

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
CHINESE DIVISION

13 November 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. S. Horwitz  
FROM : Judge Che-Chun Hsiang  
SUBJECT : Summary of Case against DOHIMARA, Kenji

Pursuant to Col. Fixel's Memorandum dated 23 September 1947, I am sending you herewith a copy of the summary of the case against DOHIMARA, Kenji, prepared by several members of this Division headed by Judge Kwei. This summary will necessarily be revised as further prosecution documents mostly concerning the accused DOHIMARA, such as IFS Doc. 1767-A, 1-25, are to be offered in evidence from time to time during the cross-examinations of other accused and/or their witnesses.

*CCHsiang*  
Che-Chun Hsiang

Copies for: Col. Fixel  
✓ Mr. Sutton

SUMMARY OF THE CASE AGAINST DOHIMARA, Kenji

Charged under Counts:

1-5, 6-17, 18-19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,  
25, 26, 27-36, 37-38, 39, 40-41, 42, 43,  
44, 51-52, 53-55.

1. DOHJHARA's Activities Prior to the Manchurian Incident

DOHJHARA had spent almost eighteen years in China prior to the Mukden Incident (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15723) and was an expert on China. (MINAMI, R. 19995) He was particularly familiar with the situation in Manchuria where, in 1928, he served as aide to Matsui, Nanao, adviser to the Chinese authority, General Chang Tso-lin. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15722) Although it was said that he believed in the friendly relations between Japan and China (SHIBAYAMA, R. 28629-30), such alleged belief was not, however, substantiated by later events in which DOHJHARA played an active part. What he actually intended to carry out was, in conspiracy with the accused OKAWA, HASHIMOTO, KOISO, ITAGAKI and other army officers, to seize Manchuria for Japan and to place the Japanese Government under army control. Such intentions were proved by the March Incident and the October Incident; the former occurring before and the latter after the Mukden Incident. (Exh. 2177-A, R. 15563-87)

In August 1931, when the tension began to mount in Manchuria, DOHJHARA was appointed the Chief of the Special Service Organ of the Kwantung Army with his office at Mukden. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15713-4) He arrived at Mukden on 18 August 1931. His particular assignment was to investigate the Case of Capt. NAKAMURA and to negotiate with the Chinese authorities on the matter. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15713-4) DOHJHARA continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution, (Lytton Report, Exh. 57, P. 65) despite the fact that the sincerity of General Chang Hsueh-liang was admitted by DOHJHARA's colleague. (SHIBAYAMA, R. 28642)

Early in September 1931, reports came to Tokyo that ITAGAKI and other staff officers of the Kwantung Army, in view of the tardy progress of NAKAMURA's case, were scheming to start actions in Manchuria. (MINAMI, R. 19821, 19827; ITAGAKI, R. 30343) DCHIHARA was summoned to Tokyo. He was quoted by the press as the advocate of a solution of all pending issues in Manchuria, if necessary by force and as soon as possible. (Lytton Report, Exh. 57, P. 66)

2. DCHIHARA's Part in the Mukden Incident

Although DCHIHARA himself was absent from Mukden on the night of 18 September 1931 when the Mukden Incident broke out, ITAGAKI was present at the office of DCHIHARA's Special Service Organ. (ITAGAKI, R. 30352) This Organ was an indispensable link in the chain of communication between the outposts and the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army. It had the exclusive possession of a special code by which communication to the Commander in Chief was made. (ITAGAKI, R. 30353) It was in the premises of this Organ that ITAGAKI approved the plan of SHIMAMOTO and HIRATA for attacking the Chinese and reported the same to HONJO who was then at Port Arthur. (Itagaki, R. 35355)

On the morning of 19 September 1931, the population of Mukden woke to find their city in the hands of Japanese troops. (Lytton Report, Exh. 57, P. 67) The Kwantung Army Headquarters moved into the occupied Mukden on the same morning. (ITAGAKI, R. 30265) Following his return from Tokyo, DCHIHARA was appointed on 21 September 1931 the Mayor of Mukden, assisted by an Emergency Committee with a majority of Japanese

members. (Lytton Report, Exh. 57, P. 88) This was the first time that an officer in active service in the Japanese Army took charge of the civil administration of a Chinese city under Japanese military occupation. It directly violates the Cabinet decision of non-establishment of military administration reached on 21 September 1931, (MINAMI, R. 19878, 19879) in spite of MINAMI's contention that the temporary military administration was unavoidable because of the acute state of disorder in the city of Mukden and therefore the Cabinet decision was not carried out for a month or two. (MINAMI, R. 19879)

It was further contended that DOHJHARA, as Mayor of Mukden, did not interfere with the internal political affairs but was merely charged with the duty of restoring peace and order. (MINAMI, R. 20068) The evidence, however, shows that he was active on the Peace Preservation Committee and exercised a great deal of pressure on the Chinese officials left behind there. (Pu-Yi, R. 3962-3) In the latter part of September 1931, when the Self-Government Board was set up in Mukden to foster and aid the independence movement, DOHJHARA was in charge of the Special Services or Espionage Division and supplied much of the information about the attitude of the Chinese to ITAGAKI, the man who was to approve all the policies and activities of the Board. (KASAGI, R. 2793-4)

While occupying the post of Mayor of Mukden, DOHJHARA concurrently acted as the spokesman for General HONJO, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. (POWELL, R. 3212)

3. DOHJHARA's Plot of Abduction of Pu-Yi

Having paved the way for the independence of Manchuria, he made the

next move in securing a puppet for the regime. DOHARA headed the plot for the removal of Pu-Yi from Tientsin to Manchuria. (Exh. 294, R. 4378-80) He had been previously told by his Government, through KUWASHIMA, Consul-General at Tientsin, that the creation of an independent state in Manchuria at that time would raise a question as being contrary to Section 1, Article 1 of the Washington Nine Power Treaty and that since the whole population of Manchuria consisted of Chinese nationals the restoration of Emperor Hsuan Tung would be unpopular in Manchuria and would make it impossible for the Government to reach an understanding with China in the future. (Exh. 286, R. 4356-8) Nevertheless, DOHARA insisted upon carrying out the plan and told KUWASHIMA that in order to pretend that Japan had nothing to do with it, the Emperor would be landed ashore at Yingkow before that port would be frozen. (Exh. 289, R. 4364) DOHARA pointed out that the state of affairs in Manchuria was brought about solely by the activities of the military authorities there and that in case the enthronement of the Emperor became indispensable in order to save the situation, it would be outrageous for the Government to take action to prevent it. (Exh. 290, R. 4367) He went as far as to say that in case of government intervention, the Kwantung Army might be separated from the Government and accidents graver than the assassinations occurred in Tokyo might happen again in Japan Proper. (Exh. 290, R. 4367-9)

To materialize abduction, DOHARA discussed the matter with Pu-Yi in an interview with him, threatening him in various ways. (Lytton Report, Exh. 57, P. 77; Exh. 291, R. 4373; Exh. 292, R. 4375-6) He instigated an incident of intimidation in which a bomb was sent to Pu-Yi in a fruit

basket. (Goette, R. 3730; Pu-Yi, R. 4124) He even associated himself with various factions and subversive organizations in Tientsin and gave them 50,000 taels as working funds to foment a riot. (Exh. 300, R. 4395-6) The plan was to use the expected disorder as a smoke screen for the flight of Pu-Yi. (Exh. 300, R. 4379) On 8 November a riot was actually started in Tientsin and DOHIMARA succeeded in having the Emperor removed to Manchuria. (Exh. 300, R. 4395) Pu-Yi was at first placed under the "protective custody" of the Japanese army at Yingkow, but was later taken to Port Arthur. (Exh. 297, R. 4387-8; Exh. 298, R. 4390; Exh. 302, R. 4400) In Port Arthur he was placed under the protection of the administrative office of the Kwantung Leased Territory. (KATAKURA, R. 18975-6)

On 17 November 1931, Consul-General KUWASHIMA reported to the Foreign Ministry:

"The object of DOHIMARA's arrival in Tientsin, in which he embodied the intentions of the Kwantung Army, was in the speedy enticement of the former Emperor Hsuan Tung ..... For this matter he repelled all intervention and remonstrance ..... and finally caused a riot to occur on the 8th, but when he saw that it ended in a failure,.....he took the opportunity of the riot throughout the city and carried out resolutely the Emperor's passage to Manchuria.....I have fully talked with him ~~and~~ ~~was~~ not to commit such rash acts but it appears he is continuing plans to overthrow Chang and there is apprehension that he may start another incident in the Peiping-Tientsin area in the near future." (Exh. 300, R. 4394-7)

Although it was said that DOHIMARA's presence in Tientsin at the time of riot was purely accidental (MINAMI, R. 19909), the fact that Pu-Yi was taken away from Tientsin during the riot cannot be denied. Moreover, the second riot anticipated in the above report did take place at Tientsin on 26 November. (Lytton Report, Exh. 57, P. 76)

DOHIMARA introduced in evidence the record of his interview with the

Lytton Commission to show that he had nothing to do with Pu-Yi's acceptance or his going to Manchuria. (Exh. 31804, R. 28669) But he admitted on interrogation that the specific purpose for sending him to Tientsin was to contact Pu-Yi, while the details for the meeting were arranged by ITAGAKI. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15726-7) HONJO notified the Tientsin Garrison that they were not to hurry about the Emperor's coming to Manchuria. (Exh. 2196, R. 15740) ITAGAKI admitted that he was so ordered to send the telegram. (ITAGAKI, R. 30381-2)

DOKIYAMA, in carrying out the plan of abducting Pu-Yi to head the puppet Manchukuo, was not unaware of the illegal consequences. For he admitted on interrogation: "I know what the Nine Power Treaty is.....I know that it guarantees the sovereignty of China..... I know that, when I was sent to contact Pu-Yi." (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15730) He stated in explaining the situation that at that time Japan had made some proclamation about her attitude toward the Treaty. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15730) But if there were such a proclamation at that time, it was only the assurance given by Premier INUKAI to Ambassador Forbes in the latter part of December 1931 that Japan would never impair Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria but was presently protecting her nationals in that territory. (Exh. 191, R. 2255)

On 9 March 1932, Pu-Yi was installed Regent of Manchukuo. <sup>(Lytton Report, Exh. 57, R. 95)</sup> (R. 2775) His actions were controlled and dictated by the officers of the Kwantung Army. (TANAKA, R. 1999; MORISHIMA, R. 3024; Pu-Yi, R. 3977-84) The main political and administrative power of the Manchukuo Government rests in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers. (Lytton Report, Exh. 57, P. 106; Pu-Yi, R. 4021-5, 4028, 4031; OKADA, R. 1825)



4. DOHIMARA's Activities in North Manchuria

While a puppet in the person of Pu-Yi was being secured for Manchuria, the rest of Manchuria was gradually occupied. In November 1931, DOHIMARA was sent to Harbin to take over the office of Japanese special service (Exh. 57, P. 79). By this time the battle of Nonni Bridge was over and General Ma Chan-Shan, Commander of the Chinese troops, was withdrawing his troops to the North (POWELL, R. 3229-30). As a result of negotiations with DOHIMARA, General Ma accepted the position of War Minister in the Changchun puppet government which DOHIMARA helped set up (POWELL, R. 3231). Thereafter, General Ma telegraphed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek that his acceptance of the job was related to the receipt of a million dollars in gold from the Japanese source (POWELL, R. 3231-4).

ITAGAKI stated that Ma Chan-Shan was not the Governor of the Province of Heilungkiang at that time, but he was a man of real worth possessing his own troops (R. 30277). KATAKURA testified that ITAGAKI went to Harbin at that time and had an interview with Ma. After explaining Japan's intention, ITAGAKI succeeded in persuading Ma to accept the position (R. 18950). The negotiations leading to the development were conducted from DOHIMARA's office in the city of Harbin (POWELL, R. 3231).

With the establishment of the puppet state "Manchukuo" virtually placing the whole of Manchuria under the Japanese control, DOHIMARA was promoted Major General on 11 April 1932 (Exh. 104, R. 695).

5. DOHIIHARA's Control of Opium Traffic

Prior to the setting up of the Opium Control Board in 1935, the Mukden Special Service Organ headed by DOHIIHARA was in control of opium traffic. (TANAKA, R. 15856-7) While denying his knowledge of its connection with the opium traffic, MINAMI, however, admitted that "one of the reasons for abolishing the Special Service Department might have been that they were running the opium for their own profit, instead of for Manchukuo whom he wanted to have the profits, but his principal reason was to enable Manchukuo to conduct its administration." (MINAMI, R. 19975-6) The yearly revenue from the sale of opium in Manchuria alone was 20 million yen, and since 1935, this sum went to the Manchukuo Government. (TANAKA, R. 15858)

6. DOHIIHARA's Endeavor in Setting up Inner Mongolia Autonomy

Japan had completed the occupation of Manchuria in the spring of 1933, when the Tangku Truce was signed. (TANAKA, R. 2023-4)

In January 1935, MINAMI deemed it proper to enlarge the scope of the Tangku Truce and sent DOHIIHARA to negotiate with the Chahar Provincial authorities. (KAWABE, R. 20754-6) DOHIIHARA was given the assignment because he was in charge of information in that area, and because he was best suited for negotiating with the Chinese. (KAWABE, R. 20754-5)

Accordingly, DOHIIHARA made a trip to Chengteh to see the governor of Chahar Province and Prince Teh. His mission was to promote Inner Mongolia Self-Government. (Exh. 197, Cable 2, R. 2284) About that time an incident happened to have taken place in Chang Pei District alleging that four Japanese army officers were insulted by the Chinese. Numerous

Japanese demands were made on the Chahar Provincial Government by Hashimoto, Consul at Kalgan, in his talks with General Ching Teh-Shun. In the midst of Consular negotiation, the matter was referred to DOKIYAMA. (Ching, R. 2312) The negotiations conducted by DOKIYAMA brought about inter alia the following results:- (a) the units of the 29th Army be withdrawn from certain districts north of Chang Pei, (b) the Chinese thereafter refrain from migrating to and settling in the northern part of Chahar Province, (c) the Kuomintang Party activities be withdrawn from Chahar Province and (d) anti-Japanese institutions and acts<sup>bc</sup> banned. (Ching, R. 2313) The Chahar regime was henceforth placed under the control of Prince Teh with some Japanese civilians serving as advisers. (TANAKA, R. 2041) Before this agreement, the leading figure in Chahar was Sung Che-yuan; after that Prince Teh was made the most powerful man. (TANAKA, R. 2120) Thus the demilitarized zone created by the Tangku Truce was extended to a part of Chahar. (KAWABE, R. 20754-6) This agreement, though carried out under Japanese pressure, was never recognized by the Chinese Central Government. The Japanese, however, claimed that the negotiations had been carried on in a friendly manner. (KAWABE, 20756)

7. DOKIYAMA's Role in the Conspiracy to Estrange North China

DOKIYAMA and his co-conspirators now directed their attention to North China, attempting to oust the political power of the Chinese Government from both Chahar and Hopei. (Exh. 210, R. 2701-3) They openly declared that the political structure in North China did not satisfy the wishes of the Japanese. (Exh. 210, R. 2702)

In the earlier part of 1935, UMEZU demanded of General Ho Yin-ching that China should withdraw the Chinese military forces and local political parties from districts in North China where Japanese resided. (ISHIKAWA, R. 20787) As a result of pressure by the Japanese, General Ho accepted the terms on or about 10 June 1935, whereby the troops of General Yu Hsueh-chun, Provincial Governor, and of certain other Chinese generals were evacuated from Tientsin to the South, and the provincial capital was removed to Peiping. (Goette, R. 3748-9; Exh. 310, R. 3701-9)

After the provincial capital of Hopei was moved south, the Japanese brought more pressure upon General Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of Hopei-Chahar Political Council, demanding that he desert the Chinese Central Government and head the Autonomous Federation which was to include Sui-yuan, Chahar, Shantung, Hopei and Honan, covering some 600,000 square miles of territory having a population of 170,000,000, but General Sung did not give in. (Goette, R. 3750-1)

In September 1935 DOKIYAMA went to Peiping on MINAMI's order to help develop the independence movement in North China. (TANAKA, R. 2028)

On or about the 18th of November DOKIYAMA announced that if autonomy for the North China was not proclaimed, he was prepared to send five Japanese divisions into Hopei and six into Shantung and he fixed an ultimatum to expire at noon on the 20th of November. (KIYASHIMA, R. 29544-5) On the same day, DOKIYAMA informed the newspaper men assembled in Peiping that he expected a formal announcement of the new regime shortly. (KIYASHIMA, R. 29536; Exh. 3242-A, R. 29542) To back up DOKIYAMA's action, MINAMI

the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army at Changchun, actually issued on November 12 the mobilization order for his troops to be prepared by 15 November 1935 outside of the Great Wall for advancing into North China, and on November 16 even mobilized the air force to make preparations by November 20 for marching towards Peiping-Tientsin area. (Exh. 3317-A, R. 30392; Exh. 3318-A, R. 30394) Although MINAMI had previously characterized it as completely false (R. 19996), ITAGAKI had to admit the fact when the mobilization orders were introduced in evidence. (R. 30392-4)

Due to the efforts of DOHARA, two regimes in North China were brought about. One was the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government with Ying Ju-keng at the head, which was completely separated from the Nanking Government; the other was the Hopei-Chahar regime with Sung Che-yuan as leader, which was not completely separated from the Nanking Government but stood in collaboration with Japan. (TANAKA, R. 2029-31)

