




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**THE
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY**

Town Hall, Bombay.

THE
NORTH-WEST PASSAGE,
AND THE
PLANS FOR THE SEARCH
FOR
SIR JOHN FRANKLIN.

A Review: Z
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BY JOHN BROWN, F.R.G.S.,

FELLOW OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF NORTHERN ANTIQUARIES, COPENHAGEN, &c., &c.

"A mighty maze! but not without a plan."—POPE.

"Here, on a single plank thrown safe ashore,
I hear the tumult of the distant throng."—YOUNG.

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TO THE PRESIDENT,

SIR RODERICK IMPEY MURCHISON,

*G.C.St.S., F.R.S., Y.P.G.S., and L.S., Corr. M. Inst. France, Mem. Acad. St. Petersburg,
Berlin, Copenhagen, &c., &c.,*

THE COUNCIL AND THE FELLOWS

OF THE

ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON,

THIS VOLUME

IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED BY

•
THE AUTHOR.



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P R E F A C E.

THE renewal of the sad subject to which the following pages are devoted, may to some appear ungracious, and therefore unnecessary; but while the lives of one hundred and thirty-five gallant Englishmen sent on a perilous service *remain unaccounted for, while the area to which they were specially directed is yet unsearched*, the British nation's character for honour and humanity suffers. The fate of Sir Hugh Willoughby and his companions became known to us, because the scene of the melancholy catastrophe was within the range of his fellow-man's haunts and wanderings; but, unhappily, it is not so with Sir John Franklin and his associates—they are beyond communication with the civilized world. Cut off from it, they can never be recovered, or the question of their existence set at rest, *unless sought*; happily, the area within which efforts may be concentrated is circumscribed, but renewed search is imperative. To keep alive the recollection of the hapless, forlorn position of our missing countrymen is the primary object of this volume. With failure, notwithstanding the persevering efforts of our daring sailors, in the past; we cannot think this appeal to the British nation, so renowned for its generous humanity, will be made in vain.



CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Preface	vii
Introduction	1
CHAPTER I.—A Glance at the Origin of the Question of a North-West Passage —The Old Worthies by Sea and by Land	4—15
CHAPTER II.—Attempts to get to the North of Hudson's Bay—Knight, Barlow, and Vaughan—Scroggs, Middleton—Hearne, Mackenzie—Phipps to reach the Pole—Cook and Clerke to get North-East from Behring's Strait— Pickersgill and Young to meet them by Davis's Strait—New Facts—Break up of the Ice on the East Coast of Greenland—Sir John Barrow—Captain Scoresby—Batch of Arctic Heroes	15—18
CHAPTER III.—Royal Geographical Society invites Opinions on the North-West Passage—Sir John Barrow's—Dr. Richardson's—Sir John Franklin's— The Hydrographer's—Sir John Ross's—The Terror Sails—Dease and Simpson—Sir R. I. Murchison—Sir John Barrow's Plan adopted—Remarks— The Erebus and Terror Commissioned—Sir John Franklin and Capt. Crozier, their Officers, &c.—The Expedition Sails, 1845—The Plan Developed— Instructions—Reflections—The Americans—France—Russia—Our Sailors —The Search—Sir John Franklin—End of 1846—Sir John Ross— Opinions asked for—Hudson's Bay Company—Remarks	19—62
CHAPTER IV.—Various Plans—Rewards—Admiral Beechey's Plans—Dr. M'Cormick's—Notes, Fitzjames—Memorandum of Sir John Barrow—Sir J. C. Ross's Plans by Lancaster Sound, and by Behring's Strait—Notes, Fitz- james—1847 ends	63—72
CHAPTER V.—Fleets Sails for Behring's Strait, and <i>Herald</i> —Rumours from Peel's River—Sir John Richardson's Final Plan—Dr. King's Plan— Opinions on it—Remarks—Rewards—Lady Franklin to Mr. Barrow—Sir John Richardson and Dr. Rae start for the Mackenzie—Sir J. C. Ross and Capt. Bird—Instructions—The <i>Enterprise</i> and <i>Investigator</i> Sails—Remarks —Peel's River Report again—1848 closes	73—89
CHAPTER VI.—Intelligence from Sir J. C. Ross—Opinions— <i>North Star</i> Sails— Lieutenant S. Osborn and the North-West Continent of America—Addi- tional Rewards Offered by Government and Lady Franklin—Dr. M'Cormick's Plan of a Boat Expedition—Sir John Richardson's Report—Sir John Ross—Peel's Bay Report and Sketch—Sir J. C. Ross's Unexpected Return —Sir John Richardson Arrives—Dr. Rae left to renew Search of Wollaston and Victoria Lands—Sir F. Beaufort Proposes an Expedition by Behring's Strait—Opinions—Remarks—Hudson's Bay Company to renew Search— Dr. Rae—Mr. Christopher—Capt. Penny—Behring's Strait—1849 ends	90—110
CHAPTER VII.—New Year Sad but Active—New Plans—Dr. M'Cormick—	

- Lieutenant S. Osborn—Lady Franklin—Offers of Service from Capt. Reid, Rev. J. Wolff, R. A. Goodair—Sir John Ross's Plan—Capt. Collinson and Commander McClure Sail for Behring's Strait—Instructions—"Observer"—Hydrographer's New Expedition to Barrow's Strait—Opinions—Hamilton, Parry, Sabine, Bock, Brocby, Richardson—Remarks—Lady Franklin—Additional Offers of Search from W. P. Snow, John M'Lenn, U.S. America, Lieutenant S. Osborn—Remarks—Dr. Scoresby's Offers of Search from S. Russel Bartlett—Capt. W. F. Lynch, U.S.N.—Capt. Wilkes, U.S.N. 111—143
- CHAPTER VIII.—Dr. King—Sir R. H. Inglis—Remarks—Lieutenant Pullen—Dr. Rae—Capt. Penny and Mr. Stewart Sail—Instructions—Remarks—Capts. Austin and Ommaney Sail—Instructions—Sir John Ross Sails—Mr. Grinnell—The American Expedition under Lieutenant de Haven Sails—Remarks—*Prince Albert*, Commander Forsyth, R.N., Sails—Esquimaux (Adam Bock's) Report—*Prince Albert* Returns—First Traces of Franklin at Point Riley and Beechey Island—Royal Geographical Society—Our Views—Remarks—Year 1850 closes. 144—169
- CHAPTER IX.—Plans—Admiral Taylor's—W. P. Snow's—Behring's Strait Expedition—Kellett and Moore—Reports—Lieutenant Pim—Collinson and McClure Sail for the North—Collinson compelled to Return—*Prince Albert* Sails under Mr. Kennedy and Lieutenant Bellot, F.I.N.—Instructions—Lieutenant Pullen and Mr. W. H. Hooper—Behring's Strait Squadron—Capt. Collinson—Lieutenant Barnard—Kindness of the Russian Authorities—Unexpected Arrival of Capts. Austin and Ommaney, and of Capt. Penny and Mr. Stewart—Committee of Inquiry—Travelling Parties—Ommaney, S. Osborn, Browne, Aldrich, M'Clintock, &c.—Results—Remarks—Penny, Stewart, Sutherland, Goodair, Marshall, &c.—Results—Remarks. 170—192
- CHAPTER X.—Evidence before the Committee—Austin and Penny's Expedition—Report of Committee—Opinions Requested—Replies from Sir John Ross, Dr. Scoresby, Capts. Austin, Kellett, Ommaney, Sir John Richardson, and Capts. Penny and Stewart—Remarks—Sir John Ross Arrives—Commander Phillips—Adam Bock's Second Report—Remarks. 193—213
- CHAPTER XI.—Sir J. C. Ross's Suggestions—Lieutenant Pim and the Kolyma—Polynia—Russian Government—A Balloon—Dr. Rae's Opinion—The American Expedition Returns—Fearful Drift in the Ice—Dr. Rae Examines Wollaston Land—Lieutenant W. H. Hooper's Plan—Dr. M'Cormick's—Mr. Roome's—Capt. R. Maguire's Plan—Commander Pullen's—Behring's Strait Squadron—Collinson, Moore, Wellesley—Death of Lieutenant Barnard—Collinson Sails for the North—Reflections—The Year 1851 ends. 214—233
- CHAPTER XI.*—Home Thoughts—Capt. Penny again Offers his Services—Capt. S. Osborn's New Plan—Sir John Ross's renewed Offer of Service—Adam Bock's Tales Resuscitated—Mr. D. Beaton's Plan, addressed to Sir R. I. Murchison, President of the Royal Geographical Society—Remarks—Mr. A. Petermann's Plan, *vis* *Novaa Zemlin*—Remarks—Capt. Wilkes, U.S. Navy, Views on the Search—Two Ships Seen in the Ice off Newfoundland—The Admiralty direct Capt. Ommaney to Examine the Report—His Opinion—

Dr. Rae Examines Victoria Land, and discovers Relics of Government Ships' Fittings—Remarks—Sir Edward Belcher and Capt. Kellett Sail for Barrow's Strait—Instructions—Remarks—Sir Edward Belcher takes the Wellington Channel and Capt. Kellett the Melville Island Route—Lieutenant W. H. Hooper's Plan—Important Letter of Capt. Fitzjames—Reflections—Dr. Rae offers Suggestions—Commander Inglefield Sails for Smith's Sound—Commander H. Trollope offers Services, *via* Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla—The *Prince Albert*, Kennely and Bellot, Arrives—Their Report—Remarks—Capt. Ommaney offers Services to attempt to reach the North Pole—Commander Inglefield returns—His Daring Voyage—Capt. Penny suggests Two Plans—Deer with Slit Ears at Spitzbergen. 234—272

CHAPTER XII.—Petermann's revised Plan—Observations thereon—Behring's Strait Searching Ships—Reflections on the Close of the Year 1852. 273—278

CHAPTER XIII.—New Year—State of Feeling—Kennedy's projected Expedition to Behring's Strait in the *Isabel*, but abandoned—*Phœnix* sails for Beechey Island—Additional Instructions to Sir Edward Belcher—Lieutenant Bellot, F.L.N.—Second American Expedition sails for Smith's Sound, under Dr. Kane—Basis of the Voyage—Remarks—W. Parker Snow's projected Expedition from Melbourne to Behring's Strait abandoned—*Phœnix* returns—Capt. Inglefield's Despatches—Death of Lieutenant Bellot—Sir Edward Belcher's Despatches—Winters in Northumberland Sound—His Discoveries—Remarks—Report of his Travelling Parties—Commander Richards—Lieutenant S. Osborn—*Assistance* and *Pioneer* leave Northumberland Sound—Capt. Henry Kellett's Despatches—Winters at Dealy Island, Bridport Inlet—Preparations for Spring Journeys—Lieutenant Mechem discovers Commander M'Clure's Record at the Parry Sandstone, Melville Island—Lieutenant Pim crosses to Banks' Land—Finds Commander M'Clure and *Investigator* at the Bay of Mercy—Capt. Kellett despatches Travelling Parties—Their Routes—Lieutenant Pim returns with Commander M'Clure—Dr. Donville sent to Mercy Bay with Commander M'Clure, to hold Survey on *Investigator's* Crew—Capt. Kellett's Hopes—His high Opinion of his Officers—His Buoyant, Generous Feelings. 279—294

CHAPTER XIV.—Capt. M'Clure's Despatches—Point Warren—Prince of Wales' Strait—The North-West Passage Discovered—Winters, 1850-51, in Prince of Wales' Strait—His Searching Parties despatched—Their Routes and Results—New Tribe of Esquimaux—Capt. M'Clure's Opinion as to the Missing Expedition—Returns to the South, and again to the North by the West Side of Baring Island—Terrific Navigation—Bay of Mercy—Winters there, 1851-52—Visits Melville Island—Detention—Intentions—Winters, 1852-53—His Observations—Remarks—Lieutenant Pim arrives on board the *Investigator*—Arrangements—Commander Pullen's Despatches—His Visit to Maxwell Bay—Dr. McCormick's Boat Party—Remarks—The Press at Home—Renowned New Arctic Expedition—Exploration—Controversy—Inglefield, Petermann, and the 1st Admiral Beechey—Despatches from Behring's Strait—Capt. Frederick—Commanders Maguire and Trollope—Reflections on the Close of the Year 1853 295—323

- CHAPTER XV.—Home—Hope Denied—Additional Instructions to Behring's Strait Squadron—Admiralty Notice to Remove the Names of Franklin and his Officers from the "Navy List"—Official^o Injustice—Their Names are Erased—House of Commons; Sir Thomas Acland and Sir James Graham—Remarks—The *Phoenix* again sails for Beechey Island—Additional Instructions to Sir Edward Belcher—*Phoenix* returns—Capt. Inglefield's Despatch—Ships abandoned—Sir Edward Belcher and Capt. Kellett, their Officers and Crews, return in the *Phoenix* and *North Star*—Sir Edward Belcher's Despatches—Western Entrance of Jones's Sound—Arthur's Strait—Buckingham Island—His Opinion regarding the Franklin Expedition—Remarks—*Assistance* and *Pioneer* abandoned—Capt. Kellett's Despatches—Mersey Bay—Capt. McClure—Drs. Armstrong and Donville—*Investigator* abandoned—Capt. Kellett's Travelling Parties—M'Clintock and De Bray—Mecham and Nares—Hamilton and M'Dougall—Results—Ships Blown out from Dealy Island—Winter in the Ice off Cape Cockburn—Mecham's Unprecedented Journey—Krabbe—Remarks—Dr. Rae—Esquimaux Report—Positive Traces of the Franklin Expedition—Party Perished—Where did that Party come from?—Reflections—Peel Sound—New Strait—New Expedition—Anderson and Stewart—Behring's Strait—Intelligence—Capt. Collinson—His Despatches—His Travelling Parties—Further Traces—Remarks—The Year 1854 ends. 324—389
- CHAPTER XVI.—Reflections—Capt. Collinson Returns—Select Committee—Claims of Capts. Kellett, Collinson, and McClure—Remarks—Who Discovered the North-West Passage?—Dr. Kane Returns—His Report—Does a Polar Sea Exist?—Esquimaux New Tribe—Scurvy—*Advance* abandoned—Arrive at Upernivik—Lieutenant Hartstein—Mr. Grinnell—Mr. Peabody—End of Year 1855. 390—401
- CHAPTER XVII.—New Year—Conjecture still Wandering—Anderson and Stewart Return—Their Report—Remarks—Reward Adjudicated to Dr. Rae—The Summary of Opinions—The only Conclusion from them—The South-West rejected, and the North adopted—The Result—Our Sailors—Arctic Authorities—Our Present Views as to the Course taken by the lost Navigators—Are there any Survivors? 402—423
- CHAPTER XVIII.—Has all been done that can be done?—Dr. King's Plan—Mr. A. G. Findlay on the Ice-Borne Ships seen off Newfoundland—Capt. Becher, R.N.—Reflections on the Franklin Expedition—Lady Franklin—Dr. Kane's Opinions—Capt. Richards's, R.N., Plan—Sir R. I. Murchison—Memorial to Lord Palmerston—Lord Wrottesley—Lieutenant Pim's Plan—Dr. King and Lieutenant Pim's United Plan—Reflections on the Close of the Year 1856. 424—435
- CHAPTER XIX.—The New Year—Renewed Hope—Dr. M'Cormick's Plan—Mr. Reebuck—Report—Mr. Napier—House of Commons—Government Decision—Sir R. I. Murchison and the Final Expedition—Capt. Allen Young—The *Fox*, Capt. M'Clintock, Sails—The Object of the Voyage—Last News—Remarks—Conclusion. 436—444
- Appendix—List of Works on Arctic Subjects—Index. 445—452

ARCTIC EXPEDITIONS

AND THEIR RESULTS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Arctic Circle is again left to its own gloom, silence, and dreary solitude. Of the well-equipped squadrons sent to the Arctic regions in search of Sir John Franklin and his gallant officers and crews, part have been abandoned, and the remainder have returned to England. Not a vestige or trace of the *Ercebus* or *Terror* has rewarded the untiring perseverance of the searchers. We know nothing of the Expedition since its departure from Beechey Island in 1846; the course it took, its movements, its fortunes, its position, or its fate, are wrapped in distressing, and seemingly impenetrable, mystery. The important fragments found in Parker Bay (1851), and brought home by the indefatigable Dr. Rae, notwithstanding their maritime origin and the British Government mark (affording evidence of identity), offer no decided clue to the whereabouts of the missing expedition, neither do those obtained from the natives of Cambridge Bay (1852), nor the other articles picked up at the largest Finlayson Island (1853) by Captain Collinson, of H.M.S. *Enterprise*, all equally of naval source, and bearing the same indubitable stamp. Even (and above all in interest) the still more positive and precious relics, including an Order, and various articles in silver plate, &c., known as having belonged to Sir John Franklin and other officers of this ill-fated expedition,—even these, with the calamitous report connected with them, obtained from the Esquimaux of Pelly Bay (1854), due also to the exertions of Dr. Rae;—these all, sad memorials as they are, while they indicate significantly a probable locality for this anxiously and steadfastly sought for expedition; while they reveal the too certain fact of a portion of the gallant officers and men of that expedition having perished under the most miserable circumstances, still they do not



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entirely solve the mystery; they tell us the sad tale of the whereabouts and fate of a part, but the welfare generally of the expedition, its weal or woe, its safety or its doom, remain as inexplicably dark as ever. But of these important reliquia, more anon; they involve inquiries too serious to be lightly passed over; silent but significant is the tale they tell, involving important inferences, especially the earlier relics of Rae and Collinson, 1851-2 and 3, as to the direction in which we must look, if we would learn more of the position of the Expedition or its remains. We fear they have not obtained sufficient attention.

Thus are we unhappily placed after six years of rigid search, conducted, with rare exceptions, with an order, energy, and perseverance above all praise: still every exertion has failed to penetrate the gloomy mystery hanging over the fate of the lamented Franklin and his gallant companions; in vain have we tried to lift the awful veil: hidden from our eyes, he and they have become, and all that concerns them, their joys or their sorrows, as it were, a sealed book to us. Still memory lingers fondly over them, recalls them in the past under a thousand forms, in scenes, happy scenes in years gone by, sees and follows them in the desolate region where science and honour had called them, and pauses, lingering, hoping that hope might arise, unwilling to forsake, and incredulous to believe that all are gone. She yet vivifies the dreary solitude with the animation of our ill-starred countrymen; she mourns a part as already lost, whose sufferings are with the past; but she forbids the hasty assumption that all have perished;—the inured manly form, the hardy youth in his beauty, these she conceives may yet live, harboured by the wild Esquimaux, or, self-sustained, are acclimatized and supported by a more energetic, persevering skill, and a superior management. Thought, ever restless, would penetrate the future; she wails their long absence, and weighs the probabilities of support, of life, and of return. To her, a small but bright ray yet exists, and hope is sustained by it; for she doubts the power of the fell destroyer over the will of the strong man in his prime, the self-reliant, him to whom the life of the land and the sea are alike tributary. Thought, too, impatient of failure, scans the means adopted, and the causes that have led to such barren results; she questions and doubts the judgment which has terminated in such lamentable want of success. "Turn, busy thought, turn from them:" but "thought repelled, resenting rallies," reasons, and questions,—All *your* efforts have failed to trace the absent ones, those so dear to our hearts: you directed their footsteps, have you followed after them? Has all been done that can be done to restore

the gallant Franklin and his devoted companions to their country and their home? •

Having given the question of a North-West Passage, and the Arctic inquiries arising out of it, much and long consideration (since 1817), unbiassed by routine, and free to think, we are compelled to confess, however disinclined to differ from Arctic authorities, that while we admit the sincere desire on the part of those who planned the searching expeditions to advise and to act rightly, and cheerfully acknowledge the great zeal and merit of all the officers and crews of the searching squadrons, whether public or private,—for, with exceptions, they have nobly done their duty,—still we cannot bring our minds to think that all has been done that can be done, nor much less can we join with those who think we have sought the *Erebus* and *Terror* in the right direction: we do think, and have ever thought, that from the period (1850) when we rejected the search by the southern side of Barrow's Straits for the northern (in other words, departed from the tenor of the instructions given to Franklin on his departure in 1845), from that time we have been in pursuit of a myth. Plainly to speak, we think that all search by the North, whether by the Wellington Channel, or Jones' or Smith's Sounds, has been so much precious time lost, so much suffering unnecessarily inflicted, and the valuable qualities for daring, endurance, &c., of our heroic officers and men unwisely trifled with. But unhappily this is not the only source for deep regret; who can say what this sad hallucination may not have led to? One dares not contemplate the dreadful results of disappointment, suffering, and sorrow, on board the doomed *Erebus* and *Terror*!

CHAPTER I.

A GLANCE AT THE ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION OF A NORTH-WEST PASSAGE.

THE "OLD WORTHIES" BY SEA AND BY LAND, TO 1631.

It is scarcely necessary to recapitulate in our day, when Arctic enterprise has been so much discussed, all the circumstances that gave rise to the long (more than three centuries and a half) much agitated question of a North-West Passage. The marvellous and brilliant discoveries made by Christopher Columbus in the West, and by Diaz and De Gama in the East, without doubt set men's minds pondering on acquisitions still to be gained, and on profitable speculations yet to be hoped for. Columbus more particularly excited astonishment. Of him "there was great talk in all the Court of Henry VII.," "insomuch that all men with great admiration affirmed it to be a thing more divine than humane to sail by the West unto the East, where spices growe, by a way that was never known before."* The Cabotas were already here (Henry VII., 1496); men of great reputation. "John Cabot, the father, who was very skilful in navigation and cosmography," conjectured, from the success of Columbus, "that there might probably be lands to be found out to the North-West."† These opinions at once obtained credit with the king and with the merchants. "The era was propitious to the quick advancement of knowledge. The recent invention of the art of printing enabled men to communicate rapidly and extensively their ideas and discoveries." "Every step in advance was immediately and simultaneously and widely promulgated, recorded in a thousand forms, and fixed for ever. There could never again be a dark age. Nations might shut their eyes to the light, and sit in wilful darkness, but they could not trample it out; it would still shine on, dispensed to happier parts of the world."‡ John and Sebastian taught "by

* Hakluyt, part iii., p. 6; Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 87; Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1849 (by Rundall), p. 4.

† Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 84.

‡ Washington Irving's "Life and Voyages of Columbus" (Bohn), p. 29.

reason of the sphere," "by way of the North-West," "a shorter track" "into India," and men "became excited," "by this Fame and Report," "to attempt some notable thing."* The Cabotas saw the material for maritime enterprise was there, but dormant, because the object on which to fix itself was wanting; they saw daring, endurance, and perseverance around them, the elements (good raw material) required; and the Cabotas, by their skill in cosmography and seamanship, soon furnished the object, and with it threw in their feeling, zeal, and adventurous enthusiasm. No wonder, then, that an ardent desire should be kindled for the "Passage," which desire has continued in all its fulness to the present day. It may at times have been arrested, from causes arising out of various circumstances; it may have been misdirected; but though intermitted in its action, the desire has been persistent, and has endured, and will endure, until discovery has no more "unknown" regions to bestow—until science has filled all the blanks in her round of inquiry—and until the question of the "Passage" is absorbed in perfect knowledge. The love for enterprise is inherent in Englishmen; it may be interrupted, but, because innate, it cannot be eradicated.

The fruits soon followed; for to John Cabot is due "that the American continent was first discovered, by an expedition commissioned to "set up" the "banner of England."† To these men, then, may be attributed the glory of having raised the spirit of maritime discovery; the first instalment of which was the "Londe and Isles"‡ of continental North America. "For, though Columbus had found certain isles, it was 1498 before he saw the continent, which was a year after Cabot; so that, in reality, the honour of this great discovery is as much, or more, due to the English nation than to the Spanish. Americus, from whom this whole continent has taken its name, only swept away the gleanings (if I may be allowed the expression) of these two great discoverers; but Sebastian Cabot went further than all of them, for he sailed to about 40° southward of the line, and to 67° towards the North."§

We have dwelt with a lingering fondness on the memory and merits of the Cabotas, for they invoked the latent spirit of our beloved country: by them, the example they gave, and the knowledge

* Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 87.

† "Memoir of Cabot" (Biddle), the original patent, pp. 76 and 77.

‡ "Memoir of Cabot" (*ibid.*), p. 76.

§ See Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 88; the testimony of John Smith "author" of the "General History of Virginia."

they bequeathed to us, has resulted the exalted position we hold; by it Britain attained the high position in which it stands, the pride and yet the envy of the nations. They "gave a continent to England; yet no one can point to the few feet of earth she has allowed them in return."* Alas! their deeds or their memories have had scarcely their meed of praise, scarcely justice. Thus from the Cabotas originated in England the first idea of a North-West Passage, and they were the first to show the way and practically to attempt to solve it. It seems that Henry VII. countenanced it, but it is doubtful if he did more; the first charter granted to the Cabotas says, "upon their own proper costs and charges;"† but whether he aided in the fitting out of the first expedition or not is uncertain. Be this as it may, the merchants were not slow to act on the suggestions of the Cabotas—"men of great wisdom and gravity;" they saw at once the great advantages that would accrue to themselves if, by any probability, the passage could be made. "Divers marchants of London ventured in her (John Cabota's ship) small stockes," "and in the company of the said ship, sailed, also out of Bristow, three or foure small ships fraught with sleight and grosse merchandizes, &c., &c."‡ No doubt these "marchants" had already experienced the annoyances and procrastination—may be, had been subjected to the impositions, the robberies, and the losses, arising from and besetting both the long and then only known routes to China, India, and the Spice Islands. They knew of the perils of the stormy cape (of Good Hope), and the hazardous nature of all transport by the Levant, both alike injurious to their interests. Can we greatly wonder, then, that they should turn their minds to a shorter route and brighter prospects, and give their best energies to the North? by which the Indies and Cathaio might be quicker reached, either by the "Londe and Isies" "of late found by the said John Kabatto" (Cabot) that is, by the West unto the East, "where spices growe, by a way that was never knowen before,"§ that is, by a North-West passage. Or, if by an easterly course along the northern coasts of Europe, attain the same object by a North-East passage.

It has been charged to the old "marchants" that they were in-

* "Memoir of Cabot" (Biddle), p. 223.

† Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 85, quoting Hakluyt, part iii., p. 4.

‡ See "Robert Fabian's Chronicle," Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850 (Rundell), p. 23; and "Memoir of Cabot" (Biddle), p. 43; and Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 88.

§ Hakluyt, part iii., p. 6; Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 87.

fluenced solely by their covetousness, and were not wont to regard "vertue without sure, certaine, and present gaines;" and even the estimable Hakluyt, in his "Epistle Dedicatorie," seems led away by a similar feeling: "Certes, if hetherto in our own discoueries we had not bene led with a preposterous desire of seeking rather guine than God's gloric, I assure myself that our labours had taken farre better effecte."* This charge, to say the least of it, is not over just towards the "old worthies;" for do we not find the kings of "Spaine" and "Portugale" (in opposite directions) solely influenced by the desire to obtain the "wealth of Mangi, Cathay, and other provinces belonging to the Grand Khan" ? &c., "so that by" "the orient and occident they haue compassed the worlde." But they mixed up a seeming religion with it, "pretending, in glorious words, that they made their discoueries chiefly to convert infidelles to our most holy faith (as they say)," but "in deed and truth sought not them but their goods and riches," so says the worthy Hakluyt. Again, with us, was it not the setting forth by John Cabot to Henry VII. "that he made no doubt he could" "find out islands or countries abound- ing with rich commodities, as Columbus had lately done," that induced that monarch to lend "a willing ear" to his proposal ?

The facts are—the North-West question was brought so prominently, so vividly before the attention of all, from the highest to the lowest, the "ilands and lands" were so invested with the romance of wealth, in all its fascinating forms, all that was rich and rare, gems and "spicerie," in every thought and form, to allure to realms unknown, that kings, nobles, lawyers, merchants, each and all, were excited in the last degree, and each and all entered on the great question of a Passage, trusting and hoping to share in the sure, solid results that were to follow. To impute, then, to the merchants alone the charge of covetousness is manifestly unjust. It is not too much to say, if the "marchants," with the Cabotas at their head, had not equipped this first expedition, it never would have sailed, and England would have lost the glory of the first discovery of the American continent.

That the spirit of traffic and commercial speculation entered largely into the views of the first promoters of this great geographical inquiry, there is not a doubt. "Gold, Rubies, Diamonds, Bolasses, Granats, iacinets, and other stones and pearles," † had then, as now, a potent influence. But let no man sneer at this as an unworthy

* Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850, "Divers Voyages, &c., by J. Winter Jones," pp. 13 and 14.

† *Ibid.*

motive; the first impulse to great acts does not always take a pure form, it often arises under a questionable phase. How often is it marked by the love of power, neglected freedom, honour, and glory, or under an imagined sense of wrong! How often has it set mankind together by the ears, warring against each other, to the cruel injury of the mass and the benefit of the few! How much more to be prized the arts of peace—commerce excited and aided by science, than all the wild uproar, misery, and ruin concomitant with war! "Forasmuch as the great and almighty God hath given unto mankind, above all other living creatures, such a heart and desire that every man covets to join friendship with others, to love and to be loved, also to give and receive mutual benefits,—It is, therefore, the duty of all men, according to their power, to maintain and encrease this desire in every man, with well deserving to all men"—"As well to seek such things as we lack, as also to carry unto them, from our regions, such things as they lack, so that hereby not only commodity may ensue both to them and Us, but also an indissoluble and permanent league of friendship be established between Us both,"* &c. Man is not changed; the love of filthy lucre is equally strong; but at the present time it is a question if it is continued with the same elevated spirit of honesty and fair dealing as in those of old. Again, embarking their "ventures," as they did in such ships, seeking to find out "unknown lands," what hope had they of "certaine and present gaines?" Such a thought is simply ridiculous. No; a higher purpose ruled them, and that was the thought "that there is a straight and short way open unto the West—even unto Cathay." †

The merchant adventurers suffered great losses; their "marquisset of golde" had turned out valueless. This gives occasion to the worthy Hakluyt for the remark, "I trust that nowe, being taught by their manifolde losses, our men will take a more Godly course." This is rather severe from that good old man, after pointing them to a "lande where cinamon and cloues are growing," and telling them, "the time approacheth, and nowe is, that we of England may share and part stakes (if we will our selves) both with the Spaniarde and the Portingale, in part of America and other regions as yet undiscovered, and surely if there were in vs that desire to aduance the honour of our countrie which ought to be in every good man, wee woulde not all this while have foreflowne the possessing of those

* See "Letters Missive from King Edward VI.," Hakluyt, part i., p. 231; Lediard's "Naval History," vol. i., p. 117, &c.

† See Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850, "Divers Voyages by J. Winter Jones," p. 13.

landes, whiche of equitie and right appertaine vnto vs."* Admitting the love of gain, still it was tempered with self denial, and with a chivalry for daring enterprise; and both were subjected to the science of the day, which last was encouraged, and allowed, on the whole, full play. The love of traffic is no way dishonourable in itself; it is only when pursued inordinately that it becomes base and unworthy. But in our case this was scarcely likely, where the influencing motives are, "yf the yssue proue good, they are like to be takers of that good; and yf itt should succede otherwise, yet the deed is charitable;"† wealth connecting herself with the dangers and uncertainties of discovery with such principles cannot be presumed selfish, or to look for "sure, certaine, and present gaines." The results tell of "manifolde losses" to the merchants; but science was enriched, and the nation was benefited, and the name of England was in the end made glorious, "farre more then can be done by any of all these great troubles and warres, which dayly are vsed in Europe among the miserable christian people."‡

Let it not be forgotten, that these time-honoured "old worthies," these rich "merchaunts," did it. Their names will last while "England is true to herself." Thickly are they strewed around the "londe and isles" their enterprising spirit had given to their country, giving an interest to and adorning many an otherwise solitary, desolate spot. Kings, queens, princes, royal maids and matrons, our Henries, Elizabeth, Charles, Ann, &c., are loyally remembered; as are dutifully many noble patrons—Nottingham, Salisbury, Exeter, Southampton, &c., their true names lost in their titles. But who can notice the proper names without a deep interest in what they said and what they did?—Dudley Digges, Lancaster, Jones, Smith, Roe, Button, and that "never failing friend of the voyage," Wolstenholme, Master Lok, &c. Who can read the quaint titles given to places, as "Brook Cobham," "Briggs' Mathematics," "Cury's Swans' Nest," "Hubert's Hope," "Hopes Checked," and "Hope Advanced," without entering into their hopes and fears, esteeming and wishful to know more of them; how they "lived, and moved, and had their being;" how their generals and captains fared; of the hapless Hudson, of John Davis, of Baffin, of N. W. Foxe, and a host of

* "Epistle Dedicatorie," Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850, "Divers Voyages by J. Winter Jones," pp. 8, 11, and 14.

† See "Voyages towards the North West by Thomas Rundall," Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1849, p. 151.

‡ "Divers Voyages by J. Winter Jones," Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850, p. 25.

others, often in tribulation, and yet always acknowledging "God's Mercy." Many of these respected names have, and others are fast disappearing from our charts,—a fact greatly to be regretted, for they told of the deeds of the enterprising merchants of Old England. Where does Lok's Land appear now?

Let not slander, then, condemn the "Old Worthies:" they seem to have thrown their "ventures" in rather as a point of their faith in the matter, for the encouragement of geographical discovery and the glory of their country, than from any great hope of gain they might realize to themselves. "In a flecte of three shippes and a carauell, that went from this citie, armed by the marchauntes of which departed in April last past, I and my partener haue 1400 ducates, that we employed in the sayde flecte, principally for that two Englishmen, friends of mine, which are some what learned in cosmographie, should go in the same shippes to bring mee certaine relation of the situation of the countrey, and to be experte in the nauigation of those seas, and there to haue informations of many other things and aduise that I desire to know especially," &c.* They and their officers seem to have acted in many cases with singular disinterestedness, and freedom from narrow-minded covetousness, a conduct we should do well in our time to imitate, marked as it is by a selfishness too obtrusively all-pervading not to be observed. How rare are the examples of one "attemptinge of the Discou'ry of ye Northwest Passage," and, by his own act, "disable himselfe from all demands for his Sallary and paines taking if he discou' not"?† This observation is not intended to apply to the Arctics and Antartics of the nineteenth century; we would have persevering effort always rewarded, whether the object sought is achieved or not. We only give the above quotation to show that the "Old Worthies" were not so penurious and selfish, were not influenced solely by the love of gain. But little did these "Old Worthies," in their desire to reap the riches of Cathaya,—little did they imagine the perplexing legacy they were bequeathing to their posterity; the care, the suffering, and the toil to be undergone; the steadfast, the prolonged effort and daring required, and this too amid obstacles the most harassing, monotonous, and appalling, in regions where man, in all his might, presents in himself the humilisting spectacle of utter weakness. Little did

* See Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850, "Divers Voyages, &c., by J. W. Jones," p. 35.

† See Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1849, "Voyages towards the North West by Thomas Rundell," p. 64.

those "men of great wisdom and gravity," even "the good old gentleman, Master Cabota" himself, when "he and his friends banketted at the signe of the Christopher," at "Grauesende," conceive the sacrifices to be made over centuries, and the devotedness demanded from all those who should come after them, before they, in their struggles to settle this "Great Question," should successfully tread the broad lands of the flowery Cathay, or gather the overflowing riches of the farther Ind.

It would lead us far beyond the limits we have assigned to ourselves were we to chronicle all the reasons urged and the attempts made to "finde out that shorte and easie passage by the North-West, which we haue hetherto so long desired."* Under the auspices of the "Old Worthies" really,—though ostensibly countenanced by kings, queens, and nobles,—uprose a race of men, *daring* and enthusiastic, whose names would add honour to any country, and embalm its history.

Commencing with the reign of Henry VII., we have first, John Cabot (1497), ever renowned; for he it was who first saw and claimed for the "Banner of England" the American continent. Sebastian, his son, follows (1498)—a name the faint-heartedness of Sir Thomas Pert (Henry VIII., 1517), and failure in the enterprise, could not tarnish—honourable as wise. Nor may we omit Master Robert Thorne, of Bristol (1527); Master Hore (1536); and Master Michael Lok (1545), of London—men who knew "cosmographie" and the "weighty and substantial reasons" for "a discovery even to the North Pole." For a short time Arctic energy changed its direction from the North-West to the North-East,† but wanting success in that quarter, again it reverted to the North-West, then we find Martin Frobisher (1576 to 78), George Best (1577), Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1583), James Davis (1585 to 87), George Waymouth (1602), John Knight (1606), the cruelly-treated Henry Hudson (1607 to 10), James Hall (1611), Sir Thomas Button (1612), Fotherbye (1614), Baffin and Bylot (1615-16), N. W. (Lake) Fox (1631), Thomas James (1631), &c., &c. Thus

* "Epistle Dedicatorie," p. 11, Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850, "Divers Voyages by J. Winter Jones."

† But of this change came "the discoverie of Muscoria," &c. Associated with the North-East is the hapless Sir Hugh Willoughby (1553), Chancellor (1553-5), Burroughs (1556), Pet (1580), Jackman (1580), Bennet (1603), Wood (1676)—names of Englishmen. Other nations were not idle—the Dutch Barentz (1594 & 8), Nay (1594), Rejp (1596), &c. Danish—Munk (1619), &c. French—Verazzano (1524), the gallant Cartier (1534-5), Roberval (1549), &c. Portuguese—the unfortunate Corterealis (1500-2), &c.

in the course of sixty years—now breaking the icy fetters of the North, now chained by them; now big with high hope "of the Passage," then beaten back by the terrific obstacles, as it were guarding it— notwithstanding, these men never faltered, never despaired of finally accomplishing it. Their names are worthy to be held in remembrance; for with all their faults, all their strange fancies and prejudices, still they were a daring and a glorious race, calm amid the most appalling dangers: what they did was done correctly, as far as their limited means went; each added a something that gave us more extended views and a better acquaintance with the globe we inhabit—giving especially large contributions to geography, with a more fixed resolution to discover the "Passage." By them the whole of the eastern face of North America was made known, and its disjointed lands in the North, even unto 77° or 78° N.

It seems their labours were not suffered to be lost—the results were noted down, and taken advantage of; for we find the cold and tempestuous "New-found-land," and even Spitzbergen, commonly visited within a few years after. One can easily conceive, that lands nearer to the sun should be visited by numbers—their genial influences, no doubt, offered greater attraction; that the man of wisdom and the sage inquirer should soon be followed by the reckless lover of adventure, and the mercenary and the sordid, and even that the British merchant, too, should go—his mission would give consistency, honour, and order; but that the frozen, desolate North should have at such an early period so many adventurers, surprises. It could only be the "Passage" that was to lead to the long and coveted "Land of y^e Chinas, and from thence to the Land of Cathay oriental,"* that attracted them. Every mile in a north-west direction cleared the way for further attempts—adding to the knowledge of those who were to come after, the dear-bought experience of the past. Still, all their efforts were unsuccessful, though in the main in the right direction. Ye marine worthies! how many anxious days and painfully sleepless nights, from storm and doubt of position, must have been yours! what suffering from cold and from scanty fare! what discomfort from your small, fragile, pent-up vessels! All this you patiently endured, so that "by God's grace" "you might possess and keepe that Passage." Still, though unsuccessful, by their undaunted efforts the Great Question became more known and of deeper interest; every new discovery contributed to dispel the darkness hanging over the dreary mystical

* "Declaration of the Indies," &c., by Master Robert Thorne, p. 31, Hakluyt Society's Vol., 1850, by J. Winter Jones.

regions of the North. The generals, admirals, and captains, gained great honour and fame; but the merchants, as we have shown, only incurred great losses—they were denied even the poor merit of having consideration for the Passage.

We cannot part with these old worthies of the sea (we have endeavoured to do justice to those of the land) without giving expression to the sentiments of those no mean judges who came after them, and under far more comfortable and heart-cheering circumstances. "They appear to have encountered dangers," says Capt. Phipps,* "which at that period must have been particularly alarming from their novelty, with the greatest fortitude and perseverance; as well as to have shown a degree of diligence and skill, not only in the ordinary and practical, but more scientific parts of their profession, which might have done honour to modern seamen, with all their advantages of later improvements." The late distinguished Sir Edward Parry adds his testimony;† and coming from such an authority it cannot fail to be interesting, although somewhat lengthy; the sentiments he expresses are marked by such sincerity of feeling that we think it our duty to extract the whole:—

"In revisiting many of the spots discovered by our early British navigators in the Polar regions, and in traversing the same tracks which they originally pursued, I have now and then, in the course of my narratives, had occasion to speak of the faithfulness of their accounts, and the accuracy of their hydrographical information. I should, however, be doing but imperfect justice to the memory of these extraordinary men, as well as to my own sense of their merits, if I permitted the present opportunity to pass without offering a still more explicit and decided testimony to the value of their labours. The accounts of Hudson, Baffin, and Davis, are the productions of men of no common stamp. They evidently relate things just as they saw them, dwelling on such nautical and hydrographical notices as, even at this day, are valuable to any seaman going over the same ground; and describing every appearance of nature, whether on the land, the sea, or the ice, with a degree of faithfulness which can alone, perhaps, be duly appreciated by those who succeed them in the same regions, and under similar circumstances. . . . It is, indeed, impossible for any one, personally acquainted with the phenomena of the Icy Seas, to peruse the plain and unpretending narratives of these

* See the Introduction to Phipps' "Voyage towards the North Pole," 1773, p. 9.

† "Journal of the Third Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage in 1824 and 25," pp. 181-83.

navigators, without recognizing, in almost every event they relate, some circumstance familiar to his own recollection and experience, and meeting with numberless remarks which bear most unequivocally about them the impress of truth.

"While thus doing justice to the faithfulness and accuracy with which they recorded their discoveries, one cannot less admire the intrepidity, perseverance, and skill, with which, inadequately furnished as they were, those discoveries were effected, and every difficulty and danger braved.

"That any man, in a single frail vessel of five-and-twenty tons, ill-found in most respects, and wholly unprovided for wintering, having to contend with a thousand real difficulties, as well as with numberless imaginary ones, which the superstitions then existing among sailors would not fail to conjure up,—that any man under such circumstances should, two hundred years ago, have persevered in accomplishing what our old navigators did accomplish, is, I confess, sufficient to create in my mind a feeling of the highest pride on the one hand, and almost approaching to humiliation on the other: of pride, in remembering that it was *our* countrymen who performed these exploits; of humiliation, when I consider how little, with all our advantages, we have succeeded in going beyond them.

"Indeed, the longer our experience has been in the navigation of the Icy Seas, and the more intimate our acquaintance with all its difficulties and all its precariousness, the higher have our admiration and respect been raised for those who went before us in these enterprises. Persevering in difficulty, unappalled by danger, and patient under distress, they scarcely ever use the language of complaint, much less that of despair; and sometimes, when all human hope seems at its lowest ebb, they furnish the most beautiful examples of that firm reliance on a merciful and superintending Providence, which is the only rational source of true fortitude in man. Often, with their narratives impressed upon my mind, and surrounded by the very difficulties which they in their frail and inefficient barks undauntedly encountered and overcame, have I been tempted to exclaim, with all the enthusiasm of Purchas:

"How shall I admire your heroic course,
Ye marine worthies, beyond names of worthiness?"

CHAPTER II.

ATTEMPTS TO GET TO THE NORTH OF HUDSON'S BAY—KNIGHT, BARLOW, AND VAUGHAN—SCROGGS, MIDDLETON—HEARNE, MACKENZIE, PHIPPS, TO REACH THE POLE—COOK AND CLERKE, TO GET N.E. FROM BEHRING'S STRAITS—PICKERSGILL AND YOUNG TO MEET THEM BY DAVIS' STRAITS—NEW FACTS—BREAK-UP OF THE SEA ON THE EAST COAST OF GREENLAND—SIR JOHN BARROW—CAPTAIN SCORESBY—BATCH OF ARCTIC HEROES.

SEVERAL years now intervene, and the attempts made were desultory, and occur at irregular intervals, yet the question of a passage West by the North had not lost its interest. The representation of the enterprising Grosseliez, a Frenchman, now (1688) led to the formation of the Hudson's Bay Company, and Capt. Z. Gillam was despatched by them to Rupert's River to take possession. This Company, in 1719, sent an expedition to the northern part of Hudson's Bay, under Knight, Barlow, and Vaughan, to search for a copper mine as reported by the Esquimaux, all of whom perished, it is supposed, on Marble Island. One John Scroggs was sent in search of them, but the richness of the copper mine seems to have had more influence over his actions than the salvation of his fellow men. The results were unsatisfactory, but sufficient information was elicited upon which to found strong arguments in favour of the existence of a North-West Passage; and Mr. Dobbs unceasingly solicited the Hudson's Bay Company to make an attempt. This, at last, was done under their captain, Christopher Middleton. The result of this voyage never transpired, but it appears to have been most unsatisfactory to Mr. Dobbs, who openly charged the Hudson's Bay Company with "intentionally preventing the discovery." In the end, Mr. Dobbs prevailed on the Admiralty to renew the attempt; and two ships were fitted out (1741), under Captain Middleton and Mr. William Moor. Wager Inlet and Repulse Bay were discovered; they reached the lat. $66^{\circ} 14'$, and from thence saw a Frozen Strait to the eastward, which afterwards led to much controversy, too lengthy here to be entered upon. Dobbs, still less satisfied, charged Middle-

ton with having been bribed by the Hudson's Bay Company; the truth seems never to have come out, but the Admiralty, as if not altogether satisfied, shortly after offered a reward of £20,000 for the discovery of a North-West Passage, and a new expedition, under Mr. William Moor and Mr. Francis Smith, sailed in 1746; they reached Wager Inlet, but otherwise the attempt was abortive. It is greatly to be regretted that the Hudson's Bay Company have given so little encouragement to Arctic exploration, so admirably situated as they are for carrying out the enterprise. The journey of Hearne (1770), and Mackenzie (1789), proved the existence of two large rivers, flowing into the Polar Sea. Great credit attaches to both these journeys, but we return to the order of dates. In 1773, Phipps and Lutwidge* made an attempt to approach the North Pole. This voyage was barren in results as regards the great question. It will be interesting to notice that the failure of Phipps led to the attempt made in 1776 by Behring's Straits, eastward, to reach the Atlantic, under the great Cook and his coadjutor, Capt. Clerke; in connection with these great men, seeking a passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic, Lieut. Pickersgill (in 1776) and Lieut. Young (in 1777) were sent up Davis' Straits, to aid and act in concert with them: these returned after reaching—Pickersgill, $68^{\circ} 10' N.$, and Young, $72^{\circ} 42' N.$

We must now pass over thirty years—for during that time the Great Question seems to have remained in abeyance; but let it not be supposed it was lost sight of, much less forgotten; the same spirit for discovery still existed, still was there; but accursed war, with its licensed cruelty and empty pageantry, led away and distracted the national mind. No sooner was peace restored, and the delirium and sorrow which war had occasioned passed away, when all the probabilities of a North-West Passage became again the subject of inquiry; the trending and position of the lands, the currents and their debris, already known, were again brought forward and reflected on. In 1817 new facts had arisen; it had been observed for two or three years previously that vast quantities of ice, and much larger than usual, had found their way into the Atlantic—so vast as even to affect the climate of our islands,—in short, that there had been a complete disruption of the ices in the North; and that the sea, between Greenland and Spitzbergen, from lat. 70° to 80° , had become open. These facts had not escaped the notice of our whalers, particularly the observant Scoresby. It was reported, also, that ships crossing the Atlantic Ocean going west were beset by the floating masses.

* In this expedition sailed the immortal Nelson as midshipman of the *Corvette*.

above all, the solution of the vexed question—the discovery of a North-West Passage.

We need not say, to meet these requirements and to clear all remaining doubts, none but the most active, talented, and experienced, were chosen for this most important expedition. The peculiar nature of the service required, demanded, too, all that was manly, daring, persevering, and enthusiastic; all that fortitude and love of enterprise which so eminently characterized the "Olden Voyagers," and which renders the memory of them so dear to every Englishman, the preference being given to those who had already served on Polar expeditions, and who had acquitted themselves with credit. Distinguished for all these qualities amongst others was Sir John Franklin. He was selected for the chief command in the *Erebus*. A more judicious selection could not have been made. Possessed of a well-regulated, well-informed mind, he had dared the perils and the privations of the Arctic regions by sea and by land, and had acquired much experience, and good, sound, practical knowledge. His feeling, too, was with the enterprise:—"No service is nearer to my heart than the completion of the survey of the north coast of America, and the accomplishment of a North-West Passage."* Capt. Crozier was appointed to the second command in the *Terror*. This experienced officer had been with Sir Edward Parry in 1821, 1824, and 1827; and also with Sir James Ross to the Antarctic regions: he had "borne the fierce extremes of either Pole!" Commander Fitzjames acted in the *Erebus* under Franklin. Chivalrous, talented, and kind-hearted, he had seen good service, and was a most efficient officer. These were the chosen leaders of this important expedition; the other officers were selected with equal regard to good service and ability. When we name such officers as "Gore," late in the Antarctic regions with James Ross, and with Back in the *Terror*; as Fairholme, of the Niger Expedition, &c., it will readily be imagined what sort of stuff they were made of: the junior officers were of the most promising, and full of life, as we well remember witnessing on a visit to the *Erebus* just prior to her departure; the crews were picked men from among the most steady, daring, and efficient as seamen; in fact, the *élite* of maritime England was there. The ships were fitted and strengthened by every process of ingenuity to meet and overcome every obstacle, and for the convenience and comfort of the officers and crews; in short, everything that could be suggested in regard

* "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. vi., part i., p. 46.

to provisions, and even little luxuries, for change of diet and the preservation of health, was supplied. Thus commanded, thus equipped, the *Erebus* and *Terror* sailed from the Thames the 26th May, 1845, bearing England's choicest sons on a mission of universal interest; with them followed the sincerest prayers, the most ardent aspirations were breathed for their safe return; truly they went forth from amongst us with the world's "God speed!"*

Before we give the instructions given to Sir John Franklin for his guidance in the conduct of this expedition, it may not be deemed unfitting if we again bring before our minds the locality chosen for its operations, the relative position of its lands and seas, and the chances they offered of success for the final accomplishment of the now more deeply interesting question of a North-West Passage. It is the more imperative that we should do so here, because so many conflicting opinions have arisen since its departure, as to lead those not fully informed on the subject to the conclusion, that the expedition had no determinate object, that the instructions were indefinite; and hence, that Sir John Franklin and his gallant companions were sent on a wild goose chase. Such a conclusion would be altogether in error. The subject of the expedition was not only definite, but the locality chosen offered the best prospect for the final settlement of the long-agitated problem. We have already noticed the various opinions submitted to the Royal Geographical Society in 1836 on this subject: it will be seen that the plan adopted, to complete which the Franklin Expedition was specially directed, owed its origin to the reflective and vigorous mind of the late Sir John Barrow; than whom no man was more competent to form a sound opinion. The series of expeditions from the year 1818, which had by their discoveries shed so much lustre on the British name, all originated with him. In order fully to understand the plan, it will be necessary to refer back to the Arctic charts of the year 1845; without these it is rather difficult to throw the ideas back twelve years, and to realize the meagre features of the charts Franklin had for his guidance, with the crowded appearance they present now (1857); and yet they contained the essence of many a hard-earned renown, from Parry in 1819 to Dease and Simpson in 1839. It will be observed, the widest opening westward is by the way of Davis' Strait, Baffin's Bay, and Barrow's Strait. The bottom of Prince Regent's Inlet had not been visited, it therefore remained undelineated. A communication was supposed

* The expedition was accompanied to the Whalefish Islands, Baffin's Bay, by the transport *Barretto Junior*, Lieut. (now Comm.) Griffith, laden with extra stores.

to exist between it and Back's Great Fish River; but it ought to be noticed, Prince Regent's Inlet had hitherto been found so ice-clogged that it offered very little hope of a passage to the westward that way; the only prospect of success was the route we have above noticed,—viz., that by Barrow's Strait. As no attempts had been made in the direction of Melville Island, west of 90° W., since Parry's celebrated successful voyage in 1819 and 1820, what was known in that quarter was due alone to the enterprise and careful observation of that distinguished officer. Any assumption regarding it must, therefore, be founded alone on his authority; all beyond was purely speculative. The chart, then, of Parry, in 1819 and 1820, will be all-sufficient. Now, taking the south side of Barrow's Strait, and going west on the parallel of about $74^{\circ} 15'$ N., a coast line is indicated between Capes Clarence and Bunny; a gap or open space then occurs of about two and a half degrees of longitude, or about forty-one miles in this latitude; a shaded spot follows, Cape Walker; from this Cape to Banks' Land an extensive opening presents itself of about seventeen degrees of longitude, or about 290 miles, called Parry or Melville Sound; this opening offered every reasonable prospect of a passage to the southward and westward. It is true, the southern limit of Banks' Land was not known, nor were the northern limits of Wollaston and Victoria Lands; still it was hoped a passage might be found in the blank of 240 miles between Banks' and Wollaston Lands, or between the latter and Victoria Lands; and the 120th degree of west longitude being reached on or near the coast of the American continent, the question of "the Passage" would be solved, as beyond that meridian west to Behring's Strait no land is visible to the north from that coast. From this it will be seen that the impediments arising from the presence of land bear no comparison with the encouraging prospects offered by the presumed extent of water: hence every feature gave promise of "a Passage," and cheerful hope of speedily realizing the long-sought object. It was upon this promise of success, no doubt, the veteran Sir John Barrow founded his plan: it presented the most auspicious future, and hence its adoption by the Government. We will now turn to the north side of Barrow's Strait, along which the enterprising Parry was the first to navigate; it is marked by a greater extent of land, broken up apparently into islands. That enterprising commander, with the exception of Melville Island, saw only the southern extremities of those lands or islands: the passages between led to the north. One broader than the rest he named the Wellington Channel; he describes it as a "noble channel," "more

than eight leagues in width.* But he did not stop to examine them. No one knew, therefore, where they would ultimately lead, and so they remained up to the year 1845. All to the north, then, of 75° N., between 80° and 115° W., with the exception we have noticed, was unknown and unlimited, whilst by the southern route a few days of successful navigation would bring the fortunate explorers on known ground, with a sea extending to Behring's Strait. Thus far the plan: we will now give the Instructions founded upon it. We omit the preamble, and the sections into which it is divided, not immediately bearing on our object, which is to show where the Franklin Expedition was sent; and that the orders issued for its guidance were clear and explicit. These Instructions are dated May 5, 1845;†—

"Section 5. Lancaster Sound, and its continuation through Barrow's Strait, having been four times navigated without any impediment by Sir Edward Parry, . . . will probably be found without any obstacles from ice or islands; and Sir Edward Parry having also proceeded from the latter in a straight course to Melville Island, and returned without experiencing any, or very little difficulty, it is hoped that the remaining portion of the passage, about 900 miles, to Behring's Strait may also be found equally free from obstruction; and in proceeding to the westward, therefore, you will not stop to examine any openings either to the *northward* or southward in that strait, but to continue to push to the westward without loss of time, in the latitude of about 74½°, till you have reached the longitude of that portion of land on which Cape Walker is situated, or about 98° W. *From that point we desire that every effort be used to endeavour to penetrate to the southward and westward, in a course as direct towards Behring's Strait as the position and extent of the ice, or the existence of land at present unknown, may admit.*

"Section 6. We direct you to *this particular part* of the Polar Sea as affording the *best prospect of accomplishing the Passage* to the Pacific, in consequence of the unusual magnitude, and apparently fixed state, of the barrier of ice observed by the *Hecla* and *Griper* in the year 1820, off Cape Dundas, the south-western extremity of Melville Island; and we therefore consider that loss of time would be incurred in renewing the attempt in that direction; but should your progress in the direction before ordered be arrested by ice of a permanent appearance, and that when passing the mouth of the strait between Devon and Cornwallis Islands, you had observed that it was

* See Parry, "First Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage," p. 50.

† See Parliamentary Paper, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition," 1848, pp. 3 to 7.

open and clear of ice, we desire that you will duly consider, with reference to the time already consumed, as well as to the symptoms of a late or early close of the season, whether *that channel* might not offer a more practicable outlet from the archipelago, and a more ready access to the open sea, where there would be neither islands nor banks to arrest and fix the floating masses of ice; and if you should have advanced too far to the south-westward to render it expedient to adopt this new course before the end of the present season, and if, therefore, you should have determined to winter in that neighbourhood, it will be a matter for your mature deliberation, whether in the ensuing season you would proceed by the above-mentioned strait, or whether you would persevere to the south-westward, according to the former directions.

"Section 7. You are well aware, having yourself been one of the intelligent travellers who have traversed the American shore of the Polar Sea, that the groups of islands, that stretch from that shore to the northward to a distance not yet known, do not extend to the westward further than about the 120th degree of western longitude, and that beyond this, and to Behring's Strait, no land is visible from the American shore of the Polar Sea."

We have given these sections in full; but they may be condensed into a very few words, embracing three points. First, the expedition is directed to proceed to about $74\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N., and 98° W., to a spot in near vicinity to Cape Walker. Secondly, From thence to the south-west, towards Behring's Strait. Thirdly, If arrested by ice or land in that direction, and Wellington Channel was seen in passing it to be open and clear of ice, the alternative was given, either to proceed up that channel, or to persevere to the south-westward.

These are the Instructions given to Sir John Franklin when he sailed; they do not admit of doubt; their object and intent are obvious. Still we cannot but observe, there are omissions of the gravest character. For example, there is no mention of rendezvous, nor of depôts to fall back upon in case of separation or accident; no expectation held out of relief from home. The expedition was left to rely solely on its own resources. Surely, there was a want of thought and fostering care in these omissions, for those who were about to dare the rigours of an Arctic climate. We can only account for such apparent neglect in the feeling that was at the time prevalent, that the Arctic Seas were navigable, with very little difficulty, "even unto the Pole." The gallant Franklin himself seems to have entertained the same idea. These views had arisen probably out of the

successful voyage of Parry,* or the assumed existence of a Polar Ocean: hence this seeming want of necessary precaution. Again, the solution of the "Great Question" involved all thought; no dull, throbbing, remote probability of what might occur found favour to war, much less to cloud, the happy, hopeful future; it was invested with the brightest anticipations of success. With such joyous feelings, with such confidence and determination to conquer all difficulties that might oppose it, sailed the Franklin Expedition. Alas, that its future should involve a mystery!

Perhaps at no period of our history, or under any circumstances, has an expedition left our shores so well equipped or provided for, or carried with it so much of feeling and heartfelt solicitude for its welfare and ultimate success in the great object for which it departed from us, or for which more anxious, fervent prayers have been offered for its safe return to reap the glory and reward of achieved perilous enterprise, than did the Franklin Expedition.

Year after year have the same feelings been exhibited throughout the country, with all the sincerity of the deepest interest; from the highest to the lowest, in Parliament and out, all have united in one common expression of sympathy for our long absent navigators, coupled with the desire to institute the most rigid search to recover (if it were possible) and restore the missing ones to their country and their home.

Twelve years of anxiety and painful doubt, supported alone by hope, for "hope of all passions most befriends us here!" have passed away since Franklin and his gallant associates left us.

Expedition after expedition has been despatched in search of them, guided by the clearest heads, the coolest judgments, and the best of hearts: some by the east, others by the west; some overland, others by sea: some by the Government, backed by all its resources; others by private means, suggested by the most exalted feelings, and sanctified by the calls of suffering humanity. Amongst these latter stands prominently forth the extraordinary efforts of Lady Franklin herself. What continued personal sacrifices has she not made! What inde-

* That enterprising commander made his principal discoveries, including that of Prince Regent's Inlet, in thirty-three days; during which he ran over thirty degrees of longitude.—Deducting the time occupied exploring that inlet, his run from Lancaster Sound to Winter Harbour was done in eighteen days; and, taking his extreme limit west in thirty days, over thirty-three degrees of westing, or, including Prince Regent's Inlet to his farthest westerly point from Lancaster Sound, the whole was done in forty-five days, over thirty-three degrees of longitude.

fatigable perseverance has she not exhibited! What has not this noble lady, this devoted wife, attempted to search out and follow to the rescue her gallant husband and his devoted companions! Wherever hope lent a ray, there has she been unshaken by the past, firm in the present, and trustful in the future, aiding and assisting by her example, her presence, and her counsel, the manly hearts around her, infusing her own untiring spirit into them, and giving firmness, strength, and consistency to the whole. Such the Government expeditions, such the private expeditions, and such those fitted out under the auspices of Lady Franklin herself.

Our transatlantic brethren—for the wide, wild wave cannot efface the tie of blood—have felt and acted, have been up and doing, in the munificent Grinnell and generous Peabody,* with the ready De Haven and the intelligent Kane, with the "Advances" and the "Rescue," a small but gallant band.

Brave, warm-hearted France, inspired by the love of mighty daring, whether in the cause of science or in the field, was there. The votaries of science were missing and deemed to be suffering; she lent her Bellot and De Bray, two sons worthy of her, worthy the cause and worthy the profession to which they belonged. Poor René Bellot! chivalrously humane! we would that we had been spared the sad task of chronicling your death!

"Brief, brave, and glorious was his young career;
And fitly may the stranger, lingering here,
Pray for his gallant spirit's bright repose;
For _____ he had kept
The whiteness of his soul, and thus men o'er him wept."

"De Bray leaves with the good will and good wishes of all officers and men; he has done this service much credit." † In him we had another "noble specimen;" "like the lamented Bellot he has acquired

* In the recent desire shown to appreciate the unparalleled generosity and feeling of the sons of the "fair daughter" for the long missing hapless sons of the "fair mother," we find no notice of the name of Peabody. The noble-minded Grinnell cannot suffer by the mention of this omission, but the grateful feeling of the "fair mother" may; the omission cannot be designed, and therefore should be rectified at once. Mr. Peabody is known to us over twenty years of conduct, marked by a kindness of heart and a liberality of thought and action, that has done more to break down the little differences and jealousies between America and England than all the efforts of diplomatists: justly has he earned the esteem of both mother and daughter.

† See Blue Book, 1855; "Further Papers," &c., Capt. Kellett's Letter, p. 78.

the warmest sympathies of all who have had the pleasure of his society. I earnestly hope that our sentiments may be made known to his Government, and that his merit may meet with the distinction it so richly merits." * Returned to his dear France and his home, yet his name will ever be held in high respect and esteem by Englishmen.

America and France especially demand the grateful thanks of England, nor may we forget the good offices of Russia—Europe felt. The wide, wide world looked on with deep interest for those who went forth from amongst us on a great and glorious errand, whose end and objects were universal. Hence its feeling, its sympathy for the gallant Franklin, and his no less gallant officers and crews; and hence, too, its solicitude for all those that followed in the perilous search that they might be recovered.

But again we turn to the searching squadrons; no joyful demonstration marked their return. Alas! they have failed to realize the object for which they were sent; they have been unable, with all their hardy daring, their energy, their endurance and their sufferings, to discover farther traces of the lost navigators; they have been unsuccessful. Their regrets are feelingly expressed, in every variety of form, in their official reports. Let no man say they have not "done their duty;" we shall show to the contrary. If there exists a poor worn-out spirit, prostrate with "that sickness of heart which arises from hope deferred," or a discontented, over expectant, or less amiable being, who thinks more might have been done, let such read the Arctic reports, and learn from those valuable, particularizing documents what has been done by their more than equally disappointed (from want of success) gallant countrymen. Having done so, they will rise with a changed and better spirit—one rather of admiration and encomium. If prolonged enduring effort—if dragging extreme weights (life-sustaining and therefore not to be lessened) over rugged surfaces, long distances, continued day by day so long as to institute a comparison unfavourable to the powers of the horse; now sleeping in damp and wet, or thanking cruel frost for the dryness it brings; and now, under an intensity of cold of which we have no conception, many degrees below zero;—surely, if aught has, these have a claim on the better feelings of our nature.

No! no one can doubt the untiring energy and perseverance of our sailors, whether officers or men; and who shall gainsay

* See Blue Book, 1855, "Further Papers," &c. ; Sir Edward Belcher's Letter, p. 68.

their feeling? for who has not noticed with admiration their simple-minded kind-heartedness heightened often to chivalrous daring and utter regardlessness of self, at the call of distress? But in this case, with more than 100 of the flower of their countrymen, on a cherished but perilous question, in jeopardy, with the baneful breath of the north wind rustling wild and mournful in their ears, singing, perchance, the sad requiem of their long absent friends, urging them to the rescue, who shall dare say they were not sensitively alive to the sacred call of the holy mission on which they had entered? Sailors have, with rare exceptions, ever done their duty in times past, and, we thank God, our sailors are not at all altered; they may be "rough," but they are always "ready." It may not be out of place here to give proof of what they have done. The whole of the north side of Barrow's Strait has been searched to the parallel of 78° N.; east to the long. of 80° W.; and west to Melville and Prince Patrick's Islands to 125° W. This includes all the passages between the Parry Islands—the over-estimated, elusive Wellington Channel, Penny's Sea beyond, and the new islands arising out of its discovery to the north and north-east of it, converting Jones's Sound into a strait. On the south side of Barrow's Strait, Regent's Inlet to Bellot's Strait on the east, and to the west the coast line between Port Leopold to Cape Bunny; the east and west coasts of Peel's Sound, the former to lat. $72^{\circ} 35'$ N., and the latter to $74^{\circ} 45'$ N.; and from Cape Walker to the west and south, to lat. 72° N., and long. 103° W. Over land and over sea, the whole Arctic coast-line of America, from Behring's Strait east to 105° W., has been examined; also from the bottom of Regent's Inlet to 95° W. The northern and western limits of Wollaston and Banks' Lands, including Baring Island and Albert Land; the southern limits of Wollaston and Victoria Lands eastward to 100° W. Here, then, is surely more than proof, if proof were wanting, of the indomitable energy and perseverance of our sailors; but there is a space yet blank on our charts, the particular space to which the energies of the Franklin Expedition were specially directed; that remains even yet unsearched. It lies between 103° and 115° W.

In the prosecution of the extended search that has been made, it is only justice to the gallant officers and men to say, that where they were directed to go, the search has been complete; their exertions have given to England another kingdom, but, alas! it has been dearly purchased. This is highly honourable to our sailors, and geographically it has added another wreath to Britain's well-earned laurels—a wreath pure and

unstained by the hateful mark of blood. Still there is the sacrifice; those whom they sought, they have not found; and while we cordially admit they have done their duty, the questions yet remain,—“What has become of the gallant Franklin and his companions? Have we sought them in the right direction?”

Seeing, then, that every effort of all the searching squadrons has failed to trace the course the Franklin Expedition took after leaving Beechey Island (1846); seeing that the important relics brought home by Dr. Rae and Capt. Collinson, R.N., while they are highly suggestive, lead to no positive conclusion; we are compelled to confess, however painful the thought, that we are as ignorant now of the position and the fate of the Franklin Expedition as we were in 1846; all is equally inexplicable and apparently mysterious now as then. But are there no reasons to be assigned why we have been unable, with all our exertions, to penetrate the gloom, and reveal the secret? Surely there must have been some error somewhere for this want of success; for we cannot believe that an expedition, acting under definite instructions, can have passed away entirely; we cannot realize the idea that both ships, with their masts and yards, their boats, &c., with their ready, talented officers and crews, can have been wholly lost, without leaving some vestige of their former existence, some mark to lead to the fatal scene of the sad catastrophe; it seems altogether improbable. We ask, then, Would it not be wise to inquire,—to throw our thoughts back on the past, and re-examine the plans and measures adopted for the recovery of our unfortunate countrymen,—whether, in selecting the course that has been pursued, we have been guided by a sound judgment in this momentous matter? Surely, if ever there was a case requiring a sound decision, unwarped by prejudice, by routine, by ignorance, by rumour, or by feeling, it is this. Unhappily, we know too well now the inefficacy of the plans adopted; they have failed to realize the object sought. Still, does it not behove us to inquire whether we have applied the best means, and given the right direction, to the efforts of our searching squadrons? These questions it were well to consider. We are all predisposed to particular views and pre-conceived notions, professional or otherwise. Routine infests and imparts its influence to all bodies of men, whether afloat or ashore; it is seen in all establishments, naval and military, offices, manufactories, everywhere; the aged adopt it, and call it experience; the young reject it, and term it dotage. Ignorance is bold and intrusive, and rumour retails her fictions, while feeling “no soft medium

knows." Each and all have a power over the mind, and baleful, too often, are the effects; we pray they may not have influenced the decisions on this distressful subject. We have already claimed for our sailors the merit that is justly their due for their continued, daring, and unwearied exertions. As to the toicans employed in the search, they were, without doubt, perfect, for they combined all the advantages of the two extreme opinions—expeditions by land and sea. It remains, then, to consider, Has a right direction been given to the efforts of the searchers? Has all been done that could have been done? Here we pause.

Before we reply to these important questions, it is no less imperative that we should inquire upon what principle the plans of search should have, and have been founded. We know the original plan and intentions of the voyage, and the instructions given to Sir John Franklin (when he sailed), with the hope of completing *that plan* and *those intentions*. Have we aught beside? Has any new fact arisen to alter or suspend either one or the other? We can easily conceive that any subsequent change of circumstances, such as Sir John Franklin being unable to fulfil either of the primary points of his instructions, would necessarily involve a change in his course of action; but from the time he sailed (1845) not a particle of evidence exists to prove that he was prevented or unable to do so. We are, then, in the same position as we were in 1845; we have, in short, only the *Instructions we gave him on his departure to guide us to him*. They and they alone can or should instruct us how to follow him. Here, then, is the principle upon which the plans for search should have been based. His Instructions direct him first to a given point near Cape Walker; second, from thence to the south-west; third, if prevented by obstacles in that direction, and favourable prospects offering in another (Wellington Channel), he had the option either still to persevere to the south-west, or to adopt the more favourable prospect by Wellington Channel. Now, have we, in forming our plans of search, recognized such a principle? that is, have we founded them upon these Instructions? If, in the absence of other rules to guide us, we have departed from them, inasmuch as we have departed, have we strayed from the only guide we had to him, and involved ourselves in the mazes of uncertainty. We know the expedition reached Beechey Island; we have no positive proof that it was crippled or lost there; we therefore must conclude it sailed from that island. Here all that is positively known ends; still we hold it reasonable to assume that the expedition, after its departure,

attempted to fulfil the primary point (section 5th) of its Instructions, that is, that it attempted to reach Cape Walker, and to get to the south-west. All beyond this is dark, but *not sealed* in mystery.

Now, what have been our plans for the recovery of the Franklin Expedition? what the instructions given to the various searching squadrons for the attainment of so desirable, so humane an end? We speak particularly of those sent by the way of Barrow's Strait; for there is not a doubt that all the land expeditions through America to the Arctic Sea, and also those by sea *via* Behring's Strait, originated out of a just sense of the probability of the Franklin Expedition having, by a south-west course from Cape Walker, as ordered, either made the passage, or approached the American coast so nearly as, in case of distress, wreck, or of abandoning the ships, to offer the best means of escape from the perils of the North. The fact of sending expeditions in these directions indicates, too, that the tenor of the Instructions given to Franklin was understood, *viz.*, from about Cape Walker to penetrate in a south-west direction.

We turn, then, to those sent by Barrow's Strait. Here, latterly, a widely different principle seems to have been acted on from that upon which it is known and admitted that the Franklin Expedition was ordered to follow. Cape Walker, and thence in a south-west direction, seems to have been forgotten, or only partially thought of; or why have directed the search to be made to the north of Barrow's Strait, particularly by the Wellington Channel, before completing the examination of the southern side, west of Cape Walker, that is, Parry's or Melville Sound? Certainly the latter should have been our first object, especially as that unknown space involved the spirit of the original plan, which Sir John Franklin was instructed to complete; and we had no proof of its impracticability, no reason to induce a departure from the Instructions given to him. It is true, Franklin had the alternative, in case of insurmountable obstacles presenting themselves to the south and west, to return and make the attempt by Wellington Channel; but that he was shut out in that southern direction by such obstacles we had no knowledge, no new facts to prove. It therefore follows, that by leaving the space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land unsearched or incompletely examined, for the north, we have departed from the right direction, and the hope of finding our hapless countrymen.

We cannot understand this, we cannot comprehend, much less appreciate, the soundness of any judgment or plan that orders an expedition in a precise direction, and then searches for it in a direction

at right angles to that in which it was ordered. This, we fear, has been the fatal error, and hence we mourn the long absence of our missing, if not lost, countrymen. For these reasons we cannot satisfactorily convince ourselves that the search for them has been complete, or that they have been sought in the right direction; consequently all has not been done that could or should have been done. We have referred to the plans for search adopted in the past, and we know their barren results, notwithstanding the extreme efforts that have been made on the part of those appointed to carry them out: the fruitless past may, nevertheless, yield us instructive lessons for the future. We have seen that plan after plan has been adopted, and, what is rarely the case, has been well carried out, and yet all have ended unsuccessfully; and so far from assisting to clear the obscurity and the gloom that envelops this mournful subject, they have rather tended yet more to embarrass and mystify it. Their baseless structure and utter insufficiency are proved by the painful doubt in which they leave the sad subject after seven years of laborious search; they have ended by telling us where the Franklin Expedition is not, rather than where it is. But any plan, however inconsiderate and wild, could have told this, and perchance might have told us more. We must confess we are not surprised at their universal failure, for they were founded on mere assumption, an assumption antagonistic to the only guide we had, *viz.*, the Instructions given to the Franklin Expedition; hence, loss of time and distressing disappointments. The plans that have sought in the north for an expedition that was directed to the south-west, carried within themselves the elements of their own failure. This would have been of little consequence, if they had not involved the safety of the expedition. Still one feels quite at a loss to account for such extreme aberration of ideas on a question so clear and distinct.

After what we have expressed, the conflicting nature of the opinions existing on this subject is not greatly to be wondered at; and yet the original plan of the voyage for the discovery of "the Passage," as also the Instructions embodying it for the guidance of Sir John Franklin, are, as we have shown, simple and clear in their object and direction; but we have departed from them, and hence confusion reigns. It is clearly obvious that, where we sent him, it was our duty to follow, if we would hope to find him; we have not done this, and the extreme differences between the direction given to the searchers and the sought has not only failed to find the lost expedition, but has contributed to encourage erratic ideas on the

subject; the consequence is, that which was simple and clear has become involved and confused. If those who are supposed to be acquainted with the original intention of the voyage thus differ, can we be astonished that others less informed (a class always more confident and self-opinionated) should set themselves up for judges, and add their indigested and obscure notions to the mass, until at last the whole becomes, as we find it, chaotic, and a sad mystery? Such is the state of uncertainty regarding this memorable expedition, that while some doubt if it ever left Beechey Island at all, others think it attempted a passage by the way of Peel's Sound, and was lost there; some assert it was lost in Regent's Inlet, whilst others think the catastrophe occurred on its homeward voyage. Some question the intent of the Instructions, and doubt the clearness that admits of so many and such various interpretations; others by their opinions would lead one to the conclusion that the Admiralty did not know exactly to what quarter they had sent the expedition; for some have asserted determinately that it went up Wellington Channel; others have thought Jones's Sound; and even Smith's Sound has had its advocates; but few have believed that the expedition followed the direction of its Instructions, and endeavoured to get west and south. Even the excellent-hearted Franklin himself has not escaped animadversion. Some have said he had his own views, and only waited his opportunity to carry them out, regardless of the Admiralty Instructions; some have even doubted his capacity afloat; others censure his not leaving despatches here, and others there, especially at Beechey Island; some say he was too old, and others too daring; and so on, without end. All of these opinions are the offsprings of a fevered brain; for they do not originate from the plan of the voyage. We have not a particle of proof that Franklin ever did otherwise than attempt to carry out his Instructions, as in the course of these pages we shall endeavour to show. We therefore shall leave these crude absurdities, called opinions, to be remarked upon anon.

We have said the conduct and character of Sir John Franklin have been much animadverted upon (all public men are more or less open to this), but we should feel we were guilty of a dereliction of duty in the task we have assigned ourselves, if we did not at once enter our protest against the calumniators of this talented and enterprising man. Before mentioning our own opinion, we will record the opinions of those who, from long intimacy and friendship, are best capable of judging of his character, whether private or professional.

Sir Roderick I. Murchison, President of the Royal Geographical

Society, in his annual address, May 26, 1845, after noticing the recent departure of the *Erebus* and *Terror*,* says:—"As far as depends on my judicious and enterprising friend, Sir John Franklin, and his energetic officers and seamen, I have the fullest confidence that everything will be done for the promotion of science, and for the honour of the British name and navy, that human efforts can accomplish. The name of Franklin alone is, indeed, a national guarantee; and proud shall we geographers be if our gallant Vice-President shall return after achieving such an exploit, and gladly, I am sure, would we then offer to him our presidential chair as some slight recompense for his arduous labours."

Sir Francis Beaufort (Hydrographer) thus speaks: "Sir John Franklin is not a man to treat his orders with levity;"† and Sir Edward Parry reiterates the observation of the Hydrographer. Sir John Richardson says:—"It is admitted by all who are intimately acquainted with Sir John Franklin, that his first endeavour would be to set up to the letter of his Instructions." These authorities may suffice to show the estimation in which Sir John Franklin was held, by those eminently capable of forming an opinion on his merits.

The character of this great and good man can be enhanced by no eulogium of ours; our opinion avails nothing; but, being of the world, moving in and observant of it, we are wishful to see justice rendered, and the palm awarded where it is most due. We take a deep interest in the "Question," and in Arctic matters generally, more especially since the "Father of Arctic enterprise" aroused anew the dormant (never extinct) spirit of British feeling, for further efforts to reveal the hidden secrets of the North. As such, let it not be ascribed to presumption if we offer the ground of our faith in the man,—how we learned to appreciate the high qualities of Sir John Franklin. Antecedents will, and should ever influence, and these were all his own, were all in his favour. He had often been selected for Arctic service—in fact, had been reared amidst the perils of ice and storm, by land and by sea; there he gained and perfected his experience. Science acknowledged him as hers, for his labours were constant to solve her Arctic problem. No wonder, then, that he should be selected for this important command. Though tried by danger and deprivation in extreme, even where hope seemed lost, and sorrow and distress alone remained, still he did not despair, for he had learned

* See "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. xv., part I., p. 46.

† Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition," pp. 99, 103, 107.

to rely where reliance can alone be placed, and he gathered confidence where hope gave no sign. The records of his career tell of abandonment, of hunger, of murder, and of death; still he preserved the equanimity of his soul in the most fearful situations. He was kind and humane, and his followers, and all about him, knew it; even the savage felt its softening influence; when the white man had forgotten his fellow white man he relieved him in his extremity! Who can read of the generous Akaitche and his tribe, and the noble sacrifices they made for him, without confessing the fascinating power of this good man's example over the "untutored Indian?" The idea of his disregarding his Instructions is simply ridiculous; he knew how to obey as well as to command. In whatever light we view this great man's character, we are compelled to acknowledge a more fitting commander could not have been chosen; let the tongue of slander, then, cease. Of this we may rest assured, that should futurity ever raise the awful veil, and reveal to us the fate of Sir John Franklin and his devoted officers and crews, it will be found they have dared death, and mayhap have met it, in the desire to fulfil their Instructions, and to complete the great object of their hazardous enterprise, for their country's honour and their own.

We are the less inclined to hear blame attached to Sir John Franklin and his gallant officers and crews, inasmuch as they were chosen for their chivalrous devotion to the "Great Question" in which they had embarked, and we have not a tittle of evidence in proof that they were faithless to the noble cause, or the plan and instructions by which it was to be achieved. Had we at home but continued to follow the principles of that wise plan on which the voyage was founded! had we but adopted the tenor of those simple instructions in sending out our searching squadrons, all might now have been well, and we had not to lament, with feelings of bitter regret, the terrible uncertainty hanging over the fate of this long-missing expedition.

The *Erebus* and *Terror*, as we have before noticed, sailed from the Thames May 26, 1845. They arrived safely at the Whalefish Islands. Sir John Franklin, in a letter to the Admiralty, dated thence 12th July, 1845,* says, "The ships are now complete with supplies of every kind for three years, . . . and I hope to sail in the night," as "I have learnt, though the winter was severe, the spring was not later than usual, nor was the ice later in breaking away hereabout; it

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition," p. 50.

is now supposed to be loose as far as 74° N., and our prospect is favourable of getting across the barrier, and as far as Lancaster Sound, without much obstruction." He ends by speaking "of the energy and zeal of Capt. Crozier, Commander Fitzjames, and of the officers and men with whom he has the happiness of being employed."

We left them, says Lieut. (now Commander) Griffiths, with every species of provisions for three entire years, independently of five bullocks; they had also stores of every description for the same time, and fuel in abundance.*

The *Erebus* and *Terror* were last seen by the *Prince of Wales* whaler, Capt. Dannett, on the 26th July, 1845, moored to an iceberg in lat. 74° 48' N. and long. 66° 13' W., waiting a favourable opening of the middle ice to cross to Lancaster Sound. Thus departed this memorable expedition, about which so much of deep and anxious feeling and fond hope was invested at the time, and so much of melancholy interest is attached since.

We have noticed the great object of this voyage, the plan on which it was founded, the reasonableness and favourable prospect it offered for the final completion of "the Passage;" we have remarked on the means employed, the perfect equipment of the ships, and the superior efficiency of the commander and officers; we have given the Instructions, and pointed out their clearness, definite meaning, and intentions; we have noted the departure of the expedition, its long absence, and the uncertainty hanging over it; we have alluded to the continued, extended, and careful search that has been made for its recovery, and the complete failure of every effort; we have drawn attention to the particular quarter to which it was directed—and in the absence of other information have endeavoured to show, that in searching for the lost expedition we have nothing to guide us to him but the Instructions that were given to Sir John Franklin on his departure; that in seeking him, these Instructions have been departed from, or lost sight of, and hence our want of success—hence the sad mystery which envelops the fate and position of this memorable expedition. We shall now inquire if there exists no cause for this unhappy termination to our prolonged efforts; we shall examine the opinions and plans upon which the searching expeditions have been directed to act. We have long questioned their soundness, for we could never see any promise of happy result likely to arise from any opinion or plan which recommended a search in one direction for an

* See Shillinglaw's "Narrative of Arctic Discovery, 1851," p. 271.

expedition sent in another and a widely different one. We cannot comprehend the efficacy of any plan that does not include the intent of Franklin's Instructions. We have yet to understand the train of reasoning which institutes a search to the north of Barrow's Strait with the hope of recovering the Franklin Expedition, which was (on a specific and approved plan) specially directed to the south-west; much less can we comprehend why this particular (this south-west) quarter, to which it was sent, should be almost altogether neglected—or at best only partially examined. In the prosecution of our inquiries we shall notice all suggestions and plans, whether public or private, that come before us, and the searching expeditions arising out of them, their orders and their doings, whether by Barrow's or Behring's Straits, or by the Mackenzie or the Coppermine River; but our principal attention will be devoted to those by Baffin's Bay and Barrow's Strait; our immediate object being to ascertain why the south-west, from Cape Walker (Melville Sound), has been only "partially" searched, whilst the north of Barrow's Strait has obtained almost exclusive attention. We shall note, too, the various rumours and reports that have from time to time arisen—alike false and unfeeling, and specially to be denounced.

1846.—The year 1846 passed away without the betrayal of more than the ordinary anxiety which is always felt for those that are away, especially when on an enterprise, such as that of the *Erebus* and *Terror*. The general impression was that Sir John Franklin would not lightly relinquish the "great object" of the expedition, the "solution" of which was the darling feeling of his heart, for any ordinary difficulty; it was felt, too, that he was well supported by his able second, Capt. Crozier, by Fitzjames, and his other excellent officers and devoted crews. The only circumstance worthy record was a letter addressed to the Admiralty (September 16, 1846), by Sir John Ross:—"Having promised to Sir John Franklin, that, in the event of the expedition under his command being frozen (as the one I directed was for four years), I would volunteer, in the year 1847, to proceed to certain positions we had agreed upon in search of him and his brave companions." The Admiralty replied (September 30, 1846), "Your gallant and humane intentions are fully appreciated by their Lordships, yet no such service is at present contemplated." The season of 1846 seems to have been severe, as none of the whale-ships appear to have approached Lancaster Sound.

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 53.

1847.—The first official notice we have of watch and ward over the fortunes of the Franklin Expedition emanates, as it very properly should, from the Admiralty, and seems to have originated out of several communications to their Lordships from Sir John Ross. This document is dated, Admiralty, February 19, 1847,* and is addressed to the late Sir Edward Parry. It encloses "extracts of two recent letters from Sir John Ross," and requests "the substance of any communication which Sir John Franklin may have made to" him with regard to "depôts" "for his relief (no record of such" "having been left" "here") "their Lordships being sure, that from his known intimacy," "he would have consulted him on the subject." "Their Lordships, having unlimited confidence in the skill and resources of Sir John Franklin, have as yet felt no apprehensions about his safety; but, on the other hand, it is obvious, that if no accounts of him should arrive by the end of this year, or, as Sir John Ross expects, at an earlier period, active steps must then be taken." Their Lordships then call for Sir Edward Parry's opinion on the subject, both with respect to the question of employing vessels, the period of sailing, and the several places it would be expedient to visit; as well as for any advice which may occur to "him," who has had "so much personal experience of the Arctic regions," &c., &c., and concludes, "it would be satisfactory" if you would call upon Sir James Ross, Colonel Sabine, and Sir John Richardson, to enter into consultations with you.

The two extracts are as following; the first is dated January 27, 1847:—"In reference to the several communications I have made to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, touching the probable position of the discovery ships under the command of Sir John Franklin, and in the performance of a promise I made to that gallant officer, namely, that if no accounts were received from him up to the middle of January, 1847, I would volunteer my services to ascertain his fate, and to visit the several depôts we had fixed before his departure from England.

"I beg most respectfully to state, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that my opinion, founded on my experience in the Arctic regions, and on my knowledge of the intentions of Sir John Franklin, is, in the first place, that he cannot have succeeded in passing through Behring's Straits; because the expedition, had it been successful, would have been heard of before the

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 21.

middle of this month; and, in the second place, the probability is, that his ships have been carried by drift ice into a position from which they cannot be extricated."

The second, dated February 9, 1847.—"In reference to the communication I had the honour of making to you this morning, when I pointed out the impossibility of Sir John Franklin and his crew being able to reach the nearest place a whaling-ship could be found, from the position in which the expedition must be frozen up, consequent on the known intentions of Sir John Franklin, namely, to put his ships into the drift ice at the western end of Melville Island; a risk which was deemed in the highest degree imprudent by Lieut. Parry and the officers of the expedition of 1819-20, with ships of a less draught of water, and in every respect better calculated to sustain the pressure of the ice, and other dangers to which they must be exposed; and as it is now evident that the expedition cannot have succeeded in passing Behring's Strait, and, if not totally lost, must have been carried by the ice that is known to drift to the southward, on land seen at a great distance in that direction, and from which the accumulation of ice behind them will, as in my own case, for ever prevent the return of the ships; consequently they must be abandoned either on the 1st of May next, in order to reach Melville Island before the snow melts at the end of June, and where they must remain until the 1st of August, and at which place I had selected to leave a depôt of provisions, absolutely necessary for their sustenance; or if they defer their journey until the 1st of May, 1848, it will be still more necessary that provisions, fuel, &c., should be deposited there, after I had secured my vessel in a harbour on the south side of Barrow's Strait, and in such a position as would enable them to reach her when the sea was sufficiently open for boats, which I would leave at the depôt in 'Winter Harbour,' while in the meantime I would survey the west coast of Boothia, and in all probability decide the question of a North-West Passage. I was officially acquainted by Captain Hamilton that it was the intention of their Lordships not to accede to my proposals, but to offer a reward to whalers and to the Hudson's Bay Company, to use their 'endeavours' for the rescue of Sir John Franklin and his companions, a proposition I hereby protest against as utterly inefficient; for as one of the officers of Parry's expedition, who was then of opinion that what Sir John Franklin intended to do was imprudent, and who from experience knew with what extreme difficulty we travelled 300 miles over much smoother ice after we abandoned our vessel, and must be certain

that Franklin and his men, 138 in number, could not possibly travel 600 miles, while we had in prospect the *Fury's* stores to sustain us after our arrival, besides boats; and unless I reach Melville Island next summer, they will have nothing."

We have deemed it better to give these extracts in full, fearful of destroying the sense of them by abridgment. It will be impossible, within our circumscribed limits, to award the same justice to the distinguished men whose opinions are sought, but we will endeavour faithfully to give the sense of their replies: even this would be scarcely necessary, were it not that new opinions have arisen, opinions so opposed and inconsistent with the tenor of Franklin's Instructions; the latter have been so perverted or disregarded as almost to lead to the conclusion that the whole plan was one great phantom of the brain, one unmingled incomprehensibility, never intended to be understood, much less carried out. Our object here and elsewhere will be to show that the plan had a reasonable and fixed object, and a definite direction; as will be seen in the replies given by Parry, James Ross, Sabine, and Richardson. But how their Lordships could have imagined that the two extracts were capable of reply at all, we cannot conceive; we can only account for their being referred over to these gentlemen to save themselves a useless labour, and with the hope that they might be able to elicit a meaning from them which they themselves were unable to detect; at any rate, these replies go to show that Franklin was to be sought for in a south-west direction from Cape Walker.

We ought to remark here, our extracts or quotations from these replies will be confined, as nearly as possible, to the direction which they take, the several places "which it would be expedient to visit" involved in this, and also the object we have ourselves in view in writing these pages; namely, to inquire whether we have sought the Franklin Expedition in the right direction?

Sir Edward Parry replies, 23rd Feb., 1847.* He says:—"As to depôts, he has no recollection whatever of any such communication from Sir John Franklin. The conclusions of their Lordships, as to the absence of any present cause for apprehension, exactly coincide with his own. Former experience has clearly shown that, with resources, two winters may be passed in the Polar Regions, not only in safety, but with comfort. The absence of intelligence is rather in favour than otherwise of the success which has attended

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," pp. 23—28.

their efforts, but *concludes* that the time has arrived when due preparations should be made for an active search, in case no information should be received in the autumn of the year." As to the measures to be pursued, "nothing short of a second well equipped expedition could be expected to do more than penetrate through Barrow's Strait, which may be considered as the mere threshold of the enterprise in which the *Erebus* and *Terror* are engaged. The only plan which appears to hold out a reasonable prospect of success is to push supplies to the northern coast of the American continent and the islands adjacent thereto, with the assistance of the Hudson's Bay Company," and refers to the experience of Sir John Richardson for all matters of detail. "In conclusion, it might be satisfactory to adopt (as suggested by Sir John Barrow) the only remaining mode of obtaining information,—to direct the commander-in-chief in the Pacific to send a small vessel into Behring's Strait, and, if practicable, to despatch a boat along the shore of the American continent to the eastward, in the manner pursued by Capt. Beechey in the *Blossom*."

Sir John Richardson, 25th Feb. 1847, says:—"I had many conversations with Sir John Franklin up to the eve of his departure, and also a communication written on the coast of Greenland, and never heard him express a wish or expectation of depôts of provisions being stored at Melville Island or elsewhere. He would have preferred such a request to the Government alone."

"Sir John Franklin's plans were to shape his course, in the first instance, to Cape Walker, and to push to the westward in that parallel; or if that could not be accomplished, to make his way southwards to the channel discovered on the north coast of the continent, and so on to Behring's Strait; failing success in that quarter, he meant to retrace his course to Wellington Sound (Channel), and attempt a passage northwards of the Parry Islands; and if foiled there also, to descend Regent's Inlet, and seek a passage along the coast discovered by Dease and Simpson. With respect to the very strong apprehensions for the safety of the expedition," he thinks "they are premature; the ships being equipped to pass two winters in the Arctic Sea, and until next November shall have passed without tidings of them, no well grounded cause for more anxiety than was naturally felt when the expedition sailed; but the case will be very different if next winter sets in without satisfactory intelligence of their safety." He thinks "precautionary steps advisable; concurs in a well-appointed expedition of two strong ships, to trace the course of the missing vessels, and encouraging

the whalers by an adequate reward to examine the shores of Lancaster Strait and Wellington Sound. The boat party which sailed from Hudson's Bay last summer for the Welcome and bottom of Regent's Inlet will procure intelligence of the ships, should they have gone down Regent's Inlet." Sir John Richardson adds:—"There remains the contingency of the ships having penetrated some considerable distance to the south-west of Cape Walker, and having been hampered and crushed in the narrow channels of the Archipelago," believed to occupy "the space between Victoria, Wollaston, and Banks' Lands. Such accidents among ice are seldom so sudden but that the boats of one or both ships with provisions can be saved; and in such an event the survivors would either return to Lancaster Strait, or make for the continent, according to their nearness. Sir John Franklin being fully aware of the parts of the continent where they may expect relief, we may expect intelligence of the crews having reached a post of the Hudson's Bay Company to arrive in June or July next, to obtain tidings of the ships. Wollaston and Victoria Lands and the neighbouring islands might be visited by boats, but this cannot be effected earlier than August, 1848." Sir John Richardson proposes a boat expedition, entering into all the details of number, size, manning and provisioning, period of departure, wintering place, &c., and adds:—"Should the season be favourable, the boats would arrive in the Mackenzie by the end of July, and at its mouth in four days afterwards; time enough to examine a considerable portion of the coast, or even in a fine autumn to run down Wollaston Land, and return to winter quarters by way of the Coppermine River, thus searching the whole line of coast to which a shipwrecked crew would make their way. The winter residence ought to be at the north end of Great Bear Lake, as from that locality the channels between Wollaston and Victoria Lands could be most easily explored in the summer (1840)." He concludes by adding, "he would cheerfully conduct it himself."

The Admiralty, the 2nd March, 1847, in a letter to Sir John Pelly, Bart., says:—"Being engaged in collecting the best practical opinions as to the measures to be adopted towards obtaining tidings of Sir John Franklin, have now before them letters from Sir Edward Parry and Sir John Richardson, from the last of which my Lords beg to send extracts, and would wish to be favoured with any observations he might have to offer, and to be informed of the nature of the instructions" already issued to the servants of the Hudson's Bay

Company, with the view of obtaining intelligence of Sir John Franklin.*

Sir John Pelly replies, 4th March, 1847:†—"I think it will be better if I defer offering my opinion until I shall have had an opportunity of conferring with Sir George Simpson." He encloses the extract of a despatch forwarded to the Governor and Council of Rupert's Land, dated 11th March, 1845, as follows:—

"The subject of Arctic discovery again engages the attention, not only of the Government, but of the people, and Sir John Franklin is about to proceed in command of an expedition, with a view of effecting a passage by sea round the northern shore of the American continent. To that end he proposes going up Davis' Strait into Baffin's Bay, through Lancaster Sound, Barrow's Strait, and inside Melville Island on to Point Barrow." The rest relates to the Company's servants, and through them the natives, "to be on the look out for the expedition," &c. Here the route intended by Franklin is laid down so clearly, that it is impossible to mistake it. It tells one not only the impression of the Hudson's Bay Company, but also that of the Admiralty in 1847, or why have applied to the Company at all, if their territories had not been in his (Franklin's) route, *i. e.*, to the south-west, and *not to the north of Barrow's Strait?*

Sir George Simpson reports, Hudson's Bay House, 22nd March, 1847:‡—"After a very attentive examination of the whole subject, I cannot suggest any amendment of Sir John Richardson's plan."

Sir James C. Ross's reply is dated 2nd March, 1847:§—"I do not think there is the smallest reason of apprehension or anxiety for the safety or success of the expedition. No one would have expected they would have been able to get through to Behring's Strait without spending at least two winters. Except under unusually favourable circumstances,—which all accounts from the whalers concur in proving they have not experienced,—neither Sir John Franklin nor Capt. Crozier expected to do so. Their last letters to me inform me they had provisions for three years on full allowance, which they could extend to four without inconvenience, so that we may feel assured they cannot want from that cause until after the middle of July, 1849. It therefore does not appear to me desirable to send after them until the spring of next year. With reference to dépôts of

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 53.

† *Ibid.*, p. 36.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

provisions, I can very confidently assert that no expectation of the kind was seriously entertained by him. Capt. Crozier was staying with me at Blackheath nearly all the time the expedition was fitting out, and with Sir John Franklin I was in almost daily and unreserved communication respecting the details of the equipment and future proceedings of the expedition, and neither of them made the least allusion to any such arrangements or expectations beyond mentioning, as an *absurdity*, what Sir John Ross had *proposed* to Sir John Franklin." He adds:—"If no account should arrive before the end of this year, it would be proper to send to their assistance; two such ships as the *Erebus* and *Terror* should be sent. They should sail early in May, 1848, and follow the route that Sir John Franklin was directed to pursue, or that might appear to the commander more likely for him to take, after passing beyond the limits of our knowledge of those regions." He concludes:—"The present year the Hudson's Bay Company should be required to send out instructions for a supply of provisions to be in readiness at the more northern stations, and direct such other arrangements as likely to facilitate Sir John Franklin and his people's homeward journey, as they would assuredly endeavour to make their way to the Hudson's Bay Company's settlements, if their ships should be so injured as to prevent their proceeding, or so entangled in the ice as to preclude every hope of escape in any part of the Polar Seas westward of Melville Island, as the shortest and safest route they could pursue."

Colonel Sabine's reply is dated March 5, 1847:—

1st, "I never heard Sir John Franklin express either wishes or expectations that deposits of provisions should be made at particular points for his relief."

2nd, In a letter received from Sir John Franklin from the Whale-fish Islands, dated July 9, 1845, after noticing "what they had received from the transport," the *Erebus* and *Terror* had on board provisions, &c., &c., for three years complete from that date (*i. e.*, to July, 1848), he adds as follows:—"I hope my dear wife and daughters will not be over anxious if we should not return by the time they have fixed upon; . . . you know well, that even with the second winter, without success in our object, we should wish to try some other channel, if the state of our provisions and the health of the crews justify it."

"If, therefore," continues Colonel Sabine, "the crews have preserved their health as other crews have done under similar circumstances, and if no accident has befallen, we should consider the espe-

dition, according to the last known intention of its commander," is "still engaged in the prosecution of the North-West Passage, and that for some months yet to come their views will not be directed to a return to England by any other route than by that of Behring's Strait. It is quite possible, . . . Sir John Franklin may even be detained a third winter in the Polar Sea: should he not return in the autumn of 1847 it will by no means be to be inferred that some misfortune must have taken place."

3rd, "If the month of November, 1847, should pass without tidings of the expedition, measures of a decisive character should be taken . . . the following summer; . . . it would be proper to have regard to both extremities of the passage—to Behring's Strait as well as to Baffin's Bay."

4th, "With respect to Behring's Strait both sides of the strait should be watched, as, should the ships have succeeded in getting into the open sea discovered by *Wrangell*, they might be as likely to come down on the Asiatic as on the American side of the strait. If obliged to abandon the ships" in the "summer of 1848, between Melville Island and Behring's Strait, the boats must be looked for on the American side."

5th, "With respect to Baffin's Bay . . . I presume it would be proper to employ two vessels, . . . fitted for ice navigation, . . . with at least two years' provisions."

6th, "It was Sir John Franklin's intention, if foiled at one point, to try in succession all the probable openings into a more navigable part of the Polar Sea. . . . The range of coast is considerable in which memorials . . . would have to be sought for, extending from Melville Island in the west to the great sound at the head of Baffin's Bay in the east. As the sea in the upper parts of Baffin's Bay and in Barrow's Strait is in general comparatively free from ice during the summer months, it seems desirable to call in the aid of steam to ensure every accessible part of the coast referred to being visited in the one season. . . . The east and west sides of Wellington Channel should be especially searched for notices, . . . and one of the ports in the vicinity might be made one of the . . . stations for a depôt ship, being central . . . to Barrow's Strait, Wellington Channel, and Melville Island."

In quoting these replies our first desire is to show that the original plan of the voyage, which was to settle the much vexed question of a passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific, was definite and understood by the majority, with one exception. Sir Edward Parry looks to the

south-west, to the American continent, he does not even mention Wellington Channel. Sir John Richardson expressly tells us Franklin's plans, from about Cape Walker, west and south, "to the channel . . . on the north coast of the continent, and so on to Behring's Strait; . . . all that follows is merely secondary to this. Surely this is clear enough for the advocates of the Wellington Channel route; but did Franklin fail of success in getting west and south? South we now know he could not get, but it was not known then; still he might have obtained large westing. Sir John Richardson, in proposing a plan for search, like Sir Edward Parry, looks only to the American continent, but Lancaster Strait and Wellington Sound he would leave to the whalers, these being only subsidiary to the primary object. Sir James Ross clearly shows us, that he looks to the American continent, by recommending "the route Sir John Franklin was directed to pursue, and by referring to the Hudson's Bay Company for provisions" to facilitate Sir John Franklin and his people's homeward journey "through their territories, should any calamity have befallen their ships in any part of the Polar Sea westward of the extreme point of Melville Island." He thus shows that he thought it probable Franklin had made large westing—rather premature. One thing is pleasing, there is no reference to the north *et* Wellington Channel.

Colonel (now Major-General) Sabine's* views, unlike his colleagues', appear to us to take too extended a range. Let us repeat: both extremities of the passage—Behring's Strait and Baffin's Bay—Behring's Strait itself, and both sides of that strait, as Franklin may have succeeded in getting into the sea of Wrangell; the American coast between Melville Island and Behring's Strait, all the probable openings into the Polar Sea, and the range of coast "extending from Melville Island in the west to the great Sound at the head of Baffin's Bay in the east," and the east and west sides of Wellington Channel. This is rather a wide range, and yet it is to be done in "one season." Now we have great respect for this talented officer, but we cannot help thinking he has "o'erleaped himself." The examination of all these passages, channels, sounds, and coasts "in one season," is impracticable; and would be so even though the whole British navy were employed in this service; and yet to record it! Amidst all this wide range, the fifth section of Franklin's Instructions, directing him to a given point and in a given direction, is altogether unnoticed.

* The translator of Wrangell's "Polar Sea," 1820-3.

Franklin's intentions are mentioned, and yet his Instructions are forgotten. How is this to be accounted for? Why leave that which we know to go in quest of that which we know not of? For ourselves, we think the field for hopeful search is wide enough without extending it beyond the bounds of probability. As to searching the "great Sound at the head of Baffin's Bay," we should as soon have thought of examining the shores of Spitzbergen; but the tendencies here shown are all with the mysterious north. Major-General Sabine was with Parry on his unprecedented and successful voyage in 1819-20; the Parry Islands are part of himself; and the Wellington Channel, that "fair straight," he looks on with an old fondness; thoughts on a Polar Sea are his solace, especially if he can get at it and extract, for useful purposes, its hidden meteorology and its mystic magnetism; he would have no element of our earth sacred, secret, or idle;—so far we rejoice in and with him, but let us not distract that which is clear, by multiplying imaginary probabilities, so that at last, forgetting the only light we have to guide us, we wander lost in the bewildering mazes of uncertainty. In the case before us, "To Cape Walker and the south-west!" should have been our watchword; there lies our only true path to Franklin.

Before leaving the "*Extracts*" we would remark, their Lordships at the Admiralty cannot have selected them for the facts they contain, or the clearness of the views they express; they seem rather to have been chosen and used as an instrument for the attainment of other objects than for any merit they possess: their letter to Sir Edward Parry clearly shows this; for while they desire information as to what were Sir John Franklin's expectations regarding depôts, they state their convictions as to the present safety of the expedition, and they call for opinions as to the best measures to be taken with the view of affording relief if necessary. The fact seems to have been with their Lordships as with others, they could not comprehend the drift of Sir John Ross's letters, excepting his desire to be employed. They wished to escape the invidious alternative of rejecting them altogether, which they ought to have done; they therefore refer them to Sir Edward Parry and his distinguished Arctic contemporaries, to find a meaning in them if they could—in short, mildly to shelve them. Still we think, if extracts were given at all, those given should have comprehended the entire views (if possible) of Sir John Ross.*

* See "*Rear-Admiral Sir John Franklin: a Narrative*," by Sir John Ross.—
"Magna est veritas, et prævalebit."

We will now give a non-official opinion of these extracts; an opinion which we have little doubt was entertained quite as much at the Admiralty, and by those to whom the extracts were referred, as by ourselves, but from professional delicacy not expressed.

Extract 1—Hints at a probable position for Franklin's ships, but it is not given. Then comes an alleged promise made to Franklin, "that if no accounts were received from him up to the middle of January, 1847, he (Sir John Ross) would volunteer . . . to ascertain his fate, and to visit the several depôts we had fixed before his departure." To go in what direction?—to depôts where fixed? If this promise was made, if depôts were fixed upon, how is it no one knew anything about it? The Admiralty ought to have been made aware of it: we regret, but we must reject this tale. Sir John Ross then gives an "opinion . . . founded on" his "experience in the Arctic regions," and his "knowledge of the intentions of Sir John Franklin." He tells us first a fact we knew; that the expedition "cannot have passed Behring's Strait, . . . or we should have heard of it;" and, secondly, without assigning any reason, adds, "the probability is that his ships have been carried by drift ice into a position from which they cannot be extricated." What profound nonsense!

Extract 2—Asserts that Franklin's "known intentions" were "to put his ships into the drift ice at the western end of Melville Island." This, if not positively false, leads to another conclusion; that Franklin never intended to follow his Instructions, for they (Section 6) expressly caution him against that quarter. This is equally improbable. But according to Sir John Ross, there he is, "and if not totally lost, must have been carried by the ice that is known to drift to the southward, . . . on land seen at a great distance in that direction; the ships, consequently, . . . must be abandoned." How rational is this cheering conclusion! The ships are assumed to be in a position where they are cautioned *not* to go; they are carried down upon a land no one had ever seen since the time of Parry, 1819-20, "by the wind, for there was no current."* Such are the strange visions Sir John Ross sees, and which he would have the Admiralty to believe are realities! He then talks of securing his vessel "in a harbour on the south (-west?)† side of Barrow's Strait, . . . and in such a position as would enable them (Franklin and his people) to

* See his Letter, "Journal, Royal Geographical Society," vol. vi., part i., p. 49.

† See "Sir John Franklin: a Narrative," by Sir John Ross, p. 17.

reach her " when the sea " was open " for " boats which " he " would leave at the depôt in Winter Harbour. . . . In the meantime " he " would survey the west coast of Boothia, and in all probability decide the question of a North-West Passage : "—so then it seems Sir John Ross purposes going to Melville Island, return to some harbour on the south side of Barrow's Strait, survey the unknown west coast of Boothia, and find the North-West Passage—in how long a time ? From these extracts it will be seen, even at the very outset, what a mist of words clouds the ideas of Sir John Ross, in advising the future search for the Franklin Expedition.

CHAPTER IV.

REWARDS FOR DISCOVERY OF RECORDS OR TRACES OF FRANKLIN'S EXPEDITION—ADMIRAL BEECHEY'S PLAN—DR. M'CORMICK'S—NOTES, FITZJAMES—MEMORANDUM OF SIR JOHN BARROW—SIR J. C. ROSS' PLAN OF RELIEF BY LANCASTER SOUND—J. C. ROSS' PLAN BY BEURLING'S STRAIT—NOTES, FITZJAMES.

VARIOUS letters from the Admiralty, dated 6th to the 13th of March, 1847,* to the Commissioners of Customs, offered rewards to the masters and crews of whalers visiting Lancaster Sound, and those "who may succeed in obtaining any information or record of the progress of the *Erebus* and *Terror* through Lancaster Sound, and to the westward." One of these letters, dated Admiralty, March 10, 1847, is worthy quotation, as it embodies the views contained in Col. Sabine's letter (see page 59) for extending the line of search for "memorials of the ships' progress" from "Melville Island in the west to the great Sound at the head of Baffin's Bay in the east:"—"My Lords are desirous that this supposition as to Sir John Franklin's probable proceedings should be made known to the masters of the several whalers." The notice of this supposition at this preliminary stage of the search we observe with regret, as the whole is founded on Franklin's privately communicated general impressions and conversations. Again, it assumes him to have been "foiled" in the west. There is, therefore, a premature importance attached to these "intentions," which, in effect, clouds and draws attention from the plain tenor of his Instructions. We fear in the end it may work ill.

Capt. (the late Admiral) Beechey now (April 28, 1847)† submitted a plan of relief, the leading features of which may be thus given:—"There does not at present appear to be any reasonable apprehension for the safety of the expedition. At the same time it would be prudent to despatch a vessel to Barrow's Strait this season. . . . If one vessel (a whaler) cannot be engaged to execute this, . . . there seems to be nothing left but to equip an expedition, and start it off as soon as it can be got ready. . . . This expedition should make its way to Barrow's Strait, and closely navigating the

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition," pp. 64-5.

† *Ibid.*, p. 30.

southern shore, gain Cape Walker as speedily as possible, as I think this is a place where information of an important nature is likely to be found; from this vicinity one vessel may proceed to examine the various points and headlands in Regent's Inlet, and also those to the northward, while the other watches the passage, that the expedition may not pass unseen, should it be on its return. The season ended, the ships may repair to Port Bowen, or any other port in the vicinity of Leopold Island, to winter. . . . In the spring of 1848 a party should . . . explore the coast down to Hecla and Fury Strait, . . . to communicate with the party despatched by the Hudson's Bay Company in that direction.* . . . It would render the plan complete if a boat could be despatched down Back's River to range the coast eastward of its mouth to meet the above-mentioned party; and thus . . . complete the geography of that part of the American coast," and "it would complete the line of information as to the measures of relief . . . set on foot. . . . This part of the plan has suggested itself to me from a conversation I had with Sir John Franklin as to his first effort being made to the westward and south-westward of Cape Walker. It is possible, that after passing that cape he may have been successful in getting down upon Victoria Land, and have passed his first winter (1845) thereabout, and that he may have spent his second winter at a still more advanced station, and even endured a third, without either a prospect of success, or of an extrication of his vessels. . . . If in this condition . . . Sir John Franklin should resolve upon taking to his boats, he would prefer attempting a boat navigation through Sir James Ross' Strait, and up Regent Inlet, to a long land journey across the continent to the Hudson's Bay settlements, to which the greater part of his crew would be wholly unequal. . . . The season of 1848 would be passed in watching the strait on both sides. . . . The season of 1849 will be one of painful anxiety, but it will be imperative for the vessels to come away at such a period . . . as will render their return to England certain." Capt. Beechey then refers to the west side of the American continent. "There does not appear to be any necessity whatever for sending a vessel to Behring's Strait until 1848; for, in the event of Sir John Franklin reaching the Pacific before that period it will assuredly not be in his boats, but with his ships in an efficient condition. But in 1848, . . . Icy Cape" should be visited, and "Point Barrow," &c., "to as distant a point beyond" as "practicable." We omit further details on the west side, observing only

* Dr. Rae's expedition to explore the bottom of Prince Regent's Inlet, 1846-7.

it is in the general direction of Franklin's Instructions, and that every observation, considering the time in which this plan was written and submitted (1847), is marked by the usual soundness of that talented and judicious officer; but we must confess we do not see clearly his object in visiting Fury and Hecla Strait, or the motive for a boat party down Back's River; Sir John Franklin was directed to the south-west from Cape Walker, and we had no information to prove he was unable to fulfil his Instructions; we think *Cape Walker* at this time the great object to reach.

This plan of the late Admiral Beechey's was submitted to Sir John Richardson, and he, in a reply dated the 5th of May, 1847,* after various observations connected with fitting out the expedition to Barrow's Strait, says:—"With respect to a party to be sent down Back's River to the bottom of Regent's Inlet, . . . it could scarcely be organized to start this summer;" and gives, as his reason "the scarcity of provisions in the Hudson's Bay country," and "moreover, there is no Company's post on the line of Back's River nearer than the junction of Slave River with Great Slave Lake; and I do not think, under any circumstances, Sir John Franklin would attempt that route. . . . In the summer of 1849, if the resources of my party . . . remain unimpaired, . . . much of what Captain Beechey suggests in regard to exploring Victoria Land may be done by it, and indeed forms part of the original scheme. . . . Were Sir John Franklin thrown upon the north coast of the continent with his boats and all his crew, I do not think he would attempt the ascent of any river but the Mackenzie." He concludes:—"A vessel meeting the *Erebus* and *Terror* in Behring's Strait this season might render great service." It is well to notice these observations of Sir John Richardson's; they are the result of sound thought, and clearly show that he does not look for the Franklin Expedition in the direction of Back's River, but to the Mackenzie, *i. e.*, to the *south-west of Cape Walker*.

Dr. McCormick, R.N., † 20th of May, 1847, submitted the outline of a plan of search for Sir John Franklin by the way of the Coppermine; ‡ "If Sir John Franklin, guided by his instructions, has passed through Barrow's Strait, and shaped a south-westerly course

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition," pp. 32-3.

† This active, meritorious officer served with Sir Edward Parry in his attempt to reach the North Pole in 1827; was in the Antarctic Expedition, under the command of Sir James Ross, from 1839 to 1843; commanded a boat expedition up Wellington Channel, 1852, &c. He has been 82 years in the Royal Navy.

‡ Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 125.

from the meridian of Cape Walker, with the intention of gaining the northern coast of America, and so passing through Dolphin and Union Straits, along the shore of that continent, to Behring's Straits, his great risk of detention in the ice throughout this course would be found between the parallels of 74° and 69° N., and the meridians of 100° and 110° W." "Should the *Erebus* and *Terror* have been beset in the heavy ice, or wrecked amongst it and the broken land which in all probability exists there, whilst contending with the prevalent westerly winds in this quarter, the Coppermine River would decidedly offer the most direct route and nearest approach to that portion of the Polar Sea. . . . After crossing Coronation Gulf and Dease's Strait to" Victoria Land, "from this point a careful search should be commenced in the direction of Banks' Land, the intervening space between it and Victoria Land occupying about 5 degrees, or little more than 300 miles."

The above plan we insert with pleasure, inasmuch as it shows that Franklin's Instructions were understood, and the direction that expedition would take. The north is not mentioned, and with reason; Franklin was sent to the south-west, and in that direction all reasonable hope rested.

The following is an extract of a private letter, communicated by John Barrow, Esq.,* dated Admiralty, 8th June, 1847. "Extract of private letter from Captain Fitzjames, dated January, 1845:—"It does not appear clear to me what led Parry down Prince Regent's Inlet, after having got as far as Melville Island before." "The North-West Passage is certainly to be gone through by Barrow's Strait, but whether south or north of the Parry Group remains to be proved. I am for going north, edging north-west, till in longitude 140° , if possible." Mr. Barrow appends to this extract this memorandum:—"Captain Fitzjames was much inclined upon trying for the 'Passage' to the northward of the Parry Islands, and he would no doubt endeavour to persuade Sir John Franklin to pursue the course mentioned, *if they failed to the southward*. This should be borne in mind in sending any searching expedition next year through Baffin's Bay and Lancaster Sound." This extract and memorandum are interesting; they show that, however talked about, no attempt would be made by the north unless all had failed to the south-west.

We shall now give extracts from a memorandum (July, 1847)†

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1843," p. 71.

† *Ibid.*, p. 72.

from Sir John Barrow, Bart., founder of the plan for the solution of the Great Question:—"The anxiety that prevails regarding Sir John Franklin and the brave fellows who compose the crews of the two ships is very natural, but somewhat premature; it arises chiefly from nothing having been received from them since fixed in the ice in Baffin's Bay in 1845, . . . opposite to the opening into Lancaster Sound. Hitherto no difficulty has been found to the entrance into that Sound. If disappointed, rather than return to the southward to winter . . . at or about Disco, . . . I should think that they would endeavour to enter Smith's Sound, so highly spoken of by Baffin. . . . From Lancaster Sound, Franklin's Instructions directed him to proceed through Barrow's Strait, as far as the islands on its southern side extended, which is short of Melville Island, which was to be avoided, not only on account of its dangerous coast, but also as being out of the direction of the course to the intended object. Having, therefore, reached the last known land on the southern side of Barrow's Strait, they were to shape a course direct to Behring's Strait, without any deviation, except what obstruction might be met with from ice or from islands, . . . of which no knowledge had at that time been procured; but if such existed, it would be left to their judgment, on the spot, how to get rid of such obstructions, by taking a northerly or a southerly course. One thing is certain; they did not get through Behring's Straits last season, and if in the present one, it should" be "February or March before we could hear of it. There is not, therefore, any occasion yet to be anxious about their safety, but if nothing be heard of them in the course of these two months, the Admiralty will, no doubt, take measures for every possible inquiry to be made into their fate. . . . But how or where to direct inquiry is the difficulty:—if they pursued their instructions, the coasts of the Polar Sea and its two entrances are the most obvious points to be examined." "Lord Auckland consulted Sir Edward Parry and myself on the subject: our opinion was, that the first step was that of a vessel to pass the two entrances of the Polar Sea, in order to ascertain from the Esquimaux or Indians if they had seen or heard of any such vessels; and if so, how, when, and where? . . . On the coast of North America I should consider any inquiry unnecessary; the Hudson's Bay Company have their stations so little removed from the sea-coast, and have so much intercourse with the Indians and Esquimaux; and besides, Sir John Franklin must have had such a *painful recollection* of that coast, as to avoid it in the first instance, and if forced on it, to lose no time in quitting it. . . . The northern coast of

the Polar Sea is also inhabited, even Siberia; and I am almost certain, if they happen to be there, the Russian Government would know it, and be anxious to communicate that knowledge to England. . . . The only chance of bringing them upon this coast is the possibility of some obstruction having tempted them to explore an immense inlet on the northern shore of Barrow's Strait (short of Melville Island), called Wellington Channel, which Parry felt an inclination to explore; and more than one of the present party betrayed to me a similar inclination, which I discouraged, no one venturing to conjecture even to what extent it might go, or into what difficulties it might lead. . . . Under all these circumstances, it would be an act of folly to pronounce any opinion of the state, condition, or position of those two ships. They are well suited for their purpose; and the only doubt I have is that of their being hampered by the screws among the ice."

