

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIR ULLA SAID WALI KHAIRKHA

d. Other Relevant Data

1. After arriving in Herat, Afghanistan, the detainee spent much of his time establishing himself as the premier narcotics trafficker in the region. The Taliban government used opium and other smuggling operations as a funding mechanism for combat operations throughout western Afghanistan.

2. The detainee has instigated other detainees to cause problems, including making noise, not eating, killing themselves, not showering, and pushing the door during a search.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he performed only civilian work as Governor of Herat, Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated no al Qaida training camps were located in the Herat province, Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims he has no ill feelings towards the United States and was only working for the Taliban to protect his family and tribe.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 October 2007

To: ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALGHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID
ABDALSALAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he made a trip from Peshawar, Pakistan to Saudi Arabia for Umra in 1988. The detainee stated he spoke to an individual and several other Libyans while in Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated he heard many stories about the plight of the people of Afghanistan in their war with the Soviet Union.
 2. The detainee stated he knew the individual in the previous statement was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 3. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a foreign terrorist organization.
 4. The detainee stated he eventually moved back to Libya and talked to several other people who suggested he go to Afghanistan and fight with the Mujahedin. The detainee stated he then relocated to Peshawar, Pakistan to take up the "Afghan cause."
 5. The detainee stated that he resided at a madafa in Pakistan where many people came to train before they went to the front lines of Afghanistan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALHAZAWY, ABDULLAH HAMID ABDALSALAM

6. The detainee stated he remained at the Madafa in Peshawar, Pakistan for approximately 15 to 20 days before leaving for Afghanistan via Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated he found his way to the Jaji Training Camp located in the rear of the battle area where people came to regroup. After a week the detainee got sick and returned to Libya. In 1989, the detainee was ordered to go back into the Navy so he decided to leave Libya once and for all.
7. The detainee stated he moved to Afghanistan in 1995 when the Pakistani authorities began to arrest Arabs in Pakistan.
8. The detainee stated that when he left Pakistan, he went to Kabul, Afghanistan where he tried and failed to acquire Afghan citizenship documents. The detainee stated that when he tried to return to Jalalabad, he was arrested and he spent approximately 18 months in prison.
9. The detainee stated that he stayed at the Libyan Madafa for approximately a total of five months from 1997 to 1998. While residing at this madafa, the detainee was shown a video of an attempted assassination of a Libyan leader. The detainee stated all of the residents of this madafa, except for himself, were members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
10. In 1998 the detainee was in Jalalabad, Afghanistan at the Khalden guest house which was associated with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
11. An al Qaida operative stated he saw the detainee several times between 2000 and 2001 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and believed the detainee was in charge of a guest house for the Libyans.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he completed his second year of middle school in 1977, and then went on to attend a trade school associated with the Ministry of Maritime Transport. The detainee stated he was required to serve compulsory military service in 1980, but escaped from the training camp. The detainee stated he was arrested and sent to the Abu Sitta Naval Training Center for approximately one year.
2. The detainee stated that in 1986 he returned to basic training at Abu Sitta for four months where he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and an unnamed Italian rifle.

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3. The detainee stated he went to Jaji and Sadah Training Camps. After he left the Sadah camp, he entered Afghanistan and joined Khalden Camp for 10 days.
4. The detainee stated that at the Sada Camp he received training on several different types of firearms including 6mm and 8mm pistols, a machine gun, and a Kalashnikov rifle.
5. The program at the Khalden camp was a complete course covering light and heavy weaponry, explosives, topography and tactical operations.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee frequented a mosque and began to establish relationships with some extremist elements, including individuals who espoused the ideas of jihad. These individuals rallied supporters through meetings and distributed tapes that preached jihad.
2. The detainee was listed by the Libyan authorities as belonging to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
3. An al Qaida operative stated the detainee was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
4. The detainee stated he met several individuals at a camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and indicated the camp was associated with al Qaida and had a large guest house.
5. A noted jihadist stated the detainee was a security leader for Usama bin Laden during a trip to a guest house in Afghanistan.
6. The detainee stated that when he was in Pakistan there were many al Qaida members and that he met people from al Qaida.
7. A source stated the detainee referred him to an organization which supports al Qaida.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee traveled extensively between 1987 and 2001 to cities in Saudi Arabia, Malta, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Malaysia, Dubai, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. The detainee requested asylum in the United Kingdom and Malta and

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attempted to immigrate to Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Norway.

2. A member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group stated the detainee took part in the fighting in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stated he was imprisoned in Afghanistan because he entered Afghanistan with a fraudulent Iraqi passport.
4. The detainee had a Casio F-91W watch in his possession at the time of apprehension.
5. The type of Casio watch the detainee had in his possession at the time of apprehension has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist groups with improvised explosive devices.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he is not a member of al Qaida or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
- b. The detainee claimed to have no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. The detainee stated that if anyone knew of such attacks but failed to act to prevent them would be just as guilty as the perpetrators of the attack.
- c. The detainee stated that in the total of 13 years in which he lived in Afghanistan, he never fired a single shot.
- d. The detainee stated he does not think it is a problem to travel with bad documents so long as one doesn't intend to hurt people. The detainee stated he always used his true name to travel, even when he used an Iraqi passport while traveling from the Sudan to Yemen. The detainee stated he needed the Iraqi passport because he sent his Libyan passport home to relatives for renewal, but it never came back.
- e. The detainee stated his trips to foreign countries were for tourism and were taken with tickets he and his brother obtained as employees of Libyan Civilian Aviation. When the detainee was told the years he worked at Libyan Civil Aviation did not encompass all his travel, the detainee stated he continued to have the same travel privileges even after leaving the Libyan Civil Aviation.
- f. The detainee stated the only support he gave the jihad was to teach the children of the Mujahedin. For this, the detainee stated he received a salary, so it was not voluntary

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work for the jihad.

- g. The detainee stated that all religions teach peace and that killing innocents is not acceptable. The detainee stated that individuals or groups that engage in terrorism are not preaching real religions, they are merely distorting Islam.
- h. The detainee stated he had gone to Pakistan originally to find work, not to fight as a jihadist. The detainee stated he did not fight at all in Afghanistan and he did not have the will to fight.
- i. An al Qaida operative stated the detainee is not a member of al Qaida or of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
- j. An al Qaida operative stated the detainee never stayed long with other Mujahedin and did not fight on the front lines.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 June 2007

TO: ABDENOUR SAMEUR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDENOUR SAMEUR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought in Bosnia in 1995.

2. The detainee stated he attended the Finsbury Park Mosque after he had been in London, England for six months. The detainee gave money to the Finsbury Park Mosque and he later found out this money went partially to fund individuals going to Afghanistan and other areas of the world where jihad was being fought.

3. A source stated the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, England is the place where Mujahedin meet to go to the fight.

4. The detainee stated an individual helped him get to Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated he paid about 400 British Pounds for a false French passport and gave the individual an additional 600 British Pounds to make arrangements for travel to Pakistan.

6. The individual who obtained the detainee's passport and travel arrangements is a well known Salafist Group for Combat and Preaching recruiter who handled large amounts of Mujahedin transiting to Afghanistan.

7. The Salafist Group for Call and Combat is a foreign terrorist organization.

8. The detainee stated he traveled from England to Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDENOUR SAMEUR

9. The detainee stated he traveled from Islamabad, Pakistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated, when he heard the Taliban was fleeing, he fled with about 150 others to the caves in the area of Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee then fled to cross the border into Pakistan, where he was captured by the Pakistan Army.

b. Training

1. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov and the Makarov handgun in the Algerian Military.

2. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Training Camp and received training on firing the AK-47 rifle.

3. The detainee stated the purpose of the al Farouq Camp was to train Mujahedin for jihad.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee acknowledged having been told something would happen to the United States within one week of the 11 September 2001 attacks.

2. The detainee stated he got a fraudulent French Passport for which he paid 200 British Pounds. He also had a British, Algerian and a fourth passport he stole while attempting to flee Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever having been to Bosnia and admitted lying about this in the past.

b. The detainee stated he never attended any training camps, never fought against the Northern Alliance or the United States, and never carried a weapon. The detainee stated he does not want to fight jihad. The detainee wants to get married and have a family and a job.

c. The detainee stated he never went to al Farouq Camp and this information was provided to interrogators so the detainee could obtain medical attention for his legs.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 February 2007

TO: SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated his devoutness changed while attending religious classes at a Jamat al Tabiligh mosque near the al Murauk Mosque in the al Murauk mountain area of Jordan. The detainee learned there was a Jamat al Tabiligh organization in Pakistan. The detainee flew from Amman, Jordan through Karachi, Pakistan to Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1993, the detainee attended an annual Jamat al Tabiligh public meeting in Lahore, Pakistan.

2. Jamat al Tabiligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee stated he did not have steady employment during his five years in Pakistan. The detainee would perform volunteer work with the International Islamic Relief Organization and the Islamic Relief Committee. This work would sometimes take the detainee to Afghanistan. The detainee would not explain what he actually did when volunteering.

4. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan a total of four times between 1990 and 1992.

5. The detainee was arrested in April 2000 attempting to cross into Afghanistan. The detainee was carrying a pocket telephone diary containing about 200 entries written in mixed Arabic and English and two letters written in Arabic. One of the letters was noted to have the name of a senior al Qaida member and aide to Usama bin Laden written at the top.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN

6. When the detainee was arrested in April 2000 while attempting to cross into Afghanistan, he had no identification documents on his person, but was carrying 100,000 Pakistani Rupees in cash, the equivalent of about 2,000 United States Dollars.

7. A foreign government has labeled the detainee a terrorist suspect.

8. In August 2000, the detainee was sentenced to three years in prison. Reportedly, the detainee was the subject of a security case with international implications. However, the detainee was released from jail on 19 October 2000. It was reported that a substantial amount of money, exact amount unknown, was probably paid to arrange the release of the detainee. It was believed the bribe money was probably paid by an al Qaida supporter, and the money for the bribe came from the al Qaida organization.

9. Following the detainee's release from confinement, it is believed the detainee and his family used false identity documents to travel to Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee was reported to be a senior commander of al Qaida. The detainee was reported to have been involved in providing military training to al Qaida trainees at a camp in Afghanistan, possibly in the area of Khowst, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he was in the Jordanian Army from 1979 to 1981. The detainee was assigned to a maintenance platoon while serving in the infantry and stated the only weapon he ever trained on while in the army was the M-16.

3. The detainee stated he had previous experience with AK-47s in the Jordanian military.

4. The detainee advised he was familiar with electrical detonators, but denied using his skills in basic demolitions.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was reportedly personally acquainted with Usama bin Laden and was known as an active member of the Maktab al Khidmat.

2. The detainee was believed to be one of the sons of the chief founder of the Maktab al Khidmat. The detainee was also believed to be the associate of a senior al Qaida operative.

3. The Maktab al Khidmat was founded in the early 1980s by Abdullah Azzam. The Maktab al Khidmat provided logistical help and channeled foreign assistance to the Mujahedin in their fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden was the group's chief financier. The Maktab al Khidmat later morphed into al Qaida.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN

4. A relative of the detainee was known as an al Qaida supporter and former employee of a Saudi Arabian construction company owned by Usama bin Laden.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he and other employees of an aid committee escorted money to Khowst, Afghanistan, approximately four times during 1990 to 1992. The detainee stated that prior to leaving for Khowst, he and other employees would take an AK-47, 30 rounds of ammo and 250,000 to 300,000 Pakistani Rupees each time.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he wanted to hide his travel because he was scared his family would think he was fighting the Russians.

b. The detainee was asked if he ever worked for the Afghanistan Taliban government or al Qaida. The detainee replied he did not have a relationship with either.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee claims to not have traveled to Afghanistan since 1992.

e. The detainee denied knowledge of al Qaida or the Taliban using Pakistani relief organizations as fronts for illegal activities.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 April 2007

To: MOHAMMED TAHAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED TAHAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In mid-September of 2001, the detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee was met in Karachi by someone from the Jamat al Tabligh, who took the detainee to the Maki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled to Lahore, Pakistan and spent two days there. The detainee then went to a mosque in Raywand, Pakistan.

2. The headquarters of the Jamat al Tabligh is located in Raywand, Pakistan.

3. Jamat al Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists, including members of al Qaida.

4. The detainee enrolled at the Salafeyah University in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The university is run by the Jamat al Tabligh.

