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INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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DIVISION OF

APR 8 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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AIRGRAM

From: USPOLAD, Tokyo

Date of Mailing: April 3, 1948

Rec'd: Apr. 8, 1948

9:51 AM

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Secretary of State,
Washington.

A-66, April 3, 1948.

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 8 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State

894.00/4-348

For the Department's information, there follows the text of a press release issued by the Public Information Office, General Headquarters, Far East Command on April 1, 1948:

"Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, Chief of SCAP's Government Section, has pointed out that the purge program, while fully consistent with the purposes of the Japanese Government and people in charting a democratic future, is one of the direct requirements of the Potsdam Declaration. As such, final action taken thereunder is regarded to be of a permanent nature for which the Allied powers will unquestionably hold future Japanese governments fully responsible."

SEBALD

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APR 28 1948

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NA files

May 20, 1948

STATUS OF THE PURGES IN JAPAN

(Source: NA)

As of May 1948, approximately 95% of the various purges undertaken in Japan have been completed, with approximately 200,00 persons removed or excluded from public office and from key positions in the economic and cultural life of Japan. No new categories have been added to the purge list since last year, and present plans contemplate relaxation of the program hereafter, rather than the addition of any new groups. In relation to the economic recovery personnel needs of Japan, it is felt that the purges may already have been carried too far.

The major goal of the purge program was to eliminate from leadership in Japan those groups considered responsible for Japanese militaristic nationalism and aggressive expansionism. From the beginning of the occupation the responsibility for administering the program has been in Japanese hands, in accordance with detailed instructions from SCAP and under SCAP's general supervision.

Groups thus removed from office or barred from appointment or election to office include over 150,000 military, naval and Gendarmerie officers, 45,000 influential members of ultra-nationalistic political and patriotic societies and agencies. In addition, the economic purge has affected about 1500 key persons in commerce, industry, finance and agricultural and 700 in the public information media field. Corresponding action was taken in the educational system.

The purges in Japan have differed in three significant respects from the denazification activities in Germany. In the first place purgees in Japan have been identified by categories rather than as individuals. Second, the only penalty imposed in the Japanese purges has been disqualification from office. Purgees, other than war criminals, have not been subjected to imprisonment, fines, or property confiscations. In the third place, the manner of administration of the Japanese purges has been such that only persons in office or aspiring to office have been affected. It is felt, however, that the coverage of persons in the affected categories has been substantially complete, so that there is no one now in governmental or key private positions who falls clearly within purged categories, and that there remain relatively few affected aspirants to such offices who have not been notified in advance of their ineligibility.

The present status of the program is that the national level Central Screening Board of the Japanese Government has been reduced to a small residual unit in the office of the Prime Minister, and although the prefectural screening boards are still in existence, the volume of their activities is rapidly declining.

There are two principal problems which remain for the future:

1. There is the prospect of an increase in the criticism which has already been voiced, as to the justice of disqualifying persons for office by categories rather than following examination of their records and histories of individuals. For the duration of the occupation this is clearly not a serious threat to the purpose of the purge program.

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2. The clear need for a concerted effort towards economic recovery, to establish a peaceful and independent nation that can play its part in Far Eastern and World affairs without reliance on abnormal outside help, is already generating a demand for the return to active roles of experienced and able purgees. Pressure in this direction may be expected to increase over the next few years and some compromise with the principles laid down in the immediate post-surrender phase appears indicated during the rebuilding phase of Japanese history which lies ahead.

This substantial completion of the purge program, should not lead to complacency regarding the attainment of the anti-militaristic and democratizing objectives of the occupation of Japan. The fight goes on between those elements in the Japanese society, such as the entrenched bureaucracy, which generally escaped the purges, and which clings substantially to old patterns of thought, and those newer elements such as the liberal trade unions and farm groups which are being weaned away from feudal restrictions towards the role of potential supporters of democracy in Japan. Our hopes for the future of Japan must rest on the emergence of a native leadership, as free as possible from the stigma of subservience to the foreign occupying power, if the destructive effect of the purges is to be followed by the constructive developments which constitute our underlying objectives.

DG

Form DS-302
(7-2-46)

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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file

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 24 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Control 7791

Rec'd May 24, 1948
8:55 a.m.

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Action: FE
Info :
DCR

FROM : Tokyo
TO : Secretary of State
NO : 99, May 24.

FROM SCAP TO DEPARTMENT OF ARMY FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

PERSONAL FOR BUTTERWORTH FROM SEBALD.

REULET May 6.

Yoshio Osawa's appeal has been successful and he is now released from purge.

SEBALD

MHD:KC

894.00/5-2448

PLAIN

MAY 28 1948

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May 6, 1948

Dear Sebald:

Would you be good enough to let me know the status of the appeal of Yoshio Osawa who was purged because of the executive position he held in a Japanese film company. I make this request not so much because he is a classmate of mine and I personally wish him well, but because he has a host of friends in the United States many of whom are friends or acquaintances of mine or feel themselves free to get in touch with me and do so with great and increasing frequency. I want to be in a position to give them definite information.

Osawa went to Lawrenceville School for five years and Princeton for four years. He graduated from Princeton in 1925 and was one of the most popular members of that class. On returning to Japan, he worked with General Motors until it closed up its operations in the latter part of the 30's. As a result, a large number of solid citizens and not a few important people have had continuous contact with Osawa over a number of years and they regard him as the epitome of the type of Japanese who should come to the fore in Japan if the purposes of our occupation are to be consolidated by action on the part of the Japanese themselves.

Every few days I get an inquiry from someone who has heard, not from Osawa but from a fellow American, that he is in difficulty and who finds it incredible that he should be purged.

All this leads me to write asking would you let me know what the status of his case is and whether his personal standing has, on appeal, overcome the category of the position he held during the war or if not what the case against him is in brief.

With kindest regards.

Faithfully yours,

W. Walton Butterworth

William J. Sebald, Esquire,
Acting Political Adviser for Japan,
Tokyo.

FE:WWButterworth:mss

Form DS-302 (7-2-46)

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JUN 1 1948
DIRECTOR
Department of State
Copy referred to PE for action request RPS/F Hanson

Action	<i>M. Fisher</i>
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Control 10065

Rec'd May 29, 1948 10:35 p. m.

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RECORDS & DISTRIBUTION SECTION

Required action taken by phone with Army Dept. File F.M.F.

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JUN 1 1948
To FE for action
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Action: FE
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FROM: Shanghai
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1213, May 30, 8 a.m.

PRIORITY

REDEPTEL 227 February 6

Suggest AMPOLAD request SCAP issue invitational orders for two-week visit by Woo Kyatang, executive editor of American owned SHANGHAI EVENING POST. Randall Gould, POST editor, anxious have Woo do series articles on Japan to counteract growing Chinese criticism US policy vis-a-vis Japan. Woo, able and conscientious, knows what to write. Consulate General believes would help our cause. Since criticism presently well played local press believe timeliness of trip now valuable. If Department concurs, advise AMPOLAD proceed immediately requesting SCAP issue necessary invitational orders and clearances and arrange make facts available to Woo.

Sent Department 1213, repeated Nanking 971.

CABOT

RSP:WH

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JUL 27 1948

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTCONFIDENTIAL

DATE: June 7, 1948

TO : HMB

FROM : FMF

SUBJECT: Shanghai's 1213 of May 30th

I talked with Major King, of the Public Information Division of the Department of the Army, who has been assigned action on the attached. I suggested that in their wire to Tokyo they indicate that information had come to their attention that Mr. Woo would be available to go to Japan to do a series of articles for the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, that the State Department had been consulted and heartily endorsed the project as being in the national interest in view of the present situation in China, and that invitational orders be issued if possible.

Major King explained that "invitational orders" brings up a budgetary problem as well as one of precedent. He explained that at one time Secretary Royall's suggestion that invitational orders be issued to US editors had been turned down, but at last admitted that SCAP could in his discretion overcome these difficulties and it would be pointless to anticipate them now.

Major King promised that a wire would go out this afternoon and that he would telephone when the reply has been received.

FE:FMFisher:mp

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FMF 894 00/5-3048

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LABOR ADVISER THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEB 14 1950

ACTION

is assigned to



DIVISION OF
NORTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JUN 16 1948

Office of the U. S. Political Adviser

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Tokyo, June 3, 1948.

No. 321

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(For Department Use Only) OCT 20 1948

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RECEIVED SEP 14 1948

DIVISION OF BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Handwritten notes and initials: IR, FE, DCIR, BT

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1948 JUN 16 AM 8 25

FACILITIES BRANCH

Subject: Observations Made as a Result of an Orientation Visit to Kyushu.

DIVISION OF OCCUPIED AREAS ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

SEP 18 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 299 of May 24, 1948 concerning the activities of communists in Kyushu and to enclose a copy of an additional memorandum, prepared by FSO W. Henry LAWRENCE, Jr., containing further results of his observations and interviews during an orientation visit to Kyushu during the latter part of April, 1948. The memorandum deals primarily with such subjects as labor, reparations, and the decentralization and purge programs.

Handwritten notes: 894.00B, 894.504, 740.00119 P.N., 894.60, 894.50

Much of the information contained in the enclosed memorandum is of a corroborative nature and affords ample evidence that a number of policies implemented by the Occupation do not meet with whole-hearted approval or sympathetic response from a large segment of the Japanese population. That there should be criticism of policies which are distasteful to individuals primarily affected thereby is understandable. But it would appear from the reasons advanced for certain conclusions reached by Mr. Lawrence, that a considerable field exists for a well-devised and executed information and education program. Much of the resentment which is mirrored throughout the enclosed memorandum is the result, I believe, of misunderstanding or ignorance of the objectives which are sought in the labor, decentralization, purge, and other programs carried on by the Occupation. Thus, there is constant reiteration that legislation, particularly labor laws, is too far advanced and in consequence is causing uneasiness on the part of both labor and management. While it may be admitted that the new Japanese labor legislation is far from perfect and undoubtedly requires revision, it is felt that a period of adjustment is necessary and that subsequent revisions should be made only after a trial period and further experience indicate the advisability of amendment.

The persistent demand on the part of labor for wage increases, as well as management's claim that labor fails to appreciate its responsibilities, is illustrative of the general pattern of dispute presently prevalent in Japan as a whole. Labor has been given privileges far beyond its wildest dreams in the past; it has not, however, been taught, neither in theory nor in practice, the advantages for the labor movement of cooperating with

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Tokyo's 321
June 3, 1948

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management to find ways and means to increase production, to achieve greater stability, and flowing therefrom, an increase in real wages.

