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Vol. 64

4

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee
on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S. Con. Res. 27

February 16, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 64

(4)

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TESTIMONY OF:

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ROCHFORD, Capt

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NOYES, Rear Adm
United Sta

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

C O N T E N T S

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TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

ROCHEFORT, Captain Joseph John (Resumed)

12,515

NOYES, Rear Admiral Leigh
United States Navy

12,558

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

S. Con. Res. 27

Saturday, February 16, 1946

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present. Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 Senator Ferguson will proceed.

4 TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH JOHN ROCHEFORT,

5 UNITED STATES NAVY

6 (Resumed)

7 Senator Ferguson: You have the message now?

8 Captain Rochefort: Sir?

9 Senator Ferguson: I asked you about the message of
10 November 24. Do you have it?

11 Captain Rochefort: November 26.

12 Senator Ferguson: November 26.

13 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Do you wish me to read
14 it, sir?

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 Captain Rochefort: At the direction of the Commander
17 in Chief the unit under my command during the month of
18 November had been making various summaries and as a result
19 of Admiral Kimmel's order as transmitted by Captain Layton
20 we prepared a summary on the 26th of November which gave
21 our general views as regards the situation which had been
22 developing. I shall read the message. It went to OPNAV
23 for information of Commander in Chief Asiatic and COML6 and
24 Commander in Chief Pacific:

25 "FOR PAST MONTHS COMMANDER SECOND FLEET HAS BEEN

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 ORGANIZING A TASK FORCE WHICH COMPRISES FOLLOW UNITS:
3 SECOND FLEET, THIRD FLEET INCLUDING FIRST AND SECOND BASE
4 FORCES AND FIRST DEFENSE DIVISION, COMBINED AIR FORCE,
5 DESRON THREE, AIRRON SEVEN, SUBRON FIVE AND POSSIBLY UNITS
6 OF BATDIV THREE FROM FIRST FLEET

7 "IN MESSAGES CONCERNING THESE UNITS SOUTH CHINA FLEET
8 AND FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE HAVE APPEARED AS WELL AS THE
9 NAVAL STATION AT SAMA, BAKO AND TAKAO

10 "THIRD BASE FORCE AT PALAO AND RNO PALAO HAVE ALSO
11 BEEN ENGAGED IN EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS WITH SECOND FLEET
12 COMMANDER COMBINED AIR FORCE AS ASSEMBLED IN TAKAO WITH
13 INDICATIONS THAT SOME COMPONENTS HAVE MOVED ON TO HAINAN

14 "THIRD FLEET UNITS BELIEVED TO BE MOVING IN DIRECTION
15 OF TAKAO AND BAKO

16 "SECOND BASE FORCE APPEARS TRANSPORTING EQUIPMENT OF
17 ALL AIR FORCES TO TAIWAN

18 "TAKAO RADIO TODAY ACCEPTED TRAFFIC FOR UNIDENTIFIED
19 SECOND FLEET UNIT AND SUBMARINE DIVISION OR SQUADRON

20 "CRUDIV SEVEN AND DESRON THREE APPEAR AS AN ADVANCE
21 UNIT AND MAY BE ENROUTE SOUTH CHINA

22 "THERE IS BELIEVED TO BE STRONG CONCENTRATION OF
23 SUBMARINES AND AIR GROUPS IN THE MARSHALLS WHICH COMPRISE
24 AIRRON TWENTYFOUR AT LEAST ONE CARRIER DIVISION UNIT PLUS
25 PROBABLY ONE THIRD OF THE SUBMARINE FLEET

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 "EVALUATION ABOVE TO INDICATE STRONG FORCE MAY BE
3 PREPARING TO OPERATE IN SOUTHEASTERN ASIA WHILE COMPONENT
4 PARTS MAY OPERATE FROM PALAO AND MARSHALLS"

5 That, I think, Mr. Senator, gives our views as of the
6 end of November.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, boiling that down, where did
8 that mean an attack, if one?

9 Captain Rochefort: That meant -- we did not refer to
10 it in terms of attack or war. We referred to it constantly
11 as a strong offensive movement with major operations of
12 the Japanese primarily toward Southeastern Asia while certain
13 parts may operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, where would they go from
15 Palao? What should we be on guard for? Did you see that
16 Australian message that was held up the 17 hours?

17 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I do not recall having
18 seen it.

19 Senator Ferguson: Have you seen it recently?

20 Captain Rochefort: I have seen it in the papers, sir,
21 is all, or some reference to it in the papers.

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, if the Dutch knew there was
23 going to be an attack on the Dutch possessions from Palao
24 at the time or prior to that message, how do you account
25 for your Intelligence Branch not knowing? Didn't you have

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 close liaison with the Dutch?

3 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: And with the English?

5 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you know what the arrangement
7 was under the ABCD Bloc?

8 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: How could you plan if you didn't
10 know the arrangement? If there was an attack on British
11 possessions what did that mean to you as far as America
12 was concerned?

13 Captain Rochefort: You mean whether or not we would
14 be involved, sir?

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 Captain Rochefort: I would not hazard an opinion on
17 that, sir; that decision would be made in Washington.

18 The Vice Chairman: I didn't understand, Captain.

19 Captain Rochefort: I said I would not hazard an opinion
20 on that, the decision would be made in Washington.

21 The Vice Chairman: If you will permit the suggestion,
22 I am afraid you keep a little too close to the microphone.
23 It has a tendency of blurring your words. Keep four or
24 five inches from it.

25 Senator Ferguson: You knew there was some arrangement

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Senator Ferguson
 2 but the actual arrangement was not known by you and all
 3 action, as far as that would be concerned, would come
 4 from Washington?

5 Captain Rochefort: Would come from Washington to the
 6 Commander in Chief, sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Yes. But if there was going to be
3 an attack on the Dutch, for instance, as shown by the Mel-
4 bourne message that was held up by the Australians, where
5 they were going to put Rainbow-2 into effect, which meant
6 the joint plan, as I take it from reading that with the evi-
7 dence, now did that mean anything to you?

8 Captain Rochefort: That merely -- if I had seen the mes-
9 sage from the Australians prior to the 7th that would merely
10 have confirmed an opinion that we already had, namely, a
11 movement to NEI, Indo-China and neighboring areas.

12 Senator Ferguson: But the fact that they were going to
13 attack there on Sunday --

14 Captain Rochefort: I did not see the message, sir, prior
15 to the 7th.

16 Senator Ferguson: No, but if you had known that they
17 were going to attack these possessions on Sunday, would that
18 have meant anything to you under what you knew about the
19 A-B-C-D?

20 Captain Rochefort: Not necessarily, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Well, you were more or less of a col-
22 lector of this material, is that true, and handed it up to
23 Layton?

24 Captain Rochefort: Of the radio intelligence material.

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

3

4

Senator Ferguson: And you were confined, really, to the radio intelligence?

5

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

6

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Senator Ferguson: You do not feel that your responsibility was to determine when war was coming or where it was coming, except as you would get it from radio intelligence?

9

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, that is correct.

10

11

Senator Ferguson: And as to the policy, you did not have charge of that?

12

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

13

14

Senator Ferguson: And did not understand it and did not know it?

15

Captain Rochefort: No, sir. That was at a higher level.

16

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Senator Ferguson: Well, now, when you got radio intelligence, - for instance, you intercepted some of these messages that are in exhibit 2, which you were shown yesterday, that you saw here. Did you send them to Washington? Do you know what I mean by exhibit 2? The ship movements.

21

22

Captain Rochefort: Oh, yes, sir, they would have been sent to Washington.

23

Senator Ferguson: How were they sent to Washington?

24

25

Captain Rochefort: If they were important enough they would have been sent by radio. Otherwise, if they were very

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 old, they would have gone by airmail.

3 Senator Ferguson: Well, look at page 22. First look at
4 page 12. Do you see the message on page 12?

5 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: September 24, 1941.

7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. That is a diplomatic mes-
8 sage, Mr. Senator. I think we are perhaps being confused by
9 diplomatic and naval.

10 Senator Ferguson: Oh, no.

11 Captain Rochefort: That is a diplomatic message, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Now, the one on page 12 is considered
13 a diplomatic message?

14 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. That did not go in any
15 naval system.

16 Senator Ferguson: Look on page 22.

17 Captain Rochefort: That is also a diplomatic message,
18 sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, do I understand then
20 that all these exhibits in exhibit 2 were the J-19?

21 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, in the various diplomatic
22 systems, sir, J-19 and so on.

23 Senator Ferguson: They were all in the diplomatic sys-
24 tems?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: And therefore you were not decoding
3 them in --

4 Captain Rochefort: Honolulu.

5 Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- Honolulu or Pearl Har-
6 bor?

7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you know how to do PAK-2?

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: But some of these messages are in that
11 code?

12 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, would you tell me whether 12, 22,
14 25, 26, 27 and 29, in what codes are those?

15 Captain Rochefort: The one on page 12, sir, is in the
16 J-19 system.

17 Senator Ferguson: So then you did not translate it?

18 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we did not have facilities for
19 translating that one.

20 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever seen that one before, up
21 to the 7th, up to and including the 7th?

22 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, what is 22?

24 Captain Rochefort: The one on page 22 is PAK-2, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: But you did not attempt to translate

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 that and send it on to Washington. Do you know whether you
3 intercepted it?

4 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we did not. We did not
5 intercept it: we did not read it.

6 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now go to the one on page
7 25. These are all in exhibit 2.

8 Captain Rochefort: The one on page 25, sir, is also
9 PA K-2.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did you intercept it?

11 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we did not.

12 Senator Ferguson: Therefore, you did not have any know-
13 ledge of it prior to the 7th.

14 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we did not.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, on page 26 there are
16 two of them, the first one and the second one.

17 Captain Rochefort: The first one, No. 252, was also in
18 PAK-2.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you intercept that?

20 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: The second one on that page?

22 Captain Rochefort: That is also PAK-2.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did you intercept that one?

24 Captain Rochefort: We did not intercept it or read it.

25 Senator Ferguson: The one on page 27 and then the one

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 on 29.

3 Captain Rochefort: The one on page 27, No. 253, likewise
4 was not intercepted or read.

5 Senator Ferguson: What code is it in?

6 Captain Rochefort: PAK-2, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And on 29?

8 Captain Rochefort: The one on page 29 is also PAK-2.
9 The same condition applies; we did not intercept it or read it.

10 Senator Ferguson: Then you in effect did not know that
11 those existed?

12 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you were before Admiral
14 Hewitt, were you not?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Hewitt said this:

17 "The book of Battle Reports states, 'The United
18 States shortly before 7 December 1941 had two task forces
19 at sea and the Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo.
20 What do you know about that?'"

21 You answered:

22 "To the best of my knowledge Tokyo was not informed
23 on the presence at sea of the two task forces."

24 What did you mean by that?

25 Captain Rochefort: What I was referring to there was, sir,

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 that at the time I did not know whether or not they had been
3 and I had seen no traffic subsequent to that that indicated
4 that they had; in other words, reading this sort of material
5 here.

6 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, weren't you concerned with
7 the exhibits in number 2 where Japan is trying to ascertain,
8 as they did originally on the 24th of September, laying out a
9 plan of the harbor, not only of the ships that were going out
10 but where they were anchored, so that if they came in for an
11 air attack they would know exactly what ship was at what dock
12 or what buoy?