5. The detainee stated that after Ramadan, a Pakistani took him and other Yemenis to an off-campus house. There were about 12 other students already at the house. Several months later, the detainee and the other occupants were arrested by Pakistanis and subsequently turned over to United States forces.

6. A source identified the detainee as an occupant of the Issa house in Faisalabad, Pakistan in March 2002.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED TAHAR

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated an individual from the Jamat al Tabiligh mission went to the Pakistani embassy and obtained a visa for the detainee for 25 United States Dollars.

2. The detainee was sent a personal greeting from the Taliban deputy minister of intelligence.

c. Intent

1. The detainee stated he should be considered a terrorist.

2. The detainee stated that if Muslim scholars say people must die, Muslims must follow the scholars' words. The detainee stated if the scholars issued a fatwa for the attacks of 11 September 2001, then the attacks would have been legitimate.

3. The detainee threatened to instigate an uprising in the Guantanamo camp, claiming that the Americans are assaulting Islam.

4. The detainee advised he wishes to remain in the group of detainees who do not cooperate and who will never leave.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he did not respond to a fatwa. The detainee visited Pakistan to attend a university to study medicine to aid Muslims. The detainee withdrew from the classes because they were too difficult. The detainee is not a Jamat al Tabiligh member, but needed their assistance to get into medical school.

b. The detainee noted he did not observe any type of weapons, computers, or telephones in the Issa house. The detainee further stated he did not observe or hear anyone preaching about jihad or recruiting for the Taliban and al Qaida.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. After being shown a video concerning the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City, the detainee said what he saw was a terrible event.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED TAHAR**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 September 2007

To: BAKUSH, SAID BIN BRAHIM BIN UMRAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, SAID BIN BRAHIM BIN UMRAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he wanted to leave Algeria and get a job overseas. The detainee stated he obtained his passport in the beginning of 2001. The detainee stated the first opportunity to obtain a visa was to travel to Pakistan with the Jamat-al-Tabligh and later ended up with a visa for Pakistan.
2. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
3. The detainee stated that in October 2001 he traveled from Libya to Afghanistan via Tunisia, Syria and Pakistan. The detainee stated he stayed at a Taliban house for one week in Karachi where he gave his passport and money to Afghani students at the house for safekeeping.
4. The detainee spent some time in Sudan while looking for jihad.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was a soldier in the Algerian Army and received his military training at Camp Thaknah in al Jilffah, Algeria. The detainee stated he served out an 18 month mandatory obligation

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, SAID BIN BRAHIM BIN UMRAN

2. The detainee attended the Khaldan Camp for several months in approximately 1997.
 3. The detainee trained at the Khaldan Camp circa 1996 and 1997.
 4. The Khaldan Training Camp's program was a complete course about weapons. An entire six-month program at Khaldan consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.
 5. The detainee may have gone to the Derunta Camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 6. The Derunta Training Camp as one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Afghanistan.
- c. Connections/Associations
1. The detainee was with a senior al Qaida Lieutenant in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The detainee was a member of his group, which traveled to various safe houses in Pakistan.
 2. The detainee remained in Afghanistan after he had completed training at the Khaldan Camp and lived in the Algerian Guest House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he worked as a driver.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he was never a member of Jamat-al-Tabligh and he never traveled to Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee stated he never received training in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he had heard of the Khaldan Camp but had no personal knowledge of the Khaldan Camp. The detainee stated he had never heard of the Derunta Camp.
 - c. A claim was made that the detainee was not a member of al Qaida, because al Qaida does not accept Algerians.
 - d. The detainee denied any involvement with al Qaida.
 - e. The detainee stated the only time he had ever been to Afghanistan was after his capture in March 2002.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAKUSH, SAID BIN BRAHIM BIN UMRAN

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 September 2007

To: HAKIM, ABDEL GHALIB AHMAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDEL GHALIB AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated, after one unsuccessful attempt to get a visa, he went to the Jamat-al-Tabligh Center in Talizz, Yemen and handed over his passport. After two or three days, the detainee retrieved his passport and visa to Pakistan.
2. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
3. The detainee stated he traveled to Pakistan in May or June 2001 because he wanted to study religion and the Koran at the al Riwand Center in Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee stated he flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates and then on to Karachi, Pakistan.
4. The detainee stated a local benefactor paid for his plane ticket to Pakistan.
5. The detainee stated his plane ticket cost approximately 400 United States Dollars, and he traveled with approximately 100 to 150 United States Dollars. The detainee stated he was able to pay for his own travel by growing and selling khat in Yemen.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAKIM, ABDEL GHALIB AHMAD

6. Once in Karachi, Pakistan the detainee and others met an unknown male at the Karachi airport. The detainee stated it is known that a group of Arabs traveled to Pakistan each week, and this unknown Pakistani male takes the travelers to one of either two mosques, the Makie Mosque or the Madanie Mosque, in Karachi, Pakistan.
 7. Upon arrival in Karachi, the detainee and another individual went to the Macci Mosque. The detainee stated he and the same individual traveled to Lahore, Pakistan by train and then took a taxi to the Riwand Center.
 8. A source stated that within Pakistan, the mosque in Riwand near Lahore is the most important mosque to the Jamat-al-Tabligh and the organization's headquarters. The Mekki Mosque in Karachi is the next most important location for the Jamat-al-Tabligh.
 9. The detainee stated he stayed at the Riwand Tabligh Center for a few months, but then decided he needed a quieter place to memorize the Koran.
 10. The detainee stated he decided to travel to the Jamea al Selafiya University in Faisalabad, Pakistan in the hopes he could study with one of the scholars without having to enroll in the university and pay tuition.
 11. The detainee stated he was directed to a house by a sheik at Jamea al Selafiya University in Faisalabad, Pakistan, because many Arabs from the university lived at that house.
 12. After arriving in Faisalabad, Pakistan the detainee and three others received permission, from the owner of the house, to live at the owner's home while studying at Selafiya University. The detainee stated he stayed at the house for several months.
 13. The detainee was apprehended in Faisalabad, Pakistan, and he did not have any identification documents.
- b. Training
1. The detainee was at al Farouq in the summer of 2001.
 2. The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando

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course, topography, and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

One source reported that the detainee was captured with the source and fourteen other detainees.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested with one 7.62 round of ammunition; 274,000 Afghanis; and 15,000 rupees.
2. The detainee stated he knew very little about the Koran or religion in general and pleaded ignorance on the Koran and God.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he did not serve in the Yemeni military and has never received any type of military training.
- b. The detainee stated he never traveled to Afghanistan and would never go there to fight. The detainee further stated he never received any military training in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.
- c. The detainee stated he did not have any intention to fight in any conflict.
- d. The detainee stated he did not want to officially become a member of the Jamat-al-Tabligh but believed by traveling with them to Pakistan, it would further his own goal of memorizing the Koran. The detainee further stated he never met anyone associated with al Qaida or the Taliban.
- e. The detainee denied being recruited by an al Qaida or Taliban operative in Yemen and stated that he traveled to Pakistan on his own free will with the sole intention of studying the Koran.
- f. The detainee denied knowing a senior al Qaida operational planner as well as being at the al Farouq Camp.
- g. The detainee stated he has not met Usama bin Laden.

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- h. The detainee denied knowing if the Riwand Religious Center was a training center for fighters. The detainee denied the lectures promoted violence. The detainee further stated the people who attacked the United States need to be captured and prosecuted and he considered the attacks unacceptable.
 - i. The detainee stated none of the individuals living at a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan had any connection to al Qaida, the Taliban or any other Islamic non-governmental organizations. The detainee denied the owner of the house had any connection to al Qaida or the Taliban.
 - j. The detainee denied having any ammunition in his possession when he was arrested by Pakistani authorities. The detainee stated he only had his passport, money, a ticket, and a watch in his possession.
 - k. The detainee's career plans once back in Yemen is to resume farming khat.
 - l. The detainee stated if he is released, he would like to go back to Yemen and live with his family. The detainee further stated he probably would not look for a job, but just stay around the house eating and drinking.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 August 2007

To: AHMED, FAHMI ABDULLAH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAHMI ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated an individual recruited him to go to Afghanistan to work for the Taliban.
 2. A source stated the individual in the previous statement was a recruiter in Taiz, Yemen who was associated with and received money from the Taliban.
 3. The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen to Pakistan.
 4. The detainee stated that while in Pakistan, an individual invited the detainee to stay at a house connected to the Jamat-al-Tabligh Mosque.
 5. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
 6. The detainee was seen many times at the Hasan Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2001. The detainee had probably completed basic training since the detainee was at the Guest House for trained Mujahedin.
 7. A source stated the Hassan Guest House was used as a reception point for the Mujahedin arriving in Afghanistan, and also to facilitate travel to the frontlines and to the Afghan training camps. The Guest House was also used as a storage

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAHMI ABDULLAH

and distribution facility for mortars and rifles.

8. The detainee was seen at the Abu Suhayb Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan in Spring 2000 and in a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan around February 2002.
9. A source stated the Suhaib Guest House was also known as the al Ansar Guest House.
10. A source stated the al Ansar Guest House was a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in the area of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was shown how to use a Kalashnikov while on the front line in Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was identified as having received a training course, which was held at the al Farouq Camp. Usama bin Laden directed that the course be held as a result of complaints from al Qaida members of Yemeni and Saudi origin over the poor quality of the Egyptian trainers.
3. A source stated the al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. Students that took the basic training class at al Farouq took a basic commando course and received training in weapons, topography and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee met a senior al Qaida Lieutenant in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2000 or 2001.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was on the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan as a member of the Taliban. The detainee stated he was fighting against the Northern Alliance.
2. The detainee stated that when he was in Kandahar, Afghanistan, a Taliban commander gave him the order to go to Kabul, Afghanistan to fight. The detainee stated he traveled to the front lines of Dusarak, Afghanistan, and Bagram, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he stayed in Duscrak for one and a half years and i Bagram for four or five months.

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3. The detainee stated he served the Taliban for two years. The detainee stated he served as a guard and later became a driver for the Taliban on the front lines.
 4. The detainee stated he served the Taliban by supplying food and other supplies to the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan.
 5. An individual stated that the detainee was with him on the front lines in Afghanistan.
 6. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida member as of 15 December 2001.
 7. The detainee stated he left Kabul once to go to Khwost to look for a wife. He was there one week.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee emphasized that he was not in al Qaida.
 - b. The detainee denied ever going to Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee denied knowing there was an al Qaida training camp in khowst, Afghanistan and stated he would have settled down in Kabul, Afghanistan if he had found a wife.
 - d. The detainee stated when the time comes for his release, he will remain in the city he is from in Yemen. The detainee stated he is scared to travel to another country because he does not want any insurgent groups to pick him up thinking he still wants to fight.
 - e. The detainee stated he never heard about al Qaida until he came to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and did not hear anyone planning or speaking of future attacks.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 September 2007

To: SALAM, MOHAMMED AHMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALAM, MOHAMMED AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated at the end of May 2001, he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated a man he had met at a Jamat-al-Tabligh mosque in Taizz, Yemen had suggested the detainee go to Pakistan and had paid approximately 800 United States Dollars for the airline ticket.
 2. The preachers of the Jamat-al-Tabligh organization have been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
 3. The detainee stated he met an individual in Karachi, Pakistan whose name the man at the mosque in Taizz, Yemen had provided. The detainee stated he stayed three months in Karachi, Pakistan.
 4. The detainee stated he was the individual's roommate at a hotel for three months and paid the individual 100 United States Dollars for room fees. The detainee stated the individual seemed to have some sort of connection with the Tablighi network and visited five or six mosques in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated the individual talked the detainee into going to Faisalabad, Pakistan for religious

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALAM, MOHAMMED AHMED

instruction instead of returning to Yemen.