Sir John Barrow in this memorandum seems desirous to relieve anxiety by briefly unfolding the whole plan on which the expedition was directed to proceed, viz., to the south-west. He recommends inquiry from the east by Barrow's Strait to *follow* the expedition, and by the west—Behring's Strait—to *meet* it. For intelligence from the American coast he looks to the Hudson's Bay Company, through their intercourse with the natives. He refers to Siberia and the Wellington Channel, but *only* in case of obstruction to the west, and the ships, having taken advantage of it, had fallen on Siberia. It seems, he discouraged any inclination in Franklin's officers to explore it, as no one could say to what extent it might go up—to what difficulties lead. This memorandum *clearly points to the south-west and not to the north*; and it is worthy of particular notice, that though intelligence of the expedition is wanting, still he fixes his confidence on that quarter alone. Now here is the opinion of the distinguished projector of the voyage, an opinion surely entitled to respect, and he emphatically discourages all attempts by the Wellington Channel. We are glad to be enabled to record this.

Sir James Ross, 8th November, 1847,* in a letter to the Admiralty, volunteered his services to command any expedition sent to the relief of Sir John Franklin. Their Lordships, in reply, accept them, and state, "It is the intention of the Board to appoint you to the command of an expedition, to be shortly fitted for Baffin's Bay."

The whalers this year, 1847,† appear to have reached the western

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 74.

† *Ibid.*, p. 52.

water, but not farther west in Lancaster Sound than Navy Board Inlet. The preceding winter is represented as having been mild.

December 2, 1847.—Sir James Ross submitted to the Admiralty the “outline of a plan for affording relief to the Franklin Expedition by the way of Lancaster Sound.”* From this we extract:—“As vessels destined to follow the track of the expedition must necessarily encounter the same difficulties, . . . it is desirable that two ships be purchased for this service;”—the class of ship, equipment, boats, &c., are then noticed. . . . They should sail at the end of April next (1848), and proceed to Lancaster Sound, . . . searching both shores of that extensive inlet and of Barrow’s Strait, and then progress to the westward. . . . Wellington Channel should next be examined, and the coast between Cape Clarence and Cape Walker explored. . . . As this coast has generally been found encumbered with ice, it is not desirable that both ships should proceed so far along it as to hazard their getting shut up for the winter; but finding a convenient harbour near Garnier Bay or Cape Rennell, it would be a good position in which to secure one of the ships for the winter. . . . From this position the coast line might be explored as far as it extends to the westward, . . . as well as the western coast of Boothia, a considerable distance to the southward; . . . and, at a more advanced period of the season, the whole distance to Cape Nicholai might be completed. . . . A second party might be sent to the south-west; . . . and a third party to the north-west, or in any other direction deemed advisable at the time. . . . The easternmost vessel safely secured, the other ship should proceed alone to the westward, and endeavour to reach Winter Harbour in Melville Island, or some convenient port in Banks’ Land. . . . From this point, also, parties should be despatched early in the spring. . . . The first should be directed to trace the western coast of Banks’ Land, and proceeding to Cape Bathurst or other conspicuous point, . . . previously agreed on with Sir John Richardson, reach the Hudson’s Bay Company’s settlements or Peel River in time to return with their people to their principal establishment, and thence to England. . . . The second party should explore the eastern shore of Banks’ Land, and, making for Cape Krusenstern, communicate with Sir John Richardson’s party” about “the Coppermine River, and either assist him in completing the examination of Wollaston and Victoria Lands, or return to England. . . . These two parties would pass over that space in which most probably the ships had become involved (if at all), and would therefore

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, “Arctic Expedition, 1846,” p. 29.

have the best chance of communicating with Sir John Franklin." This arrangement was subsequently agreed to by Sir John Richardson.

In reading this "plan," it will be noticed, the "western coast of Boothia, at a considerable distance," and even "Cape Nicholai," are specified for a first party; and yet the services of the second party are thus lightly disposed of—it "*might be sent to the south-west,*" and "a third to the north-west (why?) or any other direction." We can easily understand that every plan should embrace all the points of probability; but it is past our comprehension why the primary points of Sir John Franklin's Instructions are thus lightly passed over, while to the secondary are given a speciality altogether above their value. It is true our ideas are subsequently called back to the first and proper points for search,—the eastern shore of Banks' Land, part of that space on which the original plan was founded and pointed out to Sir John Franklin "as affording the best prospect of accomplishing the passage to the Pacific," yet it is passing strange that greater importance is not given to the whole space offering such "best prospect;" *i. e., from Cape Walker west and south to Banks' Land:* surely this demanded first attention. If Franklin had passed south to the eastward of Cape Walker, we should have found some notice of such fact at the entrances of the channel, out of Barrow's Strait, which he adopted (suppose between the Capes Bunny and Walker); and having examined these, and found no traces of the expedition, there existed no necessity for the prolonged southerly search to Cape Nicholai. Cape Walker should have been gained "as speedily as possible."* One ship is to proceed to Winter Harbour, Melville Island, or a port in Banks' Land (upon which the southerly drift sets the ice (?))† and from thence a party is "to trace the western coast of Banks' Land." Why? We can understand a search to the *south-west*, between Victoria and Wollaston Lands, and the latter and Banks' Land; but here we are at a loss. How did he get there?—by the north? certainly not by the south-west. At any rate, Franklin is thus assumed to have *gained large westing*. To our rude notions it had been better, while all the headlands were examined in the progress west, to have directed special attention to Cape Walker and the south-west, and thus have been assured as we went along. But in this plan extremes are proposed. The Franklin Expedition has either made no westing, or large westing. Why not have followed the directions laid down for his guidance?

* See the late Admiral Beechey's plan, *ante*.

† See the late Sir John Ross's Letter, *ante*, February 9, 1847.

Sir James C. Ross about this time submitted (without date) the "outline of a plan" for affording relief "by the way of Behring's Strait."* After various preliminary remarks regarding equipment, &c., he says, "the vessel should sail in January, 1848." The ships should arrive in Behring's Strait about the 1st of July, 1848, and proceed along the American coast as far as possible; "two boats" should "proceed along the coast in search of the voyagers, and to communicate, if possible, with the party under Sir John Richardson;" and, "with the assistance of the natives," extensive excursions might be made early in the spring by small parties from the *Plover*, in every desirable direction; "and," as soon as the water "formed . . . boat expeditions . . . towards the Mackenzie River again to communicate . . . with Sir John Richardson's party. . . Parties of Esquimaux might be induced to travel throughout the winter, and thus keep up a communication along the American coast junc." It will be seen, in this extensive line of operations, the absorbing thought is, that the Franklin Expedition would emerge to the south-west of Cape Walker. The myth of the north, the Wellington Channel, however spoken of as a point for search, is treated only subordinately to this thought. Would that it had ever continued so; the south and west would then have been entirely explored, and poor Franklin and his hapless companions had probably been restored to us.

We cannot forbear to notice in this place a note from W. A. B. Hamilton, R.N., dated Admiralty, December, 1847, to Mr. John Barrow, enclosing "extracts of letters from Commander Fitzjames to the latter, proposing to come home through Siberia on passing Behring's Strait:"†—

"Dear Barrow,—This is interesting at this time; they may be wintering this winter either at Okhotsk or Yakoutsk. You sent it to me before the expedition sailed. The enclosed extracts are:—'In whatever year the expedition gets through Behring's Strait the month will be August or September, so that there will be time to go at once to Okhotsk and start off for Petersburg; but in case of it being too late in the season to attempt the journey through Siberia, a winter would be profitably employed at either Okhotsk, Yakoutsk, Tomsk, or Tobolsk, in taking magnetic observations, which would form a chain of them round the world. . . Sir John Franklin tells me he had thought of such a journey for some officer; and Col. Sabine says it would be highly desirable and interesting.' In another letter (his

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 33.

† *Ibid.*, p. 77.

last to me), Capt. Fitzjames says, 'I do hope and trust that, if we get through, we shall land at Petropaulowski, and that I may be allowed to come home through Siberia; I shall do all in my power to urge Sir John Franklin to let me go, and I do wish the Russian Government had been asked to send to their governors, &c., that they may expect me, and not oppose my going on: this was done in former expeditions, as I have just read in Beechey's account of the voyage of the *Dorothea* and *Trent*. . . It is not now too late to send to St. Petersburg, and could do no harm: get through I firmly believe we shall.'"

These notes show the cheerful, confident feeling of the gallant Fitzjames; they indicate, too, the daring but hopeful spirit of all on board the *Erebus* and *Terror*. Here we are bound to record the generous conduct of the Russian Government and its minister, Baron Brunnow, in the offers of assistance, should the Franklin or the searching expeditions require it in any part of the Russian territories.

The Admiralty, after much deliberation and careful weighing of the various plans and suggestions, had now resolved to send out three searching expeditions,—one by Barrow's Strait, another down the Mackenzie River, and a third to Behring's Strait.

It will have been seen the plans and suggestions embrace a wide field for search; but as yet, happily, reason rules. The original plan of Sir John Barrow, and the Instructions, founded upon it, given to Sir John Franklin, are as yet the only text consulted upon which the operations of the searching expeditions (whether by sea or land) are to be directed. It is true, alleged intentions on the part of Franklin are brought forward, and the North obtains some notice, but not of sufficient interest to withdraw attention from that unknown space (between 98° and 115° W.) to which the Franklin Expedition was specially directed, as offering the best prospects of "a Passage."

CHAPTER V.

PLOVER—CAPTAIN MOORE SAILS FOR BEHRING'S STRAITS—REPORTED RUMOURS FROM PEEL RIVER—SIR JOHN RICHARDSON'S FINAL PLAN—DR. KING'S LETTER—SIR EDWARD PARRY'S AND SIR J. C. ROSS' REMARKS ON IT.

NOTHING having been heard of the Franklin Expedition up to 1848, now absent nearly three years—the time for which it was provisioned—the Government, as we have said, having matured their plans, now set to work in good earnest to adopt the most complete and effectual means for their relief. The *Plover*, Commander Moore, was ordered to Behring's Strait,* there to be joined by the *Herald*, Capt. Henry Kellett, C.B.† The Instructions may be briefly given thus:—"They" are to proceed along the American coast as far as possible, without "being beset." Having found a harbour for the *Plover*, "two boats are to proceed along the coast in search of the voyagers (Franklin's Expedition), and to communicate, if possible, with the party which it is intended shall descend the Mackenzie River, under the command of Sir John Richardson," and "so soon as symptoms of . . . winter appear to return to the *Plover*. The *Herald* will then return to the southward for provisions, &c., and return northward about July, 1849; re-equipping the *Plover* for passing a second winter on that part of the coast, . . . and for repeating the same operations for the search after and for the relief of Sir John Franklin."

These instructions seem to have been framed to meet every contingency should Franklin have succeeded in getting to the American coast west of the Mackenzie River.

The *Plover* sailed from Sheerness, January 1st, 1848.

The following extract of a letter, dated from Peel River, December 17th, 1847, from Mr. Peers, excited a good deal of attention at the time:‡—"I have reason to believe that some white men were off the coast last summer; as a party of Indians, who came here this fall,

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," pp. 7—16.

† Instructions of a similar tenor were sent to Captain Henry Kellett, C.B., of H.M.S. *Herald*.

‡ See "Nautical Magazine" for 1848.

stated that they were some days in company with the Esquimaux east of the Mackenzie River, in the summer. The latter showed the former knives (like our scalpings) and files, that they said were given to them gratis by some white men whom they saw in two 'large boats,' and who spoke to them in a language they did not understand."

Sir John Richardson, in submitting his final detailed plan of proceedings, London, February 18th, 1848,* says:—"Section 6. If we reach the sea in the first week of August, I hope to be able to make the complete voyage to the Coppermine River, and also to coast a considerable part of the western and southern shores of Wollaston Land." And in Section 11:—"A second summer (1849) I propose . . . to examine the passages between Wollaston and Banks' and Victoria Lands, so as to cross the routes of some of Sir J. C. Ross's detached parties." We have been particular to notice these arrangements, as they go to show that parties were to be despatched from Barrow's Strait from the north-east in search of Franklin to the south-west; rightly, in short, searching for the Franklin Expedition in the direction in which it was sent: folly had not then taken a final stand on the vision of a Wellington Channel route.

We shall now give extracts from a letter of Dr. King's† to the Admiralty, dated February 16, 1848, on the subject of the Arctic Expeditions: †—"The old route of Parry, through Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, as far as the last land on its southern shore, and thence in a direct line to Behring's Strait, is the route ordered to be pursued by Franklin.§ . . . The gallant officer has thus been despatched to push his adventurous way between Melville Island and Banks' Land, which Sir Edward Parry attempted for two years unsuccessfully. He reported:—"The navigation of this part of the Polar

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 39.

† This gentleman was with Sir George Back down the Great Fish River in 1833-4-5; Sir George thus speaks of him:—"I cannot close this preliminary statement without conveying the public expression of my thanks to Mr. Richard King for his uniform attention to the health of the party, and the readiness with which he assisted me in all cases where his services were required," &c., &c.—("Arctic Land Expedition," by Captain Back.) Notwithstanding this testimonial, Dr. King's services appear to have been overlooked. Dr. King has made many offers of service to the Government, and we should have noticed them before but they embody the same views as the one above, which, being official, we select. (See his "Narrative of a Journey to the Arctic Ocean," published 1836, and "The Franklin Expedition, from First to Last," 1855.)

‡ See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 41.

§ See Barrow's "Arctic Voyages from 1818," p. 11.

Sea is only to be performed by watching the occasional opening between the ice and the shore, and therefore a continuity of land is essential for this purpose; such a continuity of land was here about to fail us.* Assuming, therefore, Sir John Franklin has been arrested between Melville Island and Banks' Land, where Sir Edward Parry was arrested by difficulties which he considered insurmountable, and he has followed the advice of that gallant officer, and made for the continuity of America; he will have turned the prow of his vessels south and west, according as Banks' Land trends for Victoria or Wollaston Lands. It is here, therefore, that we may expect to find the expedition wrecked, when they will make in their boats for the western land of North Somerset, if that land should not be too far distant. . . . In order to save the party from the ordeal of a fourth winter, when starvation must be their lot, I propose to undertake the boldest journey that has ever been attempted in the northern regions of America, one which would be justifiable only from the circumstances. I propose to attempt to reach the western land of North Somerset, or the eastern portion of Victoria Land, as may be deemed advisable, by the close of the approaching summer; to accomplish, in fact, in one summer that which has not been done under two. I rest my hope of success in the performance of this Herculean task upon the fact that I possess an intimate knowledge of the country and the people; . . . the health to stand the rigour of the climate, and the strength to undergo the fatigue of mind and body to which I must be subjected. It is because I have these requisites, which I conscientiously believe are not to be found in another, that I hope to effect my purpose. A glance at the map of North America . . . will make it apparent that to render assistance to a party situated on that coast, there are two ways by sea and one by land. Of the two seaways, the route by the Pacific is altogether out of the question; it is an idea of bygone days; while that by the Atlantic is so doubtful of success that it is merely necessary to put this assistance aside as far from certain, to mention that Sir John Ross found Barrow's Strait closed in the summer of 1832. To a land journey, then, alone, we can look for success. . . . To the western land of North Somerset, where Sir John Franklin is likely to be found, the Great Fish River is the direct and only route; and, although the approach to it is through a country too poor and too difficult of access to admit of the transport of provision, it may be made the medium of communication

* See Parry, "Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage, 1819-20," p. 242.

between the lost expedition and the civilized world, and guides be thus placed at their disposal to convey them to the hunting-grounds of the Indians. . . . The fact that all lands which have a *western* aspect are generally ice free, which I dwelt largely upon when Sir John Franklin sailed, must have had weight with that gallant officer; he will, therefore, on finding himself in a serious difficulty, while pushing along the eastern side of Victoria Land, at once fall upon the western land of North Somerset as a refuge ground if he have the opportunity. The effort by Behring's Strait and Banks' Land is praiseworthy in attempt but forlorn in hope. In the former effort it is assumed that Sir John Franklin has made the passage, and that his arrest is between the Mackenzie River and icy Cape; in the latter, that Sir James Ross will reach Banks' Land, and trace its continuity to Victoria and Wollaston Land, and thus make the passage (?) . . . First, we have no reason to believe that Sir John Franklin, or Sir James Ross, will be more fortunate than their predecessors. Second, we are unable to assume that Sir James Ross will reach Banks' Land: Sir Edward Parry was unable to reach it, and only viewed it from a distance; much less are we able to assume that the gallant officer will find a high road to Victoria Land, which is altogether a *terra incognita*."

"The main point, then, for consideration, is the effort of Sir James Ross along the western land of North Somerset, from his station in Barrow's Strait,* for it is that alone can supersede the plan which I have proposed. It is not in Sir John Richardson's power . . . to search the western land of North Somerset. Mr. Thomas Simpson . . . has set that question at rest. . . . A further exploration, remarks Mr. Thomas Simpson, 'from the most eastern limit of his journey, would necessarily demand the whole time and energies of another expedition, having some point of retreat much nearer to the scene of operations than Great Bear Lake;'[†] and Great Bear Lake is to be the retreat of Sir John Richardson. The Doctor then asks, "What retreat could Mr. Simpson have meant but Great Slave Lake, the retreat of the land party in search of Sir John Ross? and what other road to the unexplored ground, the western land of North Somerset, could that traveller have meant than Great Fish River; that stream which I have pointed out as the ice-free and high road to the land where the lost expedition is likely to be found?" The Doctor continues, "if Mr. Simpson, in the youth of his life, . . . could not

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition," p. 29.

† See Simpson's "Discoveries on the North Coast of America," p. 377.

make a greater distance from Great Bear Lake than Castor and Pollux River, . . . can more be expected of Sir John Richardson, at his period of life? It is physically impossible that Sir John Richardson can occupy the field which I am proposing for myself: this is evidently a question of importance. . . . Does the attempt of Sir James Clarke Ross to search the western land of North Somerset in his boats from his station in Barrow's Strait render that proposal unnecessary?" The Doctor sums up:—"Here the facts will speak for themselves:—1st, Barrow's Strait was icebound in 1832, it may be in 1848; 2nd, Sir James Clarke Ross is using the same means to relieve Sir John Franklin which has led the gallant officer into his difficulty; the relief party may, therefore, become themselves a party in distress; 3rd, The land that is made on the south shore of Barrow's Strait will be of doubtful character, the natural consequence of discovery in ships; the searching parties, at the end of the summer, may find they have been coasting an island many miles distant from the western land of North Somerset, or navigating a deep bay" or "sound. The plan which I have proposed, is to reach the Polar Sea across the continent of America, and thus to proceed from land known to be continent, where every footstep is sure."

In extracting these passages, we have, with the desire to do justice to Dr. King, been sorely puzzled; the assertions, the assumptions, and the inferences, are so bold, so questionable. Their Lordships seem to have laboured under the influence of a similar feeling, and therefore referred his letter to Sir Edward Parry and Sir James Ross for their opinions.

Sir Edward Parry replies from Royal Hospital, Haslar, February 23, 1848:—"My former opinion, quoted by Dr. King, as to the difficulty of ships penetrating to the westward beyond Cape Dundas, remains unaltered; . . . and I should expect that Sir John Franklin, being aware of this difficulty, would use his utmost efforts to get to the southward and westward before he approached that point; that is, between the 100th and 110th degree of longitude. The more I have considered the *subject*, . . . the more difficult I find it to conjecture where the expedition may have been stopped, . . . but as no information has reached up to this time, I conceive that there is some considerable probability of their being situated somewhere between the longitudes I have just named. How far they have penetrated to the southward, . . . must be a matter of speculation, depending

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition," p. 43.

on the state of the ice and the existence of land in a space hitherto a blank on our maps. . . . Be this as it may, I consider it not improbable, as suggested by Dr. King, that an attempt 'will be made by them to fall back on the western coast of North Somerset, wherever that may be found, as being the nearest point affording a hope of communication.' . . . Agreeing thus far with Dr. King, I am compelled to differ with him entirely as to the readiest mode of reaching that coast, because I feel satisfied that . . . the expedition now equipping under Sir James Ross . . . will render it a matter of no very difficult enterprise to examine the coast in question, . . . whereas an attempt to reach that coast by an expedition from the continent of America must be extremely hazardous and uncertain. . . . And as I understand it to be their Lordships' intention to direct Sir James Ross to station one of the ships about Capo Walker while the other proceeds on the search, and likewise to equip his boats specially for . . . examining the various coasts and inlets, I am decidedly of opinion that as regards the western coast of North Somerset, this plan will be much more likely to answer than any overland expedition. . . . In regard to Dr. King's suggestion respecting Victoria and Wollaston Lands, . . . it does seem . . . not improbable that parties may attempt the continent in that direction; but not being well acquainted with the facilities for reaching the coast of America opposite those lands, I am not competent to judge of its practicability."

Sir James Ross replies by a series of remarks on Dr. King's letter: * —"First, Dr. King begins by assuming that Sir John Franklin has attempted to push the ships through to the westward, between Melville Island and Banks' Land (although directly contrary to his Instructions); that having been arrested by insurmountable difficulties, . . . he would . . . make for the west coast of North Somerset. If the expedition failed to penetrate to the westward between Banks' Land and Melville Island, it is very probable it would have next attempted . . . a more southerly course, and . . . after making . . . (say 100 miles) to the south-west . . . and then finally stopped or wrecked, the calamity will have occurred in about lat. $72\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N. and long. 115° W. This point is only 280 miles from the Coppermine River, and 420 miles from the Mackenzie; either of which, therefore, would be easily attainable, and . . . abundance of provisions. . . . At the point above mentioned, the distance from the

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 44.

west coast of North Somerset is probably 360 miles, and the mouth of the Great Fish River full 500; at neither of these places could they hope to obtain a single day's provisions for so large a party; and Sir John Franklin's intimate knowledge of the impossibility of ascending that river, or obtaining . . . food, . . . would concur in deterring him from attempting to gain either of those points. . . . I think it most probable that . . . he would . . . retrace his steps, and passing through the channel by which he had advanced, . . . seek the whale-ships which annually visit the west coast of Baffin's Bay.

"Secondly, It is far more probable . . . that Sir John Franklin, in obedience to his Instructions, would endeavour to push his ships to the south and west, as soon as they had passed Cape Walker; and the consequence of such a measure, owing to the known prevalence of westerly wind and the drift of the main body of the ice, would be (in my opinion) their inevitable embarrassment; and if he persevered in that direction, which he probably would do, I have no hesitation in stating my conviction that he would never be able to extricate his ships, and would ultimately be obliged to abandon them. It is therefore in lat. 73° N., and long. 105° W., that we may expect to find them involved in the ice, or shut up in some harbour. . . . This is almost the only point in which it is likely they would be detained, or from which it would not be possible to convey information . . . to the Hudson's Bay Company's settlements. . . . If, then, . . . compelled to abandon their vessels at or near this point, they would endeavour . . . to reach Lancaster Sound; but I cannot conceive any position . . . from which they would make for the Great Fish River, or at which any party descending that river would be likely to overtake them; and even if it did, of what advantage could it be to them?

"Thirdly, If Dr. King and his party in their single canoe did fall in with Sir John Franklin, . . . on the west coast of North Somerset, how does he propose to assist them? He would have barely provisions for his own party, and would more probably be in a condition to require rather than afford relief.

"Sixthly, Dr. King states, 'that Barrow's Strait was icebound in 1832; I need only observe, that Barrow's Strait was not icebound in 1832, nor during any of the other seven seasons I have passed through that strait and Lancaster Sound, . . . nor have I ever heard of their having been found so . . . during the last thirty years.'

No one acquainted with the subject can avoid noticing the common

sense view of the question these replies take; they involve the whole bearing of the original plan, and the Instructions framed upon it.

Sir Edward Parry, after reverting to his opinions of 1820, founded on the facts then before him, and that they had remained unaltered, remarks:—"Franklin, being aware of the difficulties besetting him (Sir Edward) between Melville Island and Banks' Land, would avoid them, and would endeavour to effect the passage between 100° and 110° W., in the open space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land." The absence of information only seems to confirm him in this view; but how far south, as he wisely observes, is "a matter of speculation," depending wholly on obstacles he may meet with from ice, or "the existence of land in the space hitherto a blank upon our maps."

We need not say, this perfectly accords with Franklin's Instructions; but, regarding the western coast of North Somerset, this coast not having been visited, and consequently not "laid down," being without definite limits west, we cannot see how it can be calculated as a point "to fall back on."

We heartily coincide with Sir Edward Parry as to the hazard and uncertainty of the attempt to relieve Franklin by the Great Fish River.

Sir James Ross:—we pass over his arguments to controvert the assumption of Dr. King, that Franklin was ordered to push his ships between Melville Island and Banks' Land. The simple fact of Sir John Barrow not having said so, and the rejection of the assertion by reference to the Instructions, was and is quite enough, without additional argument and farther conjecture on the matter. The second section fully illustrates the meaning of Franklin's Instructions, directing him to Cape Walker and the south-west, and the position indicated by lat. 73° N., long. 105° W., shows careful investigation. His conviction as to the fate of the expedition bears the spirit of prophecy. The advantages offered for escape by Lancaster Sound instead of the Hudson's Bay Company's settlements—the improbability of the expedition making for the Great Fish River, and the almost utter impracticability of sending aid to Franklin by that river,—all these we concur in, we have always thought them the only reasonable conclusions which could be arrived at under the circumstances, having no information to guide us.

The Instructions alone can tell us where we sent him, and they alone can indicate the course we should pursue in following with the hope of recovering him. How much it is to be regretted that the sense of these replies was not adopted in framing Instructions for the future searching expeditions!

But we turn now to Dr. King's letter. We do not like its irregular style; we had rather it had been less presumptive, less egotistical, more consecutive and clear; but it is another instance how judgments may be warped and perverted by the adoption of one idea to the exclusion of all others; we shall have occasion to notice equal errors in others, arising from the same narrowness of view. What, indeed, has called forth these pages but the fatal consequences that have arisen from prejudice, from hasty assumption and imaginative wandering in favour of particular routes, places, and means?

The Doctor surely cannot have read the Instructions, or he would have found at Sections 5 and 6 not only directions where to go from Cape Walker to the south-west, but also cautions where not to go, so as to prevent "loss of time." The quotation from Barrow's "Arctic Voyages," p. 11, is correct, but Dr. King's reading of the passage is not so; by "as far as to the last land on its southern shore," Sir John Barrow meant "Cape Walker, the last land on the south of Barrow's Strait." * The arguments, therefore, on his reading of the passage fall to the ground. We cannot understand this eternal reference (not only of Dr. King's, but others) to the west coast of North Somerset. In the then state of our knowledge it was not known how far west it extended (see the Admiralty Charts), it may have had Cape Walker for its western limit, or even Banks' Land. To assume, then, that the boats of the expedition (prematurely pronounced wrecked), should endeavour to make for a land unknown, through a sea unknown, seems to us to border closely on the wild visions of unbridled thought, from which reasonable conjecture shrinks. Relief by that "execrable river," the Great Fish River, † advocated by Dr. King, we ever did and do consider altogether impracticable for the purpose, not only as being "through a country too poor and too difficult of access," but also as not being "the ice-free and high road to the land" or sea where the expedition was likely to be found. It was, in short, the last place we should have looked for any information or traces of the Franklin Expedition,—speaking at this period, and of what was then known of the position and trendings of the

* See a copy of the original "Proposal for an Attempt to Complete the Discovery of a North-West Passage," submitted to the Royal Society, December, 1844; in a pamphlet, "Arctic Expeditions: a Lecture," by Mr. C. R. Weld, 1850, p. 18; also, Memorandum from Sir John Barrow, July, 1847, Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expeditions," p. 72.

† See Back's "Narrative of the Arctic Land Expedition to the Mouth of the Great Fish River, 1833-5;" also, "King's Journey to the Arctic Ocean, 1833-5."

land about here, as then shown on our charts. It is true, there was the supposed channel or passage between Back's Great Fish River and the bottom of Regent's Inlet; but that was questionable. We are aware that the Esquimaux report, and the sad relics brought home by Rae (1854), are now commonly quoted as proof of the accuracy of Dr. King's views; but, notwithstanding these, and the position in which they were found, we cannot consider them as any proof that, because they were found there, Dr. King is right in his conjectures. We should have looked for parties seeking relief retracing their way to the eastward in Barrow's Strait, at Fury Beach, &c., or to the westward to the Coppermine or Mackenzie; but last of all should we have looked to the Great Fish River for them. The fact of the relics being found at Montreal Island is due altogether to another cause, which does not seem to have occurred to Dr. King, but of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter in our inquiries, to ascertain where that party who brought them, and who are said to have perished there—came from?

The Doctor, speaking of "lands having a western aspect being generally ice free," claims to be the first to point out that fact; we beg to refer him to "Voyages into the Arctic Regions," by Sir John Barrow, published in 1818: at page 372 he will there find it already described as a "well-established fact;" and Sir Edward Parry, in his Journal, 1819-20, remarking on the probable existence of a North-West Passage, page 297, says:—"I should . . . confidently hope to find the difficulties lessen in proportion as we advanced towards the latter sea (Pacific); especially as it is well known that the climate of any given parallel on that side of America is, no matter from what cause, very many degrees more temperate than on the eastern coast." Sir John Franklin was quite aware of this fact,* but still, according to the Doctor, after having "turned the prows of his vessels south and west,"—"from between Melville Island and Banks' Land," he will have Franklin rushing into difficulty and "pushing along the eastern side of Victoria Land," a coast as yet undefined, and bearing from "between Melville Island and Banks' Land, as near as can be assumed, south-east. And then comes again the undelineated coast of North Somerset, as refuge ground for Franklin, and a point of relief for Dr. King, by the way of the Great Fish River. The Doctor says:—"It is not in Sir John Richardson's power" to reach the western land of North Somerset, and then quotes a passage from Mr. Simpson's

* See "The Franklin Expedition, First and Last," by Dr. King, p. 15.

narrative, in support of that assertion; the passage referred to was made by that gentleman in reference to—not North Somerset, but to a much more extensive exploration, viz., to Fury and Hecla Strait; and he argues, “if Mr. Simpson, in the youth of life, . . . could not make a greater distance” from his winter’s quarters (Great Bear Lake) “can more be expected of Sir John Richardson, at his period of life?” This comparison, to say the least of it, is coarse and indelicate towards that distinguished Arctic veteran, that kind-hearted, excellent man. We shall conclude:—“The land,” the Doctor says, “that is made on the south shore of Barrow’s Strait, will be of *doubtful* character, the natural consequence of discovery in ships.” All lands are doubtful until discovered, whether in ships or boats, or by land parties.

We have been compelled to enter at some length on Dr. King’s letter, inasmuch as his views have been noticed largely, and have gained a sort of notoriety and a praise which we cannot think is quite due to them; still, of his ability and capability we have not a doubt; but the soundness of his views regarding the relief of the Franklin Expedition we must very much question.

Our great object, again, has been to show that Dr. King, with Sir Edward Parry and Sir James Ross, all look to the west and south for the expedition, and not to the north.

The Lords of the Admiralty,* by letters dated 6th and 14th March, 1848, to the Commissioners of Customs, offered rewards to the whalers visiting Lancaster Sound, &c.

Lady Franklin, 20th March, also offered £2,000 to the whalers for the exploration of Prince Regent’s Inlet, Admiralty Inlet, Jones’ Sound, or Smith’s Sound.

Lady Franklin, in a letter to Mr. Barrow at this time, March, 1848, says:†—“I have never been able to divest myself of the idea that in case of shipwreck on the west coast of North Somerset, our friends might endeavour to make their way across Prince Regent’s Inlet, towards the fishing grounds of the whalers. With respect to the sounds north of Baffin’s Bay, Colonel Sabine has told me that my husband mentioned to him, that if he were baffled everywhere else, he might perhaps look into these before he returned home. It was suggested to me to add Admiralty Inlet, though I do not think it likely that they should get in there. It is not probable, indeed, that they should be found in any of these places, but there is a possibility

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, “Arctic Expedition, 1848,” pp. 47-9.

† *Ibid.*, p. 49.

of it. . . . I have ever had it much to heart, and have it still, that the Hudson's Bay Company should be urged to do their utmost with their unequalled resources to search themselves. . . . Give them his Instructions, and a clear outline of the present expeditions, and leave the manner of doing it to themselves."

The west coast of North Somerset is here again obtruded upon the attention. Where do they fix this west coast of North Somerset? We know Capes Rennell and Walker, to the north, and Cape Nicholai, to the south, but not the intermediate space. As to the sounds north of Baffin's Bay, it is a pity they are mentioned at all. Franklin was not ordered in that direction. When the coasts and seas in the direction in which he was ordered have been examined, then the places not of the Instructions, but mentioned in private conversation, may be thought of, but not until then.

We fear, from the above extract, already traces of distracted views appear; and that, too, before any search has been made at all in the direction in which the Franklin Expedition was sent.

Sir John Richardson,* accompanied by Dr. Rae † (Hudson's Bay Company), with efficient boats' crews, were directed, *via* the Hudson's Bay Company's territories, to the Mackenzie River; their instructions were "to examine . . . the coast between the Mackenzie and the Coppermine Rivers; and also to coast . . . the western and southern shores of Wollaston Land;" and "if necessary" to devote a second summer (1849), "to examine the passages between Wollaston and Banks' and Victoria Lands, so as to cross the routes of some of Sir James Ross's detached parties." In the spring of 1850 to return to England. These Instructions embrace all the points within which Franklin was expected to emerge from the north-east (Cape Walker). Sir John Richardson and Dr. Rae left England 25th March, 1848.

Sir James Ross, in the *Enterprise*, and Captain E. J. Bird, in the *Investigator*, fully manned and equipped, were now despatched to Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Straits. The Instructions given to this, the first of the searching expeditions sent in that direction, and to follow the footsteps of Sir John Franklin, are briefly extracted, as follows:—

"Whereas the period for which H.M.S. *Erebus* and *Terror* were

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," pp. 19—21.

† This gentleman was already known for his discoveries at the bottom of Prince Regent's Inlet, 1846-7,—by which he proved the non-existence of a channel between it and the entrance of Back's River, to the westward,—and for the admirable manner in which he carried out that expedition.

victualled will terminate at the end of this summer, and whereas no tidings whatever of the proceedings of either of those ships have reached us since their first entry into Lancaster Sound in the year 1845, and there being therefore reason to apprehend that they have been blocked up by immovable ice, and that they may soon be exposed to suffer by privation, we have deemed it proper to defer no longer the endeavour to afford them adequate relief." After reciting the means placed at his command, Sir James Ross is directed "to proceed without delay to Lancaster Sound. . . In your progress through that inlet to the westward, you will carefully search both shores, as well as those of Barrow's Strait. Should your early arrival there . . . admit of your at once extending a similar examination to the shores of Wellington Channel, it will leave you at greater liberty to devote yourself more fully afterwards to your researches to the westward. The several intervals of coast that appear in our charts to lie between Cape Clarence and Walker must be carefully explored;" and after alluding to the facilities in boats, &c., given to him:—"We trust, by these means, all preliminary researches may be completed during the present season." Near Cape Rennell is indicated for securing the *Investigator* for the ensuing winter, "as from that position a very considerable extent of coast may be explored on foot, and in the following spring detached parties may be sent across the ice by Captain Bird, in order to look thoroughly into the creeks along the western coast of Boothia, and even as far as Cape Nicholai; while another party may proceed to the southward, and ascertain whether the *blank space* shown there in our charts consists of an open sea, through which Sir John Franklin may have passed," or "islands among which he may be still blocked up. . . The *Enterprise*, in the meantime, will press forward to the westward, and endeavour to reach Winter Harbour, in Melville Island; or, perhaps, if circumstances render it advisable, to push onward to Banks' Land. . . . From this western station you will be able to spread some active parties, and make some short and useful excursions, before the season altogether closes, and still more effective ones in the ensuing spring. One party should then pursue the coast, in whatever direction it may seem likely to have been followed by Sir John Franklin, and thus determine the general shape of Banks' Land; it is then to proceed to Cape Bathurst or Cape Parry, on the mainland, at each of which places we have directed Sir John Richardson to leave provisions, and on to Fort Hope and England. . . . Another party will explore the eastern coast of Banks' Land, and from thence make at once for

Cape Krusenstern. . . . They should communicate immediately with him (Sir John Richardson), according to the agreement which he and you have made, and placing themselves under his orders, they will assist him in examining the shores of Victoria and Wollaston Island, and finally return with him to England. . . . We direct you to consider the foregoing orders as the general outline of our desires, and not as intended too rigidly to control your proceedings."

We cannot resist a remark or two on these Instructions. It should be remembered that this was the first expedition sent out to ascertain what had befallen the gallant Franklin and his companions. Three years had been permitted to pass away in uncertainty and suspense, and rumour, with her thousand false tongues, had assigned every variety of distressful form to the absent navigators, adding to the anxiety and anguish arising from absence. It behoved us, therefore, to be clear and decisive in what was to be done; in fact, taking the Instructions given to Franklin as our guide, to follow on his trail. We can understand that Barrow's Strait, north and south to Wellington Channel, on the one hand, and to Cape Clarence and between it and Cape Walker, on the other, should be thoroughly searched in passing, preparatory to a more extended one to the westward; but why the intermediate coast from Barrow's Strait south as far as Cape Nicholai, we cannot so readily comprehend. If considered under the idea of a retreating party, we should have looked for them in Barrow's Strait. The strait of James Ross, and the supposed channel from Back's River to Regent's Inlet, offered a means of escape to Fury Beach; but we had not reached Cape Walker, to which Franklin was specially directed: we did not know what important information might be awaiting us there. The search to the south in the direction of Cape Nicholai was therefore premature; we should have paused before we made any search in that direction.

In endeavouring to escape, Franklin would look south and west to the American continent, and not south-east, unless under very peculiar circumstances, or east by Barrow's Strait, for succour. But surely it appears far more reasonable, after due examination of the various headlands and entrances to the inlets along the course of Barrow's Strait to Cape Walker, that that cape should have been made a primary object for arrival at and for departure to the south-west; but it seems strange that it is nowhere mentioned in these Instructions. Again: the western division was to endeavour to reach Melville Island or Banks' Land. This was all well. But here, again, one party is to pursue the direction "likely to have been followed by Franklin,"

and thus determine the western face of Banks' Land; by which we are led to infer that he attempted to pass down this western face. Here we are at a loss; we cannot conceive under what circumstances it could be thought that Franklin would be found there. He was not ordered there: why and how did he get there? If he had been enabled to get to the south-west, we ought to look for him between Banks' and Wollaston Lands, judging from what was known and laid down on the charts of the period; but this would lead him to the southward, and we should most likely have heard of him *vid* the American continent. We cannot imagine he attempted the forbidden channel between Banks' Land and Melville Island: we can only suppose, then, that it was contemplated that, shut out from the south, he made westing, and then attempted some northern route between the Parry Islands, and came down on their western side, and so on to the western side of Banks' Land; but this is too hypothetical to be admitted; the northern and western limits of the whole of the islands or lands north of $74\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N. and west to 115° W. were unknown. The search, then, of the western coast of Banks' Land at this early period we think quite unnecessary. We had not ascertained that he had been compelled to a northern route; it was, therefore, needlessly exhausting the energies of the expedition. The examination of the eastern shores of Banks' Land is more within reason. Throughout these Instructions there is no specific mention of the space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, that important space which gave such fair prospects of a passage to the veteran promoter of the Franklin Expedition.

This expedition sailed 12th June, 1848.

With the departure of the last of these well-arranged, well-equipped expeditions followed the most heartfelt wishes and sincere prayers for success. Their united efforts were to be concentrated around that area or space which embraced the whole substance of the Plan to which the talent and the daring of Sir John Franklin and his companions were so specially directed—to complete, once and for all, the question of a North-West Passage. The highest hopes and the warmest anticipations were, therefore, entertained—nothing short of the joyful restoration of the absent voyagers to their country and their homes. While they pursue their way on their sacred mission, it may not be out of place here to glance briefly at the various plans, and the opinions arising out of them at this period. They present already great diversity of direction; their range is very extended; and yet all are derived from the same source—the same simple Plan,

and the same clear Instructions. The majority show, however, that the original idea of the voyage is understood. One is particularly incoherent, wandering, and vague; it is next to impossible to conclude, with certainty, what is meant. He assumes intentions at variance with the express intent of the voyage, and gives for the Expedition a most improbable position, a position in direct violation of its orders; still he *looks west, not north*. There are three who are *really* Arctic authorities, whose opinions are founded on a simple interpretation of Sections 5 and 6 of Franklin's Instructions; and there is also another, whose general views are sound as to the space to which the ships were sent, and particularly in his opinion as to their position; but he looks on other and irrelevant matter, which weakens and detracts from his otherwise sound arguments. One passes over altogether, without notice, the object and direction of the Expedition, and looks to the north alone; he would extend the search in an improbable direction, and to a perplexing extent, only on *talked-of "intentions,"* casually expressed by Sir John Franklin before his departure. There is yet another. He advocates a search in a doubtful direction; he asserts and re-asserts the soundness of his views; at last believes them to be facts, and argues from them as though they were so; still their locality, though doubtful, is in the *south*, and the *north is unthought of*. Thus do they vary, and yet Franklin is as yet unsought for. His movements, beyond his orders, are wholly unknown.

The sum of these plans and opinions amounts to this; that while the majority of the distinguished men we have so fully quoted leave not a doubt as to the clearness and intent of the Instructions given to Franklin for his guidance, there are two who speak of Franklin having "intentions" beside them; in fact, in complete opposition to them. Whether these supposed intentions have or may influence the direction of the efforts of the after searching squadrons—may draw them from the true direction of search (so clearly given in Sections 5 and 6) will be seen in the sequel; for ourselves, we have ever considered that Sir John Franklin would deem his Instructions absolute. Whatever private views he might have, whatever his wishes or intentions, he would make his opinions subordinate to the manifest tenor and spirit of his orders. This was his duty, and, because his duty, with him paramount to every consideration of private feeling. It will be observed, that even in the opinions advocating a search by the south and west, they vary in many points; this surprises us, because the space included between 70° and 74° N., and 98° and 115° W.,

was altogether unknown; it might be navigable water. If conjecture must be called in, why not have assumed a progress for the Expedition in the obvious direction to which the Instructions tended, rather than to other and less probable ones, involving, as we see, many points of difference? Again, there seems a feeling that the Expedition had attained large westing, which can only be accounted for by its continued absence, the known daring and perseverance of the navigators, and the imaginary freedom with which it was thought the Arctic seas could be navigated; for of positive information there was none: the fact is, conjecture was beginning to run wild. As to the north, while its advocates were equally destitute of all intelligence, they built up a theory of assumed intentions, unsupported by a single fact, that called aside and diverted attention from the Instructions, if it did no worse; but in attributing intentions foreign to his orders, they indirectly, but literally, involve the gallant Franklin in the grave charge of disobeying them, thus rendering him open to animadversion from any and every malicious or slanderous quarter,—thus doing a positive injury, as far as they are concerned, to this great man's name, unjust and perhaps irreparable!

An extract from a letter (dated York Factory, Aug. 28th, 1848)* from Mr. Hargreave to A. Barclay, Esq., Secretary of the Hudson's Bay Company, may be noticed here: "I may mention, as a rumour possessing some interest, that in a private communication of March 1st from Mr. M'Pherson, of Mackenzie River District, he says:—'There is a report from Peel's River that the Esquimaux saw two large boats (query, ships?) to the eastward of the Mackenzie, full of white men, and they (the Esquimaux) showed knives, files, &c., to the Peel's River Indians, which they had received from these white men. Could these have been Franklin or Rae?' He adds: 'Rae never left the southern point of Committee Bay,' and 'Indian information is proverbial for its inaccuracy and exaggeration.'" This report seems to have the same source as that given by Mr. Peers (*ante*, p. 78). There is an appearance of truth about it. The articles given by the white men are specified, and indicate facts: we shall refer to them again.

Thus closed the year 1848. Many and various were the reports and rumours as to the movements and the fortunes of the Franklin Expedition, but *not a single fact* regarding it had reached England up to this time, since it parted from the whalers in Baffin's Bay. All plans and suggestions then, if not based on the Instructions issued for its guidance, were purely speculative—purely ideal.

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 188, "Arctic Expedition, 1849," p. 6.

CHAPTER VI.

INTELLIGENCE FROM SIR J. C. ROSS—OPINIONS—"NORTH STAR"
 SAILS—LIEUT. S. OSBORN—REWARDS—DR. M'CORMICK—SIR JOHN
 RICHARDSON—SIR JOHN ROSS—POND'S BAY REPORT—SIR J. C.
 ROSS RETURNS—SIR JOHN RICHARDSON ARRIVES DR. RAE SIR
 F. BEAUFORT—PROPOSED EXPEDITION BY BEHRING'S STRAIT—
 OPINIONS—HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY—MR. CHRISTOPHER CAPT
 PENNY—BEHRING'S STRAIT—1849 CLOSES.

1849.—THE year opened: anxiety betrayed her presence.

The Admiralty, having received intelligence from Sir James Ross (dated July 12th, 1848), from which they were led to infer that the *Investigator*, Captain Bird, would be sent to England in the summer of 1849, in which case the *Enterprise* would be left to prosecute the search alone; and this being considered unadvisable, not only as being unsafe but as likely to frustrate the objects of the expedition, various Arctic officers, &c., were consulted, and subsequently a meeting took place (January 17th, 1849).* In the end, it was resolved the *North Star* should be laden with provisions, and sent to Barrow's Strait, under the command of Mr. Saunders, Master, R.N. The *North Star* sailed May 16th, 1849. Mr. Saunders's orders were to proceed to Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, and endeavour to intercept the *Investigator*; failing to do so, he was to make for Whaler Point, Port Leopold, but should that point prove inaccessible on account of the ice, he was to leave notice there where he would land the provisions, &c., on the south side of Lancaster Sound. As some of these opinions embrace the line of search to be adopted for the recovery of the unfortunate Franklin, we shall notice them; they go partly to show the ideas prevailing at this period.

Sir George Back "is of opinion that Sir James Ross . . . should be left entirely to his own well known intelligence and discretion, nothing doubting that he will thoroughly explore the Wellington Channel, and other northern passages from Barrow's Strait."

Captain Beechey (January 12th, 1849) says:—"It can hardly be expected that full and efficient examination of every port in search of our forlorn countrymen can be made even by the two vessels there; such a search, I mean, as would alone satisfy this country, and in the lamentable event of hearing no more of the parties, would enable us to lay our heads on our pillows with the inward satisfaction of knowing that we had done all that humanity could suggest, and all

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 188 II., "Arctic Expedition," pp. 1—10.

that a great nation, jealous of the lives of its subjects, could possibly have accomplished. Wellington Inlet, Bathurst Inlet, and Regent's Inlet, have all to be examined, in addition to the other routes contemplated by Sir James Ross. . . Matters have arrived at such a crisis that merely sailing up and down an inlet will not satisfy us; a rigid, minute search of the shore must be made in boats from the ships; the hills must be ascended, the points and headlands examined, for traces of the objects of their search. . . I am informed by Sir John Franklin's nearest connections, that he placed much reliance on Wellington Inlet. . . It ought to be minutely examined, and traced to its head, as far as the ice will permit with safety."

Col. Sabine (January 9th, 1840):—"If Franklin has taken the south-westerly route after passing through the Strait (Barrow's), and has persevered in that course, we shall either hear of him on the side of Behring's Strait, or either Ross or Richardson will surely come upon his traces. . . Circumstances may be different, however, if, failing in the south-west, he returned, . . . to make trial of Wellington Channel. . . If that channel be, as it appeared to me, a continuation of the deep and open sea which we found in Barrow's Strait, and if it conduct into an open sea, . . . it may be far more difficult to determine the direction which Franklin may have taken, or to conjecture, otherwise than on the spot, the most eligible course by which he may be followed. It is to this quarter, therefore, that one's thoughts are naturally directed. . . Supposing that there should appear to be no probability that Franklin has taken that direction (Wellington Channel), they might authorize . . . him to examine the sounds at the head of Baffin's Bay. . . It was Franklin's declared intention, if he failed in one channel to attempt another, and not to desist, if possible, till he had tried all. . . The search of the sounds referred to, even if unsuccessful, in the absence of more promising traces elsewhere, would be satisfactory."

Capt. Sir Edward Belcher (January 8th, 1849):—"It appears very clear to my mind, that Sir John Franklin could not have adopted the opening to the south-west of Melville Island, for two reasons;—first, because he would have fallen in with Esquimaux, who seem to abound about lat. 70° or 72°; secondly, from the tenor of the remarks of Capt. Parry, . . . it is not probable that he would be able to penetrate the frozen barrier there noticed. . . If Sir John Franklin has met with the difficulty noticed in the voyage of Parry in 1819, he will of necessity have sought for a more northern route. . . And if he succeeded, I think that the probabilities are

in favour of his safety until he reached the Arctic Circle; there he would be reduced to the necessity of following any open channels which offered southerly, and they may have led him to the northward of Asia, whence I have some slight suspicion that he will eventually emerge."

These opinions, it will be seen, are all founded on the word "if;" all on the assumption of failure to the south and west from Cape Walker, and we might so dismiss them; but we cannot, without remarking the little mention that is made of the direction in which the Franklin Expedition was really sent.

Sir George Back is particularly in favour of exploring the northern passage from Barrow's Strait; we would he had given his reasons.

Capt. Beechey feelingly describes how the search should be conducted, and names Wellington Channel; but it would seem, only from what he has heard of the stress laid upon it by Franklin himself. We cannot conceive Franklin as likely to have been very greatly influenced by the Wellington Channel route. There is little doubt he was consulted in the drawing up of his own Instructions; and had he given that channel a preference, he would have made it the primary object of his Instructions, and Melville Sound the secondary point for the solution of the question. Melville Sound was made primary, and this is the best proof that Wellington Channel did not possess that paramount influence over Franklin it is said to have done. Let any one consult Parry's chart (1819-20), and he will soon be convinced which offered the more favourable prospect "for the Passage,"—Wellington Channel, *without defined limits*, or the *limited area of Melville Sound*:—he may have spoken of it casually, but nothing more.

Colonel Sabine takes a general view of the tenor of Franklin's Instructions, but he betrays an evident bias in favour of the northern passages. Why his thoughts should be "naturally" directed to the Wellington Channel we cannot conceive; we should rather have thought they would have been more naturally directed to *Cape Walker and the south-west, until information had been received that Franklin had altogether failed in that quarter*. But Franklin's "declared intentions," and "the great Sound at the head of Baffin's Bay," exert a superlative influence over him; and they must be searched prior to the direction in which the Franklin Expedition was ordered.

Sir Edward Belcher gives two reasons for thinking Sir John Franklin "could not have adopted the opening south-west of Melville Island" (*i. e.*, between it and Banks' Land); we can give one more

cogent than both. By Section 6th *he is cautioned not to go there, because "it would involve loss of time," in consequence of the "unusual magnitude and apparently fixed state of the ice in that direction;"* which Sir Edward seems to have been aware of, but not that the attempt that way was contrary to his Instructions. It was contrary; and therefore the necessity "for a more northern route, in consequence of failure there, falls to the ground; and with it all speculation as to where he will eventually emerge, . . . to the northward of Asia."

Some of the opinions offered about this time are so monstrous that we have often been led to think, the plan of the voyage and the Instructions have either not been understood or not consulted.

Additional instructions were sent by the whalers, and by the *North Star*, to Sir James Ross, making it imperative on him strictly to search the "Wellington Channel and its neighbourhood," as "Sir John Franklin attached very great importance to that opening, *in case of his failing . . . to the southward and westward.*" Notwithstanding, we presume to think the search to the *southward and westward should have been the first, and so to ascertain if he really had failed* in that direction. If not, we were liable to great error in the search, as we had nothing positive to guide us but his (Franklin's) Instructions. Without them all must be left to conjecture and chance. To think of leaving 138 gallant fellows to such uncertainty is fearful.

Lieut. (now Capt.) Sherard Osborn, in a letter to Sir Francis T. Baring, Bart.,* dated January 29th, 1849, "offered his services to lead a party from Hotham's Inlet (Behring's Strait), across the American continent towards the River Colville, . . . descend it, and examine the coast eastward to the . . . Mackenzie River, and ascend that river to winter at Fort Good Hope, or Franklin;" or "from the neighbourhood of Mount Elias . . . strike across for the mouth of the Mackenzie River, trace the coast to Cape Anxiety, and return to Hotham's Inlet." The object is the examination of this part of the coast in case of unforeseen obstacles occurring to the party from the eastward. There is a misconception here. Richardson's party was not ordered to search west of the Mackenzie, but east, to the Coppermine. This plan assumes the probability of Franklin being west of the Mackenzie River.

At this time, March, 1849,† the Government offered £20,000, to which Lady Franklin added £3,000, to be given to such "exploring party or parties as may, in the judgment of the Admiralty, have reu-

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 128.

† *Ibid.*, p. 148.

dered efficient assistance to Sir John Franklin, his ships, or their crews." Attention was particularly directed to the "Gulf of Boothia, Regent's Inlet, the inlets or channels leading out of Barrow's Strait, or the sea beyond, either northward or southward; also, to any sounds or inlets in the north or western sides of Baffin's Bay, about lat. 75°. To our thinking, it had been better to have given a copy of Sir John Franklin's Instructions, and left their interpretation to those seeking the rewards.

Dr. R. M'Cormick, R.N.,* by a letter addressed to the Admiralty (dated April 24th, 1849), offered a plan for a boat expedition, and volunteered to conduct it. This plan is founded on the reported "intentions" expressed in Colonel Sabine's letter, March 5th, 1847:—"It was Sir John Franklin's intention, if foiled at one point, to try in succession all the probable openings into a more navigable part of the Polar Sea." He suggests, "that Jones' and Smith's Sounds, at the head of Baffin's Bay, should be carefully examined, . . . but more especially the former, it being the first opening north of the entrance to Lancaster Sound."

We have already ventured an opinion on the plans of search by the north, "from Melville Island in the west to the great Sound at the head of Baffin's Bay in the east." At this period there was no ground for thinking that Franklin would attempt "the Passage" by the north; he was ordered to the south-west. Had he been shut out from Barrow's Strait, and consequently, from the completion of the first part of his instructions, it would have been made known to us by cairns, flag-staves, &c., at the entrance of Lancaster Sound. We should have found notice, too, giving his reasons for adopting a new course more to the northward.

In the absence of these, surely it had been wiser to have followed Franklin where we sent him, and set at rest the question whether he had reached Capo Walker or not. By doing so, much confusion of ideas and trouble and hardship would have been avoided. It will be seen here, that the very mention of "intentions," other than those conveyed in the Instructions given to Franklin, is already producing a tendency to fatal error, distracting and drawing attention aside from the original objects of the plan and voyage of 1845. We see it developing itself in our respected friend, Dr. M'Cormick: intelligent, active, and enterprising, capable of any endurance, governed by an enthusiasm in the holy cause that knows no limits, yet, under the

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 121.

influence of sounding authority, he permits his judgment to be warped, and offers to attempt an impossibility--the examination of Jones' and Smith's Sounds in one season--volunteering, in short, to neutralize his best feelings and his brightest hopes, and perhaps sacrifice his life. How can we place a limit to time for the examination of parts whose limits we know not of?

In July, intelligence was received from Sir John Richardson, that that devoted friend and companion of Sir John Franklin had, during the summer of 1848, under much difficulty (from the early setting in of the winter) examined the Arctic shores of America, between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers, without discovering any trace of the missing expedition. He says, in his Report to the Admiralty, dated from Great Bear Lake, 16th September, 1848:--"I shall endeavour to make arrangements for sending Mr. Rae, with one boat and a select crew of active men, down the Coppermine next July, to examine the opening between Victoria and Wollaston Lands. The flood tide, which, at full and change, runs in Dolphin and Union Straits at the rate of three knots an hour, comes from the eastward out of Coronation Gulf, and must flow primarily down the opening I have mentioned, or by the one between Victoria Land and Boothia, being the only two communications between Coronation Gulf and Lancaster Sound and its continuation. On this account, and also for the purpose of aiding a party which Sir James Ross proposed to send towards the Coppermine over the ice, Mr. Rae's expedition may be useful." There cannot be a question as to the justness of these remarks. They are, it is true, founded only on observation in a circumscribed area, very little known, but their reasonableness is obvious.

Sir John Ross (1st September, 1849) renewed his offers of service, with plans. The letter is addressed to Sir Francis Baring, Bart., Admiralty.†

These plans refer principally to the class of vessels desirable to employ. Davis' Strait and Lancaster Sound are incidentally mentioned, but no detailed plan of search is given. He repeated his offers (27th November, 1849), but still without any decided plan. These letters abound in flat contradiction of the opinions of others: altogether, they betray a morbid feeling which ill accords with the distressing nature of the subject. We care not to perpetuate them here.

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 497, "Arctic Expedition," pp. 1-3.

† *Ibid.*, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 111-12.

In October this year intense interest was excited by the report and sketch of four ships seen frozen in the ice, obtained from an Esquimaux at Pond's Bay, and brought home by the master of the *Truelove* whaler.* "It appears the *Chieftain* and other whalers got into Pond's Bay. . . . Immediately they reached that place some of the natives went on board, and without questioning the man drew the sketch, and by signs and in words in his own language, understood by the masters of the whalers, stated that two of the ships had been frozen up for four years on the west side of Prince Regent's Inlet, and that the other two had been frozen up on the east side for one year; that the two ships which had been there the longest had tried to get beyond Cape Rennell, but not being able had come into Prince Regent's Inlet to winter, where the ice had not broken up since; that he and his companions had been on board all the four ships in March last, and they were all safe." This account was greedily caught at, and the greatest hopes were entertained that Franklin and his companions were safe; but it seems great discrepancies are said to have arisen on examining the statement. A communication by signs and words, though apparently understood, must ever be open to misinterpretation. Again, the positions given for the ships could not be comprehended. Still, though not understood, there may have been some truth at the bottom of it. Our opinion at the time was, that the two westernmost ships might have been Franklin's, in Melville Sound, and the two easternmost Ross's, in Leopold Harbour. We did not believe it was altogether a fabrication. We could not see what object the Esquimaux could have for inventing such a tale. Again, the appearance of the ships bears evidence of fact about it; at any rate, the whalers believed it. They, being on the spot, were the best capable of judging of its truth. Some of them endeavoured to reach Regent's Inlet, but failed.†

Sir James Ross‡ unexpectedly returned, November 3rd, 1849. This expedition had been greatly retarded on its outward passage. It reached Port Leopold 11th September, 1848, barely in time to prevent being frozen in the pack, and wintered there. After the usual preliminary journeys, Sir James and a party left the ship on

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 70.

† This report and sketch is referred to in a very excellent paper "On the Probable Course pursued by Sir John Franklin's Expedition," by A. G. Findlay, Esq., published in the "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1856," vol. xxvi., p. 26.

‡ See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 58-64.

15th May for the west, by the north coast of North Somerset. He says, "The examination of all the inlets and smaller indentations of the coast, in which any ships might find shelter, occupied a large portion of our time, and cost us much labour; but it was necessary that every portion of the coast we passed along should be thoroughly explored. The north shore of North Somerset trends slightly to the northward of west, until after passing the extreme north capo of America, a few miles beyond Cape Rennell; from this point it trends slightly to the south of west, until after rounding Cape Bunny, when it suddenly assumes a nearly south direction. From the high land," about "Cape Bunny, we obtained a very extensive view, and observed that the whole space between it and Cape Walker to the west, and Wellington Channel to the north, was occupied by very heavy hummocky ice, whilst to the southward it appeared more favourable for travelling; I therefore determined not to divide the party, as I originally intended, until we should find a more practicable point for their exertions. We therefore proceeded to the south, tracing all the indentations of the coast. . . . The examination was pursued until the 5th June; when, having consumed more than half our provisions, and the strength of the party being much reduced, I was reluctantly compelled to abandon further operations, as it was necessary to give the men a day of rest. But that the time might not be wholly lost, I proceeded with two hands to the extreme south point in sight, distant about eight or nine miles.

"The extreme point of our operations is in lat. $72^{\circ} 38' N.$, and long. $95^{\circ} 40' W.$; it is the west point of a small, high peninsula, and the state of the atmosphere being at the time peculiarly favourable for distinctness of vision, land of any great elevation might have been seen at the distance of a hundred miles. The extreme high capo of the coast . . . was not more than fifty miles distant, still bearing nearly south, the land thus trending for Cape Nicholai. . . We observed several capes and inlets between us and the southernmost cape; of whose continuity we could not be assured at so great a distance. . . They are marked on the chart, . . . by which it will be perceived that a very narrow isthmus separates Prince Regent's Inlet from the western sea, at Cresswell and Brentford Bays.

"If those we were in search of had at any time been upon the north or west coast of North Somerset, we must have met with some traces of them. . . Had they abandoned their ships at Melville Island, they must have arrived on either of these shores long before this time."

"During my absence, Capt. Bird had despatched parties in several directions; one under 'Lieut. Barnard to the north shore of Barrow's Strait; a second, commanded by Lieut. Browne, to the east shore of Prince Regent's Inlet; and a third, conducted by Lieut. Robinson, along the western shore of that inlet. . . The latter . . . extended his examination . . . several miles to the southward of Fury Beach.'

"Although it was now but too evident, from no traces of the absent expedition having been met with, . . . that the ships could not have been detained anywhere in this part of the Arctic regions, yet I considered it proper to push forward to the westward, as soon as the ships should be liberated. . . My chief hopes now centred in the efforts of Sir John Richardson's party; but I felt fully persuaded that Sir John Franklin's ships must have *penetrated so far beyond Melville Island*, as to induce him to prefer making for the coast of America, rather than seeking assistance" from "Baffin's Bay." They got clear of Leopold Harbour on August 24th, and endeavoured to get to the westward, but were beset and frozen in on Sept. 1st, and drifted with the ice to the eastward, until abreast of Pond's Bay, when they were miraculously liberated, and returned to England. Thus ended the efforts of the first searching expedition sent to ascertain the whereabouts and to relieve our unfortunate countrymen, and upon whose successful efforts so much fond hope relied. We have often regretted that, notwithstanding the "hummocky" nature of the ice—but being fast—an attempt was not made to cross it to Cape Walker, instead of going south, as it would have saved much precious time. Had Franklin gone down Peel's Sound, he would have left notice of his having done so on the headlands at the entrance of that Sound, probably on its eastern side, but certainly on its western. Again, had he in going down it met with disaster, he would have discovered and crossed the narrow isthmus described by Sir James Ross, and have repaired to Fury Beach; but no traces being found at the latter, was proof that if he did go down Peel's Sound, no mishap had befallen him in his passage. And no traces being found on its eastern side, was good evidence that he did not attempt a passage that way at all. Still, as they might have passed down it on its western side, *not crossing to Cape Walker to set this matter at rest*, left the course and position of the Franklin Expedition as uncertain as ever.

Mention is made of "the western sea," west of Cresswell and Brentford Bays (?) and yet no notice is taken of the lands forming the western coast of Peel's Sound. They must have been visible

under the "peculiarly favourable" state of the atmosphere described; and if so, they should very much have abridged this expression of a "western sea."

He says, "I considered it proper to push forward to the westward." Why, it did not require any consideration; it was a duty. As to the persuasion that Franklin "must have penetrated so far beyond Melville Island as to induce him to prefer making for the American coast rather than seek assistance from the whalers in Baffin's Bay"—upon what ground is this persuasion founded? How did he get there?—by the north or south? It was to settle this, that this expedition was sent out; and failing to obtain additional information or farther clue to his position, this persuasion can only be considered as purely speculative. Altogether this was a most unfortunate voyage.

Sir J. Richardson returned, Nov. 7, 1849, from his examination of the Arctic shores of America between the Mackenzie and the Coppermine Rivers, already noticed. In the narrative of his proceedings, addressed to the Admiralty,* he again reverts to his former opinion as to the probable existence of a communication between Melville Sound and Coronation Gulf. He says, "The opening between Wollaston and Victoria Lands has always appeared to me to possess great interest; for through it the flood tide evidently sets into Coronation Gulf, diverging to the westward by the Dolphin and Union Straits, and to the eastward round Cape Alexander. By the fifth clause of Sir John Franklin's Instructions, he is directed to steer south-westward from Cape Walker, which would lead him nearly in the direction of the strait in question. If Sir John found Barrow's Strait open, as when Sir Edward Parry passed it on four previous occasions, I am convinced that (complying exactly as he could with his Instructions, and without looking into the Wellington Sound, or other openings either to the south or north of Barrow's Strait), he pushed directly west to Cape Walker, and from thence south-westwards." If so, "the ships were probably shut up in some of the passages between Victoria, Banks', and Wollaston Lands. . . . This opinion, which I have advocated in my former communication, is rather strengthened by the laborious journeys of Sir James Ross, having discovered no traces of the missing ships." Sir John, being of opinion that this opening ought to be examined, says, "I determined to entrust this important service to Mr. Rae, who volunteered, and whose ability and zeal in the cause I cannot too highly commend."

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 1—8.

It will be seen that Sir John Richardson's views have undergone no change; after some very valuable observations on the amount of animal life in and about that region, and the duration of Franklin's provisions, and giving the example of Dr. Rae, who supported a party through a severe winter at Repulse Bay, he says, "Such instances forbid us to lose hope;" and alluding to the necessity of abandoning his ships, "they would endeavour to make their way *eastward to Lancaster Sound, or southward to the mainland*, according to the longitude in which the ships were arrested." Again he adds, "It is thought by some, whose opinion I highly value, that the discovery ships may have penetrated to the westward in so high a latitude, as not to come within sight of the mainland;" he therefore suggests "the examination of the western coasts of Banks' Land and the Parry Islands; but as this would require a ship expedition by way of Behring's Straits," he leaves the discussion of its practicability to the "officers who have navigated the northern seas," wisely confining his attention to the direction in which the ships had been sent, and not by a species of wild errantry, with reason or without, seek here, there, everywhere.

His memorandum to Dr. Rae is replete with sound sense; after stating his views (already given) as to the probable existence of a strait between Victoria and Wollaston Lands, and the necessity for its being searched, as being in the direction from which Sir John Franklin might be expected to emerge, and also as being in connection with Sir James Ross's parties from Melville Island and Banks' Land, he is directed to explore this supposed strait, and, if possible, to pursue his researches on to Banks' Land. It was now very important that the search should be made to the north-east, towards Cape Walker, through that blank formed by Cape Walker on the north-east, Banks' Land north-west, Wollaston Land south-west, and Victoria Land on the south-east; this blank or space had originated the plan of Sir John Barrow for the accomplishment of the passage, and to the equipment of the Franklin expedition to complete it. It would, as we have said, be meeting Franklin from Cape Walker, and Sir James Ross's parties in search of him from the north. The necessity was seen, and thus provided for. Dr. Rae was, too, to appropriate the summer of 1850, if necessary. This important task could not have been entrusted to a more efficient officer, as will be seen in the sequel.

Another expedition was now proposed by the hydrographer, Sir Francis Beaufort, by the way of Behring's Strait. The design was

to get to the northward and round Point Barrow, and from thence easterly, to endeavour to reach the west side of Banks' Land and Melville Island. It was supposed that Franklin, having got to the westward of Melville Island, was there locked up in the ice. The report of the hydrographer, conveying his reasons for coming to this conclusion, and the opinions of the various distinguished Arctic officers upon it, cannot be otherwise than interesting at this period of the search for our missing countryman. The hydrographer, in his report* (24th November, 1840), proposing this expedition to Behring's Strait, opens the subject by observing, "There are four ways only in which it is likely the *Erebus* and *Terror* would have been lost,—by fire, by sunken rocks, by storm, or by being crushed;" and after arguing and dismissing each as improbable, he says, "the point where they now are is the great matter for consideration. . . . Their orders would have carried them towards Melville Island, and then out to the westward, where it is, therefore, probable that they are entangled amongst the islands and ice. For should they have been arrested at some intermediate place, for instance, Cape Walker, or at one of the northern chain of islands, they would undoubtedly, in the course of the three following years, have contrived to send some notices of their position to the shores of North Somerset or of Barrow's Strait. If they had reached much to the southward of Banks' Land, they would have communicated with the tribes on the Mackenzie River; and if, failing to get to the westward and southward, they had returned, with the intention of penetrating through Wellington Channel, they would surely have detached parties . . . towards Barrow's Strait, in order to have deposited statements of their intentions. The general conclusion, therefore, remains, that they are still locked in the archipelago to the westward of Melville Island." After alluding to the alternating nature of the weather between the opposite sides of North America, the report concludes:—"An attempt should now be made by Behring's Strait, in the direction of Melville Island."

Sir Edward Parry (2nd December, 1840†) says, "With respect to the place in which these ships have been detained, we have no data on which to found any satisfactory conjecture beyond the fact, that in the attempt to get westward, . . . they have been too far removed from the continent of America to render a communication practicable; . . . but it seems to me likely that the ships have been pushing

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 74.

† *Ibid.*, p. 75.

. . . in the direction of Behring's Strait, and, are detained somewhere in the *space* south-westward of Banks' Land. . . . Should . . . they have been unsuccessful in that direction, they may have attempted to proceed to the northward, either through Wellington Channel, or . . . some other of the openings among the same group of islands. . . . I do not myself *attach any superior importance to Wellington Channel* as regards the North-West Passage, but I understand that Sir John Franklin did, and that he strongly expressed to Lord Haddington his intention of attempting that route, if he should fail in effecting the more direct passage to the westward. . . . Under these circumstances, which . . . amount to no more than mere conjecture, it seems to me expedient still to prosecute the search in both directions, namely, by Behring's Strait (to which I look with the strongest hope), and also by Barrow's Strait. . . . In the latter direction, the difficulties with which Sir James Ross had to contend have, in reality, left us with very little more information than before he left England; and I cannot contemplate, without serious apprehension, leaving that opening without still further search, . . . in case of the missing crews having fallen back to the eastern coast of North Somerset, where they would naturally look for supplies, in addition . . . to those left by the *Fury*." Sir James Ross* (30th November, 1849):—"With respect to the probable position of the *Erebus* and *Terror*, I consider it is hardly possible they can be anywhere to the eastward of Melville Island, or within 300 miles of Leopold Island; for if that were the case, they would . . . have made their way to that point, with the hope of receiving assistance from the whale ships. . . . It is probable, therefore, that during their first summer, which was remarkably favourable for navigation in those seas, they have been enabled (in obedience to their orders) to push the ships to the westward of Banks' Land, and have there become involved in the heavy pack of ice, which was observed from Melville Island always to be setting past its westernmost point in a south-east direction, and from which pack they may not have been able to extricate their ships. . . . From such a position, retreat to the eastward would be next to impossible; whilst the journey to the Mackenzie River of comparatively easy accomplishment. . . . If this be assumed as the present position of the *Erebus* and *Terror*, it would manifestly be far more easy and safe to afford them relief by means . . . of Behring's Strait than any other direction."

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 77.

Captain (the late lamented Admiral) Beechey (1st December, 1849*) agrees with Sir Francis Beaufort as regards "any casualties which Sir John's Franklin's ships may have sustained; . . . and entirely agrees with him and Sir Edward Parry that the expedition is probably hampered amongst the ice somewhere to the south-westward of Melville Island." He urges "every possible method of relief," by "Barrow's Strait, Behring's Strait, and the northern coast of America." He says, "Barrow's Strait should be visited in the ensuing summer."

Sir George Back (1st December, 1849†) agrees "with Sir Francis Beaufort in his general conclusion, that the ships are still locked up in the archipelago to the westward, . . . or I should rather say, in the neighbourhood . . . of Melville Island. . . . It becomes of the first importance to get at that locality." Sir George "rejects all and every idea of any attempt on the part of Sir John Franklin to send boats or detachments over the ice to any point of the mainland eastward of the Mackenzie River; because (he observes) I can say, from experience, that no toil-worn and exhausted party could have the least chance of existence by going there." He seems to think sending "two other ships" to Behring's Strait "superfluous." He continues:—"If open water should have allowed Sir John Franklin to have resorted to his boats, . . . he would make for either the Mackenzie River, or, which is far more likely, from the almost certainty he must have felt of finding provisions, Cape Clarence and Fury Point. . . . Finally, believing, with Sir Francis Beaufort, that the coast about Melville Island, including the south-west direction from Cape Walker and Wellington Channel, as well as the two points already mentioned, to be the most probable places of finding, or at least ascertaining beyond conjecture the fate of the expedition," he concludes by proposing that the *Enterprise* and *Investigator* should be despatched in that direction in March next.

Sir John Richardson, 1st December, 1849:‡—"It seems to me very desirable that the western shores . . . of Parry's Islands should be searched in a high latitude, in the manner proposed by the hydrographer. If the proposed expedition succeeds in establishing its winter quarters among these islands, parties detached over the ice may travel to the eastward and south-eastward, so as to cross the line of search which it is hoped Mr. Rae has been able to pursue in the

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 80.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

present summer, and thus to determine whether any traces of the missing ships exist in localities the most remote from Behring's Strait and Lancaster Sound, and from whence shipwrecked crews would find the greatest difficulty in travelling to any place where they could hope to find relief."

In offering some general remarks on the report of the hydrographer, and the opinions of the pre-named Arctic officers thereon, we would draw attention to the unanimity of their views as to the general westerly direction in which the Franklin Expedition should be sought for. Allusion is made to the passages between the northern chain of islands (Parry's) and to Wellington Channel, but only in a secondary sense, that is, in case of the expedition "failing to get to the southward and westward." All of them, in assuming Franklin to have abandoned his ships, "and seeking supplies" and safety, refer to Port Leopold and Fury Beach on the east, or to the Mackenzie River, or between it and Behring's Strait in the west; in all these conclusions acting obviously under a thorough knowledge and just sense of the plan of Sir John Barrow, and the Instructions founded upon it. But while admitting this, it must be observed the proposition and the opinions upon it differ very materially. The hydrographer concludes, that because they have not been heard of in Barrow's Strait, on the shores of North Somerset, or on the Mackenzie River, hence they must be to the westward of Melville Island, and yet does not suggest how they got there. This conclusion is hypothetical.

Sir Edward Parry thinks, with reason, they may be detained somewhere south-west of Banks' Land, but admits it is conjectural. He rejects the Wellington Channel; still would have both directions searched, that is, by the east and west.

Sir James Ross thinks it hardly possible that the ships can be to the eastward of Melville Island, or we should have heard of them through the whalers at Regent's Inlet; but that, in obedience to their orders, they pushed "to westward of Banks' Land," and are "involved" in the south-east drift he mentions as observed to be setting past the westernmost point of Melville Island. This apparent south-east drift would have set the ships into Melville Sound, or on to Banks' Land. Sir James has already referred to this easterly drift of the ice,* and the inevitable embarrassments consequent to the Franklin Expedition, if caught within its influence. Of the fact of

* See his Reply to Dr. King's Plan, Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition," p. 45.

this drift there was no doubt; but in it do we not find one of the most powerful arguments that could be adduced in support of a thorough examination of Melville Sound, that blank which the Franklin Expedition was directed to explore, with the hope of finding within it a passage to the westward? How is it that no one has recommended *specially* the search of Melville Sound? However, upon this assumed position he argues;—retreat from it to the eastward is next to impossible, and therefore looks to the Mackenzie River. He says nothing as to how the ships got to the westward of Banks' Land, and into this south-east drift, whether by the north-west or south-west. Were the ships shut out from the south-west? and did they attempt "the Passage" by one of the westernmost channels between the Parry group, round by the north? or did they pass to the westward between Banks' Land and Melville Island (forbidden)? In either case all is assumed. Sir James Ross recommends the search by Behring's Strait.

Captain Beechey thinks the expedition is *south-west* of Melville Island. This we can comprehend by reference to Parry's chart, 1819. He may have passed to the south-west, between Banks' and Wollaston Lands; but Captain Beechey regards it as "probable" only, and even this probability arose out of the protracted absence of the expedition, for there were no new facts. He says every method of relief should be pushed forward from Barrow's and Behring's Straits, and by the coast of America; but he specially recommends an expedition by way of Barrow's Strait, in which he is joined by Sir George Back.

Sir George Back thinks the missing ships are in the neighbourhood of Melville Island, and, seemingly, *not westward of it*. He does not agree with his colleagues in recommending other vessels to be sent to Behring's Strait, but proposes an expedition by *Barrow's Strait*. His views are evidently fixed solely on the *south-west direction* from *Cape Walker*. We fully concur in this expression of Sir George Back's; he seems to feel the fact that nothing had been done towards searching the area to which the Franklin Expedition was directed, and that it was imperative that it should be done, and at once.

Sir John Richardson thinks the western shores of the Parry archipelago should be searched in a high latitude, but that the parties should be sent in an east and south-east direction, crossing the line of search of Dr. Rae. He obviously looks to Melville Sound and its vicinity, a direction perfectly in accordance with Franklin's Instructions. The *large ice* assigned to the expedition is easily accounted for, when we consider the known energy and daring of Sir John

Franklin and his able officers and crews, the desire to push on, their long absence, and the entire want of intelligence or traces to the eastward in Barrow's Strait. But how did he get to the westward of Melville Island, that a searching expedition should look for him in that direction? It could only be by the north: we had no proof of this—all was conjecture—we had not been enabled even to ascertain the first fact, whether he had reached Cape Walker (or its meridian); or, having reached there, whether he had gone to the southward or the westward. This should have been first determined. It will have been observed that two of the Arctic authorities give the preference to the search by Barrow's rather than Behring's Straits. The supposition that he had attempted the route of the Wellington Channel, before this was ascertained, was altogether absurd; out of the question in a reasonable point of view, and quite at variance with the Instructions.

There is yet one observation: it is singular that while the advocates for the Behring's Strait Expedition have speculated more or less on the western limits of Melville Island and Banks' Land, without knowing their extent westward, no one has ventured to express any opinion of the *northern limits of Victoria or Wollaston Lands, or the eastern extreme of Banks' Land*, excepting Sir John Richardson: he, seeking for the origin of the flood tide known to come from the eastward, down Dolphin and Union Straits, imagines a passage to exist between Wollaston and Victoria Lands. Now, looking at the position of Melville or Parry's Sound, between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, it would seem natural that its southern limits should have drawn *inquiry*, and we think, *should have had marked attention*; but no, it is shunned: this is much to be regretted, as within that deeply important space ever has and will be centred all our thoughts and hopes of the toils, the daring, the enterprise, and the safety, of the Franklin Expedition. To return: in the end it was resolved by the Admiralty to send an expedition to Behring's Strait; from thence eastward to Banks' Land and Melville Island; in reality to make a north-east passage from Behring's Strait. By this route it was hoped the long absent navigators would be met, *whether they had made good a passage from Cape Walker to the south-west, or having gained large western longitude by the north of Melville Island, had come down to the westward of it; so far, it was good.*

1849.—The secretary of the Admiralty, in a letter to the secretary of the Hudson's Bay Company, dated Dec. 22nd, 1849,* in ignorance

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," pp. 44-7 et 53.

of the point which Dr. Rae may have attained last summer, "and of the means he may yet have left at his command, it is difficult to say to what special points it would be wise to direct Dr. Rae's well-known energy, or the generous disposition of the Hudson's Bay Company. It would, no doubt, be most desirable that Dr. Rae should again proceed to the northward of Victoria Island (Land); and though varying his route, yet always endeavouring to approach Banks' Land and Melville Island; but my Lords consider that the safest and surest thing that can be done is to request the Hudson's Bay Company to authorize him to do the utmost that he can accomplish with safety to himself . . . to further the great object in view; and to let him be guided by his own experience and judgment. . . . If all further efforts afloat are beyond his reach, then the expedition proposed . . . to the westward of the Mackenzie River, and the establishment of a communication with the Russians and the Esquimaux, would be well worth any expense attending it. . . . Their Lordships therefore request that the . . . Hudson's Bay Company will give the requisite orders, and the Government will pay the necessary expense incurred."

The necessary orders were forwarded to Sir George Simpson, Dec. 28th, 1849, and a letter was also written to the Governor of the Russian American colonies at Sitka, requesting his co-operation.

Sir George Simpson (January 21st, 1850), giving instructions to Dr. Rae, says, "You will observe that the opinion in England appears to be that our explorations ought to be more particularly directed to that portion of the northern sea lying between *Cape Walker on the east, Melville Island and Banks' Land to the north, and the continental shore, or the Victoria Islands, to the south,*" as these limits are believed to embrace the course that would have been pursued by Sir John Franklin. Our object in noticing these letters is to show,—the first point of the Instructions given to the Franklin Expedition was quite understood—the north of Barrow's Strait and of the Parry Islands is not mentioned.

Mr. John Christophers, Dec. 4th, 1849,* suggested to the Admiralty a plan for reaching the Pole from Smith's Sound. However wild and imaginary it may seem at first sight, Mr. Christophers offers many valuable suggestions for travelling parties. But the portion we have to do with is the course Franklin pursued, and the search to be made for his recovery. He says, "as the distance from Melville Island

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 133.

near Icy Cape is only about 750 geographical miles, I respectfully suggest, that the *Enterprise* and *Investigator* should go to Melville Island," and if Sir John Franklin's ships be not found there, he recommends his mode for searching by travelling parties; this gentleman looks to the south and west, the true direction.

Captain Wm. Penny, well known for his experience acquired over twenty-eight years of service in the northern whale fishery, at this time offered his services, to search by the way of Baffin's Bay. In a letter to the Admiralty, dated Dec. 22, 1849,* he proposes to examine Jones' Sound, and obtain through it "an earlier passage . . . into Wellington Strait;" thoroughly to examine it, "since, if Sir John Franklin has taken that route with the hope of finding a passage westward to the north of the Parry and Melville Islands, he may be beyond the power of helping himself. No trace of the expedition, or practical communication with Wellington Strait, being obtained in this quarter," he "would proceed to Lancaster Sound, with the view of proceeding to the west, and entering Wellington Strait; or, if this should not be practicable, of proceeding farther westward to Cape Walker, and beyond," and "commence the search westward and northward the ensuing year." This plan, it will be seen, embraces the north-west, the west, and south-west, a wide range of coast for search in such a fettered climate, for the adoption of which Capt. Penny offers no specific reasons; all his arguments are founded on the very doubtful position, "If Sir John Franklin has taken that route." We do not agree with him that "Sir John Franklin may have gone in several other directions," nor with this conclusion, "for one seems just as probable as another." These assertions go to prove nothing as to the course the expedition pursued; but they do rather prove the erroneous opinions entertained at the time. Here is another instance of the errors that may and do arise from unrestrained thought. If Captain Penny had read the only fact we had for our guidance, *i. e.*, if he had read with attention and without prejudice the Instructions given to Sir John Franklin, he never could reasonably have imagined that he took a north-west course, unless under the circumstances pointed out by Section 6, which left him no alternative but to take that direction. His orders commanded him specially "not to stop to examine the openings north and south of him," but "to push on to Cape Walker, and from thence in a south-west direction." But if "arrested by ice of a permanent appearance," he had then the option

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 133-4.

of taking the Wellington Channel route. Now we are bound to infer, Franklin would make Cape Walker his first great object; and in the absence of all intelligence, we are equally bound to conclude that he was successful; in short, we had not a particle of evidence to prove to the contrary, then why seek him in the north? We perceive Capt. Penny mentions Cape Walker as the last for examination—why, it should have been the first. Why should the intent of the Instructions be thus inversed? The tendencies shown in this case, as in others already given, prove that the ill-judged importance attached to the sounds and passages north of Barrow's Strait by some of the Arctic authorities are acquiring a widespread, and, we fear, a disastrous influence. That Capt. Penny possessed all the qualifications of a seaman; that his experience was perfect as a commander amid the perils of ice navigation, there is no doubt; that his motives and feelings were in the humane cause, and highly honourable to him, is not questioned; still something more than these were required. With the knowledge of the vexed question, and particularly the original plan of Sir John Barrow, to daring and a love of enterprise, a calm, cool judgment was required, where ebullition of feeling and visionary conclusions held no sway. The hydrographer, in a memorandum on this plan,* noticing "the daring but prudent conduct Mr. Penny is said to have evinced on many occasions, together with his large experience, . . . gained during a whole life among the ice, . . . thinks it would be wise to let loose his energy." But did it never occur to those, advising in these matters, that this plan offered but slight hope for giving relief to the missing expedition? it therefore might fail of its object, and failing, time would be lost, time finite; and it lost, death to Franklin and his gallant officers might ensue. Calm reason and sober truth once left, we stray in endless error!

During this year (1849), the Behring's Strait Expedition, *Herald* and *Plover*, under the direction of that excellent officer, Capt. Henry Kellett, and his able second, Commander Moore, became completely organized. The *Plover*, a bad sailer, had not effected a meeting with the *Herald* until July 15th, 1849. Her voyage from England had been so protracted, that she was compelled to winter on the Asiatic side in a harbour since called Emma Harbour, near Tchutskoi Noss.

Various were the offers of service during the year; to blow up the

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 134.

ice at ten or fifteen miles per day by Mr. G. Shepherd, C.E.; to explore by means of balloons, by Lieut. Gale, &c.

It would be untrue to say the Admiralty were not at this time fully impressed with the importance of sending immediate relief, if possible, to the unhappy Franklin and his unfortunate companions; they were doing all that a fond country, *anxious* for its long absent sons, could do; but the conflicting nature of the advice tendered will, we fear, perplex, if it does not confound, their best intentions.

CHAPTER VII

NEW YEAR SAD BUT ACTIVE—NEW PLANS: M'CORMICK, S. OSBORN, JOHN ROSS, LADY FRANKLIN—OFFERS OF SERVICE FROM CHARLES REID, REV. J. WOLFF, R. A. GOODSIE—COLLINSON AND M'CLURE SAIL — INSTRUCTIONS — HYDROGRAPHER'S NEW PROPOSAL VIA BARROW'S STRAIT—OPINIONS: HAMILTON, PARRY, SABINE, BACK, RICHARDSON — REMARKS — LADY FRANKLIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA—PLANS OF W. SNOW, M'LEAN, S. OSBORN.

1850.—The new year opened oppressive with gloom and fearful anticipations of disaster and suffering to the missing expedition, and yet there was an activity of mind pervading all ranks, a firm resolve to save if possible. Legion were the gallant hearts offering service in a cause so noble, so holy and humane. It would be vain here to describe the deep anguish and anxiety for the missing ones in their homes at this period, of mothers, fathers, wives, and children; and the profound solicitude of the public. Hope had not altogether expired, but it flickered between the extremes, life and death. She had not departed, and the forlorn and drooping still clung to her. The three years for which the ships were provisioned were now expired, and terrible visions of protracted misery and starvation forced themselves on the minds of all; still the ships and crews were considered safe; the full provisions of three years might by prudence be lengthened out to five; it was hoped, too, the animal life of the land and the sea of those regions, so abundant in parts already known, even yet farther to the north than the locality in which they were supposed to be ice-bound, would yield to the gallant missing ones sufficient to sustain life until relief should arrive: but then, again, during the five years they had been away not a trace of their movements had been discovered! It is true nothing, or little or nothing, had been done, and deeply, deeply was it deplored that Sir James Ross's expedition had been so completely a failure; much was it regretted that he had not attempted to get west, and endeavour to reach Cape Walker from North Somerset, instead of going south to a quarter where it was scarcely probable the expedition would be found; for had Franklin attempted that passage, he would have been safe, as he could then

have made known his position by notices at Cape Leopold or other headlands, and found provisions at Fury Beach. Two years were considered wholly lost. Cape Walker had yet to be reached, the threshold to be examined before we might expect any positive information as to whether the expedition had or had not reached so far west as it, or had been crushed in the middle ices of Baffin's Bay, as painfully asserted by unfeeling rumour.

Dr. M'Cormick (1st January, 1850) submitted another plan to the Admiralty,* for search by the Wellington Channel, &c.; alluding to his previous plan, the search up "Jones's and Smith's Sounds," and the deep interest attached to Wellington Channel, which he says he should have comprised within" his plan, "had not H.M.S. *Enterprise* and *Investigator* been employed at the time in Barrow's Strait for the express purpose of examining *this inlet* and *Cape Walker*, two of the most essential points of search in the whole track of the *Erebus* and *Terror* to the westward; being those points at the very threshold of his enterprise, from which Sir John Franklin would take his departure from the known to the unknown, whether he shaped a south-westerly course from the latter, or attempted a passage in a high latitude from the former point. . . The return of the sea expedition from Port Leopold . . . unsuccessful, . . . the case stands precisely as it did two years ago; the work has yet to be begun." He adds his belief, "that Sir John Franklin's ships have been arrested in a high latitude, and beset . . . northward of the Parry Islands. Their probable course thither has been through the Wellington Channel, or one of the sounds at the northern extremity of Baffin's Bay. . . This appears to me to be the only view of the case that can in any way account for the entire absence of all tidings of them throughout so protracted a period of time. . . Isolated . . . their position would be under such circumstances. . . Had Sir John Franklin been enabled to shape a south and westerly course from Cape Walker, as directed by his Instructions, the probability is, some intelligence of him would have reached this country ere this . . . either in the direction of the coast of America, or Barrow's Strait, . . . or Esquimaux would have been fallen in with and tidings . . . obtained. . . Failing to penetrate beyond Cape Walker, Sir John Franklin would have left some notice of his future intentions on that spot or the nearest accessible one to it; and should he then retrace his course for the Wellington Channel (the most

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 124.

probable conjecture), he would not pass up that inlet without depositing a farther account of his proceedings." Dr. M'Cormick concludes by volunteering to examine the Wellington Channel, the western coast of North Devon and Cornwallis Islands. Jones's Sound not to be omitted. Enclosed with this plan is the opinion of Sir Edward Parry;* he says, "Among the probabilities to which we are now driven there is none more likely than that Sir John Franklin may have tried some one of those inlets, *after failing in Lancaster Sound*. . . I do think it would be worth while to let you have a boat to make the attempt."

The hydrographer, Sir Francis Beaufort, in a note appended to this plan, says:—"Dr. McCormick has shown so much heart and perseverance in urging his project for relief, . . . that there can be no doubt he would execute it with commensurable zeal and resolution, and though it does not appear to me that Jones's Sound or Wellington Channel are the most likely places to find the ships, yet in the fifth year of their absence *every place should be searched*."

Dr. McCormick clearly understands the plan and object of Sir John Franklin's Expedition; altogether, his reasoning is excellent, but the arguments are founded on the supposition that, because of the protracted absence of the expedition, and no tidings being heard of it, hence it must be to the north, in a high latitude. Now this wanted proof. The case stood as he says it did "two years before;" indeed, as it stood after Franklin left the whalers in 1845. The absence of information could not alter it; it was "as problematical as ever;" the instructions, therefore, were equally binding upon us now as then. We had done nothing, although five years had nearly elapsed. We had not sought for intelligence where it could be obtained, *i. e.*, on the route in which he was sent. At this time Franklin may have reached Cape Walker, and cairns may have been erected and despatches deposited there, but as WE *had not reached it*, of course we were ignorant of their existence. Again, as to the American coast; although success had not rewarded the arduous efforts of the indefatigable Sir John Richardson and Dr. Rae (sent with the hope of meeting him emerging from the north-east), still, could not conjecture spare a thought on this, and question, Might there not exist causes preventing Franklin making known his position, either by the American coast or Barrow's Strait? as we shall show anon. At this time, then, there was no reason for the conclusion that he

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 123-5.

had gone up Wellington Channel, or by any outlet, sound, or passage north of Barrow's Strait (or 74° north), between "Melville Island on the west and the great sound at the head of Baffin's Bay on the east." Had we been certain that Franklin was shut out from Cape Walker, then Wellington Channel might have offered a point for attention; but even then, only under consideration, for although unable to get to Cape Walker from ice, &c., still the south-west over 17° of longitude was before him; he might still have persevered to make *westing* along the parallel of 74° north, and *southing* where he could; and in the course of doing this he may have attained such large westing, as to make it questionable whether it were not better still to persevere in that direction; or, being foiled near Banks' Land (but east of it), have taken advantage of one of the western passages to the north, between the Parry Islands, rather than to return to the eastward and attempt the ascent of that doubtful (because unknown) passage, the Wellington Channel; "no one knew where it would lead." There was and is only one condition of things that could at all make the Wellington Channel probable, and that is—having positively ascertained that all outlet to the south and west was impracticable by the existence of insurmountable obstacles from ice, extending from Cornwallis Island across to North Somerset, presenting a bar to all advance in that direction. Even then we must presume that Wellington Channel was "open, and free from ice," ready to receive and offer him a navigable passage to the north. Under such circumstances, he might have passed up it; but all these we had yet to learn. Wellington Channel, the northern passages, and the great sounds, have received prominent notice; but all the reasoning is purely imaginative, and, therefore, baseless. We repeat, we fear the preponderating influence of these channels and sounds; they are opposed to the letter of Franklin's Instructions, and may lead to disappointment, if not fatal results.

Lieut. Sherard Osborn, R.N. (4th January, 1850), submitted a plan and offer of service to the Admiralty: * "A second attempt to reach Sir John Franklin being about to be tried, I take the liberty of calling your attention to the inclosed proposition for an overland party to be despatched to the shores of the Polar Sea, with a view to their traversing the short distance (301 miles) between Cape Bathurst and Banks' Land." The reasons assigned are:—"General opinion places the expedition to the west of Cape Walker, and south of the

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 167, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 130.

latitude of Melville Island. . . . Every mile traversed northward by a party from Cape Bathurst would be over that unknown space in which traces of Franklin may be expected. . . . The proposed expedition would carry into execution a very important clause in the Instructions given to Sir James Ross, viz., that of sending exploring parties from Banks' Land in a south-westerly direction towards Capes Bathurst and Parry."

The necessity for an expedition in this direction had already been anticipated by Sir John Richardson, as has been already noticed, in the unsuccessful attempt in the summer of 1849 by Dr. Rae. His object was to reach the opening (a supposed strait) between Victoria and Wollaston Lands, and thence north to Banks' Land. He did not succeed; but intended to renew the attempt in the summer of 1850. The Admiralty Instructions subsequently directed the course of the expedition more westward to Cape Bathurst, and thence to Banks' Land, and this service was confided to Commander Pullen.

Lady Franklin, 13th January, 1850,* inclosed to the Secretary of the Admiralty various communications addressed to herself, containing offers of service from Captain Charles Roib, brother of the ice-master of the *Erebus*, and from the Rev. Joseph Wolff, of Bokhara celebrity, and subsequently one from Mr. R. A. Goodsir, brother of the assistant-surgeon of the *Erebus*. Neither of these communications offer any views as to the course and position of the Franklin Expedition.

Sir John Ross (14th January, 1850)† offered the "outline of a plan for affording relief to the Franklin Expedition," addressed to the Admiralty. We dismiss all preamble about the means to be employed; we have to do with the *direction* only. The expedition is to "call at Leopold Harbour, and thence to proceed to the western cape of Wellington Channel, where probably the first intelligence of Sir John Franklin may be found; and subsequently, according to circumstances, proceed to visit the headlands between it and Melville Island. . . . If necessary, to proceed to Banks' Land. . . . If no intelligence of" the "expedition is found at the different positions in Barrow's Strait, small parties . . . of an officer and two men must be detached in every direction likely to find the missing ships." Sir John Ross is decidedly of opinion, that with "this" plan he could perform this important service during the summer and autumn months, and concludes, "I have no hesitation in pledging

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 135.

† *Ibid.*, p. 115.

my word that I shall return in October next, after having decided the fate of Sir John Franklin and his devoted companions."

In reviewing this plan, we would observe that no objection can be taken to examining the headlands at the entrance (east and west) of Wellington Channel; but without absolute information that the Franklin Expedition had been altogether shut out from Cape Walker and the west and south, an extended search up that channel we considered, at the time (and of course now), mere chance-work: nearly the same observation may be applied to the headlands between it and Melville Island. But why not have examined the headlands or sea on the south, between Cape Walker and Banks' Land? Surely there the hope of finding the expedition was certain, for to that quarter Franklin was sent. Had the author of this plan ever read Franklin's Instructions? There are nine memoranda inclosed with this plan, as to Sir John Ross's "peculiar claims" for this service, two only of which apply here. "No. 2. As being the only officer who actually promised to search for Sir John Franklin, in the event of his not returning in 1847. . . . 3rd. Having had communication with Sir John Franklin touching the positions in which he may be found."

As to the promise, no one seems to have known that it was made; still it may have been made between the two gallant officers (?); but as regards the communication "touching positions in which he (Franklin) may be found," we may remark, why did Sir John Ross not make them known to the Admiralty, that they might be taken advantage of, and the rescue of this unhappy expedition be made certain? but we do not find any notice of them, either in any of Sir John Ross's letters or plans, and therefore they rest on mere assertion, which the plans themselves, by their vagueness, go to disprove. Their lordships do not seem, by their reply (dated 22nd January, 1850), to enter on Sir John Ross's views, for they say, "Further search from the eastward has not yet been determined upon."

The result of the hydrographer's proposition, and the opinions expressed upon it (already given), was the fitting out and despatch of the *Enterprise*, Captain Collinson, and the *Investigator*, Commander M'Clure, for the search to the north-east by way of Behring's Strait. They sailed from Plymouth 20th January, 1850. The essence of the Instructions upon which these enterprising officers were directed to proceed may be comprised in a sentence:—"Section 16. We leave it to your judgment and discretion as to the course to be pursued after passing Point Barrow"—sufficiently brief and unfettered; but we

ought to remark, great care is shown in these Instructions for the safety of this expedition, by the general excellent arrangements for communication with the *Herald* and *Plover*, and for depôts to fall back upon. Captain Collinson was farther aided by valuable memoranda from Sir Edward Parry, Captain Beechey, and Sir John Richardson; to those who feel an interest in Arctic exploration these offer most interesting matter for perusal.*

The object of this expedition was to search, not only the northern coast of America, but also the western coasts of Wollaston and Banks' Lands, Melville Island, Victoria Land, and the passages between, on the assumption that Franklin had made large westing, all of which was mere conjecture, arising out of long absence; but how he got there, whether by the south-west from Cape Walker, or by the north, no sound reason could be offered. Why not, then, have searched Melville Sound?

About this time various excellent letters, exciting to renewed search, appeared, "By an Observer."† In these a retrospect is taken of the whole plan of the Franklin Expedition and the past search; the conduct of the Admiralty, the Royal, and the Royal Geographical Societies are reviewed, and not always with candour; bold language is used, and assertions hazarded not always in keeping with facts; still their object was to spur the public and the Government to the rescue, and so far good. "Observer" suggests the following plan:—"Six whale-boats to be procured at Boston, and forty persons, scamen and officers, as the relieving party, divided into three brigades of two boats each. To this party should be attached another of forty men and officers, with six or eight canoes, the men being hunters and Canadian voyageurs, and they, likewise, should be divided into three brigades. Having obtained full instructions for every aid to be afforded to them by the Hudson's Bay Company's servants, the united brigades might push, in March or April (or earlier or later, according to circumstance), to the Great Slave Lake; thence, one brigade should strike to the north-east, down the Back or Great Fish River, to the Polar Sea. The other two brigades . . . down the Mackenzie and Great Bear Lake; one of them might turn off, cross the lake, and endeavour to reach the Coppermine River, following it down to the sea. The remaining brigade down the Mackenzie,

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 89-94.

† Letters "On the Relief of Sir John Franklin's Expedition. By an Observer." Pamphlet, published by Saunders, Charing Cross.

to its mouth. These three parties having reached the Polar shores, they should each choose a wintering spot. . . . The whale-boat parties, either on foot over the ice, or in their boats, according to the state of the sea, proceed in the following directions :—the Back River party in a north-north-west course, after passing Dease and Simpson's Straits. The Coppermine party towards the north-north-east, towards Cape Walker, Dr. Rae having been instructed to take his party due north to Banks' Land. The Mackenzie River division to make a northerly course, until it intersect the line which, it is supposed, the expedition of Captain Collinson from Cape Barrow will make in steering for Melville Island. "I cannot conceive," the author says, "that the whole of such a plan could miscarry. . . . In the year 1851, a fresh party might be sent, to re-provision, reinforce, or assist them . . . homeward."

We cannot view the plan before us with much favour. It involves the employment of too large a number of men; and it is questionable if so large a party could be provided for by the Hudson's Bay Company without long previous notice, the ground to be traversed is of great extent, and too remote from their stations. As to carrying their own stores over such a country and for so large a party, we think any attempt to do so would only impair their efficiency for action on their arrival on the shores of the Polar Sea, if not impracticable. The policy of wintering on those bleak shores we much question. Then, as to the directions of search, we do not see the advantage of sending a party from the Mackenzie in a "northerly course;" again, the ground eastward of the Mackenzie—Wellaston and Victoria Lands—was already occupied by Dr. Rae, and was soon to receive additional examination by Commander Pullen; the ships, too, under Captain Collinson would explore the western and southern shore of Melville Island, Banks', Wellaston, and Victoria Lands. The Coppermine party to Cape Walker might be of advantage, and so might the Back River party, if they could extend their search far enough in the directions indicated; but over unknown ground there always will arise the question whether it is land or sea, and if practicable. We therefore must doubt if any great good would result from either.

The Lords of the Admiralty,* availing themselves of a proposal of the Hudson's Bay Company to send a despatch to the Mackenzie, forwarded a letter to Lieutenant (now Commander) Pullen (dated 25th January, 1850). In it they observe :—"Viewing the possible

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition," pp. 47—57.

opportunity which your position may afford of a search being made from Cape Bathurst towards Banks' Land, my Lords are pleased to convey to you their sanction for your prosecuting such a search.

. . . The Hudson's Bay Company have been requested to instruct Mr. Rae to afford you his best advice and assistance, if you should fall in with him." With this was inclosed a copy of a letter from Sir John Richardson, containing his views on the subject; they embrace the time for starting, river routes, boats, provisions, &c.: also extracts from a letter from Dr. Scoresby (2nd January, 1850), from which we note, "It does not appear to me that the examination of the region or channel proximate to Wollaston Land and Victoria Land (as designed, I believe, for Dr. Rae) will comprise all that seems desirable, but that a party (a small one would do) issuing from the Mackenzie towards and *beyond Cape Bathurst, in the direction of Banks' Land*, would perform a most important service in a great and well-laid plan.

. . . This line of search seems to afford as good a prospect of crossing the track of the missing expedition as almost any other in contemplation." Enclosed also were memoranda from a paper by Lieutenant S. Osborn, R.N., 4th January, 1850 (see page 114).

These letters prove the existence of a strong feeling that Sir John Franklin was expected to have, at least, endeavoured to fulfil the first point of his Instructions; and more, that he had succeeded in making a general south-west course from Cape Walker. Considering the time that had elapsed since his departure (nearly five years), still to cling to the intent of the Instructions, induces the question, Why not search from the east by Barrow's Strait, from Cape Walker, in a south and west direction?

We shall now turn to the eastern opening. The search by Barrow's Strait was too important to be neglected; it was the direction in which the Franklin Expedition was ordered, and the Admiralty wisely entered upon the subject at once. The last expedition in this direction had failed altogether, as regards the west and south from Cape Walker; we were, therefore, nearly in the same position as before Sir James Ross's expedition sailed, with this exception—no traces having been found on the western coast of North Somerset, it led to the inference that the Franklin Expedition had not passed down Peel Sound. This was scarcely likely, unless under peculiar circumstances, at any time, as Franklin's route was more to the westward, but less probable in this instance, as the season of 1846 was by all considered favourable for getting to the westward, and reaching the first point of his Instructions. It proved only that Sir John

Franklin had not communicated with the *western* shores of North Somerset.

Five years had now passed over since Franklin sailed, years of painful anxiety. Procrastination was fraught with danger—danger imminent. Again the able hydrographer (still looking to the Instructions and to the south-west) proposed another expedition through Baffin's Bay and Lancaster Sound: the opening of the proposition is worthy the humane and experienced Sir Francis Beaufort* (date 29th January, 1850).

Section 1. "The Behring's Straits expedition being fairly off, it appears to me to be a duty to submit to your lordships that no time should now be lost in equipping another set of vessels to renew the search . . . through Baffin's Bay. . . . This search should be so complete and effectual as to leave unexamined no place in which, by any of the suppositions that have been put forward, it is likely they may be found.

2. "Sir John Franklin is not a man to treat his orders with levity, and therefore his first attempt was undoubtedly made in the direction of *Melville Island*, and not to the westward. If foiled in that attempt, he naturally hauled to the southward, and, using Banks' Land as a barrier against the northern ice, he would try to make westing under its lee. If both of these roads were closed against his advance, he perhaps availed himself of one of the four passages between the Parry Islands, including the Wellington Channel; or, lastly, he may have returned to Baffin's Bay, and taken the inviting opening of Jones's Sound.

3. "All these four tracks must be diligently examined before the search can be called complete.

7. "Whatever vessels may be chosen, I would beseech their lordships to expedite them. *All our attempts have been deferred too long.*

9. "As the Council of the Royal Society some time since thought proper to remind their lordships of the propriety of renewing this search, it would be fair now to call on that learned body for all the advice and suggestions that science and philosophy can contribute towards the accomplishment of the great object on which the eyes of all England, and indeed of all the world, are now entirely fixed."

This report, with memoranda by Capt. W. A. B. Hamilton, Secretary of the Admiralty, led to a conference; and the following opinions were given by Sir Edward Parry, Sir George Back, Capt. Beechey, Sir John Richardson, and Col. Sabine.

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 68.

Capt. Hamilton, February 5th, 1850, says, "With reference to Sir F. Beaufort's memorandum, it may be useful to advert to certain papers before the Board relative to the eastern search (*vid* Barrow's Strait), and he refers to three papers in particular. Mr. Hamilton, brother-in-law of the eminent Dr. Rae, writing from Stromness (November 15th, 1849), affirms positively, that 'on the day previous to his sailing from that place . . . Sir J. Franklin expressed his determination to endeavour to find a passage to the westward through Alderman Jones's Sound. To this observation Capt. Hamilton, after justly observing, 'Sir John Franklin is as little likely as any man to deviate from his orders,' thinks 'it quite possible that' he 'may in conversation have referred to Jones's Sound, and that Mr. Hamilton has construed his mentioning Jones's Sound in a *conditional* sense as an *un*-conditional statement of his intention.' Capt. Hamilton then refers 'to other papers, tending to show what the opportunities are which Jones's Sound offers.' "

"Captain Penny, in the offer of his services to the Admiralty, December 22nd, 1849, says, 'If an early passage be obtained, I would examine Jones's Sound, as I have generally found . . . clear water at the mouth of that sound, . . . and there is a probability that an entire passage by this route might be found to Wellington Channel.'

"Capt. Gravill, in his letter, January 25, 1850, suggests 'Jones's and Smith's Sounds, together with other quarters, as points of search.' Capt. Lee, an experienced commander, reports his having 'mistaken Jones's Sound in thick weather for Lancaster Sound;' that he 'sailed 100 miles up the sound without meeting obstruction of any sort;' and that, 'in running out of the sound the carpenter . . . observed a cairn of stones on one of the headlands.' * 'Admitting, therefore,' says Capt. Hamilton, 'the utmost desire of Sir John Franklin to follow his orders, . . . he may have found a literal compliance with them impossible; and their purport being to push to the westward, he would naturally take the next means of doing so, *if the first failed*; and if, on arriving off Lancaster Sound, he found obstruction, . . . he would most probably make the attempt by Jones's Sound. . . . Sir John Franklin being well aware that both Jones's and Smith's Sounds have always given promise of open water, . . . it may therefore be considered that there are sufficient grounds for a specific

* Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852." See letter from his son, p. 128. It was not Jones's Sound, but another deep inlet, in $74^{\circ} 40'$, or 75° , he entered—a pretty authority!

search of Jones's and Smith's Sounds.' He adds, 'With respect to any expedition . . . by the way of Lancaster Sound, Capt. Penny's may be difficult to improve upon.' Capt. Gravill's letter also offers some useful suggestions. In the paper by Dr. McCormick, great stress is laid upon 'the necessity of a search by Jones's Sound.'

We will now quote the opinions of various Arctic officers on the plan proposed by the hydrographer.

Sir Edward Parry (February 6th, 1850), says,* "I am decidedly of opinion that the main search should be renewed in the direction of Melville Island and Banks' Land, including as a part of the plan the thorough examination of Wellington Strait and of the other similar openings between the islands of the group bearing my name. I entertain a growing conviction of the probability of the missing ships, or a portion of the crews, being shut up at Melville Island, Banks' Land, or in that neighbourhood, agreeing with Sir F. Beaufort, that 'Sir John Franklin is not a man to treat his orders with levity;' which he would be justly chargeable with doing if he attached greater weight to any notions he might personally entertain than to the Admiralty Instructions, which he well knew to be founded on the experience of former attempts, and on the best information that could then be obtained on the subject. For these reasons I can scarcely doubt he would employ two seasons, those of 1845 and 1846, in an unremitting attempt to penetrate directly westward or south-westward, towards Behring's Strait," and "having penetrated, in seasons of ordinary temperature, a considerable distance in that direction, have been locked up by successive seasons of extraordinary rigour, thus baffling the efforts of their weakened crews to escape," either "by Behring's or Barrow's Straits. My conviction of this probability has been greatly strengthened by a letter I have lately received from Col. Sabine. . . It must be admitted, however, that considerable weight is due to the conjecture, . . . offered by persons capable of forming a sound judgment, *that having failed. . . to penetrate westward*, Sir John Franklin might deem it prudent to retrace his steps; and was enabled to do so (?) in order to try a more northern route, either through Wellington Channel or some other of those openings between the Parry Islands; and this idea receives importance from the fact, said to be beyond doubt, of Sir John Franklin having . . . expressed such an intention in case of failing to get to the westward . . . I cannot, therefore, consider the intended

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 102-3.

search complete, without making the examination of Wellington Strait and its adjacent openings a distinct part of the plan. . . . Much stress has likewise been laid" on "Jones's and Smith's Sounds," and "considerable interest has been attached to Jones's Sound. . . . From the fact of its having been recently navigated, . . . and found of great width, free from ice, with a swell from the westward, . . . and no land visible . . . in that direction," it "may be found to communicate with Wellington Strait; so that if Sir John Franklin's ships have been detained anywhere to the northward of the Parry Islands it would be by Jones's Sound that he would probably endeavour to effect his escape, rather than by the less direct route of Barrow's Strait. I do not attach much importance to the idea of his having so far retraced his steps as to come through Lancaster Sound and recommence . . . by entering Jones's Sound." Sir Edward notices the "somewhat vague report . . . of a cairn of stones" seen by a whaler, and thinks it "expedient to set this question at rest by a search in that direction, including the examination of Smith's Sound." Sir Edward recommends the examination, by two vessels, of "Wellington Strait, . . . and the adjacent openings between the Parry Islands, . . . and then to endeavour to ascertain the connection with Jones's Sound," and of it "with Baffin's Bay." "Two other vessels should push . . . towards Melville Island and Banks' Land, . . . carefully searching the southern shores of the Parry Islands;" he "thinks Capt. Penny might be advantageously employed in the examination of Jones's and Smith's Sounds," and that "Dr. McCormick's plan, for searching by boats, might form a useful . . . appendage to this branch of the expedition. He concludes, "What I have now proposed, when taken into consideration with the efforts of Capt. Collinson from the west, and those of Dr. Rae and Commander Pullen from the south, will complete a concentration of search (so to speak) in the direction of Banks' Land and Melville Island, *which I believe to constitute our best hopes of success.*"

Col. Sabine, in a confidential letter to Sir Edward Parry (January 15th, 1850,* and which he refers to in the preceding opinion), declares his views fully, from which we extract:—"There can be little doubt, I imagine, in the mind of any one who has read attentively Franklin's Instructions, and, in reference to them, your description of the state of the ice and of the navigable water in 1819 and 1820, in the route which he was ordered to pursue;—still less, I think, can there be a

* See Parliamentary Paper, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 109.

doubt in the mind of any one who had the advantage of being with you in those years,—that Franklin (always supposing no previous disaster) must have made his way to the south-west of Melville Island, either in 1845 or 1846. It has been said that 1845 was an unfavourable season; and as the navigation of Davis's Straits and Baffin's Bay was new to Franklin, we may regard it as more probable that it may have taken him two seasons to accomplish what we accomplished in one. So far, I think, guided by his Instructions, and by the experience gained in 1819 and 1820, we may reckon pretty confidently on the first stage of his proceedings; and, doubtless, in his progress he would have left memorials in the usual manner at places where he landed, some of which would be likely to fall in the way of a vessel following in his track. From the west end of Melville Island our inferences as to his proceedings must become more conjectural. . . . If he found the ocean, as we did, covered to the west and south . . . with ice of a thickness unparalleled, . . . he would, after probably waiting through one whole season, in the hope of favourable change, have retraced his steps, in obedience to the second part of his Instructions, in order to seek an opening to the north which might conduct to a more open sea. . . . He may, however, have found a more favourable state of things at the south-west end of Melville Island" than we did, and "have been led thereby to attempt to force a passage for his ships in the direct line of Behring's Strait, or perhaps, in the first instance, to the south of that direction; viz., to Banks' Land. In such case two contingencies present themselves; first, in the season of 1847 he may have made so much progress, that in 1848 he may have preferred . . . to push through to Behring's Strait, or to some western part of the continent, to an attempt to return by the way of Barrow's Strait; . . . the second contingency," and it is the one which "compels me, in spite of my wishes, to regard as the more probable, . . . his advance from Melville Island, in the season of 1847, may have been limited to a distance of 50, or perhaps 100 miles at farthest; and in 1848 he may have endeavoured to retrace his steps, but with only partial success. . . . Under these circumstances, incapable of extricating the ships, . . . the crews may have been . . . obliged to quit them, and attempt a retreat, not towards the continent, being too distant, but to Melville Island, where certainly food, and probably fuel (seals), might be obtained, and where they would naturally suppose that vessels despatched from England for their relief, would, in the first instance, seek them. . . . *Where the Esquimaux have*

lived, there Englishmen may live; and no valid argument against the attempt to relieve can, I think, be founded on the improbability of finding Englishmen alive in 1850, who may have made a retreat to Melville Island in the spring of 1849; nor would the view of the case be altered in any material degree if we suppose their retreat to have been made in 1848 or 1849 to Banks' Land, which may afford facilities of food and fuel equal or superior to Melville Island, and a further retreat the following year to the latter island as the point at which they would more probably look out for succour. . . The most promising direction for research would be by a vessel which should follow them to the south-west point of Melville Island." Finally, "one contingency unconsidered," . . . is that which would have followed in pursuance of his Instructions, if Franklin should have found the aspect of the ice too unfavourable to the west and south of Melville Island to attempt to force a passage through it, and he should have retraced his steps in hopes of finding a more open sea to the northward, either in Wellington Channel or elsewhere. . . Here, also, the expedition may have encountered, at no very great distance, insuperable difficulties. . . In this case the retreat of the crews . . . would most probably be directed to some part of the coast on the route to Melville Island," in expectation of succour.

Sir George Back (February 6th, 1850):* "In reference to the plan proposed . . . for continuing the search . . . in the direction of Barrow's Strait, Melville Island, and the openings north and south, especially Wellington Channel, together with a thorough examination of Jones's Sound, there cannot, I think, be a second opinion. . . I am persuaded that the missing ships are somewhere thereabouts." Sir George concludes with "a hope that the second plan (by Capt. Hamilton) of exploring Jones's Sound may be simultaneously executed."

Capt. Beechey (February 7th, 1850), Section 3,† fully concurs with Parry, Hamilton, and Sabine, with one exception. He says, "I think Leopold Island and Cape Walker . . . should be examined prior to any attempt being made . . . in other directions from Barrow's Strait, and that the bottom of Regent's Inlet, about the Pelly Islands, should not be left unexamined." Alluding to his memorandum, January 17th, 1849, he says,—"I am still of opinion, had Sir John Franklin abandoned his vessels near the coast of America, and much short of the Mackenzie River, he would have preferred the

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 106.

† *Ibid.*, p. 106.

probability of retaining the use of his boats until he found relief in Barrow's Strait, to risking an overland journey *vid* the before mentioned river; and it must be remembered, that at the time he sailed, Sir George Back's discovery had rendered it very probable that Boothia was an island.

"4. An objection to the necessity of this search seems to be that, had Sir John Franklin taken this route, he would have reached Fury Beach already; however, I cannot but think there will yet be found some good grounds for the Esquimaux sketch, and that their meaning has been misunderstood; and as Mr. McCormick is an enterprising person, . . . I would submit whether a boat expedition from Leopold Depot, under his direction, would not . . . set at rest all inquiry upon this, now the only quarter unprovided for."

5. "The examination of the sounds at the head of Baffin's Bay, but especially of Jones's Sound, I fully concur in, . . . more especially as there seems to be an opinion that this sound will be found to communicate with the Wellington Channel."

