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MISSION #35 BANGKOK "CAPACIOUS 5"
7 February 1945

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XX BOMBER COMMAND



Tactical Mission Report

No. 35

DATE 7 FEBRUARY 1945

GENERAL OF THE ARMIES H. H. ARNOLD

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* 3 Mar 1954 *
* Date Initials *
* * * * *

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C
AFC 493

TACTICAL MISSION

REPORT

Field Orders No. 35

Mission No. 35

TARGET: RAMA VI BRIDGE, BANGKOK, THAILAND

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section
XX Bomber Command

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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C
AFC 493

3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 7 February 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington, 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING: The 40th Bombardment Group and the 468th Bombardment Group of the XX Bomber Command were directed by Field Orders Number 35 to participate in a daylight strike on D-day against the Rama VI Railroad Bridge at Bangkok, Thailand. The Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

| <u>Group</u> | <u>Base</u> | <u>Commanding Officer</u> |
|--------------|-------------|---------------------------|
| 40th | Chakulia | Colonel W.H. Blanchard |
| 468th | Kharegpur | Colonel J.V. Edmundson |

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 35.

b. Targets Specified:

(1) Primary Target: Rama VI Railroad Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand (AAF Target No. 98.2-45)

(2) Secondary Target: Railroad Marshalling Yard and Jetties, Martaban, Burma (XX Bomber Command Target Chart No. 30)

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets:

(1) Primary Target: Bangkok is now the principal control and supply center for troops and material being moved into the Burma theatre of operations. With the mining of the Menam River, water borne traffic has been restricted to small coasters and an occasional medium sized merchant vessel. In October of 1944 a 250 foot M/V observed at the new docks was reported to be the first vessel of this size to enter the river since the previous May. Ocean going ships destined for Bangkok may anchor off the Koh Sichang Islands, 30 miles south of the mouth of the river, and tranship by lighters or unload at small ports along the east coast of the Malay peninsula and move their cargo to Bangkok by rail. Rail traffic has, therefore, become the critical factor in maintaining the Japanese war effort in the Burma-Thailand areas. There is one main line leading into Bangkok from French Indo-China from which point it branches in three directions, to north Thailand, to Burma, and to the Malay peninsula and Singapore. All rail traffic must pass over the Rama VI Railroad Bridge, the only means by which rolling stock may be transferred to and from the north - south lines to the east - west lines.

(2) Secondary Target: Ferries carrying goods and personnel ply between the jetties at Martaban and those at Moulmein thus bridging the gap in the Burma-Thailand Railroad caused by the Salween

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and Gyaing Rivers. There is thus a railroad terminal at both towns for the reception of rolling stock and there are also warehouses for storing supplies awaiting trans-shipment. The rail yards at Martaban are currently very active, reflecting present events in Burma. On recent photo coverage an average of over 100 cars has been observed at Martaban at any one time; on 1 January there were 140 cars in the yards and on 4 January, 116. Destruction of rolling stock and facilities at Martaban will complicate the Japanese problems of supply and of retreat from Burma.

b. Details of Planning:

(1) Operational Planning

(a) It was originally planned to strike the Singapore area with 112 sorties on 7 February. Due to instructions from Higher Headquarters, this mission was cancelled and it was planned to use all available sorties on a mission to be run 8 February. Existing weather conditions limited this to a great extent in the selection of targets. It was not felt that over 100 sorties would be necessary to destroy the Rama VI Bridge at Bangkok; therefore, it was decided to divide the 112 available sorties evenly and send half of the striking force against the Rama VI Bridge and half against the Naval Dry Dock at Saigon, French Indo-China.

(b) Each Group was ordered to furnish 32 airborne aircraft. The 40th and 468th Groups were to strike Bangkok and the 444th and 462nd Groups were to strike Saigon.

(c) Because of the light defenses in both areas it was decided that bombing altitudes would be 18,000 and 20,000 feet at both targets.

(d) These missions, while of relatively small strategic value, provided tactical targets which would be good experience for the newer crews of the Groups and at the same time afford a means of utilizing the available sorties to the best possible advantage.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load:

(a) The field orders prescribed that each group was to furnish 32 aircraft airborne. Each aircraft was to be loaded with 1000-pound general-purpose bombs, fused .10 second nose and .10 second tail delay.

(b) The Rama VI Bridge is a 5 span, steel girder, lattice-type bridge of cantilever construction, 1456 feet in length and approximately 45 feet in width. In addition to shore abutments there are four masonry piers supporting the structure each of which is formed by two round, twin columns approximately 12 feet in diameter and 16 feet apart.

(c) The most vital section of the bridge is the 394 foot central span which rests on the two central piers, because the center span is cantilevered, its weight is largely supported by the two central masonry piers which are the most critical points in the structure. The destruction of either one of these piers would cause the collapse of at least two spans, namely, the center span and one intermediate span; consequently either could be used as an aiming point. The estimated rectangular dimension of each pier is 40 x 12 feet. However, employing a 1000 - pound G.P. bomb and assuming that,

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properly fused, such a bomb detonating within 15 feet of the pier would destroy it, the vulnerable dimensions of each of the central piers is approximately 70 x 42 feet.

(d) Although the total area occupied by the bridge is approximately 65,520 square feet, calculation showed that the total possible fuse activating surface within the area occupied by the bridge is only 45% of the total area. On this basis roughly 55 out of 100 short delay fused bombs placed within the area occupied by the bridge could be expected to pass through the area without their fuses being activated. The destruction of the two central piers could best be accomplished by uprooting them, subjecting them to repeated shock waves, progressively undermining them, or momentarily shifting the weight of the superstructure. The probability of attaining this end is infinitely increased by the use of long delay fuses. Serious consideration was given to the feasibility of employing a portion of the striking force with 1000-pound G.P. bombs with a nose plug and a 4-5 second tail delay. Since the M-117 tail fuse was not available, it was finally decided to employ 1000-pound G.P. bombs fused .10 second nose and, 10 second tail delay. At the designated altitudes and air speeds the striking velocity of a 1000-pound G.P. bomb is approximately 1040 feet per second. Since the distance from the highest point on the chord of the bridge to the mean water level is 74 feet and the distance from the top of the piers to the bedrock on which they are erected is 74-91 feet depending on the tide, the designated fusing would insure that even those bombs which hit a fuse-activating surface would not be detonated until they were in close proximity to the bottom of the pier. Bombs so fused having the water as their first point of impact would detonate an estimated 10-15 feet below the bed of the river and would, if placed within the vulnerable area of the piers, affect their stability. The bombs whose fuses were activated by contact with the lattice work above the bridge could be expected to detonate below the surface of the water exerting considerable hydraulic ramming effect on the piers.

c. Bombing Data:

(1) Bombing was to be accomplished by 3-plane formations on a heading of 68 degrees magnetic from the following pressure altitudes: 468th Group - 18,000 feet; 40th Group - 20,000 feet.

(2) Aiming points were established as follows: primary target - visual, center of the Rama VI Bridge, and radar - center of the city of Bangkok; secondary target - center of rolling stock in yards at Martaban.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes A and K):

a. Take-off:

(1) Times of take-off were not specified in the Field Orders, but were left to the discretion of the Group Commanders. An arrival time at Group assembly points was specified. Each of the Groups was given a different assembly point.

(2) Take-off was accomplished as follows:

| <u>Group</u> | <u>A/C Airborne</u> | <u>First A/C Off</u> | <u>Last A/C Off</u> |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 40th | 32 | 2230Z-a | 2323Z-a |
| 468th | 32 | 0058Z | 0150Z |
| Total | 64 | 2230Z-a | 0150Z |

a. D-day minus one

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(2) Weather at both bases at take-off was clear with visibility restricted to from 3 to 4 miles by haze and ground fog. Winds were from the north at 2 miles per hour at Kharagpur and from the west at 2 miles per hour at Chakulia. Take-offs at Kharagpur was delayed approximately one half hour by ground fog.

b. Route Out:

(1) The route out for both Groups was from base to Diamond Island to a separate assembly point for each Group to a common initial point at Mondhol Rajburi to the target.

(2) Deviations from the route to the target were few and minor. One aircraft of the 40th Group jettisoned its bombs in the Bay of Bengal and returned to base. One aircraft of the 468th Group bombed the secondary target and three aircraft of this Group returned to base with bombs due to engine trouble.

c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 64 aircraft airborne, 58 bombed the primary target at Bangkok. Bombing was accomplished by 18 separate formations of from 2 to 4 aircraft each. Aircraft of the 40th Group dropped 371 bombs on the target from 0325Z to 0420Z at altitudes varying from 19,600 feet indicated to 21,200 feet true on magnetic headings varying from 67 to 97 degrees magnetic. Aircraft of the 468th Group dropped 324 bombs on the target from 0548Z to 0637Z at altitudes varying from 18,500 feet to 19,200 feet true on magnetic headings varying from 62 to 78 degrees magnetic. During an interval of 3 hours and 12 minutes the 18 formations dropped 695 1000-pound bombs in the primary target area - a total of 353.9 short tons (using the actual weight of the bombs - 1019 pounds). All bombing was accomplished visually.

(2) Bombing altitudes varied from approximately 18,500 feet to 21,000 feet and indicated air speeds from 184 to 199 miles per hour.

(3) Visibility at the target was unrestricted and the ceiling was unlimited except for a slight amount of cirrus clouds at 30,000 feet.

d. Secondary Target:

One aircraft of the 468th Group dropped 12 1000-pound bombs on the secondary target at Martaban at 0600Z from 17,000 feet indicated on a heading of 32 degrees magnetic at an indicated air speed of 240 miles per hour. Bombs were observed falling into the river short and to the right of the target.

e. Route Back:

(1) Aircraft proceeded from the target to Tavoy Point to base except for 1 aircraft of the 468th Group which was unable to release its bombs over the primary target and flew direct from the primary to the secondary target and back to base.

(2) Weather at bases on return was clear with visibility 7 to 8 miles.

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5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Seventeen of the 18 formations bombing the Rama VI Bridge or 95 percent of the total aircraft (59) over the area encountered meager and inaccurate (75%) to accurate (25%) heavy anti-aircraft fire from 0334Z to 0638Z at altitudes varying from 18,500 to 21,200 feet under CAVU conditions. All aircraft reported black bursts while 9 observed white flak and 2 reported grey and brown bursts. From 1 to 6 bursts were observed at one instant resulting in totals of from 1 to 30 bursts. Continuously Pointed fire was directed against all formations. Fire commenced from 5 minutes before to 3 minutes after bombs away and ended from 3 minutes before to 3 minutes after bomb release.

b. Meager and inaccurate black and white heavy anti-aircraft fire was reported from Don Meung airfield by two formations at 0604Z and 0622Z, each two minutes after bombs away at an altitude of 19,100 feet under CAVU conditions.

c. Three aircraft of a total of 7 in two formations reported black heavy anti-aircraft fire at 0343Z and 0403Z at 15,600 and 16,000 feet altitude respectively under CAVU conditions at Tavoy Point.

d. One formation observed 6 cigar-shaped, silver colored, conventional barrage balloons over the mouth of the Tavoy River at 0450Z from 16,000 feet. The balloons were reported as anchored to vessels in the river and were flying at approximately 2000 feet.

e. As no enemy aircraft were sighted in the Bangkok area prior to the first bombs away time and the first formation failed to meet any anti-aircraft opposition it is possible that the enemy did not have prior warning of the attack. This was possibly due to aircraft of other groups which, in their attack on Saigon, penetrated enemy territory before those aircraft directed against Bangkok on the same date.

