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Vol. 67

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 20, 1948

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 13,341 to 13,708

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 67

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S. Con. Res. 27

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3 Wednesday, February 20, 1946
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5 Congress of the United States,
6 Joint Committee on the Investigation
7 of Pearl Harbor Attack,
8 Washington, D. C.

9 The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10 9:30 a. m., in the Caucus Room (318), Senate Office Building,
11 Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

12 Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
13 Ferguson and Brewster.

14 Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
15 Gearhart and Keefe.

16 Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
17 Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
18 Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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1 The Chairman: You may proceed.

2 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the
3 committee this morning several additional documents, which
4 we would like to mark as exhibits.

5 The first is the yellow folder entitled "Correspondence
6 between General Arnold and General Martin."

7 I believe some of this is already in evidence, but
8 this is a complete compilation, as I understand it, of
9 the correspondence between those two gentlemen.

10 We would like to have that marked as Exhibit 154.

11 The Chairman: That may be done.

12 (The document referred to was
13 marked as Exhibit No. 154.)

14 Mr. Masten: Throughout the transcript there are
15 various letters and dispatches on the subject of basing
16 additional aircraft at Wake and Midway.

17 We have one additional letter, which is dated November
18 10, 1941, and signed by Admiral Kimmel, which we would like
19 to have spread in the transcript at this point inasmuch as
20 there is no exhibit on that general subject.

21 The Chairman: That will be done.

22 (The letter of November 10, 1941 is as follows:)

23

24

25

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1 UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

2 U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

3 Cincpac File No. Pearl Harbor, T. H.,

4 L24/VZ/(95) November 10, 1941.

5 Serial 01825

6 C O N F I D E N T I A L

7 From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet,

8 To: Commander Aircraft, Battle Force

9 Commander Patrol Wing TWO.

10 Subject: Naval Air Station Wake and Naval Air Station

11 Midway - Basing of Aircraft at.

12 1. In order to be able to meet emergency requirements
13 for basing of aircraft at Wake and Midway, while minimizing
14 logistic demands of those places for the present, the Com-
15 mander-in-Chief desires that the following action be taken
16 immediately:

17 (a) Make preparations at Wake for basing:

18 (1) 12 patrol planes.

19 (2) 12 Marine scout bombers or 12 Marine fighters.

20 (b) Make preparations at Midway for basing:

21 (1) 12 additional patrol planes (total 24).

22 (2) 18 Marine scout bombers or 18 Marine fighters.

23 2. These preparations shall include the following pro-
24 visions and assumptions:

25 (a) When the aircraft movements are ordered, it

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3 shall be necessary only to fly the patrol planes
4 and landplanes (from a carrier in the latter case)
5 to the designated places and it shall be practicable
6 to operate on arrival without attendant transporta-
7 tion of material or personnel by ship.

8 (b) It shall be practicable to continue operations
9 on this basis for a period of six weeks, at the end
10 of which time relief may be expected, either by air
11 exchange of planes and flight crews or by provision
12 of additional support transported by ship, or by com-
13 bination of the two.

14 (c) Preparations shall, accordingly, include trans-
15 portation to Wake and Midway of:

16 (1) Necessary tools, spares and equipment for
17 minor repairs, adjustments and checks.

18 (2) Necessary minimum number of ground personnel
19 to meet the requirements of subparagraph 2(b) above,
20 assuming the full availability of Naval Air Station
21 personnel and Marine defense personnel already
22 present for non-technical manpower assistance.

23 (3) Necessary additional bombs, with necessary
24 additional bomb handling equipment. (Note: With
25 delivery of the 48 1,000 lb. bombs approved for
the patrol planes at Wake the bomb situation for
patrol planes will be satisfactory at both Wake

1 and Midway. The following additional bombs
2 are needed for the Marine planes; Wake, 12 1,000
3 lb., 24 500 lb.; Midway, 18 1,000 lb., 36 500 lb.
4 150 100 lb. bombs each, of those already available
5 at Wake and Midway, should be designated for the
6 Marine planes. Aircraft machine gun ammunition
7 already at Wake and Midway is sufficient)

8 (d) Patrol plane personnel at Wake shall base and sub-
9 sist in excess accommodations available in Contractor's
10 Camp No. 2 near the air station site. Patrol plane per-
11 sonnel at Midway shall base and subsist at the Naval Air
12 Station with additional accommodations, if and as neces-
13 sary, to be provided by the use of Contractor's space.

14 (e) Marine squadron personnel at Wake shall base and
15 subsist adjacent to the landplane runways. Marine squad-
16 ron personnel at Midway shall base and subsist on Eastern
17 Island. At both places it is necessary to set up a suit-
18 able tent camp. The assistance of Marine defense person-
19 nel shall be used to accomplish this.

20 (f) Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall provide, by patrol
21 plane tender, the necessary personnel and material trans-
22 portation for both patrol plane and Marine aircraft
23 preparations.

24 3. By copy of this letter the Commandant Fourteenth
25 Naval District is directed to take immediate steps to:

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- 1 (a) Make available the 48 1,000 lb. bombs still due
2 for patrol planes at Wake and the additional bombs for
3 the Marine planes (paragraph 2(c) (3) above).
- 4 (b) Provide for necessary storage of bombs and
5 ammunition for Marine landplanes adjacent to landplane
6 runways at Wake and Midway.
- 7 (c) Make available the Contractor's accommodations
8 needed for patrol squadron personnel at Wake and Midway.
- 9 (d) Cover the bulk subsistence and potable water
10 requirements of the personnel of the foregoing prepara-
11 tory parties and anticipate the additional requirements
12 resulting from actual aircraft basing.
- 13 (e) Expedite expansion of tank storage of aviation
14 gasoline at Wake and anticipate the aviation gasoline
15 and lubricating oil requirements at both Wake and Midway
16 resulting from actual aircraft basing.
- 17 (f) Provide lumber needed for the tent camps of
18 Marine aircraft personnel at Wake and Midway.
- 19 (g) Make available the needed assistance from Naval
20 Air Station and Marine defense personnel for camp con-
21 struction and, on arrival of aircraft, for aircraft
22 operations.

H. E. KIMMEL

23
24 Copy to:

25 Combatfor

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C.O. Marine Air Group 21
/s/ P. C. Crosley
/t/ P. C. Crosley
Flag Secretary

Received S-C FILES
Room 2055
Nov 26 1941
ROUTE TO:- 38
Op File No.(SC)A43/V2
Doc. No. 38467
Copy No. 1 of 2
PRN 711

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

1 Mr. Masten: Exhibit 117 contains various correspon-
2 dence relating to the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands.
3 That correspondence is in addition to other material which
4 appears in the transcript or exhibits at various places.

5 We would like to add to Exhibit 117, as 117-A, the
6 letter entitled "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian
7 Area," which is dated 17 February 1941, and signed by General
8 Short.

9 The Chairman: That will be done.

10 (The letter referred to was
11 marked Exhibit 117-A)

12 Mr. Masten: Finally, we would like to add to Exhibit
13 123, which contains correspondence relating to Joint Opera-
14 tions Centers on Oahu, the correspondence which was distri-
15 buted to the Committee this morning, and the first letter
16 of which is dated January 10, 1942 from the Assistant Chief
17 of Staff, War Plans, Admiral Turner, to the Commander in
18 Chief, U. S. Fleet.

19 We would like to add that to Exhibit 123, as 123-A.

20 The Chairman: That will be done.

21 (The letter referred to was
22 marked Exhibit 123-A).

23 Mr. Masten: That is all we have.

24 The Chairman: Commander Sonnett.
25

Witness Sonnett

questions by: senator Ferguson

h9

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SONNETT (Resumed)

1
2
3 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson, I believe you were
4 to examine.

5 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

6 Mr. Sonnett, what is your present occupation?

7 Mr. Sonnett: I am an Assistant Attorney General of
8 the United States and in charge of the so-called Claims or
9 General Civil Division of the Department of Justice.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did you go to the Department of
11 Justice at the time you left the Navy?

12 Mr. Sonnett: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: You had spent all of your service
14 in the Navy in the Secretary's office?

15 Mr. Sonnett: That is correct, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: When did you first learn that there
17 was to be a new investigation under Admiral Hewitt?

18 Mr. Sonnett: Approximately in November of 1944, that
19 there was to be a new investigation. The selection of
20 Admiral Hewitt by the Secretary as the investigating, or
21 hearing officer, came later.

22 Senator Ferguson: About when did it come?

23 Mr. Sonnett: Sometime in the spring of 1945. I am
24 unable to give you the exact date.

25 Senator Ferguson: Wasn't it in May?

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Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Sonnett: It may have been.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you conduct a personal investigation between November and May?

Mr. Sonnett: To the extent, Senator, of reviewing all prior Navy investigations to determine what subjects had not adequately been covered by the previous investigations.

Senator Ferguson: You were familiar with the report of the Navy Board?

Mr. Sonnett: I was, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And didn't it recommend that no further proceedings be taken? Wasn't the last recommendation:

"The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter, the court having finished the inquiry."

Then:

"At 4 p. m. Thursday, October 19, 1944, adjourned to await the action of the convening authority."

Did you know that?

Mr. Sonnett: I am sure I did, Senator. I read the report at the time.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, can you give us just what led up to the new investigation after the Board had recommended that no further proceedings be had in the matter?

Mr. Sonnett: The customary practice, Senator, under

Witness sonnett

questions by: senator Ferguson

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1
2 Naval regulations is that reports by courts of inquiry
3 are advisory only to the Convening Authority.

4 The Convening Authority was the Secretary of the Navy.

5 In accordance with the usual practice under Navy regu-
6 lation, he caused a review to be made of the proceedings of
7 the Court of Inquiry. That review, in which I participated,
8 led to the further investigation.

9 Senator Ferguson: Who did the actual reviewing of the
10 testimony and the report?

11 Mr. Sonnett: Well, that was done by several people.
12 It was done by myself, it was done by then Major Mathias
13 S. Correa, who was a special assistant to the Secretary also,
14 and it was done by the Secretary himself. How much of the
15 actual record he read, I am unable to state. I know that he
16 read some of it.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Who was in charge of the review?

2 Mr. Sonnett: The Secretary of the Navy, sir.

3
4 Senator Ferguson: Now, the Secretary of the Navy had
5 many other things to do?

6 Mr. Sonnett: He did, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: Didn't he designate you as the one
8 in charge of review to get his report out?

9 Mr. Sonnett: I don't mean to argue, Senator, but I don't
10 think I was in charge of the review. I assisted the Secretary
11 in his review.

12 Senator Ferguson: What did Mr. Baecher have to do with
13 the review?

14 Mr. Sonnett: Mr. Baecher was selected by me as an
15 assistant, Senator, in the spring of 1945 when it became
16 apparent that further investigation was necessary. He reviewed
17 documents, participated with me in the preliminary examination
18 of prospective witnesses, and later participated throughout
19 as assistant counsel during the Hewitt Investigation.

