


TANI, MASAYUKI (2545)

(7)

(55)

TANI, MASAYUKI.



EE. 4.6.9.7.-dbw.

By the note verbale No. 36/C.R. of February 15, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the kindness to inform the Swiss Legation that the Government of the United States of America, in order to obtain the names of the American internees on the Island of Wake, should refer to the lists sent to the International Red Cross Committee by the War Prisoners Information Bureau.

The Swiss Legation has the honor of informing the Imperial Ministry that the Government of the United States of America, to which this information was transmitted, points out that, considering the lists it received through the agency of the International Committee of the Red Cross, about 400 names of American civilians on the Island of Wake have not yet been communicated to it, which is contrary to the provisions of Article 77 of the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war concluded at Geneva on July 27, 1929.

The Government of the United States of America insists therefore on receiving immediately notification of these 400 names. In addition it would attach importance to knowing the reasons for the delay accorded this notification.

The Legation would be very grateful to the Ministry for being kind enough to enable it to reply to the Government of the United States of America, and in thanking it very much for its kind and prompt reply, takes this occasion to renew the assurances of its high consideration.

TOKYO, April 8, 1943.

CERTIFICATE:-

I, ROBERT M. BOYD, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the French and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the French and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 8436.

/s/ Robert M. Boyd

28 December 1946.

Doc. No. 8427

Page 1

EE. 4.6.9.7. CE.

Tokyo, 6 October 1942

(Stamp) Oct. 7, 1942.

My dear Minister,

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that in reply to letter number 366/T3, of the 10th of August last, on the subject of the American prisoners of War and civilian internees from Wake Island, the Government of the United States of America has asked me to notify the Imperial Government as follows:

"United States Government is still without report on approximately 400 American civilians from Wake Island. While United States Government welcomes offer Japanese Government to report on welfare of individuals upon request it expects Japanese Government to report all names promptly in accordance with Article 77 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention through International Red Cross Information Bureau or protecting power."

I must add that contrary to what His Excellency Mr. Togo thought in the aforementioned letter, I have not received any individual slips on American citizens captured at Wake Island by the Japanese forces.

Begging Your Excellency to consent to furnish me the information asked for by the American Government I take this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest regard, my dear Minister.

The Swiss Minister

CERTIFICATE

I, YALE MAXON, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the FRENCH and ENGLISH languages, and as a result of the comparison between the FRENCH and the ENGLISH texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 8427.

/S/ Yale Maxon

FILE
RETURN
COPY TO ROOM 361

CC.2.1.2.-ca.
1.5.1.

IX, 2024
Tokyo, 23 December 1942

M. le Ministre,

In connection with the instructions of my Government, I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency a protest from the Government of the United States enumerating cases in which, according to declarations of American citizens repatriated from Japan, they have been subjected to ill treatment by officials or junior Japanese employees.

The Government of the United States has repeated to my Government that it is ready under conditions of reciprocity on the part of Japan to conform with all the provisions of the Geneva Convention concerning prisoners of war and civilian internees, and that it has already demonstrated its intention in asking the cooperation of the Power which represents Japanese interests in the United States, as well as that of the International Red Cross Committee, all of whose representatives have access on American territory to places where Japanese subjects are detained.

It adds that it has always been, and still is, fully disposed to open inquiries on every complaint emanating from the Imperial Government, and that it has always appreciated, and still appreciates, the cooperation which it gets from the power representing the Japanese interests in the United States.

My Government, in taking notice of this last observation, informs me that there is no doubt that the cooperation given by the Government of the United States to the Power protecting Japanese interests in the United States will be accorded in the same measure by the Imperial Government to my country insofar as representing American interests in Japan. This cooperation has already been manifested many times since the Swiss assumed the task of representing in Japan interests of enemy Powers. There is then every reason to admit that insofar as complaints made by the United States Government on the subject of a certain number of its nationals in Japan or the territories occupied by Japan are concerned, the cooperation between the Imperial Government and my country has been shown to be useful, and it is hoped that it will be the same in other regions. After these preliminary observations, I desire to send to Your Excellency the following text of the American protest:

"From American citizens repatriated from Japan and Japanese controlled territories the Government of the United States has learned of instances of gross mistreatment suffered by American civilians and prisoners of war in the power of the Japanese Government in violation of the undertaking of that Government to apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention to prisoners of war taken by Japanese forces and insofar as they may be adaptable to civilians, to American civilian internees in Japan and Japanese controlled territories.

"It is evident that the Japanese Government has failed to fulfill its undertaking in this regard and that some officers and agencies of that Government have violated the principles of the Geneva Convention in their treatment of certain American nationals not only by positive mistreatment but by failure to provide for these American nationals necessities of life that should, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention be furnished by the holding authorities.

The Government of the United States therefore lodges with the Japanese Government a most emphatic protest and expects that the inhuman and uncivilized treatment accorded American nationals both civilians and prisoners of war will be made a matter of immediate investigation and that the Japanese Government will give assurances that treatment inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Geneva Convention is not now and will not in the future be inflicted upon American nationals detained, interned or held prisoners of war in Japan or Japanese controlled territory. The American Government also expects the Japanese Government to take necessary disciplinary action with regard to agents or officers of that Government who have inflicted mistreatment upon American nationals or who have neglected their obligations to supply to American nationals in their care necessities of life which the Geneva Convention provides shall be supplied.

There follows a statement citing cases of mistreatment of American nationals in Japanese hands:

Paragraph A. - CIVILIANS.

a) Conditions in prisons and internment camps.

Americans incarcerated in jails were furnished unhealthful and inadequate rations of common criminals. Those interned were supplied a meager diet for which they were sometimes compelled to pay or they were given no food and had to provide their sustenance under difficulties. This situation apparently still exists in certain areas. It is direct contrast to the treatment accorded Japanese subjects in United States who are provided hygienic quarters with adequate space for individual needs, sufficient wholesome food in preparation of which allowance is made for nationals differences in taste and in addition allowances of money for tobacco, sweets and toiletries.

I. Bridge House Shanghai.

More than fifty-three Americans have been imprisoned for varying periods up to over six months in gendarmerie prison Bridge House where they were crowded into vermin infested cells with common criminals some of whom suffered from loathsome contagious diseases. Sanitary facilities were primitive and inadequate; food was far below standard necessary to maintain health; no heat was supplied from December to June and medical care was virtually nonexistent. Americans were compelled to sit by day and to sleep by night provided only with filthy and inadequate blankets on cold floor. They were not allowed to converse with each other or smoke at any time. An outstanding example of effects of incarceration at this prison is the condition of Mr. J. B. Powell who through lack of medical attention developed gangrene and lost the front half of both feet.

II. Army prison Peiping.

Floyd F. Spielman, R. E. McCam, C. J. Eskeline, J. B. Sherwood, E. X. Mills and P. H. Benedict were taken in handcuffs from Tientsin on March 2 to Army prison at Peiping where conditions were as bad as those at Bridge House. During 89 days of imprisonment their first exercise was for five minutes after 37 days in cells. At one time they went without bathing for 23 days and as a result of unhealthful food and harsh treatment they lost an average of forty pounds in weight.

III. Tsingtao.

Frank G. Keefe, Grady Cooper, Frank R. Halling, Charles Liebgold, C. J. Meyer, N. H. Mills and H. J. Zimmerman were confined in an unheated common jail in Tsingtao for a period of three weeks. They were forced to sleep on floors or benches without covering in coldest winter months.

IV. Fort Santiago Manila.

Roy Bennett, Robert Abbott and other Americans are reported to be imprisoned under barbarous conditions in Fort Santiago. They were reported practically unrecognizable in June as a result of hardships and mistreatment suffered. The American Government insists that they be released immediately and receive medical care.

V. Camp Stanley Hongkong.

Americans in Hongkong were taken on January 4th and received no food and very little water during first forty-eight hours. On January 21 they were placed in Fort Stanley where they were forced to provide most of their bedding and other necessities. Food given them was insufficient, amounting to nine hundred calories daily per person. They were subjected to indignities and insults by gendarmerie and their faces were frequently slapped. Result of malnutrition: average loss of weight among these internees was thirty pounds.

VI. Santo Tomas Manila.

Americans at Santo Tomas because of lack of preparation were forced to sleep on floors without mosquito nets or covering for at least three nights before they were permitted to obtain necessities from their houses. They were offered choice of being fed by holding Authorities at cost of twenty-five centavos per day or of feeding themselves with funds the American Red Cross had in the Philippine National Bank. They were refused permission to use Red Cross funds for supplementing food which holding Authorities should have supplied and not being able to exist on twenty-five centavos were obliged to depend entirely on Red Cross funds to feed themselves. These funds may be exhausted and the American Government is gravely concerned regarding the welfare of these internees.

VII. Davao and other internment camps in the Philippines.

In Davao interned Americans were forced to perform hard labor during the first six weeks of their internment. They were at first provided with an inadequate ration of cornmeal and fish. In April they were informed that they would have to provide for their own sustenance and would have to reimburse the Japanese Authorities for the food previously furnished. From information received, conditions in other internment camps in the Philippines appear equally bad. The American Government expects that the Japanese Government will take immediate steps to fulfill its undertaking to furnish American nationals held by it with suitable and adequate housing and sustenance under humane and hygienic conditions.

b) Mistreatment and torture.

I. Torture and physical violence.

Japanese Authorities have resorted to physical torture of American nationals and numerous of them were subjected to great mental torture by being constantly threatened with treatment far worse than that they were already suffering.

(A.) Three American missionaries in Korea were subjected to "water cure" and brutal beatings. In Keijo, R. O. Reiner, aged fifty-nine, suffered this torture six times during the period from May 1 to May 16. In one instance he collapsed from effect of blows and while lying unconscious on the floor, was kicked by gendarmerie employee named Syo with such force that his rib was broken. When he requested medical attention and pointed to broken rib, gendarmerie employee named Kim, struck him vicious blow directly over broken rib. On one occasion Reiner was given fifty or sixty lashes with rubber hose and pulley belting making half inch deep cuts on his arms and legs. Edwin W. Koons, aged sixty-two suffered the same torture at the Ryuzan police station.

(B.) In Ichang, Elsie W. Riebe and Walter P. Morse were taken without explanation to the Japanese headquarters where she was struck many times with a bamboo pole and he was beaten for two hours with an iron rod, one-half inch thick. These acts of cruelty were committed in the presence of the commanding officer of the Japanese police in Ichang.

(C.) Joseph L. Macsparran was arrested on December 8th at Yokohama, bound with a rope and taken to Yokohama prison. During his imprisonment in dark unfurnished cell he had three hemorrhages from duodenal ulcers but was denied medical attention despite numerous requests. While undergoing questioning, he collapsed from internal hemorrhage and was unable to stand or walk without assistance, yet he was handcuffed as usual when returned to his cell.

II. Solitary confinement.

Many American citizens were kept in solitary confinement for periods

ranging from a few days to many weeks in cells, unheated rooms or other equally unhealthful places, in some cases deprived of all reading matter and subjected to indignities from their guards. The following are typical cases:

- 1) H. W. Meyers, aged 70, missionary in Japan since 1897, after harsh treatment during nearly five months in prison at Kobe was deprived of all books and on May 1 put in solitary confinement at Osaka until his release for repatriation on June 7.
- 2) William Mackesy, solitary confinement in one room of his house at Tsu Micken Japan from December 10 to March 30th, 1942.
- 3) Mrs. Alice C. Grube, solitary confinement from December 25th, 1941 to 9 April 1942 in unheated room of Osaka prison.
- 4) J.B.N. Talmadge, aged 57, solitary confinement in common jail Koshu from 8 December 1941 to 9 April 1942.
- 5) Edward Adams, in a common jail at Taikyū, from December 8 to 28.

III. Deaths due to mistreatment and neglect.

- 1) Arthur Duhamel, missionary priest on Guadalcanal is reliably reported to have been bayoneted through the throat by Japanese soldiers after being held prisoner for three weeks.
- 2) Leo Poloquin, aged fifty, requested hospitalization at the Christian Hospital Heijo because of serious heart ailment but Japanese Authorities refused permission and forced his return to Kangai without treatment. He died at Kobe as the result of this neglect.
- 3) Charles Liebgold, aged sixty-seven, imprisoned in an unheated jail at Tsingtao, contracted a cold which developed into a fatal attack of pneumonia.
- 4) George B. MacFarland, aged seventy, at Bangkok, Thailand succumbed after an operation at the Chulalongkorn Hospital in May, 1942. Orders issued by Japanese military Authorities in Bangkok to the police guards at his residence fatally delayed emergency operation necessary to save this life.

The American Government expects that the Japanese Government will take immediate steps to punish the persons guilty of these crimes against American nationals.

IV. Violation of exchange agreement.

- 1) Transportation.

American nationals in Tsingtao and Chefoo were required to pay for their passage to Shanghai. Internees who were forced to pay their fare to

Yokohama from Nagasaki were reimbursed only part of the sum expended. Accommodations provided on local vessels were in some cases worse than those furnished dock passengers.

2) Baggage limitation and search.

Japanese Authorities in some areas ruled that Americans being repatriated might take only as much baggage as they could carry themselves forcing many in Korea, Manchuria, Hongkong and Thailand to leave behind necessary clothing and effects. Americans were forced in some cases to carry their own baggage even where there were available porters whom they were prevented from employing. This treatment is in contrast to that accorded Japanese subjects repatriated from the United States who were permitted to take almost unlimited amounts of baggage with them. Baggage was often searched three or four times and different officials made inconsistent decisions as to what Americans could take. The effects of American officials from Korea were searched in violation of the agreement.

Paragraph B. - PRISONERS OF WAR

Reports have been received of inhuman treatment accorded prisoners of war by the Japanese Authorities which is completely inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Geneva Convention.

I. Philippines.

American and Filipino troops taken at Bataan were forced to march ninety miles despite fatigue, sickness and wounds to camp O'Donnel near Tarlac. During the march, sick and wounded dropped by the roadside and were left without medical care and when those who survived reached the camp O'Donnel, they were without food for thirty-six hours and without shelter for three days, sick and well equally exposed to the elements. The Japanese Authorities made no effort to give medical care to sick and wounded and American and Filipino nurses and doctors who volunteered their services were refused permission to enter the camp. A death rate estimated at twenty-five percent was the result of this neglect.

Seven American commissioned officers were brought from Zamboanga to Davao where Japanese Authorities forced them to work stripped to the waist in a river bed as a result of which they were severely sunburned. They were given no medical attention and only after lapse of several days was a Filipino doctor permitted to visit them. Their food was entirely insufficient and the Japanese would not allow Filipinos to supplement meager diet with gifts of food. These officers and Filipino officers who were later confined with them were subjected to harsh treatment and indignities from their Japanese guards.

The American Government must insist that the treatment of these prisoners be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, that their names be reported and that representatives of the protecting Power be permitted access to them.

II. Shanghai.

The American Government again most emphatically protests the illegal sentences imposed by a military court at Shanghai on Commander W. S. Cunningham, U.S.N., Lieutenant-Commander D. Smith, U.S.N.R., and/or N. J. Tatters for an attempted escape from Woosung camp. The American Government also protests the mistreatment of four United States Marines, Corporals Stewart, Gerald Story, Brimmer and Battles who, after an unsuccessful attempt to escape from the Woosung war prisoner camp, were imprisoned in the Bridge House at Shanghai and later transferred to Gendarmerie western district substation prison, 94 Jessfield Road, where they were subjected to the so-called "Electric Treatment" in violation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding admissible punishments. The American Government insists that the sentences imposed on these prisoners be cancelled, that their punishment be in accordance with the prisoners of war Convention and that their treatment be in accordance with their rank."

Please accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my highest esteem.

Signed by the Swiss Minister

To His Excellency
M. Masayuki TANI
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo

Tami
Terashima

Records of the Meeting of the
Inquiry Committee of the Privy Council on Dec. 8, 1941

**Inquiry Committee Meeting
Concerning Declaration of
War against America and
England.**

Dec. 8, 1941 (Monday) 7:30 a.m. all the councillors of the Privy Council (except Councillor KANEKO) meet in the East Third Waiting Hall in the Imperial Palace. Naval Minister SHIMADA reports on the starting aspect of the war opened against America and England. While he is reporting the Council receives the Emperor's reference bill for their deliberation pertaining to the above subject. President HARA announces the general committee meeting and the meeting opens at once.