Lack of final decision concerning reparations is a factor which disturbs Japanese industrialists who obviously are marking time pending definite knowledge that plant rehabilitation or improvement will not become so much wasted effort. In addition, aside from the reminder of reparations, the sight of scarce materials, such as lumber, being used for packaging goods being transferred under the interim reparations program is one which naturally causes envy and discouragement to Japanese business men desirous of rehabilitating their plants and business but who are unable for various reasons to obtain the needed materials.

The decentralization program is also the subject of considerable uncertainty which exerts a retarding influence on Japanese industrial recovery. The breaking up of large combines is understood locally; but fear continues that single units producing closely related products will likewise be broken up into inefficient components. Apprehension exists that decentralization will increase production costs and will augment the difficulties of financing productive operations.

Many Government officials with whom Mr. Lawrence conversed believed that transportation, an important factor in any recovery program, should have high priority in American aid which might be accorded to Japan. Transportation includes such important divisions as road repair, railway equipment, and increased shipping. In this connection, there is evident in Mr. Lawrence's memorandum, an optimistic vein on the part of Japanese officials and industrialists that the United States will pour into Japan large sums of money to rebuild and rehabilitate the Japanese economy within a very short period. This feeling has been given impetus and encouragement by exaggerated press reports concerning aid allegedly promised by the Draper Mission. The Japanese consistently couple with their optimism a note of urgency and state that the sooner American aid becomes available the more effective it will be.

The consensus of conversations regarding the purge is that purge policies have been too sweeping - an opinion also shared by many American military officials. Comment was to the effect that some of the most capable leaders in industry have been removed despite claims that they did not participate in ultranationalist or militaristic activities; that younger men without maturity or experience have replaced these leaders; and that while five years hence these young men may have gained the requisite experience, in the interim the rehabilitation of Japan is severely handicapped.

Mr. Lawrence is to be commended for the diligence with which he searched out information, opinions, and facts from the many officials, both American and Japanese, with whom he conversed. In addition, he took full advantage of his presence in Kyushu to visit and observe many activities, including a number of important industries, such as steel, chemical, and ceramic plants, shipyards, and one of the coal mines in northern Kyushu. It is felt that Mr.

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Lawrence

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Lawrence made the maximum use of the time which was allocated for his trip.

Respectfully yours,

W. J. Sebald
W. J. Sebald

Enclosure:

Memorandum prepared by FSO
W. Henry Lawrence, Jr., dated
June 3, 1948, concerning visit
to Kyushu.

*copy retained in Interm
Control Files*

In triplicate to the Department.

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WJSebald:cs

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 321 dated June 3, 1948 from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled "Observations Made as a Result of an Orientation Visit to Kyushu".

MEMORANDUM

June 3, 1948.

SUBJECT: Observations Made as a Result of a Visit to Kyushu by Foreign Service Officer W. Henry Lawrence, Jr., Concerning Labor, Reparations, Decentralization, Obstacles to Rehabilitation, and the Purge.

The following observations are the result of my visit to four prefectures in Kyushu, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, and Kagoshima during the last ten days of April, 1948. Besides travel in urban and rural areas, tours were made of several basic industries including steel, chemical, and ceramic plants, shipyards, and a coal mine. Facts and opinions regarding current conditions were obtained during conversations with members of the Kyushu Regional Military Government Team and of local prefectural Military Government teams, and with representative Japanese leaders and individuals (a list of the names of the more important persons interviewed is enclosed). The Japanese leaders included the governors and the chairmen of the assemblies of the four prefectures. In addition, conversations were had with individuals from the following groups:

1. Prefectural Bureau chiefs.
2. Chiefs and members of local offices of the Central Liaison and Coordinating Office.
3. Mayors of cities and towns.
4. Industrialists in steel, coal, chemical, and other basic industries.
5. Bankers.
6. Union leaders.
7. Newspaper publishers and editors.
8. Farmers and fishermen.
9. Educators and students.
10. Housewives.

My visit to Kyushu provided convincing evidence that this area is of basic importance to the recovery and rehabilitation of Japan. In Fukuoka Prefecture alone is produced fifty percent of Japan's coal, and eighty percent of her steel. Considerable progress has been made in rehabilitation, but there are major obstacles preventing rapid attainment of a self-supporting economy. The major difficulties appear to be:

CONFIDENTIALI. Insistent

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- I. Insistent demands of labor for increased wages and improvements in welfare, unaccompanied by a realization that labor has the responsibility to cooperate with management in order to achieve greater production.
- II. Uncertainty in planning present and future production caused by the lack of determination of the reparations problem.
- III. Uncertainty concerning the extent of the decentralization program.
- IV. Shortage of raw materials and transportation. Stringency of financial resources.
- V. Loss of capable leaders as a result of the purge.

SECTION I - LABOR

A. Occupation Policies Favor Labor to Detriment of Management - Urgent Need for Revision of Labor Legislation

The majority of Military Government officials and Japanese leaders interviewed are convinced that labor legislation sponsored by the Occupation and encouragement of the labor movement by the Occupation have resulted in a disproportionate emphasis on the rights and welfare of labor as contrasted to those of management. These officials and leaders claim that labor does not realize that it has responsibilities to cooperate with management in accelerating production, and believe that labor, with the support of the Occupation authorities, has tended to run roughshod over management. However, there were indications that labor is gradually recovering its sense of balance, although doubt was expressed whether labor will assume its proper role unless there is revision of existing labor legislation.

Since labor difficulties are now considered as a major problem in the rehabilitation of Japan, management and financial interests are anxious that this revision take place during the Occupation because of fear that the political strength of labor after the Occupation will be so great, due to the tremendous number of votes involved, that the difficulties of amending the legislation will be almost insurmountable. Opinions expressed indicated that as the Occupation is responsible for the too advanced state of labor legislation, the Occupation should correct the imbalance between labor and management.

The management of the Kurosaki Factory of the Mitsubishi Chemical Company, Ltd., which appeared to be reasonable in its approach to the problems of management and labor relations, pointed out that union officials do not properly distinguish between the respective duties of labor and management and attempt to dictate policies which are clearly the responsibility of management. The officials of this company believe in taking the union into

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their

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their confidence, but not in allowing the union to assume the duties of management.

B. Labor Leaders Oppose Revision

Labor leaders contend that the labor laws do not at present need revision, except perhaps in very minor provisions relating to further improvement in the welfare of labor. These leaders are fearful that any change would enable management to gain the upper hand and reduce the advantages now held by labor. Labor leaders are greatly disturbed by current Cabinet discussions as to whether or not existing labor legislation should be revised and cited statements made by Dr. ASHIDA Hitoshi, the Prime Minister, and Mr. NISHIO Suehiro, Deputy Prime Minister, as betrayals of the interests of labor.

✓ Labor leaders are apprehensive concerning the establishment of Labor Arbitration Boards, although they for the most part express approval of such boards as a medium for settling disputes arising from interpretations of the laws. These leaders state that they understand the arbitration boards in the United States restrict labor activities, and express fear that government officials and capitalists in Japan will use the boards for their own ends. This uneasiness has been increased by statements of Mr. KATO Kanju, Minister of Labor, to the effect that while revision of the labor laws is not contemplated, labor activities will be restrained from going too far.

✓ Comment: Mr. YOSHITAKE Eiichi, Career Vice Minister of Labor, recently told an officer of this Mission that Mr. Kato has placed himself in an exceedingly precarious position by his declaration, on becoming Minister of Labor, that there would be no revision of the labor laws. If there is any revision, Mr. Yoshitake believes that Mr. Kato has no alternative but to resign. In a private conversation recently with officers of this Mission, Mr. Kato has said he would resign if the labor laws are revised.

Mr. Yoshitake is convinced that the present Japanese Government, despite its discussions on the subject, will not undertake a revision of the law unless driven to it by public opinion which he declares is becoming incensed at the extent to which strikes are interfering with the welfare of the Japanese nation, or unless directed by SCAP to revise the laws.

C. Labor Leaders Unable to Control Union Members ---
Distrust Between Management and Labor.

✓ An important aspect of the labor picture is the fact that labor leaders find it difficult to control members of their unions. Mr. KANAGAE Yasaburo,

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Chairman

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Chairman of the union of the Japan Rubber Co., Ltd. (Kurume), said that after he thought he had convinced members of the union that a certain course should be pursued and had worked out an agreement with the management, a group within the union stirred up the workers so that it became impossible to carry out the terms of the agreement. In consequence of similar occurrences, distrust between management and labor arises. In addition, management and labor distrust the Central Labor Relations Committee as much as they distrust one another. This attitude is held to stem from an instinctive and basic tendency on the part of Japanese to distrust governmental agencies. Intelligent officials of labor and management agree that there must be mutual trust if the problems of rehabilitation are to be solved. Yet some officials of both management and labor attempt to raise difficulties with Military Government by reporting, and occasionally misreporting, activities of each other.

D. Demands for Increased Wages

Military Government and Japanese officials maintain that labor has been insatiable in its demands for higher wages and other benefits, communists and socialists being mainly responsible. Leaders of unions of more moderate character, such as those of the Japan Coal Miners Union (Tanro or Nihon Tanko Rodo Kumiai Domei) endeavor to take into consideration the financial problems of management. Even though these leaders disagree with the exorbitant demands of unions dominated by communists, such as those of the All Japan Coal Industry Workers Union (Zen-sekitan or Zen-nihon Sekitan Sangyo Rodo Kumiai), they desire the cooperation of all unions in a common front to obtain wage increases.

The urgent need for coal in reviving the economy of Japan has led to miners receiving higher wages and more incentives than other workers. The miners, however, are not satisfied and are continually demanding more and more. As a result, Military Government labor officers are far less sympathetic with the demands of miners than with those of tax collectors and others who are poorly paid. Workers in other industries resent the discrimination. At the Yawata Works of the Japan Steel Co., Ltd., workers insist that their products are as essential to the rehabilitation of Japan as coal and therefore seek the same high wages and incentives.