20 Senator Ferguson: What were your duties as counsel for
21 Admiral Hewitt?

22 Mr. Sonnett: To explore the documentary evidence, to
23 investigate in a preliminary fashion by taking statements of
24 witnesses, to make recommendations to the Admiral as to the
25 witnesses to be interrogated by him, and to put questions to

WARD 3 PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 witnesses during the course of the hearings, to assist in
2 the preparation of the final report and to give the Admiral
3 any assistance I could generally.
4

5 Senator Ferguson: You had been in the Navy at that time
6 how long?
7

8 Mr. Sonnett: I went -- that requires a little explana-
9 tion, Senator. I went to the Navy in the fall of 1943 as a
10 civil special counsel. I worked in that capacity until
11 January of 1944 when, at the request of then Under Secretary
12 Forrestal, I applied for a commission and was commissioned.
13 I was on active duty from January of 1944 until May of 1945.
14 I then was appointed a civil special assistant at the
15 Secretary's suggestion, and continued in that capacity until
16 approximately the end of August of 1945.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, in order that you might
18 assist Admiral Hewitt, it was necessary for you to know what
19 was to be developed or what your purpose was in conducting
20 a further inquiry, was it not?

21 Mr. Sonnett: That is correct, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: What was the purpose of the further
23 inquiry?

24 Mr. Sonnett: To obtain all of the facts which had not
25 adequately been obtained before, either by re-interrogation
26 of previous witnesses, or, in addition, by the interrogation

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 of other witnesses who had been in combat before and not
3 available.

4 Senator Ferguson: If a witness had fully testified
5 before the Board, did you interrogate him if his testimony
6 conflicted with someone else's?

7 Mr. Sonnett: Not unless there was some ambiguity or
8 uncertainty in his testimony.

9 Senator Ferguson: Was there any uncertainty in Captain
10 Safford's testimony?

11 Mr. Sonnett: There was, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: What was it?

13 Mr. Sonnett: The uncertainty consisted primarily, as I
14 recall, in the fact that Captain Safford had told varying
15 stories, in the sense of the date when he thought he saw
16 the winds execute message, the names of other people whom
17 he said also saw that winds message. I am unable at the
18 moment to recall any of the other conflicts in his statements,
19 but there were such.

20 Senator Ferguson: Was there any conflict in Admiral
21 Stark's testimony?

22 Mr. Sonnett: It was my personal opinion, Senator, that
23 the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark both had
24 been fully stated in the Naval Court of Inquiry and I was
25 unable to see any item on which further investigation was

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Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 required in order to obtain their full statements.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did Admiral Hewitt review the evidence
4 so that he knew of these conflicts?

5 Mr. Sonnett: He did, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Were there any so-called leads pre-
7 pared?

8 Mr. Sonnett: Well, the scope of the further investiga-
9 tion, Senator, was decided by Admiral Hewitt in the form of
10 his own view, and then presented in formal fashion to the
11 Secretary of the Navy for his approval of the further in-
12 vestigation. I can get that for you. Commander Baecher
13 has produced the memorandum by Admiral Hewitt to the
14 Secretary dated 18 May 1945 setting forth the items of
15 further review.

16 Senator Ferguson: I would like to see those.

17 Mr. Sonnett: And the approval of the Secretary.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, prior to Admiral Hewitt
19 coming in on the 18th of May, had you taken any statements
20 or interviewed any witnesses?

21 Mr. Sonnett: I had, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: What were the witnesses that you
23 had interviewed prior to Admiral Hewitt's coming in?

24 Mr. Sonnett: I am unable to recall them all, Senator.
25 I can recall, among others, Captain Safford; Captain Rochefort,

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(2)

1 Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 I believe, was interrogated before the arrival of Admiral
3 Hewitt. I can't give you off-hand the names of the others.

4 Senator Ferguson: D'd you take any evidence down, or
5 memorandums?

6 Mr. Sonnett: No. These were purely informal exploratory
7 meetings, Senator, with the purpose of, in a preliminary
8 fashion, arriving at some view as to what the witness could
9 testify to.

10 Senator Ferguson: Hadn't Captain Rochefort already
11 testified and hadn't Captain Safford already testified?

12 Mr. Sonnett: They had, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Before Admiral Hewitt came in, you
14 had a definite purpose that you were going to follow. Will
15 you state what that purpose was, what were you going to prove
16 or try to prove?

17 Mr. Sonnett: My instructions, Senator, from the
18 Secretary of the Navy were to conduct a thorough review of
19 all prior Navy investigations and upon completion of that
20 to see whether in my opinion there was further investiga-
21 tion required. I did that. My later instructions from
22 the Secretary of the Navy, when it was apparent that further
23 investigation was necessary, were to obtain directly and
24 as counsel to Admiral Hewitt all of the facts from whatever
25 source.

1 Witness Sonnett Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Did you review the Roberts Report?

3 Mr. Sonnett: I did, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: And was it your duty, under your
5 instructions from the Secretary, to review that as well as
6 the Admiral Hart Report, the Navy Board Inquiry?

7 Mr. Sonnett: I am unable to state, Senator, whether
8 I had any specific instructions concerning the Roberts Report.
9 I can state that I did review it.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did you review the evidence?

11 Mr. Sonnett: I examined portions of the evidence, as
12 I recall it.

13 Mr. Ferguson: Did you review the Secretary Knox report?

14 Mr. Sonnett: I did not, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Had you ever read that?

16 Mr. Sonnett: I had not, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

18 Mr. Sonnett: I had not.

19 Senator Ferguson: Was it not in the Department?

20 Mr. Sonnett: I assume it was, Senator, but I am unable
21 to state. I have never seen that report.

22 Senator Ferguson: You had access to magic?

23 Mr. Sonnett: I did, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: All of the magic, I assume?

25 Mr. Sonnett: I did, sir.

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you go into the question in the Secretary of State's office?

Mr. Sonnett: I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you go into any question in the Executive Office, the White House?

Mr. Sonnett: I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you try to find out what agreement or understanding there was if there was an attack on the British and not on America, what the policy was?

Mr. Sonnett: I didn't try to review any particular thing, Senator. As I stated before, my immediate function at the outset was to review the Naval Court of Inquiry Investigation and Admiral Hart's Investigation; as part of the customary regular routine under Naval regulations to assist the Secretary in his decision, whatever it might be upon the advisory opinion of the Naval Court of Inquiry.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Shefner follows

Witness Sonnett

Questions by; Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: You did not quite answer my question.
3 My question was in relation to the A-B-C-D understanding.

4 Mr. Sonnett: Well, I am not familiar with that, Senator.

5 Senator Ferguson: You are not familiar with that?

6
7 Mr. Sonnett: My attempt to answer your question was to
8 state that I had my instructions and I complied with them.
9 Those instructions were limited to the Navy. I did not inves-
0 tigate outside of the Navy in any way, shape or fashion.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did you take any testimony from any
11 Army officers?

12 Mr. Sonnett: I did, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Are you familiar with exhibits 16 and
14 17?

15 Mr. Sonnett: I do not remember them.

16 Senator Ferguson: They were signed by Admiral Stark.
17 They had to do with the so-called line in the Pacific.

18 Mr. Sonnett: If I could look at them, Senator, I could
19 refresh my recollection. I do not know the numbers of the
20 exhibits.

21 Senator Ferguson: Here is 16 and we will have 17 in a
22 minute. This is 17. (Handing documents to witness).

23 Mr. Sonnett: Looking at 16 first, Senator, I note the
24 recommendations at the end of that memorandum by the Chief of
25 Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

3 Mr. Sonnett: And it indicates to me that I have seen it
4 before. As to exhibit 17, I do not recall having seen it be-
5 fore.

6 Senator Ferguson: The exhibit 17?

7 Mr. Sonnett: I do not, Senator, no.

8 Senator Ferguson: Well, I want to review your memo here
9 of the 18th, so I am through at the present moment until I
10 review it, Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman: All right. Mr. Keefe?

12 Mr. Keefe: I do not have but a couple of questions.

13 I just wondered, - I was not here at the beginning of your
14 testimony, Mr. Sonnett, - but I have before me the examination
15 of Captain Kramer taken before Admiral Hewitt on the 22nd day
16 of May 1945. Now, prior to your interview with Captain Kramer
17 he had previously testified, had he not?

18 Mr. Sonnett: He had, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: He had testified before the Naval Court of
20 Inquiry.

21 Mr. Sonnett: That is my recollection, sir, yes.

22 Mr. Keefe: I believe he had not testified in the Hart
23 inquiry, and then followed the final Hewitt inquiry, of which
24 you were a part.

25 Now, just what was the purpose of going all over that

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 again with Captain Kramer?

3 Mr. Sonnett: Well, Mr. Congressman, there were a number
4 of items upon the review of the prior investigations which
5 were regarded as being important. Those items are in the
6 document which Senator Ferguson is now examining. There were,
7 I think, some twelve or fourteen of them.

8 Mr. Keefe: Pardon the interruption. Items drawn up by
9 whom?

10 Mr. Sonnett: By the Secretary of the Navy, sir, and by
11 Admiral Hewitt, in whose opinions I should say that personally,
12 if you want my personal opinion, I wholly concurred.

13 Of those items, one was the winds code execute. The only
14 real importance that had, in the judgment of the Secretary and
15 in the judgment of Admiral Hewitt, was because there was a
16 conflict between the witnesses and because the evidence of the
17 existence of such a message rested almost entirely on the tes-
18 timony of one man and was disputed by many others. In order to
19 resolve that point the winds code investigation was done, along
20 with the investigation on the other more important matters.

21 Mr. Keefe: Well, of course, I fully realize that all of
22 these subject matters were investigations pursuant to an Act
23 of Congress directing the Secretary of the Navy and the Secre-
24 tary of War to make investigations, with no prescribed method
25 set forth in the resolution, and they could continue it in

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 any form and in any manner that they saw fit.

3 Now, if I understand your testimony, when a review of the
4 testimony taken by the Navy Court of Inquiry came before the
5 Secretary of the Navy for review it was apparent that there
6 were some disputes among the witnesses as to what were con-
7 sidered to be essential facts and you attempted to resolve
8 those facts, is that right?

9 Mr. Sonnett: Not quite, Mr. Congressman, no. It was
10 apparent that there were certain matters of great importance
11 which I have mentioned, particularly the question of the in-
12 telligence which Admiral Kimmel had at Pearl Harbor, "apart from
13 messages from Washington, was a matter of considerable import-
14 ance.

15 That had not been adequately investigated. We investi-
16 gated it and I trust did it adequately. That was important. The
17 only importance the winds code message had, as I indicated
18 to you before, was because there was a conflict and that con-
19 flict required that there be further investigation. Captain
20 Safford, for example, had named certain people as having seen
21 the winds code message, the execute or alleged execute. Those
22 people had not been interrogated. We interrogated all of them
23 and, incidentally, none of them -- as you know, none of them
24 saw the message; at least they so testified, but it was be-
25 cause --

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Mr. Keefe: Well, I don't agree with that at all. The
3 testimony is quite to the contrary before the committee.

4 Mr. Sonnett: Not the testimony I am referring to, Mr.
5 Congressman. The people named by Captain Safford in his pre-
6 vious testimony as having seen the winds code execute testi-
7 fied before us that they had not seen such a message.

8 Mr. Keefe: Captain Kramer was one of them, wasn't he?

9 Mr. Sonnett: He was one of them.

10 Mr. Keefe: He certainly did not testify that he did not
11 see this winds execute.

12 Mr. Sonnett: Well, I don't know what he testified to here,
13 Mr. Congressman, I haven't been following this inquiry that
14 closely, but I do know that before Admiral Hewitt he was unable
15 to testify or state that he ever saw a genuine winds code mes-
16 sage prior to the attack relating to the United States.

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, I don't want to go off on a tangent about
18 this winds execute. We have had two or three weeks about that
19 kind of business and as far as I am personally concerned I
20 don't care for my own thinking whether there was or was not a
21 winds execute. Whatever the facts are they are before this
22 committee and we can take them for what they are worth. I
23 don't think myself that it was of very great importance in
24 view of the other evidence and facts that were at hand, but I
25 have before me Captain Kramer's testimony taken before the

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Hewitt investigation. I note that he was examined at some
3 length by Admiral Hewitt and then after Admiral Hewitt got
4 through with him you examined him. That was on the second
5 day of the examination.

6 Did you talk with Captain Kramer before you reduced his
7 testimony to writing?

8 Mr. Sonnett: I am sure I did, Mr. Congressman, yes.

9 Mr. Keefe: You went over the testimony that he had given
10 before to point out the conflicts?

11 Mr. Sonnett: I don't know that we went over the exact
12 testimony he gave before. I know that we reviewed his recol-
13 lection with him to try to find out what the facts were ac-
14 cording to his best recollection.

15 Mr. Keefe: Well, all I can say, Captain, after the full
16 examination before the Army Board, and the Navy Board and the
17 Hart investigation and the Hewitt investigation and the Son-
18 nett investigation and this investigation here I think we are
19 more muddled up than we were before we started so far as the
20 winds message is concerned. We still haven't got any clear,
21 definite picture as to exactly what did take place. That is
22 all.

23 The Chairman: Are you ready to resume now, Senator
24 Ferguson?

25 Senator Ferguson: Well, I will be as soon as I finish

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2 reading it.

3 The Chairman: In the meantime I will ask a question.

4 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

5 The Chairman: Reference has been made to the statement
6 of the Navy Board, "The Board recommends that no further pro-
7 ceedings be had in the matter." That is a report to the Sec-
8 retary of the Navy and I suppose it is based upon the last
9 paragraph of their opinion, which says:

10 "Finally, based upon the facts established, the
11 Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been com-
12 mitted nor serious blame incurred on the part of any per-
13 son or persons in the naval service."

14 In other words, they exonerated in that paragraph every-
15 body in the Navy and then the first recommendation was that
16 there be no further proceedings.

17 I suppose that might be interpreted to mean that inasmuch
18 as they found no offense had been committed and no serious
19 blame on the part of anybody, not to proceed against anybody
20 under courts-martial or any other legal proceeding, but re-
21 gardless of that the Secretary was not satisfied that an ade-
22 quate investigation had been had of all these matters and,
23 therefore, he set up this supplementary investigation under
24 Admiral Hewitt.

25 Mr. Sonnett: That is correct, sir, and after his re-

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: The Chairman

1 view of the entire investigations and facts in all of them you
2 will recall that his conclusions which differed markedly from
3 the Court so were set forth in his endorsement.
4

5 The Chairman: Yes. In other words, the mere fact that
6 the Board recommended that no further proceedings be had was
7 not binding on the Secretary of the Navy, who had been directed
8 by Congress to make an investigation, and the Secretary of
9 War had been directed to make an investigation, and they had
10 full authority to set up any commission or any board, or as
11 many commissions or as many boards as they might think were
12 necessary in order to get the facts?

13 Mr. Sonnett: That is correct, sir.

14 The Chairman: And if it were not for the fact that after
15 these investigations that had been had by the Army and the Navy
16 Congress itself and probably the country felt that the matter
17 had not been adequately gone into, this committee has been
18 sitting here since the 6th of September to get further facts
19 with reference to the matter.

20 In other words, after each investigation it had been felt
21 that some further inquiry was necessary and that is why this
22 committee was created. I don't know whether there will be an-
23 other one or not, but I can guarantee one thing that if there
24 is another one that this member will not be on the committee
25 that carries it out.

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Brewster: Is that a threat or a promise?

3 The Chairman: Well, in your case it will be a promise, I
4 think.

5 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I ask that there be spread
6 on the record at this point the citation from the Secretary
7 of the Navy and the citation from Admiral Hewitt as to the
8 witness on the stand at the present time.

9 The Chairman: It will be so ordered. That is all I want
10 to ask.

11 (The citations above referred to are in words
12 and figures as follows, to-wit:)

13 "12 July 1945

14 From: Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy

15 To: The Secretary of the Navy

16 Subject: John F. Sonnett; Commendation of

17 1. John F. Sonnett served from 14 May 1945 to 11
18 July 1945 as my counsel for the further investigation into
19 the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, di-
20 rected by the Secretary of the Navy's precept of 2 May 1945.

21 2. During this period he exhibited professional
22 skill to a high degree, and was of the greatest assistance to
23 me.

24 3. His efficient conduct of these hearings and
25 thorough development of the testimony contributed immeasurably

Witness Sonnett

to the completion of the investigation.

4. It is respectfully requested that the substance of this correspondence be made a part of his official record.

H. K. HEWITT."

- - -

"THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN F. SONNETT

UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

"For outstanding services as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy from January 22, 1944, to May 5, 1945. Applying himself with keen foresight, effective resourcefulness, purposeful initiative and delicate tact to the complex problems inherent in confidential assignments of paramount importance, Lieutenant Commander Sonnett skillfully formulated and executed missions of the highest classification pertaining to, affecting and furthering the war effort. His constant devotion to duty and loyal discharge of weighty responsibilities reflect the highest credit upon Lieutenant Commander Sonnett and upon the United States Naval Service."

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 "A copy of this citation has been made a part of Lieutenant
3 Commander Sonnett's official record and he is hereby author-
4 ized to wear the Commendation Ribbon.

5 /s/ James Forrestal

6 Secretary of the Navy."

7 The Chairman: Are you ready, Senator Ferguson?

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

9 Mr. Sonnett, under "F" on page 2 you were:

10 "To determine the basis for the statement at page 6
11 of 'Battle Report' that 'There were two powerful task
12 forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of
13 one lurking just over the horizon from its companion
14 force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the
15 invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces
16 at sea, and Japanese espionage had so informed Tokyo."

17 Did you make any investigation of that "F"?

18 Mr. Sonnett: We did, yes. We made an investigation of
19 every one of those items, Senator.

20 Senator Ferguson: What did you find on that particular
21 one?

22 Mr. Sonnett: That related, Senator, as I recall it, to
23 the question of Japanese intelligence or espionage at Hawaii,
24 a subject which we felt had not been fully explored.

25 The statement in the book "Battle Reports" indicated

Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
 2 that the Japanese espionage had advised Tokyo of the fact
 3 that two task forces of ours were at sea.

4 We wanted to find out whether or not that was so and, as
 5 I recall it, although I am trusting to recollection a year old
 6 now, as I recall it we found there was no specific evidence
 7 so indicating, but that that was a fair inference from the
 8 various reports which the consul at Honolulu had sent to Tokyo.

9 Shef--
 10 Shack
 11 fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Now do I understand then that the
3 Hewitt investigation and your investigation prior to the
4 Hewitt never made any report to the Secretary?

5 Mr. Sonnett: No, we made a report, Senator.

6 Senator Ferguson: You did make a report?

7 Mr. Sonnett: We did, yes. My impression is it was
8 before this committee. It is a rather long one with findings
9 of fact and conclusions.

10 Mr. Kaufman: It is part of the Hewitt Report.

11 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever have any discussion with
12 the Secretary as to having the Court of Inquiry complete its
13 work?

14 Mr. Sonnett: Not that I recall, Senator, no.

15 Senator Ferguson: Can you give us any reason why the
16 Court was not continued to do this work? They had the
17 previous history and they had all the facts that they had
18 obtained, at least.

19 Mr. Sonnett: I am unable to give you any reason, Senator,
20 except I am confident of one thing, that the Secretary wanted
21 all of the facts and he wanted them accurately, and he wanted
22 them from whatever source he could get them.

23 Senator Ferguson: Was there any dissatisfaction with
24 the report that the Navy Court of Inquiry had made?

25 Mr. Sonnett: To the extent, Senator, that, first, their
26

1 Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 investigation was not complete, and second, that certain of
3 their findings were erroneous, yes.

4 Senator Ferguson: That certain of their findings were
5 erroneous?

6 Mr. Sonnett: That is correct, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: What were those particular findings?

8 Mr. Sonnett: I cannot recall, but the Secretary's
9 subsequent endorsement considers each one in detail and sets
10 forth the Secretary's findings on the basis of the various
11 findings of the Board.

12 Mr. Kaufman: Senator Ferguson, the Hewitt Report is
13 part of Exhibit 107.

14 Senator Ferguson: Is that the third volume?

15 Mr. Kaufman: Yes.

16 Senator Brewster: And that includes the report by
17 this witness?

18 Mr. Kaufman: Yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Does this include your report also?

20 Mr. Sonnett: Senator, I made no report individually.
21 I drafted, with the help of my assistants Admiral Hewitt's
22 report which he revised and then submitted to the Secretary.

23 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have
24 in the record the two exhibits, if they are not already in,
25 the one creating the Hewitt Board and the other one the

1 Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 further investigation of the facts, and then it proceeded
3 to give what was to be investigated, so that the record will
4 be complete.

5 The Chairman: All these matters are in the record as
6 exhibits.

7 Senator Ferguson: That is what I am trying to find out.

8 Mr. Kaufman: Commander Baecher tells me that one of
9 these is not in at the present time. Commander Baecher says
10 the one dated May 18, which sets forth the scope of the
11 examination, is not in the record.

12 Senator Ferguson: I ask then that that be made part
13 of the record here in the transcript, because I think it is
14 material to many other questions.

15 The Chairman: That will be done.

16 (The matter referred to is as follows:)

SECRET

17
18 18 May 1945.

19 From: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S. Navy.

20 To: The Secretary of the Navy.

21 Subject: Further investigation into the facts surrounding
22 the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

23 Reference: (a) Precept 2 May 1945 appointing Admiral H. Kent
24 Hewitt, U. S. Navy to conduct further Pearl
25 Harbor investigation.

Witness Sonnett

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1. In accordance with reference (a) a study has been made of the report of the Robert's Commission, of the record of examination of witnesses directed by the Secretary of the Navy 12 February 1944, the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy 13 July 1944, and of various other documents relating to this matter. It appears that further investigation is necessary in order

- (A) to obtain the information now available concerning the composition and movements of the Japanese forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941;
- (B) to obtain the information which was available at Pearl Harbor, at Cavite, and at Washington, during the period 26 November 1941 to 7 December 1941, concerning the location, composition and movements of Japanese naval forces, including (1) examination as to the activities of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor and the information obtained by it, with particular reference to the location of the major portion of the Japanese carriers, to the change in radio contact with units of the Japanese Fleet on or about 1 December 1941, and to the apparently erroneous belief that on 7 December 1941 the attacking force was located south of Hawaii; (2) examination

1 Witness Sonnett

2 as to ONI bulletins, such as the bulletin of 1
3 December 1941; (3) examination as to the information
4 furnished by the Navy to the Army, at Washington
5 and at Pearl Harbor, concerning Japanese naval
6 movements and radio contact with Japanese units;
7 (4) examination as to information of Japanese Naval
8 units obtained by Army reconnaissance, with parti-
9 cular reference to the War Department's directions
10 to General Short, about 26 November 1941, to
11 conduct reconnaissance to Jaluit, to the action
12 taken, and to the question whether Admiral Kimmel
13 was advised of this;

- 14 (C) to determine whether or not Japanese submarines
15 operated in and around Pearl Harbor prior to
16 7 December 1941, including (1) whether a captured
17 Japanese map, as indicated in the Army Pearl Harbor
18 report, establishes that such submarines were in
19 Pearl Harbor before that date, or, as indicated in
20 the book entitled "Battle Report", that the map was
21 made on that date and erroneously fixed the
22 positions of United States ships in the harbor;
23 (2) what submarines contacts were made in or around
24 Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941; (3) according
25 to "Battle Report", at about 0500 on 7 December 1941,

Witness Sonnett

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a naval radio station on Oahu intercepted and logged a conversation between the WARD and CONDOR concerning the sighting of a submarine at approximately 1350. It should be determined what was done about this and why were the net gates allowed to remain open from 0445 until 0800;

- (D) to obtain the information received in Hawaii through the interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages by the Office of Naval Intelligence, or so obtained by other agencies of the United States Government or of other governments and communicated to the Naval Intelligence at Hawaii;
- (E) to determine who obtained the intercepted Japanese messages concerning ship movements, sent to and from Honolulu, which are set forth in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court's Record, and how, when and where they were obtained and decoded;
- (F) to determine the basis for the statement at page 6 of "Battle Report" that "There were two powerful task forces sent against Pearl Harbor, the major elements of one lurking just over the horizon from its companion force to overwhelm any American attempt to engage the invaders. The United States, too, had two task forces at sea, and Japanese espionage

Witness Sonnett

had so informed Tokyo."

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- (G) to determine whether or not there was a "winds code" message relating to the United States;
- (H) to interview Admiral Wilkinson generally and with particular reference to combat intelligence and to the "winds code";
- (I) to interview Captain McCollum generally and with particular reference to the "winds code";
- (J) determine what information the records of CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN contain concerning (1) Admiral Kimmel's approval of Annex VII to the Joint Coastal Defense Plan and the "Bellinger" estimate, (2) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of copies of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January 1941, and the Secretary of War's reply, (3) Admiral Kimmel's receipt and evaluation of the second letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning air torpedo attack, (4) the date when Admiral Kimmel approved the aircraft schedules which were submitted covering employment of planes during the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941;
- (K) to determine what were the reasons for the air reconnaissance which Admiral Kimmel directed in

Witness Sonnett

or about July, 1941, toward the Jaluits.

(L) to ascertain the facts in connection with such other questions as may arise during the investigation to be conducted by me.

2. Having found that such further investigation is necessary, I propose to examine the persons having knowledge of the facts in question and to obtain such documents as may be relevant thereto.

3. Counsel in this investigation will be John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting will be Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Griswold, U.S.N.R., and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, U.S.N.R. Each of these men has taken a special oath to maintain the security of the information received during this investigation.

H. KENT HEWITT

FIRST ENDORSEMENT:

5-21-45

The further investigation set forth herein is hereby approved.

(Copy)

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1 Witness Sonnett

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Senator Brewster

2 Senator Ferguson: Did you, Mr. Sonnett, make a report
3 after you made this preliminary investigation? Did you make
4 a report to the Secretary of the Navy as to what you thought
5 should be done?

6 Mr. Sonnett: I made no formal or written report, Senator,
7 no.

8 Senator Brewster: As I understand, you made a draft of
9 a report for the Secretary, on which his report was finally
10 based, is that correct?

11 Mr. Sonnett: Well, on the Hewitt Report to the Secretary,
12 I drafted that at the completion of the Hewitt investigation.
13 Admiral Hewitt revised it and then submitted it to the
14 Secretary as Admiral Hewitt's Report.

15 Senator Brewster: Were there material variations from
16 your recommendations, or did it follow substantially the
17 outline of your conclusions?

18 Mr. Sonnett: There were some changes of substance which
19 Admiral Hewitt made. He made a number of changes in form.
20 Just what they were, off-hand I cannot state, but I know
21 there were some.

22 The Chairman: Are you finished, Senator Ferguson?

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

24 The Chairman: Are there any further questions? If not,
25 thank you very much, Captain. I am not demoting you? Are

Witness Sonnett
Witness Elliott
you Captain or Commander?

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

Mr. Sonnett: Lieutenant Commander, sir. You have promoted me.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

(Witness excused)

The Chairman: Who is next?

Mr. Richardson: Sergeant Elliott.

The Chairman: Will you be sworn, please?

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, JR.

(Mr. Elliott was duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson: Sergeant Elliott, will you state your name for the record?

Mr. Elliott: George E. Elliott, Jr.

Mr. Richardson: How old are you?

Mr. Elliott: Twenty-eight, sir.

Mr. Richardson: You are not in the service at present?

Mr. Elliott: No, sir, I am lucky enough to have been discharged four months ago.

Mr. Richardson: You were on duty in Hawaii at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Elliott: That is right, sir.

Mr. Richardson: In what division of the Army?

Mr. Elliott: I was in the Signal Corps, Aircraft Warning

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hook follows

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 Mr. Richardson: And that brought you in contact with
3 the radar sets that the Army had on Oahu?
4

5 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Richardson: You were present at one of those mobile
7 radar sets on the morning of the attack?
8

9 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Richardson: Can you indicate on this map, Sergeant,
11 where the mobile station was located, and where you were
12 on the morning of the attack?
13

14 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Richardson: Indicate on this map where the station
16 is located where you were on the morning of the attack.
17

18 Mr. Elliott: The station was located at the top of
19 the mountain, I believe they call it Opana, at the northern-
20 most point of the Island of Oahu, as I indicate here (indi-
21 cating).
22

23 Mr. Richardson: Now, coming to this map, Sergeant,
24 this colored chart of what is supposed to be a radar chart
25 of approaching Japanese planes prior to the attack, you were
at this point (indicating)?

Mr. Elliott: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Will you indicate with the pointer
where you saw any indication of approaching planes, where
it would be on this map?

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Elliott

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Elliott: At this point up here (indicating)
3 three degrees northeast at the Asimuth that they came in
4 on.

5 We picked them up at the mileage of 136 or 137 miles.
6 That was the very first indication of the flight that we
7 had picked up.

8 Mr. Richardson: Now, follow with your pointer, just
9 generally how the planes came down toward your station.

10 Senator Brewster: Will you place the time so it will
11 be identified?

12 Mr. Richardson: What was the time when you first found
13 any information of planes?

14 Mr. Elliott: That was 7:02.

15 Mr. Richardson: All right. Now, follow with your
16 pointer the course, as nearly as you can recall it, that
17 the planes followed as you watched them on the radar.

18 Mr. Elliott: I believe that they came in on a very
19 straight line. I do not recall of their being any differences,
20 as indicated here. It was fairly straight.

21 Mr. Richardson: Now, when they approached your station
22 did they disappear finally from your radar?

23 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, they disappeared at approxi-
24 mately 15 to 20 miles away from the Island. We lost them
25 due to distortion from a back wave from the mountains, and

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1
2 it was impossible to follow them further than we had.

3 Mr. Richardson: Up to the time they disappeared, had
4 there been any diversion of the planes? Were they still
5 all in the main group which you had seen at 7:02?

6 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, they were all in the same
7 group, so far as I know.

8 Mr. Richardson: That is the last you saw of them?

9 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Richardson: Who was with you, Sergeant, at the
11 time these planes were sighted?

12 Mr. Elliott: Another private, Joseph L. Lockhart.

13 Mr. Richardson: Who first saw these planes? You or
14 Lockhart?

15 Mr. Elliott: We actually both saw them together.

16 Mr. Richardson: What discussion was there between you
17 with reference to the matter when you saw them?

18 Mr. Elliott: At the time I was receiving instructions
19 on the operation of the scope. Lockhart looking over my
20 shoulder noticed that there was a target, so he, knowing
21 more about the operation of the scope, actually took over
22 the control there. I went over to the plotting board, and
23 we got an azimuth and mileage and figured out a reading as
24 to the location where the flight was, where the target was.

25 Mr. Richardson: How long did that take you, would you

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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say?

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2
3 Mr. Elliott: Well, just a very short time.

4 Mr. Richardson: A minute or two.

5 Mr. Elliott: Less than a minute.

6 Mr. Richardson: All right, go ahead.

7 Mr. Elliott: At that time I suggested to Private
8 Lockhart that we send it in to the Information Center. Pri-
9 vate Lockhart, figuring that our problem was over at 7
10 o'clock disagreed as to sending the reading.

11 Mr. Richardson: What do you mean by your problem was
12 over at 7?

13 Mr. Elliott: The normal operating period at that
14 time was from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning.

15 Mr. Richardson: Was that true on week days as well as
16 on Sundays?

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, I believe it was.

18 Mr. Richardson: For how long a period prior to the
19 morning of the 7th had you been on the 4 to 7 status?

20 Mr. Elliott: Well, our particular station at that time
21 had only been set up, it was only in operation about two
22 weeks before December 7th.

23 Mr. Richardson: And during that whole two weeks, were
24 you on the 4 to 7 schedule?

25 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, I believe we were.

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1
2 Mr. Richardson: Had there been other men in the
3 station up to 7 o'clock that morning?

4 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. The only ones present at the
5 station were Private Lockhart and myself.

6 Mr. Richardson: Now, before that, during the 4 to 7
7 period that morning, had there been other men on this station?

8 Mr. Elliott: Oh, yes, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: And what had become of them?

10 Mr. Elliott: I do not quite understand.

11 Mr. Richardson: What became of them? How did it
12 happen that only you and Lockhart were left there?

13 Mr. Elliott: I will have to go back to December 6th.
14 It was a standing rule that we would keep two men at the
15 unit at all times.

16 Mr. Richardson: 24 hours of the day?

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: All right.

19 Mr. Elliott: That was for protection of the unit. They
20 were armed with .45 guns.

21 Mr. Richardson: That was to protect the unit? It
22 was not to operate the unit as a radar system?

23 Mr. Elliott: Well, they were there to protect the unit
24 but they did not operate.

25 When the men that operated came to the station, the

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 two men that guarded the unit were there at the same time,
3 although they did not do any operation.

4 Mr. Richardson: All right. Go ahead now.

5 You got back to the 6th. What were your hours on
6 the morning of the 6th?

7 Mr. Elliott: Well, we went out to the station at
8 Opana to relieve the two men that had been on the unit,
9 guarding it all the week. We went out there to give them
10 a break, more or less, to come in and get a pass to go to
11 town.

12 Mr. Richardson: Did you go out as guards?

13 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, we went out as guards. The
14 idea was we would stay there all night and be there at
15 four o'clock in the morning, to start working on our problem.

16 Mr. Richardson: This was the night of the 6th?

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: Go ahead. When did the other men that
19 had been on the station during the night, leave?

20 Mr. Elliott: Well, there had been no other men there
21 since 12 o'clock on December 6th, when we relieved them,
22 when Private Lockhart and I relieved them.

23 Mr. Richardson: Then, as a matter of fact, from four
24 until seven on the morning of the 7th, you two were the
25 only men at that station?

1 Witness Elliott Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h7

2 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. We were the only two at that
3 station from noon of December 6th through 8 o'clock on
4 the morning of December 7.

5 Mr. Richardson: And that was the station at Opana?

6 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: A t the farthest north station?

8 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: The station most immediately adjacent
10 to the whole northwest sector north of Oahu?

11 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: All right.

13 Now, at 7:02 you two men discovered planes on your
14 target?

15 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Richardson: You suggested that you contact the
17 Information Center?

18 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Richardson: At first Lockhart did not approve
20 of that?

21 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. That was after we had figured
22 out the reading from the azimuth and mileage. At that time
23 I spoke to Private Lockhart. I even recall saying to him
24 since he did not want to send it in, even if we sent it in
25 and the Army and Navy would work together, they may not

Witness Elliott

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

know just whose planes they are, but if we worked out through the information center and had it not on any scheduled problem, that it would be more effective as to actually going out there and intercepting like, say, the Army go out and intercept planes, or vice versa.

Finally, after mentioning a few of those things to Private Lockhart, he finally told me to go ahead and send it in if I liked.

Mr. Richardson: How long from the time you discovered the planes was it until you concluded to phone the Information Center? How many minutes?

Mr. Elliott: I would say offhand seven or eight.

Mr. Richardson: During that time, you could still see the target on your charts, these planes coming from the north?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: You called up the Information Center?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. We had two phones in the mobile unit: One was a direct line, a tactical line, as it was called. That was from the plotting board directly to the Information Center which was located at Fort Shafter.

Mr. Richardson: Which phone did you use?

Mr. Elliott: I picked up the tactical phone on the plotting board, and I found nobody on the other end at the

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Information center.

3 After that, I went to the Administrative line and
4 called the Information Center.

5 After getting the Information Center --

6 Mr. Richardson: Who answered?

7 Mr. Elliott: A corporal or Private McDonald answered
8 the phone. He was a switchboard operator at the Information
9 Center.

10 Mr. Richardson: All right.

11 What conversation occurred?

12 Mr. Elliott: At that time, I explained to Private
13 McDonald what we had seen, and he told me that there was
14 nobody around there, and he did not know what to do about
15 it.

16 I asked him if he would get somebody that would know
17 what to do and pass on the information, and have him take
18 care of it.

19 Well, a few minutes later --

20 Mr. Richardson: How many minutes? Just make a guess.

21 Mr. Elliott: Two or three, I would say.

22 Mr. Richardson: Two or three. All right.

23 Mr. Elliott: Two or three minutes later, this lieutenant
24 that is referred to, or was first referred to in the Roberts
25 Report, called back to the station, and Private Lockhart

h9

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h10

2 picked up the phone and spoke to the Lieutenant.

3 It was at this time that the Lieutenant told us to
4 forget about the flight.

5 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, you, of course, did not
6 hear what the Lieutenant said over the telephone.

7 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, I did not.

8 Mr. Richardson: What did you hear Lockhart say over
9 the telephone, to whomever he was talking.

10 Mr. Elliott: Well, he only acknowledged that we were
11 to forget it, that we were to forget the flight.

12 Mr. Richardson: Did Lockhart say anything to the
13 Lieutenant about having discovered planes coming on the chart?

14 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, I believe he did. He again
15 repeated the distance that we had picked up the planes.

16 Mr. Richardson: When Lockhart had finished his
17 telephone conversation, what did he tell you the Lieutenant
18 on the other end said?

19 Mr. Elliott: He told me that the Lieutenant said to
20 forget it.

21 Mr. Richardson: Did he say anything about the Lieuten-
22 ant mentioning what these planes might be, or from where
23 the planes might be coming? Did he make any statement
24 that the Lieutenant had mentioned that subject to him over
25 the telephone?

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

hll

1 Mr. Elliott: I do not recall whether or not he did.

2
3 Mr. Richardson: I am referring to the question of
4 whether the Lieutenant mentioned the fact that a flight of
5 B-17's from San Francisco was expected in that morning,
6 and that these planes were probably those planes.

7 Was there any discussion on that subject by Lockhart
8 in reporting the telephone conversation to you?

9 Mr. Elliott: That is what I do not quite remember.
10 I cannot place it together, whether we received that informa-
11 tion then, or whether that came out after the publicity of
12 the Roberts Commission.

13 I cannot say for sure.

14 Mr. Richardson: Now, what did you continue to do after
15 the end of the conversation over the telephone with the
16 Lieutenant at the Information Center? What did you and
17 Lockhart continue to do, if anything?

18 Mr. Elliott: Private Lockhart at that time wanted to
19 shut down the unit and just go off the air, and the original
20 intention was that I was to have gotten further training
21 on the unit. I insisted again, and we continued to operate.

22 Mr. Richardson: You could still see the plane target?

23 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: And you followed it in until it got
25 within about 20 miles of your station?

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

hll

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4 whether the Lieutenant mentioned the fact that a flight of
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21 on the unit. I insisted again, and we continued to operate.

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23 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: And you followed it in until it got
25 within about 20 miles of your station?

Witness Elliott

questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl2

1 Mr. Elliott: That is right, sir.

2
3 Mr. Richardson: Now, then, did you make any chart
4 of the course of those planes?

5 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. We had an overlaid chart,
6 that is, a transparent paper that is put over the map it-
7 self, of the Island, with true north on the overlay. That
8 is the grid lines on the overlay were true north on the
9 map, and in the center is a radius, a mileage radius rule.

10 From your azimuth and your mileage you can plot exact-
11 ly where your location is on the map. That is used so that
12 you could have a record of all the flights that you had.

13 In other words, as you posted your target on this over-
14 lay, you could take it off of there and put it on a new
15 sheet of transparent paper and continue on again.

16 Mr. Richardson: Now, you did complete a chart follow-
17 ing the course of those planes as they approached your
18 station?

19 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Richardson: Did you make any readings?

21 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, we had a running log, a record
22 of reading sheets that covered the time, mileage, azimuth
23 and coordinate readings.

24 Mr. Richardson: And you filled that out?

25 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Elliott questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl3

2 Mr. Richardson: When did you leave the station that
3 morning?

4 Mr. Elliott: It was approximately 15 minutes of 8.

5 Mr. Richardson: Where did you go?

6 Mr. Elliott: Our station at Opana was nine miles away
7 to our camp where he billeted and of course coming down the
8 mountain to the highway took sometime, and then the nine
9 miles was from the highway.

10 Mr. Richardson: How did you go?

11 Mr. Elliott: At approximately just shortly before 15
12 minutes of 8, a private --

13 Mr. Richardson (interposing): How did you go, by
14 shank's mare or in a car?

15 Mr. Elliott: That is just what I am going to explain.

16 Mr. Richardson: All right.

17 Mr. Elliott: Just a few minutes before a quarter of
18 8, Private Farnback came out in a truck to pick us up, and
19 take our bedding, and ourselves back to the camp.

20 Mr. Richardson: He took you back to the camp?

21 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Richardson: What time did you get back to the camp,
23 do you think.

24 Mr. Elliott: It was very close to 8 o'clock.

25 Mr. Richardson: Did you have with you either your chart

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl4

1
2 or your readings?

3 Mr. Elliott: We only had the record of readings, the
4 log.

5 Mr. Richardson: Did your record or reading log
6 show the direction from which these planes were coming?

7 Mr. Elliott: It could have been replotted on the
8 map with the information given to get the exact location
9 of the flight.

10 Mr. Richardson: What did you do with that log?

11 Mr. Elliott: That log was turned over to a Lieutenant
12 Upson, the Commanding Officer of the two platoons that were
13 out in that particular camp.

14 Mr. Richardson: Was it turned over immediately upon
15 your return to the camp?

16 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. We were very proud of the
17 reading that we had gotten, that is, the distance out, and
18 we brought it along, not knowing what was taking place,
19 but it was just the fact that the reading was a very
20 good reading.

21 We brought it back to show it off, so to speak.

22 Mr. Richardson: Now, you gave it to your platoon
23 commander?

24 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Richardson: Do you know what he did with it?

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h15

1 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, I do not.

2 Mr. Richardson: Who was your platoon commander?

3 Mr. Elliott: A First Lieutenant -- at that time
4 Second Lieutenant John Upson.

5 Mr. Richardson: And he was in the Aircraft Warning
6 Division?

7 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: Who was his superior, if you know?

9 Mr. Elliott: A Captain Tetley.

10 Mr. Richardson: And where was he stationed?

11 Mr. Elliott: He was stationed in Schofield Barracks,
12 at the headquarters. That is where the main body of the
13 company stayed.

14 We had several headquarters. We had the Fort Shafter,
15 at the Information Center was one headquarters, and also
16 within the same company we had the headquarters at Schofield
17 Barracks, where most of the men stayed, and then, of course,
18 we had the outlying platoons, where we had our individual
19 stations.

20 Mr. Richardson: Where and to whom would your platoon
21 commander have reported to his superior?

22 Mr. Elliott: He would have reported directly to
23 Captain Tetley.

24 Mr. Richardson: At Schofield Barracks?
25

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl6

2 Mr. Elliott: At Schofield Barracks, yes, sir.

3 Mr. Richardson: Do you know who was over Tetley?

4 Mr. Elliott: Offhand, I believe it was Colonel Powell,
5 although I am not sure of the chain of command.

6 Mr. Richardson: They were all in the aircraft warning
7 section?

8 Mr. Elliott: I am not sure about Colonel Powell. I
9 believe he was head of the Signal Corps installations.

10 Mr. Richardson: And the material which you had given
11 to your platoon commander could have been read by any com-
12 petent person to whom it came, and would indicate where you
13 saw the planes, the direction from which they came and when
14 they disappeared from your view?

15 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

16 Mr. Richardson: With the times of day involved?

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. An identical chart could have
18 been made, as is indicated up there on the map.

19 Mr. Richardson: Did you remain in camp after you
20 arrived there, and during the attack?

21 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. We stayed in camp only long
22 enough to get up our main belongings that we would need,
23 and we went right back to the unit nine miles away.

24 Mr. Richardson: And you stayed at the unit the rest
25 of the day?

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl7

1
2 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, we stayed there day and night
3 from then on; we did not go back to the camp.

4 Mr. Richardson: There were two operating phones to
5 that unit?

6 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: Did anyone call you up while you were
8 there to inquire concerning what you discovered and the
9 details?

10 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, they did not call me. They
11 called back, but Private Lockhart answered the phone.

12 Mr. Richardson: Who called him, do you know?

13 Mr. Elliott: Well, as I said before, it is explained
14 as this Lieutenant through the Roberts Report. That is the
15 only knowledge I have actually as to who called.

16 Mr. Richardson: Someone called him?

17 Mr. Elliott: Well, the information was relayed by
18 Corporal McDonald at the switchboard to the Lieutenant.

19 Mr. Richardson: You do not get what I mean, I don't
20 think, Sergeant.

21 Mr. Elliott: You mean the Lieutenant called --

22 Mr. Richardson: After you came back from the camp on
23 the morning of the attack, after you came in at 8 o'clock
24 and turned over your reading, you then went back to the
25 station, as I understand it.

1 Witness Elliott

questions by: Mr. Richardson

h18

2 Mr. Elliott: Yes.

3 Mr. Richardson: While you were at the station did
4 anyone contact you to find out what you knew about the
5 incoming planes?

6 Mr. Elliott: That, sir, I could not answer.

7 When we went back to the unit, we did not go back to --
8 at least I did not, and I not recall just what Private
9 Lockhart did -- we did not go back to the operation. The
10 operation of the unit was being manned by other men in the
11 platoon.

12 As I recall, we were busy setting up tents, since we
13 were not going to travel back and forth to our old camp.

14 Mr. Richardson: Well, but, Sergeant, did anybody come
15 to you during that day and ask you to tell them what you
16 saw in the radar at 7 o'clock that morning?

17 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, only the men at our individual
18 camp that were interested to know just what had gone on.

19 Mr. Richardson: Well, by the time you had worked
20 around there for a while, all of the men at that unit knew
21 the story of what had happened to you, and your companion
22 after 7 o'clock in that radar station that morning?

23 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, very definitely, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: And if anyone had called that unit on
25 the telephone they could have gotten that information from

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h19

1
2 practically anybody on the job, could not they?

3 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Richardson: When you went back from camp to your
5 station, did you have any instructions from your officer
6 in camp as to what you were to do, or anything of that kind?

7 Mr. Elliott: None at the camp. We were just told
8 to go back to the unit and that we would receive all of
9 our instructions. That is, it was understood as to the
10 working arrangement, what we were going to do, arranging
11 the camp, and so forth, that would have been taken care of
12 out there.

13 Mr. Richardson: Did you get any instructions after
14 you got back to the camp?

15 Mr. Elliott: Only as I said before, that we broke up
16 into different groups.

17 Mr. Richardson: I see.

18 Mr. Elliott: And did the necessary work.

19 Mr. Richardson: I see.

20 When did you first know of the attack?

21 Mr. Elliott: At the time that we arrived at our camp.
22 However, as we were going to the camp, and just, oh, about
23 a quarter way away from the camp, we noticed from our truck
24 all of the men from the camp driving very fast in the opposite
25 direction in which we were going. They were going to the
unit.

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Mr. Richardson
The Chairman

h20

1 They had their field packs, and helmets, and what not.

2 We still had no indication as to what had happened
3 until we arrived at the camp, when we were told that we
4 had been attacked by the Japanese.

5 Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions.

6 The Chairman: Sergeant, if I understand you, this unit
7 up there on this mountain at the tip of the Island, was
8 under guard 24 hours of the day by somebody.

9 Mr. Elliott: Yes.

10 The Chairman: What were they guarding against?

11 Mr. Elliott: Well, the only thing they were guarding
12 against was to see that no one came around to interfere with
13 the equipment we had.

14 The Chairman: Now, during four hours of that 24, or
15 three hours, from 4 to 7 in the morning, the radar station
16 was in operation?

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

18 The Chairman: Why was it in operation during those
19 particular hours?

20 Mr. Elliott: Well, those were the instructions that
21 we had from our company commander, and, as I imagine, they
22 came from --

23 The Chairman: Headquarters?

24 Mr. Elliott: He had taken the orders from higher head-
25

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The ChairmLn

h21

2 quarters.

3 The Chairman: Did the selection of those three hours
4 from 4 to 7 have any relationship, as far as you know? Was
5 it generally understood that those hours were selected
6 because they might have some relationship to a possible
7 air attack?

8 Mr. Elliott: As a matter of opinion, as I would have
9 looked at it at the time, I would say we were not operating
10 under those conditions.

11 I mean, it was more practice than anything else.

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Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 The Chairman: As far as you were concerned, and Private
3 Lockhart, you were students, in a sense, you were practicing
4 to become more proficient in the operation of the radar
5 station?

6 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

7 The Chairman: But there must have been some reason
8 why, from 4:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning was chosen as
9 the hour during which the station was to be in operation.
10 Would you be able to inform the committee, if you have any
11 opinion, as to why those hours were chosen?

12 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, I could not.

13 The Chairman: You do not know about that?

14 Mr. Elliott: I could not form any opinion.

15 The Chairman: Those hours were fixed by higher officers?

16 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: Do you know who determined that it should
18 be done from 4:00 to 7:00?

19 Mr. Elliott: Well, only through the Information Center,
20 down through the chain of command from Captain Tetley, our
21 Commanding Officer. But that was understood, that we were
22 to work from 4:00 to 7:00 in the morning.

23 The Chairman: Was there any information passed down to
24 you as to why those hours were selected?

25 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Chairman

2 The Chairman: Did you learn anything about that at
3 any time, either before or after the attack, as to why those
4 hours were chosen for the operation of the radar?

5 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. That angle of the question of
6 4:00 to 7:00 never came up, that I recollect.

7 The Chairman: You don't know whether it had any rela-
8 tionship to the general feeling that if an attack occurred
9 there it would be sometime in the early morning, around
10 daylight or sunrise?

11 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

12 The Chairman: You have no information on that?

13 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

14 The Chairman: Now how far were these planes when you
15 first picked them up?

16 Mr. Elliott: They were actually 137 miles.

17 The Chairman: 137 miles. And you traced them all the
18 way in until they got within 20 miles?

19 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, I believe that is what it was,
20 until they got within 20 miles.

21 The Chairman: How long did that take you, or how long
22 were they in making that flight from 137 miles to 20 miles,
23 within that distance?

24 Mr. Elliott: I am not particularly sure. I think it
25 was about 20 minutes of 8:00.

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Chairman

2 The Chairman: About 20 minutes of 8:00?

3 Mr. Elliott: Between 7:35 and 20 minutes of 8:00.

4 The Chairman: So from 2 minutes after 7:00 until
5 approximately 20 minutes of 8:00 you were tracing these planes
6 in towards the island?

7 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

8 The Chairman: Now did you call, or did Private Lockhart,
9 or either one of you, call the Central Information Station
10 while they were being traced in, or after you lost sight of
11 them?

12 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. We sent it in -- I sent it
13 in to the switchboard operator I would say about actually
14 7:07 or 7:08.

15 The Chairman: I did not get that.

16 Mr. Elliott: 7:07 or 7:08. I picked up the flight
17 at 7:02.

18 The Chairman: You picked up the flight at 7:02?

19 Mr. Elliott: Yes.

20 The Chairman: At 7:07 or 7:08, five or six minutes
21 after that, after you picked up the flight, you phoned in
22 to the Central Information Center?

23 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. We gave them the reading as
24 of 7:02.

25 The Chairman: Did you continue to call them as you got

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Chairman

2 the reading as the ships came in closer?

3 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

4 The Chairman: You did not?

5 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

6 The Chairman: Just that one call?

7 Mr. Elliott: That was when we carried on, when he was
8 told to forget..

9 The Chairman: Do you recall the name of the Lieutenant
10 who told you to forget it?

11 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, at the time I did not know.

12 The Chairman: You did not know at the time?

13 Mr. Elliott: I think it was Lieutenant Tyler. I mean
14 this information I received later.

15 The Chairman: Yes. Did you know anything about the
16 expectation that some B-17's or P-17's were scheduled to come
17 in from San Francisco?

18 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. I know that I did not know
19 about it before we picked up the target, and as I told Mr.
20 Richardson here, I am not sure just when we actually did find
21 out that those were B-17's.

22 The Chairman: You did not know that they were coming
23 in from San Francisco? Would you have known whether they
24 were coming from the north, the direction in which these
25 planes you picked up were coming, or would they have come

Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: Sergeant, you were then a private?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You and Lockhart were both privates?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: How long had you been engaged in this radar work?

Mr. Elliott: Only about three months.

The Vice Chairman: Three months?

Mr. Elliott: Not quite three months.

The Vice Chairman: You were still being trained for that type of work?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Was Lockhart your instructor?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, he was.

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1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: How long had he been engaged in
3 that radar work?

4 Mr. Elliott: I am not sure. I believe that it might
5 have been a year or so. I can't say on that.

6 The Vice Chairman: Then he was considered as an exper-
7 ienced, capable radar man and qualified to give instructions
8 to you?

9 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, so far as the operation of the
10 unit went he knew the different phases of operation.

11 The Vice Chairman: And you and he worked together there
12 that Sunday morning in operating the radar?

13 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. During the problem he operated
14 the scope and I operated the plotting board. In other
15 words, the targets that he would have picked up from the
16 scope he would have relayed the information and I would have
17 plotted it on the map and followed through on sending it
18 to the Information Center at Fort Shafter where they would
19 have coordinated with the liaison officers as to whether
20 anybody had a flight in that particular area, and from then
21 on they would have followed through.

22 The Vice Chairman: What was the name of that station
23 where you were?

24 Mr. Elliott: Opana.

25 The Vice Chairman: O-p-a-n-a?

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

3 The Vice Chairman: Now, you had been on duty there
4 from 12:00 o'clock noon on Saturday the day before?

5 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: As guards of that station?

7 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: And then during the period from
9 4:00 o'clock on Sunday morning to 7:00 o'clock on Sunday
10 morning you operated the station?

11 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

12 The Vice Chairman: And you were due then to go off
13 duty in the operation of the station at 7:00 o'clock?

14 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. The original plans were that
15 we would stay there until 12:00 o'clock noon Sunday December
16 7 and at that time the two men that we had relieved the day
17 before would have been back on pass and they would have
18 taken over the guarding of the unit.

19 The Vice Chairman: They would have taken over as guards?

20 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. And then we would have returned
21 to our camp. However, that was changed and it was decided
22 that since they came back from there, on a pass, earlier,
23 they figured they would come out to the unit at 8:00 o'clock
24 in the morning.

25 The Vice Chairman: But you were due to stop operating

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 the unit at 7:00 o'clock?

3 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: And from 7:00 o'clock on until you
5 were relieved you were to just serve as guards there?

6 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, but that also at that time we
7 were to continue on with my instructions, my further in-
8 structions as to the operation of the unit.

9 The Vice Chairman: Well, it was more or less voluntary
10 on your part as you wanted to get as much training as you
11 could?

12 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: And voluntary on Lockhart's part
14 to give you that training?

15 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: After 7:00 o'clock?

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: So you were just staying on on a
19 voluntary basis after 7:00 o'clock?

20 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: And you just continued to practice?

22 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: After 7:00 o'clock?

24 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: And then at 7:02, why, you picked

1 Witness Elliott Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 up this flight of planes coming in?

3 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. I wonder if I could make
4 mention of the fact that at the time that we reported off
5 the air to the Information Center by our clock at the unit
6 I am very sure the time was six minutes of 7:00 and I can't
7 recall just whether or not we had made a time check with
8 the Information Center. But I know very definitely that
9 the time on the clock when we actually closed down the unit,
10 that is, went off the air with the Information Center, was
11 approximately six minutes of 7:00.

12 The Vice Chairman: Six minutes before 7:00 o'clock?

13 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: You notified the Information Center?

15 Mr. Elliott: We were told at that time that the problem
16 was over and that we were to go off the air. In other words,
17 we wouldn't forward then to the Information Center.

18 The Vice Chairman: Anything you received after six
19 minutes to 7:00 o'clock you would not send on to the Informa-
20 tion Center?

21 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. The point I am trying to
22 bring out there is that it was six minutes before 7:00 and
23 I don't recall whether or not we had made a time check to
24 verify the time with the Information Center.

25 The Chairman: That is, your clock showed six minutes

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 to 7:00 and you don't know whether you synchronized your
3 time with the Information Center?

4 Mr. Elliott: That is right.

5 The Vice Chairman: So that from the time you were told
6 by the Information Center at six minutes before 7:00 o'clock
7 that you could go off, the remaining time then was just on a
8 voluntary basis by you and Lockhart?

9 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: And you picked up this flight of
11 planes coming in at two minutes after 7:00 o'clock?

12 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: And within five or six minutes after
14 you first sighted them, why, you undertook to contact the
15 Information Center to tell them about it?

16 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. It was between six and eight
17 minutes, off-hand. I can't recall just what it was.

18 The Vice Chairman: Between six and eight minutes
19 after 7:00 o'clock?

20 Mr. Elliott: Somewhere between there.

21 The Vice Chairman: And when you used the first phone
22 there was nobody that responded at the Information Center?

23 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. That was the actual phone that
24 went through to the actual plotting table in the Information
25 Center.

Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: That was the phone you were supposed
3 to use to give that information?

4 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: And there was nobody that responded
6 at the other end?

7 Mr. Elliott: That is right.

8 The Vice Chairman: Or, at the Information Center?

9 Mr. Elliott: That is right.

10 The Vice Chairman: Then you used the other phone which
11 you say was the administration phone?

12 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: And Private McDonald answered that
14 switchboard?

15 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: And you gave him the information
17 and he told you that there was nobody there to tell him what
18 to do about it?

19 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: And you asked him to please get
21 word as quickly as he could to somebody who would know what
22 to do?

23 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. I might mention that as I was
24 explaining it to McDonald on the switchboard I spoke in a
25 very nervous voice and from the time that I spoke that way

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Lockhart seemed to take more note of what I was trying to
3 do in sending in the reading, although I didn't know at the
4 time that they were enemy planes. It was just that I did talk
5 over the phone in a very nervous tone of voice.

6 The Vice Chairman: That was probably your first ex-
7 perience of that type, was it?

8 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, it was.

9 The Vice Chairman: I see.

10 Mr. Elliott: It probably was the idea of getting such
11 a large flight of planes at such a distance, because ordinarily
12 before then we hadn't picked up anything really over 100 to
13 a 110 miles, I would say. But this was very big and it
14 was very noticeable and it was just something out of the
15 ordinary.

16 The Vice Chairman: It was out of the ordinary to the
17 extent that you were a little bit excited about it?

18 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: And also proud of your achievement?

20 Mr. Elliott: Well, yes, sir. I only wish that it
21 could have been followed through. It could have saved any
22 number of lives.

23 The Vice Chairman: Well, you really did do a good job
24 in the work you did there.

25 Mr. Elliott: I hope I did, sir.

Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: How many men were there at that
3 time that operated this radar?

4 Mr. Elliott: In our platoon we had, I believe it was,
5 18 men. Out of that 18 men there were three drivers, I
6 believe, truck drivers, and I believe there were two cooks.

7 The Vice Chairman: That would leave --

8 Mr. Elliott: That would leave --

9 The Vice Chairman: Thirteen.

10 Mr. Elliott: Thirteen.

11 The Vice Chairman: Operators.

12 Mr. Elliott: Operators, yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: Now, although you were still in
14 training and had not had the experience that Lockhart had,
15 why, the events of that occasion showed that you had become
16 rather efficient in that line of work.

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: Now, just how did you conduct this
19 type of work Sergeant? Was there a platoon or squad or de-
20 finite number of men assigned to each of these radar units?

21 Mr. Elliott: We had the men assigned, we had what we
22 called the crew chiefs, and I believe with the assigned
23 strength that we had they only had two men under them, and
24 the three men together each operated the unit in shifts of,
25 as I recall it on December 7 especially, very close to that

1 Witness Elliott Questions by: The Vice Chairman
2 time, we operated four hours on duty on the radar, four
3 hours on guard on the unit, and then four hours off, and
4 then repeating four hours on the unit and so forth; and
5 I believe at that time we had four different crews.

6 The Vice Chairman: Four different crews of two men each?

7 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. There were three men, actually
8 three men on each crew.

9 The Vice Chairman: Three men on each crew and you had
10 four crews?

11 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. I believe that is the way it
12 was set up, yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: And you had four crews?

14 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: Well, of course, then you spent as
16 much time on guard duty as you did in operating the unit?

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. The number of men we had at
18 that time was not a sufficient number to operate 24 hours
19 a day.

20 The Vice Chairman: Well, now, if all the operators
21 had been used for operational purposes and ordinary infantry
22 soldiers had been used for guard duty, you could have done
23 that, couldn't you?

24 Mr. Elliott: Oh, yes.

25 The Vice Chairman: And ordinary infantry soldiers could

Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 have been used for guard duty, and were used for guard duty
3 at all other places around the island, weren't they?

4 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, but there were none assigned to
5 us at that time.

6 The Vice Chairman: I know, but that could have been done,
7 for the guard duty?

8 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: And then that would have left all
10 of you operators to work in shifts just in operational work?

11 Mr. Elliott: Well, yes, although in the Army they sort
12 of put you to work to the best advantage. In other words,
13 they wouldn't have considered us working four hours on the
14 unit and eight hours rest, whereas they probably would have
15 fixed it up eight hours work and four hours rest.

16 The Vice Chairman: Yes, that could have been done.

17 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. I mean that is the general
18 practice, so to speak.

19 The Vice Chairman: What was done in that respect after
20 the attack, after December 7, how did they do it?

21 Mr. Elliott: Well, at the time I believe we received
22 a few more men from the company. I would say off-hand four
23 or five to help out in the operations. We operated under
24 those conditions for approximately three weeks.

25 The Vice Chairman: After December 7?

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. And at that time our company
3 was enlarged to a regiment and we had some men transferred
4 there from the infantry to enlarge our company and the
5 infantry men were to be trained in the operation of the unit.

6 The Vice Chairman: They assigned other men there on
7 the island to train in radar work?

8 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: That was done after December 7?

10 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, approximately, I am not sure
11 whether it was two or three weeks. It was somewhere in
12 between that time.

13 The Vice Chairman: The forces were greatly enlarged then?

14 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. Instead of 18 men, as we had
15 on December 7, we had approximately 40 men. That was two
16 or three weeks after December 7.

17 The Vice Chairman: I see.

18 Mr. Elliott: But they had to be trained.

19 The Vice Chairman: But those same men had been on the
20 island before December 7?

21 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

22 The Vice Chairman: Now, what hours did you operate
23 the unit after December 7?

24 Mr. Elliott: Twenty-four hours a day, sir.

25 The Vice Chairman: Twenty-four hours a day?

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
The Chairman

2 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

3 The Vice Chairman: After December 7?

4 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: You increased it from three hours
6 to 24 hours a day?

7 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: Well, didn't anybody have to go to
9 the hospital as a result of that, did they?

10 Mr. Elliott: Well, none that I recall, sir. They
11 were probably afraid to go to the hospital.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right. Thank you.

13 The Chairman: I would like to ask one other question.

14 You say that you called this Information Center about
15 7 or 8 minutes after 7:00?

16 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: And talked to Private McDonald at the
18 switchboard. He was the switchboard operator?

19 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

20 The Chairman: How long was it after that before
21 Tyler came back and talked to Lockhart?

22 Mr. Elliott: Between one or two or three minutes, I
23 don't recall. It was fairly shortly.

24 The Chairman: From the time of that conversation
25 between Tyler and Lockhart until you went into the Information

1 Witness Elliott

2 Center did they call back any more to seek any information
3 about these planes?

4 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. The last time that we talked
5 to the Information Center during the flight that we had
6 plotted, the plane flight, there was no other conversation
7 about it. Now then, when the flight was finished and we
8 took the record of the reading sheets back to the platoon
9 commander, he passed that on, I imagine, to the company
10 commander.

11 The Chairman: That was about a quarter to 8?

12 Mr. Elliott: At the time that we went.

13 The Chairman: Now, the attack was on right away pretty
14 soon after that?

15 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. As I understand it it was
16 on about 5 minutes of 8.

17 The Chairman: That is all.

18 The Vice Chairman: There is one question I overlooked.

19 You told us that after December 7, why, the hours of
20 operating the station were increased from 3 hours to a full
21 24-hour basis.

22 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: And the men held up all right under
24 that. Did this wear out the sets, radar sets, did they
25 operate all right?

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Senator George

2 Mr. Elliott: Well, our particular set was somewhat
3 of a good set. I mean, we continued operating, I don't know
4 just whether we were lucky or what, but we didn't have very
5 much trouble. Another thing I might mention is that the
6 different units on the islands could overlap each other and
7 where one went off for servicing, and incidentally we did
8 go off an hour a day for servicing and repair, they would
9 cover the particular unit that went out.

10 But so far as having any serious trouble with the
11 unit I don't recall any.

12 The Vice Chairman: You don't recall any?

13 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: That is all.

(4) 15 The Chairman: Senator George.

16 Senator George: You say you have been out of service
17 about four months?

18 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, since the 20th of September
19 last year.

20 Senator George: When did you enter the service?

21 Mr. Elliott: On November 12, 1940.

22 Senator George: Where did you enter the service, from
23 what State?

24 Mr. Elliott: I entered in Chicago, sir; Chicago, Illinois.

25 Senator George: And do I understand that you and Mr.

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator George

1
2 Lockhart were the only two people at this station from
3 midnight, say, of the 6th until the morning of the 7th,
4 when you picked up this flight of planes?

5 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

6 Senator George: There was no one else there?

7 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. I might make a comment, if I may.

8 Senator George: Yes.

9 Mr. Elliott: On December 8, I believe it was -- well,
10 on December 7 Lockhart, Private Lockhart was called into
11 the company commander, Captain Tetley, and Captain Tetley
12 sent him back to the unit for a statement from Lockhart and
13 myself, a signed statement as to what had happened. And
14 at that time Private Lockhart told me that he wanted me to
15 incorporate in the statement the name of a man that was not
16 there, the man that ordinarily would have run the motor,
17 the motored generator for the unit. It was put to me that
18 they wanted to keep the records straight.

19 The C.O. called for no one to operate the unit unless
20 the motor man was present to operate that motor and we were
21 not qualified motor men or mechanics to do that.

22 However, in that statement that I have given reference
23 to I wouldn't agree to that, to incorporating this other
24 man's name in that statement. The statement itself was just,
25 it was put in the form of "we". Everything that was written

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator George

2 In there was "we" did this and "we" did that. There was
3 no individual "I" did this or "I" did that.

4 Senator George: But actually you and Private Lockhart
5 were the only two people at the station at this unit?

6 Mr. Elliott: That is correct, sir.

7 Senator George: I fix the time arbitrarily from midnight
8 on because that was the important time. And you say at
9 7:02 you picked up the planes on the radar 3 degrees east
10 of north?

11 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

12 Senator George: Could you tell anything about the
13 number of planes in the flight?

14 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, not definitely. You could just
15 tell that there was a large number.

16 Senator George: Now, on that very point, Sergeant,
17 I think the committee would like to have full information.
18 Did you judge it to be a large number of planes?

19 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, by the size of the echo we judged
20 it to be a fairly large number of planes.

21 Senator George: And not merely one or two or three
22 or four planes?

23 Mr. Elliott: We knew that it was not one or two or
24 three or four since at that distance the echo would have
25 shown up very much smaller. This was very definitely very

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator George

2 big.

3 Senator George: And you picked up this flight actually
4 at a distance of about 137 miles?

5 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

6 Senator George: Now, you say that when you called to
7 make the report you did not find anyone at the station except
8 Private McDonald, as I believe you said his name was?

9 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, McDonald.

10 Senator George: And within a very short time, two or
11 three minutes, someone did call and Private Lockhart did
12 the talking to the officer who called?

13 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. Private Lockhart was the
14 nearest to the phone and picked it up and spoke to the
15 lieutenant.

16 Senator George: You have since learned that the officer
17 who called was a Lieutenant Tyler?

18 Mr. Elliott: I don't believe at that time the name was
19 mentioned, but the only thing that I knew was that it was
20 some officer that had called and told Lockhart to forget it.

21 Senator George: To forget it; just to forget it?

22 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. As I recall I never did know
23 the name of the officer until sometime later.

24 Senator George: But your best information subsequently
25 secured was that he was Lieutenant Tyler?

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator George

2 Mr. Elliott: Not at that time.

3 Senator George: Not at that time but I mean since that
4 time.

5 Mr. Elliott: Senator George: That is your present
6 information, in other words?

7 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

8 Senator George: Where is he now?

9 Mr. Elliott: That I don't know, sir.

10 Senator George: Did he remain in the service on the
11 island after the 7th of December?

12 Mr. Elliott: I don't know anything about Lieutenant
13 Tyler with the exception that he has, as I understand, been
14 promoted through the grades to Lieutenant Colonel. That is
15 all that I happen to know.

16 Senator George: I wanted to find out if he had been
17 promoted.

18 Mr. Elliott: That is all that I know of the man in
19 question.

20 Senator George: Now, I further understand you were
21 able to follow this flight of planes in until your radar
22 was broken by the projection of the mountains. In other
23 words, you traced them in or followed them in until they
24 were within about 20 miles of the island?

25 Mr. Elliott: That is right, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Elliott

questions by: Senator George

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Senator George: Were any other radar stations on the Island in operation that morning?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, there were. Offhand I don't know how many. One that I do know definitely of was on until 7 o'clock.

Senator George: Until 7 o'clock?

Mr. Elliott: I believe they continued on a little after 7 also, and they had a partial record of the flight that we had picked up. It wasn't quite out as far as the one we had picked up because the station itself was right on the coast, it wasn't up higher in the air.

Senator George: It didn't have the elevation?

Mr. Elliott: The efficiency wasn't as great, but that is the only station that I know of that actually picked up any portion of the flight that we recorded that morning.

Senator George: I believe that is all.

The Chairman: Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark: No questions.

The Chairman: Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: Sergeant, what do you mean by the technical term "echo."

Mr. Elliott: The screen goes about a circle, about a 5" circle. On this screen you will see a horizontal line, and that horizontal line was broken up from zero to 150

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h2

1
2 miles of scale. At the point that the target is hit by
3 the transmission being sent out and referred back to the
4 unit, it will come up and there is a break in that line
5 and there extends a vertical line up. Then, by the mechan-
6 ism on the scope we bring the air line over to the echo,
7 and that is where you get your mileage. But the echo looks
8 like a straight line, and at a right angle a vertical line
9 up which is the particular target that you see.

10 Senator Lucas: When you first discovered these planes,
11 did you find more than one?

12 Mr. Elliott: As I recall it, there were a couple of
13 other flights, but we only followed the main flight because
14 we had all we could do to follow that one.

15 Senator Lucas: Would you care to give the committee
16 an estimate of the number of planes you thought, from radar,
17 was in that flight?

18 Mr. Elliott: Any figure that I would say, or that we
19 did have in mind would be only a guess.

20 Senator Lucas: I understand that, but it would be inter-
21 esting to the committee to get the guess, from your experience
22 out there with this radar.

23 Mr. Elliott: I really don't recall even guessing that
24 there were any particular number. We knew that there were
25 probably more than 50, but, of course, we didn't know. I

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h3

1
2 mean, it all enters into the picture, just how high the
3 plane is flying and just where you strike it, as to the
4 size of the echo you might get.

5 Senator Lucas: Now, do you recall when you talked
6 to Private McDonald over the phone, whether you indicated
7 as to the number of planes you thought might be in this
8 flight?

9 Mr. Elliott: There was no definite number stated.
10 It was just that there were many, very many.

11 Senator Lucas: Will you recall, and this may have been
12 given before I came in, will you recall again the substance
13 of the conversation that you had over the phone with McDonald?

14 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. I called Private McDonald on
15 the Administrative line and told him who I was and explained
16 what we had found.

17 Senator Lucas: Can you say what language you used?
18 Can you remember the exact language that you used? I don't
19 suppose you do recall.

20 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. As I said before, I said it
21 very nervously, and as to the exact wording, I couldn't say.

22 Senator Lucas: All right.

23 Mr. Elliott: I gave him the information that there
24 were a large number of planes coming in, and gave him the
25 location, that is, the reading of those planes.

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h4

2 Senator Lucas: Where was the Information Center on
3 the Island located with reference to Opana?

4 Mr. Elliott: Well, that was down in Fort Shafter.
5 Fort Shafter itself was about, I believe 8 miles from
6 Honolulu.

7 Senator Lucas: And Fort Shafter is where General Short
8 and his staff were located?

9 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir. That was the Hawaiian Depart-
10 ment headquarters.

11 Senator Lucas: You had a direct communication from the
12 radar station to the Information Center?

13 Mr. Elliott: We had two lines. One, a tactical line
14 was connected directly to the information desk where the
15 individuals would place their targets in respect to the
16 map.

17 Senator Lucas: What was your understanding as to what
18 the Information Center was supposed to do with the informa-
19 tion that you sent day after day while you were in that
20 training program?

21 Mr. Elliott: By plotting the different targets
22 that we sent in, the plotters on the end of the Information
23 Center would plot the targets on the table with the map.

24 Directly overhead in a balcony would be the liaison
25 officers and Signal Officers and they would determine as

1 Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h5 2 they saw the target going up in that locality, each unit,
3 each Liaison Officer would decide whether it was his slight
4 or not, and if nobody could identify that flight, of
5 course, they had pre-arranged routes that their planes
6 would be taking, and if no one could identify that flight
7 it was considered an enemy flight.

8 Senator Lucas: Did you ever learn, Sergeant, whether
9 or not those men who were charged with this responsibility
10 were on duty that morning, December 7, 1941?

11 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. I had no contact with them.
12 I mean, I assume that they were there. That is all I can
13 say. I didn't have any direct conversation with any of
14 them, to know.

15 Senator Lucas: I understand.

16 Now, how long had this training program been going on
17 from 4 to 7 in Hawaii?

18 Mr. Elliott: As I recall, it was going on all the
19 time that we were in operation which was two weeks prior
20 to December 7.

21 Senator Lucas: Two weeks prior to December 7?

22 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

23 As to the other units and the time for duty, 4 to 7,
24 I would not be able to state.

25 Senator Lucas: Did you get any different information

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h6

1
2 or orders after November 27, 1941?

3 Mr. Elliott: No, sir, none that I can recall.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, now these men in the plotting
5 room, these men in that plotting room, as I understand it,
6 were presumed to take your findings and were supposed to
7 work them out, between the hours of 4 and 7 each morning?

8 Mr. Elliott: That is correct, yes, sir.

9 Senator Lucas: And were they too on duty after 7
10 o'clock; is that your understanding?

11 Mr. Elliott: That is my understanding, yes, sir.

12 Senator Lucas: So could it be possible that the reason
13 Lieutenant Tyler said, "Forget it," was because they had
14 no one there to carry through?

15 Mr. Elliott: It might be interpreted that way.

16 Senator Lucas: But anyhow, if these men in the plotting
17 room had taken this intercepted radar message and plotted
18 it properly, there wouldn't have been any question but what
19 they could have probably determined whether or not this
20 particular flight was enemy planes or otherwise?

21 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, they could have, but I think
22 it would have possibly reverted to the same thing that came
23 up, and that was the B-17's coming in. It is just my
24 opinion, but I think the Japs knew every move we made.

25 Unless they considered that it was not the B-17 flight,

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h7

1
2 as you say, nothing, probably, would have been done about
3 it.

4 Senator Lucas: If these men in this room charged
5 with the responsibility of making that determination were
6 there, they undoubtedly would have known how many B-17's
7 were coming in from the Coast?

8 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, they would have had that in-
9 formation.

10 Senator Lucas: And if they had that information and
11 a flight of planes turned up on this radar screen to the
12 extent that you said, possibly 50, then certainly they would
13 have known definitely, under those circumstances that there
14 was something unusual and probably would have considered it
15 an enemy flight of planes?

16 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: I don't believe there were over 14
18 B-17s.

19 Was there anything, when you picked up the planes,
20 was there anything in the way the planes were flying so
21 that you could make a determination as to whether or not
22 they might be fighters, pursuit planes, or bombers, or what
23 not?

24 Mr. Elliott: No, sir. I don't recall offhand how
25 fast they were going. We could have figured it out by the

1 Witness Elliott .

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h8

2 time element just how fast they were going, but that
3 would not have been our responsibility. I don't know as
4 though we could determine just whether it was a fighter
5 plane going slow or a bomber going faster. But at that
6 time it was very hard to identify whether it was one plane
7 or a large number of planes.

8 Senator Lucas: That is testimony in the record. It
9 was difficult, according to the testimony, to determine
10 whether it was a hostile plane or a friendly plane that was
11 coming in.

12 Mr. Elliott: Yes. As I said, from my knowledge of
13 how the information center worked, the only way they could
14 tell at that time whether it was enemy or a friendly plane,
15 was by checking up on their own flights, and if they didn't
16 have any flight in that particular area, it was considered
17 an enemy plane.

18 Senator Lucas: Sergeant, did General Short ever call
19 you to headquarters to talk to you about this?

20 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Did Colonel Phillips ever talk to you
22 about this?

23 Mr. Elliott: No, sir.

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Witness Elliott

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

Senator Lucas: Did anybody on General Short's staff ever take enough interest in this radar situation to call you and discuss it with you?

Mr. Elliott: They hadn't called me in at all. Private Lockhart was called in to speak to the company commander. Whether he spoke to anybody else after he spoke to the company commander I do not know.

Senator Lucas: Did your own company commander ever talk to you?

Mr. Elliott: No, sir, he did not. He called Private Lockhart only. Private Lockhart only testified before the Roberts committee.

Senator Lucas: You did not. Have you testified before any committee heretofore?

Mr. Elliott: I have testified before the Army and Navy committees only.

Senator Lucas: Your testimony, I presume there was about the same as you have given here?

Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir, only I have had a little more freedom, so to speak, here.

Senator Lucas: You feel a little freer with Senators than you do with Generals, is that it?

Mr. Elliott: Very definitely, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You have got on a different uniform

Witness Elliott

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 now.

3 Senator Lucas: I want to include the Congressmen in
4 that, too.

5 The Vice Chairman: He is wearing a different uniform now.

6 Senator Lucas: So after the attack on December the 7th
7 no one in the Army ever discussed this question with you at
8 any time in trying to learn any additional or further informa-
9 tion about what happened, until the Army Board got ahold of
10 you. I am talking now about anybody in General Short's com-
11 mand or any officer now. I am not talking about any particular
12 private that you probably discussed it with.

13 Mr. Elliott: I don't know whether you were in here when
14 I told of the statement.

15 Senator Lucas: No, I was not.

16 Mr. Elliott: Well, anyhow there was a statement prepared
17 by Lockhart and myself to the effect as to what was done on
18 that morning.

19 Senator Lucas: Who asked you to prepare that statement?

20 Mr. Elliott: That was relayed to me through Lockhart from
21 the commanding officer, Captain Tetley, when he had gone in
22 to see the company commander.

23 Senator Lucas: They merely asked you and Lockhart to
24 get together and make a joint statement?

25 Mr. Elliott: Yes, sir.