6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

There was no enemy air opposition on this mission.

7. WEATHER (See Annex D):

a. The weather as encountered was substantially as forecast and had no adverse effect on the outcome of the mission except at Kharagpur where take-off was delayed one-half hour by ground fog. The weather was excellent for formation flying and high altitude precision bombing. Visibility at base was slightly restricted on return due to haze.

8. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex E):

a. Communications during this mission were good. All aircraft of both Groups were accounted for by bombs away messages and by 400 mile from Base Position Reports.

b. There were no violations of transmission security and only three violations of the Tactical Doctrine, all by aircraft of the 40th Group which transmitted "YYY" type position reports in place of the encoded position report required when 400 miles from base.

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- c. One aircraft of the 468th Group made use of D/F facilities, obtaining a class I bearing.
- d. Air-to-air homing was not used on this mission.
- e. There were 7 malfunctions of equipment during the mission, 3 of which were remedied in flight.

9. RADAR (See Annex F):

- a. Bombing on this mission was entirely visual with radar as an aid. The target was not a radar target, however, radar operators did identify terrain features which helped to align the directions of the aircraft in advance of the bombing run.
- b. Radar scope photography was below average but a number of bombing run photographs were obtained.
- c. The serviceability of the radar systems was above average on this mission.

10. RCM (See Annex G):

- a. Four RCM search aircraft each with a bottom-mount D/F antenna participated in this mission. Of the four, two returned to base early, one bombed the primary target, and one participated in a post-strike photographic mission.
- b. Enemy radar activity was extremely light and from the intercepts made it is impossible to determine if prior warning was obtained by use of the early warning net guarding this area.
- c. It is possible that the aircraft activity on the morning of the seventh confused the enemy early warning net, as both combat mission number 34 to Saigon and combat mission number 35 to Bangkok took place on the same date.
- d. No intercepts with radar fire control characteristics were made.

11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H):

- a. This mission was considered satisfactory with respect to gunnery.
- b. Total rounds of ammunition expended totalled 9312 all of which were used in test firing guns.
- c. There were 4 malfunctions (1.2%) of the 310 turrets on the mission and only 9 malfunctions (1%) of the 688 50-calibre machine guns on the mission.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I):

On this mission, 7 K-18, 30 K-20, 23 K-22, and 6 K-24 were installed in airborne aircraft, a total of 66 cameras of all types, of these, 4 were in aircraft failing to bomb any target. Of the remaining 62 cameras, based on incomplete reports, 53 cameras were used to photograph targets with 602 usable negatives resulting.

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13. AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE (See Annexes J and M):


- a. There were no losses of any kind on this mission.
- b. One aircraft of the 40th Group sustained major damage from enemy antiaircraft fire. Four aircraft of the 40th Group and 2 aircraft of the 468th Group sustained minor damage from enemy anti-aircraft.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annexes K and M):

- a. Of the 64 aircraft airborne 6 failed to bomb the primary target, all for mechanical reasons.
- b. There were 86 malfunctions of equipment in flight (excluding 6 malfunctions which were related to failure of 6 aircraft to bomb the primary target) as follows: (1) power plant and accessory section - 10 (1 engine failure, 6 running hot); (2) propellers and governors - 2; (3) oil system - 9 (4 leaks); (4) fuel system - 1; (5) electrical system - 22; (6) instruments - 55 (7 tachometers); (7) miscellaneous - 7.
- c. Over-all averages in fuel consumption were: average - 4800 gallons, maximum - 5500 gallons, minimum - 4250 gallons. Averages by groups were as follows: 40th - 4830 gallons (maximum - 5175, minimum 4455); 468th - 4765 gallons (maximum -5500-a, minimum 4250).
- a. returned at high speed with wounded on board.
- d. Average gross weight on take-off was 130,830 pounds. (40th - 130,200, 468th - 131,170).

15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex L):

- a. Assessment of damage was determined from excellent photographs obtained by the 40th Bomb Group, XX Bomber Command on 7 February 1945.
- b. The attack was accomplished by 18 formations of from two to five planes each over the target from 0325Z to 0637Z at altitudes ranging from 18,500 to 21,200 feet.
- c. Some repair activity was evident at points sustaining damage during the previous attack, especially in the vicinity of the northernmost approach abutment. It is believed, however, that the bridge was still unserviceable.
- d. During the course of the attack numerous near misses and at least four direct hits were scored on the framework of the bridge. The hits resulted in two principal top chord members being ~~covered~~, the railroad tracks and the bridge being cut, and the complete collapse of 65 per cent of the center span. Near misses effected a 5 foot lateral displacement of the extreme end of the northwest span.
- e. Approximately 160 feet of the northeast approach tracks and 90 feet of siding tracks were destroyed by direct hits. Five small buildings averaging 25 by 37 feet were destroyed and a pier 130 feet in length northwest of the bridge was damaged.


R.M. RAMSEY,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Commander.

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ANNEX

A

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path *
- IV - Bombing Data **
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report *

* Prepared by Staff Navigator

** Prepared by Staff Bombardier

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I - INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 35

8 February 1945

| Group | First A/C Off | Last A/C Off | Elapsed Time | No. A/C Airborne | Average Take-off Interval |
|---------|---------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| 40th | 2230Z | 2323Z | 53 min. | 32 | 103 sec. |
| 468th | 0058Z | 0150Z | 52 min. | 32 | 101 sec. |
| Overall | 2230Z | 0150Z | 200 min. | 64 | ----- |

II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

Mission No. 35

8 February 1945

A. Planned Routes

| Base | 40th | 468th |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Chakulia | Kharagpur |
| First Check Point | Diamond Island | (15°52'N - 94°17'E) |
| Assembly Point | Tavoy Point (13°32'N - 98°08'E) | Cabusa Island (12°49'N - 97°53'E) |
| Initial Point | Mondhol Rajburi (13°32'N - 99°50'E) | |
| Target | RAMA VI Railroad Bridge, Bangkok, Siam | |
| First Return Check Point | Tavoy Point | (13°32'N - 98°08'E) |
| Base | Chakulia | Kharagpur |

B. Deviations from Planned Route

1. A/C Bombing Assigned Targets - Secondary:

a. 468th Group:

(1) A/C 895 flew as briefed to 13°55'N - 96°25'E. Turned off at 0506Z (#4 engine cutting out) going direct to Secondary Target (Martaban). Bombed Secondary Target and proceeded direct to home base.

2. A/C Jettisoning Bombs:

a. 40th Group:

(1) A/C 455 was forced to return after flying on course for one hour and thirty five minutes. It was necessary to feather #4 engine due to a cracked cylinder, and bombs were jettisoned in the Bay of Bengal. A/C 455 returned to its home base without further difficulty.

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(2) A/C 374 dropped 11 bombs on Primary Target and jettisoned 1.

b. 468th Group:

(1) A/C 445 flew as briefed to 15°00'N - 95°15'E where it turned back after losing #1 engine. A/C 445 jettisoned 4 bombs and brought 8 bombs back to its base.

3. A/C Bringing back bombs:

a. 468th Group:

(1) A/C 445 brought back eight bombs and jettisoned after feathering #1 engine. Landed at home base.


(2) A/C 471 brought back twelve bombs to its home base after feathering #4 engine.

(3) A/C 532 brought back twelve bombs to its home base (blown stack on #2 engine).

(4) A/C 663 flew as briefed to PT. Unable to release bombs it proceeded direct to ST (Martaban) on course of 310°. Made bomb run at 0710Z at Martaban on heading of 315, IAS 190. Bombs did not release. A/C 663 returned direct to its home base bringing back all twelve bombs. A/C 469, 456 and 276 accompanied A/C 663 from PT to ST to home base.

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

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Auth: CG, XX BC
Initials *CRM*
Date 11 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT
OF STAFF BOMBING OFFICER

Date Prepared; 11 February 1945

Field Order Number 35
Date of Mission; 7 Feb 45

1. Weather at the Primary Target was clear and visibility unlimited. Nine (9) formations from the 40th Group and nine (9) formations from the 468th Group successfully bombed the target under ideal conditions.

2. Malfunctions Reported:

40th Group:

#269 - Forward pneumatic operated bomb doors would not open using normal system and doors were opened with pilot's emergency lever. After bombs away forward doors would not retract with normal or emergency systems. Bombardier closed doors with bomb hoists hooked into emergency cables fixed to the doors. Cause; Air-valve of pneumatic system was stuck in the open position.

#374;

a. Rear bomb doors would not open using normal system and were opened with pilot's emergency release. After bombs away emergency electric motor was used to retract rear doors although right aft door would not retract but half way. Cause; Electric motor driving screws to rear doors was burned out. It has not as yet been ascertained why right door failed to fully retract with emergency system.

b. Bomb in number four station, right aft bomb-bay would not release as one bolt securing shackle carrying lug sheered off and forced shackle away from A-2 release so that release could not trip shackle trigger when it fired. As a result the bomb in the upper station released, fell against bomb in lower station and fell out of bomb-bay without incident. Bombardier jettisoned bomb in number four station manually. Cause: Structural failure of the bolt securing the shackle carrying lug. U. R. has been submitted on this malfunction.

468th Group:

#663 was unable to drop bombs at the Primary Target; proceeded to Secondary Target and tried all salvo switches but still could not drop them so returned to base with all bombs. Cause: Unknown. Airplane ground checked O. K.

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V - BOMB LOADING*

Mission No. 35

7 February 1945

| Type of Bomb Load | 40th | | 468th | | Total | | | | |
|-------------------|------|------|-------|------|-------|------|-----------------------|-------------|------------------|
| | A/C | G.P. | A/C | G.P. | A/C | G.P. | Wt. in lbs per A/C ** | Wt. in Tons | No. A/C Carrying |
| 12 M-44 | 32 | 384 | 32 | 384 | 64 | 768 | 12,220.8 | 6.11 | 64 |

* Based on Aircraft Airborne.

