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IMPORTANT NOTE:

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COPIES LOCATED IN

"SAIONJI-HARADA" FILES

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3150

22 Oct 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: The SAIONJI-HARADA Memoirs, 24 Parts and 9 Supplementary Volumes

Date: 6 March 1930 to Original (x) Copy () Language: Japanese
21 Nov 1940 English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

IPS Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Special Activities Branch, CIS, G-2

PERSONS IMPLICATED: All defendants

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Contents of document and their historical importance are well summarized in the following Introductory Notes to Part I ("Prelude to Mukden"), published and translated by Special Activities, CIS, G-2:

1. The Prince Kimochi Saionji - Baron Kumao Harada Memoirs constitute an invaluable source of hitherto unknown information on Japanese politics during the critical 1930's, a period during which the hope of a liberal, democratic Japan faded away before the ever increasing ascendancy of the military and the ultra-nationalists.

2. Prince Kimochi Saionji, who served four Emperors, was the last of eight Genro, the Elder Statesmen of the Realm who acted as the highest counsellors and advisors to the throne. From 1924 until his death on 24 November 1940 at the age of 92, Prince Saionji was the sole supreme adviser to the Emperors Taishe and Hirohito. He was consulted by the Throne on all critical state affairs, particularly on the choice of succeeding premiers.

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3. Baron Kumao Harada, member of the House of Peers before his death on 26 February 1946 at the age of 60, was the private secretary of Prince Saionji during the Prince's latter years, years in which old age forced the Prince to avoid visitors as much as possible. The Baron acted as liaison between the Prince and important statesmen, politicians, etc., meeting them constantly to obtain formation on current behind-the-scene political activities. His findings he reported weekly to the Prince.

4. No notes or memoirs written by Prince Saionji himself covering the 1930's are known. The Prince did not want any of the political and state secrets which he possessed to become public. His will expressly prohibited the preparation of an official biography lest the revelations therein "produce disastrous, unpredictable effects in future ages". However, Baron Harada believed that the Prince's historical position was too important to be lost completely to future generations, and that if it were not recorded, much unnecessary confusion and possibly misleading historical criticism might result. He therefore dictated weekly the information listed in paragraph (a) below to Viscountess Yasuko Konoye, wife of Viscount Hidemaro Konoye, younger brother of the late Prince Konoye. The Baron's activities were not unknown to Prince Saionji however, for the Baron turned over his dictated notes to the Prince for corrections and additions. And in spite of the Prince's attitude toward an official biography, the Baron contemplated the future official publication of the Memoirs, though not for "one hundred or more years after the death" of Prince. (See Chapter 378 of the Memoirs for evidence supporting the preceding statement.)

a. Information dictated weekly by the Baron includes:

- (1) Prince Saionji's important statements to the Baron.
- (2) The Baron's activities as the Prince's secretary and liaisonman.
- (3) All information obtained for the Prince by the Baron in the latter's liaison capacity.

Listed below are the titles of the 24 volumes (translated) of the Memoirs, as prepared by CIS, G-2.

- | | |
|--------|----------------------------|
| Part 1 | Prelude to Mukden |
| " 2 | From Mukden to Shanghai |
| " 3 | Rise of Terrorism |
| " 4 | Withdrawal from the League |

- Part 5 Saite vs ARAKI
- " 6 Steel Under Velvet
- " 7 Organizing MANCHUKUO
- " Resurgent Chauvinism
- " 9 North China Fiasco
- " 10 Year of Assassins
- " 11 Shadows of Coming Events
- " 12 First KONOYE Cabinet and LUKOUCHIAO
- " 13 Stress and Strain in Cabinet
- " 14 KONOYE Seeks Relief
- " 15 Cabinet Reshuffle and Changkufeng
- " 16 Plans for New Party Simmer
- " 17 Nursing KONOYE and His Cabinet
- " 18 HIRANUMA Takes Over
- " 19 Drafting the Axis Alliance
- " 20 Britain and the TIENTSIN Problem
- " 21 ABE Tries for Solution
- " 22 YONAI Given Cabinet
- " 23 Tension Mounts
- " 24 KONOYE Tries Again

Suppl Volumes (3): "Prince SAIONJI and the London Naval
Disarmament Treaty"

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Exh. No. 3754-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter ~~2~~² - (pages 7-8)

13 July 1931

. On the night of the 13th, a newspaperman came to my place and I heard from him that the commander of the Sixth Division, Lt. Gen. Sadao ARAKI, was to be the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor. I was very intimate with Lt. Gen ARAKI but he was an idolizer of Baron HIRANUMA and a prominent figure in the so-called KOKUHONSHA. Therefore, to have such a person serving so close to the Emperor is a serious matter from a certain point of view and I think it very dangerous.

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Ex. 3175
Doc. 3150-2A

昭和六年七月十六日
於 石田氏邸

陸軍々縮會議と西園寺公

第二回 石田氏の談話

十三日の夜新聞記者が自分の知り来て侍従武官
長は中六師團長の荒木^{サダヲ}之田力中將である云
ふことを耳にした。其処で荒木中將は自分も
懇意にして居る人だけども之は平沼田力の非
常に尊崇拜者で所謂國本社^ニの顯著な名士
である。で斯の如き人が側近に奉侍すること
或る見方は依れば重大なることであつて非常な
危険を感じあする。

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SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 2 (page 8)

16 July 1931

Thereupon, I went to the War Ministry and met Col. INOUE, and looked at the Army List in secret. As it is today, even the Army thinks that Lt. Gen. ARAKI is a follower of HIRANUMA. The Army says that Lt. Gen. Senjuro HAYASHI, Commander of the Chosen Army, is the most suitable man for the position. If not he, then Lt. Gen. KAWASHIMA, the Commander of the division at Nagoya. At the present time, there are no others. After my return home I went so far as to call the Imperial Household Minister on the phone and told him about this.

By these indications, even in the matter of disarmament, it is clear that the extreme rightist KOKUHONSHA is maneuvering in concert with the Army. That these problems arise, both directly and indirectly is, I think, a very disconcerting matter.

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Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記第二回よりの抜萃

其処で自分は陸軍者に行つて井上大佐に逢つて
 空に名簿を以て種々人を見せ今日の見陸
 軍でも矢張荒木中將は平沼の子分のやうに
 思つて居る。で「何と云つても朝鮮軍司令官の
 林銑十郎中將は最適任である。然らざれば
 名古屋の師團長の川島中將である。これ等の
 人以外には今の処他に見あたらぬ」と云ふ
 事で、自分は帰つてから宮内大臣まで電話で
 其話をして置いた。

其処で此軍縮なんかには就ても右傾の最たる
 國本者辺りが可なり陸軍と連繫を執つて策
 動して居ると云ふ事實も明に分る訳である。
 直接間接に斯の如き問題が湧いて来るに至
 つては洵に困つたことであると思つて居る。

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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 8 - (pages 47-48)

August 23, 1931.

/KONOYE SPEAKING/ Later, the Chief of the Asia Bureau said: "The Army is attempting to use the killing of Captain NAKAMURA in Mongolia as a tool for the solution of the Manchuria-Mongolian matter by enlarging the importance of the incident. It is very troublesome".

I (HARADA) returned to Hakone and met Railway Minister EGI and mentioned these things to him. He /EGI/ said: "I did not know anything about it but War Minister MINAMI came to Hakone yesterday and told me all about it. At that time, I /EGI/ asked him: 'The discipline of the Army today is very confused. Just what does Your Excellency think about the bomb incident of UGAKI? It is outrageous to speak of such things as an expedition to Manchuria-Mongolia, etc. because the troops are the Emperor's and it is unthinkable to move them without an Imperial Order. Just what is your opinion on this?' I, /EGI/ probed here and there, but the Minister only made very obscure replies on the matter of UGAKI. It is a very troublesome thing".

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西園寺原田日記才八回ヨリノ抜萃

夫かう又亞細亞局長の話に^中中村大尉の蒙古に於て
 殺されたことを陸軍は非常にする件を拡大してこうして之
 を満蒙問題解決の道具に使はふとして居ると云ふ事や突
 がある。詢に困った^とと云ふやうな話を聞いた。で夫等をもつて
 自分は再び箱根に帰って江木鐵道大臣にも逢って種々
 話をした処が江木大臣の言ふめに、実は自分は何する事も知
 らなかつたが昨日南陸軍大臣がわが^く箱根に来たから
 種々話をした結果、^近近來陸軍の軍規は非常に紊
 れて居るじやないか。現に議^会会中に於ける宇垣の爆弾^事事
 件のことに就て閣下は如何に思はれるか。又満蒙出兵と
 かとやかく種々あるが斯の如きことも一体陛下の軍隊であ
 る以上陛下の御命令なしに勤^くやうなことを言つたりす
 ることは甚だ怪しからぬ話である。閣下はどう思はれるか^と
 と言つて種々突止めて見たが宇垣大將の事一件に就ては
 有耶無耶な返^るる事をして居つた。どうも困つたものである。

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 RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. No. 3150-10A

Exh. No. 3756-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 10 - (page 53)

4 September 1931

On September 4, I met the Finance Minister, /INOUE./ He said: "The War Minister, /MINAMI,/ on the whole, was in complete accord with me on the Army reorganization plan, and the matter was agreed upon between us before we parted. However, upon returning to the War Ministry, he was severely criticised by the Military Affairs Bureau Chief, KOISO, and the Intendance Section Chief. Consequently, he returned to me later, and said: 'I previously agreed with you upon the matter, but I found it very difficult to appease the members of the staff. . . .'" For this reason, the matter has reverted to its starting point."

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Exhibit No.

J. P. S. Doc No. 3150-10A

西園寺原田日記 第十回ヨリノ改革

九月の四日に大蔵大臣に逢つた処が「陸軍大臣は軍
政改革は大体に就て全く自分と意見が合つて一旦は
凡てを決めて別れたが陸軍省に歸つてから小磯軍
務局長と経理局長に逆襲を喰つて再び自分の処
に來つて一旦承知して見たが却々部内が治まらなから
……」と云ふ風なことで又基に戻つて來た。

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DOC. No. 3150-11A

Exh. No. 3757-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 11 - (pages 74-5)

14 September, 1931.

On the 14th the War Minister returned from Gotemba, and immediately had Maj. General TATEKAWA deliver a confidential letter to the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army. The content of the confidential letter was about the warning the War Minister received from His Majesty on the 11th regarding military discipline, and also about the fact that he was told by His Majesty to take extra precautions in regard to the actions of the Army in Manchuria and Mongolia. The War Minister transmitted the wishes of His Majesty to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army with the intention of bringing pressure upon him so as to have a stop put to the various Army schemes in Manchuria and Mongolia.....

The incident broke out on the night that TATEKAWA arrived at Mukden with the confidential letter from the War Minister. In short, it seems to me that it was TATEKAWA's plan to have the scheme carried out before the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army saw the confidential letter from the War Minister. This may be seen from the fact that although at the beginning of the conference of the so-called War Councillors, representing the Supreme leaders of the Army, the attitude of the members was very firm. Whereafter the War Minister conveyed the wishes of His Majesty to the members at the conference, the attitude of the members changed completely. And they decided that the present plans of the Army should be completely abandoned by all means. This appears to have resulted in having the War Minister's confidential letter conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

西園寺原田日記オノ同ヨリ抜華

…天は十四日の日につあり陸軍大臣が御殿場から帰る直ぐ建
 川少將を以て関東軍司令官に親展書と持してやした。
 其内容は十一日の日に陛下の御召が有つて陛下から軍規に
 関して御注意があり満蒙に於ける軍隊の行動に就て
 更に慎重なる可きことと言はれたので其聖旨を関東軍
 司令官に傳へて関東軍司令官として満蒙に於ける陸
 軍の種々の畫策を止めさせたといふ考へて抑へる考で手紙を
 持してやる

夫で建川が其陸軍大臣の親展書と持て奉天に
 著いた晩にこれが起つたのであつて要するに建川は関東軍
 司令官が其手紙を見ない中に計畫と実行させよう
 と云ふのであらうい。何となれば十四日の陸軍の最高幹
 部の所謂軍事参議官の会議は最初頗る強硬な
 議論であつたが陸軍大臣が陛下の思召と其会議
 で傳へてからすみやかに變つてさうして今日陸軍の畫策を
 どうしても徹底的に治めたい。其結果陸軍大臣の親展
 書と関東軍司令官に持て行くや否手紙になつたといふ

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 11 - (pages 77-8)

19 September 1931

About supper time on the 19th, there was a telephone call from the Premier, and he said: "I want you to come immediately." Therefore, I went to the official residence of the Premier after dinner. The Premier appeared very troubled, and he said: "No reports have been delivered to me by the Foreign Ministry nor the War Ministry /T.N. regarding the Manchurian Incident/. However, I have told Chief Secretary KAWASAKI to caution them about it. I am trying by various means to prevent this incident from spreading, and if possible to settle it. However, it seems that the Army authorities are desirous of making a guarantee occupation. Guarantee occupation is a matter to be decided by the government, and the Army authorities have no power to make decisions regarding such matters. The Chinese military forces in Manchuria exceed 200,000, and at present, the strength of the Japanese Army there is a little over 10,000. I asked what they intended doing if, by acting too outrageously in Manchuria, something should possibly happen against such a huge opposing force, to which the reply was: 'We will send out troops from Korea. Probably troops already have been sent out from Korea'. Therefore I remarked 'Isn't it outrageous for the Army to send out troops from Korea without the order from the government?' However, there is a precedent, during the TANAKA ministry troops were moved without Imperial sanction.