13 Captain Rochefort: If I may have your indulgence for
14 just a moment, sir, perhaps I can clear up that point.

15 My unit in Pearl Harbor was charged by the authorities
16 in Washington with specific duties, which were to intercept
17 and to exploit all Japanese naval communications systems and
18 transmit all the information we could obtain from those
19 interceptions to the Fleet and to the Navy Department and
20 other interested parties. We were specifically told to keep
21 away or not to exploit the so-called five number system,
22 which was a naval system. That was being done elsewhere.

23 We were not to do any work on the diplomatic systems.
24 That was being handled in Washington and perhaps in Cavite.
25 In other words, the reason that we did not have these diplo-

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

matic messages, the reason we did not intercept them, the reason we did not work on them or read them was because it was not our assignment but was being handled by Washington.

On the other hand, Washington was not doing anything on our general naval systems. That was our responsibility.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Captain Rochefort: In other words, there was a division of work, a division of labor.

Senator Ferguson: Now, your job then was to use the radio finers and locate fleets?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that was your specific assignment, on radio?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that was your assignment?

Captain Rochefort: Japanese naval messages.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And not these so-called diplomatic or from the consuls in Hawaii.

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That was not your assignment.

Captain Rochefort: No, sir, it was not.

Senator Ferguson: That does clear up some of this testi-

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 money.

3 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. There apparently has been
4 some confusion on that, Mr. Senator.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I correctly understand then
6 that you did not personally inform Fielder, Bicknell or any
7 other Army officers of the fact that the Japs were destroying
8 most of their codes in the United States in early December 1941?

9 Captain Rochefort: I would hesitate to make a categori-
10 cal statement to that effect, sir. I may have. If I did it
11 was probably in the course of conversation. I do not recall
12 informing them at this time.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, when you were considering that
14 point did you have in mind that it meant war with America?

15 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: And you do not have any recollection
17 of it now?

18 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. I may have but I do not
19 recall it.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know what conference you
21 had with Bicknell or with -- yes, with Bicknell or Fielder
22 between the 27th of November and the 7th of December?

23 Captain Rochefort: As to dates or hours or places, no,
24 sir. I saw them fairly frequently, perhaps twice a week,
25 something in that nature, and maybe oftener.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Would you generally sit down with
3 your various memorandums and messages and compare them? Is
4 that what you call liaison, or is it just to meet each other
5 and be friendly?

6 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. You see as of that time,
7 Senator, Colonel Fielder was not what we would say in on the
8 "Ultra" picture. In other words, he was not a recipient
9 of that type of information. However, if it affected him or
10 it affected his organization, I would give it to him in a
11 somewhat sanitized form.

12 Senator Ferguson: What did you mean by the last answer?
13 In what form?

14 Captain Rochefort: I would give him the sense of the in-
15 formation without disclosing its source.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now you are going back. You tell me
17 now, this morning, that you were connected only with the
18 Navy, the naval codes and location of the fleets, and so
19 forth, and I think at one time there was a dispute between
20 your branch and the one in the Sixteenth, was there not?

21 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, there was no dispute be-
22 cause Admiral Hart said what he was going to do and that was
23 sufficient.

24 Senator Ferguson: No, no, as to where the fleets were.

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. There was no dispute there.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: It was decided here in Washington
3 that in the future they would look for and rely more on Ad-
4 miral Hart's information than they would upon yours.

5 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: What did that mean to you? Did that
7 remove from you that branch?

8 Captain Rochefort: Oh, no, sir, not at all.

9 Senator Ferguson: And you considered then that the Army
10 was not directly connected with the information on what you
11 were covering, the fleet movements of the Japanese, and that
12 is the reason that you cannot recall giving anything to Bick-
13 nell or to Fielder?

14 Captain Rochefort: I would not put it that way, sir. I
15 would say that if anything developed insofar as the Japanese
16 were concerned that indicated a vital interest or a general
17 interest or which affected the Army, I would have given it
18 to either General Fielder or Colonel Bicknell, whoever was
19 concerned, in a sanitized form.

20 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the Army was alerted
21 to sabotage from the 27th on?

22 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: You knew that?

24 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Do you know where you got your infor-

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 mation?

3 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. Probably in conversations
4 with Army officers.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, did you ever tell Colonel
6 Bicknell about any magic messages or about the winds message?

7 Captain Rochefort: I do not recall that, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: And if you did did you place a con-
9 dition on it that he keep it secret even from Fielder and from
10 General Short?

11 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I would never have done any-
12 thing like that. On the contrary, it is much more reasonable
13 to assume that I would have given the information to General
14 Fielder rather than to Colonel Bicknell by reason of the fact
15 that General Fielder was Colonel Bicknell's superior.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, you do not then recall either
17 Fielder or Bicknell conferring with you about the winds mes-
18 sage?

19 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I do not.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, you know what I mean, the orig-
21 inal setup on the winds message.

22 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Not even on those?

24 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you ever confer with them

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 that you were looking for a weather report?

3 Captain Rochefort: Trying to exclude what those offi-
4 cers have testified I still cannot recall having discussed
5 the matter with them.

6 Senator Ferguson: Were you monitoring for a wind execute
7 message?

8 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: And how did you come to do that? You
10 had not intercepted the original two setup codes?

11 Captain Rochefort: We had received from Admiral Hart's
12 organization the basic message. We received further orders
13 from Washington to listen in on the known broadcast frequen-
14 cies, which we proceeded to it and which we continued to do
15 until after the attack on the 7th.

16 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know what I mean by the
17 two setup messages for the wind code?

18 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. The directions you mean.

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

20 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: That east wind meant --

22 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, I am perfectly familiar
23 with that.

24 Senator Ferguson: You are familiar with that?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Where did you get that information, -
by intercepting and decoding?

3

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Captain Rochefort: No, sir. That information came to
us initially from Admiral Hart and it was followed shortly
by a directive from Washington.

5

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7

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

8

Captain Rochefort: Telling us what to do.

9

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Senator Ferguson: That is right. So you had a direc-
tive to look out for and monitor for an execution of the
wind code?

11

12

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

13

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Senator Ferguson: And up until the time of the attack
were you continuing that monitoring for the wind code?

15

16

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, with four of my very best
language officers on a twenty-four hour watch. That is, a
constant watch on the frequencies that were given to us by
Washington as well as at frequencies which we knew existed
and which we had uncovered.

17

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Senator Ferguson: You were following Washington's in-
structions and even doing more in trying to intercept a wind
code message?

21

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23

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: Did you at any time get such an inter-
cept?

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: What is that?

4 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we did not.

5 Senator Ferguson: You did not get it?

6 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, after the attack did you
8 talk to Colonel Bioknell about either the setup messages or
9 the execute message, or neither of them?

10 Captain Rochefort: To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether you talked to
12 Fielder after the attack about either the setup messages for
13 the wind code or the execute message?

14 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I do not believe I did.

15 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of anything that you can
16 add here to give us information that would help us in this
17 problem that we have before us?

18 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I do not. If the duties of
19 my organization are understood now, that is--

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you want to say anything on
21 your duties so that we do understand your duties?

22 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, aside from the fact that we
23 were not working on diplomatic systems, that was not one of
24 our assignments, and we were directed to work on naval systems
25 only, which we were doing. The reason I mention that is there
has been some confusion apparently about diplomatic systems.

Senator Ferguson: That is all I have.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

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Mr. Keefe: No questions.

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Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

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The Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

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Mr. Murphy: Captain Rochefort, you were considered, and still are considered, one of the most capable and competent communications men in the Navy. I do not want to ask you to put yourself in the position of criticizing your superiors, but in regard to this winds message set-up, here you are with the four best men that you had on a 24-hour watch, and here is the Army and the FCC working on it, and here is the Navy and everybody apparently frantic about the winds message, and all that we get is apparently that the Japanese international communications must be broken up, and then when it comes, all we get is that diplomatic relations are not according to expectations.

I am wondering why the Navy and the Army got so excited about a message of that kind, when the fact is we were still continuing to get all of these interceptions right along, even up to the 7th of December, when international communications were not broken up, and when we already knew the diplomatic relations were not according to expectations; when we even knew that war was coming. Can you understand why all this excitement, and why this 24-hour watch

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 to get a message that would only confirm what these fellows
3 on the 24-hour watch were going to supplement by getting
4 other valuable information?

5 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness,
6 from his position, cannot possibly answer any part of that
7 question.

8 The Chairman: That would seem to be an expression of
9 an opinion, and the drawing of a conclusion by the witness
10 and argumentative.

11 Mr. Murphy: He is referred to in this record, Mr.
12 Chairman, as the outstanding expert of the Navy.

13 The Chairman: He could not tell why he was ordered from
14 Washington to put a 24-hour watch on the monitoring system.
15 It was his duty to carry it out. I doubt very much whether
16 this witness could give the reasons for that. If he can,
17 the committee would be glad to have it.

18 Mr. Murphy: Let me ask you some specific questions,
19 in view of the objection of counsel.

20 Do you know of any information that the winds intercept
21 would have given and that you did not have?

22 Captain Rochefort: It would have given perhaps a little
23 advance information as to whether it was the Japanese intention
24 to terminate or to break off the negotiations then in progress.

25 Mr. Murphy: The fact is, is it not, that we had the

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h3

1
2 deadline message of the 29th, and we had the messages saying
3 "Just carry out this pretense for a little while," and we
4 had a message saying "You will be sent the code word as to
5 what to do," and we had a message from someone in Tokyo
6 saying the instructions will come very soon.

7 That is one link in the chain that would add up to what
8 we already had; is that it?

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. It would, perhaps have
10 given a little additional or earlier information of Japanese
11 intentions with regard to negotiations only.

12 Mr. Murphy: One of the witnesses yesterday, was permit-
13 ted in the record, to say it was the most important message
14 ever received.

15 Would you so consider it?

16 Captain Rochefort: You are referring to the winds message
17 sir?

18 Mr. Murphy: What he thought was a winds intercept.

19 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, that would not, in my
20 opinion be an extremely important message.

21 Mr. Murphy: The next thing I would like to have is for
22 you to put in the record your communication summary of the
23 26th of November.

24 Captain Rochefort: The 26th of November, sir?

25 Mr. Murphy: Yes. That was the one where you pointed

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4

1
2 is it not, that the Japs were ready for action? You read
3 that this morning, did you not?

4 Captain Rochefort: I read the dispatch, sir, which was
5 based on perhaps a month's summaries.

6 Mr. Murphy: Will you refer to the dispatch, if you can,
7 that shows the submarines at Saipan moving eastward?

8 At any rate, Captain, as I understand it, all of your
9 daily communications summaries are in evidence. I understand
10 between November 26 and December 7 in your communications
11 summaries, you did point out that the Japanese submarines
12 were then at Saipan and moving gradually in an easterly
13 direction.

14 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, toward Jaluit.

15 Mr. Murphy: And Jaluit is in the same general location,
16 considering a movement from the Asiatic Coast, as Pearl
17 Harbor, is that right?