Members present:

President HARA

Chairman of Inquiry Committee: Vice President SUZUKI

Inquiry Committee members:

Councillor ARIMA

- ISHIZUKA
- MINAMI
- ARAKI
- SUGAHARA
- USHIO
- FUKAI
- MANO
- OBATA
- MITSUCHI
- HIRADA

Councillor ISHII

- KUBOTA
- SHIMIZU
- NARA
- MATSUI
- MATSUURA
- HAYASHI
- FUTAGAMI
- OSHIMA
- TAKEGOSHI
- IZAWA

A member absent: Councillor KANEKO

Government members:

- Premier)
- Home Minister) TOJO
- Army Minister)
- Education Minister HASHIDA
- Agriculture and Forestry Minister) INO
- Overseas Minister)
- Welfare Minister KOIZUMI
- Justice Minister IWAMURA
- Navy Minister SHIMADA
- Foreign Minister TOGO
- Communication Minister TERASHIMA
- Finance Minister KAYA

- Commerce and Industry KISHI
- Railway Minister HATTA

Explaining members:
Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO
Chief of the Legislative Bureau MORIYAMA
Chairman of the Cabinet Planning Board SUZUKI
Chief of the Intelligence Bureau TANI
Chief of the East Asia Bureau, Foreign Ministry YAMAMOTO
Chief of the Europe and Asia Foreign Ministry SAKAMOTO
Chief of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry MATSUMOTO
Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau, Army Ministry MUTO
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry OKA
Chief Secretary HORIE
Secretary MOROHASHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI

(Meeting opened at 7:45 a.m.)

Chairman SUZUKI declared that the meeting come to order.
Premier TOJO explains the reason why, at last, they have been obliged to deal with this bill.

Comm. member ISHII asks in regard to the time of declaration of war.
TOJO answers that it shall be done as soon as the Imperial sanction is obtained on this subject.

KUBOTA questions regarding the relationship between negotiations with America and treatment of this subject. To this Premier TOJO answers that at their meeting in the Emperor's presence on Dec. 1st, war against America, England and Holland was decided on. Therefore those negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy.

SHIMIZU asks whether or not war is to be declared against Holland; also he asks what will be the attitude of Siam. TOJO replies that Japan will not declare war against Holland in view of future strategic convenience. As for Siam the Japanese Government is in the course of negotiations with her for concluding an Alliance Pact.

MINAMI asks what attitude Germany will assume in relation to the Tripartite Alliance, following the disposition of this subject. To this TOJO and SAKAMOTO, Chief of the Europe and Asia Bureau, reply that, as far as the German Government is concerned, as soon as Japan declares war against America and England, Germany and Italy will also assume the same attitude as Japan, and they will not make a separate peace. In fact they are preparing the draft of an agreement therefore.

NARA asks what will be the attitude of Soviet Russia. TOJO replies that relationship between Japan and Soviet Russia at present stands on

the basis of the Neutrality Pact, but as to the treatment of the same he expects special care to be taken. As to the general situation, Soviet Russia is now fighting against Germany, so she will not avail herself of the Japanese southward advance. Also she will not make any ready move following America's plotting which is naturally expected. Further, if Soviet Russia grants America use of her territory in the East, that means Russia makes Japan her enemy; therefore she cannot easily make such a decision. In the future Japan shall never fail to keep an increasingly close watch over Russian activities.

SUGAHARA asks about the budget distribution of expenses incurred in connection with this proposition. Finance Minister KAYA explains that it will be drawn upon a special account of Emergency War Expense just as in the case of the China Incident.

Comm. member FUKAI debated on the fact that, under the present currency system disposition of required funds will be easily made for the time being, but in regard to materials required thoughtful planning is necessary; so he inquires the Government's opinion regarding it. TOJO replies that, in conclusion based on views from all angles it is not necessary to have such anxiety so far as material supplies are concerned and as for financing and money circulation they shall be treated with most careful attention to their bearing on materials.

Comm. member FUTAGAMI says that according to the draft for an imperial edict which is accompanying this project for reference, it seems as though action of war is started from our side and so, he asks, if it does not give America an excuse for her declaring war. To this Premier TOJO answers that action of war may have been started from our side, the cause of the war is really nothing but the fact that America gave various economic pressures to Japan. FUTAGAMI further asks if accuracy is lacking in using the words, "America" and "England" in the draft for the Imperial edict. Foreign Minister TOGO and Chief of the Treaty Bureau MATSUMOTO answer that there are precedents that they used such words as, "Chin," "Russia," and "Germany" in edicts of declaration of war. In the announcement documents to enemy countries the government will use regular names of the countries involved, and there is no fear of arising misunderstanding.

Comm. member TAKEGOSHI expresses hope that there will be no lack of attention regarding food plans. Comm. member IZAWA expresses hope that they will do their best to try to bring about an effective unification of the national mind.

Comm. member IKEDA and Comm. member KUBOTA say that it will not be good to leave any doubtful point in the Imperial edict and so it will be better to avoid using the word, "America." To this Foreign Minister TOGO replies that it is known all over the world and it is clear that America means the United States of North America.

Chairman SUZUKI considers that questioning has been finished by the above discussion and he asks the Government Ministers and Explaining Members to leave.

(Ministers and Explaining Members leave.)

Then as the result of conference among the committee members it was unanimously decided to approve this proposition as it is.

Thereupon Chairman SUZUKI declared the adjournment of the meeting. Further they sent telephone message to the President, Vice-President and each (Meeting adjourned at 9:55 a.m.)

By the appointed time all members of Privy Council (except Councillor KANEKO) and the Chief Secretary of Privy Council together there, when they received a draft of the Imperial sanction concerning the declaration of war against America and England.

**General Outline of the Privy Council
Attending to Business at the Time of
Declaration of War against America
and England**

The international situation surrounding the China Incident had become tense and diplomatic negotiations with England and America had been driven close to the breaking point. The Cabinet anticipated that it might happen that war would be declared at the same time with the opening of hostilities. Concerning procedures to be taken at such a time, MORIYAMA, Chief of Legislative Bureau privately had conferred with HORIE, Chief Secretary of Privy Council. On Dec. 7 (Sunday) at 4 pm. MORIYAMA phoned to HORIE saying that he wanted to have a talk with HORIE concerning an urgent treatment of affairs to face the tense situation at hand, and asked him to come and have a meeting in the official residence of Premier at 7:30 p.m. HORIE at once notified Secretary MOROHASHI by phone and MOROHASHI notified Secretary TAKATSUJI accordingly. Further, Procurator HOTTA and Commissioner NODA were notified of the meeting by a messenger. So at 7:30 pm. everyone came to meet in the Premier's official residence. At 8 p.m. in the office room of Chief of the Legislative Bureau they were informed of details of the matter by MORIYAMA, Chief of the Legislative Bureau. Owing to the disruption of Japan-America conference a critical situation was brought about and Japanese Army and Navy were to begin action early in the morning, next day, and the government would present, during the next day, declaration of war against America and England for Imperial sanction. Therefore they had Procurator HOTTA, etc. go on to prepare a bill pertaining to this matter and at the same time Chief Secretary HORIE informed HARA, President of Privy Council, and SUZUKI, Vice-President of Privy Council, by phone of the above fact, receiving instructions from them, he made arrangements for holding a meeting of the Privy Council, and then they went home at 11 p.m. After that the two Secretaries MOROHASHI and TAKATSUJI moved to the official residence of the Cabinet Chief Secretary and in a room there they set on preparing an inquiry and report draft on the matter of declaration of war

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Doc. No. 1078

Page 5

against America and England. They finished writing after 12 p.m. and had a nap.

It was a fairly cold day and was not clear either.

A little after 4 a.m. Dec. 8 (Monday) Cabinet Secretary INADA informed the two secretaries of the fact that it had been decided to ask for the Imperial sanction for declaration of war against America and England. The two Secretaries at once passed this information on to the Chief Secretary. Further they sent telephone message to the President, Vice-President and each Councillor asking them to come and meet in the East Third Hall of the Imperial Palace to consider an urgent matter at 7:30 a.m. By the appointed time all the members of Privy Council (except Councillor KANEKO) and the Chief Secretary and others of Privy Council got together there, when Navy Minister SHIMADA reported on the outbreak of war against America and England at Hawaii and Malay. While he was reporting they received a draft of the Imperial ratification pertaining to the declaration of war against America and England. President HARA announced the General Committee Meeting. At once the meeting opened. Since the bill was an extremely urgent one it was discussed in a hurry, the Committee Meeting adjourning at 9:55 a.m. Following this at 10:50 with the Emperor's

presence a plenary meeting was held and it was unanimously approved. At once the resolution was presented to the Emperor. The time was exactly 11 a.m. The sun was shining brilliantly and the weather was very clear.

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
17th day of Sept., 1946

Witness /s/ Eric W. Fleisher 3d Lt.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
1946

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

COPY

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D.C. No. _____
I. P.S. No. 1078

Legation of Swiss Tokyo
Foreign Interest
BB 4.6.9.2 Apr 22, 1943

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. Takatsuji hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 14 pages, dated 8 Dec, 1941, and described as follows: Records of the meeting of the Investigation Committee, Privy Council, concerning Declaration of War against America and England. Dated 8 December 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council, Imperial Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ M. Takatsuji
Signature of Official

Witness: s/ T. Swzuki

SEAL

April 19, 1943

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of Sept., 1946

Witness: /s/ Eric W. Fleisher 3d Lt.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

THE GAIMUSHO
TOKYO

No. 106/C.R.

2044

Legation of Swiss Tokyo	
Foreign Interest	
EE 4.6.9.7	Apr 22, 1943

NOTE VERBALE

In acknowledging receipt of the Note No. EE 4,6,9,7 - DBw of the Swiss Legation dated April 8 concerning the American civilians on the Island of Wake, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Legation as follows:

1. As regards the Americans on the Island of Wake, all the information to be furnished have been already communicated to the Legation by the Note Verbale No. 336/T.3. of August 10, 1942 and by the Note Verbale No. 36/C.R. of February 25, 1943.
2. As regards the approximately 400 American civilians whose names are allegedly not included in the list attached to the above mentioned communication, the Ministry begs to be informed of the names, addresses, occupations, etc. thereof, as such information is necessary for investigation.

April 19, 1943.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Karuzawa, 14 June 1945

CC.1.5.1.-FGc.
(CC.1.1.-
CC.1.2.-
CC.1.4.-)

My dear Minister,

You know that the Governments of Britain and of the United States of America are exhibiting great concern as regards prisoners of war in the hands of Japan. These Governments insist that the Federal Government take steps to obtain a reply to their pressing demands to obtain information about the prisoners or to ameliorate their conditions. But in spite of many requests not only to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but also to his Ministry, I have not received any reply which enables me to give to the interested Governments any information on this important question which they have awaited for a long time with impatience.

I have already called your attention to this state of affairs in my personal letter of 2nd June concerning the nomination of M. Ruch as delegate of the Swiss Minister to visit the camps.

In a new communication from Berne, the London Government has expressed the desire that an urgent solution be found for the three following serious problems.

1. The right of the protecting Power and the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit all camps of prisoners of war and civil internees in all regions of the Far East.
2. Prompt notification of the names of all prisoners of war and civil internees in the power of Japan, also of prisoners of war and internees who have died.
3. Removal of camps from the vicinity of industrial quarters and military objectives.

As to the first point, you know that I have this year visited only two prisoner of war camps and you know also my continual efforts to visit camps in Japan which have not been inspected at all or which have not been inspected for a long time. The approval given to the nomination of M. Ruch as my delegate is a first step and I sincerely hope that he will be allowed without delay to make the visits which the interested Governments require.

So far as concerns visits in occupied territories, I have received the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 5th June in which he states that negotiations are taking place between the Ministry and the International Committee of the Red Cross for the purpose of making visits to the prisoners' hospital in Malaya. I received this news with satisfaction; I hope that visits as well as others will take place shortly.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

I send you herewith a copy of a letter from M. TOGO by which I acknowledge receipt of the above mentioned communication.

With regard to the second point above mentioned, the Government of the United Kingdom has complained on many occasions of the delay in communicating the names of prisoners of war and civil internees in the power of Japan and particularly of those who have died. In my letter of 19th May to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I set out that the London Government had stated that thousands of prisoners had died in Thailand and Burma without their names having been notified. It is not necessary to tell you that entire families are plunged into a great anxiety because of the lack of any news and my Government would be extremely happy to be able to inform these unfortunate families of the fate of their loved ones.

As to the last point relative to the situation of camps near military objectives, the interested Governments attach great importance to this, which importance I have stressed in my numerous letters to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and also, as you will remember, during the interview which you arranged between General TAMURA and myself. These Governments urgently demand that prisoners and internees be moved from dangerous zones so that they no longer may be exposed to the danger of bombing. I have given in my above mentioned letters by way of example the names of a certain number of camps in such zones. To my knowledge nothing has been done to remedy the position; I have not even received a reply to my requests.

I once more make an appeal to you to aid us in our humanitarian task and to help us to carry out the duty which has been confided to my country. I hope that thanks to your efforts it will soon be possible for me to inform my Government of the decision of the Imperial Government on the problems mentioned in this letter.

The Government of His Britannic Majesty insists on knowing if the Japanese Government has modified its policy concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. I would be extremely embarrassed to reply, but it is what you know as well as I do, that the situation has perhaps never been as bad as during the last six months. The efforts which have been made by M. SHIGEMITSU to bring about a change in the sense of a greater freedom to visit camps in Japan as well as overseas do not seem to have given any result at all. You will regret this no doubt as much as I do.

Please accept, my dear Minister, my kindest regards.

Attachment

To His Excellency
M. Minister Tadakazu SUZUKI
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tokio

Loaned

Document No. 2765-A-20

Page 1

THE GAIMUSHO
TOKYO

W. 2022

Translation
No. 116/C.R

N O T E V E R B A L E

Referring to Notes Nos. CC.1.3.8.-EGf. and CC.1.3.3.-EGc./CC.1.7.57/
CC.1.7.60., of the Swiss Legation under dates of 4th July and 18th November,
1944, and following the Note No. 246/C. R. of 26th August, 1944, the Imperial
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to inform the Legation as follows,
based on the report of competent authorities:

1. As regards notification of transfer of prisoners of war (paragraph 1-A of the British Government's protest transmitted by note No. CC.1.3.8. EGf of 4th July 1944), it was replied to by letter No. 246/C. R. of 26th August, 1944.
2. As regards the treatment of prisoners of war (paragraph 1-B of the British protest), the authorities concerned regret that the situation of prisoners of war in Moulmein camps and in the outskirts of that city are such that the concentrated efforts of all the sanitary services of the Japanese troops cannot prevent the spread of diseases of the digestive system, etc., cases of which have increased, caused not only by the very bad conditions due to the climate, but also by the frequent interruption, in the rainy season of 1943, of communications with these localities. The prisoners are not the only ones who suffer from this difficult situation; the Japanese troops stationed in the same region were themselves obliged to face the same situation. But by the extraordinary efforts of the troops in these places, in the autumn of the same year, necessary sanitary installations were completed, and in consequence the number of sick and deaths was considerably lessened.
3. The inquiry made into the subject of the exhibition of prisoners of war (paragraph 1-C of the British protest) discloses that no such thing ever occurred.
4. The full inquiry made by competent authorities has shown that it is impossible to accept the allegation of the British Government that atrocities were committed by Japanese troops in Burma (paragraph 2 of the British protest and the last part of the letter of 18th November, 1944.)

The competent authorities, who are just as concerned about the treatment of prisoners of war now as they have been in the past, continue to guide the Japanese troops accordingly at these places.

15 May 1945

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE CONCLUSION OF A PACT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
October 30, 1943.

The Japanese Government have today concluded with the Government of the Republic of China the "Pact of Alliance between Japan and the Republic of China". As a result of the conclusion of this Pact, the Treaty Relating to the Basic Affairs between Japan and China and the Documents attached thereto have lost their validity and, at the same time, the treaty relations between the two countries have entered upon a period of epochal development.

The Japanese Government previously made clear, in their statement of January 9 of this year, their convictions regarding Japan's policy toward China to meet the new situation following the outbreak of the War of Greater-East Asia. Since that time, Japan has steadily translated into action what was publicly declared in that statement and thereby extended her utmost aid toward the speedy establishment of a new China on the basis of self-asserting independence and manifestation of the political power of the National Government, and the latter also, in concert with Japan, have taken measures to reinforce themselves and strengthened their co-operation for the prosecution of the war, resulting in the smooth and satisfactory development of the new relations between the two countries.

With the outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia, the situation in this part of the world has undergone a radical change. Before the War, the aggressive activities of the United States and Great Britain were rampant and consequently Japan was placed in a position where she could not ignore the realities of this situation in determining her treaty relations with China. But after the war broke out, the influence of the United States and Great Britain has been completely expelled and the National Government have also declared

war against those countries. As a result, Japan and China have come to deem it appropriate to readjust their treaty relations to conform with the new situation in order that they may, untrammelled by all past circumstances, revert to their normal and proper status as good neighbors and accomplish their common mission of collaborating to stabilize Greater East Asia and promote its renaissance and prosperity. This indeed is the reason why the new Pact has been concluded.

Japan has already secured with Manchoukuo, Thailand, Burma and the Philippines close co-operative relations based on justice and has now firmly established with the Republic of China a new foundation for their cooperation. Thus, the order to assure the common prosperity and well-being of all countries in Greater East Asia is steadily being realized.

The Japanese Government, confidently expecting an epochal progress of Japanese-Chinese relations in conformance with the spirit of the new Pact and, at the same time, being unstinting in extending every possible assistance for the complete realization of China's self-asserting independence, and expecting that Japan and China will together in close co-operation march vigorously forward toward the successful prosecution of the present war and the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia, hereby make known their convictions both at home and abroad.

