

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. MGL-A-9853

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division, M
FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe *yfs*

DATE: 4 January 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
SPECIFIC— USAGE

*NS
HD*

Reference: MGKW-11190, MGLA-8041, MASA-1030

1. Developments in the USAGE operations over the past three months have caused us to hold up reply to your MGKW-11190 until comments were received from the Austrian station and it was possible to discuss the matter here with 1. We have received MASA-1030, outlining the position of the Austrian station; 1 has returned, and the 31 December deadline date for final assessment of USAGE has now been reached. The purpose of this dispatch, therefore, is to point out what has been accomplished thus far and to record our recommendations for the future. Whether these recommendations meet with your approval or not, it is hoped that some definite and positive decision will result which can be implemented at the earliest practicable date.

2. To begin, our comments on the various paragraphs in MGKW-11190 follow:

a. Par. 1 - "GRUESOME is the proper agency to handle (USAGE), but dependent on transfer of GRUESOME to ZACABIN". When will this occur? We feel that if such transfer is not effected in the near future, it will only result in further vacillation and indecision on the ultimate disposition of USAGE. Further, we are inclined to agree to a great extent with the objections by the Austrian station to GRUESOME handling of USAGE as expressed in par. 3, MASA-1030, and to these add our own comments that no one presently on the GRUESOME staff except Clarence Foley is now authorized to read the extensive ZACABIN files on USAGE operations. Rewriting of these could not be staffed by POB, nor, probably, by the Austrian station.

b. (1) Par. 2 - "USAGE has survived various assessment periods and various deadlines never enforced". True, but due, in large part, to our previous inability to provide a final assessment based on divergent requirements and views of customer agencies. We feel that we have reached the end of these assessment periods, and make a final recommendation of transfer to SOB. We did reach the end of the latest deadline given USAGE for Hungarian operations, and enforced it by withdrawing financial support on 1 November, prior to receipt of your MGKA-11190.

DIST:
✓ 2 - FDM
1 - COS
1 - SALZ
2 - File
1 - SRF6

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

CLASSIFICATION

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Date: 11 2005

2015 RF

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

(2) Par. 2 - "Satellite success has been meager. June-July-August, 2 CSR reports, of value, but from complex which USAGE quite probably does not and will not control". During Sept.-Oct.-Nov. this operation has produced 26 reports (info reports, documents, photos, materials, etc.) gained as a result of four successful courier trips into CSR and return. What appears to be a good possibility for establishing a permanent residentura within CSR is now being explored. As for control, USAGE has procured from this CSR group PRQ's, photos, fingerprints and signatures. He is kept continuously informed of RFE, ZACACTUS, and other intelligence approaches to this group. This, plus the ZACACTUS support of Bjela Legia radio which this group has gained, ostensibly through USAGE, seem to indicate to us that USAGE has shown more control over this group than has been maintained previously by anyone else.

c. Par. 3- "USAGE's forte has been his immense accumulated knowledge of Austrians involved in intelligence peddling If asked to drop his attempts to procure positive intelligence, his show, if properly controlled, may well complement and protect the positive efforts of GRUESOME". His forte has been not only this, but also his ability to penetrate and gain knowledge of U. S. and other I. S. activities in Austria, including ZACACTUS, ZIPPER and SOB. For this reason we feel it would be preferable to have SOB control him rather than GRUESOME, which at present disseminates its reports to G-2 USFA, unless, of course, GRUESOME becomes part of ZACABIN and this dissemination is changed. However, since USAGE probably has the connections and capabilities to maintain these penetrations in any event, there seems to be no reason per se to condition their continuance or expansion upon dropping of his positive operations.

d. (1) CSR Operation

We feel that it is not now too early to say that USAGE has something here which at least merits further exploration. This we base on production stemming from this operation (plus Wash. evaluation so far received); apparently genuine courier trips, and the informal estimate of [] of MOB that the operation appears sound. Incidentally, MOB ([]) and SOB ([]) have been kept informed and consulted on this operation. JOB, which had access to the entire WACO project files but showed no interest, was not included in discussions principally because their principal group (OKAPI), is in diametric opposition to the USAGE (Bjela Legia) Slovaks. The decision to include or exclude GRUESOME in these talks, we felt was a matter for SOB to resolve. The fact that GRUESOME is not yet a part of ZACABAL, plus reasons set down above and those advanced in MASA-1030 probably account for non-inclusion of GRUESOME in either specific or general USAGE discussions. We have secured a copy of the CIC report # R-1312-51 on the Bjela Legia, and [] has been consulted on some of the persons mentioned. [] is also quite familiar with many of the persons forming part of this group. His knowledge along with that of [] has been called upon and made use of by []

(2) Hungary

RPL

As pointed out in 2 b (1) above, financial support was terminated for the Hungarian operation on 1 November. Your vexation at the lack of success of this operation is certainly understandable, and, indeed, reflects the frustration USAGE expresses and we keenly feel. Despite withdrawal of funds, USAGE insists he will continue to attempt to establish a going operation into Hungary, and if success is achieved, again present the operation, much as he did with the CSR show. If, in addition, for possible future use by us, or by way of partial recompense for money expended, true names and biographical data of all personnel involved are desired, USAGE is willing to continue to gather same - at no additional costs, of course. In this connection, [] and [] have expressed interest in certain persons used in the now defunct Hungarian operation.

(3) Operation SINGER

As reported in MGLA-8552, this operation was dropped by USAGE after the three month trial period failed to produce sufficient returns to justify continuance.

(4) KOSSAREV case

Better, and perhaps luckier, file tracing on our part would have exposed the key figure, KOSTUCHENKO, as a shady character and averted this aptly termed "fiasco", wherein Van Cutsem, USAGE and ourselves were quite obviously taken, we for a sum of 500 DM.

(5) GAVRILOV case

We are preparing a paper on this case, also turned up by Father Van CUTSEM, which after a number of weakly explained delays, begins to take on the appearance of an RIS confusion operation. However, this operation is not, nor was it ever, financed, and we feel reasonably certain that no one employed by us has been blown. As no costs are involved, and defectors are currently such a primary target, we can do little else than await future developments. Our only commitments in this case are to receive the body if and when he comes out.

3. The sentiments expressed in para. 4 are certainly most sound in principle and in fact and ones which we most heartily endorse. That the takeover agency must be familiar with USAGE's history could not be truer. We therefore feel, that because SOB has been kept informed of USAGE's operations, has received copies of all reports for a period of six months, and now has present on the SOB staff [] who is also familiar with USAGE from the Washington side, SOB is the logical base to handle USAGE. It does not appear to us that GRUESOME can match these qualifications. As far as the takeover agency becoming otherwise bogged down in a series of "assessment periods" and grandiose schemes", we again feel that with SOB as the takeover agency this danger is precluded, since as stated, SOB has been fully included in this current and final assessment period.

There have been, since this period started, and there should be no "grandiose schemes" in the immediate or distant future, depending, of course upon the successor agency's adhering to the rigid policy of applying ZACABIN regulations which [] has imposed and enforced most stringently since taking over USAGE on a full-time case officer basis. In this regard it should be pointed out that USAGE has responded with fullest cooperation, speed and understanding. Certainly, when one looks at the PRQ's submitted, with real names, photograph-signature-fingerprint cards, plus operational details and this in addition to production, one must conclude that this last "assessment" period has been a profitable one, and at least so it seems to us at POB, should be sufficient to precipitate a decision as to disposition of USAGE. As for guarding against large payrolls for piddling returns and masses of paper on inconsequential aspects, we feel that the takeover agency now finally has the advantage of good indoctrination of USAGE thru our efforts of the last few months. His reporting is within the strict framework of the Project system. We believe he knows what we want and expect and what we do not want nor need. Costs in the CSR operations and in Austrian activities have been kept from expanding. In the CSR operation they amount to \$457.00 per month for a total of \$1828.00 for the four months it has been in existence. (\$748.00 of the total has been paid in Czech crowns, the remainder in Austrian shillings.). In that time it has produced, as pointed out above, 26 disseminated reports, operational and administrative reports, and has embraced four successful courier trips in and out of Slovakia.

With regard to the UJDRUID proposal as originally submitted by USAGE, we feel that this should be required reading not only for the agency taking him on, but for everyone dealing with Germans or Austrians. It is significant that our complete rejection of the first proposal succeeded in reducing the large number of persons involved to the manageable number of three, which was also rejected, for reasons dealing with the [] station.

4. Our comments on MGKW-11190 being completed, a summary of the bases for our recommendation that SOB rather than GRUESOME take over-handling of USAGE is set forth as follows:

a. GRUESOME cannot at this time take over USAGE under the conditions set forth in MGKW-11190.

b. The end of the final USAGE assessment period will be reached 1 January, and the sooner USAGE is transferred to an Austrian-based AIS agency the better we feel it will be for AIS, POB and USAGE's operations per se.

c. SOB has the double advantage of foreknowledge of USAGE in the form of an ex-Wash. ZIPPER desk man [] on its staff, plus full insight into the present assessment period.

d. SOB has more interest than GRUESOME, not only in USAGE's tapping possibilities with respect to intelligence mills, but also in his internal Austrian connections, and an understandable desire to control USAGE penetration of other SOB connections.

RPS

5. We feel, therefore, that SOB is the most logical and suitable agency to take over USAGE and his operations. For this purpose we recommend that SOB name a qualified case officer, (who does not know USAGE socially), to begin immediately after 1 February working closely with [] and accompanying [] on meetings with USAGE. It is hoped that this take-over period should be accomplished within two months time. In other words, on 1 February, POB gives up USAGE in principle, and on 1 April in final actuality.

6. To implement the take-over, if approved, SOB should be prepared to do the following:

a. Provide one case officer, beginning immediately, to accompany [] on weekly meetings with USAGE for a period to two months (approximately 6 or 7 meetings), or a shorter period, if SOB feels that the take-over can be accomplished within a lesser time.

b. Provide the operating expenses for USAGE beginning 1 April or earlier. (45,820 AS, 75,000 Kc monthly).

c. Provide such documentation as may be necessary for properly papering bona-fide couriers.

d. Final decision on the question of continuing supply of cigarettes and operational gasoline to USAGE should be left to SOB. Because the support was included in the original agreement with USAGE and does not appear unreasonable, and because purchase of gasoline and cigarettes on the Austrian economy would involve increased costs, we see no valid reason here for arbitrary discontinuance if the operations are intended to continue. The sooner the above can be put into effect, the sooner it will aid the SOB case officer psychologically in establishing an early and effective liaison with USAGE.

7. To sum up:

a. SOB has been cut into all USAGE proposals since the present period started. All final questions since receipt of MGKW-9897, MGKW-11190 have been referred to Washington for decision. All have been or will be in ZACABIN form.

b. The probability of taking over internal Austrian operations being entailed has been recognized and is in fact welcomed, at least in a limited degree, by SOB. The performance of this while sloughing off the satellite operations can be accomplished by dropping defection operations and CSR operations depending, especially in case of the latter, on progress made.

c. The possibility of using USAGE to spot and report on other paper mills in Austria is being considered by SOB, as well as establishing possible CI contacts in Sovzone Austria through USAGE's OB operations, in order to complement SOB's efforts.

RPS

d. USAGE's satellite effort should be confined to the CSR until such time as it is felt that his operations there are solid and sound. Any expansion will depend on conformity to the pattern already set, i.e. ZACABIN regulations, small, slow, sound build-up under strict supervision and control by the successor agency.

e. USAGE's internal Austrian show can best be molded by SOB to serve the proper interests of all parties concerned in the order of their proper priority. Incidentally, we learned from G-2 USFA (see MGLA-9557) for the first time, that USAGE's OB production is useful and worthwhile if not voluminous and also that his political and CI reporting is of value.

8. In conclusion, the overall assessment would not be complete without a total monthly costs for the period 1 July to 31 December 1951.

	<u>AS</u>	<u>\$</u>	<u>Kc</u>
July	35,200	500	
August	35,200	500	
September	43,300	500	75,000
October	45,820	575	75,000
November	45,820		75,000
December	45,820		75,000
Totals:	<u>251,160</u>	<u>2,075</u>	<u>300,000</u>
Approx. totals converted to \$			
@ 30/1 - - - -	\$8,372.00		
@ 1/1 - - - - -	2,075.00		
@ 400/1 - - - -	750.00		
	<u>\$ 11,197.00</u>		

Barring major changes, estimated costs for the next six months period will approximate \$10,290.

[] [] []

WFW

RA

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DIS (CH NO. MGL-A 9889)

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division, M

DATE: 7 January 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe *et al*

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Developments re Bjela Legia Radio Station *N)*

Reference: MGLA-8555

1. We informed you in referenced paper that a meeting was held between POB representatives and [] of ZACACTUS at which time formal activation of the Bjela Legia for propaganda purposes by ZACACTUS was discussed. As you know, the radio is controlled by the group operating courier lines for USAGE as part of Developmental Project Number 2. This operation was given three months probationary period to prove itself; and having apparently succeeded in doing so within the allotted time, we are continuing our support, at least until such time as other instructions are received.

2. Coincidentally with the end of the trial period we were notified by [] that he has received approval from ZACACTUS to undertake support of the radio and broadcasting personnel for the purpose of filling the propaganda vacuum in Slovakia.

3. Upon receiving notification of this development, a meeting was held between [] and [] on 3 January at which the following was brought out:

a. ZACACTUS will initially undertake support of the Bjela Legia radio in the form of a subsidy [for a period of two months] during which time they will observe the modus-operandi of the Bjela Legia group and attempt to assay the value of the broadcasts. [Continuance of the subsidy will be dependent on results of these studies.]

b. ZACACTUS does not wish to be involved with any direction of operations of the group, nor with logistical support other than financial. Secure housing of the radio proper will be provided through a ZACACTUS representative in Austria, or, if this proves impossible, rent will be paid for a house to be located by the Bjela Legia.

c. ZACACTUS desires only very general control of the broadcasts, which will take the form only of setting general tone. To accomplish this, ZACACTUS will monitor the broadcasts, and receive broadcast transcripts.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DIST:

- 2 - FDM
- 1 - COS
- 1 - SFRG
- 1 - SOB

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MAR. 1949

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- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Target date for resumption of Bjela Legia broadcasts is to be 15 January, dependent on results of meeting to be held between ZACACTUS/Bjela Legia representatives on 7 January.

4. To implement the above [] requested a meeting be arranged between himself, SLAA, SLAD and an interpreter, to take place in Salzburg on 7 January. [] to act simply as radio broadcast specialist of the same agency represented by USAGE, who as has been reported, is known to SLAA as an unnamed American. The conversation will be confined to financial requirements of the broadcasts and a general policy outline. The aspect of being blown to SLAA and SLAD was discussed with [], who still desires the meeting. No other interpreters being available who could logically attend this meeting, USAGE was suggested to arrange introduction to SLAA, security ramifications of meeting USAGE also being pointed out. [] also had no objections to meeting USAGE personally. Inasmuch as [] is posing as the radio specialist in the same agency as USAGE, SLAA would undoubtedly keep USAGE briefed on the conversations. POB also considered the security aspects of USAGE being known to [] and reached the conclusion that from our standpoint, no breach existed. The target date for commencement of the broadcasts left us insufficient time to refer this matter to Washington for decision.

5. [], using the cover name EDWARDS, will meet USAGE, who will use the cover name EISNER, in the lobby of the Oestereicher Hotel on 7 January, after which arrangements will be made to meet SLAA. We will report details on the conversations when received from []. We will probably also be kept fully briefed by USAGE.

[]
[]
[]

PPS

AIR

MGLA-10016

Chief, Foreign Division, K

17 January 1952

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

Identities in MGLA-9758

MGLA-10016

Reference: MCKA-35773

1. As pointed out in reference the V number of (3) under OSW in MGLA-9758 is erroneous.

2. Instead of V-21555 this number should read V-21514. The identity given in MGLA-9759 for (3) stands the same.

DIST:

- ✓ 2 - FDM
- 1 - GOS
- 2 - POB

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6 OCT 1955

JK

FORM NO.
DEC. 1947 35-5

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Page No.

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

FROM: VIENNA ROUTINE
 TO: SPECIAL OPERATIONS 18 JAN 52
 INFO: ~~FIS (1-2-3)~~ IN 14666
 INFORMATION: IR (4-5), ADMIN (6), S/G (7-8-9)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Fars. 51 (I) 60A AR 330-5

6761

TO: WASHF INFO: FRANF PULF CITE: VIENF
 FROM: SALZBURG.

REQUEST REPLY MASA 1030 ON USAGE TURNOVER.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
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 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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C	I	
ABSTRACT	INDEX	
DATE 23 FEB 1956		

210Z 19 JAN 52
 FOR:

SECRET

Copy No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

205

6 Mar. 52.

After flooding them with all my feelings (and curses) and so far in life I expected to see some sort of a paper but, at the same time, feel there is nothing I can contribute which would shed some light or clarification on this MESS. It would only be another piece of paper which in the final analysis is meaningless, along with many other meaningless documents in these files.

I STATE is not already dead by the time I arrive and I am faced with the frightening prospect of stepping in to the picture, perhaps the best solution lies in my only hoping a grasp of a few basic facts. My trying to draw some logical conclusions or trying to completely reject previous illogical & irrelevant conclusions may lead to a pre-judging of STATE's abilities & capabilities.

To sum up I feel over-briefing on this case undesirable. I would prefer a semi-cold tackling of the job (to avoid previous contamination of thinking) and coming up with my own answers. -1

4 APR 52 -

Love this man! PS

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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usage

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SLZ/5307

20 March 1952

Chief of Station, Vienna
Attention: []
Chief, Salzburg Base

USAGE - XI 1

XX-1 is one of USAGE's two chief assistants, is doing agent handling and training in connection with the Slovakian project, and is trying to develop possibilities for another Hungarian operation. USAGE has indicated in conversations with [] that XX-1, who is not a professional intelligence officer, has a great deal to learn and needs almost constant supervision and stimulus. At this stage USAGE would probably be unwilling to detach XX-1 to Vienna, and he undoubtedly would not consider him qualified for semi-autonomous work. With more experience, however, XX-1 might be a good man for USAGE's Vienna representative, and we will keep the idea in mind.

3-Vien.
3-Salz.files

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT to MAUA 10893

129

ABM

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

VSOIA C7C
2 *2010*
3 *2010*
4 *2010*
5 *2010*
6 *2010*
7 Page No.

SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTINE

SALZBURG

OPERATIONS

FRAN, JUGE, MUNI

31 MAR 52

IN 31854

EE (1-6), RI (7-8-9), AD/SO (10), OPS (11), STC (12),
AD/PC (13), CAL (14), S/C (15-16-17)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-390-5

LZ 311

FRANFG, JUGEFG, MUNIF

INFO: WASHF, VIENF

CITE: SALZF

RE: VIEN 705*

1. SUBJECT INVOLVED USAGE SLOVAKIAN OPERATION NOW RUN BY SALZBURG BASE. FULL DETAILS IN MASA 1461. WILL POUCH INFO COPY TO FRAN.
2. SUBJECT CURRENTLY UNDER INTERROGATION BY USAGE, X 1, AND SLAA.

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Date: *2005*

WASH S/C COMMENT: APPARENTLY WRONG REF.

L	J
ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 6	OCT 1955
Copy No.	

31 MAR 52

SECRET

PLEASE RETURN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

MI

364

1 April 1952

Chief of Base, Salzburg

Chief, MI

Operational

Transmittal of KAMA 1418

We are returning herewith two copies of KAMA 1418 for your files, and two for Vienna, which were forwarded to headquarters by airmail.

[] 7/1 [] []

on Vienna w/attach.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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[] []
1955
264

usage fee

MASA 1513

SECRET

MASA-1513

3 April 1952

Chief, EE

Chief of Station, Vienna

Operational

USAGE-MHBK Approach to HAJDU-NEMETH

REF: WFFA-10825, MGL-A-8402, MGL-A-9573

1. In the middle of February 1952, XX-1 (Subject of MGL-A-9573) received a letter from Paris from HAJDU-NEMETH (para two, MGL-A-8402) dated 9 February 1952, and containing in Hungarian the following s/w message:

"Dear(XX-1): An important thing happened. A group composed of such members of MHBK as do not engage in daily politics, and led by a general staff major, visited me seeking personal contact. There were many interesting preludes, but about these only orally. I find this group of experts suitable for serious work. Our endeavors thus far might now find fruition providing we proceed wisely toward realizing our aims. You decide what should happen before we present the group. If you deem it important and necessary I will visit you in order to discuss the details. Reply requested! Excuse this ugly writing but this pen is miserable. How about my passport? Embrace. Lajos."

2. On being consulted by XX-1, USAGE rather properly and on his own initiative told XX-1 to write back turning down the somewhat vague proposition. When he discussed the letter with [redacted], however, he was told that rather than a flat brushoff XX-1 should answer with an equally vague statement that he had no contacts which would be useful in the case but that he still, out of simple curiosity, would like to have full details. He did reply to that effect on about 17 February, and received a letter dated 22 February and containing the following--in part illegible--answer.

"Dear (XX-1): I have selected the presented gentlemen and at that time the controversies began (in the MHBK), since not all of them want to follow the political course of the leadership but rather desire to remain plain soldiers. They want to fight for the liberation of the country when the hour comes. Therefore they--and a lot of others--are in favor of collaboration with the Committee as far as political representation is concerned, if not in every detail. For a start I mention three names. (Illegible)...have already worked...but were not exposed, they told me. They are experts for sure...Oliver LOVASZ, general staff major, was in...American captivity...one year old. Please check him. I had a good impression of him, would entrust him with leadership. I would tie to him as a good expert Lieutenant Ervin GEVAY...old, was in Schwarzwald.. (illegible). Finally Ervin HOLLOS, captain...eight old, who is assigned

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ABSTRACTED BY [redacted]

DATE 4 OCT 1955

2005

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

to Captain LABNER at the group. The rest I leave to you, dear (XX-1), or better you (the "you" in plural form). Embrace you, Lajos."

3. This exchange may be of some interest in view of []'s information in WPPA-10825 that LOVASZ was in charge of the Linden MHBK unit. It appears to us that the proposal which [] discussed with [] has in effect been also put to us through HAJDU-NEMETH and XX-1 to USAGE. Because of USAGE's earlier BITSCHNAU connections it is probably safe to assume that the French at some level know or guess that USAGE is working with the Americans. You may wish to conjecture whether the approach through HAJDU-NEMETH represents a snafu on the part of the MHBK, on the part of the French, or could be a calculated attempt on the part of [] to test the Americans good faith.

4. We have been trying without success to get HAJDU-NEMETH's visa for Austria in his Temporary Travel Document in Lieu of Passport (furnished to him by POB through USAGE) renewed in order that he may visit XX-1. Needless to say, we have no intention of getting XX-1 or USAGE involved in the MHBK affair, but we do believe it would be worthwhile to have XX-1 debrief HAJDU-NEMETH for more particulars. USAGE will probably return the TTD unvisited to him this week and he will travel as far as Germany from where we will arrange to have him brought over the border if necessary.

C 1

RPS

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Form No. 35-5
April 1950

Handwritten:
See Warren
out

MAIL ROOM

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

Handwritten:
601A
2
3 *chicago*
4 *SO/C*
5 *C/EE*
6 *EE/SO*
7
8

PAGE No.

"SECURITY INFORMATION"

From: SALZBURG ROUTINE

To: OPERATIONS 10 MAY 52

Action: FRAN IN 42294

Information: EE (1-6), RI (7-8), AD/SO (9), OPS (10), S/C (11-12-13)

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SALZ 373

TO: FRANF INFO: VIENF, WASHF CITE: SALZF

REQUEST EARLIEST DATE COULD SPEND APPROXIMATELY FIVE DAYS SALZBURG RUNNING ROUTINE CARRIAGE TESTS THREE MEMBERS USAGE STAFF AND ONE PRINCIPAL AGENT (PP-1).

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Date: *2005*

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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DATE	23 FEB 1956

17 FEB 10 MAY 52

SECRET

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FORM NO. 35-5
DEC. 1947

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file usage
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MAY 13 1952

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

EE(30)A
EE(PC)H
Chino

Q/EE
EE780

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

PAGE No.

~~SALZBURG~~

~~ROUTINE~~

FROM: OPERATIONS
TO: EE (1-6)
ACTION: RI (7-8), ADMIN (9), S/C (10-11-12)

13 MAY 52
IN 42970

INFORMATION:

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Pars. 51 (1) 60A AR-380-5

SALZ 383

TO: WASHF CITE: SALZF
RE: PARA 2 OF WASH 40230 (OUT 75797)

SALZ 375 (IN 42141) AND 376 (IN 42148) SENT ROUTINE PER SALZ
COMMO RECORDS.

usage

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

2239Z 13 MAY 52

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DATE 3	OCT 1955	

TOR:

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RM

FORM 1-57-R
1-57-R

REV
Way
air

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1/501A
3
4
5
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8
Chiron
SOIC
C/EE
EEIS

SECRET

Page No.

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

FROM:	FRANKFURT	ROUTINE
To:	OPERATIONS	15 MAY 52
ACTORS:	SALZ	IN 42950
OPERATION:	EE (1-6), RI (7-8), AD/SD (9), OPS (10), S/C (11-12-13)	

Paraphrase Not Required. Handle as SECRET Correspondence per Para. 51 (1) CIA AR-300-5

FRAN 2996
 TO: SALZF INFO: MUNIF, VIENF, WASHF CITE: FRAMF
 REF: SALZ 373 (IN 42291)

WILL ARRIVE SALZBURG 19 MAY AS REQUESTED.

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2853Z 15 MAY 52

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<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 3	OCT 1955
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209

DISPATCH NO. MASA-1645

TO: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA TOUCH)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 14 May 1952

TO : Chief, ~~EE~~
FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
 SPECIFIC— USAGE - Subject of MASA-1644
Reference— MASA-1644

Subject is USAGE operational contact HH-1.

- > 2 - Wash
- 2 - Vien
- 2 - Salz

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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CLASSIFICATION

FORM 51-28 A

REF

SECRET

NOTE FOR USAGE FILE

MASA 1
16 May 1952
in Frankfurt

CC-2

Attached USAGE report re Willi HOETTL's request to ~~XXXX~~ for help in converting Deutsche Mark to Austrian Schillings. There had previously been a preliminary memorandum on this.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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SECRET

RIP

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

MASA-01759
1000-1000

Chief of Station, Vienna
Acting Chief of Station, Vienna

16 May 1948

Operational
(Dr.) Wilhelm KUTTL

Attached is a copy of a report by USAGM on a request by
Willi KUTTL to SO-2 of USAGM's staff for assistance in con-
verting Deutsche Marks to Austrian Schillings. USAGM had
previously handed you a preliminary memorandum on this
subject.

S-FCB w/1 attach
1-From
S-Back
S-Vism w/attach
S-Sals

DECLASSIFIED	
RI/AE	
RI/IS	
RI/Files	

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

INDEX

1 att H/W

IR COPY


16 May 1952


NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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IR COPY





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10 7 1 1 1 9 1 1



usage file

attas sent to Mava-11330

SLE-5517

16 May 1952

Chief of Station, Vienna
Attn: [] and []
Chief, Salzburg Base
Operational - USAGE Project Proposals
MASA-1615, 1616, 1617, and 1614

REC'D MICRO SER.
MAY 29 1952
MICROFILMED

1. As he pointed out in an informal note attached to MASA-1618, it was []'s intention that all the basic USAGE proposals go to Vienna for your perusal and concurrence or suggestions prior to being pouched to Headquarters. Most unfortunately both [] and []

have been out of the office a great deal in the past few days, and MASA-1615, 1616, and 1617 were pouched directly to Headquarters. We regret this accident and hope that there was nothing in either of these three dispatches with which you seriously disagreed.

2. Fortunately, the two dispatches which were most apt to contain disputable points were MASA-1618 and 1614. MASA-1618, "USAGE--Salzburg Base Assessment", was pouched to you in its entirety, and MASA-1614, "USAGE - Developmental Project Outline - CSR", is being pouched to you today with the Headquarters copies for your forwarding if you approve.

3 - Vien (enclosures)
2 - Salzburg

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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16 May 1952

MASA-11330

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

-NASH-1650

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Acting Chief of Station, Vienna, JOB

16 May 1952

MICROFILMED
MAY 29 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Operational

Dr. Wilhelm HÜTTL

Attached is a copy of a report by USAGE on a request by
WILLI HÜTTL to CC-2 of USASR's staff for assistance in con-
verting Deutsche Marks to Austrian Schillings. USAGE had
previously handed you a preliminary memorandum on this
subject.

JOB w/l attach
A-Fran
A-Wash ✓
S-Vien w/l attach
A-Salg

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RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AB	
RI/MS	
RI/Files	

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Date: 12 OCT 2005

INDEX
07 11/11

16 May 1952
E J RST

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. MASA-1741

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, **EE**
Attention:

DATE: 10 June 1952

FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna

SUBJECT: GENERAL— **Operational**

SPECIFIC— **USAGE - Living and Travel Conditions in Slovakia**

Attached are two USAGE reports on living and travel conditions in Slovakia. They were obtained in the course of an operational debriefing of a prospective USAGE subagent (SLR-01), who recently came out of Slovakia for training and return. Since the use of the source of these reports as a resident agent in Slovakia is contemplated, any evaluations of the reports for content, accuracy, and reporting ability would be appreciated.

- 2-Wash. w/3 atts.
- 2-Vien. w/2 atts.
- 1-Fran. w/ 2 atts.
- 1-POB w/1 att.
- 1-MOB w/1 att.
- 1-JOE w/1 att.
- 1-MKTOPAZ w/1 att.
- 1-USAGE w/att.
- 1-chrono

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- (2)(A) Privacy
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- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

✓
RF

23

NWC-001193

TRAVEL CONDITIONS IN SLOVAKIA

1. It is generally inadvisable to start a conversation on any subject in a train. It is further inadvisable to walk in trains or to loiter at stations before or after the arrival of trains.

2. Police checks should be expected at larger railroad stations and also particularly on certain lines. These lines are:

- a. Bratislava-Kuty
- b. Bratislava-Kosice, especially after Sillina and between Kysak and Presov *
- c. Mihalany-Cierna nad Tisou
- d. Kosice-Medzilaborce
- e. Kosice-Tahanovce (special workers' trains on this line are only rarely controlled)
- f. Breclav-Znojmo via Valtice

* The best train between Bratislava and Kosice is the night express leaving Bratislava at about 2300 hours. It is usually overcrowded.

3. The normal procedure for the police checks is that two SNB men in uniform, sometimes accompanied by an STB man, ask for the Obciansky Preukaz ("Kontrolla Obciansky Preukazov"). Only in the case of suspicion is further investigation made as a rule.

4. At the exit of most railroad stations, and almost invariably at the larger ones, two SNB men are permanently stationed to make Obciansky Preukaz spot checks. Stations where these controls are made only rarely are:

- a. Male Nadrazie Bratislava
- b. Vinohrady (formerly Kynamitka)
- c. Raca
- d. Cerveny-Most

market.

7. Travel in airplanes is particularly difficult. Travellers are strictly checked by police before boarding the plane, and searched for firearms and cameras. Cameras are collected and returned after the flight is completed. Tickets are issued by the government travel bureaus only, and are usually issued only to persons travelling officially. The fare is comparatively low, with a flight from Bratislava to Kosice costing only 950. and a round trip flight, valid for two months, costing 1,400.

8. Bus travel for long distances is practically impossible. The longest existing runs known to source are those between Bratislava and Nitra via Modra, Trnava, and Sereď. Another bus line exists from Nitra via Zlate-Moravce to Banska Bystrica, and a third from Nitra via Levice, Vrhně, Banska Stiavnica to Banska Bystrica. The ordinary bus runs only cover short distances. Police checks on busses are rare.

9. Railroad time tables are on sale at railroad stations and tobacco shops at Kc 40.

TRAVEL CONDITIONS IN SLOVAKIA

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- e. Kosice-Tahanovce (special workers' trains on this line are only rarely controlled)
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- b. Vinohrady (formerly Kynaralka)
- c. Raca
- d. Cervery-Most

market.

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9. Railroad time tables are on sale at railroad stations and tobacco shops at Kc 40.

RPS

NUN 0112

PRICES AND RATIONING IN SLOVAKIA

1. People in Slovakia are entitled to receive 120 textile coupon points per year.

2. The following food ration coupons are issued monthly:

- 1.750 kilo meat
- 0.250 kilo lard or vegetable fat
- 0.250 kilo butter
- ? kilo flour
- 1.250 kilo sugar
- ? kilo potatoes

3. Potatoes and flour are sufficient, but meat and fat are scarce. Most meat is sent to canning factories. Peasants are strictly supervised regarding delivery of products. No slaughtering is permitted on farms, and may only be done in government slaughter houses.

4. At the present time both food and textiles can be bought in practically any store, but only at the higher prices shown in the following paragraph.

5. The following prices were valid at the end of April 1952:

	<u>With Coupons</u>	<u>Without Coupons</u>
Rain coat		
Rain coat	Kc 1,500. (44 Points)	Kc 5,000. - 8,000.
Man's suit	2,200. - 3,000. (70 Points)	5,000. - 16,000.
Shoes	450. - 600. (55-60 Points)	2,000. - 5,000.
Boats	only for the military	10,000.
Short overcoat	2,200. (60 Points)	5,000. - 6,000.
Winter overcoat	3,500. (60 Points)	6,000. - 18,000.
Man's shirt	250. (22 Points)	600. - 1,000.
Hat	-	250. - 600.
Man's socks	25. - 35. (1 - 4 Points)	50. - 120.
Nylon stockings	-	1,200. - 1,500.
Kunert silk lady's stockings	-	800.

RUP

Meat (per kilo)	25.	160. - 200.
Pork	30.	250.
Fat	120.	500.
Butter	60.	220. - 250.
Milk	5.	12.

6. Meat, fat, and milk are scarcely to be found on the free market.

7. Food served in restaurants where meat and fat coupons are required sells at the following prices:

A very plain meal with coupons at 37., without coupons 50.
 A mediocre meal with coupons 51., without coupons 100. A
 good meal with coupons 100., without coupons starting at
 150. Wine sells at 250. to 500. per liter. Four qualities
 of beer are sold at 15., 3., 6., and 4.00. Olivovic of
 45 strength sells at 500. per liter, of 50 strength at
 750., and of 55 strength at 970. It is practically there should
 be only one brand of liquor on the market, and it should
 sell at 500. per liter. Men come 450. to 600. per liter.

229

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

MASA-1751

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

12 June 1952

Chief of Station, Vienna

Operational

USAGE - Military Cover Address

Normally when registering at hotels in Germany or other countries outside Austria, it is necessary for USAGE to register with his AGO card. Rather than take a chance on accidentally using a military address which might for some reason be insecure we would appreciate your furnishing us with a suitable address. There are no particular requirements for the address other than that it not duplicate an existing cover unit address and that it possess a reasonable degree of verisimilitude.

2-Fran
2-Wash
2-Vien
2-Salz

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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28
[] [] []

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
1	SO/A
2	SO/A
3	CHRONO BOARD
4	BOARD
5	
6	
7	
8	

OUT 83272

INFO: VIENNA, FRANKFURT

L

J

EE/SO/A

2095

OPERATIONS

ROUTINE

EE (1-4)

0247Z 13 JUNE 52

file copy

INFORMATION:

RI (5-6), AD/SO (7), OPS (8), S/G (9-10-11),

WASH 49264

TO: CALZ F

INFO: VIEN F, FRAN F

CITE: WASH F

RE: AKA 490 (IN 49945)

1. GROSSBAHN REPEAT GROSSBAHN. NORMALLY ASK VIEN FOR CRYPTOS.
2. TO VIEN: 302 ON LIST.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005

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RF 2

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
FOR: METOPAZ
Chief of Station, Vienna

16 June 1952

Operational

Request for Documents

MASA-1769

1. During [] 's recent visit to Salzburg Base, [] discussed with him the possibility of furnishing a completed Temporary Travel Document in Lieu of Passport and Deutsche Kennkarte for an agent of this base (SLA-01 of the GROSSBAHN Slovakian operation). Since the request is of some urgency, we are having it delivered to you by hand, and we would appreciate your expediting its completion.

2. For your information, the person who will use these documents has recently come out of Slovakia for training and will probably return there in two to three months as a resident agent. The TTD and Deutsche Kennkarte are exclusively for the purpose of enabling him to travel to Italy and return on private and church affairs. These particular documents will not be used in connection with an intelligence mission.

3. The pertinent personalia follow:

a. For the Kennkarte:

First page: To be filled out by the issuing authority.

Second page: ECHAK
Frantisek
2. Mai 1911
Bratislava/CSR
staatenlos
Priester
Please insert residence according to issuing authority and also give an appropriate street address

Bratislava
180 en, mittel

Braun
Keine
Keine

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2) (A) Privacy
- (2) (B) Methods/Sources
- (2) (G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

Stamp: [] [] []
ANZELT
DATE 6 OCT 1955

Vertical stamp on the right edge of the page.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

Third page: One photo attached.

Fourth page: No entries necessary.

D. For the IEE:

Second page: REBAC
Frankfurt
Bratislava, CZE
2 May 1911
stateless
print

Third page: 180 cm.
brown
brown
none

Fourth page: One photo attached

Fifth page: longest possible validity, and valid for the
countries normally shown on this page

Eighth page: Probably no entry

Ninth page: Reentry permit for longest possible validity

Tenth page: Visa or transit visa for Austria
(If a transit visa is inserted, it should be
valid for two trips to and from Italy.)

Eleventh page: Visa for Italy, valid for a period of twenty
days. (If it is not possible to insert the
Italian visa we believe that we can procure
it locally.)

L J

- 1 - NATIONAL (hand carried) (1 enc.)
- 1 - Fran
- 1 - Mack
- 1 - Tison
- 1 - Molo

RECEIVED
MAY 1911
RM

181 - 1001

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

MASA-1781

Chief, EE

18 June 1952

Chief of Station, Vienna

Operational

GROSSBAHN - Subject of MASA-1782

Reference- MASA-1782

1. The subject of reference is SLAH, who is being used provisionally by GROSSBAHN as a part time interpreter in connection with the SLAA Slovakian operation.

2. Traces were requested on SLAH in SALZ-404, and were received in FRAN F 3381, FRAN G 3587, and WASH F 43223. We would appreciate any significant additional information on DISCOUR's previous use of the man (FRAN G 3587).

2 - Wash
2 - Vien
2 - Sals

MA S-W-460
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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SECURITY INFORMATION

MASA-1787

18 June 1952

Chief, EE

Chief of Station, Vienna

Operational

GROSSBAHN - Subject of MASA-1786

Reference- MASA-1786

Subject of reference is SIC-09, whose use as an accompanying courier in the GROSSBAHN Slovakian operation is planned.

2 - Wash
2 - Wien
2 - Salzburg

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2) (A) Privacy
- (2) (B) Methods/Sources
- (2) (G) Foreign Relations

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DATE 2005

7
20 FEB 1956

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1	EE/AD/C
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3	CH/NO
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19 JUNE 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

UT 85338

TO:

FROM: **SECRET**

OPERATIONS

EE/SO/C

3508

ROUTINE

EE (1-4)

1104Z 21 JUN 52

INFORMATION:

RI (5-6), AD/SO (7), OPS (8), S/C (9-10-11), STC (12), DDP (13)

WASH 46688

TO: **SECRET**

INFO: FRANK, SALES

CITE: WASH

EE: **SECRET** 8302 (IN 12007)

ALAZ PAULOVIC, ANTON CASTA, KARL SENCICRAST,
MAJOR JURAJ MICHAEL ZIGO SALES INTEREST. PAULOVIC
REPORTED UNBALANCED, INSECURE, TROUBLE MAKER.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
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Date: 2005

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DATE 6 OCT 1951		

EE/PC/C

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. X
EE/SO/C

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SECRET
TOP SECRET

MASA-1843

7 July 1952

Chief, EE

Chief of Station, Vienna

Operational

GROSSBAHN - Subject of MASA-1844

Reference- MASA-1844

The subject of reference is SLAC of the DYCLUCK sponsored clandestine Slovakian radio project run by GROSSBAHN through SLAA.

2 - Wash
2 - Vien
1 - Salz 101 (F-1a VIII)
1 - Salz 101 (F-1a III)
1 - Salz chrono

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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20 FEB 1956
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1	SDIA
2	SDIA
3	C420110
4	BOARD
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JUL 9 1952
 alu
 CIC
 C/C
 ps

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

8 JULY 1952

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 88973

TO: SAIZBURG, VIENNA [] EE SO A 2695

FROM: OPERATIONS [] FOXTAIL 2122Z 8 JUL 52

EE (1,4)

INFORMATION: RI (5-6) AD/SO (7) OPS (8) STC (9) S/C (10-11-12)

WASH 49037

TO: SAIZ F INFO: VIEN F CITE: WASH F

RE: SAIZ 466 (IN 16531)

PERMISSION GRANTED: CHANGE EXEMPTS [] IN VIEW OF PARA 2
 NARA 1775 WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS FUTURE USE SIR-OL? DO YOU INTEND USE
 AUSTRIA OR CSR? POUCH REPLY.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
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EE SO

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION

EE SO A COPY NO. 1

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Via: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPA NO. MASA-1876

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna *Salz*
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
 SPECIFIC— USAGE Operational Personnel
Ref: MASA-1877

DATE: 16 July 1952

*N/S
N/D*

1. Since we have unfortunately not as yet been able to digest all the USAGE records inherited from POB and at the same time keep up with current matters, we are forwarding you a copy of an interim summary of USAGE operational contacts (SLZ/5434) which was prepared in April. Progress is being made on putting the USAGE operations into notebook form, and we devoutly hope that before too long we will be able to give Headquarters a more organized and up to date picture of all contacts by true name and cryptonym.