Sir John Richardson (February 7th, 1856*) commences by various observations on the "supplies of food to be procured by diligent hunting parties," &c. Section 3. "With respect to the direction in which a successful search may be predicated with the most confidence, various opinions have been put forth; some have supposed either that the ships were lost before reaching Lancaster Sound, or that Sir John Franklin, finding an impassable barrier of ice in the entrance of Lancaster Sound, may have sought for a passage through Jones's Sound. I do not . . . give much weight to either conjecture."

4. "With respect to Jones's Sound, it is admitted by all who are intimately acquainted with Sir John Franklin, that his first endeavour would be to act up to the letter of his Instructions, and that, therefore, he would not lightly abandon the attempt to pass Lancaster Sound. . . . Had Sir John Franklin gained that sound, —and we appear to be fully justified in concluding that he did so,—and had afterwards encountered a compact field of ice, barring Barrow's Strait and Wellington Sound, he would then . . . have borne up for Jones's Sound, but not until he had erected a conspicuous landmark, and lodged a memorandum of his reason for deviating from his Instructions."

5. "The absence of such a signal-post in Lancaster Sound is an

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 107.

argument against the Expedition having turned back from thence, and is, on the other hand, a strong support to the supposition, that Barrow's Strait was as open in 1845, as when Sir E. Parry passed it in 1819; that such being the case, Sir John Franklin, without delay, and without landing, pushed on to Cape Walker, and that subsequently, in endeavouring to penetrate to the south-west, he became involved in the drift ice, which there is reason to believe, urged by the prevailing winds, and the set of the flood tides, is carried towards Coronation Gulf, through channels more or less intricate. Should he have found no opening at Cape Walker, he would, of course, *have sought one further to the west*; or, finding the southerly and westerly opening blocked by ice, he might have tried a northern passage."

11. "Mr. Penny's project, restricted, as it is, to the search of Jones's Sound at its outlets, seems a fitting appendage to the other measures. Although I have endeavoured to show, in a preceding paragraph, *that it is not likely the missing ships entered Jones's Sound from Baffin's Bay*, yet, as they may have been compelled to make a northerly course from Barrow's Strait, and might afterwards, in trying to regain Baffin's Bay, have been arrested near Wellington Sound, with which it is understood Jones's Sound communicates, the latter ought to be explored, and its headlands carefully examined. The cairn . . . seen at the entrance of the sound should be visited, and searched for memoranda."

From the foregoing proposition of the hydrographer, and the opinions elicited by it, we are enabled to infer the sense in which the Franklin Instructions were viewed in 1850. Simple as these Instructions are, it will be seen other and a different meaning is given to them; or whence is it that these opinions vary so greatly, in some cases at variance, not only with the Instructions themselves, but also with each other? Hence any attempt to deduce a course for the Franklin Expedition from them would lead to conclusions most deceptive and erroneous. All, more or less, look to the west; but the error would lie, whether to the north or south of that point: the leaning seems to the north, and is, therefore, in *opposition to his orders*. We would rather these opinions had been less discursive; from this cause arises that indefinable vagueness in some of them, which imparts the tone of weakness and indecision observable in them. Facts are ever terse and stubborn, and need no verbose or elaborate style of expression; more brevity had given them more clearness. We fancy, too, we see in the expression of some of them a deference to others' opinions, rather than the enunciation of an

unfettered conviction; and yet two elements antagonistic each to each are visible—extreme caution and bold assertion. We admire the former, for the subject was momentous; but still, we think, whilst we would shut out bold assumption, that a more determinate expression might have been adopted, as we find it is in some cases, with equal soundness of judgment. Again, these opinions involve a very extended line of search. To us it seems impracticable, with four vessels only, in a climate with so short a season for navigation. How such various views could have arisen, it is our object to inquire; for it should be remembered, the plan was simple, and limited to a given space—between 98° and 115° west; and the Instructions are clear and positive—they admitted not of doubt. In them the Wellington Channel was only considered as secondary. Whatever value may have been given to “intentions” attributed to Sir John Franklin, those “intentions” were overruled by his orders; and unless we are prepared to think he would premeditatedly resolve to be faithless to them, a charge too grave to be entertained, we must throw overboard all assumed “intentions” on his part. In the absence of positive intelligence of the actual movements of the Expedition, we ought to have taken for granted that that gallant leader was endeavouring to fulfil his orders to the utmost of his power; and it was for us to follow *after him, taking them as our guide.*

The hydrographer's views as to the course of the missing Expedition appear to us rather obscure. He says, “His first attempt was undoubtedly made in the direction of Melville Island, and not to the westward.” To reach Melville Island from the east involves making westing: we presume he means, and not “to the westward of it.” But even this rendering of the sentence is not reconcilable with his views given in his “Report on the Proposed Expedition to Behring's Strait.” He there says, “Their orders would have carried them towards Melville Island, and *then out to the westward*, where they are entangled, &c.; and he endeavours to prove this. “For should they (the ships) have been arrested at some intermediate place, as Cape Walker, or at one of the northern chain of islands,” or “much to the southward of Banks' Land,” or lastly, “Wellington Channel,” we should have heard of them; and he concludes hence, “that they are locked up in the archipelago, to the westward of Melville Island.” We cannot account for this discrepancy.

Capt. Hamilton's memorandum of Franklin's conversations at Stromness about Jones's Sound may be summed up in that officer's own words: “Mr. Hamilton has construed his mentioning Jones's

Sound in a conditional sense, as an unconditional statement of his intentions." Capt. Penny's opinion of Jones's Sound, and its connection with Wellington Channel, is geographically of value, and would be in the search, if we were certain Franklin had gone up that Channel; but we were not, and, therefore, it seems to us of little value. The same may be said of Capt. Gravill's suggestions as to Jones's and Smith's Sounds. Capt. Lee's experience we are taught to value. If he makes such mistakes in his latitudes, Heaven only can tell us what dependence we ought to place on his longitudes; not to have examined the carpenter's cairn was, to say the least, negligent.* Finally, as to Jones's and Smith's Sounds, here given an undue importance to—an importance founded solely on the idea that the Expedition had altogether failed in the south-west—a mere supposition, which we cannot admit. If shut out from Lancaster Sound, Franklin, we repeat, would never have left the known for the unknown, without leaving notices of his determination. Dr. McCormick's plan for searching by Jones's Sound is daring, but again, he is active and enthusiastic. We have already ventured some observations on his plan.

Sir Edward Parry speaks with much apparent decision as to the direction in which the "main search" should be renewed, from a "conviction of the probability of the missing ships . . . being shut up at Melville Island, Banks' Land, or in that neighbourhood." He thinks Franklin followed his orders, and "employed two seasons in an unremitting attempt to penetrate westward or southward towards Behring's Strait, and that he is shut up at Melville Island, Banks' Land, or in that neighbourhood," and therefore the "main search" should be renewed in that direction, but he does not say whether to the eastward or westward of Banks' Land; he indicates the distance as "considerable," as "baffling the efforts of the weakened crews to escape," either by Barrow's or Behring's Straits; still all this is very vague;—he admits it "conjectural." Not a word is said of Cape Walker and the south-west: of that important space to which Franklin was directed, namely, Melville Sound. We again say, if the imagination had nothing firmly to fix itself upon but conjecture—but probability—why not have conjectured it probable (it is admitted he would follow his orders) that he *would go where he*

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 128. "It was not Jones's Sound he was in that year. It was a deep inlet, in from 74° 40' N. to 75° N., as near as he can say."

was sent—and there we ought to seek him—that is, in Melville Sound. Sir Edward's "probabilities" have been strengthened by a letter from Colonel Sabine. Of this we shall have to speak in our notice of it, to which we refer our readers. Sir Edward includes in his plan of search "a thorough examination of Wellington Channel . . . and other openings between the Parry Islands, . . . because considerable weight is due to the conjecture offered by persons of sound judgment (?) that if failing to the west, Sir John Franklin would try a more northern route." Why, this alternative was permitted him by his Instructions. There is no "soundness" evinced here; no need for conjecture; every one knew it who knew aught of the subject; then why waste time and words about it? This question should have been considered, *Had he failed to the westward and southward?* and the only answer that could be given was, We did not know. The next best thing to be done, then, was to ascertain; to send an expedition, and thoroughly examine Cape Walker, and thence to the south-west on to Banks' Land; in short, the whole of Melville Sound. A passing examination of the headlands from Wellington Channel to Melville Island might have been made by a second division at the same time. Sir Edward notices Jones's and Smith's Sounds, but it would seem, only from the "great stress" laid upon them by others; the vague report of the cairn of stones seen by Captain Lee, he thinks, should be set at rest and, finally, he believes the efforts of Collinson, Rae, and Pullen "from the south will complete a concentration of search in the direction of Banks' Land and Melville Island, which, he thinks, constitutes our best hope of success." From this it is clear the north holds out little promise to Sir Edward Parry; his hopes are centred in the south and west; and we entirely agree with him, for there lies the area in which Franklin was sent, and there we should follow.

Colonel Sabine says, in his letter to Sir Edward Parry, "There can be little doubt in the mind of any one who has read attentively Franklin's Instructions . . . but that he must have made his way to the south-west part of Melville Island." Surely there is some mistake here, or we have misconceived Franklin's Instructions. The south-west part of Melville Island, as then known, was that given by Sir Edward Parry, viz., at or about Cape Dundas. To reach it, Franklin must have passed between Melville Island and Banks' Land, that particular part he was directed to avoid, "in consequence of the unusual magnitude" and "fixed state of the barrier of ice observed (by Parry, 1820) off that cape." Why, then, suppose him

there, in face of Section G of his Instructions? and yet, Colonel Sabine has "little doubt" of it; nor can "any one," he says, "who has read attentively Franklin's Instructions," and "Parry's description of the state of the ice in 1819-20." Why, this very description induced the Admiralty to caution Franklin *not* to make the attempt that way. We are wholly at a loss to account for the Colonel's ideas on this subject. We must speak positively. It may be safely affirmed Franklin never attempted to reach Cape Dundas or the south-west end of Melville Island. He *was ordered to the south-west from Cape Walker*, and we had no information to prove that he was unable to penetrate in that direction. We cannot bring our minds to think that he abandoned his Instructions, and went to a part which he was especially directed not to attempt. We are compelled entirely to reject that idea, so contrary to the opinion of those who knew him—that he "was not a man to treat his orders with levity." Besides these, there is the improbability of his *leaving a limited, favourable area, where his energies might be concentrated*, to waste them on the illimitable unknown. We notice with pleasure, and fully concur in Colonel Sabine's observation, "Where the Esquimaux have lived, there Englishmen may live," and the conclusions he draws as to the probability of their existing in 1850 who have retreated in 1848 or '49, whether to Melville Island or Banks' Land. The reference to "Wellington Channel or elsewhere" is vague; still it is within the letter of Franklin's Instructions, assuming him as having failed "to the west and south of Melville Island;" but we think, if Franklin had advanced so far as to the meridian of that island, he would not have retraced his steps to make an attempt by Wellington Channel, but would have taken advantage of one of the more western passages of the Parry group.

Sir George Back presses the search generally in the right direction,—Barrow's Strait, Melville Island, and the openings north and south,—but we cannot agree to the specialty given to Wellington Channel and Jones's Sound; he thinks "the missing ships are somewhere thereabouts;" but where, in this extended area? If he had thrown overboard Wellington Channel and Jones's Sound, and confined his opinion to Melville Sound, he had probably been nearer about the position of the ships, and nearer his own formerly expressed views: at any rate, we knew of nothing to induce a change from them—where the ships were sent, there, and there only, could we have looked with reason to find them.

Captain Beechey, with a soundness of judgment that commands

our admiration, makes an exception to the general views entertained. He thinks, "Leopold Island and Cape Walker *should both* be examined *prior* to any attempt being made to penetrate in other directions from Barrow's Strait." This opinion is most important, as it confines attention to the points of Franklin's advance. He adds, "The Pelly Islands (Regent's Inlet)" should be examined also, as when Franklin sailed "Boothia was supposed to be an island," separated from the mainland by a passage between Back's River and Regent's Inlet, thus offering the means of escape to Fury Beach and Barrow's Strait. We must confess we should have looked for a retreating party in Barrow's Strait, but not by this circuitous route. "The sounds at the head of Baffin's Bay" he seems to think but little of; he concurs in their examination, but only to avoid the "painful regret of leaving them unexplored, . . . in the event of Franklin not being discovered in other directions." It is really gratifying to record the sentiments of this excellent, now lamented, officer.

Sir John Richardson attaches no weight to the opinion that Franklin's ships were lost in crossing to Lancaster Sound, or that they were barred out by ice at its entrance; nor does he believe they were shut out from Barrow's Strait or Wellington Channel. He thinks Penny might be employed in searching the outlets of Jones's Sound in Baffin's Bay, not because he believes the missing ships entered that sound from the eastward (by that bay), but in case of their having been compelled to a northerly course from Barrow's Strait up Wellington Channel, and arrested there by the ice; they might then try to escape to Baffin's Bay by the supposed communication between Wellington Channel and Jones's Sound. All his arguments enforcing these views are reasonable, and we may say conclusive on the several points. Still he thinks "*the expedition pushed on to Cape Walker and to the south-west, and became involved in the drift ice, which, there is reason to believe, urged by the prevailing winds and the set of the flood tides, is carried down to Coronation Gulf, through channels more or less intricate.*"

These observations are of the greatest importance, and we can only wonder they did not receive the attention they ought at the time. The following is not less so:—

"Should he (Franklin) have found no opening at Cape Walker, he would, of course, have sought one further to the west." Without doubt he would. Does it appear probable that, because he could not reach Cape Walker, he would abandon all hope to the west, over 17 degrees of longitude, with every favourable prospect of

effecting his object, and adopt the Wellington Channel route, which might lead him he knew not whither? It is improbable. He would try to gain all the westing he could over the whole space between 98° and 115° west; but "finding the southerly and westerly opening blocked by ice," or the existence of land, he might then, but not until then, have tried a northern passage. Of all the opinions that have been given, there are none more rational, more cogent, than Sir John Richardson's; it is in complete accordance with the general design of the voyage and alternative of Franklin's orders. Simple as this opinion appears, it especially marks the careful thought and investigation of this estimable, highly talented man; unswerving, he fixes his mind on the original intentions of the voyage, and all other thoughts are cast away. Amidst the whirl of distracting opinions in others, he still steadily follows the movements of his former friend and companion in suffering,* guided and assured by the Instructions given to Franklin, and his belief that he would not depart from them without good and sufficient reason. The after expressed intentions attributed to Franklin have no influence over him; the northern openings from Barrow's Strait and Baffin's Bay are of but little value in his estimation. We had as yet not searched for the expedition in the primary direction in which it was sent, and consequently we were not assured that Franklin and his gallant officers and crews had not accomplished the great object for which they went forth from amongst us. It should be noticed, Sir John Richardson does not even mention Smith's Sound. The reasons are obvious; it was out of Franklin's track, and altogether unknown; it was, in fact, as William Baffin (its great discoverer) left it in 1616.

The sum of these opinions is, the majority look to the west, to Melville Island and Banks' Land. The solitary opinion that Franklin "must have made his way to the south-west end of Melville Island" must at once be rejected; because it is not only not within the spirit of his Instructions (see Sections 5, 6), but is in direct violation of them. There is much mention of Wellington Channel and Jones's Sound: the former is mere conjecture, and the latter is founded upon it. As to Smith's Sound, how it could be thought Franklin should have been found in that vicinity is past our comprehension; but it is another proof that when reason and fact are left, and imagination rules, what wild and improbable notions are produced: there was not the shadow of a hope of finding our missing country-

* Franklin and Sir John Richardson were together on that fatal expedition, *via* the Coppermine River, 1819-20, and again down the Mackenzie, in 1825-6.

men in that direction. The impossibility of searching so vast an extent of coast from the south-west end of Melville Island to Smith's Sound, during the brief period of an Arctic summer, has been noticed. Happily, some of these opinions redeem *from oblivion the space, the plan, and the Instructions upon which the Franklin Expedition was to act*; they show how sound and legitimate were the original objects of the voyage. We should have wished to have seen Melville (or Parry) Sound specifically named for rigid examination. How much more worthy consideration than Wellington Channel, or Jones's or Smith's Sounds, the very mention of which distract from the original plan! In and by that Melville Sound was centred all our fairest prospects of a passage, best hopes of finding our countrymen, and restoring them to their kindred and their homes. However, it is highly gratifying, amid this jumble of facts and probabilities, to observe how highly and how justly the name and character of Sir John Franklin is appreciated, how strongly his sense of duty is insisted on. The hydrographer urges, "He was not the man to treat his orders with levity;" backed by Sir Edward Parry, who adds to those words, "which he would be justly chargeable with doing, if he attached greater weight to any notions which he might personally entertain, than to the Admiralty Instructions." These feelings are corroborated by his early friend and companion in Arctic discovery, Sir John Richardson:—"It is admitted by all who are intimately acquainted with Sir John Franklin, that his first endeavour would be to act up to the letter of his Instructions. . . . Without delay and without landing" he "pushed on to Cape Walker and to the south-west." These expressions of esteem and confidence are echoed by all; and however these opinions may (as we much regret to see) differ as to the direction Franklin took, and the probable, or rather, improbable localities suggested by some for search, with the desire to recover him, still all are united in bearing testimony to the distinguished qualities of this great commander, a testimony worthy the man, and the fair fame of Sir John Franklin.

Lady Franklin (February 11th, 1850) enclosed to the Admiralty various offers of service from the United States of America and Canada. The first in order of date is from Mr. W. Snow (New York, January 7th, 1850).*

This gentleman suggests a land expedition, of a party of 100 men, to proceed to Moose Fort (Hudson's Bay), thence to Chesterfield

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1860," pp. 137-8.

Inlet; the party then to be divided into three detachments. One party to proceed westerly to the "*easternmost limits of discovery yet made* from Behring's Strait, not beyond; a second party, the central, to shape a course towards the magnetic pole; and the third party (the easternmost) to go "direct to Prince Regent's Inlet, or the *westernmost point of discovery from the east*;" or "if a public and more extensive expedition, one upon a similar plan with the same number of men, say 300, or more, formed into three great divisions, one to proceed by the Athabasca, or Great Slave Lake, and follow out Capt. Back's discoveries; the second, through the Churchill district; and the third according to the plan of the private expedition before named." Mr. Snow thinks "the present position of the Arctic voyagers is not very accessible either by land or sea," or long ere this the Franklin Expedition would have, if not the whole, at least a part, returned. The object of the author is to force an expedition to them. The long letter, of which the above is the essence, seems to us to emanate more from enthusiasm and a humane desire to afford relief to our absent countrymen, than from reflection as to the practicability to carry it out. One hundred, and in the second plan, 300 men through the Hudson's Bay Company's territories, to be "upheld and pushing forward," seems difficult. Mr. Snow admits it, and would employ "convicted criminals," if no other men would engage themselves. The employment of such men in a humane cause, who had forgotten their duty to their fellow men amid more peaceful, less responsible, and less perilous scenes, seems to us to border closely on hallucination. Both of these plans embrace a quarter where it was scarcely probable Franklin or his parties were likely to be found; if retreating from the space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, they would endeavour to reach Port Leopold in Barrow's Straits, to take advantage temporarily of the supplies at Fury Beach, under the hope of ultimately receiving succour from Lancaster Sound from the whalers, or a relieving expedition from England; or, if far to the south and west, from the Hudson's Bay Company's stations, *via* the Mackenzie River; but under no circumstances can we imagine they would make towards the southward and eastward, say to the embouchure of Back's River, unless the trending of the land at the bottom of Melville Sound, unknown then as now, forced them in an easterly direction to take advantage of the passage then supposed to exist between Back's River and Regent's Inlet, and so on to Fury Beach. Any attempt to ascend Back's River is most unlikely. Sir John Franklin was too

fully aware of its difficulties, its poverty in animal life for the supply of his men, &c., to attempt it. The route by Repulse Bay, and on to the Hudson's Bay Company's posts of Churchill, &c., is equally improbable, as Franklin was not aware of the discoveries of Dr. Rae in 1847, and the possibility of escape in that direction. These plans are ill considered; the scene of action is too far from the resources, and too exhaustive for so large a body of men to be of any use: even supposing them to have arrived on the spot, they would be more fit objects for relief than for relieving. We think, too, this plan, although very extensive, takes in a too circumscribed portion of Arctic America, and that in a very questionable direction.

Mr. John McLesn, Guelph, Canada West, 11th January, 1850.* The plan recommended by this gentleman is, by a vessel from York Factory to Wager River, *vid* Sir Thomas Rowe's Welcome, and thence to the Arctic Sea, "some 60 or 70 miles distant (?), then dividing into two parties, one to proceed east, the other west; he thinks 250 or 300 miles might be explored in either direction." The part of the Arctic Sea to be visited is not sufficiently defined; this plan otherwise seems practicable, but still it is not directed to a part where we should have looked for any retreating parties from the *Erebus* and *Terror*, unless under such circumstances as we have noticed on Mr. Snow's plan.

Enclosed with the preceding is the message of the President of the United States, Z. Taylor, Esq. (Washington, 4th January, 1850), to the Senate and House of Representatives, and the correspondence of the Vice-President, Millard Fillmore, Esq., John M. Clayton, George Bancroft, and Silas E. Burrows, Esqrs., to Lady Franklin.† These documents are all in reply to her ladyship's eloquent and touching appeal to the President, and through him to the sympathies of the American people, to aid in the search for the long-missing expedition (dated 4th April, 1849). We would endeavour to do justice to these more than interesting documents, by transcribing them in full, but the limited object of these pages does not permit us to detail the deep feeling here shown by our trans-Atlantic brethren, and yet feeling has originated our mission. Surely, if ever there was a sincere reciprocation of honest solicitude of man for his fellow man, we find it exemplified here for our missing countrymen—from the chief magistrate to the citizen, from the citizen to the chief magistrate!

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 141.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 143-50.

We can only say, long may such mutual feelings, such generous emotions, exist between the mother and daughter, proved as they have since been by the daughter's best test of sincerity, "action." We cannot leave this correspondence without noticing how clearly Lady Franklin, in an explanatory paper, lays down the Instructions given to her gallant husband (on his departure), for the guidance of the President and people of the United States.* She adds:—"It is possible that they may be found in quarters the least expected, but in the first instance the attention . . . *should be directed to the quarters pointed at in the Admiralty Instructions to Sir John Franklin.*"† In her anxiety she calls attention to the channels leading out of Barrow's Strait to the north. She mentions, too, "Wellington Channel," and "the sounds and inlets north and west of Baffin's Bay;" and to the south, "Boothia, North Somerset, Gulf of Boothia and Regent's Inlet, and the coast eastward of the Coppermine to Back's River."

The next enclosure is from Lieut. Sherard Osborn (6th October, 1850).‡ After an observation on the importance of giving to generous America "a clear field for the exercise of their energy and emulation," he offers the following as points for search, in which it is probable the lost expedition may be found:—"The coast of Repulse Bay, Hecla and Fury Strait, Committee Bay, Felix Harbour, the estuary of the Great Fish River, and Simpson's Strait, with the sea to the north-west of it." He reasons:—"Suppose Sir John Franklin to have so far carried out the tenor of his orders as to have penetrated south-west from Cape Walker, and to have been either" cast away, "or hopelessly impeded by ice," and "found it necessary to quit his ships, they being anywhere between 100° and 108° W., and 70° and 73° N., . . . to retrace his steps to Cape Walker, and thence to Regent's Inlet, would be, no doubt, the first suggestion that would arise. Yet there are objections to it. Firstly. He probably would have to contend against the prevailing set of the ice and currents (?) and northerly winds. . . . Secondly. If no whalers were found in Lancaster Sound, how was he to support his party where the musk ox and reindeer are never seen? Thirdly. Leaving his ships in the

* The thanks of the Royal and the Royal Geographical Societies were at this time offered to the Government and people of the United States. See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," pp. 149-50.

† Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 146; and *Ibid.*, No. 97, 1851, pp. 1-4.

‡ Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 151.

summer, . . . he could only reach the whaling ground in the fall of the year. . . . In such case, would it not be advisable to make rather for the southern than the northern limit of the sea visited by whalers? Fourthly. By edging to the south rather than to the north, Sir John Franklin would be falling back to, rather than going from relief, and increase the probabilities of providing food for his large party." Lieut. Osborn thinks he would not go "due south," because "Victoria Land was in his road, and when he did reach the American shore, he would attain a desert of whose horrors he no doubt retained a vivid recollection." He adds:—"There remained but one route for Sir John Franklin . . . to follow, and it decidedly has the following merits,—that of being in a direct line for the whale fishery; that of leading through a series of narrow seas adapted for . . . open boats; that of being the most expeditious route by which to reach Fort Churchill; that of leading through a region visited by Esquimaux and migratory animals; and this route is *through the straits of James Ross, across the narrow isthmus of Boothia Felix* (which was not supposed to exist when Sir John Franklin left England, and has since been discovered (?) . . . into the Gulf of Boothia, where he would pass by Hecla and Fury Strait into the fishing ground of Hudson's Strait, or else go southward down Committee Bay, cross the Rae Isthmus into Repulse Bay, and endeavour from there to reach some vessels in Hudson's Bay, or otherwise, Fort Churchill. It is not unlikely, either, that when Franklin had got to the eastern extremity of James Ross' Strait, and found land . . . where he had expected to find a strait, that his party might have divided, and the more active . . . attempted to ascend Back's River, where we have Sir George Back's authority for supposing they would find . . . abundance of food, in fish and herds of reindeer, &c." (?), "whilst the others travelled on the road I have already mentioned. . . . A search for them, therefore, on this line of retreat I should think highly essential." Lieut. Osborn suggests the following plan, of which we can only give the outline:—

"Suppose a well-equipped expedition to enter Hudson's Strait, and then to divide into two divisions, one to go northward through Fox Channel, to Hecla and Fury Strait, examine the shores of the latter carefully, . . . and proceed to Melville, or Felix Harbour, in Boothia, . . . and despatch . . . boat parties across the neck of the isthmus into the western waters, . . . divide, . . . and one party to proceed through James Ross' Strait, and push over sea, ice, or land to the north-west as far as possible. . . . The other boat

party to examine the estuary of the Great Fish River," and "westward along the coast of Simpson's Strait," and "examine the Broad Bay formed between it and Dease's Strait." The second division "might pass south of Southampton Island, and coast along from Chesterfield Inlet (northward) to Repulse Bay; there boat parties might cross Rae Isthmus into the bottom of Committee Bay, . . . visit both shores of the said bay, and rendezvous at the western entrance of Fury and Hecla Strait. . . . The second division should then pass into Fox Channel, and turning through Hecla and Fury Strait, pick up the boats at the rendezvous," and "steer northward along the unknown coast extending as far as Cape Kater," and from thence "to Leopold Island, and having secured the ships there, despatch boat or travelling parties in a direction south-west from Cape Rennell (North Somerset), being in a parallel line to the line of search we shall adopt from Cape Walker, and at the same time it will traverse the unknown sea beyond the islands lately observed by Captain Sir James Ross: some such plan would, I think, ensure your gallant husband being met or assisted, should he be to the south or west of Cape Walker, and attempt to return by a south-east course."

Before we proceed farther with this plan, we would draw attention to the remarkable *extension eastward the line of search* is taking. Each recommendation increases it yet more. Already search has been proposed from "Melville Island in the west to the great sound at the head of Baffin's Bay in the east," including the passages between the Parry Islands and the Wellington Channel: this by the north. Hudson's Bay, Fury and Hecla Straits, Repulse Bay and Regent's Inlet, Boothia, Simpson's Strait, Back's River, and on to the Coppermine River, in the south. How to reconcile such widely extended and different directions for the escape of a retreating party, originally ordered to Cape Walker and the south-west, we are sorely perplexed. We had not, at this time, a particle of information to guide us, but the knowledge of where we had sent Sir John Franklin. How their Lordships at the Admiralty, with such conflicting and opposite elements before them, embracing half the compass, could arrive at anything like a sound conclusion, we cannot conceive, unless they were themselves "well up" on the question; but it must, even then, have been a great trial for their patience. It will have been observed, that no positive plan is yet offered for searching the area to which Sir John Franklin was specially ordered (that is, south-west of Cape Walker); it would have been a glorious and independent field

for our kind and generous brethren of the United States. Few at that time looked for a retreating party on the American continent eastward of 100° W., excepting the most crotchety or enthusiastic, or others led solely by their humane feelings, who would search here, there, everywhere, however improbable the direction, so that our long-absent countrymen might be found and restored. But the indulgence of these feelings only led to weakness in our operations; we attempted too much, and disappointment followed, as might be expected. In the prefatory remarks to the plan before us, we must notice several discrepancies, arising from hasty thought. First. If the expedition was so far westward, say, "between 100° and 108° W., and 70° and 73° N.," in attempting to retrace his steps to the eastward Franklin was not likely to be impeded, by either the set of the ice or currents. It was well known the general current ran to the eastward into Baffin's Bay, and with it the ice; therefore he would be assisted and not impeded by it. Then, as to the isthmus of Boothia Felix not being supposed to exist when Franklin sailed, but discovered since. This is quite erroneous; the Ross's expedition discovered it during their long captivity here from 1829 to '33, and Franklin was aware of its existence. However, he may have taken advantage of the isthmus and its chain of lakes to reach the Gulf of Boothia. We certainly think this far more probable than his attempting a retreat by the supposed passage between Back's River and the bottom of Regent's Inlet, more to the southward—it was nearer Fury Beach and its supplies, and it should not be forgotten, the southern part of Regent's Inlet was unknown when he sailed. Lieut. Osborn thinks he would pass by Hecla and Fury Strait to the fishing ground of Hudson's Strait, or cross Rae Isthmus into Repulse Bay. The first offers, according to Parry, an ice-blocked strait,—no very great recommendation,—we therefore think it very unlikely to have been adopted. The second might have been attempted; but it should be remembered it was little known, and consequently uncertain. Rae's discoveries in 1847 Franklin was, of course, unaware of. Franklin never expected to find a strait eastward of James Ross' Strait, across the Isthmus of Boothia. The author seems to have confounded the supposed strait from Back's River with one across the isthmus. He thinks one party may have ascended Back's River, and, if we are not strangely mistaken, misquotes Sir George Back as to its "abundance of fish and herds of reindeer," &c. We think it in the highest degree improbable that any party would make an attempt by that "execrable river," with its eighty falls, and its scarcity of animal life. Lieut.

Osborn seems altogether to have forgotten *Fury Beach and its supplies*, and the importance of Barrow's Strait as a means for relief and supply from England; and yet there was the example of Sir John Ross before him. We cannot understand why Franklin should be looked for so much to the southward and eastward, by Back's River—in preference to Port Leopold and Fury Beach. We had not reached Cape Walker, and therefore knew not what direction he had taken, otherwise than that conveyed in his Instructions. We knew nothing of the space between it and Banks' Land; it might be water, facilitating his course to the south-west; why, then, look for him in the south-east? Again, there was encouragement to look to the south-west, in the flood tide noticed by Sir John Richardson, as coming down Coronation Gulf from the northward and eastward, as he supposed, from between Victoria and Wollaston Lands. With respect to the plan, the assumed position for the missing ships is by no means improbable; we are, therefore, the more surprised that the author of it should have looked to the Isthmus of Boothia or Back's River as the direction in which Franklin would retreat (the former was probable, the latter not). Barrow's Strait was equally near, and more known.

The observations we have made on the author's prefatory remarks apply to the plan itself. We think it in a wrong direction, and the course proposed for the expedition, by Hudson's Bay and Fury and Hecla Straits, we consider altogether impracticable, seeing the magnitude of the obstacles and the delay that beset Parry, Lyon, and Back in their attempts to reach Regent's Inlet by that way. They were insurmountable, and yet seem not to have had due weight and reflection in the present case. The northern part of the search proposed, that is, from Cape Rennell to the south-west, could more easily be accomplished by way of Barrow's Strait, and if the bottom of Regent's Inlet required search, which at this period, when Cape Walker had yet to be examined, was doubtful, a boat expedition from Fort Churchill, *vid* Repulse Bay, would have completed it well, if done as it had been previously done by Dr. Rae, 1847. By the same route, Back's River, James Ross', Dense's and Simpson's Straits might have been examined. We must confess with astonishment that such a route as that by Fury and Hecla Strait should have had an advocate, especially as time was then so precious, when the failure, or even the loss of a season, might be fraught with much misery if not death to those in whose favour the plan was proposed. We can see nought but failure in this plan in all its divisions, whether we

consider the navigation of Fox's Channel, or the attempt to push through Fury and Hecla Strait; and after the experience we have had of the ice-encumbered Regent's Inlet, we shall not, we trust, be thought presumptuous when we declare our sincere conviction, gathered from the experience of the past, that all attempts to cross from Fury and Hecla Strait to Melville or Felix Harbour would be utterly impracticable. The new departure recommended, viz., from Cape Rennell to the south-west, is beyond our conception. What resultant good could possibly arise from such a course? What value the traversing of an "unknown sea"? rather a sound, or at best an intricate strait, where Franklin was not ordered to go, and where, if he did go, he was safe, being within the range of succour from Fury Beach or from England by Lancaster Sound; or, lastly, What hope of finding him in a locality from whence Sir James Ross had just returned without discovering any traces of the expedition? But the author thinks it probable Franklin might be retreating to the south-east. We do not. We would willingly pass over the remainder of this plan, but the task we have undertaken compels us on. We have ever considered that the want of success, and its painful results, have had for their origin a speculative tendency arising from unrestricted thought, instead of being the calm conclusion of well weighed reflection. Hence, schemes wild and delusive, contradictory and distracting, have followed. Lieut. Osborn then speaks of *Smith's Sound*: it is but justice to him to say he alludes to it as "an argument that has been brought forward;" but he thinks it quite possible Franklin, "having failed in getting through the middle ice, . . . may have turned northward, and gone up Smith's Sound. Every mile beyond its entrance" was new ground, and a reward to the discoverers; it likewise brought them nearer the Pole, "and . . . that open sea of which Wrangel speaks so constantly." Is this probable? He is here made to attempt a sound not even mentioned in his Instructions. It will be scarcely credited, —and yet this is not all,—the very limited area to which Franklin was directed seems now altogether lost sight of; the south-west is forgotten; that area to which our attention ought to have been solely confined. It had become extended, as we have noticed, from Melville Island in the west to the head of Baffin's Bay in the east; but even this extension for search in a northern direction is now deemed insufficient, and is to be farther extended eastward. "I think," says the plan before us, "a small division of vessels starting from Spitzbergen, and pushing in a north-west direction, might be of great service;" for

"it will be seen Spitzbergen is as near the probable position of Franklin (*if he went north about*), on the east as Behring's Strait is upon the west." Surely we have now reached the eastern limit for search by the north; imagination can no further go! A northern limit is here assigned to Greenland; it is converted into an island. Parry's experience of the sea north of Spitzbergen seems not to have been consulted; but we now leave this plan. Having endeavoured to do justice to it by copious quotation, how far, if adopted, it presents in its details any reasonable hope for the recovery of the gallant Franklin and his companions, who were ordered in a contrary direction, we must leave to our readers more conversant with the subject than ourselves; for ourselves, we believe it does not; on the contrary, we think such plans allure attention from the true direction for search, and may lead us to bitter reflections and painful endless regrets.

Other enclosures are from John Russel Bartlett, Esq.* to the Rev. Dr. Scoresby (Nov. 27th, 1849), enclosing a plan (but which does not appear in the Blue Book), also a letter from Capt. W. F. Lynch, U.S. Navy, dated Baltimore, Maryland, Nov. 17, 1849, late of the U.S. Expedition to Syria, expressing a wish to volunteer for the search. It contains also a notification that Capt. Wilkes, U.S. Navy (late commander of the U.S. Antarctic Expedition), had tendered his valuable services to his Government. These expressions of our American brothers in favour of Franklin and his companions cannot fail to be appreciated.

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107 "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 164.

CHAPTER VIII.

DR. KING—REMARKS—PENNY AND STEWART SAIL—INSTRUCTIONS—
 AUSTIN AND OMMANEY SAIL—INSTRUCTIONS—SIR JOHN ROSS
 SAILS—REMARKS—“PRINCE ALBERT” SAILS—“PRINCE ALBERT”
 RETURNS—ESQUIMAUX REPORT—FIRST TRACES OF FRANKLIN—
 OUR VIEWS, 1850—YEAR 1850 CLOSES.

DR. KING, in a letter, dated February 18, 1850, to the Admiralty, again urged his plan of search by the way of the Great Fish River: as the Dr. reiterates merely the same views, already fully noticed, we need not recapitulate them here.

That the British Parliament were not unmindful (February, 1850), of the fearful position of our long absent countrymen, we quote the following. Sir Robert Harry Inglis, in moving for any reports that might have been made by any of the officers employed in the late expeditions, and for copies of any plans of search, &c., &c.,* said he was “desirous of exciting an expression of sympathy for those who were now passing a fifth year—if God should have spared their lives—amid the horrors of an Arctic winter. He earnestly urged upon Her Majesty’s ministers to take such measures for the relief of their fellow countrymen as their own zeal, and the science of those by whom they were surrounded, might teach them to be most applicable for the purpose. The Government ought but lightly to esteem that person who could move for even a bit of paper in reference to future proceedings, who did not at the same time acknowledge what they had already done upon the same subject. At the same time he was bound to urge upon them not to lose a month, a week, a day, or even an hour, in seeking to release those gallant men from their perilous position. For every former expedition had failed, if not entirely or principally, yet in some measure, at least, from not having been sent forth from this country at an earlier period. In order that the search might be effectual, it ought to commence in *Baffin’s Bay*, at the end of May or the beginning of June, so that it might take advantage of the first opening in July. . . . He had not said a word on

* Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, March 5th, 1850, No. 107.

the subject as being one connected with humanity, with national honour, or with science; but the feeling of humanity ought to compel them, and a feeling of national honour ought to induce them to do what he now urged on Her Majesty's Government, without a word being said about science. For what did they hear at the close of last session? That the Governments of two other States were engaged in making preparations for rescuing our countrymen. He believed there was no precedent in history of one nation sending forth an expedition to rescue the lives of the subjects of another nation. He did not know whether, either in the case of Russia or of the United States, their hopes had been realized; but the honour of England required that efforts should be made by England herself to rescue our own countrymen. . . . This was not a private question, he would not therefore introduce private considerations; but when he reflected on the extraordinary conduct of the wife of Sir John Franklin, of her self-denying efforts in the cause of her husband and his companions: when he considered the hundreds of persons who were interested in the fate of the husbands and brothers now engaged in that expedition, he thought he did not unreasonably prefer his suit to the First Lord of the Admiralty, when he expressed a hope that he would take the subject into consideration, not merely from a sense of humanity towards those who were missing, or from a sense of national honour, or from a consideration for the cause of science, but also from a sympathy for the anguish and suspense that had been felt by so many of those who, though breathing the same genial air with ourselves at home, were suffering for those who were now separated from them, and were existing in the regions of an ice-bound zone." The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Francis Baring, stated in reply that it was the intention of the Government to send out again in search of Sir John Franklin, by Lancaster Sound, and that the various plans submitted to them had received their most anxious consideration. He thought it right to state that he had never done the House of Commons or the country the injustice to suppose that expense would be an obstacle when the lives of their fellow countrymen were at stake (an expression received with acclamation by the House), and that everything that human power could do should be done to save the lost expedition; while he was glad "to say that His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, the United States of America, and the Hudson's Bay Company, had most cordially entered into these views, and manifested the most earnest sympathy."

The First Lord might well say, in speaking of the plans submitted to them, that they had received *anxious consideration*: they were so numerous, so contradictory, and so widely extended, it demanded the exercise of every anxious thought and consideration, that they should be enabled to distinguish between those which had reason and probability for their basis and those which were merely the plausible emanations of heated thought.

The Admiralty must have presented at this time the similitude of a very *Babel*; such the "confusion of tongues," vying with that confusion of old. Would they had been scattered, and completed: resemblance! Their lordships saw the chaos around them, and probably dreaded the evil that might arise out of such conflicting elements; but out of them, we are bound to say, they sought to "educe good." They saw the *danger of delay*, and out of the discordant maze, the distracting elements before them, endeavoured to elicit Fact and Truth. Perplexed they were on all sides; the wonder, then, is, not that Cape Walker, and thence to the south-west, should have received only a secondary consideration, but that the first point of Sir John Franklin's Instructions should have been remembered, or, if remembered, been considered at all. The advocates for the search by the north certainly contributed their share to this chaotic result; those advocating the search southward of Barrow's Strait, however erring in detail, must be considered comparatively as harmless; inasmuch as they looked in a more reasonable direction. However, false as many of these opinions were, they led to the equipment and despatch of two expeditions by the way of Barrow's Strait, as will be noticed, in due course; each independent of the other, but, anomalous as it may seem, *both under the direction of the Government*.

In March intelligence was received from Lieut. W. J. S. Pullen and Dr. Rae.

Lieut. Pullen,* accompanied by Mr. W. H. Hooper,† with three boats, left the *Plover* off Wainwright Inlet, July 25, 1849, to examine the coast between it and the Mackenzie River, where they arrived on Sept. 5th, 1849. Having achieved this adventurous voyage in safety, they encountered several mishaps, all of which, with the usual ready expedients of our sailors, were soon overcome, but without discovering any traces of the Franklin Expedition, nor had any of the Esquimaux with whom they communicated seen anything of ships or men. Mr. Pullen and his party were accompanied by the

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," pp. 23—33.

† Author of "Ten Months among the Tents of the Tuski."

Nancy Dawson, yacht, owned and commanded by Robert Sheddon, Esq.,* to and beyond Point Barrow. This gentleman rendered them every and valuable assistance, the more praiseworthy as it was done in defiance of a most unruly, mutinous crew.

Dr. Rae, in a despatch dated Sept. 1, 1849,† details his unsuccessful attempt to reach Wollaston Land from the Coppermine River, during the past summer. It will be remembered that this indefatigable traveller had been intrusted by Sir John Richardson with the exploration of a strait then supposed to exist between Wollaston and Banks' Lands; and, if possible, to reach Banks' Land. "He accomplished the journey to Cape Krusenstern, but all his attempts—and they were numerous and daring—to effect the traverse to Wollaston Land were baffled, by the heavy pack ice which entirely barred the progress of his boat. Having waited in hopes of a change as long as he could, taking into consideration the imperative necessity of returning before the closing up of the Coppermine River, he was reluctantly compelled to abandon the enterprise."‡ One might regret this failure of success, but could not blame: a perusal of this despatch will convince the most exacting there was no lack of exertion on Dr. Rae's part.

Mr. William Penny was now (April) appointed to the command of the *Lady Franklin* and the *Sophia*; the latter under Mr. Alexander Stewart. Well manned and provisioned, they sailed from Aberdeen April 13th, 1850. The reasons assigned by the Lords of the Admiralty for appointing Mr. Penny to this anomalous command, may thus be given in brief extracts from their orders to him, dated April 11th, 1850.§

"Section 2.—In entrusting you with the above command, we do not deem it advisable to furnish you with minute instructions as to the course you are to pursue. In accepting your offer of service, regard has been had to your long experience in Arctic navigation, and to the attention you have evidently paid to the subject of the missing ships. We deem it expedient rather that you should be instructed in all the circumstances of the case, and that you should be left to the exercise of your own judgment and discretion.

* This gentleman had formerly been in the Navy. He died on his return, at Mazatlan, much esteemed and sincerely lamented. He was the first to circumnavigate the globe in a yacht.

† Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," p. 44—50.

‡ See "Anniversary Address of the President of the Royal Geographical Society," Capt. (now Admiral) W. H. Smyth, May, 1850, pp. 1, li.

§ Parliamentary Papers, No. 397, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 2.

"Section 3.—For this purpose you will be furnished with copies of the original Instructions given to Sir John Franklin, and which Instructions will indicate the course he was directed to pursue, together with our orders and directions to Sir James Ross, . . . in the spring of 1848.

"Section 4.—You will be aware that the case virtually stands now as it did then; Sir James Ross, from adverse circumstances, failed in discovering traces of the missing expedition.

"Section 5.—Our orders of May 9th, 1848, to Sir James Ross, will serve as the indication of our views of the general course you will have to pursue; but it being our earnest desire that a certain strait known as *Alderman Jones's Sound* . . . should be searched, you are . . . directed to proceed in the first instance to that sound . . . proceeding . . . in the direction of Wellington Strait, and on to the Parry Islands and Melville Island.

"Section 6.—At the same time you will bear in mind that Sir John Franklin's orders were '*to push on through Lancaster Sound without stopping to examine any openings north or south of that sound, till he had reached Cape Walker.*' Obstructions may have forced Sir John Franklin north or south of his prescribed course, yet his principal object would be the gaining the latitude and longitude of Cape Walker.

"Section 7.—To that point, therefore, failing your discovering traces of the expedition . . . by Jones's Sound and the Parry Islands, your efforts will be directed, and beyond this, your own judgment must be your principal guide.

"Section 8.—Sir James Ross having partially searched the shores of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, as far west as Cape Rennell, without discovering traces of Sir John Franklin's ships, has led in some quarters to the *supposition* of an extreme case, viz., that *failing to get into Lancaster Sound,*" he "*had proceeded in the direction of Smith's Sound, at the head of Baffin's Bay.*"

"Section 9.—We do not deem it expedient to direct your attention especially to this sound, . . . but should your passage by Jones's Sound, to which you are specially directed, be early and absolutely impeded, and there should be the time (without hazarding the . . . chance of proceeding to Wellington Strait, the Parry Islands, and Cape Walker by Lancaster Sound) for examining Smith's Sound, you are at liberty to do so, but this is a contingency scarcely to be contemplated; as, in the event of your being frustrated in the attempt to get to the westward and towards Wellington Strait by Jones's

Sound, the late period of the year when Smith's Sound is said to be open would render it difficult, if not impossible, to continue a search in that quarter with the securing a passage into Lancaster Sound before the season closed.

"Section 10.—Much of the painful anxiety that now exists respecting the missing ships might possibly have been avoided if greater care had been taken to leave traces of their progress."

We cannot but notice in these instructions of their lordships, Sections 2, 3, and 4. They acknowledge Capt. Penny's "experience in Arctic navigation" and "the subject of the missing ships," but yet they deem it expedient that he should be "instructed in all the circumstances of the case." If Capt. Penny (we mention it with every respect for him) was not "well up" in the question, he ought not to have been employed; a mere ice-master was not wanted, but the scientific commander of an expedition; one perfectly conversant with the original plan and instructions, and upon what grounds they were based. We have always imagined that the required knowledge preceded the appointment to an extraordinary service, and *not* followed it. Was there any latent feeling of doubt as to the employment of Captain Penny? Did the Navy List contain no efficient names?

Again, to direct him to Jones's Sound before it was known Franklin, having failed in the south-west, had taken a northern channel, looks very like sending Penny in the pursuit of a myth; and their lordships seem to be under the same impression, for immediately after he is recalled to that most important section, No. 5, of Sir John Franklin's instructions, directing him to "push on through Lancaster Sound (and Barrow's Strait) without stopping to examine any openings north or south of that Strait, till he had reached Cape Walker." When it is remembered that Sir James Ross had failed in getting to Cape Walker, and that no new facts had arisen—in short, "that the case stood virtually now as it did then," it does seem surprising that Penny was not *at once ordered to Cape Walker and the south-west*. The mention of the extreme case supposed in "some quarters," that, because Sir James Ross only reached Cape Rennell (not Cape Walker), and did not discover any traces of Franklin, therefore he failed to get into Lancaster Sound, and proceeded at once in the direction of Smith's Sound, is really so eminently ridiculous that we are lost in wonderment how such monstrous notions could have come into existence and a place in print. However, Smith's Sound is to be examined, if Penny (shut out early from Jones's Sound) can achieve "a contingency scarcely to be contemplated;" viz., without

hazarding the chances by Wellington Strait, the Parry Islands, and Cape Walker, before the season closes—an exploit pronounced “difficult,” we should say *impossible*. These Instructions seem to us, like “a rope coiled against the sun,” to begin the wrong way; that is, with Jones’s Sound, Smith’s Sound, Wellington Channel, the Parry Islands, and lastly, Cape Walker. Now, we should have begun the search at Cape Walker; and for this reason,—the Franklin Expedition was sent in that direction; and having examined it and the southwest from it, and finding no trace of the expedition that way, we might have turned our thoughts to Wellington Channel and the Parry Islands, but Jones’s and Smith’s Sounds we regard as *altogether out of the true line for search*. A greater proof cannot be given of the distraction ruling at the Councils of the Admiralty at this period than these instructions. The wild absurdity of “assumed intentions” on Sir John Franklin’s part to attempt a route contrary to his written instructions is visibly forcing attention in a wrong and utterly hopeless direction. Chagrin and failure could not but follow. Whatever feeling or “good intentions” their lordships may have possessed, they are made foolishness by untoward influences and wild imaginary schemes. It is clear we could hope for no good results from Mr. Penny’s expedition, as far as regards the relief and restoration of our unfortunate countrymen. Let the north wind howl o’er them as it list! We think the remark (Section 10), “that much of the anxiety that now exists respecting the missing ships might have been avoided if greater care had been taken to leave traces of their progress,” quite unnecessary,—indeed, unjust. How did we know that Franklin had not left traces of his progress?—what had we done to prove he had not? Nothing; and yet he had been away five years. Here is another assumption—as thoughtlessly offered as it is recklessly adopted. Franklin was ordered not to *stop*, but to *push on* to the meridian of Cape Walker. We had not reached there, and yet we would blame him for not leaving traces of his progress. Why were not particular places named for depôts, rendezvous, and leaving despatches, before his departure? Rather let us blame ourselves for want of organization.

We will now notice the other Government expedition, composed of four vessels and commanded strictly by Naval officers; they were also to go by the way of Barrow’s Strait. The *Resolute*, Capt. Horatio T. Austin, C.B.; the *Assistance*, Capt. Erasmus Ommaney; the *Intrepid* and *Pioneer*, screw-tenders, commanded respectively by Lieuts. S. Osborn and I. B. Cator. This expedition, fully equipped and manned, sailed from Greenwich May 4th, 1850. The orders

issued by the Admiralty to Capt. Austin are given briefly as follows.*

Capt. Austin was furnished with a copy of the orders given to Sir John Franklin and Sir James Ross, and the various papers which had been laid before the Houses of Parliament. By reference to them he would be "made aware that the opinions of the most able and experienced persons connected with Polar navigation" had been taken, and "*many valuable conjectures*" made.

"It has been suggested that Sir John Franklin may have effected his passage to Melville Island and been detained there. . . It has again been suggested as possible, that his ships may be detained in the neighbouring sea, . . and that . . he may have abandoned them and made his escape to that island. . . To these 'possibilities' you will give every proper weight."

"Section 4.—It therefore appears to us to be a main object of the expedition, . . to reach Melville Island, detaching a portion of your ships to search the shores of Wellington Channel, and the coast about Cape Walker, to which *point Sir John Franklin was ordered to proceed.*"

"Section 7.—In the prosecution of your search you will use your utmost efforts, . . taking care not to lose any opportunity . . of getting to the westward."

The general tenor of these Instructions, it will be seen, is in the right direction—that is, *in a westerly one*, by Barrow's Strait; but why the *Wellington Channel* should be deemed of such immense importance as to demand the *attention of both Austin and Penny*, we cannot conceive. Surely the point to which the Franklin Expedition was directed (Section 5 of his Instructions) ought to have obtained our first notice, and a rigid examination. As yet nothing had been done in that direction. The Franklin Expedition was provisioned only for three years, perhaps eked out to four; he had been away five, and nothing had been heard of him during all that time. He had not reached the coast of America; we could only conclude, then, that he had got entangled in the ice in the opening *between Cape Walker and Banks' Land*; or, shut out from there, had reached Melville Island, and perhaps taken advantage of one of the western passages *leading north between the Parry Islands*, with the hope of completing the passage by that route; but of all this we were ignorant, and therefore our first and most certain exertions should have been directed to

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 397, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 5.

Cape Walker and to the south-west; and complete the examination in that direction, and westward on to Banks' Land and Melville Island. The northern side of Barrow's Strait to Melville Island could have been examined at the same time; and Wellington Channel left solely to Messrs. Penny and Stewart.

The allusion to damage and abandonment of the ships in the neighbouring sea is very indistinct. Was this *sea westward* or *eastward* of Melville Island? if to the westward, we may ask, How did Franklin get there? but if to the eastward of that island, we say at once, Why not SEARCH IT? It is the fact of this sea not having been searched, even up to this period, that has led to the painful uncertainty that hangs over the movements of the Expedition, and with this uncertainty the most fearful anticipations of suffering and of death to the officers and crews of the *Erebus* and *Terror*.

Another expedition was at this time equipped by public subscription, at the head of which the Hudson's Bay Company appeared with a subscription of £500. It was composed of the *Felix* schooner and the *Mary* yacht, of only 12 tons, and was commanded by the Arctic veteran Sir John Ross, accompanied by Commander G. Phillips, R.N. It sailed from Loch Ryan 20th April, 1850. We have seen no copy of the Plan and Instructions by which Sir John Ross was to be governed, but we believe the following contains the general direction of them:—"He is to proceed to Barrow's Strait by the northern or southern route, as most advisable, and beginning at Cape Hotham, the western extremity of Wellington Channel, will examine all the headlands to the westward for deposited intelligence, and if none is found before reaching Banks' Land, the *Mary* will be left there as a vessel of retreat, while the *Felix* will continue her search during this and the ensuing year, after which Sir John Ross thinks that it will be needless, as he has no doubt that before that time the fate of the gallant Franklin and his devoted companions will be ascertained."*

We have already spoken of the generous sympathy of the President and people of the United States of America, in answer to the eloquent appeal of Lady Franklin; but "the delays incident to . . . national legislation menaced the defeat of her appeal. The bill making appropriations for the outfit of an expedition lingered on its passage, and the season for commencing operations had nearly gone by. At this juncture a noble-spirited merchant of New York . . . fitted out two of his own vessels, and proffered them gratuitously to

* See "Narrative of Arctic Discovery," by John J. Shillinglaw, F.R.G.S., p. 331.

the Government. Thus prompted by the munificent liberality of Mr. Henry Grinnell, Congress hastened to take the expedition under its charge, and authorized the President to detail from the Navy such necessary officers and seamen as might be willing to engage in it.* The vessels were named the *Advance* and the *Rescue*; Lieutenant E. J. De Haven, U.S. Navy, was selected for the chief command in the former, Mr. S. P. Griffin, Acting Master, to the latter. The officers were Messrs. Murdagh and Lovell, with Dr. K. Kane and thirteen men, in the *Advance*; and Messrs. Carter and Brooks, and Dr. Vreeland with twelve men, in the *Rescue*: gallant, noble-hearted fellows all. The Instructions issued by the Navy Department, Washington, 15th May, 1850, to Lieutenant E. J. De Haven, may be thus summarily given:†—He is directed to “make the best of his way to Lancaster Sound. . . . The chief object of this expedition is to search for, and, if found, afford relief to Sir John Franklin and his companions. You will, therefore, use all diligence and make every exertion to that end; paying attention, as you go, to subjects of scientific inquiry, only so far as the same may not interfere with the main object of this expedition. Having passed Barrow’s Strait, you will turn your attention northward to Wellington Channel, and westward to Cape Walker, and be governed by circumstances as to the course you will take. Accordingly, you will exercise your own discretion, after seeing the condition of the ice, sea, and weather, whether the two vessels shall here separate, one for Cape Walker and the other for Wellington Channel, or whether they shall both proceed together for the one place or the other. Should you find it impossible, on account of the ice, to get through Barrow’s Strait, you will then turn your attention to Jones’s Sound or Smith’s Sound; finding these closed or impracticable, and failing all traces of the missing expedition, . . . if so, you will return to New York. . . . Nearly the whole Arctic coast has been scoured without finding traces of the missing ships. It is useless for you to go there, or to re-examine any other place where search has already been made; you will, therefore, confine your attention to the routes already indicated.” Several observations follow, as to the point of maximum cold, and the probability of an “open sea (Polynia) to the north-west of the Parry Islands. . . . Should you succeed in finding an opening there, either after having

* See “The Narrative of the U.S. Grinnell Expedition in Search of Sir John Franklin,” by the late talented and highly esteemed, but now deeply lamented, Dr. K. Kane, 1854, p. 15.

† See Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, “Arctic Expedition, 1851,” pp. 2—4.

cleared Wellington Strait, or" the "Parry Islands by a northerly course from Cape Walker, enter as far as in your judgment it may be prudent to enter, and search every headland, &c., . . . for signs and records of the missing party. . . . If by any chance you should penetrate so far beyond the icy barrier as to make it . . . more prudent to push on than to turn back, you will do so. . . . Falling in with any of the British searching parties, you will offer them any assistance of which they may stand in need, and which it may be in your power to give. Offer also to make them acquainted with your intended plans," &c., &c.

The tenor of these Instructions points to the north and west, the Polynia, or sea free from ice, of Wrangell. This sea had long obtained much attention, and at this time more particularly; it was supposed to extend eastward to the north of the Parry Islands. Colonel Sabine, reasoning from analogy and the close resemblance and configuration of the northern coasts and islands of Asia and America, contributed largely to induce the belief in the existence of this Polar Sea; and Wrangell himself thinks,* "It should be possible to reach and to follow this open water to Spitzbergen." We think to these ideas, so prevalent among the scientific, may be attributed the notion that Sir John Franklin attempted the Wellington Channel; at all events, our trans-Atlantic brethren seem to have caught the infection, and to lean in the direction of the open sea of Wrangell. The desire to ascertain whether such Polar Sea existed or not was very natural and of great interest, for it involved an inquiry fraught with the most important probable results; but in the case before us—the relief and rescue of our missing countrymen, now in all likelihood painfully suffering from starvation and long exposure to these merciless regions—it was wrong to permit ourselves to be influenced in our search by a problematical Polar Sea; and this, too, before we had examined the first point to which Franklin was so peremptorily directed, a position on which rested our only trustworthy hope. It seems to us very much like abandoning the reality for the pursuit of the shadow. Our kind and generous brethren, no doubt, took their view from ourselves; but the end was fatal to their chivalrous efforts.

The *Advance* and *Rescue* sailed the 22nd May, 1850.

"Whatever may be the result of this expedition, as connected with the fate of the gallant Sir John Franklin, it is one which reflects the

* See the Preface to Wrangell's "Polar Sea," edited by Colonel Sabine. Second Edition. 1844.

highest honour upon the philanthropic citizen who projected it, and upon the officers and men engaged therein :"* and, *we may add, upon the American people as a nation.*

With the departure of Austin's, Penny's, and Ross's vessels, joined by those of our generous American friends under De Haven, again hearts at home beat warm. There would now be ten searching vessels in Barrow's Straits, full of ardour and zeal for the enterprise; and notwithstanding the time that had elapsed, still it was impossible to shut out the feeling of hope that good might arise. At this time we thought the search proposed extended over too great an area, to too many points, and in too widely different directions. Fear and doubt would, therefore, at times, intrude. We felt that too much was attempted, and the preference given to points holding out, to our views, but faint hopes of success; that they divided attention, distracted and weakened the efforts of these most efficient expeditions. We saw, too, and we deeply regretted it, that the true direction for search, Cape Walker and the space to the south-west of it, originally so important, was now nearly lost sight of, or, at best, looked upon as only secondary. *To that space Franklin was sent, yet it was placed in the same category with places not even named in his Instructions; and yet no sound reasons could be offered for thus deviating from them, our only guide to him. In short, we dreaded failure. Already we had failed in our first efforts: now to fail might be fatal. The search, too, we thought, had been too long deferred, and particularly in the direction in which Franklin was ordered.* Often would the memory of the year 1845 come before us; the plan of the Expedition and the departure of Franklin and his gallant followers; his Instructions, and their object, "the Passage." How often we regretted that no rendezvous, no depôts upon which he might fall back with certainty of relief, had been arranged before he sailed; and then the complete failure of the expedition of 1848-9 would obtrude itself on us, and add still more pain to our anxiety. We had not a relative or friend, that we were aware of, in the Expedition; still, we felt the "great Question" on which they were engaged was England's—was ours—it was full of peril, and they were our countrymen, and therefore they claimed from us a feeling and a regard beyond all and every other expedition that had ever left our shores. For England's honour they went forth, and it was for her to recover them. But how? Not by flights of enthusiastic fancy;

* See the *New York Tribune*, 22nd May, 1850.

not by the doubtful impressions and influences of talked of "intentions," at variance with the Instructions; but by following in the track which *had been laid down for him as the best means of achieving the great object of his voyage.* Until we had done this, we felt all attempts were like pursuing the shadow of "a lifeless fire." These were our feelings in 1850. Our views as to the course the Franklin Expedition would take were simple, and formed on the Instructions given to him on his sailing, viz., *That he would proceed to Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, and without stopping to "examine any openings northward or southward of that strait," that he would "push on" to the westward until he had reached the meridian of Cape Walker, or about 98° W., and the latitude of 74½° N.* Having attained that point, from thence he would penetrate the *unknown* Melville Sound, and endeavour to cross it in a southerly and westerly course towards Behring's Strait. As to the rumours of disaster and loss—whether crushed by the middle ice, destroyed by fire, wrecked by storm or by hidden rocks—none of these were confirmed; we, therefore, gave no heed to them.

It will be seen, from what we have said of the expeditions under Austin, Penny, Ross, and that of our American friends under De Haven, that their efforts would be confined to the examination of the passages north of Barrow's Strait; or if to the southward, west of the 98° of western longitude. But it having been suggested to Lady Franklin, that the western coast of Regent's Inlet and the western side of Boothia should be searched, under the conviction that Sir John Franklin, in retreating to the stores at Fury Beach, might adopt the route by the strait of James Ross, and crossing the isthmus into the Gulf of Boothia, *so reach* those important supplies, aided by several sympathizing friends, Lady Franklin purchased the *Prince Albert*, a vessel of 89 tons, the command of which was given to Commander C. Codrington Forsyth, R.N., who offered his services free of any remuneration. In her also went Mr. W. P. Snow, a volunteer: this gentleman had come purposely from America to join in this little expedition. The general instructions were, a thorough search of the west coast of Regent's Inlet to the Gulf of Boothia, the western side of Boothia into James Ross's Strait, and down to Simpson's Strait. The *Prince Albert* sailed from Aberdeen 5th June, 1850.* We cannot but say the arguments in favour of a search in this direction were reasonable; the strait of James Ross and the

* See "The Voyage of the *Prince Albert*," by W. Parker Snow. 1854.

isthmus of Boothia were *both known*, and offered fair facilities for escape from Melville Sound to Fury Beach. A "western sea," from the western side of North Somerset and Boothia was said to exist; at all events, the land or sea west of 95° W., between the parallels of 70° and 73° N., was undescribed.

28th September, 1850—The *North Star*, James Saunders, Master commanding, arrived at Spithead.* This vessel, loaded with provisions, had been despatched to Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, 1849, with the hope of intercepting and preventing the return of the *Investigator*, Captain Bird. Additional Instructions had also been sent by her to Sir James Ross. The *North Star* failed to cross the middle ice, and was compelled to winter (1849-50) in Wolstenholme Sound. Being liberated in the spring (1850), she proceeded to Lancaster Sound, but being unable to reach Leopold Harbour, Jackson's Inlet, Ports Bowen or Neill, she finally landed the provisions "in a bay just within the easternmost Wollaston Island." The failure to communicate with Sir James Ross or Captain Bird defeated all the humane objects of the Admiralty. In the mean time, as we have shown, the *Enterprise* and *Investigator* had returned, and been sent to Behring's Strait; and another expedition, under Captains Austin and Ommaney, had been despatched to Barrow's Strait. We have often thought it had been much better had Mr. Saunders endeavoured to communicate with Captain Austin's squadron; he knew, from Captain Penny, they were in Lancaster Sound, and the season was not so far advanced but that he might have spared some little time to accomplish so greatly desirable an object.

The Hudson's Bay Company, 30th September, 1850,† received despatches from Sir John Ross, dated 13th and 22nd August previous, which were immediately forwarded to the Admiralty. The only matter worthy record here was the extraordinary report, of which the following is the substance:—"On the 13th August natives were discovered on the ice, near Cape York (Melville Bay), with whom it was deemed advisable to communicate. Lieutenant Cator, in the *Intrepid*, and Commander Phillips, with the Esquimaux interpreter of the *Felix*, were detached on this service." From Commander Phillips's subsequent reports to Sir John Ross we extract the following:—"As soon as the Esquimaux observed one of their own race in our boat, they ran to meet us, throwing up their hands, and

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition," pp. 56—68.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 83—88.

expressing signs of satisfaction. . . . Our interpreter appeared to understand and be understood by them, and a long and earnest conversation took place, in which the gold-laced caps of some of the officers were alluded to." The subject of the conversation was said to be,—“In the winter of 1846, when snow was falling, two ships were broken up by the ice a good way off, in the direction of Cape Dudley-Digges, and afterwards burnt by a fierce and numerous tribe of natives. . . . The ships were not whalers, as epaulettes were worn by some of the white men. . . . A part of the crews were drowned; that the remainder were some time in huts or tents, apart from the natives; that they had guns, but no balls, were in a weak and exhausted condition, and were subsequently killed by the natives with darts or arrows." This appalling account was investigated on the spot, and Wolstenholme Sound was reached by Captain Ommaney; the wintering spot of the *North Star* was discovered, but nothing else was found to confirm the tragic tale of Adam Beck, Sir John Ross's interpreter. “On the report being cleared up,” in the words of Captain Penny, the whole of the searching ships pursued their original object, and crossed to Lancaster Sound. At the time, this report created much painful sensation; but it always seemed to us, much more than it deserved. We may notice it again on the arrival of the *Felix*.

The *Prince Albert*, Commander C. C. Forsyth, R.N., arrived at Aberdeen October 1st, 1850.* She brought the first intelligence that traces of the missing expedition had been discovered at Point Riley and at Beechey Island, by Captain E. Ommaney and officers of H.M.S. *Assistance* and *Intrepid*, 23rd August, 1850. Great was the joy and exalted the hopes of all, arising out of this, the discovery of the first traces of the *Erebus* and *Terror*. The *Prince Albert*, it will be remembered, had been sent by Lady Franklin to examine Prince Regent's Inlet; it appears she had been unable to reach Brentford Bay, having found the ice to extend from Fury Beach, across Regent's Inlet, to about Port Bowen. Commander C. C. Forsyth then returned, with the intension of proceeding down the western side of North Somerset, but found the pack extending across Barrow's Strait, from Leopold Island to the entrance of Wellington Channel. Foiled in getting to the westward, the *Prince Albert* returned, “being the last and smallest vessel that left England, and the first that arrived in Barrow's Strait;” and, it may be

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, “Arctic Expedition, 1851,” p. 68.

added, *the first home*.* However, the intelligence she brought was most important, as it cleared away all the rumours of disaster, of which it was said Baffin's Bay was the scene. The remains, ropes, &c., brought home by the *Prince Albert*, underwent careful examination, and were pronounced at once, from the marks, &c., as being British. The evidence subsequently offered by the graves of three men who had died at Beechey Island, belonging to the Franklin Expedition, confirmed the conclusion that that expedition had wintered there in 1845 and 6. An account of the trip of the *Prince Albert*, by Commander Forsyth, was read before the Royal Geographical Society of London, on November 11th, at the opening of the session, 1850-1. We have already remarked on the deep interest evinced by this Society for Arctic exploration; perhaps, of all the scientific bodies, none have shown for the solution of the "Great Problem" more steady feeling, or given greater aid to complete this truly British question, not only by encouraging the production and reading of "Arctic Papers" at its meetings, but also in the assistance rendered by the subscriptions of its presidents and fellows. We allude particularly to the search for the Franklin Expedition.† More than one plan has been materially aided and put into active operation in this humane cause by their example and liberality.

The labours of this distinguished Society are now beginning to be appreciated. Of their usefulness and important influence, in a maritime country like ours, there cannot exist a doubt, not only in advancing the spread of geographical knowledge, which, rightly understood, embraces "a vast field of study, in which collectively, all our arts, sciences, and pursuits are in close and obvious connection,"‡ but also as furnishing fixed and faithful data for the extension of commercial enterprise. Preceding Commander Forsyth's paper was one by Mr. Cartwright, which was simply an enumeration of recent Arctic voyages, and what had been done to recover our absent countrymen. The former, as we have said, was an outline of the voyage of the *Prince Albert*; it consisted of little more than a list of the dates of arrival and departure of that vessel on her passage out and home. The only portion of it worthy notice was the recent discovery of the first traces at Point

* This "Voyage of the *Prince Albert*," by Mr. W. P. Snow, was published 1851.

† Sir John Franklin was one of the Vice-Presidents of the Royal Geographical Society, and one of its most esteemed and talented members.

‡ See the President, Admiral W. H. Smyth's, Address, "Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 1850," p. lxi.

Riley and the wintering station of the *Erebus* and *Terror* at Beechey Island. As neither of these papers touched on the original plan of the voyage, or the course Sir John Franklin was likely to pursue (agreeable to his orders) after leaving Beechey Island, and as, hence, his probable position remained unindicated, and was left to be *fixed at the fancy or the will of any or every one*, however unacquainted, prejudiced, precipitous, or wild on the subject, we thought that any paper that should calmly and reasonably investigate the subject could not fail to be acceptable to the Society. Such a paper was at the time absolutely necessary, as opinions the most contradictory and absurd were prevalent. They embraced three-fourths of the compass, and were withdrawing attention from the true direction of search,—the direction in which Sir John Franklin was sent—from the south and west to the north, from Cape Walker to the Wellington Channel. In resolving, then, to furnish a paper, our object was, to recall attention to *the starting points—to the views entertained as to the question in the year 1845*—the Plan of Sir John Barrow and the Instructions founded upon it, to accomplish which Sir John Franklin and his gallant officers and crews went forth from amongst us.

We were aware of the scanty materials at command. We knew that beyond the Franklin Instructions, the failure down Peel's Sound, and the evidence of the just discovered traces at Beechey Island and Point Riley, these were all the materials existing upon which to work. The subject remained as it did in 1845; all beyond was *mere conjecture*, and the best evidence of its being so was shown in the monstrous notions then prevailing. To restrain wild theory, to aid reason, and to give hope where anxiety depressed, we set to work. Our paper (the original of which is before us) is dated 9th December, 1850. It is addressed to the then President of the Royal Geographical Society, Captain (now Admiral) W. H. Smyth, a gentleman alike distinguished for his highly scientific acquirements, his profound antiquarian lore, and his excellency of heart; in short, one of the first and most talented officers of that Navy of which we all are, or ought to be, so proud. We shall give running extracts from it. These will show our own views at the time, 1850, before Cape Walker had been reached; and from them, too, may be gathered *the prevailing tone* regarding the search for the Franklin Expedition, &c.

After alluding to the before named two papers, and the North-West Passage, now "of painfully absorbing interest by the long absence of the Franklin Expedition, . . . the critical position in which they may be placed, . . . the diversity of opinions . . .

on the subject, . . . the misconception as to the route taken and the present position and resources of Sir John Franklin . . . shown in the distracting plans offered for his relief." It then gives Franklin's Instructions, Sections 5, 6, and 7, which it fears "have not been sufficiently consulted," and yet "Sir John Franklin would read and follow them, and we must do the same if we would get on his trail." The inference drawn from the above sections is, "*That the Franklin Expedition was to proceed, first, direct to Cape Walker, and from thence . . . to the south and west, between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, with the view of reaching the open sea to the westward of 120° W., emerging probably between Wollaston and Banks' Lands;*" or, "secondly, that route being impracticable, from the presence of land or permanent ice, if, in passing the entrance of Wellington Channel," he "observed it to be open and clear of ice, he was at liberty to attempt a passage to the westward by that channel, or still to persevere to the south-westward." It should be remembered that at the time we wrote this (1850), there was the whole space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land (called Parry's or Melville's Sound) offering a fair prospect of a passage, the same as when Franklin sailed, equal, on the 74° parallel, to about 280 miles, and an opening to the south-west, between Wollaston and Banks' Lands, of perhaps 200 miles. With a favourable sea and wind, a few days of fortunate navigation would have brought Franklin to the meridian of 120° W., where it was known at the time there was an open sea, as, "beyond this, and to Behring's Strait, no land is visible from the American shore of the Polar Sea." The question of a North-West Passage would then have been at once settled and for ever. True, to the southward of the space above noticed lay Victoria Land, with its northern limits undefined. Still, Franklin's course was to the south-west; and it was thought not improbable, if drawn by circumstances more to the eastward, whether he might not find a passage eastward of Wollaston Land, between it and Victoria Land. But to return to the paper. Alluding to the rumour that the *Erebus* and *Terror* were lost in the middle ice, it says:—

"Fortunately, the traces recently discovered at Beechey Island and Point Riley, leave not a doubt as to the expedition having been there, . . . no doubt on its outward course to Cape Walker. . . . Whoever reads the Admiralty Instructions will notice how emphatically this cape is mentioned as being the first object for attainment; and Franklin, so zealous and alive to all that tended to the ultimate success of the expedition, would look to his arrival at Cape Walker

*with feelings of the deepest solicitude. It would be his first point to arrive at, and his last for departure. It would be his last known position for leaving despatches; it would separate the past from the future,—the past old and familiar, the future new and hopeful; it therefore would become invested with paramount interest. Scarcely a doubt arises but that he left Beechey Island or Point Riley under favourable circumstances for Cape Walker,—the distance is short,—and that he reached it. Assume he had been frozen up in the Straits, he would then have drifted to the eastward, and we should have known it; or, say he could not cross the strait to Cape Walker, he would then have returned to the northward, and left despatches on Beechey Island or Point Riley. Grant that he has been wrecked, still, one cannot conceive that both ships and their boats, and all the men, have been swallowed up at one 'fell swoop,' and left not a vestige: it is improbable. Cape Walker has been gained, and there are his despatches left. . . His views would now turn to the southward and westward; based on Cape Walker he would commence his explorations, to achieve which he would make every sacrifice. Between Cape Walker on the N.E., Banks' Land to the N.W., Wollaston Land to the S.W., and Victoria Land to the S.E., within this area will he be found."** As regards the non-existence of despatches at Beechey Island, the following passage occurs. "The querulous have wondered that despatches were not left at Point Riley or Beechey Island. It should be recollected, Franklin, when he was at Point Riley or Beechey Island, had done nothing, and had consequently nothing to communicate; he was on old ground, and had not reached its ultimate point, from whence he was to depart in search of the new; he would consider further the possibility of Barrow's Strait being frozen up, and his despatches not accessible; and as his orders and course lay to the southward, he would leave them on the south side of Barrow's Strait, as Cape Walker could be more readily reached from Port Leopold (from the eastward) by land, if not practicable by sea, the land being then (1845) supposed to be continuous. . . When Sir James Ross left his ships at Port Leopold on a land trip to the westward, it was with the hope of reaching Cape Walker. He could have had no idea that the land at Cape Bunny would have so changed its bearing—say at right angles to itself, and lead him directly south. I have little hesitation in adding, he never expected to find Franklin in that direction. . .

* It will be seen from this note that we always considered that Franklin would persist in making westing and southing where he could between Cape Walker and Banks' Land—agreeable to his Instructions.

Let us look around us from Cape Walker, and examine the nature of the lands already known; from them we may draw a reasonable inference as to what the lands are in a S.W. direction; that is, in the area I have already referred to. If one looks over a chart of this part of the globe, he will be struck with the extraordinary manner in which the land is broken up in all directions;—formed of primitive and trap rocks; the result of violent action is shown in the deeply indented, irregular inlets, jagged bays and islands; and when the climate is remembered, a reference to Dove's isothermal charts, and Parry's interesting papers on the temperature at Melville Island (in 1819 and 1820), will exhibit this tract as one of the coldest spots on our globe—a nucleus for the production of ice, with jagged, deep inlets to keep it *in situ*. When these are considered, the surprise is that so much has been done by our Polar heroes. In no part of the world is so disjointed, irregular a coast-line to be found, with such a climate. England may be unfortunate, having such enormous difficulties to contend with in solving the North-West Question; but the honour should and will be hers—our *Jack* will float through it one day.*

“With a country possessing such geographical features, and with a climate whose mean annual temperature is scarcely above zero, has the gallant Franklin and his noble fellows to contend. Ice-bound, but land-locked, and safe as regards his ships, he may not be able to retrace without abandoning them; which no Naval officer would do unless necessity, ever imperious, compelled him. Franklin and his crews would hold together as long as hope remained; that lost, he would retrace to Fury Beach or Port Leopold. . . He would know Port Leopold was the most ready for access, for communication, and for succour from the eastward. As to going south, with the chance of obtaining supplies through the Hudson's Bay Company's territories, he would not; their inhospitable coasts would be fraught with too many painful reminiscences of the year 1819. No; if compelled to abandon he would look for a relieving expedition from the eastward, and Cape Walker would again become the spot about which all his hopes of rescue would turn.

“I have not a doubt but the missing Expedition will be found *in the space indicated*; and we know nothing, nothing of it, *because we have not reached Cape Walker*. As to resources, of this we have reasonable hope, the enormous migration of deer, oxen, birds, &c., &c.,

* Without pretending to the gift of prophecy, we may say our *Jack* has now been borne through the North-West Passage; not literally afloat in a ship or boat, but still afloat over water-borne ice, and it was done by British enterprise.

lead one to this cheering conclusion. . . All travellers by land on the north coast of America, and our Polar voyagers, too, by sea, confirm rather than dispel it. . . Hungry men will eat almost anything; certainly would rather support existence by eating seals and even blubber, than perish. Here, again, let it be borne in mind that Parry, in 1819, got together 3,766 lbs. of provisions at Melville Island—*separated as it is by two straits from the American continent.**

“I will now assume that Franklin has been compelled to relinquish *all further attempt to the south-westward*, from the existence of land or permanent ice, shutting him out in that direction. In such case he would again consult his Instructions; which would result in his turning his attention to the north side of Barrow’s Strait, and to the channels leading to the northward and westward between the Parry Islands.

“In reviewing the various passages leading to the consummation of the great object of the expedition, that between Melville Island and Banks’ Land would be noticed, and at once rejected (see Section 6 of Franklin’s Instructions). It is only in the event of Franklin being in a position *so far west as to see open water there, that he would attempt to get westward by that channel.* Wellington Channel would occur to him, and the state of the ice as he passed it on his outward passage; but the fact of despatches not having been found at Beechey Island or Point Riley, both admirable localities for leaving them, being on the south-eastern entrance of that channel, and the most accessible from the east, go to prove that it was seen to be ice-blocked when he passed it, and any attempt that way would end only in disappointment. He would therefore not attempt the Wellington Channel.

“We must, then, seek for him in or by one of the channels farther west; . . . that is, by one of the *straits formed by Bathurst, Byam Martin, or Melville Islands.* Thus far we have been guided by the Instructions, and the probable course of Franklin in his attempt to carry them out. The inferences are, we think, reasonable.” The paper then continues the inquiry hypothetically: “Whichever outlet to the

* At the time Franklin sailed, and even up to 1850, the lamented Parry, Sir John Richardson, and Dr. Rese were considered the first authorities as to the abundance of animal life in the localities visited by them. Many other authorities might be given. Of course all lands, seas, and rivers are not alike prolific in animal life; because all parts do not produce life-sustaining matter, whether animal or vegetable. Sterile limestone, or primitive rocks, are scarcely likely to attract deer, the musk-ox, or birds.

north-west has been chosen, . . . there I follow with the hope of fixing his present position; but as regards the nation's duty, no perils should dismay or arrest us in the prosecution of the search for the missing navigators. As to pecuniary expense, humanity forbids such sordid thought where life and honour are pending. Alive or dead, the fate of the Expedition should be known. I continue my inquiry, then, north about by the channels before-named; the same remarks apply to either." After quoting Capt. Fitzjames, who was "for edging north-west till in long. 140° W.," and the opinions of various Arctic authorities,—that of Col. Sabine, who thinks that "should they have succeeded in getting into the open water described by Wrangell, they may be as likely to come down on the Asiatic side as the American;"—of Sir Edward Belcher, who thinks "the probabilities are in favour of his safety until he reached the Arctic circle; there he would be reduced to the necessity of following any open channels which offered southerly, and they may have led him to the northward of Asia:"—the paper continues,—"I hope he will turn up in or near Behring's Strait; but when I refer to Dove's isothermal chart, and find the line of mean annual temperature at zero to the southward of the Parry group, I am led to infer that he would not be able to penetrate so far to the north and west as to be out of the reach of succour, either by retracing (with or without the ships) to some known headland, where he could obtain assistance in Barrow's Strait.

. . . Under fortuitous and most favourable circumstances he might reach so far north as to have the genial influence of that higher temperature which, from the continued presence of the sun acting on the extremes of our earth, has led to the idea of a Polar Sea free, or nearly so, of ice; in such a case the Polynia of Wrangell would tempt him to the west—but he would steer direct for Behring's Strait. . . . Then a new difficulty arises, How would he get south again? The barrier of ice investing both poles between the 65° and 75° parallels would offer insuperable obstacles to his progress, rendered still more formidable by the land recently discovered to the northward of Behring's Strait by the *Herald* and *Plover*. But why enter on hypothesis? even should he be there we are not bereaved of hope; he might even then take to that permanent ice, and obtain relief and safety from Captain Collinson's expedition.

"I have thus endeavoured to trace Franklin and his noble fellows to the north; I have had to grope my devious way darkly; but when the position and configuration of the Parry Islands is duly considered, when the known severity of the climate is fully weighed, I think I

have not instituted an uninteresting, uninteresting inquiry, *but still my firm belief is that he is icebound in the area I have indicated, i. e., to the south and westward from Cape Walker, and that the expedition is safe.*" The paper then notices with regret the failure of the expedition under Sir James Ross, and with pleasure the sailing of that under Capt. Austin and Ommaney, and the hopes entertained from it; remarks on the generous kindness of our brethren of the United States; smiles at the Esquimaux, Adam Beck's report, and notes "the Skrellings of Scandinavian history have passed away;" hints at the tardiness of the Hudson's Bay Company, "*with their appliances at hand, and the Coppermine and Mackenzie flowing to and washing the lands holding Franklin and his gallant companions in detention;*" and concludes by referring to Dr. Rae's letter to Sir John Richardson, in which he says, "*the intervening space between the western points of Wollaston Land north to Banks' Land is to be searched by Commander Pullen.*" It will be seen that this paper is framed on the original Plan, and the Instructions founded on that plan—these had led to the appointment of Sir John Franklin, and it was and is presumed, that *by them (i. e., the Plan and Instructions), he would be governed in his attempt to solve the "question of a North-West Passage."* The paper *takes a mere common sense view of what we might conclude Franklin would do, in the absence of all information as to what he had done. It takes for granted that he would follow his Instructions, and which, up to the time we write (1857), we have no proof that he has not done.* We saw other and extreme views apart from the Instructions acquiring an undue importance, and we wished to arrest their progress. Our object in the paper was to recall the past, to bring back the recollection of the orders under which Franklin was acting, *the direction he was to proceed in, and to show that, by following him in that direction, we should be pursuing the only reasonable course open to us.* We believed by doing so we should trace and relieve him. The change of search from the south-west to the north-west we viewed with the *greatest apprehension, not only as turning our backs on Franklin and his crews, but also as fraught with disappointment, sorrow, and distress.* We therefore pointed out, that, *although the Expedition might be unable to reach Cape Walker (from the accumulation of ice about it), still it would persist to make westing and southing, where it could, over the whole space between that cape and Banks' Land, and having gained the meridian of Melville Island—having attained such large westing, we felt assured that new ideas would arise in Franklin's mind, and make it questionable with him*

whether, even though he should have seen Wellington Channel "open and ice-free" when he passed it, it would not be wiser to attempt one of the passages between the more western of the Parry Islands than to lose a season by retracing to Wellington Channel. All the passages between these islands, it was imagined, led into the same sea as Wellington Channel; and if the latter was free of ice, with a current setting to the eastward, it was only a fair conclusion that the western passages were free also; and therefore the large westing he had attained would place him in a better position for the ultimate successful completion of his voyage.

How far our views (1850) have been correct we leave others to judge; for ourselves, even at this time (1857), with all the additional information obtained during years of persevering daring and toil on the part of our sailors, we can see no reason to alter them materially. We still think the course we have indicated should have been followed, *i. s.*, we should have followed Franklin where we sent him. The absence of despatches at Beechey Island was *no argument that, hence, he had gone up Wellington Channel.* Franklin had not then reached the first point of his Instructions, Cape Walker, where they would be sought for. We may regret that no notices of his intended movements were left *there* (*query, May he not have left despatches, and we have not found them?*), but we cannot, hence, conclude he went up that Wellington Channel.

As we have before said, this paper was addressed to the President, and, as we have understood, it was (as usual in such cases) referred to an "Arctic authority," and considered "conjectural." So it was; but only in so much as it conjectured Sir John Franklin would follow the Instructions laid down for his guidance: the imaginists thought he would not. In thinking so, they forgot that they were rejecting the only guide they had to him. We had received no intelligence from Franklin. How could any one tell but what he was following out his orders to completion, and had partially succeeded?

It is now admitted on all hands that conjecture formed the basis of the majority of the plans of search for recovering the lost ones; if not, how is it that they vary so greatly in their direction? Let us glance at a few? We will commence with "Melville Island in the west." Has not the search been recommended from that island, including "all the passages between the Parry Islands, . . . Wellington Channel, . . . Jones's Sound, . . . to the great sound at the head of Baffin's Bay," and even *vid* Spitzbergen? all this by the north, in face of Franklin's Instructions, and without a particle of evidence up to this period (1850), to prove that he was

unable to reach Cape Walker, and to get on to the south-west. Looking southward and commencing eastward, have not plans of search been proposed for an examination of the coasts extending from the southern limits of the whale fishery, Davis's Strait, to Hudson's Bay, Fury and Hecla Strait, both sides, and the bottom of Prince Regent's Inlet, Peel's Sound, Boothia, Back's Great Fish River, Victoria, Wollaston, and Banks' Lands, the entire examination of the Arctic American coast-line onwards to Behring's Strait, and, to crown the whole, even the strait between Melville Island and Banks' Land, from which Franklin was specially warned; altogether mixing the probable with the improbable in one distracting mass? Where was fact and evidence all this time? There was neither. Conjecture was busy with it all: she trampled on the Franklin Instructions, and sent reason beside herself. Let any one who has really gone into the question of Arctic discovery examine the various opinions that have from time to time been expressed; he must, indeed, be professionally blind, or much prejudiced, who does not at once admit that an expedition sent to a given place or spot, and from thence in a particular direction, if not heard from, or not returning, must be sought for at that place or spot, and in that direction. An analogous case in private life would be deemed a very simple matter. Then why, because public, should it be invested with so much gravity, and involve such contrariety of opinion? In the case of the Franklin Expedition, it was ordered to a given meridian and to a given parallel, and from thence in a specified direction. It has not been heard of since its departure from its wintering place, on its outward route. Various undoubted relics have been found, belonging to the Expedition, indicating the presence of a part of the suffering crews, but nothing positive as to the ships. The Expedition, as a whole, is wrapped in mystery. Various arguments have been raised as to its position, founded on its long absence, and great weight has been attached to them; but these should have been received with caution, especially as they were in regions where movement in ships is confined to a few weeks' hampered navigation. Then, again, long absence cannot annul, or make the Instructions a dead letter; it rather makes them more imperative, and of greater force. In seeking the Franklin Expedition, the sense of the Instructions given to it should have been adopted in the search. The Instructions, in short, are the only sure and safe guide to the whereabouts, or the fate of the missing Expedition. The "intentions" attributed to Sir John Franklin should have had no weight—they are not included in the orders under which he was directed to act; we therefore

could never see the reason for placing any value on them. To assume that he would attempt to carry them out, in face of his orders, derogates from the fair fame of this great commander. Not that we think he did not express his views and "intentions." The Wellington Channel and the open sea of Wrangell obtained much attention at the time (1845); it was thought to extend to the north of the Parry Islands, and induced a sanguine hope of success in that direction for the solution of the Question. But these "intentions" ought to have been regarded as after objects, after having failed in all attempts to reach Cape Walker and the south-west. We may rest assured, that with Sir John Franklin his Instructions were sacred, and not to be broken. Again, to act upon future intentions, which involved many points of difference of direction from that special point to which he was ordered, before we knew aught of the movements of the Expedition, was manifestly premature and wrong. These were our views at the time, and we have seen no reason to alter them. However, the Wellington Channel and Jones's and Smith's Sounds obtained (as we anticipated) almost entire possession of men's minds, and Cape Walker and the south-west were ignored. We feel, then, after what we have said, we may with propriety again ask the question, "Have we sought the Franklin Expedition in the right direction?"

The year passed away. It was a year full of activity; all deplored the protracted absence of our unfortunate countrymen; all looked with satisfaction on the magnitude of the efforts made for their relief and recovery; and though deferred, still from them they gained hope. The Government had certainly done its best to do right; had shown its feeling and its sympathy for both those abroad and at home. We cannot close the year better than in the words of Admiral W. H. Smyth, President of the Royal Geographical Society:—"The British nation has a right to expect that the Government of this great maritime country will do all in its power to carry succour to those so especially requiring it; and nobly has it met that expectation, as well in the outfits of the expedition as in proclaiming a munificent reward for those who find and relieve the sufferers. Whatever may be the result of these measures, one useful moral will be elicited. It will be shown, that when Englishmen are ready and willing to hazard their lives for their country's honour, they will not be neglected in the hour of peril."

* See "Anniversary Address, May, 1850," p. liii.

CHAPTER IX.

PLANS—ADMIRAL TAYLOR—MR. SNOW—BEHRING'S STRAITS EXPEDITIONS—REPORT ON THE EK-KO—"PRINCE ALBERT'S" SECOND VOYAGE—OBJECT—PULLEN AND CAPE BATHURST—LIEUTENANT BARNARD—MICHAŁOWSKI—AUSTIN RETURNS—PENNY RETURNS—COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON THEIR PROCEEDINGS—OMMANEY—OSBORN—BROWNE—ALDRICH M'CLINTOCK—REMARKS.

REAR-ADMIRAL TAYLOR, C.B. (4th January, 1851),* proposed to the Admiralty a combined land and water expedition, to examine all the fiords in Barrow's Strait and Banks' Land.

This is a lengthy, rambling, inconsequential, and yet hopeful paper, difficult to be understood; but so far as we are enabled to understand it, its object is to recommend a land and water expedition under the direction of his son, with "four Esquimaux and some of our own people, . . . provided with Esquimaux dogs and sledges, . . . seal-skin boats, . . . a schooner, and launch fitted as a steam-boat." With these he would undertake "to examine all the fiords in Barrow's Strait, from longitude about 80° to 100°; and if no tidings were discovered, would examine Banks' Land and all its fiords the following summer." We do not find their lordships took advantage of the well intentioned but not over-profound views of the author.

Mr. W. B. Snow (late of the *Prince Albert*) next proposes (9th January, 1851) an expedition to proceed to Lancaster Sound and Griffith Island.† The object sought seems to be rather to bring home early information "from the vessels now employed in the Arctic Seas," than a distinct search for the Franklin Expedition.

January—Despatches were received at the Admiralty from the Behring's Strait expeditions, under the able management of Captain Kellet and Commander Moore; the strait *from Point Barrow had been completely swept*. They bear dates from the former, 14th October; from the latter, 2nd September, 1850. From these we extract the following:—The *Plover* wintered in Kotzebue Sound, during

* Blue Book, "Arctic Discovery, 1851," p. 96.

† *Ibid.*, p. 99.

which the Buckland and Spafareif Rivers and Hotham Inlet had been visited. Various reports from the natives of ships and men on the northern coast.* In November, 1849, a native of Buckland River stated two ships, as large as the *Plover*, had, in the course of the summer of 1848, stood in shore to the eastward of Point Barrow, and were visited by some Esquimaux; but the water shoaling, the vessels put about to the northward, and were no more seen. This report was said to have been brought during the summer, 1848, by a native who had been on board, and who visited Kotzebue Sound every summer, but he was not met with by Commander Moore.

In April, 1850, Mr. Pim, having been despatched to Michaelowski, in Norton Sound, to obtain any information the Russian authorities might have relative to Sir John Franklin, brought a report from them to the effect that, in the summer of 1848, a party of two officers and ten men were on the north coast with two boats; they were in distress, and bartered their arms for provisions. This intelligence had reached Michaelowski through the Russian trading post on the River Ek-ko. In May, 1850, four natives arrived at Kotzebue Sound from the northward; one who had visited the ship before, and appeared to understand her mission, reported a number of people like ourselves "were a long way to the northward." A chief's son assured one of Commander Moore's officers there was no truth in this report, but others of the tribe maintained the truth of it. Immediately on the breaking up of the ice, the *Plover* proceeded to the northward to ascertain the truth of these reports. Arrived at Icy Cape, Commander Moore left the ships with two boats. At Point Barrow he was informed that a number of people had arrived at a river called the *Ko-pak*, or *Coo-pak*,—when, he was unable to discover; that they had bartered their arms for food; were now dead, and buried by the natives there. On being questioned as to the manner of their deaths, they appeared reluctant to answer. Commander Moore offered rewards to the natives to be guided to the spot, but they refused, excusing themselves by saying, "there were no huts on the journey at which they could stop." From what he could understand, he places the *Ko-pak* close to the Mackenzie. At Wainwright Inlet he "met a large number of natives just returned from the northward. Here he received further information of the two boats that were said to have arrived at the *Ko-pak*, or *Coo-pom-me*." The

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," pp. 28—34; et pp. 36—40.

crews had quarrelled with the natives, who had killed the whole of them, and had buried "some on one side the river, and the remainder on the other," and the arms collected "made a large pile; . . . that one of the boats still remained at the Ko-pak; the other had been washed away to sea. I made inquiries of a woman if she knew anything regarding the boats and men said to have been killed at the Coo-pom-me? and she said, No; and yet it was from her party (says Commander Moore) the men told us the news." Captain Kellett* "is of opinion that these reports have been entirely created by the anxiety of all on board the *Plover* to obtain information, which has caused the natives to be fully aware of the subject on which the strangers wished to be informed. The Esquimaux are quick; and where it is likely that their natural cupidity would be gratified, are ever ready, can they but get a lead, to exercise their ingenuity by inventing a story. . . . It was after he (Commander Moore) had made the chief of the Hotham Inlet tribe perfectly understand the object of the *Plover's* wintering in those regions, that the majority of these reports were received; only one, on which not the least reliance was placed at the time, had been reported previously. . . . The natives at Point Barrow had not actually seen either the ships or the graves, . . . but had learned the story from some natives who came from the Ko-pak, with whom they meet to barter, at a place distant from Point Barrow ten sleeps, or days' journey (about 25 to 30 miles each). . . . All these reports refer to the autumn of 1848; therefore, should there be any truth in them, Commander Pullen must have unravelled them in 1849." We may observe, Commander Pullen appears to have had no communication with the natives after leaving Return Reef; the truth or falsehood of these reports, therefore, could not be established, which is to be regretted. We know, on the authority of Sir John Richardson, that "the Esquimaux between Point Barrow and the Mackenzie carry on a traffic along the coast; the western party meet the eastern ones at Point Barter" early in August.† We have already noticed the rumours from Peel River:‡ how far these have any connection with the reports extending from Michaelowski to Point Barrow we cannot determine. "The whole of the small extent of coast accessible to ships (says Captain Kellett) at this moment (July, 1850) is

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," pp. 20—21.

† *Ibid.*, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 32.

‡ See *ante*, p. 89.

alive with them." However, there is nothing impossible in them. May not the Franklin Expedition, after leaving Beechey Island, 1846, have made large southing and westing, agreeable to its instructions?

Despatches were also received from Captains Collinson (13th September, 1850) and M'Clure (28th July, 1850). The *Investigator*, Captain M'Clure, by a surprising passage from Oahu, had beaten her consort, and arrived first in Behring's Strait. She had been communicated with by the *Herald*, Captain Kellett, who was on board of her. He describes her crew "in excellent health and high spirits, and the ship in excellent order. . . . Everything in the right place." The *Investigator* was last seen by the *Plover* (5th August, 1850), latitude 70° 44' N., longitude 159° 52' W., steering to the north under a press of canvass, with a strong south-west wind. Captain M'Clure's intentions were,* "to make between the American coast and the pack, as far to the eastward as the 130° meridian, unless a favourable opening should earlier appear in the ice, which would lead me to infer I might push more directly for Banks' Land. . . . The season continuing favourable, it would be my anxious desire to get to the northward of Melville Island, and resume our search along its shores and the islands adjacent, as long as the navigation can be carried on, and then secure for the winter in the most eligible position which offers. In the ensuing spring, as soon as practicable for travelling parties to start, I should despatch as many as the state of the crew will admit in different directions, . . . to examine minutely all bays, inlets, and islands towards the north-east. . . . Supposing the parties to have returned (without obtaining any clue of the absent ships), and the vessels liberated by the 1st of August, my object would then be to push on towards Wellington Inlet (assuming that channel communicates with the Polar Sea), and search both its shores, unless, in so doing, some indication should be met with to show that parties from any of Captain Austin's vessels had done so, when I should return, and endeavour to penetrate in the direction of Jones's Sound, . . . and return to England."

It will be observed, the whole of the route Captain M'Clure lays down for himself is based wholly on the assumption that *Sir John Franklin has attempted the passage by a northern route; indeed, this northern route seems to have absorbed all other views, and yet no one*

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 12.

knew the Franklin Expedition had failed to pass through Melville Sound to the south-west; it was all purely conjectural.

The *Enterprise*, Captain Collinson, having been delayed by light winds, did not reach Wainwright Inlet until the 15th August, 1850. Unsuccessful in falling in with the *Herald* or *Plover*, he at once stood to the north. He succeeded in rounding Point Barrow, and reaching 153° West, but was ultimately forced to return, beaten at all points by the insurmountable nature of the ice he met with, and, the 29th of August having arrived, he was compelled reluctantly to return to the southward. At Grantley Harbour he fell in with the *Plover* and *Herald*. Consulting with Captains Kellett and Moore, it was resolved the *Enterprise* should winter at Hong Kong.

The *Herald*, Captain H. Kellett, having returned to England, was this summer replaced in Behring's Strait by the *Dædalus*, Captain G. G. Wellesey, with similar instructions regarding supplying and assisting the *Plover*, Commander Moore.

The following report we copy from the *Leader*, 22nd February, 1851. The intelligence, it says, is contained in the *Colombo Observer*, under the date of Singapore, January 6th:—"I have it in my power, this month, to give you later information of the search which is being prosecuted for the recovery of Sir John Franklin and his party, than even the Admiralty itself is yet possessed of. H.M.S. *Herald* arrived here from the Arctic regions during the last week, and she has the latest accounts from the far north. Near the extreme station of the Russian Fur Company, they learned from the natives that a party of white men had been encamped 300 or 400 miles inland; that the Russians had made an attempt to supply them with provisions and necessaries, but that the natives, who are at enmity with the Russians, had frustrated all attempts. No communications could be opened with the spot where they were said to be, as a hostile tribe intervened. From the Esquimaux they had this vague story very satisfactorily confirmed, with the addition, that the whites and natives having quarrelled, the former had been murdered." This rumour is evidently another version of the report brought by Mr. Pim, obtained at Michaelowski, through the Russian station on the Ek-ko. The following memorandum, left by Sir John Richardson at the Admiralty, February, 1851,* probably refers to the above:—"The rumour now current (February, 1851) of white people being in the interior, cut

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," p. 105.

off from the Russians by a hostile tribe, I consider to be altogether a fabrication. The Russians have all the tribes in the north-west corner of the continent in subjection, and had so fifteen years ago, before their posts were extended so far north and east as they are now, when they come very near the Hudson's Bay Company's posts."

We have already noticed the failure of the *Prince Albert*, Lady Franklin's own schooner, to accomplish the objects of her first voyage down Prince Regent's Inlet in 1850. That lady, with a spirit not to be daunted by the ordinary course of events, resolved again to fit out that vessel; and this time it was to be commanded by Mr. William Kennedy, accompanied by Lieut. Bellot, of the French Navy, member of the Legion of Honour—a gentleman that was hereafter to distinguish himself, not only in his life but in his death; the veteran John Hepburn, the tried and gallant follower of Franklin and Richardson on their distressing journey down the Coppermine, was also of this party.

"The locality allotted for our search," says Mr. Kennedy,* "included Prince Regent's Inlet, and the passages connected with the western sea south-west of Cape Walker, to which Sir John Franklin was required in the first instance to proceed." The search was assumed to be necessary on the following grounds.

"1st. The probability of Sir John Franklin having abandoned his vessels to the south-west of Cape Walker.

"2nd. The fact that when Franklin sailed he believed an open passage was to be found from the westward into the south part of Regent's Inlet, according to the chart supplied to him from the Admiralty," and which does not exhibit the subsequent discoveries of *Rae*.

"3rd. Sir John Franklin would, it was thought, be more likely to take this course, through the country known to possess the resources of animal life, with the wreck of the *Victory* in Felix Harbour for fuel, and the stores at Fury Beach, further north, in view, than to fall back upon an utterly barren region of the north coast of America.

"4th. He would be more likely to expect succour by way of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait, . . . than in any other direction." The *Prince Albert* sailed from Aberdeen, 22nd May, 1851.

This was an auxiliary search. Lady Franklin's anxiety for the search of Wellington Channel was well known at this time, but that object being secured by the Admiralty Instructions to Capt. Austin

* See "The Second Voyage of the *Prince Albert*," by W. Kennedy.

and Mr. Penny, she was then free to look and reflect on other, and we may add, certainly equally probable collateral directions. This design, taking in view our ignorance of the southern limits of Melville Sound, the trending of its coasts, and if any, the direction of the channels issuing from it; added to these, the supposed connection with Regent's Inlet for a retreating party, and the probable position of Franklin (south-west of Cape Walker), all these gave apparent promise of favourable results. But we think the search should have been limited southward to the Isthmus of Boothia; beyond all was doubtful. Back's River offered no advantages in its stream or in animal life, and Repulse Bay uncertain, because unexplored in 1845. This plan was far more reasonable than any evidence that could be advanced in favour of the Wellington Channel. The importance it was now acquiring rested solely on imaginative, rambling ideas, as to what the long absence of the Expedition had resulted in; its probable course, position, and resources: then came the bias and leaning of the inquirer. As to the Instructions, our only guide, *they were too clear*; something more abstruse was required, that dull monotony or routine might fix and waste itself on.

June, 1851.—Intelligence was received at the Admiralty from Lieutenant Pullen and Mr. Hooper* (of the *Plover*). It will be recollected they were directed to continue the search eastward of the Mackenzie River, &c., from Cape Bathurst to Banks' Land. They left Fort Hope 17th July, 1850; and after considerable delay from the heavy nature of the ice, they turned back (15th August), unable to reach Cape Bathurst. They arrived at Fort Hope (17th Sept.) UNSUCCESSFUL. Lieut. Pullen, in his despatch, thus ventures his opinion as to the position of the Franklin Expedition:—

“I hardly know what to say of the position of the lost voyagers, for I cannot think they are shut up in the supposed archipelago south-west of Cape Walker, and near Wollaston Land, without some of the Hudson's Bay posts hearing of them; for among so many, and Sir John Franklin knowing the coast so well, some would be ready to undertake the journey (for the distance cannot be very much more than 500 miles) to the nearest post, which is Fort Norman.

“Even could they once get to Bear Lake, Indians might be found ready to assist them.

“Again, Esquimaux about the Coppermine, and the coast in its

* Blue Book, “Further Correspondence and Proceedings, Arctic Expedition, 1852,” pp. 33—64. See also a very interesting *Journal*, by Mr. Hooper, during the winter, 1849-50, pp. 143—186.

vicinity, hunt on Wollaston Land, and surely, if they had been near about them, or found any traces, Sir John Richardson and Mr. Rae would have heard of it." "I am strongly inclined to think, that after visiting Cape Walker and not finding the route practicable, they have left memorials, pushed through Wellington Channel; and thence westward, and are now shut up, far from land, between Melville Island and Point Barrow. My reason for this is, Capt. Fitzjames has so confidently expressed his opinion of that being the direction to be pursued, a route I think impossible to be accomplished. If the passage is ever to be made, it will be alongshore."

"Cape Walker, as well as every other likely place for making deposits of their proceedings, ought to be visited at all events."

The opinion thus given takes it for granted that Franklin has visited Cape Walker, and not finding the route practicable has therefore, at the very threshold, turned tail, abandoned his Instructions, which direct him to penetrate over a space of 17° of longitude, and gone up Wellington Channel. Very sound reasoning this, in the absence of facts!

Dr. Rae, in the summer of 1850, was to have renewed the attempt to reach Wollaston Land, and endeavour to get to the north, between it and Victoria Lands, and so on to Banks' Land; but there being an insufficiency of provisions for both Expeditions, the preference was given to Commander Pullen to carry out the route assigned to him. Dr. Rae's intention was to pass the winter of 1850—1 at Fort Confidence, and in the ensuing summer to search Wollaston and Victoria Lands.*

June 20, 1851.—Despatches were received from Capt. Collinson, of H.M.S. *Enterprise*, of December 23rd, 1850, and February 23rd, 1851.† The same rumours continued to be reported which we have already given; to which we add, "Capt. Moore informed me, a party of natives, who visited the *Plover* (at Port Clarence, Sept. 18th, 1850), had informed him that a vessel had arrived at a place called Noo-wak, some distance to the eastward of Point Barrow; that she was destroyed by the ice, and the people starved; a number of whom are represented to have been lying on the shore. . . The vessel had three masts, and the wreck had taken place on the breaking up of the ice in the spring of 1849. . . Feeling," says Capt. Collinson, "that an attempt might be made to reach the Polar Sea through the Russian Posts communicating with Michaelowski, I

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," pp. 51—56.

† Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 65.

availed myself of the offer of Lieutenant Barnard, who had previously volunteered, and determined on proceeding to Norton Sound for the purpose of landing him." This was done on October 12th, 1850. With him were left Mr. Adams (Assistant-surgeon), Thomas Cousins (Captain, maintop), who was with Sir John Richardson in 1848. "We also received information from a post in the interior that five Europeans and an officer had been seen by some natives, but the difficulty of communicating with the Russians rendered the information vague."

Capt. Collinson speaks highly of the kindness of the Russian authorities, Captains Tebenkorf and Rosenberg; the instructions given to Lieut. Barnard were, "As it appears to me desirable that the reports relative to white men having been seen on the shores of the Polar Sea should be thoroughly investigated, and as, by information received from Commander Moore, Michaelowski is greatly resorted to by native tribes who maintain a traffic along the coast to Point Barrow; it will be desirable that one, if not two, should remain at that place, while the others are proceeding to the posts in the interior, where it will be readily ascertained, . . . whether a communication is maintained with the Polar Sea, . . . and the feasibility of a party reaching the sea by this route in the ensuing summer. In the event of attaining any palpable information of the missing Expedition, you will endeavour to establish a communication with them, affording them information as to the deposits of provision, &c., &c."

At the latter end of the month of September, 1851, the public were greatly surprised by the unexpected return of the *Resolute* and *Assistance*, under Captains Austin and Ommaney, and the *Lady Franklin* and *Sophia*, under Messrs. W. Penny and Stewart.

The early return of these Expeditions led at first to the hope that farther and more favourable intelligence had been obtained of the course Franklin had pursued after leaving Beechey Island; but when it was known nothing additional had been discovered, hope gave way to surprise, despondence, and, we may almost say, to despair. It was thought, and fairly presumed, that having been the first to discover the traces, and to fix the safety of the Franklin Expedition up to its arrival and wintering at Beechey Island, thereby throwing overboard all previous reports and rumours of disaster on his passage thither, that now, having gained a clue, it would be perseveringly followed. It is true, opinions were divided as to whether he had followed a northern route or the direction in which the Instructions directed him; but as both routes were to be examined, it was concluded that,

failing to discover farther traces in one season, a second would be devoted to the same humane purpose; their return thus early was, therefore, considered altogether premature. The disappointment to the public, ever watchful, was consequently great; but it seems, at the close of the first travelling season, an estrangement of feeling, ill-defined at first, had arisen between the two commanders of these expeditions. A difference followed, and this difference led to estrangement; whether it arose from misconception or prejudice, or morbid sensitiveness, whether from disappointment and the uneasy, depressing influence arising from the want of success, or from whatever cause, these efficient, excellently-commanded Expeditions returned. It is not within our province here to go into the details of this unhappy result, we can only notice the effects produced on the public—everybody was disappointed. It was deeply and generally regretted, and the more so as both squadrons had, as will be seen in the sequel, made the most of the season they had been out, had earned credit to themselves, and done more to secure relief, and to trace and recover the object of their search, than any previous expedition. Alas! that with so propitious a beginning, the end should have had such opposite results, should have terminated so destructive to our hopes. These differences having become known to their Lordships,* the Admiralty very properly appointed a committee. This committee was “to direct their attention to and report on the conduct of the officers intrusted with the command of the late Expeditions, and the several exploring parties, and whether everything was done by them to carry into effect their Instructions, and to prosecute the search for the missing ships.”†

As we have said, it would be beside our object to enter at great length into this painful subject. We therefore shall confine ourselves to the direction and results of the search in which the labours of these most indefatigable commanders were employed; for, notwithstanding what has been said, the organization of the travelling parties, and their persevering efforts, merited every praise, and were only too early closed. We cannot forbear here noticing one remark of their Lordships; they direct the particular attention of the committee to the return of the expedition from Cape Riley in this season, and they desire” a special report, “whether it would have been any ad-

* Blue Book, “Arctic Expeditions, Report of the Committee, 1851.” See “Letters” from Mr. Penny, dated, 15th Sept. 1851, p. lv., and October 10, 1851, p. lviii.

† Blue Book, “Arctic Expeditions, Report of the Committee, 1851,” p. x.

vantage if Capt. Austin and Mr. Penny had remained a further time to continue the search in that direction?"—evidently showing their leaning in favour of a continued northern search by Wellington Channel. We cannot but think it had been more agreeable to reason, had they desired a special report as to the advantages of prosecuting further search in the direction of that space from which the design of the voyage originated, and upon which Sir John Franklin's Instructions were founded; and the more especially, as not a jot of evidence existed from which to prove that he had, from untoward circumstances, been compelled to depart from them. But we turn to the Expedition under Capt. Austin: from the time of his sailing, the whole conduct of this gallant officer is marked for approbation. His careful thought, and determination to carry out the great object of the expedition, is shown in the various systematic and judicious arrangements made for extended search; they stamp him as possessed of no ordinary mind. In these he was fully aided and supported by his able second, Capt. E. Ommaney, and in justice to them we are bound to add, by the whole of his excellent officers and crews. The Expedition had not arrived on the ground from which was to commence that series of important operations afterwards so fully carried out, when a general memorandum, dated at sea, lat. $75^{\circ} 25' N.$, lon. $61^{\circ} 34' W.$, July 25th, 1850,* was issued by Capt. Austin to the officers commanding the vessels under his orders. We notice it as a prelude to what might be expected hereafter from such an officer. The preamble runs, "In the hope that the Expedition is now not far distant from the north water, and although the nature and movements of the ice are so varied in different seasons as to prevent any determination of plan, until the moment for acting arrives, it becomes desirable that what is contemplated in the prosecution of the charge assigned to me (the accomplishment of which we all have so much at heart), should be made known, I therefore promulgate it, and it is to be received as an addendum to the Instructions issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and carried out with all the earnestness and zeal that so highly an important service demands." This valuable document provides arrangements for the course of search to be adopted. Under the idea that the crews of the missing ships would retreat by way of Lancaster Sound and Pond's Bay, it provides for the search of and from Pond's Bay to Whaler Point, on the South side of Lancaster Sound and Barrow's Strait; and from Cape War-

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," p. 93.

render to Wellington Channel, and its entrance on the north. Capes Rennel and Walker and the south-west, and on to Melville Island, are specially noted, as also the Parry Islands—places of rendezvous, and for leaving notices, are fixed and named, and especially Griffith Island; as also is Winter Harbour, as their winter quarters. Altogether, this document is most complete; one more excellent we have seldom read. To Capt. Penny was left the examination of the northern part of Wellington Channel. Capt. Austin's Expedition did not succeed in getting much farther west than Griffith Island; it was, therefore, chosen as their winter quarters. Scarcely were the ships frozen fast (September, 1850), when a series of preliminary journeys were commenced to deposit provisions in advance, for the use of the travelling parties in the ensuing spring. All the orders show the desire of Capt. Austin to carry out, to the extreme limit, the great object of the expedition, the search for and recovery of the missing Franklin and his companions, with due regard to the preservation of the gallant officers and men by whose unflinching exertions the hoped-for success was to be achieved. The spring came, and with it another general memorandum,* rousing to preparation, and giving a general plan of operations for search by travelling parties (March 10th, 1851). The principal search was confided to his second, Capt. Ommaney, and in the right direction, because, in the direction of Sir John Franklin's Instructions, from "Cape Walker to the south-west." Most ably was it executed under that excellent officer. Having reached Cape Walker, without finding any traces of Franklin, he continued the examination of the coast west and south until he attained a position about 101° W.; from thence he despatched Lieut. (now Capt.) S. Osborn on an extended search to the westward, whilst he examined a deep bay, since distinguished by his name. Capt. Osborn succeeded in reaching 103° 25' W. In the meantime Cape Walker was found to be an island, separated by a strait explored by Lieut. (now Commander) Mecham; and the western coast of Peel's Sound to 72° 49' N., was examined by Lieut. Browne; several islands in the offing were also examined. Capt. Ommaney remarks in his report,† "The coast which I have searched being exactly in the route where Sir John Franklin was instructed to seek a passage to the American continent, much importance must necessarily be attached to the nature of its shores, and the chances of its being practicable for ships to navigate in that direction. . . . The character of

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," Additional Papers, &c., p. 10.

† *Ibid.*, p. 27.

the land is very low. . . The nature of the ice along its shores is mostly of old formation. . . Little indication of tide. . . Shoals abound along the coast, and there was no place where a ship could obtain shelter. On that part most exposed to the north there were masses of grounded floe-pieces, quite forty feet in thickness. . . . After giving my best attention to the subject, and from all that passed under my observation, it is my opinion that the coast is unnavigable for ships. The distance travelled by my party amounts to 480 miles, of which I have traversed 200 of newly-discovered coast." Lieut. Osborne observes,* "From 101° to 105° W. the floe, in addition to its exhibiting the same aged appearance, . . . had evidently been subject to enormous pressure, by which large blocks, many tons in weight, were thrown up, one on the other, in wild confusion. . . . I beg to express, as my opinion, that at no period of the year can there be a navigable sea for ships in the neighbourhood of the coast along which I travelled westward of Cape Walker." And lastly, Lieut. Browne, in travelling down the west side of Peel's Sound, remarks,† "from the state and appearance of the ice in the Strait (Sound?) and in the bays along the coast, I think it unlikely that any ship could penetrate to the southward through this channel." Again, "shortly after leaving Cape Walker, the ice becomes smooth, continuing so right up to the land; no tide-mark could be observed, giving me the idea that the floe was frozen solid to the bottom. . . . This was the case in all the bays around which I travelled, and confirms me in the original impression. Proceeding along the east coast of the islands (about 73° N.), the ice is very smooth, close up to the cliffs. . . . This ice appears to be of old formation; and but small pressure to be perceived along the coast;" from "the state of the ice . . . it is my opinion that this channel is rarely, if ever, sufficiently open for the purposes of navigation."

That this south-western division was well conceived, and well carried out under Captain Ommaney, not a doubt exists; that it was continued as far to the west as the means of the Expedition and the state of the ice (from returning spring) permitted, is equally certain. Still, every effort failed to discover any farther traces of the missing Expedition. But the failure to discover traces at Cape Walker and westward to 103° West was no proof that Franklin had given up all hope to the southward and westward, and therefore returned: much less was it proof that he never attempted the passage by Cape Walker

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Additional Papers," p. 102.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 30 and 75.

and the south-west at all—a conclusion afterwards come to by Captain Austin. Captain Ommaney and his parties simply proved that Franklin had not communicated with Cape Walker and the coast westward to 103° West; but it should have been remembered that there was the greater part of the space to be examined upon which was founded the original design of the voyage, extending from 103° to 115° West (to Banks' Land); that space (as yet unexplored) comprised 12° of longitude, = about 216 miles, and even under its reduced form offered every prospect of a passage.—(See Chart, Austin and Penny's Discoveries.)*

The search by the south-west may be said virtually to have closed with the return of Captain Ommaney's parties. Previous to the journey of this excellent officer, no attempt had been made to reach Cape Walker, or to follow the Franklin Expedition in the direction in which it was ordered (see Section 5 of his Instructions); and yet six years had passed, and it was known that the Expedition was only victualled for three, may be, to be eked out to five years at farthest. How shall we account for this most unjustifiable procrastination? Those six years—full of anxiety, of hope, of fear, at home—might be fraught with the most distressing consequences to Franklin and his gallant fellows—consequences one shudders to think on. But this procrastination led to other and most baneful effects. Because Franklin did not return unassisted, it led to all sorts of speculation as to the causes of his prolonged absence, and the most improbable inferences and conclusions as to the position of the Expedition. The Instructions given to Franklin for his guidance, and the only guide we had to him, were now to be cast aside, and the result was, as might have been foreseen, all was left to conjecture;—hence followed the visionary plans and schemes for his recovery. This delay speaks unfavourably as to the soundness of our feeling and solicitude for the missing ones; and yet all were really anxious, and full of fearful anticipations of distress, of sorrow, and of death. But the truth is, notwithstanding the earnest desire to adopt the best and most efficient means for the recovery of our long-absent countrymen on the part of the Admiralty and the public, still the subject (otherwise simple) became so involved and confused by the opposing and distracting variety of the plans, schemes, and theories offered, that sound thought retired confounded, and conjecture ruled—and, unhappily, was still to rule. But we digress.

* Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," Report, &c., at the end.

We will now turn to the northern and western divisions of this excellently arranged Expedition. They equally claim our admiration. The southern extremes and the passages between the Parry Islands were explored up to $76^{\circ} 23'$ North, and westward to and beyond 114° West; and Lowther, Garratt, Young, and other islands were examined. New lands were discovered to the westward of their farthest western limit; but still, unhappily, not a vestige was obtained to indicate that the Franklin Expedition had been there. All these parties were admirably conducted by their respective officers, equalled only by the zeal and persevering activity of their crews. Where all behaved so well in the holy cause, it were invidious to select; still we hope not to offend any when we mention Lieutenants Aldrich and M'Clintock, and Mr. Bradford, the surgeon of the *Resolute*. Lieutenant (now Captain) M'Clintock particularly distinguished himself in his very extended journey to the westward of Melville Island, to Liddon Gulf, and by new discoveries further to the westward. However unfortunate all these parties were in failing to clear the mystery hanging over the fate of Franklin and his gallant companions, their zealous, persevering labours were not altogether lost. Alas! that they told us only where he was not; still they were in the right direction. Franklin was ordered to longitude 98° West, and latitude $74\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ North, and thence to the south-west. He had reached Beechey Island, on his outward route; who could say but that, shut out from the south, he might have made westing, and reached Melville Island? This island had not been visited; it was, therefore, most important that it should be examined. The following table will best show the extraordinary and prolonged efforts of the travelling parties of this excellently managed Expedition.

ALONG SOUTH SHORE.

Officer in command.		No. of Crew.	Days out.	Miles travelled.	Miles of Coast searched.		Extreme point reached.	
Name.	Rank.				Newly discovered.	Old.	Lat. N.	Long. W.
Erasmus Ommaney	Captain . . .	6	60	480	205	—	$72^{\circ} 44'$	$100^{\circ} 42'$
Sherard Osborn, Esq.	Lieutenant . .	7	58	506	70	10	$72^{\circ} 18'$	$103^{\circ} 25'$
Wm. H. Browne, Esq.	Lieutenant . .	6	44	375	150	—	$72^{\circ} 49'$	$96^{\circ} 40'$
Geo. F. Mechem, Esq.	Lieutenant . .	6	29	236	80	—	—	—
Mr. Vesey Hamilton.	Mate	7	28	198	—	23	—	—
Mr. Charles Edo . . .	Asst.-Surgeon	6	20	175	—	—	—	—
Mr. Fred. J. Krabbe.	2nd Master . .	7	13	116	—	—	—	—
Geo. F. Mechem, Esq.	Lieutenant . .	6	23	238	—	75	—	—
Mr. Fred. J. Krabbe.	2nd Master . .	6	18	110	—	—	—	—

ALONG NORTH SHORE.

Officer in command.		No. of t. w.	Days out.	Miles un- velled.	Miles of coast searched.		Extreme point reached.	
Name.	Rank.				Newly disco- vered.	Old.	Lat. N.	Long. W.
Rob. D. Aldrich, Esq.	Lieutenant . .	7	62	550	70	75	76° 16'	104° 30'
F. L. McClinton, Esq.	Lieutenant . .	6	80	760	40	215	74 38	114 20
A. R. Bradford, Esq.	Surgeon . . .	6	80	669	155	30	76 23	106 15
Mr. R. B. Pearce. . .	Mate	7	24	208	—	—	—	—
Mr. Walter W. May.	Mate	6	34	371	—	—	—	—
Mr. W. B. Shelaboar.	2nd Master. . .	6	24	245	—	—	—	—
Mr. John P. Chyuc.	Mate	7	12	136	—	—	—	—
R. C. Allen, Esq. . .	Master	7	18	137	—	25	—	—
R. C. Allen, Esq. . .	Master	5	7	44	—	—	—	—
Mr. Walter W. May.	Mate	5	6	45	—	—	—	—
Mr. Geo. F. McDougal	2nd Ma-ter. . .	7	18	140	95	20	—	—
Mr. Geo. F. McDougal	2nd Master. . .	6	18	198	—	—	—	—

Having endeavoured to do justice to the able management, the extraordinary exertions, and the excellent conduct of all concerned in the Expedition under Captain Austin, we now give that officer's opinion, derived from the results of his travelling parties. It is given in the "Report of his Proceedings to the Admiralty" (dated Griffith Island, 14th July, 1851),*—"Having now carefully considered the direction and extent of the search (without success) that has been made by the Expedition, and weighed the opinions of the officers when at their 'extremes,' I have arrived at the conclusion that the Expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of his mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Channel, and therefore deem it unnecessary to attempt the prosecution of any further search to the westward." We have given ourselves some trouble to ascertain upon what ground Captain Austin comes to this conclusion, but have not been enabled to discover any reason. The explorations of Captain Ommaney's parties prove that Sir John Franklin did not communicate with Cape Walker, nor with the coast to the westward and southward to 103° West; and that officer, in his Report, furnishes good and cogent reasons why he could not, if he would. He says, "The land is low; . . . shoals abound;" and "the coast is unnavigable for ships;" therefore, if Franklin had had the wish to get to the south and west (between the ice and the shore, as has been pronounced the most advantageous by some), he would have found it impracticable here. But this fact does not lead to the con-

* Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Report of Committee," &c., p. xvi.

clusion that he gave up all hope of penetrating to the south-west; he might still have been enabled to get to the westward, agreeable to the option given him, Sect. 6 of his Instructions. We have always thought he did so, and that he endeavoured to make a general south-west course. To suppose that, because he could not reach Cape Walker, he immediately returned, and abandoned the voyage, seems absurd. The absence of all traces at Melville Island certainly surprised us; but the arduous labours of Lieutenant M'Clintock were not altogether fruitless; * he confirms the opinion of Parry, 1819--20, as to the impracticability of getting to the westward between that island and Banks' Land, and the favourable prospects presented of getting to the south-west to the eastward of Winter Harbour; but the very absence of despatches proved that the Franklin Expedition had not made such large westing--had, in fact, not succeeded in reaching that island, or, most assuredly, we should have found records of his visit at the now celebrated sandstone at Winter Harbour (Parry's): the only inference, then, to be drawn from this was, that we must look for the missing Expedition more to the southward and eastward from that island. Lastly:--The unsuccessful search along the southern shores of and between the Parry Islands may be accounted for, on the supposition that Franklin, in persevering along the northern edge of the ice of Melville Sound for a passage to the south-west, was too far distant, or under too favourable circumstances to admit of delay, and, therefore, did not communicate with those islands. After a careful consideration of all these circumstances at the time, the general inference we drew was--that Franklin, after leaving Beechey Island, attempted to reach Cape Walker, and was shut out from there; that, having a favourable prospect to the westward, he persisted in that direction, endeavouring to penetrate to the south-west, along the whole space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land; obtained large westing and some southing, until within the influence of that south-east drift noticed by Parry in 1820 to be always setting past Melville Island; he there got entangled in its heavy masses, and ultimately locked in. We have, notwithstanding all that has transpired since, seen no valid reason for altering this opinion, and we therefore conceived this to be the true direction for search.

From this view of the search and results of Captain Austin's travelling parties, we must, necessarily, differ from his conclusion. It

* See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, Report of Committee, 1851," p. 88.

will be seen we do not regard the absence of *traces in the particular localities visited as any proof that Franklin did not, or was unable to, follow out his Instructions.* Had Captain Austin's parties completed the *examination of Melville Sound*, it would for ever have set the *question at rest, whether the missing ships had penetrated in that direction or not.* The examination of that Sound being left incomplete, left the matter open to doubt—not the doubt of the caviller—but Franklin having been sent there, there we should hope to find him. We have often regretted that an Expedition composed of such efficient officers and crews—so united, so daring, and so persevering—altogether animated with such excellent feelings—that it should not have been kept together, and its services prolonged for another year. We have often considered it unfortunate that two of the vessels were not enabled to reach Melville Island, and, from that advanced position, have despatched travelling parties to Banks' Land and eastward, to meet the parties from Cape Walker. With his admirable arrangements, and able officers and crews, we have no doubt farther traces of the lost Expedition would have been found, which would have led to the development of the sad mystery. A communication with M'Clure's parties might have been effected, and Captain Austin might have shared with that officer the honour of discovering the North-West Passage. But it was not to be.

We cannot part with this much abused Expedition without expressing the high opinion we have of the talents and judicious arrangements of its commander, Captain Austin—the zeal and perseverance of his able second, Captain Ommaney—and the activity and able management of the officers. The conduct of the crews is marked in their diligence, kindly bearing and generous feelings towards their officers and each other, often under difficulties and privations at times extreme;—it is above all praise. Each and all seem to have felt and acted under the sacred influence of a holy cause. They deserved success; but it is not given to mortals to command it.

We will now give the results of Capt. Penny's Expedition. It will be remembered that he was to explore Jones's Sound and on to the Wellington Channel, the Parry Islands, and Cape Walker, and, failing all these, to attempt (circumstances permitting) Smith's Sound. Capt. Penny was equally fortunate in the selection of his officers; being ably assisted by Capt. Stewart and his other officers, and by willing and persevering crews. Capt. Penny, being prevented from approaching Jones's Sound by a chain of immense floes extending out twenty-five miles from its entrance, made the best of his way

up Barrow's Strait, discovered the graves at Beechey Island, and wintered in a harbour on the south side of Cornwallis Island, since called Assistance Harbour. Capt. Penny undertook the examination of the Wellington Channel. Depôts were laid in advance, and the spring travelling parties started on their several journeys May 5th, 1851, under well-arranged travelling instructions.* They searched both sides of Wellington Channel. About forty-five or fifty miles north from its entrance, they found it to extend east and west, and open water was discovered there early in the season. Subsequently, the eastern coast was examined, and its limits ascertained to run to the eastward in places to 91° W., and north to lat. $76^{\circ} 25'$ N.; forming a gulf, enclosing several extensive bays. To the west, Cornwallis Island was found to change its trending gradually round to the west, until its northern coasts lay in a nearly east and west direction; it ultimately curved round again to the north-west. Between Cornwallis Island and the northern land, an open sea was seen before them, running in the same (north-west) direction. A cluster of islands, situated about 76° N. and 96° W. divided the broad channel (nearly fifty miles in width at this point) into several navigable passages for ships. Captain Penny explored the land to the north, and coasted the intermediate islands, reaching the northern land about lat. $76^{\circ} 20'$ N., and long. 97° W.

Capt. Stewart and Dr. Sutherland explored the coast from the northern entrance of the Wellington Channel east round by the north to lat. $76^{\circ} 17'$ N. and long. $92^{\circ} 20'$ W.; when Dr. Sutherland returned, on his way examining the bottoms of various bays and islands. Capt. Stewart continued the search, and ultimately reached a point in lat. $76^{\circ} 20'$ N., and long. 97° W.

Messrs. Goodsir, Marshall, and Manson examined the northern coast of Cornwallis and Bathurst Islands (which were found to be united) as far as long. 99° W.

Mr. John Stuart searched the eastern side of Wellington Channel, and reached Cape Hurd in Barrow's Strait.

The distances travelled by these energetic officers and their crews during April, May, and June, range from 400 to 932 miles. When it is considered that this was done on entirely new ground, not a doubt can be entertained but that each and all did their duty. It was, therefore, the more deeply to be regretted that any misunder-

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Additional Paper," pp. 303-367. Also the Appendix to the "Journal of a Voyage to Baffin's Bay, and Barrow's Strait, by Dr. Sutherland," vol. ii., p. v. to cxxi.

standing should have arisen, or seeming want of co-operation between the chiefs of these admirably conducted Expeditions, and the mere especially on such a mission; but want of success has soured energetic minds under far more favourable circumstances of climate and life-sustaining comforts. Prolonged exertion, battling with ice and snow, cold and wet, have a disheartening influence, and more so where hope is not cheered onward by some prospective assurance that the right track has been obtained, leading to the object sought. Unhappily, their labours were altogether unrewarded by such discovery. Great excitement was produced at the time by a piece of elm that was picked up at Hamilton Island, but on careful examination no inference could be drawn that it had belonged to the Franklin Expedition.

We have never attached any importance to Wellington Channel as a route adopted by Sir John Franklin, still the opinion of others, who think he did make an attempt that way, should have their just weight, especially those who explored it. It is difficult to come at Penny's decided opinion. We give a few extracts from his travelling Report, May 16, 1851;* he says, "The moment I passed over Point Surprise the expression that escaped me was, 'No one will ever reach Sir John Franklin; here we are, and no traces are to be found.' . . . So we returned to the sledges very much disappointed." Again, July 19, 1851, near Cape Becher; "I took another view of the expanse of water that was before my eyes; oh, to have been here only with my two little vessels, what could we not have done in the way of search? but I greatly fear, if we had, the missing ships are beyond our reach. . . . Had Sir John Franklin left documents, surely he would have done so upon this headland or Dundas Island. We found none." The following note was made at the same place:—"It was a severe struggle to leave the search, but there was no other course left; that the missing ships had gone beyond our reach, I had no doubt; for if they had not, then we should have found traces of them about some of the Bird Heads, or Duck Islands." These extracts lead us to infer that Captain Penny thought that Franklin had passed to the north by the Wellington Channel, and had gone beyond the reach of search (at least with his means); and yet he failed to discover a single positive trace of the course of the Expedition to lead him to such a conclusion. It was an impression, but impressions mean nothing; they will not suffice, where proofs are required. Impressions with ardent minds soon ripen into belief; and so we find it. On

* See "Journal of a Voyage to Baffin's Bay, &c., by Dr. Sutherland," vol. ii., pp. 132, 178—9.

August 10th, 1851, the following passage occurs:—"Again and again he said, that he would neither be responsible for bringing the search to a close, nor for jeopardizing the lives of upwards of 220 men, by leading them up the Wellington Channel, in the very footsteps, as he believed, of the unfortunate Franklin and his adventurous companions. He could not convince others to the same extent as he believed it himself, that the missing ships had taken that route. But he looked forward to an early meeting with Captain Austin, and said, that after he had given an outline of what had come under his observations in the Victoria Channel, he should at once propose a continuation of the search, . . . through the Wellington Channel." Capt. Austin came; the commanders consulted:—"It was a most important duty; . . . not only did the destinies of our . . . ships and their crews hang upon the decision to which they should come, but also the fate of those who might still be looking for help. . . . All that Mr. Penny could or did say failed to convince him of even the faintest probability that the missing ships had taken that (the Wellington Channel) route. He gave his opinion that had he done exactly as Mr. Penny's Expedition had done, and were he placed in the position which Mr. Penny occupied, he should not hesitate to conclude at once that the *search for the missing ships* need not be prosecuted to the north-west of their winter quarters at Beechey Island, a direction which he believed they had never taken. . . . Mr. Penny had no means of satisfying Capt. Austin, with respect to the opinion he (who had been in and beyond the Wellington Channel) entertained of the route they took from their winter quarters. This opinion he could not base upon anything more substantial than ideas suggested by the experience he and those engaged on the same route had acquired. To all appearance it had no tangible relation whatever to the missing ships, and not a single unexceptionable fact could be brought in to substantiate it. . . . Capt. Austin was satisfied the missing Expedition need not be searched for to the due west or north-west; and Mr. Penny, uncertain whether they had proceeded up the channel, could hold out no hopes of our being able to accomplish anything worthy the inevitable risks of a second winter."† Capt. Austin, requesting Mr. Penny's opinion in writing, after some demur, August 11, 1851, he wrote the following laconic reply; "Your question is easily answered. My opinion is, Wellington Channel requires no further search. All has been done in the power of man

* See "Journal of a Voyage to Baffin's Bay, &c., by Dr. Sutherland," vol. ii. p. 301.

† *Ibid.*, p. 304-6.

to accomplish, and no trace has been found. What else can be done?"

It is difficult to reconcile all these differences of opinion; and therefore we do not attempt it. Captain Stewart argues the question to our views much more rationally in his valuable report:—"That Sir John Franklin may have gone up Wellington Channel, is not at all impossible; I would (after having seen it) myself, if seeking a passage to the north-westward, seek for it in that channel. But the circumstances of the Wellington Channel, and the shores and islands of the more intricate channels to the north-west of it, having been thoroughly searched without finding any traces of the missing ships, goes a great way to refute the idea that they have gone in that direction. This circumstance, together with the late period at which the ice breaks up in Wellington Channel, on one side, and the early period at which open water was found to the northward, coupled with the first winter quarters of the ships at the mouth of the channel on the other side, leaves the question in the same doubt and uncertainty as ever." This opinion involves several considerations; the chief of which is, Did Sir John Franklin, in the hope of solving the question of a North-West Passage, adopt the Wellington Channel? We all know that he was specially enjoined by his Instructions "not" to "stop to examine any of the openings to the northward or southward in Barrow's Strait, but to continue to push to the westward without loss of time, in the latitude of about $74\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, till" he had "reached the longitude of that portion of land on which Cape Walker is situated, or about 98° W." With these Instructions before him, and ever uppermost in his mind, is it likely that he would stop until he had reached the point so particularly specified? The season of 1845 may have closed before he reached it, forcing him to winter *en route*; still all his thoughts would centre on Cape Walker. We know he wintered on the eastern side of Wellington Channel, at Beechey Island; but is that any proof that he attempted the passage by that channel? We think not. He had not fulfilled the first part of his Instructions; Cape Walker was yet to be reached; the south-west yet to be attempted. With these unaccomplished, we cannot think that he looked to the north at all, much less that he adopted the Wellington Channel. Show us that he had attempted and failed altogether to the west and south, prior to his taking up his winter quarters at Beechey Island, then the question of his adoption of the Wellington

* See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Additional Papers," p. 316; and "The Journal of a Voyage to Baffin's Bay, by Dr. Sutherland," vol. 2, p. xxvii.

Channel route may be entertained; but the very idea that he had made the attempt and failed, thus early in the season, never entered the heads of even the most strenuous of the Wellington Channel advocates. We must conclude, then, that when Franklin was at Beechey Island, he considered himself merely *en route* to Cape Walker, and, therefore, would not admit even the thought of a passage by the Wellington Channel. But let us inquire, from his winter quarters, which presented the better prospect of realizing the object of the voyage—the route by Wellington Channel, or that by Cape Walker, and the south-west (the direction of his Instructions)? We will assume that Franklin was aware of this open water to the north of Wellington Channel, but interposed between it and Beechey Island there was a barrier of ice of some thirty miles in extent, which barrier does not break up until late in the season, sometimes not at all; the period for navigation would, therefore, be very short; and it would be through a sea unknown, leading no one knew where; added to which, it was in a direction opposed to his Instructions. Would Sir John Franklin wait and run the risk of losing a season? We will now turn to Barrow's Strait; it becomes open much earlier, offers a wider sea for navigation, was known, was in the direction in which he was ordered, and was terminated with every fair prospect of successful accomplishment. It is, then, easy to imagine which he would adopt; we think the Cape Walker route. It is true this route was plain, simple, and limited; it did not present the attractive vision of a Polynia, "a wide, unmeasurable ocean," unlimited, but it was to appearance more practicable. But assuming that Franklin did attempt a northern route, by the Wellington Channel, and that under favourable circumstances he reached the open water, considering the probable late period of the season when he was enabled to accomplish this, and the short time for navigation, it seems improbable that he could have obtained any great distance to the north-west, especially in a sea encumbered by islands, presenting intricate passages between, and impetuous currents, obstacles opposed to quick progress. We think, then, considering all these conditions, had Franklin passed up the Wellington Channel, some traces of his outward course would have been found by Mr. Penny and his diligent searchers. The absence of these goes to prove he did not, and this is farther confirmed by the report of the whalers, that the year 1846 was very severe, but the whole is confirmed by the absence of despatches at Beechey Island. Franklin would never have departed from the unknown without leaving notices of his intentions, and he could not have selected a more eligible spot for such purpose than Beechey Island.

CHAPTER X.

AUSTIN AND PENNY EXPEDITION.—REPORT OF COMMITTEE.—THEIR QUESTIONS TO SCORESBY, AUSTIN, KELLETT, OMMANEY, SIR JOHN RICHARDSON, PENNY, AND STEWART, AND REPLIES.—REMARKS.—RETURN OF SIR JOHN ROSS.—HIS REPORTS AND OPINIONS.

IN going over the evidence before the Committee, we notice with surprise the manifold and varied nature of the impressions and opinions of the various officers of both Expeditions, as to the motives, condition, and movements of Franklin after he left Beechey Island; the slender ground on which they are formed shows them to be evidently more the ebullitions of hasty fancy, than the serious conclusions of well-weighed reflection. We would give them here, but they would swell our pages beyond the limits intended, and would conduce to nothing conclusive. We may say the majority are in favour of the Wellington Channel, as the route adopted by Sir John Franklin. Some few think the *Erebus* and *Terror*, with their officers and crews, all perished in returning; but there is not a single opinion in favour of a farther search south-west of Cape Walker. The direction in which the Franklin Expedition was sent was henceforth to be left again to its own dreary solitude.

The Expedition under Austin and Penny returned, but dissatisfaction reigned on all sides; no positive conclusions could be drawn, and why? These enterprising men, having failed to discover farther indications of the course of the missing Expedition after it left Beechey Island, all was again left to prejudice or conjecture. The alienated feeling between the commanders did not tend to clear the sad mystery enveloping the fate of Franklin and his devoted officers and crews. All this was deeply to be deplored, and the more so, as each had done more to achieve the recovery of the missing Expedition, now absent six years, than had been done during all that long period of painful doubt and anxiety. All was now uncertainty; failure on every side; the Plan forgotten, and the Instructions left. These deserted—without fixed rendezvous for the Franklin Expedition to fall back upon, and where it might be sought—men's minds wandered

in darkness; the delay in searching, the long absence, the want of success, all contributed to give rise to new thoughts—thoughts fevered with anxiety or enthusiasm. Can we wonder then, that, amongst the rest, the most absurd intentions should be attributed to Sir John Franklin, amounting to little short of an absolute dereliction of his Instructions? or be surprised at the monstrous plans and the visionary schemes that sprang up, followed by villainous reports and lying rumours? To these, add the deep anxieties and the depressing cares, “the foreboding fancies and prophetic tears” of the solitary hearths at home. All these tended, in the end, to so complicate and confuse, that thought—distracted from the original Plan and Instructions in her search after truth, finding no resting place in the chaos thus created—became herself wild, imaginative, and ungovernable. Knowing this, we cannot greatly wonder that these persevering commanders should have become perplexed, and that the conclusions drawn by them should have had no other foundation than mere conjecture—conjecture it was, for there was not a particle of evidence to sustain either opinion. Penny, ardent and persevering while undergoing the labours and discomforts of the search, disappointed in his humane object became, shall we say it? susceptible, flighty, and peevish, alike painful to himself and his kind-hearted co-operator. Austin—equally zealous and alike disappointed, but having his feelings more under command, more disciplined—did not show their pressure outwardly, but still his mind was ill at ease, his responsibilities were great, and, as a naval officer, he was more amenable to the Admiralty. It became him, whatever the ideas, and however suggested by experience, “if they had no tangible relation whatever to the missing ships,”* to reject them. But, as we have said, chaos prevailed, and minds were darkened; not alone those who had little claim to the knowledge of Arctic matters, but also others more profound, and of high scientific acquirements—all seemed under a cloud, or how can we imagine an Austin coming to the conclusion “that the Expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait?”† when as yet he had only examined a small portion of that space to which the Franklin Expedition was so specially directed. It could only have arisen on the assumption that, if not discovered to the eastward of 108° West (as far as they had searched), he must have

* See Dr. Sutherland's “Journal of Penny's Voyage,” p. 305.

† Blue Books, “Arctic Expedition, 1851,” Report, &c., p. xvi.

made large westing along the southern shores of the Parry group, and must be looked for at Melville Island; and if not there—and both had been searched in vain—hence must come the conclusion, that he could not have gone to the southward and westward; but the intermediate gap or space of about 12° of longitude (= 216 miles) seems to have been forgotten, or the question would have suggested itself, May he not be locked up in the ice, and helpless to the south-west, between 78° or 74° North and about 110° West? Again, Penny's opinion that he went up Wellington Channel and on to the north-west, arose, no doubt, from his discovery of the navigable sea to the north-west of that channel, and the prevailing mania in favour of it, already so often abjured in these pages. Again, the laudable but erratic anxiety to be doing something under the anguish of disappointment, and yet, being without any positive evidence or trace to direct him to the missing ones, he fears the responsibility. The general conclusions then drawn were, that Franklin did not prosecute the object of his voyage to the south-west, the west, or the north-west. In what direction, then, did he steer, after leaving Beechey Island? We think he followed the intent of his Instructions; these directed him to Cape Walker, and thence to the south-west. He was unable to reach that cape, but having the whole space between it and Banks' Land before him, he persisted to the westward, and ultimately was locked in the ice on the south-west side of Melville Sound.

We again express our regret at the unhappy termination of these Expeditions. The merit due to them for their extraordinary exertions, and zealous, persistent efforts over such an extended area, is most praiseworthy, but it was altogether lost for a time, to be better appreciated hereafter. We lament that such men as Austin and Ommaney, and their officers and crews, should have been placed, as it were, on their trial when they returned, for conduct that commands, and should ever command, the approbation of Englishmen, for they had highly distinguished themselves; still, let not Penny and Stewart, and their officers and men, be forgotten; their zeal in the cause was doubtless, and their prolonged efforts were well conducted and well carried out, but theirs was an anomalous position—*not of the Navy and yet of the Government*: let it suffice, the Committee before named express "unqualified admiration of the arrangements of Captain Austin and Mr. Penny," and of the "zeal, energy, intrepidity, and perseverance" of the officers and crews. It has been attempted to lower the merits of Penny's discoveries, by carping at some of his positions, bearings, &c. To say the least, this is un-

generous; for surely there is all the difference between observations taken in an open boat, in such an inclement region, average temperature scarcely above zero, and those obtained amidst the facilities and comforts offered by luxuriously equipped argosies, furnished with every advantage as to instruments. But "let one plain tale be told, that doth surpass all saws"—*William Penny discovered that sea to the northward of the Wellington Channel; he led the way.*

It is gratifying to add, notwithstanding these untoward circumstances, that the Admiralty appreciated and fully recognized the extraordinary merits of not only Captains Austin and Ommaney, and their officers and men, but also Messrs. Penny and Stewart, and the officers and crews under their command.

An extract or two from the Report of the before-noticed Committee (dated 20th November, 1851) may not be out of place:—"With respect to the results of the late Expedition," as regards the search for the missing ships, they remark, "it is a matter of no small interest and importance to have ascertained with certainty the exact position in which they passed the winter of 1845—6; while the careful and minute exploration of the coast to the southward and westward, by Captain Ommaney and Lieutenant M'Clintock, without discovering any traces whatever of Sir John Franklin, would seem to afford a very strong presumption that he did not pass that way; and conjecture, therefore, naturally turns towards Wellington Channel, to which, it is well known, he had often looked, as affording one chance of a passage to the north-west, and which we see, by Mr. Penny's account of his examination of the upper part of the Channel, appears to form at least a possible outlet in that direction." How the Committee can have presumed that Franklin did not pass to the southward and westward, from the results of Captain Ommaney's and Lieutenant M'Clintock's explorations (explorations commanding our highest admiration), while as yet the space between 103° West and Banks' Land—that important space that formed the groundwork of the original PLAN of the voyage—remained unsearched, we cannot conceive. We are compelled to say, but with due deference, it was "a very strong presumption." After thus disposing of Sections 5 and 6 of Franklin's Instructions, of Cape Walker, and the south-west, we cannot greatly wonder that "conjecture . . . naturally turns to Wellington Strait," the "presumption" of the one and the "conjecture" of the other being equally without foundation, equally fallacious and improbable. As to Sir John Franklin's predilections in favour of Wellington Channel, we think there is some little error

here; his views are shown in a Plan, read before the Royal Geographical Society, dated 10th February, 1836.* The concluding sentence says, "No service is nearer to my heart than the completion of the survey of the north coast of America, and the accomplishment of a North-West Passage." Neither "verbal information" or "expressed intentions" can stand before a recorded opinion. We must take his Instructions, it is said written principally, if not wholly, under his own dictation; but whether so or not, they are binding on him, and it is admitted he would not treat them with "levity." Are we prepared to say he was unwilling or unable to fulfil them? To say "unwilling," is to charge this great and good man with a wilful disobedience of orders. Let shame follow the thought! Or if to say "unable," is boldly to assert *that, of which we have not a shadow of proof.* Thus do the Wellington Channel advocates place us on the horns of a dilemma. We thought, at the time, he followed his Instructions, and that he never attempted the Wellington Channel, and we think so still. The paragraph No. 11, in reply to No. 10, is affecting creditable to the feelings of the Committee for the relatives and friends of the Franklin Expedition, who still clung to hope, "even against hope," and whose thoughts (as might be expected) turn eagerly towards further explorations "in any and every direction."† We might add, this disposition to search "in any and every direction" has been shown by others (not relatives), and cannot be better illustrated than in the importance and preference given to Wellington Channel, Jones's Sound, and the "great sound at the head of Baffin's Bay." In reply to their lordships' question, "What benefits can be expected from any further research, with the means and direction in which the Committee are of opinion that such search should be prosecuted?" after recommending "that an Expedition should be despatched next year to Barrow's Strait," the Committee observe:—"We consider any further exploration in the direction of Melville Island, or to the south-west of Cape Walker, wholly unnecessary; and we, therefore, propose that all the strength and energy of the expedition should be directed towards the examination of the upper part of Wellington Strait." Thus, was a veto given to all further

* See "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1836," vol. vi., part i., pp. 43—46; also, *ibid.*, Captain (now Admiral Sir F.) Beaufort's opinion thereon, p. 47; also, the "Voyage of the *Terror*, 1836—7," by Captain (now Admiral Sir G.) Back.

† See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition," Report, p. v.

search in the direction in which Franklin was ordered, and the route adopted, which, of all others, he was least likely to have followed. "More than one of the party (Franklin's) betrayed to me" an "inclination" to explore it, "which I discouraged, no one venturing to conjecture even to what extent it might go, or into what difficulties it might lead."* From this time we may consider the search for our much-valued countrymen abandoned; they were left to their fate—a fate we fear to think of. But how could this extraordinary conclusion have been come to? Only under the daring assumption that Franklin was altogether shut out from the south and west, by insurmountable obstacles presenting themselves between North Somerset and Cornwallis Island, and, therefore, had turned his attention to Wellington Channel. All this was imaginary. We had not an iota of evidence to prove it. The search by Cape Walker and the south-west merely proved that he could not approach an impracticable coast—a portion only of that space he was sent to explore; the Wellington Channel offered no proof that he had been there; and Beechey Island was altogether silent, which it would not have been, had Franklin passed up Wellington Channel. But in the face of all these, with the western side of Melville Sound and Banks' Land as yet unsearched, the south-west is rejected, and the Wellington Channel chosen. Was there ever such strange inconsistency? Why, the very fact of despatches not having been found at Beechey Island was alone sufficient negative evidence that Franklin had not gone up the Wellington Channel. The Committee conclude by stating, "they have thought it right to request from the several gentlemen (named in the margin), their opinions on this interesting but most difficult question."

The gentlemen named are, Rear-Admiral Sir John Ross, the Rev. Dr. Scoresby, Captains Austin, Kellett, and Ommaney, Sir John Richardson, and the Messrs. Penny and Stuart. They are requested to reply to the following questions:—

"1st. Do you suppose it probable that Sir John Franklin, or any portions of the crews composing his Expedition, still survive? If so, in what direction?"

"2nd. What are your grounds for forming that opinion?†

* See Sir John Barrow's Memorandum, Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 78.

† The Replies to Questions 1 and 2 are well worthy perusal. See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," Report, p. 163.

"3rd. Should a further search be decided on, what measures do you recommend for this purpose, and in what direction?"

The replies given to the above questions are in many cases very lengthy; but as the object of these pages is simply to inquire whether we have sought the Franklin Expedition in the right direction, our extracts will be confined principally to those replies that tend to throw light on that subject. The question, if any survive of our missing countrymen? we shall notice. All our quotations must be very brief; but we shall endeavour to extract the sense of the author in all cases.

Sir John Ross, 1st November, 1851, in his reply, says he does "not think it probable that . . . any portion of the crews . . . still survive; it is *barely* possible, if the ships have been wrecked on the east or west sides of Baffin's Bay, where there are natives, but nowhere else." No "British born" subjects could withstand the climate. He thinks "the only place (besides the locality of Adam Beck's report), that requires search, is the west coast of Baffin's Bay, between Pond's Bay and Cumberland Strait."

The Rev. Dr. Scoresby, 7th November, 1851, says:—"That Sir John Franklin, or some portion of his associates, *may* still survive, is a position which cannot be controverted. It follows, therefore, that some degree of probability . . . does exist." As to the direction the Expedition is to be looked for, and the grounds for the opinion, the Doctor observes, "The impression conveyed to my mind from the very first has been, that the Franklin Expedition must, on the strongest probabilities, have proceeded by the Wellington Channel, and from thence north-westward, into some remote position, or some position of inextricable embarrassment among the ices of the North-West Polar Sea. . . . In the Official Instructions directing Sir John Franklin (failing in finding a passage westward and south-westward from Cape Walker) to proceed, as a second route, by Wellington Channel, we have sufficient grounds for looking to this as the probable direction pursued. . . . From the ascertained fact of the voyagers having wintered at Beechey Island, 1845—6, the inference is irresistible, that in the first season, . . . either no passage was found to the westward at all, or some such opening only as that met with . . . in the summer of 1850; or else the ships were too late for that year to enter on the desired exploration. . . . The next season would . . . be employed in searching out one or the other,

* Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," Report, &c., p. 154.

whichever might appear the most promising. . . . As to which was actually pursued, the conclusion arrived at by Captain Austin, after his admirable and elaborate explorations of the regions to the westward from Barrow's Strait, seems to afford, negatively at least, satisfactory guidance, viz., that the Expedition under Sir John Franklin did not prosecute the object of its mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Strait (Channel). . . . The primary direction proposed by Sir John Franklin's Instructions being * thus disposed of, we reasonably look for him in that other direction next in order appointed to him, which Captain Penny's interesting researches show us he might have pursued, a direction which a mere view from the hills might have shown him to be open, . . . replete with promise of a grand and successful progress north-westward."

The Doctor then talks of "Franklin's favourable opinion of this channel," and the "accordant opinion of Captain Fitzjames." Alluding to the barrier in Wellington Channel, and "the retreat of the recent searching Expedition," he says, "the encumbering field . . . might, under the power of a few hours' favouring gale, have so drifted upward and westward from the eastern shore, as to have afforded a *free and easy* passage. . . . Probably it was a sudden and unexpected opening of this kind, filling the hearts of the adventurers with hope and gladness, . . . which urged a departure so hurried and imperative as to leave no moment for caring for records;" and "as to no traces of the Expedition being met with in all the extent of Captain Penny's exploration, . . . all that can be concluded is, that the probability of Sir John Franklin having passed that way into the . . . Polar Sea, lacks what might have been demonstration, but loses, as to probability, nothing." After the above quotation, it will be anticipated Dr. Scoresby recommends the Wellington Channel route.

Capt. Austin, November 15th, 1851,* says:—"I do not believe, nor suppose it probable, that Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the crews, . . . still survive." His reasons are, long absence, want of resources, and the scarcity of animal life: he continues, "Any search up Wellington Channel would in my opinion be fruitless. I cannot bring myself to search at all with the hope of success in any direction. I found this conclusion on the circumstance of the late extensive search having discovered no traces beyond those in the neighbourhood of the first winter quarters, and I cannot resist the conviction

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1853, Report &c.," pp. 164-7.

that the missing Expedition did not advance in the second season beyond Beechey Island. . . . If Sir John Franklin proceeded up Wellington Channel, a record of it would have been left. . . . Vessels could not have passed through a narrow passage between the islands which appear on Capt. Penny's chart, without detention; and (being a new discovery) possession would have been taken, and some mark of such discovery left on them. . . . But there are other grounds; there are opinions which have influenced and guided me, —there are the recorded opinions of our most eminent Arctic navigators and men of science, far from favouring the search for Sir John Franklin by the way of the Wellington Channel. The committee will remember that the orders to Sir John Franklin himself laid no stress upon the importance of that channel, but pointed his especial attention to another direction. . . . Lady Franklin, in a letter to me upon my departure, expressed her anxiety that particular search should be directed to the south-west of Cape Walker; but not one word of Wellington Channel. With all these important considerations before me, I am at a loss to account for the strong feeling that is abroad in favour of a further search for the missing ships in the direction of the Wellington Channel. . . . Having, therefore, very maturely weighed all these circumstances, I cannot but be strongly impressed that Sir John Franklin did not prosecute beyond Beechey Island; but leaving his winter quarters, he was either beset on that occasion, or was attempting to return to England. . . . Contact with bergs would also sufficiently account for the disappearance of the ships, with all on board."

Captain Kellett, November 5th, 1851,* says:—"There is no evidence of their having been wrecked; on the contrary, I think we have evidence that they have not been wrecked. I feel it is not within the power of man to say they are dead, nor do I consider it right to do so." Capt. Kellett gives Dr. Rae as an evidence as to food and fuel; and Capt. Penny and Lieut. M'Clintock as to animal life; and concludes, "I must therefore give it as my opinion that there is a possibility that some may still survive." As to direction, and the grounds for forming an opinion, he says, "The answers to these questions must be conjectural. . . . I base my opinion on the following points; giving Sir John Franklin credit for pursuing the object of his Expedition, the ships will be found, I think, a long way to the westward of any point reached by the parties from the late Expeditions.

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Report, &c.," p. 168.

. . . In the summer of 1846 he may have reached a navigable sea north of the Parry Islands, which may have enabled him to get to the westward, and probably to the southward of Melville and Banks' Land (which may be one), making his return by *the eastward more difficult than that by the westward*, and the open water, as far as he could know (Wrangel's?), less distant by the western route. He would, therefore, persevere westerly, and having made his westing, may have been stopped in his endeavour to get south by continuous land or islands. We have certain proof of there being land in this sea, for, on August 17th, 1849,* I landed on an island in lat. $71^{\circ} 19' N.$, long. $175^{\circ} 16' W.$ (named Herald's Island; it is almost inaccessible, and literally alive with birds. From the neighbourhood of Herald's Island I saw (as far as a man can be positive of his sight in those seas) to the westward an extensive land, very high and rugged, distant, I consider, from my position fifty or sixty miles. I could not approach it in my ship, but it might have been easily reached by a steam-vessel.

. . . I do consider that it is more probable that the ships are stopped to the westward of the meridian of Behring's Strait, than anywhere within 600 miles west of their winter quarters, 1845—6; for had they been within that distance, we should have had, long ere this, *some one* out of so large a party, return to give us information of their whereabouts. *Being in the meridian, or to the westward of it, is the very reason we have not heard from them, for they could not possibly reach either America or Asia in boats or on foot.*" As to further search, and the direction, Capt. Kellett says, "were I proposing to make a north-east passage, I should recommend an attempt to be made, directly north in the meridian of Behring's Strait, where the sea is

* "The U.S.S. *Vincennes*, Commodore Rogers, visited Herald Island in 1854; and thence sailed either over or in the neighbourhood of several localities, where land had been reported to be seen, without finding any of these. He specifies as follows:—that by Capt. Kellett to the eastward, and in the neighbourhood of Herald Island; the northern portion of that land mentioned in "Arctic Papers, 1847—51," p. 41; and the so-called Plover Islands; also that land which has been reported by Baron Wrangel, on native authority, to lie to the north of Cape Jakan."—*See Proceedings of Royal Geographical Society*, No. 1, p. 16. "It becomes a nervous thing to report a discovery of land in these regions, without actually landing on it after the unfortunate mistake to the southward; but as far as a man can be certain, who has 120 pair of eyes to assist him, and all agreeing, I am certain I have discovered an extensive land; I think also it is more than probable that these peaks we saw are a continuation of the range of mountains seen by the natives off Cape Jakan, . . . mentioned by Baron Wrangel."—*See Parliamentary Papers*, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, p. 18; Capt. Kellett's Letter."

clearer of ice for a greater extent northerly than in any other direction; but as the object of an expedition would be one of search not of discovery, I should recommend their making Herald Island, and then push westerly for the land seen by me, which may be a continuation of the land seen by the natives from Cape Jakan, and which we know, from Baron Wrangel's voyage, is not connected with the coast of Asia. I would pass, if possible, to the westward of this land, and then prosecute the search easterly along its northern face." Alluding to Capt. M'Clure, he says, "he will use every endeavour to reach Melville Island with his parties, if he failed with his ships. . . Should one of these parties reach Melville Island, or even the northern shore of Banks' Land, they will endeavour to get home by the east, being a safer route than attempting to return to their ships."

Capt. Ommaney, November 12th, 1851,* says:—"I am of opinion, that neither Sir John Franklin, or any portion of the Expedition, are now alive." His reasons for thinking so are, "when they quitted Beechey Island (say, August, 1846), they had less than two years' provisions left to last them up to the present time. . . No English constitution, civilized people, could exist so long on reduced allowance. . . I place no reliance upon the support they are likely to procure from the quantity of game or animals found in those regions." He thinks, from "the numerous old Esquimaux settlements, that a change has taken place in those seas, in the course of time, which, becoming blocked up with ice for a longer period of the year, deprived the natives of the means of living, which caused them to emigrate eastward. (?) . . If they abandoned their ships north of the Parry group, in all probability" they "would have retraced their steps towards their first winter quarters, or, Melville Island, where there is more animal life, of which they were quite aware. . . There are reasons to suppose they did not prosecute the north-west passage, after leaving Beechey Island. . . It is supposed their preserved meats were inferior. . . No records being left, does not look like advancing. . . Again, . . the position of Cape Riley I regard as merely the threshold of the north-west passage. . . Under these circumstances, and supposing that Franklin had examined the seas beyond Cape Walker (?) in the fall of 1845, and found this impenetrable barrier across Wellington Channel, what other course had Franklin left but to retreat? . . That two ships could be lost in the ice, without meeting a vestige of them, I can easily conceive

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Report, &c.," p. 171.

possible, . . . if close to each other." Should another search be desirable, "If Wellington Channel is navigable to any considerable distance, it must be only on an occasional open season, no two seasons are ever alike; but taking such a season as we met with, there is no alternative but to winter at Beechey Island, from whence it may be practicable by travelling to set at rest the question respecting the channel seen by Mr. Penny; it may terminate in a gulf, which I am not unprepared for, from what I remarked about the tides in Wellington Channel. Another proposition:—You find Wellington Channel blocked up, but all promises well to the westward; as some people express a wish that Banks' Land should be explored, the leader of the Expedition might have authority for detaching a vessel in that direction. . . . I would not recommend advancing up Wellington Channel a second season, unless certain of retreat, for it amounts almost to a certainty that the vessels would be blocked up, as may have been the fate of Franklin. I have no faith in the theory of a Polar Basin."

Sir John Richardson, November 15th, 1851,* says:—"I think it probable that part of the crews may still survive to the north or north-west of Melville Island." This opinion is founded on the abundance of animal life which he thinks extends to the 80th parallel, from the existence of Esquimaux up to the 77th parallel; from the fact of Europeans having lived six years and a half at Spitzbergen, &c.; the facts and arguments deduced are reasonable, convincing, and hopeful. He thus reasons; "Supposing Sir John Franklin went up Wellington Channel, and is beset to the west or north-west of Melville Island, the absence of any written document renders the reply to this one of election among various probabilities. . . . I do not feel inclined to admit . . . that the only reason for Sir John's not leaving one was his intention of returning forthwith to England:" he thinks "it much more probable that he did actually leave a memorandum," and "that it may have been placed on the north or east side of Union Bay: he doubts if "the two ships have been involved in a pack of ice, and drifted involuntarily into Baffin's Bay, as Sir James Ross's ships and the two American schooners were, and there overwhelmed, without leaving traces of it. . . . Adam Beck's confused and imperfect story," he considers "sufficiently disproved," but "the necessity for search in Victoria Channel remains the same. . . . The direction of search," he observes, "is now actually limited to the channel here

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Report, &c.," p. 174.

indicated, since Capt. Austin's extensive and accurate examination of the shores of Barrow's Strait, to beyond the 114th meridian, shows that the *discovery ships did not take a westerly course* (?) . . . If this conclusion needed further support," it has been supplied by the account of "Dr. Rae's* very remarkable pedestrian journey," "just arrived, by which we are informed that that zealous and active traveller had explored the coasts of Victoria and Wollaston Lands from the 110th to the 118th degree of longitude, approaching on the one side within 220 miles of Lieut. Osborne's farthest point south-west of Cape Walker, and on the other within an equal distance of the north side of Banks' Land. . . The large horde of Eskimos, . . . met by Dr. Rae, . . . had never seen ships or white men. . . The way in which I think the information that has been collected by the various searching Expeditions ought to be interpreted is,—The summer of 1845, Sir John Franklin was foiled in his attempts to pass Barrow's Straits; that while waiting for the disruption of the ice, Capt. Fitzjames and other magnetic observers landed on Cape Riley to keep the August term-day; and having then discovered the qualities of Union Bay as a secure harbour, the ships eventually chose it as a winter retreat. . . In the spring, exploring sledge parties were sent up Wellington Channel, and having merely a passage to look for, and neither bays to examine nor the circuits of islands to make, they had gone much beyond Capt. Penny's farthest, and that cairns will be found erected as usual at the limits of their journeys. . . The strong tides or currents in the straits which bound Baillie Hamilton Island will probably keep the sea open there in most seasons, and thus Sir John would be encouraged to take that route, which his Instructions justified him in doing, *if the ice remained fast to the westward.*"

Mr. Penny, November 15, 1851,† thinks "it possible that Sir John Franklin and his crews, or a portion of them, may still survive. . . Esquimaux live to a good old age. . . The same mode of procuring food, which "they "have, is open to our countrymen." As to what direction, he says, "I am firmly of opinion that Sir John Franklin pursued his course through Wellington Strait and Victoria Channel, and has got far advanced towards Bebring's Strait." Alluding to the open water to the north-west, he says, "Sir John Franklin must have been well aware of the presence of this water, having passed his first winter at the mouth of Wellington Straits, and a watch tent

* See ante, and Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 18.

† See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Report, &c.," p. 179.

having been discovered north of Cape Spencer. . . Also, the ruts of loaded sledges, apparently sent to examine the channel; these circumstances, with the second clause of his Instructions, and his own well known preference, and that of his officers, for the passage by Wellington Strait, is quite conclusive in my mind. . . Our finding no cairns, or appearance of his having landed, seems to me to indicate that the passage must have been open, and nothing to stop him in 1846, and that he took advantage of it." Referring to the Esquimaux, he thinks "a migration has taken place from a people living in a higher latitude, and that they came down Wellington Strait, from the remains of stone huts, and that the stock from which they came may still be existing on some land to the north of the open sea, which I expect to find leading to Behring's Straits; . . and Sir John Franklin and his companions may have found a refuge among them."

Mr. A. Stewart, November 15, 1851,* "fully concurs" in Capt. Penny's plan of search.

Reviewing these opinions, it will be observed in regard to the first question, as to the probability of Sir John Franklin, or any portion of his crews, being alive, five of the eight gentlemen consulted, answer in the affirmative. When we mention such names as Scoresby, one almost literally to the Arctic regions born; a Kellett, with his large experience in Behring's Strait; a Richardson, not only experienced as an Arctic traveller, but by his profession and his eminent talent, more qualified to form an opinion as to the effects of an Arctic climate on a British constitution than most others; Penny, engaged all his life in buffeting with ice and cold, and their injurious consequences;—when we mention such names, one is irresistibly led to the conclusion that some may yet survive: the facts and arguments adduced are founded on all the knowledge of the past, and, as far as they go, are unanswerable; they are, therefore, not to be lightly rejected. There is one opinion adverse to the above conclusion—that "some may yet survive," we allude to that of Sir John Ross. It is remarkable, as this gentleman offers in his own person the best evidence of the power of man to endure the rigours of an Arctic climate over a protracted period, and still to enjoy health. He thinks it is not probable that any survive, but it is "barely possible, if the ships are wrecked on the east or west coasts of Baffin's Bay, where there are natives, but nowhere else." Sir John Ross supposes the scene of the catastrophe in quite as high a latitude as is the probable position of the Franklin Expedi-

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1851, Report, &c.," p. 181.

tion, if it was enabled to follow the course of its Instructions. The only difference is, that it is more west; and as for natives, he was not assured there might not be some living in that direction; we know now there is a simple race living in apparent comfort there—*it follows, then, if likely to be alive in Baffin's Bay, it was equally probable they might be so more to the westward*; the climate, too, improves in a westerly direction. The remaining two gentlemen think it impossible that any can survive; their opinions are founded on their long detention in such a climate, want of resources, and the impossibility of replenishing them during the short summer for the necessities of the very long winter.

With respect to the future direction of search, it will be seen four of the authorities consulted are decidedly of opinion that Sir John Franklin passed to the north by the Wellington Channel. The reasons urged in support of that opinion do not appear to us to be at all conclusive, or even satisfactory. The Rev. Dr. Scoresby founds his conclusions from the ascertained fact, that Franklin, having wintered at Beechey Island, hence "the inference is irrealisable" that he was shut out to the west, or partly so, or was too late for that year, (1845—6); and then, quoting Capt. Austin's conclusions, "that" he "did not prosecute the objects of his mission to the southward and westward of Wellington Channel," he concludes, "the *primary* direction of Franklin's Instructions disposed of;" and therefore, that he went up Wellington Channel. It must be admitted this reasoning is inconclusive; for there is no proof of failure to the westward and south-west of Cape Walker.

Sir John Richardson limits the search to Victoria and Wellington Channels, because Capt. Austin's examinations "show that the discovery ships did not take a westerly course" (?) he quotes Dr. Rae's recent journey in support of this conclusion. This journey proved only that he had not emerged in a south-west direction from Cape Walker. We will quote the following as more within the range of probability:—"Should he have found no opening at Cape Walker, he would of course have sought one farther west. . . . In endeavouring to penetrate to the south-west, he became involved in the drift ice which there is reason to believe, urged by the prevailing winds, and the set of the flood-tides, is carried towards Coronation Gulf through channels more or less intricate." We know Dr. Rae set at rest the question of a passage between Victoria and Wollaston Lands, which

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition," pp. 107—8.

was once supposed to exist; still Franklin may have been involved in this drift ice, and become embarrassed in some passage, leading in a southerly direction at the bottom of Melville Sound; but of this we shall have to speak anon. We are sorry to record Sir John Richardson's opinion in favour of Wellington Channel; but after all he rests it on the condition, "*if the ice remained fast to the westward;*" and a most important condition it is, for of this we had no certain knowledge.

"Captain Penny, in which Captain Stewart joins, expresses himself firmly of opinion, . . . that Franklin went up Wellington Channel." He assumes "Franklin knew of the open water, from the ruts of sledges apparently sent to examine the channel;" and "his well-known preference, and that of his officers, for it." From the absence of all trace of his course up it, he thinks "the passage must have been open, and nothing to stop him, in 1846." Now, what proof have we of this? "We think the absence of despatches at Beechey Island, and the failure of all traces up it, are negative proofs that Franklin did not attempt the Wellington Channel. From the *want of evidence to prove that Franklin could not get westward, although shut out from Cape Walker, from the absence of despatches, cairns, &c., in Wellington Channel, we are compelled to conclude that Franklin persevered to westward, and did not attempt the Wellington Channel at all.*

Capt. Austin does not think any of the Expedition survive, and, therefore, further search is fruitless; and with regard to the Wellington Channel, he gives some good reasons for concluding he never attempted the passage by that route; he confesses himself "at a loss to account for the strong feeling that is abroad in favour of a further search" in that direction.

Capt. Ommaney supposes they did not prosecute the North-West Passage after leaving Beechey Island, as no records were left; that they retreated, and were lost on their return.

Sir John Ross is, as usual, rambling and indefinite; without assigning any reason, he thinks the west coast of Baffin's Bay should be searched, and the land about Cape York, to prove the truth or falsehood of Adam Beck's story, already proved false.

Capt. Kellett's opinion is evidently founded on the supposition that Franklin passed to the north in 1846, and made large westing in a high latitude, probably to the westward of the meridian of Behring's Strait, and that he must have been stopped in getting south by "continuous land or islands. Here it will be seen the impression of the existence of a Polar Sea—or Polynia, is the governing feeling; truly,

if aught could "allure to realms unknown," it is the fascinating influence of this Sea of Wrangell. It will have been noticed (*ante*, p. 164), in reasoning hypothetically on the probable course of Franklin, that we have adopted a nearly similar line of argument; but in our case we have assumed that he had reached the meridian of Melville Island, having in all his endeavours to get south through Melville Sound been frustrated. We are happy to see that Capt. Kellett admits his answer to be "conjectural." We must confess, here, to the weakness of a little pride when we see our views, however hypothetical, but we hope reasonably advanced, thus countenanced by one possessing the talent and experience of a Kellett, and particularly as both opinions were formed unknown and independent of each other. *We observe with deep regret that farther search by Cape Walker and the south-west has not a single advocate.* Before we take leave of these opinions, we would ask, Were there no other conditions to which might be referred the long detention of the Franklin Expedition? The unknown nature of the region north and eastward of Wollaston Land; North of Victoria Land, and south-east of Banks' Land, might be land, or composed of ice-clogged, narrow passages; in short, it might present features insuperable to advance or retreat. "Owing to the drift of the main body of the ice," might there not result to the missing Expedition that "inevitable embarrassment" which had been foretold, "from which Franklin would never be able to extricate his ships" ? *

Was it, then, the dread of that south-east current (noticed by Parry at Melville Island), and the dire prognostics of Sir James Ross as to the fate of all that came within its fatal influence, that deterred the very mention even, much less the examination of it? Melville Sound, like the Maelstrom, should have been searched, and robbed of its imaginary terrors.

The fact is, lengthened absence had led to the conclusion that if Franklin did endeavour to make westing (outside Cape Walker), he must long since have passed beyond that region, or he would have been heard of retreating to the eastward, or to the southward and westward. Strange did it never occur to the minds of our Arctic authorities that the sad presages—the direful forebodings, of one of their own body might be realized, and that Franklin and his gallant fellows were locked up in the position indicated, were looking for help from the east, "whose eyes might be dim with daily scanning the far distant horizon, with watching the rise of every little cloud, and

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 264, "Arctic Expedition, 1848," p. 45.

the illusory appearance of anything that might encourage the hope that release from the icy wastes and chilly waters around them was at hand!"* The more especially as the Parry Islands had been searched and no traces found. With the exception of five degrees of longitude (examined by Capt. Ommaney and Lieut. Osborn), this region, this gap, presented the same "fair prospect," the same favourable features for a speedy solution of the great question, as when propounded by the father of modern Arctic exploration. It does, and ever has appeared to us altogether incomprehensible, that this area, to which the Franklin Expedition was specially directed, should have been so neglected. Even unto this day, this gap of 200 miles in width has been left unexamined. But to return, these opinions offer much matter for inquiry and thought; they are carefully considered, and are void (with exceptions) of that dogmatism which characterizes many previous ones; they seek facts, however slender. Their object is truth; still there seems a predilection, a feeling about them, a presupposing influence, attractive and at variance with the simple facts before them. Whence this influence, this feeling, this disturbing power, that thus distracts, that makes the wise man forget his soundness, the experienced his facts, that induces a departure from the only light there is (the Franklin Instructions) to wander dubiously amid the perplexing obscurity of an ever changing ignis-fatuus?

We can allow for the pain "arising from hope deferred," the anguish of prolonged anxiety; we can understand the kind but often injudicious zeal of the humane, that prompts to immediate action, anywhere, everywhere, so that it is "up and doing;" but these should have been restrained, and limited to the direction in which the Franklin Expedition was sent. When all examination had been exhausted in that direction, we might then have looked elsewhere; but not until then. We have shown, in the extended notice we have given, the high estimation in which we hold the labours of this equitable committee, its well-considered report, and the valuable opinions arising out of it; but all were under a cloud. The Wellington Channel mania was now triumphant, it over-ruled all—it was the jargon of the day. It had been searched, and yielded *no sign that Franklin had penetrated its ice-blocked channel; it had been pronounced to require no farther search, and yet it was again to be searched.* Strange inconsistency! On the other hand, all thought of Cape Walker and the south-west was thrown to the winds, and a seal was set against

* See "Journal of a Voyage to Ballin's Bay, by Dr. Sutherland," p. 303.

all further search in that direction; and with it the fate of the gallant Franklin, and his chivalrous and no less gallant officers and devoted crews.

September 25th, 1851.—The *Felix*, commanded by Sir John Ross, arrived at Stranraer. The results of this private expedition may be expressed in a few words:—The exploration of a portion of Cornwallis Island, by Commander Phillips; which appears to have been well executed. We are glad to find Commander Phillips, and Dr. Porteous, spoken of *in terms of commendation*. Besides this, there were two reports; both originating with Adam Beck, Sir John Ross's Esquimaux interpreter. They both created much sensation at the time, occasioned a great deal of trouble, and a most voluminous correspondence.

The first report* refers to "the loss of two ships in the ice, a good way off, in the direction of Cape Dudley Digges, and afterwards burnt by a fierce and numerous tribe of natives—part of the crews were drowned, the remainder were some time in huts or tents, apart from the natives. They had guns, but no balls; were in a weak and exhausted condition, and were subsequently killed by the natives with darts and arrows."

To us there never has appeared even the semblance of truth in this report. It was at once investigated on the spot by Capt. Ommaney, Capt. Penny, Commander Phillips, &c., and resulted in the discovery that the *North Star* had wintered in Wolstenholme Sound. Commander Phillips, Sir John Ross's own officer, says, "We were unable to discover any circumstances in corroboration," which was also the united opinion of all the aforementioned officers, Capt. Penny and others, present. Adam Beck's statement was written down and translated, and proved to be altogether a fabrication.

The second report refers to a piece or post of elm, said to have had a sawcut at one end, in which was inserted a plate of tin, on which was the inscription, "September, 1846," painted in white on a black ground. This tin plate was lost, bringing it away, *in the snow*; the ground was searched *when free from snow*, and it was not found. Commander Phillips considers this also a fabrication: that gentleman's evidence, given before the Arctic committee,† is sufficient; but if not, let the reader wade through the Blue Books, the despatches, translations, &c., and observe the discrepancies, and he will soon come to

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 97, "Arctic Expedition, 1851," p. 87-8. See also, Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, Report of Committee, 1851," p. 68.

† See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, Report, 1851," p. 70. Also, Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, Further Correspondence, 1852," pp. 7, 8, and 9, and 135-6.

the conclusion that there was not a word of truth in the whole matter. But we close our notice of the private expedition under Sir John Ross, with his opinion as to the movements and the fate of the Franklin Expedition. Writing to Capt. Austin* (June 23rd, 1851), in reply to a letter from that officer, communicating the results of his south-west division under Capt. Ommaney, and the northern branch under Lieut. Aldrich, he says, "*It is important to find they cannot have taken that road to destruction; while to me it is satisfactory to see so clearly proved, that my conclusions of land intervening between the Polar ice and the coast of America, were perfectly correct.*" Again, in a reply (July 4th, 1851), to Capt. Austin's letter, informing him of the return, &c., of Lieut. M'Clintock's division from Melville Island, he says, "I cannot restrain myself from adding that I am afforded some satisfaction in having it so clearly proved, . . . that the gallant Franklin and his devoted companions *cannot have pursued any of the courses westward of Beechey Island, which, it must now be admitted, would have eventually led to their destruction.* . . . There still remains a hope, . . . that traces of a more favourable nature may be found in one or other of the positions in the north-west extremity of Baffin's Bay, or on its western coast." On being furnished by Capt. Austin with a rough outline chart, showing the direction and extent of his searching-parties, Sir John replies, July 16th, 1851, "It proves, to my mind at least, that the missing expedition cannot have taken any course westward of Cornwallis Island." From these opinions we gather that Sir John Franklin, in being ordered to the south-west from Cape Walker, was sent on a *road to destruction*, and the Admiralty having sent him there, the blame, of course, "lies at their door." But how far is Sir John Ross warranted in making this assertion? As to the south-west being a road to destruction, he knew no more of *the south-west and its destructive tendencies than what he had learned from Sir Edward Parry, and the latter nowhere speaks of the horrors of Melville Sound.* His conclusion as to the land intervening between the Polar ice and the American coast is mere talk—Sir John Franklin and every one knew it. Upon what grounds does Sir John Ross infer that Franklin did not pass to the westward of Cornwallis or Beechey Islands? *He offers no reasons, for the best of all reasons,—there were none to offer.* Capt. Ommaney and Lieut. Osborn proved he had not visited the coast between Cape Walker and 103° W.; M'Clintock that he had not touched at Melville Island, and Aldrich,

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, Report of Committee, 1851," pp. xlii. and xlv.

that the Parry Islands afforded no trace of his presence there; but all these are insufficient to prove that he did not get to the westward, and attempt that "road to destruction" by Melville Sound; indeed, it may have proved such; but, for aught that Sir John Ross knew at the time, it presented every favourable prospect for the solution of the great question of a North-West Passage.

But to conclude: from Adam Beck's first report at Cape York, and the fact of finding this piece of elm (?) and *not finding* the tin plate with the inscription (the whole of both reports pronounced fabrications), yet, says Sir John Ross, "In my opinion this fact accounts for no documentary notices having been found in the cairns" * at Beechey Island; and "Sir John Franklin having remained at their winter quarters . . . until September, 1846, and seeing . . . no possibility of advancing further during that season (after which they would have only one year's provisions), that they had on their return home round the north end of the pack been wrecked on the east coast of Baffin's Bay." Is it on such conclusions that 135 gallant, enterprising spirits are to be left to die off unsuccoured from the face of the earth? For aught that was known, they might have been still alive, and prosecuting the object upon which they were sent in the area to which they were ordered.

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, Further Correspondence," &c., pp. 8 and 9.

CHAPTER XI.

SIR JAMES ROSS'S SUGGESTIONS—LIEUT. PIM'S PLAN—GLOUCESTER BALLOON—RETURN OF AMERICAN EXPEDITION—DR. BAE'S NEW DISCOVERIES—LIEUT. DOOPER'S PLAN—DR. M'CORMICK'S PLAN—MR. ROOME—LIEUT. MACQUIRE'S PLAN—COMMANDER PULLEN'S PLAN—BEHRING'S STRAIT EXPEDITION—CLOSE OF YEAR.

SIR JAMES ROSS, in a letter addressed to the Admiralty, dated September 26th, 1851,* inquires, in allusion to the "two posts bearing a hand pointing in a certain direction, . . . did Captain Penny cause a careful search to be made in the direction indicated by the hand?" as he "cannot doubt that if a search had been made, by digging to a short distance from the posts, the cylinders containing the despatches from Sir John Franklin would most assuredly have been found." He adds, "When the report of the wreck of the *Erebus* and *Terror*, and the massacre of their crews by the Esquimaux, reached England, one chief reason for disbelieving it was, that it was said to have occurred in the winter of 1846, a year after the sailing of the Expedition, and therefore the calamity could not have occurred on their outward voyage. It is well known that the season of 1846 was the most severe that has been known for many years; none of the whale ships attained a higher latitude than 74° on the east, and 68° on the west side of Baffin's Bay, which was completely choked with heavy ice. . . . Sir John Franklin's Expedition had made but a small advance to the westward during the more favourable season of 1845. . . . Taking into consideration the character of the following season, it appears to me by no means improbable that the ships were not released from their winter quarters until too late a period for them to make any farther progress to the westward, the barrier of ice in that direction, as well as across the Wellington Channel, probably not breaking up at all that season, as they assuredly did not either in 1848 or 1849. To have wintered again in the same vicinity would have been a waste of the resources of the Expedition, and if," as "assumed, they were unable to advance, they

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence," &c., p. 130.

would be compelled to return to England." Under these circumstances, they would have endeavoured to round the north end of what is called the middle ice, and effect a passage to the southward, between it and the east coast of Baffin's Bay. In such a season as that of 1846, it is probable their attempt would have been frustrated, and that the ships would have been frozen in in a high latitude, and not far from the east land, . . . a position . . . of great peril." In the absence of further traces of the missing Expedition being found, Sir James Ross submits "a more rigid inquiry be made of the natives of Cape York and Melville Bay, from whom the report of the loss of the two ships was obtained; for although I cannot believe them capable of murdering the crews, they might have been spectators of the last sad catastrophe, without being able to afford them any assistance." Here is resuscitated the essence of two improbable reports,—loss of the ships in the "middle ice," and the destruction of them and their crews about Cape York; but now they come under a more probable form, still equally without positive evidence. How rumour shifts and changes! First, the ships were said to have been lost in the "middle ice," going out. The vestiges at Beechey Island set that at rest. *Now, it is returning home.* As to the Cape York catastrophe, we thought that had been cleared up too; so, at least, the officers concluded who were detached to inquire into it on the spot. Alas for the relatives and friends at home! What anxiety, what torture, has been inflicted on them. Now Charybdis, now Scylla; nothing but destruction follows this ill-starred Expedition. But on what evidence? There is none; and yet the ships and crews are lost, leaving "not a wreck behind." By this letter we are led to the belief that Franklin was unable to penetrate to the north by the Wellington Channel. This at least relieves, for the moment, the pressure of that monstrous opinion which, notwithstanding the fruitless examination of Penny, still is in the ascendant, and dragging us from the examination of Melville Sound to a direction at variance with the original plan of the voyage, to end in loss and farther bitterly painful disappointment.

Lieutenant B. C. T. Pim, R.N., recently of the *Herald*, Captain Kellett, offered a plan (27th September, 1851),* and his services to conduct an expedition through Siberia to the mouth of the River Kolyma, and to explore the Arctic shore, from Cape Sievero Vosto-

* See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence," &c., p. 94.

tchini Nos* to the North Cape of Captain Cook. The plan may be thus briefly given :—

“All the plans hitherto adopted for the relief of Sir John Franklin have been based on the supposition that the Expedition has not penetrated to the northward of the Parry Islands; there are, however, various reasons to strengthen the opinion that Sir John Franklin has succeeded in forcing a passage through Wellington Channel into the *Polymei*, or open water. In this clear sea the progress of the ships towards the west would be unimpeded until re-entering the ice in the meridian of Behring’s Strait, where the difficulty of the navigation renders it problematical which continent the vessels would ultimately reach. I am impressed with the idea they are upon the coast of Asia. . . . The prevalent winds lead to this supposition. *Vide* Appendix of Baron Von Wrangell’s ‘Journey to the Shores of the Polar Sea.’ . . . My own researches (a Journey from Kotzebue Sound across the mountains to a Russian settlement in Norton Sound) serve to strengthen my conviction that the missing ships have attained the meridian of the Colville River, thence despatched the two boats (of which reports were in circulation during the winter, 1849-50) to reach the shore, which it is likely the winds above mentioned, as well as the shoalness of the water, prevented the larger vessels from approaching. . . . The coast of America and the adjacent countries have been well searched; . . . that of Siberia has been totally overlooked; and yet an attentive perusal of Baron Von Wrangell’s book forces upon us the opinion that ships have been wrecked on the Siberian shores. He quotes, ‘On the western declivity of the hills there is a large quantity of driftwood, among which the Tungusians had found fragments of a vessel, which, from the iron nails adhering to it, appeared to be of a different construction from the simple ones in use here. Lat. about 70° North; long. 159° 30’ East, &c.’ †

“I therefore propose to go in search of Sir John Franklin on the coast of Siberia,” leaving in proper time to arrive at the Kolyma River the beginning of spring. “I would, in that and the succeeding one, completely explore every approachable part of the Arctic shore (from Cape Sievero Vostotchini to the Cape North of Cook, a distance of about 1,300 miles), and thus finally set the question at rest, whether the missing ships, or traces of them, are to be found.

* Nos is the Russian name for “cape.”

† “Narrative of an Expedition to the Polar Sea, 1820-23, by Admiral F. Von Wrangell,” edited by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sabine, 1844, p. 206.

"It will be obvious that the accomplishment of this task completes the researches; and all that human efforts can effect will have been exerted in their behalf. . . . Should the plan I have proposed be adopted, it will be found inexpensive in comparison with the Expeditions now absent, which (I say it with deference), with the utmost exertion of talent and bravery, can only follow in the path, and consequently incur a similar risk as Sir John Franklin."

In offering some remarks on this plan of Lieutenant Pim's, we must beg to correct that officer when he says, "The plans hitherto adopted have been based on the supposition that the Expedition has not penetrated to the northward of the Parry Islands." Has he forgotten Austin's northern divisions, Penny's Expedition, and Collinson's? The great error has been that too much attention has been given to the north, and too little to the south-west; and that, too, without a particle of evidence to prove the Expedition adopted a northern route. All that could be urged was, that Sir John Franklin expressed "intentions . . . to try in succession all the probable openings into the Polar Sea;" but these *intentions were to be acted upon only in case of failure to the south and west*. What "the various reasons are to strengthen the opinion that Sir John Franklin has succeeded in forcing a passage through Wellington Channel," Mr. Pim does not specify. We are not aware that any positive reason can be given, and yet we have endeavoured to acquaint ourselves with the subject. *We do not believe the Wellington Channel was ever attempted by Sir John Franklin, or he would have left notices, giving his reasons for departing from his Instructions, at Beechey Island, Point Riley, or elsewhere.*

Lieutenant Pim writes evidently under the mystic influences of the north, attracted by that "wide and immeasurable ocean, . . . fearful and magnificent; . . . melancholy,* but still fascinating, because to appearance navigable." It was to this Polynia the Wellington Channel and the new sea discovered by Penny led; and Sir John Franklin having a discretionary power to adopt this channel, therefore it is assumed that he did adopt it. But this train of reasoning we cannot admit: we prefer Arctic facts to Arctic opinions. Again, even though the Asiatic shore should have been searched within the space he mentions, still that would not have completed "the researches," or "all that human endeavours . . . in their behalf" could accomplish; there *was yet the space, Melville Sound, to be com-*

* See Wrangell's "Journey to the Polar Sea," p. 333.

pleted. We had yet to ascertain whether the Expedition might not have attained large westing and southing. We ought, then, rather to have inferred that it was ice-blocked on the western side of Melville Sound than not; and it was our duty to have followed "*in the path,*" even though we should "*incur a similar risk as Sir John Franklin.*" To incur the risk, we had and have lots of gallant hearts—volunteers, himself amongst the number. But amid the conflicting opinions, which is the path? We will answer, See 5th, 6th, and 7th sections of Franklin's Instructions; they will tell you. With respect to the two boats, of which such wide-spread report was in circulation, we cannot refrain from thinking but that there was some truth at the bottom of it; but might not these two boats have been endeavouring to reach the Mackenzie from Melville Sound? the *Ko-pak*, to which most of the reports refer, was supposed by Commander Moore, and *may be*, one of the western branches of the Mackenzie. The Admiralty having declined Lieutenant Pim's proposal, Lady Franklin, impressed with the hope of obtaining satisfactory intelligence, advanced £500. The plan was submitted to the Royal Geographical Society at its first meeting, 1851. The main objects there urged were nearly the same, but it was now said the plans *that had been adopted for the relief of the Franklin Expedition were based on the supposition that the Erebus and Terror had failed at the very commencement of their voyage, and had therefore passed to the north by the Wellington Channel,*—a rather different line of argument to that urged in his proposal to the Admiralty. However, having now taken Franklin up the Wellington Channel, in default of all evidence to prove it, it was then said they would find the northern ocean comparatively free from ice, and easy to penetrate to the westward; that Franklin's greatest difficulty would occur in endeavouring to get south to Behring's Strait, arising from ice-bound islands, shoals, &c.; he would, therefore, persevere to get to the westward, and, if possible, to the Asiatic shores; the difficulty of getting eastward again along these shores, as proved by the early Russian discoverers, was also noticed. Here is the hypothetical portion of our paper of 1850 seriously proposed for practical adoption (see *ante*, p. 164). The plan was well received by that Society, and Sir R. I. Murchison, the President, wrote to the Imperial authorities, but "*on the condition that the Expedition should be arranged and executed by the Russian Government.*" The plan was also approved by the First Minister of the Crown, Lord John Russell, who granted a sum in aid. It was supported, too, by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Palmerston,

by Humboldt, Adolf Erman, and other illustrious foreigners. Lieutenant Pim, thus countenanced, proceeded to St. Petersburg. He received marked attention from the Court and the Imperial Geographical Society, and even had an interview with the Emperor; but "the reports of the Russian authorities . . . were adverse to the enterprise. They represented that, in order to enable travellers, furnished with instruments and interpreters, to traverse the ultra-Siberian country of the Tchuktchi, previous arrangements of eighteen months would be required to assemble the necessary quantity of dogs and sledges! and that, as the former Expedition (Wrangell's) had, by withdrawing the use of many of these animals, produced fatal diseases among the natives, and a great mortality, such an extraordinary effort ought not to be renewed without motives of overwhelming necessity. . . . In short, being informed that such an Expedition could not be put in motion before March, 1853, and being aware of the responsibilities which they would be led into, whether as respected their relation to the native tribes, or the young British officer, whose life, they thought, would be uselessly perilled, the Imperial Government declined to co-operate in the project; at the same time, they gave Lieutenant Pim permission to travel in any direction he pleased through Siberia,"*—which permission, we must say, without the support of the Imperial Government, amounted almost to a negative. The scheme was abandoned, and Mr. Pim returned to England. Still it is but justice to add, and we have much pleasure in adding it, that the Emperor of Russia, feeling a *real* interest for our celebrated navigator and his bold companions, gave orders, through the Ministers of Marine and the Interior, for a careful investigation of the northern coasts of Asia.†

5th October, 1851.‡—Considerable sensation was produced at this time by the fall of a small balloon at Wootton Lodge, near Gloucester, to the car of which a card was attached, on which was written the following inscription:—

* See Sir R. I. Murchison's Anniversary Address, "Royal Geographical Society's Journal," May, 1852, vol. xxii. p. lxxiv. See also, "The Pedestrian Journey through Russia and Siberian Tartary," by Captain J. D. Cochrane, R.N., 1820-22. He was the guest of the celebrated Baron Wrangell, at that time engaged in the survey of the coasts of Siberia and the islands situated in the Arctic Ocean; and see Wrangell's "Siberia and Polar Sea," by Colonel Sabine, R.A.

† See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence," p. 98.

‡ See the *Morning Chronicle* of the 11th and 17th October, 1851.

"*Erebus*, 112° West longitude, 70° North latitude. September 3rd, 1851. Blocked in."

Every inquiry was instituted by the Admiralty on the spot, and all that could be gathered was the fact that a balloon really had fallen, with its appendant inscription; but as no balloons were supplied to Sir John Franklin, the excitement soon subsided. Of the conduct of the party who would thus trifle with the feelings of the distressed relatives at home there cannot be but one opinion. He was a heartless miscreant.

It is worth while here to record the opinion of that most indefatigable traveller, Dr. Rae. It is conveyed in a letter to Sir John Richardson, dated Fort Confidence, April 18, 1851.* Alluding to the search by the Magnetic Pole and Back's River, he says:—"It is very proper those parts should be examined, but I have very little expectation that any traces of those looked for will be found in that quarter. If not found in the space bounded in the west by 118° West longitude and on the east by longitude 104° West, and between latitude 71° and 74° North, the most likely place for Sir John Franklin's party to be heard of will be at Melville Island, or in the neighbourhood of some other of the Parry group." Dr. Rae was, at the time he wrote, unaware of the results of Captain Ommaney's researches in a south-west direction, or M'Clintock's to Melville Island; but that would not materially affect his conclusion as to the particular space within which we ought primarily to look for the Franklin Expedition. The absence of all traces in either direction more than confirmed the necessity for a rigid search in the space indicated by Dr. Rae.

In October, 1851, intelligence was received of the safe arrival at New York of the Grinnell Expedition; the *Advance*, under Lieutenant De Haven, on the 30th September, and the *Rescue*, under Mr. S. P. Griffin, on the 7th October, 1851. Lieutenant De Haven and his gallant followers had landed at Point Riley, immediately after the discovery of the traces there by Captain E. Ommaney; they had also, in company with Captain Penny, examined Beechey Island; had visited the sad memorials recording the deaths of three of the crews of Franklin's ill-fated Expedition; and seen the various other remains caavass, ropes, &c. "From all these indications," says Lieutenant De Haven (in his despatch, dated 4th October, 1851),† "the infer-

* See *Times*, October 13th, 1851.

† Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 188.

ence could not fail to be arrived at that the *Erebus* and *Terror* had made this their first winter quarters after leaving England. . . . Everything, too, went to prove up to this point the Expedition was well organized, and that the vessels had not received any material injury." Various excursions were made in different directions in search of farther traces, but without success. Cornwallis and Griffith Islands were reached, but the ice was unfavourable for making further progress with the season so far advanced. A consultation was held, and it was resolved to return to the United States. The Expedition soon after was frozen in. It first drifted slowly up Wellington Channel, . . . to the north-north-west, until the 22nd September, when" they were "arrested by a small low island" (Murdaugh's) "discovered in that direction. . . . Between Cornwallis Island and some distant high land, visible in the north, appeared a wide channel leading to the westward. A dark, misty-looking cloud which hung over it (termed frost-smoke) was indicative of much open water in that direction." This open water was subsequently reached by the enterprising Penny, little imagining that the *Advance* and *Rescue* had literally drifted into its discovery previously. Lieutenant De Haven, after some observations on his "admirably drawn Instructions," says, they "not only pointed with emphasis to an unknown open sea, into which Franklin had probably found his way, but directed me to search for traces of his Expedition in the very channel at the entrance of which, it is now ascertained, he had passed his first winter." He concludes, therefore, "the direction in which search with most chances of success is now to be made . . . is, no doubt, in the direction which is so clearly pointed out in my Instructions;" by which he means, by the way of the Wellington Channel and the open water leading to the north-west. "All through October and November (he says) we were drifted to and fro by the changing wind, but never passed out of Wellington Channel. . . . On the 1st of December the weather cleared off," and they got a glimpse of the land; they "appeared to be off Gascoigne Inlet. . . . We were now clear of Wellington Channel, and in the fairway of Lancaster Sound." 31st December they drifted out of Lancaster Sound into Baffin's Bay, and continued to do so until to the southward of Cape Walsingham, when they were released from their perilous position, 6th June, 1851, after drifting the extraordinary distance of 1,050 miles.* It is impossible to read

* A further illustration of the force and direction of this extraordinary current

the account of this fearful voyage,* without feeling deeply how much they suffered; what anxiety they underwent during this protracted winter, now imbedded in the floe, drifting helplessly—then set free by the disruption of the ice in all directions, agitated and crashing all around them, leaving not a moment with the sense of security—causing hours, days, and weeks of terrible suspense, but borne with a fortitude and a courage which danger could not dismay;—and all this in the cause of humanity. We ought to be, we are, grateful to our generous American kinsmen; and, above all, thankful to Him that supported and preserved them in the time of danger and difficulty, and in the end restored them in health to their generous-hearted countrymen. The *Advance* and *Rescue* released from their icy fetters, Lieutenant De Haven attempted to return to the searching ground, and had succeeded in reaching Upper Melville Bay, when, ultimately arrested by the ice, he was compelled to return—"with sad hearts (says Lieutenant De Haven) that our labours had served to throw so little light upon the object of our search."

November 10th, 1851.—Intelligence was received at the Admiralty, through the Hudson's Bay Company, from Dr. Rae. It will be recollected that it was intended that Dr. Rae should, in the summer of 1850, explore the supposed passage between Wollaston and Victoria Lands, and on to Banks' Land; but the Admiralty having ordered a boat expedition, under Commander Pullen and Lieutenant Hooper, down the Mackenzie, and thence to Cape Bathurst, to examine the space between it and Banks' Land, and there being an insufficiency of provisions for both Expeditions, to Commander Pullen was given the preference. Dr. Rae, therefore, deferred his examination of Wollaston Land, &c., until this summer, 1851. The intelligence now received from that enterprising traveller, dated Kendall River, 10th June, 1851,† showed how worthy he was of the trust reposed in him. Descending the Coppermine, and crossing Dolphin

may be seen in the drift of H.M.S. *Resolute*, Captain Kellett. See also a paper "On the Probable Course pursued by Sir John Franklin's Expedition," by A. G. Findlay, Esq., F.R.G.S., "Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 1856," vol. xxvi., p. 26.

* See the "U.S. Grinnell Expedition in Search of Sir John Franklin," by Elisha Kent Kane, M.D., U.S.N. This enterprising, talented gentleman afterwards made a second attempt to search by way of Smith's Sound, in 1853-4-5, and died soon after his return; much esteemed while living, and universally lamented in his death.

† Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence," &c., pp. 18-22.

and Union Straits to Wollaston Land, he explored, between the 5th and the 30th of May, "the shores of Wollaston eastward to 110° West, and westward to 117° 17' West. At his western limit there was the appearance of a strait running to the eastward, which want of time for the interests of his summer voyage would not allow him to decide. Though in the south-west track from Cape Walker, should Franklin have succeeded in getting in that direction, yet no traces of that Expedition were found. The various Esquimaux parties met with are described as a good, harmless, friendly people. The journal of this journey contains many excellent observations, and is worth reading. It shows what may be done by management, energy, and a hearty good will.

Lieut. W. H. Hooper, November 15th, 1851, sent to the Admiralty a plan of search, of which the following is the essence.* Alluding to the traces at Beechey Island distinctly proving the wintering-place of the *Erabus* and *Terror* in 1845, he says:—"Beyond that period doubt and conjecture assume the place of certainty," consequently opinions are divided into two parties, which may be designated "the despairing" and "the sanguine. . . Those who belong to the first . . . allege that Sir John Franklin must have been suddenly forced from his winter quarters (in the spring of 1846), on the breaking up of the ice, . . . which poured down Wellington Channel; and carried down through Barrow's and Davis's Straits, when both ships must have been crushed, . . . and all hands perished. . . He could not," say they, "have gone through the channel to the south-west, since . . . it was blocked up with old ice, nor . . . up Wellington Channel, . . . without leaving at his winter quarters a notification of his . . . intended departure and proceedings. . . The sanguine party, those who consider, that while there is uncertainty there should be hope, advance views equally rational and supported by apparent probability. The absence of information respecting his intended future is as great a plea FOR as AGAINST his having proceeded northward, since, while on the one hand a sudden disruption of the ice may have carried him without warning from his position, the same occurrence may, on the other, have opened up a clear channel; to neglect which chance, all conversant with the sudden and inconstant motions of ice would, I believe, pronounce to be imprudent, since so fortunate a circumstance might not speedily recur. . . Even supposing the ships were driven

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence," p. 99.

down Davis's Strait, does it not seem improbable that both were crushed at the same instant, *without one having time to evade or prepare for the fate of the other?* and even had such been the case, is it not equally strange that not the slightest splinter, not the slightest vestige of ships, of gear, or of men, has ever been found in those seas? It is asserted that the passage to the south-west is impracticable, because blocked up by ice of several years' formation, but is there proof that this ice has *not* formed, or even drifted there at a period subsequent to that at which Franklin may have entered it? There appears, therefore, to be now only two routes by which to search for the lost ships—by the Wellington Strait, and thence westward in a high parallel; or to the south of the Parry Islands, between them and Banks' Land, or between Banks' and Wollaston Lands. Now that the *Enterprise* and *Investigator* have entered the ice from the westward, also to entirely set at rest any lingering uncertainty which may exist respecting the possibility of the balloon (found at Gloucester)* having come from the *Erebus*, it may be considered . . . advisable to despatch an expedition overland to the southward of the Parry Islands, while others, by sea, proceed northwards through the straits of Wellington." For the former he volunteers his services, and proposes as follows:—"To proceed to Fort Churchill in Hudson's Bay, and thence to the north-east extreme of Great Bear Lake; . . . descend the Coppermine," and "proceed to the eastward, through Dease's Strait to Victoria Land, and following the eastern shore of that land from Cape Colborne (the last known point), endeavour, striking north, to reach Lieut. Sherard Osborn's farthest in lat. 71° 52' N., long. 103° W.; . . . visit the position named by the balloon, and thence make for Banks' Land. . . . The route from Banks' Land would be northward, towards Melville Island, from the western point of which I should endeavour to push westward in the hope of meeting one of Franklin's or Collinson's ships; . . . the latter event being desirable—first, to learn the space that may have been searched, and so to fix upon another line of inquiry; and secondly, to ascertain that their safety is assured, and powers unshackled. . . . My route" would lie to the eastward of where Dr. Rae has gone, and is a point of search not yet provided for; it would connect Lieut. Osborn's farthest with the land known as Banks' Land, which it will doubtless be found to join (?). This plan, it will be observed, opens with the assertion, "Doubt and conjecture have assumed the place of certainty." True,

* See *ante*, p. 219.

they have; and yet, as Lieut. Hooper adds, "while there is uncertainty there should be hope." But the despairing know not of hope; they reject her, and embrace all the possibilities of disaster to the missing ships as certain. Every flying rumour, or report, they receive as true rather than look to the more reasonable conjecture that they may be safe. But we have not found them—why? Inasmuch as we have not sought them (or only partially) in the direction in which we sent them. Mr. Hooper perpetuates the idea that Franklin may have gone up Wellington Channel. After the search that had just been made, we think this an error. The absence of traces is proof he did not—confirmed by the non-existence of despatches at Becchey Island. The reason, if a reason can be assigned in the absence of facts, for his not leaving any notice of his future intentions there, is, he had not, *when there, reached the first point of his Instructions—Cape Walker; and our not finding them at Cape Walker is proof that he could not reach it, but is no evidence that he returned and ascended the Wellington Channel; he no doubt persevered to the westward.* The route Lieut. Hooper proposes for himself to reach Cape Colborne is, we think, rather circuitous; we should have thought it would have been more readily reached by Wager River or Repulse Bay, or by an expedition down Prince Regent's Inlet: once at Cape Colborne the space proposed to be searched to the north-west and on to Banks' Land is good. We fear, as a whole, this plan is too extended to be practicable. One thing is clearly shown by it,—the author understands the intent of Franklin's Instructions. Lieut. Hooper proposes to carry out his plan with a crew composed entirely of Esquimaux; as "they would pick up means of subsistence where white men would perish, and relish food which whites would view with disgust; they are inured to the rigour of the climate, and expert in all necessary manœuvres for gaining shelter and warmth where fire cannot be obtained. Their experience would more easily discover any, the slightest signs of recent visitors, whether on ice or land, and they would be less likely to be molested by their brethren of the northern coast." This idea, of employing Esquimaux, is novel, and, we should say, a happy one, if we could be assured of their obedience and activity in the attempt to carry out what Mr. Hooper considers its most important feature, viz., "continued progression in all seasons, by land, by ice, or by water;" for, as he remarks, "the summer is so brief that in it there is scarcely time to commence operations ere it is necessary to discontinue them." But this gentlemen had been much among these people, was with Commander Moore in the *Plover*, and

with Pullen on his two boat expeditions; in short, had been engaged nearly four years in the searching expeditions, had seen and learned much, and had profited and gained a large experience. He was altogether a talented officer.

Looking over our Arctic notes, we find in a letter addressed to a lady, whose name has now become a household word, the following passage; the date November 18th, 1851: "I forbear to enter on the probable causes which have (in my poor opinion) resulted in the prolonged detention of your gallant husband and his devoted followers. I shall only say, I believe the Expedition to be safe, and that he has endeavoured to carry out his Instructions. Hence I regret that greater westing has not been gained by the searching expeditions; for, notwithstanding the extraordinary exertions of the various parties detached from the Austin Expedition, I still think, where all is one monotonous white, cairns and traces to despatches might have escaped the most scrutinizing sight. There is not a doubt but that despatches have been left by Sir John Franklin, at some known place, previous to departure for the unknown. *I do not think the Franklin Expedition passed through Wellington Channel*, but that it followed the Admiralty Instructions, and when it was not practicable between the south and west, it pursued a westerly and northerly course." By this note it will be seen, we were of opinion that Franklin, though shut out from Cape Walker, would persist to the westward; and if prevented from making southing until he had reached the meridian of Melville Island, he would then attempt a passage between the more westerly of the Parry Islands by the north and west.

Dr. R. M'Cormick, 27th November, 1851,* again renewed his offer of service to the Admiralty. After alluding to the inexplicable mystery still hanging over the missing Expedition, he says, "Yet, strange enough, not one of these Expeditions have explored Smith's Sound; although, next to Wellington Channel, the most promising and important opening to the Polar Ocean. . . My own opinion has ever been, that Sir John Franklin went up Wellington Channel, and . . . the surest way to find him would be, not only to follow on his track up that channel, and to the northward and westward of the Parry Group, but also to meet him in any retrograde movement he might be compelled to make to the eastward, should his ships, in the attempt to get to the westward, be driven by the strong currents from the north-west to the meridian of the sounds at the northern ex-

* Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence, &c.," p. 137.

trinity of Baffin's Bay; a by no means improbable event, and one that should not be lost sight of. . . . If Smith's and Jones's Sounds should prove to be openings into the Polar Ocean, as I long ago anticipated, they would offer the readiest means of exit to either ships or boats, with the prospect before them of falling in with some whaler." Dr. M'Cormick then refers to his previous plans (*see ante*), in which he advocated the search by the Wellington Channel, and says, "In these views I believe I at the time stood alone. . . . The generally received opinion having been that Sir John Franklin's ships had been arrested in the ice to the southward and westward of Cape Walker, or Melville Island. . . . The results of the late searching parties have however proved, beyond a doubt, the correctness of my views (?), even to the finding of traces at Cape Riley and Beechey Island. . . . The Arctic Council have recommended that the future search shall be exclusively confined to the Wellington Channel. . . . Under these circumstances I most willingly volunteer . . . to go out in any of the vessels to Wellington Channel, there to commence the search in the reverse order, round *Cape Sir John Franklin*, northward or eastward as the land may trend; . . . exploring . . . in the direction of Smith's and Jones's Sounds for any corresponding openings to the Polar Sea." This excellently-drawn document embraces several important observations, not only on the animal life, but valuable suggestions as to how human life may be sustained in these inclement regions; it does credit to the Doctor's head and heart. The whole view, excepting as regards Smith's Sound, is consistent for retreating parties. If (as the Doctor believes) Sir John Franklin really did adopt the Wellington Channel route, which we most strongly doubt, the recent rigid search offered not the slightest trace that the Expedition had been there. Again, Franklin would never leave the known for the unknown without leaving a record informing us of his reasons for abandoning the first point of his Instructions (which directed him to Cape Walker and the south-west) at Beechey Island. Lastly, the route by Cape Walker offered every prospect of successful termination, while that by the Wellington Channel was unknown, and, however "fair" it might look, led to no one knew where.

.Mr. J. Roome, November 28th, 1851,* in a letter to the Admiralty, says, "In 1815, being engaged in the trade to Hambro'," he "was frequently in company with the captains of vessels employed from Hambro' to Greenland, and has heard them say (two in particular),

* Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence, &c.," p. 131.

that they got so far to the northward as 84° , with clear water and a heavy swell or sea from the northward, similar to what we have in crossing the Bay of Biscay;" he "recollects . . . getting a book from a circulating library, which must be thirty years back, being a narrative written by a Dutch captain, . . . of a whaling voyage," and wherein he "distinctly recollects . . . its saying that he got as far to the northward as 83° or 84° , with a heavy swell from the northward, and clear water as far as the eye could see to the north." He ends by saying, "I have given you these accounts to assist and encourage a search to be made direct (or so) north, as I am confident Sir John has gone through Wellington Strait to the northward." Mr. Roome gives no reasons for his faith; but because he has heard of some Dutch captains (the names and logbooks not given) having reached 84° N. on the east side of Greenland, and found clear water there and a swell from the northward, so Sir John Franklin, who was ordered to Barrow's Strait, and south-west from Cape Walker, must have gone (at right angles to his orders) up Wellington Channel. What shall we say of this authority? We pass to observe we give this letter only to show what insane notions prevailed at the time as to the course Franklin took after leaving Beechey Island, and the reasons (?) assigned for his going up Wellington Channel. This letter, we presume, was published by the Admiralty for the special information of the "gentlemen of England who sit at home at ease."

Lieut. Rochford Maguire* (late of H.M.S. *Herald*, Capt. Kellett), November 30th, 1851, made a proposal to the Admiralty for communicating with Behring's Strait, in the summer of 1852, by means of a screw steamer, should their lordships determine upon sending new orders to the ships employed there in the search for Sir John Franklin; he proposes also to send a boat party a hundred miles eastward of Point Barrow, and by means of the Esquimaux distribute the new orders; and whilst that search is being carried out, to examine in the vessel "the packed ice as far to the west as Herald's Land," and "*by that means decide the question of a continuity of land across the meridian of Behring's Strait.*" The discovery of land to the north of Behring's Strait had led to the idea, that Franklin, having succeeded in attaining large westing in a high latitude, might, in his endeavours to get to the southward, be arrested by this land; the object here sought was to ascertain its continuity across the northern end of Behring's Strait. Long absence, and the numerous reports of a ship

* See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence," &c., p. 105.

in the offing, of boats and of white men off the northern coasts, all added to the importance and necessity for such an examination.

Commander Pullen, already noticed as having been employed in the search, again (December 8th, 1851)* offered his services and plan. He proposes to explore the coast of Arctic America, from Point Barrow eastward as far as Wollaston Land, with a small steamer. Various observations follow, the object of which is to show that a passage exists to the northward, between Herschel Island and Return Reef; he then says, "To get to the northward is the grand object to accomplish, for it is there we must look for our missing countrymen." He adds, "I do not think a doubt can exist of their having gone through the Wellington Channel; and as the distance between it and Behring's Strait is not very great, they may have pushed on, and be now checked so far from the former, that their hope of getting back is not so great as getting forward, and they may, even now, be in the vicinity of that goal which they have so long striven to attain." He continues:—"I think there is another part which might be examined, namely, the land Capt. Kellett discovered, . . . by which an exploring party might get to the northward of the ice, and *into what is called the Polar basin*, and supposed to be an open sea." We wish we could coincide with these Wellington Channel advocates without the sacrifice of our own views. This paper, well meant, no doubt, but always conjectural, will take Franklin to the north, by the Wellington Channel, without a particle of proof to show that he ever attempted the northern route at all. Penny's recent search should have abated this Wellington Channel furor. Commander Pullen shows here that he, too, has a glimpse of a Polar Sea: we think he would have done better service in exploring the sounds running eastward between Wollaston and Banks' Lands, and extending the search by travelling parties to the north-east, as Capt. Austin had done to the south-west (but not far enough), than wasting his energies on the problematical north; for, notwithstanding all that has been written and said, it was wholly founded upon mere conjecture. Franklin's predilections were not with the north, in face of his Instructions, but were with the south, the completion of the American coast-line.†

December 26th, 1851,‡ despatches were received from the Behring's Strait Expedition, dated Port Clarence, from Capt. Collinson,

* See Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," Further Correspondence, &c., p. 140.

† See "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1836, part i., p. 48.

‡ Blue Books, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence," pp. 78—91, et 200—215.

of H.M.S. *Enterprise*, July 9th, 1851; from Commander Moore, of the *Plover*, April 30th, 1851; and from Capt. Wellesley, of the *Dædalus*, October 27th, 1851, giving their proceedings, and enclosing correspondence from the detached parties under Lieuts. Barnard and Cooper, Mr. Adams, assistant-surgeon, &c. It will be remembered that Lieut. Barnard had been left by Capt. Collinson at Michaelowski, with the view of ascertaining the truth or falsity of information gained by Mr. Pim that some Englishmen were living on one of the rivers in the interior, and that they were in great distress, &c., and also to ascertain whether a communication is maintained with the Polar Sea, so that the white men said to have been seen on its shores might be relieved. Lieut. Barnard's first object was to reach the Russian fort of Darabin, the northern post on the Koepak, and there wait the arrival of the same party of the Indians from whom the first report was obtained. Prior to leaving Michaelowski the Russian chief of Darabin brought a letter from Mr. A. Murray, dated River Youcon, June 9th, 1850, a Hudson's Bay post on the Colville, which cleared up the report about the five whites on the Ek-ko (a branch of the Koepak), that they were no part of the missing Expedition. Lieut. Barnard started for Darabin December 29th, 1850; on his way, at Kalishka (Gariskaf), he heard through a native of the Buckland River, that "a ship, said to be English, in the month of September, 1849, anchored at Point Barrow, was beset, and was attacked by the natives, who murdered the crew, and plundered and broke up the ship." This promising young officer arrived at Darabin on January 16th, 1850, and sent a letter by a Russian and a native to the village of Co-u-kuk, to be forwarded on "to the Englishmen said to be living on the Ek-ko River." The messengers were murdered by the Indians of the Co-u-kuk, who afterwards attacked Darabin, and killed the Russian Governor, Worsell Maxemoff, and mortally wounded Lieut. Barnard. Mr. Adams started immediately from Michaelowski for Darabin, but arrived too late: Lieut. Barnard was dead; he buried him there on March 16th, 1851. The Expedition was thus deprived of a most valuable officer, and Russia of a humble but good subject. Capt. Moore, it seems, being anxious to ascertain if any intelligence had been elicited from the northern natives, determined to send a small party to Michaelowski; they started February 1st, 1851, under Lieut. Cooper, &c. At Kalishka this gentleman says, "I questioned Gregoria Wanoff (the Russian in charge of this station) regarding the party supposed to have been murdered to the northward, which he fully confirms. . . They were attacked and murdered by the Co-u-kuk Indians, . . . in the

middle of 1849. . . This was told to a man," says Lieut. Cooper, "now in this house, whilst up the Coe-park last year, and by one of the Co-u-kuk Indians." Commander Moore, at Port Clarence, had also heard, by means of his interpretress, "of a party of English, with one or two boats, having visited the River Ko-pak, which, from description," he "conceives to be the Youcon, or Colville; they have been destroyed by the Indians somewhere near its mouth, who had been seen with the clothes, knives, and other articles belonging to the people." That excellent officer adds, "From the frequent recurrence of these reports, and the variety of their sources, I am often inclined to think that the people referred to may possibly have formed a part of the crews of the missing Expedition."

Mr. Adams, in his very clear report to Capt. Collinson, July 10th, 1851, on his return from Darabin *vid* Michaelowski, to his ship at Port Clarence, says, "After weighing well all the reports relative to white men having been seen in the interior, I am of opinion that they all have their origin in the presence of the Hudson's Bay party on the Colville River. . . The Indians to the eastward of Darabin are migratory, are a bad set, and fight much with tribes who trade with the Russians. These and other reasons lead me to believe that no party from the missing Expedition can be in the interior of Russian America."

The *Enterprise*, Captain Collinson, sailed from Port Clarence on July 10th, 1851, for the north, in obedience to Instructions. As nothing had been heard of her since her departure up to October 1st, 1851, when the *Dædalus* left Port Clarence, it was concluded that Captain Collinson had succeeded in rounding Point Barrow, and was on his way to the north-eastward.

The year 1851 closed, a year replete with matter of great Arctic interest. Extensive explorations had been made, beyond any that had ever been attempted before, and they had been carried out with an energy and determination commanding all praise. Important additions to science and to geography had accrued. The first wintering quarters of the Franklin Expedition had been discovered, but, regarding the course the Expedition had taken after it left Beechey Island, every effort had failed to ascertain. How are we to account for this want of success?—and England, too, the nation of sailors! This question naturally induces another;—Have we sought our missing countrymen in the right direction? Let us inquire.

The directions which the searching expeditions have taken have been—the *Wellington Channel*, *Cape Walker*, the south-west in part, and west to *Melville Island*. We will take the *Wellington Channel* first.

Upon what grounds has the search by the Wellington Channel been made? all the facts known go to prove (as we have shown) that Franklin never adopted that route. The failure, then, to discover traces of him up that channel, notwithstanding the rigorous search that has been made, is no more than might have been expected.

We will now take Cape Walker and the south-west, and the search by the Parry Islands and Melville Island. The former of these directions is in complete accordance with the original object of the voyage, and the orders given to Franklin; and the latter subsidiary to it, in case of his not being able to get to the south-west. Here we are (in the absence of all facts to the contrary) on the most probable, if not sure ground;—still the search in both these directions has failed. Taking the south-west, though failing in finding traces of the missing Expedition at Cape Walker, and along the coasts to the southward and westward, still, the very nature of the coast, and the sea adjoining, as far as they had been searched, afforded abundant reason for not finding any traces of him there; they are, in short, impracticable for navigation. Again, the search in this direction extended only to a part of the area or space to which Franklin was ordered; it was therefore incomplete; in fact, it could not be completed with the means and in the time (one season) devoted to it. We will now take the western divisions; neither the Parry Islands nor Melville Island afforded any proof that Franklin had visited them; but the examination of them assured us of one fact, that, if he had, we should have found a record of his visit at Winter Harbour. The only inference, then, that could be drawn was, that he had not made such large westing as the meridian of Melville Island, and that we must look for him more to the eastward and southward. Taking, then, the results of both Expeditions, that by the Wellington Channel was altogether without proof, and in a wrong direction; and that by the south-west, although in a right direction, was incomplete, and therefore no sound conclusion could be arrived at until the whole space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land had been searched. The search by the west to Melville Island was complete, and it went wholly to show the absolute necessity for the perfect completion of the former. But what are the conclusions? They are the opposite to what might have been anticipated or inferred. The Wellington Channel, which offered at no time either sign or hope that he had gone up it, was now decided to be the only channel by which he could have passed to the north; and the south-west, which had only been partially examined, is altogether rejected. How are we to account for this strange aber-

ration of judgment? It can only be accounted for in the preconceived notions in favour of the north generally, and of the Wellington Channel in particular. This feeling, which existed from the first, was then confined to the doubting few, but it now extended to the unthinking many, and developed itself under its true phase, of which the Wellington Channel was merely the accessory. The problem of a Polynia, or open water to the north of the Parry Islands, was the leading feeling; and under its influence the sense of Franklin's Instructions was inverted the secondary point was made the primary, and *vice versa*; but this feeling, let it be understood, did not arise out of, or as a consequence of, what we knew of the movements of Franklin. We knew nothing; it was, as we have said, a preconceived notion, doubtfully expressed at first, but now that the period had arrived when "doubt and conjecture" assumed "the place of certainty," all reason was thrown aside. *By this baseless prepossession in favour of the Wellington Channel and the north, a fiat was placed against all further search to the south-west.* The Instructions, and the plan of the voyage, which had hitherto restrained erratic opinions, being now set aside, the imagination was let loose, the most visionary plans and the wildest of theories followed. The probable and the improbable met, and formed one incongruous medley; how can we wonder, then, that the whole should be characterized as "so many lesser puzzles, as additions to the great geographical puzzle of three centuries?" It was impossible to distinguish truth from error; but, unhappily, the fate of Franklin, and his devoted, gallant followers, were involved in the solution of it. Various opinions have been given to account for the absence of records at Beechey Island. Some say the Expedition left the island in a hurry, and had not time to leave them; this after a whole winter spent there! Others, that he was returning home, and there was no necessity for leaving them. Others, again, think he left them on his outward course, but, on retreating, took them away, as being likely to lead his searchers into error; and so on, *ad infinitum*. But, while we regret that none have been found, we think in every case they ought to have been left, whether advancing or retreating; and if none were left there, we can only account for such apparent irregularity, that the Expedition was *en route*, and Franklin considered they would be first sought for at Cape Walker. The year closed; disappointment in its severest form pervaded all; dark gloom and mute sorrow sat around the hearths of Britain. There was yet a ray of hope, but it was too feeble to cheer. It played its evanescent fires, too, in a quarter already rejected.

CHAPTER XI.

PENNY AGAIN OFFERS SERVICES—OSBORN'S PLAN—SIR JOHN BOSS OFFERS—BEATSON'S PLAN—REMARKS—PETERMANN'S PLAN—REMARKS—TWO ICE-BOUND SHIPS SEEN BY "RENOVATION"—DR. BAE'S DISCOVERIES AND RELICS—BELCHER AND KELLETT'S EXPEDITION—INSTRUCTIONS—REMARKS.

1852.—Gloomily opened the new year at home. Anxiety and Suspense, worn with long watching, now caught at every aurora-gleam, whether from "Behring's rocks, or Greenland's naked isles," and invested it with the promise of happy result. Alas! "that sasive hope hath but a syren tongue!"

Mr. Penny, January 10th, 1852, again volunteered for the search; and in urging the Admiralty to be appointed "to continue the exploration of Queen Victoria Channel," says: "As the Committee in their report have deduced from the evidence that the channel discovered by me was the one which Sir John Franklin has probably taken. . . I do hope . . . I have fairly earned my title to conduct and continue a search . . . from which such results may happily be anticipated."*

This offer was declined. "My Lords have no intention of employing private parties in command of any Expedition that may be sent out by the Admiralty."

We always looked on the appointment of Penny to a command under the Admiralty as an anomalous position, alike unpleasant to himself and the naval officers forming the other part of the Expedition. Still, that was no fault of his, but the Admiralty's. We have ever looked on the *ground which he was to occupy in the search as holding out no hope for the recovery of the Franklin Expedition, whether by Wellington Channel or Jones's or Smith's Sounds.* The search in that quarter could lead to nothing but disappointment and ill-feeling; but to Captain Penny and his active second, Captain Stewart, with their excellent officers and crews, the merit is due of the exploration of the northern entrance of Wellington Channel; and Penny discovered the sea to the westward, leading to the north of the

* Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence, &c.," p. 101.

Parry Islands, in a north-west direction, and probably to the open water of Wrangoll.

1852.—About this time (not dated), Lieut. (now Capt.) Sherard Osborn,* lately commanding the *Pioneer*, in Capt. Austin's Expedition, submitted a "memorandum connected with the renewed search." He says, "I think I can show good cause for believing that Wellington Channel is not the only route to the water to the north-west; I believe the Byam Martin Channel an equally good channel, and as in the one case a choke of ice may probably prevent vessels proceeding up Wellington Channel above Cape Grinnell, so in the other case, the probable difficulty in reaching Byam Martin Channel will, I think, be found in rounding Griffith Island. . . . To ensure, therefore, the North Water being reached by one of these routes appears to me an essential point in any future search." The memorandum then proposes the employment of four steamers and two depôt ships, sledges drawn by dogs, &c. The arrangements for placing advanced depôt vessels, and the examination of the coasts between by sledge parties, appear excellent and complete, but we have only to do with the direction of their efforts, not the means employed. Arrived at Beechey Island, Captain Osborn proposes that the Expedition divide into two divisions: "The first to have the Wellington Channel and north-west as its line of search; . . . the second to have the Byam Martin Channel and north-west for its line of search."

He thus assumes that *Franklin has attempted a northern route*. In searching for him he adopts the Wellington Channel, and also the more western Byam Martin Channel; so that in case of "a choke of ice" preventing advance to the Wellington Channel division, the other may possibly be free; or if, in rounding Griffith Island, the Byam Martin division is arrested, the Wellington Channel division may, by chance, be unimpeded; in short, it was the adoption of the chances of two routes instead of one; so far, in pursuing him to the north it was reasonable. But, in thus assuming Franklin adopted a route by the north, what proof have we? Not a vestige rewarded the extraordinary exertions of any of the searching parties of either Austin's or of Penny's vessels. The Parry Islands, or the passages between them, yielded nothing, not even Melville Island, and Franklin would assuredly have left a record there, had he been in the neighbourhood. Wellington Channel afforded not a trace, or the islands to the north of it. After these negative proofs to the contrary, why still cling to

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence, &c.," p. 102.

the north? There must have been some other motive. Was it the attraction of a Polar Sea, a second Polynia? Lieutenant Osborn had himself searched the eastern side of Melville Sound to 103° W.; he found its shores low, its coasts abounding with shoals, ice blocked and unnavigable; surely in these there was sufficient reason for no trace of the Expedition being found there. Where, then, shall we look with any hope of finding the long absent ones? The question is easily answered; to the space where the Expedition was specially directed,—to Melville Sound; for, though unable to navigate its eastern side, there was no reason to think he would not attempt to *get south and west, farther west, and to the eastward of Banks' Land*. Even supposing him to have attempted *Cape Walker* in 1845, and failing, even in such a case, he was most unlikely to have given up all hope in that quarter, on the threshold, and turned tail, with the intention of taking advantage of the less hopeful prospect presented by the Wellington Channel. We find it impossible to believe that Franklin attempted the north at all.

Sir John Ross, January 17th, 1852,* repeated his offer of service to the Admiralty, "should their Lordships be desirous that the east coast of Baffin's Bay, north of Upernavik, and the inhabited part of the west coast should be examined for the missing ships." He says: "My belief of the ships . . . being lost in Baffin's Bay is strengthened by the fact that Adam Beck, the interpreter, has deposed that the words, '3rd of September, 1846,' were on the tin plate which was lost, as appears by the translation from Germany, and which is believed to be true by the Danish authorities. . . Mr. Lewis Peaton, an intelligent Danish gentleman, . . . has volunteered to accompany me. . . We are both of opinion, and confident that we should be able to *put an end to the question, which will not be the case by the plan recommended by the Arctic Committee*." He concludes, "On purpose to perform this service, I shall most willingly *hoist my pendant as a Captain* instead of hoisting *my flag as a Rear-Admiral*." Sir John Ross seems still to retain his belief of Adam Beck's story as to the loss of the ships in or about *Cape York*: we should have thought he had learned wisdom from the officers who examined into the truth of it—Captain Ommaney, and others—on the spot; he believes also that veritable man picked up the piece of English elm, with a *tin plate at top*, with the words, '3rd September, 1846,' and which he lost. This man did not understand English, and

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, Further Correspondence, 1852," p. 141.

yet could recollect the inscription. Sir John Ross may believe it, but we cannot. The translation of this second story of Adam Beck's says,* "The shining plate (or skin) *was nailed on*; with writing in the English language, which I did not understand, because it was not my work; only *this I recognized*, '3rd September, 1846,' for which I *was immediately thankful*." Then follows the tale of how he lost it slipping down the snow over a hill; not soft snow, by which it might be buried, but *hard ice*; and which, he says, he could *not climb* to recover it. We leave this second story to the fate of the first. The last observation—sacrificial, it may be called, that of offering to hoist his pendant as Captain instead of his flag as Admiral, would induce a smile if the subject were not fraught with the most painful and melancholy associations. We will only say, to be employed on a mission so holy and humane, would confer honour on the greatest admiral that ever garlanded by his deeds his country's fame. We need not add, the Admiralty were not prepared to avail themselves of Sir John Ross's proposal.

Mr. Donald Beatson, in a letter, dated January 12th, 1852,† addressed to Sir R. I. Murchison, President of the Royal Geographical Society, proposed a plan for search *viâ* Behring's Strait:—"The subject of search for Sir John Franklin having been so frequently discussed by the members of this scientific society, and others well acquainted with the navigation of the Polar Regions, it would be presumptuous in me to attempt an explanation of my reasons for commencing the search from the north-west of Behring's Strait.

"I believe that many are of opinion that a high northern latitude may be reached through the open water seen by Wrangell, and that, subsequently, an eastern passage may be forced by a screw steamer, . . . This is no hasty idea of mine, but one which I have had in contemplation for above two years. . . . While in Russia last winter, in speaking upon the subject with some of the officers of the Imperial navy who had been in the Arctic Seas, I found that their opinions were exactly the same as mine; namely, that Sir John would pass to the north of the Parry Islands, and never think of returning back till in the meridian of Behring's Straits. They were also of opinion, that, when he arrived thus far, he would be prevented from getting to the *southward* by a chain of islands extending farther westward,—a continuation, in fact, of the Parry Islands. Supposing, now, Franklin to have succeeded in getting so far to the westward, and being

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence, &c.," p. 136.

† *Ibid.*, p. 215.

stopped there, it cannot be imagined that he would relinquish the attempt to get through this last barrier to all his hopes, and the realization of the passage into the Pacific,—to retrace his steps from a point which may have taken him four years to reach. What would a brave man do in such a case? Certainly not retreat, in two, or even three years; particularly if, as we hope, they have met with sufficient animal food to support them. *I believe Sir John Franklin to be somewhere to the north of Behring's Straits, and certainly not far to the eastward; and in that belief I wrote to Lady Franklin in October last, stating my plan, and soliciting her assistance, which I am happy to say was immediately given.* Mr. Beatson then points out his route to Behring's Strait, and continues, "When there I must be guided by the condition of the ice. If there is a possibility of getting to the north on or about the meridian of the straits, I shall do so; otherwise I intend pushing my way to the north-west till I arrive at the open water, seen by Wrangell; when, perhaps, I may be able to get to the north, and then to the east. Should I not succeed in getting so far along the coast this year, I might employ the spring (before the breaking up of the ice) in an attempt to reach that land seen by Captain Kellett from Herald Island, and thus be enabled to perform one part of the scheme proposed by Lieut. Pim. I would next, in the spring, push away to the north and east, in which direction I believe I shall eventually find some traces of the missing ships."

A copy of this letter was sent to the Admiralty, February 6th, 1852. This plan, taken from the prospectus, is briefly, "to enter Behring's Strait and keep to the north-west, . . . then to strike off for New Siberia, when, after having searched the northern and eastern parts, to push to the eastward, to the northward of a chain of islands that is supposed to extend from Melville Island to long. 140° or 150° W., in which longitude it is anticipated the navigation will be comparatively clear; to winter as far east as possible, and during the early spring, examine by sledges around the winter quarters; and the next year again push eastward as before." We have said this plan was submitted to the Royal Geographical Society by Sir R. I. Murchison (January 12th, 1852). Various observations were made on it; "in all of which a hope was expressed that Franklin and some of his brave companions might still be alive." It was most favourably received, and a resolution was unanimously adopted, "That Capt. Beatson's generous and noble devotion deserved the countenance and support of the Society;" and a subscription list, in aid of the undertaking, was opened at the Society's rooms.

It will be seen that the plan here noticed is founded simply on the presumption that the Polynia of Wrangell (already referred to) extended eastward to the north of the Parry Islands, and that this open water was navigable. At this period the impression was general that Franklin had really passed to the north; had forced the barrier of ice obstructing the access to, and had succeeded in entering, the Polynia, through which the passage to the west was, on the authority of Wrangell and Sabine, of comparatively easy accomplishment. The question of the existence of a Polar Basin had long been a favourite subject. The old voyagers had invested it with something like a feeling of romance; there was a chivalrous adventure, and we may say a poetry, in daring the spirits of the mysterious north in their own secret recesses; but, setting aside these, the thought that there was a "wide immeasurable ocean," in which ships might navigate "even unto the Pole," was so fascinating, so exciting, that it was almost impossible to examine into it and not to feel it possible, and be drawn within the influence of that charmed circle: we must confess to its magic power over us. We are not usually led by theoretical imaginings, we thought, like others, it was probable. Under this influence, and his long absence, we thought we saw *just a hope that Franklin might have gone to the north, not by the Wellington Channel, but by one of the passages, more to the westward, between the Parry Islands.* Hence we too advocated Capt. Beanson's plan. We admit we doubted, because Austin's western parties had failed to discover anything to lead to the conclusion that Franklin had been in that direction. Still we thought a cairn or trace might have escaped them, travelling so early in the spring, when all was covered with one monotonous white, and that Franklin might have gone up between Cornwallis and Byam Martin Island, or the latter and Melville Island.

The absence of traces at Winter Harbour added yet more to our doubts; but, and above all these, was our positive impression that Franklin was locked up in the ice, on the western side of Melville Sound. This period was a sad trial for one's firmness, holding opinions, as we did and do, widely different from most Arctic authorities, and we may add, too, from others whose names justly stand distinguished for their highly scientific acquirements. With such an array against us, we have often paused and questioned the soundness of our own views; but, as they were formed independently, and without a motive for prejudice, and besides which, as they were based on Franklin's Instructions, the only guide we had in the absence of all intelligence of the missing Expedition, we could not change them.

Again, we were without power, and they were therefore a dead letter. But now, as farther search by the south-west was ignored, we could not remain apathetic whilst 134 of our countrymen's lives were in jeopardy; we had, then, no alternative but to remain in apparently bigoted, inactive, sullen silence, or to succumb and bend to the opinions of the majority: the cause was sacred, and could not be deferred. Others' opinion might be right, especially as Franklin, *if shut out from Melville Sound*, might have turned his attention to the north; we therefore advocated Mr. Beatson's plan, which, however, in our opinion poor in promise, still did give promise (if the general impression was right) of some hope of success; but, as we have said, our faith and hope was in the south-west from Cape Walker,—both centered in Melville Sound.