E. Inefficiency of Labor

Some of the labor leaders interviewed admit the truth of management's complaint that labor is not as efficient as it should be and that it does not have the will to work. One major cause, these leaders assert, is that labor has not yet been able to achieve a living wage, because the cost of living has risen faster than wages. They state that workers are willing to work longer than eight hours per day if overtime were paid. Management objects to overtime work because it is convinced that workers do not turn in a full day's work. Management claims that were labor to perform efficiently for an eight-hour period, demands for increased wages could be met.

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Officials of both the Mitsubishi Chemical Company and the Japan Steel Company raised objections to General Headquarters' prohibition of contract labor. These officials feel that production costs are increased thereby, because of the expense of maintaining workers for certain operations which are only necessary at intervals.

F. Labor Awakening to Its Responsibilities

There are encouraging signs here and there that labor is coming to the realization that there is a limit to their demands for increased wages unless production is increased. In several instances, management has been able to obtain the cooperation of labor unions in increasing production. In the communist-dominated Takamatsu coal mine of the Japan Coal Mining Co., Ltd., management persuaded union leaders to investigate (and improve) the mine's internal transportation system, with the result that efficiency in bringing miners to and from work and in carrying out coal has been increased.

At the Kurosaki factory of the Mitsubishi Chemical Company, the union leaders of their own accord presented management with a three-month plan for a production drive. The officials of this company are aware that if the drive succeeds, the union leaders will present demands for wage increases. However, they state that management will be in a better position to consider such increases based on the level of production achieved. These officials point to this method of seeking wage increases as a refreshing contrast to the inordinate demands of labor for wage increases in other industries, including such demands as that management must pay taxes levied on labor, as well as funeral, marriage, and other types of expenses.

On the other hand, at the Yawata Iron Works, despite an increase in production of 20% to 60% in various items during the period January through March 1948, negotiations for higher wages failed. Management maintains that the demands can not be met for financial reasons. Union leaders are aware that the official price of steel is shortly to be reviewed and plan to insist upon a new wage scale being taken into account in the new price. The alternative, it is stated, is that a strike will be called.

G. Need for Education of Labor

While great strides have been made since the Occupation, Military Government and labor leaders both emphasize the pressing need to educate labor regarding its duties and responsibilities. These leaders feel that interest exists on the part of labor, but that progress is handicapped by lack of funds and by lack of paper and equipment for preparing materials for dissemination. There is also a desire on the part of both management and labor officials to know how labor problems are handled in the United States, but information available is very limited. Japanese workers tend to join unions with alacrity, but the majority do not become active members, being content to be led. This passivity accounts in part for the strength of the communists in the labor movement.

In connection with education of labor, Mr. TAMAKI Masayoshi, Principal of the Kyushu Labor Training School, is of the belief that the Occupation's efforts have indicated a lack of understanding of the characteristics of

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Japanese

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Japanese labor. He claims that there is a regional difference varying from workers of higher intellectual attainments in the Kanto District, to workers of a more practical mind in the Kansai District. He also maintains that Japanese ideas relating to labor are based on Russian and German standards rather than upon American ideas. He shares the opinion of many officials that labor had been presented with too many advantages too quickly for proper digestion.

SECTION II

Reparations

The concensus of my discussions on the subject of reparations was that uncertainty in this regard is seriously hindering the rehabilitation of Japan. Business men find the reparations question the most discouraging aspect of Allied policy. They complain of inability realistically to plan or make improvements in plants until it is known whether the particular plant is to remain in Japan. Furthermore, not only are business men unwilling to borrow capital for rehabilitating war-damaged equipment or to modernize their plants, but the uncertainty makes it very difficult to acquire needed funds.

Military Government officials and Japanese leaders urge that there be no further reparations except in cases of specialized equipment designed solely for war-making purposes. They point out that much of the industrial equipment tentatively designated for reparations is ordinary equipment essential for production of peace-time goods. Already a sizable amount of equipment which may be designated for reparations is being used with the approval of the Occupation authorities, but large amounts of machinery are in storage awaiting some determination of the reparations problem.

While both the Japanese and Military Government officials feel that profitable use of this stored equipment could be made, it is felt that the gain would not be worth the effort of placing it into operation, later to be dismantled and shipped out of the country. In Kagoshima Prefecture, Military Government has had many applications for use of reparations equipment being held, but has denied the applications because of uncertainty concerning the ultimate disposition of the equipment.

In the Nagasaki Precision Machine Works, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., a number of machines formerly used for the manufacture of torpedoes were put into operation immediately after the surrender with the approval of the Occupation authorities, even though the factory had at first been considered a complete loss due to damage by the atomic bomb. A large number of useful articles are now being made, including industrial and coal mining equipment, but a large portion of the machinery is stored because the entire plant is tentatively designated for reparations.

Japanese business officials point out that the cost of maintenance of plants and machinery designated for reparations is tremendous. Many of these machines were seen awaiting shipment at the Sasebo Naval Base. Packing costs also are very high, and it appeared that packing specifications similar to

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those of the United States Army or Navy were used. The amount of lumber involved results in a drain upon the Japanese economy at a time when such material is urgently needed for construction purposes. There is a feeling expressed both by Military Government and Japanese officials that reparation shipments to China will be more valuable to that country for the lumber than for the machines themselves.

There is a belief on the part of some Japanese officials interviewed that it would be advantageous to the Japanese economy to know exactly what plants are to be taken for reparations even if the equipment now being used for producing essential peace-time articles had to be removed and new equipment manufactured in order to continue production. The contention of these officials is that once reparations are concluded, definite plans can be made and the net result over a period of time will be greater production.

At the Yawata Works of the Japan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. about 39% of capacity is in use, but the works produce only 15% of possible production. Part of this low production, according to Mr. SUMINO Naonori, Chief of the Yawata Works, is due to uncertainty regarding the reparations program. He stated that he cannot plan for the future when even the cement plant might be removed, depending upon an interpretation of the term "reparations". Mr. HARADA Kanaye, Chairman of the Yawata Works Union, said that formerly 180,000 tons of finished steel were produced by 60,000 men whereas now with 25,000 men only 26,000 tons are being produced. Between 2,000 and 3,000 of these 25,000 men are employed to take care of equipment which might be moved for reparations. Mr. Sumino claims that the rehabilitation needs of Japan are so great that the full capacity of the plant is needed, including that part which is being considered for reparations.

Some officials are of the opinion that it would be better to allow Japan to keep its industrial equipment and pay reparations from current production, because these officials believe that it is questionable whether countries to whom the reparations are to be shipped can make proper use of the machinery. The question of the future war potential of Japan, if there were no further reparation shipments, is answered by Japanese officials by reference to the loss of control of raw materials as a result of defeat and the likelihood of control of importation of raw materials which might be included in the peace settlement.

SECTION III

Decentralization

Another uncertainty which appears to hang over Japanese industrial recovery is the question of decentralization. In many conversations on this subject, no major objection was voiced to the breaking up of the big combines, but there was strenuous opposition to sub-dividing single units producing closely related products. For example, the Kurosaki Factory of the Mitsubishi Chemical Co., Ltd. has been advised that the plant might be divided into three parts, because it is a large plant and has three major divisions--coke, organic, and inorganic departments. While such a sub-division would not be impossible, it would obviously greatly increase costs of production. At present one power plant and water system serves the whole installation; in addition, there is

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integration of manufacture, a by-product of one process being used as an ingredient in the production of another product. And finally, it was argued that by American standards the plant is not excessively large.

The prospect of decentralization for branches of companies with head offices in Tokyo has raised the question in the minds of some companies as to means of financing operations in the future. It is believed that those companies which are decentralized will find the difficulties of financing greatly increased by reason of the curtailment of the advantages of a large operation and the closeness of association with other companies and financial interests.

The announcement by the Supreme Commander on May 1, 1948 of the action by the Holding Company Liquidation Commission to release 194 Japanese industrial and distributive companies out of 325 from continued designation under Public Law No. 207 "Elimination of Concentrations of Excessive Economic Power Law" has been helpful in eliminating some uncertainty. Furthermore, the presence in Japan of the American Decentralization Board appointed by the Supreme Commander to consider this problem augurs well for a definite determination of companies to be decentralized.

An interesting side-light concerning decentralization was made by a local newspaper editor who stated that this Headquarters' policy toward newspapers is at variance with its general decentralization policy. He stated that only 20 percent of newsprint is allocated to local newspapers, whereas 80 percent goes to the three national papers, Asahi, Yomiuri, and Mainichi. He declared that the allocations had not been changed since the war and believes that local newspapers can be a greater force for democracy than national newspapers because local papers are in closer contact with the masses of people.

SECTION IV

Lack of Basic Requirements for Rehabilitation

A. Raw Materials

As is well known, the rehabilitation of Japan is greatly retarded by a serious shortage of raw materials. It is felt by management that if raw materials were available some means could be found for solving other serious problems. The Yawata Iron Works of the Japan Steel Company showed a chart which dramatized the tremendous increase in production following the importation of Canadian coal. The same type of production increases have also resulted when sufficient power, coal, and other materials have been available for use by companies making agricultural implements, chemicals, and similar products.

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As has been repeatedly pointed out, coal is the crucial raw material of the Japanese economy. Until April, the coal industry was producing the quotas allotted for this year. During April, there was a large slump, but due to special efforts during the latter part of April, the quota was met in Kyushu, but not in Hokkaido. The slump is believed by Military Government officials to have been largely due to the failure of the Japanese Government and the Occupation authorities to carry out promises made at the time of an inspection team visit last fall. At that time, it is claimed, promises were made of higher wages and additional incentives, but the promises have not been met. The officials of the Takamatsu Mine of the Japanese Coal Mining Company said that the tobacco which was promised for last October actually arrived in April. This delay was also true of supplies of clothes and sake. Management, on the other hand, had been urged by Occupation officials to have miners work longer hours but feels that overtime wages are not justified in view of the inefficiency of the miners. The opinion was expressed that means can be found to increase the efficiency of workers and that production can also be augmented by the use of machinery. It is hoped that some of the machinery can be imported from the United States.

The Coal Law is not popular among mining officials. They feel that it contributes nothing toward increasing production and tends to increase costs because of the red tape involved. They believe that the government was already doing all that was necessary. Both Military Government and Japanese officials are perturbed at the official price of coal which is considerably below the cost of production, the deficiency being made up by a government subsidy. Hope was expressed that a new price could be fixed for coal which would meet the cost of production and give miners a living wage.