The East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government took over 22 districts in the demilitarized area covering 10,000 square miles. (Exh. 210, R. 2703; Goette, R. 3753) which were alleged to be within the geographical scope of the assignment and duty of the Japanese troops. (HASHIMOTO, R. 20666) This new puppet regime became the center of dope and commodity smuggling. (Goette, R. 3754)

From November 1935 to March 1936, DOHARA was adviser to the Hopei-Chahar Regime, his duties being to control its politics and economics in accordance with Japanese hopes. (TANAKA, R. 2037) About that time DOHARA returned to Mukden twice to report to MINAMI. (TANAKA, R. 2036) He told MINAMI that the Hopei-Chahar Regime and the East Hopei Regime,

though unsatisfactory, had been established and would more or less obey the demands of the Kwantung Army and that the North China Regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar Regime as its core. (TANAKA, R. 2036) MINAMI admitted that he heard of the formation of the Hopei-Chahar Regime from DOHARA. (MINAMI, R. 19994-5)

On 7 March 1936 DOHARA was promoted Lieutenant General by the Japanese Government in recognition of his services rendered to Japan in Inner Mongolia and North China. (Exh. 104, R. 696)

8. DOHARA's Activities after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident

In March 1937 DOHARA became Commander of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya in Japan. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15715) After the outbreak of hostilities at the Marco Polo Bridge on 7 July 1937, he returned to China with his 14th division and participated in the Peiping-Hankow drive. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15715)

He tried to prove, through his witness Yazaki, Watase, etc. that he was opposed to the war against China and that he loved, and was loved by, the Chinese but the evidence shows that he was the man who paved the way for Japanese aggression and as early as in 1934 had created in the minds of the Chinese people, such apprehension about himself as reflected in the following words in this report of his own organ: "In South China, to hear the names of Major Generals DOHARA and ITAGAKI is something like mentioning a tiger and causes people to turn pale." (Wazaki, R. 28680-1; Watase, R. 28692; Sakurai, R. 28704; Exh. 3177-A, R. 28618-9)

His success as a commander in the field was apparently not as brilliant as an instigator of political disturbances. From 18 June 1938 to 19 May 1939 he was summoned back to Japan and attached to the General Staff. (Exh. 104, R. 697) . But, in August 1938, he was once more sent to China to help establish the puppet government in Central China. (~~HS Doc. 2570-B~~) In trying to find a leader for the bogus Central Government, DOKIYAMA approached Tang Shao-I and Wu Pei-fu. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15716) His plan failed as a result of the assassination of Tang Shao-I and the flat refusal of Wu Pei-fu. (Exh. 2190-A, R. 15716) Reports to the Foreign Ministry on negotiations with Wang Ching-wei and other puppet Chinese leaders were all sent in the name of DOKIYAMA Kikan at Shanghai. (KAGAWA, R. 24101-9)

In May 1939 DOKIYAMA was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Army in Taosen, Manchuria. (Exh. 104, R. 697) When stationed at the border area of the East Manchuria, the machine gun units, mortar units and other units under his command were dispatched to Nomonghan area and took part in the battle against U.S.S.R. (Exh. 834, R. 8094-8102; Exh. 703, R. 7516; Exh. 705, R. 7527)

In June 1940, DOKIYAMA was a member of the Supreme War Council. On 18 April 1940 he was decorated with the Second Class of the Gold Golden Kite for meritorious service in the China Incident. (Exh. 104, R. 697-8)

On 28 April 1941, DOKIYAMA was promoted to full general and on 6 September 1941 was assigned as Chief of Air Inspectorate General. (Exh. 104, R. 698)

9. DOKIYAMA's Contribution to the Tri-Partite Pact

DOKIYAMA was considered by Germany as a man belonging to the immediate

group surrounding TOJO. (Exh. 1272, R. 11352, 11356-7)

And he was recommended for the German Grand Cross with the following citation:

"By constant close and friendly cooperation with the air attache, he has in a leading position contributed in the true sense of the Tri-Partite Pact, to the extension and deepening of the military alliance."

And on 1 October 1942 he received the Grand Cross of German Eagle from Hitler at German Embassy in Tokyo, on which occasion Ambassador Ott stated:

"We acknowledge your merits in having by your efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the War." (Exh. 2247, R. 16180)

10. DOHARA's Part in the Pacific War

When the Japanese staged the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and started the war of aggression against U. S., Britain, France, Thailand, etc. in December 1941, DOHARA was Chief of the Air Inspectorate General and concurrently Supreme War Councillor. (Exh. 104, R. 698) On 30 June 1941, he attended the meeting of the Council, presided over by TOJO in which candid views were exchanged regarding the fast moving international situation and the attitude to be taken by Japan. (Exh. 2246, R. 16179)

On 1 May 1943, he became Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army, which was apparently directed against the U. S. A. (Exh. 104, R. 698) On 22 March 1944 he was appointed Commander of the Seventh Area Army at Singapore and retained this position until 7 April 1945. This command embraced Malaya, Sumatra, Java and Borneo. (Exh. 104, R. 698; Exh. 2282, R. 16258; Exh. 2190-A, R. 15716) From 7 April to 25 August 1945, he was Commander of the 12th Area Army embracing the area around Tokyo



(Exh. 104, R. 698; Exh. 2282, R. 16258) concurrently holding the position of Commander of the East Area Army and Supreme War Councillor. (Exh. 104, R. 698)

11. DOHJHARA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR MALTREATMENT OF POW

DOHJHARA as Commander of the Eastern Area Army in September and October 1943 had jurisdiction over POW camps located around Tokyo. (Exh. 2282, R. 16257-8) During that time some sixty prisoners died from starvation and ill treatment at the Maotsu camp in Niigata Prefecture. (Strickland, R. 14272-3) There is evidence of DOHJHARA's visit to the said camp, but the conditions of the camp were not improved after his visit. (Strickland, R. 14273-6) From March 1944 to April 1945, while DOHJHARA was Commander of the Seventh Area Army at Singapore, there were many instances of mistreatment of war prisoners and civilian internees in Malaya, Sumatra, Java and Borneo. (Exh. 2282, R. 16258; Exh. 1422, R. 12529-36; Exh. 1513, R. 12915-26; Brien, R. 12882-91; Exh. 1703, R. 13604; Exh. 1917, R. 14197-9) The treatment of war prisoners and internees was improved a little after ITAGAKI inspected the camps in Singapore about May 1945. (Exh. 3312, R. 30218)

DEFENSE WITNESSES - DOMIHARA

DOC. NO.	NAME OF WITNESS	ATTORNEY	REPORT RECD.	EXAM. ATTORNEY
2054	SANADA, JOICHIRO ✓	(10)		
2116	(KURASHIMA) KUWATAMA, KAZUE ✓	(3)		
2052	KAWABE, TORASHIRO ✓	(11)		
2230	HATTORI, TAKUHIRO ✓	(8)		
2087	SHIBAYAMA, KANEHIRO ✓	(2)		
2098	AIZAWA, MAKOTO ✓	(1)		
2232	FUJII, HIROSHI ✓	(9)		
2053	YAZAKI, KANJU ✓	(5)		
2489	TATSUMI, YUICHI ✓	(12)		
2107	WATASE, RYOSUKE ✓	(6)		
1485	SAKURAI, TORUSABURO			
	SAKURAI 1485	(7)		
	when served			
(4)	By Doc 2437			

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

16 September 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : ✓ Chinese Division  
Col. Rowland W. Fixel

FROM : D. N. Sutton

SUBJECT: DOHIHARA Phase

Following our several conferences, I went over with Mr. Warren the several affidavits and documents on the order of proof in DOHIHARA's phase. I stated to him those to which we would not object and indicated where there was objection the portions of the document to which we were objecting. Since that time, he has twice conferred with me and has agreed in certain instances to eliminate portions of the affidavits to which we objected. There are several instances in which we could not agree and in order that there may be no misunderstanding I am sending you this memorandum setting out the points at which we have now arrived. I list the documents and affidavits in the order in which they appear on the order of proof.

Def. Doc. No. 2098 - AIZAWA  
No objection.

Def. Doc. No. 2087 - SHIBAYAMA  
We objected to the first two sentences at the top of page 2 and Mr. Warren agreed to eliminate these. In view of this, I stated that there would be no further objection to the affidavit.

Def. Doc. No. 2116 - KUWASHIMA  
We objected to the last two sentences of the affidavit and Mr. Warren agreed to eliminate them.

Note: He states that he will ask this witness one additional question concerning the authenticity of the reports received from Consular Police and that the witness will state they were of no value.

Pros. Exh. No. 245 -  
Reference will be made to this -- no objection.

Def. Doc. No. 2437 - Interview with Lord Lytton  
While we determined there would be no objection to this document, I kept the matter open and stated that we had not reached a final decision. If objections were made, they would be that it was a self-serving document, that it contained the opinion of Lord Lytton, and that it was a pre-

liminary matter concluded by the Lytton Report. Under all the circumstances, it is perhaps just as well to let it come in in view of the fact that it contains statements which may be considered contrary to the interrogation of DOHIHARA, Ex. No. 2190-A.

12 Def. Doc. No. 2053 - YAZAKI

There were four objections to this. Warren agreed to eliminate three and the fourth was left open.

- (a) On page 2, near the beginning of the paragraph at the middle of the page, the words "deeply regretted that it had come about and" will be omitted.
- (b) We could not agree on our objection to that portion of the affidavit beginning with "For example" on page 5 and continuing to the end of that page and the first four words on the next page. Mr. Warren explained that the phrase, "what could be expected" should read "what he said" and I told him that we would then make no objection to this, but we would object to the substance of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 which followed on the ground that these were the self-serving speeches of the defendant.
- (c) On our objection, Mr. Warren eliminated the two sentences, the first of which begins "Whenever trouble" at the middle of page 8.
- (d) On our objection, Mr. Warren agreed to eliminate the paragraph on page 8 which begins "Knowing General Dohihara".

NOTE Def. Doc. No. 2107 - WATASE

No objection. Mr. Warren reported a correction in line 4 of page 2; after "as nearly as" insert the words, "I can recall the conversation, General DOHIHARA in answer to my".

Def. Doc. No. 1498 - Article by DOHIHARA

Objected to as self-serving. We will follow what we ascertain to be the rule of the Court laid down in the ARAKI phase. Left open with no agreement.

7  
1 Def. Doc. No. 1485 - SAKURAI

We objected to sections 4 and 12. Mr. Warren agreed to eliminate both. No further objections.

ASAM Def. Doc. No. 2230 - HATTORI

No objections at present, with the right reserved to make any (if suggested by the USSR).

Def. Doc. No. 2232 - FUHA  
No objections.

Def. Doc. No. 2054 - SANADA  
No objections.

? Def. Doc. No. 2052 - KAWABE  
Two objections:


(1) From the sentence beginning "I observed" near the middle of page 1 to the end of that paragraph, on the ground that it was character evidence reciting the opinion of the witness and contains self-serving declarations. We reached no agreement on this. It was left open.

(2) We objected to the first two sentences of the paragraph on page 4 which begins "From my observations" and ends with "civilian politics." and agreed to eliminate these two sentences.

+ E Def. Doc. No. 2489 - TATSUMI  
No objections.

There will be no objection to the extracts from pages 79 and 88 of the Lytton Report, which he desires to read.

The revised order of proof recites that he desired to read from pages 14,277, commencing with the next to the last question on that page, through the second answer on page 14,278. The question of whether we would make any objection was left open. I see no harm to be done by allowing him to read this brief excerpt from the record.

  
D. N. Sutton

cc: Brig. Nolan  
Mr. Tavenner

9/15/47

To: Mr. D. H. Sutton  
From: Judge Judson Nyi  
Subject: Documents Relating to Doihara, Kenji

1. To-day the Tribunal has ruled that speeches of the accused and character evidence will not be received.

2. The last nine lines on page 1 of Shibayama's affidavit are clearly self-serving and should be objected to. I remember we discussed and agreed but did not include among other matters to which we are going to object.

3. The first eight lines on page 2 of the same affidavit are character evidence. They will naturally be excluded in accordance with today's ruling.

September 15, 1947

Judson Nyi

*J.N.*

OPENING STATEMENT

MR. PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL.

In presenting the case of the accused, DOHIHARA, Kenji, we have interrogated many witnesses and examined literally hundreds of documents, but in the interest of time we have discarded all of our contemplated evidence, both oral and written, except that which we feel is absolutely necessary. In accordance with the policy which we have thus established, we shall attempt to place our individual defense before the Tribunal as expeditiously as possible.

There has been produced, for the benefit of the Tribunal, a great deal of information apparently directed against the accused DOHIHARA. The prosecution has characterized this information as competent evidence, but a careful analysis will reveal that it is, in the main, either rank hearsay or an attempt to prove facts by innuendo, and in the opinion of counsel need not be answered. Consequently, we have limited ourselves to rebuttal evidence and such other explanatory evidence as we feel will be of most benefit to the Tribunal.

Evidence concerning the so-called Mukden Army Special Service Organ, which was headed by General DOHIHARA, was introduced in such a manner as to leave the impression that this organization was a far flung network; at all times engaged in nefarious and

underhanded practices. In order to meet this highly conjectural evidence, we will offer the affidavit of one AIZAWA, Makamoto, who will testify that he was employed as a civilian in this organization from December, 1935, until March, 1936, and that the accused DOHIHARA was his immediate superior. His testimony will disclose that in truth and in fact the Mukden Special Service Organ had only four clerks, of which he was one. He will outline in general to operations of that organ, and will describe its actual functions.

The prosecution has introduced evidence intending to show that General DOHIHARA was not only opposed to the Chinese people as such, but that he actively instigated incidents for the purpose of bringing about a clash of arms between the Chinese and Japanese nations. In support of this theory the prosecution produced one General Ching Teh-Chun, who testified, in substance, that he had held a conversation with a certain Shibayama in Chung-shan Park in Peking; that this Shibayama told him: "Dohihara is about to go to Manchuria to embark on some big project." This conversation is alleged to have taken place just prior to the Mukden Incident. We shall produce and offer to the Tribunal, by affidavit, the testimony of a witness by the name of Shibayama. He will testify, among other things, that after Gen. Ching testified, he called the witness Shibayama and informed him that he had used his name before the Tribunal. Furthermore he informed him in what connection his name had been used. This witness, if permitted to testify,



will deny that he ever had any such conversation with Gen. Ching at any time; that as a matter of fact, prior to 9 September 1931 he was in Tokyo in connection with the murder of one Captain Nakamura, Shintaro and that while there Gen. DOHIHARA was also in Tokyo making his report on the same case, and that it would have been quite impossible for him to have had any conversation with Gen. Ching at the time Gen. Ching testified the conversation took place.

In a further attempt to tie Gen. DOHIHARA into other activities in Manchuria, evidence was introduced in the form of several telegrams which <sup>i</sup>originated with one Kuwajima, Kazue, who was the then Consul General at Tientsin. On first examination, these telegrams apparently recite facts. The prosecution, however, did not offer the testimony of Kuwajima, Kazue, who prepared and caused to be transmitted the telegrams in question, but we will offer him as a witness. We will offer his testimony in order to show the true character of the evidence contained in the telegrams in question. If permitted to testify, Kuwajima will state, among other things, that the contents of the telegrams were based upon information gleaned from such sources as newspaper articles, rumor; in short, any information from whatever channels available. He will further state that the telegrams contained nothing but conclusions which he had drawn without having any personal knowledge of the alleged facts. This testimony will be offered to show to the Tribunal that if the evidence in ques-

tion had been offered by the prosecution in any other form, it could have been, and no doubt would have been rejected, on any of several grounds. In order to substantiate the testimony of the witness Kuwajima we will make brief reference to prosecution's exhibit 245, which is the affidavit of one Morishima, Moroto, a prosecution witness who was an Assistant Consul General. He states, concerning the transmission of such information as was contained in the telegrams introduced by the prosecution, that it was the duty of the Consulate officials to draw conclusions and to transmit them to the Foreign Office.

There is a great deal of evidence concerning alleged atrocities committed against the Chinese by Japanese forces, and while there is none directly attributed to the forces of the accused DOHIHARA, the inference is strong and it appears, by innuendo only, that the accused DOHIHARA was responsible for some of the acts. We will offer the testimony of several witnesses who were officers with Gen. DOHIHARA in the field, and we will offer the personal testimony of at least one newspaper correspondent who was in the field with him and who had an opportunity to observe his actions; listen to his counsel, and to inspect and become familiar with his orders concerning the treatment of the Chinese people. This testimony will show that Gen. DOHIHARA not only did not believe in armed hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese, but that he actually deplored the fact that such hostilities were being carried on; that he often cautioned and, when necessity arose,

reprimanded his subordinates with reference to the ill treatment of the Chinese people. We will offer a document which was written by the accused DOHIHARA and published in March, 1937, which will bear out the testimony of the witnesses as to his attitude and thoughts. This document will show that not only did he act in accordance with well defined principles, but that he also wrote about them and used whatever medium was at his disposal to inform the Japanese people of his thoughts. Our testimony will show that the Chinese people in the occupied territory under the command of the accused DOHIHARA came to trust him and continued in their occupations peacefully and without interference from Japanese troops. Evidence of this type will be introduced to show that he acquired and maintained a reputation among the masses of Chinese civilians for fair play and honest dealing. In this connection we shall make reference to certain passages in the Lytton Report and will offer in evidence a verbatim conversation between Lord Lytton and the accused DOHIHARA, by which we will prove that Lord Lytton not only knew of his reputation but also commended him for his ability to be able to reorganize in a phenomenal period of time the disrupted city of Mukden.

