

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO #234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 179

PLACE Tokyo  
DATE 30 October 1945

Division of Origin: Oil and Chemical Division.

Subject: Navy Fuel (incl. Navy Aviation Gas).

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Vice Adm. MORITA  
Rear Adm. AKISHIGE  
Capt. HAZA

Where interviewed: Room 528, Meiji Bldg.

Interrogator: Mr. M. Lewin.

Interpreter : Mr. S. Mizota, Lt. Thorlakson.

Allied Officers Present: Major Burgess (part time)  
Mr. Meyer (part time)

Summary:

New complete questionnaire of oil division was handed to the Admirals and all questions discussed. Answers to be submitted not later than 10 November 1945.

Short general discussion on Navy fuel supply which Admirals think was adequate at beginning of war. Navy Aviation gas and substitutes (pine root, alcohol) were discussed briefly.

Interrogation of : Vice Admiral Morita, Rear Admiral Akishige  
and Captain Hara.

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The new complete questionnaire of the Oil Division was given to the Admirals (3 copies), also sample forms showing how some of the questions are to be answered. The Naval appendix prepared by Comdr. Stanley (Naval Analysis) was also submitted as well as a third questionnaire prepared by Major Eurgess, concerned with Naval aviation.

Tables and charts submitted by the Naval Fuel Bureau previously were discussed and missing data (units, areas, etc.) added. All questions of the new questionnaire were briefly discussed, it was emphasized that all statements should specify unit, area referred to, and time period covered. It was agreed that the answers will be submitted piecemeal, as soon as they can be prepared, not later than 10th November.

A short general discussion followed on these topics:

Before the war the Navy depended for their fuel supply mainly on US crude, some crude from Borneo and a little from Sakhalin. Admiral Morita believes that the Navy fuel supply was adequate at the beginning of the war, much more so than the Army's. A fuel shortage was first felt in June 1943 (in the Homeland). In the South a fuel shortage was not apparent till Saipan. The General Mobilization Bureau of the Munition Ministry was allocating fuel to Army-Navy-Civilian use.

The Allocations were made on the 1st of the fiscal year, quarterly thereafter. Until 1943 the Navy received 1.3 to Army's 1 (Morita). After 1943 (as operational area shrank) the Navy received about 1.2 to Army's 1. This comparison for homeland only. Figures for the southern areas should be available in Singapore, Lt. Col. Naito was there in charge of the 3rd Shipping corps. Shipments from Balikpapan were direct but records kept in Singapore.

Aviation Gasoline:

Navy received about 1000KL/month of aviation gas from civilian refineries (from domestic crude). From the south 20,000 to 40,000 KL/month of refined aviation gas.

Amount needed in Homeland, 40,000-50,000 KL/month (in 1943) and in the South 20,000-30,000 KL/month of aviation gas.

The balance for the Homeland came apparently from synthetic production.

Alcohol:

Alcohol was used straight for training and transport only. Alcohol mixtures used for combat, up to 91 octane.

Pine Root Oil:

By the end of Sep 1945 at least 25,000 KL were produced. About 20% of that aviation gas.

Questioned whether the fuel shortage was the decisive factor in the termination of the war, Admiral Morita thought that the lack of planes and pilots was of prime importance, however admitted that fuel shortage was responsible for the lack of pilots. In July 1945- 4-5,000 KL/month were available for pilot training.

The Admiral thinks that there was sufficient oil on hand for the final last stand to supply the 7,000 Navy planes for the defense of the homeland. It should be noted that he thinks in terms of one way suicide missions only.