


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THE ROMAN THEOCRACY
AND THE REPUBLIC



The Roman Theocracy
and
The Republic

1846-1849

BY

R. M. JOHNSTON

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“If any man will consider the original of this great ecclesiastical dominion, he will easily perceive that the Papacy is none other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.”

In any endeavour to relate some part of the history of modern Rome, be the period chosen long or short, remote or recent, it is impossible to present to the reader an even approximately correct impression, unless the exceptional position of the Eternal City and of the Papacy, in their connection with the early period of European civilization, be considered. This “ghost of the deceased Roman Empire,” as Hobbes eloquently describes it, must be made to assume some definite form, it must be perceived in some sort of correlation with the particular problem considered.

The task is not easy ; for its accomplishment leads from the narrower paths of History to a broader plane, in which the imagination, the instincts, the irresistible and often enough illogical sentiments of men play a more important part and delude those whom they sway, equally with those who would judge them, into error. Yet for who would understand something of the deeply-acting influences that helped to bring into being the ephemeral government of the Roman Republic of 1849, it is necessary that very remote, as well as immediate antecedents should be dwelt on.

The end of the Roman Empire cannot be thought of in the same manner as that of other monarchies and dominions whose downfalls have filled the pages of History. It was not with the Empire of the Cæsars as it was with Persia, or Assyria, or Venice, or Poland, or Egypt ; for the Roman world was something more than a State, it was the aggregation of the whole of Mediterranean civilization under one form of government, and about one imperial centre. No invader from the barbarous regions beyond could, at one sweep, conquer or occupy more than a portion of the vast whole that embraced southern and western Europe, northern Africa and western Asia ; nor could even the most savage and brutal of invading kings resist the improved methods of life that met him in the provinces he conquered.

But it was precisely this difference in civilization that had come to essentially constitute the difference between what was Roman and civilized within, and what was hostile and barbarian without. Thus, although profound modifications were brought about by the influx of northern invasion, yet on the whole the conquered absorbed the conquerors, and in its broad features the

outline of the established institutions remained,—centring about Rome, weakened in some respects, strengthened in others, ever exchanging for the novel military and feudal customs of the invaders what managed to survive of the ancient system.

Conquest and modification came piecemeal, hence it is that the date at which the Roman Empire fell can only be fixed arbitrarily ; Gibbon has not inaptly chosen the 29th day of May 1453 ;¹ Mr. Bryce, following a different thread of history, has brought us to the year 1806,² and, if the saying of Hobbes, with which this chapter opened, be adopted and elaborated, both of these dates may be passed, and we may view in the person of the present successor of St. Peter and of Pius IX, the representative of “the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.”³

For if the republican and Napoleonic upheaval that shattered and transformed the kingdoms, the institutions and the politics of Europe, put an end to the theoretical succession of the Germanic Roman Emperors, there was another symbolic force, identified for many centuries with Mediterranean and European civilization, which the greatest of modern conquerors could not destroy,—that of the Papacy. Arising from a creed, contemptuously tolerated at first, persecuted later, then firmly fastening on Rome and the Empire, concentrating at last, in the person of the Popes, all that was left of esteemable or imposing,—all that was left of the tradition and continuity of the mighty civilization of the past, the

¹ Capture of Constantinople by Mahomet II.

² Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*. In 1806 the Emperor Francis II resigned his rights as Holy Roman Emperor, and assumed the style of Francis I, hereditary Emperor of Austria.

³ Pius VII not so unreasonably declared : “If there be a Cæsar it is I !”—E. Olivier, *L'Empire Libéral*, iv. 304.

Papacy possessed a latent strength that the Cæsars of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine had lost. The force of the ecclesiastical sovereigns was largely religious and sentimental, and the traditions of the Church formed an unbroken link with the period that preceded the darkest days of the decadence of the Empire.

Before Alaric and the Goths sacked the city, in the year 410, the bishops of Rome had already begun to assert something of that authority which, in the hands of such rulers as Gregory I, Innocent I, Leo I, and Gregory the Great, was developed into the primacy of the Catholic world. And so, by a remarkable chain of events, it came about that the priestly head of a religion sprung from the thought of Judæa, Arabia, and India, became the last representative of the mighty traditions of empire bound up with the Roman name.

If the position of the Popes be now viewed from a more narrowly political point of view it will be necessary, for the present purpose, to recall briefly some of the most notable incidents of their history.

Without dwelling on a more remote period, and coming at once to the Middle Ages, the conflicts of the two great factions of Guelphs and Ghibellines may be noted as nothing more than the temporary manifestations of the long-continued struggle between North and South, between the Teuton soldier and conqueror and the conquered but struggling Italian.

This great strife of the Middle Ages mostly degenerated into the jealous wars of petty municipalities and ambitious nobles ; its course may, strictly speaking, be limited to the period comprised between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries. The savage Goths and destroying Huns of an earlier age had then become mail-clad Ghibelline men-at-arms, as they were to be

transformed later into the scarcely less savage bayonet and scourge wielding Croat infantry of the nineteenth century. The conflict, though constantly changing in name and appearance, was always essentially the same ; the Papacy was inevitably called to play a great part in it.

The tremendous confluence of a double stream of popular sentiment proceeding from the traditions of the Roman Empire on the one hand, and from the superstitious credulity of the darkest ignorance on the other, appeared to concentrate an overwhelming power in the hands of the Popes ; and to this was added the material opportunity and means of action afforded by the possession of a temporal domain, snatched from the hands of pious or frightened Emperors and Princes, or derived from the testamentary gifts of the faithful. But some inherent vice appeared to render less potent and less beneficent than it should have been, this great concentration of authority and power ; and it is difficult to select any lengthy period during which the Papacy showed vigour in its institutions, its material resources, or its improving influence. It is in fact precisely the reverse that can more truly be said. "The destinies of Italy depend on the Papacy, and are therefore unhappy," said Macchiavelli ; and nothing that has taken place since that great statesman's day has tended to disprove the correctness of his estimate.

Although the prestige and authority of the Court of Rome were so terrible in the distant parts of Europe, the Pope was generally so little revered at home that, at times, his inveterate enemies surrounded the gates of his capital, and controlled the government of the city, while he was more often than not the object of the familiar witticisms, hatred, scorn, and ridicule of his

subjects. The theocratical government of Rome was nearly constantly a feeble misrule of the worst character; and, in the course of the continuous vicissitudes and troubles that followed the eight centuries of uninterrupted prosperity under the Romans, the sentimental ambition of reforming factions led, more than once, to the ostentatious resuscitation of those ancient symbols and forms of government that were associated with the greatness of the past by momentarily successful reformers. In the twelfth century the monk Arnold of Brescia preached the restoration of the magistrates and institutions of the Senate and Roman people, and declaimed against the temporal power: "the Kingdom of Christ," he declared, "is not of this world!" Another restorer of the past, whose transient success was rendered more remarkable and attaching because of the picturesque and romantic circumstances that surrounded it, was Nicola di Rienzi, who came to power in the fourteenth century. Again, as in the case of the monk Arnold, the majestic traditions bound up in the venerable stones of Rome, were turned to use to favour the overthrow of the government of the Catholic chief-priest; it was under the name of Tribune, and theatrically clad in the toga of the Ancients, that Rienzi for a space directed the affairs of the Roman people, with the forced consent of the Pontiff. His active, idealizing mind dreamed the expansion of his Holy Roman Republic, and embraced the whole of the Italian peninsula in an ambitious, though not wholly illogical vision. But Rienzi's plans were shattered, like those of his Brescian predecessor, by his own faults and those of his age,—and he likewise came to a violent end.

In his political imaginings it is curious to note in

Rienzi the precursor of Mazzini, who was, five centuries later, also to be a dictator of a short-lived Roman Republic, who was also to dream of a united Italian democracy,—of Rome, capital of Italy and of the world, and who was likewise to fail, partly owing to the unhappy destiny that opposed to the interests of the Roman people those of the Papacy, and those of the ambitious and jealous statesmen and governments of Europe.

From the days of Dante¹ and of Rienzi, when the germs of thought from which Italian nationality has sprung first found popular expression, the mighty seed of great events lay slowly, imperceptibly, swelling in the rich Italian soil until the end of the eighteenth century. Then the terrific revolutionary stroke dealt by the people of France, burst through the mesh of rottenness in which the southern peninsula was choked, and brought a faint ray of light, of hope, of liberty, of promise. From that moment the germ rapidly expanded: fast through the wars and revolutions of the Napoleonic period,—expressed in a limited sense in the kingly title of the great Conqueror himself, later by King Murat in his last desperate enterprise,² and differently again by the emissary of England, Lord William Bentinck;³ coming at last to the position of a supreme political and military question in the year 1848; and finally, in tentative fashion, resolved in favour of the Italians in 1859.

¹ Dante's share in the formation of Italian nationality might be described as commensurate with his influence in the formation of the Italian language.

² The allusions are to Napoleon's title of King of Italy, and to Murat's appeal to Italian nationality when he opened his campaign against the Austrians in 1815.

³ In a proclamation issued from Leghorn in 1814, inciting the Italians to turn against Napoleon (*British State Papers*, 1814-1815, 316), Lord William Bentinck appealed strongly to their nationalist sentiment, and urged them to fight for what he declared to be their own cause.

Throughout this last period,—it may be conveniently dated from the beginning of the French Revolution,¹—the Papacy exhibited a remarkable contrast of strength and of weakness. Through the greater part of the eighteenth century, a succession of feeble Popes had lost the Catholic Church much ground politically and in public opinion; to a hasty observer the ancient religion of Italy might have appeared to be in a dangerous, if not alarming position. But under the clever and gentle Chiaramonti, Pius VII (1800-1823), the lost ground was rapidly regained. The long struggle between Napoleon and Pius cannot be more than alluded to here, but it may be pointed out as among its most remarkable results that the Pope, prisoner, and shorn of his sovereignty over Rome and the Papal States, appeared a more commanding and dignified figure than had any of his predecessors in the course of several centuries. Something of the most authoritative and revered part of the traditions of the accustomed conduct of human affairs, something of the tremendous latent strength of the then imminent and inevitable reaction, appeared to be concentrated in the delicate figure of the venerable Pontiff, who, although apparently helpless, had yet serenely withstood the ungovernable furies of the conqueror of Europe.

The collapse of the French Empire had resulted, among other things, in the return of the Pope to Rome, and in the re-establishment of the temporal power; but in Italy, as elsewhere, the restoration of the ancient rulers was marked by the retention of some features of the system of administration elaborated by the genius

¹ The death of Maria Theresa in 1780 is, for many reasons, a better date to take, but the one chosen has the advantage of being more suggestive to a wider circle of readers.

of Napoleon from the earlier French forms of Richelieu, Louis XIV, and the First Republic.

Bureaucracy and police government were the order of the day throughout Europe, in some cases resulting in an amelioration of conditions, in others not, but everywhere bringing greater concentration of authority, greater importance to the central seat of administration, greater potentiality, and consequent responsibility, for good and evil to those in power.¹

But before coming to a consideration of those features of Papal government in the nineteenth century that more directly helped to prepare the remarkable events that occurred between the years 1846 and 1849, it will be as well, while yet dealing with the broader aspects of the subject, to shortly consider what is not without its importance,—the character of the people whom Providence had thrown under the rule of the Popes.

It would be easy, and not inconvenient, to collate from the accounts of travellers, philosophers, and historians, a general description of the character of the Italian people, leaving to each authority the responsibility for his particular opinion, and to the reader, that of elaborating his own; but no such plan for escaping from a difficulty will be adopted, and an attempt will be made, however unauthoritative, to formulate an adequate statement on the subject. This must be read with the following limitations: it particularly applies to the Italians of the nineteenth century; it is chiefly framed from a political, and only incidentally from a social point of view.

¹ For the organization of the Papal government on the return of Pius VII, see his decree of July 6th, 1816.—*British State Papers*, 1815-1816, 621.

The modern Italians trace their origin from many sources,¹ and show in their blood a great, though now well-fused diversity of race. From north, south, and east, for ten centuries, the tide of invasion ebbed and flowed; Saracen and Norman, Goth, Greek, and Albanian fought and died, settled and begat children in the land of a greater people decayed by centuries of prosperity. Something of these variously accumulating strata of alien population may be traced even at this day, and a marked difference is to be observed, for instance, between the hard-headed Piedmontese, with their slightly northern characteristics, and the crafty Sicilians who reveal at every turn the impress of the Greeks, the Saracens, and the Orient. Precisely what effect on the race this intermingling may have had, and how far it is possible to trace it, is matter for the ethnographer; but the suggestion will probably not be very far wide of the mark that, in this remarkable fusion, is to be found an important cause of the abnormal cerebral activity of the Italians.

Unfortunately the activity just noted, whatever its causes may be, does not appear to be balanced by a corresponding force and sense of discrimination; adopting Bacon's classification, the Italian intellect would appear to be *discursive*, not *discriminative*. Intellectual concentration and terseness of diction appear to have left Italy with Dante and Macchiavelli; and if the works of her prolix historians, philosophers, and statesmen are as numerous as they are bulky, the canons of criticism by which their excellences have been magnified are perhaps better suited for judging the outpourings of *improvisatori*, than the balanced and

¹ On this question, see some interesting observations by Cantù, *Cronistoria*, ii. 617.

weighty productions of the great Italians of the past. So widely is this national characteristic diffused that even the most ignorant and poor of the peasantry in that generous land of the olive and the grape, are easily swayed by the inspirations of spontaneous declamation, whether oratorical or poetical, and are thereby rapidly exalted to the most sublime heights of passion, or cast down to the most despondent depths of despair.

However much there may be to admire in this Italian facility of intellect, it will be readily perceived that it cannot be without its disadvantages. Subject to irresistible bursts of passion, and to paroxysms of grief and desperation, they are soon at one extreme or the other,—heroes one moment, the next panic-stricken,—a people apt for revolution, and for failure.¹ More than once the Italians have been accused of lacking courage,—as when just before the first French attack on Rome in 1849, Commander, afterwards Admiral Cooper Key of the British Navy, entered in his diary that the Romans were all cowards, and General Oudinot proclaimed bombastically to his troops that, “Italians do not fight!”² Such an opinion is even now prevalent, but must be pronounced hasty and unjustified; for without showing any of that pre-eminent and consistent bravery that has been the distinctive attribute of certain races, the Italians have on many occasions, especially when skilfully led in a cause in which their hearts and understandings were engaged, shown military valour worthy of the highest admiration.³ It was not so much in physical courage

¹ “ . . . Those bursts of passion which inflame the more imaginative multitudes of southern climates, and render them both apt for revolution and incapable of conducting them.”—Hallam, *Constitutional History of England*, ii. 371.

² “Les Italiens ne se battent pas.”

³ On this question of the bravery of the Italians an instructive account may be

that they were deficient, as in the intellectual equilibrium, political confidence, and military leadership and training, that go so far to command victory. Their lack of balance, together with their emotional sensibility, often led to disastrous results, both in the field of war and in that of politics. A strange thing is that their emotions, however violent, never precisely coincided with their convictions, and rarely deceived them. An incident related by Lord Napier, British Minister at Naples, well illustrates the underlying insincerity with which they could be drawn into the most extravagant and ridiculous excesses.

After a popular convulsion, which nearly cost him his throne, Ferdinand II had been compelled to grant his subjects a constitution; on the King's issuing from the royal palace, mounted on horseback, he was immediately surrounded by an excited mob of his lately savagely oppressed and revolting subjects; they kissed his hands, his boots, the trappings of his horse and demonstrated by their cheering and their tears their singular devotion to the monarch. Ferdinand himself joined in the general emotion and wept copiously; thus harmony was for a short space restored between Sovereign and people! ¹

But before hastily passing judgment on a people capable of such scenes, and more than once found wanting at a critical moment, it must not be forgotten

read in Massimo d'Azeglio's *Miei Ricordi*, of the manner in which the peasants of Romagna were accustomed to settle their personal differences. Two adversaries would agree to meet at a stated time in some thick plantation, or piece of undergrowth, armed with knives only; there they would grope their way towards one another until they met and so decide their difference with their weapons.

¹ Lord Napier to Lord Palmerston, January 29th, 1849 (*British Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, lvii. 423). The page number of *British Parliamentary Papers* (Blue Books) will be always given, not as originally published, but according to the consecutive numbering as bound annually.

that they also demonstrated by the numberless victims they offered to despotism, and by such brilliant military feats as the capture of Milan from Radetsky, and the defence of the Vascello against the French, that cowardice is not a term that can be properly applied to the Italian people.

In that portion of the peninsula where the administration had completely passed into the hands of a venal and corrupt Theocracy, the lot of the non-governing classes was perhaps more unhappy than elsewhere.¹ The most wretched and uneducated of the Papal subjects, inhabitants of the Trastevere, or of the flat, desolate and unhealthy Agro Romano beyond the walls, were completely under the spell of the priest, and the grossest superstition tightened the chains of their bondage and debasement. An obscurantist and well-disciplined clergy thought respect and obedience to the Church cheaply purchased at a price that meant ignorance and vice, and even brigandage and crime.² Farther from Rome, on the eastern slope of the Apennines, and among that very small class of the inhabitants of the capital, whom neither social habits, pecuniary interest, official position, nor the prestige and attraction of religion attached to the Papal system,³

¹ It would be a nice point to determine whether the Bourbon regime at Naples, or the Papal at Rome, presented the greater number of bad features.

² An English Consular Report for the year 1837 states that but two per cent of the population of the rural districts received any education whatever. In the towns the percentage was but very little greater.

³ Rome itself was peculiarly situated, and had substantial reasons for being attached to the Papal institutions. For the seat of the Popes was the capital of Catholic Christendom, and the influx of travellers and pilgrims thereby attracted equally increased the prestige of the city, the dignity of the Papal Court, and the revenues of the Romans. Besides the appeal to the sense of local pride and of the profitable, the imagination was struck, and reflection subdued by the ever-recurring religious pageants and sacred exercises and diversions that enlivened the capital of the Popes. The reign of Gregory XVI was declared by one Italian writer to have been one long carnival!

the priesthood wielded a lessened influence. The inhabitants of Romagna, and especially of the turbulent university town of Bologna, were wealthier, more independent, more liberal and more dissatisfied than their fellow-subjects of the western provinces.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the condition of the people of the Pontifical States, during the period that followed the downfall of Napoleon and the restoration of the Popes, was the widespread influence of secret associations. Conspiracy, with the Italians of the first half of the nineteenth century, appears in the light of a national habit; although this curious fact cannot be easily explained there are at least two great contributory causes, the action of which can be indicated with some degree of precision.¹

One of these causes may be described as the demoralizing effect of the all-pervading, and long-continued, methods and manner of thought inculcated by the all-powerful Catholic Church; the other, as the natural reaction produced by the continuous pressure of unintelligent and harsh despotism on a people endowed by nature with exceptionally active and ardent intellects. Imbued with all the wiles of the casuists, half sceptical, but easily influenced, victims of super-

¹ To study the innermost peculiarities of Italian character is beyond the scope of this work; a general outline, and some indications, is all that is possible. The following quotation from Madame de Staël may be not without value when considering the proclivity of Italians for secret methods: "In Italy may be observed a queer admixture of simplicity and corruption, of dissembling and truthfulness, of kindness and revengefulness, of weakness and strength, and always explained by one unvarying observation: that is, that the good qualities proceed from the fact that vanity is never the impelling motive, and the bad from the fact that many things are done to further material interests, whether of money, of love, or of ambition" (*Corinne*, bk. vi. chap. 2). At another place she adds: "Their characters are debased by private hatreds, without finding elevation in a love for their country; assassination has become as familiar as despotism. Fanaticism gives way occasionally to scepticism, but never to reason."

stition, unscrupulous in their methods, unbalanced in their views, the Italians turned their scheming, secretive, vindictive spirits to the congenial and only available outlet offered by the secret societies.

These organizations were numberless, and of all shades of secrecy, of opinion and of morality; among them a few may be selected that will serve to represent some of the wider streams of opinion current in central Italy between 1815 and 1849. Leaving out of account the Jesuits,—who will engage our attention later,—the Sanfedisti and Centurioni may be chosen as representing the fanatical, theocratical party, and the Carbonari and Giovane Italia, the liberal and revolutionary spirit. The internal history of central Italy from the return of Pius VII to Rome¹ to the death of Gregory XVI (June 1st, 1846), is but little more than what can be elucidated of the doings of the two great factions for which these secret associations did battle.

The Carbonari first came into public notice in Naples, and their chief exploits were performed in the southern kingdom, in Piedmont and in Lombardy. In the Papal States, the period of great activity of this society, and of such closely related associations as those of the Guelfi, Adelfi, Bersaglieri Americani, and others, was about the year 1831, and culminated in the revolt of Romagna and the proclamation of a Provisional Government. The rapid collapse of this movement before the troops dispatched by Austria to the assistance of the Pope, following as it did somewhat similar failures in Naples and in the north of Italy ten years before, did much to destroy what remained of the prestige that had once made the name of the Carbonari so powerful, and that had well-nigh identified them with the cause

¹ May 24th, 1814.

of Italian national unity. The liberals of Bologna and Romagna, crushed once more by the superior strength of their oppressors, became more than ever the victims of the despotic and ignorant Theocracy of Rome, the objects of the contumely and revenge of the sectaries of Holy Church.

There were numerous willing agents ready to hand, in addition to the military, the police, and the helpful Austrians, to carry out the work of repression. For the Church, no less than her opponents, understood the delicate and subtle arts of secret conspiracy. Her partisans were mustered into the army of the Holy Faith, an institution whose sacred-sounding name ill accorded with the many deeds of horror committed by its members. Its numbers had been large since the days when Cardinal Ruffo's Sanfedists had deluged the streets of unhappy Naples with the blood of the defeated and betrayed republicans.¹

¹ The society of the Sanfedists was a loose and ancient organization, known in later times as the Catholic Apostolic Society, and specifically directed, according to one of its edicts, against the "infame cambricola dei liberali." It is said to have been of mediæval origin, one authority giving as its founder Cardinal Beltramo in the reign of Honorius III at the time of the destruction of the Albigenses.—Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 455.

The Sanfedist Society threw off many kindred, but smaller, better organized, and more easily handled associations, of which one or two deserve special mention. The Calderari (Braziers), founded by Canosa, the infamous Minister of Police of Ferdinand I of Naples: they were intended to counterbalance and destroy the Carbonari, and were specially armed by the Minister's order for that purpose. The Consistorii: a society whose members were fewer in number and included many persons of rank; its doings remain very obscure; although Sanfedist in general character, it was curiously enough anti-Austrian. Ferdinand IV of Modena was closely connected with it, and attempted to turn it to use at the time of his intrigues with the Carbonari to further his ambitious designs against the succession of Charles Albert, Prince of Carignano, to the throne of Sardinia. The Pacifici: about whom little is known, and whose chief period of activity was between 1815 and 1820; this society was entirely priest led, and was the direct precursor of the more powerful Centurioni. The Ferdinandi: organized by Canosa, with headquarters at Rimini; this was an offshoot of the Consistorii conspiracy, and was particularly active against the liberals through the troubles of Romagna.

During the fifteen years of the reign of Gregory XVI, Sanfedism in the Papal States became nearly entirely merged in the famous society of the Centurioni. Cardinal Bernetti, this Pope's first State Secretary, seized the moment of reaction after the failure of the revolutionary movement of 1831 in Romagna, to found this organization. It was destined to play a prominent part in the troubles of the next twenty years. The ordinary grade of membership was readily filled by the clergy from among the lowest classes of the peasantry,¹ who, in return for their support of the Church, were protected in disorders and criminal license. In the Trastevere Sanfedism found its most ardent supporters,² and the Transtevereni occupied a position in the Papal capital in some respects not unlike that of their cousins the Lazzaroni at Naples.

The chief object of the Centurioni was the destruction, by every means possible, of the known supporters of liberalism. Orsini describes them as a sort of rude militia, and says that, "if a citizen was unfortunate enough to allow his beard to grow, or if he failed in attending mass, he was immediately set down as a liberal, and as such was exposed to all the fury of the Centurions. Not a day passed but some one was killed or ill-treated by these irregulars. Sometimes, however, the liberals, driven to desperation, took their revenge, which increased the insolence and barbarity of the Centurions."³

Their organization was semi-military, in decurions and centuries, and the leadership was largely, if not exclusively, in the hands of priests. Under cloak of this Catholic Apostolic Society, as it was officially

¹ D'Azeglio, *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna*.

² Gualterio, *Ultimi rivolgimenti*, iii. 104.

³ Orsini, *Memoirs*, 6.

known, secret revenge, private lusts, the vendetta, and assassination flourished, while by means of the denunciations and assistance of devout and faithful subjects, the Pope's governors rapidly filled the dungeons of Civita Castellana, the Castle of St. Angelo, and the other Papal fortresses with liberal and other prisoners.

The Sanfedist reign of terror, the Austrian military occupation, and the wholesale imprisonments and executions that followed the revolt of 1831, had alarmed the Powers of Europe. It was generally felt that under such gross misgovernment as existed in the Papal States, a general conflagration of Italy might at any moment be kindled that might necessitate further military measures on the part of Austria or France, and might even lead to a great European war. Diplomacy set to work, and without great difficulty, it was agreed to make urgent representations to the Pope in favour of better government. On May 21st, 1831, a Memorandum was presented to Cardinal Bernetti, embodying the unanimous recommendations of England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. This Note of the Great Powers was a short document, divided into four paragraphs, the effect of which may be shortly given as follows¹ :—

1. It was recommended, for the good of the Pope and

¹ The Memorandum of the Powers was professedly dictated by purely humane and disinterested considerations. Between the lines, however, may be read the veiled antagonism and unavowed aspirations of Austria and France. The first of these Powers was not bent on a policy of expansion, although had a favourable opportunity offered, she would probably have been quite ready to extend her influence over the Papal States. France, strong once more after her reverses under Napoleon, viewed Europe generally and Austria in particular with a jealous dislike arising from her position under treaties that had imposed the loss of much territory. Many of her statesmen and writers vaguely dreamed of a regained natural frontier on the Rhine and the Alps. Her antagonism to Austria was already marked out, and appeared destined to be sooner or later decided in the plains of northern Italy.

The Memorandum is given in full in Appendix B.

the general advantage of Europe, that administrative reforms should be initiated, and safeguarded by an internal guarantee.

2. An organic decree was advised, extending not only to the lately revolted provinces, but to the whole State, of which the fundamental principle should be the opening of all functions to laymen.

3. The reforms specifically suggested comprised matters judicial, and the establishment of provincial and municipal Councils representative of the taxpayers.

4. Financial stability was insisted on as essential to the welfare of the State, and the formation of an audit office was recommended ; while a Council of State, in which all other bodies might find representation, was also urged.

That it should have been necessary to address a Memorandum containing such recommendations as these to a European Power in the middle of the nineteenth century may appear remarkable. It pointed out, however, but the bare minimum of what was urgently required to place the government of the Pontifical States on anything even remotely resembling a basis of decent administration.

The condition of the States of the Church during the miserable reign of that incapable Pontiff Gregory XVI, must now be considered. It will be convenient to divide the subject, and to group it under the following four principal heads : 1. Justice ; 2. Finance ; 3. Administration ; 4. Clerical Authority.

1. On the re-establishment of Pius VII on his throne in 1814, practically the whole of the judicial reforms introduced during the French occupation were swept away, with the exception of the Commercial Code. Their place was taken by the pre-existing shapeless mass

of legal forms accumulated through many centuries of clerical rule. There were no less than fifteen separate jurisdictions or tribunals, in addition to private baronial and ecclesiastical courts in Rome; and in some of them, such as the *Segnatura* and the more celebrated *Rota*, no set debate was permitted, nor were the decisions guided by any better ascertained authority than that of the conscience of the *Monsignori* who sat in judgment, and of the patched-up conclusions presented to them by their barely-paid subordinates. In many of these courts, Latin was the only language used, and to further complicate and delay finality of decision, above them all Canon Law and the Papal authority reigned supreme. Young *Monsignori*, with badly-paid assessors, administered such justice as ambition, prejudice, or pecuniary interest prompted. Away from Rome, provincial governors ruled with Oriental supremacy and conveniently dictated not only the decisions, but even, at times, the very laws of the local dispensaries of justice.¹ The terrors of the more regular legislation were not light, and its application entailed sufficient severity without the added ruthlessness arising from despotic interpretation; for among its ordinary provisions it was punishable by death to belong to any secret association, while such was the Theocracy's abject fear of enlightenment that the police were given strict instructions to keep diligent watch over persons belonging to the dangerous class known as "thinkers"! As a specimen of the vexatious and arbitrary edicts issued by provincial governors, one that

¹ The governors of small towns and country districts were paid the miserable pittance of from 300 to 600 scudi a year. (The Roman scudo may be taken at the very near approximate value of one American dollar.) They acted as chief police authority, and as judges in matters criminal, with a power of inflicting sentences up to ten years in the galleys.—Farini, *Lo Stato Romano*, i. 149.

is ascribed to the initiative of the detested Cardinal Rivarola may be quoted. In the year 1824, when Legate of Bologna, he proclaimed it to be unlawful for any inhabitant of that city to pass through the streets at night without carrying a lantern! ¹

If such were the judges, and such the laws, it may readily be believed that the administrative and financial departments of the State also suffered.

2. Under the French Imperial regime the Roman budget had been recast and placed on a sound basis, so that when Pius VII and his State Secretary Cardinal Consalvi took over the government, they found themselves with an income more than equal to the expenditure of the State. This happy state of affairs was fairly well maintained under Consalvi's long administration, but shortly after his death in 1824,² the condition of the Papal finances rapidly grew worse. In 1828 a small deficit appeared, but there was nothing seriously amiss until, coincident with the election of Gregory XVI to the Papal chair, the northern provinces revolted. To suppress the insurrection money had to be borrowed, and so unsettled was the state of Europe, so shaken the confidence of bankers, that the great Jewish firm of Rothschild demanded a discount of 35 per cent on a loan of 3,000,000 scudi³ which it made to the Pontifical Government.

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* i. 21. The illustration here given is semi-humorous, though not uninteresting. Other instances of the misapplication of administrative energy could be multiplied, some of them of a far from humorous character. Indeed D'Azeglio goes so far as to assert that on the return of Pius VII to Rome the rack was restored to use.—Cf. Colletta, *Storia di Napoli*, ii. 192.

² Consalvi actually retired from office one year earlier.

³ The sum received after deduction of discount and commissions was 1,818,091 scudi (Report of Delfini to the Roman Chamber of Deputies, 1848). This transaction is generally quoted by the Italian writers to demonstrate the lamentable financial position of the Papal government at that time; the demonstration is misleading. For the unsettled political conditions prevailing in Europe

From 1831 to 1833 nearly ten millions more were borrowed from the same source, though on less onerous terms, and by 1845 that amount had been nearly doubled.¹

After 1834 yearly balance-sheets ceased to be presented,² and the treasurer rendered no account whatever of his administration.³ At the end of Gregory's reign the accumulated borrowings, added to the pre-existing debt, totalled about forty millions of scudi; the annual revenue was about nine millions, which it cost about one and a half millions to collect,⁴ and the annual expenditure was about ten millions.⁵

3. A natural remedy for the unsatisfactory condition of the Roman exchequer might have been sought for in the development of the natural resources, the industries,

were the principal factor in the enormous discount charged by Rothschilds; this will the more clearly appear when it is considered that although in 1831, when the budget had for many years shown an approximately satisfactory balance, 35 per cent was demanded, yet in 1837, when increasing deficits and accumulating debts and disorder had been the rule for six years, the discount on a similar loan was fixed at only $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

¹ With the exception of one small loan placed with the Roman banker Torlonia, all the borrowing transactions of Gregory's government were with the Rothschilds. The total debt accumulated during the reign was 15,750,000 scudi nominal, 12,700,000 net from Rothschilds; 2,000,000 scudi nominal, 1,860,000 net from Torlonia.—Spada, *Storia della rivoluzione di Roma*, i. 160.

² Pasolini, *Memoirs*, 42.

³ Vecchi, *Storia di due anni*. This would apply to the period of ten years, 1836-1846, during which Cardinal Tosti was treasurer.

⁴ Mr. Petre to Lord Palmerston, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 118.

⁵ The figures given are, in the main, those of Farini, whose exceptionally good sources of information make him the weightiest authority. Carletti, however, declares Farini's statement to be below the mark, and somewhat inconclusively attempts to correct it. He fixes the total of the Papal debt at well over the 38,000,000 scudi estimated by Farini, and believes that at the end of Gregory's reign it exceeded 50,000,000 scudi, and that in 1848 it amounted to 64,000,000 scudi. His opinion is partly based on figures of Lord Brougham, but his quotation from *Political Philosophy* is incorrect and apparently unjustified. In the complete absence of accounts for many years it is clear that no absolutely accurate computation can be framed. See an Italian translation of Gouraud, *l'Italia, Sue ultime rivoluzioni*, note by Carletti, 13; Farini, *op. cit.* i. 142, 162; and Tivaroni, *l'Italia durante il dominio Austriaco*, ii. 256.

and the commerce of the State ; but though the country was poor enough, the leaders of the clergy were comparatively rich, and viewed change and improvement with well-reasoned dislike and fear.¹ Manufactures were all but non-existent,² trade restricted in every way, and but one prosperous form of business was known,—that of smuggling. The roads were nearly impassable, and presented the further disadvantage of being infested with brigands. These were, generally speaking, highly respected, if not respectable members of society, and such was the importance and prestige attached to their time-honoured calling, that they entered into contracts and treaties with all sorts and conditions of men, including on occasion the Holy Father himself. These bandits were quite usually deeply attached to their religion, gave alms, duly observed Sunday, were frequently members of Sanfedist organizations, and were even known to have earned posthumous honours and praise from the pulpit !

To stem the tide of chaos that threatened to engulf the Papal States, not even the ancient municipal institutions remained ; they had once formed the most distinctive and strongest feature of Italian political life, but had been swept away in the storms of the revolutionary period. The restored Pope, and his astute adviser Consalvi, had taken care not to revive a power incompatible with the highly-centralized, bureaucratic system they wished to continue on the lines introduced by the French. But in the hands of the Pope this indispensable adjunct of modernized despotism took on

¹ Five thousand lay employés of the government earned a little more than 250,000 scudi per annum, while 300 ecclesiastics received 1,100,000 scudi, or 65 times more per person !—Tivaroni, *op. cit.* ii. 256.

² Probably less than one-half of one per cent of the population could be described as artisans.

a peculiar and odious complexion, one differing generically from what might be observed in any other of the bureaucracies of Europe. Not only was the administration of the State absolutely unchecked by popular representation and a public press, but it was entirely in the hands of a class, or rather caste, of ignorant and bigoted ecclesiastics.¹

4. Of the great mass of the Roman Catholic clergy of that period it is difficult to find anything approbatory to say. Making allowance for the small number of good men who might be found among them, and for a few versed in scholastic learning, the priesthood was mostly ignorant, fanatical, and unscrupulous. The Monsignori,² with a little more education and considerably less fervour, were an equal misfortune for the State, devoting their energies to the advancement of their fortune at the expense of that of the public, and to the struggle for the Cardinal's hat. Among them and their superiors already members of the College of Cardinals, was divided the task of governing the long-suffering population, whose lot had been cast in the patrimony of St. Peter. Immorality was, if not general, at all events a common failing with the governing caste, and in that respect certain of the monastic orders had won unenviable notoriety;³ Secretaries of State and Cardinals were well known for the number of their mistresses and gallantries, while many a supposed "thinker" had to expiate in chains in gloomy vaults the hideous crimes of wishing to improve the lot

¹ The expression *ignorant* must be understood in a broad sense. Thus a ruler, such as Gregory, who was deeply versed in the humanities and in the works of the early Fathers of the Church, but yet was not able to comprehend the utility of railroads or telegraph lines for the unhappy people placed under his charge, and often famishing at his palace doors, is not included in the category of the wise.

² A Monsignor, or prelate, was not necessarily in priest's orders.

³ For instance, the Ignorantelli, a happily-named teaching fraternity.

of the people, or perchance, of being the husband or father of a pretty wife or envied daughter. In the season of Carnival, when the Catholic Church watches, with benignant and half-closed eyes, the frivolity and frailty of mankind, the inmates of monasteries and convents were accustomed to make their sacred halls resound to unfitting echoes of revelry while they indulged in masquerading and other doubtful mummeries.¹

At the head of this priestly caste, which a long-continued custom, the judgments of the Holy Inquisition, and the repressive bayonets of Europe, compelled nearly three millions of people to obey, was the Holy Pontiff. Elected by the College of Cardinals from among themselves, he was generally advanced in years, and frail of body. For such was the cumbrous mode of election in use, such the personal rivalry of the Cardinals, that the most suitable aspirant was rarely elected to the chair of St. Peter. Many, in despair of their own election, preferred to give their vote to him who was least likely to interpose a long interval before the time should again recur when, under more fortunate circumstances, a different and more personally gratifying result might be arrived at.

But age and weakness were not the only incapacities under which the Popes habitually laboured, for there was rarely anything in their early life, education, experience, or training, to fit them for the exalted and delicate office they were called to fill. As Napoleon once said to Cardinal Arezzo, the Roman Church was

¹ It is worthy of remark that not only is a bad priest an unfit person to act as a governor, but that a good priest is equally unfit. For the latter's natural paths must be those of charity, of good works, and, above all, of humility; these qualities, admirable in themselves, are not those best fitting men to cope with the rough work of administration.

governed by a small body of ecclesiastics from a single province, utterly ignorant of the conditions and wants of Italy and of Europe. And a great natural stimulant, that has urged many a monarch to improve the condition of his domains, failed the Pope alone among the personal rulers of his day,—the desire of transmitting a glorified patrimony to an heir. On the contrary, in the case of the elected occupant of the Papal throne, the inevitable end of his probably short tenure could only mark the elevation to his vacated place of a successor whose name the most subtle and crafty courtier could by no means arrive at, until the solemn hour of the conclave had rung,—an hour that could only come when the reigning Pope should be no more.

Every surrounding circumstance therefore, made probable the fact, eloquently attested by the records of many centuries, that in the successors of St. Peter were not to be looked for those qualities of wisdom, of experience, or of virility, that go to make up a statesman.

Yet exceptions occurred ; and even in the nineteenth century, Rome found in Pius VII a ruler of great qualities fit to rank in the small and select company of the great Popes. He retrieved the damaged moral position of the Catholic Church, and, carried on the crest of the wave of reaction that swept Europe, re-established the temporal power on an apparently safe and durable basis. But after his death and that of Cardinal Consalvi (1823-1824), and especially during the pontificate of Gregory XVI, political disintegration and ruin rapidly overtook the States of the Church.

The revolt of 1831, its repression by the Austrians, and the Memorandum presented by the Great Powers,

were indeed followed by a short period of apparent amelioration.¹ Cardinal Bernetti, first Secretary of State of Gregory XVI, made some show of complying with the recommendations of Europe; a civil code was introduced, provincial councils were convened, but so constituted as to be practically useless and representative of nothing more than the favour of the government. The reforms were purely superficial, and the essential viciousness of the Papal system of government was left untouched. In 1836 Bernetti was succeeded by the more thoroughly retrograde Lambruschini,² whose sympathies were strongly Austrian, and whose policy was thoroughly Papal; he remained the virtual head of the Pontifical administration until the death of Gregory in 1846.

The latter years of this reign were marked by a recrudescence of liberal unrest in Romagna, which was met by increasingly severe repressive measures and wholesale imprisonment, inflicted by specially constituted military commissions; these movements were the subject of D'Azeglio's widely read and deeply effective *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna*, published in 1846.³

¹ The improvement was very slight and superficial. On September 7th, 1832, Mr. Seymour, British Special Envoy at Rome, wrote as follows to Count Lutzow, Austrian Ambassador: ". . . More than fourteen months have now elapsed since the Memorandum was given in, and not one of the recommendations which it contains has been fully adopted and carried into execution by the Papal government. . . . The British Government foresees that if the present system is persevered in, fresh disturbances must be expected to take place in the Papal States, of a character progressively more and more serious, and that out of these disturbances may spring complications dangerous to the peace of Europe."—*British State Papers*, 1832-1833, 1367.

² Nominally Lambruschini was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs only, and Cardinal Gamberini, and afterwards Mattei, had charge of the Interior. In reality the first named directed the whole policy of the government.

³ These movements were more or less connected with the society of the "Giovane Italia," which will be dealt with later. Among those arrested at this time was Doctor Galletti of Bologna, who played a prominent part later. The executions were comparatively not numerous (*Masi, Fra Libri, Casarini e la Società Nazionale*).

When Gregory XVI rather suddenly died, on the 1st of June of that year, the political atmosphere was charged with all the elements necessary to produce an explosion, and it was the general conviction of all classes that some radical, inevitable change must shortly take place. How that change came about, and the incidents that marked it, will be the subject of the succeeding chapters.

The moderate character of the demands of the Romagnal liberals may be judged by the extracts given in Appendix C, from a memorial which is generally ascribed to C. L. Farini.

CHAPTER II

THE ELECTION OF PIUS IX—THE AMNESTY

The Conclave summoned—Nationalist influences—The *Primato* and *Ultimi Casi*—The Bishop of Imola—His personality and opinions—The Papal election—Lambruschini and Micara—Proclamation of Pius IX—His first acts—The Amnesty—Popular enthusiasm—Metternich's foreboding.

THE Cardinal Camerlengo had performed the most solemn of his functions ; having thrice struck the forehead of the late Pontiff, he had announced the decease of Gregory XVI and the vacancy of the chair of St. Peter. It was necessary that the Sacred College should assemble in Conclave at the Quirinal to elect from their number one who should discharge the duties of God's Regent on Earth.

The great majority of the electors on whom this great and imposing responsibility rested were Italians,¹ and it was impossible that, as such, many of them could fail to be impressed with the gravity of the circumstances under which they were to assemble, and of the consequences that might follow the exercise of their vote. For to the long-continued liberal ferment and agitation, to the accumulated inheritance of persistent maladministration, had been added a new and powerful

¹ At the time of the death of Gregory there were 62 Cardinals, of whom 55 were Italians. Of these 50 attended the Conclave.

factor calculated to unsettle the minds of even the most inveterately retrograde of the Cardinals. In the north of Italy, where stronger governments and intellectual activity existed, a school of Italian writers had arisen who although differing in their immediate aims, yet all agreed in preaching the doctrine of the political regeneration of the Peninsula, of the disgrace of her present position, and of the hope of the future. A lengthened consideration of this movement must be deferred to another chapter; here only what is strictly necessary will be stated. But two books shall therefore be mentioned in connection with the Conclave of 1846, one D'Azeglio's *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna*, the other, Gioberti's *Del Primato morale e civile degli Italiani*.¹ The first of these epoch-marking works was a powerful and popularly written indictment of Papal misrule in Romagna, and its weight was greater in that the author was not a Roman but a Piedmontese, not a partisan of revolution but of moderate courses. Gioberti, a priest and a philosopher, with broader aims than D'Azeglio, proclaimed his hopes for the restoration of Italy, and pinned them on the eventual, but inevitable appearance of a liberal Pope who would act as the spiritual and beneficent guide of his country and of humanity, and preside over a league of the confederated Princes of the Italian peninsula. Gioberti's book appeared three years, and D'Azeglio's but a few weeks, before the death of Gregory.

These two books, notwithstanding the most strenuous efforts of censors and governments, had penetrated to the uttermost parts of Italy, had penetrated to the

¹ The title of Gioberti's most celebrated work is decidedly misleading. It must not be understood as implying a claim to *actual* moral and civil supremacy for the Italians, as the wording might at first sight lead one to suppose.

innermost depths of all true Italian hearts; one at least of the Cardinals who answered the summons of the Dean of the Sacred College, and journeyed to Rome to attend the Conclave, had been deeply stirred by the words of Gioberti,—he was the Bishop of Imola, Giovanni Maria Mastai Ferretti. This obscure priest, who was in a few months to become the most celebrated man of his day, was then fifty-four years of age, having been born at Sinigaglia in 1792.¹ Member of a family of rank whose sympathies had long been liberal,² —impressionable and tender-hearted, he had not passed unmoved through the troublous years in which fate had thrown his lot, had not hardened his heart to the cry of distress of the Pontifical States. The aged Vicini, an ex-republican of the Revolutionary period, who had been identified with the Cisalpine Republic and with the Insurgent Government of 1831, had in his last days made the acquaintance of the kindly Bishop of Imola, and had placed in his hands a copy of Gioberti's famous book.³ The Cardinal read it with the deepest interest. Another neighbour and attached friend of the future Pope, the cultured and liberal Count Pasolini, relates in his Memoirs how they would frequently read and discuss the *Primato* together, how the Bishop of Imola, “. . . in his enthusiastic moods would often throw himself from one side to another of his great armchair, repeating Gioberti's words, wondering whether they were prophetic or illusory.”⁴ Fortuitous circum-

¹ Sinigaglia is a small seaport in the States of the Church, on the Adriatic Sea just north of Ancona.

² The Italians had it that in the Mastai family even the cats were liberal!

³ Vicini was too old to be dangerous to the Papal Government, and though kept under strict observation, was allowed to reside in privacy at Massa Lombarda near Imola. It was there, at the house of the parish priest, Don Foschini, that he met the bishop.—Vicini, *Memorie*, 358.

⁴ Pasolini, *op. cit.* 33.

stances such as those that brought him into relations with men like Vicini and Pasolini, had great influence in developing Mastai Ferretti's latent liberalism ; but that he would otherwise have remained a supporter of Sanfedisti and Centurioni, as some authorities suggest, appears somewhat improbable.¹ The fact is that the liberalism of the Bishop of Imola might be traced, not only to the influence of his friends, and to the obvious lessons of the times as he had seen them and as they were interpreted by Gioberti, or Balbo, or D'Azeglio, but also to his predisposing largeness and kindness of heart. But this last characteristic was unfortunately allied with a morbid condition that must be fully realized to understand clearly the temperament and actions of the man who was to have such deep and permanent influence on the fortunes of Italy and of the Papacy ;—the future Pope was a victim of epilepsy. A convulsive attack of this terrible malady, that seized on him in the streets of Rome during his young days, changed his career from that of arms, to which he aspired, to that of the Church.² In the irresponsible impulsiveness, in the lack of intellectual precision and vigour, in the vanity, the love of effect and of praise that he added to his naturally benevolent qualities, he showed all the weakness and lack of balance that so frequently accompany epilepsy, that so often lead with advancing age to mental paralysis and, in some cases to dementia.³

¹ See among other accounts, Silvagni, *La Corte Romana*, iii.

² But as to Pius contemplating a military career, see Marchal, *Histoire de S. S. Pie IX*, 16 ; Helfert, *Gregor XVI und Pius IX*, 64.

³ Great importance must attach to such a physical defect in the case of a man placed in circumstances in which his personal decisions and judgments are of wide importance. In the case of the first Napoleon, who probably suffered from epilepsy to a greater extent than Pius IX, has not the fact received rather scant notice at the hands of historians ?—See Lombroso, *L'uomo di genio*, part iv. chap. iii., reviewing H. Taine's views on this subject.

In the Bishop of Imola's personal appearance might be detected the expression of his constitutional deficiencies. Although strikingly handsome, and of dignified demeanour, yet a close scrutiny revealed a mouth that was weak, and eyes that could not support a steady gaze.¹ Perhaps the best trait of his feeble character was his charitableness, which, if Pasolini is to be trusted, was as unostentatious as it was extensive.²

Mastai Ferretti travelled to Rome to attend the Conclave, with not the remotest suspicion that, by any combination of circumstances, the Papal crown could be destined for one who had but recently reached the rank of Cardinal, and who was perhaps the most obscure of all the members of the Sacred College. He brought with him three books, with the intention of humbly offering them to the elected successor of Gregory; they were Gioberti's *Primato*, Balbo's *Speranze d'Italia*, and D'Azeglio's *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna*; he as little suspected, as did the people of Rome, that the recipient for whom they were destined was himself.

The nine-day obsequies of Gregory XVI had been duly concluded, and on June 15th, 1846, two weeks after the Pontiff's death, the Conclave assembled. The proceedings of the Papal electors were usually extremely lengthy. Cut off from all communication with the outside world until their final decision was recorded, they cast their votes but twice a day, morning and evening, to the accompaniment of solemn ceremonies and prayer. It was necessary that one of the generally numerous candidates should obtain two-thirds of the votes of all the Cardinals present. Jealousy, canvassing, interested bargaining and

¹ Trollope, *Pius IX.*

² Pasolini, *Memoirs*, 29.

intriguing, in which the Cardinals' clerical attendants, or *conclavisti*, sometimes took a prominent share,¹ occupied the hours of the day and night not allotted to balloting and to religious exercises; and the rapid attainment of a final result was not hastened by the right acknowledged to France, Austria, Spain, and sometimes Portugal, of taking exception, or opposing a veto to one designated Cardinal. On some occasions days were spent in combining votes on candidates who were never intended to secure an absolute majority, merely to pierce the secret of which Cardinal was armed with a veto, or of against whom that veto was to be directed. This fact, and all the complications and Italian subtleties arising from it, might easily lead to months of delay, as actually happened when Pius VII was elected in 1800.²

The usual course of the proceedings of the Conclave, therefore, in a way favoured the small number of foreign Cardinals, who travelling from a distance, generally escaped the tedium of the early voting, yet arrived in time to participate in the decisive negotiations. In 1846, however, it so happened that the foreign Cardinals were for once deprived of their electoral rights. Gaysbrück, Archbishop of Milan, who was known to be armed with the Austrian veto, made no secret of his pretension of settling the election in favour of the Court of Vienna. Journeying leisurely towards Rome, he was met half-way by the startling intelligence that the election was concluded, and that a liberal Pope was made. What had happened was this. At the time of the assembly of the Conclave the most influential

¹ In 1831 Gregory XVI was elected after a prolonged struggle, and was said to have been *made* by the Conclavisti.

² The account of the Conclave of 1800 in Cardinal Maury's Memoirs is perhaps the best and most interesting that is to be read.

of all the Cardinals was Lambruschini. He had been for many years State Secretary, and had conferred many favours and promotions among those who now sat about him. He represented the traditions of the past reign, was assured of the support of Vienna, and was the strongest candidate for the vacant throne. At the first scrutiny it was found that Lambruschini had received the largest number of votes, and his supporters confidently anticipated that they would easily and rapidly carry the election. After the unsuccessful count, the voting papers were, according to the long-used custom burned, and the escaping smoke proclaimed to the curious throng of Romans outside that the first scrutiny had yielded no definite answer to their anxieties.

If Cardinal Lambruschini possessed most influence, the greater persuasive force belonged to the Dean of the Sacred College, Cardinal Micara.¹ A strong liberal, devout and simple, he had lived in disgrace throughout the reign of Gregory. Although advanced in years, he now acted with the decision, zeal, and energy of a young man, and as though he felt that the one great opportunity of his life had come to him. Making fullest use of his official position, doubling the force of his earnest arguments and entreaties by his transparent disinterestedness, by his eloquent appeals to patriotic feeling, to the irresistible necessities of the situation, to the urgent petitions for better government hurriedly presented by the cities of Romagna and the Marches,² and to the fears of the Cardinals lest liberal conspirators should attempt an outrage

¹ D'Azeglio, *Corresp. politique*, 4.

² These petitions were moderate and respectful in tone. They concurred in calling for administrative reforms, and were influentially signed.—Gualterio, *Ultimi rivolgimenti*, iii. 183.

on the assembled Conclave,¹ he urged his hesitating colleagues to unite their votes and to rapidly make an Italian Pope before the arrival of the foreign Cardinals.²

Those who at the first scrutiny had not supported Lambruschini were a majority, but had divided their votes among several candidates, among whom the estimable and liberal Soglia was perhaps the most conspicuous.³ All that was necessary was to get a general agreement of these electors on some neutral candidate who would unite all the moderate liberal and anti-Austrian votes. Micara's choice fell on the Bishop of Imola.⁴

On the evening of the second day a vast crowd watched for the ascending smoke of the burning bulletins, for the *fumata*, as it was called, that would announce that once more the Cardinals had voted without result. And as time passed and no smoke ascended, whispers and murmurs began to pass that the Pope was already made.⁵ When later it was rumoured that the popular candidate Gizzi had been elected, the rejoicings were great and Rome illuminated.⁶ The rumour was false and the rejoicing of the people pre-

¹ A plot was said to have been hatched to put an end to the College of Cardinals by blowing up the Conclave with gunpowder.—Masi, *Fra Libri*.

² *British Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 56.

³ It is probable that many of the first votes on the liberal side were eventually intended for Gizzi. Ferretti received several, but not intended to elect him.—Gabussi, *Memorie*.

⁴ At the first scrutiny Mastai Ferretti had received ten votes. This was not necessarily significant of any real intention. At the second he reached thirteen, at the third twenty-seven, at the fourth thirty-seven. The necessary number was thirty-four.

⁵ The expression to *make a Pope* follows the Italian, *fare un Papa*. It has been made use of as perhaps conveying a shade of meaning which in the Italian is quite significant.

⁶ Gizzi as a Papal legate in Romagna had resisted the appointment of military commissions, and administered justly and temperately. He was made more widely known and popular by the approbation with which he had been mentioned in D'Azeglio's *Ultimi casi*.

mature, though it was true enough that Lambruschini and the Austrian party had been defeated.

It had fallen to Cardinal Mastai Ferretti's lot to count the votes on the evening of the 16th, and as the bulletins bearing his name rapidly increased in his hands he had become paler and was nearly overcome with emotion. After the decisive thirty-fourth bulletin that gave him the Papal crown had been reached, he had fallen inanimate to the ground.¹ It was not until the following morning that it had been possible to show the elected Sovereign to the Roman people; then the new Pope Pius IX was presented to their gaze from the great loggia of the Quirinal. But instead of the well-known figure of Cardinal Gizzi, whom they had expected to see, it was the handsome, striking face of an unknown man they saw, and the people knelt in wondering, unmoved silence to receive the solemn Papal benediction, *urbi et orbi*. To them their new Pope was a sealed book. What promise of the future lay in him they knew not.

The first act of the new Sovereign promised well. It was to abolish the military tribunals; and this was followed by the appointment of a commission of government, made up of five members. Of these, three represented the Gregorian regime,—Cardinal Lambruschini, Cardinal Bernetti, and Monsignor Marini, chief of the Police department; two were liberals,—Cardinal Gizzi and Cardinal Amat. With this Council the Pope immediately entered into deliberation as to what measures for the better ordering of the State might mark the beginning of the new reign. There was one conspicuously indicated by every consideration of

¹ Tivaroni, *op. cit.* ii. 264. Silvagni, *op. cit.*

sentiment and of necessity, as imperatively urgent. The endless unhappiness and entreaties of so many cities and families, the congested state of the prisons at Civita Castellana and the other Papal fortresses, the tenderness of heart of the Pope, all called loudly for the pardon and release of the political prisoners. Soon it was rumoured that an amnesty was in contemplation,—a restricted one, said some: a wide one, said others. The Pope was for the more generous course, it was reported; but the Gregorians opposed it, and were thought certain to prevail. While yet these confused rumours were circulating, before anything more than a vague expectation had been excited, on the evening of July 16th, the people of Rome were suddenly moved to a wild frenzy of delight by the unexpected posting of a proclamation granting a full amnesty to all classes of political offenders.¹ The pent-up feelings of years of oppression and suffering spontaneously exploded that night. Those who managed to force their way up to the proclamations deciphèred aloud to the struggling people around them the blessed words that meant the deliverance of father, son, brother, or husband. Men wept and embraced in the streets, and the people of Rome, moved by an irresistible and unanimous impulse, marched as one man towards the Quirinal,—one great, convergent mass of emotional Italian humanity vibrating with gratitude and affection. The Piazza di Monte Cavallo in front of the Palace rapidly filled, and Pius, departing from the traditions of his predecessors, appeared on the balcony clad in white robes that showed conspicuous by the light of two flambeaus

¹ The decision was totally unexpected, Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 61. It probably proceeded from a sudden impulse that overrode the slow deliberation and opposition of the Pope's advisers.

held high on either side of him. With unrestrained emotion the Pontiff joined his tears to those of his people, and raised his trembling hand to bless them; and as the Piazza filled and refilled, twice more Pius appeared on his balcony to repeat his benediction. That night every house in Rome was illuminated, with one illumined exception, that of the Austrian Ambassador.¹

The grant of the amnesty was an act that deserved no less public acknowledgment than it received, for it affected many hundreds of prisoners and exiles. At Civita Castellana alone, 700 prisoners were liberated, while their total was far greater, and the exiles were said to number no less than 4000.²

But something was asked from the liberals in return for their freedom, or for the right of returning to the Pontifical States. They were required to sign an undertaking " . . . not to take advantage in any way, or at any time, of this act of sovereign clemency, and to faithfully perform all the duties of a faithful subject." Such an undertaking had as little political meaning as practical value; there is no case recorded of any prisoner having refused to subscribe it, and among the exiles there were but two or three, including Count Mamiani and Count Carlo Pepoli,³ to whom a keen sense of honour dictated a refusal of the Pope's condition. "We are persuaded that we can pardon without public danger," Pius declared in the *motu proprio*⁴ recording his act of clemency to his subjects, and this sentiment, together with his vaguely liberal tendency

¹ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea in Italia*, v. 18.

² The London *Times* says that the total number of prisoners affected was 2000. No less than 40,000 persons were under warning from the police.—Tivaroni, *op. cit.* ii. 256.

³ A member of the Provisional Government in 1831, married a daughter of Joachim Murat.

⁴ A *motu proprio* was the designation of a Papal decree with the force of law.

and love of popular applause, may be said to have been the determining factors of the measure.¹

He had now tasted and relished the joy of public approbation and acclamation; and his first step in the direction of better government had so satisfied his senses, that his benevolent heart was henceforth open to any suggestion that might lead further down the enchanted path of popularity. Father Ventura, a popular preacher and pronounced liberal, congratulating the Pope on the Amnesty, exclaimed: "It is a page from the book of liberty!" Pius is reported to have replied: "If that is what the people have read, they have seen to the bottom of my heart."

But that which seemed to the Pope and to his excitable subjects, a matter for congratulation and a happy augury for the future, appeared in a very different light to one whose judgment in matters political was, though warped, probably clearer and surer than that of any other statesman of his time. When the news of the extraordinary events that were occurring in Rome was brought to him, Prince Metternich declared that the election of a liberal Pope was "the greatest misfortune of the age."²

The general conditions prevailing in Italy that caused the Austrian statesman to pass this shrewd, if biassed judgment, must now be reviewed, and the bearing of the political circumstances of the surrounding States on the fast-approaching Roman revolution considered.

¹ Bernetti said to the French Ambassador, Count Rossi: "We shall get an amnesty and a railroad and all will be well!" This was an approximately correct description of the political programme of the Pope.—Tivaroni, quoting d'Haussonville, *op. cit.* ii. 265.

² For Metternich's views on the Amnesty see his dispatch to Lützow of July 12th, quoted by Helfert, *op. cit.* 90.

CHAPTER III

ITALIAN SENTIMENT AND PARTIES

Unrest of the Peninsula—Kingdom of Sardinia—The Austrian provinces and regime—The writers—Double current of nationalist sentiment—Mazzini and the *Giovane Italia*—Rise and fall of his popularity—Gioberti—His correspondence with Mazzini—The *Primato*—A remarkable prophecy—Balbo—D'Azeglio—His interview with Charles Albert—Antagonism of democrats and Albertists.

CENTRAL and southern Italy were the worst governed parts of the Peninsula, and from Bologna to Palermo a state of perpetual unrest had long existed. In the northern section less unsatisfactory conditions prevailed, and political thought and education had made some progress since the territorial resettlement effected by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The kingdom of Sardinia had since 1831 been under the rule of Charles Albert, and although not enjoying the advantages of a representative system, was reasonably well administered. The King, who had as regent played a conspicuous part in the unsuccessful constitutional movement that preceded the accession of his uncle Charles Felix in 1821, had long been looked on by many as at least a moderate liberal; in many quarters it was even asserted that he had once been affiliated to the Carbonari. Be that as it may, notwith-

standing the severity of the police repression that marked the early years of his reign, notwithstanding his Austrian marriage¹ and bigoted religious views, he was thought by many to unite such qualities and advantages as were to be looked for in a leader of the Italian people. Among these qualities were noted his simplicity, integrity, and sense of duty, together with his scarcely veiled ambition and dislike of the House of Hapsburg; among these advantages, the complete independence of the kingdom of Sardinia, its considerable military and naval resources, and the long and honourable martial tradition of the House of Savoy.

Immediately to the east of Charles Albert's province of Piedmont stretched the fertile plain of Lombardy, where, as in neighbouring Venetia, German administrators and Croat bayonets dominated. The vices and the virtues of Austrian officialdom have both been somewhat exaggerated. Without attempting to completely reconcile the numerous conflicting statements on the subject, it may be generally stated that in Lombardy Venetia the system of government was neither progressive nor yet retrograde, but stationary,—and alien. The administrative, commercial, and educational improvements, introduced under the Napoleonic regime, had been in large measure retained, though what little there was of public liberty and opinion had been suppressed. The life of the people could only centre about its amusements; the Church and the Opera flourished and were fostered, while all other national institutions failed. At times the appearance of orderly administration led observers to conclude that the Austrian rule was the best in Italy, and that the practical individual freedom

¹ He married the Archduchess Maria Teresa, daughter of the Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany, in 1817.

enjoyed in the Lombard Venetian provinces was greater than elsewhere. D'Azeglio, who long resided at Milan, and who was certainly not a partial witness, goes so far as to declare that in the year 1845 Lombardy was better administered than any other part of Italy.¹

But no adequate idea of the condition of northern Italy can be formed that is concerned merely with an administrative aspect; it is necessary to turn from the well-drilled operations of officialdom, policemen and soldiers, to the mighty evolution of patriotic and national sentiment.

From the time of the first French revolution, Italy had produced a number of writers imbued with patriotic feeling and with more or less unsectional ideals. From Ugo Foscolo² to Manzoni, from Alfieri to Silvio Pellico, covers the early period, the end of which may be conveniently identified with the failures of the Carbonari in 1821 and 1831. Beginning at the latter date a new period is entered showing a double current of nationalist sentiment, one republican and revolutionary, closely associated with the name of Mazzini, the other tentative, or constructive, anti-revolutionary and anti-Austrian, with three conspicuous representatives,—Gioberti, Balbo, and D'Azeglio.³

In appreciating the work of these well-known

¹ D'Azeglio, *Recollections*, ii. 417.

² Ugo Foscolo is responsible for the famous dictum: "Per fare l'Italia, e d'uopo disfare le sette." At a later date Giorgini, with equal force and greater wit, retorted: "Per disfare le sette, d'uopo fare l'Italia!" which may be translated: *To make Italy it is necessary to unmake the factions; and,—To unmake the factions it is necessary to make Italy.*

³ The name of Giusti should perhaps be added, but it is easy to get drawn along the vast torrent of *Risorgimento* literature, and it has been thought advisable to stop at the three names mentioned.

Helfert apparently prefers a triple division, taking Mamiani as the representative of a middle party; there is much to say for this arrangement, though it has not been followed here.—See Helfert, *op. cit.* 9.

writers, the sole test of excellence that will here be applied is that of utility, of practical result; there will be no attempt made to judge of their merits or demerits from a purely literary or technical point of view. The footing on which they shall appear is not that of classicism or romanticism, nor shall the influence of Madame de Staël or of Macpherson, the opinions of Beyle or of Chateaubriand detain us; that with which we are concerned is solely,—what, and how great, was the positive *political* effect of their writings? Viewed in this light, the place of honour must, with some hesitation, be allotted to the works of Giuseppe Mazzini.

The future dictator of Rome was born in 1805, in republican Genoa. Too young to participate in the constitutional rising of 1821, he was yet old enough to be deeply stirred by what he saw of the events of those days. A few years later he ardently embraced the cause of democratic reform and, in 1829, joined the Carbonari, only to be imprisoned by the Sardinian police in the following year. At this time, and more especially after the failure of the Romagnol rebellion of 1831, Carbonarism was a fast-decaying institution. The first wave of enthusiasm had spent its force, and the disastrous results that had attended the political movements concerted by the Society, had forfeited favour and support. The awful oaths and dreadful, or childish, rites intended to secure secrecy and to provide for the safety of its members, had been so freely administered that the Austrian, Sardinian, and Papal secret agents found easy access to all the Lodges. Metternich's subordinates in Lombardy, Menz, Hartig, or D'Adda, through spies among whom were enrolled Grand Masters of the Carbonari and members of the highest Italian nobility, had obtained complete control over the

chief liberal association and such allied societies as the Veri Italiani, reformed Carbonari, Setta recondita dell' Arno, and others.¹

Mazzini, although not long in prison, left it with very changed sentiments; he had deeply ruminated over his position and that of struggling liberalism, and had come to the conclusion that the failures of the Carbonari, their loose organization and present situation, left no hope of their eventual success. Following the natural bent of his bold and confident spirit, with complete faith in his own merits and powers, he determined to found a new society under different conditions and his own direction; he named it "Giovane Italia,"—Young Italy.

This association, founded in 1831 at Marseilles, had for its professed objects the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, and the unification of the States of the Peninsula under one central republican government; its watchword was, "Dio e il popolo,"—God and the People.

Save in the clearness of its objects, and its unity of central direction, the Giovane Italia was not so great an advance on Carbonarism as the ardent followers of Mazzini have claimed. The aims might be clearer, and more persistently kept in view by an unquestioned leader, but the methods remained essentially the same, with all the inherent viciousness, immorality, and weakness of systematized conspiracy. The members of the new association were recruited from among the old Carbonari, and if Mazzini's own ideals were high,

¹ Report, Menz to Metternich. Gualterio, *Ultimi rivolgimenti*, iii. 474. The last-named society was probably nothing more than a Carbonaro Lodge. The Veri Italiani were later very influential in Lombardy; they took a prominent part in the rising of 1848, were especially strong in Milan and Brescia, and were Albertist in politics. Their head centre was in Bruxelles.—Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, v. 10.

his followers were chiefly inspired by the importance of secret initiations and passwords, and by the time-honoured prospect of armed rebellion.¹

It was not, therefore, in the novelty of its methods that the Giovane Italia supplied a new force to the national movement, but in the wonderful energy, eloquence, and force of character of its chief. Self-centred, self-respecting, austere, disinterested, and unconquerably combative, Mazzini placed an ever-ready, ever-flowing pen at the service of what he conceived as the Italian cause. Though, like nearly all his countrymen of modern times, superabundantly prolix, he wrote well; and when driven with hot surges of anger at the wrongs and misfortunes of his country, he occasionally rose to great heights of emotional eloquence. Read, for example, a short ephemeral writing of his, "Una notte di Rimini,"² commemorating the defence and death of Olini and his handful of students at the gates of Rimini in 1831; its fervid passion is perhaps a little overdone for a northern reader, but who can doubt that the many thousands of Italians who read it, were deeply moved and affected by the molten torrent of words in which their defeats, their misfortunes, and their dead were lamented? From Mazzini's ever-active pen, for many years, a constant stream of articles, pamphlets, and private

¹ The forms of the Giovane Italia were various, and constantly undergoing transformation; here are two, at one time used by members, probably in the north of Italy:

- A. The inquirer placed his hands crossed against his chest, palms inwards. *Answer*, a similar sign, palms outwards. Both then hooked the first fingers of the right hand. The inquirer said, "Virtue." *Answer*, "Sacrifice."
- B. The inquirer presented his closed fist. *Answer*, it was repelled. Inquirer passed his hand over his brow, as though to brush aside perspiration. *Answer*, striking the region of the heart twice with the hand. Inquirer said, "Secrecy," *Answer*, "Death."—Mario, *Vita di Mazzini*, 189.