FILE COPY
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2757-B

I.P.S Doc No. 3150 - 11 B

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記オ十回ヨリ、抜萃

さうすると十九日の晩に夕食頃總理大臣から電話が
 かって「直ぐ来て貰ひたい」と云ふことであつた。天から自分
 は食後總理の官邸に行つたが非常に總理は弱り切つて
 居るやうであつて先づオ一に「外務省の報告も陸軍省の
 報告も自分の手もとに集む」と云ふことを頼りに云つて
 居たが、然し川崎書記官長を以て今注意をさして置い
 て、と云つて居た。夫が、自分は此の件を擴大しなげや
 うに出来るだけ何しよと止めたいと思つて種々心配して居
 るが軍部当局が歩哨は領をこぼさうと。で歩哨
 は領は政府の決定の事であることであつて軍部当局の
 権能を以て出来る性質のものではない。天からオ一滿蒙
 に於ける支那の兵力は廿万以上もある。今日本の軍は
 一万餘りである。で餘りに傍若無人に滿洲で振舞
 つて居たりの大^對兵力で若しオ一^のことがあつたらどうす
 るかと云ふ事を伺いたら「朝鮮から兵を出す。或は
 「おしとらうい」で政府の命令なしに朝鮮から兵を出す
 ことは怪しくなうやないか」と云つた。然るに田中内閣
 の時に脚裁可下しに云はらるる実がある。……

FILE COPY
 RETURN TO ROOM 361

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 12 - (pages 86-9)

22-3 September, 1931.

.....On the 22nd the Premier went to the Imperial Palace, and reported to the Emperor on the progress of the Cabinet meeting, the substance of which was as follows: To cause an absolute cessation on establishing military administrations, and on seizing customs offices and seizing banks, and the like, and to forbid all actions excepting those to prevent risks. The War Minister made a proposal to send the Korea Army to Manchuria. The reason that the War Minister expressed such a desire was that he had been notified by the Chief of the General Staff that the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army had made the demand to strength in Manchuria. The Cabinet did not approve the proposal in its meeting because the matter might be taken up by the League of Nations, and also because upon the withdrawal of the Manchurian Army there would be difficulty. "I (Premier) severely rebuked the War Minister for sending out troops as far as Kirin and Changehun....."

Later on, the War Minister again consulted with the Chief of the General Staff about dispatching the Korea Army, and decided to bring up the matter in the Cabinet meeting of to-day (the 22nd). Later on, however, the War Minister told the Premier: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Korea Army decided that the situation was urgent and already has dispatched one brigade".

.....The War Minister was very anxious to have the dispatching of the Korea Army approved at the Cabinet meetings.....

At 9:30 a.m. the following morning, the 23rd, His Majesty summoned Premier WAKATSUKI. And then, at the Cabinet meeting that day it was decided that the troops having been dispatched anyway, the Government should defray the expenses, though the Finance Minister was not actually admitting that the dispatch of troops had been carried out duly in accordance with a Cabinet decision. /It was decided/ at the Cabinet meeting that in view of the fact that the Chief of the General Staff had received a report from the War Ministry that the troops had been dispatched arbitrarily and considering the dispatch had been done, that is, the thing having been done, the Government should defray the expenses without raising any objection. Being asked to report exactly what had happened to the Throne, the Premier was compelled to report exactly what had happened to His Majesty and after that the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff presented themselves. And thus, the dispatch of troops which had been decided and carried out arbitrarily had been submitted for Imperial ex post fact approval.

During the Cabinet meeting of the same day, the words of His Majesty were conveyed to the Cabinet members: "I believe that the policy that has been decided by the Government of the so-called non-expansion of the Incident is very appropriate. Therefore, endeavour to carry it out completely".

昭和二年
九月廿二日

西園寺原日記第十頁より抜粋

1. 總理は廿二日に参内して陛下に對し閣議の模様を上奏した。其内容は軍制を敷くこと、税関を抑へること、銀行を抑へること等は断然之を中止させて、唯危険防止以外の行為は之を差止めることにし朝鮮軍を滿洲に出すことを陸軍大臣が發議して其理由に滿洲の兵が手薄であるから……と云ふので閣議東軍司令官から參謀總長に要求して來たと云ふことと參謀總長から陸軍大臣が通告があつてさう云ふ希望を述べたから國際聯盟の問題にもなり、又滿洲軍引揚の場合にも鬼倒を起すから……と云ふので閣議は之をいれなかつたこと及び「吉林長春にまで出兵したことも陸軍大臣に對し之を難詰致しました。

2. 其後陸軍大臣は朝鮮軍出兵に就て再び總長と議を練つて今日(廿二日)の閣議に出すことに決したが其後既に陸軍大臣は「朝鮮軍司令官が事態急を要すると見て一個旅團を出してしまつたと云ふことを總理大臣に言つて來た。

3. 陸軍大臣は……朝鮮軍出兵を閣議にかけて認めさせやうと焦慮してゐた。

4. 閣議即ち廿二日の午前九時半に陛下から若槻總理を御召しになり……さうして其日の閣議で結局兵は出してしまつたのだから政府は經費は之を支辨すると云ふことに大藏大臣も正式に閣議決定として出兵を認めた諺……ではないけれど

九月廿三日 Exhibit No.

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 13 - (page 102)

30 September, 1931.

After returning, I again met the Premier on other business. The Premier said: "At the Cabinet meeting, the War Minister repeatedly stressed: 'I want to dispatch troops to Chientao! Therefore, I said, 'Absolutely no: If there is any danger, it is better to evacuate the Japanese Nationals!' However, the War Minister retorted: 'In case the lives and properties of Japanese residents are endangered, will Your Excellency take the responsibility? Therefore, I answered: 'That cannot be helped.'

At a later date, there were incidents and bombings and assaults in Chientao. A Korean who threw the bomb was apprehended and upon investigation, he confessed: 'I did it because I was engaged to do so by Japanese Military.' "Such a situation is too dangerous to contemplate."

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Exhibit No. 3759A

IPS Doc 3150-13AB

昭和六年十月二日

清書清

西園寺・原田日記

オ十三回」より抜萃

夫から自分は帰つて再び他の用で總理大臣に逢つた処の
 閣議下で陸軍大臣が頻りに同島にせよといひ
 云ふことを云ふで自分は絶対にならぬ。危険なら日本人を
 引揚げさせれば好い」と云ふことを言つたが陸軍大臣は
 「然し若し万一日本人、居留民の生命財産に危害を
 加へた場合には閣下が責任を背負ひますか」と云ふ下
 自分は「夫は己を不得ない」と云ふ。其後同島は爆破事
 件となり傷害事件となり其爆弾を投じた朝鮮人も
 捕へて取調べた処が日本軍人に移すといふやうな事
 云ふことを自白した。

下事情斯の如きであらう。實に危険千万で堪らぬと
 云ふことを總理は言つて居た。

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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 14 - (page 106)

1 October 1931

In the Cabinet Meeting of the 1st of October, Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA stated that he wanted a clarification of attitude before the opening of the Council meeting in Geneva on the 14th. If Japan withdraws troops by that time, there will be no problem. The Foreign Minister further stated that the stationing of troops for the purpose of self-protection is all right. However, the maintenance of more than necessary troops, and the keeping of troops in Kirin and Tungkia is far from good. However, the War Minister said: "If we withdraw troops now, the situation will be very difficult for us, and we will not be able to maintain control of the situation in Mukden and Kirin. Properly speaking, I believe it better for Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations."

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Exhibit No. 3760-A

I.P.S. Doc No 3150-14A

昭和二年十月十一日

西園寺原田日記

第十四回「よりの拔萃」

夫から十月一日の閣議で幣原外務大臣はジエネバに用
かれる十四日の理事會までには何とかはつきりした態度を
して置きた。で天まで日本が撤兵して居れば問題は
ないので自衛権の爲になら好いけれども天以上に或は
吾杯に兵を残し他家に兵を残したりして置くことは面白
くないと云ふことを外務大臣は説いたけれども陸軍大臣
は「今撤兵すれば非常に困難な立場になるし奉天と
吉林との柳へが利かなくなる。一体國際聯盟なんかと云
ふものから日本が脱退すれば良いじゃないか」と云ふ脱退
論を陸軍大臣は去した。

FILE COPY
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DOC. No. 3150-15-16A

Exh. No. 3761-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapters 15 & 16 - (page 135)

22 October, 1931

The Premier also complained: "At today's Cabinet meeting, the War Minister, MINAMI, Jiro said an exceedingly outrageous thing; in regard to the League of Nations. He said: 'There is no need for paying deference to the League of Nations; there should be no objection to seceding from the League. Should Japan be determined to wage war against the whole world, this (T.N. secession from the League) can be readily done. I'll excuse myself now, because I've been invited to the marriage of Prince RIKEN.' And he left the Cabinet meeting. I'm really troubled because he is such an irresponsible person."

3761-A

J.P.S Doc # 3150-15-16-A

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記

第十五回第十六回ヨリノ抜萃

「夫から今日の閣議で陸軍大臣は随分乱暴な
 話をして聯盟だの何かに對して、何れも遠慮するこ
 とはない。脱出したって好いぢやないか。或は世界中相
 手に戦争する氣で其肚があれば何でもないぢやな
 いか。今日は李鍵公の婚礼に呼ばれて居るから夫
 礼する。と云つて立つて行つてしまつた。實に無責任な
 先生で困る。と云つて總理はこぼして居た。

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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 36 - (pages 286-7)

About 11 March 1932

. . . . The Cabinet Meeting on Friday was carried over until Saturday. The decision on the Manchurian-Mongolian policy which was the topic of the Inter-Ministry Conference (Army, Navy, Foreign Affairs, and Finance) was reached and was placed before the Cabinet meeting on Friday. At this meeting, various problems were encountered. Among them was the soon to be formed "New Nation," problem, if this were to be looked upon as a violation of the Nine Power Pact it would be an unsatisfactory state of affairs, then at least on the surface, its recognition should be postponed for the time being. However, if CHANG Hsueh-Liang acts as an insurgent against the "New Nation" and sends punitive troops, it will not be able to quell the rebellion because the "New Nation" has no army. Therefore, in order somehow to safeguard the "New Nation" the Japanese Army must repel the attack. At the time of the Feng-Chili War /T.N. Civil war between the Feng-Tien Regime and the Chili Regime/ the Japanese Army under the guise of a Manchurian peace preservation force, was on the alert. The problem whether or not we may do the same as in that case raised so much trouble that the Cabinet meeting was carried over to Saturday.

The demands of the Army, to a certain extent, from various stand-
points, were repulsed /for the present/. Having obtained the inside
story from the Navy Minister, I showed the original and corrected
plans to the Prince on Monday.

2762-A

J. P. S. Doc No. 3150-36A

Exhibit No.