Mr. Beatson purchased the schooner *Isabel* for his projected voyage; but, from some unforeseen circumstances, the voyage was abandoned.

We now come to the consideration of an interesting paper (addressed to the Lords of the Admiralty, January 22nd, 1852) by Mr. Augustus Petermann,* a gentleman having the reputation of being a good physical geographer. He says:—"It is the general opinion that Franklin has passed through Wellington Channel. If so, it is beyond doubt that he must have penetrated to a considerable distance further, so as to have rendered it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to retrace his steps, should he have found it impracticable to proceed in any other direction. . . . It is a well known fact, that there exists to the north of the Siberian coast, and at a comparatively short distance from it, a sea open at all seasons. It is beyond doubt a similar sea exists on the American side, to the north of the Parry Group; it is very probable that these two open seas form a large navigable Arctic Ocean. . . . It is evident, that, until an entrance into this Arctic basin has been effected, that is, into that part which is comparatively open and navigable, scarcely any hope can be entertained of rescuing Franklin, or of ascertaining his fate." He then says, "Wellington Channel and Behring's Strait, the two chief entrances from the American side into the Polar Basin, have, owing to the proximity of the land and accumulation of ice, hitherto frustrated the most determined advances . . . in these directions. There are only two other entrances; these are between Greenland and Spitzbergen, and between Spitzbergen and Novaia Zembla; with respect to the former, . . . the difficulties . . . are very great,

* See Blue Book, "Arctic Expedition, 1852, Further Correspondence, &c.," p. 142; and *Athenaeum*, January 17th, 1852.

I therefore confine myself to the latter," and "would suggest that the wide opening between Spitzbergen and Novaia Zemlia most probably offers the easiest and most advantageous entrance into the open, navigable Polar Sea, and perhaps the best route for the search after Sir John Franklin." Mr. Petermann then notices "those navigators who have attempted, during the summer months, to penetrate northwards in that direction;" speaks of "that immense body of Arctic ice which every spring is known to drift, with a powerful current, from the Siberian coasts towards the Atlantic Ocean;" shows its subsequent drift, and the effects of the Gulf Stream upon it, and, in proof, notices "that while its course is arrested between the northern part of Novaia Zemlia and Spitzbergen, no floating ice having ever been known to reach North Cape; on the other side of the Atlantic it travels upwards of 2,500 miles further south."

"The barrier of ice, which may justly be supposed to exist between Spitzbergen and Novaia Zemlia during the summer, unquestionably presents obstacles," he observes, "but not greater than those on the . . . American side—Davis's Strait, Baffin's Bay, Lancaster Sound, and Barrow's Strait. . . We have the testimony of numerous whalers, &c., that whenever they succeeded in pushing through this barrier of ice, they found, to the north of it, a sea more or less open and free. . . A vessel, then, which should effect a passage through this ice, would . . . find itself in the great, open, navigable 'Polinya' of the Russians. . . The preceding remarks are offered, . . . not as anything new, but as well established facts," submitted, by way of preparation, for "the consideration of that portion of my views which I believe to be entirely new. . . My belief is, nay, I think I am able to demonstrate, that during the Arctic winter months, namely, from September to March, an entrance into the Polar Sea, through the opening under consideration, may be much more easily effected than during the summer months; and also, that the further navigation of the Siberian sea may, likewise, be performed with much greater facility in winter than in summer."

The author then proceeds to show how he founds his views. He enters at large on the subject—too largely to be given here, expatiates on "the principles which regulate the distribution of the gaseous and fluid coverings of the earth, . . . the currents of the Arctic Ocean," and "the distribution of temperature;" asserts the existence of "a moveable pole of cold," notices the deductions arising therefrom, gives a number of known facts in corroboration of his views, and concludes,—“I cannot but think, then, that on the consideration

of all the circumstances, it will be the opinion of those who are most competent to decide on the question, that an entrance into the Polar Basin, through the opening under consideration, as well as the navigation of that 'wide, immeasurable ocean,' might be more easily effected during the Arctic winter than in the summer months." As to the time of departure, he says: "Vessels arriving in the Polar Sea in February or March, just before or when the sun has made its appearance, might, if only once able to enter the Polar Basin, easily traverse it to the opposite side, before the power of the sun had set in motion the great ice-bearing current, and they would then have before them the whole summer of the fullest sunshine for carrying out the object of their voyage,—the search for Sir John Franklin." He adds: "It is my conviction that there is no really good authority decisive of the point; . . . in fact, the passage between Spitzbergen and Novaia Zemlia has never been fairly attempted. . . . The said opening into the Polar Basin may, after all, turn out to be the most favourable one, even during the summer months." Two charts were submitted, illustrative of the author's views.

This paper we consider very valuable; but, as will already have been seen, though favouring the idea of a Polynia and its continuation to the north, still, as the fact was not established that Franklin had taken the northern route, we could not place any confidence in it as a route for the search and discovery of the missing Expedition. We looked in the direction in which it was ordered; we felt assured the original plan of Sir John Barrow was sound; we had not completed the search in that quarter; and as there were no new facts to prove that he had failed there, and had gone to the north, we could not place confidence in any plan of search not having fact for its basis; again, we thought, Might not Franklin be detained in the direction in which he was sent, by obstacles arising out of that current known to set down Melville Sound in a south-east direction? We still clung to the belief that he was there, ice-bound, without the power of extricating himself. "This plan was, we believe," says the editor of the *Athenæum*,* "submitted to Capt. Beaton, who naturally is reluctant to give up his own plan. . . . If, however, the competent authori-

* See *Athenæum*, 17th January, 1852. We give this note to show how strongly theory was advocated at the time.

A letter from Mr. John Hilton, abounding in valuable data, suggesting the desirability of trying the route between Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla, was published in the *Manchester Guardian*, in June, 1851. See "The Arctic Regions," &c., by P. L. Simmonds, 1857, p. 230.

ties, to whose opinion Mr. Petermann has made an appeal, should consider the Nova Zembla route a more advantageous one than that by Behring's Strait, he has, we are informed, expressed his willingness to adopt the former; but at the same time he has suggested that, nevertheless, he should be allowed to follow his own route, if another vessel could be despatched by the Nova Zembla opening, lest no one else should be found to follow up his proposed route. The important facts brought forward by Mr. Petermann should certainly be at once investigated. If they can be contradicted—if his conclusions can be proved incorrect—why, there is an end of the matter. If not, his plan deserves, as we have said, the most serious consideration; for in that case, his proposed route would seem to be the most feasible and advantageous of all."

We ought to notice here the strong feeling, at this time, of our American brothers, in favour of a renewal of the search for our missing countrymen. Capt. Charles Wilkes, U.S.N., so well known as an Antarctic navigator, presented a memorial to Congress, praying that a grant of 500,000 dollars may be made for this purpose. Capt. Wilkes's views on the search, as addressed to the editor of the *National Intelligencer*, are briefly—"From the letters from England I am satisfied that the means will not be afforded to make an effectual search. . . Fatal errors have been made, in attempting the search in vessels, it being quite evident to the simplest mind that if vessels can track Sir John, he certainly would be enabled to get out. . . . It has always appeared to me absurd nonsense . . . to keep to vessels, the scene of whose operations must be limited to the fast ice. . . . The only and true course is a thorough exploration over the ice by means of sledges or boats, making the advance in all directions, under a well-organized base of operations, but particularly to the westward from *Wellington Channel, where his trail has been struck.* (?) . . . The anxiety and interest which exist in this country to receive tidings of the lost Expedition . . . cannot be greater, even in Great Britain. It is the cause of humanity, in which all our hearts and minds should assent to intervention." We have extreme gratification in recording this expression of generous sympathy on the part of our American kinsmen. We trust, in the future, that the seeds thus sown may flourish to the mutual happiness and prosperity of both nations. Venturing our opinion on the direction of search suggested by Capt. Wilkes, he will easily conceive, should he ever see these pages, that from what we have already said we cannot coincide with his views. He will see that we altogether repudiate

the Wellington Channel route; but we quite agree with him when he says, "It behoves . . . Great Britain to consider the search as now but begun; and it ought and must be continued, as becomes a great nation under whose flag, and in whose service, Sir John and his companions have risked, and are, if alive, enduring great privations."

March 20th, 1852.—Information was received at the Admiralty from Mr. James M. Share, second master of H.M.S. *Sampson*, the substance of which was a report that two three-masted ships had been seen on an iceberg, or floe, off the coast of Newfoundland, in April, 1851, by a brig, named the *Renovation*, Mr. Edward Coward, Master. Much against the wish of Mr. J. S. Lynch, a passenger, the vessel proceeded without examining them. On her arrival at Quebec, Mr. Lynch reported the circumstance, it being his opinion that the two ice-borne vessels might be those of Sir John Franklin. It seems no notice was taken of the report there, or afterwards at Limerick, although all the particulars were given in the *Limerick Chronicle*, May 28th, 1851. On receiving this information, the Admiralty lost no time in communicating with the owner, master, mate, and crew of the *Renovation*; also with the various authorities connected with the Merchant Service at home and abroad. An extensive correspondence followed, but it failed to elicit little more than the fact as noticed. Capt. Erasmus Ommaney, already known as the able second of Austin's Expedition, was very active in his endeavour to investigate this report. He examined the mate, Mr. Simpson, and one of the crew of the *Renovation*, and several other persons. The following extract from his official letter to the Admiralty, April 16th, 1852,* will give the result of his inquiries:—
 "Whatever ships they may have been, whether Franklin's or not, the fate of the crews must be a subject of public sympathy, and many surmises will result. My firm conviction is, that those vessels drifted a considerable distance on that piece of ice. . . . From the fact of being found drifting with the current that sets along the coast of Labrador from Davis's Straits, I infer they came from a high northern latitude; the removal of the spars and absence of the boats indicate that the abandonment of the ships had been a work of time and deliberation. The fact of the ships being close together has the appearance of consorts." Notwithstanding this inquiry of Capt. Ommaney's, some asserted the appearance to be altogether an optical

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 501, "Vessels in the North Atlantic, 1852," p. 11.

delusion, which, from the evidence, we cannot think. This report produced great excitement at the time. Being within the drift from the north, and no losses having occurred among the whale ships within the previous three years but what could be accounted for, there was a general belief that these two ice-embedded ships were the hapless *Erebus* and *Terror*. Here was a fruitful subject for speculation. Conjecture and theory went hand in hand—whence did these ships come? It must have been from the north; but did they drift down on the east or west side of Greenland? The advocates for the former opinion, under the prevailing ill-founded notion that Franklin had gone up the Wellington Channel, and had reached the Polynia of the Arctic Basin, strenuously urged that they must have come down from the north between Greenland and Spitzbergen. The facts afforded in the drift of various whalers, of Sir James Ross's ships, and, more recently, those of De Haven, down Baffin's Bay and Davis's Straits, were unheeded. They argued, if drifting from that direction, they must have been seen by the whalers on their passage down. This opinion, visionary and untenable as it is, whether we consider the width of the Bay and Strait, or the fact that whalers avoid the ice, by giving it "a wide berth;" have not time to spare to seek an object they know not of; and, above all, the want of evidence to show that Franklin had sought the solution of the "great question" by the north, still these views were listened to.

It was in vain the supporters of the opinion that these ships came down on the west side of Greenland pointed to the experience and facts of the past. Reason and fact in this case, as in others on this distressing subject, and which we have so often had occasion to notice, were rejected; the facts were known, but unheeded. "An object ever pressing dims the sight."

The meagreness of the information obtained did not afford materials for forming a sound conclusion whether they were Franklin's ships or not; but looking to the source of their drift, our conviction was certainly in favour of Barrow's Strait, Baffin's Bay, and Davis's Strait. We shall have occasion again to notice those random-driven, ice-locked ships.*

April 3rd, 1852.—Further intelligence was received at the Admiralty through the Hudson's Bay Company from the now celebrated Dr. Rae; his letter is dated from Fort Simpson, September 27th,

* See a valuable paper on the "Probable Course of Sir John Franklin," by A. G. Findlay, Esq., F.R.G.S., "Royal Geographical Society's Journal," vol. xxvi., p. 26, *et seq.* Also an Appendix to the above, dated March 21st, 1857.

1851.* This party started on June 15th, 1851. On August 13th, 1851, they had attained a position, lat. $70^{\circ} 2' 36''$ N., long. $101^{\circ} 24' 47''$ W. From thence Dr. Rae despatched two men to the north, who advanced ten miles, and from thence had a northerly view of seven miles. To this point was given the name of "Pelly," Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company. On the 14th they commenced their return. On August 21st, being in Parker Bay (we quote from Dr. Rae's able Report), "a piece of pine-wood was picked up which excited much interest; in appearance it resembled the butt end of a small flagstaff, was five feet nine inches in length, and round, except twelve inches at the lower end, which was a square of two inches and three quarters. It had a curious mark, resembling this (S C) apparently, stamped on one side; and at two and a half feet distance from the top, there was a bit of white line in the form of a loop nailed on with two copper tacks. Both the line and the tacks bore the Government mark; the broad arrow being stamped on the latter, and the former having a red worsted thread running through it. We had not advanced half a mile when another piece of wood was discovered lying in the water, but touching the beach; this was a piece of oak three feet eight inches long, the lower part, to the height of a foot and a half, was a square of three inches and a half; half the square, to the extent of six inches at the end, was cut off, apparently to fit into a clasp or band of iron, as there was a mark three inches broad across it. The remaining part of the stanchion (as I suppose it to have been) had been turned in a lathe, and was three inches in diameter." Dr. Rae, anticipating future observation on these most interesting fragments, thus notes his opinions regarding them on the spot: "As there may be some difference of opinion regarding the direction from which these pieces of wood came, it may not be out of place to express here my own opinion on the subject. From the circumstance of the *flood tide coming from the northward along the east shore of Victoria Land*, there can be no doubt, but there is a water channel dividing Victoria Land from North Somerset; and through this channel I believe these pieces of wood have been carried, along with the immense quantities of ice that a long continuance of northerly and north-easterly winds, aided by the flood tide, had driven southward. The ebb tide, not having power enough to carry it back again against the wind, the large bay immediately south of Victoria Strait became perfectly filled with ice, even up to the south shore of Victoria Land.

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 248, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 8; and see "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. xii., p. 82.

Both pieces appear to have come to shore about the same time, and they must have been carried in by the flood tide that was at the time flowing, or during the previous ebb, for the simple reason, that, although they were touching the beach, they did not rest upon it. The spot where they were found was in lat. $68^{\circ} 52' N.$, long. $103^{\circ} 20' W.$ " We have had great pleasure in reading this, as we have had every report of Dr. Rae's. There is about them a simplicity, a clearness, and a truthfulness, that charms one onward to the end of his journey. In following him we seem to partake of his persevering, cheerful spirit; with him there is no mauding; danger and suffering, under whatever forms presented, find him prepared with daring to face them, and energy to overcome them; and yet no fool-hardiness or gallant exploits are attempted, or depicted; all is tempered by a judicious ardour, full of life, that sees, weighs, and acts with promptitude, but ever calmly, and with ready wits about him. With reference to the two pieces of wood, the inferences of Dr. Rae, with respect to the direction of their drift,—that is, *that they came from the north by a channel dividing Victoria Land from North Somerset*,—are most natural; but he was not aware, at the time, of the search that had been made by Ommaney's party down Peel's Sound, and the doubt thrown on the existence of a passage to the southward by that Sound; this, with other reasons for assigning the drift of these most important relics to another quarter, will again be referred to and considered: *but of the deep interest involved in them there is not a question, and yet they do not seem to have obtained that attention; and inquiry "whence they came" one would have been led to expect. In their drift is enwrapped the mysterious TALE of the position, and, probably, the fate, of the ill-starred Sir John Franklin, and the officers and crews of the Erebus and Terror.*

We have already noticed the report of the Arctic Committee, and their recommendation "that an Expedition should be despatched to Barrow's Strait," and have remarked on their extraordinary conclusion, that they "*consider any further exploration in the direction of Melville Island, or to the south-west of Cape Walker, wholly unnecessary;*" and, "therefore, propose that all the strength and energy of the Expedition should be directed towards the examination of the upper part of Wellington Strait." We have endeavoured to show that, in *selecting the Wellington Strait*, it was in the face of every reasonable inference; not only because it was only a secondary point in Sir John Franklin's Instructions, but also that it was subordinate to the route by *Cape Walker*, and at variance with the original plan of

Sir John Barrow; and, lastly, having been strictly searched, it had yielded not a particle of evidence to prove that the Expedition had advanced to the north by its ice-blocked channel. We have also attempted to prove, that in rejecting the former, they have strayed from the primary direction in which the Franklin Expedition was so especially ordered, and have done so without a single fact to prove he was unable to prosecute the object of his voyage in a general south and west direction from Cape Walker; for, excepting the particular coast to the south and west of it to 103° W., recently searched by Capt. Ommaney, no one knew whether Franklin might not be more to the westward, and in Melville Sound. The efforts of that indefatigable officer were confined to a small portion only of the space between that Cape and Banks' Land; they were therefore inconclusive, and must ever of necessity remain so, so long as the larger portion remained unexamined. In rejecting the route, then, by Cape Walker and Banks' Land, a route still offering the promise of a passage over an unexplored space or gap of 200 miles in width, we contend they left the original and only true direction of search, and in leaving it, they sealed the fate of the Franklin Expedition, unless, indeed, they could help and rescue themselves. What an entanglement of inconsistency the search of our lost countrymen has produced! First, the search is delayed, and then not carried out; then, again, another delay. After five years' absence, we seek them on the threshold of the south-west route, and, not finding them, rush to the north-west, a quarter without prospect, without any real promise of success, but that which wild imagination or overwrought conjecture chose to invest it; over ground, too, where we are assured they could not have passed, or we should have found some sign, some vestige to indicate their presence and their track. However, it was decided that another Expedition should be sent to Barrow's Strait, and that its energies should be confined to the north and the west. Capt. Sir Edward Belcher, C.B., was appointed to the entire command in the *Assistance*, and Capt. Henry Kellett, C.B., to the *Resolute*, with two steam tenders and a depôt-ship to accompany them. Bountifully equipped and provided, these vessels sailed from Woolwich 15th April, 1852.

The Instructions given to Sir Edward Belcher, C.B.* (dated 16th April, 1852), may be thus abbreviated. After the usual preliminaries, Section 4 says:—"Adopting the recommendation of the Arctic Committee, . . . the plan of future operations there pro-

* Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 1.

posed is to be considered as the basis of your proceedings. . . By that plan, Beechey Island is the point indicated as the basis of your operations, and you are to consider it as the grand rendezvous, and as a general depôt.

"5th. Arrived at this point, two great objects will engage your attention,—first, the endeavouring to pass up Wellington Channel with one sailing vessel and a steamer; second, the advance of a similar force towards Melville Island.

"6th. The object of the first of these Expeditions will be to endeavour to recover the traces of Sir John Franklin, which ceased at Cape Bowden, to the north of Beechey Island, and to follow up such traces *if they should be found*.

"The object of the other Expedition will be to deposit, if possible, at Winter Harbour, Melville Island, or, failing that, at Byan Martin Island, a supply of provisions, &c., for any parties that might reach such positions from Capt. Collinson's or Commander McClure's ships.

"7th. As regards the first-named Expedition, and the possible contingency of coming on Sir John Franklin's track, (?) we cannot too strongly impress upon you the necessity of your establishing along your line of route caches of provisions sufficient to supply your crews and those of the missing ships." He is then directed "to deposit notices, erect cairns, &c."

9th. The Western Expedition is directed, "in the ensuing spring, first, to deposit provisions at Melville Island;" secondly, to detach "travelling parties in a westerly direction, for the combined purpose of a search for traces of Sir John Franklin, and of depositing notices . . . where the supplies are left, being at the same time strictly enjoined to return to their ships before . . . the usual period of the" breaking up of the ice in order that "they" may return to "Beechey Island."

"12th. It is, of course, possible that such seasons as were experienced by the Expedition in 1850-1 may again occur, to prevent a passage by ships up Wellington Channel, or to the west of Griffith Island; and under such circumstances, it will be for you to consider how far it might serve any useful purpose to undertake an examination by travelling parties from Baring Bay, or Prince Alfred Bay, in the direction of Jones's Sound, in addition to those which it will be your duty to send out to the north and north-west for traces of Sir John Franklin in the direction of Queen's Channel."

13th. Directs "further search of Beechey Island for records, and if found it should prove Sir John Franklin proceeded to the east-

ward after wintering at Beechey Island, 1845-6," he "will still continue to push two ships towards Melville Island, as directed. . . . Adverting to the report of two ships having been seen on the ice in the North Atlantic, in the spring of 1851, they direct the adoption of such steps on the way from Ballin's Bay, with reference to search and inquiry on the shores of Davis's Straits," as he "may consider most advisable."

These Instructions are very simple and clear. Arrived at Beechey Island the Expedition is to divide; one division is to ascend the Wellington Channel, to follow up the traces of Franklin's Expedition, which ceased at Cape Bowden; the other, to deposit a supply of provisions, &c., at Winter Harbour, Melville Island, or, failing that, at Byam Martin Island, for Capt. Collinson's or Commander McClure's ships. This division is also to detach parties in a westerly direction for traces of Franklin, and deposit notices where supplies are left. In case of a bad season offering obstacles, and preventing a passage, either up Wellington Channel or to the west of Griffith Island, due consideration is to be given how far it might be useful to examine Baring Bay, or Prince Alfred Bay, in the direction of Jones's Sound, in addition to the north and north-west of Queen's Channel. From the tenor of these Instructions it will be seen the efforts of both divisions *are to be confined to the north of Barrow's Straits, in search of an Expedition sent to the south and west of those straits.* At this time (1852) there was a perfect infatuation in favour of Wellington Channel and the north. With every earnest and sincere wish that our missing countrymen should be found and restored to England and their homes; with every desire to inform ourselves, and rightly to think on this momentous subject, we have sought and spared no exertion to ascertain upon what grounds this extraordinary delusion was based. We have read and read again, but with all our endeavours we have been unable to discover a single point or fact upon which to "hang a reason" for supposing that the Franklin Expedition ever passed to the north by the Wellington Channel. We knew the interest attached to it when Franklin sailed, and that it was sufficient to make it the second point of his Instructions; but, in choosing it, the *complete failure of the first point was assumed to have occurred: this fact we have never been enabled to establish.* The Wellington Channel, then, can claim no preference on this account. Again, the absence of records at Beechey Island is strong presumptive evidence that he did not pass up this channel; for no one can with reason believe that such a man as Franklin would depart from

his Instructions, and leave the known for the unknown, without depositing some document assigning his reason for doing so; again, at this time Wellington Channel had been rigidly searched, and nothing was found to give the least clue that he had ascended it; what, then, can have influenced the minds of those advising in the matter, that they should have come to a conclusion so adverse to all rational inference, and yet so determinately, so obstinately insisted on? It has been said that Franklin's predilections were in favour of a northern route: this is not fact. Franklin, as we have already noticed, was in favour of completing the North American coast-line. The fact is, there was no tangible reason for thinking so; it was a mere hallucination, built up under the glare of an Arctic Polynia, of talked-of intentions of what he should like to do, distorted into resolves of what he would do, and by easy transition coined into the fact of what he had done. One error ever follows another; so in the case before us, it was this monomania in favour of Wellington Channel and the north, without stopping to inquire whether the Franklin Expedition might not be beset to the west and south of Cape Walker, that led to the despatch of Collinson and M'Clure from Behring's Strait to seek them to the north of Melville Island, thereby drawing attention from and leaving the true direction of search unexamined. Again, it will be observed in these Instructions, that not a passing word is devoted to Cape Walker and the south-west route, and yet it was this quarter that first attracted the attention of the father of Arctic enterprise, as presenting the best prospect for effecting "the Passage," to accomplish which Sir John Franklin and his gallant crews left our shores. The search in that direction, then, should have been our first and principal object; it was begun but *never has been completed*, and so it remains to this day. Extraordinary as it may now appear, it is by these Instructions entirely disregarded, probably never to be completed;—so much for Arctic authorities! Thus, *that which we so much feared in 1849-50, when we saw the first signs of departure from the sound plan of Sir John Burrow's and Franklin's Instructions, was now realized—the Wellington Channel route, which from the first was doubtful, as no one knew "into what difficulty it might lead," was now decided to be the ONLY channel which Franklin could have taken to realize the great object of his voyage; thus was attention distracted from the south and west to the north and north-west. The search, therefore, for the Franklin Expedition we now consider ended.*

From this time the fate of our unfortunate countrymen may be

said to be sealed. From this time our conviction is, we departed from the true direction of search, and adopted a route, as far as regards the Wellington Channel, *entirely at variance with all sound judgment*; in short, searched for the ill-fated Franklin and his doomed companions *in a wrong direction*, and hence we have failed to recover them. At the offset we jeopardized the safety of the Expedition by delay and lukewariness; then we permitted our judgments to be led away by ill-digested opinions and wild schemes, and, lastly, by scientific theories, the solution of which, however important and interesting in themselves at another time, were out of place now, and were trivial in comparison with the preservation of one hundred and thirty-five men's lives—men sent on a soundly scientific but perilous service, for the solution of a great question for the honour of their country.

But we return to Sir Edward Belcher's Expedition. As the chief *he took the post of honour, the Wellington Channel; that channel which led to Penny's sea, and the Arctic Polynia*. We have no faith, no hope, whatever his exertions, however perseveringly conducted, that his efforts will be attended with success; it is *in the wrong direction*; and therefore the expectation that he will accomplish the object of his humane mission *hopeless*. We leave him and his gallant followers with every good wish that the arduous service on which they are engaged may result in honour to themselves, but, for our part, we sincerely *believe them to be in the pursuit of a myth*. The western division, under the excellent-hearted Kellett, promises better; it is just possible that Franklin, shut out from the southward in the space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, may have attained large westing and attempted the north by one of the western passages between the Parry Islands: but then it implies that the cairns, &c., he erected have escaped the eyes of Austin's travelling parties; for we cannot conceive he departed from the known for the unknown without leaving records of his future intentions; it is too monstrous for conception. How much it is to be regretted that these Instructions do not include the examination of the *eastern side of Banks' Land, and the southern shores of Melville Sound, eastward to 103° W.*; but *this quarter was invested with all the horrors of embarrassment and destruction from the first, and was therefore tabooed*.

The question, then, Have we sought the Franklin Expedition in the right direction? we consider answered;—WE HAVE NOT. The task we have assigned ourselves is completed; but we shall continue to give notices of the various opinions and plans as they rise; and espe-

cially for the results of the "*last of the Arctic voyages*," a future age may inquire.

Lieut. W. H. Hooper, R.N., whose name we have already had occasion to notice as having done good Arctic service, again offered his services to the Admiralty (May 6th, 1852);* and submitted a plan, modified from the last (see *ante*, November 15, 1851): he says, "Dr. Rae, having made extensive progress in the quarter I then proposed to visit, I would suggest an alteration of my route, so that it may embrace the western side of Wollaston Land, upon which some traces might be found of Sir John Franklin's party, or of Capt. Collinson's ships." This plan is in the right direction.

We extract the following very remarkable passage from the "*Nautical Magazine*."† It occurs in one of the letters of that noble-hearted officer, Capt. Fitzjames, and first appeared in a paper called the *Leader*, in 1852.

"At dinner to-day (June 7th, 1845), Sir John gave us a pleasant account of his expectations of being able to get through the ice on the coast of America, and his disbelief in the idea that there is an open sea to the northward."

We do not quote the above extract from the "*Nautical Magazine*" without astonishment and shame, mingled with feelings of the deepest regret, that such an important document should have been permitted to remain so long in secret, unknown to the world. Had this record of the latest views and opinions of Sir John Franklin been made sooner known, what happy consequences might have followed! We should never have heard of the predilections and intentions ascribed to that great and good man; predilections and intentions wholly adverse to the plan of Sir John Barrow, his own Instructions, and his own recorded opinion in 1836 (see *ante*, p. 22),—in short, the mania in favour of the Wellington Channel, and the route by the north, would have been denuded of its chief support. It was but bare justice to Franklin's name, when motives were attributed to him so contrary to his real views and opinions, that this important letter should have been instantly made known to the public generally, and to the Admiralty particularly. We cannot believe a letter of Capt. Fitzjames's, and one of such consequence, bearing so much on the direction for after search, would have been unnoticed there, but the "*talent*" was "*hid in the earth*," and produced nothing! Who can say what might not have resulted by making these views and opinions of Franklin

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 77.

† See "*Nautical Magazine*, 1852," p. 160.

known? how much anxiety and suspense, suffering and distress, might have been prevented at home, and probably that terrible fate which we have all too much reason to dread has befallen the daring officers and crews of the *Erebus* and *Terror*. By its early publication the withdrawal of the energies of the searching squadrons from Cape Walker and the south-west to the always doubtful Wellington Channel and the north might have been prevented. On the contrary, renewed effort would, we doubt not, have been concentrated in and about that important space between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, to which Sir John Franklin was so specially directed, and the result might have been the restoration of our ill-fated countrymen to England and their desolate homes. The apathy, supineness, or ignorance, call it which we will, from whichever cause, is deeply and lastingly to be deplored. We have always considered it questionable whether Franklin ever attempted the northern route; and if he did, we have strenuously argued, *it was not by the Wellington Channel, but by one of the western passages of the Parry Group, eastward of Melville Island*; but there was no evidence to prove that he attempted the north at all; and as to the Wellington Channel, the evidence, though negative, was all against it. *But here we have written proof that he was not in favour of the northern route, but that of America, the direction of his Instructions.* After reading this letter of Capt. Fitzjames, recording Franklin's real views and opinions, of what value are the opinions of the advocates for the Wellington Channel, and the route by the north? that chivalrous, gallant officer's letter, dated January, 1845, wherein he says, "I am for going north, edging north-west (see *ante*, p. 66), was quoted and paraded on all occasions, in support of their Utopian notion, that Franklin had adopted the northern route by the Wellington Channel; it was even suggested that he himself would be influenced, regardless of the plan and his Instructions, by this opinion of Capt. Fitzjames. What now becomes of all their arguments by which they gave "to airy nothing a local habitation and a name"? Their chief support gone, their gossamer-web tissue of specious probabilities falls—vanishes into thin air: so much for the opinions for search by the "Wellington Channel, Jones's Sound, and the great Sound at the head of Baffin's Bay"! Again we say, these visions, visions now numbered with the dreams of the past, by drawing attention from the south-west (Melville Sound) to Wellington Channel and the north, distracted men's minds from the only true direction of search to a quarter having neither reason nor promise in its favour; in short, sought for the Franklin Expe-

dition in a *wrong and not in the right direction*. Hence we deplore their loss.

Dr. Rae, who had returned to England, suggested to the Admiralty, June 29th, 1852,* "the expediency of sending a Boat Expedition, *via* the Coppermine or the Mackenzie River, to examine the west coast of Wollaston and Banks' Lands; not," he says, "that there is any probability of finding traces of Sir John Franklin there, but because those lands, or part of them, lie in the direct route that was to be followed by Capts. Collinson and M'Clure in their progress eastward from Behring's Strait;" this suggestion is made to provide for the examination of those shores, in case Capt. Kellett should fail to reach Melville Island from the eastward. Dr. Rae, in concluding his letter, says, "As for myself, even were I considered worthy to be placed in command of the proposed expedition, I could not accept the charge, as I am already appointed to a similar service in another direction." This suggestion would probably never have been called for, if Melville Sound had been rigidly searched in the first instance; but it was now necessary, not only in case of the failure of Capt. Kellett to reach Melville Island, but also to communicate with and relieve Capt. Collinson's Expedition, if it should be required. We perceive Dr. Rae is appointed to a similar service, but in what direction he does not state. We have no doubt, wherever employed, it will be well carried out by that intelligent, persevering traveller.

The private schooner *Isabel* has already been noticed as having been purchased by Lady Franklin for the Expedition proposed by Capt. Beaton *via* Behring's Straits. That Expedition having from some cause been abandoned, she was offered to the Admiralty as a gift; conditionally that she should be sent upon the service for which she was equipped. The Admiralty having declined the offer, Lady Franklin offered the *Isabel* to Commander E. A. Inglesfield, "on condition that" he "should carry her by whatever route may appear most likely to obtain information of the missing Expedition." † These conditions that gentleman accepted. We ought to add here, Commander Inglesfield had already volunteered six times for Arctic service; ‡ "and being one," he says, "of that numerous party who consider that Franklin is to be found, or, at all events, to be followed

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 72.

† *Ibid.*, p. 33.

‡ See Introduction to "A Summer Search for Sir John Franklin," by Commander E. A. Inglesfield, R.N., pp. viii. to xix.

by the same path he had pursued, this was too tempting an opportunity to be lost." After alluding to Sir Edward Belcher's squadron, then out, and the impossibility of his making a tour in the direction of "Smith's and Jones's Sounds—albeit a part considered by many well worthy of inquiry, as being one to which it was well known (?) Sir John Franklin's attention had been sometimes directed,"—he says, "The west coast of Baffin's Bay also appeared to me to deserve more serious attention; for though we may reject the story of the mate of the *Itenovation* as to the character of the vessels seen on the travelling iceberg, still it is a part of the bay where Franklin might have met with an accident on his homeward voyage." Commander Inglefield thus lays down his route:—"My first object was to endeavour to reach Whale, Smith's, and Jones's Sounds; . . . and having examined those sounds, bays, inlets, or whatever they may turn out to be, . . . I would then proceed down the western side of Baffin's Bay, exploring the shores as far south as Labrador. . . . If obliged to winter, . . . to the northward of Lancaster Sound, I hope, during the spring, to be enabled to communicate with the Government squadron, as well as to make a careful search and general survey of all the deep inlets of Baffin's Bay. And this, should I be unsuccessful in the great objects of my undertaking, would enable me to add largely to our geographic knowledge of that region, and to set at rest for ever the much- vexed question of the entrance into the Great Polar Basin through the so-called Smith's Sound."

Under any other circumstances than the search for Franklin, we should have gladly hailed the chivalrous commander who would have undertaken such an interesting voyage on his own account; but as it offers, to our humble view, not a chance of rescuing the missing Expedition, we cannot but regret that the daring and energy of such an officer as Commander Inglefield should be thus thrown away in a wholly wrong direction. The sounds indicated by him have no place in Franklin's Instructions, and have only become invested with interest in proportion as Wellington Channel and the Polar Sea have swelled into importance; but, as we have said again and again, where are the proofs that Franklin ever attempted the north at all? We say thus much regarding the chances of search for Franklin by the sounds of Baffin's Bay; but, viewed in a geographic sense, we cannot but express how much we admire the *daring* and *intrepidity* that would attempt to lay down those extensive, remote, and desolate shores, that baffled even a Baffin (1616). We could not but wish Commander Inglefield success. Embarked in the *Isabel* was the talented

Dr. Sutherland,* already known for his scientific tastes: Messrs. Abernethy and Manson, all well known in "Arctic circles;" two other chosen officers and an excellent crew. The *Isabel* sailed from Woolwich July 4th, 1852.

Commander Henry Trollope, R.N., September 30th, 1852,† offered his services to the Admiralty:—"Should any further search or assistance be intended to be rendered to Captain Collinson's Expedition in Behring's Strait," and "should it be considered practicable to send a steam-vessel by the channel between Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla, a project which, from Mr. Petermann's data," he says, "I cannot but look upon as being more likely to succeed than any other route hitherto traversed, I should be gratified beyond measure by being employed in that direction." Commander Trollope then cites "Barentz, in the sixteenth century, some whalers in 1750, Sir Edward Parry and Baron Wrangell,—all seem," he adds, "to point to this route as being both practicable and desirable." This officer "was with Captain Kellett during three voyages to Behring's Strait." It is a great pleasure to observe that England never wants for experienced officers, however perilous the service. We have already noticed the plan of Mr. Petermann's, and, however we might desire to see its practicability tested, still we consider the lives of one hundred and thirty-five men too valuable to be risked on the chance of its succeeding. Again, it is doubtful whether the Franklin Expedition ever adopted a route by the north for the completion of the passage.

Information was now received of the safe arrival of Lady Franklin's vessel, the *Prince Albert*, at Aberdeen. Mr. William Kennedy, the commander, in a letter to the Admiralty (October 9th, 1852), reports, "The *Prince Albert* wintered at Batty Bay, Prince Regent's Inlet." It will be recollected (see *ante*, p. 175), the object of this voyage was the examination of that inlet, and the passages (if any) communicating with the western sea south-west of Cape Walker, the direction in which Franklin was ordered (then a blank on our charts); for all that had been done in that direction (although six years had elapsed) was merely the examination of the northern and western shores of North Somerset to lat. 72° 38' N., by Sir James Ross. It was known that Austin and Omunney, Penny and De Haven, were working to the north and west of them, but of their movements they knew nothing. On March 20th, 1852, Mr. Kennedy, Lieut. Bellot, of the French

* Already noticed as the author of "The Journal of Captain Penny's Voyage, 1850-51."

† See Parliamentary Paper, No. 82, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 71.

Navy, and party, proceeded on their extended journey. At "Brentford Bay, . . . here we," says Mr. Kennedy,* "found an opening running in a general course of about south-west and north-east, of about fifteen miles, to Cape Bird. On attaining Cape Bird, crossed a bay of some twenty-five miles in width, when we struck a low-lying beach, and pursued our course on it over gentle undulations in a direction due west, to the estimated distance of long. 100' W. On the third day we got on flat table land, until the latitude of 73° N., when we turned east, struck the inlet west of North Somerset. Our course was now generally along the sea coast, until we reached Cape Walker, when our provisions compelled us to retreat to the ship round North Somerset and Leopold Harbour. . . Mr. Cowie, the medical officer, searched the bottom of Creswell Bay, to see if any passage existed there, but found none. . . We have found no record or trace of the Franklin Expedition." The results of this Expedition are indistinctly given; but the opening or channel and bay here indicated are so important, involving one route said to have been taken by Franklin, that we must refer to the more detailed account of it; and this we have in Mr. Kennedy's Report to Lady Franklin (dated October 10th, 1852); † he there enters more fully on the subject of the strait or straits discovered by himself and Lieut. Bellot:—"April 6th being devoted to the examination of the western shore of Brentford Bay, was the day not only of our coming on new ground, but of the discovery of a passage leading to the western sea. On the previous evening, while marching westward, and after rounding the southern extremity of Brown's Island, it gave intimation of its existence by an unusual and dense mass of vapour which then conceded the channel, and out of which it was issuing. On approaching the locality on this day, the vapour was found to arise from an open space of water at the western entrance of the passage, extending about a mile in length, and having a width equal to the channel itself, which might be about two miles. Its current was variously estimated at from four to six miles an hour; whilst the fact of its bearing on its surface heavy masses of ice of at least three feet in height above the level of the water, gave undeniable evidence of its depth. These masses of ice, at different states of the tide, were noticed going north-east on one side of the channel, before a strong south-west wind, and in mid-channel, as well as on the opposite shore, forcing their way against it at the same rapid rate. . . Some four or five miles to the

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, p. 26.

† *Ibid.*, p. 30.

west of this, a second open space of water presented itself. It was not of the same extent as the first, but seemed, like it, to be kept open from its being forced through the most contracted parts of the channel, such contractions being greatest at both these open points. The most commanding view that could be obtained of the channel along the south shore, was from the summit of a lofty hill (one of a chain), midway between the extremities, whence it was seen running its entire extent in a south-west and north-east direction for about twelve miles, when it united with the western sea, somewhat to the south as well as east of Cape Bird; thus presenting a connecting link between that sea and Regent Inlet. To the east, Regent Inlet could be indistinctly seen over the islands in Brentford Bay, through the light haze that was suspended over it; whilst to the west, where no such curtain existed, we saw with equal clearness sea and land, the former having an apparent width of about thirty miles, running north and south; and the latter, seemingly, united further north with the land on which we stood, and stretching southward until it was either lost in the distance, or obscured by the haze over which the sun was suspended. . . . It is probable that this is but one of other channels in the neighbourhood leading to the west,—at least I was led to this supposition from seeing several narrow lanes of ice running among the hills from the west to the east, though they could not be traced continuously on account of the intervening elevations. This opinion was strengthened when, on returning to our camp, I found M. Bellot had also discovered a narrow channel leading to the west.

“On the 7th, having decided on following the northern channel, we set out from Brentford Bay, and reaching the extreme west point of the passage by the end of the day, were not a little disappointed at finding the sea before us, which we had hoped might, perhaps, prove continuous with the opening between Cape Walker and Cape Bunny, terminated apparently in a bay on our north. This led us to doubt our estimated distance, and (not having the power of determining our position astronomically) whether we had not mistaken a prolongation of Brentford Bay for this new sea. It was not until the evening of the 10th (after camping on the 8th and 9th, in succession, on the floe, before we succeeded in reaching the western land), that we were assured of our discovery. We had, in fact, come out at the northern extremity of the Victoria Strait of Rae, and our western land proves to be the Prince of Wales’ Land of Ommaney.” The party continued to travel west until they had reached somewhere about 100° W., “when feeling assured . . . that the very low-lying land over which

we had passed . . . must have been mistaken by Sir James Ross for a western sea; we resolved to walk up to Cape Walker, as well to ascertain whether any channel existed between us and it, by which Sir John Franklin could have been led into the field assigned for our search, as to find out whether he had left any intelligence there." They then directed their course "due north, when a succession of loftier hills than any" they "had yet seen on this new land, induced" them "to turn eastward," until they reached "the western shore of . . . Peel Inlet, about 73° N.;" they ascended by its western side to Cape Walker (without discovering Oummauy's cairn), and then bent their steps to Whaler Point, and on to the vessels at Batty Bay. Even this report does not satisfy us. The question at issue is, *Is Peel's Sound closed at the bottom or not?* Because in its solution are involved many weighty inferences, even the probable position of the Franklin Expedition itself, hence we feel it imperative to avail ourselves of all the information existing. Neither of the communications before quoted are over clear in their description of what was really seen. We shall therefore refer to Mr. Kennedy's "short narrative" of this voyage,* and also to the "journal" kept by Lieut. J. René Bellot, of the French Navy,† who was the companion of Mr. Kennedy at the time. Mr. Kennedy says: ‡—

"April 5th.—Shortly afterwards, we arrived at a rising ground, from which Brentford Bay, with its numerous islands, could be distinctly seen and recognized, from Sir John Ross's description. About three o'clock p.m. we came to the entrance of the bay; and, on rounding the north point, struck for a conspicuous island a few miles within the entrance (Brown's Island of Sir John Ross), beyond which a dense column of vapour was issuing, apparently from some open channel of water. Camped on the north side of the island at six o'clock, p.m.

"6th. The remainder of the day was devoted to the examination of Brentford Bay in two parties, M. Bellot and John Smith going southward, and Adamson and myself northward, in the direction of the column of vapour observed yesterday. On coming up to it, we

* See "A Short Narrative of the Second Voyage of the *Prince Albert*, in search of Sir John Franklin," by William Kennedy. Dalton, 1853.

† See "Journal d'un Voyage aux Mers Polaires, exécuté à la Recherche de Sir John Franklin, en 1851 et 1852," par J. R. Bellot (Paris, Perrotin, 1854); also, "Memoirs of Lieut. J. R. Bellot, with his Voyage in the Polar Seas in Search of Sir John Franklin," 2 vols., Hurst and Blackett, 1855.

‡ See "A Short Narrative of the Second Voyage of the *Prince Albert*," p. 130.

found it to issue from a space of water, extending for upwards of a mile in length, along a channel leading westward, that might have an average breadth of about two miles. About four miles further up, a second piece of water was discovered, with pieces of loose ice floating through it, carried up and down by the tide. From a high hill in the neighbourhood, I could plainly distinguish *a sea stretching westward to an estimated distance of about thirty miles*, with the channel through which we had come so far apparently *leading into it*. Other passages, or what seemed to be passages, we also observed running amongst the hills to the southward, but I was unable to trace their connection, . . . whether they were in reality channels or inlets. On arriving at the encampment, we found M. Bellot and John Smith returned, who reported having likewise discovered a passage leading westward.

"7th. Started early, and took the northern channel, . . . and continued along it until six p.m., when we reached its western extremity, a distance of not less than twenty miles, including its various windings. From a high hill near our encampment at this spot, we observed *a broad channel running north-north-east and south-south-west*, true (variation, 140°), which was at first taken for a continuation of Brentford Bay, until its great extent convinced us that we had fallen upon *a western sea or channel*, and that the passage we had just gone through was in reality *a strait leading out of Prince Regent's Inlet* (named Bellot's Strait). The western sea, into which the channel opens, we have ascertained since our return to be the *northern extremity of Victoria Strait*, partially explored by Dr. Rae from another direction. The hill on which we stood was probably a portion of the high land seen from Sir James Ross's farthest in 1849, and retains, therefore, the name of Cape Bird, given to it by that distinguished officer. . . . On the south side of the entrance of the channel is another conspicuous headland, to which I gave the name of Cape Hodgkin. . . . Having satisfied ourselves that we were now upon the west side of North Somerset, it became a question *how far the sea or channel before us might prove continuous with the opening laid down on the chart between Cape Walker and Cape Bunny*. . . . We had arrived at a point where . . . the future direction of our route must be regulated by the appearance the western sea might present. *If such as to afford a prospect of Franklin's having passed through to the south, our proper course would have been south also; but on examining the coast line to the northward, nothing could be seen but a continuous barrier of land, extending from North Somer-*

set to an extensive land which we could distinguish on the other side of the channel (ascertained since to be the Prince of Wales' Land of Ommaney). Having made it a rule to lay nothing down on our chart as land which had not been actually travelled over, the connection between North Somerset and Prince of Wales' Land does not appear on our map, in which the conspicuous headlands only have been inserted; but that a connection does exist, or if it be broken by any passage or passages out of Peel's Sound, that such passages are not navigable, we had no doubt, and accordingly had no alternative but to proceed westward, with the view of ascertaining whether any more promising channel existed farther west, through which Franklin might have penetrated from Cape Walker.

"8th. We struck due west across the channel, but, owing to the rough ice, made very slow progress, and did not reach the opposite side until the 10th, after camping on the 8th and 9th on the floe. We had not been able, owing to the thickness of the weather, to make any extensive examination of the channel over which we had passed; but from the rough ice on each side appearing as if lodged by the tide, we inferred the existence of a current running north and south. Whether this current is derived from Prince Regent's Inlet through Bellot Strait, or from the inlet between Cape Walker and Cape Bunny, through any passage or passages that may lead out of it, is a question of which we had no means of obtaining a satisfactory solution.

"10th. About noon we reached the west side of the channel, and found the land so low, as scarcely to be distinguished from the floe we had been travelling over the last two days.

"21st. We had reached a little beyond the 100° W. without any indications of approaching the sea. Being now satisfied that Sir James Ross had . . . mistaken the very low and level land . . . for a western sea, I felt no longer justified in continuing a westerly course.* . . I determined to direct our course northward."

Thus far Mr. Kennedy's narrative. It will be seen at one time he speaks positively of a continuous barrier of land uniting the western coast of North Somerset with the eastern coast of Prince of Wales' land, thereby showing the northern limits of the Victoria Strait of Rae, and that it does not communicate with Peel's Sound to the north, and, as a consequence, that Franklin could not have passed down that sound with the hope of getting to the south and west.

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition," 1850, p. 62.

Still, because he did not travel over this land, he seems to doubt, and does not give it a place on his map; and *yet so strong are his convictions* that no *navigable passage* exists, that he alters the *course of the Expedition entrusted to his charge from the south to the west*. At this time we had much questioned the connection or the continuation of a passage between Peel's Sound and Victoria Strait; we thought Lieut. Browne's report and (under Ommaney) observations threw a *doubt* upon it; but now, *joined by Mr. Kennedy's report*, we considered it conclusive; not that we ever thought that *Franklin passed down it, even if open*, but for other reasons, which will appear hereafter. We will now refer to Lieut. Bellet's journal. This gallant young officer (amiable and truthful as he was gallant) possessed considerable scientific acquirements, and had charge of the astronomical instruments, and, moreover, "kept a journal, which he wrote up every evening, and therefore on the spot."*

"7th April.† We set out on the route taken by Mr. Kennedy yesterday, and we find on our way, besides the principal piece of water, two smaller ones. . . . At noon we reached an inlet *perpendicular to the general direction we have hither followed*. . . . Going southward along the inlet, the general direction of which is from north-north-east to south-south-west, we came upon several tracks of foxes and bears. . . . At six o'clock we encamp at the southern extremity of the western margin.

"8th. We make for the north-west part of the bay, where we think we see an opening, but after toiling for twelve miles (to N.W. $\frac{1}{2}$ W.), over very uneven ice, we descry land at the *bottom of the opening*, and so find it *closed before us*. Capt. Kennedy attributes the rough state of the ice to a current, which exists in a passage to the sea on the west; but why should it not be a current all round the bay? I am not fond of launching out in conjectures on geographical matters, and I believe only what I see, though, after all, his hypothesis is possible, only hitherto we can derive nothing.

"9th. We now shape our course a little more southerly (west-north-west), and towards another opening. The land appears continuous to the north. . . . After five miles we halt at noon on a sort of reef, near which the latitude observed is $71^{\circ} 58'$, and we march another six miles over the same sort of ice, which makes our progress

* "Memoirs of Lieut. Joseph René Bellet, 1855," English translation of "Journal d'un Voyage aux Mers Polaires, exécuté à la Recherche de Sir John Franklin, en 1851 et 1852." Paris, 1854.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii., pp. 177—185.

very slow. . . . At sunset we see land once more at the bottom of the opening towards which we are marching. We resolve to persist in the same direction, otherwise we might range the whole outline of the bay without finding the passage we are in search of. . . . I observe, too, that we are much more to the west than the coast marked on the chart at the bottom of the bay. . . . We halt at noon to take the latitude ($72^{\circ} 3'$), in a very disagreeable mist, which hides the ground over which we are walking, and which we imagined to be still far off, when, to our great surprise, and after only a few minutes' walking, we find ourselves on the beach. We bear away a little to the south to enter the inlet we had in sight yesterday, but the breeze and the drift increase, . . . that we are forced to halt.

"12th. We traverse the little bay we entered on the 10th, after a course of about three miles to the west; and after ascending a very gentle slope we reached ground uniformly flat; a hillock to the south is the only object that breaks the level. . . . Weather snowy and cloudy; we cannot see very far, but we advance with pleasure, reckoning that to-morrow we shall see the coast of that western sea, towards which we have been plodding longer than we expected." They persist in a westerly direction.

"20th and 21st.* It seems to us absolutely impossible to reach the west coast. . . . The distance we have traversed westward, which I have always computed at the lowest rate, places us more than four degrees from Brown's Islands. . . . In any case, it is evident that the sea, to the west of Somerset Land, is closed to the north of Cape Bird, and that the best way is to make straight for the north, where we must, soon or late, come upon the coast. Hitherto I hoped that Sir James Ross was right in his conjectures, but there can be no doubt now that he was mistaken.† . . . He examined the country: 'The clearness of the day,' he says, 'was remarkably favourable; and the whole land, being very elevated, could be seen to a distance of a hundred miles.' Now the lands we have passed over are so flat that we often took them for the sea itself, and could only give up that idea when we had ocular proof to the contrary. . . . The islands he marks on the map, a little to the north of us, would, in that case, be the several hills we have seen, or high lands, still more to the north, which we could not distinguish." Capt. Kennedy now consulted M. Bellot and the whole party, "whether, 1st, to continue a western course for one day more; 2nd, to retrace to Brentford Bay, . . .

* "Memoirs of Lieut. J. René Bellot," English translation, vol. ii., pp. 195-7.

† See Blue Books, No. 107, "Arctic Expedition, 1850," p. 62.

and to proceed overland to the magnetic pole, or to Cape Elizabeth ; 3rd, to make for Cape Walker." The first proposition was adopted. Bellot then says, "As Capt. Kennedy asks us all for our opinions, I took the opportunity, this evening, fully to explain mine ; which would be, move north-east in the hope of meeting the sea as soon as possible. Capt. Kennedy desires to get north, that we remain on land, and on snow, which is less dangerous to the sledges. . . To this I reply, that if Sir John Franklin's Expedition penetrated to the bottom of this *cul de sac*, we shall find traces of its passage on the coast, and not in the interior.

"9th June.* To my surprise, Capt. Kennedy this day communicates to me an idea which must have sprung up in his mind the last few days ; namely, that we crossed Brentford Bay the very day we thought we encamped at its entrance and on the north coast ; that is to say, that we encamped at the bottom of the bay, crossed next day the narrow isthmus which divides Somerset and Boothia Felix, and that the sea traversed by us on the 8th and 9th of April is the sea of Sir James Ross, to the west. . . Looking over the entries in my journal from the 6th to the 9th of April, I see that the lands extended all round us ; to the north, west, and south they were low, and were seen a very long way. Hence, admitting that we crossed Brentford Bay on the 5th, one thing still remains unexplained, viz., the land to the north ; that is to say, connecting Somerset with the western lands. Capt. Kennedy forgets this, and declares—1st, That Somerset is an island ; 2nd, That there is a passage between Regent's Inlet and the western sea ; 3rd, That the sea runs without interruption from Cape Walker, or Somerset Island, to the magnetic pole. I do not think I can subscribe to this last proposition ; and, as to the two others, I can only affirm them as probabilities. This does not satisfy him ; but I am fully resolved, happen what may, never to support, by my assent, what I am not sure of. We differ also, as to some details ; for the route traversed on the 6th, which I believe to have been on two lines of an angle, he now affirms to have been in a right line, but westward instead of south-south-west and west-north-west, as the compass showed me. He trusts to his memory for hours, directions, distances, and the various details of a journey ; and is not pleased that I will admit nothing on the authority of his memory, or my own, after a lapse of two months ; and that, for the details of this nature, I prefer relying on the journal I kept regularly,

* "Memoirs of Lieut. J. René Bellot," English translation, vol. ii., p. 268.

and wrote up every evening."* Very fortunately for me, there are unanswerable proofs, that, at all events he waited rather long before he changed his opinion; and of these proofs the best are—1st, That we moved westward when we ought to have gone south, had he believed at that time that this was possible; 2nd, The name of Grinnell (Peel's Sound?) Inlet, which shows the persuasion he was under, up to Cape Walker, and further, that the passage was closed; 3rd, The notice he left at Port Leopold. What confirms me in my opinion is the report of the Doctor, whose plain, so wide in both directions, north and south, east and west, is, according to Capt. Kennedy himself, the sea, and was bounded by the lands I saw to the north. These circumstances make me very unhappy, because Capt. Kennedy does not understand to what a degree I am bound to be scrupulously accurate in these matters, at the risk, and I may truly say at the cost, of my peace and quiet."

This gallant young officer seems to have felt very keenly these changes of opinion:—"I unfortunately consented to make some indispensable observations; and people will naturally consider me as having had charge of these observations, imagining that I was appointed to that duty.† . . . There is no reckoning on the pocket chronometer we had with us; consequently, our longitudes can only be estimated; otherwise there would have been an arbitrator between our differences of opinion." Their chronometer was allowed to stop at Fury Beach; their artificial horizon was accidentally broken; and their compasses *slept*, from their near vicinity to the magnetic pole. No wonder, then, that he says, "Our labour has produced no results." Happily there is no one, however he may regret the paucity of determined positions, but will at once acquit this active, talented young officer. Continually does he regret the want of necessary instruments for this purpose. Poor fellow! he was fully aware of the necessity of verifying observations, to sustain the facts that came before their eyes, so easily deceived in this region, and that they would be expected from him, although it was said, "*We are not here to make scientific observations, but researches.*" Here we would ask, But for the sound observations made by this intelligent young man, of what value would have been the results of this voyage? Let those who read the journals of Mr. Kennedy and Lieut. Bellot judge. However,

* It is said this difference of opinion did not continue; but we cannot see how it could be reconciled with Mr. Kennedy's Report from memory: we must give our faith to M. Bellot's daily written journal.

† "Memoirs of Lieut. J. René Bellot," English translation, vol. ii., p. 272.

we can arrive *only at one conclusion*, founded on the united testimony of both Kennedy and Bellot, given on the spot, but more firmly determined by Lieut. Bellot, which is, *that the Victoria Strait of Dr. Rae is closed to the north by continuous land, extending from Cape Bird round by the north to the west, and joining the Prince of Wales' Land of Capt. Ommaney, and therefore has no communication with Peel's Sound.* Other considerations—the absence of tidal marks, &c., go to corroborate this conclusion. As we have said before, this question involves other and very important considerations, regarding the movements, probable position, and the disavement of the mystery hanging over the fate of the Franklin Expedition; but to this subject we shall have occasion to advert again at a future time.

Intelligence was received, by the *Prince Albert*, from the Expedition under Sir Edward Belcher. All the ships had arrived safely at Beechey Island on the 10th and 11th of August, 1852. Having a favourable season, with open water, Sir Edward, in the *Assistance*, accompanied by the *Pioneer*, Commander S. Osborn, proceeded up Wellington Channel on the 14th of August. Captain Kellett, in the *Resolute*, with the *Intrepid*, Commander M'Clintock, sailed in the direction of Melville Island on the 15th; and Dr. M'Cormick, in command of a boat party, proceeded up Wellington Channel, to examine Baring Bay, &c., on the 19th of August.

Captain Erasmus Ommaney, R.N., already so well known for the admirable manner in which he conducted Captain Austin's south-west division from Cape Walker, now (25th October, 1852)* submitted a proposition to his Grace the Duke of Northumberland, the object of which was "to undertake an Expedition for the purpose of reaching the North Pole from Spitzbergen." Captain Ommaney says: "To explore the North Pole appears to be an object which this country is bound in honour to prosecute, and should be undertaken before other nations make the attempt to accomplish it." He then proceeds to give the facts known, and his reasons for thinking it practicable. Referring to the route proposed, "between Nova Zembla and Spitzbergen," he says, "This direction might also be explored by the same Expedition, in the event of the travelling parties meeting with the same obstacle which Parry encountered, though I am of opinion that during the early part of the year the Polar ice is not in motion." This plan has a purely scientific object, and makes no reference to the long missing Franklin Expedition; but the views it gives are collaterally valuable, as affording data for the

* See Parliamentary Paper, No. 82, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 74.

consideration of the soundness and practicability of other plans in this direction. How much it is to be regretted that the efforts of this excellent officer were not prolonged in the direction of Melville Sound, so that its entire examination might have been completed, and the question for ever set at rest whether Franklin had succeeded in getting down that sound or not. We feel assured Captain Ommaney would have been richly rewarded: Melville Sound will yet reveal to some daring explorer the secret that still hangs over the fate of that noble band embarked in the *Erebus* and *Terror*.

November 4th, 1852.*—The *Isabel*, under Commander Inglefield, R.N., arrived at Stromness, having been only four months away from England, but in this brief period she had performed a voyage unprecedented since the time of Parry. Happily, it is not length of time that is always required to win a name; in the case before us Commander Inglefield "won his spurs" in four months. During this time he had examined Wolstenholme Sound, the Omenak of the base Adam Beck! and Whale Sound. In this sound he discovered two extensive inlets, running north and north-eastward, which he named after Sir R. I. Murchison and Sir Francis Beaufort. He then pushed on to Smith's Sound, and reached lat. $78^{\circ} 35' N.$; here he was driven back by a gale. He now returned to the southward; and, having followed the western shore of Baffin's Bay, he passed through Glacier Strait into Jones's Sound, reached long. $84^{\circ} W.$; when, thick weather having again set in, he returned, by Lady Ann Strait, to Baffin's Bay. He then ascended Lancaster Sound, reached Beechey Island, communicated with the *North Star*, the depôt-ship there, and again returned and proceeded down the west side of Baffin's Bay, reached lat. $69^{\circ} 41' N.$, when bad weather, and the lateness of the season, compelled him to return to England. During this extended examination (which includes the discovery of 600 miles of new coast) not the slightest trace of the Franklin Expedition was detected. This was no matter for surprise; amongst others, we ourselves never thought it at all probable that the missing Expedition would be found in this direction, and we could only lament that the energy and daring enterprise exhibited by this energetic, diligent officer should thus fruitlessly be thrown away. The humane object of the voyage was altogether unsuccessful, but science, especially geography, was largely enriched; well did Commander Inglefield bear in mind the words

* Parliamentary Paper, No. 82, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 35; see also, "Report on the Return of the *Isabel* from the Arctic Regions," "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. xxiii., p. 136, *et seq.*

addressed to him by that good old man, and talented hydrographer, Sir Francis Beaufort, "Remember, from the Carey Islands to the northward, all is new, as well as the interior of Jones's Sound."

After the foregoing sketch of Commander Inglesfield's brilliant trip, or "A Summer Search,"* as he unassumingly calls it, it is no great wonder that the Royal Geographical Society should hasten to recognize his merits. A joint letter was addressed, December 12th, 1852,† to his Grace the Duke of Northumberland, signed by its President, Sir B. I. Murchison, and the Earl of Ellesmere, one of the vice-presidents, in which, after enumerating the important services rendered to geography by this distinguished officer, they strongly recommend him for reward. The Royal Geographical Society subsequently awarded to Commander Inglesfield their gold "Victoria Medal." The hydrographer, Sir Francis Beaufort, making a Report of this important Arctic voyage,‡ concludes it in these words, "All this has been performed in four months, and all accomplished without the drawback of a single accident; every obstacle has been overcome by his persevering energy, and every vain temptation resisted by his singleness of purpose; altogether forming, in my estimation, one of the most extraordinary voyages on record." The Admiralty, too, in a letter, December 20th, 1852,§ to Commander Inglesfield, "acknowledge with satisfaction the enterprise and energy . . . displayed in" his "late research. . . Your endeavours to discover traces of the missing Expedition have not been rewarded with success," but "they do credit to yourself," &c.

We remarked one observation in the letter to his Grace the Duke of Northumberland that surprised us at the time. Alluding to Commander Inglesfield's services it says, "He has obtained entirely new data respecting Smith's Sound, which go far to settle the belief, that Franklin must have taken the route by Wellington Channel." We note this only to show how the all-powerful influence of the Wellington Channel mania prevailed at this time; and to what a confused state the so-called Arctic authorities had reduced the question of search; even the most scientific and the most talented of shore-going folks were drawn aside and into error. Bewitching, but fatal, was the Polynia of Wrangell; at this period, it attracted and absorbed all thought. Rushing, torrent-like, to the north, it overwhelmed and

* "A Summer Search for Sir John Franklin, with a Peep into the Polar Basin," by Commander E. A. Inglesfield, R.N.

† Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, "Arctic Expeditions, 1852," p. 40.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

Ibid., p. 41.

carried all before it. We never could comprehend why it should be thought that Franklin passed up the Wellington Channel, for sound reasons there were none † it ever appeared to us a delusion; and the more extraordinary, for, at this very time, when men's minds were absorbed wholly by it, it really was extremely doubtful whether *he had attempted a northern route at all*. The results of Austin's travelling parties to the westward, and of Penny's up Wellington Channel, and now Commander Inglefield's search of the sounds in, and especially the "Great Sound at the end of Ballin's Bay," all went to prove that he had not. All search by the north we consider *in a doubtful direction, and that by the Wellington Channel altogether in a wrong one*.

Mr. W. Penny (4th November, 1852)* again offered his services to the Admiralty. He suggests two plans of search, one by the way of Behring's Strait, "to take the Asiatic shore along until they pass through that strait formed by Cape Yakan and that land seen by Wrangell and H.M.S. *Herald*," and entering the Polar Basin. "*An extensive, open sea (he says), and comparatively free from ice, does exist, even to the Pole itself.* . . . Who knows but, on some lone island in that trackless ocean, a remnant of the missing voyagers are looking to their country for aid?" The other is "by the Nova Zembla route. . . . The valuable facts brought to bear upon this route by the talented geographer, Mr. Petermann, must satisfy all unbiassed minds of the practicability of the passage." Mr. Penny states, "It is my conviction that the searching squadrons will meet at the islands of New Siberia, and accomplish all this great search, in one season." Humane, ardent, and confident, Mr. Penny urges his plans—not always wisely; still they have a national spirit. We cannot help admiring him, even in his wildness. Still, we must remark on both plans, they are too theoretical to obtain our confidence. Prove to us that Franklin and his gallant followers were altogether shut out from all advance to the south and west, between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, and that they adopted a route by the north for the accomplishment of the great object of the voyage, then we can look upon these theories with somewhat unbiassed minds, but not until then: *the true direction of search is Melville Sound—its claim does not rest on theory*.

Lieut. W. H. Hooper, R.N. (15th November, 1852),† renewed the

* See Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, "Arctic Expedition, 1852," p. 76.

† *Ibid.*, p. 77.

offer of his valuable services to the Admiralty, "to be employed in the manner mentioned" in his letter, 6th May, 1852, "or to proceed by the Mackenzie towards Banks' Land, . . . either of which the possible existence of a vast continent, part of which may lie in Franklin's supposed route, in the unexplored portions of the Polar regions, may render of high importance." Should a steamer be despatched up Behring's Strait for the "relief of Franklin's, Collinson's, or Belcher's ships," Lieut. Hooper offers to conduct her there.

The above allusion to a "vast continent" to the north of America, had its origin in the discoveries, to the north of Behring's Strait, said to have been made by that excellent officer, Capt. Kellett. Various opinions were formed as to its extent; its western limit was assigned to that land said to have been seen by the natives from Cape Yakan or Jukan. How far it extended to the northward was unknown. Its eastern limit was equally so; but it was conjectured by Lieut. Hooper to extend to, and be continuous with, *Wollaston Land*.* This is the continent to which that gentleman refers. Whether the Franklin Expedition was to the north or south of it was another point, upon which imagination revelled. The general opinion was that he was to the north, and had gained, by the Wellington Channel route, large westing along its northern limit. It is unnecessary here to repeat our opinions on the Wellington Channel and the northern route; let it be sufficient to say, *not a particle of evidence existed to prove either*.

A letter was received at the Admiralty, dated Ottersberg, near Bremen, 22nd November, 1852, from Mr. W. H. der Griesbach.† It seems the Spitzbergen vessels had returned to Tromsøe, Finmark, and had brought with them a great many deer skins, having cuts or slits in their ears. As this was unusual, it was suggested that, in the same manner as Sir James Ross had caused a number of foxes to be taken alive, and afterwards turned adrift with brass collars round their necks, bearing information where relief might be obtained, with the hope that some of them might be caught or shot by the missing Expedition, so it was thought that Franklin might have adopted similar means, "making the local animals (deer) the vehicle of communication . . . to the world without, that within the dreary . . .

* See the Map appended to "Ten Months in the Tents of the Tucki," by Lieut. Hooper.

† See Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, "Arctic Expeditions, 1852," p. 87.

fastnesses of Spitzbergen there existed men in possession of knives, and endowed with sufficient intelligence to catch or entrap the wildest animals of the region involuntarily inhabited by them alive, and then, trusting to Providence for the result, turning them loose in hope. . . . Again," says the writer, "who shall say that Sir John Franklin, or one of his party, may not actually have caught or shot one of the foxes before alluded to, and thus have arrived at the very idea of making the animal creation a means of notice of their existence *within to the world without?*" We notice this letter to show the wide-world interest the prolonged absence of our unfortunate countrymen, and the extraordinary efforts made by England for their recovery, had created. Every circumstance, however trifling, which could be supposed to emanate from the north, became invested with importance, and linked to the all-absorbing subject. This solicitude was felt from the shores of the Scheldt to North Cape, and from North Cape to the Strait of Behring; but joined to this noble feeling was much wildness of thought as to the probable course and position of the unfortunate Franklin and his companions; hence, however well meant, the feeling, *by its very intensity, often contributed to render confusion more confounded.*

CHAPTER XII.

PETERMANN'S REVISED PLAN — OBSERVATIONS THEREON — BEHRING'S STRAIT SQUADRON—CLOSE OF YEAR 1852.

MR. AUGUSTUS PETERMANN, whose plan of search we have already given (see p. 240), now addressed another communication to the Admiralty, November 29th, 1852,* the results, he says, of more recent and extended researches, and accumulated knowledge. This paper was read before the Royal Geographical Society, November 8th, Sir R. I. Murchison, President. It is entitled, "Sir John Franklin, the Navigableness of the Spitzbergen Sea, and the Whale Fisheries in the Arctic Regions." It will be seen from the title, that this paper, besides the plan of search, embraces other subjects, not within the range of our inquiry. Indeed, the author's object is to show "the advantages which would be *likely* to accrue in commercial and geographical regards, should an Expedition on his plan be decided on." Mr. Petermann, alluding to his former plan, says, "*it was based on the supposition that Franklin had passed up Wellington Channel; and as this supposition has been strongly confirmed by the intelligence recently brought home by Mr. Kennedy, my plan has become of a more direct bearing on the subject.*" He then takes "a general glance of the subject of the missing Expedition, as it stands at present;" and says, "Sir Edward Belcher has been so fortunate . . . as to find an unusually open season, which has allowed him to sail up Wellington Channel. . . The search on the track of the missing vessels *may be considered to have now actually commenced.* . . The fact that no news has reached us from the *Investigator*, . . Capt. M'Clure, for the last two years, seems to suggest that that navigator has not been successful in the region between Behring's Strait and Banks' Land, and my opinion that Sir John Franklin would be found on the Asiatic side of the Polar Regions, seems to become more and more probable. I take it, then, for granted, that Sir John Franklin has been arrested somewhere *opposite the Siberian coast, most probably on the land, which, there is reason to think, stretches*

* See Parliamentary Paper, No. 83, "Arctic Expeditions," pp. 78—85. See also "Royal Geographical Society's Journal," vol. xxiii., p. 129.

from the Islands discovered by Capt. Kellett towards the new Siberian Islands. If this be the case, the story of the iceberg off Newfoundland, and the two vessels said to be Franklin's, would seem to find an explanation. We know that the Greenland seas—namely, that part of the Polar Ocean lying between Greenland and Spitzbergen—forms the outlet for that mighty current which comes from the Siberian Sea; it effectually clears the Asiatic shore every spring of its ice, which it carries away to the south, into the Atlantic Ocean. . . . A current of such magnitude and force would easily drift away two vessels on the breaking up of their 'ice cradle.' How sudden this might be," Mr. Petermann cites the case of the four Russian sailors, who were left behind at Spitzbergen, by their vessel drifting away in the night; and adds, "In a similar manner Sir John Franklin may have lost his vessels, and have been helplessly . . . looking forward to *relief from directions hitherto entirely neglected.* . . . On the other hand," the author observes, "it is almost impossible that the two vessels . . . could have come from the head of Baffin's Bay without being perceived by the whalers, &c., or that the crews would not have made their way to some spot where we should have heard of them." He continues, "Belcher's, M'Clure's, and Inglefield's Expeditions only encompass one-third of the circumference of that portion of the Polar Regions where Sir John Franklin must have been arrested, and the remainder of the region is at present *altogether unprovided for.* As this is just the region where I, with many others, consider it as most *probable that Franklin has been arrested, and also where my proposed route of search is directed to, I am desirous of again drawing attention to my plan.* . . . The Spitzbergen Sea is by far the widest—indeed, the only oceanic opening towards the North Pole, and to the chief Polar Regions. . . . Nevertheless, Arctic writers and geographers generally have assumed an impenetrable ice barrier to stretch across that sea, and have pronounced it to be altogether impracticable for navigation. . . . This assumption I consider to be groundless, and as resting upon prejudice and imagination." Mr. Petermann then proceeds to quote the late Rev. Dr. Scoresby, and Admiral Beechey, &c., to prove this sea is navigable. He says, "Spitzbergen reaches beyond lat. 80°, and forms the highest country in latitude *yet reached in either hemisphere,*" and asks, "Where is there another group of islands which could be circumnavigated in a like manner? Compare it to the Parry Group, though in lat. 75°, and the difference will be obvious. In short, the assumed difficulties in the Spitzbergen Sea are groundless, and rest upon a prejudice dating

back to the voyage of Capt. John Wood in 1676." Various authorities are then quoted to prove that Wood was not a trustworthy man; he then proceeds to show the practicability of his plan, which, irrespective of Franklin's Expedition, is of the highest geographical interest, and may lead "to results of great importance to the whale-fishery:" and in concluding observes, "Bearing the preceding points in mind, and assuming that Sir John Franklin has gone up Wellington Channel, and there found a sea of considerable extent, and navigable, like that to the north of Baffin's Bay, the question arises, How is it that nearly seven years have passed without" his "*having been able to pass out of that sea into the sea situated to the north of Behring's Straits, in the direction of either the American or the Siberian shores?*" The most feasible solution of this question that suggests itself to me is, that a tract of land may have hitherto prevented his progress in that region. There are reasons for conjecturing that *such a tract of land may extend from the land seen by Capt. Kellett, to the north of Behring's Strait, as far as the eastern coast of Greenland without a single opening.* At all events, it admits of scarcely any doubt, that the sea to the north of Baffin's Bay can have no connection with the Polar basin, nor even with the sea beyond Wellington Channel, but that it forms the true head of Baffin's Bay. . . . As to the direction to be pursued from the starting-point, namely, midway in the Spitzbergen Sea (about lat. 76° N., and long. 40° E.), probably one direct towards Behring's Strait, IF PRACTICABLE, would be the best, . . . as it would be *in the direction where Sir John Franklin has most probably been arrested.* Another route, if more practicable, would be to the New Siberian Islands."

We have quoted from Mr. Petermann's paper rather at length, because it is in itself highly interesting; but it should be remembered the whole plan is founded on hypothesis. That talented gentleman has, by a skilful arrangement of the few facts we have, raised a goodly structure, but the basis is "rotten at the core," because "*based on the supposition that Franklin had passed up Wellington Channel.*" We have already striven to show that he never attempted the north by that channel; *there is not a tittle of proof that he did;* on the contrary, all we know argues strongly, *that he did not.* We cannot see in Mr. Kennedy's voyage ought to confirm, or reject, any opinion regarding Franklin's movements in or about the Wellington Channel. In our opinion, if the whole of the support Mr. Petermann derives from the Wellington Channel were washed away, the fair edifice he has raised would still stand, *but not as a plan of search for the*

Franklin Expedition; for in that sense we consider the title a misnomer, and we can only look upon its adoption as a vehicle or means for introducing the question of a Polar Sea, and the practicability of navigating it. As regards the search, so far from thinking that Sir Edward Belcher, by his "fortunate" (?) passage up the Wellington Channel, has now actually commenced the search, we look upon any and every search by that channel as staying the commencement of the search by diverting it from the true direction. We do not comprehend how the absence of news from Capt. McClure can in any way render Mr. Petermann's opinion "more and more probable" that "Franklin will be found on the Asiatic side." Nor can we permit it to be taken "for granted," from the arguments adduced, "that he is arrested somewhere opposite the Siberian coast." We have no evidence in proof. As to the two vessels seen on an iceberg, as it is very doubtful whether Franklin ever attempted the northern route at all, so much greater are the doubts, then, that those ships drifted down between Greenland and Spitzbergen; we think it more than probable that they came down Baffin's Bay. Whether they were Franklin's ships is purely conjectural, but an excellent paper by Mr. A. G. Findlay, "On the Probable Course of Sir John Franklin's Expedition,"* goes strongly to prove they were. We think it not unlikely, as our belief has ever been (and the results of Austin's western parties more confirmed that belief), that *Franklin's ships were ice-locked on the western side of Melville Sound, that he there was forced to abandon them, that the ice subsequently broke up, and drifted, with them imbedded in it, to the eastward, down Barrow's Strait, Lancaster Sound, and Baffin's Bay; and that, ultimately, they made their appearance off Newfoundland.* The drift of Sir James Ross's and Lieut. de Haven's vessels, then known, are analogous cases. The facts adduced by the author, and his remarks, irrespective of the search for Franklin, on the practicability of ascending to the north, between Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla, and crossing the Polar Basin to the Arctic lands of Asia or America, are, we consider, clever, and mark him as an industrious inquirer; but after all, this paper cannot be estimated other than as a proposition for the solution of a most interesting geographical problem. *The conclusions founded on the assumption that Franklin went up Wellington Channel are altogether imaginary, and we must reject them; but assuming that he did, and "there found a sea of considerable extent, and navigable, like that to the north of Baffin's Bay,"* Mr. Petermann asks, "How

* See "Royal Geographical Society's Journal," vol. xvi., p. 26.

is it possible that nearly seven years have passed without Sir John Franklin having been able to pass *out of that sea into the sea situated to the north of Behring's Strait, in the direction of either the American or Siberian shores?*" In attempting to solve this question, he says, "There are reasons for conjecturing that . . . a tract of land may extend from the land seen by Captain Kellett, to the north of Behring's Strait, as far as the *eastern coasts of Greenland, without a single opening.*" If such tract really exists, Mr. Petermann has given a reply to the latter part of his question. Its *presence would bar all advance to Franklin in the direction of the Siberian shores.* Why, then, expect to find the missing Expedition there? Thus much for the conjectured northern limit of this unknown land. The southern had also been indicated at this time; it was supposed that Kellett's Land was continuous to Wollaston Land,* *thereby shutting Franklin out from the south, and consequently from the coasts of America and the sea to the north of Behring's Strait:* thus is a reply given to the question in both directions. True, all this was merely imaginary, but it will be observed that these *supposed northern and southern lands form a cul de sac, or gulf, or Mediterranean Sea, of Penny's Sea,* the entrances to which are the *Wellington Channel and the channels between the Parry Islands:* now the *velocity and direction of the currents and drift wood out of Penny's Sea go to disprove any such idea.* Again, *what becomes of the supposed communication between the open water to the north of the Parry Islands and the Polynia of Wrangell,* so much calculated upon? He thinks there are two Polar Seas, the Asiatic and the American.† The author concludes the sea *discovered by Inglefield to be a mere cul de sac.*

We have made these remarks to show the spirit of the age. Involving a question of the highest geographical interest, this plan has great merit; but as a plan for the recovery of our lost countrymen, *it is altogether in a wrong direction.*‡

December, 1852.—Letters were received at the Admiralty from the searching squadron in Behring's Strait,§ from Capt. C. Frederick,

* See the Chart in Lieut. W. H. Hooper's "Ten Months among the Tents of the Tusk." † See the Polar Chart in Dr. Sutherland's "Journal of Penny's Voyage," vol. i. ‡ See "The Search for Franklin," by Augustus Petermann, F.R.G.S., &c.; also, "Notes on the Distribution of Animals available as Food in the Arctic Regions," by the same author; also, "Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 1852," vol. xxi., pp. 118 *et seq.*

§ See Parliamentary Papers, No. 82, "Arctic Expeditions, 1852," pp. 45—60.

of H.M.S. *Amphitrite*, up to October 13th, 1852, and from Commander Rochfort Maguire, to the 20th of August, 1852. The latter excellent officer had succeeded Captain Moore in the command of the *Plover*. Unhappily, not a particle of intelligence had been obtained of the missing Franklin Expedition; even the endless rumours and reports which, since 1849, had abounded along the coast from Michaelowski to Point Barrow had all died away. The *Plover* sailed for Point Barrow 21st August, 1852, with the intention of wintering at that Point, so that she might render assistance, should the crews of the *Erebus* and *Terror*, or those of the *Enterprise* and *Investigator*, be compelled, from distressful circumstances, to seek the shores of Arctic America.

Another year came to a close. Still the secret of the whereabouts and the fate of Franklin and his companions remained as profoundly mysterious and inexplicable as ever. The more than interesting fragments picked up at Parker Bay, Victoria Land, this year, by that energetic, truthful traveller, Dr. Rae, do not seem to have obtained that attention which the identifying Government mark they bore would have led one to suppose they would have commanded; they elicited no opinion regarding their origin and their drift, beyond that given by Dr. Rae himself on the spot, which, from the fact of his not being acquainted with the results of Austin's travelling parties, was open to objection. One would have thought, seeing the locality in which they were found, that some attempt would have been made to solve the significant, though dumb, suggestions they offered; but the fact is, under the delusive glare of the Wellington Channel and the north, blinding men's minds and darkening all reason, they could not be understood at the time; and any attempt, by one not under its fatal influence, honestly to unravel the important tale they told by their appearance in such an unexpected quarter, must have been of necessity antagonistic to the phrensy then raging, and would have been met with scornful contempt. The time was not convenient, and their silent admonitions were lost—Melville Sound was unthought of. This year, like others, teemed with inconsiderate plans and flying rumours and reports. The most cruel falsities were promulgated regarding the position of our unfortunate countrymen, now elevating, then outraging, the feelings of the relatives and friends at home. Thus, alternately raised and depressed, they were deprived even of the *transitory comfort* which they might have derived from that *hopeful but delusive aurora* with which the Spirits of the North had overshadowed them.

CHAPTER XIII.

KENNEDY'S PROJECTED EXPEDITION TO BEHRING'S STRAIT IN THE "ISABEL," BUT ABANDONED—PHENIX SAILS FOR BEECHY ISLAND—SECOND AMERICAN EXPEDITION SAILS FOR SMITH'S SOUND UNDER DR. KANE—PARKER SNOW'S PROJECTED EXPEDITION FROM MELBOURNE TO BEHRING'S STRAIT, BUT ABANDONED—PHENIX RETURNS—INGLEFIELD'S DESPATCHES—DEATH OF LIEUT. BELLOT, OF IMPERIAL NAVY OF FRANCE—BELCHER'S DESPATCHES—HIS NEW DISCOVERIES TO THE NORTH-EAST OF GRINNEL LAND—REPORT OF HIS TRAVELLING PARTIES—RICHARDS AND OSBORN TO THE SOUTH-WEST—BELCHER LEAVES NORTHRUMBERLAND SOUND FOR BEECHY ISLAND—KELLETT'S DESPATCHES—LIEUT. PIM VISITS BANKS' LAND—FINDS M'CLURE AND "INVESTIGATOR" AT BAY OF MERCY—M'CLURE VISITS KELLETT, AND ARRANGEMENTS—KELLETT'S TRAVELLING PARTIES DESPATCHED.

1853.—THE year opened with a lull—not of apathy, for the public feeling was as much alive to the forlorn condition of our long absent countrymen as ever—but hope and fear balanced each other; there was a vague expectation that good would arise, but whence no one had any definite idea. It was not from the Wellington Channel; for, strange to record it, no sooner was it known that Nature had unbarred the ice-locked entrance of that channel, and admitted a free passage to the north, than doubts arose, and the motives (for reasons there were none) were canvassed for renewing the search in that direction. Divested of extraneous feeling, the consequence was *mistrust*, and the bright anticipations of successful, happy results from that quarter *waned*; still the expectation, however illusory, for a time gave relief.

April 8th, 1853.—Sailed the *Isabel*, under the command of Mr. William Kennedy (late of the *Prince Albert*), for Behring's Strait. It will be remembered this vessel was purchased for Capt. Beatson, that he might be enabled to carry out his plan of search, viz., the Asiatic shores, New Siberian Islands, and eastward, to the north of the land seen by Capt. Kellett. From unforeseen circumstances this voyage was prevented at the time; but it will have been noticed the

little *Isabel* had not laid idle; she did good service under Capt. Inglefield in Whale, Smith's, and Jones's Sounds (1852). On her return, she was restored to Lady Franklin, who now resolved to fit her out for her original destination. In this, that noble-minded lady was aided by the generous contributions of the Legislative Council and inhabitants of Van Diemen's Land,* of which Sir John Franklin had been Governor. Various addresses were sent to Lady Franklin on this occasion, expressive of their sincere esteem for, and high appreciation of, the distinguishing public and private virtues of their late ruler, her gallant husband—their deep sympathy for herself, and admiration of the heroic devotion she had shown in the endless sacrifices she had made. But the good fortune of the little *Isabel* seems to have left her with her late talented, enterprising commander, Inglefield. She arrived at Valparaiso, where a disagreement arose between Mr. Kennedy and the officers and crew, and the voyage was abandoned.

May 19th, 1853.—H.M.S. *Phœnix*, Commander E. A. Inglefield, accompanied by the *Breadalbane* transport, left Sheerness for Beechey Island, stored with provisions, &c., for Sir Edward Belcher's squadron.† He was directed, in returning, in case of opportunity, to examine "the coast in the vicinity of Cape Walsingham." Additional orders were sent to Sir Edward Belcher. We notice the following paragraph: "*If no traces of the missing ships have been found in Wellington Channel, and if it should appear that*" they "did not proceed in that direction, and if Capt. Kellett should have reached *Melville Island, . . . and his land expeditions should also have failed to discover any such traces, it does not appear to us that there is any other direction in which a prospect of their discovery can be expected. Every accessible part of the shores, Polar Seas, west of Lancaster Sound, will have been visited, without finding a trace of the missing ships, except their former station at Beechey Island in 1845 and 6. In such a contingency as this, . . . there appears no other course left but to abandon all further search.*" The above extract shows the feeling of the Admiralty: it is obviously their intention to discontinue the search; it is evident they think enough has been done to rescue our unfortunate countrymen. But the assertion that "*every accessible part of the Polar Seas, west of Lancaster Sound, will have been visited,*" is

* See the Address of Sir R. I. Murchison to the Royal Geographical Society, May, 1853, vol. 23, p. lxxx.

† See Blue Books, "Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions," 1854, p. 8.

not fact; the search of Melville Sound, the special locality to which Franklin was directed, was begun, but left incomplete by a space of 200 miles in width. It was this important space that led to the formation of the original plan of the voyage; it ought to have commanded our first attention, and no other quarter, until it had been completely examined; it was, alone, the true direction of search, or in "which a prospect of their discovery could be expected." The above extract shows great ignorance of the whole subject. We fancy we detect in these Instructions already some misgiving of the sanguine hopes entertained as to the search by the Wellington Channel—the mania in its favour was at its height—was passing the meridian:—but enough! never were plans drawn so opposed to existing facts, and so pertinaciously persisted in. We seek for our unfortunate countrymen in a wrong direction, are astonished at not finding them, and then conclude, in opposition to all reason, that "every part" has "been visited," and that there is "no other course left but to abandon the search." Alas! for the unfortunate Franklin, and his doomed officers and crews.

The gallant young French officer, Lieut. Bellot—already noticed as having accompanied Mr. Kennedy in the *Prince Albert*, 1851.—2, again a volunteer for Arctic service—was appointed to the *Phœnix*, under Commander Inglefield, on this voyage.

May 30th, 1853.—Sailed from New York, the *Advance*, under the command of the talented, enterprising Dr. Elisha Kent Kane, of the U.S. Navy, for the examination of Smith's Sound, Baffin's Bay, in search of our lost navigators. We have much pleasure in recording the departure of this, the second expedition fitted out with this humane object by our American kinsmen, for in it we see another proof of the deep sympathy and solicitude of our trans-atlantic brethren, not only for the now critical, if not distressful, position of the lamented Franklin and his devoted followers—so long abroad—but also of respect for that sorrow which ariseth from anxiety and hope deferred, now pervading all classes in the mother country at home. The feeling thus shown will ever reflect honour on America as a nation, and add yet another star to its already well covered star-bespangled banner; more especially may its lustre fall on her noble-hearted citizens, Henry Grinnell and George Peabody, for by their munificent example, countenanced by the Government, and aided by various scientific societies, associations, and friends of science, was this expedition despatched on its sacred mission. It will be remembered, Dr. Kane was with Lieut. De Haven in the *Advance* in 1850:

to him we owe the admirably written, highly interesting chronicle* of that eventful voyage, where danger was on every side to destroy, but where also the hand of an almighty Providence was ever present to protect. A votary to the prevailing feeling that a higher temperature and a Polar Ocean existed to the north, and that Franklin had adopted the Wellington Channel and the Sea of Penny as the means to accomplish the great object of his voyage, Dr. Kane thus records his views for recommending his plan of search by Smith's Sound. They were developed in a paper read before the Geographical Society of New York. The following extracts will put the reader in possession of the leading features of the plan : † "It was based (says Dr. Kane) upon the probable *extension* of the *land masses of Greenland* to the *far north*—a fact at that time not verified by travel, but sustained by the analogies of physical geography. Greenland, though looked upon as a congeries of islands, connected by interior glaciers, was still to be regarded as a peninsula, whose formation recognized the same general laws as other peninsulas having a southern trend. From the alternating altitudes of its mountain ranges, continued without depression throughout a meridional line of nearly 1,100 miles, I inferred that this chain must extend very far to the north, and that Greenland might, not improbably, approach nearer the Pole than any other known land. Believing, then, in such an extension of this peninsula, and feeling that the search for Sir John Franklin would be best promoted by a course that might lead most directly to the open sea of which I had inferred the existence, and that the approximation of the meridians would make access to the *west as easy* from North Greenland as from Wellington Channel, and access to the east *far more easy*; feeling, too, that the highest protruding headland would be most likely to afford some traces of the lost party, I named, as the inducements in favour of my scheme—1st. Terra firma as the basis of our operations, obviating the capricious character of ice-travel; 2nd. A due northerly line, which, throwing aside the influences of terrestrial radiation, would lead soonest to the open sea, should such exist; 3rd. The benefit of the fan-like abutment of land, on the north face of Greenland, to check the ice in its southern or equatorial drift, thus obviating the great drawback of Parry, in his attempts to reach the Pole by the Spitzbergen Sea; 4th. Animal life, to sustain tra-

* See "The U.S. Grinnell Expedition in Search of Sir John Franklin," by Elisha Kent Kane, M.D., U.S.N.

† See "Arctic Explorations in the Years 1853, '54, '55," by the same author.

velling parties; 5th. The co-operation of Esquimaux, settlements of these people having been found as high as Whale Sound, and probably extending still farther along the coast." In conclusion, Dr. Kane says, "We were to pass up Baffin's Bay, therefore, to its most northern attainable point, and thence, pressing on toward the Pole as far as boats or sledges could carry us, examine the coast line for vestiges of the lost party."

These are the outlines of Dr. Kane's plan. Clever and sound in conception, in a geographical sense, as a means of obtaining a high northern position, they are also excellent as a plan for the relief and recovery of the Franklin Expedition, *if the fact had been fully authenticated that that Expedition had attempted the northern passage by the Wellington Channel route*; but of this we were uncertain. In short, we knew nothing positive, for notwithstanding the multitude of opinions, written and expressed, they were all mere surmises—all merely the emanations of wandering imaginations, and without a tittle of positive evidence to prove that the Wellington Channel route had been adopted. The preceding pages will show that the Wellington Channel mania was a mere prejudice, that owed its origin to preconceived supposed intentions on the part of Franklin to adopt it, but which, in truth, never had any sound or reasonable basis. On the contrary, *all that Franklin did write testifies (see ante, page 22) that he looked to the American shores, and not to the north by Wellington Channel. Capt. Fitzjames's letter (see ante, page 253) is a farther corroboration of this fact. With such testimony before us, we must reject all idea that he attempted that channel: and, in rejecting it, all hope that Dr. Kane will be successful in falling on any traces of the Franklin Expedition in Smith's Sound.* We cannot leave this subject without expressing our deep regret that Dr. Kane, one so pre-eminently qualified for the task he has undertaken, should have been swayed by the wild ideas prevailing here as to the course and intentions of Sir John Franklin. Alas for his voyage! It can only end in adding another record of useless daring, painful suffering, and bitter disappointment.

May, 1853.—At this time Mr. W. Parker Snow, a gentleman known to Arctic circles as having accompanied Commander C. C. Forsyth in the *Prince Albert*, in 1850, in his unsuccessful attempt to get down Regent's Inlet, now endeavoured to get up an Expedition, by subscription, at Melbourne, Victoria, for Behring's Strait. The object of this voyage is not made very clear by the few papers that have reached us. Cape Chelagskoi is mentioned as the first point to be

attained, but beyond that we have not been enabled to gather anything definite.

As the subscriptions did not realize sufficient to cover the expenses of the voyage, it was abandoned.

October 4th, 1853.—H.M.S. *Phœnix*, Commander Inglefield, returned from Beechey Island, Lancaster Sound, bringing despatches from Sir Edward Belcher, Captain Kellett, and Commander M'Clure, giving intelligence of the safety of the *Investigator*, and the important discovery of the North-West Passage; also from Commander Pullen. Lieut. Cresswell, in charge of the *Investigator's* despatches, Mr. Wynniatt, of that ship, and Dr. M'Cornick, returned by the *Phœnix*. The substance of these despatches we shall give. Capt. Inglefield arrived at Beechey Island 8th August, and proceeded to land the stores, &c., at Cape Riley, Erebus and Terror Bay being unapproachable. This was a work of great difficulty, as the *Phœnix* and *Bread-albane*, her transport, were continually blown off the shore. After much labour, the mass of the stores were landed, but not without the total loss of the transport with the remainder. August 10th, Commander Inglefield proceeded up Wellington Channel in search of Commander Pullen, who had been absent from the *North Star* more than a month, and about whom there was some apprehension, being desirous also to convey to Sir Edward Belcher his despatches. "Wellington Channel was then full of ice, and so rough with large cracks and pools, that it defied sledging, excepting with a strong party. Landing at Barlow Creek, Cornwallis Island, they made an attempt to carry a punt over the ice, but this proved ineffectual." Commander Inglefield then determined to proceed with a small party by land to Cape Rescue. He reached that cape on the 13th. Here they learned (by notice left) of Commander Pullen's return. Having deposited in the cairn duplicates of their lordships' despatches for Sir Edward Belcher, they returned, reached the tent on the fifth day of their absence, and the ship on the 16th August. On the 17th, Commander Inglefield received from Commander Pullen the melancholy intelligence of the death of Lieut. Bellot.* This amiable and talented young French officer had volunteered, on the return of Commander Pullen, to lead the party proposed to be sent up Wellington Channel with despatches for Sir Edward Belcher, and to communicate with that officer, then on his return to Beechey Island, and, if possible,

* See Blue Books, 1854, "Recent Arctic Expeditions, &c.," pp. 11--17.

with Commander Inglefield. Lieut. Bellot left 12th August. He had no positive instructions, but the best mode to accomplish these objects was conveyed to him in a half-official letter from Commander Pullen. It suggests: * "Point Hogarth being a principal point of rendezvous, make for it as speedily as possible, keeping, as much as you can, the eastern shores on board, as it is Sir Edward Belcher's intention to travel this way, if he cannot get on with his ship. . . The ice is still heavy in Wellington Channel, and I hardly think it will break out this month. . . Should you see any signs to suppose such likely to happen, make for the shore, and use your own discretion as to advance or retreat. . . Provisions are *en cache* at Point Bowden and Point Rescue, but I trust you will reach the *Assistance* before you are out. . . Wishing you God speed and every success," &c. On the 17th, having reached somewhere between Capes Bowden and Grinnell, and wishing to get inshore to encamp, he had landed part of his men and the despatches, but (blowing a gale at the time) Mr. Bellot and his other two men could not get ashore, the floe on which they stood having drifted away from it. It appears that shortly after, while reconnoitring from the top of a hummock, Mr. Bellot was blown off by a violent gust of wind into a crack in the ice, and perished by drowning. The two men on the floe, after being driven about for thirty hours without food, drifted with it on to the land on the eastern shore, and they were enabled to escape, as it were, by miracle. Thus died Joseph René Bellot! "The loss of this gallant officer," says Capt. Inglefield, "has been deeply felt by all on board; for his amiable qualities, and bold, adventurous disposition had rendered him beloved by all that knew him."† "The tidings of his loss rung like a knell through England, and the narrative of that catastrophe will be studied so long as men shall seek, in the annals of christian heroism and self-devotion, of active but modest and unostentatious philanthropy, examples of how to live and how to die."‡ His name, and we have pleasure in recording it, is associated for ever with Britannia's darling sons—her sailors—at Greenwich.§ The *Phœnix* left Beechey Island 23rd August, 1853.

We now turn to the despatches of Sir Edward Belcher (they are

* See Blue Books, 1854, "Recent Arctic Expeditions, &c.," pp. 144—7.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 20.

‡ See the Earl of Ellesmere's Address, "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1854," p. lxxvi.

§ A polished granite obelisk has since been erected, within the grounds of Greenwich Hospital, to the memory of the intrepid young Bellot.

up to July 26th, 1853).* Our views regarding the search by the north have been sufficiently shown, and the route by the Wellington Channel has been particularly animadverted upon. We did, and have ever considered it utterly without hope. The gallant Franklin never attempted the solution of the Question by that channel; we therefore think the re-search of it a useless waste of time—a wanton sacrifice of the distinguishing admirable qualities of our seamen, whether officers or men. With such opinions, we might with reason pass over the efforts of Sir Edward Belcher's division; but they are our countrymen, and we love to record the devotion and enterprise of Englishmen, in whatever quarter, and however hopelessly employed. After leaving Beechey Island, 14th August, 1852, under most favourable conditions, Sir Edward Belcher ascended the Wellington Channel, and taking advantage of his predecessor's (Penny) discoveries, passed between Cape Becher and Dundas Island. Proceeding west, he reached an "expanse of islet-covered sea," which he named Northumberland Sound, lat. $76^{\circ} 52' N.$, long. $97^{\circ} W.$ Here he wintered. "On the 18th," from "one of the highest peaks of the outlying north-western island," angles were obtained "to Cape Lady Franklin, as well as to the southern and westernmost land, where it seemed to trend away to S.S.W. true; the next distant land bore N.N.E. about 30 or 35 miles. . . I specially remark," says Sir Edward, "these computed distances, to show that, under the most favourable circumstances in this climate, with first-rate instruments, I could barely, at such distances, be sure of the objects presented to my view. . . . As far, therefore, as my observations are concerned, there is no loom of land between Cape Lady Franklin and the newly discovered land N.N.E., or by actual observation $143^{\circ} 2'$ of the horizon. . . From the great motion of the tides and floes (in the direction here parallel to the channel, say N.N.W. and S.S.E.), I am satisfied that we are now in the Polar Sea, composed, in all probability, of a great archipelago of islets and sandbanks;" thus verifying Penny's opinion that an extensive sea existed to the north and west, and not a gulf, as had without reason been conjectured. August 23rd, Sir Edward Belcher, accompanied by Commander Richards and Lieut. Osborn, started to the westward. On the 25th, they "landed on a low point (Village Point), where the coast turns suddenly to the eastward." Several well built Esquimaux houses were here met with. 27th, they discovered and took possession of a large island, naming it Exmouth

* See Blue Book, "Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1854," pp. 62, 66, 73.

Island; and on the 29th another large island, North Cornwall, lat. $77^{\circ} 33' 30''$ N., long. about 97° W., was added to her Majesty's territories, also Table Island." During this search "no drift wood was noticed, not a trace of human beings; . . . animal life seemed to fail after quitting Exmouth Island." Sir Edward remarks, "If our unfortunate countrymen have" taken the floe and drifted with it, "their case is hopeless, if we may judge from the aspect of the floes, . . . where they have piled themselves in layers over forty feet on the north-western extremities of the islands. We noticed nothing equal to it in Melville Bay. . . . Our only resource now is the close search of the coast west and south-westerly, and north and north-easterly, for any traces of vessels or crews. . . . The tides in the parallel of $77^{\circ} 40'$ are regular east and west, the flood coming from the east."

Sir Edward then observes: "From our examination of this northern sea, I now feel convinced that the so-termed Smith's (?) and Jones's Sounds are connected with this northern sea. . . . *If Franklin passed easterly through Lancaster Sound, to try the openings of Jones's or Smith's outlets*, we may yet fall upon his traces, as my own spring movements will carry me in that direction. . . . Commander Pullen or Dr. M'Cormick may have already settled this important question." All the parties returned on the 8th September. On the 22nd Sir Edward left again with a party, to fill up the coast line between their winter quarters and Cape Beecher, but the ice breaking up, they were left on an island (Hungry Island), to escape from which, having no boat, they had great difficulty, but providentially succeeded. Some observations then occur on the *visual discoveries of Penny*, which we pass over, referring Sir Edward to *his own remarks*, just quoted, as to the difficulty, in that climate, of being sure of the objects presented to view—mirage or refraction may have deceived Penny. On the 22nd to 29th March, 1853, depôts of provisions were pushed over to Cape Lady Franklin. "The winter," it is remarked, "has been severe; — $62^{\circ} 5'$." On the 10th April the south-western division started, under Commander Richards and Lieut. Osborn, assisted by Lieut. May, Dr. Lyall, and other officers.

On the 28th April this passage occurs: "If Sir John Franklin passed through this channel to the southward of Barrow and Parker Islands, and met the floe moving westerly, he never could reach, as far as we can discover, any place of refuge, and in all probability drifted into the Polar Basin, and may be anywhere within 78 and 90° N., if not forced out to the north of Greenland and Spitzbergen." We can-

not comprehend this. There seems great confusion in the opinions regarding the tides and current system in these regions. It has been usually received that a general south-easterly current prevails, setting down Barrow's Strait, Wellington Channel, Lancaster Sound, and also down Jones's Sound; but from the observations made, the general drift or current would appear to set to the westward, or how could it be thought probable that Franklin would drift into the Polar Basin? and yet, to the north of Grinnell Land, the islands are said to have their north-western extremities loaded with immense masses of ice, which we think is indicative of a powerful current to the eastward through Jones's Sound, and is not due to the prevailing north-west winds. Inglefield found a set to the eastward out of Jones's Sound and to the northward into Smith's Sound. All this is very perplexing. It seems to us very improbable that there should be a general easterly current setting from the Polar Sea, and yet, on the north and south sides of Grinnell Land, it should run to the westward. These currents must be purely local, or Franklin never could be "forced out" to the eastward, "to the north of Greenland and Spitzbergen." The apprehension arising from them seems to us to be over-estimated. As to the impossibility of either Franklin (had he gone to the north) or Collinson making easting, we think it would arise more from the presence of ice than from the westerly set of the currents. Nor can we see how it could be inferred that no place of refuge existed on the south side of Penny Strait, or to the north of the Parry Islands, from what was then known. Sir Edward's south-western parties were then *en route*, and on new ground; he could therefore know nothing as to the trending of the coasts, and what harbours of refuge they might offer. We notice such observations, because they are often productive of false conclusions, and lead to great error. The hopeless search, upon which this northern division was then engaged, was founded wholly on imaginary conclusions, for which there was not a shadow of proof. Sir Edward and party started on the north-east search the 2d May, 1853. In his despatch, 26th July, he says, "After my April despatch, I proceeded to the north-east as far as the connection with Jones's Strait (Sound?) in 90° W., where I found the sea open, and all progress obstructed on the 20th May." Polar Sea from 1,500 feet elevation, "rough sailing ice;" the elevation is in lat. 76° 31' N., and about 90° W. "Being cut off by sea, I now pursued an opening from Cape Separation (Cape d'Israeli), and reached Wellington Channel," naming it Arthur's Strait. Here is a

case in point as to hasty conclusions. Sir Edward, in passing up towards Cape Becher, near its southern entrance, says,* "*I think I may safely say that not the most distant hope of any communication by sea exists in this direction with Jones's Sound;*" and yet here he soon after makes the discovery himself. The party afterwards returned again to the northward and eastward. "Having observed the loom of land from the high land of Britannia Cliff," they "started from Princess Royal Island, and reached the westernmost island, in $78^{\circ} 10'$ N. (?), calling the group Victoria Archipelago; and the easternmost, forming the channel to Jones's Strait, North Kent." Various other islands and inlets rewarded their persevering efforts. They returned to the ship 22nd June.

12th July. Commander Richards returned, having examined the northern shores of Cornwallis and Bathurst Island, and reached Melville Island. "In lat. $76^{\circ} 48'$ N., long. 109° W., he" parted from Lieut. S. Osborn, who was detached to examine the north-eastern shores of Cornwallis Island. Commander Richards then continued his route to the north-west. He soon after fell in with Lieut. Hamilton, of the *Resolute*, in search of despatches from Sir Edward Belcher. From that officer he learned of the safety of Capt. McClure, and the crew of the *Investigator*, and the discovery of the North-West Passage. Commander Richards now found that Commander McClintock "had poached on his ground." He resolved, therefore, to communicate with Capt. Kellett. Having directed Lieut. Hamilton to the despatches,† he proceeded on, rounded the northern extreme of Sabine Peninsula (part of Melville Island), and searched its western side to the bottom of Hecla and Griper Bay. From thence he crossed the land to Dealy Island, and arrived on board the *Resolute* 5th June. By this clever movement he was enabled to put Sir Edward Belcher in possession of all the news of the western division. He started on his return on the 8th, passing up the western coast of Byam Martin Channel. He then struck eastward to the north of the Parry Group, to Cape Lady Franklin. During this journey, many new discoveries of islands and inlets were made and examined, accomplishing 860 miles in 94 days. Commander Richards concludes his report:‡—"It is with much regret I am obliged to inform you that,

* See Blue Book, 1854, "Papers Relative to Arctic Expeditions," p. 62.

† The rendezvous for leaving despatches was to have been 77° N. and 105° W., but they were deposited $76^{\circ} 32'$ N., and $105^{\circ} 4'$ W., the nearest position then attainable.

‡ See Blue Book, 1855, "Further Papers Relating to Recent Arctic Expeditions," pp. 180—255.

so far as the great object of our search is concerned, we have been entirely unsuccessful. No traces whatever have been discovered of the missing Expedition, and my opinion is, that the frozen sea we have passed over is rarely, if ever, navigable." Lieut. S. Osborn returned on the 15th July. After leaving Commander Richards, he explored several inlets and islands, north of the Parry Group, and reached Cape Lady Franklin. From that cape he examined the north-eastern coast of Cornwallis Island to Foulweather Bay (Goodsir's Inlet?). He did not discover the cairn erected by Goodsir and Marshall at their farthest west, when under Capt. Penny. Lieut. S. Osborn was 97 days out; he roughly estimates his journey at 935 miles. His remarks lead us to infer that in the offing north of the Parry Islands "*the ice is of one season*, broken up by strong tides and winds, and constantly on the move at spring tides to the end of December." He adds:—"The theory of an uncongealable ocean has received from us no confirmatory testimony. . . . Our journeys in 1853, whether easterly or westerly, were undoubtedly along a coast, northward of which there existed much land." In reading over the despatches of the Belcher Expedition, we have often been tempted to give lengthened extracts, so interesting are they; but they would have unnecessarily swelled our volume. It may suffice to say, every line tells of excessive labour, cheerful endurance, and of a gallant and persevering spirit on the part of our sailors, both officers and men; it tells, too, of the absurdity of a search in this, a direction quite opposed to Sir John Barrow's plan and Franklin's Instructions.

14th July. The *Assistance* and *Pioneer* left Northumberland Sound on their return to Beechey Island, and on the 26th they had advanced ten miles eastward of Cape Becher, altogether unsuccessful in their humane object, but still "ready and willing to do more." Sir Edward Belcher was ably supported by the officers of his detached parties—Commander Richards and Lieut. S. Osborn, assisted by Lieuts. May and Cheyne, Dr. Lyall, Messrs. Loney and Allard, masters, and Messrs. Herbert and Grove, mates, and fine crews.

The results of this, the eastern or Wellington Channel division, added its full share to science—to geography in particular—but to the holy cause on which it was engaged, nothing; on the contrary, the time and energy wasted on this north-eastern search—a quarter to which the Franklin Expedition was not sent, *but only by the imaginative assumed to have gone*—abstracted from that precious time which should have been devoted to the entire examination of *Melville*

Sound. At this period every moment might be charged with life or death to the unhappy missing Franklin and his gallant companions.

Capt. Henry Kellett's despatches (to the 7th May, 1853*) detail the movements of the western divisions. After leaving Beechey Island (the 14th August, 1852), the *Resolute* and *Intrepid* proceeded to the westward. Owing to much detention from ice and landing depôts, &c., at various points as they advanced, they did not reach Point Griffith (Melville Island) until the 2nd September. From this point there was "no ice in sight along the land to the northward in Byam Martin Channel. . . . On the 7th they were off Winter Harbour, but finding from the fast ice they could not winter there, after leaving notices and an advanced depôt of provisions for travelling parties, they returned to Skene Bay. Here they were blocked out by the ice. Subsequently (9th) they cut into Bridport Inlet, to a position a little east of Dealy Island. This they made their winter quarters. On the 10th, they were frozen in. The 22nd, the parties started to lay out depôts for their spring journeys. Lieut. Mechem and Mr. Nares . . . to cross the land at Winter Harbour, for the search to the south-west of Melville Island;" Lieuts. Pim and Hamilton, and M. de Bray (of the French Imperial Navy), to "Cape Providence, for the search of Banks' Land, east and west." On the 11th October, Commander McClintock, with the same object, "proceeded across the land to Hecla and Griper Bay, . . . for the search of the north-west Melville Island coast," Capt. Kellett intending to take "Point Griffith for the rendezvous route" himself. All these parties succeeded in placing their advanced depôts, and returned without casualty. It was on this preliminary journey that Lieut. Mechem, "on his return through Winter Harbour, . . . on the 14th October, . . . visited the *Parry sandstone*, and found the important record deposited by Commander McClure in April, 1852, only five months before their visit," which informed them of his having arrived at Mercy Bay, Banks' Land, and discovered the North-West Passage—that passage so often sought, but never before realized. The particulars of Commander McClure's voyage from Behring's Strait will be seen in the despatches of that officer. Capt. Kellett says:—"To send a party at that late period (October) out, his chances of meeting him was impossible, the ice in the strait was so broken up." The winter came and passed cheerfully away,

* See Blue Book, 1854, "Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions," p. 85, *et seq.*

leaving the crews in good health, but it is noticed as having "been very severe." On the 10th March, 1858, "supposing that Commander McClure would desert his ship at the earliest moment this year, . . . Capt. Kellett despatched a party for the Harbour of Mercy (temp. — 50°), without the slightest hopes of catching him." This party was conducted by Lieut. Pim and Dr. Domville. One of the sledges having broken down, Dr. Domville returned. "Mr. Pim gallantly went forward, and reached the Harbour of Mercy on the 6th April, and found there Commander McClure, in the *Investigator*, preparing to despatch a part of his crew to Cape Spencer (Barrow's Strait), and a party by Mackenzie River."

All the travelling parties left the ship on the 4th of April, to search the following coasts:—Commander M'Clintock, with Mr. do Bray, overland into Hecla and Griper Bay, . . . to pursue the search to the north-west." Lieut. Meehan, with Mr. Nares, "crossed Winter Harbour, to follow the coast (of Melville Island) westerly." Lieut. Hamilton, with Mr. Roche, "crossed into Hecla and Griper Bay, to place a dépôt, to search north-easterly along Sabine Island, as" more likely to reach the Rendezvous Point by that route than by Byam Martin Channel. The north-east search was subsequently entrusted to Lieut. Hamilton and Mr. M'Dougall. Capt. Kellett says, writing to Sir Edward Belcher, "I have great hopes that this party will have success in finding something of the missing ships. . . . They are certain to meet your parties, if Wellington Channel is not a blind one." On the 19th April the Banks' Land party returned, and with them Capt. M'Clure and a party from the *Investigator*. The joyful meeting of the two leaders and their crews, from such opposite directions, can be imagined. "You can fancy (writes the warm-hearted Kellett), better than I can paint, my delight in shaking hands with him. . . . His despatch will convey to you the effects of Mr. Pim's appearance on his side the strait." Subsequently, 2nd May, another party arrived, "all in a very bad condition," but improved on good diet. Dr. Domville was now, 7th April, despatched to Mercy Bay with Capt. M'Clure, and there, with Dr. Armstrong, to hold a survey on the *Investigator's* crew; and Capt. M'Clure was "directed to desert his ship," if his crew were considered "unfit to stand another winter; . . . and also, as I consider (feelingly remarks Capt. Kellett) the men have done their work, to leave her if he has not more than twenty volunteers, which is the least number the ship can be navigated with." He adds: "It would be a glorious thing to get her through this way (be-

tween Melville Island and Banks' Land); *the other way she cannot go.*" Mr. Roche and ten men of the *Resolute*, and Lieut. Cresswell and Mr. Wynniatt of the *Investigator*, now left for Beechey Island, to go home the first opportunity. Capt. Kellett speaks highly of Mr. Roche and these men: he says, "Their only fault is--*they eat.*" He expresses great hopes from his travelling parties then out: "I am most anxious for the results of their journeys;" and alluding to his officers, "My next letter will show you what stuff they are made of. . . . If Sir John Franklin's ships are ever to be found, I think they will now. Be assured, we will have them between us." It will be seen, from these extracts, what admirable arrangements were made by Capt. Kellett for the recovery of our missing countrymen, if they had attempted the solution of the Great Question by the north. That they might have done so by one of the passages east or west of Byam Martin Island was *but barely probable*; and even this could only be presumed on the condition that Franklin had first attempted and failed to get to the south-west between Cape Walker and Banks' Land, evidence of which failure there was none. All the results of the searching expeditions up to this time led to an opposite inference. The absence of traces along the southern shores of and between the Parry Islands, particularly at the sandstone at Winter Harbour (Melville Island), proved positively that Franklin had not been there, and, negatively, that if sought for *via Barrow's Strait*, it must be to the south-westward of that Strait, or east and south of Winter Harbour; these were the only reasonable conclusions that could be arrived at. The results of Capt. Kellett's travelling parties were not known when the *Phoenix* left Beechey Island. We shall return to them anon.

Before we close our notice of Capt. Kellett's despatches, we cannot but remark on the kind and ingenuous manner in which that good man and excellent officer speaks of all about him; he seems well to understand and to value the "stuff" they are made of, and to have infused his own buoyant, enthusiastic spirit into them. There is no attempt ostentatiously to speak of his own services. The private letters from him that have been published show his feeling: "I can merely state that we have done nothing wonderful. We have reached Melville Island certainly; but what of that? Parry did so thirty-four years ago, without the aid of steam, gunpowder, or galvanic batteries." Again, 8th April, the day before his parties started, he says in a private letter to Mr. Barrow: "On Sunday I read prayers, and made a short address to the men, which they appeared to understand. I hoped they would leave little for any one to do coming after us,

and that they would render the Expedition (*by their exertions*) so remarkable that every person would feel proud in having belonged to it. "We will do our best," was their response; *and they will, I am convinced.*" *As there were not many to cheer us, we cheered one another, and parted.* Again, alluding to the exhaustive nature of the travelling service, he says, "I have been a long time at sea, and seen various trying services, but never have seen (for men) such labour and such misery after. No amount of money is an equivalent. The travelling parties ought to have some honorary and distinctive mark. *Men require much more heart and stamina to undertake an extended travelling party than to go into action. The travellers have their enemy chilling them to the very heart, and paralyzing their limbs; the others the very contrary.* I should like to see the travelling men get an Arctic medal. I would gladly give £50 towards it, and I am sure every Arctic officer would be anxious to subscribe; but to be of value it ought to be presented by the authority of her Majesty." On the 19th April, 1853, when he first met Commander M'Clure, his heart overflows with joy: "This (he says) is really a *red letter* day in my voyage, and shall be kept as a holiday by my heirs and successors for ever. . . I cannot describe to you my feelings," &c. He sees good in everything.

We shall now refer to Commander M'Clure's despatches.* They are up to the 10th April, 1853.

* See Blue Book, "Papers Relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1864," pp. 21—62.

CHAPTER XIV.

CAPTAIN M'CLURE'S DESPATCHES—PRINCE OF WALES' STRAIT—
NORTH-WEST PASSAGE DISCOVERED—WINTERS PRINCE OF WALES'
STRAIT, 1850-51—HIS SEARCHING PARTIES AND THEIR REPORTS
—WEST SIDE OF BARING ISLAND, TERRIFIC PASSAGE ALONG IT
—BAY OF MERCY—WINTERS THERE, 1851-52—DETENTION—
WINTERS, 1852-53—REMARKS—LIEUT. PIM ARRIVES ON BOARD
"INVESTIGATOR."