2. The contacts listed in SLZ/5434 are further identified in the attachment to MASA-1877 (SLZ/5435).

[]

Distribution
2-Wash w/attach
2-Vien
3-Salz - 101 (E-1)
 101 (A-1)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

✓

FORM NO. 51-28 A **IR COPY**
MAR. 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

6-6-8-33

AP

MASA-1876

CLASSIFICATION

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Attention: HKTOMZ
Chief of Station, Vienna

16 July 1952

AQUAZED

Austrian Identity Card Collection

Ref: GS-A-3001

1. The attached memorandum, prepared by principal agent GROESBACH of Salzburg Base, may be of some assistance to the addressees of reference dispatch in looking for representative issues of the Austrian Identity Cards. You will notice also that in a few instances the spelling of the place names has been corrected.

2. GROESBACH expects to begin furnishing completed documents, initially from the Salzburg area, shortly, and is also preparing instructional material on the proper completion of the various Austrian individual documents.

3. We have asked G-2 USA for assistance in procuring completed Austrian or photocopies, and they have offered to collect all the documents of the Austrians employed by the CGS installations in Linz and Salzburg and to loan them to us for one working day. Thus, if you could send down a well briefed photographer for two days—one for Salzburg and one for Linz—we could obtain a significant number of valid documents for photographing. Please let us know if you are interested in this idea, and, if so, give us at least several days advance notice as to when we might expect your representatives here to handle the photography.

4. G-2 has also suggested that we brief the U.S. Military Permit Officer in Salzburg on the problem. They believe that he might be able and willing to furnish, on loan, documents of interest for photocopying. We will explore this possibility.

Distribution

- 2-HKTOMZ w/inal
- 1-Fran "
- 2-Vien "
- 2-Wash "
- 1-MOS
- 1-DYLOTH
- 1-DICLOCK, Vien (w/attach & G-T-A-3001)
- 3-Salz 22
- 101 (1-1)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 5(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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1	2
3	3 OCT 1955

gph

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Date: 2005

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
For: NETOPAZ
Chief of Station, Vienna

17 July 1952

AURIC

MASA-1892

Request for Deutsche Kennkarte

1. A completed Deutsche Kennkarte is requested for an agent of Salzburg Base for use for approximately one month in Germany. During this period the agent (Agent SLAG of the QUASSBANK operation) will not be engaged in intelligence activities. The necessary personalia for the completion of the Kennkarte are attached.

2. We are forwarding this request to you by hand, and would appreciate your expediting the completed document by similar means if possible.

- 2 - NETOPAZ (2 enc.) By hand
- 1 - Fran
- 2 - Wash
- 2 - Vien
- 1 - Sala chrono
- 1 - 101 F-1 & IV
- 1 - 101 N-2 (enc.)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

1	1
AS	1955
6	

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

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CONFIDENTIAL
AGENT REPORT

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Arrest of Czech Refugees by StB in the CSR

2. DATE SUBMITTED

30 July 1952

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NO.

CIC Salzburg

Ref. No. S-14411 CET/par

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

The following information was submitted to this Agent on 24 July 1952 by Informant 3784-T (Evaluation: "C"), who obtained the material from Jan KMEC, CSR refugee residing DP Camp 1001, Wels, Land Upper Austria, who in turn obtained the information from an unnamed Catholic priest who recently visited DP Camp 1001. (Evaluation: sub-Sources "F").

(Information: 3)

During the period of late June and early July 1952 the following named Czechoslovak refugees who had previously fled the CSR to the comparative safety of the US Zone of Austria were apprehended and arrested by the StB (STATNI BEZPECNOSTI - State Secret Security Corps) as they attempted to return to the CSR for unknown reasons.

Anton "Tono" CASTA ←

Peter PAVLOVIC

Oliver STANKOVSKY

Ernest STRECHANSKY or STRECANSKY - 88062

Alexander TIHLARIK

FILE CHECK:

AGENT REPORT, CIC, Sub-Detachment "A", dated 22 January 1952, (Ref. No. S-12348), Subject: "Czech Group Allegedly Working for US Intelligence Agencies", states that on 21 November 1951 Ernest STRECANSKY and Hugo SPICKA, CSR refugees, allegedly departed Salzburg for Germany where they were to work for a US intelligence agency.

AGENT REPORT, CIC, Sub-Detachment "A", dated 6 November 1952, (Ref. No. S-11754), Subject: "STRECHANSKY Ernest, Possible Czech Intelligence Personality", mentions that STRECANSKY as an employee of Radio Free Europe in Salzburg was asking suspicious questions of CSR refugees concerning their anti-Communist acquaintances. He was known to have exhibited considerable interest in the "White Legion", an anti-Communist organization comprised of Czechoslovak refugees, and the KOVANDA

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

CLYDE E. TAYLOR, S/A CIC

430th CIC Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Clyde E. Taylor

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

WD 341

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2005

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246
By: Mc Date: 8/20/85

Arrest of Czech Refugees by
StB in the CSR

Secret
30 July 1952

CIC Salzburg
Ref. No. S-14411 CET/par

Group, which allegedly gathers intelligence information for a
US agency in Germany (C-3)

AGENT REPORT, CIC, Sub-Detachment "B", dated 10 December
1951, (Ref. No. L-24652), Subject: "Radio Free Europe - Theft
of Documents", discloses that one (fnu) STRECKANSKY, who had
been employed by RFE as a secretary, allegedly confiscated
some confidential documents from the RFE office in Salzburg.

(C-3)

AGENT REPORT, CIC, Sub-Detachment "B", dated 31 January
1952, (Ref. No. L-25214), Subject: "Robert VALUCH - Representa-
tive of Radio Free Europe in Salzburg, Austria", reports in-
formation furnished by Alexander TIHLARIK, CSR refugee residing
in Salzburg, to the effect that VALUCH is engaged in illegal
activities in the Salzburg area.

(F-6)

USFA Information Report, 7669 MIS Sub-Detachment "B",
dated 14 June 1951, Subject: "TIHLARIK, Alexander, born 26
February 1933 in Borsky Svaty Jur, CSR", states that TIHLARIK
arrived illegally in Austria from the CSR on 4 June 1951.

TWX MIS and CIC, Vienna to MIS and CIC, Linz and Salzburg,
dated 25 July 1951, (Ref. No. 251505), lists Peter PAVLOVIC as
a partially processed Slovak refugee sent to the US Zone of
Austria on 25 July 1951.

AGENT REPORT, CIC, Sub-Detachment "A", dated 4 April 1952,
(Ref. No. S-13029), Subject: "Slovaks Allegedly Operating on
Behalf of the RIS in Austria", states that Oliver STANKOVSKY
is allegedly in the employ of one Ernest STRECKANSKY and is paid
2,000 Schilling as well as room and board.

USFA Information Report, 7669 MIS Detachment, dated 13
December 1951, (Ref. No. S-9997-51), states that Oliver
STANKOVSKY, born 14 April 1930 in Zahorska Bystrica, Bratislava,
CSR, arrived illegally in Austria in September 1951.

- 2 -

CLYDE E. TAYLOR, S/A CIC
430th CIC Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

Clyde E. Taylor

Secret Security Information []

Arrest of Czech Refugees by
StB in the CSR

Secret

Security Information
30 July 1952

CIC Salzburg
Ref. No. S-14411 CET/par

USFA Information Report, 7669 MIS, Sub-Detachment "A", dated 23 January 1952, (Ref. No. S-1021-52), reports that one Jan KMEC, Slovak refugee born 12 August 1918 in Stara Lubovna, Jarabina, CSR, arrived illegally in Austria on 16 January 1952.

AGENT'S NOTES:

The above information is submitted because the Undersigned believes that if the five named refugees have actually been intercepted by Czech authorities they will, after debriefing the men, attempt to trade them their freedom in exchange for their acceptance to work as Czech intelligence operatives in the US Zone of Austria. In the event that any of the above-mentioned personalities appear in Salzburg they will be subjected to a detailed interrogation in an effort to prove or disprove whether they are actually operating for the CIS.

DISTRIBUTION:

6 - Hq 430th CIC
1 - CIC Sub-Det "B"
1 - CIC Sub-Det "C"
1 - Files

- 3 -

CLYDE E. TAYLOR, S/A CIC
430th CIC Sub-Det "A" (Salzburg)

Secret

Security Information

Clyde E. Taylor

RTS

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1 AUGUST 52

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 24156

ROUTING	
1	SOIA
2	SOIA
3	CHRONO
4	
5	C/EE
6	EE/SO
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP FRANKFURT
 SSALZ
 INFORMATION: EE (1-6), RI (7-8), CF1 (9), OPS (10), STC (11), S/C (12-13-14)

ROUTINE
 1644Z 01 AUGUST 52

FRAN 5266

TO: SSALZ INFO: DIR VIEN CITE: SFRAN
 REF: WASA-1908.
 FOR ID

ATTACHMENT UNSATISFACTORY. SEND PLAIN BACKGROUND STUDIO
 PHOTO 45 BY 55 MILLIMETERS. LEFT EAR MUST SHOW MORE THAN RIGHT.
 ENCLOSE NEGATIVE IF AVAILABLE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
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 Date: 2005

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
 DATE 6 OCT 1955

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(44)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

above
RG AUG 7 1952
5 August 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 95389

1	SOLH
2	30/10/52
3	C
4	BOARD
5	PC/C
6	
7	
8	

TO: SALESBO, INFO VITRA, STAMFORD, LUNICH L □ IE/SO/A 2695

FROM: OPERATIONS ROUTINE
EE (1-6) 0238Z 6 AUG 52

INFORMATION: RI (7-8-9), CFI (10), OPS (11), STC (12), CPP (13),
S/C (14-15-16), DDP (17)

WASH 13268

TO: SSAL *NS* INFO: SVIN, SPAN, SMIN OPER: DR

RE: SALE 517 (IN 24023) *ND*

THRU/CTV/VY

1. CAPTURE OF COURIERS SEE'S BEST LAST ASSETS IN DECLASSIFIED SLAA OPERATION.
2. DECLASSIFIED HAS RECENTLY ^{DECIDED} ~~ACCEPTED~~ SUPPORT RADIO ACTIVITIES VIA ICB UNTIL OWN FACILITIES ESTABLISHED.
3. REQUESTED □ □ VICTIM LOG DISCUSSES RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND BEST DISPOSITION SLAA OPS. CABLE RECOMMENDATIONS.
4. REQUEST YOUR OPINION FEASIBILITY CARRIAGE SLAA AND SEC-08.
5. FROM: PASS REF NOB.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

□	□	□
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DATE 6 OCT 1955		

EE/RC/CI IE/SO/CI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IE/SO/A
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WASH 13268

SECRET
OF DEFENSE INFORMATION

MASA-1980

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
FOR: MKTOPAZ
Chief of Station, Vienna

14 August 1952

AQUATIC

GROSSEBAHN - Request for German Kennkarte

Reference- MASA-1908; SFRAN-5266

GROOVY/HIWAY

MASA-1980

Inclosed are passport photos believed to meet the specifications outlined in second reference. We are most anxious to receive the completed Kennkarte at the earliest convenient moment.

- 2 - MKTOPAZ (2 enc.)
- 2 - Fran
- 2 - Wash
- 2 - Vien
- 1 - Salz chrono
- 1 - Salz 101 F-1 a IV
- 1 - Salz 101 H-2

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources.
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

AS	6	OCT 1952
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2005

14 Aug 1952

19 August 1952

MEMORANDUM

1. Effective as early as is convenient for you, all P/ reports other than OB will be submitted typed on paper with six carbon copies. The body of the report will be strictly without:

a. Cross reference to P/ or other reports, or

b. Operational information of any kind - i.e., source cryptonyms; status of subsource; method of obtaining the information; previous connections or implication of any of the subjects, sources, or subsources with our or operations; or to briefs from me or

2. Necessary reference to data, other than personality traces (see para 3f below), previously submitted will be made, in the body of the report, in the form of source or subsource comment as is presently being done in the OB P/ reports. These comments will be keyed, as on the OB reports, by a system of asterisks to the cover sheet described below.

3. Each report will carry a cover sheet similar to the OB P/ report cover sheet except that it will contain considerable more operational detail than the OB report cover sheets. This will unfortunately place a serious additional burden on you, at least initially, but it will be necessary in view of the wider variety of less well known subsources and the nature of the material reported - counter intelligence for the most part. In addition to the information now included on OB report cover sheets, the cover sheets of non OB P/ reports will contain:

a. Method of obtaining the report - i.e., theft, regular informant, witting informant, unwitting informant, police report; analysis of such overt sources as press or public speeches.

b. Source identification (e.g.: PP-1, HH-1, CC-2) and detailed subsource (and, if applicable, sub-subsource) description, taking nothing for granted and identifying subsource sufficiently that he may be fully identified without further reference to the files.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
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Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

For example:

NOT: Subsource: "ZZ-186" or "a police subsource" or "a subsource employed as a secretary by BEDOC Innsbruck" or "an employee of Salzburger Wurstanzeiger" or "subsource" or "the principal agent of proposed Project Maldemer".

BUT: Subsource: Frl. Traum von Gestern, assistant bookkeeper in the domestic sales department of the Grödig office Weichstahl GmbH. She has been a regular, paid source for XX-1 for two and a half years, and was able to steal the information for this report from the desk of the chief bookkeeper, Karl-Heinz HEINZ.

c. Evaluation of source, subsource, and content.

(1) Content: Your evaluation, on the following scale

Documentary
Probably true
Possibly true
Doubtful
Cannot evaluate

(2) Source: Your evaluation, on the following scale, and bearing in mind that your evaluation covers not only his honesty but also his reporting competence in the subject concerned:

Thoroughly trustworthy
Usually trustworthy
Fairly trustworthy
Usually untrustworthy
Thoroughly untrustworthy

(3) Subsource: Source's evaluation of subsource on the same scale as above. If you agree with his evaluation, no further comment is required. If you disagree, add your evaluation as a comment e.g.: "Although I agree in general with ZZ-1's views as to subsource's technical competence and the accessibility to him of his material, I believe that in view of subsource's known weakness for a quick Groschen ZZ-1 is overrating his honesty."

RP

d. In the form of comment, any restrictions on the use of the material, including injunctions against its release to other friendly agencies.

e. References, keyed to source or subsource comments as on OB P/ reports.

f. Severly summarized, consolidated personality traces, included as attachments to the basic report and strictly without references. P/reports or memoranda from which traces are compiled will be listed on the cover sheet without being keyed to the traces. This procedure again will add a very large but temporary, burden. It is necessary, however, in order to build up the files of local users on your reports without maintaining an apparent continuity with the reports as they were previously handled.

4. In line with the last comment in the preceding paragraph in order to disguise further the fact that your reports are identical with the P/reports previously passed to some local users, a definite effort should be made to change the style and appearance of your reports. This does not mean that you need to labor over each report to make it grammatically and stylistically correct. You need, in fact, to give no more attention to this aspect than you normally do. However, a close duplication of our usage in the matter of setting up your pages would in itself give them an entirely new cast. Particular attention should be paid to paragraphing to achieve this effect, and the Style Book which you have been furnished should be followed as closely as possible in the matter of page composition.

5. Separate instructions on the preparation of operational reports will follow shortly.

RPG

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

1	FIH
2	FIH
3	CHRONO
4	CFIA
5	CEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 36125

15 SEPT 52

*adm
CIC
RG*

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR REP SALZBURG

ROUTINE

EE 6

1339Z 15 SEP 52

INFORMATION

DDP 2, CFI, OPS, STC, SR 2, RI 2

SALZ 618

TO: DIR INFO: SVIEN CITE: SSALZ

INTEL/HIWAY

1. GROSSBAHN SOVZONE DE OBSERVER AA-8 (MASA 1977)
SEVERAL DAYS OVERDUE FROM OBSERVER MISSION ST POELTEN AND PRESUMED MISSING. SINCE NO POLICE TRACE FOUND WOULD APPEAR SEIZED BY SOVIETS RATHER THAN AUSTRIAN POLICE.

2. ONLY OTHER CHAIN MEMBER KNOWN BY AA-8 WAS AA-3 (PARA 50 ATTACHMENT TO MASA 1877) MEMBER VERKEHRIS-UNFALLS KOMMANDO WIENER POLIZEI DIREKTION, IX BEZIRK. WE ATTEMPTING SECURE TRANSFER TO GENDARMERIE BATTALION, UPPER AUSTRIA, WHERE WOULD BE OUT OF DANGER AND ABLE ORGANIZE SUB NET RUNNING INTO SOV ZONE.

3. [] DISCUSSED SECURITY AND DISPOSAL WITH GROSSBAHN AND AA-1 ON 11 SEPT AND RECOMMENDS DISPOSAL PAY 10,000 SCHILLINGS TO AA 8 WIFE AND TWO SMALL CHILDREN. CABLED APPROVAL REQUESTED.

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

ABSTRACTED	INDEXED
DATE 3 OCT 1955	

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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Classified and Approved for Release (44)
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

Safe Hideout of STB Stool Pidgeons in the Separatist Den of Salzburg

As we learned from Slovakia, comrade Strecansky Ernest and Tihlarik Alexander, who for more than a year have been carrying out counter espionage for the STB in Austria, enjoy their successful work which they carried out sheltered by the foremost members of Fascist organizations in Salzburg.

On 18 August they were merrily drinking in the Cafe Grand in Bratislava in the company of an STB member and an official of the Ministry (Poverenictvo) of Information to whom they described their successful work.

Strecansky often crossed the Czechoslovak border under the name Horl as a collaborator Sidor. Slovak priests like Dr. Cik of Rome and Father Melzer of Vienna who sent letters to their relatives in Slovakia did not know in whom they were placing their confidence. Comrade Strecansky was very clever in his trade. With the help of a certain priest he even succeeded in getting into RFE from where he also very likely supplied his employers. Strecansky censored letters on both sides always according to the necessity and circumstance. This activity protected by the Slovak Fascists was really very successful.

When these two heroes arrived in the Village Bor Svaty Mikulas, they immediately visited their "girl friends" comrade Helen Hladikova and comrade Olga Sokolova who helped them in their work. Apparently the STB did not like this visit so they arrested them "pro forma" in the houses of their girl friends. Naturally on the next day they were free.

Maxian who was shot in June of this year and the seriously wounded Casta Anton and Pavlovic Peter, who were caught by the STB as a result of Strecansky's treason, were arrested and taken to the State Prison in Bratislava on Racarsky Road.

R.V./Capt. J.M./

Vlast Vola - No. 7, Vol. II, September 19, 1952
Published by the Association of Czechoslovak newspapermen in exile.
(Svaz Ceskoslovenskych Novinarov V. Exile)

A monthly of Czechoslovak newspapermen in Austria published according to need. Edited by a group of editors. Editor, P.O. Box 604, Editor - R.V.- Topolansky

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

passed to me by EE/PC/c
Oct 52

29 Sep 1952

TAB D

EASA-112

GROSSEBAHN - U.S. Citizenship

RELATIONS WITH NSDAP AND DENAZIFICATION

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2001, 2005

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Approximately in March 1932, when I came back from Great Britain to my brother's estate in East Prussia (on which I held certain inheritance rights) I found great difficulties in getting the Government consent for the erection of a cement factory there. At that time Germany was still nominally a democracy under Reichskanzler Brüning, and the state of Prussia was run mainly by the Sozialdemokratische Partei, Ministerpräsident in Prussia was Herr Braun. Any industrial development, especially if proposed by the nobility, met cold disapproval. German military circles, as I was well aware, were interested in developing key industries, especially in East Prussia, because this province was completely cut off from the actual Reich. I had discussions with all party leaders (from the Deutschnationale Volkspartei down to the Sozialdemokratische Partei) and found interest but no support. The then Wehrkreiskommandeur in East Prussia v. ~~Bruchmann~~ who was particularly interested in having a cement factory installed in the vicinity of the "Heilsberger Dreieck" (a planned fortification against any eastern - then it was thought Polish - occupation) thought it wise to come to an arrangement with the "coming" NSDAP. I spoke to the butler of my brother who was NSDAP Ortsgruppenleiter whether he could arrange a meeting for me with Gauleiter Koch; to this he agreed provided that I would fill out a party application. I took this matter as an inferior affair and filled out an application then. I did not meet Koch, I took part in no party affairs and only in 1934, when I was already in Palestine and the Middle East heard that I had been accepted. Even then I did not pay any attention. Somehow my "party membership" followed me through Auslandsorganisation to Palestine and I was there summoned by the Landesgruppenleiter of Palestine who rebuked me for not participating in party activity, since I was an "alter Kämpfer" (a party member pre 1933), I refused to deal with the party. When I came to Germany in 1935 and negotiated with Autounion for the general agency of this firm for the Middle East I was informed that Auslandsorganisation had refused to grant me the representation because I did not comply with party directives. In fact I had greatly insulted the Landesgruppenleiter for Palestine and the Ortsgruppenleiter for Jerusalem by telling them to go to hell. I was summoned to Amtsleiter Stempel of Auslandsorganisation at Berlin and prior to seeing him I went to East Prussia, where I through my brother's former butler, Herman Kraass, who had then become a fairly high Arbeitsfront official arranged to get my party memberbook by paying the fees back to 1932. I thought that I would thereby be protected, but when seeing Amtsleiter Stempel found that I was

*Blomberg

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

mistaken. Amtsleiter Stempel called me anything but a swine and I left in a rage after I had told him the fact that he was apparently only trying to protect his good friends the Ortsgruppenleiter and Landesleiter who had themselves applied for the Autounion representation. I left Germany and from Switzerland mailed several letters to Hess, the deputy party chief, and others demanding an investigation. Early in 1938, after my return to Germany, I was informed that I had been cleared. This "clearance" had been greatly influenced by a journalist whom I had met in Palestine in 1933, a Diplomingenieur Leopold Itz Edler von Mildenstein, whom I had stood a number of favors including a good sum of money he needed when he was in the Middle East. I had not been aware that Mildenstein was a referent of SD, and had I known such fact it would not have enlightened me at such time. Mildenstein after my return to Germany had been very friendly to me, and after my helping him financially, had brought me in contact with his chief Werner Göttisch, (fnu) Behrends and Heinz Jost. When in Germany, and after passing the examination as foreign exchange councillor, I was notified that Auslandsorganisation had still not buried the hatchet; my new friends however informed me that as long as I did not go into politics against the Reich I had little to fear. Possibly to increase their income, I met a showdown in winter 1937/1938 when I was arrested by order of Franz A. Six and accused of pro-Jewish sympathies; this happened again in 1938. In both cases I was freed by intervention of Mildenstein, Göttisch, Alfred Naujoks and Jost.

I tried hard to emigrate under the false allegation that I would be able to save my money. Finally I had everything laid on for the end of September 1939. When the war broke out I was called to the Hilfspolizei. I notified "friend" Göttisch and Naujoks who assured me that they would straighten the matter out. Already in fall 1939 I was called for a briefing to Delbrückstrasse and was there informed that I would become chief of intelligence ad interim in Rumania if I wanted to save my skin, if not I would have little chances. After paying a sum of 5,000 Reichsmark to the account of Alfred Naujoks father and a further sum of Swiss francs 10,000 to the banking account of (fnu) Sanner, the Abwehrbeauftragte with AEG, and a number of further smaller sums in favor of Göttisch and friends I was nominated by Jost to Hauptbeauftragter Rumänien and in April 1940 was informed that I had become Untersturmführer der SS, followed by two promotions until early 1941. Göttisch and his deputy Wilhelm Waneck had cooked up a story that I was a reliable "alter kampf" and as SS applicant since 1937 - a statement based on nothing.

RPS

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It was found out during my being under arrest by Gestapo from September 1942 through April 1943 that I had actually never been an SS member and that my party membership was more than dubious. For what reasons I got away I am unable to say. Possibly to save the organizational face of the SS, whose bigshots I had met, I was demoted to SS-Mann and discharged from SS, because I was unbecoming to the dignity of SS.

Previous to this act I had been asked

- a- to volunteer for Waffen SS
- b- to take over other assignments of importance abroad
- c- to run the insurrection in Irak
- d- to kiss Heydrich in a vulgar fashion
- e- to become adjutant of Berger and a good number of other proposals

which I had all declined.

I may also state that I have never been in the pay of SS or the party or the German Government, and I flatter myself that at least in this respect I am an exception. When Gestapo found this fact they seemed greatly baffled and disturbed.

As far as I can remember my party number was 984 212 dating back to sometime in 1932. The SS number assigned to me is not known; I believe that this number never existed since I never passed the prescribed SS school, it seems to me that I only was an "Ehrenführer" but am not sure, my respective Ausweise were taken away by Gestapo during my arrest together with the majority of my personal documents including diplomatic passports certificates etc. and were never returned to me.

Complying with the law I registered on 3 February 1950 with Registrierungsbehörde I. Instanz (Stadtmagistrat Salzburg) as SS Hauptsturmführer and with decision dated 9 February 1950 was exempted from registration according to para 4, Absatz 5 lit.f VG 47 because of my resistance activity. This decision became irrevocable. Thereby my full civil rights were reinstated.

TAB E

EASA-112

GROSSBAHN - U.S. Citizenship

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES

RPS

RESISTANCE

My first contacts with resistance, which actually could not be called organized, date back to the time 1933 after Hitler took over. During the years when I was not in Germany this contact remained very loose and only increased after my return (approximately in 1937). I personally had intended to emigrate to the USA and therefor participated only stronger after the outbreak of the war in September 1939 when I found that it was impossible for me to leave.

Resistance planning was somehow vague and concentrated on winning international influence and thereby counter-acting government planning. The majority of resistance interested personalities were however loyal Germans and this fact made planning and working all the more difficult. Their idea of resistance sprang from anti-nazism for economic, religious, racial or humane reasons. No overall organization could exist therefor and I made it my habit to find as many friends as possible and amending their individual anti-nazism to a scheme which I called Pan-Europeanism. Gradually a collaboration developed with Gesandter von Hentig of the Foreign Office, Direktor, Abs of the Deutsche Bank and others. (Thereby I f.i. in 1941 could arrange a meeting for Mr. Harriman with Staatssekretär von Weitzäcker at Berlin). No influence however was sufficiently large to actually help. At such time I also tried to link inter-European trade and industries together as to avoid a German predominance, I found part success in Rumania and Holland but my work was stopped cold when I fell in disfavor on 5 December 1941 and was not allowed to leave Germany again. This was followed up by my arrest in September 1942. After my release in spring 1943 my former contacts were usually scared to deal with me, I commenced to gradually build up again. But always found the terrific trouble that any type of close organization was made impossible because of supervision; this included my contacts to the 20 July circle which I estimated a thoroughly German-nationalistic affair. I found contacts with Vienna resistance clergy but also there saw no immediate possibility. In 1944 my attention was called to a small group in Tyrol by my brother in law. Then rumors existed already regarding an Alpine retreat of German nazis; I thought it worth while supporting this group which later on at least provided cover for a larger number of refugees and deserters. I finally greatly influenced the activity of this group and thereby succeeded in practically breaking up any planned German resistance, opening the way for the advancing American Army etc. until the day of the German surrender. For this activity I received one of the 47 issued "Urkunde" from the Tyrolian Landeshauptmann.

(in 1940 until a release in Feb. 1941) had
contact with the U.S. ambassador, I believe his name
was Junger.

End of April 1945 - June 1945 with 44th Division, Seventh
Army Intelligence, Division HQ. From then until end of
August 1945 with 103 Division, until December 1945 with
84 Division, commencing then work with Third Army Intelligence
and OSS, OMGB until December 1946. From June 1947 until
(date of official dissolution of connection) 31 January

the

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TAB F

EASA-112

GROSSEBHN - U.S. Citizenship

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN CITIZENSHIP STATUS

APPLICATION for AUSTRIAN CITIZENSHIP

In March 1947 I applied for Austrian citizenship thru my legal friend Dr. Heinrich Brodfeld of Vienna. My application was recommended by the Minister for Trade (Handelsminister) Dr. Kolb in person. My application was then filed with Salzburg Landesregierung. After a considerable time I was informed by Landesrat Weisskind that my file, when being sent to Vienna, had come into Russian hands and that the MVD chief of Vienna had asked Helmer (Min. for Interior) not to grant my application. I have never been able to get a definite confirmation for this allegation. Much later I was informed through Weisskind and later by Dr. Kwisda of the Landesregierung that actually my file was held up by a letter from Ministerialrat Pammer, ~~in~~ who allegedly after contacting CIC had found that I was undesirable. I have personally seen the Pammer letter in my file; the citizenship could pass at any time if Pammer would ~~cancel~~ his letter ~~back~~. The letter only generally states that Abteilung II of the Ministerium für Inneres (Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit) does not consider it desirable that I became a citizen although I had been cleared by denazification. Since this letter is already some years old now it could easily be revoked (and Pammer takes paying advice). **

*revoke

GERMAN CITIZENSHIP

Since the end of the war I have never claimed German citizenship, and it has been much longer that I have described myself German. During my stay in Germany after 1945 I have lived there as an Austrian (assuming that this was correct).

With my application for my Austrian citizenship I have given a written statement that I am stateless and do not claim German citizenship nor would I do so. Although such declaration could be merely a file matter I consider it absolutely correct and will do so in the future.

** Landeshauptmann KLAUS assured me that my citizenship would be granted on the day when the land can decide without asking the Ministry; this according to law would be on 27 April 1955 (ten years after the reinstallation of the Provisorische Staatsregierung in Österreich). The law requires a permanent stay for 10 years (the German occupation time does not count), in which case the Land can grant citizenship.

RPS

Chief, KE

30 September 1952

Chief of Station, Vienna

~~Operational~~

GROSSBAHN - Vehicle Procurement

GROOVY/HIMAY

1. We have been attempting since taking GROSSBAHN over to devise a means of procuring a vehicle for him. His efficiency and that of his case officer suffer by his lack of personal transportation, meeting arrangements are less flexible and less secure, and his freedom and scope of movement is seriously hampered. Unfortunately, Austrian tax and import regulations are so stringent that there appears to be no way out. He can not purchase a vehicle without facing tax authorities' questions on where the funds came from, non-Austrians are forbidden to give automobiles to Austrians, purchase in Germany is out for the same reasons. This is doubly unfortunate since Salzburg Base occasionally has vehicles which have worn down to pretty much of a nub and are surplus to the station T/E. We would be delighted to transfer one such vehicle to GROSSBAHN, but cannot devise the method for doing so.

2. Recently GROSSBAHN had an opportunity to rent a somewhat aged but still competent Opel for a year or longer from a Salzburg resident who is leaving the country for an undetermined period. The rental proposed was AS 500 monthly, plus insurance and taxes. The taxes for a car older than 1942 are around AS 400 annually, and insurance—depending on the car and the coverage—between AS 1,200 and AS 2,400 yearly. This adds up to approximately \$26.00, which admittedly is an expensive solution. However, this is a good half what renting a car commercially would amount to, and in the absence of a means of transferring a vehicle to him the savings in his time and that of his case officer should represent a substantial saving for the organization. This opportunity got away from us before we could request approval, and it is not likely that too many such opportunities will crop up. For these reasons, we are requesting prior approval for the expenditure of up to \$30.00 per month for this purpose should another such proposal be made.

* per month


Distribution

2-Wash
2-Vien
1-Salz #30
1-Salz #101
1-Salz chrono

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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 by the Central Intelligence Agency
 Date: 2005



RPF

COURIER

SECRET

EGT-A-208

Chief of Base, Salzburg
Chief, MKTOPAZ

14 October 1952

Documentation for Baron Otto Bolschwing

REF: W/O #5593

1. A Temporary Travel Document is enclosed for subject in accordance with your request. An exit cachet from Germany and an entry cachet from the Salzburg Bahnhof have been placed in the document.
2. According to regulations, the Permit to Enter Austria may have a validity of only six months. Upon the expiration of the Permit, forward the TTD to MKTOPAZ for extension of the entry permit.
3. Bearer should sign document on Page 4, below his photo.

Dist:

- 2 - SALZ w/att.
- 1 - VIEN
- ✓ 1 - EE
- 3 - COM
- 2 - MKTOPAZ

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Date: 2005

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET

RI COPY

32-1-37 HC

229

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-198

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Attention:
Chief of Station, Vienna

DATE: 16 October 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC— GROSSBAHN - Operational Instructions

ND
ND

1. The attachments, as listed below, are to complete your records on formalized operational reporting instructions passed to GROSSBAHN. The PRQ Part I form, which is not listed here, and which was passed to him during POB's handling of the case, duplicates the DYCLEMATIS form.

- a. Project Form: Similar to the DYCLEMATIS form, but with some minor variations introduced by .
- b. PRQ Part II: Worked out between GROSSBAHN and with somewhat more detail than the DYCLEMATIS PRQ Part II form, and in the German language.
- c. Non-OB P/ Report Instructions: Memorandum of 19 August 1952 from to GROSSBAHN containing instructions designed to simplify the processing of non-OB reports at Salzburg Base.
- d. Contact Report Outline: Identical with the contact reporting outline in general staff use in the Austrian Station.
- e. Berichtsschema fur Zusammenkunfte: GROSSBAHN's version in the German language of the Contact Report Outline.

2. So far, out of these various instructions, GROSSBAHN has passed only the Berichtsschema on to AA-1. He will from time to time pass on other of these instructions to AA-1 and to other of his reliable principal agents as they become needed. GROSSBAHN himself has now begun using the contact reporting outline as a matter of routine, and AA-1 has promised to do the same.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Distribution

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- 1-Salz #101
- 1-Salz #101 I-1
- 1-Salz chrono

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FORM NO. 51-28 A

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005 11 01

	Req. Action Req.	by cable	(Check one)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	See para _____	by pouch	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Req. Comments Req.	by cable	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	See para _____	by pouch	RF
<input type="checkbox"/>	For info and files		

Chief, EE

30 September 1952

Chief of Station, Vienna

Operational

GROSSBAHN - Vehicle Procurement

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
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RPF

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Date: 2005

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(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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32-1-37-4C
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(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

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FROM : Attention:
Chief of Station, Vienna

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FORM NO. 51-28 A

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	(Check one)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Action Req.	by cable
<input type="checkbox"/> See para _____	by pouch
<input type="checkbox"/> Comments Req.	by cable
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> See para _____	by pouch
<input type="checkbox"/> For info and files	

RF

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21 October 1952 G-133

Handwritten:
Hoc...
pat.

SUBJECT: Meeting between CC 2 and HH 1 on 16 October 1952

I. Opening of Meeting:

a. How and for when arranged:

HH 1 came to Salzburg on 16 October 1952 in order to arrange for the printing of his planned "Ober-oesterreichische Hauszeitung". At about 1230 hours he called me by phone (26534) and proposed a meeting at platform 7 of Salzburg main railroad station at 1730 hours.

b. Date, time, and place held:

The conversation was started at 1730 hours at the pre-arranged place and was continued in the Arlberg express restaurant car, where no other guests were present.

II. Production:

III. Operational Matters:

a. I urged HH 1 to intensify his endeavors to find new personnel suitable for collecting military intelligence in Buehviertel and especially Lower Austria. His method of procedure should be to carefully search for such persons, collect details on them however without disclosing himself, and forward results to us. Upon our decision he would then inform in detail the persons chosen by us.

b. I informed HH 1 that we definitely expect him to meet our request, since present information submitted by him is of little interest to us. HH 1 promised to do his best. He only objected that the persons he could possibly find would mostly reside in Upper Austria and therefore would have to travel to the places they have to reconnoitre. I replied that this would mean no hindrance.

COPY

Handwritten:
209
2510

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Date: 2005

c. I informed HH 1 that his recent reports on VÖEST were of no value because of lacking accuracy. HH 1 apologized by stating that any access to the VÖEST files had become impossible to him, since he was moved from Generaldirektion by HITZINGER and transferred to an unimportant Linz plumber firm affiliated to VÖEST. Despite all endeavors he sees little chances to become reemployed by VÖEST Generaldirektion through his SPOs connections. Since he has no acquaintances he could consider trustworthy, he does not dare to ask anybody for detailed information regarding internal VÖEST matters. He stated however that he would try to find somebody who could collect information for him on VÖEST Generaldirektion.

IV. Operational Factors:

a. Operational security:

-

b. Agent training:

-

c. Control:

-

d. CE Aspects:

I urged HH 1 to be extremely careful in his connection with Alois WIESINGER, since the latter's contact with the Communist Party seems to be very close.

e. Commo.:

-

V. Biographical Details and Personal Factors:

-

VI. Supply and Support:

-

VII. Close of Meeting:

a. Time and circumstances of close of meeting:

I left the train at Attnang-Puchheim at 1900 hours and went on to Altmuenster.

b. Arrangements for new meeting:

A new meeting was arranged for the afternoon of Saturday, 25 October 1952, at my Altmuenster home.

229
L-1-2-11

Extract from EASA-226 dated 24 October 1952
(Salz Progress Report 1 July - 30 Sept. 52)

p. 4

paragraph 3 B

"The GROSSBAHN operations have suffered a few setbacks during the period - primarily the loss of the Slovak operation in toto, and the arrest of one Sovzone OB courier observer, AA-8. All concerned felt that the Slovak operation was a bad risk from the start and that it was the type of sponsored-group operation which we plan consciously to avoid in the future. The arrest of AA-8 was not an unmitigated disaster, since [] as a result of this arrest met AA-1, and AA-1 has agreed to submit himself and his agents to CARRIAGE testing and to conform to strict reporting standards-- including contact reporting and full PRQs Parts I and II, as well as operational clearance procedures. A contact in Vienna has been arranged to forward such operational communications by pouch to Salzburg. SLAG, who was compromised in Vienna, is now in the U.S. Zone of Austria, and we are laying plans to use SLAG as a trainer for bilingual Hungarian Slovaks to be dispatched overland into Hungary. Thus we hope to succeed in tying in this aspect of the GROSSBAHN operation to our principle target in a closely controlled manner. Little progress has been made in locating better indigenous staff assets for GROSSBAHN beyond the recent location and assessment of a prospective secretary. Other major problems are: secure office space for GROSSBAHN and transportation, both of which are under active study and tentative solutions for which have been forwarded. A proposal has been forwarded to Washington relative to bringing GROSSBAHN to the States to acquire U.S. citizenship, which would eliminate many of the thorny problems which are plaguing the operation today. [] met with GROSSBAHN on 15 July and adds his favorable impressions of the agent to those of [], [], [] and []


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Date: 2005



28 Oct 52

Note for GROSSBAHN File

SALZ 714 (IN 46673) asks for clearance to do police checks & surveillance thru Grossbahn.

SALZ 737 (IN 47964) Re CVRK, KANDRAC, MICUDIK. (being sponsored by private US group in attempt to spring O.)

ref.
SALZ 739 (IN 48133) Refers to DIR 25397 (OUT 64338). GROSSBAHN POLICE ACTION NOW CONFINED HOTEL AND TRAVEL CHECKS. PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OR EVEN APPARENTLY ROUTINE POLICE QUESTIONING CVRK, KANDRAC, MICUDIK OR OTHERS MIGHT BE FEASIBLE AND ADVISABLE..... ALSO EXPLORING POSSIBILITY PUTTING ... ROOM NEXT WIDENERS (WHICH GROSSBAHN HAS SECURED).

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

RPF

EE/112

EE

OUT65075

28 October 1952

TO: Chief, Plans
FROM: Chief, EE
SUBJECT: Funds for Office Space for GROSSBAHN

1. The GROSSBAHN project is being written up for approval and will be submitted within the next day or so. GROSSBAHN (formerly known as USAGE) was originally an agent of Zipper. In early 1950 he became an agent of the Pullach Operations Base, and in the spring of 1952 was turned over to the Salzburg Operations Base. Submission of the project for approval has been held up pending the receipt of full PRQ's on the principal GROSSBAHN sub-agents. Full operational clearance for GROSSBAHN has been granted.

2. We have been asked to make an immediate decision on the expenditure of funds to procure secure office space for GROSSBAHN. The request is deemed urgent, because office space in Salzburg is at a great premium, and a possibility has come up which must be decided on right away. The present office quarters occupied by GROSSBAHN are not considered very secure.

3. The proposed new office space involves a six month payment of rental in advance. Approval, as embodied in paragraph 1 of attached cable, is therefore requested for the expenditure of up to \$800 to cover office rent and utilities for a six month period for GROSSBAHN. This will be included in the project outline.

*OK. approved as
operations of
pullach operations.*

RECEIVED IN MSG CTR AS ATTACHMENT TO OUTGOING CABLE.
RETURNED TO EE.