西園寺・原田日記ヨリノ抜萃 第三十六回

……で実は先日金曜の閣議を土曜まで持越して対滿蒙政策に就て所謂各省聯合會議(陸海軍外務大藏)の議題となつて居たものの結論が出たので其末を対蒙と金曜日の閣議にかけた。其時にいろいろな問題に到着して或は今度出まると新国家は九ヶ国條約に反する行為と觀らるゝは面白くないから兎に角表面上は之を承認することほ暫次見合す、而して張学良が新国家に対して反逆者として之を應徴する爲に軍を送つた場合には今度の新国家には軍隊と云ふものはないのであるからどうしても何とか此新国家を援ける爲には日本の軍が之を要せ敷くないければならぬ。其等の消息は例の奉直戦争の時に日本軍が滿洲治安維持と云ふ名目の下に之を監視した場合があるといふと同様に好いどころか、或はいけないうらうかと云ふやうな問題でゴマクしてとうとう翌日の上曜日まで其の閣議を持越した。

可なり陸軍の要求は種々な意味で退けられたけれども其外で自分は其内容に就て海軍大臣に詳細タテマウとして月曜の日にその案を修正されたもろりと持って公府に見せた。

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IPS Doc. No. 3150-41A

Exh. No. 3963-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-FARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 41 - (pages 328-9)

3 May 1932

There were many in the Foreign Ministry who, like SHIRATORI advocated Japan's withdrawal /from the League of Nations/. Army circles in general were enthusiastic about this "Withdrawal from the League of Nations". The basis of SHIRATORI's argument is that, "Japan is unable to remain in the League after taking such actions in Manchukuo since September 18. It is unreasonable for the small nations in Europe who are lacking in knowledge, to get together and restrain Japan in any way. However, even if Japan desires to have the understanding of the great powers, it is still unnecessary for her to remain in the League. Japan can do anything if she'll negotiate directly with England, France or the United States and obtain their understanding. It is quite improper to remain in the League."

He must have aroused Chief Cabinet Secretary MORI's sympathy and MORI went directly to the Premier and urged withdrawal from the League.

* * * * *

Subsequently, in order to report on SHIRATORI's opinion regarding /Japan's/ withdrawal / from the League of Nations/ to the Prince, I had KIDO, INOUE and SUZUKI come over to my place and I heard their opinions regarding SHIRATORI's view. - - - - -

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Doc. 3150-41A

昭和七年五月三日

陸軍 々 緒 下 西 国 寺 公

第四十一回ヨリノ拔萃

デ外務省內デモ或ハ白鳥ノ如キ脱退論ヲ唱ヘル
 モノカ多ク軍部ハ大体ニ於テ「聯監ヲ脱退ス可シ」
 ト云フ意氣込テアツタ。即チ白鳥等ノ議論ノ根本
 ハ「元來九月十八日以後日本ガ南洋ニ於ケル所ノ
 如キ行動ヲ執ツタ以上ハ到底聯監ニハ入ルコトノ
 出来ナイ筈デアル。而シテ認識不足ノ歐羅巴ノ小
 國達ガ集ツテ彼即日本ニ對シテ掣肘ラスルガ如キ
 コトハ以テノ外ノコトデアツテ而シテ若シ日本ガ
 大國ノ諒解ヲ待ムト欲スルナラバ何モ聯盟ニ留ツ
 テ居ナイデモ宜シイ。直接英國取ハ米國ニ交渉シ
 テ其諒解ヲ得レバ何等モ出来ルジヤナイカ。」ト
 云フノテアツテ「聯監ニ入ツテ居ルコト夫自身ガ
 賤ル當ヲ待ナイ。」夫デ或ハ録書記官長ヲ共鳴サ
 セテ録ハ直接總理大臣ノ處ニ行ツテ聯盟脱退論ヲ
 強説シタ。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 51 - (pages 414-5)

12 September 1932

I then visited SHIRATORI on the 12th at the Foreign Ministry. SHIRATORI repeatedly remarked: "How about appointing the present War Minister ARAKI as the next Premier?" When I asked him why, he replied: "Up to now the exchange rate has dropped considerably. This is because Japan does not possess a strong government, and consequently, in foreign affairs, it is prodded from behind by the militarists, and changes to the right shortly after proclaiming that the Empire's foreign policies are toward the left. This is very harmful to the country's reputation. Rather than that, would it not be a more becoming policy for the present-day Japanese Empire to have ARAKI, who is a representative of the powerful militarists, become the Prime Minister, and to proceed upon an unwavering policy for five or six years more."

I then said: "How many years have you been a diplomat anyway? In our opinion it is of course bad to have the militarists, who should have no connections with politics, restrain the administration after it has once set its policies. Not only that, the reason why Japan has lost the confidence of other nations is the absence of diplomacy. This results from the militarists' direct intervention in international problems; and not only that; they even interfere directly in domestic affairs. This is the reason for the instability of political affairs and today's loss of trust. Therefore, in foreign relations, it is possible to regain this faith only by placing the militarists in the background. At the same time, from a domestic standpoint, freedom of action, without restrictions from militarists, is the basis for stabilizing the political situation. I believe that this is the fundamental issue in stabilizing the exchange rate." I parted with SHIRATORI after that.

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昭和七年九月七日

陸軍々縮ト西園寺公第五十一回ヨリ、拔萃

夫レカラ十二日ノ日ニ外務省ニ白鳥ヲ訪ネタ處ガ
白鳥ハ頻リニ「次ニ來ル可キ總理大臣ハ荒木現在ノ
陸軍大臣ヲシテハドウカ。」ト云フヤウナコトヲ言
ツテ居タカラ「何故カ。」ト言ツタラ「元來爲替ヤ
ナンカ、非常ニ下ツタリスルノハツマリ強固ナ政府
デナイカラ隨ツテ對外的ニ政府ハ帝國ノ外交方針ガ
左ト云フコトヲ聲明シテ居ナガラ後カラ軍部ニツ、
カレルト直グ夫レガ又右ニ變ルト云フコトガ如何ニ
國家ノ信用ヲ害スルカ。デアルカラ寧ロ力ノアル軍
部ヲ代表スル荒木ヲ總理大臣ニシテモウ五六年一定
不動デ變ラナイ方針デ行クト云フコトガ今日帝國ノ
執ル可キ大方針デハアルマイカ」

夫レカラ自分ハ「一体君ハ何年外交官ヲシテ居ル
ノカ。寧ロ我々ノ考カラ言ヘバ政府ノ一日決メタ方
針ヲ後カラ政治ニ關與スベカラサル軍人達ガ彼是言
ツテ政府ヲ掣肘スルコトハ勿論ヨクナイコトデア
ルノミナラズ今日日本ガ國際的ニ信用ヲ失墜シタ所以
ハ無外交デ軍部ガ國際問題ニ彼是直接ニ關與スルト
云フコトガ原因ニナツテ居ルノミナラズ内政マデ直
接關與スルト云フコトガ政治ノ安定シナイ原因デア

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Doc. 3150-5/A

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ツテ同時ニ今日ノヤウニ信用ヲ失墜シタ所以デア
ルデアルカラ寧ロ此際ハ表ニ軍部ヲ出サナイコトガ對
外的ニ信用ヲ恢復スル所以デアツテ同時ニ内政的ニ
モ軍部ノ掣肘ヲ受ケナイコトガ政局ヲ安定サセル素
デアル。之ガ爲替ノ安定ヲ圖ル根本ノ問題デハナイ
カト自分ハ思フ。」夫テ白鳥トハ別レタ。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 52 - (pages 423-4)

About 21 August 1932

"The Chinese Ambassador came several times to KONOYE's place in Kamakura saying 'Cannot the Japanese Government abandon the idea of the recognition /of Manchukuo/? Since the problem is one between China and Japan it should be settled between the two without it coming into the hands of the League.' KONOYE repeated the above statement to me so I told him 'If the Chinese Ambassador feels that way I think that it is better to ask him to speak directly to a person who is responsible. Perhaps if he speaks to the War Minister and if the Army takes action on this problem, the way will be made much easier for the Foreign Ministry....'"

And then, Prince KONOYE went to see War Minister ARAKI in the afternoon and discussed the problem in detail but the Minister was entirely disinterested /T.N. in what Prince KONOYE proposed/. He said that it might be all right if the matter were to be handled as a local issue, but that it would not be desirable if it were to be handled as a general problem /T.N. between Japan and China/ and settled without taking it to the League of Nations. Since the attitude of the War Minister seemed to be as if he favored creating a situation in which Japan, as a result of the deliberations of the League of Nations, would become isolated and would have to wage a war against the world, Prince KONOYE returned very astonished.

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昭和七年九月十二日

陸軍軍縮と西園寺公

第五十二回より抜萃

夫から荒木陸軍大臣の處に近衛公爵は午後
から行つて委細話をして見た處が陸軍大
臣は全く氣乗りがしないで地方的の問題と
して取扱ふのならば或は好いかも知れないけれど
か全体の問題として取扱つて聯盟まで行か
ないで形付けることは寧ろ欲しない。
國際聯盟に持出されて其結果日本が孤立
になつて吾界を相手に戦争をする段取に
なることを寧ろ望んで居るやうな状態
であつたので流石の近衛公爵も非常
に驚いて歸つて来た。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 60 - (page 464)

1 November 1932.

. I left the Navy Minister's place and went to meet Finance Minister TAKAHASHI. I told the Finance Minister about the matter of the national policy that the War Minister, ARAKI, is said to have shown KONOYE, when KONOYE met him in the morning on the previous Sunday (Oct. 30), but since he had already talked it over very carefully with the War Minister with the intent of instructing him, he seemed very well informed on this matter of national policy.

This National Policy, which ARAKI is said to have shown to KONOYE, is as follows: -

- A. Carry on an emergency policy for two years.
- B. Study whether to attack Soviet Russia within the two years or not.
- C. Plan the perfection of military preparedness and national defense within the two years.

Another item was the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and the United States and the furtherance of international goodwill.

ARAKI seems to have discussed this matter with Finance Minister TAKAHASHI and he /TAKAHASHI/ said: "He /War Minister ARAKI/ talks about carrying on the emergency policy for two years, but it cannot be fully executed in just two years. We must consider that it will take four or five years. "

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Doc. 3150-60A

昭和七年十月五日

陸軍大臣 西園寺公

オラフ十回 からの抜萃

M 361 CULTURE I

自今海軍大臣の処を辞して事務大臣蔵大臣に
 逢ひに行つた。下大蔵大臣に例の日曜(十月三十日)
 の朝近衛が荒木陸軍大臣に逢つた所は近衛
 に陸軍大臣が見せた云ふ國策の一件に就
 して大蔵大臣に話した処が陸軍大臣に對
 しては豫てから大蔵大臣が先に教育をすつ
 たりで充分慎重に話合をせし居られるので國
 策一件に就ても可なり。知つて居られた。夫て
 近衛に見せた國策と云ふのは先づ

- 一、二年間非常時政策を續行する。
- 一、二年の間にソヴイエトにシアを懸すつか朝野
 だがいかと云ふことを考究する。
- 一、二年間の中に軍備國防の充實を図る。
 夫からもう一つは日米親善及び列國との國際親善
 を図ると云ふこと等の項目があつた。

是等に就て矢張り事務大臣蔵大臣にも應じ話
 したと見えて大蔵大臣の語に「二年間の非常
 時政策遂行とか何とか言はれども夫はとて二年
 位で止まらなさい。まあ四五年はかると思は
 なければならぬ。」

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 61 - (pages 469-470)

7 November 1932

..... On the evening of the 7th, I met, after a long time, the War Minister at his official residence. He said, "The Finance Minister has a thorough understanding of the situation." and "Roughly speaking, we must continue on emergency provisions from the standpoint of national policy for two or three years. We must decide whether to attack Soviet Russia during this period or to convene a Peace Conference for the Far East, and by inviting England, U.S. and France who have vital interests in the Far East, hold a so-called Peace Conference among Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Russia, and it would be very well if we could arrive at an agreement to prevent the spread of Communistic propaganda. Should it still happen that the security of neighboring nations are disturbed by the Red movements, Japan must attack and destroy them. Within two or three years we must perfect our national defense, that is, we must complete preparations and assert our nation's intent by displaying power for both peace and war in order not to permit other nations to make light of us. Furthermore, in regard to our relations with the U.S., we must keep Japanese-American good-will as our keynote and also continue our diplomatic relations with other nations along the same line."