The prosecution introduced evidence to show that at one time the accused DOHIHARA was Commander of the Seventh Area Army which had jurisdiction over Malaya, Sumatra, Java and British Borneo. The reason for the prosecution's evidence undoubtedly was for the purpose of attempting to show that the accused DOHIHARA

was responsible for all atrocities, if any, which may have occurred in those areas during his command of the Seventh Area Army. We will offer evidence to prove that the Seventh Area Army was a subordinate command of the Southern Army, and that the Southern Army retained under its direct supervision the control of the prisoners of war camps, and that the Commander of the Seventh Area Army had nothing whatsoever to do with prisoners of war.

There is evidence to show that at one time Gen. DOHIHARA was the Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army of Japan. This evidence also was undoubtedly introduced to show that Gen. DOHIHARA was responsible for the atrocities, if any, committed in the area under the command of the Eastern Area Army. Our testimony will show that the Eastern Army was in charge of the defense of the Tokyo area and some adjacent territories. We will produce and offer as a witness one Tatsumi, Yeichi, who will testify that he was Gen. DOHIHARA's Chief of Staff. He will also testify about a rather complicated system of command, which was set up for the purpose of the control and treatment of prisoners of war camps and prisoners of war in the area under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Area Army. He will also testify that he knows of his own personal knowledge that Gen. DOHIHARA never received a ~~single~~ <sup>single</sup> complaint concerning the mistreatment of prisoners of war during the time he was the Commanding General of the Eastern Area Army. He will testify briefly concerning the policy of Gen. DOHIHARA with reference to the treatment of

Def. Doc. No. 2556

prisoners of war and Gen. DOHIHARA's activities concerning them.

We will also make brief reference to the testimony of a prosecution witness who testified concerning a visit of Gen. DOHIHARA to one of the prisoner ~~es~~ war camps. This reference will be made in order to show that if there was mistreatment of prisoners, ~~if~~ was contrary to the orders of Gen. DOHIHARA, because before his visit the camp commanders required the camp to be cleaned on several different occasions in anticipation of Gen. DOHIHARA's inspection trips. Our testimony will disclose that Gen. DOHIHARA did not and could not formulate major policies concerning prisoners of war, and that the only policies which he did formulate were with reference to those of command, administration and supply.

This, in brief, covers the content of our expected testimony, and we will now proceed to the introduction of our evidence in the individual phase concerning General DOHIHARA.

RUNNING COMMENTARY

IF THE TRIBUNAL PLEASE:

At this point we should like to offer in evidence Def. Doc. No. 2437. This is a record of an interview with Gen. DOHIHARA taken on May 3, 1932. The interview was primarily with Lord Lytton, Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, requested by the League of Nations, commonly referred to as the "Lytton Report." It is an official United States Government document and is duly certified to by J. R. Lovell, Colonel, General Staff Corps, U. S. Army, Deputy Director of Intelligence for Research, War Department, General Staff. This document records the official visit which Gen. DOHIHARA had with the Lytton Commission, and sets out his views with reference to the events immediately following the Mukden Incident, also his activities in Tientsin and Harbin. It also deals with questions concerning PU-YI. There are other references in the document to conditions which then existed and which we believe to be of benefit to the Tribunal. This document is offered for the purpose of showing to the Tribunal that the Lytton Commission had a great deal of confidence in the truth and veracity of Gen. DOHIHARA, inasmuch as a perusal of the Lytton Report will show that in their statement of fact with reference to the subject upon which they conversed with Gen. DOHIHARA, they accepted, in almost every instance, his version of the situation. It is offered for the further purpose of showing that this ties into our general testimony, which will be offered and which will be connected, that contrary to the impression left by the evidence of the prosecution, the accused, Gen. DOHIHARA, did have the confidence of the masses of people, as well as of the officials of

the places where he was stationed. In fact, this document will show that Lord Lytton himself complimented Gen. DOHIHARA on his accomplishment, not only in his conversation with him on May 3, 1932, but at a later date when the Lytton Report was compiled.

\* \* \* \* \*

( In substantiation of the previous document which has just been read to the Tribunal, we should, at this time, like to read briefly two extracts from the Lytton Report. The first appears on page 88 in Chapter IV, the last three sentences of the first paragraph commencing with the words "during the days", through the balance of that paragraph, and the first four sentences of the following paragraph, ending with the words "and the public utility services were restored." Also, in order to show that the Lytton Commission had confidence in Gen. DOHIHARA, I should like to read from page 79, the first complete paragraph, the first sentence beginning with the words "Colonel DOHIHARA" and ending with the words "the danger of massacre." )

At this point, if the Tribunal please, I should like to offer in evidence Def. Doc. No. 1498, which is an article appearing in the Japanese periodical "Bungei Shinju" for March, 1937. This article was written by Gen. DOHIHARA and will substantiate the testimony of our witnesses who testified to the effect that Gen. DOHIHARA had certain well defined ideas concerning the relationship between Japan and China, but that in addition, he incorporated his ideas into a well defined policy which he enforced in the field. This document will show he also used whatever medium he had at his command to carry his message to the Japanese

people. The document reflects the thoughts, ideas and feelings of the accused at that time, and shows conclusively that his published ideas were diametrically opposed to any common plan or purpose which might bring him within the purview of the alleged conspiracy charged in the Indictment in the Counts thereunder.

\* \* \* \* \*

At this time, with the Tribunal's kind permission, I should like to read from the record of the cross-examination of the witness CHISHOLM. This reading is in connection with the P.O.W. camps in the Tokyo area, and adjacent territories, at the time the accused, Gen. DOHIHARA, was Commander of the Eastern Area Army. To refresh the Tribunal's memory, I should like to state that this witness testified concerning the condition of the camps, lack of clothing, treatment of prisoners, etc. I should like to read commencing with the next to the last question on page 14,277 of the record for 3 January 1947, and continuing through the second answer on page 14,278 thereof.

Q. Well, I understood you to testify that at the time the General was there that there was snow on the ground and that there were boots available which were not issued to you. Now, possibly Col. Woolworth meant at a later period of time.

A. That testimony with regard to the boots and the snow was not in connection with DOHIHARA.

Q. Thank you for clearing that up, sir. Was any preparation made prior to the visit of Gen. DOHIHARA with regard to the condition of the camp?

A. On all such visits the camp was cleaned very thoroughly about ten or fifteen times.



Q. How long would you say that the General stayed at the camp during that visit, Captain?

A. I have no recollection.

Mr. Sutton 9/10/47 Saoyi Diary

The reference to Doihara in the Saoyi diary do not add anything to what is already in the case.

P42 merely says that "it seems" that Doihara has aided Shih Yu San

P97.5 that Doihara had a scheme to install Pa-yi

162 - that Doihara "probably" has taken Pa-yi from Tientsin

136 - that Doihara cannot win the North Chinese as puppets as the North Chinese do not understand self government. Doihara is only trying to create confusion.

1410. Finally "heard" that Doihara had become a advisor to the new North China Government.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
CHINESE DIVISION

8 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO : Mr. D. N. Sutton  
FROM : Judge Che-Chun Hsiang  
SUBJECT : Statement of Defense Evidence relating  
to DOHIMARA, Kenji.

Pursuant to Mr. Tavenner's memorandum of 14 July 1947, a statement of Defense Evidence relating to DOHIMARA, Kenji was prepared by Judge Kwei and four copies are herewith forwarded for filing.

*C. C. Hsiang*

STATEMENT OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE

RELATING TO

DOHIHARA, KENJI

PREPARED BY THE CHINESE DIVISION, IPS

STATEMENT OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE RELATING TO DOHIHARA, Kenji

I. A long chain of events leading to the Manchurian Incident for which DOHIHARA could in no way be held responsible.

A. Background

T.P. 18,706  
Lytton Report, p 11  
et seg, Exh. 57

Since Japan is China's nearest neighbor, she has suffered more than any other power from the lawless conditions. Over two-thirds of the foreign residents in China are Japanese, and the Koreans in Manchuria numbered about 800,000.

Her anxiety to safeguard the life and property of her subjects caused her to intervene repeatedly in times of civil war or local disturbances. This was bitterly resented by China, especially at the armed clash in 1928 at Tsinan. In recent years the claims of Japan have come to be regarded in China as a more serious challenge to national aspiration than those of all the other powers taken together.

T.P. 18,718

After the death of Marshall Chang Tso-lin, his son Chang Hsueh-liang became ruler of Manchuria. His relations with Kuomintang became closer. In Dec. 1928, he declared allegiance to the Central Government, was made Commander-in-Chief of the North-Eastern Frontier Army and was confirmed as Chief of the Administration of Manchuria and Jehol.

T.P. 18,720

After union, Manchuria never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the recovery of lost sovereign rights, the abolition of unequal treaties, and the wickedness of imperialism. The party propaganda entered the schools and associations made their appearance stimulating and intensifying the nationalist sentiments and carrying on Anti-Japanese agitation. Pressure was brought to bear on Chinese landlords to raise rents of Japanese and Korean tenants or refuse renewal.

T.P. 18,721

T.P. 18,733

Japanese interests in Manchuria differ both in character and degree from those of other powers. Behind it all is the great struggle with Russia in Manchuria, which will be remembered by Japan as a life and death struggle fought in self-defense. The hundred thousand soldiers who died and the two billion gold yen expended have made the Japanese determined that the sacrifices have not been in vain.

T.P. 18,734

\* The vision of a unified, strong and hostile China, dominated in Manchuria and East Asia, disturbs many Japanese. To the greater number, when they speak of menace, they mean Russia. Fundamentally, to Japan, Manchuria is of strategical importance.

T.P. 18736

The Washington Conference, although it had a marked effect on China, made little change in Manchuria. The Nine Power Treaty, despite the Open Door proviso, had but qualified application to Manchuria in view of Japan's vested interests there.

T.P. 18738

The legal rights of Japan to all these depended entirely upon the validity of the Treaty and Notes of 1915 which the Chinese continuously denied.

T.P. 18739

In 1919 China demanded their abrogation on the ground of conclusion under coercion and in March 1923, shortly prior to the expiration of the original Kwantung lease, China demanded from Japan abrogation of the 1915 treaties and stated that they had been constantly condemned by public opinion in China. Because of these views China declined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria except as expedients.

T.P. 18740

Japan complained bitterly of the violation by China. They claimed that the treaties were signed and ratified and in full force. Both Japan and its people were unanimous in insisting upon the validity with respect to Manchuria.

T.P. 18741

The important provisions in the treaties were the extension of the Kwantung Lease and the extension of the concession for the railways. Often associated with these was the agitation for the recovery of the South Manchurian Railway or for stripping it of its political character and reducing it to a purely economic business. The utterance of the nationalist spokesman urging recovery of the railroads served as an irritant to the Japanese.

T.P. 19133  
Exh. 2383

Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking May 25, 1915 stated Japan and China agreed that the leases of Port Arthur and Dairen and the terms of the South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Railways are to be extended to 99 years. Japanese in South Manchuria may lease land necessary to build buildings for trades and manufacture or to carry on agriculture. Japanese are to be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in all kinds of business. China may give permission to Japanese and Chinese to jointly undertake agricultural enterprises and incidental industries.

B. Japanese  
Interests in  
Manchuria in  
1928

An excerpt from the Manchuria Year Book 1931 showed that Japanese investments in Manchuria at the end of 1928 totalled more than ¥ 1,510,000,000. The amount of Japanese direct investment in enterprises in Manchuria in 1928 reached ¥1,340,000,000.

T.P. 19214  
Exh. 2398

C. The Anti-Japanese movement and the violation of Japanese treaty rights on the part of the Chinese  
T.P. 19157  
Exh. 2386

The Charge d'Affaire in China sent to Foreign Minister TANAKA on Feb. 5, 1929 the reported regulations for confiscation of Japanese goods which provided that all Japanese goods held by merchants in the city not registered after Nov. 26, 1928 shall be confiscated, that such goods ordered before that date and not yet arrived and registered with the Anti-Japanese Society

are to be confiscated upon arrival at Peiping and that Japanese goods under absolute ban ordered after Dec. 1, 1928 are to be confiscated.

T.P. 19161  
Exh. 2387

The Japanese Consul-General at Tielin reported to TANAKA, Foreign Minister, April 24, 1929, that the governor of Hsien had issued a proclamation, prohibiting private lease or sale of land to foreigners under instruction of the Provincial Government. All leases of house sites to Japanese residents outside the railway zone at Tielin is strictly prohibited and those in existence are to be recovered as soon as possible.

T.P. 19165-7  
Exh. 2388

The Japanese Director of the Bureau of Police of Kwantung Province reported to the Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs and others on Aug. 2, 1929 to the effect that the Chinese have prohibited the unlawful sale of land by death penalty and have drafted an act to prevent loss of national lands and interests which was passed at the Provincial Conference and sent to the Central Government in Nanking for sanction.

T.P. 19168-70  
Exh. 2389

The Consul-General at Chien-tao reported to SHIDEHARA, Foreign Minister, Aug. 19, 1929 saying that the Government (Kirin) has enacted a regulation on leasing land to Korean farmers in order to secure the living conditions of the natives and immigrants pouring in from China and to check the rapid increase of Koreans.

T.P. 19177  
Exh. 2390

The Consul-General at Kirin reported to SHIDEHARA, Foreign Minister, Nov. 8, 1929, stating that the Board of Construction has enacted a regulation concerning rice field irrigation which provides that only Chinese nationals are allowed to reclaim and cultivate rice fields.

T.P. 19183  
Exh. 2391

The Director of the Department of Korean Affairs of Overseas Ministry reported to the Director of the Asiatic Affairs Bureau of Foreign Office, stating that according to recent information the Governor of Liaoning Province has formulated a special law called "The Disciplinary Law against the Unlawful Sale of Land" to be enforced after May 1, 1931, providing whoever leases Chinese land to a foreigner shall be sentenced from five years in jail to death punishment.

D. Japan's China  
Policy based on  
International  
Justice

T.P. 19208  
Exh. 2395

In an article in the Japan Chronical Sept. 26, 1931, entitled "Baron WAKATSUKI's Replies", it stated that the present day diplomacy must be based on international justice and aim at promoting common prosperity. It is wrong to depart from this guiding spirit in shaping China policy. The spirit does not run counter to the determination to uphold the country's vested rights in Manchuria and Mongolia. Japan had no reason to abandon these rights and any

attempt to ignore them will be resisted. It must be kept in mind, however, that the only foreign policy which can be pursued fearlessly is one based on international justice and common prosperity. The nation must not show impatience, but must follow a steady course. A China policy framed and pursued in this way will prove effectual.

E. Chiang's fiery statement

T.P. 19210-1  
Exh. 2396

In an article in the Japan Chronicle, Sept. 9, 1931, entitled "Chiang's Fiery Attack", it stated that General Chiang Kai-shek made an inflammatory speech against Japan. He denounced Japan for alleged activities behind the scenes in connection with the Canton revolt. He stated that when Foreign Minister Chen of the Canton Government visited Tokyo, Japan placed facilities at his disposal including a large supply of arms and munitions. The result is the recent advance. He declared that Japan had butchered more than a hundred Chinese in Korea and had occupied Wanpaosan. He emphasized that Japan had forfeited her claim to the comity of nations by aiding and abetting civil war in neighboring countries.

T.P. 19212  
Exh. 2397

An excerpt from the Japan Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1931, entitled "Chiang Repeats his Charges" stated that SHIGEMITSU had been ordered to make inquiries into the truth of the report that Chiang Kai-shek on the 7th had charged Japan with instigating civil disturbances in China, alleging that it had supplied arms and munitions to Canton and instigated the murder of Chinese merchants.

The report from SHIGEMITSU makes it clear that Chiang spoke to that effect, and the Foreign Office had decided to demand an explanation by asking Chiang to substantiate his accusations, especially with regard to supplying arms.

A telegram from Nanking states that on the 14th, Chiang repeated his charges. He stated that the rebels had purchased 100,000 rifles from Japan, and he was now sure that Chen's visit to Japan was to buy arms from Japan and confer with Russian friends at Hongkong with Russian Communists in Tokyo.

II. The past record shows that DOHIHARA was a friend to China.

T.P. 15721-6  
Exh. 2190-A  
DOHIHARA  
Interrog.

"I spent almost 18 years in China, but during that time had returned to Japan for a short period. Most of the time I was aid to Lt. Gen. Banzai. Lt. Gen. Banzai was adviser to Yuan Shih-kai, Ti-Huang and Fong Yui-shiang - different Chinese leaders in other words."



"In 1929 I went there as aide to MATSUI, but had no connection with Special Services Organizations and on Aug. 18, 1931 I went there with the Special Service organizations."  
\* "On Aug. 15, 1931 I entered Manchuria with Japanese forces, as a colonel and as commander or head of the Japanese special service department."

"My duties were, first, to gain intelligence of the Chinese and as a liaison between the Chinese forces and the Japanese forces - but this was before the war.

"At that time, there was a Captain who was killed. I had to investigate the killing and negotiate with the Chinese forces. That was the particular job. (Later he corrected that it was the most important job.) I was there for that purpose."

T.P. 19995  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

DOHIHARA was an expert on Chinese and very mild. He (HONJO) sent him to Peiping to talk with General Sung Cheyuan and see whether some means for peaceful relation could be found. DOHIHARA had many friends among the Chinese.