² It is reproduced in full in Mario's *Vita di Mazzini*.

letters poured forth, all preaching with prophetic zeal the cause of democracy and the Republic, of independence and nationality,—“Dio e il popolo.”

The Giovane Italia, and the writings of its founder, spread with astonishing rapidity through every part of Italy. According to Leopardi there were in 1833 60,000 members in the kingdom of Naples alone;¹ and so well known and dangerous had the Society become in northern Italy, that in the same year the Austrian Government issued an edict making membership of the Giovane Italia high treason, and punishable in the same way as Carbonarism, by death.

Mazzini's republican ardour and indefatigability were unfortunately symptoms of a somewhat morbid exaltation, he may be said to have been possessed with the mania for revolution; the history of the Giovane Italia is but little more than the account of a series of small, badly-planned, wretchedly-executed risings and revolutionary attempts. The only two insurrections with which Mazzini was in any way connected and that won a temporary success, those of Milan and Rome, owed that success far more to other influences than to that of the Giovane Italia.

The long record of Mazzini's failures, from that of the Savoy expedition in 1834, to the futile movements in Romagna that marked the last years of Gregory's reign, had gradually discredited the Giovane Italia, and its influence had greatly declined at the time of the election of Pius IX to the Papal throne.² But if the Society was becoming weaker, its leader had lost nothing

¹ There is no way of checking this estimate; it is quite possibly a gross exaggeration.

² “The links of our association had become somewhat loosened, and I now limited myself to maintaining points of contact here and there, in Lombardy especially.”—Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, v. 11.

of his courage and energy; Mazzini still indomitably clung to his ideas and purposes. He had, by dint of constant and eloquent repetition, done much to drive home among Italians the idea of the unity of Italy with its capital at Rome; ¹ and he had taught another lesson as well. For by the obvious futility of his attempts at political revolution, he had alienated the sympathies of the more thoughtful classes, and shown them that it was hopeless to look to him and his methods for the accomplishment of the redemption of Italy; some more effective and powerful means had clearly to be found. What these means were, had for some years been indicated by writers who, equalling Mazzini in patriotism, looked less to revolutionary methods than to the evolution of existing political conditions for the accomplishment of their designs.

Chief among these was Gioberti, a liberal Piedmontese priest, thinker, and philosopher. On the accession of Charles Albert to the throne of Sardinia, he had been appointed Court Chaplain; but though well liked by the King, he was unable to maintain his position long, and his liberal opinions soon resulted in his imprisonment and exile. He went to Paris, and after the failure of the *Giovane Italia* rising in Savoy, Mazzini attempted to draw him into the republican fold. The letters exchanged on this occasion between the leaders of the two streams of Italian national sentiment that were to come into such violent and disastrous collision twelve years later, are extremely interesting and important. The correspondence took place in the month of September 1834, and comprised three letters,

¹ Mazzini's ideas fluctuated considerably, but speaking generally, he may be said to have had a semi-mystical religious conception of Italian unity bound up with the idea of Rome, capital of the Peninsula, and of the world's thought and civilization.

one from Mazzini to Gioberti, the other two from the latter to the former. The substance of what separated the two men at that time, and later, will sufficiently appear from a single extract; it is from one of the letters addressed by Gioberti to Mazzini:—

“You believe that one, or many, partial attempts at revolution can transform the fortunes of the Peninsula, and that, by the sole effort of the Italians themselves, unassisted from without; in this belief you place the greatest reliance on the exiles; and thence you conclude that that party should be supported whenever an opportunity would seem to occur, without any regard to the position of European affairs. I, on the contrary, believe that the armed attempts of exiles, save in very rare cases that would not present themselves under modern conditions in Italy, cannot have any good results, and failing, that their effects must be in every way calamitous . . .

“To assume that the Italians have such civil and military virtues as are necessary to withstand such a shock (*capace di reggere all' urto*) is what I find impossible to do . . .

“My hope and my reply I state in two points only, both equally essential and inseparable,—the people, and war. I mean a general war that may arise from a new revolution in France or otherwise, probably not just yet, but, as it appears to me inevitably in the course of a few years.”¹

Such opinions as these led directly to a practical and not unstatesmanlike conclusion,—that Italy could only be liberated by the direct action of governments possessing military resources, that is to say of Sardinia and

¹ Gioberti, *Opere inedite*, viii. 344.

possibly even of France ;¹ and further, that their action should be patiently awaited, and only expected when the general European situation should render it possible.

Until 1842 Gioberti's literary activity was entirely taken up with works of philosophy ; but in 1843 appeared the first of a series of political works, it was the celebrated *Del Primato civile e morale degli Italiani*, that we have already seen placed in the hands of the bishop of Imola by the ex-revolutionist Vicini. In this book Gioberti advocated the moral reform of the Italian people, and, exhorting them to fit themselves for the blessings of good government, pointed out a path that appeared to his practical, but strongly religious mind to open a way for the realization of their aspirations. The constituted political and armed strength he thought indispensable as a starting-point, was that of the kingdom of Sardinia ; under the military leadership of her King, and under the supreme guidance and presidency of the Pope, a league of all the Italian States from the Alps to the Ionian Sea would bring about the political and moral regeneration of the Peninsula. But to convert Gioberti's dreams into reality it was essential that the King of Sardinia should be placed in a position of commanding military strength, and, most necessary of all, that the great, the liberal, the national Pope should arise, who would boldly seize the people's standard and lead Italy to happier and greater destinies.

In 1843, when the book appeared, these sentiments of the author were received with approbation, and were read with emotion by many Italians ; but the existing conditions were so widely removed from those suggested as possible by Gioberti, that, to most, his conclusions

¹ The subject will gain in clearness if a consideration of international questions that might well be introduced here, be relegated to a later chapter.

must have appeared more academic than practical ; yet, by one of those strange and instantaneous changes slowly elaborated in the crucibles of Time, but a few months after the publication of the *Primato*, the remarkable events of Rome and the easily inflamed imaginations of the Italians, had combined to elevate Gioberti to the rank of a prophet ! And thus two men, a King and a Pope, not without qualities, yet both far weaker than their circumstances demanded, had suddenly become exalted by public opinion into the dual leaders of Italy dreamed of by the priest-philosopher.

But Gioberti was not alone in his views, nor must he be thought of as the sole creator of a state of public opinion that would, but for him, not have arisen ; that was far from being the case. Among numerous other popular writers, two other Piedmontese, Balbo and D'Azeglio, may be singled out for special mention as having done much to strengthen the current of opinion that Gioberti largely helped to form. By a curious coincidence the former, a retired diplomat, who had already won reputation by various historical writings, published his best-known work, *Speranze d'Italia*, within a few weeks of the *Primato* ; the two books were in complete accord on all essential points.¹

D'Azeglio was the free-lance of the Sardinian or Albertist party. Strongly imbued with the ideas of Gioberti and Balbo, but discarding their gravity of style, he met Mazzini on his own ground and poured from a ready pen novels, pamphlets, and books,—fresh, vigorous, and stirring. The Mazzinians he cordially and frankly detested, and could recognise no good in

¹ The chief political difference between them was that Balbo's scheme of Italian federation left out the Austrian provinces, while Gioberti's provided for the entry of Austria into the league in respect of her Italian possessions.

them. From his *Recollections* the following characteristic passage may be quoted :—

“ . . . Among us everything degenerates into a secret society. That of the Giovane Italia was a bad example, and a bad school for Italy from the absurdity of its political principles, the stupidity of its intentions, the perversity of its methods, and lastly, on account of the mean behaviour of its leaders, who, while themselves in a place of perfect safety, sent to the scaffold generous fools who did not understand that their heads were offered up, not to regenerate Italy, but only to revive a withered sectarian zeal.”¹

D’Azeglio’s opinion need neither be entirely accepted nor entirely rejected ; but it will well serve to show the bitterness of feeling that divided the two Italian parties. D’Azeglio was an artist, a novelist, a Bohemian, and also of noble birth ; he travelled in many parts of Italy, and, having chanced to see much of the disorders of Romagna, made the state of that Papal province the subject of a pamphlet that has already been several times alluded to.² But, however strongly he wrote, his judgment remained cool, and he steadfastly clung to the methods of the fast-forming Albertist party, and advocated constitutional evolution and moral force, deprecating revolutionary attempts.³ On his return from the Roman States to Turin, he obtained an interview with Charles Albert, who was

¹ D’Azeglio, *Recollections*, ii. 353. It should be added, in justice to Mazzini, that many of the disastrous revolutionary attempts made by his partisans received no encouragement from him. In the noted case of the brothers Bandiera it is probable that he did his best to dissuade them from their fatal enterprise.

² *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna*.

³ Patience was at that moment the most necessary quality in Italian politics ; it was essential that some turn should be given to the political kaleidoscope before anything could be attempted. It was at this time that Charles Albert had the famous medal struck bearing the device : “ J’attends mon astre.”

already showing symptoms of following the stream of the popular movement. D'Azeglio exposed the situation of Romagna to the King, and told him that many leading men had expressed concurrence in his ideas of progressive improvement, and of a national movement to free Italy under the leadership of Sardinia. Charles Albert replied to him in the following words: "Tell those gentlemen to remain quiet and to avoid a rising, as nothing can be done at present; but let them be certain that when the time comes, my life, the lives of my sons, my sword, my treasury, my army shall all be devoted for the Italian cause."¹

The sympathy of Charles Albert, thus early shown² may lend sufficient point to the following observation: that of the two Italian parties the one was revolutionary and democratic, the other conservative and aristocratic. Although an equal hatred of the foreign domination, and an equal pride in their Italian blood animated both Mazzinians and Albertists, yet in their opposite aspirations and aims,—of a republic, of a federation of Princes, of an Italy freed by her own unassisted force,—they were unable to combine a united effort, and sought in mutual distrust, recrimination, and intrigue the extinction of their opponent's cause, while that of their country suffered, and well-nigh perished.

The brief sketch that has just been given of the rise of the two great streams of Italian opinion will serve to show more clearly the fatal trend that the affairs of Rome took shortly after the election of her new Sovereign. For although the reasons that dictated

¹ D'Azeglio, *Recollections*, ii. 482.

² Charles Albert appears to have accepted Pius in his character of a national leader from the very first. See the King's correspondence with Villamarina given by Cantù, *op. cit.* ii. 712.

the grant of the Amnesty were chiefly local and individual to the Pope, yet, from that time on, the issues involved in the relations of Pius with his subjects tended to become less local and more general, more national.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY MONTHS OF THE PONTIFICATE—THE CONGRESS OF GENOA

Popularity of Pius—Difficulty of his position—The Gregorian party opposes him—Gizzi State Secretary—First attempts at reform—Sanfedist agitation—Failure of crops—Scientific Congresses—National enthusiasm.

IN the movement of enthusiasm that had broken out at Rome, and was thence fast spreading through the Pontifical States and Italy, the qualities of appearance, of graciousness, and of benevolence with which the new Pontiff was so largely indued, had become immensely magnified by public rumour and applause. Pius appeared to his astonished contemporaries as a personage of prodigious signification and power, whose virtue and wisdom and constructive force equalled that of a Solon or Numa, whose patriotism and enlightenment designated him as the liberal and liberating Pope. This was, unfortunately, far from being the case, and even had Pius been the great statesman Italian opinion for a moment believed him to be, it is doubtful whether he could have accomplished a tithe of what his subjects expected of him, or one-half of what was urgently necessary. For it was not only the terrible disorder of the administration of the Papal States that had to be grappled with, but a fundamental question of political

ethics, to which it was difficult to see how a Pope could furnish a reasonable answer without surrendering his throne. The matter is one that has animated the debates of many generations of theologians and others, and though one may well hesitate to enter a field of controversy tenanted by such subtle and acrimonious disputants, yet it is necessary to view, from an historical standpoint, some of the wider aspects of this interesting question. The authority of the Pope was twofold, temporal and spiritual,—of this world, and of the other. Spiritually he claimed an absolute supremacy and immunity from error ;¹ temporally, he ruled as a despot, with no other check than that of conscience. Was it possible to restrict the application of the Pope's infallibility of judgment to the spiritual field, and in that of civil administration to admit a totally opposite fundamental principle? This was in effect the question that must necessarily arise from the introduction of any substantial reform based on the example offered by the better governed Italian States, or by the leading countries of western Europe, England and France. The slightest concession of an electoral right, be it only for a municipal council, and with the most restricted voter's qualification, at once set up a subject's judgment against the Sovereign's, a human judgment against the divine. Nor was there any loophole of escape from this terrible dilemma by devising any reasonable, or even arbitrary distinction to separate the ecclesiastical from the material questions that concerned the life of the people. An instant's reflection will show that at every

¹ This statement is only relatively accurate. The doctrine of the infallibility of the Catholic Church is very ancient, but a controversy long raged between Ultramontanes and Gallicans as to whether the decisions of Pope and bishops, or of the former alone, were to be taken as those of the Church, and as immune from error. It was decided in the latter sense in 1870.

point there was a close association and intermingling that made such a distinction a practical impossibility.¹

If, therefore, the Papacy was to advance along the path of nineteenth-century European reform it was evident that, quite apart from any immediate success attained, a large party within the Church must sooner or later become opposed to a policy that would necessarily appear self-derogatory and self-destructive, that would insult their faith, impair their prestige, and curtail their advantages. That party was ready formed ; the unmistakable tendencies of the new reign soon roused it to a state of great activity.

The Amnesty had not long been proclaimed when the Pope, much to the satisfaction of the public, and notwithstanding the opposition of many of the Cardinals, appointed Gizzi Secretary of State (August 8th). We have already seen that this Cardinal had played a humane and moderate part in the troubles of Romagna, had been the popular candidate for the Papal throne, and had even for a few hours been thought elected ; it may now be added that he was eighty-nine years of age, and, though doubtless capable of governing tolerably well a small Italian city or province, was totally devoid of the clearness of view, firmness of character, and extended experience that are necessary in a statesman ; his chief concern while in office was to be a constant solicitude for the susceptibilities of the College of Cardinals.²

Nevertheless the public bestowed its approval on the appointment, for such was the temper of the people of Rome that nothing their new Sovereign did could come

¹ Take for obvious examples matters concerning divorce, marriage, testamentary dispositions, etc. See also in Chap. VII the remarks on the Roman Constitution of 1848.

² Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 131. Gizzi had won the praise of D'Azeglio, *Ultimi casi di Romagna*, 63.

amiss. They repeated at frequent intervals the ovations that the proclamation of the Amnesty had first provoked, and Pius on his side was not slow in showing the pleasure he derived from the renewed acclamations of the populace. One of the facts that made the greatest impression on the Romans was the benevolent reception given by the Pope to several of the persons who had been pardoned.¹

Alongside of this demonstrative and emotional side of the operations of the Pontifical Government, other apparently more serious business was taken in hand. Committees of ecclesiastics were formed to examine various questions of urgent necessity,—railroads and telegraphs, matters commercial, financial, and fiscal; and Cardinal Gizzi addressed a circular letter to the provincial authorities requesting them to put forward proposals for various administrative and social improvements. Discussions were lengthy, practical results, save in a measure at the Treasury, non-apparent.²

Still these steps of the Government, illusive as they were, served as food for discussion, as a bait and encouragement to the people, and every reform, actual or imagined, was placed to the credit of Pius. So great had the enthusiasm for the Pope become that it can only be properly described as a cult; the leading musician of Italy, Rossini, composed a hymn in honour of Pius, and his face was reproduced on handkerchiefs, brooches, and dresses.³ “If the Pope reopened the Academy of the

¹ *Journal des Débats*, quoted by *London Times*, September 2nd, 1846. He gave frequent audiences to travellers; on February 24th, 1847, Cobden was received, which gave rise to much comment.

² Farini, *op. cit.* i. 184.

³ These articles were not everywhere well received. At Naples a tradesman who had imported a bale of handkerchiefs bearing the head of Pius had them confiscated by the police. *London Times*, February 12th, 1847. The best known of all the veterans of the Italian revolutions, the ex-Carbonaro General G. Pepe, actually contemplated dedicating his Memoirs to the Pope.—Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 93.

Lincei," says Farini, "it was acclaimed a miracle, as though the Parliament of universal civilization was being inaugurated; if commercial associations, night schools, orphanages, reading rooms were permitted,—it was declared a portent. . . . It was an adulatory, congratulatory conspiracy in which all men took part, and that deluded the Sovereign himself, rejoiced at the universal happiness and at the adoration of his subjects. . . ." ¹

In such an atmosphere, the voice of rumour grew daily in importance. It soon became reported, and believed, that the Pope was secretly in favour of an Italian war of independence, in fact that he had completely adopted the ideas of Gioberti and the Albertists. This belief gradually gained greater consistency as the Government, pursuing its even-handed course of benevolent inaction, took no measures to repress the anti-Austrian cries that were now frequently heard.

But the rapidly-growing nationalist fervour of the liberals, and the extraordinary popularity acquired by the Pope among the Roman people, only presented one side of the picture; there was also a reverse. Margaret Fuller, who was residing among the Alban hills, relates in a letter to Emerson, how she questioned one of the peasantry she chanced to meet in the fields about the new Pope, and asked for an opinion of him. "Un gran Carbonaro," was the immediate answer. That peasant was typical of a large number of the Pontifical subjects. Among the Centurioni and Sanfedisti, among the country clergy who directed their operations and devotions, among the holders of sinecures and of government appointments, among Abates, Mon-

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* i. 186.

signori and Cardinals,¹ there was a general opinion that Pius was, if not exactly a Carbonaro, at all events something dangerously near it. At Genoa it required all the efforts of Cardinal Tadini to restrain a portion of the clergy from offering prayers for the conversion of the Pope,² and in the Pontifical States armed men assembled at tap of drum to defend the Church against the liberals, and Pius was actually denounced as the secret head of the Giovane Italia.³

The crops had failed for the second year in succession (1846-1847),⁴ and in the autumn and winter the dissatisfaction and unrest arising from this cause was assiduously fostered by the factions and secret associations. But as the liberals were generally speaking townsmen, and the clericals countrymen, it was usually the latter party that found ready to hand the most necessary elements of rebellion and civil war. Chief among the Gregorian Cardinals who openly encouraged Sanfedist activity was Della Genga, a nephew of Leo

¹ According to Abercromby, British Minister at Turin, the majority of the Cardinals were already hostile to Pius.

² Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 118.

³ Rey quotes from a Sanfedist proclamation the following passage:—"The religion of Christ is in danger. The interloper Mastai is its desecrator, and seeks to destroy it. Worshippers of the true God cannot longer tolerate such a reproach," *Histoire de la Renaissance politique de l'Italie*, 192. On September 19th, 1846, there was a sanguinary encounter between the two parties at Forli.—Tivaroni, *op. cit.* ii. 275.

⁴ From the autumn of 1846 through the following winter and spring the price of grain rose very high in western Europe, chiefly in France, England, and Germany. In the first-named country the price of the hectolitre of wheat rose from something less than twenty-four francs to more than double; the average price between 1797 and 1830 having been about eighteen francs (*La Presse*, quoted by *London Times*, January 1st, 1847). The movement of grain was chiefly from east to west, and principally from Odessa to Marseilles, though large shipments were made from the United States to England. Italian wheat, though there was little enough of it, was largely bought up, and a great part of that produced in the Papal States found an outlet at Ancona, which was a free port with extensive granaries and important commercial relations with England. On January 1st, 1847, Cardinal Gizzi issued a decree prohibiting the exportation of grain at this port, but it remained a dead letter.

XII; among others who were noteworthy opponents of the Government were Cardinals Orioli and Odescalchi, strong supporters of the Jesuits and of Austria.

Della Genga was connected with the secret society of the *Ferdinandeï*, and worked strenuously to convert the unrest of the peasantry to political uses. But it is doubtful whether the Cardinal, or any other of the reactionary leaders, either knew precisely what they wanted, or possessed sufficient ability to turn the semi-anarchy of the provinces into a successful anti-liberal movement. Although assassination and outrage flourished, and the Government appeared helpless, yet a state of actual civil war was never quite reached.¹

While the affairs of the Pontifical States remained in this undecisive and unsatisfactory position, the closing months of the year 1846 had witnessed several occurrences in the north of Italy that were to have a very direct bearing on the future course of the slowly-forming national movement, on the future destinies of the Peninsula and of Rome.

In 1839 an assemblage of representative Italians from the various States had been brought together for the first time; ² it was a congress of scientists, and met

¹ The year 1845 marked the opening of a series of bad harvests and consequent distress in western Europe which had a very close connection with the political troubles of 1848. No country was so sorely visited as Ireland, and the sufferings of the peasantry from famine in the winter of 1845-1846 led directly to Sir Robert Peel's repeal of the Corn Laws in the following spring. This measure attracted the keen attention of all the statesmen of the Continent; it also served indirectly to make matters worse in other countries in the bad years that followed, owing to the throwing open of the British ports. It may be added that Peel was defeated, and a Lansdowne Cabinet, with Palmerston at the Foreign Office, was formed, and took office within a few days of the election of Pius.

² It so happened that in the same year the first of the Italian railroads was built. Their extension was to prove an operation of the greatest national importance, for, as D'Azeglio picturesquely put it, they served to "stitch up the boot."

at Pavia. This meeting was supposed to have no political significance ; but even if politics were not openly discussed, the assembly could be viewed in no other light than national, and that to many appeared a great matter. This first Congress had been repeated in other cities, and had become an annual and popular institution ; and although the one held in 1845 had not achieved much success in the Bourbon-poisoned atmosphere of Naples, yet in the following year no less than two thousand Italian scientists and men of education assembled at Genoa for the ostensible purpose of discussing the position of scientific progress. And for the first time in the history of these Congresses Papal subjects received permission to attend.

But in 1846 science had for once to be content with a very subordinate position,¹ even her most enthusiastic exponents and votaries deserted her, and the Congress of Genoa quickly resolved itself into a great national demonstration. Charles Albert and the Sardinian Government did nothing to restrain the ardour of the Congress, and the King was loudly acclaimed by its members as by common consent the leader of Italy.

How far he was prepared to go at that time is a matter for doubt ; he was at all events wavering, and not disinclined to allow the popular sentiment to place him in the position designated by Gioberti, and by the voice of the people.

Among the Romans who travelled to Genoa none made themselves more conspicuous than Charles Lucien Bonaparte, Prince of Canino. This nephew of the great Emperor was a distinguished ornithologist, in which capacity he had attended the Congress. Tradi-

¹ "The Congress of Genoa achieved even less than any of the others from a scientific point of view."—Marco Monghetti, *Miei Ricordi*, i. 203.

tionally a supporter of the Papacy,¹ the Prince of Canino had contracted the prevalent nationalist fever in its most virulent form; he was somewhat eccentric and irresponsible in his actions,² and, carried away by his enthusiasm, he publicly announced that the Pope would like to see the next of the scientific reunions take place in the Pontifical States, perhaps at Bologna, in the following year. This was in reality far from being the wish of Pius or of his advisers, and this alarming indiscretion had to be officially explained away.

The proceedings of the scientific Congress, the demonstrations it had provoked, and the growing popularity of Charles Albert with all classes of Italians encouraged the Sardinian Government, now drifting towards strained relations with Austria, to sanction the celebration by the Genoese of the one-hundredth anniversary of their expulsion of the Imperial troops from their city in 1746. No political manifesto could have been clearer or more provocative in its intention than this. The people of Genoa were not slow to make the most of the loosened reins thrown to them by the Government. Together, with a crowd of visitors from every part of Italy who had flocked to the city, they shouted, "Viva Carlo Alberto," "Viva Pio Nono," and, "Fuori Tedeschi," until they were hoarse, and the illuminations of the City of Palaces were repeated by beacons from a hundred hill-tops to the most distant parts of Tuscany and Romagna. It must have appeared

¹ The first Prince of Canino was a great friend of Pius VII. One day that he and his son were with the Pope, he laid his hand on the boy's head and said, "The child shall be the Confaloniere of the Church; he will be like his father."—Silvagni, *op. cit.* iii. 47.

² The Prince of Canino had such a reputation for telling lies that at Rome it became customary to call a particularly big one a *caninata*, Minghetti, *op. cit.* i. 203. Is it not possible that Minghetti was mistaken as to the origin of the expression, and that a distinguished archæologist's reputation is really involved?

certain to many who gazed at the flickering flames along the horizon that the hour of the national war of liberation against Austria was fast approaching. The manifestations of Genoa had their echo in the Pontifical States, and at Ravenna, close to the Lombard-Venetian border, the Austrian arms were publicly insulted ; the Government showed the same benign weakness in dealing with these insults to a powerful neighbour as it had in every other matter.

There lay the danger. If possibility there were that a liberal Pope could bring the Roman Theocracy into line with the political ideals and methods then in fashion in western Europe, the qualities he evidently required were matureness and breadth of judgment, delicate tact, and, above all, firmness and strength. In every one of these qualities Pius was deficient ; but even had it been otherwise, even had those qualities that were his been added to those of a Manin or Cavour, his chance of success would have remained very doubtful. Without aim, without nerve, the Papal Government drifted through the winter of 1846-1847, too fettered by tradition and predilection to purge the bureaucracy that hampered its every movement, too ignorant to deal with the pressing economic questions that threatened to rouse the people to revolt, too unsated with an unusual joy to resist the insidious temptation of Roman acclamations.

CHAPTER V

THE JESUITS AND THE PEOPLE

Opposing forces—Europe and the Jesuits—Rossi's mission and success—Popular opinion—Ciceroacchio—The Italian League—The Press—The Council of State—The first Ministry—Cardinal Antonelli—Civic guards—The Sanfedist conspiracy—Tumults—Ferretti succeeds Gizzi—Austria occupies Ferrara.

ALONGSIDE of numerous real or imaginary party divisions and shades of opinion, two strong political forces were rapidly becoming all-important at Rome ; one of them new, uncertain, uninformed, and very evident, the other ancient, skilled, wary, and secret. The first may be identified with the large mass of the people who, whether spontaneously following the dictates of their own excited sentiments, or obediently acting on the signals of popular leaders, made the demonstrations that guided the action of the Government ; the other was that veiled and secret power that had for many centuries sucked into its own dark vortex all the directing force, intelligence, and purposeness of the Catholic Church,—that of the Jesuits and their allies. Deep and devious was their way, nearly undistinguishable their track ; but difficult as it may be to determine the precise relation of their deadly, and often unguessed influence on this, or that other event, the overwhelming mass of accumulated facts attaches to their name a general connection with

many acts that bear the impress of their unscrupulous and unswerving genius. Jealousy, persecution, and dislike, had followed the steps of this most remarkable and dangerous of all secret societies in every country, and testified to its reputed power. Nearly every government of Europe had at one time or another expelled the Jesuits, only to see them return ; and even the total suppression of the Order by Pope Clement XIV in the latter half of the eighteenth century, had not been maintained by his successors. Authority, as represented by the Pope, by the Catholic Church, and more especially by their Society, was the creed of the Jesuits ; and in maintaining it against the encroachments of lay intelligence, civil power and religious dissent, their highly-trained consciences were led to admit and approve the use of the most subtle, and even criminal means. Unmarked by any badge or distinctive dress, with lay associates as well as clerical, they were to be found in every rank of life, generally intelligent, frequently ambitious, without exception zealous, disciplined, and yielding unquestioned obedience to the General of the Order. They had rightly recognised in education the most powerful of all means of influence ; and the evil but effective methods of mental dominion they employed and inculcated in their schools and seminaries, their knowledge of the human heart acquired in the confessional, the secrecy and centralization of their activity, combined to make of the Jesuits a force greater and more enduring than that of Kings and Emperors, greater than that of the Head of the Catholic Church himself.

The Popes had generally been the friends and protectors of the Society, for in its members they had found ready to their hand a powerful, yet unobtrusive

instrument. Secret in their ways, more anxious to disappear behind the pomp of the throne, than to obscure it by the announcement of their achievements,—striving more to bring new splendour and strength to the Papacy than to earn worldly rewards that had little attraction for them, it was not long before the Jesuits proved themselves the strongest defence of the Papacy, the greatest power in the Catholic world.

In the years that immediately preceded the accession of Pius IX, the Society of Jesus had been sorely pressed. In Spain, several periods of success and failure had alternated; in France, it had been entirely defeated, and had been compelled to close its establishments. Thiers had led the attack in the Chamber of Deputies,¹ and Louis Philippe and his minister Guizot had sent a special envoy to Rome to negotiate the matter with the Holy See. Count Pellegrino Rossi, who had been intrusted with this delicate mission, was only a naturalized Frenchman, having been born a Papal subject.² When a young professor of jurisprudence at Bologna in 1815, he had been one of those few Romagnols who had thrown in their lot with Murat when he attempted to face the Austrians. King Joachim appointed Rossi Administrator of Bologna, but, on the speedy collapse of the Muratist movement, he had been compelled to seek safety in exile.³ As a jurist and philosopher he won reputation

¹ His great speech of May 2nd, 1845, contains a remarkable exposition of the relations between the French and Papal Governments in matters ecclesiastical (Thiers, *Discours Parlementaires*, vi. 617). The history of the Jesuit negotiations belongs to the reign of Gregory XVI, and can find no place here.

² On Rossi's return to Rome after his long exile he wrote: "The national sentiment has so grown in thirty years that even I, who thought I knew the country, was astonished."—Rey, *op. cit.* 175.

³ So far back as 1829, Rossi published a pamphlet in which he put forward the argument, used later by Gioberti, that an Italian national movement must be based on the action of a military power.

at Geneva and later, at Paris ; no man was better fitted by his ability, personal qualities, and knowledge of the intricacies of jurisprudence to obtain the Pope's consent to the closing of the Jesuit establishments in France. Gregory, notwithstanding his secret leanings and the influence brought to bear on him, compelled by the irresistible cogency and pertinacity of the French envoy, shaken by the general consensus of European opinion, had finally consented to the demands of the French Government.

But the Jesuits kept up the struggle, as they had on more than one such occasion before, with an obstinacy that appeared to increase with ill-success. The attacks made on them by such writers as Michelet and Gioberti were answered by their pamphleteers, Curci, Taparelli, and Pellico¹ ; their newspapers, such as the *Univers*, poured forth misrepresentations for the due instruction of the faithful ; while at Rome itself, at the headquarters of the Church, they clung with the courage of desperation to the Papacy, and strove to indissolubly identify themselves with its essential principles and interests. The Cardinal Vicar Odescalchi was perhaps the most conspicuous and well-known member of the Order, but the General, the Dutch Father Rothaan, wielded supreme authority.

The government offices, the police, and the Curia were strongholds of the Jesuits, and their influence was large and membership numerous, among the foreign prelates resident at Rome and the diplomatic corps. For the Society worked on an international basis, and who would seize the secret of their obscure machinations must closely watch the responsive indications of Vienna, Paris, Frankfort,

¹ Brother of Silvio Pellico.

and Madrid.¹ Among the foreign Prelates at Rome who acted as agents of the Society may be mentioned Monsignor de Falloux, whose brother, also a strong supporter of the Jesuits, became a minister under the presidency of Prince Louis Bonaparte²; among the diplomats, the name of the Bavarian Minister, Count Spaur, may be singled out,—it will not infrequently recur in the course of succeeding chapters.³

A complete contrast to the power of the Jesuits was that proceeding from the popular enthusiasm. With the constant, but rarely insistent, fixity of purpose of the first, might be contrasted the impetuosity of the mob, setting up a divinity one day, hurling it down the next, always at the mercy of its own immaturity of judgment and narrow vision, or of the garrulous oratory it spontaneously generated. Misled by its ignorance, superstition, and prejudice, it was one day for the Pope, another for the moderates, another for the republicans, another for whoever would lead against the hated Austrians; but on nearly all days emotional and easily swayed, at the mercy of a religious inspiration or instigation, and always, be it said, most deeply moved and furthest led by an appeal to virtue or an example of heroism. Such a force as this can therefore be appropriately described as contrasting with, and not necessarily as opposed to that of the Jesuits; for though generally in opposition, the occasions did not

¹ The hold of the Jesuits at Frankfort and in South Germany was principally religious; at Vienna, where they were strongest, political.

² See De Falloux, *Mémoires*; also Debidour, *L'Eglise et l'Etat*, Chapter V. (*L'expédition de Romé et la loi Falloux*).

³ Nearly as important as Count Spaur was the beautiful Countess, a Roman by birth and twice married to foreigners. Her first husband was the well-known English archæologist Edward Dodwell, author of *A Tour through Greece* and other works. The Countess was attractive, and received much attention; she was thoroughly retrograde and Austrian in sentiment. The Spaur were both active Jesuit agents.—Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 360; Silvagni, *op. cit.* vol. iii.

fail to arise when the superior craft of the latter enabled them to turn the energies of the unsuspecting mob into a previously chosen channel, and thus, if only for a brief period or particular purpose, to irresistibly combine the two forces into one.

The necessary and inevitable consequence of freedom of speech is eloquence, if Emerson may be believed; the concessions of a liberalizing Pope certainly produced a latter-day Cicero, or *Ciceroacchio*, as the Romans dubbed him; his real name was Angelo Brunetti. A man of many trades, whose concern had been principally with horses, hotels, and wine,¹ and who had acquired some substance, Brunetti, or *Ciceroacchio* as he will henceforth be called, was tall, fair, bearded, handsome, loud-voiced, garrulous, and assertive; he lived in the neighbourhood of the Piazza del Popolo. He was a social man, with a large circle of acquaintance in every quarter of Rome, full of a sense of his own dignity, but withal the best of all good fellows, generous and charitable.² From the beginning of the new Pontiff's reign none had made themselves more conspicuous for their zeal and for their applause of the measures and motives of Pius. The Italian people are peculiarly susceptible to the influence of sound, and of that no Roman could produce more in quantity or variety than *Ciceroacchio*; the growth of his popularity was therefore rapid under the benevolent rule of Cardinal Gizzi, and it was not long before he had to be reckoned with as a power in the State. Here is what Mr. Petre

¹ All sorts of vocations have been given as that of Brunetti, chiefly those of wine merchant and hotel-keeper; *Oliphant* alone suggests wood-seller. The best opinion would appear to be that he turned his attention to more than one means of making money. It can, however, be stated with certainty that in the winter of 1846-47 Brunetti was carrying on the business of a livery-stable keeper; see the very direct testimony of *Minghetti*, *op. cit.* i. 319.

² *Farini*, *op. cit.* i. 188.

says of him, in a dispatch addressed to Lord Palmerston, dated Rome, July 21st, 1847: “. . . The influence of one individual of the lower class, Angelo Brunetti, hardly known but by his nickname of Ciceroacchio, has for the last month kept the peace of the city more than any power possessed by the authorities, from the command which he exerts over the populace.” It was Ciceroacchio, and a small group of men of his class possessing influence in the various quarters of Rome, who made themselves the interpreters and leaders of the public sentiment aroused by the accession of Pius to the Pontifical throne.

The sudden outburst of feeling that had carried the Roman people to the Quirinal on the memorable night of the 16th of July 1846, had had its sequel; but the noisy demonstrations that continuously followed the footsteps of the Pope were gradually changing in character, gaining in objectivity what they were losing in spontaneity. The Roman people soon began to show the peculiar grain of exaggeration and scepticism that may be found in the Italian character, and if their demonstrations showed no outward abatement of zeal, the note of sincerity soon began to weaken.¹

The quick perceptions of his subjects had instinctively and nearly instantaneously realized the weakness of Pius. As long as they could successfully flatter his vanity and gratify his benevolent sentiments, so long might they hope to lead him in the direction they desired, and draw him away from that other path towards which stronger intellects than his own and all the instincts, traditions, and necessities of Papal authority were bound to eventually urge him. The acclama-

¹ Madame de Staël says of the Italians: “Ils aiment l'exaggeration de tout, et n'éprouvent le sentiment vrai de rien.”

tions of the multitude were fast becoming a delicate, but unerringly employed, political weapon ; the Pope's popularity was being insensibly converted into the instrument of his destruction.

In the early part of the year 1847 the progress of affairs was marked by the rapid development of the nationalist movement along the lines advocated by Gioberti. The Pope and Charles Albert were to jointly lead the new Italy, and discussion centred on the means whereby a league or federation of the Italian States could be constituted as a first or tentative step. Whatever baits committees of Cardinals or Monsignori might throw out, in the form of reports on railroad projects, or on legal reform, the cry of public opinion was for national institutions, and a national closing up of ranks.

In March the censorship on the Press was greatly relaxed by an edict of Cardinal Gizzi, and the activity of editors and publishers consequently increased. Earlier in the year the weekly *Contemporaneo* had made its appearance ; it soon passed into the hands of Doctor Sterbini, an advanced radical and indifferent poet ; at first this paper professed moderate liberal and nationalist opinions, and occasionally published articles by such writers as Gioberti and Galeotti. Among other journals, *Il Felsineo* deserves notice for the widely-read articles that appeared in its columns on matters economic and political ; they were mostly the work of a young Bolognese, whose future career was very distinguished, Marco Minghetti. Among the others, only the *Diario di Roma* and *Bilancia* need be mentioned ; the latter was under the control of Cardinal Orioli, and represented the opinions of the retrograde party.¹

¹ For the Roman newspapers, see Bibliography, Section II.

On April 14th appeared an edict announcing a first instalment of administrative reform, the creation of a Council of State. This measure was not a very decided step towards popular or representative government, for it merely provided for the appointment by the Pope of Councillors who were to represent districts; their nomination was to hold good for two years, and their functions were merely of a consultative order. Yet, whether the effect of the measure was misunderstood, or whether it was accepted as an augury of further progressive reforms to follow, it was hailed with the unanimous applause of press and people.

Those who saw in the Council of State but a step in the road of progress were not mistaken, for two months later, Pius gave form to another and even more remarkable novelty,—he constituted his first Ministry. It was composed as follows:—Cardinal Gizzi, Secretary of State, President and Minister of the Interior and for Foreign Affairs, ecclesiastic and secular; Cardinal Sforza, Industry and Commerce; Cardinal Massimo, Public Works; Monsignor Spada, Arms and War; Monsignor Grassellini, Police; and Cardinal Antonelli, Treasury. Of the composition of this extremely orthodox but not over-competent ministry only a few words need be said. Its leader, Cardinal Gizzi, was clearly overweighted, not only with years but with responsibilities; he might well be said to typify in his intellectual and physical feebleness the hopeless infirmity of the Papal system. Massimo, with one or two of the other members of the Ministry, was strongly retrograde, and represented the official or Gregorian interests. Most important of all, because of his personal abilities, was the treasurer, Antonelli; he had not then won the reputation that was to be his later, having

obtained his Cardinal's hat only three days before the publication of the *motu proprio* containing the appointment of the Ministry.

Antonelli was something more than a mere supporter of the Gregorian regime, for he had proved himself to be a painstaking administrator as well. He had restored some sort of order in the Treasury, and bowed a sufficient and passing assent to the liberalizing spirit of the new reign. With no reputation for sanctity, or even virtue,¹ his keen and strong practical sense was rapidly bringing him forward. He was closely connected with the Jesuits; for whether or not he was a member of the Society at this period, he was at all events in close and confidential relations with one of their members, Monsignor Tessieri, who was attached to him in the quality of secretary.²

Such was the curious ecclesiastical medley resulting from the first attempt at cabinet making of Pius IX.

Cardinal Gizzi met with no greater success as President of a Council of Ministers than he had before, and his administration was not of long duration,—it lasted something more than three weeks (June 14th to July 7th). During that brief period administrative reform within the Papal States remained in much the same position as before, the interested inertia of officialdom proving quite sufficient to neutralize the aspirations of both ruler and people; but events, connected with the presence in the Italian peninsula of the armed forces of a foreign enemy, began to move with some apparent rapidity, towards an end that a few clear-sighted men already foresaw.

¹ Antonelli was in the widest sense a man of the world. He was well known for his gallantries.—Silvagni, *op. cit.* iii.

² Antonelli was a numismatist, and Tessieri looked after his collection.—Silvagni, *op. cit.* iii. 308.

As a result, partly of the unrest of the provinces and of the system of terror pursued by the Gregorians and Centurioni against the liberals, partly of the tendency already shown by the Government to concede whatever was sufficiently loudly clamoured for, a popular movement had made considerable headway that aimed at the arming of the inhabitants of the towns as civic guards. This cry was artfully interwoven with those that proclaimed Pius the benefactor and leader of Italy, and many of those who loudly called for muskets made no secret of their hope of eventually discharging them at the Austrians.¹

The growth of the popular demand for a civic guard, and the increasingly emphatic manner in which it was being put forward, finally opened the eyes of the Government to the possibility of violence and sedition. The danger and impropriety of tolerating such a state of affairs was urged on the Pope and his Ministers by Count Lutzow, the Austrian ambassador. Finally, after a monster demonstration of which Ciceroacchio acted as director, in commemoration of the Pope's election in the previous year, an edict was unexpectedly issued (June 22nd), whereby public meetings were prohibited for the stated reason that they interrupted the studies of youth, and disturbed the work of public functionaries! Nothing could have been more childish,

¹ Italian enthusiasm finds a natural outlet in exclamation and song. There were many popular hymns to Pius, all of a more or less fervently religious and nationalist character. From one of these productions the following are two typical lines—

Benedetta la santa bandiera,
Che il Vicario di Christo inalzo.

“Blessed may the holy banner be,—raised by the Vicar of Christ” (Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 131). Cooper Key, in his *Memoirs*, notes the cry of some of the Roman peasantry—

Viva Pio Nono
E basso Metternich!

ill-judged, or ill-timed than this abrupt and ridiculously worded confession of weakness. The agitation among the people rose to fever heat under the inspiration of Ciceroacchio and the other popular leaders. The word soon passed that not the Pope, but his retrograde advisers, were responsible for the edict; that the measure was but a step in a great Sanfedist conspiracy, of which the first acts of revenge and massacre were being already enacted in the provinces; that in Pius, but in Pius alone, Pius without his councillors, lay the people's hope. "Viva Pio Nono solo!" was the shout with which the excited people of Rome greeted the perturbed Pontiff's ears as he passed along the Corso on the following day. Before the storm of public anxiety and agitation the Government gave way, and on July 5th conceded the civic guard; two days later Cardinal Gizzi abandoned the stormy field of politics, and was succeeded by Cardinal Gabriel Ferretti.

This change of advisers served but little to allay the popular excitement which had now reached a very dangerous point; the anniversary of the Amnesty was close at hand, and a crisis was felt to be approaching.

Strong pressure had been brought to bear on the Pope to obtain permission for the public rejoicings with which it was intended to celebrate the anniversary of the great event of the year before, and he had felt unable to withhold his consent. Had he refused that permission, it does not appear probable that the course of the events that followed would have been appreciably modified. Rumours of the wildest kind were circulating, and it was widely credited that the Centurioni had arranged all the details of a vast conspiracy that aimed at the total extirpation of the liberals. The walls of Rome were placarded with the names of Sanfedist

Cardinals and their abettors,¹ and on July 11th the Government thought it advisable to parade a large force of soldiers and carabinieri² in the streets, which highly exasperated the people and nearly brought about an actual outbreak. On the 14th, however, nothing serious happened, but on the following day the mob, finding that military precautions had been omitted, seized the opportunity and resorted to violence. Gregorians, or such as bore the reputation, were seized, houses of supposed Sanfedists were broken into and ransacked; disorder had nearly become revolution, and, for a brief space, Ciceroacchio was the ruler of Rome. Fortunately little blood was spilt; the principal objects of the popular anger fled from the city; the troops and police succeeded in restoring order, and Cardinal Ferretti, though nominally successful, thought it prudent to bow before the storm. He appointed the liberal Morandi Governor of Rome, in the place of the retrograde Grasselini who had fled, and, in the course of the next few days, ordered a number of arrests³ and the dismissal of certain subordinate officials who were obnoxious to the people.

¹ The *Sémaphore de Marseilles*, quoted by the London *Times*, gives the following as the text of one of the placards posted in Rome:

“NOTICE TO THE PEOPLE.

Instructions of Cardinal Lambruschini and Colonel Nardoni, left to the last-mentioned for the execution of the popular tragedy.—Infamous actors—Monsignor Grasselini, Governor General of the police of Rome.—Colonel Freddi, President of the famous military Commission at the mournful period, 1844.—Lieutenants Gianuci, Sangiorgi, and Benvenuti, assistants of Monsignor Grasselini.—Minardi, the celebrated spy.—Vincenzo Moroni, brother of the inspector general of the Post Office.—Chevalier Bertola. Sergeant Pontini.—The three sons of the notorious spy, Galanti—Fier Avanti Patoca.—All are devoted to the eternal execration of the people.”—See also Tivaroni, *op. cit.* ii. 290.

² A semi-military police, like the French *gendarmérie*.

³ “Colonel Freddi, Minardi, and Blai, with about eighty others, were captured and placed in prison” (London *Times*, August 11th, 1847). They all appear to have been quietly released later.

The Government's full acquiescence in the popular view as to the great conspiracy was certified by the appointment of a special Commission to investigate all its circumstances.¹ Thus relative calm was re-established, and general congratulations were exchanged on the danger to the State so happily averted by the action of the people.

But at the very moment in which Cardinal Ferretti was succeeding in allaying the excitement of the population of Rome, a startling and unexpected event of the utmost gravity came to complicate anew an already very difficult position; on July 17th, 1500 Austrian troops were marched into the Papal city of Ferrara.

¹ Farini, in his first volume, gives a spirited account of these transactions. As to the real existence of a great Sanfedist conspiracy no more than this can be suggested. In the strict sense of the word there was none, that is, there was no specific organized plot to do some one prearranged thing. But there was a loose conspiracy, a general semi-spontaneous action, of which the ramifications reached from Rome, through Romagna, to Vienna, and of which a few clever intriguers did their best to control the workings. In some of its features the Popish plot of 1678 offers an interesting parallel, especially in regard to the predisposed state of public opinion. As to the existence of a conspiracy, a similar observation to that of Hallam's on the Popish plot might fairly be made. See *Constitutional History of England*, ii. 571, the passage beginning, "It is first to be remembered . . ."

CHAPTER VI

THE AFFAIR OF FERRARA

Austria and Italy—Metternich—England and Canning—France under Guizot—Austrian alarm and policy—Reports of Menz—Hesitations of Metternich—Radetzky occupies Ferrara—Diplomatic aspect—Effects of the Austrian move—Palmerston's views—Gregorian influence at Vienna—Ferretti's policy—The Customs Union Treaty—Death of Father Graziosi—Speech of Pius at the opening of the Consulta.

IF, from the point of view of Metternich, the election of a liberal Pope was the greatest misfortune of the age, from that of the liberals, the Austrian domination over Italy, and the political system of the Holy Alliance imposed on her, constituted an at least equal calamity. From the fortresses of the great Quadrilateral,¹ flanked on either hand by the rich provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, the disciplined arms of the Austrian Empire weighed on the whole Peninsula. Equally ready to chastise Sardinia, to assist the princes of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine who occupied the thrones of Modena, Parma, and Tuscany, to maintain the authority of Pope, or Bourbon, in central and southern Italy, the vast military strength of the Hapsburgs had apparently crushed out the political vitality of Italy. As with arms, so with diplomacy, Austria was supreme. The

¹ Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, Legnago.

most experienced, the most wary and foreseeing of European statesmen had for forty years directed her policy ; and by the inflexible and remorseless application of the principles of the Holy Alliance to the international contracts embodied in the treaty of Vienna, Austria had been exalted to the position of the triumphant champion of the principle of immobility. To maintain the prescriptive and divine rights of princes, and the decisions arrived at by outraged and powerful vested interests, at the time of fullest reaction from the liberal movement that had culminated in the excesses of the French Revolution, was the sole and consistent aim of Austrian diplomacy. Ever since the fall of Napoleon, Metternich had dominated in the councils of Europe by his superiority of intellect, of logic, and of strength. Ministers, who might otherwise have entered the path of progress, were drawn by means of his overpowering influence into compliance with the pleasant policy of immobility so dear to diplomat statesmen.

But the success that had long attended the Austrian Foreign Minister was more apparent than real ; and even open rebuffs had been not a few. England alone of the great Powers, although under the spell of a violent anti-revolutionary panic, had, after some hesitation, declined to accede to the Holy Alliance ; Canning, who succeeded Castlereagh at the Foreign Office, had righted the helm and set his country's momentarily deflected course once more towards progress ; from that moment Metternich could no longer entertain hopes of drawing England into his policy. At the time of the election of Pius, a change of government had given the charge of England's foreign affairs to a statesman of considerable attain-

ments and of unimpeachably liberal temperament,— Lord Palmerston ; and if a comparison may be instituted between two such dissimilar men as the British and the Austrian Ministers, it may be said that the former could not be placed in the same category as the latter for judgment, foresight, and diplomatic skill, but that he altogether excelled him in that to very real abilities he added the strength that comes from a principle of conduct based on the interests of the people, of progress, and of humanity.

If Metternich had seen England gradually escape from the sphere of policy of the Holy Alliance, he had been more fortunate in retaining the support of a succession of French statesmen. For a time, in 1830 and 1831, after the elder branch of the House of Bourbon had been finally driven from Paris, Franco-Austrian relations had become strained, and it had for a moment appeared as though under the new Orleans dynasty, France would follow the path on which England showed the way, and break from the policy of the three great Powers of the north. These liberal proclivities of the new French Government soon passed. Although Louis Philippe owed his election to the throne to the intrigues of a party whose views were liberal, no sooner was his crown secure than he inclined towards a policy which, in respect of foreign affairs, differed but little from that pursued by Louis XVIII and Charles X. Under the simplicity of manners that had won him popularity when he held no position in the State, Louis Philippe inherited a strain of Bourbon blood that was not to be denied. Compelled to guard himself against the more advanced liberals who were not satisfied at the change effected and aimed at proclaiming the Republic, his fears had also been aroused by the

spectre of Bonapartism displayed to him by Metternich in the person of the young Duke of Reichstadt.

He soon satisfied the Austrian Minister that no assault on his policy was likely to be threatened by France. Slowly but surely immobility became again the corner-stone of French statecraft, and, at the period we have now reached Prince Metternich could view with equanimity, and even with satisfaction, M. Guizot as supreme director of the destinies of France.¹

The light in which the Austrian Minister had regarded the election of Pius IX to the Papal throne has already been referred to. From the first, he alone of the statesmen of Europe appeared to unerringly grasp the full danger of the situation; and no sooner was the possibility of the amnesty apparent than he made strong representations on the subject at Rome.²

Following the natural bent of his masterful intellect, and the traditional line of Austrian policy in Italy, he early foresaw and prepared for the eventuality of an armed intervention; he was anxious to repress quickly, and viewed delay with deep misgiving. Under the smooth outward appearance of success that made of him and his policy the greatest visible force in Europe, Metternich perceived the progress that had quietly been made by liberalism. In his own Cabinet his decisions were no longer so unquestioningly accepted as had once been the case, and in Vienna itself, a certain amount of sympathy for the Italians and for the cause of progress was openly shown.³ He despondently wrote in a dispatch to Lutzow, that the thirty-nine years during which he had directed Austrian affairs had been

¹ Guizot was Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1840 until the revolution of 1848.

² Lord Cowley to Lord Palmerston, *British Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, lvii. 58.

³ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v. 401.

years "of flagrant revolution." It was this peculiar, but in a way perfectly logical point of view, that urged him to put an end to the Italian movement before it should have acquired alarming proportions.

Although Metternich had in due course officially expressed guarded approval of the reforms projected by Pius,¹ his diplomatic professions deceived no one as to his real sentiments.² His apprehensions as to Italian affairs had been strengthened by the reports sent to him by the chief of his system of secret information in Italy, one of his most trusted and confidential agents, Menz, who had for many years kept close watch on the political agitations of the Peninsula. Menz had always and consistently reported that he was perfectly well able to estimate and check all possible danger from conspirators, whether Carbonari, members of the Giovane Italia, or others. From 1833 to 1845, his reports had never varied as to this general conclusion, and his optimism had been steadily maintained. But writing on May 4th, 1846, he completely changed his tone, and, for the first time, expressed serious anxiety. It was not the doings of the secret societies that alarmed Menz, but the general ferment, the formation of a nationalist sentiment, and the fear lest some accident of politics might thrust Sardinia or some other Power into the position of champion of the cause of the Peninsula. By a curious coincidence, the death of Gregory occurred within less than a month of the signing of this report, and the political accident that Menz had

¹ Metternich, in the fifth volume of his *Memoirs*, plainly expresses the opinion that the Roman Government was detestable, and required some measures of reform.

² Marquis di Ricci, Sardinian Minister at Vienna, to Count Solar de la Marguerite, February 27th, 1847: ". . . Le Prince de Metternich est trop adroit et trop habile pour avouer avec sincérité toute sa pensée, aussi son langage officiel est il toujours une approbation de la politique du Saint Père."

half foreseen and wholly dreaded had come about, thereby confirming prognostications of evil that must have fully coincided with Metternich's own opinions.

An armed intervention was by no means a simple matter for Austria to undertake; it could hardly be thought of except with the consent of the Powers, and, so far as the States of the Church were concerned, at the request of the Pope.

But there were natural allies at Vienna, at Rome, and elsewhere, anxious to remove the obstacles that lay in Metternich's path. Much of the agitation in Romagna traceable to the influence of the Centurioni, or Ferdinandeï, was doubtless fostered with the hope that the fear of disorder would force Pius into a demand for Austrian assistance. Monsignor Viale, Papal Nuncio to the Court of Vienna, constantly affirmed that a request for intervention must be made, and so strong was Metternich's conviction that the Pope's position was illogical and untenable, that he for some time clung to the hope that it would be abandoned: "the Pope,—he declared,—must save the ruler of Rome and bring him back to us."¹

Such a state of affairs could not long continue; it was brought to an end by Marshal Radetzky, Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian forces in Italy, who issued orders for the occupation of the Papal city of Ferrara in virtue of a treaty right secured to Austria at the Congress of Vienna.

The reasons that dictated this strong move were complex. Impatience at the frequently-promised, but

¹ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v. 197. From so close to the Pope did support to Austria come, that such writers as Gabussi have not hesitated to declare that the occupation of Ferrara was actually approved by Pius, and that the subsequent negotiations were purely comedy.

never-realized, request for assistance from the Pope ; irritation at the anti-Austrian demonstrations and flagrant provocations of the Romagnol liberals, and perhaps especially of the Ferrarese ; expectation that a movement of troops might provoke an outbreak on the part of the newly-formed civic guards in the Papal States, which could lead to no other result than the intervention so ardently desired by Metternich, all these were doubtless among the motives that decided the action of the Austrian Commander.

However much the occupation of Ferrara might be open to criticism from other points of view, from that of strict international law it was perfectly defensible.

By Article CIII of the treaty of Vienna it was provided, among other things, that although the towns of Ferrara and Comacchio were within the boundaries of the States of the Church, yet the Emperor of Austria was to have the right of maintaining garrisons within them. But at Ferrara it was the citadel alone that the Austrians had occupied ; and that their troops should take possession of any portion of the town was contended to be a violation of Papal rights. The argument turned chiefly on the construction to be placed on one word of the treaty ; the paragraph dealing with the matter is to be found in Article CIII, and runs as follows :

“Sa Majesté Imperiale et Royale Apostolique, et ses Successeurs, auront droit de garnison dans les places de Ferrare et de Comacchio.”¹

What was the meaning to be attached to “*place de Ferrare*” ? Did it mean the citadel, or the whole of

¹ “His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and his successors, shall enjoy the right of maintaining garrisons in the positions of Ferrara and Comacchio.” There is not another word in the treaty of Vienna referring directly or indirectly to the question.

the fortified precincts of the city?—Metternich maintained that the wider interpretation was the correct one, basing his contention on the ordinary accepted military meaning of the word *place*,¹ and on the equally strong argument that, in the case of Comacchio where there was no citadel but only a fortified outer line of defence, there could be no question but that *place* applied to the whole town as included within its fortifications.² If, therefore, his interpretation of the word *place* agreed with both military usage and the conditions existing at one of the two towns, was there any sufficient ground for maintaining an unusual application of the term at the other? ³

But it was not in reality the diplomatic or technical aspect of the occupation of Ferrara that mattered most; what was of far more importance was the manner and the circumstances in which it was effected.

Since the death of Gregory, Radetzky, the veteran Commander of the Austro-Italian army,⁴ had made all his preparations for crossing the frontier and gratifying the military ardour of his young officers.⁵ When Bologna had formed a town guard, he had immediately

¹ According to Littré, *place* may mean among other things,—“Place fortifiée, ou simplement ville défendue . . . Place d’armes . . . Place d’armes se dit d’une ville frontière.”

² Palmerston attempted to uphold the opposite view, but his dispatches on the subject are far from convincing.

³ Discussion also turned on whether there had not been a tacit abandonment of right on the part of Austria. The reason why only the citadel of Ferrara was garrisoned was doubtless the great and disproportionate circumference of the walls. Greville who passed through in 1831, describes it as a vast desolate city with a population of 24,000 and a circumference of $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles (*Memoirs*, i. 405); and sixty years before, another traveller, Gibbon, had found it a “sad solitude.” Its population had decreased since the end of the eighteenth century.—Oppenheim, *Cisalpine Republic*, 121.

⁴ A large proportion of Radetzky’s 35,000 or 40,000 men were Italians, recruited by conscription. Many of them proved untrustworthy at a later period, which was perhaps not surprising.

⁵ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v. 6.

introduced a reinforcement into the citadel of Ferrara,¹ but quietly, and without ostentation. But when later he had determined to answer the anti-Austrian demonstrations of the Ferrarese by the dispatch of a considerable force, the entry of the troops was made in an unnecessarily provocative manner, the gunners actually carrying lighted artillery matches as they defiled through the streets of the city.²

The occupation of Ferrara did not produce the precise effect that had probably been anticipated by the Austrians. If Radetzky and Metternich hoped for a disorderly outbreak and attack that would have made intervention inevitable, they were disappointed. An outbreak certainly did occur, but it was more of feeling and resentment than of positive disorder. A wave of bitter hostility to the hereditary northern enemy was sent spreading throughout Italy that did not translate itself into a hopeless attack, but rather into a stronger fervour of national feeling, a more strenuous support for the only measure that appeared likely to afford a remedy for the woes of Italy,—the league under the dual guidance of the Pope and of Charles Albert that might eventually prove strong enough to drive out the hated foreigner.

But before tracing the successive steps that were to bring nearer accomplishment the object of the popular aspirations, it will be more convenient to follow the affair of Ferrara to its completion; save for what it may serve to show of the diplomatic situation, what remains to relate is comparatively unimportant.

The occupation of Ferrara was followed by protests

¹ *British Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 66.

² Report of Vice-Consul McAlister, July 18th, 1847, *British Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 103.

and negotiations suitable to the occasion ; Metternich, who was by no means prepared to fly in the face of the loudly expressed opinion of western Europe,¹ showed himself willing to discuss a compromise,² and finally, but not before the month of December had been reached, he agreed to have the Austrian troops withdrawn from the town into the citadel, but under express reservation of the Austrian Emperor's treaty rights.

In the diplomatic correspondence that the affair of Ferrara gave rise to, no one of the Ministers of Powers not directly interested took a more prominent part than Lord Palmerston. At Vienna the British Ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, proved unable to accurately gauge the diplomatic finesse of Metternich.³ Writing to his chief at a date when the occupation of Ferrara must have already been decided, if not ordered (July 14th), the British Ambassador emphatically stated his belief that the Papal Government had requested Austrian intervention in Romagna, though he was careful to add that Prince Metternich had not made such a statement in so many words.⁴

More than once about this time Ponsonby found himself compelled to alter his views from day to day ; but throughout his dispatches one may constantly trace the strong impress of the influence exercised by the remark-

¹ The first news of the entry of the Austrian troops was received with calm, even in Rome, see official note in *Diario*, July 24th ; it was only later when the provocative manner of the proceedings became known, that the affair assumed grave proportions. The value of Roman securities was scarcely affected ; in May they were quoted at 99½ on the Paris Bourse, and on August 9th they had been sold down to 94, recovering five days later to 100.

² It is reported, on not very good authority, that the Pope used a threat of excommunication as a means of bringing the Emperor to terms.

³ Ponsonby was a difficult man to deal with, as he had shown at Constantinople in 1840. He was deep in the counsels of Palmerston and had a brilliant reputation. Metternich called him "un fou," which may have been a compliment by implication.

⁴ *British Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 98.

able statesman who ruled the diplomatic salons of Vienna. With Lord Palmerston there may be noted a totally different style of writing from that of his subordinate. The British Foreign Secretary was vigorous, independent, and liberal, but perhaps not always very far-sighted. In the conflict of opinion that very soon arose between the two Cabinets, Metternich's position was twofold and well chosen. He claimed the right of upholding the stipulations agreed to by all the Powers at the Congress of Vienna, and he pleaded the necessity of maintaining order and of supporting governments established under the provisions of treaties to which Great Britain herself was a party. At the same time he strongly disclaimed any intention of permanent occupation, or of territorial aggrandizement. In opposition to these views Palmerston, while acknowledging the correctness of the first part of Metternich's position, expressed himself on the question of intervention in the following manner :—

“ With reference, however, to the posture of things in Italy, Her Majesty's Government would wish to observe that there is another right besides that of self-defence and self-maintenance which is inherent in independent sovereignty, and that is the right which belongs to the sovereign power in every State to make such reforms and internal improvements as may be judged by such sovereign power proper to be made, and conducive to the well-being of the people whom it governs.¹ ”

This quotation may serve to strike the keynote of English policy in Italy through the early part of the period here dealt with, though it must be added that Palmerston, alongside of his strong declarations in

¹ Palmerston to Ponsonby, Aug. 12th, 1847. *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 119.

favour of the progressive movement, insisted on the fact that England, having no direct interest involved, would under no circumstances allow herself to be placed in the position of a possible belligerent.

Whether these declarations of the British Foreign Secretary can be completely reconciled with the course of his diplomatic relations with Sardinia, is a question on which much might be written, but not in issue here. It will suffice to state, that so far as the Roman Government was concerned, he may be said to have consistently acted up to them.¹

Although it would be difficult, if not impossible, to assign precise dates, yet there can be little question but that about this period Metternich several times changed his mind as to what was the best course to pursue. Through all the deceptions, errors, and argumentative points of the diplomatic dispatches, it remains fairly clear that the Austrian Minister was in a constant state of uncertainty as to what would be the probable development of the Pope's policy. His earliest opinion had been, as we have seen, that Pius could not long maintain the apparently illogical position into which he was rapidly drifting. Later, he had appeared to give up hope of the Pope's throwing himself on the support of Austria, and had attempted to force matters by the occupation of Ferrara ; again, in the course of the following few months, he evidently reverted back to his former opinion, and to an expectant policy.

There were exceptional sources from which Metter-

¹ Whether Palmerston would have given the Italian moderates and Albertists all the encouragement he did had he foreseen as clearly as Metternich what was to result, is what it may be permitted to doubt. It is instructive, and in a manner amusing, to compare his dispatches written at a time when small diplomatic triumphs were to be won against the Austrian Minister, with those written at a later period, when war was threatened or raging, and British commercial interests seriously affected.

nich was able to command information on which to base his action, and to this fact may be partly ascribed the hesitating course he followed. Vienna was in a very different position with respect to the Catholic faith from that which it had occupied in the latter portion of the eighteenth century. In no capital was the political action of the Jesuits more influential, and it was to Vienna that the Gregorian party looked for the support it could not find in Rome. Thus the secret hopes and fears of those who were unobtrusively working to draw Pius away from the path of reform and nationalism were read like an open book by Metternich, and a careful observation of the changing moods of his policy will occasionally throw light on events at Rome the deep significance of which might otherwise be lost.

The occupation of Ferrara had led to a great recrudescence of nationalist sentiment in the capital of the Pontifical States. Cardinal Ferretti, whatever his real sentiments may have been, had of necessity followed the overwhelming current of public opinion. For a few weeks all went well, and harmonious relations were kept up between the Ministry and the people. The new Secretary of State was a distant cousin of the Pope, and had liberal connections. So condescending were his manners or so democratic his sentiments, that following the example of Monsignor Morandi, he successfully cultivated the acquaintance of the triumphant Ciceroacchio! ¹ Taking up a mildly hostile attitude towards Austria, he supported the formal protests of the Papal Legate at Ferrara by repeated communications to the Nuncio at Vienna, in which he entered, at very great lengths, into the reasons that should induce

¹ Cardinal Ferretti is accused by many Italian writers of having been in the pay of Austria. Nothing that will justify the opinion has been discovered.

Prince Metternich to order the withdrawal of the imperial troops. Some of these diplomatic representations were, by a somewhat unusual course, allowed to appear in one of the Roman papers, the *Diario*; this publication served to strengthen the belief of the people that in Cardinal Ferretti they had found a liberal and adequate Minister. The Secretary of State rapidly acquired considerable popularity,¹ but the support he gave to the national party carried the Government much further in a direction that caused more than one of its members to have serious misgivings. The excitement over the formation of the civic guard had been developed by the Ferrara incident into a general agitation for war with Austria. From towns and individuals, from priests, bishops, and religious fraternities, from the students, from the poor, from women and from children, came offers of military service, or of arms, of money, or of jewellery and trinkets, of anything and everything that might serve the sacred cause of Italian independence. The Government, not wishing to remain behind the people, deliberated, and decided on the formation of a camp of observation at Forli.

These warlike demonstrations of the Pontifical States were not of a nature to cause much uneasiness either to Metternich or to Field-Marshal Radetzky; but diplomatic negotiations accompanied them, in which the Pope, the King of Sardinia, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany were equally concerned; and these appeared to constitute a far more serious threat to Austrian supremacy. It was in this light that the Roman people viewed these negotiations, and the

¹ He took half a bajocco (this coin may be reckoned as equivalent to one cent, or halfpenny) per pound off the salt tax, which largely contributed to this result. Farini, *op. cit.*, i. 235.

successful issue to which they were rapidly brought, reflected credit on the negotiators and brought added strength and popularity to the Government.

The establishment of a federal league of the Italian Princes was one of the fundamental ideas of Gioberti's *Primato*.¹ The accession of Pius and the early measures of his pontificate had suddenly raised the suggested league to a question of practical politics. An exchange of views on the subject between the various Italian Governments had soon conformed with the direction of public opinion; negotiations followed, and it was agreed that a Customs Union should be arrived at.² The events of July and August gave a new impulse to the labours of the diplomats, and a first step towards federation was successfully accomplished by the signing of a Customs League Treaty on the 3rd of November 1847, between the States of the Church, Sardinia, and Tuscany.³ But at the very moment when everything seemed to be progressing in the manner most flattering to the liberal hopes, at the very moment when Pius appeared irrevocably pledged to the cause of Italian independence, the Pope gave a decided sign that he was dissatisfied with the position in which he found himself, and that he did not wish to proceed much further on the road

¹ It did not originate with Gioberti; his was only a modern variation of an ideal many centuries old. But it was the *Primato* that had put the proposal in a strong, plausible, popular form before the religious and educated Italians of his day, and it may therefore be taken as the practical starting-point of the idea.

² This was partly prompted by the example of the German Customs Union which had been started about ten years previously, and which had met with great success. For the influence of England and Cobden, see the latter's correspondence with Minghetti, *op. cit.* i. 258.