** Based on M-44 G.P. bombs weighing 1018.4 lbs.

VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Mission No. 35

7 February 1945

| | 40th | | 468th | | Totals | | | |
|-------------------------------------------|------|------|-------|------|--------|------|-------------------|-----------------|
| | A/C | G.P. | A/C | G.P. | A/C | G.P. | Weight in Pounds* | Weight in Tons* |
| A/C bombing all targets and bombs dropped | 31 | 371 | 28 | 336 | 59 | 707 | 720,008.8 | 360 |
| A/C bombing PT and bombs dropped | 31 | 371 | 27 | 324 | 58 | 695 | 707,788 | 353.9 |
| A/C bombing ST and bombs dropped | 0 | - | 1 | 12 | 1 | 12 | 12,220.8 | 6.1 |
| A/C jettisoning bombs | 1 | 13-a | 1 | 4-b | 2 | 17 | 17,312.8 | 8.7 |
| A/C returning with bombs | 0 | - | 3 | 44-c | 3 | 44 | 44,809.6 | 22.4 |
| Totals for A/C airborne | 32 | 384 | 32 | 384 | 64 | 768 | 782,131.2 | 391.1 |

* Based on M-44 G.P. bomb weighing 1018.4 lbs.

- a. Includes 1 bomb jettisoned by A/C 374.
- b. A/C 445 jettisoned 4 bombs and returned to home base with remaining 8 bombs.
- c. Includes 8 bombs which were returned to home base by A/C 445.

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A-VI-1

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VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 35

7 February 1945

A. Formations Planned

1. Bombing by 3-plane formations was specified in the Field Orders.

B. Formations over the Primary Target

1. Diagrams of aircraft as they were over targets at the time of bomb release is intended to show relative position only. "W" represents an aircraft of the 40th Group; "Z" represents an aircraft of the 468th Group. All individual statistics are those of the leader.

1. Aircraft over the Primary Target

1st.

W - 274

W - 404

W - 740

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of Attack | - 69°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 195 mph |
| Time of release | - 0325Z | Bomb load | - 36 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 x 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 20,000'P | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - all at 20,000'P | | |

2nd.

W - 579

W - 738

W - 795

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of Attack | - 67°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0335Z | Bomb load | - 36 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 x 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 21,100'T | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - all at 21,100'T | | |

3rd.

W - 271

W - 718

W - 668

W - 798

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 4 | Axis of Attack | - 72°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 4 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0343Z | Bomb load | - 48 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 48 x 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 20,000'P | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - all at 20,000'P | | |

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4th.

W - 752

W - 587

W - 894

W - 462

W - 527

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 5 | Axis of Attack | - 72°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 5 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0345Z | Bomb Load | - 60 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 60 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 19,900'T | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - 19,600 to 20,000' | | |

5th.

W - 620

W - 685

W - 269

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of Attack | - 68°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0400Z | Bomb Load | - 36 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 X 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 21,200'T | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - all at 21,200'T | | |

6th.

W - 541

W - 538

W - 542

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of Attack | - 89°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0403Z | Bomb Load | - 36 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 x 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 21,200'T | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - all at 21,200'T | | |

7th.

W - 888

W - 420

W - 498

W - 757

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 4 | Axis of Attack | - 72°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 4 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0411Z | Bomb Load | - 48 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 48 x 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 21,200'T | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - 21,000 to 21,200' | | |

8th.

W - 505

W - 508

W - 374*

W - 908

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 4 | Axis of Attack | - 70°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 4 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0412Z | Bomb Load | - 48 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 47 X 1000# GP |
| Altitude (leader) | - 21,000'T | | |
| Range of Altitudes | - 21,000' to 21,200'T | | |

* This aircraft dropped 11 x 1000# GP on the PT, and jettisoned 1

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9th.

W - 846

W - 233

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 2 | Axis of attack | - 69°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 2 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0420Z | Bomb Load | - 24 x 1000# GP |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 24 x 1000# GP |
| Altitude (both A/C) | - 20,000'F | | |

10th.

Z - 525

Z - 272

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 2 | Axis of Attack | - 62°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 2 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0548Z | Bomb Load | - 24 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 24 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,200'T | | |

11th.

Z - 469

Z - 276

Z - 456

Z - 663*

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 4 | Axis of Attack | - 66°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 188 |
| Time of release | - 0554Z | Bomb Load | - 48 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,100'T | | |

* This A/C failed to release bombs, returning 12 M-44 bombs.

12th.

Z - 460

Z - 487

Z - 442

Z - 534

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 4 | Axis of Attack | - 66°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 4 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0556Z | Bombs loaded | - 48 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 48 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,200'T | | |

13th.

Z - 892

Z - 429

Z - 714

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of Attack | - 62°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0601Z | Bomb Load | - 36 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,000'T | | |

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SECRET

14th.

Z - 208

Z - 529

Z - 542

Z - 734

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 4 | Axis of Attack | - 69°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 4 | IAS | - 195 mph |
| Time of release | - 0611Z | Bomb Load | - 48 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 48 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,200'T | | |

15th.

Z - 719

Z - 486

Z - 464

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of Attack | - 68°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 191 mph |
| Time of release | - 0620Z | Bomb Load | - 36 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,000'T | | |

16th.

Z - 877

Z - 879

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 2 | Axis of Attack | - 78°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 2 | IAS | - 188 mph |
| Time of release | - 0621Z | Bomb Load | - 24 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 24 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 18,500'T | | |

17th

Z - 703

Z - 691

Z - 670

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of attack | - 63°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0626Z | Bomb Load | - 36 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,150'T | | |

18th.

Z - 546

Z - 536

Z - 424

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 3 | Axis of Attack | - 62°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 3 | IAS | - 190 mph |
| Time of release | - 0637Z | Bomb Load | - 36 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 36 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 19,150'T | | |

2. Aircraft over Secondary Target

1.

Z - 895

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------|
| No. of A/C in formation | - 1 | Axis of Attack | - 32°M |
| No. of A/C releasing | - 1 | IAS | - |
| Time of release | - 0600Z | Bomb Load | - 12 M-44 |
| Method | - visual | Bombs dropped | - 12 M-44 |
| Altitude | - 17,000'T | | |

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

SECRET
Auth: CG XX BC
Initials: OVG
Date: 12 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF
XX BOMBER COMMAND NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 12 February 1945

Field Order No. 35
Date of Mission: 7 Feb 45

1. This was a routine mission accomplished without difficulty.

a. Average navigation times out and back and Group assembly times follow:

| | <u>NAV TIME OUT</u> | <u>NAV TIME BACK</u> | <u>ASSEMBLY TIME</u> |
|-------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| 40th | 4h 57m | 5h 29m | 7m |
| 468th | 4h 49m | 5h 13m | 0m |

b. The following navigational aid work was reported:

| | <u>CEL LOG'S</u> | <u>CEL FIXES</u> | <u>RADIO FIXES</u> | <u>ODM'S</u> |
|-------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------|
| 40th | 126 | 17 | 36 | 0 |
| 468th | 192 | 9 | 9 | 1 |

c. Winds forecast was mediocre particularly for the first part of the trip to the target. Computed winds follow:

| | <u>ONE HALF OUT</u> | <u>TARGET AREA</u> | <u>ONE HALF BACK</u> |
|-------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 40th | 5000' 311° 17K | 20,000' 243° 20K | 14,000' 281° 19K |
| 468th | 6000' 246° 14K | 18,000' 200° 18K | 15,000' 285° 18K |

2. Comments by Groups: None.

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Flak Officer *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *

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By *CD* NAPA Date *10/1/88*

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* SECRET *
* By Authority of CG *
* XX Bomber Command *
* 14/2/45 JSA *
* Date Initials *

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
AFC 493

14 February 1945

PRELIMINARY REPORT

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 35, (DAYLIGHT), 7 FEBRUARY 1945

Primary Target - RAMA VI BRIDGE, BANGKOK, Secondary Target -
MARSHALLING YARDS, MARTABAN and Target of Last Resort - None

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. BANGKOK (13°45'N-100°30'E)

Seventeen of the 18 formations bombing the bridge or 95 percent of the total aircraft (59) over the area encountered meager and inaccurate (75%) to accurate (25%) heavy anti-aircraft fire from 0334Z to 0638Z at altitudes varying from 18,500 to 21,200 feet under CAVU conditions. The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to heavy anti-aircraft fire encountered.

Table I; Heavy Flak Encountered, BANGKOK, (CAVU conditions).

| Formation | No. of Aircraft | Bomb Release Time | Time Encountered | Heavy AA Fire Encountered | Altitude in feet | Total Bursts | Heading |
|-----------|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|------------------|--------------|---------|
| 1 | 3 | 0325:30Z | ----- | -----None----- | 21,000 | --- | 67°M |
| 2 | 3 | 0335:30Z | 0334-36Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 21,200 | 24 | 70°M |
| 3 | 4 | 0343Z | 0346Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 21,200 | 1 | 72°M |
| 4 | 5 | 0345Z | 0346Z | Meager - Accurate | 21,200 | 20 | 72°M |
| 5 | 3 | 0400:30Z | 0358-00Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 21,200 | 10 | 68°M |
| 6 | 3 | 0403Z | 0402Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 21,000 | 6 | 89°M |
| 7 | 4 | 0411Z | 0410-12Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 21,200 | 15 | 72°M |
| 8 | 4 | 0412Z | 0410-14Z | Meager - Inaccurate to Accurate | 21,200 | 27 | 70°M |
| 9 | 2 | 0420:30Z | 0420Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 21,200 | 24 | 69°M |
| 10 | 2 | 0548Z | 0544-47Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 19,100 | 5 | 62°M |
| 11 | 4 | 0554Z | 0553Z | Meager - Inaccurate to Accurate | 19,100 | 12 | 66°M |
| 12 | 4 | 0556Z | 0553Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 19,200 | 30 | 66°M |
| 13 | 3 | 0601Z | 0556-01Z | Meager - Inaccurate to Accurate | 19,100 | 25 | 62°M |
| 14 | 4 | 0611Z | 0610Z | Meager - Accurate | 19,100 | 25 | 69°M |
| 15 | 3 | 0620Z | 0618-20Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 19,100 | 10 | 68°M |
| 16 | 2 | 0621Z | 0619-20Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 18,500 | 5 | 78°M |
| 17 | 3 | 0626Z | 0624-26Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 19,100 | 15 | 63°M |
| 18 | 3 | 0637:30Z | 0637-38Z | Meager - Inaccurate | 19,100 | 20 | 62°M |

All aircraft reported black bursts while 9 observed white flak in addition to 2 reports of grey and brown bursts. From 1 to 6 bursts were observed at one instant resulting in totals of from 1 to 30. Continuously Pointed fire was directed against all formations and at no time were enemy aircraft reported on the same course and altitude. Fire commenced from 5 minutes before to 3 minutes after bombs away and stopped from 3 minutes before to 3 minutes after bomb release with the average for the 17 encounters beginning at 1.3 minutes before to 0.6 minutes after bombs away.