It will be remembered the *Investigator*, Captain M'Clure, was last seen in Behring's Strait, August 5th, 1850, standing to the northward, with the intention to round Point Barrow, and endeavour to get to the eastward and to the north of Melville Island, and to examine the land or sea, whichever it might be, to the north of the Parry Group. The expectation of finding Franklin in this direction had arisen out of the then prevailing feeling, for it was nothing more, that he had passed to the north up Wellington Channel. We have already shown the fallacy of this notion, not only as being at variance with his Instructions, which directed him primarily to Cape Walker and the south-west, but *that cape not having been visited at the time*, it was not known whether he had reached it, and was pursuing the course of his Instructions to the south-west or not. There was a probability of finding traces of the Expedition south of Banks' Land, but scarcely a hope north of it. Captain M'Clure rounded Point Barrow without much difficulty, and proceeded eastward, communicating with the natives. Notices were deposited at Points Drew and Pitt, Jones's Island, &c. On the 21st, he passed the Pelly Islands (Mackenzie River), still pushing eastward. At Point Warren his landing was disputed by two very hostile natives: having conciliated them he was informed the tribe had left. "*A flat brass button being observed in the ear of the chief, he was questioned about it. . . . He said it was taken from a white man who had been killed by one of his tribe who went away . . . when the vessel was seen. The white man belonged to a party that landed at Point Warren, and there built a house. Nobody knew how they came, as they had no boat, but they went inland. The man killed had strayed from the party, and he (the chief) and his son buried him upon a hill at a little distance.*" When this oc-

curred they could not make out.* The following day they landed again and saw two huts, but could gather nothing positive from them. Captain M'Clure then proceeded to Cape Bathurst. Here he communicated with a fine, intelligent tribe of Esquimaux, and left another despatch. On the 6th September, they were off the small islands near Cape Parry. Thus far they were on known ground. They now steered to the northward and eastward, and on the morning of the 7th they discovered "high land. . . . On approaching it, the main pack appeared to be resting on . . . its western shore, which side," says Captain M'Clure, "it was my intention to have coasted had it been possible; the eastern one . . . being comparatively clear, as far as could be ascertained from the masthead, decided me to follow the water, supposing it an island, round which a passage would be found into the Polar Sea. . . . The south cape, a fine, bold headland, . . . was named . . . Lord Nelson's Head." They landed near it, and took possession, "calling it Baring Island," and left records of their visit. Its ascertained position was lat. $71^{\circ} 6' N.$, long. $123^{\circ} W.$ Capt. M'Clure here remarks, "We observed numerous recent traces of rein-deer, hares, and wild-fowl: moss and divers species of wild flowers were also in abundance. . . . From an elevation obtained of about 500 feet we had a fine view towards the interior, which was well clothed with moss, giving a verdant appearance to the ranges of hills that rose gradually to between 2,000 and 3,000 feet, intersected with ravines. . . . The sight to seaward was favourable in the extreme; open water with a very small quantity of ice, for the distance of full forty miles towards the east, insured good progress in that direction. . . . We made sail to the eastward. On" the 9th, "land was observed to the eastward, extending to the northward as far as the eye could reach. The mountains in the interior are lofty and snow-covered, while the low ground is quite free. . . . This discovery was named Prince Albert's Land, . . . lat. $72^{\circ} 1' N.$, long. $119^{\circ} 25' W.$ Continuing to the north-east," on the 10th they "were near two rocky islets, named after . . . the Princess Royal. . . . The wind becoming fair and weather clearing, all the studding sails were set, with the hopes of reaching Barrow's Strait, from which we were now distant about seventy miles, as the water was tolerably clear in that direction. . . . Our advance was of short duration; . . . the wind

* See "A Personal Narrative of the Discovery of the North-West Passage," by Alexander Armstrong, M.D., R.N., F.R.G.S., Surgeon and Naturalist of H.M.S. *Investigator*, chap. vi., p. 159.

suddenly shifted to the north-east, and began to freshen; the water, which a few hours previously had excited hopes of a good run, became so thickly studded with floes, . . . there was scarcely sufficient to keep the ship free." Alternately beset and free, the gallant commander persevered. "The wind shifting to the north-west, . . . a clear space of two miles was the result, . . . in which we continued working the whole night, and upon . . . the 12th, perceived we had lost some miles, as the pack was in motion to the southward. . . . On the 15th, . . . the wind, which had been fresh from the south-west during the day, at seven, p.m., fell light, when the ice in the north-east, no longer restrained, spread itself abroad with such rapidity that a little after eight it was observed approaching, its white line clearly defined, running, like an unbroken wave, along the dark, smooth water. . . . It encircled the vessel, sweeping her away to the south-west."

As the navigable season was now drawing to a close, a harbour was to be sought. After full consideration, the commander resolved to continue to advance to the north-east as long as the season permitted, and then submit to "*hazarding a winter in the pack.*" He says: "I decided upon the latter for these reasons,—that to relinquish the ground obtained through so much difficulty, labour, and anxiety, for only the remote chance of finding safe harbour quarters, would be injudicious; and thoroughly impressed as I am with the absolute importance of retaining every mile to ensure favourable results while navigating these seas, the loss of which might frustrate the operations of a whole season; above all, being in the vicinity of Banks' Land, and in the direction *which Sir John Franklin would, in all probability, have endeavoured to penetrate, could he have reached Cape Walker,* I considered that our position was most eligible for carrying into full effect the Instructions of the Admiralty, when the season becomes favourable for despatching parties upon this important and interesting search. . . . On the 17th they were beset." On the 8th October the ship was housed for the winter. The 10th, Prince Albert's Land was taken possession of. "From an elevation of 1,500 feet, which gave an extended view in every direction, the country was very hilly, with deep ravines and large lakes. . . . The course of the water towards the north-east we were anxious to trace, hoping to see an opening into Barrow's Strait; in this we were disappointed, from the many low points intervening rendering it impossible to ascertain the land from the sea, both being frozen. . . . Dissatisfied with the view obtained from Prince Albert's Land respecting the waters we were now in, as

to their connection with Barrow's Strait, which would settle the *Question of a North-West Passage*," Captain M'Clure "determined to proceed in that direction. Upon the 21st, everything being favourable, . . . I started with Mr. Court (second master), and a party of six men. On the 26th, . . . we had the extreme gratification of pitching our tent upon the shores of Barrow's Strait (lat. $73^{\circ} 31' N.$, long., by chronometer, $114^{\circ} 39' W.$, by lunars, $114^{\circ} 14' W.$), nearly on the line, as represented in the charts, where Sir Edward Parry has very correctly marked the *loom of the land*." Ascending "a hill about 600 feet in height, so that we could command an extensive view of forty or fifty miles, the extreme point of Prince Albert's Land bore, latitude (South?) $78^{\circ} E.$ true, about 85 miles; the farthest land north, N.N.E. 8 miles. The Melville Island shore could not be discovered; but in that direction the ice appeared to be very heavy, and the floes exceedingly large." The strait through which they had passed was named Prince of Wales' Strait, a cairn was erected, and a record deposited. On the 31st, the party arrived in safety on board the ship, "having in nine days made, in a direct line, 156 miles by observations, with a temperature between $+ 7^{\circ}$ and $- 15^{\circ}$." The discovery of the North-West Passage was the result of this journey; the question of ages was set at rest, and is thus simply recorded in the ship's log:—*

"October 31, 1850.—The captain returned at 8.30 a.m., and at 11.30 a.m. the remainder of the party, having, upon the 26th inst., ascertained that the waters we are now in communicate with those of Barrow's Strait, the north-eastern limit being in lat. $73^{\circ} 31' N.$, long. $114^{\circ} 39' W.$, thus establishing the existence of a NORTH-WEST PASSAGE between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans." "The winter, that dreary period of the voyage, . . . passed mildly away, there being very little snow or wind, without our sanitary state being in the slightest degree impaired, for which happiness," Captain M'Clure "assigns these reasons,—the unflagging spirits and cheerfulness of the men, the excellency of every species of provisions, the free ventilation of the lower deck, and the extreme attention of Dr. Armstrong to the state of the crew, . . . so that the month of March, 1851, found us in a most healthy and efficient condition. . . Upon the 3rd we commenced our preliminary duties." They now erected a cairn, left notices, provisions, and a boat at the larger Princess Royal Island.

* See "A Personal Narrative of the Discovery of the North-West Passage," by Dr. Armstrong, p. 278.

18th April, "All arrangements being now made for the start of the searching parties, and the weather becoming very favourable for travelling, . . . three were despatched, . . . with six weeks' provisions each;" Lieut. Haswell to search the *south-east shore*, Lieut. Cresswell the *north-west shore*, and Mr. Wynniatt, *mate*, *north-east shore*. Early May 6th, Mr. Wynniatt returned, having broken his chronometer; at six p.m. he was again en route. The 20th, Lieut. Cresswell returned, in consequence of the severe frost-bites of two of his men, having reached lat. $74^{\circ} 16' N.$, long. $117^{\circ} 40' W.$, being absent thirty-one days, contending against "strong north-west winds, . . . difficult to walk against (*temp.* 15° below zero). . . He traced the coast-line, which, for about seventy miles ALONG BANKS' LAND, was very precipitous, from which it gradually sloped to a point trending to south-west, apparently the extreme of the land in that direction, as it abruptly turned to southwards. An elevation of 1,000 feet, aided by an exceedingly clear atmosphere, left no doubt in his mind but that the Polar Sea was before him, and that Banks' Land is a part of Baring Island. . . On the 21st, a large bear was killed. Upon examination of the stomach an extraordinary medley was discovered, consisting of raisins, tobacco, pork, and adhesive plaster, that I came to the conclusion (remarks Commander M'Clure) that the *Enterprise* must be near; . . . I therefore determined to send a party to the south-west." On the 22nd, Lieut. Cresswell, with his party, were sent in that direction. "24th. The mystery of the bear was satisfactorily solved two days after; some men, in pursuit of another near the ship, picked up a preserved meat tin, with articles in it identical with those found in the stomach of the bear. . . 29th May. Lieut. Haswell and party returned in perfect health, having traced the coast towards Wollaston Land to lat. $70^{\circ} 36' N.$, long. $115^{\circ} W.$, from which point, the day being remarkably clear, he observed the outline of land to the distance of full forty miles, trending to the south-west. . . Two large inlets and a deep bay were examined, besides an archipelago of islands along the northernmost shore of the southernmost inlet, which is high, bold, and stratified, each inlet trending to the east-north-east from 80 to 90 miles. The whole coast was strewn with drift-wood. Many vestiges of Esquimaux encampments were met with, of a very old date. . . Returning, he met with a party of eighteen natives, . . . a few miles from the north-west point of the northernmost inlet." They "were in quest of seals, and were very friendly and well-disposed, but not understanding each other no information could be obtained." Hearing

this, Captain M'Clure "immediately decided upon proceeding to these people, for the purpose of obtaining information that might determine the question relating to Prince Albert's, Wollaston, and Victoria Lands, as to their forming part of the American continent, or whether each was an island." On June 3rd, they "fell in with them about ten miles to the northward of the point where they were first met with. They conversed freely with the interpreter, giving every information required relative to the trending of the coast, as far as they knew, which was some distance along Victoria Land; this they did by tracing upon a sheet of paper, . . . continuing a sketch which Mr. Miertsching (the interpreter) had made, from the ship to their tents, which they immediately comprehended, and as they were very particular in placing the islands of Sutton and Liston, with three smaller ones not mentioned in the charts, off Wollaston Land, I am," remarks Captain M'Clure, "fully persuaded of its correctness, and only regretted that they could not go further. They described a large land opposite Wollaston, called Nunavak Saraluk." This, of course, is America, to which they had never been, as they only trade with the Esquimaux to the south-east, nor had they the slightest article of European manufacture about them. Captain M'Clure describes them as "a kind, simple, purely pastoral tribe. . . Their language, Mr. Miertsching observes, is identical with that spoken on the Labrador coast." The account given of these people is very interesting.

On the 7th of June, "Mr. Wynniatt returned with his party, having been fifty days under the tent, from his exploration of a portion of the south-eastern shores of Barrow's Strait, as far as lat. $72^{\circ} 6' N.$, long. $107^{\circ} 42' W.$ * (D. R.), from whence the land was observed for about fifteen miles trending to the north-east (?). After rounding Point Peel, lat. $73^{\circ} 21' N.$, long. $112^{\circ} 30' W.$, the north point of Prince Albert's Land, he reports it to be, in all respects as to formation, the same as in this vicinity for the distance of about forty miles, when, upon crossing a deep inlet, the land assumed a north-western aspect, . . . high, precipitous, and barren; no drift-wood of any description was met with, but the ice lay against its base in heavy and broken masses. Further to the eastward, a lesser one

* Mr. Wynniatt's farthest east is over-estimated by fifty miles. See Appendix to a Paper "On the Probable Course pursued by Sir John Franklin's Expedition," read before the Royal Geographical Society, 28th March, 1856, by Alex. G. Findlay, Esq., p. 6.

was circumambulated, having in it several small islands, with its southern shore formed of stratified cliffs, having an elevation of about 800 feet. . . Upon the 10th, Lieut. Cresswell, having completed nineteen days, returned from his search towards the south-west (to lat. $71^{\circ} 10' N.$, long. $123^{\circ} 4' W.$), making, in the aggregate, fifty under the tent; during which he has coasted three sides of Baring Island." A cairn was erected, and a cylinder deposited, at Cape Lambton. The animal life is represented as very abundant. "At the present time (June) both shores of the strait are covered with wild fowl of every description, musk oxen, deer, hares, ptarmigan, and golden plover. . . All being now on board, and in excellent health, our season's operations may be considered to have terminated fortunately. . . From the close examination which has been made over a vast extent of coast, whose direct distance, by observation, embraces 800 miles, to which a third may be added for the devious windings of the coast-line, without observing the slightest vestiges of any spar, or other indication of civilized man having reached these shores, I am fully confident," remarks Captain M'Clure, "*that the missing Expedition under Sir John Franklin has never penetrated towards the Polar Sea in this direction, as some portion of the immense mass of stores, spars, or fitments with which these ships were provided must have been picked up, when drift-wood of very inconsiderable dimensions did not escape observation.*"

The first indication of open water occurred on July 7th. "Being amongst loose ice on the 17th, they made sail. . . On the 20th, a light air from the south-west gave hope of making progress to the north-east, in which direction," observes Captain M'Clure, "I was anxious to get, for the purpose of entering Barrow's Strait, . . . that I might be enabled to carry out my original intentions of *proceeding to the north of Melville Island* (see his letter to Admiralty, *ante*, p. 173), or should such not be practicable, *return to England through the Strait.*" From this date every endeavour was used to get to the north-east, occasionally gaining a few miles on the eastern side of the strait, to be drifted helplessly back on the western, which gives occasion for this remark on the 25th; "From which I am of opinion, when taken with the quantity of drift-wood that is thickly strewed along the beach, that on this (the eastern) side of the strait there is a slight current to the north-east, while, upon the opposite one, it sets to the southward, upon which there is scarcely any wood." Still they persevered, but on the 16th they "found the vessel had been drifted fifteen miles to the south-west. As there was, however,

open water to the eastward, every exertion was made to reach it;" they "succeeded, working along the eastern shore to ascertain what probability existed of being able to round the pack, and thus get into Barrow's Strait, not distant more than twenty-five miles. At nine, a.m., all hopes disappeared, as a clear view from the crow's nest discovered the ice to be closely packed, resting upon Point Lady Ross, extending in one unbroken line to the opposite side of the strait. This," says the gallant commander, "determined me to give up all idea of prosecuting our search in this direction; having been foiled in attempting this passage the latter end of one season, and at the commencement of another, I considered it not practicable, except under the favourable circumstances of a continuance of south-westerly winds, which would drive the ice into Barrow's Strait; but *I imagine there would be little difficulty in coming from the north-east*, from which quarter we found the winds prevail: our greatest advance in that direction was lat. $73^{\circ} 13' 43''$ N., long. $115^{\circ} 32' 30''$ W. Accordingly, "we bore up with the intention of running to the southward of Nelson's Head, and continuing our search along the western side of Baring's Island, with the hope of reaching the entrance of Barrow's Strait by that route, as from the report of Lieutenant Cresswell I felt convinced, that by Banks' Land there is a passage from the Polar Sea."

They rounded Nelson's Head, August 17th. Between Cape Lambton and Point Kellett the land gradually recedes to the north-west. . . Point Kellett was examined, and was reported an excellent and commodious harbour, well sheltered from the north-west to south, . . the beach, shingle and covered with drift-wood. A cask containing a notice was left there, its positive lat. $71^{\circ} 56'$ N., long. $125^{\circ} 29'$ W.; from this the land turns abruptly north by east." On the 19th they "passed between two small islands lying at the entrance of what appeared a deep inlet; . . it had a barrier of ice extending across, which prevented examination; . . near two other islands, the ice resting upon the westernmost, upon which the pressure must have been excessive, as large masses were forced nearly over its summit, which was upwards of forty feet." They ran through a channel "between these and the main, when an immediate and marked change took place in the general appearance and formation of the land; it became high, precipitous, sterile, and rugged, intersected with deep ravines and watercourses," with deep water close to the cliffs. The pack "was within half a mile of the shore, "and in many places close to it; so that, to avoid being beset," they "had nearly

to touch the land. . . On several occasions the boats were compelled to be topped up, and poles used to keep the vessel from off the grounded ice, which extends all along the coast; nor could they "round-to," fearful of carrying away the jib-boom against the cliffs, which here ran east and west. . . The cape forming its western extreme" was called "Prince Alfred. . . There were two apparently good harbours about twenty miles to the eastward of this cape. . . Our critical position," remarks Captain M'Clure, "would not admit of any detention, . . being very anxious to find a secure retreat in the event of having to winter on the coast;" the wind "now veered to the west-south-west, bringing fog and rain, . . so that, on the 20th, our further progress was impeded by finding the ice resting upon a point which formed a slight indentation of the shore, and was the only place where water could be seen. To prevent being carried away with the pack," they "secured to . . a heavy piece of ice, . . the only protection against the tremendous Polar ice, setting a knot per hour to the eastward." The position of the ship was now most critical: she was at one time lifted six feet; at another the piece to which they were attached was raised perpendicularly thirty feet, ascending above their foreyard, presenting a most frightful aspect, and made them apprehensive that it might be thrown completely over and crush the ship; again, she would be thrown over 15°, and raised bodily 1 ft. 8 in. A merciful Providence interposed, and they escaped. On September 10th, the temperature having fallen to 16°, with all the appearance of the setting in of the winter, I considered, says Captain M'Clure, "our further progress stopped until next year. . . A most interesting discovery was made in lat. 74° 27' N., long. 122° 32' W., of a range of hills composed of one entire mass of wood, in every stage, from a petrification to a log fit for firewood. . . Specimens were obtained, 3 ft. 10 in. in girth, and 7 ft. in length. . . These were found at an elevation of 300 feet above the beach. . . The country has fine valleys, well covered with verdure," and seems to abound in musk oxen, deer, hares, ptarmigan. From the 10th to the 19th every exertion was used, every method adopted, by blasting the ice, &c., to force the ship from her exposed position—open to the whole pressure of the Polar pack, surrounded by dangers on every side. On the 19th they passed Point Colquhoun, "the ice to the eastward of which was much larger and more massive." Pursuing their perilous way, on the 20th they were forced into the pack, but extricated themselves. The pressure near Cape Austin (M'Clure) was so great as to force the ice up the cliff full seventy

feet. 21st. They passed that cape, "grazing round it within fifteen yards." Again, they were compelled "to make fast beneath a cliff, whose summit, nearly plumbing the hatchways, rendered" their "position very unsafe, many fragments appearing so loose, . . . that a slight concussion would have brought them down." 22nd. They reached Cape Crozier, upon the south-eastern side of which the ice was resting." Capt. McClure here "examined the coast-line: towards the south-east a deep bay extended thirty miles in that direction, . . . filled with ice moving to the westward," but "much less formidable . . . to that" they had been subjected. He says, "Indeed, since rounding Cape Austin it has lost much of its terrible aspect, which led to the inference that we were fairly in Barrow's Strait, and that the main Polar pack takes a direct line from the last-mentioned cape to the east-north-east, and is carried down Barrow's Strait; and that which fills these bays is the comparatively small ice which drifts from its southern edge, as we have invariably remarked that there is a decidedly eastern current, which impels the enormous Polar floes on that course, while the lighter, influenced by wind, is oftentimes setting in an opposite direction." Early a.m. of the 23rd, "open water, and a wind from westward," enabled them to run close along the shore, on which rested a line of thin ice, rendering the entrances of what appeared three good harbours inaccessible. 7.30 p.m., they ran on "a mud-bank," but, after much exertion, they hove the vessel off. At daylight of the 24th, they found they "were on the north-west side of a large bay, whose eastern limit bore north-east eight miles, which," they "subsequently found, formed the western point of Banks' Land. . . . Still, wishing to see if any possibility remained of getting down Barrow's Strait," they "stood to the north-east, when, observing from the crow's nest no water in that direction, I determined," says Captain McClure, "to make this our winter quarters. Having remarked, on the south side of the bank on which we had grounded, a well-protected bay, we anchored, and that night were firmly frozen in; which, in grateful remembrance of the many perils that we had, during the passage of that terrible Polar Sea, escaped, . . . have named it the Bay of Mercy," lat. $74^{\circ} 6' N.$, long. $118^{\circ} 15' W.$; thus finally terminating this short season's operations. Preparations were now made for passing another winter. On October 4th, Mr. Court was sent to connect" their "position with that visited by Lieutenant Cresswell in May last, . . . distant eighteen miles. . . . On the 7th he returned; which service completed the search around the entire coast-line of this island. He reported open water a few miles

from the shore, which, gradually extending, reached the cliffs of Banks' Land upon the 6th; detached the heavy grounded land ice from their base," drifting "it to the north-west. . . *That evening no ice could be remarked in the strait, the whole being set into the Polar Sea. . .* 10th. Mr. Sainsbury, mate, went to examine an inlet which appeared to run some distance to the south-west, from the south side of the bay; but upon the following day returned, finding it extended only twelve miles; it "terminated in a large marsh." The shooting parties were now very successful, and during the whole winter, excepting during three weeks in January, when it was too dark. On April 1st, they had upwards of 1,000 pounds of venison hanging to their yardarms. . . The winter," remarks Capt. M'Clure, "has been much more boisterous, but in each month several degrees *more mild* than was experienced in Prince of Wales' Strait, *nearly a degree and a half further south*, last year, which, in conjunction with *the animals remaining in numbers in this locality the entire winter*, must, I suppose, *be taken as a proof of its mildness, although always exposed to the north-west winds, direct from the Polar Sea*, which, upon our being first frozen in, led to the anticipation . . . of a very severe season. . . Being desirous of visiting Winter Harbour, Melville Island, with the hope of meeting an officer with whom arrangements might be made in the event of any accident occurring which would render it necessary to quit the ship," Capt. M'Clure, with Mr. Court (second master) and a sledge party, started on April 11th, 1852; but in consequence of continued thick weather did not reach there until the 28th. "Having deposited a notice of their visit under the same cairn that Lieutenant M'Clintock left one last year, upon a *large fragment of sandstone*;" the well known sandstone, bearing the inscription of the *Hecla* and *Griper* having wintered in the adjacent harbour, under Parry and Lyddon, in 1819-20, A. Fisher, sculpsit; they returned, "*travelling on flat ice nearly the entire way, accomplishing in ten days what occupied eighteen on the outward trip, and reached the ship on May 9th*, where they received satisfactory reports as to the sanitary condition of the crew, and that the supply of venison continued abundant. June 30 was an entire day of heavy snow; and on July 1st, they "found the ice had increased its thickness four inches during the last month. The crew now showed "evident signs of debility, . . . and decided scorbutic tendency, . . . plainly," says the gallant commander, "the effect of the late heavy labour in ballasting and watering; but as all our work is on board, their gradual return to perfect health may be anticipated. On the 8th

two musk bulls were killed, whose gross weight was 1,390 pounds, yielding 650 pounds of excellent beef. More Esquimaux huts were found, and the question is suggested, "Why should they have quitted an island abounding throughout the year with game? except, as the Esquimaux interpreter observes, there may be a paucity of seals, without which luscious food they cannot exist; and this may be the reason, as we have seen very few." During July there was but little thaw. August 10th. "Lanes of water were observed to seaward, and along the cliffs of Banks' Land there was a clear space of six miles in width, extending along them as far as the eye could reach from the north-west hills, elevated 1,000 feet." The 12th, the wind, which had been some time northward, veered to the south, which had the effect of separating the sea ice from that of the bay, entirely across the entrance, but, shortly shifting to the north, it closed again, and never after moved. . . . 20th. The temperature fell to 27°, the entire bay was completely frozen over; and on the 27th, to 19°; . . . the young ice two inches and a half thick." Capt. McClure remarks, "The summer was fairly gone, the uplands are all snow-covered, the wild fowl all departed, and the flowers, which gave cheerful variety to this bleak land, are all withered; the very season may be considered as one long sunless day, as since May that luminary has been scarcely visible. . . . I felt assured," he says, "that the winter had fairly set in, and all hopes of any release this year totally annihilated. . . . On the 8th September I announced my intentions to the crew, of sending half of them to England next April, *viz* Baffin's Bay and the Mackenzie, detaining the remainder with the hope of extricating the vessel in 1853; or, failing that, to proceed with sledges, in 1854, by Port Leopold; our provisions admitting of no other arrangement. Although we had already been a twelvemonth upon two-thirds allowance, it was necessary to make preparations for meeting eighteen months more; a very severe deprivation, and constitutional test, but one which the service calls for." He adds, "The vessel being as sound as the day she entered the ice, it would be discreditably to desert her in 1853, when a favourable season would run her through the straits, and admit of reaching England in safety, where the successful achievement of the long-sought-for and almost hopeless discovery of the North-West Passage would be received with a satisfaction, that will amply compensate for the sacrifices made and hardships endured. This statement was well received" by the gallant fellows. September 24th. "This is the anniversary of our arrival; the contrast is very remarkable. We entered the bay with a temperature at 33°,

and not a particle of ice in it; to-day it stands at 2°, with ice which has never moved, and every indication of a very severe winter." October 25th. "Housed the vessel over, and prepared to meet it. 26th, being the second anniversary of our discovery of the 'Passage,' and the last we should be together, the occasion was celebrated by a small additional allowance of provisions and an extra glass of grog. . . The evening was passed most jovially, in singing and dancing. . . During the winter deer were met with, ninety at one time and forty at another, but wild; also hares and ptarmigan." The Christmas festivities passed with the greatest cheerfulness. "Haunches of venison, hares roasted, and soup made of the same, with ptarmigan and sea-pies, such dainties, in such profusion, I should imagine never before graced a ship's lower deck;" and all "enjoying such excellent health, so joyful, so happy. . . I could not but feel deeply impressed (writes the gallant officer) as I contemplated the gay and plenteous sight, with the many great mercies which a kind and beneficent Providence had extended towards us." March 1st, 1853, the following remark occurs: "The cold of the last two months was excessive. January showing a mean of — 44°, being 17° below the corresponding period last year, and one day it fell to — 65°." They invariably felt the *greatest cold when the wind was from the south-south-west quarter during both winters; when from the north the glass rose, and was highest when it was easterly.* These low temperatures, with an insufficiency of firing, caused much moisture between decks, which was materially felt by the crew. "To these may be added the long time they had been on a reduced allowance of food; but they improved as the season advanced. Preparations were now made for sending away part of the crews to England; some by the Mackenzie and others by Baffin's Bay. On the 15th those intended to travel were placed on full allowance. On April 5th the temperature at noon exposed to the sun, + 40°." Capt. M'Clure remarks, "The extreme severity of the winter is over. . . On April 15th it is my intention to start the parties destined to make their way to England." On April 10th,* details are given as to what his operations will be in 1854, in the event of not getting to England in 1853. These details we need not enter upon. This letter is written evidently under sad depression of feeling; it concludes, "Although we have not succeeded in obtaining information which could throw the slightest clue upon the fate of our missing countrymen, I hope that the services per-

* Blue Book, "Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1854," p. 60.

formed in the tracing of a very great extent of coast-line, the discovery of much new land, a portion inhabited by a simple and primitive people not hitherto known, and, above all, the accurate knowledge of that PASSAGE BETWEEN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, which for so many hundred years has baffled maritime Europe, . . . will, I trust, be considered events sufficiently interesting and important to elicit . . . a favourable consideration of our services." But it had pleased God a speedier and happier termination to all their labours and privations was nearer at hand than they expected. Before succour and rescue arrives, whilst as yet the *Investigator* is tenanted by the gallant hearts who had guided her in safety half over the globe, that she might enter upon her perilous but sacred mission, soon to be deserted herself, a few remarks on this important voyage may not be out of place. But first let us pay tribute to Capt. M'Clure, his excellent officers and crew: their skill, energy, and determination command our highest admiration and warmest praise. *Theirs was the honour to be the first to navigate a ship along the coasts of Arctic America; theirs the solution of the long agitated question of a North-West Passage.* It will be seen the search for our unfortunate countrymen, exclusive of the American coast-line, extended from lat. $70^{\circ} 38'$ to $74^{\circ} 29'$ N., and from long. $107^{\circ} 42'$ to $125^{\circ} 29'$ W. These limits comprehend Baring Island, Prince of Wales' Strait, and the northern part of Prince Albert's Land,*—new discoveries, which connected the Banks' Land of Parry, within a few miles, to Dr. Rae's furthest north-west point on Wollaston Land. This of itself was of great importance, as the space between these two lands had hitherto been a blank on our charts; and it was, too, on the direct south-western route from Cape Walker; hence it was not unreasonably inferred, that *Franklin, if successful in following the course indicated by his instructions, might here be found, emerging to the westward.* Unhappily, the examination afforded not the slightest trace that the Expedition had been anywhere along this whole coastline, or on either of the shores of Prince of Wales' Strait, or on Banks' Land. On the west side of Baring Island, we could not think traces would be found; but the search between Banks' and Wollaston Lands did

* Here one of those singular coincidences occurred so often noticed in the course of the search. Lieut. Hoewell was on the north side of an inlet (afterwards called Albert's Sound) on May 14th, 1851, and Dr. Rae was on the south side of the same inlet on the 24th; only ten days and thirty miles between them. It has often been said, these coincidences arose from want of arrangement; we really cannot see it—how is an arrangement to be made for meeting on an unknown coast?

good service, although unsuccessful, as it afforded still stronger evidence that Franklin had not attained such large westing as was supposed; and therefore, as no trace of him was discovered by Austin's western parties along the southern shores of the Parry Islands, or at Melville Island, it could only be concluded, that, in seeking him we must look for him more to the eastward, in Melville Sound; and here we must regret that the search of Melville Sound was not made a primary object; the search should have been exhausted in that direction. By and through that sound Franklin was especially directed to proceed. It formed the groundwork of the plan devised by Sir John Barrow for the solution of the great problem; but it seems on all occasions to have been avoided, for some reason which is inexplicable to us. Capt. M'Clure at this time was not aware of the partial search of its eastern side by Capts. Oumaney and Osborne; it was, therefore, all open for his examination, and should have been done. We must confess we should have looked for some traces of a retreating party in Prince of Wales' Strait, for the report of the party at Point Warren we do not consider satisfactorily cleared up. We shall now follow the course of the *Investigator* after she left Cape Bathurst, noting occasionally the currents she experienced on this eventful voyage. When Baring Island was discovered, with the ice resting on its western side, Capt. M'Clure had no alternative but to follow the open water to the north-east, up Prince of Wales' Strait; but it will be remembered his object was to examine the western and northern sides of Melville Island, and to the north of the Parry Group, on to Wellington Channel. Having reached lat. $73^{\circ} 14' 19''$ N., long. $115^{\circ} 32' 30''$ W., his extreme north-east limit in that strait, he found the ice impenetrable, a current setting to the southward on the western side, and a slight one to the north-east on the eastern side, but both considerably under the influence of the prevailing winds. The southerly current seems to have predominated; but this is no more than one might have expected, from the known general easterly direction of the current between Banks' Land and Melville Island. The course of this current to the eastward would be deflected to the southward, through Prince of Wales' Strait, and hence its northern entrance would become ice-blocked. Capt. M'Clure regrets he could not get through, but perhaps it was fortunate for him that he could not; for, had he, might he not have become involved and embarrassed by that south-east drift so portentously spoken of by the Rosses? (see *ante*, pp. 52 and 79) and perhaps have shared the fate of the *Erebus* and *Terror*, if no more exertion had been made for his rescue (from Cape Walker to the

south-west, than has been for the inmates of those unfortunate ships: not that we are inclined to pin our faith to all the assumed horrors of this fatal region; it was unvisited, and therefore unknown. But it pleased Providence that he should not get through; still the lesson this ice-blocked channel gave it would have been wise to have remembered; for, even supposing him to have succeeded, and to have overcome that south-east drift, how would he get to the western side of Melville Island? Not through Banks' Strait: how then?—between Melville and Byam Martin Islands? But he did not succeed, and we need not speculate. Capt. M'Clure now resolved to attempt a passage north by the western side of Baring Island. The proximity of the floating masses of ice all along this coast rendered the navigation exceedingly difficult; but when he reached Cape Alfred, and thence on to Cape Austin (M'Clure), the coast trending north-east and south-west, it must have been really appalling. The enormous masses were now found driven home to the cliffs, and the wonder is how he succeeded in getting his ship through at all. After rounding Cape Austin, a marked change is noticed in the ice, "it has lost much of its terrible aspect." From this Capt. M'Clure infers "we are now fairly in Barrow's Strait, and that the main Polar pack takes a direct line from that cape to the east-north-east." *This is, no doubt, partially the fact, but not all: the large masses of ice along the shores of the whole of the western and north-western sides of Baring Island told a tale easy of interpretation, the key of which was to be found between Capes Alfred and Austin. They told of a large northern and western sea, having a current setting to the eastward, but arrested and turned aside in a south-east direction by the presence of some obstacle to the north and west of their position; say of land: bearing onward the heavy Polar pack directly against the opposing north-west shores of Baring Island; and hence the heavy pressure there. Here the main pack would divide: the greater portion would follow the southern trending of those shores, and the lesser the course of Banks' Strait. They told further that the western limit of this north-west land might be nearly defined by the altered aspect and drift of the floating masses east and west of Cape Austin: for if this north-west land did not exist no change could have occurred, but the whole northern coast of Baring Island would have been open to the same terrific effects as at that cape, and westward to Cape Alfred. But the line of heavy pressure ceasing at Cape Austin, the masses were left free, and, obeying the general current, floated off easterly and northerly; they were, in short, within the shelter and eddy resulting from the position of this north-west land.*

If we are right in the inferences we have drawn, they go strongly to prove the existence of a great north-western sea, but whether open or not remains to be proved; still, looking to Wrangell's discoveries, and to the fact noticed by M'Clure, *that the glass rose when the wind was from the north, we may with reason imagine his Polynia to extend to the north of Prince Patrick's Land. The debris of that portion of the main pack taking the direction of Banks' Strait, and easily influenced by the wind, was found to fill the inlets and bays on the south side of Banks' Strait. It follows, then, that a ship on that side of the strait would, by continuing an easterly course, lessen her chances of crossing to Melville Island, and making the passage; whereas, did she make the attempt more to the westward, and take advantage of the east-north-east current near Cape Austin (M'Clure) the passage might be made.*

Capt. M'Clure does not state the plan he shall adopt for getting through Banks' Strait; whether he shall wait until open water presents a favourable prospect of getting across to Melville Island, or shall throw his ship into the pack, and drift with it to the eastward, taking advantage, of course, of any lead to the northward. The chance by the former might be rare, and to adopt the latter seems like temerity; but not so much so as would at first sight appear. *Parry, in attempting to get west by this strait, had the general current against him; in the case before us, M'Clure, in trying to get east, would have it in his favour.* We must think, if it was his intention to throw his ship into the pack, that it should have been done the first favourable opportunity after passing Cape Austin (M'Clure); he would then have had the advantage of that east-north-east set he mentions, which, with the prevailing north-west winds, would, we have no doubt, have brought him through. More than one chance of open water occurred, particularly on September 24th,* when no ice could be seen in the strait; the time in the season was late, but the distance was nothing—about sixty or seventy miles. By hugging the shores of Haring Island after passing Cape Austin (M'Clure), we think he lost his chance of getting his ship across. The experience of Parry in the past, and his own, obtained at the northern entrance of Prince of Wales' Strait, would at this time, if remembered, have done him good service: from them he would have learned, that in proportion as he persisted to the eastward on the south side of Banks' Strait, the more would he get within the indraught of Melville Sound, and defeat his great object, that of making the Passage.

* Parry reached his winter quarters, Melville Island, September 26th, 1819.

We should scarcely have made these remarks on a voyage so full of peril, and yet so skilfully conducted, but we feel that the entire passage might have been made in the ship. It was not; and we regret it, as so much greater honour would have redounded to the gallant commander and the officers and crews of the *Investigator*. An officer like commander, M'Clure, one who had the experience of wintering in the pack in Prince of Wales' Strait, and had the daring and ability to bring his ship safely through the terrific dangers of the passage, along the western and northern sides of Baring Island, needed not to have dreaded any difficulties that he might have had to encounter between Baring and Melville Islands; if any one could have overcome them he would. We have quoted very profusely from Capt. M'Clure's despatches, we have done so for this reason;—that enterprising commander settled the question, that truly British question, of a North-West Passage, and we feel it cannot be too often printed, or too widely known, that it was done by Britain. Alas! that Franklin and his gallant associates were not restored to join in the exultation, that another wreath had been added to their country's fame.

May 10th, 1853.—Lieut. Pim was despatched by Captain Kellett from Melville Island to the Harbour of Mercy, where he arrived April 6 (thermometer ranging from -40° to -50°). For a description of the meeting between that enthusiastic young officer and all on board the *Investigator*, we must refer the reader to Capt. M'Clure's letter to Capt. Kellett, May 2, 1853: he says,* "All description must fall below the reality. . . The heart was too full to articulate. . . The sick forgot their maladies; . . the healthy their despondency. . . Such a scene can never be forgotten; all was now life, activity, and joyful astonishment. . . In the twinkling of an eye the whole crew were changed." The commander, officers, and crew of the *Investigator*, being now in communication with that warm-hearted, efficient officer, Capt. Kellett, may be, under Providence, now considered safe; preparations were instantly made for the removal of the sick. April 7th. Lieutenant Pim, with Capt. M'Clure and party, started for Dealy Island, and arrived on board the *Resolute*, Capt. Kellett, on April 19th; another party soon followed. When the despatches left a survey was about to be held on the remainder of the crew; and if not more than twenty effective volunteers to remain by her, the *Investigator* was to be abandoned.

Commander Pullen's despatches are to August 24th, 1853;† they

* See Blue Book, "Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1854," p. 91.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 103 to 147.

admit of few extracts: the following only come within our object—the direction of the search for Sir John Franklin.

August 19th, 1852.—Dr. M'Cormick started with a boat party to explore the eastern shores of Wellington Channel, and round Baring Bay, to ascertain if any channel existed to the eastward, communicating with Jones's Sound.

August 26th.—Commander Pullen left with a boat party to examine the coasts between Cape Riley and Maxwell Bay: the head of the latter had not been determined, it too was supposed to communicate with Jones's Sound.

On September 2nd, Commander Pullen returned. The land was found to be continuous all round the head of Maxwell Bay. No traces of our countrymen were detected; he found other circles of stones, similar to those at Cape Riley, and had no doubt but they were the remains of old Esquimaux encampments.

September 8th. — Dr. M'Cormick returned, having, notwithstanding a continued series of heavy gales from the north-west, examined every nook in the coast-line north to Baring Bay, and sledged from that bay to Point Owen; from thence, at an elevation of 300 feet, he had a view of the curve of Prince Alfred's Bay; but found no passage running eastward into Jones's Sound, nor any traces of the presence of our missing countrymen in this direction.

Dr. M'Cormick's narrative* abounds with valuable notes and observations, which the limited object of these pages does not permit us to take advantage of. We cannot coincide with his views regarding the course of Sir John Franklin after he left Beechey Island, but we cannot but respect them, because we believe them sincere.

We must make room for the following extracts from his "Remarks on the Search for Sir John Franklin, the Probable Position of the *Erebus* and *Terror*, and Fate of their Crews:" he says, "My experience during the late voyage, and winter passed on the very same spot where Franklin spent his, and where all traces of him cease, have most decidedly confirmed me in the opinion I had ventured to express in my plans of search some five years ago, viz., that the missing Expedition passed up the Wellington Channel into the Polar Sea, and was to be sought for amongst the archipelago of islands and drifting packs of ice, with which that sea is most unquestionably encumbered. . . My reasons for coming to the conclusion I then did, need not be recapitulated here, they have been fully explained in

* See Blue Book, "Papers Relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1854," pp. 187 to 225.

my plans, submitted at the time, and subsequently in the year 1850-2." As we have given the whole of the Doctor's plans (*see ante*, pp. 65, 94, 112); to these we must refer the reader. He adds, "I am of opinion that sledging parties from his ships had been up Wellington Channel. . . Their tracks round Cape Spencer, in the direction of Cape Bowden, clearly point out the course they had in view;" and he concludes, "Nearly nine years have now elapsed since our countrymen left these shores; I cannot help feeling now, that *traces of their fate is all*, unhappily, I have too much reason to fear, *that remains to be discovered of them.*" The Doctor subsequently volunteered to explore Smith's Sound, which was declined. We ought to add here, the journal of his trip up Wellington Channel is admirably illustrated from drawings made by him on the spot; they portray with skilful truth the wild, desolate, often grand scenery of these regions.

Our extracts from these despatches have been lengthy, but our object has been to do justice to the efforts of the Wellington Channel division of the Expedition under Sir Edward Belcher. It will be seen not a vestige of the missing Expedition rewarded their persevering labours; but could aught of success have rationally been expected from a quarter where we had not the least fact to prove they had gone? From the period when the search by the Wellington Channel was first mooted it was advanced on purely apocryphal grounds, it was nearly at a right angle to the direction in which Franklin was sent; the result, then, was as might have been anticipated. It is a waste of words to talk of its being the principal remaining point of his Instructions, failing the first: *we were in ignorance whether he had failed in the first or not; there was, then, only one course open to us, which was to follow the first. We rejected this simple course, and have, as a consequence, failed to discover and rescue our unfortunate countrymen.* The eastern parties of the Wellington Channel division of this Expedition were wholly in a wrong direction, and the south-western held out little or no promise of success, excepting at their western extreme. Even the western or Melville Island division under Captain Kellett offered but barely a hope. The extended and careful examinations of Austin's and Penny's parties along the southern shores, and between the Parry Islands, and up Wellington Channel, had, in our opinion, settled the question that *Franklin had never attempted a northern route at all.* The Wellington Channel, and Jones's and Smith's Sounds, were from the first a delusion. Commander McClure's parties at Wollaston and Prince Albert's Lands were in the right direction; their want of success in

discovering traces of the missing Expedition, particularly in Prince of Wales' Strait, we must confess surprised and disappointed us. We had looked for signs of a retreating party in that direction; the absence of such leads us to think they sought a passage more directly south, *i. e.*, from the bottom of Melville Sound. Thus placed, without a particle of information to guide, either from the eastern division under Sir Edward Belcher, or that from Behring's Strait, under Commander M'Clure, with the hopes from the Melville Island division, under the gallant Captain Kellett, hitherto so sanguine, almost forgotten, speculation, wild and discursive, again prevailed. Rumours of new expeditions were bruited, especially the route by way of Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla; the latter was no sooner abroad than it called forth a violent burst of opposition from a portion of the Press: but before we remark upon it and what followed, we think it would not be out of place, amidst the conflicting opinions reigning, to notice what were those of this all-powerful body. We shall give extracts from two or three of its principal organs, immediately on the arrival of these despatches by the *Phoenix*. It will be seen they are not marked by over-delicacy of feeling, nor do they exhibit a very profound knowledge of the subject upon which they pronounce so authoritatively. The opinions, then, thus expressed, can only be taken for what they are worth. The *Times*, in a leader (October 8th), says, "Commander M'Clure can send us no news of Sir John Franklin's Expedition: can any be expected? The opinion among the most distinguished and experienced of the Polar worthies now is, that Sir John Franklin, after leaving the winter's quarters, proceeded to carry out the Admiralty's Instructions—*steering first westerly for Melville Island, and then shaping a course, as far as the configuration of the scene of action permitted, southerly and westerly for Behring's Strait*. It is supposed, that in endeavouring to carry this purpose into effect, the *Erebus* and *Terror* were hopelessly frozen up or destroyed years ago. *We do not give this as a theory of our own, although it is with reference to a point upon which all men now may venture to advance a theory.*" The article closes thus: "Even Sir John Barrow, had he been yet alive, would now have entreated the Admiralty to hold their hand." We beg to remark, 1st. That Franklin was not directed to Melville Island at all, but rather to avoid it; he was directed to the meridian of Cape Walker, or about 98° W., and latitude about 74½° N., and from thence in a south-west direction (see Sections 5 and 6). 2nd. We fancy we know the sentiments of most of the Polar worthies, and we are quite assured they would shrink from

the expression of an opinion that would thus summarily dispose of the lives of 135 energetic English seamen, led by talented officers, with their endless expedients for supporting life, and consign them to a miserable death. Why should not an Englishman, by adopting their food, &c., live and become acclimatized in a high northern latitude as well as an Esquimaux? Notwithstanding all that has been written, we are yet uncertain that he might not. It is not many years since when the scurvy raged fearfully on board ships bound to India and round the Horn: we hear nothing of the kind now. 3rd. We do not think "all men may venture to advance a theory" upon a question involving life or death. Sir J. Franklin's Instructions were positive; they admitted not of theorizing in the prosecution of the search—but theory stepped in and bewildered, and we know the lamentable result. 4th. It is unjust to the memory of Sir John Barrow to assume that "he would now have entreated the Admiralty to hold their hand." He would rather have said, "You sent 135 Englishmen on a perilous service; it is your duty to recover or know the end of them." The remarks of the *Morning Herald*, October 10th, are in a very different tone: "A North-West Passage has been found, but those who were specially despatched, and have so long spent themselves for its accomplishment, are not rescued; and we confess ourselves to be among those who cannot advocate the cold-blooded policy of our contemporary, and say, 'Hold! enough,' while the efforts which England has made for the safety of her imperilled sons have resulted only in an addition . . . to our geographical knowledge. . . . We are convinced that the name which has been invoked in the cause of supineness has been unwarrantably dealt with, and that neither Sir John Barrow's hand nor his pen would have been stayed so long as the question of life or death to the heroic Franklin and his followers remained a doubtful one." This is nobly and justly written. But the following cannot be borne out by facts. Before we give the extract, it would be as well to remark, on the glass balls alluded to by it, that information had been received at the Foreign Office from St. Petersburg that several glass balls or bottles, hermetically sealed, but containing no memoranda, had been found on the most northern part of the Siberian coast. These bottles were thought to have been thrown overboard from Franklin's ships; supposed, of course, to have attained a high northern latitude. The extract runs thus: "There are rumours that little or no doubt exists . . . that Franklin did pass up Wellington Channel; and this confirmation of previous convictions gives the deepest importance to

the fact, recently communicated to the Admiralty by the Russian Government, of the discovery on the coast of Siberia of glass bottles of a peculiar form, thrown up by the Polar Sea. That these bottles have come from the northward can no more be doubted than they have been carried there by a more civilized people than any to be found in that region. . . . We cannot but regard these bottles as having been thrown out by some of our missing countrymen, either the parties of Franklin or Collinson. The reasonings of those who oppose the view that Franklin passed into the Polar Basin are founded on a *mis-statement of facts*. It is asserted that his Instructions ordered him to proceed to Melville Island, whereas the exact reverse of this is true. A reference to his orders will show that he was instructed to avoid Melville Island (for reasons adduced), and was recommended to take the more northern course by Wellington Channel as his alternative, if prevented from proceeding to the south-west." The route here indicated is doubtless that which Franklin was directed to pursue; but passing from this fling at the *Times*, as to "mis-statement of facts," we would ask, By what train of reasoning does the *Morning Herald* arrive at the conclusion that Franklin adopted "*the more northern course by Wellington Channel*"? or even that he ever adopted a northern course at all? Facts in favour of either there were none—all was mere assumption. How, then, these Siberian bottles without memoranda could be looked upon with the "deepest importance" on a fancied confirmation that he did, is past our comprehension. Could he not as readily (and from what we have learned of that ice-blocked channel, we think far more readily) have gone to the north, if he did attempt it, by one of the more western passages of the Parry Group as by it? We have ever thought, seeing the general easterly current into Baffin's Bay, that the same combination of favourable circumstances which cleared that channel would clear these western passages also. Again, had not that notorious channel been now twice searched for traces of the Franklin Expedition in vain? wasting the all-precious time in profitless labour, and the daring energies of our sailors in an unavailing, useless effort. What is this but pitting one baseless theory against another? But enough: *imagination, restlessly wandering, had now rounded the circuit of the Pole*—had made, in short, a circumpolar voyage, and looked for our lost countrymen any and every where but in the south; there she had conjured up an extension of Kellett's Land to the eastward, barring them from the Pacific. Not content with this, she created a Polynia to the north of the Parry Islands,

and she deceived the friends of science into the belief that Franklin (in opposition to his orders) had ascended the Wellington Channel to navigate it—that he had entered the “wide, immeasurable ocean” of Wrangell, and had reached the Siberian coast: here she paused. These bottles were now *picked up in the Sea of Kara,* not on the Siberian coast, yet, assuming a drift for them to the westward*, she saw a farther course for Franklin, and on airy wing outspread she pursued him on to the west, along the coasts of Northern Asia, watched him rounding Cape Taimyr, which never keel had done before, and traced him persisting to the westward by the jagged outline of the north of Europe, and on to England and his home—consummating, at one and the same time, the two passages of the “Old Worthies,” the north-west and the north-east. Again she rested: could she farther go? It will be seen—her presence will be recognized in the rumoured “New Arctic Expedition,” which follows.

Notwithstanding the unfavourable reports from the north-eastern division under Sir Edward Belcher (now on his way home) as to the existence of a Polynia to the north of the Parry Islands, and the utter want of success of all his parties in detecting any traces of the Franklin Expedition up Wellington Channel and to the north of it, eastward to 90° W., and westward to Melville Island, the opinion still continued to be maintained to the contrary in both cases, namely, that it had gone to the north by that channel, and had penetrated the Polar Basin which was thought to exist beyond the parallel of 80°. It was even thought that the ships might be forced out to the north of Greenland, or “fragments of the ships, if lost,” would be found on the shores of Spitzbergen; the deer with the split ears, too (see page 271), were supposed to have reference to the crews of the Expedition. This belief was countenanced by several eminently scientific men, and a *hope was expressed that the seas around Spitzbergen might be explored*; in short, that the plan of Mr. Petermann should be tested. The rumour of a “new Arctic Expedition,” especially in this direction, roused opposition in many quarters, and a portion of the Press thundered violently against the project. For ourselves,

* The bottles found in the Sea of Kara, south-east of Nova Zembla, which have created so much curiosity of late, as possibly having been sent adrift by Franklin, turn out to have no connection with him whatever. They have been recognized by persons competently informed on the subject to be the same as those made at Hammerfest, near the North Cape, and used by Norwegian fishermen for the purpose of *floating their nets*. See the “Arctic Despatches,” reprinted from the *Nautical Magazine*, Potter, page 100.

believing that Franklin had been enabled partly to fulfil his Instructions, and that in prosecuting them he had got locked up in the ice to the west and south of Cape Walker, we looked upon all search by the way of Spitzbergen as a useless waste of time and energy, and the more so as Melville Sound had not been completely searched. We could not coincide with Captain Austin's conclusions, however we might regret to differ from that estimable officer. Again, the relics picked up by Dr. Rae (already referred to) went to strengthen our belief in this position. But notwithstanding we concurred with the non-contents in their opposition to a search for our lamented countrymen in this direction, still we must say the arguments of the projectors are not always fairly stated; the conclusions, therefore, arising from them are worthless, besides which we perceive there is a coarse, unfeeling tone of expression which, we think, ill befits the melancholy subject, and must have jarred painfully with the feelings of the mothers and fathers and other relatives and friends at home. We cannot forbear noticing the following (see *Times*, November 25th, 1853): "Sir John Franklin and his gallant companions have long since been called to their account. . . *It is not very important to establish the exact spot* at which they met with a fate which, no doubt, they encountered with all the courage and devotion of British seamen. *But they are gone—gone long since—every one felt it*, although, from delicacy and over-scrupulousness, men were slow to assert the truth. Eight years' absence is the proof on one side of the question; what is the proof on the other?" We do not choose to waste our time in going into arguments to disprove this heartless, unsubstantiated assertion, but we would ask, What proof has the *Times* that "they are gone" at all? "Eight years' absence" is no proof of death, and we have high authority for saying—no less an authority than Sir John Franklin himself—"that where Esquimaux do live out a fair period of life, it is but reasonable to suppose that Europeans may also subsist and survive for many years;"* and there is no doubt of it, if their habits and mode of living are adopted. The means nature has afforded equally to the Englishman and the Esquimaux. As to the "*spot*" where they are said to have met their fate, we hold it to be *most important that it should be determined*—that we may know for certain whether they are alive or dead. England sent them on a hazardous enterprise, and she is bound to know the end of them.

* See "An Earnest Appeal to the Public on behalf of the Missing Arctic Expedition," by Lieut. Bedford Pim, R.N., F.R.G.S., page 19. 1857.

The following sentence must have been written in error, or it argues great carelessness or most deplorable ignorance. We would, in mercy, place it to the former: "Our conjecture . . . is, that Sir John Franklin and his companions must have perished *beyond Wellington Channel*; that is, to the eastward, and probably south-east, somewhere in the line of . . . the Admiralty Instructions." Now, every tyro knows the Admiralty Instructions directed him to the south-west. The expression "*beyond Wellington Channel*" is very indefinite. We shall conclude with one more extract, in which, we are glad to say, we fully agree with the *Times*: "But there has always been one point which, to our apprehension, has been quite conclusive against the fact of the advance up Wellington Channel. Had Sir John Franklin, at this early point and period (at Beechey Island) of his Expedition, determined to deviate from the Admiralty Instructions, we are very confident that at the mouth of Wellington Channel, or at some proper spot in the neighbourhood, he would have left a record of his intended direction. . . . The ships . . . might have met with disaster in the ice, either here or there, . . . but there could not be any contingency which would make such an officer as Franklin so terribly forgetful of his duty as not to leave behind him a notice of his route at his point of deviation." These articles (as their names were mentioned) called forth replies from Capt. Inglefield and Mr. Petermann in vindication of, and from Capt. (the late Admiral) Beechey against, the project. Experienced and sound, years had taught him to be cautious. We must extract the following from his letter, because of the reply given to it: "It has been rumoured that a lady, whose heroic conduct is so well known to the world, is willing to advance money towards such project." This produced a denial from Mr. C. B. Weld, that Lady Franklin had any such intention. He says: "She has no funds for such a purpose. . . . Her anxiety is mainly directed to another point, viz., that unexplored region, lying in the course that her husband was ordered to take, *between the meridians of Wellington Channel and Behring's Strait*, which was his destined outlet." This extract will show in what undefined terms the sense of Franklin's Instructions are expressed. Who can understand by "*between the meridians of Wellington Channel and Behring's Strait*" the direction in which the *Ersbus* and *Terror* were sent, or the route for search which should be adopted to recover them? But all along there seems a want of decision, a fear in writers to commit themselves by *urging the really first point of Franklin's Instructions, viz., from Cape Walker to the south-*

sent: hence the visionary search by the Wellington Channel. But we must leave the opinions of the Press—with their *cui bono* cry, melancholy sacrifice of life, waste of public money, &c.—to be replied to by the “Polar dilettante” invoked by the *Times*.

However, this controversy elicited many valuable deductions and facts from Mr. Petermann, tending to prove the existence of an open sea in the far north, and that ships, as late as the year 1837, had reached the latitude of $82\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$, with open water still farther to the north, therein confirming in part the rejected accounts of the old Dutch navigators. Though not favourable to the project as a plan for the rescue of Franklin and his companions, now, alas! absent eight years, and yet *unsought for in the direction in which they were sent!* still we must think the *facts* advanced greatly contribute to favour the opinion of a Polar Ocean, which, in the present state of our knowledge, we cannot regard as “such an anomaly in nature” as has been so dogmatically insisted on.

It was now (December) asserted—and contradicted—but still believed, that the Admiralty intended, if intelligonce was not received by the 31st of March, 1854, that Sir John Franklin and his officers and crews were alive, they would be considered as having died in Her Majesty's service. At first we could not believe this report, but it was too true. Again the Press:—“The Polar Seas have been *ransacked in every direction,*” (?) says one newspaper. “The sum of money thus spent (in Polar discovery) in the last thirty-five years could not fall much short of ten millions sterling!” (†?) “And all this nearly at the instigation of one silly dreamer like Sir John Barrow,” (?) observes another. “No more expeditions in quest of these; let us give them up, and *gloze of immortality* in another world, for there is no hope for them in this.” Thus howled a portion of the Press: but it is free, and, to its honour, the majority indignantly spurned the inhuman thought that would leave the good and gallant Franklin and Crozier, with their devoted officers and crews, to protracted suffering, and perchance a terrible death, without some convincing proof that *all* are no more. Well was it asked by a correspondent, “Into what new depths of baseness is this growing spirit of selfish and cowardly despair about to hurry us? . . . There is still light enough to work by, and to hope—but the night cometh.” The sound-thinking Sir John Barrow a “silly dreamer”! One whose heart was wrapped in the advance of science for his country's fame. But enough! he sleeps in peace—a peace which no slander of incoherent madman, or puerile babblement of idiotcy, can disturb.

December 16, 1853, despatches were received by the *Amphitrite*, Capt. C. Frederick, from Behring's Strait, to September 11, 1853. Those from Commander R. Maguire, of the *Plover*, to August 23, 1853.* This ship had wintered, 1851-2, at Moore's Harbour, on the east side of Point Barrow. Various excursions had been made along the coast to the eastward, and one to Point Berens in April. Printed notices were distributed, &c. From this latter journey was established "the fact of these people *being acquainted with the Mackenzie River, under the name of Ko-pak*, which had hitherto been considered to be the Colville." It will be recollected, that, in 1850, a party of whites were said to have been murdered by the natives on the Ko-pak. Capt. Moore at the time suspected, from all the information that he could obtain, that the Ko-pak was one of the western branches of the Mackenzie; his suspicions are here partially confirmed. This fact, taken in conjunction with the conduct of the chief and natives at Point Warren, and the confession that a white man had been murdered by a native, who went away with the tribe in the morning as soon as they caught sight of the *Investigator*, imagining she had come to punish them for the deed, makes us the more regret that Capt. McClure did not stop more searchingly to investigate the matter. The fact of saying they did not know when it occurred was a mere savage device; the acknowledgment that the native who had killed the white man went away directly the vessel was seen, was quite near enough as to the time it was committed. A rigid inquiry should therefore have been instituted, until the whole of the circumstances of the foul deed had been ascertained; and, if guilty, the native should have been punished. Much valuable information might have been elicited regarding the fate of the missing Expedition. We have always thought the numerous reports along these shores, in 1849 and 1850, must have had their origin in something like fact; and so strongly have we felt on this subject, that when by the despatches of McClure it was found that the search up the Prince of Wales's Strait had yielded no traces of a retreating party by it towards the Mackenzie, we were greatly surprised. Capt. Maguire had brought the *Plover* south to Port Clarence; but, having fallen in with the *Amphitrite* and *Rattlesnake*, and been well supplied with provisions, &c., he sailed immediately, August 24th, to take up his old quarters at Point Barrow. The *Rattlesnake*, Commander Henry Trollope,

* See Blue Book, "Papers relative to recent Arctic Expeditions, 1854," pp. 160 --186. The "Narrative of Commander Maguire" during his winter sojourn at Moore Harbour, is one of the most interesting Arctic documents we have read.

unable to get into Grantley Harbour, had resolved to winter at Port Clarence.

The year 1853 passed; the cloud hanging over the fate of the ill-starred Franklin and his unfortunate companions was still as dark and impenetrable as ever: yet it was a year that will be ever memorable in Arctic annals, if nowhere else, for during it the gallant McClure and his associates were discovered and relieved; and the truly British question of a North-West Passage was made known to us and set at rest for ever. These alone would have consecrated it to gratitude and joy, but the long-sought ones were still unfound. And yet there was abundant reason to be thankful. The year was remarkable, too, for the projection of two new searching Expeditions, and the rumour of a third; all of which were abandoned.* Theory was busy, but without effect; and rumour, with her false reports, still agitated many a desponding fireside. The undue interest attached to the bottles found in the Sea of Kara, and the consequent depression, we can understand and forgive, because arising out of the intense feeling abroad in favour of our lost countrymen; but not so the false intelligence conveyed in bottles found floating to or on our shores. The authors of these deserve the execration of our race; for such an act can only be viewed as a vile, cruel design to distress yet more the feelings of those already too painfully distressed. We forbear further to notice (having already done so) the dogmatism that would pronounce our absent countrymen dead without proof, and deny the means for further search, to prove that such had or had not been their fate. With what mingled emotions of sorrow, bitterness, and despair, must the year 1853 have closed on those whose hearts and fortunes were embarked in the hapless *Erebus* and *Terror*! The old year and the new afforded no joy to them; the missing ones are not found, and loneliness and desolation usurp their vacant places:—

“First-born of Heaven, eternal Hope, remain!”—*Abraham*.

* That of the *Isabel*, Kennedy, to Behring's Straits; also the one to those straits from Melbourne, under Mr. W. Parker Snow; and the rumoured Arctic Expedition, *visâ* Spitzbergen and Nova Zembla.

CHAPTER XV.

BEHRING'S STRAIT SQUADRON—INSTRUCTIONS TO COMMANDERS TROLLOPE AND MAGUIRE ADMIRALTY NOTICE FOR REMOVING THE NAMES OF FRANKLIN AND HIS OFFICERS FROM THE NAVY LIST—REMARKS—HOUSE OF COMMONS—PHENIX SAILS—ORDERS TO SIR EDWARD BELCHER PHENIX ARRIVES—SIR EDWARD BELCHER'S DESPATCH—HIS OPINION REGARDING THE FRANKLIN EXPEDITION—REMARKS—CAPT. KELLETT'S DESPATCHES—CAPT. M'CLURE—DRS. DOMVILLE AND ARMSTRONG—INVESTIGATOR ABANDONED—CAPT. KELLETT'S TRAVELLING PARTIES—LIEUTS. HAMILTON AND MECHAM RETURN.

1854.—On agonized hearts, torn by long watching, anxiety, and suspense, the year opened. Hope, that hitherto had cheered and supported them, whilst imagination revelled and conjecture wandered guessing—auspicious Hope! their fast friend, even she was now to be denied to them, leaving them wholly to despair.

January 11, 1854, additional Instructions from the Admiralty were forwarded to Commanders Trollope and Maguire in Behring's Strait.* Those to Commander Trollope may be thus condensed. Instead of proceeding to "Honolulu," as previously directed, he is to "remain at Grantley Harbour until the summer of 1855; . . . when that season shall have arrived," he "is to proceed to the northward for the purpose of assisting the *Plover* to return to Port Clarence preparatory to her finally leaving Behring's Straits; or, in case the *Plover* has not wintered, to the northward for the purpose of communicating with the shore, and looking for any of the crew of H.M.S. *Enterprise*, should circumstances have compelled them to fall back on Point Barrow; and, having remained on this service so long as the season will permit," he "is again to communicate with Grantley Harbour;" deposit provisions, stores, &c., and one or more boats; "and, having left information for the guidance of any party who may arrive there," he is to proceed to San Francisco and Valparaiso for further orders; thus concluding: "You will, on no account, risk the safety of the ship, or her being detained during the winter of 1855, and you are distinctly to understand, that no ship

* See Parliamentary Papers, "Arctic Expeditions," No. 171, 1854.

will be sent from the Pacific station in 1855 to communicate with Grantley Harbour; which port you must positively leave in the autumn of that year, in company with H.M. sloop *Plover*, should that ship be still in Behring's Strait."

Commander Maguire's Instructions were, after referring to former orders, to direct "the return of H.M. sloop *Plover* from Point Barrow to Grantley Harbour, so soon as the season of 1854 would permit." Commander Maguire is informed of the safety of Capt. M'Clure. The probable movements, position, resources, and ulterior proceedings of Capt. Collinson are then given conjecturally. "If . . . the *Enterprise* has been lost, it is by no means improbable that Capt. Collinson may have returned to the *Plover*. If such should have been the case, there will be no further necessity for the detention of the *Plover* and *Rattlesnake* at Behring's Strait, . . . you will accordingly proceed to San Francisco and Valparaiso to wait . . . further orders. But should no further information have reached you respecting the *Enterprise* since she was reported off the Colville, it will be necessary for you to consider the expediency of remaining another season at Point Barrow, with the view of affording assistance to Capt. Collinson and his crew, should he still be compelled to fall back on the *Plover*. On this point we are unable, from want of information relative to your proceedings since August last, and the further tidings you may have gained respecting the *Enterprise*, to give you definite instructions; their Lordships entirely rely on your judgment as to the necessity of your remaining another year." Commander Maguire is then told, "that the *Plover* and *Rattlesnake* are now detained solely on account of, and to afford assistance to, Capt. Collinson and the crew of the *Enterprise*. If you feel certain that the crew of that ship is safe, you are hereby directed to discontinue your present service, and to return to Valparaiso. . . . If you should, after full deliberation, deem it to be essentially necessary to extend the services of the *Plover* to another winter, it is their Lordships' direction that you should exchange officers or men, revictual the ship, and again proceed to Point Barrow; . . . but as soon as the season of 1855 will admit, that you proceed to Grantley Harbour, and from thence to San Francisco and Valparaiso for further orders. You are distinctly to understand that it is not their Lordships' intention . . . to communicate with Grantley Harbour in 1855; you are therefore positively to leave Behring's Strait in that year. . . . In case of not being able to place the *Plover* . . . at Point Barrow, or in any other safe position north of Grantley Harbour, you may

return to that port; and having deposited all spare provisions and stores with H.M.S. *Rattlesnake*, you may at once proceed to Valparaiso, as there does not exist any necessity for retaining two ships at that port. . . Any accident having occurred to the *Plover*, rendering her unseaworthy, or her having been, on survey, found unfit for further service, my Lords desire that the ship be placed in some safe position as a depôt to afford shelter to any travelling or other party, and that you proceed, with the officers and crew, on board H.M.S. *Rattlesnake*, or whatever ship may have been sent from Valparaiso."

These orders are sufficiently stringent: all the searching vessels are to be out of Behring's Strait by the autumn of 1855. It will be observed that Franklin and his companions are not even mentioned; and Collinson, if not heard of before that time, is to be abandoned to his own resources.

January 20, 1854, notice was given by the Admiralty, "that, if intelligence be not received before the 31st March next, of the officers and crews of H.M.S. *Erebus* and *Terror* being alive, the names of the officers will be removed from the 'Navy List,' and they and the crews of those ships will be considered as having died in Her Majesty's service."

Thus the Admiralty defined how long 135 Englishmen, sent by their country on a specially dangerous service, may or should be considered alive to claim its protection and succouring care. If there had been any fact existing by which it could be inferred they were no longer alive, we could have understood why they were to be thus prematurely deserted. *But there was not.* All that could be urged in support of this cruel decree was, *that they had not returned after eight years' absence; had been searched for, but not found. That there should be a limit when a country must cease her exertions for the recovery of her absent sons, and erase their names from the roll of the living, and thus terminate all doubt and emolument, is necessary and just; but abruptly to do so, as in this case, before the searching squadrons sent to seek for them could report the results of their labours, is, to our views, manifestly unfeeling and unjust; it seems to argue that their Lordships had no faith in the means or directions employed by themselves for the recovery of the missing ones. If it were thought enough had been done, order the searching ships home; but, having equipped them for this express purpose, and sent them in what they thought the most favourable direction, surely it had been wiser, and had had more the show of justice, to have waited their report or arrival before this*

extreme measure was adopted; as it is, it looks like a desire to mulct them of a few months' pay. For ourselves, we have always thought the search by the north, in opposition to the primary points to which Sir J. Franklin's attention was so especially directed, was a waste of valuable time and priceless energy. We never could look for success to arise from the Wellington Channel, whether searched by Penny or Belcher; nor could we from Smith's Sound, whether under Kane or Ingfield; but there was just a chance, if Franklin passed up by the east or west side of Byam Martin Island, that Kellett's north-west parties of the Melville Island division might bring us some favourable news. Again, who could say that Collinson, in his track to the eastward, and north, between Wollaston and Banks' Lands, being then in the right direction from Cape Walker, might not obtain traces or intelligence that had escaped the eyes of M'Clure's parties, that would set the matter at rest for ever? This decree pronounced these 135 men dead on March 31st; and, however favourable the success of the searching vessels, dead they were. Can it be wondered at, then, that this outrageous act, so mean and narrow-minded, should have been looked upon with disgust as a stain on our national character? It should be remembered, that these gallant, chivalrous Englishmen, had been sent on a great and glorious mission—the solution of a great question, that of the existence of a North-West Passage; a question which had taxed the intellects of the wisest, and the energies of the most daring of our country, since the time of Henry VII.,—that since the days of John Cabot to the departure of the unfortunate Sir John Franklin, had been uniformly persisted in; and although, by reason of the rigorous nature of the climate, every effort had failed, as a whole, to solve it, still each had added something to England's fame, either by the discovery of new lands, or by opening out new sources of wealth. Science and knowledge were benefited; *England saw and appreciated these continued heroic efforts; she made this interesting question her own, and she was admired by the nations.* To complete, then, this great problem, these adventurous Englishmen went forth from amongst us in 1845; they have not been heard of since. Expedition after expedition has been sent in search of them, but in vain. Their first winter quarters have been discovered, but nothing positive as to the welfare of the Expedition. Since they left there all is dark, we have had no guide to direct us to them *save the Instructions which we gave them, and which we have not followed.* Should we, then, because we have failed to find them, consider them dead, and desert them without proof? We

cannot think that it is England's wish. It would have better become the Admiralty rather to have reconsidered the intent of Franklin's Instructions, and inquired whether all our means had been exhausted—for exhausted they ought to have been before we gave them up; *whether, in fact, our countrymen had been sought in the right direction, i. e., in the direction in which they were sent!* To these questions we would boldly answer, No! we have sought them in the most improbable directions; we have indeed searched *all around the area to which they were specially sent; but only in part, and hence it is that we have not found them.* The fault is our own; then wherefore this cruel desertion? "The rescue of Sir John Franklin and his party would be the redeeming achievement of our age, and up to the present time there is nothing so noble in all the history of England as the pertinacious gallantry with which she has laboured to effect it. To register her missing sailors among the dead simply because they are missing, should be an office reserved for a future generation of statesmen.*" "When Arctic Expeditions for the sake of the missing navigators have long ceased to be familiar to the public ear, and wars and rumours of wars have passed away, the interest in those geographical and other problems which were left unsolved in the year 1854, will again appear worthy of a great national effort for their solution; and then will arise, in touching association, the memory of the men who, in pursuit of this knowledge, and in obedience to their country's command, first penetrated into the fastnesses of the North, and were left there to their fate. Perhaps it will be the wonder of that future generation that this should have been done, . . . when it had at its disposal a fleet of invulnerable ships, fit and fit alone for Arctic service, and still afloat in Arctic seas, and a host of trained and brave explorers, better disciplined for their work than ever, a combination such as was never seen before, and may never be seen again." †

March 13th, Sir John Franklin and his able second, Capt. Crozier, and their officers and crews, were pronounced, officially, to be beyond earthly hope, and their names were removed from the "Navy List" as dead.

April 5th, 1854, Sir Thomas Acland, in the House of Commons, moved for copies of any Instructions which either have been issued, or hereafter might be issued, during the present season, to the com-

* See the "American" and "Gazette," Philadelphia, March 7th, 1854.

† See "Letter from Lady Franklin to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty," February 24th, 1854.

manders of Her Majesty's ships now engaged in the Arctic regions in search of Sir John Franklin's Expedition. He said the subject was one which was of such deep anxiety to many persons who had already for some years experienced the tender consideration and indulgence of that House, that as the period during which that anxiety must be satisfied—if it could be satisfied at all—was now rapidly approaching, he thought it would be wrong were he, even at that late hour (twelve o'clock), to postpone the matter. The question he was desirous of putting to the First Lord of the Admiralty was, Whether he would inform the House what was the nature of the Instructions that might have been, or were about to be, sent to the commanders of Her Majesty's ships now engaged in the Arctic regions? The House was aware that several expeditions had been sent to the Arctic regions in search of Sir John Franklin, and it was also aware that though no one of them had been successful in the main object for which it was despatched, several had been eminently successful in exploring the coast of America, and in ascertaining that no traces of the Expedition had been found there. It was not asked that the Government should send any new expedition, or incur, generally speaking, any additional expense; but that the Instructions issued to the commanders of Her Majesty's ships engaged in the Arctic regions should not convey such a peremptory order to them to return home as to prevent them from exercising some discretion as to the expediency of their continuing their efforts, in case they should think there was any hope of their being successful. Sir James Graham expressed his sympathy with the feelings which had prompted the observations of the honourable gentleman, and observed that he should neglect his duty if he did not impose some limit on the search after Sir John Franklin, which had now been protracted for many years, and was unhappily attended with great risk and possible loss of life. He had not thought it hitherto expedient to suspend the sending of additional ships, or to refuse incurring additional expense. A ship had been sent to Behring's Strait for the purpose of communicating, if possible, with those vessels that had passed three winters within the ice. The House was aware that two ships had entered Behring's Strait in search of Sir John Franklin. Captain McClure succeeded in effecting his passage to the eastward, and the gratifying intelligence had been received that he was safe; but he regretted to add, with respect to Captain Collinson, no information had been received, and great anxiety and most serious apprehensions were entertained with respect to him. Instructions had

been sent, that if happily he was safe, he should at once leave the ice, and also all the ships; but if any circumstance should occur which might excite a last lingering hope that assistance might yet be given to Sir John Franklin, and that his safety might still be secured, though there was hardly in his (Sir James Graham's) opinion any hope left with regard to the safety of that gallant officer and his companions, then orders would be given for the prolonged stay of the ships of search for the period of a year. Admiral Walcott considered that all that was consistent with the honour of the country had been done in seeking Sir John Franklin. He was of opinion that the vessels had foundered, and the crews had perished. His only regret was that the First Lord of the Admiralty should have determined to remove the names of the officers employed on that Expedition from the list until the return of Sir Edward Belcher, which he hoped would not be later than September or October next. He wished him to consider that point. Captain Scobell said that although it might be hopeless to save Captain Franklin, still Captain Collinson remained a survivor in the ice, and he might yet be rescued. He was one who thought Sir John Franklin was not now alive, and that, whether alive or dead, the spot where his ship was had never been reached. With respect to the possibility of his being alive, Captain M'Clure had given them some evidence on that point, for he had described an island which was full of the means of living. He thought it would be advisable to allow all the coming summer to be employed in continuing the search, not only for Sir John Franklin but for Captain Collinson. Sir James Graham said, Instructions were express, that if Captain Collinson were not heard of, the ships should remain the present summer. Lord Stanley agreed that there was no ground for sending out a new expedition in search of Sir John Franklin; but he concurred in the propriety of allowing the ships now in the Arctic Seas to pursue the search. He hoped they would be allowed to do so according to their own judgment. Sir James Graham said a discretionary power was given them. The motion was agreed to.

Arctic explorers have great reason to be thankful to such men as the late Sir R. H. Inglis and Sir T. Acland, for they were ever their fast friends. But what were the real facts as to Instructions? Any one reading the latest issued to the *Behring's Strait* squadron, dated 11th January, 1854 (see *ante*), will see that the search for Sir John Franklin is already abandoned: his name is not even mentioned, either in those given to Commander Trollope or to Commander Ma-

guire. That officer is expressly told—"The *Plover* and *Rattlesnake* are now detained solely on account of, and to afford assistance to, Captain Collinson and the crew of the *Enterprise*." Commander Maguire is, in these Instructions, allowed the discretionary power of remaining another winter, 1854-5, to look for or hear tidings of Collinson; and Commander Trollope is positively ordered to do so; but both these officers are told, "You are distinctly to understand that no ship will be sent from the Pacific station in 1855 to communicate with Grantley Harbour." As to giving orders to the ships to remain another year, in case circumstances should arise "which might excite a lingering hope" that, by assistance, the safety of Sir John Franklin and his gallant followers might be secured, the very words go to show there was no such intention, or why not at once have expressed it in the Instructions to Commanders Trollope and Maguire, and given them the needful discretionary power? No; the man who, from his position, could sanction the presumption that Franklin and his associates were dead, while yet the searching expeditions were out seeking them, and before it was possible to receive information as to their success or not—we say such a one shows pretty clearly what his feelings are, and the value of his sympathy. We perceive, too, that aid to Collinson was limited to the autumn of 1855. As to Instructions to the Barrow's Strait Expedition, the last despatches speak of Sir Edward Belcher being on his return; unsuccessful. There is little hope, therefore, that he will be ordered to remain. Where would he search? The only place at all likely is Melville Sound, and that has been considered searched and done with, although in fact only partly so; and yet its importance outweighs all others, as being the area to which Franklin was directed to go in the first instance.

May 6th, 1854, H.M.S. *Phoenix*, Capt. Inglefield, was again despatched to Beechey Island, with a transport containing provisions, &c., for Sir Edward Belcher's squadron. With her additional Instructions were sent by the Lords of the Admiralty to the latter officer, dated April 28th, 1854, the purport of which we give. He "is to direct his especial attention to the measures they now require to be adopted for at once withdrawing, if possible, the whole of the force now employed in the search of Sir John Franklin from the Polar seas." A limited discretionary power is given to Sir Edward Belcher, but their Lordships' views may be stated as follows:—"First, If the crews of the *Enterprise* and *Investigator* are at Banks' Land, they must abandon their ships and endeavour to get to Beechey Island, that

they may return to England. If this has already been effected, and Capt. Kellett, with his ships, has returned from Melville Island, you are immediately to proceed to England, with the whole of the ships and their crews, *abandoning all further search for the missing Expedition*, unless any circumstances (on consultation) should induce you to believe that your remaining out another year would tend to clear up the fate of our missing countrymen. If Captain Kellett has been unable to move from his position at Melville Island, it may be necessary to give orders to him to abandon the *Resolute* and *Intrepid*, and secure his retreat to Beechey Island; but as this cannot be accomplished this year, you need not detain any officer or men who may have already reached Beechey Island, but send them to England forthwith. Second, Should no tidings have been heard of Capt. Collinson, it becomes absolutely necessary to provide for his safety. For this purpose the Melville Island depôt must be replenished with provisions and stores, and it will be necessary for a ship and steam tender to remain there also—the *North Star* or *Talbot*, with a tender at Beechey Island; and at those stations everything that can add to the health and comfort of the crews should be deposited. . . . Having done this it does not appear . . . to be necessary that any of the other ships should remain another year in the Polar Sea.

“These are the views of their Lordships; their great object being to recall, with the least possible delay, the whole of the ships or crews, if it can be done. If not possible to do so, they leave it to your judgment and discretion to send home such as may not be required, and to adopt those measures which you consider most necessary to ensure the safety of Capt. Collinson and his crew, and their speedy return to England. . . . On the return of any of the ships to England from Beechey Island, it is desirable that the coast to the southward of Pond’s Bay, viz., from the River Clyde towards Cape Walsingham, should be examined.”

These Instructions are sufficiently clear and positive for withdrawing the whole of the searching vessels. The unhappy Franklin and his companions having been, or were soon to be, prematurely numbered with the dead. The vessels, being no longer necessary, the sooner they were back the better, and their Lordships very properly set about their recall at once. Again, it was discreditable to prolong a search where all was failure and disappointment. The discovery of the North-West Passage, and the presumed death of all on board the *Erebus* and *Terror*, gave them an excellent opportunity to shake themselves clear of Arctic questions and Arctic men: still we think it

might have been done in a less offensive manner. The pay of the unfortunate Franklin and his gallant men might have been prolonged to their unhappy families until Belcher's squadron had returned; or, at least, until that officer had made his final report. Again, Collinson was out, and no one could say what success might reward his search. We are glad to see every regard given to the safety and comfort of that gallant officer and his crew, even to leaving vessels at Melville and Beechey Islands; but there are no directions to attempt a communication with him, whether by Prince of Wales' Strait or Peel's Sound. The examination of the latter would have set the question at rest whether Franklin ever attempted to get down that Sound, about which so much speculation has been abroad since.

September 28th, 1854, H.M.S. *Phoenix*, Captain Inglefield, arrived at Cork.* After much difficulty in getting to the northward in Baffin's Bay, and in crossing the middle ice, she arrived at Beechey Island, 26th August, 1854. She here found the *North Star* "standing off and on," and was informed that the whole of the officers and crews of the *Investigator*, *Resolute*, *Intrepid*, *Assistance*, and *Pioneer* were on board that ship, the first three having been abandoned by Sir Edward Belcher's orders in May last, and Sir Edward himself, with his own party, having just deserted the *Assistance* and *Pioneer*, about fifty miles from Beechey Island.

We shall now give extracts from the proceedings of Sir Edward Belcher.†

It will be recollected that the despatches of last year left the *Assistance* and *Pioneer* ten miles east of Cape Becher on the 26th of July, 1853, on their return to Beechey Island. The search for the Franklin Expedition was therefore virtually terminated then in this direction. It is not necessary for our object to go into the fatigues, vexations, delays, and dangers of Arctic navigation. Every effort was made to get the ships down Wellington Channel. They were finally arrested ten miles north-north-east of Cape Osborn, where they wintered in 1853-4. Sir Edward, in his despatch dated Wellington Channel, from the 8th August to the 10th September, 1853, recapitulates in greater detail his previous discoveries. These we have already noticed; but the following more extended description of the western entrance of the much talked-of Jones's Sound and its islands we think worthy extract. He says:—

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions in Search of Sir John Franklin, &c., 1855," p. 11.

† *Ibid.*, p. 12.

"We reached on the 18th (May) the entrance of a splendid channel. Fog had for some time worried us with indistinct glimpses of the approaches, but as it now cleared off and the sun enlivened the scene, we were regaled with such a magnificent view of successive beetling headlands on either side of the channel, and extending for about twenty miles, that it really became a puzzling matter to find names for them. Of one thing I felt quite convinced, viz., that we were now really in Jones's (Sound) Channel, and by nothing but *bad taste in nature* could we be deceived. The latitude, the direction, the limit in longitude to which we could see, only required sixty miles to lead to the cairn erected by Captain Austen's party. Who could dream of failure on the 18th May? The roughness of the frozen pack now compelled us to take to the land, and we advanced easily five or six miles, when a further stop was put to our progress" by "an abrupt glacier, half a gale of wind, and the mortifying discovery *that its base was washed by the sea*, and the off-lying pack rotten and tumbling asunder. . . . It was determined to try an overland route, and avoid this unfortunate hole, as we then thought it." They started, "the hills increasing in height, until they reached 1,500 feet. We then descended, and took up another position at nearly the same height at the *last bluff* (Britannia Heights). All our hopes were crushed. Between us and the distant bluff *the open sea prevailed on the 20th May*; the horizon was streaked with open 'sailing ice,' and all communication cut off for sledges. The bluff, distant sixteen miles, was clearly the turning point into Jones's Channel. No land was visible beyond it. . . . To the north of us lay the new land of Kent, and far to the westward a new chain, hereafter to be examined. Fortunately our weather was beautifully clear, and we not only saw all the distant objects, but obtained the requisite observations for planting them in their proper places."

Sir Edward then speaks of Arthur's Strait, which we noticed in last year's despatches. The following observation, as he is starting from Princess Royal Land, with the object of examining the Victoria Archipelago, June 6th, we must quote: * "It occurred to me that under any circumstances, either as regarded Sir John Franklin, Captain Collinson, or Commander McClure, that if either of them entered the Polar Sea here on the range of these islands, with comparatively open water for perhaps 100 miles, they might drift to and fro for years. or

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 15.

until they experienced one of those northern nips which would form a mount above them in a very few seconds. The more I have seen of the action of the ice, the *partially open water*, and the deceitful leads into 'the pools,' the more satisfied I am that the man who once ventures 'off the land' is, in all probability, sacrificed. He may desert his vessel, and by hard travel succeed in gaining some place of rendezvous under the present dispositions effected by Captain Kellett as well as myself; but there is no calculating, as yet, that our exertions . . . may not be directed to a similar object."

At Buckingham Island he remarks: "The heavy, even solid nature of the floe surrounding, or, where 'nipped,' the almost berg-like lumps that protruded, afforded a fair inference that the sea is seldom seriously disturbed in these latitudes: on the other hand, if we take into consideration the *exuviae of whales* and other animals, found at every elevation, even to the summits of hills—above 800 feet; the extraordinary wear or abrasion of the outlines, which nothing we have experienced could effect,—it almost leads one to imagine that nature at some moment, possibly past and for ever, *fatally perhaps for those we seek*, has piled up layer over layer to effect what otherwise nothing but a recent deluge could account for." These observations convey a fearful picture of the Arctic Sea to the northward of Grinnell Land for navigation; but we think the conclusions are scarcely warranted by the limited experience gained in one season—facts had not sufficiently accumulated. We cannot conceive the conditions of such a sea, where ships "might drift to and fro for years, . . . with partially open water," and "leads into pools," without some *lead*, some *open water* by which, however deceptive, advantage might be taken to extricate the ships; or, if nipped, afford facility for the escape of their crews—that is to say, if within a few hundred miles of some known spot or depôt. The results of the travelling parties have taught us this. The inference drawn at Buckingham Island, one of the Victoria Archipelago, with narrow passages between, offering resistance to the free drift of the floes, and no doubt ice-blocked—"that the sea is seldom disturbed in these latitudes" is, we think, not tenable, especially in June, with open water east and west of them. The existence of the *exuviae of whales* at a height of 800 feet above the sea level, geologically, we might comprehend, but not that they came there by any action of nature in force in the present day, such as by piling up "layer over layer," or "a recent deluge." We cannot think, therefore, even supposing that Franklin did ascend the Wellington Channel, that any fatality oc-

curred to him through this agency. But we leave this extraordinary fact to be accounted for by wiser heads than our own, premising it rests on the authority of Sir Edward Belcher, which is undoubted—he saw these exuvia *in situ*. At last, on the 16th June, on Princess Royal Island, Sir Edward had proof that animals really did exist in the regions about him. He says: “For the first time this day we noticed three musk oxen; . . . five deer were subsequently seen; but no human being could subsist by the aid of his gun throughout our whole range, and as to a party of five or seven men, *impossible*. By extraordinary good fortune, bears might fall in the way of the traveller; but having killed and eaten his proportion, I much doubt if his strength would enable him to drag the remains until another piece of similar good fortune befell him. *The assertion, therefore, of any ‘teeming or abundance of animal life’ in this north-eastern district is utterly untenable.*” Sir Edward seems determined not to countenance the opinion that animals are to be found in sufficient numbers in high latitudes to support life, and yet Esquimaux find subsistence and do live in higher latitudes than his farthest north; but animals are not usually looked for on sterile limestone tracts, where no vegetation can exist. Near Baillie Hamilton Island, 17th August, it is remarked: * “But as far as geography or navigation are concerned, I am not inclined to suspect that any human beings will, from choice, attempt to revisit a portion of the earth’s surface so utterly barren and void of interest in animal, vegetable, or mineral productions. The picture which Captain Kellett may draw of Melville Island would be a paradise to this.” We do not look for an oasis or paradise in these regions, but surely this is a very morbid view.

Still persisting in their efforts to force the vessels down Wellington Channel, amid heavy masses of grounded ice, on the 4th September, near Cape Osborn, some objects were observed on a floe, and a boat was sent to examine them. They proved to be the *Halket’s* boat, chart, and other vestiges of the chivalrous Bellot’s party. The men—everything was saved but him! Even the brittle floe which had borne him to destruction was unbroken, and seemed to have been preserved that, these relics restored, the memory of this lamented, gallant young Frenchman might not pass away from the face of the earth. “How many fall as sudden, not as safe!” The ships were finally frozen in, as we have said, ten miles north-

* See Blue Book, “Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855,” p. 17.

north-east of Cape Osborn. The winter of 1853-4 was scarcely over, before preparations were made for communicating with the *Resolute* and *Intrepid*. In February and March travelling parties were despatched for this purpose, and for the examination of Capes Bunny and Rennell, and Leopold Harbour, in case Captain Collinson should attempt to make his way into Barrow's Strait by Peel's Sound: a circumstance not at all probable, as the reports of Lieutenant Browne, of Mr. Kennedy and Lieutenant Bellot, lead to the conclusion that it is closed, or, if not closed, unnavigable. Parties from the eastern and western divisions having met, the position of the ships of the western division was ascertained. The *Resolute* and *Intrepid* had been blown out from Dealy Island the 17th August, drifting easterly and southerly. They were ultimately frozen in in the pack on the 12th November, twenty-eight miles south-west of Cape Cockburn, where they were subsequently abandoned.

The following we extract from Sir Edward Belcher's despatch, 15th August, 1854, as being his opinion of the movements and subsequent fate of Sir John Franklin:—

“That our efforts have entirely failed in our first and most exciting search rests mainly, I believe, on the conviction that the *Erebus* and *Terror* did not advance westerly or northerly beyond Beechey Island, and it is a matter of no common importance to my mind, and adverse to any intention of a northern movement, that not one single reliable trace of detached sporting parties has been met with northerly. But, on the other hand, easterly, at points where we should naturally expect explorers would be averse to proceed, numerous traces of temporary sojourn abound, fatal in my mind to any idea of further western discovery, and specially in the direction of Wellington Channel. I admit, now that we know that navigable channels exist on either sides of Buillic Hamilton and Dundas Islands, that it was not unnatural to suppose that ships might have escaped westerly by that route. But, speaking as a surveyor, as a simple navigator, had I travelled from hence to the heights of Cape Osborn, or further north to Cape Hogarth, and beheld from thence, as I have done, on the latter and near the former, the clear panoramic view of Wellington Channel, I would not have deemed the Queen's Channel of sufficient importance to risk my vessels for exploration, nor of equal value to the Byam Martin Strait, (which is?) easier of approach, and for every object attainable more secure, than the course by Wellington Channel. . . . I saw no features from the eastern shores to warrant any passage, nor is it fair to judge from the very extraor-

dinary season of 1852, that successive years would afford similar facility. . . I know that 1853 and 1854 offered no invitations to the judicious navigator to try his chance late in the season, merely perhaps to enter the great bay where the *Assistance* spent her dreary winter. My impression still clings to the escape out of Lancaster Sound, or a fatal issue off Cape Riley, and that traces, if ever discovered, must be sought from the Esquimaux of the southern land (Cockburn Island)." *

Again, in his letter to the Admiralty, reporting his arrival at, and dated Cork, September 28th, 1854, he says: † "August 26th.—I feel satisfied that no reasonable being of this expedition, with brains free from the delusions of interested motives, will venture to suggest that our unfortunate countrymen ever passed the meridian of Beechey Island after the spring or autumn of 1846. If any final proof were wanting to seal the impossibility of escape until too late to advance westward to positive destruction, let them look to the *advance and immediate sealing* of the *Assistance* in 1852, and the struggle of the *North Star* for release with three crews in 1854, from a position *far outside* that inferred to have been occupied by the *Erebus* and *Terror*."

From these observations it is very clear that Sir Edward Belcher, whatever his former views may have been, now concludes that Sir John Franklin never advanced westerly or northerly of Beechey Island, and consequently that he did not attempt the north by the Wellington Channel. In this we cordially agree, but in regard to his not advancing to the westward of Beechey Island, we must differ. We think, on the contrary, *that he made large westing; at any rate, there is no proof that he did not*. Sir Edward does not consider the Queen's Channel to possess any features, from Capes Hogarth or Osborn, to induce the navigator to think that there existed a channel in that direction to tempt him to the N.W.; from this we must infer, that had Sir Edward been sent up Wellington Channel he would not have made, and consequently would have lost the honour of discovering, the navigable sea of Penny; Penny, must, therefore, ever obtain the merit of that discovery. Sir Edward contrasts the Wellington with the Byam Martin Channel, and points out with truth the advantages of the latter over the former; but, besides the greater facilities of approach, the latter offered a better position for solving

* Blue Books, "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 54.

† *Ibid.*, p. 61.

the great question, if it were to be done by the north, than did the former. It was a more advanced position, but it was not named in Franklin's Instructions, and it involved making large westing. Now, all along it has been contended, that if Franklin could not reach Cape Walker, or make southing to the west of it, that he would not persist to the west, but return and make the attempt by Wellington Channel. It is this *idea* that has led to the searching ships being sent to the north by it—we may add, in a wrong direction. We have always contended, and do contend, that Franklin would, if he could, persist to the west; as by so doing he would better his position, and the Byam Martin Channel would become possessed of far greater interest to him for the ultimate accomplishment of the great object of the voyage, than any favourable prospect the Wellington Channel, as then known, could offer. It is monstrous to suppose, that because he could not make a direct south-west course from Cape Walker that he would not, if he could, *make westing*; or, that if he could not reach Cape Walker, that he would not persist to the westward along the southern shores of the Parry Islands, rather than return to make the attempt by the Wellington Channel. Much more monstrous would it be to imagine that *Franklin, having made large westing, but barred out to the south*, would, with the passages between the Parry Islands in his route, all leading north in the same direction as the Wellington Channel, and nearer the object of his wishes, pass by all these to return to make a roundabout attempt by that channel. It is true they were unknown, but it should be remembered that all beyond the entrance of Wellington Channel was equally unknown and unexplored; besides which, it led in a direction involving many points of difference between it and the course indicated by the original plan and the first point of Franklin's Instructions.

Sir Edward Belcher's impression as to the fate of Franklin and his crews can be regarded only as an impression. He does not, because he cannot, offer any proof. The traces of sojourners to the eastward of Point Biley is not conclusive. How is it that, if there, we have no notice to mark their presence? or how that no trace is found of them at Capes Bunny or Rennell, or Port Leopold; or, above all, at Fury Beach? We think he was lost to the westward, in Melville Sound; for reasons which we shall show hereafter. We are not interested in stating our convictions, brainless though they may appear, but certainly not more so than those of others who have so pertinaciously advanced the opinion that Franklin went to the north by the Wellington Channel, Jones' and Smith's Sounds, in opposition to Cape

Walker and the south-west, where he was so especially directed to proceed.

August 26th, 1854.—There being no hope of extricating the ships, Sir Edward Belcher now resolved to abandon them. On that day, "the jack, ensign, and pendant, never to be hauled down, were properly secured, the decks cleaned, and the cabins put in due order;" and at six a.m., the *Assistance* and *Pioneer* were abandoned, left to themselves, solitary and inanimate, as the *Resolute*, *Intrepid*, and *Investigator* had already been, more to the westward. "Our hearts were too full," says Sir Edward; "no cheers escaped, but, turning our backs on the ships, we pursued our cheerless route over the floe, leaving behind our home."* There is a something, a pang, touchingly painful, in forsaking one's old ship; long association has endeared her to you; in calm and in storm, in the time of trial, she has been faithful and true; you hence have learned to estimate and rely on her qualities. Again, she is your home; not fixed to one spot, immobile and inert, but at your call she unfolds her wings and bears you to new climates and scenes, for she is a thing of life! Fire and ice are to her most implacable enemies. All arrived on board the *North Star* the following day.

We shall now give extracts from the despatches of Capt. Henry Kellett, C.B., in command of the western division, the *Resolute* and *Intrepid*, at Dealy Island. It will be seen (*ante*), that when the last despatches left that officer, he had arranged for a survey being held on the Captain, officers, and crew of the *Investigator* at Mercy Bay, in order to ascertain if there remained on board that ship a sufficient number (twenty) of effective men (volunteers) to remain out another winter, with the hope of bringing her through the "passage" (between Baring and Melville Islands) to England, and thus realize the accomplishment of the North-West Passage. It will also be seen, the travelling parties of this division being still out, no report of their proceedings could be given at that time. Our extracts must, of necessity, be brief; still we are desirous to record the leading events of this admirably-arranged and well-conducted western division, they reflect great credit on Captain Kellett, and his able, active second, Commander M'Clintock, and, indeed, on all the officers and crews of the *Resolute* and *Intrepid*.

Commander M'Clure and Dr. Domville started for Mercy Bay on May 5th, 1853; arrived on board the *Investigator* on May 21st, and

* Blue Books, "Further Papers relating to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 61.

the survey was held on her officers and crew on the 23rd. The summary of the united report of Dr. Domville and her surgeon, Dr. Armstrong,* was—"Their present state of health is such as renders them utterly unfit to undergo the rigour of another winter in this climate, without entertaining the most serious apprehension for the consequence," &c. Volunteers having been called for by Capt. McClure, besides the officers only four of the crew offered themselves; indeed, it will be seen by the report that they were not a fit state to remain out another winter. Dr. Armstrong thus records his opinion in another place:† "I cannot conclude . . . without noticing the noble spirit and patriotic feeling that had animated the ship's company in the almost superhuman exertions hitherto made under the most severe and trying circumstances, such as it has fallen to the lot of but few to encounter. I knew what they had been exposed to, and what they had endured; I had witnessed their courage and daring in many eventful scenes; had seen their manly forms gradually shrink under hunger and cold; and had marked their patience and fortitude when suffering from disease; and certain do I feel that the records of their deeds ought to form one of the brightest pages in the history of our country." This tribute, from one who had shared in their privations and felt for their sufferings, one so able, so capable of judging of their merits, cannot but be highly gratifying to every gallant "*Investigator*,"—*palmas qui meruit ferat*. Thus placed, without sufficient hands to work the ship, Commander McClure resolved reluctantly to abandon her, which he did on June 3rd, 1853. In perfect order, and full of honour, the *Investigator* was left alone with her glory; those who had given her "life to live" now departed. We cannot close this always melancholy scene, without again borrowing from Dr. Armstrong's work: he says;‡ "The white ensign of St. George was hoisted at the peak, and the pendant at the main, which flaunted gaily in the breeze as we stepped over the side of the ship that had so long been our home, never to visit her again. . . . As we stood on the ice, and took a last view of our fine old ship, we could not but do so with a grateful recollection, considering how far she had borne us. But while we entertained those feelings which sailors are prone to indulge in for their vessels, we felt that the time

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expedition, 1855," p. 70.

† "Personal Narrative of the Discovery of the North-West Passage," by Alexander Armstrong, M.D., R.N., F.R.G.S., &c., p. 574.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 576.

had arrived when it became imperative to abandon her." Dr. Domville arrived on board the *Resolute* on June 10th, and Capt. McClure, and his officers and crews, on the 17th, where they were received with a thorough joyous welcome by the sympathizing, warm-hearted Kellett, and the officers and crews of the *Resolute* and *Intrepid*, on board which they wintered, 1853-4. We shall now turn to Capt. Kellett's travelling parties. Our opinions are already given, recorded in 1850, as to the course Sir John Franklin would adopt (see p. 164 *et seq.*); from them may be inferred, taking into consideration, too, the results of the search made in this direction by Austin's parties, what probability of success remained for Capt. Kellett's. There was just a chance, but barely a hope. Still, governed by its unsteady influence, we must follow these noble fellows, and endeavour to record, briefly though it be, their high motives and their gallant deeds; but it is no simple matter to cull from 600 to 800 pages of "Blue Book," &c., where each and every line tells of some act of toil, of devotion, and of heroism, without the apprehension of omission or of failure to do full justice. We trust to truth to guide us, deeply regretting that such chivalrous daring, such unwearied zeal and exertion, borne, too, with such unrepining fortitude, should have only resulted in total want of success as regards tracing our hapless long-lost ones.

It will be remembered, that the whole of Capt. Kellett's parties left Dealy Island on April 4th, 1853. Commander McClintock, with M. de Bray, Enseigne de Vaisseau of the French Imperial Navy, and eighteen men, to pursue the search to the north-west. Lieutenant Meham, with Mr. Nares, and fourteen men, to cross the Winter Harbour of Parry, and to follow the coast westerly. Lieutenant V. Hamilton and Mr. McDougall, and fourteen men, to cross Hecla and Griper Bay, to search north-easterly along Sabine Island.

Capt. Kellett, in his despatch, Dealy Island, June 8th, 1853, says:— "M. de Bray, auxiliary to Commander McClintock, arrived on board the *Resolute* on May 18th, having left with him seventy days' provisions on May 2nd, lat. $76^{\circ} 8' N.$, long. $116^{\circ} 45' W.$ To the northward of him, from Cape Fisher, westerly, he could see land forty miles off." Commander McClintock speaks in the highest terms of M. de Bray: he says; "He could not have had a better second." Mr. Nares, auxiliary to Lieut. Meham, arrived on June 1st, having left him, on May 3rd, in lat. $75^{\circ} 35' N.$, long. $118^{\circ} W.$

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expedition, 1853," pp. 73, 74, and 621-646.

having crossed from Melville Island to Prince Patrick's Group or Land. "This name I have given it, says Capt. Kellett, as it was landed and taken possession of on His Royal Highness's birthday. Lieutenant Meeham had on that date forty-five days' provisions. . . . He will pass to the southward of this new land, and as far west as he can reach." We ought to remark here, that Capt. Kellett so identifies himself with his officers and crews, that his despatches are merely a simple record of events as they occur; he leaves to his officers to express in their journals, in their own words, their acts and doings; he arrogates no merit to himself, although to his excellent orders and arrangement are due the preservation of his men, and the extraordinary results of this well-conducted, well-carried out western division. He seems to have known, and rightly to have esteemed, the "stuff" his officers and men were made of, and had confidence in them. Beloved by them, this confidence, it will be seen, was appreciated, and repaid by exertions in Arctic travel, unprecedented: there was a reciprocity of feeling, and both centred in the humane object on which they were sent. We shall, therefore, in giving extracts from his despatches, combine with them the results of the journals of the various officers.

Capt. Kellett's despatch of February 10th, 1854, says:—"Lieutenant Hamilton returned on June 20th, after an absence of fifty-four days." Having passed over the land to Hecla and Griper Bay, where he parted from Mr. M'Dougall, he pursued a north-east direction along the western side of Sabine Island, now found to be a peninsula, and forming a part of Melville Island. He rounded its northern extreme: soon after doing so, he met with Commander Richards, from Sir Edward Belcher's division; he then proceeded down the eastern side of Sabine Peninsula, crossed Byam Martin Channel to the north of Cornwallis Island, and to the rendezvous, lat. $76^{\circ} 33' N.$, long. $104^{\circ} 50' W.$ Returning, he pursued the same route; but, having discovered two islands to the north, off Cape Richards, named Hamilton and Markham Islands, he examined the former. "Near Point Roche," he "saw a piece of drift-wood, standing upright, about fifty or sixty feet above the sea level. Thinking it must have been placed there for a mark, the ground was searched in every direction for documents, "but no traces were found, either here or during the journey, that could induce" him "to think any travelling parties or ships had passed along this coast."

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expedition, 1855," pp. 73, 74, and 624--645.

"Lieutenant Meham* arrived on the 6th July, having been absent ninety-four days." Leaving Dealy Island, he made for Winter Harbour, and crossed over to Liddon Gulf (Parry's); from thence he proceeded westward along the land seen by Lieutenant, now Capt., M'Clintock in 1851 (when detached from Austin's Expedition), but now visited for the first time; passed Murray Inlet and Hardy Bay to Cape Smyth; then Warrington Bay and Cape Cyclops to Cape Russel. The south-western extremity of Melville Island was reached, which he places in lat. $75^{\circ} 14' N.$, long. $117^{\circ} 12' W.$; here the coast turned to the north-north-east. He now entered on new ground, as all beyond this cape was undoubtedly new discovery. Land was seen to the north-westward, since found to form a part of Eglington Island. He crossed the intervening strait—named after his distinguished and respected chief, Kellett's Strait—to it, and landed on Point Pitoural, May 2nd, lat. $75^{\circ} 29' N.$, long. $118^{\circ} 35' W.$ Here he parted with his excellent auxiliary, Mr. Nares (May 8rd). Travelling westward, along the southern extremity of Eglington Island, the beach (his path) contracted, and was frequently hidden by the immense hummocks pressed upon it. He reached, with much labour, its "south-western extreme, a remarkably black and prominent headland. . . The pack here forced considerably up the face of the cliffs. From its summit he" discovered extensive new land from north-east to west-north-west—now Prince Patrick's Land. He then pursued the course of a channel, Crozier Channel, running to the northward, but was driven back by a gale. Returning to a course westerly, he landed on Prince Patrick's Land, at Butter Bay; passing Cape Cam, and proceeding on, he discovered Walker Inlet, Cape Meham, Wolley Bay, and Cape Manning. The land now trended to the north-west: he followed its course, and passed Bloxsome Bay and the Land's End. From hence the land again changed its direction to the northward and eastward, and they passed along the western face of Prince Patrick's Land, West Bay, and Points Weatherall, Tullett, and Discovery, lat. $77^{\circ} 6' N.$, long. $120^{\circ} 30' W.$ Lieutenant Meham remarks: "The coast line of this land may be considered more correctly as the line of pack, as in fact the coast for several miles inland consists of a series of low patches, upon the outer edges of which the pack rests. . . Not the slightest appearance of land could be seen to the westward from here or any other

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expedition, 1855," pp. 74, and 498—540.

position since rounding Land's End. Tremendous pack occupies the whole space in that direction." He now returned across the land to Walker Inlet, which he examined; and, pushing a north-easterly course, passed Cape May, the Points Dames and Manson, and the intervening Bays Carter and Mould, called by the men, Happy Land, in contrary distinction to the miserable country to the westward, named by them Zero's Land. In lat. $76^{\circ} 12' N.$, a deep bight or channel was seen to the north-westward. Soon after, they discovered a cairn of Commander M'Clintock's, stating he had examined in that direction, and had gone to the north-west side of Eglington Island. He now started for the northern part of Melville Island, passing round the north end of Eglington Island, and finding that that officer had also been down the *west shores* of Melville Island, Lieutenant Meham traced the east side of Eglington Island down to lat. $75^{\circ} 48' N.$, and crossed to Melville Island; reached Cape Huronphries, on the south side of Ibbott Bay. He followed the land to the southward, passed Purchase or Resolute Bay, and, in lat. $75^{\circ} 25' N.$, he found M'Clintock's southern cairn. "Much disappointed," Lieutenant Meham says, "I turned my back to the northern land, . . . there being no room for further exploration within my reach." He now started for the south-west point of Melville Island, passing Purchase Inlet, Comfort Cove, to Cape Russel; from this cape he returned on his outward track, examining Hardy Bay, Murray Inlet, and Barry Bay, M'Clintock's cairn, and the remnants left by Parry in 1820, crossed from Lyddon Gulf to Winter Harbour, and thence on to the ship at Dealy Island, performing a journey of 1,006 geographical or 1,173 English miles, which at the time was without precedent; and it is the more worthy praise, inasmuch as it was done under the greatest difficulties, from the tremendous nature of the ice, being set on the western and north-western sides in huge blocks of sixty feet thick, and forced up against the cliffs. In the drift of these masses from the westward may be traced the source from whence the channels eastward, extending into Baffin's Bay, get ice-blocked. Musk oxen, deer, &c., were seen in abundance—so much so as not to be estimated, in consequence of their being so numerous. Game was also seen in great quantities. Some coal was found, and wood—unaltered except by decay—in such a position as to lead to the conclusion that it had grown on the spot where seen; petrified wood was also picked up. Lieutenant Meham says, in his report to Captain Kellett, "In conclusion, . . . besides the absence of traces being a negative proof that the missing crews have not visited any

part of the land traversed on this journey, I have further to add, that, from the character and appearance of the pack, driven against the land, and in every direction to seaward, . . . thoroughly convinces me of the impossibility of penetrating with ships to the southward and westward against such tremendous impediments."

Commander M'Clintock* returned on the 18th July, after an absence of 105 days. The ground being clear of snow, and very heavy, the ravines running with impassable torrents, obliged him to abandon all his equipments on the north side of Melville Island. . . . He walked in with his crew, carrying their knapsacks and a few provisions, all safe and well. . . . How ably and zealously," remarks Captain Kellett, "they must have done their duty to cover so much ground—1,618 miles discovered and walked over!" Commander M'Clintock started on his extended journey 4th April† Crossing Melville Island to Hecla and Griper Bay, he advanced to the north-west in the direction of Cape Fisher, passed Grassy Cape to Point Cleverly: rounding the north-west extreme of Melville Island he followed the coast line, passing Cape Scott and Sandy Point. He now pursued a course to the south and west. On the 2nd May‡ he arrived at Cape de Bray, named after his excellent auxiliary of the French Imperial Navy, with whom he parted here, lat. $76^{\circ} 10' N.$, long. $116^{\circ} 44' W.$ Still continuing in a south and west direction, he traced the coast down to Blackley Haven, Ibbott Bay, and Terrace Cape, crossed Purchase or Resolute Bay, and at a point five or six miles beyond the latter erected a cairn, and deposited a note for Lieutenant Meham. He now retraced his steps by Purchase and Ibbott Bays to Cape de Bray, and crossed Fitzwilliam Strait to Point Wilkie, on the eastern face of Prince Patrick's Land, lat. $76^{\circ} 17' N.$, long. $117^{\circ} 9' W.$; rounding the southern extreme of a peninsula issuing from that land, he crossed Intrepid Inlet to Point Salmon. Intrepid Inlet was then examined, and Green's Bay to Snow-Patch Point; from thence he proceeded southerly past Point Disappointment, crossed another considerable, un-named bay to about lat. $76^{\circ} 20' N.$, long. $119^{\circ} W.$: here he erected a cairn and left a record on the 24th May. He then crossed Crozier Channel to

* See Blue Books, "Further Papers relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," pp. 74, and 540—596.

† In order to facilitate the reader, and to show what Captain M'Clintock has really done, we have adopted, besides the names on his Chart, others which have been added since. See Admiralty Chart, "Discoveries in the Arctic Regions up to 1854."

Eglington Island, and, in lat. $75^{\circ} 59' N.$, long. $118^{\circ} 27' W.$, erected another cairn and deposited a record. Returning along its north-west side, round by the north, he passed Gardner Point, and at a point on its north-east face he deposited another record. He now crossed again to the north to Point Wilkie, and continuing a northerly course passed Jameson Bay, Brown Bluff, Point Giddie (?), and several other bays not named, to Cape Hemphill (Giddie?). He now examined a small bay, and crossed the wide Moore Bay to Cape Ludlow Rich. The land now trended to the north-west, and some new land was discovered to the northward. Commander M'Clintock proceeded on, and landed on its eastern side; it proved to be the southernmost of a cluster of islands. Still advancing in a northerly direction, he reached the second, and on its eastern side built a cairn and deposited records of his visit. Rounding its northern extreme, he discovered several other islets lying off between north and east, with very heavy Polar ice pressed in against their western shores. These groups were named the Polynia Islands, about lat. $77^{\circ} 45' N.$, and $116^{\circ} W.$ To one in the extreme north he gave the name of Ireland's Eye. He now returned to Prince Patrick's Land, and found he had reached its northern extreme—that its shores now trended west and south. Following them, he passed Cape Krabbe, now Cape M'Clintock; threading his way between several un-named islands to Satellite Bay, he ultimately reached his furthest—Point M'Clintock—on the 17th June. "Here," he says, "we saw several islands, forming a chain a few miles off shore; these keep off the Polar pack. . . . It is almost impossible to form a correct idea of the shape of this coast line, it is so extremely low and so deeply covered with snow; far out we see sand-heaps, and far inland we find masses of ice; the land and ice seem confusedly heaped together all about us, but two miles outside us the edge of the tremendous pack seems to rest on the ground. . . . Fragments of drift-wood were found along these shores and islands." A heavy gale now came on. After waiting in vain (the 17th and 18th) for fine weather, they were compelled to return. The position attained was about lat. $77^{\circ} 23' N.$, long. $118^{\circ} 20' W.$, distant about sixty miles from Lieutenant Mechem's furthest northern point reached. Commander M'Clintock started on the 19th June; he followed the coast to the northward to Cape M'Clintock, and then to the south-east by Cape Krabbe to Cape Ludlow Rich, crossed Moore Bay to Cape Hemphill (Giddie), and left a record and chart. From here they crossed over to the north-west side of Emerald Isle, built a cairn and deposited a record, and, taking the western and southern

sides, advanced to the south-eastern extreme; having left a record, they now crossed the strait for the nearest point of Melville Island. Arrived at Cleverly Point, they proceeded by Grassy Cape, and encamped at M'Cormick's Inlet, examined its centre island, and saw two others inside it. Crossed to Cape Fisher, where a large cairn was built, and a record left. Point Nias was next visited, and Parry's monument and his record, left in 1820, copied. Other records were added, and the whole secured. The party landed at the bottom of Hecla and Griper Bay on the 14th July, where another cairn was built, and a record left. They then began their march across the island, but the thaw was so rapid the whole country was flooded, and they were unable to get on. It was now resolved to leave the cart and equipments behind, and they proceeded on foot to the ship, where they arrived on the 18th July, accomplishing 1,148 miles geographical, or 1,325 statute miles. This journey is another proof of what can be accomplished where cheerfulness and determination in a good cause rule. We are at a loss which to admire most, the talented, enterprising spirit of the leader, or the energetic, willing perseverance of the men. Commander M'Clintock certainly has all the distinguishing qualities of a good leader, and his men all those so necessary in faithful followers. The latter seem to have fully understood and estimated their commander, and he to have as fully appreciated the value of his men, and he is not chary in acknowledging their merit. The result was yet another *unprecedented* journey, adding to the honour and fame of our Arctic explorers. This journey is yet more highly to be distinguished, because the greater part of it was over entirely new ground; no less than 768 geographical = 886 statute miles of new coast line were discovered and explored. Still, unhappily, no traces of the ill-starred Franklin and his crews rewarded their efforts. Commander M'Clintock thus concludes his journal: "In proportion to our efforts have we shared in the disappointment common to all who have sought after Sir John Franklin: with the solitary exception of the record and traces of Sir Edward Parry at Point Nias, nothing has been found that could lead one to suppose that the shores we have searched had ever been visited by human beings."

We have now given the general results of the extended travelling parties detached from the *Resolute*; but we feel there are other names that have a claim on our notice. Their repeated short journeys, made in establishing depôts for the more extended parties to fall back upon, involved not only much labour, but great attention and perseverance.

We should regret to omit the names of Messrs. Nares and Roche, mates; Mr. Purchase, senior engineer; Mr. R. C. Scott, assistant-surgeon, &c. We would record every name, but our pages do not permit it. Each did his duty.

We subjoin a compendium of the distances travelled by each party:—

Name.	Rank.	Days out.		Distance travelled.		New Coast Line.		Farthest Position attained.
		Autumn, 1852.	Spring, 1853.	Autumn, 1852.	Spring, 1853.	Explored.	Re-visited.	
F. L. McClintock.	Commander.	40	145	295	1,154	740	68	Point McClintock, Prince Patrick Island, lat. 77° 22' N., long. 116° 27' W.
Geo. F. Meacham.	Lieutenant.	23	94	230	1,328	809	77	Prince Patrick Island, lat. 77° 6' N., long. 150° 30' W.
Bedford Pim.	„	17	62	213	1,163	785	„	Bay of Mercy, Bering Island, lat. 74° 6' N., long. 117° 46' W.
R. V. Hamilton.	„	16	68	202	635	170	„	Unsettled Rendezvous, lat. 70° 36' N., long. 104° 50' W.
Geo. F. McDougall.	Master.	„	19	„	237	196	„	Five miles north of Point Read, Hecla and Griper Bay of Mercy, Bering Island.
Wm. T. Donaville.	Surgeon.	„	76	„	440	„	„	„
Richard Roche.	Mate.	„	78	„	738	„	„	„
Geo. S. Nares.	„	25	69	164	1,037	„	„	Cape Mudge, lat. 75° 51' N., long. 116° 12' W.; also, to Recovery Island and back.
Emile De Bray.	Enseigne de Vaisseau.	„	17	45	375	391	„	Cape Nares, Edgington Island, lat. 73° 32' N., long. 115° 30' W.
Wm. H. Richards.	Clerk in charge.	„	54	„	440	642	„	Cape De Bray, Melville Island, lat. 76° 10' N., long. 116° 45' W.
					92	92	„	Point Hecla.
		Total		1,111	6,250	7,561	68	1,619
		Total		1,282	7,220	8,502	77	1,887

To this account in justice we add Journeys performed in 1854:—

Geo. F. Meacham.	Lieutenant.	63	1,137 + 1,194 = 2,347
F. J. Krabbe.	Master.	65	1,336 + 1,375 = 2,711
			869
			1,001
			9,384
			Grand Total 10,839

Animals and Game procured by Captain Kellett's division, altogether, 47,463 lbs.

The travelling parties being now all on board, and the search to the west and north completed; a noble depôt having been built at Dealy Island, and well stored with provisions, in case of any wandering party from Franklin's or Collinson's Expeditions falling back upon Melville Island for relief; and the *Resolute* and *Intrepid* having been put into sea-going order, Captain Kellett now looked anxiously for the breaking up of the ice and the release of his ships. On the 18th August, 1853, a furious gale from the north unexpectedly broke up the floe about them, and drove them to sea. The vessels continued drifting to and fro helpless in the pack for eighty-seven days, but eventually became fixed on the 12th November, twenty-eight miles southwest of Cape Cockburn. Here, in the pack, the *Resolute* and *Intrepid* were frozen in, and wintered. Thus unexpectedly arrested, Captain Kellett resolved to make another attempt to communicate with the *Enterprise*, Captain Collinson. He therefore despatched away two parties; one, under Lieutenant Meham, of the *Resolute*, to the Princess Royal Islands, Prince of Wales' Strait; the other, under Mr. Krabbe, of the *Intrepid*, to Mercy Bay. These parties started on the 3rd April, 1854.* Their orders were to proceed together to the Sailor's Home, Dealy Island, and from thence to the westward and across Banks' Strait to Point Peel or Cape Russel. Here they were to separate, the one for the Princess Royal Islands, the other for Mercy Bay. Proceeding to the west and north, they passed Cape Gillman, Byam Martin Island, and reached the Sailor's Home, Dealy Island, on the 12th. They then continued on to Cape Providence, and crossed the strait. On the 25th they encamped off a low point at the entrance of a wide inlet, which they supposed to be Cape Russel. Here they parted, Mr. Krabbe for Mercy Bay, and Lieutenant Meham for Prince of Wales' Strait. Supposing this inlet to be the entrance to that strait, he proceeded down it; but on the 28th, having reached the bottom, they discovered they were in error. Placing his men on half allowance, he retraced his steps to the north. It turned out they had been traversing Collinson's Inlet, the land about here having been laid down too far to the eastward by fifty miles. Following the land, which now gradually trended round to the westward, they opened a new inlet. This proved to be Prince of Wales' Strait (they were on Point Peel), having lost five days in useless travelling. They now proceeded down the strait, and "on

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," pp. 87 and 689.

the 4th May landed on the larger Princess Royal Island, and at the cairn found a document, stating that H.M.S. *Enterprise*, in August, 1851, passed up the strait to Point Peel; returned, and attempted to get to the north by the west coast of Baring Island, but could only reach lat. $72^{\circ} 55' N.$; that she ultimately wintered, 1851-52, in lat. $71^{\circ} 35' N.$, long. $117^{\circ} 40' W.$; and that information of her subsequent movements would be found on an islet (Ramsey Island) in lat. $71^{\circ} 36' N.$, long. $119^{\circ} W.$ " Lieutenant Mechem now "started to the southward for further traces. . . On the 9th arrived at the islet," and "found records. . . These stated that the *Enterprise's* parties had visited Point Hearne, on Melville Island, and had examined the north and south shores of Prince Albert's Land. Upon her leaving this, the 27th August, 1852, Captain Collinson intended to pursue a channel between Wollaston and Prince Albert Land" (Prince Albert Sound). Having left records here, Lieutenant Mechem resolved to return to the ship immediately. Depositing records and notices of his visit at Cape Russel and on the south side of the strait, he crossed to Cape Providence, and arrived at Dealy Island on the 27th May. He there found orders from Captain Kellett, directing him to proceed at once to Beechey Island, Captain Kellett himself having received orders from Sir Edward Belcher to abandon the *Resolute* and *Intrepid*. Depositing his latest information he again started, passed Point Gillman, Cape Cockburn, Assistance Harbour, &c., &c. He arrived at Beechey Island, 12th June, having travelled 1,157 geographical or 1,336 statute miles in 70 days, or deducting $8\frac{1}{2}$ lost from various detentions, in $61\frac{1}{2}$ days.