W 29 Oct

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- (2)(A) Privacy
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Date: 2005

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35-82

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 OCT '52

*also
CIC
RG*

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 65075

ROUTING	
1	FIA
2	FIA
3	C
4	
5	CAF
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: SEN REP AUSTRIA (GALL, VIND)
FROM: DIRECTOR

IF FIA 2695

ROUTINE

EE 6

2147Z 29 OCT '52

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/CD, FI/RI/2

DIR 25841

TO: SCALF INFO: SVEIN CITE: DIR
RE: FASA 106 ET AL
INTEL/GRCOVY

1. INITIAL AMBASSADOR FOR GROSSMAN APPROVED. OFFICE AND UTILITY EXPENSES UP TO \$800 FOR SIX MONTH PERIOD AUTHORIZED. NO TRACES INDIVIDUALS LISTED EASA 117.
2. APPROVAL BEING REQUESTED GROSSMAN VEHICLE. POUCH POLICY RE: FASA 112.
3. DISAPPROVAL PROPOSED USE SEAC WHO UNDOUBTEDLY BELONG TRU COMM. MISID SLOVAK OP (FASA 1776 ET AL).
4. PLS SUBMIT HQ PART II ON AA-1 AND HE-1.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 3	OCT 1955

LE/FI/FO

CHIEF, FI PLANS

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SECURITY INFORMATION

IF FIA

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RG

INFORMATION

KASA-2140

Chief, EE

29 October 1952

Chief of Station, Vienna

Operational/GROOVY

GROSSEBAHN - Contact Report on Meeting of GROSSEBAHN with HH-1

1. Attention is invited specifically to Para III of attached report. This reflects our trend with GROSSEBAHN to attempt to work him into a position where he is making more of a contribution to the overall REDCAP effort. In reference to his closing remarks under paragraph III b, we plan to point out to him at the next meeting that we feel he was mistaken in stating to HH-1 that recruitment of non-Govsone residents to reconnoiter the Soviet area is satisfactory. We have found the courier/observer type sub-Agent somewhat unsatisfactory and are convinced that a high priority target such as REDCAP stands little chance of success if the basic groundwork must rely on this type operation. Thus, we plan to inform GROSSEBAHN that he should place emphasis, with his people, on the recruitment, in place, of residents of the Soviet area, preferably those having some degree of contact with or access to Soviet personnel.

Distribution

- 2-Wash w/incl
- 2-Vien w/incl (Attn. L)
- 1-Salz chrono
- 3-Salz 101

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3 OCT 1955

204

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*RC
Grossbahn file*

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SLZ/7011

Chief of Station, Vienna
Attention:
Chief, Salzburg Base

29 October 1952

Administrative
GROSSBAHN Finances

Reference: ADM/2117

1. With reference to your communication about a charge to Salzburg Base for KCS 71,045 for GROSSBAHN, I find that some action in this matter was taken in SLZ/5708. For your convenience, following is a pertinent quotation from that memorandum:

"3. Accompanying this memorandum are a Requisition for Funds and Disbursement Voucher from POB in the amount of KCS 71,045.00 and a photocopy of a note acknowledging receipt of this sum by a GROSSBAHN representative..... The above-mentioned documents are sent to you in support of the T/A which you presumably have received from POB."

2. Inasmuch as the transfer of the funds has been handled in this rather unusual fashion, do you feel that the KCS should still be picked up, and charged off simultaneously, on the next Salzburg accounting? To do so would present something of a problem in view of the elapsed time and our lack of a receipt or any supporting paper.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DIST: 3-Vien
1-File #28
1-Chrono File

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(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

1205

GR to EAVA 825

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FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING	
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1 NOV 52

above
CIC
RG

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 49629

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

ROUTINE

EE 6

1400Z 1 NOV 52

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/CD, SR 2, FI/RI 2

SSALZ 757

TO: SVIEN INFO: DIR CITE: SSALZ

REF: VIEN 8660 (IN 47403)

INTEL/REDCAP

1. SUBJECT ARRIVED ROTER KREBS-20 OCTOBER. DEPARTED 27 OCTOBER BEFORE WE BRIEFED.
2. GROSSBAHN PRIMED FOR OP. RECOMMEND REASSIGNMENT SUBJECT TO JOB NEAR BUT NOT IN SALZ (EG ST WOLFGANG) SOONEST WITH SUFFICIENT TIME FOR US ARRANGE CONTACT. GROSSBAHN ON LEAVE O/A 7 TO 21 NOV 52. RECRUITMENT MUST BE BEFORE OR AFTER. PREFER BEFORE.
3. DET 35 GOT ON TRACK SUBJECT THRU BADEN PHOTOS PASSED THEM BY SUNDIN. AT OUR REQUEST DROPPING EXPLORATION. THIS HAS NO CONNECTION OUR MISSING SUBJECT.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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7

SLZ-7069

Chief of Station, Vienna
Attention:
Walter Salzburg Base
GROSSBAHN's Austrian Citizenship

14 November 1952

EASA-196, 1041-112

1. The time has apparently come when we will have to resolve the question of GROSSBAHN's Austrian Citizenship. We have discussed the question with him on numerous occasions and in considerable detail. All agree the question of citizenship, as far as his value to us is fairly academic. He, at the same time, does not wish to take a step which might eventually interfere with his hope of eventually acquiring U.S. citizenship. We fail to see where citizenship status will have much bearing on this latter question as he will have to be admitted to the U.S. under special provisions in any event.

2. There are some personal and operational reasons why we feel it would be a good idea for him to acquire Austrian citizenship. Firstly, his son, being under documentation age, has been able to register himself in school as the son of an Austrian citizen. The son's 14th birthday is coming up in about three months time, when he will be required to secure his own identity document. As you can see, the problem is going to become somewhat complex and embarrassing, and the son will, unless GROSSBAHN gets Austrian citizenship in the meantime, probably be declared a German citizen--for GROSSBAHN an odious thought.

3. Operationally, having Austrian citizenship will facilitate GROSSBAHN's travel and permit him to move around more freely with less suspicion. At the present he travels with a TD. These documents have become so well known that they are practically a flag indicator of an intelligence personnel. An Austrian passport with necessary visas will render him considerably less conspicuous, and it will also simplify some of his residence problems.

4. As stated in attachment to EASA-196, GROSSBAHN claims has put the "fix" in on his citizenship application because of the described fiasco dating back several years. The problem

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

ref to EAVA 1041

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is how to get []'s disapproval removed without endangering GROSSEBACH's security. We are at a loss to guess how this could be accomplished and ask that Vienna look into the matter and advise what, if anything, can be done. We wish to caution against any premature overtures to [] displaying undue DIOCLAIH interest in the GROSSEBACH case, without due consideration of the security problems involved. We also ask that Vienna advise us of possibilities before taking any action.

Distribution

3-Vien
1-Sals chrono
2-Sals 101

REF to EAVA 1041

RPS

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NOV 13 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 NOV 52

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IN 13830

ROUTING	
1	FIZ
2	FIA
3	CHRYSD
4	FIC
5	CFE
6	QFI
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*above
CIC via
JEN-tn*

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

RG - you had ref

FROM: SR. REP. FRANKFURT

ROUTINE

EE 6

1800Z 13 NOV 52

INFORMATION DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/CD, FI/RI 2

FRAN 8723

TO: SPULL INFO: DIR CITE: SFRAN

RE: SPULL 4443 (IN 13129)

NO TRACE SASIMA OR MELCER.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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20 NOV 52

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IN 14629

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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

RG

FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

ROUTINE

EE 6

2141Z 20 NOV 52

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, PP 2, SR 2, FI/RI 2

SALZ 814

TO: SVIEN INFO: DIR CITE: SSALZ

REDCAP

RECOMMEND HOTEL BRAUNER BAER LINZ FOR AMSUESS (ALSO RCVD
AMSUKSS) MEETING GROSSBAHN. PREFER TWO DAYS NOTICE GROSSBAHN.

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ATR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. FAS-W-02

CLASSIFICATION

NOV 26 1952

TO : Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: _____

FROM : Chief, ER

INFO: VIEN

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC - GROSSBAHN - CC-2

USMC - Hunter

PT

Reference: LASA 205, 225

1. The CC-2 - HOETTL relationship is one of great concern here and we have not been completely reassured by the contents of LASA 225.

2. It is not entirely clear from this and as to the exact nature of CC-2's duties for GROSSBAHN at the present time. In the past he has been variously described as chief assistant, reports editor, case officer etc. In SLZ 5134 he is said to handle "internal Austrian and OB reporting, briefs, and follow ups". If this situation is still true, then he would seem to be completely au courant of everything going on within GROSSBAHN's office. Although not expressly stated, it appears that CC-2 has access to GROSSBAHN's files; for example the background information on Theodor ALBERT as given by CC-2 in attachment B to LASA 205 seems to be taken directly from a report by FP-1 (P/23047). We would, therefore, much appreciate clarification as to the extent to which CC-2 has been sealed off from knowledge of GROSSBAHN's intelligence activities.

3. We realize, of course, the urgent need which GROSSBAHN has for CC-2's services at the present time, and the danger that, if dropped, the latter might fall like a ripe plum into the lap of Bonn. On the other hand, GROSSBAHN is being used increasingly to provide support of one sort or another to our operations in Austria, and a penetration by HOETTL could naturally have widespread implications for other DECLAIM projects such as REDCAP.

4. In an effort to look into the CC-2 - HOETTL matter from another angle, we have reviewed the HOETTL file here, a task which has yielded some possible leads. The following is quoted from HQ-W-301 of 12 September 1952 (not sent to Vienna or Salzburg):

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SERIALIZED	FILED
6 JAN 1953	
COORDINATING OFFICE	

Date of Origin
18 November 1952
X REF FORM FILED

INT:

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CLASSIFICATION

EE/FIA

GPO 83-22240

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"On the occasion of HOETTL's last visit to CAPOTE at Frankfurt sometime in April 1952, CAPOTE told me he was convinced that HOETTL produced plenty of phoney reports and that he was cutting him off financially. CAPOTE said that the only intelligence of value that HOETTL produced concerned the Austrian government, but all other, namely OB, Hungarian, and Romanian political reports, reports on North Africa, Italy and Trieste were phoney. When I asked CAPOTE why, if he knew HOETTL manufactured so much paper, he subsidized him and maintained his close contact, CAPOTE replied that he was trying to determine who HOETTL's excellent source on internal Austrian affairs was before completely severing the connection".

The following is extracted from WFA 6452 dated 9 April 1952 (forwarded to Salzburg as an attachment to WAG-4-407):

"He (CAPOTE) steadfastly maintains...that HOETTL has ability and does get bona-fide internal political information which, over a period of months, has proven to be true...HOETTL received 600 DMs monthly for his political information."

5. The above quotes are interesting when considered in connection with paragraph 1 of WASA 205 in which WAST is said to claim that CC-2 receives AS 2000 monthly for a report to HOETTL, whereas he, WAST, receives only AS 4000 for his entire office. WAST's allegation does not prove that CC-2 is HOETTL's "excellent source on internal Austrian affairs", but it seems not improbable. It is noteworthy that in the first half of 1950 when GROSSBAHN reports were primarily concerned with the internal Austrian scene, the largest number originated with CC-2 and HI-1.

6. One possibility which is extremely remote but which cannot be entirely overlooked is that GROSSBAHN himself may be closer to HOETTL than is apparent. According to SALZ 238, HOETTL approached GRUESOME 201 in December 1951, and mentioned among other things that he was collaborating "with Otto Inu (suspected here to be USAGE)". There is in addition the CIC report cited in WAG-3-1 alleging GROSSBAHN collaboration with HOETTL. There is naturally no reason to doubt GROSSBAHN's good faith on the basis of these two vague and unsubstantiated reports and it is of course possible that they refer to the CC-2 - HOETTL relationship.

7. At any event, it seems that HOETTL dominates CC-2 as does GROSSBAHN. Whether GROSSBAHN dominates him more than HOETTL is the big question. CC-2 appears to tell GROSSBAHN the facts about his meetings with HOETTL, but, if we are to believe the GRUESOME 201 allegations, CC-2 tells HOETTL even more about GROSSBAHN's intelligence activities. In view of the many rumors in the past about the connections between HOETTL and various intelligence services, the implications from a CE standpoint are serious. Incidentally, Theodor ALBERT, mentioned in the report on the meeting between CC-2 and HOETTL, is said in a [] report (WASA 11701) to have been won over to work for the Soviet IS by Ivar KAGY.

8. To sum up, the situation seems to resume itself as follows: CC-2, through his relationship with HOETTL, constitutes a security threat to the GROSSBAHN project. As a result of five years of close collaboration with GROSSBAHN, CC-2 has a fairly extensive knowledge of GROSSBAHN contacts and operations. In addition he seems to have at least some access to GROSSBAHN's files. On the other side of the picture,

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205

he is immensely valuable to GROSSBAHN because of his editing abilities, his intelligence experience and his high-level contacts. Also, GROSSBAHN has no one else at present who could take over CC-2's work. There is in addition the question of what would happen to CC-2 if dropped: there is the likelihood that he would then work full time with Born or HOTTIL.

9. The ideal solution would naturally be to replace CC-2 and to transfer him to a peripheral spot in GROSSBAHN's complex, where he would rarely if ever come inside GROSSBAHN's office. Actually, there seems to be no such easy and immediate way out, and any solution must be a compromise. If, after weighing the factors on each side, it is decided to keep him on for the time being, it should be with the full realization that we are dealing with a calculated risk, and that any information to which CC-2 is exposed may end up via HOTTIL with other intelligence services.

10. We shall look forward to hearing more on the situation. In closing we quote a statement by Willi in Die Geheime Front to which we say a hearty amen: "Der Geheimdienst stellt ungemein schwierige organisatorische Probleme".

AQ

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FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING

1	<i>PIZ</i>
2	<i>FIA</i>
3	<i>ADROLO</i>
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6	<i>CFI</i>
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 NOV 52

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 16693

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA *Res- you hnd ref.*

FROM: SR REP VIENNA

ROUTINE

1920Z 28 NOV 52

EE 6

INFORMATION: FT, FI/OPS, FI/CD, FI/RI 2

VIEN 8884

TO: SPULL INFO: SFRAN, DIR CITE: SVIEN

INTEL

RE: PULL 4443 (IN 13129)

NO TRACES VIEN STATION OR CIG.

END OF MESSAGE

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Prepared 1 Dec 52 for monthly report.

most recent reports indicate that the approach was on the point of being made.

The GROSSBAHN (formerly known as USAGE) operation is being used increasingly to get at the REDCAP target. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~GROSSBAHN recruited~~ GROSSBAHN has been assigned the task of recruiting ~~XXXXXX~~ an agent (spotted by REDCAP in Vienna) as a covert photographer and resident agent spotter in the Soviet Zone. In addition, GROSSBAHN is attempting, through a sub-source in Upper Austria, to develop new personnel to collect military intelligence in ~~Austria~~ Lower Austria, - personnel preferably having some contact with Soviet personnel.

Another development in the GROSSBAHN operation was the report received via a CIC informant that GROSSBAHN's chief office assistant was keeping Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL, *well known intelligence fabricator of widespread connections* ~~widely known~~ (~~a very promiscuous agent intelligence-wise~~) informed of developments in GROSSBAHN's office. GROSSBAHN has sealed his assistant off from information which might do ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ GROSSBAHN operations serious ~~damage~~ damage, and is planning to replace ~~him~~ him as soon as a satisfactory ~~substitute~~ *substitute* can be found.

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TO: DIRECTOR CIA

FROM: SR REP VIENNA

ROUTINE

EE 6

2349Z 3 DEC 52

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, PP 2, SR 2, FI/RI 2

VIEN 8917

TO: SSALZ INFO: DIR CITE: SVIEN

RE: SALZ 814 (IN 14629)

REDCAP

AMBUSS WILL BE AT HOTEL BRAUNER BAER 4 AND 5 DEC 52. WILL REMAIN IN HOTEL UNTIL 1100 HOURS EACH DAY WAITING FOR FURTHER ASSIGNMENT FROM OKAMOTOS "LOCAL MAN".

END OF MESSAGE

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VOB/10

GROOVY

Chief of Base, Salzburg
 Attn: []
 Chief of Base, Vienna

19 December 1952

Operational
 Austria/I - GROSSBAHN Citizenship

REF: SLZ 7069, EAVA-1041

1. This is a hard nut to crack and we feel that it will be difficult to circumvent [] []'s alert eye and considerable authority in matters of this sort.

2. It is our understanding that Austrian citizenship can be secured in one of three ways:

a. If the applicant has resided here for less than four years, he may apply to the Provincial Landeshauptmann and if his application is approved it moves on to the Council of Ministers, who can grant citizenship on the ground that this action is beneficial to the national interest. All applications clear through the Minister of the Interior and pass over [] [] desk for security scrutiny.

b. If the candidate has resided here for ten years or more, he files an application for citizenship at the office of the Landeshauptmann, who has the authority to grant or deny this request without further clearance on a higher level.

c. If the individual has resided here from four to ten years he files an application with the Landeshauptmann, and if it is approved it goes to the Minister of Interior, who is authorized to grant or deny the request, as he sees fit.

3. We assume that GROSSBAHN fits into Category "c" and if this is the case, it will be necessary to clear his application through the Salzburg Landeshauptmannschaft and have it sent to Vienna when [] [] is away from his desk (i.e., summer vacation in August-September) and trust that he doesn't have a black flag on GROSSBAHN's file card which indicates that all inquiries on the individual are to be called to [] []'s personal attention.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 Act No. 2AVA 1334.

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 []

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19 December 1952

4. In a routine citizenship application case which came to the undersigned's attention, it was disclosed that 10,000 schillings placed in a politician's pocket by an enterprising refugee resulted in wiping away all obstacles and red tape. Since GROSSBAHN could not pit his weight against in OeVP circles, it might be worth considering the cultivation of an influential SPOe politician for this purpose. This is merely a suggestion for your consideration.

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

SLZ-7302

Chief of Mission
Attn: []
Chief, Salzburg Base
Operational/GROSSBAHN and Landeshauptmann KLAUS

31 December 1952

1. [] and I talked to GROSSBAHN about Landeshauptmann KLAUS on the afternoon of 30 December 1952, immediately after your departure from Salzburg. He confirmed in general what we had told you about his relationship with KLAUS. Briefly, his working contact to KLAUS has been through CC-2, although KLAUS has been aware of the fact that CC-2 was a representative of GROSSBAHN's and GROSSBAHN himself has had a friendly direct contact with KLAUS. The contact has not been operational, but rather in the nature of support, cover, and back-stopping. With no prompting on our part GROSSBAHN volunteered the fact that it would be valuable to him if he had some means of taking over the contact directly, without going through CC-2. To our way of thinking, to put GROSSBAHN in a position to drop a discreet hint that he is informed about--not responsible for--the impending transfer of OeVP funds would be an admirable means of achieving a takeover which would leave a lasting impression on KLAUS. We do not believe that that would necessarily point to an intelligence tie in, or much less be an indication of GROSSBAHN's precise U.S. sponsorship; rather it would be an impressive but simple indication that he enjoys the confidence of highly placed American officials.

2. GROSSBAHN describes KLAUS as most discreet, an honest and reliable public servant, ambitious for position but not a Wadfahrer. His wife, GROSSBAHN says, is more ambitious for money than position, but KLAUS nevertheless apparently intends to remain in politics rather than returning to his profession of lawyer. If the OeVP loses strength in Land Salzburg KLAUS will of course lose his present appointment, but he has been mentioned as a possibility for Minister of Education in the Bundesregierung. If the OeVP loses out, GROSSBAHN will still retain a good working contact to the Socialist WRISSKIND, who will no doubt stay in the Landesregierung as a deputy governor or some fairly influential position.

Distribution
3 - Wien
1 - Salz Chrono
2 - Salz #101
2 - Salz Subj.

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5 January 1953

PROJECT CRYPTONYM: GROSSBAHN

- OBJECTIVES:
- a) to collect ground and air OB on the Soviet Zone of Austria;
 - b) to assist in the Station's REDCAP operations;
 - c) to furnish CI/CE coverage, police surveillance and checks;
 - d) to furnish aid and support of Satellite operations;
 - e) to give political coverage of the Austrian scene when specifically requested;
 - f) to give leads to, and possibly handle, personnel for the ICEBERG program.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED IN 1952: (The period of time covered is from April 1952, as previously GROSSBAHN was handled from Germany.)

MAV-MAS-EAV-EAS Series:

Soviet Zone OB:	138	Only 6 of these were not disseminated. They have been received with great favor by customer agencies in the field. They constitute approximately 25% of the USFA OB take, exclusive of MIS debriefings. A memo from the Chief of Intelligence Section of USAF characterized these GROSSBAHN reports as "extremely useful in helping this Headquarters maintain its Air Order of Battle of Soviet Air Forces units in Sovzone Austria". It described the information in the reports as "quite reliable" and "of great interest to this Headquarters as well as to USAF, USAFE, USFA".
Werkschutz	2	
Political	2	One, a four page report on the present political situation in Land Salzburg and information on the VdU, was prepared in answer to a thirteen point brief submitted by USCOA.
East-West trade	3	
Communist and Communist Front Organizations	6	

MAVA-EAVA-MASA-EASA Series:

CE	circa	25	These reports were not disseminated, but have been very useful to us operationally and as background information. For example, there has been a report on the main personality; another on a figure in the operation; several on Willi HOETTL's relations to CAPOTE; one on a German IS approach to an agent of a Czech PC operation; one on a group of persons of interest in the ROESSELSPRUNG case; several on ZIPPER agents and activities. In addition to these CE reports relating to our operations, there have been a number concerning personalities of general intelligence interest to us. The CE coverage has been mainly of Austria, but some reports have dealt with Germany and Slovakia.
Slovakian economic		3	These were not disseminated because of being general or because useful mainly from an operational standpoint. GROSSBAHN's Slovakian operation collapsed in July 1952 before the reports collection was fully launched.

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Date: 2005

GROSSBAHN

OPERATIONAL LEADS PRODUCED:

Documentation: Austrian: (furnished Austrian Identitätsausweis of a new 1952 printing, a Salzburg Meldezettel für Untermieter, an Austrian Identitätsausweis of 1950)

Czech: (furnished complete information on the Czech document "Obciansky Preukaz", and procured 2 originals of this document)

Recruitment: Handled recruitment of agent for REDCAP.

SUMMARY:

In terms of the project objectives, GROSSBAHN has been quite successful in furnishing the desired coverage:

- a) His OB reporting has been extensive and competent, highly regarded by local customers, although the reaction of Washington customer agencies has been varied (some of the material has been evaluated in Washington as known and of slight interest).
- b) GROSSBAHN has only recently been asked to contribute to the REDCAP program. He successfully recruited the prospective agent he was asked to approach. He is now attempting to develop leads to possible REDCAP agents through his own sub-sources.
- c) GROSSBAHN's CI/CE coverage has been very helpful, both in terms of our own operations and the general CE scene. A particular advantage has been his ability to do namechecks on request speedily and in detail.
- d) The Slovakian operation which was beginning to produce reports and documentation collapsed in July 1952 with the arrest of the couriers in the CSR. Since then the emphasis has been mainly on the furnishing of leads to the Satellite operations, rather than on having GROSSBAHN actually mount such operations himself.
- e) In 1950, when under the direction of the Pullach Operations Base, GROSSBAHN was asked to desist from furnishing reports on the Austrian political scene, in favor of other targets. Although he now does not furnish political reports on a regular basis, he fulfills specific requests.
- f) The use of GROSSBAHN in the ICEBERG program is in the planning stage, and he has so far not been approached in this matter.

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SECURITY ASPECT:

GROSSBAHN's Slovakian operation ended in July 1952 when his last remaining couriers were picked up while on a mission inside Czechoslovakia. Following this, STAA, the Slovakian priest in Austria, involved in the operation was dropped. So later was XX-1, GROSSBAHN's case officer for the operation. These steps were taken to seal off GROSSBAHN from any efforts by CIS to follow up leads obtained from the captured couriers. There are no indications that GROSSBAHN's security has been endangered by the collapse of the Slovakian operation.

A serious threat to GROSSBAHN's security has come to light, however, through allegations that CC-2, GROSSBAHN's office assistant, has close connections with Willi HOETTL (well-known intelligence peddler suspected of connections with RIS, inter alia) and has disclosed classified information to him. These allegations were made by Karl HASS, a CIC informant, who also knows HOETTL well. CC-2 has on his own initiative submitted his resignation, to be effective 31 January 1953. CC-2 was to be interviewed in the field in early January and we are awaiting the report of the result before submitting a full report on the security compromise.

99

NO 1 0 1 1

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 JAN 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 28039

ROUTING	
1	FIA
2	FIA
3	C. HADND
4	
5	REE
6	QFI
7	
8	

JAN 19 1953

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP SALZBURG
 ACTION EE 6
 INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

ROUTINE
 1545Z 13 JAN 53

abm
Cicci
RG

SALZ 921
 TO: DIR SVIEN INFO: SFRAN CITE: SSALZ
 REF: EASA 468
 INTEL/GROOVY

DUE ILLNESS [] UNABLE PROCEED SALZ AS PLANNED. GROSSBAHN
 CONSIDERS SELF UNABLE HANDLE INTERROGATION ALONE AND EXPOSURE BASE
 PERSONNEL EXTREMELY UNDESIRABLE BUT CC 2 SHOULD BE INTERROGATED PRIOR
 SEVERANCE 31 JANUARY. RECOMMEND ASSIGNMENT VIEN OR GERMANY BASED
 EXPERIENCED CASE OFFICER INTERROGATOR HANDLE ONE SHOT BASIS. DESPITE
 STRONG DESIRE LEARN EXTENT CC 2 DISCLOSURES TO HOETTL AFFECTING GROSS-
 BAHN OPERATION RECOMMEND DROP PLAN INTERROGATION IF OUTSIDE CASE
 OFFICER UNAVAILABLE.

END OF MESSAGE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
 by the Central Intelligence Agency
 Date: 2005

OUT 82718
285

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 10	OCT 1955

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

COPY NO.

(44)

EASA-671

RG

14 January 1953

Chief, EE
Attention:
Chief of Base, Salzburg

Operational/GROOVY

GROSSBAHN

1. For several recent reasons we are forcing GROSSBAHN to take a three to four week rest. He displayed evident signs of strain and in all fairness to him, as well as ourselves, we insisted that he "get away from it all" for a spell.

2. We are working up the details in a separate memo, which we will pouch in the near future. In the meantime we felt it best to advise you that GROSSBAHN operations will grind to a halt until sometime in mid-February.

Distribution

- 2-Wash
- 3-Vien
- 2-Salz #101
- 1-Salz chrono

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Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

COPY

PPS

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ABSTRACT	EX	
DATE 10 OCT 1955		

77

RG

EE

VOB/303

Chief of Base, Salzburg

14 January 1953

Chief of Base, Vienna

Operational

Austria/I - Grossbahn Citizenship

VOB/10, SOB/33

You are correct in assuming that SLZ-7069 was forwarded to Headquarters under EAVA-1041.

[Redacted]

- 2 - Sals
- 1 - EE ✓
- 1 - E ✓
- 1 - [] ✓

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Act to EAVA 1547

E 7

RPS

NOV 1951 35-82 JAN 22 1953

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 JANUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 82718

ROUTING	
1	FIA
2	FRAN
3	SAIZ
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	

TO: SEN REP AUSTRIA (VLEN, SAIZ)
SEN REP GERMANY (FRAN)

FROM: DIRECTOR

EE, FIA 2695

ROUTINE

CONF: EE 6

1708Z 21 JAN 53

alru
RG
cic

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 36767

TO: SVLEN, SSAIZ

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

RE: SAIZ 921 (IN 28039)

INTEL GROOVY

IN VIEW SERIOUSNESS CG-2 SECURITY BREACH TO GROSSEBAIN OP, RECOMMEND VLEN
THE
ASSIGN EXPERIENCED CASE OFFICER HANDLE INTERROGATION. SUGGEST [] SINCE
HE LEAVING STATION.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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EE FIA *cic*

1	2
3	4
5	6
7	8

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DATE 10 OCT 1955

DC EE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

EE FI

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(44)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951
JAN 23 1953

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21 JANUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 83222

1	FIR
2	FIA
3	China
4	
5	CEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: SR REP AUSTRIA (VIEN, SALZ) EE/REDCAP 3234

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA DEFERRED

CONF: EE 6

0039Z 23 JAN 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, SR 2, FI/RI 2, FI/STC

DIR 37114

TO: SSALZ INFO: SVIEN CITE: DIR

RE: EASA 501

REDCAP

*abu
CIC in
RG*

1. ASSIGN GR CRYPTONYM. BEING PROCESSED AS NEW PROJECT.
2. RE PARA 6 D 3 PROJECT OUTLINE REF. REVISING TO STATE LEADS SPOTTED OR RECRUITED BY GROSSBAHN TO BE DEVELOPED BY GROSSBAHN OR SEPARATELY DEPENDENT UPON INDIVIDUAL CASES.
3. ADVISE CONCURRENCE REF PROJECT.

NS

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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RP

DC/EE

EE/FA

EE/FI/FO

EE/FI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 JAN 26 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

N 31160

ROUTINE	
1	FIA
2	FIA
3	DATA
4	
5	USE
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

00432 24 JAN 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

SALZ 956

TO: DIR SVIEN CITE: SSALZ

*alru
RG*

RE: DIR 36767 (OUT 82718)

INTEL/GROOVY

REQUEST [] PROCEED SALZ 27 JAN FOR BRIEFING BY
GROSSBAHN AND [] WITH PLANNED DATE BEGINNING INTERROGATION
CC-2 28 JANUARY.

END OF MESSAGE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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(4)

5 Feb 53

Extract for GROSSBAHN file

from EASA-715, 19 January 1953, KUFIRE Status and Progress Report for Month of Oct 52

6-8 Oct. ... [] visits Vienna for briefings on operations pending assignment as Chief, Operations, Salzburg and for work on GROSSBAHN assets in Vienna.

3c. GROSSBAHN

1) GROSSBAHN once again.. furnished all the intelligence reports published by Salzburg Base. He was involved in tying up the loose ends in the loss of the Slovak operation and in the loss of the Soviet Zone OB observer AA-8. Although his reporting for October did not suffer, the restriction of certain members of the AA-1 net to the Vienna area caused a significant drop in subsequent periods. The proposal to use SLAG as a trainer for bi-lingual Hungarian Slovaks was disapproved by Headquarters. This decision was relayed to GROSSBAHN, who performed the nasty job of firing SLAG without a murmur.

2) A serious development in the GROSSBAHN case came to our attention during this period with the allegations by GRUESOME 201 that CC-2 was reporting on GROSSBAHN's activities to the noted fabricator Willi HOETTL. Further details on this bothersome matter have been reported separately and will be summarized in future progress reports.

3e. KANDRAC/CUERK/WIDENER/OATIS Case

At Headquarters' request Salzburg Base attempted to mount, primarily through GROSSBAHN, a temporary CE coverage of the Salzburg area which worked very smoothly and inconspicuously. KANDRAC and WIDENER were spotted quickly upon arrival and through a bit of good luck we did achieve contact with them through the person of James Hodgson of G-2, IB. Although Salzburg's proposals for delving deeper into the proposed operation to free Oatis were vetoed by Headquarters, we believe through judicious use of GROSSBAHN's police contact (PP-1) and our own staff resources, we were in a very advantageous position to make an aggressive, secure follow-up in this case.

5a. ^{reports} During the period nine OB reports obtained from the GROSSBAHN AA-1 operation were published; four reports were of the marginal Soviet vehicle numbers in Vienna series which we are continuing per G-2 request. Two concerned airports at Voerslau and Wiener Neustadt; two were on troop and naval units in Klosterneuburg, and one concerned Soviet armored vehicles in Liesing.

b. Also dispatched following the practice of disseminating Political or Economic Reports thru Vienna, four SBG's on Political Organizations were sent to Vienna for release as EAV's. Again, all reports originated with GROSSBAHN.

c. In addition a total of 10 reports were sent by Disposition Form to G-2 USFA (contents sent Headquarters separately). Of these eight GROSSBAHN reports concerned mostly low-level CI and OB particulars...

RF

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By the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 5 00 5

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (1) (A) Privacy
 (2) (B) Methods/ Sources
 (2) (G) Foreign Relations

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

EASA- 842

RG

Chief, EE
Attn: J C
Chief of Base, Salzburg

11 February 1953

Operational/GROOVI

GROSSEBAHN - General Security

Reference: EASA - 819

1. The "other incident" which we make reference to in Para. seven of EASA-819 is as related herein.

2. Attached hereto is GROSSEBAHN's unnumbered report, dated 18 December 1952, in which he describes some rather discouraging episodes which took place on the night of 17 December in the Dixie Expresso in Salzburg. Shortly after he submitted the report, we went over it in detail with him and pointed out that we felt that a bit more judicious, lucid thinking and action on his part would probably have extricated him from the two predicaments without their assuming the proportions which they did. We were especially critical of his conversation with OFFCZAREK and were somewhat bothered by the connotation of his trying to straighten out the boundaries between two spheres of jurisdiction.

3. On 16 December 1952, we did show GROSSEBAHN a copy of ZIPPER BV S report number 5743, which had been passed to us by []

[] Our reason for doing this was merely as a reminder to GROSSEBAHN that he should not relax his security guard; he was still a figure of interest in the Salzburg area. He, incidentally, is mentioned in an extremely offhand manner in the report; the final paragraph merely stating that VOLLER previously worked for GROSSEBAHN in the ZIPPER organization.

4. We are always extremely careful in handling KUBARK correspondence which must be brought to GROSSEBAHN's attention and take pains to sterilize to the nth degree. Due to the wealth of material which we are constantly taking up with GROSSEBAHN, we have had little reason to sterilize the non-KUBARK material to the same extent. This was founded on two basic premises; there was no previous occasion to doubt GROSSEBAHN's powers of discretion and the pure mechanical difficulties of sterilizing the voluminous non-KUBARK material which we constantly refer to him on almost a day to day basis.

5. Due to the fact that we had shown GROSSEBAHN this report just the day prior to his meeting with OFFCZAREK, we closely questioned him

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2005
1-2-84

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- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

at the same time we were discussing the report in general, as described in Para. 2, on his use of the terminology "I did not appreciate the publicity he had tried to give me" as mentioned in Para. 4. We suspected, but not too strongly at the time, that he might possibly have had reference to the ZIPPER report. He stated that he was harking back to the old days just after he separated from ZIPPER when he was the subject of much interest on the part of ZIPPER personnel in the Salzburg area. We, naturally, accepted his explanation and let the matter drop other than for the aforescribed security implications.

6. On 11 January 1953, [] [] , on a liaison visit to Salzburg, advised us that OFFCZAREK's version differed considerably from that reported by GROSSEBAHN. OFFCZAREK alleged that he had been accosted by GROSSEBAHN and that GROSSEBAHN had made specific reference to the EV 3 report in his discussion with OFFCZAREK. This naturally placed POB in a difficult position with ZIPPER due to an apparent violation of the third agency rule.

7. On 13 January, we re-questioned GROSSEBAHN on his report of events on the night of 17 December, but he failed to alter his original version in any manner.

8. The truth of the matter, we suspect, lies somewhere between the two versions. The next opportunity we have to get GROSSEBAHN on Carriage, we certainly will pursue the matter to its conclusion. For the time being, [] [] reports that the incident has apparently blown over with the ZIPPER people and we can only hope that time will relegate it to the group of forgotten matters.

9. Prior to this incident we had made up our minds that GROSSEBAHN was badly in need of a rest and vacation and this lent considerable weight to our decision. As reported in reference, we had him checked medically and packed him off for a month without making any more of an incident of the OFFCZAREK affair. We could see little point in pursuing the matter to the point of getting unpleasant especially in view of his condition. On his return from vacation, we feel it best to let the matter ride and straighten it out later through the use of Carriage.

10. We, naturally, dislike having this shadow of a doubt hanging over GROSSEBAHN and will do all we can to resolve it at the earliest opportunity.

CLU Comment: Whatever the precise truth of this incident may eventually develop to have been, we will of course in the future be forced to adopt a more stringent policy in written briefs

to GROSSEBAHN. However, we have never had any reason heretofore not to apply the generally accepted rule that AR 350-5 does not literally apply to agent briefing. It is extremely unfortunate that this is far more of a political than a security breach on GROSSEBAHN's part, and []

[] accepts the full responsibility in not having foreseen the possible repercussions of showing GROSSEBAHN a BV S report in which he was mentioned. Insofar as ZIPPER is concerned, as we all know, GROSSEBAHN has always until this incident displayed impeccable discretion from the time of his sensitive half-defector status with ZIPPER, through his reporting to FOB case officers on ZIPPER--the leader of BV S himself having been the subject of one such requested report, the [] Project, and the rest of his activities. In any event, the case officer showed GROSSEBAHN the unsanitized BV S report at [] specific direction.

DISTRIBUTION

- 2 - LE w/att.
- 1 - POB w/att. (direct)
- 1 - Fran w/att.
- 3 - Vien w/att.
- 1 - Salz Chrono
- 1 - Salz #101 w/att.

RP9

[]
[]
~~CL 84~~

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, PLANS

16 February 1953

SUBJECT: Project GROSSBAHN (Formalization and Renewal)

1. Project GROSSBAHN was originally established under ZIPPER, transferred from ZIPPER in February 1950 and turned over to PULLACH Operations Base for control. In the spring of 1952 control was transferred to the Salzburg Base. The attached project outline is the first attempt at formalization of the operation.

2. The objectives of this project are: a) to provide OB information on the Soviet Zone of Austria; b) to assist in Salzburg Station's REDCAP program; c) to furnish CI/CE coverage, police surveillance and checks; d) to provide leads to, and possibly handle, personnel for the ICEBERG program; e) to furnish aid and support for Satellite REDSKIN operations; f) to provide political coverage when requested; and g) to build up a local support structure.

3. The principal agent, GROSSBAHN, has worked for U.S. intelligence since the end of the war. His sub-agents are CC-2, CC-3, CC-4, PP-1, AA-1, HH-1, and XX-1. Details on their respective backgrounds are given in paragraph (4) of the attached Project Outline.

4. GROSSBAHN knows that he is working for CIA. He has a loose cover of journalistic and publishing interests.

5. GROSSBAHN is motivated primarily by a desire to become an American citizen (no commitment has been made); control is based on his financial dependence on salary we pay him and the possibility of compromise. He has been favorably carriage-tested. The sub-agents' motivation is primarily through personal respect for GROSSBAHN; control is also maintained through GROSSBAHN.

6. The estimated total yearly cost of Project GROSSBAHN is \$20,000 (compensation, GROSSBAHN and sub-agents, \$14,540; travel expenses \$1,005; and operational expenses \$4,455).

7. A possible security threat to Project GROSSBAHN has arisen in the case of agent CC-2, who has been in contact with Dr. Willi HOETTL, an intelligence peddler suspected of being in contact with the Soviets. CC-2 submitted a resignation effective 31 January 1953

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET

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Date: 2005

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RDS

PROJECT FORM

1. Background of Proposal:

- a. How discovered by you.
- b. Contact and relationship to date with principal agent or agents.
- c. Intelligence background of principal agent or agents.
- d. Extent and status of recruitment of or approaches to subagents.
- e. Security considerations:
 - 1. CE
 - 2. CI
 - 3. Other
- f. Funds or supplies expended to date or planned for expenditure prior to approval.
- g. Name checks requested:
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - etc.

2. General Aims:

- a.
- b.
- etc.

3. Specific Objectives or Targets:

- a.
- etc.

4. Personnel:

- a.
- etc.

Handwritten initials and a signature in the bottom right corner of the page.

5. Contact, Communications, and Control:

- a. Methods of contact:
- b. Methods of communication:
- c. Control:

6. Proposed Cover:

- a. Cutout:
- b. Principal agent or agents:
- c. Agents:
- d. Your office:

7. Proposed Costs:

a. Quarterly:

- 1. Compensation:
- 2. Operational expenses:
- 3. Travel and other expenses:
- 4. Supplies:
- 5. One time expenses:

b. Monthly:

- 1. Compensation:
- 2. Operational expenses:
- 3. Travel and other expenses:
- 4. Supplies:
- 5. One time expenses:

c. Services:

- 1.
- etc.

RMS

d. Possible disposal costs:

8. Proposed Commitments:

9. Special Problems:

a.

etc.

205

Contact Report Outline

- I. Opening of Meeting:
 - a. How and for when arranged.
 - b. Date, time, and place held.
- II. Production:
 - a. Itemized list of take.
- III. Operational Matters:
 - a. Discussion of operational ground covered at meeting.
- IV. Operational Factors:
 - a. Operational security.
 - b. Agent training.
 - c. Control.
 - d. CE Aspects.
 - e. Commo.
- V. Biographical Details and Personal Factors:
- VI. Supply and Support:
 - a. Remuneration.
 - b. Supplies.
 - c. Other.
- VII. Close of Meeting:
 - a. Time and circumstances of close of meeting.
 - b. Arrangements for new meeting if any made.