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The following table (II) lists reports of intensity, accuracy and deviations for the heavy antiaircraft fire encountered. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level, or below.

Table II: Intensity, Accuracy and Deviations.

| Reports of Accuracy | | Reports of Intensity | |
|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|------------------|
| Struck | 7 (12 percent) | Intense | 0 (0 percent) |
| Rocked | 1 (2 percent) | Moderate | 0 (0 percent) |
| Within 150' | 6 (11 percent) | Meager | 56 (100 percent) |
| Outside 150' | 42 (75 percent) | | |

| Reports of Deviations | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Above | 12 (15 percent) | Ahead | 10 (18 percent) |
| Level | 31 (38 percent) | Left | 5 (11 percent) |
| Below | 39 (47 percent) | Abreast | 19 (35 percent) |
| | | In Line | 8 (14 percent) |
| | | Behind | 26 (47 percent) |
| | | Right | 43 (75 percent) |

Ground flashes were observed from sites numbered 16 and 20 (C.P.I.C.) by Formation #15 (468th Group).

There was no possibility of radar controlled fire through R.C.M. Intercepts or undercast conditions.

2. DON MUANG AIRDROME (13°57'N-100°36'E)

Meager and inaccurate black and white heavy antiaircraft fire was pinpointed as originating from DON MUANG by aircraft of Formations 13 and 15 at 0604Z and 0622Z, each two minutes after bombs away, at an altitude of 19,100 feet under CAVU conditions. Bursts occurred individually with the total reported varying from 2 to 3. Deviations were above and below, ahead and abreast, and in line and to the right. The type of fire could not be determined and no enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

Gun flashes, probably AW fire, were observed on the west side of the airdrome at 0403Z by one aircraft of the 40th Group (Formation #5). Fire encountered by Formations #3 and #8 and reported under BANGKOK probably merges into bursts originating from DON MUANG.

3. RAJBURI (13°32'N-99°50'E)

One aircraft of Formation #12 reported meager and inaccurate (2000' distant) white heavy antiaircraft fire at 0545Z (11 minutes before bombs away) at 19,200 feet altitude under CAVU conditions as originating from RAJBURI. Deviations were below, behind and to the right and no enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude. Number of bursts observed were not reported nor could the type of fire be determined.

Although RAJBURI was the designated I.P. for BANGKOK, no other aircraft report antiaircraft opposition from this location.

4. TAVOY POINT (13°33'N-98°10'E)

Three aircraft of a total of 7 (Formations #3 and #6) reported black heavy antiaircraft fire at 0343Z and 0403Z at 15,600 and 16,000 feet altitude respectively under CAVU conditions. From 1 to 3 bursts were observed at one instant resulting in a total of from 11 to 15 for each encounter. Deviations were level and below, behind, and in line, and Continuously Pointed fire is believed to have been used. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude.

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 By CD NAPA Date 12/1/88

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Although this location was used as the Assembly Point by 31 aircraft, and the return route as designated for all aircraft was "Target to Tavoy Point to Base", no other aircraft reported antiaircraft opposition.

5. BANFONG (13°50'N-99°54'E)

Aircraft #908 of the 40th Group (Formation #8) reported "gun flashes from one gun in the BANFONG Area as it left the target about 0415Z" but no bursts were seen.

B. SMOKESCREENS, GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS, AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS

None reported.

C. BARRAGE BALLOONS

1. Mouth of the TAVOY RIVER (13°48'N-98°15'E)

Formation #7 (Table I) of the 40th Group observed 6 cigar shaped, silver colored conventional barrage balloons at 0450Z from 16,000 feet. The balloons were reported as anchored to vessels in the river resulting in 3 rows of balloons with 2 per row across the mouth of the river. The balloons were flying at approximately 2,000 feet and it was reported that "the tails of the balloons were riding higher than the nose".

2. BANGKOK (13°45'N-100°30'E)

Aircraft of Formation #13 of the 468th Group observed 4 possible barrage balloons from 18,000 feet at 0600Z flying at approximately 2,000 feet altitude over the city of BANGKOK. Balloons were described as silver and oval.

D. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Six aircraft sustained minor damage and 1 aircraft suffered major damage as a result of the heavy antiaircraft fire encountered over BANGKOK as follows:

Table III: Damage from Heavy Antiaircraft Fire

| Formation | A/C | Group | Bomb Release | Heading | Altitude | Extent |
|-----------|-----|-------|--------------|---------|----------|--------|
| 4 | 587 | 40th | 0345Z | 72°M | 21,200' | Minor |
| 4 | 894 | 40th | 0345Z | 72°M | 21,200' | Minor |
| 4 | 462 | 40th | 0345Z | 72°M | 21,200' | Minor |
| 4 | 527 | 40th | 0345Z | 72°M | 21,200' | Major |
| 8 | 374 | 40th | 0412Z | 70°M | 21,200' | Minor |
| 13 | 714 | 468th | 0601Z | 62°M | 19,100' | Minor |
| 14 | 542 | 468th | 0611Z | 69°M | 19,100' | Minor |

Cursory examination of fragments causing damage to and recovered from aircraft #527, #462, and #587 does not establish their identity as flak fragments but indicates that damage may have been caused by some other agency. The 40th Group Ordnance Officer reports, however, that "From statements made by members of the crews of the four aircraft affected, all bombs fell true and along a normal trajectory as far as they were able to observe the bombs. There was no instance reported of fins coming loose or of bombs tumbling. Members of the crew reported feeling a concussion similar or slightly greater intensity than that produced by a heavy burst of flak. A heavy cloud of black smoke was reported as coming from a burst immediately behind and on approximately the same level as the formation of the aircraft affected." In addition no instances of enemy fighter or air-to-air bombing attacks were reported for any of the aircraft over the BANGKOK area.

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Conditions, therefore, indicate damage may have been caused by flak as in Formation #4 (Table I) four aircraft were reported as struck, 1 crew reported being rocked, 2 crews reported bursts within 150', while 1 crew reported bursts at a distance greater than 150' from the aircraft. As this formation consisted of 5 aircraft, it is obvious that reports of the accuracy of bursts overlap, i.e., one crew may have been struck and rocked by a group of bursts within 150' of the plane. Further detailed examination of the recovered fragments is to be made.

E. WARNING NETS

As no enemy aircraft were sighted in the BANGKOK area prior to the first bombs away time in addition to a complete lack of antiaircraft opposition for Formation #1 coupled with meager early warning radar activity, it is possible that the Jap did not have prior warning of the attack. This was probably caused by aircraft which, directed against SAIGON, penetrated enemy territory before those aircraft directed against BANGKOK on the same date.

Frank L. Scott, Jr.

FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Section.

B-I-4

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ANNEX

C

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Operational Intelligence Unit *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

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Authority *now* 7600 63
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

I. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 35

TARGET: Rama VI Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand.

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: 7 February 1945.

The enemy made no attacks during Mission No. 35, but the following sightings of enemy aircraft were reported by individual B-29's:

Enemy Aircraft Sightings

| <u>A/C No.</u> | <u>No. E/A</u> | <u>Type E/A</u> | <u>Time</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Altitude</u> | <u>Distance</u> |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 374 | 1 | S/E | 0415Z | BANGKOK | 20,000 | 2 miles |
| 374 | 7 | Unidentified | 0555Z | 15°35'N - 95°16'E | 5,000 | 2 miles |
| 271 | 1 | S/E | 0342Z | BANGKOK | 20,000 | 1 mile |
| 233 | 1 | S/E | 0420Z | BANGKOK | 20,000 | 5000 yds. |
| 846 | 1 | S/E | 0413Z | BANGKOK | 15,000 | 3 miles |
| 541 | 2 | Unidentified | 0415Z | BANGKOK | 12,000 | 2 miles |
| 508 | 1 | Unidentified | 0412Z | BANGKOK | 4,000 | 3 miles |
| 542 | 1 | S/E | 0405Z | BANGKOK | Taking off | 4 miles |
| 685 | 1 | EMILY | 0503Z | 15°05'N - 96°10'E | 12,000 | 1/2 mile |
| 668 | 1 | S/E | 0345Z | BANGKOK | 20,000 | 3000 yds. |
| 508 | 1 | TOJO | 0415Z | BANGKOK | 20,000 | 800 yds. |
| 272 | 4 | S/E | 0605Z | CABUSA IS. | 18,000 | 5 miles |
| 719 | 1 | S/E | 0622Z | BANGKOK | 18,000 | ---- |
| 529 | 3 | S/E | 0800Z | DIAMOND IS. | 17,000 | 2000 yds. |
| 691 | 2 | Unidentified | 0800Z | 15°55'N - 98°20'E | 10,000 | ---- |
| 456 | 1 | Unidentified | --- | PAK KRET | 1,000 | ---- |
| 469 | 1 | Unidentified | 0554Z | DON MAUNG | ---- | ---- |

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S E C R E T

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ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I- Weather Information
- II- Chart - Weather as Forecast and as Encountered
- III- Synoptic Map

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*****  
* Prepared by: *  
* Weather Section *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
*****
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Authority *now* 760063
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

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I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 35

7 February 1945

| | As Forecast | As Encountered |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Base At Take-Off | Clear. Visibility 4 miles in haze. | <u>KHARAGPUR</u> : Clear. Visibility 3/4 mile improving to 3 miles during take-off in ground fog. Wind north 2 mph. <u>CHAKULIA</u> : Clear. Visibility 4 miles in haze. Wind west 2 mph. |
| Route Out | Clear over water. Scattered stratocumulus over land area from assembly point to target. | Scattered patches of ground fog from base area to coastline. Scattered cirrus at 25,000' from coastline to 20°N. and from assembly point to target. Scattered stratocumulus with tops at 3,500' from coast to 20°N. in the vicinity of Diamond Island, and from assembly point to target. |
| Target Area | 3/10 cirrus at 28,000'. 3/10 stratocumulus, base 1,500', tops 2,500'. Visibility unrestricted. Altimeter setting at target: 29.89 inches. | 2/10 cirrus at 25-30,000', otherwise clear. Visibility unlimited. |
| Return Route | Clear | No change from route out except ground fog had dissipated over Indian mainland |
| Base on Return | Clear. Visibility 8 miles | <u>KHARAGPUR</u> : Clear. Visibility 7 miles. Wind south 5 mph. <u>CHAKULIA</u> : Clear. Visibility 8 miles. Wind west 10 mph. |

A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

| Altitude | Base to 19 Deg. | 19 Deg. to 15 Deg. | South of 15 Deg. |
|----------|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|
| 1,000' | 180 Deg-12K | 30 Deg-10K | 70 Deg-08K |
| 5,000' | 290 Deg-18K | 260 Deg-15K | 180 Deg-10K |
| 10,000' | 290 Deg-30K | 270 Deg-20K | 260 Deg-15K |
| 15,000' | 280 Deg-32K | 260 Deg-22K | 250 Deg-18K |
| 20,000' | 280 Deg-35K | 260 Deg-25K | 240 Deg-20K |
| 25,000' | 270 Deg-40K | 260 Deg-30K | 250 Deg-25K |

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B. Winds Aloft Encountered

| Altitude | 16°N | Target |
|----------|-------------|-------------|
| 5,000' | 311 Deg-17K | |
| 6,000' | 340 Deg-14K | |
| 14,000' | 281 Deg-19K | |
| 18,000' | | 250 Deg-19K |
| 20,000' | | 243 Deg-20K |

C. Target Temperatures

As Forecast

| Altitude | Temperature |
|----------|-------------|
| 1,000' | 26 Deg C. |
| 5,000' | 19 Deg C. |
| 10,000' | 10 Deg C. |
| 15,000' | 0 Deg C. |
| 20,000' | - 9 Deg C. |
| 25,000' | - 18 Deg C. |

Mean temperature surface to 18,000': 10 Deg C.