B. Power

It was apparent that power will be a major bottleneck in Japan for a long time. This fact was emphasized over and over again in Kyushu. In this area, at present, there is little hydro-electric power; most of the power is produced by thermal electric plants, some of which are marked for reparations. Earnest hopes were expressed by Military Government and Japanese officials that these plants would not be taken for reparations because they are so essential to Kyushu. These plants are producing fairly well their production efficiency depending mainly upon the amounts of coal allotted. However, some electricity has to be brought in from Hiroshima.

Comment: Mr. William Turnage of the Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters who has recently returned from Shanghai following a visit of several weeks during which he worked closely with the Industrial Working Party of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, has reported that the Chinese are especially anxious to obtain thermal electric plants in Japan as a part of their reparations claim.

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C. Transportation

Inadequate transportation impedes the progress of recovery in Kyushu. Roads are poor and railway equipment badly needs repair and replacement. Coal production could be speeded if coal cars were in sufficient supply. It is believed by a number of government officials whom I interviewed that transportation equipment should have high priority in American aid. The tremendous loss of shipping during the war has placed a strain on available shipping so that it appears obvious that the Japanese merchant marine must eventually be expanded. Existing facilities at Nagasaki and Sasebo are capable of building practically any size ship, but there are great difficulties in obtaining raw materials and in financing the shipyards. The facilities are currently being used for producing miscellaneous equipment such as that urgently needed for mining. The shipyards are also anxious to build ships not only for Japan but for other countries.

D. Lack of Financial Resources

With all its other difficulties, industry in Japan is constantly faced with the need for means of financing its operations. I was told that banks are hesitant to make loans because of the present unstable conditions and that the government itself accentuates financial difficulties because of its slowness in payment for services and materials. A good example is the Takamatsu Mine of the Japanese Coal Mining Company, which has not received payment of money due it by the government for required housing; the company, therefore, used money set aside for taxes and for payment of coal mining equipment. The fact that the coal mine cannot pay for its equipment causes difficulties with the company which produces the equipment. This results in a vicious cycle which causes uncertainty for all companies concerned.

The limited resources of Japan were referred to by many officials in stressing the urgent need for American capital if a high level of recovery is to be attained within a reasonable time. This urgent need makes the Draper suggestion of aid the most encouraging aspect of the immediate future in so far as recovery is concerned. The Japanese leaders are anxious to learn the scope of such aid and the speed with which it will materialize. They feel that the sooner such aid becomes available the more effective it will be.

SECTION V

Purge

The purge is considered by many members of the Japanese governmental, educational, and industrial circles to have been too sweeping in its application, an opinion shared by many military government officials. In discussions on this subject it was pointed out that some of the most capable leaders in industry have been purged; claim was made that these men took no part in ultranationalistic or militaristic activities, and that during the war they had acted only as would any patriotic citizen in like circumstances. It was further stated that as a result of the removal of experienced individuals, many officials have suddenly been thrust into positions of great responsibility for which they are not prepared. There was constant reiteration in my discussions of the theme that although a few years of experience in such positions

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✓ | may enable the new company officials to carry on their functions with ability, these men do not, in this critical period, have the maturity or experience of those who have been purged. Stress was constantly laid upon the severe handicap which this lack of competent management places upon the rehabilitation of Japanese economy.

W. Henry Lawrence, Jr.
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosure: *att*

List of Japanese Officials and
Business Men Met by Foreign
Service Officer W. H. Lawrence, Jr.
During Official Trip to Kyushu
April, 1948.

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Enclosure to Memorandum dated June 3, 1948 enclosed with Despatch No. 321 dated June 3, 1948 from the Office of the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled "Observations Made as a Result of an Orientation Visit to Kyushu".

LIST OF JAPANESE OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS MEN MET BY
FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER W. H. LAWRENCE, JR. DURING
OFFICIAL TRIP TO KYUSHU APRIL, 1948

1. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

Fukuoka Ken:

SUGIMOTO Katsuji, Governor of Fukuoka.
TSUCHIYA Koroku, Director, General Affairs Department,
Fukuoka Ken.
FUKUMA Toru, Chief, Administrative Office, Liaison Office,
Fukuoka Prefectural Government.
YUKI Shiroji, Director, Kyushu Liaison and Coordination
Office.
NAGAIWA Yayoi, Chief, Fukuoka Branch, Special Procurement
Board.
TENNICHI Koichi, Director, Fukuoka Regional Bureau of
Commerce and Industry.
SHIBATA Takayoshi, Chief, Fukuoka Regional Economic
Stabilization Bureau, concurrently Chief, Fukuoka
Regional Price Board.
MIZUNO Susumu, Coal Expert, Fukuoka Prefectural Government.

Nagasaki Ken:

SUGIYAMA Sojiro, Governor of Nagasaki Ken.
SAYAMA Takeo, Director, Economic Department, Nagasaki Ken.
TOSHIMA Tokuji, Chief, Sasebo Branch, Nagasaki Prefectural
Government.

Kumamoto Ken:

SAKURAI Saburo, Governor of Kumamoto Ken.
OTSUBO Toichi, Chief, Economic Department, Kumamoto Ken.
YAGI Masao, Chief, Fourth Division, Civil Property Bureau, Tokyo.
NAKANO Yoshimori, Liaison Officer, Kumamoto Liaison and
Coordination Office.
YOSHIDA Masami, Liaison Officer, Kumamoto Liaison and
Coordination Office.
YOKOI Susumu, Liaison Officer, Kumamoto Liaison and
Coordination Office.
KOMAMURA, Liaison Officer, Kumamoto Liaison and Coordination
Office.
MATSUSHITA Yukihiro, Chief, Foreign Affairs Section, Kumamoto
Prefectural Government.

Kagoshima Ken:

SHIGENARI Tadasu, Governor of Kagoshima Ken.
FUKUDOME Masamitsu, Chief, Foreign Affairs Section,
Kagoshima Ken.
SATO Hajime, Chief, Tourist Section, concurrently Chief of
Secretariat, Economic Department, Kagoshima Prefectural
Government

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1. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (Continued):

Kagoshima Ken (Continued):

KAWABATA Tsukao, Liaison Officer; Chief, Kagoshima Branch
Office of Kyushu Liaison and Coordination Office,
c/o Kagoshima City Office.

2. MAYORS AND PREFECTURAL AND MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLIES MEMBERS:

Fukuoka Ken:

INAKAZU Minoru, Speaker, Fukuoka Prefectural Assembly.
MIYOSHI Yaroku, Mayor of Fukuoka City.
TAKAOKA Minoru, Speaker, Fukuoka Municipal Assembly.

Nagasaki Ken:

NAKATA Masasuke, Mayor of Sasebo.
NAGANO Seisaburo, Chief, Secretariat, Sasebo City Office.
FUKUDA Shigeichi, Chief Liaison Officer, Sasebo City Office.

Kumamoto Ken:

SATO Masao, Mayor of Kumamoto.
UCHIYAMA Shozo, Secretary to Mayor of Kumamoto.
NOGAMI Susumu, Vice Speaker, Kumamoto Prefectural Assembly.
NISHIMOTO Kazuo, Chief, Office of Kumamoto Prefectural Assembly.
ARAKI Frank S., Interpreter to Vice Speaker of Kumamoto
Prefectural Assembly (Liaison Section, Kyushu Industrial
Transportation Co., Ltd.)

Kagoshima Ken:

ARIMA Jun, Speaker, Kagoshima Prefectural Assembly.
IWAMATSU Chikayoshi, Vice Speaker, Kagoshima Prefectural
Assembly.
OYAMA Gonosuke, Vice Mayor, Taniyama Town Office.

3. IRON AND STEEL WORKS:

SUMINO Naonori, Chief of Yawata Works of Japan Iron and
Steel Co., Ltd., Yawata.
YASUNAGA Tohei, Vice Chief, Yawata Works of Japan Iron
and Steel Co., Ltd., Yawata.
USHIO Hiroe, Chief, Superintendent Department, Yawata
Works of Japan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., Yawata.
OKAMOTO Isamu, Reparations Department, Yawata Works of Japan
Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., Yawata.
NAKAMURA Yuji, Reparations Department, Yawata Works of Japan
Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., Yawata.

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4. COAL MINES:

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4. COAL MINES:

MIYAGAWA Keizo, President, Nihon Tanko Kabushiki Kaisha
(Japan Coal Mining Co., Ltd.), Higashi Nakasu,
Fukuoka.
ASHIKAWA Masanobu, Standing Director, Japan Coal Mining
Co., Ltd.
YOSHIDA Yoshiya, Chief, Executive Office, Japan Coal Mining
Co., Ltd.
ODA Minoru, Acting Chief, Administrative Office, Japan Coal
Mining Co., Ltd.
SAKAMOTO Tatsue, Director, and Chief of Onga Mining Office
of Japan Coal Mining Co., Ltd.

5. CHEMICALS:

SATO Shikao, Chief, Kuroaki Factory of Mitsubishi Chemical
Industries Inc., Yawata City.
SUZUKI Atsushi, Chief, Executive Office and concurrently
Chief of Accounting Department, Kuroaki Factory of
Mitsubishi Chemical Industries Inc., Yawata City.
NOGUCHI Shozo, Chief, Business Department, Kuroaki Factory
of Mitsubishi Chemical Industries Inc., Yawata City.
SHINOZIMA Hideo, Chief, Labor Department, Kuroaki Factory
of Mitsubishi Chemical Industries Inc., Yawata City.
MIYAKI Munehiko, Liaison Secretary, Kuroaki Plant,
Mitsubishi Chemical Industries Inc., Yawata City.

6. BANKING AND FINANCE:

SATO Tamaki, Former Manager, Fukuoka Branch of the Bank of Japan,
(new Director of Bureau of Investigations, Bank of Japan,
Tokyo).
KATO Man-ichi, Manager, Fukuoka Branch, Bank of Japan.
TAKAHASHI Shigetake, President, Fukuoka Bank.
TOMISHIGE Nisaburo, Standing Director, Fukuoka Bank.

7. LABOR PROBLEMS: (Labor leaders)

TAMAKI Masayoshi, Principal of the Kyushu Labor Training
School; a member of Public Security Committee, Fukuoka Ken;
Chief, Educational Department of Western Japan Branch of
Sodomei Labor Union, 1-chome Kiyomizu-nachi, Okura, Yawata,
Fukuoka Ken.
EGUCHI Yoshimi, Chairman, Fukuoka Tanro, Japan Coal Miners Union.
KANEGAE Yasaburo, Chairman, Japan Rubber Co., Ltd. Labor Union
(Kurume Rubber)
YAMAKAMI Shigeki, Assistant Chief Secretary, Yawata Iron and
Steel Works Labor Union.
HARADA Kanae, Chairman, Yawata Iron and Steel Works Labor Union.