III. On or about Sept. 18, 1931 DOHIHARA was back in Tokyo on official business and there was no linking-up whatsoever of the defendant with subsequent developments in Manchuria.

T.P. 15715  
Exh. 2190-A  
DOHIHARA Interrog.

"I was recalled to Tokyo about the 18th of Sept. I was recalled to Tokyo regarding the killing of Captain NAKAMURA."

T.P. 19306  
Test. of HIRATA,  
Yukihiro

At the time I went to contact the special service office, DOHIHARA was absent and HANAYA was in charge.

T.P. 22209  
Test. of  
ISHIHARA, Kanji

DOHIHARA was the head of the special service organ and was under the direct control of HONJO. He was then away on business in Tokyo. He did not play a very important role. He was in Tokyo when the telegram was sent.

IV. Testimonies given by different witnesses prove that there was no pre-arranged plan of aggression in which DOHIHARA participated.

T.P. 19409  
Test. of TORASHIRO,  
Kawabe

The duty given to the Kwantung Army was to defend the leased territory of the Kwantung Peninsula and protect the railroad. From the days of peace the Central Command had ordered the commander of the Kwantung Army to set up a plan to cope with any emergency and have the troops occupy important areas along the railway zone if it became necessary for Japan to resort to arms.

To protect the railroad, 15 men per kilometer was allowed. This was a right which Japan had on basis of the Sino-Japanese Treaty, and Japan had a right to station 15,000 men. In 1931, Japanese troop strength in Manchuria, including the independent garrison force under Major-General MORI, and the 2nd Division under TAMON,

amounted to approximately a strength of 10,000 all under the command of HONJO.

T.P. 19410

From the spring to the autumn of 1931, a series of disagreeable incidents between Japan and China took place, but they did not forewarn that in the near future such a great incident would break out so as to require momentous activity by the Central Command. On the night of the 18th of September the incident suddenly broke out.

T.P. 19411

Early in the morning of Sept. 19, the witness learned of the outbreak of the incident near Mukden from the newspapers. About 9 a.m. his Section Chief IMAMURA came with a happy look on his face, holding a slip of paper and stated that Generals NINOMIYA, Vice Chief of Staff, and KOISO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and others had reached a resolution after investigation. On the paper was written that "Actuated by the Incident, the Army expected to solve the Manchurian problem." By "solving the problem" it meant that Chang Hsueh-liang would be expected to fulfill present treaties to the letter.

T.P. 19412

IMAMURA explained that at the conference, the leaders agreed that the actions of the Kwantung Army were admissible as self-defense, but utmost care had to be taken not to spread out to the extreme within the realm of exercise of military power.

T.P. 19415-6

The Central Command then deemed that the sending of troops to Kirin had brought an end to military action, and they ordered that the military forces sent to Kirin should be evacuated to the railway zone as soon as the situation subsided. To check further action, on the evening of Sept. 22 they sent a telegram to the Commander of the Kwantung Army stating that military action was deemed to have been fulfilled and they should now reach a conclusion. Further action would be closely related with domestic and foreign policy and the commander was to be careful in considering matters and not to start new matters until he received instructions from the Central Command.

T.P. 19436-9

The witness repeated that there was written on the paper shown to him by IMAMURA on Sept. 19, the wording that actuated by the incident the army expected to settle the Manchurian problem and by that it meant that it was expected that Chang Tso-lin would fulfill his treaties. The witness repeated that such wording was actually written on the slip of paper. Whether it was wise or reasonable to use the expression, he had his personal views. However, he felt that this expression was used to make more concrete the rather abstract statement with reference to settling the Manchurian Problem.

T.P. 19441-3

IMAMURA's joy was due to the fact that the high authorities of the Army had finally come to a decision.

When asked why the airplane around Chinchou carried bombs for self-defense, the witness stated that they had learned from a report of

the Kwantung Army that when its aircraft went on reconnaissance they received ground fire and in retaliation and for self-defense they used the bombs which they had been carrying. This was interpreted as an act of self-defense. He had forgotten to use the word retaliation before. While it goes into the realm of general theory, he felt that retaliation could be considered as self-defense and carrying arms for the purpose of self-defense enables the party to carry out a retaliatory act. \* However, carrying bombs he admitted also enabled them to carry out an offensive action.

\* He regarded the Army of Chang Hsueh-liang not as bandits, but as regular army. He heard the report, however, that there were bandits active in that area who were being manipulated by Chang. He did not believe that the Japanese Army described all Chinese forces, when it suited them as bandits to deceive the League of Nations.

T.P. 19481-2  
Test. of  
SHIMAMOTO,  
Masaichi

\* The witness stated that the Japanese removed the rails at the crossing of the railway since it was necessary for defense. He did not know what was used for explosions, since this was done by the enemy, and there was no residue. However, from results it would seem not to have been very strong. It was certain that the explosion happened between 10 and 10:30 and the express train passed over the point after the explosion. Since the damage was slight the train was not derailed but did lean to one side. The Japanese tried to stop the train with signals, but it passed on. No damage was sustained by the 3rd Company when they were attacked by the enemy in the Kaoliang field.

T.P. 19484-5

There were about 10,000 Chinese and a little more than 600 Japanese. There were probably 400 Chinese killed, while the Japanese had two killed and 22 wounded. \* When asked whether these comparisons did not indicate that the Chinese offered no resistance, he had stated that observation on the scene will show that the battle was planned by the Chinese. The great difference in casualties indicates the efficiency of the Japanese army. The Chinese foolishly fought with electric lights turned on, while the Japanese approached from the dark and shelled, and fought hand to hand. Most of the Chinese shells flew high.

If the battle had continued into daytime, Japanese casualties would have been greatly increased, which is what he tried to avert. \* If another battle should occur in the future, they would exterminate the whole Chinese with no casualties.

T.P. 19258  
Test. of KAWAMURA,  
Kyoichi

On Sept. 18, 1931 Manchurian troops stationed at Peitaying outside Mukden, destroyed near Liutiaokou the railroad tracks running through the western border of the camp. The Japanese forces who were drilling not far

away went out and drove away the hostile troops. At the same time they returned the attack of the enemy forces covering the retreats of those who had done the job. With the assistance of rear units the army succeeded in bottling them up.

\* Upon receipt of an urgent dispatch HONJO immediately issued the order to his troops at various points to use force. There was no time to ask instructions from headquarters. Some of his forces started action before the arrival of HONJO's order, and some started attacks previous to the enemy's offensive. The Kwantung Army thus took the offensive all along the line.

T.P. 19261

The military strength of the Kwantung Army was composed of one peace-time division and six independent defense battalions and numbered about 15,000 to 16,000. The Manchurians had as many as 200,000 and it was evident that not only the railway but the army, the residents and their interests would have been ruined if the army had hesitated. This is the reason why his units were ordered to use force by him without asking instruction, under the responsibility and right given to him. This is also why some forces started activities prior to the arrival of his orders and why other forces started activities prior to the enemy's offensive. This is in keeping with an army called to defend itself against a very large force.

T.P. 19278  
Test. of  
HIRATA, Yukihiro

Before the outbreak of the incident, there had never been any plot by the witness or any of his subordinates, either alone or with civilians, to create incidents. The situation in Manchuria was so aggravated that the legal rights of Japanese were infringed and anti-Japanese attitude prevailed over Manchuria. As a result, the soldiers were in a highly strained state of mind. The witness, in light of his own experience in the Russo-Japanese war, had cautioned his subordinates never to smear the honor of their predecessors and enforced strict military discipline to prevent disorderly conduct.

T.P. 19280

Just before the outbreak the Northern Chinese Army under Chang Hsueh-liang was steadily increasing in number and had begun to circle the Japanese barracks in the railway zone. They consisted of a mixed brigade of 10,000 in the North, a training regiment of infantry and artillery in the East, in the Northwest and Southwest outside the wall, three escort battalions, and one battalion with infantry guns and machine guns. Inside the walled city there was one guard battalion and corps of soldiers and to the West there was one battalion. The total regular force was about 15,000 to 16,000.

T.P. 19281

In addition there was a police unit of more than 3,000 which was said to surpass the soldiers in training and equipment and was stationed in strategic positions east of the business section. The equipment was the best in all Manchuria, having four light tanks,

many trench mortars and heavy machine guns and airplanes. A large quantity of weapons and ammunition were being stored and gas bombs were being manufactured.

The Japanese forces, on the other hand, consisted of the witness' regiment about 2,000 strong, that is, two battalions and a machine gun unit and, in addition, the infantry battalion of railway guards about 400 strong. The Japanese armament consisted of two armoured cars, some infantry guns, mountain guns, and heavy machine guns, all inferior to the Chinese. They had no military airplanes. Both in quality and quantity the Japanese were constantly conscious of their inferiority and the threat from the Chinese.

T.P. 19,296

When the witness was asked why he decided to attack the walled city of Mukden, the witness stated that when SHIMAMOTO reported to him, he felt that his troops were in danger of being annihilated and he decided to attack the walled city of Mukden.

T.P. 19310

On cross-examination the witness said that he did not know the details about the installation at Mukden of the heavy guns. He learned of them for certain when the guns were actually fired. He had heard as a rumor that the guns were secretly installed and a story given out that a well was being dug. When asked if the Japanese had a right to install them, why the secrecy, he said he did not know. He said he did not know they were installed to be used in this operation. He knew that Generals McCoy and Claudel, who he said understood the actual situation, had signed the Lytton Report.

T.P. 19875  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

The witness said he had not heard from SHIDEHARA that these men boasted that on July 25 an artillery battery was already made ready at Mukden. It was after the incident that he heard of an attack by the artillery, and after he had it investigated he learned for the first time that the artillery was brought from Port Arthur. These two guns were not sent from Tokyo. They could not be that foolish. They had been at Port Arthur for a long time. They were probably the same guns used at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. He did not have investigated the person who ordered them sent to Mukden. They learned about it from Col. ANDO's investigation.

T.P. 19028  
Testimony of  
KATAKURA, Tadashi

The witness said that in Sept. 1932 HONJO reported to the Emperor on military matters and the witness went to the place with him. The witness heard that HONJO when inquired by the Emperor whether the incident was the result of a plot on the part of the Kwantung Army, emphatically stated that the Kwantung Army and he, as Commander-in-Chief, had not participated in any plotting.

T.P. 19114

His inquiry was to the effect, the witness added on cross-examination, that he had heard rumors of a plot and he wanted to know whether this was true or not. This question was asked one year after the incident and after the Cabinet had accepted the Kwantung Army's explanation of what had happened.

T.P. 19533  
Exh. 2414

In the Preliminary Report of the Commission of Inquiry sent from Mukden, April 29, 1932 by the League, it stated that on Sept. 18, the number of the Japanese in the railway zone was 10,590. For the first part of December there were 4,000 inside and 8,900 outside the zone, a total of 12,900. In the latter part of April, there were 6,600 inside and 15,800 outside the zone, making a total of 22,400 regular Japanese Army.

T.P. 19535

With respect to opposing forces, the Commission learned from Chang Hsueh-liang that his forces outside the Great Wall on Sept. 18, including non-fighters, totaled 190,000, of which 50,000 were subsequently withdrawn inside the Wall, leaving 140,000 outside.

T.P. 19525  
Exh. 2413

Speech of Minister YOSHIZAWA in the House of Peers, January 22, 1932 stated that in China itself, for many years the anti-Japanese movement has been carried on. It has gained strength and become vigorous. It is not a movement to sever economic relations by boycotting Japanese goods, but to inspire anti-Japanism. There is evidence that the movement has been conducted against the will of Chinese tradesmen under coercion of private organizations and it has been encouraged by the Chinese Government. Some made anti-Japanese agitation their occupation.

V. DOHIHARA assumed the Mayorship of Mukden for the sole purpose of restoring peace and order in the locality without any ambition to aggrandize his country.

T.P. 15717-8  
Exh. 2190-A  
DOHIHARA Interrog.

"When I went back, I was relieved of the Special Service Command and was sent over there as one of the Staff Section of the Kwantung Army."

"On the 23rd (later he changed to 21st) I became head of the city of Mukden.

"When I was Mayor of Mukden, I was not the head of the Special Service Organization."

T.P. 18816-9  
Testimony of  
YAMAGUCHI, Juichi

The witness said that following the outbreak, security and order in Mukden had completely stopped and that officials in Mukden were making all attempts to restore peace and order. The witness offered to DOHIHARA the Mayor his opinion to operate the Mukden - Haicheng Railway autonomously, since it was the route for supplying food to Mukden and DOHIHARA adopted his opinion.

Exh. 57  
Lytton Report  
p. 88

The immediate necessity was the organization of municipal government and the restoration of the ordinary civil life of the city. Col. DOHIHARA was installed as Mayor of Mukden and within three days normal civil administration was restored.

P. 18926-7  
Testimony of  
KATAKURA,  
Tadashi

The witness believed that the making of DOHIHARA as Mayor of Mukden was not contrary to the principles of these reports. He had heard from the Commander of the Kwantung Army and his staff of the reasons for appointing DOHIHARA as Mayor.

At that time there were many Chinese public establishments, facilities, and organizations in Mukden but most of the Chinese leaders had abandoned the locality. Since Mukden was the center of Manchuria, efforts were first directed toward establishment of law and order temporarily to serve until a competent person could be found.

T.P. 19888-90  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

MINAMI thought that DOHIHARA was a Mayor for a month and a successor was appointed. He was not interfering with internal political affairs, but was primarily engaged in maintaining law and order.

T.P. 20068

When asked whether DOHIHARA's assumption of the Mayorship was a violation, MINAMI stated that the investigation showed that DOHIHARA was appointed mayor for the sole purpose of restoring law and order because of the chaos prevailing.

T.P. 19881

MINAMI said that he had not heard from SHIDEHARA or from any other body that DOHIHARA had said that he was guiding the local Chinese committee in Manchuria. He had not been informed that DOHIHARA had ordered the local Chinese Committee against its wish to set up a board of Finance and Industry and DOHIHARA had prohibited the setting up of another committee.

Exh. 57  
Lytton Report  
p. 88

On Oct. 20th the reins of the municipal government were restored to a qualified Chinese body with Dr. Chao Hsin-Pao (a lawyer who had studied for 11 years in Japan and was a doctor of law of the Tokyo University) as Mayor.

VI. The independence of Manchuria was the result of the people's movement toward which Japan remained passive.

T.P. 18822-3  
Testimony of  
YAMAGUCHI, Juichi

The witness stated that he did not know Yuan Chen-tao previously but while in a hospital a member of his company told him that Yuan Chen-tao was chief of a hospital in Kirin and was quite concerned over the outbreak of the incident and desired to participate in a movement for establishing Manchukuo.

\* The Witness introduced Yuan Chen-tao to KANAI, an adviser to the Provincial Government of Mukden. As chief of the Secretariate he assisted Tsang Shih-I in planning the independence movement and continued his work despite attacks by

guerrillas. Yuan Chen-tao joined the movement to release the thirty million Manchurians from the oppressive rule of the military chieftains and to establish a democratic nation.

In accordance with the policy of the civilians to restore land and bring stability, and since the military regime had fallen, the people, under the leadership of pioneers, should seek to establish a democratic country and escape from the evils of the former regime. Before the outbreak of the incident there was this civilian faction that the witness had mentioned. It had been organized in 1926 under Wang Hung-chieng and was the so-called civilian faction. He could state the names of those he had associated with in this faction. For example, Yu Chung-han, at one time custodian for Chang Tso-lin. He was at one time the general manager of the iron mines at Anshan. He later despite illness assumed the task of guiding the autonomous movement. Another was Yu Cheng-yuan.

T.P. 18837-8

At one time Yuan Chen-tao told the witness about the existence of a secret society in Kirin and showed him its rules and regulations. The purport of the regulation was to restore the Ching Dynasty and to effect independence of Manchurians and Mongolians from the Han race. The rules were very brief, about 20 articles. Yuan Chen-tao explained that Hsi Hsia was the prime figure of the movement.

T.P. 18841

From Oct. 31 until independence the witness had discussed the matter with the people he worked with and because they all approved it was decided to form the Concordia Party of Manchukuo. Five persons were appointed on a committee to establish this society: Yuan Chen-tao, Yu Chen-yuan, Wada Kei, the witness, and OZAWA, Kaisaku. An understanding was sought with the government in Shinking and with the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army expressed no particular views on the problem. The Government would cooperate and make it a united national party. The name was therefore changed to the Manchukuo Concordia Society with government members participating.

T.P. 18842

The aim of the Concordia party at the time it was established dealt most with the domestic situation.

T.P. 18851

Military officers did not participate in the Committee for its establishment.

T.P. 18852

T.P. 18853

When the Concordia Party was established, the Commander of the Kwantung Army was an honorary adviser.

T.P. 18854

While the understanding of the Kwantung Army was sought at times the society did not work under orders.

T.P. 18855

While he would not say that the KASAGI's statement was a lie, he believed it was incomplete in many respects. When it was pointed out that the Committee first formed consisted of about 20 members, the witness stated that the number was only five.

T.P. 18942  
Test. of KATAKURA,  
Tadashi

About Sept. 22 or 23 Lo Chen-yu went to Mukden and met ITAGAKI and after contacting HSI Hsia and Chang Hai-peng he returned to Mukden. He stated that he had found that Hsi Hsia had made preparations for independence and



T.P. 18943

wanted to have Hsiun Tung come to Kirin. Lo was going to Tientsin to call him and left for there by way of Dairen. Hsi Hsia after consulting Chang's group, at the end of September, issued an independence declaration. For purposes of obtaining intelligence reports the Kwantung Army made various contacts, but did not directly participate in the movement.