The gist of the comments by the War Minister was as above and was the same in context as the one he had shown to KONOYE the previous day. /He further stated,/ "Finance Minister TAKAHASHI, especially, understands very well, and as he is such a splendid person, I ask his views on various problems." The War Minister went on, "In view of the present national situation, an annual budget of ¥ 2,500,000,000 to ¥ 2,600,000,000 is reasonable. The present differs from the past when ¥ 1,000,000,000 or so sufficed, so the present budget, although it reaches the above amounts, is not unreasonable. Furthermore, I believe this can be had without over-burdening the people. I am confident that a considerable amount of revenue can be obtained from Manchukuo if we so desired. The Finance Minister wants to hold the combined Army and Navy budget down to eight hundred million yen, but we want an additional increase of two hundred million yen. However, at the present no definite outcome can be foreseen. Anyway, on the whole, the outline for the budget has been made rather smooth....."

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ことである。然し國民の負担は加重せしめて自分はちまると
思ふ。殊に滿洲國に歳入を求めらるは、相當程度のも
が得られると、自分は確信する。大陸海軍を併せて大藏
大臣は八億を打ちたいと言ふのを二億回も尚ほ増した
いと云つて居るけれども、その風になるか、一寸今の如見
尙田か、かぬまゝ、大体に於て、豫算外の輸部、及び内務
に去来上ったわけである。

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 65 - (pages 496-8)

6 December 1932

"Reduction of Military Armaments and Prince SAIONJI"
Excerpt from the 65th entry, Dec. 26, 1932 & Jan 15, 1933

Then, on the 6th, I visited the War Minister and inquired about the state of affairs. According to the War Minister, he looked upon the Jehol problem as a local matter because it was a part of Manchukuo, and he said he wanted to 'settle the matter by shortening time' as it was after all a question of limitation of area or of time. The general outline of the War Minister's conversation was as follows: 'I am afraid that if we keep on moving small troops into Jehol as we are doing now, another failure like the Nikolayevsk Incident might be brought about. So, we should follow the example of the Shanghai Incident -- that is, to send out large troops and decisively settle the matter once and for all in a short period of time, or otherwise, I am afraid it might be another repetition of the Nikolayevsk Incident if we grudge the dispatch of large troops.' The War Minister further said that, 'I am still very indignant about the Shanghai Incident. From the first, the army did not want to send troops. However, it was much discussed at one time that the army should act only within the leased territory, and at other times, that the army should be prohibited to pass through the settlement, or some such thing or other. Thereupon, I demanded to know what on earth our aim was and asked them to decide the aim in the first place. And, then, at last, it was decided that our aim was to protect the residents. The soldiers were then sent forth and the matter was settled very satisfactorily, much more than had been expected. In spite of the fact that the Powers did not make any difficulties, everyone is indifferent to the Army, or to that Shanghai Incident. They seem to have completely forgotten that they had been very particular about the army, and that is highly exasperating to us.' Although much is being said about the international political situation, Japan will not be spoken well of, no matter what she does, it is a great mistake to expect to be considered agreeable. He spoke about the matter as above, so I said, 'Of course we do not expect to be considered agreeable or to manage things tactfully, and after all it is our fundamental point of view to avoid as much as possible what is useless or rather, harmful, and unagreeable. Furthermore, if we are to actually put something into practice, it must be right both in name and reality. It is very disadvantageous

to be considered by the Powers as to have waged an unjustifiable war! Finally, the War Minister stated as follows, explaining that it was his unreserved opinion; "If about three divisions were first to land at Tsingtao and pass through Tsinan, or in other words, if the troops landed in Shantung Province and advanced towards Peking and Tientsin districts, Chang Hsueh-liang would take to flight before the troops reached Tsinan. So, I would like to carry out this plan if permitted, but I think that would be rather difficult." We discussed much, but he said in general that he 'wanted as much as possible to limit the matter to Jehol alone, and that the General Staff Office also seemed to be deliberating, on such various methods,' and with this, we parted.

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昭和七年十二月二十六日
昭和八年一月十五日

陸軍の縮と西園寺公
オ六十五日より抜萃し

夫から六日の日に陸軍大臣を訪ねて様子を見
ると陸軍大臣の話には先づ大体に於て熱河は満洲國
の一部であるから局地の問題として今は考へて居る。夫で
結局地城の限定か時間の限定か問題である。大臣
は「時間短縮に依る方法をやりたいと思つて居る」と
云ふやうな話で大体陸軍大臣の話は「若し熱河
に於いて今日のやうにして兵隊を省く、當らして居
たら結局尼港事件の二の舞でありはせぬ。夫
で上海事件のやうにやるか——即ち大軍を出すか
思つて一度に短時日の中にやう付けたい。少くも
らざれば軍を出すことを惜んで少しづつやう居たら
寧ろ尼港事件の二の舞に終りはせぬ。で陸軍
大臣の話に依ると自分には非常に今でも憤慨に堪え
ない。上海事件のことである。最初から陸軍は
兵を出さなくかつた。夫をやる租借地内に限るし
とか或は「租界を通つちやいかぬ」とか、やあどうだとか
斯うだとか喧し、かど「漸く民保護と云ふ
的決定」と言つた。漸く民保護と云ふ
こと以上によく

RETURNS TO ROOM 3061

No. 1

事件は形付いた。列國も之に對して彼是言ふことなしに諦んだにも拘らず陸軍に對して何ともあの上海事件に就てはどうとも思つて居らぬ。景表に自今遼は喧しく言つたことはすつかり悉くして居る。長るやうなことで実は非常に憤慨に堪えないんだ。夫で彼是國際政局を云々を承るけれども今日令が到底何をやつたやよくは言はれないのだから良い子にたうらなんかと云ふことは非常な間違だ。と云ふやうな話であつたから我々始め別に良い子にならうと云ふ上手にやううとか云ふやうなことは無論考へて居らぬのであつて結局出来るに於て無用な言言をいささないことはしたくないと云ふのが根本であつて然も夫がどうせするのならば名實共に正しくなければならぬ。好んで列國から名々の戦争を起すやうに思はれることは非常な不利である。と云ふやうな話をしと結局露骨に陸軍大臣が自唱を言はばと云ふこと。先づ三個師団を青島から上陸させて青南を這つてつら山東省から上陸させて平津地方を突つて行つたらはもう清軍が行かない中に張學良は逃り去つた。と思つてやればさうしてやうに見たいけれどもなかなか難いだろう。さう種々話もあつたが大體に於て「出来るだけ」熱河だけの問題に極限してさうしたい。で參謀本部でも其方は既に種々今考へて居るやうだ。と云ふ話で別れて来た。

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Doc. 3150-66 A

昭和八年一月十六日

陸軍軍縮と西園寺公

第六十六回よりの抜萃

其處で自分は興津から歸つて十四日の朝高橋大藏大臣を訪ねた處が矢張り熱河の問題が出て、昨日閣議で外務大臣が日露不可侵條約の下話のあつたこと及び其條約の不成立に就てロシア政府が内容を發表すると云ふので、日本は夫に就て賛意を表明するや否や』と云ふことで日本政府に問合せがあつた。夫で其事を閣議の席上において外務大臣が説明しかけた時に自分は『何故不可侵條約を結ばなかつたのか』と云うすると赤の宣傳が益々容易になりはしないかと云ふやうなことを陸軍あたりで心配し居るから……』と云ふ話であつたから、條約を結んで置けばこそ文句が言へるんじやないか。で條約を結ぶ問題と共産黨の宣傳とは全然別問題として考へて好いぢやないか。夫で今言つたやうに結局不可侵條約を結んで居ればこそ思つて文句が言へるやうに自分は考へる。で此頃のやうに何でもかんで陸軍に引きこづられて居ると云ふことは甚だ怪しからぬことである。『さうすると陸軍大臣が……』とか『國』

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. 3150-66A

論が云々』と云ふやうなことを言つたから『輿論も國論も今日は全くありはしない』やないか、何とか一軍部には不利益なことを言へば直ぐ憲兵が来て劔をガテヤノ、やつたり拳銃を向けたりして威嚇される。輿論も國論も今日絶対はないじやないか、言論の圧迫今日より酷いことはない、現に九州のある新聞社が軍部に対して不利益なことを書いたと云ふのを、『飛行機で爆弾を落とす』と言つて新聞社の上空を巡回して威嚇したり、え、れたと云ふ事、實があるのみならず、金でスパイ政治のやうに憲兵が政治家に尾行したり、免に角甚だ怪しからぬ状態である。現に自分の處に来る新聞記者に『今日殆んど言論の自由はない』やないか』と言ふと、『いや全くさうです。私達も言ひたいことも言へないやうな状態である。』と言つて歎いて居た。』と言つた處が陸軍大臣は色をなして、『そんなことはありませぬ。』言ふから、『ないことはない。』と言つて、『まあ君の精神は認めるけれども実行が伴はない』やないか、君の監督の下にある憲兵が斯の如く状態でどうするか』と言つた處がまあ後で何とか種々言つたが關係の中で誰一人言葉を以て自分を支持する人もなかつた。

Notice:

Exhibit 3769A to be

Corrected in accordance with language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record p 37,661.

Doc. Div.

Exh. No. 3769-A

I-HARADA MEMOIRS

(pages 502-4)

I visited Finance Minister when the problem of JEHOL was the subject of our conversation and cabinet meeting held yesterday, reported that there had been an agreement on a Japanese Non-Aggression Treaty, intending to announce it in failure, had inquired

of the Japanese government whether she would agree to such measures or not. Then when the Foreign Minister began to explain the matter at the Cabinet meeting, I queried, 'Why did you not conclude the Non-Aggression Treaty?' His answer was that, 'the Army fears that such an act might further facilitate the Communist propaganda.' Therefore, I said, 'Don't you think that only when the Treaty has been concluded, can we complain? Therefore, would it not be better to consider the conclusion of the treaty as quite a different matter from the communist propaganda? As I said just now, I think that we can say whatever we like without hesitation only when we have the non-aggression treaty concluded. And it is highly improper that everything should be led by the Army as of late.'

The War Minister then said something or other about 'the public opinion, etc. . . . ' or 'the national opinion, etc. . . . ' I told him that 'There is no such thing as public opinion or national opinion these days. We are threatened by the rattle of the gendarme's sword or his revolver pointed at us whenever we say anything disadvantageous to the Army. Isn't it a fact that there is absolutely no public opinion nor national opinion today? The pressure upon the freedom of speech has never been so strict as recently. I know, indeed, a fact that a certain news office in KYUSHU was threatened by the Army on the reason that it wrote something disadvantageous to the Army. The Army flew an airplane over the building in circles, saying it would drop a bomb from the plane. Furthermore, the gendarmes are shadowing the statesmen as if they were all spies, and the state of affairs at any rate is truly disgusting. For instance, I once said to a pressman who often comes to see me "there is almost no freedom of speech these days is there?" Whereupon, he lamented and said that what I said was quite true and that the actual condition was such that they, too, could not dare to speak what they wanted to.' At this, the War Minister, flared up and said, 'That cannot be. It is impossible.' 'Yes, it is possible,' I replied and further added, 'I admit your spirit, but you do not act up to it. What

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 66 -- (pages 502-4)

13 January 1933

On returning from OKITSU, when I visited Finance Minister TAKAHASHI on the morning of the 14th the problem of JEHOL was again brought up between us as subject of our conversation and he told me the following. "At the cabinet meeting held yesterday, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that there had been an unofficial negotiation on the RUSSO-JAPANESE Non-Aggression Treaty, and that the Russian Government, intending to announce the particulars of the treaty ending in failure, had inquired of the Japanese Government whether she would agree to such measures or not. Then when the Foreign Minister began to explain the matter at the Cabinet meeting, I queried, 'Why did you not conclude the Non-Aggression Treaty?' His answer was that, 'the Army fears that such an act might further facilitate the Communist propaganda.' Therefore, I said, 'Don't you think that only when the treaty has been concluded, can we complain? Therefore, would it not be better to consider the conclusion of the treaty as quite a different matter from the communist propaganda? As I said just now, I think that we can say whatever we like without hesitation only when we have the non-aggression treaty concluded. And it is highly improper that everything should be led by the Army as of late.'