5. The detainee stated the individual convinced him to work as a missionary in Pakistan where the detainee lived at a hotel for two months and then a center for four months. The detainee stated that two months prior to his capture, he was moved to a home. The detainee stated the people staying at the center were in Pakistan illegally and moved to avoid arrest. The detainee was captured March 2002.
6. The detainee stated he went to Faisalabad, Pakistan to study the Koran at the Salafi Mosque. The detainee stated he was in Faisalabad seven to eight months when the Pakistan Army captured him.

b. Training

1. A senior al Qaida member stated he saw the detainee in early summer 2001 at al Farouq Training Camp.
2. The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated the Jamat-al-Tabligh paid for all his travels. The detainee stated the individual he met in Karachi, Pakistan was part of Jamat-al-Tabligh and paid for his lodgings in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. A source stated the detainee was at the Salafist University in Faisalabad, Pakistan when he was arrested.
3. According to Salafist Islam, a modern state is fundamentally incompatible with true Islam, which had to be fought for in a jihad. Salafism rejects all other forms of Islam and foreign influence. Radical Salafism is practiced by many terrorist organizations including al Qaida.
4. A senior al Qaida member stated he saw the detainee in early summer 2001 at al Qaida's Nibras guest house, where new students gathered before being transported to al Farouq for basic training.

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5. The Niberas guest house was an al Qaida guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and was used for new recruits who were on their way to the al Farouq Training Camp for basic training.
 6. A senior al Qaida member stated he saw the detainee in late summer 2001 at the Hasan guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which was a guest house for trained Mujahedin.
 7. The Hassan guest house was used for veterans of basic training who were either cycling out of the al Farouq Training Camp or receiving more advanced al Qaida training.
- d. Other Relevant Data
1. The detainee stated he had eight United States one hundred dollar bills when he arrived in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated this was his life savings, which he had acquired gradually between 1999 and 2001 from working and gifts from his brothers.
 2. The detainee was captured with a Casio watch model A-159W.
 3. The Casio A-159W watch is a silver version of the Casio F-91W watch which has been used in bombings that have been linked to al Qaida and radical Islamic terrorist improvised explosive devices.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he had never stayed at the Hasan or Nibras guest houses.
 - b. The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to get medical treatment for his sinuses and has never been to Afghanistan.
 - c. The detainee stated he has no knowledge on anyone involved with al Qaida.
 - d. The detainee stated he had never seen any al Qaida or Taliban members.
 - e. The detainee stated he had nothing to do with the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States.
 - f. The detainee stated that if released, he wanted to get married and possibly work in his father's store.

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5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 September 2007

To: SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he met with twelve Tableegh missionaries at a mosque sometime in 2000. The detainee stated the missionaries encouraged him to become a missionary and go on Tableegh with them. The detainee stated two months later he met a Sheikh, who gave the detainee a letter for the Pakistani embassy that identified the detainee as a missionary so the detainee could obtain a visa.
 2. The Sheikh who encouraged the detainee to go on Tableegh was responsible for the Jihadist movement in the Sadah, Yemen region. The Jihadist movement recognized Usama bin Laden as their leader.
 3. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaeda.
 4. The detainee stated he traveled to Pakistan in October 2001, after traveling around Yemen for about one year with Tableegh missionary groups. He stated he traveled to the Maki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan and the Raywand Mosque outside Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee stated he traveled from mosque to mosque for four months around Lahore, Pakistan and Islamabad, Pakistan.

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5. A source stated the Makki Mosque in Karachi, Pakistan was a Tabligh mosque where various Jamat-al-Tabligh functions were coordinated and administered, such as obtaining visas and approving travel requests to Pakistan for Jamat-al-Tabligh members.
6. A source identified Raiwind, also spelled Raiwand, as the world center for the Jamat-al-Tabligh.
7. After the detainee returned from the Raywand Mosque, the detainee enrolled in Salafeyah University in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The detainee stated he lived in a house off campus run by a man named Isa. About one and a half months after the detainee moved into the house, everyone but Isa was arrested by Pakistani authorities.
8. A source stated the detainee was a resident of the Yemeni House in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
9. A source stated the director of the Yemeni guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan was a senior al Qaida member.
10. A source stated he knew the detainee from Issa's house and heard other people at Issa's house refer to the detainee as "The Tabligh".
11. The detainee in 1998 was on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan and later at the al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was acting as a doctor or nurse.
12. A source stated he saw the detainee in a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house. The guest house was simply known as the Arab house and was located in the Haji Habash district of Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee led 5 prayers every other day and then would preach about jihad and recite verses from the Koran.
13. Al Qaida maintained a safe house in 2001 in Kandahar, Afghanistan, near the Haji Habash Mosque. Arabs who came to Kandahar for military training at the al Farouq Training Camp, operated by al Qaida, used this house.
14. A source stated the detainee was in charge of a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
15. According to a senior al Qaida Lieutenant, he first saw the detainee in Kabul, Afghanistan and the last time he remembered seeing him was in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The source claimed the detainee spent a lot of time at an

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

individual's house in Kabul, Afghanistan at the front lines.

16. A source claimed that the house the detainee spent a lot of time in Kabul, Afghanistan was the house of the individual in charge of Usama bin Laden's personal security after the United States air strikes in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. A senior al Qaida operative thought the detainee had already completed training in Kabul, Afghanistan by the time he met him in 1999. The al Qaida operative claimed the detainee remained in Kandahar, Afghanistan for several months and then returned to Yemen in about spring 1999.
2. A senior al Qaida operative claimed he saw the detainee at Mes Aynak Training Camp in the fall of 1999.
3. The Mes Aynak Training Camp offered courses in basic training, close combat, anti-aircraft, and mountain combat tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

1. According to a senior al Qaida operative, he first met the detainee in early 1999 at an al Qaida village near the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport.
2. A source stated the detainee was among a group of 30 Arabs traveling from Zurnat, Afghanistan to Barmal, Afghanistan. The group traveled to a Madrasa that was owned and operated by Jamiat Ulema e Islami.
3. The Jamiat Ulema e Islami is a radical Sunni religious-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama bin Laden, and sponsorship of some 3000 religious schools.

d. Intent

An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as an attendee of a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan with Usama bin Laden, a senior al Qaida operative, and about 25 other Yemeni and Saudi individuals. The meeting took place more than a month after the bombing of the USS Cole and they discussed attacking another ship or a plane that accompanied the ship.

e. Other Relevant Data

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALEM AL ZARNUKI, MOHAMMED ALI

1. When presented with the eye witness accounts placing him in Afghanistan over the period of about two years, the detainee stated the interrogators were mistaken. However, when pressed about telling the truth, the detainee said, "If I tell you the truth, you are just going to ask me about everywhere I have been."
 2. A source stated the detainee led five prayers every other day. Then, the detainee would preach about jihad and recite verses from the Koran while in a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he had never traveled to Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee denied having been on Tablighi in the Lahore area with any of the men he lived with at the Aysa House.
 - c. The detainee stated he did not know anyone who went to Afghanistan for training, nor did he remember anything about training camp recruiting.
 - d. In a later interview, the detainee stated he never spent any time with the Sheikh who encouraged him to go on Tableegh.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 April 2007

TO: HALA BIN ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HALA BIN ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's decision to travel to Pakistan was driven by his desire to see Pakistan and pursue higher education. The detainee desired to study Salafiah.

2. The detainee admitted he wanted to go to Pakistan to learn the Koran so he could be a teacher.

3. The detainee applied for a tourist visa from the Pakistan embassy in Aden, Yemen and left for Pakistan in October 2001.

4. The detainee stated he stayed at Issa's Guest House in Faisalabad, Pakistan for approximately four and a half months.

5. The detainee claims he did not return to Yemen because his visa expired. The detainee could not remember what date his visa expired.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he met an Arab male at the Sanaa, Yemen airport who suggested the detainee go to Pakistan. The detainee lived with that Arab male for two months in Karachi, Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HALA BIN ALI

2. The detainee claimed he met two individuals at the airport in Karachi, Pakistan and stayed at the two individuals' house for one and a half months. The detainee then moved to Issa's Guest House in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

3. While the detainee was in Karachi, Pakistan, an individual paid for the detainee's airline ticket to Lahore, Pakistan.

4. Five to seven days prior to the Pakistani raid on Issa's house in Faisalabad, Pakistan the detainee received 300 United States Dollars from Mohammed Abdul Rahman. Rahman asked the detainee to hold the money until Rahman returned from Karachi, Pakistan.

5. The detainee's alias was found on a listing of captured Mujahedin. This information was found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.

6. An individual identified the detainee as Bilal, a Yemeni whom the individual saw when he was being smuggled from Zurmat, Afghanistan to Banu, Pakistan.

7. An individual reported that the detainee was part of a group that traveled from Zurmat, Afghanistan to Barmal, Afghanistan. The group spent two days at a Madrasa used by foreign fighters fleeing Afghanistan and operated by Jamiat Ulema e Islami.

8. The Jamiat Ulema e Islami or Assembly of the Scholars of Islam is a radical Sunni deobandi religio political party best known for its anti United States threats and vocal support of Usama bin Laden. Their stated goal is the Talibanization of Pakistan.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. In Faisalabad, Pakistan the detainee was arrested at Issa's Guest House.

2. The detainee identified 12 other detainees that were captured with him by the Pakistan police at Issa's house in March 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims, if he were to leave Cuba, he will most likely not stay in touch with other detainees that the detainee has met here.

b. The detainee denied ever going to Afghanistan.

c. The detainee claims he did not receive any military training while living in Pakistan.

d. The detainee denies being a member of the Taliban or al Qaeda.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HALA BIN ALI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 June 2007

TO: MIN GAZOV ARIVIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MIN GAZOV ARIVIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he left his wife and son to travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan, so he could live in a pure Muslim state.

2. The detainee stated he decided to move to Afghanistan to live by the laws of Shariat.

3. The detainee was identified as attending the Salafist University and as a member of the Tabiligh organization.

4. Jamat al Tabiligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover for travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

5. The detainee traveled by van from Lahore, Pakistan, to an al Qaida safe house where Abu Zubaydah lived in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

6. The detainee stated he left for another al Qaida safe house where he was eventually arrested with a number of suspected al Qaida members.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan basic training that included battle drills, tactics, infantry weapons, orienteering, survival training, mines and explosives familiarization, physical training, and first aid.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MIN GAZOV ARIVIL

2. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has been designated a foreign terrorist organization.

3. The detainee stated he spent two weeks at a Training Camp of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and was shown infantry equipment, how to make an explosive mixture, and how to use trinitrotoluene.

4. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other camps in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq camp and received training on pistols, rifles, chemicals, how to make small bombs, and how to use a sniper rifle.

6. The detainee stated he attended an explosives and poison training camp in Afghanistan that included training on how to make a formula bomb, explosives, and poisons.

c. Intent

The detainee is a religious person that would fight for Islam.

d. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee is familiar with the history of Afghanistan and believes things were better after the Taliban came to power.

2. The detainee has made numerous controversial statements to investigators including threatening to hit an investigator.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee served in the Russian military from 1986 to 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b. The detainee stated he never went to training in Afghanistan and that he made up the story about going to training camps.

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- c. The detainee claims he did not go to Afghanistan to fight.
 - d. The detainee claims no knowledge of al Qaida or Taliban personalities or network.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 July 2007

TO: ABDALLAH HUSSEINI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH HUSSEINI

1. Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he attended the al Nur Mosque in Germany.

2. The al Nur Mosque in Hamburg, Germany belongs to Jamat-al-Tabligh.

3. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

4. The detainee stated an individual gave him fundamentalist tapes to listen to and persuaded the detainee to go to Afghanistan and participate in jihad. The detainee stated he decided to go and fight jihad.

5. The detainee stated the individual in previous statement recruited for jihad for Afghanistan and members of Jamat-al-Tabligh at the al Nur Mosque in Germany.

6. The detainee stated, in September 2001, he left Germany with approximately 3,000 United States Dollars. The detainee traveled with two individuals from Germany to Afghanistan via Turkey and Pakistan.

7. The detainee stated, when asked to fight against the Northern Alliance, he volunteered to go with the Taliban and was placed on a defensive line.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH HUSSEINI

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received training on the AK-47, Seminov and Dictaroff single shot rifle in the Algerian Army.

2. The detainee stated he was taken into the mountains outside the al Farouq Training Camp where the detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket propelled grenade and physical training.

3. The detainee was taken to Camp Nine Training Camp, outside Kabul, Afghanistan where he received training on camouflage techniques, weapons and physical fitness.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated, that while on the defensive line, there was an individual in charge of the defensive lines.

2. A source stated that the individual in the preceding statement was a major al Qaida associate that was ordered by Usama bin Laden to be the line commander in Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he and Abu Zubaydah were captured by Pakistan authorities in Pakistan.