³ No practical accord could be arrived at on tariffs; so that the treaty was general in form, and provided for a future agreement on specific details. In the case of Sardinia and the Papal States this agreement was arrived at in the following year.

he was following. It may be that this first symptom of drawing back was influenced by the fact that, at this time, Pius was simultaneously deprived of the advice of two men who had up till then carried great weight in his counsels. They were both honest, both sincere, both liberals, and both nationalists; one was Monsignor Corboli-Bussi, the other Father Graziosi, the Pope's Confessor. The first was dispatched to Turin to carry through the last stages of the negotiations for the Customs Union Treaty; the latter died. Monsignor Corboli-Bussi was no longer able to exert a personal influence; Father Graziosi was succeeded by a Jesuit.¹

It was soon after this important change in the personal entourage of the Pope that the opening ceremony of the newly-constituted Council of State took place; it was performed by Pius in person, and he pronounced an allocution suitable to the occasion. Among those who had succeeded in obtaining admission to the function, a group in which were such advanced democrats as Sterbini and Masi stood conspicuous; the extreme views of these men were known to be distasteful to the Pope. According to Petre's official account of what occurred,² Pius at one stage of his discourse showed great heat;³ turning towards the group already mentioned, and speaking pointedly and emphatically, he said: "They are mistaken who would see in the Council of State instituted by me, the realization of their Utopias and the germ of institutions incompatible with the Pontifical sovereignty."⁴

¹ Graziosi was a very old man, and had been in close relations with Pius for thirty years.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 250.

³ He showed resentment, says Minghetti who was present, *op. cit.* i. 295.

⁴ "Ingannarsi chi nella Consulta di Stato da lui instituta vedesse qualche Utopia propria, e i semi di una istituzione incompatibile con la Sovranita Pontificia." The report of the speech is that of the *Diario di Roma*.

It was not so much the words pronounced by the Pope, as the excited manner in which they were delivered, that was suggestive of much, and nothing else was discussed in Rome for some days after ; it was generally agreed that the allocution marked the opening of a new phase in the policy of Pius. To those who knew or suspected his physical debility, who realized the strength of his religious fervour, and who saw into the silently working rings of intrigue that surrounded the Pope, his sally against Sterbini and his friends came less as a surprise than as a confirmatory symptom of the incurable malady that equally possessed the State and its ruler.¹

The Council of State thus inaugurated by Pius deserves no lengthened consideration, for its influence in matters of government and on the march of events was of the slightest. Weak in the manner of its composition, and in the scope of its functions, it was not strong in the personal qualities of its members. Romagna alone was fairly well represented, and in Minghetti, Recchi, and Pasolini, the Pope might find, if not experienced statesmanship, at all events liberal, informed and rational counsels. The President of the Consulta was Cardinal Antonelli, who after leaving the Treasury and suffering a momentary eclipse at the time of Cardinal Gizzi's retirement from office, was now rapidly rising to pre-eminent importance in the State.

¹ The simile had done considerable duty ; Czar Nicholas discussing Turkish affairs with Metternich, spoke of the Sultan as "the sick man." Again Metternich once said to D'Haussonville : "Believe me, I am an old and experienced doctor ; this malady of Italy is incurable."

CHAPTER VII

THE PAPAL CONSTITUTION

Lord Minto at Rome—The winter of '46-'47—Revolt of Palermo—Grant of a Constitution by Ferdinand II—His example followed by Charles Albert—And by the Grand Duke Leopold—Progressive steps of Pius—*Motu proprio* of December 30th—Scenes in the Corso—Reconstruction of the Ministry—Popular excitement—Resignation of Ferretti—A foolish proclamation—Admission of laymen to office—Grant of a Constitution—General considerations—Its provisions.

THE winter months of 1846-47 were marked by a general unrest at Rome as in so many other of the capital cities of Europe. Some feared, others hoped, but nearly all were convinced, that the approaching spring was pregnant with extraordinary events.

The succession of bad harvests that had afflicted the people of several States, the long-repressed, but slowly-forming revolt of public opinion against the aged Metternich and the antiquated system supported by his name and authority, the exciting events that had already been enacted in the ancient capital of civilization, the hope of a future of reasonable and above all national government for the Italian people, made food for the conversation and agitation of the Roman liberals and their sympathizers. Among the latter,—a large class composed of Italians, of foreign Catholics, and of travellers,

—one, Lord Minto, deserves special mention because of his peculiarly representative or semi-official character.

The encouraging and all but anti-Austrian position taken up by the British Government had aroused the gratitude of the Italians. Palmerston, anxious to support the liberal professions and doctrines he had paraded before Metternich,¹ decided to send a special commissioner to Italy. Perhaps the best of all the reasons that could be brought forward for the mission of Lord Minto, was the fact that Great Britain, being a Protestant State and unrepresented at Rome, considered it advisable that some authoritative means of communication should be established between the two Governments. Another and sufficient cause arose from the fact that, since the time of Lord Holland's departure from Florence, Great Britain's diplomats in Italy had been of inferior ability; the best of them was probably Abercromby, who was accredited to the Sardinian Court.

The dispatch of Lord Minto to Italy could not be viewed otherwise than as a political demonstration of the first importance. He was a nobleman of high rank and influential connection, he had been a Cabinet Minister, and there was no attempt made to disguise the fact that it was not as a traveller that he journeyed, but in a semi-official capacity.²

¹ Palmerston nearly always showed a strong and personal bias against Austria. His communications to Vienna were full of ill-disguised hostility, and the semi-humorous style in which he occasionally opened fire on Metternich's most strongly held positions, was more than once met in that statesman's acerb, trenchant, and dictatorial manner,—one that was not at all calculated to soothe the ruffled feelings of a diplomatic adversary. This is not the place to quote from their dispatches, suffice it to say that whatever course Palmerston took was never dictated by a desire to spare the Austrian Foreign Minister's policy or feelings. Palmerston's action was no more palatable to France than it was to Austria, and Louis Philippe and Guizot highly resented his patronage of the Italian liberals.—Guizot, *Mémoires*, viii. 402.

² A ship of the British Mediterranean Fleet was detached to convey him and his family from one port to another.

Lord Minto's instructions were in one sense of a firmly non-committal nature, for he was on no account to pledge the British Government to any action; apart from that, he was expressly instructed to praise both the Pope and Charles Albert, and to encourage them to continue in the path of moderation and reform.¹

The special emissary of the British Cabinet acted the part thus sketched out for him with zeal and distinction, and was everywhere warmly received as a friend of the Italian cause. At Turin he had long conversations with Charles Albert just before the conclusion of the Customs Union treaty, and urged the King strongly to go much further in the direction of federation than he was at that time prepared to. After a short stay at Florence, he proceeded to Rome, where he spent the greater part of the winter.² He arrived in the first week of November, and on the evening of the 6th was entertained with a public serenade. During his stay in the capital of the Popes, Lord Minto was constantly in the company of the prominent liberals: in the middle of November he granted Ciceroacchio a long interview,³ and frequently held conversations with Pasolini, Massimo D'Azeglio, Farini, Pantaleoni, and others, in which many plans were discussed for the regeneration of Italy. But between the schemes of the Englishman and those of his Roman friends there stretched, unseen to him, an impassable gulf; for the statesmen of Great Britain refused to contemplate the possibility of any interruption of the peace of Europe, while nearly all the Italian patriots were agreed, that only through a

¹ M. Guizot's instructions to Count Rossi were of a very similar nature.

² He remained three months, until February 3rd, 1848, when he left for Naples.

³ *London Times*, November 29th, 1847.

successful national war could their aspirations be fully realized. It was in this respect that the foresight of Palmerston and of his emissary failed ; but it is perhaps not so very remarkable that this should have been the case, for there were but few who could have prophesied the extraordinary events that Europe was to witness in the early months of the year 1848 ; perhaps Metternich alone, among the leading statesmen of the day, had some inkling of what was to come.

The anxious forebodings of the Austrian Minister were now at length to be justified. New Year's Day had scarcely passed when, from south to north, and from west to east, Europe broke out into a fever of revolution against her established Governments. To give a comprehensive view of this movement is impossible here : all that will be attempted will be to present such of its features as are closely related to the history of the Roman State.

The political unrest of Europe was a matter of long date. Some might trace the inception of the movements that culminated in 1848 to the eighteen days' civil war of the Sonderbund in Switzerland the year before ; others might choose the period of the Gallician insurrection of 1846 ; but most would probably view as the original historical cause the proceedings of European autocracy at the fall of the French Empire, as embodied in the territorial parcellings of the treaty of Vienna, and in the annihilation of the political rights of the people proclaimed in the treaty of the Holy Alliance. But to trace the causes and effects of these treaties and their application over a period of a quarter of a century is not possible here : convenience dictates as unavoidable a narrower practice, and the 12th day of January 1848 must be chosen as the date

on which the first scene of this great political drama was enacted ; those who took part in it were the inhabitants of the city of Palermo on the one hand, and the soldiers of Ferdinand of Bourbon, King of the Two Sicilies, on the other. A rising of the principal cities of the island had long been planned for that day ;¹ it was to be the sequel of others that had taken place, though with no success, the year before.² No ambitious ideas of Italian independence animated the Sicilian insurgents ; their revolt was merely the natural outcome of a disgraceful despotism that left no hope but in violent change. It was with cheers for a Constitution that the inhabitants of Palermo met the garrison of King Ferdinand, and, after several days of heavy fighting, drove it from the city.³ Alarmed by the success of the insurgents, and by the constitutional agitation that had immediately arisen in Naples, Ferdinand applied to Vienna for assistance. Metternich complied by causing the Papal Government to be sounded as to its willingness to permit Austrian troops to march through the States of the Church on their way to the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. This proposal was promptly declined ; and it may be surmised that in his rejection of the Austrian overtures, the Pope was animated no less by the affront he had received at Ferrara than by the conviction that his subjects were in no mood to support with sufficient restraint the

¹ This point has been much discussed, and the rising is generally described as having been spontaneous. A state of insurrection had been chronic for some time in Sicily, but yet the English authorities show pretty conclusively that the officers of the Mediterranean fleet knew the date beforehand : it must, therefore, have been at least equally known among the Palermitans. See Cooper Key, *Memoirs*, Admiral Parker, *Life*.

² During 1847 there had been several movements in Naples and in Sicily, but all unsuccessful. In Calabria the old Carbonaro flag had been displayed.

³ Signor Crispi, the well-known Italian statesman, took a prominent part in organizing the revolt.

presence of the detested Croat uniforms in their midst.¹

But Ferdinand was not allowed sufficient time to hear of Metternich's ill-success on his behalf: events had moved with too great rapidity. In a few days the whole of Sicily had been lost to the King, a part of his Neapolitan dominions rose in arms, and before the end of the month a rising was on the point of breaking out in the capital.² Ferdinand prudently bowed before the storm, and, on January 27th, granted a Constitution to his subjects.

Such was the ferment, so combustible were the political elements throughout Italy, so universal and irresistible was the desire for change and improvement, that although up till that time the establishment of a constitutional regime had not been the principal demand in the northern States, yet scarcely had the exciting news from Naples been disseminated than it was at once recognised as inevitable that the example of Ferdinand should be followed. Charles Albert gave in without a semblance of resistance, and promised a Constitution on February 8th; the Grand Duke of Tuscany followed his neighbour's example three days later.

At Rome the stirring news from the neighbouring States had not been without effect. The people had

¹ Notwithstanding the step he took, it is doubtful whether Metternich was prepared at that critical juncture to throw a detachment of the Austrian army at so great a distance from its base; the relations between Vienna and Turin were already very strained, and Milan and Venice were causing grave apprehension. His immediate reply to Ferdinand's request was sympathetic, but guarded; he put forward the hope that the King's troops would be able to repress the movement unassisted. He further privately urged the King not to grant a Constitution, as also did the Russian and Prussian Governments.

² Naples had been in a state of great political unrest for some time, and had been liberally supplied with clandestinely introduced nationalist literature. As early as July 25th, 1847, Lord Napier, the British Minister, wrote as follows: "At the present moment there is a state of political excitement in the capital which has had no parallel since the events of 1820."

already become too thoroughly accustomed to what may be described as their newly invented system of government by demonstrations, to remain quiet while their Italian brethren were gaining their political birth-right. And there was nothing to make the Romans believe that the Pope would decline to grant a further concession that all felt to be inevitable. On the last day of the closing year, nearly a fortnight before the revolt at Palermo, he had already taken a further step in the direction of liberal institutions. By a *motu proprio* of December 30th, 1847, the functions and status of Ministers had been remodelled ; and a great principle was introduced for the first time, when it was provided that Ministers incurred responsibility for their acts. This was a very great concession for a Pope to make, but in reality this edict contained little that made for popularity : had it been silent on the score of ministerial responsibility but frankly¹ opened the doors of office to laymen, it might have achieved some measure of success.

When the people repaired to the Quirinal to vent their noisy approval of the latest *motu proprio*, and to indulge in the demonstration that had now become the necessary conclusion of every political act, they found troops and police stationed about the Palace. Great was the clamour ; those who had come to shout approbation turned away uttering angry imprecations against the Government. But to Pius, as opposed to his advisers, the people still fondly clung, and two days later (January 2nd) he was greeted with frenzied acclamations as he drove along the Corso. The tall houses on either side of the narrow lane that then did

¹ The wording was negative, the inference being that no layman would be admitted to office, though this was not positively stated.

duty as Rome's principal thoroughfare suddenly became alive with flags and fluttering handkerchiefs. Cicero-acchio the inevitable, who, with the help of his coadjutors in the various quarters of the city, had organized the demonstration, succeeded in clambering up at the back of the Papal carriage; from that point of vantage he unfurled a streaming banner on which appeared the following device: "Santo Padre, fidatevi nel Popolo."¹ Tremendous applause greeted the feat of Angelo Brunetti, and when, from the midst of the terrible folds of Nessus that wound about him, the Pope bowed his head in acknowledgment, it was redoubled so that the Corso rang again.²

The edict on the Ministry did not justify such a scene as the one just described, for the sum total of administrative reform remained very much the same as it was before. Misgovernment was nearly as great under Pius as it had been under Gregory: the same men remained in office, the provinces had never suffered more terribly from the horrors of political assassination, and no political rights had yet been granted to the people, save that most fatal of all, the right of demonstrating. "The Pope has squandered the treasures of his popularity," said Rossi;³ and the only real concession obtained, that of the civic guards, was not a factor of stability. This force made a great display,⁴ and formed

¹ "Holy Father, trust the people."

² Farini, *op. cit.* i. 325. The cheers for Pius were plentifully interspersed with hostile exclamations against the Jesuits and Gregorians. "It was the first demonstration that betokened revolution," says Spada.

³ Minghetti, *op. cit.* i. 325.

⁴ There is no greater force than that of eloquence. So stimulating had the effusions of the popular orators been, so effective their appeals to the virtues and heroism of classic times, that in a fit of enthusiasm, it had been decided to decorate the unfortunate civic guards with the helmet of the ancient Roman legionaries! ("antico Romano elmetto" are Farini's words). This adornment was more likely to create a vacuum in the municipal treasuries than to strike terror into the hearts of

a nucleus for the national army that many of the enthusiasts hoped to enroll for the coming war of liberation.

One of the first acts of the Ministry, which had been reconstructed at the opening of the year,¹ was to request the Sardinian Government to furnish a few military officers to reorganize the Pontifical forces.

The approval of the public followed this step of the Government, but attention was soon distracted by matters of even deeper interest the news of which kept reaching Rome from south and from north. The revolt of Sicily, the concessions of Ferdinand, of Charles Albert, and of Leopold to their subjects, the increasing excitement and signs of rebellion in Milan and in Venice, were the subject of every Italian's conversation and thoughts.

The national and anti-Austrian complexion of affairs, especially in the northern and central part of the Peninsula, was still further heightened by difficulties attending territorial readjustments consequent on the death of the ex-Empress Maria Louisa Duchess of Parma (October 17th, 1847). Her succession fell to the Duke of Lucca, whose territories in turn passed to the Grand Duke Leopold. Tuscany was further bound to cede certain districts, notably that of Fivizzano, to the Duke of Modena, who, not succeeding in obtaining immediate cession, had recourse to armed occupation. Behind the Duke of Modena was Austria, and Radetzky had disposed a body of troops to lend assistance if

the Austrian infantry! The choice of this ridiculous headgear is by some writers attributed to Pius himself; Tivaroni ascribes it to Sterbini.

¹ Under the edict the Ministry was reconstructed as follows:—Foreign Affairs, lay and ecclesiastic, Cardinal Ferretti; Interior, Monsignor Amici; Public Instruction, Cardinal Mezzofanti; Justice, Monsignor Roberti; Finance, Monsignor Morichini; Commerce, Cardinal Sforza; Public Works, Cardinal Massimo; War, Monsignor Rusconi; Police, Monsignor Savelli.

necessary. The excited Tuscans loudly talked of war, and it had been the utmost that diplomacy could effect to prevent the breaking out of hostilities before the close of 1847.

When, at the end of January, the news of the revolution of Naples and of Ferdinand's grant of a Constitution to his subjects reached Rome, the city immediately illuminated, and the Municipality proclaimed a public holiday. Nothing seemed more probable than that the people of Rome would straightway follow the example of the Neapolitans, and Cardinal Ferretti, feeling no longer able to support the responsibilities of office, handed in his resignation. The Pope soon succeeded in finding a substitute for the late State Secretary in the person of Cardinal Bofondi, whose term of office was to be even shorter than that of his predecessor.

The change of Ministry did nothing to calm the people; the ears of Pius were constantly assailed by cries of "Death to the Jesuits!" and by anti-Austrian, national, and constitutional vociferations of all sorts. On February 10th,—two days after Charles Albert had granted a Constitution, one day before Leopold of Tuscany followed the example,—Pius caused a proclamation to be issued. In it he attempted to pacify his subjects by reminding them of the benefits that his reign had conferred on them, of the mutual confidence that existed between Sovereign and people, of the progressive steps that marked the path which they were treading towards liberal institutions. To appease them, he announced that the lay part of the Ministry would be largely increased.¹ At the same time he warned

¹ A few days before this, the first layman had been introduced in the person of Prince Gabrielli Romano, who had succeeded Monsignor Rusconi as Minister of War.

them that their agitation must be kept within bounds, and that they must not allow themselves to be deluded by any visionary ideas of a probable war.¹

Such a pronouncement could have but one result. It was placarded in the early hours of the morning, and already by nine o'clock an enormous crowd filled the Piazza del Popolo, and thence marched on the Quirinal; there the accustomed rites were duly performed. The successor of Saint Peter appeared on his balcony; the shouts of the crowd, their manner, and the inscriptions they displayed on banners held up to his sight, informed him of their wishes; he solemnly bestowed on the kneeling mass the pontifical benediction, and, on the following day, a change of Ministry was hurriedly arranged and announced. On this occasion the change was of a far-reaching character, for several laymen among the liberal leaders were invited to displace ecclesiastics in the councils of the Pope. Count Pasolini, the esteemed personal friend and neighbour of Pius, a man of high honour, information, and culture, who at a later period and under happier auspices proved a capable administrator, became Minister of Commerce. Of the others, Sturbinetti, a lawyer, who afterwards played a prominent part as a leader of the popular party, need alone be mentioned. But of even greater importance than the change of Ministry, was the simultaneous announcement made of the appointment of a Commission that was to examine the question of extending the reforms,—in other words, the question of a Constitution.

Cardinal Bofondi enjoyed office one month, during

¹ "Ascoltate dunque la Voce Paterna, che vi assicura, e non vi commova questo grido che esce di ignote bocce ad agitare i popoli d' Italia con lo spavento di una guerra straniera, aiutata e preparata da interne congiure, o da malevola inerzia dei governanti."

which period the Commission was elaborating its projects. The people continued to demonstrate,—especially about the middle of February, when the news of the Sardinian and Tuscan revolutions reached Rome, and at the beginning of March, when it became known that Paris had risen, that Louis Philippe was a fugitive, and that the Second French Republic had been proclaimed. On March 10th, a new Ministry under the presidency of Cardinal Antonelli was announced, and on the 14th, the long-delayed Constitution was at length published.

The Ministry of Cardinal Antonelli was composed of the following members in addition to himself: Gaetano Recchi, Interior; Sturbinetti, Justice; Monsignor Morichini, Finance; Marco Minghetti, Public Works; Count Pasolini, Commerce; Prince Aldobrandini, War; Doctor Galletti, Police; as Under Secretary for the Interior, Farini's name appeared. This Ministry was by far the most liberal, and also the most capable, that the Pope had yet seen: in Minghetti it possessed one of the strongest and clearest intellects of Rome; and Recchi, Farini, Pasolini, and Monsignor Morichini were all liberals and men of decided ability. The qualification of liberal cannot, however, be applied to the President of the Council, whose subtle and dangerous leadership did much to neutralize the hopeful public spirit of its other members.

It was neither the Ministry of Cardinal Bofondi, nor that of Cardinal Antonelli, which actually elaborated and settled the Fundamental Statute, or Constitution, that was to provide the subjects of the Bishop of Rome with some of the elementary privileges of free men: that delicate task had been reserved, as has already appeared, for a Special Commission, and this body was

composed entirely of ecclesiastics. Between the 10th and 14th of March several Consistories were held, at which Pope and Cardinals came to an agreement on various subsidiary details, and finally on the last-mentioned date the Constitution was formally promulgated.

The full text of this curious document is given elsewhere ;¹ and here, all that will be done will be to give a general impression of its provisions and peculiarities.

A written Constitution, or fundamental Statute, pact, or contract, must of necessity partake of the character of a compromise ; for it implies the reconciliation of at least two differing interests,—that of those who exercise power, and that of those who are governed. Where the largest measure of self-government is vested in the people, as in democracies in which the administrators are chosen by the popular vote from every class of the community, the difficulties in the way of devising such a fundamental compromise for the operation of government should be least ; for as the people control the executive functions by direct delegation of powers, the two differing interests that are to be reconciled are brought as nearly as possible together ; divergence of view between governor and governed, when they may shortly exchange places, is less likely to arise, and mutual jealousy, and a desire for extended rights, should nearly, if not entirely, disappear. The further from this most convenient basis a community, the greater the difficulties in the way of a reconciliation between the rights of governors and governed by means of a fundamental pact.

The compromise that had to be effected by the Roman Constitution of 1848 was excessive : nothing

¹ Appendix D.

less than divine right and judgment had to be reconciled with human ; the absolute wisdom and authority claimed by a theocratical caste, with the empirical principles and utilitarian requirements of aspiring democracy ;¹ autocracy of a prescriptive and arrogated variety, —perhaps not far removed from a natural order in times of ignorance, but totally incongruous in times of press enlightenment,—with the new-born force of liberalism. Was it possible to devise a practical instrument of government that would, under existing circumstances, prove capable of effective application ?²

The attempt that was actually made to answer this question is open to endless criticism ; yet in justice it must be said that it remains very doubtful whether human wisdom could have devised a workable Constitution for the Papal States in 1848.

In examining the provisions of the Statute, it may be first remarked that no less than five governing corporations, exclusive of the Ministry, were created or reaffirmed ; they were as follows : (1) the Pope, elective head of the State ; (2) the College of Cardinals, or Electors ; (3) the Council of State ; (4) the Upper Council ; (5) the Council of Deputies. In addition to

¹ Lord Brougham, in his robust manner, put the difficulty in the following way. Pius, whom he described as a “coryphæus in revolutionary movements,” was “a limited monarch, a constitutional sovereign who partakes of the Divine nature, who is of an infallible class of beings ; and, if infallible in Church matters, how separate these from temporal ?”

² It may be noted as a matter of general interest that similar, if not identical principles to those just enunciated are involved as the real basis of the Papal question at the present day. If the Papacy boldly enters the course of Christian Democracy with a view of ousting the House of Savoy from Rome and from Italy, by means of a republic presided over by the Pope,—if, further, it should succeed in that course, a supposition quite within the bounds of political possibilities,—at the end of all come precisely those same questions of principle that are found so difficult to answer when considering the Constitution granted by Pius IX in 1848. Can it be said that those questions are likely, under any probable circumstances of the future, to prove more easy to answer ?

these, the Curia acquired the limited right of determining the constitutional effect of legislation,¹ and might thus be added to the number.

The functions of the Council of State were much lessened in importance, and it may for the present purpose be left out of account; but the position of the College of Cardinals was improved, for it was provided that, in addition to retaining its ancient privileges, it should act as a final consultative Senate, deliberating in secret, and in conjunction with the Pope. Had this Constitution been capable of practical application, and had the Cardinals assembled in frequent Consistories, it may be suggested as a possible and unforeseen result that their influence in the State might have gradually become similar to that of the Senators at Venice, and that the Papacy might have assumed a more obviously oligarchical character.

The Upper Council was not elective, and was unlimited in numbers; its members were nominated by the Sovereign. The only one of these numerous bodies that represented the people was the Council of Deputies, which was elective. But the franchise was very far from being a popular one; the voting qualification was so high as to exclude the great majority of adult males. Passing over specific qualifications, it was necessary to possess property of the taxable value of 300 scudi per annum, or to pay 12 scudi in direct taxes, to qualify for inscription on the voters' register. An idea of what this represented may be gathered from the fact, mentioned by Minghetti in his *Memoirs*, that in the constituency of San Giovanni in Persicato, which he represented in the Council, there were only 124 voters!

¹ Functions somewhat similar to those of the Supreme Court of the United States.

As may easily be imagined, the process of legislation provided for was inordinately lengthy and cumbersome. Initiated by the Ministry, a law had to pass the votes of the deputies and members of the High Council, after which it came to the consideration of the Council of State, whence it was forwarded to the secret Consistories, in which Pope and Cardinal together debated it before it received the final assent of the Sovereign.

The public principles laid down by the Constitution included some vague generalities on the right of private liberty and property, and some very precise provisions, among which that one may be cited whereby the profession of the Catholic religion was made a condition not only of office, but even of the exercise of the right of voting. On the other hand, that great safeguard of the rights of the taxpayers, the consent of the elective assembly to all proposals for taxation, was duly secured.

By Article XXXVI it was provided as follows : "The Councils may not under any circumstances propose laws : (1) concerning matters ecclesiastical or mixed ;¹ (2) contrary to the canons or discipline of the Church ; (3) tending to vary or modify the present statute." And Article XXXV ran : "All discussions concerning the diplomatico-ecclesiastical relations of the Holy See with Foreign Powers are forbidden to both Councils."

The only other provisions of the Constitution to which attention need be drawn, were those whereby it was provided that, on the Pope's death, the sessions of

¹ The Roman Curia regarded a large number of matters as of mixed ecclesiastical and lay jurisdiction ; even matters fiscal were known to have been so classified.—Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 3.

the Councils should become *ipso facto* suspended ; and such was the fear of their attempting some act of political power during the interregnum caused by the proceedings of the Conclave, that it was even specifically provided that the Councils should not present any petitions to the College of Cardinals at that period.

CHAPTER VIII

WAR IN LOMBARDY

Fall of Metternich—State of Lombardy—Unrest of Milan—Insurrection—Radetzky defeated—Charles Albert's position—His character and policy—The democratic party—Genoa—Sardinian army mobilized—Change of Government at Paris—Its effect at Turin—French and Italian republicans—Mazzini's energy—His influence at Milan—The Società Nazionale Italiana—The Sardinians cross the frontier—*L'Italia farà da sè*—A lost opportunity.

ON the 13th day of March 1848, exactly twenty-four hours before the Roman Constitution was promulgated, the great liberal movement of Europe won its most striking and memorable triumph. Five hundred miles away from the Papal city, in the capital of Italy's mighty enemy and oppressor, a fatal blow had been struck at the cause of despotism,—Metternich had been hurled from power by a Viennese mob. The movement that had taken place in the Austrian capital was not in itself very formidable: it did not amount to an insurrection, and was scarcely more than an excited gathering of students and sympathising spectators; yet such was the accumulated moral force behind it, that it served to show, to the complete satisfaction of all good liberals, the artificial and insecure foundation on which the power of Metternich was founded.

At that period the electric telegraph was in its infancy; news travelled slowly, and several days elapsed before the astounding intelligence of the fall of the mighty slave-driver of absolutism reached the Italian people. But presently reports of the event circulated, and becoming magnified, soon it was believed not only that the Austrian Minister had resigned, which was true, but that the Viennese following the example of the Parisians, had driven the Sovereign from his throne and proclaimed a republic, which was false.

With public opinion such as it then was in Austria's Lombard-Venetian provinces, the intelligence of the revolution of Vienna proved sufficient to produce a tremendous wave of popular and national sentiment, to bring the people into the streets face to face with the bayonets of their conquerors, and to drive the northern dominator, for a short space, from Italian soil.

Before touching on the insurrection of Milan, and the Austro-Sardinian war that followed, it will be better to define at what length and in what manner the relation of these extraneous events will be treated. It is evident that such a narration must principally concern the histories of Lombardy, of Sardinia, and of Austria; it is concerned with that of Rome only in so far as any clear connection is to be traced. Proceeding on this basis, many incidents of this exciting chapter of North Italian history will appear in outline only, denuded of all detail, while others, on the contrary, will be treated at some length. These will be those that are of special importance as showing the direct influence of the war with Austria on the Roman popular movement, and in following the involved causes and fluctuations of the latent but constant struggle between the two Italian parties, democratic and aristocratic; for the closing

and most dramatic scene of that struggle was to be played in the ancient capital of Italy in the following year. It is with these two principal links of connection between Roman and North Italian history borne constantly in mind that the reader should follow the course of the narrative.

For many months the generally frivolous and docile population of Milan had been in a state of unusual agitation. The Duomo and the Opera no longer held the first place in public esteem; of Rossini's compositions, the famous *Barbiere* for once gave way in public favour to the enthusiastically sung *hymn to Pius*. Curious, and at first peaceful manifestations against the Austrians took place, culminating in the anti-tobacco movement that made of abstention from smoking an ostensible and edifying badge of nationalism.¹ Between the Milanese and the garrison feeling grew, insults passed more and more frequently, and in January rioting took place that resulted in the death of some eighty Italians. Through every part of Italy solemn services were held for the Milanese dead, and the citizens of the Lombard city prepared themselves for revenge. Through February and March the excitement constantly increased, and the secret societies of all shades of opinion actively concerted measures. When on the 17th of the latter month the news of the overthrow of Metternich arrived, every patriot of Milan was ready to rise, and either instinctively, or at the bidding of mysterious chiefs, prepared for decisive action on the following day.

Early on the morning of the 18th the Austrian

¹ Recalling the demonstrations of the Bostonians in 1774 that resulted in the famous "tea-party."

authorities displayed a proclamation announcing reforms and liberal concessions, but the Milanese showed their opinion and their temper by writing across them: "Too late!" A mob suddenly invaded the palace of the Governor, and simultaneously the soldiers were attacked in all quarters of the city. But an army of 12,000 regular troops, under such a commander as Marshal Radetzky, one of the most brilliant soldiers of the century, was not to be surprised and instantaneously overwhelmed by an undisciplined crowd of civilians.¹ The Austrians promptly seized the walls, the gates, the Duomo, and all the principal positions, and having isolated the city from the outside world, attempted to clear the hastily erected barricades from the streets. But the Milanese fought with fury; while an incessant fusillade was maintained along the streets, from windows and roofs women and children poured showers of flower-pots, furniture, stones, and boiling oil on the Austrians and Croats below.² For five days and nights the battle raged, slowly turning in favour of the Italians. At last brave young Count Manara³ with a handful of men stormed and carried the Porta Tosa, thus restoring communication with the Lombard country beyond. Armed peasants and volunteers poured in to help the besieged, and before many hours Radetzky, his muni-

¹ Radetzky's numbers are placed as high as 16,000 by Garibaldi (*Autobiography*), and as low as 8000 by the correspondent of the *London Times*. Making allowance for the reinforcements that Radetzky called up, and on the other hand for the desertions among the Italian and Hungarian troops in the imperial service, the figure given in the text appears the most probable.

² The English Vice-Consul Campbell confirms the Italian writers in their statements that women and children were ill-used and murdered by the Austrian troops, especially by the Croats.—*Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 572. But Cantù, whose testimony cannot be lightly rejected, takes the opposite view; *op. cit.* ii. 799.

³ He will reappear at the head of a Lombard corps at the siege of Rome, where he was killed. From the first he appears to have been an ardent Mazzinian and republican.—*Archivio Triennale*, iii. 150.

tions depleted, his troops exhausted, disheartened, and defeated, his communications threatened by a spreading rebellion and by an even more serious danger, skilfully concentrated his remaining forces and outlying posts, and ordered his retreat in the early hours of the 23rd of March. The Austrians had lost from 3000 to 4000 men, many of them through desertion; the Milanese from 1000 to 1200.

Not twenty miles across the Lombard plain from the gates of Milan was the small bridge of San Martino. It was thence that, through their five days of desperate struggling, the Milanese had strained for the sight of help. It was thence that Radetzky had been threatened with an even deeper disgrace than that involved in his evacuation of the capital of the Austrian provinces. For under the arches of the bridge flowed the Ticino, boundary between the Austrian empire and the kingdom of Sardinia, and beyond the frontier the army of Charles Albert was already being mobilized. Would Piedmontese help save Milan? Would fatal irretrievable disaster overtake Radetzky and his shattered army? Those were the two questions in every man's mind during the painful, anxious week that followed the 17th of March. Their solution lay with Charles Albert, and something of the considerations that guided his momentous decision must now be related.

The position of the King of Sardinia was strong in certain respects, weak in others. His strength came from the respect generally felt for his personal character, from the comparatively great military resources of his little kingdom, from the support of a large class of widely read and followed Italian writers, from the peculiar international position of his dominions that made of France his inevitable ally in the event of his

suffering a reverse that should bring the Austrian arms to the Alps. His weakness came from his vacillating temperament,¹ from the narrowness of his religious views that had long been exploited by the Jesuits, and from the strongly democratic tendency of a large section of his subjects. It is on this last point alone that it will be necessary to insist at any length at present.

The election of Pius to the throne vacated by the death of Gregory had effected a great change in the position of Charles Albert. For a constant fear of the opposition of the Church was now substituted a confident belief in her support; and those secret aspirations that urged him to take up the Italian national cause could now be indulged without incurring the slightest qualm of conscience. This, together with the imperious demands of the popular enthusiasm, had been sufficient to lead the King from the path of silence and reserve he had till that time pursued, and to persuade him into bolder methods. Some of the events that marked his policy during the years 1846 and 1847 have already been noticed. With Austria his relations had rapidly become strained; with the national party they had become very close. But every one of his steps forward had been marked by hesitation and evident misgiving. Apart from the undecided character of Charles Albert, there was one principal explanation of this fact; it was his fear of the democratic and Mazzinian party. Genoa was the great stronghold of the republicans² in the

¹ A popular song familiarly referred to him as "Re Tentenna," which may be freely rendered *the wobbling king*.

² Generally speaking, the cities where the Giovane Italia had most adherents were the ports,—for instance, Nice, Genoa, Leghorn, Naples. This was largely owing to the employment by Mazzini of Marseilles as his principal entrepot, whence the distribution of illicit literature and other contraband was managed along the coasts of Italy. The English stations at Malta and Corfu were extensively used for the same purpose.

Sardinian kingdom, and the chief cause of apprehension to the Government. Little more than thirty years had passed since the ancient independence and republican constitution of Genoa, hastily restored by Lord William Bentinck, had been suppressed by the Congress of Vienna and her territory merged with that of Piedmont.

The Genoese had long resented their forced reunion to the neighbouring kingdom, and this feeling, fostered by the more active life and thought of a seaport, and by the large intercommunication of ideas with that hot-bed of republicanism Marseilles, had made of Genoa the best of all centres for Mazzini's propaganda, the largest recruiting field for the *Giovane Italia*. Yet so low had the influence of that Society fallen, so completely had the wave of anti-Austrian enthusiasm for the moment blotted out matters of sectional difference, that even at Genoa, Charles Albert in his rôle of the Champion of Italy, appeared for a while to have become really popular. The demonstrations that had taken place there in the autumn and winter of 1846, on the occasions of the Scientific Congress and of the centenary celebration of the expulsion of the Austrians, have already been noticed. In the following year Charles Albert had much strengthened his position with all sections of his subjects by his outspoken declarations on the question of Ferrara, and by his offers of military assistance to the Pope.¹ In the month of November 1847 he had paid a visit to Genoa, and had been received with the greatest possible demonstrations of popular

¹ On the occasion of the Agricultural Meeting at Casale he had written a much-quoted letter to his secretary and friend Castagnetto, in which, after referring to the Austrians remaining in occupation of Ferrara, he went on to say that, "If God grant us to fight a war of independence, I will command the army in person."

enthusiasm.¹ But notwithstanding this outward show of loyalty and support, Genoa remained very difficult and dangerous ground for the King of Sardinia, and the mutual distrust between ruler and governed was only slightly abated.

A letter from Mazzini to one of his supporters in the city, written about this time, serves to show something of the political undercurrent; but one short paragraph need be quoted. It runs as follows:—

“There is no possible middle course for him (Charles Albert), and I trust my many friends at Genoa to compel him either to advance or to draw back.”²

It was precisely this that the King's enthusiastic reception had meant. He was cheered because the course on which the people saw him embarked was that which furthered their aspirations. The artificial and totally self-interested nature of the demonstrations had been very clearly manifested in an incident that had occurred. One day during his stay the King passed through the streets, and determined to visit the Church of the Jesuits. No sooner was his intention perceived by the people than their *vivas* ceased, as though by enchantment, and were presently succeeded by cries of “Down with the Jesuits,” and with cheers for a national guard.

Charles Albert was far too intelligent not to fully appreciate how insecure his popularity was, how rapidly an anti-Austrian movement might develop into an anti-monarchical one, and how his first mistake would be

¹ “A Genova le ovazioni salirono fino al delirio,” says Della Rocca, who was present.—*Autobiografia*, i. 149. Among the deputations that were reviewed was one composed entirely of priests, who carried a banner inscribed with the words, “Viva Gioberti!”

² Mazzini to De Boni, January 3rd, 1848.—N. Bianchi, *Vicende del Mazzinismo*, 126.

seized and turned against him. He also recognised that the Monarchy, unlike the Papacy, was an institution that had no greater hold on the large mass of the people than that arising from the fact that it was the existing form of government.

The King of Sardinia's position was thus extremely difficult, and were it not that his character in that particular had been so clearly revealed by the experience of many previous years, his hesitations during the month of March 1848 might well be excused.

Through the early weeks of that year the situation had grown more and more critical. On March 16th, Count Cesare Balbo became Charles Albert's first constitutional Prime Minister, and General Franzini issued orders for placing the Sardinian army on a war footing. Three days later Turin knew that Metternich had fallen, and that the Milanese were in arms and struggling to drive Radetzky's soldiers from their streets.

Under such circumstances the only choice open to the Sardinian Government was between objectionable courses. Perhaps the most intelligible, decisive, and defensible, would have been to immediately proffer an armed mediation to Radetzky, with a preliminary condition attached in the form of a twenty-four hours ultimatum to evacuate Milan. Such a step however, and in fact any of an irrevocable character, appeared too abrupt and dangerous, and the five precious days during which the Milanese bravely freed themselves from Austria were wasted by Charles Albert in fruitless doubts and hesitations. How was it then that after his warlike declarations of the year before, after going so far in his anti-Austrian attitude as to order the mobilization of his army, after finding himself placed in an unexpectedly hopeful position for striking a first blow owing

to the revolution at Vienna, Charles Albert did not promptly and eagerly seize the opportunity fortune had thrown in his way? The reason is not far to seek.

A few weeks before the revolt of Milan an unexpected, all but totally unforeseen event had fundamentally altered the international position of the kingdom of Sardinia. Until the end of February 1848 that Government had merely internal democratic revolt to fear; from that date on the difficulty was doubled, and revolution threatened from without as well as from within. With Louis Philippe and Guizot directing the policy of France on purely dynastic lines, Sardinia could face Austria with not much greater anxiety than that arising from the uncertainties of warfare; with the Second Republic proclaimed, and the policy of France once more becoming national and democratic, the situation was completely changed.¹ The French republicans threatened danger to Charles Albert in two ways. In the first place their newly-established Government, the result of a political surprise and with none too strong nor united a party behind it, looked to some rapid and tangible success to furnish the prestige it lacked. Improvised and blundering statesmen like Lamartine² and Bastide, saw in the chaotic state of Italian politics an opportunity of restoring to France a part of her natural frontiers, lost with the disasters of Napoleon; they could with difficulty disguise their ambition of wresting Savoy and Nice from the King of Sardinia.³

¹ "There is no disguising the fact that on this, as on every point, the national and dynastic policies of France are at utter variance."—Editorial, London *Times*, referring to Spanish question, September 2nd, 1847.

² It is not intended to suggest that Lamartine was lacking in diplomatic and political experience.

³ In 1814, after Napoleon's abdication, Nice and Savoy had remained French; it was only in the following year, after the return from Elba, that it was decided that these provinces should form part of the reconstituted kingdom of Sardinia.

And not only were these territorial ambitions of the Second Republic at least suspected in Turin, but the numerous links of sympathy and acquaintance that connected many of the supporters of the new Republic with the advanced Italian party were viewed with dismay by the Sardinian Government.¹ Mazzini had left London for Paris immediately after the flight of Louis Philippe, and was there working indefatigably. Early in March a band of Italian refugees had invaded Savoy from Lyons, but had been easily dispersed. At Milan, which was soon placed in close touch with the republican circles of Paris, Mazzini had been especially active in establishing strong connections in every class of society.² He felt that the signal for the war of liberation must come from Lombardy, and it was essential for the success of his republican and centralizing views that he should turn the first rising to the advantage of his party. Exertion was all the more necessary as there was no very clear indication to show what form of government the Austrian provinces would prefer in the event of their succeeding in regaining their liberty.³

At Milan the stalwarts of the *Giovane Italia* had long been active, and another association similar in aim and equally prepared to follow Mazzini's lead came into existence about the beginning of March; it was

¹ For relations of French and Italian republicans see Weill, *Parti républicain en France*.

² According to a report of the Austrian Chief of Police at Venice, the well-known banking house of Pastem Girod transacted all business matters for the *Giovane Italia* at Milan.

³ Consul Dawkins to Lord Ponsonby, September 9th, 1847: "There seems to be a general feeling among the Lombards that things cannot remain as they are, and a disposition to await peaceably the progress of events. . . . A national Government is the favourite idea with an Italian Prince as their ruler; but what Prince, of what family, and under what form of government, no two persons seem to be agreed upon. They say, 'Let us first get rid of the foreigners, and then it will be time enough to settle our form of government.'"—*Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 176.

known as the Società Nazionale Italiana.¹ This organization was little more than a cloak for the Giovane Italia, and was intended to secure converts that the ill repute into which the older Society had fallen might prevent from joining; the Società Nazionale Italiana gave special prominence to an anti-Austrian programme and carefully avoided mention of republicanism.

When therefore, uncertain rumours reached Charles Albert and his ministers that Milan had risen, they were, in the absence of precise information, much perplexed.

From the revolted city it was, until the very end, nearly impossible to obtain reliable information. The walls and citadel were in the hands of the Austrians. Nothing much was known outside save that Milan was encircled with smoke and flame, that every bell was wildly clanging, and that a continuous roar of musketry and of artillery was rising from her streets. What pandemonium was being enacted within was left to be pictured by the heated imagination of the crowds of half-armed and wholly excited Italians who, from the surrounding districts, and even from Piedmont, hurried along the roads that led to the ancient capital of the Lombards.² A few emissaries succeeded in leaving the city, their partial accounts coloured by their political sympathies. One of them, Count Arese, found his way to Turin, and urged Charles Albert to fly to the rescue of the Milanese, who expected him as their deliverer. But the King knew the position too well to trust a messenger that could only at the best represent a section, and still feared that the defeat of Austria only

¹ Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, v. 176. Several other societies bearing this title have existed, the best-known perhaps that founded in 1856 by Lafarina and supported by Cavour.

² See several excellent dispatches, *London Times*, March and April 1848.

meant the proclamation of a Lombard Republic. He was overwhelmed with anxiety and doubt.

How could he be certain that an arrangement was not at that instant being secured by the Milanese whereby the French Government pledged itself to armed mediation in favour of Lombard independence?¹ And in the latter case was not the King of Sardinia faced by the immediate prospect of a republican movement among his own subjects that would sweep him from his throne and divide his dominions between the French and the Lombard Republics?² It must be concluded that Charles Albert had the most serious grounds for hesitating, even in the face of the violent patriotic excitement of his own people; and his reluctance to take any positive step was strengthened by the strong representations made to him by the foreign Ministers at Turin, especially by those of Russia, Prussia, and England. Abercromby, in his alarm at the prospect of hostilities, expressed the strongest indignation at the course the Sardinian Government appeared likely to take, while his Russian and Prussian colleagues threatened to ask for their passports if any movement hostile to Austria was decided on.³

But the efforts of diplomacy could be of little avail in such a tempest of national passion as was now raging through Northern Italy. On March 23rd Charles Albert, unable longer to resist popular clamour, decided

¹ Something of the sort appears to have been actually broached.

² To fully appreciate the extent of Charles Albert's fear of republicanism see a dispatch of Marquis Pareto to Hon. R. Abercromby, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 185.

³ Already on February 12th, 1824, Nesselrode had issued a Note threatening that if Sardinia attacked Austria, and were supported by any of the Powers, Russia would consider a state of general war created and take up arms. The passports of the two Ministers of the northern Powers were subsequently asked for, and they both left Turin for a time.

to take the only course open to him, but with characteristic indecision, embarked on the greatest enterprise of his life in the most tentative manner possible. He ordered General Bes to cross the frontier of Lombardy, and the rest of his army to follow; but in announcing this step to the European Governments he informed them not that he had declared war against Austria, but that his military measures were merely dictated by a desire to maintain order in Lombardy, where there was some fear of an unruly section declaring a republic.¹ His deeds matched his words. While Radetzky dragged a fifteen-mile-long column of dispirited and badly supplied soldiers² through a difficult and flooded country, intersected by numerous watercourses and bristling with insurrection, the Sardinian army attended the retreat of the defeated Austrians from a respectful

¹ The wording of the proclamation to the people of Lombardy and Venetia issued by Charles Albert on March 23rd hardly accords with the expressions used in his communication to the Powers. Here follows a free translation of this document:—

“To the People of Lombardy and Venetia—

“The destinies of Italy have ripened! Fortune smiles on the intrepid defenders of your downtrodden rights. Racial ties, the spirit of the times, our equal hopes, lead me to join in the universal admiration that Italy offers you.

“People of Lombardy and of Venetia, our soldiers were already concentrating on your borders when the glorious liberation of Milan anticipated their efforts; they now come to offer you in further trials that help that a brother and a friend may call for and expect. We will support your just desires, trusting in the assistance of God who helps us, of God who has given Pius IX to Italy, of God who by such marvellous strokes shows the world that Italy unassisted will suffice to conquer (*l'Italia farà da sè*).

“And to better express, by some sensible sign, the sentiment of Italian unity, we have ordered those of our troops that have entered the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia to display the arms of Savoy charged on the Italian tricolor.

CHARLES ALBERT.

“Turin, March 23rd, 1848.”

The expression *l'Italia farà da sè* became the popular catch phrase of the early part of 1848; but if to the people it conveyed only an agreeable national flattery, to Charles Albert it represented something besides,—a dread of the intervention of the French Republic.

² He could get forward at no faster rate than six miles a day.

distance, and without firing a single shot. It is hardly too much to say that for several days the chances of war were all in favour of Charles Albert, that he might have forced the capitulation of Radetzky and his army, that he might, with one bold stroke, have put an end to the long dominion of Austria. Those few days were lost in ever-recurring doubts and hesitation ; the good fortune of liberating Italy was to be reserved to Victor Emmanuel ten years later.

CHAPTER IX

EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS—THE POPE'S ABANDONMENT OF THE NATIONAL CAUSE

Excitement in Rome—Insults to Austria—Outcry against the Jesuits—Their expulsion—Its effect on Pius—Financial embarrassments—Warlike measures—Troops for the frontier—Papal benedictions—League negotiations—Hesitation of Pius and of Charles Albert—General Durando on the Po—His address to the troops—Operations about the Quadrilateral—The Allocution of April 29th—General dismay—Pius gives way—Antonelli's methods—Change of ministry.

To frame a detailed narrative of the history of Rome at the period here dealt with, in such a manner as to avoid the frequent repetition of expressions generally employed to characterize popular emotion and agitation, would be a task that might well drive the narrator to despair. *Excitement, fervour, and enthusiasm* may be suggested to the reader as words with which he has become tolerably familiar in the course of former chapters, and a poverty either of the language or in its use, must be responsible for their early and frequent reappearance. The true reason for this excessive and perhaps unavoidable repetition may be found in the extraordinary facts of the case; for rarely has a State passed through such a period of constant, sudden, and novel emotions as did Rome during the three years

that followed the election of Pius IX to the Papal throne.

The reader will not be unprepared to learn that the news of the fall of Metternich was received at Rome with the most extravagant expressions of delirious joy. The bells of the city pealed in triumph, and the people in their frenzy tore down the imperial escutcheons of Austria wherever they were found displayed. Ciceroacchio led a party to the Palazzo di Venezia, where the Austrian Ambassador resided, and marked over the doorway the words, "alla dieta Italiana," for the *Italian Parliament!* Margaret Fuller relates that she "saw the Austrian arms dragged through the streets here, and burned in the Piazza del Popolo.¹ The Italians embraced one another and cried, *Miracolo! Providenza!* the tribune Ciceroacchio fed the flames with faggots; Adam Mickiewicz, the great poet of Poland, long exiled from his country, looked on . . . men danced, and women wept with joy along the street."² Mr. Petre furnishes us with the additional and characteristic detail that, as the flames rose from the bonfire, the band of the Carabinieri played a funeral march!³

The excitement of the people was not allowed time to cool, for the news from Vienna was closely followed

¹ Laurence Oliphant, then a boy of seventeen travelling with his parents, took part in this demonstration. One of the incidents noted by him may be given: "I remember . . . a lady, I think the Princess Pamfili Doria, who was passing in a carriage at the time, being compelled to descend, and being handed a flaming torch, with which she was requested to light the bonfire."—*Memoir of L. Oliphant*, i. 26.

² *Memoirs*, iii. 170.

³ Mr. Petre to Lord Palmerston, March 22nd, 1848. In a previous dispatch he gives the details of another demonstration in the course of which the mob had filed past the Austrian Embassy with reversed torches and in dead silence. Thence they made their way to the Palace of the Jesuits, the Gesù, and after solemnly and feelingly singing a *De Profundis*, dispersed!

by that of the insurrection of Milan, and of the crossing of the frontier by the Sardinian army. When the proclamation of Charles Albert to the people of Lombardy and Venetia became known,¹ it was instantly reprinted and placarded on every wall of Rome, while "l'Italia farà da sè" became the rallying cry of all good patriots.

But though the thoughts of the Romans turned instinctively to the long-dreamed-of war of independence thus suddenly become a present and urgent reality, the name and power of their fallen enemy were so intimately associated with the reactionary or Gregorian party, that the earliest popular inspiration was to make the victory complete, to deal out retribution to Austria's Italian allies. Metternich's influence was the Jesuits' influence; as the Austrian Minister had fallen, it was fit that they too should fall; and the people of Rome turned to rend them with exultation and impatience.

That the popular fury had considerable justification there can be little doubt. The consistently anti-national and retrograde policy of the Jesuits had long been suspected and exposed: Gioberti, in his *Prolegomeni* and *Gesuita Moderno*, had shown the necessary connection between the Jesuits and Austria; and from Sardinia and Naples they had already been expelled in deference to the irresistibly expressed wish of the people.

At Rome they struggled hard to maintain their position. But so great did the danger of popular violence become, that finally the Pope, Cardinal Antonelli, and Father Rothaan, General of the Order, agreed that to abandon a hopeless struggle was the only course left open. With many expressions of regret and esteem Pius issued a notification on March 30th,

¹ See note, page 126.

wherein the decision arrived at with the consent and approval of the General and his Council of Assistants was recorded. The document is short, and so curiously characteristic, that it is here given in full :

“The resigned supplications of the reverend Jesuit Fathers, representing the distressing circumstances in which their Order is placed in the capital, and the necessity of some measure being taken for their personal safety, have been frequently laid before His Holiness our Lord. The Holy Father who has ever held these religious men in his highest esteem, as indefatigable workers in the Vineyard of the Lord, cannot but feel new and greater affliction at the shameful misfortune that overtakes them ; but nevertheless, because of the increasing agitation and to prevent unfortunate consequences, he has felt obliged to take into serious consideration the gravity of the case. Wherefore, day before yesterday, through the intermediary of a distinguished personage,¹ he communicated the above-expressed sentiments to the General of this worthy Order, and also his agitation at the peril of the times, and his alarm at the possibility of some mishap. On receipt of this information the General called the Fathers Assistants to deliberate, and they resolved to bend before necessity, being anxious that their presence should not be made the pretext of grave disorder and of the shedding of blood. After which it only remains to make the necessary arrangements with the reverend Father General for carrying this resolution into effect, for making provision for the schools of the Collegio Romano and their religious establishments, and for the safeguarding of their goods and property.”²

The real sentiments of a Pope are not of necessity expressed in documents to which his name is appended, yet in the case of the one just quoted, it is impossible not to believe that Pius gave expression to what he sincerely and deeply felt. For however great his liberal

¹ Probably Cardinal Castruccio Castracane.

² *Government Gazette*, March 30th, 1848.

and national sympathies, Pius had stronger ones yet. He was above all things God's Regent on earth, the Shepherd of the flock ; in Frenchman, and German, and Italian, he saw alike the human subjects who owed him equal religious veneration and allegiance. If the Jesuits had laboured truly in the Vineyard of the Lord, —and who could doubt the tremendous work they had done for the Catholic Church,—they had necessarily rendered the greatest service to the Head of that Church, and their errors on less important matters of earthly politics could be easily condoned. What wonder is it that Pius agreed to their expulsion from Rome with a heavy heart, and a dire foreboding of the future? One who was well qualified to judge thought this blow so bitter that the Pope never forgave it ; it excited in him a generous feeling of defence, and an inclination that ever after showed itself in his marked preference for the Jesuit over every other Order of the Catholic Church.¹

But religious questions were not the only ones that pressed for the immediate consideration of the Papal Government ; among others that of finance had once more reached a critical stage. One of the first acts of the new Ministry had been to publish a statement of the fairly satisfactory position of the Roman Bank, in hopes of supporting its weakened credit and the value of its notes. Several measures of minor importance were at the same time devised to strengthen the position of the Treasury,—by levying money on ecclesiastical benefices and revenues, and by raising voluntary contributions from religious Corporations. It was anticipated that the now usual deficit would, for the year 1848, amount to about 500,000 scudi. In the month of January a contract had been passed with the banking firm of La

¹ Minghetti, *op. cit.* i. 353.

Hante for a 5 per cent loan of 1,000,000 scudi at a discount of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent ; but the political agitation that had shaken Europe during the early weeks of the year had sent the value of money up with a bound. The bankers had declined to carry out the terms of their contract, while the conditions of the money market deprived the Papal Government of all hopes of securing another loan until settled political conditions once more prevailed. The Treasurer, Monsignor Morichini, had already spoiled his year's revenue by anticipating three-twelfths of the direct taxes ; he had also attempted to borrow on various unencumbered ecclesiastical securities ; he could now find no better remedy for the impecuniosity of the State than the issue of paper money not redeemable in coin. On April 11th the Government decreed that the Roman Bank could issue 800,000 scudi in notes with the force of legal tender. This measure was followed by the resignation of Monsignor Morichini.¹

The financial embarrassments of the Pontifical Government were sadly aggravated by the necessity of providing for the military measures that popular opinion imperatively demanded. No sooner had the news of the great events in the north reached Rome, than the Ministry assembled and decreed the formation of a corps of observation ; it was to be composed of four regiments of Italian infantry, and two of Swiss, together with three batteries of artillery and various details. The command of this nucleus of an army was given to General Durando, a Sardinian officer ;² among the members of his improvised staff

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 55.

² Durando was a strong nationalist and liberal ; he had, when a younger man, been actively connected with the Carbonaro movement.

was to be found Massimo d'Azeglio, who had suddenly found himself graced with the unaccustomed title of Colonel. By the 24th of March these troops had all left the capital, and on the following day irregular bodies of civic guards and volunteers began to follow them towards the frontier.

These volunteers represented all classes of society from Princes to peasants; they displayed the most extraordinary enthusiasm, and marched under flags that showed the Papal arms surmounted by a cross, and by streamers of the Italian national colours, the red, white, and green tricolor.¹

As they marched from Rome towards the Austrian border the Papal volunteers swelled their ranks from the towns and villages they passed; for the national crusade against the Austrians had stirred the people profoundly, and already the hastily improvised forces of Romagna had captured Comacchio and beleaguered the citadel of Ferrara. In the camps popular preachers like Father Gavazzi proclaimed the Holy War, and equally stirred the religious zeal and the nationalist enthusiasm of their hearers with torrents of facile Italian eloquence.²

The task of General Durando was at the best one of extreme difficulty, and the instructions he received from the Government were hardly calculated to facilitate it. From his headquarters, which he established at Bologna, the Papal Commander-in-Chief endeavoured to organize his forces and to impart the rudiments of

¹ De Cesare relates an amusing anecdote in connection with the first issue of Neapolitan stamps. So great was Ferdinand's horror of Italian nationalism, that he declined to permit either red or green to be used for any of them. He was afraid lest ardent patriots might proclaim their sentiments by affixing to a *white* envelope two stamps, one *red* and one *green*!—De Cesare, *La fine di un Regno*, i. 234.

² See Appendix E.

discipline to his raw levies. But it was far more a national rising than a regular army that Durando had under his command, an instrument perhaps fit for rapid strokes, but not for well-ordered and long-drawn-out strategical operations. The undisciplined voice of the camp that urged the General to lead his troops across the Po at once, was perhaps not mistaken as to the essential capacity it represented.

Durando's instructions and the dispatches he received from Rome were somewhat vague and contradictory. He had left the capital with orders to concentrate his army in Romagna. On March 27th Antonelli wrote to him stating that he should place as large a body as possible along the frontier, by that means keeping an Austrian force engaged ; but that he was on no account to make a forward movement for fear of embarrassing the operations of Charles Albert. On the following day, March 28th, Prince Aldobrandini, Minister of War, wrote instructing him to place himself in correspondence with the King of Sardinia's headquarters and to co-operate in his movements. These last instructions could not be otherwise than satisfactory to the Piedmontese Commander ; in pursuance of them, he immediately dispatched D'Azeglio to join Charles Albert and to open communications between the Royal and Pontifical headquarters.

But between the Pope and his Ministers, or rather the lay members of the Ministry, there was a wide divergence of views on the subject of the war : every day Pius was getting more and more averse from the path on which he found himself engaged, more and more inclined to turn back ; the influence of the Gregorian party, notwithstanding the ostensible defeat of the Jesuits, was rapidly gaining a decided hold on

him, which the force of circumstances was slowly strengthening.¹ When the volunteers left Rome on their way to the front, they had all in turn passed through the Piazza di Monte Cavallo in front of the Quirinal and knelt for the Papal benediction. Pius had neither found it in him, nor had he dared, to set his face firmly against a movement that he strongly disapproved, and he had appeared on his balcony to bless the departing soldiers; yet if the clerical authorities are to be trusted, he did so in very suggestive terms, making no allusion to a national war nor to Italian independence, but speaking of the soldiers' task as the protection of the frontiers of the Pontifical States from external aggression.²

The great majority of the Ministers were anxious that the Pope should definitely decide to declare war and order his troops to cross the frontier. But to Pius the question to be resolved was more than military, more than national, more than temporal; whatever his inclination, whatever the arguments brought to bear, however great the difficulty of resisting the torrent of public opinion, he had to consider his position as the spiritual Head of the Catholic world. Was it for him to draw the sword of the aggressor? The gentle-

¹ Among the Cardinals whom Pius most consulted at this period were Vizzardelli, Orioli, Patrizi, and Ferretti,—this, of course, in addition to Antonelli. It is interesting to recall that among the liberalizing Churchmen who supported Pius was Monsignor Pecci, Bishop of Gubbio, now Pope Leo XIII.

² "I remember standing on the steps of St. Peter's while Pope Pio Nono gave his blessing to the volunteers that were leaving for Lombardy to fight the Austrians, and seeing the tears roll down his cheeks,—as I supposed because he hated so much to have to do it."—Oliphant, *op. cit.* i. 28.

The clerical writers, Balleydier in particular, attribute significant words to Pius on this occasion; whether he uttered them or not, it is equally clear that but very few of the soldiers in the Piazza could have heard them, and that even if not heard, nor even pronounced, they fairly represent the Pope's frame of mind at that time.

minded, narrowly conscientious priest who occupied the chair of St. Peter, not finding an immediate possible answer to this terrible question, sought refuge in an oblique course ; he declined to reply to his Ministers' eager entreaties, and told them that until he could come to a decision they must obey the force of circumstances. Among the reasons put forward by Pius to warrant this expectant course, was the uncertain state of the negotiations then pending with Sardinia and Tuscany, that were the sequel of the Customs Union Treaty of November 1847. This treaty had been generally considered as the first step towards the accomplishment of that federation of the States of the Peninsula under the dual leadership of the Pope and of the King of Sardinia that Gioberti had preached in the *Primato*. Its successful conclusion had not interrupted the negotiations that had as their eventual object the formation of a strong pan-Italian national organization. Through the winter the diplomats had exchanged a multitude of communications on the subject, and in the spring the constitutional movements had come to give a renewed impetus to the project. Now that the principal object that called for federation,—the freeing of Italy from foreign domination,—had become a difficulty actually in course of solution, the question at once arose whether the negotiations should be adjourned to a more convenient season, or whether on the contrary they should be pushed on to a rapid and practical conclusion. Such was the question to which Pius informed his Ministers he must obtain an answer before his final determination on the prosecution of the war could be taken ; and it may consequently appear not unreasonable to say that, both in his spiritual and temporal capacities, he had taken up a position that was not so

entirely irrational as his critics have been generally agreed in thinking.

From the moment that the Sardinian army had crossed the frontier of Lombardy in pursuit of Radetzky, from the moment that Charles Albert had ascertained that the Provisional Government of Milan would not proclaim a republic but maintain a neutral attitude and co-operate in the war, his enthusiasm for the Italian league apparently diminished. Although the Pope's ablest negotiator and counsellor, Monsignor Corboli-Bussi, was once more dispatched from Rome on a special mission to the King of Sardinia, the efforts of the Papal Government to conclude the league negotiations failed. For although in the middle of March the most powerful incentive that influenced Charles Albert was the fear of losing his throne, in the early days of April circumstances were already so completely modified, that a totally different consideration principally guided his acts,—the ambition of forming a great kingdom of Northern Italy. But an essential feature of the Italian league, as it had up till then been thought of, was the equality of force, or balance, among the States that were to compose it; it was one thing for Sardinia to be a member of the federation, but a kingdom of Northern Italy stretching from Genoa to Venice, from the Alps to the Adriatic, was a very different matter. Two points were specially urged by Monsignor Corboli-Bussi as essential to the conclusion of negotiations: one was that Lombardy-Venetia and the kingdom of Sardinia must come into the league as separate political entities; the other that Charles Albert should repay the Pope's co-operation in the war with a subsidy of money. The answer of the Sardinian Government to these proposals was guided by the

considerations that have been just reviewed, and by a well-grounded belief that Pius intended at heart to withdraw from the conflict.¹

The Ministers of Charles Albert abandoned all pretence of following up the negotiations on the original basis, and now put forward a counter-proposal whereby it was provided that the two States should enter into a simple military convention for the joint prosecution of the war against the Austrians.²

If Corboli-Bussi's negotiations did not appear likely to be attended by any very striking result, the Papal Commander-in-Chief was rapidly bringing matters to a crisis. Prince Aldobrandini had finally taken it on himself to issue instructions to Durando that left him a free discretion to cross the Po.³ On April 5th that General decided to invade Venetia; he issued a proclamation to the troops in which he announced the co-operation of the Pontifical with the Sardinian army in a national and holy war, and declared that their symbol of victory should be the sign of the Cross,⁴ and their battle-cry, "God wills it!"

This discourse of Durando was received with considerably more enthusiasm by his troops than by his

¹ So desperate was the financial position of the Papal Government, that early in April General Durando, acting under official instructions from the Minister of War, attempted to persuade the Provisional Government of Venice to provide him with a subsidy.

² Farini, whose opinion is entitled to weight, takes a somewhat different view from that put forward here. In this matter it is difficult to find an Italian writer who is not either wholly for Charles Albert, or wholly for the Pope. A careful comparison of dates is in itself sufficient to rob many of the contemporary accounts of authority. What appears probable is, that Pius was genuinely anxious that the league should be formed,—hoping thereby to be relieved of many temporal anxieties and responsibilities. See especially the dispatches of Boninsegni, Tuscan envoy at Rome, to Serristori, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Florence, given by N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v.

³ Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 63.

⁴ ". . . tutti moviamo fregiati della croce di Cristo."

Sovereign. Pius was deeply incensed at his General's excursion into the regions of spiritual warfare ; zealous advisers persuaded him without difficulty to officially record his disapproval of Durando's proclamation ; the *Government Gazette* of April 10th contained the following announcement :—"An order of the day to the troops, dated Bologna, April 5th, expresses ideas and sentiments that are made to appear those of his Holiness. The Pope, when he desires to express his sentiments, speaks in person, and not through the intermediary of subordinates."

But official reprimands could not keep Durando and his eager soldiers south of the Po ; by the 21st of April the greater part of his troops were in the enemy's country, advanced parties were pushed out in the direction of the Quadrilateral, and several skirmishes were fought in the neighbourhood of Legnago.

The Papal army at first appeared to be without a clear objective, and Charles Albert remained indecisively along the course of the Mincio ; the Sardinians had so far done little. Allowing Radetzky to withdraw the shattered remnant of his troops from Milan, they advanced even more slowly than the Austrians had retreated,¹ giving the veteran Field-Marshal time to recover from his surprise and from the confusion caused by the desertion from his ranks of nearly twenty thousand soldiers of Italian birth.² Radetzky had taken up a position between Verona and Mantua, in the heart

¹ Radetzky succeeded in covering $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles a day during his retreat. This, considering that he moved in a single column, through a partially flooded country, and across numerous streams of which the bridges had been broken down, was by no means bad. Charles Albert, notwithstanding all his advantages, could manage no more than 5 miles a day. If campaigns are won by marching, as so many strategists have believed, Radetzky had already proved his superiority !

² This figure applies to the whole of the Austrian forces in Italy, and not to the column under Radetzky's immediate orders at Milan.

of the Quadrilateral. Here he was placed at the outlet of the two routes through which he expected the arrival of the reinforcements that would enable him to meet his enemy in the field; the first of these routes followed the valley of the Adige northwards to the Tyrol; the other, passing north-east through Vicenza and Udine, led between the Carnic Alps and the Adriatic to the south-western provinces of the Austrian Empire.

Charles Albert, having lost his opportunity of destroying his enemy as he struggled over the numerous watercourses that intersect the Lombard plain, had now to choose between several possible plans of operation. They were all perhaps difficult; for an attack on the Quadrilateral, defended by a Radetzky, could not be considered anything less than a considerable military undertaking. Yet several offered a fair chance of success, and at all events it was possible to state with a considerable degree of precision what the feasible modes of taking the offensive were,—for Charles Albert was operating on the classic ground of the military student, on ground that had witnessed some of the finest marches and counter-marches of the first Napoleon. It was open to the King of Sardinia to concentrate his and Durando's forces for an attack on his enemy's army in the field before it was reinforced,—or to attempt the capture of the most important of the four fortresses, that of Verona,—or again to throw Durando with the largest possible force against Radetzky's left flank and rear, preventing the passage of reinforcements through Venetian territory, while he himself occupied the Austrian Commander in front, and threatened to cut his line of retreat by the Adige. But Charles Albert lacked the decision and common qualities that might have led a man of little military science and of far less intelligence

than himself to victory ; in his mystical, conscientious, and narrowly ambitious conception, as in his calm courage and ardent imagination, he appeared a very Don Quixote of a King riding through the Lombard plain merely to tilt at imaginary assailants. He perceived danger everywhere but there where it really lay, and took every precaution and measure save that one on which all depended. He feared France behind him, his republican subjects at home, the undecided Milanese close at hand, the threats of England, of Germany, of Russia, and he mistrusted equally his own ability and that of his generals. He could not see how quickly these phantom dangers would vanish at the first decisive victory, and that having drawn the sword, he must strain every nerve to the stroke it was to deal, leaving other matters for that easy solution that is the victor's.