RPH

Berichtsschema für Zusammenkünfte

- A. (1) Wie, für wann, und für wo wurde das Zusammentreffen arrangiert?
- (2) Datum, Zeit und Ort, wo das Zusammentreffen tatsächlich stattgefunden hat.
- B. (1) Detailliste der bei dieser Zusammenkunft übernommenen Berichte, Photographien, Skizzen, Dokumente, etc.
- C. (1) Beschreibung der operativen Gegenstände während der Zusammenkunft (Aufträge, Hinweise, Deckungsanweisung, Subaufträge, usw.)
- D. (1) Operative Sicherheitsvorkehrungen (einschliesslich Vorkehrungen für das Zusammentreffen)
- (2) Schulung
- (3) Überwachung
- (4) Möglichkeiten der feindlichen Überwachung oder Infiltrierung
- (5) Verbindungsaufnahme und vereinbarte Verbindung
- E. (1) Biographische Daten und Personalangaben (einschliesslich aller eventuellen Änderungen)
- F. (1) Entschädigung
- (2) Eventuelle Warenlieferungen
- (3) Eventuelle sonstige Unterstützungen
- G. (1) Zeit und Umstände, unter denen das Zusammentreffen beendet wurde
- (2) Absprache für ein neues Zusammentreffen.

12/25

Extract for GROSS WAIN File

EASA-927 of 5 March 1953

Have been trying to locate relatively secure family group to place in apt under GROSSHANN's office as tenants. Subject (of EASA-926) appears to be ideal answer. To outside eye should appear as an ordinary airman. Request POC and FCC on him. Don't intend to appraise GROSSHANN that subject is in our employ. Subject will not accompany [] on any trips transporting GROSSHANN or his sub-gents. []

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-100X

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Attn: []
Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: 17 March 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative
SPECIFIC- GROSSBAHN/Austrian Reference Books

GROOVY

Reference: EASW-88

*NS
ND*

1. The shipment of reference material was shipped from Salzburg 17 March 1953. The estimated arrival date is 31 March 1953.

2. The costs of shipment to Bremerhaven have been paid by this base. The remainder of the shipping charges have been indicated for your payment in the United States. The financial arrangements were made in this way since it is less expensive from Bremerhaven to New York if the burden of costs is carried by the consignee.

3. The material was shipped as per your instructions in reference dispatch.

cel []

Distribution:
2 - EE
3 - Vien
1 - chrono
1 - RDG -

*these books arrived
were given to Library of
Congress -*

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

RM
[] []
ABSTRACT [] INDEX []
DATE 10 OCT 1955

SECRET

EASA-1147

Chief, ES
Attention: [redacted]
Chief of Base, Salzburg

8 April 1953

Op/SHOCVI

TO: [redacted] - Austrian Citizenship

board
ABM *alm*
LE/F/PO
RLG

- References:
- a. WOB-10
 - b. EASA-196
 - c. SLZ-7069 (sent Hq. under EAVA-10/1)

1. We appreciate the clarifying data submitted in WOB-10. Grossbahn falls in the category of persons with less than 10 years residence in Austria and his application, of necessity, would come to the attention of [redacted]. The only stumbling block in the entire process outlined is the person of [redacted], for Grossbahn enjoys excellent relationship with the responsible Land officials and had no trouble getting his papers, initially, as far as [redacted] desk.

2. We do not know -- nor does Grossbahn -- on what grounds [redacted] based his original disapproval. The attachment to reference b may contain the reason -- Grossbahn, back in 1947, refused to go to work for [redacted]. Grossbahn also tells us that [redacted] for some unexplained reason, checked his application with CIC (probably Fritz ETTINGER) who replied they had no interest in Grossbahn and likewise had no interest in whether he obtained Austrian citizenship or not.

3. We did discuss the problem with [redacted] in Vienna on 3 April 1953. The suggestion was made that we try to handle the son's problem on a local basis with the Bezirkshauptmannschaft. Discussion with Grossbahn indicates this solution to be impractical for several reasons; documentation is now so tightly controlled that all unusual requests must be brought to the attention of the Ministry of Interior, which would mean that any attempts on Grossbahn's part to make a deal or exert influence on the local HI, might conceivably be reported directly to [redacted] which would tend to make the situation even worse. If an attempt is made to handle the situation locally, it means the son will have to be briefed to some extent, as Grossbahn has never told the lad he is considered Stateless. Grossbahn, in most of his operations and in all his local dealings, plays the part of an Austrian citizen -- this is part of his operational cover -- and he is afraid the son, if he should learn the truth, might, being young and naive, let the information slip in the wrong quarter, doing Grossbahn serious operational damage. Incidentally, the son will be 14 in July at which time he will have to secure his own ID card from the local

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 5(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

EH. We appear to have sufficient time to work the problem out, but considering how slowly these matters move through the Austrian bureaucratic machine, it is requested that our planning be accomplished as quickly as possible.

4. We see little hope of really solving the problem satisfactorily except to overcome the hurdle of []'s objection. How best to do this without confirming, in []'s eyes, that Grossbahr is in KUBARK employ is the trick involved. We have thought of possibly letting the request originate with ODACID, direct to [] through their official channels, with the explanation that Grossbahr has been of help to ODACID in lending technical aid or advice and they would like to see that he does get his Austrian citizenship. Probably Vienna can think of better means of deflecting the request so that a direct intelligence connection or sponsorship is not in evidence when the request reaches []'s desk.

5. We do not know where Grossbahr's citizenship file rests at the moment. Offhand, we would guess it is pigeonholed in the Salzburg Landes-hauptmannschaft, but we will confirm this from Grossbahr and forward a separate dispatch. Any suggestions Vienna may have as how best to get this file moving again without attracting undue attention would be appreciated.

Distribution:

2 - ~~EE~~
3 - Wien
1 - Salz chrono
1 - Salz #101
1 - Salz RCM notebook

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 51

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 APRIL 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 17089

ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	CHRO
4	
5	CEE
6	DEF
7	
8	

ABM
abw
E J

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1614z 18 APR 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

SALZ 1216

TO: DIR INFO: SVIEN CITE: SSALZ

RE: EASA 904 EASA 905 *J. ...*

OPS/GROOVY

VIEW OFFER OTHER EMPLOYMENT REQUEST CABLED POC PRIOR 30 APRIL
AS SUBJECT MUST MAKE DECISION BY THEN.

END OF MESSAGE

*rec given by phone
21 April 53 (#5126)*

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

E	J	
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DATE	23 FEB 1956	

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

205
(44)

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21 APRIL 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 55585

ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	CHAD
4	
5	CISE
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: SEN REP AUSTRIA (SALZ, VIEN)

FROM: DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

EE A

2695

CONF: EE 6

2017Z 21 APR 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 01048

TO: SSAIZ

INFO: SVIEN

CITE: DIR

RE: SALZ 1216 (IN 17089)

INTEL GROOVY

POC GRANTED.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

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DATE 23 FEB 1956	

APR 22 1953

SECRET
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COPY NO.

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

EAC
EASA-1267

Chief, EE
Attn: [] and []
Chief of Base, Salzburg

27 April 1953

Operational/GROOVY/REDCAP

Grossbahn - ZZ-1 (Security Infraction)

Ref- EASA-1197

Phase I

1. On Friday, 10 April 1953, Grossbahn switched suitcases with another person, later identified herein, while enroute from Salzburg to Attnang-Puchheim on the Arlberg Express. The following are the details in his own words:

a. On Friday, 10 April 1953, I left Salzburg by the Arlberg in the direction of Attnang at 1805 hours. I travelled in the last second class compartment of the first second class carriage (in the direction of the locomotive) next to the third class carriages. Because of a broken water pipe the compartment was flooded and I changed after probably five minutes into the adjacent compartment. There were two other men, occupying the window seats, in this compartment. I left my two suitcases on the rack and after possibly ten minutes went into the third class, where I had seen SLAA. I passed his compartment and he stepped out. After making sure that I did not know anybody and after asking him whether he knew anybody, which he didn't, I conversed with him. I suddenly noticed that the train had already passed Voecklabruck station and therefore parted in a hurry and rushed to my compartment. There was no other stop by the train until Attnang. When I reached my compartment I found the two other men still sitting in their seats but there was no light in the compartment - it had become almost dark by then. I put on my coat, grabbed (what I believed to be) my two bags, rushed for the door and left the train then went to the exit where my wife waited for me with the car. Arriving at home I left the two suitcases in the hall and went to meet our guests.

b. On Saturday, 11 April, at about ten in the morning I went to "my suitcases" to take out my black briefcase which contained one yellow envelope in which I had placed

- (1) The enlarged photos made by ZZ-1.
- (2) The contact letter dated 10 March (ZZ-1).
- (3) Two empty film covers for ZZ-1's Robot.

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

RPS

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

EASA-
Page 2

I found to my utter dismay that I had either grabbed a wrong suitcase or that somebody in my absence had exchanged mine for another one. This other suitcase, also brown but slightly smaller, contained two shirts, one with an Innsbruck textile mark, a small toilet set with razor, brush (also with an Innsbruck mark) one used night shirt (flannel), and one Tiroler Zeitung dated 31 Jan. 1953.

c. I thereupon called the Linz railroad lost property office and asked whether somebody had given notice to have exchanged a suitcase. Linz immediately contacted the stations where a stop of the Arlberg was scheduled: Attnang, Wels, St. Valentin and Vienna (Westbahnhof), I was then informed that no notice had arrived so far. The official wanted my name, I informed him that I was going to take the wrong suitcase to Wels, where I was going in any case, he in turn was going to inform Wels. (I did this as not to disclose my identity). I drove to Wels with my wife, she parked some distance from the station and I rushed there on foot. I arrived shortly before noon, the official in charge of lost property had already left but a man from the ticket office was already informed. He in my presence once more called Linz, where no further news had arrived, and from where he was informed that before Monday morning no further news could come because the offices were closed until then. I filled out a form where I described the suitcase, the compartment and the time and requested that in case of it being found it should be forwarded to the Wels lost property railroad office. I had to give a name and address and gave: Albert A. EISNER, APO 403, U.S. Army.

d. We then went to Salzburg where I had hoped to find notes in my office regarding the contents of the contact letter--which could have been a damaging document--but I found none. I did not get an answer when calling the office (yours). I then returned to my home. I intentionally did not call Wels again from my home on Monday morning as not to give traces that could have been followed but called you requesting to see you this morning. Providing that time allows I will call Wels from Voecklabruck, where I am not known at the post office.

e. My suitcase did not contain any other indicative information regarding my person but a number of letters from my family in Germany without addresses, dirty laundry without initial marking, a number of German and American journals.

f. As far as I can recollect the contact letter with ZZ-1 does not bring him except his so far used Vienna address on Malerstrasse of Vienna's first district.

2. The contact report which he mentions under paragraph b was forwarded to Headquarters as Attachment B to reference. Attached at B is a set of photos which are copies of the photos also mentioned under paragraph b. These photos had not as yet been forwarded as we felt they were of insufficient importance to distribute. They represent ZZ-1's efforts during a spell of extremely bad weather and many are fairly unclear. The set of photos which were in the suitcase were unmarked, unlike those attached. We have coded the pictures according to the Grossbahn report (P/34015) attached at A merely as a guide to the coverage entailed.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[] 209

3. Grossbahn held an extremely brief meeting with ZZ-1 in Liezen, Steiermark on 14 April 1953--taking all security precautions possible under existing circumstances--and warned ZZ-1 to stay out of the Soviet Zone and at home, until further notice. He was not told the reason why. Explanation was that there had been an indication of increased security measures on the part of the Soviets and it was felt prudent to keep him out of the area until things returned to normal.

4. In spite of Grossbahn's optimistic paragraph f, a thorough examination of the contact report indicates clear leads to ZZ-1's true identity--leads which an aggressive and unfriendly service would have little trouble picking out and following down, if they were so inclined. (See contact report, para. IV.a(7).)

5. We try to excuse Grossbahn on the grounds that this sort of accident or incident could happen to any of us. We have not as yet given him the brutal tongue lashing he deserves for he is in such a depressed mood over the affair that we are afraid of pushing him too far. We cannot answer why he had sensitive information in his suitcase--why he walked off and left it to chat with SLAA of all people on the Arlberg Express of all places. These answers we will furnish at a later date.

Phase II

6. Attached at C is Grossbahn's report covering the receipt of a letter from one M. MAHLER, Anichstrasse 24, Innsbruck, and the circumstances attendant thereto. As part of this attachment, are photocopies of the postcard from XX-1 to Grossbahn which, fortunately, furnished the only clue by which MAHLER was enabled to ultimately track down the owner. XX-1 had mailed the postcard to Grossbahn in a covering envelope, hence the appearance that the postcard was ready for mailing but had never been dispatched. This offered a ready made cover story--Grossbahn could explain (and he did) that Dr. KINACH, a friend from Germany, actually XX-1, had asked him to mail the card to some friends in Austria, but that he had forgotten to do so and had left the card in his suitcase.

7. PP-1 did not go to Innsbruck immediately to check on MAHLER. Rather we are having the check performed through routine channels.

Phase III

8. Grossbahn traveled to Innsbruck the night of 22 April--after stopping by Wels to pick up MAHLER's suitcase--and effected the exchange. His report covering the trip is attached at D. It would appear as though the suitcase fell into the hands of a completely trustworthy and exceptionally intelligent person. MAHLER appears to be decided pro-West--note his compliments to Grossbahn on the fine job he is doing. We wish there were some way in which we could express our thanks to MAHLER--possibly even offer him some type of remuneration for his fine handling of the episode--but we feel it is best to let the matter close out without attaching further significance to it.

2 3
RST

9. As soon as PP-1's traces are in on MAHLER--and we see no reason now why his report should be unfavorable--we will reactivate ZZ-1, but will insist that he change boarding houses in Vienna and avoid contact with his former acquaintances from Frau PFALZ's house.

10. We are convinced, after this affair, that there is a Goddess of Good Luck, who must look over our left shoulder and does favor us with an occasional smile.

11. We will develop the answers to questions posed in paragraph four and do plan on following up with a stern lecture to Grossbahn on the sheer foolhardiness of his initial steps which culminated in his near compromise of a promising new source. He will also be reminded that this security breach is being entered in his record, and just so with the rest of us, no one can afford to set up a string of such incidents without expecting to eventually suffer the consequences.

Attachments:

- A. P/34015, 21 April 1953
- B. Photos (Nos. A-L)
- C. Grossbahn memo dtd. 21 April 53 & atts.
- D. Grossbahn memo dtd. 23 April 53

Distribution:

- 3 - EE (w/1 set of atts. A,B,C,D,)
- 3 - Vien (w/1 set of atts. A,B,C,D)
- 1 - Salz chrono (w/1 atts.)
- 1 - Salz subj #101 (w/1 set of atts. A,B,C,D)
- 1 - RCM notebook (w/1 set of atts. A,B,C,D)

COURIER

EXMA- 5003

SECRET

1. Mai 1953

Chief of Base, Salzburg
ATTN: *E*
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: Chief ES, Washington
Chief of Mission, Vienna

Board w/
R.L.G. v.

MEDICAL

Medical Report - Grossbahn (S-O-169)

Reference: MASA-1187

1. Grossbahn was seen by way of a repeat examination on 20 January 1953. Original physical examination was on 5 May 1952.

2. It was the undersigned's opinion that the above individual was manifesting numerous gastrointestinal symptoms as a result of considerable anxiety. It is not impossible that he may have had some reactivation of an old duodenal ulcer. At any rate, the magnitude of symptoms was directly proportional to the degree of nervous tension he experienced.

3. Therapy consisted of a rather rigid ulcer regimen combined with a sincere attempt to develop some insight on the part of the patient regarding the factors leading to his psychosomatic complaints.

4. My apologies for the delay in this report.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

29 April 1953

Distribution: 3-SALZ.
3-EE
3-VIEN
3-FRAN
3-CB

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Date: 2006

DMH/mrs

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET

10 OCT 1955
APK

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COPY

6. We will furnish a breakdown on the individual salaries in the AA and PP groups in the near future.

7. We have agreed with Grossbahn to attempt to work out the proposed salary increases by 1 June 1953. He feels, and we agree, that the raises, which actually are long overdue, will give a much needed boost in general morale. In order that we might keep our word with Grossbahn, request that Headquarters indicate their approval of the revised budget by cable.

RCM

Attachment:

Grossbahn memo, 26 March 1953

Distribution:

- 3 - EE (w/l att.)
- 3 - Vien (w/l att.)
- 1 - Salz chrono (w/o att.)
- 1 - Salz #101 (w/l att.)
- 1 - RCM notebook (w/o att.)
- 1 - CET (GRS) w/o att.

RCM

VIA: ATR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-1288

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Attn: 1
Chief of Base, Salzburg HW
SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC- Grossbahn Project Budget

DATE: 4 May 1953

*ND
NS*

Ref- A. EASA-621
B. EASW-213

1. As requested in reference B, we are attaching a revised budget prepared by Grossbahn and amended by us. He made no recommendation for an increase for himself (under CC-1)--the 8,500 AS, representing a 17% increase, is our insertion.

2. We feel Grossbahn's comments in paragraph one of his report are valid. We have no supporting statistics at hand but, judging from our own experiences, we feel he has understated the rise in cost of living since the summer of 1951, by setting the increase at 50%.

3. Note that we have included CC-4 in the new budget, although clearance has not as yet come through on her. We presume we can expect her clearance at any time in the near future and thus it appears a sound idea to include her salary. We have also added the salary of CC-5, on whom POC was received in DIR 01048. XX-1 is still carried in the new figures, though we do expect his transfer to RFE to come about shortly. When he leaves, naturally, the budget will be reduced accordingly.

4. The allowance for transportation we have eliminated entirely as the 900 AS set in the budget in reference B was entirely too low. Some misunderstanding seems to have crept into this 900 AS offer, for in actuality it was strictly a one-shot affair which Grossbahn had to snap up on the spot or pass up entirely. Today, it is impossible to arrange for the rental of a car for this figure. We have deleted this item from the new budget for we are in the throes of attempting to work out something else locally and will report on this matter separately.

5. The regular budget totals 45,350 AS monthly, which we calculate at \$1,744.23 in dollar equivalents. Grossbahn does draw a certain amount of miscellaneous PX supplies which he uses as gifts to unregistered sources and persons of peripheral aid. These purchases average about \$20.00 per month. The value of the gasoline and cigarettes he has listed is \$30.00 and \$50.00 per month respectively. This means the total dollar equivalents, per month, for the Grossbahn operation, should be calculated at \$1,844.23. We express the total sums involved in dollar equivalents due to the fact that currencies required by the operation vary from month to month and we do not wish to be restricted by having the entire budget on a set schilling basis. While the bulk of currency required each month will be Austrian schillings, expressing in dollar equivalents, we feel, will leave us free to substitute other currencies as specific needs arise. Advice would be appreciated if there is any objection to this scheme.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET
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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

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*✓ Dost 2018/83 RPS
6-6-8-78 (encl.)*

COURIER

Security Information

EGMA-

SECRET

5. Mai 1953

Chief of Base, Salzburg
ATTN:
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: Chief EE, Washington
Chief of Mission, Vienna

MEDICAL

Medical Report - Grossbahn CC-4 (A-0-636)

1. The above named individual underwent a routine medical examination on 4 March 1953.
2. History: 1938 - Scarlet Fever; no known complications or sequelae. Denies any other significant illnesses or injuries.
3. Physical Examination: Blood pressure, 110/64; Pulse, 68-86/min.; Vision, 20/40 on right, and 20/50, left; Thyroid palpable and slightly enlarged; Large furuncle scar over left shoulder.
4. Laboratory Studies: Chest x-ray, negative; Serologic test for Syphilis, negative; Urinalysis reveals a 1+ sugar reaction.
5. Disposition: Deferred; Should have a blood sugar determination, preferably drawn about 2 hours after a normal meal. If this value is within normal limits, she is qualified for full duty. I would like to be informed of this value as soon as possible.
6. NOTE: The delay in this report was due to our not having received an x-ray of this woman's chest until today (1 May 1953).

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

1 May 1953

Distribution: 3 - SALZ.
3 - EE
3 - VIEN
3 - FRAN
3 - MOB

EEH/mnc

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Date: 2005

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DES	MFD
FI	

Security Information

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FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

05 MAY 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ABM
above
Rosa Gib

ROUTING	
1	EEIA
2	EEIA
3	CHADRO
4	FMIDS
5	CIFE
6	CFI
7	
8	

IN 27629

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP SALZBURG
 ACTION: EE 6
 INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/R: 2

ROUTINE
1147Z 5 MAY 53

SALZ 1259

TO: (PRITY) SVIEN INFO: DIR CITE: SSALZ
INTEL/GROOVY

PENDING OUTCOME VIENNA CONTACTS GROSSBAHN WILL CALL MR THOMPSON
 B-48550 X2 AT 0815 HOURS 5 OR 6 MAY USING NAME ALBERT FOR TIME OF
 RETURN SALZBURG [] WILL GIVE ROOM NUMBER AT A-17242 IF
 CALLBACK NECESSARY. NEED ONLY SPECIFY A TIME. THIS WILL
 INDICATE HIS DESIRED ARRIVAL TIME AT STRIP. IF CALL SALZBURG
 NECESSARY PLEASE REFER TO MABLE.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

ABM

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MAY 5 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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(4)

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	Q. H. H. W.
4	
5	DEF
6	DEF
7	
8	

5 MAY 53

SECRET INFORMATION

21777

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

PRIORITY

ACTION: EE 6

1715Z 5 MAY 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

SALZ 1272

RLG

TO: (PRIORITY) DIR *Info* INFO: SVIEN CITE: SSALZ
RE: DIR 02816# FAVA 2251
INTEL/GROOVY/ I

INTERESTED DETERMINING ANY PENETRATION GROSSBAHN THROUGH HOETTL AND BOEHM BUT BELIEVE INADVISABLE INTRODUCE GROSSBAHN NAME INTERROGATION. SUGGEST INTERROGATING ON BOEHM WHOSE NAME APPEARED VERBER'S COPY HOETTL NOTEBOOK AND WHO KNOWN HAVE HAD CLOSE CONTACT HOETTL EDITING DIE GEHEIME FRONT AND FURNISHING POLITICAL REPORTS PASSED ON TO AMT BANK.

END OF MESSAGE

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

* (OUT 58519)

Board

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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DATE 10 OCT 1955		

5 1953

RPT

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

(44)

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Attachment to VOB/2460

"At the end of March 1953 GROSSBAHN noticed a man hidden in the bushes opposite his apartment and watching the entry-way to the villa. On the basis of his report, the area police carried out an action which resulted in the arrest during the first week of April of one Rudolph HAWELKA, born 30 July 1926 in Köstingbrunn, Lower Austria, address Altaunster 179, Bezirk Gmünd, unemployed."

"Since HAWELKA is a member of the Communist Party, it is suspected that he had been assigned to watch BOLSCHWING and his visitors."

"It has been reported that GROSSBAHN is working for the American MIS in Salzburg."

5 June 1953

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

EAVA-5222/C3

30 Nov 53

[]

~~68-12042~~

VOB/2460 AH

re: EASA-1412

Extract of EASA-1497 of 14 June 53

To Germany [] from Salz. Subject: Eleonore MERAN

Copy attached of the recent medical test performed on
subject at [] request (RPS of EGMA-5460)

Blood sugar result: 120 mg %

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

RPS

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

15 JUN 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 33463

ROUTING	
1	EE/HA
2	EE/HA
3	CHAONO
4	
5	YES
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: SR REP SALZBURG
ACTION: EE 6

ROUTINE

1817Z 15 JUN 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

abu

SALZ 1417

TO: SFRAN

INFO: DIR SVIEN

CITE: SSALZ

INTEL HIWAY

1. REQUEST PRESENT LOCATION AND DUTIES PFC G.J. SZEMLER U.S. 55209319 LAST KNOWN (MARCH 53) ASSIGNED COMPANY C371 ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION APO 16 WIS. GERMANY.
2. SZEMLER FORMER MEMBER OLD GROSSBAHN HUNGARIAN OPS REPORTED TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE MEMBERS CATHOLIC GROUP IN HUNG AND RECORD THREE SUCCESSFUL BORDER CROSSING OPS.
3. NO ACTION CASE CONTEMPLATED UNTIL BRIEFED AND ASSESSED.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

JUN 15 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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DATE 10 OCT 1955	

(44)

0-0 16-68202-1

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

50/100
308/1200

no cover sheet
RLG

Chief of Base, Vienna

24 June 1953

Chief of Base, Salzburg

Operational/GROOVY
GROSSEBHN - Austrian Citizenship

Ref- KASA-1147

1. In view of the short time still remaining in which to attempt to conclude this matter of acquiring Austrian citizenship for GROSSEBHN, we now presume nothing further can be done.

2. Would appreciate confirmation of this fact as we wish to close our files on this problem.

Distribution:

- 3 - Vien
- 1 - EE (via Vien)
- 1 - Salz chrono
- 2 - Salz #101

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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EE

VOB/1154

Chief of Base, Salzburg

8 July 1953

Chief of Base, Vienna

Att: []

Operational

Grossbalm - Immigration Visa to U.S.

1. [] made a blind query to Paul Hoylen, U.S. Consulate, Visa Section, concerning the time required for a German citizen to receive an immigration visa to the U.S. Hoylen states that the German quota is still open. Assuming that the applicant (a) gets a security clearance; (b) has an affidavit of support, and (c) encounters no other "administrative" difficulties, he can expect to get to the U.S. approximately four months after submitting his original application.

2. Hoylen is aware of []'s KUBARK affiliation, and stated that if we were to endeavor to expedite the security clearance, the waiting time might be decreased by as much as a month.

[]

Dist:
2-Salz
1-EE
1-[]
1-Gratias
1-[]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

204

Chief of Mission, Germany
Attn: MOB -
Chief of Base, Salzburg
Operational/GROOVI
GROSSBAHN - U. S. Visa.

27 Jul

1. This is to confirm verbal request to from Ralph C. Muzitz on 15 and 17 July 1953 that arrangements be made and processing commenced to issue a U. S. visa to Grossbahn. True identity of agent has been made known to .

2. GROSSBAHN has been issued full operational clearance in WASH 23751 (22 January 1952) and MASW-462 (5 July 1952). Local traces and investigations on him have not turned up any information which could be considered of a derogatory nature, except for GROSSBAHN's membership in the NSDAP and affiliation with the S.D., on which exact details have been passed to . The aforesaid political information on GROSSBAHN was furnished by him voluntarily early in his association with KUBARK and was not discovered as the result of investigation.

3. As requested, GROSSBAHN will bring with him, on Monday 27 July 1953 a certificate from the Austrian Police to the effect that he has not been convicted of any crime. In addition, , who will accompany GROSSBAHN, will borrow GROSSBAHN's chest x-ray taken in May, 1952, from the Munich KUBARK medical office and turn this over to for his use, should the need arise.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

24 July 1953

- Distribution:
- 1- MOB (hand carrier)
 - 2- COM, Germany
 - 1- EE
 - 3- Visa
 - 1- Salz chrono
 - 2- Salz #101

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2001, 2005

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(C) Foreign Relations

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EASA-1860

14 AUG 1953

10 Aug. 1953

F1 Board LF
F1/PO V
RLG

Chief, EE
Attn: []
Chief of Base, Salzburg
Operational/GROOVI

ND
NS

GROSSBAHN - Progress Report for the Period 16 June to 15 July 1953

Ref- EASA-1580

A. Synopsis. The following paragraphs reflect progress within the GROSSBAHN operation for the period indicated. Salient developments were:

1. [] J/E [] briefing and conference regarding GROSSBAHN on 29 June (decisions reached during this meeting are reflected in subsequent text).
2. Preliminary steps with MOB toward securing a U. S. visa for GROSS-BAHN.
3. Debriefings of [] on the Soviets and related personalities in Urfahr.
4. Preparation of [] for his trip to Budapest/Bucharest on 28 July 1953.

B. Specific Action Requested of Headquarters. None.

C. Specific Action Requested of Vienna. See paragraph D.10., a reply to SOE/1269 is requested (suspended meeting with [] in order that transfer of PP-1 might be planned.

D. Summary.

1. GROSSBAHN.

- a. Budget revision submitted under EAVA-3801 (SOE/1268). No fund increase requested.
- b. Training has not progressed beyond BOC lecture material.
- c. Security remains essentially unchanged.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT. Vehicle issue has presented no complications.

e. Files have been completely microfilmed.

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Original of RLG, EE/Red cap, EC/A (RLG)

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Date: 2005

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10 OCT 1953	

- f. Major problems settled.
2. CC-4 reported for duty 22 June.
3. CC-15. No POC granted as yet.
4. AA operation continued dormant. To be disbanded.
5. AA-1 cut-out idea disapproved by [] and []
6. AA-2 meetings with Soviets suspended. Agent to be transferred to Zone.
7. AA-3 (NW-1) contact established.
8. HH-1 has accomplished no real progress in phasing over to REDCAP support.
9. [] debriefings fruitful. He appears well suited as REDCAP asset in Urfahr.
10. PP-1 transfer held up pending COM and COPS decision on []
11. [] briefings and preparations for Budapest/Bucharest trip nearing completion.

E. General.

1. GROSSBAHN.

a. Budget. A revised budget has been submitted under EAVA- 3801 (SOB/1268). No increase in funds was requested, rather a reduction of \$4.31 per month was recommended in spite of the fact that general increases were suggested for all but a few personnel. This was due to recent attrition in the GROSSBAHN operation—dropping of agents CC-2, CC-5, and XI-1. The monthly budget is now set at the dollar equivalent \$1,604.23. Detailed breakdown is contained in EAVA- 3801(SOB-1268).

b. Training. During the past month, we have continued reviewing with GROSSBAHN in detail the Basic Operations Course lecture material we reported turning over to him in EASA-1580. Due to the heavy agent meeting schedule which GROSSBAHN is now handling personally, difficulty is being experienced in finding sufficient time to devote to formal training. Much of the meeting time with his case officer is devoted to reviewing operations, offering operational guidance, planning the course of present operations and discussing ways and means of developing new operations. Wherever possible, time is taken for academic instruction but this is probably averaging an hour per week—certainly too little time. However, a brighter side to the training problem is that due to the fact that GROSSBAHN is now functioning as a P/A—is out in the field handling his sources—he is actually receiving invaluable on-the-job training. We feel this working training more than compensates for the lack of formalized training.

c. Security. There were no new security developments during the period. We are satisfied that GROSSBAHN answered the questions we put to him early in June truthfully (see para. 3.a.(2) of EASA-1580) and we have thus abandoned our plans to re-run him on LOFLUTTER. has advised us against running a routine re-test as results are usually valueless and may have a negative effect on the agent. Unless something specific crops up, we do not plan to re-test.

d. Vehicles. The issuance of a vehicle (see para. 3.a.(3) of EASA-1580) removed the last obstacle standing in the way of our insistence that GROSSBAHN assume the role of P/A and handle his own agents. GROSSBAHN's becoming completely mobile has been one of the most rewarding operational innovations in recent months. He is now keeping, personally, six to eight agent meetings per ^{WEEK} month, a schedule which would have been ~~impossible~~ ^{difficult} without the vehicle.

e. Files. While GROSSBAHN's records are now completely on micro-film, a portion of his files still remain in Frankfurt. These will be retrieved before mid-August, as GROSSBAHN is experiencing difficulty in incorporating file traces in his reports.

f. Major Problems. These problems were threefold: U. S. citizenship, Austrian citizenship and a KUBARK contract. We are well on our way to securing a U. S. visa for GROSSBAHN (see EAVA-380 (SOB/1327) and EAVA-3857 (SOB/1453)) through MOB. The need for Austrian citizenship has evaporated since GROSSBAHN's son's birthday has passed without disastrous results and he secured his ID card as the son of a stateless father. We have offered GROSSBAHN a contract which he ultimately refused on the grounds that he has been operating on KUBARK good will for over six years now and feels that he can continue to do so without a formal document. We are planning on GROSSBAHN's departing Austria to reach the U. S. on or about 15 October 1953 for the primary purpose of filing his first papers toward U. S. citizenship. He is to be turned around as quickly as circumstances will permit and is to assume a role of spotter, recruiter and developer of new operations on his return to Austria.

2. CC-4 reported for duty on 22 June. Her performance to date has not been impressive. GROSSBAHN states she is an 8:00 to 5:00 type, has no devotion to duty and seems anything but impressed with the importance of the new field in which she finds herself. We have told GROSSBAHN that chances are it will be difficult to justify his retention of two secretaries in view of his newly planned role after return from the U. S., possibly even difficult to justify one secretary. If anyone is retained, it will be CC-3. We should leave the opportunity open to dismiss CC-4 on rather short notice in the near future. GROSSBAHN has been told to discuss CC-4's poor performance to date with her, stress that he is not at all pleased with her and that she is to consider that she will continue on probation for at least 60 more days. We will discuss CC-4 again with GROSSBAHN in early August and, if she continues uninspired, we will probably recommend that she be dropped.

3. CC-15. POC has been requested in EASA-1524. Although POC probably will be granted prior to GROSSBAHN's departure for the U. S., no recruitment of CC-15 will take place until GROSSBAHN's return. This will be placed on the agenda of GROSSBAHN's new tasks--to recruit and develop whatever potentials CC-15 might have.

4. AA Operation. This operation has ceased to exist, as a group. AA-2 has been told by the Soviets that he need no longer appear on a regular basis--they will summon him if and when needed. Arrangements are being made among the Bundesheer planners to transfer AA-2 to the Gendarmerie (he is an ex-officer) then quietly arrange his transfer to the Gendarmerie School in Carinthia, safely out of convenient Soviet reach. AA-2 is being given 60 days severance pay and is being dropped as of 31 July. At his last meeting with AA-1 in Vienna on 6 and 7 July, GROSSBAHN broached the idea of his taking over AA-6 and sub-sources AA-61, AA-62 and AA-63 directly. AA-1, surprisingly enough, was enthusiastic about the idea and admitted that AA-6 and sub-sources had been rather disappointing to date and that a fresh viewpoint and control could only bring salutary results. Arrangements have been made for AA-1 to drop contact with this sub-group and for GROSSBAHN to come into direct contact with AA-6. This will be done prior to 15 August. If this group has no potential against the REDCAP target, they will be dropped. AA-1 has been instructed that he is to sever contact with any and all peripheral personalities he has been using in a casual manner and to cease all personal OB reporting. In substance, this means that the AA group has been completely dissolved or removed from the direct control of AA-1. As firm plans are drawn up for the disposition of GROSSBAHN's present assets, we will, in all probability, recommend that VOB take over direct control of AA-1 principally for his potential value against the [] [] [] targets.

5. AA-1 Cut-Out. The ideas which we expressed in para. 3.f. of EASA-1580 (inserting a cut-out between AA-1 and KUBARK) were not concurred in by [] [] and [] [] during briefing of 29 June. Subsequent events have proven the fallacy of these plans and the soundness of this decision. Therefore, plans to secure such a cut-out are abandoned. We have not advised AA-1 of this. Rather, we have encouraged him to continue his spotting efforts, however, stressing that any candidates must measure up to stiff requirements on our part. This leaves us free to disqualify spotted persons for the cut-out position, but at the same time permits us to look over AA-1's candidates and measure them against KUBARK targets and standards.

6. As reported in paragraph 4, foregoing, at AA-2's last meeting with the Soviets on 30 June, they stated that he would no longer be required to call at their offices regularly. They indicated they would probably look him up again in the fall. Arrangements are underway, initiated by AA-1 through his official Austrian channels, to transfer AA-2 to the Gendarmerie and assign him to the Gendarmerie School in Carinthia. We are preparing a final consolidated report on all of AA-2's meetings with the Soviets which will be forwarded shortly. He is being dropped as of 31 July.

7. AA-3. This agent is now described by GROSSBAHN as W-1 due to his severance from the former group. GROSSBAHN has had three meetings with this agent since the last progress report. He has reported some data on the

[] [] []

Gendarmerie school at Ebelsberg--principally their intelligence endeavors--of marginal interest. We still do not have a clear idea on his possibilities because he, himself, is still unsure of just what he is going to be capable of doing. At present, his personal logistical problems are receiving almost his full attention (moving his family from Vienna, settling in a new apartment, getting oriented in his new job) and we have, by no means, conducted a thorough assessment of this agent for this reason. If we cannot clarify our plans on WW-1 prior to GROSSBAHN's departure, we will recommend that he be kept dormant during GROSSBAHN's absence and that he be fully assessed and developed on GROSSBAHN's return.

8. HH-1. We are making little progress in securing worthwhile results from HH-1. He has been over a month now compiling data on the SPARROWS, a father and daughter team in the Soviet Zone, whom we feel may have some REDCAP potential. Except for the SPARROWS and a few marginal tidbits he has submitted on Lins and Urfahr, HH-1 gives all the earmarks of being a poor investment in terms of both time and money. We are giving him until 31 August to produce (he has been told this) or he will be dropped. While prospects with HH-1 are rather bleak, and the contact has been generally unrewarding, a sizeable redeeming feature in his favor is the fact that we were led to [] (see para. 9) who bears all the earmarks of being a solid REDCAP asset. Nevertheless his retention cannot be based on one performance alone and unless he shows real promise of leading us to equally rewarding operations, it is problematical whether he will be retained beyond August.

9. []. (Formerly [] and/or []). PRQ, Part I, with operational details and request for POC was forwarded under EASA-1621. Progress to date with []'s debriefing was summarized by [] in EASA-1692. This agent is in periodic personal contact with Soviets and is in almost constant contact with persons (principally younger females) who are in touch with Soviets. To date, we have accumulated a fair amount of operational intelligence on the Soviets in Urfahr and surrounding areas, plus some biographical and pictorial data on []'s sub-sources. This agent will be phased to direct case officer handling in the near future. For details, see paragraph F.2.i. under Future Plans.

10. PP-1. The question of PP-1's transfer to Vienna and subsequent phasing over to a ~~full-time~~ REDCAP support role, has been held in abeyance pending COM and COPS decision on planned meeting with []. The major problem involved is one of continuity-- [] should be met by someone close to or the person who will be his future contact in Vienna, so that the operation with him, if undertaken, can be carried on without an artificially induced strain. This would be the case if he were first contacted by an SOB case officer because, if the initial meeting proved successful, it would then be necessary to phase him over to a VCB case officer as his official position and residence are both in Vienna. From what GROSSBAHN tells us, the PP-1 transfer can take place at any time. We are holding it up, however, hoping that the planned meeting with [] will place us in a better position to insure that PP-1 gets the best assignment possible in Vienna to carry on against the REDCAP target.

225

11. E This agent was given one REDCAP assignment to follow down—a lead to a photographer in Waidhofen/Thaya who allegedly is in direct contact with Soviets—which he carried off with a fair performance, taking into consideration his inexperience and youth. We will gradually give him more assignments of this type as it is felt he is basically sound, can give us fair performance, and can be learning by doing. Although a REDCAP asset, agent will attend the Communist Youth Festival in Bucharest during the first half of August because the opportunity he presented to secure intelligence, plus photos, on a satellite country appeared too potentially valuable to overlook. He was able to secure sound cover for his planned photo activities by obtaining photo commissions from Communist publications in Austria. In addition, his travelling with Adolf LECHNER, leading Communist youth figure in agent's home town and a long time acquaintance, will lend him general overall cover during the entire trip. For further details on this agent, see paragraph F.2.k. under Future Plans.

F. Future Plans.

1. In the light of GROSSBAHN's planned trip to the U. S. and return to Austria in the role of spotter, recruiter and developer of new operations, it is vital that we dispose of—either by direct takeover, suspending or dropping—his present operations prior to his departure. While our planning has not progressed to the point of being able to offer precise details, we do have a rough framework in mind against which we will work in breaking up his operations.

2. The following paragraphs give the details:

a. CC-3. CC-3 will be retained to handle PP-3 contact in GROSSBAHN's absence. In addition, she will hold down the office and allow us a contact with persons who will be kept dormant during this period, should the need arise.

b. CC-4. We can see little justification, in view of our planned future role for GROSSBAHN, for the retention of two secretaries. Unless unforeseen significant developments take place prior to GROSSBAHN's departure, or CC-4 has other possibilities we are not aware of at the moment, she may be dropped.

c. CC-15. We do not plan any further activity with this contact prior to departure date. CC-15 will be one of GROSSBAHN's first developmental targets upon return.

d. AA-1. AA-1 is to be phased over to direct VCS case officer control prior to GROSSBAHN's departure, to be run as a single agent against future possibilities vis-a-vis Precise details will be worked out with COPS and submitted.

e. AA-2. This agent has been dropped as of the end of July 1953.

f. AA-3. This agent is now described by GROSSBAHN as WW-1 as he has no present connection with the AA group. Inasmuch as we do not, as yet, have a clear view of exactly what WW-1's capabilities are, he should probably be classified as still developmental. As such, we intend instructing GROSSBAHN that he is to place the WW-1 operation on a suspended status during his absence, and to place WW-1 ~~high~~ on the developmental list to be looked into closely on his return.