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. _____

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA, Takeso hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated _____, 19____, and described as follows: STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE CONCLUSION OF A PACT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA October 30, 1943.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
10th day of July, 1946.

T. SHIMODA

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: M. EMURA

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
10th day of July, 1946.

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

NAME

Witness: ROBERT F. MAHON

Investigator I.P.S.
Official Capacity

EXTRACTS FROM PAGE 10, 11, 12 FROM OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING
FOREIGN RELATIONS
BOARD OF INFORMATION

AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY CONCERNING ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The Imperial Government of Japan and
The Government of Germany.

In order to assist mutually with total economic strength in the present war for the construction of the new order in Greater East Asia and Europe and to realize after the conclusion of the war in their victory the new order to secure co-existence and co-prosperity of the peoples concerned by a plan of extensive construction in their respective economic spheres, having decided to render still closer the economic co-operation between them. Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Japan and Germany shall accelerate and prosecute with all their power the exchange of economic goods and services in all branches between their economic spheres.

They shall mutually assist in the procurement of materials and in the installation of equipments and effect close technical co-operation.

ARTICLE II

Japan and Germany shall effect close financial co-operation to facilitate Payment arising from the enforcement of the provisions in the preceding article.

ARTICLE III

Japan and Germany shall maintain close contact to make more effective their co-operation regarding the prosecution of their economic policies.

The Governments of the two countries shall make committees, appointed specially for the purpose, to pay constant attention to the development of economic relations between the two countries.

ARTICLE IV

The competent authorities of the two countries shall make agreement concerning necessary details for the enforcement of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The present Agreement shall come into effect from the day of its signature and shall remain valid for the same duration as the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy of September 27, of the 15th year of Syowa or September 27th, 1940.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND ITALY CONCERNING ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

(The text of the Agreement is identical with that of the Japanese-German Agreement. In the preamble, replace "The Government of Germany" with "The Government of the Kingdom of Italy," and in all articles in which the name "Germany" appears, replace with the name "Italy". In Article V added after September 27, 1940, "the 18th year of the Fascist calendar.")

Immediately after the signature of the Agreement between Japan and Germany at the General Headquarters of the German Fuehrer, three arrangements including concrete details pertaining to trade, technical co-operation and payment were concluded at Tokyo between the Foreign Minister, Mr. Masayuki Tani, and the German Ambassador, Lieutenant-General Eugen Ott, and the Chief of the German Economic Mission, Mr. Helmuth Wohlthat.

As regards the details concerning the enforcement of the above-mentioned Japanese-Italian Agreement they are presently being discussed between the two countries.

Doc. 1767

4-1-231

Telegram from KUWASHIMA, the Consul-General in Tientsin to
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Tientsin Nov. 3, 1931

Telegram No. 461 (Urgent, Top Secret, Code)
Re Our telegram No. 460
To TANI, Chief of Asiatic Affairs Bureau

DOIHARA told the staff of the Consulate that the Manchurian state of affairs was brought to the present condition solely by the activities of military authorities there and that in case that the enthronement of the Emperor becomes indispensable in order to save the situation, it would be outrageous for the present government to take the attitude of preventing it. If it should prove true, the Kwantung Army might separate from the government; and who knows what action it might take? In Japan proper too besides the assassination plotters who are now under confinement, some graver accident may occur, he feared. The policy of the government is out of the question at this time. If the Emperor should decide to come out, he must be brought out even if it depends on political expediency as a means, he threateningly declared. As you know, he (DOIHARA) has close liaison with the Governor-General of Korea; and the fact that before this incident, when Chao Hsin Po in order to overwhelm the Mukden faction, asked DOIHARA to let him have confidential talks with some influential Japanese, he was immediately introduced to the Governor-General. (DOIHARA's direct talk on the 31st shows good evidence of it.) Again when Commander Honjo was requested by DOIHARA and others to get the understanding of the Consul-General, he simply gave them advice not to act in a hurry. (DOIHARA's talk on the 2nd.) And on the other hand he took such steps as seen in our telegram No. 449; these facts can not but be considered to explain that even the Commander has to take into consideration the influential background. Consequently it can be no more than a trifle to advise them here to stop activities, and I suppose that it will be without avail. Further with regard to the Emperor, I have repeated through his attendants my advice to act with greater prudence. Kindly let me know your instructions as to the degree to which I may speak to the Emperor about this matter.

Dispatch relayed to the minister, to Peiping and to Mukden.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 4-1-231

Document No. 1767

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated November 3, 1931, and described as follows: Telegram from Kuwajima to Shidehara. Telegraphic Communication No. 461.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

24th day of August 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

24th day of August 1946.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

90 1673

Svenska
Beskickningen i Tokio

The undersigned, Ripa, Olof, Swedish Diplomatic Representa-
tive in Japan, declares and certifies that the annexed
document is a complete and true (photo) copy of a letter,
dated Tokyo 30 December 1943, sent by the Swedish Charge
d'Affaires in Japan, addressed to the Jap Foreign Minister,
copy of which original document is part of the official records
of the Swedish Mission in Tokyo,

Tokyo, October 31st, 1946

L.S. (Seal)

/s/ Ripa

(Signature: O. Ripa)

Tokyo, December 30th, 1943

Monsieur le Ministre,

The Netherlands Government having approached the Royal Swedish Government in a matter relating to the treatment of Netherlands subjects, made prisoners of war by the Imperial armed forces or interned by the Japanese authorities, I have the honour, in accordance with instructions received, to bring the following to the knowledge of Your Excellency.

The Netherlands Government have received information that a number of Netherlands prisoners of war and civilian internees should have been transferred by the Japanese authorities, to internment camps, which are exposed to air attacks, due to their close vicinity to military establishments, and consequently must be considered to be situated in zones of danger. It is reported that some of the camps are located in the cities on the Burma coast.

In this connection the Netherlands Government point to the stipulations contained in articles 7 and 9 of the Geneva Convention of July 27th, 1929, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, the principles of which the Japanese Government hitherto generally seem to have been disposed to apply.

According to the aforesaid articles prisoners of war are to be interned in camps, established so far from the war zone, that their safety is not endangered. The Netherlands Government further emphasize that they, on their side, strictly adhere to the regulations of the said Convention in regard to the treatment of Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees.

The Netherlands Government, therefore, should appreciate to receive an assurance from the Imperial Government to the effect that they are prepared to observe the above mentioned stipulations of the Geneva Convention of 1929, and that, if in some instances this should not have been the case, the Imperial Government have already taken steps to remove Netherlands prisoners of war and civilian internees from zones of danger.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency
Monsieur Mamoru Shigenitsu
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
etc. etc. etc.
T O K Y O

/s/ Enk von Lubow

Extracts from the
Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee
"Organization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"

p. 17

The Second Meeting of the Investigation Committee for
the Government Organization of Greater East Asia
Ministry and eight other items.

Meeting held on October 12, 1942 (Monday) at Privy
Council Office.

Persons present:

President HARA
Chief of Investigation Committee; Vice President
SUZUKI

Investigation Committee members:

p. 18

Councillor ISHII
Councillor MINAMI (Hiroshi)
Councillor USHIO
Councillor FUTAGAMI
Councillor OBATA
Councillor TAKEGOSHI
Councillor MITSUCHI
Councillor IZAWA
Councillor IKEDA
Councillor MINAMI (Jiro)

Ministers of State:

p.19

Premier concurrently War Minister TOJO
Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently
Overseas Affairs Minister INO
Home Minister YUZAWA
Foreign Minister TANI ✓

Exponents:

p. 20

Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO
Chief of Legislation Bureau MORIYAMA
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau IRIYE
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau SATO
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau MIYAUCHI
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau ARAKI
President of Planning Board SUZUKI
Chief of 1st Section, Planning Board AKINAGA
Vice-Chief, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs TAKEUCHI

Chief Secretary HORIYE
Secretary MOROHASHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI

(Opened at 10 a.m.)

p. 21 Chief of Investigation Committee SUZUKI announces the meeting open.

To the question from Committee Member USHIO:

p. ²⁵~~27~~ Regarding the inquiry about the limits of the Greater East Asia Sphere, Premier TOJO has replied that it includes KWANTUNG Region, South Sea Islands, Manchuria, China, Siam, French Indo-China and new occupation zones resulting from the Greater East Asia War, and therefore, the limits would expand together with the extension of occupied territories.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____
 I. P. S. No. 1086B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shuzo Jimbo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary to the President of the Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated 9-14 Oct., 1942, and described as follows: Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee "Organization of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council in Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 4th day of September 1946.

/s/ Shuzo Jimbo
 Signature of official

SEAL

Witness: Kiichi, Chosokabe

 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 4th day of September 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
 NAME

Investigator, IPS
 Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

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2171*

Document No. 10-B-2

Page No. 1

"JO" 3, "FUTSU" No. 5

Jan. 21, Showa 17/1942/

Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs

Matter Concerning Transmission of the Notes from the American Government with regard to the International Treaty of July 27, 1929, regarding Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Concerning the above, the Swiss Minister in Tokyo, representative of AMERICAN interests, has sent us a note, as per separate copy, enclosed herewith. We would greatly appreciate your opinion concerning the policy of treatment of overseas non-combatant internees of the enemy countries.

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. No. 10 M 1, 10 S 1, 10 B 1,
10 B 2, 10 B 3

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. _____

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3/27 pages, dated 12 Feb., 1944, and described as follows: Transmittal of American Government's Protest with regard to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in the Area under the Japanese jurisdiction. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this
27th day of December, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

AUTOGRAPH TESTIMONY

P.W. Former Commander of the First Area Army
of the Kwantung Army. General KITA, Seiichi.
From April 20 to April 23, 1946.

I, former Commander of the first Area Army of Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seiichi shall state about the preparation for sei-ure of Manchuria and the attack against U.S.S.R. by Japan.

At the beginning of Showa era, i.e., in 1926, the civil war in China expanded. This civil war was caused by the anti-northern expedition carried out by Sun-Bun and CHIANG Kai-shek with the object of unifying and restoring the national rights of China. If this movement should extend to Manchuria, the Japanese rights in that area would be contradicted. The Japanese government, therefore, decided the following measures:

1. That the civil war of China shall not be allowed to extend over Manchuria.
2. That the influence of Sun-Bun shall not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria.
3. That the government of CHANG Tsuo-lin in Manchuria shall be supported to the utmost so that he might be able to make every effort to prevent the Chinese national liberation movement from penetrating into Manchuria and also to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria itself.

These political measures of Japan were decided by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and were sanctioned by Premier TANAKA. I myself saw the documents concerning the above decisions at the War Ministry office in July, 1927. The then War Minister was General UGAKI.

In May 1928, the nationalist forces in North China smashed the resistance of CHANG Tsuo-lin and drove him into Manchuria. The nationalist movement did not penetrate into Manchuria, but the anti-Japanese sentiment there gradually aggravated. Under such conditions in China and Manchuria in August 1929, I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking by the order of the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA, and was attached to Military Attache, Major-General SATO, who was stationed in Shanghai. I was appointed to this post, because I had studied the general situation in China, the characters and customs of the Chinese people, and the Chinese language, and also because I had some acquaintances among the important persons of the Army in the Nanking government. For instance, I met War Minister General HO Ying-Chin at CHENKIANG in 1927 through one of his friends who was working at the Japanese consulate in Nanking. At that time the Japanese War Ministry dispatched me for the investigation of the Nanking Incident in China. (Japanese residents took refuge in the Nanking Consulate, which was attacked by the nationalist force). I went to CHEN KIANG with the

object of spying upon the conditions of the nationalist anti-northern expedition. It was there that I made the acquaintance of HO Ting-Chin, then the highest commander of the nationalist army in that section. HO Ying-chin had formerly studied in the Military Academy of Japan and was kind to the Japanese. Besides this person, I was on good terms with the vice-chief of the Military Administration Section of the Nanking Government, CHEN-Yi, Inspector-General of Military Discipline, Lt. General CHU Ya-wei, Chief of the Survey Bureau of Army, Lt. General HUANG, MU-sung, and Commander of Engineer Corps, Lt. General YANG-Chieh. With them I was friends from the time when we were students of the Military Staff College in Tokyo. When I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Embassy, my personal opinion regarding the Japanese policy in China was taken into consideration in addition to the above-said conditions. I, of course, was in accord with this policy. Before my departure for Nanking, I received the following instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA:

1. To spy upon the military strength of the Central Army of the Nanking Government.
2. To collect data regarding the national liberation movement originated by the Nationalist party, to pay special attention to the trend of expansion of this movement into Manchuria, and to make efforts to prevent it from penetrating into Manchuria.
3. To form friends among the military circles of the Nanking Government to facilitate execution of my duties.

I received the same instructions from the military attache to the Embassy, Major-General SATO in Shanghai, who directed me further on the day that I was dispatched to Nanking, to pay attention to the situation of military administration of the Nanking Government. After my arrival in Nanking, I established contact with the above-mentioned military authorities of the Nanking Government and I carried out my duties as instructed. Aside from the above, I took charge of the intelligence work pertaining to Military Administration. I executed this work through connections with important persons in the Nanking Government and by the utilization of secret agents. The situation in China at that time can be said to have facilitated intelligence work -- the segregation of society due to the civil war, the confrontation of the Chinese military cliques, the existence of anti-government elements and so on. We could easily fulfill whatever requirements concerning intelligence under such circumstances. I succeeded in forming somewhat better relationship with the military authorities of the Nanking Government, but the situation in Manchuria at that time was aggravated day by day by anti-Japanese movement which caused many incidents. Not long before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, a Japanese captain whose name was NAKAMURA was killed on a road in HSINGAN LING near Solon. Captain NAKAMURA was one of the staff officers of the General Staff. The General Staff had dispatched him to attend to the intelligence work in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING. After my arrival as Chief of the second section of the Headquarters of Kwantung Army, in 1932, I heard from many people working at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the said NAKAMURA was dispatched with the object of investigating the roads in HSING AN LING and I am convinced of the statements being true.

I think I can safely say concerning the Japanese preparation for the occupation of Manchuria that the fact that Japan has long been covetous of Manchuria could be testified by the condition before the Manchurian Incident and by various other situations there. Japan wanted to have military bases in Manchuria for the execution of aggressive plans against Soviet Russia. The construction of strategic railway lines in Korea such as the Seoul-Fumen line, the Ranan line, and the Fusan-Mukden line was carried out with the same objective. To realize this cherished plan some proper historical time had to be chosen. The year of 1931 afforded a good opportunity, because countries which had interests in Manchuria, for instance, China and Soviet Russia were absorbed in their own affairs and could not afford to direct their attentions to Manchuria, the former being absorbed in civil war, and the latter, in the five-year national construction program. Japan, taking all these facts into consideration, increased the expeditionary forces in Manchuria on Sept. 18 1931. The action resulted in the occupation of the whole of Manchuria. Following the occupation, Japan set to work on the establishment of Manchukuo. There were two opinions--one was to place Manchuria under Chinese administration with certain number of Japanese advisers in the Manchurian government, the other was to form an independent monarchical state, Manchukuo, and to keep the real power of the country in the hands of Japan. The latter plan was advocated by Lt. Col. ISHIMARA and Col. ITAGAKI who were at the headquarters of Kwantung Army, and was supported by Gen. ARAKI. In accordance with the latter program, all the ministers of the cabinet were selected from among the Manchurians, and the positions of vice-ministers were filled by Japanese subjects. Moreover, it was decided that some Japanese officials should serve in various Manchurian government offices. Such a policy aggravated the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Manchurian people, and caused the increase of anti-Japanese troops which had actively resisted the Japanese forces in Manchuria. In this connection Kwantung Army made it their primary task to annihilate all the anti-Japanese elements either by subjugating them or by advising their allegiance by means of propaganda. Major punitive expeditions were carried out around the cities of Harbin, Chinchow, and in the vicinity of TUNG PIEN TAO. The pursuit of the armies of MA Chan-shan and LI-Tu and the subjugation of Jehol were also punitive campaigns. These military operations were directed by the Chief of the Staff Lt. Gen. MIYAKE and Lt. Gen. KOISO when Generals Honjo and Muto were commanders of the Kwantung Army. These punitive operations caused the innocent Manchurian civilians enormous damage and brought many of them to bankruptcy. We cannot but definitely admit that such operations caused the dispersion of the people, destruction of houses, loss of properties and such like. Owing to the number of years that have elapsed I do not remember well the amount and scope of losses and damage caused by these operations, but I cannot but recognize the fact for seven long years warfare was conducted at a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. During the period when I served at the headquarters of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as Chief of the second section, the subjugation plans and measures were formed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army by Col. SAITO and Lt. Col. SENDO. Those officers who directly commanded the expeditions are as follows:

1. Harbin and the vicinity of KIRIN the 10th Division
(Commander, Lt. Gen. HIROSE)
2. The vicinity of Chinchow and Jehol the 8th Division
(Commander, Lt. Gen. NISHI).