It is unnecessary to be led into a detailed account of the proceedings of the Sardinians and of their King ; by the end of April several engagements had been fought, in which the Piedmontese soldiers had appeared to advantage and won a certain measure of not very profitable success. Part of the Papal troops were detached to Northern Venetia, there to oppose the advance of an Austrian corps under Nugent. The military position might be summed up as uncertain, though Radetzky appeared to be all but holding his ground. The prompt dispatch of reinforcements from Vienna, and the final decision of the Pope to abandon the nationalist party, came to mark a new phase of the war at the beginning of the month of May.

Pius had at last determined to break silence ; for some days it had been generally understood that the secret Consistory fixed for April 29th was to be the occasion for an important declaration of policy. The

sequence of events that had been driving Pius further and further towards the reactionary party has been already narrated ; another and last link had been added to the chain during the course of April. For Monsignor Viale, Nuncio at Vienna, and Monsignor Sacconi, Nuncio at Munich, had forwarded urgent representations to Rome, whereby it appeared that the war against Austria, apparently resolved on by the Roman Government, was turning the South Germans strongly against the Papacy, and might even result, so it was said, in a disastrous schism.¹ Nothing served more readily to work on the excitable temperament of Pius than an attack on the Church, and it may be that this last move of the Gregorian party determined the first decided retrograde step of the Pope.

An Allocution is traditionally a speech delivered by the Pope to the Cardinals in Latin, and it speaks little either for the scholarship, or for the attention, of Cardinal Antonelli that, on the occasion of the Allocution delivered by Pius IX on the 29th of April 1848, after leaving the Consistory he was unable to tell Farini whether the Pope had pronounced words of serious import or not. The Cardinal and Under Secretary however, soon procured a printed copy, and straightway discovered therein sufficient food for reflection. This most memorable speech of Pius is given in full in another place ;² it marks better than anything else the great turning-point of his political career ; here it need be dwelt on at no great length.

The Pope in his address to the assembled Cardinals began by repudiating responsibility for the unsettled state of public affairs, and after recapitulating the course of events from the Papal point of view, came to the

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 92.

² Appendix F.

matter of the war with Austria. As to that the pronouncement was perfectly definite and left no doubt as to the Pope's intentions : his troops had been dispatched to the frontier as a defensive measure only, and with no intention of attacking Austria ; his first duty was not to draw the sword, but to carry out the divine mission of peace entrusted to him from above.

The full sense and application of the words that Pius had pronounced, the deep significance of the intention they conveyed, sank but slowly in the minds of the liberal leaders and of the people. The first to realize the calamity that had overtaken the Italian cause were the Ministers, and on the same day they handed in their resignations. The clubs were much agitated, and frequent messages passed between them and the Quirinal. The people appeared dazed, and too stupefied even to demonstrate ; the political illusion that had for so many months played the chief part in the daily life of Rome had been finally, officially, dispelled ; the people had led their friend so far that at last he had turned against them.

The first movement of dismay over, the nationalists tried to recover the lost ground, to compel Pius to retreat from the position he had taken up. The advanced section did not hesitate to adopt means of the most reprehensible character to stir up popular agitation : intelligence was widely circulated that Austrian troops had hanged Papal prisoners with an inscription affixed to their bodies that bore, "This is how we treat the soldiers of Pius IX !" Cardinal Lambruschini was mobbed, and Sterbini, editor of the *Contemporaneo*, did his best by expostulation, scarcely veiled threats of violence, and by every other means, to force a retraction from the Pope. Such was the consternation with which all but a small party were seized,

that it appeared impossible for the moment to form a new Ministry, and Antonelli and his colleagues agreed to provisionally continue in office. So persistent and numerous were the representations made to Pius on the subject of his disastrous speech, that in the course of the day that followed the delivery of the Allocution, he wavered and appeared prepared to give way once more. Pasolini relates in his *Memoirs* how, on the evening of May 1st, he and Recchi walked in the gardens of the Quirinal with Pius. The Pope had quite given in to his liberal advisers by this time: he had promised to rectify everything, and had even made a beginning; for as the three walked about the lovely gardens of the Palace, they awaited the final proof of a proclamation that was intended to allay all fears on the subject of the national war, and to announce the participation of the Roman arms. Three times did Pius impatiently send for the proof, and three times the answer was returned that it was not yet struck off; finally Pasolini and Recchi left without seeing it. Early on the following morning the Pope's new declaration was placarded throughout the city; but it confirmed in every particular the words of the Allocution! Pasolini states, on the authority of Monsignor Pentini who had charge of the printing works at the Quirinal, that the proclamation had originally been prepared as the Pope had declared to Pasolini and Recchi, and that the fatal alterations were due to Cardinal Antonelli. He had visited the printing office and ordered the insertion of the corrections that totally changed the meaning of the words drafted by Pius.¹ From this well-attested incident may be equally estimated the methods of the Theocracy and the character of its Head!

¹ Pasolini, *op. cit.* 64; Minghetti, *op. cit.* i. 372.


That the trick played on Pasolini and Recchi was not of the contrivance of Pius hardly needs assertion, and were confirmation needed, it is to be found in the fact that by the Pope's instructions Farini was immediately hurried off to the headquarters of Charles Albert to make what explanations were possible, and to put the best construction on the Allocution ; he was further instructed to offer to the King of Sardinia the supreme command of the Pontifical troops beyond the Po. Farini's dispatch to the camp had the further effect of releasing Monsignor Corboli-Bussi, and of so enabling that prelate to return to Rome.¹

In the Pope's modified frame of mind some of the difficulties in the way of forming a new Ministry were now found to be superable ; there was urgent necessity that some one should be found with sufficient devotion and public spirit to take up the reins of government, for the state of the city was becoming rapidly serious. Rospigliosi, chief commander of the civic guards, practically controlled Rome, and disorder threatened to become revolution ; finally on May 4th the following Ministry was announced :—

Cardinal Ciacchi, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs ecclesiastical ;² Count Marchetti, Foreign Affairs secular ; Count Mamiani, Interior ; Professor de Rossi, Justice ; Lunati, Finance ; Prince Pamfili Doria, War ; Duke of Rigano, Public Works ; Galletti, Police.

¹ Minghetti, *op. cit.* ii. 87.

² Cardinal Ciacchi, and after him Cardinal Orioli, who must not be confused with the well-known professor of the same name, eventually persuaded the Pope to excuse them from the task of presiding over the Ministry. Finally the aged Cardinal Soglia submitted to the order of his ecclesiastical superior, and unwillingly filled the office.



Position after the Sardinian victory at Goito, May 30, 1848

- ▲ Pontificals.
- Sardinians.
- Austrians.

CHAPTER X

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Mamiani—The Papal army in Venetia—Its retreat before Nugent—Effect of the Allocution—Democratic propaganda—Mazzini at Milan—Conflict of ideals—The “guerra reale”—Fusion of northern Italy with Sardinia—Mamiani and reform—His views on the temporal power—Papal constitutional methods—Antonelli’s position—Gioberti’s visit to Rome—His meeting with Ciceroacchio—Elections—Opening of Council of deputies—Speech of Mamiani—The Prince of Canino—Roman eloquence—Anniversary of the Amnesty—Papal balance sheet—Durando holds Vicenza—Victory of Goito and fall of Peschiera—Radetzky’s bold strategy—Capitulation of the Pontifical army—Defeat of Charles Albert at Custoza—He abandons Milan—Armistice of Salasco.

THE most important member of the new Ministry was not its nominal head, Cardinal Ciacchi, but the occupant of the arduous post of Minister of the Interior, Count Terenzio Mamiani. His name will be recalled as that of one of those few exiles who, at the time of the Amnesty, had declined to take the oath tendered by the Government as a condition of repatriation. Later he had been permitted to return on giving his promise to respect the laws, and had won a high reputation at Rome for his intellectual attainments, his temperate though advanced views, his sincerity, his high personal character, and his strong support and admiration of

Pius. The other Ministers represented very much the same shade of moderate liberal and nationalist opinion as others had done before them, and also very much the same degree of administrative capacity ; that Galletti was retained as Minister of Police was a fatally dangerous concession to Sterbini and the agitators of the clubs with whom he was in complete accord.

The period of three months during which the Mamiani Ministry, as it is generally called, remained in office (May 4th. to August 3rd, 1848), may be said to mark the opening of the struggle between the advanced democratic party and the Princely or Albertist nationalists.¹

The Allocution of April 29th had perhaps an even more deplorable effect among Durando's soldiers than among the people of the capital. With an army composed in great part of raw levies and undisciplined volunteers, and with but few efficient officers, the question of morale was one of absolutely vital consequence. The Pontifical troops had, after some hesitation, been moved to the Venetian province with a view of blocking this most convenient route to the Austrian reinforcing column under Nugent. They had not fought well, and were driven from one line of defence to another by the enemy. Routed, badly disciplined, and insufficiently supplied, the volunteers soon got completely out of hand ; the news of the Pope's Allocution led to the circulation of the wildest rumours among them. That Pius was secretly in league with Austria, and that, as he declined to formally declare war, the Papal troops were not entitled to the rights of belligerents, and were consequently liable to be shot or

¹ The reader may be reminded that this observation is made from the point of view of Roman, not of Italian, history.

hanged if captured by the Austrians, were among these ; and fertile Italian imaginations soon evolved even worse fictions. After an action at Cornuda, in which the Pontifical troops behaved even more wretchedly and were routed even more completely than before, General Ferrari, the brave and experienced officer who commanded them, was in such despair at the conduct of his men, that he offered then and there to discharge all who wished to return to their homes. Many shamelessly availed themselves of this proposal.

In the meanwhile Thurm, who had succeeded Nugent, continued his advance ; cleverly manœuvring Durando out of a strong position covering the passage of the Brenta, he crossed that river, and thence forced forward his march to reach the important strategical point of Vicenza. If the Austrian general could succeed in occupying that city, he was within reach of Verona and in touch with the Quadrilateral and Radetzky.

Similar causes to those that had so demoralized the Pontifical army had been working in that of Sardinia, and as with the former, more with the volunteers than with the regulars. From Tuscany, from revolted Parma and Modena, and even from Naples, soldiers had been sent to aid in the national war ; but apart from the regular troops of the Sardinian army, there was but little cohesion or military efficiency among them. Lombardy also had formed several corps for active service, but Charles Albert, whether from a prejudice against the employment of irregular troops or from considerations of a political nature, showed no great encouragement to the Lombard military organizations ; for the King's eyes were still turned with more

anxiety to Milan behind him, than towards the Quadrilateral whence Radetzky was now rapidly preparing to strike a blow and to meet the Italians in the field.

There were certainly matters at Milan that could not but deeply interest the King of Sardinia. On the first news of the rebellion Mazzini had left Paris; he arrived in the capital of Lombardy on April 8th, accompanied by Ruffini and Menotti, and was received with a popular ovation. He proceeded through the streets in triumph to the building occupied by the Provisional Government, and there, from a balcony, addressed an excited and enthusiastic crowd.

The situation created by the presence of Mazzini was most anomalous, for the Milanese had not as yet decided either for the King of Sardinia or for the Republic. The fact that Charles Albert was the visible sword of Italy, by whose army alone Austria could apparently be defeated, paralyzed the democratic movement of which Mazzini was the recognised head; and the fact that Mazzini was the idol and hero of a large section of the Milanese, of many Sardinians, and of Italians in every part of the Peninsula, appeared to equally paralyze the faculties of Charles Albert.

The lack of vigour of the King, his evident hesitations, his marked distrust of the popular movement, his obvious disposition to withhold arms from the Lombards, were as many weapons used against him by the republican propagandists.

Mazzini himself professed willingness to support the war, and to postpone constitutional considerations until after its conclusion. In a proclamation of the Società Nazionale Italiana he stated that: "The Association does not aim at the success of this or that

form of government, but will urge the development of the national idea in every possible way and in accordance with the declared aspirations of the Italian people."

On the night of his arrival at Milan the democratic leader had declared that his desire was : " To work with the members of the Provisional Government, reserving till after the day of victory the measures that would enable the people to determine their form of government and future destinies." ¹

But in such a national upheaval as then was in Italy, it was evident that armed force and success were the two factors that would dominate the solution of the questions of the day. The complete victory of Charles Albert over the Austrians would inevitably mean the defeat of the republicans and the renewed imprisonment or exile of their chief ; and if Mazzini is perhaps entitled to be absolved from the accusation of consciously attempting to weaken the position of the leader of the national forces, yet his followers can by no means be acquitted from the charge.

Among the insubordinate volunteers of Durando, and among the disheartened soldiers whose impatience suffered from the long-drawn-out and indecisive operations between the Mincio and the Adige, the Mazzinians had begun their work. " L'Italia farà da sè," the popular catch phrase of the early weeks, soon gave way to another even more suggestive one ; many of the soldiers openly, and in no spirit of flattery,

¹ Charles Albert had at first felt compelled to take up a somewhat similar position. The King's words offer a curious parallel to those of his democratic opponent ; they were addressed in the form of a proclamation to the people of Lombardy : " Italians, your victory is certain, my arms, by shortening the struggle, will afford you a security that will enable you in a calm and unperturbed spirit to reorganize your internal affairs ; the will of the people shall be truly and freely expressed."—Mario, *Vita di Mazzini*, 315.

spoke of the war in which they were engaged as the "guerra reale,"—the *Royal* war.

The political and military dangers that threatened Sardinia on every hand had been the constant subject of debate of Charles Albert and his Ministers; they decided to adopt a course that perhaps was less objectionable than any other in the event of the result of the military operations being successful; should, however, the contrary prove to be the case, a more embarrassing one to pursue could hardly have been chosen. It was decided, before the strength of the opposing armies had yet been seriously tested, to call on the revolted people of Lombardy and Venetia to decide whether or no they would come under Sardinian rule. Every political means in their power, every argument, every inducement, every promise, did the Albertists utilize to gain their end, and though Cattaneo, Mazzini, and the republican section of the Provisional Government at Milan, though Manin at Venice, and others elsewhere, did their utmost to oppose the royalist movement, it was arranged that on May 29th a plebiscite should be taken. The voters were to be asked to reply, yes or no, to the question whether fusion with Sardinia was to take place immediately. The result was a surprise to all; only 16 per cent of the electors failed to poll, and out of 560,000 votes less than 1000 were cast against fusion.¹ Thus on the 29th day of May 1848, as a result of the practically unanimous vote of the population of the Austrian provinces, Charles Albert had taken a great stride on the road of ambition, had become ruler of a large north Italian kingdom with 10,000,000 inhabitants.

¹ The figures are very remarkable and difficult to accept without reservation. Yet plebiscitary votes have given nearly as surprising results on many other occasions, notably when the third Napoleon first appealed to the direct suffrage of the French people.

On that very day other operations and more decisive than those of the ballot-box had opened. Radetzky had made his first attempt at taking the offensive, and after a brilliant march from Verona had crushed De Laugier and the Tuscans at Curtatone and Montanara near Mantua.

While Charles Albert with the pen and Radetzky with the sword were contesting the destiny of northern Italy, the Roman Ministry, of which Mamiani was the guiding spirit, bravely attempted to labour in the taresown field of Pontifical liberalism. It was well known to all who were personally acquainted with him that the new director of the Papal policy held strong opinions on the question of the temporal power. Mamiani believed that the interest of both Pope and people was to effect a total separation between powers ecclesiastical and lay. The Pope, he argued, would find his spiritual authority strengthened and elevated by his absolute abstention from worldly contentions and controversies; and the Minister wished to see the Pontiff occupy a constitutional position somewhat similar to that of the Sovereigns of Great Britain, one in which his whole responsibility would become merged in that of his advisers. But however strong and thorough Mamiani's views, he pressed them forward in no unreasonable manner; he realized fully that neither Pope nor people were prepared to immediately carry out such a policy, and that the retrograde Catholic party was too interested and too powerful to be rapidly overcome; he was therefore prepared to proceed by degrees, but with the intention of ultimately diverting the Pope's temporal authority and responsibility into lay hands.

The reactionary party in the Papal Court had not failed to bring these views of Mamiani to the notice of the Sovereign, and that probably in a very exaggerated form. Pius was firmly persuaded that his latest Minister was a very dangerous, if necessary man, an enemy of religion, and not to be trusted. The Pope's conduct, which in the matter of the Allocution and the subsequent explanations had come near meriting the epithet of insincere, now became unmistakably hostile and deceptive towards his ministers. He apparently resolved to treat them as inferior officials, and to transact high matters of state over their heads, trusting to the loyal support of the hierarchy to supply him with the agents necessary for accomplishing his design. And as though to make the unconstitutional character of his proceedings even more indubitable, it was in the hands of the late President of the Council of Ministers, of Cardinal Antonelli, that Pius placed the duty of carrying on those confidential diplomatic negotiations of the Holy See that were not intrusted to his constitutional advisers. No later than May 12th, eight days only after the new Ministry had entered on their functions, a confidential and important dispatch was addressed by Antonelli to Farini, then with Charles Albert's headquarters beyond Peschiera. In this the Cardinal specifically states that it is under special instructions from his Holiness that he writes, and then comes to the question of a mediation which the Pope proposes to interpose between Austria and Sardinia. In pursuance of this same proposal Monsignor Morichini had been sent to Vienna, and this part of the negotiation was managed in the same way as the first, that is to say not through the constitutional channel, but through the intermediary of Cardinal Antonelli.

Notwithstanding the Allocution, notwithstanding the Pope's effort to escape from his difficulties by offering mediation and attempting to arrange terms of peace, Mamiani did not hesitate to take a step equally prompted by the popular demand and by his own strongly nationalist sentiments; Count Lutzow, the Austrian ambassador, received his passports.¹ His presence at Rome had for some time been a scarcely tolerated anomaly; on his departure, he placed the interests of Austria in the hands of Count Spaur, the Bavarian minister.

It was very nearly at the time of Lutzow's departure that Gioberti arrived on a visit to Rome. The illustrious author of the *Primato*, after an exile of more than ten years, revisited his native country to reap the reward of literary and patriotic celebrity, and to witness the beginning of the accomplishment of his remarkable political prophecies. He had visited the headquarters of Charles Albert, and had afterwards spent some little time in Milan, where his authority, backed up by the eloquent testimony of facts, completely overshadowed that of Mazzini. Gioberti had contributed greatly to the success of the Sardinian cause in northern Italy; he now came to Rome when the first symptoms of weakness of the *guerra reale* were being manifested; he trusted that his eloquence and influence would be sufficient to restore the confidence of Pope and people in the leadership of Charles Albert.

Gioberti reached Rome on May 24th, and if the reception he met with may be taken as a reliable indication, the Albertist cause was still as strong as it had been a month before. The municipal council decided

¹ Notwithstanding which Monsignor Viale followed the Austrian Court to Innsprück.—Tivaroni, *op. cit.* ii. 329.

to change the name of the Via Borgognone, where he had taken up his abode, to Via Gioberti, and placed a guard of honour at his door. He met the leading men representing every shade of political opinion,—Mamiani, Pantaleoni, Orioli, Farini, Sterbini, the Prince of Canino, and the Pope. With all he debated and maintained those positions that were essential to the final success of the theories of the *Primato*: the valour of the Sardinian army, the sagacity and moderation of Charles Albert, the necessity of a united Italian movement, the enlightenment and nationalism of Pius.

But one name of note has been omitted from among those who associated with the priest-philosopher during his visit to Rome,—that of Angelo Brunetti. The two met one night, on the occasion of a political reunion given in honour of Gioberti at the Circolo Popolare. An account of this meeting has served to perpetuate one of the few specimens of *Ciceroacchionian* eloquence that have come down to a later age, it will here be noticed as a sole and sufficient tribute to the powers of the latest of Roman orators. The assembly was attended by every man of note of the city, numerous lights gave a brilliant illumination, speechmaking and conversation were animated. The simple-minded Brunetti sat in silence for a great part of the evening, his eyes riveted on the celebrated Piedmontese; at last his tall form was observed to rise, he approached Gioberti, and after the audience had become silent, solemnly apostrophized him in the following words:—

O Bella Italia,
Tu hai li occhi aperti,
Pe l'entusiasmo de li popoli,
E la penna di Gioberti!

Lovely Italy,—thine eyes are opened,—by the enthusiasm of thy people,—and the pen of Gioberti! ¹

It is felt that no criticism that could be offered would adequately deal with this remarkable effusion!

With Pius, Gioberti had no less than three interviews,—without their mutual admiration appearing to have suffered. Just before the close of his visit, the news of a double Sardinian success, at Peschiera and at Goito, arrived; it was the brightest day the Italian cause had seen, and Gioberti was called to his balcony by an acclaiming crowd that thronged the Via Borgognone. He addressed them, and closed with the following words:—

“Long life to Pius IX, to the Italian Pope, who shall bind the brows of the victor of Goito and of Peschiera with the Iron Crown.” ²

The public attention which had been concentrated on Gioberti during his stay in Rome, soon found another subject of interest after his departure. From the moment when Mamiani had taken up the duties of Minister of the Interior, he had been engaged in making preparations for the first meeting of the legislative assemblies provided for by the new constitution. On May 18th the elections were held, ³ and the first session took place on the 5th of June; the opening ceremony was attended with great pomp and circumstance, and was presided over by Cardinal Altieri. The speech which he delivered on behalf of the Pope was short and colour-

¹ Gioberti, *Opere* (Massari), vol. x. part iii. 125.

² Napoleon had been the last King of Italy to wear the Iron Crown of the Lombards. He had placed it on his head in the Duomo of Milan on the 26th of May 1805, with the exclamation: “Dio me l’ha dona, guai a chi la tocca!”—God gave it me, touch it who dares! The Iron Crown is still kept at Monza and accounted one of the most precious possessions of the House of Savoy.

³ Only about one-third of the electors voted. Tivaroni, *op. cit.* ii. 328.

less, for up to the very last moment no agreement could be come to between Pius and Mamiani on the wording of a longer and more elaborate discourse, with which it had been intended to meet the deputies.

Mamiani soon made up for this failure, and found an opportunity for making a declaration of policy on the opening of business in the Council of deputies two days later. His speech on that occasion contained the usual profusion of high-sounding generalities, so dear to the Italian understanding, but that do not require to be reproduced here. The first real point of interest in the Ministerial declaration had reference to the temporal power ; on this subject Mamiani pronounced himself as follows :—

“ Our Prince, as Father of all the faithful, shall remain within the lofty sphere of his divine authority, he shall live in the serene atmosphere of the Faith, he shall dispense to the world the word of God, prayer, benediction, and pardon.

“ In his capacity of Sovereign and constitutional ruler, he leaves to your wisdom, largely, to provide for the temporal interests of the people. The Constitution, adding its sanction to that of the Catholic Faith, declares the acts of the Prince blessed and involving no responsibility, and that in accordance with his nature his deeds must always be good, and can never be evil.”

This theological constitutional statement may well be regarded as one of the most extraordinary ever delivered by a responsible Minister to an elective assembly. Without pursuing the interminable questions of doctrine it raises in a fruitless discussion, it may be permissible to point out, from a plain point of view that many will accept, its fundamental and hopelessly

unworkable incongruity. For although according to the Church, to the Constitution, and even to the Minister, the Pope's judgment was absolutely infallible and its consequence inevitably beneficent, yet such was the condition of his estate, that it had been found urgently necessary to call to his assistance the un-inspired faculties of all those of his subjects whose names were to be found on the electoral roll!

The next point of interest in Mamiani's declaration was on the subject of the national movement. Without entering into details, or venturing on a prosaic consideration of ways and means, the Minister of the Interior pronounced strongly for the prosecution of the war under the supreme direction of Charles Albert. He also announced that the negotiations for an Italian federation or league would be resumed and actively prosecuted. Only two definite projects of legislation were put forward,—for the better organization of municipal bodies, for more precisely defining the responsibility of Ministers.

The burden thus thrown on the new-fledged legislators was not a very heavy one; yet the Roman Parliament was to prove equally unable to do justice to the extremely elevated sentiments, and to the more than modest programme, submitted to it by Mamiani. It first proceeded to the election of its officers, choosing as president Sereni, as vice-presidents Sturbinetti and Count Carlo Pepoli.¹ Among the non-official members of the Council none made themselves more conspicuous, or obnoxious, than the representative of the illustrious House of Bonaparte, the Prince of Canino. Endowed with a voice of brass, and an eccentric and ungovern-

¹ An ex-member of the Provisional Government of 1831; he married a daughter of King Joachim Murat.

able temper, the Prince of Canino rarely allowed a session to pass without raising an uproar by some personal insult, by some outrageous attack on any whom he chose to designate as reactionary, or by some provocative or indecent appeal to the rabble that loudly cheered him from the public galleries. Little perceptible effort was made to transact public business, but much time was devoted to the refurbishing of the eloquence of all the Ages, and to the drawing up of proclamations and addresses overflowing with laudable sentiments.

A short specimen of the rhetorical efforts of the Council of deputies may be quoted, to convey an impression of the intellectual and political plane on which the Roman representatives struggled at the time of the Ministry of Count Terenzio Mamiani.

Less than a fortnight after the first session of the Council, a great anniversary occurred, that of the election of Pius to the Papal throne two years before. There had been much talk of a grand demonstration to fitly celebrate the day. But the times were sadly changed; the first spontaneous expressions of gratitude and affection, even the later manifestations in which sincerity had gradually fallen to a far less conspicuous place, were now past history. The days of streaming banners and fluttering handkerchiefs, of strewed flowers and immortelles, of acclamation and laudation, of gratification and sympathy, were over. Now was the undemonstrative, ill-omened pause before—what none could yet predict. The projected celebration of the great anniversary fell perfectly flat; few went, they showed no enthusiasm, and it was for the last time.¹ But the new-formed Council of deputies did

¹ "Fu poco numerosa, poco lieta, e fu l'ultima."—Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 237.

its best to atone for the apathy of the people. A congratulatory address to the Sovereign was voted, of which the opening paragraph might be freely translated in some such words as these :—

“Most blessed Father,—Each time the recurring sun marks once more the sacred day in which your Holiness was sent, as a pacifying angel, to occupy the holy chair of Peter, from every corner of the earth, and in every tongue, a melting melody of gratitude and prayer arises.”¹

From this opening, the remainder of the Council's address can be sufficiently imagined. It may be doubted whether in the exuberance of the language used by the representatives of his people, Pius found consolation for the coolness of the once fervent crowds that so often knelt for his benediction in the Piazza di Monte Cavallo.

Apart from that most important of all matters, the settled basis of the constitution of the State, two extremely urgent questions faced the Roman Assembly,—finance, and war. The first was expeditiously disposed of by the deputies, in a fashion that argued considerable natural aptitude for the acquirement of the most convenient and approved methods of constitutional procedure. The Minister Lunati had a terrible balance-sheet to present, and worse remedies: his accounts balanced with a deficit of 2,700,000 scudi, and this without making provision for 2,500,000 scudi that the Minister of War immediately and imperatively required. The Chamber found itself unable to cope with such a problem, and promptly appointed a commission

¹ “Beatissimo Padre, Tutte le volte che il sole riconduce quel benedetto giorno, in cui l' Eterno mando la Santità vostra, come angelo conciliatore, ad occupare la cattedra santa di Pietro, da tutti gli angoli della terra, in ogni favella, s' inalzo al Cielo una melodia soavissima di ringraziamenti e di preghiere.”

to investigate the whole question of the Papal finances. This first difficulty thus summarily disposed of, the deputies were able to devote the greater part of their time to heated discussions on the one matter that was then engrossing the attention of every Italian,—the war with Austria. There was much to excuse the prominence given to this subject, and much to give serious anxiety to the members of the Roman Assembly.

It has already been seen that about the time when Mamiani had accepted office, the Pontifical army in Venetia was fast losing ground and credit. But though the tide of war that had now set against them was not to be turned back, yet a certain amount of lost reputation was recovered by the Papal troops before the end of the campaign.

Prince Thurm, after outmanœuvring Durando and forcing the passage of the Brenta, had advanced on Vicenza, but was only partly successful in the object of his march.

Durando hurried back, and managed to throw troops into the city before the Austrians could occupy it. From the 19th to 23rd of May there was fighting in the suburbs of Vicenza, and at least one determined attempt was made by the Austrians to capture the city; but the Italians held their positions, and repulsed every attack. They were, however, quite unable to prevent the forward movement of the Austrians, who by skirting the Papal positions, were able to effect their junction with Radetzky on the road to Verona. With this reinforcement to strengthen him, the Austrian commander now determined to take the offensive, and to attempt the relief of the fortress of Peschiera, closely besieged by Charles Albert. He rapidly marched

south from Verona, and on May 28th, as we have already seen, defeated a detached corps under De Laugier at Montanara and Curtatone. Having now crossed the Mincio, Radetzky advanced up the right bank of that stream, and on the 30th of May encountered the main body of the Sardinian army at Goito. The field was well contested : a general advance of the whole of Charles Albert's line at the close of the day decided fortune in his favour.¹ In the hour of victory the news arrived that Peschiera had surrendered to the Duke of Genoa, and the excited troops acclaimed Charles Albert King of Italy. It was the last fitful ray of fortune that was to cheer the Sardinian King ; not many at that hour could have guessed how few and how bitter were to be the remaining months of his life.² For two or three days Radetzky, who had retreated unpursued to the walls of Mantua, seemed powerless ; and the veteran Field-Marshal's position appeared all the more desperate, as news came to him from Vienna of further revolution that might necessitate the recall of the army and its chief for the defence of the person of the Emperor. But Radetzky showed his greatness of heart and of genius, by rising higher than the circumstances that threatened to engulf his country. He determined on an operation involving the greatest risks. Boldly denuding the Quadrilateral and the line

¹ Bava directed the operations ; his general advance at the close of a long and uncertain day will appeal to military students as a sound move deserving of success.

² The religious temperament of Charles Albert had a paralyzing effect on his military movements. After his victory at Goito, his utmost preoccupation was, not to turn his successes to advantage, but to return to Peschiera and offer up a *Te Deum*. Costa de Beauregard relates how his father, who was in attendance on the King, was awakened in the middle of the night that followed the battle by the sound of lamentations. He looked into the King's room, and there saw Charles Albert on his knees praying, his face bathed in tears.—Costa de Beauregard, *Le Pensieroso, Vita Italiana nel Risorgimento*, ii. 40.

of the Adige of troops, trusting for safety to the well-proved hesitation and inertness of his enemy, he threw back the whole mass of his army, together with a reinforcing corps under Welden, and rapidly concentrated his columns on the Pontifical army at Vicenza. On the 9th of June he surrounded the city with 40,000 men and 150 guns. Durando with but 10,000 men did all that could be done: he slowly contested the ground with the Austrians for thirty-six hours; the fighting was severe, the Pontifical troops, notably the Swiss regiments and the artillery, fought well and lost heavily;¹ finally an honourable capitulation was entered into (June 11th).² By its terms the Italians retained their arms, and were permitted to evacuate on an undertaking not to take the field against Austria for a term of three months.³

Durando's capitulation at Vicenza marked the end of the effective co-operation of the Pontifical army in the war of 1848. It remains to briefly outline the operations of the Austrians and Sardinians in Lombardy.

Radetzky, having now effectively cleared his left flank and his communications through Venetia, having inspirited his troops by success and received considerable reinforcements, hastened back to Verona, where he

¹ Among the wounded were D'Azeglio and Cialdini.

² An interesting and lifelike description of the retreat of the Pontificals is given by Schönhalls (*Erinnerungen eines österreichischen Veteranen*); he convincingly describes the demoralization of the volunteers, the dejected but soldierly bearing of the Swiss, the misery of escaping civilians,—men, women, and children,—and the brutal jeering of the victorious Austrians.—Quoted by Cantù, *op. cit.* ii. 910.

³ It appears quite probable that the favourable treatment accorded to the Pontifical army proceeded not only from military, but from political considerations. The Court of Vienna must at this time have been momentarily expecting Pius to withdraw from hostilities.—D'Azeglio, *Corresp. politique*, 46.

arrived on June 13th. He found his lines practically intact, and that the inactivity of Charles Albert had fully warranted his expectations.¹ For a few weeks the two armies faced one another; each consisting of about 70,000 men and stretched parallel on a line which between the extreme points of Rivoli and Mantua measured some thirty miles or more. Of the two positions, however, the Austrian was the stronger, as its extreme flanks were covered by the fortresses of the Quadrilateral.

Finally, wearying of inactivity, Charles Albert committed a gross blunder. Forgetting the length of the line he held, and the activity and strength of his opponent, on July 13th he began to gradually shift a great part of his army towards his extreme right, threatening to attack Mantua. Radetzky, who had kept his troops strongly concentrated, unerringly seized the moment and the opportunity. With converging columns he drove right into the weakened centre of the Sardinians, and forced the King to a general engagement under disadvantageous conditions. At Custozza, on July 24th, the Austrians won a complete victory. Two days later a further success fell to them at Volta, and the Sardinian army, in which demoralization had set in, commenced its retreat through Lombardy. On August 3rd, Charles Albert was under the walls of Milan, and of his army he could place but little more than 20,000 men in line. On the 4th there was some desultory fighting with the advancing Austrians; on the 5th the King surrendered the city on terms, and withdrew the remnants of the Sardinian army

¹ The King knew on the 7th that Radetzky was abandoning the Quadrilateral; the Austrian Marshal re-entered Verona on the 13th, a few hours before an attack on that fortress by the whole Sardinian army had been planned to take place!

beyond the Ticino, which he had crossed at their head some four months before.¹

By the armistice of Salasco, shortly afterwards concluded, it was agreed that hostilities should be suspended, and that Austria and Sardinia should remain *in statu quo ante bellum* until peace were concluded, or until either belligerent gave the other eight days' notice to resume hostilities.

¹ The salient fact about this inglorious termination of the operations of the Sardinian army was demoralization. Had it not been for that, it is quite conceivable that some sort of stand might have been made at Milan or elsewhere. According to Consul Campbell, in a dispatch to Lord Palmerston dated Milan, August 14th, 1848, Charles Albert's excuse for not defending the city, owing to lack of money, provisions, and ammunition, was not warranted. He states that there was plenty of money and food in Milan, and that, according to the Austrians, they had found so much ammunition that much of it had been thrown into the canal. See also Cantù, *op. cit.* ii. 923.

CHAPTER XI

THE FABBRI MINISTRY

Relations of Pius and Mamiani—Pellegrino Rossi—His character and career—His unpopularity—Austrians invade Papal territory—Public agitation—Change of Ministry—Fabbri's qualifications—Austrian severities—Bologna attacked—Marshal Welden defeated—Popular movement—Disorder—Mission of Farini—Last decree of Fabbri's Ministry—Rossi called to power.

THE sudden collapse of Charles Albert's army before the victorious Austrians came as a tremendous shock to the Nationalists in all parts of Italy; in the brief space of a fortnight all their hopes had been shattered. At Rome these events coincided with the fall of the Mamiani Ministry.

The divergence of views between Pius and the liberal leaders had been gradually becoming more and more evident, and their official relations more and more unsatisfactory. Mamiani resented the frequent acts of unconstitutional prerogative of his Sovereign who, without consulting the Minister, made undesirable appointments and carried on diplomatic and other correspondence. So far did this go that in a ciphered dispatch that was intercepted, instructions were found from Cardinal Soglia to one of the Nuncios, directing him that he need pay no attention to communications

made to him by the Minister. But Mamiani considered it indispensable that the Ministry should have the control of Foreign Affairs, while, on the other hand, the Pope was anxious to substitute a cleric for a layman in that department of State. Thus matters drifted, neither side giving way, and Mamiani's position gradually becoming weaker; for the Nuncios, the hierarchy, and the foreign representatives at Rome all worked with the Pope, and counted for nothing the opinions, the favours, or the gratitude of a Minister whose term of office was evidently not destined to be a long one. Neither could Mamiani fortify his influence in the State by pointing to any legislative success. But one law had passed during his administration, and that not a very complicated measure of constructive statesmanship: it conferred Roman citizenship on the Swiss troops that had fought under Durando's orders at Vicenza.

If Mamiani had failed as a statesman, he had equally failed in the task that especially lay at the charge of his own department of State,—that of maintaining public order. The condition of the provinces continued to be little less than anarchical. At Faenza, Pesaro, Ravenna, Fano, Ancona, Imola, and Sinigaglia, political assassinations were carried out in broad daylight, and the situation was rendered no better by the return to the Papal States of many of Ferrari's disbanded volunteers, and of those who had capitulated at Vicenza. Democratic agitation was rapidly growing, and the rumour was widely circulated that Mazzini was on his way to Bologna; incapacity and disorder reigned supreme.¹

¹ "There is no Minister of Finance, . . . disorder and incapacity reign supreme"; Pasolini, *op. cit.* 90. And at page 49: "Inopportune measures are daily enacted, and I am supposed to be supporting them. It is tantalizing to see the way of safety without being able to walk in it."

There was one man of note at Rome, one man alone, who appeared to possess those qualities that might yet save the State from the vortex of chaos into which it was plunging,—Pellegrino Rossi. The diplomatic mission on which he had been sent to Rome during the Pontificate of Gregory had come to an end with the fall of Louis Philippe, for Rossi had declined to give his adhesion to the Government of the Second French Republic.

By the extent of his attainments and experience, and the solidity of his judgment, by his moderate liberalism and support of established institutions, Rossi had won the admiration and regard of Pius ; he was essentially an enlightened administrator, not an innovator—a man who thought that “there is no form of Government but what may be a blessing if well administered.”¹ He was well fitted to carry on the executive functions of the State by his capacity for work, resolute courage, and extraordinary self-confidence. Rossi’s views on the respective rights and duties of Governments and people were perhaps not very advanced, not far removed from those held by his friend Guizot ; yet before joining in the condemnation with which the democrats have covered his memory, it is as well to remember the complete lack of political or other education of the Roman people, the chaotic condition of the Roman State, and the systems of Government pursued in the surrounding countries. Viewed by this comparative standard, it is difficult to pronounce Pellegrino Rossi a reactionary : he was rather a strong, self-confident, and even dictatorial man, and by nature an administrator, though theoretically believing in constitutionalism. Here then was a statesman pre-eminently endowed with just those

¹ Benjamin Franklin, Speech before the Convention at Philadelphia.

qualities that might possibly save what, for lack of a better name, may be described as Papal Liberalism. More than once the Pope had sought his advice, especially in the matter of the Constitution, of which Rossi had submitted a draft that was rejected: now that Mamiani was his Minister, Pius viewed Rossi as a possible and welcome successor.¹

The first efforts of the Pope to persuade the ex-Ambassador of France to take office had failed. Later, when his relations with Mamiani had become strained, and that Minister had offered to resign, Rossi tentatively sounded Recchi, Pasolini, and Minghetti² as to the formation of a new administration, but without success. No sooner did the popular leaders hear of this proposal and of the negotiations that were proceeding, than signs of strong disapproval were immediately manifested. They felt that the assumption of the powers of government by Rossi would infallibly mean the termination of the reign of the clubs and of the civic guard. The organization of demonstrations against Rossi offered no difficulty to the Roman agitators, for he had long been unpopular. All through the year 1847, and especially about the time of the Ferrara affair, the policy of France had been so subservient to that of Austria, that the Ambassador of that power had become the most disliked man in Rome after Count Lutzuow.³ Matters in this respect were not mended by a certain mental asperity and thinly veiled contempt for inferiority of intellect in others, that were marked and unfortunate traits of Pellegrino Rossi. In the

¹ Pasolini to Minghetti, July 17th, 1848. "Le cose si sono aggravate al punto che è sembrato necessario il rinnovare ad ogni momento il Ministero."—Minghetti, *op. cit.* ii. 102.

² In the latter's case not directly.—*Ibid.* 98, 108.

³ D'Azeglio, *Corresp. politique*, 6.

Chamber of Deputies Sterbini, in a violent speech, declared that if the ex-Ambassador of Louis Philippe and friend of Guizot ventured to show himself in that Assembly he would be stoned. Such threats probably alarmed Pius more than they did Rossi; at all events, for various reasons, the idea of forming the projected Ministry had been for the time abandoned.

Both within and without, the situation was becoming steadily worse. In the middle of July the Austrians, having reconquered all Venetia save Venice, sent a column under Prince Lichtenstein across the Po to Ferrara. Great was the perturbation of Pope, people, and deputies at this new violation of Papal territory by the enemy. On July 19th an excited mob invaded the Chamber of Deputies; the Prince of Canino made himself the interpreter of its sentiments, declared that the country was in danger, and demanded the arming of all citizens. He was supported by Sterbini and others; Galletti rose and declared that nothing could surpass the behaviour of the people and the civic guard; while the mob overran the Assembly, uproar prevailed, and the President was compelled to suspend the session.

With Rome in such a state and the news from Lombardy more and more unfavourable, a change of Ministry,—the Papal panacea for all political perturbations,—appeared imperatively necessary. As a Rossi administration could apparently not yet be formed, it was resolved to reconstruct that of Cardinal Soglia on the basis of Mamiani's retirement from office. The change accordingly took place on August 2nd, and on the following day it was announced that Count Odoardo Fabbri, Pro-Legate of Urbino, was to succeed Count Terenzio Mamiani as Minister of the Interior. This

new director of the fortunes of the Papal States was over seventy years of age, stone deaf, and had had little if any experience of matters of state! The other changes in the Ministry do not require notice, but it may be remarked that the indispensable Galletti was once more retained at the head of the Police department.

The new Ministers were soon faced by an even more alarming state of affairs than that which had confronted their predecessors. The Austrians, having reconquered Venetia, and made secure their bridge-head over the Po at Ferrara, showed a disposition to carry their arms into central Italy. Marshal Welden, with a considerable force, entered the Pontifical States and marched on Bologna. The Austrian troops, having had to deal with numerous bodies of irregular combatants, and with an excitable, revengeful, and often treacherous population, had been driven to retaliation that was often of a brutal character: villages had been burnt, and the world-wide reputation of the Croat infantry for savagery and violence well maintained.¹ Welden

¹ The Austrians acquired an unenviable reputation for cruelty during the period of their occupation of northern Italy in the nineteenth century. The evidence on the subject is mostly Italian, and therefore to be accepted with great caution, yet the substratum of fact cannot be thought other than true. Well-attested instances of barbarity are numerous, such as the terrible sack of Brescia in the spring of 1849. The Austrians had a great liking for the application of corporal chastisement, which was the favourite form of disciplinary punishment used in their army, and did not hesitate to make women suffer this ordeal in public, often for trivial offences, or barely recognizable insults to the black and yellow flag of Austria. Rey (*Histoire de la Renaissance Politique de l'Italie*) gives the following account of one such incident, which he has drawn from the Italian sources:—

“Radetzky ne le cédait guère en férocité à Haynau. Le 10 août 1849, jour anniversaire de la naissance de l'Empereur, un avis circula à Milan, pour engager la population à s'abstenir de toute jouissance. Une courtisane, fort connue des militaires, la Olivara, ayant arboré à sa fenêtre les couleurs Impériales, un rassemblement se mit à siffler à ses fenêtres. La troupe accourt, fait des arrestations, et quinze individus sont condamnés à la bastonnade. On dressa tout exprès un échafaud sur la place du Château, et l'exécution eut lieu avec appareil, au milieu des rires des officiers, divertis par les cris de ces malheureux. Parmi eux on comptait deux jeunes femmes: l'une âgée de vingt ans, reçut quarante coups de la main du

reached Bondeno on August 4th, and issued a proclamation threatening to shoot any inhabitants taken with arms in their hands, and warning Municipalities that they would have to maintain his troops. He thence moved on Bologna.

To the advance of the Austrians, the Papal Government found itself unable to oppose anything more formidable than a solemn and eloquent protest addressed by Cardinal Soglia to the European Governments. The inhabitants of Bologna, fortunately for themselves, proved capable of more efficacious measures. The troops of the garrison had nearly all been with Durando at Vicenza, and as under the terms of the capitulation they had undertaken not to appear in the field against the Austrians for three months (June 10th to September 10th), it was decided that they should retire.¹ On the 7th, Welden encamped just outside the city; on the 8th, in the early morning, Austrian officers showed themselves in the streets, they were

bourreau; l'autre en recut trente. Non content de cet exemple . . . Radetzki obligea la Municipalité à payer 30,000 livres à la Olivara, sans parler d'une note de 114 livres pour baguettes cassées, et pour la glace employée à refermer les chairs des suppliciés."

The official records on which the foregoing accounts are based, although they do not appear to have been used by Rey, are extant and may easily be consulted in the Archives of the municipality of Milan under the dates of August 14th and 23rd, 1849.

Similar brutal pleasantries were enacted more than once. Palmerston expressed himself on the subject with considerable force. The workmen at Barclay and Perkins' brewery in London did even better; for when, some years later, Marshal Haynau happened to visit that establishment, they gave him a forcible and painful demonstration of what their opinion was as to his treatment of Italian women; it was all the police could do to rescue this deplorable specimen of the Austrian officer from their hands.

¹ Colonel Challer, in command of the Swiss troops, absolutely declined to accede to the requests of the Legate of Bologna, Cardinal Amat, that he should oppose the Austrians. Minghetti endeavoured to arrange a combined movement with a Piedmontese brigade still occupying Modena, and both he and the Cardinal brought forward many arguments why Challer should not abide by the terms of the capitulation of Vicenza. The Swiss preferred to put a strict construction on the engagement into which he had entered.—Minghetti, *op. cit.* ii. 94.

insulted, blows followed, and the people flew to arms. While the invader brought artillery to bear down the principal street, the bells of the city were set ringing, barricades sprung up, and a general fusillade broke out. The Austrian Marshal massed his troops in the public gardens at one end of the city, and there the fighting was maintained for four hours. At the end of that time a small body of Carabinieri and civic guards charged, and the Austrians were dislodged, leaving many dead, wounded, and prisoners.

The victory won by Bologna did not prove such an unmixed blessing as the inhabitants of that turbulent city at first imagined it would be. The defeat of the Austrians had been in no way attributable to the action of the Government : it was the citizens alone, acting under the direction of a hastily improvised Committee of Public Safety, who had done everything. Constituted authority had practically disappeared, and Bologna was apparently at the mercy of the first popular movement that should take possession of it. That movement immediately took place. Romagna was full of the human wreckage cast by the tide of war from the plains of Lombardy, representing every gradation of national and military discouragement and demoralization. Zambecharri's regiment of the Alto Reno, and other free corps that had retained some sort of organization, together with disbanded volunteers and deserters from Charles Albert's retreating army, civic guards, and armed men of every sort, flocked into Bologna.

Nowhere more than among this inflammable assemblage was the reaction of sentiment against the *Royal* war more felt ; nowhere were more eager listeners to be found to the passionate denunciations of Charles

Albert, and to the democratic exhortations of the Mazzinians. And the republicans had some basis of fact on which to found their arguments.

While the King of Sardinia led back his defeated troops within the borders of Piedmont, where the diplomacy of Europe afforded him protection against Austrian revenge, Mazzini and Garibaldi were attempting to prolong armed resistance in the lake district ; and Venice, under brave Danielo Manin, had withdrawn her allegiance to Sardinia, and once more proclaiming her republican faith, was holding the enemy at bay. The *Royal* war was ended ; the people's war had commenced.¹ The disasters of Italy, so speciously argued the Mazzinians, had come from the ambitions and incapacity of her Princes ; had they but trusted and armed the people, Austria would have been defeated, the Peninsula would have been freed, and the unity of Italy attained. It was yet time for the people to take their fortunes into their own hands, to drive out the Princes, and, under the banner of the democracy, to once more, and victoriously, meet the Austrians.

Driven from Milan on the fall of the city, the republican leaders had dispersed ; some were gradually drifting over the Swiss border, others were attempting to raise Genoa and Leghorn, a few were making their way towards Florence and Rome, and many were assembling at Bologna. And of the republicans, it was the worst section that the capital of Romagna saw.

The feat of arms of the Bolognese had served as an admirable text for extolling the power of the people ; the condition of Bologna during the following few weeks showed how little capacity they as yet possessed

¹ "La guerre royale a fini, la guerre du peuple commence."—Mazzini to Bastide, August 9th, 1848.

for exercising it. The Pro-Legate, Bianchetti, Colonel Zuccari, commanding the military district, and a committee of citizens, attempted in vain to restrain excesses; the armed mob quickly took possession of the city, and utilized to the full the opportunity afforded of airing their eloquence, of parading their nationalism, and of gratifying private and political revenge.

By the middle of August the position had become well nigh intolerable, and assassination, on the pretext of searching out the police officers and spies of the Gregorian days, had become frequent.¹ On August 26th matters had gone so far that the Palazzo di Governo was invaded, and the Pro-Legate was invited to divest himself of his functions.

At last the dangerous posture of affairs at Bologna roused the Roman Government from its apathy, for the state of semi-revolution in the capital of Romagna threatened to spread to Rome itself. Already, on August 7th, Sterbini and the Prince of Canino had persuaded the Chamber of Deputies to vote a resolution calling for French intervention against Austria; and Count Fabbri, though treated with the respect due to his honourable character and advanced age, had no influence among the deputies or elsewhere. Pius, wisely for once, decided that a suspension of the sittings of the deputies might give him the opportunity of introducing a strong element in the direction of public affairs. On the 26th of August accordingly, the Chamber was prorogued to November 15th, much to its indignation. Four days later, at the earnest solicitation of the deputies from Romagna, Farini was sent on a special mission to Bologna to restore order. Here follows his account of what he saw on his arrival:—

¹ Minghetti, *op. cit.* ii. 112.

“I arrived there unobserved about mid-day on the 2nd. The disorder was getting worse and worse: for two days the ruffians had been murdering their enemies and Government officials, some bad enough, others honest, through the streets and squares of the city. They were shot down, and if still showing signs of life, the guns would be reloaded in plain sight of soldiers and people, discharged again, and the butchery finished with the knife; it was like a wild beast hunt, houses were broken into and the victims dragged out for slaughter. . . . The corpses remained in the public street, a horrible sight. I saw these things: I saw death dealt out, and the infamous pursuit.”¹

Farini requested the Government that he should be allowed to proclaim a state of siege, and at the same time made arrangements for moving some of the Swiss regiments, one of which was stationed no farther away than Forli, into the city. Although his request was refused at Rome, where it was thought that such stringent measures as those the Papal delegate contemplated were excessive, yet what with the support of the better part of the population, and of several bodies of regular troops, Farini was able to make a beginning of restoring order. The authorities thus encouraged made arrests, and soon purged Bologna of the worst of her visitors, who dispersed to various parts of Italy.²

A noteworthy incident of the disorders of Bologna was the appearance there of Galletti, Minister of Police. Leaving his duties in Rome to be discharged by his

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 331.

² Orsini, *op. cit.* Zambecchari with his so-called regiment of the Alto Reno, in which Orsini held the rank of captain, made his way from Bologna to Venice and helped in the defence of that city against the Austrians. Orsini remained there until he was elected to the Roman Constituent Assembly. His name will appear again later.

trusted subordinate Accursi,¹ he visited Bologna apparently in the character of an interested spectator, and without attempting to assist the authorities in repressing disorder. What his mission was and what work he expected there might be for him to do, must remain a matter for conjecture.

In the absence of Galletti from Rome, Accursi published an ordinance which was the last act of the Soglia-Fabbri Ministry, and perhaps the most inept committed by any of the numerous Governments of Pius IX. It was decreed on September 13th that no gold, silver, currency, nor any precious metal should be exported from the States of the Church. In the case of travellers an exception was made up to the value of 250 scudi.

It was clearly time for change ;—the Chamber was not sitting, the opportunity and necessity for Pellegrino Rossi had come. He was called on by Pius to undertake the most arduous and the last labour of his life, and fearlessly accepted.

¹ Accursi had been an exile since the rebellion of 1831 ; he had joined the *Giovane Italia*, and had been one of Mazzini's supporters at Milan. He by some means secured a recommendation to the Pope from the Nuncio in Paris, Monsignor Fornari, and Pius appears to have placed much reliance in his abilities ; Accursi, like his patron Galletti, was a born intriguer, and in the closest relations with the popular leaders.

CHAPTER XII

ROSSI'S MINISTRY, AND HIS ASSASSINATION

The new Ministry—First measures—League negotiations—Position assumed by Rossi—His motives discussed—Views of the Sardinian Government—Rossi's arguments—Administrative measures—Garibaldi—Zucchi sent to Bologna—The meeting of the Chamber—Assassination of Rossi.

THE *Roman Gazette* of September 16th contained the names of the new Ministers ; they were as follows :— Cardinal Soglia, Foreign Affairs and President of the Council ; Count Rossi, Interior and Finance ; Cardinal Vizzardelli, Public Instruction ; Cicognani, Justice ; Montanari, Commerce ; Duke of Rignano, Public Works and War. The Ministry might be described as nationalist and constitutional in character, and strong in its support of the Papal authority and prerogatives ; it proceeded to the discharge of its duties with great promptitude. Within a week of assuming office Rossi announced three important steps : the selection of General Zucchi, a veteran of the Napoleonic wars, to command the Pontifical troops ; the cancellation of the ordinance of September 13th on the exportation of the precious metals ; the suppression of the Ministry of Police. This last step was intended as an indirect means of getting rid of Galletti, whom it was felt impossible to retain longer ; his subordinate Accursi

was disposed of in a somewhat similar manner, being sent on a voyage to Switzerland and France, on the penitentiary system of which countries he was commissioned to draw up a report.

Rossi was eminently laborious, and he plunged at once into a vast amount of work concerning both the internal and external affairs of the Pontifical States. One of the earliest subjects to which he turned his attention was that of the negotiations with Sardinia which Mamiani had renewed.

The object pursued by the late Minister had been the convocation of a federal assembly at Rome to settle the terms of a political confederation between the central and northern Italian States. To bring these negotiations to a successful issue now appeared to the distracted Albertists the only hope of recovering Lombardy and their lost prestige.

Rossi continued the diplomatic work of his predecessor with great apparent vigour, yet a consideration of all the attendant circumstances raises considerable doubt as to his sincerity, and points to the probability that his real desire was that the negotiations should not come to a successful issue. For what were the circumstances as they must have presented themselves to Rossi's dispassionate intellect?

Sardinia's army had been crushed and demoralized,—Ferdinand of Naples was earning his well-known surname of *Bomba*, and infamously smearing the pages of the constitution he had granted with the blood of men, women, and children whom their evil fortune had placed under the rule of the Bourbons,¹—in Tuscany and the

¹ These expressions are strong, yet less so than those used by the English statesman Gladstone to stigmatize the abominable rule of Ferdinand II. He described the Government of Naples as "the negation of God erected into a system of government."—Gladstone, *Two Letters*, 9.

Papal States there was a popular clamour for war, but it proceeded from a quarter which the Government could only view with more anxiety than favour; "Viva Carlo Alberto" was no longer the war cry, but "Diò e il Popolo."

No head was cooler or keener to gauge the political possibilities of such a situation than that of the Pope's Minister. Success for Sardinia appeared impossible, peace and economy for the Pontifical State imperative. But it was not easy for Rossi to openly oppose public opinion by breaking off the negotiations; he therefore determined to arrive at a similar result by deftly directing them towards breakers on which they must wreck.¹ It must be said, however, that this view was not taken by Rossi's contemporaries; the opinion appears to have been nearly unanimous that he was anxious to bring the league negotiations to a successful end.²

Be this as it may, the facts of the matter may be fairly stated as follows:—

Before the war with Austria had broken out, Sardinia had shown much zeal for the projected league. Later, as we have seen, the success of her arms, and the momentary accession of Lombardy and Venetia to the domains of the House of Savoy, had reduced this ardour, and just before Mamiani had taken office in

¹ At an earlier period he had been all for the war and thoroughly nationalist. In a letter to Teresa Guiccioli, he declared emphatically that the hope of Italy was in the foundation of a strong North Italian kingdom under Charles Albert; this, in May 1848; Bertolini, *Pellegrino Rossi*, 51. The comparison of this and similar declarations, with his arguments during the league negotiations at the time of his Ministry is curious, and apparently confirms the opinion here put forward that Rossi was not sincere in his dealings with Sardinia, and was really aiming at keeping the Pontifical States out of the war that was soon to again break out between Austria and the North Italian kingdom.

² It may be noted, however, that both Gabussi and Rusconi thought Rossi insincere; the latter says, "Rossi repugnana alla lega col Piemonte." These authorities cannot be considered strong ones.

May, the negotiations had virtually come to an end.¹ Now, in despair and anger at the sudden collapse of her North Italian kingdom, Sardinia was striving eagerly to find means for retrieving her disasters, was searching for allies and help that might enable her to denounce the armistice of Salasco and to regain her lost provinces. The radical party at Turin, under the leadership of Gioberti, was violently in favour of resuming hostilities; they advocated the assistance of a French army or General, and looked to Tuscany and Rome for help in the form of contingents of men.

The unfortunate Charles Albert, with resigned fatalism, followed the path down which the extreme party urged him; he had apparently resolved that to redeem the honour of his House he must either succeed in negotiating the withdrawal of Austria from Lombardy, or he must once more face her arms on the field of battle. The king's spirit had been deeply affected by his reverses, and his pride had been fatally wounded by the storm of accusation and recrimination that had marked the hour of his defeats. He could not drive from his mind the terrible scenes of popular indignation and reproach that had occurred when he had abandoned Milan to the Austrians.²

As the Milanese had deserted Charles Albert in the hour of his not altogether unmerited misfortunes, so the King feared that the democratic party in Sardinia

¹ But Minghetti reports a conversation with Castagnetto two days before Custoza, in which Charles Albert's confidential secretary professed his anxiety that the league should be concluded; Minghetti, *op. cit.* ii. 107. But what Sardinia aimed at then was a pan-Italian guarantee for her new possessions.

² Della Rocca relates what he saw of Charles Albert at the time of the evacuation of Milan in perhaps the most interesting passage of his *Autobiografia*; the full force of his account can unfortunately not be reproduced by a translation. He tells how, on hearing that the King was surrounded by a furious mob and in danger of his life, he marched immediately with what troops he could collect to

would follow the fast-spreading example, would proclaim him a self-seeking traitor to the Italian cause, and seek a remedy for the royal failure in a republican revolution. In a speedy restoration of Sardinia's military credit, in an immediate combination of the Italian Princes to face Austria and to repress democracy, Charles Albert saw his only chance of safety. In hopes of succeeding in obtaining some assistance from Rome, Monsignor Rosmini, a distinguished philosopher for whom the Pope had much regard, had been placed in charge of the league negotiations on behalf of Sardinia. He arrived at Rome about the end of August, shortly after the signature of the armistice of Salasco.¹

Rossi could not discern in the situation the same elements of urgency that spurred the decisions of the Sardinian Government. For the States of the Church the conclusion of a peace with Austria presented few difficulties, while as the security of the Sovereign's throne reposed ultimately on the venerated basis of religious belief, it appeared to Rossi unassailable.

No sooner had the new Minister picked up the threads of the negotiations than he clearly defined his position to the Sardinian envoy. The Pontifical Government, he declared, was anxious to proceed with the negotiations for the league, but an essential condition was that it must be an equally-balanced one, which result could not be otherwise reached than by the inclusion of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies as the natural equipoise of Sardinia, and by the treatment

his assistance. "Arrivamo sotto il palazzo Greppi nel momento in cui Carlo Alberto ne usciva. Era a piedi, pallidissimo, invecchiato nel viso e nell' incedere ; teneva stretto sotto il braccio la spada : appena mi vide, mi disse :

Ah ! mon cher La Rocca, quelle journée, quelle journée !

V' era nel suo accento qualche cosa di così angoscioso, che non potei mai dimenticarlo."—Della Rocca, *op. cit.* i. 244.

¹ For Rosmini's instructions see Cantù, *op. cit.* ii. 1128.

of the latter kingdom as its boundaries existed before the war. With Naples in full reaction, and Sardinia prepared to face a nearly certain defeat from Austria rather than to give up Lombardy, is it to be believed that Rossi had anything else than the failure of the negotiations in view, when he thus stated his position?

In the *Roman Gazette* of November 4th appeared a long article generally ascribed to Rossi himself, of which the following passages well resumed his arguments.

“It would first of all be expedient to explain for what territory Piedmont requires a guarantee from Rome and Tuscany. Is it for the old, or for the new; for that which she possesses, or for that which she hopes that she may be able to possess?”

“If it is for the old, there is no objection to offer.

“If it is for the new, is it not evident that Tuscany and Rome entering into such a guarantee would be merely exciting the laughter of Europe?”

“It is certain that the aggrandizement of Piedmont and the autonomy of Italy are not interchangeable terms, and that the latter may quite well come about without the former.”

In every direction and by every means Rossi was fighting against the league, and that not altogether without success, as appears from the dispatches of Bargagli to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Florence. On October 20th the Tuscan Minister wrote as follows:—

“From what he (Rossi) has said to me, I clearly see that matters will not progress beyond the *statu quo*, and that the cause of this unfortunate delay is the deceitful policy of Piedmont.”¹

¹ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v. 495. Later Bargagli, whose judgment need not necessarily be relied on, came to the conclusion that Rossi preferred seeing Austria in Lombardy to Sardinia.

That the policy of Sardinia was ambitious cannot be denied, but on the other hand that Austria would have otherwise been driven from Italy may be doubted : so far as this history is concerned, the relations of Rossi and his government to the Italian national question have been sufficiently indicated ; it is now time that his steps for the amelioration of the internal disorder of the Papal States should be traced.

Perhaps the most urgent of all necessities that faced the Roman Minister was the better ordering of the Papal finances. Money was required at once, and there being no other source from which it could be obtained, Rossi extracted 2,000,000 scudi from the religious bodies on the security of Treasury bonds ; with this he was able to meet the interest, then nearly due, on the Rothschild loans. The building of the first telegraph lines was commenced, and railroad contracts were entered into. A Bureau of Statistics was added to the Ministry of Commerce, and a Police department to the Ministry of the Interior, while many minor improvements were taken in hand, especially in the administration of Justice. Bologna signified her approval of the manner in which the ex-Professor of her University was conducting public affairs by electing him to a seat in the Chamber, and many of the newspapers, including occasionally even the *Contemporaneo*, praised the work of the new Minister. A few, however, remained irreconcilable, notably the *Epoca* and a humorous and somewhat scurrilous sheet of large circulation, the *Don Pirlone*.

Tuscany had now become the centre of democratic agitation ; the Grand Ducal Government had fallen into the hands of the advanced party, and while one of the Ministers, Montanelli, actively promoted the

interests of the Giovane Italia, Leghorn threatened the immediate proclamation of the Republic. Many Romans visited Florence, the Prince of Canino and Sterbini among others, and entered fully into the views of the predominant party at the Tuscan capital.

It was at this juncture that a new and interesting personality first entered the stage of Central Italian history, that of Giuseppe Garibaldi. This celebrated revolutionist was a Sardinian subject who had, in his youth, taken part in the Giovane Italia conspiracies and risings. He had spent many adventurous years as an exile in South America, where he had earned a reputation for his wary leadership of an irregular body of Italians, in the disorders among the States watered by the Uruguay and the Rio de la Plata. The Italian movement that had followed the election of Pius IX to the Papal throne had drawn him back to Europe, with a small band of followers; and he had arrived in Lombardy in sufficient time to assume command of a corps of irregulars. After the capitulation of Milan he had attempted to maintain the contest along the Swiss border, but with little success. Towards the end of October, Garibaldi had arrived in Tuscany, and the Government hastened to offer him and his red-shirted followers every facility for proceeding beyond the frontier to wherever he thought his force might be most usefully employed. He chose Bologna as his objective.

The Romagnol city was still a source of great anxiety to the Roman Government; and for very much the same reasons that had determined Garibaldi to visit it, Rossi decided to send there General Zucchi with full military powers. He left Rome on November 5th and arrived at Bologna before Garibaldi, and in

time to assert the authority of the Government with great vigour, and to arrest many criminals.¹

Scarcely had Rossi's special Commissioner arrived, when Garibaldi made his entry, at the head of 350 men. General Zucchi's instructions were to assist the rapid passage of this irregular body through Pontifical territory, and to offer to assist Garibaldi to reach Venice; the Minister further directed the immediate arrest of the most violent democrats, including the popular preacher Father Gavazzi.² This last order Zucchi had anticipated. When Garibaldi arrived at Bologna he found that the energetic measures of the Roman Government had restored order; having obtained a few recruits, he was persuaded without too much difficulty to continue his march to Ravenna, whence he might hope to successfully convey his forces to Venice.

Zucchi had performed his mission with energy and tact; the removal of Garibaldi from the Papal States appeared to dispel the last possibility of a democratic outbreak, and Rossi wrote to thank the General for his services and to convey the Pope's satisfaction.

This letter was apparently the last ever written by Rossi to Zucchi, and in it he made reference to the coming event that was to put a tragical end, not only

¹ Zucchi's consistent and reasonable narrative of these events has been generally followed, though it does not always agree with other contemporary accounts. See his *Memorie*, 146.

² Nicolini quotes from the Roman newspapers a dispatch of Rossi to Zucchi of very different tenour which is obviously spurious. See also *London Times*, December 11th, 1848.

The Roman press at this period abounds with the grossest misstatements and misrepresentations. Many of the contemporary writers, both democrat and clerical, are merely unprincipled party pleaders whose statements are deplorably untrue. The much quoted Gabussi is perhaps the most conspicuous case of a misleading authority, and among many others, Nicolini and Balleydier deserve prominent mention. Among the clericals Spada, and among the liberals Farini, carry most weight.

to their correspondence, but to many matters besides. "It appears," so Rossi wrote, "that the dissatisfied mean to attempt some folly at the opening of the Chambers."¹

From every side the Minister of the Interior had received warning that he was in danger, and that an attempt on his life would be made on November 15th; but with an obstinate disdain of his opponents he took no heed.² The extreme section of that party which Sterbini, Canino, and Ciceroacchio led, had come to the conclusion that between them and Rossi there could be no compromise; the dismissal of Galletti from the Ministry of Police had shown that clearly enough; either the Minister, or they, must rule. This faction found support with many who were not prepared to go to the same lengths,—as from the clericals, who detested Rossi for levying money on them and for reforming the abuses on which they fattened;³ from the Jesuits, who had not yet forgiven their expulsion from France.⁴ Quietly the conspiracy came to a head, and the day of the opening of the session of the Chamber of Deputies was set apart for breaking for ever the power of Rossi.

On November 14th the newspapers were full of the event fixed for the following day. The *Roman Gazette* contained an article that stated the Government's firm determination to put down any attempt against public order. This article was replied to in the *Contemporaneo* on the 15th in violent language, to which Sterbini lent his signature.

But there was no need for artificially created excite-

¹ Zucchi, *op. cit.* 149.

² Pasolini, *op. cit.* 100.

³ Cantù, *Cronistoria*, ii. 1134.

⁴ It is not thought, nor is it intended to suggest, that the Jesuits were directly involved in the plot against Rossi. The contemporary statements to that effect are not apparently based on anything substantial.

ment, for the conspirators had settled every detail, and there was nothing left to chance.

