所贊同。誠以遠東大局。非中日相安。永無平和確定之可能也。然國聯及各會員國國民須知。中日不能友善之責。不在我而在日本。其最明確之證據。即如此次報告書。本絕對有利日本。然日本外務省陸軍省。昨已表示反對。將對於該報告書之結論。完全反駁。荒木更屢屢昌言。調查團任何建議。與日本軍部政策。不生影響。是可知日本目的在分割中國。獨立亞洲。與調查團之希望完全相左也。

第四。由今日之事實。證明國聯及各主要會員國。自始即態度錯誤。蓋各國志在維持和平。故始終只持調解態度。不能爲擁護公約之有力措置。然寧知日本軍閥專恃武力。擅懷戰爭。故各國愈調解。愈長其氣燄。愈遷就。愈促其侵吞。

年來事實。可爲明證。今調查團報告書。較之去年九月三十日國聯決議。更遷就多矣。凡關切和平和維持公約之各國。倘仍持去年以來之態度。僅空言勸告。無議約決心。則李頓建議案。必遭日本峻拒。或且因此更促日閥進一步之退。

第五。中國於此自應守其正當不變之立場。即絕對保持領土主權及行政完整。而對日關係。則以兩國條約爲範圍。凡合此原則之建議。應贊成。不合者。應反對。此原則貫徹。則進一步與日本訂立互不侵犯及公斷仲裁等條約。如李頓報告書所建議者。自應爲中國所深願。雖然。此理論則然耳。事實上必無從達此目的。蓋日本志在分割中國。安有和平解決之望。是以中國應在世界上守正當立場。鼓勵國際輿論。同時應覺悟國聯勸告調解式辦法之畢竟難成。而自求其禦侮圖存之真正出路。(大公報)

東省事變責任確定之後。通讀李頓報告書第一至第八章摘要。定第九十兩章全文。可知不論國聯若何採納。及其建議之解決方法是否合宜。但報告書本身。業已對本案爲重大之貢獻。此無他。即證明日本爲侵略國是也。

報告書第四六兩章。雖不明指日本爲侵略者。但於九一八之變既稱「依據調查團所得確切之說明。可知日本係抱有一種精密預備之計畫」。一九三一年九月十八夜。該項計畫。曾以敏捷準確之方法實行之。一同時證明中國方面。依照所奉訓令。並無進擊日軍。亦並無在特定時間及地點危害日僑生命財產之計畫。一至於鐵路炸毀事。則謂「鐵路即使受有損害。但事實上並未阻礙長春南下列車準時之到達。且即

就鐵路損害之本身而論。實亦不足以證明軍事行動之正當。一故斷言「是晚日方之軍事行動。不能視為合法自衛之辦法。」根據本章可知九一八之變。純為日本侵略的挑釁。又第六章說明「滿洲國」成立經過。尤為公正。即（一）「一九三一年九月以前。滿洲毫末聞有獨立運動。其所以有此運動者。乃日本軍隊在場所致。」（二）「一羣日本文武官吏圖謀組織。並實施此項運動。以為解決九月十八日以後滿洲局面之辦法。」（三）「日本參謀部對於獨立運動之組織者。予以援助及指揮。」（四）「本調查團認為滿洲國」之構成。其最有力之兩種份子。為日本軍隊之在場。及日本文武官吏之活動。若無此二者。「新國」決不能成立。」（五）「基此理論。現在之政權。不能認為由真正及自然之獨立運動所產生。」（五）「基此理論。現在之政權。不能認為由真正及自然之獨立運動所產生。」（六）「該政府」重要之政治行政權。操諸日本官吏及日人顧問之手。」（七）「所謂滿洲國政府者。在當地華人心目中。直是日人之工具。」根據本章。可知偽國成立純為日本侵略之手段。

凡以上所云。本為完全事實。報告書尚婉曲言之而已。夫就李頓及諸委員言。甘於犯一強國之怒。而揭開事實。宜諸世界。其忠于職務之精神。及主張公道之勇氣。殊足令世界人類讚佩。而就國聯各關係國及美國言。則調查團此項調查事實之結論。實為對於滿洲事變責任之最後的判決。其性質意義。誠重大無倫。蓋由此結論。證明日本為以武力手段占領鄰國領土之侵略者。是則為與國聯盟約非戰公約九國公約絕對抵觸之行為。日本此項行為不能糾正。則各和平公約勢成廢紙。

各關係國既稱維護國聯及各公約。則對於此侵略的行為。勢不應不加以糾正。此論理的必然之結論也。夫上述理由。本中國一年來所主張。然中國為爭執中之一造。所言未能生效。且因爭執不能決。訴諸國聯。亦不能即決也。而後派遣調查團。此調查團者。五大國代表所組織。國聯所任命。其人皆當代名流。皆忠于國聯。尤忠于其本國。而得其本國政府信任者也。而此五國者。與中日皆為友邦。此五委員者。對中國復向無關係。而其東來職務。第一即為調查滿洲事變之事實。今其所報告之事實如此。是則在現代國際社會中。此當然為法律上事實上最有權威之證言。易言之。是非曲直。已因此而定讞矣。夫國聯約章。既禁侵略他會員國。非戰行政完整。然現據調查團報告日本既用武力侵略中國而破壞其完整矣。是則或護約。或承認侵略。二者之中。必須居一。苟承認侵略也。勿論已。若言護約。則最遲就事實之解決。亦必須如調查團建議之原則。即一切辦法要以日本交還東三省于中國為前提。此絕無通融曲解之餘地者也。吾人因念。調查團五委員。本五大國政府所自薦。則該團報告。理應受五國政府支持。倘五國一致主張。自增加國聯權威。雖然。今不能不望世界注意者。遠東問題。萬分緊張。稍一懈怠更釀巨禍。單看日本軍部對報告書之憤怒。便知大局醞釀之危機。國聯及各主要國。苟決心護約。須有堅固一致之步驟。倘若依遠理勢之間。仍欲以空言模稜。聽其推移。則東亞前途。更不可問。中國人民。誓抗日本之侵略。同時願望中日之和好。其志只在保土建國。並不欲與日本結未來之仇。種

東亞民族不幸之根。是以荷日本悔悟。糾紛本可立決。惟觀近勢。日閣對於一切公論及公共利益。完全不顧。野心無限。備戰日亟。以李頓報告書之善爲日謀。保其一切利益。委曲遷就以圖解決者。而日閣且憤然一蹴焉。是問題之性質可知已。在滿洲事變責任已明之今日。吾人願一問國聯及各關係國之決心及認識如何也。(大公報)

■調查團報告書簡評 調查團報告書已於昨日擇要發表。在未讀到全文以前。對報告書我們不能作詳細的討論。此刻我們所能發表的。只是報告書的卒倉中的一個簡評。

起首。我們很感謝李頓及調查團一班人員。感謝他們半年以上的勤勞。收集關於中日爭端之材料。編撰這本十萬字以上的報告書。報告書的內容。我們雖不能全體同意。然而對他們公正不偏的態度。愛護和平的苦心。我們讀了報告書節略以後。絕無絲毫懷疑。姑無論報告書在中日爭端上。將來發生的效力如何。調查團本身對他的職務。確已盡責。對他的工作。確算成功。

報告書共有十章。前八章追述滿洲歷史。包括一九三一年的中日關係。九一八事變發生的經過。滿洲國成立的異象等等。這些關於事實的報告。比較起來。似乎沒有結論的重要。然而世界讀報告書的人士。絕對不應忽略這部分報告所指出來的幾個重要事實。

第一。經過以前一切的戰事及獨立時期。滿洲始終是整個中國的一部分。(第二章)

第二。在以往的二十五年中。日本在滿洲雖已取得許多特殊權利。然而中國與滿洲的關連。是日益堅固。(第

第三章)

第三。日本奪取滿洲。早有處心積慮的計劃。中國方面絕無中日衝突的準備。九一八事變。「日本當夜的一切軍事準備。絕不能認爲合法自衛步驟。」(第四章)

第四。滿洲僞國的組織。因有日本在滿洲的軍隊。始有實現可能。同時滿洲僞國運動。是靠一羣日本文武官吏計畫。組織。並執行。因爲這個緣故。現在的僞國運動。不能成純正的與自然的獨立運動。(第六章)

其實世界人士。今後儘可不必細讀全部報告書。明瞭這四點。即已明瞭中日問題的是非曲直。這種事實的公布。不啻證明日本以往關於滿洲一切官式非官式的宣傳。齋藤。武藤。內田。荒木的一切宣言談話等等。都是虛構捏造。都是造謠欺世。隱瞞的事實。絕無不被發現之理。妄想一手遮天的日本人。此後又將何以自解。

報告書第八章所提關於解決滿洲問題的十項原則。大體公正平允此則與我國政府歷次聲明解決中日問題之原則。大體符合。對這十個原則。我們固無批評。我們亦相信中國國民可以接受。原則中的第三與第七兩條。尤爲我中國國民所特別注意的條文。報告書原則第三與第七條原文如下。

(三)一切解決方式。應與國聯盟約。非戰公約。及九國公約相符合。

(七)滿洲政府。應在尊重中國的主權與行政完整的條件下。加以修正。使其享有更大的自治權。以求適合於該三省之地方情形與特性。新民政機關之組織與行政。須具備良好政府之要件。

在這種原則上。謀中日問題的解決。我們認定是合法並且合理的途徑。只要能保持這種原則。我們相信中國人民爲敦睦中日邦交。維持世界和平起見。其他條件可以作相當的忍耐與退讓。

我們今日惋惜之點。即在報告書所提出解決中日問題的具體方案中。確有放棄與違背上列兩項原則之處。報告書所提出的解決爭端的具體方案。共分四點。

(一) 中國政府宣言。依照顧問會議所提出辦法。組織一種特殊制度。治理東北三省。

(二) 訂立關於日本利益之中日條約。

(三) 訂立中日和解公斷不侵犯與互助條約。

(四) 訂中日商約。

在這四點中。第(二)第(三)第(四)三點。中國不但可以接受。且極願接受。中國不但願與日本成立此項條約。中國且願意與任何國家成立此項條約。唯此一切條約的內容。仍不得違背上舉第(一)第(七)兩項原則。

中國國民絕對不能同意者。即在解決方案中的第一點。此即「組織一種特殊制度。治理東北三省」一點。我們並不反對東北三省應爲自治區域。然中國中央與地方治權的分配。中國地方政府組織的形式。此則純粹關係內政。此在主權與行政完整的國家。絕不容他人置喙。今調查團建議由中日合組顧問會。以討論東北三省的政治制度。此種顧問會議的組織。除中日代表外。且得由日本政府規定方法。選舉代表參加會議。這種辦法。實已將中國領土的東北三省。變成中日自治的區域。此與中國主權及領土完整的原則。絕相矛盾。

絕對衝突。

我們反對這種辦法。實不止從法律一點立言。這種合法的辦法。實爲中日國交上留無窮的隱患。根據報告書的建議。今後東北政府的職權與組織。須經過顧問會議的規定。此後關於此類事件的修改。仍須經過上列所舉手續。今後的新政府人員。關於日本顧問的人數等等。又須規定確定的比例。關於東北三省憲兵的訓練。又須聘請確定人數的外人。此種方法。在非洲一切殖民地中。曾一再試驗。且曾一再失敗。調查團中不乏熟習殖民歷史之人。對此過去失敗的往事。當然尙能記憶。在中日問題上。留此隱禍。實爲我輩不敢贊同之點。

我們以爲對於報告書。中國方面。大體可以接受。中國始終爲尊重國聯意見之一方。調查團報告書。亦可認爲國聯意見之代表。中國今日自無拒絕接受之理。國聯報告書將來取何態度。此刻尙不可預知。惟中國今日對報告書。在大體接受的條件下。應聲明兩點。

(一) 中國對滿洲政府的組織與職權。應完全由中國政府自動的規定。他人絕不得過問。

(二) 關於日本權利條約。中日不侵犯條約。及中日商約。倘日本願直接交涉。中日自可直接交涉。然此種交涉。應由通常的外交方式。絕不必採所謂顧問會議的方式進行。若須舉行國際會議。則另行召集國際會議。俾美俄等國都可加入會議。此種方式比顧問會議較爲適當。

(益世報)

再評調查團報告書節略 對調查團報告書節略。本報

在昨日社論欄中。曾發表簡評一篇。加以討論。不過昨日簡評。成於倉卒。未能盡達全意。今願引申前文。與關心報告書內容的國內外人士。再事商榷。

滿洲問題上過去與現在的一切事實。自報告書公佈後。已大白於世界。中日雙方。誰是誰非。世界人士根據已經公佈的事實。自有判斷。中日雙方果能尊重調查人意見及保持自重態度。對爭端的事實。只有緘默自守的途徑。因此。我們對報告書的前八章。絕對不欲多言。

我們雖然是當事國的一方。我們目前的意旨。與調查團的意旨相同。今日事重在問題上合理的解決。不在爭端上是非的辯論。在解決上。我們所希望的是澈底的一勞永逸的。不是敷衍妥協。養毒貽患的結果。就在這點上。我們對報告書第十章提出的方式。關於顧問會議。關於今後東北三省的政治制度。我們不能滿意。

調查團所提出的顧問會議與法律上「主權完整」四字的意義絕對矛盾。這點我們在昨日社論中已經指出。國家主權完整。本包括對內對外兩層意義。對內。國家政府有支配內政的全權。對外。有支配外交的全權。對內。本國國民絕對服從政府。對外。本國政府絕對不服從別的國家。這纔是主權完整。根據調查團的提議。今後在滿洲方面。中國政府絕無支配滿洲內政外交的全權。今後關於滿洲的內政外交。顧問會議是中國政府的太上政府。國聯又是顧問會議的太上政府。根據調查團報告書的辦法。今後的滿洲。在法律上可認他是中日合治。或可認他為國際共管。絕對不能認成純粹的中國領土。一個國家。在本國領土以內。不能自由任命官吏

。不能自由徵收賦稅。不能自由駐屯軍隊。國家對這區域的主權在那裏。當然。世界上這種事亦有先例。一九零六年英法德義美十幾個國家在愛爾基希拉斯 *Algiers Conference* 會議。把摩洛哥 *Morocco* 的內政外交軍事財政權都瓜分了。他們還共同簽了一個條約。保障摩洛哥的自主與獨立。一八七零年的時候。英法共同管理埃及。條約上還說共同尊重埃及的主權。當年埃及與摩洛哥的主權與獨立是欺人的口語。中國人民無論如何不能把今日的滿洲。看成當年的埃及與摩洛哥。所以中國對這次調查團提出來的顧問會議及東北政制的辦法就絕對不能接受。

在我們看來。這次調查團提出來的解決滿洲問題的辦法。幾乎是整個抄襲當年埃及與摩洛哥的舊文章。我們知道當年埃及與摩洛哥的往事。就知道報告書中對滿洲辦法。是個養毒貽患的方案。現在我們可以把埃及與摩洛哥的往事說說。埃及在十九世紀初年是土爾其的領土。拿破崙說「打倒英國。必先占領埃及。」此後法國就垂涎埃及。因為蘇彝士運河的開掘。又引起英國的注目。因此埃及成了英法競爭的地點。後來埃及因為財政困難。在一八七零年時候。成立實際上英法共管的政府。名義上英法固然維持埃及的主權實際埃及已非土爾其的領土了。英法之間。此後又引起許多無意識的誤會。一八八三年畢竟英國武力占據埃及。這是幾個國家充力合作統治別的國家的領土的結果。

摩洛哥的往事。與今日調查團所提出的解決滿洲問題的辦法。更為類似。在十九世紀末葉。摩洛哥是英法德西各國競爭的地點。法國想獨佔。德國唱門戶開放主義。相持不下

。因有一九零六年愛爾基希拉斯的會議。會議的結果。莫洛哥斯財政由荷蘭。英。法。西班牙四國代理。憲警由法國西班牙人訓練。由瑞士人統帶。政府各機關。又規定聘用各國顧問。結果。莫洛哥並沒有整理好。只增加了法德英等國的猜疑與妬嫉。列強間成立了許多密約。莫洛哥終於被法國併吞。這幾段故事。不過表明合治與共管。不是解決國際分爭的辦法。這種辦法。只增加國際間的妬嫉。引起國際間的猜疑使問題愈複雜化。

滿洲是中國的一部份。這點調查團已從歷史上的事實證明。同時調查團又認定解決滿洲問題。應該依據下列這個原則。

「解決現在時局的合理辦法。必以不背國聯盟約。非戰公約。及九國公約。與中國主權。同時鞏固遠東永久和平為條件。」

同時調查團又認定要建設滿洲維持秩序的鞏固政府。「惟有合於當地民意。而完全順乎彼等之情感及志願之管理機關。始能切實担保。」

調查團所提議的顧問會議及滿洲特殊政治。對上面所說的話。都有違背。這種政制。不能保全中國主權。不是東北三省人民情感與意志所希望的管理機關。更不能鞏固遠東永久的和平。這種建議。我們認為是全部報告書中最大的缺點。在這點上。我們認定中國政府不應輕易接受。中國國民不應讓政府輕易接受。我們亦是希望滿洲問題及早解決的人。然而使滿洲成為中日合治或成為國際共管。這不是合理的解決。這點中國政府與中國人民非堅持反對不可。(益世報)

■調查團報告書之分析 國聯調查團報告書洋洋十餘萬

言。即其摘要。亦達二萬言。吾人於匆匆一讀之後。曾略述感想。以告讀者。惟反覆研究之餘。百感交集。復不知從何處說起。全書十章。第一章敘述中國近年之發展。對於中國之進步。頗有同情之認識。其言曰。「中國當此過渡時期。具有不能避免之政治的。社會的。智識的。及道德的種種紊亂情形。雖不免使友邦失望。且產生憤恨之念。足為和平之危險。但調查團却認為雖有此種種困難。遲滯。與失敗。中國方面已有許多之進步。」此足以打破誣蔑中國為無組織之國家之觀念。蓋由古代國家蟬脫為近代國家之過渡時期內。當然有種種矛盾現象發生。試稽現代國家之發達史。何國不經此一度之波紋。惟此矛盾或紊亂現象。大抵隨文化之進步。人民之努力。自減少而至消滅。又為進化原則必然之結果。故以過渡期之一時的現象。欲推翻中國立國基礎。無異否認人類歷史與進化原則。徒自貽無識之譏耳。調查團首先對此下以公正之判斷。則日本一切之虛偽宣傳。皆無所施其技矣。惟調查團對於中華民族所深致惋惜者。則謂。「由該項簡要之陳述以觀。即可知分離力之極中國。現仍具有威權。此等不能黏合之原因。則以大多數民衆。除于中國與外國間。呈極度緊張狀態時。係均側重於家族或地方觀念。而不重國家觀念。此乃該團在華半載所得之感想。慨乎言之。而為吾人所應加檢討者也。吾人能否消除家族或地方觀念以增進國家觀念。是在吾人今後能否改變人生觀耳。調查團忠言。應牢記勿忘。

第二章敘述東北一般狀況。吾人雖不承認其「若無日本

之活動。滿洲不能引誘並吸收如此多數人民。但對「若無中國農民及工人之源源而來。滿洲亦不能如此迅速發展」之論。則認為正確。在外人眼光觀之。滿洲之能發展。首賴中東南滿兩路之開通。惟中國開發滿洲之計畫。遠在中東路開通之前。即使當時無帝俄之刺激。而中國自身亦必竭其資力。以開闢我東北蘊藏之富源。况日本對於滿洲。僅繼承帝俄時代業已開通之鐵路。於滿洲發達上不特未有顯著功績。且多阻害。吾人相信。苟無日本在滿擾亂。則今日滿洲之發展。必更有可觀。惜調查團對於此點。未曾認清。而以中日兩國在滿之地位。相提並論。不免有錯誤之感。惟調查團對於滿洲為中國領土。則下極明晰之斷語曰。「同時中國數百萬農民之移植。確定該處將來永為中國之所有。當日俄兩國致力於劃分利益範圍時。中國農民即占有土地。故目下滿洲之屬中國。已為不可變易之事實。」近來日本人盛唱滿洲非中國領土之說。以淆世界觀聽。讀此。則疑惑可以一掃矣。日本又以東北之在我國。久成獨立狀態。冀可藉此掩飾其分離運動之非法。而調查團亦有正確之認識曰。張作霖雖屢次對北京政府宣告獨立。但此種宣告。並不表示張氏或滿洲人民願與中國分離。其軍隊之入關。亦不能與外兵侵略相比擬。實則不過參加內戰耳。在一切戰爭及獨立時期中。滿洲仍完全為中國領土。「過去東北之宣告獨立。概係對於當時握有政權之個人而發。不獨未曾脫離中國。且同時必與其他之有力者。共同行動。若以過去之獨立。與今茲日本所指使之分離運動。等量齊觀。是舍日本外。無第三人矣。日本又以東北行政腐敗。為其不得不採取行動之理由之一。調查團

亦加以有力之反駁曰。「但此種情形。不為在東北所獨有。在中國其他各部。亦有同樣狀況。或且過之。……其更可特別留意者。在張作霖及張學良統治時代。關於滿洲中國人民及利益。其經濟富源之發展及組織。較從前確有顯著之進步。」此為日本所深知而認為可憂。然為多數中國人所未了解者。今調查團於實地調查之後。認有特別指陳之價值。此足為後代史家判定張氏父子功罪之有力資料矣。

第三章敘述九一八事變以前中日之爭執。而調查團若不勝其感慨者。其言曰。「如斯情勢。世界各國無可比擬。一個國家在鄰國領土內。竟能享受範圍在此廣大之經濟及行政權利。可謂絕無而僅有矣。」日本在滿勢力。純以武力為後盾。巧取強奪。明侵暗占而來。條約上所允許之權利。已足驚人。而條約外所侵佔之權利。更僕難數。故今日日本在東北所採取之政策。可以一言而蔽之曰。欲反客為主而已。調查團認在此環境之下。祇有兩種條件。或可避免衝突。其一即出自雙方自由志願。並同意接受。其一即出於雙方在經濟政治事項上曾經詳細考慮之合作政策。惟此兩條件。吾人認為在今日狀態之中。決無可以成立之理。中國在經濟上。或於程度內。雖不辭與日本合作。但在政治上萬難發見可以合作之理。在自己領土內。承認他國可以參加行使治權。此尙復成何國家。惟調查團關於本章結論。認在去年八月杪。當中日紛爭正達高潮之際。「日本軍人團體如帝國在鄉軍人會鼓動日本輿情。尤為有力。於是解決一切中日懸案。必要時用武力解決等口號。遂囂騰於日本民衆之口矣。」此可為九一八事變乃預定行動之鐵證。任何日人皆難狡辯也。

第四章敘述九一八以後東北之事變。有幾段斷定。極爲精確。如「依據調查團所得種種確切之說明。則可知日方係抱有一種精密預備之計劃。以因應該國與中國方面萬一發生

之敵對行爲。」中國方面依照其所奉命令。亦並無在特定時間及地點。危害日僑生命財產之計畫。對於日本軍隊並未作一致進行或會經許可之攻擊。日方之進攻。及其事後之軍事行爲。實出中國方面意料之外。」九月十八日下午十時至十三十分之間。在鐵路附近。確曾有炸裂物爆發之事。惟鐵路即使受有損害。但事實上並未阻碍長春南下列車準時之到達。且即就鐵路損害之本身而論。實亦不足以證明軍事行動之正當。」是晚日方之軍事行動。不能視爲合法自衛之辦法。「凡此斷語。皆爲斷定事變責任之關鍵。責任在日。則當然結論。必須恢復原狀。然調查團之建議。果如是耶。第六章敘述僞組織成立經過。亦甚明確。如「一羣日本文武官吏。現任與退職者均有圖謀組織並實施此項運動。以爲解決九月十八日以後滿洲局面。」以此爲了的。該員等利用某某華人之名義及行動。又利用不滿以前政府之少數居民。」由此亦可知日本參謀部最初或不久已知可以利用此項獨立運動。因此該部對於獨立運動之組織者。予以援助及指揮。」以各方面所得之一切證據而論。本調查團認爲「滿洲國」之構成雖有若干助成分子。但其最有力之兩種分子。厥爲日本軍隊之在場。及日本文武官吏之活動。蓋以本調查團之判斷。若無此二者。則「滿洲國」決不能成立也。」「基此理由。現在之政權。不能認爲由真正及自然之獨立運動所產生。」此儼如法官宣判。一針見血。何等痛快。故其結論曰。……但

一般華人均異其趨。此所謂「滿洲國政府」者。在華人心目中。直是日人之工具而已。」

七八兩章。詞簡無可批評。第九章歷叙解決之原則及條件。與第十章之審查意見及建議。同爲全報告書最重要部分。亦爲調查團所自信爲調查工作之結晶者。第九章於詳述滿洲特殊情形之後。對中國主張恢復九一八以前原狀。認爲不可能。對日本主張維持僞國。亦認爲更造成嚴重難解之問題。吾人於此前提之下。所深覺詫異者。調查團既一再斷定滿洲爲中國領土。何以於外敵非法佔領之後。便不應恢復原狀。據調查團意見。以爲「此次衝突。原係發生於去年九月前所存在之各種情形之下。故今日如將各該情形。恢復原狀。亦徒使糾紛重見。」此種立意。殊爲費解。去年九月以前糾紛。是何性質。調查團既有上述數章之明確認識。便不應於此種挑撥的軍事行動。進攻的侵略政策。加以事實上之承認。如一國領土受他國佔領。被侵略者爲免除將來糾紛計。須將該領土劃作特別區域不得恢復原狀。是任何侵略者皆處必勝地位。此豈維持世界和平。尊重國際公約者所應探之途徑。調查團既知「此案經過所探之步驟。日本謂爲合於國聯盟約。非戰公約及九國公約之義務。而實則各該約之意義。正在防止此種行爲。」則不能恢復原狀。豈非承認日本行爲爲不違反保障和平之各種公約乎。雖然。事實與理論。往往不能一致。中日事件。中國既不能以自力解決。則第三者所能爲謀者。自有一定限度。國聯急在解決目前糾紛。如果兩方皆可接受。其適合公約精神與否。原非所計。况從國聯地位而言。與其因爭持公理。而拖延不決。無寧稍重事實。而

盡圖結束。蓋國際間爭執。祇有力的強弱。無理的是非。故調查團之調停方案。亦未可厚非。該團所列舉之適當解決條件十項。當然基此見解而來。最可注意者、厥爲第七項。其言曰。「滿洲自治」滿洲政府」之組織。應於無背於中國主權及領土完整之範圍內。使其享有自治權。以求適合於該三省之地方情形與特性。新民政機關之組織與行爲。務須具備良好政府之要件。一揣調查團之意。殆欲以東北爲大英帝國內之加拿大。澳洲焉。然加拿大澳洲之實行自治制度。乃居民之自由意志。非由外力強迫者。故其自治爲真正之自治。且確有實行自治之能力。若東北今因外患之故。不得不以自治。以救其窮。而其自治之政制。又須聘用多數外國顧問。而顧問之中調查團又主張多用日本人。且顧問之權限。須極廣泛。是所謂顧問非尋常可比。調查團雖勸就任顧問者須以中國公僕自任。然日本人性質如何。當爲該團所洞悉。彼服務中國者。豈肯以中國公僕自居。即使本人作如是想。而彼之政府又豈許其如是。大連關事件。卽其明證。在中國中央政府之下。日本顧問尙且含有極濃厚之政治色彩。况在自治政府之下乎。

調查團以爲在實行自治制之前。應由中日兩國政府代表。及東北人民代表組織顧問會議（此顧問會議與所謂聘用顧問者無關。）討論設立自治制具體辦法。其議題有三。一中國政府宣言。依照顧問會議所提辦法。組織一種特殊制度。治理東三省。二關於中日和解公斷。不侵犯與互助條約。三中日商約。吾人以爲日本若僅爲保持在滿利益之安全計。則九一八事變本可不至發生。惟其包藏領土野心。故乘機攻取

。促成偽組織。今調查團縱欲使東北成爲最高度之自治制。而日本必尙嫌其仍爲中國領土。不能遂所欲爲。自極明顯。日本必維持其所手造之偽國。而後始對中國再議其他辦法。在此前提之下。任何調停案皆非日本所願聞矣。日本意在獨吞東北。今調查團方案不獨仍認爲中國領土。且所謂「自治政府」中。應一就國聯理事會所提出之名單中。指派國籍不同之外籍人員二名。一監督警察。一監督稅收機關。是日對於東北。不獨應與中國平分。同時且應與歐美平分。此豈日本所願。在調查團之意。以爲東北區域。非中國獨立所能對抗日本。若有第三勢力加入。則日本勢力自可減少。然此第三勢力。卽爲日本所大懼者、况由國聯理事會推舉。更非日本所樂聞。

吾人尙有懷疑者。卽調查團於主張東北爲無軍備區域之時。又勸告日本勿爲無期限之軍事占領滿洲。使內受民衆之包圍。外受中國之敵視。夫所謂無軍備區域者。當然結論。須以條約保障其永遠不受外國侵略。或作軍事根據地。今一方欲使其成爲無軍備區域。一方又爲日本將來作戰打算。是所謂無軍備區域者。仍默許他國在此作戰。此豈與設立原意相合。吾人以爲欲保持東北爲平和安樂之土。非設法永遠不許任何國家在此作戰或爲軍事根據地不可。惟能避免軍事性。而後乃能得真正之和平。然此亦以可以商談爲前提。否則一紙廢話而已。吾人感想雖多。而我國對於調查團意見應當修正之處亦不少。但目前國際關係甚爲微妙複雜。姑以冷靜態度。觀察變化可也。（北平晨報）。

●個人之意見

胡適 自調查團報告書公布後。各界多有意見發表。茲將我國學者胡適批評報告書之意見。探錄如下。

國聯調查團關於中日問題的報告書的摘要。昨夜公布於全世界了。全文凡十章。前八章為歷史事實的概括的敘述。第九章為「解決的原則及條件」。第十章「為供國聯行政院考慮的意見」。(這兩章因為特別重要。所以公布的是全文)。我們今天讀了外交部的譯文。又用英文對勘之後。不能不佩服李頓調查團的團員和專家的審慎考查。他們的公平的判斷。和他們為國際謀和平的熱心。他們這七個月的辛勤工作。是值得我們的感謝和敬禮的。

報告書的歷史敘述部分中。有兩點最足以喚起世界的注意。最足以掃除一切淆亂是非的謬論。而樹立中日關係史上兩大事件的鐵案。其一為第四章中論去年九一八夜日本的軍事行動「不能視為合法的自衛的辦法」。乃是「一種精密預備的計劃」的敏捷準確的實行。這個判斷。我們認為最公。其二為第六章中論。「滿洲國」的成立。報告書說。

從各方面所得的一切證據使調查團相信「滿洲國」的造成雖然有若干助成的因子。而其中最有力的兩個因子是日本軍隊的存在和日本文武官吏的活動。依調查團的判斷。若沒有這兩個因子。所謂「新國」決不能成立的。

根據於這個理由。現在的新政權決不能認為由真正的自然的獨立運動產生的。這是很切實明白的判斷。使全世界人都可以感覺調查團在這一點上是絲毫沒有疑義的。

第九章論解決原則及條件。分兩部分。前一部分討論調查團認為不能滿的解決方案。第一、他們不主張「恢復原狀」

。因為恢復去年九月以前的原狀不過是徒然使種種糾紛依舊出現。並不能解決什麼問題。第二、他們不主張「維持滿洲國」。因為這種辦法。一、違反國際信義的原則。二、妨害那關係遠東和平最深切的中日兩國之間的好感。三、違反中國的利益。四、不顧滿洲人民的志願。五、這種辦法究竟是能否維護日本的永久利益。至少也是可以疑問的。

在這一部分。調查團對於日本的侵略主義者提出不少的逆耳的忠言。他們說。

無論在法律上。或在事實上。將這幾省從中國部分割出來的。勢必為將來造成一個嚴重的「領土恢復」的問題。(Irredentist problem)。(外交部譯本誤譯為「嚴重難解之問題」)使中國常懷仇視之意。並且或許繼續抵制日貨。那就足以妨害和平了。

調查團又指出日本認佔據滿洲為鞏固國防之論調的謬誤。他們說。

無期限的武力佔據滿洲。勢必擔負財政上的重担。是不堪抵禦外患的最有效方法呢。況且。萬一這一方面真有抵禦外患的必要。而四圍有強頑叛亂的民衆。背後有敵視的中國。日本軍隊是否不受重大脅迫呢。這都是很可疑問的。也許因世界的同情與好意。日本倒可以不費一錢而得着安全的保障。也許比她現在用的大代價去尋求的保障還更安全哩。

這種不入耳的良言。我們想。荒木陸相一班人在這個時候決不會領受的。

第九章的下半提出十條適當解決的條件。

(一)願全中日兩國的利益。

(二)顧到蘇俄的利益。

(三)遵守現行的多方面的各種條約(國聯盟約、巴黎公約、九國條約)。

(四)承認日本在滿洲的利益。「日本在滿洲之權利及利益。乃不容漠視之事實。倘某種解決不承認此點。或忽略日本與該地歷史上之關係。亦不能認爲適當之解決」。

(五)建立中日兩國之間的新的條約關係。

(六)籌設解決將來糾紛有效辦法。

(七)滿洲自治。

「滿洲政府之改組。應於無背於中國主權及行政完整之範圍內。使其享有治權以求適合於三省之地方情形與特性。新民政機關之組織與行爲。務須具備好政府之要件」。

(八)內部的秩序與對外的安全「境內的秩序應由一種有效的地方憲警維持。對外患的安全則有兩途。憲警以外的武裝軍隊一概撤退。並且由關係各國相互訂立不侵犯條約」。

(此條外交部譯本有錯誤。如 *The conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between the countries in-terested* 譯

爲「須與關係各國訂立互不侵犯條約」那就成了「自治的滿洲」與「關係各國訂立條約」了。這是大錯的)。

(九)鼓勵中日兩國之間經濟上的攜手。

(十)中國建設事業上的國際合作。

這十個條件都只是原則。其詳細節目都在第十章內討論。國內的輿論對於這些原則必定有很不同的見解。依我個人的愚見看來。在今日的現狀之下。在承認國際調處的原則之下。這些條件如果都能做到。也未嘗不是一種解決的途徑。

我們要認清楚。這個解決方案的目標是「取消「滿洲國」。恢復中國在東三省的主權及行政的完整」。如果我們能有其他途徑可以達到這個目標。我就當然不須求助於國際的調處。現在既然走上了國際調處的路子。我們只應該問問這些條件是能做到上述的目標。如果承認日本在滿洲的條約上的利益。和承認滿洲的自治權。可以取銷「滿洲國」可以使中國的主權與行政權重新行使於東三省。我以為爲這種條件是我們可以考慮的。

這十條之中。最可以引起國人的反對的。自然是「滿洲自治」一條。在報告書第十章裏。調查團詳細說明所謂「滿洲自治」。是要中國政府宣言承認東三省爲中華民國的一個自治區域。對於這個自治區域。中央政府保留下列的權限。

一、一般的條約及外交關係之權(除特別規定外)

二、管轄海關。郵政。鹽務所之權(或於可能範圍內。有管轄印花稅及菸酒稅行政之權)。

三、依照中國政府宣言所規定的程序。任命東三省政府行政長官之權。——至少第一次應當如此。此項官吏出缺時。或以同樣方法補充或以東三省內的某種選舉方法補充。

四、東三省自治政府管轄下之事項有關於中央政府所訂國際協定之執行者。中央政府有權訓令東三省長官執行之。

五、議定的其他權限這五項列舉的權限之外。一切其他權限均屬於東三省自治政府。在這自治區域內並應籌畫某種代表民意的機關。

這樣的一個自治省政府。我看不出有什麼可以反對的理由。調查團的五位團員之中。三位(英、德、美、)是從聯

國家來的。大概他們都假定中國的政治制度的演變總免不了要經過一種聯邦式的統一國家。他們想像中的東三省自治政府也不過似聯省政府之下的一個自治省其獨立的程度。依上文所規定。遠不如往日的東三省。或今日的廣東四川。凡中央與地方的權限的劃分。本來有兩種方式。或者列舉地方的權限。而剩餘的權限全歸中央。或者列舉中央的權限。而剩餘全歸地方。報告書中東三省自治政府對中央的關係是採取第二種劃分法。其所列舉。不過是舉例而已。也許有遺漏的。其第五項中當然還得添入一些「其他權限」。但有些論者因此就說調查團的提議是主張把東三省劃分中國範圍之外。這未免有點冤枉調查團了。調查團的建議。正是要說這三省是已經被人家用暴力劃分中國範圍之外了。現在也許可以用這個自治省的方式使他們重新回到中國範圍之中。

其次。可注意的是東三省解除武裝的問題。第十章內提議。『由外國教練官協助訓練一種特別憲兵。為東三省境內之唯一武裝實力。憲兵組織成後。其他武裝軍隊。包括中國方面或日本方面之一切特別警隊或護路守備隊。皆應即退出東三省境』批評這個提倡的人。也許要說。日本應該撤兵。為什麼中國也不可以駐兵呢。這不是自己放棄主權嗎。東三省解除軍備。我在幾個月之前也主張過。理由很簡單。去年九一八之夜。在東三省境內不會有二十萬中國大兵嗎。二十萬的大兵守不住這塊疆土。武裝的實力在守土上究竟有何效用。所以為地方的安全計。為東三省人民的福利計。我是贊成三省的解除武裝的。

第十章內又主張東三省自治政府之下可以僱用相當數額

的外國顧問。其中日本人民應佔一重要比例。自治政府又可以從國聯行政院所擬的名單中指派兩個不同國籍的外國人員來監督警察及稅收機關。前一項是很牽就現在「滿洲國」的局面。後一項却是想用他國人員來稍稍打破日本顧問包辦三省政治的局面。並且想開創一個僱用外國專家的新局面。在事實上如果辦得到。我以為這種國際顧問的辦法在一個「好政府」之下是有利益的。但我們可以預料日本人一定要用全力反對這後一項提議的。

報告書的第十章是對於國聯行政院建議的通行調處的手續與內容。手續共分五個步驟。

第一步是由國聯行政院提出。謂中國政府和日本政府依據第九章所示的綱領。討論兩國間的糾紛解決。

第二步。如中國和日本接受了上項提議。即應早日召集

一個「諮詢會議」(Advisory Conference) 外交部本譯為「顧問會議」此項會議的分子有四。一為中國政府代表一為日本政府代表。一為中國政府規定辦法選出的東三省人民代表團。一為日本政府規定辦法選出的東三省人民代表團。如經當事雙方的同意。此會議可以得中立觀察員的幫助。諮詢會議專討論關於改組東三省特殊政制的提議。

第三步。當諮詢會議開會期中。中日兩國政府交涉之代表應同時開會。分別磋商中日兩國間發生糾紛之各種權利及利益問題。如雙方同意。中立觀察員亦可襄助。

第四步。以上兩項會議中討論與談判的結果。應作成四種文件。

(一) 中國政府公布組織一種東三省特殊政制的宣言。

(二)關於日本利益的中日新條約。

(三)中日和解。公斷。不侵犯。及互助的條約。

(四)中日商約。

第五步。由中國政府發表那商定的宣言。送交國聯盟約及九國條約簽字的各國。

在這些步驟之中。我們最懷疑那諮詢會議的組織法。調查團的用意是要使滿洲居民有代表出席。『可為現政體與新政體遞嬗的協助』。可是用日本政府規定的方法選出的那些滿洲居民代表。在原則上決不會有情願取消現政體的人在內。同這班人磋商怎樣改組滿洲政權。使他回到中國的主權與行政權之下。這不是與虎謀皮嗎。調查團也見到了這一層。所以提議。『諮詢會議如有不能互相同意的任何特殊之點。可以提出於國聯行政院。行政院當設法求得一個同意的解決法』。但我們實在想不出行政院有什麼好法子可以應付那必不可避免的僵持局面。

以上我們所討論的。其實都是枝節的問題。那真正根本的問題還是。日本的侵略主義者能不能接受國際調處的原則。荒木陸相與內田外相早已一倡一和的明白向國聯挑戰並向世界挑戰了。司汀生所謂「全世界的道德的貶義」。昨晚已經向世界發表了。整個文明世界的道德制裁力。已到了千鈞一髮的試驗時期了。

如果這樣嚴重的全世界公論的制裁力在這個絕大危機上還不能使一個狂醉了的民族清醒一點。那麼。我們這個國家和整個文明世界。都得準備過十年的地獄生活。

胡漢民 胡漢民先生以國聯發表此種毫無維護正義

主持公道之能力之調查報告書。徒自毀其立場。惟有益增世人之輕視國聯而已。固無裨於遠東問題之解決也。胡先生因此特發表其批評國聯報告書之文字。原文如左。

舉世矚目之國聯調查團報告書，經於一日公布。我人受時間及空間之限制。截至今日。猶未觀此報告書之全文。然就報章所載。則此所謂報告書之內容。亦足以窺見大凡。該報告書所提出之所謂能令滿意解決滿案之基礎原則。計共十項。核其要點。則。

(一)滿洲問題之解決。其方案應合乎國聯盟約。巴黎非戰公約。及九國公約條文之所規定。然亦必須承認日本在滿洲之權利。并顧及第三方面(指蘇俄)之利益。

(二)應改革滿洲政府。俾符合中國主權之完整。然此政府。又必須含有大部份自治性質。期適合當地之環境及特性。同本中日兩國間。最好能另訂新條約。規定如何回復彼此在滿之權利及責任。

(三)滿洲應組織地方憲兵師團。以維持地方之秩序。而確保滿洲國境。又當與各關係國訂立一非侵略協定。以避免外來之侵略。同時并主依照孫逸仙博士之主張。由國聯共同合作以完成中國之內部復興。

調查團之所謂解決滿案之基礎原則。雖列為十項。而歸納之不則實為如右之三端。上述三端。為報告書全文精華所在。換言之。我中國政府。自九一八事變發生以來。徒事依賴國聯。不圖抵抗。不講外交。不求辦法。喪失土地至七千四百萬方里之結果。即為獲得如右之原則。今後之國聯會。

即將依據此上述之原則。進而解決所謂中日滿案之糾紛。故我人對於國聯之態度及此報告書之大要。未忍默爾。願爲單簡之評述。

第一。我人在根本上。認此國聯調查團之報告書。爲絕不必。要。進言之。國聯派遣調查團而草擬此項報告。幾於爲自毀其立場。而暴露其無維護正義。主持公道之能力。故國聯而苟採取此項報告書。資爲解決我東北問題之依據。實不啻自行宣告國聯之破產。按國聯盟約第十條。「聯盟會員國。應担任尊重保持各盟約會員國之領土完整。及現在政治之獨立。以防禦外國之侵犯。」第十二條。「聯盟會員國中。倘有任何一國。漠視本約第十二條。第十三。或第十五條之規定。而逕向他一聯盟國開戰。則該國當認爲即與其他聯盟國全體挑釁。其他聯盟國全體。應立即截奪與該國之商務或財政關係。……：……：凡遇此項事件。聯盟理事會應盡其職。陳述意見。通告有關係之各政府。使聯盟國得以派遣任何有效之陸軍海軍。以保護聯盟約章。」基於上述之規定。則自九一八事變發生。國聯而誠有維護盟約。主持公道之決心。應立即採取有效之處置。嚴重制裁日本違約之暴行。然事實不爾。事變之始。既一再限令日本撤兵無效。則又于十二月十日作此派遣調查員之空洞決議。我人或不願過爲苛酷之論。然跡國聯此決議之用心。實不啻過意揆延時日。予日本以從容囊括我東北之時機。今日日本已悍然承認其在東北之傀儡組織。又未聞國聯出一言以爲糾正。而此內容無聊之報告書。國聯乃尙允許日本爲

延期之討論。日本此種全無公理之行爲。何足深責。然國聯而有此舉措。我人實深感其劣弱與無聊。

第二。就國聯調查團之報告書言。則其內容之衝突矛盾。實不一而足。該報告書中。既已確認滿洲問題之解決。其方案應合乎國聯盟約。巴黎非戰公約。及九國公約條文之所規定。乃忽又承認所謂一滿洲政府之存在。謂此政府必須含有大部分自治性質。期適合當地之環境及特性。不特此也。且言滿洲當組織地方憲兵師團。以維持地方之秩序。而確保「滿洲國境」此種不合論理。自相矛盾之句語。竟聯繫而成爲一國聯調查團之報告。苟非文字之技巧已窮。適用之辭句已盡。又何至此極。國聯盟約之內容如何。已如上文之所引述。至巴黎非戰公約之精神。厥爲確保世界之和平。九國公約之要義。惟在維護我領土主權之完整。我人試問日本在東北之暴行。及其在上海天津各地所引起之不斷的騷擾。果已符合於巴黎非戰公約之精神否。我人再問日本侵襲我東北。并造成傀儡組織。企圖永久割據之行爲。果已符合於九國公約之要義否。藉曰不合。則解決所謂滿案之方案。除國聯及一切簽字於公約之國家。一致奮起嚴重制裁日本外。更無其他應取之途徑。我人必據過去一切歷史的實事。認東北爲中國領土之一部。東北之主權及政權。應純爲中國政府所掌握。依此事實。我人當進而否認有所謂滿洲政府之存在。及所請「滿洲國境」之存在。東北之一權利及責任。「惟中國有之。既無庸與日本協商。更無庸顧及所謂第三方面之利益也。」

第三東北問題之解決。

果如國聯調查報告書所言當顧全國聯所謂第三方面之利益。我人在事實上。亦實無從認。我人認爲東北問題。果不幸而必致擴大。則此問題。應爲整個太平洋問題之一。而非祇爲日本與所謂第三方面之問題。此我人所當鄭重爲國聯調查報告者。其次。國聯調查報告書中謂。「當如孫逸仙博士所主張。由國際共同合作。以完成中國之內部復興。」據中國電訊之所傳布。卽易其辭曰。「政治適當辦法之最終要件。厥爲依據孫中山先生之建議。以暫時的國際合作。促進中國之內部建設。」使此消息而不誤。則我人丁此場合。當根據孫中山博士之遺教。確認國聯調查團之建議。爲誤解孫博士主張之原意。而嚴予糾正。孫中山博士擬具國際共同發展實業計劃。係國際共同發展實業。而非所謂「政治適當辦法之最終要件。」孫博士之言曰。「歐戰甫完之日。作者始從事於研究國際共同發展中國實業。而成此六種計劃。蓋欲用開戰時宏大規模之機器。及完全組織之人工。以助長中國實業之發達。而成我國民。突飛之進步。……惟發展之機。操之在我則存。操之在人則亡。此後中國存亡之關鍵。則在此實業發展之一事也。」我人體察孫博士之遺教。則所謂國際合作促進中國內部之建設者。論其時。則爲歐戰之後。而非東北淪陷。共匪遍地之今日。論其事。則爲開發實業。而非從事作所謂政治適當辦法之最終要件。尤要者。則必須權操在我。故在我國尙無強固之中央政府樹立之先。在事實上。當無國際合作。越俎代謀之可能與必要。

上述三端。僅其犖犖大者。其他小節。未遑評述。總言之。則以我人過去一年來之經驗。不能不認國聯處措東北事變之手段爲失當。國聯調查團之報告爲無聊。我人更深信東北問題之最終解決。不在國聯。不在所謂公約。而在我國人民最後之自決。領土之完整。主權之確保。非白紙黑字之條文所能勝任。非現時之國聯所能負擔。能勝任負擔者。厥爲我國民堅決之意志。與抵抗之精神。換言之。亦卽爲由此意志與精神所產生之偉力。雖然。就國聯言。苟誠不能負荷其維持正義之責任。則國聯之信用。將盡行喪失。不復能起人些微之信仰。此我人所當爲國聯進最後之忠告者也。

■孫科

中委孫科評論該報告書內容。孫氏首謂。九一

八事變之調查。該報告書記載較爲清楚。例如（一）第四章內。指九一八事件之發生。該調查團認爲是晚日方之軍事行動。不能視爲合法自衛之辦法。（二）日本嗾使東北傀儡。成立偽組織後。卽在國際極力宣傳。謂「滿洲國」之成立。爲三省民衆之獨立運動云云。該調查團報告書第六章。亦斥爲「滿洲國」係在日本軍隊威勢下所組織。不能認爲該地民衆之獨立運動所成立。上述兩點之事實。調查報告。主持較爲公道。亦爲吾人比較認爲滿意之處。報告書第十章所立解決方案。如（一）建議召集顧問會議。及不主張恢復九一八事前狀態一點。該點須加以詳密之研究。蓋召集所謂顧問會議。及不主張恢復九一八事變前之東三省原狀。似遷就暴力及已成之事實。關於不主張恢復以前之狀態。我人甚屬疑問。該方案此種主張。係指九一八以前中國之統治狀態。抑或指張學良之軍人統治狀態。如指前者。則與其自述有所矛盾。如係

指後者。則似應明白指出。以免日人之誤解也。(二)關於滿洲之廣泛自治。及顧問會議之組織。其結果將使東三省與中國。或中國之於東三省。成名存實亡之統治狀態。蓋在現況之下。日本實有鉅大之勢力。顧問會議之組織。日本因其關係之密切。當得多數之席次。是則將來之東三省。名義上雖為中國領土之一部份。而統治之形式。則為國際共管。在事實上則為日本代管耳。此二點。我人表示絕對失望該報告書實有益於日本。而我國則僅得其名。乃日本朝野於公布後。一致表示反對。足見日本早具併吞東北三省之決心。迴憶甲午之役。中日雙方。承認高麗自立。不數年。日本即反汗。將高麗併吞。此即前車之鑒。今日本併吞東北之決心。既已暴露。若一味依賴國聯。則僅得到一失望之結果。此際惟有深望政府與全國民衆。一心一德。收復東北失地。蓋據本人所見及。東北問題。國聯決不能根本解決。解決辦法。惟有一視吾政府與民衆之努力程度。一視國際間對該案之態度耳。

馮玉祥等。留滬中委李烈鈞、柏文蔚、程潛、及馮玉祥等。昨由馮氏領銜通電全國云。中央黨部、國民政府、廣州西南執行部。各省市黨部。各團體、各報館、均鑒。慨自暴日入寇。當局者實行不抵抗主義。舉全華民族之前途而付諸國聯。遷延至今。始有調查團報告書之發表。此報告書者。不特為國聯威信所攸繫。抑且為我無數民衆暴骸流血。忍痛經年所期待。其本身應如何公正平允。使持續經年之中日糾紛。得一充分合理之結束。適事實竟有大謬不慈者。報告書前八章。對於中日爭端之審查。除於日寇暴行絕難掩飾者

予以含糊說明外。其關於最重之責任問題。竟至絕無正面之解答。反以由暴日侵略而引起之中國經濟絕交運動。責難我方。其混淆真象。顛倒因果。隱為日寇卸責。已昭然若見。九十兩章。對於解決中日爭端之建議。一則曰滿洲須成立特別憲兵下之無軍備區。再則曰滿洲須設立範圍廣泛之自治政府。夫軍隊所以保障國家主權之行使。滿洲不能註紮中國軍隊。即無異於滿洲非復我有。自治政府之建立。須依於當地人民之自由意志。東北數千萬民衆。方浴血鏖戰。以求民族與領土之完整。報告書乃謀以外來勢力強設滿洲之自治政府。其違反政府建立原則。分裂吾華民族。正與日寇操持滿洲偽國等。此外如顧問會議之設立。日本權利之積極擴大與保障。在在均使我國處於危亡地位。此種違背正義與公理之解決方案。不啻使我國於日寇侵略之外。再受國際共管之束縛。國人如非甘為列強附庸者。對此焉能為籠統之承認。同人等謹為鄭重聲明。挽救國難。在於積極抵抗。唯抵抗乃能表見民族求存之決心。唯決心乃能轉移國際之視聽。解人民徒爾求助國聯。實為民族自殺。此同人一年來所堅持不移之信念。證諸今日事實而益確。當局今日果有挽救國難之決心。應於政策上有盡決之轉變。放棄不抵抗主義。及依賴國聯認想。速東轉切實與民衆合作。全國動員。抗暴日而收復失地。庶國際之不利形勢。得以一變。民族之垂危生命。得以保存。更有進者。當此國難日亟之秋。全國民衆。應不忘主人地位與責任。嚴密監督政府。堅決為武力抵抗而奮鬥。毋使暴日之鐵蹄。得留於中國。毋使國際不正確之調處。得以實現。民族不亡。實賴於此。幸全國同胞亟圖之。臨電憤絕。

馮玉祥、李烈鈞、柏文蔚、熊克武、張知本、劉蘆隱、陳嘉祐、張定璠、薛篤弼、程潛、黃復生、黃季陸、孫鏡亞、桂崇基、傅汝霖、叩佳。

日本

●政府之表示

路透東京電稱。日外務省對於李頓報告書之最初反響。

其梗概似對於「報告書第一、二、三、七、八各章小有爭執。但對於第六章指摘甚烈。認為削減全報告書之價值。其起草時似抱有極強烈之偏見。」自大體上言之。該報告書之主要批評。即為太限於滿洲一隅。而對於中國及遠東全局太少注意。倘令調查團正當了解其在國聯決議案下規定之職權範圍。將不至以第九與第十兩章列入報告。惟承認該兩章中。確含有若干健全的結論」。在其他部份之主要批評點。為第八章稱述日本主張在滿洲所享之特別地位。與九國條約不符。又如第九章稱述「九一八」夜間轟炸鐵路事。不足為採取軍事行動之理由。故逾越自衛權範圍等據發言人稱。日政府觀點以為當場者為判定採取何種需要最佳之人。故調查團本身之結論。不能接受。惟對於該團無意污蔑日軍為侵略者。表示滿意。關於第六章該發言人稱。調查團似重視卑賤隱名之華人之證據。而對於日本及「滿洲國」所提證據。則似不信。該發言人指陳。調查團在滿僅兩星期。時間不足。尤因「滿

洲國」成立伊始。一切仍在混亂中。且調查團以後在北平勾留頗久。有意或無意間。無疑的過分受張學良之勢力影響。該發言人於評論報告書最後兩章時。稱其中有若干健全結論。並申述日本對於滿洲爭端之解決。絕不容第三者置喙。且不能同意承認現時之「滿洲國」改為自治區域之建議。該發言人以為經考慮後。中日對於滿洲問題。無談判餘地。惟關於滿洲之建議如施用於中國與列強間之關係。或為有益。例如組織某種國際共管之問題。該發言人對調查團辛苦之工作。表示傾情。惟彼對於報告書情緒之結晶語。則謂「該報告書對日不公正之處甚多。但對華不公正之處則絕無」。彼又宣稱。日政府將強烈駁斥滿洲獨立運動係日本參謀總部所煽動與贊助而成之主張。該發言人結束時暗示。日本宣言將僅限於駁斥並修正第一與第八章中事實與理想錯誤之點云。日本新聯東京電云。日本政府將向國聯提出意見書。已由外務省及軍部。組織委員會。着手作製。日外務當局對於報告書之結論的部分。即第九章及第十章。完全取無視之方針。將立於事實。反駁調查團。以期矯正其認識。有唱議要求再行調查之說。據軍部方面多數之意見。以該報告書完全不足成為問題。可按照既定之方針邁進。日本民政黨聲明書。略稱李頓委員會有由滿洲撤退中日軍隊而以具有國際的政策之特別憲兵隊維持之建議。然滿洲千零十五萬方英里之宏大危險地帶之秩序。委諸憲兵隊維持之事實。乃紙上空論。又謂由中央政府掌握滿洲諸權云云。在此無力之中央政府之下而行自治政治之事。乃係一大錯覺。滿洲之秩序維持。乃今日之急務。其由列國招聘顧問之主張。乃係增加國際紛擾之機會。而

使東洋和平陷於危險者也。吾人希望不為報告書所誤。真正為東洋和平而樹立百年之大計。同時並發明日本斷不能盲從委員會之無理解結論云。

日政府閣議。以報告書為主要議題。令外務省着手編製意見書。並決定出席十一月十四日子日內瓦開會之國聯行政院會議之全權人選。日本全權已有長岡及佐藤。又加派松岡洋右。惟視從來之關係上。駐英大使松平。亦將被任為全權。閣議中荒木陸相謂「統覽報告書。乃全然立脚于認識之不足。實係純粹之旅行記而已。斯此。殊無介意之必要。基于既定方針邁進可也。」荒木及內田于閣議散會後。留于首相官邸。與齋藤鼎坐。對於李頓報告書開重要協議。

路透社東京電。陸相荒木昨夜向報界作半官宣言稱。李頓報告書實懷惡意。欲將滿洲成爲第二巴爾幹。中國成爲遠東之土耳其。一般人士實太重視報告書。其實僅能視爲參考材料。首八章紀經過之事實。而以渠目光所及。其中錯誤百出。須加駁斥。滿洲問題早由日滿之議定書解決。如列強出而干涉。則將使滿洲成禍源。如昔日彼等之干涉巴爾幹然。荒木又問滿洲之治安。是否僅以憲警之力可以維持。繼謂。世界他處無有能以憲警維持治安者。即以歐洲而論。已可知矣。如列強必欲試之。是使滿洲成爲第二上海也。如歐美希圖利用李頓報告書。干預遠東事務。則此種企圖。必堅決拒之。尤其因國聯對歐洲之問題。法德爭端與法意爭端等。猶不能解決故也。

路透社東京電。反對李頓報告書某部分之批評。雖未全息。但論調漸見和緩。外務省發言人今晨對外報訪員聲稱

。報告書最後兩章。雖可反對。但報告書含有多建設性質之提論。草擬日本意見書豫備送交日內瓦之委員會。定將予以審慎之研究。陸省發言人亦謂報告書內稱中國狀況。自華府會議後已有進步等說。殊屬可笑。惟報告書描寫中國狀況。使人讀之亦不爲無益云。