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g. AA-6, AA-61, AA-62 and AA-63. This sub-group is almost completely unassessed. GROSSBAHN will establish direct contact with AA-6 prior to 15 August. If the group has no REDCAP potential, they will be dropped after a thorough assessment has developed this. If they do have a potential, in all likelihood we will be unable to properly develop this group prior to GROSSBAHN's departure, in which case the AA-6 sub-group would also be placed on the list of assets to be properly developed by GROSSBAHN on his return.

h. HH-1. This agent has been given until 31 August to produce against the REDCAP target. It appears at present that he may be dropped at that time. However, should the SPARROWS or other HH-1 possibilities not apparent at the moment, show real promise, we will hold HH-1 dormant during the period of GROSSBAHN's absence and develop him fully on GROSSBAHN's return. Firm recommendations on the fate of HH-1 will be submitted.

i. [] This agent will be phased to direct REDCAP case officer control as quickly as possible. We will LCFLUTTER him on 28 July, allow for two GROSSBAHN meetings after the LCFLUTTER test for the purpose of smoothing any ruffled feathers that the test might raise and so as not to throw too much at the agent at once, then phase control directly to []

[] At the moment, we see no reason why [] will not be a direct REDCAP asset by 15 August.

j. PP-1. We plan on phasing PP-1 to direct VOB control prior to GROSSBAHN's departure. The local police, CI/CE coverage will be placed in the hands of PP-3, who will be contacted by CC-3, in GROSSBAHN's absence. We plan on seeing CC-3 at least once a week at GROSSBAHN's office (at night) while he is in the U. S. We will thus be able to pass along routine requests to PP-3 (or to any other dormant agents, as a matter of fact) and receive through her routine reports.

k. [], The second of two agents whom we plan to turn over directly to the SOB REDCAP Section. [] is by far the more fruitful and promising looking and thus will receive priority treatment in turnover. [] will be handled by GROSSBAHN as long as possible and will be turned over shortly prior to his departure date.

G. Recommendations. We will shortly furnish our suggestions on the handling of GROSSBAHN while available in the U. S. While the primary task is to get him started on his first citizenship papers and back to Austria as promptly as possible we nevertheless feel that some advantages might accrue as a result of Headquarters getting a first hand look at (and a chance to talk with) GROSSBAHN.

31 July 1953

Distribution:

3 - EE
3 - Vien
1 - Salz chrono
2 - Salz #101

N.B. Reference paragraphs D.6., E.4. and E.6., we may have failed to make the matter of AA-2's transfer to the Gendarmerie and subsequent transfer to the British Zone absolutely clear. According to GROSSBAHN, AA-2 has for some time, even prior to his initial Soviet contact on 4 March, desired to get into the Gendarmerie and become an officer in the embryonic Bundesheer. With or without pressure from the Soviets, he would have made the transfer in time—the Soviet slackening of interest in him has given him an incentive to make the move now. It is entirely his idea and we have had nothing to do with influencing his decision. While we are not enthusiastic about the transfer at this time—the Soviets may look on the move with certain suspicion and consequently may revive their interest in him—there is little we can do to prevent it. We cannot insist that he remain in place, available to the Soviets indefinitely, for he finds such a future prospect repugnant and nerve-wracking. As a compromise measure, we see no objection to allowing him to work out his own future as he sees fit and to drop him as of 31 July 1953. There will undoubtedly be a social correspondence between AA-1 and AA-2 after the latter transfers. If the Soviets become interested in AA-2 again, we could expect him to inform AA-1, who, in turn, should inform us.

R.C.M.

EAVA-3857

VIA: (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. EAV-3857(SOB/1453)

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CLASSIFICATION

14. Aug. 1953

TO : Chief, EIC
Attn:

FROM : Chief of Base, Salzburg *gab*

DATE: _____

SUBJECT: GENERAL. Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC. GROSSBAHN - U. S. Visa

Ref- EAVA-3801 (SOB/1327)
INFO: Frankfurt, Munich.

A. Synopsis.

There are no major obstacles apparent at present standing in the way of furnishing GROSSBAHN with a U. S. visa within the next month.

B. Specific Action Requested of Headquarters.

1. Action to ease GROSSBAHN's entry past McCarran Act restrictions (see paragraph B.2. of reference, plus paragraph 7 following).
2. Contact instructions for GROSSBAHN in the U. S., assuming he will arrive approximately 15 October 1953. Detailed recommendations for his handling will follow.
3. Headquarters should disregard paragraph B.1. of reference (request for advise, suggestions and guidance on securing a U. S. visa for GROSSBAHN) as the matter apparently can be handled completely in the field.

C. General.

1. It was determined that GROSSBAHN's place of birth (Schoenbruck, East Prussia) was German territory in 1938 and thus GROSSBAHN could be placed under the German quota.
2. GROSSBAHN's present TTD was shown to While the document was in order, was of the opinion the job of papering GROSSBAHN would be simplified if he were issued a new TTD with home address listed as Munich. Necessary photos will be turned over to on 17 July and new TTD will be issued shortly thereafter.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

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- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
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3. GROSSBAHN will complete two forms on 16 July: Application for Registration and Immigration Visa Application Scratch Sheet. These will be turned over to [] on 17 July, together with necessary photographs (five copies - 2 1/4" x 2 1/4"), plus original birth certificate and either original or photocopy of marriage certificate. In addition, it will be necessary to furnish a certificate of good conduct. GROSSBAHN can secure such a certificate from Salzburg police sources as the certificate need only state that he has not been convicted of any criminal, moral, or political crimes.

4. The speed with which it is necessary to furnish the foregoing listed forms and documents is necessitated by the fact that GROSSBAHN should be gotten on the waiting list as promptly as possible. Once he is on the list, issuance of the visa can be timed in operational terms, subject to the progress which we can make in phasing GROSSBAHN's present operations over to direct handling or dropping them. In any event, we have set arrival in the U. S. at approximately 15 October 1953 and will have the phasing of GROSSBAHN's operations completed in time for him to depart as scheduled.

5. No Affidavit of Support will be necessary. [] assures us that he can furnish the Munich Consulate with a certificate that GROSSBAHN's entry is in the best interests of the U. S. Government and that he will not become a public charge while there. This will serve in lieu of the usual affidavit.

6. [] states that the only point on which difficulties may arise is the question of getting GROSSBAHN past the physical examination. He does have a record of lung infection in his youth, though this did not appear in his medical examination at MOB, which was conducted on 5 May 1952. (A copy of []'s medical report is attached at A.) We plan to secure the chest x-rays which were taken in May of 1952 and have these on hand to assure the Munich Consulate medical examiner that the chest condition is arrested, should the need arise.

7. In regard to the question of GROSSBAHN's possibly striking a stumbling block with the INS people upon entry, we are of the opinion, and judging from what [] told us, there appears no reason to assume the INS people should have a reason for having a particular interest in GROSSBAHN. It would seem to us that any derogatory information would have to originate from here. If there appears to be no security objection to the issuance of a visa from Germany, could INS, in some other manner, learn of GROSSBAHN's NSDAP and SD background? Do they perform a routine screening on all persons entering? Any preliminary steps Headquarters can take to insure against GROSSBAHN's possibly becoming entangled with INS would be well worth the effort.

8. We have discussed the problem of eventually securing U. S. citizenship for the rest of the family (wife and 1 1/2 year old son) with GROSSBAHN. He (and we agree in this) sees no other course than to let his wife sit in Austria while he is in the U. S. and face the problem of starting her on the way to U. S. citizenship at a later date. The son, we have assured him, represents no problem, provided his divorce decree from his former wife will not bind him in some manner.

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Page 3

GROSSBAHN states that there is no official entry in court records that his former wife has any rights in regard to the child. He has agreed with her, informally, to let her see the boy on more important Austrian holidays. He has discussed with her in general terms (under cover of sending the boy to school in the U. S.) the son's future and she has assured him that she will not stand in the way of any such future plans. In summation, GROSSBAHN prefers to clarify his own status in regards to U. S. citizenship first and tackle the problems of his wife and child at a later date. He realizes that we will lend whatever aid is possible under the circumstances, but that the future is unpredictable and he may be left completely to his own devices in working out the family's future citizenship.

9. We, naturally, will advance GROSSBAHN sufficient funds to purchase his round-trip air ticket to the U. S. In addition, we plan on advancing him the sum of \$405.00 for per diem, figured at the average rate of \$9.00 per day (standard U. S. per diem rate) on the basis of his being absent from Austria for approximately 45 days.

D. Recommendations.

It will be necessary that GROSSBAHN reach the U. S. within four months of the time that a visa is granted to him. We thus recommend that a visa be secured for GROSSBAHN within the next month and that we plan, both operationally and administratively, on his departing Austria so as to reach the U. S. approximately 15 October 1953.

rcm.
SA

Attachments:

Medical Report, 19 May 1952

Distribution:

- 8 - Vien (w/8 copies of att.)
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- 2 - Salz #101 (w/2 copies of att.)

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 Aug 53

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ROUTING	
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TO: SEN REP AUSTRIA

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

GEIB/vch

EE/A 2695

CONF: EE 6

DEFERRED

2127Z 28 AUG 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 17553

TO: SSALZ, SVIEN

INFO: SFRAN, SMUNI

CITE: DIR

above

INTEL

GROSSBARN

1. WE ARE UNABLE ENSURE ENTRY UNDER QUOTA DUE NSDAP AND ED PAST. HAVE REQUESTED COURSE WAIVE OBJECTIONS BUT THIS INVOLVES POLICY DECISION WHICH MAY TAKE THREE WEEKS OR MORE.
2. SUBJ NOT ELIGIBLE ENTRY UNDER ONE HUNDRED PERSONS PROVISION.
3. HDQS CONSENSUS SUBJECT'S IMMIGRATION TO ZI, IF PERMITTED, SHOULD COINCIDE WITH TERMINATION, UNLESS MUCH STRONGER, MORE SPECIFIC PLAN PRESENTED FOR FUTURE WORK UPON RETURN TO AUSTRIA. ON BASIS PAST PERFORMANCE WE UNCONVINCED FUTURE EFFORTS AS RECRUITER WILL BE PRODUCTIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT UNDERTAKING SPONSORSHIP HIS RETURN. SUCH SPONSORSHIP BOUND TO MAKE ULTIMATE DISPOSAL MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.
4. REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER PROPOSALS FAVA 3801. ADVISE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

END OF MESSAGE

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ABSTRACT	INDEX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DATE 10 OCT 1955		

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 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2001, 2005

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Security Information

1 Sep 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
Attention: Alien Affairs Division
FROM: Chief, EE
SUBJECT: Request for Aid in Facilitating US Entry for Agent

1. Your assistance is requested in facilitating the entry into the United States of Baron Otto von BOLSCHWING, who was the subject of a discussion between [] of EE/A and [] of the Alien Affairs Office on 26 August 1953.

2. Von BOLSCHWING has been working for US Intelligence organizations for the past eight years, six of which have been spent in Agency-sponsored intelligence activities. Because of his services on behalf of US Intelligence organizations, it is considered desirable to assist von BOLSCHWING to come to the United States on an immigration visa, but we do not wish to sponsor him under Section 8 of the CIA act of 1949. [] has indicated that because of Von BOLSCHWING's membership in the NSDAP and the SD (details of which are set forth below), his entry into the United States must be cleared with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Since von BOLSCHWING has been advised by case officers that all reasonable assistance will be given him to come into this country on an immigration visa, the use of your good offices in taking the matter up with I and NS is requested.

VON BOLSCHWING'S US VISA

Von BOLSCHWING was issued immigrant visa # 14846 at the American Consulate General in Munich on 24 August 1953. It was granted under the German quota. The expiration date is 23 December 1953. We have been informed that von BOLSCHWING's arrival in the U.S. may be expected approximately 1 November 1953.

BACKGROUND DATA ON VON BOLSCHWING

The information given below was furnished by von BOLSCHWING himself. Results of all checks made by the Agency confirm the biographical data submitted by

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

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Security Information

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von BOLSCHWING. As requested, the field has been asked to supply the following items which will be forwarded to you as soon as received:

- a. The results of a polygraph test given within the last six months;
- b. The results of an up-to-date recheck of field traces;
- c. A current assessment of von BOLSCHWING by case officer.

PERSONAL DATA:

Born 15 October 1909 in Schönbruck, East Prussia (then German territory, since World War II Polish). German citizen at birth, but since World War II considered stateless. Married in 1938 to Brigitte nee KLENZENDORFF. Divorced 1942. Remarried to Ruth nee von PFLAUNDLER in 1943. One son, Gisbert, from first marriage, born 1939, given by court decree to custody of von BOLSCHWING.

PAST OCCUPATIONS

1927 apprentice at shipping firm, Royal Mail Steamship Company, London
1928-30 employee of export firm, C. Illies & Co., Hamburg
1930-31 manager of Oberon Investment and Development Company, Berlin and Vienna
1930-32 owner of lime factory, Upper Silesian Lime and Cement Works Ltd.
1932 banking course with the Bank für Industrieobligationen, Berlin
1931-33 European representative of investment interests of several London investment firms
1932-33 businessman negotiating deals for industrial development in Bulgaria (backed by international finance and German Foreign Office).
1933-35 search in Palestine for treasure supposedly buried by German Army in World War I
1933-36 manager of own export firm, Amaneh Company, Jerusalem and Cairo
During this period advised German Foreign Office on trade questions
1937-39 foreign exchange and tax counselor, Vienna and Berlin
1939-41 chief of SD intelligence in Rumania (under diplomatic cover)
1941 intelligence assignments in Greece and Holland
1942-43 under Gestapo arrest
1943-45 manager of Vienna branch of Pharmachemie (pharmaceutical firm)
1945-46 with US military organizations and with US Military Government in Austria and Bavaria
1947-present U.S. Intelligence (CIA)

RELATIONS WITH NSDAP

According to von BOLSCHWING, he ran into difficulty when in March 1932 he tried to get Government consent to erect a cement factory in East Prussia.

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After discussing the problem with leaders of all parties, and meeting with interest, but no support, he was advised by the military district commander in East Prussia to take the matter up with the "coming" NSDAP. Von BOLSCHWING then contacted the Gauleiter through his brother's butler who was a local NSDAP group leader. The butler agreed to arrange the meeting on condition that Von BOLSCHWING fill out a Party application form; Von BOLSCHWING did so, although he considered the application as a mere formality. He took no part in Party affairs, nor did he meet the Gauleiter. In 1934, when in the Middle East, he learned that the application had been accepted. He did not participate in any Party affairs, and was rebuked by the group leader in Palestine for this. In 1935 when he was in Germany negotiating for the general agency of the Autounion firm in the Middle East, he was informed that the Auslandsorganisation (section of the NSDAP dealing with Germans abroad) had refused to grant him the agency because he had not complied with Party directives. In an attempt to protect himself against these charges, he arranged through his brother's butler to get him Party membership book by paying the fees back to 1932.

RELATIONS WITH SD and SS

In the winter of 1937-38, and again in 1938, von BOLSCHWING was arrested by the Gestapo and accused of pro-Jewish sympathies, but was freed by the intervention of highly-placed SS connections who offered him protection in return for payment. When the war broke out in September 1939 he was called to the Hilfspolizei, but through the help of the highly placed connections just mentioned, he was made SD chief of intelligence ad interim in Rumania. In arranging the appointment the SS connections "cooked up" the story that von BOLSCHWING was a reliable old-time Nazi and that he had been an SS applicant since 1937. In April 1941 von BOLSCHWING was informed that he had become "Untersturmführer" in the SS; two promotions were given him between then and early in 1941. From 1939 until February 1941 he was in Rumania as chief of SD intelligence under Foreign Office cover. At the end of this time, because of disagreement with the Nazi Party on their policy toward the Rumanian Iron Guard, he got into serious trouble. Several months later he was sent on an intelligence mission to Greece where he this time disagreed with the Party's automatic arrest policy, was relieved of his command and returned to Berlin. Through the influence of SS General JOST, he was assigned in August 1941 to IS work in Holland, from which he tried to build a line to Portugal to contact Western intelligence directly. When JOST fell into disgrace von BOLSCHWING was recalled to Berlin in December 1941 and henceforth was under watch by the Gestapo. He was under medical treatment until July 1942, but in September 1942 was arrested by the Gestapo and kept in Gestapo confinement in Berlin until April 1943. During this time he claims it was discovered that his Party membership was "more than dubious" and that had "actually never been an SS member" (apparently it was found out that the stories made up by von BOLSCHWING's sponsors to get him the SD assignment in Bucharest were untrue). In a seeming effort to save face, the SS demoted him from officer to enlisted man rank and then discharged him from the SS.

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ANTI-NAZI and RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES

After his release by the Gestapo, von BOLSCHWING obtained a position in Vienna as manager of the Austrian branch of a pharmaceutical concern. His second wife, whom he married in 1943, is part Jewish. Von BOLSCHWING made contact with members of the Vienna resistance clergy; in 1944 through his brother-in-law he made contact with a small resistance group in the Tyrol. In February 1945 he was arrested by the Gestapo, Vienna, but was released after giving a bribe. He then fled with his wife to the Tyrol where he worked in a resistance group with which he had been in contact for some time. For his activities on behalf of Austrian Resistance he was awarded the Tyrolean honor certificate in May 1946.

Complying with Austrian law, von BOLSCHWING registered in February 1950, indicating that he had held the rank of Hauptsturmführer, but was informed several days later that through a decision made by Austrian authorities he was exempted from registration because of his Austrian resistance activities.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF US

Von BOLSCHWING met the incoming American troops in the Tyrol, worked with their security forces several months, and earned recommendations from these units for his work. From the end of 1945 through 1946 he worked for the US Military Government, mostly in the Garmisch-Partenkirchen area (southern Bavaria). Since June 1947 he has been employed in Agency-sponsored intelligence activities.

PRIOR TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES

As of possible interest to the present problem is the fact that von BOLSCHWING visited the United States in 1939. At that time he wanted to emigrate to the United States and made a preliminary trip to look over financial possibilities here. He returned to Germany, intending to emigrate with his wife and infant son, but the outbreak of war made these plans impossible.

MEMORANDUM TO SPECIAL SECURITY DIVISION

As requested by [] [], a memorandum containing biographical data on von BOLSCHWING has been written to the Special Security Division which has assigned case number #67215 to von BOLSCHWING.

EE/A

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Security Information

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

RASA-1992

1 Sep. 1953

Board
F.I./PO
RLG
file

Chief, XI
Acting
Chief of Base, Salzburg
Operational/GROOVY
GROSSBAHN - U. S. Visa

Ref- A. RASA-1743
B. RAVA-3801 (not sent to Fran or PCB)

1. We have GROSSBAHN's visa for the U. S. The document itself is too bulky to reproduce. Details are as follows:

Application No. I-264531
Immigrant Visa No. 14846 (German Quota)
Issued 24 August 1953, at the American Consulate General, Munich
Expires 23 December 1953

2. As a supporting document, GROSSBAHN was issued a TTD, described as follows:

No. 0131147
Issued 3 June 1953 at Berlin
Expires 3 June 1955
Containing a Re-entry Permit for Germany No. R-C0369, which expires 3 June 1954.
Three Zone-Repeat Journey-Visa for Austria No. A-C09091, which expires 3 December 1953.
A U. S. visa stamp, indicating bearer has been issued Immigrant Visa No. 14846 (German Quota) by the American Consulate General, Munich.

3. For the record, we wish to express our appreciation for the extremely competent manner in which [] of MOB went about securing the above described documentation. We are most grateful to MOB and [] for a job well done.

4. For Headquarters Action. Early advice on contact arrangements in the U. S. and an approximation of the time GROSSBAHN will have to spend in the U. S., as requested in reference B, is needed soonest.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

28 August 1953

Distribution:

- 3 - EE
- 3 - Visa
- 3 - Fran
- 1 - MOB
- 1 - Sals chrono
- 2 - Sals #101

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SECURITY INFORMATION

(please see note on attached page)

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Date: 2001, 2005

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SECURITY INFORMATION

H.B.

1. As we completed the foregoing, DIR 17553 was received.
2. Request that Headquarters continue to attempt to secure necessary COURSE waiver.
3. The questions which are raised in paragraph 3 of DIR 17553 will be answered in a separate dispatch which will embody Station and Mission views.

H.C.M.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

BEST AVAILABLE

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2 SEP 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 15261

ROUTING	
1	EEIA
2	EEIA
3	CHANO
4	
5	CIER
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1713Z 2 SEP 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

alm

SALZ 1673

TO: SVIEN

INFO: DIR

CITE: SSALZ

INTEL GROSSBAHN

RE: DIR 17553 (OUT 84658)

WILL FORWARD SOB POSITION AND DETAILED PLANS TO SVIEN SOONEST FOR
INCORPORATION IN MISSION STATEMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

RPS

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 10 OCT 1955	

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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(4)

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING	
1	EE/A
2	EE/A
3	CHAND
4	
5	CEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13 SEP 53

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 19662

TO: DIRECTOR CIA

FROM: SR REP VIENNA

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

2210Z 18 SEP 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

abw
[]

VIEN 0333

TO: DIR

INFO: SSALZ

CITE: SVIEN

INTEL/GROOVY/GROSSBAHN

RE: DIR 17553 (OUT 84658)

1. HAVE DISCUSSED TERMINATION WITH GROSSBAHN STRESSING FACT CONSIDERING AGE AND IMMIGRANT STATUS HE WOULD DO SELF DISSERVICE BY TAKING CONTRACT AS KUBARK AGENT AUSTRIA. EMPHASIZED SERVICES NOT ESPECIALLY NEEDED AND TOTAL ABSENCE COVER AUSTRIA WOULD PROBABLY ENSURE UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE HIS PART THUS CLOSING HIS KUBARK RECORD WITH FAILURE.

2. HE INITIALLY RELUCTANT QUIT SINCE MIGHT BE REGARDED AS UNGRATEFUL ACCEPTANCE IMMIGRATION HELP WITHOUT ATTEMPT PAY OFF DEBT. WE ASSURED HIM HIS SIX YEARS SERVICE WERE AMPLE PAYMENT AND HIS VISA ASSISTANCE UNENCUMBERED REWARD. RETAINS CERTAIN RELUCTANCE SINCE APPARENTLY SINCERELY DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE BUT NOW RECOGNIZES ANOTHER TOUR AUSTRIA WOULD PROBABLY CONCLUSIVELY END CAREER. BELIEVE PRIOR DEPARTURE AUSTRIA LINGERING DOUBTS WILL BE RESOLVED INSURING SMOOTH TERMINATION AND DISPOSAL STATESIDE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	30 OCT 1955

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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(44)

10 SEP 53

~~SECRET~~

IN 19662

VIEN 0383

PAGE 2

3. WE RECOMMEND:

A. EVERY EFFORT OBTAIN ODURGE WAIVER SINCE WITHOUT VISA COMPARATIVELY SIMPLE TERMINATION MIGHT BECOME MAJOR DISPOSAL PROBLEM. RE SECOND REF: GROSSBAHN HAS VISA. WE ANTICIPATE NO DIFFICULTY VISAS FOR DEPENDENTS. BEING LOFLUTTERED AGAIN WITH FIRST HALF TEST ON 12 SEPT WITH SECOND HALF SCHEDULED 19 SEPT. EXPEDITING REMAINDER REQUIREMENTS.

B. PAYMENT SIX MONTHS TERMINATION BONUS.

4. POUCH FOLLOWS DETAILING TERMINATION CONVERSATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

Now: want amount to signify under \$2000.

~~SECRET~~

RP4

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 Sept 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 89732

ROUTING	
1	EE/A
2	EE/A
3	CHC/OOD
4	
5	C/EE
6	CEI
7	
8	

TO: SO REP, VIENNA

1/rah

EE/A

2694

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

1833Z 23 SEP 53

CONF: (EE) 6

INFORMATION:

FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

abu

5

DIR 20359

TO: SVIEN

INFO: (DEFERRED) SSALZ

CITE: NUR

INTEL GROSSBARTH

RE: VIEN 0983 (IN 1962)

1. IN TERMS INFO SO FAR AVAILABLE HERE ON GROSSBARTH DO NOT ANTICIPATE DIFFICULTIES ARRANGING ENTRY WITH COURSE.

2. APPROVE RECOMMENDATION PARA 3 B.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

P. SICHEL

EE/PI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. EE/A

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(4)

FORM 16-5222-1

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VIA: (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-2171

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

~~KAPOK~~
28 Sep 1953
MAY 1953

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Base, Salzburg *HRK*
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC - Otto von BOLSCHWING - Local Traces
REF: DIR-18334
INFO: Vienna

MICROFILMED
MAY 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. G-2, USFA, and CIC, Salzburg, files were rechecked on Subject with the following results:

a. Informal file memo signed [] dated 22 April 1948 states that one Dr. Bollschwing, alias Otto MAIER, is working for ^(Agency sponsored intelligence group) the Waldmann-TIB group and is in close contact with Graf MERAN as well as other U. S. net personalities at the Hotels zum Hirschen and Elefant.

b. CIC report dated 9 August, "Dutch Claim #133 Investigation Report" gives information on attempts to locate Baron Otto von BOLSCHWING, alleged holder of the two items (sic). Apparently the investigators attempted to locate von Bolschwing at Helbrunnerstrasse 5 and Neutorstrasse 12, Salzburg, without success. ^(A pencilled note on this report states that von Bolschwing is a TIB operative, and the Salzburg addresses were listed for purposes of IRO immigration.)

an operative of Agency sponsored intelligence group

c. A note to the files, signed [] dated 8 March 1950 states that the Austrian Police and Ministry of Interior are investigating Otto Bolschwing for his SS and NSDAP affiliation. SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, NSDAP Pg. 984212. Subject is to become long range top ^(Agency sponsored intelligence group) TIB informant.

d. A TWX message from CIC Vienna to CIC Salzburg, dated 10 June 1949, alleges that Subject Aryanized the PHARMACHEMIE firm. Former owners have complained to the Ministry that they are having trouble recovering their property, as Subject appears to be under US protection, possibly CIC. Investigation is requested into Subject's background and present activities and former owners of firm determined in order to answer informal inquiry from PSO here. (Presumed to be Public Safety Officer, Vienna.)

e. A CIC file card on one Frau Bolschwing alleges that he uses the aliases GOLIER and GOHLA—aged 40 in 1951, former SS Lieutenant.

f. A TWX msg. from CIC Salzburg to CIC Vienna (apparently in reply to msg. at d, above) states that von Bolschwing unknown in Salzburg. Gives SHAEF

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~~KAPOK~~
SECURITY INFORMATION
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19 May 1956 *ph*

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(C) Foreign Relations

card trace and refers to OSS Austria report, dated 31 August 1945, Subject, "Detailed Interrogation of Kapitaenleutenant JONETZ, Fritz" as containing considerable data on Subject and the PHARMACHEMIE firm.

g. An informal note, entitled "Translation of Informant's Notes", dated 10 March 1950, states that Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing (TIB operative, Altmenster bei Gmunden No. 130) subsequent to WW I, proceeded to the Near East where he engaged in business along with one fnu BORMANN. It is believed this business concerned construction materials and was located in Haifa, Palestine. It is reported that in 1936 he acted as an SD agent. During 1937 he was expelled from Palestine by British authorities, possibly on the basis of his intelligence activities for the German Government. Subsequent to 1937 and the beginning of WW II, Bolschwing was engaged by the SD and Abwehr as an agent in Greece, Rumania, and Holland. During 1941 he was arrested by the SD on undetermined charges and imprisoned in a Concentration Camp. Released during 1941-1942, he proceeded to Vienna, where he engaged in the direction of a firm known as PHARMACHEMIE, a medical supply establishment, which was utilized by the Abwehrstelle in Vienna as a cover for its activities. At that time Bolschwing functioned as an agent of Section I-M, of the Abwehrstelle, Vienna, and for the Naval Intelligence Section of the same Headquarters. The SS officers' list notes Bolschwing as having been appointed an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer on 30 June 1941. Subsequent to the cessation of hostilities, Bolschwing was denounced by a source believed to be reliable, as a member of the notorious SD Sonderkommando "Eichmann". Recent information stemming from a reliable source within the Austrian Police system indicates that the Austrian Ministry of Interior is attempting to locate Bolschwing and charge him, under Austrian law, with failure to register as a member of the NSDAP and SS.

h. An undated denunciation (#239), Eidesstattliche Erklaerung, states (in German), "I, Dieter Wisliceny, born 15 July 1910 in Regulfskon, East Prussia, single, Evangelical, presently confined in Bratislava, swear, state and declare under oath, concerning the members of the Abt. IVa of the former SS Obersturmbahnfuehrer Adolf Eichmann: (There are listed 25 former members of the SS, SA, and SD, including one von Bolschwing, after whose name appears the following additional data.) Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing is from East Prussia, a business man in the Near East after WW I. Owned a construction materials firm along with a Wilhelm Maria BORMANN in Haifa. Through fnu MILDENSTEIN from 1936 on in contact with the SD. Expelled from Palestine in 1937 by the British, he went to Berlin. Here he was a collaborator of the SD and AST. Later for Amt VI in Rumania, Greece, and Holland. Here arrested and placed in a concentration camp on HIMMLER's orders. There some two years until the Spring of 1944. Last a resident of Vienna. Personal Description: Since I last saw Bolschwing in 1938, I can only give an approximate description. About 45 years old, very slender, dark, formerly had a dark mustache. Very intelligent, speaks several languages, definitely perfect English and French. Bolschwing was divorced from his wife. (This same document contains the following information on Leopold Edler von MILDENSTEIN, probably identical with the fnu MILDENSTEIN listed above: He was Austrian, from 1936 to 1937 in the SD. After a conflict with HEYDRICH separated from the SD. Later in the Propaganda Ministry, allegedly referant for the Middle East Press. Residence and living conditions unknown to me in recent years.)"

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i. An OSS, Detachment A, report (Austria), c/o II Corps, Msg Ctr. APO 19, US Army, SCI/Unit A, Salzburg, LSX-48, dated 31 August 1945, was prepared from the detailed interrogation of Kapitaneleutnant JONETZ, Fritz, I-M (Eins Marine) officer, Abwehr, Stuttgart, Brest, Nantes, Vienna, and Salzburg. (We presume this report is available to Headquarters.) The personality index accompanying this report lists Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing, director of PHARMACHEMIE import and export company near Vienna. Lives in Vienna. About 1.85 cm. 35 years old, blond bleached hair, blue eyes, thin face, thin body, suffers from stomach disease. In 1942 arrested by SS without reason and released after 7 months imprisonment. Since end of 1943 with I-M Abwehrstelle, Vienna, working in connection with PHARMACHEMIE. On P. 21 of this report JONETZ states that he was commissioned to locate a cover firm for agent work. Dr. Max FRANZKE, economic advisor with I-M Abwehrstelle, Vienna, got in touch with August RUB, manager of the Vienna branch of the Frankfurter Handelsbank, whom he enrolled to aid in the scheme. RUB, in turn, finally contacted Bolschwing, the director of the Hamburg pharmaceutical firm PHARMACHEMIE. Bolschwing had been in the SS before and had been arrested by the Gestapo without any reason. JONETZ intervened for him and finally had him released, thereby earning Bolschwing's gratitude. A contract was drawn up between the Frankfurt Handelsbank and the firm, setting up a Vienna branch, which was to be the only sales outlet for the parent firm in Hamburg. It was given the name of PHARMACHEMIE HANDELS A.G. JONETZ states that there was a secret clause which gave him the right to employ and dispatch as salesmen as many agents within the firm as he chose. Setting up this cover took a long time and could not be used for agents in Turkey. It was valuable for agent work in Italy. In the late Summer of 1944, JONETZ reports that he pressured the PHARMACHEMIE firm to set up a branch plant near Feldkirch on the Austrian side of the Austro/Swiss border for the purpose of agent work towards Switzerland. One Unteroffizier Fritz STRENKERT was selected to work out of the Feldkirch branch, though in actuality he was head of the Swiss/Near East agent chain. He spent some time in the area with a W/T operator establishing his cover as Swiss representative of the firm. Ottomar von HAHN was the Italian "representative" of the firm. In May 1944, HAHN was dispatched to Italy and returned in July the same year with orders for 8 million lire worth of chemicals, plus proposals for his future intelligence work and for recruiting of sub-agents. It was planned to establish a depot of PHARMACHEMIE somewhere behind the Italian front, which would have given HAHN an excellent base of operations; however, the imminence of defeat prevented this plan's activation. The Feldkirch branch never got into operation, though considerable material and some personnel were dispatched there shortly prior to the close of hostilities.

j. One other trace, in which Baron von Bolschwing is described as a West German Intelligence operative, was reported in EASW-1 and EASA-105.

2. Subject has been debriefed and INTERVIEWED by both [] and [] on the new information contained in the foregoing paragraphs. The results of these sessions will be pouched separately. There is, in essence, no indication that he is engaging in deception on any of the aforesaid information. Except for minor variations, he voluntarily confirmed all checkable information in our possession.

24 September 1953

- 3 - EE 2 - Salz #101
- 3 - Vien 1 - Salz chrono

DCM.
[]
19 May 1956 []

4

In Begleitung von Kindern unter 14 Jahren:

Nr 097474

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____



Grenzübertrittsschein
für den wiederholten Grenzübertritt

Anmerkung.

Der Mißbrauch dieses Grenzübertrittsscheines wird gemäß § 24a des Paßgesetzes in der Fassung der Paßgesetznovelle vom 18. Juni 1946, BGBl. Nr. 125, bestraft und hat überdies den Entzug der Grenzübertrittsbewilligung zur Folge.

Der Inhaber dieses Grenzübertrittsscheines ist berechtigt, bei nachgewiesener Notwendigkeit im Zielorte zu nächtigen, jedoch darf der Aufenthalt daselbst jeweils die Frist von 6 Tagen nicht überschreiten.

St. Dr. Lager-Nr. 198. — Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, Verlag. 1557 52

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

Grenzübertrittsschein

Name: Otto BOLSCHWING
Beruf: Exportkaufmann
geboren am 15.10.09 in Schönbruck
ohne Staatsangeh., wohnhaft in Salzburg
Hellbrunnerstr. 5

ist zum

wiederholten Grenzübertritt
Grenzzone Grenzzone
von Österreich nach Deutschland
und zurück über alle zugelassenen
Grenzübertrittsstellen
innerhalb der Zeit vom 1.10.53 bis 30.9.54
berechtigt.

Der Inhaber dieses Grenzübertrittsscheines ist legitimiert
durch den Identitätsausweis (Personalausweis für Staatenlose und
Ausländer) Nr. 20577, ausgestellt am 23.10.47
durch Bundes Pol. Dion. Salzburg
Ausstellungsort: Salzburg, am 1.10. 1953



Bundespolizeidirektion Salzburg
Ausstellende Behörde
Abteilung III
Paßamt

[Handwritten Signature]
(Unterschrift)

Raum für die Vidierung durch die amerikanischen Dienststellen
in Österreich:

Raum für die Vidierung durch die amerikanischen Dienststellen
in Bayern:

Raum für die Vidierung durch die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden:



Bayer. Landesgrenzpolizeikommissariat
Freilassing/Obb.

[Handwritten Signature]

SECRET

EASA-2263

18 Okt. 1953

EASA-2263

Boach
Fc/PO
PLG
fil

Chief, EE
Attn:
Chief of Base, Salzburg

Operational/GEOOVY

GROSSBAHN - Progress Report for Period 16 August to 30 Sept. 1953.

REF: EASA-2018

INFO: Vienna

In 201

A. SYNOPSIS. The following paragraphs reflect progress within the Grossbahn operation for the period indicated.

1. Salient developments were:

- a. Orderly termination of the Grossbahn operation and disposition of Grossbahn in the U. S. is in process.
- b. Processing of reports from the [] Bucharest trip.
- c. Phase-over of [] and [] planned for 7 October and 15 October respectively.

B. Specific Action Required of Headquarters.

See following cables: DIR-18334, SVIEN-0883, DIR-20359, and SSAIZ-1755. Request continued Headquarters efforts to secure ODURGE waiver to facilitate GROSSBAHN entry into U. S.

C. DEVELOPMENTS.

1. Termination. A good deal of our efforts during the period were devoted to convincing GROSSBAHN that the time had arrived for him to sever his connection with KUBARK, take up residence in the U. S., and realize his hope of becoming an American citizen. We have managed to resolve GROSSBAHN's doubts as to the propriety of such a move at this time and are tentatively scheduling his departure for mid November. Two major problems face us: securing visas for his wife and son, and Headquarters' securing ODURGE waivers to get Grossbahn into the U. S. We have been in touch with [] of MOB in regard to the visas and should encounter no unusual delay in obtaining the wife's and son's documentation. According to DIR-20359, Headquarters expects no difficulties in securing an ODURGE waiver. On the basis of the thorough and favorable ICFILTER of Grossbahn (which we reported in SSAIZ-1755) we feel that there will be no reason for Headquarters to change this viewpoint.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

COPY

10 OCT 1953

ref

76

2. [redacted] i. Efforts on this agent were confined to debriefing him on his recent trip to Bucharest and reviewing with him the photographs he took on the trip. We have submitted two batches of KURIOT material (see EAVA-4404 and EASA-2144). Yet to be processed are all the photographs, dead drops and meeting sites in Bucharest, and the operational reports on his trip. One cable was dispatched regarding the rumor that a plane had dropped anti-Communist leaflets during the Youth Festival (see SSALZ-1700). Though [redacted] picked up this rumor in Bucharest, he could find nothing confirmatory. We plan to phase operation of [redacted] to [redacted] on or about 7 October 1953.

3. HH-1 and [redacted] j. See EASA's-2106 and 2154. Lengthy interrogation failed to bring forth any significant admissions on the part of HH-1, despite continued LCFLUTTER indications that he was practicing deception regarding his contacts to the Soviets. In interrogating HH-1 we were mainly interested in two points: how HH-1's possible Soviet connections might affect our plans vis-a-vis [redacted] k and the general CE implications regarding the Grossbahn operation. Indications (secured from both HH-1 and [redacted] l) are that the latter has not been compromised to the Soviets, and we plan to proceed with [redacted] m's taking [redacted] n over directly, under maximum security. Tentative takeover date is 15 October. HH-1 was dropped as a Grossbahn agent effective 31 August, with the CE ramifications regarding the Grossbahn operation generally unresolved.

4. PP-1. We have instructed this agent to proceed with plans to effect his transfer to Vienna. Details concerning a VOB takeover will be worked out jointly with them, and Headquarters will be informed accordingly.

D. Future Plans. Present plans call for the Grossbahn operation, as such, to be completely phased out and Grossbhan on his way to the U. S. by 15 November. PP-1 and AA-1 will be turned over to Vienna; CC-3, PP-3, [redacted] o and [redacted] p will come under direct case officer control at SOB. The balance of agents, with the exception of EE-1 who may be of value in the Linz area, will be dropped.

tober 1953

- 1 E
- 2 len
- 3 alz chrono
- 4 alz #101

RF

[redacted] [redacted]

file 2

1. A check of the GROSSBahn files reveals the following items which may be pertinent to the present problem;

A- EASA-2412, 29 Oct. 1953 - Para 2 states; "He (GROSSBAHN) has been warned that under ^{any} no circumstances is he to attempt ~~in~~ contact with the overt CIA office. It has also been suggested to him that he would be probably be better off not trying to pick up social contact with any of his former case officers or CIA acquaintances."

B- In a Memorandum to Chief/Liaison Control Branch, FI, from Chief EE/A dated 19 Nov. 1953, EE/A stated that; "It is understood this (backstopping arrangement with Dept. of Defense) will apply only in cases ^(P) where references are needed for employment in private industry and in non-sensitive jobs. The individual (GROSSBAHN) will be instructed to refrain from applying for sensitive jobs with the United States government which will entail a thorough investigation." The file indicates that this was communicated to the Subject.

C- There is no single piece of paper in the GROSSBAHN files (three volumes of the XII numbered files appear to be missing) which spells out the exact circumstances ^{under which he} of his having received a U.S. immigration visa. ~~XXXX~~ Extracts of a number of documents indicate the following. GROSSBAHN received U.S. immigration visa #14846 (German Quota) on application number I-264531 issued at the American Consulate General in Munich on 24 ^U Aug. 1953 after CIA had recommended issuance. As a supporting document GROSSBAHN was issued

Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2001 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy (2)(B) Methods/Sources (2)(G) Foreign Relations

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

a Temporary Travel Document (TTD) #0131147 dated June 3 1953 and issued in Berlin, Germany. He arrived in New York City on 2 Feb. 195⁴ aboard the Andrea Doria.

D- Information relating to GROSSBAHN's NSDAP and SS connections was not concealed from the ~~XXXX~~ Immigration and Naturalization Service. The true story, as CIA than ~~they~~ knew it, was made known to them and they agreed after consultation with our Alien Affairs Staff, to make the administrative decision to admit GROSSBAHN as an immigrant. CIA did not provide a sponsor but we are on record with I and NS as vouching for GROSSBAHN and providing ~~XXXX~~ all other assurance that he was not a security hazard. His entry was in effect accomplished ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ by the CIA statement that his services on our behalf were of such a nature as to override his otherwise undesirable background as defined by the McCarran Act.

2. The CIA Alien Affairs Staff has been asked to check their files for additional information and will be in touch with us as soon as they have something to report.

VIA: (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-2412

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

29 Oct. 1953

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Base, Salzburg **HRK**
SUBJECT: GENERAL-Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC-GROSSBAHN - Termination

DATE: _____

REF: EASA-2379

Inf: Vienna

1. Acknowledgment of Party Membership. Grossbahn has asked a question which has us fairly well stumped. What should his answer be in the event the question of NSDAP membership arises after his entry into the U.S., for example, on the citizenship application forms? We have told him he is to deny any party, SS, SD, Abwehr, etc. affiliations. Our reason for doing so runs as follows: his entry into the U. S. is based on our covert clearance. In other words, in spite of the fact he has an objectionable background, ODURGE is willing to waive their normal objections based on our assurance that Grossbahn's services to KUBARK have been of such a caliber as to warrant extraordinary treatment. Should Grossbahn later, overtly and publicly, admit to an NSDAP record, it strikes us that this might possibly leave ODURGE with little recourse than to expel him from the U. S. as having entered under false pretenses, KUBARK assurances notwithstanding, for the matter would then possibly be considered as public knowledge and ODURGE would be forced, for appearances sake, to follow the letter of the law. At the same time, we feel such instructions might give Grossbahn a degree of control against us, should he decide he wants our help again at some future date—an altogether undesirable situation. What has Headquarters' experience been on this point? Have we instructed Grossbahn incorrectly? Cabled advice would be appreciated, as time to the planned departure date is running short.