The War Minister then said something or other about 'the public opinion, etc. . . . ' or 'the national opinion, etc. . . . ' I told him that 'There is no such thing as public opinion or national opinion these days. We are threatened by the rattle of the gendarme's sword or his revolver pointed at us whenever we say anything disadvantageous to the Army. Isn't it a fact that there is absolutely no public opinion nor national opinion today? The pressure upon the freedom of speech has never been so strict as recently. I know, indeed, a fact that a certain news office in KYUSHU was threatened by the Army on the reason that it wrote something disadvantageous to the Army. The Army flew an airplane over the building in circles, saying it would drop a bomb from the plane. Furthermore, the gendarmes are shadowing the statesmen as if they were all spies, and the state of affairs at any rate is truly disgusting. For instance, I once said to a pressman who often comes to see me "there is almost no freedom of speech these days is there?" Whereupon, he lamented and said that what I said was quite true and that the actual condition was such that they, too, could not dare to speak what they wanted to.' At this, the War Minister, flared up and said, 'That cannot be. It is impossible.' 'Yes, it is possible,' I replied and further added, 'I admit your spirit, but you do not act up to it. What

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do you propose to do, with the gendarmes under your supervision acting as I have mentioned before?" He then mumbled that he would explain later or the like, but none of the Cabinet members spoke up to support me."

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 69 - (Page 519)

1 February 1933

Then, at the Cabinet meeting of the 1st, when the criticism was made: "The Army has of late been completely in control of Japan's diplomacy; withdrawal and such matters /are getting/ into the newspapers too often, and the Army is making announcements on each and every diplomatic affair. Why on earth are they doing such things?" The explanation was "No, it is the newspapers that put it out" that is, "The Army does not make propaganda;" and "The Army itself does not have it written, the newspaper offices do the writing, so there is no help for it." Finance Minister TAKAHASHI severely reproached the War Minister, saying, "If the newspaper offices are doing the writing, why doesn't the Army stop them? It should be quite easy for the Army with its present power to stop the, shouldn't it? All things considered, not stopping them is absurd." The War Minister seemed to be quite at a loss.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

昭和八年二月九日

陸軍之縮小西園寺公

第六十九回

「リ」の換字

Doc. 3150-69A

3770A

夫小から一日の閣議で「一作近まらるで日本の外交を
 陸軍が引摺って居る新聞存んかにもやあ何とか言へ
 ば直ぐ脱退だとかさうしてすぐ事々に外交に關して陸
 軍が声明したり存んかするか一作何故あ、云ふことをす
 るか」と言つて難詰した知か「イヤあれは新聞が出す
 ので……と云ふ風に「陸軍が宣傳するんじやない」と云
 ふ辯解で「陸軍自ら書かせるのでなくして新聞社が書
 くのであるから己を心得ない」と云ふやうな辯解だつたが
 高橋藏相は「新聞社が書くのをうは何故夫と止めないか
 今日、陸軍の力を以てすは誤なく止め得るじやないか
 要するに止めないことか頗る怪しからぬ」と云ふので頗る
 非道く陸相を責めたので餘程陸相も閉口した様
 子だつた。

Doc. No. 3150-71A

Exh. No. 3771-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARA MEMOIRS

Chapter 71 (page 531)

13 February 1933

And on the 13th, the Premier held a Cabinet council and asked the opinion of the Cabinet Ministers about the draft of the reply. The reply drafted by the Foreign Ministry was on the whole agreed to and was sent off on the night of the 13th.

At the Cabinet council, they were again reminded that if /the League/ should turn to Article 15, Paragraph 4 and an advice be sent to them, their stand was not to be decided upon carelessly without scrutinizing the contents and it was decided that the Jehol issue should continue to be treated as one of bandits; in other words, that the attitude that the so-called bandits, not the Chinese Army, were to be attacked, should be assumed. And it was also clearly decided at the same time that it should be disposed of within the boundaries of Jehol, without going south of the Great Wall.

FILE COPY
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Ex. 3771-A
Doc 3/50-71A

昭和八年二月十七日

陸軍々縮と西園寺公

第七十一回

ノートの抜萃

十三日には高橋貞次は閣議を開いて回答書案に
関する件に就て閣僚の意見をも求め、大体外務省
の造つた回答案に纏つて十三日の晩に夫を返送
した。

夫で其閣議では若し十五條の四項に移つて勸
告があつても充分其内容を検討した上でなければ
輕率に態度を決めることは出来ないと云ふこと
を重ぬる念を押し、尚ほ熱河の問題は何処
かのも匪賊と視てやる。所謂對支那の軍
隊を討つてなくして要するに匪賊を討つて云ふ
態度を執る。同時に熱河の区域内だけで
処分して長城以南には断つて出ないと云ふ
こともはつきり決められた。

Doc. No. 3150-72A

Exh. No. 3772-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
(Chapter 72 - (page 536))

15 February 1933

A Cabinet meeting was held at 10 A.M. on the 15th; a serious attitude had to be taken if /Japan/ were to withdraw from the League. So for the purpose of clarifying opinion after giving the written advice a thorough examination, and with the intention of making doubly sure, the Cabinet meeting was held, and Foreign Minister UCHIDA and the War Minister pressed for a decision of immediate withdrawal from the League, but the majority of the Cabinet members did not agree to this, saying, "After taking another look at the situation at the General Meeting /of the League/"

FILE COPY
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Ex 3772-A

Doc 3150-72A

昭和八年二月二十八日

陸軍々編と西園寺公

第七十二回

トリーの抜萃

其起で十五日の午前十時から閣議を開いて
 聯盟を脱退するに於ても餘程慎重な態度
 を執らなければならぬ。で勸告文の内合をよ
 く検討した上で其態度を明瞭にしようとい
 云ふことでは念には入るを入れ、トリーと云ふ
 閣議を閉じた内田外務大臣及び陸軍大
 臣は即刻聯盟を脱退の決意を促したけれど
 も尚ほ總會の模倣を見てトリーと云ふので多
 数の閣僚は之に賛意を表さなかつた。

THE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 85 - (pages 610, 611, 612)

14 May 1933

. . . . Vice-Minister ARITA came over to my place after 9:00 P.M. and made the following statement: "With the permission of the Minister, a plan had been already made to change personnel, sending SFIRATORI, Chief of the Publicity Bureau abroad and TANI, Chief of the Asia Bureau to Manchukuo as a Councillor. This was all ready to be put into effect.

* * * *

"In order to carry out the plan submitted by the Vice-Minister, Foreign Minister UCHIDA called in Bureau Chief SFIRATORI and said: 'I want you to go abroad either as a Minister or as a Councillor.' Bureau Chief SFIRATORI stated: 'I will give it consideration, but what do you think about sending the Vice-Minister abroad also?'

"Once, a long time before that, when Bureau Chief SFIRATORI was approached on the same subject, he strongly objected by stating: 'If I should be sent out, there is no telling as to what may happen.' Consequently, the Foreign Minister was finally placed at a complete loss. The Foreign Minister therefore called me in and said: 'Since SFIRATORI states that if I send you abroad he will go, I want you to go out as Ambassador to Great Britain or to any other country that you prefer. If you accept this proposition, the matter will be settled amicably.' If, as regards the relationship between myself and the Bureau Chief, the Foreign Minister is going to take the stand that in a quarrel both parties are to blame, it is utterly useless for me to give him my support.

"Although I was also in an embarrassing position on the previous occasion, I believed that I should exert my increased efforts and have acted accordingly up to this day. However, as matters stand at present, it is absolutely impossible for me to continue on assisting the Minister.

RETURN TO ROOM 361

I thought it would be best, therefore, for me to resign by submitting my resignation before such a decision was reached

* * * * *

On the other hand, when the resignation of the Vice-Minister became a reality, Bureau Chief SFIRATORI, seemed to feel that he had to resign also. However, as the result of conferences with SUZUKI of the Army, Bureau Chief SFIRATORI finally said: 'I shall accept the post of Minister to a foreign country provided that there will be no change in policy.' On the next day, he made his said intention known to Foreign Minister UCHIDA. Foreign Minister UCHIDA was overjoyed at the action of SFIRATORI. He seemed to have been especially pleased when SFIRATORI advised him: 'Please in any case retain the Chief of the Asia Bureau since he is a very important figure in connection with Chinese problems!'

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Doc. 3150-85-A

昭和八年五月廿三日

陸軍々縮ト西園寺公

(第八十五回ヨリノ拔萃)

九時過ぎニ有田次官が自分ノ處ニ來テノ話ニ「實ハ豫テ白鳥情報部長ヲ海外ニ出シ、谷アジア局長ヲ滿洲ニ參事官トシテ赴任サセテ賞ヒ夫々人專ノ配置ヲ變ヘル計畫テ豫テ大臣ノ諒解ヲ得テ唯決行スル許リニナツテ居タ。

内田外務大臣ハ豫テ次官ノ出シタ案ニ依ツテ愈々實行ニ取掛ルヘク白鳥部長ヲ呼ンデ「海外ニ參事官ナリ公使ナリトシテ出ルヤウニ」ト云フコトヲ言ツタ處ガ白鳥部長ハ「考ヘテ見マセウガ次官モ外へ出サレタラドウデスカ。」デ之ヨリズツト前ニ一度交渉ヲ受ケタ時ニハ全ク白鳥部長モヨリ強ク反對シテ「若シ自分ヲ出スナラバドシナコトガ起ルカモ分ラヌ。」ト云フヤウナコトヲ言ツタノデ大臣ハトウ々々手モ足モ出ナクナツテシマツタ。夫デ大臣ハ自分ヲ呼ンデ「白鳥モ若ク出セバ出シテ行クハカラ君ニ一ツ英國大使デモ何處デモ好イカ大使ニナツテ出テ行ツテ賞ヒタイ。サバ事ガ丸ク治マルカラ。」ト云フコトヲ云フテ「FROM M. G.」其處テ自分ハ自分ト部長ノ間ヲ大臣ガ喧嘩兩成敗ト云フ風ニスル氣

持デハトテモ大臣ヲ助ケテヤツテモ駄目ダ。デ此前
ノ時モ困ツタト思ツタケレドモ尙ホ一層ノ努力ヲシ
テ……ト思ツテ今日マデ來タケレドモ今日斯ノ如
キコトデハ到底大臣ヲ助ケテ行ク譯ニハイカナ。夫
デ先ヅサウ云フ裁決ヲサレル前ニ自分トシテハ辭表
ヲ出シテ辭メルコトガ一番好イト思ツタ。……
……一方白鳥部長ノ方ハ實際次官ニ辭メラレテ見
ルト自分モ何トカ辭メナクテハナラナイヤウナ氣持
ニナツタラシイケレドモ尙ホ種々陸軍ノ鈴木アタリ
ト相談シタ結果白鳥部長ハ結局「政策ノ轉換ヲシナ
イト云フコトデアルナラバ自分ハ公使ニナルコトヲ
受ケル。」サウシテ内田大臣ニ翌日其意味ヲ通ジタ
處ガ内田大臣ハ非常ニ喜ンデ、殊ニ白鳥ハ「對支問
題ニ就テ大事ナアジア局長ヲ兎ニ角殘シテ置イテク
レ。」ト云フコトヲ進言シタノデ之ニ就テモ亦大臣
ハ非常ニ喜ンダラシイ。」

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 103, (page 718)

19 October 1933

On the 19th I met Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU at the Foreign Ministry. Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU seems to take a pessimistic view of the whole situation. He made various statements concerning the Russian problem, our China policy, general disarmament, Japanese-American problems and the League. He said: "The Navy is demanding equality in armaments; it is stressing the fact that should this demand be denied, it will abrogate the Naval Disarmament Treaty. In other words, /the Navy/ is demanding equality in the sense of reserving the right to maintain a basic minimum of armaments absolutely necessary for national defense and by 'abrogation of the Treaty' seemed in other words to wish to insert even the wording "We are prepared to risk a rupture."