電通社東京電。有企圖審判遠東問題之調查團報告書。於昨午後九時公表。日政府當局以該報告書之內容。過於失當。且有逸出調查團本來使命範圍以外之點。決提出意見書於十一月四日國聯理事會。加以精細之反駁。當局已設置外務陸軍聯合委員會。着手起草。據聞日政府對意見書之方針。大抵如下。(一)調查團之使命。如去年十二月十日國聯理事會之決議。對國聯會無法律的拘束力。僅提供參考資料而已。希望國聯方面不爲報告書所拘束。適應現地之新事態。謀適當之解決。(二)報告書第一章。第二章。第三章。第七章。及第八章係紀述事實。大抵可無異議。惟第四章記述九一八以後之滿洲事態。第五章記述上海事變。第六章記述滿洲國。爲日政府所不能承認。(三)第九章關於解決之主張與條件。及第十章之結論。認爲已承認「滿洲國」爲獨立國家之日本政府所不能加以何等考慮者。尤以不承認滿洲國之自主的發生與長成。而於國際教官協力之下。以組織憲兵隊爲條件。設立非武裝地帶之主張。爲完全越出調查團使命以外之提案。日政府絕對不能承認。(四)日政府雖無自動誘致最惡事態。以謀脫退聯盟之意。然聯盟方面苟繼續其認識不足。則有與聯盟絕緣。對遠東問題照自主獨往的解決策邁進之用意。此則不可不聲明者。

◎政黨之聲明

政友會 電通社東京電 政友會對李頓報告書。三日

鈴木總裁以談話之形式。發出聲明如下。李頓報告書之中日解決糾紛案。實係空中之樓閣而已。因不依遠東之實際。故實行爲不可能。縱能實行。則將較導成九一八事變之事情。其形勢將更爲惡化。當於問題之解決。以中日俄三國爲之已足。而設介以國聯。則事情將更複雜而更混亂也。然現實的日。本之死活關係與國民感情。無論世界何國皆不能輕視者也。民政黨 電通社東京電 民政黨對報告書三日發表聲明如下。李頓報告書表示可驚異之無理解。中國之中央政府無統治滿洲之實力。爲顯著之事實。故滿洲爲馬賊橫行及赤化運動之策源地。而李頓委員會乃欲使無統治能力者。復歸於主權者之地位。則國內的國際的。將使滿洲再化爲動亂之巷而已云云。

◎各報之批評

日聯社 東京電 李頓報告書發表後。今晨各報如朝日。報知。日日等加以痛烈之批評。謂其係錯覺。曲言。認識不足。非禮。愚蒙之報告書。其所說爲誇大妄想之夢。又揭白本應退出國聯之記事。貴族院及各政黨亦發表意見。非難調查團之無理解。

路透社東京電 今日各報皆注意於李頓報告書。他事皆不遑顧及。而皆一致表示不滿。惟一般語氣尙和緩耳。

電通社東京電 關於李頓報告書。東京朝日新聞本日著

社說論之曰。支配調查團委員之頭腦者。不問事態如何。始終以撤兵論爲本旨。所謂國聯理論而已。陷於自己所稱「蔑視實現者」之誤而已。至於解決之主義與條件。提倡國際協力。尤爲蔑視歷史之空言。如此之解決意見。試問有何權威。

路透社東京電 日本一般人士之意見。謂李頓報告書所載關於解決滿洲之建議。如在半年前提出。則必可爲日本接受。但今日新國之獨立。業已告成。實無接受之可能矣。又此間官員以爲國聯最上之策。厥爲忍待二三年。使「滿洲國」有證明其能力與安全之機會。國聯在此期限滿後。即決定在中國之下自治。或逕自獨立。二者孰佳。尤其因中政府本身亦不穩固云。

路透社東京電 全國工商業有名人物對李頓報告書一致勸勉日政府「前進」。日本商會聯合會會長鄉誠之助男爵謂報告書昧於事實。又謂日本已準備應付最惡劣之事變。脫離國聯。亦居其一云。又日本銀行總裁宣稱。日本之承認「滿洲國」。決不因李頓報告書。亦不因國聯所通過任何決議案而加取銷。其他銀行家亦促請政府與全國勿過於重視報告書。而當「依豫定計畫前進」。

○ 德意志國之新報
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德意志國之新報，其內容之豐富，實非他報所能及。其內容之豐富，實非他報所能及。其內容之豐富，實非他報所能及。

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世界各國之輿論

美國

●路透社華盛頓電 現有種種象徵。李頓報告書大體使美政府人員滿意。但官場不願遽即發表批評。欲先見國聯將有何動作也。史汀生終日在家透澈研究報告書。後往見胡佛總統談一小時。旋又回家重行瀏覽報告書。

●國民社華盛頓電 日來中國要人突然出現於華盛頓。

迭與美政府要人秘密會晤。此間頗為注意。認為中政府欲利用李頓報告中有利部份之表示。前中國駐英公使施肇基刻正在此僑訪美要人。並據中國使署某君言。前實業部長孔祥熙亦將來此。已在途中。又前外交次長李錦綸今亦往來各國。專事訪問要人與外交家。其晤談之目的。迄今皆秘而不宣。至於李頓報告既經深切研究後。美國官吏及他國外交家皆覺國聯若完全贊成李頓報告後。將與日本之裂痕益見深鉅。並有數人認為報告中含有一種切實意見。以為國聯不須切實斥責日本。設果如此。則日本至少在暫時必將與國聯斷絕關係。現國聯對此報告尚未允作正式表示。各方正切盼史汀生表示態度。觀察時事者多料史氏在數日內當能有所宣示也。頃聞美國商家代表數人曾與李錦綸及此間數華人先後晤商。其所談是

否與滿洲有關。雖無所聞。但美京人士則因此對於李頓報告及滿洲當局。益為注意矣。

●路透社華盛頓電 據日本大使署聲稱。日政府前擬派「善意」委員團至美。由野村海軍中將為領袖。茲因野村在上海炸彈案中目部所受之傷。迄未痊癒。故已作罷。

●國民新聞社華盛頓電 美國對於李頓調查報告之正式意見。尚須待國務卿史汀生詳細研究該報告之後方能表示。史氏可望於今日自費府回京。立即開始審閱。現據接近政府者之非正式評論。以為該報告對於滿洲時局。有廣大而超異的客觀研究料可有裨於獲致中日俱能滿意之解決辦法。美官場中人會詳細研究該報告者。見其維持九國公約與非戰公約切實援用於滿洲問題。皆覺欣慰。並謂其中保全中國領土與行政完整之建議。與美國見解相協調。而其承認日本在滿洲有重要特殊利益。亦為任何最後解決所不可少者。

●國民新聞社華盛頓電 今日美國國務卿史汀生先召國務院遠東司長杭佩克對於李頓調查報告有所商榷。嗣兩人即與國務院其他要員。共同詳細研究報告內容。史氏在研究完畢前。不願表示意見。但聞美政府高級官員。認此報告對於解決滿洲問題。供給一闊大而令人滿意之工作基礎。其將俄國在滿洲利益一併叙入一層。更多認為目光遠大。可為調查團抱有欲使滿洲永久和平志願之明證。又有若干熟悉國際情事

者。則認此報告對於中日兩國毫無顧忌。同樣公平。且可證明調查團抱有剛強之志願。欲令滿洲在形體上在民族上為中國所保有。但同時對於日本利益。供給相當保護。總之。在美京無有認此報告與美國政策相背馳者云。

路透社紐約電 紐約各報華盛頓訪員似皆以為美國務院雖對李頓報告書尚未予以批評。但顯然擬用美政府之勢力贊助李頓勳爵等所提出關於和平解決滿案之建議。華盛頓官員視報告書審量大局。殊為公正。且為排難解紛之實在的途徑。據可靠消息傳負責方面之意見。美政府目下對於此事。不欲作任何行動。以為此事現由代表多數國之機關加以調查。則美國唯一適當途徑。乃靜待國聯之行動耳。紐約時報今日載有社說。評論報告書。稱為包含豐富。鞭辟入裏。持論公允。又謂報告書示明渴望中日兩國從事和解。及列強彼此合作。以助中國脫離內戰之禍害。而建設穩固之政府云。

國民新聞社華盛頓電 美官場對於李頓報告。表示滿意。但一般注重實際者。則覺欲令其中建議見諸實施。尚多困難。因料日本必將反對建議中許多條目。尤其對於不駐兵之議。此間消息靈通者對於日本願否同意撤盡所駐軍隊一層。深為懷疑。又關於廢除傀儡國。代以名義上服從南京之新政府。亦料日本未必能允從。此間意見。以為欲使日本贊同李頓建議之唯一希望。厥在其感覺應付滿洲義勇軍之棘手而已。因欲撲滅此項義勇軍。需費浩繁。當在此用兵時期。在經濟方面。收益極微。殊不足以償付此長期之鉅額支出也。

路透社紐約電 紐約講壇報稱。日本不待李頓報告書之發表。遽即承認「滿洲國」。實鑄一大錯。東三省自治而不

駐兵。得中國之同意。與實際之好意。從策略點觀之。較諸永遠武力佔據。招地方之反抗。中國之惡感。與國際之疑忌者。實有更大之價值云。

英國

路透倫敦電 李頓報告書驟視之。顯為甚有能耐且甚諳詳之文件。惟英國政治家甚不願供獻任何詳細之批評。蓋以目前可供考量者。僅為報紙上所載報告書節要。至於正式全文。尚需充分時間以研究之。然後始可發表詳細批評也。且不獨須考慮個人提議。亦須細察報告書全文。方可估定其適當之分量。再英政府地位。在此事於十一月間提交國聯以前。亦不準備供獻批評或意見也。

路透倫敦電 英國經濟學報著名記者萊頓氏。今日在倫敦發言。謂就軍縮而言。日本對李頓報告書之態度。乃全部國際形勢中最嚴重要素。日本之態度或可對於軍縮會議之前途。予以極大之損害云。

路透倫敦電 李頓到倫敦後語路透訪員。凡讀報告書者。定知調查團為篤愛和平之一念所感動。而不斤斤斷定孰是孰非。渠希望世界政治家國聯與報紙。可遵隨報告書所供給之指導。日人見解以為「滿洲國」之成立與獨立。已使調查團之建議無接受之可能。此種見解渠不以為異。蓋調查團在東京時。日人已以此為言矣。惟日人此種見解。可否以世人所承認。殊未可知。渠今所可言者。渠希望中日兩國態度以造成將來和平之材料。可於此報告書得之耳云。

倫敦路透電 李頓勳爵今夜發出播音演詞。述其對於調查團工作之個人意見。言及各處官場對於調查團使命目的之注意。及調查團在東三省所得之招待。謂欲不完全銷磨於日夜宴會。誠非易也云。又言及東三省問題解決之景象。謂前途困難尚多。但渠信國聯以其過去十二年所得之經驗。當能圓滿解決此難題云。

路透倫敦電 孟却斯德指導報訪員今日因李頓報告書事。訪問自一九二九年起為中政府政治顧問刻在英倫之懷德爵士。懷氏稱。李頓報告書議論中所含蓄未申者。為中國自己亟須積極改革。而日本所探途徑。則破壞其國際義務之義。報告書之本質。謂為請日本重行考慮其政策之言論。亦無不可。今日難題中之焦點。在日本有意先行承認「滿洲國」。以妨礙國聯任何可能的行動一舉。國聯與美國當前之難題。在設法向東京重申李頓之請求。即日政府應一再考慮日本現行政策。是否確為與日本自己有利的政策之問題是。依渠意見。日本不久將自覺此孤獨地位。危險實甚。不能同時激怒俄國。慢侮美國。藐視國聯也。且有日臻明瞭者。中國民意決不許其政府承認「滿洲國」。而反對「滿洲國」之義勇軍。將繼續獲有來自關內軍械與金錢之供給也。至於李頓報告書。所謂遠東和平之路。在中國內部之改良一節。亦屬言之得當云。

路透社倫敦電 今日倫敦各報。皆有關於李頓報告書之批評。泰晤士社論。謂李頓報告書之原則。不難承認。但報告書之繕成與報告書之送達日內瓦。其間相隔若干時日。致報告書之論斷。不幸似已為此相隔時期所損害矣。再調查團之出發稍遲。而其歸來。則在日本承認「滿洲國」以前。此亦調查團不利之點。調查團之任務。原在調查瀋陽之事實。但遲至事變五個月後。調查團始抵遠東。而國聯與美國今所遭遇者。乃東三省成為日本保護國之變相。報告書建議一種解決法。在調查團觀之。可適用於其所見之東三省狀況。而對於日本之政治上與經濟上特殊利益。予以完全之諒解。故其所擬之條陳。不適合於公斷人之合法形式。但適合於為中日雙方人之智慧。顧在今日環境中。此種主張能在實際上立即實現否歟。此為問題也。事有絕無可疑者。東京將不願接受此種條陳。但李頓諸人則確知東三省反對日本之民意。今日本已陷於極大困難中。其財力未能維持繼續用兵之費用。而其人民或終將表同情於李頓報告書。而以為不顧東三省民意。絕不能為日本福也。外國政府當然稍需時日。以研究此報告書之意義。誠不宜作倉促之決定。且須有集合的而非單獨的之外交行動。國聯行政會未必能於下月以前討論此報告書。屆時將遇有一方面維持國聯盟約原則。一方面顧及空前事實之難題。想國聯積極籌慮之適當時機。未必能及早見之也云。每日電聞謂。李頓報告書表示誠懇透澈之謀。冀決定雙方曲直。報告書不贊助國聯方面之斥責日本侵犯弱國權利者之宣傳。雖主張東三省之脫離中國為無效。但承認日人在東省之利益。報告書所載之條陳。謀解決此問題者。頗保持中日兩國之尊嚴。不幸國際成功。迴無希望。因日本自認滿洲問題業已解決也。報告書之結論。以為中國必須有堅強之中央政府。此層仍為解決之大障礙。如解決須待諸中國內部建設中國國際合作之結果。則有長期之等待矣。日本在東三

省之行爲。雖屬不合。然亦中國政治有以促成之也云。農郵報注意報告書中關於建設中國強有力政府之一點。並稱中國之前途。恐將瓦解。現中國北有「滿洲國」。南有廣東之變相獨立。蒙古復有蘇維埃共和國之存在。南京政府之威權。不能及遠。故謂中華民國爲中國之統治者。乃一種「禮貌之名稱」而已。若日本及各國能合作爲中國改建一強有力之中央政府。自可謂爲一大成功。但此種計畫能否實現。殊爲疑問云。每日譯報謂李頓報告書認日本爲有罪。調查團既如此判定。外相西門爵士恐不能繼續寬容日本之行爲。國聯會解決中日事件之希望甚微。若日本果拒絕國聯之解決辦法。則國聯自必探進一步之行動。(該報並未指定此進一步之行動爲何事)否則吾人復將從事於武力萬能之支配矣。幸而此次國聯獲得美國之合作。於採行任何維持法律之舉動。皆能得美國全力之協助云。每日郵報謂李頓報告將無何種結果。該報告之反日。雖不若前傳之盛。但確有偏向中國之色彩。惟該報告中對於最重要之事實。即苟非一九零四年日本對俄之犧牲作戰。東三省久已成爲俄國地土一事。並未注意及之。至於調查團之建設提議。事實上必須經數年長時期之會議。始能實現。在目前之環境下。似難成立云。該報主張外長西門不可贊助任何促成日本退出國聯之行動。因日本之退出。將引起各種糾紛。且日本之在東三省。實與英國之在印度埃及之性質相同云。彙聞報謂首相麥唐納在外交上。重伸其勢力。迄今各國對付滿洲問題。皆極軟弱。且英國所應採行之政策。以聯合美國共同行動。而爲他國所可加入及爲日本所須遵守者。迄未施行。此次李頓之報告。實爲國聯能力之試

驗品。今日欲謀歐陸各國之安全。應由各國採取同一戰線。而最重要者。莫若英美態度之一致。若麥唐納政府僅採觀望態度。不立即行動。則現政府之威信。將大受影響矣。

法國

路透巴黎電

法人對於李頓報告書之批評。多措詞慎重。態度冷淡。自由報謂此報告書。未必能解決東三省難題。而其所擬之折衷辦法。亦未必能提高國聯之聲望。辯論報謂撰此報告書者第一錯誤。既須變更現狀。而又承認「滿洲國」之不可免。如新邦之獨立既成問題。則「滿洲國」當局未必允參加調查團所提議之會議云。

哈瓦斯德電

晨報撰文評論李頓報告書稱。「報告書中有一要點。立能引起注意。要點爲何。曰調查團在結論中建議滿洲政府組織應予更改。設立一種廣泛自治行政制度。務求其適合地方情形。及東三省特殊狀態。而與中國主權及其行政完整不相抵觸。但半月以前。日本業已承認滿洲國。今欲令其退步不甚難乎」云云。

意國

路透那泊爾電

意國馬狄諾報今日評論李頓報告書。指爲意義含渾之傑作。謂調查團之赴東。非取謀遠東三省變

題之解決策。但爲國聯開一途徑。以擺脫其對於莫可公斷的事件之公斷工作而已。調查團用一種無意味之方式。規避此種不可能之工作云。

德國

國民社柏林電。德國報紙對於李頓報告皆一致抨擊。認爲無意識之空言。並無可藉此得解決東省問題之希望。尤其因日本在調查團簽字之前。已將既成之事實呈諸世界。而此報告書中居然有德國代表希尼氏之印鑑。尤爲惋惜云。極端右派克魯茲報稱。該報告書爲一百六十頁之妙文。末謂德國代表之簽字於此言多而毫無力量之國聯具文。於德國國家究有多少利益。實屬疑問。因德國對於維持國聯威信一事。可云毫無興趣。蓋德國自身與國聯之關係。恐不久即將發生極嚴重之問題也。中央官吏派之日曼尼亞報預言李頓報告書中建議之遠東會議。日本必反對之。因日本提早承認「滿洲國」。實已明白表示其絕對不願考慮國聯和解之用意也。故十一月國聯行政院開會時。將遇一難解之問題。此問題即國聯將任日本退出乎。抑將對日本之要求一再讓步乎。二者同將損其威信。不過分量微有輕重耳。德國普通輿論言日本對於李頓報告書。固不能表示歡迎。但實際上日本已獲得最好之條件。蓋日本倘不先攫取滿洲。則李頓報告書不至發生。然則何來國聯之媾和條件。何來經濟之擴張。由滿而及於中國全境。又何論在東三省建設自治。而撤除其軍備。何

來經濟利益。又何能與一險惡不甯之鄰邦發生密切政治之關係乎。德國輿論界全體俱覺美國與蘇俄雖皆非國聯會員。但此後之變化。胥將受其左右。再則美國顯已有與蘇俄成立諒解之勢力。今後美國對於中日爭案及其他國際問題之態度。將視此舉成敗爲決云。

國民社柏林電。此間觀察遠東時事者多信日本承認滿洲僑國後。已使李頓報告失去實際價值。料西方列強現將企圖獲得某種妥協。俾可避免施加壓力於日本。德報則對於李頓報告。多漠視之。如德意志報甚致稱爲「國聯又一騙局」。以爲國聯祇能多做紙上工作耳。前進報則稱。此報告爲政治實體主義之模範產生物。承認弱國已受武力強大國家之蹂躪。願其糾正之權。仍操諸彼破壞法紀的強暴者之手也。

俄國

國民社莫斯科電。今日共黨機關報斯維斯的亞報評論李頓報告。謂其宗旨在喚起世界輿論反對日本。以鞏固美國對抗日本之地位。按此文爲共黨著名新聞記者雷台克斯所撰。尙係蘇俄機關對於李頓報告第一次正式評論。據雷氏意見。報告措辭一方挑唆日本攻擊蘇俄。但同時再圖留一途徑。將來可使蘇俄加入對付日本之聯合陣綫。又謂該報告極爲莫斯科所注意。因表現日本尙爲各國所屈服後。則帝國主義者將欲如何解決遠東問題也。今觀於報告內容。足見帝國主義國家倘能以充分壓力迫日本接受。則欲使在中國重設國際銀

行團云。

國民新聞社莫斯科電 俄報伊新維斯的亞報載雷台克

評論李頓報告聲稱。蘇聯在遠東不取帝國主義政策。亦無欲得日本土地野心。亦不欲與日本作經濟競爭。該報告最大缺點之一。在未能重視各資本主義國家對於開發滿洲與中國本部之競爭。至於蘇俄。即如中東一路雖屬帝俄時代遺產。亦始終與中國按照純粹商務利益。共同管理。迄未牽入中爭執。今李頓報告乃力圖牽引蘇俄捲入中日爭執及帝國主義者國際競爭漩渦。再此報告一方企圖拉攏日本。與英美法等帝國主義者一致抗俄。另一方面則欲煽唆俄與日鬥。使日俄俱疲。俾其他帝國主義者在華坐收漁人之利。至其所予中國者。不過一場好夢而已。

塔斯社莫斯科電 今日蘇聯政府公報「伊士凡斯太

」發表名記者拉達克之一長文。以嚴密之分析。評國聯調查團報告書之敘述及其建議。拉氏指稱。李頓調查團漠視真實之狀況。不提及遠東糾紛中帝國主義者之敵視。更避去述及日美在滿洲之衝突。實則中國之「紛擾」。為帝國主義之產兒。此亦即報告書提議國際共管中國之來源也。拉氏又稱。報告書提議日帝國主義與其競爭者妥協。俾滿洲不成為日本之單獨殖民地。而為日本與國際帝國主義共有之殖民地。惟中國則僅保有一甜蜜之美夢。其土地被宰割。為帝國主義進攻世界第一社會主義國之根據地。繼云。帝國主義對中國所最恐懼者。為其恢復「秩序」蓋。「秩序」即統一之謂也。關於報告書述及蘇聯在遠東之地位。拉氏謂。蘇聯在遠東地位之日增重要。無容置疑。惟彼無一舉動可予日本或其他關係國

以軍事計畫之口實。蘇聯不採用帝國主義政策。彼未嘗企圖侵略日本之土地。亦決非日本在滿洲之競爭者。蘇聯與論未嘗不測度日本在滿之政策。惟彼顯然不能對每一帝國主義之行爲作鬥爭。蓋如此則戰爭將遍及於各洲矣。蘇聯自沙皇取得遺下之中東路。該路係用俄國民衆之錢而造者。路非在蘇境。乃通行於北滿。惟蘇聯雖無理由以此路贈任何人。却已盡力減去其帝國主義色彩。嗣論日本與蘇聯之關係。拉氏謂調查團一方謹慎掩飾實際之帝國主義衝突。一方則伴稱日本與蘇聯間頗有危險。而勸日帝國主義勿過分樹怨於中國人民。俾爲對蘇聯戰爭時留地步。李頓及其助手。於是滿心希望消滅帝國主義間之敵對。而轉向於一對蘇聯之共同戰線。彼等一方暗示。如日本與蘇聯衝突。當予以同情。同時亦設一團套。以誘進蘇聯與日本發生衝突。於建議滿洲不置軍隊時。調查團之意爲欲使日本放棄其以滿洲爲帝國主義間戰爭根據地之企圖。而暗示其僅能用爲對蘇聯作戰之根據地。同時報告書中敘述中國政府數度勸共之無結果。則又暗示必須假國際助力之意。迫使中國接受國際共管之建議。惟調查團之德惠日本與蘇聯衝突。實際亦隱存有使饑渴之日本帝國主義。在與社會主義巨靈之碰擊中。損失其實力。而減弱彼與其他帝國主義間衝突之望也。關於美國與遠東之關係。拉氏指出自滿洲事變發生後。美國無時不思增加其壓力於他國。俾一致共同對付日本。李頓報告書之否認日本所持滿洲爲自動獨立國之立場。即顯示英法已有所顧忌。而不敢附和日本之立場。目前美國與英法之談判。方在急進中。此談判之結果。將決定英法或與美國聯合對日。或竟宣稱報告書雖持論公正

。惟因日本不允改變其態度。故結果不能有所成就。李頓報告書一方鼓動世界之輿論以反對日本。并擁護美國反日之主張。惟其注意蘇聯在滿洲之利益似欲引誘蘇聯加入反日陣線。而一方又鼓動日本對付蘇聯。則顯然證明此報告書。不過一交易之產物耳。拉氏之結論。謂報告書後文究將如何之問題。當在日內瓦之幕後決定之。彼引紐約時報之一通訊。指出

一般寄其希望於國聯者。惟有假定日本政局之發展。將使經濟破產而發生革命。或與中國公然開戰。以爲能使日本退讓之理由。乃謂國際聯盟之玄虛。蓋亦可憐極矣。彼一方既以革命之危險恐嚇日本帝國主義者。一方乃又望日本之革命果能成爲事實。以解救其本身之困難情形云。

Formal Appeal, September 21, 1931

On September 21, 1931, the representative of the Chinese Government at Geneva wrote to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations asking him to bring to the attention of the Council the dispute between China and Japan which had arisen from the events which took place at Mukden on the night of September 18-19, and appealed to the Council under Article II of the Covenant to "take immediate steps to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations."

Resolution of the Council, September 30.

On September 30 the Council passed the following resolution:—

"The Council

"1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

"2. Recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

"3. Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

"4. Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are re-established;

"5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

"6. Requests both parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above-mentioned undertakings; *aggravated*

"7. Requests both parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation; *restoration*

"8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14, 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

"9. Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14, should he decide, after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two parties, that, in view of such information as he may have received from the parties or from other members of the council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary."

Session of the Council, October 13-24.

The Council held a further session for the consideration of the dispute, from October 15 to 24. In consequence of the opposition of the Japanese representative unanimity could not be obtained for the resolution proposed at this session.

Session of the Council, at Paris, November 16-December 10.

The Council met again on November 16 in Paris and devoted nearly four weeks to a study of the situation. On November 21, the Japanese representative, after stating that his Government was anxious that the Resolution of September 30 should be observed in the spirit and letter, proposed that a Commission of Enquiry should be sent to the spot. This proposal was subsequently welcomed by all the other Members of the Council and on December 10, 1931, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:

Resolution of December 10.

"The Council

"1. Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30, 1931, by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound; it therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution;

"2. Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24;

"Notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life;

"3. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation;

"4. Invites the other Members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot;

"5. Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures,

"Desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two Governments of the questions at issue between them;

"Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends;

*to be taken the... interfere with
remain seized of the matter likely to
sum on it afresh legitimate apprehension
have given rise to... facilitate
abstain from... 24+*

"The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the Commission.

"The two Governments will afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require;

"It is understood that, should the two parties initiate any negotiations, those would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission, nor would it be within the competence of the Commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party.

"The appointment and deliberation of the Commission shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the solution of September 30 as regard the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone.

"6. Between now and its next ordinary session, which will be held on January 25, 1932, the Council, which remains seized of the matter, invites its President to follow the question and to sum on it afresh if necessary."

Declaration of the President.

In introducing this resolution, the President, M. Briand, made the following declaration:

"It will be observed that the resolution which is before you provides for action on two separate lines; (1) to put an end to the immediate threat to peace; (2) to facilitate the final solution of (existing causes) of dispute between the two countries.

"The Council was glad during its present sittings that an enquiry into the circumstances which tend to disturb the relations between China and Japan, in itself desirable, would be acceptable to the parties. The Council therefore welcomed the proposal to establish a Commission which was brought before it on November 21. The final paragraph of the resolution provides for the appointment and functioning of such a Commission.

"I shall now make certain comments on the resolution, paragraph by paragraph.

"Paragraph 1.—This paragraph reaffirms the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on September 30, laying particular stress on the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone on the conditions described therein as speedily as possible.

"The Council attaches the utmost importance to this resolution and is persuaded that the two Governments will set themselves to the complete fulfilment of the engagements which they assumed on September 30.

"Paragraph 2.—It is an unfortunate fact that, since the last meeting of the Council, events have occurred which have seriously aggravated the situation, and have given rise to legitimate apprehension. It is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting, and from all other action likely to aggravate the situation.

"Paragraph 3.—Under Paragraph 4, the Members of the Council other than the parties are requested to continue to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

"Such information having proved of high value in the past, the Powers who have the possibility of sending such representatives to various localities have agreed to do all that is possible to continue and improve the present system.

"For this purpose, these Powers will keep in touch with the two parties, so that the latter may, should they so desire, indicate to them the localities to which they would desire the despatch of such representatives.

*provides for existing causes
during its present sittings
in itself desirable not conducive to*

"III. China understands and expects that the Commission provided for in the resolution will make it its first duty to enquire into and report, with its recommendations, on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, if such withdrawal has not been completed when the Commission arrives on the spot.

"IV. China assumes that the said arrangement neither directly nor by implication affects the question of reparations and damages to China and her nationals growing out of the recent events in Manchuria, and makes a specific reservation in that respect.

"V. In accepting the resolution laid before us, China appreciates the efforts of the Council to prevent further fighting and bloodshed by enjoining both China and Japan to avoid any initiative which may lead to further fighting or any other action likely to aggravate the situation. It must be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs which it is the very purpose of the resolution to do away with. It is to be observed that much of the lawlessness now prevalent in Manchuria is due to the interruption of normal life caused by the invasion of the Japanese forces. The only sure way of restoring the normal peaceful life is to hasten the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and allow the Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities.

"VI. China notes with satisfaction the purpose to continue and improve the present system of neutral observation and reporting through representatives of other powers, and China will from time to time, as occasion requires, indicate the localities to which it seems desirable to dispatch such representatives.

"VII. It should be understood that, agreeing to this resolution which provides for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the railway zone, China in no way recedes from the position she has always taken with respect to the maintenance of military forces in the said railway zone.

"VIII. China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting so-called independence movements or utilising disorderly elements for such purposes) as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation."

Appointment of the Commission of Enquiry.

The Members of the Commission were subsequently selected by the President of the Council, and, after the approval of the two parties had been obtained, the membership was finally approved by the Council on January 14, 1932, as follows:—

- H. E. Count Aldrovandi (Italian)
- General de Division Henri Claudel (French)
- The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Lytton, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. (British)
- Major-General Frank Ross McCoy (American)
- H. E. Dr. Heinrich Schmee (German).

Organisation of the Commission.

The European members, with a representative of the American member, held two sittings in Geneva on January 21, at which Lord

Lytton was unanimously elected Chairman and a provisional programme of work was approved. The Governments of Japan and China, each of which had, by virtue of the Resolution of December 10, "the right to nominate one Assessor to assist the Commission," subsequently appointed as their Assessors H. E. Mr. Isaburo Yoshida, Ambassador of Japan in Turkey, and H. E. Dr. Wellington Koo, a former Prime Minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of China.

The Secretary-General of the League designated M. Robert Haas, Director in the Secretariat of the League, to act as Secretary-General of the Commission.¹

In the course of its work the Commission was assisted by the technical advice of Professor G. H. Blakeslee, Professor at Clark University, U.S.A., Ph.D., L.L.D., M. Dennery, Agrégé de l'Université de France, Mr. Ben Dorfman, B.A., M.A., William Harrison Mills Fellow, University of California, U.S.A., Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino, Colonel T. A. Hiam, Assistant to the Chairman of the Canadian National Railways, G. S. Moss, Esq., C.B.E., H.B.M. Consul in Weihaiwei, Dr. C. Walter Young, M.A., Ph.D., Far Eastern Representative of The Institute of Current ~~World~~ Affairs, New York City.

The European members of the Commission sailed from Le Hayre and Plymouth on February 3, and were joined by the American member at New York on February 9.

Chinese Appeal to the League of Nations under Articles 10, 11 and 15.

Meanwhile the development of the situation in the Far East caused the Chinese Government, on January 29, to submit a further appeal to the League of Nations under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant. On February 12, 1932, the Chinese representative requested the Council to submit the dispute to the Assembly in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant. Since no further instructions were received

¹The Secretary-General had put at the disposal of the Secretariat of the Commission:

Mr. Pelt, member of the information section; Mr. von Kotze, assistant to the Under Secretary-General in charge of International Bureau; Mr. Pastuhov, member of the Political Section; the Hon. W. W. Astor, temporary member of the Secretariat acting as Secretary of the Chairman of the Commission; and Mr. Charrere, of the information section.

Major P. Jouvelet, Army Medical Corps, French Army, acted as personal assistant to General Claudel, and Lieut. Biddle as personal assistant to General McCoy, and collaborated also in the general work of the Secretariat.

M. Depeyre, French Vice-Consul at Yokohama, acted as interpreter in Japanese language.

Mr. Aoki and Mr. Wou Sao-fong, members of the information section, collaborated with the Secretariat of the Commission.

from the Council, the Commission continued to interpret its mandate according to the Resolution of the Council of December 10. This included:

1. An examination of the issues between China and Japan, which were referred to the Council, including their causes, development and status at the time of the enquiry;
2. A consideration of a possible solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute which would reconcile the fundamental interests of the two countries.

This conception of its mission determined the programme of its work.

Arrival of the Commission at Tokyo, February 29, 1932.

Before reaching Manchuria, the main theatre of the conflict, contact was established with the Governments of Japan and China and with representatives of various shades of opinion, in order to ascertain the nature of the interests of the two countries. The Commission arrived in Tokyo on February 29, where it was joined by the Japanese Assessor. It had the honour of being received by His Majesty the Emperor. Eight days were spent in Tokyo, and daily conferences were held with members of the Government (and others), including the Prime Minister, Mr. Inukai, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yoshizawa, the Minister of War, Lieutenant-General Araki, the Minister of Navy, Admiral Osumi. Interviews were also held with leading bankers, business men, representatives of various organisations and others. From all of these we received information regarding the rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria and her historical associations with that country. The Shanghai situation was also discussed. After leaving Tokyo, we learned while in Kyoto of the establishment of a new "State" in Manchuria, under the name of "Manchukuo" (The Manchu State). In Osaka conferences were arranged with representatives of the business community.

Shanghai, March 14-26.

The Commission reached Shanghai on March 14, and was joined there by the Chinese Assessor. Here a fortnight was occupied, in addition to our general enquiry, in learning as much as possible about the facts of the recent fighting and the possibility of an Armistice, which we had previously discussed with Mr. Yoshizawa in Tokyo. We paid a visit to the devastated areas, and heard statements from the Japanese naval and military authorities regarding recent operations. We also interviewed some of the members of the Chinese Government and leaders of business, educational, and other circles, including Canton.

Nanking, March 26-April 1.

On March 26, the Commission proceeded to Nanking, some of its members visiting Hangchow on the way. During the following week it

had the honour of being received by the President of the National Government. Interviews were held with Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Council, Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, General Cheng Ming-chu, Minister of Communications, Mr. Chu Chia-hua, Minister of Education, and other members of the Government.

Yangtze Valley, April 1-7.

In order to acquaint ourselves more fully with representative opinion and with conditions existing in various parts of China, we proceeded on April 1, to Hankow, stopping *en route* at Kiukiang. Some representatives of the Commission visited Ichang, Wanhsien and Chungking in the Provinces of Hupeh and Szechuan.

Peiping, April 9-19.

On April 9 the Commission arrived at Peiping (as Peking is now called) where several conferences were held with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and with officials who had been members of the administration in Manchuria until September 18. Evidence was also given by the Chinese Generals who had been in command of the troops at the barracks at Mukden on the night of September 18.

Our stay in Peiping was prolonged owing to a difficulty which arose regarding the entry into Manchuria of Dr. Wellington Koo, the Chinese Assessor.

In proceeding to Manchuria, the Commission divided into two groups, some of the party travelling to Mukden by rail via Shanhaikwan, and the remainder, including Dr. Koo, by sea via Dairen, thus remaining within the Japanese railway area. The objection to Dr. Koo's entry into "Manchukuo" territory was finally withdrawn after the arrival of the Commission in Changchun, the northern terminus of the Japanese railway area.

Manchuria, April 20-June 4.

We remained in Manchuria for about six weeks, visiting Mukden, Changchun, Kirin, Harbin, Dairen, Port Arthur, Anshan, Fushun and Chinchow. We had intended to visit Tsitsihar as well, but while we were in Harbin there was continuous fighting in the surrounding districts, and the Japanese military authorities stated that they were unable at that moment to guarantee the safety of the Commission by rail on the western branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Accordingly, some members of our staff visited Tsitsihar by air. From there they travelled by the Taonan-Angangchi and Ssuningkai-Taonan Railways and rejoined the main body in Mukden.

During our stay in Manchuria we wrote a Preliminary Report, which we despatched to Geneva on April 29.¹

We had numerous conferences with Lieutenant General Honjo, Commander of the Kwantung Army, other military officers, and Japanese consular officials. At Changchun we visited the Chief Executive of "Manchukuo", the former Emperor, Hsuan Tung, now known by his personal name of Henry Pu-Yi. We also had interviews with members of the "Manchukuo" Government including officials and advisers of Japanese nationality, and Governors of Provinces. Delegations were received from the local population, most of which were presented by the Japanese or "Manchukuo" authorities. In addition to our public meetings, we were able to arrange interviews with a great number of individuals, both Chinese and foreign.

Peiping, June 5-28.

The Commission returned to Peiping on June 5, where an analysis of the voluminous documentary material collected was begun. Two more conferences were also held with Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance.

Tokyo, July 4-15.

On June 28 the Commission proceeded to Tokyo via Chosen (Korea). Its departure for Japan was delayed by the fact that no Foreign Minister had yet been appointed in the Cabinet of Admiral Viscount Saito. After their arrival in Tokyo on July 4, conferences were held with leaders of the new Government, including the Prime Minister, Admiral Viscount Saito, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Uchida, and the Minister of War, Lieutenant-General Araki. From these we learned the present views and policy of the Government regarding the development of the situation in Manchuria and Sino-Japanese relations.

Peiping, July 20.

Having thus renewed contact with both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, the Commission returned to Peiping, where the drafting of the Report was undertaken.

Assessors.

The two Assessors, who throughout spared no effort to assist the work of the Commission, presented a great amount of valuable documentary evidence. The material received from each Assessor was shown to

¹ See Appendix.

the other, and an opportunity given for subsequent comment. These documents will be published.

The large number of persons and organisations interviewed, as listed in the Appendix, will illustrate the amount of evidence examined. Further, in the course of our travels we have been presented with a great quantity of printed pamphlets, petitions, appeals, and letters. In Manchuria alone we received approximately 1,550 letters in Chinese and 400 letters in Russian, without mentioning those written in English, French or Japanese. The arrangement, translation and study of these documents involved a considerable labour which was carried out in spite of our continual movement from place to place. ~~It~~ was finally completed on our return to Peiping in July and before our last visit to Japan.

**The Conception of its mission under Resolution of December 10,
determined the plan of the Commission's Report.**

The Commission's conception of its mission, which determined the programme of its work and itinerary, has equally guided the plan of its Report.

First we have tried to provide an historical background by describing the rights and interests of the two countries in Manchuria, which provide the fundamental causes of the dispute; the more recent specific issues which immediately preceded the actual outbreak were then examined and the course of events since September 18, 1931, described. Throughout this review of the issues we have insisted less on the responsibility for past actions than on the necessity of finding means to avoid their repetition in the future.

Finally, the Report concludes with some reflections and considerations which we have desired to submit to the Council upon the various issues with which it is confronted, and with some suggestions of the lines on which it seemed to us possible to effect a durable solution of the conflict and the re-establishment of a good understanding between China and Japan.

CHAPTER I.

OUTLINE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

A knowledge of antecedent conditions necessary to a complete understanding of the present conflict.

The events of September 18, 1931, which first brought the present conflict to the notice of the League of Nations were but the outcome of a long chain of minor occasions of friction, indicating a growing tension in the relations between China and Japan. A knowledge of the essential factors in the recent relations of these two countries is necessary to a complete understanding of the present conflict. It has been necessary, therefore, to extend our study of the issues beyond the limits of Manchuria itself and to consider in their widest aspect all the factors which determine present Sino-Japanese relations. The national aspirations of the Republic of China, the expansionist policy of the Japanese Empire and of the former Russian Empire, the present dissemination of communism from the U.S.S.R., the economic and strategic needs of these three countries: such matters as these, for example, are factors of fundamental importance in any study of the Manchurian problem.

Situated as this part of China is geographically between the territories of Japan and Russia, Manchuria has become politically a centre of conflict, and wars between all three countries have been fought upon its soil. Manchuria is in fact the meeting ground of conflicting needs and policies, which themselves require investigation before the concrete facts of the present conflict can be fully appreciated. We shall therefore begin by reviewing these essential factors seriatim.

1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CHINA.

China a nation in evolution.

The dominating factor in China is the modernisation of the nation itself which is slowly taking place. China to-day is a nation in evolution, showing evidence of transition in all aspects of its national life. Political upheavals, civil wars, social and economic unrest, with the resulting weakness of the central government, have been characteristics of China since the revolution of 1911. These conditions have adversely affected

all the nations with which China has been brought into contact, and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace and a contributory cause of world economic depression.

China first opened to foreigners in 1842.

Of the stages by which the present conditions have been reached only a brief summary can here be given, which in no sense aims at being a comprehensive history. Throughout the first centuries of her intercourse with individual Occidentals, China remained, as far as western influence is concerned, practically an isolated country. This condition of isolation was bound to come to an end when, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the improvement of modern communications diminished distance and brought the Far East within easy reach of other nations, but in fact the country was not ready for the new contact when it came. As a result of the Treaty of Nanking, which ended the war of 1842, some ports were opened to foreign trade and residence. Foreign influences were introduced into a country whose government had made no preparations to assimilate them. Foreign traders began to settle in her ports before she could provide for their administrative, legal, judicial, intellectual and sanitary requirements. The latter brought with them conditions and standards to which they were accustomed. Foreign cities sprang up in the Treaty Ports. Foreign methods of organisation, of administration and business asserted themselves. Any efforts there may have been on either side to mitigate the contrast were not effective, and a long period of friction and misunderstanding followed.

The efficacy of foreign arms having been demonstrated in a series of armed conflicts, China hoped by building arsenals and by military training according to western methods to meet force with force. Her efforts in this direction, restricted as they were in scope, were doomed to failure. Much more fundamental reforms were needed to enable the country to hold its own against the foreigner, but China did not desire such reforms. On the contrary, she wanted to protect her culture and dominion against them.

Japanese comparison.

Japan had to face similar problems when that country was first opened to western influences: new contacts with disturbing ideas, the conflict of different standards, leading to the establishment of foreign settlements, one-sided tariff conventions and extraterritorial claims. But Japan solved these problems by internal reforms, by raising her standards of modern requirements to those of the west and by diplomatic negotiations. Her assimilation of western thoughts may not yet be complete, and friction may sometimes be seen between the old and the new ideas of different generations. But the rapidity and the thoroughness with which

Japan has assimilated western science and technique and adopted western standards without diminishing the value of her old traditions, have aroused general admiration.

China's problem vastly more difficult.

However difficult Japan's problems of assimilation and transformation may have been, those faced by China were much more difficult, owing to the vastness of her territory, the lack of national unity of her people, and her traditional financial system, under which the whole of the revenue collected did not reach the Central Treasury. Although the complexity of the problem which China has to solve may be so much greater than that which confronted Japan as to make unjust any comparison between the two, yet the solution required for China must ultimately follow lines similar to those adopted by Japan. The reluctance of China to receive foreigners, and her attitude toward those who were in the country was bound to have serious consequences. It concentrated the attention of her rulers on resistance to and restriction of foreign influence, and prevented her from profiting by the experience of more modern conditions in the foreign settlements. As a result the constructive reform necessary to enable the country to cope with the new conditions was almost completely neglected.

China's losses from conflict with foreign Powers.

The inevitable conflict of two irreconcilable conceptions of respective rights and international relations led to wars and disputes resulting in the progressive surrender of sovereign rights and the loss of territory either temporary or permanent. China lost a huge area on the north bank of the Amur River, and the Maritime Province; the Luchu Islands; Hong Kong; Burma; Annam, Tongking, Laos, Cochin-China (provinces of Indo-China); Formosa; Korea; and several other tributary States; she also granted long leases of other territories. Foreign courts, administration, police and military establishments were admitted on Chinese soil. The right to regulate at will her tariff on imports and exports was lost for the time being. China had to pay damages for injuries to foreign lives and property and heavy war indemnities which have been a burden to her finances ever since. Her very existence was even threatened by the division of her territory into spheres of interests of foreign Powers.

Reform movement starts after Boxer uprising in 1900.

Her defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, and the disastrous consequences of the Boxer uprising of 1900 opened the eyes of some thoughtful leaders to the necessity of fundamental reform. The reform movement was willing at first to accept the leadership of the Manchu house, but turned away from this dynasty after its cause and its leaders

had been betrayed to the Empress Dowager, and the Emperor Kwang Hsu was made to expiate his hundred days of reform in virtual imprisonment to the end of his life in 1908.

End of the Manchu dynasty.

The Manchu dynasty had ruled China for 250 years. In its later years it was weakened by a series of rebellions: the Taiping rebellion (1850-65); the Mohammedan risings in Yunnan (1856-73), and the risings in Chinese Turkestan (1864-77). The Taiping rebellion especially shook the Empire to its foundation, and dealt a blow to the prestige of the dynasty from which it never recovered. Finally, after the death of the then Empress Dowager in 1908, it collapsed through its own inherent weakness.

After some minor attempts at insurrection, the revolutionaries were successful in South China. A brief period followed during which a Republican Government was established at Nanking, with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leading figure of the Revolution, as provisional President. On February 12, 1912, the then Empress Dowager in the name of the child Emperor signed a decree of abdication, and a provisional constitutional regime, with Yuan Shih-kai as President, was then inaugurated. With the abdication of the Emperor his representatives in provinces, prefectures and districts lost the influence and moral prestige which they had derived from his authority. They became ordinary men, to be obeyed only in so far as they were able to enforce their decisions. The gradual substitution of military for civil governors in the provinces was an inevitable consequence. The post of central executive could, likewise, be held only by the military leader who had the strongest army or was supported by the strongest group of provincial or local military chiefs.

Tendency towards military dictatorship in the north.

This tendency towards military dictatorship, which was more apparent in the north, was facilitated by the fact that the army had gained some popularity by the support it had given in many instances to the Revolution. Military leaders did not hesitate to lay claim to the merit of having made the Revolution a success. Most of them were northern leaders, to a certain extent grouped together in the so-called Peiyang Party—men who had risen from a low status to higher commands in the model army trained by Yuan Shih-kai after the Sino-Japanese war. They could more or less be trusted by him because of the tie of personal allegiance which, in China, has not yet given place to the corporate loyalty which characterises organisations in the west. These men were appointed military governors by Yuan Shih-kai in the provinces under his control. There the power rested in their hands and provincial revenues could, accordingly, be taken at will by them to be used for their personal armies and adherents.

Position in the South.

In the southern provinces the situation was different, partly as a result of intercourse with foreign countries and partly on account of the different social customs of the population. The people of South China have always been averse to military autocracy and official interference from outside. Dr. Sun Yat-sen and their other leaders remained faithful to the idea of constitutionalism. They had, however, little military force behind them, because the reorganisation of the army had not yet progressed very far in the provinces south of the Yangtze, and they had no well-equipped arsenals.

Revolt against Yuan Shih-kai, 1913.

When, after much procrastination, the first parliament was convened in Peking in 1913, Yuan Shih-kai had consolidated his military position, and lacked only sufficient financial resources to ensure the loyalty of the provincial armies. A huge foreign loan, the so-called Reorganisation Loan, provided him with the necessary financial means. But his action in concluding that loan without the consent of Parliament brought his political opponents of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, under Dr. Sun's leadership, into open revolt. In a military sense the South was weaker than the North, and was still more weakened when the victorious northern commanders, after conquering a number of southern provinces, placed the latter under northern generals.

Civil war and political unrest, 1914-1928.

There were several attempts to reinstate the 1913 Parliament, which had been dissolved by Yuan Shih-kai, or to convene bogus Parliaments, two attempts to establish monarchical rule, many changes of Presidents and Cabinets, continuous shifting of allegiance among military leaders, and many declarations of temporary independence of one or more provinces. In Canton, the Kuomintang Government, headed by Dr. Sun, succeeded in maintaining itself from 1917 onwards, with occasional intervals during which it ceased to function. During these years China was ravaged by warring factions; and the ever-present bandits grew into veritable armies by the enlistment of ruined farmers, desperate inhabitants of famine-stricken districts, or unpaid soldiers. Even the constitutionalists, who were fighting in the South, were repeatedly exposed to the danger of militarist feuds arising in their midst.

Reorganisation of the Kuomintang.

In 1923, convinced by Russian revolutionists that a definite programme, strict party discipline, and systematic propaganda were necessary

to ensure the victory of his cause. Dr. Sun Yat-sen reorganised the Kuomintang with a programme which he outlined in his "Manifesto" and "Three Principles of the People."¹ Systematic organisation ensured party discipline and unity of action through the intermediary of a Central Executive Committee. A political training institute instructed propagandists and organisers of local branches, while a military training institute at Whampoo, with the help of Russian officers, was instrumental in providing the Party with an efficient army, the leaders of which were permeated with the idea of the Party. Thus equipped, the Kuomintang was soon ready to establish contacts with the people at large. Sympathisers were organised in local branches or in peasant and labour unions affiliated with the Party. This preliminary conquest of the people's mind was, after the death of Dr. Sun in 1925, followed up by the successful Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang army which by the end of 1928 succeeded in producing a nominal unity for the first time in many years, and a measure of actual unity which lasted for a time.

The first, or military, phase of Dr. Sun's programme had thus been brought to a successful end.

The second period of political tutelage under Party dictatorship could begin. It was to be devoted to the education of the people in the art of self-government and to the reconstruction of the country.

A Central Government established.

In 1927 a Central Government was established at Nanking. It was controlled by the Party—it was, in fact, merely one important organ of the Party. It consisted of five Yuans or Boards (the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial, the Control, and the Examination Boards). The Government had been modeled as closely as possible on the lines of Dr. Sun's "Five Power Constitution"—the Trias Politica of Montesquieu with the addition of two old Chinese institutions, the Censorate and the Public Services Examination Board—in order to facilitate the transition to the final, or constitutional, stage, when the people, partly directly and partly through its elected representatives, would itself take charge of the direction of its government.

In the provinces, similarly, a committee system was adopted for the organisation of provincial governments, while in villages, towns and districts the people were to be trained in the handling of local self-government. The Party was now ready to put into operation its schemes of political and economic reconstruction, but was prevented from doing so by internal dissensions, the periodical revolt of various generals with personal armies, and the menace of communism. In fact, the Central Government had repeatedly to fight for its very existence.

¹ National Independence, Democratic Government and Social Reorganisation.

The authority of the Central Government challenged from without and weakened by dissensions within.

For a time unity was maintained on the surface. But not even the semblance of unity could be preserved when powerful War Lords concluded alliances amongst themselves and marched their armies against Nanking. Though they never succeeded in their object, they remained, even after defeat, potential forces to be reckoned with. Moreover, they never took the position that war against the Central Government was an act of rebellion. It was in their eyes simply a struggle for supremacy between their faction and another one which happened to reside in the national capital and to be recognised as the Central Government by foreign Powers. This lack of hierarchical relations is all the more dangerous because serious dissensions in the Party itself have weakened the title of the Central Government to be the unquestioned successors of Dr. Sun. The new schism has led to the estrangement of influential southern leaders, who retired to Canton, where the local authorities and the local branch of the Kuamintang frequently acted independently of the Central Government.

From this summary description it appears that disruptive forces in China are still powerful. The cause of this lack of cohesion is the tendency of the mass of the people to think in terms of family and locality, rather than in terms of the nation, except in periods of acute tension between their country and foreign Powers. Although there are, nowadays, a number of leaders who have risen above particularist sentiments, it is evident that a national outlook must be attained by a far greater number of citizens before real national unity can result.

Present condition of China compared with that at the time of the Washington Conference.

Although the spectacle of China's transitional period, with its unavoidable political, social, intellectual and moral disorder, is disappointing to her impatient friends and has created enmities which have become a danger to peace, it is nevertheless true that, in spite of difficulties, delays and failures, considerable progress has in fact been made. An argument which constantly reappears in the polemics of the present controversy is that China is "not an organised State" or "is in a condition of complete chaos and incredible anarchy," and that her present-day conditions should disqualify her from membership in the League of Nations and deprive her of the protective clauses of the covenant. In this connection it may be useful to remember that an altogether different attitude was taken at the time of the Washington Conference by all the participating Powers. Yet, even at that time, China had two completely separate Governments, one at Peking and one at Canton, and was disturbed by large bandit forces which frequently interfered with communications in the interior, while

preparations were being made for a civil war involving all China. As a result of that war, which was preceded by an ultimatum sent to the Central Government on January 13, 1922, when the Washington Conference was still in session, the Central Government was overthrown in May, and the independence of Manchuria from the Government installed at Peking in its place was declared in July by Marshal Chang Tso-lin. Thus, there existed no fewer than three Governments professing to be independent, not to mention the virtually autonomous status of a number of provinces or parts of provinces. Although, at present, the Central Government's authority is still weak in a number of provinces, the central authority is not, at least openly, repudiated, and there is reason to hope that, if the Central Government as such can be maintained, provincial administration, military forces and finance will acquire an increasingly national character. These, among others, were doubtless the reasons which induced the Assembly of the League of Nations last September to elect China to the Council.

Efforts for Chinese reconstruction.

The present Government has tried to balance its current receipts and expenditures and to adhere to sound financial principles. Various taxes have been consolidated and simplified. In default of a proper budgetary system, an Annual Statement has been issued by the Ministry of Finance. A Central Bank has been established. A National Financial Committee has been appointed, which includes among its members influential representatives of banking and commercial interests. The Ministry of Finance is also trying to supervise the finances of the provinces, where the methods of raising taxes are often still highly unsatisfactory. For all these new measures the Government is entitled to credit. It has, however, been forced by recurrent civil wars to increase its domestic indebtedness by about a billion dollars (silver), since 1927. Lack of funds has prevented it from executing its ambitious plans of reconstruction, or completing the improvement of communications which is so vitally necessary for the solution of most of the country's problems. In many things, no doubt, the Government has failed, but it has already accomplished much.

Nationalism.

The Nationalism of modern China is a normal aspect of the period of political transition through which the country is passing. National sentiments and aspirations of a similar kind would be found in any country placed in the same position. But, in addition to the natural desire to be free from an outside control in a people that has become conscious of national unity, the influence of the Kuomintang has introduced into the

nationalism of China an additional and abnormal tinge of bitterness against all foreign influences, and has expanded its aims so as to include the liberation of all Asiatic people still subject to "imperialistic oppression." This is partly due to the slogans of its early communistic connection. Chinese nationalism to-day is also permeated by memories of former greatness, which it so desires to revive. It demands the return of leased territories, of administrative and other not purely commercial rights exercised by a foreign agency in railway areas, of administrative rights in concessions and settlements, and of extraterritorial rights which imply that foreigners are not amenable to Chinese laws, law courts and taxation. Public opinion is strongly opposed to the continuance of these rights, which are regarded as a national humiliation.

Attitude of foreign Powers on the subject of extraterritoriality.

Foreign Powers have in general taken a sympathetic attitude towards these desires. At the Washington Conference, 1921-22, they were admitted to be acceptable in principle, though there was divergence of opinion as to the best time and method of giving effect to them. It was felt that an immediate surrender of such rights would impose upon China the obligation to provide administration, police and justice of a standard which, owing to financial and other internal difficulties, she could not at present attain. The present single issue of extraterritoriality might lead to a number of separate issues with Foreign Powers if the former were abolished prematurely. It was also felt that international relations would not improve but would deteriorate if foreign nationals were to be exposed to the same unjust treatment and extortionate taxation as Chinese citizens were subjected to in so many parts of the country. In spite of these reservations, much was actually accomplished, especially at Washington, or as a result of that Conference. China has recovered two out of five leased territories, many concessions, administrative rights in the area of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Customs autonomy, and postal rights. Many treaties on the basis of equality have also been negotiated.

Having started upon the road of international co-operation for the purpose of solving her difficulties, as was done at Washington, China might have made more substantial progress in the ten years that have since elapsed had she continued to follow that road. She has only been hampered by the virulence of the anti-foreign propaganda which has been pursued. In two particulars has this been carried so far as to contribute to the creation of the atmosphere in which the present conflict arose, namely, the use made of the economic boycott, to which reference is made in Chapter VII, and the introduction of anti-foreign propaganda into the schools.

Nationalism in the schools.

It is provided in the Provisional Constitution of China promulgated on June 1, 1931¹ that "the Three Principles of the People shall be the basic principles of education in the Republic of China." The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen are now taught in the schools as if they had the same authority as that of the Classics in former centuries. The sayings of the Master receive the same veneration as the sayings of Confucius received in the days before the Revolution. Unfortunately, however, more attention has been given to the negative than to the constructive side of nationalism in the education of the young. A perusal of the text books used in the schools leaves the impression on the mind of a reader that their authors have sought to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to build up manliness upon a sense of injury. The result of this virulent anti-foreign propaganda, begun in the schools and carried through every phase of public life, has been to induce the students to engage in political activities which sometimes have culminated in attacks on the persons, homes or offices of Ministers and other authorities, and in attempts to overthrow the Government. Unaccompanied by effective internal reforms or improvements in national standards, this attitude tended to alarm the Foreign Powers and to increase their reluctance to surrender the rights which are at the moment their only protection.

Problems of law and order. Necessity of adequate communication.

Local armies.

In connection with the problems of maintaining law and order, the present inadequate means of communication in China is a serious handicap. Unless communications are sufficient to ensure prompt transportation of national forces, the safeguarding of law and order must largely, if not completely, be entrusted to provincial authorities, who, on account of the distance of the Central Government, must be allowed to use their own judgment in handling provincial affairs. Under such conditions independence of mind and action may easily cross the boundary of law, with the result that the province gradually takes on the aspect of a private estate. Its armed forces are also identified with their commander, not with the nation. The transfer of a commander from one army to another by order of the Central Government is, in many cases, impossible. The danger of civil war must continue to exist so long as the Central Government lacks the material means to make its authority swiftly and permanently felt all over the country.

¹ Article 47 of the Chapter on "Education of the Citizens."

Banditry.

The problem of banditry, which may be traced throughout the history of China, and which exists to-day in all parts of the country, is subject to the same considerations. Banditry has always existed in China and the administration has never been able to suppress it thoroughly. Lack of proper communications was one of the reasons which prevented the administration from getting rid of this evil which increased or decreased according to changing circumstances. Another contributory cause is to be found in the local uprisings and rebellions which have often occurred in China, especially as a result of maladministration. Even after the successful suppression of such rebellions, bandit gangs recruited from the ranks of the rebels often remained active in parts of the country. This was especially the case in the period following the suppression of the Taiping rebellion (1850-65). In more recent times bandits have also originated from the ranks of unpaid soldiers who were not able to find other means of living and had been accustomed to looting during the civil wars in which they had taken part.