18 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

19 We said that, I might say, on the 30th of November, sir.
20 That might answer your question.

21 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

22 Captain Rochefort: On the 30th of November. The known
23 progress of the submarine force from the Empire to Chichi Jima
24 and to Saipan makes his destination obviously the Marshalls.

25 Mr. Murphy: One other question. You said that General

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Fielder was not entitled to magic in this ultra form, so when you say if there was something that you felt was vital, that affected the Army, you gave it to him in a sanitized form.

Now, who would be over you in authority to give an order so that you would give the information you had to your counterpart in the Army? Who had the authority to give you the order to do that?

Captain Rochefort: Captain Layton, as a personal representative of Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral Kimmel had the authority to order you, did he not, to give this ultra material to General Fielder?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And of course, if you got the order you would promptly obey it?

Captain Rochefort: I would carry out any order I received.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairmen.

The Chairman: Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman: Captain, allow me to inquire a little for information.

I am not quite clear on one or two points mentioned by you.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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General, then Colonel, I believe, Fielder, was the head of G-2 in Hawaii for the Army, wasn't he?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: And Colonel Bicknell was G-2 for the Army Air Forces in Hawaii, wasn't he?

Captain Rochefort: That was not my understanding sir. I considered Colonel Bicknell as a subordinate of Colonel Fielders.

The Vice Chairman: He was an assistant to Colonel Fielder?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, that was my understanding.

The Vice Chairman: And that applied to the G-2 of the Army in Hawaii?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Is it your understanding that
3 the head of G-2 and the assistant G-2 in Hawaii were not
4 entitled to receive this secret information?

5 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, he was not on the list
6 of personnel that I had, which indicated those that were en-
7 titled to receive ultra.

8 The Vice Chairman: Well, who made that list?

9 Captain Rochefort: That list was maintained in our
10 office and was made up initially by the officer in charge
11 and was passed on to succeeding officers in charge.

12 The Vice Chairman: Who was the responsible official
13 for determining that question?

14 Captain Rochefort: The officer in charge, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: As to who would receive this
16 secret information.

17 Captain Rochefort: The officer in charge, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: Who was the officer in charge?

19 Captain Rochefort: I was from June 1941 on, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: Then while you held this position
21 it was solely within your province to determine who in
22 the Army should or should not receive this secret information?

23 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, unless I received contrary
24 orders from either Washington or from Admiral Kimmel.

25 The Vice Chairman: How is that?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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Captain Rochefort: Unless I had received orders to the contrary from either Washington or Admiral Kimmel.

The Vice Chairman: Who fixed that responsibility or that discretion in you?

Captain Rochefort: I do not think I understand that, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You said it was within your province to determine who in the Army should receive this secret information.

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Well, who fixed your province as to what you should do in that respect?

Captain Rochefort: Nobody, sir. I would determine that by ascertaining whether or not Colonel Fielder had been receiving ultra from his own people, from the Army, and whether or not he was qualified -- I say "qualified" -- to receive ultra either from Washington or from Admiral Kimmel's staff.

The Vice Chairman: Then you determined the question?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: As to what and how the secret information should be transmitted from the Navy to the Army?

Captain Rochefort: A slight correction, sir. I would determine whether or not certain people in the Army received ultra from the Navy. Not secret information, but ultra.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Ultra?

3 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: Then you could receive certain ultra
5 information and did?

6 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Then you determined how much or what
8 part of that was transmitted to the Army?

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: Now if the Army had requested or
11 desired this information, could they have secured it from you?

12 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: But they would have had to come to
14 you and ask for it?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: And there was not that free inter-
17 change of information of that type and character between
18 you and the Army unless they requested it of you?

19 Captain Rochefort: I think I have given the wrong
20 impression there, sir. If we received any information at
21 the ultra level, that is information obtained from ultra
22 sources, which the Army should have had, or it would have
23 been desirable for the Army to have had, I would have
24 certainly given it to the Army, but not in the form of
25 ultra. I would have paraphrased it, or changed it around,

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 or, as we say, sanitized it and then given it to them in
3 such a way as not to disclose the source. But I would have
4 seen that they had the information.

5 The Vice Chairman: But in the final analysis you
6 determined what they should get?

7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: And if you decided that something
9 was not necessary in your opinion to give to the Army, why,
10 they did not get it?

11 Captain Rochefort: That applies to myself, yes, sir.
12 Of course they could obtain it from Admiral Kimmel, or
13 possibly from Washington, or any other source. But insofar
14 as I was concerned, that was it, yes, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: Now were you monitoring for the
16 Morse code, or Morse code information in Honolulu?

17 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: Not at any time?

19 Captain Rochefort: You are referring to the winds
20 message now, sir?

21 The Vice Chairman: Well, I will refer to that, but
22 right now I am talking about the general situation.

23 Captain Rochefort: All Japanese naval communications --
24 I say "all", but perhaps 98 percent of them were in Morse
25 code or Imperial Japanese Kani, which is a variation of Morse,

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

about 98 percent of it.

The Vice Chairman: About 98 percent of it was in Morse?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, of naval communications.

The Vice Chairman: Naval communications?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: I am trying to find out about the Morse code. You certainly know what that is?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: All right. Were you monitoring for that?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Were you monitoring for the winds message in the Morse code?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Never did at any time?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

The Vice Chairman: So then if any winds message had come in the Morse code you would not have received it?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

The Vice Chairman: If you were monitoring the Morse code messages why did not you also monitor for the winds message in the Morse code?

Captain Rochefort: The broadcasts that were furnished us

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 by Washington, the broadcast schedules giving the various
3 frequencies, were all on voice frequencies; none of them
4 were Morse. The term "broadcast" to me, in referring to
5 weather messages and news broadcasts, and all that, means
6 simply voice. As I said before, all of the frequencies that
7 had been assigned us by Washington, giving in their opinion
8 a complete list of all known Japanese broadcast frequencies,
9 were all voice broadcasts.

10 The Vice Chairman: Well, Captain, you stated to
11 Senator Ferguson that you tried to receive information in
12 all of the systems that were designated to you by Washington,
13 and some in addition to that.

14 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: All right. You just stated a few
16 moments ago that you were monitoring for Morse code messages.

17 Captain Rochefort: Yes.

18 The Vice Chairman: Then if you were monitoring for
19 Morse code messages generally, why did not you monitor for
20 the winds message in Morse code?

21 Captain Rochefort: The monitoring of Morse code messages
22 was for Japanese naval communications system messages which
23 went by well-known circuits, what we would call circuits,
24 that is established channels of communication. Within the
25 Japanese Navy, perhaps 98 percent of that traffic would

AL-7

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 have been in the Japanese version of the Morse code. The
3 listening in for the winds message, for the winds execute
4 message, was a separate and totally distinct assignment from
5 the normal assignment which had been given us.

6 In other words, it was a little additional duty. All
7 the frequencies that were known in Washington on which that
8 winds execute message could have been sent, and which were
9 furnished us, were all voice frequencies. We listened for
10 those. We also searched for other voice frequencies. We
11 uncovered several of them. We continued monitoring all
12 of the known voice broadcasts from the Japanese Empire.

13 Does that clear up the thing, sir?

14 The Vice Chairman: No, I am sorry. I just want to
15 ask the simple question if you were monitoring for Morse
16 code messages why you did not monitor for the winds execute
17 message in Morse code.

18 Captain Rochefort: Because the very setting up of the
19 winds execute, the term itself implies, in my mind, voice.
20 I have never seen it used otherwise.

21 The Vice Chairman: Then with the Japanese message
22 setting up the so-called winds code, it was clear to you
23 that there would not be any message in that code, about
24 the winds execute message, in Morse code?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: That is clear?

3 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: You then knew there was no need
5 for monitoring for the winds execute message in a Morse code?

6 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

7 The Vice Chairman: Well, as I recall Captain Safford's
8 testimony here, I think he stated that the winds execute
9 message, which he says he saw, came in the Morse code.

10 Captain Rochefort: That is entirely possible, sir,
11 but in order to have that condition exist you must remember
12 that the list of frequencies given us by Washington were
13 all voice. If the message was sent in Morse code, that is
14 the exact message was sent in Morse code, that would have
15 meant then that every Japanese Embassy in every Japanese
16 location throughout the world for whom the message was
17 intended by the Japanese Government would have had to main-
18 tain Morse code operators, people capable of receiving
19 Morse code. I do not think so.

20 The Vice Chairman: You do not think so?

21 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: Then you do not attach much im-
23 portance to the winds execute message?

24 Captain Rochefort: Personally I would not, sir. I
25 would say that it merely would have given a little additional

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 information, perhaps earlier information. The Chairman

3 The Vice Chairman: Is it your best judgment, Captain,
4 that there was never any genuine winds code execute message
5 received?

6 Captain Rochefort: I would prefer to answer that, sir,
7 by saying that, inssofar as my unit was concerned, no winds
8 execute was ever heard. I would rather not pass on what
9 may or may not have been heard in other parts of the world.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right.

11 The Chairman: The Morse code is a technical, mechanical,
12 instrumental method of transmitting information?

13 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. It is normally referred
14 to as dot and dash.

15 The Chairman: It is in no case voice?

(6) Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

17 The Chairman: Weather broadcasts, such as that indicated
18 in the winds messages, that predicted that under certain
19 circumstances the weather report would be broadcast, that
20 is always in voice, isn't it?

21 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

22 The Chairman: So that you had two entirely different
23 systems?

24 Captain Rochefort: Yes.

25 The Chairman: One of them mechanical and the other

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Chairman
Senator Brewster

2 vocal?

3 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

4 The Chairman: And you were listening over the vocal
5 system?

6 Captain Rochefort: That is correct, sir.

7 The Chairman: For the winds execute message?

8 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

9 The Chairman: It never came through?

10 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we did not hear it.

11 The Chairman: According to the two messages predicting
12 that under certain circumstances the broadcast of weather
13 would contain certain words, that in itself indicated it
14 would be a vocal transmission?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

16 The Chairman: That is all.

17 Senator Brewster: What is the difference, Captain,
18 between a cipher and a code?

19 Captain Rochefort: Between a cipher and a code, sir?

20 Senator Brewster: Yes.

21 Captain Rochefort: In the original understanding, sir,
22 a code has a group of letters and numbers -- sometimes the
23 letters are pronounceable and sometimes not -- which designate
24 a letter or number, a phrase, perhaps, a whole sentence or
25 a complete thought. That would be termed a code.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Brewster

2 Senator Brewster: And you would need a code book of
3 some character in order to interpret it?

4 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, you would require the
5 book. That is, the original people would.

6 Senator Brewster: Whoever would get it decoded would
7 have to have a book indicating the significance of these
8 letters and symbols?

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Brewster: What about a cipher?

11 Captain Rochefort: A pure cipher would interchange or
12 change each letter of the original text so that rather
13 than having a group of letters meaning a whole thought
14 or sentence or phrase, each letter would be changed, or
15 each numeral.

16 Senator Brewster: You mean the letter "A" might mean
17 "X", for instance?

18 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, and then the following
19 letter "B" might mean "L". Where you interchange your
20 letter by another letter, or a numeral by another numeral,
21 that would be a pure cipher.

22 Senator Brewster: That was the advantage of this
23 so-called cipher machine that you referred to?

24 Captain Rochefort: The Japanese system, you mean?

25 Senator Brewster: Yes. That would mean on this machine

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Senator Brewster
2 you punch certain letters and certain other letters come
3 out?