4. Abu Zubaydah stated he met the detainee while smuggling Mujahedin into Birmal, Pakistan and later in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

5. Abu Zubaydah is a senior al Qaida lieutenant.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and hand grenades while positioned on the defensive lines.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated his dream is to one day have his own coffee shop in Germany.

b. The detainee stated it was not his intention to fight with the Taliban and hoped his truthfulness would allow him to be released so he could return to Germany.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDALLAH HUSSEINI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 May 2007

To: ISMAEL ALI BAKUSH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAEL ALI BAKUSH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that in 1991, while in Saudi Arabia, he decided to travel to Afghanistan to help support the Mujahedin.

2. The detainee fought against the Soviet backed Najeeb Allah government until it collapsed. The detainee then returned to Torkhum, Afghanistan, where he remained until 1994.

3. In 1997, after several years living in different countries, the detainee returned to Afghanistan and joined the Taliban.

4. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance.

5. The detainee admitted he was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

6. The detainee and his group would fight sporadically whenever there was a fight between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAEL ALI BAKUSH

b. Training

1. In Afghanistan, the detainee attended the Kun Sayaf Training Camp, where he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket propelled grenades, and the Semenov pistol.
2. The detainee received training at the al Ghanad Camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee specialized in electronics, energy, and conductive circuits, and was considered an expert with explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

1. In 2001, the detainee provided training to an al Qaida operative and a group of Mujahedin on electronics and explosives at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee's name was found on media associated with al Qaida.
3. The detainee provided military training at camps in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee also participated in building and equipping a training camp in Kabul, Afghanistan.
4. The detainee was a member of the military committee of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
5. While in Afghanistan, the detainee stayed in a safe house owned by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
6. In 1999, the detainee and four other Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, and stayed in the town of Wazeer Akbar Khan, a neighborhood for Arabs.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. In Saudi Arabia, the detainee was arrested for assaulting a woman.
2. In 1997, the detainee was arrested by the Sudanese government and told to leave the country. The detainee flew to Damascus, Syria, where he was subsequently arrested for being a spy for Israel.
3. The detainee was released by the Syrian government and traveled to Zarka, Jordan, where he stayed for three to four months with members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAEL ALI BAKUSH

4. The detainee stated the reason he decided to fight with the Taliban was because he lived in Afghanistan both prior to Taliban control and after Taliban control. Prior to Taliban control there were robberies, thefts, and fights between groups, but after the Taliban took over, the area became safe.

5. The detainee stated that prior to the events of 11 September 2001, he had no feelings towards the United States, and considered the United States like any other country. The detainee's main concern was Libya and the overthrow of Khadaffi.

6. The detainee stated he differentiates between the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee considers the Taliban a state, while he sees al Qaida as an organization.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that at no time did he conduct any operations against American Forces.

b. The detainee stated he does not blame anyone for his current situation and it is a result of his own personal struggle. Additionally, the detainee stated he never swore allegiance to any extremist groups, and does not know where he wants to go if released.

c. The detainee stated he would like to be released to any non Arabic country but Libya. The detainee believes the government of Libya would not treat him well and that they would put him in jail because of his political outspokenness.

d. The detainee stated he would like to find a wife and start a family. He would work in any job that would allow him to support his family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 April 2007

To: MUSTAFA IBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUSTAFA IBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. After hearing of the situation in Afghanistan between the Taliban and another Muslim faction and the requests for assisting the Taliban in their moment of need, the detainee made a decision to help the Taliban and travel to Pakistan and then Afghanistan.

2. After traveling to Malaysia and Thailand, the detainee returned to the Sudan to make preparations for travel to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated that in late 2001, during a visit to the al Kabeer Mosque, or Great Mosque, in Khartoum, Sudan the detainee came engaged in conversation with a man regarding the war in Afghanistan. Being convinced that the United States was intentionally attacking and killing innocent Muslim women and children, the detainee conveyed his desire to perform jihad.

4. The detainee was introduced to a Sudanese national at the market of Libya Mosque in Khartoum, Sudan. The Sudanese national obtained a Pakistani visa for the detainee and a paid ticket to Syria. The detainee also received 1,500 United States Dollars to purchase his airline ticket from Syria to Pakistan and other travel costs from the Sudanese national.

5. The detainee departed Khartoum, Sudan on 30 December 2001 enroute to Karachi, Pakistan via Damascus, Syria.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUSTAFA IBRAHIM

6. The detainee arrived in Karachi, Pakistan, in early 2002. In Karachi, the detainee proceeded to a mosque near the Karachi airport, where he met a group of Sudanese who were enroute to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was not given a phone number, but simply was told to visit mosques and search out jihadists on their way to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he stayed in Karachi for one week before traveling to Peshawar, Pakistan. While in Peshawar the detainee and colleagues were moved from safe house to safe house every ten days.

7. In March 2002, the detainee met other associates at a Peshawar, Pakistan, bus station. The group traveled to a local mosque to pray. The detainee discussed leaving Pakistan by attempting to catch a ride on a vehicle headed into Afghanistan. The detainee and his associates wore burkas as a disguise because of their dark skin.

8. The detainee was traveling from Peshawar, Pakistan, to Afghanistan when he was arrested in Parachinar, Pakistan before crossing the Pakistan border into Afghanistan. The detainee was wearing a burka to disguise himself as a woman at the time of the arrest.

b. Connections/Associations

1. An Arab, provided the detainee with a visa and plane ticket to Pakistan, because the detainee had been convinced by another man that he needed to perform jihad

2. The detainee stated he traveled with three other men from Karachi to Peshawar, Pakistan. They were told to go to the Jama'at al Dawa Wa al Irshat once in Peshawar. The Jama'at al Dawa Wa al Irshat is a Pakistani center that assists Muslims who aspire to fight jihad.

3. The detainee stated Dawa Wa Irshat is a non-governmental organization operated by Pakistani nationals that assists Muslim Mujahedin who aspire to fight the jihad in Afghanistan. It has two facilities in Peshawar, Pakistan and other facilities on the Afghanistan border.

4. The detainee was wearing a burka when he was captured with four companions trying to cross the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan. The detainee stated a Pakistani national, who was well known as a smuggler throughout Pakistan, tried to help the detainee cross the Pakistan border into Afghanistan.

c. Other Relevant Information

1. The detainee denied he was going to Afghanistan to participate in jihad. It was only after one of the other Arabs admitted to being a jihadist that the detainee changed his story.

2. Another detainee recognized a photograph of detainee as a person on the frontlines in Afghanistan during 2000 or 2001

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUSTAFA IBRAHIM

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has nothing to do with al Qaida or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The detainee stated he would never fight for anybody or an organization and that Muslims fight for God only.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 May 2007

TO: AMIR MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIR MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1991, the detainee took an interest in participating in jihad after listening to a presentation at a local mosque on the activities of the Jamaat al Dawa al Quran. The detainee expressed his desire to participate in jihad.

2. An associate, who had fought against the Russians, provided a ticket and visa for the detainee's travel to India and instructed him to then travel to Peshawar, Pakistan to join the Mujahedin.

3. In March 1991, the detainee traveled from Khartoum, Sudan to Assadabad, Afghanistan via Kenya, India, and Pakistan. At Assadabad the detainee received military training.

4. In India, Jamat al Tabligh obtained a visa for the detainee from the Pakistan Embassy. At the Tablighi Center in Lahore, Pakistan, the detainee indicated he wanted to join the Mujahedin in Peshawar, Pakistan.

5. Jamat al Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

6. The detainee stated when he was in Afghanistan in 1991 for the jihad against the Russians, he belonged to a group called Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIR MOHAMMED

7. The Jamaat al Dawa al Quran is a militant religious group that operates a university oriented towards radical Islam, specifically the Salafi Wahabi movements. In approximately 1997 their training camp was moved to Kashmir where it was being run by the Lashkar e Tayyiba, a radical wing of Markaz a Dawa.

8. The detainee was sent to the front lines to fight the Afghan communist government for six months.

9. The detainee participated in the Kashmiri cause from 1993 to 1994.

10. In January 1994 the detainee and four other Pakistanis who had come with him from the Markaz ud Dawa wal Irshad were selected to participate in a dangerous incursion into Indian Kashmir territory.

11. In January 2002 the detainee encountered an associate who had fought against the Russians. The associate was preparing to return to Afghanistan and invited the detainee to join him.

12. The associate who fought against the Russians has been identified as a member of al Qaida.

13. In February 2002 the detainee left Sudan to go fight jihad in Afghanistan against the Americans.

14. The detainee stated he was influenced by anti-United States propaganda that focused on the killing of innocent Muslim women and children by the United States. The detainee felt it was his religious duty to defend these individuals.

15. The detainee claims he went to Afghanistan to fight jihad against the occupiers of Afghanistan, to include the Americans. The detainee claims he believed the media, which stated the Americans were trying to take the land from the Muslims.

16. In February 2002 the detainee traveled from Khartoum, Sudan to Damascus, Syria. After three days, the detainee traveled through Doha, Qatar to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee then went Peshawar, Pakistan.

b. Training

1. For one month in 1991 the detainee trained on the AK-47, M-16, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and Soviet artillery.

2. The detainee was given limited classes on the T-54 tank.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIR MOHAMMED

c. Connections/Associations

1. After leaving the front lines in 1991, the detainee met Abu Ikhlas al Masri and worked with him for approximately one year. In 1994 the detainee spent approximately two additional years with Abu Ikhlas al Masri.

2. Abu Ikhlas al Masri was identified as a close aide to al Qaida leader Usama bin Laden. Abu Ikhlas al Marsi trained Arabs, Pakistanis, Chechens, and others at the camps in Paktia, Konduz, Nanjarhar, and Rujar, Afghanistan. Abu Ikhlas al Masri is believed to be one of the most skilled experts at making bombs and explosive devices, and the author of a number of military books.

3. In 1993 the detainee began to associate more with members from Markaz ud Dawa wal Irshad, which had historical ties to the local Jamaat al Dawa al Quran Wa Sunnah organization. The detainee joined Markaz ud Dawa wal Irshad in their jihad to retake Kashmir from Indian control.

4. The Lashkar e Tayyiba is the armed wing of the Pakistan based religious organization, Markaz ud Dawa wal Irshad, a Sunni anti United States missionary organization. The Lashkar e Tayyiba is one of the largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India. The group was banned, and the Pakistani Government froze its assets in January 2002.

5. A facilitator in Sudan obtained Pakistani visas and airline tickets for the detainee and a friend. The facilitator gave the detainee 1,500 United States Dollars for travel and expenses.

6. During his month in Peshawar, Pakistan, the detainee spent time in five different houses. The detainee left Peshawar with three individuals, the detainee was wearing a burka to disguise his appearance.

7. The detainee identified one of the individuals he was captured with at the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. The detainee said the other person was traveling to Afghanistan to fight the jihad.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee and four people were loaded into a minibus. Due to the fact that false documentation could not be procured, the Arabs were instructed to dress in women's clothing with full head covering. At the final checkpoint, they encountered a female Pakistani military officer. When the disguised Arab men were required to lower their head coverings for the female officer, the men were discovered and detained.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMIR MOHAMMED

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he detested the events of 11 September 2001. The detainee mentioned that a true Muslim would never act or have participated in this kind of terrible act.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee bears no grudge against America and claims he was rash in his decision to go to Afghanistan for jihad in 2002. The detainee claims he did not realize the United States was fighting in conjunction with the Northern Alliance to punish the Taliban for harboring terrorists like Usama bin Laden. The detainee has no tolerance for Usama bin Laden and people that kill innocents and spread fear behind Islam.

d. The detainee denied any involvement with al Qaida or any other terrorist group.

e. Upon release the detainee desires to return to his home in Sudan and look for a job.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 July 2007

TO: JIHAD DEYAB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JIHAD DEYAB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In May 2000, the detainee traveled from Syria to Afghanistan via Iran and Pakistan.

2. The detainee showed up in Afghanistan in 2000 expecting to attend the Khalden training camp and was seen with a group of Libyan jihad members in Kabul, Afghanistan. In late 2001, the detainee received from a senior al Qaida operative, approximately 600 rupees so the detainee could travel to meet his family in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was identified as a member of a terrorist cell linked to Usama bin Laden.