COPY
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Doc. 3150-103 A Ex. 3774-A

西園寺、原田日記百〇三章カラノ拔萃
一九三三年十月十九日

夫レカラ十九日ノ日ニ自分ハ外務省ニ行ツテ重光
次官ニ逢ツタ處ガ、如何ニモ重光次官ハ凡テ大體ニ於テ
悲觀論デアッタ。テ對露問題、對支政策、或ハ一般軍縮、
對米問題、或ハ對聯盟問題ニ就テイロイロ話シテ居
タガ、海軍ハ平等權ヲ主張シ、破レタラ軍縮條約
破棄、ト。要スルニ矢張り防禦ノ最小限度ヲ主張ス
ル意味ニ於テノ平等權デアツテ、其條約破棄ハ言換
ヘレバ一決裂ヲ辭セヌ。ト云フ文句ヲモ入レテ置
キタイト云フ氣持デアツタラシイ。

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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS
Chapter 109 - (Pages 755-6)

5 December 1933

Thereupon the Domestic Policy Conference was promptly held on the afternoon of the 5th. Nevertheless, an ordinary Cabinet meeting was held in the morning. At the conclusion of the Cabinet meeting, the Foreign Minister took the floor and spoke to the effect that "Since the countries of Europe and the United States, from the standpoint of trade with Japan, have increased tariffs under a unified policy against the exportation of Japanese merchandise, and in short, are striving towards placing Japan in an isolated position, I want the Ministries concerned also to give mutual consideration to counter-measures."

However, Finance Minister TAKAHASHI said, "The fact that foreign nations in unison are taking a defensive attitude towards Japan does not arise simply from trade relations alone. Rather, the anti-Japanese attitude which appears in trade relations is something that appears only on the surface. The fact is that the Army and Navy, that is, the Japanese militarists, are claiming that 1935 and 1936 will be critical years, and with hints that war with Russia and the United States will break out, are inciting the rural and urban districts. Such activities

will have its effect abroad and at a time when European countries and the United States are trying to conduct matters as peacefully as possible and trying to avoid wars in every sense of the word, the pro-war atmosphere of Japan creates a very bad feeling in diplomacy and this is what appears in trade relations. For these reasons, the military must restrain its speech and actions. There will be no crisis in 1935 and

1936." The War Minister, turning color, replied, "That is not true. The military has no intention of waging a war today, but we must be prepared.

~~There will be a crisis.~~ *It cannot be said that this is not a crisis.*

昭和八年十二月十二日

陸軍軍縮と西園寺公

第百九回 一よりの抜本

其処で内政会議は早速五百の午後から始まったのだけれども
 午前中は矢張普通の定例の閣議をやつた。其閣議の最後に
 外務大臣が立つて「政羅」アメリカあたりの日本に對する貿易
 上日本の商品の進出に就いて其対策上一致して関税の引
 揚やをやつたり西村あるに日本を孤立の立場に置置くやうには向けて
 来るから閣議各者では矢張対策をお互に考慮して世見たい
 と云ふ意味の話をした。知が高橋大藏大臣は「外國が一致して
 日本に對する防衛的の態度に去るのは固守に貿易関係かうのみ起つて
 来るのではない。尙早う貿易関係に現はれて来る。対日態度といふものは
 表面的なものであつて、実は陸海軍即ち日本の軍部が一九三五、
 六年を危機なりと稱してさうして地方に行つても或は中央で
 閣議にロシアやアメリカと戦争でも始まるかの如き口吻を以て刺戟して
 居るさう云ふ風なことが對外的に響いてさうして現にアメリカの
 政羅に對して外國が出来ただけ平和的に行かふとして戦争を
 仰る者心味に於て避けてさうして居る。矢先に日本に好戰的の氣
 分があると言ふのは氣が對外的に非高中に居る。感心しを興へることが
 貿易の上に見はれて来るのであつて、閣議は「日本」を慎まなければならぬ
 何し一九三六年や五年か、機を伺つて「日本」を慎まなければならぬ
 大臣は「日本」を慎まなければならぬ。機を伺つて「日本」を慎まなければならぬ
 と田中「日本」を慎まなければならぬ。機を伺つて「日本」を慎まなければならぬ
 機を伺つて「日本」を慎まなければならぬ。

REFURIA
 TO ROOM 61

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 109 - (pages 758-9)

December
9 ~~October~~ 1933

Since the voices of resentment from various circles reflected on the military which has become extremely nervous, the Army and the Navy jointly issued something which resembled a statement on the evening of the 9th, and in the morning papers of the 10th, stated their views in regard to the alienation of the public from the military. Making such statements as: —

Generally, in connection with the budget question and others, the number of those who are speaking and acting to alienate the people from the military is not small. For example, there are those who say that the crisis of 1936 is for the ulterior purpose of propaganda of the military, that in past wars, only those from the lower classes were killed in action whereas among high ranking officers, there were none who died in action, or that the agrarian problem was sacrificed for the sake of the military budget. This form of movement to alienate the people from the military is an undertaking which destroys the harmonious unity of the public mind which is the most essential basis of national defense, and the military absolutely cannot tolerate it.

and repeatedly stating: —

Two important measures used as international schemes to impair the power of a nation for national defense are anti-war movements which aim at the defeat of one's own country based upon instructions from the Third Internationale, and the movement to alienate the people from the military mentioned above. The former is a well-known fact, whereas the latter, in spite of the fact that various measures from abroad are becoming more persistent in our country, is surprisingly unknown although its evil is great because its movement is only moderate and disguised.

and finally issued a threatening statement which declared that those who make such statements in spite of the fact that the military, faced with this difficult situation, had made demands for minimum national defense were extremely insolent.

昭和八年十一月九日

陸軍軍縮と白團事件

第百九回「よりの扱方」

其処で彼等たるに「うそ」を聞えるのが非常に神経的見になりつゝ
 軍部に反動して九日の晩に手明言明したものを陸軍軍縮共同して
 出して十日の朝刊に軍民離間に就いて陸海軍が所信を声明
 した大體は「軍縮問題」其他に「軍民離間の言動」もなる
 ものが少くない例へば一九三六年の危機を以て軍部の意向による
 傳言もなし或は過言の戦役に於て戦死者もものは庶民階級のみ
 にして「高級指揮官」に戦死者がなかつたといふ説も或は「軍部」が
 のために「農林問題」は「犠牲」に供せられるものなりと可すが如く、此種
 の「軍民離間の言動」は「国防の根本」をなす人々の「知合」結果
 を破壊する企てである。軍部として「黙視」する事は出来ぬとい
 う。軍部は「黙視」する事、

一國の「國防」を「滅亡」させるために「國際的」暴動の一大手段として
 用いられる「軍部」の「指揮官」の「命令」を「自國」の「敗戦」を「自
 的」とする「反動運動」として述べた「軍民離間の言動」は「前
 者は既に衆知」の事であるのに反して「後者は海外から各種の
 手段を通じて「執拗」に「我國」に「働きかけ」て「拘束」し「其運動」
 が「微細」に「進行」したために「且つ」官公署の「人々」に「比して」「異常」に「一般」に
 知られて居る。

と云ふやうに「軍部」の「命令」を「自國」の「敗戦」を「自
 的」とする「反動運動」として述べた「軍民離間の言動」は「前
 者は既に衆知」の事であるのに反して「後者は海外から各種の
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 が「微細」に「進行」したために「且つ」官公署の「人々」に「比して」「異常」に「一般」に
 知られて居る。

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 127 (pages 858-9)

17 April 1934

. And since he (AMAU) made an informal statement on the situation to the said effect, the various newspapers printed it conspicuously as a declaration or some such thing of the Foreign Ministry. And the comments of the various countries in regard to this were very strong, so that the Foreign Ministry was also somewhat taken aback. Actually, the Vice Minister and Minister knew nothing of this. In actuality, since various countries were selling arms and doing various other things in China a strong feeling of insecurity arose, so the Foreign Ministry sent instructions to the Ministers stationed overseas, the so-called Ambassadors and Ministers. Then the Chief of the Information Bureau translated into his own English the contents of the said official instructions and he gathered the foreign correspondents and blabbed something to them that became the cause of all the trouble. I heard later that it would have been better to have shown the English translation of the official instructions instead of his own translation.

Chief of the Information Bureau AMAU has always been a very fine man but since he is somehow careless in some ways we have not had much contact with him. After that I went to the Foreign Ministry and met the Minister and Vice-Minister and asked them but it seems that they were not greatly worried about the matter, and on the surface the Minister and Vice-Minister said: "It is nothing serious."

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西園寺原田日記才百二十七回

と云ふやうな内容の時局談をしたりで、夫が各新聞に麗々しく
 外務当局の声明とか何とか云ふことば出て居る。で、夫に対する各國
 の反響は非常に悪かつたので、外務省も多少周章して居る氣味
 があつた。で、現に次官も大臣も知つた話では無いので、其實際の
 知を聞いて見ると、事實上支那でいろいろ各國が武器を賣込んで
 だりいろいろことをすゝ爲に非常に不安な空氣があるので、夫に
 對して駐外の使臣、所謂大公使に對して外務省が訓令を
 出した。其訓令の内容を其儘情報部長が自分の英語に
 譯して、外國の通信社を集めて何と思つたか喋つたことが
 禍を爲したので、後から聞けば、訓令其もの、英譯を見せ
 た才が来たと言がなかつた。と言ふやうな話も聞いて居る。
 で、元來天羽情報部長は非常に善良な人だけれども、何
 となく軽率な知があるので、自分等は餘り接近しない。
 で、自分は其後外務省に行つて大臣にも次官にも逢つて
 聞いて見るけれども、大してまあ氣にもして居ないやうな風
 で、表面は大臣も次官も、大したことはないよ。と言つて居た。

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Doc. No. 3150 - 148A

Exh. No. 3077-A

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 148 - (page 1008)

11 September 1934

Next, when I also talked to the Premier, he too said, "I didn't think it was so serious until now. However, it is extremely dubious. Actually, after the War Minister returned from my place yesterday, the 1st Division Commander in question, Lt. General YANAGAWA, stayed constantly in the War Minister's room. The reason for this is, the faction composed of ARAKI, MASAKI, and YANAGAWA was always in favor of the annexation of Manchuria. On the one hand, they wish to carry out actively their will to the end and on the other hand, they believe that it is a very good reason for overthrowing the Cabinet."

3777-18

Doc. 3150-148A

昭和九年九月十三日

陸軍々縮と西園寺公

第四十八回

上りの沿革

夫から總理にも話して見左処か總理も「どうも今迄は
 此程でよいと思つたけれども餘程怪しい。現に昨日陸軍
 大臣が自介の処から歸つてから例の第一師團長の柳川中
 將が陸軍大臣の室に「め切だ」と云ふのは元來荒
 木と真崎、柳川と云ふ一派は始めから満洲併合論
 であつた。矢張其意思を何知までも一徹底させた
 といふのと、もう一つは倒閣の材料は大変好いと思ふ

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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 148 (page 1004)

7 September 1934

. I met the Foreign Minister and the Premier on the following morning and reported that I had transmitted the disarmament draft to the Prince. I said: "The Prince was inquiring whether the Washington Treaty was going to be abrogated even if Japan's proposals should happen to be accepted." The Foreign Minister and the Premier thereupon both said: "The long and short of it is that in the draft we have utterly opposed a ratio. Therefore we must abrogate it no matter how much the other Powers agree to our proposals. We are taking an unconditional stand."

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3777A

Doc. 3150-148B

「西園寺原田日記(二八九回)」よりの抜萃

一九三四年(昭和十九年)九月七日

翌朝外務大臣にも總理にも逢ふ、軍縮案を公爵の處にお傳へしたことを報告し、尚ほ公爵から「ワシントン條約廢棄と云ふことは、若し向ふか万一本の言ふ主張を容れた場合にも廢棄するのぞか」と云ふお話であつた。と云ふ話をした處が「要するに内容は比率と云ふことには絶対に反対なんだから、どんなに向ふか云ふことを聞いても、天張廢棄しなければならぬ。絶対的な態度を執つて居るんだ」と云ふ話を外務大臣からも聞き、總理からも聞いた。

Notice:

Exhibit 3778A to be

Corrected in accordance with language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record p. 37, 777.