Rossi had taken few or no precautions. A few days before the meeting of the Chambers he had strengthened the garrison of Rome with a small body of cavalry, which had been somewhat ostentatiously paraded down the Corso, and to which he had addressed a speech, calling on the men to stand firm by the authorities in repressing disorder. As to his personal protection, he declined to take special measures for placing extra bodies of police or soldiers at the Chamber, unless at the request of the President of that body; and Sturbinetti gave no sign.¹ "They will not dare," he said to some of his friends; ² his natural intrepidity, and his contempt for the democratic leaders, blinded him to the realities of the position. To Count Spaur he remarked, "You may tell the diplomatic corps that the Pope's authority can be broken down only by passing over my body."³ The words were prophetic.

The morning of the 15th of November had arrived; the ceremony at the Palazzo della Cancelleria was fixed to take place at one o'clock; the speech with which Rossi intended to expound his policy was prepared.⁴ Rome gave little sign of interest or excitement, but as the hour of the session drew near the Piazza della Cancelleria and the adjoining streets began to fill; a battalion of the civic guard occupied the square in front of the Palace, and a small detachment of police took up their usual positions about the building. Beyond this

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 403.

² Bertolini, *op. cit.* 56.

³ Bargagli to Georgini, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Florence.—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 16.

⁴ This speech was given by Bonfadini in the Politecnico in 1867; its authenticity does not appear to be clearly proved. Minghetti and several other writers also give what can only be considered as a part of the speech; it is colourless and disappointing. D'Ideville, *Le Comte Pellegrino Rossi*, gives a résumé that is on the same lines.

there was no special preparation made, as there was to be no formal ceremony.

Soon after the doors were opened the entrance lobby was rapidly filled by a considerable number of agitators, and especially of volunteers belonging to the First Roman Legion, generally known as the *reduci*—sur-rendered,—of Vicenza. These *reduci* appear to have been in reality the dregs of that corps, which, on its departure for the front, had left behind about 140 men, mostly under arrest for breach of discipline and bad conduct. These had become a practically distinct organization, and had elected the not over reputable Grandoni as their commander.¹ This man was in close relations with Ciceroacchio and the other popular leaders, and following a carefully arranged plan, he disposed the *reduci* from the entrance of the lobby to the foot of the stairway that led to the Chamber.² The fierce and excited faces of these ruffians, and their uniform Venetian blouses, gave to the entrance of the Roman Assembly an aspect that turned back ordinary spectators, and that enabled them to completely control the lobby without fear of interference. The small force of not very efficient police was quite useless in such a mass.³

At a little past one⁴ Rossi drove up. He had with him only Righetti, an under secretary, who carried his official papers; the Minister left his carriage, and as he did so a howl of execration suddenly burst from the mob that was awaiting him under the peristyle. Undaunted, and smiling disdainfully, he advanced without

¹ Gouraud, *op. cit.* 261.

² Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 407.

³ "Mi fece impressione quella folla di reduci che ingombravano l' atrio del Palazzo e le scale; ceffi biechi, e atteggiamenti incomposti. Pensai fra me quanto poco fosse curata la polizia del Parlamento."—Minghetti, *op. cit.* ii. 122.

⁴ "The clock had just struck half after one," says Silvagni; *Corte Romana*, iii. 292. Most accounts make the hour rather earlier.

perceptible hesitation straight towards them, and rapidly entered the building, Righetti following. No sooner had Rossi passed in between their ranks than the *reduci*, howling and spitting at the Minister, closed in behind him. He forced a passage to within a few yards of the stairway, impassive, looking neither to the right nor to the left. Then one of those who encircled him struck him on the left side with an umbrella, and as Rossi turned his head and swerved to identify his assailant, several arms rose, a dagger flashed, and a downward stroke through the base of the neck at the right-hand side of the body sent him reeling to the floor. The blow was that of an experienced assassin, a second was unnecessary; the victim lay huddled on the ground, the blood pouring in rapid flow from the wound; a few moments later Rossi was dead.


NOTE

The Italian stilo or stiletto,—the stilus of the Ancients,—is a long, needle-shaped, puncturing instrument, the effective use of which demands a peculiar combination of skill and knowledge that has at times been looked on much in the light of an artistic accomplishment. For the slenderness and lack of weight of the weapon make it useless if brought to bear against resisting portions of the human body; art corrected such blundering procedure, and, with the smallest of punctures, produced the most fatal results; it follows, that an extensive acquaintance with anatomy was necessary to real proficiency.

In the case of the assassination of Rossi, a comparison of the contemporary accounts leaves no other conclusion possible than that some one specially skilled poignardist had been chosen to deal the blow; and even more than this can be said. The conjunction of the hit from an umbrella, apparently intended to turn the head, followed immediately by a downward stroke aimed through the base of the neck on the right-hand side, at a spot so vital that it is known as the *dangerous area*, looks like the work of a professed and vain-

glorious assassin not averse from showing off his full command of the niceties of his art. It is horrible, detestable, pitiable, but it is also in the national character. It was doubtless owing to the certain knowledge of the infallible result of the blow that there was no attempt made to stab Rossi a second time. However great the discrepancies of the accounts in other respects, they are all agreed that there was but one stroke.

Nicolini and Balleydier, both, generally speaking, not very reliable authorities, though differing in their point of view indirectly confirm the account here given; Balleydier's gruesome details are perhaps the least trustworthy, though not incredible. Nicolini was in close touch with the agitators among whom the conspiracy originated, and more weight may therefore be attached to his testimony. See in addition to the authorities already quoted, Spada, Pasolini, and Rusconi. Tivaroni sums up the different accounts without throwing any new light on them. The London *Times* also has some curious but not very authoritative details (December 11th, 1848).



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ENGLISH MILES.

----- Frontier between the States of the Church and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

CHAPTER XIII

CIVIL WAR—FLIGHT OF PIUS

Cowardice of the deputies—Dismay at the Quirinal—Scenes in Rome—Pius consults Galletti—Popular demonstration—Demands for a democratic Ministry—The Pope declines to accede—Insurrection—The Palace besieged—Victory of the people—Protest of Pius—Galletti's Ministry—His measures—Conferences at the Quirinal—Flight decided on—Harcourt's preparations—Pius escapes—Antonelli's ruse—Arrival at Gaëta—Dismay in Rome—Position of the democrats—Galletti and the Chamber—Hasty steps of the Romans—And of the Pope—Provisional Government—Mamiani attempts compromise—His defeat and resignation—Constituent Assembly decreed.

THE origin of the conspiracy that resulted in the assassination of Rossi is very obscure, and little can be here added to those general indications that have been already given; to go beyond would be advancing on ground too uncertain. It may be stated however, that a man named Cesare Costantini was condemned and executed in 1854 as the actual murderer, and that Grandoni, commander of the *reduci*, was also sentenced to death, but escaped the scaffold by committing suicide in prison.¹

¹ Cantù states that the deed was attributed to various persons, by most to a Colonel Ruggero, a Neapolitan. In the report of the trial it is said that the following drew lots as to who should carry out the assassination,—Luigi Brunetti, son of Ciceroacchio, Felice Neri, Sante Costantini, Filippo Trentanove, Alessandro Todini, and Antonio Ranucci; the drawing was attended by Ciceroacchio, Sterbini, Guerini, and Grandoni.—Cantù, *Cronistoria*, ii. 1136.

Whatever may be the precise truth as to the origin of the murderous assault of which the fatal issue has just been narrated, there can be no possible question as to which party profited by it ; the events that immediately followed showed that clearly enough.

The roar with which the mob had greeted Rossi as he alighted from his carriage, and the subsequent clamours, had been distinctly heard in the Chamber ; several deputies had rushed in from the lobby, pale and excited ; and as reports of the events outside spread, intense excitement and confusion was caused,—nearly a panic. Several members who were doctors, among them Pantaleoni, hurried to the private room of Cardinal Gazzoli, where Rossi had been carried, but soon returned, having found the victim lifeless. Sturbinetti was in the chair, and not daring to take official notice of the events of the present, sought refuge in ordering the recital of those of the past in the form of the minutes of the last session. Above the din of the terrified house could be heard the resounding voice of the Prince of Canino shouting : “To business, to business ! Is the King of Rome dead ?”¹ But business could by no means get itself done that day. As the reading of the minutes dragged on, one by one, for one cause and another, the Roman legislators left their seats and escaped from the Chamber. The post of duty and of danger had no attraction for them ; no word of reprobation for the deed done at their door escaped them, no measures were provided for the security of the State, even the founts of their oratory were dried up ; unostentatiously, and like cravens, they slunk home and abdicated all authority.

¹ Cantù, *Cronistoria*, ii. 1135, by direct implication. Farini notes the cry but gives no name.

At the Quirinal the intelligence of the tragedy at the Palazzo della Cancelleria struck like a thunderbolt,¹ and for a moment the Pope and his Court appeared helpless. In the course of the afternoon however, Pius devised such steps as the emergency recommended to his political sense: he entrusted Montanari, Minister of Commerce, with the task of carrying on the Government; he dispatched a courier to General Zucchi ordering him to leave Bologna for Rome immediately, and repeatedly sent for Pasolini and Minghetti, with whom he was anxious to confer.

The streets had remained fairly quiet,² though as the afternoon wore on bands of demonstrators attempted to fraternize with the Carabinieri, some of whose officers openly supported the democrats. In the evening Galletti, whom Rossi had removed from Rome by means of an appointment to a provincial tribunal, arrived in the city and was received with a great ovation. Later a small procession, in which many of the *reduci* were prominent, followed a tricolor flag down the principal streets, and turning down the Via Borgognone where Rossi had resided, stopped under his windows. There they fitly closed the infamous proceedings of a shameful day by "brutally howling" a Miserere for the benefit of their victim's widow and sons.³

Early in the morning of the 16th the Pope requested the presence of the Presidents of the two Councils at

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* ii. 409.

² The contemporary accounts vary from "anarchy" to "absolute calm," according to the democratic, clerical, or other bias of the writer.

³ Pasolini, *op. cit.* 102. It is interesting to note that shortly afterwards one of the young Rossis accused the Prince of Canino of being his father's murderer, and challenged him to fight. Nothing came of the duel, but Prince Pierre Bonaparte declined to act as his brother's second.

the Quirinal to consult on the situation ; he found what they had to say of but little assistance. Sturbinetti indeed had apparently made up his mind to throw in his lot with the extremists, for in his conversation with Pius he used violent language, and went so far as to tell the Pope that : " Rossi's carcass might be carried out beyond the walls to rot there." ¹ But an even more brutal and forcible adviser than Sturbinetti soon arrived on the scene.

Down at the Piazza del Popolo the leaders of the people were mustering a monster demonstration. It was not, as in happier times, to kneel for the Pope's benediction, but to dictate to him the terms on which they were content that he should retain power, that the Romans were preparing to march on the Quirinal. And there were few means of resisting the popular demands, or of restraining the popular force. So incompetent, or so treacherous, were the officers in command of the military stationed at the Palace for his protection, that when Pius consulted the Colonel commanding, the only advice he received was to permit the soldiers to mingle with the crowd and thus exercise a peaceful and salutary influence !

From the uncertainties of the hour all sorts of counsels arose, mostly impracticable. Among the reactionaries of the Court many recommended immediate flight to Civita Vecchia, Castel Gandolfo, or even farther. Minghetti and Pasolini, both for the moment too unpopular to be useful as Ministers, advised as a desperate but as the only possible course, the formation of a Government under the leadership of Galletti. Finally the Pope acceded so far to this advice as to consent to an interview with his former Minister of

¹ Pasolini, *op. cit.* 104.

Police ; but could not for the moment bring himself to enter into a definite engagement. He deferred his decision until evening, and Galletti left the Palace.

The democratic leader had not proceeded far from the Quirinal before he met the demonstrators making their way up from the Corso to the Piazza di Monte Cavallo ; among them Sterbini, Ciceroacchio, and the Prince of Canino were conspicuous.¹ The shouts and the demands of the mob were nearly if not quite unanimous ; they required a democratic Ministry, and approved the names of Galletti, of Sterbini, and even of Mamiani ; those of Recchi, of Pasolini, and of Minghetti were received with unequivocal expressions of dissent. Having arrived in front of the Quirinal, a deputation was formed consisting of Mariani, Galletti, Sterbini, and a few others ; they advanced to the Palace gates and demanded admission. Pius ordered that they should be shown into his presence, and listened patiently to their representations of the demands and wishes of the people. When the delegates had concluded, the Pope indignantly repelled their proposals ; he reminded them of his authority and prerogatives as their Sovereign, temporal and spiritual, and not without dignity declined to subordinate his freedom of judgment to violence. Notwithstanding Galletti's utmost entreaties, and those of many of his courtiers, he persisted in refusing any other answer to the delegates of the people than that it was his will to come to a decision in perfect freedom.

When at last, despairing of moving Pius from his resolve, Galletti and his colleagues made known their ill success to the mob, a cry of fury was raised, and

¹ "On the 16th the Prince of Canino was passing and repassing under my window all day long. He carried a gun, and was followed by five or six citizens."—Teresa Giraud Spaur, *Relazione del viaggio di Pio IX.*

citizens, civic guards, volunteers, and even Papal regulars ran eagerly to obtain arms. Within the Palace the means of defence were slight: the only troops that could be relied on were the Swiss halberdiers and a handful of trustworthy Carabinieri,—less than two hundred men in all. Scarcely had the gateways and doors been barricaded than the report of musketry was heard from the adjoining streets, and bullets began to mark the walls of the Quirinal. All the disorderly elements of Rome were drawn together by the disturbance, and soon the Pope and his Court were assailed from all sides. Passing by an open window that faced the Piazza, Monsignor Palma was shot dead, and bullets penetrated as far as the Pope's ante-chamber. In their terror some of those about Pius managed to open communication with the insurgents outside, and to make proposals for surrender to Galletti. But Pius remained in an obstinate mood, and would not yield; the Swiss, as was customary with them, stood unflinchingly at their posts, and the Pope's spirit for a while rivalled that of his mercenaries. Finally the threats of bombardment by artillery and of assault, together with the prayers and supplications of the priests around him, were no longer to be resisted. Pius turned to those who encircled his throne, conspicuous among whom stood several of the foreign Ambassadors, and acknowledged the necessity of submitting to force. He solemnly protested against the violation of his rights, and declared that whatever might result he should consider invalid and void. This said, he turned to Cardinal Soglia and entrusted him with the duty of making whatever arrangements with Galletti the popular demands should make necessary.

As soon as the Pope's surrender became known, the

firing ceased.¹ Galletti entered the Palace and found in Cardinal Soglia an accommodating negotiator. The list of the new Ministry was soon settled, the sooner in that the democratic leader included such names as he required, omitting the inconvenient formality of first securing the assent of his nominees. Among them Monsignor Rosmini and Count Mamiani declined the honour conferred on them ; Sterbini, Muzzarelli, Sereni, and Lunati found no difficulty in accepting it. The names of the new Ministers were received with loud cries of joy and victory by the people.

Under whatever show of names the new Roman Ministry was announced to the world, there were two essential facts in connection with it that were equally fundamental and obvious. One was that the latest Government of Rome was revolutionary and imposed by force, the other that Sterbini and Galletti now virtually ruled the State. But these two men stood as representatives of the *Circolo Popolare*, and it was in reality that body whose evening deliberations guided public affairs. Thus the Club decided that the Swiss Guard, the only reliable force in the Pope's service, must be removed from the Quirinal. Accordingly Galletti communicated the necessity for this step to Pius, who could not do otherwise than submit ; instead of his trusted Swiss defenders, the hostile civic guards were placed on duty at the Quirinal, thus practically constituting the Pope a prisoner. The *Circolo Popolare* in the same way decided that Colonel Stuart, of the Pontifical artillery, should be made to give up the keys of the Castle of St. Angelo, and Galletti was also appointed General of the *Carabinieri*.²

¹ It had lasted from 3 till 6 in the afternoon.

² Galletti, *Memorie*, 57.

While the Pope's new Minister was thus seizing the reins of power, his former subordinate, the crafty Accursi, had hurried from Bologna to Rome, and was immediately placed in charge of the Police department, which he thenceforward managed to the complete satisfaction of the agitators and to the equal detriment of the public interest. He practically established his headquarters at the Circolo Popolare, whence, with the assistance and advice of Ciceroacchio and other coadjutors, he exercised a large and peculiar influence.

The democratic party was now firmly installed in power, the breach between Pope and people threatened complete rupture, the last vestige of theocratical authority had been trodden under foot.

The protest which Pius had made to the foreign Ambassadors on the evening of the 16th of November had led to the immediate and official discussion of measures whereby his escape from the terrorism of his subjects might be secured. It was evidently necessary, unless he was prepared to completely surrender the temporal rights of the Papacy, that he should retire to some place whence those rights could be asserted. And if the army was not sufficiently to be relied on to warrant the choice of any small town or fortress near Rome, Bologna had shown such strong support of Rossi's administration as to offer some inducement, while at the small port of Civita Vecchia, Pius could rely on complete protection from the fleets of France, of Spain, and of all the Catholic Powers. The Ambassadors had immediately communicated to their Governments the news of the Roman insurrection, and the utmost anxiety was shown on all hands to assist Pius in his difficulties. Soon *Le Tenare*, a French gunboat, arrived at Civita Vecchia, and was immediately

followed by the *Bulldog*, detached from the British Mediterranean fleet.

In the meanwhile numerous conversations were secretly held between the Pope, Cardinal Antonelli, the Duke d'Harcourt, French Ambassador, Martinez de la Rosa,¹ Spanish Ambassador, and Count Spaur, Bavarian Minister.² It was soon settled in a general way, though kept strictly secret, that Pius should leave Rome. D'Harcourt urged strongly that the Pope should cross to Marseilles and accept the hospitality of the French Republic, while Martinez de la Rosa, with equal importunity, pressed the claims of Spain, and forced on the consideration of Pius the unalterable devotion of Isabella and the agreeable climate of Majorca. Count Spaur took a less conspicuous part at these conferences, confining himself to vague assurances of support. The French and Spanish Ambassadors received impartial encouragement: no declaration could yet be made that the Pope would leave his own States, but should he eventually decide to do so, the offers of both Ambassadors would be gratefully considered. In the meanwhile it was suggested to Martinez de la Rosa, that Spain might do well to send a gunboat to Gaëta, a fortress on the Neapolitan border, and to D'Harcourt that the one already dispatched to Civita Vecchia by the French Government should be kept ready for any emergency. In this manner an alternative line appeared to render escape doubly secure.³

¹ The most distinguished diplomatist then in the Spanish service. His last mission had been to Paris, where he had taken part in the Spanish Marriages negotiations the year before.

² The Marquis Pareto, Sardinian Ambassador, exercised little influence at this juncture, the relations of his Court with that of Rome being much less friendly than formerly.

³ The intrigues in connection with the flight of Pius from Rome were by no means confined to those related here. To give an impression of their extent it may

On November 22nd, one week after the murder of Rossi, Pius definitely decided to abandon his capital, and charged Cardinal Antonelli with the necessary arrangements. Late on the afternoon of the 24th, the Duke d'Harcourt had completed his preparations : *Le Tenare* was at anchor at Civita Vecchia, relays of horses were disposed between that port and Rome, a well-appointed carriage was posted at a quiet spot beyond the Colosseum by the Church of SS. Pietro e Marcellino. At five o'clock the Duke drove in full diplomatic state to the Quirinal, and was ushered into the presence of Pius. It had been previously arranged that the French Ambassador was to remain some time at the Palace, while the Pope was making his escape, so that by the presence of his equipage at the gates any possible suspicion on the part of the people and civic guards should be allayed. As soon as the Duke had arrived, Pius removed the white robe and red shoes that he usually wore within doors and donned the ordinary attire of a priest, completing his disguise by a pair of spectacles ; attended by Cardinal Antonelli and Monsignor Stella, who were also travestied, the Pope passed out of the Quirinal by a private door¹ where a hired carriage was in waiting. The party quickly got in and drove to the appointed rendezvous.

It has already been seen that the Duke d'Harcourt had posted a carriage near the Church of SS. Pietro e

be recalled that Cooper Key, commander of the *Bulldog*, received secret instructions to expect the Pope on board, and to convey him to any destination he might indicate. This officer went up to Rome, and was privately and very amicably received by Pius at the Quirinal. It would appear that the Archbishop of Corfu, and a Catholic Englishman named Doctor Nicholson, quite expected to place the Pope in safety under the British flag.—Cooper Key, *op. cit.* 170.

¹ Countess Spaur in her narrative states that the Pope passed out through the main entrance of the Palace, where a number of civic guards were standing about. Other accounts make the Pope's disguise a livery of the Bavarian Minister's.

Marcellino beyond the Colosseum.¹ When the Pope and his companions arrived at this spot, there was possibility of confusion, for beyond the Duke's stood another empty carriage, also apparently awaiting some expected traveller. But among those present none was less likely to fall into error than Cardinal Antonelli; he quickly hurried his Sovereign into the carriage that did not belong to the French Ambassador, and in a moment Pius was being rapidly driven towards the Porta San Giovanni.

Once beyond the walls of Rome, the Pope continued his way along the Via Appia fifteen miles south, to the little village of Aricia in the Alban hills.² There a travelling chaise awaited him, occupied by Count and Countess Spaur, and after a brief halt, the Pope entered the Bavarian Minister's carriage, and was safely conducted to Gaëta which he reached on the following day.

The Duke d'Harcourt, after patiently waiting at the Quirinal until the Pope should have made good his escape, returned in state to the French Embassy, and thence started post haste for Civita Vecchia, where he found nothing but the assurance of having sustained a cruel diplomatic defeat.³ He was not the only one

¹ This was the Church of which Gregory XVI had conferred the title on his future successor when he bestowed on him the Cardinal's hat.

² Aricia near the lake of Nemi, famed for the ancient grove and sanctuary of Diana of the Wood.

³ The account here given is taken largely from the relation of Countess Spaur; L. Bianchi, *Life*, 92; Silvagni, *op. cit.* iii., *Countess Spaur and Pellegrino Rossi*. How confidently Pius was expected to come to France appears from the first dispatch announcing the flight, communicated by General Cavaignac to the Assembly on December 1st. It was from the French Consul at Civita Vecchia, and ran as follows:—"The Pope secretly departed from Rome on the 24th, at 5 o'clock P.M. Rome is calm and indifferent. A vote of confidence has been granted to the new Ministry. The Pope has repaired to France. The steamer *Tenare* has left for Gaëta to take his Holiness on board."—London *Times*, December 2nd, 1848.

deceived. So thoroughly had Antonelli's comedy been played, that several members of the Papal Court travelled to Civita Vecchia, and two, Monsignori Piccolomini and Della Porta, actually made their way to Marseilles in the expectation of meeting the Pope at the end of their journey.¹

The news of the flight of Pius was received with consternation in the capital.² The mass of the population, notwithstanding the revolutionary appearance of their demonstrations, were totally unable to conceive the idea of a Roman Government without a Pope. Their most venerated traditions, their ancient religion, their worldly interests, their racial pride, and their holiday joys,—all were indissolubly bound up with the Papacy, and necessitated the presence of its Head among them. It may be said that since the Allocution of April 29th there had been growing a party the aim of which was distinctly anti-papal, but it may be doubted whether in November it had won any very large number of adhesions. Some few Mazzinian republicans had long been plotting,³ and now their propositions were openly heard.⁴ A much larger party, of which Mamiani was the recognised head, strongly desired the mainte-

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 38.

² "E coloro stessi i quali avevano fatta leva alle popolari passioni sembravano inquieti della vittoria."—Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 4; L. Bianchi, *op. cit.* 115.

³ Gualterio, *Le Riforme*, 405. Many of the old Carbonaro ideas, such as that of the Ausonian Republic, reappeared. It was in this under-bed of conspiracy that the plot for Rossi's assassination was hatched.

⁴ Castellani, Venetian envoy, wrote to his Government on November 22nd, stating that he had been approached by some of the leaders of the popular movement, who had asked him for his opinion as to the advisability of proclaiming a republic. Margaret Fuller states that immediately after the assassination of Rossi, a crime which she viewed with astounding equanimity, there was talk of sending for Mazzini and proclaiming a republic. Her views however, were tintured by those of her friends, who were nearly all members of the Giovane Italia. See generally her *Memoirs*, iii.

nance of the Papacy, but had by now come to the firm opinion that a total surrender of its temporal rights into lay hands was a necessity. So strong and widespread was this opinion that many priests openly professed and supported it.

But among the parties that disputed the fragments of the Pope's squandered authority, success appeared certain to incline to the boldest, least scrupulous, and most energetic. The advanced democrats possessed these advantages, and others besides; for they commanded the oratory of the clubs and of Ciceroacchio and his assistants, while in the north of Italy the current of events became every day more favourable to their cause. Faith in Sardinian leadership had been completely shaken by the events of the campaign in Lombardy, and the one great and wholly successful exploit of the war, the driving of Radetzky from Milan, was proclaimed the glory of Mazzini and the people. That it was the people who had won the victory was true enough, but that Mazzinian organization and sentiment had made that victory possible was only partly, perhaps not even half true.

The tide of Italian sentiment was fast ebbing for Charles Albert, fast flowing for Mazzini; in Piedmont, the radicals were on the eve of attaining power with Gioberti; in Tuscany, the Grand Duke only retained his throne on sufferance from his nationalist Ministers, Guerrazzi and Montanelli. The democratic leaders in Rome had already established close relations with those in Tuscany before the 15th of November; it now remains to relate their proceedings in the Papal capital after the events of that day.

Several days had elapsed since the assassination of Rossi before the Roman legislators succeeded in

recovering sufficient composure to admit of the resumption of their labours. When they once more assembled, on the 19th of that month, they clearly showed their intention of placing themselves in line with public opinion as represented by the dominant faction. The efforts of a few courageous members, whom sentiments of loyalty or decency still moved, were unsuccessful in inducing the Chamber either to record an official reprobation of the deed that had insulted their authority, or to adopt a vote testifying respect and allegiance to the Pope.¹ In disgust, Minghetti, Bevilacqua, and Banzi, all Romagnols, resigned, and several other deputies followed their example soon afterwards.

The apparent ruler of the Chamber was now Galletti, and his authority reposed not only on the support of the Circolo Popolare, but also on the ostensible approbation of the Pope. For Pius, immediately before his departure, had written a letter which Marchese Sacchetti was instructed to hand to the Minister of the Interior, and in this he recommended to the care of Galletti and the other Ministers, the quiet and good order of the city during his absence.²

Armed with this letter, Galletti had not hesitated to claim the support of the Chamber of Deputies as the special mandatory of the Pope, and the course which he and his supporters followed shows that, at that time, not more than a small section of the advanced party had arrived at the conclusion that Pius could be

¹ Among them Pantaleoni deserves mention.

² "Marchese Sacchetti, Affidiamo alla sua nota prudenza ed onestà di prevenire della nostra partenza il Ministro Galletti, impregandolo con tutti gli altri ministri non tanto per premunire i palazzi, ma molto più le persone addette e Lei stessa che ignoravano totalmente la nostra risoluzione. Che se tanto chi è a cuore e Lei e i famigliari, perche lo repetiamo, ignari del tutto del Nostro pensiero, molto più ci è a cuore di raccomandare ai detti signori la quiete e l'ordine dell'intera città. 24 Novembre 1848. Pius P. P. IX."—Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 4.

altogether dispensed with. And it must not be forgotten that even among those who openly professed republican principles, all did not perceive the inherent incompatibility between the Papacy and a democratic government such as they vaguely aspired to.

Such being the general tendencies of public opinion, Galletti declined to accept a violent resolution proposed by the Prince of Canino, that would have finally dispelled all hopes of reconciliation; for it he substituted a moderate declaration, in which the Pope's letter was taken as sufficiently warranting the continuance of the government *de facto*; means were also discussed for opening negotiations for the return of the absent Sovereign.

The possibility of compromise which the communication of Pius to Galletti and the temporizing course pursued by the latter appeared to offer soon vanished; neither side continued long on a reasonable course. For both were too impatient and unskilled in constitutional methods, too jealous of counterbalancing powers, too irritated by continuous strife, too fundamentally irreconcilable for political, ethical, and religious reasons that have already been discussed; rash and inconsidered steps were taken on both sides, that soon dealt a further and fatal blow to the constitutional institutions of the Roman State.

On the 27th of November the Chamber of Deputies, on the proposition of Lunati, ordered the issue of Treasury Bonds to the value of 600,000 scudi; and on the 1st of December Mamiani, who had after the Pope's flight accepted from Galletti the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, initiated a debate on the question of whether an Italian federative Assembly should be convened. On his side, the Pope had drawn

up a Brief which reached Rome on December 3rd.¹ In this document Pius, after shortly alluding to the violence used against him as the reason for his leaving the city, announced the appointment of a Commission of Government of seven members : they were Cardinal Castracane, Monsignor Roberti, Prince of Ruviano, Prince Barberini, Marquis Bevilacqua, Marquis Ricci, and General Zucchi ; the three last named were moderate liberals, the others reactionaries. This step was totally ineffective, except in so far as it excited the resentment of those in whose hands the Government of Rome was actually vested.

Within a week of the appointment of the Commission, Zucchi and Bevilacqua abandoned their posts at Bologna and left the Pontifical States ;² while Ruviano and Barberini had left Rome by the 20th of December. Of the seven members of the Commission, Castracane and Roberti alone showed the slightest symptom of treating their appointment seriously, though in the absence of instructions directing them to act, they practically did nothing. But even had they received precise instructions from Gaëta, it is not probable that any orders they might have issued would have been obeyed ; for the greater part of the Provincial Governors and officials had given their adhesion to the new order of things, while some of them, like Monsignor Bucciosanti Governor of Civita Vecchia, even afforded a zealous support to the Ministry.

Among the members of the *de facto* Government, Count Mamiani appeared to be the only possible leader. He had accepted office under great pressure and with

¹ It was dated November 27th.

² Zucchi, *op. cit.* 152.

the firm resolve of saving Rome from civil war and a republican revolution ; his superior abilities, experience, and position gave him for a time the virtual direction of affairs. To those representatives of foreign Powers who had remained in the city, he pointed out the immense difficulties of the political situation, the mistakes of the Pope and his advisers, and the fact that constitutionally the position of the Ministry was, if not unassailable, at all events the best possible under existing circumstances.

No sooner had the Pope's Brief been received than the Chamber declared it unconstitutional, and appointed a delegation to proceed to Gaëta "to invite his Holiness to return to Rome, and otherwise to provide for the lack of an executive Power." The delegates were moderate and representative, and were headed by the Senator of Rome, Prince Corsini ; they left for Gaëta on the 5th of December. At Portello on the Neapolitan frontier, they were stopped by the chief police official, who declined to allow them to proceed further, but who permitted them to forward a request for an audience with the Pope. This was immediately and unconditionally declined by Cardinal Antonelli.

At the session of the Chamber held on the 8th of December, the ill success of the delegation to the Pope was known ; Pantaleoni, anxious to temporize, moved that a special commission of five members be appointed to consider the difficulty created by the absence of the Sovereign. The Prince of Canino opposed the proposal, he argued that the executive power of the State was derelict, consequently reverting back to the people ; he submitted as a counter-proposal that a commission of three be appointed to exercise the lapsed rights of the Chief of the State, until such time as the Pope

should peacefully return to Rome. This declaration which, for the Prince of Canino, was fairly temperate and not altogether lacking in logic, was received in silence by the Assembly, with frantic applause by the occupants of the public galleries. Galletti then rose to address the House; the Minister impartially commended the speeches of both the preceding speakers, striving to show that there was no contradiction to be found in them; he vaguely concluded that to the people alone belonged the decision as to their form of government. Eventually a Provisional Committee was appointed to exercise executive functions; its members were Rusconi, Sturbinetti, Rezzi, Sereni, and Lunati.

In the excitement arising from circumstances that all felt to be necessarily transitional, even the bold step marked by the appointment of this Committee could not long satisfy the agitators and that part of the people which had assumed the functions of representing public opinion. It was soon decided that another step forward must be taken, one that must result in the final abrogation of Papal authority. On the 11th of December the president of the Chamber Sturbinetti, read a letter from Prince Corsini who, like many others, had been carried along by the revolutionary torrent, and in this instance was probably used as a tool by the agitators. In this communication the Senator of Rome appealed to the Chamber to come to some decision as to the carrying on of the Government that might make for the restoration of public order. Fusconi then rose and proposed a decree, based on the dereliction of the executive functions of the State, whereby a supreme Giunta was to be appointed to exercise power during the absence of the Pope. This was to all intents the same proposal as the Prince of

Canino had made three days before; it was also a direct supersession of the Commission of Government appointed by Pius on November 27th. And if the action of the Pope had been unconstitutional, that of the Chamber was at least equally so, and indicated more openly than any event up till then the beginning of a direct and open conflict, amounting to civil war, between the Sovereign and the people. Fusconi's proposal was carried, and Prince Corsini, Count Camerata, and Galletti were nominated as members of the Giunta.¹

That an official rupture now existed between the Pope and the Romans was at once made clear, for Pius immediately replied to the act of the Assembly by drawing up a formal protest against the appointment of the Giunta, which was notified by Cardinal Antonelli to all the Courts of Europe (December 17th).

These successive incidents increased the ferment in the city, which was not made less by the now fast increasing arrivals of republican nationalists from all parts of Italy. Garibaldi, Cernuschi, Del Bene, Caldesi, La Cecilia² and many others arrived at Rome, and greatly increased the effective strength of the advanced party. Republican demonstrations became of daily occurrence, and it was decided among the leaders that the time had now come for getting rid of the existing Government, and for realizing the aspirations of the Giovane Italia.

Mamiani was determined at all costs to maintain

¹ Galletti, "il quale non ricusava mai alcuna carica," sarcastically observes Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 92.

² Who afterwards fought in the American Civil War, wrote Memoirs, and took a very prominent part in the Communist rising in Paris in 1871. See Pasolini, *op. cit.* 110. He was recommended by Montanelli to Bargagli, the Tuscan envoy at Rome, as a man skilled in organizing demonstrations.

Papal authority, and was fast coming to an open breach with his colleagues; he contemplated closing the *Circolo Popolare*, a measure which, if it could have been carried into effect, might have given an opportunity for decent administration and for negotiation. The civic guards, among whom were many moderates, turned out to repress disorders caused by the parading of republican colours through the streets; finally Mamiani was emboldened to ask power of the Chamber to expel, at his discretion, all or any of the foreign agitators from the capital (December 21st). The Prince of Canino opposed and defeated the ministerial proposal, and the *Giunta* simultaneously issued a proclamation announcing the early convocation of a Roman Constituent Assembly to settle the form of government of the State. This double defeat was immediately followed by the resignation of Mamiani.

CHAPTER XIV

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AT THE CLOSE OF 1848

Conduct of the war by Sardinia—Perilous situation of Austria—
Her fear of France—Ambitions of the Second Republic—
Palmerston's attempts at mediation — Negotiations — The
democrats and France — Lamartine — Bastide — Mazzini —
Internal difficulties of France—Prince Louis Bonaparte Presi-
dent—Intervention at Rome considered—Sardinia's difficulties
—Gioberti in office—His policy—Pius at Gaëta.

FROM the time of the Pope's flight to Gaëta a consideration of the varying courses of policy pursued by the Powers of Europe becomes even more important than before in regard to the affairs of the Roman State. To clearly follow the diplomatic and military movements of France and Austria that played so large a part in the settlement of central Italy in 1849, it will be necessary to first cast a retrospective glance at some of the prominent features of European international relations during the period that followed the proclamation of the French Republic and the fall of Metternich.

Charles Albert's campaign in Lombardy had been opened under circumstances so disadvantageous to Austria that for some weeks, or months, notwithstanding the military incapacity of Sardinia, it appeared as if a part, if not the whole of Lombardy-Venetia must be lost to the Empire of the Hapsburgs. The fall of

Metternich at the threat of the Viennese demonstrators had shown the inherent weakness of the autocratic system of government which the skill and strength of that great statesman had so long upheld ; it was further emphasized by the mental disability of the Emperor Ferdinand, by the hostilities that had broken out between Hungarians and Croats, by the revolt of the Italian provinces, and by the desertion of 20,000 of Radetzky's conscripts.¹

The situation was a terrible one for the Austrian Empire ; to Metternich it appeared desperate ;² and his successor, Count Fincquelmont, took office prepared to make the largest concessions to save the monarchy. The Viennese demonstrations in March had been followed by actual revolution that drove the Court from the capital in May, while Hungary was rapidly drifting towards open rebellion. Nothing but the remarkable ability of Austria's diplomacy and the ancient pride, steadfast discipline, traditional loyalty, and splendid leading of her army, saved the House of Hapsburg. To all the reasons that urged concession in Italy on Fincquelmont, was added the fear of French intervention.

The change of government in France had been far from favourable to Austrian policy, for under Louis Philippe and Guizot the Cabinet of Vienna had had little to fear from French ambition. But the proclamation of the Second Republic had completely changed the aspect of affairs, for the new Govern-

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 698. Probably an exaggerated figure reported to Ponsonby at Vienna. A certain proportion of the Italian troops remained faithful, though not perhaps very effective.

² A week before his fall he wrote to Count Dietrichstein : " Ce n'est pas en effet la seule Autriche, mais toute l'Europe, qui se trouve reculée de plus d'un demi siècle " . . . (March 4th, 1848).

ment and the statesmen who guided its destinies, were anxious to confirm their theoretical excellence by some tangible success. In the convulsed state of Europe, in the downfall of the presiding genius of the Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance, liberal, patriotic, and ambitious Frenchmen not unnaturally perceived an opportunity that was to afford some compensation for the humiliations of 1815, some restoration of the territory of which France had then been curtailed.¹ For centuries she had been the hereditary enemy of Austria in Italy; her reassertion of democratic principles had now once more placed her in clear antagonism to her ancient foe. France saw a natural and reasonable cause why she should espouse an anti-Austrian policy, and her statesmen were prepared, and even anxious, to join in the Italian quarrel provided their eventual reward appeared secure. That reward could be nothing but the natural frontier of the Alps once held by Napoleon; the King of Sardinia could attain Italian supremacy at the price of the cession to the Republic of the territories of Nice and Savoy.²

Bearing in mind the broad fundamental outlines of the Italian policies of Austria and France, let us now revert to the time at which Charles Albert had ordered his troops to cross the Ticino. A more half-hearted act of war than that of the King of Sardinia never was. Palmerston, who had not the talent to foresee all that the Italian movement implied, now that his eyes were

¹ "Les traités de 1815 n'existent plus que comme faits à modifier d'un accord commun." Lamartine, in Chamber of Deputies, May 23rd, 1848. Palmerston more or less admitted as reasonable that France would require compensation for her intervention in Italy. See his dispatch to Abercromby, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 667.

² In a speech in the French Chamber on May 8th, Lamartine suggested that the foreign negotiations of the Government had for aim the restoration of France's natural frontiers, the Rhine and the Alps.—Lamartine, *Trois mois au pouvoir*, 178.

opened, made desperate efforts to restrain the torrent of war by diplomatic obstacles. It was doubtless in great measure owing to the energetic protests of the British Foreign Secretary that Charles Albert attempted for some little time to maintain the fiction that there was not actually a state of war, and that the Sardinian troops were merely engaged in preserving order, restraining excesses, and preventing the outbreak of a republican movement. This theory very probably saved Radetzky and the Austrian army, yet could not long resist the inexorable logic of facts. At sea too, even after hostilities on land had actually occurred, Charles Albert hesitated to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by his great naval superiority over his opponent, and allowed a favourable chance for a vigorous stroke at Trieste to slip by.¹

On the Austrian as well as on the Italian side the war had not at first been conducted with the vigour that is generally conducive to success. Two days after the Sardinian Minister had been handed his passports, Count Fincquelmont verbally declared to Lord Ponsonby that in the event of the Austrian arms being successful the advantage would not be pursued beyond the line of the Ticino.²

In this declaration, logically enough deduced from the traditional policy of immobility of Metternich, the Austrian Cabinet had a double object. The first was to found their claim to the Lombard-Venetian provinces on the rights conferred by the treaties of

¹ A consideration of the naval policy of Charles Albert is quite beyond the scope of the present work. For the very curious negotiations that took place at Munich between Sardinia and Austria, with the object of limiting hostilities to Lombardy-Venetia, see the dispatches given by N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea in Italia*, vols. v. and vi.

² Ponsonby to Palmerston, Vienna, April 2nd, 1848, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 650.

1815, to which all the Powers of Europe were parties; the second was to check French statesmanship, anxious to find in an advance of Austria beyond the Ticino and to the foot of the Alps a pretext for a military occupation of Savoy.¹

In the peculiar circumstances under which the two contending Powers and France were placed, Lord Palmerston appeared to have found the opportunity of restoring peace by means of a friendly mediation. But the terms that Austria was prepared to accept during the first few weeks of the war,—terms that involved the cession of the greater part of her Italian possessions,—would not satisfy the Albertists flushed with victory and the anticipation of complete success. *L'Italia farà da sè* was then the cry, no foreign help would be accepted or paid for, and Italy would be wholly freed from the foreign yoke by her own sons, even to the uttermost parts of Trieste and Istria.

These illusions had been quickly and violently shattered. As the military genius of Austria's great commander gradually overcame all obstacles and attached victory once more to the Imperial standards, the Cabinet of Vienna modified its views. At the time of the capitulation of Durando at Vicenza, Lombardy, though not Venetia, would have been surrendered;² after Custozza friendly mediation was no longer practicable, and Austria was determined to accept nothing less than her frontiers as they had been before the war.

The inhabitants of Lombardy and Venetia, although they had cast such an overwhelming vote in favour of

¹ There was latent sympathy between Vienna and Turin on one point throughout the war, that was as to the presence of French troops in Lombardy. Fincquemont turned that circumstance to advantage, Charles Albert did not.

² Wessenburg to Casati, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 969.

reunion to Sardinia when victory appeared to incline to the arms of Charles Albert, had quickly abandoned him in his misfortunes. Venice had reverted back to the republican form she had adopted when she threw off the Austrian yoke in March; Milan attempted to negotiate directly for the armed assistance of the French Republic. At the end of July, Guerrieri, one of the members of the Provisional Government, was sent from Milan to Paris, where he soon met two Venetians, Gar and Alleardi, dispatched on a somewhat similar errand by the dictator Manin;¹ they found in the French capital a difficult political position to deal with.

Through the months during which northern Italy was being contested between Charles Albert and Radetzky the French Government had maintained an expectant attitude. One of the first acts of the Second Republic had been the formation of a corps of observation at Lyons, officially announced as *l'Armée des Alpes*; Lamartine described it as, "a defensive and mediating army." This force was partly collected by the end of March, and represented the possibility of an eventual muster of 60,000 men. In explanation of this warlike measure the Government, after professing in general terms its sympathy with the cause of Italian independence, put forward two possible cases each one of which would involve French action; one was that Sardinia might develop into a Power of the first rank, thereby disturbing the military equilibrium along the south-eastern frontier of France; the other that Austria might, by the defeat of Sardinia, occupy the Italian side of the Alps. A third eventuality involving French action was not officially alluded to, but was well understood, it was that an agreement between France

¹ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea in Italia*, v. 300, 315, 490.

and Sardinia as to the cession of the latter's French provinces might call the *Armée des Alpes* into Lombardy to fight the cause of Italian independence.¹

There were other and complicating elements affecting French action that must also be noticed. Between Paris and London considerable tension had been created by the affair of the Spanish marriages which had marked the last year of Guizot's tenure of office; and the pursuit of an ambitious line of policy by the Republic was the one course that was likely to render Anglo-French relations even more strained.² Another of these complicating circumstances was the sympathy and close intercourse that had long existed between the republicans of France and the Italian exiles. Now that the former had crowned the political hopes of so many years with success and were in power, the latter looked to them for the material assistance that might bring their own cause to a similarly prosperous issue.

In the first few hasty weeks, while yet the possibilities of power seemed unbounded and its responsibilities light, while the mutual hostility of the moderate and advanced sections of the republican party had not yet engrossed the whole attention of France, Lamartine, the virtual director of her external policy, had been with the utmost difficulty restrained from hasty action in Italy.³

¹ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v. 278, 292. One side of French policy in Italy is well resumed in the following passage from a dispatch written some fifteen years earlier by the Marquis de la Maisonfort to Baron Pasquier:—"The independence of Italy, and also its subdivision among various States, must ever remain the desire and object of every French agent who is attached to the interests of his country."—Gualterio, *Ultime Rivolgimenti*, i. 102.

² It must be said however, that in his first letter of instructions to French diplomatic agents abroad (March 4th) Lamartine disclaims the Spanish marriage policy as dynastic and not national, and lays stress on the pursuance of a conciliatory course by the new Government.—Lamartine, *op. cit.* 69.

³ On April 20th, 1848, Bixio, the able representative of the French Republic at Turin, wrote to Lamartine strongly dissuading him from intervention that was not wanted. "Why not wait until the appointed hour is come? So soon as fate is

In the summer, when fortune was slowly inclining towards the Austrian arms, Bastide, a personal friend of Mazzini, was acting as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He took a strongly republican line in Italy and gave the Italian patriots much encouragement; in June he declared that Austrian intervention in Papal territory or in the Duchies would be considered a *casus belli* by the French Government.¹

The Mazzinians had done their utmost to turn their relations with Paris to some advantage, and to so influence the possible French intervention that it should not only rid Italy of Austria, but of her Princes as well. Such agents as Guerrieri, Gar, and Alleardi, were neither the first nor the last who had been sent to invoke French aid for the republicans.

The position which Mazzini himself took up is important and interesting; it can best be shown by giving in full a letter he wrote to Bastide on July 31st, 1848, immediately after the Sardinian defeat at Custozza:—

“MY DEAR BASTIDE—Your intervention has probably been requested both by Charles Albert and by Mr. Guerrieri on behalf of the Provisional Government. A third envoy has probably approached you in the name of the National Guards. Speaking for myself, I have nothing to do with all this. I think our duty is to work out our own salvation; I have always prayed for a European war, but never for foreign intervention in the Italian question.

“But if, at the request of others, France is to give us the aid of her sword, let it be the sword of the Republic that is drawn, not that of a France without faith (*une France sans croyances*).

unpropitious all Italy will spontaneously appeal to France, and her soldiers will then enter Italy not as conquerors, but as saviours.”—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v. 276. See also speech by Lamartine in the Chamber on May 8th.—Lamartine, *op. cit.*

¹ Confidential dispatch, Bastide to Bixio, June 1848.—Bastide, *La République Française en Italie*, 45.

Trust not in the devices of princes, sully not your banner with the words, *For a king*; that king has even now lost that one thing he possessed,—material force. Come to us for our national cause, for the people of Italy; it is with the people alone you can form an abiding alliance. Any other course spells anarchy for us, and, I shall not hesitate to say, dishonour for France.

JOSEPH MAZZINI.”¹

In the short space of time that elapsed between Custozza and the signing of the armistice of Salasco, the Government of France came to no important decision. Her army was not ready for war, her diplomacy was too uncertain and unskilled to advantageously direct her affairs, her political dissensions absorbed all her attention; Austria by not crossing the frontier of Piedmont, Sardinia by not invoking her aid, left her without any reasonable pretext for intervention.

The internal difficulties of France had culminated in the month of June in a struggle between the two sections of the republican party that was accompanied by considerable bloodshed; victory rested with the moderates under the leadership of General Cavaignac, who remained at the head of the Government until December. On the 10th day of that month Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the first Emperor, son of the ex-King of Holland, first cousin of the Prince of Canino, was elected President of the French Republic by an overwhelming majority.

We have already seen something of the working of the diplomacy of France in Roman affairs just before this momentous change in the political arrangements of that country. The strenuous efforts made by the Duke d’Harcourt to secure the custody of the Pope’s person by offering him an asylum on a French vessel

¹ Bastide, *op. cit.* 44.

at Civita Vecchia had been supported by a military demonstration. On the reception of the news of the assassination of Rossi 3500 French troops had been prepared for embarkation at Marseilles, for it now appeared to the French Government safer and more profitable to operate against the rebel subjects of the Pope than against the victorious and veteran soldiers of Radetzky. The Second Republic, eager to check Austria and to earn prestige at an easy rate, determined, in default of Lombardy, to make Rome the object of her intervention; for want of a better pretext, the maintenance of the Papal rights was paraded as an all-sufficient motive by her diplomatists.

But the miscalculations of the Duke d'Harcourt, the flight of Pius to Gaëta, instead of to Civita Vecchia, the approaching Presidential election in which he was to be defeated, all came to stay Cavaignac's hand. At the moment of the accession to the Presidency of Prince Louis Bonaparte the policy of France might be described as suspended; its tendency was to vaguely threaten Austria, to support the establishment of Papal authority, to strongly menace the revolted democracy of Rome.

With the hostility of the Pope, France, and Austria to face, the Romans stood in great need of a friend among the military powers. There was but one direction in which any hope lay of finding such a support,—in that of defeated Sardinia. The North Italian kingdom, in the desperate straits that war and internal faction had driven it into, clung desperately, and not without sound appreciation of the political necessities of the situation, to the leadership of the Italian cause. Her statesmen still maintained the hope of obtaining military

assistance from other parts of the Peninsula, and of concluding the long-deferred league negotiations. The rupture that had occurred between the Pope and his subjects was evidently a serious blow to Charles Albert's policy and hopes, and the Sardinian diplomatists received instructions to attempt a reconciliation between Gaëta and Rome. On December 30th a long dispatch was written by Gioberti, now Prime Minister, to Count Martini, Sardinian Envoy to Rome. From this document the following passages may be quoted with advantage :—

“The Minister may enter into officious relations with the *de facto* government at Rome, and into official relations with the Holy Father, to whom he is accredited as Ambassador.¹ . . . Should the breach between the Holy Father and the people of Rome continue, the States of the Church and all Italy will be placed in an extremely dangerous position. Foreign Powers will intervene in our affairs, much to the damage of our dignity and independence.

“If the governing body at Rome should desire a mediator between themselves and the Holy Father, the Minister will offer the good and disinterested services of the Piedmontese Government. . . . This officious mission in Rome shall be the Minister's first duty. When accomplished, he shall present himself to the Holy Father . . . and urge him to accept his mediation. . . .”

If the officious part of the task imposed on Count Martini was difficult, the official was well-nigh hopeless ; for at Gaëta the intrigues of the diplomatic and clerical world were centring, and Sardinia was too friendless, too weak, and too unsuccessful to command a hearing.

¹ It may be well to explain that *officious* and *official*, so used, are terms conveying a considerable diplomatic difference. Speaking broadly, an *officious* step is unofficial and non-committal ; lawyers would translate it by the expression “without prejudice.”

Immediately on the arrival of Pius within his dominions, Ferdinand II had left Naples and hurried to Gaëta personally to pay the respect he owed to the Head of the Catholic Church; the King of the Two Sicilies made offers of assistance to the Pope, and seconded by every means in his power the active and insidious steps of the reactionary Catholic and Austrian party. Under the folds of the Bourbon flag that waved over the little Neapolitan fortress, entrapped in the Jesuit toils more and more closely spun about him by the indefatigable and crafty Antonelli, Pius had at last verified the prediction of Metternich,—the Ruler of Rome and the Pope were now one, and Pius had found his way back to his only logical standpoint.

Through the months that followed, obscure Gaëta became the most important diplomatic centre of Europe, but through all the conferences and notes, dispatches and protocols, some of which must needs be adverted to in later chapters, one fact stands clear, that the real director of the Papal policy was now Cardinal Antonelli, and that the liberal tendencies and individual opinion of Pio Nono were no more.

NOTE

A somewhat different aspect of French policy from that given in this chapter is presented in Mr. Emile Ollivier's *L'Empire Libéral* (see particularly ii. 134, 160). His contentions do not appear to support close comparison with dates, nor with the dispatches and speeches of the French statesmen. Several of those quoted here are destructive of Mr. Ollivier's ingenious and eloquent arguments; most of them are readily accessible in N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vols. v., vi., vii.; Bastide, *La République Française en Italie*; Lamartine, *Trois mois au pouvoir*; and Thiers, *Discours parlementaires*, vols. vii. and viii.

CHAPTER XV

PROCLAMATION OF THE REPUBLIC

The Roman Giunta—Anarchic conditions—Proclamation convoking the electors—Papal rejoinder—Gioberti negotiates—Affairs of Tuscany—Leopold and the Giovane Italia—Montanelli and the Republicans—Legislation of the Giunta—The elections—Meeting of the Constituent—The debate—Mamiani's resolution—Filopanti's—Canino's speech—Proclamation of the Roman Republic.

THE Giunta's announcement of the convocation of a Roman Constituent Assembly had not only driven Mamiani from power, but had also taken from the Chamber of Deputies the last vestige of its influence. The remaining powers of the State were those of the Giunta, of a Ministry in which Muzzarelli and Armellini were most conspicuous, of the Circolo Popolare and Sterbini, and of the momentarily expelled but threatening Theocracy. Of these, that of Sterbini was for the moment most felt; and the peculiar methods and measures adopted by the Circolo Popolare for furthering the political happiness of the Roman people commanded the admiration of some, the abhorrence of others, but the subservience of most. As in the capital, so in the provinces; while Cardinals and Legates abandoned their posts, the local clubs and

liberal secret society men constituted the only real authority, and chaotic conditions continued to prevail.¹

But the influence of Sterbini had reached its highest point, and now that he had attained power he showed none of the attributes and qualities of statesmanship that might have enabled a more able man to retain it. Turbulent, vain, and light-headed, he lacked courage, prudence, and knowledge; only capable of destruction, impotent to construct, or to conduct the affairs of the Government that had fallen into his hands, he continued to tie and untie the knots of intrigue, and to promote alternate and equally aimless demonstrations of fear and of rejoicing. This was a fatal course to take with a people whose spontaneity of enthusiasm was already destroyed, and with whom apathy had become the prevailing note. Despised by the moderates and constitutionalists, Sterbini was disliked by the Mazzinians, who saw in him the only obstacle to the accomplishment of their republican ambitions;²—their fear of him was exaggerated. For there was little real capacity in the leader of the *Circolo Popolare* save that of riding on the highest crest of the wave of public opinion, of following the irresistible sequence of events that was carrying Rome from the thrall of her ancient Theocracy to the birth-throes of ignorant, impotent, and still-born democracy.

On December 29th the Giunta published an edict regulating the various details of the elections for the Roman Constituent Assembly. This decree stated:—

¹ Among those who fled about this time may be mentioned Cardinal Marini, Cardinal Amat, Manzoni, Spada, Zannolini, Bonfigli, Lovatelli, and Fabbri. General Zamboni, military commandant of the city of Rome, was arrested while on the point of taking to flight.

² "Gli onesti di tutti i partiti erano contrari a Sterbini," wrote Castellani to his Government.

that the Constituent Assembly should exercise full power to settle and establish public affairs ;
that the elections were to take place on January 21st, by manhood suffrage and secret ballot ;
that the Assembly should meet on February 5th.

This proclamation of the Giunta was immediately answered by one from Gaëta ; Pius and his advisers still fondly clung to the wordy methods so dear to the Church, still believed in the emotional force of religious appeals,—and perhaps rightly. The Pope and those who advised him had declined to give a pledge of maintaining the constitution to a party that sought, by means of a large section of the civic guard, to effect a Papal restoration ; and in reply to the measures announced by the Giunta, issued a solemn admonishment on January 1st, 1849. In this document, after qualifying the decree convoking the Roman Constituent as “abominable, monstrous, illegal, impious, absurd, sacrilegious, and outrageous to every law, human and divine,” all Pontifical subjects were warned that they must pay no heed to the decree and take no part in the elections ; and all who failed to comply with the Papal warning were threatened with the pains of excommunication in the major degree.

This admonition of the Pope to his subjects had little, if any, effect on the course of events, though among the provincial magistrates many faithfully complied with its terms. At Rome the clubs were already busy selecting candidates and in other ways preparing for the elections, and the Mazzinians were every day gaining influence by reason of the general tendency of public opinion, and also of the secret propaganda of the *Giovane Italia*,—Accursi in particular doing much work.

In the meanwhile Gioberti was struggling to bring to some good end his desperate and tortuous anti-Austrian policy. An agent of his, Berghini, entered into a secret military convention with the Giunta (January 18th), whereby it was provided that in the event of the renewal of hostilities, 15,000 men should be placed under the command of Charles Albert by the Roman Government. This was in effect not far removed from the military convention Sardinia had proposed once before, at the time when Count Mamiani had first taken office. Berghini's treaty does not appear to have been ratified by the Sardinian Government, but it may be noted that one of its provisions stipulated secrecy. It was quite essential to the success of Gioberti's policy that this should be so. He wrote to Berghini:—"Keep everything as secret as possible. Say nothing to the Tuscan envoys, who are mere decoys for the *Giovane Italia*. . . . Leave Rome at once, and go to Gaëta; if your relations with the Roman Government are known, you may state that they were merely officious. If you see the Holy Father . . . declare the firm resolve of the Sardinian Government to maintain and defend by every means the cause of order and of constitutional monarchy."¹

In this dispatch Gioberti speaks of the Tuscan envoys as decoys for the *Giovane Italia*; his words require explanation.

Tuscany was, in one sense, the nearest neighbour of the States of the Church, for from Rome communication was more easy with Florence than with any other Italian capital. The intercourse between the two cities was considerable, and at the period of the national

¹ Gioberti to Berghini, written presumably at the end of January. Given, without date, by Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 155.

movement, the public opinion of the one largely influenced that of the other. The occasional references already made to Tuscany, and to the acts of the Grand Duke Leopold and his advisers, will have sufficiently made clear that the policy of the Florentine Government had followed, though at a distance, the trend of nationalist sentiment of which Charles Albert had assumed the leadership. After Custozza and the armistice of Salasco, a democratic reaction had made itself felt, especially at the port of Leghorn, where the Mazzinians were very active; the Grand Duke had been finally compelled to entrust the direction of affairs to two very advanced and popular politicians, Montanelli and Guerrazzi.¹ The choice thus made proved not altogether a bad one. For however democratic in their theories Leopold's Ministers might be, however ardently they might desire the convocation of an Italian Constituent Assembly and a federation that should link Tuscany and Rome, they were above all things anxious and determined to maintain peace and good order within the boundaries of the Grand Duchy.²

Montanelli had all the subtlety of the typical Italian statesman. Although he was a Minister of Leopold, yet he maintained a close correspondence with Mazzini;³ although he was, or had been, a member of the Giovane

¹ Capponi, *Scritti*, ii. 46. Among their colleagues in the Ministry was Giorgini.

² Opinions as to Montanelli's policy vary; the truth is that it changed from day to day, and that its only consistent feature was his honest desire of maintaining order and retaining office. N. Bianchi asserts that the Tuscan Minister was not favourable to the establishment of a republic at Rome. He wanted a Provisional Government and an Italian Federal Assembly.—*Vicende del Mazzinianismo*, 167.

³ Ciphred letter from Nerli, Tuscan envoy at Turin, written at the suggestion of Gioberti to the private secretary of the Grand Duke Leopold, January 29th, 1849. It is quite possible that Gioberti's source of information was apocryphal, though there is nothing at all improbable about the statement which is generally confirmed by Montanelli's contemporaries.—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 96.

Italia, yet, on one pretext or another, he kept sending off the republican firebrands from Florence across the frontier to Bologna or to Rome. With many of these he kept up correspondence, notably with La Cecilia, to whom he had given, on December 28th, a letter of introduction to the Tuscan envoy at Rome. In the course of this letter he says, "La Cecilia will tell you our plans. Should Rome immediately convoke a Constituent and decide for the presidency of Leopold, we shall at once obtain a double result—(1) the fusion of the two central Italian States; (2) an Italian centre to which Piedmont, and perhaps even Naples, will be drawn."

Montanelli and Guerrazzi were not alone in pursuing an expectant or opportunist policy and in looking to the meeting of the new Roman Assembly for the solution of their difficulties. Italians in every part of the Peninsula, whether Monarchists, Albertists, democrats, or clericals, were watching anxiously to see whether from Rome, whence in 1848 nothing but futility and disappointment had sprung, would, in 1849, come a republican watchword and leader that should cast out the Austrians and found a Nation.

But before relating the outcome of the experiment in universal suffrage attempted by the inhabitants of the Pontifical States, the proceedings of the Giunta during the month of January must for one moment detain us; they will show that the democratic and provisional rulers of Rome chosen by the voice of the *Circolo Popolare*, however better they may have been in intention, were as incapable as the Theocracy they had supplanted of grasping the elementary principles of civil liberty and rational government.

The Giunta, finding itself in practical possession

of all the powers of Government, made the most of the temporary lapse of the legislative body by boldly assuming its functions.

The list of the enactments promulgated by these self-made lawgivers during the month that followed the 4th of January is both long and curious ; on an average a new law appeared about every other day, and the alert and all-pervading wisdom of the Giunta discovered subjects for legislative action in such a wide field as may include military law, the administration of trusts, the duties of trustees, the registry of title to land, the regulation of taxation, of gratuities, of pensions, and of legal procedure in civil cases, the composition of courts martial, maritime law, assessments, imprisonment for debt, the emission of State loans, the rights of municipal corporations, and several other matters. Such was the remarkable scope of the work attempted by a small and non-legislative body of unpractised statesmen in the space of four weeks ; such an example could not but inspire the approaching labours of the Roman Constituent !

On January 21st the elections were held ; there was but little enthusiasm, and many whose loyalty or religious fear had been evoked by the admonition of the Pope abstained from voting. It is difficult to estimate both what proportion of the electorate was thus neutralized, and what proportion actually went to the poll. The probability appears to be that in some places, notably at Rome, the voting was fairly heavy, and that at others but few electors exercised their privilege, with the result that some constituencies were not represented at all.¹ It may be conjectured that perhaps

¹ For this statement no authority can be quoted ; it appears justifiably deducible from a number of small facts.

200,000 votes were cast in all, a small section of the clergy taking part.¹ In all the towns except Bologna, where a passive loyalty to the Pope was maintained, the clubs carried the elections without difficulty. The successful deputies were nearly all middle-class men, and all but seven of them were Papal subjects. Among the strangers elected were Mazzini, Garibaldi, Cernuschi, Saliceti, and Dallongaro.

On the 5th day of February 1849 the Roman Constituent Assembly met. The opening ceremony was attended with less pomp than had ushered in the first session of the Chamber of Deputies the year before, and with less tragic circumstances than had attended the opening of the prorogued session of that inglorious body.

The duty of making a statement of policy to the Assembly fell on the aged Armellini, Minister of the Interior. As far as it is possible to correctly state what were the ever-fluctuating desires of the Ministry for whom he acted as spokesman, they may be best resumed in the words of Mr. Freeborn, the British Consular agent. Writing to Lord Palmerston on February 2nd, he gave it as his opinion that the Ministry were anxious for the Pope's return with full constitutional power, but without the camarilla. They were also prepared to enter into negotiations on the basis of French or English armed intervention, but not on that of any other Power. If threatened with hostilities from the direction of Gaëta, the Provisional Government would probably proclaim the Republic.²

But to none of these sentiments did Armellini give

¹ Including Cardinals Oppizoni and Cadolini, together with the bishops of Terracina and Rieti. For the figures of the voting, which are extremely contradictory, see among others Pasolini, Consul Freeborn, Rusconi, Spada, and Beghelli.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 155.

utterance when he first addressed the Roman Constituent.

So thoroughly had his mind become imbued with the suggestions of his Under Secretary Accursi,¹ that his duty appeared to him not to direct or control the aspirations of the people, but merely to follow them, and to associate himself with the expressed wishes of the majority. And unfortunately, to Armellini's narrow vision the whole people was represented, very much as mankind is to the actor, by the occupants of the tribunes and galleries of the Chamber in which the Roman Constituent Assembly had assembled. He could not, or dared not, perceive that the excited faces framed between the upper pillars and arches of the hall were those of but a small section of the community,—a small section in which men, “good at organizing demonstrations,” to use Montanelli's expression once more, played a not unimportant part. Whatever his real opinion, moved by the inspirations of an elastic conscience and circumscribed vision, Armellini delivered a speech overflowing with democratic eloquence and generalities, but that did not commit the Ministry to any positive statement beyond this, that a new era had dawned, and that the two most holy of words were *Italy* and *the People*. The close of the Minister's discourse was marked by loud cheering, mostly proceeding from the galleries, and the Prince of Canino took the lead in shouting, “Evviva la Repubblica!” which was loudly repeated by Garibaldi.

But the republicans were unable to reach their goal immediately; Sterbini opposed them with dilatory measures referring to the House, among other matters

¹ Beghelli speaks of Armellini as timid but honest, which probably accurately sums up his character; *op. cit.* 152.

that required attention, the choice of a president. This eventually fell on Galletti.

Preliminary business thus occupied two days, and it was not until the 7th that the great debate on the Constitution of the Roman State could be opened.

The first resolution was put forward by Mamiani. It was framed in the following terms: "The National Assembly declares that the political settlement of the Roman State is deferred to an Italian Constituent Assembly." This proposition was well framed from the point of view of the mover. For if anything could stave off the fatal decision that was rapidly drawing near it was the suggestion of an Italian unification which the advanced party fondly hoped would be under some form of republican government. Mamiani was probably not sincere in looking forward to the proceedings of an Italian Constituent, but he certainly was sincere in his desire to put off as long as possible the declaration of a republic. In support of his proposal Mamiani declared strongly for the suppression of the temporal power of the Popes; to attain such a result, while maintaining the Papacy, should be the aim of the people, and not the establishment of a republic. The charm of that form of government lay in the word *republic*, but as soon as theory was left behind, facts showed little in its favour. When the French first revolted from Monarchy they were able to make good their position with 300,000 soldiers; at Rome neither arms nor money were to be found. The republican flag could not perform miracles, nor would Italy, save possibly Tuscany, adhere to the movement. What hope was there of assistance? What hope of France? There, as elsewhere in Europe, the democracy though still existing in name, had in reality been defeated. He

concluded by arguing that to await the convocation of an Italian federal Assembly was the wisest course to pursue.

Mamiani's speech was listened to, but evoked no applause. The orators of the advanced party followed, and met with greater success. Filopanti of Bologna proposed the following decree :—

“ 1. The Papacy has, in fact and in law, ceased to exercise temporal dominion over the Roman State.

“ 2. The Pope is given every guarantee necessary to his free exercise of his spiritual authority.

“ 3. The Government of the Roman State shall be democratic, and shall assume the glorious name of the Roman Republic.

“ 4. The Roman Republic shall open with the rest of Italy such relations as a common nationality demands.”

If the Papacy, so argued Filopanti, desired freedom, that was secured by the proposal he had just put forward ; for on such a basis the Pope would be rid both of the disadvantages of a subject and of those of a Sovereign. As the Theocracy was destroyed, sovereignty must return to its source, the people ; the Republic was but the expression of popular sovereignty, the Republic would become an example to the rest of Italy.

Agostini followed Filopanti, and addressing himself to a refutation of Mamiani, endeavoured to show that the monarchies of Europe were weak and democracy everywhere triumphant ; if Rome were attacked, the French Republic would come to her aid.

At this point Sterbini interposed. He was still hesitating as to the course he should adopt, and to gain a few hours in which to come to the most advantageous decision, he moved the adjournment of the debate till

the following day. This was not carried, but it was decided to suspend the session until eight o'clock in the evening.

On resuming, the moderate Audinot first addressed the Assembly. He argued that the question of the Papal sovereignty was not a Roman question, nor even an Italian one, but concerned all the Catholic Powers of Europe, whose arms were perfectly well able to solve it agreeably to their desires, and to those of the Pope. He concluded by supporting Mamiani's resolution.