4. The detainee's name was found on a list of Syrians who were trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and believed to be fighting with, or on behalf of, Usama bin Laden.

b. Training

The detainee served in the Syrian Air Force from 1991 to 1993. During basic training he learned how to take apart and clean a pistol and received an AK-47. The detainee was trained to drive large trucks but was eventually assigned to operate smaller vehicles.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's name was on a list of individuals whose telephone numbers were associated with assorted jihadists based in Yemen.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JIHAD DEYAB

2. The detainee's name was found on a spreadsheet account of stipend assistance provided to al Qaida operative families covering a six-month period of May to October 2002. The spreadsheet was on a twenty-gigabyte laptop computer hard drive associated with an al Qaida financial operative.

3. The detainee allowed a senior al Qaida operative to stay in his house.

4. A senior al Qaida operative met the detainee under an alias in the mid 1990's. The senior al Qaida operative noted the detainee was an expert in passport and document forgery. The detainee also worked with the Libyan groups and used computers in his passport forgery work. The senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee again in Lahore, Pakistan, in approximately 2002.

5. While the senior al Qaida operative was in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in March 2002, he received a telephone call from the detainee. The detainee stated he needed the senior al Qaida operative's financial assistance to travel to Iran and onward to Europe.

6. During an 11 September, 2002 raid by a foreign governmental agency on an alleged al Qaida residence on Tariq Road in Karachi, Pakistan, they recovered a personal address book and pocket litter containing names and telephone numbers. The detainee's name and phone number were among a list of names and telephone numbers recovered.

7. The detainee met an al Qaida facilitator in Afghanistan shortly after the 11 September, 2001 attacks.

8. The detainee's name appeared on a document listing al Qaida members recovered from the home of a suspected al Qaida member.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denies having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September, 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated he never went to a training camp for fighting. He said if he wanted to fight, he would not have brought his wife and children with him during his travels.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JIHAD DEYAB**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2007

To: DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that in 1993 he went to Bosnia to join the Mujahedin, and that he stayed in Bosnia for one year at a Mujahedin Army Camp.
 2. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan in the summer of 1999 using a fake British passport, which he purchased for 1,000 British pounds.
 3. The detainee stated he obtained airline tickets for 800 British pounds from an individual whom the detainee knew was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
 4. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a designated foreign terrorist organization and has pledged to overthrow the Libyan government. Some members are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.
 5. The detainee stated that he flew from England to Islamabad, Pakistan via Karachi, Pakistan, where he was met by a contact. The detainee stated that he stayed for three days at the contact's home, was driven to Jalalabad, Afghanistan by the contact, and then rented a ride to Kabul, Afghanistan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DEGHAYES, OMAR AMER

6. The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan he worked as a financial supervisor at the charity organization, Sanibel.
7. A former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group stated that Sanibil characterizes itself as a charitable organization, but Sanibil's first priority was providing support to the jihad activities of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
8. A source stated the detainee stayed at the Ashara guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan numerous times.
9. A source stated that the Ashara guest house was owned by al Qaida and used by al Qaida members from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya.
10. The detainee stated that when the bombing began in Afghanistan, he was transported by truck with Taliban members from Kabul, Afghanistan to the Peshawar, Pakistan area, and was later arrested in Lahore, Pakistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he took military training that all students attend in secondary school in Libya, and was taught to fire, clean and strip an AK rifle.
2. The detainee went to Afghanistan in 1998 and received training at the Khaldan Camp.
3. Khalden Camp was co-managed by a senior al Qaida Lieutenant. An entire six-month program at Khaldan consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.
4. The detainee was a student of an Islamist extremist who trained Arabs in a number of courses which fit the al Qaida operational deception profile.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee had a good relationship with Usama bin Laden. The last time the detainee met with Usama bin Laden was during the last days of the Taliban regime in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan.
2. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee stayed at the operative's al Qaida guest house in Pakistan in 1998.

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3. A senior al Qaida operative stated he facilitated the detainee's travel to a Libyan camp in Afghanistan.
- d. Other Relevant Data
 1. A foreign government service reported transfers of two large sums of money involving the detainee and the Bahamas-based Bank al Taqwa. On 22 December 1994, the detainee and another individual deposited 225,774 United States dollars into an account at Bank al Taqwa. On 25 May 1996, 45,762 United States dollars from that account was wired to the detainee.
 2. Al Taqwa Bank in the Bahamas is listed in Executive Order 13224, which blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
 3. Several newspaper articles about the November 2001 arrest of extremists in Spain identified the detainee as an individual depicted in an Islamic extremist military training video which showed atrocities in Chechnya.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated one of the reasons he moved to Afghanistan was because England is not ruled by Sharia law and it would be wrong for him to become a citizen of England.
 - b. The detainee denied being a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the detainee denied traveling to Afghanistan with a false passport.
 - c. The detainee stated he did not know any of the members of the al Qaida cell members arrested in Spain in November 2001.
 - d. The detainee stated he was not in the video, depicting atrocities in Chechnya, which several news articles identified him as being in.
 - e. The detainee stated that he did not know the individual who has been associated with al Qaida and has provided dive training to jihadists.
 - f. The detainee stated that he had no knowledge of Usama bin Laden or al Qaida, had no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks, and never worked for the Taliban.

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- g. The detainee stated that he was not connected to any terrorist groups, he did not attend any training camps, and he has never engaged in jihad.
- h. The detainee stated that if released he would like to go back to Brighton, England to work in his family's property business, which his mother and brother are currently running.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 September 2007

To: NASSIR, JAMIL AHMED SAID

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSIR, JAMIL AHMED SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he was recruited in Yemen by an acquaintance after the detainee had applied for a visa to Pakistan and was turned down by the Pakistani Embassy. The acquaintance told the detainee that for 2,500 Yemeni Riyals, approximately 13 United States Dollars, he could facilitate the detainee's travel to Pakistan.
 2. The detainee's acquaintance was known to be a very active Taliban and al Qaida recruiter, with experience fighting in both Chechnya and Afghanistan.
 3. In July 2001, the detainee traveled from Yemen to Pakistan to have knee surgery. The detainee claimed to have had a soccer injury that caused him pain for fifteen years. At other times, the detainee said that the injury occurred during horseback riding. The detainee stated a doctor in Yemen advised him to travel outside of Yemen to have the knee surgery.
 4. The detainee flew to Pakistan and stayed at an unknown hotel for one week. The detainee chose not to have surgery because the doctor at the hospital said that it would take three months to recover.

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5. At the hospital, the detainee met an Afghan who said Afghanistan was poor and needed educators. The detainee traveled with the Afghan to Quetta, Pakistan and stayed in a house there for ten to twelve days. Approximately ten Afghans came and went from the house that the detainee thought were Taliban. The detainee knew the Taliban was fighting the Northern Alliance in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
6. The detainee and the man in the previous statement traveled by car to Kandahar, Afghanistan stopping at check points along the way, but with no overnight stops. The man and the detainee stayed at an Afghan house in Kandahar, Afghanistan for three days. The detainee then met an individual who invited the detainee to stay with him at his house in Kandahar and the detainee stayed with him for one month and ten days reading and studying the Koran.
7. The detainee had traveled to Afghanistan a number of times, the last time, with his wife, in July 2001. The detainee was met at the airport by an individual responsible for arranging travel of jihad personnel to Afghanistan. The detainee and his wife then flew to Karachi, Pakistan where they were received by an individual who arranged their transportation to Afghanistan.
8. The detainee rented a house next to the residence of the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad 'Umar in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was among the jihadist personnel in Afghanistan.
9. When the bombing of Kandahar, Afghanistan began in October 2001, the detainee traveled with others in a large van to a town on the Afghan-Pakistan border where they stayed for ten days. From there, the detainee claims to have traveled to an unknown hospital in Lahore, Pakistan to have a laser procedure on his eyes and a root canal. The detainee stayed in a house with some Pakistanis and Afghans for one and a half months during his recovery.
10. Sources link the detainee to the purchase of equipment used to assist al Qaida operatives in the production of biological weapons, including anthrax, and to outfit an al Qaida biological weapons development laboratory.
11. The detainee stated he considers the United States an enemy.

b. Training

The detainee stated he attended a mandatory 30-day military training course where he learned to dismantle and reassemble a Kalashnikov rifle.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. The individual the detainee stayed with in Kandahar was an al Qaida facilitator who ran a guest house and had sworn an oath of allegiance to Usama bin Laden and attended an al Qaida camp.
2. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative.
3. The detainee was a member of al Wafa and a Karachi University microbiology graduate student that purchased materials from New Chemicals Company.
4. As of August 2002, the nongovernmental organization Wafa, officially named, Al Wafa Al Igatha Al Islamia and headquartered in Saudi Arabia, was believed to have connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.
5. A source identified the detainee as a member of a group of Arabs who traveled from the castle in Zurmat, Afghanistan to Bannu, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. In February 2002, the detainee traveled to Faisalabad, Pakistan because Pakistanis said they allow Yemenis there. In Faisalabad, the detainee stayed in a Yemeni house, where he was arrested. The detainee stated he knew nothing about whether the house was Taliban or al Qaida.
2. A senior al Qaida operative was identified as the director of the Yemeni guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied the accusation of being affiliated with al Wafa.
- b. The detainee denied ever having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
- c. The detainee stated that the only camp that he had ever attended was a summer camp in 1985 or 1986 located in the suburbs of Taiz, Yemen on a military base. The detainee denied receiving any other training of any kind. The detainee also stated he never attended Karachi University, although it was something he wanted to do.
- d. A source stated the detainee was not a guard nor affiliated with al Qaida, and the detainee moved to Afghanistan with his wife and children.

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- e. The detainee stated he knew nothing about whether the house he was arrested in was Taliban or al Qaida.
- f. The detainee claims not to have gone to Afghanistan to join any group, but to continue his Islamic studies.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 January 2007

TO: AZIA, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIA, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 2000 the detainee decided to travel to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and fulfill his Muslim obligation of Omra, a pilgrimage to Mecca that is mandated by Islam for all Muslims.

2. The detainee confided in one individual and related his desire to fight a jihad. According to the detainee, this individual is a member of Lashgar e Tayyiba. This organization assists and funds those who are willing to fight a jihad.

3. The Lashgar e Tayyiba (LET) is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz ud Dawa wal irshad a Sunni anti United States missionary organization formed in 1989. LET is led by Abdul Wahid Kashmiri and is one of the three largest and best trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India.

4. The detainee's priority was to fight the jihad in Chechnya, Russia but he learned that the borders were well guarded and difficult to penetrate. Instead, the detainee decided to volunteer to fight the jihad in Kashmir, Pakistan.

5. The detainee stated he walked approximately ten hours until he reached the border of Kashmir, Pakistan. It was here that the detainee began disarming mines in an effort to safely enter Kashmir. As the detainee was disarming one mine, he accidentally detonated a second mine thus losing his right leg. The detainee was then taken to Lahore, Pakistan where he was admitted to a hospital for the next 25 days.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIA, ABDUL

6. The detainee was identified as a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah Muqatilah.

7. A source stated the Jemaah Islamiyah Muqatilah is closely connected with the Salafist Group for Call and Combat. The source further stated that this group is responsible for many murders in Western Libya and seeks to have the Libyan government blame the Algerian government for these murders.

b. Training

1. In 1995 the detainee volunteered and joined the Algerian army. The detainee claims he wanted to fight against the terrorism that was pervasive in his country by Muslim extremists known as Takfiri. The detainee received four months of training, which consisted of physical training, the use of a Kalashnikov rifle and the use of a fully automatic, ammo belt fed weapon known as a Bikan. After basic training the detainee was assigned guard duties and was part of a rapid response unit that assisted the local police in restoring order.

2. At the LET Training Camp there was light weapons training to include the use of Kalashnikov rifles. The detainee added that since he was already trained in light weapons during his service in the Algerian army, it was decided that he would instead train and specialize in demining.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee received 400 Saudi Arabian Riyals, the necessary visa and an airline ticket to Karachi, Pakistan from a representative of LET.

2. The detainee was provided transportation by the LET to a training camp in a mountainous area near Kashmir, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated before he was arrested he never thought about the United States. The detainee related if he wanted to fight the United States, he would go back to Algeria and fight the Americans there.