T.P. 18953

Yu Chun-han was one of the three foremost leading civil officials in Manchuria. On Nov. 3, 1931, he came to Mukden and met HONJO. The witness was not present but learned the context of the conversation from ITAGAKI and saw the document tendered by Yu. In the two points mentioned by HONJO, one was that the Incident had developed to such a state that in order to secure law and order, the area must be separated from Nanking and a new country founded on the kingly way.

T.P. 18968

On Sept. 26, Lo Chen-yu had reported that certain men were entertaining a desire to see the restoration of monarchy and on the 27th he left for Tientsin. On Oct. 1, there was a sudden communication from the headquarters of the Tientsin Garrison that Pu-Yi would come to Manchuria if he had the support of the people and if he had the understanding that Japan would support his return. At that time they heard that Chin-liao of the Liaoning Committee for the maintenance of peace and order had gone to Tientsin to bring Pu-Yi into Manchuria.

T.P. 18975-6

Upon Pu-Yi's arrival, Chang Hai-peng gave him a present of 200,000 yuan and sent an emissary to welcome him. Also, Lao Tan-yan went to see him and Lin Sheng, son of a tribal Mongolian Chief, called on him. In Port Arthur, Pu-Yi was placed under the protection of the administrative office of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and this was taken by the Army on consultation of the consulate general and the administrative office. They prohibited interviews with Japanese. He was free to interview Manchurians to the extent that no personal harm would come to him. This was adopted by the administrative office for the Kwantung Leased Territory. In Port Arthur, Pu-Yi stayed at a hotel.

T.P. 19373  
Test. of  
TAKEDA, Hisashi

When asked whether it was not true that because of Japanese aid Chang Hai-peng announced himself as ready to support Pu-Yi, the witness said that this was outside his knowledge, but he said he had heard that Chang voluntarily rose to aid the movement to restore Pu-Yi.

T.P. 19895  
Test. of MINAMI,  
Jiro

The witness had made no inquiry as to what the self-governing board consisted of. For the first time, he had heard in testimony that the board was directed by ITAGAKI, financed by the Kwantung Army, and that friendly Chinese were supplied by DOHIHARA and that about 90% of the Staff were Japanese.

Exh. 57  
Lytton Report  
p. 95

The North-Eastern Administrative Council met at once in urgent session and elected six delegates to proceed to Port Arthur, to convey their invitation to the Former Emperor at Port Arthur, where he had been residing since he left Tientsin in the previous November. Mr. Pu-Yi at first declined it, but on March 4th a second delegation comprising 29 delegates obtained his consent to accept the post for one year only. Then the Administrative Council elected chairman, Lt. Gen. Chang Ching-hui and nine others to be the reception committee. On March 5th, the committee went to Port Arthur and was received in audience. In response to this request, the Former Emperor, on March 6th, left Port Arthur for Tangkantze, and after two days began, on the 8th, to receive homage as the Regent of Manchukuo.

VII. The independence movement had been in existence long before September 1931.

T.P. 19150  
Exh. 2385

In the Report from the Chief of the Public Safety Bureau of the Kwantung Army to the Chief of the Colonial Bureau of the Japanese Cabinet, January 11, 1929, it stated that the movement to support Kung Ching-wang had been tried many times but no concrete development had been seen yet and that connection between North China bandits and Mukden Dissension had been established and it is reported that Pa has come to a secret agreement with Cheng and they have come to some sort of understanding with Chang Hai-peng. Recently they started organizing the three Eastern Provinces Independence Army. Pa and Cheng are preparing and have secretly distributed propaganda bills to urge Kung's cause.

T.P. 18680-1  
Exh. 57  
Lytton Report

China is not really an organized state. Even at that time China had two governments and was disturbed by large forces and preparations were being made for civil war. During this time, the revolt took place and the independence of Manchuria from the government at Peking was declared in July 1922.

VIII. DOHIHARA was sent to Tientsin by HONJO to sound out if Pu-Yi really desired to go back to Manchuria as rumored.

T.P. 15726-9  
Exh. 2190-A  
DOHIHARA Interrog.

"My instruction was to convey to Pu-Yi that should he return to Manchuria, the Kwantung Army would welcome his return.

"That is true although I did not have any plan; however, upon receipt of instruction from the Kwantung Army I felt that such things would be required to settle the Manchukuo turmoil where so many factions are competing against each other and causing disturbances.

"He (ITAGAKI) definitely told me that there would not be a necessity to bring him back forcibly.

\* "It is my motto that whatever the order I receive I see to it that the purpose is accomplished."

T.P. 18970-2  
Test. of  
KATAKURA,  
Tadashi

\* In the latter part of October, DOHIHARA was sent to Tientsin personally by HONJO and without any connection with the General Staff or the War Ministry. He had two assignments. One was to collect intelligence with respect to the Tientsin-Peiping area, and the other was to study the measures to be taken if Chang Hsueh-liang should move off the Great Wall into China Proper. Another duty was to observe into the possible attitude of the Chinese Generals in the Peiping-Tientsin area in the event Chang Hsueh-liang should withdraw toward Tientsin. One other duty was entirely military, a study of the question if Chang Hsueh-liang should withdraw into North China and would clash with Japanese forces there and the services of the Kwantung Army would become necessary, what the Japanese side should do in such event. He was also, because of the clamor being heard in the area, to sound out whether Pu-Yi would like to go to Manchuria. HONJO, on this last point, gave strict instruction to DOHIHARA not to make any commitment as to whether Pu-Yi was to become Chief Executive or Emperor.

T.P. 19909  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

MINAMI testified that he received a report that Pu-Yi arrived in Yingkou about November 11. The report was not to the effect, however, that he had been taken out, but that he had come to Manchuria at his own desire. He did know that DOHIHARA was in Tientsin at that time. It did not occur to him to connect the two events. He believed DOHIHARA was sent to Tientsin by order of HONJO on a particular assignment. He had never seen the order, but the observation was made at that time that he had gone to Tientsin to collect intelligence. Instructions were sent to HONJO, that is, additional instructions over and above September instructions. (Referring to the Cabinet decision to prohibit Japanese participation in establishing a new government. (p 19783) His instructions were that it should not be done at all. He did believe that HONJO was sufficiently obeying his instructions.

IX. Pu-Yi went to Manchuria of his own accord and established the "Manchukuo" according to the wishes of the people.

T.P. 19877-8  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

MINAMI denied that on Sept. 26 he heard a report from the Ministry of Overseas Affairs that DOHIHARA and others in the army were planning to re-install Pu-Yi as Emperor of Manchuria.

T.P. 19785

In the early part of November, TOYAMA, Takeo brought MINAMI a letter as a messenger from Pu-Yi in Tientsin. While he did not personally talk with him, the message conveyed through the office of the day was that Pu-Yi desired to effect a fundamental correction of the evil administration in Manchuria. Since there was no reason for him to believe this messenger and since it was the government's fixed policy not to interfere, he did not favor the proposition and ignored the letter without replying.

T.P. 19786

Some years later when Ching Hsiao-hsu, Prime Minister of Manchukuo, was in Japan, MINAMI visited him and showed him the letter and asked him if it was authentic. Ching signed the letter certifying that it was Pu-Yi's handwriting. MINAMI had kept it as souvenir.

T.P. 18972  
Testimony of  
KATAKURA,  
Tadashi

Around the first part of November, DOHIHARA reported to the Kwantung Army that Pu-Yi wanted to come as soon as possible, and had the idea that if he went, the problem of Ma would be settled and the people of Mongolia would support him. He wanted to establish his government in Kirin.

T.P. 19007

The Kwantung Army and General HONJO did not feel particularly favorable to the restoration of the Monarchy, but they did not touch on the question of Pu-Yi as leader.

T.P. 19011

Pu-Yi's final decision was that the national language would be Manchurian, the head of the state a regent, the calendar be Tatung, and the name of the state Manchukuo, with a five-colored flag. No request was ever made by HONJO to Pu-Yi regarding his decision.

T.P. 19636  
Exh. 2426

The Imperial Enthronement Rescript of Pu-Yi. The Rescript stated that two years had elapsed since Manchukuo was founded. In the early days they suffered from the lawlessness of bandits, and the good people could not stand on their own feet. At this point, the Japanese Empire, disregarding the suspicions and criticisms of the world, came to their aid. Thanks to this unprecedented aid, most serious problems have been solved almost completely. The internal disturbances have been largely suppressed, and prospects are brilliant. Heaven helps the virtuous. There is a will on the part of the people, but without a master they are easily thrown into confusion and they therefore appeal for a right person for the throne. Since all had agreed, he could not hesitate to obey the divine call. The first day of the third month of the third year of Tai T'ung, he would ascend the throne and the country would be renamed Manchukuo. As to measures and policies of defense and administration, they will cooperate in perfect accord with Japan and can hope for everlasting national security. The bodies and laws of treaties will remain substantially unchanged.

T.P. 19145-50  
Exh. 2384

The instructions from the Foreign Minister TANAKA to Consul-General KATO at Tientsin, June 17, 1927 stated that in November 1924, when Pu-Yi took refuge in the Japanese Legation in China, Japan telegraphed to YOSHIZAWA, the minister, that if Pu-Yi came to Japan or to Kwantung Province, he might be utilized by the Tsungshe Party or give rise to various movement which would be disadvantageous not only to Japan but to Pu-Yi and must be avoided.

In December 1924, Pu-Yi told YOSHIZAWA that he wanted to visit Japan. YOSHIZAWA, considering the problem, requested instructions. The Foreign Minister replied that Pu-Yi's coming to Japan should be avoided in view of Japan's former policy.

In February 1925, Pu-Yi went to Tientsin and stayed there ever since. Japan followed a consistent policy with respect to his visit to Japan or Kwantung Province. Recently his followers, fearing for his safety, are plotting a movement to remove him to Japan or the Port Arthur-Dairen area. When the matter was brought to the notice of the Japanese Government, the Foreign Minister had sounded the view of the Imperial Household and it was found that no objection would be raised if he came as a political refugee but it would be difficult for Japan to give him special treatment as an abdicated Emperor of a large neighboring nation. The Consul-General at Tientsin should explain this to those close to him (Pu-Yi) at an appropriate time. He was not informed that DOHIHARA had gone to the consulate and stated that the Manchurian State of Affairs was brought to the present condition by the military authorities in Manchuria. He did not know that DOHIHARA seized the opportunity of the riot to take Pu-Yi to Dairen.

X. DOHIHARA was not involved in the Tientsin Riots.

When asked whether it was not true that the incidents occurred on November 8, he stated that he did not remember but he recalled that there were two incidents. The first riot was the result of misunderstanding, which was immediately cleared up and settled. He did not believe that the riots were caused by DOHIHARA's bribing certain people and starting it. No one telegram was sent from the Foreign Office and SHIDEHARA did not speak of it. He was not informed by SHIDEHARA at the time.

XI. Misunderstanding between the Kwantung Army and the Consul-General accounted for the sensational reports concerning DOHIHARA.

\* About Sept. 22, ANDO, Chief of the Military Service, came to Manchuria to investigate four things. The first question related to the situation in guarding and patrolling Fushan. The second was to investigate into the report that the Kwantung Army had attacked the Chinese in spite of the fact that on Sept. 18 the Chinese troops had declared non-resistance. The third question was an investigation of the report that a certain Staff Officer in a telephone

T.P. 19903-4  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

T.P. 18931-4  
Testimony of  
KATAKURA,  
Tadashi

conversation with the Japanese Consul-General in Mukden had used offensive language. The fourth question was an investigation into operational matters, because it was said that so swift was the action of the Kwantung Army that its preparations had been made in peace time.

Because of the tense situation of some of the army officers, HAYASHI, out of his pre-conceived over-cautiousness had expressed a desire that the young officers would not make any mistakes, and that facts had been reported in a very over-exaggerated form.

\* With respect to HAYASHI's telegram of Sept. 19, the witness stated that he learned briefly and simply about it when ITAGAKI reported to HONJO. This telegram had stated that China had declared she would fight on the non-resistance policy.

T.P. 19106

T.P. 19363  
Testimony of  
TAKEDA,  
Hisashi

When asked whether he knew that on Oct. 13 HAYASHI had reported that Chang Hai-peng had received 500 rifles and \$200,000 from the Japanese in support of his declaration of independence, the witness stated that so far as he knew, no such thing occurred. He assumed that the Consul-General HAYASHI telegram was emotional since he had a tendency to exaggerate.

XII. DOHIHARA was sent to Harbin to take charge of Special Organ there.

Exh. 57  
Lytton Report  
P. 79

Colonel DOHIHARA, now General, was sent to Harbin on the 26th in order to take over the office of the Special Japanese Service there. (January 1932)

T.P. 18950  
Testimony of  
KATAKURA,  
Tadashi

Toward the end of November, Ma was defeated by the Japanese and retreated to Hailun. At that time ITAGAKI went to Hailun and had an interview with Ma. After ITAGAKI had explained Japan's intentions, Ma was persuaded to accept the position. At that time Chang Ching-hui in Harbin made strong efforts to have Ma become governor of Heilungkiang. Later, in February 1932, Ma was appointed Minister of Military Administration.

XIII. The Special Service Organ of which DOHIHARA was in charge had nothing to do with opium, its sole duty being to collect information.

T.P. 22114  
Testimony of  
ISHIHARA, Kanji

\* HONJO's chief of staff at the time was General MIYAKE. The senior staff officer was ITAGAKI. The witness was operational officer. The chief of the Mukden special service organ was DOHIHARA who succeeded General SUZUKI in August 1931.

T.P. 22188-9

The witness stated that he was acquainted with DOHIHARA. The function of the special service organ was the collection of information and liaison with the Chinese army and Government. Its duties were vague and cannot be clearly defined.

While DOHIHARA was chief, his mission was to collect information in as many ways as he could. He did not know definitely what methods were employed, but he believed they conducted activities similar to those of military attache. The organ was part of the Kwantung Army and under its control.

T.P. 19232  
Testimony of  
KANAI, Shoji

When asked whether the special service organ ever handled opium, the witness stated that he had never heard anything about it while he was adviser, and the same is true with respect to the Kwantung Army.

T.P. 19975-6  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

The witness stated that DOHIHARA was attached to the Staff of the Kwantung Army as a special service agent in intelligence activities, but DOHIHARA had nothing to do with problems such as opium. He did not know whether the special service department had anything to do with it. One of the reasons for abolishing the special service department might have been, he found, that they were running the opium for their own profits instead of for Manchukuo whom MINAMI wanted to have the profits, \* but his principal reason was to enable Manchukuo to conduct its own administration. When Manchukuo took over the opium traffic, he believed this was one of its principal sources of revenue.

XIV. DOHIHARA had nothing to do with the Chi-Tung Government.

T.P. 20664-5  
Testimony of  
HASHIMOTO, Gun

The Chi-Tung Anti-Communism Autonomy was established toward the end of 1935. The witness stated that Chi-Tung meant Eastern Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Regime. He did not think that DOHIHARA was responsible for the creation of the regime.

The witness stated that the Japanese were related with the East Hopei Regime because it was within the geographical scope of their assignment and duty, and it was consistent with the policy strengthening ties between Japan and China.

T.P. 19996-7  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

The witness did not know that DOHIHARA fixed noon on November 21, 1935 as the time limit for acceptance of these terms. MINAMI did not send troops about November 20 to Shan-Hai-Kwan to back DOHIHARA. He stated that the Chinese did not set up the autonomous council for Eastern Hopei under threats. It was set up by the Chinese themselves, and MINAMI had nothing to do with it.

XV. UMEZU-Ho Agreement etc. were voluntarily entered into in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere.

T.P. 19983  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

The witness received a report that it was concluded in an exceedingly friendly atmosphere from DOHIHARA. DOHIHARA told him of the talk he had in Peiping with General Ching Teh-chun. The North China garrison were under

the direct control of the Emperor, as was MINAMI. Each army had separate jurisdiction. Without special orders the two could not conduct a common conspiracy. He had no reports, however, as to the details of the negotiations. He had never seen an agreement and did not know if there was written one.

T.P. 19985-6

The witness stated that the Kwantung Army never made a series of demands on China beginning with the removal of General Yu Hsueh-Chung, governor of Hopei Province. He heard of rumors that the North China Army had made demands, but knew nothing of them.

T.P. 20754-6  
Testimony of  
KAWABE,  
Torashiro

Troubles often occurred on the border between Manchuria and Chahar Province. On Oct. 6, 1934 there was an insult to the Japanese military and Foreign Office clerks at Changpei. The units of General Sung Che-yuan troops intruded into Manchukuo on January 24, 1935. Fearing that this might lead to further trouble, MINAMI deemed it proper to enlarge the scope of the Tangku Truce, and under instructions from Tokyo sent DOHIHARA of his Staff and Chief of the Special Service Agency in Mukden, to negotiate with Chahar authorities. DOHIHARA was sent on this mission because the trouble had arisen in the area over which he was in charge of information, and he knew the actual facts, and his character was best suited for negotiating with the Chinese. As a result the DOHIHARA-Ching Teh-chun Agreement was signed June 27, 1935, stipulating the responsible persons dealing with suppression of Anti-Japanese agitation in Chahar and the area for cessation of hostilities.