Sterbini next spoke, with violence, yet inconclusively. He heaped insults on the Popes, and on the Neapolitan Bourbons, and loudly vaunted the virtues of democracy; yet would not plainly declare for the republic.

A franker profession of faith followed from Gabussi. He was succeeded by the Prince of Canino, who speaking to the galleries, evoked loud applause, which was redoubled when he closed his speech by shouting, "Evviva la Repubblica Romana!" which the spectators, as though at a prearranged signal, took up and continued. The wavering Sterbini now at length decided to follow the torrent; he rose, and demanded that the Republic should be solemnly proclaimed from the Capitol on the following day. This proposal was received with enthusiastic acclamation.

Mamiani's resolution was then put formally to the vote, and rejected by a very large majority; after which Filopanti's decree was taken, and carried by 120 votes to 10, twelve deputies abstaining.¹

Amid a scene of wild excitement and uproar, the

¹ 143 is the largest number of deputies reported present, out of a total of 200—Freeborn says that the votes on the temporal power were 138 against, and 5 for; and on the republic, as given above.—*Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 156.

Roman Constituent Assembly brought this memorable session to a close at two o'clock on the morning of the 8th of February 1849. The Roman Republic had come into existence ; it now remained to be seen what it was capable of accomplishing.

CHAPTER XVI

MAZZINI AT ROME—NOVARA

Victory of the Giovane Italia—Character of Mazzini—His letter to Pius—Arrival at Rome—Speech to the Assembly—Flight of Leopold—Business of the Assembly—Finance—Condition of the provinces—Resignation of Gioberti—Sardinia resumes hostilities—The battle of Novara—Abdication and end of Charles Albert.

AMONG the numerous catch phrases about which the resounding eloquence of the Roman Constituent Assembly revolved, none was more often heard than that plausible and euphonious expression, “Dio e il popolo.” It was in the name of God and the People that resolutions were introduced, that appeals were made to immutable justice and to the public galleries, that God’s Regent on earth was humbled, and that the democracy was exalted. The acclamation of the device of the Giovane Italia drew to Rome, as to a magnet, the High Priest of that national and patriotic society, Giuseppe Mazzini.

To appreciate at its just value the personality of the extraordinary man, who for nearly the whole of the five months during which the Roman Republic existed directed its fortunes, is no easy task. As a political leader or administrator Mazzini possessed some qualities, but in such an exaggerated form that they might better

be described as weaknesses. He was indefatigable and full of resource ; but so uninterruptedly had his intellect been directed to the formulation of eloquent appeals, so continuously had he laboured at his desk, that his energies had become the slaves of his pen ; his active, eager, and benevolent mind saw remedies for every ill of struggling humanity in the paragraphs of sonorous decrees or of humanitarian manifestoes. He worked, he thought, and conscience was his guide ; but in action he was impotent ; he might fill the part of prophet, but not that of ruler.

Mazzini's enormous and constant output of personal literature had inevitably developed in him a narrow self-concentration and sufficiency that accorded well with the semi-prophetic rôle he had assumed.¹ In his early attempts to win a foothold for the *Giovane Italia* at Rome, while yet Pius and his subjects were living in an enchanted atmosphere of joy and laudation, he had written a letter to the Pope which reveals his egotistic nature and arrogance of intellect under its most unpleasing aspect.² It was published in September 1847, at a time when the fortunes of the *Giovane Italia* were at the lowest ebb, and when its leader had been all but entirely deserted by his former adherents.

In this letter Mazzini offers his assistance to Pius in carrying out his mission. For success, two things are necessary, he declares, "to believe and to unify Italy."³ Later on he addresses the Pope as follows : "I speak these words to you, not because the least doubt as to our destinies assails me, nor because I think you indis-

¹ "Mazzini is one in whom holiness has purified, but somewhat dwarfed the man."

—Margaret Fuller, *op. cit.* iii.

² It has not been thought necessary to transcribe this letter into the Appendix ; it may be seen in Mazzini, *Scritti*, vi. 64, 156.

³ "Vi sono necessarie due cose, essere credente, e unificare l'Italia."

pensable to our success. Italian unity is in the gift of God: it may be conquered both with you, and also without you."¹ And again, "I regard you favourably. There is no man now, not only in Italy but even in Europe, who is more powerful than you. Therefore, Holy Father, you have great duties to perform."

But Mazzini's boundless egotism was only part of a personality in which the chief and excellent note was sincerity of conviction, rectitude of conduct, and disinterestedness. He was one of those most rare and most admirable men of whom it could be unhesitatingly said that not all the riches of civilization could move them from their path. The lean purse of Mazzini was never closed to those who claimed his assistance; his heart always beat in response to the call of the afflicted and the distressed; in the misfortunes of others he could forget the constant sorrows, tribulations, and privations of his own life. And it was, naturally enough, in personal and immediate influence that Mazzini was greatest; however impotent and ill-judged his political acts, however hasty and nebulous his theories, few could witness his example of inflexible virtue, devotion, and striving for lofty ideals, without falling under the spell that captivated so many good men of his age. That spell was now about to be cast over the Roman people.

Mazzini arrived at Rome on the evening of March 6th.² One of his friends and most ardent devotees, Margaret Fuller, has recorded the following interesting impression of the event:—

"Last night Mazzini came to see me. You will

¹ "L'unita Italiana e cosa da Dio: si compiera con voi, o senza di voi!"

² "I entered the city one evening early in March, with a deep sense of awe, almost of worship."—Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, v. 194. Margaret Fuller gives, mistakenly, March 8th as the date of his arrival.

have heard how he was called to Italy, and received at Leghorn like a Prince as he is ; unhappily in fact the only one, the only great Italian. . . . He has been made a Roman citizen, and elected to the Assembly ; the labels bearing in giant letters, *Giuseppe Mazzini, cittadino Romano*, are yet up all over Rome. He entered by night on foot, to avoid demonstrations, no doubt, and enjoy the quiet of his own thoughts at so great a moment. . . . Last night I heard a ring ; then somebody speak my name ; the voice struck on me at once. . . .”¹

On the evening of his arrival Mazzini attended the session of the Constituent Assembly ; a great reception had been prepared for him. Before he made his entrance, a heated discussion had agitated the meeting ; Sterbini had been violently attacked, and showed neither ability nor dignity in his defence, but clung desperately to the ministerial portfolio that was fast slipping from his incompetent hands. Then the outcry of the excitable deputies had turned against the incapable but perfectly honest Guiccioli, whose indignant emotion completely choked his utterance, and whose helpless incapacity finally conquered the charity of his colleagues.

It was at this moment that Mazzini made his entrance ; he was received with demonstrations of respect, and after being conducted to a seat next to the President, was invited to address the Assembly. The words he then spoke may be reproduced in the following abbreviated form :

“These manifestations of admiration should not be addressed by you to me, but rather by me to you,” he said ; “for what little of good I may have accom-

¹ Fuller, *op. cit.* iii. 208.

plished, or attempted, has owed its inspiration to my life's talisman, Rome. In my heart I have said, It is not possible that the City that has already lived two lives, should not arise to see a third. After the Rome of conquering soldiers, after the Rome of the triumphant Word, so I kept saying to myself, there shall come the Rome of virtue and of example ; after the City of the Emperors, after that of the Popes, shall come that of the People. But the Rome of the People has arisen ; it is here ; therefore do not salute me, but let us rather rejoice and work together, in so far as we are able, for the good of Italy, of Rome, and of Italian humanity.”¹

So spoke Mazzini, not without eloquence and dignity, addressing himself to the general interests of Italy, and to the relations between himself and the Romans. But questions of less general and of immediate import pressed for solution, and in a second speech he urged on the attention of the Assembly the dispatch of envoys to Florence, as a step towards the fusion with Tuscany which he was so eager to bring about. To this the Assembly assented.²

Thus, from the first moment of his arrival among them, Mazzini guided the responsive minds of the representatives of the Roman people ; and the generous hearts of his auditors responded, as Italian hearts will, to the utterance of lofty and sincere sentiments, in which their untutored and superficial judgments could detect no fallacies. Their unskilled and excitable minds could not balance the stern realities of their position ; from the moment that they heard the magician's voice, they fell under the charm. Yet notwithstanding the errors and follies of the Roman Republic, notwithstand-

¹ Farini gives the speech at full length ; *op. cit.* iii. 311.

² N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 453.

ing its violent and inevitable end, it cannot be thought altogether unfortunate for the Romans that the last days of their struggle to free themselves from the servitude of bigotry under which they had so long suffered, should have been marked by subservience to the decrees of the prophet of Italian democracy. Their devotion to and faith in their guide during the short space for which he wielded authority among them, goes far to redeem the levity, insincerity, and lack of self-control, so often recorded in these pages.

Mazzini's first care after arriving in the city had been, as we have seen, to draw closer the relations of Rome and Tuscany. At Florence the struggle between the Albertists and the Giovane Italia had been severe, and although the latter had won an advantage, the victory was far from being decisive. As far back as October of the preceding year, the Sardinian Government had contemplated with much alarm the possibility of a Tuscan movement resulting in the flight of the Grand Duke Leopold, and the establishment of a republic.¹ The eventuality feared was averted for a period of four months. Finally, on February 7th, Leopold thought it prudent to fly from Florence, and a republican rising broke out at Leghorn; yet Guerrazzi succeeded in retaining power under the forms of a Provisional Government, and in restoring some sort of order.

At first Leopold accepted a Sardinian offer of armed assistance, but having made his way to Gaëta, was rapidly drawn into the Austrian and reactionary intrigues.² But before following the thread of the princely

¹ Perrone to Villamarina, October 20th, 1848.—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 99.

² Had Sardinian intervention taken place, Austria would have immediately denounced the armistice of Salasco and crossed the Ticino. It appears not at all

interests, that were gradually being woven into a destroying net for Italian democracy, it is necessary that certain events that immediately preceded and followed Mazzini's arrival at Rome should be related.

The first work attempted by the Assembly after the proclamation of the Republic, had been to reform the ever-changing Executive Power of the State ; Armellini, Montecchi, and Saliceti respectable men but of mediocre ability, were appointed an Executive Committee ; a few changes of minor importance also took place in the Ministry.¹ This first step was soon followed by proposals for drawing up a new Constitution that were referred to a special committee. In the ardour of a republican enthusiasm, that led some members of the Assembly to the extreme of decorating themselves with the revolutionary Phrygian cap,² a project of Constitution was rapidly elaborated. Its most salient feature was the provision that the executive functions of the Republic should be vested in Tribunes, Consuls, and Dictators, after the model of ancient Rome. This interesting, if slightly archaic, scheme, never came to the point of practical application, and need therefore not detain us longer.

There was a matter even more urgent than that of the Constitution of the State that called for the immediate attention of the Ministry and the Assembly, —the financial position was wellnigh desperate. Expenses and disorder had increased, revenue had decreased, public credit was non-existent and the Treasury empty.

improbable that this was the real, though not avowed object of the Sardinian proposal ; for in the event of such an aggression on the part of Austria there was a bare hope of French intervention.

¹ Rusconi took Foreign Affairs ; Saffi, the Interior ; Lazzarini, Justice ; Ignazio Guiccioli, Finances ; Muzzarelli, Sterbini, and Campello remained in office.

² A party of enthusiasts actually decorated the cross that surmounted the obelisk in the Piazza del Popolo with this classic symbol of revolution.

Government Bonds to the value of 2,600,000 scudi, issued under Papal authority, still retained some value; but others, representing 800,000 scudi issued since the departure of Pius, had a value that was little more than nominal, while gold was at an exorbitant premium.¹

As a specimen of the remedies for the restoration of public credit proposed by the Assembly, and of the general methods of legislation of that body, one of the early laws on the financial question may be given. It ran as follows:—

“In the name of God and the People: The Constituent Assembly, in pursuit of the principles of morality and of the welfare of the public, decrees that the Roman Republic recognises the public debt as national and inviolable.”²

The principle enounced was doubtless excellent, but the law neither helped matters very much, nor did it long remain respected in principle. Guiccioli, Minister of Finance, and Manzoni his chief Secretary, arranged for some temporary assistance from the Roman Bank, but could do nothing to prevent the gradual and appalling depreciation of the five millions of paper currency in circulation. Among the desperate remedies that suggested themselves, was that of confiscating the property of the numerous wealthy Romans

¹ The gold premium during the period of the Republic varied between 400 and 600 paper scudi for an English pound sterling; see newspaper files generally.

² The Assembly as a legislative body was utterly incompetent. Vannucci, a Tuscan envoy and a democrat, wrote as follows, on February 22nd, to Mordini, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Florence:—“One of the Ministers declared to the Assembly yesterday that the Government could not be reproached with taking half measures; yet it is difficult to point to any measures denoting energy. Yesterday the Assembly went into secret session, but I am informed that there were many speeches, and no decisions. . . . Generally speaking, the Assembly has good intentions and desires complete freedom . . . but it has neither discipline nor dignity; disorder is constant, empty declamation and recrimination extremely frequent.”—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 451.

who were now leaving the capital, many of them for Gaëta ; but what for the moment appeared even preferable, was the issue of debased coin that was so composed as to give the Treasury a nominal gain of 60 per cent, and the framing of a 5 per cent forced loan, based on incomes, and graduated in scale. Neither of these desperate remedies gave the Roman Exchequer any appreciable relief, though they vastly increased the discontent and opposition to the Republic.

In the Provinces deep dissatisfaction prevailed. In the north Ferrara had been occupied by Marshal Haynau (February 18th), who had forced the inhabitants to replace the Papal arms, and threatened to continue his advance to Bologna. At Ancona, Rimini, Faëenza, and other towns, secret associations sought in assassination and plunder to assuage their political animosities and financial necessities. Here and there, by the exercise of dictatorial authority, order was restored by the Republican authorities, as at Ancona by Felice Orsini, and at Imola by Count Laderchi.¹

In the capital the police was entirely in the hands of Accursi and in the interests of the clubs, Ciceroacchio and Bezzi acting as practical heads of the detective department. Yet public order was fairly well maintained, and the Carnival was a success, though political rioting was not infrequent.²

But the centre of interest for those who watched the evolution of political affairs in the Peninsula, soon changed from the Pontifical States to the north of Italy, where by the action of Sardinia, a further

¹ The situation of Ancona in this respect was particularly bad. In Appendix G some extracts from Orsini's *Memoirs* and from British Consular Reports are given, that will afford a clearer idea of the conditions prevailing in the Roman provinces.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii., Freeborn to Lord Palmerston, March 23rd, 1849 ; Cooper Key, *op. cit.* 181 ; Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 278.

chapter in the history of the conflict between North and South was quickly added to those already accomplished.

The proclamation of the Republic at Rome,—the flight of the Grand Duke Leopold,—the continuous efforts of Mazzini and the Giovane Italia to unify Tuscany and the Roman State into the central nucleus of a pan-Italian democracy,—were driving Sardinia to a fatal pass. Gioberti had attempted to retain for his King the leadership of the Italian movement; but his negotiations for intervention in Tuscany, and his failure, had been followed by his defeat in the Chamber of Deputies at Turin and by his resignation. In desperation Charles Albert called General Chiodo to office, and determined to resolve an intolerable situation by attempting once more the fortune of war. On March 13th, Radetzky received notice denouncing the armistice of Salasco.¹

The step taken by the King of Sardinia had long been expected, yet its effect throughout Italy was very great. One of the strongest passions which animate Italians is that of hatred and revenge,—the *vendetta* is

¹ The reader will recall the stipulation that hostilities could be resumed by either party at eight days' notice. Nothing serves to show Charles Albert's position better than the following fact. When Rattazzi announced the denunciation of the armistice to the Sardinian Chamber, he asked for the immediate suspension, for such period as the war should last, of the rights of freedom of speech, of public associations and meetings, and of personal liberty. He asked in fact, for the suspension of constitutional liberty, and for the concentration of dictatorial power in the hands of the Government. It was this, as much as a victory over Austria, that the Sardinian Ministers most urgently required. A dispatch of Chiodo, Gioberti's successor, throws light on this aspect of Sardinian policy; writing to Valerio an agent at Rome, on March 2nd, he says: ". . . persuade that Government that the King's Government, in order to carry on the war vigorously, must be able to secure internal tranquillity in Piedmont, and the present unanimous loyalty of the people to the constitutional Sardinian monarchy, and that consequently any republican propaganda that might be attempted in Piedmont would be fatal to the success of the war."—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 122.

a national institution. At Rome, as in many other parts of the Peninsula, were many who had participated in the struggle against Austria in 1848. With them, as with the whole people, the announcement of the reopening of hostilities against the hereditary foe suddenly revived the fierce fire of national enmity and *vendetta*, that had been for the moment forgotten in the attempt of the democracy to establish the Republic. The Roman Government maintained a semblance of amicable relations with Sardinia, and made show of preparing to fight the common enemy. Volunteers came forward from all quarters, the Assembly delegated full powers to a Triumvirate,—Mazzini, Saffi, and Armellini,—warlike decrees rapidly followed one another, and numerous battalions were constituted on paper. But all this martial energy was fated to result in nothing, for the sands that marked the days of Charles Albert's reign were rapidly running out, and before March had come to an end, peace had been once more restored in Northern Italy,—peace that was to endure for ten years.

The armistice had been denounced on the 14th of March; on the 21st the armies were in motion, each of about 80,000 men; but the Austrian far more efficient in its composition, confidence, discipline, and leadership. Radetzky, although now in his eighty-third year, handled his columns with consummate ability and relentless activity. Issuing from Milan, and immediately assuming the offensive, he crossed the Ticino, completely outmanœuvred the badly-led Sardinians, forced them into a desperately bad strategical position at Novara, and there, on the 23rd of March, totally defeated them. Charles Albert, with calm, uninspiring intrepidity, exposed his life, and sought death on the

battlefield, but could not find the soldier's end he sought. On the night of the battle, he summoned his principal officers and announced his abdication in favour of his eldest son, the Duke of Savoy,—Victor Emmanuel II. The unfortunate Charles Albert immediately after left his kingdom, and made his way to Portugal, where, entering a monastery, he died broken-hearted four months later (July 28th, 1849).

CHAPTER XVII

THE EFFECTS OF NOVARA

Intrigues at the Papal Court—British policy—Antonelli's views—Sardinia's rebuff at Gaëta—Her success in Paris—Policy of France—Esterhazy's embassy—Antonelli's Note to the Powers—Schwarzenberg assents to a Conference—Its first meeting—Effect of Sardinia's defeat—Vote of the French Assembly—Government determines to intervene—French expedition to Rome—Explanations of Drouin de Lhuys.

THE defeat of the Sardinian army at Novara, followed by the signing of peace preliminaries that had left Austria completely victorious in Northern Italy, had effected a fundamental change in international relations that few had clearly foreseen. Nowhere were the effects of that change more felt than at Gaëta.

Hardly had the Papal Court settled down at that picturesque little Neapolitan seaport, once the favoured haunt of the Romans of the Augustan age,¹ ere it had been enveloped in an atmosphere of Catholic devotion. King Ferdinand of Naples had offered the assistance of his arms to chastise the rebellious Romans and to restore the temporal power. Count Spaur, working in close conjunction with Antonelli and the Neapolitan Ambassador Count Ludolf, had assured Pius of the

¹ Among the Italian bays that of Gaëta is second in beauty to that of Naples only. On its shores Cicero erected a villa, and Plancus a tomb; while Virgil and Horace celebrated it in memorable verse.

early arrival of an Austrian Envoy, and of the certain and effective support of his rights by the Court of Vienna. Martinez de la Rosa, on behalf of the Spanish Government, promised the early dispatch of naval and military succour,¹ and put forward a proposal for a Conference of the Catholic Powers at Gaëta. The time-honoured manner of dealing with the question suggested by the Spanish Ambassador, though not immediately acted on, met with general approval from the interested Powers. Of the others, Russia and Prussia appeared content to hold aloof, while England had already made too many miscalculations and met with too many rebuffs in her Italian policy, to venture on any decided line of action. From a neutral and disinterested position, Lord Palmerston continued to privately sympathize with the Italian liberals, but gave his steady support to whatever course appeared most likely to result in a general re-establishment of order. In a guarded way the British Foreign Secretary was in favour of the restoration of the temporal power: "It is obviously desirable that (the Pope) . . . should be Sovereign of a territory of his own," he wrote to Lord Normanby on January 5th,² and Lord Lansdowne, who led the Government in the House of Lords, made the somewhat complicated and puzzling declaration that: "there is no country with Catholic subjects and Catholic possessions which has not a deep interest in the Pope being so placed as to be able to exercise his authority unfettered and unshackled by any temporal influence which might affect his spiritual authority."

To Antonelli there was no possible compromise

¹ A few Spanish vessels, with a small detachment of troops, arrived at Gaëta about the end of January.

² *British Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 3.

with the Romans that offered a satisfactory solution ; in Austrian armed intervention appeared the surest hope of the complete and final extinction of the work initiated by the liberal movement. For Austria alone of the Great Powers could be relied on to re-establish the Pope in all his rights untempered by inconvenient restrictions, and Austria alone had a large and victorious army on the borders of the Papal States, for which a march to Rome would apparently prove nothing more serious than a tactical manœuvre. To the necessity for a complete accord with Vienna, Antonelli from the first directed his master's mind, and on the accession of the young Archduke Franz Josef to the Imperial throne (December 2nd, 1848), Pius wrote to him in terms of great affection, soliciting his assistance.

Such being the situation and tendency of the Papal Court, it was evident that the position of none of the Powers at Gaëta could be worse than that of Sardinia. It was rendered no better by the fact that the direction of Charles Albert's foreign affairs had fallen into the hands of a diplomatic novice, in whom theological and philosophical studies had apparently not developed the qualities of practical statecraft.

We have seen in a previous chapter something of Gioberti's secret negotiations with the Roman Giunta, and his instructions to Count Martini to proceed to Gaëta and to assure the Pope of the support of the Sardinian Government.

Martini on his arrival, had made a formal demand for an audience of the Pope, but was met with a direct refusal. On January 11th Antonelli wrote to the Sardinian envoy, and after making a technical excuse for declining the interview, went on to say : " . . . the Piedmontese Government is in relations with the

Roman rebels ; to desire to mediate between the Holy Father and the rebels, is an act unworthy of the Royal Government. It is intolerable that Spini and Pinto should be received in Turin as Roman envoys, nor can any good come of the idea the Piedmontese Government appears to entertain, of arranging for an Italian Constituent Assembly.”¹

The reception accorded to the Sardinian envoy had not been flattering, and Gioberti had in great measure his blundering diplomacy to thank for it. When, after some days of persistent efforts, that were greatly assisted by Monsignor Rosmini, Martini finally succeeded in obtaining an informal audience of Pius, he derived but little more satisfaction from it. For the Pope declared to him, in the most unambiguous terms, that he no longer had confidence in any of the Italian Governments, that the Church was not a national but a universal institution, that he looked abroad for effective assistance, and that Austrian intervention was quite possible.

Gioberti had shown more skill in his negotiations with France than he had in those with Gaëta. He had sent there, on a special mission, Count Arese, an attached friend of the new President of the French Republic, Prince Louis Bonaparte.² Although Gioberti had succeeded no better than previous Sardinian Ministers, in obtaining from France a military assistance for which neither he nor they would pay the necessary price, yet as regards the Roman question, he had fairly succeeded in getting French and Sardinian diplomacy into line. Arese and the Ambassador Rufini

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 200.—Spini and Pinto had been sent from Rome to Turin, but were never officially recognised. For Martini's mission, see generally Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi.

² E. Ollivier, *op. cit.* ii. 202.

were soon able to satisfy themselves that the new French Government, though unwilling to act in Lombardy, was determined at all costs to oppose the occupation of Rome by Austria. Notwithstanding the opposition of perhaps the cleverest of his Ministers, De Falloux,¹ the Prince President and his advisers were equally determined to follow an assertive and unequivocally anti-Austrian policy at Gaëta. Rayneval,² French Minister at Naples, and D'Harcourt, received instructions to make strong representations to Pius against Austrian intervention. They accordingly declared, that any movement of troops on the part of Austria would be at once followed by a similar movement on the part of France. In addition to thus opposing the idea of a foreign intervention in Italy, the French diplomats counselled the Pope to look to the Italian States for the restoration of his temporal power, suggesting the possibility of a joint Neapolitan and Sardinian armed mediation at Rome.

This proposal was quite unfeasible, and could hardly have been seriously intended, for Naples was now in full reaction and under the influence of the clerical and Austrian party, while the central and northern Italian States had broken off relations with the Bourbon kingdom about the end of January. Not only this, but Gioberti, in view of the failure of Martini's mission, had on January 16th withdrawn his proposal for a Sardinian mediation between the Pope and his subjects.³

¹ De Falloux, whose brother Monsignor de Falloux has already been alluded to, may be considered to have been the most important centre of Catholic and Jesuit action among the Ministers of Prince Louis Bonaparte.

² Rayneval was one of the oldest and most experienced diplomats in the French service.

³ Gioberti's policy is difficult to follow, especially through the medium of the often prejudiced and imaginative contemporary accounts. It is not at all improb-

On February 4th Count Esterhazy, Austrian Ambassador to the Holy See, arrived at Gaëta; he immediately held several long conferences with Cardinal Antonelli and the Pope, as a result of which a Consistory of the Sacred College of Cardinals was called together on February 7th, at which it was decided to forward to Austria, France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, a demand for armed assistance. This appeal was drawn up by Antonelli, in the form of a Note which he handed to the Ambassadors of the interested Powers on February 18th. But one paragraph of this document need be quoted; it runs as follows:

“As Austria, France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, are so placed geographically as to be in a position to restore by their arms public order, now overturned by a band of sectarians in the dominions of the Holy See; the Holy Father, trusting to the devout feeling of these Powers, daughters of the Church, confidently requests their armed intervention to free the States of the Church from the faction of rogues (*tristi*) that now exercises over them an outrageous and atrocious despotism.”¹

From the terms of this appeal and from the declarations of Austria's statesmen, it was evident that Prince Schwarzenberg, chief of the Cabinet of Vienna, had no intention of hastily embarking on the line of policy that Antonelli anxiously hoped to see adopted. The new director of Austrian policy evidently considered it a hazardous and insufficiently attractive enterprise to risk an army at Rome, while Austria was still threatened in Northern Italy by the Piedmontese troops in their

able that this withdrawal of the offer of mediation was in reality intended to clear the way for the dispatch of Sardinian troops to Rome. Whatever the intention, the total impression is far from favourable for Gioberti's diplomatic methods.

¹ *British Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 11.

cantonments beyond the Ticino, and by the possibility of a French descent from the Alps into the plains of Lombardy.

Schwarzenberg, in order to pierce the designs of the Paris Government, had skilfully put forward a proposal for a joint French and Austrian intervention in the Papal States. Drouin de Lhuys adroitly parried this insidious suggestion, and to Antonelli's note had replied by generalities, and the persistently reiterated advice that nothing should be attempted on the part of the Pope without Sardinian approbation. The French Foreign Minister at the same time took up and warmly supported the proposal made by Spain in December for a Conference at Gaëta, and urged the Pope to call together the representatives of the four Powers, so that no step should be taken save by mutual consent.

The prospect of delay and long-drawn-out negotiations offered by the proposed Conference, and by the negative attitude and opposition of France, accorded perfectly with the aims of Austrian diplomacy;¹ for events in northern Italy were then fast drawing to the final settlement of the Austro-Sardinian quarrel on the battlefield, and required the immediate concentration of all disposable means of action.

Austria accordingly assented to the proposed Conference, and as the other Powers also concurred, a first session took place on March 30th. This was presided over by Cardinal Antonelli, and was attended by Count Esterhazy for Austria, Martinez de la Rosa for Spain, Count Ludolf for Naples, the Duke d'Harcourt and Count de Rayneval for France. Nothing much beyond formal business was transacted at this meeting, but Antonelli

¹ Schwarzenberg to General Martini, March 22nd, 1849.—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 493.

made an explanation that may be noted on the subject of the non-representation of Sardinia, which he ascribed to the fact that the Government of Turin had deprecated armed intervention.¹

The Conference was thus opened under circumstances that rendered slow and protracted negotiations nearly certain ; but the decision of the Sardinian Government to resume hostilities, together with what came of it, suddenly gave an entirely new complexion to the intrigues and discussions at Gaëta. The last and most decisive of Radetzky's victories had produced a deep but totally different effect in Vienna and in Paris.

Austria's domination over northern Italy was now completely assured, and her veteran army was free to act south of the Po, in the Duchies, or even in the Papal States. The warlike jealousy of France, so repeatedly stirred during the previous year, rose to fever-heat. When the news of Charles Albert's defeat at Novara reached Paris, the Assembly, by 444 votes to 320, passed the following resolution (March 31st) :—

The National Assembly declares that, should the Executive, for the purpose of protecting Piedmontese territory and of defending the interests and honour of France, decide to back pending negotiations by a partial and temporary occupation of Italian territory, it will support the Government in every way.

There was in reality nothing to necessitate a threatening attitude on the part of France. The experience of the past twelve months, and the storms that the House of Hapsburg had with such difficulty weathered, had chastened the ambitions of the Austrian Cabinet. Radetzky had refrained from marching on Turin, and had already concluded preliminaries of peace that recognised the Ticino as the frontier of Sardinia. Austria, though

¹ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 222.

freed from the tyranny of Metternich, still based her policy on the immutability of the treaties of 1815 : to maintain them she now prepared to intervene in central Italy. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, since his arrival at Gaëta on the 22nd of February, had completely placed himself in the hands of the head of his House, the Emperor Franz Josef ; and General d'Aspre was on the point of marching on Florence and Leghorn to re-establish the Grand Ducal authority. Further east, strong columns detached by Radetzky were threatening Bologna and Ancona ; it could hardly be credited that the Austrian intervention would extend no further, and leave Rome unmolested under the red flag of the Giovane Italia. The time had therefore come when France must once and for all decide whether she was prepared to arrest the march of her great rival, or whether she would merely continue an irresolute and unprofitable policy.

There was much to recommend a bold course to the French Government. A military occupation of Rome was an internationally defensible step ; for the Pope had formally requested the armed assistance of France, as well as of three other Powers, to restore his temporal authority.

Through obscure French Catholic channels, of which the two De Falloux, Mercier, and Forbin de Janson could probably reveal the secrets, an impression had been created in Paris, that such was the strength and frame of mind of the Roman constitutionalists and reactionaries, that the presence of French troops would immediately evoke a popular movement in their favour and for the restoration of Papal authority.

A restoration of the Pope to his capital by means of French arms signified more than a successful move

against Austria, gratifying to Sardinia and helpful to French prestige; for it also amounted to a strong bid for the support of the Catholic voters of France for the new Government.¹ Prince Louis Bonaparte was strongly in favour of energetic action: it appeared to him that the future control of the executive power of France by a Bonaparte necessarily implied a foreign policy based on the revision of the treaties of 1815, and that the position of Italian affairs and the evident military insufficiency of Sardinia all pointed to a possible future rearrangement of the map.² For many reasons then, the Prince President and his Ministers perceived few dangers, and many advantages, in a military intervention at Rome; but it was quite evident that the only chance of carrying out such an operation before the Austrians, was to act with the utmost rapidity, and without incurring the risk of diplomatic delay.³

The necessary steps for embarking 8000 men at Marseilles were immediately taken. General Oudinot,

¹ In Appendix H may be found extracts from a speech of Lamartine, that place many aspects of French policy in Italy in the most advantageous light. See also Debidour, *L'Eglise et l'Etat*, 481.

² Even after Novara, Gioberti, who was acting as Sardinian envoy in Paris, still clung to his hopes and attempted to secure French intervention. He might have succeeded in obtaining it, but for the fact that it was quite realized in Paris that the French army was not in condition to face the Austrians in Lombardy, and also that its services might be urgently required in order to repress internal disorder. Gioberti had even reached the position, now that it was too late, of discussing as possible the cession of Nice, Savoy, and even Genoa, in return for French services. See particularly his dispatch of April 19th, 1849, reporting a conversation with Drouin de Lhuys (Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 146); and generally his dispatches during April and May, given by the same authority.

³ Were this a history of France, and not of the Roman State, greater prominence would be given to the views and declarations of various French statesmen,—Drouin de Lhuys, Odillon Barrot, Lamartine, Thiers, and others. As it is, this course would entirely distort the proportions it is proposed to adhere to. The initiative here ascribed to Prince Louis Bonaparte is perhaps somewhat exaggerated, for in his early days as President he possessed little power in official circles; what influence he had was used in favour of the expedition to Rome; see the *Memoirs* of Odillon Barrot and De Falloux.

son of the first Napoleon's Marshal, was placed in command, and on the 21st of April the expedition started. On the 16th Odillon Barrot asked the Assembly to vote the necessary credit, which, notwithstanding the opposition of the republican extremists, was carried by a good majority. Not until these irrevocable steps had been taken did the French Government proceed to issue, through the usual diplomatic channels, its reasons and explanations for the expedition to Rome. The substantial points of the position assumed by Prince Louis Bonaparte's Ministry will appear from the following extracts from dispatches sent from Paris to Vienna, London, and Gaëta.

On the 17th of April, Drouin de Lhuys wrote a long dispatch to De la Cour, in charge of the French Embassy at Vienna, to be communicated to Prince Schwarzenberg. After adverting to the dissatisfaction of the French Government at the threatened developments of Austrian policy in central Italy, and to the inconclusive results of the negotiations at Gaëta, he said :

“The Government of the Republic has resolved to send to Civita Vecchia a body of troops commanded by General Oudinot. In deciding on this measure, we have not been actuated by the desire of imposing on the people of Rome a political system repugnant to their wishes, nor yet by that of constraining the Pope to adopt any preconceived method of government, when he shall be reinstated in the exercise of his power. . . . Prince Schwarzenberg will readily understand that, having come to the important decision I have the honour to announce, we have not thought it possible to compromise the probability of our success by the delay that would have been necessitated by preliminary explanations at Gaëta.”¹

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 21.

In his dispatch to the Duke d'Harcourt of the same date, for communication to Cardinal Antonelli, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs said :

“The Cardinal will understand that to profit (by our efforts), the Pope should publish a manifesto guaranteeing to his people liberal institutions such as they desire and the spirit of the time calls for, and whereby resistance will be rendered impossible.”¹

To the English Ministry, Drouin de Lhuys explained his views in the following terms :—

“Our object is to maintain, so far as in us lies, the balance of power ; to protect the independence of the States of Italy ; to secure a liberal and regular administration for the inhabitants of the Roman States, and to save them from the dangers of a blind reaction, as well as from the excesses of anarchy.”²

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 412.

² Drouin de Lhuys to Cécile, April 19th, 1849, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1849, lvii. 163.

CHAPTER XVIII

LOUDINOT'S DEFEAT

The Triumvirate—Revolt of Genoa—Reaction—Prisons of the Inquisition—Anti-clerical legislation—The Roman army—French agents at Rome—The French at Civita Vecchia—Negotiations—Proclamations—Advance of Loudinot—He attacks the city—Outflanked by Garibaldi—Defeat of the French.

THE news of the defeat of Charles Albert at Novara reached Rome on the 29th of March; the momentary consternation that resulted caused the Assembly to decree the levy in mass of all able-bodied citizens, and also to elevate the King of Sardinia's most inveterate and dangerous enemy to the virtual dictatorship of Rome: a Triumvirate with unlimited powers was decreed, and conferred on Mazzini, Armellini, and Saffi.

The first day of the Triumvirs' tenure of office was marked by the arrival of the news of a second Sardinian disaster; it was received with great demonstrations of satisfaction by the Mazzinians. Novara had been immediately followed by a rising at Genoa, and that city was now in the possession of republican insurgents. Mazzini could not restrain his expressions of gratification; the dream of his life suddenly appeared to be crystallizing into reality,—Italy, republican Italy, was answering her leader's call from Rome; and soon from



the Alps to Sicily the people's tricolor would float supreme, while from the ancient capital of the world the fulminating decrees of the chief of the Giovane Italia would call national armies into being and hurl the foreigner from Lombardy. It was but a dream, rapidly dispelled by inexorable facts. The Italian army evoked by the Triumvir's ardent imagination was only a vision; his statesmanship, theoretical and superficial; his influence in the Councils of Europe, nothing; the mass of the Italian people, disheartened and longing for repose. The revolutionary wave in which Mazzini put his trust had not even enough strength to overthrow the doubly humiliated and defeated House of Savoy. The Sardinian army remained faithful, and General La Marmora, after bombarding Genoa, reoccupied the city and re-established order. The reaction soon spread south, preceding the advancing Austrians. In Tuscany the fear of invasion from the north led to a mild counter-revolution in favour of the Grand Duke, who was invited to re-enter his dominions. Before many days had passed, Rome and Mazzini were left isolated, face to face with the indignant and insulted Catholic Theocracy and the diplomatic ambitions and jealousies of half the Powers of Europe.¹

One of the first acts of the Triumvirate, was to violate the financial principle announced in the remarkable decree that was noticed in the last chapter. An issue of 250,000 scudi in Treasury bonds was created, and at the same time the interest payment on those previously issued by the Papal Government was repudiated.

¹ Strictly speaking, not quite alone: at Venice, and at one or two other isolated points, popular governments were still maintaining the struggle.

On April 4th a decree appeared, whereby it was provided as follows :—

“Whereas it is the office and duty of a well-organized Republic to provide for the gradual amelioration of the condition of the most necessitous classes. . . .

“Whereas . . . it is a work of republican morality to cancel even the vestiges of past iniquity, by consecrating to benevolence that which past tyranny employed for torture; the Constituent Assembly, at the suggestion of the Triumvirs, decrees :

“The edifice hitherto employed as the Holy Office (the Inquisition) is henceforth dedicated to the use of necessitous families or individuals, who shall be permitted to have lodging therein on payment of a small monthly rent.”¹

Whatever may be thought of Mazzini's grasp of economical principles, or of his large and elastic ideas on the subject of confiscation, this measure must be considered as less open to criticism than most, and even as being to a certain extent defensible. For it was urgently necessary that something should be done for the poor of Rome, whose condition was lamentable owing to the cessation of employment, the stoppage of trade, the dearness of bread, and the scarcity of money.² Three days before the decree was issued, that is to say on the 1st of April, an excited mob had burst into the Palace of the Inquisition and ransacked it. From this incident a much exaggerated tale has arisen, whereby it would appear that human remains and instruments of torture were discovered in the vaults of the building. All that can be said for certain is that a few prisoners were found incarcerated, including several nuns. Among them was a well-known impostor named Ceshiur, or

¹ Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, v. 371.

² In May wheat was at a premium of 35 per cent.

Chiascour, who had some twenty years before got himself enthroned under false pretences as Archbishop of Memphis, or some such Egyptian locality. There is nothing to show that the other prisoners had not been placed under restraint for just and due cause.¹

The accusations against the Church that the opening of the prisons of the Inquisition gave rise to, cannot be thought extraordinary, when the state of public opinion, and the record of the Roman Theocracy are considered. What is perhaps more remarkable is that a great part of the Roman clergy remained unmolested in the full tide of the reaction against the system they represented. How far that tide had run may be judged by the fact, that in the remarkable list of the Mazzinian decrees may be included laws for the expropriation of a portion of the ecclesiastical lands,—for the purpose of supplying agricultural allotments to the peasantry,—forbidding the demand of fees for the performance of religious offices, and declaring the vows of those entering monastic orders revocable.²

Whether these rapid steps towards secularization were likely to promote the internal tranquillity of a community such as that which was now docilely following the leadership of Giuseppe Mazzini, may be a matter for argument; but from the point of view of the external relations of the Roman Republic, it was self-evident that they were likely to diminish any sympathy or likelihood of assistance that might yet be within reach; and the time was now fast approaching

¹ L. Bianchi, *op. cit.* 147. Petre to Palmerston, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 247. For the popular tale, the only relation that possesses any weight is that of Spada, a clerical. La Farina's catalogue of horrors may be dismissed as fantastic. The matter is discussed at some length by King, *History of Italian Unity*, Appendix.

² *Actes Officiels*; Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, v. Appendix. The last-quoted decree was probably suggested by the well-known law on the same subject passed by the French *Constituante* in February 1790.

when in arms alone the supporters of the Republic would have to repose their trust.

The capture of Genoa by La Marmora, and the counter-revolution in Tuscany, had been bitter blows for the republicans ; and although Mazzini had as yet no apprehension of French intervention, the necessity for arming at once was felt.¹

Starting with the nucleus furnished by such part of the regular Papal army as was still existent, the effective Roman forces, for the period comprised between the months of April and July 1849, may be roughly put at not more than 20,000 men, including regulars, volunteers, civic guards, Garibaldi's legion, and the Lombard corps.² This little army was, from a professional

¹ Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, v. 197. If Clough's report of a conversation he had with the Triumvir may be relied on, Mazzini even then viewed the future as hopeless (Arthur Clough, *Prose Remains*).

² Consul Freeborn gives the following curious statement on the composition and total of the Roman army, evidently derived from a republican source and representing the maximum possible :—

1st Division, Garibaldi, well armed	3,400
2nd Division, Galletti, well armed	4,600
3rd Division, Roselli, well armed	5,500
4th Division, Mezzacapa, well armed	3,600
Reserve	6,000
	<hr/>
	23,100
Populace with guns	4,000
Populace with guns and knives	40,000
National Guards, well armed	10,000
	<hr/>
	<u>77,100</u>

40 field-pieces.

British State Papers, 1851, lvii. 188.

De Lesseps (*Ma Mission à Rome*) gives 25,000 men as the total. Carletti (*op. cit.* Appendix) has a very detailed and perhaps accurate statement, and fixes the total at 17,580 ; Mazzini says 14,000 ; Garibaldi, 16,000 ; Farini, 19,000 (on the 29th of April) ; Vanucci (quoted by Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*), 23,000 on April 12th ; Ulloa (*Guerre de l'Indépendance Italienne*), 16,200. Freeborn's table has been taken as a basis for arriving at the figure given in the text : the populace with knives and

soldier's point of view, of uneven quality. The artillery officers were well trained and highly efficient, the civic guards all but totally untrained and inefficient. Between these two extremes various gradations might be traced, through the once well-disciplined Carabinieri, now under Galletti's command, and the irregular non-Roman corps who took such a brilliant part in the operations against the French. But to draw fine distinctions, and to judge the Roman army by a technical standard, would be doing injustice to the military valour and pertinacity displayed by a considerable part of it during the ten weeks of its active service.

It has already been seen that in the early part of April Mazzini did not believe in French intervention : it was against Austria that he still expected to send forth the army of the Republic. Yet he might well have suspected from the activity of French and clerical agents, among whom Forbin de Janson may be specially mentioned, that some development of policy might not unreasonably be expected to take place before long.¹

Rome was not, however, to be left in suspense long. Another agent of the Paris Government, Mercier by name, soon arrived, and taking up the thread of Forbin de Janson's intrigues with the moderates, clericals, and constitutionalists, soon allowed it to be known that it was intended to land French troops at Civita Vecchia.

other weapons has been omitted from the calculation, as it never came into action ; the reserve of 6000 men has been treated as existing on paper only ; the national guard has been taken at one-half the estimate, and the first four divisions at three-quarters. This process gives a total of 17,500. Of these, a certain proportion were not within the city when hostilities first broke out, leaving a force of probably not more than about 12,000 actual combatants to face the first French attack.

¹ Forbin de Janson may be identified with the French Catholic or Jesuit party ; he was in close relations with Monsignor de Falloux and his brother, then Minister of Public Instruction. It may also be noted that at this time a considerable distinction may be drawn between the aims of the French and Austrian Jesuit parties.

He appealed for the support of all those who were disaffected to the republican regime, and attempted to secure the goodwill even of the democrats, by declaring that the sole object of the French expedition was to protect Rome from an Austrian occupation. The French intentions had scarcely been generally realized before the startling intelligence spread through the city that General Oudinot was at Civita Vecchia with a fleet of transports (April 24th).

The French move had been so rapid and so unforeseen, it was announced so plausibly as a help, and not as a menace to Rome, it was felt to be so gratifying to a considerable section of the population, that the Government was for a moment at a loss how to proceed.¹ Avezzana, who had just been appointed Minister of War, apparently for no better reason than that he was an honest man and a republican refugee from Genoa, had made no provision for the defence of Civita Vecchia; and after some negotiations with the helpless Governor, Oudinot had been able to disembark his troops unopposed, and to occupy the port. The French soldiers observed perfect discipline, and the inhabitants perfect indifference.²

In his manner of landing, General Oudinot had faithfully carried out the instructions of his Government; for it had been strictly enjoined on him to observe a friendly attitude to the Roman Government but under no circumstances to recognise it officially: his orders were to occupy Rome, and if possible, as a friend.

¹ Mazzini was apparently uncertain as to his course at first.—*London Times*, May 7th, 1849.

² Lieutenant Wiles to the Lords of the Admiralty, *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 181. Farini, in this case not so good an authority, states that on landing the troops shouted "Vive la République! Vive l'Italie!" to which the inhabitants replied, "Viva la Repubblica Romana! Viva la Repubblica Francese!" The account of the *Paris Moniteur* may be dismissed as purely official and fanciful.

Once in possession of Civita Vecchia, Oudinot issued a proclamation, which had been drafted for him by Drouin de Lhuys, and of which the terms were as follows :—

“Inhabitants of the Roman States,—In view of the agitation now reigning in Italy, the French Republic has determined to send a body of troops within your territory, not to defend the existing Government, which it has never recognised, but to preserve your country from great perils. France will not take it on herself to decide questions that primarily concern the Roman people, and also the whole of Europe and of the Catholic world.

“France has believed that she was specially called on to intervene, merely to facilitate the establishment of a system of government equally far removed from the abuses for ever destroyed by the generosity of Pius IX, and from the anarchy of a more recent period.

“The flag I have displayed on your shores is that of peace, of conciliation, of true liberty : those will rally to it who wish to take part in the accomplishment of their patriotic and sacred duty.”

On their side the Triumvirs, after attending a hastily summoned session of the Constituent Assembly (24th-25th April), published the following protest :—

“The Roman Assembly, moved by the threatened invasion of the territory of the Republic, and considering that it is unprovoked by any external action of theirs, that it has not been preceded by any communication from the French Government, that it is provocative of anarchy in a country enjoying peace and quiet, that it violates public rights, the constitutional obligations assumed by the French nation,¹ and the fraternal bonds that should unite the two Republics in a natural alliance, protests in the name of God and the People against this

¹ An allusion to Article 5 of the French Constitution of 1848 that an incident related at the end of this chapter will make clear.

unexpected invasion, declares its firm intention to resist, and throws on France all responsibility for the consequences.”¹

While placing on record this protest, and solemnly warning the world of their resolve to fight, the Triumvirs had also sent envoys to Civita Vecchia to explore the sentiments and intentions of the French Commander. The emissaries chosen were the Minister for Foreign Affairs Rusconi and Pescantini. They left Rome immediately, and reached the camp late on the afternoon of the 25th. An audience was at once granted to the Roman envoys by General Oudinot, who received them with every attention and mark of courtesy. Rusconi presented the protest which the Constituent Assembly had voted the night before ; the French Commander, after having perused the document, expressed astonishment at the use of the term *invasion*. This expression, he declared, implied the idea of conquest, and that was decidedly not the intention of his Government. On being pressed to explain what that intention was, he referred vaguely to the necessity of maintaining French prestige in Italy, and of protecting Rome from Neapolitan and Austrian invasion ; he then expressed his surprise at the lack of cordiality that had marked the reception of the French troops. Rusconi and his colleague explained that this was owing to the belief of the people that they had landed to support a Papal restoration. Oudinot emphatically asserted that nothing of the sort was to be found in his instructions, and protested that the presence of the French expedition could only be rightly viewed in the light of a guarantee for the Romans against hostile intervention.²

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 424.

² Report of Rusconi to Roman Constituent Assembly, April 26th, 1849.

This sort of conversation could not, and did not, lead to any great result; but on a smaller question Rusconi had the satisfaction, on the following day, of extorting a small concession from the French Commander. Just as the French vessels were arriving at Civita Vecchia a Sardinian ship had brought there a body of 500 Lombard riflemen: they were under the command of Count Manara, who had stormed the Porta Tosa at Milan during the Five Days. This volunteer corps had fought with the Sardinians in the campaigns of 1848-49, and was in large part composed of young Milanese holding republican opinions. After Novara,—their cities and homes once more brought under the rule of Austria, and the Government of Turin perhaps rightly suspicious of their political sentiments,—they had turned their thoughts to participation in the last scene of the Italian struggle, and were now on their way to Rome. They had nearly reached their goal, when the arrival of Oudinot had prevented their disembarkation. Rusconi now pressed the French General closely on behalf of Manara and his companions, and finally it was agreed between them that the Lombards should be allowed to land at Porto d'Anzio, lower down the coast, on entering into an undertaking to maintain neutrality until May 4th.

While Rusconi was negotiating at Civita Vecchia, Oudinot had dispatched one of his staff officers, Colonel Leblanc, to Rome. From the declarations of this officer and of Forbin de Janson, the Triumvirs could not fail to perceive, what they probably already suspected, that the friendliness of France, even if partly unfeigned, was little more than a cloak for getting possession of the city. A secret session of the

Assembly was immediately convened, and it was decided to forcibly oppose the entry of the French into Rome.

The French artillery, matériel, and stores were soon landed; D'Harcourt from Gaëta urged Oudinot to strike rapidly, and before advancing on the city the French General attempted to obviate the possibility of a resistance he did not seriously anticipate by a new proclamation, in which he protested his friendly zeal for the interests of the Roman people. At the same time he sent one of his officers to Rome to convey to the Triumvirs the certain intelligence that the Neapolitan and Austrian troops were on the point of marching against the city.

On April 27th, Oudinot had pushed his advanced posts as far as Palo; on the 28th he proclaimed a state of siege at Civita Vecchia, and set in motion his main column consisting of about 9000 men with 12 guns; on the 29th he bivouacked at Castel di Guido, rather more than twelve miles from the western rampart of the capital.

Within Rome all was warlike excitement. The civic guards were reviewed in the Piazza del Popolo, where they were harangued by Sterbini and Galletti, a barricade commission was appointed, parapets and glacis were improvised in all directions, deputies were delegated to refresh those who laboured with patriotic eloquence, horses and arms were freely requisitioned.

The defensive efforts of the Romans were nearly entirely centred on that small portion of the city which lies beyond, or to the west, of the Tiber. This quarter is about two miles long from north to south, with but very little breadth except at the northernmost end,

where it projects out right and left, making space for the castle of St. Angelo on the one hand, and for St. Peter's and the Vatican on the other. This further bank of the Tiber rises very rapidly from the stream, and the elevation on which the churches of San Pietro Montorio and Sant' Onofrio appear, forms the highest summit within the boundaries of Rome. Just beyond these churches, a bastioned wall made a complete circuit from the Castle of St. Angelo in the north, to the Porta Portese at the south.

It was at some point of this fortified line that the French were nearly certain to strike, for they could only select some other point for their attack by first crossing the Tiber either north or south of the city,—an operation which, with their small force and extended line of communications, was evidently very hazardous.

On the night of April 29th the Roman army took up positions protecting the whole length of the walls of the Trastevere, from the Porta Angelica to the Porta Portese; the main force was stationed about the Porta Cavallegieri and the Porta San Pancrazio. Garibaldi, who was in command of the left wing, threw out a considerable number of riflemen between the Villa Pamfili Doria, half a mile outside of the Porta San Pancrazio, and the Tiber. At five o'clock on the morning of the 30th, Oudinot broke up his bivouac at Castel di Guido, and marching through Maglianella was close to the walls by a little after ten. A singular detail of this march has been reported, illustrating the curious manner in which the Romans attempted to reproach the French republicans for their attack on the city. Along the highway, the ancient Via Aureliana, inscriptions had been placed in conspicuous

positions to attract the attention of Oudinot's soldiers ; they reproduced textually the words of the 5th Article of the French Constitution of 1848 :

“France respects foreign nationalities ; her might shall never be employed against the liberty of any people !”

Oudinot did not know the ground, nor had any reconnaissances been made ; he advanced with a boldness and lack of precaution that proceeded either from inexperience, or from confidence that his march would not be opposed. He appeared to have persuaded himself, at the inspiration of his clerical friends and of the French agents within the walls, that his somewhat deceptive discourses and proclamations would open the gates of the city for his troops.¹

Proceeding on this fatally mistaken basis, Oudinot probably thought that he might be met with a faint show of resistance at some points, but probably not at all, and that therefore the more gates he attacked simultaneously, the more likely would he be to secure at least one easy opening to the city. Having arrived within two and a half miles of the walls,—at the spot where the Via Aureliana divides in two, one branch going to the Porta Cavallegieri, the other to the Porta San Pancrazio,—Oudinot broke up his column and divided his small force into several detachments. So badly planned were the French operations, that one of these was very unprofitably sent to operate against the Porta Pertusa, a gate shown on old maps but that had for some years been walled up. The bells of Rome were now loudly calling her citizens to arms, and it was to their clangour of alarm that the French soldiers marched steadily up in regular alignment ; at one point

¹ Reuchlin, *Geschichte Italiens*, iii. 28.

they advanced to within less than 200 yards from the walls before a shot was fired.¹

The extreme right of the French did not extend further south than the Via Aureliana, along which a large division of their force marched to attack the Porta San Pancrazio. The officers were wearing white gloves, the troops defiled in marching column along the dusty roadway, neither skirmishers nor flankers were thrown out. Garibaldi, finding that the southern section of the fortifications was not to be attacked, hastily concentrated his riflemen, and extending them from behind the Villa Pamfili Doria, suddenly fell with much skill and determination on the flank of the advancing French.² Oudinot's men, at first shaken, stood their ground, and then drove Garibaldi back to the Villa Pamfili Doria. Here he was reinforced by Bartolomeo Galletti, with the 1st legion of volunteers and a few companies of regular infantry; after several hours of fighting, which gradually turned to the advantage of the Romans, a number of French Voltigeurs, and a company of the 20th regiment of the line, were surrounded in some houses along the Via Aureliana and compelled to surrender. At the Porta Cavallegieri the French troops had for a moment penetrated the defence, only to lose more prisoners, and there, as well as along the walls at the back of the Vatican gardens, the diffused attack had made no impression. The defeat of his right wing by Garibaldi made retreat necessary for Oudinot;³ he had lost about 400 or 500 killed and wounded, and about 350 prisoners.⁴ The casualties of the Romans, who mostly

¹ Garibaldi, *Autobiografia*. ² Carletti, *op. cit.* 269. ³ Farini, *op. cit.* iv. 20.

⁴ Vaillant places the casualties, officially, somewhat lower,—at 580 in all out of a total of 5800 engaged.

fought under cover, amounted to about 200 killed and wounded,¹ and these were for the moment forgotten in the intoxication of victory.²

¹ Freeborn to Palmerston.—*Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 170. Garibaldi and Galletti were both slightly wounded.

² While the fight proceeded bulletins were posted in various parts of Rome reporting progress. Some of these were so curious and typical as to deserve reproduction :—

“ War is holy when it defends our soil from the attacks of the stranger.

“ God and the People are the foundations of all Justice.

“ The pure religion of Christ gives courage and constancy.

“ He who dies for the country fulfils the duty of a man and a Christian.

“ The Republic and its Government are just. All will defend them at the hazard of their lives.

“ Citizens, the hour of peril has arrived. . . .

“ When the enemy appears, the people must retire and concentrate themselves in places that can be defended. If these are compelled to give way, let all fall back on the Capitol. Let none fall into the hands of the enemy. Announce by couriers the coming of the troops. Energy, courage, loyalty, brotherhood ! . . .’—*London Times*, May 12th, 1849.

CHAPTER XIX

THE MISSION OF DE LESSEPS

Clerical activity—Allocution of April 20th—Position of French Government—Its theoretical basis—Steps at Gaëta—Their ill success—Debate in the French Assembly—Mission of De Lesseps—Illusory instructions—Arrival at Rome—The French prisoners—Their treatment—Armistice agreed—Unsuccessful negotiations—De Lesseps recalled—Invasion of Roman territory by Neapolitans—Fight at Velletri—Garibaldi and Roselli—Disorder in Rome—Steps of the Government—Order restored.

THEIR victory over the French served to elate the Romans, but not to appreciably abate the sum of the dangers that threatened the existence of the Republic. From Gaëta an irreconcilable and powerful enemy was relentlessly bending the whole force of the Catholic arms, and of Catholic opinion, to the destruction of the presumptuous enthusiasts of Rome. The Papal Court displayed none of that humility, charity, and resignation in adversity, that its claim to inspiration from the divine founder of the Christian religion might have led sincere but inexperienced devotees to anticipate. The Theocracy stiffened its neck with pride, and as the armies of the faithful daughters of the Church were set in motion to reclaim the patrimony of St. Peter, saw with joy the hour approaching at which its usurped rights would be reaffirmed in their plenitude.

Every possible means was being urged whereby the republican Government might be speedily destroyed, and if possible, by some other power than that of France. The Church herself brought her most time-honoured and dangerous weapons into play, and in those parts of the Papal States where priests faithful to their ecclesiastical allegiance yet remained, signs, wonders, and miracles, irrefutably demonstrated to a credulous people their political heresies. At San Benedetto in the Marches, the face of an image of Saint Francis showed signs of life ; at Fermo, Our Lady of Sorrows wept ; at Rome, the Mother of Christ visited a young woman of approved faith ; and at other places similar supernatural occurrences excited the fear or the enthusiasm of the votaries of the Church.¹ Nor was this all. At Orvieto, Albano, and other localities, armed movements in favour of a Papal restoration took place, and the Neapolitan border was kept in a state of unrest. After the second session of the Gaëta Conference (April 14th), it is not improbable, as one authority asserts,² that steps were actively concerted between Antonelli, Ludolf, and Esterhazy for fomenting disorder within the Papal States, thus rendering the necessity for Austrian and Neapolitan armed intervention more urgent.

A week later, on April 20th, the Pope called together a Consistory, before which he delivered a long Allocution ; it created nearly as great an impression as the one he had pronounced nearly twelve months before, and that had marked his abandonment of the national cause.

A few extracts from the Pope's inordinately long

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* iii. 395.

² N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 224.

declaration, will sufficiently elucidate its meaning. It opened with a full recapitulation of the events of the Pontificate, and then went on to say :

“ All assuredly know with what transports of applause that memorable and ample amnesty was everywhere celebrated, granted by us to secure the peace and tranquillity of families.” The grant of the amnesty had only been turned to their own purposes by wicked, crafty, and designing men, who agitated and pressed for concession after concession. So audacious, so cynical, did they become, that they actually went to the length of suggesting the establishment of a republic to the Pope. “ That nocturnal hour is still present to our recollection, and we have before our mind certain men who, miserably misguided and deluded by the architects of deceit, did not hesitate to take part in that affair, and to propose to us the proclamation of a republic.” As a result of . . . “ a most abominable conspiracy . . . the city of Rome, the principal See of the Catholic Church, is at present,—O sorrow !—made a forest of roaring wild beasts.” From this terrible position escape was sought, and . . . “ after having implored the assistance of all the Powers, we more willingly requested succour from Austria. . . .”

The Pope's discourse concluded with a vigorously expressed resolve to extirpate all the “ abominable and pestiferous ” persons who were carrying on the government of Rome.¹

It was but a very few days after the delivery of this Allocution, that Pius was informed of the disembarkation of Oudinot's troops at Civita Vecchia ; yet he showed little sign of gratitude for the assistance thus sent him. There were comprehensible reasons why

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 227.

French help should be unacceptable to the Pope, for the occupation of Rome by the soldiers of France was a totally different matter from what might be expected were those of Austria, of Spain, or of Naples to effect an entry. It was, in the first place, reasonably certain that, from the French generals and soldiers, the inhabitants of Rome would receive far more considerate treatment than from those of the other Powers. In the second place, and this was certainly the chief consideration with the Papal Court, the French Government was undoubtedly sincere in its desire that the re-establishment of the temporal power should not mean the re-establishment of the old Papal abuses. Many writers have adopted the view that France was consistently insincere in her declarations, both at Rome and at Gaëta, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the reiterated declarations and diplomatic steps of the French Government, together with the barely veiled hostility of the Papal Court for their allies, with such a theory. The fatal weakness of the French policy,—a weakness which, seeking refuge in ambiguity, lent to the acts of her statesmen and generals a deplorable character of duplicity,—was a basis that was theoretical. The Government of Prince Louis Bonaparte founded its action on the following proposition: intervention by one or more of the Powers is inevitable; if Austrian or Neapolitan, it means a cruel occupation and the restoration of all the old abuses; if French, it shall mean the return of the Pope, but at the same time a guarantee to the people of Rome against the renewal of the abuses of the Theocracy. This theory had a plausible look, but was utterly unworkable in practice, for the reason that neither the Pope, nor the established representatives of

his subjects, had the least intention of assenting to the implied conditions of the French Government.

On April 26th, the Duke d'Harcourt, acting on instructions from Paris, attempted to extract a promise from Antonelli for the better treatment of Papal subjects,—it was in vain; the Cardinal bluntly declined, and declared that it would be time for Pius to make known his intentions when the Catholic Powers had restored him to his capital.

The French Government, irritated at the uncompromising position assumed by the Papal Court, at first took up a strong attitude; a governor sent from Gaëta to Civita Vecchia to take possession, was sent about his business by General Oudinot.¹

The French general's defeat under the walls of Rome had come to render the self-imposed task of France even more difficult. On May 3rd, D'Harcourt renewed his instances for a moderate declaration on the part of Pius, asking for an assurance that the Roman Constitution would not be withdrawn; while in Paris, Drouin de Lhuys blustered to the Papal Nuncio and to Antonini, the Neapolitan minister; but neither entreaties nor threats could move Antonelli.

On May 7th a general debate on the Roman question took place in the French Chamber. The Ministry had reduced the scope of Oudinot's operations to a reconnaissance in force, and by dint of skilful manœuvring, succeeded in riding out the parliamentary storm which their General's ill success had provoked. The extreme Left, under Ledru-Rollin, violently attacked the Government's action, and urged the cause of the Roman republicans, Jules Favre concluding a torrent of indignant eloquence with the

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 185.

exclamation that France had become "le gendarme de l'absolutisme!" The Chamber was finally induced to vote a colourless resolution¹ that the Government thought it advisable to interpret as a vote of confidence. To quiet the advanced party, the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced, on the following day, the immediate dispatch to Rome of Ferdinand de Lesseps on a conciliatory mission.

It is hardly too much to say, that the instructions handed by Drouin de Lhuys to the special Envoy of the Second Republic were so nearly impossible of execution and so illusive, that no self-respecting diplomat ought to have accepted them. The essential part of these instructions ran as follows :

"We have for aim to save the States of the Church from the anarchy now reigning, and at the same time to guard lest the restoration of a regular Government should be regretably marked by a blind reaction. . . . You will abstain from any step that might give the opportunity to those in power of believing, or of fostering the belief, that we are prepared to recognise them as an established Government ; this would give them a moral force they at present lack. In any partial arrangement you may conclude, you will avoid every stipulation, every word even, that might rouse the susceptibilities of the Holy See and of the Congress at Gaëta."

And if anything beyond the wording of these instructions is needed to show the unreality of De Lesseps' mission to Rome, the following quotation from a letter written by the President to General Oudinot on May 8th, which was given publicity in the French press, will supply it :

"Our military honour is at stake ; I will not admit

¹ "L'Assemblée Nationale invite le Gouvernement à prendre sans délai, les dispositions nécessaires pour que l'expédition ne soit pas plus longtemps détournée du but qui lui avait été désigné."

the possibility of its compromise ; you may rely on being reinforced.”¹

The choice made by Drouin de Lhuys was by no means a good one for the particular object in view. De Lesseps, who had shortly before earned considerable diplomatic reputation in Spain, was an impulsive, opinionated man, a decided liberal, and particularly responsive to large and generous ideas ; he had far from mastered Talleyrand's guiding principle for young diplomatists, and was not likely to satisfactorily carry out a mission for which lack of zeal was evidently the most necessary qualification.

The French Envoy reached Rome on May 15th ; starting from the assumption that his mission imposed on him the duty of arranging honourable terms between the parties, he opened his relations with the Roman Government by declaring, that under no circumstances would the French troops act with those of Naples, and by proposing a suspension of hostilities between the combatants. This was no difficult matter to arrange ; on the one hand, Oudinot was not in a position to resume operations until heavy reinforcements should reach him ; on the other, the Roman Government was anxious to be freed from apprehension on the side of the French, so that the now threatening armies of Spain, of Naples, and of Austria, might in turn be dealt with. And against these, there was a far more genuine feeling of hostility among the Romans than against the army of France ; for towards the latter, a constant substratum of friendliness underlay all the acts of the Triumvirs ; they and the people long hoped to convert their enemy into a friend and ally.

¹ E. Ollivier, *op. cit.* ii. 222.

After Oudinot's retreat on April 30th, every kindness had been shown to the prisoners; and a number of wounded, whom he had left behind at Maglianella, were treated with the utmost consideration; this led to the exchange of reciprocal courtesies between the two camps. A few days later, the Triumvirs decided to liberate the prisoners; the French soldiers were marched to St. Peter's where, after a short service, they were addressed by Filopanti in the following brief words: "Frenchmen and Italians, in this sublime and holy spot let us together offer our prayers to the Almighty, for the liberty of all people and for universal fraternity!"¹ The French were then escorted by a friendly crowd to the gates of the city, and departed thence on their way to Palo to rejoin their comrades.²

On his arrival at Rome therefore, De Lesseps found himself in the midst of people anxious to befriend him, and by every little attention and artifice in their power to convert him into a friend. During the first few days of his stay, he was totally unable to resist the blandishments of the Romans and the magnetism of Mazzini's eloquence and superiority of intellect; so far was the Frenchman carried away, that he was persuaded to acquiesce in the proposition that the people of Rome should have the right of deciding on their own form of Government, thus completely losing sight of the scope of his instructions, and of the views of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.³

On May 16th, the Assembly, on the proposition of

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* iv. 79.

² The facts are substantially correct as stated, but there was undoubtedly some sort of informal transaction amounting to an exchange of prisoners. The contemporary Italian accounts of this matter are grossly exaggerated and misleading. See London *Times* dispatches from Civita Vecchia, May and June 1849.

³ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazi Europea*, vi. 232.

the Triumvirs, appointed three deputies to negotiate with the French Envoy, Sturbinetti, Audinot and Agostini ; on the following day a suspension of hostilities was formally declared.

The relation of the course of the negotiations that were conducted by De Lesseps during the two following weeks will not be extended to any great length ; the space allotted to this incident in the contemporary accounts is out of all proportion to its real importance.¹

After a preliminary consultation with Oudinot, the French Envoy proposed : (1) that the Romans should formally request the protection of the French Republic ; (2) that they should be left free to choose their own form of Government ; (3) that the Roman and French troops should jointly occupy and protect Rome ; (4) that the local administration should remain unchanged. It is hardly necessary to point out that this proposal was completely beyond De Lesseps' powers ; for it necessarily implied the recognition of the *de facto* Government, it engaged France in what was virtually a defensive alliance against the arms of the three other Powers already operating on Pontifical territory, and it could certainly not fail to arouse the susceptibilities both of the Pope and of the Conference at Gaëta.² However, such as the terms were, they were declined by the Roman Assembly, convened in secret session on May 19th ; the vote was unanimous.

¹ This prominence arises doubtless from the accessibility of the documents. See especially De Lesseps, *Ma Mission à Rome*, and Mazzini, *Scritti*.