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8. NEWSPAPERS:

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June 3, 1948

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8. NEWSPAPERS:

TANAKA Johei, Representative Director, Nagasaki Minyu
Shimbun (Daily) Co., Ltd.
MAYUMI Yaoto, Director, Manager, and Chief of Ads Department,
Nagasaki Minyu Shimbun Co., Ltd.
KATAOKA Shigemi, Assistant Editor, Nagasaki Minyu Shimbun
Co., Ltd.

9. SHIPBUILDING:

KOEZUKA Yoshiro, Chief, Nagasaki Shipbuilding Yard,
Mitsubishi Jukogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Mitsubishi Heavy
Industry Co., Ltd.).
HARAGUCHI Tomiichi, Director, Sasebo Sempaku Kogyo Kabushiki
Kaisha (Sasebo Ship Industry Co., Ltd.), c/o former
Naval Arsenal, Sasebo; head office; No. 1 Muro-machi
2-chome, Nihonbashi, Chuo Ku, Tokyo.

10. MISCELLANEOUS:


TSUTSUMI Isamu, Fishery Expert, Fishery Division, Economic
Department, Nagasaki Prefectural Government.
OKI Masatada, Assistant Chief, Nagasaki Branch Office,
Taiyo Gyogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Taiyo Fishing Co., Ltd.)
MARUTA Hajime, Forwarding Department, Nagasaki Fish Market.
KAWAI Kiyoshi, Assistant General Manager, Nagasaki Seiki
Seisakusho (Nagasaki Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., Ltd.).
KURIBARA Tadao, owner of Yumei Hotel, Unzen.

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FROM: Shanghai
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1295, June 9, 11 a.m.
REMYTEL 1213, May 30.

MacArthur has telegraphed approval. Does Department concur. Woo available only until 23rd when Gould departs for New York.

Sent Department 1295, repeated Nanking 1044.

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FROM: Shanghai
 TO: Secretary of State
 NO: 1295, June 9, 11 a.m.

REMYTEL 1213 May 30.

MacArthur has telephoned approval. Does Department concur. Woo available only until thrtthree when Gould departs for New York.

Sent Department 1295, repeated Nanking 1044.

VOID - SEE CORRECTED COPY ATTACHED



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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION is assigned to



United States Political Adviser for Japan

Tokyo, June 14, 1948

DIVISION OF NORTHWEST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JUN 22 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 351

UNCLASSIFIED

XR 894.91

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Japanese Public Opinion Surveys.

1/

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to forward herewith five copies of a publication entitled Current Japanese Public Opinion Surveys, No. 1, 29 May 1948, prepared by the Analysis and Research Division of the Civil Information and Education Section of this Headquarters.

This study of public opinion is the first of a series to be issued at approximately the rate of one per week. However, there are at present in process of editing and publication eight additional studies which are expected to be issued together in the very near future. Five others are at present being analyzed with a view to publication. Subsequent public opinion surveys will be forwarded without covering despatch, unless there appears to be special need for comment.

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The present study is an analysis and evaluation of a cross section of Tokyo public opinion regarding three political questions: "What do you think of the Ashida cabinet?" -- "What political party do you think is best right now?" -- and, "Do you think the present Diet should be dissolved or not?"

The survey was conducted by the Association for Public Opinion Science (Yoron Kagaku Kyokai), which the Analysis and Research Division of the Civil Information and Education Section considers to have been highly reliable in previous surveys. The same division comments that although a survey of Tokyo alone cannot be accepted as indicating the trend of the nation, previous surveys have shown that attitudes in Tokyo generally conform to those of the rest of the country.

CIA - one

Among the subjects to be covered in the succeeding eight public opinion studies to be issued soon, as mentioned above, are the following:

1. Attitude toward cultural and political problems in Osaka Prefecture.
2. Survey of attitudes toward co-education in Kyoto.
3. Attitudes

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June 14, 1948.

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3. Attitudes towards strikes of Government workers:
Comparison of surveys conducted in Kyoto and
Tokyo.
4. Survey of attitudes of union members in the
Tokyo area.
5. Survey of attitudes of parents in Tokyo toward
the 6-3-3 school system.


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Enclosures:

Five copies of publication
entitled Current Japanese Public
Opinion Surveys, No. 1, May 29,
1948.

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
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Enclosure to Despatch No. 351 dated June 14, 1948 from the Acting Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, entitled: Transmittal of Japanese Public Opinion Surveys.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Information and Education Section

CURRENT JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS

NO. 1 29 MAY 1948



Public Opinion and Sociological Research Branch
Research Unit

ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH DIVISION

FOREWORD

In this series of Current Japanese Public Opinion Surveys, Civil Information and Education Section presents brief analyses of surveys by Japanese agencies of the attitudes of the Japanese people toward significant current issues. In some cases, discussion of these findings will have appeared in the Japanese press. In this series, each public opinion survey which is reported is evaluated from the point of view of general reliability both of techniques and of findings. This evaluation is intended as an indication of the acceptability of the surveys as measures of Japanese attitudes.

The analysis in this series of a survey by a Japanese public opinion agency does not constitute either an endorsement of that agency or approval of the findings.

ATTITUDES OF TOKYO RESIDENTS TOWARD THE ASHIDA CABINET
Yoron Kagaku Kyokai, February 1948

THE SURVEY

THE PROBLEM

In February 1948, Mr. Hitoshi ASHIDA was elected Prime Minister by the Japanese Diet. The election was by a small margin of votes after a great deal of disagreement in both houses of the National Diet. The opposition remained vocal and articulate even after the formation of the new Cabinet, and demanded the dissolution of the Diet and a general election to reascertain the popular mandate. It was contended that changes in popular sentiment had altered the representativeness of the Diet.

THE SURVEY

In order to test the various claims and counterclaims, the Association for Public Opinion Science (Yoron Kagaku Kyokai) conducted a poll of attitudes toward the newly formed ASHIDA Cabinet on 22 February 1948, the day after the announcement of the election of Mr. ASHIDA. It interviewed 516 persons in a carefully selected cross section of the Tokyo population.

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

The general results of the survey indicated that public attitude toward the Cabinet was lukewarm, with resignation and watchful waiting as the dominant tone. It was found also that a plurality of all respondents favored dissolution of the Diet and the holding of new elections. That a general shift of public political sentiment had occurred was indicated by the fact that the Liberals emerged as the strongest single party, a reversal of previous tendencies in Tokyo, where the Social Democratic Party had been strongest, as shown by the 1947 Diet elections and subsequent public opinion surveys.

RELIABILITY OF THE FINDINGS

The general findings of this survey seem to be fairly reliable, although the number of persons polled was too small a sample of the population to give high reliability in the detailed breakdowns.

SURVEY FINDINGS

GENERAL RESPONSE

The prevalent sentiment reported by the respondents was one of indifference or of actual hostility to the Cabinet. One-fourth of the respondents were classified as "against" it. More than one-third reported the feeling that "it cannot be helped." Only 18 percent reported themselves definitely in favor of the Cabinet.

Question: What do you think of the ASHIDA Cabinet?

In favor	18%
Cannot be helped	36
Against	25
Don't know	21

By Sex

Women were far less decided in their attitude than men. Forty percent of the women respondents were unable to offer an opinion and only 10 percent indicated definite opposition.

	Men	Women
In favor	19%	16%
Cannot be helped	37	34
Against	35	10
Don't know	9	40

By Age

Little significant difference was noted in the responses given by the different age-groups.

	20-29	30-39	40-49	Over 49
In favor	19%	16%	21%	16%
Cannot be helped	36	41	35	30
Against	29	24	20	27
Don't know	16	19	24	27

POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT

Increase in support of the Liberal Party makes it stand out as the most strongly supported group. Social Democratic Party and Democratic Party support are correspondingly less than they had been in the past. One-third of the respondents were uncertain. Forty-eight percent expressed no party preference.

Question: Which political party do you think is best right now?

ATTITUDES OF TOKYO RESIDENTS TOWARD THE ASHIDA CABINET 3

Liberal	33%
Democratic	9
Social Democratic	6
Other parties	4
Support no parties	15
Don't know	33

By Sex

While the general tendencies among men and women were similar, 59 percent of the women respondents had no opinion as compared with 18 percent of the men. Of the men, 37 percent failed to express a party preference; of the women, 69 percent.

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Liberal	41%	20%
Democratic	9	3
Social Democratic	9	6
Other parties	4	2
Support no party	19	10
Don't know	18	59

By Age

Political party support by age-groups was as follows:

	<u>20-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>Over 49</u>
Liberal	30%	36%	31%	36%
Democratic	8	4	10	4
Social Democratic	13	6	6	9
Other parties	4	5	1	3
Support no parties	22	17	12	7
Don't know	23	32	40	41

DISSOLUTION OF THE DIET

A plurality of the respondents favored dissolution of the Diet.

Question: Do you think the present Diet should be dissolved or not?

It should be dissolved	45%
It should not be dissolved	30
Don't know	25

By Sex

Women were less decided than men on the question of the dissolution of the Diet.

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
It should be dissolved	56%	26%
It should not be dissolved	31	28
Don't know	13	46

4

CURRENT JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS

By Age

Age-groups, responding as follows, indicated no significant differences.

	20-29	30-39	40-49	Over 49
It should be dissolved	46%	46%	42%	43%
It should not be dissolved	32	30	32	26
Don't know	22	24	26	31

"DON'T KNOW" RESPONSESBy Sex

Women were far less certain than men of their political sentiments, as shown in the following tabulation of "Don't know" responses to each of the questions.

	Men	Women
Attitude toward the Cabinet	9%	40%
Political party support	18	59
Dissolution of the Diet	13	46

By Age

The younger age-groups seemed to be more decided in their political attitudes than the older groups, as indicated by percentages of "Don't know" responses.

	20-29	30-39	40-49	Over 49
Attitude toward the Cabinet	16%	19%	24%	27%
Political party support	23	32	40	41
Dissolution of the Diet	22	24	26	31

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS

This study represents the attitudes of the small but carefully selected cross section of the population of Tokyo the day after the announcement of the appointment of Mr. ASHIDA as Prime Minister. It seems to demonstrate that there was no popular enthusiasm for the choice, and that uncertainty and an attitude of resignation and probably of unconcern were prevalent.