As Encountered


| Altitude | Temperature |
|----------|-------------|
| 18,000' | -5 Deg C. |
| 20,000' | -6 Deg C. |

D-I-2

SECRET


SECRET
 XX BOMBER COMMAND
 WEATHER AS FORECAST

MISSION NO. 35




WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
 ROUTE OUT


MISSION NO. 35



WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED
 ROUTE BACK

MISSION NO. 35






JOINT PHOTO TECH UNIT

REPRODUCED BY

~~SECRET~~



H.I.H.
0230Z
7 FEB 1965

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10TH PHOTO TECH. UNIT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AW 7600 63*
By *CD NPA* Date *11/18*

S E C R E T

ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Communications Section *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D), or (E)
By *WJD* 740120
By *CD/mt* NARS, Date *OCT 21* 1975

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

SECRET

: : : : : : : : : :
: SECRET :
: Auth: CG, XX BC :
: Initials: KW :
: Date: 13 Feb 45 :
: : : : : : : : : :

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALISTS MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date prepared: 11 February 1945 Field Orders No: 35

Date of Mission: 7 February 1945.

1. Mission number thirty-five (35) was accomplished by the 40th and 468th Groups only. Based upon the greatest number of such messages which could be received (i.e., one per aircraft), the following percentage figures indicate the number of aircraft accounted for by Bombs Away and 400 mile from Base Position Report messages:

a. Bombs Away:

| | <u>40th Gp</u> | <u>468th Gp</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| No of a/c from which msg could be expected: | 31 | 28 | 60 |
| No of msgs received: | 9 | 11 | 20 |
| No of a/c accounted for by msgs: | 31 | 32 | 64 |
| Percentage of a/c accounted for by msgs: | 100% | 114% | 106% |

- (1) Excess of four aircraft reported by the 468th Group is accounted for by the fact that one operator, who did not hear the lead aircraft of his formation send a bombs away message, transmitted a second message covering the same formation.

b. 400 Mile from Base Position Report:

| | <u>40th Gp</u> | <u>468th Gp</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| No of a/c from which msg could be expected: | 31 | 28 | 59 |
| No of msgs received | 7 | 19 | 26 |
| No of a/c accounted for by msgs: | 25 | 34 | 59 |
| Percentage if a/c accounted for by msgs: | 80% | 121% | 100% |

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SECRET

Spray

SECRET

- (1) Six aircraft of the 40th Group were accounted for by 468th Group position reports.
- c. A total of four abort messages were passed; three by the 468th Group and one by the 40th group. No convoy sighting or attack messages were transmitted.

PART II

2. Following is a resume of the distress traffic handled when the right waist gunner of aircraft 542 was injured during a fighter attack. 3S8 is the call-sign of the 468th Group ground radio station:

0700Z 3S8 V 542 - WOUNDED MAN ON BOARD SHOT IN NECK CANT MOVE
RIGHT ARM THINK COLLAR BONE BROKEN ADVISE
IF POSSIBLE ETA 1010Z

542 V 3S8 KEEP MAN QUIET GIVE ONE TUBE ONLY OF
MORPHINE AND PLASMA AS NECESSARY

3S8 V 542 - HAVING TROUBLE GIVING PLASMA IT WONT FLOW
INTO VEIN STOP AND MAKES SWELLING JUST
ABOVE NEEDLE ADVISE

542 V 3S8 - PUT IT IN OTHER ARM IN VEIN REASON FOR
SWELLING FIRST TIME WAS THAT NEEDLE WAS
NOT IN VEIN PINCH BACK THE RUBBER TUBING
ABOVE THE NEEDLE TO DETERMINE IF BLOOD
IS DRAWN INTO THE GLASS TUBE THIS PROVES
THE NEEDLE TO BE IN VEIN IF BLEEDING
PUT ON PRESSURE BANDAGE

3S8 V 542- HAVE DONE SO

542 V 3S8 - IS HE IN SHOCK WHAT IS PULSE

3S8 V 542 - UNABLE TO GIVE PLASMA PULSE IS NORMAL
MAN IS RESTING

542 V 3S8 - HOW MUCH BLOOD HAS HE LOST MODERATE OR
SEVERE MIX ALL PLASMA IN PLANE RIGHT AWAY

3S8 V 542 - BLEEDING IS MODERATE PULSE RATE IS 89

542 V 3S8 - KEEP PATIENT WARM ALSO ON OXYGEN REPORT
PULSE RATE EVERY TEN MINUTES

3S8 V 542 - PULSE IS 76

3S8 V 542 - RESPIRATION STRONG 18 PULSE 98

3S8 V 542 - RESPIRATION 15 PULSE 78

3S8 V 542 - CONDITION IS FAIR RESPIRATION 17 PULSE
RATE 60

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SECRET

SECRET

542 V 3S8 - GIVE NO MORE MORPHINE IS BREATHING AND CONDITION GOOD

3S8 V 542 - PULSE NORMAL PATINET RESTING COMFORTABLE

3S8 V 529 - NORMAL PULSE CONTINUING PLASMA INJURED MAN IN 542 DOING OKAY NOT IN SHOCK.

3. Pulse rate was given every ten minutes until aircraft landed at approximately 1030 GMT, being sent direct by aircraft 542, or relayed for 542 by aircraft 529 or aircraft 734 which were in formation with 542. The radio operator aboard aircraft 542 served as medical aid man in addition to handling the distress traffic involved, and is to be commended on the manner in which he discharged his duties under a trying situation.

PART III

4. No violations of transmission security were logged.

5. Aircraft 532 of the 468th Group violated cryptographic security when an encoded abort message was followed by "Q" signals, which supplemented the encoded information and thus compromised the encoded message.

6. Three (3) aircraft of the 40th Bomb Group violated communications procedures as outlined in the Tactical Doctrine when they transmitted a "YYY" type position report (such as was used on China based missions) in place of the encoded position report required when 400 miles from base.

PART IV

7. Initial takeoff was approximately 2230 GMT and frequencies remained in use until approximately 1130 GMT. During this period the average static level never exceeded a W-1 value.

8. Heavy interference was again reported by the 468th Group from station LDO of the South East Asia Command. Theatre Headquarters was once again informed of this interference, and has since informed this Headquarters that station LDO has been assigned another frequency in order to alleviate this interference.

9. The 40th Bomb Group reported three interfering stations on the eight megacycle frequency assigned that Group. This interference was also reported to Theater Headquarters, and this Headquarters has been advised that the interference will be cleared and has been assigned two additional frequencies which may be used as alternate frequencies in the event interference should again be encountered.

10. No attempts at jamming or deception tactics on the part of the enemy were noted.

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SECRET

SECRET

PART V

11. Statistical data on radio aids to navigation is as follows:

a. Radio beacons:

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Power</u> | <u>No of a/c reporting</u> | <u>Average Initial Contact</u> | <u>Extreme Initial Contact</u> |
|-----------------|--------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Chakulia | 1200W | 18 | 378 | 600 |
| Khargpur | 1200W | 14 | 365, | 500 |
| Chittagong | 1200W | 10 | 270 | 500 |

b. Radio ranges were not used by aircraft during this mission.

c. One aircraft of the 468th Group made use of D/F facilities. A Class 1 bearing was obtained from a distance of 50 miles. No unusual occurrences were noted.

d. Air-to-air homing was not utilized on this mission.

PART VI

12. Following malfunctions were reported.

a. 40th Bomb Group:

- (1) A/C 703 had radio compass sense antenna break. Jumpered compass antenna binding post to command set antenna for a substitute.
- (2) A/C 469 had malfunction of Radio Receiver BC-348. Cause undetermined. Not repaired in flight.
- (3) A/C 468 had interphone system malfunction. VT-99 in amplifier was replaced in flight and system worked satisfactorily.
- (4) A/C 272 had radio compass sense antenna break. Not remedied in flight.

b. 468th Bomb Group:

- (1) A/C 620 and A/C 274 had radio compass sense antenna break. Both aircraft remedied this situation by substituting a whip type sense antenna.

SECRET

- (2) A/C 505 had the antenna mast and antenna for the SCR-522 which supports the radio compass sense antenna carry away, taking the sense antenna with them. Not remedied in flight.
- (3) A/C 894 had receiver unit BC-455-B of the command set malfunction, cause undetermined. Could not be repaired in flight.

PART VII

13. Group ground stations now transmit a series of V's followed by the station's call sign on all frequencies in use during the first minute of each fifteen minute quadrant of the hour, as an aid to airborne operators in keeping tuned to the ground station. During this mission, the 468th Group was authorized to stagger these transmissions, i.e.: V'S on the lowest frequency were transmitted during the first minute period of the quadrant, on the next highest frequency during the second minute period of the quadrant etc. It was found that this method gave the operator a better opportunity to tune across the frequencies in use. The inclusion of this practice in the Tactical Doctrine will be recommended.