IUS

2. U. S. Contact Arrangements. We have discussed this question further with Grossbahn. We have spelled out to him clearly that he is to use the arrangements which we have requested in reference (answer also desired by cable) only for the purpose of advising where monies due him are to be deposited and in cases of dire emergency. We have told him that our interpretation of this last point allows for life and death matters only—for example, if he were on the verge of being expelled from the U. S. We, at the moment, can think of no other reason why Grossbahn might have to contact Headquarters. He has been warned that under no circumstances is he to attempt any contact with the overt KUBARK office. It has also been suggested to him that he would probably be better off not trying to pick up a social contact with any of his former case officers or KUBARK acquaintances.

AN	HR
PS	IX
IN	
PS	
BX	
DES	NFL
FI	

LCM

RPG

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

23 October 1953

- 3 - EE
- 3 - Vien
- 1 - Salz chrono
- 2 - Salz #101

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2004, 2005

CLASSIFICATION

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

CS COPY IN COPY

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 November 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 98642

ROUTING	
1	EE/P
2	EE/P
3	Choud
4	
5	CEE
6	EE/P
7	
8	

TO: SR RFP, SALESBURG, INFO: VIETNAM 1/00 EE/A 3488

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA ROUTINE

CONF: EE 6 2224Z 3 NOV 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 25635

TO: SSALE INFO: SVILEY CITE: DIR
INTEL/CROSSBARR

1. THE DELAYS INVOLVING RECEIPT OF CHECKS FROM OTHER AGENCIES
HERE, REQUEST NECESSARY POSTPONE GROSSBARR DEPARTURE 5-12 DECEMBER.
2. FULLY AWARE WITHIN RANGE EXPIRATION DATE VISA AND DOING UTMOST
EFFORTS.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2001, 2005

Handwritten initials and checkmark

Handwritten marks: L, 1, EE/P

Handwritten marks: L, EE/A

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

Handwritten number: 289

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(44)

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 NOVEMBER 1953

SECRET
S E C R E T
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 51295

ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	OPANO
4	
5	CEE
6	EEA
7	
8	

TO: SR REP, SALZBURG, INFO VIENNA

EE/A

3128

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

CONF: EE 6

2230Z 16 NOV 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 27255

TO: SSALZ

INFO: SWIFN

CITE: DIR

INTEL/GROOVY

REF: EASA-2379, 2412, DIR 25635 (OUT 98642)

1. STILL HOPING MEET DEADLINE SPECIFIED DIR 25635. DEFINITE CONFIRMATION NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL CIRCA 1 DEC. SUGGEST YOU CONTINUE PRESENT PLANNING WITH UNDERSTANDING THERE IS OUTSIDE CHANCE DELAY. DOING ALL POSSIBLE EXPEDITE. 2. POUCHING DETAILS RE PROBLEMS REFS. PLS CABLE EXACT NATURE GROSSHAHN'S PRESENT COVER. ALSO ESTIMATE CHARGES SHIPMENT EFFECTS, SINCE APPROVAL HERE NECESSARY.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2001, 2005

EE/FI

EE/A

SECRET
S E C R E T
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

GPO 16-5232-1

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 November 1953

SECRET OUN 52048
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
1	CCA
2	CCA
3	(Handwritten)
4	
5	CCA
6	CCAF
7	
8	

TO: SR REP SALEBURG
FROM: DIRECTOR CIA

1/with

EE/A 3488

ROUTINE

CONF: CE 6

1718Z 19 NOV 53

INFORMATION:

COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 27694

TO: SSALZ

INFO: SVIEN, SMUNI (ATTN [])

CITE: DIR

IMMEDIATE HANDLING

INTEL

TO ENSURE PROPER HANDLING GROSSBACH IMPORTANT WE KNOW WHETHER ODAGID FULLY INFORMED HIS NAZI PAST ON VISA APPLICATION FORM.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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DC/ []

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NEE/A

RP3 (44)

GPO 16-58292-1

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 NOV 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 35971

ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	CHRONO
4	
5	EEA
6	EEA
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

ACTION: EE 6

ROUTINE

1856Z 20 NOV 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, COP, FI/RI 2

SALZ 1984

TO: DIR INFO: SVIEN SMUNI (ATTN []) CITE: SSALZ

IMMEDIATE HANDLING

RE: DIR 27694 (OUT 52048)

INTEL

STATE
INFORMATION FURNISHED. ODACID MUNI SHOWS NSDAP 1932 AND CAPT
WAFIEN (ALSO RCVD WAFIEN) SS 1939 TO 41.

END OF MESSAGE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Bl

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

RFR

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA _____
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EASW-576

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

NOV 24 1953

TO Chief of Base, Salzburg
FROM Chief of Mission, Vienna
Chief, EE

DATE _____

SUBJECT { GENERAL
SPECIFIC Operational/GROOVY
GROSSBAHN Termination

Ref: EASA-2379, 2412; DIR 25635, DIR 27255

6-6-110

6-6-114

1. As pointed out in reference cables, we are doing our utmost to expedite the arrangements for GROSSBAHN's departure. What has slowed up the matter so far has been the checks undertaken by Security with other agencies. Until the results are in, formal arrangements cannot be made with ODURGE. It is expected that all checks will be completed by 27 November, and that a definite ODURGE decision can be obtained by approximately 1 December, assuming, of course, that the checks do not disclose information of so derogatory a nature that it would preclude sponsorship. We therefore recommended in DIR 27255 that the target date of 5-12 December be continued.

2. As mentioned in this same cable, there is an outside possibility that some delay may take place. Although this seems unlikely, we have, nevertheless, made inquiries as to what could be done in such a case. We have been advised that GROSSBAHN should in no case leave Austria until everything is completely laid on with ODURGE. In the event it became evident that his visa would expire before the arrangements were completed, it would be possible to arrange to exchange his present visa for a new one having the same number, provided this exchange were made before the actual expiration of his present visa. If, therefore, the unexpected happens and by 15 or 16 December the arrangements with ODURGE are not finalized, it will be necessary to obtain a new visa. However, we do not anticipate any such complication, and mention it only as an outside contingency.

(Releasing officer)
DC/EE

(Coordinating officer)
Security

(Authenticating officer)
EE/A

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

SECRET
Security Information

EXEMPTIONS Section 5(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2001, 2005

EASW-576

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

3. Household Goods. With reference to paragraph 2 of IAP4-2379, we asked in DIR 27255 for an estimate of the shipment charges, since we must get the project amended in order to get funds for this purpose. We hope that the estimate will be as reasonable as possible, for in view of the current economy drive, it will be difficult to get approval if the estimate is high.

4. U.S. Contact Arrangements.

a. The question has been raised as to whom GROSSBARN should contact if he encounters difficulty at the time of entry into the United States. This problem will not arise, as the arrangements to be made with ODIBEX will include their having a man to meet GROSSBARN's plane and guide him through the immigration formalities. We shall cable details before GROSSBARN's departure.

b. Arrangements are being made to set up a post office box so that GROSSBARN can contact us and advise where he would like the balance due him to be sent. This post office box will be in effect for six months, and GROSSBARN can use it during that time if he has any other reason to communicate with us. As a matter of fact, we would appreciate being kept generally advised of his job-seeking efforts, and would particularly like to be informed when he lands a definite job. Although we plan to provide for the letter drop for the limited period of 6 months, we could extend its validity in case of necessity.

5. References. This problem is a rather difficult one to solve, particularly on a long-term basis. What we are working on is as follows: We are trying to arrange for a particular officer in ODIBEX to serve as a back-stop when GROSSBARN is asked by a prospective employer for a reference for his employment during the time he worked for ZIPPER and KEBARK. GROSSBARN should state he was a contract employee and that only this particular individual would know of the details of the arrangement. Full details will be sent you as soon as the arrangements with this ODIBEX officer are completed. We would like to point out, however, that this cover created for GROSSBARN is not a particularly sturdy one. It would not stand up under investigation by the FBI, for example. But as GROSSBARN is not a citizen, he will not apply for a government job where he would be investigated by the FBI. Nor would he be likely to apply for any sensitive position which would entail FBI investigation. With these reservations in mind, the cover created for him should fit his need, i.e., that of a reference address to which a prospective employer in business or finance might write.

In connection with the references to be furnished, it would be a great help if we were informed of GROSSBARN's plans for job hunting. Does he know yet in which part of the country he would most likely settle? Does he have any leads or commitments? Where does he intend to go upon arrival in New York? We realize that it may be extremely

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SECRET
Security Information

difficult for GROSSBACH to make any definite plans from Austria, and any information given us now would be general in nature. However, it is necessary for us to know on a developing basis about his job-seeking so that the references furnished a prospective employer can bear connection with the type of position being applied for. For this reason we have suggested in paragraph 4b above that after arrival in this country he continue to keep us informed of his progress until he is settled in a job.

The arrangement with OSIBAJ has no definite period of validity, although it is expected that as long as the particular GILBY individual who is briefed on the matter now remains in his present assignment it can be continued, and that if he leaves, he would ask his replacement to continue the arrangement. But we wish to emphasize that the cover address is primarily meant for the initial period following GROSSBACH's arrival in the United States.

We are waiting now to hear whether this cover can be arranged. If it cannot, we may have to build a private business cover for the period of his employment with us. Hence, the request in DIR 27255 for information as to the exact nature of his present cover.

6. Acknowledgment of Party Membership. We have discussed at length the question raised in EASA-2412 concerning the answer GROSSBACH should make to any inquiries put to him about his Party membership once he has arrived in the States. Assuming that he has not denied Nazi affiliations on his visa application form, he should definitely not deny his record if the matter comes up in dealings with US authorities and he is forced to give a point-blank answer. Thus, if asked, he should admit membership, but attempt to explain it away on the basis of extenuating circumstances. If he were to make a false statement on a citizenship application or other official paper, he would get into trouble. Actually, GROSSBACH is not entering the US under false pretenses, as OSIBAJ will have information concerning his past record in a secret file. He will enter legally under an OSIBAJ interpretation of the provisions of the immigration law applicable to his case. (Of course we are asking that they grant such a favorable interpretation.) We would very much like to recommend to GROSSBACH, both for his sake and our own, that he steer clear of any sensitive jobs and that, even when he becomes a citizen, he not try for any government position.

7. Citizenship. We have checked with Immigration the current requirements regarding citizenship. A person coming in on an immigration visa files no first papers under the regulations now in force. To become a citizen he must reside in the US five years, of which the last six months prior to application for citizenship must be in the district where he files his application. During the five-year period, he can go abroad, but not for a period exceeding six months at any one time. For information purposes, we are enclosing a copy of the form now in effect, although naturally there may be a number of changes five years from now.

SECRET

Security Information

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~~SECRET~~
Security Information

8. We hope that the above answers most of the questions about GROSSBAHN's departure. We will cable re the ODAGE arrangements, the letter box, and the references. In the meantime we are keeping fingers crossed and hoping that GROSSBAHN's entry and resettlement will take place smoothly.

1 Attachment (h/v) [] []
Form H-400 U

23 November 1953

Dist:

COB, Belzburg -3 w/1 Att.

COH, Vienna -2 w/o Att.

EE/A -2

RI -1

ADDENDUM: Since preparing the above dispatch, Security has asked specifically about the explanation given by GROSSBAHN of his Nazi past when filling out the visa application form, hence DIR 27694. Please tell us in detail what oral and/or written statements concerning his Nazi affiliations were made to the consulate when the visa application was submitted.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

RPC
24 Nov 53

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 NOV 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 37403

ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	CHITANO
4	
5	DAE
6	EEFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP SALZBURG

ACTION: EE 6

ROUTINE

0035Z 26 NOV 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

RLG

SALZ 1994

TO: DIR

INFO: SVIEN, SMUNI, SFRAN

CITE: SSALZ

RE: SALZ 1984 (IN 35978)

INTEL GROSSBAHN

1. ADVISES ODACID MUNI QUERIED BY WASH WHY VISA ISSUED GROSSBAHN. EXPLANATION FORWARDED. INDICATED KUBARK SPONSORSHIP THIS CASE.

2. REQUEST NECESSARY HQ ACTION:

A. AVOID POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT TO ODACID MUNI PERSONNEL WHO EXTREMELY HELPFUL KUBARK VISA ISSUANCE.

B. FORESTALL POSSIBILITY ORDERS MAY BE ISSUED CANCEL G VISA.

3. ADVISE ACTION NECESSARY OUR PART IF ANY.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

Mr. [unclear]
2504. I

1-34

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

RPS

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(44)

SALZ-1994

EE

6114-5222
A22-46

VOB/2460

Chief of Base, Salzburg
Chief of Base, Vienna

30 November 1953

Operational/URCOVI

[] Request for Information on GROSSBAHN's
Contact with Americans

1. On 5 June 1953 [] submitted a brief report on the possible surveillance of GROSSBAHN by the KPOe. The report concluded with the sentence "...it has been reported that GROSSBAHN is working for the American MIS in Salzburg". In turning over the report, [] asked for confirmation of GROSSBAHN's ties with American intelligence.

2. VOB decided to defer a reply to []'s request pending GROSSBAHN's departure for the United States. However, on 7 November a second request was received. It was decided to acknowledge the fact of GROSSBAHN's contact with American intelligence, but to furnish no additional details. Accordingly, [] told [] the following on 25 November: "It has been determined that GROSSBAHN has collaborated from time to time, in American office in Salzburg." [] merely remarked: "Well, it's been obvious that he has been under American protection." He did not press for further information.

3. A translation of []'s original request is attached. This was discussed with [] during his visit to VOB early in August.

Attachment:

Translation of [] orig. request (HW)

Distribution:

- 2 - Salz
- 1 - EE
- 1 - []
- 1 - []
- 1 - []

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

EE
EAVA-5222/03
30 Nov 53

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

6114-5222-120

VOB/2460

Note for GROSSBAHN File

EAVA-5222 of att. 46
30 Nov 53

re: [] s request for info on GROSSBAHN's contact with the Americans.

On 5 June 53 [] submitted a brief report on the possible surveillance of GROSSBAHN by the KPOs. It concluded with remark that GB reported working for American MIS in Salz. [] asked for confirmation GB's ties with Ami IS. No reply given, but 7th Nov. he asked again. Reply given that GB had collaborated from time to time with an Ami office Salz.

The [] report had stated that at the end of March 53 GB noticed a man hiding in bushes opposite his apt. and watching entry-way. Police arrested man who turned out to be Rudolph HAWELKA, born 30 July 26. He member of CP. Suspected he had been assigned watch GB.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : Z
UNIT : EE/A
EXT : 3488
DATE : 1 DECEMBER 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
1	EEA 4
2	EEA 5 CEE
3	CHRON 6 REFI

TO : SR REP, SALZBURG
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA
CONF: EE 6
INFO: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, DD/P-ADMIN, SO 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 29146 (OUT 54531) 2324Z 1 DEC 53

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE
CITE: DIR

TO: SSALZ INFO: SVIEM, SMUNI, SFRAN

INTEL/GROSSBARN.

RE: SALZ 1994 (IN 37403) ✓

NO ACTION POSSIBLE UNTIL SECURITY CHECKS COMPLETED WHICH NOW
EXPECTED 4 DECEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

SO
COORDINATING OFFICERS

DC/EE/FI
RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

EE/A
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Copy No.

DIR 29146

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG :
UNIT : EE/A
EXT : 2695
DATE : 7 DECEMBER 1953

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	CHRONO
4	
5	CEE
6	RCIP

TO : SR REP, SALZBURG
FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA
CONF : EEC
INFO : COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 29747 (OUT 55628) 1916Z 7 DEC 53

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: SSALZ INFO: SVIEN, SMUNI, SFRAN CITE: DIR

INTEL/CROSSBAHN

RE: SALZ 1994 (IN 37403), DIR 29146 (OUT 54531)

ONE SECURITY CHECK STILL OUTSTANDING; EXPECTED 9 DEC. REGRET

DELAYS WHICH UNAVOIDABLE OUR PART.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

✓
EEA
RCIP

DC/EE
RELEASING OFFICER
AMG

COORDINATING OFFICERS
~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

EE/A
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Copy No.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

DIR 29747

10 Dez. 1953

Edgard
F.F.F.
R.L.G.

Chief, EE
Attn: []
Chief of Base, Salzburg
Operational/GROOVY
GROSSBAHN — Termination
— "Progress Report" Attached

REF: (A) EASW-576
(B) EASA-2263

INF: Vienna

1. The extremely lucid presentation of "The Grossbahn Problem", contained in reference A has been most gratefully received. It completely dispels a few of the doubts which recently have been gathering in our minds as to the probable outcome of this unusual disposal case.

2. We were just on the verge of pouching a Grossbahn Progress Report giving a resume of what we had done to date and recapitulating the points on which we were awaiting word from you when reference A arrived. All of the points we raise have been answered by your dispatch, with the exception of an accommodation address for CG-3 when she departs for Germany. This, however, is a separate problem and can and should be handled as such. Merely in order that the administrative side of the Grossbahn operational file might be kept up to date, and we are not adjudged lax in keeping up with our progress reporting, we would like to allow the Progress Report to stand as is and submit it as an attachment to this dispatch. We find the charting of things yet to be done, as shown in the Progress Report, helpful in keeping in mind precisely where we want to go.

3. We should, now, like to go over some of the specific points in reference A so that you will be completely informed as to what is happening here:

a. Re. paras. 1 and 2: Grossbahn certainly will not depart Austria without the final word from you. We have adapted this policy since final termination was first decided, for we could well imagine the chaos should Grossbahn arrive at a port of entry without the way being completely prepared. Secondly, as you point out in paragraph 1, there is just the remote possibility that something unforeseen of a security nature might crop up at the last moment so that the entire plan would have to be abandoned. We, too, feel (and certainly hope) that all security checks will give him a reasonably clean bill of health, but one never knows in this business.

b. [] of MOB has informed us that there should be no difficulty in renewing Grossbahn's visa, using the old number, and we do plan on getting this into motion about 15 December. As we have stated in paragraph 4

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2004, 2005

EASA-2619

of the attached Progress Report, it will be about mid January 1954 before we can get the Grossbahn group on their way. First cause for delay was the ODURGE waiver; second cause was receipt of information that they had to move as a unit and the group would be delayed until visas were secured for the wife and son. Coupled with these two main reasons were the logistical problems connected with closing out their household and arranging for shipment of their effects to the U. S.

c. Re. para. 3, Household Goods: See paragraph 6 of attached Progress Report. We plan on seeing Grossbahn as soon as possible. If he still has no word from his Hamburg contact, we will instruct him that he is to bring in a Linz or Salzburg mover and secure an estimate immediately. We will cable as soon as we have a figure.

d. Re. para. 5, U. S. Contact Arrangements: We are indeed pleased to hear that Grossbahn will be escorted through ODURGE formalities on entry. See paragraph 4 of Progress Report attached; the Grossbahn group will move via ship rather than plane as originally planned, reason being that Grossbahn's wife simply refuses to fly. Final arrangements, then, with ODURGE should reflect this change. We will cable the ship, ETA, and point of entry when known. We presume the latter will be New York but will confirm this.

e. Re. para. 5, References: The arrangement you suggest follows right along with what we have told Grossbahn tentatively. We will expect details on the final arrangements as soon as they are confirmed. We will certainly brief Grossbahn to steer clear of applying for any sensitive positions where he might be the subject of a searching security investigation. Your point here is extremely well taken. We also will have Grossbahn prepare for us a rundown on exactly what he has done to date in regard to job hunting and what his tentative plans are for the future. We will also have him answer the other specific points you raise in paragraph 5, i. e., where he will go after arrival in New York, in which part of the country he will most likely settle, and what leads and/or commitments he might already have. He will be instructed to keep you informed after arrival (through the P. O. Box mentioned in paragraph 4b) on his success in job hunting.

f. Re. para. 6, Acknowledgment of Party Membership: It is most helpful to have this information, for as we indicated in EASA-2412, we were apprehensive lest we offer Grossbahn some unsound advice. We are still not clear on exactly what will happen when Grossbahn admits his Nazi affiliations in answering question 8 of the Application to File Petition for Naturalization which you attached to Reference A. As paragraph 7 of Reference A indicates, Grossbahn will not be taking such action until 1958 at the earliest; so we have some time to worry this matter. We presume from the wording of paragraphs 6 and 7 that on receipt of application in 1958, Grossbahn's file would be checked and the 1953 waiver discovered to explain away his being in the U. S. In any case, we certainly will instruct Grossbahn immediately that he is to answer any and all such questions truthfully and to follow out the instructions contained in paragraph 6. Regarding the Addendum to reference A, we sent SSALZ-1984 on 20 November 1953 in reply to DIR-27694. We were again in touch with [redacted] of MOB via phone today (9 December), and he will attempt to make copies of the application form and scratch sheet in

Grossbahn's file at the Munich Consulate. Failing this, we are sending him word tomorrow (10 December) to let us have the exact wording of the political and military information furnished. Needless to say, the Munich Consulate was given true information, however brief, which seems to be the basic question involved. However, in compliance with your request in the Addendum, we will cable the precise wording as soon as we have it.

4. As indicated in the foregoing, we will secure all desired information from Grossbahn and pouch it as soon as we can. We do plan on giving Grossbahn a sterile and general brief on the main points of reference A that he needs to know.

5. We wish to express our thanks once more for the fine run-down you have given us in reference A. It was indeed an eyeopener, for we had no idea of the problems you were facing—rather, we never sat down and added them up as you did—and we thought we had troubles!

9 December 1953

Att: Grossbahn Progress Report.

- 3 - EE (3 atts.)
- 3 - Vien (3 atts.)
- 1 - Salz chrono (1 att.)
- 2 - Salz #101 (2 atts.)

RPS

SECURITY INFORMATION

Att. to
EASA-2619

10 Dez. 1953

~~Chief, EE~~
~~Attn: []~~
~~Chief of Base, Salzburg~~

Operational/GROOVY

GROSSBAHN - Progress Report for the Period
1 October to 30 November 1953.

REF: EASA-2263

INF: Vienna

A. Synopsis. Except for agents PP-3 and EE-1, the phase-out operation is completed. We are awaiting final word on the ODURGE waiver before we complete arrangements for movement of the Grossbahn group. As plans stand at present, we expect them to depart the area during the period 15 to 31 January 1954. Grossbahn is performing a few last minute assessments for us prior to his departure.

B. Specific Action Required of Headquarters. We should like to briefly summarize the various points on which we are awaiting word from Headquarters:

1. Final ODURGE waiver (latest reference is DIR-29146, indicating that word is expected about 4 December 1953).
2. Accommodation address (mail only) for Grossbahn US contact. (EASA's 2379 and 2412).
3. Answer on Grossbahn action should question of Nazi Party membership arise after his US entry. (EASA-2412)
4. Employment references for period 1946 to 1953. (EASA-2379)
5. Decision on shipment of household effects after estimated costs are submitted by SOB. (EASA-2379)
6. Contact arrangements for CC-3 in Germany. (EASA-2580)

C. Developments.

1. Phase-over of agents. The following former Grossbahn agents were phased over to direct case officer control on dates indicated:

[]

[] (REDCAP-SOB) -- 15 October 1953.

EASA-2619 AH

[(REDCAP--SOB) -- 7 October 1953.
 [(VOB) -- 11 November 1953.
 [(VOB) -- 23 November 1953.

Still remaining to be handled are agents PP-3 (the remaining Police source in Salzburg) and EE-1 (Grossbahn's priest friend) in Linz. We will probably assign an SOB case officer (as yet undecided) to handle PP-3 and intend to establish a loose contact with EE-1 in Linz. He appears to be a fairly valuable casual contact, as he is probably one of the most politically active Jesuits in the area. WW-1 (formerly AA-3) was dropped on 30 November 1953 for lack of initiative, lack of interest, and general unsuitability as an agent.

2. CC-3 and CC-4. CC-4 is being dropped effective 31 December 1953. She will probably secure private employment in the Salzburg area. CC-3 will be dropped at the time that Grossbahn finally departs for the US. We hope to be able to furnish an address for her in Germany, in the event she feels she can be of use to KUBARK again. (See EASA's 2579 and 2580.)

3. Visas. Grossbahn's visa is already secured. This was reported in EASA-1992. Application for the wife's and son's visas were made at the Munich Consulate on 13 November 1953. There should be no complications; both have passed their physical examinations, and it is only a question of time before the actual visas are issued. We will probably have to renew Grossbahn's visa (it expires on 23 December 1953); however, MOB assures us this should present no problem.

4. Departure Date. Our secondary plan called for Grossbahn and son to depart Austria, by air, about 15 December, with the wife following by boat about 15 March 1954. This was in order that she might close out the household and give Grossbahn a chance to get established in a new job in the US before she joined him. On 13 November 1953 we learned that this plan was impossible, that they had to move as one family group. This, coupled with recent delays cable from Headquarters in securing the final ODURGE waiver (see most recent cable DIR-29146 on this problem) means that it will probably be somewhere about 15 to 31 January 1954 before we actually get the Grossbahn group moving on their way to the US. We have still not made any reservations for them for surface transportation during the planned departure period due to the lack of final confirmation from Headquarters that entrance into the US is insured. When final word is received, we plan to attempt, for security reasons, to secure the reservations in Munich, possibly with the assistance of MOB. We will advise Headquarters by cable of ship, date, and port of entry, as soon as this information is available.

5. Grossbahn Interim Assignments. We have instructed Grossbahn that he is to perform assessments on the following persons, while he is marking time in Salzburg:

25

- a. [] -Polizei Kommissar with the Salzburg Police Direction.
- b. [] -A Socialist Landrat in Salzburg who is an extremely influential member of the Socialist Party.

6. Household Effects. Grosabahn, prior to the receipt of DIR-27255, was instructed to secure an estimate of the cost of moving his household goods via surface transportation to the US. He turned this matter over to a Hamburg shipping firm with whom he maintains good connections and as yet has not received the final answer. He did furnish them with all necessary measurements and weights. As soon as we have the answer, this information will be cabled to Headquarters.

9 December 1953

3 - EE
3 - Vism
1 - Salz chrono
2 - Salz 101

RPS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG : E 3/53
UNIT : EE/A
EXT : 2695
DATE : 11 DECEMBER 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING			
1	KAA	4	
2	KAA	5	CRK
3	CHAND	6	EFRT

TO : SR REP, SALZBURG
FROM : DIRECTOR, CIA
CONF : EE 6
INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 30623 (OUT 56944)

0022Z 12 DEC 53

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO : SSALZ

INFO: SVIEN, SMUNI,
SFRAN

CITE: DIR

INTEL/GROSSBAHN

RE: DIR 29747 (OUT 55628)

INVESTIGATION JUST COMPLETED. DECISION EXPECTED EARLY NEXT

WEEK.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2001, 2005

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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SECURITY INFORMATION

EE/A
RELEASING OFFICER

EE/A
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Copy No.

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DIR 30623

SECRET

PROJECT TERMINATION

CRYPTONYM: GROSSBAHN

HEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER

DIVISION: EE

[]

STATION: SALZBURG, AUSTRIA

Room No. 2707 J

Extension 2695

Date: 22 December 1953

1. The GROSSBAHN project is submitted for termination.
2. The project as approved on 16 February 1953 is attached.

[]
Acting Chief, EE/A

[]
Acting Chief, EE/FI

22 December 1953
Date

Approved: []
Chief, Plans

23 December 1953
Date

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2001, 2005

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RM

SECRET

22 December 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/PLANS
FROM: Chief, EE
SUBJECT: Termination of Project GROSSBAHN

1. Approval is requested to terminate the GROSSBAHN project which was approved 27 February 1953 for the period 1 February 1953 through 31 January 1954, and to pay termination benefits of \$4000.

2. It has been deemed advisable for operational reasons to terminate the project and to assist the principal agent (also known as GROSSBAHN) to come to the United States with his family. He has been a principal agent since February 1950, and for three years previously was employed by ZIPPER.

3. The termination benefits of \$4000 would include a six-month termination bonus to the principal agent, a two-month termination bonus to the office assistant of the principal agent (who has been employed for over five years), and fare to the United States for agent, his wife and son. It would also partially cover shipment to the United States of agent's household effects. We feel these termination benefits are justified by reason of agent's loyal services on behalf of U. S. Intelligence since 1947.

4. The total amount approved for the project was \$20,000. According to the Accounts office of the Finance Division, a total of \$8384.20 had been spent on the project from 1 February 1953 until 30 November 1953. Thus the \$4000 requested for termination expenses would not necessitate any additional funds for the project.

5. It is desired to terminate the project in early January 1954, at which time the principal agent is expected to end his services for the Agency and depart from Austria.

6. All GROSSBAHN clearances are cancelled with the exception of PP-1 and AA-1 who are being turned over to the Vienna Station.

* BONUS FOR GROSSBAHN GROSS PAY	\$ 1960
" " OFFICE ASSISTANT	192
TRAVEL TO U. S. FOR WIFE, FAMILY	980
SHIPMENT HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS	866
TOTAL	<u>\$ 4000</u>

SECRET

201-

285

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 23 DEC 53

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1	EIA	4	
2	EIA	5	CRG
3	CHP	6	WEIF

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SALZBURG

ACTION: EE6

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

SALZ 2093 (IN 44190) 1347Z 23 DEC 53

ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE

TO: DIR INFO: SVIEN CITE: SSALZ

RE: DIR 31284 (OUT 58164)

INTEL GROOVY

RE PARA THREE REF GROSSBAHN ADVISES WILL PROBABLY BE MET
NY BY SPONSOR AND RELATIVES.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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SALZ 2093

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 4 JAN 54

~~SECRET~~
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ROUTING	
1	EEA
2	EEA
3	CHANE
4	EE/Bud
5	EE
6	EE/ET

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SALZBURG

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, DD/P-ADMIN, FD 3, SO 2, FI/RI 2

~~SALZ 2119 (IN 46241)~~

~~0051Z 5 JAN 54~~

~~ROUTINE~~
~~PRECEDENCE~~

TO: DIR

INFO: SVIEN

CITE: SSALZ

GROOVY

REF: DIR 31021 (OUT ⁵⁷⁷⁴⁸57748)

RE PARA 1 REF GROSSBAHN GROUP ARRIVING NEW YORK 0800 FEB 2 ON
ANDREA DORIA.

END OF MESSAGE.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2001, 2005

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DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

VIA: _____ MICROFILMED: 19 JUL 1986 DISPATCH NO. EASA-2738
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

7 Jan. 1954

TO : Chief, ES
FROM : Chief of Base, Salzburg *HKK*
SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational/GROOVI
SPECIFIC: GROSSBAHN Termination
REF: EASN-576
INF: Vienna

DATE: _____

2P

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph 5 of reference, we have had Grossbain prepare a brief summary of his job hunting efforts to date, his plans on arrival in the U. S., and his future job hunting ideas. We regret that the attached is so sketchy, but, as you correctly state, he has not much of an idea where he is headed sitting in Austria.

2. If left to his own devices, it seems that Grossbain is pointing for the shipping or transportation field or will catch on with some import/export firm. He has told us (and mentions in the attached statement) that Roy P. COGGIN, his sponsor, has written that Grossbain should definitely not make any job commitments before seeing him. Exactly what this means we are not sure, but it sounds as though COGGIN may well have some proposition already in mind for GROSSBAHN.

3. We have definitely instructed Grossbain that he is to keep you posted, through the P. O. Box arrangement, on his progress in locating work. We feel sure he will do this.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- 5 January 1954
3 - ES (2 atts.)
3 - Wien (1 att.)
1 - Salz chrono
2 - Salz #101 (1 att.)

Cell.
7042

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2001, 2005

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RPS
7 Jan 54

COPY

23 December 1953

Memorandum

1. Apart from vague advice regarding prices and living quarters, which we have received from my wife's relatives and friends, we have so far not the definite plan made where we will settle at the beginning - except that it will probably be in New York.
2. Our friends, Colonel and Mrs. Roy F. Goggin, 1436 Mass. Ave. Lexington, Mass., have asked us to immediately contact them after our arrival to discuss future planning. They asked us not to make a decision before seeing them.
3. I have sent my curriculum vitae to the following:
 - a. Colonel & Mrs. Howard F. Selk, Delavan, Ill.
 - b. Capt. Milbert G. Jones, on return from duty in Japan - permanent address Elcho, Wis.
 - c. Harry W. Hamacher, Köln-Braunsfeld, Friedrich Schmidt-Str. 52 a, who in turn recommended me to his former Schenker-co-director Mr. Marcel Holzer, managing director, The American Transport Union, New York, N. Y.
 - d. Dr. Hermann J. Abs, president Süddeutsche Bank, Frankfurt (Main), who in reply sent me a letter of recommendation referring to my former work as vice-president of the German Rumanian Chamber of Commerce.

I have further asked my uncle Heinrich v. Dietlein, co-owner of the shipbuilding yards Stülcken of Hamburg for his advice. Since he was on a trip to southern East Asia, his secretary gave me a provisional reply and recommendation to Dr. Alfred Otto, importer and exporter, 350 Broadway, room 1211, New York 13, N. Y. I expect further notice after Dietlein's return.
4. I will receive a strong letter of recommendation from the Jesuit Provincial for Austria, an introduction to the Jesuits all over the world from Father Hugo Court Montjoye, and probably a general recommendation (through the Jesuits) from Archbishop Rohrer, Salzburg.
5. Regarding future job hunting I can not yet give any further details. Together with my Christmas Cards I have notified all my friends - mostly Army officers - that I expect to arrive in the States very soon and that I would contact them again after my arrival.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

285
23/

6586 /

AIR

EAJL 10-79

RAM-679

RLG

Chief of Base, Salzburg

Info: Chief of Mission, Vietnam

Chief, ~~NS~~

Operational/CROOVY

GROSSBAHN

1. You will be pleased and relieved to know that GROSSBAHN and family arrived as per schedule on 2 February and made a smooth landing.

2. We have as yet no word from GROSSBAHN via letter-drop but assume we will hear from him in the course of the next few weeks.

3. As unfinished business there is the matter of the final payment to be made to him for termination bonus, unpaid salary, etc. We will arrange the payment once we receive an itemized account from you, and once we hear from GROSSBAHN as to where to send the money.

4. It seems difficult to believe that the GROSSBAHN case is at last at an end, and we sincerely hope that he has said a permanent good-bye to intelligence activities.

8 February 1954

Distribution:

Sals - 3

Vien - 2

EE/A - 2

HI - 1

JBL/RLG/vah EE/A

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EE/PI

EE/A

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Date: 2001, 2005

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8 Feb. 1954

Chief of Mission, Germany
FOR: MGB

Chief of Base, Salzburg

Operational/CROVY

GRECERAM - Czech Publications

INFO: Fran., MGB, Vlen, EE

1. In closing out the Greeshahn operation, we have come into possession of the following documents which may be of use at MGB:

- a. Seznam Obci na Slovensku (Register of Communities in Slovakia)
- b. Die Wahrheit über die Slowakei (The Truth about Slovakia)

2. These publications are enclosed with the MGB copy only.

2 February 1954

Att: 2 books

- 2 - MGB (w/att.)
- 3 - Fran
- 3 - Vlen
- 1 - EE
- 1 - Sals chrono
- 2 - Sals #101

NS
ND

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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Handwritten marks and signatures, including a large checkmark and the name 'H/El'.

KISA-2882

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
For: MKTOPAZ Attn: []
Chief of Base, Vienna

6. April 1954

Operational

① SW Systems Issued to Crossbahn

1. We have recently received a packet of SW materials from SOB. It was indicated that these were all of the materials in the Crossbahn operation and that they were recalled by SOB due to a termination of SW activities in this operation. SOB further indicates that it is unable to locate any correspondence regarding this material, although they believe that it was issued on or about 22 August 1952. A check of our files shows that VOB was never informed of any SW training or issuance of materials with regard to this operation. We wish MKTOPAZ to make a file check to ascertain if they handled this training and issuance of supplies, and if so, please advise VOB as to the requested disposition of the returned material and close the file for the record. The material in question consists of the following items:

- a. one packet of developer pills for ATLAS when used on newsprint or pulp paper
- b. one bottle of "Lax-D" powder
- c. approximately ten unlabeled items of either ink or developer camouflaged as match sticks
- d. one box labeled "Lowe" containing fifteen capsules of either ink or developer
- e. one SW writing pen
- f. one mechanical pencil
- g. several brushes

We shall hold the material at this base awaiting your instructions for further disposition.

2. It would be greatly appreciated if the Technical Section of VOB could be informed on any SW activity within the Austrian Mission

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

AN	HR
AB	X
IN	
PS	
DES	NFD
FI	

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 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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 Date: 2005

SECRET

EAVA-6530

when carried out by NKTPAZ.

1 April 1954

Distributions:

- 2 NKTOPAZ
- 1 Fran
- 1 KURLOT
- 1 EE
- 1 []
- 1 []
- 1 []

SECRET

WE []
8-8-54
REF

COPIER

SECRET

EGT-A-03373

APR 21 1954

Chief of Base, Vienna
ATTN:
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Operational

o S/W Systems Issued to Grossbahn

REF: EAV-A-6530

1. According to the S/W records of MKTOPAZ the items listed in reference were issued to GROSSBAHN by when the former was trained in Salzburg on 22 August 1952 at the verbal request of

2. It is requested that the S/W supplies listed in reference be forwarded to MKTOPAZ, attention the undersigned.

3. Vienna Base was not notified by MKTOPAZ regarding the training in S/W given to GROSSBAHN as it was assumed that SOB was acting under directions from Vienna Base. MKTOPAZ now requires that all requests be written and properly coordinated.

4. Apart from the operation under discussion, MKTOPAZ has issued no S/W systems to activities within the Austrian Mission.

AD

ea 0 1 111

20 April 1954

Distribution:

- 3 - VIEN
- 1 - KURIOT
- ✓ 1 - EE
- 2 - COM
- 2 - MKTOPAZ

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

AN	KR
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FI	

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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SECRET

6-6-5 128

TSS

Note for GROSSBAHN File

EAVA-6977 of 10 May 1954 to Frankfurt (MKTOPAZ) re transmittal of SW materials.
Sends all the SW materials in Vien's possession from the GROSSBAHN op.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

986

SECRET

EAVA 6977

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
For: MKTOPAS, Attn: []
Chief of Base, Vienna

10. Mai 1954

Operational

① Transmittal of SW Materials

Ref: EAVA 6530 and EGTA 03373

1. Attached per your request are all the SW materials in our possession from the GROSSBAHN operation. We appreciate information forwarded concerning this training and with which we are closing the SW GROSSBAHN file.

Attachment: as stated/herewith

6 May 1954

Distribution:

- 2 Fran
- 1 EE
- 1 OCM
- 1 COPS
- 1 []

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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1173

Chief of Case, Salzburg

Chief, EE

Info: Chief of Mission, Vienna

Operational/GROSSI
GROSSI's Personal Funds

Reference: EASA 4079 dated 21 October 1954

According to recent communications from GROSSI, he has been having trouble finding a permanent job. In his last letter he asked us to check into the transfer of the 10,000 schillings Mrs. GROSSI turned over to Headquarters and if not, your aid in expediting the transfer would be greatly appreciated.

17 December 1954

Distribution:

- 3 - Salzburg
- 2 - Vienna
- 1 - RI
- 2 - EE/A

EE/A:EC [initials]

EE/A

EE/A

28

~~SECRET~~

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2001, 2005

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VIA AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

D. ATCH NO. EAVA-11252

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
ATTN : []
FROM : Chief of Base, Vienna
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC— Otto A. von BOLSCHWING

DATE 26 July 1955
MICROFILMED
MAY 29 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. [] on his return trip to VOB had a short visit in New York City with Subject. Subject is presently assistant to the vice-president in charge of foreign exports of the Richard Hudnut Co. (cosmetics), a branch of the former Warner-Hudnut Pharmaceutical Co., presently the Lambert-Warner Pharmaceutical Co. Subject informed [] of the impending merger at the time of our visit. Subject is apparently being groomed for future employment with the firm in Europe. This was verified by Subject's wife, who is now visiting in Europe and whom [] spoke with in Vienna on 28 June 1955. She also indicated that Subject is in no hurry to return to Europe but that he hopes to remain in the US for at least 2 years or longer.

22 July 1955

Distribution:

- 3-EE
- 1-OCM
- 1-REG
- 1-SAT/ []

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

INDEX

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2001, 2005

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CLASSIFICATION

EAVA-11252

VIA _____
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EAVA-12428

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, EE

DATE 67 5561
ACM

Attn: E 1

FROM Chief of Station, Vienna G

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC GROSSBAHN AA-8 Visit of 28 November 1955

Meeting Arrangements

1. At 1715 hours on 28 November, [] went unannounced to the house of GROSSBAHN AA-8 in Vienna. [] well knew from [] that GROSSBAHN AA-8 had been reinstated as an officer in the Austrian Army and was undergoing training at Villach. Nevertheless, [] had to put in an appearance, since his failure to appear would show that he had inside knowledge.