2. The detainee stated that with his disability, it would be impossible for him to actually fight. The detainee did say that he would only fight against those who fight against Islam. The detainee did make the comment that it seems the United States is fighting against Islam and not terrorism.

3. The detainee was arrested at the home of a man affiliated with the Islamic relief society in Peshawar, Pakistan and the Wafa humanitarian organization in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee denied ever killing anyone, even when he was affiliated with LET. The detainee stated he was uncertain if he could ever kill anyone, saying he is a coward.
 - c. The detainee does not want to go back to Algeria since he wishes to stay away from the bad things. The detainee would like to get asylum in Europe after he is released.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 November 2007

To: AZIZ, AKHMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AKHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he traveled from Mauritania to Afghanistan in September 1999. The detainee stated he had heard about the Taliban regime and thought what they were doing was good.
 - 2) The detainee said he was in support of the Taliban's resistance against the Northern Alliance.
 - 3) The detainee traveled from Jalalabad to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee believed that going to Kabul was important because it is the capital and the center of power for the Taliban. The detainee also wanted to observe the front line of the war against the opposition. The detainee visited a camp in Kabul.
 - 4) A source stated the detainee was a member of al Qaida and pledged bayat to Usama bin Laden.
 - 5) The detainee said he could not change his beliefs, as he was a fundamentalist, an extremist and an al Qaida member. The detainee stated he supported the acts by Usama bin Laden and was glad America was attacked the way it was.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AKHMED

- 6) In Afghanistan, the detainee received military training and fought on the front lines against the Northern Alliance.
 - 7) The detainee was identified as a Mujahedin fighter and had a good reputation as a fighter among the brothers in the Kandahar, Afghanistan safe house.
 - 8) In December 2001, the detainee stated he left Afghanistan and traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, where he was eventually arrested in June 2002. The police accused the detainee of being an al Qaida member.
- b) Training
- 1) While at the front line, the detainee received "theoretical" training in the use of the Kalashnikov.
 - 2) The detainee stated he went to the front line in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was trained on 82mm and 120mm mortars, Kalashnikov, and the RPG-7.
 - 3) A source identified the detainee as a committed jihadist who had extensive training in weapons, explosives, and leadership. The source also stated the detainee attended all the training that was given in Afghanistan.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee agreed with the ideologies of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and joined the Libyans to actively fight and die to overthrow the Libyan government.
 - 2) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.
 - 3) The detainee stated he saw al Qaida leaders visit the Institute in Kandahar during his two years of employment. He saw Usama Bin Laden visit the Institute on three occasions. The detainee stated he spoke with Usama bin Laden about the Institute in October 2000.
 - 4) A source stated that the detainee's supervisor at the Institute was the personal advisor of Usama bin Laden, the leader of an al Qaida cell and active in recruiting individuals, to include the detainee.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AKHMED

- 5) The detainee was seen several times at an al Qaida safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan in late 2001 after the 11 September 2001 attacks, and in Karachi, Pakistan in early 2002 with a group of al Qaida fighters who had fled Afghanistan.
- 6) It was identified that following the fall of Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee was part of a group of 25 al Qaida and al Qaida-affiliated Arabs that traveled from Afghanistan to Quetta, Pakistan.
- 7) The detainee stated he attended the wedding of Usama bin Laden's son sometime towards the end of 1999 or beginning of 2000.
- 8) The detainee attended a celebration at Usama Bin Laden's compound near the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport.
- 9) The detainee was a member of al Qaida and was a close associate of al Qaida's second in command.
- 10) The detainee is familiar with many al Qaida members who were in Afghanistan.
- 11) The detainee attended a speech by Usama bin Laden at Tarnak Farms near Kandahar, Afghanistan in approximately November 1999.

d) Intent

The detainee stated when he is released he plans to do whatever he can to take vengeance against the Pakistani authorities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida.
 - b) The detainee stated he never pledged bayat to Usama bin Laden.
 - c) The detainee stated the 11 September 2001 attacks were wrong and not in keeping with the teachings of Islam.
 - d) The detainee stated he had no prior knowledge of 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 July 2007

TO: IBRAHIM MAHDY

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IBRAHIM MAHDY

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in March of 2000 and resided in Afghanistan until after 11 September 2001 and the fall of the Taliban.

2. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to live a good Muslim life under the Taliban.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he performed mandatory military training in 1992 and 1993 in Jordan, including a three week course where the detainee learned to shoot the AK-47 and PK rifle. The detainee was shown visual aids of both the RPG and grenades.

2. According to a senior al Qaida Lieutenant, the detainee was at al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan when the USS COLE was attacked in October 2000. The detainee appeared in a movie al Qaida made about the attack.

3. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consisted of two-week blocks of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography and explosives.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IBRAHIM MAHDY

4. The detainee received security training from an individual at a series of guest houses. The training included courses on surveillance, counterintelligence, report writing, and observation.

5. According to a senior al Qaida lieutenant, the individual who provided the detainee with security training in the guest houses discussed plans to attack foreign embassies and leaders.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother worked for Jamat-al-Tabligh.

2. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including member of al Qaida.

3. The detainee claims to have seen Abu Musab al Zargawi while he was incarcerated.

4. The detainee was recognized as a Mujahed by an al Qaida member.

5. A senior al Qaida lieutenant saw the detainee in Khowst, Afghanistan, with a group from Khalden Training Camp.

6. Khalden Training Camp, located outside of Khowst, Afghanistan, was a military training camp for Arab Mujahedin. Students would take a six month course which included weapons, artillery, and mountaineering instruction.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured with a Makhtab al Khidmat inscribed Koran.

2. Makhtab al Khidmat received donations from Usama bin Laden. One of Makhtab al Khidmat's functions was supporting the camps and the Arab and Afghan fighting fronts, including operating the Khalden Training Camp in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he felt that the attacks on America were God's wrath against Americans for their treatment of Muslims around the world.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was not a member of al Qaida and that he never owned or fired any weapons while living in Afghanistan.

b. The detainee stated he does not feel he can judge any people who plan or provide financial support to al Qaida, although says the people that execute the plans are criminals.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IBRAHIM MAHDY**

c. The detainee denied attending any training camps in Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2007

To: OBAIDULLAH, BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAIDULLAH, BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he joined Jamat-al-Tabligh when eight to ten men who belonged to Jamat-al-Tabligh came to his village of Mulani, located near Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated the Jamat-al-Tabligh members stayed in the detainee's village for approximately three days and discussed prayer and the Koran.
2. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.
3. A source stated the detainee was a coordinator for al Qaida. During the time of Taliban rule, the detainee helped coordinate the movement and activities of various foreign al Qaida members.
4. A source stated the detainee actually emplaced two Soviet anti-tank mines on a road. The mines were to be command detonated, but the detainee had difficulties emplacing the devices. The detainee subsequently removed the mines after no United States forces passed by on the road and then a rain shower washed the dirt covering off the devices.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAIDULLAH, BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA

5. A source stated the detainee continued to experiment in order to devise a means to detonate the mines. As of mid-July 2002, the detainee had at least 18 anti-tank mines hidden inside his compound.
6. The detainee was captured with over twenty anti-tank mines in his home and was personally carrying a notebook containing electronic and explosives schematics.
7. The detainee described the contents of the notebook as directions on how to use the anti-tank mines, not as electronic or explosive schematics.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was drafted by the Taliban and attended Taliban anti-tank mine school for two days then left to go into hiding from the Taliban.
2. The detainee stated the Taliban forced him to attend a mechanical school, whose purpose was to provide explosives and firearms training. The detainee stated he left the school after two days.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated that following the beginning of the allied forces campaign against al Qaida and the Taliban, the detainee used his compound to hide and subsequently relocate about 18 Arab al Qaida members to Pakistan.
2. A source stated the detainee hid six additional al Qaida members in his residence subsequent to the Shahi Kot campaign.
3. A source stated the detainee received orders from an Arab in Pakistan, approximately one month after the conclusion of the Shahi Kot fighting, to begin preparing command detonated mines to use against United States forces.
4. A source stated the detainee also had received cash and additional explosives at his residence, and traveled fairly frequently to Pakistan to receive instructions or to carry messages between Arab al Qaida members in Pakistan and their Afghan subordinates.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAIDULLAH, BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA

plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

- b. The detainee stated he never attended training camps related to Jamat-al-Tabligh, jihadists, or the military.
 - c. The detainee stated he would not have placed and detonated mines that an individual had given him.
 - d. The detainee stated the information contained in the notebook was obtained when he attended a mechanical school in Khowst, Afghanistan, that the Taliban forced him to attend.
 - e. The detainee stated he took the training course to learn how to dispose of the mines, and he left the class after two days because his mother was afraid he would be sent to fight if he completed the training.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 August 2007

To: GUL, AWAL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, AWAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that in 1981 he enlisted with an individual who was the local commander of the Mujahedin.
2. The individual in the previous statement was a commander of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Khalis faction.
3. The Hezb-e-Islami Khalis, HIK, is attempting to re-establish itself as a jihad organization focused on fighting against forces operating in Afghanistan. The HIK is also attempting to recruit new members and re-establish old ties with the Taliban and al Qaida.
4. The detainee stated he would travel from Peshawar, Pakistan, where his family was living as refugees, to jihad with a commander.
5. The detainee stated that for three Afghan years he was in charge of logistical support for the Jalalabad highway in Afghanistan. The detainee's duties included distributing food, oil, and supplies for the Mujahedin front line.
6. The detainee stated that when the Mujahedin took over Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he became Commander of Military Base #4 from 1992-1996. Military Base #4 was a

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staging area for Mujahedin arriving from Kabul, Afghanistan, to fight in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

7. Following the death of the Hezb-e-Islami Khalis faction Commander, the detainee assumed command of his forces.
8. The detainee stated that when the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 1996, he fled to Pakistan for approximately one month. The detainee stated the Taliban asked him to return and re-take command of Military Base #4. The detainee stated that at the beginning of the Taliban reign, he cooperated with them in the hope that the Taliban would stabilize the area. Military Base #4 consisted of approximately 300-400 men. The base had a tank unit, personnel and ammunition.
9. The detainee stated that the last time he was in command of Military Base #4 was 1 December 2001, which is the day he was captured.

b. Training

The detainee has practical knowledge of light weapons and knowledge of guerilla and Taliban tactics and training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he first saw Usama bin Laden around 1990 during the jihad against the Soviets and while the detainee was drawing water from a nearby river.
2. The detainee stated he met Usama bin Laden again around 1995 when the detainee's commander invited him to go see Usama bin Laden. The detainee and his commander were able to talk with Usama bin Laden for about 15 minutes.
3. The detainee stated his third sighting of Usama bin Laden was during the Taliban takeover of Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee and his commander were stopped by Usama bin Laden as they passed by Usama bin Laden's house and spoke to him for 10-15 minutes.
4. The detainee stated that a week to ten days before the arrival of the Taliban, the detainee and his commander passed by Usama bin Laden's house and told him that the Taliban was coming to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to take over the city.
5. As of late September 1996, the detainee's forces controlled the Tora Bora camp and a location northwest of Agam, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, where

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Usama bin Laden had a facility under construction.

6. A source stated that he was told the detainee worked with Usama bin Laden and al Qaida and helped many of them. The source stated the detainee was a commanding Emir in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and vicinities.
7. A source stated the detainee assisted an individual with logistical support. Following the battle of Tora Bora that took place in Nangrahar Province, Afghanistan, Usama bin Laden and the individual reportedly visited the detainee's house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
8. The individual in the previous statement was second in command for al Qaida.
9. The detainee attended a meeting in March 2000 for Terrorist Leaders hosted by Usama bin Laden.
10. As of late November 2001, Usama bin Laden gave the detainee 100,000 United States Dollars to pass to Arabs attempting to flee to Pakistan.
11. The detainee stated that fifteen days before he was captured, he was in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and sat with a United States person and another individual and told them that he was with the Taliban.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated the detainee fought against the Northern Alliance in Kabul, Afghanistan on the Gul-Da-Da-Ra front lines and was a commander in charge of ten men.
2. The detainee was in Afghanistan from 1996-2001 and owned a guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in 1997.
3. The detainee was a highly regarded leader during the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The detainee met with the Taliban as an honorable representative of Jalalabad in order to officially surrender the town to Taliban rule.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he wrote a letter of resignation in 2000 because he was unhappy.
- b. The detainee stated he tried to resign from the Taliban twice, but his resignations were rejected.