S E C R E T

ANNEX

F

RADAR

I - Radar Information

- Section A - Navigation and Bombing
- Section B - Scope Photography
- Section C - Serviceability

II - Radar Tables

- Table A - Bombing Data
- Table B - Photographic Results
- Table C - Navigational Ranges
- Table D - Serviceability
- Table E - Malfunctions

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* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Radar Section *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
```

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AW 760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

SECRET
Auth: CG XX BC
Initials: CS
Date: 12 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared 12 February 1945 Field Orders Number 35
Date of Mission 7 February 1945

I - Radar Information

A - Navigation and Bombing

1. Two (2) groups participated in this mission, dividing their aircraft into many three (3) and four (4) plane formations. The target, Rama VI Bridge, was definitely not a radar target, hence all bombing was accomplished visually. The radar equipment was used, however, as an aid to bombing, although CAVU conditions prevailed over the target area.

2. The target area was readily identifiable on the radar scope, in spite of the fact of returns from the actual target.

3. Radar was also of considerable assistance in navigation and a great aid in avoiding many storm areas.

B - Scope Photography

1. Radar scope photographic results were below average. Only fourteen (14) sets of pictures were useable. This was due primarily to a greater number of equipment malfunctions and improper camera operation.

2. Thirteen (13) sets of scope pictures traced the bombing run.

C - Serviceability

1. Serviceability of the radar systems was good; ninety-three (93) per cent of the systems were operative over the target.

2. Three (3) systems were completely inoperative; however, two (2) of these systems were inoperative before take-off.

3. There were two (2) SCR-718 equipment failures. The other auxiliary equipment performed without any additional failures.

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S E C R E T

S E C R E T

II - RADAR TABLES

A - Bombing

Total A/C Bombing - 59
 Total A/C Bombing Bangkok (P.T.) Visually - 58
 Total A/C Bombing Martaban (S.T.) Visually - 1

B - Photographic Results

| DATA | 40th Gp | | 468th Gp | | Total | |
|--------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----|----------|-----|-------|-----|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| No. Cameras Installed | 15 | | 14 | | 29 | |
| K-35 Cameras | 9 | | 9 | | 18 | |
| K-24 Cameras | 6 | | 5 | | 11 | |
| No. Cameras in Abort, Early Return, & Missing A/C * | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| No. Cameras Completing Mission * | 15 | 100 | 14 | 100 | 29 | 100 |
| No. Cameras in Radar & Camera Mal- function A/C # | 5 | 33 | 3 | 21 | 8 | 28 |
| Sets Pictures Returned # | 10 | 67 | 10 | 71 | 20 | 69 |
| No. Negatives Returned | 140 | | 151 | | 291 | |
| Sets Pictures Useable ** | 8 | 80 | 6 | 60 | 14 | 70 |
| Sets Pictures Tracing Bomb Run ** | 7 | 70 | 6 | 60 | 13 | 65 |

* Percentage based on cameras installed.
 # Percentage based on cameras completing mission.
 ** Percentage based on Sets of pictures returned.

C - Navigational Ranges

| DATA | 40th Gp | | 468th Gp | | Total | |
|----------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| | Number Reporting | Average Range | Number Reporting | Average Range | Total No. Reporting | Weighted Average Range |
| Mapping Range | 51 | 50 | 23 | 52 | 59 | 51 |
| Rama VI Bridge Area (P.T.) | 9 | 17 | 3 | 12 | 12 | 16 |
| Rajburi Bridge (I.P.) | 7 | 18 | 15 | 26 | 22 | 23 |
| Tavoy Point (A.P.) | 26 | 46 | 21 | 45 | 47 | 46 |
| Bok Island | 4 | 35 | 6 | 37 | 10 | 36 |
| Bangkok Area | 10 | 18 | 17 | 26 | 27 | 23 |
| Cabusa Island | - | - | 22 | 41 | 22 | 41 |
| Diamond Island | 18 | 40 | 24 | 48 | 42 | 45 |
| Irrawady River | 2 | 75 | - | - | 2 | 75 |
| Kaleguak Island | - | - | 2 | 55 | 2 | 55 |
| Maungnagon Island | 1 | 80 | - | - | 1 | 80 |
| New Island | 2 | 35 | 7 | 40 | 9 | 39 |
| Pagoda Point | 8 | 30 | 16 | 39 | 24 | 36 |
| Purian Point | 9 | 35 | 20 | 43 | 29 | 40 |
| Subarnekh River | 2 | 45 | - | - | 2 | 45 |
| Tavoy Island | 1 | 30 | - | - | 1 | 30 |

S E C R E T

D - Serviceability

| DATA | 40th Gp | | 468th Gp | | Total | |
|--------------------------------|---------|-----|----------|----|-------|----|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Aircraft Airborne | 32 | | 32 | | 64 | |
| Aircraft Reporting | 32 | | 32 | | 64 | |
| APQ-13 Operative at Take-Off * | 32 | 100 | 30-a | 94 | 62 | 97 |
| Aircraft Bombing | 31 | | 28 | | 59 | |
| Aircraft Reporting Bombing * | 31 | 97 | 28 | 88 | 59 | 92 |
| APQ-13 Operative Over Target # | 29 | 93 | 26 | 93 | 55 | 93 |
| APQ-13 Unrepairable Failures: | | | | | | |
| Partially Inoperative # | 2 | 6 | 3 | 11 | 5 | 8 |
| Completely Inoperative # | 1 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 5 |
| Total Malfunctions # | 3 | 9 | 5 | 18 | 8 | 13 |
| APQ-13 Repaired in Flight # | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 3 |
| SCR-695 Failures | 0 | | 0 | | 0 | |
| SCR-718 Failures | 0 | | 2 | | 2 | |

* Percentage based on Aircraft Reporting.

Percentage based on Aircraft Reporting Bombing.

a - Two sets inoperative before takeoff.

E - Malfunctions

| | 40th Gp | 468th Gp | Total |
|------------------------------------------|---------|----------|-------|
| <u>Between Take-Off and Target</u> | | | |
| Completely Inoperative: | | | |
| No Reception | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Range Unit Out | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Partially Inoperative: | | | |
| Bad Spoking | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Low Range, Azimuth Stab. Out | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Erratic A.F.O. | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Total Completely Inoperative | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Total Partially Inoperative | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Total Between Take-Off and Target | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| <u>Malfunctions Repaired in Flight</u> | | | |
| Changed Inverters | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| <u>Summary, AN/APQ-13 Malfunctions</u> | | | |
| Completely Inoperative | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Partially Inoperative | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Repaired in Flight | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 3 | 7 | 10 |
| <u>Malfunctions of Auxilliary Equip.</u> | | | |
| SCR-695 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SCR-718 (No Trace) | 0 | 2 | 2 |

S E C R E T

ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* RCM Section *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 7600 63
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

SECRET
Auth: Dep Com 20th AF
Initials: MOP
Date: 18 February 45

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB & C
APO 493

18 February 1945

SUBJECT: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 35, Bangkok,
7 February 45 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

Four RCM search aircraft, each with a bottom mount D/F antenna, participated in this mission. Of the four search aircraft, two returned to base early due to an aircraft malfunction; one bombed the primary target and one participated in a post strike photo mission.

B. Results

1. Enemy radar activity was extremely light and from the intercepts made it is impossible to determine if prior warning was obtained by use of the early warning net guarding this area.

2. It is possible that the aircraft activity on the morning of the seventh confused the enemy early warning net as both combat mission No. 34 to Saigon and combat mission No. 35 to Bangkok took place on this date.

A. Sixty-five aircraft were airborne for combat mission No. 34 to Saigon with the first aircraft taking off at 062010Z. Forty four of the aircraft bombed the primary target with the majority of the remaining aircraft bombing targets of opportunity in the Rangoon-Moulmein Area. Search aircraft on the mission to Saigon reported the 80 Mc. Rangoon radar site and the 99 Mc. Moulmein radar site in operation, strong and tracking.

B. At 062230Z the first of a formation of thirty two aircraft took off to bomb Bangkok with one RCM Observer participating. This strike occurred two hours and twenty minutes after the first aircraft took off for Saigon. No radar intercepts were made enroute to the target. Enroute home, possibly the Mergui radar at 196/956/5 was intercepted, occasionally tracking. The 100 Mc. Mk 1 Model 1 previously

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reported to be in the Rangoon Area was intercepted fairly strong and tracking from 95°25'E 15°45'N to 94°21'E 16°42'N.

C. At 070057Z, two hours and twenty one minutes after the first formation of thirty two aircraft took off to bomb Bangkok, thirty two more aircraft took off to bomb Bangkok. Three RCM search aircraft participated in this group with two of the search aircraft returning to base early due to an aircraft malfunction without making any enemy radar intercepts. The third search aircraft in this group made a weak 199 Mc. intercept at 98°25'E 13°00'N which may possibly have been the Mergui radar site.

D. The RCM search aircraft on the photo mission was in the Bangkok Area from 0759Z to 0809Z and no radar intercepts were recorded. Also, enroute home in the Mergui Rangoon Area, no radar intercepts were recorded.

3. Following are the radar intercepts.

| | |
|-----------|------------------|
| 196/965/5 | Possibly Mergui |
| 199/ - / | Possibly Mergui |
| 100/ /20 | Possibly Rangoon |

4. No intercepts with radar fire control characteristics were made.

C. Enemy Countermeasures

Air-ground traffic encountered severe CW interference. However, the interference is believed to have originated from an allied station.

D. Equipment

1. Low voltage output on a PE-218 Inverter regardless of the voltage regulator or resistance setting.
2. Unsatisfactory AN/APA-24 D/F antenna due to faulty selsyn transmitter gear.

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDER:

Leo I. Herman
LEO I. HERMAN
Colonel, Air Corps
Actg. Adjutant General

-2-

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* * * * *
* Staff Gunnery Officer *
* * * * *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 7600 63
By *CD* NAPA Date *10/1/88*

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