Under this agreement, the Chinese demilitarized zone was extended to part of Chahar. A few days after this, DOHIHARA came to the Army Headquarters to verbally report on his negotiation. The witness was present. From this report and what he learned from a member of DOHIHARA's staff, the witness believed that the negotiations had been carried on in a friendly manner.

XVI. The Hopei-Chahar regime was established by the Chinese themselves.

T.P. 19994-5  
Testimony of  
MINAMI, Jiro

In November, 1935 the witness heard that the formation of the Hopei-Chahar regime was at the invitation of the Chinese Government. He had heard that from DOHIHARA but he did not give DOHIHARA such a difficult mission. DOHIHARA was an expert on Chinese and very mild. He sent him to Peiping to talk with General Sung Che-yuan and see whether some means for peaceful relations could not be found. DOHIHARA had many Chinese friends.

He stated that it was completely false to state that DOHIHARA announced on Nov. 18, 1935 that if autonomy for North China was not proclaimed five divisions were going to Hopei and six to Shangtung. This was completely contrary to his mission, and contrary to DOHIHARA's mission.



XVII. DOHIHARA did not take charge of  
DOHIHARA Organ in Shanghai.

T.P. 24101-9  
Testimony of  
KAGESA, Sadaaki

Being the chief of the military section of the War Ministry the witness had no connection with DOHIHARA's mission and did not know anything about it. Many of the telegrams were relayed through the DOHIHARA agency. The DOHIHARA agency had come to an end but the witness used their building. As the witness did not have access to ciphers, he used the name of the DOHIHARA agency. As a matter of fact, there was no relation whatsoever between the two missions.

The witness had no right to send telegrams so he was forced to use the DOHIHARA name, which did have the privilege. Although DOHIHARA had returned to Tokyo, his right to send telegrams still existed. This is why he used it. It is true that at the time there was in fact no DOHIHARA agency but he merely used the code in the cipher book. He believed that DOHIHARA returned at the end of April. After his departure there were a few clerks who remained in the office. He imagined the mission came to an end when DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

8 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. F. S. Tavenner, Jr.  
Acting Chief of Counsel

FROM: David Nelson Sutton

SUBJECT: Chronological Statements of Prosecution's Evidence

I hand you herewith a copy of the Chronological Statement  
of the Prosecution's Evidence as to each of the seven following  
defendants:

DOHARA, Kenji  
HATA, Shunroku  
HIRANUMA  
HIROTA, Koki  
ITAGAKI, Seishiro  
MUTO, Akira  
TOGO, Shigenori

DAVID NELSON SUTTON

DOIHARA, Kenji

Statement of Prosecution's Evidence  
(Arranged chronologically)

I. Activities prior to Mukden Incident

1925  
DOIHARA became intimately acquainted with OKAWA, who was also intimate with KOISO, TADA and others of the Army circles, and as a result, OKAWA was able to openly deliver lectures at the Army General Staff. R 15,569

OKAWA's aims were to establish a revolutionized Japan; a national ideal; to realize spiritual liberty; political equality; fraternity in economic life; liberate the colored races and unify the world morally. R 15, 563-4

OKAWA's immediate purposes were:

a. to promote positive action by the Army R 15, 575

b. to reconstruct the national life of Japan in an economic union with Manchuria R 15,578

15 Mar 1931  
To accomplish the foregoing purposes, OKAWA's plan to overthrow the Diet and set up a new political power centered around the Army. R 15,583  
OKAWA planned the Incident of March 1931. R 15,580-4  
OKAWA planned the October Incident R 15,585  
OKAWA was a moving force in the Manchurian Incident R 15,585

15 March 1929  
DOIHARA appointed Commanding Officer of the 30th Infantry Regiment. Exh 104  
R 695

22 Dec 1930  
Appointed to Army General Staff. Exh 104, R 695  
Placed in charge of Special Service Organization at Mukden and made an investigation of the case involving the murder of Captain NAKAMURA. He, "continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the NAKAMURA case in spite of the fact that an amicable settlement was well within sight." Exh. 57 Lytton Report, p. 64

1 Aug. 1931  
Appointed to Headquarters Kwantung Army. Exh 104, R 695

15 Aug. 1931  
He went to Manchuria as he claims, for the first time and assumed the office of Commander or Head of the Japanese Special Service Department as Colonel. R 15, 713-4  
Exh 2190-A  
His duties in that capacity were to gain intelligence of the Chinese and act as liaison between the Chinese Forces and the Japanese Forces. R 15, 714

8 Sept. 1931  
He was again back in Tokyo, where he was quoted by the Press as the advocate of the solution of all pending issues if necessary by force as soon as possible. R 15,713  
p. 66  
Exh 2190

## II. Connection with Mukden Incident

- CHING Teh-Chun testified that DOIHARA instigated the Mukden Incident on 18 September 1931. He also stated that DOIHARA had been a resident in China a long time and had many friends and associates there; that a week prior to the Mukden Incident many mutual friends told CHING that DOIHARA was about to go to Manchuria to embark on a big project. CHING also said that five days before the happening of the Mukden Incident, one CHANG, and a Japanese SHIBAYAMA, and CHING had a conversation at Chungshan Park in Peiping and they told him that CHANG Hsueh-Liang should be thrown out and that DOIHARA was working on this over-all project of the Japanese Government.
- 18 Sept 1931 MORISHIMA of the Mukden Consulate was unable during the afternoon of that day to locate DOIHARA who was then out on a Special Mission, and HANAYA, Assistant Chief, and he was unable to locate any of the responsible military officers at 9 o'clock of the evening of that day. This, coupled with the report that General TATEKAWA was traveling in civilian clothes to Mukden, created quite a bit of apprehension in his mind. But MORISHIMA found them all after the Incident had broken.
- 23 Sept 1931 DOIHARA became Mayor of the City of Mukden. He had previously been an independent member of the "Local Peace Preservation Commission" set up by the Japanese in Mukden. As Mayor of Mukden he exercised great pressure on the Chinese officials who were left behind at that time in Mukden. Powell testified that right after the Mukden Incident DOIHARA acted as spokesman for General HONJO, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army.
- Sept 1931 The Self-Government Guiding Board was set up in Mukden, the latter part of September 1931. All policies of the Self-Government Guiding Board had to be approved by ITAGAKI and information as to which Chinese would be friendly to Japan's plans and would serve as willing collaborators, was furnished by DOIHARA. DOIHARA was in charge of espionage for the Board. Of 120 members of this Board, only about 15 of whom were Chinese or Manchurians.
- Nov 1931 At the end of November, DOIHARA ceased being Mayor of Mukden and was sent to Harbin as head of the Special Service Organization and he stayed on the job until the last of March 1932.

## III. DOIHARA's connection with abduction of PU YI

- 2 Nov 1931 DOIHARA interviewed PU YI and discussed PU YI's removal to Manchuria. DOIHARA headed plot in the escape of the Emperor PU YI from Tientsin. His plan was to incite Japanese in Tientsin in order to make a pretense for the flight. In order to accomplish his purpose, DOIHARA threatened the Emperor in various ways. PU YI testified that DOIHARA instigated the incident in which a bomb was sent to PU YI in a fruit basket.

- "Whatever accidents or incidents that then happened, DOIHARA was the man who was pulling the strings behind." R 4124
- The activities of DOIHARA in the enticement of PU YI were pursuant to the desires of the Kwantung Army which aimed at the establishment of the independent state of Manchukuo and the crushing of the influence of CHANG Hsueh-Liang. DOIHARA resorted to all sorts of plots in the secret support of influential politicians to carry out his object of enticing PU YI to Manchuria. He associated himself with various factions and subversive organizations in Tientsin and gave them 50,000 taels as working funds to foment a riot. R 4394
- The Japanese Consulate urged DOIHARA to refrain from committing such acts, but he insisted on continuing his plans to overthrow CHANG, even though he caused difficulties and complications for the Japanese residents and threw Tientsin in disorder and confusion, hurt the prestige of Japan and created an unfavorable international situation. R 4395
- The Chinese were greatly concerned with DOIHARA's intrigues since his arrival in Tientsin. Finally DOIHARA took the opportunity of a riot throughout the city as a means of carrying out the Emperor's passage to Manchuria. DOIHARA also was entirely familiar with the plan to abduct the Empress Hsuan Teh to Manchuria. R 4397
- 9 March 1932 PU YI was installed as Regent in March. R 4397
- IV. DOIHARA's connection with Kyo-Wai-Kai
- Kyo-Wai-Kai was also known as the Concordia Society. It continued the work of the Self-Governing Guiding Board which was abolished shortly after PU YI was installed as Regent on 9 March 1932. R 4395
- 9 March 1932 R 4401
- Jan 1932 R 2795
- The Self-Governing Board issued a proclamation stating that the Northeastern provinces were faced with the need for developing at once a great popular movement for the establishment of a new independent state in Manchuria and Mongolia and it appealed to all the people in these provinces to overthrow CHANG Hsueh Liang and set up a new administration. R 2785
- 18 Feb 1932 A Declaration was published by the Self-Governing Guiding Board declaring that the Northeastern provinces, namely Fengtien, Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Jehol had been severed and that a new state should be established. The Board played an important part in the organizing of an independence movement in various provinces which resulted in setting up the new state of Manchukuo. R 2795
- DOIHARA played an active role in the activities of the Kyo-Wai-Kai. This organization was a powerful ideological front for the Manchurian Empire for the creation of a new order and the "Renovation of the Great East Asia." R 2794
- It was a channel through which the Fascist-racial ideas of the "New Order," and of the domination of the Japanese nation in Asia and the whole world were considered. R 7615
- It was founded by a committee in April 1932 in which Colonel ITAGAKI was a member. General HONJO, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army was Supreme Advisor. R 7614
- The ultimate purpose of the organization was to form a united front in the struggle of Japan against the Anglo-Saxon world and Comintern aggression. R 7608
- R 7606
- R 7606
- R 7607

To attain this purpose, Kyo-Wa-Kai was established to carry on a permanent ideological struggle both inside and outside Manchuokuo.

R 7607

V. DOIHARA's dealings with General MA in setting up puppet government in Northern Manchuria, and rewards for service in the 1931 Incident

Nov 1931 to Mar 1932	DOIHARA helped set up General MA Chan-Shan in a puppet government in Northern Manchuria. General MA Chan-Shan was Commander of Chinese troops in Northern Manchuria. General MA succeeded in getting his troops to Tsitsihar within the Russian Zone of northern Manchuria after the battle of the Nonni River. After negotiating with DOIHARA, General MA accepted the position of Minister of War in the Chang-Chun government which the Japanese set up. Negotiations leading to these developments were conducted from DOIHARA's office which he established in Harbin. After General MA accepted the job as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the puppet government he sent a wire to CHIANG Kai Shek, explaining that his acceptance of the job was related to the receipt by him of a million dollars in gold from Japanese military sources and he did not use any name except General DOIHARA with whom he said he had been in negotiations continuously, and who arranged the details.	R 2237-8 R 2239 R 2230 R 2231-2 R 2232 R 3231- R 3233-4
April 1932 to July 1934	DOIHARA stayed at Harbin in command of the 9th Brigade, after which he went to Mukden with the Japanese Special Service Organization.	R 15,715
1933	Jehol Incident	R 2392
	Japanese march to Great Wall line	R 2392
May 1933	Japanese advance to Tung-Chou only 40 miles from Peiping	R 2393
	Japanese advance along Tung-Chou line to Tientsin	R 2393
31 May 1933	Chinese troops were forced to withdraw from Tung-Chou to Tientsin pursuant to the Tang-Ku agreement	R 2393
15 Oct 1933	Assigned to Headquarters, Kwantung Army.	R 696 Exh 104
7 Feb 1934	Decorated with Second Order of Merit with the Sacred Treasure.	R 696 Exh 104
29 Apr 1934	Decorated with 5th Order of the Golden Kite and given a grant of 500 ¥.	R 696 Exh 104
April 1934	Decorated with Order of Double Rays for meritorious service in the incident between 1931-4.	R 696 Exh 104

VI. DOIHARA's connection with the opium traffic

	Opium trade until 1935, when the Opium Control Board was set up, was under the jurisdictional control of various service organizations of the Japanese Army. Mukden Special Service Organization was at the head of the Special Service organization relating to opium. At the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, DOIHARA was head of the Mukden Special Service Organization. He remained in that position until the control of opium traffic was transferred to the Opium Control Board.	R 15, 856 R 15,857 R 15,926 R 15, 857
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The duties of the Opium Monopoly Bureau were to collect and sell opium as one of the outer bureaus of the Manchurian Government. General TANAKA testified that, at the time he was there (time not stated), the yearly revenue from this source was twenty million yen and that this sum went to the Manchuokuo Government.

R 15,358

VII. DOIHARA's relation to the Hopeh-Chahar Regimes

June 1935

A dispute arose between the Chinese and Japanese as a result of the detention of certain Japanese Army officers who had no entry permits into Chahar Province, but who tried to enter the gates of Chang Pei District en route to Kalgou.

R 2311

DOIHARA represented the Japanese Garrison forces in this dispute and as a part of the settlement of this dispute it was provided that no further Chinese should migrate to northern Chahar Province and activities of the Kuomintang party should be withdrawn from the Province.

R 2311-3

The Hopeh-Chahar Political Council was the responsible institution in charge of political affairs in Hopeh-Chahar province and in the Peiping-Tientsin municipalities.

R 2318

Sept 1935

DOIHARA was sent to Peiping many times to investigate the formation of a North China autonomous government, to estrange the local government from the Central Government.

R 2314

Sept 1935

DOIHARA at the command of MINAMI, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army was attached to General SUNG Che-Yuan in Peiping-Tientsin area. Immediately after his arrival in Peiping, he came under the command of General TADA of the Japanese Army stationed in North China. He bent his efforts toward the autonomous movement with the intentions of the Kwantung Army and Japanese Army in North China in mind. He at first hoped when in Peiping to prevail upon WU Pei-Fu to become the central figure in the North China autonomous movement, but this plan failed. Later, as a result of his efforts two regimes were established in North China in November 1935. The East Hopeh anti-communist autonomous regime, which was completely separate from Nanking Government and the Hopeh Chahar, which was not completely separated from the Nanking Government, but stood for close collaboration with Japan.

R 2026-31

Sept 1935  
to summer  
of 1936

DOIHARA tried to accomplish the autonomy movement for this province, first by inducement and later by threats and demands.

R 2314-6

November 1935

DOIHARA controlled the negotiations following the northern Chahar Incident in June 1935.

R 2312-4

An agreement was reached between DOIHARA and CHING Teh-Chun of the Hopeh Chahar Regime under which it was agreed that Prince TEH would control the CHAHAR Regime and thus bring about Inner Mongolia Self-Government. DOIHARA exerted pressure on General SUNG to proclaim a North China autonomous government and made political and economic demands, the rejection of which, according to the testimony of General CHING Teh-Chun led up to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

R 2323-4

TANAKA also testified concerning DOIHARA's activities in the establishment of autonomous regimes in North China stating that instructions given by MINAMI to DOIHARA were to set up an autonomous regime in North China that would maintain close relationship with Manchuokuo, Manchuria and Japan, and would have as its motto -- "Anti-Communism."