Doc. Div.

Exhibit No. 3778-A

JI-HARADA MEMOIRS

(p. 1294)

and met Vice Minister SHIGEMITSU. He proposed a plan for disarmament. She 'armament'; however, the Navy is opposed to limit the quality /of

armament/ without limiting the quantity'. The attitude of the Navy seems to be that 'it is to our advantage, never in future to accept limitations from other countries'. The Navy is very touchy on this matter.

"However, looking at the situation as it may develop other countries would place the responsibility of the failure of the Disarmament Conference on Japan, so this problem has to be treated delicately. Definitely, Japan would have to make a difficult proposition which I fear might disrupt the entire relationship with Great Britain. I would like to wrap this /proposal of the Navy/ in a pretty cloth and try to avoid any 'trouble'" emphatically stated SHIGEMITSU.

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 180 - (p. 1294).

21 August 1935.

Then I went to the Foreign Office and met Vice Minister SHIGEMITSU. He /SHIGEMITSU/ said: "Great Britain has proposed a plan for disarmament. She proposed 'qualitative limitation of armament'; however, the Navy is opposing it, saying that: 'It is meaningless to limit the quality /of armament/ without limiting the quantity'. The attitude of the Navy seems to be that 'it is to our advantage, never in future to accept limitations from other countries'. The Navy is very touchy on this matter.

"However, looking at the situation as it may develop other countries would place the responsibility of the failure of the Disarmament Conference on Japan, so this problem has to be treated delicately. Definitely, Japan would have to make a difficult proposition which I fear might disrupt the entire relationship with Great Britain. I would like to wrap this /proposal of the Navy/ in a pretty cloth and try to avoid any 'trouble'" emphatically stated SHIGEMITSU.

THE COPY

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3178-A

I. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-180 A

Exhibit No.

西園寺原田日記 第百八十回

トリの抜萃

それから其後外務省に行つて、重光次官に会つた処が、「イギリス
 から軍縮の案を持つた。それでイギリスは『實の制限をやりな
 』と言つた。未だか海軍では『量りの制限をしな』を置いて『實の制限を
 』をやらうと云ふことは駄目だ』と言つて反対をして居る。で結局
 どうも海軍の様子を見ると、『凡て将来他国から拘束を受けな、こ
 が利益である』と云ふ説明で、餘程感情的になつて居る』と云ふ
 ことを言つて居る。

「それからどうもこの先の様子は見ると外国は日本に軍縮
 会議の不成立の責任を負はせて来るやうな形勢がから成る。
 此問題は小さく取扱ふで、完全に日本が難しい、と言
 ふことに在り。英國との全面的關係に之が波及しやしない
 と云ふことを懸念する。まあ何とか綺麗を風呂敷に包
 んであんまりことのないやうにして見たい』と云ふことを言
 先は頼りに言つて居る。

FILE COPY
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Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 189 - (pages 1374-5)

30 November 1935

I met the Foreign Minister on the 2nd. He told me: "There is no need to worry so much about the situation in North China. General MINAMI has clearly told me: 'In the event of ever dispatching troops south of Shanhaikuan it would naturally be based upon an Imperial command. Troops will definitely not be sent south of Shanhaikuan as long as there is no Imperial command to do so.' If this secret information were to leak out to China, they would start slighting us and begin doing all sorts of things. On the other hand, if the military faction of Japan were to find out that the secret had leaked out to China, they would act all the more strongly. I believe that this would be extremely dangerous."

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J.P.S Doc No. 3150-189A

Exhibit No. 3779-A

西園寺原田日記第百八十九回以下の抜萃

それから二日の日に外務大臣に會つた處から北支はそれ程心配はしないやうに……と云ふ事があるし、南大將からも可成り兵を關内に入れるやうな場合には、無論大命に依る事がある、決してそんなやうな事は大命に非ざる限り絶対に關内には入れないといふ事をほうきり言つて来て居る。此内密に言つて来て居る事は支那側に漏れると、又支那側が馬鹿にして彼是やり出す。又支那側にこれが漏れたと云ふ事は日本の軍部に令つと却て日本の軍部が強くなる。これは實に危険なと思はれる。

TURN THE COPY TO ROOM 361

Excerpt from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 244 - (pages 1820-21)

12 July 1937

Then the War Minister determined to rescue the five thousand men at Tientsin, declared at a Cabinet meeting, 'This time I definitely would like to have troops sent out.' Then Premier KONOYE said, 'I do not want to expand the issue. It may be all right to despatch troops according to necessity.' In this way, he agreed with the War Minister, but he added, 'If we oppose the dispatching of troops at this time and do not heed the wishes of the Army, the War Minister will be compelled to resign. Consequently, the Cabinet will have to resign, also. If I resign, somebody will eventually have to accept this position, but as there may be no one who can possibly check the Army, there is no other way than for me to assume the responsibility and confront the issue.' Thus, Premier KONOYE made an extremely touching decision.

Then the War Minister finally stated that he would definitely 'not expand the issue.' His Majesty received in audience His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the General Staff, twice, and His Imperial Highness, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, once. The War Minister said that he would settle the issue neatly by sending a large force to smash the opposition and then withdraw quickly, but when asked, 'Can you carry it out as expected?', the War Minister was not able to give a definite answer." Such is what the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal told me.

On the afternoon of the 12th, a report came saying that the Chinese Army would accept all our demands. Prior to that, when the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the War Minister were talking, an adjutant came and said, "A telegram has come from Tientsin saying, 'Accepted all our demands.' It is a very sincere answer." It is probable that the War Minister did not want to hear this report in front of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, but it actually happened.

These demands were, the withdrawal of troops, guarantee of the future, and the punishment of responsible officers. The officers of the Chinese Army are justifying themselves by saying "The troops are being influenced by the communists."

In the Army, even the General Staff Headquarters thought, "Let us make an agreement" was probably a Chinese attempt to make us stop our military preparation. Thus, it seems that the Army, as long as it has decided to despatch troops, wants to put forth more stringent demands.

3780A

Doc. 3150-244A

西園寺原田日記(第二四四頁) 日山本按筆

一九三七年(昭和十二年)七月十二日

さうすると急に北平の郊外の蘆溝橋方面で夜間演習中
支那の九軍と云ふのが襲撃を食つたと云ふ事件が起つた。で
此問題は成るべく擴大しなやうにと云ふので一度は治つた
やうな形になつた。で一番初め起つた時に直ぐ自分達の頭に
来たのは陸軍大臣が最近非常に心配して居る事は、お先の若
士官達が八月の移動を前に何かするをやりはせんか、で殊に綏遠
で失敗した田中隆吉と云ふ参謀あたりが何か又い出か、やあせ
んかと云ふると、その小から又今の真崎の判決の具合は、ど
うしても何か多少のゴタゴタがありはせしか、と云ふるやうに
か非常な心配の問題であつたと云ふると思ひ出すのであつた。
さうすると後から聞くと、蘆溝橋の問題が起つた時に陸軍大
臣は閣議で、早速三個師團の兵を国内から出した、でさ
うして五千の兵隊を救ふ為にどうしても出した、で凡そ
自分に任せて貰つた、と云ふ話であつた。

で近衛首相は其時に「今日日本が大軍を支那に送ると云
ふ事は、餘程考へなければ、國際的に重大な事である。又内政的
に見ても、必ずしも今日さう云ふ問題で軍を動かす事に國民
は賛成しない。益々軍と離反するやうな事があつては面白
くない。だから自分は絶対に出兵には反対だ。随つて陸
軍大臣に凡そ其責任を伴つた、と云ふ事で、陸
軍大臣の申出を蹴つた。」

で内務大臣も海軍大臣も外務大臣も凡て近衛首相の申出に賛成し、結局陸軍大臣は自分の申出を撤回したと云ふ事であった。其後又再び事態が急変して治まりかけたものが治まらなう様子であった。

それから十二日に自分から御殿場に行く前に朝早く葉山の御用邸に行つて、長者園で内大臣に会つた処が、内大臣の語に「十一日に参謀總長宮さんと陛下がお召になると云ふ事を聞いたのが自分には直ぐ前に参内して拜謁を願つて、参謀總長にお会ひにならう前に、總理にお会ひにならうどうか」と云ふ事を陛下に申上げた処が陛下は

「彼の滿洲事變の時に總理に先に会つた処が後から陸軍から統帥権云々と云ふ事を言はれて、非常に總理も迷惑したやうな事があったから、此際近衛には後で会はふ」と云ふので参謀總長宮に会はれて、陛下は参謀總長

宮に

「若しソヴィエツトが後から立つたらどうするか」

と云ふ所の御下向があったか、閑院宮殿下は

「陸軍は立たんと思つて居ります」

然し陛下は尚ほ

「それは陸軍の独断であつて、若し万一ソヴィエツトが立つたらどうするか」

と云ふ御下向があったか、殿下は唯

「致し方ありません」

と云ふやうな御奉答であつたので非常に陛下は

抑不満足であられた御様子であつた。

それで天津に居る五千の兵隊を陸軍大臣は援助する決心を決めて、^可 どうしても一っ今度は派兵をして貰ひたい』と云ふるのを閣議に申出た。其処で近衛首相は『事態を擴大しな』と云ふるので、^可 必要に應じて派兵もよからふかと云ふ事で陸軍大臣に同意した。が、總理は『若し此際派兵に反対して、陸軍の希望を不入の場合には、陸軍大臣は職を辞めなければならぬ。随つて内閣も辞めなければならぬ。結局自分か辞すも誰か又此地位に立たなければならぬ人があるのであるから、とても軍を抑へて行く人はあるまいから、自分か責をとつてこれに當るより仕様が、あるまい』と云ふので、近衛首相は非常に悲壯な決心をして居られた』と云つて居つた。

それから結局陸軍大臣も、擴大しな』と云ふるは、けつまり其時にさう言つて居つた。

で陛下は参謀總長宮に二回、軍令部長宮に一回お会ひになつた。で、陸軍大臣は一擧して大軍をおくつて叩きつけ、短時間引揚げて綺麗にやると云ふるのであるのだが、^可 果してそれが思ふやうに出るか』と云ふると陸軍大臣に聞いたか、はつきりした返事は陸軍大臣も出さなかつた』と云ふるのを内大臣か言つて居られた。

で恰ふ十二日の午後になると、全部支那軍が要求を不入と云ふ情報が入つて来て、其前に内大臣と陸軍大臣と話し居る間に副官が来て、天津軍からの電報で、^可 要求を全部入

Doc. 3150-244A

No. 4

小た」と云ふ非常に真面目な回答を」と云ふ事と言つて
 来た。恐らく陸軍大臣は内大臣の前で其報告を聞く事と
 好まなかつたから云ふけれども、その実どう云ふるに於つた
 其要求と云ふのは、兵を撤退する事、將來の保證、將校を
 罰する事、何れも將校は「兵隊は共產黨にやら小居るんで
 ある」と言つて辯解して居る。
 で陸軍では参謀本部でも「どうも協定をしよう」と云
 ぶるは、兵備を緩めさせる為に支那がやるんじゃないか
 と云ふ事を考へて、陸軍では、もう一たび兵と決つた以上
 は、もう少し嚴重に彼等に要求したいと云ふ希望である
 やうだ

陸軍大臣は内大臣の前で其報告を聞く事と好まなかつたから云ふけれども、その実どう云ふるに於つた其要求と云ふのは、兵を撤退する事、將來の保證、將校を罰する事、何れも將校は「兵隊は共產黨にやら小居るんである」と言つて辯解して居る。で陸軍では参謀本部でも「どうも協定をしよう」と云ぶるは、兵備を緩めさせる為に支那がやるんじゃないかと云ふ事を考へて、陸軍では、もう一たび兵と決つた以上は、もう少し嚴重に彼等に要求したいと云ふ希望であるやうだ

EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 249 - (pages 1859-61)

13 August 1937

. When I /HARADA/ met the Foreign Minister that afternoon, he said:

"However, the previously mentioned Shanghai Incident broke out. There are individuals in China and Japan, who are saying: 'The reasons for the assassination of Lt. (JG) OYAMA, and the rousing of considerable excitement in Shanghai, are the increased number of Japanese warships, and the increasing of the number of Japanese marines to 3,000.' However, under such circumstances, the increase of personnel is only natural, and I believe it was actually inevitable. From Consul General OKAMOTO a message came saying: 'If it can be done I would like to see Shanghai kept free of the devastation of war.' It was not good that Japan increased the number of warships as I mentioned before, but that could not be helped. If we should announce the issuing of the mobilization order, then the situation will become troublesome. So, at yesterday's Cabinet meeting, it was decided that the mobilization orders will be issued, but not announced....."