3. The Province of HEILONGJIANG and the vicinity of CHICHIAERH the 14th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. MATSUKI, later succeeded by Lt. General HATA, Shinroku.
4. Vicinity of Jehol, the 6th Division (Commander, Lt.Gen.SAKAMOTO)
Mixed brigade (Commander, Maj. Gen. HATTORI)

A part of the above-mentioned divisions simultaneously launched a punitive campaign in another area. The operations in Jehol was directly commanded by the commander of Kwantung Army General MUTO and I also participated in the Jehol operations. I, as chief of the second section, presented to the chief of staff of Kwantung Army the data of intelligence concerning both the doings and movements of the anti-Japanese troops; and the districts whose population was imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments. Then the first section made the subjugation plan based on my reports. In the spring of 1934 a large scale military operation was carried out in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, south of CHIA MU SSU. The operation was carried out to subjugate the Manchurian units which, being dissatisfied with the purchase of Manchurian possessed land by the Manchurian Development Company of Japan, revolted and attacked the Japanese forces with the result of annihilating the whole strength of a company and killing the regimental commander, Colonel IIZUKA. In order to suppress the rioters in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, the Japanese army sent a large number of forces there. Bestirred by the retaliative sentiment provoked by the death of their own regimental Commander Col. IIZUKA, they caused enormous damages to the Manchurian residents. This fighting was directed by the chief of staff Col. KANO of the 10th Division (Commanded by Lt. Gen.HIROSE). The responsibility for these subjugation campaigns in general carried out by Kwantung Army in Manchuria during the period from 1931 to 1936 should be borne by the then commanders of Kwantung Army--Generals HONJO, MUTO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI and UEDA. At the same time in 1933 Japan began to take measures to expel from Manchuria the influence of Soviet Russia which at that time confined itself to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With this object in view, the Japanese put various kinds of pressure upon the railway and its employees. These machinations were chiefly made by the head of military Special Service in Harbin, Maj. Gen. KOMI TSUBARA, the Representative of the South Manchuria Rly. Company in Harbin. Director USAMI and other agents, they were all under the direction of Col. HARADA, chief of the third section of headquarters. I cannot flatly deny the fact that Japan made use of agitators in the Chinese Eastern Rlys. in order to expel the influence of Soviet Russia from Manchuria or that Japan utilized some bandits to disturb the railway administration as well as to bring pressure to bear upon its employees. But at that time, not only the business of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, but also those of all other railways throughout Manchuria were disturbed by bandits.

In 1935 Japan, by resorting to every possible means, induced Soviet Russia to sell the right and interest of the Chinese Eastern Rlys. After that Japan gradually enlarged her preparation for military bases in Manchuria for war against Soviet Russia. Along with it, the building of fortresses in ten areas, the establishment of 200 airfields of all sizes,

the construction of railways extending 9,000 kilometers, the construction of HASHIN harbor, the construction of communications and roads, the establishment of munition factories etc., were carried out. Most of these construction works were executed in accordance with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Japanese Government the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The Kwantung Army took the following measures in order to carry out these plans, the instructions of the General Staff, and requests made by myself.

1. The fortification department to build fortresses.
2. The air force units to build air-fields.
3. The Manchurian Civil Engineering Bureau to build military roads.
4. The Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company to establish communications.
5. The construction of harbors and railways shall be entrusted to the South Manchuria Rly Company.
6. The Manchurian Heavy Industry Company shall be founded for the establishment and management of munition factories.

The Japanese authorities, either purchased at low prices by compulsion the land owned by Manchurians or forced them to remove to other places for the sake of these construction works and for the settlement of Japanese immigrants, and thereby provoked intense dissatisfaction among the Manchurian people. In addition, the Japanese authorities established the system of compulsory labor to conscript Manchurians for military construction works. The conscripted laborers received lower wages than the free laborers to the detriment of their welfare. Moreover, the bad condition of housing, sanitation and supply, the defective management by the Japanese and so on resulted in the death of many laborers from sickness. In 1944, for instance, about 20,000 Manchurian laborers were employed for the construction of fortresses in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING and the number of those who died from illness mounted to 500. The former chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. HATA and General USHIROKU explained to me that there were cases of death reported from other districts but they did not tell me the number of the dead laborers. The total number of Manchurian laborers conscripted by Kwantung Army amounted to 120,000 or 130,000.

Those who were responsible for the strengthening of Manchuria as military bases against Soviet Russia since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 are Japanese Premier, INUKAI, KONOE, and General TOJO; Japanese War Ministers, Generals ARAKI, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Chiefs of the General staff, Generals KANAYA, Prince KAN-IN, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals HONJO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI, UEDA and UMEZU, and those members of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to whom I referred to in this testimony. In August of 1934 I was transferred to the position of Chief of the China section the General Staff. The then chief of the General Staff was Prince KAN-IN, Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. SUGIYAMA (later General); Chief of the 1st department, Maj. Gen. SUZUKI (later Lt. Gen.); chief of the 2nd Department, Maj. Gen. ISOYA (later Lt. Gen.), and chief of the 3rd department, Maj. Gen. USHIRO-KU (later General). The work of the China section was the adjustment and judgment of the intelligence pertaining to China and the investigation of topography for military purposes. The section constituted of two groups, that is, the China group (chief, Lt. Col. KUSUMOTO) and the geography group (chief Lt. Col. WACHI), with four or five officers being attached to each of them. The work was executed

by studying and putting together all the intelligence and documents from the Korea Army, Kwantung Army, Tientsin Army and Formosa Army; from the military attaches and officers stationed in the various countries, especially from the attache at the Embassy in China and officers stationed in Peking, Pivan, and Canton, together with those from the Navy and Foreign Ministers. While I was in that post, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China gradually increased and spread owing to the Manchurian Incident, but nothing serious happened. At that time a plan for strengthening the forces in Manchuria was furthered and in 1936 the program to increase Kwantung Army to four divisions, five railway guard units (each five battalions) and four frontier garrisons, was realized.

In 1934 the General Staff gave Kwantung Army instructions pertaining to the building of fortresses. In this connection investigation had already been made since about 1933.

The Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy:

In 1936 the anti-Comintern Pact was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy. Negotiations relative to this pact had already been in progress since autumn 1935 between the military attache to the Embassy in Germany, Lt. Gen. OSHIMA, and the German government authorities. Since then through the efforts of Military Attache OSHIMA its conclusion was reached. It is not clear who, among the important governmental officials in Tokyo supported this measure, but I, as well as other persons clearly recognized the fact that the appearance of this pact, whose nature was provocative to Soviet Russia, brought an ill effect on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Japan this anti-Comintern Pact was used to unify the National thought against Soviet Russia. Every possible effort was made to instigate the people that we had to fight to the utmost against the Communist politics of Soviet Russia, and that it was necessary to dissolve the PA LU Army of China, etc. This pact resulted in strengthening Japanese national spiritual preparation for war against Soviet Russia and also in the interference in the internal administration of China.

The days when I was the Military Attache to the Embassy in China:

In April 1936, having been appointed the Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I reported to Shanghai. Before this, the Foreign Minister of the Tokyo Government, considering the fact that the Sino-Japanese relation was becoming more serious, had newly appointed Ambassador KAWAGOE to China. The problems to be solved by the Ambassador were as follows:

1. China shall connive the Japanese rights in Manchuria, that is to say, China shall pretend not to notice the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.
2. China shall suppress movements which are anti-Japanese and which are insulting to Japanese. Both countries shall cooperate economically.

3. China shall cooperate with Japan in anti-Comintern activities.

I remember that as the compensation for the above three conditions Japan promised China economic and technical aid. Although in June 1936, Ambassador KAWAGOE began negotiations with the Nanking Government on these problems, the Nanking Government did not agree and the negotiations were suspended. The Nanking Government made the following answers as to the proposals offered by Japan:

1. China will not officially recognize Manchukuo, but will connive the situation in Manchuria.
2. China herself will resist Communism. Materially speaking, China is fighting against the Pa Lu Army. But she cannot promise Japan that she will cooperate against Communism lest it should aggravate diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
3. The Chinese Government cannot suppress the anti-Japanese movements in China by its own power as it represents the sentiment of the whole Chinese people, and not sentiment of an individual.

The Nanking Government continued to maintain this opinion till the last moment, and brought about the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before my departure for Shanghai as Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I received from the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lt. Gen. NISHIO instructions, the important points of which were as follows: "I shall collect intelligence regarding the political trend of the Nanking Government, especially the military situation and at the same time co-operate with Ambassador KAWAGOE to adjust the diplomatic relations between both countries." I went from time to time to Nanking and saw the Ambassador. However, relations with China became serious day by day and at last an incident broke out when, in July 1937, Japanese troops stationed in the suburbs of Peking on maneuver were fired upon by the Chinese. Japan strived to solve the problem on the spot but did not succeed. Japan later announced in the press and to the diplomatic representatives that she would not recognize CHIANG Kai-shek's Government and would attack to punish the Chinese troops. In August 1937 the Japanese landing party (Navy) collided with the Chinese forces near Shanghai. This incident formed the second stage of the gradually expanding Sino-Japanese War.

The period when I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Chief of the Liaison Section of the China Affairs Board (KO-A-M).

In August 1937 at the time of the expansion of the Sino-Japanese War the North China Area Army was established in Peking. At the same time, I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Section of the Army and reported to my new post in Peking. I was appointed to that post by War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA. The duties of the Special Service Section

were to execute the work of Military administration, and the actual work was to Japanize the occupied areas in China, i.e. to establish a government as a guiding organ of politics, economics and culture. I made the following bureaux in the Special Service Section.

1. General Affairs Bureau--in charge of political matters.
2. First Economic Bureau--in charge of finance and economy.
3. Second Economic Bureau--in charge of traffic and industries.
4. Culture Bureau--in charge of education and culture.

Experts were sent to the Special Service Section from various departments of the Japanese government and in order to establish a plan for managing administration and economy in the occupied areas in China at that time. An important measure, which I took in North China while I was chief of the Special Service Section, was the establishment of a regime in North China with Wang Ko-min, a pro-Japanese at its head. He was formerly a finance minister, but I do not remember in what regime. Japanese representatives were employed as advisers in the Wang Ko-min regime. As one of the advisers I took direct charge of political affairs. The others were economic adviser HIRAO Hachisaburo, administrative adviser YUSAWA Michio, and legal adviser ODATE Shigeo. These three were not military men. The principle of the advisers was to carry out the policies of the Japanese government in the activities and operations of the Wang Ko-min regime and to cooperate to the fullest extent with Japanese Military forces in the war against China. In 1939 the Special Service Section was DISSOLVED and its duties were transferred to the newly organized Asia Development Board (Koain). I was appointed Chief of the North China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Board. I received this appointment from the cabinet, HIRANUMA was Premier at that time. Since the board was not a military organ, I became a civilian official, but still remaining in active service. I was also a committeeman on the board. The headquarters of the Asiatic Development Board was in Tokyo and Premier HIRANUMA was the head and the president. Vice-presidents were War Minister Lt. General ITAGAKI, THE Navy Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister; and there were about sixty board members. The actual work was not carried out by the president but by Chief of the General Affairs Bureau YANAGAWA Heisuke. Since this board was not a social organization but a purely national organization, civilian officials as well as military officers could become board members. As stated above during the time when I was Chief of the Liaison Section up until 1940 the planning duty of the Asia Development Board was to Japanize China. I know well that such a plan was not to be applied to the other countries which came into the system of greater East Asia. Later, however, upon the break of the Jap--U. S. war when Japan occupied other countries in East Asia such as Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, the Phillipine Islands and other islands in the Southern Pacific, the scope of such activities as those of the Asia Development Board was greatly expanded. Therefore, so as to perform the planning duties of the board not only in China but also in the occupied territories in Greater East Asia, a larger and stronger organization based on the Asian Development Board was required. Consequently, in the beginning of 1942, the Board was absorbed by the newly established Greater East Asia Ministry and the duty of the Chief of the

Liaison Section of the Board was transferred to the embassies set up in the various occupied territories. For example there was General YAMADA, the commander of the Kwantung Army as Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchuria, TANI as Ambassador in a similar position in the Wang Ching-Wei regime and similar embassies in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, other countries occupied by Japan. These embassies performed the planning duty of the former Asia Development Board, that is, they Japanized the territories under Japanese occupation. While I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Liaison Section in North China, I did much to assure the suitable condition of the strategic operation of our North China Army and to help to strengthen the military foundation in Manchuria.

In the summer of 1937, the Inner Mongolian Garrison Army was set up in Kalgan concurrently with the operations of the North China Army. In August 1937, the Kwantung Army under the command of the Chief of Staff Lt. General TOJO (later full general) captured Inner Mongolia and established the Special Service Agency TOKUMU-KIKAN, appointing Major General MATSUI its chief. Later, when the Mongolian Army was established its Commander was Lt. General HASUNUMA, the Special Service Agency was changed into the Special Service Section (TOKUMU-BU and Major General MATSUI remaining as chief. In November 1937, Major General MATSUI established a Japanized Mongolia-Hsinking government headed by Prince Te. Japanese advisors from Manchuria were placed in this government. The object of our occupation of Inner Mongolia and the establishment of a Japanized government was the same as our object at the time when we got possession of Manchuria, that is to say, to hold Inner Mongolia at Japan's command and set up a military base there against Outer Mongolia. This measure was carried out at the insistence of Lt. General TOJO, the then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and the same policy was continued by him even after he became Prime Minister of Japan. The assistance which I offered to the measure for the taking of Inner Mongolia was in creating in North China a provision for driving out of China and out of Inner Mongolia the Chinese forces which opposed our North China Army thereby facilitating Lt. General TOJO's occupation of Mongolia. The Japanese assets in Inner Mongolia being lacking, Japan did not build fortresses there as she did in Manchuria but maintained a force of 50,000 soldiers in Inner Mongolia until 1941. As to the border line troubles at Chang-Ku-Feng in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939, the hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Russia initiated by Lawless actions of the Japanese Army; and since the details and the persons responsible for those incidents are well known, I need not make any further answer here.

In March 1940, I was recalled from the position of Chief of the Liaison Section of the Asiatic Development Board and appointed commander of the 14th Division in Utsunonuya (Japan). In September 1940, I was told confidentially by the Chief of the General Staff His Highness Prince Kan-in that the 14th Division would be diverted to Manchuria in accordance with a plan to increase the Kwantung Army to 15 divisions. In October 1940, I arrived at Chichihaorh with my division. Since such an increase in strength was not necessary for defense of order in Manchuria it was in preparation for Japanese operations against the Soviet Russia.

When I was in Chichihaerh with the division in 1940, I received secret instructions from the commander of the 6th Army to the effect that the officers of the 14th Division were requested to be thoroughly familiar with the topography in the vicinity of Hairaerh, as the division would be employed on the Hairaerh plain in case of the outbreak of war; and also that training should be carried out so as to be chiefly capable of sustained defense against the well-equipped Russian forces. Moreover, the 6th Army in Hairaerh executed map strategic maneuvers in the vicinity of Hairaerh twice in 1940, by way of studying the operation against Soviet Russia. I and my staff participated in these and I stressing combat with Soviet Russia trained my subordinates.

After the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941, the General Staff Headquarters heavily increased the Kwantung Army by sending troops, horses and guns from Japan in order to strengthen the preparation for the operations against Russia. This increase was executed in accordance with a plan known as "Ken-Toku-En" (Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers). The amount of troops and ordnance of the Kwantung Army reached the maximum limit under the plan of the summer of 1941. First of all, two fresh divisions were sent from Japan and added to the thirteen divisions already there. Besides this, each division was increased by 5,000 personnel and 3,500 horses. Consequently, the Kwantung Army which, before the "Ken-Toku-En" consisted of:

13 divisions.....	195,000 men
2 tank divisions.....	30,000 men & 400 tanks
Air forces.....	24,000 men & 1,000 planes
Border guards (28 battalions).....	19,000 men
Railway guards (5 units).....	17,500 men
Rear forces.....	100,000 men
Total...(men).....	386,000
(horses).....	40,000

It now possessed 600,000 men and 80,000 horses due to the increase made by the "Ken-Toku-En" plan. As for guns, the 14th Division under my command had the increased number of 48 while the number previously was 36. It may be considered that similar increases were made in other divisions.

When the increase was put into effect, the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to hasten preparations for the operations against Soviet Russia. This order was issued in the latter part of June 1941, but I did not read it, and I do not know its number, as I simply heard of it from a man in the service of the Kwantung Army. At that time I received no other order except an instruction from the Commander of the 6th Army to which my 14th Division belonged. However, the Commander of the 6th Army ordered the 23rd Division at Hairaerh to build field fortifications on the heights east of Hairaerh in order to quickly prepare for the operation. All the conditions in Kwantung Army during the summer of 1941 were of such a nature as to hasten preparations for a war against Russia. But, at that time, the Japanese forces had invaded and occupied French Indo-China. This caused a sudden tension in the Jap-American relations, making the situation acute and, as a consequence, Japan was placed at a crossroad. That is to

say, the Japanese Government did not know whether she should open a war first against the Soviet Russia or against America. The following three items were decided at an Imperial Council in Tokyo in June 1941:

- (1) To go on independently with no opinions and policies of our own as regards the Russo-German War.
- (2) To prepare for the operations in the South.
- (3) To keep peace with Russia on the borders.