The findings of this Tokyo survey may be construed as indicative of national opinion despite possible differences in political opinion between Tokyo and the rest of Japan. The small minority support accorded the ASHIDA Cabinet, as revealed by this survey, is comparable to the minority support reported for the KATAYAMA Cabinet in national surveys conducted in the latter part of 1947 and early in 1948. Early surveys

ATTITUDES OF TOKYO RESIDENTS TOWARD THE ASHIDA CABINET 5

of attitudes toward the KATAYAMA Cabinet showed support running as high as 69 percent.¹ By December, surveys showed that support had fallen to 22 percent. A study by Jiji News Agency Public Opinion Room² of a national cross section showed the following distribution of attitudes toward the KATAYAMA Cabinet.

In favor	22%
Against	45
Don't know	33

A study conducted about a month later³ showed that while the percentage of respondents expressing support remained essentially the same, there had been a rapid consolidation of clear-cut opposition on the part of those who had been uncertain.

In favor	23%
Against	70
Don't know	7

The KATAYAMA Cabinet was a coalition of three parties, the Social Democratic, the Democratic, and the People's Cooperative. The ASHIDA Cabinet is a coalition of the same three parties. The findings of this survey suggest that the support for the ASHIDA Cabinet in Tokyo is substantially the same as the final support of the KATAYAMA Cabinet. It is clear from this survey, as it has been from other recent surveys, that support of the Liberal Party has increased while support for the Democratic and Social Democratic Parties has fallen away rapidly.

EVALUATION OF THE SURVEY

The survey was conducted by an agency which has been very reliable in previous surveys. During the April 1947 elections they were able to predict very closely the outcome of the Diet elections in Tokyo by use of an extremely small sample.

The present sample was based upon modern considerations of random sampling by area sampling design. Its relative success is indicated by the fact that the age composition of male and female groups of the

-
1. Mainichi Newspaper Public Opinion Room (Mainichi Shinbun Yoron Chosa Shitsu), KATAYAMA Cabinet Survey, No. 1, 1-10 July 1947.
 2. Jiji News Agency Public Opinion Room (Jiji Tsushinsha Yoron Chosa Shitsu), 5-8 December 1948.
 3. Mainichi Newspaper Public Opinion Room (Mainichi Shinbun Yoron Chosa Shitsu), KATAYAMA Cabinet Survey, No. 3, 8-15 January 1948.

sample derived through random methods accorded closely with the latest available census statistics.

Age-Groups	Men		Women	
	1946 Census	This Survey	1946 Census	This Survey
20-29	28.7%	30.2%	32.7%	30.8%
30-39	25.1	25.5	25.3	28.8
40-49	22.9	21.7	19.4	23.7
Over 49	23.3	22.6	22.6	16.7

While a survey of Tokyo alone cannot be taken to indicate exact trends in the nation, previous surveys have shown that attitudes in Tokyo generally conform to those of the rest of the country.

The over-all results, based upon 516 cases, are fairly reliable in terms of sample size. The breakdown by sex is also adequate though of lesser reliability. However, the breakdown by age-groups resulting as it does in a small number of cases per category-response, must be regarded as indicative only.

There is one technical objection to the survey procedure which makes estimates based upon assumptions of perfect random sampling somewhat uncertain. The field procedure permitted the possibility of some individuals in the population being selected more than once. The amount of this deviation from true random sampling cannot be estimated from available data, but it may be considerable. While the theoretical possibility of duplication of responses exists, the practical chance was reduced by taking all the interviews in one Sunday afternoon so that mobility from one area to another was assumed to be at a minimum.



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The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose three copies of a pamphlet prepared by the Japan Institute of Pacific Studies concerning trends of Japanese opinion since the end of the war.

The pamphlet contains a brief survey of the methods used to poll public opinion in Japan and tabulates the results of various polls, mostly in 1947, on political, economic, and social matters. It is believed that the pamphlet is of value both as a description of Japanese experiments in opinion testing and as an indication of Japanese reactions to some of the reforms undertaken by the Occupation.

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Following
The End of War*

By

YASUO TATSUKI

THE JAPAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC STUDIES



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GENERAL TREND OF JAPANESE
OPINION FOLLOWING
THE END OF WAR

—Based Especially on Public Opinion Surveys—

By

YASUO TATSUKI

This paper is prepared by Mr. Yasuo Tatsuki, a research associate of the Japan Institute of Pacific Studies. The author alone is responsible for all statements of fact and opinion.

PACIFIC STUDIES SERIES

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I. On Public Opinion Surveys in Japan

Surveys on public opinion have been studied and conducted in Japan since the cessation of hostilities in 1945 for the express purpose of investigating and appraising in a scientific manner the views of the entire people freely expressed, which form the basis of democratic government. The object of this paper is not to investigate such public opinion surveys themselves, but to attempt, faulty though it may be, to present rough data on the general trend of the Japanese public opinion following the end of World War II on various problems in this country covered by such surveys, albeit incomplete, conducted so far. Before proceeding further, it may be appropriate to give a brief sketch of the organizations which now exist that concern themselves with such surveys.

Any dictator, however tyrannical, must know the general trend of the will and wishes of the people whom he governs, if he wants the machinery of his administration to run efficiently and smoothly. In feudal Japan, various methods—temporary, partial, and unscientific, naturally—were employed by the so-called able and wise administrators to find out just what the common men and women were thinking about their rulers. Some disguised themselves as ordinary travellers and toured the country from province to province, and from village to village, to conduct the necessary investigations themselves; others despatched special agents to do the work for them. In other cases, such intelligent administrators consulted scholars and priests who were looked upon as possessing full knowledge of the conditions of the lower strata of life. It has now become clear that the chauvinistic bureau-

crats and militarists during the period preceding the surrender of Japan employed secret police agents and the gendarmes to carry out the surveys of popular opinion, not motivated by paternal and sincere desires to improve their administration like the wise rulers in feudal times, but for the purpose of compelling obedience of the people to their policies or to suppress views and ideas considered dangerous to the administration.

After the close of World War II, however, various organizations have arisen from an entirely different motive. The surveys conducted by the new organizations are based on the fundamental idea that democratic government rests on intelligent public opinion, and efforts are made to carry out such surveys scientifically. According to an investigation by the Asahi Shimbun, there were in November 1946 five bodies in Japan whose sole business was to conduct public opinion surveys, three in Tokyo and one each in Osaka and Kyoto. In addition, departments to study public opinion have been created at Keio, Tokyo Imperial and other universities each headed by competent professors. Among the newspapers and news agencies carrying on such surveys from time to time are the Jiji Press, the Asahi Shimbun, the Mainichi Shimbun, the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Chubu, the Nishi-Nihon, the Chukyo, and the Nihon Keizai Shimbun. The findings of these surveys are published in their respective papers.

But obvious difficulties exist. Needless to say, surveys of public opinion to be conducted scientifically, require a complete set of statistics, a trained personnel, a national network of organs and staffs, etc. Moreover, there must be preparations on the part of the general public. As is well illustrated by cases in the United States, where such surveys are best developed, the various communities and the individual citizens,

men and women alike, must have a good knowledge of the social movements of political, economic, labor and social life. They must have opinions on the current events. The people today lack in varying degrees. Some people may possess views in regard to various social problems, but they are still unable to express them in a free and open feudalistic social environment. For example, the traditional virtue for the wife to obey her husband is self-evident that it is exceedingly difficult to change from the wife.

In spite of such difficulties and obstacles, it is possible to draw conclusions which seem to be reasonable if the surveys are conducted in the proper and scientific manner. The leading newspapers of this country, through their local branches and agencies, adequately conduct such surveys and their findings can be given full credit.

The Mainichi Shimbun was the first to initiate these surveys, taking samples of the population. Recently, it has been sending questionnaires for a survey, now that the general cessation of hostilities has been realized. The general citizen has become more or less stable and the results are normally in each survey, one month for the individuals to whom enquiries are made, etc. and another month for the results. About 90% of the individuals received according to the Mainichi.

A feature of the Mainichi's survey

period preceding the surrender of Japan and the gendarmes to carry out the surveys motivated by paternal and sincere administration like the wise rulers in feudal compelling obedience of the people to views and ideas considered dangerous to

War II, however, various organizations different motive. The surveys conducted based on the fundamental idea that intelligent public opinion, and efforts surveys scientifically. According to an *Shimbun*, there were in November 1946 business was to conduct public opinion one each in Osaka and Kyoto. In addition public opinion have been created at Keio, universities each headed by competent professors and news agencies carrying on such the *Jiji Press*, the *Ashi Shimbun*, the *Shimbun*, the *Chubu*, the *Nishi-Nihon*, *Yuzen Shimbun*. The findings of these respective papers.

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men and women alike, must have a good understanding of the general movements of political, economic, labor, and other social aspects of life. They must have opinions on these topics. These the Japanese people today lack in varying degrees. Even though some of our people may possess views in regard to various problems presented to them, they are still unable to express them in a clear-cut manner, due to semi-feudalistic social environment. For example, when it is still considered a woman's virtue for the wife to obey the views of her husband, it is self-evident that it is exceedingly difficult to extract the true wishes from the wife.

In spite of such difficulties and handicaps, it is still not impossible to draw conclusions which seem correct and fair, if the surveys are conducted in the proper and scientific manner with due preparations. The leading newspapers of this country have their own network of local branches and agencies, adequately staffed and financed, and their findings can be given full credit.

The *Mainichi Shimbun* was the first among the newspapers to initiate these surveys, taking samples on a rather large scale. Recently, it has been sending questionnaires to 5,000 or 6,000 in each survey, now that the general confusion immediately following the cessation of hostilities has been removed and the life of the average citizen has become more or less stabilized. Two months are required normally in each survey, one month for deciding upon the class of individuals to whom enquiries are to be issued, the questions to be asked, etc. and another month for obtaining the replies. Usually, about 90% of the individuals receiving such questionnaires answer, according to the *Mainichi*.

A feature of the *Mainichi's* surveys in the ratio of men and women

to whom questionnaires are sent. This paper believes that under present conditions, the adoption of the simple ratio of men to women represented by the census figures is inadvisable, and the ratio 8:2 (for men and women, respectively) is chosen, based upon considerations of the qualified voters of men and women in the general elections for Lower House members (of the Diet), the ratio of effective votes cast by men and women, and the ratio of men and women candidates for seats in that House.