4 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Brewster: If you know what that combination
6 is you are able to read it?

7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Brewster: Is that peculiar to the Japanese, or
9 do other countries use somewhat similar systems, as far as
10 you know?

11 Captain Rochefort: Ciphers go back to before the days
12 of Julius Caesar.

13 Senator Ferguson: They are not exactly novel?

14 Captain Rochefort: There is nothing that is novel in
15 them, sir.

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17 follows

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1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Brewster: It is just a question of the possible
3 ways in which they follow the techniques, and so on?

4 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

5 The Chairman: Anything further?

6 Senator Ferguson: There is one question.

7 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

8 Senator Ferguson: When you said you were getting radio
9 information, did that include RCA? That was cable, was it,
10 or was that considered radio?

11 Captain Rochefort: You mean the messages we got about
12 the 3rd of December?

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

14 Captain Rochefort: I do not know where the District
15 Intelligence Officer got his information, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: What did you do with those messages
17 that you received?

18 Captain Rochefort: On the night of the 3rd or the
19 morning of the 4th, sir?

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

21 Captain Rochefort: We read what we could as quickly as
22 we could. We put our best people on it. Those that we
23 read prior to the 7th were of absolutely no value whatever.

24 We continued working on them, and on the night of the
25 10th, we managed to read the remainder.

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1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2 2 Senator Ferguson: Give it to me up until the time the
3 bombs fell.

4 Captain Rochefort: Nothing of any value, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: And you put your best men on those
6 messages as soon as you got them from the so-called cable
7 office; is that right?

8 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Wherever they came from
9 I do not know.

10 Senator Ferguson: I mean they were on other than your
11 regular channel.

12 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Those were diplomatic
13 messages, Senator.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, on this winds code, you were
15 attempting to evaluate that execution message when you did
16 not have all of the other diplomatic messages.

17 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. I think it could have
18 been reason to assume the meaning of the thing.

19 Senator Ferguson: Did you know we had sent a message
20 on the 26th to Japan?

21 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, not prior to the 7th. I
22 did not know that.

23 Senator Ferguson: You did not know that prior to the
24 7th?

25 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Give it to me up until the time the bombs fell.

Captain Rochefort: Nothing of any value, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you put your best men on those messages as soon as you got them from the so-called cable office; is that right?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Wherever they came from I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: I mean they were on other than your regular channel.

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Those were diplomatic messages, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Now, on this winds code, you were attempting to evaluate that execution message when you did not have all of the other diplomatic messages.

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. I think it could have been reason to assume the meaning of the thing.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know we had sent a message on the 26th to Japan?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir, not prior to the 7th. I did not know that.

Senator Ferguson: You did not know that prior to the 7th?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

Witness Rochefort

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 Mr. Richardson: And wherever that message would go,
2 it would go in Morse?

3 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Richardson: Then if it was to be in a weather
5 news communication, it would mean that London and the United
6 States and other places that Morse could go to, would be
7 advised in Morse what the news and weather was in Japan?

8 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: If you had had any idea that a winds
10 execute might come in Morse, you could have directed your
11 attention to Morse intercepts for the purpose of getting
12 such an intercept, could not you?

13 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, we could have.

14 Mr. Richardson: But it was your understanding, from
15 the information you received from Washington, and the nature
16 of the recitals in the original winds code message, that
17 any intercept was to come by radio broadcast?

18 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Richardson: That is all you monitored for?

20 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, it is true, is it not,
22 that early in 1941, arrangements were made for the transmis-
23 sion from Washington to Cavite the information with respect
24 to purple messages received at Washington from Tokyo?
25

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Captain Rochefort: I imagine there were a series of
3 messages technical in nature.

4 Mr. Richardson: Now, when Washington would transmit
5 the information which they got from the purple intercepts
6 to Cavite, would that be transmitted in the Japanese code
7 to Cavite or would it be transmitted in our code, or would
8 it be transmitted in English between Washington and Cavite?

9 Captain Rochefort: That would have been transmitted
10 in one of the U. S. Naval cryptographic systems.

11 Mr. Richardson: Then, would you be able in Hawaii to
12 intercept and read the communication from the United States
13 to Cavite, the information that Washington had received in
14 purple?

15 Captain Rochefort: Oh, yes, sir.

16 Mr. Richardson: Then, whenever information was given
17 by Washington to Cavite, based upon information which came
18 to Washington under the purple code, did you pick it up
19 in Hawaii?

20 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

21 Mr. Richardson: You could have?

22 Captain Rochefort: We could have, with considerable
23 difficulty, I would say. In other words, it would have in-
24 volved picking one message out of perhaps 50,000, which
25 would have required going to the Fleet communications officer.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Witness Noyes

Mr. Masten

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Mr. Richardson: Then you paid no attention, in your station at Hawaii, to communications between Washington and Cavite of that nature?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

Mr. Richardson: That is all.

The Chairman: The committee thanks you, Captain, for your appearance here. You are excused.

Captain Rochefort: Thank you, sir.

(Witness excused)

The Chairman: Call the next witness.

Mr. Richardson: I would like to call Admiral Noyes, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LEIGH NOYES,

UNITED STATES NAVY

(Admiral Noyes was duly sworn by the Chairman)

Mr. Masten: Admiral Noyes, will you please state your full name, your rank, and present assignment for the committee.

Admiral Noyes: Leigh Noyes. Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. President of the Board of Inspection and Survey.

Mr. Masten: And what were your rank and duties on the 7th of December, 1941?

Admiral Noyes: I was Rear Admiral, Director of Naval Communications in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Masten: When did you become Director of Naval

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Communications, Admiral?

3 Admiral Noyes: About the 1st of August, 1939.

4 Mr. Masten: And how long did you then continue as
5 such?

6 Admiral Noyes: Until the 24th, I think, of February,
7 1942.

8 Mr. Masten: Now, would you state briefly to the com-
9 mittee, your experience in the Navy?

10 Admiral Noyes: I was appointed to the Naval Academy
11 from Vermont; graduated in February, 1906; went to the Asiatic
12 station for three years; came back in the cruise around the
13 world; was in the Missouri, Mississippi; aide to Rear Admiral
14 Ward; the Wyoming; in 1914 I went to the Office of the then
15 Aide for Operations in the Navy Department, and became the
16 first communications officer of the Navy Department.

17 I went to sea in 1916 as Fleet Communications Officer,
18 Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet. I commanded the Bidell,
19 a destroyer; came ashore to the Office of Director of
20 Naval Communications, Atlantic Coast Communications Super-
21 intendent; went to the Naval War College; battle ship
22 Colorado; the Naval Mission to Brazil; Director of Training
23 for Navigation on shore; commanded the light cruiser Richmond
24 for two years; went to Pensacola to qualify as a naval
25 aviator; commanded the Lexington, Chief of Staff; commander

Witness Noyes questions by: Mr. Masten

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aircraft battle force.

In 1939, Director of Naval Communications, which I left in February, 1942 to go to sea in the Pacific Fleet.

Commander Task Force 18, 61; came ashore in November of 1942 to the Board of Inspection and Survey, West Coast, and in March, 1945, to Washington as President of the Board of Inspection and Survey, which position I now hold.

Mr. Masten: Admiral, how many appearances have you made before the Boards investigating the Pearl Harbor matter?

Admiral Noyes: One. Before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Mr. Masten: That was in July, 1944, about?

Admiral Noyes: December.

Mr. Masten: December 1944?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, in San Francisco.

Mr. Masten: In San Francisco?

Admiral Noyes: Yes.

Mr. Masten: Where had you been immediately prior to your appearance before that board?

Admiral Noyes: I was then a senior member of the Board of Inspection and Survey, West Coast - Pacific Coast.

Mr. Masten: Now, the office of Naval Communications --

Admiral Noyes: May I add something, sir?

Mr. Masten: Excuse me.

Admiral Noyes: I was approached by the Hewitt Board,

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 or, rather, I was given an opportunity to appear before
3 them if I wished to make any changes in any testimony I
4 had given to the Naval Court of Inquiry, but at that time
5 I had nothing to say.

6 Mr. Masten: It is my recollection that all, or part
7 of your testimony in the Navy proceeding was incorporated
8 in the record of the Hewitt proceeding.

9 Admiral Noyes: I would have made three minor changes
10 if I had known then what I do not.

11 Mr. Masten: What would those have been, Admiral, do
12 you recall?

13 Admiral Noyes: In regard to the cards for the winds
14 code.

15 In regard to the telephone message from one of the watch
16 officers about a false winds message, and about my knowledge
17 about the first 13 parts.

18 Mr. Masten: We will come to that a little bit later.

19 At the time we mention it, will you state what changes
20 you would have made to any part of what you had previously
21 testified?

22 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Masten: Now, in November and December, 1941, the
24 Office of Naval Communications was one of the principal
25 divisions of the Office of Naval Operations, was it not?

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Admiral Noyes: It was one of the coordinate divisions.
3 All divisions are supposed to be coordinate.

4 Mr. Masten: On a par with the War Plans Division,
5 and Division of Intelligence?

6 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Masten: And you were Admiral Stark's principal
8 adviser on matters relating to Naval communications, were you
9 not?

10 Admiral Noyes: Yes,,sir.

11 Mr. Masten: Did your work as head of that office,
12 bring you into contact more closely with certain of the
13 division heads than others; that is, Admiral Wilkinson or
14 Admiral Turner?

15 Admiral Noyes: You are speaking of the pre-Pearl Harbor
16 period?

17 Mr. Masten: Yes.

18 Admiral Noyes: Yes, more closely with Admiral Wilkinson
19 and Admiral Turner than the other divisions.

20 Mr. Masten: At that time, the principal function of
21 your office was the maintenance of the Navy's communication
22 system, was it not?

23 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Masten: In a sense you were the Navy's Western
25 Union telephone at that time?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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Admiral Noyes: Western Union and A.T. & T.

Mr. Masten: In addition to those duties, your office included the unit that was under Captain Safford, known as the Communications Security Unit, or some such name?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Masten: And a part of that unit was the translation section headed by Captain Kramer?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Masten: At whose initiative was Captain Kramer appointed to that work?

Admiral Noyes: I found him there when I reported.

Mr. Masten: At the time you became Director of Naval Communications?

Admiral Noyes: That is my recollection.

Mr. Masten: Now, who was your assistant director of Naval Communications during the period just prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Noyes: Then Captain J. R. Redman.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1 Mr. Masten: Did he come into the office after you
2 came in, or was he there before?

3 Admiral Noyes: After.

4 Mr. Masten: What was what might be called the chain
5 of command as regards the Communications Intelligence Unit?
6 Did you issue orders directly to Captain Safford in matters
7 pertaining to his unit, or did you issue orders to Captain
8 Redman and then he passed them on to Captain Safford?

9 Admiral Noyes: I was the Chief of the Division and
10 Captain Redman was my assistant, second in command, the
11 Executive Officer, Chief of Staff, whatever you might call
12 it. I dealt directly with the heads of sections, who acted
13 in my place. I could give instructions to him, or in handling
14 a certain amount of detail, he could carry it out without
15 referring to me.
16

17 Mr. Masten: There would be Captain Redman, who would
18 be in charge of the Office of Naval Communications?

19 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

20 Mr. Masten: To what extent were you familiar with
21 the day-to-day operations of Captain Safford's unit?

22 Admiral Noyes: I tried to be familiar with all that
23 was going on, that was my responsibility. I did not exactly
24 follow you on the question, as to how much detail I could
25 keep track of.