Other causes which have given rise to an increase of banditry in parts of China were floods and droughts. These are more or less regular occurrences, and they have always brought famine and banditry in their wake. The problem has been further aggravated by the pressure of a rapidly increasing population. In congested areas normal economic difficulties were still further increased, and among people living on a bare subsistence level with no margin to meet times of crises the slightest deterioration in the conditions of life might bring large numbers to the point of destitution. Banditry, therefore, has been largely influenced by the prevailing economic conditions. In prosperous periods or districts it has diminished, but where for any of the reasons mentioned the struggle for existence was intensified or the political conditions were disturbed, it was sure to increase.

When once banditry had become well established in any area, its suppression by force was rendered difficult because of the defective communications in the interior of the country. It is in regions which are difficult of access, where a few miles may involve days of travel, that large armed bands can move freely, appearing and disappearing suddenly, without their abodes and movements being known. When bandit suppression has been long neglected, and when the soldiers even co-operate with bandits secretly, as has happened often enough, traffic along highways and waterways is interfered with. Such occurrences can only be stopped by adequate police forces. In the districts of the interior, bandit suppression is much more difficult, because guerilla warfare inevitably develops.

Communism a challenge to the authority of the Central Government.

But though the personal armies of local Generals and the prevalence of bandit hordes throughout the country may disturb the internal peace of the country, they are no longer a menace to the authority of the Central Government as such. There is, however, a menace of this kind from another source, namely, Communism.

Origin of Communism in China, 1921.

The communist movement in China, during the first years of its existence, remained restricted within intellectual and labour circles, where the doctrine gained considerable influence in the period 1919-24. Rural China was, at that time, scarcely touched by this movement. The manifesto of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919, declaring its willingness to renounce all privileges "extorted" from China by the former Tsarist Government, created a favourable impression throughout China, especially among the intelligentsia. In May, 1921, the "Chinese Communist Party" was formally constituted. Propaganda was especially conducted in labour circles at Shanghai, where red syndicates were organised. In June, 1922, at its second Congress, the Communist Party, which did not then number more than three hundred members, decided to ally itself with the Kuomintang. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, although opposed to the Communist doctrine, was prepared to admit individual Chinese communists into the Party. In the autumn of 1922 the Soviet Government sent a mission to China, headed by Mr. Joffe. Important interviews, which took place between him and Dr. Sun resulted in the joint declaration of January 26, 1923, by which assurance was given of Soviet sympathy and support to the cause of the national unification and independence of China. It was explicitly stated, on the other hand, that the communist organisation and the Soviet system of government could not be introduced at that time under the conditions prevailing in China. Following this agreement, a number of military and civil advisors were sent from Moscow by the end of 1923, and "undertook, under the control of Dr. Sun, the modification of the internal organisation of the Kuomintang and of the Cantonese Army."

At the first National Congress of the Kuomintang, convened in March, 1924, the admission of Chinese communists into the Party was formally agreed to, on the condition that such members should not take any further part in the preparation of the proletarian revolution. The period of tolerance with regard to communism thus began.

Period of tolerance with regard to Communism, 1924-27.

This period lasted from 1924 until 1927. Early in 1924 the communists counted about 2,000 adherents, and red syndicates approximately

60,000 members. But the communists soon acquired enough influence inside the Kuomintang to raise anxiety among the orthodox members of that Party. They presented to the Central Committee, at the end of 1926, a proposal going so far as to include the nationalisation of all landed properties except those belonging to workmen, peasants or soldiers; the re-organisation of the Kuomintang; the elimination of all military leaders hostile to communism; and the arming of 20,000 communists and 50,000 workmen and peasants. This proposal, however, was defeated, and the communists ceased to support the intended campaign of the Kuomintang against the Northern militarists, although they had previously been most active in the organisation of the Nationalist forces. Nevertheless, at a later stage they joined in it, and when the Northern Expedition reached Central China and established a Nationalist Government at Wu-Han, in 1927, the communists succeeded in obtaining a controlling position in it, as the Nationalist leaders were not prepared to join issue with them until their own forces had occupied Nanking and Shanghai. The Wu-Han Government put into operation, in the provinces of Hunan and Hupeh, a series of purely communistic measures. The Nationalist Revolution was almost on the point of being transformed into a Communist Revolution.

Break between Kuomintang and Communism, 1927.

The Nationalist leaders at last decided that communism had become too serious a menace to be tolerated any longer. As soon as they were firmly established at Nanking, where another National Government was constituted on April 10, 1927, a proclamation was issued in which the Nanking Government ordered the immediate purification of the Army and the Civil Service from Communism. On July 15 the majority of the Central Executive of the Kuomintang at Wu-Han, who had so far refused to join the Nationalist leaders at Nanking, adopted a resolution excluding communists from the Kuomintang and ordering the Soviet advisers to leave China. As a result of this decision, the Kuomintang regained its unity, and the government at Nanking became generally recognised by the Party.

Affairs of Nanchang and Canton.

During the period of tolerance, several military units had been gained to the communist cause. These had been left in the rear, mostly in Kiangsi Province, when the Nationalist Army was marching to the North. Communist agents were sent to co-ordinate these units and to persuade them to take action against the National Government. On July 30, 1927, the garrison at Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi Province, together with some other military units, revolted and subjected the population to numerous excesses. However, on August 5 they were defeated by the Government forces and withdrew to the south. On December 11 a communist rising at Canton delivered control of the city

for two days into their hands. The Nanking Government considered that official Soviet agents had actively participated in these uprisings. An order of December 14, 1927, withdrew the exequatur of all the consuls of the U.S.S.R. residing in China.

Continuation of armed struggle with the Communist armies.

The recrudescence of civil war favoured the growth of communist influence in the period between 1928 and 1931. A Red Army was organised, and extensive areas in Kiangsi and Fukien were sovietised. Only in November, 1930, shortly after the defeat of a powerful coalition of northern militarists, was the Central Government able to take up the suppression of communism in earnest. The communist forces had operated in parts of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces, and were then reported to have caused in two or three months the loss of 200,000 lives and of property valued at about one billion dollars (silver). They had now become so strong that they were able to defeat the first and frustrate the second expedition sent against them by the Government. The third expedition, directed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Chiang Kai-shek, defeated the communist armies in several encounters. By the middle of July, 1931, the most important communist strongholds had been taken, and their forces were in full retreat towards Fukien.

Whilst constituting a political commission to reorganise the areas which had been devastated, General Chiang Kai-shek pursued the Red armies, and drove them into the mountainous region south-east of Kiangsi.

The Nanking Government was thus on the point of putting the principal Red army out of action, when events occurred in different parts of China which obliged them to suspend this offensive, and to withdraw a large part of their troops. In the North had occurred the rebellion of General Shih Yu-san, supported by a hostile intervention on the part of the Cantonese troops in the province of Hunan; simultaneously with this intervention came the events of September 18 at Mukden. Encouraged by these circumstances, the Reds resumed the offensive, and before long the fruits of the victorious campaign were almost completely lost.

Present extent of communist organisation.

Large parts of the provinces of Fukien and Kiangsi, and parts of Kwangtung, are reliably reported to be completely sovietised. Communist zones of influence are far more extensive. They cover a large part of China south of the Yangtze, and parts of the provinces of Hupeh, Anhwei, and Kiangsu north of that river. Shanghai has been the centre of communist propaganda. Individual sympathisers with communism may probably be found in every town in China. So far two provincial communist

governments only have been organised in Kiangsi and Fukien, but the number of minor soviets runs into hundreds. The communist government itself is formed by a committee elected by a congress of local workers and peasants. It is, in reality, controlled by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, which sends out trained men for that purpose, a large number of whom have been previously trained in the U.S.S.R. Regional Committees, under the control of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in their turn control provincial committees and these, again, district committees, and so on, down to the communist cells organised in factories, schools, military barracks, etc.

Methods employed by the Communists.

When a district has been occupied by a Red Army, efforts are made to sovietise it, if the occupation appears to be of a more or less permanent nature. Any opposition from the population is suppressed by terrorism. A communist government, as described above, is then established. The complete organisation of such governments comprises: Commissariats for Internal Affairs, for the struggle against the anti-revolutionaries (G.P.U.), for Financial Affairs, for Rural Economy, for Education, for Hygiene, for Post and Telegraph, for Communications; and Committees for Military Affairs and for the control of workmen and peasants. Such elaborate government organisations exist only in completely sovietised districts. Elsewhere the organisation is more modest.

The programme of action consists in the cancellation of debts, the distribution among landless proletarians and small farmers of land forcibly seized, either from large private owners or from religious institutions, such as temples, monasteries and churches. Taxation is simplified; the peasants have to contribute a certain part of the produce of their lands. With a view to the improvement of agriculture, steps are taken to develop irrigation, rural credit systems, and co-operatives. Public schools, hospitals and dispensaries may also be established.

Thus the poorest farmers derive considerable benefit from communism; whereas the rich and middle-class landowners, merchants and local gentry are completely ruined, either by immediate expropriation or by levies and fines; and in applying its agrarian programme the Communist Party expects to gain the support of the masses. In this respect, its propaganda and action have met with considerable success, notwithstanding the fact that communist theory conflicts with the Chinese social system. Existing grievances resulting from oppressive taxation, extortion, usury and pillage by soldiery or bandits, were fully exploited. Special slogans were employed for farmers, workmen, soldiers and intellectuals, with variations especially adapted to women.

Special character of Communism in China

Communism in China not only means, as in most countries other than the U.S.S.R., either a political doctrine held by certain members of existing parties, or the organisation of a special party to compete for power with other political parties. It has become an actual rival of the National Government. It possesses its own law, army and government, and its own territorial sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country. Moreover, in China the disturbance created by the communist war is made more serious by the fact that the country is going through a critical period of internal reconstruction, still further complicated during the last eleven months by an external crisis of exceptional gravity. The National Government seems to be determined to regain the control of the districts under communist influence, and to pursue in these districts, once their recovery is achieved, a policy of economic rehabilitation; but in its military campaigns, apart from difficulties already mentioned, both internal and external, which weaken its position, it is hampered by lack of funds and defective communications. The problem of communism in China is thus linked with the larger problem of national reconstruction.

In the summer of 1932 important military operations, having for their object a final suppression of the Red resistance, were announced by the Government of Nanking. They were commenced, and, as stated above, were to have been accompanied by a thorough social and administrative reorganisation of the recaptured regions. But up to the present no important results have been announced.

Effect of these conditions upon Sino-Japanese relations.

So far as Japan is China's nearest neighbour and largest customer, she has suffered more than any other Power from the lawless conditions described in this chapter. Over two-thirds of the foreign residents in China are Japanese, and the number of Koreans in Manchuria is estimated at about 800,000. She has more nationals, therefore, than any other Power, who would suffer if they were made amenable to Chinese law, justice and taxation under present conditions.

Japan felt it impossible to satisfy Chinese aspirations so long as satisfactory safeguards to take the place of her Treaty rights could not be hoped for. Her interests in China, and more especially in Manchuria, began to be more prominently asserted as those of the other major Powers receded into the background. Japan's anxiety to safeguard the life and property of her subjects in China caused her to intervene repeatedly in times of civil war or of local disturbances. Such action was bitterly resented by China, especially when it resulted in an armed clash such as occurred in 1928 at Tsinan. In recent years the claims of Japan have come to be regarded in

China as constituting a more serious challenge to national aspirations than the rights of all the other Powers taken together.

International interest in the problems of Chinese reconstruction.

This issue, however, though affecting Japan to a greater extent than other Powers, is not a Sino-Japanese issue alone. China demands immediately the surrender of certain exceptional powers and privileges because they are felt to be derogatory to her national dignity and sovereignty. The foreign Powers have hesitated to meet these wishes as long as conditions in China did not ensure adequate protection of their nationals, whose interests depend on the security afforded by the enjoyment of special Treaty rights. The process of fermentation, inevitable in a period of transition, which this chapter has attempted to describe, has developed forces of public opinion which will probably continue to embarrass the Central Government in the conduct of their foreign policy, as long as they are weakened by failure to complete the unification and reconstruction of the country. The realisation of China's national aspirations in the field of foreign relations depends on her ability to discharge the functions of a modern government in the sphere of domestic affairs, and until the discrepancy between these has been removed, the danger of international friction and of incidents, boycotts, and armed interventions will continue.

International co-operation offers the best hope of their solution.

The present extreme case of international friction having forced China once more to seek the intervention of the League of Nations, should, if a satisfactory settlement can be effected, convince her of the advantages of the policy of international co-operation which was inaugurated at Washington with such beneficial results in 1922. China has not at the moment the capital nor the trained specialists necessary for the unaided accomplishment of her national reconstruction. Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself realised this, and actually drew up an ambitious plan of international participation in the economic development of his country. The National Government, too, has in recent years sought and accepted international help in the solution of her problems—in financial matters since 1930, in matters relating to economic planning and development in liaison with the technical organisations of the League of Nations since the constitution of the National Economic Council in 1931, and in relief of the distress caused by the great flood of the same year. Along this road of international co-operation China would make the surest and most rapid progress towards the attainment of her national ideals, and such a policy would make it easier for foreign Powers to give what support the Central Government may seek, and to help in the removal as rapidly and as effectively as possible of any causes of friction which may endanger her peaceful relations with the rest of the world.

CHAPTER II.

MANCHURIA

DESCRIPTION, RELATIONS WITH REST OF CHINA AND WITH RUSSIA.

1. DESCRIPTION.

Introductory.

Manchuria—which is known in China as the Three Eastern Provinces—a large fertile region only forty years ago almost undeveloped and even now still under-populated, has assumed an increasingly important role in the solution of the surplus population problems of China and Japan. The provinces of Shantung and Hopei have poured millions of destitute farmers into Manchuria, while Japan has exported to that country her manufactured articles and capital, in exchange for food supplies and raw materials. In providing for the respective needs of China and Japan, Manchuria has proved the usefulness of their partnership. Without Japan's activity, Manchuria could not have attracted and absorbed such a large population. Without the influx of Chinese farmers and labourers, Manchuria could not have developed so rapidly, providing Japan thereby with a market and with supplies of food, fertilisers, and raw materials.

Manchuria a coveted region, first on account of its strategic advantages, subsequently on account of agricultural and mineral resources.

Yet, Manchuria so largely dependent on co-operation, was destined, for reasons already indicated, to become a region of conflict: at first between Russia and Japan, later, between China and her two powerful neighbours. At first, Manchuria entered into this great conflict of policies only as an area, the occupation of which was thought to imply domination of Far Eastern politics. It became coveted for its own sake later, when its agricultural, mineral and forestry resources had been discovered. Exceptional treaty rights were acquired in the first instance by Russia at the expense of China. Those which concerned South Manchuria were subsequently transferred to Japan. The use of the privileges so acquired became more and more instrumental in furthering the economic development of South Manchuria. Strategical considerations have remained para-

mount, but the extensive economic interests resulting from the active part taken by Russia and Japan in the development of Manchuria found an ever increasing insistence in the foreign policy of these two countries.

Occupation of the soil by Chinese farmers.

China at first showed little activity in the field of development. She almost allowed Manchuria to pass from her control to that of Russia. Even after the Treaty of Portsmouth, which reaffirmed her sovereignty in Manchuria, the economic activities of Russia and Japan in developing those Provinces figured more prominently than her own in the eyes of the world. Meanwhile the immigration of millions of Chinese farmers settled the future possession of the land. This immigration was in fact an occupation, peaceful, inconspicuous but none the less real. While Russia and Japan were engaged in delimiting their respective spheres of interest in North and South Manchuria, Chinese farmers took possession of the soil, and Manchuria is now unalterably Chinese. In such circumstances China could afford to wait for a favourable opportunity to reassert her sovereign rights. The Russian revolution of 1917 gave her that opportunity in North Manchuria. She began to take a more active part in the government and development of the country which had been so long neglected. In recent years she has tried to diminish Japan's influence in South Manchuria. Growing friction resulted from that policy, the culminating point of which was reached on September 18, 1931.

Population.

The total population is estimated at about 30,000,000, of whom 28,000,000 are said to be Chinese or assimilated Manchus. The number of Koreans is put at 800,000, of whom a large number are congregated in the so-called Chiantao District on the Korean border, the remainder being widely scattered in Manchuria. Mongol tribes live in the pasture lands bordering Inner Mongolia, their number being small. There may be about 150,000 Russians in Manchuria, most of them being in the area along the Chinese Eastern Railway, especially at Harbin. About 230,000 Japanese are mainly concentrated in the settlements along the South Manchuria Railway and in the Kwantung Leased Territory (Liaotung Peninsula). The total number of Japanese, Russians and other foreigners (excluding Koreans) in Manchuria does not exceed 400,000.

Area.

Manchuria is a vast country with an area as large as that of France and Germany taken together, estimated at about 380,000 square miles. In China it is always referred to as the "Three Eastern Provinces" because of

its administrative division into the three provinces of Liaoning (or Feng-tien) in the South, Kirin in the East, and Heilungkiang in the North. Liaoning is estimated to have an area of 70,000 square miles, Kirin of 100,000, Heilungkiang of over 200,000.

Geography.

Manchuria is continental in its characteristics. There are two mountain ranges, the Changpai range in the South East and the Great Khingan range in the North West. Between these two mountain ranges lies the great Manchurian plain, of which the northern part belongs to the basin of the Sungari river and the southern part to that of the Liao river. The watershed between them, which has some historical importance, is a range of hills dividing the Manchurian plain into a northern and a southern part.

Manchuria is bounded on the west by the province of Hopeh and by Outer and Inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was formerly divided into three special administrative areas: Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan, which were given the full status of provinces by the National Government in 1928. Inner Mongolia, and more especially Jehol, has always had relations with Manchuria, and exercises some influence in Manchurian affairs. On the north-west, north-east, and east, Manchuria is bounded by the Siberian provinces of the U.S.S.R., on the south-east by Korea, and on the south by the Yellow Sea. The southern end of the Liaotung Peninsula has been held by Japan since 1905. Its area is over 1,300 square miles, and it is administered as a Japanese leased territory. In addition, Japan exercises certain rights over a narrow strip of land, which extends beyond the Leased Territory, and which contains the lines of the South Manchuria Railway. The total area is only 108 square miles, whereas the length of the lines is 690 miles.

Economic resources.

The soil of Manchuria is generally fertile, but its development is dependent on transportation facilities. Many important towns flourish along its rivers and railways. Formerly, development was practically dependent on the river system, which is still of much importance though the railways have now taken the first place as a means of transport. The production of important crops, such as soya beans, kaoliang, wheat, millet, barley, rice, oats, has doubled in fifteen years. In 1929 these crops were estimated at over 876,000,000 bushels. According to estimates given in the Manchurian Year Book 1931 only 12.6 per cent. of the total area has been brought under cultivation in 1929, whereas 28.4 per cent. was cultivable. A large increase of production may therefore be expected in the future if economic conditions improve. The total value of the agricultural products of Manchuria

for the year 1928 was estimated at over £130,000,000 sterling. A large part of the agricultural produce is exported. Pongee or tussah silk is another important article of export from Manchuria.

Timber and minerals.

The mountainous regions are rich in timber and minerals, especially coal. Important deposits of iron and gold are also known to exist, while large quantities of oil shale, dolomite, magnesite, limestone, fireclay, steatite, and silica of excellent quality have been found. The mining industry may therefore be expected to become of great importance.¹

2. RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF CHINA.

Early history to the fall of the Manchu dynasty.

Manchuria has, since the dawn of history, been inhabited by various Tungus tribes, who mixed freely with Mongol Tartars. Under the influence of Chinese immigrants of superior civilisation they learned to organise themselves, and established several kingdoms which sometimes dominated the greater part of Manchuria, and some northern districts in China and Korea. The Liao, Chin, and Manchu dynasties even conquered large parts or the whole of China over which they ruled for centuries. China, on the other hand, under strong emperors, was able to stem the tide from the north, and in her turn to establish sovereignty over large parts of Manchuria. Colonisation by Chinese settlers was practised at a very early date. Various Chinese towns which radiated the influence of Chinese culture through the surrounding districts, date from the same early time. For two thousand years a permanent foothold has been maintained, and Chinese culture has always been active in the southernmost part of Manchuria. The influence of this culture had become very strong during the rule of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), whose authority extended over practically the whole of Manchuria. The Manchus were permeated by Chinese culture and had amalgamated to a great extent with the Chinese, before they overthrew the Ming administration in Manchuria in 1616, and in 1628 passed the Great Wall to conquer China. In the Manchu army were large numbers of Chinese who were organised in separate military units known as Chinese Banners.

After the conquest, the Manchus quartered their garrisons in the more important cities of China, forbade Manchus to engage in certain professions, prohibited intermarriage between Manchus and Chinese, and restricted the immigration of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia. These measures were inspired more by political than by racial discrimination, and

¹ See also Chapter VIII and the special studies No. 2 and No. 3 annexed to this Report.

aimed at safeguarding the permanent dominance of the dynasty. They did not affect the numerous Chinese Bannermen, who enjoyed practically the same privileged status as the Manchus themselves.

The exodus of the Manchus and their Chinese allies greatly reduced the population of Manchuria. However, in the South, Chinese communities continued to exist. From this foothold a few settlers spread across the central part of Fengtien province. Their number was increased by a continuous infiltration of immigrants from China, who succeeded in evading the exclusion laws, or who had profited by their modifications from time to time. Manchus and Chinese became still more amalgamated, and even the Manchu language was virtually replaced by Chinese. The Mongols however were not assimilated but pushed back by the advancing immigrants. Finally, to stem the Russian advance from the North, the Manchu Government decided to encourage Chinese immigration. In 1878 various parts of Manchuria were accordingly opened and various forms of encouragement given to immigrants, with the result that at the time of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the population of Manchuria was estimated at 18,000,000.

In 1907, a few years only before its abdication, the Manchu Dynasty had decided to reform the administration in Manchuria. These Provinces had hitherto been administered as a separate, extra-mural dominion, with its own form of Government. The Chinese practice of entrusting the civil administration in the provinces to scholars who had passed the competitive examinations had not been followed in Manchuria, which had been placed under a purely military regime in which Manchu officials and traditions were maintained. In China officials were not allowed to hold office in their native province. Each Manchurian province had a military governor, who exercised complete power in civil as well as in military matters. Later, attempts had been made to separate military and civil administration. The results were not satisfactory. The demarcation of the respective spheres of authority was not adequate; misunderstandings and intrigues were frequent and inefficiency resulted. In 1907, therefore, this attempt was given up. The three military governors were replaced by a Viceroy for all Manchuria, with the object of centralising authority, especially in the domain of foreign policy. Provincial Civil governors under the control of the Viceroy were in charge of provincial administration. This reorganisation prepared the way for the later administrative reforms which introduced the Chinese system of provincial government. These last measures of the Manchus were very effective, thanks to the able administrators in charge of Manchurian affairs after 1907.

After the fall of the Manchu dynasty.

When the Revolution broke out in 1911, the Manchurian authorities who were not in favour of the Republic succeeded in saving these provinces

from the turmoil of civil war, by ordering Chang Tso-lin, who was later to become the dictator of both Manchuria and North China, to resist the advance of the revolutionary troops. When the Republic had been established, the Manchurian authorities accepted the *fait accompli* and voluntarily followed the leadership of Yuan Shih-kai, who was chosen the first President of the Republic. To each province both civil and military governors were appointed. In Manchuria as in the rest of China the military governors soon succeeded in putting their civil colleagues into the background.

1916. Chang Tso-lin appointed Governor of Fengtien Province.

In 1916, Chang Tso-lin was appointed military governor of Fengtien Province, concurrently acting as civil governor. His personal influence extended much further. When the question arose of declaring war against Germany, he joined the military leaders in China in their request to dissolve the Parliament which had opposed that measure. When the request was rejected by the President he declared his province independent from the Central Government at Peking. Later, he withdrew that declaration and in 1918, in recognition of his service to the Central Government, he was appointed Inspector-General of all Manchuria. In this way Manchuria again became an administrative unit with its own special regime.

1922. He severs allegiance to Central Government at Peking.

Chang Tso-lin accepted the honours accorded by the Central Government, but his attitude from time to time depended on the nature of his personal relations with the military leaders who controlled the changing central authorities. He seems to have looked upon his relations with the Government in the sense of a personal alliance. In July, 1922, when he failed to establish his authority south of the Great Wall and saw his rivals taking control of the Peking Government, he renounced allegiance to the Central Government and maintained complete independence of action in Manchuria until he extended his authority south of the Wall and became master of Peking as well. He expressed his willingness to respect foreign rights, and accepted the obligations of China, but he requested foreign Powers to negotiate henceforth directly with his administration in all matters concerning Manchuria.

The Mukden Agreement with the U.S.S.R., 1924

Accordingly, he repudiated the Sino-Soviet agreement of May 31, 1924, though very advantageous to China, and persuaded the U.S.S.R. to conclude a separate agreement with him in September, 1924. It was virtually identical with that of May 31, 1924, with the Central Government. This

fact emphasised Chang Tso-lin's insistence on the recognition of his complete independence of action, both in domestic and foreign policy.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin defeats General Wu Pei-fu.

In 1924 he invaded China again and was successful, because General (now Marshal) Feng Yu-hsiang abandoned his superior, General (now Marshal) Wu Pei-fu, at a critical moment in the campaign. The immediate result was the overthrow of the Central Government and the expansion of Marshal Chang's influence as far south as Shanghai.

Mutiny of Kuo Sung-lin, 1925.

In 1925 Marshal Chang had again to resort to arms, this time against his late ally, General Feng. In this campaign one of his commanders, Kuo Sung-lin, abandoned him at a most critical moment in favour of General Feng. The mutiny of Kuo Sung-lin, in November 1925, was of more than passing interest, because it involved both the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the action of the former having been indirectly of advantage to General Feng, and that of the latter to Marshal Chang. Kuo Sung-lin, though a subordinate of the Marshal, shared General Feng's views about social reform, and turned against his superior in the belief that his downfall was necessary to put an end to civil war. This defection put the Marshal in a most critical position. Kuo Sung-lin was in possession of the territory west of the railway and the Marshal was at Mukden with greatly reduced forces. At this moment Japan, in her own interests in South Manchuria, declared a neutral zone of 20 li (7 miles) on each side of the South Manchuria Railway, across which she would allow no troops to pass. This prevented Kuo Sung-lin from advancing against the Marshal and allowed time for the reinforcements from Heilungkiang to reach him. They were delayed by the action of Soviet railway authorities who refused to allow them to travel over the Railway without first paying their fares in cash, but they managed to travel by another route. The arrival of those reinforcements and the more or less open help given by the Japanese settled the campaign in the Marshal's favour. Kuo Sung-lin was defeated and General Feng was forced to withdraw and abandon Peking to Marshal Chang. Marshal Chang resented the action of the authorities of the Chinese Eastern Railway on this occasion and left no stone unturned to retaliate by continuous encroachments on the rights of this railway. The experience provided by this incident appears to have been an important factor in causing him to build an independent railway system connecting the three provincial capitals of Manchuria.

Meaning of Manchurian independence.

The independence declared by Marshal Chang Tso-lin at different times never meant that he or the people of Manchuria wished to be separated

from China. His armies did not invade China as if it were a foreign country, but merely as participants in the civil war. Like the War Lords of any other province, the Marshal alternately supported, attacked, or declared his territory independent of the Central Government, but never in such a way as to involve the partition of China into separate States. On the contrary, most Chinese civil wars were directly or indirectly connected with some ambitious scheme to unify the country under a really strong Government. Through all its wars and periods of "independence," therefore, Manchuria remained an integral part of China.

Chang Tso-lin and the Kuomintang.

Although Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the Kuomintang had been allies in the wars against Wu Pei-fu, the former did not himself accept the doctrines of the Kuomintang. He did not approve of the constitution as desired by Dr. Sun, as it did not seem to him to harmonise with the spirit of the Chinese people; but he desired the unification of China, and his policy with regard to the spheres of interest of the U.S.S.R. and Japan in Manchuria shows that he would have liquidated both if he could have done so. Indeed, he almost succeeded in accomplishing this in the case of the sphere of the U.S.S.R., and initiated the policy of railway construction already referred to, a result of which was to cut off the South Manchuria Railway from some of its feeder districts. This attitude towards U.S.S.R. and Japanese interests in Manchuria may be attributed partly to impatience at the limitations of his authority in dealing with these countries, and partly to the resentment which he shared with all shades of Chinese opinion regarding the privileged position of foreigners in China. In fact, in November, 1924, he invited Dr. Sun to a Reorganisation Conference in the programme of which the latter wanted to include the improvement of the standard of living, the convening of a National Convention and the abolition of unequal treaties. Dr. Sun's fatal illness prevented this conference from taking place; but his proposals suggest a certain understanding with the Marshal and a possible basis of agreement between them with regard to the foreign policy of their country.

Last years of Chang Tso-lin.

In the last years of his life, Marshal Chang Tso-lin showed increasing unwillingness to allow Japan to profit by the privileges she derived from various treaties and agreements. Their relations at times became somewhat strained. Japanese advice that he should keep out of the factional strife in China and concentrate his energy on the development of Manchuria he resented and disregarded, as did his son after him. After the defeat of General Feng, Chang Tso-lin became the chief of the alliance of the Northern militarists, with the title of Great Marshal.

In 1928 he suffered defeat at the hands of the Kuomintang army, in their Northern Expedition referred to in Chapter I, and was advised by Japan to withdraw his armies into Manchuria before it was too late. The declared object of Japan was to save Manchuria from the evils of civil war which would have resulted from the entry of a defeated army pursued by its victors.

Death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, June 4, 1928.

The Marshal resented the advice, but was obliged to follow it. He left Peiping (formerly Peking) on June 3, 1928, for Mukden, but was killed the next day by an explosion which wrecked his train just outside the city at the spot where the Peiping-Mukden Railway passes underneath the bridge over which run the lines of the South Manchuria Railway.

The responsibility for this murder has never been established. The tragedy remains shrouded in mystery, but the suspicion of Japanese complicity to which it gave rise became an additional factor in the state of tension which Sino-Japanese relations had already reached by that time.

Succeeded by his son, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

The Young Marshal declares allegiance to the Central Government.

After the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin his son, Chang Hsueh-liang became the ruler of Manchuria. He shared many of the national aspirations of the younger generation, and desired to stop civil warfare and assist the Kuomintang in its policy of unification. As Japan had already some experience of the policy and tendencies of the Kuomintang, she did not welcome the prospect of such influence penetrating into Manchuria. The Young Marshal was advised accordingly. Like his father, he resented that advice and decided to follow his own counsel. His relations with the Kuomintang and with Nanking became closer, and in December, 1928, he accepted the national flag and declared his allegiance to the Central Government. He was made Commander-in-Chief of the North-Eastern Frontier Army and was also confirmed as chief of the administration of Manchuria, with the addition of Jehol, a part of Inner Mongolia with an area of about 60,000 square miles.

Kuomintang connection more nominal than real.

The union of Manchuria with Nationalist China necessitated some changes in the administrative organisation, which was made to approximate that of the Central Government. The Committee System was introduced and Kuomintang headquarters were established. In reality, the old system and its personnel continued to function as before. The

interference of Party branches with the local administrations, such as continually occurred in China, was not tolerated in Manchuria. The provision which required all important military officers and civil officials to be members of the Kuomintang was treated as a mere formality. The relationship with the Central Government depended in all affairs military, civil, financial and foreign, on voluntary co-operation. Orders or instructions requiring unquestioning obedience would not have been tolerated. Appointments or dismissals against the wishes of the Manchurian authorities were unthinkable. In various other parts of China a similar independence of action in Government and Party affairs existed. All important appointments are, in such cases, really made by the local authorities and only confirmed by the Central Government.

Effect of union with Nationalist Government on foreign policy in Manchuria.

In the domain of foreign policy, the union of Manchuria with the Nationalist Government was to have more important consequences, although, in this respect, the local authorities were also left much liberty of action. The persistent assaults of Marshal Chang Tso-lin on the position of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and his disregard of certain rights claimed by Japan, show that in Manchuria a "forward policy" had already been adopted before the union with the Nationalists. However, after the union, Manchuria was opened to well-organised and systematic Kuomintang propaganda. In its official Party publication and numerous affiliated organs it never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the recovery of lost sovereign rights, and abolition of unequal treaties, and the wickedness of imperialism. Such propaganda was bound to make a profound impression in Manchuria, where the reality of foreign interests, courts, police, guards or soldiers on Chinese soil was apparent. Through the Nationalist schoolbooks Party propaganda entered the schools. Associations such as the Liaoning Peoples' Foreign Policy Association made their appearance. They stimulated and intensified the nationalist sentiment and carried on an anti-Japanese agitation. Pressure was brought to bear on Chinese house-owners and landlords to raise the rents of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to refuse renewal of rent contracts.¹ The Japanese reported to the Commission many cases of this nature. Korean settlers were subjected to systematic persecution. Various orders and instructions of an anti-Japanese nature were issued. Cases of friction accumulated, and dangerous tension developed. The Kuomintang Party Headquarters in the provincial capitals were established in March, 1931, and subsequently branch organisations were set up in the other towns and districts. Party propagandists from China came North in increasing

¹ See special study No. 9 annexed to this report.

numbers. The Japanese complained that the anti-Japanese agitation was intensified every day. In April, 1931, a five days' conference under the auspices of the People's Foreign Policy Association was held at Mukden, with over three hundred delegates from various parts of Manchuria in attendance. The possibility of liquidating the Japanese position in Manchuria was discussed, the recovery of the South Manchuria Railway being included in the resolutions adopted. At the same time, the U.S.S.R. and her citizens suffered from similar tendencies, while the White Russians, although they had no sovereign rights or exceptional privileges to surrender, were subjected to humiliation and ill-treatment.

Effect on domestic affairs.

As regards domestic affairs, the Manchurian authorities had retained all the power they wanted, and they had no objection to following administrative rules and methods adopted by the Central Government so long as the essentials of power were not affected.

The Political Committee of the North Eastern Provinces.

Soon after the union, the Political Committee of the North Eastern Provinces was established at Mukden. It was, under the nominal supervision of the Central Government, the highest administrative authority in the North Eastern Provinces. It consisted of 13 members, who elected one of their number as President. The Committee was responsible for the direction and supervision of the work of the Governments of the four provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, and of the so-called Special District which, since 1922, had replaced the administrative sphere of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Committee had authority to deal with all matters not specifically reserved to the Central Government, and to take any action which did not conflict with their laws and orders. It was the duty of the Governments of the Provinces and of the Special District to carry out the decisions reached by the Committee.

The administrative system of the Provinces did not differ essentially from the organisation adopted in the rest of China. The concession made with regard to the preservation of Manchuria as an administrative unit was the most important difference. Without this concession voluntary union would probably not have taken place. In fact, notwithstanding external changes, the old conditions continued to exist. The Manchurian authorities realized that as before their power derived much more from their armies than from Nanking.

The Army. Military expenditure 80 % of total expenditure.

This fact explains the maintenance of large standing armies numbering about 250,000 men, and of the huge arsenal on which more than \$200,000,000 (silver) are reported to have been spent. Military expenses

are estimated to have amounted to 80 per cent. of the total expenditure. The remainder was not sufficient to provide for the costs of administration, police, justice and education. The treasury was not capable of paying adequate salaries to the officials. As all power rested in the hands of a few military men office could be obtained only through them. Nepotism, corruption and maladministration continued to be the unavoidable consequences of this state of affairs. The Commission found grave complaints concerning this maladministration to be widely current. This state of affairs, however, was not peculiar to Manchuria, as similar or even worse conditions existed in other parts of China.

Heavy taxation was needed for the upkeep of the army. As ordinary revenues were still insufficient, the authorities further taxed the people by steadily depreciating the irredeemable provincial currencies.¹ This was often done, particularly of late, in connection with "official bean-buying" operations, which by 1930 had already assumed monopolistic proportions. By gaining control over Manchuria's staple products, the authorities had hoped to enhance their gains by compelling the foreign bean-buyers, particularly the Japanese, to pay higher prices. Such transactions show the extent to which the authorities controlled banks and commerce. Officials likewise engaged freely in all sorts of private enterprise, and used their power to gather wealth for themselves and their favourites.

Constructive efforts of the Chinese administration in Manchuria.

Whatever the shortcomings of the administration in Manchuria may have been in the period preceding the events of September, 1931, efforts were made in some parts of the country to improve the administration, and certain achievements must be noted, particularly in the field of educational progress, of municipal administration, and of public utility work. It is necessary in particular to emphasize that during this period, under the administration of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the Chinese population and Chinese interests played a much greater part than formerly in the development and organisation of the economic resources of Manchuria.²

The extensive settlement of Chinese immigrants, already mentioned, helped to develop the economic and social relations between Manchuria and the rest of China. But apart from this colonisation, it was during this period that Chinese railways, independent of Japanese capital, notably the Mukden-Hailung, the Tahushan-Tungliao (a branch of the Peiping-Mukden system), the Tsitsihar-Koshan, and the Hulun-Haikun railways, were built, and that the Hulutao Harbour project, the Liao River Conservancy work, and some navigation enterprises on various

¹ See Special Studies No. 4 and No. 5 annexed to this report.

² See also Chapter VIII and Special Study No. 3 annexed to this report.

rivers, were started. Official and private Chinese interests participated in many enterprises. In mining, they had an interest in the Penhsihu, Muling, Chalainoerh and Laotoukou coal mines, and sole responsibility for the development of other mines, many of them under the direction of the official North-Eastern Mining Administration: they were also interested in gold mining in Heilungkiang province. In forestry they had a joint interest with Japanese in the Yalu Timber Company, and were engaged in the timber industry in Heilungkiang and Kirin provinces. Agricultural experimental stations were started in various places in Manchuria, and agricultural associations and irrigation projects were encouraged. Finally, Chinese interests were engaged in milling and textile industries, bean, oil and flour mills in Harbin, spinning and weaving mills for Pongee or Tussah silk, cotton and wool.

Commercial relations with the rest of China.

Commerce between Manchuria and the rest of China also increased.¹ This trade was partly financed by Chinese banks, notably the Bank of China, which had established branches in the leading towns in Manchuria. Chinese steamships and native junks plied between China Proper and Dairen, Yingkow (Newchwang) and Antung. They carried increasing amounts of cargo and occupied second place in Manchuria's shipping, being exceeded only by Japanese tonnage. Chinese insurance business was also on the increase, and the Chinese Maritime Customs derived an ever-increasing revenue from the trade of Manchuria.

Thus, during the period preceding the conflict between China and Japan, both the political and economic ties between Manchuria and the rest of China were gradually strengthened. This growing interdependence contributed to induce Chinese leaders, both in Manchuria and in Nanking, to pursue an increasingly nationalist policy directed against the interests and rights acquired by Russia or Japan.

3. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

Russo-Chinese relations.

The Chinese Eastern Railway.

Contract of September 8, 1896.

The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 had given Russia an opportunity to intervene, ostensibly on behalf of China, but in fact in her own interest, as subsequent events proved. Japan was forced by diplomatic pressure to return to China the Liaotung Peninsula in South Manchuria, which

¹ See also Chapter VIII and Special Study No. 6 annexed to this report.

had been ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, and Russia assisted China to pay off the war indemnities which had been imposed by Japan. In 1896 a secret defensive alliance was concluded between the two countries, and in the same year, in consideration of the services above referred to, Russia was authorised by China to carry a branch of the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria in a direct line from Chita to Vladivostock. This line was said to be needed for the transportation of Russian forces to be sent to the East in case Japan should again attack China. The Russo-Chinese Bank (later Russo-Asiatic Bank) was established to mask somewhat the official character of the enterprise. The Bank formed in its turn the Chinese Eastern Railway Company for the construction and operation of the railway. By the terms of the contract of September 8, 1896, between the Bank and the Chinese Government, the Company was to build the railway and operate it for eighty years, at the end of which it was to become the property of China free of charge, but China had the right of purchasing it at a price to be agreed upon at the end of thirty years. During the period of the contract the company was to have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands. This clause was interpreted by Russia in a much broader way than various other stipulations in the contract seem to warrant. China protested against the continuous Russian attempts to enlarge the scope of the contract, but was not able to prevent it. Russia gradually succeeded in exercising in the Chinese Eastern Railway area, with its rapidly developing railway towns, rights equivalent to rights of sovereignty. China had also consented to hand over free of charge all government lands needed by the railway, while private lands might be expropriated at current prices. The Company had furthermore been permitted to construct and operate the telegraph lines necessary for its own use.

Lease of the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia, 1898.

In 1898, Russia secured a lease for twenty-five years of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula, which Japan had been forced to give up in 1895, and also secured the right to connect the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin with Port Arthur and Dalny (now Dairen), in the leased territory. Authority was given for the construction of a naval port at Port Arthur. In the area traversed by this branch line the Company was granted the right to cut timber and to mine coal for the use of the railway. All the stipulations of the contract of September 8, 1896, were extended to the supplementary branches. Russia was authorised to make her own tariff arrangements inside the leased territory. In 1899 Dalny (now Dairen) was declared a free port and opened to foreign shipping and commerce. No railway privileges were to be given to the subjects of other Powers in the area traversed by the branch line. In the neutral ground north of the leased territory no ports were to be opened to foreign

trade and no concessions or privileges were to be granted without the consent of Russia.

Russian occupation of Manchuria, 1900.

In 1900 Russia occupied Manchuria on the ground that the Boxer rising had endangered her nationals. Other Powers protested and demanded the withdrawal of her forces, but Russia delayed taking action in this sense. In February, 1901, the draft of a secret Sino-Russian treaty was discussed in St. Petersburg, by the terms of which China, in return for the restoration of her civil authority in Manchuria, was to sanction the maintenance of the railway guards which Russia had established under Clause 6 of the fundamental contract of 1896, and to engage not to transfer to other nations or their subjects, without the consent of Russia, mines or other interests in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. These and some other clauses in the draft treaty, when they became known, aroused opposition from public opinion in China and other countries, and on April 3, 1901, the Russian Government issued a circular note to the effect that the project had been withdrawn.

Japan resorted to war against Russia, February 10, 1904.

Japan followed these manœuvres with particular attention. On January 30, 1902, she had concluded the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance and accordingly felt herself more secure. However, she was still concerned at the prospect of Russian encroachments into Korea and Manchuria. She therefore pressed with other Powers for the evacuation of the Russian forces in Manchuria. Russia declared her willingness to withdraw on conditions which would have virtually closed Manchuria and Mongolia to other than Russian enterprise. In Korea, Russian pressure increased also. In July, 1902, Russian troops appeared at the mouth of the Yalu River. Several other acts convinced Japan that Russia had decided upon a policy which was a menace to her interests if not to her very existence. In July, 1903, she began negotiations with Russia concerning the maintenance of the policy of the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China, but having met with no success whatever she resorted to war on February 10, 1904. China remained neutral.

Treaty of Portsmouth.

Russia was defeated. On September 3, 1905, she concluded the Treaty of Portsmouth, whereby she relinquished her exceptional rights in South Manchuria in favour of Japan. The leased territory and all rights connected with the lease were transferred to Japan, and also the railway between Port Arthur and Changchun, with its branches, as well as all coal mines in that region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway.

Both parties agreed to restore to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria occupied or under the control of their respective troops, with the exception of the leased territory. Both reserved the right to maintain (under certain specified conditions) guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria, the number of such guards not to exceed fifteen per kilometre.

Russian influence restricted to North Manchuria.

Russia had lost half of her sphere of influence, which was henceforth to be restricted to North Manchuria. She retained her position there and increased her influence in the following years, but, when the Russian revolution broke out in 1917, China decided to reassert her sovereignty in this area.

Siberian expedition.

At first her action was restricted to participation in the Allied intervention (1918-20) which, in connection with the chaotic conditions rapidly developing, after the Russian Revolution, in Siberia and North Manchuria, had been proposed by the United States of America for the double purpose of protecting the vast stores of war material and supplies accumulated at Vladivostock and of assisting the evacuation of some 50,000 Czecho-Slovak troops, who were retreating from the eastern front across Siberia. This proposal was accepted and it was arranged that each country should send an expeditionary force of 7,000 men to be assigned to its own special section of the Trans-Siberian line, the C.E.R. being confided to the sole charge of the Chinese. To ensure the working of the railways in co-operation with the Allied forces, a special Inter-Allied Railway Committee was formed in 1919 with the technical and transportation Boards under it. In 1920, the intervention came to an end and the Allied forces were withdrawn from Siberia, except the Japanese, who had become involved in open hostilities with the Bolsheviks. The fighting dragged on for nearly two years. In 1922, after the Washington Conference, the Japanese troops were also withdrawn and, simultaneously, the Inter-Allied Committee with its technical board ceased to exist.

After outbreak of Russian Revolution in 1917, China revokes privileges granted to Russia in 1896.

Meanwhile China, after an abortive attempt of General Horvath, the head of the C.E.R., to set up an independent regime in the railway area, assumed responsibility for the preservation of order in that area (1920). In the same year she concluded an agreement with the reorganised Russo-Asiatic Bank, and announced her intention of assuming

temporarily supreme control of the railway, pending the conclusion of an agreement with a new Russian Government. China also announced her intention of resuming the advantages conferred on her by the contract of 1896 and the original statutes of the Company. Thenceforth the President and four members of the Board of directors of the Company, and two members of the Audit Committee, were to be nominated by the Chinese Government. Russian predominance was also weakened by other measures which followed. The Russian armed forces in the railway area were disarmed and replaced by Chinese soldiers. The extraterritorial status of Russians was abolished. Their courts were forcibly entered and closed. Russians were made amenable to Chinese law, justice and taxation. They could be arrested by the Chinese police and held by them indefinitely, as the police had large powers and were insufficiently controlled.

Special administrative district formed.

In 1922, the railway area which so far had been under the administration of the Company was transformed into a Special District of the Three Eastern Provinces under a Chief Administrator directly responsible to Mukden. The administration of the lands belonging to the railways was also interfered with. Marshal Chang Tso-lin had practically liquidated the Russian sphere before Russia's new government had been recognised, and private interests had suffered heavily in the process. When the Soviet Government succeeded to the Manchurian inheritance of its predecessor the railway had been shorn of most of the privileges.

Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1919-20.

The declarations of policy made in 1919 and 1920 by the Soviet Government with regard to China implied a complete relinquishment of the special rights which the Imperial Government had acquired in China, notably those acquired in North Manchuria.

Agreement of 1924.

In accordance with this policy, the Soviet Government agreed to the regularisation of the *fait accompli* by a new agreement. By the Sino-Russian agreement of May 31, 1924, the Chinese Eastern Railway became a purely commercial concern under joint management, in which China also acquired a financial interest. The Government of the U.S.S.R. had, however, the right of appointing the General Manager, who exercises extensive and ill-defined powers, and, under the Agreement, the Government of the U.S.S.R. exercised a preponderant influence in the affairs of the railway and was able to retain the essential parts of its economic interests in North Manchuria. As mentioned above, the Agreement of May, 1924, concluded with the Chinese Government at Peking, was not

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accepted by Marshal Chang Tso-lin, who insisted on a separate Agreement being concluded with himself. This Agreement, signed in September, 1924, was almost identical in its terms, but by it the lease of the railway was shortened from eighty to sixty years.

Chang-Tso-lin's aggressive policy against the interests of the U.S.S.R.

This Agreement did not inaugurate a period of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the administration of Marshal Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria.

The convening of the Conference which was to deal with the many questions left unsettled in the two Agreements of 1924 was postponed on various pretexts. On two occasions in 1925 and 1926 the General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway refused to transport troops of the Marshal on the railway. The second incident led to the arrest of the General Manager and to an ultimatum from the U.S.S.R. (January 23, 1926). Nor were these isolated incidents. Nevertheless the Chinese authorities persisted in a policy which was directed against Russian interests and which was resented both by the Government of the U.S.S.R. and by the White Russians.

Final efforts of China to liquidate Soviet influence in Manchuria, 1929.

After the adherence of Manchuria to the Nanking Government, nationalist spirit increased in strength, and the efforts of the U.S.S.R. to maintain predominating control over the railway were, more than ever before, resented. In May, 1929, an attempt was made to liquidate the last remnants of the Russian sphere of interest. The attack started with a raid on the Soviet consulates at various places by the Chinese police, who made many arrests and claimed to have found evidence proving that a communist revolution was being plotted by employees of the Soviet Government and of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In July, the telegraph and telephone systems of the railway were seized, and many important Soviet organisations and enterprises were forcibly closed down. Finally, the Soviet Manager of the railway was requested to hand over the management to a Chinese appointee. He refused to do so, and was thereupon forbidden to carry on his duties. The Chinese authorities replaced freely members of the Soviet staff by their own nominees, many Soviet citizens were arrested, and some were deported. The Chinese justified the violent action taken on the ground that the Soviet Government had broken its pledge not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of China. The Soviet Government, in its Note of May 30, denied the charge.

Action of the U.S.S.R.

Protocol of Habarovsk, December 22, 1929.

In consequence of the forcible liquidation of the remaining Russian rights and interests the Soviet Government decided to take action. After the exchange of several notes, it recalled from China its diplomatic and commercial representatives, and all its nominees to posts in the Chinese Eastern Railway, and severed all railway communications between its territory and China. China, likewise, broke off relations with the U.S.S.R. and withdrew all Chinese diplomatic offices from Soviet territory. Raids by Soviet troops across the Manchurian border began, and developed into a military invasion in November, 1929. After having suffered defeat and severe loss of prestige, the Manchurian authorities to whom the Nanking Government entrusted the settlement of the dispute were forced to accept the demands of the U.S.S.R. On December 22, 1929, a protocol was signed at Habarovsk whereby the *status quo* was reestablished. During the dispute the Soviet Government had always taken the position, in answer to various Memoranda from third Power signatories to the Pact of Paris, that her action had been taken in legitimate self defence and could in no way be interpreted as a breach of that agreement.

Russo-Japanese relations regarding Manchuria since 1905.

Before describing the interests of Japan in Manchuria, which are dealt with at length in the next chapter, a brief reference must be made in this account of the position of Russia in Manchuria, to the relations between that country and Japan since 1905.

Policy of co-operation, 1907-17.

It is an interesting fact that the war between Russia and Japan was followed almost immediately by a policy of close co-operation, and when peace was concluded they were able to strike a satisfactory balance between their respective spheres of interest in North and South Manchuria. Such traces of the conflict as might have remained behind were rapidly effaced by controversies with other Powers who wanted to engage actively in the development of Manchuria. The fear of other rivals hastened the process which was reconciling the two countries. The Treaties of 1907, 1910, 1912, 1916 brought the two countries progressively closer together.

Effect of the Russian Revolution on Japan.

The Russian revolution of 1917, followed by the declarations of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919, and of October 27, 1920, regarding

its policy towards the Chinese people and, later, by the Sino-Soviet agreements of May 31, 1924, and September 20, 1924, shattered the basis of Russo-Japanese understanding and co-operation in Manchuria. This fundamental reversal of policy radically changed the relations of the three Powers in the Far East. Moreover, the Allied intervention (1918-20) with its aftermath of friction between the Japanese and Soviet forces in Siberia (1920-22) had accentuated the change in the relations between Japan and Russia. The attitude of the Soviet Government gave a strong impetus to China's nationalistic aspirations. As the Soviet Government and the Third International had adopted a policy opposed to all imperialist Powers which maintained relations with China on the basis of the existing treaties, it seemed probable that they would support China in the struggle for the recovery of sovereign rights. This development revived all the old anxieties and suspicions of Japan towards her Russian neighbour. This country, with which she had once been at war, had, during the years which followed that war, become a friend and ally. Now this relationship was changed, and the possibility of a danger from across the North Manchurian border again became a matter of concern to Japan. The likelihood of an alliance between the Communist doctrines in the north and the anti-Japanese propaganda of the Kuomintang in the south made the desire to impose between the two a Manchuria which should be free from both increasingly felt in Japan. Japanese misgivings have been still further increased in the last few years by the predominant influence acquired by the U.S.S.R. in Outer Mongolia and the growth of communism in China.

The Convention concluded between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in January, 1925, served to establish regular relations, but did not revive the close co-operation of the pre-revolution period.

CHAPTER III.

MANCHURIAN ISSUES BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA.

(Before September 18, 1931)

1. JAPAN'S INTEREST IN CHINA.

During the quarter of a century before September, 1931, the ties which bound Manchuria to the rest of China were growing stronger and at the same time the interests of Japan in Manchuria were increasing. Manchuria was admittedly a part of China, but it was a part in which Japan had acquired or claimed such exceptional rights, so restricting the exercise of China's sovereign rights, that a conflict between the two countries was a natural result.

Japan's Treaty Rights of 1905.

By the Treaty of Peking of December, 1905, China gave her consent to the transfer to Japan of the Kwantung Leased Territory which was formerly leased to Russia, and of the southern branch of the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway as far north as Changchun. In an additional agreement China granted to Japan a concession to improve the military railway line between Antung and Mukden, and to operate it for fifteen years.

South Manchuria Railway Company was organised in August 1906.

In August, 1906, the South Manchuria Railway Company was organised by Imperial Decree to take over and administer the former Russian railway, as well as the Antung-Mukden Railway. The Japanese Government acquired control of the Company by taking half of the shares in exchange for the railway, its properties, and the valuable coal mines at Fushun and Yentai. The Company was entrusted, in the railway area, with the functions of administration, and was allowed to levy taxes: it was also authorised to engage in mining, electrical enterprises, warehousing, and many other branches of business.

Annexation of Korea.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea. This annexation indirectly increased Japanese rights in Manchuria, since Korean settlers became Japanese subjects over whom Japanese officials exercised jurisdiction.

The Treaty and Notes of 1915.

In 1915, as a result of the group of exceptional demands made by the Japanese and generally known as the "Twenty-one Demands," Japan and China signed a Treaty and exchanged Notes on May 25, regarding South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. By these agreements the lease of the Kwantung Territory, including Port Arthur and Dalny (now Dairen, which was originally for a period of 25 years and the concessions for the South Manchuria and the Antung-Mukden Railways, were all extended to 99 years. Furthermore, Japanese subjects in South Manchuria acquired the right to travel and reside, to engage in business of any kind, and to lease land necessary for trade, industry and agriculture. Japan also obtained rights of priority for railway and certain other loans in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and preferential rights regarding the appointment of advisers in South Manchuria. At the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, however, Japan relinquished her rights regarding the loan and the advisers.

These treaties and other agreements gave to Japan an important and unusual position in Manchuria. She governed the leased territory with practically full rights of sovereignty. Through the South Manchuria Railway she administered the railway areas, including several towns and large sections of such populous cities as Mukden and Changchun; and in these areas she controlled the police, taxation, education and public utilities. She maintained armed forces in many parts of the country: the Kwantung Army in the Leased Territory, Railway Guards in the railway areas, and Consular Police throughout the various districts.

Exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations between Japan and China in Manchuria.

This summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighbouring state such extensive economic and administrative privileges. A situation of this kind could possibly be maintained without leading to incessant complications and disputes if it were freely desired or accepted on both sides, and if it were the sign and embodiment of a well-considered policy of close collaboration in the economic and in the political sphere. But in the absence of those conditions it could only lead to friction and conflict.

2. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF JAPAN AND CHINA IN MANCHURIA.

Chinese attitude towards Manchuria.

The Chinese people regard Manchuria as an integral part of China, and deeply resent any attempt to separate it from the rest of their country. Hitherto these Three Eastern Provinces have always been considered both by China and by foreign Powers as a part of China, and the *de jure* authority of the Chinese Government there has been unquestioned. This is evidenced in many Sino-Japanese treaties and agreements, as well as in other international conventions, and has been reiterated in numerous statements issued officially by foreign offices, including that of Japan.

Manchuria, China's first line of defence.

The Chinese regard Manchuria as their "first line of defence." As Chinese territory, it is looked upon as a sort of buffer against the adjoining territories of Japan and Russia, a region which constitutes an outpost against the penetration of Japanese and Russian influences from these regions into the other parts of China. The facility with which China, south of the Great Wall, including the city of Peiping, can be invaded from Manchuria has been demonstrated to the Chinese from historical experience. This fear of foreign invasion from the north-east has been increased in recent years by the development of railway communication, and has been intensified during the events of the past year.

China's economic interest in Manchuria.

Manchuria is also regarded by the Chinese as important to them for economic reasons. For decades they have called it the "granary of China," and more recently have regarded it as a region which furnishes seasonal employment to Chinese farmers and labourers from neighbouring Chinese provinces.

Whether China as a whole can be said to be overpopulated may be open to question, but that certain regions and provinces, as, for example, Shantung, are now peopled in such numbers as to require emigration is generally accepted by the most competent authorities on this subject.¹ The Chinese, therefore, regard Manchuria as a frontier region, capable of affording relief for the present and future population problems of other parts of China. They deny the statement that the Japanese are principally responsible for the economic development of Manchuria, and point to their own colonisation enterprises, especially since 1925, to their railway development, and other enterprises in refutation of these claims.

¹ See also the Special Study No. 3 annexed to this report.

Japanese interests in Manchuria: sentiment resulting from the Russo-Japanese War.

Japanese interests in Manchuria differ both in character and degree from those of any other foreign country. Deep in the mind of every Japanese is the memory of their country's great struggle with Russia in 1904-5, fought on the plains of Manchuria, at Mukden and Liaoyang, along the line of the South Manchuria Railway, at the Yalu River, and in the Liaotung Peninsula. To the Japanese the war with Russia will ever be remembered as a life and death struggle fought in self-defence against the menace of Russia encroachments. The fact that a hundred thousand Japanese soldiers died in this war, and that two billion gold Yen were expended, has created in Japanese minds a determination that these sacrifices shall not have been made in vain.

Japanese interest in Manchuria, however, began ten years before that war. The war with China, in 1894-5, principally over Korea, was largely fought at Port Arthur and on the plains of Manchuria; and the treaty of peace signed at Shimonoseki, ceded to Japan in full sovereignty the Liaotung Peninsula. To the Japanese, the fact that Russia, France and Germany forced them to renounce this cession does not affect their conviction that Japan obtained this part of Manchuria as the result of a successful war, and thereby acquired a moral right to it which still exists.