On the other hand, the Jiji Press uses in general the method employed by the Gallup system. Questionnaires are issued to about 3,000 to 5,000 persons; some 200 students, employees of the Press' local branches, etc. are mobilized to obtain first hand replies (through direct interviews).

The Asahi Shimbun has been more cautious in its undertakings. It has pointed out in its editorials the dangerous possibility of falling into unscientific surveys due to national conditions, and has endeavored earnestly to compensate by its own efforts for the handicaps and insufficiencies—lack of complete statistics, remnants of feudalistic conceptions and prejudices or nationalistic concepts, all of which constitute obstacles to the conducting of an ideal public opinion survey. Simple topics and forms are adopted; the card system is used for questions; surveys are conducted by about 500 cultured and non-politically biased persons in the various prefectures, who act under detailed instructions from the paper's head office; about 200,000 individuals are questioned in every survey in order to make up for the defects of sample cases; and each survey usually takes about a month.

Let us now take up some of the more important surveys conducted by reliable organizations.

II. Political P

1. Yoshida Cabinet and Political Part

Q (1) Do you support the Y

Q (2) Which party would yo
should be held in th

Two hundred thousand question of every 200, of the 39,820,000 persons a number, 70 % were men, and 30 % wo cupation was represented by the reci came in more heavily from the urban middle-age groups, than from the rur advanced in age.

These questionnaires were sent out of the Yoshida Cabinet (formed in May of confusion and instability in the resignation of the Shidehara Cabinet came somewhat clear and after the Di 127,436 replies were received, which, a were as follows;

Q (1) Do you support the Y

Yes.....	39,519..
No	45,292..
Reserved	37,416..
Total.....	122,227

This paper believes that under present sample ratio of men to women represented... and the ratio 8:2 (for men and women)... upon considerations of the qualified general elections for Lower House members... effective votes cast by men and women, candidates for seats in that House.

Press uses in general the method employment questionnaires are issued to about 3,000 to employees of the Press' local branches, and replies (through direct interviews).

been more cautious in its undertakings. It has the dangerous possibility of falling national conditions, and has endeavored its own efforts for the handicaps and in-statistics, remnants of feudalistic concepts, all of which constitute an ideal public opinion survey. Simple card system is used for questions; 500 cultured and non-politically biased persons, who act under detailed instructions about 200,000 individuals are questioned to make up for the defects of sample cases; about a month.

the more important surveys conducted

II. Political Problems

1. Yoshida Cabinet and Political Parties (1st Survey by Asahi)

- Q (1) Do you support the Yoshida Cabinet?
- Q (2) Which party would you support if a general election should be held in the near future?

Two hundred thousand question cards were mailed (one out of every 200, of the 39,820,000 persons above the age of 21). Of this number, 70 % were men, and 30 % women. Every profession or occupation was represented by the recipients of these cards. Replies came in more heavily from the urban residents and from persons in middle-age groups, than from the rural communities and those more advanced in age.

These questionnaires were sent out on July 1, 1946, when the nature of the Yoshida Cabinet (formed in May 1946, after a prolonged period of confusion and instability in the political circles, following the resignation of the Shidehara Cabinet in April of the same year) became somewhat clear and after the Diet had been convened. In all 127,436 replies were received, which, after deducting the invalid ones, were as follows;

Q (1) Do you support the Yoshida Cabinet?

Yes.....	39,519.....	32.3 %
No	45,292.....	37.1
Reserved	37,416.....	30.6
Total.....	122,227	100.0 %

Q (2) Which party would you support ?

Progressive (now Democratic).....	12 355.....	10.1 %
Liberal.....	28,810.....	23.6
Socialist	49,843.....	40.8
Communist	5,903.....	4.8
People's Cooperative.....	6,348.....	5.2
Other minor groups	1,114.....	0.9
No party.....	17,894.....	14.6
Total	122,227	100.0

Four points may be enumerated as indicative of the trend of opinion revealed in the replies to Question (1) above.

1). While 32 % of the persons, to whom questions were put, replied that they would support the Yoshida Cabinet 37 % definitely were opposed to it, and 31 % reserved their attitude. Thus, no conclusive and overwhelming votes were cast either in favor or against the Cabinet.

2). Geographically, prefectures in which farming communities predominate, showed support for the Yoshida Cabinet, where as those in which large cities are concentrated tended to oppose the said Cabinet.

3). By occupation (see Table 1 in the next page), opponents to the Cabinet belonged chiefly to the intellectual classes (students 51 %, company employees 42 %, clerks 42 %, officials 35 %, teachers 34 %) and laborers (manual workers 51 %). Supporters of the Government included: enterprisers 46 %, farmers 42 %, merchants 39 %, and industrialists 38 %. Those reserving their attitude included teachers 36 % and housewives 35 %.

Did you support?

.....	12,355	10.1 %
.....	28,810	23.6
.....	49,843	40.8
.....	5,903	4.8
.....	6,348	5.2
.....	1,114	0.9
.....	17,894	14.6
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Table 1.

Occupation	Supporting	Not Supporting	Reserving	Total
Public officials	4,911 32%	5,361 35%	5,119 34%	15,391 100%
Company employ- ees	3,528 29 "	4,995 42 "	3,555 29 "	12,078 100 "
Enterprisers	623 46 "	412 30 "	327 24 "	1,362 100 "
Independent pro- fessional workers	1,415 36 "	1,330 34 "	1,166 30 "	3,911 100 "
Teachers	2,157 30 "	2,422 34 "	2,533 36 "	7,112 100 "
Students	764 21 "	1,866 51 "	1,050 29 "	3,680 00 "
Manual workers	2,948 22 "	6,935 51 "	3,687 28 "	13,570 100 "
Clerks	2,667 24 "	4,747 42 "	3,810 34 "	11,224 100 "
Farmers	9,218 42 "	6,579 30 "	6,184 28 "	21,981 100 "
Merchants	3,693 39 "	2,822 30 "	2,791 30 "	9,306 100 "
Fishermen	581 40 "	465 32 "	396 38 "	1,442 100 "
Industrialists	597 38 "	517 33 "	463 29 "	1,577 100 "
Others	820 41 "	649 32 "	558 28 "	2,027 100 "
Housewives	1,760 31 "	1,889 33 "	1,979 35 "	3,528 100 "
Jobless	3,275 33 "	3,533 35 "	3,184 32 "	9,992 100 "
Undetermined	562 29 "	770 40 "	614 32 "	1,946 100 "
Grand Total	39,519 32%	45,292 37%	37,416 31 "	122,227 100%

N.B. Occupational groupings were based on the following:

- (a) Enterprisers (capita'ists, directors of companies & factories).
- (b) Industrialists (medium and smaller-classes).
- (c) Manual workers (factory operatives, miners, transport workers, and free laborers).
- (d) Clerks typists, telephone operators, sales girls, shop employees, and clerks).

- (e) Farmers (farmer owners, tenant farmers, live-stock breeders, forest owners).
- (f) Others (hotel or restaurant owners and the like landlords of houses).

4). By age, the replies showed that the Yoshida Cabinet was supported more by (1) men above 40 and (2) women above 30, than the younger people. Of the men in the twenties, only 24 % said that they supported the Cabinet, while 46 % said they would not support it. Of the men in the thirties, 30 % were supporters and 41 % non-supporters. Of the women in the twenties, 25 % were in favor of the Cabinet and 39 % opposed.

Table 2.

Ages	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 & over	total	sex unknown
No. of votes	26752	35031	23982	11009	3562	90309	1439
Supporting	24%	30%	38%	47%	53%	33%	36%
Not Supporting	46 "	41 "	32 "	26 "	22 "	37 "	38 "
Reserved	30 "	30 "	30 "	27 "	25 "	29 "	26 "
<i>Women</i>							
No. of votes	17470	7333	3915	1344	417	30479	
Supporting	25%	33%	37%	43%	48%	30%	
Not Supporting	39 "	33 "	31 "	26 "	23 "	36 "	
Reserved	36 "	34 "	33 "	31 "	29 "	35 "	

As for Q (2), which party would you support ?, the replies reflected the popular thinking vis-a-vis the parties and their basis. The following points require emphasis :

1). Just as the Yoshida Cabinet supported overwhelmingly, none of the parties received support, although the Socialist Party received the highest percentage.

2). In those prefectures where the number of cities of the country with large numbers of voters, the various parties were supported as follows:

Socialist P.....	46 %
Liberal P	20 %
Progressive P	8 %
Cooperative P	4 %
Communist P	6 %
Other minor P....	1 %

The Socialists obtained in these prefectures 46 % of the votes, while the Liberals obtained 20 %, 4 % and 2 % less than the national average, respectively.

3). By occupation, about 50 % of the voters (workers, clerks) and about 44 % of the voters (teachers, school teachers, free workers and farmers) supported the Communist Party. This Party received about 32 % of the votes from commercial, industrial, and fishing communities.

The Liberal Party, on the other hand, received 21 % support from the intellectuals, while the Communist Party was favored by 21 % of the voters.

The Communist Party was favored by 21 % of the voters.

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showed that the Yoshida Cabinet was above 40 and (2) women above 30, than men in the twenties, only 24 % said that while 46 % said they would not support es, 30 % were supporters and 41 % non- the twenties, 25 % were in favor of the

Table 2.

31-40	41-50	51-60	61 & over	total	sex un-known
35031	23982	11009	3562	90309	1439
30%	38%	47%	53%	33%	36%
41 "	32 "	26 "	22 "	37 "	38 "
30 "	30 "	27 "	25 "	29 "	26 "
7333	3915	1344	417	30479	
33%	37%	43%	48%	30%	
33 "	31 "	26 "	23 "	36 "	
34 "	33 "	31 "	29 "	35 "	

would you support ?, the replies reflected the parties and their basis. The fol-

1). Just as the Yoshida Cabinet was not either opposed or supported overwhelmingly, none of the parties received a strong-majority support, although the Socialist Party obtained a relatively high percentage.

2). In those prefectures wherein are located the eight leading cities of the country with large numbers of intellectuals and laborers, the various parties were supported as follows:

- Socialist P.....46 %
 - Liberal P20
 - Progressive P 8
 - Cooperative P 4
 - Communist P 6
 - Other minor P.... 1
- (15 % said they would not support any party)

The Socialists obtained in these areas 5 % more votes than the national average, while the Liberals and Progressives received, respectively, 4 % and 2 % less than the national average.