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 Mr. Masten: It would be only matters that he would
3 bring to you that you would be informed regarding, or on
4 occasion you would find it necessary to raise questions
5 with him as to the daily operation of his unit?

6 Admiral Noyes: It was desired to have a considerable
7 amount of decentralization. There was a great deal of detail
8 to Captain Safford's section. In addition to the part in
9 which you are interested, magic, we had a tremendous job
10 in our own codes and ciphers, for which he was responsible.

11 Mr. Masten: Captain Safford was also responsible for
12 that work?

13 Admiral Noyes: Yes, or his office.

14 Mr. Masten: Turning to the interception for decryption
15 of the Japanese messages, we know from the testimony before
16 the committee that the Navy was maintaining a system of
17 monitoring stations for the interception of those messages.
18 You were familiar, were you not, with that system?

19 Admiral Noyes: I was, except --

20 Mr. Masten: Except what?

21 Admiral Noyes: Except the intercept stations were
22 part of the Navy system. They had not been established
23 for this specific purpose.

24 Mr. Masten: And did they take their orders directly
25 from Washington to Captain Safford?

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 Admiral Noyes: We had what is called in the Navy
3 operational control of all the systems, somewhat similar
4 to the telephone tie-up. You have to have a net. There
5 must be some over-all control of the entire system. Each
6 station, as Commander Rochefort mentioned -- he reported
7 directly to the Commander in Chief, Commander Fourteenth
8 Naval District, but he got over-all directions from Washington.

9 Mr. Masten: Now in addition to the intercepting system
10 of monitoring stations, did the Navy Department also
11 maintain facilities in Washington and at Corregidor and
12 Pearl Harbor for decrypting Japanese messages? Captain
13 Rochefort has been testifying as to how it was done at
14 Pearl Harbor.

15 You were familiar with the assignments and facilities
16 available at Pearl Harbor and at Corregidor, were you not?

17 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Masten: What was your understanding, prior to
19 December 7, as to what could be decrypted in Pearl Harbor,
20 of the diplomatic traffic?

21 Admiral Noyes: What Captain Rochefort said.

22 Mr. Masten: That is to say, you understood that there
23 were no facilities at Pearl Harbor for decryption of
24 Japanese messages in the purple code?

25 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 Mr. Masten: And in the code known as J-19, that
3 was your understanding prior to December 7?

4 Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

5 Mr. Masten: Admiral Kimmel has contended before the
6 committee that the diplomatic intercepts which were de-
7 crypted in Washington, some of them should have been sent
8 to Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Turner has stated before the
9 committee it was his understanding there were facilities
10 at Pearl Harbor which permitted people at Pearl Harbor to
11 read the diplomatic messages. Did Admiral Turner or Admiral
12 Stark ever discuss that matter with you?

13 The Chairman: We will suspend just a moment.

14 (Short interruption)

15 Mr. Masten: Admiral, you were about to say whether
16 or not Admiral Turner or Admiral Ingersoll, or Admiral
17 Stark had ever had any conversations with you as to the
18 facilities available for the decrypting of diplomatic messages
19 in Pearl Harbor.

20 Admiral Noyes: I know the question. I think it has
21 already been stated by Admiral Turner that he discovered he
22 was mistaken. I think if you look at his testimony, on
23 page 419, of the Navy Narrative, you will see that he is
24 speaking of what we call radio intelligence, which is the
25 activity that Captain Rochefort has been discussing. It

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 does not involve knowing the contents of the messages.

3 It involves direction finding, to find the location of ships,
4 the analysis of the transmissions they monitored, and call
5 signs on messages in code, which, although you cannot read,
6 you can form a good estimate of what the ships are doing
7 from the call signs and the direction alone. That is
8 called a traffic analysis. The ultimate was the question
9 of the carriers, when the traffic became zero.

10 Mr. Masten: Now did you ever make any statements to
11 Admiral Turner that Admiral Kimmel was able to read the
12 translated or decrypted messages in purple code at Pearl
13 Harbor?

14 Admiral Noyes: Not to the best of my knowledge and
15 belief, because I had been the one who had proposed, when
16 we had one machine available -- I had to get approval from
17 Admiral Stark to send it to Cavite, and I knew perfectly
18 well that they could decipher the diplomatic traffic and
19 send it to Honolulu.

20 Mr. Masten: Do you now recall that any time prior to
21 December 7 Admiral Turner made any statements to you which
22 would have indicated at the time that he understood that
23 Admiral Kimmel had the means of decrypting purple traffic?

24 Admiral Noyes: I do not.

25 Mr. Masten: You account for his apparent misunderstand-

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 ing as confusion in his mind between the decrypting and
3 handling of the traffic that you spoke of and the diplomatic,
4 the Japanese diplomatic code? In other words, do you think
5 that he had those two types of information confused in his
6 mind?

7 Admiral Noyes: That is merely my opinion.

8 Mr. Masten: That is merely your opinion?

9 Admiral Noyes: Yes. I think it is the only way in
10 which I could see that a misunderstanding could have occurred,
11 plus the fact that his original testimony referred to traffic
12 analyses, which had nothing to do with the reading of the
13 text of enemy messages.

14 Mr. Masten: Now turning to the exchange in purple
15 information between Manila and Washington and Pearl Harbor,
16 to what extent was the station in Manila expected to forward
17 in to Washington the information which it derived from the
18 interception and decryption of Japanese purple messages at
19 Manila? Will you state in a general way the arrangement
20 between Manila and Washington for any such exchange of
21 information?

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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Admiral Noyes: Originally there were no facilities at Cavite for decrypting diplomatic traffic, it all had to be forwarded to Washington. I might say that starting in 1939, when I first came, what little we were doing was not of immediate importance and mail was used almost entirely for forwarding the intercepts.

As Pearl Harbor approached, as December approached and the crisis, that was speeded up more and more.

Mr. Masten: May I interrupt you there, Admiral. Are you speaking of forwarding the messages still in the Japanese code or after decryption in English?

Admiral Noyes: Originally they could only be forwarded in the Japanese code.

Mr. Masten: Yes.

Admiral Noyes: I think it was early -- may I look at this dispatch that you have there.

I should say that about March 1941 one machine became available and it was decided to send it to Cavite.

Mr. Masten: And after that anything that came into Washington from Cavite was decrypted and in English?

Admiral Noyes: If they could handle it. All this enemy interception is not an open and shut proposition. Many messages we never could translate. We were very fortunate to get what we did.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Mr. Masten: Was it the practice more than to send
3 on to Washington in the encoded Japanese what they could
4 not handle in Manila in order that Washington could have
5 an opportunity to decode it?

6 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

7 Mr. Masten: And did they also send to Washington in
8 English the messages which they did decode in Manila?

9 Admiral Noyes: The object of putting the machine at
10 Cavite, which was the best listening post we had, was to
11 cut out the transmission between Cavite and Washington,
12 let them decrypt the messages there, throw out the unimportant
13 ones and forward in Navy cipher the important ones, or by
14 ML the important ones, to Washington, depending on the
15 importance.

16 Mr. Masten: Now, to what extent was the reverse true,
17 to what extent did Washington send to Cavite decrypted
18 messages that had been decrypted here in Washington?

19 Admiral Noyes: I think testimony has been given as
20 to the division of responsibility between Naval Intelligence
21 and Communications in regard to the enemy intercepted messages.
22 The function of Naval Communications was to obtain under-
23 standable messages from the original material. That was
24 turned over to Naval Intelligence for distribution. It
25 was their function to evaluate or distribute it to the

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 proper people, everything in its final form. We only
3 exchanged messages to assist the other station. For
4 example, if Cavite had found that they had gotten started
5 on a message and found a reference which they didn't have,
6 to another message, and they were stuck on continuing their
7 translation, breaking down this message, they would ask
8 Washington for this reference which they had found and that
9 would be sent out to assist them.

10 Mr. Masten: That would be sent out translated in
11 English, would it not?

12 Admiral Noyes: Probably.

13 Mr. Masten: When it was sent would it be sent for the
14 information of Admiral Kimmel as well as for action to
15 Admiral Hart, or whoever you would describe it as at that
16 time?

17 Admiral Noyes: It would be sent for the use of the
18 people who were decrypting some message which they had.
19 It wouldn't be sent for information to anybody.

20 Mr. Masten: Now, I will ask you to look at Exhibit
21 37, pages 6 through 10. Exhibit 37 contains various basic
22 dispatches from the Navy Department in Washington to
23 Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart, and these dispatches on
24 pages 6 through 10 contain specifically, do they not,
25 material derived from intercepted Japanese diplomatic

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1 messages in the purple code?

2 The first one is dated 7 July, the one on page 6; the
3 next is also on 7 July; the next is 15 July; the next is
4 17 July; and the last one, on page 10, is dated 19 July,
5 and they all appear to have been sent from the Navy Depart-
6 ment in Washington for action of Admiral Hart and for informa-
7 tion of Admiral Kimmel, and they all specifically refer to
8 particular intercepts, do they not?
9

10 Admiral Noyes: They do, although they are not exact
11 translations, but apparently just briefs of what appeared.

12 Mr. Masten: Yes.

13 Admiral Noyes: I would say those are not actual
14 messages that you were referring to.

15 Mr. Masten: These are not messages that were sent to
16 aid Admiral Hart in translating.

17 Admiral Noyes: This is straight intelligence.

18 Mr. Masten: According to the photostats from which
19 this exhibit was prepared the message on page 6 was released
20 by Captain Kramer by direction of Captain Safford; the message
21 on page 7 was released by Captain Kramer also by direction
22 of Captain Safford; the message on page 8 was released by
23 you; the message on page 9 was released by Captain Kramer
24 by your direction, as also in the case of the message on
25 page 10.

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by Mr. Masten

2 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Masten: Now, for the information of the committee
4 will you explain what is meant by the use of the phrase
5 "released by" on these Navy forms? Does that mean that you
6 decided to send the message or does that mean that it was
7 final clearance for sending it, that final clearance was
8 given by the people that I have just referred to?

9 Admiral Noyes: Each office of the Navy Department had
10 officers authorized to release messages and we only insisted
11 that a message be authenticated by the authorized officer.
12 We had one very strict rule. The basis of all our handling
13 of these enemy intercepted messages was the extreme importance
14 of allowing no incling to reach the Japanese that we could
15 read their messages. That would have ruined everything.

16 We had a strict rule and endeavored to carry it out
17 that nothing should ever appear in any kind of ordinary
18 Navy traffic which referred to the fact that we could read
19 any Japanese messages. We had a special cipher, a special
20 security cipher, which any reference to magic was supposed
21 to be in, in which it was supposed to be decrypted, and I
22 or some one of my subordinates were the only ones that
23 released messages in that system. I would have released
24 in that system, if anyone wished to I would have been
25 directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or requested by

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 the Director of Naval Intelligence, or by War Plans, to
3 transmit the messages in this form, and any one of those
4 forms, I would have immediately sent them in cipher, provided
5 they wished to refer, as they did, to the fact of their
6 origin. If they could express it as intelligence without
7 referring in any way where the information was to be obtained,
8 for example, the expression of "reliable source", that
9 doesn't give away the secret, that could have been sent
10 in ordinary Naval dispatch.