SECRET

Auth: CG XX BC
Initials: W
Date: 11 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT
OF STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared: 10 February 1945

Field Order Number 35
Date of Mission: 7 Feb 45

1. On the mission directed by Field Order No. 35 there was no fighter opposition.
2. The mission is considered as satisfactory in regards to gunnery. All guns were test fired.
3. The following statistical data is submitted:

| | <u>40th</u> | <u>468th</u> |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Ammunition used test firing | 5837 | 3475 |
| Ammunition used in combat | 0 | 0 |
| Malfunctions of CFC System | 2 | 2 |
| Total turrets on Mission | 16 | 150 |
| Malfunctions Cal. .50 MGS | 3 | 6 |
| Total MGS on Mission | 348 | 340 |
| Total airplanes (included in report) | 32 | 30 |
| Total percent malfunctions CFC 1.2% cal. .50 MGS 1% | | |

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now 760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

I - CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 35

7 February 1945

| | 40th | | | 468th | | | Total | | |
|---------------------------------------|------|-------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|------|
| | K-18 | K-20 | K-22 | K-18 | K-20 | K-22 | K-18 | K-20 | K-22 |
| No. cameras airborne | 2 | 22 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 13 | 7 | 30 | 23 |
| No. in A/C failing to bomb any target | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| No. in A/C bombing targets | 2 | 21 | 9 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 7 | 28 | 21 |
| No. photographing targets | 2 | 17-a | 9 | 4 | 3 | 12 | 6 | 20-a | 21 |
| Failure to photograph - mechanical | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1-b | 0 | 0 | 1-b | 0 | 0 |
| Failure to photograph - other | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4-c | 0 | 0 | 4-c | 0 |
| No. usable negatives | 15 | 132-a | 89 | 31 | 43 | 235 | 46 | 175-a | 224 |

- a. Incomplete. Target photographed and number usable negatives not known for 4 cameras.
- b. Internal malfunction.
- c. Not used. Includes one camera in A/C bombing secondary target.

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ANNEX

J

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now 760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

I - AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

Mission No. 35

7 February 1945

A. Aircraft Losses

There were no aircraft lost from either combat or operational causes. No aircraft are missing from this mission.

B. Aircraft Damaged

For details of battle and operational damage by aircraft, see Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

J-I-1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

- I - Functioning of Equipment
- II - Performance Data *

* Prepared by Staff Flight Engineer

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 760063
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

SECRET

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 35

7 February 1945

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1. A/C airborne | 64 |
| 2. Less A/C failing to bomb the primary target - mechanical | 6 |
| a. Bombed secondary target (1) | |
| (1) A/C 895 (468th) - #4 engine backfiring - runaway propellor | |
| b. Jettisoned bombs (2) | |
| (1) A/C 455 (40th) - #4 engine failure | |
| (2) A/C 445 (468th) - #1 engine backfiring and smoking - jettisoned 4 bombs, brought back 8. | |
| c. Bombs brought back (3) | |
| (1) A/C 532 (468th) - blown stack #2 engine | |
| (2) A/C 663 (468th) - bombs would not release - reason unknown | |
| (3) A/C 471 (468th) - #4 engine failure | |
| 3. A /C bombing primary target | 58 |

K-I-1

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SECRET

SECRET

Auth: CG XX BC

Initials WBC

Date: 12 Feb 45

CONSOLIDATED
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF
STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

Date Prepared: 11 February 1945

Field Order No. 35

Date of Mission: 7 Feb 45

1. A summary of the performance of the aircraft participating in this Mission is contained in the attached table.

2. Bomb loads were limited by space on this Mission to twelve bombs per aircraft. As a result the weight of bombs carried is less than has been carried to this target in the past. As a result all the aircraft were able to carry more than ample fuel.

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SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE

F. O. No. 35

| Group | | Overall | 40th | 468th |
|-----------------------|------|---------|--------|----------|
| * No. of Aircraft | | 58 | 31 | 27 |
| Total Time | | 10:25 | 10:36 | 10:12 |
| Time to Target | | 4:59 | 5:05 | 4:49 |
| Fuel Burned | Ave | 4800 | 4830 | 4765 |
| | Max | 5500 | 5175 | 5500**** |
| | Min | 4250 | 4455 | 4250 |
| Fuel Carried | Ave | 6115 | 6155 | 6065 |
| | Max | 6400 | 6400 | 6100 |
| | Min | 6000 | 6000 | 6000 |
| Turnable Reserve | Ave | 1315 | 1325 | 1300 |
| | Max | 1750 | 1600 | 1750 |
| | Min | 500 | 1000 | 500**** |
| ** Air Miles | | 2344 | 2360 | 2323 |
| Round Miles | | 2278 | 2290 | 2262 |
| ** Gal/Air Miles | | 2.04 | 2.04 | 2.05 |
| *** Bombing Alt. | | 19600 | 20000 | 19150 |
| Starting Gross Weight | Ave | 130830 | 130200 | 131170 |
| | Max | 131990 | 131737 | 131990 |
| | Min | 128979 | 128979 | 130223 |
| Weight of Bombs | Ave | 12240 | 12240 | 12240 |
| | Max | 12240 | 12240 | 12240 |
| | Min | 12240 | 12240 | 12240 |
| No. of Bombs | M-44 | 12 | 12 | 12 |

* Aircraft that bombed primary target and returned to their own bases for which logs were available.

Accuracy of air miles is questionable due to methods in determination.

*** Pressure altitude.

**** Returned at high speed with wounded aboard.

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ANNEX

L

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Target Intelligence Unit *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority *now* 760063
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
Intelligence Section
APO 493

23 February 1945

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 42

TARGET: Rama VI Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand. (13° 49'N - 100° 31'E).

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to damage resulting from a daylight attack by 58 aircraft of the XX Bomber Command on 7 February 1945. A total of 695 M-44 1000 lb GP bombs fused .1 second nose and .1 second tail were dropped. Assessment of damage was derived from excellent photos obtained by the 40th Bomb Group, XX Bomber Command, on 7 February 1945.

The attack was accomplished by eighteen formations of from two to five planes each over the target from 0325Z to 0637Z. Weather encountered varied from CAVU to 2/10 undercast. Bombing altitudes ranged from 18,500' to 21,200'.

Some repair activity was evident to damage sustained during the previous attack especially to and in the vicinity of the northernmost approach abutment. It is believed however, that the bridge was still unserviceable.

During the course of this attack numerous near misses and at least four direct hits were scored on the framework of the bridge. The hits resulted in two principal top chord members being severed, the RR tracks and the bridge being cut, and the complete collapse of 65 percent of the center span. Near misses effected a 5 ft. lateral displacement of the extreme end of the NW span.

Approximately 160 feet of the NE approach tracks and 90 feet of siding tracks were destroyed by direct hits. Five small buildings averaging 25 ft. x 37 ft. were destroyed and a 130 ft. pier NW of the bridge was damaged.

REFERENCES: (1) XX Bomber Command D.A. Report No. 34, 17 Jan 45.

WEIGHT OF ATTACK: 58 Aircraft.
695 M-44 1000# GP bombs.

PHOTOGRAPHY: (1) Strike Photos 5MB35, 7 February 1945, quality and scale variable.

(2) XX Bomber Command 5MR18, 7 February 1945, scale approximately 1:10,000, quality excellent.

ANNEXES: (1) "Before" and "After" photos, sketch and Bomb Fall Plot, Annex 1.

REMARKS:

Numbers preceding statements below refer to corresponding numbers on the attached sketch and annotated photos, Annex 1. Span designations are shown on the bridge sketch, Annex 1.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:




- (1), (2) These two items refer to damage sustained during the previous attack. Item (1), the northeast approach abutment, suffered heavily with both track-supporting girders and the tracks proper having been destroyed. Photos obtained just prior to this attack show some repair activity to and in the vicinity of the abutment. The state of repair, however, does not appear to have been such that the bridge could have been serviceable. One of the top principal members of the truss frame of Span "A", Item 2, which was severed in the last attack remains unchanged.
- (3) As a result of near misses in this attack, Span "A" has been horizontally displaced at its abutment end approximately 5 ft. to the northwest.
- (4) The top principal northwest chord member of the center panel of Span "B" has been severed.
- (5) Approximately 260 ft. of the northeast end of Span "C" was destroyed by either a direct hit on the bridge or by a hit at the pier between Spans "B" and "C". Destroyed members are under water except at the pier connection.
- (6) The RR tracks were cut on the southeast end of Span "C".
- (7) The top principal northwest chord member of the center panel of Span "D" has been severed.
- (8) Two small buildings 38 ft. by 43 ft. and 22 ft. by 22 ft. located at the end of a 130 ft. pier were destroyed.
- (9) Just north of the NE abutment approximately 90 ft. of tracks were destroyed by two near misses.
- (10) Approximately 1600 ft. NE of Item (9) about 68 ft. of tracks were destroyed by a direct hit.
- (11) Just SE of Item (10) about 90 ft. of siding tracks were destroyed by a direct hit.
- (12) Two buildings, 22 ft. by 65 ft. and 22 ft. by 22 ft., were destroyed by direct hits.
- (13) One building 22 ft. by 32 ft. was destroyed by blast.

Frank L. Scott, Jr.

FRANK L. SCOTT, JR
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L



BEFORE

A

B

C


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

2

4



5



AFTER



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↑
C

↑
D

↑
E

ANNEX I
D.A. REPORT NO. 42
RAMA VI BRIDGE,
BANGKOK, THAILAND
TARGET UNIT, XX B.C.
CONFIDENTIAL

6
↓

7
↓



100 150 200 250 300 350 FEET

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By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

ANNEX

M

CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