Operational

2. [] was received by GROSSBAHN AA-8's mother, who told [] her son was away in Villach, allowed him to read a letter from the new captain and explained that her son had been very disappointed not to see [] in October. (At that time [] expecting GROSSBAHN AA-8 to be recalled to service momentarily, had avoided the agent so as not to have to give him AS 10,000 to buy a motor scooter, which he would not need as a captain in the Army.)

3. The mother said her son had run out of money and had to borrow some from her. [] thereupon gave her AS 2,000, due GROSSBAHN AA-8 for October and invited her to take whatever she had loaned him and either send the balance to Villach or hold it until he came home at Christmas.

4. The mother said that her son had gotten a final divorce from his wife and the wife had married the man with whom she was living, although she professed to love GROSSBAHN AA-8 more than the new husband. The mother was not sure how her son felt about the whole affair now that he was a captain once again, earning a fair salary, and with the prospect of being returned to Vienna and being provided with quarters.

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5. [] discussed with the mother the wisdom and practicality of talking to the wife to see if she would not rejoin GROSSBAHN AA-8 and

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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Date: 2005

EAVA-12428

SECRET

EAVA-12428
Page 2

start all over again. The mother thought it would be worth trying.

Communications

6. [] said that he would drop in again between Christmas and New Year's and give GROSSBAHN AA-8, who would be there at that time, another 2,000 AS.

Security

7. At no time did [] mention who he was or where he came from. He claimed he had been out of town for over a month and was therefore unable to visit GROSSBAHN AA-8. The mother asked no questions. She had seen [] before on several occasions at the house. The Communist Party office, which was formerly located in the front of the house, has apparently moved. No posters or Communist signs are now in evidence.

Case Officer Comment

8. [] feels that it may still be possible, by talking to GROSSBAHN AA-8's former wife, to bring this family back together again. If they can be persuaded to try, some money may be needed to help them set up housekeeping. This matter will be discussed further in the Austrian Station.

29 November 1955

Distribution:

✓ 1 - EE
1 - OCS
1 - REG
1 - [] []

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EAVA-12665

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

9 9581
NYC

TO Chief, EE DATE _____

Attn: []

FROM Chief of Station, Vienna

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC GROSSBAHN AA-8 Visit of 29 December 1955

Reference: EAVA-12428 6-6-8-138

Meeting Arrangements

1. At 1700 hours on 28 December 1955, [] went to the Vienna home of GROSSBAHN AA-8's parents, hoping to find the former agent in. In November, his mother had said that he would be in Vienna between Christmas and New Year's. Unfortunately, he was out to a movie. [] promised to return the next day at 1700 hours.

2. Instead [] came the next day at 1400 hours and did find GROSSBAHN AA-8 at home. [] had his small son along with him. The child cannot talk, so there was no great security risk.

Operational

3. [] first apologized for not seeing GROSSBAHN AA-8 in October and making him go so long without money. [] said he had been out of town. Actually, he had avoided seeing the agent so as not to have to give him AS 10,000 to throw away on a motor scooter. (We knew from [] that the agent would be called into the Army soon as an officer, although he himself did not realize it and wanted to buy the scooter and become a salesman.) GROSSBAHN AA-8 was satisfied with the explanation.

4. The agent said he was well adjusted to military life and enjoyed it very much. He is a Rittmeister and will soon take over the company he is in. His salary after taxes is about AS 2800 in cash, plus free room and board, so he is very well off. He pays AS 700 a month for the support of his two children.

5. The agent and his wife are now formally divorced, and she has married her paramour, by whom she has one child. GROSSBAHN AA-8 insists he is perfectly reconciled to all this. He sees his former wife occasionally

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[] [] []

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6-6-8-138 (over)

EAVA-12665

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

SECRET

EAVA-12665

Page 2

and is on friendly terms with her. He can see the children whenever he wants.

Administrative

6. He agreed with [] that it would be foolish to spend the AS 10,000 on a motor scooter. Instead he will save it in a postal savings account. We arranged that [] would draw up a quit claim and give it to his mother to mail to him in a registered letter. He would sign it and mail it back to his mother. [] will then pick it up and pay his mother the money to be deposited to his account.

7. [] explained that the quit claim was a requirement and that it would close out our responsibility for him. He agreed. [] added that we might look in on him from time to time to see how he is making out. On the spot, [] gave him a present of AS 2000, for which he receipted.

Security

8. GROSSBAHN AA-8 has not been contacted by the Soviets at any time since his release.

Future Plans

9. GROSSBAHN AA-8 will probably stay indefinitely in Carinthia, instead of being transferred to Vienna. [] confirmed this on 2 January 1956.) We have, therefore, little or no operational interest in him. We could, of course, contact him at any time should the need arise. How he would react to a pitch would depend on the political situation in Austria at the time. The man himself is well disposed toward KUBARK.

Note

10. On 2 January 1956, [] filled agent [] URE in on the details of the disposal of GROSSBAHN AA-8 and asked him to keep an eye on the man. If he ever got in any kind of trouble, we might be in a position to help him. [], of course, headed the chain in which GROSSBAHN AA-8 once worked as an order of battle collector and has been kept informed of our handling of the GROSSBAHN AA-8 disposal.

3 January 1956

Distribution:

✓ 3 - EE
1 - OCS
1 - REG
1 - []

SECRET

6-68-1386

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CI/R&A
8192
17 June 1960

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

FRANKFURT

DIRECTOR

CONF. C/CI/RA

C/EE 3, C/SR 3, S/C 2

P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	JUN 17 7 53 1960 CABLE SENT
	X ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 37207

OUT 67207

TO FRAN

INFO HAMB, MUNI

CITE DIR

35421

RYBAT

35421

KUDESK

REF: A. EGQA 88980 (3 MAY 57) ATTACH PAGE 16

B. PARA 2K DIR 35039 (OUT 86455). NOT TO HAMB AND MUNI

1. DR. (PROFESSOR) FRANZ ALFRED SIX, BORN 12 AUG 09 MANNHEIM, WAS SS LT. COL. AND ADOLF EICHMANN'S BOSS 1936-1939. HE APPEARS IDENTICAL WITH DR. SIX MENTIONED REF A. FYI: HQ HAS UNCOVERED MUCH INCRIMINATING MATERIAL RE SIX'S ACTIVITIES IN RSHA AND CONNECTIONS EICHMANN'S ANTI-JEWISH OPS. IF ALL OR PARTS THIS INFO KNOWN TO SOVS SIX VERY VULNERABLE AND COULD HAVE EASED HIS RECRUITMENT.

2. HAVE ALSO BEEN ABLE ESTABLISH CONCLUSIVELY THAT PERSON MENTIONED REF B PARA 2A WAS ONE OF EICHMANN'S PRINCIPAL AGENTS

per [redacted]

CS COPY FILED IN [redacted]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Declassified and Approved for Release
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Date: 2001, 2005

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

ROUTING	
1	4
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3	6

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	
	ROUTINE	
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT 87207
D!R 35421

TO INFO CITE DIR

Page 2

1936-1938 AND LATER BECAME STAFF MEMBER RSHA WORKING JEWISH MATTERS. PERSON REF B PARA 2A WELL KNOWN TO AND BY SIX. IF SIX RECRUITED BY SOVS HE COULD HAVE INFORMED THEM ABOUT PERSON REF B PARA 2A MAKING LATTER ALSO VULNERABLE AS HE HAS WITHHELD TRUE BACKGROUND DATA FROM KUBARK AND NOW RESIDENT CITIZEN **PBPRIME.**

3. PRESUME CASE REF A INACTIVE. ADVISE.
4. CAN YOU DETERMINE SIX PRESENT LOCATION? HAS HE IMMIGRATED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY? HE NOT LISTED HAMB ADDRESS BOOKS 59 AND 60.
5. FOR FRAN: PLS NAME CHECK ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES ON SIX. AT THIS TIME DO NOT CHECK UPHILL. WILL ADVISE RE UPHILL AFTER RECEIPT YOUR TRACES AND COMPLETION HQ RESEARCH.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICERS

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

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RPS

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

ROUTING	
1	4
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TO:
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

P R E C E D E N C E	DEFERRED	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	INITIALS
	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUR 87207
DIR 35421

TO INFO Page 3 CITE DIR

EE/OPS AC/CI/R&A C/CI/SPG

CI/OPS/SOV-SAT
(coordinated in draft with

EE/G/OPS

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DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGBA-64267/1
TO: Chief, EE	INFO: Chief of Station, Germany		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. UNKNOWN BOB FILE NO.: 2599
FROM: Chief of Base, Berlin	SUBJECT: Operational Forwarding of Second Copy of EDC Check Results		DATE: 23 JUL 1960 E: "A" - (CHECK "X" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED: For your information		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

REFERENCE(S)
 A. DIR-35039, dated 16 June 1960
 B. EGBA-64261, dated 21 June 1960

Forwarded herewith, as stated in para 2 of reference B, are Berlin Document Center check results on the persons listed in para 2 of reference A.

Distribution:
 2 - EE, w/att.
 2 - COS, & w/o att.

✓ EDC file on Otto von BOLSCHWING FILED into EGBA 64267/1 and classified to []

EDC file on Dr. Franz Alfred SIX filed into EGBA 64267/2 and classified to []

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
 by the Central Intelligence Agency
 Date: 2001, 2005

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 (2)(A) Privacy
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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~~see letter~~
(Name and address of requesting agency)

URGENT

Berlin Document Center,
U.S. Mission Berlin
APO 742, U.S. Forces

Date: 20.6.60 **rs**

It is requested that your records on the following named person be checked:

Name: **BOLSCHEWIK von, Otto**
Place of birth: **Schoenbruch**
Date of birth: **15.10.09**
Occupation:
Present address:
Other information: **SS-No.: 353 603, NSDAP-No.: 984 212**

It is understood that the requested information will be supplied at cost to this organization, and that payment will be made when billing is received.

(Telephone No.)

(Signature)

(This space will be filled in by the Berlin Document Center)

	Pos.	Neg.		Pos.	Neg.		Pos.	Neg.
1. NSDAP Master File	—	—	7. SA	—	—	13. NS-Lehrerbund	—	—
2. Applications	—	—	8. OPG	—	—	14. NS-Aerztobund	—	—
3. PKK	—	—	9. RWZ	—	—	15. Party Census	—	—
4. SS Officers	—	—	10. EWZ	—	—	16.	—	—
5. RUSHA	—	—	11. Kulturkammer	—	—	17.	—	—
6. Other SS Records	—	—	12. Volksgerechtshof	—	—	18.	—	—

For explanation of abbreviations and terms, see other side.

JUN. 20. 1960

☐

7

204

Form AE/GER-205
(Jan 59)


(Date Request Received)

(Date Answer Transmitted)


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Dienstgrad	Bef.-Dat.	Dienststellung	von	bis	h. omitt.	553603		Dienststellung	von	bis	h. omitt.
U'Stuf.	10.4.40	S.D. g. l. g. m. t.				984-12					
O'Stuf.	1.7.40					15.10.09					
Otto H. Abrecht von Bohschwing											
Größe: 188						Geburtsort: Schönbruch					
O'Stubal						H.-J. R. Winkelträger	SR-Sportabzeichen Olympia				
Stab.						Bürger Abzeichen	Reitersportabzeichen Jahresabzeichen				
Oberf.						Bistorden Gold HJ-Abzeichen	Reichsportabzeichen D. I. R. B.				
Beif.						Gold. Parteiabzeichen Gauwehrenszeichen	H.-Leistungsabzeichen				
Scuf.						Totenkopftag					
O'Gruf.						Ehrendegen					
						Julleuchter					
Zivilstand:		Familienstand: <i>vh.</i> <i>15.5.38</i>				Beruf: <i>Bank. Kaufmann</i> <i>erleget</i>		<i>Kaufmann</i> <i>lebt</i>		Parteitätigkeit:	
		Ghefrau <i>Brigitte Hlenzendorf. 31.1.15 Bin.</i> <small>Muttername Geburtsdag und -ort</small>				Arbeitgeber: <i>selbst</i>					
		Parteiangehörig Tätigkeit in Partei: <i>+</i>				Volksschule <i>4 Kl.</i>		höhere Schule <i>02</i>			
		Religion <i>(ev) gottgl.</i> <i>M. R. 39</i>				Fach- od. Gew. Schule		Technikum			
		Kinder				Handelschule		Hochschule <i>1 Sem. (ohne)</i>			
		1. <i>27.39</i>				Fachrichtung: <i>Handelsrecht</i>				Stellung im Staat (Beamter, Arbeiter, Arbeiter, Lehrling)	
		2.				Sprachen: <i>engl, franz.</i>					
		3.				Führerschulung: <i>HJ I, II, III, IV</i>					
		Nationalpol. Erziehungsanstalt für Kinder:				Ahnennachweis:		Lebensborn:			

8 DB-13010



<p>von 24 bis 26</p>	<p>Alte Armee:</p> <p>Trupp:</p> <p>Dienstgrad:</p> <p>Gefangenschaft:</p> <p>Orden und Ehrenzeichen: <i>K.K. u. K. m. S. h. u. (H. 1)</i></p> <p>Verw.-Abzeichen:</p> <p>Kriegsbeschädigt %:</p>	<p>Auslandstätigkeit:</p> <p>Deutsche Kolonien:</p> <p>Besond. sportl. Leistungen:</p>
<p>von bis</p>	<p>Reichswehr:</p> <p>Dienstgrad:</p>	<p>Aufmärkte:</p>
	<p>Reichssee:</p> <p>Dienstgrad:</p>	<p>Sonstiges:</p>



Subject: <i>[Handwritten]</i> Program: <i>[Handwritten]</i> CI: SA: SO-PA: SFAA: DISE: Security: Intelligence: [Handwritten]	New Area: Type: Method: Frequency: Date and Classification: <i>R, K, I, K, M, S, K, W, U, U</i> Date of Issue: Classification:	Distribution: [Handwritten] [Handwritten] [Handwritten]
[Handwritten] [Handwritten] [Handwritten]	Reference: Date: Frequency: Reference:	Subject: [Handwritten]
[Handwritten] [Handwritten]	Reference: Date: Frequency: Reference:	Subject: [Handwritten]

Name: <u>Boleschwing v. Hitzel</u> Ort: <u>15. 10. 08</u> Str.: <u>914 1 12</u> Wohnort: _____ Beruf: _____ Geburtsort: _____ Geburtsdatum: _____ Familienname: _____ Dienstort: _____ Dienstgrad: _____ Dienstzeit: _____ Dienstort: _____ Dienstgrad: _____ Dienstzeit: _____	Name: <u>Boles</u> Ort: <u>Hilgersheim</u> Str.: _____ Wohnort: _____ Beruf: _____ Geburtsort: _____ Geburtsdatum: _____ Familienname: _____ Dienstort: _____ Dienstgrad: _____ Dienstzeit: _____ Dienstort: _____ Dienstgrad: _____ Dienstzeit: _____
--	---

4 Jan 1975
24. 5. 37.

Gippenakte

Unterabteilung: *W. Botschning*
 Braut, Ehefrau: *Kronenauhoff*
 H-Nr.: *Ein-Nr. 11111*

Abklemmung

I. Semester: Bis zur Abklemmung einmündig: *Abklemmung 11. April*

II. 1800 erreicht: *21.2*

III. 1700 erreicht: *21.6*

nicht leistungsfähig: Schwer	nicht leistungsfähig: Schwer
nachzutreiben:	nachzutreiben:
unbekannt:	unbekannt:

Gesamterfolg: *21.6*

Erbgesundheits

1. Aufnahme: *30. APR. 1940*

2. Datum:

Die H für pers. Entlohnung weiß:

Lebenserleben (Ebenenerleben)	ja	nein
-------------------------------	----	------

Brust:

Spezialabteilung:

Früherer Schulung:

Beurlaubungsbescheinigung:

Beurlaubungsbescheinigung:

Einbezug:

Rücklauf

Arten: *Arten* Entlohnung: *Entlohnung* Bestand: *Bestand*

Raum zum Aufleben der Lichtbilder.



Kleine ff-Abwechselfel

Zusammenfassung

1. Welche Rechte hat die Partei Abwechselfel?
 Die Partei Abwechselfel hat folgende Rechte bei der Durchführung der Abwechselfel:

2. Welche Rechte hat die Partei?

Die Partei hat folgende Rechte:

1. Gewerbesteuerbefreiung,
2. Steuerbefreiung bei Einnahmen,
3. Steuerbefreiung bei Einnahmen,
4. Steuerbefreiung bei Einnahmen,
5. Steuerbefreiung bei Einnahmen.

Die Parteien sind eine selbständige juristische Person und sind als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen.
 Die Parteien sind in einem besonderen Verzeichnis zu führen. Die Partei Abwechselfel hat einen, mehrere oder mehrere Abwechselfel zu bezeichnen. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist in der Abwechselfel gelistet und hat die Rechte eines Vereins, § 21. Die Parteien sind in der Abwechselfel gelistet und haben die Rechte eines Vereins, § 21. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist in der Abwechselfel gelistet und hat die Rechte eines Vereins, § 21. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist in der Abwechselfel gelistet und hat die Rechte eines Vereins, § 21.

3. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen.
 Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen.

Die Parteien sind folgende Parteien:

Abwechselfel	1	2	3	4	5
Parteien	1	2	3	4	5

Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen.

4. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen.

5. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen.

6. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen. Die Partei Abwechselfel ist eine selbständige juristische Person und ist als Partei abwechselfel beizufügen.

1	2	3	4 (Bauernhof)	5	6	7	8
VON BOLSCHWING Otto Pommern 5.8.1777 Rust 24.11.1842 Lr.	FLEISS Anna Christine Schellhorn Königsberg 11.10.1708 Lr.	BIRNBAACH Auguste Friedriche Königsberg (?) Potsdam 22.9.1806 Lr.	MAUL Dorthe Königsberg 1810 Lr.	VON HOLLEN Julius Heinrich Schönwilde 19.2.1879 Lr.	LUEDEW Sophie Caroline Königsberg 5.4.1812 Schönwilde 23.10.1865 Lr.	VON RESTORFF Friedrich Titus Rachow Tritz 4.4.1801 8.10.1846 Lr.	VON STENGLIN MARIA BRUNN Buck Rachow 6.5.1818 5.9.1895 Lr.
Landrat, Major & Landrat 28.11.1811	Landrat Abrenhausen 22.7.1828	Landrat Abrenhausen 22.7.1828	Landrat & Kaffeeplantagen Wetunde 12.4.1832	Landrat & Kaffeeplantagen Wetunde 12.4.1832	Landrat & Kaffeeplantagen Wetunde 12.4.1832	Rikmische & Resident in Jönköping Kubskow 2.1.1835	Rikmische & Resident in Jönköping Kubskow 2.1.1835
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
VON BOLSCHWING Karl 7. Mai 1863 Lr.	OTTO 14.11.1850 23.5.1918 Landrat 5.8.1855	BIRNBAACH Perle Königsberg 19.9.1880 Lr.	MAUL Johann 8.2.1830 19.9.1880	VON HOLLEN Schönwilde Königsberg 29.6.1840 6.8.1896 Lr.	LUEDEW Alfred Königsberg 29.6.1840 6.8.1896 Landrat	VON RESTORFF Marie Köln Königsberg 19.8.1842 27.8.1920 Lr.	VON STENGLIN Marie Köln Königsberg 19.8.1842 27.8.1920 Lr.
Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
VON BOLSCHWING Otto 15. Oktober 1809 Lr.	MAUL Dorthe Königsberg 1810 Lr.	VON HOLLEN Julius Heinrich Schönwilde 19.2.1879 Lr.	LUEDEW Sophie Caroline Königsberg 5.4.1812 Schönwilde 23.10.1865 Lr.	VON RESTORFF Friedrich Titus Rachow Tritz 4.4.1801 8.10.1846 Lr.	VON STENGLIN MARIA BRUNN Buck Rachow 6.5.1818 5.9.1895 Lr.		
Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat	Landrat		

Quelle: ...

Quelle: ...

Handwritten title: ...

Ur-*Handwritten*

Das Handwritten-Buch ist in folgende Abschnitte unterteilt:

1. Einleitung
2. ...
3. ...
4. ...
5. ...
6. ...

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zu 11:

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Die Urkunden über 11 sind nicht aufzufinden.
 Sie war Tochter des Heinrich Wilh. Maul (22) geb. 22.7.1772 zu Lehm (Niederrhein) geboren als Kirchenschatz & Gutsherrin zu Frau Waldeck am 24.10.1832 (14) und des Auguste Maul (59 Jahre alt) (22) verheiratet zu Frau Waldeck am 6.3.1819 (14).
 Die Kirchenbücher von Frau Waldeck sind 1914 beim Russeneinfall zum Teil verbrannt.

Seite 6

Dem untersuchenden Arzt zustellen.

Ergänzungen des untersuchenden Arztes zum Gebirgsärztlichen:

- 1. Dauer des Aufenthaltes im Gebirge
- 2. Ort des Aufenthaltes
- 3. Höhe des Aufenthaltes
- 4. Zweck des Aufenthaltes

Schlussatz des untersuchenden Arztes über die Gebirgsarbeit:

Der (die) Untersuchte ist geeignet / nicht geeignet.

[Handwritten Signature]

Unterschrift des Arztes

Stempel

Dienstort: *[Handwritten]*

Dienststellung: *Antw. Reichswehr-Regiment*

Wohnort: *[Handwritten]*

[Handwritten]

Seite 15

Datum: 31.1.1940

Dem Stab:

- 1. Rufnummer: *[Handwritten]* (Stempel)
- 2. Gebirgsarbeit: ja / nicht ja
- 3. Höhenarbeit: ja / nicht ja

Bemerkungen:

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1/P 0-2894

Executive Registry
60-4239

- 1 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Adolf EICHMANN

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. In our effort to locate all available information on EICHMANN, the SS man who, according to the newspapers, was seized by the Israelis on 23 May 1960, we have made a concentrated search through various captured German documents. Among the items on EICHMANN we have found a report dated 4 November 1937 which was prepared by EICHMANN, then an SS master sergeant, and one fnu HAGEN, then an SS first sergeant. The report provides details on the trip which EICHMANN and HAGEN took during September 1937 and contains data on a number of agents and informers who worked for the RSHA. Other captured records have brought to light the names of additional agents and informers. Details are provided in the attached interim report.
3. A final report will be forwarded to your office as soon as all inquiries, investigations, and research are completed.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Signed: [] []

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- (2)(A) Privacy
 - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
 - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

[] []
Acting Chief
Counter Intelligence Staff

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Date: 2001, 2005

cc: DDCI

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Adolf EICHMANN

1. On 4 November 1937 Adolf EICHMANN, then an SS master sergeant, and fnu HAGEN, then an SS first sergeant, prepared a report on their trip of September 1937 to various countries, including Israel (then Palestine). According to the report, Dr. Franz REICHERT, then a representative of the German news agency D. N. B., in Jerusalem, was one of EICHMANN's principal agents. Among sub-agents REICHERT handled was Feivel POLKES, aka Feibel POLKES, aka Feivel POLKES, a Jew who resided at that time in Tel Aviv. The report stated that POLKES had no profession and that his only means of livelihood was the money paid to him "by us" through REICHERT. He received a total of 20 pounds per month: ten pounds were his monthly salary; five pounds were a special payment; and another five pounds were given to him to pay one of his sub-agents, fnu KLEIN of Halfa. The report stated that POLKES had another sub-agent, one fnu SCHALOMI (or Schalomi Inu), who was a member of HAGANA.

2. Another captured German document is a progress report for the period 1 July to 31 July 1937, prepared by the unit of which EICHMANN was a member. It states that Feibel POLKES had the task of furnishing information on "HAGANA, political developments in the Near East, and universal organization of Judaism." Still other captured records contain extensive and detailed reports on HAGANA and other world-wide Jewish organizations. A study of these reports will be made in order to determine whether they were prepared on the basis of information furnished by POLKES and his sub-agents.

3. RID's central index contains no record on POLKES. However, a check of the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has brought to light the following information:

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"Feivel POLKES

"Arrived in U. S. January 1, 1954 at New York for business. Departed January 13, 1954. Occupation - Business Executive. Born - September 11, 1900, in Sghol, Israel. Nationality - Israeli. Race - Hebrew. Israeli passport #11538 issued February 17, 1953. Wife's name - Lisa. Address - 43 Hillel Street, Haifa, Israel. Destination in U. S. - 7704 - 141 St., Queens, N. Y. White hair, grey eyes, 5'6". Also in U. S. before in October 1953."

4. Through the efforts of the Office of Security, it has been possible to determine that the above-cited address in Queens consists of garden apartments. Number 7704 on 141 Street, one of these apartment houses, consists of six individual residences (apartments). Five of the residents at this address have moved there since 1954. The sixth apartment is occupied by the family of William H. WHITE. We shall endeavor to determine the names of the tenants of the other five apartments who lived there in January 1954.

5. We are conducting investigations on the following agents or contacts who worked directly or indirectly for EICHMANN in 1938:

- a. Fnu GENTZ, D. N. B. representative in Cairo. His area of activity was Egypt and the Near East; his principal task was the observation of development of "the Jewish State." He was in contact with Dr. REICHERT.
- b. Wilhelm M. BORMANN had been expelled, presumably from a country in the Near East. German attempts to have the expulsion order rescinded had failed; and at the time (January 1938) BORMANN was temporarily residing in Berlin. His area of activity had been the Near East, and he collaborated with Dr. REICHERT and fnu GENTZ. Occasionally Dr. REICHERT used him as a courier.
- c. E. F. ELMHURST operated in the United States. His area of activity was given as "America," and his task was observation of "anti-national socialist boycott leagues."
- d. Henri ARCHACHE, a lawyer, resided in Alexandria, Egypt.
- e. Samy MOUSFY, an editor, resided in Cairo, Egypt.
- f. Ibrahim CHANTI, aka SHANTI, owner and editor-in-chief of the newspaper, Ad-Difah, reported through Dr. REICHERT.

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2 February 1961

MEMORANDUM: Chief/CI/Liaison

SUBJECT: Otto Albrecht Alfred von BOLSCHWING

1. It has been brought to our attention that subject has applied to ICA for employment and is supposedly being processed for a position in India. Therefore, it has been suggested that your office be apprised of certain phases of his background; the facts cited below indicate that subject's past activities could result in political embarrassment to ICA and to the U.S. Government.

2. Examination of captured German documents has brought to light voluminous information about Adolf EICHMANN, his office, his subordinates, and his agents. It has not been possible to complete a thorough analysis and prepare a detailed report because of the very large number of documents involved.

3. According to the captured records, subject became a member of the Nazi party on 1 April 1932. His party membership number was 984212. From 1937 (or earlier) until about 1939, he appears to have been a principal agent of the Department II, Section 112 of the RSHA (the German Security Service Headquarters). At that time, EICHMANN (and several other persons who have been tried as war criminals) was a member of this section. The examination conducted thus far has not made it possible to ascertain whether EICHMANN was subject's case officer in the early years of their service with the RSHA. It does, however, appear that by 1938 EICHMANN directed at least one or two specific phases of subject's work.

4. The chief of Department II, Dr. Franz Alfred SIX, appears to have exercised a considerable degree of supervision of Section 112. The captured records contain evidence that, at least on one occasion, SIX, EICHMANN, and subject conferred in detail about certain anti-Jewish activities of Section 112 and gave subject specific guidance. Other papers indicate that Dr. SIX and EICHMANN were well acquainted with subject and with his work. In 1960, Dr. SIX was reported as residing in a small town in southern Germany. In 1956, he was part owner of a publishing firm in West Germany.

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5. In 1937 or 1938, subject appears to have been directly involved in foreign currency manipulations. Specifically, at that time, the Nazis were exerting pressure upon persons of the Jewish extraction in order to get them to leave Germany. As a result, many Jews sold their property in preparation for emigration. The Nazi laws stipulated, however, that only a limited amount of German currency could be taken out of Germany by Jewish emigrants and that additional sums of money could be taken out only if the sums were officially converted to currencies of other countries. As these transactions could be made only at official installations, the Nazis exchanged the funds at a rate inflated in their favor and used the proceeds for financing their intelligence (i. e. RSHA) activities. Subject was directly involved in these manipulations, having gained his experience in fiscal matters while working for "Overseas Traders, Ltd." in Jerusalem, Beirut, and Cairo from 1933 to 1936. In 1936 he was expelled from those areas by the British authorities.

6. He then continued these financial activities for the RSHA in Berlin and later in Vienna.

7. Probably in April 1940 he became a staff member of the RSHA and held the rank of SS 2nd Lt. He was promoted to the rank of SS 1st Lt. in July 1940 and to captain in January 1941. In May 1940 he was working for the RSHA in Bucharest, and was closely associated with von KILLINGER, the German Envoy to Rumania. Von KILLINGER's activities have been linked with EICHMAN's attempts to exterminate the Jews and he has been considered a war criminal. It has not, however, been possible to establish whether the accusations are founded and whether von KILLINGER has been brought before a war crimes tribunal.

8. The above information about subject may be passed to ICA. However, the information cited below should not be made available to other agencies without the approval of pertinent CIA offices.

a. Shortly after WW II, subject was employed by the West German Intelligence Service. While with this service, he also performed various assignments for this Agency and indicated loyalty toward the U.S. and a desire to switch employers.

b. Subject was employed by this Agency as a contract agent from about 1950 to 1954. In the course of his association with us, he never provided full and correct details of his RSHA employment and failed to advise us that he had been involved with several war

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criminals. He acknowledged to us that he had been a member of the Nazi Party, but claimed that he was compelled to join. He said further, that he had been able to alter the official records to show that he had joined the party at an earlier, more advantageous date. He entered the U.S. without Agency sponsorship. We did, however, indicate to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that we were aware of his membership in the Nazi party, but that we felt it was relatively inconsequential, particularly in view of subject's excellent service in our behalf. It is presumed that this certification is a matter of record with the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

c. Several months after the Israeli Government's announcement of EICHMANN's seizure, the German authorities reinstated active investigation of EICHMANN and of several other persons accused or suspected of war crimes. In the course of the investigation, three representatives of the West German Ministry of Justice were sent to Washington, D.C., on detail and spent more than a month examining captured records. The records containing the desired evidence--among them many which we have examined and which we have used as a basis for the above statements--were microfilmed and sent to Germany for use in the investigation and presumably for use as evidence in future war crime trials conducted in Germany.

d. Finally, it has also been brought to our attention that the Israeli Government has obtained certified reproductions of many of these captured records. It is presumed that the copies are to be used as evidence in the forthcoming EICHMANN trial.

9. It is our assumption that subject may be named as EICHMANN's collaborator and fellow conspirator and that the resulting publicity may prove embarrassing to the U.S. if subject becomes associated with ICA or its activities. It is suggested that the ICA be advised of the facts contained in the captured records so that they can weigh the risks involved. Similarly, it is suggested that you consider informing the FBI concurrently as there may be in this case a violation of U.S. statutes.

C/CI/R&A

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - addressee
- 1 - []
- 1 - Office of Security/SRS
- 1 - CI/OPS/EE
- 1 - EE/G

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12/85

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION <i>Secret</i>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. NBDA-7571 <i>Pr...</i>
TO	Chief, NE	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. Not Known	
INFO	Chief, EE		
FROM	Chief of Station, <i>[redacted]</i>	DATE	8 April 1961
SUBJECT	Possibility of GROSSBAHN's Coming to India for TCM Investment Center	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING	
		<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED	See para 3 and provide early reply	<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	

REFERENCE(S)

1. *[redacted]* has been advised twice in the last few days that there is a possibility that GROSSBAHN might come to India as a high pay contract employee in the Indian Investment Center. The chief of the Indian Investment Center, a very high powered employee named BOURDRES, is considering two candidates:

A. GROSSBAHN, whom BOURDRES vastly prefers, but who, as he was informed by ICA telegram to Delhi ICA TO 20-1193, was not available. BOURDRES attributed this to a poor recommendation by someone in KUBARK to Mr. SLAGHT of ICA's Private Enterprise Office, who told BOURDRES that the references of the agency previously employing GROSSBAHN in Austria were not entirely favourable and were enough to definitely stop consideration of GROSSBAHN. BOURDRES, very anxious to have GROSSBAHN, is attempting to reopen this issue and since GROSSBAHN said in a letter that he had a friend in India (an unnamed friend - *[redacted]*), there was a great search on the part of TCM to find this friend. Finally, Philip Van Wyck, head of the Investment Program in TCM, asked *[redacted]* if he knew GROSSBAHN and *[redacted]* said he did and favourably so. *[redacted]* has thus let it be known to the chief of the Industry Branch of TCM that he knows GROSSBAHN and considers him favourably.

B. The other candidate is ANDRE MAXIMOV, born 23 May 1905 in Moscow, a legal partner in the firm of Spence, Hotchkiss, Parker and Duryee in New York, who lists as one of his character references the present Chief of FE Division of KUBARK.

2. From what *[redacted]* knows of the GROSSBAHN case, it would seem that KUBARK has done an injustice to him by giving TCM a less than enthusiastic report. While of course we do not plan to use GROSSBAHN operationally, we are certain that due to his friendship with *[redacted]* and his natural inquisitive flair, he would assist the Station wherever possible through motives of friendship and patriotism. Naturally, any use of him would be cleared in advance according to regulations.

3. It is requested that, if it is not too late, our liaison with ICA inform SLAGHT of ICA that we have no reason to object to GROSSBAHN's coming to India; in fact, we would think it a good idea. An early reply is requested to this dispatch since *[redacted]* in all probability, will soon be asked to give his opinion of GROSSBAHN to TCM.

6 April 61

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - C/NE
2 - C/EE
1 - *[redacted]*
2 - files

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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10 April 1961

SUBJECT: Otto Albrecht Alfred von BOLSCHWING

1. During a period beginning shortly after the conclusion of World War II and extending into 1954, Subject conscientiously performed useful work, at first indirectly and then directly, for the United States in Austria. At this time he made no secret of having been a nominal member of the NSDAP and of having held assimilated SS rank. He also claimed, however, that he had consistently and effectively impeded the true aims of the Nazi party. As a reward for his loyal post-war service and in view of the apparent innocuousness of his party activities, Subject was given certain covert but official assistance in immigrating to the United States in 1954.

2. Following the Israeli arrest of Adolf EICHMANN, an examination of captured German documents bearing on EICHMANN's activities coincidentally revealed that Subject had concealed from United States Government representatives the true aspects of his NSDAP membership and most of the details of his relationship with the RSHA. The most significant single fact revealed was that, at least in the years prior to the war, he was a principal agent of Department II, Section 112,

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of the RSHA. At that time EICHMANN and several other persons who have since been tried as war criminals were members of this section. It has not thus far been possible to determine whether EICHMANN supervised all of Subject's activities in this period, but it does appear that by 1938 EICHMANN directed at least one or two specific phases of Subject's work. All that has come to light so far indicates that his activity for the EICHMANN office had to do with the manipulation of private funds away from Jewish owners in connection with immigration proceedings, and nothing ~~to date~~ has connected him with EICHMANN's genocide activities. As a matter of fact, at this point in the examination of records it is unclear as to how far into the war years Subject's collaboration with EICHMANN extended.

3. A possibility exists that in the course of the EICHMANN trial or in West German trials of lesser war criminals, Subject's true record may come to public notice. Certified reproductions of many of the captured German documents are in the possession of the Israeli Government, and some months after EICHMANN's arrest representatives of the West German Justice Ministry spent more than a month in Washington examining and microfilming relevant captured documents. It is also to be noted that Subject has been identified in at least two books on EICHMANN which have been published since EICHMANN's arrest: He is mentioned, with an unimportant variation in the spelling of his name, on page 154 of Tuviah Friedman's The Hunter

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as a principal agent of the "Jewish Department", and he is mentioned as "Otto von Butschwing" on pages 73 and 77 of Quentin Reynolds' Minister of Death as the assistant to the head of German intelligence in Palestine in 1937. The latter book ascribes to him the role of getting "acquainted with members of the Haganah in hopes of finding some who would work with the Gestapo".

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EXCERPT FROM DAILY LOG -- ICA/CI LIAISON

5 May

Otto Albrecht Alfred von BOLSCHWING

[redacted] OS, brought to my attention a conversation which he said that [redacted] of DDI had had with Mr. Charles Keating re subject. I telephoned [redacted] who had expressed an interest in knowing what had been told to Mr. Keating re Subject and advised him of the contents of our log entry of 6 Feb. [redacted] indicated that he had not personally talked with Mr. Keating but that a representative of his office had and they were concerned because of their belief that subject was a rather "slippery character," that he was going to be employed by ICA. I emphasized with [redacted] that we had explained to ICA that we were bringing to their attention the fact that he had been an agent of Eichman merely to keep them apprised of the possibility which might arise out of this information inasmuch as Eichman's trial might very possibly surface von Bolschwing's name. [redacted] appeared satisfied that this information had been brought to ICA attention. I suggested that if ICA had had any further interest they might possibly be conducting a full name check with our agency.

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10 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations, DDP

SUBJECT : Otto Albrecht Alfred von BOLSCHWING

1. This memorandum is for your information and concurrence in the recommendations contained in paragraph 5.

2. Subject, a former agent of the Austrian Station, who, under [redacted] cover, was assisted in his immigration and naturalization by CIA, has been trying for some months to gain employment with ICA. He is apparently particularly well qualified for the position, which is with an Indian governmental or semi-governmental financial advisory body sponsored and in part staffed by ICA. In the normal course of events he probably would have had no difficulty obtaining the position. However, in the aftermath of EICHMANN's arrest [redacted] of CI/R&A discovered evidence in captured German documents that Subject had concealed from us the true facts of his Nazi Party membership and his true relationship with the RSHA, including the fact that he was once a principal agent of EICHMANN's office. What we knew on the EICHMANN connection was passed to Mr. Charles Keating of ICA by [redacted] on 6 February without recommendation pro or con, but pointing out that Subject's connection with EICHMANN might at some point come to public attention. Mr. Keating was of the opinion that the possibility of later adverse publicity would rule out Subject's employment, but said that he would undertake to attempt to make any turndown appear to be for simple administrative reasons and not on security grounds.

3. Recently an associate of Mr. Keating's advised the interested ICA man in India that Subject was being turned down on security grounds, and the representative in India wrote Subject that it appeared that he had enemies in Washington. Meanwhile, with the help of the president of the company employing him, ex-Governor Driscoll of New Jersey, Subject had marshalled an imposing array of individual congressional support for his employment by ICA. Mr. Keating advised [redacted] yesterday that he has congressmen on his back about Subject, and asked for a memorandum from us briefly outlining the derogatory information.

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4. Furthermore, Subject has been in telephonic contact with [] of EE/H, and [] of the CI Staff requesting advice as to how to proceed to erase any governmental objections to his employment. Since [] will receive another call from Subject this evening, 10 May 1961, he has been instructed to tell Subject that the reason for his turndown was new information on his RSHA activities discovered in research of German documentary material connected with the EICHMANN trial. Subject will be advised that he should write ICA immediately withdrawing his application for personal reasons, and send copies to the various persons whom he has enlisted in his support. If he refuses, he is to be advised that the information will be forwarded to these persons with resultant unpleasantness to himself. If he requests a meeting, both [] and [] will meet with him to detail the information which has been uncovered and make it clear to him why he must write the letters to protect himself.

5. If Subject refuses to cooperate in withdrawing his application, EE will advise Legislative Counsel of the situation and provide blind memoranda for use with the appropriate Members of Congress. A duplicate of this memorandum will be given to Mr. Keating of ICA. If Subject is willing to write the suggested letters, Mr. Keating will be so advised and asked to keep us informed of any further repercussions.

[]

GORDON M. STEWART
Chief, Eastern Europe Division

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15 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/A/

SUBJECT: Otto Albrecht Alfred von BOLSCHWING

1. On the evening of 11 May 1961 [✓] and I met von BOLSCHWING in New York City to point out to him the prudence of withdrawing his pending application for ICA-sponsored employment in India. The entire meeting, which lasted from shortly before eight in the evening to three in the morning, was in an amicable atmosphere and interspersed with mutual reassurances of continued friendship. [✓], EE/H,

2. The point was gotten to with dispatch, and was introduced by calling to his attention derogatory references to him in recent books by Quentin Reynolds and Tuviah Friedman. He said that he was unfamiliar with the books. When he dismissed the references as ridiculous he was told that the books were in fact supported by a comparatively cursory review of captured German documents dealing with Adolf EICHMANN's activities. It was clearly pointed out that the documents on EICHMANN, as well as a detailed review of his own NSDAP records, established the fact that he had told Agency representatives far less than the truth about his Nazi activities. It was explained that although the Agency had been to an extent had no one was mad at him, and the purpose of our meeting was in no sense punitive. The purpose of the meeting, it was explained, was to draw to his attention the scandal that might result if he pressed his desire for employment and his congressional sponsors were caught out in the publicity that might break at any moment.