11 Mr. Masten: This special cipher that you had, when
12 one of these messages was sent by either being paraphrased
13 or quoted directly from a Japanese purple message, was
14 there any danger in your opinion that that would, that
15 Navy code would be broken by someone else?

16 In other words, did you have any feeling of danger
17 in revealing the secret of purple when you forwarded
18 messages from Washington to Admiral Hart in that special
19 cipher?

20 Admiral Noyes: We didn't like it particularly. We
21 would have preferred never to cross up any reference to
22 Japanese messages in our own codes, because, particularly
23 in any long message, it is the greatest opening to a
24 crypt analyst to break a cipher or code, the fact that he
25 knows something has been sent, but actually by keeping

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 the traffic down as we did in this particularly cipher
3 it could not be, the cipher was not used even by my own
4 communication watch officer. We had a special watch who
5 were the only ones that could read the cipher. When messages
6 came in in this cipher the regular communications watch
7 officers had to send it down to the special watch to be
8 translated. They never saw it.

9 Mr. Masten: If you look at pages 11 and 15 of the
10 same Exhibit 37, those are two messages also in July, the
11 first one on the 19th of July, the second on the 20th,
12 from COM-16, which was the Naval District in the Philippines,
13 was it not?

14 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Masten: To Washington. And those also referred
16 specifically to intercepts, Japanese intercepts in the
17 purple code, do they not?

18 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Masten: So that these are representative of
20 messages that were exchanged during July between Washington
21 and Manila in the purple code, messages exchanged containing
22 information derived from the purple code?

23 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. I had nothing to do with
24 the preparation of this document. I am accepting them as
25 they stand.

1 Witness Masten

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 Mr. Masten: We understand.

3 Admiral Noyes: I can't remember now whether those
4 are all the messages. There are no originals there. There
5 is nothing I have to go by.

6 Mr. Masten: Were there any messages comparable to
7 these on pages 6 through 10 which were sent after July and
8 prior to December 1, 1941 and which referred specifically
9 or quoted from Japanese diplomatic intercepts. There
10 are none in this Exhibit 37 but I am asking whether you
11 recall any others?

12 Admiral Noyes: Let me see.

13 Mr. Masten: It won't be necessary to look through.
14 You will have to accept my assurance that there are none
15 that refer specifically to purple messages in this particular
16 exhibit.

17 But do you now recall any, so if we don't have them
18 here we can get them?

19 Admiral Noyes: No, I do not. I couldn't recall any.

20 Mr. Masten: If you look at pages 40 and 41 of Exhibit
21 37, the first one on page 40 is the message from Washington
22 for action of CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM14 and COM16. This
23 starts off "Highly reliable information has been--".

24 Admiral Noyes: Which one is that?

25 Mr. Masten: On page 40, Exhibit 37.

1 Witness Masten

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

3 Mr. Masten: Starting off "Highly reliable information
 4 has been received that categoric and urgent instructions
 5 were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular
 6 posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington
 7 and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at
 8 once and to burn all other important confidential and secret
 9 documents."

10 That also was based upon purple, information from
 11 purple sources, was it not?

12 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Mr. Masten: Similarly in the case on the next page,
3 page 41, that specifically refers to the number designation
4 of the circular from Tokyo, does it not?

5 Admiral Noyes: It does.

6 Mr. Masten: So that we have a situation where, during
7 July messages were sent in this special code to which you
8 have referred between Washington and Manila for the informa-
9 tion of Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii, which specifically refer-
10 red to Magic and quoted from magic, and no other messages
11 after July were sent until December; is that not correct?
12 Which referred to magic?

13 Admiral Noyes: You are asking me to accept something
14 that I had nothing to do with.

15 Mr. Masten: I am asking whether you recall any during
16 the period from July to December 1st.

17 Admiral Noyes: I have no recollection now of individual
18 messages.

19 Mr. Masten: But it is also true that during that same
20 period, as shown by, for example, the warning message of
21 November 27, messages went out which contained information
22 from magic, and did not specifically refer to the magic
23 source?

24 Admiral Noyes: That is true. I would have very
25 much preferred that that be done. We always preferred that

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Noyes

questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 the message be sent out, like the message you referred
3 to, giving the information, but not stating its source,
4 rather than in these direct quotations.

5 Mr. Masten: Now, were there any rules established in
6 your division or was there any rule set up in the Navy
7 Department which expressly prevented or instructed against
8 the sending of messages after July, referring to magic
9 and the source from which the information came?

10 Admiral Noyes: I know of no specific rule. I would
11 say that -- I think there has been testimony before this
12 committee that we had several words about the fact the
13 Japanese finding out the fact that we were reading their
14 code, or at least one, and we had others where we were
15 afraid that they were finding out that we were reading their
16 codes, which, ofcourse, caused us to be more careful in
17 what we were doing.

18 Mr. Masten: You say there were no specific rules? Was
19 there any policy established in the Navy Department against
20 that?

21 Admiral Noyes: The basic policy was that, as I mentioned
22 before, direct reference to the fact of our being able to
23 read Japanese messages should never be referred to in
24 ordinary Navy traffic.

25 Mr. Masten: Was that a rule or a policy that you

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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1
2 established in your division, or was that established
3 elsewhere in the Navy Department.

4 Admiral Noyes: It is one I inherited when I came to
5 the place.

6 Mr. Masten: So that if messages that were being sent
7 out for the information of those two posts, Manila and
8 Hawaii, if any was to be sent out you would have sent it,
9 including information based upon purple intercepts, you
10 would have sent it if you had been instructed by Admiral
11 Wilkinson or Admiral Turner or Admiral Stark, or Admiral
12 Ingersoll; is that correct?

13 Admiral Noyes: If a message came to me, or if it came
14 to the Communications watch officer, released by proper
15 authority, it might very well have gone. All of the messages
16 in the Navy Department didn't pass through me. I couldn't
17 visa all messages before they went out. It was generally
18 understood that the people involved in this sort of thing
19 what the rules were.

20 Mr. Masten: Well, did all messages that went by radio
21 from Washington to Hawaii or the Philippines go through
22 your office or did the Navy Department use other radio
23 means?

24 Admiral Noyes: Every message that went out from the
25 Navy Department, every official dispatch passed through the

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Navy Department's Communications office, which was one of
3 my activities, but it was a 24-hour day function; they
4 were handling at that time -- I got the data the other day.
5 I think it was 4100 messages a day.

6 Mr. Masten: By Naval Communications means?

7 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Masten: From Washington?

9 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Masten: Now, you say there were other means by
11 which this information could be sent. Are you referring
12 to mail dispatches, or courier dispatches, or what else
13 did you have in mind?

14 Admiral Noyes: Yes, we had a special arrangement with
15 Pan American by which the pilot carried in a locked box,
16 to which he did not have the key, messages for Honolulu.

17 Mr. Masten: How frequently did the messages go by that
18 system?

19 Admiral Noyes: I couldn't say.

20 Mr. Masten: Weekly?

21 Admiral Noyes: That was not necessarily for the purpose
22 of sending these messages. It was a general means of communi-
23 cation. We would not have used ordinary air mail for any
24 of this sort of thing on account of the danger.

25 Mr. Masten: Was this courier system regarded as safer

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 than the special radio codes to which you referred a few
3 minutes ago, in connection with these other messages that
4 went from Washington?

5 Admiral Noyes: No, sir.

6 Mr. Masten: Did you consider there was less likelihood
7 of the knowledge leaking out that we were breaking the Japanese
8 code?

9 Admiral Noyes: Of course, we would have put anything
10 we sent by the courier into a Navy cipher before we sent
11 it so that we wouldn't have been much worse off if we had
12 lost them than if it had been intercepted on the air.

13 Mr. Masten: And if anything went by this Naval courier
14 which involved magic, you would have presumably used this
15 special cipher which you referred to a few minutes ago?

16 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. One of the greatest dangers
17 of the communications business on the security side of it,
18 we were responsible for both things. We had to protect our
19 own codes and ciphers, and we were endeavoring to break the
20 enemy codes and ciphers, and we had certain rules that we
21 went by. We knew what we could do, and we avoided giving
22 them the same opening. A large amount of traffic is one
23 of the worst things that can be done, one of the worst offenses
24 that can be committed against the security of any means of
25 communication.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Mr. Masten: At page 11,157 of our transcript appears
3 this message which I will ask you to look at. It is dated
4 December 1, and it is an additional message conveying purple
5 information from Washington to the Philippines for the inform-
6 ation of Admiral Kimmel.

7 Down at the bottom of the message there is a certifica-
8 tion that that is a true copy of an encrypted message in
9 the files of the Navy Department. I would like to ask you
10 this:

11 Was it customary when a message was sent from Washington
12 to Manila which contained purple information, or information
13 derived from Japanese purple messages, was it customary
14 to leave in the files of the Navy Department the outgoing
15 message only in the Navy code, or were copies of the message
16 left in other files of your division?

17 In other words, I am interested in finding this: Would
18 we be able to find other messages which went from Washington
19 to the Philippines by making a further search through the
20 encrypted messages in the files of the Navy Department, or
21 was it the practice also to leave the translated versions in
22 some of the files of your division?

23 Admiral Noyes: I couldn't say what the details of the
24 filing were, I couldn't say at this date what the details
25 of the filing system were then. I notice this is not the

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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1 original of the message, but has been translated by some-
2 one from the coded copy, so I don't know who originated
3 it.
4

5 Mr. Masten: You know of no practice whereby when a
6 message containing purple was sent from Washington, the only
7 file copy of that was kept in the Navy code as a matter
8 of precaution?

9 Admiral Noyes: Anything that referred to the purple
10 code should not have appeared in the ordinary Navy filing
11 system. It should have gone in a special channel which
12 was kept entirely separate from this sort of stuff.

13 Mr. Masten: Yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: What do you mean by "this sort of
15 stuff"?

16 Admiral Noyes: It is an ordinary Naval dispatch which
17 went in, it is a secret dispatch that went in a Navy cipher.

18 Mr. Masten: Now, I have here, Admiral, a message
19 dated March 25, 1941 from Opnav to Com 16 for the informa-
20 tion of Cincaf, and Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, which reads
21 as follows:

22 "FOLLOWING PLAN OF COORDINATION BETWEEN ASIATIC COM-
23 MUNICATION INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF ARMY AND NAVY PROPOSED X
24 ARMY INTERCEPT UNIT FURNISH NAVY DECRYPTING UNIT COPIES OF
25 ALL INTERCEPTS IN ORANGE DIPLOMATIC SYSTEMS FORWARDING SAME

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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1
2 BY LAND WIRE OR OTHER RAPID AND SECURE MEANS X COM 16 FURNISH
3 COMMANDING GENERAL PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT TRANSLATIONS OF
4 ABOVE MESSAGES --"

5 There are some words stricken out here. Do you know
6 what they are?

7 These two words?

8 Admiral Noyes: The original draft said "of interest
9 to the Army," and it is corrected to say, "the translations
10 of above messages be delivered."