Japan's strategic interest in Manchuria.

Manchuria has been frequently referred to as the "life line" of Japan. Manchuria adjoins Korea, now Japanese territory. The vision of a China, unified, strong and hostile, a nation of four hundred millions, dominant in Manchuria and in Eastern Asia, is disturbing to many Japanese. But to the greater number, when they speak of menace to their national existence and of the necessity of self-defence, they have in mind Russia rather than China. Fundamental, therefore, among the interests of Japanese in Manchuria is the strategic importance of this territory.

There are those in Japan who think that she should entrench herself firmly in Manchuria against the possibility of attack from the U.S.S.R. They have an over-present anxiety lest Korean malcontents in league with Russian communists in the nearby Maritime Province might in future invite, or co-operate with, some new military advance from the north. They regard Manchuria as a buffer region against both the U.S.S.R. and the rest of China. Especially in the minds of Japanese military men, the right claimed, under agreements with Russia and China, to station a few thousand railway guards along the South Manchuria Railway is small recompense for the enormous sacrifices of their country in the Russo-Japanese War, and a meagre security against the possibility of attack from that direction.

Japan's "Special Position" in Manchuria.

Patriotic sentiment, the paramount need of military defence, and the exceptional treaty rights, all combine to create the claim to a "special position" in Manchuria. The Japanese conception of this special position is not limited to what is legally defined in treaties and agreements either with China or with other States. Feelings and historical associations, which are the heritage of the Russo-Japanese War, and pride in the achievements of Japanese enterprise in Manchuria for the last quarter century, are an indefinable but real part of the Japanese claim to a "special position." It is only natural, therefore, that the Japanese use of this expression in diplomatic language should be obscure, and that other States should have found it difficult, if not impossible, to recognise it by international instruments.

The Japanese Government, since the Russo-Japanese War, has at various times sought to obtain from Russia, France, Great Britain and the United States recognition of their country's "special position," "special influence and interest," or "Paramount interest" in Manchuria. These efforts have only met with partial success, and where recognition of such claims has been accorded, in more or less definite terms, the international agreements or understandings containing them have largely disappeared with the passage of time, either by formal abrogation or otherwise, as for example, the Russo-Japanese secret Conventions of 1907, 1910, 1912 and 1916, made with the former Tsarist Government of Russia; the Anglo-Japanese Conventions of alliance, guarantee and declaration of policies; and the Lansing-Ishii Exchange of Notes of 1917.

The Signatories of the Nine Power Treaty of the Washington Conference of February 6, 1922,¹ by agreeing "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity" of China, to maintain "equality of opportunity in China for the trade and industry of all nations," by refraining from taking advantage of conditions in China "in order to seek special rights or privileges" there, and by providing "the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government," challenged to a large extent the claims of any signatory State to a "special position," or to "special rights and interests" in any part of China, including Manchuria.

But the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the abandonment, by abrogation or otherwise, of such agreements as those mentioned above, have led to no change in the attitude of the Japanese. Viscount Ishii

¹ The Nine Powers were the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal.

doubtless well expressed the general view of his countrymen in his recent Memoirs (Gaiko Yoroku), when he said:

"Even if the Lansing-Ishii agreement is abolished, Japan's special interests unshakenly exist there. The special interests which Japan possesses in China neither were created by an international agreement, nor can they become the objects of abolition."

Japan's claims to a "Special position" in Manchuria in conflict with China's sovereign rights and policies.

This Japanese claim with respect to Manchuria conflicts with the sovereign rights of China, and is irreconcilable with the aspirations of the National Government which seeks to curtail existing exceptional rights and privileges of foreign States throughout China, and to prevent their further extension in the future. The development of this conflict will be clear from a consideration of the respective policies pursued by Japan and China in Manchuria.

Japan's general policy towards Manchuria.

Until the events of September, 1931, the various Japanese Cabinets, since 1905, appeared to have the same general aims in Manchuria, but they differed as to the policies best suited to achieve those aims. They also differed somewhat as to the extent of the responsibility which Japan should assume for the maintenance of peace and order.

The general aims for which they worked in Manchuria were to maintain and develop Japan's vested interests, to foster the expansion of Japanese enterprise, and to obtain adequate protection for Japanese lives and property. In the policies adopted for realising these aims was one cardinal feature which may be said to have been common to them all. This feature has been the tendency to regard Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as distinct from the rest of China. It resulted naturally from the Japanese conception of their country's "special position" in Manchuria. Whatever differences may have been observable between the specific policies advocated by the various cabinets in Japan, as, for example, between the so-called "friendship policy" of Baron Shidehara and the so-called "positive policy" of the late General Baron Tanaka, they have always had this feature in common.

The "friendship policy" developed from about the time of the Washington Conference and was maintained until April, 1927; it was then supplanted by the "positive policy" which was followed until July, 1929; finally, the "friendship policy" was again adopted and continued the official policy of the Foreign Office until September, 1931. In the spirit which actuated the two policies there was a marked difference: the "friendship policy" rested, in Baron Shidehara's words, "on the basis of

good will and neighbourliness": the "positive policy" rested upon military force. But in regard to the concrete measures which should be adopted in Manchuria, these two policies differed largely on the question as to the lengths to which Japan should go to maintain peace and order in Manchuria and to protect Japanese interests.

The "positive policy" of the Tanaka Ministry placed greater emphasis upon the necessity of regarding Manchuria as distinct from the rest of China: its positive character was made clear by the frank declaration that "if disturbances spread to Manchuria and Mongolia, and, as a result, peace and order are disrupted, thereby menacing our special position and rights and interests in those regions," Japan would "defend them, no matter whence the menace comes." The Tanaka policy definitely asserted that Japan would take upon herself the task of preserving "peace and order" in Manchuria—in contrast to previous policies which limited their objectives to protecting Japanese interests there.

The Japanese Government has generally pursued a firmer policy in Manchuria than elsewhere in China, in order to preserve and develop those vested interests which are peculiar to that region. Certain of the Cabinets have tended to place great reliance on the use of interventionist methods, accompanied by a threat of force. This was true especially at the time of the presentation of the "Twenty-one Demands" on China in 1915, but as to the wisdom of the "Twenty-one Demands," as well as to other methods of intervention and force, there has always been a marked difference of opinion in Japan.

The effect of the Washington Conference upon Japan's position and policy in Manchuria.

The Washington Conference, although it had a marked effect upon the situation in the rest of China, made little actual change in Manchuria. The Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, in spite of its provisions with respect to the integrity of China and the policy of the Open Door, has had but qualified application to Manchuria in view of the character and extent of Japan's vested interests there, although textually the treaty is applicable to that region. The Nine Power Treaty did not materially diminish the claims based on these vested interests, although, as already stated, Japan formally relinquished her special rights regarding loans and advisers which had been granted in the Treaty of 1915.

Japan's relations with Chang Tso-lin.

During the period from the Washington Conference until the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin in 1928, the policy of Japan in Manchuria was chiefly concerned with its relations with the *de facto* ruler of the Three

Eastern Provinces. Japan gave him a measure of support, notably during the Kuo Sung-lin mutiny mentioned in the last chapter. Marshal Chang Tso-lin, in return, although opposed to many of the Japanese demands, felt it necessary to give due recognition to Japan's desires, since these might at any time be enforced by superior military power. He also wished to be able, upon occasion, to obtain Japanese support against Russian opposition in the north. Upon the whole, Japanese relations with Marshal Chang Tso-lin were reasonably satisfactory from her point of view, although they became increasingly disturbed towards the end of his life in consequence of his failure to fulfil some of his alleged promises and agreements. Some evidence even of a revulsion of Japanese feeling against him became apparent in the months proceeding his defeat and final retreat to Mukden in June, 1928.

Japan's claim to maintain peace and order in Manchuria.

In the Spring of 1928, when the Nationalist armies of China were marching on Peking in an effort to drive out the forces of Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese Government, under the premiership of Baron Tanaka, issued a declaration that, on account of her "special position" in Manchuria, Japan would maintain peace and order in that region. When it seemed possible that the Nationalist armies might carry the civil war north of the Great Wall, the Japanese Government, on May 28, sent to the leading Chinese generals a communication which said:

"The Japanese Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and is prepared to do all it can to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order, or constitute the probable cause of such a disturbance.

"In these circumstances, should disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, Japan may possibly be constrained to take appropriate effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria."

At the same time, Baron Tanaka issued a mere definite statement, that the Japanese Government would prevent "defeated troops or those in pursuit of them" from entering Manchuria.

The announcement of this far-reaching policy brought protests from both the Peking and the Nanking Governments, the Nanking note stating that such measures as Japan proposed would be not only "an interference with Chinese domestic affairs, but also a flagrant violation of the principle of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty."

In Japan itself this "positive policy" of the Tanaka Government, while it received strong support from one party, was vigorously criticised by another, especially by the Shidehara group, on the ground that the preservation of peace and order over all Manchuria was not the responsibility of Japan.

Strained relations between Japan and Chang Hsueh-liang.

Japan's relations with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who succeeded his father in 1928, were increasingly strained from the outset. Japan wished Manchuria to remain separate from the newly-established National Government at Nanking, while Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang was in favour of recognising the authority of that Government. Reference has already been made to the urgent advice given by Japanese officials that allegiance should not be pledged to the Central Government. When, however, the Mukden Government raised the Nationalist flag over government buildings in Mukden in December, 1928, the Japanese Government made no attempt to interfere.

Japanese relations with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang continued to be strained, and acute friction developed in the months immediately preceding September, 1931.

III. SINO-JAPANESE RAILWAY ISSUES IN MANCHURIA.

Manchurian international politics largely railway politics.

The international politics of Manchuria for a quarter of a century have been largely railway politics. Considerations of a purely economic and railway-operating character have been overshadowed by the dictates of state policies, with the result that Manchurian railways cannot be said to have contributed their maximum to the economic development of the region. Our study of Manchurian railway questions has revealed that in Manchuria there has been little or no co-operation between the Chinese and Japanese railway builders and authorities directed to achieving a comprehensive and mutually beneficial railway plan. In contrast with railway development in such regions as Western Canada and Argentina, where economic considerations have in large measure determined railway expansion, railway development in Manchuria has been largely a matter of rivalry between China and Japan. No railway of any importance has ever been constructed in Manchuria without causing an interchange of notes between China and Japan or other interested foreign States.

The South Manchuria Railway served Japan's "Special Mission" in Manchuria.

Manchurian railway construction began with the Russian-financed and directed Chinese Eastern Railway under circumstances which, after the Russo-Japanese War was replaced in the South by a Japanese-controlled system, the South Manchuria Railway, thus making inevitable future rivalry between China and Japan. The South Manchuria Railway Company, although nominally a private corporation, is, in fact, a Japanese Government enterprise. Its functions include not only the management

of its railway lines, but also exceptional rights of political administration. From the time of its incorporation the Japanese have never regarded it as a purely economic enterprise. The late Viscount Goto, first President of the Company, laid down a fundamental principle that the South Manchuria Railway should serve Japan's "special mission" in Manchuria.

The South Manchuria Railway system has developed into an efficient and well-managed railway enterprise, and has contributed much to the economic development of Manchuria, serving at the same time as an example for the Chinese in its numerous services of a non-railway character, such as its schools, laboratories, libraries and agricultural experiment stations. But this has been accompanied by limitations and positive hindrances arising out of the political character of the Company, its connection with party politics in Japan, and certain large expenditures from which no commensurate financial returns can have been expected. Since its formation, the policy of the Railway Company has been to finance the construction of only such Chinese lines as would be connected with its own system, thus, by means of through-traffic agreements, to divert the major part of the freight to the South Manchuria Railway for seaboard export at Dairen in the Japanese leased territory. Very large sums have been expended in financing these lines and it is doubtful if their construction, in certain cases, was justified on purely economic grounds, especially in view of the large capital advances made and the loan considerations involved.

Chinese efforts to build their own railway anteceded Manchuria's declaration of allegiance to Nanking.

The very existence of such a foreign-controlled institution as the South Manchuria Railway on Chinese soil was naturally looked upon with disfavour by the Chinese authorities, and questions concerning its rights and privileges under treaties and agreements have constantly arisen since the Russo-Japanese War. More particularly, after 1924, when the Chinese authorities in Manchuria, having come to recognise the importance of railway development, sought to develop their own railways independent of Japanese capital, did these problems become more critical. Both economic and strategic considerations were involved. The Tahushan-Tungliao line, for example, was projected to develop new territory and to increase the revenues of the Peking-Mukden Railway, while, on the other hand, the Kuo Sung-lin mutiny in December, 1925, demonstrated the possible strategic and political value of independently owned and operated Chinese lines. The Chinese attempt to overcome the Japanese monopoly, and to place obstacles in the way of its future development, anteceded the period of political influence of the Nationalist Government in Manchuria, the Tahushan-Tungliao, Mukden-Hailungcheng and Hulan-Hailun Railways,

for example, having been constructed while Marshal Chang Tso-lin was in power. The policy of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang after his assumption of authority in 1928, re-enforced by the widespread movement for "rights recovery" sponsored by the Central Government and the Kuomintang, came into collision with Japan's monopolistic and expansionist policies, centered, as they were, around the South Manchuria Railway Company.

The conflict over "parallel lines."

In the Japanese justification of their resort to forceful means in Manchuria, on and after September 18, 1931, they have alleged violation of Japan's "treaty rights," and have emphasised China's failure to carry out an engagement made by the Chinese Government during the Sino-Japanese Conference held at Peking in November-December, 1905, which was to the following effect:

"The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in the neighbourhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interests of the above-mentioned railway."

This dispute over the question of so-called "parallel railways" in Manchuria is of long standing importance. The issue first arose in 1907-1908, when the Japanese Government, asserting this claim of right, prevented the Chinese from constructing, under contract with a British firm, the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway. Since 1924, when the Chinese in Manchuria undertook with renewed vigour to develop their own railways, independent of Japanese financial interest, the Japanese Government has protested against the construction by the Chinese of the Tahushan-Tungliao and the Kirin-Hailungcheng lines, although both these lines were completed and opened to traffic in spite of Japanese protests.

The question as to the existence of a "treaty right" or a "secret protocol."

Prior to the arrival of the Commission in the Far East, there had been much doubt as to the actual existence of any such engagement as was claimed by Japan. In view of the longstanding importance of this dispute, the Commission took special pains to obtain information on the essential facts. In Tokyo, Nanking and Peiping, all the relevant documents were examined, and we are now able to state that the alleged engagement of the Chinese plenipotentiaries of the Peking Conference of November-December, 1905, regarding so-called "parallel railways" is not contained in any formal treaty; that the alleged engagement in question is to be found in the minutes of the eleventh day of the Peking Conference,

December 4, 1905. We have obtained agreement from the Japanese and Chinese Assessors that no other document containing such alleged engagement exists beyond this entry in the minutes of the Peking Conference.

The real question at issue.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not whether there exists a "treaty right" whereby Japan is entitled to claim that certain railways in Manchuria have been constructed by the Chinese in violation of such an engagement, but whether this entry in the minutes of the Peking Conference of 1905, whether called a "protocol" or not, is a binding commitment on the part of China, having the force of a formal agreement, and without limitation as to the period or circumstances of its application.

The determination of the question whether this entry into the minutes of the Peking Conference constituted, from an international legal point of view, a binding agreement, and whether, if so, there is but one interpretation which may reasonably be placed upon it, was properly a matter for judgment by an impartial judicial tribunal.

The Chinese and Japanese official translations of this entry into the minutes of the Conference leave no doubt that the disputed passage concerning "parallel railways" is a declaration or statement of intention on the part of the Chinese plenipotentiaries.

That there was a statement of intention has not been disputed by the Chinese, but there has throughout the controversy been a difference of opinion between the two parties as to the nature of the intention expressed. Japan has claimed that the words employed preclude China from building or allowing to be built any railway which, in the opinion of the South Manchuria Railway Company, was in competition with its system. The Chinese, on the other hand, contend that the only commitment involved in the disputed passage was a statement of intention not to build lines with the deliberate object of unduly impairing the commercial usefulness and value of the South Manchuria Railway. During the exchange of notes of 1907 concerning the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway project, Prince Ching, representing the Chinese Government, stated to Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Minister, in a communication dated April 7, 1907, that the Japanese plenipotentiaries in the Peking Conference, while refusing to agree to a definition of the term "parallel line" in terms of specific mileage from the South Manchuria Railway, declared that Japan "would do nothing to prevent China from any steps she might take in the future for the development of Manchuria". It would seem, therefore, that the Chinese Government during this period admitted in practice that there was, on their part, an obligation not to construct railways patently and unreasonably prejudicial to the interests of the South Manchuria

Railway, though they have always denied that Japan had any valid claim to a right to monopolise railway construction in southern Manchuria.

There has never been a definition as to what would constitute a parallel railway, although the Chinese desired one. When the Japanese Government opposed the construction of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway in 1906-1908, the impression was created that Japan considered a "parallel" railway one within approximately thirty-five miles of the South Manchuria Railway, but in 1926 the Japanese Government protested against the construction of the Tahushan-Tungliao Railway as a "competitive parallel line", noting that the distance between the proposed railway and the South Manchuria Railway would be "no more than seventy miles on the average" It would be difficult to make a thoroughly satisfactory definition.

Difficulties in interpretation of a clause phrased so broadly and non-technically.

From a railway-operating point of view, a "parallel" line can be considered a "competing line"; one which deprives another railway of some part of the traffic which naturally would have gravitated to it. Competitive traffic includes both local and through-traffic, and, especially when the latter is considered, it is not difficult to see how a stipulation against the construction of "parallel" lines is capable of very broad interpretation. Nor is there any agreement between China and Japan as to what constitutes a "main line" or a "branch line." These terms, from a railway operating point of view, are subject to change. The Peking-Mukden Railway line from Tahushan extending north was originally considered by that administration as a "branch line", but after the line had been completed from Tahushan to Tungliao it was possible to regard this as a "main line"

It was only natural that the interpretation of the undertaking in regard to parallel railways should lead to bitter controversy between China and Japan. The Chinese attempted to build their own railways in South Manchuria, but in almost every case met with a protest from Japan.

Issues caused by Japanese loans for construction of Chinese railways in Manchuria.

A second group of railway issues which increased the tension between China and Japan before the events of September last, were these which arose from the agreements under which the Japanese advanced money for the construction of various Chinese Government Railways in Manchuria Japanese capital to the present value, including arrears and interest, of Yen 150,000,000 had been expended in the building of the following Chinese lines: The Kirin-Changchun, the Kirin-Tunhua, the Saupingkai-

Taonan, and the Taonan-Angangchi railways and certain narrow gauge lines.

The Japanese complained that the Chinese would not pay these loans, nor make adequate provision for them, nor carry out various stipulations in the agreements, such as those respecting the appointment of Japanese railway advisers. They made repeated demands that the Chinese should fulfil the alleged promises made by their Government that Japanese interests should be permitted to participate the construction of the Kirin-Kwainei Railway. This projected line would extend the Kirin-Tunhua Railway to the Korean border, and would make available for Japan a new short sea and rail route from her seaports to the centre of Manchuria, and, in conjunction with the other railways, shorten the communications with the interior.

The Chinese Defence.

In defence of the failure to repay their loans, the Chinese pointed out that these were not normal financial transactions. They claimed that the loans were made largely by the South Manchuria Railway in order to monopolise railway construction in South Manchuria; that the object was primarily strategic and political; and that in any case, the new lines had been so heavily over-capitalised that they were, at least for the time being, financially unable to earn the necessary money to repay the construction expenses and loans. They contended that in each instance of alleged failure to fulfil obligations, an impartial examination would show adequate justification for their conduct. As for the Kirin-Kwainei Railway, they denied the moral, and even the legal, validity of the alleged agreements.

The South Manchuria Railway desired a system of Branch Lines.

There were certain conditions which existed in connection with these railway agreements which make it natural for the loan controversy to arise. The South Manchuria Railway had practically no branches, and wished to develop a system of feeder lines in order to increase its freight and passenger traffic. The Company was therefore willing to advance money for the building of such new lines, even though there was little likelihood that the loans would be repaid in the near future; it was, also, willing to continue to make further advances, when earlier loans were still outstanding.

In these circumstances, and so long as the newly-constructed Chinese lines functioned as feeders to the South Manchuria system, and were operated in some measure under its influence, the South Manchuria Railway appeared to make no special effort to force payment of the loans, and the Chinese lines operated with ever-increasing debt obligations. But when certain of these lines were connected with a new Chinese Railway

System, and in 1930-31 started a serious competition with the South Manchuria Railway, the non-payment of the loans at once became a subject of complaint.

The Nishihara Loans.

Another complicating factor, in the case of certain of these loan agreements, was their political character. It was as a result of the "Twenty-one Demands" that the Kirin-Changchun Railway was placed under the direction of the South Manchuria Railway Company, and the outstanding indebtedness of the line converted into a long-term loan, maturing in 1947. The advance of Yen 20,000,000 made in 1918 in consequence of the so-called "Four Manchuria-Mongolia Railway Agreement", was one of the so-called "Nishihara Loans," made to the military Government of the "Anfu clique," without any restriction as to the purpose for which it might be used. Similarly, it was from a Nishihara loan that an advance was made of Yen 10,000,000 to this clique in connection with the preliminary loan contract agreement of 1918 for the construction of the Kirin-Kwainai Railway. Chinese national sentiment has been greatly aroused over the subject of the "Nishihara Loans" ever since their negotiation; but in spite of this the Chinese Government has never repudiated them. In these circumstances, the Chinese felt little moral obligation to fulfil the conditions of the loan contracts.

The Kirin-Kwainai Railway Project.

Especially important in Sino-Japanese relations were the issues over the Kirin-Kwainai Railway project. The first set of issues related to the section of the line from Kirin to Tunhua, the construction of which was completed in 1928. From that time on, the Japanese complained because the Chinese would not convert the Japanese advances for construction purposes into a formal loan secured by the earnings of the railway and maintained that the Chinese were violating the contract by their refusal to appoint a Japanese accountant for the line.

The Chinese in turn claimed that the construction costs submitted were not only much higher than the estimates of the Japanese engineers, but were greatly in excess of the amount for which vouchers were presented. They refused to take over the line formally until the construction costs should be settled; and contended that until they should do so, they were under no obligation to appoint a Japanese accountant.

These issues, definite and technical, involving no problems of principle or policy, were obviously suited for arbitration or judicial discrimination, but they remained unsettled and served to intensify the mutual resentment of Chinese and Japanese.

The projected Tunhua-Kwainei Line.

Of much greater importance, and far more complicated, was the issue over the construction of the railway from Tunhua to Kwainei. This section would complete the railway from Changchun to the Korean border, where it would connect with a Japanese railway running to a nearby Korean port. Such a line, giving direct entrance to central Manchuria and opening a region rich in timber and mineral resources, would be of economic value as well as great strategic importance to Japan.

The Japanese were insistent that this line should be built and that they should participate in its financing. They claimed that China had given treaty assurances to this effect. The Chinese Government promised, they pointed out, in the Chientao Agreement of September 4, 1909, to build the line "upon consultation with the Government of Japan," the promise being given in part as a consideration for Japan's relinquishing the old claims of Korea to the Chientao region in Manchuria. Later, in 1918, the Chinese Government and the Japanese Banks signed a preliminary agreement for a loan for the construction of this line, and in accordance with the agreement, the banks advanced to the Chinese Government the sum of Yen 10,000,000. This, however, was one of the Nishihara loans, a fact which in the view of the Chinese, affected the validity of the engagement.

Neither of them, however, was a definitive loan contract agreement, obligating China, without condition and before a specific date, to permit Japanese financiers to participate in the construction of such a line.

The Contracts of May, 1928.

It was alleged that formal, definitive contracts for the construction of this line were signed in Peking in May, 1928, but there was much uncertainty regarding their validity. Such contracts were doubtless signed, under very irregular circumstances, on May 13-15 by a representative of the Ministry of Communications of the Government at Peking, then under Marshal Chang Tso-lin. But the Chinese contend that the Marshal, who was then hard pressed by the Nationalist Armies and was about to evacuate Peking, gave his consent that this official should sign, under "a duress of compulsion," due to threats of the Japanese that if he should not sanction the contracts his retreat to Mukden would be endangered. Whether Marshal Chang Tso-lin himself also signed the contracts has been a matter of dispute. After the death of the Marshal, the North Eastern Political Council at Mukden and Marshal Chang Hsueh-kiang both refused to approve the contracts on the ground that they were faulty in form and negotiated under duress and had never been ratified by the Peking Cabinet or the North Eastern Political Council.

The underlying reason for the opposition of the Chinese to the construction of the Tunhua-Kwainei line was their fear of Japan's military

and strategic purposes, and their belief that their sovereign rights and interest would be threatened by this new Japanese approach to Manchuria from the Japan Sea.

This particular railway issue was not primarily a financial or commercial problem, but involved a conflict between the state policies of Japan and China.

Through-traffic controversies.

There were additional issues over through-traffic arrangement between the Chinese and Japanese lines, rate questions and rivalries between the seaport of Dairen and such Chinese ports as Yingkow (Newchwang).

By September, 1931, the Chinese had built unaided and were owning and operating railways with a total length of nearly a thousand kilometres, of which the most important were: The Mukden-Hailung, the Hailung-Kirin, the Tsitsihar-Koshan, the Hulan-Hailun and the Tahushan-Tungliao (a branch of the Peiping-Mukden system) lines; and they owned the Peiping-Mukden Railway and the following Japanese-financed lines: The Kirin-Changchun, the Kirin-Tunhua, Ssuping kai-Taonan and Taonan-Angangchi lines. During the two years preceding the outbreak of the present conflict the Chinese attempted to operate these various lines as a great Chinese railway system, and made efforts to route all freight, if possible, exclusively over the Chinese-operated lines, with a seaboard exit at the Chinese port of Yingkow (Newchwang)—potentially at Hulutao. As a result the Chinese made through-traffic arrangements for all ports of their railway system, and refused in important sections to make similar traffic agreements between their lines and the South Manchuria system. The Japanese claimed that this discrimination deprived the South Manchuria Railway of much freight from North Manchuria which would normally pass over at least a part of its line and would find an outlet at Dairen.

A war of Railway rates.

Associated with these through-traffic controversies a bitter rate war sprang up between the Japanese and Chinese lines, which began in 1929-30, when the Chinese reduced their rates after the opening of the Tahushan-Tungliao and the Kirin-Hailung lines. The Chinese line appeared to have a natural advantage at that time due to the fall in the value of the Chinese silver currency, which made the silver rates on these lines cheaper than the gold-yen rates on the South Manchuria Railway. The Japanese claimed, that the Chinese rates were so low that they constituted unfair competition, but the Chinese replied that their aim was not primarily to make profits, as was the case with the South Manchuria, but to develop the country and to enable the rural population to reach the markets as cheaply as possible.

Allegations of national discrimination in favour of native manufactured goods.

Incidental to this rivalry in rate cutting, allegations were made by each side that the other indulged in rate discrimination or secret rebates in favour of its own nationals. The Japanese complained that the Chinese made railway classifications which enabled Chinese products to be carried over Chinese lines more cheaply than foreign goods, and that they gave lower rates than normal for native goods and for freight shipped over Chinese lines to a Chinese controlled seaport. The Chinese on their side charged the South Manchuria Railway with granting secret rebates, pointing out particularly that a Japanese forwarding agency was quoting rates for freight consigned through them which were lower than the regular scheduled rates of the South Manchuria line.

These issues were highly technical and involved, and it was difficult to determine the justice of the charges which each side was making against the other. It is obvious that such questions as these should normally be settled by a Railroad Commission or by regular judicial determination.¹

Port controversies.

The railway policies of the Chinese authorities in Manchuria were focussed upon the new port development at Hulutao, Yingkow was to be the secondary port, and pending the completion of Hulutao, the principal one. Many new railways were projected which would serve practically all parts of Manchuria. The Japanese claimed that the through-traffic arrangements and the low rates put into effect by the Chinese deprived the port of Dairen of much cargo that would normally have moved to it, and that this situation was particularly evident in 1930. They stated that the export freight carried to Dairen by the South Manchuria Railway fell off over a million metric tons in 1930, while the port of Yingkow actually showed an increase over the previous year. The Chinese, however, pointed out that the falling off in freight at Dairen was due principally to the general depression and to the especially severe slump in soya beans, which constituted a large part of the freight normally carried over the South Manchuria line. They claimed also that the increase at Yingkow was the result of traffic from regions recently opened by the new Chinese railway lines.

The Japanese appeared to be especially concerned over the potential competition of the Chinese lines and the port of Hulutao, and complained that the purpose of the Chinese in planning to construct many new railways and in developing Hulutao harbour was to make "the port of Dairen as well as the South Manchuria Railway itself as good as valueless."

¹ See special study No. 1 annexed to this Report.

Viewing these many railroad issues as a whole, it is evident that a number of them were technical in character and were quite capable of settlement by ordinary arbitral or judicial process, but that others of them were due to intense rivalry between China and Japan which resulted from a deep-seated conflict in national policies.

The Sino-Japanese Railway negotiations of 1931.

Practically all these railway questions were still outstanding at the opening of the year 1931. Beginning in January, and continuing sporadically into the summer, a final but futile effort was made by both Japan and China to hold a conference in order to reconcile their policies with respect to these outstanding railway questions. These Kimura-Kao negotiations, as they were called, achieved no result. There was evidence of sincerity on both sides when the negotiations began in January, but various delays occurred for which both Chinese and Japanese were responsible, with the result that the formal conference, for which extended preparations had been made, had not yet met when the present conflict started.

IV. THE SINO-JAPANESE TREATY AND NOTES OF 1915 AND RELATED ISSUES.

The Twenty-one Demands and the Treaty and Notes of 1915.

With the exception of the railway controversies the Sino-Japanese issues of greatest importance which were outstanding in September, 1931, were those which arose from the Sino-Japanese treaties and notes of 1915, which in turn were a result of the so-called "Twenty-one Demands." These issues mainly concerned South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, since with the exception of the question of the Hanyehping Mine (near Hankow) the other agreements negotiated in 1915 had either been replaced by new ones, or had been voluntarily given up by Japan. The controversies in Manchuria were over the following provisions:

- (1) the extension of the term of Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory to ninety-nine years (1997);
- (2) the prolongation of the period of Japanese possession of the South Manchuria Railway and the Mukden-Antung Railway to ninety-nine years (2002 and 2007 respectively);
- (3) the grant to Japanese subjects of the right to lease land in the interior of "South Manchuria," i.e., outside those areas opened by treaty or otherwise to foreign residence and trade;
- (4) the grant to Japanese subjects of the right to travel, reside and conduct business in the interior of South Manchuria and to participate in joint Sino-Japanese agricultural enterprises in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

The legal right of the Japanese to enjoy these grants and concessions depended entirely upon the validity of the Treaty and notes of 1915, and the Chinese continuously denied that these were binding upon them. No amount of technical explanation or argument could divest the minds of the Chinese people, officials, or laymen, of their conviction that the term "Twenty-one Demands" was practically synonymous with the "Treaties and Notes of 1915" and that China's aim should be to free herself from them. At the Paris Conference, 1919, China demanded their abrogation on the ground that they had been concluded "under coercion of a Japanese ultimatum threatening war." At the Washington Conference, 1921-22, the Chinese Delegation raised the question "as to the equity and justice of these agreements and therefore as to their fundamental validity," and in March, 1923, shortly before the expiration of the original twenty-five year lease of the Liaotung (Kwantung) territory which China granted in 1898 to Russia, the Chinese Government communicated to Japan a further request for the abrogation of the provisions of 1915, and stated that "The Treaties and Notes of 1915, have been consistently condemned by public opinion in China." Since the Chinese maintained that the agreements of 1915 lacked "fundamental validity," they declined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria except in so far as circumstances made it expedient to do so.

The Japanese complained bitterly of the consequent violations of their treaty rights by the Chinese. They contended that the treaties and notes of 1915 were duly signed and ratified and were in full force. To be sure, there was a considerable body of public opinion in Japan which from the first did not agree with the "Twenty-one Demands"; and more recently, it has been common for Japanese speakers and publicists to criticise this policy. But the Japanese Government and people appeared unanimous in insisting upon the validity of those provisions which related to Manchuria.

The Extension of the Lease of the Liaotung Territory and of the Concession for the South Manchuria and Mukden-Antung Railways.

Two important provisions in the treaty and notes of 1915 were those for the extension of the lease of the Kwantung Territory from 25 to 99 years, and of the concessions of the South Manchuria and the Mukden-Antung Railways to a similar period of 99 years. For the dual reasons that these extensions were a result of the 1915 agreements and that recovery of the territories originally leased by former Governments was included in the nationalist "Rights Recovery" movement, directed against foreign interests in China, the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway were made objects, at various times, of agitation and

even diplomatic representation on the part of the Chinese. The policy of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang of declaring Manchuria's allegiance to the Central Government, and of permitting the spread of Kuomintang influence in Manchuria made these issues acute after 1928, although they remained in the background of practical politics.

Associated also with the treaty and notes of 1915 was the agitation for the recovery of the South Manchuria Railway, or for stripping that institution of its political character in order to reduce it to a purely economic enterprise. As the earliest date fixed for the recovery of this railway on repayment of the capital and interest outlay was 1939, the mere abrogation of the 1915 treaties would not in itself have recovered the South Manchuria Railway for China. It was extremely doubtful whether China, in any case, would have been able to obtain the capital for this purpose. The occasional utterances of Chinese Nationalist spokesmen, urging recovery of the South Manchuria Railway, served as an irritant to the Japanese, whose legitimate rights and interests were thereby threatened.

The disagreement between the Japanese and Chinese as to the proper functions of the South Manchuria Railway continued from the time of the railway company's organisation in 1906. Technically, of course, the railway company is organised under Japanese law as a private joint stock enterprise, and is quite beyond the pale of Chinese jurisdiction in practice. Particularly since 1927, there had been an agitation among Chinese groups in Manchuria for divesting the South Manchuria Railway of its political and administrative functions and converting it into a "purely commercial enterprise." No concrete plan for achieving this end seems to have been proposed by the Chinese. The railway company was in fact a political enterprise. It was a Japanese Government agency, the Government controlling a majority of its shares: its administrative policy was so closely controlled by the Government that the company's higher officials were almost invariably changed when a new Cabinet came into power in Japan. Moreover, the company had always been charged, under Japanese law, with broad political administrative functions, including police, taxation and education. To have divested the company of these functions would have been to abandon the entire "special mission" of the South Manchuria Railway, as originally conceived and subsequently developed.

The Railway Area.

Numerous issues arose in regard to the administrative rights of the Japanese within the South Manchuria Railway area, especially as to the acquisition of land, the levying of taxes, and the maintenance of railway guards.

The railway area includes, in addition to a few yards on each side of the railway tracks, fifteen municipalities, termed Japanese "railway

towns," situated along the entire system of the South Manchuria Railway from Dairen to Changchun and from Antung to Mukden. Some of these railway towns, such as those at Mukden, Changchun and Antung, comprise large sections of populous Chinese cities.

The right of the South Manchuria Railway to maintain practically complete municipal governments in the railway area rested legally upon a clause in the original Russo-Chinese Railway Agreement of 1896, which gave the railway company "absolute and exclusive administration of its lands." The Russian Government, until the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924, and later the Japanese Government, which acquired the original rights of the Chinese Eastern Railway so far as concerned the South Manchuria Railway, interpreted this provision as granting political control of the railway area. The Chinese always denied this interpretation, insisting that other provisions in the treaty of 1896 made it clear that this clause was not intended to grant such broad administrative rights as control of police, taxation, education, and public utilities.

Land disputes.

Disputes regarding the acquisition of land by the railway company were common. By virtue of one of the clauses of the original agreement of 1896, the railway company had the right to acquire by purchase or lease private lands "actually necessary for the construction, operation and protection of the line." But the Chinese contended that the Japanese attempted to make improper use of this right, in order to obtain additional territory. The result was almost continuous controversy between the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Chinese local authorities.

Controversies over the right of taxation in the railway areas.

Conflicting claims as to the right to levy taxes within the railway area led to frequent controversy. The Japanese based their claim upon the original grant to the railway company of the "absolute and exclusive administration of its lands": the Chinese, upon the rights of the sovereign state. Speaking generally, the *de facto* situation was that the railway company levied and collected taxes from Japanese, Chinese and foreigners residing in the railway areas, and that the Chinese authorities did not exercise such authority, although they claimed the legal right to do so.

A type of controversy which was frequently arising was where the Chinese attempted to tax produce (such as soya bean shipments), which was being carted to the South Manchuria Railway towns for transport by rail to Dairen over the Japanese line. This was described by the Chinese as a uniform tax, necessarily to be collected at the boundaries of the Japanese "railway towns," since to refrain from doing so would have been to discriminate in favour of produce carried by the South Manchuria Railway.

The question of Japan's right to maintain "railway guards" along the South Manchuria Railway.

The issues as to Japanese railway guards led to almost continuous difficulty. They were also indicative of a fundamental conflict of state policies in Manchuria already referred to and were the cause of a series of incidents, resulting in considerable loss of life. The legal basis of Japan's alleged right to maintain these guards was the oft-quoted clause in the original Agreement of 1896 which granted to the Chinese Eastern Railway "the absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands," Russia maintained, and China denied, that this gave the right to guard the railway line by Russian troops. In the Portsmouth Treaty, 1905, Russia and Japan, as between themselves, reserved the right to maintain railway guards "not to exceed 15 men per kilometre." But in the subsequent Treaty of Peking, signed by China and Japan later in the same year, the Chinese Government did not give its assent to this particular provision of the agreement between Japan and Russia. China and Japan, however, did include the following provision in Article II of the Additional Agreement of December 22, 1905, which is an annex to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking of that date:

"In view of the earnest desire expressed by the Imperial Chinese Government to have the Japanese and Russian troops and railway guards in Manchuria withdrawn as soon as possible, and in order to meet this desire, the Imperial Japanese Government, in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia, consent to take similar steps accordingly. When tranquillity shall have been re-established in Manchuria and China shall have become herself capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia."

Japanese contention.

It is this article upon which Japan based her treaty right. Russia, however, long since withdrew her guards and she relinquished her rights to keep them by the Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1924. But Japan contended that tranquillity had not been established in Manchuria, and that China was not herself capable of affording full protection to foreigners; therefore she claimed that she still retained a valid treaty right to maintain railway guards.

Japan has appeared increasingly inclined to defend her use of these guards less upon treaty right than upon the grounds of "absolute necessity under the existing state of affairs in Manchuria."

Chinese contention.

The Chinese Government consistently controverted the contention of Japan. It insisted that the stationing of Japanese railway guards in

Manchuria was not justified either in law or in fact, and that it impaired the territorial and administrative integrity of China. As to the stipulation in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking, already quoted, the Chinese Government contended that this was merely declaratory of a *de facto* situation of a provisional character, and that it could not be said to confer a right, especially of a permanent character. Moreover, it claimed that Japan was legally obligated to withdraw her guards, since Russia had withdrawn hers, tranquillity had been re-established in Manchuria, and the Chinese authorities were able to give adequate protection to the South Manchuria Railway, as they were doing for other railway lines in Manchuria, provided the Japanese guards would permit them to do so.

Activities of the Japanese railway guards outside of the railway area.

The controversies which arose regarding the Japanese railway guards were not limited to their presence and activities within the railway area. These guards were regular Japanese soldiers, and they frequently carried their police functions into adjoining districts or conducted manoeuvres outside the railway areas, with or without the permission of, and with or without notification to, the Chinese authorities. These acts were particularly obnoxious to the Chinese, officials and public alike, and were regarded as unjustifiable in law and provocative of unfortunate incidents.

Frequent misunderstandings and considerable damage to Chinese farm crops resulted from the manoeuvres, and material remuneration failed to alleviate the hostile feelings thus aroused.

Japanese Consular Police.

Closely associated with the question of the Japanese railway guards was that of the Japanese Consular police. Such police were attached to the Japanese Consulates and branch Consulates in all the Japanese consular districts in Manchuria, not only along the South Manchuria Railway, but in such cities as Harbin, Tsitsihar and Manchouli, as well as in the so-called "Chientao District," the area in which lived a large number of the Koreans resident in Manchuria.

The Japanese justification for stationing Consular Police in Manchuria.

The Japanese claimed that the right to maintain consular police was a corollary to the right of extraterritoriality; that it was merely an extension of the judicial functions of the consular courts, these police being necessary to protect and discipline Japanese subjects. In fact, Japanese consular police, in smaller numbers, have also been attached to Japanese

consulates in other parts of China, contrary to the general practice of countries having extraterritorial treaties.

As a practical matter, the Japanese Government apparently believed that the stationing of consular police in Manchuria was a necessity under the conditions which prevailed there, especially in view of the importance of the Japanese interests involved, and the large number of resident Japanese subjects, including Koreans.

The Chinese denied the Japanese claims.

The Chinese Government, however, always contested this position advanced by Japan as justification for stationing Japanese consular police in Manchuria, and sent frequent protests to Japan on the subject. She claimed that there was no necessity to station Japanese police officers anywhere in Manchuria, that the question of police could not be associated with extraterritoriality, and that their presence was without treaty basis and a violation of China's sovereignty.

Whether justified or not, the presence of consular police led in a number of cases to serious conflicts between members of their force and those of the local Chinese authorities.

The right of the Japanese to travel, reside and conduct commercial enterprises in interior places in South Manchuria.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, provided that "Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever." This was an important right, but one which was objectionable to the Chinese since in no other part of China were foreigners as a class permitted to reside and to engage in business outside the treaty ports. It was the policy of the Chinese Government to withhold this privilege until extraterritoriality should be abolished and foreigners should be subject to Chinese laws and jurisdiction.

In South Manchuria, however, this right had certain limitations: the Japanese were required to carry passports and observe Chinese laws and regulations while in the interior of South Manchuria; but the Chinese regulations applicable to Japanese were not to be enforced until the Chinese authorities had first "come to an understanding with the Japanese Consul."

On many occasions the action of the Chinese authorities was inconsistent with the terms of this agreement, the validity of which they always contested. The fact that restrictions were placed upon the residence, travel and business activities of Japanese subjects in the interior of South

Manchuria, and that orders and regulations were issued by various Chinese officials prohibiting Japanese or other foreigners from residing outside the treaty ports or from renewing leases of buildings is not contested in the documents officially presented to the Commission by the Chinese Assessor. Official pressure, sometimes supported by severe police measures, was exerted upon the Japan to force them to withdraw from many cities and towns in South Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia, and upon Chinese property owners to prevent them from renting houses to Japanese. It was stated by the Japanese that the Chinese authorities also refused to issue passports to Japanese, harassed them by illegal taxes, and for some years before September, 1931, failed to carry out the stipulation in the agreement by which they had undertaken to submit to the Japanese Consul the regulations which were to be binding upon the Japanese.

The defence and the explanation of the Chinese.

The object of the Chinese was the execution of their national policy of restricting the exceptional privileges of Japanese in Manchuria and thus strengthening the control of China over those Three Eastern Provinces. They justified their actions on the ground that they regarded the Treaty of 1915 as without "fundamental validity." They pointed out, moreover, that the Japanese attempted to reside and conduct business in all parts of Manchuria, although the treaty provision was limited to South Manchuria.

This controversy was a constant irritant until the events of September, 1931.

In view of the conflicting national policies and aims of China and Japan it was almost inevitable that continuous and bitter controversies should arise over this treaty provision. Both countries admit that the situation was a growing irritant in their mutual relations up to the events of September, 1931.

The Land Lease Issue.

Closely associated with the right to reside and to do business in the interior of South Manchuria was the right to lease land, which was granted to Japanese by the Treaty of 1915 in the following terms: "Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises." An exchange of notes between the two Governments at the time of the Treaty defined the expression "lease by negotiation" to imply, according to the Chinese version, "a long-term lease of not

more than thirty years and also the possibility of its unconditional renewal"; the Japanese version simply provided for "leases for a long term up to thirty years and unconditionally renewable." Disputes naturally arose over the question whether the Japanese land leases were, at the sole option of the Japanese, "unconditionally renewable."

The Chinese interpreted the desire of the Japanese to obtain lands in Manchuria, whether by lease, purchase, or mortgage as evidence of a Japanese national policy to "buy Manchuria." Their authorities therefore very generally attempted to obstruct efforts of the Japanese to this end, and became increasingly active in the three or four years preceding September, 1931, a period during which the Chinese "Rights Recovery Movement" was at its height.

In making strict regulations against the purchase of land by the Japanese, their ownership of it in freehold, or their acquisition of a lien through mortgage, the Chinese authorities appeared to be within their legal rights since the Treaty granted only the privilege of leasing land. The Japanese, however, complained that it was not in conformity with the spirit of the Treaty to forbid mortgages upon land.

Chinese officials, however, did not accept the validity of the Treaty and consequently put every obstacle in the way of Japanese leasing land, by orders, provincial and local, calculated to make the leasing of lands to Japanese punishable under the criminal laws; by imposition of special fees and taxes payable in advance on such leases; and by instructions to local officials prohibiting them under threat of punishment, from approving such transfers to Japanese.

**The Japanese have acquired land by lease, mortgage and
purchase in "North Manchuria" as well as
in "South Manchuria."**

In spite of these obstacles, great tracts of land have, as a matter of fact, not only been leased by the Japanese, but actually obtained in freehold—although the titles might not be recognised in a Chinese court—through outright purchase, or by the more usual means of foreclosing a mortgage. These mortgages on land have been obtained by Japanese loan operators, especially large loan associations, certain of which have been organised especially for the purpose of acquiring land tracts. The total area of lands leased to Japanese in the whole of Manchuria, and in Jehol, according to Japanese official sources, increased from about 80,000 acres in 1922-1925 to over 500,000 acres in 1931. A small proportion of this total was in North Manchuria where the Japanese had no legal right under Chinese law and international treaty to acquire land leases.

Sino-Japanese negotiations on the issue of land lease.

Due to the importance of this land lease issue there were at least three attempts during the decade preceding 1931, to reach some agreement by direct Sino-Japanese negotiation. A possible solution which there is reason to believe was under consideration, would have treated together the two subjects of land leasing and the abolition of extraterritoriality: in Manchuria the Japanese were to surrender extraterritoriality and the Chinese were to permit the Japanese to lease land freely. But the negotiations were unsuccessful.

This long-standing Sino-Japanese controversy over the right of Japanese to lease land arose like the other issues already mentioned out of the fundamental conflict between rival state policies, the allegations and counter statements concerning violation of international agreements being less consequential in themselves than the underlying objectives of each policy.

V. THE KOREAN PROBLEM IN MANCHURIA.

The presence of about 800,000 Koreans in Manchuria, who possess Japanese nationality under Japanese law, served to accentuate the conflict of policies of China and of Japan. Out of this situation there arose various controversies, in consequence of which the Koreans themselves were victimized, being subjected to suffering and brutalities.¹

Chinese opposition to Korean acquisition, by purchase or lease, of land in Manchuria, was resented by the Japanese, who claimed that the Koreans were entitled, as Japanese subjects, to the privileges of land leasing acquired by Japan in the Treaty and Notes of 1915. The problem of dual nationality also arose, as the Japanese refused to recognise the naturalisation of Koreans as Chinese subjects. The use of Japanese consular police to invigilate and protect the Koreans was resented by the Chinese and resulted in innumerable clashes between Chinese and Japanese police. Special problems arose in the Chientao District, just north of the Korean border, where the 400,000 Korean residents outnumber the Chinese by three to one. By 1927 these questions led the Chinese to pursue a policy of restricting the free residence of Koreans in Manchuria, a policy which the Japanese characterised as one of unjustifiable oppression.

Sino-Japanese agreements governing the status of Koreans in Manchuria.

The status and rights of Koreans in Manchuria are determined largely in three Sino-Japanese agreements, viz., the Agreement relating to the

¹ See special study No. 9 annexed to this report.

Chientao Region, September 4, 1909, the Treaty and Notes of May 25, 1915, concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and the so-called "Mitsuya Agreement" of July 8, 1925. The delicate question of dual nationality in the case of the Koreans has never been regularised by Sino-Japanese agreement.

By 1927 the Chinese authorities in Manchuria generally came to believe that the Koreans had become, in fact, "a vanguard of Japanese penetration and absorption" of Manchuria. In this view, so long as the Japanese refused to recognise the naturalisation of Koreans as Chinese subjects, and especially since the Japanese consular police constantly exercised surveillance over Koreans, the acquisition of land by Koreans, whether by purchase or lease, was an economic and political danger "which threatened the very existence of Chinese people in Manchuria."

Chinese contentions.

The view was prevalent among the Chinese that the Koreans were being compelled to migrate from their homeland in consequence of the studied policy of the Japanese Government to displace Koreans with Japanese immigrants from Japan, or to make life so miserable for them, politically and economically, especially by forcing them to dispose of their land holdings, that emigration to Manchuria would naturally follow. According to the Chinese view, the Koreans, being an "oppressed race" ruled by an alien Government in their own land, where the Japanese monopolised all the important official posts, were forced to migrate to Manchuria to seek political freedom and an economic livelihood. The Korean immigrants, ninety per cent. of whom are farmers, and almost all of whom cultivators of ricefields, were thus at first welcomed by the Chinese as an economic asset and favoured out of a natural sympathy for their supposed oppression. They contended that, but for the Japanese refusal to permit Koreans to become naturalised Chinese subjects and the Japanese policy of pursuing them into Manchuria on the pretext of offering them necessary police protection, this Korean colonisation in Manchuria would have created no major political and economic problems. The Chinese deny that the efforts admittedly made by their officials in Manchuria, especially after 1927, to restrict the free settlement of Koreans on the land in Manchuria except as mere tenants or labourers, can be regarded as instances of "oppression."

Japanese denial of these Chinese accusations.

The Japanese admit that the Chinese suspicion was the principal cause of Chinese "oppression" of the Koreans, but vigorously deny the allegation that they pursued any definite policy of encouraging Korean migration to Manchuria, stating that "Japan having neither encouraged nor restricted

it, the Korean emigration to Manchuria must be regarded as the outcome of a natural tendency," a phenomenon uninfluenced by any political or diplomatic motives. They therefore declare that "the fear on the part of China that Japan is plotting the absorption of the two regions by making use of Korean immigrants is entirely groundless."

The Korean problem intensified the Sino-Japanese hostilities, victimising the Koreans themselves.

These irreconcilable views intensified such problems as those related to the leasing of land, questions of jurisdiction and the Japanese consular police, these having created a most unfortunate situation for the Koreans and embittered Sino-Japanese relations.¹

The Koreans and the Land Lease question.

There exist no Sino-Japanese agreements which specifically grant or deny the right of Koreans to settle, reside, and conduct occupations outside the Treaty Ports, or to lease or otherwise acquire land in Manchuria, except in the so-called Chientao District. Probably, however, over 400,000 Koreans do live in Manchuria outside Chientao. They are widely distributed, especially in the eastern half of Manchuria, and are numerous in the regions lying north of Korea, in Kirin Province, and have penetrated in large numbers into the region of the eastern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the lower Sungari valley and along the Sino-Russian border from north-eastern Korea to the Ussuri and the Amur river valleys, their migration and settlement having overflowed into the adjoining territories of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, partly because a very considerable group of the Koreans are natives of Manchuria, their ancestors having immigrated generations ago, and partly because others have renounced their allegiance to Japan and have become naturalised Chinese subjects, a great many Koreans to-day actually possess agricultural lands in Manchuria, outside of Chientao, both by virtue of freehold title and leasehold. The vast majority, however, cultivate paddy fields simply as tenant farmers under rental contracts, on a crop division basis, with the Chinese landlords, these contracts usually being limited to periods from one to three years, renewable at the discretion of the landlord.

Conflict over the Sino-Japanese agreements concerning the right of Koreans to lease land.

The Chinese deny that the Koreans have the right to purchase or lease agricultural lands in Manchuria outside the Chientao District, since the

¹ See special study No. 9 annexed to this report.

only Sino-Japanese agreement on the point is the Chientao Agreement of 1909, which is restricted in its application to that area. Only Koreans who are Chinese subjects, therefore, are entitled to purchase land, or, for that matter, to reside and lease land in the interior of Manchuria. In denying the claim of right of the Koreans to lease land freely in Manchuria, the Chinese Government has contended that the Chientao Agreement of 1909, which granted Koreans the right of residence with special land-holding privileges in the Chientao District alone, and specified that the Koreans were to be subject to Chinese jurisdiction is, in itself, a self-contained instrument "purporting to settle, by mutual concessions, local issues then pending between China and Japan in that area." The Chientao Agreement contained a *quid pro quo*, Japan waiving the claim of jurisdiction over the Koreans, China granting them the special privilege of possessing agricultural lands.

The Chinese contention.

Both countries continued to observe the agreement after the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, China contending that the Treaty and Notes of 1915 could not alter the stipulations of the Chientao Agreement, especially as the new Treaty contained a clause specifying that "all existing treaties between China and Japan, relating to Manchuria, shall, except as otherwise provided for, by this treaty, remain in force." No exception was made for the Chientao Agreement. The Chinese Government further contends that the Treaty and Notes of 1915 do not apply to the Chientao District, since the latter is not geographically a part of "South Manchuria," a term which is ill-defined both geographically and politically.

The Japanese contention.

This Chinese contention has been contested by the Japanese since 1915, their position being that, inasmuch as the Koreans became Japanese subjects by virtue of the annexation of Korea in 1910, the provisions of the Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes of 1915 concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, which grant Japanese subjects the right to reside and lease lands in South Manchuria and to participate in joint agricultural enterprises in Eastern Inner Mongolia, apply equally to the Koreans. The Japanese Government has contended that the Chientao Agreement was superseded by those provisions of the 1915 agreements in conflict therewith, that the Chinese contention that the Chientao Agreement is a self-contained instrument is untenable, since the right secured by the Koreans in Chientao was actually in consequence of Japan's agreement to recognise that region as a part of Chinese territory. They assert that it would be discriminatory on their part to refrain from seeking for the

Koreans in Manchuria rights and privileges granted to other Japanese subjects.

**The effect of these rival contentions on the conditions
of the Koreans.**

The Japanese reason for favouring the acquisition of land by Koreans in Manchuria is partly due to their desire to obtain rice exports for Japan, a desire which, so far, has been but partly satisfied, since probably half of the rice production of over seven million bushels in 1930 is consumed locally, and the export of the balance has been restricted. The Japanese assert that the Korean tenants, after having reclaimed waste lands and making them profitable for the Chinese owners, have been unjustly ejected. The Chinese, on the other hand, while equally desirous of having the cultivable lowlands producing rice, have generally employed the Koreans as tenants or labourers to prevent the land itself from falling into Japanese hands. Many Koreans have therefore become naturalised Chinese subjects in order to possess land, some of them, however, having acquired such titles, transferring them to Japanese land mortgage associations. This suggests one reason why there has been a difference of opinion among the Japanese themselves as to whether naturalisation of Koreans as Chinese subjects should be recognised by the Japanese Government.

**The problem of dual nationality of Koreans
in Manchuria.**

Under a Chinese Nationality Law of 1914 only aliens who, under the law of their own country, were permitted to become naturalised in another were capable of being naturalised Chinese subjects. The Chinese revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1929, however, contained no provision by which an alien was required to lose his original nationality in order to acquire Chinese nationality. Koreans were, therefore, naturalised as Chinese regardless of the Japanese insistence that such naturalisation could not be recognised under Japanese law. The Japanese nationality laws have never permitted Koreans to lose their Japanese nationality, and although a revised Nationality Law of 1924 contained an article to the effect that "a person who acquires foreign nationality voluntarily loses Japanese nationality," this general law has never been made applicable to the Koreans by special Imperial Ordinance. Nevertheless, many Koreans in Manchuria, varying from five to twenty per cent. of the total Korean population in certain districts, especially where they are relatively inaccessible by the Japanese consular officials, have become naturalised as Chinese. Others, incidentally, when migrating beyond the Manchurian borders into Soviet territory, have become citizens of the U.S.S.R.

Effect of dual nationality of the Koreans on Chinese policy.

This problem of dual nationality of the Koreans influenced the National Government of China and the provincial authorities in Manchuria generally to look with disfavour upon indiscriminate naturalisation of Koreans, fearing that they might, by temporarily acquiring Chinese nationality, become potential instruments of a Japanese policy of acquiring agricultural lands. In regulations issued by the Kirin Provincial Government, September 1930, governing the purchase and sale of land throughout the province, it was provided that "when a naturalised Korean purchases land, investigation must be made in order to discover whether he wants to purchase it as a means of residing as a permanently naturalised citizen, or on behalf of some Japanese." The local district officials, however, seem to have wavered in their attitude, at times enforcing the orders of the higher authorities but frequently issuing temporary naturalisation certificates in lieu of formal certificates requiring the approval of the provincial government and the Ministry of Interior at Nanking. These local officials, especially in areas far removed from Japanese consulates, often readily consented to the issuing of such certificates to the Koreans who applied for them, and, on occasion, no doubt actually compelled the Koreans to become naturalised or leave the country, their actions being influenced both by the policy of the Japanese and by the revenue derivable from the naturalisation fees. The Chinese have asserted, moreover, that some Japanese themselves actually connived at this business of naturalising Koreans in order to use them as dummy land-owners or to acquire lands by transfer from such naturalised Koreans. Generally speaking, however, the Japanese authorities discountenanced naturalisation of Koreans and assumed jurisdiction over them wherever possible.

Problems arising from conflicting claims to police jurisdiction peculiarly serious, involving the Koreans.

The Japanese claim of right to maintain consular police in Manchuria as a corollary of extraterritoriality became a source of constant conflict where the Koreans were involved. Whether the Koreans desired such Japanese interference, ostensibly in their behalf, or not, the Japanese consular police, especially in the Chientao District, undertook not only protective functions but freely assumed the right to conduct searches and seizures of Korean premises, especially where the Koreans were suspected of being involved in the Independence Movement, or in communist or anti-Japanese activities. The Chinese police, for their part, frequently came into collision with the Japanese police in their efforts to enforce Chinese laws, preserve the peace, or suppress the activities of "undesirable" Koreans. Although the Chinese and Japanese police did co-operate on many occasions, as provided for in the so-called "Mitsuya Agreement" of 1925, in which it was agreed that in eastern Fengtien Province the

Chinese would suppress "the Korean societies" and turn over "Koreans of bad character" to the Japanese on the latter's request, the actual state of affairs was really one of constant controversy and friction. Such a situation was bound to cause trouble.