3. BOLSCHWING was quick to appreciate the fact that, without regard to the merits of the charges, the damage was done as far as his government-sponsored employment was concerned. He vigorously expressed his intention, however, after getting his sponsors off the limb, to clear his record. It was pointed out to him that it was our regretfully considered opinion that it would be impossible for him to clear his record, and I explained that I had personally

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reviewed the record and that, favorably disposed toward him as I was, it would be impossible for him to convince me. Furthermore, even if he were able to dispose of the charges he insisted were mendacious the record which he acknowledged would still show NSDAP and SS membership and activities which would make him a pariah in the circles for which he was striving. As for disproving any of the charges, he was reminded, even a court of law could not undo the publicity damage, and in any event it was doubtful that he would want the anguish and expense of legal trial before a West German or Israeli court. With this he heartily agreed. He wanted to know if this were a likelihood, and was told that although the documents were available to friendly governments we thought it unlikely that Germany or Israel would take any action against him. But, he was reminded, there was not even faint assurance that his name would not come up in the trials of others. He also wanted to know if ICA was aware of this derogatory information and was told that it was our impression that only the small section of ICA dealing in security matters knew of them, and that if he moved quickly in withdrawing his application the operating officials would probably not learn them.

4. To me, at least, BOLSCHWING's protestations of innocence seemed essentially pro forma and put forward in order to maintain his self respect with us. It is of some significance, suggesting at least that the reason for the discussion was not a complete surprise to him, that he had made a point of bringing with him his Austrian denazification certificate--really rather a pathetic paper under the circumstances. Although initial efforts at a chronological review of his relations with the party were cut off as pointless, he was for the most part pretty much permitted to talk himself out on the subject of his innocence. Of his own accord he came fairly early in the discussion to the position that in deference to the things he loved best--primarily his wife and secondarily the United States and the people here who had befriended him--he could not fight the situation or attempt to clear himself. At this point he volunteered the fact that he understood that he now could never work for the government, and he went on to wonder aloud if he could best spare his present employer, ex-Governor Driscoll, any future embarrassment by quickly finding other civil employment. He mentioned suicide twice. The first time it was received and treated lightly; the second time he was told that that idea did not fit in remotely with his avowed primary interest of sparing his wife and others disgrace and pain.

5. BOLSCHWING realized that apart from the present possibilities of scandal his status as a United States citizen might well be endangered by an expose of the facts. On this he was told that, there being more to the record than the Agency had bargained for,

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we could do very little to protect him; the most we could do was not to surface the affair ourselves and to endeavor to confine any knowledge of it to security type channels. It would be a public outcry which would damage him, he was told.

6. Early on in the discussion BOLSCHWING's main worries centered around his wife and how he could use her health as an excuse for withdrawing his application without making her aware of the true situation. The health question itself presents almost no problem, because both he and his wife some months ago suffered serious automobile accidents from which she, at least, has not fully recovered. However, what and how to tell his wife revolves, he says, around the fact that she is by nature emotional and fearful, has already been quite depressed lately, and in no event is the sort of person who could live out her life with a guilty secret. After hours of discussion he settled finally on telling her that as a Devisenberater prior to World War II he had extensive dealings with emigrating Jews which now are subject to adverse misinterpretation.

7. Depressed as BOLSCHWING unquestionably was, and groping as he was for solutions in what must have seemed an insoluble situation, he showed surprising resilience and apparent courage. From the beginning there was no question at all that his first and critical step was to withdraw immediately his application for employment and to inform his sponsors that he had done so. He asked us to draft a telegram for him for this purpose to be sent to Mr. Slaght of ICA and a letter to be sent to the congressmen who had interceded for him. He had, incidentally, shown us copies of the letters written on his behalf by the individual congressmen, and in each case they had plugged for him unequivocally and aggressively. The telegram to Slaght was to be sent that night or first thing the next morning, and the letters were to go to the congressmen as soon as possible. He was also to send a similar letter to Mr. Bourdres, the ICA field man in India who was in communication with him, and he was to follow up his telegram to Slaght with a telephone call and a letter. The question came up of whether or not he should send any sort of a letter to [] in India who had expressed an interest in his ICA employment, and it was decided that he should not. There might be something to be said for having him write [] a straight faced version of his withdrawal for health reasons in order to make matters easier for [], but the question was complicated by the fact that, according to BOLSCHWING, Bourdres is aware of []'s Agency affiliation. This decision can, of course, be changed if it seems more desirable to have him write to [] but I would tend to favor not writing, and informing [] by RYBAT communication of what has happened.

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RPS

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-4-

8. BOLSCHWING is tough and rescurceful; I don't expect him not to go through with the withdrawal of his application, but over the long haul he is not apt to let sleeping dogs lie. Given enough time for rationalization it is likely that at some time in the future he will come up with ideas for clearing his record and reinstating himself as a first class citizen.

[]
CI/CG/EE

SECRET

RR

ORIG : E
UNIT : EE/G/CE
EXT : X 5751
DATE : 19 SEPT 63

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
SECRET
 INDEX
 NO INDEX
 FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-52	
ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : FRANKFURT MUNICH BONN HAMBURG BERLIN VIENNA
FROM : DIRECTOR
CONF : C/EE 3
INFO : ADDP, C/CI C/WE 2, RF, W

20 SEP 63 21 39z
DEFERRED SIG CEN
XX ROUTINE

TO FRAN INFO MUNI BONN HAMB BRLN VIEN

CITE DIR 70116

GROSSBAHN LIAISON

1. SUBJ PBPRIME CITIZEN OTTO VON BOLSCHWING BORN 15 OCT 09 SCHOENBRUCK. UPHILL AGENT AUSTRIA FROM SHORTLY AFTER WW II UNTIL 50 WHEN PICKED UP BY KUBARK FOR WHOM WORKED UNTIL 54 WHEN IMMIGRATED PBPRIME WITH KUBARK ASSISTANCE. HIS INTEL. ACTIVITY WITH UPHILL AND KUBARK COVERED BY ARRANGEMENT WITH [] SHOWING [] EMPLOYMENT. HAS BEEN SELF SUPPORTING SINCE IMMIGRATION, BUT HAS MAINTAINED LOOSE CONTACT KUBARK HQS.

2. FOLLOWING EICHMANN ARREST, DETAILED EXAMINATION CAPTURED DOCUMENTS UNCOVERED FACT SUBJ CONCEALED FROM KUBARK MOST ASPECTS HIS NSDAP AND RSHA ACTIVITIES INCLUDING FACT IN YEARS PRIOR TO AND EARLY IN WAR WAS PRINCIPAL AGENT RSHA AND DEFINITELY WORKING UNDER EICHMANN ORDERS. APPEARS HIS ACTIVITY CONCERNED CONFISCATION JEWISH PROPERTIES. NOTHING HAS CONNECTED HIM WITH MORE HEINOUS EICHMANN ACTIVITY ALTHOUGH THIS POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy RELEASING OFFICER
(2)(B) Methods/Sources []
(2)(G) Foreign Relations []

COORDINATING OFFICERS
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5871 []
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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Date: 2001, 2005

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

- INDEX
- NO INDEX
- FILE IN CS FILE NO.

12-62

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO :
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :

157

SECRET

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO PAGE 2

INFO

CITE DIR 70116

3. CURRENTLY CONSULTANT CABOT CORP OF BOSTON FOR WHOM PLANS VISIT EUROPE TO SURVEY CARBON BLACK MARKET. FLIES PARIS 24 SEPT, DUESSELDORF 26 SEPT. ITINERARY NOT FIRM BUT PLANS VISIT COLOGNE, DORTMUND, KALSCHUEEREN, EMDEN, HAMB, FRAN, WIESBADEN, MUNI, WEST BRLN, AND POSSIBLY VIEN. RETURNS PBERIME 30 OCT. TRIP STRICTLY PRIVATE COMMERCIAL AND SUBJ NOT REPEAT NOT KUBARK OR ODYOKE SPONSORED.

4. IF QUERIED BY LIAISON DENY KUBARK CONNECTION AND REFER DIR FOR GUIDANCE. WOULD APPRECIATE PROMPT NOTIFICATION ANY PUBLICITY GIVEN HIS PRESENCE GERMANY.

END OF MESSAGE

(IN DRAFT)

CI/OG/EE

~~AC/EE/SA~~

C/EE/G

DC/EE

C/EE/G/CE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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Copy No.

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4 June 70

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted], and Otto von BOLSCHWING.

1. At ca. 1500 hours on 8 May 1970 I was called on the telephone by [redacted], formerly of the French desk (at that time the WE Division). I was out at the time and a message was left for me to return the call at his home phone. Upon return ca. 1600 hours I called him and told him that I was surprised to hear from him. I had not seen him for quite some time and therefore thought that he had been overseas and had just returned. He told me that he had not been overseas [redacted]

[redacted]. He also said that he is still an Agency employee and that the next time he comes to headquarters he will visit me and provide details.

2. The reason for his call was to ask me to telephone [redacted], formerly an Agency employee who had been assigned to the CI Staff. [redacted] gave me [redacted]'s home phone number and explained that [redacted] wanted to talk with me, but had misplaced my extension number. I asked [redacted] how [redacted] was doing and whether he was in good health. He replied that everything was fine with [redacted]

3. I then telephoned [redacted], who sounded quite [redacted] lucid (I had had occasion to talk to him on the telephone and in person in the past when he sounded quite differently). After chatting briefly concerning generalities, [redacted] explained that he wanted to reach me in order to ask me something concerning Otto von BOLSCHWING, a former agent of [redacted]'s.

4. At this point an explanatory note concerning von BOLSCHWING would be in order. [redacted] first came into contact with von

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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Date: 2001, 2005

RA

[redacted]


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BOLSCHWING in Austria shortly after the end of World War II. He used him as an agent for quite some time and eventually von BOLSCHWING immigrated to the U. S. and settled in East (or West) Orange, N. J., where he worked for RCA. He continued to maintain social contact with [redacted]. When Adolf EICHMANN, the infamous SS war criminal, was seized by the Israelis, I conducted a search for captured German documents that contained information about EICHMANN. I was able to locate numerous records some of which clearly showed that von BOLSCHWING had been a member of the SS in the early days of the Hitler regime and that at that time, he had served in the same unit as EICHMANN. At the same time that I was amassing the documents containing this information, von BOLSCHWING contacted [redacted] (I believe he wrote him a letter and asked him to come and visit him) and told him that he was afraid for his life, in light of what had happened to EICHMANN. Then [redacted] came and told me about his former agent's fears and I showed him the information which I had been able to find. [redacted] was very surprised, said neither he nor others who had worked with von BOLSCHWING had known about his connection with the RSHA and expressed the belief that we would not have used him at that time had we known about it. As the public excitement of the EICHMANN case mounted, von BOLSCHWING remained in contact with [redacted], but he never admitted the true facts of the case, although he indicated that he had had some very minor connection which was grossly exaggerated after the war. He feared that because of these disproportionate exaggerations something untoward might also happen to him. Throughout the weeks of the EICHMANN crisis, [redacted] tried to keep him from panicking and eventually the entire matter faded into the background and I heard no more about it.

5. [redacted]'s reason for wanting to contact me on 8 May 1970 concerned von BOLSCHWING, who, [redacted] explained, now lives in California and is an officer of a commercial firm which has obtained a classified defense contract. For this reason an investigation of von BOLSCHWING is to be conducted and [redacted] wanted to know whether I thought that von BOLSCHWING's previous Nazi background would have an adverse effect upon his being cleared. Although [redacted] skirted around the direct point for awhile, there was no doubt that what he wanted from me was either an assurance that there would be no adverse

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SECRET

effect or - he implied - action to insure such result. also offered to call DC/CI (he used []'s name - I do not know whether he knows of []'s relatively recent promotion) if it was necessary as backing to help me answer his questions.

6. I told [] that I have nothing to do with such matters, that I presume that the request will arrive in routine fashion and that some analyst or other will work on it and will have to evaluate the information in the record against the details in the request for clearance. I also said that I could not second guess an analyst and would have no idea how such information would effect a case at this time. [] indicated that he wanted to tell von BOLSCHWING what the chances for a clearance are and said that he would be going to the West Coast during the following week (11-15 May 1970). I left no doubt in his mind that I could not help him in this matter.

7. The entire conversation was very friendly in tone (we had always been on very friendly terms in the past) and [] promised to contact me socially in the future. He received no information or commitments from me and I did not indicate explicitly that I knew his request to be most improper.

[]
CI/R&A

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declassification

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RR

SECRET

22 July 1970

TO: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Interim Reply- VONBOLSCHWING, Otto Albrecht
Alfred

1. The final reply to your request for information on Subject is being delayed due to detailed analysis of file material that may be relevant. Every effort is being made to expedite this processing and to reduce any further inconvenience to you.

2. Should you desire additional information on the processing of this case you may contact this Office through normal liaison channels.

RETURN TO:
NAC
Requester - Brown NACC

CIA BATCH NO:
0173

SEQ. NO:
0099

DATE:
02 July 1970

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
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21 MAR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of Defense-
National Agency Check Center
ATTN: Chief, Personnel Security Branch

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: OVON BOLSCHWING, Otto Albrecht Alfred
DOB: 15 October 1909
POB: Schonbruch, Germany
CIT: United States

1. Reference is made to your requests dated 2 and 28 July 1970 concerning Subject (CIA Batch Number 0173, Sequence Number 0099).

2. The following information was furnished by Subject himself; some of the biographical data has been confirmed by other sources. (Comment: It should be noted that Subject's information did not reveal the full extent of his Nazi Party affiliations.)

- a. Subject stated that in March 1932 he encountered difficulty in obtaining the German Government's consent for the building of a cement factory in East Prussia. Upon advice that Subject come to an arrangement with the "coming" Nazi Party, he agreed to apply for Party membership, considering his application a mere formality. In 1934 when Subject was in Palestine, he learned of his acceptance by the Party but did not participate in any Party activities, and was subsequently rebuked by the Auslandsorganization (coordinated branches of the Nazi Party formed outside of Germany and included Germans permanently or temporarily resident abroad) for his non-participation.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)


- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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FILE IN []




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On Subject's return to Germany in 1935, he was refused representation of a Middle East firm because he had failed to comply with Party directives. Through family contacts, Subject procured his Party membership book by paying the fees back to 1932. Subject left Germany for Switzerland and from there wrote letters to the deputy Party chief demanding an investigation. On his return to Germany in 1937, Subject was informed that he had been cleared (Subject claimed that this "clearance" came through a friend for whom he had done some favors in the Middle East). Subject was arrested in the winter of 1937/38 and again later in 1938 and was accused of pro-Jewish sympathies. In both instances, Subject was freed due to friends' intervention and payoffs by Subject. In 1939 Subject was told that he should accept the position of chief of intelligence ad interim in Romania if he wanted to protect himself. In April 1940, Subject became "Untersturmfuehrer" (Company Commander) in the Schutz Staffel (SS), and two promotions were given him between then and early 1941. From 1939-February 1941 he was in Romania as chief of Party Security and Intelligence Service (SD) under Foreign Office cover. Subject got into serious trouble because of his disagreement with the Party on its policy toward the Romanian Iron Guard and several months later he was sent on an intelligence mission to Greece where he disputed the Party's automatic arrest policy. Subject was then relieved of his command and sent to Berlin. Through the influence of an SS General, he was assigned to intelligence work in Holland in August 1941 where he claims to have tried to establish a line with Portugal to make direct contact with Western intelligence. When the afore-mentioned SS General fell into disgrace, Subject was recalled to Berlin and was put under watch by the Gestapo. In September 1942, Subject was arrested by the Gestapo and remained under

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
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arrest until April 1943. He claimed that, during this time, it was discovered that he had never actually been an SS member and that his Party membership was "more than dubious." Subject was then demoted and discharged from the SS. (Subject claimed that this was a face-saving move by the SS.) Subject stated that he was never in the pay of the SS or the Party and that both his Party and SS memberships were fraudulent, procured by bribery as self-protection both politically and materially. Subject claimed that he attempted to thwart Nazi aims from within. All Subject's identification and personal documents were confiscated upon his arrest and were never returned. Subject later fled to Tyrol, Austria, where he worked in a resistance group. Subject reported for registration with the city magistrate of Salzburg, Austria, as an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer, but, according to a decision of 9 February 1950, was exempted from registration because of his Austrian resistance activities, and his full civil rights were re-instated.

3. In a report dated 28 September 1953 from a source whose reliability can no longer be established, it was noted that subsequent to World War I Subject proceeded to the Near East where he engaged in business along with one ^{Walter} BORMANN. The business was believed to have been concerned with construction materials and was located in Haifa, Palestine. It was also reported that in 1936, Subject acted as an SD agent. In 1937 Subject was expelled from Palestine by the British authorities, possibly on the basis of his intelligence activities for the German Government. Subject then proceeded to Berlin, Germany, and collaborated with the SD and the Abwehr offices, and later worked for the Foreign Affairs Department (AMT VI) of the German Security and Intelligence (RSHA) in Romania, Greece and Holland. After Subject's release in 1943, he went to Vienna, Austria, where he engaged in the direction of a firm known as PHARMACHEMIE, a medical supply

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establishment which was reportedly utilized by the Abwehr office in Vienna as a cover for its activities. At that time, Subject reportedly functioned as an agent of Section I-M of the Abwehr office, Vienna, and for the Naval Intelligence Section of the same Headquarters. The SS Officers' list noted Subject as having been appointed an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer on 30 June 1941. After the cessation of hostilities, Subject was denounced by a source believed to be reliable, as a member of the notorious SD Sonderkommando "EICHMANN."

4. From the end of 1945-1946 Subject worked for the United States Military Government in the area of southern Bavaria. From 1947-1954 Subject was employed in intelligence activities sponsored by this Agency, and at that time, this Agency was unaware of the extent of Subject's Nazi background.

5. Following the Israeli arrest of Adolf EICHMANN, this Office undertook a detailed examination of captured documents bearing on EICHMANN's activities, and, as a result, discovered that Subject had concealed most aspects of his Nazi Party membership and his RSHA activities. In the years prior to, and early in the War, Subject was a principal agent of the RSHA and was definitely working under EICHMANN's direction. It appears that by 1938 EICHMANN directed at least one or two specific phases of Subject's work. The records indicate that Subject's activity dealt with the manipulation of Jewish properties away from their owners in connection with remigration proceedings. As yet, nothing connects Subject with EICHMANN's more serious crimes and it is still unclear as to how far into the War years Subject's collaboration with EICHMANN extended. The most significant single fact revealed was that, at least in the years prior to the War, Subject was a principal agent of Department II, Section II2 of the RSHA.

6. Subject has been identified in two books on EICHMANN. Subject was mentioned in Toviah FRIEDMAN's book, The Hunter, as a principal agent of the "Jewish Department" and in Quentin REYNOLD's Minister of Death he was named as the assistant to the head of German intelligence in Palestine in 1937. The latter book ascribes to Subject

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the role of getting "acquainted with members of the Haganah (at that time, a Jewish underground organization) in hopes of finding some who would work with the Gestapo."

CSCI-316/02569-70

RID/CE: JKS/JB/jaw

BASED ON: []
EAVA-3801
9 July 1953

EASA-2171
28 September 1953

Memorandum dated 10 April 1961

FILE IN: []

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13 NOV 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: PCS/PGL
ATTENTION:
FROM: Chief, Operations Group
SUBJECT: Name Trace and Records Search--
Colonel Boris T. Pash;
Otto brecht Alfred Von Bolshwing;
Artur Adolf Konradi; and
Dr. Heinrich Graf Von Meran (Merna)
REFERENCES: A. OGC 78-5719 dated 29 August 1978 (C)
B. United States Department of Justice
(INS) Memorandum dated 18 July 1978

1. (S) An intensive search of the files of this Directorate revealed the following information on the individuals listed in the above references.

A. Colonel Boris T. Pash

There is no indication that PASH ever had contact with Bishop Valerian Trifa and no indication in Trifa's file that PASH was a contact of or even known to Trifa. PASH was interested in the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in San Francisco, California, and in May 1971 he alerted this Agency, after his return to active Army duty, of his concern that the ROC was possibly penetrated by Soviet intelligence. You may wish to contact the FBI for further information on Subject. PASH was a military detailee of this Agency from 1951 to 1953 and returned to active duty after that time. You

DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246

By: WAC Date: 8/30/5

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(C) Foreign Relations

FOR COORDINATION WITH DOJ/OSI RP

SENSITIVE

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003, 2005

IMPDET CL BY

may wish to consult U.S. Army files for further information regarding his active duty. As of May 1971 PASH's address was:

California

This search has revealed no indication whether Colonel PASH would be willing to speak truthfully or otherwise, to the U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service.

B. Artur Adolf Konradi

KONRADI was a German intelligence chief in Romania from 1938 to 1940. The latest information on KONRADI was from the British Army Prisoner of War interrogators which indicated that in 1946 KONRADI was in Dusseldorf, Germany, address Finkenweg 46, Dusseldorf, Bissingheim. KONRADI was never contacted or debriefed by this Agency. There is no information on his German intelligence contacts in Romania.

C. Dr. Heinrich Graf Von Meran (Merna)

MERAN has been described as secretary of the German Legation and a German agent during World War II in France, Turkey, and Austria. The files reflect no post-1944 information or address, and therefore no indication whether MERAN is still living.

D. Otto brecht Alfred Von Bolshwing

As of this date we have surfaced two CI memoranda which we are prepared to make available to the Department of Justice via

however, because this individual was involved in illegal activities, guidance from the Office of General Counsel is required. There are approximately two linear feet of information on BOLSHWING, most of which concerns operational matters that are not directly related to

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your request. Information on BOLSHWING will follow in a separate memorandum.

2. (U) The processing of this case was closely coordinated with [] On 27 October 1978 he reviewed all the DO information surfaced as a result of this search and specifically requested the above information be included in this memorandum.

[]

- RDS

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 79-01118
2 February 1979

Mr. Martin Mendelsohn, Esq.
Chief, Special Litigation Unit
Immigration and Naturalization Service
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20536

Dear Marty:

Re: Otto Albrecht Alfred Von Bolschwing (U)

As we discussed in our meetings of 27 December 1978 and 18 January 1978, our files indicate that Von Bolschwing may not have been totally frank when he neglected to mention past membership in the Nazi Party on his Naturalization Application. According to his "Application to File Petition for Naturalization," dated 4 February 1959, at paragraph 13, he has never been a member of the Nazi Party. Our records, however, indicate that he may have been a member of the Nazi Party for several years, with the membership number of 984212. (S)

Von Bolschwing has commented in writing on this period, and his position seems to be that his Party membership was either erroneous or fraudulent, or both. Nevertheless, our records do indicate that he may have been a Party member, and this would in turn indicate that he may have violated Title 18 of the U.S. Code by failing to note this on his application. (S)

As always, we are available to discuss this matter further and in greater detail, at your convenience. (U)

Sincerely,

[]
Office of General Counsel

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

FOR COORDINATION WITH

DOJ/OSI

ppp

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

ORIGINAL CL BY []

DECL REVW ON _____

EXT BYND 6 YRS BY []

REASON 3d(3) and (5)

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- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536
February 28, 1979

OGC 79-0199:

3-1-79

PLEASE ADDRESS REPLY TO

AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.

SECRET

MAR 9 8 45 AM '79

Mr. Anthony Lapham
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Lapham:

On February 27, 1979, Eugene M. Thirolf and I met with C and C of your office to discuss allegations against Otto Albrecht Alfred von Bolschwing.

As a result of that meeting, I am requesting that you give us access to and, where appropriate, turn over to us all material that relates to Mr. von Bolschwing and his activities as they may relate to his violation of federal law.

Your continued cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Martin Mendelsohn (SM)

Martin Mendelsohn
Chief, Special Litigation Unit

FOR COORDINATION WITH DOJ/OSI

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

12 March 1979

MAR 12 3 05 PM '79

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

FROM : C J
Office of General Counsel

FOR COORDINATION WITH DOJ/OSI

SUBJECT : Otto Albrecht Alfred Von Bolschwing -
Possible Violation of 18 USC 1001
and 1015 (False Statements to the
U.S. Government) (S)

1. The attached letter to Martin Mendelsohn of the Justice Department Special Litigation Unit has been prepared for your signature. Because of the possible significance of this case, I felt you should be advised of the details. (U)

2. In July of 1978, Mr. Mendelsohn was considering using Von Bolschwing as a witness against Valerian Trifa in U.S. v. Trifa. Trifa is believed to be a Nazi war criminal who falsified his naturalization papers when he emigrated to the United States. Mendelsohn is instituting "quasi-criminal" denaturalization proceedings against him. Mendelsohn knew of Von Bolschwing's membership in the Nazi Party, but evidently felt he could be a useful witness. On 18 July 1978 Gene Thirolf of Mendelsohn's office wrote the Agency, requesting a name trace on a number of potential witnesses, including Von Bolschwing. (S)

3. The DDO search turned up the following information. Von Bolschwing worked for the U.S. Military Government from 1945-46 in southern Bavaria. He worked in intelligence activities sponsored by CIA from 1947-54. The U.S. Government at that time was not aware of the extent of his Nazi background. When Adolph Eichmann was arrested in 1960, C J of CI/R&A discovered evidence in captured German documents indicating that Von Bolschwing had concealed the extent of his Nazi Party membership, and also his connections with Adolph Eichmann, from the U.S. Government. The Agency apparently became aware of these facts in 1961. (S)

4. Early in the war, Von Bolschwing had worked under Eichmann, evidently in connection with the confiscation of Jewish properties. There is no evidence that he was involved in Eichmann's more villainous activities. (S)

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5. Throughout his association with the Agency, Von Bolschwing has described himself as an opportunistic businessman who acquired his Nazi Party membership and military position through bribery, fraud, extortion and family connections. He paints the picture of a man who has survived, and possibly prospered, by continually duping and victimizing the hapless Nazis and the oafish Gestapo, something along the lines of a "Hogan's Heroes" episode. He recounts how he had been continually warned and arrested by the Gestapo, only to be released through bribery and connections, all the while working to thwart Nazi aims from within. Although Von Bolschwing's story sounds a bit self-serving, the Agency apparently had no concrete information to contradict it until 1961, following the Eichmann arrest. (S)

6. [] of DDO and I agreed that we would have to advise the Justice Department of Von Bolschwing's activities, and of their scope, and I did so in my letter of 2 February 1979 to Mr. Mendelsohn and in the meeting with Messrs. [] Mendelsohn, and Thirolf on 27 February 1979. At that meeting, Mendelsohn and Thirolf were given the details concerning Von Bolschwing's activities. The next day, Mendelsohn sent a letter formally requesting access to our records. (S)

7. It now appears that the Justice Department is viewing Von Bolschwing more as a defendant than a witness. In the event Von Bolschwing is prosecuted in the quasi-criminal denaturalization proceedings, and his past relationship with the Agency becomes public knowledge, the Agency will likely be criticized on three grounds:

(1) It is possible that the Agency either knew or should have known in 1947 of Von Bolschwing's Nazi activities from captured German documents;

(2) The Agency discovered in 1961 that Von Bolschwing had worked under Eichmann and had possibly falsified his naturalization papers, yet remained silent; and

(3) According to the Chief of CIA's Eastern Europe Division, in a memorandum dated 10 May 1961, Von Bolschwing "was assisted in his immigration and naturalization [in 1954 and 1959] by CIA..."

The obvious questions will then arise: Did the Agency know the full extent of Von Bolschwing's activities in 1947? Were captured German documents in Berlin concerning Von Bolschwing examined in 1947? If not, why not? If so, did they describe Von Bolschwing's activities? Why did the Agency remain silent in 1961 when Von Bolschwing's relationship with Eichmann was discovered? And what was the extent of Agency "assistance" to Von Bolschwing when he emigrated to the United States? Did the Agency encourage him to omit his Nazi Party membership from his application? Was a secret arrangement made with INS in 1959? (S)

8. We should also anticipate discussions with the Justice Department in the near future concerning the amount and nature of information that can be declassified for prosecution. Classified information that might be relevant to the case would include information relating to CIA liaison with INS, the identities of possible witnesses, and the text of CIA records on Von Bolschwing (which measure approximately two linear feet). (S)

9. The DDO will be advising the DCI of the situation in a DDO Spot Report. (S)

[]

Attachment

MJB/rs

Distribution:

Orig - OGC SUBJ: LIAISON-GOVERNMENTAL
1 - MJB Signer
1 - OGC Chrono

RPS

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

SPOT REPORT

SUBJECT: Request from Department of Justice to review Operational Files on Otto Von Bolschwing
DATE: 12 March 1979

1. This is to inform you that on 1 March 1979 the General Counsel received a request from the Department of Justice to review certain operational files on Otto Von Bolschwing, a U.S. citizen of German origin who from 1947 to 1954 was engaged in intelligence activities in Vienna, Austria sponsored by this Agency. OGC has forwarded this request to the DDO. The request was in response to an earlier OGC memorandum to Justice Department, itself responding to a name trace and records search which noted that in Subject's "Application to File Petition for Naturalization," dated 4 February 1959 he neglected to mention his past membership in the Nazi Party. Justice wishes to review pertinent files to investigate possible violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code by failing to note this on his application.

2. A cursory review of the operational files indicates that from the end of 1945-46, Subject worked for the United States Military Government in southern Bavaria. He was picked up by the Austrian Station in 1947 for whom he worked under Army cover until his immigration to the United States with Agency assistance. Whereas the Station was not aware of his Nazi Party membership at the time he was picked up, in 1949 at our request Von Bolschwing wrote his autobiography outlining the circumstances of his Nazi Party membership. A thorough analysis of the files will be required to determine if there is information in them that reveals why Subject did not report this at the time of naturalization proceedings. Information pertinent to Justice's interest will of course be provided for their review.

3. A copy of this report is being made available to the Assistant for Public Affairs in the event public attention is drawn to this case as a result of the current effort by the Justice Department and Congress to denaturalize some alleged Nazi war criminals. It should be emphasized that available information does not connect Subject with war crimes, but the possibility of adverse press treatment cannot be precluded.

FOR COORDINATION WITH DoJ/OSI

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003, 2005

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OGC 79-02371
12 March 1979

Mr. Martin Mendelsohn
Chief, Special Litigation Unit
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Washington, D.C. 20536

Dear Mr. Mendelsohn:

I am in receipt of your letter of 28 February 1979, in which you requested access to all materials relating to the possible violation of Federal criminal laws by Otto Albrecht Alfred Von Bolschwing. This request was generated by a letter to you from Michael Barrett of my Office, in which he reported that Mr. Von Bolschwing may have falsified his application for naturalization in 1959 by failing to mention his past membership in the Nazi Party.

Please be advised that, in conformance with section 1-706 of Executive Order No. 12036, we will provide you with complete access to the requested materials relating to Mr. Von Bolschwing. Mr. Barrett will be pleased to provide you with the information at your convenience.

Sincerely,

[]

Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel

All portions of this document are classified "Secret."

FOR COORDINATION WITH DOJ/OSI

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Date: 2003, 2005

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S E C R E T

13 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: [Office of General Counsel]

FROM: [IMS/FOIA, Privacy and Litigation Group]

SUBJECT: Department of Justice Investigation of Alleged Nazi War Criminals - Otto Albrecht Von Bolschwing

REFERENCE: DDO/CS 79-068, 12 March 1979, Subject: Request from Department of Justice to Review Operational Files on Otto Albrecht Von Bolschwing

1. On 30 and 31 July and 2 and 9 August 1979, Mr. Jeffrey N. Mausner, Office of Special Investigations, Department of Justice, met with yourself and the undersigned to review the Directorate of Operations (DO) files on Otto Albrecht Von Bolschwing.

2. Mr. Mausner took notes from selected documents from the Von Bolschwing file. These notes have been sanitized to remove references to the location of CIA installations, to the identities of Agency personnel and to intelligence methods. These sanitizations were discussed with Mr. Mausner and our reasons for making them were explained to him.

3. Attached for forwarding to Mr. Mausner are the following items:

- a. One letter to Mr. Martin Mendelsohn, Department of Justice, dated 2 February 1979, and one copy of a File Status report on Von Bolschwing dated March 1979. Both of these items, classified Secret, were hand-carried to the CIA Headquarters building by Mr. Mausner and should be returned to him.

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DoJ/OSI

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- b. One set of captured German documents dated 1939, 1940 and 1941 which had been located in the Berlin Document Center. These documents are considered to be unclassified.
- c. One xerox copy of Mr. Mausner's sanitized notes. All of these notes are classified Secret. The information concerning polygraph testing, contained on pp. 24 and 28 of these notes, has been coordinated with [] OS/SAG, who agreed that it may be sent to Mr. Mausner in classified form.
- d. One copy of notes concerning Von Bolschwing which were taken from the German Primer. This information was received from a foreign intelligence service and is classified Secret.

4. Mr. Mausner has been informed verbally and should be reminded in writing that attachments C and D are being forwarded to him under the following caveats:

- a. This material is classified Secret and is for his background use only;
- b. This material may NOT be used in any litigation without prior approval from this office;
- c. This material may NOT be reproduced and is to be returned to this office when his investigation is ended.

Attachments: a/s

6 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Otto Von Bolschwing - Research into Eichmann 201 File in Response to DOJ Request

The following files were searched in an effort to find captured German documents pertaining to Otto Von Bolschwing:

- Eichmann 201 file including bulky documents. The only document which refers to subject in Eichmann's 201 file is already in Von Bolschwing's file. The document is an undated (but presumably 1960) Memorandum for the Record concerning information retrieved from German documents as a result of the Eichmann case. There are six transmittal memoranda in an RJ series which forwarded captured German documents pertaining to Eichmann to the Israeli service: RJ's 1974, 1964, 1956, 2110, 2090 and 2913 - June-October 1960). Copies of the attachments are not in the files. In early 1978, the RJ files, which had been maintained by CI/ITG, were given to the Israeli Desk who screened them, incorporated documents found relevant into 201 files and destroyed the rest. The Israeli Desk has a microfiche record of all the RJ's but not of these particular attachments. It is possible that the attachments never went into the file in the first place. There is no indication of whether a copy was kept or not.

- Archives' files containing captured German documents had already been given to the IMS/FOIA, Privacy and Litigation Group in response to a previous request to CI Staff. Pertinent archives files were again retrieved, using a machine listing number of titles which CI Staff provided. Remaining archives files (which had not gone to National Archives) which were searched were a file of index cards which contained neither Eichmann's nor Von Bolschwing's name and a correspondence file from 1960-1972 which contained CI leads developed from captured German documents. The only reference in their file to either Eichmann or Von Bolschwing was the previously cited 1960 Memorandum for the Record.

- Complete traces were run on Eichmann and Archives' documents resulting were also searched. None had any information on Von Bolschwing.

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- 201 files on other individuals mentioned in correspondence pertaining to Eichmann were reviewed. Files checked were those of Martin Bormann [] Heins Jost [] Leopold Von Mildenstein [] and Dr. Albert Six [] . None contained any information on Von Bolschwing.

[]

cc: []

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NOT HOWEVER USED ANY OF OUR INFORMATION AS EVIDENCE. CASE IS EXPECTED TO COME BEFORE A JUDGE IN MID-JUNE.

5. FILE: ^{CFS} RVW 3 JUNE 01, DRV D9C.1. ALL
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END OF MESSAGE

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD		DATE 6 Dec. 1987
SUBJECT U.S. v Otto Albrecht Von Bolschwing (Denaturalization proceedings)		FILE NUMBER []
<p>The following from [] (OGC Attorney) this afternoon: Rodney Smith (Dept. of Justice Attorney prosecuting this case) called this afternoon to say that Von Bolschwing has turned in his naturalization card. Since DOJ does not intend to move for deportation (Von Bolschwing is in a nursing home in sacramento) this case is now closed.</p>		
FOR COORDINATION WITH <u>DOJ/OSI</u>		
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(C) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>		
		Declassified and Approved for Release by the Central Intelligence Agency Date: 2003, 2005
OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE	
[]	[]	

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-14

THE NEW YORK TIMES
23 December 1981

Ex-Nazi SS Officer Loses Citizenship but Is Allowed to Stay in U.S.

SACRAMENTO, Calif., Dec. 22 (AP) — A Federal court today stripped United States citizenship from a former Nazi SS captain who served as an adviser to Adolf Eichmann, but the court allowed him to stay in the United States because he suffers from an incurable "progressive neurological condition."
District Judge Milton Schwartz ordered Otto von Bolschwing, 72 years old, to surrender his naturalization papers, ruling that he lied to the authorities when he obtained citizenship in 1959 in New York. However, the judge approved an agreement worked out by the defense and Federal prosecutors and allowed Mr. von Bolschwing to stay in this country.

Federal agents contended that Mr. von Bolschwing "devised ways of dealing with the Jews of Europe, including methods of persecution" when he worked as an assistant to Eichmann, who had a principal role in the extermination of the Jews.

Admits Nazi Affiliations

In the agreement, Mr. von Bolschwing admitted he had been a Nazi Party member and an officer in the Nazi intelligence service and the SS, a quasi-military unit of the Nazi Party used as special police. But he has also contended that he worked for American Intelli-

gence during and after World War II. That claim went unanswered by the Government, and spokesmen have refused official comment on it.

The agreement, which says Mr. von Bolschwing "persecuted innocent people in the 1930's and 1940's," also calls for annual medical examinations of Mr. von Bolschwing and, if his condition improves, "the Government's options remain open" to prosecute again. His illness was identified in court as "supra nuclear palsy," a rare brain disease.

Served as Eichmann's Aide

In the accord, Mr. von Bolschwing admitted serving as Eichmann's adviser on the persecution of Jews, which "included the complete exclusion of Jews from German economic life;" serving as the chief of the security service of SS in Bucharest in 1940 and 1941, where he persecuted Jews; lying about his Nazi past and hiding his links to the SS when he applied for United States citizenship.

Mr. von Bolschwing, who currently receives medical care in a suburban Sacramento nursing home, was not in court when Judge Schwartz issued the ruling. His attorney, Arthur Ruthenbeck, said Mr. von Bolschwing had seen the document.

"We went over it line by line," Mr. Ruthenbeck said.

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Date: 2001, 2005

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file: []

**Otto von Bolschwing;
Ex-Captain in Nazi SS**

SACRAMENTO, Calif., March 9 (AP) — Otto von Bolschwing, a former German SS captain who voluntarily surrendered his United States citizenship last year after a Justice Department investigation of his Nazi past, died Sunday in a Sacramento hospital. He was 72 years old.

Mr. von Bolschwing had been suffering from progressive supranuclear palsy, a rare and incurable brain disease.

Mr. von Bolschwing, who emigrated to the United States in 1954 and became a naturalized citizen in 1959, had contended that he was a double agent in World War II, aiding American Army intelligence units while holding sensitive high-ranking posts in the Sicherheitsdienst, the elite SD foreign intelligence arm of the SS, a quasi-military unit of the Nazi Party.

Because of Mr. von Bolschwing's deteriorating health, the Justice Department agreed to allow him to remain in the United States after he surrendered his citizenship last December.

After becoming a United States citizen, he had a wide-ranging business career. He served as a high-ranking official in international marketing at the Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Company and served as an international business consultant to TCI, an advanced technology concern in the Sacramento and San Jose areas that went bankrupt in 1971.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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NEW YORK TIMES
WEDNESDAY, 10 MARCH 82

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Date: *2001, 2005*

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-5

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
9 NOVEMBER 1982

Former Nazi reportedly had U.S intelligence ties

SACRAMENTO, Calif. (AP) — A former Nazi SS captain who died this year after giving up his U.S. citizenship said in newly released documents that he worked for several U.S. intelligence agencies, the Sacramento Bee reported.

The documents, obtained by the newspaper through the Freedom of Information Act, also show that Otto von Bolschwing admitted in 1970, long after he was granted U.S. citizenship, that he had had ties with Adolf Eichmann, since executed for war crimes.

Von Bolschwing had been charged with concealing his Nazi Party membership when applying for U.S. citizenship.

Von Bolschwing died March 7, 1982, at age 72. He had voluntarily given up his U.S. citizenship in an agreement under which he would not be deported as long as his health was bad. He suffered from supra nuclear palsy, a rare and incurable brain disease.

Nazi-hunters in this country had accused him of war crimes, including the persecution and forced emigration of Jews, and encouraging the 1941 Iron Guard rebellion in Romania, during which Jews were killed.

But Von Bolschwing was not allowed to reply to the charges in public because the U.S. Department of Justice had obtained a court order sealing his answer — the government apparently

feared revealing military secrets.

Von Bolschwing contended that he aided U.S. intelligence agencies during and after World War II. Justice Department documents carry testimony saying the Central Intelligence Agency had instructed him to keep secret his activities prior to applying for citizenship in 1945.

The Bee reported that it obtained a copy of an interrogation conducted on Dec. 22, 1970, in which Von Bolschwing admitted ties with the Nazi Party, the elite SS corps and Eichmann.

In the interrogation, he said he fell out of favor with the Nazis in 1942, was arrested by the Gestapo and held seven months without charges. Later he moved to Vienna where he acquired a small business.

After the July 1944 attempt on Adolf Hitler's life, a friend warned that he was to be arrested. Von Bolschwing said he fled to the Tyrol and hid in a mountain hut in the Otz Valley until U.S. forces arrived.

After the war, Von Bolschwing said he worked for several U.S. intelligence agencies. He said he came to the United States in 1954 with his son Gus, now a San Francisco attorney.

In 1959, Von Bolschwing became a U.S. citizen, and started a career as a financial officer and consultant. His health began deteriorating during the 1970s.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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