11 Mr. Masten: Will you continue and read the balance of
12 the message?

13 Admiral Noyes (reading):

14 "DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT LOCALLY X FOREGOING IS
15 ADDITIONAL TO FORWARDING OF INTERCEPTS TO WASHINGTON BY
16 BOTH SERVICES X DELIVER COMMANDING GENERAL EXACT TRANSLATION
17 THIS MESSAGE."

18 Mr. Masten: Now, would you also read into the record,
19 Admiral, this second message of the same date.

20 Admiral Noyes: It is addressed from the Chief of
21 Naval Operations to the Chief of Staff, Commanding General
22 of the Philippine Department and Commandant 16th Naval
23 District:

24 "CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
25 AUTHORIZE COMMANDING GENERAL PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT AND

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 COMMANDANT 16 NAVAL DISTRICT TO CONFER ON SUBJECT MATTER OF
3 OPNAV 281500."

4 Mr. Masten: Will you explain the purpose of the
5 arrangement that is set up there which applies only, as I
6 understand it, to the Philippines and to the Com 16 situa-
7 tion?

8 Admiral Noyes: Originally, the Army and Navy had
9 worked independently in regard to magic. The Army had
10 their intercept stations and the Navy had theirs, and we
11 each had a unit which was only for the purpose of training
12 cryptographers, cryptanalysts.

13 Early in 1941, General Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer
14 of the Army, who was my opposite number in the War Depart-
15 ment, and I, had a conference in regard to avoiding dupli-
16 cation and pooling our interests in this matter.

17 At about this time we had been able to send a machine
18 to Cavite and this arrangement was set up in order to cut
19 down the amount of transmission to Washington and speed up
20 the entire operation.

21 Mr. Masten: So this was, in effect an arrangement to
22 keep the Army and the Navy in the Philippines informed as
23 to what each was doing in regard to the interception and
24 decryption of Japanese diplomatic messages; is that correct?

25 Admiral Noyes: As far as the diplomatic traffic was

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 concerned, the object was to improve the system of getting
3 the diplomatic information to Washington rather than for
4 the local value. They were given the benefit of it by
5 giving them the authority to exchange locally. They were
6 able to cut out the transmission back and forth, or at
7 least back from Washington, of matters that were of
8 interest to them.

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Mr. Masten: Now, this proposal and this method origin-
3 ated in your division, or was this a suggestion which origin-
4 ated elsewhere in the Navy Department and which you simply
5 passed on as the man who was charged with communicating mes-
6 sages to the Philippines?

7 Admiral Noyes: Well, on our level there were four of us
8 involved: The G-2 in the Army, the Chief Signal Officer of
9 the Army, Director of Naval Intelligence and I. We four
10 agreed on this plan as an improvement over the independent
11 work we had been doing.

12 Mr. Masten: Now, was any similar plan to this set up
13 with respect to Hawaii that you recall?

14 Admiral Noyes: This plan could not have worked for
15 Hawaii because there was no machine available for Hawaii and
16 as I learned from listening to Commander Rochefort's testi-
17 mony they could not read another code, which was necessary.

18 Mr. Masten: But if there were advantages in making the
19 information available in the Philippines with regard to the
20 purple traffic might there not have been similar advantages
21 in Hawaii in arranging for exchange of information in con-
22 nection with the messages that were being intercepted and
23 handled and decrypted by the Army and the Navy in Hawaii?

24 Admiral Noyes: In the first place, we did not have an-
25 other machine.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Commander Rochefort said they could have translated. They
3 might have.

4 Mr. Masten: That was in this code PAK-2, about which he
5 testified this morning.

6 Admiral Noyes: I would like to add to one thing Commander-
7 Rochefort said, which I am sure he would approve. You did not
8 allow him to finish when he was describing the ciphers. He
9 described a pure cipher to you and then something came up and
10 he did not go on.

11 I am sure he intended to add that we also speak of a ci-
12 pher where there is a code book there. A key is applied to
13 the code words or groups of figures in that book and the key
14 must be found out before you can get down to looking things
15 up in a book. I am sure he would have said that if he had
16 not been interrupted, and one of the big troubles was to re-
17 cover the keys day by day and that would require a certain
18 amount of traffic before that could be done. It is very seldom
19 that an individual message in anything can be translated. It
20 requires generally a large number.

21 Mr. Masten: Now, turning to the handling of magic in
22 the Navy Department. We have been discussing the exchange of
23 information and the method back and forth between Washington
24 and the Philippines and Hawaii. Turning now to the question
25 of how the magic was handled in the Navy Department, the tes-

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 timony shows that in the customary procedure a decrypted pur-
3 ple message would be taken to Captain Kramer's unit for trans-
4 lation and preparation of smooth copies for dissemination
5 among those in the Navy Department who were entitled to re-
6 ceive them.

7 When was it customary for you to see the magic messages?
8 That is, did Captain Kramer bring them to you before his dis-
9 semination or did you just learn of them afterwards, or what
10 was the practice in that regard?

11 Admiral Noyes: Maybe this is repetition but to make it
12 quite clear, Captain Kramer was primarily a sub ordinate of
13 the Director of Naval Intelligence and his primary duty was
14 to act for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the distri-
15 bution of the messages when they had been finished, when they
16 were in readable form. He had an additional duty somewhat in
17 getting them into readable form, the idea being to have one
18 officer who carried right through horizontally through our two
19 divisions.

20 Originally, - that is when I say originally, - when I
21 first came to the division in 1939 as Director of Naval In-
22 telligence, there was only one copy made of any distributed
23 messages. They were about three weeks old before we got any
24 of them and the Director of Naval Intelligence took the book
25 and carried it himself to the few persons that saw them.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Mr. Masten: Well, now, would he show t hat book to you
3 before starting out on his distribution, or at what point
4 did you come into the picture, if I may interrupt you?

5 Admiral Noyes: I was going to put that in.

6 Mr. Masten: All right, sir.

7 Admiral Noyes: That was the original plan and, there-
8 fore, the book was brought to me to O.K. before it went to
9 him. I saw the book before he got it.

10 Mr. Masten: And that practice continued, to have the
11 one book,-after the one book method was abandoned was abandoned
12 and the several folders were prepared?

13 Admiral Noyes: No, it did not. One of our first ef-
14 forst after September 1939 was to concentrate on speeding up
15 the recovery of these intercepted messages and between 1939
16 and December 1941 we got them down to where we were getting
17 some messages in hours or a day or two days, and the volume
18 had greatly increased. That is one of the points that I wish
19 to change in my testimony. I said that after Pearl Harbor
20 we changed to separate books. I am convinced from the testi-
21 mony of Kramer, who delivered the books, and others that the
22 change had already been made.

23 Mr. Masten: That is the testimony which you gave before
24 the Navy Court.

25 Admiral Noyes: The change had been made and I think it

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 was made between October and November, when I was on temporary
3 duty and absent and that is the reason I did not remember the
4 change.

5 Mr. Masten: Well, now, when Captain Kramer brought these
6 messages to you and they were ready for distribution or dis-
7 semination, did you make any deletions from messages that he
8 brought to you or did you pass on and give him to distribute
9 all of the messages that he had translated? In other words,
10 did you exercise any censorship over the messages that were
11 distributed?

12 Admiral Noyes: I exercised no censorship. I scanned the
13 messages for the purpose of seeing that they appeared to be
14 in good -- appeared to be authentic, in the first place.
15 Second, for any indication that the Japanese had broken any of
16 our codes. Several times I found indications that they re-
17 ferred to information, secret naval information, U. S. naval
18 information. I always ran those cases down and every time it
19 developed that they got the information somewhere else rather
20 than by breaking one of our codes.

21 I also criticized my subordinates, required an explana-
22 tion in regard to delays in messages. There was usually no
23 criticism involved but I asked for an explanation as to why
24 we had not gotten things sooner. Generally it was because
25 we could not read it.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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Mr. Masten: So that your participation in the dissemination of the magic was simply the participation of one who was charged with the responsibility for getting it out to those others? In other words, you made no attempt to evaluate the messages or censor them in anyway. Everything went out that your people decrypted and translated, is that correct?

Admiral Noyes: There is only one other point that bears on it. There was an understanding between the Director of Naval Intelligence and myself that if at any time the other was involved when an important, - when something important came up, that the other would act for him because we were closer than anyone else to it. We both understood each other's duties and if, for example, some important message had come up and the Director of Naval Intelligence was involved, instead of going to his subordinate, Kramer would have come direct to me and I would have taken it up immediately to the Chief of Naval Operations. However, that had no bearing on this particular period because at that time it had been decentralized among the several bureaus and the Chief of Naval Communications went direct to him and at the same time the Director of Naval Intelligence went to him direct.

Mr. Masten: Now, you mentioned a few minutes ago the question of delays in translations. What specific steps do you recall that were taken prior to December 7th which were directed

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 toward speeding up the decryptations and translations or increas-
3 ing your staff to that end?

4 Admiral Noyes: The first thing we did was to -- we con-
5 ferred on this matter in September 1939. As I say, it was tak-
6 ing us about three weeks to get anything out, - and made an
7 analysis, an office analysis. Our bottleneck really was the
8 translators, so we made every effort to acquire more trans-
9 lators but they were very difficult to find because in addi-
10 tion to being reasonable Japanese students it was necessary
11 to have them of unquestioned loyalty to the United States and
12 we could not afford to take a chance on anyone whose record
13 was not entirely clear.

14 We found that with the competition of the Army and the
15 State Department and some other government departments the
16 supply of Japanese translators in the United States was very
17 small.

18 Mr. Masten: By December 7th do you recall how many
19 translators you had in your division?

20 Admiral Noyes: I heard Captain Kramer say the other day
21 six. I do not know of my own knowledge that that is correct.

22 Mr. Masten: Did that represent an increase during the
23 immediately preceding period?

24 Admiral Noyes: Yes.

25 Mr. Masten: In how many you had had on January 1st, 1941?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 Admiral Noyes: Well, I don't think we had found more
3 than a couple. I should say we probably added two in the
4 whole period.

5 Mr. Masten: Now I would like to turn to this question of
6 the winds message, Admiral Noyes. I would like to have you
7 look at page 154 of exhibit 1, 154 and 155, which contain
8 the messages establishing the winds code. You were familiar
9 with those, were you not, at the time they were intercepted
10 and translated?

11 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Masten: Now, following the receipt of those two mes-
13 sages what steps were taken in your division to make sure that
14 an implementing message if it was sent would be picked up?

15 Admiral Noyes: At my direction Captain Safford made cer-
16 tain assignments of frequencies to be covered by our intercept-
17 ing stations, the same was done by the Army and through the
18 Army by FCC, in order to intercept any message which might
19 include this winds code.

20 Mr. Masten: Do you recall whether there were any written
21 orders issued in that respect?

22 Admiral Noyes: I do not.

23 Mr. Masten: Probably it was done orally?

24 Admiral Noyes: I think so. Everything about the enemy
25 intercepts was kept out of writing as much as possible.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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That is one reason it is difficult to find records.

Mr. Masten: Do you recall the question of these cards that Captain Kramer was instructed to prepare, on which were to be written the English translation of the code words and what they would mean?