The special problem of Chientao.

The Korean problems and the resulting Sino-Japanese relations over the Chientao District had attained a peculiarly complicated and a serious character. Chientao (called "Kanto" in Japanese and "Kando" in Korean) comprises the three districts of Yenchi, Holung and Wangching in Liaoning (Fengtien) Province, and, in practice, as evidenced by the attitude of the Japanese Government, includes also the district of Hunchun, which four districts adjoin the northeast corner of Korea just across the Tumen River.

The Japanese attitude and policy towards Chientao.

The Japanese, describing the traditional attitude of the Koreans towards the Chientao area, have been disinclined to admit that the Chientao Agreement of 1909 closed once and for all the issue whether this territory should belong to China or to Korea, the idea being that, since the district is predominantly Korean, over half of the arable land being cultivated by them, "they have so firmly established themselves in the locality that it may practically be regarded as a Korean sphere." In Chientao, more than elsewhere in Manchuria, the Japanese Government has been insistent on exercising jurisdiction and surveillance over the Koreans, over 400 Japanese consular police having been maintained there for years. The Japanese consular service, in co-operation with Japanese functionaries assigned by the Government-General of Chosen, exercise broad powers of an administrative character in the region, their functions including maintenance of Japanese schools, hospitals and government-subsidised financing media for the Koreans. The area is regarded as a natural outlet for Korean emigrants who cultivate rice fields, while politically it has special importance since Chientao has long been a refuge of Korean independence advocates, communist groups and other disaffected anti-Japanese partisans, a region where, as evidenced by the Hunchun Rising of Koreans against the Japanese in 1920, after the Independence Outbreak in Korea, the Japanese have had serious political problems intimately associated with the general problem of governance of Korea. The military importance of this region is obvious from the fact that the lower reaches of the Tumen River form the boundary between Japanese, Chinese and Soviet territory.

Conflicts of the Chinese and Japanese interpretations of the Chientao Agreement.

The Chientao Agreement provided that "the residence of Korean subjects, as heretofore, agricultural lands lying north of the River Tumen,"

should be permitted by China; that Korean subjects residing on such lands should henceforth "be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Chinese local officials"; that they should be given equal treatment with the Chinese; and that, although all civil and criminal cases involving such Koreans should be "heard and decided by the Chinese authorities," a Japanese consular official should be permitted to attend the court, especially in capital cases, with the right to "apply to the Chinese authorities for a new trial" under special Chinese judicial procedure.

The Japanese, however, have taken the position that the Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes of 1915 override the Chientao Agreement in so far as jurisdictional questions are concerned, and that, since 1915, Koreans, as Japanese subjects, are entitled to all the rights and privileges of extra-territorial status under the Japanese treaties with China. This contention has never been admitted by the Chinese Government, the Chinese insisting that the Chientao Agreement, if applicable in so far as the right granted to Koreans to reside on agricultural lands is concerned, is also applicable in those articles where it is provided that the Koreans should submit to Chinese jurisdiction. The Japanese have interpreted the article permitting Korean residence on agricultural lands to mean the right to purchase and lease such lands in Chientao; the Chinese, contesting this interpretation, take the position that the article must be interpreted literally and that only Koreans who have become naturalised Chinese subjects are entitled to purchase land there.

The actual situation as to Korean land ownership is anomalous.

The actual situation is, therefore, anomalous, since, as a matter of fact, there are non-naturalised Koreans in Chientao who have acquired lands in freehold title, with the connivance of the local Chinese officials, although as a general rule the Koreans themselves recognise the acquisition of Chinese nationality as a necessary condition of obtaining the right to purchase land in Chientao. Japanese official figures represent over half the arable land of Chientao (including Hunchun) as "owned" by Koreans, their figures admitting that over 15 per cent. of the Koreans there have become naturalised as Chinese subjects. Whether it is these naturalised Koreans who "own" these lands is impossible to say. Such a situation naturally gave rise to numerous irregularities and constant differences, often manifested by open clashes between the Chinese and Japanese police.

Japanese allegations of Chinese oppression of the Koreans.

The Japanese assert that about the end of 1927 a movement for persecuting Korean immigrants in Manchuria broke out, under Chinese official instigation, as an aftermath of a general anti-Japanese agitation, and state that this oppression was intensified after the Manchurian provinces declared their allegiance to the National Government at Nanking.

Numerous translations of orders issued by the central and local Chinese authorities in Manchuria have been submitted as evidence to the Commission of a definite Chinese policy of oppressing the Koreans by forcing them to become naturalised as Chinese, driving them from their rice fields, compelling them to re-migrate, subjecting them to arbitrary levies and exorbitant taxation, preventing them from entering into contracts of lease or rental for houses and lands, and inflicting upon them many brutalities. It is stated that this campaign of cruelty was particularly directed against the "pro-Japanese" Koreans, that Korean Residents' Associations, which are subsidised by the Japanese Government, were the objects of persecution, that non-Chinese schools maintained by or for the Koreans were closed, that "undesirable Koreans" were permitted to levy blackmail and perpetrate atrocities upon Korean farmers, and that Koreans were compelled to wear Chinese clothing and renounce any claim of reliance upon Japanese protection or assistance in their miserable plight.

The fact that the Manchurian authorities did issue orders discriminatory against non-naturalised Koreans is not denied by the Chinese, the number and character of these orders and instructions, especially since 1927, establishing beyond a doubt that the Chinese authorities in Manchuria generally regarded the Korean infiltration, in so far as it was accompanied by Japanese jurisdiction, as a menace which deserved to be opposed.

Special attention given to the Korean problem by the Commission.

Because of the seriousness of the Japanese allegations, and the pitiable plight of the Korean population of Manchuria, the Commission gave special attention to this subject, and, without accepting all these accusations as adequately descriptive of the facts, or concluding that certain of these restrictive measures applied to the Koreans were entirely unjustified, we are in a position to confirm this general description of the Chinese actions towards the Koreans in certain parts of Manchuria. While in Manchuria, the Commission received numerous delegations, who represented themselves as spokesmen of Korean communities.

It is obvious that the presence of this large minority of Koreans in Manchuria served to complicate the Sino-Japanese controversies over land leasing, jurisdiction and police, and the economic rivalries which formed a prelude to the events of September, 1931. While the great majority of the Koreans only wanted to be left alone to earn their livelihood, there were among them groups which were branded by the Chinese or Japanese, or both, as "undesirable Koreans," including the advocates and partisans of the independence of Korea from Japanese rule, communists, professional law breakers, including smugglers and drug traders, and those who, in league with Chinese bandits, levied blackmail or extorted money from those of their own blood. Even the Korean farmer himself frequently

invited oppression by his ignorance, improvidence and willingness to incur indebtedness to his more agile-minded landlord.

The Chinese explanation of their treatment of the Koreans.

Aside from the involvement of the Koreans, however unwittingly, in the controversies which, in the Chinese view, were the inevitable results of the general Japanese policies with respect to Manchuria, the Chinese submit that much of what has been termed "oppression" of the Koreans should not properly be so called, and that certain of the measures taken against the Koreans by the Chinese were actually either approved or connived at by the Japanese authorities themselves. They assert that it should not be forgotten that the great majority of the Koreans are bitterly anti-Japanese, and unreconciled to the Japanese annexation of their native land, and that the Korean emigrants, who would never have left their homeland but for the political and economic difficulties under which they have suffered, generally desire to be free from Japanese surveillance in Manchuria.

So-called "Mitsuya Agreement", 1925.

The Chinese, while admitting a certain sympathy with the Koreans, draw attention to the existence of the "Mitsuya Agreement" of June-July, 1925, as evidence both of a willingness on the part of the Chinese authorities to curb the activities of Koreans whom the Japanese consider "bad characters" and a menace to their position in Korea, and of official sanction on the part of the Japanese themselves for certain of these very acts which the Japanese would have others believe are instances of Chinese "oppression" of the Koreans. This agreement, which has never been widely known abroad, was negotiated by the Japanese Police Commissioner of the Government-General of Chosen and the Chinese Police Commissioner of Fengtien Province. It provided for co-operation between the Chinese and Japanese police in suppressing "Korean Societies" (presumably of an anti-Japanese character) in eastern Fengtien Province, stipulating that "the Chinese authorities shall immediately arrest and extradite those leaders of the Korean societies whose names had been designated by the authorities of Korea," and that Koreans of "bad character" should be arrested by the Chinese police and turned over to the Japanese for trial and punishment. The Chinese assert, therefore, that "it is largely for the purpose of giving practical effect to this agreement that certain restrictive measures have been put into force governing the treatment of Koreans. If they are taken as evidence proving the oppression of Koreans by Chinese authorities, then such measures of oppression, if indeed they are, have been resorted to principally in the interest of Japan." Furthermore, the Chinese submit that "in view of the keen economic competition with native farmers, it is but natural that the Chinese authorities should exercise their

inherent right to take measures to protect the interests of their own countrymen."

VI. THE WANPAOSHAN AFFAIR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS IN KOREA.

The Relations of the Wanpaoshan Affair to the Events of September, 1931.

The Wanpaoshan affair, together with the case of Captain Nakamura, have been widely regarded as the causes immediately contributing to the Sino-Japanese crisis in Manchuria. The intrinsic importance of the former, however, was greatly exaggerated. The sensational accounts of what occurred at Wanpaoshan, where there were no casualties, led to a feeling of bitterness between Chinese and Japanese, and, in Korea, to the serious attacks by Koreans upon Chinese residents. These anti-Chinese riots, in turn, revived the anti-Japanese boycott in China. Judged by itself, the Wanpaoshan affair was no more serious than several other incidents involving clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops or police which had occurred during the past few years in Manchuria.

A lease contract for rice land between the Chinese landowners and the Chinese broker required the official approval of the Chinese authorities.

Wanpaoshan is a small village located some 18 miles (30 kilometres) north of Changchun, adjoining a low marshy area alongside the Itung River. It was here that one Hao Yung-teh, a Chinese broker, leased on behalf of the Chang Nung Agricultural Company, from the Chinese owners, a large tract of land by a contract dated April 16, 1931. It was stipulated in the contract that it should be null and void in case the District Magistrate refused to approve its terms.

This land was sub-leased by the Chinese broker to the Korean tenants.

Shortly after this, the lessee sub-leased this entire plot of land to a group of Koreans. This second contract contained no provision requiring official approval for enforcement and took for granted that the Koreans would construct an irrigation canal with tributary ditches. Hao Yung-teh had sub-leased this land to the Korean farmers without first having obtained Chinese formal approval of the original lease contract with the Chinese owners.

The digging of an irrigation ditch by the Koreans across land owned by Chinese farmers was the principal cause of local Chinese opposition.

Immediately after the conclusion of the second lease the Koreans, began digging an irrigation ditch or canal, several miles long, in order to divert the water of the Itung River and distribute it over this low marshy area for the purpose of making it suitable for paddy cultivation. This ditch traversed large areas of land cultivated by Chinese who were not parties to either lease transaction since their lands lay between the river and that leased by the Koreans. In order to provide ample water supply to be deflected through this ditch to their holdings, the Koreans undertook to construct a dam across the Itung River.

The Chinese farmers demanded the cessation of work on the irrigation ditch and the evacuation of the Koreans.

After a considerable length of the irrigation ditch had been completed, the Chinese farmers whose lands were out by the canal rose up *en masse* and protested to the Wanpaoshan authorities, begging them to intervene in their behalf. As a result the Chinese local authorities, deputed police to the spot and ordered the Koreans to stop excavation work at once and to vacate the area. At the same time the Japanese consul at Changchun sent consular police to protect the Koreans. Local negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese representatives failed to solve the problem. Somewhat later both sides sent additional police, with resulting protests, counter-statements and attempted negotiations.

The Chinese and Japanese authorities at Changchun agreed upon a joint investigation.

On June 8, both sides agreed to withdraw their police forces and to conduct a joint investigation of the situation at Wanpaoshan. This investigation revealed the fact that the original lease contained a clause providing that the entire contract would be "null and void" if it should not be approved by the Chinese District Magistrate, and that this approval was never given.

Inconclusive investigation.

The joint investigators, however, apparently failed to agree upon their findings, the Chinese maintaining that the digging of the irrigation ditch could not fail to violate the rights of the Chinese farmers whose lands were cut by it; and the Japanese insisting that the Koreans should be permitted to continue their work since it would be unfair to eject them on account of the error in the lease procedure for which they were in no way at fault.

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Shortly thereafter, the Koreans, assisted by Japanese consular police, continued to dig the ditch.

The Incident of July 1.

Out of this train of circumstances came the incident of July 1, when a party of 400 Chinese farmers whose lands were cut by the irrigation ditch, armed with agricultural implements and pikes, drove the Koreans away and filled in much of the ditch. The Japanese consular police thereupon opened rifle fire to disperse the mob and to protect the Koreans, but there were no casualties. The Chinese farmers withdrew and the Japanese police remained on the spot until the Koreans completed the ditch and the dam across the Itung River.

After the incident of July 1, the Chinese municipal authorities continued to protest to the Japanese Consul at Changchun against the action of the Japan consular police and of the Koreans.

The anti-Chinese riots in Korea.

Far more serious than the Wanpaoshan affair was the reaction to this dispute in Chosen (Korea). In consequence of sensational accounts of the situation at Wanpaoshan, especially of the events of July 1, which were printed in the Japanese and Korean press, a series of anti-Chinese riots occurred throughout Korea. These riots began at Jinsen on July 3, and spread rapidly to other cities.

Heavy loss of life and property among the Chinese residents.

Alleged responsibility of the Japanese authorities in Korea.

The Chinese state, on the basis of their official reports, that 127 Chinese were massacred and 393 wounded, and that Chinese property to the value of Yen 2,500,000 was destroyed. They claim, moreover, that the Japanese authorities in Korea were in large measure responsible for the results of these riots, since, it was alleged, they took no adequate steps to prevent them and did not suppress them until great loss of Chinese life and property had resulted. The Japanese and Korean newspapers were not prevented from publishing sensational and incorrect accounts of the Wanpaoshan incident of July 1, which were of a character to arouse the hatred of the Korean populace against the Chinese residents.

The Japanese claim, however, that these riots were due to the spontaneous outburst of racial feelings, and that the Japanese authorities suppressed them as soon as possible.

The riots in Korea intensified the anti-Japanese boycott in China.

A result of importance was the fact that these outbreaks in Korea served directly to revive the anti-Japanese boycott throughout China.

The case of Captain Nakamura was viewed by the Japanese as the culminating incident of a long series of events which showed the utter disregard of the Chinese for Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria.

Importance of the Nakamura case.

VII. THE CASE OF CAPTAIN NAKAMURA.

A complete solution of the Wanpaoshan affair had not been reached by September, 1931.

The Japanese, on the other hand, insisted that the Koreans had a treaty right to reside and lease land at Wanpaoshan, since their privileges were not limited to those specified in the Chientao Agreement, but included the rights granted to Japanese subjects in general, of residing and leasing land throughout south Manchuria. The status of the Koreans, it was claimed, was identical with that of other Japanese subjects. The Japanese also regarded that the Koreans had undertaken their rice cultivation project in good faith and that the Japanese authorities could not assume responsibility for the irregularities of the Chinese broker who arranged the lease. The Japanese Government consented to the withdrawal of the consular police from Wanpaoshan, but the Korean tenants remained and continued to cultivate their rice lands.

The Japanese position.

From July 22, until September 15, there were negotiations and exchanges of notes between the Chinese and Japanese local and central authorities over the Wanpaoshan affair. The Chinese maintained that the difficulties at Wanpaoshan were due to the fact that the Koreans were living where they had no right to be, since their privileges of residing and leasing of land did not extend outside the Chientao District, in accordance with the Chientao Agreement of September 4, 1909. The Chinese Government protested against the stationing of Japanese consular police in China and asserted that the despatch of a large force of these police to Wanpaoshan was responsible for the incident of July 1.

Shortly after the anti-Chinese riots in Korea, and while the Wanpaoshan affair was still unsettled, the Chinese Government made a protest to Japan, on account of the riots, charging Japan with full responsibility for failure to suppress them. The Japanese Government, in reply, on July 15, expressed regret at the occurrence of these riots and offered compensation for the families of the dead.

The Japanese Government expressed regret for the anti-Chinese riots and offered compensation for the families of the dead.

Captain Nakamura was killed by Chinese soldiers in an out-of-the-way region in Manchuria during the mid-summer of 1931.

Captain Nakamura was on a military mission in interior Manchuria.

Captain Shintaro Nakamura was a Japanese military officer on active duty, and, as was admitted by the Japanese Government, was on a mission under the orders of the Japanese Army. While passing through Harbin, where his passport was examined by the Chinese authorities, he represented himself as an agricultural expert. He was at that time warned that the region in which he intended to travel was a bandit-ridden area, and this fact was noted on his passport. He was armed, and carried patent medicine which, according to the Chinese, included narcotic drugs for non-medical purposes.

Captain Nakamura and companions were killed by Chinese soldiers.

On June 9, accompanied by three interpreters and assistants, Captain Nakamura left Hikutu Station on the western section of the Chinese Eastern Railway. When he had reached a point some distance in the interior, in the direction of Taonan, he and the other members of his party were placed under detention by Chinese soldiers under Kuan Yu-heng, the Commander of the Third Regiment of the Reclamation Army. Several days later, about June 27, he and his companions were shot by Chinese soldiers and their bodies were cremated to conceal the evidence of the deed.

The Japanese contention.

The Japanese insisted that the killing of Captain Nakamura and his companions was unjustified and showed arrogant disrespect for the Japanese army and nation; they asserted that the Chinese authorities in Manchuria delayed to institute official inquiries into the circumstances, were reluctant to assume responsibility for the occurrence, and were insincere in their claim that they were making every effort to ascertain the facts in the case.

The Chinese contention.

The Chinese declared, at first, that Captain Nakamura and his party were detained pending an examination of their permits, which, according to custom, were required of foreigners travelling the interior; that they had been treated well; and that Captain Nakamura was shot by a sentry while endeavouring to make his escape. Documents, including a Japanese military map and two diaries, they stated, were found on his person, which proved that he was either a military spy or an officer on special military mission.

Investigations.

On July 17 a report of the death of Captain Nakamura reached the Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar, and at the end of the month Japanese officials in Mukden informed the local Chinese authorities that they had definite evidence that Captain Nakamura had been killed by Chinese soldiers. On August 17 the Japanese military authorities in Mukden released for publication the first account of his death (See "Manchuria Daily News," August 17, 1931). On the same day, Consul-General Hayashi, and also Major Mori, who had been sent by the Japanese General Staff from Tokyo to Manchuria to investigate the circumstances, had interviews with Governor Tsang Shih-yi of Liaoning Province. Governor Tsang promised to investigate it at once.

Immediately thereafter Governor Tsang Shih-yi communicated with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who was then ill in a hospital in Peiping, and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nanking, and, also, appointed two Chinese investigators who proceeded at once to the scene of the alleged murder. These two men returned to Mukden on September 3. Major Mori, who had been conducting an independent investigation on behalf of the Japanese General Staff, returned to Mukden on September 4. On that day Consul-General Hayashi called on General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff, and was informed that the findings of the Chinese investigators were indecisive and unsatisfactory, and that it would therefore be necessary to conduct a second inquiry. General Yung Chen left for Peiping on September 4 to consult with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang on the new developments in the Manchurian situation, returning to Mukden on September 7.

Efforts of Chinese to reach a settlement.

Having been informed of the seriousness of the situation in Manchuria, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang instructed Governor Tsang Shih-yi and General Yung Chen to conduct, without delay and on the spot, a second inquiry into the Nakamura case. Learning from his Japanese military advisers of the deep concern of the Japanese military over this affair, he sent Major Shibayama to Tokyo to make it clear that he wished to settle the case amicably. Major Shibayama arrived in Tokyo on September 12, and stated, according to subsequent press reports, that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang was sincerely desirous of securing an early and equitable termination of the Nakamura issue. In the meantime Marshal Chang had sent Mr. Tang Er-ho, a high official, on a special mission to Tokyo to consult with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Shidehara, in order to ascertain what common ground might be found for a solution of various pending Sino-Japanese questions concerning Manchuria. Mr. Tang Er-ho had conversations with Baron Shidehara, General Minami and other high military officials. On September 16 Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang gave out

an interview to the press which reported him as saying that the Nakamura case, in accordance with the wish of the Japanese, would be handled by Governor Tsang Shih-yi and the Manchurian authorities, and not by the Foreign Office at Nanking.

The second Chinese commission of investigation, after visting the scene of the killing of Captain Nakamura, returned to Mukden on the morning of September 16. On the afternoon of the 18th the Japanese Consul called upon General Yung Chen, when the latter stated that Commander Kuan Yu-heng had been brought to Mukden on September 16 charged with responsibility for the murder of Captain Nakamura, and would be immediately tried by a military court-martial. Later it was made known by the Japanese, after their occupation of Mukden, that Commander Kuan had been detained by the Chinese in a military prison.

Consul-General Hayashi, Mukden, was reported on September 12-13 to have reported to the Japanese Foreign Office that "an amicable settlement would probably be made after the return of the investigators to Mukden," especially as General Yung Chen had definitely admitted that Chinese soldiers had been responsible for the death of Captain Nakamura. The Mukden correspondent of the *Nippon Dempo Service* telegraphed a dispatch on September 12 stating that "an amicable settlement of the alleged murder case of Captain Shintaro Nakamura of the Japanese General Staff Office by soldiers of the Chinese Reclamation Army Corps is in sight." Numerous statements of Japanese military officers, however, especially those of Colonel K. Doihara, continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Nakamura case, in view of the fact that Commander Kuan, alleged to have been responsible for the death of Captain Nakamura, had been taken into custody in Mukden by the Chinese authorities, the date of his court-martial having been announced as to occur within a week. Since the Chinese authorities admitted to Japanese consular officials in Mukden, in a formal conference held on the afternoon of September 18, that Chinese soldiers were responsible for the death of Captain Nakamura, expressing also a desire to secure a settlement of the case diplomatically without delay, it would seem that diplomatic negotiations for attaining a solution of the Nakamura case were actually progressing favourably up to the night of September 18.

The results of the Nakamura case.

The Nakamura case, more than any other single incident, greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese and their agitation in favour of forceful means to effect a solution of outstanding Sino-Japanese difficulties in regard to Manchuria. The inherent seriousness of the case was aggravated by the fact that Sino-Japanese relations just at this time were strained on account of the Wanpaoshan affair, the anti-Chinese riots in

Korea, the Japanese military manoeuvres across the Tumen River on the Manchurian-Korean frontier and the Chinese mob violence committed at Tsingtao, in protest against the activities of the local Japanese patriotic societies.

Captain Nakamura was an army officer on active service, a fact which was pointed to by the Japanese as a justification for strong and swift military action. Mass meetings were held in Manchuria and in Japan for the purpose of crystallising public sentiment in favour of such action. During the first two weeks of September the Japanese press repeatedly declared that the army had decided that the "solution ought to be by force," since there was no other alternative.

The Chinese claimed that the importance of the case was greatly exaggerated, and that it was made a pretext for the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. They denied the contention of the Japanese that there was insincerity or delay on the part of the Chinese officials in dealing with the case.

By the end of August, 1931, therefore, Sino-Japanese relations over Manchuria were severely strained in consequence of the many controversies and incidents described in this chapter. The claim that there were 300 cases outstanding between the two countries, and that peaceful methods for settling each of them had been progressively exhausted by one of the parties, cannot be substantiated. These so-called "cases" were rather situations arising out of broader issues, which were rooted in fundamentally irreconcilable policies. Each side accuses the other of having violated, unilaterally interpreted, or ignored the stipulations of the Sino-Japanese agreements. Each side had legitimate grievances against the other.

The account here given of the efforts made by one side or the other to secure a settlement of these questions at issue between them shows that some efforts were being made to dispose of these questions by the normal procedure of diplomatic negotiation and peaceful means, and these means had not been exhausted. But the long delays put a severe strain on the patience of the Japanese. Army circles in particular were insisting on the immediate settlement of the Nakamura case, and demanded satisfactory réparation. The Imperial Ex-Soldiers' Association, among others, was instrumental in rousing public opinion.

In the course of September public sentiment regarding the Chinese questions, with the Nakamura case as the focal point, became very strong. Time and again the opinion was expressed that the policy of leaving so many issues in Manchuria unsettled had caused the Chinese authorities to make light of Japan. Settlement of all pending issues, if necessary by force, became a popular slogan. Reference was freely made in the press to a decision to resort to armed force, to conferences between the Ministry of War, the General Staff and other authorities for the discussion of a plan

with this object, to definite instructions regarding the execution, in case of necessity, of that plan to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, and to Colonel Doihara, Resident Officer at Mukden, who had been summoned to Tokyo early in September and who was quoted by the press as the advocate of a solution of all pending issues, if necessary by force, and as soon as possible. The reports of the press regarding the sentiments expressed by these circles and some other groups point to a growing and dangerous tension.

CHAPTER IV.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS IN MANCHURIA ON AND SUBSEQUENT TO SEPTEMBER 18, 1931.

Situation immediately preceding the outbreak.

In the preceding chapter the growing tension between the Japanese and Chinese interests in Manchuria was discussed and its effect on the attitudes of the military forces of the two nations described. Certain internal, economic and political factors had undoubtedly for some time been preparing the Japanese people for a resumption of the "positive policy" in Manchuria. The dissatisfaction of the army; the financial policy of the Government; the appearance of a new political force emanating from the army, the country districts and the nationalist youth, which expressed dissatisfaction with all political parties, which despised the compromise methods of western civilisation and relied on the virtues of Old Japan and which included in its condemnation the self-seeking methods whether of financiers or politicians; the fall in commodity prices which inclined the primary producer to look to an adventurous foreign policy for the alleviation of his lot; the trade depression which caused the industrial and commercial community to believe that better business would result from a more vigorous foreign policy:—all these factors were preparing the way for the abandonment of the Shidehara "policy of conciliation" with China which seemed to have achieved such meagre results. This impatience in Japan was even greater among the Japanese in Manchuria, where the tension throughout the summer was increasing. As September wore on, this tension reached such a point that it was apparent to all careful observers that a breaking point must soon be reached. The public press of both countries tended rather to inflame than to calm public opinion. Vigorous speeches of the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling direct action by their army in Manchuria were reported. Protracted delay by the Chinese authorities in making satisfactory investigation of and redress for the murder of Captain Nakamura had particularly incensed the young officers of the Japanese army in Manchuria, who clearly showed their sensitiveness to irresponsible remarks and slurs made by equally irresponsible Chinese officers on the streets or in restaurants and other places of close contact. And so the stage was set for the events which followed.

The night of September 18-19.

On the morning of Saturday, September 19, the population of Mukden woke to find their city in the hands of Japanese troops. During the night sounds of firing had been heard, but there was nothing unusual in this; it had been a nightly experience throughout the week, as the Japanese had been carrying out night manœuvres involving vigorous rifle and machine gun firing. True, that on the night of September 18, the booming of guns and the sound of shells caused some alarm to the few that distinguished them, but the majority of the population considered the firing to be merely another repetition of Japanese manœuvres perhaps rather noisier than usual.

Appreciating the great importance of this occurrence which, as will be shown, was the first step of a movement which resulted in the military occupation of practically the whole of Manchuria, the Commission conducted an extensive inquiry into the events of that night. Of great value and interest, of course, were the official accounts of the Japanese and Chinese military leaders involved. The Japanese case was presented by Lieutenant Kawamoto, who is the earliest witness in the story, by Lieut-Colonel Shimamoto, the Commanding Officer of the battalion which carried out the attack on the North Barracks at Peitayang, and by Colonel Hirata, who captured the walled city. We also heard evidence from Lieutenant-General Honjo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, and from several members of his staff. The Chinese case was presented by General Wang I-Cheh, the officer in command of the Chinese troops in the North Barracks, supplemented by the personal narratives of his Chief of Staff and of other officers who were present during the operations. We also heard the evidence of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and of his Chief of Staff, General Yung Chen.

The Japanese version.

According to the Japanese versions, Lieutenant Kawamoto, with six men under his command, was on patrol duty on the night of September 18, practising defence exercises along the track of the South Manchuria Railway to the north of Mukden. They were proceeding southwards in the direction of Mukden. The night was dark but clear, and the field of vision was not wide. When they reached a point at which a small road crosses the line, they heard the noise of a loud explosion a little way behind them. They turned and ran back, and after going about 200 yards they discovered that a portion of one of the rails on the down track had been blown out. The explosion took place at the point of junction of two rails; the end of each rail had been cleanly severed, creating a gap in the line of 31 inches. On arrival at the site of the explosion, the patrol was fired upon from the fields on the east side of the line. Lieutenant Kawamoto immediately ordered his men to deploy and return the fire.

The attacking body, estimated at about five or six, then stopped firing and retreated northwards. The Japanese patrol at once started in pursuit, and, having gone about 200 yards, they were again fired upon by a larger body, estimated at between three and four hundred. Finding himself in danger of being surrounded by this large force, Lieutenant Kawamoto then ordered one of his men to report to the Commander of No. 3 Company, who was also engaged in night manoeuvres some 1,500 yards to the north; at the same time he ordered another of his men to telephone (by means of a box telephone near the spot) to Battalion Headquarters at Mukden for reinforcements.

At this moment the south-bound train from Changchun was heard approaching. Fearing that the train might be wrecked when it reached the damaged line, the Japanese patrol interrupted their engagement and placed detonators on the line in the hope of warning the train in time. The train, however, proceeded at full speed. When it reached the site of the explosion it was seen to sway and heel over to one side, but it recovered and passed on without stopping. As the train was due at Mukden at 10.30, where it arrived punctually, it must have been about 10.00 o'clock, according to Lieutenant Kawamoto, when he first heard the explosion.

Fighting was then resumed. Captain Kawashima, with No. 3 Company, having heard the explosion, was already proceeding southwards when he met Lieutenant Kawamoto's messenger, who guided them to the spot. They arrived at about 10.50. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, the Battalion Commander, on receipt of a telephone message, at once ordered the 1st and 4th Companies that were with him at Mukden to proceed to the spot. He also sent orders to the 2nd Company, which was at Fushan—an hour and a half away—to join them as soon as possible. The two Companies proceeded by rail from Mukden to Liutiaohu, and then on foot to the scene of action, where they arrived a little after midnight.

Lieutenant Kawamoto's patrol, reinforced by Captain Kawashima's Company, was still sustaining the fire of the Chinese troops concealed in the tall kaoliang grass, when the two Companies arrived from Mukden. Although his force was then only 500, and he believed the Chinese army in the North Barracks numbered 10,000, Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto at once ordered an attack on the Barracks, believing, as he told us, that "offence is the best defence". The ground between the railway and the North Barracks—a distance of about 250 yards—was difficult to cross in mass formation because of patches of water, and while the Chinese troops were being driven back over this ground Lieutenant Noda was sent up the railway with a section of the 3rd Company to intercept their retreat. When the Japanese reached the North Barracks, which were described as glittering with electric light, an attack was made by the 3rd Company, which succeeded in occupying a corner of the left wing. The attack was

vigorously contested by the Chinese troops within, and there was fierce fighting for some hours. The 1st Company attacked on the right, and the 4th Company in the centre. At 5.00 a.m. the south gate of the barracks was blown in by two shells from a small cannon left in an outhouse immediately opposite to it by the Chinese, and by 6 o'clock the entire barracks were captured at the cost of two Japanese privates killed and twenty-two wounded. Some of the barracks caught fire during the fighting; the remainder were burned out by the Japanese on the morning of the 19th. The Japanese stated that they buried 320 Chinese but only found about 20 wounded.

In the meantime operations in other places were being carried out with equal rapidity and thoroughness. Colonel Hirata received a telephone message from Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto about 10.40 to the effect that the South Manchuria Railway track had been destroyed by Chinese troops and that he was about to start to attack the enemy. Colonel Hirata approved his action, and himself decided to attack the walled city. The concentration of his troops was complete by 11.30 p.m., and his attack commenced. No resistance was offered, only occasional fighting on the streets, mostly with the Chinese police of whom 75 were killed. At 2.15 the wall of the city was scaled. By 3.40 he had captured it. At 4.50 a.m. he received information that the staff of the 2nd Division and a part of the 16th Regiment had left Liaoyang at 3.30 a.m. These troops arrived shortly after 5.00 a.m. At 6.00 a.m. the occupation of the eastern wall was completed; the Arsenal and aerodrome were captured at 7.30. The East Barracks were then attacked and by 1.00 p.m. were occupied without fighting. The total casualties in those operations were seven Japanese wounded and thirty Chinese killed.

Lieutenant-General Honjo, who had only returned from his tour of inspection that very day, received the first news of what was happening at Mukden by telephone from a newspaper agent at about 11.00 o'clock. The Chief of Staff received a telegraphic report at 11.46 from the Special Service Station at Mukden, giving details of the attack, and orders were immediately sent to the troops at Liaoyang, Yingkow and Fengsheng to proceed to Mukden. The fleet was ordered to leave Port Arthur and proceed to Yingkow and the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea was asked to send reinforcements. Lieutenant-General Honjo left Port Arthur at 3.30 a.m. and arrived at Mukden at noon.

The Chinese version.

According to the Chinese version, the Japanese attack on the Barracks at Peitoyang was entirely unprovoked and came as a complete surprise. On the night of September 18 all the soldiers of the 7th Brigade, numbering about 10,000, were in the North Barracks. As instructions had

been received from Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang on September 6¹ that special care was to be taken to avoid any clash with the Japanese troops in the tense state of feeling existing at the time, the sentries at the walls of the barracks were only armed with dummy rifles. For the same reason the west gate in the mud wall surrounding the camp which gave access to the railway had been closed. The Japanese had been carrying out night manoeuvres around the barracks on the nights of September 14, 15, 16, and 17. At 7.00 p.m. on the evening of the 18th, they were manoeuvring at a village called Wenkuantun. At 9.00 p.m. officer Liu reported that a train composed of three or four coaches, but without the usual type of locomotive, had stopped there. At 10.00 p.m. the sound of a loud explosion was heard, immediately followed by rifle fire. This was reported over the telephone by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding Officer, General Wang I-Cheh, who was at his private house situated near the railway, about six or seven miles from the barracks, to the south. While the Chief of Staff was still at the telephone, news was brought to him that the Japanese were attacking the barracks and that two sentries had been wounded. At about 11.00 o'clock a general attack on the south west corner of the barracks began, and at 11.30 the Japanese had effected an entry through a hole in the wall. As soon as the attack began the Chief of Staff gave orders for the lights to be extinguished, and again reported to General Wang I-Cheh by telephone. The latter replied that no resistance was to be offered. Distant artillery fire was heard at 10.30 o'clock from the southwest and northwest. At midnight five shells began to fall inside the barracks. On reaching the south gate, the retreating troops of the 621st Regiment found that the Japanese were attacking that gate, and that the guard was withdrawing. They accordingly took shelter in some trenches and earthworks until after the Japanese soldiers had passed through into the interior, when they were able to make their escape through the south gate and reached the village of Erhtaitze, to the east of the Barracks, about 2 a.m. Other troops made their escape through the east gate and the empty barracks just outside the east wall, finally reaching the same village between 3 and 4 a.m.

The only resistance was offered by the 620th Regiment, quartered in the northeast corner building and the second building south of it. The commander of this Regiment stated that when the Japanese troops entered through the south gate at 1 a.m. the Chinese troops withdrew from one building to another, leaving the Japanese to attack empty buildings.

¹ The text of the telegram shown to the Commission at Peiping was as follows:

"Our relations with Japan have become very delicate. We must be particularly cautious in our intercourse with them. No matter how they may challenge us, we must be extremely patient and never resort to force, so as to avoid any conflict whatever. You are instructed to issue, secretly and immediately, orders to all the officers, calling their attention to this point."

After the main body of the Chinese troops had withdrawn, the Japanese turned eastwards and occupied the eastern exit. The 620th Regiment thus found themselves cut off, and had no option but to fight their way through. They started to break through at 5 a.m., but did not get completely clear until 7 a.m. This was the only actual fighting that took place in the barracks, and was responsible for most of the casualties. This regiment was the last to reach the village of Erhtaitze:

As soon as they were all assembled, the Chinese troops left the village in the early morning of the 19th for Tung-ling. From here they made their way to a village near Kirin, where they obtained a supply of winter clothing. Colonel Wang was sent to obtain permission from General Hsi Hsia for the troops to enter Kirin city. The Japanese residents at Kirin were so alarmed at the approach of the Chinese soldiers that reinforcements were at once sent from Changchun, Ssuping kai and Mukden to Kirin. Consequently the Chinese turned back towards Mukden. They left their trains thirteen miles outside Mukden, separated into nine groups, and marched round Mukden by night. To escape detection by the Japanese, General Wang I-Cheh himself rode through the town disguised as a peasant. In the morning the Japanese obtained news of their presence and sent aeroplanes to bomb them. They were obliged to lie hidden by day, but continued their march at night. Eventually they reached a station on the Peiping-Mukden Railway, and here they were able to order seven trains, which brought them to Shanhaikwan by October 4.

Opinion of the Commission.

Such are the two stories of the so-called incident of September 18 as they were told to the Commission by the participants on both sides. Clearly, and not unnaturally in the circumstances, they are different and contradictory.

Appreciating the tense situation and high feeling which had preceded this incident, and realising the discrepancies which are bound to occur in accounts of interested persons, especially with regard to an event which took place at night, we, during our stay in the Far East, interviewed as many as possible of the representative foreigners who had been in Mukden at the time of the occurrences or soon after, including newspaper correspondents and other persons who had visited the scene of conflict shortly after the event, and to whom the first official Japanese account had been given. After a thorough consideration of such opinions, as well as of the accounts of the interested parties, and after a mature study of the considerable quantity of written material and a careful weighing of the great mass of evidence which was presented or collected, the Commission has come to the following conclusions:

Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in

evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18—19 this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese in accordance with the instructions referred to on page 98 had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorised attack on the Japanese forces, and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10.00 p.m. and 10.30 p.m. on September 18, but the damage, if any to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. In saying this the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence. The narrative of the subsequent events must now be resumed.

Movements of Japanese troops.

On the night of September 18 the Japanese troops in Manchuria were distributed as follows: In addition to the four Companies of the Battalion of Railway Guards which took part in the attack on the North Barracks, and the 29th Regiment of the 2nd Division under Colonel Hirata which captured the Walled City of Mukden, already described, the rest of the 2nd Division was distributed in various places; the Headquarters of the 4th Regiment was at Changchun, of the 16th at Liaoyang, of the 30th at Port Arthur; other parts of these regiments were stationed at Antung, Yingkow, and at many smaller places on the Changchun-Mukden branch and the Mukden-Antung branch of the South Manchuria Railway. Another battalion of Railway Guards was at Changchun, and units of the Railway Guards and Gendarmerie were distributed with the 2nd Division in the smaller places already mentioned. Lastly, there were the Garrison troops of Korea.

All the forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of September 18 over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur. Their total strength was as follows: 2nd Division, 5,400 men and 16 field guns, Railway Guards about 5,000 men, Gendarmerie about 500. The Chinese troops at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and other smaller towns were overcome and disarmed without resistance. The Railway Guards and Gendarmerie remained in these places while the units of the 2nd Division at once concentrated at Mukden to take part in the more serious operations. The 16th and 30th Regiments arrived in time to join Colonel Hirata and assisted in the capture of the East Barracks. The

39th Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division (4,000 men and artillery) concentrated at 10 a.m. on the 19th at Shingishu on the Korean frontier, crossed the Yalu River on the 21st, and arrived at Mukden at midnight. From here detachments were sent to Chengchiatun and Hsinmin, which they occupied on the 22nd.

Occupation of Changchun, September 18-19, and Kirin, September 21.

The Chinese Garrisons of Kuanchengtze and Nanling at Changchun, with an estimated strength of 10,000 men and 40 guns, were attacked on the night of September 18 by the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Division and 1st Railway Guard Battalion stationed there (under Major-General Hasebe). Here, however, some resistance was shown by the Chinese. Fighting began at midnight. Nanling barracks were captured by 11 a.m. on the 19th, those of Kuanchengtze by 3 p.m. that day. The total Japanese casualties involved were 3 officers and 64 men killed and 3 officers and 85 men wounded. As soon as the fighting at Mukden was over the Regiments of the 2nd Division were concentrated at Changchun, the staff, with General Tamon, the 30th Regiment and one Battalion of Field Artillery arriving on the 20th, and the 15th Brigade under General Amano arriving on the 22nd. Kirin was occupied on the 21st without the firing of a shot, and the Chinese troops were removed to a distance of about eight miles.

The "Herald of Asia," a semi-official Japanese publication of that time, states that all military operations were then regarded as completed, and that no further movements of troops were anticipated: The military operations which in fact ensued are attributed to Chinese provocation: an anti-Japanese demonstration at Chientao on the 20th; the destruction of a railway station at Lungsingtsun; and the explosion of some bombs which did no damage on Japanese premises at Harbin on September 23, are mentioned as examples of such provocation. Complaint is also made of growing banditry and of the activities of disbanded soldiers. All of these things, it is claimed, finally forced the Japanese to new military operations against their will.

Bombing of Chinchow.

The first of these operations was the bombing, on October 8, of Chinchow, to which place the Provincial Government of Liaoyang Province had been transferred by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang at the end of September. According to the Japanese account, the bombing was chiefly directed against the military barracks and the Communications University, where the offices of the Civil Government had been established. The bombing of a civil administration by military forces cannot be justified and there is some doubt whether the area bombed was in fact as restricted as the

Japanese allege. Mr. Lewis, an American honorary Adviser of the Chinese Government, arrived at Chinchow on October 12 and wrote an account of what he found there to Dr. Koo, who passed on the information later to the Commission in his capacity of Assessor. According to Mr. Lewis, the military barracks were in fact not touched at all and a multitude of bombs fell everywhere in the town, even on the Hospital, as well as on the University buildings. The Commander of the bombing planes informed a Japanese newspaper shortly afterwards that four planes from Changchun were ordered to Mukden at 8.30 a.m. on the 8th. There they joined other planes and a squad of six scouting and five bombing planes were immediately despatched to Chinchow heavily loaded with bombs and fuel. They arrived at about 1 p.m., within ten to fifteen minutes dropped eighty bombs, and immediately returned to Mukden. The Chinese, according to Mr. Lewis, did not return the fire.

Nonni Bridge operations.

The next operation was that of the Nonni River Bridges, which started in the middle of October and ended on the 19th of November with the occupation of Tsitsihar by the Japanese troops. The justification for this given by the Japanese was that they were attacked while repairing the bridge over the Nonni River which had been destroyed by General Ma Chan-shan. But the story must be begun earlier and an explanation given of the destruction of the bridges.

At the beginning of October General Chang Hai-peng, the Garrison Commander at Taonan, who in former times had held the same rank as Ma Chan-shan and Wang Fu-lin, and had tried to become Governor of Heilungkiang in their place, started an advance movement along the Taonan-Angangchi Railway with the obvious object of seizing the Provincial Government by force. It is alleged in the Chinese Assessor's document No. 3, and this view is supported by information from neutral sources, that this offensive was instigated by the Japanese. In order to prevent the advance of Chang Hai-peng's troops, General Ma Chan-shan ordered the destruction of the bridges over the Nonni River and both armies faced each other across the large and swampy valley of that River.

The Taonan-Angangchi Railway had been built with capital supplied by the South Manchuria Railway and the line was pledged as security for the loan. Accordingly, the South Manchuria Railway authorities felt that the interruption to the traffic on this line could not be allowed to continue at a season when the transportation of crops from the North of Manchuria was particularly needed. The Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar, on instructions from his Government, requested General Ma Chan-shan, who had arrived at Tsitsihar on October 20, to have the bridges repaired as soon as possible, but no time limit accompanied this request. The Japanese

authorities believed that General Ma Chan-shan would delay as long as possible the repairing of the bridges, as this interruption helped him to keep General Chang Hai-peng's troops at a distance. On October 20 a small party of employees of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway and the South Manchuria Railway, without military escort, attempted to inspect the damage to the bridges, and was fired upon by Chinese troops in spite of explanations previously given to an officer of the Heilungkiang Provincial forces. This aggravated the situation, and accordingly on October 28 Major Hayashi, the representative of General Honjo at Tsitsihar, demanded the completion of the repairs by noon of November 3, stating that if they were not carried out by that date, engineers of the South Manchuria Railway, under the protection of Japanese troops, would take over the work. The Chinese authorities asked for an extension of the time limit but no answer was returned to this request and Japanese troops were despatched from Ssuningkai for the purpose of protecting the execution of the repair work.

By November 2 the negotiations had not progressed and no decision had been reached. On that day Major Hayashi delivered an ultimatum to Generals Ma Chan-shan and Chang Hai-peng, demanding that neither of them should use the railway for tactical purposes and that both should withdraw their forces to a distance of 10 kilometres from each side of the river. It was intimated that if the troops of either of these Generals obstructed the repair of the bridges by the engineers of the South Manchuria Railway, the Japanese would regard them as enemies. The ultimatum was to take effect as from noon of November 3, and the Japanese protective detachment was under orders to advance to Tahsing, on the north side of the valley, by noon of November 4. The Chinese Assessor (document No. 3), the Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar and various officers of the 2nd Division all concur that General Ma Chan-shan replied that pending instructions from the Central Government he provisionally accepted, on his own authority, the Japanese demands. But the Japanese witnesses, on the other hand, added that they did not believe in the sincerity of General Ma, who obviously did not intend to permit the damaged bridges to be quickly or effectively repaired. Twice on November 4 a joint Commission, including Major Hayashi, a representative of the Japanese Consul-General, and Chinese officers and civil officials, went to the bridges in order to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, and the Chinese delegates asked for a postponement of the Japanese advance. The demand was not complied with, and Colonel Hamamoto, the Commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, in compliance with his orders, advanced to the bridges with one battalion of his regiment, two companies of field artillery and one company of engineers, to begin the repair work in accordance with the terms of the Japanese ultimatum. The engineers, under the command of Captain Hanai started work on the morning of November 4, and one

infantry company, with two Japanese flags, began its advance to Tahsing Station by noon of that day.

Hostilities actually began during the second attempt of the above-mentioned mixed commission which went to the spot early in the afternoon of the 4th in order to make a last attempt to secure the withdrawal of the Chinese troops. As soon as firing began Colonel Hamamoto realised that his men were in a very difficult position and went immediately to their support with whatever troops he had available. A rapid reconnaissance convinced him that a frontal attack was impossible on account of the swampy ground, and that nothing but an encircling movement against the left wing of the opposing force would help him out of this difficult situation. Accordingly he despatched his reserve companies to attack the hill on which the left wing of the opposing forces rested, but the small number of his forces and the impossibility of bringing his guns near enough for action prevented him from gaining the position before nightfall. The hill was captured by 8.30 p.m., but no further advance was possible on that day.

The Kwantung Army Headquarters, on receiving a report of the position, immediately despatched strong reinforcements, and another battalion of infantry arrived during the night, enabling the Colonel to re-open his attack at dawn of November 5. Even then, after a couple of hours and reaching the first Chinese position, he found himself confronted with a strong line of trenches defended, according to his own statement to the Commission, with about seventy automatic and machine guns. His attack was held up, and his troops suffered heavy losses, as a result of a Chinese encircling counter-attack executed by infantry and cavalry men. The Japanese troops were forced to retire, and for the second time they could do nothing but hold their position until nightfall. During the night of November 5-6, two fresh battalions arrived. This relieved the situation, and a renewed attack on the morning of the 6th rolled up the entire Chinese front, and brought Tahsing Station into the hands of the Japanese troops by noon. As Colonel Hamamoto's mission was only to occupy Tahsing Station, in order to cover the repair work of the bridges, no pursuit of the retreating Chinese troops was made, but the Japanese troops remained in the vicinity of the station.

The Chinese Assessor, in the same document No. 3, alleges that Major Hayashi, on November 6, made a new request to the Hei'ungkiang Government, asking (1) that General Ma Chan-shan should resign from the Governorship in favour of General Chang Hai-peng, and (2) that a public safety committee should be organised. A photograph of Major Hayashi's letter containing these requests was shown to the Commission. This document further states that on the following day, without waiting for a reply, the Japanese troops began a new attack on the provincial

forces now stationed at Sanchienfang, about 20 miles north of Tahsing, and that on November 8 Major Hayashi sent another letter repeating the demand for General Ma Chan-shan's retirement from the Governorship of the Province in favour of General Chang Hai-peng, and for a reply before midnight of that day. On November 11, the Chinese account continues, General Honjo himself asked by telegram for General Ma Chan-shan's retirement, the evacuation of Tsitsihar, and the right for the Japanese troops to advance to Angangchi Station, again requiring a reply before nightfall of that day. On November 13 Major Hayashi increased the third demand to one for the Japanese troops to occupy not only Angangchi Station but Tsitsihar Station as well. General Ma Chan-shan pointed out in reply that Tsitsihar Station had nothing to do with the Taonan-Angangchi Railway.

On November 14 and 15 the Japanese combined forces renewed their attack with the support of four aeroplanes. On November 16 General Honjo demanded the retreat of General Ma Chan-shan to the north of Tsitsihar, the withdrawal of Chinese troops to the north of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and an undertaking not to interfere in any way with the traffic and operation of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway, these demands to be carried out within ten days from November 15, and a reply to be sent to the Japanese Special Bureau at Harbin. When General Ma Chan-shan declined to accept these terms, General Tamon began a new general attack on November 18. General Ma Chan-shan's troops retreated, first to Tsitsihar, which was taken by the Japanese on November 19, and then to Hailun, to which place the administrative offices of the Government were removed.

According to the evidence of Japanese Generals commanding on the spot, the new operations did not begin before November 12. General Ma Chan-shan at that time had gathered about 20,000 of his troops to the west of Sanchienfang, and even sent for the land colonisation troops in Heilungkiang Province and the forces of General Ting Chao. Against these large forces, which showed an increasingly threatening attitude, the Japanese could oppose only the now concentrated division of General Tamon, consisting of two brigades under Generals Amano and Hasebe. In order to relieve this tense situation General Honjo demanded, on November 12, that all Heilungkiang troops should retire to the north of Tsitsihar, and that his troops should be allowed to proceed northward for the protection of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway. The advance did not begin before November 17, when the Chinese sent cavalry troops around the right flank of the Japanese and attacked them. General Tamon informed the Commission that in spite of his small strength of 3,000 infantrymen and 24 field guns he ventured to attack the Chinese forces, and completely defeated them on November 18, with the result that Tsitsihar was occupied on the morning of the 19th. One week later the 2nd Division

returned to its original quarters, leaving General Amano with one infantry regiment and one battery of artillery at Tsitsihar to hold the place against General Ma Chan-shan's troops. This small Japanese force was subsequently reinforced by the newly-formed "Manchukuo" troops, but these new troops at the time of our visit to Tsitsihar in May, 1932, were not yet considered capable of fighting the forces of General Ma Chan-shan.

The attached Military Situation Chart No. 2 on page...¹ shows the distribution of regular troops of both sides at the time of the first resolution of the Council. No account is taken of disbanded soldiers and bandit groups which, at that time, specially infested the areas east and west of the Liao River and the Chientao district. Both the parties have accused each other of purposely instigating banditry—the Japanese attributing to the Chinese the motive of wishing to create disorder in the lost parts of Manchuria, and the Chinese suspecting the Japanese of wishing to find pretexts for occupying the country and still further extending their military operations. The strength and military value of these gangs is so vague and changeable that it would not be possible to insert an accurate estimate of their significance into the picture of the military situation. The chart shows that the Command of the Northeastern troops had succeeded in organising a force of considerable strength in the southwestern part of Liaoning Province. These troops had been able to construct a strongly entrenched position on the right bank of the Taling River very close to the foremost Japanese outposts. Such a situation may well have caused the Japanese military authorities some anxiety as they estimated the total strength of those regular troops at 35,000 men, or about double the total admitted strength of their own forces in Manchuria at that moment.

The Tientsin incident.

Outbreak of November 8. Japanese version.

This situation was relieved by action taken in consequence of certain events which occurred at Tientsin during the month of November. Reports as to the origin of the trouble differ widely. There were two outbreaks, on the 8th and the 26th of November, respectively, but the whole affair is extremely obscure. According to the Japanese account in the "Herald of Asia" the Chinese population at Tientsin was divided between those who supported and those who opposed Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and the latter organised forces to create a political demonstration in the Chinese city by attacking the guardians of public order on November 8. In this dispute between two Chinese factions the Commander of the Japanese garrison observed strict neutrality from the beginning, but was forced to open fire when Chinese guards in the vicinity of the Japanese Concession began to shoot indiscriminately into his district. His

¹ Charts to be reproduced separately.—WAICHIAOPU.

demand that the combating Chinese forces should keep at 300 yards distance, the border of the Concession, did not relieve the situation which grew so tense that on November 11 and 12, all foreign garrisons mounted guard.

The Chinese version.

The account given by the Municipal Government of Tientsin is very different. They assert that the Japanese employed Chinese ruffians and Japanese plain clothes men, who were formed into operating gangs within the Japanese Concession in order to start trouble in the Chinese city. Their police authorities being timely informed by agents of this situation, were able to repulse the disorderly bands emerging from the Japanese Concession. They say that from the confession of arrested members of these gangs they are able to prove that the riot was organised by the Japanese, and that the men were armed with guns and ammunition of Japanese make. They admit that the Japanese garrison Commander complained on the morning of the 9th that some of his men had been wounded by stray bullets, and that he had asked for a withdrawal to a distance of 300 yards, but they assert that in spite of their acceptance of these conditions the Japanese regular troops attacked the Chinese city with armoured cars and shelled it.

The account of the Municipal Government further states that on November 17, an agreement was reached which fixed the details for the withdrawal to a distance of 300 yards, but it asserts that the Japanese did not carry out their part of the agreement, and that consequently the situation grew worse.

On November 26 a terrific explosion was heard, immediately followed by firing of cannons, machines guns and rifles. The electric lights in the Japanese Concession were put out, and plain clothes men emerged from it, attacking the police stations in the vicinity.

Outbreak, November 26. Conflicting Accounts.

The Japanese account of this later disturbance as given in the "Herald of Asia" is to the effect that on the 26th the situation had become so much better that their volunteer corps was disbanded, and that on the same evening the Chinese opened fire on the Japanese barracks, and as the fire, in spite of their protests, did not stop until noon of the 27th, they had no choice but to accept the challenge and to fight the Chinese. The battle went on until the afternoon of the 27th, when a peace conference was held. On that occasion the Japanese demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Chinese troops and police forces to a distance of 20 Chinese *li* from all places where foreign troops were stationed. The Chinese agreed to withdraw their soldiers but not their police forces, which were alone responsible for the safety of foreigners in that district. The Japanese say that on November 29 the Chinese

offered their withdrawal from the neighbourhood of the Concession: their offer was accepted; the Chinese armed police withdrew on the morning of the 29th, and the defence work was removed on the 30th.

Effect of the Tientsin disturbances on the situation in Manchuria.

The threatening situation at Tientsin on the 26th caused the staff officers of the Kwangtung Army to propose to the Commander an immediate expedition of troops via Chinchow and Shanhaikwan to reinforce the endangered small force at Tientsin. As a mere transport problem it would have been easier and quicker to despatch reinforcements by sea via Dairen. But considered strategically, the suggested route had this advantage, that it would enable the advancing troops to dispose *en route* of the very inconvenient Chinese concentration around Chinchow. It was assumed that the delay in taking this route would not be long as little or no resistance from the Chinese was anticipated. The suggestion was approved, and one armoured train, one troop train, and a couple of aeroplanes crossed the Liao River on November 27 and their attack on the first Chinese outposts was sufficient to initiate a retreat of the Chinese troops from their entrenched position. The armoured car corps also changed its position. A shade of resistance led the Japanese to reinforce their strength by more armoured trains, infantry trains, and artillery. They also repeatedly threw bombs on Chinchow, but news of the improved situation at Tientsin soon deprived the expedition of its original objective and on November 29, to the great surprise of the Chinese, the Japanese forces were withdrawn to Hsinmin.

Another consequence of the earlier disturbance at Tientsin was that the former Emperor, who had been living in the Japanese Concession there, sought a safer refuge at Port Arthur on November 13, after a talk with Colonel Doihara.

The occupation of Chinchow.

The districts evacuated by the Japanese were re-occupied by the Chinese troops, and this fact was widely advertised. Chinese morale was slightly raised; and the activities of irregular forces and bandits increased. Profiting by the winter season, they crossed the frozen Liao River at many points and raided the country round Mukden. The Japanese military authorities realised that even to maintain their existing positions reinforcements would be necessary, and with these reinforcements they hoped to be able to get rid of the menace of the Chinese concentration at Chinchow.

Japanese reservation when accepting the resolution of the Council on December 10.

Meanwhile the situation in Manchuria was a subject of further discussion in Geneva. When accepting the resolution of December 10 the

Japanese delegate stated that his acceptance "was based on the understanding that this paragraph (No. 2) was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as might be necessary 'to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activity of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria.' Such action was admittedly 'an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria,' and its necessity would end when normal conditions should be restored there." To that the Chinese representative replied "that the injunction to the parties not to aggravate the situation should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by the state of affairs in Manchuria," and several Council members taking part in the discussion admitted that "circumstances might arise there causing danger to Japanese lives and property and in such an emergency it might be inevitable that Japanese forces in the neighbourhood should take action." When this matter has been referred to by Japanese officers who have given evidence before the Commission it is usually asserted that the resolution of December 10, "gave Japan the right to maintain her troops" in Manchuria, or made the Japanese army responsible for the suppression of banditry there. In describing the subsequent operations they assert that while executing this right against the bandit forces near the Liao River, they incidentally came in conflict with the remaining Chinese forces near Chinchow which were in consequence withdrawn within the Great Wall. The fact remains that having made their reservation at Geneva the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans.

Arrival of reinforcements.