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Ex 2781-A

Doc 3150-249A

西園寺原田日記(第二四九回)よりの抜萃

一九三七年(昭和十二年)八月十三日

尚ほ自分は其午後外務大臣に會つた……

が例の上海事変が起つて来た。で、大山中尉が殺された
り、上海を相當に刺戟したのは軍艦が増派されて、陸軍
隊を三千に増したりした事が原因だ。と云ふ事を支那
でも言ひ日本側でも言ふ人があつたけれども、然しあの場合
増員することが当然であつて、已むを得ない事情にあつたと
思はれる。で、岡本總領事は「上海をどうかして兵火に見
舞れないやうにしたい」と言つて来て居つたが、然し又日本
の方が軍艦をさつさ言つたやうに増したのが悪いと言ふ
こともあつたけれども、これは致し方がない。……

今若し動員令を出すことを公發表すると事能心が五月
耀いから、昨日の閣議では要するに「動員令は出すが
これは發表しない」と言ふことに決めた。

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EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 250 - (page 1870)

24 September 1937

.....

I then visited the Foreign Minister at the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Minister said: "It was decided at today's Cabinet meeting to mobilize four divisions and to have another four divisions in readiness."...

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Ex. 3782-A

Doc. 3150-250A

西園寺原田日記(卷二五〇回)ヨリノ抜萃

一九三七年(昭和十二年)九月二十四日

それより外務省に外務大臣を訪ねると、外務大臣は「四個師団を動員し、他の四個師団を準備して置くべきが今日閣議で決ま

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EXCERPT From SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 251 - (page 1890)

About 26 September 1937

The Premier relayed the following information: "The English Ambassador came three times to Foreign Minister HIROTA's place and said: 'I believe the British Government will try to persuade CHIANG Kai-shek, but what are Japan's demands anyway?' Foreign Minister HIROTA replied: 'This is my personal idea, but according to my plan, / (1) I would draw a line in the area slightly south of Tientsin and Peiping line and would make it a demilitarised zone and both Japanese and Chinese as a general rule will not station troops in this area; (2) the recognition of Manchuria; (3) ceasing of anti-Japanese movements; (4) defense against Communism; (5) equal diplomatic opportunity in North China./ It is said that the demands of these five conditions were given to the English Ambassador.

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西園寺・原田日記(第二五一回)

ヨリ、拔萃

一九三七年(昭和十二年)九月二十六日

それから總理の言つげに「イギリス大使は広田外相の
 迎に三度来て「イギリスから蔣介石を動かす」と
 思ふが、日本の要求は「一体いんなさうだ」と云ふや
 うな活をしたが、まあ広田外相として「これ
 は個人の安否で、即ち自分の安否であるが、第一に天
 津北平の線から稍南の辺に線を引いて、其間を非
 武装地帯にする」と支那も日本も大体に於
 て軍隊を留めない事にしたい。それから「四洲
 國の承認、三の排日、毎日の停止、それから四の防共
 それから五の北支に於ける対外機会均等」の五
 條の要求を英大使にしたさうだ。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 254 - (pages 1919-20)

3784-A

2 November 1937

. and then when I visited the Foreign Minister and questioned him about various problems, the Foreign Minister said that when he invited the industrialists to tea yesterday, he stated to the effect that: /"This anti-British movement is very embarrassing at present. Especially at present, there is no other country besides England who would act as an intermediary between Japan and China. Therefore, if such things are done now, the government will be placed in a very awkward position. In the end, we may have to fight England. Or, we may also have to collide with her sometime, but such things are absolutely out of the question right now. Especially, from the diplomatic point of view, the government will be greatly inconvenienced/ if such things are to be carried out at present."

HORIMOUCHI pp. 29793-29795

EX-3784-A

Doc. 3150 - 254A

西園寺原田日記(第二五四回)ヨリ、抜萃

一九三七年(昭和十二年)十一月二日

それから外務大臣を訪ねて、いろいろを話と聞くと見ると
昨日外務大臣がいろいろを實業家とあそびをんなかに呼ん
だ話をする時に、其排英運動は今非常に困る。殊に今と
リスを遣つては外に支那と関係に入つてくれば、(因)に今いんが
今そんな事を言ふては政府として困る。それは結局に於て
何時かイギリスと戦はなければならぬ。或は矢張衝かなく
ちやあなうを、時があるかも知れないうち、今そんな
事をする事は以てカ外の事だ。殊に今外交上さう云
ふ事はやらぬのは政府として困る。

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EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 255 - (page 1923)

5 November 1937

Then, on the 5th, I (HARADA) met the Foreign Minister. He said: "The British Ambassador came to see me privately, and, repeatedly asked me (Foreign Minister): 'At this time, which country would be the best mediator?' Thereupon, I replied: 'Your country is still the best.' He said: 'From what I see of Japan, England seems to be much disliked so it makes me wonder whether we would be the best.' I stated: 'England is the most suitable country. Therefore, haven't we been holding preliminary conversations with you for some time?' Then, it was England's report that "after looking at the situation in China, it seemed a little as if those who are near CHIANG Kai-shek wished to somehow settle matters with Japan." So, I (Foreign Minister) told the British Ambassador: /" that even if Germany or Italy were to act as intermediary, it would not do at all."/

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3785A

Doc 3150-255A

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西園寺・原田日記(第二五五回)

ヨリー、抜萃

一九三七年(昭和十二年)十一月五日

それから五日に外務大臣に会った。此が英國大使が個人的に訪問して来て、自分に向いて何れの國が仲介すれば番此際好いのか」と云ふ事を類りに聞いて居たから、自分は「大張貴下の國が番よ」と言つた。此が日本の様子を見たと英國は非常に嫌はれて居るやうだから、どうかと思ふ」と云ふ話であつたが、自分は「英國が最も宜しい」といふから、此間から下話を身下に類りにして居るやうな「なつかし」と云ふ事を言つた。其処で「御の様子を見たい」と落着いたの周囲は何とかして日本と話を續けたいやうな様子が少しある」と云ふのがイギリス側の報告である。で自分は英大使に向つて「ドイツやイタリアが間に入つてはそれではとも然目である」と云ふ事を言つた。

444
Ex. 31786-A

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
DOCUMENT DIVISION

13 Jan 48

MEMO TO: All Concerned

1. Item No. 57 on Order List No. 5 (SAIONJI Diary) should read 3150-257-B, which is attached. 3150-257-A is hereby withdrawn.

Chief, Doc. Processing Unit

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EXCERPT FROM SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 257 - (page 1962)

7 December 1937 -- from the conversation of

"I should say that I am distressed with HIROTA also", the Premier said; "Just on the 2nd of November, HIROTA met the German Ambassador and submitted the plan which was based on the assumption of circumstances when the Supreme Command Office had decided not to advance farther than the Paoting line. The German Ambassador transmitted this to Chiang Kai-shek on the 6th of November through the German Ambassador to China. Chiang Kai-shek, however, rejected it at that time. Recently, particularly when Nanking was about to be in an imminent danger, the German Ambassador to China recently reported to Dirksen /T.N. phonetic/, German Ambassador to Tokyo, that Chiang Kai-shek, being distressed, accepted it. We found out all about it because the Army stole that telegram. And now, it is quite impossible to accept the terms proposed at the time when we stopped at the Paoting line. The Foreign Minister being prepared for a case like that, had carefully told the other side: "If the war situation changes further, the terms of this talk will also change according to the situation. Please bear that in mind."

EX 3786-A

國際檢察部文書課

一九四八年(昭和廿三年)一月十三日

覽書

向係各位

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一、才五順位表才五七項(西園寺日記)ハ三二五〇―二五七―B
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除ス

文書復寫係長

Doc. 3150-257B

西園寺原田日記(第二五七回)ヨリノ抜萃

一九三七年(昭和十二年)十二月七日

總理は「どうも原田にも困る」と云ふ事の話から、「恰度十一
月の二日に、原田はドイツの大使に会つて、さうして統帥府の決
定として保定の線より進まない」と云ふ事を決めた。居た時の
状態を前提として、決めた案を持出した處が、ドイツの大
使はそれを十一月の六日に支那駐在のドイツの大使から
蒋介石に通告させた所が、蒋介石はそれを其時は別れた。
さうして最近になつて南京が特に危くなつた時に、
蒋介石も困つてそれを承諾して来た」と云ふ事を、最近駐支
ドイツ大使から此才のテイルクマン東京駐在のドイツ大使に
言つて来た。其電報を陸軍の方で盗んだので、すつかり
それが分つた。それで保定の線で止つた時の條件は今日
に至つてはとも容れられなかつて、外務大臣としてはさう
云ふ用意もして居たから、^可此話は戦況がもつと変化し
て来れば、又其状態に依つて條件も違つて来りから、
其處は心得てくれ。

EXCERPT from SAIONJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 258 - (page 1970)

11 December 1937

- - - - - KONOYE suddenly said: "I've had enough, so when recognition is withdrawn from CHIANG's government - that is, after Nanking falls, CHIANG Kai-shek's government is going to collapse. And JAPAN is going to issue a statement withdrawing recognition from CHIANG's government - that's the time for me to get out I think, so that's when I want to quit." - - - - -

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Exhibit No. 3787 H. P. S. Doc. No. 3150-258A

西園寺一原田日記 第三百五十八回りの抜萃

急に又近衛は「しうとてし自今には堪大ら小ないから、
恰度蔣政権否認、即ち南末が陥落して蔣介
石の政権が倒れる。で、日本は蔣政権を否認し
た声明を出す其時が、恰度自今の退き時だと
思ひから、其時にやめたいし

FILE COPY
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21 Decem

Notice :

Exhibit 3788A to be

Corrected in accordance with Language

Board decision, as shown on Court

Record 38135.

Doc. Div.

On t
said: "G
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government.

to be reported to the Emperor by the Premier and also by Army and Navy leaders of the Supreme Military Command office. It was decided to close the matter without holding a conference in the Imperial presence. The President of the United States who was sitting next to Ambassador SAITO at some event in Washington whispered to him: 'Isn't it one way to try to have Germany handle the matter (as intermediary)?' The Foreign Minister also stated: "I hear that Italy wants to enter into the negotiations between Japan and China to settle the situation. Concerning China geographically, I think that Shantung must be included if a Chinese government is to be set up in view of the setting on fire by the Chinese of the cotton spinning factory owned by Japanese at Tsingtao. One of the problems is what the results will be if, at the same time as the request is transmitted through Germany, Shantung is attacked. The political parties are very strong in their demands because of what they see in the atmosphere of the foreign nations. The Soviets are approaching YEN Hsi-shan and the German militarists seem to be approaching CHIANG Kai-shek."

The Foreign Minister as soon as possible. Germany as mediator our stipulations ences endeavoured ting. They said: Government will be changed to four

That day I (HARADA) met KIDO. KIDO said: "The whole matter has been disorderly and I said plenty at the Cabinet meeting. I wonder if General Staff Headquarters hasn't committed various stipulations concretely through the German Military Attache in Tokyo. I feel it very dangerous to see the Army and Navy, especially the Army, or rather General Staff Headquarters so anxious to press the peace solution. If we submit many concrete stipulations and they turn it down, we are only letting them in on what we want. It will all be a loss with no gain. I am very worried wondering why they are in such a hurry. Today at the Cabinet meeting, I made a strong assertion and said: 'It is necessary that they be more abstract and cover everything. What need is there to force ourselves into asking Germany?' It is very strange that General Staff Headquarters is so eager. I am worried that Germany might put one over on us."

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