But at this time, too, Japan suddenly irritated Russia by continuing the reinforcements of Kwantung Army based on the "Kan-Taku-En" plan. I was appointed to the Commander of the 6th Army in October 1941, and soon after that I was called to the Kwantung Army Headquarters together with other commanders. At that time, the commander of the Kwantung Army General Limezu gave individually to each army commander instructions as regards the duties of the war-time armies. I received the following instructions for the 6th Army: At the outbreak of war the 6th Army should firmly hold the positions in Hairaerh and its adjacent key-points, and plan for sustained defence. One division shall be added to the 6th Army after one month. General LIMEZU however, did not indicate to me the duration of time for the sustained defense and the time for opening the war. I was only instructed to maintain the positions in Hairaerh for a long period of time.

In accordance with the duty given me, I reinforced the fortifications already built by the 23rd Division on the heights east of Hairaerh and strengthened the operational preparations; and at the same time stored enough ammunition and food supplies for six months near Hairaerh. In June 1942 at Chichihaerh, when the Second Area Army, to which the 6th Army belonged, was set up, its Commander Lt. General ANAMI Korechika explained to me the object of establishing the Second Area Army and its present duty as well as the present and future duties of the 6th Army under my command. In this explanation I was informed of the preparations for attacking Soviet Russia, which had been underway in the Kwantung Army in accordance with the strategic plan known by the secret name as plan "B" (Otsu), which was decided at General Staff Headquarters. Troops, horses, guns and ammunition were sent to the Kwantung Army from Japan and China according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was preparation for a part of the general strategic plan known as "No. B". Lt. General ANAMI further indicated to me that, since the 6th Army was going to assume the offense at the third stage of the operations, I should make necessary investigation and preparation for it. He further explained the strategic plan which should be followed by main force of the Second Area Army at the second stage. The details will be given later. The offensive movement at the first stage in the area of Maritime Province was to be carried out by the First Area Army according to the Strategic Plan "B". I was told about the plan of the First Area Army for the offensive operation by the former Commander of the First Area Army General YAMASHITA at Tokyo in October 1944 when his duties were transferred to me. This same operation was explained to me in more detail by the Chief of Staff Lt. General SHIDEI when I took over my duties as Commander of the First Area Army. in Mutanchiang

Thus I was fully informed of the progress of the preparations and offensive operation of the First and Second Area Armies of the Kwantung Army based on Plan "B". Under this plan the following measures were to be taken.

Preparatory Measures

Heihe District:- In the peace time there were in this district two divisions of the Fourth Army and one detachment of borderguards. The Army Headquarters was at Sunwu. Before the war was opened against Soviet Russia the Second Area Army and N Army were to be set up at Tsitsikar and Heike respectively. N Army seemed to be changed to 8th Army later. This formation was to be made by diverting four divisions from China and Japan. Consequently the Second Area Army was to have attained a strength of six divisions before the outbreak of war, that is. There were three divisions of the 4th Army at Sunwu, two divisions of 8th Army at Heike and one division under the direct control of the Area Army. Besides, the 6th Army under the Second Area Army consisting of the 23d Division and the Arshan detachment (about one division strong) should be increased by the addition of another division after the outbreak of war. Two more divisions were to be added in the future.

Maritime Province District:- Those stationed in peace time in this district were three divisions of the 5th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, the 71st Division at Hunchung and one division under the direct control of the Kwantung Army at Chiamusu--eight divisions in all together with two tank divisions. In 1941, 20th Army Headquarters was established at Tsining and to that army was given one division each from the 3rd, and 5th Armies. Prior to the outbreak of war, the 1st Area Army Headquarters, and the 2nd Army Headquarters were to be set up at Mutanchiang and Chientao respectively according to Plan B. Eight more divisions were to be transferred to this district from Japan and China, making the First Area Army possess fifteen divisions and two tank divisions, that is, three divisions and one tank division of the 5th Army, five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, two divisions of the 2nd Army and two divisions under the direct control of the First Area Army. In addition there was one air force army under the direct control of the Kwantung Army Commander with 1,000 planes. The Kwantung Army was expected to be in the above condition on the Eastern, Northern and Western fronts just before the opening of war against the USSR according to the Plan "B".

Offensive Plan:- In accordance with the offensive Plan "B" we expected to seize the entire Far East as far as Baikal in four successive steps. In the first step the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army were to carry out demonstrations on the Russian border near Sunwa and Heike, pretending offensive preparations by occasionally shooting into Russian territory. No actual offensive, however, was to be made. Thus the Red Army was expected to be fettered within that area. Should the Red Army start an offensive it must be checked. The 6th Army should maintain its positions at Hailor and Arshan.

In case an attack was made by the Red Army from Chita via Manchuria it must be checked by keeping these positions firm. In this case, the 1st Area Army in the Maritime Province District would act decisively on the offensive according to the following plan:-

(a) The 5th Army shall advance from Kuling with 3 divisions and 1 tank division and occupy Iman, and, while securing Iman to the North with a portion of its force, the main force shall march southward to join the battle to be fought by the main force of the First Area Army near Voroshilov.

(b) Two divisions of the 2nd Army shall advance from Hunchung break through the border; proceed North through the Nunn District toward Voroshilov. Its action shall be in concert with the main force of the Area Army.

(c) Five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army shall go south toward Voroshilov, passing the south-west side of Lake Hsingkoi.

(d) Three divisions of the 3rd Army shall advance from Tunkming to ~~Verdtkovo~~ and join the area army's main force there. All these forces were to press the Red Army at Voroshilov, and part of them, after seizing Voroshilov, were to cooperate with the Japanese Navy at Yuanshan to capture Vladivostok by envelopment. This was to end the first stage. Its chief object was to secure Japan proper and the industrial areas of Manchuria from the Red Army's air raids from the Maritime Province district, by entirely occupying the district.

Second Stage:- In case the first stage of the offensive was successful, the main force of the First Area Army was to advance Northward toward Habarovska along the railroad, leaving part of the Army in the Maritime Province to maintain the occupied area. The division stationed at Chiamusu would occupy the positions facing Leninsk to protect the wings of the First and Second Armies in the vicinity. At this time the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army would cooperate with the First Area Army and commence an offensive operation from Heike and its vicinity; cross the Amur; seize Blagoveshchensk Kuibishevka and Svobodny and cut off the Siberian Railway. One part of the forces were to defend the West and the main force was to move eastward along the railway line to Habarovsk. Then the First and the Second Area Armies were to cooperate in attacking in a decisive battle the Red Army from both sides and occupy Khabarovsk. This was to complete the second stage.

Third Stage:- After the occupation of Khabarovsk the Second Area Army would immediately turn westward to make preparations for the reinforcements necessary for the future offensive operations upon the Zabaikalye. At this time the 6th Army at Hailar was to be reinforced raising its strength to four divisions which were to prepare to advance the attack. In the Maritime Province the First Area Army was to secure the important districts and the rear of the Second Area Army. The main force of the Second Area Army would turn West after completing preparations and commence the advance to Chita along the railway.

As soon as the Second Area Army's main force reached Mogacha, the 6th Army was immediately to start the attack by breaking through the border near Sanho and Manchuria. And the 6th Army was to act in cooperation with the Second Area Army's main force and advance to Chita and its southern area. On seizing Chita and its vicinity, the Second Area Army was to secure important districts in the West; and thus the operation of the third stage was to come to a close.

In the fourth stage it was planned to continue the offensive until the Zabarkalye as far as Lake Baikal was seized. But I do not know about the offensive plan of the fourth stage.

Operations Regarding Outer Mongolia: - In the third stage, at the same time as the commencement of the advance of the 6th Army, the Arhshan Detachment (approximately one division) was to have been brought under the direct control of the Second Area Army to combine with and take command of the Mongolian force in Manchuria (approximately one division) and advance to Chita from Arhshan via Tampsakbulak, Baintumen and Ulan-Orasomon. This unit would cover the right wing of the Second Area Army by marching through the eastern part of Outer Mongolia.

Maintaining coordination of all Military Operations the Imperial Headquarters was to transfer one mechanized army group from North China and to have it begin strategic operations from Kalgan toward Ulan-Bator. But I am not able to explain the plan for the future development of the offensive action since I don't know it. The general outline of the offensive plan against Soviet Russia is as above. This plan for the offensive operation against the Soviet Union in 1942 was set up by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army; it was revised every year thereafter. This plan for Japanese military measures existed till around the middle of 1944. Since Japan faced difficult conditions in the battle field of Greater East Asia War, she could not carry out this plan. This hand-written testimony is confirmed by my signature.

General Kita Seiichi
Ex-Commander of the First Area Army
Kwantung Army

Interrogator: Lt. Colonel Derevyankin

Interpreter: Shehebenkov

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.,

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify
that 22 pages of a photostat of the testimony of the Japanese
prisoner of war general Kita Seiichi, written by him in Japanese on
April 20-23

was delivered to me by the Prosecutor of the Khabarovsk Region of the
U.S.S.R.

on or about June 27, 1946, and that the original of the said
document may be found in the files of the Prosecutor's Office of the
Khabarovsk Region.

I do further certify _____.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

September 26 , 1946.

Doc. No. 844

Doc 8445
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

To H. E. Monsi
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Tokyo

CC.1.2.3/1.2.7/-cr.-

24 2041
Tokyo, 21 September 1942

Monsieur le Ministre,

By letter No. 385 T/3 dated August 25, Your Excellency has been good enough to inform me that the lists of civilian internees and prisoners of war would be, as in the past, sent as fast as they are prepared, to the International Red Cross Committee which would send them to the Government of the United States. Your Excellency added that it was by error that it had been stated that the lists had been sent by the "Asama Maru".

I have the honor of informing you that the Government of the United States has asked me to send to the Imperial Government the following answer:

"American Government has taken note of information obtained by Swiss Government and International Redcross Committee regarding the activity of the official Japanese Information Bureau and that since the receipt by the American Information Bureau of Redcross telegram US 70 of June 16 reporting the presence of 29 prisoners of war from Wake Island at Zentsuji only occasional individual names of internees of prisoners of war held by the Japanese have been reported to the American Bureau by the Committee's Information Bureau. The records of the American Bureau still contain the names of only approximately 2000 American prisoners or internees in Japanese hands.

The American Government is unable to accept as a satisfactory reply the statement of the Japanese Foreign Office that lists of civilian internees and prisoners of war are communicated as in the past as prepared to the International Committee of the Redcross and urges both the Swiss Government and the International Redcross Committee to impress upon the Japanese Authorities the great importance that the American Government attaches to prompt fulfilment by the Japanese Government of the obligations it has assumed under article 77 of the prisoners of war Convention and 4 of the Redcross Convention. It desires that the Swiss Government and the International Redcross Committee call on the attention of the Japanese Government that the American Information Bureau transmits to the Central Redcross Information Bureau weekly lists of all Japanese nationals interned, released, paroled, detained, taken prisoner of war, transferred from one

camp to another, etc. that are based on official information regularly and promptly furnished to the Bureau by the Government Agencies concerned and point out that the American Government has a right under the Geneva Conventions to expect Japanese Agencies concerned to furnish the Japanese Information Bureau promptly with like information for transmission through the central Information Bureau to the United States. In this connection it desires that the Japanese Government be reminded of its agreement that such lists shall be transmitted by cable to the Central Information Bureau at the expense of the state of origin of the Prisoners of War or internees.

The American Government would like to know at the earliest possible moment whether American prisoners of war held by the Japanese have been allowed to prepare and post the capture cards which paragraph 2 of article 36 of the Prisoners of War Convention specifies may be written by each prisoner of war "within a period of not more than a week after his arrival at the camp" and which "shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner". If American have been permitted to prepare and post such cards the American Government would like to know urgently how the cards are being forwarded to the United States. If they have not already been forwarded by some other route it is urgently suggested that they, as well as complete lists of prisoners and internees containing information supplementary to that furnished by telegraph be forwarded on future trips of the exchange vessels."

While requesting Your Excellency to enable me to cable to the Government of the United States of American the information asked for, I take this opportunity to renew, my dear Minister, the assurances of my very high respect.

The Swiss Minister

Certificate:-

I, Yale Maxon, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the French and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the French and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 8445.

/s/ Yale Maxon

List of Officials of Japanese Government
Project No. 1648
21 July 1945

MASAYUKI TANI: Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador to Nanking puppet regime.

1889 Feb.	Born Kumamoto Prefecture. Married Sumiko, sister of Baron Tadamaru Shimazu.
1913	Graduated Tokyo Imperial University, Political Science.
1914	Entered foreign service.
*	Served in Canton, Hamburg and Holland.
1918	Third Secretary, Embassy in France.
1920	Second Secretary, same.
1923	Counselor, Foreign Office.
1923	Secretary to Foreign Minister.
1924	Chief, First Section of Asia Bureau in Foreign Office.
1927	First Secretary, Embassy in United States.
1930-33	Chief, Asia Bureau of Foreign Office.
1933 Aug.	Counselor, Embassy in Manchukuo.
1936	Minister to Austria and Hungary.
1938	Minister at large in China.
1939	Nomination as Ambassador to France refused by French Government.
1939-40 July	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in Abe and Yonai Cabinets under Foreign Ministers Nomura and Arita.
1941 Oct.	
1943 Apr.	President, Board of Information.
1942 Sept.-	
1943 Apr.	Foreign Minister in Tojo Cabinet.
1943 Apr.	Ambassador to Nanking Puppet Regime.

Married into the Shimazu family, one of the two chief feudal clans responsible for the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which connection has undoubtedly been an asset in his career. (65)

Has spent many years either in China or in positions directly concerned with Asiatic affairs. While Minister at large in 1938 made an extensive investigation trip throughout China, after which he advised strong economic development in North China by means of mixed Sino-Japanese companies. Nomination in 1939 as Ambassador to France was rejected by French Government because he declined to withdraw his accusation regarding the transshipment of munitions for Chungking through French Indo-China. (75)

Has proved his willingness and ability to work with military authorities in promoting Japanese development in China. Served as Counselor of Embassy in Hsinking for three years, whereas his predecessor resigned after a short time due to difficulty with the army in Manchuria. (134) Was Foreign Minister in Tojo Cabinet when formation of Greater East Affairs Ministry, an army-inspired move, stripped Foreign Office of many of its most important functions, particularly in occupied areas. (65) As Chief of Asiatic Bureau of Foreign Office was "very thick" with Toshio Shiratori, jingoistic spokesman of that Ministry, whose utterances conformed with the militarists' aims. (4)

Changed places with Mamoru Shigemitsu, Ambassador to Nanking, when the latter was appointed Foreign Minister in April 1943 to implement his policy toward China.

TANI, MASA YUKI

BB-127- S. resigned with 3 other ministers, from the TOJO cabinet in April 1943.

WPS 32 ADVISER, IRAA, 42 & 43.

WPS 35 ^{COUNCILOR}~~DIRECTOR~~, IRAA, 41 & 43.

WPS-90 member IRAPS-

WPS-109 VICE FOREIGN MINISTER, 26 Sept. 1939 to 25 July 40 ABE CABINET

WPS 111 " " " YONAI CABINET 16 Jun 40 to 22 July 40

WPS 120 CHIEF OF INFORMATION BOARD, TOJO CABINET, 18 Oct. 41 to 20 APR. 43.

Extracts from the
Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee
"Organization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"

p. 17

The Second Meeting of the Investigation Committee for
the Government Organization of Greater East Asia
Ministry and eight other items.

Meeting held on October 12, 1942 (Monday) at Privy
Council Office.

Persons present:

President HARA
Chief of Investigation Committee; Vice President
SUZUKI

Investigation Committee members:

p. 18

Councillor ISHII
Councillor MINAMI (Hiroshi)
Councillor USHIO
Councillor FUTAGAMI
Councillor OBATA
Councillor TAKEGOSHI
Councillor MITSUCHI
Councillor IZAWA
Councillor IKEDA
Councillor MINAMI (Jiro)

Ministers of State:

p.19

Premier concurrently War Minister TOJO
Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently
Overseas Affairs Minister INO
Home Minister YUZAWA
Foreign Minister TANI ✓

Exponents:

p. 20

Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO
Chief of Legislation Bureau MORIYAMA
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau IRIYE
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau SATO
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau MIYAUCHI
Counsellor of Legislation Bureau ARAKI
President of Planning Board SUZUKI
Chief of 1st Section, Planning Board AKINAGA
Vice-Chief, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs TAKEUCHI

Chief Secretary HORIYE
Secretary MOROHASHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI

(Opened at 10 a.m.)

p. 21

Chief of Investigation Committee SUZUKI announces the meeting open.

To the question from Committee Member USHIO:

p. 27 Regarding the inquiry about the limits of the Greater East Asia Sphere, Premier TOJO has replied that it includes KWANTUNG Region, South Sea Islands, Manchuria, China, Siam, French Indo-China and new occupation zones resulting from the Greater East Asia War, and therefore, the limits would expand together with the extension of occupied territories.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. _____
 I. P. S. No. 1086B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shuzo Jimbo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary to the President of the Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated 9-14 Oct., 1942, and described as follows: Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee "Organization of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council in Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 4th day of September 1946.