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- c. The Taliban weakened the detainee's unit because the detainee would not cooperate with the fighting.
 - d. The detainee stated his second attempt to resign was rejected by the Provincial Governor of Nangahar Province, Afghanistan because the detainee was being used as a token Mujahedin commander who was still working for the Taliban.
 - e. The detainee stated that when the fighting and bombing in Tora Bora escalated, he again requested permission to quit his job as Commander of Military Base #4.
 - f. The detainee stated that as the Taliban continued to engage in violence and public beatings for minor religious infractions, he lost the heart to work with them.
 - g. The detainee stated he does not support Usama bin Laden.
 - h. The detainee stated he thought it was good that the United States entered Afghanistan and that Americans came and helped free them.
 - i. The detainee stated he is willing to cooperate and answer all questions because he wants Afghanistan to be a better place and he knows the United States is there to help.
 - j. The detainee signed a contract stating he did not help al Qaida flee from Afghanistan and he did not help Usama bin Laden.
 - k. The detainee stated that, if released, he would return to his country and work for the government since they invested so much in him.
 - l. The detainee stated at the meeting with a United States official and others, he still felt responsible to speak well for the Taliban because his resignation had not taken effect.
 - m. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden and countries like Pakistan used Afghanistan for their own personal purpose and they used the Afghani people. Instead of building Afghanistan they brought their problems with them.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 June 2007

TO: MOHAMMED NABI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD NABI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was the chief of communications for the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan, approximately one year prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001.

2. After his communications job, the detainee stated he was appointed by the Taliban to be the chief of border department in Kabul, Afghanistan.

3. The individual the detainee reported to while chief of border department in Kabul, Afghanistan, was the Taliban supreme commander in Helmand province, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as an operative and a sub-commander in a group called the Union of the Mujahedin. The detainee discussed operations designed to discredit and undermine the Afghan transitional administration.

2. The Union of Mujahedin was supported, guided, and funded by al Qaida.

3. The detainee attended a meeting of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, during which plans were made to distribute weapons to Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin members and supporters, and use the weapons to attack government and military targets in the Ghazni area of Afghanistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD NABI

4. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is designated as a foreign terrorist organization in the Department of Homeland Security's Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.

5. The detainee met with senior Taliban officials. One official was from the department of intelligence and the other was a facilitator for al Qaida.

6. The detainee attended weekly al Qaida planning meetings in Khowst, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee is suspected of being a member of the al Qaida Karim bomb-making cell.

8. The detainee took part in a meeting to form an alliance between Taliban and al Qaida, in an effort to form a new Taliban-al Qaida cell in the Khowst province of Afghanistan. The new cell was to carry out attacks in the Khowst region against United States and coalition forces.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was instrumental in an al Qaida exfiltration route, providing support for Arabs and non-Afghan fighters attempting to depart the Khowst, Afghanistan area to Pakistan.

2. A source identified the detainee as a Taliban-connected individual who was active in organizing anti-coalition efforts through the local Madrassas.

3. The detainee had a cache of Taliban weapons in an Afghan village, which included artillery pieces and rounds, rockets, mortars, heavy machine guns, and small arms.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed the local villagers pressured him to take a job with the Taliban to avoid being considered part of the opposition.

b. The detainee denied all connections with individuals or groups who are suspected of having affiliations with al Qaida.

c. The detainee claims to have no knowledge about bomb making of any kind.

d. The detainee claims to have had no prior knowledge of the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 or any future attacks.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 February 2007

TO: AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN
JALUD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Tunis, Tunisia, to Frankfurt, Germany, using a Tunisian passport with his true name. Once in Germany, the detainee applied for asylum by using the name Ayman Bin Nasro.

2. In late 1999, while in Frankfurt, Germany, the detainee used documentation in the name of Aiman Ben Nasru. The detainee claimed he was born on 20 December 1979 and his nationality was Libyan. The nationality and date of birth were false.

3. The detainee earned money or a commission by arranging for Germans, French and other nationalities to meet up with Arabs who were selling drugs.

4. The detainee was arrested more than fifty times by the German Polizei, but never charged because he never carried drugs on his person.

5. The detainee attended a Turkish mosque in Frankfurt, Germany. The detainee met an Algerian at the mosque who suggested the detainee go to Pakistan in order to get his life straight.

6. The Algerian the detainee met at the Turkish mosque put the detainee in touch with a different Algerian who provided the detainee with a fraudulent Italian passport and tourist visa for his travel to Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD

7. The detainee paid 200 German Marks for the passport, which was under the name Marinelle Escalu. The detainee also purchased his own airline ticket with money he made from selling drugs.

8. The detainee traveled alone and did not have any trouble entering Pakistan with his false documents.

9. The detainee and another individual traveled from Islamabad, Pakistan, to Peshawar, Pakistan, then to the border with Afghanistan. They dressed like Afghans and crossed the border into Afghanistan without having the guards check their identification.

10. From Khalden camp, the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan to attend the institute to study the Koran. The detainee stayed at the institute for eight months studying.

11. The detainee traveled to Lahore, Pakistan, where he joined the Lashkar al Tayibah Organization.

12. During an interview in March 2002, the detainee reported that in January 2002 he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and onward to Zahedan, Iran for a religious trip sponsored by the Lashkar Organization. The Iranians subsequently arrested the detainee on 29 January 2002.

13. During an interview in February 2003, the detainee reported he fled Pakistan because he was afraid he would be arrested after the attacks on America. The detainee traveled to Zahedan, Iran, using a guide. The Iranians stopped the detainee when he reached Zahedan, and he was arrested because he did not have any identification.

b. Training

1. During an interview in March 2002, the detainee reported he attended Khalden camp in approximately December 2000. The detainee received light weapons training, along with combat training, for three months.

2. During an interview in March 2003 the detainee reported he received light weapons training, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons training from three separate instructors.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed with a Tunisian while in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The Tunisian was a member of Al Nahdah, an extremist Islamic party in Tunisia.

2. The institute the detainee attended in Kandahar, Afghanistan was called the Shari a Institute. The institute was closely associated with Usama bin Laden and located near Usama bin Laden's family residence.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD

3. The detainee was a former Usama bin Laden bodyguard.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. During an interview in June 2004, the detainee clarified that he did not attend Khalden Training Camp. The detainee advised that all previous information he provided about training at the Khalden Camp and weapons use was not true.

2. In January 2005, the detainee was questioned about his travel to Italy, prior to his arrival in Germany. The detainee indicated he did not recall how he entered Italy from Tunisia, and he denied having a place to stay once he was in Italy. During further questioning about Italy, the detainee refused to speak.

3. The detainee advised he will have a problem if he is returned to Tunisia. The Tunisian government believes that anyone who went to Afghanistan went there to fight so they could come back to Tunisia and overthrow the government.

4. During an interview in July 2005, the detainee chanted during the entire interrogation and did not respond to the interrogator.

5. During an interview in September 2005, the detainee did not talk at all during the session and was uncooperative.

6. The detainee sees jihad as necessary only when non-Muslims attack Muslims and/or for defending a Muslim country from assault on their religion.

7. Per the detainee, the killing of innocent civilians is not allowed in the Muslim religion.

8. The detainee denied knowing of any extremist groups at Khalden Camp. The detainee reported he is a normal guy with no extremist affiliations.

9. The detainee stated that the idea that al Qaida calls non-Muslims infidels is wrong. The detainee stated suicide bombers are not martyrs; suicide bombers are just committing suicide, which is wrong.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was encouraged to attend a religious training school in Pakistan. The detainee was not shown any training videos or provided with any written documents about the religious school, but was told that it would be a good way for him to recover from his drug use.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD

b. When the detainee left Germany, he did not have any desire or thought of going to Afghanistan. The detainee was only going to Pakistan so he could study Islam.

c. The detainee never heard any discussion of jihad while attending the Islamic Law Institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

d. When the detainee heard that Muslims were involved in the aircraft flying into the World Trade Center in New York City, he was surprised that Muslims would be responsible for killing innocent people. The detainee had no previous knowledge that this incident would happen.

e. The detainee reported he is not al Qaida and does not know anyone who belongs to al Qaida.

f. The detainee denied going to Afghanistan in order to learn to fight and overthrow the Tunisian government.

g. The detainee has never belonged to any armed or fighting Tunisian or Algerian Islamic groups. The detainee has heard of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, but he does not belong to it.

h. The detainee has never thought about harming the United States and stated that he never would. When the detainee heard about the 11 September 2001 attacks, it made him sad.

i. The detainee stated he never saw any propaganda videos about jihad. The detainee's intention was not to go to fight Americans or United States Allies, but to study the Koran.

j. The detainee stated he had no association with Usama bin Laden, and therefore, no opinion of the man. The detainee related any information pertaining to him being a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden was false.

k. The detainee denied seeing Usama bin Laden or other top al Qaida leaders when he was in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee denied that any of the people he had stayed with during his travels talked about jihad or future attacks.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 August 2007

To: AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that in 1998 or 1999, while in Yemen, he met a person who was involved in the Jamat-al-Tabligh missionary movement. The detainee stated he decided to join the organization and go to Pakistan to the Jamat-al-Tabligh center in Raiwind, outside Lahore, Pakistan.
 2. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
 3. The detainee stated he left for Pakistan six to seven months prior to 11 September 2001. The detainee stated he left Saudi Arabia for Karachi, Pakistan, via Jeddah and Bahrain.
 4. The detainee stated he saved approximately 1,300 United States Dollars from his clothing sales job in order to pay for his airline tickets to Pakistan. The detainee also stated a neighbor suggested that he travel to Lahore, Pakistan and donated the sum of 1,500 Saudi Riyals towards the detainee's travels.
 5. The detainee stated he stayed at the Raywan Mosque for approximately six months. The detainee stated he began to hear rumors that the Americans were coming to Afghanistan and Pakistan to arrest all Arabs in retaliation for the

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR

attacks on September 11, 2001. He stated that he needed to escape Pakistan and return to Yemen since his visa to Saudi Arabia had expired.

6. The detainee stated he decided to return home, but was too scared to go to a Pakistani airport. He decided to cross the border to Iran, and then try to get into Iraq and fly into Yemen.
7. The detainee stated he took a train from Lahore, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan, then a bus to a border town, and was then smuggled into Iran by walking across the border with a guide.
8. The detainee stated he was at the Tehran, Iran guest house for approximately one and one-half months. Then he was taken to a second guest house near the airport in Tehran and was there for at least two and one-half months.
9. The detainee stated he made his way into Zahedan, Iran where he was arrested by the Iranian police for entering the country without a visa.
10. In March 2002, the detainee was one of fifteen al Qaida operatives transferred from Iranian custody to the government of Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan then transferred ten of these individuals, including the detainee to the United States government.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he has had no formal or informal military training, although his uncle taught him to shoot and work a Kalashnikov rifle in Yemen in 1999.
2. An individual stated the detainee and one of his brothers received basic training and mortar training at al Farouq Training Camp in 2000.
3. The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
4. The detainee received training on the use of SA-7 and ZSU-23 anti-aircraft weapons in a bunker on top of the Saber Mountains near Kandahar, Afghanistan.
5. The detainee received training on building improvised explosive devices, utilizing tank shells, mortars, and land mines.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR

6. The detainee was identified as having gone to the front lines near Kabul, Afghanistan upon completion of his training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The brother of the detainee is a self-confessed al Qaida member who was a member of the Usama bin Laden and Mujahedin facilitation network in Yemen. He fought in jihad in Tajikistan and Bosnia for five years and trained operatives on the fabrication and use of explosives, including remotely detonated explosives and explosive belts, in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The training was in order to arrange for suicide operations against the United States Embassy and United States military bases in Yemen.
2. A source stated he met the same brother of the detainee at the al Qaida guest house and again at a Taliban and al Qaida training facility where the brother was an instructor in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The brother went on jihad, swore bayat to Usama bin Laden, held a leadership position in al Qaida, and was a leader and trainer in Chechnya.
3. The detainee stated a second brother went to Afghanistan, was captured, and is a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
4. The detainee stated that prior to his training at al Farouq Camp, he reported to the Nebras guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed for one week.
5. The Nebras Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan was used by Usama bin Laden and fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp.
6. The detainee stated that after completion of al Farouq training in 2001, he reported to the Hassan guest house where he met a high-ranking al Qaida member.
7. A source stated the Hassan guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan was used as a reception point for Mujahedin arriving in Afghanistan, facilitating travel to the front lines and to the Afghanistan training camps.
8. An admitted al Qaida member stated the detainee admitted to crossing the Afghanistan and Iran border with an individual associated with al Qaida.
9. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida operative.