```
* * * * *
* Prepared by:
*
* Statistical Control Section
*
* XX Bomber Command
*
* * * * *
```

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 By *CDNAP* Date *11/1/88*

S E C R E T

XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Five
 7 February 1945

S E C R E T
 By Authority of the
 Commanding General:
2-20-41 SR
 Date Initials

Table I and II - Aircraft Participating *

| Group | Mission No. | Field Order No. | ** A/C Taking Off | Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Primary Target | | | | | | | Time Of First Takeoff | Time*** Of Latest Return | Average Time of Flight*** | |
|-------|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------|--------|-------|------|--------------|-------|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | | | | Total No. | Percent | Reason | | | | | | | A/C Bombing Primary | Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary |
| | | | | | | Mech. | Pers. | Wea. | Not in Form. | Misc. | | | | |
| 40th | 35 | 35 | 32 | 1 | 3.1% | 1 | | | | | 2230Z | 1002Z | 10:36 | 3:38 |
| 468th | 35 | 35 | 32 | 5 | 15.6% | 5 | | | | | 0058Z | 1202Z | 10:12 | 7:14 |
| TOTAL | 35 | 35 | 64 | 6 | 9.4% | 6 | | | | | 2230Z | 1202Z | 10:25 | 6:39 |

* Mission was run from Rear Area bases; Tables I and II consolidated because there was no Rear to Forward Area Movement.
 ** Field Order #35 required each Group to furnish 32 aircraft on mission.
 *** Excludes A/C which landed at other fields.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Five
 7 February 1945

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Table III - Bombing Runs

| Group | No. of A/C Bombing | Target Bombed | Time of Release | | | | Altitude of Release | | Visual Bomb | Radar Bomb | Blind Bomb | On the Leader | | | A/C Dropping On | |
|-------|--------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------|---------|--------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------|------------|---------------|------|--------|-----------------|-----|
| | | | Earliest | Latest | Highest | Lowest | A/C Sight- ing For | A/C Sight- ing For | A/C Sight- ing For | Visual | Radar | Blind | AFCE | Manual | | |
| | | | | | | | R&D | Range | R & D | | | | | | Range | R&D |
| 40th | 31 | Bangkok | 0325Z | 0420Z | 21,200 | 19,600 | 9 | | | | | 22 | | | 9 | 22 |
| 468th | 27 | Bangkok | 0548Z | 0637Z | 19,200 | 18,500 | 9 | | | | | 18 | | | 9 | 18 |
| | 1 | Martaban | 0600Z | 0600Z | 17,000 | 17,000 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| TOTAL | 58 | Bangkok | 0325Z | 0637Z | 21,200 | 18,500 | 18 | | | | | 40 | | | 18 | 40 |
| | 1 | Martaban | 0600Z | 0600Z | 17,000 | 17,000 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | |

Primary Target - Rama VI Railroad Bridge, Bangkok.
 Secondary Target - Martaban.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Five
 7 February 1945

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2-10-45 SR
 Date Initials

Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

| Group | * Type of Bombs | Bomb Loading on A/C Airborne in R. A. | | | | On Targets | | | Bomb Disposal | | |
|-------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------|--------------------|--------------|------------|----------|-------------|---------------|----------|---------|
| | | Fusing | | Average No. Loaded | Total Loaded | Bangkok | Martaban | Opportunity | Jettisoned | Returned | Unknown |
| | | Nose | Tail | | | | | | | | |
| 40th | 1000# G.P. | .1 | .1 | 12.0 | 384 | 371 | | | 13 | | |
| 468th | 1000# G.P. | .1 | .1 | 12.0 | 384 | 324 | 12 | | 4 | 44 | |
| TOTAL | 1000# G.P. | .1 | .1 | 12.0 | 768 | 695 | 12 | | 17 | 44 | |

* 1000# G.P. AN-M 44 -- Actual weight 1018.4 pounds.

NOTE: Bomb weight information supplied by Ordnance Section, XX Bomber Command.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Five
7 February 1945

Table V - Aircraft Lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

Negative Report.

Aircraft Damaged

Major Damage

| <u>Group</u> | <u>Serial Number</u> | <u>E/A</u> | <u>A/A</u> | <u>Own Guns</u> | <u>Other</u> | <u>Explanation</u> |
|--------------|----------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------|
| 40th | 63527 | | X | | | Cowl Flap #3 Engine, wing and Rear Bomb Bay |
| 468th | None. | | | | | |

Minor Damage

| <u>Group</u> | <u>Serial Number</u> | <u>E/A</u> | <u>A/A</u> | <u>Own Guns</u> | <u>Other</u> | <u>Explanation</u> |
|--------------|----------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 40th | 24894 | | X | | | Wing Panel between #3 & #4 engines. |
| | 63374 | | X | | | Inboard Cowl #1 Engine. |
| | 24587 | | X | | | Holes in Lower side of right wing panel; lower side of left outboard wing panel and through aileron. |
| | 63462 | | X | | | Outboard left wing and Vertical Stabilizer. |
| | | | 4 | | | |
| 468th | 24542 | | X | | | Right Gunner's Blister shot out. |
| | 24714 | | X | | | Flak hole in Horizontal Stabilizer. |
| | | | 2 | | | |
| TOTAL | | | 6 | | | |

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Five
7 February 1945

Table VI - Attacks & Passes by Enemy Aircraft

Negative Report.

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 By CDNPA Date 11/18

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Five
 7 February 1945

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 Date Initials

Table VII - Personnel Losses

| Crew Position | Killed | | Missing | | Seriously Wounded | | Slightly Wounded | | Total Casualties | | Total Participating | |
|---------------|--------|-------|---------|-------|-------------------|-------|------------------|-------|------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|
| | 40th | 468th | 40th | 468th | 40th | 468th | 40th | 468th | 40th | 468th | 40th | 468th |
| Pilot | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 35 |
| Co-Pilot | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| Navigator | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| Bombardier | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| Flt. Engr. | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 33 |
| Radar | | | | | | | | | | | 30 | 32 |
| Radio | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| CFC Spec | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| Right Gun | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 32 | 32 |
| Left Gun | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| Tail Gun | | | | | | | | | | | 32 | 32 |
| R C M | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Others | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| TOTAL | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 353 | 361 |

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Date Initials

XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Five
• 7 February 1945

Table VIII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

Negative Report.

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 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Five
 7 February 1945

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 By Authority of the
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2-20-45 SK
 Date Initials

Table IX - Gasoline Loading and Consumption

| Group | Average Gross Weight Per Plane Before Rear Area Takeoff | Average Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Rear Area Takeoff | * Average Gallons Consumed on Mission | | * Average Gallons Remaining in A/C After Mission | |
|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | Per Aircraft Bombing Primary | Per Aircraft Not Bombing Primary | Per Aircraft Bombing Primary | Per A/C Not Bombing Primary |
| 40th | 130237 | 6167 | 4821 | 1150 | 1342 | 5150 |
| 468th | 131123 | 6069 | 4755 | 3812 | 1310 | 2248 |
| TOTAL | 130680 | 6118 | 4791 | 3363 | 1327 | 2732 |

* Excludes A/C which did not return directly to home fields.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Five
7 February 1945

Table X - Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target

| A/C Serial Number | Specific Mechanical Malfunction | Local Action To Prevent Recurrence |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| <u>40th Group</u> | | |
| 63455 | #4 engine started leaking oil from under left upper cowling flap. #14 Cylinder blown. | Engine changed. UR #45-93 submitted. |
| <u>468th Group</u> | | |
| 63532 | Blew stack on #2 engine. Ball socket of upper right front collector ring came loose. | Replaced collector ring. UR #45-89 submitted. |
| 69663 | Bombs would not release by any method. Flew over Primary and Secondary Target in attempts to release bombs. | No malfunction located. Cause undetermined after Flight Check. |
| 24471 | Lost #4 engine. Internal failure | Engine changed. UR #45-94 submitted. |
| 63445 | #4 engine backfiring and smoking. Feathered prop; #6 cylinder exhaust valve tappet ball socket (Part #61753) broken. (Material failure) | Defective part replaced. UR #45-93 submitted. |
| 24895 | #4 engine backfiring runaway prop. internal failure of #1 engine. | Engine changed. UR #45-97 submitted. |

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
Mission Number Thirty Five
7 February 1945

Table XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part I - Engineering Malfunctions Preventing Airborne A/C From Bombing Primary

| | 40th | 468th | Total |
|----------------------------------|------|-------|-------|
| POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT. | | | |
| Engine running rough | | 1 | 1 |
| Engine Failure | | 2 | 2 |
| Exhaust System | | 1 | 1 |
| Blown Cylinder | 1 | | 1 |
| TOTAL | 1 | 4 | 5 |

NOTE: For details, see Table X - "Summary of A/C Failing to Bomb Primary".

Part II - Engineering Malfunctions Not Preventing A/C From Bombing Primary

| | 40th | 468th | Total |
|---------------------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|
| POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT. | | | |
| Engine Running Rough | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| Engine Running Hot | 2 | | 2 |
| Turbo Supercharger and/or Turbo Control System | | 1 | 1 |
| Engine Failure | | 1 | 1 |
| PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS | | | |
| Governor | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| OIL SYSTEM | | | |
| Oil Leaks | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Oil Temperature Regulator | 2 | | 2 |
| Oil Temperature High | 3 | | 3 |
| FUEL SYSTEM | | | |
| Fuel Pressure High | 1 | | 1 |
| ELECTRICAL SYSTEM | | | |
| Generators | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| Voltage Regulator | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| Bomb Bay Door | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Communication System | | 6 | 6 |
| INSTRUMENTS | | | |
| Carb. Air Temp. Gage | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Cylinder Head Temp. Gage | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Nose Oil Press. Gage | 1 | | 1 |
| Rear Oil Press. Gage | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| Tachometer | 2 | 5 | 7 |
| Flux Gate Compass | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Radio Compass | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Airspeed Indicator | | 3 | 3 |
| Manifold Press. Gage | 1 | | 1 |
| Bank & Turn Indicator | 1 | | 1 |
| Flight Indicator | 2 | | 2 |
| AFCE | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Static System | 1 | | 1 |

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Table XI - Part II cont'd

| | <u>40th</u> | <u>468th</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>MISCELLANEOUS</u> | | | |
| Pressurization | 2 | | 2 |
| Pneumatic Bomb Door Sys | | 1 | 1 |
| Landing Gear | | 1 | 1 |
| Vacuum System | | 1 | 1 |
| Oxygen System | | 2 | 2 |
| <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>45</u> | <u>41</u> | <u>86</u> |

NOTE PERTAINING TO BOTH PART I AND PART II:

Only engineering malfunctions are listed. All other malfunctions, such as radar, are excluded. If one aircraft had more than one engineering malfunction, all malfunctions have been listed.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY
 Mission Number Thirty Five
 7 February 1945

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7-20-45 SK
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Table XIII - Utilization of Useful Load
 (Based on A/C Bombing P.T.)

| Group | No. of Ground Miles | Number of A/C Considered | Type of A/C | Av. Gross Weight at Takeoff for Mission | Aver Basic Weight of A/C | Aver. Useful Load | Aver. Number of Bombs Loaded | * Aver Weight of Bombs Loaded | Aver Weight of Gas Loaded at 6 Pounds Per Gal | Average Miscellaneous Weight |
|-------|---------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 40th | 2290 | 31 | Center Wing Tanks | 130244 | 74937 | 55307 | 1000#GF 12.0 | 12221 | 36977 | 6109 |
| 468th | 2262 | 27 | Center Wing Tanks | 131196 | 74991 | 56205 | 1000#GF 12.0 | 12221 | 36400 | 7584 |
| TOTAL | 2278 | 58 | Center Wing Tanks | 130687 | 74962 | 55725 | 1000#GF 12.0 | 12221 | 36709 | 6795 |

* 1000# G.P. - AN-M 44 equals 1018.4 pounds.

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HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
APO 493

DISTRIBUTION -- MISSION NO. 35

7 February 1945

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1 Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force
2 Commanding General, XX Bomber Command
3 Chief of Staff, XX Bomber Command
4 Chief, Intelligence Section, XX Bomber Command
5 Commanding Officer, 40th Bombardment Group
6 Commanding Officer, 444th Bombardment Group
7 Commanding Officer, 462nd Bombardment Group
8 Commanding Officer, 468th Bombardment Group
9 - 38 Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Attention AC/AS
Intelligence, Collection Division
39 Assistant Chief Air Staff, Intelligence
40 CINCPAC (Thru DEPCOMAF Twenty)
41 COMGENPOA (Thru DEPCOMAF Twenty)
42 Air Commander, Eastern Air Command, Attention: DCAS, OPTI
43 Chief, Air Evaluation Board, Headquarters, Army Air Forces,
United States Forces, India-Burma
44 Commanding General, Tenth Air Force
45 Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force
46 DEPCOMAF Twenty
47 Chief of Staff, Twentieth Air Force
48 Joint Intelligence Collection Agency
49 ALUSLO, c/o XX Bomber Command
50 Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas
51 Commanding General, United States Forces, India-Burma
Theater (Attn: War Room)
52 Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force
53 Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command
54 Headquarters, Air Command, South East Asia
55 Statistical Control, XX Bomber Command
56 Radar Section, XX Bomber Command
57 Photo Interpretation, XX Bomber Command
58 Operations Analysis, XX Bomber Command
59 Special Projects, XX Bomber Command
60 Historical Officer, XX Bomber Command
61 Intelligence Section, 58th Bombardment Wing
62 Operational Intelligence, XX Bomber Command



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MAR 13 45



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

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