² There was still another reason that may be best stated from a French point of view, and in the very words of Rayneval. "You will observe that by recognising this Government, we are destroying the only firm foothold we had. If we assume that this Government really exists, if it proceeds from the freely expressed wish of the people, it is our duty to assist it. We cannot connive at its fall, unless we maintain our view of what it actually is, that is the work of a faction largely made up of foreigners."

This proposal, and the refusal with which it met, opens an interesting field for speculation. The terms offered by the French Envoy constituted an exceptionally favourable practical compromise, and pledged the French Government, if not to the continued existence of the Roman Republic, at the worst to the continuance of some sort of popular government under Papal supremacy. Why, then, was it declined?

Mazzini, whose opinions practically controlled those of the Assembly, may possibly have seen through the mistake committed by De Lesseps; through Accursi, who had been on a secret mission to Paris, and who had travelled to Rome with the French Envoy, Mazzini may have rightly appreciated the drift of his instructions, and the real character of his mission. It is quite possible that the Triumvir suspected that the French Government would repudiate their agent's agreement, as being beyond his powers, and decided on that assumption to decline the bargain offered.¹ On the other hand, it is far from improbable that the decisive factor with Mazzini was the practically certain obliteration of the existence of the Republic, which was involved in the French proposal. In the obstinacy with which he clung to the slowly dawning dreams of Italian unity centring about Rome, and the banner on which he had inscribed the motto of his life,—*Dio e il popolo*,—he would not bring himself to a transaction which, however advantageous to the material interests of the people, spelt the death-blow of his ideals.

With all the fanatical sincerity of purpose and

¹ Some confirmation for this supposition might be sought in the narrative of Farini who states that Mazzini attempted, through the intermediary of Mr. Cass, U.S. representative at Rome, to get Oudinot's formal acceptance of those articles, for which the signature of De Lesseps alone hardly appeared sufficient guarantee.—Farini, *op. cit.* iv. 120.

personal uprightness of conduct that made Mazzini's force, he had by no means entirely freed himself from those venerable traditions of political duplicity that have so long been honoured in Italy. There is nothing in the whole course of his life that leads one to suppose that he would have hesitated to cloak his objection to the abandonment of the Republic under whatever plausible excuse happened to be convenient. Whether either, or both, of the considerations that have been suggested as the decisive factors for the refusal of the French proposal weighed with Mazzini, must be pronounced a matter for speculation; but there is a third factor, about which there is no possibility of mistake.

Elections were on the point of being held in France, and to their result most of the numerous parties in the French Assembly looked hopefully for an increase of strength. None of these parties was more confident, though with little enough reason, than that of those extreme republicans who, under the leadership of Ledru-Rollin and Jules Favre, were equally ready to exchange fraternal greetings with the Roman Assembly, to proclaim the Universal Republic, and to raise barricades against the Government of the Prince President. Through such emissaries as Accursi and Rusconi, Mazzini had received strong support and encouragement from this party, and with all the confidence of his visionary temperament, he hopefully looked to a reversal of the policy of France, either through a vote of the Chamber of deputies, or through the forcible assertion of the sacred right of revolution in the streets of Paris. The middle of June was generally viewed as the date when the French democracy would assert its rights, and stretch a helping hand to the Romans.

In communicating to De Lesseps the refusal of his

proposal by the Assembly, Mazzini wrote many paragraphs, achieved much eloquence, but made few substantial points; the chief grievance insisted on was that in his communications the French Envoy had constantly avoided making use of the expression, *Roman Republic*. Mazzini closed his dispatch by informing the French agent that he might shortly expect a counter proposal. This was on the 19th; on the 22nd, as no further correspondence arrived from the Roman side, a joint protest putting an end to negotiations was drawn up and signed by Oudinot and De Lesseps. The latter appears to have been extremely excited and irritated by the rejection of a proposal which he perhaps felt that he ought never to have made, and also by some hostile demonstrations which had been directed against him; he could now find no terms strong enough to condemn Mazzini, and hastily left Rome for the French camp.

On the arrival of De Lesseps, Oudinot called a council of war which the French diplomat was invited to attend; among the assembled officers opinions were divided as to the best course to pursue, and it was eventually decided to take no definite step until precise instructions should be received from Paris.

At this juncture, a fresh communication from Mazzini arrived at the camp, and appeared to open a way for negotiation once more. Again the ever active De Lesseps picked up the threads, and attempted to come to an agreement with the Triumvirs. He once more submitted terms of settlement to them; they were even more beyond the scope of his instructions than the first he had proposed, though hardly more likely to find favour with the Romans.

The terms of the French Envoy were very similar

to those he had put forward on May 17th, with this difference,—that they were more specifically based on the necessity of defending Rome from Austrian intervention, and that they contained a provision guaranteeing from invasion all territory occupied by French troops ; as to the occupation of Rome no reference was made. Surprising to say, Oudinot once more gave his approval to De Lesseps' proposal ; probably he understood the terms as implying the occupation of the city, and felt that once in possession he would be master of the situation. Be that as it may, the French terms were stated to be subject to immediate acceptance, failing which, negotiations would be broken off ; twelve o'clock on the night of May 30th was fixed as the limit of time within which the Roman answer must be delivered.

The reply was soon received. It was not an acceptance of the French terms ; but a counter-proposal wherein it was specified that the quarters occupied by Oudinot's troops should in no event include any part of the city of Rome. This virtual refusal may be conveniently said to mark the termination of the official negotiations between the two Republics.

The mission of De Lesseps was now nearing its term. The representatives of France at the Conference of Gaëta had become anxious at the proceedings of the special envoy of Drouin de Lhuys, and decided to take steps to prevent his compromising their Government. Rayneval proceeded to Civita Vecchia, and protested to De Lesseps verbally, and in writing, against his proceedings. On his return to Gaëta in time for the eighth session of the Conference, on May 29th, he formally repudiated all responsibility for any arrangements the envoy to Rome might have concluded.¹

¹ Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 244.

Subsequently, on May 31st, De Lesseps actually came to an agreement with the Triumvirs. He had the prudence to insert in this a clause making ratification by his Government necessary. Needless to say that ratification was never obtained.

The French intervention was now about to enter a new phase. Already General Vaillant, the best engineer officer in the army, had arrived at Oudinot's headquarters, and a constant stream of reinforcements had brought up his effective strength to quite 30,000 men. The Commander-in-Chief put an end to an uncertain position by resuming hostilities on the night of May 29th, when he threw a detachment over the Tiber to the south of the city. Acting in complete accord with the opinions of his Generals, with the recommendations of Rayneval, and with his orders from Paris, Oudinot now prepared to push the operations against Rome with the utmost vigour. In this course he was confirmed by a courier who arrived from Paris on May 31st, and who, in addition to his dispatches for the Commander-in-Chief, bore a curt letter of immediate recall for De Lesseps. The latter, after a violent scene with Oudinot, left for Paris.

Such were some of the matters with which the Triumvirs of Rome had had to deal during the month of May 1849; but before relating the military operations of the French that immediately followed De Lesseps' recall, other events that had been engaging the attention of the Romans must shortly be adverted to.

With Naples the relations of the Roman Government had been strained ever since the flight of Pius in November, and his cordial reception at Gaëta. In February aggressive movements had occurred along the Neapolitan border, and on the 26th of that month, the

Roman Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed a stiffly-worded demand for explanations to the Government of King Ferdinand. The relations of the two countries gradually became worse. Early in April Neapolitan troops crossed the border, and finally, when the French arrived at Civita Vecchia, Ferdinand's religious and autocratic zeal had been so far worked on that he actually placed himself at the head of an army of 16,000 men and declared his intention of marching on Rome. Count Ludolf was sent to Civita Vecchia to concert measures with the French, but was met with an abrupt refusal on the part of Oudinot.

Notwithstanding this disappointment, the King of the Two Sicilies decided to advance, and entered Roman territory. On May 8th the Neapolitans reached Albano, hardly more than a day's march from the capital. But, deprived of French support, and duly impressed with the victory of the Romans on the 30th of April, Ferdinand hesitated to advance and remained at Albano undecided. The doubts of the Bourbon King were soon dispelled by the Romans. Garibaldi and his red-shirted irregulars had been vigorously skirmishing with the enemy for some days, but were not strong enough to completely check him. For Ferdinand, in addition to his native Neapolitans, whose courage and loyalty were both somewhat doubtful, had a solid nucleus of troops in two regiments of Swiss, which he always kept near his headquarters.

But on May 16th, the truce agreed between De Lesseps and the Triumvirs changed the military position materially. The Roman forces, released from their watch over the walls of the Trastevere, were now free to act in any direction. With great decision and judgment, it was decided to take immediate advantage of

this fortunate turn of affairs, and to throw every available man against the Neapolitans. On the evening of the 17th of May, ten or twelve thousand men, with twelve field-pieces, accordingly left Rome by the Porta San Giovanni; they were under the command of Roselli. On the very same day Ferdinand broke up his camp at Albano, and retreated to Velletri, nearer his own border.

The King of the Two Sicilies reached Velletri on the afternoon of the 19th, but a few hours in front of the Roman advanced guard. The impetuosity of Garibaldi, who declined to obey Roselli's orders to refrain from action, soon brought on a heavy skirmish in which the Garibaldians distinguished themselves and eventually drove the Neapolitans off the field. Night put an end to the contest. The losses of the two sides were slight:¹ but nevertheless Ferdinand gave orders for the retreat of the Neapolitan army, which was begun at three o'clock on the following morning amidst the greatest confusion. That retreat was continued to beyond the frontier, and so great was the celerity of the Neapolitans, so great the lassitude of the Romans, that the two armies saw little more of each other. But the Romans had conclusively proved their superiority over the Neapolitans, who gave them no further trouble. The news of the affair of Velletri was received with the utmost satisfaction in the French camp.²

However gratifying this second success might be to the supporters of the struggling Republic, there was one feature of the operations that gave rise to much debate and ill-feeling, that had seriously endangered

¹ A mean between the 100 mentioned by Farini and the 650 of Carletti, would give 375 as the total of the casualties; but the lower estimate appears more probable.

² *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 189.

the victory, and perhaps wasted the opportunity of making its result complete and decisive. The insubordination shown by Garibaldi was a matter of the gravest moment to the republican cause. Roselli was a brave and modest man, by no means destitute of military experience and aptitude, and owing to his seniority in the regular army, it was impossible to place him under the orders of the guerilla leader. Garibaldi on the other hand, was a man whose qualities fitted him for the leadership of his own red-shirted corps, but for little else. Apart from his inborn fighting qualities, his intelligence was as low as his pretensions were high; and if his personal uprightness and dignity, fire in attack, and instinctive resourcefulness made him an ideal leader of irregulars, his vanity, obstinacy, and insubordination, together with his unmethodical and purely impulsive tactics, made him impossible as the leader of a regular army.¹ Few things show the character of the man better than his entry in his *Autobiography*, under date the 2nd of June, when he notes that he has requested Mazzini that he might either be declared Dictator of Rome or reduced to the ranks!

After, as before the skirmish at Velletri, the two principal officers of the republican army disagreed; Garibaldi was in favour of a strong offensive movement against Naples. He believed that such an operation gave great chances of success through a popular and republican rising. Viewed by the light of subsequent history, it must be admitted that this plan, however

¹ "Tanto valoroso condottiero, quanto inetto generale," is what Farini calls him. That opinion appears carried too far; but when Farini composed his history Garibaldi's Sicilian expedition was yet in the lap of the future. In that most brilliant and fortunate of his exploits he unquestionably showed many of the qualities that go to make a great general.

slender its chances of succeeding, might yet have proved the best one for the Romans to attempt.¹

Roselli and the Triumvirs however, were of a different opinion. At Fiumicino, at the mouth of the Tiber, the Spaniards, under Cordova, were making a beginning of landing a corps of 5000 men (May 17th); large reinforcements were constantly arriving for the French at Civita Vecchia, and in the north the Austrians were becoming threatening. General d'Aspre had marched through Tuscany to the sea, and on the 12th of May had occupied Leghorn. On the 8th of the same month other Austrian corps had appeared at Ferrara and at Bologna. The first-named city had offered no resistance, but the latter showed much of her old martial spirit, and succeeded in keeping the enemy at bay until the 16th, when a capitulation was signed. The Austrian forces were now preparing to march on Ancona, while on the western side of the Apennines, another column was already advancing against Perugia. The Triumvirs finally decided to satisfy both of their Generals, and to take a middle course by allowing Garibaldi to march southwards with 6000 men, and by recalling Roselli and the rest of the army for the protection of the capital.

During the first fortnight of May the internal order of Rome had not been well maintained. The fighting against the French had apparently stirred the blood of the most restless part of the population, and the good conduct that had for some time been a feature of the

¹ Garibaldi believed that the fate of Italy might be decided by the fall of Capua; (see his Autobiography). Mazzini also, had long believed in the facility and decisiveness of a Neapolitan rising. The following words written by Menz in one of his annual reports to Metternich (1836) may be compared, "Parmi les Etats d'Italie, le royaume des Deux Siciles est celui qui paraît renfermer le plus d'éléments révolutionnaires."—Gualterio, *Ultimi Rivolgimenti*, iii. 501. See also Ulloa, *Guerre de l'indépendance italienne*, ii. 26.

Republican rule, suddenly gave way to grave disorder. The Government professed the utmost toleration, men like Mamiani and Pantaleoni, who had vigorously opposed the proclamation of the Republic, not only walked about Rome unmolested, but entered into relations with De Lesseps and other French agents. Priests had been allowed to carry on their avocations in peace ; some had openly espoused the popular party, but others had made themselves active agents of reaction, and by their intrigues with Gaëta and the French camp, and by their unconcealed joy at the approaching Papal restoration, had given great provocation. In May several priests were seized by angry mobs and killed, notably in the garden of the Church of Saint Callixtus ;¹ and for a few days violence threatened to get the upper hand. On May 8th the Etruscan Museum was sacked, and a general pillage of the monasteries and convents appeared imminent. The Triumvirs appointed military tribunals to deal summarily with breaches of the peace and issued a long and eloquent appeal to the people, which had considerable effect. It was worded in the usual Mazzinian spirit, and declared among other things that :—

“The right of personal liberty is inviolable ; the Government alone has the right and duty of punishment.

“The right of private property is inviolable. Every stone of Rome is sacred. The Government alone has the right and duty of modifying this inviolability, when the good of the country renders such a step expedient.

“None may effect an arrest or a domiciliary visit without the directions and assistance of an officer in charge of a military post.

¹ The number so killed was probably not more than twenty, nor less than four ; the accounts are particularly confused and unreliable.

“Strangers are under the special protection of the Republic. Every citizen is morally responsible for the efficacy of this protection.”

After May 17th, when Roselli led the troops to meet the Neapolitans at Albano, the excesses that had called forth this decree of the Triumvirs abated; the city resumed the comparatively orderly life that marked the earlier weeks of the government of the Roman Republic.

CHAPTER XX

THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC

Oudinot reinforced—His operations—Battle of June 3rd—Desperate struggle of the Romans—Trenches opened—Mazzini and the Red Republicans—Their rising on June 13th—Victory of Prince Louis Bonaparte's Government—Oudinot carries the breach—Insubordination of Garibaldi—Apathy of the population—The six days' struggle—Fight at the Porta San Pancrazio—Success of the French—The Assembly abandons the struggle—Resignation of Mazzini—Garibaldi leaves Rome—The Constitution proclaimed—Oudinot makes his entry—Decrees the fall of the Republic.

EVER since his defeat on April 30th, reinforcements had been reaching Oudinot. On May 16th Cooper Key, after visiting the French lines, estimated their numbers at 20,000; he also remarked their excellent discipline and behaviour, and their friendly relations with the peasantry.¹

The French General had quickly regained confidence, and viewed the capture of the city as a feat certain of easy accomplishment; so that when he heard of the advance of D'Aspre on Perugia, he did not hesitate to address a letter to the Austrian commander containing a warning that he would view any operations against Rome as offensive and hostile to

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 186.

France.¹ It was evident that the prestige of the Second Republic was compromised, and would be seriously injured unless the enterprise entered on was rapidly and successfully brought to an issue. For not only at Perugia, but at Ancona, which was besieged on May 25th and held out three weeks, the Austrians were gradually showing greater strength in central Italy, and only awaiting an opportunity for putting a hand to, and completing the work undertaken by France.

The preparations made by the Government of Prince Louis Bonaparte were not inadequate to the task that was to be accomplished. At the end of May, Oudinot, with 40 field and 30 siege guns, had over 30,000 men under his command, and among his subordinates were such capable officers as Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Rostolan, Niel, and Vaillant. The latter was an artilleryist of great attainments, and took the direction of the approaching and besieging works; he held a discretionary commission that empowered him to replace Oudinot in the command,² but whether from lack of opportunity or of inclination did not choose to avail himself of it.

At the end of May the French army, with its base at Palo and Civita Vecchia, occupied a position stretching north and south parallel with the Transtiberine fortifications from which it had been so disastrously thrown back a month before. On the night of May 29th Oudinot threw a bridge over the Tiber on his extreme right, and pushed a detachment to the Basilica of San Paolo, one mile and a half south of the city.

¹ Farini, *op. cit.* iv. 14. Early in June Aspre had pushed his outposts as far as Foligno.—London *Times*, June 11th, 1849.

² Ollivier, *op. cit.* ii. 222.

This movement, which the French artillery on the Monte Verde protected, cut the important road from Ostia, from which direction the Spaniards might have operated, and threatened a weak part of the defences of Rome. At the same time Oudinot had extended his left flank, and occupied the Monte Mario, a considerable hill to the north of the Vatican, commanding the course of the Tiber from some distance above Rome and the important road running from the Porta del Popolo towards Umbria and Tuscany.¹

On June 1st Roselli requested the French commander to grant an armistice for fifteen days; this would have covered the period that had yet to elapse before the expected crisis at Paris. Oudinot declined, but agreed not to assail the city before the 4th, so as to enable French citizens to depart in safety.

Vaillant's plan for the capture of Rome was to attack it in the neighbourhood of the Porta San Pancrazio by breaching the walls,² and effecting a lodgment at the highest point of the Janiculum in the neighbourhood of the Church of San Pietro Montorio. To effect this was a work of considerable difficulty, but presented one great advantage; for once the French troops were established on that commanding eminence, Vaillant considered that Rome would be as good as taken, for there could be no shelter from the plunging fire he could thence direct on any part of the city. The dreaded possibility of street and house fighting was thereby minimized.

In order to open the first trench from as close and as favourable a position as possible, Oudinot and Vaillant

¹ The ancient Via Flaminia.

² They had neither ditch nor glacis, and were about 25 feet in height, with earthen counterscarp.—Ulloa, *Guerre de l'indépendance Italienne*, ii. 31.

decided to first drive the Romans from the outlying positions they occupied outside the Porta San Pancrazio, along the Via Aureliana, among the villas and gardens where Garibaldi had outflanked the French column on April 30th. In the early hours of June 3rd the troops were quietly paraded and brought up to their positions for attacking at the earliest dawn. The Romans occupying the Villa Pamfili Doria were completely surprised, two hundred were made prisoners, and in a short space the French were masters of every position, including the Vascello close under the walls. The first surprise over, the Romans bravely set to work to recover the ground they had lost. General Bartolomeo Galletti ordered a counter-attack, and Colonel Pasi, after retaking the Vascello at the point of the bayonet, drove the French out of the Villa Corsini farther to the north. But from behind the Villa Pamfili Doria, at which point Oudinot was rapidly massing his artillery, a heavy short-range fire opened on these positions, and after severe and continuous firing, a French column returned to the attack and carried the Villa Corsini. By nine o'clock the Romans held little beyond the walls, except the Vascello. But no sooner were the French in possession of these outlying houses, than the rôles of the opposing artillery changed; the guns at the Villa Pamfili Doria now opened on those of the Romans, which from the bastions kept up a heavy fire on the positions captured by the French. Garibaldi had now arrived on the scene, and assumed command. Determined to recapture the lost positions, of which he fully realized the importance, he blindly, and without the slightest skill or judgment, threw whatever troops he could dispose of against the French; and his orders were obeyed

with a dash and courage that deserved a better leader. All through the day, for sixteen hours says Petre,¹ did the firing about the Porta San Pancrazio continue ; the bravery and the bad leadership of the Italians will equally appear from the account of one incident of the fight.

Garibaldi seeing General Galletti and his staff close by, gave him orders to place himself at the head of Masina's lancers,—they were forty in number,—and to drive the French out of the Villa Corsini. To put cavalry to such work was folly, but Bartolomeo Galletti did not hesitate ; he placed himself at the head of the little troop of horsemen, drew his sword, and, with true Italian fury, galloped up the avenue leading to the villa. He scattered the French infantry, and charging right up the steps leading to the building, found himself in occupation of the ground floor with his men. For a few minutes he held the position he had so gallantly won ; long enough for infantry supports to have reached him and made good what so much brave blood was to pay for. But such well-ordered military arrangements as these were not to be looked for from Garibaldi,—at all events not on that day. Soon the French returning, attacked the villa furiously, and finally drove out all that were left of that gallant band of horsemen ; Galletti, two of his staff, and four lancers alone regained the Porta San Pancrazio ; Masina lay dead among his men in the Villa Corsini.²

While the Romans were thus hopelessly attempting to regain the positions which their improvidence had lost, fighting of an indecisive and far less important

¹ *Brit. Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 187.

² Carletti, *op. cit.* 273. Compare account in Hoffstetter, *Tagebuch auf Italien* ; Reuchlin, *Geschichte Italiens*, iii. 45.

character had been taking place at the other extremity of the French line, north of the city. There, from the Monte Mario whence their artillery protected the movement, the French had attempted to cross the Tiber at the Ponte Molle, about two miles from the Porta del Popolo. But one of the arches of this bridge had been destroyed, and the Romans maintained their positions on the further bank all day; in the course of the following night however, this important position was abandoned to the French.

In the fighting of the 3rd of June, the losses of the Romans were heavy; three colonels and many officers were among the killed and wounded, the total amounting to some 800 or 900 men. The French losses were officially placed at a very low figure.¹

Oudinot's first move had been completely successful. He had now extended his flanks so as to cut two of Rome's most important routes of communication, one to the north, the other to the south, while on the west he had forced his way to the very foot of the fortifications at a point just south of the Porta San Pancrazio where he intended to breach the walls of the city. All that now remained to be done was to open trenches, covered ways, and parallels, in which to push his infantry within easy distance of the wall, and to establish batteries of heavy guns to beat down a breach, through which the soldiers might force their way. This work was at once proceeded with; Vaillant estimated that it would take from twelve to fifteen days.²

While the French were actively plying pick and

¹ The London *Times* estimates the French casualties at 500 killed and wounded; a highly probable figure.

² The first trench was opened on June 4th at 8.30 P.M. 300 yards west of bastion number 7. Three breaching batteries were established within 60 yards on the night of the 15th.

shovel, driving parallels and saps, filling sand-bags, and placing gabions outside the walls, the Triumvirs were busy keeping up the republican zeal of the defenders. The unflagging faith and extraordinary influence of a remarkable leader, the desperation of many hopelessly compromised republicans, the skilfully flattered pride of that portion of the inhabitants of the city who claimed descent from the ancient Romans,¹ all helped to keep flying for a few weeks more the banner of a lost cause.

Arms were freely dealt out, and the citizens were summoned to man the walls; the pay of all those who would perform the semblance of military service was increased, bread was distributed to the poor, and the inexhaustible resources of oratory were freely drawn on. Such means might avail to nerve a section of the people to continue the struggle and to maintain their belief in the possibility of eventual success; but with Mazzini, and those few whose political vision extended beyond the limits of the Roman Campagna, the only justification of further resistance was to be found in the unsettled condition of the politics of France. The relations between the Roman leaders and the extreme Republicans in Paris were still very close. By means of such emissaries as Accursi and others, a constant communication and interchange of ideas and information had linked the advanced democrats of Paris and Rome. Mazzini and those in his confidence knew that the 13th day of June had now been finally decided on for an insurrectionary movement against Prince Louis Bonaparte's Government, and in favour of the Red Republic; could Rome but hold

¹ The inhabitants of the Monti quarter and of the Trastevere assumed great dignity on account of their claims to a direct descent from the ancient Romans.

out till then,—could but that movement be crowned with success, all might yet be well. Rusconi had left London, where he had found no encouragement,¹ and was now in Paris, whence he fully advised his anxious colleagues at Rome of every change in the political situation.

Meanwhile about the Porta San Pancrazio desultory firing continued, and the French rapidly drove their trenches every day nearer and nearer to the wall. On the 12th Oudinot was nearly ready to open fire with his breaching batteries, and a formal demand was sent to Roselli for the surrender of the city, failing which extreme military measures would be resorted to. The answer to this summons came in the form of a long appeal by the Triumvirs to French honour, to the agreement entered into by De Lesseps, and to the sanctity of the capital of the Christian world; but of surrender there was not a word, the Roman Republic had determined to die fighting.

On the 13th the siege batteries of the French opened a short range fire at the angles of bastions 6 and 7 and at the curtain connecting them. A heavy bombardment was continued for eight days, at the end of which time the fabric of the Roman walls had been pounded into a mass of debris and dust. The defenders made no attempt to throw out counter-works, nor did they take the precaution of closing the gorges of the threatened bastions, while they hardly interfered with the advancing trenches by sallies or sorties.

¹ The Roman emissaries to London met with no success politically or financially. Palmerston was willing to give good advice, but would not move a finger officially; there was in reality nothing he could do. On May 23rd he gave Mariani his opinion in very clear terms:—"Advise those who govern the Republic to treat with France, immediately, with frankness, and on possible conditions, . . . above all things deal quickly."—N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, v. 214.

As their defences crumbled before the fire of the French artillery, so the hopes of the Romans were destroyed by the firm action of the French Government. The great republican rising of the 13th of June had been a total failure: Paris had refused to stir, the leaders had been arrested,¹ and the movements of the revolutionists paralyzed by the prompt and effective measures of Prince Louis Bonaparte and his Ministers.

Rusconi had immediately sent the disheartening news to the Triumvirs. He informed them in emphatic terms that the moderate or conservative republicans had won the day, that Thiers and Montalembert triumphed. "The Government is secure and will charge at the double down the path of counter-revolution. God save Rome!"²

Mazzini might now have accepted his inevitable defeat, might have surrendered the shattered fortifications of Rome on the best terms obtainable, and by an act of magnanimous self-abnegation, spared many brave lives and many sorrow-stricken homes. He chose rather to nail the flag of the Giovane Italia to the mast, and to continue a hopeless struggle against that one enemy from whom alone Rome might confidently look for some measure of mercy. He suppressed or distorted the news from Paris, and deliberately misrepresented its effect. In its number of June 20th, the official *Monitore Romano* contains the report of a speech delivered by Mazzini before the Assembly, in which he gave his version of what had occurred in France in the following terms: "Paris is clearly at such a point that a result may be reached any day that would

¹ Ledru Rollin succeeded in escaping.

² N. Bianchi, *Vicende del Mazzinianismo*, 194.

decisively influence the Ministry in its line of policy regarding ourselves. It is not to be thought that the Government would risk defeat on a question of foreign affairs that has nothing vital in it, from the French point of view. Resistance therefore offers possible, nay probable chances; that resistance shall be effective."

Notwithstanding Mazzini's persistent encouragement, a great part of the people had now given up hope. The Lombards, the Garibaldians, the other foreigners, the University students, and a few of the more desperate among the Romans, still kept up courage; but the mass of the people, however averse to the prospect of a restoration of the Papal rule, were no longer active supporters of the Republic. The works of defence flagged; discipline, never very strict, became relaxed; yet public order was well maintained,¹ and no movement in favour of surrender appears to have been made.

On the night of the 22nd to the 23rd of June, the French delivered their first attack. It began with a demonstration at their extreme left, from the bridge head at Ponte Molle towards the Porta del Popolo. Several battalions took part in this demonstration, and the illusion of its seriousness was kept up by the presence of scaling ladders that were carried by the soldiers. This was but a feint however, intended to divert attention from the real point of attack. Roselli, hastily awakened, at once suspected the design of the French, and hastened to the vital point of the defence, the bastions south of the Porta San Pancrazio. There he found that the enemy had just succeeded in effecting a lodgment. The French infantry had been

¹ Clough, *op. cit.* 159. Under date June 22nd, he speaks with high praise of the orderly behaviour of the Roman soldiers in the streets.

assembled quietly in the trenches, and the storming parties had moved out swiftly towards the breach of bastion number 6, prepared to storm it at the point of the bayonet. It was found unguarded, and not a shot was fired in occupying the most vital point of the defences of Rome. When Roselli arrived he found the French engaged in rapidly entrenching themselves in the position they had so cheaply won.¹

The Roman General determined immediately that every effort must be made to repair the mischief caused by the culpable neglect of the defenders, and issued orders to Garibaldi, who commanded that section of the fortifications, to recapture the lost bastion at all costs. He then betook himself to the city, to confer with the Triumvirs on the means of continuing the defence.

While the General-in-Chief of the Roman forces was thus employed, Garibaldi remained sullenly at his headquarters, at the Villa Savorelli close to the Porta San Pancrazio, and declined to do anything calculated to facilitate the task of Roselli. On the news of the capture of the breach by the French becoming known, Sterbini and a knot of agitators had raised the cry of treason, and had paraded the streets loudly calling for a dictatorship and Garibaldi. They proceeded to the Villa Savorelli, where they discussed with the subordinate General the possibility of substituting a red-shirt leadership for that of the Triumvirs and Roselli.² In this way precious minutes and hours went to waste, during which accumulated sand-bags, gabions, and light guns were making the French lodgment on the walls impregnable. Finally two or three hundred agitators

¹ The French apparently did not lose 50 killed and wounded in the operations of the night.

² Rusconi, *op. cit.* ii. 162.

assembled, and marched on the Assembly ; but they lacked strength, enthusiasm, and the force of a public movement behind them ; Mazzini addressed and admonished them, and the deputies reaffirmed their loyalty to the chief of the Giovane Italia by a vote of confidence.

Through the entire day, notwithstanding the untiring efforts of Roselli and Mazzini, the defence was completely neutralized by Garibaldi's jealous insubordination ; and Oudinot's soldiers carried on their work without interruption, although subjected to a heavy and well-directed cross fire from the Roman batteries on the Monte Testaccio.¹

Driven from the bastions to the south of the Porta San Pancrazio, the Romans had fallen back on the line formed by the old wall of Aurelian and several Villas, among them the Villa Spada. The principal strength of the defence still lay at the highest point of the Janiculum, which may be described as a triangle of which the angles were occupied by the Porta San Pancrazio, the Villa Savorelli, and the church of San Pietro Montorio. From this point northward to the Porta Cavallegieri, a fierce struggle was maintained for six days, in which the Roman artillery bore a conspicuous part. The church of San Pietro was swept, and nearly demolished, by the fire of the French guns ; and many shells, discharged at too great an elevation, passed right over that lofty mark, whence the whole of Rome and the graceful outline of the Alban hills beyond may be discovered, and fell in the low-lying quarters of the city. From the famous Seven Hills, the panorama of the ancient metropolis of the world, and the fierce strife of the descendants of Gauls, Teutons, and Latins

¹ For Mazzini's efforts to continue the fighting, see his curious letter to Manara given in Appendix I.

among her ancient and venerable remains, was anxiously watched by thousands of interested spectators. From the roof of the Quirinal, Mazzini, or Saffi, or Canino might be observed following the fluctuations of the struggle through telescopes; and in the gardens below,—gardens in which we have followed the footsteps of Pius,—others were also assembled, and watched anxiously the smoke of battle curling over the summit of the Janiculum. For at that spot the Princess Belgiojoso¹ had established a hospital, and kind-hearted women of all nations were tending the wounded men brought in from those walls they were struggling so bravely and so aimlessly to defend.²

For six days continuous firing had been maintained along the Aurelian and outer walls as far as the Vatican gardens, and now the Roman guns were nearly all dismantled or silenced. Medici and his brave handful had fallen, honourably entombed under the ruins of the Vascello; the Villa Savorelli was a ruin; the Roman artillery at San Pietro no longer replied to the French guns at the breach; the Villa Barberini had been lost; Manara had been killed; some of the defenders were dropping from the exhaustion of continuous day and night duty; others had abandoned the struggle; ammunition was running low. Vaillant had concen-

¹ The Princess Belgiojoso was an ardent republican. On the 25th of June she headed a procession, followed by Mazzini, Garibaldi, Avezzana, and others; she was dressed in black silk, ornamented with rosettes, and wore a Phrygian cap. Even this display was insufficient to reanimate the efforts of Rome.

² Margaret Fuller was one of the nurses in this hospital. A short extract from her *Memoirs*, in which she makes allusion to it, may bring the scene a little closer: "A day or two since, we sat in the Pope's little pavilion, where he used to give private audience. The sun was going gloriously down over Monte Mario, where gleamed the tents of the French light horse among the trees. The cannonade was heard at intervals. Two bright-eyed boys sat at our feet and gathered up eagerly every word said by the heroes of the day."—*Op. cit.* iii. 212.

trated a furious cannonade from thirty-five guns on bastion number 8, immediately next to the Porta San Pancrazio ; and on the night of the 30th of June, in the midst of a raging tempest, the French advanced to another assault. This time the Romans were on their guard, and the fighting was severe. It lasted many hours, Garibaldi displaying great tenacity, and for a while driving the enemy out of the position they had won. But the superior skill of the French officers, and the determination and numbers of their men, finally overcame all resistance, and they remained masters of the position. The Romans lost nearly a thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners, together with thirteen guns; the losses on the French side were also very heavy, though rather less than those of their opponents.¹

The loss of the bastion at the Porta San Pancrazio practically marks the end of the siege of Rome, though for two or three days longer a show of resistance was kept up. The French, proceeding with the same deliberate caution that had marked all their operations since the arrival of Vaillant at the camp, appeared in no hurry to push their success, but rather to rely on the inevitable force of facts for the surrender of the city that now lay at their feet.

Early on the morning of July 1st, the Assembly met at the Capitol. Mazzini urged resistance at any cost, the erection of barricades, and the eventual removal of the Government to the provinces ; but Garibaldi appeared

¹ The accounts offer the widest discrepancies, which it is quite hopeless to attempt to reconcile : all that it is possible to do is to reconstruct the most probable story from the various sources. In this case the authorities most relied on have been Commander Cooper Key, Farini, the British Consul Freeborn, and the *London Times*. According to Freeborn, whose estimate may represent a maximum, the total of the Roman losses through the siege, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was 4000. Torre, who worked on the hospital returns, and is likely to be correct, gives 3000 as the total killed and wounded.

before the assembled deputies, his smeared clothes and haggard appearance testifying to the desperate struggle of the night. He honestly and forcibly declared that the defence was defeated, and that further resistance was impossible. Cernuschi then moved : " In the name of God and the People, the Roman Assembly discontinues a no longer practicable defence, but remains at its post,"—which was adopted. Mazzini, indignant, immediately resigned his office as Triumvir ; and Garibaldi, calling together such troops as he could collect in the great Piazza of St. Peter's, offered to lead them out of Rome to continue the struggle in the provinces. The Republic was fast disintegrating.

There was nothing now left for Rome to do but to make the best terms she could with her conquerors. This last and afflicting duty was left to her Municipality. Relations were opened with General Oudinot, and on July 2nd a proposal was made to him which provided : that the works of defence should be surrendered, that the French troops should enter the city, that the Municipality should be at liberty to make provision for the accommodation of the Roman troops, that the Roman troops should form part of the garrison of the city, that private property and liberty should be guaranteed, and that the national guard and civic administration should be retained. These terms were rejected by the French General, and the Municipality decided to make no further proposal.

On the evening of July 2nd, Garibaldi marched out of Rome by the Porta San Giovanni, with between 4000 and 5000 men : among those who accompanied him were many who had been deeply compromised in the republican revolt, including Ciceroacchio and his sons. On the same day the few remaining deputies met, and

after appointing the Prince of Canino their Ambassador to England, voted a sum of 100,000 scudi to the army, ordered solemn obsequies for the dead to be celebrated at St. Peter's, conferred Roman citizenship on all Italians who had assisted in the defence of Rome,¹ decreed that the Constitution should be engraved on a marble tablet at the Capitol, and, recalling an illustrious example of classic days, determined to await at their posts in the Assembly the advent of the conquerors.²

On the following day Oudinot decided to march down from the heights of the Janiculum and to occupy the city.³ The French columns crossed the Tiber by the Ponte Sisto,—the Pons Janiculensis of the Ancients,—and marched through deserted streets and by closed windows, until the Corso was reached. There some excitement took place: cries of “Viva la Repubblica Romana!” were raised, and some priests who foolishly presumed to ostentatiously welcome their French deliverers, paid the penalty of their rashness with their lives.

While the French troops thus defiled through the streets, a small remnant of the Assembly met at the Capitol, where before 800 or 900 enthusiastic, or

¹ Their numbers were much exaggerated. They were nearly all included in the two Lombard corps and in the Garibaldians, though on the other hand it must be said that they more than took their share of the fighting. According to the *Monitore Romano* they numbered 1650 men on the 29th of June. It appears improbable that they at any time exceeded 2000. But a handful of non-Italians were included among the combatants, mostly Poles.

² Some few actually carried out this resolve, and were turned out of the Assembly by a picket of French infantry on the evening of July 3rd.

³ Apart from his lamentable mistake on April 30th, and his deceptive negotiations, Oudinot deserves a credit that has rarely been allowed him; for he showed great humanity in his operations, and a firm resolve that Rome should be spared as much of the horrors of war as was possible. The credit of the extremely skilful conduct of the siege is doubtless mostly due to Vaillant, but it is only fair that Oudinot's share should not be forgotten.

merely curious spectators, the Constitution of the Roman Republic was solemnly read and promulgated!¹

On the following day, July 4th, General Oudinot issued a proclamation in which it was said: "The Assembly and Government, whose violent and oppressive reign originated in an act of ingratitude, and terminated with an indefensible war against a nation friendly to the Roman people, have ceased to exist."

For a brief space, and under the protection of France, the temporal dominion of the Papacy was to be resumed.

The event just narrated will fitly mark the close of this narrative; but for the reader whose interest may have been awakened in some of the incidents and personages that figure in these pages, a few more lines will be written.

Immediately after the fall of Rome, Oudinot dispatched Colonel Niel² to Gaëta with the keys of the city, which he was instructed to deposit at the Pope's feet. Pius evinced great gratification at the tidings, and honoured the victorious French General with an autograph letter of thanks, of which the following passage is the most characteristic:—

"I believe the French army would benefit by the relation of the events that have occurred during my Pontificate, which is contained in the Allocution with which you are acquainted: I am sending you a number

¹ Clough, *op. cit.* 162. This Constitution may be found fully set out at page 229 of Farini's fourth volume. It contains nothing worthy of special mention, and for those who have perused the proclamations and decrees of Mazzini already quoted would present no novel feature.

² This engineer officer was chief-of-staff to General Vaillant; he afterwards rose to the rank of Marshal.

of copies that you may place them before all whom you should think proper to. This document thoroughly demonstrates that the victory of your army has been won over the enemies of human society, and for that reason your triumph must awaken a sense of gratitude in as many honest men as there may be in Europe, and the entire world.”¹

When, some three weeks later, the Duke d’Harcourt announced to Pius that his return to Rome was not only free, but immediately desirable, Antonelli declared that the Pope would not return to his capital for the present, and announced the appointment of a Commission of Government (July 29th).²

Mazzini remained in Rome openly for some days after the French troops entered, still desperately clinging to illusions and pertinaciously preaching the gospel of democracy to all such as had heart enough left to listen. Finally he departed with an American passport; but not having secured a French *visé*, he had to trust to friends to secure his escape, which took place by means of a steamer from Civita Vecchia to Marseilles.

Oudinot showed the utmost moderation. He took no steps to hinder the departure of those who had taken part in the republican movement; and the British Consul gave out no less than five hundred passports,³—which matters caused the greatest indignation at Gaëta.⁴

Those who had difficulty in escaping were the followers

¹ No better comment on this letter can be offered than a remark made by De Tocqueville to the Papal Nuncio in Paris, a few months later: “The French Government has paid dearly for the right of advising the Pope!”

² Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 245. The Commission consisted of Cardinals della Genga, Vanicelli, and Altieri, all strongly retrograde. Pius did not return to Rome until April 12th, 1850.

³ And earned a very severe reprimand from Lord Palmerston.

⁴ N. Bianchi, *Diplomazia Europea*, vi. 550.

of Garibaldi. Hotly pursued by French and Austrian flying columns, his 4000 men soon melted away among the Apennines. He himself escaped after great hardships,¹ but many of those whom he led died or were captured. Ciceroacchio and his two sons, with twenty-four others, were captured and shot at Sinigaglia under Papal orders.²

On September 12th, Pius declared for a system of government embracing a consultative Council of State, Provincial, and Municipal Councils. On October 6th, Sir George Hamilton, British Minister at Florence, wrote to Lord Palmerston in the following terms:—

“The greatest discontent prevails at Rome, and although the character of the Pope, so remarkable for personal piety, is respected, yet all enthusiasm and even interest in his cause has ceased to exist.

“This indifference has greatly augmented since the arrival of the Cardinals who now form the governing Junta at Rome. Every act of theirs has shown the strongest tendency to retrograde principles, and to the adoption of the abuses of the old papal rule. . . . This is a melancholy prospect for the future.”

¹ His wife, who had always accompanied him, died in his arms in the forest of Ravenna.

² Tivaroni says, by an Austrian captain, *op. cit.* ii. 448.

APPENDIX A

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PONTIFICAL STATES, 1846-49

It cannot be hoped that the bibliography that follows is either free from error or absolutely complete. The list of authorities that shall fulfil those conditions has yet to be compiled. For the shortcomings that bibliographers will no doubt discover in the present one, a lack of facilities and of opportunity may serve as a partial excuse.

The classifications adopted are as follows :—(I) Works that may be conveniently described as falling in the category of first-hand evidence, whether owing to their reproducing official documents in full, or to their authors having been directly concerned in the events they narrate ; (II) Roman newspapers of the period ; (III) books not entitled to figure in the first-named class.

It is highly probable that a few works that should by rights appear in Class I have been placed in Class III, but strictness has been an obvious rule to follow, and all doubtful cases have been relegated to the less important class.

Many of the works given are short pamphlets, the contents of which are often as well explained by their crowded title-pages as they would be by critical notes.

This bibliography is not that of books *consulted*, but precisely as stated in the heading. A number of those included have been unfortunately inaccessible, while some would be difficult to procure or consult under the most favourable circumstances. On the other hand a number of books have been consulted and referred to that will not appear in the

bibliography for the reason that they do not, strictly speaking, deal with Roman history, or do not concern the period chosen. As examples, Della Rocca, Greville, and Madame de Staël may be cited: their works, as well as those of a number of other writers from whom quotations are made, will not appear in the following lists. This plan has its disadvantages, but appeared inevitable; for a small, accurately defined, and complete (or potentially complete) bibliography, is of infinitely greater value to the historian than one of which the scope, though larger, is ill defined, and in which the risk of serious omission is consequently immeasurably increased.

I

1. ANON. Actes officiels de la République Romaine depuis le 9 février jusqu'au 2 juillet 1849, extraits et traduits du *Moniteur Romain*. Paris, 1849. 8vo.
2. ANON. Arcadi, Accademia degli. Adunanza solenne tenuta dagli Arcadi per l' esaltazione al pont. di S. S. Pio IX il 3 dicembre 1846. (Without indication.) 8vo.
3. ANON. Archivio triennale delle cose d' Italia dall' avvenimento di Pio IX. all' abbandono di Venezia. Capolago, 1850-55. 3 vols. 16mo.
An important though unreliable publication, representing the views of the Giovane Italia. It was put together chiefly by C. Cattaneo and A. Saffi. The third volume has a preface by Mazzini.
4. ANON. Beiträge für Geschichte des Feldzugs im Jahr 1848 in Italien. Von einem höhern k. k. Offizier. Wien, 1880. 8vo.
Deals with the operations of the 3rd Army Corps under Nugent between Treviso and Verona.
5. ANON. Carte segrete e Atti ufficiali della Polizia austriaca in Italia, del 4 giugno 1814 al 22 marzo 1848. Capolago, 1851-52. 3 vols. 16mo.
A valuable compilation,—but must be used with discretion.
6. ANON. Degli Israeliti nei dominii della Chiesa innanzi la pubblicazione dello statuto fondamentale e della utilità e

convenienza di emanciparli, discorsi cinque per un religioso. Bologna, 1848. 8vo.

ANON. *Erinnerungen eines österreichischen Veteranen.* See Schönhalls, 90.

7. ANON. *Esatta descrizione desunta da apposito Ceremoniale della solenne pompa, corteggio, sacre funzioni e riti del Possesso del Sommo Pontefice Pio IX.* Roma, Tip. delle Scienze. (No date, but presumably 1846.) 8vo.
8. ANON. *Esatta informazione di tutto ciò che segue in Roma in tempo di sede vacante tanto nel conclave che fuori per la elezione del nuovo Sommo Pontefice.* Bologna, 1846. 4to.
9. ANON. *Indirizzo al successori di Gregorio XVI, scritto per cura di un galantuomo.* Italia, 1846. 12mo.
10. ANON. *Kriegsreignisse bei der österreichischen Armee in Italien.* Wien, 1848. 3 vols.
Official publication of the Austrian Staff, for private circulation only. The second volume deals with the operations against the Pontifical troops.
11. ANON. *Lettres sur Rome. Journal d'un officier français de l'armée expéditionnaire d'Italie,* 1849. Paris, 1850. 12mo.
12. ANON. *Protocollo della Repubblica romana. Collezione degli atti, indirizzi, e proteste trasmesse all' Assemblea ed al Governo dopo l' invasione francese.* Roma, 1849. Fol.
13. ANON. *Raccolta delle leggi e disposizioni del Governo provvisorio di Roma dal 25 nov. 1848 all' 8 feb. 1849.* Torino, 1850. 8vo.
14. AVEZZANA, GIUSEPPE. *Appello ai Genovesi, a giustificazione di quanto operò durante la Repubblica Romana.* Malta, 1849. 8vo.

A very short pamphlet, or address, written by Avezzana immediately after his escape from Rome in July 1849.

AZEGLIO. See D'Azeglio, 35.

15. BALBO, CESARE. *Delle speranze d' Italia.* Parigi, 1844. 16mo.
This work is noticed in the text.
16. BALLEYDIER, A. *Histoire de la révolution de Rome. Tableaux religieux, politique et militaire des années 1846-1850 en Italie.* Genève, 1851. 2 vols. 8vo.
Full of exaggerations and inaccuracies.

17. **BALLEYDIER, A.** *Rome et Pie IX.* Paris, 1847. 8vo. Portrait.
Balleydier, who was a strong clerical, was appointed official historiographer to the Emperor of Austria in 1858.
18. **BASTIDE, JULES.** *La République française et l'Italie en 1848.* Recits, notes et documents diplomatiques. Bruxelles, 1858. 8vo.
A good collection of documents covering the period when the author was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1848.
19. **BEGHELLI, GIUSEPPE.** *La Repubblica romana del 1849; con documenti inediti.* Lodi, 1874. 16mo.
A much-quoted work, but of very slight value and authority. Incomplete: only one volume has appeared.
20. **BELGIOJOSO, CHRISTINE TRIVULCE.** *L'Italia e la rivoluzione italiana nel 1848.*
The Princess was an ardent revolutionist. Her works are of little authority.
21. **BIANCHI, LUIGI.** *Incidents in the Life of an Italian: Priest, Soldier, Refugee.* London, 1859. 12mo.
Not without interest, but too loosely written to be of more than slight use historically.
22. **BIANCHI, NICOMEDE.** *I Ducat estensi dall'anno 1815 al 1850.* Torino, 1852. 2 vols. 8vo.
A valuable work, but bearing very slightly on the subject here dealt with.
23. **BIANCHI, NICOMEDE.** *Vicende del Mazzinianismo politico e religioso dal 1832 al 1854.* Savona, 1854. 8vo.
Indispensable for the history of the Giovane Italia movement, and containing many interesting details. Bianchi, though an opponent of the republicans, is fairer than most of the party writers of the period.
24. **BIANCHI, NICOMEDE.** *Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia dall'anno 1814 all'anno 1861.* Torino, 1865. 8 vols. 8vo.
Perhaps the most valuable of modern Italian historical works, chiefly on account of the large number of documents it sets out. The fifth and sixth volumes are of considerable assistance for the period here dealt with.

BIANCHI, NICOMEDE. See Zucchi, 103.

25. BONAPARTE, C. L. Discours, allocutions, et opinions dans le conseil des députés et l'assemblée constituante de Rome en 1848 et 1849, avec un appendice contenant des documents historiques et des pièces diverses. Traduit de l'Italien d'après le *Moniteur* et autres journaux et documents officiels. Leide, 1858. 4 vols. 8vo.
26. BOULANGÉ, THÉODORE. Rome en 1848, 1849, 1851. Correspondance d'un officier français de l'armée expéditionnaire d'Italie. Limoges, 1851. 2 vols. 8vo.
27. BRESCHIANI, ANTONIO. L' Ebrao di Verona. Bologna, 1848.
The fanciful production of a Jesuit, not strictly entitled to take place in a historical bibliography, and only included because so often quoted.
28. British Parliamentary Papers. (Blue-Books.)
29. British and Foreign State Papers.
Quoted as British State Papers.
CANINO. *See* Bonaparte.
30. CAPPONI, GINO. Scritti editi e inediti. Per cura di Marco Tabarrini. Firenze, 1877. 2 vols. 12mo.
Contains miscellaneous matter, of which little is of interest for the present subject.
31. CAPPONI, GINO. Sulle attuali condizioni della Romagna. *See* 35.
CARLETTI, MARIO. *See* Gouraud, 197.
32. CERNUSCHI, ENRICO. Représentant du peuple romain, jugé par le Conseil de guerre de l'armée française à Rome. Capolago, 1850. 8vo.
33. CLOUGH, A. H. Prose Remains. London, 1869. 12mo.
Clough was in Rome during the siege, and some of his letters and entries give interesting details, though none of very great importance.
COLOMB. *See* Key, 66.
CORCELLE. *See* de Corcelle, 41.
34. D' AZEGLIO, MASSIMO. Degli ultimi casi di Romagna. Lugano, 1846. 12mo.
This book is fully commented on in the text. (The first edition was given as published : Italia, 1846. 32mo.)

35. D' AZEGLIO, MASSIMO. *Degli ultimi casi di Romagna ; riflessioni.* Bastia, 1846. 16mo. *See* 31.
36. D' AZEGLIO, MASSIMO. *Lutti di Lombardia.* Roma, 1848. 8vo.
A short pamphlet published in February 1848 calling for war against Austria.
37. D' AZEGLIO, MASSIMO. *Proposta d' un programma per l' Opinione Nazionale Italiana.* Firenze, 1847. 16mo.
38. D' AZEGLIO, MASSIMO. *Relazione succinta delle operazioni del generale Durando nello Stato Veneto.* Milano, 1848. 8vo.
D' Azeglio commanded the most important of the Pontifical positions at Vicenza, where he was wounded. His relation is valuable.
39. D' AZEGLIO, MASSIMO. *L'Italie de 1847 à 1865. Correspondence politique de Massimo d' Azeglio accompagnée d'une introduction et de notes par Eugène Rendu.* Paris, 1867. 16mo.
Dealing principally with Sardinian affairs, and with a later period.
40. D' AZEGLIO, MASSIMO. *I miei ricordi.* Firenze, 1866. 8vo.
An English translation (by Count Maffei, London, 1868) has been used.
Has more personal than historical interest, though not without importance.
41. DE CORCELLE, FRANÇOIS TIRCUIR. *Souvenir de 1848, première intervention dans les affaires de Rome.* Paris, 1858. 8vo.
42. DE LAMARTINE, ALPH. *Trois mois au pouvoir.* Paris, 1848. 12mo.
An interesting and valuable record, with a number of official documents and reports of speeches.
43. DE LESSEPS, FERDINAND. *Ma mission à Rome.* Mai, 1849. *Mémoire présenté au Conseil d'Etat.* Paris, 1849. 8vo.
Statement prepared by de Lesseps after his recall, containing considerable official information.
44. DE LESSEPS, FERDINAND. *Notes officielles échangées entre le Gouvernement de la République romaine et M. de Lesseps.* Paris, 1849. 8vo.
45. DE LESSEPS, FERDINAND. *Réponse au Ministère et au Conseil d'Etat.* Paris, 1849. 12mo.

46. DEL VECCHIO, B. L'assedio di Roma, racconto storico. Capolago, 1849. 12mo.
47. DEL VECCHIO, B. Bologna nel maggio, 1849; cronaca. In *Documenti della Guerra santa d' Italia*. Capolago, 1849-51. 20 vols.
48. DEL VECCHIO, B. L'assedio e il blocco d' Ancona (maggio e giugno, 1849). In same publication as 47.
49. DEL VECCHIO, B. Intorno al fatto Bolognese del 8 agosto 1848; cronaca. In same publication as 47.
50. DURANDO, GEN. Schiarimento sulla condotta del Gen. Durando. Rome, 1848. 8vo.
51. DURANDO, GIACOMO. Della nazionalità italiana: saggio politico militare. Losanna, 1846.
One of the most important pamphlets of the period. A call to insurrection, but with ill-defined political aims.
52. FARINI, LUIGI CARLO. Le stato romano dall' anno 1815 all' anno 1850. Torino, 1850. 4 vols. 16mo.
By far the best of the contemporary accounts. The author, who had taken a prominent part in the liberal agitation, occupied official posts that gave him good facilities for obtaining information.
53. FARINI, LUIGI CARLO. Lettere. Ravenna, 1878.
54. FULLER, MARGARET FULLER OSSOLI. Memoirs. London, 1852. 3 vols. 12mo.
Margaret Fuller's *Memoirs* belong more to the domain of literature than to that of history. Yet it may be recalled that she had collected materials for a history of the Roman Revolution that were lost with her. Count Ossoli, her husband, was a Mazzinian, as were most of her friends.
55. GABUSSI. Memorie della rivoluzione degli stati romani. Genova, 1851.
A detailed but untrustworthy account.
56. GALLETTI, G. Memorie intorno ai fatti accaduti in Roma nel 1846 e 1849 ed osservazioni sulla condotta degli amnistiati verso Pio IX. Modena, 1863. 8vo.
57. GARIBALDI, GIUSEPPE. Memorie. Florence, 1888.
A disappointing book. See in English, *Autobiography*; of very slight value.

58. GAVAZZI, A. Orazione per l' anniversario dell' elezione di Pio IX e due opuscoli inediti: *Il papa e la costituzione, e Se debba ammettersi una Camera di Pari nella costituzione degli Stati papali*. Genova, 1848. 12mo.
For an account of Father Gavazzi, see Appendix E.
59. GAVAZZI, A. Elogio funebre del padre Ugo Bassi. London, 1849.
60. GIOBERTI, VINCENZO. Del Primato morale e civile degli Italiani. Bruxelles, 1843. 8vo.
61. GIOBERTI, VINCENZO. Prolegomeni del Primato. Capolago, 1846.
62. GIOBERTI, VINCENZO. Il Gesuita moderno. Losanna, 1847.
These are all noticed in the text.
63. GIOBERTI, VINCENZO. Opere inedite (edited by G. Massari). Torino, Paris, 1856. 10 vols. 8vo.
A bulky collection of miscellaneous matter, much of it of trifling value.
64. GUALTERIO, F. A. Gli ultimi rivolgimenti italiani, Memorie storiche con documenti inediti. Firenze, 1850. 2 parts, 4 vols. 8vo.
Written on the same lines as Bianchi's *Diplomazia Europea*, but less trustworthy, and with a much smaller collection of documents. Indispensable to the student of the period.
Gualterio's book is very awkwardly divided. What is practically his fourth volume has been cited as Gualterio, *Le Riforme*.
65. HOFFSTETTER, G. VON. Tagebuch aus Italien, 1849. Zurich, 1851. 8vo. (8 maps and plans.)
Account of the military operations, May-June 1849, by a German officer in the service of the Roman Republic. Contains some useful details.
66. KEY, ADMIRAL SIR ASTLEY COOPER. Memoirs. By Vice-Admiral P. H. Colomb. London, 1898. 8vo.
Has a few references to the period here dealt with, which have value coming from an impartial and intelligent observer.
67. LA CECILIA, H. Memorie storico-politiche dal 1820 al 1876. Rome, 1876.
LAMARTINE. See de Lamartine, 42.

LESSEPS. *See* de Lesseps, 43.

68. MAMIANI, TERENCE. Due lettere, l'una a suoi elettori, l'altra alla Santità di Pio IX. Genova, 1849. 8vo.
69. MAMIANI, TERENCE. Opere politiche. Firenze, 1853. 12mo.
70. MANNUCCI, M. Il mio governo in Cività Vecchia e l'intervento francese, con note e documenti ufficiali. Torino, 1850. 8vo.
Good to consult for the disembarkation of the French troops at Civita Vecchia.
- MASSARI. *See* Gioberti, 63.
71. MAZZINI, G. Pio IX, lettera al clero italiano. Italia, 1850. 8vo.
72. MAZZINI, G. Ai signori Tocqueville e Falloux, ministri di Francia; lettera. Losanna, 1849. 8vo.
73. MAZZINI, G. Italy, Austria, and the Pope. A letter to Sir James Graham, Bart. London, 1845. 8vo.
74. MAZZINI, G. Scritti editi e inediti. Milano, 1861-71; Roma, 1877-80. 13 vols.
75. MAZZINI, G. Life and Writings. London, 1864. 6 vols. 8vo.
76. MAZZINI, G. Le pape au dix-neuvième siècle. Paris, 1850. 12mo.
For Mazzini's writings, *see* text.
77. MICKIEWICZ, ADAM. Mémorial de la légion polonaise de 1848 créée en Italie. Publication faite d'après les papiers de son père avec une préface et notes par Tadislas Mickiewicz. Paris, 1877. 12mo.
78. MINGHETTI, MARCO. Miei Ricordi. Torino, 1889. 3 vols. 8vo.
Containing much superfluous matter, yet one of the most valuable and reliable personal records of the period.
79. NICCOLINI, G. History of the Pontificate of Pius the Ninth. Edinburgh, 1851. 12mo.
Contains a few interesting details.
80. OLIPHANT, MRS. Memoir of Laurence Oliphant. Edinburgh, 1892. 2 vols. 8vo.
A few diary entries of Laurence Oliphant are of slight use.
81. ORSINI, F. Memorie e documenti intorno al Governo della Repubblica romana. Nizza, 1850.

An English translation by George Carbonel (Edinburgh, 1857) has been used.

An interesting work containing many curious details. Completely devoid of literary merit and pretensions, but with a better claim to sincerity than most of the contemporary memoirs.

OSSOLI. *See* Fuller, 54.

82. OUDINOT, GEN., DUC DE REGGIO. *Précis historique et militaire de l'expédition française en Italie* (1849). Marseilles, 1849. 8vo.

83. PASOLINI, GIUSEPPE. *Memorie raccolte da suo figlio*. Imola, 1881. 8vo.

An English (abridged) translation by Lady Dalhousie (London, 1885) has been used.

Somewhat disappointing from one who was so well placed for information. A few interesting details, but no very high standard of precision.

84. PISACANE, CARLO. *Rapido cenno sugli ultimi avvenimenti di Roma, dalla salita della breccia al di 15 luglio 1849*. Losanna, 1849. 8vo.

Was Chief-of-staff to Roselli during the siege.

85. PYAT, FÉLIX. *Question romaine. Affaire du 13 juin. Lettre aux électeurs de la Seine, de la Nièvre et du Cher*. Lausanne, 1849. 8vo.

Pyat was one of the supporters of Ledru Rollin, and took a prominent part in the attempted rising of June 13th, 1849. He was one of the leaders of the Commune in 1871.

86. REUMONT, ALFRED VON. *Gaëta. Erinnerungen aus dem Jahre 1849*. Berlin, 1850. 12mo.

The writer followed Pius IX to Gaëta after his flight from Rome.

87. ROSELLI, PIETRO. *Memorie relative alla spedizione e combattimento di Velletri avvenuto il 19 maggio 1849*. Torino, 1853. 16mo.

Good to consult for the fighting at Velletri and General Roselli's relations with Garibaldi.

88. RUSCONI, C. *La repubblica romana del 1849*. Torino, 1850. 2 vols. 8vo.

An important account by one of the principal actors, but far below Farini's for scope and accuracy.

89. RUSCONI, C. *La repubblica romana (del 1849)*. In *Documenti della Guerra santa d' Italia*. Capolago, 1849-51.
90. SCHÖNHALLS, FELDMARSCHALL LIEUT. VON. *Erinnerungen eines österreichischen Veteranen aus den italienischen Kriegen der Jahre 1848 und 1849*. Stuttgart, 1851. 2 vols. 8vo.
First published anonymously. A lightly written and very successful soldier's record, but not authoritative.
91. SPADA, F. *Il giorno 17 giugno 1847*. (No indications.) Fol.
92. SPADA, F. *Del genere di storia che si conviene ai fatti del nostro tempo, cioè ai primi tre anni del pont. di Pio IX. Discorso*. Roma, 1849. 8vo.
93. SPADA, GIUSEPPE. *Storia della rivoluzione di Roma*. Firenze, 1868. 3 vols.
The best of the clerical accounts of the Roman revolution, and useful to check Farini: far below the latter in authority.
94. SPAUR, CONTESSA TERESA GIRAUD. *Relazione del viaggio di Pio IX P.M. a Gaëta*. Firenze, 1851. 8vo.
Only 300 copies were printed, for private circulation. There is a French edition, and also a German one.
Useful and apparently fairly reliable for the facts that came under the personal observation of the author.
95. STEIGER, R. VON. *Die Schweizer-Regimenter in königlich neapolitanischen Diensten, 1848-1849*. Bern, 1851. 8vo.
The author was a colonel in the Neapolitan service.
96. VAILLANT, GENERAL. *Le Siège de Rome en 1849*. Paris, 1851.
Official publication of the French War Office, for private circulation only.
97. VECCHI, C. AUGUSTO. *La Italia. Storia di due anni 1848-49*. Torino, 1851. 8vo. Illustrated.
VECCHIO. See *Del Vecchio*, 46.
98. VENTURA, G. *La questione sicula nel 1848*. Roma, 1848.
99. VENTURA, G. *Rome and the Papacy*. London, 1849.
100. VENTURA, G. *Sopra una camere di Pari*. Roma, 1848.
Father Ventura was a Sicilian ex-Jesuit, a preacher of

reputation, and a popular character at Rome. He was an ardent liberal, and represented the Sicilian insurgents at Rome. *See* Clavè, 172.

101. VERTRAY, CAPITAINE. Album de l'expédition romaine. Paris, 1853.
Illustrated record by a French officer who took part in the expedition. Published for private circulation.
102. WELDEN, L. FRHR. VON. Episoden aus meinem Leben. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Feldzüge der österreichischen Armee in Italien in den Jahren 1848-1849. Gratz, 1853. 8vo.
103. ZUCCHI, C. Memorie del Generale Carlo Zucchi pubblicate per cura di Nicomede Bianchi. Milano, Torino, 1801.
An interesting autobiography, useful for the period of Rossi's ministry.

II

Published at Rome—

104. BILANCIA. Clerical.
105. CALENDRINO. Clerical; Francesco Ximenes.
106. CONTEMPORANEO. Democratic; Sterbini.
107. DIARIO DI ROMA.
108. DON PIRLONE. Comic, anti-clerical.
109. EPOCA. Afterwards SPERANZA DELL' EPOCA; was democratic at the commencement, and later anti-republican. Among the contributors may be noted Mamiani, Farini, and Pantaleoni.
110. GAZZETTA DI ROMA. *See* GIORNALE DI ROMA.
111. GIORNALE DI ROMA. Afterwards GAZZETTA DI ROMA, and later MONITORE ROMANO—official paper. Mamiani, Rossi, and Perfetti were among the contributors.
112. GIORNALE ROMANO. Clerical; Tosi.
113. ITALIA DEL POPOLO. Republican. Among the contributors were Mazzini, Princess Belgiojoso, and Ruffoni.
114. ITALICO. Moderate; Diotallevi. Spinti, Pinto, and Gigli were among the contributors.
115. LABARO. Clerical; Bianchi Giovini.
116. MONITORE ROMANO. *See* GIORNALE DI ROMA.

117. PALLADE. Democratic ; Sterbini.
118. POPOLARE. Democratic ; Malvolti. Among the contributors were Torre and Masi.
119. POSITIVO. Democratic ; Gazzola.
120. ROMAN ADVERTISER.
121. SENTINELLA DEL CAMPIDOGLIO. Democratic, clandestine ; Sterbini.
122. SPERANZA. Democratic. Among the contributors were General Durando, Dallongaro, Gennarelli, and Princess Belgiojoso.
123. SPERANZA DELL' EPOCA. *See* EPOCA.
124. SPERANZA ITALIANA. Democratic ; Gennarelli.
125. TRIBUNO. Democratic ; De Bonis.

Published at Bologna—

126. FELSINEO. Moderate democratic ; Marco Minghetti.
127. ITALIANO. Democratic ; Berti-Pichat, Aglebert.

III

128. ANON. Eroica valore italiano spiegato dei Bolognesi contro gli Austriaci nella giornate 8 ag. 1848. Bologna, 1859. 4to.
129. ANON. Cronaca generale degli avvenimenti di Europa dall' elezione di Pio IX sino all' ingresso delle truppe francesi in Roma. Bologna, 1850. 8vo.
130. ANON. Il Gesuitismo e Pio IX. Milan, 1848.
131. ANON. Il prelado italiano Mons. Carlo Gazola ed il Vicariato di Roma sotto Papa Pio IX, 1848-1850. Torino, 1850. 8vo.
132. ANON. Incitamento agli Italiani a rivolgere omai tutte le loro facultà morali e fisiche al solo nobile scopo dell' unità nazionale italiana, d' un Vigile romagnolo. Due parole sopra alcune lettere politiche di Cesare Balbo. Italia, 1847. 16mo.
133. ANON. I primordi del pont. di Pio IX. Firenze, 1848. 8vo.
134. ANON. La Repubblica italiana del 1849. Suo processo. Torino, Bologna, 1850. 8vo.