Mr. Krabbe,* after parting (April 25th) with Lieutenant Mechem, was thrown out in his reckoning, the land being laid down too far to the eastward, the same as that officer had been; but, having made out Cape Russel, he proceeded at once to the Bay of Mercy, and arrived there May 5th. Finding everything undisturbed, having examined and farther secured the stores, he left the *Investigator* and Mercy Bay on the 11th, and arrived at Dealy Island May 26th. He there received orders to proceed direct to Beechey Island, for the same reasons as those given to Lieutenant Mechem, and started directly. He pursued a similar track to Lieutenant Mechem, and arrived June 13th; distance travelled, 866 geographical = 1,001 statute miles.

We had thought the previous travelling exploits of Commander

* See Blue Book, "Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 96.

M'Clintock and Lieutenant Meham extraordinary, and the more so, taking into consideration the rigour of the climate, the nature of the country, and the excessive weight per man, but the journey of Lieutenant Meham, just noticed, eclipses them all; it is without parallel in Arctic travel, whether we consider the distance gone over or the time in which it was performed, and reflects the highest credit on that officer and his party.

We now return to the *Resolute* and *Intrepid*, during the absence of these parties. Capt. Kellett had, under the orders of Sir Edward Belcher, been compelled to abandon both vessels. Previous to arranging for the departure of his own crews, Capt. Kellett, with that humane feeling so characteristic of him, prepared for the careful removal of the Investigators, now forced, a second time, to seek another home. Under Capt. M'Clure, they were despatched, in three divisions, on April 10th, 11th, and 14th, and arrived safely on board the *North Star* on the 23rd, 24th, and 27th following. Both ships having been put into perfect working order, ready for re-occupation, and every preparation made for the comfort of his men on their journeys, on May 15th, 1854, Capt. Kellett, with his gallant officers and crews, abandoned the *Resolute* and *Intrepid* for *Beechey Island*. Thus were two good ships sacrificed, but the "*Old Resolute*," as if in defiance of unfeeling official recklessness, seems to have thought herself worthy of a better fate; and, averse to be got rid of in this ignominious way, her spirit was not to be laid. She submitted to be ice-bound, and to be wildly drifted with it; but she ultimately broke from her fetters, and told to science the tale of her drift; she unfolded important desiderata—the velocity and direction of the Polar currents. She was rescued and restored to England, and remains a monument of the deep sympathy which, forgetful of the past, excited by a great and noble cause, may exist between two kindred nations.*

Sad was the day to Capt. Kellett, and his excellent officers and crews, when the *Resolute* and *Intrepid* were abandoned; they would

* The *Resolute*, although deserted, was not to be wholly lost; drifting, she found her way down Barrow's Strait, through Lancaster Sound into Baffin's Bay and Davis' Straits, to near Cape Mercy, where she was seen and taken possession of by an American whaler, and carried into New London, Connecticut. She was purchased, refitted, and restored to her original state, by the American Government, and sent to England under the command of Capt. Hartstein, U.S.N.; and by him presented, December 16th, 1856, in the name of the American people, to Victoria, England's Queen. This noble act finds us too poor in words adequately to acknowledge. Graceful and yet glorious, it commands our highest admiration, gratitude, and praise. May it never be forgotten!

gladly have remained out yet another year. It was Capt. Kellett's intention to have examined Peel Sound, and also to have filled up the space between Lieutenant (now Capt.) S. Osborn's and Lieutenant Wynniatt's farthest in Melville Sound. This latter would, we think, have yielded to him far more knowledge of the position and fate of our unfortunate countrymen than we fear we shall ever obtain now (our reasons for thinking so will be again reverted to), but it was not permitted; to abandon were his orders. Capt. Kellett and his gallant fellows all arrived in safety on board the *North Star*, May 28, 1854. Subsequently, on August 26th they were joined, as has been noticed, by Sir Edward Belcher and the officers and crews of the *Assistance* and *Pioneer*, also abandoned. The destruction of this expedition was now complete, and never was there a more wanton sacrifice. These ships had been commissioned for a particular and a sacred purpose; the country had willingly gone into greater expense in their equipment than had ever been gone into before for similar objects, yet with these goodly ships, their country's pride! in perfect order and efficiency, with the purpose of their mission only partly completed, under the hateful influence of a vacillating, mean, unworthy policy, they are peremptorily ordered to be withdrawn from the scene and object of their mission, or to be abandoned at once on the spot, and with them all further search for our missing countrymen. All the officers and crews of this expedition being now assembled on board the *North Star*, that ship was directed to England; but, fortunately, the *Phoenix*, Capt. Inglefield, with the *Talbot*, hove in sight the same day. The *North Star* was now relieved of part of the officers and crews, which were distributed amongst the various ships. This done, the *Phoenix*, *North Star*, and *Talbot* sailed for England. The former arrived at Cork, as already noticed, on September 28th, and the others soon after.

We have now completed our notices of Sir Edward Belcher's Expedition. That extraordinary exertions were made to bring it to a successful issue no one can doubt. Who can read of the doings of Richards and Sherard Osborn, of M'Clintock and Meham, without a thrill of admiration at their gallant daring and perseverance—overcoming all difficulties with a light, cheerful spirit, and yet not to feel a corresponding regret that those bright, ennobling qualities should have been thus uselessly thrown away? The same observations apply to the rest of the officers and crews. Taking the eastern division and the Wellington Channel, what success could be hoped for from it? Beyond its fair appearance it could offer nothing. There was not the

most minute fact to prove that the *Erebus* and *Terror* ever ascended it, or Jones's or Smith's Sounds, or even the north at all. All beside was the work of dreamy visionaries, or benevolent enthusiasts; kindly meant, but full of error. As to the western division, it (as we have said before) had just a chance of hope, which hope rested solely on the supposition that, barred from the south, but having made large westing, Franklin had ascended to the north by Byam Martin's or Austin's Channel; still, as these channels had already been searched by Austin's parties, less, consequently, was the hope that flickered over them of success. We have always thought that the absence of despatches at Parry's Sandstone was pretty good negative evidence that he had *never been hereabout*. The search of the north of the Parry Islands by Richards and Osborn, and of the entire circuit of Melville Island, with all the new islands to the north and west (Prince Patrick's Land, &c.), and the channels between them by M'Clintock and Meham, all went to set at rest the thought that Franklin had ever attempted a northern route at all. Thus far as regards the north: where, then, could we look for him? There was but one place, and that is Melville Sound. This, then, should have been searched. Is it not strange that Imagination never wandered here? particularly as seeing that the *Erebus* and *Terror* were ordered to pass through it in a south-west direction. Did she shrink from the horrors and embarrassments with which it had become invested? If these were thought really to exist, the greater reason was there that more stringent effort should be made in this direction. It was, in the absence of information, the only certain and true path, whilst to the north all was a myth and *without the plan*, or at best, only secondary to it. The persevering efforts of these travelling parties destroyed the myth; but, alas! in seeking its destruction, Franklin and his gallant companions were forsaken. They may have perished, too! But all this might have been foretold by any reasonable being, taking the original plan and Franklin's Instructions for his guide, until they were superseded by other equally certain and truthful information, that he had changed his views, and with them his intentions and movements. The existence of a Polynia to the north of the Parry Islands would, we thought, be fully tested by this expedition; for, as Franklin was said to have passed up Wellington Channel and by the sea of Penny to the north-west, this expedition being expressly fitted out to follow him, the Polynia thus presumed to exist must have been crossed; but it seems that no attempt was possible in that direction. The observations made between lat.

77° and 78° rather check the fervour in favour of an open sea; but really we do not see, in the conditions it presented, aught that should lead to the conclusion that a Polynia *does not exist yet farther to the north*; again, there was only the experience of one season. That an extensive Polar ocean, partially open even in winter, does exist to the westward, north of Prince Patrick's Land and the Polynia Islands, is not disproved. That a general easterly current prevails, there is no doubt. It may be deflected to the north or south, as the case might be, by the interposition of land; but, when free, would still run to the eastward. The enormous masses of ice, pressed up on the western sides of Baring Island, Prince Patrick's Land, and the Polynia Islands, all attest this fact; it may be traced in the old ice, along the northern shores of Cornwallis Island, in the ice-blocked passage leading into Jones's Sound, in Queen's and Wellington Channels, and Banks' Strait; all these furnish abundant evidence of the prevailing influence of this easterly current. This current must clear, to a certain degree, the Polar Ocean of its ices; and this, with the warmth of summer, and the increase of warmth in proceeding westerly ("no matter from what cause," remarks Sir Edward Parry), must add to the probability of a "wide, immeasurable ocean," or Polynia. Science was, as usual, benefited by the contributions of this expedition, especially geography: the new discoveries were extensive and interesting, being in so very high a latitude; to these are added valuable remarks on geology, natural history, temperature, &c.

As to animal life, Sir Edward Belcher seemed particularly sensitive on this point, whilst Capt. Kellett is perfectly at ease upon it. The one does not seem to have sought, and therefore did not obtain, the Baron, or the prime Sir Loin, the haunch of venison or delicious game; the latter sought and secured it, ate and enjoyed it, and, like a true Briton, when his stomach was satisfied, was contented and happy, not only in himself but with every one about him; for he saw their renewed energies consecrated to the search with new hope. There is no doubt but in these regions man's stamina requires to be kept fully up, and he may not be squeamish as to what he eats; woe to him that is, or who cannot eat! The internal heat must be kept up, and it may be so from animals of the sea as well as those of the land; nourishing, though not always sightly. That animals exist abundantly to the far north, and that they make it their fixed abode, there is now no doubt; not that we think a sportsman would fall over a musk ox or deer every step he took, or that ptarmigan, &c., cloud the sky and stay their wings to be shot at. Men in large parties are

scarcely likely to obtain sufficient continuous food by hunting anywhere, but in widely separated small ones their chances are greater. Again, all rocks are not favourable to vegetation; and where vegetation does not exist animals cannot. Success or non-success in hunting no doubt influences the feelings; indeed, we fancy we detect it in the tone of the correspondence of these extreme divisions; the one seems morbid and despondent, the other cheerful, even gay and hopeful.

We notice with great pleasure how highly Sir Edward Belcher and his able second, Capt. Kellett, speak of their gallant officers and crews; especially, too, is M. de Bray, of the French Imperial Navy, mentioned by Capt. Kellett. This is very gratifying. The usual kindly, patient bearing of one towards the other is as conspicuous in this expedition as it was in Austin's—between the officers and the men, and the men with each other. The cause in which they were engaged seems to have united and bound them together in one Holy League: all did their duty.

In concluding, we cannot but express our regret that one ship and a tender was not left out for another year to complete the search of all west and south of the meridian of Beechey Island. We mean, to complete the thorough examination of Melville and Peel's Sounds. Peel's Sound, *we think, is closed to the southward (see ante)*, and if so, it would have told of the greater necessity for the rigid examination of Melville Sound; for the question would then naturally recur, Where did Rae's drifting fragments come from, if not through it? The answer could only be, From Melville Sound. If open, and found to be continuous with Victoria Strait, more important reliques would have rewarded the explorers. At any rate, *by it the bottom of Melville Sound could quite as readily have been approached by a strait (which we have no doubt exists, for reasons which we shall give anon), as by Cape Walker.* These completed, the search for Franklin and his crews west of Beechey Island must then have been considered finished; which it cannot now, whatever the conclusions of the Admiralty. We wonder the necessity for the complete examination of Melville and Peel Sounds did not occur to a talented officer like Sir Edward Belcher. It may be said that his orders were peremptory for the withdrawal of the whole of the ships: still we think he had a discretionary power given to him; on this he should have acted: but he betrayed too much anxiety for despatches and orders. On the other hand, the Admiralty, eagerly desirous to give up all further search for the unfortunate Franklin, so well hedged him round with

them, that he feared the responsibility of abandoning the ships less than he did the displeasure he might incur by keeping a part out another year, retaining them to complete the search. Again, in all this he seems to have consulted alone his own will, without reference to his efficient second. The ships were abandoned, and, altogether, failure and loss were on every side. The wisdom of our country did not shine this year; happily, the obscurity was only partial, but, partial as it was, it dimmed the glory of British Arctic achievements. Thus ended what has been anomalously called, "The Last of the Arctic Voyages!"

The arrival of Capt. M'Clure, the discoverer of the North-West Passage, with the gallant Investigators in safety to England, after their long detention in the Arctic regions, was regarded as no common event. His and their return was hailed with much joy, congratulation, and thankfulness by all who felt how much the question involved the nation's honour. The scientific world marked their especial feeling in the hearty welcome they gave him at their receptions. In this none more cordially greeted the gallant navigator than did the Royal Geographical Society.*

All rejoiced that the great problem, the *vexata questio* that had eluded the vigilance and enterprise of the most daring and intelligent of our country for three centuries, had at length been solved, and that it had been done by England. The "Old Worthies" had bequeathed this great question, the question of a North-West Passage, to her; she made it her own, and called on her sons for its solution. Many were the daring attempts made to unravel it, but all had failed; over and over again they were repeated and renewed; the solution seemed to mock all their efforts: still undismayed, they returned, again and again, to battle with storm and ice, and the treachery of unknown shores, until at last, as if in admiration of their ceaseless perseverance, nature relented, and the North-West Passage was discovered. Thus another ray fell on Britain. It could not, at any period, have more gracefully or more worthily fallen, than on the head of our excellent Queen Victoria. We stay not to

* This distinguished Society had already, in May, 1854, previous to his arrival, awarded its patron's medal to Capt. M'Clure. See the anniversary address of the good Earl of Ellesmere, President, "Royal Geographical Society's Journal," vol. 24, 1854, p. lxxvii. A paper on "The Discovery of the North-West Passage," by Commander M'Clure, was read before the Royal Geographical Society, November 14, 1854, communicated by Sir George Back. See "Journal of Royal Geographical Society," vol. 24, p. 240.

tell of the knighting of Capt. R. Le M. M'Clure, of his promotion and reward, of the promotions of the officers, and of the rewards to the deserving Investigators. Sir Robert, in a letter to the Admiralty, dated November 14, 1854,* in expressing "his most grateful acknowledgments" for his own promotion, and "for the favour and kindness" he "has at all times met while soliciting their Lordships to view the services of the officers and crew of H.M.S. *Investigator* in a favourable light," says the promotions and rewards "have left" him "nothing further to ask, or their Lordships to grant." All this is good, and is as it should be in a great and glorious country like our own; but there is yet a name that seems not to have obtained that notice it so pre-eminently deserves; we allude to Capt. Henry Kellett, C.B., of H.M.S. *Resolute*. It should be remembered that this distinguished officer and good man was, under providence, the deliverer of Capt. M'Clure and the officers and crew of the *Investigator*, for he extricated them at a time when his aid was most needed, and without which, want, sickness, and death might have been theirs. Capt. Kellett had seen long and done good service in Arctic research, and would have done honour to knighthood. Surely with such merit, such a man in such a sacred cause, and on such a great national question, should have had a special recognition.

We have said there was much joyful feeling on the arrival of the discoverer of the North-West Passage. Alas! there was, too, the wail of sorrow, with streaming eyes, that "would not be comforted because they are not;" the long-missing Franklin and his gallant band are still away, their fate still shrouded o'er in mystery.

Did the unhappy Franklin and his hapless crews discover the North-West Passage? We may revert to this question again.

October 22nd, 1854, very important intelligence was received at the Admiralty from the celebrated Arctic traveller, Dr. Rae; the substance of which may be given as follows:—Dr. Rae had been sent to the north, in 1853, to complete certain surveys; amongst others, the west coast of Boothia, from the Castor and Pollux River to Bellot's Strait. Having wintered on the North Pole River, Repulse Bay, he started on March 31st, 1854. We shall now follow his letter to the Admiralty, dated Repulse Bay, July 29th, 1854:†—"During my journey over the ice and snow this spring, with the view of completing the survey of the west coast of Boothia, I met with Esqui-

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers Relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 112.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 831—858.

maux in Pelly Bay, from one of whom I learnt that a party of 'white men' (Kabloonans) had perished from want of food some distance to the westward, and not far beyond a large river containing many falls and rapids." "Subsequently, further particulars were received, and a number of articles purchased, which places the fate of a portion (if not of all) of the then survivors of Sir John Franklin's long-lost party beyond a doubt; a fate as terrible as the imagination can conceive." The substance of the information obtained at various times, and from various sources, was as follows:—"In the spring, four winters past (spring, 1850), a party of 'white men,' amounting to about forty, were seen travelling southwards over the ice, and dragging a boat with them, by some Esquimaux who were killing seals near the north shore of King William's Land (which is a large island). None of the party could speak the Esquimaux language intelligibly, but by signs the natives were made to understand that their ship or ships had been crushed by ice, and that they were now going where they expected to find deer to shoot. From the appearance of the men, all of whom, except one officer, looked thin, they were then supposed to be getting short of provisions, and purchased a small seal from the natives. At a later date, the same season, but previous to the breaking up of the ice, the bodies of some thirty persons were discovered on the continent, and five on an island near it, about a long day's journey to the north-west of a large stream, which can be no other than Back's Great Fish River (named by the Esquimaux Oot-Koo-hi-ca-lik), as its description, and that of the low shore in the neighbourhood of Point Ogle and Montreal Island, agrees exactly with that of Sir George Back. Some of the bodies had been buried (probably those of the first victims of famine); some were in a tent or tents, others under a boat, which had been turned over to form a shelter, and some lay scattered about in different directions. Of those found on the island one was supposed to have been an officer, as he had a telescope strapped over his shoulders, and his double-barrelled gun lay beneath him. From the mutilated state of many of the corpses, and the contents of the kettles, it is evident that our wretched countrymen had been driven to the last resource—cannibalism—as a means of prolonging existence. There appears to have been an abundant stock of ammunition, as the powder was emptied in a heap on the ground, by the natives, out of the kegs or cases containing it, and a quantity of ball and shot was found below high water mark, having probably been left on the ice close to the beach. There must have been a number of watches, compasses,

telescopes, guns (several double-barrelled, &c.), all of which appear to have been broken up, as I saw pieces of these different articles with the Esquimaux, and, together with some silver spoons and forks, purchased as many as I could get. A list of the most important of these I enclose, with a rough sketch of the crests and initials on the forks and spoons.* We need not enumerate the articles, but one of them bore the lamented Franklin's name, and others belonged to Crozier, Gore, &c., &c. "None of the Esquimaux had seen 'whites,' nor had they ever been at the place where the bodies were found, but had their information from those who had been there, and who had seen the party when travelling." This letter agrees substantially with Dr. Rae's more detailed Report to the Hudson's Bay Company, dated, York Factory, September 1st, 1854.† It is there added, "A few of the unfortunate men must have survived until the arrival of the wild fowl (say until the end of May), as shots were heard, and fresh bones and the feathers of geese were noticed near the scene of the sad event;" and "from what I could learn, there is no reason to suspect that any violence had been offered to the sufferers by the natives." After parting with the natives at Pelly Bay, Dr. Rae proceeded across the land in a westerly direction, passed a river, the Becher, which falls into the west side of Pelly Bay, and soon after, another river, running seaward, westward, named after Sir R. I. Murchison, President of the Royal Geographical Society. He then went on to the Castor and Pollux River; and, after the fruitless search of a pillar near it for some document, he crossed Inglis and Shepherd Bays to Cape Colville, where the coast turns sharply to the north. Following it they came to Point de la Guiche; from there he sent a man on to Balfour Bay. This was his extreme northern limit on Boothia Isthmus. Being detained four days by fog, and seeing there was no chance of completing the survey between the magnetic pole and Bellot Strait, Dr. Rae, May 6th, resolved to return, which he did by Pelly Bay, setting the disputed question, as to a passage west out of the head of that bay, at rest.‡ Crossing Simpson's

* These relics of the lamented Franklin and his unfortunate companions are now preserved, and are to be seen at Greenwich Hospital.

† See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 835 et seq. See also the "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. 25, pp. 246—256.

‡ After Dr. Rae's return from this quarter in 1847, as he did not traverse the head of Pelly Bay, the question as to a passage west to Castor and Pollux River was considered not to have been settled.

Peninsula, he reached Committee Bay, and then followed his outward track, by Rae Isthmus, to Repulse Bay, and on to York Factory, where he arrived, August 31, 1854. "It was at their winter quarters, between May and August," Dr. Rae says, "I had opportunities of questioning the Esquimaux regarding the information which I had already obtained of the party of whites, who had perished of starvation, and eliciting the particulars connected with that sad event, the substance of which I have already stated."

The recovery of these precious relics of the Franklin Expedition, and the sad, calamitous report connected with them, we need not say excited the most painful and distressing feelings throughout England. The effect on the hearts and homes of those who had relatives or friends in the *Erebus* and *Terror* is too sacred for us to touch on; we may conceive, but dare not attempt to describe it. It would be impossible here, too, to go into the detail of all that has been written and said upon these sad remains, and the speculations they gave rise to. One general conclusion was inferred: that a party from Sir John Franklin's Expedition had reached the shores of the American Continent, in the vicinity of Back's River, and had there in part, if not all, perished. The various valuable articles brought home by Dr. Rae aided too fully to attest this; but *whence did the party come, that we should hear of them in such an unexpected quarter?* In the course of our inquiry to ascertain *if we have sought the unfortunate Franklin in the right direction*, we have always questioned the wisdom of *searching by the north for Sir John Franklin, and especially by the way of the Wellington Channel, until we had previously and fully assured ourselves that all his attempts in the direction of his Instructions—that is, by Cape Walker and the south-west through Melville Sound—had failed; and hence, acquitted or relieved from the primary part of his Instructions, he had no alternative but to adopt a northern route, or to return. We have no proof that he did. We are compelled, therefore, to believe that he did not fail, and consequently was not compelled to adopt the alternative.* In 1850 (see *ante*, p. 161), we laid down the course which we thought Sir John Franklin would follow, agreeable to these Instructions. This opinion we still retain, and the result of every effort that has been made since goes more strongly to prove the soundness of our common-sense views, and the sad intelligence now before us more and more confirms them. It was now argued that this party came from Franklin's ships, which, having passed down Peel's Sound, had been crushed by the ice some short distance to the north of King

William's Land. Others, again, asserted that it was a retreating party from the ships, abandoned to the north of Wellington Channel. Let it be remembered, there was not, nor is, a spark of evidence to prove either opinion; as usual, they are merely conjectural. We will now endeavour to clear the mystery,—for mystery it really is,—that this party should be found in such an unexpected quarter, a quarter which we have already argued, in noticing Dr. King's plan of search by the Great Fish River (see p. 81), which no retreating party would attempt, unless barred out from the *south and west by the existence of land then unknown, and forced to the southward and eastward* by some passage or strait or practicable route, also then unknown, in that direction. The only facilities for escape it offered was the supposed passage between Back's River and the bottom of Prince Regent's Inlet, on to Fury Beach, or perhaps by Repulse Bay,* or Wager Inlet, nearer routes to the Hudson's Bay Company's stations in Hudson's Bay. That any party would attempt to get south by the obstacle-beset Great Fish River we think most improbable.

But let us now inquire *whether Peel's Sound offers a passage for ships to the southward, and by Victoria Strait to the north of King William's Land? We think not.* Our attention was first called to this subject in 1851, by Lieutenant Browne (of Austin and Ommamney's Expedition), who explored the western side of Peel's Sound to lat. $72^{\circ} 49'$ N., long. $96^{\circ} 40'$ W. That officer pronounces it as his impression that it is mostly frozen solid to the bottom, and therefore is rarely, if ever, open to navigation (see *ante*, pp. 82—84). Our next authorities are still more conclusive. Kennedy and Bellot, in crossing from Bellot's Strait to Prince of Wales' Land, *on the spot, both positively affirm they saw the land continuous from North Somerset round by the north to that western (Prince of Wales') land* (see *ante*, p. 261). Besides these, our notice has been called to another fact by Alexander G. Findlay, Esq., F.R.G.S. The Union Mountains, seen to the westward from Cresswell Bay by the Rosses in 1829, occupy the site of this supposed continuation of Victoria Strait with Peel's Sound. Sidelong to these we may ask, How is it that the current which sets easterly along the shores of America from Behring's Strait is not found in Dease's Strait? If Peel Sound were open, it would continue its course to the eastward and north through that sound to Barrow's Strait. From all these authorities,

* Rae's Isthmus and discoveries in 1847 were of course unknown to Franklin.

we are bound to come to the conclusion that no passage exists; in short, *Peel Sound is a sound, and not a strait.** We must therefore look elsewhere for a passage for the ships, if they did get down on the north side of King William's Land. By referring to a map, it will be seen that no other *known passage exists but Bellot's Strait*, and it is impossible to believe that the ships *came down Regent's Inlet, and passing through Bellot's Strait* (supposing it navigable), *arrived at King William's Land, without calling at Fury Beach.* The same may be said of a retreating party from them. It is equally unlikely that, having reached there, they would depart without leaving a notice of their future intentions. We are compelled, then, to the opinion that the *Erebus* and *Terror* never entered that sea, or supposed strait, lying to the north of King William's Land, and extending to the bottom of Peel Sound, *by Peel Sound or Bellot's Strait.* Again, looking at this party as a retreating party, after having abandoned their ships, as some say, in Wellington Channel, it certainly is not impossible that, after crossing Barrow's Strait, they could find their way down Peel Sound and Victoria Strait to King William's Land, Montreal Island, and the adjacent continent. But why? For what reason adopt this route? A distressed party seeking relief would take the nearest, the most direct course to obtain it. Assuming them, then, to have started from the Wellington Channel, their first object would be to reach Fury Beach and the stores which they knew were to be obtained there; and to accomplish this, it would be far more easy to diverge a little to the eastward to Port Leopold, than to take the more circuitous westerly course down Peel Sound, to arrive at the same object. To suppose that they, being in distress, and within 140 or 150 miles of Fury Beach, and the relief its stores offered them, that they would, regardless of these stores, pass down Peel Sound to King William's Land, and on to Montreal Island, about 450 or 500 miles, trusting to the uncertain supplies of Back's River and its vicinity, is monstrous. Equally so is the idea that, having reached Fury Beach by Peel Sound, and having obtained temporary relief from there, that they returned by the way they came, and went on to King William's Land. Once at Fury Beach, they were far more likely to have adopted the plan of Sir John Ross, and endeavoured to get to Pond's

* See Appendix to a pamphlet on the "Probable Course of Sir John Franklin," with map, by Alexander Finlay, Esq., F.R.G.S. Also, the Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, No. VI., pp. 212, 213.

Bay, and aid from the whalers, or, failing that, to reach the Danish settlements, than any other; but, even assuming they preferred to attempt to obtain relief by the Hudson's Bay Company's settlements, their chances of reaching them and obtaining it by going down Regent's Inlet were quite as good as by Peel Sound, and by the supposed continuation of it with Victoria Strait to King William's Land.

We have endeavoured to trace to the source from whence these poor fellows came, and we think we have clearly shown that in no conceivable case, from whatever northern direction, can either the ships or the men, after leaving them, have come down Peel Sound. We can see no reason why they should give it a preference as a means of retreat. The fact of their being found in the direction of King William's Land and Back's River seems to us the best proof that they *did not* come down Peel Sound. We must therefore look to some other quarter for the route by which they reached King William's Land, and subsequently the mouth of Back's River. This idea is not the figment of a rambling imagination, but is the result of calm reflection and the desire for sound inquiry. Where, then, did they come from? We asked this question before, in noticing and seeking the source whence came the drifting fragments picked up by Dr. Rae in Parker Bay in 1851. Men may transport by hand small articles to long distances, such as the butt end of a flag-staff, a wooden stanchion, &c., and leave in darkness the inquiry whence they came and how they got there; but to be water-borne and drifting implies a passage to drift in or through, and if the entrance to the sea or strait where such water-borne fragments are found be confined to one or two passages, the direction of drift may be readily inferred. Hence it was thought by Dr. Rae that these fragments came from the north, between North Somerset and Victoria Land, but he was not aware of the results of Austin's travelling parties at the time. We have shown that no passage to the southward exists out of Peel Sound; they could not, therefore, come from there. Still, granting a passage really does exist, whence did they come that they should have got within the indraught of Peel Sound, and from thence be carried to the southward? Not from Boechey Island, or the Wellington Channel; for if so, we must suppose them to have drifted *westerly against, and southerly across, the general current setting to the eastward*—this is improbable; and did they come from the westward, we can only imagine they belonged to Parry's Expedition, 1819, or to Franklin's, 1845, as no other ships have ever

passed in that direction but theirs. The former is so improbable, not to say impossible, that we may at once dismiss it; and the latter is scarcely less so. Again, assuming the possibility of the latter, it implies that Franklin got to the westward, at least of Peel's Sound, which is not admitted by those who think he went to the north by Wellington' Channel; at any rate, it is only just probable, if he was enabled to get to the westward, and Peel Sound was not closed: but we have shown that it is closed, that it has no communication with Victoria Strait, and consequently none with Parker Bay. Nor can these fragments be traced to Kennedy and Bellot, or to the Hudson's Bay Company, as they bear the Government mark. May they not have been dropped by the party in attempting to escape southward by King William's Land and Back's River? They may have been. Their origin, then, must be identified with the primary source or starting-point, and movements of that party. This, we have shown, was not from the north by Peel Sound. Whence then? There can be but one conclusion, which is, that there must be a passage or strait leading to the westward from Victoria Strait, and communicating with Melville Sound. We have long thought so: the same opinion has been (though but lately) surmised by others; but from all we can learn, it is not based upon any positive grounds, but rests merely on the fact of there being a blank on our maps. A blank occurs between the Prince of Wales' and Victoria Lands, and therefore it may be a strait. It rested, in short, merely on conjecture, that curse of Arctic conclusions. That a channel or strait exists running in a north-west and south-east direction from between Rae's Pelly Point and the southern coast of Prince of Wales' Land, on the south-east side, and Osborn and Wynniatt's farthest on the north-west, we have no doubt. The southerly and south-easterly set of the current from Banks' Strait, so often referred to, goes strongly to prove this; for if Melville Sound were closed, this set would sweep round the bottom of the sound, and would clear it of its ices, which we know it never has been observed to do. It is clear, then, there must be some operating cause arresting it there; it can only be accounted for by presuming the existence of an outlet at or near the bottom, diverting the general easterly current in a southerly direction, bringing down and filling the sound with ice from the north-west, and thereby preventing its being drifted or emptied into Barrow's Strait. We are aware of the low, shallow nature of the coast, with its old ice, visited by Capt. Ommaney, on the east side of Melville Sound, and the bar it would offer to the free drift of the ice masses;

but no outward drift would occur until Melville Sound was choked; the whole pressure would then come on this coast from the north-west, and if loaded, the outside ice would float, under the influence of the easterly current, into and down Barrow's Strait. But this would be only the surplus or excess after Melville Sound was filled up, or that which might be detached by an occasional irregular breaking up of the floe on the outer or northern margin. But we have arrived at the conclusion that a strait exists here from other and more positive reasons—the combination of a succession of facts, that have had their origin in an inquiry as to the source whence the flood tide comes that flows down the south-eastern face of Victoria Land, through Victoria Strait and Dease's Strait, into Coronation Gulf. Our attention was first called to this subject by an observation of Sir John Richardson's. In his Report to the Admiralty, 1848, of his proceedings on his boat voyage between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers, he says :*—"The flood tide . . . which runs in Dolphin and Union Straits . . . comes from the eastward out of Coronation Gulf, and must flow primarily down the opening between *Victoria and Wollaston Lands*, or by the one between *Victoria Land and Boothia*, being the only two communications between Coronation Gulf and Lancaster Sound. . . . Again,† Mr. Thomas Simpson, who was an acute observer, remarked that the flood tide brought much ice into Coronation Gulf round the west end of Victoria Land, and facts collected on three visits which I have made to that gulf, lead me to concur with him." This view of Sir John's, in which Mr. Thomas Simpson seems to have joined, that a passage existed between Wollaston and Victoria Lands, was afterwards found to be incorrect, as Dr. Rae proved these lands to be continuous; but the *flood tide still came from the eastward, and we continued to watch it. At last it became a source of great interest to us, especially in connection with our views, noticed in 1850. We were aware that Dr. Rae had, in 1847, set at rest in the negative the question of a communication between Back's River and Regent's Inlet, and consequently that it (the flood) could not come from there, and therefore that we must look more toward Peel Sound for its origin. Dr. Rae, in 1851, coasting along the south-eastern side of Victoria Land, observed it as still coming from the east to Macready Point. The land then*

* See Parliamentary Papers, 1849, No. 407, p. 2; also, Blue Books, 1850, No. 107, p. 3.

† See "Arctic Searching Expeditions," &c., by Sir John Richardson, C.B., F.R.S., &c., p. 14. 1848.

changed its trending to the northward, and *the flood was now found to come from the north*. He traced it as far as Cape Alfred: *drift-wood was found along this coast*. The same year Lieutenant Brown's exploration of the west side of Peel Sound led us to doubt the existence of a passage to the southward through that sound. These doubts were confirmed (as we have already noticed) by Kennedy and Bellot in 1852, as they both assert they saw the land continuous all round to the north of them, thus proving that no passage existed by Peel Sound. The new discovery of Bellot's Strait opening from the eastward into this space, or Victoria Strait, we cannot regard as of sufficient importance in any way to influence this flood tide, from its narrowness; indeed, we may say, seeing how Peel Sound becomes narrowed by the numerous islands in it, and the contraction of its opposite shores at the bottom, that even supposing it to have a passage or passages between them, they are so insignificant, as not to afford space for the flow of so vast a body of water as would be necessary to produce a flood tide over so extended an area as that included within the limits we have indicated, however great its depth might be.

The result of this interesting inquiry was a confirmed belief that a strait must exist between Osborn and Wynniatt's farthest, extending to the south-east in the direction of Pelly Point. Having shown the impossibility of Franklin in his ships penetrating to the southward through Peel's Sound, and also the extreme improbability of this distressed travelling party adopting, from the north side of Barrow's Strait, the route by Peel's Sound, when relief could be more readily obtained by Port Leopold at Fury Beach, or *vid* Regent's Inlet from the Hudson's Bay Company's stations in Hudson's Bay;—having given proof of the existence of a strait communicating with Melville Sound—that sound or space to which Sir John Franklin was so specially ordered,—there can be but one reply to the question, Where did they come from? which is, *They came by this strait from the crushed or ice-locked Erebus and Terror in Melville Sound*. These men were forced in a south-east direction by the trending of the land and the direction of the strait. It should also be remembered, that when Franklin sailed, the western limits of North Somerset and Boothia Felix to Cape Nicolai were unknown; they might be assumed by him to extend to, *i. e.*, be continuous with, Cape Walker, and therefore impracticable to a party travelling with a heavy boat. That there was design in their retreat is seen in their desire to avoid land, by seeking a passage between Victoria and King William's Lands,

and rejecting the strait of James Ross, no doubt fearful it might turn out a *cul-de-sac*, the bottom of Poetess Bay not having been examined in 1845. Adopting the known route, they passed through Simpson's Strait to the entrance of Back's River. Their ulterior object was to reach Regent's Inlet by the passage then supposed to exist between Back's River and it, and to ascend it to the stores at Fury Beach, or to endeavour to make their way across to Repulse Bay or Wager Inlet to the Hudson's Bay Company's settlements on that bay; but certainly it was not their intention to attempt to get south by Back's River; its dangers, delays, and want of animal life were well known to Franklin, and therefore to be avoided. Hence it is we find this unfortunate party in this most unexpected direction. We cannot conceive these forlorn men to have come from any great distance, from the early period of the year—April—when they were first seen by the Esquimaux on King William's Land, unless we suppose them to have wintered at some intermediate spot between the last named land and their ships, which seems scarcely probable in such a climate, with only the shelter of their tents and boat; and yet, when we consider that the ships are scarcely likely to have been destroyed in the winter, when the ice is fixed and solid, and that it does not break up so early as April, we are inevitably led to the conclusion that they did winter, 1849-50, *en route*, and that the catastrophe, if it did occur, must have befallen them certainly not later than the summer or autumn of 1849; or if this conclusion is not deemed satisfactory, the only question that remains—and it forces itself upon us—is, Were the ships enabled to get well down on the western side of Melville Sound, and within the fatal influence of that southerly and easterly current so often spoken of, and on by the strait which we have proved exists between that sound and the Victoria Strait, and so on to the north of King William's Land, and there have been wrecked or run over by the ice? We can scarcely realize the idea; for, had such been the case, there would have been stronger evidence of the fact in a larger amount of drifting materials from the ships, which would not have escaped the searching eye of Dr. Rae in 1851. And yet it seems probable; for as we have shown, there is not a doubt but that the strait we have indicated exists, and only through it could they have come. Still it looks so like over-taxing the credulity of our readers, that we dare not positively assert it; but if not by it, whence did they come? *The men, rejecting the stores at Fury Beach,**

* It has been said that there are no supplies at Fury Beach, and that Franklin

and at the risk of their lives taking the longer route, with the chances of the precarious animal life of Back's River, might come down Peel's Sound, but the ships certainly could not. For ourselves, we do not believe they came from the north by Wellington Channel, for we have no evidence that that channel was ever attempted by Franklin, but we do believe they came from the westward—from Melville Sound.

As we have said, it would be impossible for us to enter upon the violent controversy that ensued after the arrival of these relics and its disastrous report. Dr. Rae's conduct was most severely arraigned, and we think not always with justice. It seems to have been forgotten that Dr. Rae was sent by the Hudson's Bay Company on a special expedition, which he himself had planned, not for the search of Franklin, but for the survey of the west coast of Boothia, and he was as much amenable to that Company as the commander of any naval expedition to the Admiralty. His character, too, was as much involved in the successful completion of it as any naval officer's would be under similar circumstances. Again, he was a tried, truthful, and successful traveller, and his antecedents ought to have obtained for him some consideration. It should also have been remembered that he had already contributed his share towards developing the mystery hanging over the fate of the *Erebus* and *Terror*; he had furnished a clue in 1851, in which was involved the direction which Franklin took after leaving Beechey Island. That the importance of this clue was not duly weighed, or, if weighed, was not appreciated or understood by the Admiralty, was no fault of his, but certainly was greatly to their discredit—but *conjecture ruled at that time*. However, it ill became those who had failed in all directions to trace Franklin, to find fault with one who had so energetically and so successfully discovered the only traces (excepting those at Beechey Island) that were of any value in guiding us to the position and the knowledge of the fate of the unfortunate Franklin Expedition. Carefully looking over the Report, as given by Dr. Rae, we can only see in it a simple narrative of what he heard and obtained at various times and places, as he could get it, from the Esquimaux. But as to the miserable fate of our unfortunate countrymen, we must confess we find it impossible to believe that they perished from starvation. They had already communicated, and

was aware of it; this is not fact. It is true part are said to have been stolen by a rascally Peterhead or other whaler; still, when Kennedy and Bellot were there in March, 1852, they are described as in considerable quantity and in excellent preservation.

obtained some seals' flesh from the Esquimaux; and if in such deep distress from hunger, we think they would have obtained sufficient, not only for their present exigencies, but also a store for future, or at least until the season was more advanced, or they would have stayed with and cultivated a good feeling with them. That they did not die of starvation is further evidenced in the unconsumed contents of their kettles, which, however revolting as food, and still harder to believe, would still have preserved life. Nor can we imagine them to have died of sickness; the fact of their being able to drag their heavy boat from the north shore of King William's Land to the mouth of the Great Fish River between April and May is good proof they were not so prostrated by disease, so debilitated, as to be unable to proceed further. We fear there is too much reason to suspect treachery; the scattered and mutilated state of the bodies—the position of the tall, stout, middle-aged officer, lying with his gun underneath him, with his telescope strapped across his shoulders—do not indicate a calm death; rather that he was struck down, unaware of the coming blow. Altogether, these are not the probable conditions in which we should expect to find a body of starved or scurvy-stricken men. All these, then, lead us to infer treachery and violence. Then, again, "there was a great objection (in the Pelly Bay Esquimaux) to our travelling across the country in a westerly direction;" there was the desire "to puzzle the interpreter and mislead us," says Dr. Rae; then the attempted escape of the interpreter himself—these, and their thievish propensities, &c., all contribute to create suspicion that our forlorn countrymen were the victims of surprise and foul play. Nor should this greatly astonish us, when we consider the habits and wants of the Esquimaux, and the seductive power of the enormous wealth (to them) that lay before them, in the boat, wood and iron, tools, &c., guarded only by men half starved and weak from overwrought exertion, of which they were fully aware. Might there not be, too, the recollection of former spilling of blood? Let it not be supposed, from what we have said, that we would impugn the Report of Dr. Rae. We believe him to be truthful; *but we do question the sincerity, as much as we do the honesty, of the Esquimaux.* We cannot believe that forty men, assisting themselves and aided by the good feeling of a friendly tribe of Esquimaux, would all, within barely two months, be numbered with the dead. We know how temp-

* See "Narrative of a Journey to the Shores of the Arctic Ocean, 1853, 4, and 5," by Richard King, M.D., vol. ii., p. 69.

tation excites to the worst feelings and crimes the civilized man. How much stronger must it influence the wild passions of the untutored savage!

The Lords of the Admiralty at this time seem to have laboured under considerable anxiety regarding the safety of Captain Collinson, of the *Enterprise*, now more than three years absent, and they, in a letter (24th October, 1854)* to the Hudson's Bay Company, in expressing "their high approval of the services of Dr. Rae, who has set at rest the unfortunate fate of Sir John Franklin and his party," add, "that it is by no means improbable that that officer (Captain Collinson) may be compelled to abandon his ship, and endeavour to reach the Mackenzie." They therefore request "the Company to take such further steps for their safety as they may deem necessary towards . . . insuring the necessary supplies;" and their Lordships do not seem to have been quite satisfied as to the truth of the sad account given by the Esquimaux to Dr. Rae. At the request of Sir F. Beaufort, hydrographer, Dr. Rae drew up a statement as to the best mode of carrying into effect two overland expeditions, "one for the purpose of searching for and aiding Capt. Collinson; the other to make further inquiry into the fate of, and securing, if possible, some documents from Sir John Franklin's party." This paper, dated October 26th,† does not appear in detail in the Blue Book, 1855; still it may be recognized in the memoranda bearing Dr. Rae's signature, 27th October,‡ and their Lordships seem to have acted upon it. In a letter, dated October 27th, 1854,§ addressed to the Hudson's Bay Company, they therein "express their earnest anxiety that the Company . . . should take immediate steps for organizing, in the most effective manner, two expeditions on an adequate scale, to be sent . . . as soon next spring as the weather will permit." The first was to proceed down Back's River, "and institute a diligent search throughout the islands and space pointed out by the Esquimaux to Dr. Rae as the place where, in 1850, a portion of the crews of the *Erebus* and *Terror* were last seen, and where, by the same report, it is stated that they perished. Every effort should be made," continues this letter, "to find some of the Esquimaux who themselves

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers Relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 834.

† This plan will be found in the *Times*, October 27th, 1854, communicated by Captain T. B. Collinson, R.E., brother to the gallant captain of the *Enterprise*.

‡ See Blue Book, "Further Papers, &c., 1855," p. 848.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 846.

saw this body of Englishmen, and, in 1850, communicated with them. . . Diligent search should be made for any records which may have been deposited . . . in that neighbourhood. *Every exertion must be exhausted on the spot to find traces of the survivors, if, happily, they exist; or if not, every portable relic, which may serve to throw light on the fate of these gallant men, should be brought home.* * Any proofs of where the *Erebus* and *Terror* were lost would be valuable; but the principal object of this expedition is to *ascertain whether there are any survivors of these two ships' companies?* whether the report made to Dr. Rae be true, and if true, *whether any remains can be discovered on the spot which may further explain the proceedings and events which terminated so fatally.*" In alluding to the qualities of the person to be selected to command this expedition, their Lordships say: "*It will be an honour to be selected, for it is one in which the feelings of the British nation are deeply interested, as the fate of Sir John Franklin and his men has been regarded for years with intense anxiety, both in Europe and America.*" The second expedition was to have proceeded to the mouth of the Mackenzie, with "*the object of communicating with Captain Collinson and the crew of the *Enterprise*;*" to make "*provision for his wants, if they should fail to fall in with him on shore, or to establish a communication with his ship.*" But letters were received from Captain Collinson (which we shall notice presently), announcing the safety of the *Enterprise* and crew: this expedition, therefore, did not proceed.

With respect to the Expedition to the Back River, the promptitude with which it was designed and directed to be despatched, the particular stress given in the orders as to the locality to be searched and the objects and information desired to be obtained, reflect great credit on the Admiralty, the contrast of their unfeeling decree at the beginning of the year. But we notice the officers to command this important expedition are all to be selected from the Company's service; no mention is made of the appointment of a naval officer. Surely this is a grave error; not but that we know there are gentlemen in that service eminently qualified to command such an expedition; but when we remember Franklin's journey down the Coppermine, 1819—1822,* the horrors of the barren grounds, the arrival and desolation at Fort Enterprise, we are silent.

It is due to the Hudson's Bay Company to say they lost no time

* See "*Journey to the Shores of the Polar Sea in 1819—22,*" by John Franklin, Captain R.N., F.R.S., &c., p. 312.

in making the necessary arrangements for the earliest departure of the expedition. As may be seen by their correspondence,* in this they were ably supported by Sir George Simpson on the spot. His Instructions, dated from Lachine, 18th Nov., 1854, founded on the wishes of the Admiralty, to Messrs. J. Anderson and J. G. Stewart, who were appointed to command this expedition, is an admirably written document. We ought to mention, Dr. Rae was offered the command, but from motives much to his credit he refused it.†

November 8, 1854.—Despatches, dated San Francisco, Sept. 20, 1854,‡ were received from H.M.S. *Trincomalee*, Capt. Wallace Houston, giving a brief general account of the proceedings of the Behring's Strait Arctic squadron. Capt. Houston arrived at Port Clarence June 25, 1854, where he found the *Rattlesnake*, Commander Trollope, all well. It will be remembered the latter ship was to winter at this port, which she did; the arrangements had been most successful. July 25, the *Rattlesnake* sailed for the north, hoping to meet and assist the *Plover*. August 1, the *Plover*, Commander Maguire, arrived at Port Clarence, without seeing the *Rattlesnake*—all in excellent health, after a most severe winter. Commander Maguire, having received and considered his new orders from home, determined to return to Port Barrow for another winter, in case the *Enterprise* should fall back on that point. The *Rattlesnake* returned on August 12, having received information at Cape Collie that the *Plover* had passed south for Port Clarence. The *Plover* having been re victualled, &c., sailed again August 10, 1854, for Point Barrow, and on the 21st the *Trincomalee* departed for San Francisco. During July, 1854, Capt. Houston made a trip of discovery up the River Age-e-puk, &c., but after an absence of fourteen days, was forced back by bad weather, having made only fifty miles from the ship. No intelligence had been obtained of the *Erebus* and *Terror*. Despatches were received at the same time from the *Rattlesnake*, Commander Trollope, and the *Plover*, Commander Maguire. Those from Commander Trollope, Port Clarence, July 6, 1854,§ detail the winter proceedings on board the *Rattlesnake*; these we do not enter

* See Blue Book, 1855, "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions," pp. 846—858.

† Dr. Rae and his companions, after Messrs. Anderson and Stewart's return, obtained the reward of £10,000 from the Admiralty. See forward.

‡ See Blue Book, "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 859.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 861—901.

upon, not being within our object—the search for the *Franklin Expedition*.

Commander Trollope, having heard that communication was maintained from King-a-ghee (near Cape Prince of Wales) with the Diomed Islands and Asia, determined to go there, and endeavour to cross Behring's Strait. Starting on January 9, 1854, accompanied by Mr. Stephenson, master's assistant, and a native guide, he reached King-a-ghee on the 18th. But on "ascending the conical hill which distinguishes Cape Prince of Wales," he "saw the ice slowly drifting to the northward and open water . . . within one and a half or two miles of the shore." Disappointed in his object, he returned, and arrived on board the ship January 27. Commander Trollope's journal of this trip to King-a-ghee is very interesting, and will be found particularly so to those who would wish to know what are the domestic habits of the natives of this little-known region; but not being within the immediate scope of our inquiry, we are compelled to pass it. As Kotzebue Sound was the original rendezvous appointed between Sir J. Franklin and Capt. (the late Admiral) Beechey, Commander Trollope next resolved to send a party there, as well to ascertain if the depôt of provisions left by the *Plover*, in 1850, were safe. Mr. Hobson, mate, and party started February 9, 1854. He arrived at Chamisso 4th March. Having accomplished his mission, and left a record, &c., of his visit, he returned, without "hearing anything whatever of Europeans," and arrived on board the ship the 27th March, having travelled 560 miles in 47 days, and kept an excellent journal. These two parties were well supported by auxiliaries under Mr. Gilpin Clark and Mr. Bourchier, assistant master. The *Trincomalee*, Capt. Houston, arrived at Port Clarence June 25, and the *Rattlesnake* sailed for the north to assist the *Plover* July 25, 1854. Having reached, says Commander Trollope (see letter, August 18*), "Ten or twelve miles north of Cape Collie, on the 7th (August), I went on shore, and was, on landing, overwhelmed with printed and written papers (presented by the natives), which had been distributed by Commander Maguire and the officers of the *Plover*, by travelling parties, between the 31st May and 23rd July." By these he learned that the *Plover* had "passed this place on her way to Port Clarence on the 23rd ultimo." He now returned to the southward, and arrived at Port Clarence on August 11th, where

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 300.

he found the *Plover*, which ship had arrived August 1st, as before noticed. "During our cruise to the northward," he says, "we have closely skirted the pack between Asia and America, without having seen a ship, or, I regret to say, anything that could give the slightest clue to the fate of Sir John Franklin." Commander Trollope's intentions for 1855 were to return to the north to Wainwright Inlet, and look out for the *Plover*, and return with her to Port Clarence; then return to the north again, and ascertain if any tidings had been received of Capt. Collinson, and from thence, in September or October, proceed south to San Francisco. But all these intentions and arrangements of the Behring's Strait Arctic Squadron were to be superseded. The *Enterprise* arrived at Port Clarence 21st August,* Capt. Collinson and crew in most admirable health, after their three years' absence. The *Rattlesnake* was now directed by Capt. Collinson to proceed to San Francisco, to convey the earliest intelligence of the safety of the *Enterprise*, and sailed on the 23rd August; and Capt. Collinson, finding the *Plover* had returned to the north to Point Barrow on 19th August, sailed again to recall her on the 21st.

We now turn to the despatches of the *Plover*, Commander Maguire. They are dated Port Clarence, August 18, 1854,† and detail the movements of and proceedings on board the *Plover*, from August 24, 1853, when she quitted that port, to return to winter at Point Barrow. Here, again, we are met with journals and documents of the most valuable and interesting description. Gladly would we avail ourselves of them to enliven our pages, but we may not; they must be confined to the dry but sad inquiry we have laid down for ourselves. Commander Maguire, between October 7th and 18th, 1853, made a sledge journey to Cape Halkett, 100 miles, and deposited notices, proceedings, and intentions. Again, in April, 1854, he started, accompanied by Mr. Gordon, mate, and eight men, for and reached Point Berens, where he deposited records, &c. On July 2nd, the Esquimaux, just then starting on their annual trading expedition to the eastward, "came to the ship and were supplied with notices; and presents were given to them to make inquiries whether any white men or ships had been met with, or heard of by the

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 302.

† *Ibid.*, p. 505. With this despatch was enclosed a most valuable paper, entitled "Observations on the Western Esquimaux and the Country they Inhabit," by John Simpson, Esq., Surgeon R.N., of the *Plover*. This gentleman passed five successive winters in the Arctic regions. See Blue Book, 1855, pp. 917-942.

Mackenzie Tribes." Thus was the whole coast east to the Mackenzie apprized of the objects of the expedition. Other parties under Lieutenant Vernon and Mr. Hull, second master, were sent westward to Wainwright and Refuge Inlets, to distribute notices and complete surveys. A favourable and unusually early season enabled the *Plover* to quit her winter quarters on July 20th, 1854, when she sailed for Port Clarence, and arrived there August 1. Here she found the *Trincomalee*, and learned that the *Rattle-snake* had gone to the north in quest of her. On August 12th the latter ship returned; having obtained information of the sailing of the *Plover*, at Cape Collic, as has been noticed in Commander Trollope's despatch. Capt. Maguire, having received additional Instructions from England, giving him the discretionary power of remaining another year, resolved to take upon himself the responsibility; it being, in his opinion, *though unlikely yet possible, that Capt. Collinson might return by the western route.* The *Plover* was to sail on August 19th, for Point Barrow, which, by reference to Commander Trollope's despatch, it will be seen she did.

We shall now give extracts from Capt. Collinson's despatches, dated Port Clarence, August 22, 1854.* It has been already noticed, that the *Enterprise* left Port Clarence, July 10, 1851, with the object, agreeable to her Instructions, of rounding Point Barrow, and attempting an eastern route by the north of Arctic America; "the course to be pursued after passing Point Barrow was left to Capt. Collinson's 'judgment and discretion'" (see *ante*, p. 116). We believe the intention was to search from the then known western limit of Wollaston Land, north to Banks' Land, and on to Melville Island. It was supposed, but the supposition was founded only on the protracted absence of Franklin, for there was not a single fact to prove it, that he had made large westing, and would be found to the south-west of the above-named lands and island; and hence the search in this direction *via* Behring's Strait was determined upon. In short, this expedition was intended to meet the expedition under Franklin, emerging from the north-eastward; this was rational, and is easy to be understood whilst its efforts were *confined to a north-east direction.*

There was then an unknown blank existing on our charts between

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," pp. 943-952. Also, a paper, "Account of the Proceedings on board H.M.S. *Enterprise*, from Behring's Strait to Cambridge Bay," by Capt. Collinson; communicated by Sir George Back: read before the Royal Geographical Society, June 25, 1855. See "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. 25, p. 194. See also Earl of Ellesmere's Address, 1855, p. cxxii.

the western point of Wollaston Land and Banks' Land; and it laid in the direct course from Cape Walker to the south-west: its rigid examination, then, was absolutely necessary; but we never could comprehend why it should be extended to the north of, and by the west side of Melville Island. At the time, we had not searched the space which was the very basis upon which the voyage was founded, and which Franklin was specially sent to determine. We were in total ignorance of the movements of the Franklin Expedition; and if we thought at all, we ought to have concluded that its commander was attempting to follow out the tenor of his Instructions in that particular space, Melville or Parry Sound. It was, in fact, as yet unexamined. Sir James Ross had been sent in this direction in 1848, but he had altogether failed; indeed, instead of attempting to get westward over the ice and reach Cape Walker, he kept to the land, and pursued a southern course, down Peel Sound, in the direction of Cape Nicolai; a route at a wide angle to that direction to which he ought alone to have looked for Franklin: the result was, as might have been anticipated, failure: but that was not all, two seasons were wholly lost; so much precious time uselessly employed, time so important in every attempt to convey succour to Franklin and his followers, even at that period. But we return to Capt. Collinson's despatches; we quote from his narrative. After leaving Port Clarence, July 10th, 1851, he proceeded on towards Point Barrow. At Wainwright Inlet, he "was stopped by the ice, . . . caught in it, and thus carried by the current to Point Barrow, which was doubled on the 26th; the ice then slackening, by dint of considerable labour, we reached," observes Capt. Collinson, "open water on the American coast near Tangent Point, on the 31st. Here we found the land water varying from two to eight miles in width, the water gradually deepening to nine fathoms at that distance, the mainland being fronted by low sandbanks." They arrived off Manning Point, August 8th, when "the effect of the Mackenzie River became visible, the channel between the pack and the land increasing to fifty miles, at which distance from the shore no bottom was obtained at 150 fathoms." On the 20th, "the Pelly Islands were seen, . . . and two islets discovered to the east-north-east of them. . . . On August 26th, Cape Parry was in sight," and a bold bluff (Cape Erebus, "Nelson's Head") "was discovered to the northward. Hauling up to close the land, we entered a strait on the 28th, in which, on the following day, two islets were seen (Princess Royal Isles, in Prince of Wales' Strait); on landing I found a whaleboat and depôt of provisions, with a notice

of Commander McClure's, dated June 15th, 1851. Continuing our course, we reached the north end at midnight on the 30th, when another beacon was seen on the south shore, where similar information to that deposited on the Princess Royal Isles was found. Here, in lat. $73^{\circ} 30' N.$, and long. $114^{\circ} 35' W.$, our progress was barred by large fields of ice, leaving no coast water in which a ship could navigate, either to the eastward or westward." Capt. Collinson now began to think of winter quarters. "After looking in vain for a sheltered spot" in Prince of Wales' Strait, he says, "I determined to avail myself of the remainder of the season in searching for a wintering-place on the west face of Baring Land. Rounding Cape Erebus with this intent on Sept. 3rd, we found the coast trend to the north. After examining an inlet, which proved too shallow for our purpose, we reached a long, low point (Point Kellett), in lat. $71^{\circ} 53' N.$, and long. $125^{\circ} 10' W.$, on which a cask containing information from the *Investigator*, dated August 18th, 1851, was found. . . . Proceeding to the north, we found shallow water, having only five fathoms six miles from the shore. On the 7th, an islet (Terror Islet), lat. $72^{\circ} 54'$, long. $125^{\circ} 12'$,* was fallen in with; the close vicinity of the main pack, and number of large floes between it and the shore, rendering it nearly impracticable to turn to windward among them, induced me to terminate our progress for the season." Having deposited information, and a small quantity of provisions, Capt. Collinson now returned south, "and eventually found a well-sheltered spot on Prince Albert Land, near to the entrance of Prince of Wales' Strait, in lat. $71^{\circ} 35' N.$, long. $117^{\circ} 39' W.$ " They were now visited by the Esquimaux seen by Capt. McClure; "Boats were detached to the north and south of" their "position, to erect marks, so as to guide any parties to the ships. In the latter direction, a Sound sixty miles deep was discovered (Minto Inlet)." . . . A notice, deposited by the *Investigator's* travelling party, was found on the South point (Cape Wollaston) of this Sound; and they were frozen in on Oct. 21, 1851. "Early in April, 1852, depôts of provisions for the travelling parties were laid out. On the 12th the Southern Expedition (under Lieutenant Jago), left to explore the coast towards Wollaston Land, which was found to maintain a southerly direction until lat. $70^{\circ} 38'$, when it assumed an easterly trend. He eventually reached lat. $70^{\circ} 38'$, and long. $112^{\circ} 48'$ (previous to which, on an islet, lat. $70^{\circ} 32'$, long. $115^{\circ} 25'$, a cylinder

* Muck Point Islet, lat. $72^{\circ} 44'$, long. $124^{\circ} 10'$. See "Geographical Positions. Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. 25, 1855, p. 206.

deposited by the *Investigator's* travelling party was found), where a party of Esquimaux, about eighty, were met with; they proved not to be the same that had been seen in the autumn, but the two tribes had been together during the winter, as some of the presents were recognized; otherwise they showed no sign of having been in contact with Europeans. The sound from here appeared to be twenty miles wide; its termination easterly was not seen. Lieutenant Jago returned after an absence of forty-nine days. . . The Northern Expedition, consisting of two sleighs (one under my own, the other, the command of Lieutenant Parkes), left on the 16th of the same month, proceeding through Prince of Wales' Strait together until May 5th, when he was detached, with orders, to reach Melville Island, if possible, . . . while I proceeded along the north coast of Prince Albert's Land, towards Cape Walker; eventually reaching lat. $72^{\circ} 45'$, and long. $113^{\circ} 40'$; here there is a deep bay or inlet (Collinson's Inlet). . . I returned, and reached the ship on June 6th. . . Lieutenant Parks, on the third day after leaving me, came upon hummocky ice, through which it was impossible to drag the sleigh; leaving the tent and it behind, he set out with his party, carrying their provisions on their backs, and succeeded in reaching Cape Providence on May 16th. Here he left a portion of his men to rest, and went forward with two of them towards Hearn Point, meeting with sleigh tracks, and the marks of three men's footsteps. Hearing, next day, the howling of Esquimaux dogs, as if being put in harness, and having no arms, did not deem himself in a fit condition to have any communication with the natives. . . He was obliged to return without reaching Winter Harbour. After suffering much privation from lack of water and provisions, he reached his tent on the 21st. Starting again on the 23rd, he made for Prince Albert Land, in hopes of picking up drift-wood and obtaining game. . . His people being very much exhausted, he did not reach the ship until June 29th." The Natives returned on the 25th, "bringing with them some bags of seal oil, which were purchased. They obtained at this time a good supply of game, and latterly, by means of their seine, a good number of fish from the lakes. They left on August 5th." Capt. Collinson remarks: "The season of 1852 proved a close one; the ice remained packed, both on Prince Albert and Baring Lands, until the first week in September, when we were enabled to enter the inlet examined by Lieutenant Jago, and which *I hoped would conduct us to the centre of the Archipelago; we, however, reached the head of the Gulf (Prince Albert's Sound), which is in lat. $70^{\circ} 25'$, long. 111° , on the 13th, and*

having thus established the fact that Victoria, Prince Albert, and Wollaston Lands were joined, I came to the conclusion that the most suitable place for our ensuing winter quarters would be the south-east extremity of this large island. Entering the Dolphin and Union Straits with this view, the mouth of the Coppermine was passed on the 21st, and, after a hazardous navigation, owing to the increasing period of darkness and absolute inutility of the compasses, succeeded in reaching Cambridge Bay on September 26th. . . Shortly after, we were visited by a tribe of Esquimaux, mustering in all about 200, with more provisions to spare than those we had seen last year. It was evident they had had little or no communication with white men, but they had . . . more implements of brass and iron than those at our last winter quarters. Amongst these are two, which, as they may have belonged to the missing Expedition, I transmit a detailed description of. One of these is a portion of a connecting-rod (iron), probably belonging to a steam engine; the other seems to have been part of a metal crutch, on which are faint traces of a broad arrow; the former may have been obtained from the *Victory*, and the latter from the boats at Coppermine River.* . . The natives remained in our vicinity throughout the whole winter, and may be looked upon as a well-behaved people, who would not harm a distressed party. . . Before the winter set in, Lieutenant Jago deposited information at Cape Colborne and Back Point;” and Capt. Collinson “visited the American continent for the same purpose, so that no parties could pass” them. “The season proved one of the most severe ever experienced in these regions. . . Early in April (1853), provisions were laid out for the exploration of the east coast of Victoria Island. Leaving the ship, accompanied by three sledges, on the 12th of the same month, we found the coast trend to the southward of east, until we reached the 102nd meridian, when it turned to the north; but before the 60th parallel was again reached, we fell in with the junction of the old and new ice, raising hummocks of that description as to render the road impracticable for

* A sketch of these articles is given in Blue Book, 1855, facing page 840. They were sent to Woolwich for examination; the “Report” on them leads to the conclusion that the supposed iron connecting-rod is part of a boat’s anchor, and this is corroborated by Dr. Rao; three small anchors (galvanized, as this rod is) having been left by Sir J. Richardson and himself on the coast near the Coppermine, 1848. The supposed part of a metal crutch is pronounced to be part of a “bolt-nail,” and “having the broad arrow clearly defined,” shows that it may have formed part of the *Erebus* and *Terror*. See “Further Papers relative to Arctic Expeditions, 1856,” p. 45.

sleighs. Under these circumstances we were seldom able to leave the shore, and under the necessity of following its sinuosities. This delayed our progress so much, as only to enable us eventually to reach an islet in lat. $70^{\circ} 26' N.$, and long. $100^{\circ} 45' W.$ (Gateshead Island), . . . from whence no land was seen, except to the southward, and the pack so rough as seldom to admit of our making more than half a mile an hour. Having four days' provisions left, on our return to Victoria Island we traced its shores, which here assumed a westerly direction as far as lat. $70^{\circ} 12' N.$, long. $102^{\circ} W.$ In lat. $70^{\circ} 3' N.$, and $101^{\circ} 0' W.$, we fell in with a cairn erected by Chief Factor Rae, from which we obtained the first intimation that any parties had preceded us in the search; and our observations tended to corroborate his, viz., that the ice, except in extraordinary seasons, does not leave the east coast of Victoria Land. We reached the ship on May 31st, after an absence of forty-nine days. In the course of a visit to the Finlayson Islands, and in a bay on the east side of the largest islet of the group, a fragment of a companion-hatchway, or door-frame, bearing unequivocal marks of having been fitted from Her Majesty's stores, was found (a drawing and description* is transmitted); it does not appear to have formed part of a boat's fittings, otherwise it might be presumed to have belonged to Dr. Rae's party, whose boats crossed here from the continent; nor does the boatswain of this ship, who served in the *Erebus* in the Antarctic Expedition, recognize it as a portion of the fittings of that vessel." During July, "in addition to game, a plentiful supply of salmon (whereof 1,000 were cured for sea) was obtained." On August 10th, the *Enterprise* was enabled to put to sea; the straits free of ice until abreast of the embouchure of the Coppermine, where they were detained until the 23rd. They again came in with the ice off Cape Bathurst, which they passed on the 31st. On September 5th they passed Herschel Island. After encountering various obstacles from the ice, and being driven back to Kay Point, they reached the western side of Camden Bay, where they became fixed for the winter,

* See Blue Book, "Further Papers relative to recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," facing p. 819. This piece of wood, fifty-one inches long by three inches and three-quarters broad, and three-quarters of an inch thick, was sent to Woolwich for examination and report. It seems to have formed part of a winter hood. The *Erebus* and *Terror* had theirs not panelled, but made of three-quarter inch board. All other searching vessels since have had theirs framed in panels; it is, therefore, believed to have belonged to one of the former ships. See "Further Papers, Arctic Expeditions, 1856," p. 45. These, with the preceding metal articles, are to be seen in the United Service Institution.

lat. 70° S' N., long. 145° 29' W.; during which they had no visits from the Esquimaux: "But the winter passed away," says Capt. Collinson, "more lively than many had hoped for; and a very mild January contributed greatly to the general health, which proved superior to that of the preceding years." On April 25th, Capt. Collinson, "with three sleighs, left the ship, with the intention of pushing to the north in search of land or open water; the road, however, proved so very rough, that, on the third day" he "had to abandon his purpose and return to the ship. . . In May" he "made an excursion to the Romanzov mountains, and reached a ridge 1,600 feet above the sea, but a continuance of foggy weather . . . prevented," he says, "my obtaining the extensive view I had entertained as the object of my trip. . . In July a party of forty-one Esquimaux visited the *Enterprise* from the eastward. They had among them several buttons, stamped 1852, and a notice, printed on board the *Plover*, July 4, 1853; "by which," says Capt. Collinson, "I learned, that at that date, the *Investigator* had not been seen; it was therefore probable she was shut up on the west face of Baring Land, throughout the close season of 1852; and as we had found a much larger quantity of ice about Cape Bathurst last season than in 1851, it might so happen that she had not been liberated." Capt. Collinson now determined to open a communication with Commander Maguire, in order to obtain provisions, that he might return again to Baring Land in the present season; and Lieut. Jago was despatched to Point Barrow on July 10th, but did not (open water not having occurred) arrive there until the 24th, when he was informed by the natives the *Plover* had sailed two days before. The *Enterprise* was not able to get out of Camden Bay until July 20th; when they had another visit from the Esquimaux and a party of Rat Indians; the chief of the latter produced a paper, dated from Fort Youcon, June 27, 1854, stating the *Plover* had passed the preceding winter at Point Barrow. The *Enterprise* reached Point Barrow August 8th, and Port Clarence August 21st; where she "found the *Rattlesnake*, and heard that the *Trincomalee* had sailed the same morning for Vancouver Island, and that the *Plover* had returned to Point Barrow on the 19th instant." Finding the *Plover* had sailed again for Point Barrow, Capt. Collinson immediately resolved to follow and recall her. Having made every necessary arrangement regarding the house, stores, &c., at Port Clarence, he directed Commander Trollope, with the *Rattlesnake*, to proceed to San Francisco with despatches to the Admiralty, giving information of the safe arrival of the *Enterprise*, and

sailed for the north to overtake the *Plover* on August 22. The *Rattlesnake* sailed the 23rd.

In reading the narrative of this remarkable voyage of the *Enterprise*, while we deeply regret that no traces should have been found to unfold the painful uncertainty hanging over the fate of the gallant men embarked in the *Erebus* and *Terror* , yet we cannot but commend the judicious resolve of Captain Collinson, after he was shut out from the north, to examine and complete the search between Prince Albert's Land and Wollaston Land. In adopting this course he rendered most important service, as thereby the question was set at rest whether a passage existed between those Lands, communicating with Melville Sound, and offering a means of retreat to Franklin's parties to the southward or not. In short, it closed all hope in that direction, as it showed that unless they attempted a route overland, without boats, a movement scarcely likely, with the Dolphin and Union Strait to the south of them, there was no alternative but the adoption of the Prince of Wales' Strait; that is, assuming that the ships had penetrated so far west and south in Melville Sound as to make the Coppermine or the Mackenzie the most eligible routes for escape to the Hudson's Bay Company's stations. Again, the daring resolution to attempt a passage in his ship by the little-known Dolphin and Union Strait and Dease's Strait to the south-east extremity of Victoria Land—a passage abounding with rocks and shoals, and which no ship had ever attempted before, and this without the knowledge and the consequent aid of Dr. Rae's discoveries—must place Captain Collinson's name high up the list of our most eminent Arctic explorers. The merit, and we may add the wisdom, is further proved by the selection for his hazardous exploration of this very important line of coast; it laid in the direct track from Cape Walker, and therefore there was hope of success, and notwithstanding its dangers he saw the necessity for its examination, and did it. We have said there was hope in this direction: there was; but the lands were as disjointed and unknown (with the exception of the scanty information derived from Commander M'Clure's notices) as when Sir John Richardson saw Wollaston Land in 1826,* and Dease and Simpson discovered Victoria Land, 1838.†

Captain Collinson was unfortunate. He was preceded by M'Clure in the west, and by that indefatigable traveller, Dr. Rae, in the

* See "Franklin's Second Journey, *ad* Mackenzie, 1825-6."

† See "Journal of Royal Geographical Society," vol. 9, part 2, p. 325.

east; and it was only when he had dared the danger and done the work, especially in the east, that he found himself superseded in the honour by another, who had gone before him. He discovered the North-West Passage a year after M'Clure, but *completed it in his ship nearer than that gallant officer*; and he made, and thereby proved the existence of the Passage, *only twenty days after him*. Equally unfortunate was he in his well-conceived design of searching the coasts from Minto Inlet to Wollaston and Victoria Lands (Cape Colborne). With the exception of Albert Sound, he was unknowingly preceded by Dr. Rae nearly to his farthest eastern extreme. All this was sufficiently mortifying, but cannot, nor should it in the least, abridge the merit due to Captain Collinson's persevering efforts. But there is one honour which he alone can claim; that is, that of being the first navigator who took a ship of 530 tons *through the narrow Dolphin and Union Strait and Dease's Strait, ice-strewn and rocky as they are, in safety to Cambridge Bay (105° W.), preserved his men in good health through three winters, and finally brought them home in health and his ship in safety*. This alone is a triumph, and will ever distinguish Captain Collinson as an enterprising, yet prudent, able, and skilful commander. Surely such services deserve not only reward but distinction. Captain Collinson obtained some interesting fragments in metal at Cambridge Bay, and one especially so, in wood, at the larger Pinlayson Island. No doubt these (from bearing the Government mark*) were relics of the unfortunate Franklin Expedition; but how did they reach the southern coast of Victoria Land? The same remarks that we have made, in our endeavours to trace to their source those found in Parker Bay, 1851, by Dr. Rae, and others subsequently obtained from the natives of Pelly Bay by the same gentleman, apply to these. There is not a doubt they all came to the position where they were found or obtained, through that strait which we have proved exists between Melville Sound, by Osborn and Wynniatt's farthest, and Gateshead Island on to King William's Land. These are further proofs, but Captain Collinson furnishes us with other, collateral, but to geographers more convincing, evidence of the existence of this strait. He says in his narrative, "On our return (from Gateshead Island) to Victoria Land we traced its shores, which here assumed a westerly direction, to lat. 70° 12' N., long. 102° W." Again, in another place he writes: "No land was to be seen to the northward, and the ice being impracticable for sleighs, we were com-

* See foot-notes to pp. 380, 381.

pelled to return."* Again his narrative: "Our observations tended to corroborate his (Dr. Rae's), viz., that the ice, except in extraordinary seasons, does not leave the east coast of Victoria Land." Whether the flood comes from Peel's or Melville Sound, in either case it seems probable that this north-eastern point (about Gateshead Island and Pelly Point) would be clogged with hummocky ice—the space hereabout is greatly contracted by the interposition of King William's Land,—but we think it is far more probable that this effect results from the flood coming through the latter sound. The land here ends abruptly, changing its trending from west or north-west to south, and in those directions would be the course of the current and the drift. It is, then, only reasonable to expect that the heavy hummocks would hang and ground about Pelly Point and Gateshead Island. Again, these heavy masses, so impracticable for sleighs, where could they come from, if not Melville Sound? Examination has shown that Peel's Sound produces no such ice; there it is "smooth," even "close up to the cliffs." We have endeavoured to show, too, on undoubted authority, that it is *closed at the bottom*; therefore they could not come from there. Why, then, should we reject the idea that they came from Melville Sound, for is it not the reservoir of all the heavy ice that comes from the north-west through Banks' Strait? Captain Collinson imagines that as the piece of wood, "part of a door-frame, with copper latch, having the broad arrow on it, *did not belong to Dr. Rae's boats*," therefore it may have "come from one of the missing vessels, . . . abandoned somewhere in the vicinity of the magnetic pole. . . . The depôt at Fury Beach never having been visited by them is, I think," he says, "a conclusive reason for assuming that they were deserted to the southward of 72°;" and adds, "it should be borne in mind, in addition to Peel Inlet, *there may be a strait between the points reached by Wynniatt and Osborn.*"† We quite coincide with Captain Collinson that this part of a door-frame may have come from one of the missing ships; they may even have been abandoned near the magnetic pole—but we much question it. We have shown they could not get down Peel's Sound, and although we firmly believe in the existence of a strait from Melville Sound between the points reached by Wynniatt and Osborn, *which we have been the first to demonstrate*, still we have

* See "Journal of Royal Geographical Society, 1855," vol. 25, p. 202.

† See "Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society," No. vi., p. 213; also, "Appendix to a Paper on the Probable Course pursued by Sir John Frank-

not the temerity to assert it is navigable. We think it more probable the ships were abandoned in Melville Sound, but whether to the southward of 72° we have nothing positive to found an opinion on. We think, they never reached that blank area extending west of Boothia, and north and south between King William's Land and Peel's Sound. If the ships had reached this blank area, it must have been from the west. They would, therefore, be at the northern entrance of Victoria Strait, and instead of passing they would have gone down it, as at a comparatively trifling distance the ground was known to Sir John Franklin to have been explored, and open to him to reach the American coast. If near the magnetic pole, we can only imagine the ships to have been forced there, and if afterwards abandoned, we should have looked for their crews rather following the course of James Ross's Strait, and crossing the Isthmus of Boothia by its chain of lakes to Regent's Inlet, and on to the certain shores of Fury Beach, than in the direction of the west side of King William's Land on to Montreal Island, seeking the relief of that execrable stream, the precarious Back River. For these reasons we cannot believe the ships were wrecked or abandoned near the magnetic pole, or even that they ever got down into the space to the north of King William's Land at all. The men may, but not the ships. It will be seen that Captain Collinson twice attempted to reach the supposed Polynia to the north of America, but was unable to confirm its existence. Finally, the results of this voyage would have proved, even though Dr. Rae's distressing intelligence had not arrived, that Franklin's ships never passed out to the westward from Melville Sound, and therefore that we must look to that sound for them; and the drifted door-frame, in conjunction with the relics obtained by Dr. Rae in 1851 and 1854, all point to the same quarter from another direction—all tell the same tale as to the source whence they originated. We cannot conclude these notices of Captain Collinson's remarkable voyage better than in his own words: "While we must all lament that the noble object on which we were sent was not attained, we have the answer of a good conscience on our part that no means of affording aid to the missing ships was left untried, and that the search was continued to the uttermost our means afforded."

December, 1854.—Subsequent intelligence was received from Cap-

tain Collinson, of H.M.S. *Enterprise*, and Commander Maguire, of H.M.S. *Plover*; from the former, dated Port Clarence, September 14th, 1854; and from the latter, dated San Francisco, October 31st, 1854, from which it appeared Captain Collinson did not overtake the *Plover* until she arrived at Point Barrow on the 28th August. The latter, having arrived there in the morning of that day, had already been made aware of the *Enterprise* having passed out to the southward. Both now returned to Port Clarence, where they arrived on the 8th and 9th September. Having made every arrangement for the security of the house and boat left there, in case of any distressed or shipwrecked seamen visiting the spot should require them, both vessels left Port Clarence on September 16th, 1854, the *Enterprise* for Hong Kong, and the *Plover* for San Francisco.* Thus ended all further search for our missing countrymen by the way of Behring's Strait. Well had the searching squadron here done its work at all times.

We cannot conclude our observations on the Behring's Strait searching ships more appropriately than in the language of the excellent Commander Maguire, of the *Plover*: "On quitting the field of search in Behring's Strait, I beg leave to express the joyful satisfaction that was felt on board the *Plover* on hearing of the safety of Captain McClure and his companions. . . This was heightened in no small degree soon afterwards by the appearance of Captain Collinson. . . Ungrateful we should be not sincerely to rejoice in the safety of all engaged in the search for Sir John Franklin; yet the feeling is saddened by the thought that it has pleased an all-wise Providence to allow the fate of the *Erebus* and *Terror* to remain shrouded in mystery."

Before we finish this disastrous year—a year replete with despicable meanness, reckless sacrifice, and sadly terrific report—a year of sorrow and of doubt, and yet more prolific of positive information as to the probable movements and condition of the ill-starred Franklin and his devoted band than any of its predecessors;—before such a year closes, it would not be out of place to inquire what were the opinions entertained at this time by those supposed to be best informed on the subject, as to the course adopted by Franklin after leaving Beechey Island, and the probable consequences. We need not to recapitulate

* The *Plover* arrived at San Francisco, 27th October, 1854, where a survey was held upon her, and she was condemned as unseaworthy, 9th November, 1854, and sold. Commander Maguire and his officers and crew were turned over to the *Sitka*, Russian prize. She sailed from San Francisco, 26th November, 1854, and arrived in the Downs, 8th April, 1855.

what has been done, and the superhuman efforts that have been made by our sailors on this continued and widely extended search to recover those who had been ordered to a given spot of limited area. It is not necessary to detail how that search has been made all around this spot—this confined area—but has been extended to it only in part, and then perhaps too late. We need not go into the results of the expeditions, unsatisfactory but not without a meaning; negatively in some cases, but positively in others, pointing to this area, and showing the necessity for its complete exploration. With all this valuable material for forming a judgment before them, it would naturally be concluded that memory—weary of its wanderings, its disappointments, and its abortive attempts—would revert to the object and intentions of the voyage, and that the primary spot would recur. It will be seen in the various opinions which we now give, opinions gathered not only from the scientific of the shore but also from Arctic authorities of the sea—we give them as we have heard them expressed, or have seen them written, in the course of our inquiry into the cause of our want of success, despite our unparalleled exertions. It were invidious to append names, but they are easy of reference, as all have appeared before the public. In recording them, we have no motive beyond the wish to show the causes of our failure in the search for the unhappy Franklin and his luckless crews. We trust not to memory, but give the substance of a note containing them addressed to an active officer of one of our most distinguished societies at this period, 1854:—"After what I heard I am less inclined than ever to bow to what is called *Arctic authority*. The question has not been made one of thought: the remarks are those of impulse only. Hence the contradictory views. Not one of the opinions expressed was the result of reasonable conclusion; and if it were not a serious subject, one could laugh heartily at the absurdity of some of them. Franklin has been dragged in all directions; now to the southward—now to the westward—then to the north-west, *via* Wellington Channel. Up this channel, at a point—heaven knows where!—he abandons his ships, which are driven to the eastward round the north of Greenland (making it an island), and then by Spitzbergen, down the coast of Greenland to the banks of Newfoundland, coming out in the 'two ships on an iceberg,' seen by the *Benovation*. One Eminent! takes him up Wellington Channel; but instead of eastward, he says—hence, west of Melville Island (unconscious of the new discoveries of Kellett and his officers), and down the west side of Baring Island: and yet a M'Clure has just examined that coast! One has placed

him on the Asiatic coast; another at the new Siberian Islands. One thinks from thence he sailed northward to Nova Zembla. Some have sought him in Jones's Sound; one from the west, another from Baffin's Bay; another, again, in Smith's Sound; and an Arctic authority! because he found nothing in an empty cairn, hence traces him to the eastward—either murdered by the Esquimaux, run over by the bergs of the middle ice, or lost on the west coast of Baffin's Bay. One looks to Cockburn Island, or down Regent's Inlet; another to Peel's Sound; some to the Great Fish River; many still cling to a high northern latitude; but *none, at this period, to the space where he was sent—Melville Sound.* Amid such varied and conflicting opinions, what becomes of one's faith? whither turn? on what rest?" Our reply is, See Section 5 of Franklin's Instructions. Fix faith there, and follow it. You have no other information to guide you. All the rest are mere phantasma of the brain. The year 1854 departs. Let it. It has not removed doubt. "*The unfortunate fate of Sir John Franklin and his party . . . is not set at rest.*" The *Erebus* and *Terror* may yet be in existence—yet unfold their own tale. The Homes of England! "What sighs have been wafted after *these ships!* What prayers offered up at the deserted fireside! How often has the mistress, the wife, the mother, pored over the daily news to catch some casual intelligence of *these rovers of the deep!* How has expectation darkened into anxiety—anxiety into dread—and dread into despair."*

"Oh! star-eyed Science, hast thou wandered there,
To waft us home the message of despair?"—*Campbell.*

* *Vide* "The Voyage," Washington Irving.

CHAPTER XVI.

CAPT. COLLINSON ARRIVES—SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON REWARDS TO CAPTS. KELLETT, COLLINSON, AND M'CLURE—REMARKS—DR. KANE ARRIVES—HIS VOYAGE.

1855.—MEN'S minds were too much occupied this year to think of the lost sons of science in the Arctic seas. England had drifted into war. And Carnage and Suffering, Recklessness and Waste followed in the train of glory. Occasionally memory would recall the sad uncertain fate of the noble fellows on board the *Erebus* and *Terror*, but a transient sigh would dispel the image soon as formed.

May 6th, 1855.—The *Enterprise*, Capt. R. Collinson, arrived in safety at Portsmouth after her extended search in the Arctic regions; the particulars of which we have already given (*ante*, p. 370): thus completing the return of all the British ships sent in search of the Franklin Expedition.

July 20th, 1855.—A Select Committee having been appointed by the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr. Mackinnon (June 10th), to inquire into the circumstances of the expedition to the Arctic seas, commanded by Capt. M'Clure, with a view to ascertain whether any and what reward may be due for the services rendered on that occasion, and further, to examine into the claims of Cpts. Collinson and Kellett, to ascertain whether any and what reward may be due to them for services rendered on the occasion of that expedition, now gave in their Report. It says, "The attempt to discover a water communication through the Arctic regions between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, is one which has engaged the attention of maritime nations, especially that of Great Britain, for a period now extending over three centuries. It has fallen to the lot of Capt. M'Clure, his officers and crew, to set at rest this question. They are undoubtedly the first who have passed by water from sea to sea, and have returned to this country a living evidence of the existence of a North-West Passage." The Report, then alluding to the "Rewards offered by Parliament for the discovery of the North-West Passage," remarks: "Successive sovereigns have encouraged the enterprise, and men of science have, . . . through succeeding generations, urged the attempt." It then details the course of the *Inves-*

tigator to Mercy Bay, the arrival there of Lieutenant Pim from the *Resolute*, the abandonment of the *Investigator*, the subsequent arrival of Capt. M'Clure, his officers and crew, on board the *Resolute*, Capt. Henry Kellett, at Melville Island, and finally their arrival in England on board the *Phoenix*, Capt. Inglefield, proving, "beyond doubt, that to Capt. M'Clure incontestably belongs the distinguished honour of having been the first to perform the actual passage over water . . . between the two great oceans that encircle the globe. . . . By this achievement he has demonstrated the existence, and traced the course of that connection between these two oceans which, under the name of the North-West Passage, has so long been the object of perilous search and deep interest to the nations of the civilized world." In making the following remarks we have no desire to take from Capt. M'Clure the honour of having been the first who has passed by water from sea to sea, and returned a living evidence of the existence of the Passage; still we much question whether he was the first to discover and prove the existence of the Passage. We must doubt it, when we see how clearly the movements of Franklin and his associates are developed in the floating fragments of *Rae* and *Collinson*; and yet more so, in the undoubted relics recently obtained by *Rae*. These martyrs to science have unhappily not returned to claim the honour, but that they were the first to discover and to make the North-West Passage, few, we think, will doubt, especially when they see such authorities as Sir R. I. Murchison, the late Admiral Beaufort, the present active Hydrographer, Capt. John Washington, Capt. Collinson, &c.,* advocating this "claim for those who can urge nothing for themselves." In this opinion, then, we are not solitary. Sir John Richardson, than whom no sounder Arctic authority exists, in the *Times*, June 23rd, 1855, says: "The remnant of the crews of Franklin's ships made the Passage in the spring of 1850, precisely in the same sense as it was performed† in October of the same year, over the ice, by the party sent out from Prince of Wales' Strait by Capt. M'Clure." That "the boats dragged by the forty determined men whose bones are blanching near the mouth of the Great Fish River proceeded from the ships or wrecks lying in a water-way continuous with the sea that washes the Continent . . . is proved by the fragments of the ships' fittings that had drifted to the Finlayson Islands, picked up by Capt.

* See the "Report of the Select Committee on Arctic Expeditions, 1855," pp. 11, 18, 22, 30.

† Discovered, not performed. The passage was not made, *i. e.*, performed by Capt. M'Clure, until between April and May, 1852.

Collinson ; and also by a spar, to which the same origin can now be ascribed, found by Dr. Rae, in the previous year, in the same channel." Sir John then gives extracts from a letter he received from Sir John Franklin in January, 1845, "to show that he purposely sought an entrance into the line of water that washes the shores of the mainland (America)," and adds, "Whether Franklin, after leaving Beechey Island, carried his ships to the eastward or westward of Cape Walker, will perhaps be ascertained by Mr. Anderson, now descending the Great Fish River, . . . but no dispassionate reasoner can doubt that the priority of discovery rests with the *Erebus* and *Terror*, the *Investigator* being at least six months later." Lady Franklin also claims the precedence of discovery and performance of the North-West Passage for her gallant husband and his associates. In a letter sent to Mr. Mackinnon* (July 6th, 1855), chairman of this committee, she says: "When it is remembered that these brave and unfortunate men, after years of intense privations and suffering, were found dead of starvation upon a spot which they could not have reached without having first solved that geographical problem which was the object and aim of all these painful efforts, and when it is remembered that they are beyond the reach of their country's rewards, you will not, I think, refuse them the just acknowledgment that is due to their memories.† . . . Capt. M'Clure . . . is not the less the discoverer of a North-West Passage, because my husband had previously, though unknown to Capt. M'Clure, discovered another and a more navigable passage." The fact of finding the drifting fragments of ship's fittings with the Government mark at Parker and Cambridge Bays, and on the larger Finlayson Island, and also the important fact of there being a boat with the distressed party who are said to have perished at the mouth of the Back River, all these go to prove the existence of continuous water, extending towards the American coast; it may exist on both sides, but we have shown the improbability of such a condition east of Cape Walker by Peel Sound, and in this we differ from the authorities we have quoted; they all think the ships, or a party, or parties, came down that sound, we cannot. The only other passage is Bellot's Strait, and it is narrow, doubtful and unlikely. We have

* See "Parliamentary Paper, No. 409, 1855. Report from Select Committee on Arctic Expeditions," p. 35.

† See also a paper, "Des Derniers Expéditions faites à la Recherche de Sir John Franklin et de la Découverte d'un Passage par Mer de l'Océan Atlantique à l'Océan Pacifique," lu à la Séance de la Société de Géographie de Paris, du 18 Janvier, 1856, par M. de la Roquette.

no alternative, then, but to suppose they came by *some channel issuing from the west, and communicating between Melville Sound and the north of King William's Land, and this we have proved exists*. It would be presumption in us to assert the ships got down this strait into this unknown space, and were there wrecked. They might have done so; but if they had, we think there would have been stronger evidence of the fact in the greater abundance of floating *reliquiæ*. We do not think, therefore, the ships did get down it, and consequently were not wrecked to the north of King William's Land, but we feel quite assured the boat and party did. *In either case, the North-West Passage was made by Franklin*. Again, as to the time: it was in April, 1850, that this party is said to have been seen to the north of King William's Land; in May they were at Back River; they must, then, consequently have made the passage at that time. Now Capt. McClure did not discover the passage until October 26th, 1850, and did not perform or make it until April 28th, 1852, at which time he reached Melville Island. As he could not be said to have performed or made it until he had reached that island, *the merit therefore of achieving the great object of his voyage, the solution of the question of a North-West Passage, most undoubtedly belongs to Sir John Franklin and his gallant officers and crews*.

As regards rewards, we think Capt. McClure justly earned, and is entitled to, all the honours and rewards he obtained; but with respect to Captains Kellett and Collinson, we do not think their services have been sufficiently recognized. We have already alluded to the important assistance rendered by the former officer to Capt. McClure, at a crisis when, from an insufficiency of food, sickness and despondency had reduced them to a situation described as deplorable. Some few of the most hardy of his crew might have escaped with their lives, but there was little chance the remainder could ever have reached a place of succour. Captain Kellett dragged them through all their difficulties, and restored them, under Providence, to health, happiness, and home; besides which, this efficient officer had served for many years with great credit in the Arctic regions. With regard to Capt. Collinson, he had the command of the expedition to which the *Investigator*, Capt. McClure, was attached. He had been also three years in the ice; and he, too, had discovered the Passage; indeed, had made it within twenty days after that officer, and therefore we think should specially have been rewarded. Capt. Collinson, in addition, seeing his second was ahead of him, selected other and important ground, hitherto unexplored, for his search; took his ship

through intricate passages, and further east than any one before him, where ship's keel had never passed before; and brought her and his crew home in health and safety.* Looking, then, to the merits of these two distinguished officers, we do feel that they have not been sufficiently acknowledged. The service upon which they had been engaged was an arduous, a chivalrous, and a noble one. 'Whether we view it in the sacred cause of humanity, or in the solution of the Great Question bequeathed to us by our ancestors, it demanded the possession and exercise of the highest attainments, much careful thought, anxiety, and great personal sacrifice, and therefore should have had special honour and reward. Surely, Captains Kellett and Collinson have fallen on evil days! But enough. Franklin may have perished, but it may be almost literally said, whatever merit may be due to others, "that it was his spirit that pointed out the way . . . by which the long-sought-for problem has at length been solved, . . . and that another ray has been added to the maritime glory of the British Empire." Had we been of the Committee, seeing the mighty influence it has exercised on the national mind, and the advantageous results that have accrued out of this purely British question, we should have recommended three for the honour of knighthood instead of one, and £30,000 instead of the parsimonious £10,000. We are pleased to see that Sir R. I. Murchison strongly advocates the presentation of a medal to each and all, of whatever rank and country, who have served on the Arctic Searching Expeditions. In this he shows his feeling to be identical with the wishes of Captain Kellett.

November 2nd, 1855.—Intelligence was received of the safety of Dr. Kane. He arrived at New York, October 11th, 1855. The search up Smith's Sound for our lost countrymen had been unsuccessful, notwithstanding every effort had been taxed to the extreme. The exertions of Dr. Kane and his gallant followers are far beyond any praise we can offer; the perils they dared, and the sufferings they endured for our sake, ought never to be forgotten. May the sacred influence of this holy, this generous act of our American brethren, ever have power to dispel any evil cloud that may arise between the two countries! Referring to the observations we made when the *Advance* sailed, it will be seen we had no faith in the success of this voyage as a search for Franklin (see p. 283). We conceived it to be in a wrong direction; opposed, in fact, to the plan and In-

* We are happy to hear that the Gold Medal of the Royal Geographical Society has since been justly awarded to Captain Collinson.

structions under which he sailed in 1845. We might, therefore, pass it as so much daring uselessly exercised, so much suffering needlessly endured; but we cannot, for the same reasons we assigned for commenting on Sir Edward Bekker's Expedition. We need not enter on the details of the passage up Baffin's Bay, but commence our notices from the time, August 7th, 1853, when, observes Dr. Kane, the *Advance** "reached the headland of Sir Thomas Smith's Sound, and passed the highest point attained by our predecessor, Capt. Inglefield. . . So far our observations accorded completely with the experience of this gallant officer in 1852. . . We had all the signs of continuous open water. . . As we advanced, a belt of heavy stream ice was seen, an evident precursor of drifts, and a little afterwards, it became evident that the channel to the northward was obstructed by a drifting pack. . . We were still too far to the south to carry out the views I had formed of our purposed search; it became my duty, therefore, to attempt the penetration of the ice." Having selected an appropriate inlet, Dr. Kane placed *en cache* a lifeboat and provisions; he afterwards landed on the Lyttleton Islands of Inglefield, erected a beacon, and left letters of farewell. He says: "My first design was to force a passage to the north; but, after reaching lat. $78^{\circ} 45'$, we found the ice extending in a drifting mass,* completely across the channel; this ice gradually bore down upon upon us, and we were forced to seek the comparatively open spaces of the Greenland coast, still we should *have been* *scept to the south* but for a landlocked bay (Refuge Inlet), under whose cliffs we found a temporary asylum. . . On the 13th, fearing the rapidly advancing cold might prevent our penetrating further, we warped out into the drift, and fastened to a grounded berg. Here the coast trended to the north-north-east, precipitous cliffs from 800 to 1,200 feet high. . . The shore at the base of this wall was invested with a permanent belt of ice from three to forty yards in width, with a mean summer thickness of eighteen feet. . . It had resisted the thawing influences of summer. The pack outside was impenetrable. Many bergs drifting backward and forward with the tides, and thus pressing upon the ice of the floes, had raised up hills sixty to seventy feet high. . . Mean rise and full of the tide, twelve feet. . . Rate two and a half knots an hour." Dr. Kane now attempted to press through the ice; the attempt was full of danger. Sometimes the brig was left aground and on her beam ends from receding tides,

* See "Further Papers relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1856," p. 7 *et seq.*; also, see "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1856," vol. 26, p. 1 *et seq.*

and twice she was on fire in consequence. She lost bulwarks, quarter boat, an anchor, &c., but "reached lat. $78^{\circ} 43'$ on August 29th, when he started to seek a spot eligible as a starting-point for future travel. In crossing a glacier" he was near "losing his party, and was finally compelled to abandon his sledge and proceed on foot;" he succeeded in reaching "a projecting cape, from which, at an elevation of 1,100 feet," he says, "I commanded a prospect of the ice to the north and west as high as lat. 80° . . . The entire surface was a frozen sea." Dr. Kane returned, and immediately began to organize parties to place depôts for the spring. In selecting sites for these, more than 800 miles were passed over, and "the coast of Greenland was traced 125 miles to the north and east." On September 10th, the brig was frozen in; he remarks, "As we were about to winter higher north than any previous expedition, and besides a probable excess of cold, were about to experience a longer deprivation of solar light, the arrangements for the interior were studied carefully. . . The mean annual temperature of Van Rensselaer Harbour, their winter home, is lower than that of Melville Island, as recorded by Parry, by 2° . In certain sheltered positions the process of freezing was unintermitted for any consecutive twenty-four hours throughout the year. The lowest temperature was observed in February, when the mean of eight instruments indicated minus 70° Fahrenheit. The position of our observatory was lat. $78^{\circ} 37' 0''$, long. $70^{\circ} 40' 6''$. During the winter "an anomalous form of spasmodic disease was encountered with difficulty; . . probably induced," observes Dr. Kane, "by the lengthened cold and darkness. It extended to our dogs. . . Fifty-seven perished; many with symptoms not unlike those of hydrophobia. . . The loss of these animals interfered seriously with my original scheme of search. . . Now a new system of operations was to be established, with different appliances; new sledges built, &c. . . Our party was too small for an extended system of field operations by unassisted human labour, and the only remaining hope of continuing the search was to be found in a passage through or over the great ice-fields to the north, an effort the success of which was rendered very doubtful by the crowded bergs and distorted ice of this frozen area. With this object a party was sent, 18th March, to place provisions at ten days' journey from the brig. . . A heavy gale from the north-north-east broke on this party." The thermometer fell to 57° below zero. Four of the most valuable members "were frozen at the extremities," two of whom died. The latter part of April, Dr. Kane set out "to renew the attempt from

a higher point on the Greenland coast. . . This was followed by others. These journeys are thus summed up:—March, Mr. Brooks and Dr. Kane; April, May, Dr. Kane, Messrs. McGeary and Bonsall; June, Dr. Hayes and William Godfrey; June, July, William Morton and Hans Heindrick, the native hunter. . . The arrival of the Esquimaux in April enabled us (says Dr. Kane) to add four dogs to the three that remained, . . and thus to equip a slender team. . . The earlier journeys of March, April, and May proved incomparably more arduous and exposing than those performed with dogs, while their results were entirely disproportionate to the labour they cost us. . . Invariably the entire party, on its return, passed at once upon the sick list. . . Out of 3,000 miles of travel no less than 1,100 were made by dog sledges. . . Setting out from our winter quarters, three expeditions effected the passage of the bay.

1st. To the north, with Messrs. Geary and Bonsell, along the base of a great glacier, which issued from the coast of Greenland, lat. $79^{\circ} 12'$.

2nd. To the south-west, by Dr. Hayes and William Godfrey.

3rd. To the north-west, and along the shores of a new channel, by W. Morton and the Esquimax hunter, Hans." Dr. Kane thus gives the summary of results: "Greenland reaches its farthest western point at Cape Alexander, about lat. $78^{\circ} 19' N.$, and after passing long. $70^{\circ} W.$, extends nearly due east and west ($E. 20^{\circ} N.$) This northern face of Greenland is broken by two large bays, at the base of which are numerous islands, which, as you approach long. $65^{\circ} W.$, assume the form of an archipelago. . . The aspect of the coast is imposing, abutting upon the water line in headlands from 800 to 1,400 feet high. . . The further progress of our parties towards the Atlantic was arrested by a great glacier, which issued in lat. $75^{\circ} 12' N.$, long. $64^{\circ} 20' W.$, and ran directly north; its escarpment, abutting upon the water, presents a perpendicular face from 300 to 500 feet in height." It was followed along its base, and traced into a new northern land, trending far to the west. This land Dr. Kane named Washington; the large bay, which separates it from the coast of Greenland and the glacier, bears the name of the liberal Mr. Peabody. The new territory adjoining Peabody Bay was accurately delineated. "Its south-western cape is in lat. $80^{\circ} 26' N.$, long. $66^{\circ} 42' W.$ The cape was doubled, and the land to the north traced" to "the large indentation named Constitution (Lafayette?) Bay. *The whole of this line was washed by open water, extending in an iceless channel to the opposite shores on the west. This western land I have inscribed with the name of Henry Grinnell. The course of this channel, at its southern opening,*

was traced to Smith's Sound. The western coast (of Washington) was followed, in subsequent explorations, to a mural face of 900 feet elevation, preserving throughout its iceless character. Here a heavy surf, beating directly against the rocks, checked our future progress. . .

This precipitous headland . . . was named Cape Independence. It is in lat. $81^{\circ} 22' N.$,* long. $65^{\circ} 35' W.$ It was only touched by William Morton, who left the dogs, and made his way to it along the coast. From it the western coast was seen stretching far towards the north, with an iceless horizon, and a heavy swell rolling in with white caps. At a height of 240 feet, this great expanse still presented all the appearance of an open and iceless sea." Dr. Kane says: "In claiming for it this character, I have reference only to the facts actually observed, without seeking confirmation or support from any deductions of theory. Among such facts are the following:—

" 1. It was approached by a channel entirely free from ice, having a length of fifty-two, and a mean width of thirty-six, geographical miles.

" 2. The coast ice along the water line of this channel had been completely destroyed by thaw and water action, while an unbroken belt of solid ice, 125 miles in diameter, extended to the south.

" 3. A gale from the north-east, of fifty-four hours' duration, brought a heavy sea from that quarter, without disclosing any drift or other ice.

" 4. Dark nimbus clouds and water sky invested the north-eastern horizon.

" 5. Crowds of migratory birds were observed thronging its waters."

Two islands on the threshold of this sea bear the names of Sir John Franklin and his associate, Captain Crozier. To the north-west the coasts become mountainous, rising in truncated cones, like the Magdalena cliffs of Spitzbergen. The farthest distinctly sighted point was a lofty mountain, bearing $N. 50^{\circ} E.$; its latitude, by estimation and intersection, $82^{\circ} 30'$; its longitude, as thus determined, would give $66^{\circ} W.$ (approximative). Dr. Kane suggests for it "the name of the late Sir Edward Parry, who, as he has carried his name to the most northern latitude yet reached, should have in this, the highest

* Some of these high northern latitudes are placed too far north; they are said to be the result of the "uncorrected dead reckoning and observation," a method full of error; we cannot place Cape Independence higher than $80^{\circ} 16' N.$ true. See "Arctic Explorations by Dr. Kane, U.S.N.," p. 388, Position LL.

known northern land, a recognition of his pre-eminent position among Arctic explorers. . . The extension of the coast to the south-west was the work of Dr. Haynes and William Godfrey, renewed and confirmed" by Dr. Kane. It completes the survey of the coast as far as Cape Sabine of Captain Inglefield. . . A summary of the operations of the parties will comprehend," remarks Dr. Kane, "1. The survey and declination of the north coast of Greenland to its termination by a great glacier. 2. The survey of this glacial mass and its extension northward into the *new land of Washington*. 3. *The discovery of a large channel to the north-west, free from ice, leading into an open and expanding area, equally free. The whole embraces an iceless area of 4,200 miles.* 4. The discovery and delineation of a large tract of land, forming the extension northward of the American continent. 5. The complete survey of the American coast to the south and west as far as Cape Sabine, thus connecting our survey with the last determined position of Captain Inglefield, and completing the circuit of the straits and bay heretofore known at their southernmost opening as Smith's Sound. The summer, 1854, brought with it few changes bearing towards the liberation of the brig; the melted snows did not run in the water channels until the 30th of June, and our limited flora showed a tardy and inauspicious season." On the 12th of July Dr. Kane started for Beechey Island. "The declining state of our resources," he says, "suggested the attempt, although it promised many difficulties;" but returned on the 6th of August, after several abortive attempts. He was only enabled to reach Hakluyt Island. Winter came, and found them with their physical energies sensibly declined, their resources diminished, scant of fuel, and their food the ordinary marine stores (by no means suited to repel scurvy). They now adopted the habits of the natives, and organized hunting parties, combining their own efforts with theirs for mutual support. With the dark months supplies became scanty—the exertions of their best hunters unavailing. Dr. Kane attempted to reach the Esquimaux, but failed, less on account of the cold (minus 52°) than the ruggedness of the ice, the extreme darkness, and the renewal of tetanic diseases among the dogs. The Esquimaux fared worse; famine, attended by frightful forms of disease, reduced them to the lowest stages of misery and emaciation. "Our own party (says Dr. Kane) was gradually disabled." Frost bites and amputation (even to the surgeon), "scurvy, with varying phases, gradually pervaded our company, until Mr. Bonsall and myself only

remained able to attend upon the sick and carry on the daily work of the ship. . . I pass from this topic. . . Our ultimate escape would have been hazarded, but for the painfully enforced routine which the more experienced among us felt the necessity of adhering to rigorously under all circumstances. . . The latter end of March the walrus again made their appearance," and "we shared with the Esquimaux the proceeds of the hunt. . . The sun came back on the 21st February, 1855." Dr. Kane now resolved to abandon the *Advance*, "having already consumed for firewood her upper spars, bulwarks, deck sheathing, stanchions, hatches, extra timbers; in fact, everything that could be taken without destroying her seaworthiness." The sledges left her on the 17th May, but Dr. Kane's last visit to her (for provisions) was as late as the 8th June. We do not detail the vicissitudes in the retreat of this gallant band; of the kindly parting conduct of the Esquimaux of Anostok and Etah; of their subsequent fatigues, privations, and sufferings; let it suffice they reached the Greenland coast on the 3rd August, and Upernavik on the 6th, eighty-three days after leaving the *Advance*, and after having travelled 1,300 miles. Here and at Godhaven the Danes welcomed and lavished the kindest attentions on them. At Upernavik a passage was obtained by Dr. Kane for himself and crew in the Danish brig *Marianne*, Captain Amundsen, to be landed at the Shetland Islands; but touching at Disco they were met by the vessels sent out by the U.S. Government to their rescue, under Lieutenant Hartstein, U.S.N., and arrived at New York, October 11th, 1855.

We cannot close our notices of this expedition without remarking the energy, ability, and kindness displayed throughout this trying, dangerous service by Dr. Kane.* He seems, too, to have been well supported by his officers, and, with exceptions, by his men. The fervour in favour of a Polynia or Polar Basin to the north, had abated, but his discovery of an iceless channel opening to the north of 80° (Kennedy Channel), abounding with birds, &c., and his valuable remarks thereon, must leave the question still open to further inquiry.† Thus ended the second Grinnell Expedition in search of the Franklin Expedition. It was again unsuccessful; but ours is the duty of gra-

* We grieve to record the premature death of this eminent traveller and heroic Arctic explorer, Dr. E. K. Kane. He died at the Havannah, whither he had gone in search of health, February 16th, 1857.

† See "Arctic Explorations, 1853-54-55," by E. Kent Kane, M.D., U.S.N., pp. 289-309.

titude, and above all to Him who willed its safe return to native land and home.*

The year died out, and with it War, but not so the remembrance of our lost, suffering sons of science. The glare of its glory had partially obscured them; but the glories of war soon pass away, whilst the triumphs of science endure for ever. It was still thought that all that *should be done had not been done*. All further search by the north was now repudiated as visionary, and men looked again to the rejected Plan and Instructions on which the voyage was based. In other words, their eyes began to be opened.

* On receipt of intelligence, the British Government lost no time in offering its congratulations and thanks to the American Government, to Dr. Kane and his gallant associates, and to Mr. Grinnell. All this is as it should be; nations, like individuals, lose nothing by acknowledging the kind sympathy and generous liberality of which they are the recipients. We are pleased to notice this conduct on the part of Government towards our American brethren. But how is it that we find no notice of the name of George Peabody, that "Man of Ross," that friend of the human race? We have already remarked (p. 39) this strange inadvertence in connection with the search for Sir John Franklin. We say nothing of substantial testimony; but even our poor thanks have been withheld. The following facts are not generally known, and, while it is our duty, we have great pleasure in recording them: "When, in 1832, Mr. Henry Grinnell had generously offered his vessel, the *Advance*, for a second voyage of philanthropy to the Arctic Seas, . . . Mr. Peabody wrote to his friend, Mr. Wetmore, in New York, authorising him, in case the application to Government should fail, and Mr. Grinnell should approve, to pay, on his account, 10,000 dollars towards the voyage. No notice was taken of the offer at the moment. Time ran on, Congress did not make the appropriation, and a year afterwards Mr. Grinnell inquired, through Mr. Wetmore, whether the offer was still standing? In making the proposal originally, Mr. Peabody desired and expected that the American vessel would act in conjunction with an expedition then fitting out in England for the same purpose. He felt that a co-operation so friendly, in a cause so generous, would add a new cord to the bonds of national amity. . . . The British expedition sailed, and the motive lost much of its weight; still, acting on Mr. Grinnell's expressed opinion that there was yet ground to expect a favourable result, he authorized the payment. *That money defrayed the expenses of Dr. Kane's voyage.*" (See Hunt's "Merchant's Magazine," for April, 1837. New York.) A philanthropist in the broadest sense of the term, Mr. Peabody's large heart responds to all good. "In the land of his adoption" he is "dutiful to the land of his birth." Old Danvers Mass., Baltimore, &c., tell of his noble munificence in their Institutes, founded by him at a cost of five or six hundred thousand dollars. "A lover of peace always, and for its own sake, he feels that if ever its obligations are fraternal and indissoluble, they are so between two nations of kindred blood, who are virtually one in their language and literature, and who cherish in the main the same great principles of law and liberty and the same pure religious faith." The Royal Geographical Society of London awarded to Dr. Kane their founder's gold medal, 26th May, 1850. See Admiral Beechey's Anniversary Address, vol. 26, p. 166.

CHAPTER XVII.

1856—ANDERSON AND STEWART—REMARKS—RAE AND THE REWARD—SUMMARY OF OPINIONS—THE ONLY CONCLUSION AS TO THEM—OUR SAILORS—ARCTIC AUTHORITIES—OUR PRESENT OPINIONS AS TO THE COURSE OF THE LOST NAVIGATORS—ARE THERE ANY SURVIVORS?

1856.—AGAIN another year commenced. Anxiety no longer traced the lost ones in the north. The warlock's spell that bound conjecture there was broken; and common sense, allowed more freedom, pointed to the terrible revelations of the rejected, unsearched south; but Conjecture, though with sight restored, still wandered—she saw, but would not see.

January 10th, 1856.—Letters were received at the Admiralty, through the Hudson's Bay Company, from Mr. James Anderson, detailing the result of the Expedition sent to the mouth of the Great Fish River, to investigate the truth of the Esquimaux report as to a party said to have perished there, and from whom were obtained the relics of Sir John Franklin's Expedition brought home by Dr. Rae.* Mr. Anderson's letter is dated Fort Resolution, Sept. 17th, 1855. It appears the expedition started from that fort June 22nd, and arrived at Sandhill Bay, July 11th. They now crossed to the Great Fish River, and descended it. On the 20th, at Mackinley River, the first Esquimaux were seen; here they found the want of an interpreter. "They had," says Mr. Anderson, "evidently seen whites, or had communication with others who had, . . . as they possessed our daggers, &c., probably from those who resort to Churchill. Another party was seen at the Rapid between Lakes Pelly and Garry, the men were absent, and the women and children fled. On the 30th, at the Rapids below Lake Franklin, three Esquimaux lodges were seen on the opposite shore;" having "crossed over," they immediately perceived various articles belonging to a boat; such as tent-poles, kayak paddles made out of ash oars, pieces of mahogany, elm, oak, and pine; also, copper and sheet iron boilers, tin soup-tureens,

* See "Further Papers Relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, &c., 1856," pp. 24—29; also, "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society," vol. 26, p. 18; also, see "Royal Geographical Society's Journal," extracts from "Chief Factor James Anderson's Arctic Journal, communicated by Sir John Richardson," vol. 27, p. 321.

pieces of instruments, a letter-nip dated 1843, a broken saw, chisels, &c. Only one man was at the lodges, but the women, who were very intelligent, made us understand by words and signs that these articles came from a boat, and the white men belonging to it had died of starvation. We, by showing them books and written papers, endeavoured to ascertain if they possessed any papers, offering to give them plenty of the goods we had with us for them; but though they evidently understood us, they said they had none. They did not scruple to show us all their hidden treasures. Besides the man, there were three women and eight children; the remainder of the party, two men and three lads, were seen towards evening. 31st, they crossed to Montreal Island, which was examined, and the small islands in the vicinity. "On a high ridge of rocks, . . . at the south-east point of the island, a number of Esquimaux caches were found," containing "various articles belonging to a boat or ship; chain hooks, chisels, blacksmith's shovel and cold chisel, tin oval boiler; a bar of unwrought iron, about three feet long, one inch and a half broad, and one inch and a quarter thick; small pieces of ropes, bunting, and a number of sticks strung together, on one of which was cut 'Mr. Stanley,' surgeon of the *Evebus*. A little lower down was a large quantity of chips, shavings, ends of plank of pine, elm, ash, oak, and mahogany, evidently cut by unskilful hands; on one of them was found the word *Terror*. It was evident this was the spot where the boat was cut up by the Esquimaux (?), not even a scrap of paper could be discovered, and though rewards were offered, and the most minute search made over the island, not a vestige of the remains of our unfortunate countrymen could be discovered." On the 5th, Mr. Anderson "crossed to the mainland," and a most minute search was made as far as the point of Elliott Bay, and also to the northward. Point Pechel was reached on the 6th, and the whole coast between Montreal Island and Point Pechel was searched by a land party. It was now determined to "search the peninsula on foot:" they "encamped opposite Maconochie Island, . . . the only vestige" found was a small piece of codline, and a strip of striped cotton about two inches long and one broad, at Point Ogle. They then explored "Maconochie Island, but nothing was found. It was impossible to cross to Point Richardson, the ice driving between it and Maconochie Island at a fearful rate. . . . It was now evident," says Mr. Anderson, "that all that could be done with our means had been accomplished, and that with our frail craft any delay in returning would compromise the safety of the whole party. It may be thought strange that the

remains of so large a party could not be discovered. It is my opinion that a party in a starving condition would have chosen a *low spot*, where they could have hauled their boat up, and had some shelter; and if they perished there, that their bones have been long since covered by sand and gravel, forced up by the ice: any books or papers left open would be destroyed by the perpetual winds and rain in this quarter." They commenced their return on the 10th. Thus ended an expedition that had been specially sent to relieve "the earnest anxiety" of the Admiralty, and which was desired to be "fitted out in the most effective manner," and "on an adequate scale, . . . for an exhaustive search on the spot." The expedition starts minus an Interpreter, reaches the spot, finds abundant evidence of a party from the *Erebus* and *Terror* having been there; they find the Esquimaux, who know all about the party; they find the women desirous to tell all they know; it is said the Esquimaux even reported that the people to the north of them, *who had seen and visited the ships, stated they had both been crushed by the ice*;* but as they can communicate only by signs and a few words, always open to misinterpretation, they of course can gain no clear information; they devote ten days to the search, a time quite insufficient to give hope of success; they are unable to prosecute it further, because of their "frail craft," and they then return. These are all the fruits of a special expedition, sent to follow up a clue that had been furnished to the fate of our lost expedition. They seem to have gone rather to verify Dr. Rae's report than for an extended search for the remains of the Franklin Expedition; but it was unnecessary, as everybody believed in the substance of that report. *The objects required were to trace to the source whence this distressed party came, and whether any were alive. To do this, the means were quite inadequate.* The route adopted does not seem to us the most eligible, that by Repulse Bay appears to possess far greater facilities; again, the route and the equipment should have been arranged for wintering if necessary; and, above all, an active Arctic naval officer should have accompanied the expedition. Rae himself would have been the man; he was used to the work, but then he would not have been believed, although one of the most truthful of Arctic explorers. We say this, without any prejudice to Messrs. Anderson and Stewart; it is the inefficiency of the expedition for extended search we complain of. The former Esquimaux report, that the party had starved, we could not believe, nor can we the present; every circumstance goes to disprove it; who can believe that our

* See the *Times*, January 9th, 1866.

gallant fellows, "having wandered on the beach until worn out by fatigue and starvation, they one by one laid themselves down and died?"* or the report of the Esquimaux woman, who said she saw "the last man die, that *he was large and strong, and sat on the sandy beach, his head resting on his hands?*"† *Largo and strong, and yet die of starvation!* How is it we do not hear of these humane Esquimaux aiding our countrymen in their distress? The opinion, that the bones have been covered by gravel or sand forced up by the sea, is mere imagination seeking to account in some way for that which is unknown. Why did not the sand cover the piece of cod-line and strip of cotton at Point Ogle? Men dying would crawl inland, and out of danger; it cannot be supposed that they were unacquainted with the action of ice on a low shore. Some were said to be buried, and yet no graves are found. As to their books and papers, are these poor fellows to be supposed to be so thoughtless as to leave their books and papers open and exposed to the rain and the blast? We think not; they were put *en cache*. Then as to the boat; the "chips, shavings, and ends of plank," do not seem to us to have resulted from her having been cut up by the unskilful hands of the Esquimaux; we should question whether they understood the use of *the plane*; we should rather think them to result from our own men, in their attempt (not being carpenters) to repair or rebuild their own boat. The efforts of those who are unused to edged tools are always clumsy; again, wood is more precious than gold to the Esquimaux; they are therefore very unlikely to waste it by cutting off and leaving ends of plank. Reflecting on all the circumstances, we are led to the belief that these poor fellows were surprised by treachery while as yet their work was unfinished—perhaps when separated, and were compelled to succumb.