/s/ Shuzo Jimbo
 Signature of official

SEAL

Witness: Kiichi, Chosokabe

 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
 4th day of September 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
 NAME

Investigator, IPS
 Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION

30 March 1948

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Chief, Legal Section, SCAP
SUBJECT: TANI, Masayuki

I. PRESENT STATUS:

Subject has been incarcerated in Sugamo Prison since 12 December 1945 as a Class "A" war crime suspect.

II. PURPOSE OF MEMORANDUM:

This report is based on the oral request of the Chief, Legal Section, to examine all available evidence against the nineteen (19) Class "A" war crime suspects now held in custody to determine whether or not they can be indicted for "B" or "C" war crimes.

III. SOURCES OF MATERIAL EXAMINED:

1. All files and information available in Legal Section.
2. The complete G-2 report, dated 12 June 1947, with reference to subject.
3. All files, records and reports available at the International Prosecution Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

IV. RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that subject be retained in custody for further investigation and possible indictment as a Class "B" or "C" war criminal.

Exhibit VII

Memo: TANI, Masayuki (Cont'd)

V. DETAILS UPON WHICH THE RECOMMENDATION IS BASED:

1. Pertinent curriculum vitae:

Chief of Cabinet Information Bureau. Oct 1941-April 1943

Foreign Minister; concurrently Chief of Cabinet Information Bureau. Sep 1942-April 1943

Ambassador to Nanking (puppet government). April 1943-Dec 1945

2. TANI's rise from the lowest to the highest position in the diplomatic and foreign branch of the Japanese Government was steady and sure. His importance to the war effort can be illustrated by the fact that when he was removed as Foreign Minister due to the difficulties that arose in the re-organization of this Ministry and the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, he was immediately placed in another key position by being made Ambassador to the Nanking government where his duties required activities far different from those performed by the usual diplomatic representative.
3. As Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau he did not hold Cabinet rank and was not in a policy-making position. TANI's tenure as Foreign Minister was so brief that there are few Cabinet decisions for which he can be held accountable and this is likewise a very short period of time for which to charge him with "B" and "C" atrocities committed generally.
4. TANI's greatest responsibility insofar as war guilt is concerned lies in his acts as Foreign Minister in the handling of diplomatic correspondence from the Allied powers to the Japanese government making protests as to treatment of Prisoners of War and civilian internees and other overt violations by the Japanese government of the laws and customs of war. TANI signally failed to perform properly his duties with reference to these diplomatic negotiations.
5. As Ambassador to the Nanking government, he can further be charged with "B" and "C" crimes perpetrated against the Chinese civil population during his tenure in this office.

Memo: TANI, Masayuki (Cont'd)

6. It is interesting to note that TOGO, the Foreign Minister who immediately preceded TANI, and SHIGEMITSU, the Foreign Minister who followed TANI, are both in the dock before the IMTFE and charged with offenses during the war of a similar class and character as those proposed to be charged against TANI.
7. It is believed that the evidence justifies holding the suspect for further investigation and possible indictment as a "B" and "C" war criminal.

L. P. B. LIPSCOMB
Attorney, Legal Section

COPY

IPS DOC. NO. 1613

TANI
Page 1

Confidential

17 Feb. 1943

Stamped and initialled (I) Chief of Document Section (KISHI)
(II) Treaty Bureau
(III) Official in Charge
(IV) Translator (MATSUBARA)
(V) Translation Section

To The Minister:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letters No. CG 1. 2.25 GA. and No. CG 1. 3. 9. - GR, dated 29 October and 28 November last respectively by which letters you have been so good as to bring to my knowledge that the Government of the United States has become aware through Japanese wireless reports of the intention of the Japanese authorities to bring before a court-martial certain American prisoners of war because of military operations in which they have taken part and to inflict on them severe punishment not excluding the death penalty; and that the American Government has asked the Swiss Government what are the concrete cases in which penal consequences have been inflicted on American soldiers, and whether the Japanese Government has authorized the representatives of Switzerland to visit the said prisoners and has expressed their desire to get further information relative to this matter.

I hasten in reply to give Your Excellency the following information.

1. The Imperial Government (Japanese) does intend to produce before a court-martial and to punish severely as enemies of humanity those crew members of enemy planes who, after having made a raid on the territories of Japan, Manchukuo and the zones of Japanese military operations, fall into the power of Japan and are shown, on investigation, to be guilty of cruel or inhuman acts. But they have no intention of inflicting severe punishment on them "by reason of military operations in which they take part," as the Government of the United States has been informed. This course of action taken by the Imperial Government (Japanese) is based upon the highest moral considerations which demand limitation to the minimum of the evils of war, out of respect for humanity.

2. The crew members of American planes who have fallen into the power of Japan after a raid on Japan on 18 April last, intentionally bombed and set fire to non-military objectives, such as hospitals and schools as well as even crowds in places far removed from any military installations. The most reprehensible act of all is the fact that they killed and wounded little innocent pupils playing in their school yard, mowing them down by bursts of machine-gun fire, deliberately aimed at them though they knew very well who they were. The crew members, in disclosing this fact, declared that their action was quite natural and they had not reflected deeply on their conduct. The American Government will understand that such persons are unpardonable as enemies of humanity. The Imperial (Japanese) Government cannot treat such culprits as prisoners of War.

COPY

IPS DOC. NO. 1613

Page 2

3. The guilt of these persons having been made clear by the investigations of the Court, sentence of death was passed on them in conformity with military law but as a result of a mitigation granted as a special measure to the majority of those convicted, the sentence of capital punishment has been carried out on some of them only.

4. It is the intention of the Imperial (Japanese) Government to treat as prisoners of war, those crew members of enemy planes who fall into the power of Japan after having carried out a raid on Japanese Territory, Manchoukiao and areas of Japanese military operations, provided they have not indulged in cruel or inhuman acts.

Please accept, Monsieur Le Ministre, renewed assurances of my high esteem.

Minister's Signature

CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1613Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages in French, 6 pages in Japanese pages, dated 17 Feb., 1943, and described as follows: Letter from the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Swiss Minister to Japan in regard to the treatment of captured American aviators. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this4th day of June, 1947/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. UrahyChief, Archives Section
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this5 day of June, 1946/s/ J. A. Curtis, 1st Lt., Inf.
NAMEWitness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh/s/ Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

FILE INDEX OF PROSECUTION EXHIBIT

TANI-

DOC. NO.	EXHIBIT NO.	
731	---	Organization and details of Information Bd.
3337	---	Relating to Internees and Nationals - Nov. 1942
753	---	G.E.A. Investigating Comm.
1346	---	Information Board
1209	---	BABA "Stampede to Peace"
876	---	Radio Speech, Dec. 1942
1134	---	China, 1943
1018	---	Certain Cabinet Decision 1943
876	---	Radio Lecture 5 Dec. 42
816	---	China, 1935-1942
1307	---	Tri Parte - 1943
1760	---	
1761	---	
1922	---	
2736	---	
2751	2024	
2765	2022	
2766	2025, 2025A	
2767	2023, 2023B	
2781	2026	
2782	1489	
2783	---	
2784	---	
2853	2016, 2016A	

Date: 24 June 1947

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No.
2545

CRD No.

Report by: Lt. Daniel F. Resendes

Title: Masayuki TANI

Synopsis of facts:

TANI, Masayuki born 9 February 1889, Kumamoto Prefecture. Graduated Tokyo Imperial University, majored Law and Politics 1913. Major positions in Government. Ambassador to Nanking. 1943-1945 Foreign Minister, 1942-43 President of Board of Information, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister-at-Large to China 1938-1939, Minister to Australia and Hungary 1936-1938. Member of TOJO Cabinet. Interned at Sugamo Prison 27 Feb 1946.

-P-

DETAILS:

At Tokyo:

This investigation is predicated upon a request of the Honorable Lord WRIGHT, President of the International War Crimes Commission.

TANI entered the Japanese Foreign service in 1914. He served in China, Germany, The Netherlands, and France before becoming First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Washington in 1927. He became director of the Asiatic Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Office in 1930, and three years later was sent to Manchukuo as Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy at Ksingking. He was appointed Minister to Austria and Hungary in 1936. In 1938 he became Minister-at-Large to China but returned to Tokyo in 1939 to become Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Admiral NOMURA, Kichisaburo in September 1939.

In January 1939, eight months before he was appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tani was nominated to be Japanese Ambassador to France, but the French Government refused to accept him. The French charged that in the previous July (1938), while he was stationed in China, he had publicly cast doubt on formal French assurances that they were not allowing any war supplies for China to pass by rail through French Indo-China. The Japanese government defended TANI, but had to nominate another ambassador for the Paris post.

Distribution:

1 Prosecution
1 Inv. Div File 2545
1 Lt. Resendes
1 CRD

Do not write in this space.

TA Mr Smith
R

In September 1939 he was appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Foreign Minister Admiral NOMURA, Kichisaburo in the ABE Cabinet. He reportedly was very influential in this post. He served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Foreign Ministers NOMURA and ARITA until 25 July 1940, at which time MATSUOKA, Yosuka assumed the post of Foreign Minister. When General TOJO became Premier in October 1941, TANI was appointed President of the Board of Information.

On 17 September 1942, TANI was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in TOJO's cabinet. He took over the post from TOJO, who had been holding it provisionally since the resignation of TOGO, Shigenori as Foreign Minister on September 1, 1942. TANI retained his post as Chief of the Board of Information, holding both positions simultaneously until he was removed from both on 20 April 1943 in an extensive Cabinet shakeup. At that time TANI was replaced as Foreign Minister by SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, and was succeeded by AMAU, Eiji in the presidency of the Board of Information. TANI at the time of his appointment as Foreign Minister on 17 September 1942, announced in his first official statement what he termed the Empire's three major objectives and urged the Japanese people to make greater efforts toward realizing them. He summed up the three objectives as:

1. Closer cooperation among the Axis powers.
2. Defeat of the United States and Britain
3. Establishment of a new order in East Asia.

TANI, on the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor, speaking as Foreign Minister over the radio is reported as having stated: "There can be no end to the war until Britain and the United States are brought to their knees. Without the annihilation of America there will be no true Greater East Asia sphere. Therefore, the enemy's destruction must be carried out in a most decisive manner." In the same broadcast he reportedly stated: "Though we negotiated with America for eight months, it absolutely did not attempt to comprehend matters in our light, in the just right."

Tokyo radio, shortly after TANI's resignation from the headship of the Foreign Office and Board of Information and in announcing on 28 April 1943 his new appointment as Japanese Ambassador to the Nanking puppet government in China succeeding SHIGEMITSU, eulogized him as one of the founders of the "Greater East Asia" policy of expansion. He is credited by Tokyo Radio as having assisted in the growth of the TOJO Cabinet and its policies while serving as President of the Board of Information, while taking concrete steps, after his appointment as Foreign Minister, for the establishment of the Foreign Policy of the Greater East Asia Sphere in close cooperation with Minister AOKI, who at that time became a member of the cabinet as Minister without Portfolio. After the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, Tokyo radio continued, TANI and AOKI, Kazuo played an important role in the adaptation of the new Japanese policy toward China. The broadcast concluded by observing that the relationship between TANI and SHIGEMITSU is like that of brothers; the so-called "New China Policy" was born and brought up through the cooperation of TANI, AOKI Kazuo, and SHIGEMITSU Mamoru. One source states that TANI was a friend of an closely connected with SHIRATORI, Toshio in the Foreign Office, and was one of the leaders of the Foreign Office clique which supported the militarists. TANI had influential friends in the Army, sources report, and his advancement became more rapid as the army's power increased. Another source states that "Tani has long been considered one of the Japanese Army's most trusted servants." While Foreign Minister and after becoming Ambassador to the Chinese puppet regime at Nanking in April 1943, TANI made many

tours of inspection in China holding conferences with collaborationists Chinese military and civilian 'leaders'. He went to Shanghai on 21 October 1944 and held conference with Chinese 'leaders' on various problems. He returned to Nanking on 27 October 1944.

TANI, in August 1945, at the time of the dissolution of the Chinese "National Government", the puppet regime established at Nanking by the Japanese, had this to say: "My heart is too full of emotion for words on reading the declaration dissolving the National Government of China. For the past four years and a half the leaders of the National Government have made their best efforts to restore peace in the East. I really sympathize with these leaders, but now the situation has changed and they are to make a fresh start. "I am convinced that everybody will unite and make every effort for the reconstruction of the country. As the old Chinese saying goes: "When the war is over, we should resume the intercourse of true gentlemen."

TANI's successive holding of posts important to the military policy on the Asiatic continent is suggestive of the extent and continuance of his cooperation. A statement by AMAU Eiji, TANI's successor as Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau and at present also an unindicted suspected war criminal, discloses the close relationship of the two posts held concurrently by TANI, and also suggests their connection with the War Ministry and its information channels. There would seem to be little doubt that TANI was for several years in a position which could surely not be retained by a non-sympathizer with army policies.

An address by TANI, Masayuki, to the Diet, 28 January 1943, is herein contained:

While paying constant attention to meeting the above-mentioned changes in the world situation, the Government is attaching special importance to the promotion of closer relations with the various countries in the region of Greater East Asia on the one hand, and to the strengthening of our cooperation with our European Allies on the other, thereby perfecting the cooperative structure by which to realize our common objective -- the successful conclusion of the war against the Anglo-American nations and the construction of a new world order.

First, the relations between Japan and Manchoukuo are based on the immutable basis of the principle of "one virtue and one mind." It is needless to say that the two countries have constantly been preserving an attitude of close cooperation.

Secondly, as regards China, the Nanking Government on January 9 declared war on the United States and the British Empire, and made clear both at home and abroad its determination to participate and cooperate far more vigorously in the construction of the new order in Greater East Asia in complete unity with Japan. As to the measures our Government has taken and will take hereafter in connection with Nanking's entry into the war, you gentlemen must already have familiarized yourselves with them, through the joint declaration of the Government of Japan and the Nanking Government concerning cooperation in the prosecution of war, and the agreement between Japan and China concerning retrocession of concessions and relinquishment of extra-territorial rights, both of which were promulgated on the ninth instant and by the declaration of our Government also announced on the same day.

Cooperation between Japan and China is the grand path ordained by Nature. The reason why these two countries could not pursue that path hand

in hand before is that they were obstructed for many years by the United States and Britain, who had deeply encroached upon China, thus constituting the root cause of the disturbance in East Asia. However, now that the conditions in Greater East Asia have undergone a complete change as a consequence of Japan's victories, Anglo-American positions in East Asia have entirely been destroyed, leaving no possibilities for their restoration in the future. These rights, such as the concessions and extra-territorial rights, were acquired as the result of Opium War. They are a monument to Anglo-American exploitation of the East. This country has desired the abolition of these rights as soon as possible, in view of past bitter experience. The Nanking Government having been resuscitated, Japan and China --with one mind and one body--are marching forward together to prosecute the war against their common enemies to its successful conclusion.

Thus the independence and prosperity of the Republic of China are in complete conformity with the prosperity and welfare not only of Japan, but also of all Greater East Asia. Therefore, it is both an historical inevitability and a matter for sincere congratulation for all East Asia that Japan at this time should have discarded boldly and positively such an unnatural, anachronistic and humiliating system, and that she should trust and maintain friendly intercourse with China in accordance with the real path of East Asia. However, alarmed at Japan's action, the United States and Britain on the eleventh of this month concluded with the Chungking regime treaties concerning the retrocession of international settlements and the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights. But such steps on the part of the United States and Britain are designed merely to deceive the world with their hollow promises to return their already lost rights and interests. This only shows their craft and insidiousness. It is a thousand pities that the Chungking regime should be overjoyed at this dishonored check and behave as if it had forgotten China's century-old grievances. In this connection, it is a source of great pleasure to me that our allies, Germany and Italy, with thorough understanding have immediately conformed to Japan's new China policy, and that the Italian Government has already taken the necessary steps to retrocede concessions to the Nanking Government. The development of new relations between Nippon and China is indeed one manifestation of the great ideal of "HAKKO ICHIU", demonstrating clearly to all the world Japan's true intentions and sincerity with respect to the establishment of Great East Asia and the construction of the new world order. I firmly believe that it will ever more greatly enhance the confidence in Japan not only of the Chinese people, but also of the various peoples in Greater East Asia...

Japan's collaboration with Germany and Italy in the military, political, cultural and other fields is close and firm. Our enemies are leaving no stone unturned in trying to set the three countries at variance. Thus they expose their inability to recognize the fact that the three countries are bound together by the lofty ideal of establishing a worldwide peace based upon ethical principles, and that our unity is fundamentally different from that of such countries as the United States and Britain--countries whose alignment is based upon egoistic calculations and liable to constant change. To advance the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy still further, not only that these three countries may assist each other with all their respective total economic power for the duration of the present war, but also that they may be enabled to realize a new order which would insure the co-existence and co-prosperity of every people within their respective economic spheres after the termination of the current war, negotiations have been going on for some time between the Governments of Japan and Germany, and between the Governments of Japan and Italy with, the view of concluding agreements concerning economic cooperation between Japan and Germany and between Japan and Italy. As you already know by the

announcement made at the time, the agreement between Japan and Germany and the agreement between Japan and Italy were signed on the twentieth of this month at the German General Headquarters and at Rome respectively.

