

THOUGHTS

ON



MILITARY ORGANISATION.

BY AN

EX-PRIVATE

H. M.'s 5th Fusiliers.



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# I N D E X.

*on numbers*

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## P R E F A C E

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AT the present time when Military Organization is creating so much interest, perhaps I may not be considered vain if I offer a brief summary of some original thoughts on the subject, on the plea of the deep interest I take in the welfare and prosperity of Great Britain and the glory of her arms.

I cannot recommend my pamphlet as emanating from an Officer of high standing and long experience, as it is only the production of my own brain, and I was a short time since a humble private in Her Majesty's 5th Fusiliers; but during my period of service, about two years and a half, I read many works on my profession, and pondered deeply over their contents,—the result is, that I have come to the conclusion that the present system of organization labors under many disadvantages which can easily be remedied. I will enumerate the most prominent of these disadvantages, and their respective remedies will be found in the body of my pamphlet.

1st. —Immense unnecessary outlay, and insufficient number of defenders.

2nd —The system of bounties to recruits productive of desertion.

3rd.—Difficulty of obtaining recruits and want of inducement to men, who are entitled to claim their discharge, to remain in the service.

4th.—Exposing raw recruits to contact with European hostile troops.

5th.—Enormous difference between the paper force and real force of the Militia.

6th.—Want of proper proportion of the different arms, and want of proper organization owing to the regimental system

7th.—Want of mutual reliance and good feeling between European and Native troops.

8th.—Want of proper state of preparation for war at a moment's notice, whereby are caused the disgraceful ~~ab~~ullitions of public panic at the prospect of invasion at home, or of rebellion here.

I feel certain that my Pamphlet contains propositions which, if carried into effect, would remove all these evils, and therefore, I confidently launch it before the eyes of a public, the majority of whom are Military men, some of great reputation in both the field and the Cabinet, and this I do without any fear but that the verdict of the discriminating will be favorable to me.

Perhaps I owe some apology to a certain high personage, to whom I sent a short epitome of the

reflections contained in this pamphlet, and to whom I offered the credit of them; but as that was done in the beginning of August last, and as I have not received any reply, I think I am justified in assuming that my paper has been consigned to oblivion, and consequently I have embodied my thoughts and presented them to the Public in this form.







# THOUGHTS

ON

## MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

### CHAPTER I.

1. The total amount of troops required and obtained by my system of organization is as follows:—

Infantry	{	120 European Regts., ...	120,000	Men.	
		20 Do. Depôt Battns., ...	24,000	„	144,000
		96 Native Regts, ...	96,000	-	
		16 Do. Depôt Battns., ...	19,200	„	115,200
Cavalry	{	24 European Regts.,...	24,000		
		4 Do. Depôt Squadrons,...	4,800	„	28,800
		12 Native Regts, ...	12,000		
		2 Do. Depôt Squadrons,...	2,400	„	11,400
Engi- neers	{	6 European Regts., ...	6,000		
		1 Do. Depôt Battn., ...	1,200	„	7,200
Military Train	{	6 Do. Regts., ...	6,000		
		1 Do. Depôt Squadron,...	1,200	„	7,200
Artillery	{	108 Do. Batteries or 864 guns,	21,600		
		18 Do. depôt Battns. or 216 guns,	5,400	„	27,000
Militia (as at present,)				...	80,000
Rifle Volunteers (as at present)				...	150,000
Veteran Reserve (a force of my own proposition explain- ed further on,)				...	100,000
					673,800

Which may be briefly summed up as follows:—

British Regulars,	...	223,200 Men and 1,080 guns.
Do. Veterans,	...	100,000
Do. Irregulars,	...	230,000
Native Regulars,	...	129,600

or a Total of ... 673,800 Men with 1,080 guns, exclusive of Officers, Serjeants, Horse Guards and Marines, and supposing Colonial Corps to be suppressed.

I have supposed regiments of Infantry and Cavalry to consist of 10 companies or troops, and Depot battalions and squadrons of 12 companies or troops. The same may be said of the Engineers and Military Train. Batteries of Artillery consist of 8 guns and Depot batteries of 12 guns.