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10. A source stated he saw the detainee and two of his brothers at a guest house for jihadists in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
11. A source stated the detainee was a mujahedin facilitator who lived in a guest house in Tehran, Iran from late 2000 into early 2001.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that since he was already dead he might as well be sent to Iraq to fight against the Americans there.
2. The detainee stated that after being unjustly imprisoned all of this time by the Americans, once he is released he is going to go to Afghanistan, join the freedom fighters again, and kill Americans.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he believes the United States is involved in a war against Islam, and that he will not cooperate with interrogators for at least 320 years.
2. The detainee stated a large portion of his life was involved in selling and using illegal drugs.
3. A source stated the detainee and his brother have information on how to enter and move around in Iran.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he knows of the terrorist network called al Qaida but has never met or spoken to anyone belonging to that organization.
- b. The detainee stated he did not remember an occasion of someone trying to recruit him to go to Chechnya.
- c. The detainee stated he is not associated with al Qaida or any other extremist group. He stated that he heard of the attacks on America on 11 September 2001, and vehemently disagrees with suicide and killing of innocents.
- d. The detainee stated he did not go to Azerbaijan in preparation for going to Chechnya.
- e. The detainee stated that prior to leaving Saudi Arabia, he was not recruited by anyone to fight jihad in Afghanistan or against the United States. He stated he did not have

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR

any discussions with anyone about the Taliban, al Qaida, or Usama Bin Laden.

- f. The detainee stated that while he was with Jamat-al-Tabligh in Pakistan that he never was approached or recruited to go to Afghanistan, and that no one he was with talked about jihad.
 - g. The detainee stated there was no talk of jihad while he stayed at the Raywan Mosque.
 - h. The detainee stated that during his time in Pakistan he would travel to different villages in the area spreading the word of Islam.
 - i. The detainee stated that he was innocent and that he was not doing anything wrong when he was caught.
 - j. The detainee stated he had not been in Afghanistan at any time prior to his detention, and he had not been in an al Qaida guest house in Iran in 2000.
 - k. The detainee stated that if he were released, he would return to Sanaa, Yemen, where he has several family members, and work in one of the family's three stores.
 - l. The detainee stated he had disowned his brother, and that he regretted allowing his brother to talk him into going to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he left home because he was fed up with his situation and wanted to get out of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 May 2007

TO: SHAWALI KHAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAWALI KHAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he fought in the Mujehedin for seven years.

2. The detainee claimed he was involved in one battle against the Northern Alliance, but stated his entire group of approximately 70 individuals retreated back to the Taliban facilities when the fighting started.

3. The detainee delivered a radio-controlled binary detonation device and two blasting caps to an operative working within his organization. The devices were to be used in conjunction with two mines, possibly Chinese-made type-72 antitank mines. The intended use for the devices was to target American civilians or United States led coalition military patrols.

4. The detainee was identified trying to purchase two rockets through an intermediary source for an unknown reason.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee claimed to work as a driver for his uncle from approximately December 2000 to March 2001.

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2. The detainee's uncle is the top official and commander of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin operations cell in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee's uncle makes all decisions and appoints all positions for the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin cell in Kandahar.

3. In September 2002, the detainee was directed by his uncle, to carry out a terrorist operation targeted at United States military personnel located at Gecko Base, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden, and has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

5. The detainee contacted Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin cell members through radio communication, and acted as a messenger between Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin cell operatives and an individual who is the facilitator and command element of the cell. This individual brings supplies and explosives from Pakistan to Afghanistan. This individual also directs missions in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and employs surveillance teams.

6. In December 2002, a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin terrorist cell entered Kandahar, Afghanistan, from Quetta, Pakistan. This cell intended to target Americans with grenade attacks at various choke points around Kandahar. The detainee was associated with the leader of this cell.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured by United States forces from the Kandahar, Afghanistan area on 13 November 2002.

2. The detainee was appointed by Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leadership as a leader of a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin propaganda group in the Chardehi district of Kabul, Afghanistan. The group planned to incite the local populace in the area to stage demonstrations and protests against the transitional Islamic state of Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he is not a member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and has no affiliations with the organization. The detainee claims his uncle is not a commander of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

b. The detainee denied serving in al Qaida, but knew of their existence and stated they would occupy all of the better homes and offices near his village in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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c. The detainee stated that no one ever found anything on him or his brother that shows that they are guilty of anything.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee denied having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 June 2007

TO: KHI ALI GUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHI ALI GUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee is a former Mujahedin soldier and fought in the jihad against the Russians from 1984 to 1989.
 2. A source stated the detainee worked on an assassination team employed by the Taliban.
 3. The detainee was identified as an intelligence chief that harassed and assassinated Afghan intellectuals for the Taliban regime.
 4. The detainee was identified as the possible cell leader of a terrorist group that operated near Khowst, Afghanistan. The members met at the detainee's home to plan attacks or distribute improvised explosive devices.
 5. The detainee was identified as helping plan the December 2002 rocket attack against a forward operating base in Afghanistan. Rockets were fired at the base from the bed of a pickup truck, but none impacted the base.
 6. The detainee was identified as a member of the Union of Mujahedin. The Union of Mujahedin detonated an explosive in a bazaar in Khowst, Afghanistan, in conjunction with its anti-Western and anti-United States position.

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b. Training

1. The detainee stated he instinctively knew how to use a Kalashnikov rifle without training, but learned how to use a rocket launcher against aircraft.
2. The detainee can fire an AK-47, rocket propelled grenade, pistol, and hand grenades from fighting in the jihad against the Russians.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met with Usama bin Laden in Khowst, Afghanistan, during the Mazar e Sharif bombing campaign.
2. Individuals, reportedly present at the planning meeting for the December 2002 rocket attack against a forward operating base in Afghanistan, included a person who provided a truck formerly owned by an al Qaida member and an individual with ties to Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin.
3. The detainee provided assistance to an anti-coalition militia commander associated with the Taliban and Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin.
4. Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets and has long established ties to Usama bin Laden. Hezb e Islami Gulbuddin staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured in late December 2002 at a military checkpoint near Khowst, Afghanistan, while riding in a minibus. The detainee was reportedly concealing his face.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he had no animosity towards United States Forces and no desire for jihad or revenge.
 - b. The detainee plans to return to Afghanistan, reunite with family, and work on a farm.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 September 2007

To: RAZZAK, ABDUL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAK, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee is an associate member of a Taliban organization that openly harbors and supports hostile Taliban leaders.
 2. The detainee is considered a key employee in transportation for the Taliban organization. The detainee coordinated resources to transport or facilitate the escape of key Taliban leaders. The detainee recruited immediate family members in the name of dismantling the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. The detainee has served in positions with the intent to do harm or damage to United States and Coalition Forces within Afghanistan.
 3. The detainee stated he was forced to serve the Taliban three months out of every year since they came to power in 1992. The detainee stated he served as a driver for the Taliban.
 4. A source stated the detainee was the second in command of an elite 40 man Taliban unit that was actively involved in assassinating high level Afghan government officials.
 5. A source stated the detainee was originally a freedom fighter against the Soviets, a member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, the Taliban, and then al Qaida.

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6. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was a major Mujahedin group in the war against the Soviets. The group has long established ties with Usama bin Laden and the group's founder offered to shelter bin Laden after bin Laden fled Sudan in 1996. The group staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

b. Training

A source stated the detainee was involved in a terrorist training camp near Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he fought with a commander, who was in charge of approximately 800 to 1000 soldiers, in the Russian jihad for approximately five years. When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the commander allied himself with the Taliban and participated in almost every engagement against the Northern Alliance.
2. The detainee stated he was paid 20,000 United States Dollars to break an individual out of a Taliban prison.
3. The individual in the previous statement, was a Jamiat-I-Islami commander who had ties to Iran.
4. Jamiat Ulema E Islami is a Pakistani political party that is closely affiliated with a number of international terrorist groups based in Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan. The radical Sunni religio-political party is best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama bin Laden and sponsorship of some 3,000 religious schools.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated the detainee was part of the main security escort that smuggled Usama bin Laden and bin Laden's family into Pakistan.
2. A source stated the detainee was high in the al Qaida hierarchy, and acted as a smuggler and facilitator. The detainee received money and weapons from Syria. The source stated that an al Qaida operational leader provided weapons to the detainee.
3. A source stated the detainee was directly involved in assassination attempts. The source stated the detainee attempted to have the source participate in a suicide mission and trained the source on how to use explosive vests.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAK, ABDUL

4. A source stated the detainee told the source of an assassination plot against Afghanistan President Karzai and the specific route Karzai was to take. The source stated the detainee attempted to have the source kill a governor in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee identified three routes used to smuggle weapons into Afghanistan to supply Jamiat Islami. The routes originate in neighboring countries and end in various areas in Afghanistan.
 6. A source stated the detainee received weapons shipments from Syria including crew served military weapons, plastic explosives, night-vision equipment and missiles, small arms and ammunition. The source stated the detainee has connections to a tribe that smuggles weapons from Syria to Afghanistan via Iran.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he had no men serving under him for the last 25 years, prior to 14 June 2003. The detainee stated the last time he fought was against the Russians and that he has not fought since they left. The detainee stated he has not commanded anyone to commit acts of violence or war since he stopped fighting the Russians. The detainee stated he was not a Taliban member.
 - b. The detainee stated the reason why an individual is saying bad things about the detainee is because they had a fight. The detainee stated he did not know this individual in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he first met this individual when they were both in Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 - c. The detainee vehemently denies that he is currently associated with the Taliban.
 - d. The detainee denied escorting a convoy that took Usama bin Laden out of Afghanistan.
 - e. The detainee stated he was not involved in planning attacks using poison or ordering suicide attacks. The detainee also denied entering any military training camp.
 - f. One uncorroborated report indicated the detainee was not from the Taliban.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2007

TO: SHARIFULLAH (LNU)

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARIFULLAH (LNU)

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was reportedly a member of a four man bomb cell in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The bombs were made in Pakistan and delivered to the bomb cell in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was part of a bomb cell that planned to harm and kill United States and Afghan personnel.

3. The detainee studied on how to use the bombs in Pakistan, where the bombs were made. The detainee was trained a few months prior to being sent to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was arrested at a military compound where improvised explosive devices were found.

b. Training

1. In late 2002, the detainee trained at the Gund Talimi Military School, where he received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, physical training, and riot control.

2. The detainee learned martial arts while training with the Afghanistan National Army.

3. The detainee was identified as having attended training at the Zakar Khel Training Camp in Pakistan.

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SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARIFULLAH (LNU)

4. A former al Qaeda fighter stated the Zakar Khel Camp was an al Qaeda training camp.

5. The Zakar Khel Training Camp trained individuals in the use of the Kalashnikov rifle, rockets, PK machine guns, missiles, the disassembly of land mines and the production of bombs from the disassembled land mines.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The brother of the detainee reportedly brought improvised explosive devices to a compound.

2. The detainee's brother is associated with al Qaeda members.

3. The detainee's brother was identified as a senior Taliban commander.

4. The detainee's brother was in charge of the terrorist cell in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and also selected the targets that were to be attacked with the improvised explosive devices. The targets included non-governmental organizations, American Special Forces, and Afghan nationals helping the United States.

5. After completing studies, the detainee returned to Afghanistan and joined up with Haji Qadir in Noorestan, Afghanistan.

6. On 29 January 2003, several explosive devices and bombs were recovered from a compound that belonged to Haji Zahir.

7. Haji Zahir is known as an anti-coalition militia commander with a history of planning attacks on Coalition bases.

d. Other Relevant Information

1. After completing Afghan National Army training, the detainee was assigned to the Presidential Palace Guards in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he deserted his post at the Presidential Palace.

3. The detainee stated he didn't have permission to leave Kabul, Afghanistan, but changed his story and stated his Commander had authorized him to take leave.

4. The detainee stated, while working as a security guard at the university in Karachi, Pakistan, he received a fake identification card from the director of the university.

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