135. ANON. *La spedizione francese a Roma nel 1849. Descrizione dei principali avvenimenti, fatta da un milite Lombardo reduce in patria.* Milano, 1850. 16mo.
136. ANON. *Les mystères du clergé romain ou Révélations et mémoires au sujet de la Théocratie catholique sous les pontificats de Grégoire XVI et de Pie IX, par un citoyen romain.* Lausanne, 1852. 16mo.
137. ANON. Luciano Manara. Milano, 1860. 32mo.
 Edited, or perhaps written, by G. Maestri, who was at one time envoy of the Roman Republic in Tuscany.
138. ANON. *Mémoire sur les confiscations ordonnées par le Gouvernement pontifical au préjudice des membres du triumvirat.* (No indications.) 8vo.
139. ANON. *Pius IX, or the First Year of his Pontificate.* London, 1848. 2 vols. 8vo.
140. ANON. *Risposta all' allocuzione di Pio IX nel Consistoro di Gaëta a di 20 aprile 1849.* (No indication of place), 1849. 8vo.
141. ANON. *Ristretto del processo per l' uccisione di Pellegrino Rossi.* Roma, 1854.
 Account of the trial and condemnation of Constantini, Grandoni, and others. Copies of this publication are very scarce.
142. ANON. *Roma nel giorno 8 settembre 1846. Lettera di un curato di Campagna al proprio vescovo, con note e documenti diversi.* Livorno, 1846. 12mo.
143. ANON. *Roma nel 1849 e suoi politici avvenimenti.* Milano, 1849. 8vo.
144. ANON. *Storia dell' assassinio di P. Rossi tratta dei processi e descritta dalla Civiltà Catholica.* Torino, 1854.
145. ANON. *Sul Governo Pontificio; nota di un Consultore di Stato del 1847.* Bologna, 1869. 8vo.
146. ANON. *Sulla convenzione di Durando a Vicenza dell' 11 giugno 1848.* Milan, 1848. 8vo.
147. ANON. *Vita del Padre Bresciani.* Torino, 1859. 8vo.
148. ARLINCOURT, VISCOMTE D'. *L'Italie rouge, ou histoire des révolutions de Rome, Naples, Palerme, Florence, Parme,*

- Modène, Turin, Milan, Venise, depuis l'avènement du pape Pie IX, en juin 1846, jusqu'à sa rentrée dans la capitale en 1850. Paris, 1850. 16mo.
149. ARTAUD, ALEXIS FRANÇOIS. La Papauté et les émeutes romaines. Paris, 1847. 8vo.
150. B. M. Il Gesuitismo e Pio IX. Milano, 1848. 8vo.
Printed by Tamburini.
151. BALMÈS, DON J. Pie IX, pontife et souverain. Paris, 1848. 16mo.
152. BENOIST DE MATOUGHES. Vie de S. S. Pie IX, ou biographie de cet auguste pontife, suivie de pièces justificatives et d'un tableau chronologique des papes depuis saint Pierre jusqu'à ce jour. Paris, 1847. 12mo. Portrait.
153. BERSEGIO, V. Ricordi storici : Pio IX, Pellegrino Rossi, Angelo Brunetti. Rivista Nuova di scienze, lett., ed arti, 1879.
154. BERTOLINI, FRANCESCO. Pellegrino Rossi nella storia del risorgimento italiano. Bologna, 1885.
Unimportant.
155. BIEDENFELD, FERD. FRHR. VON. Der Krieg in Ober-Italien im Jahre 1848. Leipzig, 1848. 8vo.
Compiled from the Gazette and other contemporary reports.
BONI. *See* De Boni, 178.
156. BORIE, VICTOR. Histoire du Pape Pie IX, et de la dernière révolution romaine (1846-1849). Bruxelles, 1851. 12mo.
157. BRASINI, DOMENICO. L' 8 agosto 1848 in Bologna. Notizie e documenti, raccolti e publicati. Bologna, 1883. 8vo.
158. BRETONNEAU, H. Notice biographique sur notre saint père le pape Pie IX. Paris, 1847. 12mo. Portrait.
159. BRIFFAULT, E. Le secret de Rome au XIX. siècle. Le peuple, la cour, l'église ; précédé de l'histoire des Jésuites depuis la fondation de l'ordre jusqu'à nos jours. Paris, 1850. 4 vols. 8vo.
BUSSY. *See* Marchal, 208.
C. M. *See* Marchal, 208.

160. CALINDRI, G. Saggio statistico storico del Pontificio Governo. Perugia, 1829, 1830. Fol.
A very copious and useful compilation.
161. CANTÙ, CESARE. Della indipendenza italiana—Cronistoria. Torino, 1872-77. 3 vols., 5 parts, 8vo.
For this subject the second part of the second volume may be consulted. On Rome, Cantù is far less full and useful than on Lombardy. His excellences, peculiarities of opinion, and defects are generally too well known to require mention here, yet his unprecise manner of quoting may be specially adverted to.
162. CANTÙ, IGNAZIO. Pio IX il più grande degli uomini, cause genuine dell' allocuzione del 29 aprile 1848, esposte e documentate. Milano, 1848. 8vo.
163. CANUTI, M. Question italienne; nouvelle édition, suivie de quelques réflexions de l'auteur sur les affaires des états Romains. Paris, 1846. 8vo.
A short pamphlet by a Roman exile. Of no great importance.
164. CAPPELLETTI, LICURGO. Storia di Carlo Alberto. Roma, 1891. 8vo.
165. CAPPELLI, G. Rifflessioni sul sistema amministrativo dello stato pontificio. Roma, 1847.
166. CARPI, LEONE. Blocco dei Francesi al Ghetto di Roma nell' anno di grazia 1849 e secondo della loro Repubblica. Torino, 1849. 8vo.
167. CECCONI, L. Il padre Ugo Bassi a Palermo, Roma e Bologna; racconto. Torino, 1850. 8vo.
168. CÈNAC-MONCAUT, JUSTIN EDOUARD MATHIEU. L'Eglise romaine et la liberté, ou introduction historique à l'avènement de Pie IX. Paris, 1840. 8vo.
169. CHANTREL, JOSEPH. Pontificat du pape Pie IX. Paris, 1862. 18mo.
170. CHANTREL, JOSEPH. Annales ecclésiastiques de 1846 à 1860 et de 1860 à 1866, ou histoire résumée de l'histoire catholique pendant les dernières années. Paris, 1861-68. 2 vols. 8vo.
Popular work for catholic readers.
- CHATEAUBRIAND. *See* de Chateaubriand, 180.
171. CIPPOLLETTA, EUGENIO. Memorie politiche sui conclavi da

Pio VII a Pio IX, compilate su documenti diplomatici segreti rinvenuti negli archivi degli Esteri dell' ex-regno delle Due Sicilie. Milano, 1863. 16mo.

172. CLAVÈ, FÉLIX. Vie et portrait de Pie IX ; suivi des oraisons funèbres d'O'Connell et du chanoine Graziosi, par le R. P. Ventura, et de documents officiels. Paris, 1848. 8vo. 5 portraits.

See Ventura, 198.

173. CLELIA. Il governo del monaco. Roma nel Secolo XIX. Milano, 1870.

174. CLERC, J. B. Pie IX, Rome et l'Italie. Paris, 1849. 8vo.

175. CUNEO D' ORNANO. Rome et Pie IX. Rome, 1848. 8vo. D'AGOULT. *See* Stern, 239.

176. DEBIDOUR, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis l'ouverture du Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à la clôture du Congrès de Berlin (1814-1878). Paris, 1891. 2 vols. 8vo.

Written on a large scale by a competent writer ; not without errors. Useful for the general reader.

177. DEBIDOUR, A. Histoire des rapports de l'Eglise et de l'Etat en France de 1789 à 1870. Paris, 1898. 8vo.

Chapter V. is useful for the present subject, but great caution should be used in accepting this writer's unsupported statements.

178. DE BONI, FILIPPO. La congiura di Roma e Pio IX ; ricordi. Losanna, 1847. 16mo.

179. DE BONI, FILIPPO. Il Papa Pio IX ; note. Capolago, 1849. 16mo.

DE BUSSY. *See* Marchal, 208.

- 179A. DE BRÈVAL, JULES. Mazzini judged by Himself and by his Countrymen. London, 1853. 8vo.

A collection of anti-Mazzinian quotations mostly from Gioberti, Giovini, and D' Azeglio.

180. DE CHATEAUBRIAND, F. A. Mémoires d'outre tombe. Paris, 1861. 6 vols. 8vo.

Contains little of importance for the present subject.

181. DE GIVODAN, LÉON. Le Pape et l'Italie. Considérations sur le pouvoir pontifical dans ses rapports avec les libertés et l'avenir de l'Italie. Paris, 1848. 8vo.

182. DE GIVODAN, LÉON. Rome, Turin et Florence. Considérations sur l'état présent de l'Italie. 1849. 8vo.
183. DE LA ROCHÈRE, COMTESSE EUGÉNIE. Rome. Souvenirs religieux, historiques, artistiques, de l'expédition française en 1849 et 1850. Tours, 1854. 8vo.
DE MATOUGHES. *See* Benoist, 152.
184. DE MONTALEMBERT, C. Pie IX et la France en 1859. Article in LE CORRESPONDANT, 1859.
D'ORNANO. *See* Cuneo, 175.
185. DE SAINT ALBIN, A. Les francs-maçons et les sociétés secrètes, suivi des actes apostoliques des souverains pontifes, Clement XII, Benoît XIV, Pie VII, Léon XII, et Pie IX. Paris, 1867. 8vo.
186. DE VALMY. Pie IX, prince temporel et souverain spirituel. Article in LE CORRESPONDANT, 1846.
187. DE VALMY. Pie IX en 1848. Article in LE CORRESPONDANT, 1848.
188. D'IDEVILLE, H. VICOMTE. Le comte Rossi, sa vie, son œuvre, sa mort (1787-1848). Paris, 1887. 8vo. Portrait.
D'ORNANO. *See* Cuneo, 175.
189. DU CAMP, JULES. Histoire de la révolution de février, jusques et y compris le siège de Rome. Paris, 1850. 8vo.
190. FRACASSETI, G. Pio IX, pontefice massimo. Firenze, 1846. 12mo.
191. GAILLARD, LEOPOLD DE. L'expédition de Rome en 1849, avec pièces justificatives et documents inédits. Paris, 1861. 8vo.
192. GALEOTTI, J. Della sovranità e del governo temporale dei Papi. Capolago, 1847. 12mo.
193. GALLI. Cenni economico statistichi sullo stato pontificio. Roma, 1840. 8vo.
194. GAMBERINI, CESARE (tenente colonnello). Schiarimenti sui fatti accaduti a Roma, fuori Porta S. Pancrazio, nel giugno 1849. Bologna, 1884.
195. GENNARELLI, A. Il governo pontificio e lo Stato Romano, documenti preceduti da una esposizione storica e raccolti per decreto del Governo della Romagna. Prato, 1860. 2 vols. fol.

Contains copious details of judicial and other proceedings

under the Papal Government in Romagna under Gregory XVI.

196. GENNARELLI, A. Atti e documenti diversi da servire di illustrazione e di complemento ai volumi delle sventure italiane durante il Pontificato di Pio Nono e dell' epistolario politico toscano. Firenze, 1863. 8vo.

GIVODAN. *See* de Givodan, 181.

197. GOURAUD, C. L' Italia sue ultime rivoluzioni e suo stato presente di Carlo Gouraud. Versione con annotazioni critiche e documenti di Mario Carletti. Firenze, 1852. 8vo.

An Italian version of a French work that owes its chief value to the profuse notes of the translator Carletti. He appears to have had considerable first-hand knowledge, but cannot be trusted for accuracy.

198. GUALTERIO, L. Memorie di Ugo Bassi martire dell' indipendenza italiana, coll' aggiunta di lettere e di preziosi documenti relativi alla vita e morte del martire non che ai principali avvenimenti politici del 1848. Bologna, 1861. 8vo.

199. GUIZOT, H. Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps. Paris, 1858-67. 8 vols. 8vo.

Of little assistance for the subject here dealt with.

200. HALTAUS, C. Pabst Pius IX und seine Reformen im Kirchenstaate. Leipzig, 1847. 8vo.

201. HELFERT, FRHR. VON. Gregor XVI und Pius IX. Ausgang und Aufgang ihrer Regierung. October 1845-November 1846. Mit Benutzung von Metternich'schen Schriften und K. K. Botschafts-Berichten aus Rom. Prazze, 1895. 8vo.

One of the best works on the period; unfortunately is not continued beyond the close of the year 1846. It is written temperately, from an Austrian point of view, and is largely based on the correspondence between Metternich and Lutzow. Particularly useful for the troubles of Romagna of 1845, 1846.

IDEVILLE. *See* d'Ideville, 169.

- 201A. KING, B. A History of Italian Unity, 1814-1871. London, 1899. 2 vols. 8vo.

202. LA FARINA, GIUSEPPE. Istoria documentata della rivoluzione

- siciliana e delle sue relazioni co' Governi italiani e stranieri (1848-49). In *Documenti della Guerra Santa d' Italia*. Capolago, 1849-51.
203. LA FARINA, GIUSEPPE. Storia d'Italia dal 1815 al 1850. Torino, 1851. 6 vols. 8vo.
Of many works having the same scope, this is one of the least recommendable.
LA ROCHÈRE. *See* de La Rochère, 183.
204. LENORMANT, C. Grégoire XVI et Pie IX. 1849.
Article in LE CORRESPONDANT.
205. LEOPARDI, P. Narrazioni storiche. Torino, 1856.
Imaginative and unauthoritative.
206. MALDONALDO Y ZABRAQUES, J. M. Historia del poder temporal de Pio IX, desde su elevacion al trono hasta su fuga de Roma. Madrid, 1849. 8vo.
207. MARCACCIO, F. Goffredo Mameli, o un episodio dell' ultima guerra di Roma, racconto storico. Genova, 1850. 8vo.
Mameli was on Garibaldi's staff, and died of wounds received during the siege of Rome. The episode is of no great importance.
208. MARCHAL, CHARLES. Histoire de Sa Sainteté Pie IX. Paris, 1854. 2 vols. 8vo.
Published anonymously under the initials C. M. The author also used the pseudonym "De Bussy."
209. MARIO, JESSIE WHITE. Della Vita di Giuseppe Mazzini. Milano, 1890. 4to.
Illustrated. A popular book, written in a loose and inaccurate fashion; yet not without use, and containing information not to be found elsewhere.
210. MARIOTTI, L. Latest News from Italy. London, 1847.
Pamphlet, of no general interest.
MATOUGHES. *See* Benoist, 152.
211. MESTICA, G. Su la vita e le opere di T. Mamiani. Cita di Castello, 1885.
212. MILEY, J. Histoire des états du Pape. Paris, 1851. 8vo.
213. MIRAGLIA DI STRONGOLI, B. Storia della Rivoluzione romana. Genova, 1850. 8vo.

MONTALEMBERT. *See* de Montalembert, 184.

MONCAUT. *See* Cènac-Moncaut, 168.

214. MONTANELLI, GIUSEPPE. *Questioni italiane*. Introduzione ad alcuni appunti storici sulla rivoluzione d'Italia. Torino, 1851. 8vo.
215. OLLIVIER, EMILE. *L'Empire libéral*. Etudes, récits, souvenirs. Paris, 1895-1900. 5 vols. 12mo.
Brilliantly written and useful; but only to be used with the greatest caution. A history written with a particular purpose, by a writer whose ability is rather forensic than historical.
- ORNANO. *See* Cuneo, 175.
216. ORTOLANI, P. *Il primo anno di pont. di Pio IX*. Firenze, 1847. 8vo.
217. OTTOLINI, VITTORE. *Cronaca della Compagnia Medici (1849)*. Coll' elenco dei militi che la componevano; riveduta ed approvata dal generale Giacomo Medici. Milano, 1884. 16mo.
218. PANI ROSSI, E. *Le censettantime ribellioni dei sudditi pontificii dal 896 al 1859*. Firenze, 1860. 8vo.
219. PINTO, MICHELANGELO. *Don Pirlone a Roma; memorie di un Italiano del 1 settembre 1848 al 31 dicembre 1850*. Torino, 1851-52. 3 vols.
220. POUJOLET, BAPTISTIN. *Histoire des Papes depuis St-Pierre jusqu'à la formation du pouvoir temporel, suivie d'un aperçu historique de la question romaine depuis 1848 jusqu'à 1862*. Paris, 1862. 2 vols. 8vo.
221. QUINET, EDGAR. *Les révolutions d'Italie*. Paris, 1848-49. 2 vols. 8vo.
222. QUINET, EDGAR. *La croisade autrichienne, française, napolitaine et espagnole contre la République romaine*. Paris, 1849. 16mo.
A very short pamphlet.
223. RANALLI. *Storia degli avvenimenti d'Italia*. Firenze, 1846. 12mo.
224. RAUMER, FRIEDRICH VON. *Zur neuen Geschichte Roms 1848-50*. Historisches Taschenbuch, Serie III. Leipzig, 1869.

- RENDU, EUGÈNE. *See* D' Azeglio, 39.
225. RENDU, EUGÈNE. *L'Autriche dans la Confédération italienne. Histoire de la diplomatie et de la police de la Cour de Vienne dans les Etats du Pape depuis 1815, d'après des documents nouveaux et les pièces diplomatiques.* Paris, 1859. 8vo.
226. RENDU, EUGÈNE. *Conditions de la paix dans les Etats romains.* Paris, 1849, 8vo.
227. RENDU, EUGÈNE. *L'Italie et le public français.* Paris, 1846. 8vo.
228. RENDU, EUGÈNE. *Questions italiennes (articles publiés dans divers recueils); 1846-1848.* Paris, 1848. 8vo.
229. RENDU, EUGÈNE. *L'Italie devant la France, avec une lettre à M. le Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio.* Paris, 1849. 12mo.
230. REUHLIN, HERMANN. *Geschichte Italiens von Gründung der regierenden Dynastien bis auf die Gegenwart.* Leipzig, 1859, 1860. 2 vols.
Conscientious and generally well informed work, chiefly dealing with the period 1846-49.
231. REY, RODOLPHE. *Histoire de la renaissance politique de l'Italie, 1814-1861.* Paris, 1864. 8vo.
Written from the nationalist point of view. Not without interest, though containing no original matter.
232. REYBERT, A. *Notice historique sur le pape Pie IX.* Paris 1847. 8vo.
ROCHÈRE. *See* de La Rochère, 183.
233. RUBIN, B. *De l'affaire de l'Italie et de la papauté dans les circonstances actuelles (1847).* Paris, 1847. 8vo.
234. RUGGERI, E. *Della ritirata di Garibaldi da Roma, narrazione.* Genova, 1850. 16mo.
235. RÜSTOW, W. *Der italienische Krieg von 1848 und 1849.* Zurich, 1862. 8vo. (Six maps and plans.)
SAINT ALBIN. *See* de Saint Albin, 185.
236. SILVAGNI, DAVID. *La Corte e la Società romana nei secoli XVIII e XIX.* Roma, 1884. 3 vols. 12mo.
A work the method of which is more literary than historical. Contains much interesting matter. For the

present subject consult vol. iii., the articles *Pio IX*, *Madame Spaur e Pellegrino Rossi*, and *Il Cardinale Antonelli*. The author has had very wide sources of information on matters connected with Roman history.

237. SPORSCHIL, JO. *Pius der Neunte und Geschichte aller Vorgänger Seiner Heiligkeit auf dem Stuhle des heil. Apostelfürsten Petrus*. Leipzig, 1848. 8vo.
Cf. *Archivio Storico Italiano*, vol. vii.
238. STANFORD, J. F. *The Patriots of Italy. An Appeal on their behalf*. London, 1847.
Pamphlet, principally on Roman affairs. The writer shows no special knowledge.
239. "STERN, DANIEL." *Histoire de la révolution de 1848*. Paris, 1851. 3 vols. 8vo.
The Vicomtesse d'Agoult's merits are more literary than historical.
STRONGOLI. See *Miraglia*, 213.
240. THIERS, A. *Discours parlementaires*. Paris, 1879. 15 vols. 8vo.
A voluminous but indispensable record of Thiers' parliamentary career.
241. TIVARONI, CARLO. *L' Italia durante il dominio austriaco*, Torino. Roma, 1892. 3 vols. 8vo.
A good history for the general reader, containing a certain number of useful references. The second volume deals with Rome.
242. TOMMASEO, NIC. *Rome et le Monde*, Capolago, 1851.
243. TORRE, FEDERICO (GENERALE). *Memorie storiche sull' intervento francese in Roma nel 1849*. Torino, 1851, 1852. 2 vols. 16mo.
244. TRIPEPI, LUIGI. *Ritratti e biografie dei romani pont. da S. Pietro a Leone XIII: editi per cura del cav. David Valgimigli*. Roma, 1879. 4to.
A popular work of no historical importance.
245. TROLLOPE, T. ADOLPHUS. *The story of the life of Pius the Ninth*. London, 1877. 2 vols. 8vo.
Sketchily written on generally inadequate material. Readable but unauthoritative.

246. ULLOA, GENERAL. *Guerre de l'indépendance italienne en 1848, et en 1849.* Paris, 1849. 2 vols. 8vo.
 Pretentious, but with occasional valuable information and reflections on military matters. Good maps. Ulloa served through the siege of Venice but was not present at Rome.
 VALMY. *See* de Valmy, 186.
247. VANNUCCI. *Martiri della libertà italiana*, Firenze, 1860.
 May be consulted for the Papal prisons among other matters.
248. VEUILLOT, LOUIS. *La Sainteté Pie IX.* Paris, 1863. 8vo.
 Veuillot was for many years editor of that well-known and not over-veracious clerical newspaper *l'Univers*.
249. VICINI, GIOVANNI. *Memorie biografiche e storiche con nuovi documenti raccolti e pubblicati dal pronipote Gioacchino Vicini.*
 A prolix record, of no value for the period dealt with, save for the account of the meeting of Pius IX and Vicini.
250. VILLEFRANCHE, J. M. *Pie IX, sa vie, son histoire, son siècle.* Lyons, 1889. 8vo.
 A popular book of which many editions have appeared.
251. VIMERCATI, CESAR. *Histoire de l'Italie en 1848, 1849.* Paris, 1852. 3 vols. 8vo.
 Ends with the death of Gregory. Presents the Catholic optimist view of men and things.
252. WISEMAN, CARDINAL. *Recollections of the last four Popes and of Rome in their times*, London (no date of publication), 12mo.
 Ends with the death of Gregory. Presents the Catholic optimist view of men and things.
- ZABRAQUES. *See* Maldonaldo, 206.

NOTE of several manuscripts relating to the same period with which the Bibliography deals.

BERTANI, A. *Memoria, I feriti di Roma* *Archivio Bertani*.

BOCCACINI, DOMENICO. *Relazione al Governo di Roma sullo stato della provincia* *Archivio Bertani*.

Official reports by the President of the province of Imola, May 1849.

Carteggio del Governo provvisorio di Milano col Governo pontificio e col suo console Desinioni in Milano (March to July 1848)
Archivio Casati.

Carteggio del Governo provvisorio di Milano con Tomaso Piazzoni in missione a Firenze, Roma e Napoli (April to July 1848)
Archivio Casati.

Correspondence between Pasolini and Casati *Archivio Casati.*

This collection also contains a number of letters and other writings of prominent men who took part in the affairs of Rome,—Garibaldi, Manara, and others.

DAVERIO, COLONNELLO. Tre lettere a Giuseppe Mazzini intorno alla battaglia di Velletri ed altro. Dal 15 aprile al 22 maggio *Archivio Bertani.*

MAESTRI, PIETRO. Lettere e relazioni al Governo di Roma sulle cose di Toscana *Archivio Bertani.*

Doctor Maestri was sent on a special mission to Tuscany by the Roman Government, March, April, 1849.

MOISET, FRANCESCO. Lettera al Governo provvisorio di Lombardia concui lo informa che le truppe romane del generale Durando trovansi immobilizzate per mancanza di denaro, e che occorrerebbe almeno un milione. *Archives of the Municipality of Milan.*

Moiset was on a special mission from the Provisional Government of Venice to Milan; he wrote from Reggio, April 17th, 1848.

ROSELLI, GENERALE. 10 lettere ai Triumviri della Repubblica romana; una con annotazione autografa di Aurelio Saffi *Archivio Bertani.*

APPENDIX B

MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO THE ROMAN GOVERNMENT BY THE ALLIED POWERS, ADVISING IT TO ADOPT CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS AND REFORMS.

I.—It appears to the representatives of the five Powers, that with respect to the States of the Church there are two fundamental points interesting the general condition of Europe:—

1. That the Government of this State should be fixed on a stable basis, by the reforms proposed and announced by his Holiness at the very beginning of his reign.

2. That these reforms which, according to the edict of his Eminence Monseigneur Cardinal Bernetti, would be the starting-point of a new era for the subjects of his Holiness, should be, by means of an internal guarantee, protected from the risk of change inherent in the nature of an elective Government.

II.—To arrive at this happy result which, owing to the geographical and social situation of the States of the Church, is a matter of European interest, it would appear indispensable that the organic pronouncement of his Holiness should be founded on two vital principles :—

1. On the application of the said reforms, not only to the provinces where the revolution took place, but also to those that remained faithful and to the capital.

2. On the general admission of laymen to administrative and judicial functions.

III.—The reforms themselves should extend to the judicial system, and to that of the municipal and provincial administration.

A. As to the judiciary, it would appear that the complete carrying out and subsequent development of the promises and principles of the *Motu Proprio* of 1816, present the surest and most efficacious means of doing justice to the general complaints relating to this interesting part of the social organism.

B. As to the local administration, it would appear that the re-establishment and general organization of municipalities elected by the people, and the institution of a municipal franchise to control the action of these municipalities in the local interests of the districts, should be the indispensable basis of all administrative reform.

Secondly, the formation of Provincial Councils, whether as permanent administrative Councils, assisting the Governor of the Province in the execution of his duties, with appropriate functions, or, as larger assemblies, largely drawn from the new municipalities, and intended to be consulted on the great interests of the province, would appear very useful for effecting

a reform and simplification of the provincial administration, for controlling the district administration, for regulating the incidence of taxation, and for enlightening the Government on the real needs of the provinces.

IV.—The immense importance of a settled system of finance, and of such an administration of the public debt as would constitute a guarantee for the financial credit of the Government, and would essentially contribute to augment its resources, and to assure its independence, appears to call for a central establishment in the capital with the charge, as a supreme audit office, of checking the annual accounts in every branch of the administration, civil and military, and of superintending the public debt, with attributions befitting the great and salutary object in view. The greater the freedom of this institution, and its appearance of binding the Government and country in a common interest, the more will it answer the beneficent intentions of the Sovereign and general expectation.

To reach this result it would appear best that some persons should form part of it selected by the local councils, who would, with the Councillors of the Government, form an administrative Giunta or Consulta. Such a Giunta might form part of a Council of State, of which the members would be appointed by the Sovereign from among the men most distinguished by rank, fortune, or talents in the State.

Without one or more central establishments of this nature, closely connected with the notables of a State so rich in aristocratic and conservative elements, it would appear that the elective nature of the government would necessarily take away from reforms, that would be the eternal glory of the reigning Pontiff, that stability of which the need is so generally and strongly felt, and all the more, in that the benefits conferred by the Pontiff will be great and precious.

APPENDIX C

IN 1845, some of the Romagnol insurgents drew up a lengthy document entitled: "Manifesto of the People of the

Roman States to the Princes and People of Europe." It closes with a statement of their demands which deserves attention, because, taken as a whole, it exemplifies the moderation of political views that characterized a large section of the Italian people throughout the period here dealt with.

These demands were stated as follows :—

1. That a full and general amnesty for political offences, between the year 1821 and the present, be granted.
2. That civil and criminal codes, framed on the model of those of the other civilized nations of Europe, and that shall sanction the publicity of trials, the institution of juries, the abolition of confiscation and of the death penalty for *lèse-majesté*, be granted.
3. That neither the Inquisition, nor the Ecclesiastical tribunals shall exercise authority and jurisdiction over laymen.
4. That political offences be investigated and punished by the ordinary tribunals, acting by virtue of the regular laws.
5. That the Municipal Councils be freely elected by the citizens, and approved by the Sovereign; that the Provincial Councils be chosen by lot from the former, and the Supreme Council of State in the same way from the Provincial Councils.
6. That the Supreme Council of State be located at Rome, superintending the public debt and with deliberative powers in matters of expenditure and retrenchment, in all other matters only consultative.
7. That all employments and civil, military, and judicial functions be opened to laymen.
8. That public instruction be freed from the authority of the bishops and clergy, to whom religious instruction shall be reserved.
9. That the press censure be kept within such bounds as may be sufficient to prevent insults to the Deity, to the Catholic Faith, to the Sovereign and to the private lives of citizens.
10. That foreign troops be disbanded.
11. That a civic guard be instituted, and intrusted with the maintenance of public order and the guardianship of the laws.
12. Finally, that the Government enter the path of all those social ameliorations that the times call for, following the example of all the States of Europe.

According to Cantù, this document was drawn up by Farini; it is given by the latter in his *Stato Romano*, i. 112 and 125.

APPENDIX D

FUNDAMENTAL STATUTE FOR THE TEMPORAL GOVERNMENT OF THE STATES OF THE CHURCH.—Rome, March 14th, 1848.

Translation reproduced from British and Foreign State Papers 1848-1849 (vol. xxxvi.), 879

IN the institutions we have hitherto bestowed on our subjects, it has been our intention to reproduce certain ancient institutions which were for a long time a mirror of the wisdom of our august predecessors, and which, as the age advanced, it was desired should be adapted to altered circumstances, that the majestic edifice they had originally formed might be still presented.

Proceeding in this course we had come to the resolution of establishing a consultive representation of all the provinces, whose duty it should be to assist our Government in legislative labours and the administration of the State; and we expected that the advantages of the results would have justified the experiment which we had been first to make in Italy. But since our neighbours have deemed their people already mature for receiving the benefits of a representation not merely consultive but deliberative, we do not desire to hold our people in less esteem or confide less in their gratitude, not merely towards our humble person, for which we take no heed, but towards the Church and this Apostolic See, the inviolable and supreme rights of which God has committed to our keeping, and the presence of which has been, and ever will be, a source of so much good to this people. Our communes had anciently the privilege each of governing itself by laws chosen by its own act under the sovereign sanction. An order of things by which the diversity of laws and customs often separated one commune from concert with others would not certainly be permitted to be renewed under the same forms by the present state of civilization. But we intend to entrust this prerogative to two councils of upright and prudent citizens in the one nominated by ourselves, in the other deputed by every part of the State through means of a form of election to be opportunely established, which may both represent the individual interests of every place in our dominions, and wisely reconcile them with that highest interest of every com-

muned and every province, that is, the general interest of the State. As, however, the more grave interests of the political independence of the Head of the Church, by which the independence of this portion of Italy has indeed been preserved, cannot be separated from the temporal interests of its internal prosperity, we not only reserve to ourselves and our successors the supreme sanction and promulgation of all the laws that the above-named Councils shall have deliberated on, and the full exercise of the sovereign authority in the provinces not regarded by this Act, but we likewise intend to maintain entire our authority in matters naturally connected with the Catholic religion and morals; and to this we are bound, out of regard to the security of all Christendom, that in the States of the Church, thus constituted under a new form, the liberties and rights of the same Church, and of the Holy See, may never suffer diminution, nor any example be given of violating the sanctity of that religion which we have received the mission and the obligation to preach to all the universe as the sole symbol of the alliance of Deity with mankind, as the sole pledge of that celestial benediction by which states exist and nations prosper.

Having in the meantime implored the Divine aid, and listened to the unanimous opinion of our venerable brethren, the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, for this object united expressly in consistory, we have decreed and do decree as follows:—

General Dispositions

1. The Sacred College of Cardinals, the Electors of the Supreme Pontiff, forms a Senate inseparable from him.

2. Two deliberative Councils are instituted for the formation of laws, the High Council, and the Council of Deputies.

3. Although all justice emanates from the Sovereign, and is administered in his name, the judicial order is independent in the application of the law to individual cases, the right of pardon being always reserved to the Sovereign. The Judges of the Collegiate Tribunals are irremovable after having exercised their functions for three years, dating from the promulgation of the present Statute.

4. No extraordinary Tribunals or Commissions can be instituted. Every one, whether in civil or criminal matters, shall be judged by the Tribunal expressly determined by law, before which all are equal.

5. The civic guard is to be considered as a State institution, and

will remain constituted on the basis of the law of the 5th of July 1847, and of the regulations of the 30th of the same month.

6. No restriction can be placed on personal liberty, except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law. Hence no one can be arrested except in virtue of an act emanating from the competent authority. Cases *flagrantis* or *quasi flagrantis delicti* are excepted, but here also the offender must be handed over to the competent authority within twenty-four hours of his arrest.

7. The public debt, and all other State obligations, are guaranteed.

8. All property, whether of private individuals, of corporate bodies, or any pious or public institutions, contributes equally and without distinction to the State burdens, whoever may be its possessor. Whenever the Supreme Pontiff gives his sanction to laws on the taxes, he accompanies that sanction with a special "Apostolica," superseding the ecclesiastical immunity.

9. In like manner the right of property is inviolable in all, with the sole exception of expropriations demanded by public utility, and compensated at a legal valuation.

10. Literary property is also recognised.

11. The existing Government or political preventive censure for the press is abolished, and repressive measures, to be determined by a special law, will be substituted for it. No innovation is made in the ecclesiastical Censure until the Supreme Pontiff may provide other regulations for it. The permission of the ecclesiastical Censure does not in any way affect the political and civil responsibility of those who are guaranteed, conformably with the laws in publications through the press.

12. Public spectacles are regulated by preventive measures; theatrical compositions must be submitted to a censorship before representation.

13. The communal and provincial administration will be exercised by citizens, and regulated by appropriate laws.

Of the High Council and of the Council of Deputies

14. The Supreme Pontiff convokes, prorogues, and closes the sessions of both Councils. He dissolves that of the deputies, summoning a new one within three months.

15. Neither of the Councils can assemble while the other is

dissolved or prorogued, except in the case provided for under Article 46.

16. The two Councils are convoked and closed each year contemporaneously. The ceremony of opening them is performed by a Cardinal specially delegated by the Pontiff, and this is the only occasion on which the two Councils assemble in one body. For all other purposes they meet separately. Their acts are valid when one half of the individuals composing them is present. Their resolutions are taken by a majority of votes.

17. The sittings of both Councils are public, but either may resolve itself into a secret committee on the demand of ten members. Their acts are published under their own direction.

18. Both Councils shall, when constituted, draw up respectively a code of rules for their own conduct in the treatment of affairs.

19. The members of the High Council are nominated for life by the Supreme Pontiff. Their number is not limited. They are required to have completed the age of thirty years, and to be in the full exercise of their civil and political rights.

20. They are designated from the following categories:—(1) Prelates and other Dignitaries of the Church; (2) the Ministers, the President of the Council of Deputies, the Senators of Rome and Bologna; (3) persons who have occupied or occupy a distinguished rank in the Governative, Administrative, and Military orders; (4) the Presidents of the Tribunals of Appeal, Councillors of State, Consistorial Advocates—all after six years' exercise of their functions; (5) proprietors with an annual income of 4000 scudi from taxable capital possessed for six years; (6) and finally, persons who have deserved well of the State for distinguished services, or for having rendered it illustrious by great scientific or artistic works.

21. At the beginning of each session, the Supreme Pontiff nominates as well the President as the two Vice-Presidents of the High Council from among the members of that body, unless it may please him to confer the Presidency on a Cardinal.

22. The other Council is composed of Deputies for every 30,000 souls.

23. The electors are—(1) the Gonfalonieri, Priors, and Anziani of the cities and communes; the Syndics of the "Appodiati"; (2) those who are inscribed on the census as possessors of a capital of 300 scudi; (3) those who pay to Government, on other claims, an annual tax of 12 scudi; (4) the members of the colleges and

faculties, and the titular professors of the State Universities ; (5) the members of the Councils of Discipline, and the advocates and procurators of the Collegiate Courts ; (6) graduates *ad honorem* in the State Universities ; (7) the members of the Chambers of Commerce ; (8) the heads of manufactories or industrial establishments ; (9) the heads or representatives of societies, corporate bodies, religious institutions, which are inscribed in the census under the class specified above at No. 2, or who pay the tax mentioned under No. 3.

24. The eligible are—(1) those borne on the census as possessors of 3000 scudi ; (2) those who pay to Government, on other claims, an annual tax of 100 scudi ; (3) members of the colleges and faculties, titular professors of the Universities of Rome and Bologna, members of the College of Discipline and of the advocates and procurators of the Tribunals of Appeal ; (4) those enumerated under Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 of the preceding Article, when registered for the half of the capital specified above, under No. 2 of this Article.

25. The electors must have completed the age of twenty-five, the eligible that of thirty years ; in both the full exercise of civil and political rights is indispensable, and therefore of the Catholic religion, which is the necessary condition for the enjoyment of political rights in the State.

26. No one, whatever number of domiciles he may possess, and whatever may be the different titles by which he ranks as an elector, can give more than one vote. The same person may, however, be elected in two or more districts, in which case the option of the one he will represent rests with himself.

27. The electoral colleges, assembled by the convocation of the Supreme Pontiff, proceed to the election of the Deputies according to the forms which shall be prescribed in the Electoral Law.

28. At the beginning of each session the Council of Deputies elects its President and Vice-Presidents from among its own members.

29. The members of both Councils exercise their functions gratuitously.

30. The members of both Councils are irresponsible for the opinions and votes given in the exercise of their functions. They cannot be arrested for debt during the session, and the month immediately preceding and following it. Neither can they be

arrested on criminal judgment during the same period (save in cases *flagrantis*, or *quasi flagrantis delicti*), except by the consent of the Council to which they belong.

31. Besides the case of dissolution of the Council, the office of Deputy ceases : (1) with natural or civil death, or with suspension of civic rights ; (2) with renunciation ; (3) with the lapse of four years ; (4) with nomination to the High Council ; (5) with the acceptance of a salaried employment under Government, or promotion in an office actually held. Whenever a case of vacancy is certified to, the electoral college by which the Deputy was returned shall be immediately convoked. The case specified under Nos. 3 and 5 are no impediment to re-election.

32. If, during office, a Deputy loses any of his qualifications not temporary in their nature, the Council, as soon as the fact is verified, declares the office vacant ; and a new election shall be held, as under the preceding Article.

The High Council, in a similar case, makes a report thereon to the Supreme Pontiff, who reserves to himself the power of making a fitting decision in the matter.

Attributions of the two Councils

33. All laws in civil, administrative, and governmental matters are proposed, discussed, and voted in the two Councils, including the imposition of taxes and the "Interpretations" and "Declarations" which have the force of laws.

34. Laws concerning the matters specified in the preceding Article have no force until they have been freely discussed and accepted by both Councils and sanctioned by the Supreme Pontiff. Hence the tributes cannot be exacted unless approved by a law.

35. The proposal of the law is made by the Ministers, but may also emanate from either of the two Councils, at the request of ten members. The propositions of the Ministers shall always, however, have precedence.

36. The Councils can never propose any law (1) which regards ecclesiastical or mixed affairs ; (2) which is contrary to the canons or to the discipline of the Church ; (3) which tends to vary or modify the present statute.

37. In mixed affairs a consultive interpellation may be made to the Councils.

38. All discussions on the foreign diplomatico-religious relations of the Holy See are prohibited in the two Councils.

39. Treaties of commerce, and all clauses of other Treaties which regard the finances of the State, are, previous to ratification, laid before the Councils, who discuss and vote them conformably with Article 33.

40. The proposal of laws may be transmitted by the Ministers to either Chamber without distinction.

41. All projects of laws, however, regarding (1) the estimates and the expenditure of each year; (2) the creation, liquidation, or remission of State debts; (3) the imposts, leases, or any other cessions or alienations of the State revenues and property, shall always be first presented for the deliberation and vote of the Council of Deputies.

42. The direct taxation is voted for a year; the indirect may be established for several years.

43. Every proposal of a law after having been examined in the sections shall be discussed and voted by the Council to which it has been transmitted. When approved, it is sent to the other Council, which in like manner examines, discusses, and votes it.

44. If the proposal of a law is rejected by one of the Councils, or if the Supreme Pontiff withholds his sanction after the vote of two Councils, it cannot be again brought forward in the same session.

45. The verification of the powers, and the question as to the validity of the elections of the members of the Council of Deputies, rests with itself.

46. The Council of Deputies has alone the right of impeaching the Ministers. Their trial, if laymen, belongs to the High Council which, with this object only, can assemble as a tribunal, independently of the rules laid down in Article 15, except at the time specified in Article 56. In case of the impeached Ministers being ecclesiastics, their trial is referred to the Sacred College, which will conduct it in the canonical forms.

47. Every citizen, of the age of majority, has the right to petition the Council of Deputies in the affairs specified under Article 33, or on the conduct of the agents of the Executive with respect to the objects indicated. The petition must be in writing, and deposited at the office either in person or through a legitimate proxy. The Council on the report of a section will deliberate whether and how it is to be entertained. The petitioners may be summoned before

the competent tribunal by the parties who may consider themselves injured by the facts exposed.

48. The Councils do not receive deputations ; do not give audience to other than their own Members, Government Commissioners, and the Ministers ; they correspond in writing only among themselves and with the Ministry ; they send deputations to the Supreme Pontiff in the cases and in the forms provided for by regulation.

49. The sums required for the expenses of the Supreme Pontiff, the Sacred College of Cardinals, the Ecclesiastical Congregations, the Congregation "de Propaganda fide," the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Diplomatic Body abroad, the Palatine Pontifical Guards, the Sacred Functions for the maintenance and care of the Apostolic Palaces with their dependencies, outbuildings, museums, and library, the pay, retiring allowances, and pensions of all those attached to the Pontifical Courts, are fixed at the yearly charge of 600,000 scudi, on the basis of the actual status, including a reserve fund for contingent expenses. The said sum shall be borne on the estimates for each year, and shall be considered as permanently approved and sanctioned in the full terms of the law. It shall be paid over to the Majordomo of the Supreme Pontiff, or to any other person appointed by him, and the sole voucher of such payment shall be borne on the annual statement of expenditure.

50. Moreover, the canons, tributes, and taxes, amounting annually to about 13,000 scudi, as well as the duties mentioned on the occasion of the Chamber of Tributes in the Vigil and Feast of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, remain at the entire disposition of the Supreme Pontiff.

51. Extraordinary expenses, arising from large repairs in the Apostolic palaces, dependencies, museums, and outbuildings, which expenses are not comprised in the above sum, shall (when they occur) be placed on the annual estimates and statement of expenditure, and be discussed by the Councils.

Of the Sacred Consistory

52. When both Councils have passed the proposal of a law, it shall be presented to the Supreme Pontiff, and proposed in the Secret Consistory. The Pontiff, after hearing the vote of the Cardinals, gives or withholds his sanction.

Of the Ministers

53. The Governmental authority provides by ordinances and regulations for the execution of the laws.

54. The laws and all acts of Government in affairs of the class specified under Article 33 are signed by the respective Ministers who are responsible for them. A special law will determine the cases of this responsibility, the penalties, and the forms of accusation and trial.

55. The Ministers have the right to intervene and claim a hearing in both Councils ; they have a vote only if they are Members ; they may be invited to attend the sittings, in order to give any explanations required.

Of the time when the Chair is vacant

56. The death of the Supreme Pontiff suspends immediately and legally the sessions of both Councils. They can never assemble during the vacancy of the Holy Chair, nor can they during that period proceed to, or prosecute, the election of Deputies. Both Councils are legally convoked within one month after the election of the Supreme Pontiff. In case, however, of the Council of Deputies having been dissolved, and the elections not completed, the law requires the Electoral Colleges to be convoked within the month as above, and the Council one month later.

57. The Councils can never, even before the suspension of their sittings, receive or present petitions addressed to the Sacred College, or having reference to the time when the chair is vacant.

58. The Sacred College, according to the rules established in the Apostolic Constitutions, confirms the Ministers, or substitutes others. Until this act has taken place the Ministers remain in office. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs passes immediately to the Secretary of the Sacred College, which, however, has the power to entrust it to another person.

59. The expenses of the funeral of the Supreme Pontiff, those incurred for the Conclave and for the creation, coronation, and possession of the new Pontiff, are borne by the State. The Ministers under the superintendence of the Cardinal Chamberlain furnish the requisite sum, even if not provided for on the estimates

of that year, and are required to render an account of the manner in which it has been laid out.

60. If at the death of the Supreme Pontiff, the estimates of the year have not yet been voted by both Councils, the Ministers are legally empowered to exact the tributes, and provide for the expenses on the basis of the last estimates voted by the Councils, and sanctioned by the Pontiff. If, however, at the Pontiff's decease, the estimates have been already voted by both Councils, the right of giving or withholding the Sovereign sanction will rest with the Sacred College.

61. The rights of temporal sovereignty exercised by the Pontiff deceased reside during the vacancy of the chair in the Sacred College, which will use them in accordance with the Apostolic Constitutions, and with the present Statute.

Of the Council of State

62. The Council of State will be composed of ten councillors, and of a body of auditors whose number will not exceed twenty-four—all to be nominated by the Sovereign.

63. The Council of State has the charge of drawing up, under the direction of Government, the projects of laws, the regulations for the public administrations, and is invited to give its opinion on difficulties which may occur in Government matters. The competency of administrative arbitration (*il contenzioso amministrativo*) may be conferred upon it by an appropriate law.

Transitory Dispositions

64. The Electoral Law, which will form the complement of this Statute, and the repressive law on the press spoken of in Article 11, will be promulgated as soon as possible.

65. The estimates for 1849 will be proposed at the first deliberation of the Councils. The following laws will be discussed in the same, or another early session: the law on Municipal and Provincial Institutions, the Code of Police, the reform of Civil and Criminal Legislation, and of Judicial Procedure, the law on the responsibility of Ministers and on public functionaries.

66. The Councils will assemble this year on the first Monday in June at latest.

67. The existing Consulta di Stato will cease twenty days

before the opening of the Councils. In the meantime it will proceed with the examination of the estimates, and of the other administrative affairs which have been or shall be submitted to it.

68. The present Statute will come into full force on the opening of the two Councils. But, as far as regards the election of the deputies, it shall have force immediately on the publication of the Electoral Law.

69. All existing legislative dispositions not contrary to the present Statute remain in vigour.

And in like manner we will and decree that no pre-existing law, custom, etc., shall be alleged against the dispositions of the present Statute, which it is our intention to have immediately inserted in a Consistorial Bull, according to ancient form, for perpetual memory.

“Datum Romæ apud S. Mariam Majorem die xiv Martii, MDCCCXLVIII. Pontificatus nostri anno secundo.

“PIUS PAPA IX.”

APPENDIX E

FATHER GAVAZZI

THE Italian movement reached its utmost force in the early part of 1848,—especially in the two months that followed the rising of Lombardy, April and May. There was for a time superficial unanimity, and a great part of the clergy even joined in the popular demonstrations. The prophecies of Gioberti, and the enthusiasm for Pius, had resulted in a strengthened religious sentiment, which was manifested on every public occasion.

These circumstances favoured the emotional preachers who had embraced the nationalist cause, and among these none was more widely known than Father Gavazzi. He was a Barnabite, a man of little education or culture, but versed in the methods of the Italian pulpit, and in the graces that allure the crowd. It may be that those methods implied little more than walking up and down a platform with great and constant gesticulation, starting each recurring turn with a new sentence; it may be that those graces concealed little

else than a cool and calculating nature ; yet the result achieved was always notable, and at times not without political effect.

An account of Father Gavazzi's visit to Tuscany in the spring of 1848 is given by N. Bianchi in the following words :—

A Barnabite monk was travelling through the cities of Italy, preaching war against the foreigner ; actuated by Mazzinian sentiments he plentifully poured out vituperation and calumny ; and thus more easily won the applause and love of the people, whom he used to harangue in the public squares, frequently making use of expressions unfit not only for a priest, but for any decent man. It was on the 26th of April that Father Gavazzi arrived at Reggio. As he had caused it to be announced, though untruthfully, that he had been sent by Pius IX to preach the holy crusade, the whole town made holiday. The Government Commission lodged him, and paid him a state visit ; the municipal band awakened the echoes of the adjoining street, and the madly enthusiastic people loudly cheered the accepted representative of the Pope. . . .

On the following day . . . a mob went to meet him beyond the walls, and, not content with escorting him, insisted on dragging with their own hands the carriage in which he was travelling. Then might one have seen Father Gavazzi, handsome in person, his hair adorned in feminine fashion, master of every charlatan trick, make his triumphal entry into Reggio. He was preceded by trumpeters, surrounded and followed by a multitude of people frantically applauding, constantly bowing right and left, receiving garlands of flowers thrown from balconies by numerous ladies. . . .

Arrived at the tribune of the municipality, the Barnabite, with meretricious eloquence, preached the Holy War, cursed despotism, incited every ardent passion, and, when a banner of stupendous size was presented to him . . . burst forth with really fine and moving eloquence . . .

“ . . . Benedictions on the Crusade of Italy blessed by Pius IX, who each day intercedes for her at the altar of bloodless sacrifice. Would that you knew that angel.

“ Ah, how every doubt would vanish, every delay disappear,—and you would fly to the consecrated field to which he calls you. . . . Modenese, raise a cry with me that shall re-echo in the ears of the foreigner and terrify him. Viva Pio Nono !”—N. Bianchi, *I Ducati Estensi*, 151.

Another Barnabite, Ugo Bassi, achieved nearly as much notoriety as Gavazzi ; he was one of the prime movers in the troubles at Bologna ; see Cantù, *op. cit.* ii. 830.

APPENDIX F

ALLOCUTION ADDRESSED BY PIUS IX TO THE COLLEGE
OF CARDINALS ASSEMBLED IN SECRET CONSISTORY,
APRIL 29TH, 1848.

(Translation taken from the British State Papers)

VENERABLE BROTHERS—Not once, venerable brothers, have we expressed our detestation in your assembly, of the audacity of some who have not hesitated to cast that wrong on us, and what is more, on this Apostolic See, that they should feign that we should turn aside from the most holy institutions of our predecessors, and not on one head (horrible to say), from the doctrine itself of the Church. But those are not now wanting who so speak of us, as if we were the chief author of the public commotions which have lately happened, not only in other parts of Europe, but likewise in Italy. From the Austrian parts, especially of Germany, we have learned that it is there spread about amongst the people that the Roman Pontiff, by emissaries sent, and by other arts employed, had excited the people of Italy to bring about unusual changes in public affairs. We have likewise learned that certain enemies of the Catholic religion hence seized the opportunity of inflaming the minds of the Germans with a fury of revenge, and of alienating them from the unity of this Holy See. Now truly, although we have no doubt whatever but that the Catholic people of Germany, and the most worthy prelates who preside over them, are as far removed as possible from their wickedness, yet we know that it is our duty to provide against the scandal which some unwary and more simple men might hence take, and to rebut the calumny which may not only redound to the contumely of our humble person, but likewise of the Supreme Apostleship which we discharge, and of this Holy See. And as those our same detractors, not able to bring forth any document of the schemes which they palm upon us, endeavour to throw suspicion over what has been done by us, in undertaking the

temporal administration of the Papal rule, therefore, in order that we may cut off this handle of calumny, it is our design to explain to-day, clearly and openly, the whole cause of those things in your Assembly.

It is not unknown to you, Venerable Brothers, that already from the late times of Pius VII our predecessor, the chief princes of Europe had taken care to recommend to the Apostolic See, that, in the administration of civil affairs, it should apply a more favourable rule, and one answering to the wishes of laymen. Afterwards, in the year 1831, these their counsels and desires were more solemnly made known by that celebrated Memorandum which the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the Kings of France, of Britain, and of Prussia, judged proper to send by their ambassadors to Rome. In that writing also, among other things, was treated the question of calling to Rome, from the whole Papal rule, a Consulting Council, as well as that of restoring, or of enlarging, the constitution of municipalities, and of establishing provincial councils; moreover, of introducing the same and other institutions into all the provinces for the common utility, and of opening to laymen the entrance into all offices which might belong to the administration of public offices, or to the distribution of justice. And these two last heads were especially proposed as vital principles of governing. In other writings likewise of the ambassadors, mention was made of a more ample pardon being granted to all, or nearly to all, who had rebelled against their sovereign in the Papal territory.

It is concealed from no one that some of these were accomplished by Gregory XVI our predecessor, and some promises, moreover, in edicts published by his order in the same year, 1831. But these good acts of our predecessor appeared to answer less fully to the wishes of the sovereign, and not to be sufficient to secure the public utility and tranquillity throughout the whole temporal state of the Holy See.

Therefore, we, when we were first, by the inscrutable judgment of God, appointed in his place, not certainly induced by the advice or counsel of any one, but moved by our singular charity towards the people subject to the temporal ecclesiastical rule, we conceded a more copious pardon to those who had strayed from the fidelity due to the Papal Government, and thereupon hastened to institute some things which we had considered as conducive to the prosperity of its people. And all those things which we in the very beginning of our Pontificate performed, clearly accord with those which the sovereigns of Europe principally desired.

But truly after, by the good help of God, our designs were brought about, not only our own, but the neighbouring people were seen to exult for joy, and so to extol us by public signs of congratulation and respect, that we were forced to endeavour to restrain, in this fair city especially, popular cries, applause, meetings breaking out much within the line of duty.

And these are known to all, Venerable Brothers, the words of our Allocution to you in the Consistory held on the 4th of October of the past year, by which we recommended both the paternal kindness and readier good will of sovereigns towards the people subject to them, and the people themselves we exhorted anew to fidelity and obedience towards their Sovereigns. Nor did we afterwards omit, as it was in our power, to warn and to exhort all, again and again, that firmly adhering to the Catholic doctrine, and keeping the precepts of God and of the Church, they should labour after mutual concord, and tranquillity and charity towards all.

And would that the wished-for event had answered to our paternal voice and exhortations. But well known to every one are the public commotions of the people of Italy, which we have above commemorated, and also other incidents, which either out of Italy, or in Italy itself, had either happened before, or took place afterwards. But if any one will contend that any way was opened to the issue of the self-same things, from those which at the beginning of our sacred sovereignty were by us benevolently and kindly done, he certainly in no manner whatever could ascribe it to our work, when we did nothing else than what seemed, not only to us, but also to the above-named Sovereigns, favourable to the prosperity of our temporal rule. But with regard to those who, in this our State, have abused benefits themselves, we, indeed, imitating the example of the divine Sovereign of Pastors, pardon them from the heart, and call them lovingly to sounder counsels, and from God, the Father of mercies, suppliantly beg that he may kindly avert from their shoulders the scourge which awaits ungrateful men. Furthermore, nor could the above-mentioned people of Germany be angry with us, if it were not possible for us to restrain the ardour of those who, in our temporal State, resolved on applauding what was carried on against them in Upper Italy, and, inflamed by a like desire with others towards their own nation, on giving their assistance to the same cause with the other people of Italy. Since many other sovereigns, likewise, of Europe, far more powerful in military strength than we, equally could not withstand at the same

time the commotion of their people. In which condition of things we, however, willed no other command to our troops, sent to the confines of the Papal territories, than that they should protect the integrity of the Papal State.

But when now some desire that we, likewise with the other people and sovereigns of Italy, should undertake a war against the Germans, we have at length thought it our duty that, in this your solemn Assembly, we clearly and openly declare that this is wholly abhorrent from our counsels, seeing that we, although unworthy, discharge on earth the office of Him who is the author of peace and lover of charity, and, agreeably to the duty of our Supreme Apostleship, regard and embrace with equal paternal earnestness of love, all tribes, peoples, and nations. But if, amongst our subjects, nevertheless, they desist not, in what manner finally shall we be able to restrain their ardour, who are dragged away by the example of the other Italians ?

But in this place we cannot but repudiate, in the presence of all nations, the crafty counsels made manifest by means likewise of the public journals, and of various writings, of those who would that the Roman pontiff should preside over some new Republic, to be formed of all the people of Italy. Yea, on this occasion the people themselves, out of charity towards them, we particularly warn and exhort, that they beware most diligently of crafty counsels of this kind, and pernicious to Italy itself, and that they firmly adhere to their sovereigns, whose benevolence they have also experienced, and that they may never suffer themselves to be borne from the obedience due towards them. For if they should act otherwise, not only would they swerve from their own duty, but they would likewise incur the danger of Italy itself being divided by daily increasing discords and intestine factions. With regard, however, to us, we again and again declare that the Roman Pontiff directs all, indeed, his thoughts, cares, and desires, that the kingdom of Christ, which is the Church, should daily increase : not, however, that the bounds should be widened, of the civil sovereignty with which Divine Providence willed this Holy See to be bestowed to protect its dignity, and the free exercise of the Supreme Apostleship. Greatly, therefore, are they in error who think that our soul is seduced by the ambition of a more ample temporal dominion, that we should throw ourselves into the midst of the tumult of arms. That truly would be most grateful to our heart if by our labour, cares and exertions, it were given to us to contribute in any way to the

extinguishing of the incentives to discord, to the conciliating mutually of the minds of the combatants, and to the restoring of peace among them.

In the meanwhile, we have heard, not without a slight consolation to our heart, that in many places, not only in Italy, but without it, in such a disturbance of public affairs, our faithful sons have not been wanting in their deference to sacred things, and to the ministers of things sacred; we were grieved, however, in our whole soul, that this respect has not been everywhere maintained. Nor can we refrain from lamenting in fine, in this your Assembly, that most fatal usage, spreading particularly in our times, of publishing every sort of pernicious writings, by which a dreadful war is carried on either against our most holy religion, or the purity of manners, or civil commotions and discord are inflamed, or the endowments of the Church are attacked, and all its most sacred rights are invaded, or every most trustworthy man is wounded by false accusations.

These things we have judged proper to be communicated this day to you, Venerable Brothers. It now remains that at the same time we together offer up, in the humility of our heart, assiduous and fervent prayers to God, best and greatest, that He may be pleased to defend His Holy Church from all adversity, and to look down propitiously from Zion and to protect us, and that He may deign to recall all princes and people to the desire of much-wished-for peace and concord.

APPENDIX G

ORSINI AT ANCONA

THE state of Ancona had been extremely unsettled for many months. The British Consul, Mr. Moore, reports that on the arrival there of the news of the Sardinian defeat at Novara on March 30th, 1849, an excited mob made a rush for the cafés, men tore the newspapers from the hands of one another, blows were struck and readers were stabbed; five people, including one woman, were killed in the reading room of the Casino. Between that date and April 3rd, murders were openly committed at the rate of three a day (*British Parl. Papers*, 1851,

lvii. 160). A little later, on April 22nd, Sir George Hamilton wrote to Lord Palmerston as follows: "Ancona . . . atrocities . . . hardly credible . . . the life of H.M.'s Consul is menaced. . . . The average number of daily murders is six or eight; last Sunday there were ten victims. . . . The rage of the assassins appears chiefly directed against persons of respectability supposed to entertain principles opposed to the Revolutionary Government" (*British Parl. Papers*, 1851, lvii. 167).

Shortly afterwards an Irish priest named O'Kelleher was murdered, which led to strong representations being made to the Roman Government. At first ineffective steps were taken. Baldi, deputy for Ancona, a moderate and anti-republican, offered to restore order, but his services were declined (Farini, *Lo Stato Romano*, iii. 394); Dallongaro and Barnabei were sent, but did not effect much. Finally it was decided to send Orsini, a captain in Zambecchari's volunteers of the Alto Reno, who now sat in the Assembly. The following account is in Orsini's own words, and taken from his *Memoirs and Adventures of Felice Orsini*, 76-85).

At five o'clock of the 19th of April 1849, a certain Pistrucci presented himself, desiring me to go to the Palace of the Consulta where the Roman Triumvirate wished to communicate with me. I went, and the Triumvir Mazzini spoke to me in the following manner:—'A society of assassins afflicts Ancona and Sinigaglia, spreading misery and desolation over the provinces: therefore it is the bounden duty of every wise government to administer inexorable and impartial justice to all; how much more then is this the case with a government that bears engraven on its front the words,—Liberty, Virtue, and Civil Equality. I have sent two Commissioners, Barnabei and Dell' Ongaro, to procure fresh reports, and to discover if the evil be greater or less than it has been represented; it requires extraordinary energy and swift justice. I believe you adapted for this business; I give you a little time to consider, before you assume the duty, as there are few so fitting.' 'I do not refuse the mission you offer me,' I replied. . . .

I started with post horses the same night, and arrived at Ancona at about four o'clock on the morning of the 21st.

. . . On my arrival at Ancona, I consulted the commissioners

Barnabei and Dell' Ongaro. . . . They had endeavoured, they said, to diffuse principles of moderation ; they had made the local committee swear to repress any movement which might tend to the disturbance of the public tranquillity, and the renewal of the past atrocious crimes ; they promised to send remonstrances to the Triumvirate, so that the authors of the homicides might be formed into a company of *Custom-House Officers*, to watch over the smugglers, with the pay of five paoli a-day ; the uniform to be defined ; change of conduct and reformation being conditions of admission. . . .

The state of Ancona was deplorable. There was, so to speak, no government ; the authorities were divested of all moral force, the Governor a mere name ; the dispatches sent to him from the metropolis were often opened and read before delivery ; many of the government employés absent, as well as the carabineers and many of the national guard ; and after sunset every one retired to their houses ; shops were shut ; the only persons in the streets were the members of the cruel and homicidal society, as well as certain of the police, their followers ; terror reigned supreme. Such was the aspect of the city.

I made known to the Governor the powers I possessed, and he promised to second me as well as he could. Then, as unity of command was necessary, I told the commissioners Barnabei and Dell' Ongaro that they might return to Rome. I meanwhile caused it to be noised about in the city that I had arrived upon business relating to the Finance Minister, and I did so to avoid being noticed by the assassins, and my career terminated. But although I appeared to be what I stated, I was surprised one evening to receive a visit at the Locanda Burini, where I lodged, from some of these very men, who begged me to give them the five paoli a day, as they had asserted that they had been told by the commissioners, who had departed, that I had full power to concede this. . . .

The soldiers promised me by the Triumvirate did not arrive ; fifty carabineers on horseback stationed in the Ascoli province, for which I had sent, were detained by the president Calindri, so that my position was not enviable. The force in the city, small and badly organized, did not amount to more than 200 men. . . . Of the commandants, with the exception of two, none were to be trusted, while many of the artillerymen and coastguards were accomplices of the assassins. . . .

The 27th of April, at two in the morning, was the time fixed upon for the execution of the arrests, when, in the morning of the 26th, I was requested to proceed as soon as possible to the Governor's Palace. When I entered I saw a crowd of people, and a British naval officer appeared, who had been in conversation with the Governor. I waited to hear the news. I spoke to Mattioli, and he told me that this officer commanded a war corvette, and that he protested in the name of the British Government against the murder of an Irish priest; he required satisfaction, and would have taken the Consul with his family on board, and struck his flag, had an assurance not been given that a person had been sent by the Triumvirate to prevent all such infamies in future, and to bring the guilty party to punishment, and that it would take place the next night. This was kept very secret and not allowed to transpire.

To prevent any mistakes happening, I sent my orders to the Commandant of the Fortress at half-past eleven in the evening of the 26th, in duplicate copies, one of which was sent back to me with his signature.

It was as follows:—That the Commandant of the Castle should send, at one o'clock in the morning, twenty artillerymen, fully armed, conveying twenty cartridges each, to the carabineers' barracks; that the coastguard should do the same with their respective officers; and that the carabineers remain under the orders of the Commandant.—They went according to their instructions; they were separated into many picquets of coastguards, artillerymen, and carabineers mixed, under the guidance of a marshal of carabinieri. At half-past two the houses of those destined to be arrested were surrounded by the picquets, other soldiers placed here and there where three streets met. . . .

I sent orders to the officers of the national guard that at half-past two they should be in attendance on the Governor. When they came, I explained my mission, and said I was determined to carry out the affair to the end, and that I required their aid to support me in carrying out the arrests, and when these were effected, I requested them to co-operate with me in other proceedings which I might deem necessary.

At five in the morning the drums beat, and in a minute the national guard was drawn up under arms in the public square, and the Governor harangued them. They then served with the military of their own accord. At eight there were twenty of the

guilty in the hands of justice ; not one dared resist the force—a proof that those who stab in the dark dare not meet death openly like men. During the day others were arrested.

The English corvette now gave the customary salute, and sailed towards Venice, from whence she came, and Mr. Moore, the worthy British Consul at Ancona, came to the government house to congratulate me.

APPENDIX H

LAMARTINE ON FRENCH POLICY IN ITALY

*Extracts from his speech in the Chamber of Deputies,
March 8th, 1849*

THE Roman question implies the most difficult of all interventions ; there is no cause for surprise in the fact that a Government faced by such great difficulties, compelled . . . to combine in the same result the interests of the French Republic, those of the gradual renaissance of the Italian States, political interests, and also religious interests, which are likewise political for most of the Catholic Powers of Europe ; there is no cause for surprise, I repeat, in the fact that a Government so placed, should choose for a time to veil its decisions in secrecy. . . .

In the affairs of the Roman State, in the present situation of the Roman people and of the religion represented by the Catholic Pontiff, there may be taken three points of view : a purely Catholic, ultra-Catholic, violently Catholic point of view, if you like, retrograde Catholic, Catholic after the fashion of the Middle Ages, of Charlemagne and of Countess Matilda, anxious to impose the faith, discipline, and dogma, by force of arms, at the point of the bayonet, and saying : Let us intervene at Rome to re-establish the temporal power.

There is another point of view, an absolutely contrary one, that of the radical philosopher, by which the individual conscience, and that even of the State, is entirely freed. . . . This extreme party, however true its reasonings may be, is foolhardy . . . for the spiritual independence of the Pope is regarded as a political interest and right by those Powers with whom it will be necessary for us to treat.

Lastly, there is a point of view that may be described as political, the diplomatic point of view, the French republican point of view. I need hardly add that it is mine. . . .

. . . Suppress the action of France, indirectly permit an intervention in the Roman State, allow a people to be for ever subjected, by the right of the strongest, to the Papal tiara and throne. This is what the purely Catholic element advises.

The radical philosopher, on the other hand, says : Leave everything to chance. A Republic has been born at Rome. You cannot tell whether it will be accepted, will thrive . . . if a European war should arise from this, wash your hands of it. . . .

And now from the political, from my point of view, what is there to be said ? . . .

France will not intervene, France will declare to Europe that she will not permit any intervention in Italy. . . . She is ready to open negotiations on a basis I have already explained, with all the other Catholic Powers, to effect, without touching the independence of Italy, a peaceful settlement of this great and twofold question, of the freedom of the Roman people, and of the inviolability and independence, not of the Sovereign, but of the Pope. . . .

APPENDIX I

THE following letter was written by Mazzini to Manara, June 22nd, after the French had effected a lodgment in bastion No. 6.

Citizen Colonel, I reprobate the decision of General Garibaldi not to carry out the attack at five o'clock. I highly deplore the determination he has reached, and believe it to be fatal to the interests of the country.

We ought to have attacked this very night, half an hour after the breach was carried.

If it was not possible owing to the discouragement of the troops during the night, then the agreement with Roselli for 5.30 should have been adhered to : the attack delivered then.

And since the error of not attacking at the appointed hour has been committed, we ought to have attacked at 5 in the afternoon as had again been agreed.

To-morrow morning our attack will stand no chance of success ; the enemy's artillery will be in position.

Our plan of defence is consequently totally changed, let me say ruined. Placed as we are there is but one defence, in attacking.

This morning I caused the bells to peal an alarm, rousing the people ; and then could do nought but relapse into the Jesuitry of explanations, thereby damping their ardour.

This afternoon the people were fanatics ; 2000 men were ready to reinforce the troops, enough to capture the Casino or to accomplish whatsoever else might be do-able. An enormous multitude followed these, as a second line.

Deluded once more, the people will think we are cowards, and become so themselves. Our opponents will profit by it. Some free town or other will rise at the first serious menace, and we will repeat our triumph of Milan (*rifaremo Milano*).

You have now neither workers nor material. Forty days of labour have exhausted the vitality of the people.

We can with difficulty get meat, powder, flour.

I view Rome as fallen. God grant that the enemy dare assault us, and quickly, for then we shall make a fine defence with the people and barricades ; all will join in. Later there will be no one.

My soul is full of bitterness not to be able to explain matters. So much valour, so much heroism wasted !

But come ; I have received your account, and have nothing to say to it ; I esteem you, and you begin to love me. I can swear that your thoughts are my thoughts, and that Roselli, whom so many calumniate, and the good ones of the general staff, are with you.

The useless satisfaction shall, at all events, be mine, not to affix my name to the capitulation which, I foresee, is inevitable. But what do I matter ? It is Rome and Italy that are important.—

Yours,

GIUSEPPE MAZZINI.

N. Bianchi, *Vicende del Mazzinianismo*, 195.

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