Altogether, this expedition failed in the object for which it was intended. It left the tale of the fate of these retreating forlorn men as inexplicable as ever.

We may observe here, soon after the return of Messrs. Anderson and Stewart, the Admiralty (June 19th, 1856),‡ having previously given notice in the *Gazette* (January 22nd, 1856) of their intentions, adjudicated a reward of £10,000, under the third paragraph of the Admiralty proclamation of August 7th, 1850, to Dr. Rae and his companions for having "by virtue" of their efforts "succeeded in

* See the *Times*, January 9th, 1856.

† See the *Montreal Herald*, December 24th, 1855.

‡ "Further Papers relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1856," p. 58.

ascertaining the fate of Sir John Franklin's Expedition." If the reward had been adjudged for past services, no objection could have been raised; for, of all Arctic explorers sent in search of the Franklin Expedition, no one has more distinguished himself by his talent, his truthfulness, and his exertions, than has Dr. Rae. He has, too, by his eminent services fully earned, and we are therefore pleased that he obtained, the reward. But few will assert, and still fewer believe, that he "has set at rest the unfortunate fate of Sir John Franklin and his party." He undoubtedly furnished the clue in 1851, and again in 1854, by which the fate of our lamented countrymen might have been set at rest; but misguided infatuation on the one hand, and an expedition inadequate to the objects sought on the other, have hitherto prevented us the revelation of their miserable, perhaps tragic end. It would seem Mr. Anderson himself thought another expedition to King William's Land and the west coast of Boothia necessary.* Is not the fate of the expedition, as a whole, involved in as much mystery as ever? With great reason was it asked, "Thus left in ignorance and darkness, with so little obtained, and so much yet to learn, can it be said, and is it fitting to pronounce, that the fate of the expedition is ascertained?" †

With the return of Messrs. Anderson and Stewart ceased all efforts on the part of Government for the recovery of the lost Franklin and his companions. All the searching ships having been previously withdrawn or abandoned, the north was now left to its primitive solitude. The fate of the missing navigators had not been ascertained, but further search was now relinquished—relinquished, too, at a time when accident had furnished the clue, so long sought, that was certain in its development to unfold the whole mystery; yet, at such a time, when the search should have been, if possible, more perseveringly prosecuted, it was abandoned. What an unhappy combination of perverse ideas and untoward circumstances have ruled a malign influence over us since the *Ercbus* and *Terror* sailed, freighted with lofty aspirations, full of high hope, in 1845!

It will have been observed, we all along, especially since 1850, have questioned whether the direction given to the search was the right one. Never having had anything to guide us to the lost ones but the

* "Further Papers relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1856," p. 60.

† *Ibid.*, "Lady Franklin's Letter," pp. 58—63. Some of the claims put in for the reward are curious, others most absurd. For some of the objections to Dr. Rae receiving it, see "The Great Arctic Mystery," "Arctic Rewards and their Claimants," "An Earnest Appeal in behalf of the Missing Arctic Expedition," &c.

Plan and Instructions which were to govern them, when we saw these were likely to be departed from, we had little hope our missing countrymen would be rescued, unless they should, by good fortune, be enabled to rescue themselves. From what source this obliquity of thought arose that should have induced such a departure from common sense, and which has led probably to such direful results, has been the object of these pages to inquire. The inquiry has been a somewhat tedious one, in consequence of the numerous documents it has been found necessary to consult; but we may say here, only those have been consulted whose authority is unquestionable, as will be seen by the references. It may be thought we have been prolix; but as no just conclusion could be arrived at without giving the entire substance and spirit of all the original plans and opinions, we have considered it better to be deemed a little so, rather than throw ourselves open to the charge of making only partial extracts. Again, it may be said, whether Franklin and his companions have been sought in the right direction or not, of what avail now, *the inquiry is useless, because too late?* Such a conclusion is questionable; there are those who still cling to the belief that some of our gallant countrymen may yet be alive; at any rate, the fact to the contrary has not been established; and until it is, no inquiry can be deemed useless that has for its object to excite to renewed exertion, to set at rest so important a point.

The lives of 135 British sailors, sent on a perilous public service, in which the nation's honour, interest, and feeling was invested, should not, must not, be lightly disposed of. We shall now give the result of our inquiry, which we think will show that, so far from having sought our long-lost countrymen in the right direction, we have, without a particle of information to induce the change, changed from the right, and sought them altogether in a wrong one; and the question, so often put, *Has all been done that can be done?* still remains in the negative.

We have already given the original Plan of the Voyage (pp. 21 and 35), and the Instructions (pp. 36 and 37) founded on that Plan, by which Sir John Franklin was to be guided. We have even presumed to touch on the antecedents of that great and good man, but only to show how pre-eminently he possessed the qualifications of a commander; that he, of all men, was the least likely "to treat his orders with levity;" and that, come what might, he "would act up to the letter of his Instructions." We have quoted largely from the various plans and opinions, both official and private, and have given a running commentary upon most of them, to show their bearing; in

which will be seen the basis upon which we have formed our opinion. From these we shall now draw a general conclusion. We shall not stay to remark upon the ideas prevalent when Franklin sailed, regarding the Polynia of Wrangell and its extension to the north of the Parry Islands, of the supposed easiness with which the Arctic Seas might be navigated, "even unto the Pole," and of the consequent loose arrangements for depôts, &c., for the ships to fall back upon: nor shall we dwell on the delay in sending forth the first searching expedition, except to remark that we think it ought to have been despatched in 1847.—but go at once to our object. It will be remembered that the first series of opinions (pp. 51--62) arose out of letters addressed by the late Sir John Ross to the Admiralty early in the year 1847, and it will be seen, by reference to them, that the majority of those opinions take the direction of the original Plan and Instructions given to Sir John Franklin on his sailing—Barrow's Strait, Cape Walker, and the south-west; Wollaston and Banks' Lands, and the north coasts of America, with its islands, are the principal points recommended. *All these are within the range of probability and of reason, and so far good; but there is one opinion that from the first has astonished us, as having a tendency to distract from the true direction of search. This opinion does not even allude to the Plan and Instructions, but concentrates attention wholly upon the north, the sea of Wrangell—the Polar Sea. Franklin's intentions are mentioned, and as points of search, "the whole range of coast, from Melville Island in the west to the great sound at the head of Baffin's Bay in the east;" but not one word of the space to which he was sent. Thus early to ignore the direction and object of the voyage, if not meant, was certainly injudicious, as it led the world to think that, no sooner in "blue water," but Franklin would throw his Instructions to the winds, and attempt the Passage by the north-west instead of the south-west. Thus was planted the germs of future error, and an impression created, unjust and opposed to the real sentiments and opinions (see p. 23) of Sir John Franklin. And yet "him Science taught." Injudicious as this opinion was, it was promulgated by the Admiralty to the whalers, &c., and in consequence, it extended itself. Various other opinions follow; one, a sound Arctic authority, recommends the despatch of a vessel at once (1847) to Cape Walker, "as important information is likely to be found there," but would extend the search to Back's River: this we think, thus early, too far east. This opinion of ours is corroborated by another eminent authority. We see one emphatically discourages*

search by the Wellington Channel, no one knowing "into what difficulties it might lead." We have then, a plan swayed by science more than by reason of the search. It recommends the western "coast of Boothia even to Cape Nicolai." The south-west is but lightly touched on, but Banks' Land on both sides is specially noted. The search on the eastern side we can understand, as being within "the space," so often alluded to at this time, "in which the ships may have become involved" (Melville Sound), but why the western? Surely it is premature to suppose the ships to have gone north-about yet, or is conjecture already becoming flighty? Still the promising Wollaston and Victoria Lands are noticed, and reason seems to guide. In this plan extremes meet; large westing and no westing is assumed. Then follows a plan by Behring's Strait, to keep up communication along the American coast to the Mackenzie. Thus far 1847. We have been particular to note the general bearing of these opinions: it will be seen, large south-westing is assumed generally for the Expedition; and only in one case is that, the true direction, repudiated in favour of the north.

1848.—The *Florer* sailed for Behring's Strait. A report at this time arrived that some whites in two boats were off the coast, east of the Mackenzie, giving knives and files to the natives in the summer of 1847. This is a direction in which we might look as probable. An offer was now made to search, by the *Great Fish River*, the western land of North Somerset—a land whose western limit was then unknown—founded on the assumption that Franklin was sent to "push his way" between Melville Island and Banks' Land, a part he was specially warned to avoid, and would fall back on this unknown land. Another series of opinions followed out of this plan, which point out the general intent of Franklin's Instructions. One is remarkable for the prophetic declaration of "inevitable embarrassment to the ships, and abandonment," in lat. 73° N. and 105° W., owing to the "prevalence of westerly winds," and the "drift of the ice." This conviction should have drawn special attention to Melville Sound. The sounds north of Ballin's Bay, arising out of the extraordinary opinions we have noticed in 1847, are now again spoken of, but have no weight, as Sir John Richardson and Dr. Rae are sent (March) to examine the coasts between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers, the western and southern shores of Wollaston Land, and the passages between Wollaston, Banks', and Victoria Lands; and Sir James Ross sailed with orders to search Lancaster Sound, Barrow's Strait, Capes Clarence and Walker, and the intervals between, and "the western coasts of Boothia, even to Cape Nicolai." Banks' Land is

to be reached, and both its sides examined, the party by the eastern to make for the Coppermine, and assist Sir John Richardson in searching the shores of Victoria and Wollaston Lands, and the western one to reach Cape Bathurst or Parry. *Excepting the latter and Cape Nicolai, as yet all seems to promise well, and the general opinion prevails that the direction of Franklin's Instructions is the true one, and on this conviction the expeditions by land and sea are despatched; still the north is gaining influence, and yet Cape Walker, the primary point to which the missing Expedition was sent, has not been reached, and no one can say what important secrets it may reveal.*

1849, January.—A new series of opinions arose out of the necessity for supporting Sir James Ross's Expedition. The *Wellington Channel, Bathurst Inlet, and other northern passages; the sounds at the head of Baffin's Bay; the Arctic Circle; Asia*—all are mentioned: the Instructions and the south-west route are named, and Regent's Inlet, but only in passing. *The mania in favour of the north is increasing, although the question stands wholly as it did when Franklin sailed in 1845. Whence this change? Imperative orders were now given (per North Star) for the search of "Wellington Channel and its neighbourhood," on Franklin's declared intentions "not to desist until he had tried all the channels."* Other propositions were made; to cross the American continent from Hotham Inlet to the Colville, or from Mount Elias to the Mackenzie, and rewards offered to call attention to the "Gulf of Boothia, Regent's Inlet, the inlets or channels leading out of Barrow's Strait, or the sea beyond, northward or southward;" and also a plan for exploring Jones's and Smith's Sounds. *The plans for search are now evidently running wild.* July, news arrived from Sir John Richardson: he had unsuccessfully searched the coasts between the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers. This proved that Franklin had not *reached that coast, but no more.* Dr. Rae was to persist in the direction of Wollaston and Victoria Lands. The Esquimaux sketch of four ships seen in the ice was now reported. November, Sir James Ross unexpectedly returned. *He had gone south towards Cape Nicolai, instead of west towards Cape Walker, had reached lat. 72° 38', and was unsuccessful. Could success have been expected? This voyage was a complete failure; and yet out of it came the opinion that "Franklin's ships had penetrated far beyond Melville Island," but on what grounds, is not stated. True; he had been away four years; but during that time what had been done? Nothing.* The non-existence of records at Leopold Harbour, Cape Bunny, and Fury Beach, proved he had not landed at either of those places on his outward route. The west coasts of

Banks' Land and the Parry Islands were now suggested for search, because "some thought the ships may have penetrated westward in a high latitude." Soon after, an expedition was proposed to Behring's Strait. It was argued, that if the Expedition had been arrested about Cape Walker, or one of the northern chain of islands, or southward of Banks' Land, they would have communicated with North Somerset, Barrow's Strait, or the coast of America, or, failing, have returned with the intention of passing up Wellington Channel (?), and left notices in Barrow's Strait. No notices having been discovered, a general conclusion is drawn that they are "locked in the archipelago to the westward of Melville Sound." The opinions elicited on this proposition are very various; they range between the western shores of the Parry Group, in a high latitude, and the south-west of Banks' Land. Conjecture is admitted, but still two sound authorities cling to Melville Sound. One *has no faith in the Wellington Channel*; and one, *still prophetic*, still refers to the *south-east drift, and the ships being involved in it. All look westward*, and the majority by the south. The north is referred to, but indistinctly. Retreating parties from the missing ships were now expected to be heard of, *viâ the Mackenzie River, or Cape Clarence and Fury Beach.*

1850.—An expedition, the result of the foregoing opinions, sailed under Capt. Collinson, to search the western coasts of Wollaston and Banks' Lands and *Melville Island*. In the search of the latter *the principle is recognized, that Franklin has taken a northern route, and made large westing; and yet at this time we did not know whether he had even reached Cape Walker, or whether he was detained in Melville Sound; but the impression held, that he was to be found there.* Offers and opinions now poured in, in favour of Jones's and Smith's Sounds, the Wellington Channel, and the north of the Parry Islands, although it was observed: "*The ships are not likely to be there;*" *still, "in the fifth year of their absence, every place should be searched."* Others were in favour of search "between Cape Bathurst and Banks' Land, . . . the headlands between Wellington Channel and Melville Island, and Banks' Land;" and an extensive land expedition was now suggested by the Mackenzie, the Coppermine, and the Great Fish Rivers, to winter on the Polar shores, and then one party to go to the north, another to the north-north-east, and a third to the north-north-west; and so plans poured in, in endless variety, many good as to direction, but impracticable—others only too absurd and distracting. Now came the talented Hydrographer, and proposed an expedition by Barrow's Strait. "All attempts have been too long deferred,"

he said; and now came also the whaling captains, capital sailors and good ice-masters, but not always sound in their reasoning, still active, enthusiastic, gallant fellows. One suggests Jones's Sound and Wellington Channel; one gives a vague report of a cairn up Jones's Sound (afterwards contradicted), and a new series of opinions naval are sought. They widely differ in direction; some so much so, as to confuse and perplex. Melville Island and Banks' Land towards America, and Banks' Strait, the Wellington Channel, and the openings between the Parry Islands, Jones's and Smith's Sounds, the Pelly Islands, Regent's Inlet. Erratic some, erroneous others. The north is still gathering strength. *One places Franklin's ships between Melville Island and Banks' Land, a position at variance with his Instructions; fortunately, the error is redeemed by two other and able authorities, which we have given. One thinks, "Leopold Island and Cape Walker should be examined prior to any attempt in other directions;" the other gives the whole sense of the fifth section of the Instructions, and argues against Jones's Sound.* The sum is, the west is still looked to, but the feeling appears rather to preponderate in favour of the northern route; and yet even up to this period we knew nothing, because we had done nothing, in the direct route to and from Cape Walker to the south-west. All the opinions in favour of the north are founded only on the lengthened absence of the Expedition, and the intentions attributed to Franklin. Plans from civilians now sprung up; one proposes an expedition of from 100 to 300 "convicted criminals," to be "upheld and pushed forward" to the Arctic coast, *via* Cheaterfield Inlet, to the Magnetic Pole, Regent's Inlet, &c. Another, very undefined, proposes from Wager River towards the Arctic Sea. Then follows one by Hudson's Bay, *so extended*, that we can only enumerate the names of the places; it embraces two divisions, one *by north-west Foxe's Channel*, the other, by Sir Thomas Roe's Welcome; it names, for examination, Hecla and Fury Strait, Felix Harbour, Boothia and its Isthmus, James Ross's Strait, "over ice, land, and sea," to the north-west; the Great Fish River, Simpson's Strait, and Broad Bay (between it and Dease's Strait), Committee Bay, from Hecla and Fury Strait, along the unknown coast to Cape Kater, Leopold Island, from it to Cape Rennell and to the south-west, and Smith's Sound is spoken of. Besides all these, the author thinks a small division of vessels, starting from Spitzbergen, and pushing in a north-west direction, "might be of great service." It cannot fail to have been noticed how the direction of search has been diverted and extended from the true one, and what fallacious and

impracticable views were entertained in 1850. The south-western search is altogether at a discount. Lieut. (now Capt.) Pullen arrived at the Mackenzie, having searched the American coast-line from Wainwright Inlet. It was now resolved to send two Government expeditions to Barrow's Strait—one under the command of Capt. (now Admiral) Austin, the other commanded by Mr. W. Penny, an energetic master of a whaling-ship. The general Instructions to the former were to reach Melville Island, to search the shores of Wellington Channel, and the coast about Cape Walker. The latter was to examine Jones's Sound, Wellington Channel, the Parry Islands, and Melville Island. *Section 5 of Franklin's Instructions is cited for his guidance, but Cape Walker is mentioned secondary—that is, after failing in Smith's Sound and the Parry Islands.* Here we have two expeditions with nearly similar Instructions, and these too extended even for the employment of both. This was seen by the commanders, and they wisely divided the duty. Capt. Austin took the western and southern search, and Mr. Penny the northern. A subscription expedition under Sir John Ross sailed about the same time for Barrow's Strait, to examine the headlands to the west of Cape Hotham, and, if necessary, Banks' Land. Also, a private expedition (Lady Franklin's) under Commander Forsyth, R.N., to search the western coast of Regent Inlet, and the western coast of Boothia, to James Ross's Strait and Simpson's Strait. Another was also sent to aid in the search by our generous kinsmen of America, under Lieut. De Haven, U.S.N.; their attention was directed to Wellington Channel and Cape Walker, and to be governed by circumstances. Our feeling at this time was, that the route which Franklin was directed to pursue in 1845 was now made *secondary to the Wellington Channel route and the north.* It is true Cape Walker is still specially named, but we feared failure in consequence of the extension and *importance attached to the northern search.* In September came the tragical tale of the base *Adam Beck*, of the loss of two ships in the ice, and the murder of their crews by the natives. It was pronounced a fabrication; still for a time it had its influence. Lady Franklin's vessel, under Commander Forsyth (October), returned unsuccessful; she brought the intelligence of the discovery of the first traces of the Franklin Expedition, that it had wintered at Beechey Island, 1845-6. By this discovery all the rumours of disaster and loss in Baffin's Bay were set at rest. Our views at this period are shown in our paper (pp. 161-7); its object was to call back *attention to Franklin's Instructions, and to show the improbability of the Wellington Channel*

route. It should be remembered, *Cape Walker had not even yet been reached.*

1851.—Now came a plan to examine all the fiords in Barrow's Straits, and Banks' Land, between 80° and 110° W. News, also, from the Behring's Strait ships arrived, of various rumours of ships seen, and boats' crews murdered, at the Ko-pak; also, information that Behring's Strait on to Point Barrow had been examined without success; and that Capt. Collinson and M'Clure had arrived, 1850, and sailed for the north for Melville Island, &c. The latter succeeded, the former was forced to return. 1851 came; Lady Franklin again sent the *Prince Albert*, now under Mr. Kennedy and Lieut. Bellot, to renew the search of Regent's Inlet and Boothia, unsuccessful last year. Lieut. Pullen, having been unable to reach Cape Bathurst, now writes his opinion that Franklin "*failed at Cape Walker, and pushed through Wellington Channel, and that he is shut up between Melville Island and Point Barrow,*" and yet offers no facts in proof. *There are none to offer.* Capt. Austin and Mr. W. Penny returned (September) unexpectedly from Barrow's Strait. All the vessels had been unsuccessful; the Wellington Channel had been explored; and a new sea discovered to the north by Mr. Penny, but had yielded no sign of the lost Expedition. Capt. Austin's parties had searched the southern coasts of the Parry Islands and Melville Island, and at last Cape Walker (six years after Franklin's departure) had been visited, and the coast examined east of it down to lat. 72° 49' N., and west to lat. 72° 18' N., and long. 103° 25' W. Finding no traces of Franklin, the extraordinary conclusion was come to, that "Sir John Franklin *did not prosecute the subject of his mission southward and westward of Wellington Channel. After this, all search in the line of Franklin's Instructions, i. e., to the south-west of Cape Walker, "was considered wholly unnecessary,*" and was abandoned; and the missing Expedition, *if in that quarter, was left to its fate.* We never could understand by what train of reasoning this sweeping conclusion was arrived at. The same conclusion, from the absence of traces, might have been drawn of Wellington Channel, but it was not. Was there no latent feeling, science, or prejudice for continuing the search in the latter direction, and abandoning it in the former? It could not have arisen from any new clue or information gained, for we had obtained none. It could not be from what was known of Wellington Channel, nor from misconception of Franklin's Instructions. The first was quite unknown, and formed no part of Sir John Barrow's Plan; and the second, the Instructions, are so plain, it is impossible to miscon-

strue them. In them, too, it is mentioned in a secondary sense only ; *i. e.*, in case of failing in the direction of Cape Walker. The original Plan on which Franklin's voyage was founded comprehends a space of about seventeen degrees of longitude. Austin's energetic parties to the south-west, under the able Capt. Ommauey, explored to long. 103° W., *i. e.*, five degrees to the westward of Franklin's starting-point (long. 98° W.), leaving twelve degrees, 216 miles of longitude, unexplored, a space quite wide enough to continue the promise of the "Passage." Why, then, because the first five degrees gave no traces of the absent Expedition, the remaining* twelve degrees should be considered unlikely to yield successful results, seems to us to argue certainly an illogical, if not presumptuous, inference. Had the search to the south-west, through Melville Sound, been persisted in at this time, it would, we think, have rewarded the Austin Expedition for all its toils and privations ; and, in our opinion, would have unfolded the mystery hanging over the fortunes of the *Erebus* and *Terror* and their crews.

We now conclude this summary of the plans and opinions, and the directions given to the various searching expeditions arising out of them. It will be seen that, from the first, as early as 1847, there was a tendency to distract and draw attention from the original Plan and Instructions ; from Cape Walker and the south-west (Melville Sound), to the passages and sounds to the north of Barrow's Strait and Baffin's Bay. Unhappily, this erroneous tendency was countenanced, fostered, and circulated ; the consequence was, a yet wider extension of the feeling. In 1848 it showed itself increased and extending ; and, though powerless for harm then, its stealthy influence could not be perceived by those who felt for the critical position of our missing countrymen without uneasiness and alarm. In 1849 it was openly advocated, and soon after the first searching expedition returned, having failed. Without any new fact to induce a change in the direction of search, the Wellington Channel and the north became a perfect mania. In 1850 it was recognized by authority, in the northerly direction given to the Behring's Strait' Expedition (to the west of Melville Island), and shared more than equal attention with the south-west, in the orders given to the Barrow's Strait' Expedition. On the return of the latter, because traces of the missing Expedi-

* We are now aware of Mr. Wynnatt's journey from Prince of Wales' Strait eastward in Melville Sound ; but at this time, 1850, when the search by the south-west was abandoned, it was not known at home ; it was, therefore, the more unreasonable to abandon the search in that direction.

dition were not found in the first five degrees of the seventeen degrees of space through which Franklin was specially enjoined to force his way, hence it was concluded all search of the remaining twelve degrees was unnecessary, and that the missing Expedition did not proceed to the southward and westward of Wellington Channel. Out of such an unwarrantable conclusion further search in the direction of Franklin's Instructions was given up. *Every thought and exertion was henceforth turned to the north.* In 1852, Cape Walker and the south-west, that promising space to which Franklin was sent, was left incompletely searched, was abandoned, and so it remains to this day—the north, as we have said, became the leading feature. From this time all our efforts have been in a wrong direction instead of a right one, and failure has been the consequence; we say this without any reference to after events. Erroneous conclusions were stamped on the face of each year, from the first, and yet our course was simple.

But was there no one during these latter years, strong in moral courage, boldly to stand up in spite of rank, routine, mistaken judgment, and ill-matured opinion, and advocate the soundness of the Plan, the clearness of the Instructions, the disciplined mind, and the predilection (in favour of the American coast route) of the commander; to point out error in the erring, the total absence of facts, to explain where needed, and give the reasons for his faith? There was. Several sound Arctic authorities held out in favour of the south-west route, but their reasonings were vain. The reports from the natives east of the Mackenzie were unheeded, the fragments of a Government ship's equipments brought home by Rae in April, 1851, were not understood; all were lost amidst the distraction of the numberless conflicting plans and opinions, official and civil, the majority of which would not bear the slightest scrutiny; still their effect was baneful. We fear, too, that even Science herself is not altogether blameless; she drew aside attention from the main object, the search for our unfortunate countrymen; she influenced the detour in the direction of Cape Nicolai, and she tempted her eager followers to the hidden secrets and the wide, unreaped field of inquiry and research in the unknown north. But whoever or whatever influenced the *decision in favour of the search for the Franklin Expedition by the north*, our firm conviction has all along been *that it was not in the right direction.*

It is as unnecessary, as it would be unprofitable, to pursue this melancholy subject further. We need not to speak of the failure of Belcher and Kellett, of Inglofield and of Kane, or of the wholesale

abandonment of the ships: they are all recorded; all ended as might have been anticipated. Our unfortunate countrymen were unrestored. Time, so precious, was wasted, and the energy, the daring, and the heroic fortitude of our sailors were all uselessly thrown away. From henceforth, wild theory, baseless conjecture, and imagination rampant, reigned. The Plan and Instructions for the voyage were consigned to oblivion. It was chaos come again. The field of search, always too extended, became more so, till it included the entire circuit of the Arctic circle, and extended even to the Pole itself; the most out-of-the-way, improbable routes and means were advocated; they ranged all around the compass, to every point excepting one, and that the only true one; viz., the south-west, through *the space to which Franklin was sent, and which we have so continuously dwelt upon,—Melville Sound.*

But let it not be supposed that our sailors (officers and men) have failed in their duty; failure was on every side, but not because of them; with solitary exceptions, they have nobly done their duty, and upheld the honour of their country; well have they merited to be placed by the side of the "marine worthies" of old. For among them may be traced all the "Cosmographic," the chivalry, and the "heroicke courage" of our Cabot, our Frobisher, our Davis, our Waymouth, our Hudson, our Baffin, and a host of others; names which England points to with pride; as may France to Bellot and De Bray, and as may our American kinsmen to De Haven, to Kane, &c., and her munificent citizens, Grinnell and Peabody.

Great stress has, as it will have been seen, been laid on what are called the opinions of Arctic authorities, and we think justly; but we prefer those founded on facts rather than those speculative. Their scientific contributions are most valuable; although, probably, in the acquirement sufficiently monotonous, wearying, and at times painful; still they furnish invaluable data to the shore-going inquirer, and to themselves at home. For, based on them, often arise under leisure and reflection great truths and extended views, which never would have entered the minds of those employed gathering together these precious elements of knowledge on the spot, where, tied and bound by the difficulties surrounding them, arising from cold, privation, and danger, their ideas must be in a great measure necessarily absorbed in self-preservation. We are called upon to make this observation from seeing the self-sufficient, confident manner in which opinions—purely speculative, often conflicting, and frequently contradictory—have been expressed, to the exclusion of others grounded on the

"small voice" of Reason. In short, we prefer Arctic facts to Arctic opinions.

It may be asked, What are our present views (1858) regarding the course pursued by Sir John Franklin after he left Beechey Island, his subsequent position, and if lost, where lost? With respect to the first question, we throw overboard all conjecture of fatal disaster at Beechey Island and Point Riley, "Truth must be proved, and not guessed." We believe that he left Beechey Island, in 1846, in good sea-going condition, and that he attempted to reach the point about Cape Walker, to which he was directed, *i. e.*, about 98° W. He may not have been enabled to communicate with that cape, from the heavy masses of ice always known, from the direction of the general current, to encumber the southern shores of Barrow's Strait; but that is immaterial to the great object of the original plan, which was, from that meridian to push his way in a south-west direction across the sound known as Parry or Melville Sound, towards the American coast; as it was known, that beyond the meridian of 120° W., a passage existed to Behring's Strait, and the Great Question would be solved. Therefore, as we have said, it was immaterial whether he communicated with Cape Walker or not; but, *it being his first point to arrive at, and the last for leaving* records of his movements and intentions, it was expected (and not unreasonably) that the first information of him would be found there; it may even have been his wish, too, but, unable to accomplish a landing without considerable detention and consequent loss of time (time so important in the navigation of the Arctic seas), and having no express orders to that effect, he pushed on. This may account for despatches not being left at Beechey Island; he was, when there, only *en route to his first and last point for communication with England*, and looked to leave them there; besides, he is not directed to the north side of Barrow's Strait on his outward course, he would therefore consider Beechey Island, or Point Riley, on that side, an out-of-the-way place for leaving them. From Cape Walker he would attempt a course in a south-west direction through Melville Sound; whether he succeeded soon after leaving that cape or not we have no information, but, if he did not, he would have sought a passage further west or returned. We know now that he could not have got along that coast (from Capt. Ommaney), as it is open to the north-west drift; we therefore must conclude he persevered to the westward, and when we come to consider the wide extent of the promising but unknown space before him, even to the meridian of Banks' Land, it is only reasonable to suppose that he did. The

seeming then wide outlets between Banks' and Wollaston and Victoria Lands would tempt him towards them. This, we think, is the course he pursued; that he attained large westing may be inferred from the following reasons. If he had not, he would have been within the influence of the general easterly current setting into and down Barrow's Strait, and we should have heard of him in 1847—for it is improbable that the crews would then have been so much weakened as not to be able to help themselves; it is equally so, if unsuccessful up to the summer of that year, that he would have prosecuted the voyage afterwards: *we therefore must conclude that he got so far west and south as to be out of the direct easterly current, and within the influence of that south-east drift so often spoken of (produced primarily by the strait we have indicated at the bottom of Melville Sound), and was there locked up in the ice, say about 110° W., and between 73° and 74° N., and that he obtained this position in one season, and was from thence unable to communicate or return. That he attempted to get through Melville Sound in a south-west direction, in pursuance of his Instructions, and obtained large westing, was our opinion in 1850 (see p. 162), and is now. Franklin was never in favour of the northern route, but that along the American coast (see pp. 23 and 253).*

We have assumed that he obtained this large westing (about the meridian of Melville Island or Banks' Land), let us now imagine him *unable to get to the southward*—in short, shut out from that quarter, that the whips were free, and that he resolved to adopt a northern route. By the sixth section of his Instructions his attention is called to the Wellington Channel; now *would he, having attained such large westing, waste the season to return (even if he could) to the Wellington Channel (?), and attempt the roundabout passage by the unknown north of the Parry Islands (?), when he had the equally inviting prospect before him (and more than eleven degrees of longitude further west) in the passages east and west of Byam Martin Island?* We think not, from its sheer improbability. Such thought may then at once be rejected. The question that next arises is, Having failed to get to the westward of Beechey Island, would he depart from that island to the north without leaving records of his intentions and motives? It matters not what he said at home, as to what he would or would like to do. When there, would he leave the known for the unknown, without leaving some notice of what he had done and what he was about to do, so that he might be followed? We say, Certainly he would not. The absence of records there negatively corroborates this opinion. Cairns are found in the most probable situations, but

no records; we are led then to the only—the inevitable conclusion, that Franklin *did not attempt the north by the Wellington Channel, and further, that not having done so, negative evidence is afforded of his having succeeded to the southward and westward.*

This conclusion is arrived at without any reference to the after search made in the north. The entire absence of all traces there only goes still further to confirm it. We must then look to Melville Sound for the scene of his detention and embarrassment; and if we revert again to Byam Martin Island and its passages, the entire absence of all sign of his presence there or at Melville Island, *all lead to the same conclusion.* There was a doubt whether Franklin might not have taken one of the western passages of the Parry Islands, until they were searched; but as to the Wellington Channel, no doubt ever rested on it, whether searched or not. Without information of failure in the west, it never had even probability for its basis. As Peel's Sound is talked of we may as well say a word or two on it. What could induce Franklin to attempt the passage by that sound? It offered no promise, *primâ facie*, compared with the broad opening of Melville Sound; any idea that he adopted it, therefore, can only be based on the supposition that, defeated on the western side of Cape Walker, and Peel's Sound being open at its entrance, he attempted a passage to the south by it. But it has been searched on both sides from Barrow's Strait, and not a single vestige of the presence of the Expedition has been found; furthermore, it is, as shown, *closed at the bottom*; in short, no passage exists to the southward: we therefore dismiss it.

We now turn to the precious remains discovered and brought home by Dr. Rae and Capt. Collinson. What is the tale they tell? It is easy of interpretation, they all point to *one source*—one rational conclusion; and that is, Melville Sound. The Pond's Bay Esquimaux sketch of four ships in the ice, the two ice-borne ships seen off Newfoundland, mute but positive, all unite to corroborate one fact, that Franklin *did not attempt the north but the south-west*, and succeeded so far as to enter Melville Sound; and if ever to be found, he must be, or rather should have been, sought there. There have been *direful presages enough told of it, which, instead of distracting from it, should have stimulated us to greater exertion in that quarter.* Why, then, *not have set all doubt at rest and searched it? but instead of that we have passed it over; and even unto this day the search of it is unfinished—incomplete.*

We have traced the ships to Melville Sound; did they get far down

that sound? were they wrecked or abandoned there? or, being at the outer margin of the ice, did they break away and float to the eastward as did the *Resolute*? The latter is not improbable, as we have noticed in the Esquimaux sketch and the ice-borne ships; on the contrary, they may have drifted some distance down Melville Sound, and been wrecked or abandoned. Such an event is far more probable than that the catastrophe occurred in Peel's Sound, for reasons which we have already given; but in either case, there is no doubt the crews kept to their ships while hope remained. It seems not unlikely that, seeing the south-east direction of the drift—that it set them towards Victoria Land, to the south of which the passage westward was already known—that 1847 was passed without any uneasiness greater than would arise from the helplessness of their situation, and the fear of being run over; it may even have given them hope of liberation in 1848; that passed, the winter 1848-9 would be a period of deep anxiety, and when the summer came without their being extricated, there is little doubt but they abandoned the ships—under what arrangements we can only infer. One party, no doubt, took the direction of Beechey Island, and this will account for the conjecture of a second visit there; but may not this party be further traced in the subsequent ramour of white men to the north-west of Hogarth's Sound? * One party may have gone down Prince of Wales' Strait, or a large one in a south-east direction, through the strait we have shown exists towards Victoria Strait, and there dividing, one went east towards Back River, the other west to the Mackenzie. That a party did reach Point Warren there is little doubt; one was killed and the others went inland; what became of them? The Back River party we have the Esquimaux report of, and unhappily not satisfactory. How is it we have no visit of any of our hapless countrymen to Fury Beach? To say, they could not afford time to visit it, if they passed down Peel's Sound, does not satisfy the question. We cannot clear the mystery unless we suppose the ships to have been crushed or abandoned at the bottom of Melville Sound, and that no attempt was made to retreat *vid* Barrow's Strait, or, if made, that the party did not reach it. This part of the subject is as inexplicable as that we should have sent an expedition to Melville Sound, and when missing, not seek there to find it.

The question now forces itself upon us, Have all perished? We are amongst those who think that some of the young and hardy may be

* See the *Weekly Times*, September 21, 1856.

still alive; may have received shelter and become acclimatized with the wandering Esquimaux. We do not stand alone in this opinion; there are eminent authorities who still think it possible. "It is not within the power of man to say they are dead," nor is "it right to do so." A sufficiency of food is imperative, but it is not essential to an Englishman's existence that it should be of the same description he has at home; the food of the Esquimaux sustains and extends his life to the ordinary period, equally with that of the European under more southern climates. By all accounts, and a host might be quoted, animal life, so far from being scarce, is abundant: but that is only for a season, and care is required in boarding it up for the winter: of course, there are particular situations, soils, and rocks, that are not favourable to vegetation, and there it would be madness to expect to find the musk ox, deer, &c. The sea and the lakes afford their supply, and in no stinted measure. Taking, then, into consideration all that has been said as to the want of animal life in these regions, we are still of opinion, that human life may be sustained there by adopting the cunning experience of the Esquimaux in hunting and fishing, aided by the skill, and husbanded by the provident habits, of the European. Small parties are more likely to obtain subsistence than large, yet Capt. Collinson speaks of a tribe at Cambridge Bay as amounting to more than 200.

One opinion has been started, which, of all others, is the most important; it has been said an Arctic climate is inimical to the European constitution: and yet, on the first view, it would not appear to be so; considering the generally robust health enjoyed by our Arctic crews, exhausted often by over-exertion, exposure, and long travel. The late Earl of Ellesmere, in his anniversary address (1855), as President of the Royal Geographical Society, quoting the veteran authority of the late Rev. Dr. Scoresby, says, "One remark I cannot help borrowing from him, that, putting out of the question the loss of Franklin's Expedition, 'the rate of mortality on board some fifty-six vessels employed in thirty-eight years, has not exceeded, and, taking individual instances, has been far below, that of seafaring men lying in our own harbours.'"^{*} We have two remarkable illustrations as to the effects of food in the late expeditions. Capts. Kellett and Collinson, under generous and sufficient diet, brought their crews home in excellent health, while Capt. Sir. R. McClure and the late lamented Dr. Kane, from the inability to allow

^{*} See "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1855," vol. 25, p. 124.

sufficient nourishing food, their men became reduced to a deplorable state from the fatal effects of scurvy and other diseases. It seems active, cheerful employment is preservative of health, even at a low temperature, while indolent habits and despondent feelings induce disease.* In all these cases, hard work and exposure had alike been undergone. †Others say, prolonged stay in the Arctic regions, even under favourable circumstances, destroys the constitution. We presume not to venture an opinion, but the three following instances of lengthened sojourn there may be quoted; others might be given. The well-known missionary, Hans Egede, lived twenty-five years in Greenland. Capt. (now Major-General) Sabine, in a letter to the President of the Royal Society, incidentally mentions a Mr. Sharostin, a Russian, who had passed thirty-nine winters on Spitzbergen, and resided there for seventeen years without having once left the island.‡ The Governor of Greenland, in 1854, had been there twenty-nine years. § Seeing, then, there is reasonable probability that some of the unfortunate crews of the *Erebus* and *Terror* may still survive, the imagination shrinks, is shocked, at the barbarous thought of forsaking them. All that is good, just, and humane, pleads for those who cannot make their voices heard at home. England sent them forth to solve a Great Problem, in which she had identified herself and the chivalrous exertions of her sons for three centuries; nations looked on and admired her mighty efforts, her persevering constancy, and her heroic daring. Her conduct created a world-wide interest; shall it be said of her, then, that, in the end, when those whom she sent on the glorious but perilous mission returned not, but remained unrecovered through misdirected effort—shall it be said, when led by their spirit, those who sought them solved the Great Question in the pursuit, and that then, without proof, she pronounced them dead and deserted them? O let not this shame fall on England!

* We are indebted to Captain Collinson for the subjoined note of the average number on the sick list on board H.M.S. *Enterprise*, during the years she was in the Arctic regions. Latitudes between 68° and 73°:—

From June, 1851, to June, 1852,	average number,	3·35,	or, per cent.,	5·5
„ 1852, „ 1853,	„	3·62,	„	6·0
„ 1853, „ 1854,	„	3·48,	„	5·85

Total number of days in the ice, 1,164. Total average per cent., 5·78.

† See "A Voyage to the North Pole." By the late Admiral Beechey, p. 349.

‡ See Blue Book, "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1855," p. 3.

CHAPTER XVIII.

HAS ALL BEEN DONE THAT CAN BE DONE?—DR. KING'S PLAN—MR. FINDLAY'S OPINION—CAPT. BECHER'S REFLECTIONS—LADY FRANKLIN—DR. KANE'S OPINIONS—CAPT. RICHARDS'S PLAN—MEMORIAL TO LORD PALMERSTON—LORD WROTTESELEY—LIEUTENANT PIM'S PLAN—DR. KING AND LIEUTENANT PIM'S UNITED PLANS—CLOSE OF YEAR 1856.

WE come to the second question, Has all been done that can be done? This question involves the nation's honour. While that space, Melville Sound, through which Franklin and his companions were directed to push their way to accomplish the great object of their voyage remains unsearched, all that can be done has not been done. What efforts will be made to clear the gloom and unfold the fate of our deeply-lamented countrymen, pursuing the sad subject we follow to the end. The fatal news of Rae, and the relinquishment of the search at a time when the clue having been furnished, it was most important that it should be continued, confounded, prostrated for the moment—it was but for a moment; the widow was stricken but lived, and men there were, too, who still thought and felt, and, however afflicting the intelligence received, however cold and repulsive, those on whom particularly devolved the guardianship of our lost sailors, still seeing that nothing certain was known as to the fate of the Franklin Expedition as a whole, they resolved still to persist to "do unto others as they would others should do unto them," they could not believe that all had perished; and until the fact was placed beyond doubt, they could not rest satisfied that all had been done that should be done. Various publications, tending to prove that Sir John Franklin followed his Instructions, thus vindicating that good man from absurd "intentions" opposed to them, arose. Offers of service and plans of search followed; these we will record; but, before doing so, would notice the new ideas that had sprung up. Strange as it may appear, and notwithstanding the severe lesson we had been taught, the mania in favour of the north had no sooner passed away than conjecture (as usual, without proof) rushed heedlessly on to the south, and fixed her restless wanderings in Peel's Sound; through

this doubtful sound she traced the course of the Franklin Expedition, and in its vicinity the scene of its catastrophe. Melville Sound still remained as though it had never been the prominent feature of the original plan. Fortunately, circumstances combined in our favour; the prognosticated horrors of Melville Sound were neutralized by the easiness of approach of Regent's Inlet, or again disappointing results might have followed. The complete search of the one will accomplish all that remains as necessary to be examined of the other. The space is limited, and apparently accessible by Bellot's Strait for boats, if not for a vessel; therefore we have renewed hope.

January 21st, 1856, Dr. Richard King* again addressed the Admiralty, offering, for the fifth time, to lead a party down the Great Fish River, to examine the *cache* he constructed on Montreal Island, under the name of "King Cache," when he was there with Sir George Back in 1834. Dr. King says the existence of his *cache* was known to Franklin, and it is his "firm belief that he, or the leading survivor of the Expedition, crossed over from Point Ogle for the purpose of searching this *cache*, and of depositing there a record of his visit. . . . The fact that no papers were found in the hands of the Esquimaux is in itself strong presumption that the records of the Expedition had been deposited in a place of safety." He adds, "In all human probability a history of the Franklin Expedition still lies buried in my *cache* beneath the rocky shores of Montreal Island, and that it is within the bounds of probability that this record may be recovered." It seems scarcely probable that thirty-five or forty men should linger and die of starvation without placing their books and papers *en cache*, unless, taken by surprise and cut off, they had not time to do it, or having deposited them, it had been discovered and pillaged by the natives.

The Admiralty, January 28th, "acquaint Dr. King that they do not think it advisable to undertake such an expedition."

January 8th, 1856, a very interesting paper, "On the Probable Course Pursued by Sir John Franklin,"† by A. G. Findlay, Esq., was read before the Royal Geographical Society. The object of this paper is to show that Sir John Franklin, following his Instructions,

* See "Further Papers relative to the Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1856," p. 31.

† See "Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 1856," vol. 26, p. 26, *et seq.* also, the Appendix to the above Paper, March 21, 1857, see pp. 4-6; also, "Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society," No. 1, p. 21; and a paper by Captain Irmingær, of the Danish Navy, "The Arctic Current around Greenland," Royal Geographical Society's Journal, 1856, vol. 26, p. 36.

entered Melville Sound, and there became imbedded in the pack, as did Captain Kellett in the *Resolute* (1854), and that, under the influence of the persistent easterly current, the *Erebus* and *Terror*, like the *Resolute*, drifted down Barrow's Strait into Baffin's Bay, down Davis's Strait, and were the two ships seen by the *Renovation* in the ice-floe off Newfoundland in 1851. The arguments are too numerous and extended for us to repeat here by which this conclusion is come to, but we may notice the chief. Referring to a paper read by the author before the British Association at Liverpool, he says, "It was there shown that the warm waters of the equatorial regions passed to the north-eastward, round by the North Cape of Europe, along the northern face of Siberia, and thence on to the archipelago which lies on the north-east coast of America, pouring into Baffin's Bay by the various channels from a north-western direction; another portion passing north of Greenland, and then southward along its eastern coast round Cape Farewell, and afterwards, meeting the Baffin's Bay current, forming the Labrador current, down to and over the Newfoundland Banks to beneath the Gulf Stream. . . The certain inference was," he adds, "that whatever is floatable in the so-called Arctic Basin must, at some period or in some form, pass out" to the southward, or be drifted on to its shores. Having shown the direction and influence of the currents, he then notices the drifting fragments found by Rae, Collinson, Penny, and Goodsir, to prove there is not in them any evidence that the *Erebus* and *Terror* "have met with any fatal disaster;" and then, in the explorations that have been made, that the ships were not detained on the shores of Peel's Sound, or on the north or the south-west coasts of Prince of Wales' Land, or that they proceeded south-east out of Melville Sound (?). He then notices the report and sketch of the Esquimaux at Pond's Bay of four ships in the ice, looks on the two easternmost as Sir James Ross's at Port Leopold, from being in an inclosed space, and the two with their topmasts struck as Franklin's, more to the westward; notes the severe seasons, 1848 and 1849, and the consequent slow drift, and also the state of the ice in Wellington Channel, the absence of traces, &c., and says, "In any case it may be asserted they ultimately reached Melville Sound;" he points to the improbability of their being in Victoria Strait, or Peel's Sound, or Regent's Inlet, and observes, "Of the ships themselves not the slightest vestige has been found, which may be referred to their destruction." He then remarks on the two ships seen on the ice-floe, and the credibility of the report, from authorities, and the possibility of the occurrence; the perfect consistency of such an appearance with phy-

sical phenomena, and then gives numerous examples to prove the fact of drift, route, and rate, and applying these data to the ice-borne ships, and taking the slowest and the quickest rate of drift, he places the *Erebus* and *Terror* in Melville Sound, and that they may have passed unobserved down Barrow's Strait *after* Sir James Ross's departure, and *before* the arrival of Captain (Admiral) Austin's Expedition.

March, 1856.—At this time a very excellent paper, "Reflections on Sir John Franklin's Expedition, and where his Ships were most probably Beset in the Ice," by Captain Becher, R.N.,* appeared in the "Nautical Magazine."† After noticing the entire want of success of our searching expeditions, the author says: "A strange fatality has followed them. We have been unable to succour them in their distress; and no sooner was the search relinquished, . . . than a sudden light was thrown on the subject by the relics" (Dr. Rae's) "that were brought to us, showing us too plainly *where the search had not been made!*" He says: "Let us try to trace them. . . . The materials . . . are not new. . . . They have been before us from the commencement, but they have been rejected and unheeded, because they were unconnected and not likely; besides, they came from Esquimaux, who are looked on as no high authority! Yet these reports—considered in connection with the expressions of Franklin, the expressed opinions of the highest authorities on Arctic matters generally, the vestiges of wreck and the relics of the party that have been found—become consistent, and contribute to form a mass of evidence, showing *the probability of Franklin's unhappy position that could scarcely have been expected.*" The author then, noticing their arrival at Beechey Island, says, "The advocates of the Wellington Channel route have concluded, that as soon as possible the ships passed that way, and thence into the Polar Sea. But in support of this view not one atom of evidence has been found in all the search that has been made. . . . There is, however, certain *circumstantial evidence* . . . that renders it more than probable that Sir John Franklin *did adopt the route to the south-west*, and had long been in a position from whence no tidings could be obtained of him;—that while he has been sought for on the shores of the north he has been in the south, irrevocably fixed in the ice." He then notices Dr. King's plan, Sir James Ross's failure and the two precious years lost, then Captain (Admiral) Austin's Expedition and

* Author of "The Landfall of Columbus," &c., &c.

† See the number for March, 1856, pp. 121—147, with Map.

extraordinary conclusions, and Sir Edward Belcher's, "like all the rest," leaving us "in our ignorance, hoping for the best and fearing the worst." Captain Fitzjames's letter of May 7th, showing Franklin's expectations in the direction of the American coast, is next noticed. Captain Becher then refers to the rumours and reports of "noises like distant thunder" in 1845 and 1846; the Peel River report of white men east of the Mackenzie, 1847; the reported tragedy on the Ko-pak, 1848; the Esquimaux sketch and story of the four ships in the ice, 1849; Adam Beck's tale, 1850; and says, "These stories derive from each other much probability of truth; in point of time, and of ships beset in the ice, they agree;" he combats the idea of the Esquimaux being a harmless race, and points to facts; and, after noticing an observation of Lieutenant Le Viscomte's, "that they should abandon the ships, and try for the Passage with the boats," he leaves the rumours and reports, "which," he says, "have not proved so barren as they have been considered, for they bear out each other's truth," and turns to the vestiges and relics. In treating of the former he says, "Our probability began to assume the character of certainty; but in the relics . . . there is no mistake." Those found "at Beechey Island, at the entrance of Wellington Channel, where lay that *ignis fatuus* which attracted attention towards the barren north from the first point of Franklin's orders, the south-west," are first noticed; then those of Rae's, 1851, and Collinson's, 1853, and lastly those of Rae's, 1854. "We learnt from them," says Captain Becher, referring to the latter, "for the first time that we had been seeking Franklin where he had never been; . . . that we had looked for his ships everywhere except in *the right place*; and that we did not even know the coast by which he must have passed to arrive at the mouth of Back River."

We agree with him: "It is a humiliating and sad reflection to consider the care and pains thrown away in the north that should have been directed to the south." Captain Becher then refers to the nearest positions attained by Osborn and Wynniett, the former on Prince of Wales' Land, and the latter on Prince Albert's Land, and says, "Whether these are separated by a *strait* . . . we know not. But at this moment this is more worth knowing than all the discoveries of the north, for it would solve the question whether Franklin's party could have passed that way or not?" Great, indeed, is the importance involved in the solution of this question, for in it is contained the secret of the mystery enveloping the gallant crews of the *Erebus* and *Terror*. Apropos, we do not find that the talented author

of this paper attempts to trace the source whence these relics came, whether from the north or north-west. He seems to favour the north, *vid* the supposed passage south out of Peel's Sound. If so, in this, with every deference to one so well acquainted with the subject, we think he errs. It will be seen, from various reasons we have given, that it is far more probable that they came from the north-west. We are led to make this observation because, as Captain Becher justly observes on the subject, "there were certain features of it necessary to be considered; for although they are apparently unimportant, they derive value from being placed in connection with each other. . . . Nothing is advanced for which there is not abundant authority; and the inevitable conclusion to which we are led is, that in Melville Sound . . . it is most probable Franklin's ships were hampered in the ice." In concluding the notice of this very valuable paper, we ask, with the author, "Shall the blank" (unexplored) "remain, as the only blot to tarnish our glory? . . . A part sacred to the memory of her gallant sons. . . . Could England not make one final effort?"*

April 12, 1856,† Lady Franklin, in a letter addressed to the Admiralty, strongly urged the necessity for a further search. She says: "It is due to a set of men who have solved the problem of centuries by the sacrifice of their lives;" and concludes, "The best tribute that could be paid to the first and only martyrs to the great Arctic discoveries of the present century would be a national and final expedition for this holy purpose. . . . Then may England feel that she is relieved of her responsibilities, and can close with honour one of the noblest episodes in her naval history." This letter had no reply.‡

May 9, 1856, Lady Franklin forwarded the copy of a letter to the Admiralty from Dr. Kane to Henry Grinnell, Esq.,§ in which that celebrated traveller and Arctic explorer gives his opinion as to the present position of the Arctic question: "In my opinion the vessels cannot have been suddenly destroyed, or at least so destroyed that provisions, &c., could not have been established in a safe . . . depot." Dr. Kane goes into the question as to the probability of any of the crews of the

* Observations on this Paper appeared in the "Nautical Magazine" for May, 1856, p. 284, by the late Sir John Ross; but we do not see anything in them subversive of the views entertained by Captain Becher.

† See "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1856," p. 63.

‡ See "Letter to Viscount Palmerston," by Lady Franklin, Pamphlet, p. 1, and Appendix, p. 29.

§ See "Further Papers Relative to Recent Arctic Expeditions, 1856," p. 64.

Erebus and *Terror* being alive, and says, "If the natives reached the seat of the missing ships, . . . and there became possessed, by pilfer or by barter, of the articles sent home by Rae and Anderson, this very fact would explain the ability of some of the party to sustain life among them." If from the boat, and not the ships, the "stores or ships are unmolested," and some may have been able, by these and the hunt, even yet to sustain life. In either case, he thinks, some may be yet alive. "The question as to the position of the lost ships or their remains," he says, "is no longer a vague one. The lines of retreat by boat, as determined by Rae and Anderson, when combined by the information of Collinson at Gateshead Island in 1852, Osborn and Wynniett and Ommaney in 1851, and Ross and Kennedy on the North Somerset coasts, seem to point to a narrow and circumscribed area within which must be the missing ships or their remains. The thing, to a practical mind, is not to be mistaken. How else came a party from the northward at Montreal Island? Whence else could they have issued? . . . Peel's Sound is unknown to our actual observation south of Bellot Strait. . . . Of the ice around King William's Land nothing is really known. . . . By dogs, the great blessing of Arctic travel, the whole area could be scoured." From the above observations of Dr. Kane, he considers the *Erebus* and *Terror* or their remains to be in that blank area we have already noticed as existing between King William's Land, Osborn and Wynniett's farthest, and Peel's Sound; but again we ask the question, *How did they get there? Not through Peel's Sound: it is closed. But assuming it open, what inducement for going down it, in 1845 altogether unknown, and to appearance narrow, when he was directed to the southwest of Cape Walker, over the wide space between it and Banks' Land? It is most improbable.* But both sides of it and of Barrow's Strait have been searched and no traces found. It is closed, and there ends it. *Not by Bellot's Strait, or we should have heard of them at Fury Beach. Whence then? We have already shown, viz., by the strait indicated as issuing from Melville Sound. We have no evidence that the ships came from the northward, and were wrecked in this circumscribed area. We do not think they were; but if they were, they issued from the west through this strait.* We cordially agree with Dr. Kane's closing observation: "*Their locality is absolutely surrounded by searchers, yet by some inscrutable fatality the scene of the tragedy has never been reached!*" Sad as true, and strange as sad. "Providence rules, but man alone misrules."

June 23rd, 1856, a letter was read at the evening meeting of the

Royal Geographical Society* from Capt. Richards, R.N. (late of Sir Edward Belcher's Expedition), on the expediency of despatching a vessel at once in search of the relics of the *Erebus* and *Terror*. Capt. Richards says: "I think either of the three routes might be adopted—one to King William's Land by Beliring's Strait, as proposed by Capt. Collinson; another, through Hudson's Strait to Repulse Bay; and a third, through Lancaster Sound to Peel Channel (Sound?) or Prince Regent's Inlet. Capt. Richards gives the preference to the last, "as no vessel has reached Capt. Collinson's farthest in one season, and to do it in two would expend the resources, and render the people unfit for searching by sledges." He proposes a screw vessel to proceed down Peel Channel, as far as possible; but should it be impracticable (which, he says, he does not believe), then put the ship into the neighbourhood of Brentford Bay; from thence commence travelling operations. Both sides of Peel Channel, as high as King William's Land and Gateshead Island, must be explored; if the ships or their wrecks are not found, continue the search to Montreal Island. . . . Another portion will yet remain to be examined. Between Osborn and Wynniatt's farthest there is a space of sixty miles (120 or 130); *this may be a strait*; . . . it is possible that Franklin may have passed to the south-west of Cape Walker, . . . and been blocked up here;" he concludes, "There is a conviction in my mind, amounting to certainty, that the fate of Franklin would be solved, and the remains of his ships found." The recommendations conveyed in this letter are in the right direction; but we think Peel Sound is to be avoided, notwithstanding Capt. Richards's incredulity. If we at home are to credit as facts what our Arctic explorers tell us, we must believe Peel Channel is a sound, there is no passage to the southward. Brentford Bay, as proposed, is far more eligible, if it can be reached without the chance of being locked up. The points recommended for search are all excellent; especially the strait he speaks of so doubtingly, but of the existence of which we have no doubt (see *ante*, p. 366), for we think it not only "possible that Franklin . . . passed to the south-west of Cape Walker," but feel convinced that he did, and further, that he never attempted the north at all. We therefore heartily join with this talented officer in thinking that in or about there "the fate of Franklin would be solved."

At the meeting just noticed, Sir Roderick I. Murchison read a

* See "Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, 1856," No. iv., p. 94; also, "Notice on the late Arctic Expeditions," by Capt. Sherard Osborn, R.N., *ibid.*, p. 104.

memorial addressed to Lord Palmerston, June 5th, 1856, urging another expedition on the following grounds,—“The memorialists’ belief that . . . the missing ships, . . . or their remains, are still frozen up at no great distance from the spot whence certain relics of Sir John Franklin and his crews were obtained by Dr. Rae,” and “the desirableness of sending out an expedition to satisfy the honour of the country and clear up a mystery which has excited the sympathy of the civilized world;” the belief held by eminent men here and in America that some may yet survive. And alluding to the late expedition under Mr. Anderson, the memorialists observe, “No land expedition down the Back River . . . can satisfactorily accomplish the end . . . in view; . . . such a search as can alone be . . . thoroughly accomplished by the crew of a man-of-war.” The routes of search are then indicated, by Behring’s Strait along the coast of America—Regent Inlet, Peel Sound, or across Repulse Bay, and the “narrow and circumscribed area” to be searched; concluding, “We earnestly pray that it may not be left to the efforts of individuals of another and kindred nation already so distinguished in this cause, nor yet to the noble-minded widow of our lamented friend, to make an endeavour which can be so much more effectively carried out by the British Government.” This memorial was signed by thirty-five eminent scientific men, and would have been by many officers of the Royal Navy, who had been employed on the search after Franklin, but that they were absent from London.

This memorial was most ably supported by Lord Wrottesley in the House of Lords,* in asking “if Her Majesty’s Government had returned any answer to it,” though we must think that the area mentioned for search in his Lordship’s speech, *i. e.*, between the meridians 95° and 100° W., not sufficiently extended westward. Lord Stanley of Alderley replied, “The head of the Admiralty was of opinion it was much too late that season, but “was fully disposed to take into his most serious consideration, whether it might be desirable to do so. As long as any hope remained of rescuing our brave countrymen, . . . strong reasons might be urged for fitting out another expedition; but when the only object was the obtaining details and information, it was matter for grave consideration before the Government undertook such responsibility.”

November 24th, 1856, Lieutenant Pim, in a paper read before the Royal Geographical Society, proposed a “Plan for further Search

* See the *Times*, July 19th, 1856; see also, Lord Wrottesley’s Anniversary Address to the Royal Society, December 1, 1856.

after the Remains of the Franklin Expedition."* He said, "as a decisive clue of the missing Expedition had been obtained in the relics purchased by Dr. Ræe from the Esquimaux, . . . it was natural to look for the solution of the mystery to the locality of King William's Land; . . . he denied the existence of any evidence to prove the party had perished, since no vestige of human remains had been found. . . . The scheme he proposed was that a screw steamer . . . should penetrate as far down Peel's Sound as possible, . . . and, assisted by dogs, . . . extend the search down both sides the sound. . . . Another vessel should push through Behring's Strait, and winter at King William's Land; and a third party should descend the Great Fish River." Lieutenant Pim thought the Esquimaux were, beyond doubt, *the depositories of the Franklin secret*. Sir E. I. Murchison said he "had the honour of presenting the memorial to Lord Palmerston on the subject of a renewed Arctic expedition. He was still in hopes that Her Majesty's Government would think it due to the honour of a great country like Britain not to abandon a last effort to detect the relics of the ships and probably find the log-books, &c. In the event of the Government declining to send out an expedition, he was authorized to state that that noble-minded woman Lady Franklin would." Various observations were made by members; one particularly cautioned against the adoption of Peel Sound, and gave his reasons; noticing, also, the line of retreat taken by the party said to have perished at Back River, viz., through a strait leading south-eastward from Melville Sound.

This proposition of Lieutenant Pim's called forth "a most vehement protest "from the *Times*† against the extension of any assistance from the public funds . . . to so preposterous a scheme. . . . This frantic scheme," it says;—"We are really so sick of the subject," &c.—and it might have added, "so ignorant of it too;" however, the article was met by replies from Lieutenant Pim, Capt. Collinson, and Sir Roderick I. Murchison, in which we think the *Times* felt itself "going to leeward," as the succeeding leading article was somewhat more *subdued in tone*.

December 8th, 1856,‡ a united plan of search was proposed to

* See "Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, 1857," No. vi., p. 210; see also, "An Earnest Appeal to the British Government on Behalf of the Missing Searching Expedition," by Lieutenant (now Commander) Bedford Pim, R.N., F.R.G.S.

† See the *Times*, November 27th, 28th, 29th, and December 2nd, 1856.

‡ See "An Earnest Appeal," &c., by Lieutenant B. Pim, R.N., p. 25.

the Admiralty by Dr. King and Lieutenant B. Pim, R.N. The following extract will convey the essence of it:—"We propose to make a combined effort by sea and land: by sea, through Barrow's Strait and down *Peel's Sound*; by land, across the continent of America and down Great Fish River, meeting at the Magnetic Pole. Upon the sea expedition it is proposed to use a small screw steamer, and upon the land journey, bark canoes; the time of starting on the land journey will be towards the end of February, that of the sea the end of June." We have recorded our opinions as to the prospects offered by these routes, we have no faith in either.

But the year 1856 waned, it commenced in sorrow and doubt; the *cui bono* cry, so unbecomingly and injudiciously raised when so little remained to be done, took effect in one inordinate and continued yell; still it did not daunt the humane from their feeling, or the scientific from their duty. If our ancestors had encouraged this yelping cry of the lagging, the sordid, and the cowardly; should we have known aught of the "Orient and the Occident?" or, confining ourselves to the North, of "the Hudson's Bay fur trade, the Newfoundland cod-fishery, the Davis's Strait whale-fishery, . . . and the discovery of the continent of North America,—itself pregnant with consequences beyond human calculation?"—"Are not all these" the direct results of expeditions that sailed in quest of a North-West Passage? * To these may be added the whale-fishery of Behring's Straits, the first information of which was derived from one of our Arctic expeditions, "of more value," it is said, in one of the official reports of the United States, than all the commerce with what is called the East." † We have said nothing of the advantages accruing to science, but surely these are of some value to the greatest maritime nation in the world. As to expense, the principal has been already incurred, and we cannot believe the people of England would grudge the trifle that is now required to set the matter of our forsaken countrymen at rest. We have an abomination to the cheese-paring system. The demurrage paid for the useless idling of our transports in the Black Sea, would have more than paid for expeditions from the east and the west. Regarding risk of life, this has been so often spoken of and disposed of that we need not add more than the remark, there is risk of life everywhere, at home and abroad, in all professions, trades, &c., less, perhaps, in the Arctic regions than anywhere else. We wonder such

* See "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, 1836," vol. vi., p. 38, Sir John Richardson's plan.

† *Ibid.*, 1856, vol. 26, p. ccix. The late Admiral Beechey's Anniversary Address

folks are not afraid to live on our island, lest it should be submerged; such would keep our sailors at home and burn our ships because of the risk of going aloft. The Government, it will have been seen, in its conduct rather retarded than advanced the final effort in search of our long-missing countrymen. Opinions were still strong amongst men of the highest authority, that some of them might still be alive. The late Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort says, in a letter to Capt. Collinson, "The remains of another boat must still be sought; the vestiges of separate parties will, I trust, yet be found among the Esquimaux, of men who, without the means of travelling up the Mackenzie, or of crossing to the Russian settlements, have accepted life and food at the hands of some of the native tribes." * Again, "when we reflect on the facility with which sailors adapt themselves to new habits, he must be a very incredulous person who doubts that at this moment several of our abandoned and almost forgotten countrymen are sheltering themselves in snow huts, swallowing morsels of frozen seal or walrus, and at the same time chewing the bitter cud of their country's want of gratitude, want of faith, and want of honour." † But we must conclude the year; we cannot do better than in the words of that venerable authority, Baron Alexander von Humboldt, in a letter to Lieutenant Pim: "Is it possible that, after so many generous sacrifices made by two nations of the same race, having in their possession part of the property known to belong to those victims of shipwreck; after having reduced to such a small space the country to be searched—is it possible, I repeat, that they do not add a last effort, perilous as is everything great and hazardous, for the solution of this sorrowful problem? Geography and the physical knowledge of our globe has been immensely advanced by what has been already done, but there remains a moral end to gain. There is in this enterprise an interest of sentiment and of consanguinity with those we desire to save, derived from a source far above all science, a *sentiment which ennobles and consoles at the same time*. . . The world will smile at my moral, but it is a sentiment I wish to nourish in the people of my fatherland; I have still the courage to express it." ‡

"With a new race of Hopes new efforts came."—*Abraham*.

* See Appendix to a pamphlet, "A Letter to Viscount Palmerston from Lady Franklin," p. 35.

† See "An Earnest Appeal in Behalf of the Missing Arctic Expedition," by Lieutenant Pim, p. 18.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

CHAPTER XIX.

M'CORMICK'S PLAN—MR. ROEBUCK—REPORT—MR. NAPIER—THE DECISION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS—SIR RODERICK I. MURCHISON AND THE FINAL EXPEDITION—THE "FOX," CAPT. M'CLINTOCK, SAILS—LAST NEWS—CONCLUSION.

1857.—THE morn of the new year arose—gloomy, but with it renewed Hope came. Hitherto the companion of Conjecture, she had wandered, tempting the bearers of succour and of safety to the barren North. Chance revealed the error; she now waved her "golden wand" over the neglected South, lighting up that sacred area which Reason had never left; still she was wayward.

January 6th, 1857.—A memorandum or plan was laid before the Lords of the Admiralty and the Royal Geographical Society, from Dr. M'Cormick, R.N., entitled, "Reasons for the Renewal of the Search for further traces of the Franklin Expedition," &c. The author, in developing his object, notices the "accidental discovery of the relics . . . at the mouth of the Great Fish River," and the important clue they furnish to the fate of our long-lost countrymen. The probability of finding a record of their adventures and discoveries "would," he says, "in itself justify the prosecution of a further search, were there no other reasons. . . . The relatives and friends of the lost ones, still poised between hope and despair, . . . cling naturally enough to what, I fear, must now be considered a delusive hope—that survivors will be found; a hope, nevertheless, held out, not by the inexperienced and unreflecting alone, but by those whose position and judgment give influence and weight to their opinions." He then remarks on "the area to be searched for records, . . . now reduced to . . . within the parallels of 67° and 74°, . . . and the meridians of 94° and 100°, and gives the routes by which it may be approached. After discussing the merits of each route, he says of Melville Sound, "*It is not navigable, . . . being beset with stupendous ice, . . . land low with off-lying shoals at the bottom, about fifty miles (120 or 130?) of which was not explored but supposed to be continuous. . . . Peel Sound*" was examined to lat. 73° (180 miles beyond this remains unexplored) but holds out little prospect for the passage of a ship, from the character of its ice, tide

marks, &c.; but "would be favourable for sledging over." Regent's Inlet "appears to him the most promising of all the avenues of approach to the area of search." He therefore suggests, "a small vessel . . . should proceed down that inlet as far as Brentford Bay, and the vessel being secured, a boat and sledge party pass at once through the Strait of Bellot, explore the coast of Boothia down to the Magnetic Pole, from thence, crossing over to Cape Felix, circumnavigate the shores of King William's Land by boat or sledge." He adds, "Within the area to be searched for records, I do not, for one moment, expect to find either the *Erebus* or *Terror*. I should just as soon look for them at the South Pole as King William's Land. I am nevertheless fully aware that this is by no means the general impression." Dr. M'Cormick asks how these ships got there? "If Peel and Melville Sounds are never navigable, through what channel could the ships have passed? unless they have anticipated the discovery of the North-West Passago by penetrating Prince of Wales' Strait. He then inquires, "What were they doing during the interval of four years, unaccounted for, from their departure . . . from Beechey Island to the discovery of the relics at the mouth of the Great Fish River? Is it possible that, in any position these ships could have been placed in, *south of Barrow's Strait*, . . . four years would have been allowed to elapse without an attempt to communicate with the Hudson's Bay Company's settlements? and if such an attempt had been made, can we reasonably suppose . . . not one should have succeeded?" He thinks "*it is more than ever probable that Franklin, . . . finding himself baffled in all his attempts to penetrate to the southward and westward, attempted the second course pointed out in his Instructions—the Wellington Channel*, and that the forty men came down that channel, and revisiting Beechey Island, found the boat and *cache* left there as a precautionary measure by Franklin in case of disaster to his ships." The tent-circles at Cape Riley, he thinks, were not a magnetic observatory, but "the temporary encampment of a travelling party, watching for a favourable opportunity of crossing Barrow's Strait. . . . *Regent's Inlet and Peel's Sound, being equi-distant, would either of them lead to the Great Fish River.*" He concludes: "Such an expedition as proposed *via* Bellot's Strait, in conjunction with an overland one down the Great Fish River, appears to combine the elements of success," and volunteers to conduct it. Our remarks must be few, having already noticed the *route proposed as good; but the search, to be exhaustive, should be carried by the channel we have indicated to the*

bottom of Melville Sound to 110° W., i. e., to the corrected eastern limit of Wynniatt's, and on to Osborn's farthest west, including both sides of the channel. Our present knowledge that "Melville Sound is not navigable," is no proof that Franklin did not attempt to get down it. We think he did, and hence his long detention. This was foretold, but not guarded against. And hence the difficulty of tracing his retreating parties. That a party was sent to Beechey Island seems probable; but if they reached there, how is it they left no record? Another may have been sent by Prince of Wales's Strait to the Mackenzie; we know one was reported to the north of King William's Land. The fate of all these is a mystery; but may they not be traced in the rumours about the Mackenzie, at Hogarth Inlet, and at Montreal Island? We do not think Franklin ever attempted the north by any route. As to the boat and cache left at Beechey Island, it is a supposition founded on the assumption that he went up Wellington Channel, which we think he did not, because we have no proof. Regent's Inlet and Peel's Sound are about equi-distant from Cape Riley, and therefore is it the more surprising that it should be supposed that Peel's Sound was adopted for retreat and succour, when Fury Beach was so near at hand. We cannot see what object the party could have in adopting that route which could not be better accomplished by Regent's Inlet. The fact is, the party traced to Montreal Island did not come down Peel's Sound—much less is it probable that the ships did—but came from the north-west, out of Melville Sound, and were forced, by the trending of the land, in the direction of the Great Fish River. They never intended to ascend it, knowing its utter destitution of animal life, and its obstacles; but when there, their desire would be to reach Regent's Inlet and ascend it, or to cross Repulse Bay or Wager River, to the settlements of the Hudson's Bay Company. As to an expedition down that river, we think it utterly useless, as on arriving at its mouth the party would be in a position rather requiring aid than enabled to give it.

February 9th, 1857, Mr. Roebuck, in the House of Commons, asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether the Government intended to send out another expedition in search of Sir John Franklin, and if they did, whether they would adopt a plan which had been suggested to the Admiralty, of fitting out a small screw steamer to the Great Fish River, and whether they intended to despatch it as early as the 1st of March? Sir Charles Wood said, The Committee who had sat last year on the Navy had recommended—in which he concurred—that expeditions of this kind should not be sent with-

out an estimate of the expense being laid on the table, and they had not yet decided whether an estimate would be presented for the purpose or not.*

February 14th, 1857, a letter appeared in the *Times* from Captain S. Osborn,† inclosing an extract from a letter, dated Red River Settlement, Hudson's Bay Territory, to the effect that an express had been sent to Sir George Simpson from Mr. Anderson, in Mackenzie River district, "stating that Indians had brought over reports to one of the trading posts in that quarter, that Indians had seen two or more encampments of whites on an island on some point where Anderson and Stewart turned back (1855), and that one was quite fresh, supposed to have been abandoned a day or two before the Indians saw it; and, from the traces, thought there might have been about ten or twelve men." Sir George Simpson and Mr. Smith, secretary of the Hudson's Bay Company, denied the truth of these reports, and a controversy ensued, in which Dr. King and Mr. Isbester took part. The impression left was, that the Esquimaux were in possession of information as to the fate of the Franklin Expedition.

The belief was general about this time that the Government would send out an expedition to search the narrow field yet unexamined, that is, from Peel's Sound to the southward to King William's Land and Montreal Island; but it seems from what follows, the Government never had any such intention. February 25, Mr. Napier (M.P. for Dublin) called the attention of the House of Commons "to the communications with Her Majesty's Government respecting the Franklin Expedition, and the urgent motive of the claim for a further and complete search." The honourable gentleman made a *powerful appeal in favour of a final expedition*, in which he was supported by Capt. Scobell, Mr. Lindsay, Mr. M. Milnes, Mr. Whiteside, and Mr. W. J. Fox, and opposed by Sir Charles Wood, who concluded his observations by saying, "He was most unwilling to incur any fresh responsibility with regard to that expedition, and was obliged to say that Her Majesty's Government could not give any encouragement to the proposal to send out another expedition." In this conclusion he was joined by Admirals Walcott and Berkeley, Mr. E. Denison, and Colonel Freestun. The motion was withdrawn. In looking carefully over the speeches made on this occasion, we think the arguments raised against the proposition are not at all equal in force to the powerful reasons urged in its favour. We do not see any

* See the *Times*, February 10, 1857. † *Ibid.*, February 14, 16, 17, 18, & 20.

reference made to the original Plan and Instructions given to Franklin, nor is anything said of the erroneous opinions formed, and of the misdirection given to the searching squadrons, from which has resulted the failure of every effort that has been made to trace and to restore the missing Expedition. Surely now was the time, when we had the clue, and the search was confined to such a limited area, that, abnegating former errors, every exertion should have been made to clear the mystery which baseless conjecture and flighty imagination had created. However, although without proof that the Expedition was lost, or that the crews had succumbed; although with the full knowledge of what we ought to do and ought to have known and done before, and notwithstanding the unknown space was limited, and had been neglected, that it involved no risk to the explorers, and but a bagatelle expense to the nation, still the search was abandoned—left incomplete. From this time it was vain to look for aid to the Government.

April, 1857.—It became known that Lady Franklin had resolved to make a final attempt to rescue her husband and his gallant band. It was considered "Quixotic;" but afterwards, as if in shame that the term should have been used, it was added, "but who will venture to speak with disrespect, or even with indifference, of the efforts—ay, of the desperation—of Lady Franklin in such a cause? . . . We can only say 'God speed!' to the adventurers."* For our part, seeing how the Government had acted, searching altogether in a wrong direction in the first instance, and only called to the right one when chance had fortuitously revealed a tale of misery and calamity too painful to dwell on; seeing that the search was now abandoned, left unsatisfactory, because incomplete;—seeing all this, we cannot but admire the exalted feelings and constant perseverance of this noble-minded British lady, who from a sense of duty alone, regardless of all the world might choose to think or say, resolves to persist to the end, determining to penetrate the gloom herself, and clear the sad doubt existing as to the fate of her lost husband and his devoted companions. Well and truly was it said, "*So long as the name of Franklin shall be bright in the annals of British heroism will the unceasing devotion and energy of his widow be with it remembered and honoured.*" †

April 27th, 1857, ‡ Sir Roderick I. Murchison, President, an-

* See *Times*, April 15, 1857.

† The Anniversary Address of the late Earl Ellesmere to the Royal Geographical Society, vol. 25, p. lxxviii.

‡ See "Proceedings of Royal Geographical Society, 1857," No. ix., p. 1.

nounced to the Fellows of the Royal Geographical Society that the subscription list in aid of the expedition for the search of the Franklin relics (towards which £800 had already been subscribed) would be shortly advertised.

April 29th, the advertisement* appeared, headed "Lady Franklin's Final Search." After some preliminary observations, in which are noticed the Government's decision, and refusal to lend the Arctic ship *Resolute*, presented by the American nation to our Queen, and the gift of such stores as are available for this special service, it says:—"We hold to the opinion that it is the duty of Englishmen to examine that limited area whence the traces of our missing countrymen were derived, which, though it lies to the south of well searched tracts, and has been approached by vessels that returned without loss, has never yet been explored. Supported by the advice of those experienced Arctic seamen, in whom she has every reason to confide, Lady Franklin makes this last effort to clear away the mystery that shrouds the fate of her husband and his crews, and possibly to rescue from their isolated icy abode among the Esquimaux some of his younger companions, who may still be prolonging a dreary existence. On such an occasion we, whose names are hereunto subscribed, feel confident that this our appeal will not remain unanswered by the British people, who will, we doubt not, tender to the widow of the illustrious navigator that sympathy which his fame and her devotion must call forth, and will aid her in carrying out an enterprise involving, as we believe, the honour of the nation." This appeal was signed by Sir Roderick I. Murchison, the late Admiral Sir F. Beaufort, Lord Wrottesley, Major-General Sabine, Robert Brown, Esq., Capt. Collinson, R.N., and John Barrow, Esq. A list of subscriptions follows. Among the subscribers to this noble cause we ought to mention Capt. Allen Young, of the Merchant Service, who had commanded large ships, and made many distant voyages. He not only volunteered his services, but generously contributed £500, to be permitted to accompany the expedition.†

The steam yacht *For* was purchased, and the command given to Capt. M'Clintock, R.N., an officer already distinguished for his talents as an Arctic explorer, and his extraordinary journeys while serving in Austin's Expedition, and also while in command of the steam

* See *Sun*, April 30, 1857.

† This noble-spirited gentleman thus writes to Capt. Collinson:—"I will receive no pay if it is to come from Lady Franklin's resources, and I will only receive it if Her Majesty's Government recognize our expedition."

tender in Capt. Kellett's division of Sir Edward Belcher's Expedition. A better choice could not have been made. We are not aware of the exact instructions given to Capt. Mc'Clintock, but the general nature of them may be inferred from a letter (of May 13th) from that officer to the chairman of the Liverpool Shipowners' Association :*—"I intend to proceed to Barrow's Straits, ascertain that the provisions, stores, and boats left at Port Leopold and Beechey Island by the recent searching expeditions are in good order, in the event of my having to fall back upon them; examine the state of the ice in Peel's Strait, and, if practicable, proceed down it into the *unknown area*.† Should I not succeed here, I intend to return to Port Leopold, and proceed down Regent's Inlet to Bellot Strait, and there make another attempt to pass into and through the field of search to Victoria Land, where I shall winter, and in the ensuing spring, before the thaw sets in, complete the entire exploration and search by means of sledges drawn by men and by dogs. In endeavouring to reach Victoria Land, it is my intention to avoid, if possible, any risk of becoming involved in the ice; and should I not succeed in reaching Victoria Land, I will return to Bellot's Strait to pass the winter, as we know by experience that the retreat of the ship from there amounts almost to a certainty. From Victoria Land the homeward voyage is *equally certain, but by way of Behring's Strait*. . . . Almost all will be old shipmates of my own in former Arctic voyages. . . . Volunteer offers of service from officers, and seamen, and landsmen, are very numerous, and as I have already secured the very best of *matériel*, so I hope also to be fortunate with the *personnel* of the expedition. Thus, having all the means, I gladly accept the responsibility; and no efforts on my part shall be wanting to secure the accomplishment of an object so earnestly desired by the great and good of all nations."

Well manned, provisioned, and equipped, but leaving Lady Franklin, we fear, with serious liabilities, the *Fox* sailed from Aberdeen July 1st, 1857, the whole party in the highest spirits. The last intelligence from Capt. Mc'Clintock is dated from off Upernivik, August 6th, to John Barrow, Esq.‡ He says:—"We are very comfortable; our provisions are most excellent," and "I am most

* See *Times*, June 4, 1857.

† "Area to be Searched." See Map to pamphlet, "A Letter to Viscount Palmerston, K.G., from Lady Franklin," 1857.

‡ See *Times*, November 4, 1857.

fortunate in my officers and crew; all deserve my praise alike." They had obtained an Esquimaux and thirty dogs.

Thus far had progressed the "little Fox" on the "final search." We can now only rest, trusting to *Him* who guides *that star* which her commander has before invoked—"Lead Thou us on"—to bless him and the efforts of his brave little band with success. That they will "persevere to the end" we have no doubt. We do not think Capt. McClintock will be enabled to get to the southward by Peel's Sound, for reasons which we have given, but the unsearched space may be reached by Bellot Strait. We have no expectation that the remains of the ships will be found along the west coast of Boothia, but we have great hope of the search, if extended to the north-west from King William's Land to Melville Sound, and west to the 110° W., the corrected limit of Mr. Wynniett's exploration from the west. In this strait, or at the bottom of Melville Sound, upon which we have felt it our duty so confidently and so continually to dwell, and which we think was the line of route adopted by the retreating party from the Erebus and Terror, and the source of Rae's and Collinson's floating relics of the Franklin Expedition—in or about here, we think, the veil will be uplifted which hangs over the sad mystery of the north.

Having recorded, to our belief, all that has been said and done regarding the original Plan and Instructions for the unfortunate voyage, to accomplish which the lamented Franklin and Crozier, their hapless officers and crews, were despatched in 1845, and from which they have not returned; having pointed out the causes to which we owe the failure of all the attempts of our searching expeditions—we hope, with honest truthfulness, seeking no man's ill; having shown that our sailors have done their duty, that their heroic fortitude and perseverance, their enthusiasm and kindly-mindedness under privation and suffering are above all praise, we close this mournful subject, but still not without hope. It has not been proved that all are gone, and there is no reason for thinking that an Englishman cannot exist "where Esquimaux do live out a fair period of life;" we trust, therefore, to the future, and should even the present attempt fail of success, we have no doubt there will ever be manly hearts to renew the search, until the fate of these noble-minded, chivalrous Englishmen is known. Adopting the words of Sir Roderick I. Murchison,* the fast friend of the lost voyagers, "Let it be therefore impressed on the public mind, that although the area, on the southern edges of which some

* See Sir Roderick I. Murchison's Anniversary Address, Royal Geographical Society's Journal, vol. 27, p. cxciv.

of Franklin's people were last seen, has been approached, and can be easily again visited by ships, it has never yet been examined; and also, that though it be to the south of many tracts formerly penetrated, yet is it so cut off by impenetrable wilds from the nearest parts of North America in which food can be obtained, that by no exertion could any survivors of the *Erebus* and *Terror* be saved, except by sending out a well-found ship or ships to the points nearest to such insulated Esquimaux quarters. . . . May God crown their efforts with success! May M'Clintock and his companions gather the laurels they so well merit in their noble endeavour to dissipate the mystery which shrouds the fate of the *Erebus* and *Terror* and their crews!" To which we add, Amen.

APPENDIX.

At a late meeting of the Royal Geographical Society, April 12th, 1858, Dr. Norton Shaw, the Secretary, read a paper by his friend, Dr. Rink, of Copenhagen, "On the *supposed* discovery of the North Coast of Greenland and an open Polar Sea by Dr. Elisha Kent Kane, United States' Navy." The author states, that as the speculations of Dr. Kane relate to a matter—the physical geography of Greenland—which had occupied his attention for nine years, he feels called upon to subject them to a critical examination. Dr. Rink, after paying a warm tribute to the active energy and undaunted courage of Dr. Kane, who succeeded, in 1853, in gaining a somewhat higher latitude than his predecessor, Captain Inglefield, R.N.; through Smith's Sound, the continuation of Baffin's Bay, goes on to show how, in 1855, the Doctor, with his crew, were obliged to return to Upernavik for winter quarters, in consequence of the ship being frozen in the ice. With regard to the great "Humboldt glacier," discovered by Dr. Kane, and which he places on the coast of Greenland, between 79° and 80° north latitude, Dr. Rink observes that it is really nothing more than what may be noticed in the interior of most of the Greenland fiords, from the most southern to the most northern point. After explaining why Dr. Kane did not notice these peculiar ice-formations, which he attributes to the circumstance of their in general lying behind the bights, islands, and peninsulas, and to the fact of the Doctor and others, in search of the North-West Passage and of Sir John Franklin, passing too rapidly through Davis's Strait to admit of careful examination of the country, the author proceeds to discuss the second point, namely, "The open Polar Sea," *supposed* to have been discovered by Morton, the steward, and the Greenlander, Hans; throws great doubts upon the accuracy of their statements, and opposes Kane's theory of the Polar Sea, assumed to be kept open by a branch of the Gulf Stream from Nova Zembla, down Smith's Sound to Baffin's Bay. Dr. Kane, instead of

making the meridional observations the basis for the construction of his chart, had recourse to the mean between them and the dead reckoning, the latter being no less than $43' 6''$ in excess; consequently, before we assume the latitude of $80^{\circ} 52' 32''$ N. as the farthest point reached by Morton, it is but just that the distance travelled by him on the 24th should be subjected to a deduction, which will be obtained by having recourse to the amount of error occasioned in the dead reckoning between the 21st and the 23rd of June, and which will be found to amount to 21 miles in 52. The latitude of Cape Constitution will therefore be $80^{\circ} 44' N.$, instead of $81^{\circ} 22'$.

After the reading of the paper, a lengthened discussion took place, which was sustained in an animated manner by the Chairman, Sir George Back, Captain Collinson, and Dr. Armstrong, who all supported the views of the author.

May 8th, 1858, the Royal Geographical Society gave notice, that the Royal awards "For the Encouragement of Geographical Science and Discovery" would be presented to Capt. Richard Collinson, R.N., C.B., and to Professor Alexander Dallas Bache, of the United States, by the President, Sir Roderick I. Murchison, at the Society's House, 15, Whitehall Place, on May 24th, 1858.

VOYAGES AND TRAVELS TOWARDS THE NORTH POLE.

NW.—WEST OF GREENLAND.

NE.—EAST OF GREENLAND.

BS.—TOWARDS BERING'S STRAIT.

Date.	Name.	Direction.	Date.	Name.	Direction.
1486 7, 9	Cabot, John	NW	1780	Clerke and King	BS
1498	Cabot, Sebastian	NW	1784	Chisholm	BS
1500 2	Cortereels, The	NW	1784-84	Billing and Sarschef	BS
1508-05	Carters, The	NW	1784-7	Egede and Rothe	NE
1542	Coronado	NW	1784-0	Menzes	BS
1553	Willoughby	NE	1784-83	Mackenzie	NW
1565	Chancellor	NE	1798	Broughton	BS
1566	Burrough	NE	1805	Sarrafon	BS
1567-77	Zhalazner	NW	1810	Hedenström	BS
1574-83	Gilbert	NW	1814	Chappell	NW
1578	Huntington, Meyen	*	1815	Oken	NE
1580	Pet and Jackman	NE	1815-18	Kotzebue	BS
1585	Davis	NW	1817	Boschan (Deechey)	NE
1591	Barentz and Yabrand	NE	1817	Ross and Parry..	NW
1590	Ney, Cornelison	NE	1819	Parry	NW
1600	Vicenzo	NE	1819	Vasilijef and Chichef	BS
1600	Waymouth	NW	1819-22	Franklin (Richardson, Hood, Bock)	NW
1603	Cherry	NE	1820-23	Litke	NE
1605	Knight and Hall	NW	1821-5	Parry, Lyon	NW
1606	Lindanus, Godake	NE	1822-5	Wrangell, Anjou	BS
1607	Richardson	NW	1822	Seesby	NE
1607-8	Hudson	NE	1822	Suber	NE
1608-11	Poola	NW	1823	Clavering	NE
1610-11	Hudson	NW	1824	Parry	NW
1611	Mayer	NE	1825-7	Franklin (Richardson)	NW
1612	Burton	NW	1825-7	Beechey	BS
1614	Gibson	NW	1827	Parry, Crozier, Ross	BS
1614	Fatherby and Ruffin	NE	1828-31	Graah	NW
1616	Bylot and Baffin	NW	1829-31	Vahl	NE
1619	Adams	NE	1829-31	Ross	NW
1619	Munck, Jean	NW	1831-3	Black (King)	NW
1631-2	Fox and James	NW	1831-3	Trebouart	NE
1645	Dishney	BS	1835	Bock	NW
1652	Daniel, David	NE	1835	Deane and Simpson..	NW
1652	Martiniers	NE	1837	Bähr	NE
1654	Ono	NW	1837	Fabur	NE
1657	Petshkof	NE	1838-40	Wrangell	BS
1657	Grosskilar	NW	1845	Franklin, Crozier, Fitzjames, &c.	NW
1664	Gilham	NW	1849-50	Kellett (Moore)	BS
1670	Axelgen, Otto	NE	1848-9	James Ross and Bird	NW
1676	Wood and Flaves (Marton)	NE	1849	Shelden	BS
1697	Maxon	?	1849	Richardson, Rae	NW
1707	Gilles	NE	1849	Saunders	NW
1715	Murkof	NE	1849-50	Paulsen (Hoeper)	BS
1721	Egede, Hans	NW	1850	Forsyth (Snow)	NW
1722	Sveugg	NW	1850-1	Amatin, Chummaney (Cator, Osborn, M'Clintock)	NW
1724 4	Behring (Chirikof and Spangberg)	BS	1850-1	Penny, Stewart, Netherland	NW
1728	Paurs and Lasclof	NW	1850-1	Griennell's Exp. (De Haven and Kane)	NW
1735	Lutass	BS	1850-1	John Ross and Phillips	NW
1737	Murvisief and Paviof	BS	1850-3	Moore and Maguire	BS
1739	Lapstef	BS	1850-3	M'Clure (North-West Passage)	BS
1741	Middleton	NW	1851	Rae	NW
1741	Behring and Chirikof, Heller	BS	1851-2	Kennedy and Bulot	NW
1745	Novoziof	BS	1851-4	Cullinan	BS
1746	Moore and Smith	NW	1851-4	Belcher and Kellett (Osborn, M'Clintock, Meacham, Pim)	NW
1746-7	Ellis	NW	1852	Ingieuld (Sutherland)	NW
1747	Tulstyk and Vardikof	BS	1851	Rae	NW
1752	Vahl-e, P., Ohan	NE	1853, &c.	Kane (Griennell and Vesbody)	NW
1761-3	Lavachof, Okterenin, Chitchagof	BS	1854	U.S. Expedition (Hartstein)	NW
1767-8	Kerguelan, Tremarek	NW	1854	Hudson Bay Company's Expedition (Andersson and Stewart)	NW
1772	Brauin	BS	1857	M'Clintock, Allen	NW
1772	Hewne	NW			
1773	Phillips	NE			
1777	Lane	NW			
1778	Pickersgill	NW			
1778	Cook	BS			

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I N D E X.

	PAGE
Arland, Sir Thomas, his motion in House of Commons	328
Adams, Mr. opinion on Esquimaux report, 1851	231
Admiralty notice addressed to Sir Edward Parry, February, 1847	51
letter to Sir John Pelly, Bart., March, 1847	55
resolves on three expeditions to relieve Sir John Franklin, 1847	72
January 17th, 1848, resolved to send out <i>North Star</i> , under Mr. Saunders, R.N.	90
letter to secretary of Hudson's Bay Company, December, 1849	106
committee appointed by, 1851, remarks thereon	179
report of the committee, 1851, remarks thereon	196
copy of Captain Beaton's letter to Sir E. I. Murchison, forwarded February, 1852, remarks thereon	238
reported decision concerning the Franklin Expedition, 1853, remarks of the press	321
notice, January, 1854, officers of the <i>Erebus</i> and <i>Terror</i> , removal of their names from "Navy List," remarks thereon	326
letters to the Hudson's Bay Company, 1854, proposal of two overland expeditions	371
<i>Advance</i> despatched, May, 1853, under Dr. E. K. Kane, U.S.N.	281
<i>Advance</i> and <i>Rescue</i> despatched, May, 1850 (Lieutenant De Haven, U.S.N.)	151
Aksitcho	48
Aldrich, Lieutenant	184
Anderson, Mr. James, letters to Admiralty, result of expedition to the mouth of Great Fish River, 1856	402
letter to Sir George Simpson, respecting new Esquimaux reports, 1857	439
Arctic committee, remarks on replies to questions	206
report and recommendation, 1852, remarks thereon	247
<i>Assistance</i> and <i>Resolute</i> , with tenders, despatched May, 1850 (Austin and Ommaney)	150
despatched April, 1852 (Beleher and Kellett)	248
Austin, Captain H. T. memorandum issued to his officers, July, 1850	180
memorandum issued to his officers, March, 1851	181
report of his proceedings to Admiralty, 1851	185
his reply to Arctic committee, November, 1851	200
Austin, Captain H. T. and Ommaney, E. Captain, departure of, May, 1850, List: and instructions and remarks thereon	151
return, September, 1851, remarks thereon	178
report of their voyage and remarks, 1851	180
Back, Sir George	18
his expedition to the Back River	20
opinion on Sir James Ross's voyage, 1849	90

	PAGE
Bellot, Lieutenant, 1853	281
— death of	285
Bell, George	11
Bird, E. J. and Ross, Sir James, Captains, and instructions, 1848	84, 85, 86
Boothia, Gulf of	22
Bradford, Mr.	194
Bray, De	39
Brown, Lieutenant, 1851	182
Burrows, Silas E. Esq.	120
Button, Sir Thomas	11
Bylot	11
Cabot, John and Sebastian, their discoveries	4, 5
Carverright, Mr. paper read before Royal Geographical Society, November, 1854	150
Castor and Pollux River	18
Christophers, Mr. John, plan for reaching the Pole, December, 1840	107
Clayton, John M. Esq.	136
Clerke and Cook, Captains	16
Collinson, Captain, his despatches, June, 1851; communication from Captain Moore; Esquimaux reports	177
— despatches received, December, 1851	220
— extracts from his despatches, 1854, 376; remarks thereon	393
— intelligence received of, 1854	366
— his arrival, May, 1855	390
Collinson and McClure, Captains, instructions to	116
— despatches, 1850, and report; remarks	178
Cook and Clerke, Captains	16
Cooper, Lieutenant, report of his journey, 1851	230
Conrad, Mr. G. Captain of <i>Emervolia</i> , 1852	244
Cresswell, Lieutenant, return in the <i>Phoenix</i> , October, 1853, 284; reports of his journals	290, 301
Crozier, Captain	38
— removal of his name from "Navy List," with officers of <i>Arctus and Terror</i> , March, 1854	328
Dannett, Captain	40
Davis, James	11
Dawe and Simpson	18
— Messrs. journey completing the coast of America in 1807	29
Discoveries in the Arctic Regions	41
Dobbs, Mr.	16
<i>Enterprise and Investigator</i> despatched, January 20, 1850 (Collinson and McClure)	116
— June, 1848 (Ross, Sir Jas. and Bird)	87
<i>Arctus and Terror</i> , departure of, May, 1845	34
— April, 1850 (Ross, Sir John, and Phillips)	33
— probable course of Sir John Franklin's Expedition	197, 425
— McClure's Inlet, connection between	26
— notice on	81
Fitzjames, Captain	18, 38
— opinion on the North-West Passage	66
— speaks of returning by way of Siberia, &c. 1847	71
— extract from his letter, and remarks thereon	253

	PAGE
Forayth, Commander C. R.N. arrival of, October, 1850; traces discovered at Beechey Island and Point Riley; report	158
_____ and Mr. W. P. Snow, departure of, in <i>Prince Albert</i> , June, 1850, to examine Regent's Inlet; remarks thereon	156
Fotherby	11
Fox, N. W. Luke	11
<i>For</i> despatched, July, 1857 (<i>McClintock and Young</i>)	442
Franklin, Sir John, opinion and plan on North-West Passage in 1836	22
_____ expedition of 1845 organized and directed, 30; instructions, 30, 31; opinions on the plan	31, 32
_____ his instructions	36, 37
_____ character of	47
_____ letter to Admiralty, July, 1845	48
_____ his remarks on the North-West Passage and the American coast line	197
_____ removal of his name from "Navy List," with officers of <i>Erebus and Terror</i> , March, 1854	328
Franklin Expedition, plans of search reviewed	44, 45, 46
_____ remarks on the past search, opinions and probable position, contained in a letter, 1854	389
_____ general summary of the plans, opinions, and results of the past search, 1856, 406; probable course pursued	418
_____ remarks on the probability of there still being survivors	421
Franklin, Lady	38
_____ letter to Mr. Barrow, 1848	83
_____ letters to	116
_____ offers of service from United States and Canada, February, 1850	134
_____ a letter to, November, 1851	226
_____ letter to the Admiralty to renew the search, 1856	429
_____ final attempt to rescue the Franklin Expedition, 440; subscription advertisement, 1857	441
Frederick, Capt. C. Beliring's Strait Expedition, letter to the Admiralty, December, 1852	277
_____ his arrival, December, 1853, with despatches	322
Frobisher, Martin	11
Fury and Hecla Strait	20, 21
Gale, Lieutenant, 1849	109
Geographical Society, Royal, proposes a fresh expedition in 1836	19
_____ report of trip of the <i>Prince Albert</i> , November, 1850-51, and remarks	159
_____ paper by Mr. Cartwright, November, 1850-51	169
_____ paper addressed to Capt. (now Admiral) W. H. Smyth, and remarks thereon, 160; extracts	161
_____ plan of search by Lieutenant Pim, 1851, 218; and results	219
_____ subscription in favour of Captain Beaton's plan, 1852	238
_____ recommendation of reward to Commander Inglefield, December, 1852, remarks thereon	269
_____ 1852, reviewed	273
_____ paper by Mr. A. Petermann, read November, 1852	276
_____ paper by Mr. A. G. Findlay, 1852	276
_____ paper on probable course pursued by Sir John Franklin, by A. G. Findlay, Esq., 1856	425
_____ letter by Captain Richards, R.N. 1856	431
_____ plan of search for the remains of the Franklin Expedition by Lieutenant Pim, R.N. 1856	432

	PAGE
Geographical Society, Royal, paper by Dr. McCormick, R.N. 1856	438
Gilbert, Sir Humphrey	11
Giffen, Captain Z.	15
Goodair, Mr. R. A. offers services	115
	188
Govs, Lieutenant	33
Gravill, Captain, suggests Jones's and Smith's sounds as points of search	121
Gricebach, Mr. W. H. Des, letter to the Admiralty, November, 1852	271
Griffiths, Lieutenant (since Commodore)	49
Grinnell, Mr. Henry	39, 281
Grinnell Expedition, under Lieutenant E. J. De Haven, U.S.N., and instructions, 1853; departure of, May, 1854; remarks	154
Cross-list	15
Hall, James	11
Hamilton, Captain W. A. B. opinion on Sir E. Beaufort's plan, January, 1850	120, 121
Hargrave, Mr. letter to A. Barclay, Esq. secretary Hudson Bay Company, August 28, 1848, report of white men seen by Esquimaux	69
Hartstein, Captain, U.S.N.	252
Haskell, Lieutenant, report of his journey, 1853	299
Haven, Lieutenant E. J. De, U.S.N.	39
— and instructions, 1853; departure 1851, arrival at New York; his despatch,	154
October, 1851; report	220
Hearne, Mr.	16
Heyburn, John	175
Hooper, Lieutenant W. H., plan of search and offer of services, November, 1851, remarks thereon	223
— offer of service and plan, May, 1852	253
— offer of services, November, 1852, 370; remarks on his plan	271
— and Pullen, Lieutenants, intelligence received, June, 1841, report	175
Hoppner, Mr.	18
Hore, Master	11
House of Commons, debate on renewing the search for the Franklin Expedition, 1857	428
— debate on renewing the search for the Franklin Expedition, and decision, 1857	430
Houston, Captain W. his despatches, proceedings of Bering's Strait Squadron, November, 1854	273
Hudson, Henry	11
Hudson's Bay Company, formation of, 1688	15
— expeditions under Dozo and Simpson in 1837	29
Humboldt, Baron Alexander Von, letter to Lieutenant Fitz, R.N., 1856	435
— by Capt. [redacted]	20
— [redacted] (as Captain), offer of the <i>Isabel</i> , 255; his 1852	256
— departure in the <i>Isabel</i> , July,	257
— return, November, 1852; report	268
— departure for Beechey Island,	280
May, 1853, in the <i>Phœnix</i>	280
— his return, October, 1853, with despatches; report of his voyage	284
— departure for Beechey Island,	331
May, 1854; additional instructions to Sir Edward Decker	331
— his arrival, September, 1854	333

	PAGE
Inglis, Sir R. H. February, 1850, urges Government to take measures for relief, 144; debate in House of Commons	145
<i>Investigator</i> and <i>Enterprise</i> despatched, June, 1848 (Ross, Sir James, and Bird)	87
January 20, 1850 (Collinson and M'Clure)	118
<i>Isabel</i> despatched, July, 1852 (Captain Ingfield)	267
James, Thomas	11
Kane, Dr. Elisha Kent, U.S.N.	89
departure for Smith's Sound, May, 1853	281
plan of search, 1853	282
arrival at New York, 1855, and report of his voyage	394
letter to Mr. Grinnell, opinion on present position of the Arctic Question, 1856	429
Kellett, Captain H. C.B. return of, 1851	174
his reply to Arctic committee, November, 1851	201
despatches by <i>Phoenix</i> , 1853, and remarks thereon	201
his letter to Mr. Barrow, 1853	233
return in the <i>Phoenix</i> , September, 1854	333
extracts from his despatches, 1854	341
Kellett, Captain, and Moore, Commander, Behring's Strait Expedition organized, 1819	109
despatches, January, 1851, report	170
Kellett, Captain Henry, and Captain Sir Edward Becher, departure for Barrow's Strait, April, 1852, instructions	248
Kennedy, Mr. William, arrival; report to the Admiralty, October, 1852, 257; remarks thereon	262
departs for Behring's Strait, April, 1853; voyage abandoned	279
Kennedy, Mr. W. and Bellot, Lieutenant, departure in <i>Prince Albert</i> , May, 1851; reasons for resuming the search	175
King, Dr.	18
letter to the Admiralty, February, 1848, on Arctic expeditions, 74; proposition to reach North Somerset or Victoria Land, 75; opinions as to the route of Sir John Franklin, 76; opinions on the propositions	77
letter to Admiralty, February 16, 1848	81
letter to Admiralty, February, 1850; plan of search by Great Fish River	144
letter to the Admiralty, with offer of service and reply, January, 1856	425
King, Dr. and Lieutenant Pin, their united plan of search, 1856	433
Knight, John	11, 15
Krabbe, Mr. report of his journey	351
<i>Lady Franklin</i> and <i>Sophia</i> despatched, April, 1850 (Penny and Stewart)	147
Lancaster Sound, navigation of	21
<i>Leader</i> , extract from <i>Colombo Observer</i> , 1851	174
Lee, Captain, on Jones's Sound	121
Lok, Michael	11
Lutwidge and Phipps	16
Lynch, Captain W. F. U.S.N. November, 1849, offer of service	143
Lyon, Captain	18
Mackinnon, Mr. his motion in the House of Commons regarding rewards to Captains M'Clure, Collinson, and Kellett; report of select committee	300

	PAGE
Mackenzie (afterwards Sir Alexander)	10
Maguire, Captain Richard, proposes a communication with Behring's Strait, November, 1851	225
Admiralty, December, 1852	278
his despatches by the <i>Amphitrite</i> , Capt. Fre- derick, December, 1853	322
additional instructions, January, 1854, 323; revised	331
his despatches, 1854	375
intelligence received, 1854	396
Mason, Mr.	198
Marshall, Mr.	188
Masencoff, Worsell, account of his death	230
McClintock, Lieutenant (now Captain)	181
report of his journey, 1854	346
appointment to the <i>Fox</i> , in the final search for the Franklin Expedition, 441; intentions and departure, 1857	442
letter to John Harrow, Esq. 1857	442
McClure, Captain, his despatches by <i>Phoenix</i> , 1853, 215; remarks thereon	309
letter to Captain Kellett, May, 1853	312
arrival in <i>Phoenix</i> , September, 1854	333
McClure and Collinson, Captains, instructions to despatches, 1850, and report; remarks	173
McCormick, Dr. R.N.	18
plan of search by way of the Coppermine River, 1847	66
plan for best expedition to Jones's and Smith's Sounds, April, 1849, 91; opinion thereon	94
plan for search by Wellington Channel, January 1, 1850, 112; Sir F. Bousquet's note on the plan, 113; opinion thereon	118
offers services and plan of search, November, 1851; and remarks thereon	226
returns in the <i>Phoenix</i> , October, 1853	284
remarks on the search for Sir J. Franklin, the probable position of the <i>Erskine</i> and <i>Trevelyan</i> , and fate of their crews, 1853	318
resumes his renewal of search for further traces of Franklin Expedition, and plan, 1860	436
McLean, Mr. John, plan of search, January, 1850	136
McPherson	89
Meaham, Lieutenant, report of his journey, 1854	343
Middleton, Christopher	15
Moore, William	15
Moore, Captain, ordered to Behring's Strait, in <i>Flower</i> , January 1, 1848, 73; <i>He sails to join</i>	73
on Esquimaux reports, 1851	177
despatches received, December, 1851	230
commander (since Captain), and Kellett, Captain, Behring's Strait expedition organized, 1849	109
and Kellett, Captains, despatches, January, 1851; report	170
<i>Journal</i> , extract from, October, 1853; glass bottles found; remarks	216
on Sir R. I. 1848, remarks on Franklin Expedition	46
at Esquimaux (Shedden)	147
" <i>Magazine</i> ," glass bottles found, note, 1858	318
<i>North Star</i> despatched, May 18, 1849	90
North-West Passage, discovery of, 1854	327
*Observer, An, "observations and plan for search, 117; opinion thereon	118

	PAGE
Ommaney, Captain E. Report, 1851	181
his reply to Arctic Committee, November, 1851	203
report to Admiralty of his inquiry into the facts of the ships seen by the <i>Renovation</i> ; remarks thereon, 1852	244
his proposition to attempt to reach the Pole, October, 1852	267
Ommaney, E. and Austin, H. T. Captains, departure of, May, 1850, 150, and instructions, and remarks thereon	151
return, September, 1851; remarks thereon	178
Osborn, Lieutenant Sherard (since Captain), letter to Sir. F. T. Baring, Bart. January 29, 1849; offered his services, and plan of search	93
plan for search, January 4, 1850, overland to Cape Bathurst and Banks' Land, 114; remarks thereon	115
plan of search, October, 1850, 137; remarks thereon	139
memorandum connected with renewed search, 1852, and remarks thereon	235
report of his journey, 1853	290
Palmerston, Lord, memorial to, urging another expedition, and reply, June, 1836	431
Parry, Sir Edward	18
his remarks on the Old Worthies	13
remarks on Sir John Franklin	47
reply to Admiralty, February, 1847	53
opinion on Dr. King's letter, February 23, 1848	77
opinion on probable movements of the Franklin Expedi- tion, December, 1849, 101; remarks thereon	104
opinion, and plan of search by way of Melville Island, February, 1850	122
Peabody, Mr. George	39, 281, and note 401
Peaton, Mr. Lewis, volunteers to accompany Sir John Ross in his offer of service, January, 1852	236
Peel Sound, remarks on, 1854, and probable course of the Franklin Expedition	362
Peers, Mr. letter as to white men seen near Mackenzie River in 1847	73
Pelly, Sir John, Bart. letter from the Admiralty, March, 1847, 55; and reply	66
Penny, Captain W. plan of search by Baffin's Bay, and offer of service, De- cember, 1849; letter to Admiralty	108
offers to examine Jones's Sound, &c. December, 1840	121
results of his expedition, 1851	187
travelling report, 1851; remarks thereon	189
his reply to Arctic committee, November, 1851	205
offer of service to explore Queen Victoria Channel, January, 1852, and reply from Admiralty	234
offers of service, and two plans of search, November, 1852	270
Penny, Captain, and Stewart, Mr. A. departure of, April, 1850; instruc- tions to, 147; remarks thereon	149
return, Sept. 1851; remarks thereon	178
Petermann, Mr. A. paper addressed to Admiralty, January, 1852, reviewed; remarks thereon	240
communication to the Admiralty, November, 1852	272
Phipps, Captain, his remarks on the Old Worthies	13
Phipps and Lutwidge	16
Phillips, Commander G. and Ross, Sir John, departure of, in <i>Felix</i> and <i>Mary</i> , April, 1850, and directions	152
<i>Phœnix</i> despatched to Beechey Island, May, 1853 (Captain Inglesfield)	280
despatched to Beechey Island, May, 1854 (Captain Inglesfield)	331
Pickersgill, Lieutenant	16

	PAGE
Pin, Lieutenant, information obtained from Russian authorities of white men seen; also Esquimaux reports, April, 1850	171
September, 1851, offers a plan and services to conduct an expedition to River Kolyma, 215; remarks thereon	217
his meeting with the crew of <i>Investigator</i>	312
R.N. plan of search for the remains of the Franklin Expedition, 1856	432
Pim, Lieutenant, and King, Dr. their united plan of search, 1856	433
Plans for search in 1850 reviewed	127
<i>Plover</i>, H.M.S. sails for Behring's Strait, January 1, 1848	73
Pond's Bay Esquimaux report	96
<i>Priker Albert</i> despatched, June, 1850 (Forsyth and Snow)	156
despatched, May, 1851 (Kennedy and Bellot)	175
Pullen, Captain, instructions from Admiralty to, January 25, 1850	118
intelligence received from, March, 1850, and report	146
offer of service and plan of search, December, 1851, and remarks thereon	229
his despatches by <i>Phoenix</i> , 1853	312
Pullen, Lieutenant, and Mr. Hooper, intelligence received, June, 1851; report	176
Rae, Dr. instructions from Sir G. Simpson, January, 1850	107
intelligence received from, March, 1850, and report	147
letter to Sir John Richardson, April, 1851	220
intelligence of, November, 1851, and report of his journey	232
intelligence received, April, 1852; report	245
suggestions to the Admiralty, June, 1852	255
letter to Admiralty, October, 1854	358
reward of £10,000 from the Admiralty, 1856	405
Rae and Richardson, Drs. departure of, March, 1848, and plan of search	84
Regent's Inlet and Great Fish River, connection between	26
Reid, Captain Charles, offers services	115
Remarks on the Franklin instructions, and the causes of unsuccessful results, 187; close of the year 1850	169
<i>Resolute</i> and <i>Assistance</i>, with tenders, despatched, May, 1850 (Austin and Ommaney)	150
despatched, April, 1852 (Belcher and Kellett)	248
<i>Resolute</i>, discovery of, and return to the British Government, 1856; note	362
Rewards offered for assistance rendered to Sir John Franklin, March, 1849	93
Richards, Commander (since Captain), report of his journey, 1853	289
proposed search for the relics of the	431
<i>Erebus</i> and <i>Terror</i>, 1856	431
Richardson, Dr. (afterwards Sir John)	18
opinion on the North-West Passage	21
in 1836	47
remarks on Sir John Franklin	54
reply to Admiralty, February, 1847	65
observations on the proposed relieving expedition in 1847	74
final plan of proceedings, February, 1848	95
report from Great Bear Lake, September, 1848	99
his return, November, 1849, and report	103
opinion on direction for search, December, 1849, 103; remarks thereon	105
opinion, February, 1850, as to Lancaster and Jones's	126
Sounds	126
memorandum respecting Esquimaux reports obtained from Russian authorities, February, 1851	174
his reply to Arctic committee, November, 1851	204

	PAGE
Richardson and Rae, Drs. departure of, March, 1848, and plan of search . . .	81
Roome, Mr. J. letter to the Admiralty, November, 1851 . . .	227
Ross, Sir James G. reply to Admiralty, March, 1847 . . .	56
volunteers his services, November, 1847, 68; his plan for relief, December, 1847, 69; opinions on the plan, 70; plan of relief by way of Behring's Strait . . .	71
remarks on Dr. King's letter, February 23, 1849 . . .	78
additional instructions by <i>North Star</i> and whalers, 1849 . . .	93
return and report, November, 1849 . . .	96
opinion on probable position of the <i>Erebus</i> and <i>Terror</i> , November, 1849, 102; remarks thereon . . .	104
suggestions to the Admiralty, September, 1851, and remarks thereon . . .	214
Ross, Sir James, and Bird, E. J. Captains, and instructions, 1848 . . .	84, 85, 86
Ross, Sir John . . .	18
opinion on the North-West Passage in 1836 . . .	26
letter to Admiralty, September, 1846, and reply . . .	50
letter to Admiralty, January, 1847 . . .	61
letter to Admiralty, February, 1847 . . .	62
September, 1849, offers his services; opinions thereon . . .	95
plan and offer of search, Jan. 14, 1850, to Melville Island and Banks' Land, 115; opinion thereon . . .	115, 116
despatches forwarded by the Hudson's Bay Company, September, 1850 . . .	157
his reply to Arctic committee, November, 1851 . . .	199
return September, 1851, results of the expedition, Esquimaux reports . . .	211
replies to Captain Austin, and remarks thereon . . .	212
offers his services, January, 1852, accompanied by Mr. Lewis Peaton . . .	236
Ross, Sir John, and Phillips, G. Commander, departure of, in <i>Felix</i> and <i>Mary</i> , April, 1850, and directions . . .	152
Rupert's Land, despatch to governor and council of, March, 1845 . . .	66
Sabine, Colonel . . .	18
reply to Admiralty, March, 1847 . . .	57
opinion on Sir James Ross's voyage and search, January 9th, 1849 . . .	91
opinion, Jan. 1850, as to direction taken by Sir John Franklin . . .	128
Saunders, Mr. J. S. Master R.N. sailed in <i>North Star</i> , May 16, 1849 . . .	90
return in <i>North Star</i> , September, 1850 . . .	157
Scoresby, Rev. Dr. visits Greenland, note . . .	17
his reply to Arctic Committee, November, 1851 . . .	199
Seroggs, John . . .	15
Share, Mr. James, report to the Admiralty of two ships seen on an iceberg, March, 1852 . . .	244
Sheddon, R. Esq. note . . .	93
Shepherd, Mr. G. 1849 . . .	76
Simpson, Sir George, reply to Sir John Pelly, March, 1847 . . .	107
instructions to Dr. Rae, January, 1850 . . .	167
Smith, Francis . . .	16
Snow, Mr. W. P. plan of search, January, 1850 . . .	130
proposes, January, 1851, an expedition to Lancaster Sound and Griffith Island . . .	170
proposed expedition to Behring's Strait, 1853 . . .	283
Snow, Mr. W. P. and Commander Forsyth, departure of, in <i>Prince Albert</i> , June, 1850, to examine Regent's Inlet; remarks thereon . . .	156
<i>Sophia</i> and <i>Lady Franklin</i> despatched, April, 1850 (<i>Conny</i> and <i>Stewart</i>) . . .	147
Stewart, Captain, his explorations, 1851 . . .	188

	PAGE
Stewart, Captain, remarks on Wellington Channel, 1851; observations thereon	191
his reply to Arctic committee, November, 1851	206
Stewart and Penny, Captains, departure of, April, 1850; instructions to, 147;	149
remarks thereon	178
return, September, 1851; remarks thereon	178
Stewart, Captain, and Mr. Anderson, result of expedition to the mouth of	402
Great Fish River, 1856	402
Stuart, Mr. John	188
Sutherland, Dr.	188, 257
Taylor, J. Esq.	136
Taylor, Rear-Admiral, C.B. proposes, January, 1851, an expedition to ex-	170
amine firds in Barrow's Strait and Banks' Land—rejected	170
Thorne, B. of Bristol	11
Times, extract from, October, 1853, and remarks thereon	315
on Lieutenant Pin's plan, &c. and replies, 1856	433
extract from, November, 1853, and remarks thereon, 319; replies	320
Trollope, Commander Henry, R.N. offers his services, September, 1853	257
additional instructions, January, 1854	324
his despatches, 1854	373
True-love, whaler, report brought by	96
Turnagain, Point	22
Vaughan	16
Wager Inlet	25
Wager River	22
Walker, Cape, route from	21
remarks on search by the south-west	183
Waymouth, George	11
Wellesley, Captain G. G. Behring's Strait, 1851	174
despatches received, December, 1851	230
Wellington Channel, remarks thereon, unsatisfactory results, close of the year	231
1851	231
Whalers, offers of rewards from Admiralty, March, 1847	63
offers of rewards to, March, 1848	83
Wilkes, Captain U.S.N. offer of service	143
memorial to Congress, his views of the search, 1852	243
Wolff, Rev. Joseph, offers services	115
Wynniatt, Mr. return in the <i>Phoenix</i> , October, 1853, 284; report of his	300
journey	300
Young, Lieutenant	16
Young, Captain Allen, offer of service in the final expedition in search of	441
Sir John Franklin, 1857, note	441







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