These agreements realistically and concretely demonstrate in the economic field the spirit of the Tripartite Pact which was concluded on September 27, the fifteenth year of Showa. I firmly believe that the operation of these agreements will render economic cooperation between the three countries even closer and more harmonious, contributing further toward the strengthening of their fighting power, thus making yet more certain the victory of the Axis Powers.

In connection with the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, it has already been declared that Japan harbors no intention of excluding others from the sphere or of enforcing its seclusion. The conclusion of the agreement referred to above not only fully indicates this attitude of Japan, but also makes clear that the construction of the Sphere by Japan and the establishment of the European Co-Prosperty Sphere by Germany and Italy are real facts and not mere empty propaganda in the Anglo-American manner, and that our work of construction is steadily making material progress.

The following listed Analysis of Documentary Evidence are contained in IPS Files:

Doc 2623, IPS exhibit 91-73 "Statement by Dr. Van Mook, affirming, accuracy of facts in book entitled "The Netherlands Indies and Japan." Implicates TANI.

Doc 2523, IPS exhibit 91-72 "File of telegrams sent from Foreign Office to Japanese Ambassadors. Implicates subject in item 4.

Doc 2382, IPS exhibit 91-71 "File of reports on Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty. Published by First Section of Political Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry. State Top Secret". Implicates Subject.

Doc 2385, IPS exhibit 91-70 "Telegrams etc., on Manchuria and Mongolian Political Affairs. Kept by Foreign Ministry. Implicates subject in item 22.

Doc 2245, IPS exhibit 91-69 "Printed booklet 'Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations' published by Board of Information." Implicates Subject.

Doc 1820, IPS exhibit 91-68 "Sworn statements by ONO, Katsumi of the Foreign Ministry re organization of Far East Section." Implicates subject.

Doc 1761, IPS exhibit 91-67 "The Greater East Asia War and Home Situation." Contains articles by subject "Wisdom, Benevolence and Strength."

Doc 1767, IPS exhibit 91-66 "File re Manchurian Incident and Mongolian Independence". Implicates subject in item 5.

Doc 1639, IPS exhibit 91-64 "Treaties and agreements concerning abolition of extra-territorial jurisdiction of various nations in China." Implicates subject with SHIGEMITSU.

Doc 1573, IPS exhibit 91-63 "Conversations and communications between ARITA and GREW re KONOYE's declaration concerning Japan's attitude toward China and New Order in East Asia." Contains record of Grew's visit to subject to tender official U.S. attitude.

Doc 1497, IPS Exhibit 91-61 "Treaties etc., concerning China in 1943; restitution of concessions and abolition of extra-territoriality. Implicates subject and TOJO.

Doc 1460, IPS Exhibit 91-60 "Official Documents concerning occupation of Kwang-Chow Bay by Japan." Many telegrams from Subject to TOJO and others re demand on France for Kwang-Chow Bay.

Doc 1440, IPS ext 91-59 "Privy Council Proceedings on German-Japanese, Japanese-Italian Economic Agreements and French Indo-China Note on accounts. Implicates subject.

Doc 1442, IPS exhibit 91-58 "Tenets of Foreign Policy on Execution of National Policies". Implicates subject in Imperial Conference 5 Nov 1941.

Doc 1443, IPS exhibit 91-57 "Basic Principles for Rapid Conclusion of War against America, et al." Implicates subject with MATSUOKA.

Doc 1307, IPS exhibit 91-55 "Privy Council Investigation Committee proceedings re economic coalition with Germany and Italy. Implicates subject.

Doc 1254, IPS exhibit 54 "Policy to French Indo China. Contains telegram from subject to MITANI re return by France of concessions and withdrawal of Chinese Embassy from France (10 Feb 43).

Doc 1244, IPS exhibit 91-52 "Collection of Diplomatic Announcements - speeches and announcements re treaties and other diplomatic affairs during 1941. Implicates subject.

Doc 1134, IPS exhibit 91-51 "Minutes of Privy Council Investigation Committee implicates subject in treaty drawn between Japan and Nanking.

Doc 1086, IPS exhibit 91-50 "Privy Council investigation re organization of GEA Co-Prosperity Sphere" - implicates subject.

Doc 823, IPS exhibit 91-45 "Foreign Office announcements - implicates subject.

Doc 876, IPS exhibit 91-41, "Diplomatic publications of Foreign Ministry contains subject's radio speech of 5 Dec 1942 "Resolution for destruction of America and Britain" and congratulatory addresses delivered by subject at celebrations of first and second anniversaries of signing of Tripartite Agreement.

Doc 753, IPS exhibit 91-40. Original reports pertaining to general mobilization - implicates subject.

Doc 816, IPS exhibit 91-39: File of Army-Navy concerns in China. Implicates subject (1935-1942).

Doc 819, IPS exhibit 91-38: Affairs of National Policies in Central China - implicates subject.

Doc 823, IPS exhibit 91-37: Foreign Office announcements. Implicates subject.

Doc 763, IPS 91-34: Records of Administrative Department of "Nanking Regime". Includes reports by subject.

Biographical History of TANI, Masayuki.

1889 Born, Kumamoto Prefecture.
1913 Graduated, Tokyo Imperial University (Politics)
Entered Foreign Ministry.
1914 Attached to Japanese Consulates in Canton, Hamburg and
The Hague.
1918 Third Secretary, Japanese Embassy Paris.
1919 Member, Japanese Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.
1920-23 Member, Peace Treaty Executive Committee.
1920 Member, Japanese Delegation to the 1st Session of the League
of Nations General Conference. Second Secretary, Japanese
Embassy, Paris.
1921 Member, Japanese Delegation to the 2nd Session of the League
of Nations General Conference.
1922 Member, Japanese Delegation to the 3rd Session of the League
of Nations General Conference.
1923 Councillor, Asiatic Affairs Bureau; concurrently Secretary
to Foreign Minister.
1924 Chief, 1st Section, Asiatic Affairs Bureau.
1925 Secretary, Cultural Works for China Investigation Committee.
1927 First Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Washington.
1929 Acting Director, Asiatic Affairs Bureau; concurrently Secre-
tary, Communications Ministry Electric Affairs Bureau.
1930-33 Director, Asiatic Affairs Bureau
1933 Member, Japan Manchoukuo Joint Management Communications
Company Establishment Committee.
1933-36 Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy, Hsinking, Manchoukuo.
1934 Japanese Delegate, Japan Manchoukuo Joint Economic Cooper-
ation Conference.
1936 Minister to Austria; concurrently Minister to Hungary.
1938 Minister-at-large in China.
1939 Nomination as Ambassador to France refused by French Government.
1939-40 Vice Foreign Minister (ABE and YONAI Cabinets).
1939 Councillor, Cabinet Planning Board.
Oct 41 Apr 43 Chief, Cabinet Information Bureau(TOJO Cabinet)
Sep 42 Apr 43 Foreign Minister; concurrently Chief, Cabinet Information
Bureau (TOJO Cabinet).
Apr 43 Ambassador to Nanking (Puppet) Government, China.
Dec 45 Apprehended by Chinese Government authorities.
27 Feb 46 Repatriated and interned in Sugamo Prison as "class A"
Suspected war criminal.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

The Tokyo Office - At Tokyo - Will follow up and report disposition
of Subject.

P E N D I N G

Legal Section (Htt: Invest. Div.) (2545) Tani, Masayuki
Lt. Col. K + Rodisill

⑦

(26)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET **SECRET**

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: TANI Masayuki, Internee in Sugamo Prison

Note
No.

From: G-2

To: Legal Section
(Attn: Invest. Div.
Lt. Col. R. E. Rudisill)

Date: JUN 12 1947
CIS/OD:NER/mc

Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.
Mr. E. P. Monaghan)

1

1. Curriculum vitae of TANI Masayuki (TAB A) shows that he is a career diplomat who, after several years of experience with the League of Nations, devoted himself chiefly to Asiatic affairs. From 1923 on he was closely connected with Japanese activities in Asia. In 1939 he became Vice Foreign Minister in the ABE and YONAI Cabinets. Under the TOJO Cabinet he was both Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau and Foreign Minister; in 1943 he became Ambassador to the puppet Nanking Government. During the period of his Asiatic activities, he is reported to have been on excellent terms with the Army.

2. "Japanese Government Officials, 1937 - 1945", published by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C., on 21 July 1945, gives TANI's career as per TAB B.

3. Evaluation of TANI at the time of his arrest in December 1945, reads as per TAB C.

4. Direct and implied charges against TANI in these two documents (TAB B and TAB C) are that:

a. TANI proved his willingness and ability to work with military authorities in promoting Japanese development in China. His advancement became more rapid as the Army's power increased. He has long been considered one of the Army's most trusted servants.

b. As Director of the Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office TANI cooperated closely with SHIRATORI Toshio, jingoistic Foreign Office spokesman whose utterances conformed to the aims of the militarists.

c. While Foreign Minister in the TOJO Cabinet, TANI issued statements advocating annihilation of Britain and the United States, and the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

d. Of all Japanese senior diplomats, TANI, together with SHIRATORI and OSHIMA, should be considered the most active in his efforts to bring Japan into the Axis and to coordinate Japanese policies along the lines of the Army's wishes, and should be apprehended as a war criminal.

5. In addition, official records show that TANI held the following

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1
cont'd

posts in the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations:

- a. KOMON (Advisor), TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), Sept 1942 - Apr 1943.
- b. SANYO (Councillor), TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI (IRAA), Oct 1941 - Apr 1943.
- c. Member, YOKUSAN SEIJI KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society), 1942.

6. Investigation of TANI and his activities reveals that:

a. After graduation from Tokyo Imperial University in 1913 TANI entered the Foreign Office, and for ten years he was stationed in Europe. During this period he was a Japanese representative at the Peace Treaty negotiations and at the League of Nations.

b. Upon his return to Japan in 1923, TANI entered the Asiatic phase of his career. (Previous to this he had only served for a few months as consul-eleve in Canton). For ten years he was associated with the Asiatic Affairs Bureau, barring a tour of duty as First Secretary in Washington. From 1930 to 1933, he was Director of the Bureau, during the crucial Manchurian Incident. In 1933 he went to Manchuria as Counsellor to the Embassy at Hsinking, where he remained for three years. Obviously during these years, the work of the Foreign and War Ministries was very closely connected. TANI apparently got on well enough with the military, as his long connection with the Asiatic Bureau and as Counsellor in Hsinking would prove. Whether TANI's getting along with the Army was more than a Foreign Ministry necessity would be ticklish point to prove, however.

c. TANI's successive holding of posts important to the military policy on the Asiatic continent is suggestive of the extent and continuance of his cooperation. After his Hsinking post, he became Minister-at-Large in China in 1938, Vice Foreign Minister under the ABE and YONAI Cabinets in 1939 and 1940, and under TOJO, Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau and Foreign Minister concurrently. A statement (TAB D) by AMAU Eiji, TANI's successor as Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau and at present also an unindicted suspected war criminal, discloses the close relationship of the two posts held concurrently by TANI, and also suggests their connection with the War Ministry and its information channels. There would

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cont'd

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d. TANI's positions with the Imperial Rule Assistance organizations were merely nominal, and stemmed from his position in the Foreign Office at the time.

e. To say that TANI was close to SHIRATORI Toshio doesn't mean very much unless something more is proven than that they both served in the Foreign Office in important posts during and before the war. If to be close to other diplomats and Foreign Office spokesmen is a crime, then TANI, SHIRATORI and OSHIMA are criminals, but the measure of that particular crime would seem to be that it is an official Foreign Office crime, not an individual one on the part of each of these men. It is true that the Foreign Office worked closely with the War Office; it is also true that this was a matter of necessity rather than of choice. It was the Foreign Office under KONOYE, for instance, which labored to negotiate an understanding with the United States in the summer of 1941, strong Army opposition notwithstanding.

7. In summary, TANI held important Foreign Office positions in the crucial decade before the war when willy-nilly the Foreign Office frequently acted in concert with the military. Such judgment as high policy may pronounce on the activities of the Foreign Office will naturally extend to diplomats such as TANI, but it will also be part of high policy to determine where Foreign Office culpability ends and where that of individuals within the office begins.

8. Therefore G-2 recommends that TANI's case be considered in the light of whether his actions as a diplomat and bureaucrat performing his official duties provide bases for indictment.

TAB A - Curriculum Vitae of TANI Masayuki

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Info Copy to: IPS (Attn: Invest. Div.)

- TAB B - Extract from "Japanese Government Officials
1937 - 1945"
- TAB C - Evaluation of TANI at time of his arrest
- TAB D - AMAU Eiji's statement on the Cabinet
Information Bureau
- TAB E - TANI's Diet Speech of 28 Jan 1943

P.S.B.
C.A.W.

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TANI Masayuki, Internee in Sugamo Prison

G-2

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Lt. Col. R. E. Rudisill)

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c. While Foreign Minister in the TOJO Cabinet, TANI issued statements advocating annihilation of Britain and the United States, and the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

d. Of all Japanese senior diplomats, TANI, together with SHIRATORI and OSHIMA, should be considered the most active in his efforts to bring Japan into the Axis and to coordinate Japanese policies along the lines of the Army's wishes, and should be apprehended as a war criminal.

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TANI Masayuki, Internee in Sugamo Prison

G-2

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G-2

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TAB A - Curriculum Vitae of TANI Masayuki

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TANI Masayuki, Internee in Sugamo Prison

G-2

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TAB B - Extract from "Japanese Government Officials
1937 - 1945"

TAB C - Evaluation of TANI at time of his arrest

TAB D - AMAU Eiji's statement on the Cabinet
Information Bureau

TAB E - TANI's Diet Speech of 28 Jan 1943

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Tani

Appointed Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Dojo's
cabinet 17 Sept 1942.

In Oct 1941 Tani was

Pres. of Board of Chiefs.

He announced his objectives
as:

1. closer cooperation with Axis
2. Defeat of U.S. & Britain
3. Estab. new order in Asia

92% of all senior Jap diplomats
Tani should be considered
the most active in his efforts
to bring Japan into the Axis
& to coordinate Jap policies
along the lines of the Army
wishes

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Curriculum Vitae of TANI Masayuki

Curriculum Vitae of TANI Masayuki

- 1889 - Born, Kumamoto Prefecture
- 1913 - Graduated, Tokyo Imperial University (Politics)
- Entered Foreign Ministry
- 1914 - Attached to Japanese Consulates in Canton, Hamburg
and The Hague
- 1918 - Third Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Paris
- 1919 - Member, Japanese Delegation to the Paris Peace
Conference
- 1920-23 - Member, Peace Treaty Executive Committee
- 1920 - Member, Japanese Delegation to the 1st Session of
the League of Nations General Conference
- Second Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Paris
- 1921 - Member, Japanese Delegation to the 2nd Session of
the League of Nations General Conference
- 1922 - Member, Japanese Delegation to the 3rd Session of
the League of Nations General Conference
- 1923 - Councillor, Asiatic Affairs Bureau; concurrently
Secretary to Foreign Minister
- 1924 - Chief, 1st Section, Asiatic Affairs Bureau
- 1925 - Secretary, Cultural Works for China Investigation
Committee
- 1927 - First Secretary, Japanese Embassy, Washington
- 1929 - Acting Director, Asiatic Affairs Bureau; concurrently
Secretary, Communications Ministry Electric Affairs
Bureau
- 1930-33 - Director, Asiatic Affairs Bureau
- 1932 - Foreign Ministry Delegate to the 62nd and 63rd
Sessions of the Diet
- 1933 - Member, Japan Manchoukuo Joint Management Communications
Company Establishment Committee
- 1933-36 - Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy, Hsinking, Manchoukuo
- 1934 - Japanese Delegate, Japan Manchoukuo Joint Economic
Cooperation Conference
- 1936 - Minister to Austria; concurrently Minister to Hungary
- 1938 - Minister-at-large in China
- 1939 - Nomination as Ambassador to France refused by French
Government
- 1939-40 - Vice Foreign Minister (ABE and YONAI Cabinets)
- 1939 - Councillor, Cabinet Planning Board
- Oct 1941-Apr 1943 - Chief, Cabinet Information Bureau (TOJO Cabinet)
- Sep 1942-Apr 1943 - Foreign Minister; concurrently Chief, Cabinet
Information Bureau (TOJO Cabinet)
- Apr 1943 - Ambassador to Nanking (Puppet) Government, China
- Dec 1945 - Apprehended by Chinese Government authorities
- 27 Feb 1946 - Repatriated and interned in Sugamo Prison as "Class A"
suspected war criminal

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Extract from "Japanese Government Officials 1937-1945"

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Extract from "Japanese Government Officials 1937 - 1945", published by
Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.,
21 July 1945.

"Masayuki TANI: Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador to Nanking
puppet regime.