R 2034

14 Dec 1935	Hopeh-Chahar Regime was established. The purpose of the Hopeh regime was to cooperate with Japan to establish intimate relations with Manchoukuo and to impress political and economic affairs of that area with Japanese desires, without infringing on Chinese sovereignty.	R 2104  R 2106-7
VIII. <u>DOIHARA's Military Commands activities and decorations from 1936 to 1945</u>		
End of February 1936 to 30 March 1937	DOIHARA was Commander of the First Depot Division in Tokyo.	R 15,715
7 March 1936	DOIHARA promoted to Lt. General. DOIHARA assigned to Headquarters, 12th Division.	R 696 Exh 104
23 March 1936	DOIHARA assigned to Headquarters, 1st Division.	R 696
7 May 1936	DOIHARA appointed Deputy Conscription Officer under First Division jurisdiction.	R 696
Summer of 1936 to 1937	The Japanese hoped to achieve economic monopoly in these provinces, but the demands were refused.	R 2324-5
March 1937 to 25 Aug 1937	DOIHARA was Commanding General of the 14th Division at Utsunomiya.	R 15,715
7 July 1937	CHING Teh-Chun testified that DOIHARA was the responsible figure in effecting the China Incident. He said that he (CHING) was personally "in the scene and handling the negotiations with him." (meaning DOIHARA).	R 2440
25 Aug 1937 to 1 June 1938	DOIHARA commanded the Fourteenth Division which became a part of the First Army and served in North China (Peiping to Hankow Drive).	R 15,715
9 Nov 1937	Received the First Order of Merit of the Sacred Treasure.	R 696 Exh 104
18 June 1938	DOIHARA was recalled to Tokyo to serve on the staff attached to the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters	R 697 Exh 104
August 1938 to June 1939	DOIHARA was in China to see what he could do about settling the Chinese War. He carried on negotiations with Tang Sho-I and OU Phi-Fu who was the original founder of the Kuomintang party. These people acted as intermediaries between CHANG Kai-Shek, but as Tang Sho-I was killed, the negotiations fell through.	R 15,715-6
From June 1939 to June 1940	DOIHARA served as Commander of the Fifth Army in Taonan, Manchuria.	R 15,716 p 697 Exh 104
June 1940 to May 1943	DOIHARA was appointed to serve as Supreme War Councillor.	R p 697 Exh 104
18 Apr 1940	Was decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun.	R 696 Exh 104
29 Apr 1940	DOIHARA decorated with second class of the Golden Kite for meritorious service in the Chinese Incident.	R 698 Exh 104
28 Apr 1941	DOIHARA promoted to full General.	R 697 Exh 104
6 Sept 1941	Assigned as Chief of Air Inspectorate General.	R 698 Exh 104



30 June 1941	DOIHARA attended a conference of Army members of the Supreme War Council at which TOJO and other officials explained the fast changing international situation, after which Japan's future attitude was discussed.	R 16,178
17 May 1942	DOIHARA was recommended for the German Grand Cross with citation "By constant close and friendly cooperation, with the Air Attache, he has in a leading position contributed, in the true sense of the Tri-partite Pact, to the extension and deepening of the Military alliance."	R 11,349 Exh 1272
1 Oct 1942	DOIHARA received the "Grand Cross of the German Eagle" from Hitler at the German Embassy, Tokyo, on which occasion, Ambassador OTT stated: "We acknowledge your merits in having, by your efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the War."	R 16,180 Exh 2247
1 May 1943	Became Commanding General of the Eastern District Army.  This Army Command embraced an area around Tokyo in which POW camps were stationed.  There is evidence of his having visited the NAOETSU POW Camp in Niigata Prefecture in September and October 1943. At this Camp, sixty prisoners died from starvation and ill-treatment.	R 698 Exh 104 R 16,257 Exh 2282  R 14,270-80
End of March 1944 to first part of April 1945	Became Commander of 7th Area Army at Singapore. This Command embraced Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and Borneo.  There is much evidence of mistreatment of POWs in these areas during the time DOIHARA was Commanding General.	R 698, Exh 104 R 15,716 Exh 2282 R 16,257 R 12,914 Exh 1516-18 Exh 1513-A R 12,529 R 12,924 R 16,257 Exh 2282 " 1497 R 12,891 Exh 1703 R 13,604 Exh 1766 R 13,781 Exh 1916 R 14,197 R 5491 and R 13,558
7 Apr 1945	DOIHARA became Chief Inspector General of Military Training.	Exh 104 R 698, 15,716
25 Aug 1945	Appointed to command the 12th Area Army and also the Eastern District Army.	R 699 Exh 104
14 Sept 1945	Appointed Commanding General of the First Army, General Headquarters and 12th Area Army and Eastern District Army.	Exh 104 R 699

1 copy Bohbana ~~to~~  
Summary +

Col. G. J. P. L.

7-28-47

A Concise Factual Statement  
of the Prosecution's Evidence concerning Kenji DOHIHARA

Prior to 1931 DOHIHARA had spent almost 18 years in China. Around 1925 he became "acquainted intimately" with OKAWA through "Kochi Sha" (Ex 2177A).

⊕ Evidence  
not introduced

⊕ He was reported to be involved in the murder of CHANG Tso-Lin at Huang Ku Tun, near Mukden on 4 June 1928 (Case File 48 - Serial 23).

In July 1931 he left Tokyo to take charge of Special Service Organization at Mukden and to investigate the case of Captain NAKAMURA. He "continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the NAKAMURA Case" in spite of the fact that an amicable settlement was well within sight (Ex 57 Lytton Report at page 64). Having arrived in Mukden on 18 August, he was again back in Tokyo early in September (Ex 2190), where he was quoted by the press as "the advocate of a solution of all pending issues if necessary by force and as soon as possible" (Ex 57 Lytton Report at page 66).

He was then a Colonel.

⊕ Because of his report to KOISO, then in charge of military affairs, Major General TATEKAWA, member of the Cherry Blossom Society in support of positive action in Manchuria, was dispatched to Mukden to suppress "the activities of the Chinese". However, "on the day that TATEKAWA arrived in Manchuria, the war broke out" (Case File 48 - Serial 9).

It will be noted that on the afternoon of 18 September 1931, MORISHIMA of Mukden Consulate "was unable to locate DOIHARA, then Chief of the Special Mission, and HANAYA, Assistant Chief. His "inability to locate any of the responsible military officers at 9:00 o'clock on the evening of September 18 coupled with the report with respect to General TATEKAWA travelling in civilian clothes to Mukden created quite a bit of apprehension" in his mind. But MORISHIMA found them all after the Incident broke out (Ex 245 T.Pp. 3018-9).

DOHIHARA was made Mayor of Mukden immediately after its occupation by the Japanese. He held this position until 26 November 1931.

Right after the Mukden Incident, a communication was sent from Major HANATANI, Tadashi, of Colonel DOHIHARA's staff to General HONJO at Port Arthur, stating that the chief strength of the Army must be gathered at Mukden and the Kwantung Army must dominate the important parts of the four eastern provinces (Outline of Manchurian Incident published by Army General Staff for Army officers only).

POWELL's testimony shows that, right after the Mukden Incident, DOHIHARA acted as the spokesman of General HONJO of the Kwantung Army (T.P. 3212).

At the end of October 1931 DOHIHARA was at Tientsin with instructions from the Kwantung Army to interview PU-YI and to tell him that the Kwantung Army would welcome his return to Manchuria (Ex 2190A). If these were his only instructions he greatly exceeded them. A series of Japanese consular telegrams to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA (Exhs 181, 288-294, 300 and 303) disclose that he actively engineered the return of PU-YI and his family to Manchuria against the wishes of his government and its national policy; that he admitted that the state of affairs in Manchuria had been brought about by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria; that he hinted that, if the government intervened in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army would separate from the government

and assassinations would break out in Tokyo and that he plotted an outbreak at Tientsin to prevent evacuation of Japanese forces therefrom. Exhibit 57 Lytton Report at pages 75-76 shows that trouble did break out in Tientsin on 8 and 26 November 1931.

At the end of November he took charge of the Special Service Organization at Harbin (Ex 2190A). Shortly after this he was endeavouring to arrange for MA Chan-Shan to accept the post of Minister for War in the Changchun puppet government (POWELL, T.P. 3231).

② Evidence not introduced

① DOHIHARA knew that it was in violation of the Nine Power Treaty when the Kwantung Army was planning to set up an independent state called Manchukuo (Case File 48 - Serial 24).

② DOHIHARA was among those who planned the Manchurian Incident as testified to by OKAWA, the author of the plan (Chuo Koron or the Central Review at page 42).

General CHING Teh-Chun at T.P. 2334 characterizes him as the instigator of the Mukden Incident and on T.P. 2437 tells the Tribunal that a week before the Mukden Incident some mutual friends of DOHIHARA and himself had told him that DOHIHARA was going to Manchuria to embark on some big project. Henry FU-YI stated that at the time of the Manchurian Incident he was reliably informed that for whatever accident or incidents that then happened DOHIHARA was the man who was pulling the strings behind (T.P. 4124). The Japanese government in 1934 gave him the credit of having played an important role in the aggressive war in China as, on the 29 April, he was "decorated with the Order of Double Rays for meritorious service in the Incident between 1931 and 1934" (Ex 104).

From April 1932 to July 1934 he was a Major General commanding a Brigade at Hiroshima, Japan.

③ In February 1934 he forwarded "North China Organization for Saving the Nation" Manifesto, a puppet document, to General NISHIO of the Kwantung Army (IPS Doc. 1763).

In July 1934 he was back at Mukden with the Special Service Organization and again was attached to the Kwantung Army. Throughout the period from 1931 to 1935 the control of opium was vested in the Special Service Organization of the Army. Large revenues were delivered from it, and these presumably remained with the Army until 1935 when Opium Control Board was set up and revenues went to Manchukuo Government (T.Pp. 15,855-8).

In September 1935, he, then Major General, at the command of MINAMI, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, was attached to General SUNG Che-Yuan, leader of the Peiping-Tientsin area in accordance with the UMEZU-HO agreement. "Immediately after his arrival in Peiping, he came under the command of Lieutenant General TANAKA of the Japanese Army stationed in North China. He bent his efforts towards the Autonomous Movement with the intentions of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army in North China in mind". He at first hoped, when in Peiping, to prevail upon WU Pei-Fu to become the central figure in the North China Autonomous Movement. But this plan failed. Later, however, as a result of his great efforts, two regimes were established in North China in November 1935: the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Regime which was completely separated from the Nanking Government and the Hopei-Chahar Regime which was not completely separated from the Nanking Government but stood for close collaboration with Japan (TANAKA, T.Pp. 2026-31). During the negotiations following the Northern Chahar Incident in June

1935, although TAKAHASHI, Wataru, Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in China also participated, it was DOHIHARA who actually controlled the whole thing (T.Pp. 2312-4). In November 1935 an agreement was reached between him and CHIN Teh-hum of the Hopei-Chahar Regime and it was agreed that the Chahar Regime would be under the control of Prince Teh, thus bringing about the Inner-Mongolian self-government (TANAKA T.Pp. 2041-2). He exerted pressure on General SUNG to proclaim a North China autonomous government and made political and economic demands the rejection of which, according to the evidence of General CHING Teh-Chun (2323-2334), led up to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Confirmation of attempt to form autonomous government in North China is contained in a Japanese consular telegram to Foreign Minister HIROTA on 2 October 1935 (Ex 197). TANAKA's testimony also shows that TANAKA in 1935 did see DOHIHARA report to Commander-in-Chief MINAMI regarding the establishment of autonomous regimes in North China. General CHIN's testimony shows that at that time DOHIHARA was assuming a double personality: Chief of the Special Service of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and Commander of the Japanese garrison force in Tientsin. He served in Peiping as counsellor to the Hopei-Chahar Regime from the end of November 1935 to March of 1936 when he became Commander of the First Division in absentia. His duty as adviser to the Hopei-Chahar Regime was to control its politics and economics in accordance with Japanese hopes (T.Pp. 2034-7). The East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government boasting a long sea-coast running from Manchukuo, after it was established, became the center of drug-smuggling and commodity-smuggling (GOETTE T.P. 3754). GOETTE saw DOHIHARA in an interview on 17 February 1936 at his office in Peiping (T.P. 3657) and attended a mock military manoeuvre with him outside Peiping in November 1936 (T.P. 3759).

⊗ Evidence not introduced.

⊗ In 1936 DOHIHARA made the following public statement: "Japan is seeking to make North China an experimental ground for actual sign of Japanese rapprochement by means of economic and military cooperation" (Case File 48 - Japan Weekly Chronicle, March 19, 1936).

In February or March 1936 he returned to Japan where he remained as Lieutenant General commanding a Division until 25 August 1937. After that he went to North China as commander of the 14th Division and took part in the drive from Peiping towards Hankow. He went to Japan again on 1 June 1938 but was sent back to China by his government in August 1938 to see what he could do about settling the war.

⊗ He tried to influence WU Pei-Fu in Peking and TANG Shao-Yi in Shanghai to head the new governments, but both died before the realization of the scheme (Affidavits of Mrs. WU Pei-Fu, etc.). A report from SAKANISHI to Foreign Minister UGAKI reveals that he worked with TSUDA and SAKANISHI in anti-Chiang Kai-Shek activities. He headed a Special Committee for China which was created at a five Ministers' conference on 26 July 1938 to enforce policies and help establish a new Chinese government. Liaison was to be maintained between the Committee and the Imperial Headquarters (IPS Doc. 2576). A telegram of MIURA from Shanghai to Foreign Minister ARITA, dated 10 June 1939, shows that DOHIHARA was among the mediators between WANG Ching-Wei and Japan (IPS Doc. 2576). A number of reports from the DOHIHARA Kikan also reveal his efforts exerted in the creation of the puppet regimes in connection with WANG Ching-Wei and WANG Ke-Min (IPS Doc. 1519). From June 1939

From June 1939 onwards he commanded the 5th Army in Tansen, Manchuria until June 1940 (Ex 2190A).

On 29 April 1940 he was decorated with the 2nd Class of the Golden Kite for meritorious service in the Chinese Incident (IPS Doc. 2932).

He became Supreme War Councillor on 28 September 1940 a post which he seems to have held sometime concurrently with other appointments until March 1944.

He was made full General on 28 April 1941 and appointed Chief of the Air Inspectorate General on 9 June 1941. At the end of June 1941 he attended a conference of the Army members of the Supreme War Council during which "candid views were exchanged" regarding the fast moving international situation preceding the Pearl Harbour of December 1941. TOJO was also at the conference giving explanations (Ex 2246 T.P. 16179). On 17 May 1942 he was recommended for the German Grand Cross with the citation: "By constant close and friendly cooperation with the Air Attache he has in a leading position contributed, in the true sense of the Tripartite Pact, to the extension and deepening of the Military alliance." (Ex 1272).

He received on 1 October 1942 the "Grand Cross of the German Eagle" from Hitler at the German Embassy, Tokyo, Ambassador OTT stated: "We acknowledge your merits in having by your efforts won glorious victories in the joint execution of the War" (T.P. 16180, Ex 2247).

He became Commander of the Eastern District Army on 1 May 1943 (Ex 104). This Army Command embraced an area around Tokyo in which prisoners of war camps were situated (Ex 2282). There is evidence of his having visited the NAOEISU POW Camp in NIGATA prefecture in September or October 1943. At this camp 60 prisoners died from starvation and ill-treatment. Conditions did not improve after his visit (T.Pp. 14270-14280). Article 3 of the Prisoner of War Internment Camp Ordinance (Ex 92) places responsibility for administration of the camp on Army Commander, and therefore DOHIMARA was directly responsible for the condition at this camp and others in his area of command and the deaths that resulted therefrom.

In March 1944 he became Commander of the 7th Area Army at Singapore and retained that pointment until early April 1945 (Ex 104). This Command embraced MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA and BORNEO (Ex 2282). It is sufficient to direct our attention generally to evidence given as to treatment of prisoners of war in those areas and the thousands of murders and unnecessary deaths that took place there. For the reasons stated above DOHIMARA must take direct responsibility for treatment of prisoners of war in those areas between March 1944 and early April 1945 (Exhs 1513A - 1516A, 1518A, 2282, 1497, 1703, 1766, 1916, Colonel WILD's evidence at page 5491 and RINGER's evidence at page 13558).

NOTE: \* Evidence not yet introduced.

7-1-47 (2)

JCTL:REM

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton  
FROM: James T. C. Liu  
SUBJECT: Doihara, 1937 to 1939

We have so far, evidence against Doihara's secret activities in China: In 1928 as the Advisor to General Chang in Manchuria; during Manchuria incident in 1931 as Resident Advisor of the Kwantung Army at Mukden, and 1934 to 35 as Chief of Secret Service Organ at Mukden, and also active in political disturbances both in North China and in Mongolia. On the last point, we have also processed IPS Document #1763, ready to be used when Doihara takes the stand.

To follow up, we are in need of evidence of his activities in the later period after 1937.

1. Doihara actually had a secret organ of his name working on Chinese puppets 1938 to 1939, as per copy of my memorandum to Mr. Monaghan. I suggest an affidavit be taken from that informant, or some other even better qualified.

2. IPS Document 820-H, now in process, reveals that the Five Ministers' Conference decided in 1938 that the "Special Committee on China Affairs" was defined as an organ with Doihara, Tsuda, and Benzai as the central figures. (Tsuda was a naval officer, while Benzai was a retired general, specialized in Chinese affairs, in fact, a forerunner of Doihara's type.)

3. IPS Document #1005-22, being a record of Japanese Embassy in Peking, entitled "The problem of Fei Fu's Taking Official Position". However, Mr. Laverge and I, both have the opinion that the document contains far too much details about the complicated politics among the Chinese puppets, that its processing would be advisable to be held up pending our decision after Doihara completes his testimony.

I will make a summary of the pertinent points about Doihara in this document for the use of it as information to cross-examine Doihara.

I would like to know whether you consider it to be necessary to explore further. If so, as I am afraid there cannot be much in our unintroduced documents, I would suggest that it be made an assignment to the Investigative Division.

JAMES C. T. LIU

1 cc Mr. Laverge

7-1-47 (?)

A SUMMARY OF IPS DOCUMENT NO. 1005-22  
"THE PROBLEM OF WU PEI-FU'S TAKING OFFICIAL POSITION"

This is a document which primarily implicates Lt. General DOIHARA. Since it involves too many details of politics among various Chinese puppets, it is believed that a summary of the pertinent points therein will serve better the purpose of cross-examination.

The document is a carbon copy of a handwritten report by HAYASHIDE, Kenjiro, a Staff Member of the Japanese Embassy in Peking, on 14 April 1939.

- 1- In the summer of 1938, CHANG, Premier of Manchukuo suggested to War Minister ITAGAKI that he urge WU to take up political activities. The project was assigned to Lt. General DOIHARA.
- 2- DOIHARA in August 1938, together with Lt. General BENSAN, Major General OSEKO and Vice Admiral TSUDA, devised the plan to put WU as the military leader and TANG (who was in Shanghai) as the political leader, through the efforts of a Chinese politician in North China, CHANG, Yen-ching and another politician in Central China, CHEN, Chung-fu.
- 3- The idea was for WU and TANG to issue a joint statement for the suspension of hostilities. However, TANG was assassinated and WU refused to issue it all by himself.
- 4- In October, 1938, the DOIHARA KIKAN (organ) in Peking adopted the plan of a Formosan adventurer (Ronin) by the name of LI, Shi-tou. It was to set up a pacification headquarters and a preparatory committee of People's Congress at Peking, to form a political group to support WU. Both the Provisional Government, already established since December, 1937, and the Japanese Army in North China were against it. As a result, Lt. General KITA, Chief of the Army Special Service Department in Peking, ordered LI, the Formosan, to leave Peking. The plan was cancelled after a conference of the central authorities in Tokyo at about 21 November 1938.
- 5- In spite of the repeated pressure of CHEN, Chung-fu, WU refused, or put up objections, to the various plans to get him to become a political leader in favor of peace with Japan. DOIHARA went to Hankow. He was there advised by OKAMURA, Commander of the Japanese Forces at Hankow and MARIOKA, Chief of the Special Service Department at Hankow.