2. The cost of this enormous number of armed men is purposely over-estimated below:

		per annum.	
Infantry	{ 120 European Regts.,	at £40,000	£4,800,000
	{ 20 Do. Depot Battns,	„ 50,000	1,000,000
	{ 96 Native Regts.,	„ 20,000	1,920,000
	{ 16 Do. Depot Battns.,	„ 30,000	480,000
Cavalry	{ 24 European Regts.,	„ 60,000	1,440,000
	{ 4 Do. Depot Squadrons,	„ 70,000	280,000
	{ 12 Native Regts.,	„ 30,000	360,000
	{ 2 Do. Depot Squadrons,	„ 35,000	70,000
Engrs.	{ 6 European Regts.,	„ 100,000	600,000
	{ 1 Do. Depot Battn.,	„ 120,000	120,000
Military Train,	{ 6 Do. Regts.,	„ 80,000	480,000
	{ 1 Do. Depot Squadron,	„ 100,000	100,000
Carried over ...			11,650,000

				Brought forward ...	11,650,000
				per annum.	
Artillery,	{ 108 Batteries		at	£20,000	£2,160,000
	{ 18 Depot Batteries		„	35,000	630,000
Militia,	...	...	...	...	1,000,000
Rifle Volunteers,	...	...	...	...	100,000
Veteran Reserve,	...	...	...	...	1,000,000
Staff,	...	...	...	...	2,000,000
Recruiting Service,	...	...	...	...	500,000
Miscellaneous Expenditure,	...	...	...	...	1,000,000
			Grand Total,	...	<u>£ 20,010,000</u>

Hence we see that our Land Forces might be greatly increased and maintained at no greater, if not less, expense than at present, for the above grand total expresses the sum to be paid between Great Britain, India, and all other British possessions and Colonies.

*Note.*—In estimating numerical strength, I have not counted staff and other Officers, Horse Guards and Marines, but in estimating expense, all are included except the two latter; but the wide margin left by my purposely over-estimated outlay on each regiment, battalion, squadron, and battery, will include their cost, and also any other minor disbursements which I have not entered into, further than allowing one million for miscellaneous expenditure. But, at the same time, I must acknowledge that I have not included *dead weight*.

## CHAPTER II.

Soldiers who have completed their period of 10 years' service, should be allowed to re-engage themselves for a further period of 10 years in the Guards, or 15 years in the Veteran Reserve:

The inducement to enter the Guards to be, that they should there receive 6*d.* per diem more than other soldiers, and never quit the British and Ionian Isles, Gibraltar and Malta, except in case of war. The Guards to consist of an entire corps, which word, as I accept it, is explained further on.

The inducement to enter the Veteran Reserve to be, that they should receive a quarterly payment of £1, and assemble for drill at appointed places one week before each payment is due, receiving Guards' pay when so assembled. The appointed places above mentioned, or Depôts, should be five in number, situated, two in England, two in Ireland, and one in Scotland. Central positions, easy of access, should be selected. Men joining the Veteran Reserve should be named after the year; *e.g.*, the Reserve of 1861, the Reserve of 1862, &c., &c. They are liable, in time of war, to be sent to any Regiment in the field; to supply losses occasioned by the sword and by sickness, when they should receive Guards' pay. The Reserve of each year should be embodied for drill separately, and, in case of war, the Reserve having yet

five years to serve, should be the first employed in the field: the Senior Reserves should be added to the troops doing home duty. The officering necessary for this arm, is one Colonel and usual regimental staff at each Depôt, besides a Captain to each arm, and a Subaltern to each branch of every arm, with a permanent Non-commissioned staff. The whole five Depôts to be under a Major General Commandant, having an office at the Horse Guards, to whom a Brigadier General, acting as Inspector General of the Veteran Reserve should make his reports.

This new arm would make a vast addition to Great Britain's strength at very little expense, owing to the small number of Officers required, and added to the honorable position of the Guards, would, I confidently believe, induce old soldiers to remain in the service, and recruits to enlist without bounty other than a free kit. The veterans would in a few years become so numerous, that the greatest war England might be engaged in, would not exhaust this ever-increasing supply of tried and experienced soldiers. Thus, are the four first disadvantages simply and efficaciously remedied.

Lately, from ten to fifteen thousand good soldiers have taken their discharge under Her Majesty's Warrant; these could be regained to the service by allowing them to join the Veteran Reserve and ante-dating them, so that their whole service shall

amount to 25 years. For instance, a man having joined the Reserve this year, after the usual period of 10 years' service, would belong to the Reserve of 1861, and would not be discharged until 1876, but suppose a man, who has served 15 years, joins the Reserve this year, put him in the Reserve of 1856, so that his service will terminate in 1871, and so on. England will thus regain many tried and valiant men who have now left, in disgust, a service in which they have been well tested before the enemy, and in which they have braved many years existence in most unhealthy climates, and, after all, found themselves in no better position than they were the first day they put on a red coat and paraded themselves to the wondering admiration of other bumpkins.

2. It is well known how enormous is the difference between the paper force and real force of the Militia (the fifth disadvantage mentioned in the preface), owing to the large number of absentees. I myself have heard men, now in the Regulars, boast that they belonged to two or three Militia corps at one and the same time. To obviate this evil, and to facilitate the arrest of absentees, I have hit on the following expedient.

Let there be Depôts for companies of Militia instead of for battalions as at present, thereby increasing the number of Militia Depôts twelve fold (supposing a battalion to consist of twelve companies), in order

that no recruit may be enlisted unless he reside in the immediate neighbourhood of the Depôt. These twelve Depôts should be established at nearly equidistant points from some central place selected for the annual exercise of the whole battalion.

As regards the drill of the Militia, it would be advisable, in my opinion, that no recruit should be discharged from his Depôt until he is thoroughly acquainted with the "big gun drill," battalion and light infantry drill, to be taught subsequently at the usual annual periods. This, because it is universally recognised as one of the first principles of war, that when Militia or other than regular troops are employed, they should, whenever practicable, fight behind walls, leaving the open field for the Regulars.

And now for a few words on a new arm whose existence does honor, alike to Queen, Government, and country,—the greatest proof of England's greatness—her Volunteer Riflemen! Government should foster them with care, for, in case of invasion, neither stone fortifications nor Regulars themselves would be so efficient in the defence of their country; numerous and ubiquitous, they would cut off all supplies, so that no enemy could advance far into the interior of the country. How to foster them is simply to give them arms, organize the different companies into battalions, and name places of assembly for each battalion in case of invasion, and, further,

nurse their Military ardour, and cause them to feel their worth and strength by making them take part in all Military pageants.

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### CHAPTER III.

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1. In order to obviate the sixth disadvantage, or, in other words, to introduce a good organization into the army, and arrange the proper proportion of each arm, I divide the whole Regular force, European and Native, into six corps, which will permanently garrison the places specified against their respective names.

*1st.*—The Corps of Guards.—(British and Ionian Isles, Gibraltar, and Malta.)

*2nd.*—The Colonial Corps.—(All Colonies and possessions not particularly specified.)

*3rd.*—The Bengal Corps.—(Bengal Proper, Behar and Orissa; the North East Frontier and Burmah.)

*4th.*—The Madras Corps.—(Madras, Ceylon, Singapore, and British possessions in China.)

*5th.*—The Bombay Corps.—(Bombay, Mauritius, Aden, and Perim.)

*6th.*—The North West India Corps.—(The North Western Provinces.)

I mean by the word corps, the undermentioned troops which are calculated in the proportion of



Infantry to Cavalry as 6 to 1 ; somewhat more than 1 field gun to every 1000 fighting men, and siege guns to field guns as 2 to 1, with a battalion or regiment of Engineers, and one of Military Train to each corps.

Infantry (6 divns. of 2 bgds. of 3 regts. each) ...	36,000 men.
Cavalry (1 Do. of 3 Do. of 2 Do. each) ...	6,000 „
Engineers (1 regiment) ... ..	1,000 „
Military Train (1 regiment) ... ..	1,000 „
Field Artillery (6 battrs. of 8 guns each=48 guns)	1,200 „
Siege Artillery (12 Do. 8 Do. =96 „)	2,400 „
144 guns	47,600 men.

That is, 47600 men with 48 field and 96 siege guns, form the strength of a corps in garrison; but supposing war to be declared, it marches to the field at moments notice, leaving behind 2 companies or troops out of each regiment of Infantry and Engineers, Cavalry and Military train, and 2 guns out of each battery of Artillery, thus avoiding the necessity of waiting to be relieved. Its strength in the field will then be as follows :—

Infantry (6 divns. of 2 bgds. of 3 regts. each) ...	28,800 men.
Cavalry (1 Do. of 3 Do. of 2 Do. each) ...	4,800 „
Engineers (1 regiment) ... ..	800 „
Military Train (1 regiment) ... ..	800 „
Field Artillery (6 battrs. of 6 guns each=36 guns)	900 „
Siege Artillery (12 Do. of 6 Do. each=72 „)	1,800 „
108 guns	37,900 men.

that is to say, 37,900 men, 36 field and 72 siege guns.

The force left in garrison will, by my method, be as follows :—

Infantry (2 comp. out of each of 36 regts.)	...	7,200 men.
Cavalry (2 troops out of each of 6 Do.)	...	1,200 „
Engineers (2 companies)	... ..	200 „
Military Train (2 companies)	... ..	200 „
Field Artillery (2 guns out of each, of 6 battns.=12 guns)	... ..	300 „
Siege Artillery (2 Ditto 12 Do.=24 Do.)	...	600 „
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	36 guns	9,700 men.

That is to say:

	9,700 men, 12 field and 24 siege guns.
Add field strength ...	37,900 do. 36 Do. and 72 Do.
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Garrison strength ...	47,600 Men, 48 field and 96 siege guns,
	thus proving my calculations to be correct.

I will now enter into the subject of the branches or sub-divisions of each arm, shewing the service each is intended for, and the most fitting arming and equipment to carry out such service.

2. The six Infantry divisions of a corps should consist of 1 division of Grenadiers, 1 of Light Infantry, 1 of Rifles, and 3 divisions of ordinary Foot. These should not merely be so called, but be composed of men adapted for their respective duties, which are, as I am about to show, totally different from each other.

Grenadiers and Light Infantry form a reserve in battle. In case of victory, they press rapidly in pur-

suit of the foe, in order not to give him time to re-organize his shattered masses; in case of defeat, they show a bold front and cover the retreat of their corps, eagerly watching an opportunity to make a daring dash to reverse the fortune of the day. In besieging a place, they protect the camp from any force sent to raise the siege, and cover the working parties until the assault is to be given, which honorable duty falls to their share. The standard for Grenadiers should be from 5 feet 9 inches, upwards, while that of the Light Infantry should be from 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 9 inches; the Grenadiers should be armed as at present, but Light Infantry should be armed like the Rifles, whose duty they will have to perform when sent on detached expeditions or in similar situations.

Rifles have the same duty to perform as at present, and therefore require to be from 5 feet 5½ inches to 5 feet 7 inches. Care should be taken to select none but good broad-chested men for this branch, as they have much running to perform, such as seizing advantageous positions by a rush, and running from extended order into square to defend themselves from advancing Cavalry.

The fourth class of Infantry, which I call simply "foot," form the line of battle, work in the trenches and find garrisons for captured towns or forts. They may range from 5 feet 4 inches to 5 feet 5½ inches.

3. The division of Cavalry in each corps consists of one brigade of Dragoons, one of Lancers, and one of Mounted Rifles.

Dragoons oppose and ride down hostile Cavalry, and therefore require to be heavy men, mounted on heavy horses. The Dragoon should stand from 5 feet 8 inches to 5 feet 10 inches, and his horse from 16 hands upwards. His arms should be an effective cut and thrust sabre and two Colt's five barrel holster pistols, but no carbine; it is only an encumbrance for his particular duty.

Lancers, besides opposing hostile Cavalry, have to charge infantry in square, and pursue the foe. They should range from 5 feet 6½ inches to 5 feet 8 inches, and their horses from 15½ to 16 hands; besides the arms of the Dragoons, they should have a lance, as their name denotes.

Mounted Rifles have duties to perform corresponding to those of their dismounted brethren; for them the short rifle takes the place of the lance. They should range from 5 feet 5 inches to 5 feet 6½ inches, and their horses from 15 to 15½ hands high.

4. The Military train is at present in as effective a state as it can be, and, therefore, I shall say nothing regarding it. The same remark applies to the Engineers, and, I would suggest that both these arms should be extensively used in time of peace, in order

that Officers and men may obtain practical experience in addition to their theoretical knowledge. .

5. The division of Artillery of each corps consists of 12 batteries of siege, and 6 of field Artillery; the latter is further subdivided into two troops of Horse Artillery and 4 field batteries.

Horse Artillery skirmish and pursue the foe; the troops should consist of Armstrong's 9-pounders with two 12-pounder howitzers.

Field batteries are guns of position in the field; they should consist of 18-pounders (Armstrong's) with two 24-pounder howitzers.

Siege Artillery batteries should consist of 32-pounders (Armstrong's) with two 10-inch mortars per battery.

In reckoning the strength of batteries and troops of Artillery, I have allowed 25 men per gun, in order that they may be able to cover their own guns; field and siege batteries to do so as Infantry, while horse Artillery do so as Cavalry. It would also be advisable to teach Artillery-men how to construct their own batteries, flying bridges, and pontoon-trains.

6. The whole army in England and India to be commanded as at present; each corps to be under a Lieutenant-General, each division under a Major-General, each brigade under a Brigadier-General, each regiment under a Colonel. Thus, I would abolish the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and the

anomalous position of a staff Colonel with its attendant absurdities of local and temporary rank; but I would convert the Brigadier-General into effective rank. The number of Generals to be limited to 5; that of Lieutenant-Generals 25; that of Major-Generals 200; that of Brigadier-Generals 400.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge seems so thoroughly to understand the requirements of Staff Officers, and is daily making such rapid strides to perfection, that I will not presume to make any suggestion concerning them.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

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In order to obviate the seventh disadvantage, that is to say, in order to cause Europeans and Natives to regard each other with good feeling and mutual reliance, I would brigade them permanently together. Thus, each Infantry brigade would consist of one European and two Native Regiments, while each Cavalry brigade would consist of one European and one Native regiment. The indefinable feeling termed "esprit-de-corps" would pervade every brigade, and clench the bonds of friendship between whites and blacks. I will not enter into the question of the advisability of officering Native troops from among the Native gentry, but I will say, with all men of

common sense, that the present anomalous position of Native Officers cannot be too soon altered.

The Artillery, Engineers, and Military train to consist of Europeans only, to avoid fear of mutiny.

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## CHAPTER V.

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The force in the British and Ionian Isles, Gibraltar and Malta would, according to my method, be as follows :—

Depôt Troops.	{	Infantry (20 battalions) ...	24,000	
		Cavalry (4 squadrons) ...	4,800	
		Engineers (1 battalion) ...	1,200	
		Military Train (1 squadron) ...	1,200	
		Field Arty. (6 batteries or 72 guns)	1,800	
		Siege Artillery (12 Do. or 144 <del>Do.</del> )	3,600	
			36,600	
Corps of Guards.	{	Infantry (36 regiments) ...	36,000	
		Cavalry (6 Do.) ...	6,000	
		Engineers (1 Do.) ...	1,000	
		Military Train (1 Do.) ...	1,000	
		Field Arty. (6 batteries or 48 guns)	1,200	
		Siege Arty. (12 Do. or 96 Do.) ...	2,400	
			47,600	
		Militia, ...		80,000
		Volunteers, ..		150,000
		Veteran Reserve, ...		100 000
		Grand Total ...		414 200

with 120 field and 240 siege guns.

The force in the Colonies would be an entire

corps, that is, 47,600 men, 48 field and 96 siege guns, exclusive of Marines.

The force in India, Ceylon, Mauritius, Aden, Perim, Singapore, British possessions in Burmah and China would be as follows

Europeans.	}	Infantry (48 regiments)	...	48,000	
		Cavalry (12 Do.)	...	12,000	
		Engineers (4 Do.)	...	4,000	
		Military Train (4 Do.)	...	4,000	
		Field Artillery (24 batteries or 192 guns)	...	4,800	
		Siege Artillery (48 Do. or 384 guns)	..	9,600—	82,400
Natives.	}	Infantry (96 regiments)	..	96,000	
		Do. (16 Depôt Battalions)	...	19,200	
		Cavalry (12 regiments)	...	12,000	
		Do. (2 Depôt Squadrons)	..	2,400—	129,600
					<hr/>
					212,000

with 192 field and 384 siege guns

Now if I add up these three totals, I shall prove the correctness of my calculations by comparing the sum with the number stated as the whole supposed force in Chapter I, Section 1.

Great Britain &c.	414,200	Men,	120	Field	and	240	Siege Guns.
Colonies	...	47,600	,,	48	Do.	96	Do.
India, &c.	...	212,000	,,	192	Do.	384	Do.

Total ... 673,800 men, 360 field and 720 siege guns, or in all 1080 guns, which will be found to tally exactly with the amount stated in Chapter I, Section 1.



C O N C L U S I O N .

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My plan of having the army ready organized and subdivided into corps, divisions, and brigades under their respective Commanders, and also the method of leaving behind a portion of each regiment and battery when a corps is about to take the field, obviates the eighth disadvantage, that is to say, from one end of the army to the other, every company, troop and battery could march to the field of action at a minute's notice.

The huge force in and near Great Britain, precludes all attempts, and fear of attempts at invasion.

The large proportion of European Troops in India, and the good feeling which will spring up between whites and blacks, by brigading them permanently together, will likewise preclude all attempts and fear of attempts at rebellion. Natives of all races and creeds should be enlisted, whether Sikh, Goorkah, Poorbeah, Burmese, or Kookee; whether Brahmin, Chumar, Pariah, Mussulman, Bhuddist, or Christian; and they should be sent indiscriminately to all the four Indian Corps, but, as the Natives dislike certain parts of India, it would but be fair to let them frequently change stations, even from one Presidency to another, and thus be continually circling round India. But at the same time, I would recommend all such changes of station to be made by the brigade

and never by the regiment, so that the Sepoys may not be separated from their white brethren; which latter should be taught, that they never served their country better by their valor in the field, than they can now do by evincing a kindly feeling for the Natives brigaded with them.

The permanent garrisoning of the different Colonies by certain troops, will avoid the expense of continually shipping troops from one end of the world to another. There can be no fear of Great Britain losing her Colonies by this method, as the privates of these permanent garrisons look forward to returning to England to enter the honorable corps of Guards or the Veteran Reserve, both of which are great inducements for the old soldier to remain in the service, and the recruit to enlist without a bounty, thus avoiding the concomitant evils,—expense and desertion. Another advantage of the Reserve is, that in a European war, a never-failing supply of tried soldiers will be at hand to take the places of those who may fall victims to the sword and sickness.

I would suggest a similar Veteran Reserve to be formed for the Navy, in addition to the present Naval Reserve.

In order to take still more advantage of my system of ready organized troops, I would recommend that a sufficient number of vessels (beyond the

ordinary naval requirements) be kept afloat to transport the whole field strength of the corps of Guards at a moment's notice to any hostile shore. In time of peace, these ships could be employed for training the Naval Reserve ; but they should always have on board six-months' provisions and water for the troops they are destined to carry.

I am not vain enough to imagine that my proposed organization is perfect ; far from it. I know the subject is too vast for the intellect of any single individual, how much more so then for the intellect of a man of such small experience, in Military matters, as myself ; but my aim in publishing this pamphlet is, that it may fall into the hands of able men, who will improve upon my thoughts in their several departments, so that the British army may be placed on a proper footing, and thus protect Great Britain from insulting menace, and give her that preponderance in the councils of nations which is due to the first country in the world—and British preponderance is **UNIVERSAL AND PERPETUAL PEACE.**

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