1889 Feb	Born Kumamoto Prefecture. Married Sumiko, sister of Baron Tadamaru Shimazu.
1913	Graduated Tokyo Imperial University, Political Science.
1914	Entered foreign service.
*	Served in Canton, Hamburg and Holland.
1918	Third Secretary, Embassy in France.
1920	Second Secretary, same.
1923	Counselor, Foreign Office.
1923	Secretary to Foreign Minister.
1924	Chief, First Section of Asia Bureau in Foreign Office.
1927	First Secretary, Embassy in United States.
1930-33	Chief, Asia Bureau of Foreign Office.
1933 Aug	Counselor, Embassy in Manchukuo.
1936	Minister to Austria and Hungary.
1938	Minister at large in China.
1939	Nomination as Ambassador to France refused by French Government.
1939-40 July	Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in Abe and Yonai Cabinets under Foreign Ministers Nomura and Arita.
1941 Oct-1943 Apr	President, Board of Information
1942 Sept-1943 Apr	Foreign Minister in Tojo Cabinet.
1943 Apr	Ambassador to Nanking puppet regime.

Married into the Shimazu family, one of the two chief feudal clans responsible for the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which connection has undoubtedly been an asset in his career.

Has spent many years either in China or in positions directly concerned with Asiatic affairs. While Minister at large in 1938 made an extensive investigation trip throughout China, after which he advised strong economic development in North China by means of mixed Sino-Japanese companies. Nomination in 1939 as Ambassador to France was rejected by French Government because he declined to withdraw his accusation regarding the transshipment of munitions for Chungking through French Indo-China.

Has proved his willingness and ability to work with military authorities in promoting Japanese development in China. Served as Counselor of Embassy in Hsinking for three years, whereas his predecessor resigned after a short time due to difficulty with the army in Manchuria. Was Foreign Minister in Tojo Cabinet when formation of Greater East Asia Affairs Ministry, an army-inspired move, stripped Foreign Office of many of its most important functions, particularly in occupied areas. As Chief of Asiatic Bureau of Foreign Office was "very thick" with Toshio Shiratori, jingoistic spokesman of that Ministry, whose utterances conformed with the militarists' aims.

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88

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TANI Masayuki (Cont'd)

Changed places with Mamoru Shigemitsu, Ambassador to Nanking, when the latter was appointed Foreign Minister in April 1943 to implement his policy toward China."

* Exact dates unknown

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Evaluation of TANI at time of his arrest

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Evaluation of TANI, Masayuki at time of Internment - Dec 1945.

TANI Masayuki

Born 1889. Career diplomat. His important posts include the following: Chief, First Section of Asia Bureau in Foreign Office, 1924; Chief, Asia Bureau of Foreign Office, 1930-33; Counselor, Embassy in Manchukuo, August 1933; Minister to Austria and Hungary, 1936; Minister at large in China, 1938; Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in ABE and YONAI Cabinets under Foreign Ministers NOMURA and ARITA, 1939-July 1940; President, Board of Information, October 1941-April 1943; Foreign Minister in TOJO Cabinet, September 1942-April 1943; Ambassador to Nanking puppet regime, April 1943.

TANI has proved his willingness and ability to work with military authorities in promoting Japanese development in China. Served as Counselor of Embassy in Hsinking for three years, whereas his predecessor resigned after a short time due to difficulty with the Army in Manchuria. Was Foreign Minister in TOJO Cabinet when formation of Greater East Asia Affairs Ministry, an Army-inspired move, stripped Foreign Office of many of its most important functions, particularly in occupied areas. As Chief of Asiatic Bureau of Foreign Office he intimately cooperated with SHIRATORI Toshio, jingoistic spokesman of that Ministry, whose utterances conformed with the militarists' aims.

When Foreign Minister of the TOJO Cabinet (September 1942) he summed up his three basic objectives as: (1) closer cooperation among the Axis powers, (2) defeat of the United States and Britain, (3) establishment of a new order in East Asia.

On the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor, speaking over the radio, he said: "There can be no end to the war until Britain and the United States are brought to their knees. Without the annihilation of America there will be no true Greater East Asia sphere. Therefore, the enemy's destruction must be carried out in a most decisive manner."

According to a State Department source TANI was very close to the Army and his advancement became more rapid as the Army's power increased. The same source states, "TANI has long been considered one of the Japanese Army's most trusted servants."

Of all Japanese senior diplomats TANI, together with SHIRATORI and OSHIMA, should be considered the most active in his efforts to bring Japan into the Axis and to coordinate Japanese policies along the lines of the Army's wishes, and should be apprehended as a war criminal.

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TANI Masayuki (continued)

He appears on the U.S. war Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments.

He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a. of Joint Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 Nov., 1945.

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AKI H. H.'s statement on the Cabinet Information Bureau

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AMAU Eiji's statement on the Cabinet Information Bureau

The Cabinet Information Bureau

(Information gathered from interrogation of AMAU Eiji)

When MATSUOKA was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1940 the Foreign Office Information Bureau was abolished and the Cabinet Information Department became the Information Bureau with a "Shin-nin-kan" (official appointed like a Cabinet Minister or an Ambassador personally and directly by His Majesty the Emperor) as its chief. Successive presidents of the Bureau were:

ITO Nobufumi	1940-Oct. 1941 (Second and Third KONOYE Cabinets)
TANI Masayuki	Oct. 1941-Apr. 1943 (TOJO Cabinet)
AMAU Eiji	Apr. 1943-July 1944
OGATA Taketora	July 1944-Apr. 1945
SHIMOMURA Hiroshi	Apr. 1945-

During the terms of ITO and TANI, the Bureau of Information had five Bureaus, two of which were headed by Army and Navy officers with a number of Army and Navy officer members. At the same time the Army and Navy still retained their own information organizations within their ministries.

While TANI was president, OKUMURA Kiwao was Vice-President and TOKUTOMI Iichiro, KANOKOGI Kazunobu, TANI and OKUMURA (all from the same province, Kumamoto-Ken) were members. During this period the GENRON HOKOKU KAI as well as many other patriotic societies were formed.

The Cabinet Information Bureau was reorganized in April 1943 when AMAU was appointed as President of the Board succeeding TANI. As a result of the reorganization, all military and naval officers were withdrawn. Instead, a Council Room was established in the Bureau in which the Army and Navy were formally represented by a Colonel and a Captain respectively. Besides, Army and Navy representatives were present at the weekly conferences of the Bureau.

After the outbreak of the war, the Army and Navy established the DAI HONEI HODO BU (Information Department of Grand Imperial Headquarters) and all news concerning the war was exclusively handled by them.

When the TOJO Cabinet was formed in October 1941 and the war broke out in December 1941, TOGO Shigenori was Foreign Minister and TANI Masayuki was President of the Bureau of Information (TANI was not a Cabinet member).

TOGO resigned on account of the establishment of the Ministry of Great East Asia in September 1942.

The Army was contemplating the establishment of a central bureau to

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deal with the Chinese Affairs after the China Incident occurred. The Foreign Office was strongly against it. The Foreign Minister (General UGAKI) resigned in protest when the establishment of the Central Independent Office for Chinese Affairs was proposed at the Cabinet meeting at the time of the KONOYE Cabinet in September 1938. However, the China Affairs Board was set up in November 1938. During the time of the TOJO Cabinet, there was a rumor that a plan to aggrandize the China Affairs Board to a ministry was being considered in the government as well as in Army and Navy circles. Those who had connections with the Foreign Office drew attention of Foreign Minister TOGO to this matter as early as the beginning of 1942. However, the Foreign Office did not evidently expect that there might be a sudden change. E

The proposal of the establishment of the Great East Asia Ministry was made about the middle of September 1942. The Foreign Office opposed. TOGO resigned but was appointed member of the House of Peers in September. The Great East Asia Ministry was established in September 1942 and TANI was appointed as Foreign Minister and concurrently President of the Information Bureau.

The Foreign Office and the Bureau of Information were the most closely related to each other in their functions and history. It is, therefore, essential that the Foreign Minister and the President of the Information Bureau should work harmoniously.

The Information Bureau was established by aggrandizing the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office. It was traditional that the President was selected from the Foreign Office officials. Therefore, it was the strong desire of the Foreign Office that this tradition be kept.

On the other hand, there was demand by the public that a Foreign Minister and a President of the Information Board should be of such types of men as those who could do fine team work with each other and that if the suitable men could not be found, it would be better that both posts should be occupied by one man.

It was not unnatural, therefore, that TANI occupied both posts. However, it was found that it was too much for one man to do both jobs, particularly in war time. Voices had been raised more and more strongly that different men should be appointed to the different posts, particularly rumors were running highly after the special session of the Diet of March 1943 that a full time President of the Information Bureau should be appointed.

The TOJO Cabinet was reshuffled in April 1943. The four ministers (Foreign, Home, Agriculture & Forestry, Education) were changed and one new Minister without portfolio appointed. SHIGEMITSU Mamoru was appointed as Foreign Minister, TANI as Ambassador to China and AMAU Eiji as President of the Information Board. (AMAU was not a Cabinet Member). The public

seemed to have received the impression (and the press also reported in such sense) that the scope of the selection had been widened and the men of real capacity had been chosen as regards the Foreign Minister and the President of the Information Bureau.

PACI's Hist. Speeches of 20 Jan 1943

TANI's Diet Speech of 28 Jan 1943

ADDRESS

By

TANI Masayuki

To the Diet, 28 Jan 1943

While paying constant attention to meeting the above-mentioned changes in the world situation, the Government is attaching special importance to the promotion of closer relations with the various countries in the region of Greater East Asia on the one hand, and to the strengthening of our cooperation with our European Allies on the other, thereby perfecting the cooperative structure by which to realize our common objective--the successful conclusion of the war against the Anglo-American nations and the construction of a new world order.

First, the relations between Japan and Manchoukuo are based on the immutable basis of the principle of "one virtue and one mind." It is needless to say that the two countries have constantly been preserving an attitude of close co-operation.

Secondly, as regards China, the Nanking Government on January 9 declared war on the United States and the British Empire, and made clear both at home and abroad its determination to participate and cooperate far more vigorously in the construction of the new order in Greater East Asia in complete unity with Japan. As to the measures our Government has taken and will take hereafter in connection with Nanking's entry into the war, you gentlemen must already have familiarized yourselves with them, through the joint declaration of the Government of Japan and the Nanking Government concerning cooperation in the prosecution of war, and the agreement between Japan and China concerning retrocession of concessions and relinquishment of extra-territorial rights, both of which were promulgated on the ninth instant and by the declaration of our Government also announced on the same day.

Cooperation between Japan and China is the grand path ordained by Nature. The reason why these two countries could not pursue that path hand in hand before is that they were obstructed for many years by the United States and Britain, who had deeply encroached upon China, thus constituting the root cause of the disturbance in East Asia. However, now that the conditions in Greater East Asia have undergone a complete change as a consequence of Japan's victories, Anglo-American positions in East Asia have entirely been destroyed, leaving no possibilities for their restoration in the future. These rights, such as the concessions and extra-territorial rights, were acquired as the result of Opium War. They are a monument to Anglo-American exploitation of the East. This country has desired the abolition of these rights as soon as possible, in view of past bitter experience. The Nanking Government having been resuscitated, Japan and China--with one mind and one body--are marching forward together to prosecute the war against their common enemies to its successful conclusion.

Thus the independence and prosperity of the Republic of China are in complete conformity with the prosperity and welfare not only of Japan, but also of all Greater East Asia. Therefore, it is both an historical inevitability and a matter for sincere congratulation for all East Asia that Japan at this time should have discarded boldly and positively such an unnatural, anachronistic and humiliating system, and that she should trust and maintain friendly intercourse with China in accordance with the real path of East Asia. However, alarmed at Japan's action, the United States and Britain on the eleventh of this month concluded with the Chungking regime treaties concerning the retrocession of international settlements and the relinquishment of extraterritorial rights. But such steps on the part of the United States and Britain are designed merely to deceive the world with their hollow promises to return their already lost rights and interests. This only shows their craft and insidiousness. It is a thousand pities that the Chungking regime should be overjoyed at this dishonored check and behave as if it had forgotten China's century-old grievances. In this connection, it is a source of great pleasure to me that our allies, Germany and Italy, with thorough understanding have immediately conformed to Japan's new China policy, and that the Italian Government has already taken the necessary steps to retrocede concessions to the Nanking Government. The development of new relations between Nippon and China is indeed one manifestation of the great ideal of "HAKKO ICHIU", demonstrating clearly to all the world Japan's true intentions and sincerity with respect to the establishment of Greater East Asia and the construction of the new world order. I firmly believe that it will ever more greatly enhance the confidence in Japan not only of the Chinese people, but also of the various peoples in Greater East Asia...

Japan's collaboration with Germany and Italy in the military, political, cultural and other fields is close and firm. Our enemies are leaving no stone unturned in trying to set the three countries at variance. Thus they expose their inability to recognize the fact that the three countries are bound together by the lofty ideal of establishing a worldwide peace based upon ethical principles, and that our unity is fundamentally different from that of such countries as the United States and Britain--countries whose alignment is based upon egoistic calculations and liable to constant change. To advance the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy still further, not only that these three countries may assist each other with all their respective total economic power for the duration of the present war, but also that they may be enabled to realize a new order which would insure the co-existence and co-prosperity of every people within their respective economic spheres after the termination of the current war, negotiations have been going on for some time between the Governments of Japan and Germany, and between the Governments of Japan and Italy with, the view of concluding agreements concerning economic cooperation between Japan and Germany and between Japan and Italy. As you already know by the announcement made at the time, the agreement between Japan and Germany

and the agreement between Japan and Italy were signed on the twentieth of this month at the German General Headquarters and at Rome respectively.

These agreements realistically and concretely demonstrate in the economic field the spirit of the Tripartite Pact which was concluded on September 27, the fifteenth year of Showa. I firmly believe that the operation of these agreements will render economic cooperation between the three countries ever closer and more harmonious, contributing further toward the strengthening of their fighting power, thus making yet more certain the victory of the Axis Powers.

In connection with the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it has already been declared that Japan harbors no intention of excluding others from the sphere or of enforcing its seclusion. The conclusion of the agreement referred to above not only fully indicates this attitude of Japan, but also makes clear that the construction of the Sphere by Japan and the establishment of the European Co-Prosperity Sphere by Germany and Italy are real facts and not mere empty propaganda in the Anglo-American manner, and that our work of construction is steadily making material progress.

SECRET

NAME: TANI, Masayuki.

PRESENT STATUS: Confined in Sugamo Prison.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

A career diplomat, married into the powerful SHIMAZU family. SUBJECT's career was a steady advance to the top. Prior to 1930 he held Foreign Service position in various embassies and in Japan. In 1930 to 1935 he was Chief, Asia Bureau of Foreign Affairs. He then went to the Embassy in Manchukuo where he served until 1936. From 1938 to 1939 he was Minister at Large in China.

It is reported that he proved his willingness to work with the military authorities in China. He advised strong economic development in North China. As Chief of the Asia Bureau his actions coincided with the militarists decisions.

SUBJECT was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the ABE and KONO Cabinets in 1939 and 1940.

From October 1941 to April 1943 he was President of the powerful Board of Information under the direct control of TOJO. The Board was the Chief Censor in Japan and the principal agency for internal and external propaganda.

He became Foreign Minister in September 1942 and served until April 1943. From April 1943 to the end of the war he was Ambassador to the Manchu Puppet Regime.

REMARKS:

SUBJECT is a diplomat who adhered strictly to the line laid down by the Japanese militarists. Whether he led or followed is immaterial since he was an important factor in the rise of Japanese nationalism, the aggression and exploitation of the "30's" and the waging of World War II. No recommendations regarding the final disposition of SUBJECT have been received from CIS/G-2, FEC.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SUBJECT be retained in custody as a Class A war criminal suspect and tried before an International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

-1-
SECRET

TANI, Masayuki DOSSIER

Case File No. 91

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(11)

DOSSIER

TANI, Masayuki (Case File No. 91)

In Sugamo Prison

- I. Status of Subject:
- A. Date and authority for apprehension:
Letter to Imperial Japanese Government of 1 Dec 1945, GHQ, SCAP, AG 383.7 (1 Dec 45) CI, subject: Apprehension of Japanese Personnel.
 - B. Entered Sugamo Prison 12 Dec. 45.
- II. Proposed charges are that the subject planned, prepared, initiated and waged aggressive warfare and conspired to perform the same and that he is guilty of conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity in that he was
- A. Chief, Asia Bureau of Foreign Office - 1930-1933;
 - B. Counselor, Embassy in Manchukuo - August 1933;
 - C. Minister to Austria and Hungary - 1936;
 - D. Minister-at-large in China - 1938;
 - E. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in ABE and YONAI Cabinets under Foreign Ministers NOMURA and ARITA - 1939 - July 1940;
 - F. President, Board of Information - October 1941 - April 1943;
 - G. Ambassador to Nanking Puppet Regime;
 - H. Foreign Minister in Tojo's Cabinet when formation of Great East Asia Affairs Ministry, an army inspired move, stripped Foreign Office of many of its most important functions, particularly in occupied areas;
 - I. As Chief of Asiatic Bureau of Foreign Office he intimately co-operated with SHIRATORI, the accused;
 - J. As Foreign Minister of TOJO's Cabinet, September 1942, he summed up his three basic objectives as (1) closer co-operation among the Axis powers, (2) defeat of the U.S. and Britain, (3) establishment of new order in East Asia.
 - K. He was very close to the army and his advancement