The 2nd Division, with the exception of its garrison at Tsitsihar, was concentrated west of Mukden. Reinforcements soon began to arrive; the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division¹ between December 10 and 15. On December 27 Imperial sanction was obtained for the despatch of the Staff of the 20th Division and another brigade from Korea. Changchun and Kirin were for the time being only protected by Independent Railway Guards.

Abortive negotiations for the withdrawal of Chinese troops.

As a Japanese advance on Chinchow was imminent, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs made an attempt to prevent further fighting by offering to withdraw the Chinese troops to within the Great Wall provided that three or four foreign Powers were willing to guarantee the maintenance of a neutral zone north and south of Chinchow. Nothing

¹ All the statements here given concerning numbers of units and strength of the Japanese forces are based on official Japanese information

came of the proposal. Meanwhile conversations were initiated between Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and the Japanese Charge d'Affaires at Peiping, but these too were abortive for different reasons. The Chinese allege in their document No. 3, Annex "E," that at each successive visit, on December 7, 25 and 29, the Japanese delegate increased his demands concerning the Chinese retreat and his promises with regard to the restraint of the Japanese troops became more and more vague. The Japanese, on the other hand, claim that the Chinese promises to withdraw were never sincere.

Attack on Chinchow.

The concentrated attack of the Japanese forces began on December 23 when the 19th Chinese Brigade was forced to give up its position. From that day the advance continued with perfect regularity and hardly met with any resistance at all, the Chinese Commander having given out a general order to retreat. Chinchow was occupied on the morning of January 8 and the Japanese forces continued their advance right up to the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan, where they established a permanent contact with the Japanese garrison in that place.

The complete evacuation of Manchuria by the troops of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, practically without striking a blow, was not unconnected with the internal conditions of China south of the Wall. Reference has been made in an earlier chapter to the feuds between rival Generals and it must be remembered these feuds had not ceased.

The occupation of Harbin.

The comparative ease with which the offensive down to Shanhaikwan was carried out enabled the Japanese to release some of their troops from their original positions and make them available for advances in other directions. The main force of the 2nd Division, which had done nearly all the fighting so far, returned to their quarters at Liaoyang, Mukden, and Changchun for a rest. On the other hand, the increased length of railway line to be protected against possible bandit raids at any point necessitated the use of a large number of troops the fighting strength of which was diminished by their distribution over such wide areas. The two brigades under the command of the Staff of the 20th Division were left for this purpose in the newly occupied zone, and the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division joined them more to the north. The Japanese military authorities assured us that within these well guarded areas a state of law and order was soon established and that banditry was practically extinguished on both sides of the Liao River during the following weeks. This statement was made to us in the month of June, but at the moment of writing this Report we read of vigorous raids from Volunteer troops on Yingkow and Haicheng, with threats even to Mukden and Chinchow.

The district which at the beginning of this year gave more trouble than any other was that north and east of Harbin, to which the remaining followers of the two former Provincial Governments of Kirin and Heilungkiang had withdrawn. The Chinese Generals in this northern sector seemed to have maintained some contact with Headquarters at Peiping, whence they received some support from time to time. The advance on Harbin began, as that on Tsitsihar had done, by an encounter between two Chinese forces. General Hsi Hsia at the beginning of January prepared for an expedition to the North with the view to occupying Harbin. Between him and that city were Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu, with what are described as anti-Kirin forces. According to information provided by the Japanese Assessor, when our preliminary report was under consideration, satisfactory terms would have been arranged by negotiation between the parties had it not been for the influence of the authorities at Peiping. Negotiations were in fact initiated and while they were being carried on General Hsi Hsia advanced with his troops as far as Shuangcheng, which they reached on January 25, but when it came to serious fighting on the following morning in the immediate neighbourhood south of the city, the advance was at once checked. The situation thus created was felt by the Japanese to be full of danger for the large Japanese and Korean colonies at Harbin. Fighting between two more or less irregular Chinese forces in the immediate neighbourhood would have resulted in the retreat on the town of a defeated army, the horrors of which the recent history of China provides so many examples. Urgent appeals were therefore sent to the Kwantung Army, even Chinese merchants, so the Japanese assert, joining in the appeal from fear that their property might be looted.

Colonel Doihara (now General), who, in this emergency, was sent to Harbin on the 26th in order to take over the office of the special Japanese service there, told the Commission that the fighting between the two Chinese forces around Harbin continued for about ten days, and that there was great anxiety for the 4,000 Japanese residents, who mostly lived in a menaced area, together with 1600 Koreans in the Chinese suburb of Fuchiatien, who were exposed to the danger of massacre. In spite of the fact that the anti-Kirin forces held the town during ten days of continual fighting, the casualties among the Korean and Japanese residents were comparatively few. The latter organised themselves into armed volunteer bands and helped their nationals to escape from the Chinese suburb. One Japanese and three Koreans are said to have been killed while trying to escape. In addition, one of the Japanese aeroplanes, sent to reconnoitre the threatening situation, was forced to land owing to engine trouble, and its occupants are said to have been killed by Ting Chao's troops.

These two incidents decided the Japanese military authorities to intervene. Again the 2nd Division was called upon to help its endangered countrymen. But this time the problem was not so much one of fighting

as of transportation, the railway north of Changchun being a joint Sino-Russian undertaking. As the rolling stock of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway was greatly depleted, the Commander of the 2nd Division decided to send, in the first instance, only General Hasebe and two infantry battalions. Negotiations with the railway authorities were started, but when these seemed likely to be long drawn out, the Japanese officers decided to enforce the transport of their troops. The railway authorities protested and refused to work the trains, but in spite of their opposition the Japanese military authorities succeeded on the night of January 28 in forming three military trains, which went as far north as the second Sungari bridge, which they found damaged by the Chinese forces. As the repairs were made on the 29th, Shuangcheng was reached on the afternoon of January 30. Early on the following morning, and still under cover of darkness, the small Japanese force was attacked by Ting Chao's troops and severe fighting took place, resulting in the repulse of the Chinese, but no further progress was possible that day. By that time the Soviet and Chinese railway authorities had agreed that the transport of Japanese troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway would be allowed, on the understanding that they were proceeding with the sole object of giving protection to the Japanese residents at Harbin. The fares of the troops were paid for in cash. On February 1 the Japanese troops began to arrive and the main force of the 2nd Division was concentrated near Shuangcheng on the morning of February 3. Reinforcements were even called upon from Tsitsihar, where, as will be remembered, a part of the 2nd Division had remained since November 19. But many difficulties had still to be overcome as the line between Harbin and Tsitsihar was cut by the Chinese who at the same time attacked detachments of the Independent Railway Guards on the Southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway at different places.

On February 3 the anti-Kirin troops, now estimated to have a total strength of about 13,000 to 14,000 soldiers with 16 guns, had taken up an entrenched position along the southern boundary of the city. The 2nd Division began to advance against this position on the same day, reaching the Nanchengtze River, about 20 miles north of Shuangcheng, on the night of February 3-4. Fighting commenced on the following morning. On the evening of the 4th the Chinese position was partly taken by the Japanese troops and by noon of the 5th a final decision was reached. Harbin was occupied on the afternoon of the same day, and the Chinese withdrew in the direction of Sanhsing.

Further Japanese military operations up to the end of August, 1932.

The successful attack of the 2nd Division brought the town of Harbin into the hands of the Japanese authorities, but as it was not immediately

followed by any pursuit of the retiring Chinese forces, little change was produced on the situation in northern Manchuria as a whole. The railways north and east of Harbin and the important waterway of the Sungari River still remained under the control of the anti-Kirin troops and those of Ma Chan-shan. The arrival of further reinforcements, repeated expeditions to the east and north and six months of fighting took place before the occupied area was extended as far Hailun in the north and the districts of Fangcheng and Hailin in the east. According to Japanese official statements, the anti-Kirin troops with those of General Ma Chan-shan were completely routed, but according to official Chinese sources, they are still in existence. Although reduced in their fighting strength they continually hamper the Japanese forces, at the same time avoiding actual encounters in the open field. According to newspaper information, both the eastern and western branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway is still being attacked and damaged at different places between Harbin and Hailin.

The Japanese operations since the beginning of February may be summarised as follows:

Towards the end of March the main part of the 2nd Division left Harbin in the direction of Fengcheng in order to suppress the anti-Kirin troops of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. The Division advanced as far as the region of Sanhsing and returned to Harbin in the earlier part of April. By that time the 10th Division had arrived at Harbin and took over the sector from the 2nd Division. This unit was engaged for about a month in constant fighting against the anti-Kirin troops with the greater part of its forces in the district near Sanhsing and with a minor detachment along the eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in the direction of Hailin.

In the earlier part of May, the Japanese forces in the north of Manchuria were further reinforced by the 14th Division. A detachment of this unit took part in the fighting against the anti-Kirin forces and advanced as far as the valley of Mutan River, south of Sanhsing, forcing the opposing troops to withdraw to the most eastern corner of Kirin Province. But the main operations of the 14th Division, which began in the latter part of May, took place in the region north of Harbin and were directed against the troops of General Ma Chan-shan. The 14th Division carried out its main attack to the north of Harbin, along the Hulan-Hailun Railway, and, with minor forces to the east from Koshan, the proposed terminus of the Tsitsihar-Keshan Railway. The Japanese claim that during the earlier part of August the troops of General Ma Chan-shan were again effectively routed, and that they have strong evidence that the General himself was killed. The Chinese assert that the General is still alive. In this action cavalry, newly arrived from Japan, likewise took part.

During the month of August, several minor engagements took place on the borders of Fengtien and Jehol Provinces, mainly near the Chinchow-Peipiao branch line (of the Peiping-Mukden Railway), which is the only

means of access to Jehol by Railway. There are widespread fears in China that these events are only a prelude to larger military operations at an early date, aimed at the occupation of Jehol by the Japanese. The main lines of communication which still exist between China Proper and the Chinese force in Manchuria run through Jehol, and the fear of a Japanese attack in this Province, which is already claimed as part of the territory of "Manchukuo," is not unreasonable. Its imminence is freely discussed in the Japanese press.

The Japanese version of the recent events submitted to the Commission by the Japanese Assessor is as follows:

An official attached to the Kwantung Army Headquarters named Ishimoto was kidnapped by Chinese "Volunteers" on July 17 from a train travelling between Peipiao and Chinchow, within the boundaries of the Province of Jehol. A small detachment of Japanese infantry with light artillery made an immediate attempt to rescue him but failed in their purpose, and the result was the occupation of a village on the frontier of Jehol by Japanese troops.

During the latter part of July and in August, Japanese aeroplanes demonstrated several times over this part of Jehol and dropped some bombs, but "uninhabited areas outside the villages" were carefully selected. On August 19 a Japanese staff officer was sent to Nanling, a small town situated between Peipiao and the provincial boundary, to negotiate for the release of Mr. Ishimoto. On his return journey with a small infantry detachment he was fired upon. In self-defence the fire was returned, and on the arrival of another infantry detachment, Manling was occupied but evacuated on the following day.

Through the Chinese Assessor extracts were submitted to the Commission from the reports of General Tang Yu-ling, the Governor of the Province of Jehol. These reports claim that fighting on a much larger scale took place, and that a Chinese battalion of railway guards was in action against a superior number of Japanese infantry, supported by two armoured trains. They claim that the bombing referred to by the Japanese was directed against Chaoyang, one of the larger towns in that region, and that as a result 30 casualties were caused among both military and civilians. The Japanese offensive was resumed on August 19 when an armoured train attacked Nanling.

The information given by the Japanese Assessor concludes by stating that, although the maintenance of order in Jehol is "a matter of internal policy for Manchukuo, Japan cannot be indifferent to the situation in that region in view of the important role played by Japan in the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria and Mongolia, and that any disorders in Jehol would immediately produce very serious repercussions throughout Manchuria and Mongolia."

General Tang Yu-ling concludes his report by stating that all possible measures were being taken to offer effective resistance should the Japanese attacks be renewed.

From these communications it seems that an extension of the area of conflict in this region is a contingency which must be reckoned with.

Nature of resistance offered by the Chinese.

Although the main Chinese army was withdrawn within the Great Wall at the end of 1931, the Japanese continued to meet with opposition of an irregular kind in different parts of Manchuria. There have been no further battles such as occurred on the Nonni River but fighting has been constant and widely dispersed. It has been the practice of the Japanese to describe indiscriminately as "bandits" all the forces now opposed to them. There are, in fact, apart from bandits, two distinct categories of organised resistance to the Japanese troops or to those of "Manchukuo"; namely, the regular and irregular Chinese troops. It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of these two, and, as the Commission was not able to meet any of the Chinese generals still in the field, it is necessary to make reservations with regard to the reliability of the information given below. Chinese authorities are naturally reluctant to give away exact information about such troops as are still offering resistance to the Japanese in Manchuria. Japanese authorities, on the other hand, are disposed to minimize the numbers and fighting value of the forces still opposed to them.

Remnants of the original Northeastern armies.

The remnants of the original Northeastern armies are to be found exclusively in the Provinces of Kirin and Heilungkiang. The reorganisation of troops which took place around Chinchow late in 1931 was not of long duration, because all those units were subsequently withdrawn inside the Great Wall. But the regular Chinese troops, which before September 1931, were stationed in the Sungari region and along the Chinese Eastern Railway, have never been seriously engaged with the Japanese troops, and continue to carry on a guerilla warfare which has given, and still gives, much trouble to the Japanese and "Manchukuo" forces. The Generals Ma Chan-shan, Ting Chao and Li Tu have acquired great fame throughout China as leaders of these troops. All three are former brigade-generals in command of railway guards or garrison troops in north Manchuria. Probably the greater part of the troops under their command remained faithful to their respective leaders and the cause of China after the destruction of the Young Marshal's regime. The strength of General Ma's troops cannot easily be determined, because, as will be remembered, this General changed his allegiance. As Governor of Heilungkiang Province he was in command of all the provincial troops, the number of which was given to us as seven brigades in all. Since the month of April he has definitely taken up

a position against Japan and "Manchukuo." The number of troops at his disposal between Holan River, Hailun and Taheiho is, estimated by Japanese authorities as six regiments, or between 7,000 and 8,000 men. Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu control six old brigades of Chang Hsueh-liang's army, and have since raised in the country three additional brigades. Their total strength at the time of our Preliminary Report was estimated by Japanese authorities as about 30,000. But it is very probable that the troops of General Ma Chan-san as well as those of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu have considerably diminished in number since the month of April and are now below the estimated figure. Both units, as will be seen later on, have suffered a great deal from concentrated attacks of regular Japanese troops since the occupation of Harbin. At present they seem unable to hinder any operation by the Japanese troops and carefully avoid meeting them in the open field. The use of aeroplanes by the Japanese and the complete absence of this weapon on the other side, accounts for the greater part of such losses as they have sustained.

Irregular forces, Volunteers.

When considering the irregular forces it is necessary to distinguish between the different volunteer forces in Kirin Province co-operating with the armies of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. In our Preliminary Report of April 29, 1932, we mentioned, on page 5, under the heading "Volunteers," three different volunteer armies and several minor corps, one of the latter between Tunhua and Tienpaoshan remaining in touch with these regular troops of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu. Owing to the absence of railways and other means of communication in those districts this corps still keeps the same position. Its Chief, Wang Teh-ling, united different "anti-Manchukuo" forces and kept them firmly under his command. Though this force may be of small significance compared with Japanese troops (which hardly exhibit any activity to the east of Tunhua), it seems well able to hold its own against the "Manchukuo" troops and maintains its position in a considerable part of Kirin Province. No evidence is available concerning the present activity of the "Big Sword Society" which, while keeping in touch with Wang Teh-ling, created considerable disturbance in the Chientao district. On the other hand, no action of importance has been undertaken against it by Japanese troops.

An official Japanese document has been submitted to the Commission enumerating a large number of so-called route-armies and other Chinese units, each containing not more than 200 to 400 men, which form the subdivisions of the volunteer armies. Their field of activity extends to the areas around Mukden and the Mukden-Antung Railway, to Chinchow and the boundary between Jehol and Fengtien Provinces, to the western branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to the district between Hsinmin and

Mukden. Thus the area covered by these volunteers and the anti-Kirin forces combined comprises the greater part of Manchuria.

In the middle of August, fighting broke out in the immediate neighbourhood of Mukden, at different places of the southern part of the South Manchuria Railway, especially at Haicheng and at Yingkow. On several occasions the Japanese troops have found themselves in a difficult position, but nowhere have the volunteers succeeded in attaining a victory of any importance. It seems doubtful whether any change in the general situation in Manchuria is to be anticipated in the near future, but at the time of the completion of our Report fighting continues over a wide area.

Bandits.

As in China, banditry has always existed in Manchuria. Increasing or diminishing in numbers in relation to the activity or the weakness of the Government, professional bandits are to be found in all parts of the Three Provinces and their services were often employed by different parties for political purposes. The Chinese Government has presented to the Commission a document stating that during the last 20 or 30 years Japanese agents to a great extent instigated bandits to serve their political interests. A passage from the "Second Report of Progress of Manchuria in 1930," published by the South Manchuria Railway, is quoted in this document to the effect that within the railway area alone the number of cases of banditry had increased from 9 cases in 1906 to 368 in 1929. According to the Chinese document quoted above, banditry has been encouraged by the smuggling of arms and munitions on a large scale from Dairen and the Kwantung Leased Territory. It is asserted, for instance, that the notorious bandit chief, Lin Yin-shin, was provided in November last with arms, munitions and other means in order to establish the so-called Independent Self-Defence Army which was organised with the help of three Japanese agents and destined to attack Chinchow. After the failure of this attempt another bandit chief got Japanese help for the same purpose but fell into the hands of the Chinese authorities with all his material of Japanese origin.

Japanese authorities, of course, see the state of banditry in Manchuria in quite a different light. According to them, its existence is due exclusively to the inefficiency of the Chinese Government. They allege also that Chang Tso-lin to a certain extent favoured the existence of bandit gangs in his territory, because he thought that in time of need they could easily be converted into soldiers. The Japanese authorities, while admitting the fact that the complete overthrow of Chang Hsueh-liang's government and army greatly added to the number of bandits in the country, claim that the presence of their troops in the country will enable them to wipe out the principal bandit units within from two to three years. They hope that the organisation of "Manchukuo" police and of self-defence

corps in each community will help to put an end to banditry. Many of the present bandits are believed to have been peaceful citizens who on account of the complete loss of their property were induced to take up their present occupation. Given the opportunity of resuming the occupation of farming, it is hoped that they will return to their former peaceful mode of life.

CHAPTER V.

SHANGHAI

The Shanghai Affair.

At the end of January fighting broke out at Shanghai. The story of that affair has already been told in its broad outlines down to February 20 by the Consular Committee appointed by the League. The fighting was still in progress when the Commission arrived at Tokyo on the 29th, and several discussions took place with members of the Japanese Government on the origin, motives and consequences of their armed intervention in this place. When we reached Shanghai, on March 14, the fighting was over, but the negotiations for an armistice were proving difficult. The arrival of the Commission at this moment was opportune, and may have helped to create a propitious atmosphere. We were able to appreciate the tense feeling which had been created by the recent hostilities and to obtain an immediate and vivid impression both of the difficulties and of the issues involved in this controversy. The Commission was not instructed to continue the work of the Consular Committee or to make a special study of the recent events there. In fact, we were informed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that the Chinese Government had expressed themselves as opposed to any suggestion that the Commission should delay its journey to Manchuria for the purpose of studying the situation at Shanghai.

We heard the views of both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on the Shanghai Affair, and were the recipients of a large amount of literature from both sides on the subject. We also visited the devastated area and heard statements from Japanese naval and military officers on the recent operations. In an individual capacity, too, we had conversations with the representatives of many shades of opinion on matters which were fresh in the memory of every one living in Shanghai. But we did not, as a Commission, officially investigate the Shanghai affair and therefore express no opinion upon the disputed points connected with it. We shall, however, for purposes of record, complete the story of the operations from February 20 until the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

Narrative of events at Shanghai from February 20 onwards.

The last report of the Consular Committee ended, it will be remembered, by stating that the Japanese, on February 20, opened a

new attack in the Kiangwan and Woosung areas. This attack brought no marked success to the Japanese troops, despite the fact that it was continued on the following days, but it enabled them to learn that parts of the so-called Chinese Bodyguard Army, viz., the 87th and 88th Divisions, were now fighting against them as well as the 19th Route Army. This fact, together with the difficulties which the nature of the country presented, decided the Japanese to reinforce their troops by two more divisions, namely the 11th and 14th.

On February 28 the Japanese troops occupied the western part of Kiangwan, which had been evacuated by the Chinese. On the same day the Woosung fort and fortifications along the Yangtze River were again bombed from the air and from the sea, and bombing planes operated over the whole front, including the aerodrome at Hungjao and the Nanking Railway. General Shirakawa, who was appointed to the supreme command of the army, arrived in Shanghai on February 29. From this date onwards the Japanese Headquarters announced substantial progress. In the district of Kiangwan they advanced slowly, and the Naval Headquarters stated that the opposing forces at Chapei showed signs of giving way as a consequence of the daily bombardments. On the same day the aerodrome at Hangchow, which is 100 miles distant from Shanghai, was bombed from the air.

On March 1st, as the frontal attack had advanced but slowly, the Japanese Army Commander initiated a wide enveloping movement by landing the main force of the 11th Division at some distance on the right bank of the Yangtze River, in the vicinity of Tsiyakow, for the purpose of making a surprise attack on the left flank of the Chinese Army. The manoeuvre was successful in compelling an immediate retreat of the Chinese forces beyond the 20 kilometre limit originally asked for in the Japanese Commander's ultimatum of February 20. Woosung fort had been evacuated by the Chinese troops when, on March 3, it was entered by the Japanese troops after many aerial and naval bombardments. On the previous day bombing operations had been extended as far as 7 kilometres east of Quinsan Station on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, with the alleged object of preventing the transportation of reinforcements to the Chinese front.

On the afternoon of March 3 the Japanese Commander gave the order to stop fighting. The Chinese Commander issued a similar order on March 4. A strong complaint was made by the Chinese that the 14th Japanese Division was landed at Shanghai between the 7th and the 17th of March, after the cessation of hostilities, and about a month later was transported to Manchuria in order to reinforce the Japanese troops there.

In the meantime attempts to secure a cessation of hostilities through the good offices of friendly Powers and of the League of Nations had been

continued. On February 28 the British Admiral, Sir Howard Kelly, received on his flagship the delegates of both parties. An agreement on the basis of mutual and simultaneous withdrawal and of a temporary character was proposed. The Conference was not successful, owing to the differing opinions of the two parties as to the basis of the negotiations.

On February 29 the President of the Council of the League of Nations made recommendations which contemplated, amongst other things, "a mixed conference in the presence of other interested Powers in view of the final conclusion of the fighting and for a definite cessation of hostilities, subject to local arrangements." Both parties accepted, but a successful outcome of the negotiations was rendered impossible by the conditions of the Japanese delegates, who demanded that: (1) the Chinese troops should first begin to withdraw, and (2) the Japanese having ascertained that the withdrawal was taking place, should then retire, not, as formerly stated, to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement streets, but to an area extending from Shanghai to Woosung.

On March 4 the Assembly of the League recalling the suggestions of the Council, (1) called on both Governments to make the cessation of hostilities effective; (2) requested other interested Powers to inform the Assembly on the execution of the previous paragraph, and (3) recommended negotiations, with the assistance of other Powers, for the conclusion of the arrangements in order to render definite the cessation of hostilities and to regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, wishing to be informed by the Powers on the development of these negotiations.

On March 9 the Japanese sent a memorandum to the Chinese through the intermediary of the British Minister, in which their readiness to negotiate on the basis of the points laid down by the Assembly was expressed.

On March 10 the Chinese replied through the same channel that they too were ready to negotiate on this basis, but on condition that the conference should be limited to matters pertaining to the definite cessation of hostilities and the complete and unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese troops. On March 13 the Japanese intimated that they were not disposed to regard the Chinese reservations as modifying the sense of the resolutions of the League of Nations, or in any way binding on themselves. They thought that both parties should meet on the basis of the resolutions.

On March 24 the Sino-Japanese Conference on the cessation of hostilities was opened. In the meantime the withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces had actually begun. On March 20 naval and air contingents left Shanghai, reducing the remaining strength to "something not far above normal." The Japanese Headquarters announced on March 27, on the occasion of further withdrawal, that this had nothing

to do with the above-mentioned Conference, or with the League of Nations, but was simply the outcome of the independent decision of the Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army to recall units no longer required at Shanghai.

On March 30 the Conference announced that on the preceding day an agreement relative to a definite cessation of hostilities had been reached, but further difficulties supervened, and it was not till May 5 that a complete armistice agreement was ready for signature. It provided for a definite cessation of hostilities, fixed a line to the west of Shanghai as a temporary limit for the advance of Chinese troops, pending further arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions, and provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the International Settlement and the extra-Settlement streets as previous to January 28. Certain areas outside the Settlement had to be temporarily included, because the number of Japanese troops was too large to be quartered within the Settlement alone, but these do not require to be mentioned as they have since been evacuated. A Joint Commission, in which the assistant friendly Powers, the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy and the two parties were represented, was established to certify the mutual withdrawal. This Commission was also to collaborate in arranging for the transfer from the Japanese forces to the Chinese Police.

The Chinese added two qualifications to the agreement. The first declared that nothing in the agreement was to imply permanent restriction of the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory, and the second that it was to be understood that even in areas temporarily provided for the stationing of the Japanese troops all municipal functions, including that of policing, would remain with the Chinese authorities.

The terms of this agreement as a whole have in the main since been carried out. The evacuated areas were turned over to the Chinese Special Police Force between May 9 and 30. The turning over, however, of these four areas has been somewhat delayed. It was but natural that when the Chinese owners of houses and factories, officials of railways and companies, and others began to re-enter the evacuated areas, numerous complaints concerning looting, wilful destruction and carrying away of property should have been addressed to the Japanese military authorities. In the opinion of the Chinese, the whole question of reparations remains for further negotiations. They estimate the casualties in killed and wounded and missing as 24,200 officers, men and civilians, and the total material loss at approximately 1,500,000,000 Mexican dol. rs. A draft agreement dealing with the extra-Settlement road areas had been initialed by representatives of the Shanghai Municipal Council and of the Chinese Municipality of Greater Shanghai. But it has not yet received the approval of either the Municipal Council or of the City Government. The

Municipal Council has referred it to the Senior Consul for the observations of the Consular Body.

Effect on the Manchurian situation of the Chinese resistance at Shanghai.

The Shanghai affair undoubtedly exercised considerable influence upon the situation in Manchuria. The ease with which the Japanese had been able to occupy the greater part of Manchuria, and the absence of any resistance by the Chinese troops not only led to a belief in Japanese naval and military circles that the fighting quality of the Chinese army was negligible but caused profound depression throughout China. The stout resistance put up from the first by the Chinese 19th Route Army, with the assistance later of the 87th and 88th Guard Divisions, was hailed throughout China with the greatest enthusiasm, and the fact that the original three thousand marines had to be supplemented by three Divisions and a mixed Brigade of the Japanese Army before the Chinese forces were finally dislodged and driven back after six weeks of fighting created a profound impression upon the Chinese morale. The feeling prevailed that China must be saved by her own efforts. The Sino-Japanese conflict was brought home to the people throughout China. Everywhere opinion hardened and the spirit of resistance increased. Former pessimism gave place to equally exaggerated optimism. In Manchuria the news from Shanghai put fresh heart into the scattered forces still opposing the Japanese troops. It encouraged the subsequent resistance of General Ma Chan-shan and stimulated the patriotism of the Chinese all over the world. The resistance of the Volunteer Armies increased. Expeditions to suppress them met with indifferent success, and in some areas the Japanese stood on the defensive, taking up positions along certain railway lines which were frequently attacked.

The Incident of Nanking, February 1, 1932.

The hostilities at Shanghai were followed by several other incidents, one of which was the short bombardment of Nanking. This incident created much excitement and alarm, even outside China. It happened on the late evening of February 1, but did not last for more than one hour. The incident was probably caused by a misunderstanding, but had the important consequence of a temporary removal of the Chinese Government from Nanking to Loyang.

Chinese and Japanese versions both of the origin and of the facts are widely divergent. Two justifications were given to us from Japanese sources. The first was that since the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai the Chinese had extended the Lion Hill Forts, constructed trenches and established artillery positions at the gates near the river and on the opposite

side of it, thus making military preparations on a scale sufficient to arouse concern amongst the Japanese who had warships stationed on the river. The second was that the vernacular press had spread untruthful stories of Chinese victories at Shanghai, which had caused great excitement among the Chinese population of Nanking. In consequence, Chinese employed by Japanese were, it is alleged, forced by threats to give up their situations, and Chinese merchants refused to sell even the necessary food supplies to Japanese residents, including the Consular staff and the crews of warships.

The Chinese did not comment on these complaints. They assert that the general uneasiness and tense atmosphere prevailing were caused by the fact that the Japanese, after the Shanghai outbreak, increased the number of their warships from two to five, and subsequently to seven (the Japanese authorities give the number as six, these being three old gunboats and three destroyers); that the Commander of the warships landed a certain number of sailors and put them on guard duty before the wharf of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha, where the Japanese Consular Staff and all the Japanese residents had taken refuge on a hulk. With the events of Shanghai fresh in their memories, such measures may well have filled the minds of the already excited population at Nanking with fears of a similar experience.

We know from a report of the Police Commissioner of Nanking to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the authorities at Nanking who were solely responsible for the protection of their own subjects and of foreign nationals at that place greatly resented the landing of Japanese naval forces. They addressed representations to the Japanese Vice-Consul, who replied that he was unable to do anything in the matter. At the same time, special instructions were given to the local police station at Hsiakwan, where the warships were anchored and the above-mentioned wharf was situated, to prevent, if possible, any contact between Chinese and Japanese in this area, especially at night-time. According to the Japanese official reports, their refugees were taken on board a steamer of the same Nisshin Kisen Kaisha during the days following January 29, and a considerable number were transported to Shanghai. On the late evening of February 1 the Japanese assert that three gunshots were suddenly fired, apparently from the Lion Hill Forts. At the same time Chinese regulars fired on the Japanese naval guards on the river banks, causing two casualties of which one was fatal. The fire was returned, but directed only at the immediate neighbourhood of their landing place and stopped as soon as the firing from the shore had ceased. Such is the Japanese version. The Chinese, on the other hand, stoutly deny that any firing at all took place, but allege that eight shells in all were fired at the forts, at Hsiakwan station and at other places, accompanied by machine gun and rifle firing, and that during this time

searchlights were directed at the shore. This caused considerable panic amongst the inhabitants, who rushed into the interior of the city; but no casualties were reported and the material damage was not great.

It is also possible that the incident was first started by the firing of crackers by the excited Chinese population, celebrating a supposed victory at Shanghai.

CHAPTER VI.

"MANCHUKUO"

Part I.

I. Stages in the formation of the "new State."

Chaotic conditions resulting from Japanese occupation of Mukden.

As a result of the events of September 18, 1931, as described in the last Chapter, the civil administration of Mukden city and of the Province of Liaoning (Fengtien) was completely disorganised and even that of the other two provinces was affected to a lesser extent. The suddenness of the attack on Mukden, which was not only the political centre of all Manchuria but, next to Dairen, the most important commercial centre of South Manchuria, created a panic among the Chinese population. Most of the prominent officials, and the leading members of the educational and commercial communities, who could afford to do so, left immediately with their families. During the days following the 19th of September over 100,000 Chinese residents left Mukden by the Peiping-Mukden railway, and many who could not get away went into hiding. The police, and even the prison warders, disappeared. The municipal, district and provincial administrations at Mukden completely broke down, the public utility companies for the supply of electric light, water, etc., the buses and tramways, and the telephone and telegraph services, ceased to function. Banks and shops kept their doors closed.

Restoration of order and civil administration in Mukden city.

The immediate necessity was the organisation of a municipal government and the restoration of the ordinary civic life of the city. This was undertaken by the Japanese and carried through quickly and efficiently. Colonel Doihara was installed as Mayor of Mukden and within three days normal civil administration was restored. Several hundred police and most of the prison warders were brought back with the help of General Tsang Shih-yi, the Civil Governor of the Province, and the public utility services were restored. An Emergency Committee with a majority of Japanese members helped Colonel Doihara, who held his post for one month. On October 20 the reins of municipal government were restored

to a qualified Chinese body, with Dr. Chao Hsin-po (a lawyer who had studied for eleven years in Japan and was a Doctor of Law of Tokyo University) as Mayor.

The re-organisation of Provincial Government (1) Liaoning Province.

General Tsang Shih-yi refuses to organise an independent Provincial Government.

The next problem was to reorganise the provincial administration in each of the Three Provinces. This task was more difficult in Liaoning than in either of the other two, because Mukden was the centre of this provincial administration; most of the influential men had fled, and for a time a Chinese provincial administration continued to be carried on at Chinchow. It was three months, therefore, before the re-organisation was completely accomplished. Lieutenant General Tsang Shih-yi, the existing President of the Liaoning Provincial Government, was first approached on September 20 and invited to organise a Provincial Government, independent of the Chinese Central Government. This he refused to do. He was then put under arrest and released on December 15.

Formation of a "Peace and Order Maintenance Committee" under the chairmanship of Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, September 25.

After General Tsang Shih-yi had refused to help in the establishment of an independent Government, another influential Chinese official, Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, was approached. He was a former provincial governor and a Vice-President of the Northeastern Political Committee. The Japanese military authorities invited him and eight other Chinese residents to form a "Committee for the maintenance of Peace and Order." This Committee was declared to have been formed on September 24. The Japanese press at once acclaimed it as the first step in a separatist movement, but Mr. Yuan Chin-kai publicly disclaimed any such intention on October 5. The Committee, he said, had "been brought into being to preserve peace and order after the breakdown of the former administration. It assisted, moreover, in relieving refugees, in restoring the money market, and it attended to some other matters, solely for the sake of preventing unnecessary hardship. It had, however, no intention of organising a Provincial Government or declaring independence."

Board of Finance opened October 19.

On October 19 the Committee opened the Board of Finance, and Japanese advisers were appointed to assist the Chinese functionaries. The Director of the Board of Finance had to obtain the approval of the military authorities before giving effect to the Board's decisions. In the

districts the Tax Collectors' offices were controlled by the Japanese gendarmerie or other agencies. In some cases they had to submit their books daily for inspection to the gendarmerie, whose approval had to be obtained for the disbursement of any moneys on public objects such as police, justice, education, etc. Any case of remittance of taxes to the "hostile party" at Chinchow was to be at once reported to the Japanese authorities. At the same time a Financial Re-adjustment Committee was organized, the chief business of which was to re-organise the taxation system. Japanese representatives and the representatives of Chinese guilds were allowed to take part in discussions on taxation. According to a statement in the "History of the Independence of Manchukuo," dated May 30, 1932, and submitted to the Commission by the "Department of Foreign Affairs" at Changchun, those discussions led to the abolition on November 16, 1931, of six taxes, the reduction of four others by half, the transfer of eight others to local governments, and the prohibition of all levies, without a legal basis.

Board of Industry established, October 21.

On October 21 the Board of Industry was opened by the Committee whose name was now changed to that of "Liaoning Province Self-Government Office." The consent of the Japanese military authorities was sought and obtained and a number of Japanese advisers were appointed. Before issuing any orders the Director was required to obtain the approval of the Japanese military authorities.

Northeastern Communications Committee.

Lastly, the Liaoning Self-Government Office organized a new Northeastern Communications Committee which gradually assumed control of various railways not only in Liaoning Province but also in Kirin and Heilungkiang. This Committee was separated from the Liaoning Self-Government Office on November 1.

Declaration of November 7 and establishment of a Provincial Government on November 10.

On November 7 the Liaoning Province Self-Government Office transformed itself into the Liaoning Provincial Government *ad interim*, which issued a declaration by which it severed its relations with the former Northeastern Government and with the Central Government at Nanking. It requested the local governments in Liaoning to abide by the decrees it had issued, and announced that henceforth it would exercise the authority of a Provincial Government. On November 10 a public opening ceremony took place.

Appointment of Supreme Advisory Board.

Simultaneously with the transformation of the Self-Government Office into the Liaoning Provincial Government *ad interim*, a Supreme Advisory Board was inaugurated under the Chairmanship of Mr. Yu Chung-han, who had been Vice-Director of the Peace and Order Maintenance Committee. Mr. Yu announced the objects of this Board as: the maintenance of order, the improvement of administration by the suppression of bad taxes, the reduction of taxation, and the improvement of the organisation of production and sale. The Board was, furthermore, to direct and supervise the acting Provincial Government, and to foster the development of local self-government in accordance with the traditions of local communities and with modern needs. It comprised sections dealing with General Affairs, Investigation, Protocol, Guidance, Supervision, and an Institute for Training in Self-Government. Nearly all the important functionaries were Japanese.

Name of Province changed to Fengtien on November 20 and General Tsang Shih-yi installed as Governor on December 15.

On November 20 the name of the Province was changed to that of Fengtien, which had been its name before its union with Nationalist China in 1928, and on December 15 Mr. Yuan Chin-kai was replaced by General Tsang Shih-yi, who was released from his confinement and installed as Governor of Fengtien Province.

(2) Kirin Province.

The task of establishing a provincial Government in the Province of Kirin was far easier. On the 23rd the Commander of the 2nd Division, Major-General Tamon, had an interview with Lieut.-General Hsi Hsia, the acting head of the provincial administration in the absence of General Chang Tso-hsiang, and invited him to assume the chairmanship of the Provincial Government. After this interview General Hsi Hsia summoned the various government organisations and public associations to a meeting on September 25 which was also attended by Japanese military officers. No opposition was expressed to the idea of establishing a new provincial government, and a proclamation to that effect was published on September 30. The Organic Law of the new Provincial Government of Kirin was subsequently announced. The Committee system of government was abolished, and Governor Hsi Hsia took full responsibility for the conduct of government. Some days later the principal officials of the new Government were appointed by him and some Japanese functionaries were added later. The chief of the Bureau of General Affairs was a Japanese. In the districts also some administrative reorganisation and change of personnel took place. Out of 43 districts 15 were reorganised, which involved

the dismissal of the Chinese District Officers. In 10 others the District Officers were retained after declaring their allegiance to General Hsi Hsia. The others still remained under Chinese military leaders loyal to the old regime, or kept aloof from the contending factions.

(3) The Special Administrative District of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Chief Administrator of the Special District, Lieut. General Chang Ching-hui, was friendly to the Japanese. He had no military force behind him, whereas the old regime could still dispose of considerable forces both in Kirin and Heilungkiang, as well as the railway guards in the Special District itself. On September 27 he summoned a conference in his office at Harbin to discuss the organisation of the Emergency Committee of the Special District. This Committee was formed with General Chang as Chairman and eight other members, amongst whom were General Wang Jui-hwa and General Ting Chao, who later, in January, 1932, became the leader of the "anti-Kirin" forces, in opposition to General Hsi Hsia. On November 5 the anti-Kirin army under the command of the Generals of Chang Tso-hsiang, established a new Kirin Provincial Government at Harbin. After General Chang Ching-hui had been appointed, on January 1, 1932, Governor of Heilungkiang, he declared in that capacity the independence of the Province on January 7. On January 29 General Ting Chao took possession of the office of the Chief Administrator and placed General Chang under restraint in his own house. The latter regained his liberty when the Japanese forces came north and occupied Harbin on February 5 after defeating General Ting Chao. From that time onwards the Japanese influence made itself increasingly felt in the Special District.

(4) Heilungkiang.

In Heilungkiang Province a more complicated situation had arisen owing to the conflict between General Chang Hai-peng and General Ma Chan-shan, which was described in the last chapter. After the occupation of Tsitsihar by the Japanese on November 19 a Self-Government Association of the usual type was established, and this Association, which was said to represent the will of the people, invited General Chang Ching-hui, of the Special District, to act concurrently as Governor of Heilungkiang. As the situation around Harbin was still unsettled, and no definite agreement with General Ma had been reached, this invitation was not accepted until early in January, 1932. Even then General Ma's attitude was ambiguous for some time. He co-operated with General Ting Chao until the latter's defeat in February, and then came to terms with the Japanese accepting the Governorship of Heilungkiang out of General Chang's hands, and subsequently co-operated with the other Governors in

the establishment of the new "State". A Self-Government Guiding Committee was established at Tsitsihar on January 25 and the same form of Provincial Government as in the other Provinces was gradually established.

(5) Jehol.

The Province of Jehol has hitherto kept aloof from the political changes which have taken place in Manchuria. Jehol is part of Inner Mongolia. Over 3,000,000 Chinese settlers now live in the Province and they are gradually pushing out to the north the nomadic Mongols, who still live under their traditional tribal or Banner system. These Mongols, who are said to number about one million, have maintained some relations with the Mongol Banners settled in the west of Fengtien Province. The Mongols in Fengtien and Jehol have formed "Leagues" the most influential of which is the Cherim League. The Cherim League joined the Independence movement, as did also the Mongols in the Barga District, or Hulunbuir, in the west of Heilungkiang, who have often attempted to free themselves from Chinese rule. The Mongols do not easily assimilate with the Chinese. They are a proud race, and every Mongol remembers the exploits of Genghis Khan and the conquest of China by Mongol warriors. They resent Chinese overlordship and they resent particularly the immigration of Chinese settlers, by which they are being gradually extruded from their territory. The Leagues of Chaota and Chosatu in Jehol are keeping in touch with the Banners in Fengtien, which are now ruled by committees. General Tang Ju-lin, the Governor of the Province, is reported to have assumed full responsibility for his Province on September 29 and to have kept in touch with his colleagues in Manchuria. At the inauguration of "Manchukuo" on March 9, Jehol was included in the new "State". In fact, however, no decisive step was taken by the Government of the Province. The latest events in this Province were referred to at the end of the last chapter.

The creation of an "Independent State."

The local self-governing administrations thus established in all the Provinces were subsequently combined into a separate and independent "State." To understand the ease with which this was accomplished and the amount of evidence which it has been possible to bring forward of Chinese support for it when it was accomplished, it is necessary to consider a peculiar feature of Chinese organised life which in some circumstances is a strength and in others a weakness. As has been already stated in Chapter I, the community obligations recognised by the Chinese are rather to the family, to a locality, or to persons, than to the State. Patriotism as it is understood in the West is only beginning to be felt. Guilds, associations, leagues, armies, are all accustomed to follow certain individual leaders. If, therefore, the support of a particular leader can be secured

by persuasion or coercion, the support of his adherents over the whole area of his influence follows as a matter of course. The foregoing narrative of events shows how successfully this Chinese characteristic was utilised in the organisation of the Provincial Governments, and the agency of the same few individuals was used to complete the final stage.

The Self-Government Guiding Board.

The chief agency in bringing about independence was the Self-Government Guiding Board, which had its central office in Mukden. By reliable witnesses it was stated to the Commission to have been organised and in large part officered by Japanese, although its chief was a Chinese, and to have functioned as an organ of the Fourth Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Its main purpose was to foster the independence movement. Under the direction and supervision of this Central Board, local Self-Government Executive Committees were formed in the districts of Fengtien Province. To those various districts, as occasion demanded, the Central Board sent out members from its large and experienced staff of inspectors, directors and lecturers, many of whom were Japanese. It utilised also a newspaper, which it edited and published.

The proclamation of the Self-Government Guiding Board, Mukden, January 7.

The nature of the instructions given by the Central Board is apparent from the proclamation which it issued as early as January 7, under date of January 1. The proclamation stated that the Northeast was faced with the need of developing, without delay, a great popular movement for the establishment of a new independent State in Manchuria and Mongolia. It described the development of its work in various districts in Fengtien Province and outlined its plan for the extension of its activities to the remaining districts and even to the other Provinces. It then appealed to the people of the Northeast to overthrow Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, to join the Self-Government Association, to co-operate in setting up a clean administration and improving the living conditions of the people, and it ended with the words: "Organisations of the North, East, Unite! Towards the new State! Towards Independence!" Of this proclamation fifty thousand copies were distributed.

Plans of the Chief of the Board in January.

As early as January, also, the Chief of the Self-Government Guiding Board, Mr. Yu Chung-han, was already making plans, together with Governor Tsang Chih-yi, for the new "State" which, it was reported, was to be established on February 10. But the Harbin outbreak of January 29, and General Ma's ambiguous attitude during the conflict with Ting Chao,

appear to have been the main reasons for the temporary postponement of further preparations at that time.

The Mukden Conference, February 16-17.

Later, after Ting Chao's defeat, negotiations between Lieut.-General Chang Ching-hui and General Ma had brought about, on February 14, a settlement according to which General Ma was to become Governor of Heilungkiang. The meeting at which the foundation of the new State was to be arranged was held on February 16 and 17 at Mukden. The Governors of the Three Provinces and the Spécial District were present in person, as well as Dr. Chao Hsin-po, who had played a prominent part in all the preparatory work.

At a meeting of these five men it was decided that a new State should be established, that a Northeastern Administrative Council should be organised which would exercise temporarily the supreme authority over the Provinces and the Spécial District, and, finally, that this Supreme Council should, without delay, make all necessary preparations for the founding of the new "State." On the second day of the Conference, two Mongol Princes attended, one representing the Barga District (Hulunbuir) in western Heilungkiang, the other, Prince Chiwang of the Cherim Leagues, representing practically all Banners, who respect this Prince more than any other leader.

The Supreme Administrative Council, February 17.

The Supreme Administrative Council was constituted the same day. Its members were Lieut.-General Chang Ching-hui, Chairman of the Council, the Governors of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, and Prince Chiwang and Prince Ling Sheng for the Mongolian districts. The first decisions of the Council were: to adopt the republican system for the new "State"; to respect the autonomy of the constituting Provinces; to give the title of "Regent" to the Chief Executive, and to issue a Declaration of Independence, to be signed by the Governors of the four Provinces and the Spécial District, by Prince Chiwang for all the Banners, and by Prince Kueifu for Hulunbuir in Heilungkiang. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army gave that night an official dinner in honour of the "Heads of the new State," whom he congratulated on their success and assured of his assistance in case of need.

Declaration of Independence, February 18.

The Declaration of Independence was published on February 18. It referred to the ardent wishes of the people to have permanent peace and to the duty of the Governors, who were said to have been chosen by the people, to fulfil those wishes. The Declaration referred to the necessity of the establishment of a new State, and claimed that the Northeastern

Administrative Council had been constituted for this purpose. Now that relations with the Kuomintang and the Government at Nanking had been severed, the people were promised the enjoyment of good government. This declaration was sent by circular wire to all places in Manchuria. Governor Ma and Governor Hsi Hsia then returned to their respective provincial capitals, but they designated representatives to meet Governor Tsang Shih-yi, Governor Chang Ching-hui, and Mayor Chao Hsin-po for the purpose of working out the details of the plan.

Plans for the "New State."

In a subsequent meeting held by this group, on February 19, it was decided to establish a Republic, to lay down the principle of the separation of powers in the Constitution, and to ask the former Emperor Hsuan-Tung to become the Chief Executive. In the following days it was decided that the capital should be Changchun; the new era of government was to be styled "Tatung" (Great Harmony), and the design of the national flag was fixed. Notification of the decisions taken was sent, on February 25, to all provincial governments, including Jehol, as well as to the Mongol administrative offices of Hulunbair and of the Cherim, Chaota and Chosatu Leagues. The last-named Leagues are established in Jehol. They could, therefore as already stated, take no steps against the wishes of the Chairman of the Government of that Province.

The State Foundation Acceleration Movement.

After the Declaration of Independence and the announcement of the plans for the new State, the Self-Government Guiding Board took the leading part in organising popular manifestations of support. It was instrumental in forming societies for the "Acceleration of the Foundation of the New State." It instructed its branches in the various districts throughout Fengtien, the Self-Government Executive Committees, to do everything possible to strengthen and hasten the independence movement. In consequence, the new "Acceleration" societies sprang up rapidly centering around the Self Government Executive Committees.

From February 20 onwards, these newly-formed "Acceleration Societies" became active. Posters were prepared, slogans printed, books and pamphlets issued, a "Northeastern Civilisation Half-Monthly" was edited and red scrolls were distributed. Leaflets were sent by post to various prominent citizens asking them to help the propaganda work. At Mukden the scrolls were distributed by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, to be placed on the door-posts.

The organisation of popular approval of independence.

During the same time the Self-Government Executive Committees in the districts summoned meetings of popular representatives, such as

members of the local gentry, and the Chairman and prominent members of commercial, agricultural, industrial and educational associations. In addition, mass meetings were organised and parades or processions were conducted through the principal streets of the district capitals. Resolutions expressing the wishes either of the people in general or of special groups were passed at conferences of prominent local men and at the mass meetings, in which it was claimed many thousands of persons took part. These resolutions were naturally sent to the Self-Government Guiding Board at Mukden.

The Mukden resolutions favouring a New State, February 28.

After the Acceleration Societies and the Self-Government Executive Committees had been active in various districts of Fengtien, a provincial convention was organised at Mukden to give concrete evidence of the general desire of the people for the establishment of the State. Accordingly, on February 28, a meeting was held in which about 600 persons took part, including all the district officers of the Province and the representatives of nearly all classes and organisations. This meeting issued a declaration which stated that it expressed the joy of the 16,000,000 inhabitants of Fengtien Province at the downfall of the old oppressive military caste and the dawn of a new era. As far as Fengtien was concerned, the movement had thus been brought to a conclusion.

The Independence Movement in Kirin Province.

The movement in Kirin Province in favour of a new State was also organised and directed. While in the Conference at Mukden on February 16, Governor Hsi Hsia sent a circular telegram to his District Officers asking them to enlighten him as to public opinion in regard to the policy to be followed by the new State. The District Officers were enjoined to give adequate guidance to the various guilds and associations in their districts. In direct response to the telegram, independence movements sprang up everywhere. On February 20, the Kirin Provincial Government created the State Foundation Committee, which was to guide the various organisations in conducting their independence campaigns. On February 24, the People's Association at Changchun held a mass meeting in which about 4,000 persons are reported to have taken part. They demanded the acceleration of the foundation of the new "State." Similar meetings were held in other districts and also in Harbin. On February 25, the mass meeting for the whole Province was held at the city of Kirin. About ten thousand persons were reported to have been present. A declaration was duly issued similar to that passed at Mukden on February 28.

In Heilungkiang Province.

In Heilungkiang Province, the Mukden Self-Government Guidance Board played an important part. On January 7, after General Ching

Ching-hui had accepted the governorship of Heilungkiang, he declared the Province to be independent.

The Board lent its assistance in conducting the acceleration movement in Heilungkiang. Four directing officers, two of whom were Japanese, were despatched from Mukden to Tsitsihar. Two days after their arrival, on February 22, they convened a meeting in the reception hall of the Government House, in which a large number of associations were represented. It was a Pan-Heilungkiang Conference, which was to decide upon the methods of preparing for the establishment of the State. It was resolved to hold a mass demonstration on February 24.

Many thousands of persons took part in the mass demonstration at Tsitsihar, which was covered with posters, scrolls, streamers and pennants in commemoration of the event. The Japanese artillery fired 101 guns in honour of the day. Japanese planes circled overhead, dropping down leaflets. A declaration was promptly issued which favoured a republican form of government, with a responsible cabinet and a president as the head of the State. All powers were to be concentrated in the Central Government, and the provincial governments were to be abolished, leaving districts and municipalities as the units of local government.

By the end of February, Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and the Special District had passed the stages of district and provincial declarations. The Mongol Banners had also given their allegiance to the new State, since it was known that it would mark off special autonomous Mongol districts and would in other ways guarantee the rights of the Mongol inhabitants. The Mohammedans had already, at a meeting on February 15, at Mukden, pledged their allegiance. The majority of the small number of unassimilated Manchus were also in favour of the new "State" as soon as it had become known that their former Emperor would probably be offered the post of Chief Executive.

The All-Manchuria Convention, Mukden, February 29.

After the districts and provinces had given formal support to the plan of a new State, the Self-Government Guiding Board took the lead in convening an All-Manchuria Convention which was held at Mukden on February 29. There were present official delegates from the provinces, the districts of Fengtien Province and the Mongol territories, and, in addition, many others, including representatives of various groups, such as the Koreans in Kirin Province and the Special District, and the branches of the Youth League of Manchuria and Mongolia: altogether over 700 persons.

Speeches were delivered and a declaration and resolution were un-animously approved, the former denouncing the previous regime, the latter welcoming the new "State." A second resolution was also adopted designating as the provisional President of the new State the former Emperor Hsuan Teng now known by his personal name as Mr. Henry Pu-yi

Mr. Henry Pu-yi, the former Emperor, accepts the headship of "Manchukuo."

The Northeastern Administrative Council met at once in urgent session and elected six delegates to proceed to Port Arthur, to convey their invitation to the former Emperor at Port Arthur, where he had been residing since he left Tientsin in the previous November. Mr. Pu-yi at first declined it, but on March 4 a second delegation comprising twenty-nine delegates obtained his consent to accept the post for one year only. Then the Administrative Council elected its chairman, Lieut.-General Chang Ching-hui, and nine others, to be the Reception Committee. On March 5, the Committee went to Port Arthur and was received in audience. In response to its request the former Emperor, on March 6, left Port Arthur for Tangkangtze, and after two days began, on the 8th, to receive homage as the Regent of "Manchukuo."

The inauguration ceremonies, Changchun, March 9.

The inauguration ceremonies were held at the new capital, Changchun, on March 9. Mr. Pu-yi, as Regent, made a declaration in which he promised to found the policy of the new State upon the basis of "morality, benevolence and love." On the 10th, the principal members of the Government were appointed; the members of the Cabinet, the Presidents of the Board of Legislation and the Board of Control; the President and Vice-President and Councillors of the Privy Council, the Governors of the Provinces and of the Special District, the Commanders of the Defence Forces of the Provinces, and some other high officials. A notice regarding the establishment of "Manchukuo" was issued by telegram on March 12 to the Foreign Powers. The declared purpose of this notice was to communicate to the Foreign Powers the fundamental object of the formation of "Manchukuo"; and its principles of foreign policy; and the request that they recognise it as a new State.

Prior to the arrival of the Regent, a number of laws and regulations, on which Dr. Chao Hsin-po had been working for some time, had been made ready for adoption and promulgation. They came into force on March 9, simultaneously with the law regulating the organisation of the Government, while the laws which theretofore had been in effect, insofar as they were not in conflict with the new laws, or with the fundamental policy of the State, were provisionally adopted by special ordinance of the same date.

Sources of Information.

This narrative of the stages by which the "State of Manchukuo" was created has been compiled from all the sources of information available. The events were reported at length, as they occurred, in Japanese newspapers, and most fully, perhaps, in the columns of the Japanese edited

Manchuria Daily News. The two documents entitled "Histoire de l'Independance du Mandchoukouo—Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres du Mandchoukouo" and "A General Outline of Manchukuo,—Department of Foreign Affairs, Manchukuo," which were prepared at Changchun on May 30 by the present administration; and the "Memorandum on the so-called Independence Movement in the Three Eastern Provinces," prepared by the Chinese Assessor, have also been carefully studied. In addition, wherever possible, neutral sources of information were utilised.

Civil Administration since September 18.

The measures of civil administration taken by the Japanese military authorities between September 18 and the establishment of the "Manchukuo Government," notably the control of the Banks, the administration of the public utility services and the management of the railways, indicated that from the commencement of the operations objects more permanent than the requirements of a temporary military occupation were being pursued. Immediately after the occupation of Mukden, on September 19, guards were placed in or in front of all Chinese banks, railway offices, the administrative offices of public utility services, the office of the Mining Administration, and similar premises. Investigations were then conducted into the financial and general situation of these enterprises. When they were allowed to re-open, Japanese were appointed as advisors, experts, or secretaries to officials, usually with administrative powers. Many business enterprises were owned by the former administration of the Three Eastern Provinces, as well as by the provincial administrations; and as the previous Government was regarded as an enemy Government in time of war, no bank, no mining, agricultural or industrial enterprise, no railway offices, no public utility—in fact, no single source of revenue in which they had been interested in either their public or private capacities, was left without supervision.

Railways.

As regards railways, the measures taken by the Japanese authorities from the outset of the period of military occupation were designed to settle definitely, in a manner favourable to Japanese interests, some of the questions which had long been in dispute between the Chinese and Japanese railways, and which have been described in Chapter III. The following measures were promptly taken:

1. All the Chinese-owned railways north of the Great Wall, and the moneys standing to their credit in banks in Manchuria, were seized.
2. In order that the railways might be co-ordinated with the South Manchuria Railway, certain changes were made in the arrangement of tracks in and around Mukden, by cutting the tracks of the Peiping-Mukde Railway at the viaduct under the South Manchuria Railway, thus closing the Liaoning

Central station, the Fengtien East station, the Fengtien North GMD station, and thus severing the connection with the Chinese Government railway to Kirin (later replaced).

3. At Kirin a physical connection was made between the Hailun-Kirin line and the Kirin-Tunhus and Kirin-Changchun railways.
4. A staff of Japanese technical advisors was installed in various departments of the railways.
5. The "special rates" adopted by the Chinese authorities were abolished and the original tariffs restored, thus bringing freight rates on Chinese railways more into conformity with those of the South Manchuria Railway.

During the period between September 18, when the North Eastern Communications Committee ceased to function, and the date of the creation of the "Manchukuo Ministry of Communications," the Japanese authorities assumed entire responsibility for the administration of the railways.

Other public utilities.

Measures of a similar kind, which went beyond those which were necessary for the protection of the lives and property of their nationals, were taken by the Japanese in respect of the public electricity supplies at Mukden and Antung. Also, in the period between September 18 and the establishment of "Manchukuo," the Japanese authorities made changes in the administration and management of the Chinese Government telephone, telegraph and wireless services which would ensure their intimate co-ordination with the Japanese telephone and telegraph services in Manchuria.

Conclusions.

Since September 18, 1931, the activities of the Japanese military authorities, in civil as well as in military matters, were marked by essentially political considerations. The progressive military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces removed in succession from the control of the Chinese authorities the towns of Tsitsihar, Chinchow and Harbin, finally all the important towns of Manchuria; and following each occupation the civil administration was reorganised. It is clear that the Independence Movement which had never been heard of in Manchuria before September, 1931, was only made possible by the presence of the Japanese troops.