*preparatory*



\*  
to set up WU with Hankow as base of his activities, by the reason that WU was once before the war-lord there.

BENSAI  
6- By the decision of Tokyo, the Japanese Army in China was ordered to make the North China Provisional Government and Central China Renovation Government cooperate with the project of the Special Committee on China Affairs. (In this connection, reference is made to IPS Document No. 820-H or No. 1685-C which define the Special Committee on China Affairs as an organ with DOIHARA, TSUDA and ~~SAKAWISHI~~ as the nucleus). KITA told the North China Government and HARADA told the Central China Government to discuss it at the meeting of the Joint Committee of the two regimes.

7- DOIHARA was present at the meeting of the Joint Committee, on and after 22 January 1939. WANG, of the North China regime, made a few stipulations to limit the proposed activities of WU to Hankow and further southwest into the interior. In spite of this, the Joint Committee proposed a letter to support WU to come forward as the Chairman of the pacification committee which would be set up to recreate an army.

8- The two regimes in North China and Central China, in open secrecy, tried to undermine the influence of WU by ordering the dissolution of the Peace and National Salvation Society, the organ of WU's activities. So far, WU had failed to clarify his exact attitude. He seemed to be asking for certain conditions, at the time, and failing in this, he would refuse to come up. On or about 4 March, 1939 DOIHARA and CHEN, Chung-fu went to Peking and threatened WU that they would discontinue the negotiation with him, if WU would not make his standpoint clear. On 14 March, 1939, DOIHARA and CHEN had their final interview with WU. WU still played with time, insisting that he must be made the Commander-in-chief and nominal leader of the occupied area in China, asking DOIHARA to make further efforts, and remarking that it would be no use to hurry.

9- At the end of this document, it mentioned that the Special Committee on China Affairs was dissolved. (Without any documental proof so far, the conjecture was that the date was some time in late March or early April, 1939).

In connection with this document it should be noted that DOIHARA was:

- a. a nucleus of the Special Committee on China Affairs, July 1938 to April 1939;
- b. maintaining a secret organ known as the DOIHARA KIKAN in Peking and Shanghai (the latter was closed down in April 1939 according to the testimony of KAGESA in response to cross-examination based upon IPS Document No. 1005);
- c. maintaining a secret organ - might be the same as the above mentioned one -- known as the TAKE KIKAN, or literally, the Bamboo organ. (Reference is made to memorandum from James T. C. Liu to Mr. Edward Monaghan, 20 June 1947 in which an Affidavit is suggested to testify on the information that OKADA was in charge of the Pine organ, DOIHARA the Bamboo organ and KAGESA the Plum organ, the last point has already been admitted by KAGESA himself).

It is believed that this summary has covered the secret activities of DOIHARA in China after 1937, as revealed by this document, and information already mentioned in the proceedings. A draft of the English translation of the complete text is now kept by the Chinese Division.

||  
*so far*

*never*

*James T. C. Liu*  
JAMES T. C. LIU

5 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge Nyi  
Dr. Ao  
Mr. Sutton  
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

Dohihara

WITNESS

*Defendant*  
Dohihara, Kenji

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info. from MID Report

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret; however, this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

*E P M*

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Incl  
(Described above)

General Kenji DOIHARA: Inspector General of Military Training. Member  
Supreme Military Council.

1883 Aug. Born Okayama Prefecture; 2nd son of Yoshinaga  
Doihara; m. Kayo, 2nd daughter of Kingo  
Okada.

1904 Graduated Military Academy; 2nd Lieutenant,  
Infantry.

1907 1st Lieutenant, Infantry.

1912 Graduated Military Staff College  
Attached General Staff Headquarters

1913 Captain, Infantry

1919 Major, Infantry

1922-23 In Manchuria as "Special Agent" under Gen.  
Shigeru Honjo

1923 Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry

1924 Advisor to Chinese Government

1927 Attached to Headquarters, 1st Division

" Colonel, Infantry

1928 Advisor to Marshal Chang Tso-lin (in Manchuria)  
and later to his son, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

1929 Commander 30th Infantry Regiment

1931 Head of Kwantung Army's Special Service Section  
Mukden

1932 Head of Special Service Section, Harbin.

1933 Major General Commander 9th Infantry Brigade.

1936 Head of Kwantung Army's Special Service Section,  
Mukden

1937 Highest Advisor to North China Autonomous  
Government. (Lieutenant General)

1937-39 Commander Home Unit of 1st Division  
Commander Home Unit of 14th Division  
Commander 14th Division in China and took  
part in various engagements in North China  
and Southward.

1940 Member Supreme Military Council; Commandant,  
Military Academy.

1941 Apr General

1941 June Inspector General of Military Aviation

1943 May 1 Commander Eastern Military Defense Zone of Japan

1944 Mar Relieved of foregoing post and appointed Commander  
in Chief, 7th Area (Singapore)

1945 Apr Inspector General of Military Training

1945 May Concurrently Member Supreme Military Council.

Address: 107 Shimorenjaku, Mitaka-machi, Tokyo (1941-42)

So-called "Lawrence of Manchuria" and one of most sinister figures  
in the China scene (9) As head of Kwantung Army's Special Service Section  
at different times and places was arch conniver and arranger of "incidents."  
(25) His presence indicated where trouble would next occur. Was in Mukden  
when Kwantung Army moved to occupy Manchuria and acted as Mayor of Mukden  
for one month. In Tientsin when Henry Pu Yi (Now Emperor of Manchukuo)

left there on Japanese ship for Dairen; in Harbin just prior to Kwantung Army's advance into North Manchuria in 1932. (26) In Nov. 1935 failed in long campaign to create an autonomous North China under Japanese control because of unexpected assertion of authority by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and apparently by Tokyo Foreign Office also. A few days later the East Hopei Autonomous Federation (including Teintsin) came into being under a Chinese puppet. In 1936 China created semi-autonomous North China regime. (27) Doihara was suddenly recalled from China in 1936, supposedly because Tokyo authorities believed his usefulness there had temporarily ended. (28) Appointment to Supreme Military Council in 1940 believed to have taken place to make his specialized knowledge of China and Manchuria available to that body (29)

Just prior to his being relieved as Commander of Eastern Military Defense Zone in March 1944, Doihara was reported to have been in Canton where he conducted meetings of Japanese officials. Subsequent inhuman treatment of captured U.S. aviators and terror tactics against Chinese villagers who aided other downed U.S. fliers were reported possibly resulting from his South China activities. (30)

In 1936 U.S. Military Attache in Tokyo described Doihara as meeting foreigners easily, possessing attractive personality with good sense of humor, and talking freely. Sociable but a moderate drinker. U.S. Military Attache in Peiping in same year reported he gave impression of a man of very ordinary capacities and decidedly inferior character, despite reputation as master hand at intrigue and skulduggery. Member of Black Dragon Society. Mentioned in several books, among them Secret Agent of Japan (Vespa); Tokyo Record (Tolischus); Biography of Chiang Kai-shek (Chang).

21 Jan 47

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Edward P. Monaghan, Chief, Investigative Div.  
 FROM: James C. T. Liu  
 SUBJECT: *Defendant* Doihara Kikan (Organ)

Mr. Yamamoto has brought me a report of the Japanese Demobilization Bureau signed by Mr. Tanaka. The covering letter said that records were burned--however, he recollects as a sure knowledge, the following:-

1. Matsu Kikan or "The Pine Organ"--it was under Staff Member Okada of the China Expeditionary Force Headquarters in Shanghai for the purpose of collecting information of the Chungking Government. It was incorporated in summer 1942 into a new Shanghai office of the Army.

2. Take Kikan or "The Bamboo Organ"---it was under the accused Doihara in Peking, for the purpose of securing leaders to initiate peace movements and the establishment of a New Central Government. It was established in summer 1938 when the Japanese projects on TANG Shou-Yi and General WU Pei-Fu took place. It was dissolved in Autumn 1939 with the death of WU, while during that period, TANG had already been assassinated. Take Kikan was also known as Doihara Kikan. In this connection, reference is made to the testimony of Kagesa which proves that Doihara Kikan also maintained an office in Shanghai up to March or April 1939.

3. Ume Kikan, or "The Plum Organ", it was under Kagesa, as admitted by himself. However, after its dissolution and the simultaneous establishment of the Wang Government, the Military Advisory Department in the Wang Government, still under Kagesa was sometimes referred to by its old name Ume Kikan. The last point was not admitted by Kagesa.

So far we have no evidence against Doihara on his secret activities in China, it is suggested hereby that an affidavit to the above effect should be taken from Mr. Tanaka or other person who might know even better as to the same.

JAMES C. T. LIU

cc - Mr. Sutton

11 March 1946

MEMO TO : Executive Committee

FROM : Lt Col Wm. T. Hornaday

SUBJECT : Recommendations regarding DOIHARA, Kenzi.

1. I recommend that General DOIHARA be considered as a witness in the International Prosecution case rather than as a defendant. The reasons based on interrogations of General DOIHARA and of outside witnesses follow in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. General TANAKA, Ryukichi, states that DOIHARA has always been one of the loudest exponents for expansion in China; that he has always been, from the days of his captaincy between 1915 and 1919 when he first went to China, a member of or active supporter of the Tokum Kikan, Japanese special service organization, the department which conducted secret espionage and had a hand in all the opium and narcotics traffic in occupied areas. DOIHARA himself denies that he was ever connected with Tokum Kikan until his first specific and open assignment thereto in August 1931, when as a colonel he was made chief of the Tokum Kikan at Mukden, Manchuria. He admits being on duty in Peking, China in 1928 as a colonel, assistant to General BANZAI who at that time was Military Advisor to Marshal CHANG Tso-lin. TANAKA states that at that time actually DOIHARA was a member of the HONJO Tokum Kikan at Peiking. These two Kikans, that is BANZAI's and HONJO's, were opponents and bitter enemies. On June 3, 1928, when the train of Marshal CHANG was blown up by a bomb near Mukden, DOIHARA states he knows nothing about the background of the murder of the Marshal. TANAKA states that since the Marshal's train started from Peiking to go to Mukden, and since DOIHARA's Kikan (HONJO's) investigated the murder immediately afterward, DOIHARA unquestionably knows all the facts regarding it. However, TANAKA states that the entire plot was the creature of one Colonel KOMOTO, who was the senior staff officer on the Kwantung Army General Staff. KOMOTO is alive today and our Investigation Division has initiated proceedings to have him apprehended and brought in for interrogation. Other participants and witnesses to this murder living today are also being apprehended. Full list will be found in TANAKA's interrogations.

Memo to: Exec. Committee, fr. Lt Col Hornaday, dtd 11 Mar 46

3. As to the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the war Ministry's official log of DOIHARA's assignments confirm that he went to China and Manchuria in August, 1931. He claims his assignment and that of his organization at Mukden was principally to investigate the alleged murder of Captain NAKAMURA, which was the main incident used by the Japanese as an excuse for starting the Manchurian Incident. He states that he left Mukden on telegraphic orders from Tokyo to report to the War Ministry the results of his investigation and he departed from Mukden about September 4th or 5th. He arrived in Tokyo on September 10, confirmed by the stories in "The Japan Times" and the Asahi Shimbun newspapers in Tokyo. He admits conferring with all of the highest officials in the War Ministry and the Foreign Ministry, and his departure to Mukden from Tokyo on September 15 is confirmed by other newspaper stories in the same papers which also confirm his claim that he stopped at Kobe en route for a short time on personal business. He claims that he arrived in Mukden on September 20, a day and a half after fighting had commenced. This again is confirmed by said newspapers and also by General TANAKA. He denies having any knowledge of any plans to begin the fighting and also denies that there were any such plans on the part of the Japanese. General TANAKA confirms his lack of knowledge in advance of the beginning of fighting because TANAKA states DOIHARA was personally disliked and distrusted by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, OHO (now dead), ITAGAKI, ISHIHARA and TATEKAWA (now dead), the conspirators who planned the entire thing. However, General TANAKA states that beyond question DOIHARA has since learned all the facts regarding the beginning of the Incident. Several of the officers who were directly concerned with the beginning of the fighting and ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA are now being searched for to be brought in for interrogation. Again full list can be obtained from TANAKA's interrogations.

4. Approximately a month after the beginning of fighting in October of 1931, DOIHARA admits that he went to Tientsin under orders given to him by ITAGAKI, Chief of Second Section, General Staff, Kwantung Army. From General HONJO, commanding the Kwantung Army, to contact Henry Pu-Yi and deliver the message to him that if he should return to Manchuria he would be heartily welcomed by the Kwantung Army. DOIHARA admits that he knew at the time this was an invitation to Pu-yi to return to head a new government to be established by the Japanese in Manchuria and knew also that Pu-yi would and did so understand him. He admits also that at that time he and other Kwantung



Memo to: Exec. Committee, fr Lt Col Hornaday, dtd 11 Mar 46

Army officers concerned knew that the Nine Power Treaty guaranteed the sovereignty of China. DOIHARA would be an excellent witness on this point.

5. In 1938 DOIHARA admits that he was sent, while a lieutenant general, as chief of a special mission, known as the DOIHARA Kikan, to contact three members of the Kuomintang Party of China who were willing to sell out CHIANG Kai-shek and the National Government of China, to arrange such a sell-out. These three men were TANG Shao-yi, one of the charter members of the Kuomintang Party with Dr. SUN Yat-sen, WU Pei-fu, and the third a minor military figure who was rather obscure in the arrangements. This was a conspiracy definitely to promote revolution in China engineered by the Japanese and DOIHARA so admits. The conspiracy was a failure because the Chinese Tai Li organization (the Espionage Service of China) learned of the plot and rubbed out the Chinese concerned. DOIHARA would be an excellent witness on this point. General TANAKA confirms this matter in all details.

6. In 1940 DOIHARA was made a full general, member of the Supreme Military Council, and ten days later Commanding General of the Japanese Military Academy at Tokyo. In 1941 he was made Inspector General of Aviation, one of the very powerful positions of the Japanese Army. In 1943 he became Inspector General of Military Education, one of the three highest positions in the Army and War Ministry. In 1944 he took command of the Seventh Area Army at Singapore and in 1945 he returned to Tokyo and took command of the Eastern Area Defense Army, based on Tokyo. During all these latter periods he remained a member of the Supreme Military Council. Therefore he participated in the voting for military action about the 1st of December, 1941, along with the other members of the Supreme Military Council.

7. In all the periods between those mentioned specifically herein he was carrying on the normal activities of military command. There is not on shred of evidence acceptable in the court to establish any other activities. Many intelligence reports are on hand concerning his underhanded and conspiratorial activities at different times all over China, but such reports totally lack probative value. For these reasons I submit that DOIHARA would be much more valuable as a witness than as a defendant.

WM. T. HORNADAY,  
Lt Colonel, Inf.

4/4 1630

Through Hq. of the Kwantung Army	Through Number 31 Aug. 1934
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Received by the Headquarters of the 7th Expeditionary Division	
5 September	1934
Way of Receipt - ordinary	

TOP SECRET

MUKDEN Special Mission No. 44

28 August 1934

DIVISION COMMANDER	signature
CHIEF OF STAFF	seal
STAFF OFFICER A	signature
STAFF OFFICER B	seal
STAFF OFFICER C	
OFFICER IN CHARGE	
OFFICER CONCERNED	

From: DOHIHARA, Kenji  
Chief of the Army  
Special Mission at MUKDEN.

TAJIMA (Seal)

(Seal)

CHIEF  
OF  
ARMY  
SPECIAL  
MISSION  
At  
MUKDEN

SUBJECT: (POLITICAL) CURRENT POLITICAL  
SITUATION IN CHINA (GENERAL).

OPERATIONS  
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of General Staff 2  
Vice-Min. of  
War 2

/p.1/

Outline of SUZUKI, Nobuo's Letter.

(Received on 27th of August)

Mr. SUZUKI, after visiting various places in the south for about three weeks, has come back to TIENTSIN recently.

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/p.6/

III. One or two social observations:

1) In South China mere mentioning the names of Major Generals DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI tends to cause great alarm.

2) This year it is extremely bad in South China; not only most of the cultivated areas but also most of the rivers in various places have dried up. This year's crops, therefore, is expected to be very poor.

3) In South China ill feeling toward Japan is very deep-rooted and it seems that it is not likely to be wiped out so easily as in North China.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.  
I.P.S. No. 1763-B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 28 Aug., 1934, and described as follows: "(Political) Current Political Situation in China (General)" FROM: DOIHARA, Kenji, Chief of the Army Special Mission at Mukden.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this

2 day of Aprl. 1947.

Witness: /s/ Shinaji Kobayashi

/s/ Kaneo Ishitashi  
Signature of Official (SEAL)  
Non-regular of the Archives and  
Document Section of the 1st Demobi-  
lization Bureau.  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

2d day of April, 1947.

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt., Inf.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity