

# AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED  
(Reclassify when filled out)

# CONFIDENTIAL

## I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VC-53 (b) Based on or at USS SARGENT BAY (CVE-53) (c) Report No. 25  
 (d) Take off: Date 27 Feb. 1945 Time (LZT) 1127(K) (Zone); Lat. 24°-41' N. Long. 140°-55' E.  
 (e) Mission Aircraft strike in support of invasion of Iwo Jima (f) Time of Return 1437(L) (Zone)

## II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
<b>F4U-2</b>	<b>VC-53</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>None</b>	

## III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
<b>TBM-1C</b>	<b>VC-51</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>USS NATONA BAY</b>				

## IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
		<b>None</b>	(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Did Any Part of  
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, Describe Clouds \_\_\_\_\_ (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)  
 (YES OR NO)  
 Time of Day and Brilliance \_\_\_\_\_ (k) Visibility \_\_\_\_\_ (MILES)  
 (j) of Sun or Moon \_\_\_\_\_ (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.)

## V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			GUNS USED	(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER			
			<b>None</b>			



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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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## XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Target Area 235 X and Y. (b) Time Over Target(s) 1240(X) (Zone)  
(FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target 2500 ft. - cumulus - 3/10ths  
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Hazy (e) Visibility 20  
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type \_\_\_\_\_ Bomb Sight Used \_\_\_\_\_  
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run \_\_\_\_\_ Spacing \_\_\_\_\_ Altitude of Bomb Release \_\_\_\_\_  
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed None Probably Destroyed None Damaged None

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO. A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO. HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 <b>Target area 235 X and Y.</b>	<b>200 yds. by 400 yds.</b>	<b>8 VC-53</b>	<b>Strafe - 5100 rds.</b>	<b>Many</b>	<b>See below</b>
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

1. This was an "area attack" with no specific targets assigned or observed. However, two camouflaged huts or personnel shelters, each about 12 or 15 ft. square, were set on fire by the strafing and were destroyed.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? No Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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## XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

### ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

#### OWN AIRCRAFT

- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack and Their Effectiveness
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defense Tactics and Their Effectiveness

#### ENEMY AIRCRAFT

- Method of Locating, Distance
- Disposition
- Altitudes
- Speeds
- Approach Tactics
- Use of Cover, Deception
- Angles of Attack
- Distance of Opening Fire
- Defensive Tactics

#### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Own Weaknesses
- Enemy Weaknesses
- Offensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Defensive Tactics, Own
- " " , Enemy
- Flexible Gunnery, Own
- Escort Tactics
- Fighter Direction
- Use of Radar
- Night Fighting
- Recognition, Aircraft

### ATTACK

#### OWN TACTICS

- Method of Locating Target
- Approach to Target
- Altitudes, Speeds
- Approach
- Dive
- Pull-Out
- Dive Angle
- Strafing
- Retirement
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Jamming

#### DEFENSE, ENEMY

- Evasive Tactics, Ships
- Concealment
- Searchlights
- Night Fighter Tactics
- Use of Jamming

#### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bombing Tactics
- Torpedo Tactics
- Effectiveness of Bombs, Torpedoes
- Selection of Targets
- Fuzing
- Strafing Tactics
- Defensive Tactics
- Use of Radar
- Reconnaissance
- Photography
- Briefing

### OPERATIONAL

- Navigation
- Homing
- Rendezvous
- Recognition, Ships
- Communications
- Flight Operations
- Search and Tracking
- Base Operations
- Maintenance

**8 VF from VC-53 and 8 VF from VC-51 on station at orbit point awaiting assignment of target for aircraft strike in support of invasion of Iwo Jima.**

**The flight was ordered to make a bombing and strafing attack against target areas 235 X and Y. No specific targets were assigned and none were observed in time to be used as aiming points. Some enemy gun positions were thought to be located in the area but they were concealed and could not be observed from the air. Two strafing runs were made and two personnel shelters set on fire.**

**No AA was encountered.**

**Pilots: Lieuts. H. C. COOK, B. O. McHINCH; Lieuts. (jg) J. K. McDONALD, R. R. TRUNSDALE, P. L. PAGE, T. E. CAMP, V. E. FULLER; Ensign B. H. HUNT.**

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**XIII. MATERIAL DATA.** (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.  
Use additional sheets if necessary).

## ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights  
Turrets  
Ammunition  
Bombs, Torpedoes  
Bomb Sights  
Bomb Releases

## COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar  
Homing Devices  
Visual Signals  
Codes, Ciphers

## RECOGNITION

IFF  
Signals  
Battle Lights  
Procedures

## PROTECTION

Armor, Points and Angles  
of Fire Needing Further  
Protection  
Leak Proofing

## EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes  
Life Belts, Life Rafts  
Safety Belts  
Emergency Kits  
Rations, First Aid

## NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses  
Driftsights  
Octants  
Automatic Pilots  
Charts  
Field Lighting

## INSTRUMENTS

Flight  
Power Plant

## OXYGEN SYSTEM

## CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

## STRUCTURE

Airframe  
Control Surfaces  
Control System  
Dive Flaps  
Landing Gear  
Heating System  
Flight Characteristics  
At Various Loadings

## POWER PLANT

Engines  
Engine Accessories  
Propellers  
Lubricating System  
Starters  
Exhaust Dampers

## HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

## ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant  
Lights

## FUEL SYSTEM

## FLIGHT CLOTHING

## MAINTENANCE

## BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment  
Personnel Facilities

When the Iwo Jima operation began the FM-2s were equipped with only one wing tank but within a few days all had been equipped with two drippable wing tanks. At first the majority of VF pilots did not like the change. They had been used to flying with one wing tank and they did not like the drag of the extra wing tank. However, the operation had not progressed far before there was a complete reversal of opinion on this point. As most pilots expressed it, "It feels good to have these two wing tanks". They give an added sense of security. True, the speed and rate of climb are reduced, but this loss in performance is not too important because in the event of attack the wing tanks can be readily dropped. As the situation stands now the VF pilots are disgruntled if ordered to take off without two full wing tanks.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

**H. VERNON REEY, Lt., A. O.I. Officer.**    **B. V. GATES, Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.**

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

DATE

**3/2/45**