A group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired, who were in close touch with the new political movement in Japan to which reference was made in Chapter IV, conceived, organised and carried through this movement, as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of September 18.

With this object they made use of the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals, and took advantage of certain minorities among the inhabitants, who had grievances against the former administration.

It is also clear that the Japanese General Staff realised from the start, or at least in a short time, the use which could be made of such an autonomy movement. In consequence they provided assistance and gave direction to the organisers of the movement.

The evidence received from all sources has satisfied the Commission that while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of "Manchukuo" the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which, in our judgment, the new State could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military.

For this reason the present regime cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement.

Part II.

The Present Government of "Manchukuo."

The Organic Law.

"Manchukuo" is governed in accordance with an Organic Law and a Guarantee Law of Civil Rights. The Organic Law prescribes the fundamental organisation of the Governmental organs. It was promulgated by Ordinance No. 1 issued on March 9, the first year of Tatung (1932).

The Regent is head of the State. All executive power is vested in him, and he has also the authority to overrule the Legislative Council. He is assisted by a Privy Council, which is to advise him upon important affairs.

A characteristic feature of the Organic Law is the separation of governmental power into four divisions or departments: the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial and the Supervisory.

The Executive Department.

The functions of the Executive department are carried out, under the direction of the Regent, by the Premier and the Ministers of State, who together form a State Council or Cabinet. The Premier supervises the work of the Ministries, and, through the powerful Board of General Affairs, has direct charge of their confidential matters, personnel, accounting and supplies. Subordinate to the State Council are various bureaux, especially the important Advisory Bureau and the Legislative Bureau. Executive power is thus largely concentrated in the hands of the Premier and the Regent.

The Legislative Department.

The legislative power is vested in the Legislative Council. Its approval will be necessary for all laws and revenue acts. But should it reject any Bill, the Regent may ask the Council to reconsider its decision, and

if it should again reject it, the Regent, after consulting the Privy Council, shall decide the matter. At present, however, no law has yet been passed for the organisation of the Council, with the result that laws are drafted by the State Council and become effective after the Privy Council has been consulted and the approval of the Regent has been obtained. So long as the Legislative Council is not organised, the Premier's position is predominant.

The Judicial Department.

The judiciary comprises a number of law courts, divided into three grades, the Supreme Court, Higher Courts, and District Courts.

The Supervisory Department.

The Supervisory Council supervises the conduct of officials, and audits their accounts. The members of the Council may not be dismissed except for a criminal offence or disciplinary punishment, and may not be subjected to suspension or transfer of office, or reduction of salary, against their wishes.

Provinces and Special Districts.

For purposes of local government, "Manchukuo" is divided into five provinces and two special districts. The provinces are Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Jehol, and Hsin-An or Hsingan. The last-named, which contains the Mongol districts, is sub-divided into three areas or Sub-Provinces, so as to conform to the traditional Banner system and the union of Banners into Leagues. The special districts are the old Chinese Eastern Railway, or Harbin district, and the newly-established Chientao, or Korean district. By means of this administrative division the important minorities, Mongols, Koreans and Russians, are to be guaranteed, as far as possible, special administration in conformity with their needs. Although the Commission made several requests to be shown a map of the area claimed to be included in the "State of Manchukuo," this was not provided, but a letter was received giving the boundaries of the "State" as follows:

"The new State is bounded on the south by the Great Wall, and the Mongol Leagues and Banners in the same comprise Hulinbuir and the Leagues of Cherim, Chaota and Chosatu and their Banners."

At the head of the provinces are Civil Governors. But since it is desired to concentrate executive power in the central Government, they are to be given no authority over either troops or finance. In the provinces, as well as in the Central Government, the General Affairs Department holds a controlling position. It is in charge of confidential matters, of personnel, accounting, correspondence, and matters which do not come under other departments.

Districts and Municipalities.

Provinces are divided into districts. These are administered largely by district Self-Government offices, which have under their direction various governmental departments, particularly that of General Affairs. Municipal governments exist at Mukden, Harbin, and Changchun. At Harbin, however, it is planned to create a Greater Harbin which will include both the Russian and the Chinese cities. The Special Railway District is to be abolished. Part of it will be included in Greater Harbin, and the remainder, stretching east and west along the Chinese Eastern Railway, is to be added to Heilungkiang and Kirin Provinces.

The "Government of Manchukuo" regards the provinces as administrative areas, and the districts and the municipalities as units of finance. It determines the amount of their taxes and passes upon the budget. All local revenues must be paid into the central treasury which will then supervise the proper disbursement. These revenues may not be retained, in whole or in part, by the local authorities, as was customary under the old regime. Naturally, this system has not as yet been brought into satisfactory operation.

Japanese officials and advisers.

In the "Government of Manchukuo" Japanese officials are prominent, and Japanese advisers are attached to all important Departments. Although the Premier and his Ministers are all Chinese, the heads of the various Boards of General Affairs, which in the organisation of the new State exercise the greatest measure of actual power, are Japanese. First they were designated as advisers, but more recently those holding the most important posts have been made full Government officials on the same basis as the Chinese. In the central government alone, not including those in local governments or in the War Office and the military forces, or in government enterprises, nearly 200 Japanese are "Manchukuo" officials.

Japanese control the Board of General Affairs and the Legislative and Advisory Bureaux, which in practice constitute a Premier's office, the General Affairs Department in the Ministries and in the Provincial Governments, and the Self-Government Directing Committees in the Districts, and the police departments in the Provinces of Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang. In most bureaux, moreover, there are Japanese advisers, councillors and secretaries.

There are also many Japanese in the railway offices and in the Central Bank. In the Supervisory Council Japanese hold the posts of Chief of the Bureau of General Affairs, Chief of the Control Bureau, and Chief of the Auditing Board. In the Legislative Council the Chief Secretary is a Japanese. Finally, some of the most important officials of the Regent are

Japanese, including the Chief of the Office of Internal Affairs, and the Commander of the Regent's bodyguard.¹

The aims of the Government.

The aim of the Government, as expressed in the proclamation of the Northeastern Administrative Committee of February 18 and of the "Government of Manchukuo" of March 1, is to rule in accordance with the fundamental principle of "Wang Tao." It is difficult to find an exact English equivalent for this phrase. The interpreters provided by the "Manchukuo" authorities translated it "love," but scholars give the meaning as the "kingly way" which may have many shades of meaning; which according to Chinese tradition, has been of old the basis of a good administration, sincerely concerned with the welfare of the people. Traditionally, the Chinese have used the expression "Wang Tao" as antithetical to "Pa Tao," which latter expression as discussed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his "San Min Chu Yi" (Three Peoples' Principles), connotes reliance upon physical force and compulsion. Sun Yat-sen explained that "Wang Tao," therefore, was the antithesis of "Might makes right."

The policy of the Self-Government Guiding Board, the chief agency in the creation of the new Government, was continued by the Advisory Bureau, which had superseded it. Military officers were not to be allowed to interfere in matters of administration. Regulations governing the qualifications for government service are to be enacted, and appointments are to be made on the basis of the ability of the candidates.

Taxation.

Taxation is to be reduced and placed on a legal basis, and reformed in accordance with sound principles of economics and administration. Direct taxes are to be transferred to the District and Municipal Governments, while the Central Government is to secure the income derived from indirect taxes.

The documents supplied by the Changchun authorities state that a number of taxes have already been abolished, while others have been reduced. Hopes are expressed that readjustment of Government enterprises and Government-owned resources will increase revenue, and that the eventual reduction of the military forces will lessen expenditure. However, for the time being, the financial position of the new State is unsatisfactory. Guerilla warfare has kept military expenditure high, while, at the same time, the Government is not receiving revenues from various normal sources. Expenditure for the first year is now roughly estimated at \$85,000,000, against revenue \$65,000,000, showing a deficit of

¹The more important appointments have meanwhile been announced in the "Manchukuo Government Gazette."

\$20,000,000; which is intended to cover by a loan from the newly established Central Bank, as explained hereafter.¹

The Government declares its intentions, as financial conditions improve, to spend as much as possible of its revenue upon education, public welfare, and development of the country, including reclamation of waste land, exploitation of mineral and forestry resources, and extension of the system of communications. It states that it will welcome foreign financial assistance in the development of the country, and that it will adhere to the principles of Equal Opportunity and of the Open Door.

Education.

The Government has already begun to re-open primary and secondary schools, and it intends to train a large number of teachers who will thoroughly understand the spirit and policies of the new State. A new curriculum is to be adopted, new textbooks compiled, and all anti-foreign education abolished. The new educational system will aim to improve primary schools and to stress vocational education, the training of the primary school teachers, and the teaching of sound ideas as to sanitary living. The teaching of English and Japanese is to be compulsory in the middle schools and of Japanese is to be voluntary in the Primary Schools.

Justice and police.

The "Manchukuo" authorities have decided that in the domain of justice, the interference of administrative authorities should not be tolerated. The status of judicial officers is guaranteed by the law, and their salaries are to be adequate. The qualifications for judicial positions will be raised. Extraterritorial rights, for the time being, will be respected, but the Government intends to start negotiations with Foreign Powers for their abolition as soon as adequate reforms in the present system shall have been effected. The police are to be properly selected, trained and paid, and completely separated from the army, which is not to be allowed to usurp police functions.

The army.

Reorganisation of the army is planned, but since at present it consists largely of the old Manchurian soldiery, caution is felt to be necessary in order to avoid increasing discontent and mutiny.

"Manchukuo" Central Bank opened its head offices in Changchun and branches in many other Manchurian cities on July 1, 1932.

The Central Bank of "Manchukuo" was established on June 14 and officially opened its doors for business on July 1. The Bank has its head

¹ See Special Study No. 4 annexed to the Report.

offices in Changchun, the capital of "Manchukuo" and branches and sub-branches to the number of 170 in most of the cities of Manchuria.

The Bank was organized as a Joint Stock Company with a charter to run for thirty years. Its first officers were Chinese and Japanese bankers and financiers. It was empowered to "regulate the circulation of the domestic currency, maintain its stability and control the financing service". The capital of the Bank was authorized at \$30,000,000 (silver) and permission was given it to issue notes against a specie reserve of at least 30%.

The Central Bank absorbed all of the old provincial banks including the Frontier Bank.

The old provincial banks, including the Frontier Bank, were amalgamated with the new Central Bank and their entire businesses, including affiliated enterprises, were turned over to it. Provision was further made for liquidating the non-Manchurian branches of the old provincial banks.

New currency to be based on the silver dollar but whether it will be convertible is not clear.

In addition to what it will be able to salvage from the old banks, the Central Bank has a Japanese loan reported at 'Yen 20,000,000' and a subscription to its capital of \$7,500,000 (silver) from the "Manchukuo" government on which to establish itself.² The Bank has planned to unify all the Manchurian currencies by redeeming them for new notes at rates which have been officially prescribed as from July 1, 1932. These notes are based on the silver dollar and are to be covered to the extent of at least 30% by silver, gold, foreign currency or deposits. Whether or not the new currency is to be convertible on demand and without limit into hard money is not made clear in official pronouncements. The old notes will be permitted to circulate for two years from the passage of the Conversion Act but will not be valid after that time.

Present Manchurian currencies essentially what they were prior to September, 1931.

The order for the new Central Bank notes has been placed with the Japanese Government but thus far neither the notes nor the new hard money are in circulation. The present currencies of Manchuria remain what they were prior to September 18, 1931, with the exception that the

¹ It is quite possible that this was intended to be "yuan."

² According to the preliminary budget furnished the Commission by the "Manchukuo" Finance Minister on May 5, 1932.

notes are being surcharged with the signature of Mr. Yung-hou (the president of the new Central Bank) as they pass through the various banks.

"Manchukuo's" unification programme based on inadequate supply of hard money.

It is not clear how the new "Manchukuo" Bank can hope to accomplish its ambitious programme of unifying and stabilising all Manchurian currencies with the limited amount of capital at its disposal. The resources inherited from the old provincial banking institutions with the addition of a loan from Japanese banks and a subscription to its capital from the "Manchukuo" Government, seem entirely inadequate for the purpose. Moreover, it is not clear on what basis the financial relations between the Bank and the "Manchukuo Government" will be established. According to the preliminary "Manchukuo" budget supplied to the Commission by the Finance Minister, "Manchukuo" expects to face a deficit of over 20,000,000 Yuan¹ during its first year of existence. According to the Minister, this was to be covered by a loan from the Central Bank (not then in existence). A Government which subscribes 7,500,000 Yuan to its bank and then borrows over 20,000,000 Yuan from it to balance its budget is not establishing either its central bank or its budget on a sound financial basis.

Central Bank more likely to unify the currencies than to make them convertible.

Unless the Central Bank can obtain more actual hard money than it now appears to possess, it can hardly hope to unify and stabilize all Manchurian currencies on a *convertible* silver dollar basis. Even if it were to succeed in creating a currency which was uniform though not convertible it would possibly have accomplished something, but even a uniform currency, the stability of which is not guaranteed by conversion, falls short of the requirements of a sound monetary system.

¹ This and the following items in the budget were given as *Yen* in an interview by the "Manchukuo" Finance Minister with a Commissioner but in the English translation of "A General Outline of Manchukuo" presented by the "Department of Foreign Affairs, Manchukuo," they are given in terms of *Yuan*. The Commission therefore takes the liberty of using *Yuan* rather than *Yen* in its reference to this and the following budgetary items.

The fact that the Chinese symbol for *Yuan* is the same as the one which the Japanese employ for the *Yen* has been a constant source of difficulty in dealing with the English and French translations supplied the Commission by both the Chinese and Japanese.

The Japanese extend their control over the Chinese Public Utility System.

In regard to various public utilities, as well as in regard to the railways, arrangements have been made which have tended to link up the Chinese and Japanese systems. Before the outbreak at Mukden the Japanese were anxious to bring this about, but the Chinese consistently refused to give their consent. Between September 18, however, and the formation of "Manchukuo," steps were at once taken to realise the wishes of the Japanese, as already mentioned in the first section of this chapter. Since the formation of the "new State" the policy of the "Manchukuo Ministry of Communication," seems to be to enter into agreements with the South Manchuria Railway Company for the exploitation of at least some of the main railway lines under its authority.

The Chinese Telephone, Telegraph and Radio Systems.

The Chinese telephone, telegraph and radio systems in Manchuria, being entirely Government-owned, had their own executives, and, in addition were subject to a unified control by the Northeastern Telephone, Telegraph and Radio Administration. Since September 18, all three of these systems have been brought into closer co-operation with existing Japanese systems throughout Manchuria. Moreover, arrangements have been made between the Japanese and the Northeastern Telegraph Administration for through telegrams from or to any place in Manchuria and to or from any place in Kwantung Leased Territory, Japan, Korea, Formosa, and the South Sea Islands. Between the principal centres in North Manchuria and the Japanese post-offices at Dairen, Mukden and Changchun, direct circuit lines have been constructed to ensure the quick transmission of messages.

Japanese "kana"¹ messages have been given especially low rates. To learn to handle Japanese "kana" syllables, special training is being given to the Chinese staff, and it is planned to have Japanese clerks gradually join the Chinese telegraph workers at the chief centres. Thus, every facility has been given to favour telegraphic intercourse between Manchuria and the whole Japanese Empire. Naturally, the commercial connections between the countries are thereby greatly strengthened.

The Salt Gabelle. The Japanese military authorities took control, in September, 1931, of the funds of the Salt Gabelle.

After the events of September 18-19, the Japanese authorities issued orders to the offices and banks in which the revenue of the Salt Gabelle was retained, that no payment from these funds was to be made without their consent.

¹ A Japanese phonetic script.

Supervision over the Salt Gabelle was insisted upon on the ground that the greater part of the revenue from this source, though nominally national, had in fact been retained by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Government. Income from this source, in 1930, had amounted to about \$25,000,000, silver, of which \$24,000,000 had been retained in Manchuria. Only \$1,000,000 had been remitted to the Inspectorate-General of the Salt Gabelle in Shanghai.

**Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang agreed in 1928 to pay
the Manchurian quota.**

After Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had joined the National Government in December, 1928, he agreed to pay the monthly quota of \$86,600 silver which had been fixed as the amount due from Manchuria towards the loans secured on the Salt Gabelle. Somewhat later, in April, 1930, a revised table was announced in which the Manchurian monthly quota was raised to \$217,800. Because of local pressure upon the Manchurian finances, however, Marshal Chang requested a postponement of the new assignment. At the time of the Mukden Incident, his arrears amounted to \$576,200. The first remittance at the new rate of \$217,800 was actually made on September 29, 1931, by consent of the Japanese army officers. Since then, to March, 1932, inclusive, the newly-established authorities in Manchuria have remitted to the Central Government not only these monthly quotas but also the quota arrears left unpaid by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. The surplus from the Salt revenue, however, they regarded as Manchurian, and not National, income, and therefore considered that they were justified in retaining it for local purposes.

**The seizure of Salt funds at Newchwang in October
and November, 1931.**

After the Mukden Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order had been transformed into the Provincial Government *ad interim*, it ordered the District Salt Inspectorate at Newchwang to transfer all its funds to the Provincial Bank for disbursement by the Board of Finance. According to Chinese official reports the Bank of China at Newchwang was, likewise, on October 30, forced to give up the Salt funds on deposit, amounting to \$672,709.56 silver without authority from the original depositors. A receipt was given in the name of the Liaoning Finance Board, which was signed only by the Japanese adviser to that Board.

**The new Kirin Provincial Government also seized
the Salt Revenue.**

The new Kirin Provincial Government took similar steps with regard to the Salt Transportation Office of Kirin and Heilungkiang. According to Chinese official report it demanded the transfer of the Salt revenue to

its provincial treasury. When the Chief of the Office refused, he was detained for some days and replaced by a nominee of Governor Hsi Hsia, who, on October 22, forcibly took possession of the Office, while the Auditorate Office was closed under Governor Hsi Hsia's orders. In this case, too, the Salt funds deposited in the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications were claimed by the new Kirin authorities, and on November 6, were transferred to the Provincial Bank. Since the Salt funds have from time to time been withdrawn and expended by the local authorities, while the monthly quotas have been sent regularly to Shanghai. From October 30, 1931, to August 25, 1932, for which period Chinese official figures are available, Salt revenue amounting to \$14,000,000, silver, was retained in Manchuria.

The Salt Administration throughout Manchuria continued to function, although under the restrictions described and under supervision until March 28, when the Minister of Finance of the "Manchukuo Government" ordered that the deposits, accounts, documents, and other properties belonging to the Inspectorate should be handed over on the following day to the Salt Comptroller of "Manchukuo," and that the collection of Salt revenue, which was originally undertaken by the Bank of China, should be transferred to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces. He stated that those officials who wished to continue their service in the Salt Gabelle Administration of the "Manchukuo" should report their names to the Salt Comptroller's office, and promised that their applications would receive serious consideration provided they first renounced allegiance to the Government of the Republic of China.

The "Government of Manchukuo" took over the administration of the Salt Gabelle.

On April 15, the District Inspectorate at Newchwang was dissolved by force. The Director and Deputy-Director were put out of office. The premises were occupied, and safes and documents, and seals, were seized. The remaining officials were requested to continue their service, but they are all reported to have refused. A number of those who had been in the Salt Administration followed the Director to Tientsin and waited for further instructions from Shanghai. The work of the former Salt Inspectorate in the Three Eastern Provinces was thus completely taken over by the new Comptroller's Office of "Manchukuo". The new "Government," however, has stated that it is prepared to continue to pay its equitable proportion of the sums required for the service of the foreign loans secured on the Salt revenue.

The Customs.

Since the Customs funds collected in Manchuria had always been remitted to the Central Government, the Japanese military authorities did

not interfere with the Customs administration nor with the remittance of funds to Shanghai. Interference with this revenue was first made by the "Manchukuo Government" on the ground that their "State" was independent.

Customs revenue in Manchuria.

One of the first acts of the Northeastern Administrative Committee, which was established on February 17 as the Provincial "Government of Manchukuo," was to instruct the Superintendents of Customs at the Manchurian Treaty ports that although the Customs revenue belonged of right to "Manchukuo" and would, in the future, be under the control of the Committee, for the time being the Superintendents and Commissioners of Customs should carry on their duties as usual. They were informed that a Japanese Customs Adviser had been appointed at each Manchurian port for the purpose of supervising the general Customs administration. The ports concerned were Lungchingsun, Antung, Newchwang and Harbin, together with some sub-stations, at which the revenue collected in 1931 amounted respectively to Hk. Tls. 574,000, 3,682,000, 3,792,000, and 5,272,000. The port of Aigun, which is still outside the sphere of control of the "Manchukuo Government," is functioning under the Chinese Customs Service. The port of Dairen, in the Kwantung Leased Territory, has a distinct status. The fact that the Customs revenue collected in the Manchurian ports, including Dairen, amounted in 1930 to 14.7% and in 1931 to 13.5% of the total for all China, shows the importance of Manchuria in the Chinese Customs Administration.

The procedure by which the "Manchukuo" authorities took over the entire Customs administration in Manchuria, is well illustrated by the action taken at Antung, which has been described as follows by the Inspectorate-General of Customs:

The "Government of Manchukuo" took over the Customs Administration and Revenue, March-June, 1932.

A Japanese Customs Adviser was appointed to the Antung Customs Office in March, but he took no active steps until the middle of June, when he sent definite orders from the "Manchukuo" Ministry of Finance to the Bank of China that Customs funds were no longer to be remitted to Shanghai. On June 16, four armed "Manchukuo" Police, accompanied by the Assistant Superintendent of Police, a Japanese, visited the Bank of China and informed the Manager that they had come to guard the revenue. On June 19 the Bank of China handed over to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces Tls. 783,000, and informed the Commissioner that this action was taken as a result of *force majeure*.

On June 26 and 27 a Japanese Adviser of the "Manchukuo Government" demanded that the Customs House at Antung should be handed over

to him. The Commissioner refused, but "Manchukuo" police, all Japanese subjects, forced the Commissioner to leave the Customs House. The Commissioner, however, still attempted to carry on the Customs work in his home, since eighty per cent. of the Antung Customs revenue is collected in the railway area, hoping that the Japanese authorities would not permit interference within this area. But the "Manchukuo" police entered the Japanese railway area, arrested a number of Customs staff, intimidated the others, and forced the Commissioner to suspend the Chinese Customs Service.

The Customs situation at Dairen.

Until June 7, the Dairen Customs revenue was remitted to Shanghai at intervals of three or four days, but, under date of June 9, the "Manchukuo Government" gave notice that these remittances should no longer be made. When no further funds reached Shanghai, the Inspector-General of Customs took up the matter by telegraph with the Japanese Commissioner at Dairen. As a result the Commissioner refused to send on the Customs receipts on the ground that the Chief of the Foreign Section of the Government of the Japanese Leased Territory had advised him that the remittance of the Customs revenue might severely affect Japanese interests. The Inspector-General therefore, on June 24, dismissed the Dairen Commissioner for insubordination.

The "Manchukuo Government," on June 27, appointed the dismissed Commissioner and the members of his staff as "Manchukuo" officials, to serve in their former positions. It had threatened to establish a new Custom House at Wafangtine, on the frontier of the Leased Territory, if the Japanese authorities should prevent them from taking charge of the Dairen Customs. The Japanese authorities of the Leased Territory did not oppose the passing of the Customs administration into the hands of the newly-appointed "Manchukuo" officials. They maintained that the problem did not concern Japan, but was an issue solely between "Manchukuo" on the one hand and the Government of China and its Dairen Commissioner on the other.

The view of the "Manchukuo Government" regarding the Customs.

The "Manchukuo Government" maintains that, since "Manchukuo" is an independent State, it exercises of right complete jurisdiction over the Customs Administration of its territory. But it has stated that, in view of the fact that various foreign loans and indemnities were based upon the Chinese Customs revenue, it is prepared to pay its equitable proportion of the annual sums necessary to meet these obligations. It hopes that after depositing this amount in the Yokohama Specie Bank, there will be a Customs surplus for 1932-1933 available for local use of about \$19,000,000 silver.

The Postal Administration in Manchuria.

The Japanese military authorities in Manchuria after September 18 did not greatly interfere with the Post Office, apart from exercising a certain censorship of newspapers and letters. After the establishment of "Manchukuo" the "Government" desired to take over the postal services of the territory, and appointed, on April 14, special officers to take charge of the transfer of the postal administration. On April 24, it applied for permission to join the International Post Union for which they have not yet qualified.

As the Postal Commissioners refused to surrender their offices, the *status quo* was for some time respected, altogether "Manchukuo" supervisors were placed in certain offices with a view to exercising a measure of control. The "Manchukuo Government," however, finally decided to issue its own stamps and to discontinue the use of the Chinese stamps. By ordinance of the Ministry of Communications of July 9, it informed the public that the new stamps and cards would be offered for sale on August 1. At this stage the Chinese Government ordered the Postal Commissioners to close the office in Manchuria, and to give the staff the choice of receiving three months' pay or of returning to designated bases in China for service at other places. The "Manchukuo" authorities, in turn offered to take into their service all the postal employees who wished to remain, and promised to guarantee their financial and other rights acquired under the Chinese Administration. On July 26 the "Manchukuo Government" took over completely the postal service throughout Manchuria.

The treatment of private property.

The "Manchukuo Government" has stated that it will respect private property and all concessions awarded by either the Central Government of China or by the former Government of Manchuria, provided the concessions were legally granted in accordance with the laws and regulations previously in force. It has also promised to pay the lawful debts and obligations of the former administration and has appointed a Commission to pass upon claims of indebtedness. In regard to the properties belonging to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and some of the other prominent leaders of the former regime, it is yet too early to state what action will be taken. According to Chinese official reports, all the personal property of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, General Wan Fu-lin, General Pao Yu-lin, and certain others, has been confiscated. The "Manchukuo" authorities, however, take the view that since the former Government officials used their power to amass wealth for themselves, they are not yet prepared to recognise property thus acquired as properly "private property." A careful investigation is being made of the possessions of the former officials. This is reported to have been finished as far as bank deposits are concerned.

Comments.

Having thus described the organisation of the "Manchukuo Government," its programme, and some of the measures it has taken to affirm its independence from China, we must state our conclusions regarding its operations and its principal characteristics.

The programme of this "Government" contains a number of liberal reforms, the application of which would be desirable not only in Manchuria but in the rest of China; in fact, many of these reforms figure equally in the programme of the Chinese Government. In their interviews with the Commission the representatives of this "Government" claimed that with the help of the Japanese they would be able to establish peace and order within a reasonable time, and would thereafter be able to maintain it permanently. They expressed the belief that they would be able to secure the support of the people in time by assuring them an honest and efficient administration, security from bandit raids, lower taxation as the result of reduced military expenditure, currency reform, improved communications and popular political representation.

But after making every allowance for the short time which has hitherto been at the disposal of the "Manchukuo Government" for carrying out its policy, and after paying due regard to the steps already taken, there is no indication that this "Government" will in fact be able to carry out many of its reforms. To mention but one example,¹ there seem to be serious obstacles in the way of the realisation of their budgetary and currency reforms. A thorough programme of reforms, orderly conditions and economic prosperity, could not be realised in the conditions of insecurity and disturbance which existed in 1932.

As regards the "Government" and the public services, although the titular heads of the Departments are Chinese residents in Manchuria, the main political and administrative power rests in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers. The political and administrative organisation of the "Government" is such as to give to these officials and advisers opportunities not merely of giving technical advice but of actually controlling and directing the administration. They are doubtless not under the orders of the Tokyo Government, and their policy has not always coincided with the official policy either of the Japanese Government or of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army. But in the case of all important problems these officials and advisers, some of whom were able to act more or less independently in the first days of the new organisation, have been constrained more and more to follow the direction of Japanese official authority. This authority, in fact, by reason of the occupation of the country by its troops, by the dependence of the "Manchukuo Government" on those troops for

¹ See Special Studies Nos. 4 and 5 annexed to the Report.

the maintenance of its authority both internally and externally, in consequence, too, of the more and more important role entrusted to the South Manchuria Railway Company in the management of the railways under the jurisdiction of the "Manchukuo Government," and finally by the presence of its consuls, as liaison agents, in the most important urban centres, possesses in every contingency the means of exercising an irresistible pressure. The liaison between the "Manchukuo Government" and Japanese official authority is still further emphasised by the recent appointment of a special ambassador, not officially accredited, but resident in the capital of Manchuria, exercising in his capacity of Governor-General of the Kwangtung Leased Territory a control over the South Manchuria Railway Company and concentrating in the same office the authority of a diplomatic representative, the head of the consular service, and commander-in-chief of the Army of Occupation.

The relations between "Manchukuo" and Japan have hitherto been somewhat difficult to define, but the latest information in the possession of the Commission indicates that it is the intention of the Japanese Government to define them before long. A letter dated August 27, 1932, addressed to the Commission by the Japanese Assessor states that the Special Ambassador, General Muto, "left Tokyo on August 20 for Manchuria. On arrival he will commence negotiations for the conclusion of a fundamental treaty concerning the establishment of friendly relations between Japan and Manchuria. The Government of Japan regards the conclusion of this treaty as a formal recognition of Manchukuo."

Part III.

The opinions of the inhabitants of Manchuria:

Attitude of the inhabitants of Manchuria.

It was one of the objects of the Commission to ascertain the attitude of the inhabitants of Manchuria towards the new "State." Owing to the circumstances in which the enquiry had to be made, however, the obtaining of evidence presented some difficulty. The danger, real or supposed, to the Commission from bandits, Korean Communists, or supporters of the new "Government" who might be angered by the presence of the Chinese Assessor on account of his criticism of that regime, provided a reason for exceptional measures of protection. There were no doubt occasional real dangers in the unsettled conditions of the country, and we are grateful for the efficient protection with which we were provided throughout our tour. But the effect of the police measures adopted was to keep away witnesses; and many Chinese were frankly afraid of even meeting members of our staff. We were informed at one place that before our arrival it had been announced that no one would be allowed to see the Commission without

official permission. Interviews were therefore usually arranged with considerably difficulty and in secrecy, and many informed us that it was too dangerous for them to meet us even in this way.

In spite of these difficulties we were able to arrange private interviews with business men, bankers, teachers, doctors, police, tradesmen and others, in addition to our public interviews with "Manchukuo" officials, Japanese consuls and military officers. We also received over 1,500 written communications, some delivered by hand, the majority sent by post to different addresses. The information so received was checked as far as possible from neutral sources.

Deputations and prepared statements.

Many delegations representing public bodies and associations were received, and usually presented to us written statements. Most of the delegations were introduced by the Japanese or "Manchukuo" authorities and we had strong grounds for believing that the statements left with us had previously obtained Japanese approval. In fact, in some cases persons who had presented them informed us afterwards that they had been written or substantially revised by the Japanese, and were not to be taken as the expression of their real feelings. These documents were remarkable for the studied neglect to comment either favourably or otherwise upon Japanese participation in the establishment or maintenance of the "Manchukuo" administration. In the main these statements were concerned with the relation of grievances against the former Chinese administration, and contained expressions of hope and confidence in the future of the new "State."

Letters.

The letters received came from farmers, small tradesmen, town workers and students, and related the feelings and experiences of the writers. After the return of the Commission to Peiping in June this mass of correspondence was translated, analysed and arranged by an expert staff specially selected for the purpose. All these 1,550 letters, except two, were bitterly hostile to the new "Manchukuo Government" and to the Japanese. They appeared to be sincere and spontaneous expressions of opinion.

Officials of the "Manchukuo."

The higher Chinese officials of the "Manchukuo Government" are in office for various reasons. Many of them were previously in the former regime and have been retained either by inducements or by intimidation of one kind or another. Some of them conveyed messages to the Commission to the effect that they had been forced to remain in office under

duress, that all power was in Japanese hands, that they were loyal to China, and that what they had said at their interviews with the Commission in the presence of the Japanese was not necessarily to be believed. Some officials have remained in office to prevent their property from being confiscated, as has happened in the case of some of those who have fled into China. Others, men of good repute, joined in the hope that they would have the power to improve the administration, and under promise of the Japanese that they would have a free hand. Some Manchus joined in the hope of getting benefits for persons of Manchu race. Some of these have been disappointed, and complained that no real authority was conceded to them. Lastly, a few men are in office because they had personal grievances against the former regime or for reasons of profit.

Minor and local officials.

The minor and local officials have in the main retained their offices under the new regime, partly because of the necessity of earning a living and supporting their families, and partly because they feel that if they go, worse men might be put in their place. Most of the local magistrates have also remained in office, partly from a sense of duty to the people under their charge, and partly under pressure. While it was often difficult to fill the higher posts with reputable Chinese, it was an easy matter to get Chinese for service in minor posts and local offices, though the loyalty of the service rendered in such circumstances is at least questionable.

Police.

The "Manchukuo" police are partly composed of members of the former Chinese police, partly of new recruits. In the larger towns there are actually Japanese officers in the police, and in many other places there are Japanese advisers. Some individual members of the police who spoke to us expressed their dislike of the new regime, but said they must continue to serve to make a living.

Army.

The "Manchukuo Army" also consists in the main of the former Manchurian soldiers reorganised under Japanese supervision. Such troops were at first content to take service under the new regime provided they were merely required to maintain local order. But since they have on occasions been called upon to engage in serious warfare against Chinese forces, and to fight under Japanese orders side by side with Japanese troops, the "Manchukuo Army" has become increasingly unreliable. Japanese sources report the frequent defection of "Manchukuo" forces to the Chinese side, while the Chinese claim that one of their most reliable and fruitful sources of warlike supplies is the "Manchukuo Army."

Business men and bankers.

The Chinese business men and bankers who were interviewed by us were hostile to "Manchukuo." They disliked the Japanese; they feared for their lives and property, and frequently remarked: "We do not want to become like the Koreans." After September 18, there was a large exodus of business men to China, but some of the less rich ones are now returning. Generally speaking, the smaller shopkeepers expect to suffer less from Japanese competition than do the larger merchants and manufacturers, who often had profitable relations with the former officials. Many shops were still closed at the time of our visit. The increase in banditry adversely affected business in the country side, and the machinery of credit has largely broken down. The announced Japanese intention to exploit Manchuria economically, and the numerous visits of Japanese economic missions to Manchuria in the last few months have caused apprehension among Chinese business men, in spite of the fact that many of these missions are reported to have returned to Japan disappointed.

Professional classes: Doctors, teachers, students.

The professional classes, teachers and doctors, are hostile to "Manchukuo." They allege that they are spied upon and intimidated. The interference with education, the closing of Universities and some schools, and the alterations in the school text books, have added to their hostility, already great on patriotic grounds. The censorship of the press, post, and opinion is resented, as is also the prohibition of the entry into "Manchukuo" of newspapers published in China. There are, of course, Chinese who have been educated in Japan who are not included in this generalisation. Many letters were received from students and young people directed against "Manchukuo."

Farmers and town workers.

Evidence regarding the attitude of farmers and town workers is divergent and naturally difficult to obtain. Opinion among foreigners and educated Chinese was to the effect that they were either hostile or indifferent to "Manchukuo." The farmer and worker is politically uneducated, usually illiterate, and normally takes little interest in the Government. The following reasons were advanced by witnesses for the agricultural population being hostile to "Manchukuo," and were confirmed in some of the letters received from this class of person. The farmers have good grounds for believing that the new regime will lead to an increased immigration of Koreans, and possibly of Japanese. The Korean immigrants do not assimilate with the Chinese, and their methods of agriculture are different. While the Chinese farmer mainly grows beans, kaoliang and wheat, the Korean farmer cultivates rice. This means digging canals and dykes and flooding the fields. If there are heavy rains, the dykes built by the Koreans are liable to burst and flood neighbouring Chinese land,

ruining the crops. There have also been constant quarrels in the past with Koreans over land ownership and rents. Since the establishment of "Manchukuo" the Chinese allege that the Koreans have often ceased to pay rent, that they have seized lands from the Chinese, and that the Japanese have forced the Chinese to sell their lands at an unfavourable price. The farmers near the railways and towns have suffered from orders forbidding the planting of kaoliang—a crop which grows to ten feet in height and favours the operations of bandits—within five hundred metres of railway lines and towns. The falling off of the seasonal migration of labourers from China Proper, due to the economic depression and accentuated to some extent by the political disturbances, continues. The public lands, usually available on terms to immigrants from China, have now been taken over by "Manchukuo."

Since September 18, 1931, there has been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in the countryside, partly due to disbanded soldiery and partly due to farmers who, having been ruined by bandits, have to take to banditry themselves for a living. Organised warfare, from which Manchuria, compared to the rest of China, had been free for many years, is now being waged in many parts of the Three Provinces between Japanese and "Manchukuo" troops and the scattered forces still loyal to China. This warfare naturally inflicts great hardships on the farmers, especially as the Japanese aeroplanes have been bombing villages suspected of harbouring anti-"Manchukuo" forces. One result has been that large areas have not been planted and next year the farmer will find it harder than ever to pay his taxes. Since the outbreak of disorders, large numbers of the more recently established immigrants from China have fled back inside the Wall. These material reasons, when added to a certain ingrained dislike of the Japanese, caused many witnesses to tell us that the Chinese farmers, who constitute the overwhelming mass of the population of Manchuria, suffer from and dislike the new regime, and that their attitude is one of passive hostility.

As regards the townspeople, in certain places they have suffered from the attitude of Japanese soldiers, gendarmes and police. Generally speaking the behaviour of the Japanese troops has been good, there being no widespread lootings or massacres, though we have received in our letters complaints of individual brutality. On the other hand, the Japanese have been vigorous in suppressing elements that they believed to be hostile. The Chinese allege that many executions have taken place, and also that prisoners have been threatened and tortured in Japanese gendarmerie stations.

It was, we were told, impossible to stimulate in the towns a show of popular enthusiasm for the inauguration ceremonies of "Manchukuo." Generally speaking, the attitude of the town population is a mixture of passive acquiescence and hostility.

Minorities.

While we found the Chinese majority either hostile or indifferent to the "Manchukuo," the new "Government" receives some support from among various minority racial groups in Manchuria, such as the Mongols, Koreans, White Russians and Manchus. They have in varying degrees suffered oppression from the former administration, or economic disadvantage from the large immigration of Chinese in the last few decades, and while no section is entirely enthusiastic, they hope for better treatment from the new regime, whose policy in turn is to encourage these minority groups.

Mongols.

The Mongols have remained a race apart from the Chinese, and, as already stated, have preserved a strong race-consciousness, as well as their tribal system, aristocracy, language, dress, special modes of life, manners, customs and religion. Though still mainly a pastoral people, they are increasingly engaged in agriculture, and in the transportation of products by carts and animals. The Mongols bordering Manchuria have suffered increasingly from Chinese immigrants who obtain possession of and cultivate their lands from which they are being gradually extruded. This leads to chronic and unavoidable ill-feeling. Mongol delegations we received complained also of past sufferings from the rapaciousness of Chinese officials and tax-gatherers. The Mongols of Inner Mongolia have seen Outer Mongolia pass under the influence of the U.S.S.R., whose extension to Inner Mongolia they dread. They wish to preserve their separate national existence against the encroachments of the Chinese on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other. Placed in this precarious position, they have greater hope of preserving their separate existence under the new regime. It must be observed, moreover, that the Princes are mainly dependent for their wealth on fixed property and on their special privileges, and that they therefore tend to become amenable to *de facto* authorities. A deputation, however, of Mongol Princes was received by the Commission in Peiping, and stated their opposition to the new regime. At present the connection between the Mongols bordering on Manchuria and the "Manchukuo Government" is undefined, and the "Manchukuo Government" has so far refrained from interfering in their administration. While the support of certain of these Mongol elements at present is genuine, if cautious, they are quite prepared to withdraw it should the Japanese prove a menace to their independence or economic interests at some future date.

Manchus.

The Manchus have been almost completely assimilated with the Chinese, although in Kirin and Heilungkiang there still exist small and

politically unimportant colonies of Manchus who, though bilingual, remain distinctly Manchu. Since the establishment of the Republic the remnants of the Manchu race lost their privileged position: although the Republic promised to continue the payment of their subsidies, they were paid in depreciated currency, and were therefore forced to take up farming and trade in which they had no experience. The few distinct Manchu groups that remain may cherish hopes that with the establishment of "Manchukuo," whose backers spoke so often about the inhabitants of Manchuria being distinct in race from those of the rest of China, and in which the last of the Manchu Emperors is the Chief Executive, they may once more get privileged treatment. Persons of Manchu race have entered the "Government" with such hopes, but Chinese witnesses in Manchuria alleged that these office-holders have been disillusioned by finding all the power in Japanese hands and their own proposals ignored. Although there may still exist some sentimental loyalty to the ex-Emperor among persons of Manchu blood, there does not exist any race-conscious Manchu movement of any significance. They have been so largely assimilated with the Chinese that although efforts have been made to recruit Manchus for the administration and to stimulate Manchu race-consciousness, this source of support for the new "Government" is not sufficient to give it any title to represent the people.

Koreans.

In the past there has been much friction between Korean farmers backed by the Japanese authorities on the one hand, and Chinese officials, landowners and farmers, on the other. There is no doubt that in the past Korean farmers suffered from violence and extortion. The Korean deputation which appeared before the Commission generally welcomes the new regime, but we cannot say to what extent they were representative of their community. In any case, those Koreans who are political refugees, having emigrated to escape Japanese domination, might not be expected to welcome an extension of that domination. These refugees have proved a fertile ground for communist propaganda, and maintain contact with the revolutionary groups inside Korea.¹

White Russians.

Of all the minority communities in Manchuria, the small colony of White Russians—at least 100,000 in number—in and around Harbin has suffered the most in recent years. Because they are a minority community with no national Government to protect them, they have been subjected to every kind of humiliation by the Chinese officials and police. They are in conflict with the Government of their own country and are, even in Manchuria, in constant anxiety on that account. The richer and more

¹ See also Chapter III and Special Study No. 9.

educated members of their community can earn a livelihood, but they have been liable to suffer whenever the Chinese authorities have thought some advantage was to be gained from the U.S.S.R. at their expense. The poorer members find it very hard to make a living, and have suffered continually at the hands of the police and the Chinese courts. In a province where taxes are assessed by a process of bargaining, they have been made to pay a higher portion of their assessed taxes than their Chinese neighbours. They have experienced many restrictions on their trade and movements, and have had to pay bribes to the officials to have their passports examined, their contracts approved, or their land transferred. It is not to be wondered at that many members of this community, whose condition could not well be made worse, should have welcomed the Japanese and now entertain hopes that their lot may be improved under the new administration.

We received a deputation of White Russians when we were in Harbin, as well as many letters, and we gathered from them that they would support any regime which would guarantee to them:

- (1) The right of asylum;
- (2) An honest and efficient police administration.
- (3) Justice in the law courts;
- (4) An equitable system of taxation;
- (5) Rights of trade and settlement, not dependent on the payment of bribes;
- (6) Facilities for educating their children.

Their requirements in this respect were chiefly efficient teaching of foreign languages to enable them to emigrate, and good technical education to enable them to obtain business employment in China;

- (7) Some assistance regarding land settlement and emigration.

Conclusions of the Commission.

Such are the opinions of the local population conveyed to us during our tour in Manchuria. After careful study of the evidence presented to us in public and private interviews, in letters and written statements, we have come to the conclusion that there is no general Chinese support for the "Manchukuo Government," which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese.

CHAPTER VII.

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND THE CHINESE BOYCOTT.^{1, 2}

Chinese boycott of Japanese goods an important factor in Sino-Japanese struggle.

The three preceding chapters have been chiefly confined to a description of military and political events since September 18, 1931. No survey of the Sino-Japanese conflict would be accurate or complete without some account of another important factor in the struggle, namely the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods. To understand the methods employed in this boycott movement and their effect on Japanese trade, some indication must be given of the general economic position of Japan, of her economic and financial interests in China, and of the foreign trade of China. This is also necessary to understand the extent and character of the economic interests of both China and Japan in Manchuria, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Japan's over-population.

During the Meiji Restoration period in the sixties of the last century, Japan emerged from her isolation of over two centuries, and within less than fifty years developed into a world power of the first rank. A population formerly almost stationary started to grow rapidly from 33,000,000 in 1872 until it reached a figure of 65,000,000 in 1930; and this tremendous growth still continues at the rate of about 900,000 per year.

The population of Japan compared with its total surface is approximately 437 persons per square mile, as against about 41 in the United States, 330 in Germany, 349 in Italy, 463 in Great Britain, 670 in Belgium and 254 in China.

Comparing the population of Japan per square mile of *arable* land with that of other countries, the ratio for Japan is exceptionally high, due to the particular geographical formation of the Island Empire:

¹ BOYCOTT: The word was first used in Ireland and was derived from the name of Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott (1832-97), agent for the estates of the Earl of Erne in County Mayo. For refusing in 1880 to receive rents at figures fixed by the tenants, Captain Boycott's life was threatened, his servants were compelled to leave him, his fences torn down, his letters intercepted and his food supplies interfered with. The term soon came into common English use, and was speedily adopted into many foreign languages. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th edition, 1929.

² For a special study on this subject see Annex No. 8.

Japan	2,774	Germany	806
Great Britain	2,170	France	487
Belgium	1,709	United States	229
Italy	819		

Due to a highly concentrated population on agricultural land, the individual holdings are exceedingly small, 35% of the farmers tilling less than one acre and 34% less than two and one half acres. The expansion limit of tillable land has been reached, as has also the limit of cultivation intensity—in short, the soil of Japan cannot be expected to produce much more than it does to-day, nor can it provide much additional employment.

Agrarian difficulties.

Moreover, as a result of intensive cultivation and the widespread use of fertilisers the cost of production is high. The price of land is far higher than in any other part of Asia, and even in the most overcrowded parts of Europe. Much discontent seems to exist amongst the heavily indebted population, and conflicts between tenants and landowners are on the increase. Emigration has been considered a possible remedy, but for reasons dealt with in the next chapter it has not, up to the present time, proved to be a solution.

Japan at first turned to industrialism to foster the growth of an urban population which would both provide a home market for agricultural products and turn labour to the production of goods for domestic and foreign use. Several changes have occurred since that time. Where, formerly, Japan was more than self-sufficing from the point of view of food supply, of recent years from 8% to 15% of her total imports have been foodstuffs, the fluctuation being due to the varying conditions of the home crops, principally rice. The importation of foodstuffs, and the probable increasing need of these imports necessitate an attempt to offset the country's already unfavourable trade balance by an increase in exports of industrial products.

Need for further industrialisation.

If Japan is to find employment for her increasing population through the process of further industrialisation, the development of her export trade and of foreign markets capable of absorbing an increasing amount of her manufactured and semi-manufactured goods becomes more and more essential. Such markets would, at the same time, serve as a source of supply of raw materials and of foodstuffs.

China a market for Japanese export trade.

Japanese export trade, as hitherto developed, has two main directions: her luxury product, raw silk, goes to the United States; and her staple manufactures, chiefly cotton textiles, go to the countries of Asia, the

United States taking 42.5% of her exports and the Asia market as a whole taking 42.6%. Of this latter trade China, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and Hong Kong take 24.7%, and a large share of the remainder is handled by Chinese merchants in other parts of Asia.¹

During 1930, the last year for which complete figures are available, the total exports of Japan amounted to Yen 1,469,852,000, and her imports to Yen 1,546,071,000. Of the exports, Yen 260,826,000, or 17.7%, went to China (excluding the Kwantung Leased Territory and Hong Kong), while of the imports Yen 161,667,000, or 10.4%, came from China (excluding the Kwantung Leased Territory and Hong Kong).

Analysing the principal commodities exported by Japan to China, it will be found that China takes 32.8% of all aquatic products exported by Japan; 84.6% of refined sugar; 75.1% of coal, and 31.9% of cotton tissues, or an average of 51.6%.

The same analysis applied to the commodities imported from China shows that 24.5% of the total amount of beans and peas imported by Japan comes from China; 53% of the oil cake; and 25% of vegetable fibres; or an average of 34.5%.

As these figures are for China only, excluding Hong Kong and the Kwantung Leased Territory, they do not indicate the extent of Japanese trade with Manchuria, which passes mainly through the port of Dairen.

Importance of Sino-Japanese trade relations.

The facts and figures just given clearly show the importance to Japan of her trade with China. Nor is Japan's interest in China limited to trade alone; she has a considerable amount of capital invested in industrial enterprises, as well as in railways, shipping and banking, and in all of these branches of financial and economic activity the general trend of development has been increasing considerably during the last three decades.

Japanese investments in China.

In 1898 the only Japanese investment of any consequence was a small cotton gin in Shanghai owned jointly with Chinese, representing a value of about 100,000 taels. By 1913 the estimated total of Japanese investments in China and Manchuria amounted to Yen 435,000,000, out of a total of Yen 535,000,000 estimated investments abroad. By the end of the World War, Japan had more than doubled her investments in China and Manchuria over those of 1913, a considerable part of this increase being due to the famous "Nishihara loans," which had been partially granted for political considerations. Notwithstanding this setback, Japan's investments in China and Manchuria in 1929 were estimated at almost Yen 2,000,000,000² out of her total investments abroad of Yen 2,100,000,000.

¹ Figures for 1929, Japan Year Book of 1931.

² According to another estimate, Japan's investments in China, including Manchuria, total approximately Yen 1,800,000,000.

showing that Japan's investments abroad have been almost entirely confined to China and Manchuria, the latter having absorbed by far the greater part of this investment (particularly in railways).

Apart from these investments, China has been indebted to Japan for various state, provincial and municipal loans which in 1925 were estimated at a total of Yen 304,458,000 (the greater part unsecured) plus Yen 18,037,000 interest.

Although the bulk of Japan's investments are in Manchuria, a considerable amount is invested in industries, shipping and banking in China proper. Nearly 50% of the total number of spindles operated in the spinning and weaving industry in China in 1929 were owned by Japanese. Japan was second in the carrying trade of China, and the number of Japanese banks in China in 1932 is put at 30, a few of which are joint Sino-Japanese enterprises.

China's interest in the development of trade with Japan.

Although the foregoing figures are stated from the standpoint of Japan, it is easy to see their relative importance from the standpoint of China. Foreign trade with Japan has held first place in the total foreign trade of China up to 1932. In 1930, 24.1% of her exports went to Japan, while in the same year 24.9% of her imports came from Japan. This, in comparison with the figures from Japan's standpoint, shows that the trade of China with Japan is a greater percentage of her total foreign trade than is the trade of Japan with China of the total foreign trade of Japan. But China has no investments, banking or shipping interests in Japan. China requires, above all else, to be able to export her products in increasing quantities to enable her to pay for the many finished products she needs and in order to establish a sound basis of credit on which to borrow the capital required for further development.

Sino-Japanese economic and financial relations easily affected by disturbing factor.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Sino-Japanese economic and financial relations are both extensive and varied, and, consequently, easily affected and disorganised by any disturbing factor. It also appears that, in its entirety, Japanese dependence on China is greater than China's dependence on Japan. Hence Japan is the more vulnerable and has more to lose in case of disturbed relations.

It is therefore clear that the many political disputes which have arisen between the two countries since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 have in turn affected their mutual economic relations, and the fact that in spite of these disturbances the trade between them has continued to increase proves that there is an underlying economic tie that no political antagonism has been able to sever.

Origin of boycott.

For centuries the Chinese have been familiar with boycott methods in the organisation of their merchants, bankers, and craft guilds. These guilds, although they are being modified to meet modern conditions, still exist in large numbers and exercise great power over their members in the defence of their common professional interest. The training and attitude acquired in the course of this century old guild life has been combined, in the present day boycott movement, with the recent fervent nationalism, of which the Kuomintang is the organised expression.

Modern anti-foreign boycotts.

The era of modern anti-foreign boycotts employed on a national basis as a political weapon against a foreign power (as distinct from a professional instrument used by Chinese traders against each other) can be said to have started in 1905 with a boycott directed against the United States because of a stipulation in the Sino-American Commercial Treaty, as renewed and revised in that year, restricting more severely than before the entry of Chinese into America. From that moment onward until to-day there have been ten distinct boycotts which can be considered as national in scope (besides anti-foreign movements of a local character), nine of which were directed against Japan¹ and one only against Great Britain.

Causes of these boycott movements.

If these boycotts are studied in detail, it will be found that each of them can be traced back to a definite fact, event or incident, generally of a political nature and interpreted by China as directed against her material interests or detrimental to her national prestige. Thus, the boycott of 1931 was started as a direct sequel to the massacre of Koreans in July, following the Wanpaoshan incident in June of that year, and has been accentuated by the events at Mukden in September and at Shanghai in January, 1932. Each boycott has its own immediately traceable cause, but none of the causes in themselves would have initiated economic retaliation on so extensive a scale had it not been for the mass psychology described in Chapter I. The factors contributing to the creation of this

¹ The date and immediate cause of each of these boycotts is:

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1908 | The Tatsu Maru incident. |
| 1909 | The Antung-Mukden Railway question. |
| 1915 | The "21 Demands." |
| 1919 | The Shantung question. |
| 1923 | Port Arthur and Dairen recovery question. |
| 1925 | May 30th incident. |
| 1927 | Despatch of troops to Shantung. |
| 1928 | Tsinan incident. |
| 1931 | The Manchurian affair (Wanpaoshan and Mukden events) |

psychology are: a conviction of injustice (rightly or wrongly considered as such), an inherited faith in Chinese cultural superiority over foreigners, and a fervent nationalism of a western type, mainly defensive in aims but in which certain aggressive tendencies are not lacking.

Boycott movements before 1925.

Although a Society for the Regeneration of China (Hsing Chung Hui), which may be considered the progenitor of the Kuomintang, was founded as far back as 1893, and although there can be no doubt that all the boycotts from 1905 to 1925 were launched with the war-cry of Nationalism, there is no concrete evidence that the original nationalist associations, and later the Kuomintang, had a direct hand in their organisation. Inspired by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's new creed, Chambers of Commerce and Student Unions were fully capable of such a task, guided as they were by century old secret societies, guild experience and guild mentality. The merchants furnished the technical knowledge, means of organisation and rules of procedure, while the students inspired the movements with the enthusiasm of their newly acquired conviction and their spirit of determination in the national cause, and helped to put them into operation. While the students were generally moved by nationalistic feelings alone, the Chambers of Commerce, though sharing these feelings, thought it wise to participate from a desire to control the operation of the boycott. The actual rules of the earlier boycotts were designed to prevent the purchase of the goods of the country against which the boycott was directed. Gradually, however, the field of action was extended to a refusal to export Chinese goods to the country concerned, or to sell or render services to its nationals in China. Finally, the avowed purpose of the more recent boycotts has become to sever completely all economic relations with the "enemy country."

It should be pointed out that the rules thus established were never carried out to the fullest extent, for reasons which have been fully dealt with in the special study annexed to this report. Generally speaking, the boycotts have always had more impetus in the south, where nationalistic feelings found their first and most fervent adherents, than in the north, Shantung especially having withheld support.

Boycott movement since 1925. Action of the Kuomintang Party.

From 1925 onward a definite change took place in the boycott organisation. The Kuomintang, having from its creation supported the movement, increased its control with each successive boycott until to-day it is the real organising, driving, co-ordinating and supervising factor in these demonstrations.

In doing this, the Kuomintang, as indicated by evidence in the possession of the Commission, did not dismiss the associations which had hitherto been responsible for the direction of boycott movements. It

rather co-ordinated their efforts, systematised and made uniform their methods, and put unreservedly behind the movement the moral and material weight of its powerful party organisation. Having branches all over the country, possessing vast propaganda and information services, and inspired by a strong nationalistic sentiment, it rapidly succeeded in organising and stimulating a movement which had, up to that time, been somewhat sporadic. As a consequence, the coercive authority of the organisers of the boycotts over the merchants and the general public became stronger than ever before, although at the same time a fair margin of autonomy and initiative was left to the individual boycott associations.

Methods employed.

The boycott rules continued to vary according to local conditions but parallel with the strengthening of the organisation, the methods employed by the Boycott Societies became more uniform, more strict and effective. At the same time the Kuomintang Party issued instructions prohibiting the destruction of commercial houses belonging to Japanese or the infliction of physical harm. This does not mean that the lives of Japanese in China have never been threatened in the course of a boycott, but as a whole it may be stated that during the more recent boycotts, acts of violence against Japanese subjects have been less numerous and serious than in earlier days.

An examination of the technique of the methods employed shows that the atmosphere of popular sentiment without which no boycott could succeed is created by a formidable propaganda uniformly carried out all over the country, using slogans well chosen to incite the popular mind against the "enemy" country.

Anti-Japanese propaganda.

In the present boycott directed against Japan which the Commission has seen in operation, every available means was employed to impress upon the people the patriotic duty of not buying Japanese goods. The columns of the Chinese press were filled with propaganda of this kind, the walls of buildings in the towns were covered with posters, often of an extremely violent character;¹ anti-Japanese slogans were printed on currency notes, on letters and telegram-forms; chain letters went from hand to hand, etc. These examples were by no means exhaustive, but serve to show the nature of the methods employed. The fact that this propaganda does not differ essentially from that used in certain countries

¹ In most cities visited by the Commission these posters had been removed beforehand but declarations from reliable local witnesses who often possessed samples of these posters bore out the fact mentioned above. Moreover, samples are to be found in the archives of the Commission.

of Europe and America during the World War, 1914-1918, only proves the degree of hostility towards Japan which the Chinese have come to feel as a result of the political tension between the two countries.

Boycott rules adopted by anti-Japanese Associations.

Essential as the political atmosphere of a boycott may be to its ultimate success, nevertheless no such movement could be effective if the boycott associations had not secured a certain uniformity in their rules of procedure. The four general principles adopted at the first meeting of the Shanghai Anti-Japanese Association held on July 17, 1931, may serve as an illustration of the main objects aimed at by these rules. They were:

- a. To withdraw the orders for Japanese goods already ordered.
- b. To stop shipment of Japanese goods already ordered but not yet consigned;
- c. To refuse to accept Japanese goods already in the godowns but not yet paid for;
- d. To register with the Anti-Japanese Association, Japanese goods already purchased and to suspend temporarily the selling of these goods. The procedure of registration will be separately decided upon.

Subsequent resolutions adopted by the same Association and reproduced in the annex, are much more detailed and contain provisions for all possible cases and eventualities.