Admiral Noyes: I do not.

Mr. Masten: You mentioned it a few minutes ago, earlier in your testimony.

Admiral Noyes: I testified previously I did not recall them, the reason I should think being that as I understood the question I was asked if we had cards in the office and I could not see any reason why we should have done that.

Captain Safford explained to me this summer that we had these cards so that we could telephone to people at home and just mention "weather". Of course, we never used the telephone for anything which had to do with intercepted messages and by having the cards with the English expression "East wind, rain", we could call up Admiral Stark and say that a message had come in -- we had a weather report of "rain with an east wind" and he would have understood what it meant.

Mr. Masten: So that this card system was a rather code in the Navy Department to enable you to discuss this matter over the telephone, was that the original purpose of it?

Admiral Noyes: It was a code to enable the watch officer

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 in the Navy Department or me to talk over the telephone, - to
3 transmit that information at night or at odd hours to leading
4 people at home.

5 Mr. Masten: If the information for which the Department
6 was looking had come in during the daytime or at a time when
7 you were at your office, there would have been no occasion to
8 use these cards; it would have simply come direct to you?

9 Admiral Noyes: That is correct.

10 Mr. Masten: Did you issue any instructions that any
11 winds execute message if received should be brought directly
12 to you?

13 Admiral Noyes: Reasonably direct. There was no reason
14 that it should not pass through Captain Safford. It did not
15 need to pass through anybody else because the watch officers
16 understood it and it was just a case of an expression ap pear-
17 ing and it did not require any translation. I knew the words,
18 I knew the Japanese words. The English meaning did not make
19 any difference to us.

20 Mr. Masten: You say it was just a case of an expression
21 appearing. Wasn't it also necessary to see the entire con-
22 text of the message in which the words appeared?

23 Admiral Noyes: That is true. It had to appear in a cer-
24 tain way. It had to appear, this one to which you refer--

25 Mr. Masten: Page 154.

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

1
2 Admiral Noyes: It had to be repeated twice in the middle
3 of a short wave broadcast.

4 "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end
5 as a weather broadcast and each sentence will be repeated
6 twice. When this is heard please destroy all code
7 papers," and so forth.

8 At the beginning it said:

9 "The following warning will be added in the middle
10 of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast,"
11 which is the same thing that you will hear over "WINX
12 hourly in this city.

13 Mr. Masten: Well, the code established by the message on
14 page 154, which is circular 2353, did you expect that that
15 would come in in voice or in Morse?

16 Admiral Noyes: In voice. In voice because that is what
17 the message said:

18 "The daily Japanese language short wave news broad-
19 oast."

20 As I say, a good example of that is given in WINX on an
21 hourly broadcast by voice which people would listen to. The
22 other message, - do you know what page the other one is on?

23 Mr. Masten: The next following, on page 155.

24 Admiral Noyes: Oh, yes. In that they only use the
25 first words, the words that mean "East, North and West",

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 were at the end of the general intelligence broadcast and I
3 believe those could have come in the Morse broadcast, which
4 is the dot-dash. You can hear it on the same receiver, but we
5 knew in general what the schedule was.

6 Mr. Masten: Now, while it is perfectly true that under
7 circular 2353 it was to be in a short wave news broadcast,
8 was there not a possibility that that short wave news broad-
9 cast might be sent out from Tokyo in the Morse code?

10 Admiral Noyes: I don't see how. You can only have a
11 broadcast when people know when it is coming, just the same,
12 to use the analogy here, you have to listen all day long if
13 you did not know when the news was being sent. Now, if you
14 say that you are going to put something in a news broadcast
15 on a certain schedule and then you send it at some other time,
16 then you certainly cannot depend on anybody hearing it who is
17 familiar with the schedule.

18 Mr. Masten: So that as far as your opinion at the time
19 is concerned you wish the committee to understand that you
20 expected any implementing message under 2353 to be a voice
21 broadcast?

22 Admiral Noyes: I did and, furthermore, I expected it to
23 be a voice broadcast in accordance with this.

24 Mr. Masten: With the other conditions.

25 Admiral Noyes: "Daily Japanese language short wave news

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 broadcast." If they changed their short wave news broadcast
3 to a Morse transmission that would have changed the code
4 along with it, but at the time it was being sent by voice.
5 The guiding point was what they said, that it would appear in
6 the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news
7 broadcast and the Japanese are most meticulous in carrying
8 out their own instructions.

9 Mr. Masten: Now, under this arrangement that you set up
10 would it have been necessary for a winds execute message if
11 received to have passed through Captain Kramer's hands?

12 Admiral Noyes: No.

13 Mr. Masten: It would have been brought directly to you
14 or to Captain Safford and then to you?

15 Admiral Noyes: I should think so. There is no reason
16 that Captain Kramer should not have been consulted, but if a
17 correct message had ever come in nobody would have needed to
18 be consulted. If there had not been a question about it I
19 could have told just by being shown it.

20 Mr. Masten: Now, under the system which was set up who
21 was to be the final judge of whether or not a message was a
22 genuine winds execute message under either of these two circu-
23 lars that we have mentioned?

24 Admiral Noyes: Well, I was the Director of Naval Communi-
25 cations. I was supposed to be the deciding factor over my

Witness Noyes

Questions by Mr. Masten

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2 instructions and that here it should be in the middle of the
3 news, so that somebody would not say that it was too far
4 and miss it, - "but today, at this point specially I will give
5 the weather forecast: West Wind, clear --WEST Wind, Clear."

6 The other station did the same thing in almost the same
7 words, just changed the point of the wording, of the word
8 "specially." Now, I would say that assuming that that was
9 repeated again at the end, that that was an authentic broad-
10 cast in this cipher, in this code.

11 Mr. Masten: Now, this document that you are looking at
12 is the one which is described as true copy of two weather
13 messages intercepted by Federal Communication Commission moni-
14 tors from Tokyo stations between 0002 and 0035 GMT December
15 8, 1941 and telephoned to Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Dusenbury,
16 U.S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's
17 office at approximately 8 P.M. Eastern Standard Time December
18 7, 1941.

19 I am reading from the certification of Mr. Slowie on
20 Number 3 of this exhibit.

21 Now, before we discuss anything further I would like to
22 ask you this.

23 Did at any time prior to December 7, 1941 did anybody
24 bring to you or call your attention to a message which they
25 said was or appeared to be a genuine winds execute message and

Witness Noyes

Questions by Mr. Masten

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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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subordinates if there was any question.

Mr. Masten: And in deciding whether or not an alleged winds execute message was genuine would you have taken into account these various points you have mentioned that appear from circular 2353, is that correct?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir. That is what I did do.

Mr. Masten: Now, did anybody --

Admiral Noyes: If you do not mind, if you will refer to that FCC, it is on page --

Mr. Masten: It is item 3, right at the top, in the right hand corner.

Admiral Noyes: That is what I expected to come as an executed winds message, assuming that it is repeated at the end.

Mr. Masten: You are referring now to item 3-D of exhibit No. 442?

Admiral Noyes: Item No. 3-d, document No. 4.

Mr. Masten: Document No. 4, yes.

Admiral Noyes: Sent as in the right hand column, which is in Japanese, expressed in "Kana".

Mr. Masten: With the phrase repeated twice?

Admiral Noyes: The English translation is, "This is in the middle of the news." He went out of his way to state that it was in the middle of the news, to comply with those

Witness Noyes

Questions by Mr. Masten

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24 bring to you or call your attention to a message which they
25 said was or appeared to be a genuine winds execute message and

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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2 after consideration by you was so regarded? In other words,
3 did you see prior to December 7, 1941 a genuine winds execute
4 message under either of these two circulars, 2353 and 2354?

5 Admiral Noyes: You asked me about two things. You
6 asked did I receive a false one and did I receive a correct
7 one.

8 Mr. Masten: Let us confine it just to the latter part.
9 Did you receive a genuine one?

10 Admiral Noyes: I did see messages that were brought to
11 me because they were supposed to be but I never saw one which
12 checked out as being an authentic message.

13 The Chairman: It is now 12:30. We will recess
14 until 1:30. Admiral, be back at that time.

15 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

16 (Whereupon, at 12:30 P.M. a recess was taken
17 until 1:30 P.M. of the same day.)
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Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will be in order, please.

Counsel may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL LEIGH NOYES

(Resumed)

Mr. Masten: Admiral, just before the recess I asked you whether prior to December 7 any genuine winds execute message was brought to you or to your attention by anyone in the Navy Department.

Admiral Noyes: There was not.

Mr. Masten: Your answer to that question is there was not?

Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

Mr. Masten: If there had been would that have been a matter of importance so that you would now remember it?

Admiral Noyes: Up to December 3 it would have been a matter of importance. On December 3 we received an intercepted message, which is in the exhibit --

Mr. Masten: Exhibit 1.

Admiral Noyes: Yes, which informed us that the Japanese were destroying their codes. Sent out on December 2, No. 867.

Mr. Masten: Will you identify the page, Admiral?

Admiral Noyes: Page 215. I think that is the one.

Mr. Masten: That is message No. 867?

Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

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3 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Masten: And what effect did that have on how
5 you regarded the question of intercepting a winds execute
6 message?

7 Admiral Noyes: We sent that message out to all people
8 concerned and thereafter there was no particular importance
9 to an execute of the winds message except in a cumulative way.

10 Mr. Masten: So that you regarded the sending from
11 Tokyo of the instructions to burn the codes of the Japanese
12 representatives as for all practical purposes nullifying
13 the importance of the search for a winds execute message;
14 is that what the committee is to understand?

15 Admiral Noyes: No, I don't think that that way, I am
16 quite sure from what I heard testified to, for instance,
17 in Honolulu, I don't think the orders were immediately
18 countermanded, I don't think they would have been, because
19 this coverage was, at any time something else might have
20 come up, and we had a system which covered pretty well
21 Japanese transmissions.

22 Mr. Masten: But the receipt of this message instructing
23 the Japanese representatives to burn their codes did lessen
24 the importance in your mind at any rate of the intercept
25 of a winds execute message?

Admiral Noyes: Of this particular East Wind Rain message,

1 Witness Noyes

Questions by: Mr. Masten

2 yes.

3 Mr. Keefe: What message are you referring to, East
4 Wind Rain? Are you referring to that code set-up when you
5 make that statement?

6 Admiral Noyes: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: You are not referring to the message that
8 is alleged to have been delivered by Captain Safford?

9 Admiral Noyes: That is what is alleged to have been
10 delivered to me.

11 Mr. Keefe: Well, I want to know whether that answer
12 relates to the message which Safford delivered. We haven't
13 gotten to the point where it is shown one was delivered.

14 Mr. Masten: We haven't come to that.

15 Mr. Murphy: Well, now, counsel is doing a good job.

16 Mr. Keefe: I am not critical of counsel.

17 The Chairman: He will do a better one if he is not
18 interrupted.

19 Mr. Masten: Admiral, the question was whether or not
20 after December 3 and the receipt of this message from Tokyo
21 instructing the Japanese representatives to burn their
22 codes you regarded the interception of a winds execute
23 message of as great importance as you had before you received
24 the message regarding the code burning, and I take it your
25 answer to that is that it was not of as great importance