A powerful means of enforcing the boycott is the compulsory registration of Japanese goods held in stock by Chinese merchants. Inspectors of the Anti-Japanese societies watch the movement of Japanese goods, examine those of doubtful origin in order to ascertain whether or not they are Japanese, undertake raids on stores and godowns where they suspect the presence of non-registered Japanese goods, and bring to the attention of their principals any case of the violation of the rules they may discover. Merchants who are found to be guilty of such a breach of the rules are fined by the Boycott Associations themselves and publicly exposed to popular disapproval, while the goods in their possession are confiscated and sold at public auction, the proceeds going into the funds of the Anti-Japanese organisation.

The boycott is not limited to trade alone. Chinese are warned not to travel on Japanese ships, to use Japanese banks or to serve Japanese in any capacity, either in business or in domestic service. Those who disregard these instructions are subjected to various forms of disapproval and intimidation.

Another feature of this boycott, as of previous ones, is the wish not only to injure Japanese industries, but to further Chinese industries by stimulating the production of certain articles which have hitherto been imported from Japan. The principal result has been an extension of the Chinese textile industry at the expense of the Japanese-owned mills in the Shanghai area.

Fluctuations of the boycott movement in 1931-32.

The boycott of 1931, organised on the lines just described, continued until about December of that year, when a certain relaxation became apparent. In January, 1932, in the course of the negotiations then proceeding between the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and the Japanese Consul-General in the city, the Chinese even undertook to dissolve voluntarily the local anti-Japanese association.

During the hostilities in Shanghai, and the months immediately following the evacuation of the Japanese troops, the boycott, although never completely abandoned, was moderated, and during late spring and early summer it even looked as if Japanese trade in different parts of the country might resume. Then, quite suddenly, at the end of July and beginning August, coinciding with the reported military activity on the borders of Jehol, there was a marked revival of the boycott movement. Articles urging the people not to buy Japanese goods appeared anew in the Chinese press, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce published a letter suggesting the resumption of the boycott, and the Coal Merchants' Guild in the same city decided to restrict to the minimum the importation of Japanese coal. At the same time more violent methods were employed, such as the throwing of a bomb into the compound of a coal dealer suspected of having handled Japanese coal, and the sending of letters to storekeepers threatening to destroy their property unless they stopped selling Japanese commodities. Some of the letters reproduced in the newspapers were signed the "Blood and Iron Group" or the "Blood and Soul Group for the punishment of traitors."

Such is the situation at the time of writing this Report. This recrudescence of the boycott activity caused the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai to lodge a formal protest with the local authorities.

Material effects of boycott movement.

The various boycott movements, and the present one in particular, have seriously affected Sino-Japanese relations, both in a material and in a psychological sense.

As far as the material effects are concerned, that is, the loss of trade, the Chinese have a tendency to understate them in their desire to present the boycott as rather a moral protest than as an act of economic injury, while the Japanese attach too absolute a value to certain trade statistics. The arguments used in this connection by the two parties are examined in the annexed Study already referred to. In that Study will also be found full particulars of the extent of the damage done to Japanese trade, which has certainly been considerable.

Another aspect of the subject should also be mentioned. The Chinese themselves suffer losses from goods already paid for, not registered with

the Boycott Associations, and seized for public auction; from fines paid to the associations for violation of the boycott rules; from revenue not received by the Chinese Maritime Customs; and generally speaking, from loss of trade. These losses are considerable.

Psychological effect on Sino-Japanese relations.

The psychological effect of the boycott on Sino-Japanese relations, although even more difficult to estimate than the material effect, is certainly not less serious in that it has had a disastrous repercussion on the feelings of large sections of Japanese public opinion towards China. During the visit of the Commission to Japan, both the Tokyo and the Osaka Chambers of Commerce stressed this subject.

The knowledge that Japan is suffering injuries against which she cannot protect herself has exasperated Japanese public opinion. The merchants whom we interviewed at Osaka were inclined to exaggerate certain abuses of boycott methods, such as racketeering and blackmailing, and to under-estimate or even to deny completely the close relationship between Japan's recent policy towards China and the use of the boycott as a defensive weapon against that policy. On the contrary, instead of regarding the boycott as China's weapon of defence, these Japanese merchants insisted that it was an act of aggression against which the Japanese military measures were a retaliation. Anyway there is no doubt that the boycott has been amongst the causes which have profoundly embittered the relations between China and Japan in recent years.

Controversial issues in connection with the boycott.

(1) Whether the movement is spontaneous or organised.

There are three controversial issues involved in the policy and methods of the boycott.

The first is the question whether the movement is purely spontaneous, as the Chinese themselves claim, or whether as the Japanese allege, it is an organised movement imposed upon the people by the Kuomintang, by methods which at times amount to terrorism. On this subject much may be said on both sides. On the one hand it would appear to be impossible for a nation to exhibit the degree of co-operation and sacrifice involved in the maintenance of a boycott over a wide area and for a long period if there did not exist a foundation of strong popular feeling. On the other hand, it has been clearly shown to what extent the Kuomintang, using the mentality and the methods which the Chinese people have inherited from their old guilds and secret societies, has taken control of the recent boycotts, and particularly of the present one. The rules, the discipline, and

the sanctions used against the "traitors", which form such an essential part of the present boycott, show that however spontaneous, the movement is certainly strongly organised.

All popular movements require some measure of organisation to be effective. The loyalty of all adherents to a common cause is never uniformly strong, and discipline is required to enforce unity of purpose and action. Our conclusion is that the Chinese boycotts are both popular and organised; that though they originate in and are supported by strong national sentiment, they are controlled and directed by organisations which can start or call them off, and that they are enforced by methods which certainly amount to intimidation. While many separate bodies are involved in the organisation, the main controlling authority is the Kuomintang.

(2) Legality or otherwise of boycott methods.

The second issue is whether or not in the conduct of the boycott movement the methods employed have always been legal. From the evidence collected by the Commission it is difficult to draw any other conclusion than that illegal acts have been constantly committed, and that they have not been sufficiently suppressed by the authorities and the courts. The fact that these methods are mainly the same as those used in China in olden days may be an explanation but not a justification. When in former days a Guild elected to declare a boycott, searched the houses of suspected members, brought them before the Guild Court, punished them for a breach of rules, imposed fines and sold the goods seized, it acted in conformity with the customs of that time. Moreover, it was an internal affair of a Chinese community, and no foreigner was involved. The present situation is different. China has adopted a code of modern laws, and these are incompatible with the traditional methods of trade boycotts in China. The memorandum in which the Chinese Assessor has defended his country's point of view with regard to the boycott does not contest this statement but argues that "the boycott . . . is pursued, generally speaking, in a legitimate manner." The evidence at the disposal of the Commission does not bear out this contention.

In this connection a distinction should be made between the illegal acts committed directly against foreign residents, *in casu* Japanese, and those committed against Chinese with the avowed intention, however, of causing damage to Japanese interests. As far as the former are concerned, they are clearly not only illegal under the laws of China but also incompatible with treaty obligations to protect life and property, and to maintain liberty of trade, residence, movement and action. This is not contested by the Chinese, and the boycott associations, as well as the Kuomintang authorities, have tried, although they may not always have been successful, to prevent offences of this kind. As already stated they

have occurred less frequently during the present boycott than on previous occasions.¹

With regard to illegal acts committed against the Chinese, the Chinese Assessor observed on page 17 of his memorandum on the boycott:

"We would like to observe in the first place that a foreign nation is not authorized to raise a question of internal law. In fact, we find ourselves confronted with acts denounced as unlawful but committed by Chinese nationals in prejudice to other Chinese nationals. Their suppression is a matter for the Chinese authorities, and it seems to us that no one has the right of calling into account the manner in which the Chinese penal law is applied in matters where both offenders and sufferers belong to our own nationality. No state has the right of intervention in the administration of exclusively domestic affairs of another state. This is what the principle of mutual respect for each others' sovereignty and independence means."

So stated, the argument is incontestable, but it overlooks the fact that the ground of the Japanese complaint is not that one Chinese national has been illegally injured by another, but that the injury has been done to Japanese interests by the employment of methods which are illegal under Chinese law, and that failure to enforce the law in such circumstances implies the responsibility of the Chinese Government for the injury done to Japan.

(3) Responsibility of the Chinese Government for the boycott.

This leads to a consideration of the last controversial point involved in the policy of the boycott, namely the extent of the responsibility of the Chinese Government. The Chinese official attitude is that "the liberty of choice in making purchases is a personal right which no government can interfere with; while the governments are responsible for the protection of lives and property, they are not required by any commonly-recognized regulations and principles to prohibit and punish the exercise of an elemental right of every citizen".

The Commission has been supplied with documentary evidence which is reproduced in the Study No. 8 annexed to this Report, and which indicates that the part taken by the Chinese Government in the present boycott has been somewhat more direct than the quotation above would tend to indicate. We do not suggest that there is anything improper in the fact that Government Departments should support the boycott movement: we only wish to point out that official encouragement involves a measure of Government responsibility. In this connection the question of

¹ According to recent Japanese information, there were 35 instances in which goods belonging to Japanese merchants were seized and kept in detention by members of the Anti-Japanese Associations in Shanghai during the period from July, 1931, to the end of December, 1931. The value of the goods involved was estimated approximately at 287,000 dollars. Of these instances, in August, 1932, five were reported as still remaining unsolved.

relations between the Government and the Kuomintang must be considered. Of the responsibility of the latter there can be no question. It is the controlling and co-ordinating organ behind the whole boycott movement. The Kuomintang may be the maker and the master of the Government; but to determine at what point the responsibility of the Party ends and that of the Government begins is a complicated problem of constitutional law on which the Commission does not feel it proper to pronounce.

Comments.

The claim of the Government that the boycott is a legitimate weapon of defence against military aggression by a stronger country, especially in cases where methods of arbitration have not previously been utilised, raises a question of a much wider character. No one can deny the right of the individual Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese goods, use Japanese banks, or ships, or to work for Japanese employers, to sell commodities to Japanese, or to maintain social relations with Japanese. Nor is it possible to deny that the Chinese, acting individually or even in organised bodies, are entitled to make propaganda on behalf of those ideas, always subject to the condition, of course, that the methods do not infringe the laws of the land. Whether, however, the organised application of the boycott to the trade of one particular country is consistent with friendly relations or in conformity with treaty obligations is rather a problem of international law than a subject for our Enquiry. We would express the hope, however, that in the interest of all States this problem should be considered at an early date and regulated by international agreement.

In the course of the present chapter it has been shown first that Japan, in connection with her population problem, is seeking to increase her industrial output and to secure for this purpose reliable overseas markets; secondly, that, apart from the export of raw silk to the United States, China constitutes the principal market for Japanese exports and at the same time supplies the Island Empire with an important amount of raw materials and foodstuffs. Further, China has attracted nearly the whole of Japan's foreign investments, and even in her present disturbed and undeveloped condition, offers a profitable field to Japanese economic and financial activities of various types. Finally, an analysis of the injury caused to Japanese interests in China by the various boycotts which have succeeded one another from 1908 until to-day has drawn attention to the vulnerable character of these interests.

The dependence of Japan on the Chinese market is fully recognised by the Japanese themselves. On the other hand, China is a country which stands in the most urgent need of development in all fields of economic life, and Japan, which in 1931, notwithstanding the boycott, occupied the first place in her total foreign trade, seems more than any other foreign Power indicated as an ally in economic matters.

The interdependence of the trade of these two neighbouring countries and the interests of both call for an economic rapprochement, but there can be no such rapprochement so long as the political relations between them are so unsatisfactory as to call forth the use of military force by one and the economic force of the boycott by the other.

CHAPTER VIII.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA.¹

It has been shown in the preceding chapter that the economic requirements of Japan and China, unless disturbed by political considerations, would lead to mutual understanding and co-operation, and not to conflict. The study of the inter-relation between Japanese and Chinese economic interests in Manchuria, taken in themselves and apart from the political events of recent years leads to the same conclusion. The economic interests of both countries in Manchuria are not irreconcilable, indeed, their reconciliation is necessary if the existing resources and future economic possibilities of Manchuria are to be developed to the fullest extent.

In Chapter III the claim of Japanese public opinion that the resources, both actual and potential, of Manchuria are essential to the economic life of their country has been fully examined. The object of this chapter is to consider how far this claim is in conformity with economic facts.

Investments.

It is a fact that in South Manchuria, Japan is the largest foreign investor, whereas in North Manchuria the same is true of the U.S.S.R. Taking the three provinces as a whole, the Japanese investments are more important than those of the U.S.S.R. although it is difficult to say to what extent because of the impossibility of obtaining reliable comparative figures. As the subject of investments is examined in detail in an annex to this Report, a few essential figures will be sufficient to illustrate the relative importance of Japan, the U.S.S.R., and other countries as participating factors in the economic development of Manchuria.

According to a Japanese source of information, Japanese investments were estimated in 1928 at about Yen 1,500,000,000, a figure which, if correct, must have grown to-day to approximately Yen 1,700,000,000.² A Russian source puts Japanese investments at the present time at about Yen 1,500,000,000, for the whole of Manchuria inclusive of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and at about Yen 1,300,000,000 for the Three Provinces, the bulk of Japanese capital being invested in Liaoning Province.

With regard to the nature of these investments it will be found that the majority of the capital has been devoted to transportation enterprises

¹ See for this chapter Special Studies Nos. 2, 3, 6, 7.

² Another Japanese authority puts the total of Japanese investments in China, including Manchuria, in 1929 at a figure of approximately \$1,500,000,000.

(mainly railways), agriculture, mining, and forestry coming next. As a matter of fact, the Japanese investments in South Manchuria centre mainly round the South Manchuria Railway while the investments of the U.S.S.R. in the North are to a great extent, directly or indirectly, linked up with the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Foreign investments other than Japanese are more difficult to estimate, and in spite of the helpful assistance of those immediately interested, the information obtained by the Commission has been meagre. Most of the figures given by the Japanese are prior to 1917, and consequently out of date. For the U.S.S.R., as has been stated, no definite estimate is possible. With regard to other countries, a recent Russian estimate for North Manchuria only, which it has not been possible to verify, indicates Great Britain as the next largest investor with G.\$11,185,000, followed by Japan with G.\$9,229,400, the United States with G.\$8,220,000, Poland with G.\$5,025,000, France with G.\$1,760,000, Germany with G.\$1,235,000, and miscellaneous investments G.\$1,129,600, making a total of G.\$37,784,400. For South Manchuria similar figures are not available.

Japan's economic relations with Manchuria.

It is now necessary to analyse the part Manchuria plays in the economic life of Japan. A detailed study on this subject will be found in an Annex to this Report from which it will be seen that although this part is an important one, it is at the same time limited by circumstances which must not be overlooked.

It does not seem from past experience that Manchuria is a region suitable for Japanese emigration on a large scale. As already stated in Chapter II, the farmers and coolies from Shantung and Chihli, have in the last few decades taken possession of the soil. Japanese settlers are, and for many years will mostly be, business men, officials, salaried employees who have come to manage the investments of capital, the development of various enterprises, and the utilisation of natural resources.

Agriculture.

As regards her supplies of agricultural produce, Japan to-day depends on Manchuria mainly for the soya bean and its derivatives, the use of which as food stuff and as forage may even increase in the future. As a fertiliser, which is to-day one of its chief uses, its importance is likely to decrease with the growth of chemical industries in Japan. But the question of food supply is not at the moment acute for Japan, the acquisition of Korea and Formosa having helped to solve, at least for the time, her rice problem. If at some future date the need of this commodity becomes urgent for the Japanese Empire, Manchuria may be able to provide an additional source of supply. But in that case a large amount of capital would have to be spent in the development of a sufficient irrigation system.

Heavy industries.

Larger still, it seems, will be the amount of capital necessary for the creation of Japanese heavy industries, if these are destined to become independent of foreign countries, as a result of the utilisation of the resources of Manchuria. Japan seeks above all to develop in the Three Eastern Provinces the production of those raw materials which are indispensable to her national defence. Manchuria can supply her with coal, oil, and iron. The economic advantages, however, of such supplies are uncertain. For coal, only a comparatively small part of the production is utilised in Japan; oil is extracted from shale only in very limited quantities; while it would appear that iron is definitely produced at a loss. But economic considerations are not the only ones which influence the Japanese Government. The resources of Manchuria are intended to assist the development of an independent metallurgic system. In any case Japan must seek abroad a great part of her coke and certain non-siliceous ores. The Three Eastern Provinces may ensure greater security in the supplies of certain products which are indispensable for her national defence but heavy financial sacrifices may be involved in obtaining them. The strategic interests of Japan in Manchuria involved in this question have been mentioned elsewhere. Further, Manchuria is not likely to supply Japan with those raw materials which she needs most for her textile industries.

Manchuria as a market for Japanese products.

The Three Northeastern Provinces provide a regular market for Japanese manufactured goods, and the importance of this market may even increase with their growth in prosperity. But Osaka in the past has always depended more on Shanghai than on Dairen. The Manchurian market may perhaps offer more security but it is more restricted than the Chinese market.

The idea of "Economic Blocs" has penetrated to Japan from the West. The possibility of such a bloc comprising the Japanese Empire and Manchuria is often found in the writings of Japanese statesmen, professors and journalists. In an article written shortly before he took office, the present Minister of Commerce and Industry pointed to the formation in the world of such economic blocs, American, Soviet, European and British, and stated that Japan should also create with Manchuria such a bloc.

There is nothing at present to show that such a system is practicable. Some voices have recently been raised in Japan to warn their compatriots against dangerous illusions. Japan depends for the bulk of her commerce far less on Manchuria than she does on the United States, China proper and British India.

Manchuria may become in the future of great assistance to an over-populated Japan but it is as dangerous not to discern the limitations of its possibilities as it is to underestimate their value.

China's economic relations with Manchuria.

When studying the economic relations of the rest of China with her Three Eastern Provinces, it will be apparent that, contrary to what we have seen in the case of Japan, her chief earlier contribution to their development consisted in the sending of seasonal workers and permanent settlers to whom the great agricultural development of the country is due. More recently, however, particularly in the last decade, her participation in railway construction and in the development of mineral and forestry resources and in industry, trade and banking, has also shown a marked progress, the extent of which cannot be adequately shown due to lack of data. On the whole it may be said that the principal ties between Manchuria and the rest of China are racial and social rather than economic. It has been recalled in Chapter II that the present population of Manchuria is, in the main, drawn from recent immigrations. The spontaneous character of these immigrations show clearly how they have fulfilled a real need. They have been a consequence of famine, although they were encouraged to some extent by both the Japanese and Chinese.

The Japanese have for a number of years recruited Chinese labour for the Fushun mines, for the Dairen harbour works and for the construction of railway lines. But the number of Chinese thus recruited has always been very limited and this recruitment ceased in 1927, when it appeared that the local supplies of labour were sufficient.

The Provincial authorities in Manchuria have also on several occasions assisted the settlement of Chinese immigrants, although in practice these activities of the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces have only had a limited influence on immigration. The authorities in North China, and the charitable societies, have also in certain periods endeavoured to encourage the settlement of families in Manchuria.

The principal assistance received by the immigrants has been the reduced rates offered by the South Manchuria Railway, the Chinese lines, and the Chinese Eastern Railway. These encouragements given to newcomers showed that at least until the end of 1931, the South Manchuria Railway, the Manchurian provincial authorities and the Chinese Government regarded this exodus with favour. All of them profited by the peopling of the Three Eastern Provinces, although their interests in the movement were not always identical.

Emigrants, once settled in Manchuria, maintain their relations with their province of origin in China proper. This is best shown by a study of the remittances that the emigrants sent back to their families in the villages of their birth. It is impossible to estimate the total of these remittances, which are effected through banks, through the post and through money taken back by returning emigrants. It is believed that twenty million dollars are so taken annually into Shantung and Hopei,

while the Post Office statistics showed in 1928 that the Provinces of Liaoning and Kirin remitted to the Province of Shantung by money orders a sum equal to the amount remitted to that province by all the other provinces in China. There is no doubt that these remittances form an important economic link between Manchuria and China Proper. They are the index of the contact maintained between the emigrants and their families in the provinces of their origin. This contact is all the easier because conditions on either side of the Great Wall do not greatly differ. The produce of the soil is in the main the same and the agricultural methods identical. The most pronounced variations between agricultural conditions in Manchuria and in Shantung are caused by differences of climate, varying density of population and different states of economic development. These factors do not prevent the agriculture of the Three Eastern Provinces from tending to resemble more and more the agricultural conditions in Shantung. In Liaoning, a long settled territory, rural conditions resemble more closely those in Shantung than do those in Heilungkiang, a territory more recently opened up.

The organisation of direct trade with the agriculturalists in Manchuria resembles also the conditions in China proper. In the Three Provinces such commerce is in the hands of Chinese, who alone buy directly from the farmers. Similarly in the Three Provinces as in China proper, credit performs an important function in such local trade. One can even say that the resemblance in commercial organisation in Manchuria and China proper is found not only in local countryside trade but also in trade in the towns.

In fact, the social and economic Chinese organisation in Manchuria is a transplanted society which has kept the customs, dialect and activities of its home. The only changes necessary are those required to meet the conditions of a land more vast, less inhabited and more open to outside influences.

The question arises whether this mass migration has been merely an episode or whether it will continue in the future. When account is taken of the areas in South Manchuria and certain valleys in the south and east, as the Sungari, Liao and Mutanchiang Valleys, it is clear that from the purely agricultural point of view, Manchuria can still absorb numerous colonists. According to one of the best experts on the staff of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the population of Manchuria could reach in forty years a figure of 75,000,000.

But economic conditions may in the future limit the rapid growth of the population of Manchuria. Economic conditions in fact alone render the future of soya bean farming uncertain. On the other hand, crops recently introduced into Manchuria, especially rice farming, may develop there. The hopes which some Japanese have placed in the development of cotton growing seem to be subject to certain limitations. Consequently

economic and technical factors may to some extent limit the entry of newcomers into the Three Provinces.

The recent political events are not the only cause of the decline of Chinese migration into Manchuria. The economic crisis had already in the first six months of the year 1931, diminished the importance of the seasonal migration. The world depression added to the effect of an unavoidable local crisis. Once this economic crisis is over and order has been re-established, Manchuria may once more serve as an outlet for the population of China proper. The Chinese are the people best adapted for the colonisation of Manchuria. An artificial restriction of this migration by arbitrary political measures would be prejudicial to the interests of Manchuria as it would be to the interests of Shantung and Hopei.

The ties between Manchuria and the rest of China remain chiefly racial and social. At the same time economic ties are continuously becoming stronger, which is shown by the growing commercial relations between Manchuria and the rest of China. Nevertheless, according to Customs' returns, Japan remains the best customer and chief supplier of Manchuria, China proper occupying the second place.

The chief imports from Manchuria into the rest of China are the soya bean and its derivatives, coal and small amounts of groundnuts, raw silk, miscellaneous cereals and a very limited amount of iron, maize, wool, and timber. The chief exports to Manchuria from China proper are cotton piece goods, tobacco preparations, silken and other textiles, tea, cereals and seeds, raw cotton, paper and wheat flour.

Consequently China proper relies on Manchuria for certain foodstuffs, most important of which is the soya bean and its derivatives, but her imports of minerals with exception of coal and her imports of timber, animal products and raw materials for manufacturing purposes have in the past been slight. Furthermore, China proper is able to use only a portion of Manchuria's favourable balance to offset its own unfavourable balance. It is able to do this not by virtue of its political affiliation as such, as is generally thought, but chiefly because the Manchurian Post Offices and Customs have been highly profitable institutions and because of the substantial remittances of Chinese settlers to their families in Shanghai and Hopei.

Comments.

The resources of Manchuria are great, and as yet not fully ascertained. For their development they require population, capital, technical skill, organisation and internal security. The population is almost entirely supplied by China. Large numbers of the existing population were born in provinces of North China where their family ties are still very close. Capital, technical skill and organisation have hitherto chiefly been provided by Japan in South Manchuria and by Russia north of Changchun. Other foreign countries to a much smaller degree have interests throughout the

Three Provinces but principally in the large cities. Their representatives have exercised a conciliatory influence in the recent years of political tension, and will continue to do so, provided that Japan, as the dominating economic Power, does not attempt to monopolise the field. The all-important problem at the present time is the establishment of an administration, acceptable to the population and capable of supplying the last need—namely, the maintenance of law and order.

No foreign Power could develop Manchuria or reap any benefit from an attempt to control it without the good will and wholehearted co-operation of the Chinese masses which form the bulk of the population, tilling its soil, and supplying the labour for practically every enterprise in the country. Neither will China ever be free from anxiety and danger unless these northern Provinces cease to afford a battle ground for the conflicting ambitions of neighbouring Powers. It is as necessary therefore for China to satisfy the economic interests of Japan in this territory as for Japan to recognise the unalterably Chinese character of its population.

Maintenance of the Open Door.

Parallel to an understanding of this kind and in order to allow all interested Powers to co-operate in the development of Manchuria it seems essential that the principle of the Open Door should be maintained, not only from the legal point of view but also in the actual practice of trade, industry and banking. Amongst foreign business men in Manchuria other than Japanese there is a fear that Japanese business concerns will try to reap benefit from the present political position by other means than those of free competition. If this fear came to be justified, foreign interests would be discouraged and the population of Manchuria might be the first to suffer. The maintenance of a real Open Door manifested by free competition in the field of trade, investment, and finance, would be in the interest of both Japan and China.]

¹ In this connection it is necessary to mention the extraordinary extent to which goods are being smuggled into Manchuria, especially over the Korean border and through Dairen. Not only is this practice detrimental to the Customs revenue but it disorganises trade, and rightly or wrongly gives rise to the belief that the Power which has virtual control over the Customs Administration might discriminate against the trade of other Powers.

CHAPTER IX.

PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT.

Review of Previous chapters.

In the previous chapters of this Report it has been shown that, though the issues between China and Japan were not in themselves incapable of solution by arbitral procedure, yet the handling of them by their respective Governments, especially those relating to Manchuria, had so embittered their relations as sooner or later to make a conflict inevitable. A sketch has been given of China as a nation in evolution with all the political upheavals, social disorders, and disruptive tendencies inseparable from such a period of transition. It has been shown how seriously the rights and interests claimed by Japan have been affected by the weakness of the authority of the central government in China, and how anxious Japan has shown herself to keep Manchuria apart from the Government of the rest of China. A brief survey of the respective policies of the Chinese, Russian and Japanese Governments in Manchuria has revealed the fact that the administration of these Provinces has more than once been declared by their rulers to be independent from the central government of China, yet no wish to be separated from the rest of China has ever been expressed by their population, which is overwhelmingly Chinese. Finally, we have examined carefully and thoroughly the actual events which took place on and subsequent to September 18, 1931, and have expressed our opinion upon them.

Complexity of the problem.

A point has now been reached when attention can be concentrated on the future, and we would dismiss the past with this final reflection. It must be apparent to every reader of the preceding chapter that the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background, should entitle any one to express a definite opinion upon them. This is not a case in which one country has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighbouring country, because in Manchuria there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world.

The dispute has arisen between two States, both members of the League, concerning a territory the size of France and Germany combined, in which both claim to have rights and interests only some of which are clearly defined by international law; a territory which, although legally an integral part of China, had a local administration of sufficiently autonomous character to carry on direct negotiations with Japan on the matters which lay at the root of this conflict.

Conditions in Manchuria unparalleled elsewhere.

Japan controls a railway and a strip of territory running from the sea right up into the heart of Manchuria, and she maintains for the protection of that property a force of about 10,000 soldiers, which she claims the right by Treaty to increase, if necessary, up to 15,000. She also exercises the rights of jurisdiction over all her subjects in Manchuria, and maintains consular police throughout the country.

Diversity of interpretations.

These facts must be considered by those who debate the issues. It is a fact that without a declaration of war a large area of what was indisputably the Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan, and has in consequence of this operation been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China. The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed by Japan to have been consistent with the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, all of which were designed to prevent action of this kind. Moreover, the operation which had only just begun when the matter was first brought to the notice of the League was completed during the following months and is held by the Japanese Government to be consistent with the assurances given by their representative at Geneva on September 30 and December 10. The justification in this case has been that all the military operations have been legitimate acts of self-defence, the right of which is implicit in all the multilateral treaties mentioned above, and was not taken away by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League. Further, the administration which has been substituted for that of China in the Three Provinces is justified on the grounds that its establishment was the act of the local population who, by a spontaneous assertion of their independence, have severed all connection with China and established their own Government. Such a genuine independence movement, it is claimed, is not prohibited by any international treaty or by any of the resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations, and the fact of its having taken place has profoundly modified the application of the Nine Power Treaty and entirely altered the whole character of the problem being investigated by the League.

It is this plea of justification which makes this particular conflict at once so complicated and so serious. It is not the function of our Commission to argue the issue, but we have tried to provide sufficient material to enable the League of Nations to settle the dispute consistently with the honour, dignity and national interest of both the contending parties. Criticism alone will not accomplish this: there must also be practical efforts at conciliation. We have been at pains to find out the truth regarding past events in Manchuria, and to state it frankly; we recognise that this is only part, and by no means the most important part, of our work. We have throughout our mission offered to the Governments of both countries the help of the League of Nations in composing their differences, and we conclude it by offering to the League our suggestions for securing, consistently with justice and with peace, the permanent interests of China and Japan in Manchuria.

Unsatisfactory suggestions of settlement:

(1) Restoration of the *status quo ante*.

It must be clear from everything that we have already said that a mere restoration of the *status quo ante* would be no solution. Since the present conflict arose out of the conditions prevailing before last September, to restore these conditions would merely be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It would be to treat the whole question theoretically and to leave out of account the realities of the situation.

(2) The maintenance of "Manchukuo."

From what we have said in the two preceding chapters, the maintenance and recognition of the present regime in Manchuria would be equally unsatisfactory. Such a solution does not appear to us compatible with the fundamental principles of existing international obligations, nor with the good understanding between the two countries upon which peace in the Far East depends. It is opposed to the interests of China. It disregards the wishes of the people of Manchuria, and it is at least questionable whether it would ultimately serve the permanent interests of Japan.

About the feelings of the people of Manchuria towards the present regime there can really be no doubt; and China would not voluntarily accept as a lasting solution the complete separation of her Three Eastern Provinces. The analogy of the distant province of Outer Mongolia is not an entirely pertinent one, as Outer Mongolia is bound to China by no strong economic or social ties, and is sparsely inhabited by a population which is mainly non-Chinese. The situation in Manchuria is radically different from that in Outer Mongolia. The millions of Chinese farmers now settled permanently on the land have made Manchuria in many respects a

simple extension of China south of the Wall. The Three Eastern Provinces have become almost as Chinese in race, culture and national sentiment as the neighbouring Provinces of Hopei and Shantung, from which most of the immigrants came.

Apart from this, past experience has shown that those who control Manchuria have exercised a considerable influence on the affairs of the rest of China—at least of North China—and possess unquestionable strategic and political advantages. To cut off these Provinces from the rest of China, either legally or actually, would be to create for the future a serious irridentist problem which would endanger peace by keeping alive the hostility of China and rendering probable the continued boycott of Japanese goods.

The Commission received from the Japanese Government a clear and valuable statement of the vital interests of their country in Manchuria. Without exaggerating the economic dependence of Japan on Manchuria beyond the limits ascribed to it in a previous chapter, and certainly without suggesting that economic relationship entitles Japan to control the economic, still less the political development of those Provinces, we recognise the great importance of Manchuria in the economic development of Japan. Nor do we consider unreasonable her demand for the establishment of a stable government which would be capable of maintaining the order necessary for the economic development of the country. But such conditions can only be securely and effectively guaranteed by an administration which is in conformity with the wishes of the population and which takes full account of their feelings and aspirations. And equally is it only in an atmosphere of external confidence and internal peace, very different from that now existing in the Far East, that the capital which is necessary for the rapid economic development of Manchuria will be forthcoming.

In spite of the pressure of increasing over-population, the Japanese have not as yet fully utilised their existing facilities for emigration, and the Japanese Government has not hitherto contemplated a large emigration of their people to Manchuria. But the Japanese do look to further industrialisation as a means to cope with the agrarian crisis and with the population problem. Such industrialisation would require further economic outlets, and the only large and relatively sure markets that Japan can find are in Asia and particularly in China. Japan requires not only the Manchurian but the whole Chinese market, and the rise in the standard of living which will certainly follow the consolidation and modernisation of China should stimulate trade and raise the purchasing power of the Chinese market.

This economic rapprochement between Japan and China, which is of vital interest to Japan, is of equal interest to China, for China would find that a closer economic and technical collaboration with Japan would assist

her in her primary task of national reconstruction. China could assist this rapprochement by restraining the more intolerant tendencies of her nationalism and by giving effective guarantees that as soon as cordial relations were re-established the practice of organised boycotts would not be revived. Japan, on her side, could facilitate this rapprochement by renouncing any attempt to solve the Manchuria problem by isolating it from the problem of her relations with China as a whole, in such a way as to make impossible the friendship and collaboration of China.

It may, however, be less economic considerations than anxiety for her own security which has determined the actions and policy of Japan in Manchuria. It is especially in this connection that her statesmen and military authorities are accustomed to speak of Manchuria as "the life-line of Japan." One can sympathise with such anxieties and try to appreciate the actions and motives of those who have to bear the heavy responsibility of securing the defence of their country against all eventualities. While acknowledging the interest of Japan in preventing Manchuria from serving as a base of operations directed against her own territory, and even her wish to be able to take all appropriate military measures if in certain circumstances the frontiers of Manchuria should be crossed by the forces of a foreign Power, it may still be questioned whether the military occupation of Manchuria for an indefinite period, involving, as it must, a heavy financial burden, is really the most effective way of insuring against this external danger; and whether, in the event of aggression having to be resisted in this way, the Japanese troops in Manchuria would not be seriously embarrassed if they were surrounded by a restive or rebellious population backed by a hostile China. It is surely in the interest of Japan to consider also other possible solutions of the problem of security, which would be more in keeping with the principles on which rests the present peace organisation of the world, and analogous to arrangements concluded by other Great Powers in various parts of the world. She might even find it possible, with the sympathy and goodwill of the rest of the world, and at no cost to herself, to obtain better security than she will obtain by the costly method she is at present adopting.

International interests.

Apart from China and Japan, other Powers of the world have also important interests to defend in this Sino-Japanese conflict. We have already referred to existing multilateral treaties, and any real and lasting solution by agreement must be compatible with the stipulations of these fundamental agreements, on which is based the peace organisation of the world. The considerations which actuated the representatives of the Powers at the Washington Conference are still valid. It is quite as much in the interests of the Powers now as it was in 1922 to assist the reconstruction of China and to maintain her sovereignty and her territorial and

administrative integrity as indispensable to the maintenance of peace. Any disintegration of China might lead, perhaps rapidly, to serious international rivalries, which would become all the more bitter if they should happen to coincide with rivalries between divergent social systems. Finally, the interests of peace are the same the world over. Any loss of confidence in the application of the principles of the Covenant and of the Pact of Paris in any part of the world diminishes the value and efficacy of those principles everywhere.

Interests of U.S.S.R.

The Commission has not been able to obtain direct information as to the extent of the interests of the U.S.S.R. in Manchuria, nor to ascertain the views of the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the Manchurian question. But even without sources of direct information it cannot overlook the part played by Russia in Manchuria nor the important interests which the U.S.S.R. have in that region as owners of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and of the territory beyond its north and northeast frontiers. It is clear that any solution of the problem of Manchuria which ignored the important interests of the U.S.S.R. would risk a future breach of the peace and would not be permanent.

Conclusions.

These considerations are sufficient to indicate the lines on which a solution might be reached if the Governments of China and Japan could recognise the identity of their chief interests and were willing to make them include the maintenance of peace and the establishment of cordial relations with each other. As already stated, there is no question of returning to the conditions before September, 1931. A satisfactory regime for the future might be evolved out of the present one without any violent change. In the next chapter we offer certain suggestions for doing this, but we would first define the general principles to which any satisfactory solution should conform. They are the following:

Conditions of a satisfactory solution.

1. *Compatibility with the interests of both China and Japan.*

Both countries are members of the League and each is entitled to claim the same consideration from the League. A solution from which both did not derive benefit would not be a gain to the cause of peace.

2. *Consideration for the interests of U.S.S.R.*

To make peace between two of the neighbouring countries without regard for the interests of the third would be neither just nor wise, nor in the interests of peace.

is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Results which would follow from the fulfilment of these conditions.

If the present situation could be modified in such a way as to satisfy these conditions, and embody these ideas, China and Japan would have achieved a solution of their difficulties which might be made the starting point of a new era of close understanding and political co-operation between them. If such a rapprochement is not secured, no solution, whatever its terms, can really be fruitful. Is it really impossible to contemplate such a new relationship even in this hour of crisis? Young Japan is clamorous for strong measures in China and a policy of thoroughness in Manchuria. Those who make these demands are tired of the delays and pin-pricks of the pre-September period; they are impetuous, and impatient to gain their end. But even in Japan appropriate means must be found for the attainment of every end. After making the acquaintance of some of the more ardent exponents of this "positive" policy, and those especially who, with undoubted idealism and great personal devotion have constituted themselves the pioneers of a delicate undertaking in the "Manchukuo" regime, it is impossible not to realise that at the heart of the problem for Japan lies her anxiety concerning the political development of modern China, and the future to which it is tending. This anxiety has led to action with the object of controlling that development and steering its course in directions which will secure the economic interests of Japan and satisfy strategic requirements for the defence of her Empire.

Japanese opinion is nevertheless vaguely conscious that it is no longer practicable to have two separate policies, one for Manchuria and one for the rest of China. Even with her Manchurian interests as a goal, therefore, Japan might recognise and welcome sympathetically the renaissance of Chinese national sentiment; might make friends with it, guide it in her direction and offer it support, if only to ensure that it does not seek support elsewhere.

In China, too, as thoughtful men have come to recognise that the vital problem, the real national problem, for their country is the reconstruction and modernisation of the State, they cannot fail to realise that this policy of reconstruction and modernisation, already initiated with so much promise of success, necessitates for its fulfilment the cultivation of friendly relations with all countries, and above all with that great nation which is their nearest neighbour. China needs, in political and economic matters, the co-operation of all the leading Powers, but especially valuable to her would be the friendly attitude of the Japanese Government and the economic co-operation of Japan in Manchuria. All the other claims of her newly awakened nationalism—legitimate and urgent though they may be—should be subordinated to this one dominating need for the effective internal re-construction of the State.

3. *Conformity with existing multilateral treaties.*

Any solution should conform to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine Power Treaty of Washington.

4. *Recognition of Japan's interests in Manchuria.*

The rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria are facts which cannot be ignored, and any solution which failed to recognise them and to take into account also the historical associations of Japan with that country would not be a satisfactory.

5. *The establishment of new treaty relations between China and Japan.*

A re-statement of the respective rights interests and responsibilities of both countries in Manchuria in new treaties, which shall be part of the settlement by agreement, is desirable if future friction is to be avoided, and mutual confidence and co-operation is to be restored.

6. *Effective provision for the settlement of future disputes.*

As a corollary to the above, it is necessary that provision should be made for facilitating the prompt settlement of minor disputes as they arise.

7. *Manchurian autonomy.*

The government in Manchuria should be modified in such a way as to secure, consistently with the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China, a large measure of autonomy designed to meet the local conditions and special characteristics of the Three Provinces. The new civil regime must be so constituted and conducted as to satisfy the essential requirements of good government.

8. *Internal order and security against external aggression.*

The internal order of the country should be secured by an effective local gendarmerie force, and security against external aggression should be provided by the withdrawal of all armed forces other than gendarmerie and by the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between the countries interested.

9. *Encouragement of an economic rapprochement between China and Japan.*

For this purpose a new commercial treaty between the two countries is desirable. Such a treaty should aim at placing on an equitable basis the commercial relations between the two countries and bringing them into conformity with their improved political relations.

10. *International Co-operation in Chinese reconstruction.*

Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world, as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern; and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong central government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution.

CHAPTER X.

CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS TO THE COUNCIL.

Suggestions to facilitate a final solution.

It is not the function of the Commission to submit directly to the Governments of China and Japan recommendations for the solution of the present dispute. But, in order "to facilitate the final solution of existing causes of dispute between the two countries", to quote the words used by M. Briand when explaining to the Council the text of the resolution which originated the Commission, we now offer to the League of Nations, as the result of our studies, suggestions designed to help the appropriate organ of the League to draw up definite proposals for submission to the parties to the dispute. It should be understood that these suggestions are intended as an illustration of one way in which the conditions we have laid down in the preceding chapter might be met. They are mainly concerned with broad principles; they leave many details to be filled in and are susceptible of considerable modification by the parties to the dispute if they are willing to accept some solution on these lines.

Even if the formal recognition of "Manchukuo" by Japan should take place before our Report is considered in Geneva—an eventuality which we cannot ignore—we do not think that our work will have been rendered valueless. We believe that in any case the Council would find that our Report contains suggestions which would be helpful for its decisions or for its recommendations to the two great Powers concerned, with the object of satisfying their vital interests in Manchuria.

It is with this object that, whilst bearing in mind the principles of the League of Nations, the spirit and letter of the Treaties concerning China and the general interests of peace, we have not overlooked existing realities, and have taken account of the administrative machinery existing and in process of evolution in the Three Eastern Provinces. It would be the function of the Council, in the paramount interest of world peace, whatever may be the eventuality, to decide how the suggestions made in our Report may be extended and applied to events which are still developing from day to day; always with the object of securing a durable understanding between China and Japan by utilising all the sound forces, whether in ideals or persons, whether in thought or action, which are at present fermenting in Manchuria.

Invitation to the Parties to discuss settlement.

We suggest in the first place that the Council of the League should

invite the Governments of China and Japan to discuss a solution of their dispute on the lines indicated in the last chapter.

An Advisory Conference.

If the invitation is accepted, the next step would be the summoning as soon as possible of an Advisory Conference, to discuss and to recommend detailed proposals for the constitution of a special regime for the administration of the Three Eastern Provinces.

Such Conference, it is suggested, might be composed of representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Governments and of two delegations representing the local population, one selected in a manner to be prescribed by the Chinese Government and one selected in a manner to be prescribed by the Japanese Government. If agreed by the Parties, the assistance of neutral observers might be secured.

If the Conference were unable to reach agreement on any particular point, it would submit to the Council the point of difference, and the Council would then attempt to secure an agreed settlement on these points.

Simultaneously with the sitting of the Advisory Conference, the matters at issue between Japan and Chinese relating to respective rights and interests should be discussed separately, in this case also, if so agreed, with the help of neutral observers.

Finally, we suggest that the results of these discussions and negotiations should be embodied in four separate Instruments:

1. A Declaration by the Government of China constituting a special administration for the Three Eastern Provinces, in the terms recommended by the Advisory Conference;
2. A Sino-Japanese Treaty dealing with Japanese interests;
3. A Sino-Japanese Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration, Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance.
4. A Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty.

It is suggested that, before the meeting of the Advisory Conference, the broad outlines of the form of administration to be considered by that body should be agreed upon between the parties, with the assistance of the Council. Among the matters to be considered at that stage are the following:—

The place of meeting of the Advisory Conference, the nature of the representation, and whether or not neutral observers are desired;

The principle of the maintenance of the territorial and administrative integrity of China and the grant of a large measure of autonomy to Manchuria;

The policy of creating a special gendarmerie as the sole method of maintaining internal order;

The principle of settling the various matters in dispute by means of the separate treaties suggested;

The grant of an amnesty to all those who have taken part in the recent political developments in Manchuria.

When once these broad principles have been agreed upon beforehand, the fullest possible discretion as regards the details would be left to the

representatives of the parties at the Advisory Conference or when negotiating the treaties. Further reference to the Council of the League of Nations would only take place in the event of failure to agree.

Advantages claimed for the procedure.

Among the advantages of this procedure, it is claimed that, while it is consistent with the sovereignty of China, it will enable effective and practical measures to be taken to meet the situation in Manchuria as it exists to-day, and at the same time allow for such modifications hereafter as the changes in the internal situation in China may warrant. Notice, for instance, has been taken in this Report of certain administrative and fiscal changes which have either been proposed or actually carried out in Manchuria recently, such as the reorganisation of provincial governments, the creation of a central bank, the employment of foreign advisers. These features might be with advantage retained by the Advisory Conference. The presence at the Conference of representatives of the inhabitants of Manchuria, selected in some such way as we have suggested, should also facilitate the passage from the present to the new regime.

The autonomous regime contemplated for Manchuria is intended to apply to the three provinces of Liaoning (Fengtien), Kirin and Heilungkiang only. The rights at present enjoyed by Japan in the province of Jehol (Eastern Inner Mongolia) would be dealt with in the Treaty on the subject of Japanese interests.

The four Instruments can now be considered seriatim:—

1. The Declaration.

The final proposals of the Advisory Conference would be submitted to the Chinese Government, and the Chinese Government would embody them in a Declaration which would be transmitted to the League of Nations and to the signatory Powers of the Nine Power Treaty. The Members of the League and the signatory Powers of the Nine Power Treaty would take note of this Declaration, which would be stated to have for the Chinese Government the binding character of an international engagement.

The conditions under which subsequent revision of the Declaration, if required, might take place would be laid down in the Declaration itself as agreed to in accordance with the procedure suggested hereabove.

The Declaration would distinguish between the powers of the Central Government of China in the Three Eastern Provinces and those of the Autonomous Local Government.

Powers to be reserved to the Central Government.

It is suggested that the powers to be reserved to the Central Government should be the following:—

1. The control of general treaty and foreign relations not otherwise provided for; it being understood that the central government would not enter into any international engagements inconsistent with the terms of the Declaration.
2. The control of the Customs, the Post Office, and the Salt Gabelle, and possibly of the administration of the stamp duty and the tobacco and wine taxes. The equitable division, between the Central Government and the Three Eastern Provinces, of the net income from these revenues, would be determined by the Advisory Conference.
3. The power of appointment, at least in the first instance, of the Chief Executive of the Government of the Three Eastern Provinces in accordance with the procedure to be laid down in the Declaration. Vacancies would be filled in the same way, or by some system of selection in the Three Eastern Provinces, to be agreed upon by the Advisory Conference and inserted in the Declaration.
4. The power of issuing to the Chief Executive of the Three Eastern Provinces such instructions as might be necessary to ensure the carrying out of the international engagements entered into by the Central Government of China in matters under the administration of the autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces.
5. Any additional powers agreed upon by the Conference.

Powers of the local government.

All other powers would be vested in the autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces.

Expression of local opinion.

Some practical system might be devised to secure an expression of the opinion of the people on the policy of the Government, possibly through the traditional agency of the Chambers of Commerce, Guilds, and other civil organisations.

Minorities.

Some provision should also be made to safeguard the interests of White Russians and other minorities.

Gendarmerie.

It is suggested that a special gendarmerie should be organised, with the collaboration of foreign instructors, which would be the only armed force within the Three Eastern Provinces. The organisation of the gendarmerie should either be completed within a period to be specified in advance, or the time of its completion should be determined in accordance with a procedure to be laid down in the Declaration. As this special Corps would be the only armed force in the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces, its organisation, when completed, should be followed by the retirement from this territory of all other armed forces, including any special bodies of police or railway guards, whether Chinese or Japanese.

Foreign Advisers.

An adequate number of foreign advisers would be appointed by the Chief Executive of the autonomous Government, of whom a substantial proportion should be Japanese. The details would be worked out by

the procedure described above, and would be stated in the Declaration. Nationals of small States, as well as of the Great Powers, would be eligible.

The appointment of two foreigners of different nationalities to have supervision of (1) the constabulary, and (2) the fiscal administration, would be made by the Chief Executive from a panel submitted by the Council of the League. These two officials would have extensive powers during the period of organisation and trial of the new regime. The powers of the advisers would be defined in the Declaration.

The appointment of one foreigner as a general adviser to the Central Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces would be made by the Chief Executive from a panel submitted by the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements.

The employment of foreign advisers and officials is in conformity with the policy of the founder of the Chinese Nationalist Party, and with that of the present National Government. It will not, we hope, be difficult for Chinese opinion to recognise that the actual situation and the complexity of the foreign interests, rights and influences in these provinces require special measures in the interests of peace and good government. But it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the presence of the foreign advisers and officials here suggested, including those who, during the period of the organisation of the new regime, must exercise exceptionally wide powers, merely represents a form of international co-operation. They must be selected in a manner acceptable to the Chinese Government and one which is consistent with the sovereignty of China. When appointed they must regard themselves as the servants of the Government employing them, as has always been the case in the past with the foreigners employed in the Customs and Postal administration or with the technical organisations of the League that have collaborated with China. In this connection the following passage in the speech of Count Uchida in the Japanese Diet on August 25, 1932, is of interest:

"Our own Government, since the Meiji Restoration, have employed many foreigners as advisers or as regular officials; their number, for instance, in the year 1875 or thereabout, exceeded 500."

The point must also be stressed that the appointment of a relatively large number of Japanese advisers, in an atmosphere of Sino-Japanese co-operation, would enable such officials to contribute the training and knowledge specially suited to local conditions. The goal to be kept in view throughout the period of transition is the creation of a civil service composed entirely of Chinese, who will ultimately make the employment of foreigners unnecessary.

2. The Sino-Japanese Treaty dealing with Japanese Interests.

Full discretion would of course be left to those who will negotiate the three suggested treaties between China and Japan, but it may be useful to

indicate the matters with which it is suggested that they should deal.

The treaty dealing with Japanese interests in the Three Eastern Provinces and with some Japanese interests in the Province of Jehol would have to deal principally with certain economic rights of Japanese nationals and with railway questions.

Aims of the Treaty.

The aims of this Treaty should be:—

1. The free participation of Japan in the economic development of Manchuria, which would not carry with it a right to control the country either economically or politically;
2. The continuance in the Province of Jehol of such rights as Japan now enjoys there;
3. An extension to the whole of Manchuria of the right to settle and lease land, coupled with some modification of the principle of extraterritoriality;
4. An agreement regarding the operation of the railways.

Japanese rights of settlement.

Hitherto the rights of settlement of Japanese nationals have been confined to South Manchuria, though no definite boundary line between North and South Manchuria has ever been fixed, and to Jehol. These rights have been exercised under conditions which China found unacceptable, and this caused continued friction and conflicts. Extraterritorial status as regards taxation and justice was claimed both for the Japanese and the Koreans, and in the case of the latter there were special stipulations which were ill-defined and the subject of disputes. From evidence given before the Commission we have reason to believe that China would be willing to extend to the whole of Manchuria the present limited right of settlement, provided it was not accompanied by extraterritorial status, the effect of which, it was claimed, would be to create a Japanese State in the heart of a Chinese territory.

It is obvious that the right of settlement and extraterritoriality are closely associated. It is, however, equally clear that the Japanese would not consent to abandon their extraterritorial status until the administration of justice and finance had reached a very much higher standard than has hitherto prevailed in Manchuria.

Two methods of compromise have suggested themselves. One is that the existing rights of settlement, accompanied by extraterritorial status, should be maintained and that such rights should be extended both to Japanese and Koreans in North Manchuria and Jehol without extraterritorial status. The other is that the Japanese should be granted the right to settle anywhere in Manchuria and Jehol with extraterritorial status, and that the Koreans should have the same rights without extraterritorial status. Both proposals have some advantages to recommend them, and both have rather serious objections. It is obvious that the most satisfactory solution of the problem is to make the administration of these

Provinces so efficient that extraterritorial status will no longer be desired. It is with this object that we recommend that at least two foreign advisers, one of whom should be of Japanese nationality, should be attached to the Supreme Court, and other advisers might with advantage be attached to other Courts. The opinions of these advisers might be made public in all cases in which the Courts were called upon to adjudicate on matters in which foreign nationals were involved. We also think that in the period of reorganisation some foreign supervision of the administration of finance is desirable, and, in dealing with the Declaration, we have presented some suggestions to that effect.

A further safeguard would be provided by the establishment, under the Treaty of Conciliation, of an Arbitration Tribunal to deal with any complaints which the Chinese or Japanese Governments might bring in their own names or in those of their nationals.

The decision of this complicated and difficult question must rest with the parties negotiating the Treaty, but the present system of foreign protection, when applied to a minority group as numerous as the Koreans, who are, moreover, increasing in number, and who live in such close touch with the Chinese population, is bound to produce many occasions of irritation, leading to local incidents and foreign intervention. In the interests of peace it is desirable that this fruitful source of friction should be removed.

Any extension of the rights of settlement in the case of Japanese would apply on the same conditions to the nationals of all other Powers which enjoy the benefits of a "Most Favoured Nation" clause, provided that those Powers whose nationals enjoy extraterritorial rights enter into a similar treaty with China.

Railways.

As regards railways, it has been pointed out in Chapter III that there has been little or no co-operation in the past between the Chinese and Japanese railway builders and authorities directed to achieving a comprehensive and mutually beneficial railway plan. It is obvious that if future friction is to be avoided, provisions must be made in the Treaty at present under discussion for bringing to an end the competitive system of the past, and substituting a common understanding as regards freights and tariffs on the various systems. The subject is discussed in the special Study No. 1, annexed to this Report. In the opinion of the Commission there are two possible solutions, which could be considered either as alternatives or as stages to one final solution. The first, which is the more limited in scope, is a working agreement between the Chinese and Japanese railway administrations, which would facilitate their co-operation. China and Japan might agree to manage their respective railway systems in Manchuria on the principle of co-operation, and a joint Sino-Japanese Railway

Commission, with at least one foreign adviser, might exercise functions analogous to those of Boards which exist in some other countries. A more thorough remedy would be provided by an amalgamation of the Chinese and Japanese railway interests. Such an amalgamation, if it could be agreed upon, would be the true mark of that Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, to secure which is one of the objects of this Report. While safeguarding the interests of China, it would place at the disposal of all the railways in Manchuria the benefit of the great technical experience of the South Manchuria Railway and could be evolved without difficulty from the system which has been applied to the railways of Manchuria in the last few months. It might even pave the way in the future to some wider international agreement which might include the Chinese Eastern Railway. Though a fairly detailed description of such an amalgamation is to be found in the appendix as an example of the sort of thing that might be done, only direct negotiations between the parties could evolve a detailed scheme. Such a solution of the railway question would make the South Manchuria Railway a purely commercial enterprise, and the security provided by the special corps of gendarmerie, when once this body was fully organised, would enable the railway guards to be withdrawn, thus saving a considerable item of expense. If this is done, it would be well that special land regulations and a special municipal administration should previously be instituted in the Railway area in order to safeguard the vested interests of the South Manchuria Railway and of Japanese nationals.

If a treaty on these lines could be agreed upon, a legal basis for Japanese rights in the Three Eastern Provinces and in Jehol would have been found which would be at least as beneficial to Japan as the present Treaties and Agreements, and one which would be more acceptable to China. China might then find no difficulty in recognising all the definite grants made to Japan by such Treaties and Agreements as those of 1915, unless abrogated or modified by the new treaty. All minor rights claimed by Japan, the validity of which may be open to dispute, should be the subject of agreement. In case of disagreement resort should be made to the procedure outlined in the Treaty of Conciliation.

3. The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration, Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance.

It is not necessary to describe in any detail the subject matter of this Treaty, of which there are many precedents and existing examples.

Such a treaty would provide for a Board of Conciliation whose functions would be to assist in the solution of any difficulties as they arise between the Governments of China and Japan. It would also establish an Arbitration Tribunal composed of persons with judicial experience and the necessary knowledge of the Far East. This tribunal would deal with any disputes between the Chinese and Japanese Governments regarding the

interpretation of the Declaration or of the new treaties, and with such other categories of disputes as might be specified in the Treaty of Conciliation.

Finally, in conformity with the provisions for Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance inserted in the Treaty, the contracting parties should agree that Manchuria should gradually become a demilitarised area. With this object it would be provided that after the organisation of the gendarmerie had been effected any violation of the demilitarised territory by either of the parties or by a third party would constitute an act of aggression entitling the other party, or both parties in the case of a third party attack, to take whatever measures might be deemed advisable to defend the demilitarised territory, without prejudice to the right of the Council of the League to take action under the Covenant.

If the Government of the U.S.S.R. desired to participate in the Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance section of such a treaty, the appropriate clauses could be embodied in a separate tripartite agreement.

4. The Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty.

The Commercial Treaty would naturally have as its object the establishment of conditions which would encourage as much as possible the exchange of goods between China and Japan, while safeguarding the existing treaty rights of other countries. This treaty should also contain an undertaking by the Chinese Government to take all measures within its power to forbid and repress organised boycott movements against Japanese trade, without prejudice to the individual rights of Chinese consumers.

Comments.

The above suggestions and considerations regarding the objects of the proposed Declaration and Treaties are submitted for the consideration of the Council of the League. Whatever may be the details of future agreements, the essential point is that negotiations should be begun as soon as possible and should be conducted in a spirit of mutual confidence.

Our work is finished.

Manchuria for a year past has been given over to strife and turmoil.

The population of a large, fertile and rich country has been subjected to conditions of distress such as it has probably never experienced before.

The relations between China and Japan are those of war in disguise, and the future is full of anxiety.

We have reported the circumstances which have created these conditions.

Everyone is fully aware of the gravity of the problem which confronts the League of Nations, and of the difficulties of the solution.

At the moment of concluding our Report we read in the press two statements by the Foreign Ministers of China and Japan, from each of which we would extract one point of the utmost importance.

On August 28 Mr. Lo Wei-kan declared at Nanking:

"China is confident that any reasonable proposal for the settlement of the present situation will necessarily be compatible with the letter and spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the anti-war Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty, as well as with China's sovereign power, and will also effectively secure a durable peace in the Far East."

On August 30 Count Uchida is reported to have declared at Tokyo:

"The Government considers the question of Sino-Japanese relations as more important than the question of Manchuria and Mongolia."

We cannot close our Report more appropriately than by reproducing here the thought underlying these two statements, so exactly does it correspond with the evidence we have collected, with our own study of the problem, and consequently with our own convictions, so confident are we that the policy indicated by these declarations, if promptly and effectively applied, could not fail to lead to a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian question in the best interests of the two great countries of the Far East and of humanity in general.

國聯調查團報告書

中英文合刊本