3). By occupation, about 50 % of the working classes (manual workers, clerks) and about 44 % of the intellectuals (company employees, school teachers, free workers and students) supported the Socialist Party. This Party received about 32 % support from the agricultural, commercial, industrial, and fishing classes or communities.

The Liberal Party, on the other hand, polled 31 % support from the agricultural, commercial, industrial, and fishing groups; it received 21 % support from the intellectuals, and 17 % of the laborers.

The Communist Party was favored by a small number of students

Table 3.

	<i>Progressive</i>		<i>Liberal</i>		<i>Socialist</i>	
Public Officials	1,526	10%	3,265	21%	6,580	43%
Company Employees	985	8	2,572	21	5,852	43
Enterprisers	189	14	597	37	370	27
Independent professional workers	378	10	912	24	1,421	37
Teachers	506	7	1,358	19	3,281	46
Students	183	5	534	15	1,622	45
Manual workers	86	6	2,171	16	7,031	52
Clerks	962	9	2,016	18	5,248	47
Farmers	3,096	14	6,450	30	6,814	31
Fishermen	170	12	461	33	446	31
Merchants	1,206	13	2,983	32	3,144	34
Industrialists	178	11	489	30	617	38
Others	317	16	590	29	697	34
Housewives	510	9	1,519	27	2,331	41
Jobless	1,080	11	2,534	25	3,628	36
Unknown	207	11	449	23	761	39
Grand Total	12,355	10%	28,810	24%	49,843	41%

and manual workers (mostly younger people) only.

It is noteworthy that a considerable number in all occupations replied that they would support no party. Apparently, this class of people are dissatisfied with the older conservative parties, but have not yet come to place full confidence in socialism. A few cases may be cited to show the ratios existing among the supporters of the various parties and this group of non-partisans.

Table 3.

Communist		People's Coop.		Others		No Party		Total	
539	3%	856	6%	90	1%	2,58	17%	15,427	100%
621	5	476	4	63	1	1,759	14	12,328	100
34	3	80	6	21	2	164	12	1,365	100
203	5	237	6	41	1	641	17	3,833	100
174	2	411	6	151	2	1,242	17	7,123	100
329	9	165	5	9	0	727	20	3,569	100
1,371	10	385	3	104	1	1,648	12	13,572	100
576	5	481	4	99	1	1,894	17	11,276	100
697	3	1,871	9	218	1	2,600	12	21,746	100
69	5	66	5	15	1	191	13	1,418	100
289	5	428	5	85	1	1,160	12	9,295	100
53	3	56	3	16	1	207	13	1,616	100
67	3	89	4	22	1	257	13	2,039	100
203	4	273	5	66	1	780	14	5,682	100
549	5	407	4	88	1	1,74	17	10,035	100
139	7	67	3	26	1	294	15	1,943	100
5,923	5%	6,348	5%	1,114	1%	17,894	15%	122,267	100%

Aomori pref.....Liberals 24 %, Socialists 26 %, Non-partisans 18%.
 Saga pref.....Liberals 27 %, Socialists 29 %, Non-partisans 15%.
 Kumamoto pref ..Liberals 34 %, Socialists 29 %, Non-partisans 17%.

4). Considered by age, the Socialist Party was favored by 45% of those in the twenties, 43% of those in the thirties, and 39% of those in the forties. On the other hand, the Liberal Party was supported by the aged people; those in the 50's and 60's gave more

support to the Liberals than to the Socialists. The Progressive Party supporters showed a tendency very much similar to those supporting the Liberal Party. As for the Communists, 7 % in the twenties supported them, decreasing to 0 as the ages advanced.

The Second Survey by Asahi Shimbun

- Q. (1) Do you support the Yoshida Cabinet?
Q. (2) Which party would you support in the next general elections?

Questionnaires were issued on January 15, 1947, when political tension was almost at its climax (a movement was actively on foot for the formation of a three-party Coalition Cabinet of Liberals, Progressives and Socialists), and when the so-called "labor offensive" was steadily advancing. A total of 204,880 question cards were sent out, and 173,383 replies came in (of this number, 10,849 were invalid). The questions were sent to one out of every 180 qualified voters recorded by the Home Ministry in April 1946. As for occupations, the figures of the agriculture and forestry (as on April 1, 1946) of farmers and non-farmers were taken into consideration. Farming population was classified into land owners, independent farmers and tenant farmers. Non-farmers' occupation statistics included the Welfare Ministry's Provisional Registration Reports on Labor (Feb. 1, 1945), and Labor Survey on October 10, 1946.

These questionnaires were distributed throughout the country by 4,500 survey conductors and a certain number of primary school children. Replies were sent back sealed, so that secrecy could be maintained and the free expression of the people obtained. Replies

from women, as well as those from the rural communities, increased considerably as compared with the previous survey. Another feature was the increase of replies from aged people (in the former survey, more replies came from the younger people), and a more correct picture of the whole trend of views was thus obtained. Again, this time more replies came from public officials and school teachers than the laborers, more from the independent farmers than the tenant farmers, as compared with the previous survey.

Q (1) Do you support the Yoshida Cabinet ?

Yes	46,135.....	28.4 %	(32.3 % in first survey)
No	79,127.....	48.7 %	(37.1 % ")
No view	37,227.....	22.9 %	(30.6 % ")

Q (2) Which party would you support in the next election ?

Liberal P	42,256.....	26.0 %	(23.6 % in first survey)
Progressive P	20,951.....	12.9 %	(10.1 % ")
Socialist P.....	73,624.....	45.3 %	(40.8 % ")
People's Coop	7,299.....	4.5 %	(5.2 % ")
Nationalist P	2,415.....	1.5 %	
Communist P	8,299.....	5.1 %	(4.8 % ")
Other factions	1,559.....	1.0 %	(0.9 % ")
Independents.....	6,090.....	3.7 %	(14.6 % ")

The replies to Q(1) may be summarized as follows :

1). Approximately 50 % showed no support for the Yoshida Cabinet, and only 30 % showed support. Compared with the results of last year's survey (32 % supporting, 37 % opposing, and 31 % reserving their attitude), this is a marked change in the attitude of the

people. It means that considerable numbers who formerly supported the Cabinet and those who had reserved their attitude in the first survey, had shifted over to the side of non-supporters.

2). From the occupational point of view, 60 % of company employees, school teachers, laborers, and students, who are in the financially poor classes, as well as 60 % of the public officials, did not give their support, as shown in the following table. Those who were better off financially, such as enterprisers (52 %), merchants and industrialists (35 %), independent professional workers (36 %), independent farmers (39 %), fishermen (30 %), and land owners (54 %) supported the Cabinet. Again, it is noticeable that the areas which are economically better off, like Kyushu, Shikoku, and others of agricultural regions, gave their support to the Cabinet, while the regions of Tohoku, Kanto, and the cities where living is difficult, did not favor this Cabinet.

3). By sex, replies from women were lower in percentage compared with the men, both of the supporting or non-supporting groups; apparently, women still do not possess clear-cut views of their own on political matters.

4. As in the previous survey, the older people generally supported the Yoshida Cabinet, and the younger groups opposed it.

Replies to Q (2) may be summarized as follows;

1. Although failing to secure a stabilizing majority, the Socialist Party obtained 45 %, which was higher than the combined support received by the Government parties (Liberal and Progressive), which was 39 %. If all the other minor factions were added, the Opposition

Table 4.

	<i>No. of valid votes</i>	<i>Supporting</i>	<i>Not Supporting</i>	<i>No View</i>
Public officials	16,655	4,411 26%	9,469 57%	2,775 17%
Company employees	13,800	3,298 24	8,240 60	2,262 16
Laborers	15,482	2,244 15	10,108 65	3,130 20
School teachers	7,054	1,614 23	4,418 63	1,022 14
Students	3,525	801 23	2,208 62	516 15
Independent profes- sional wokers	3,497	1,246 36	1,640 47	611 17
Enterprisers	2,576	1,331 52	882 34	363 14
Merchants, indust- rialists	12,477	4,385 35	5,227 42	2,365 23
Land owners	4,651	2,498 54	1,239 26	914 20
Independent farmers	25,544	9,848 39	9,051 35	6,645 26
Tenant farmers	20,607	5,218 25	9,837 43	5,552 7
Fishermen	2,048	616 30	813 40	619 30
Jobless	3,318	581 17	2,046 62	691 21
Housewives	29,966	7,701 26	13,384 45	3,881 29
Others	1,289	343 27	565 44	331 29
Grand Total	162,439	46,135 28%	79,127 49%	37,227 23%

received 61 % support.

2). According to occupations, the Socialist Party obtained the support of 59 % of laborers, 57 % of school teachers, 56 % of company employees, and 50 % of jobless people. These groups of people are living by borrowing money from others or by selling whatever property they happen to possess. Those supporting the Liberal and Progressive Parties included land owners (69 %), enterprisers (60 %),

Independent farmers, merchants, industrialists, fishermen, and free workers.

Communists were favored by 13% of the jobless people, 11% of students, 10% of laborers, and 5% each of the public officials and company employees.

3). By ages, as in previous examples, the older groups were in

Table 5.

	Liberal		Progressive		Socialist	
Public officials	3,574	24%	1,916	12%	8,133	53%
Company employees	2,800	20	1,446	10	7,790	56
Laborers	2,310	15	1,240	8	9,138	59
School teachers	1,180	17	715	10	4,011	57
Students	637	18	257	7	1,916	54
Independent professional workers	998	29	495	14	,400	40
Enterprisers	1,041	40	509	20	703	27
Merchants & industrialists	4,081	33	1,878	15	5,047	40
Land owners	2,061	44	1,164	25	794	17
Independent farmers	8,788	5	4,387	17	8,242	32
Tenant farmers	4,916	24	2,306	11	9,45	46
Fishermen	687	33	268	13	703	34
Jobless	537	16	270	8	1,641	50
Housewives	8,322	28	3,919	13	13,412	45
Others	324	25	181	14	541	42
Grand Total	42,256	26%	20,951	13%	73,624	45%

favor of the conservative parties and the younger the Socialist or Communist (or other progressive) parties. The majority of both men and women up to 40 supported the newer and progressive parties, while those above 50 overwhelmingly cast their votes to the conservative parties. The majority of men and women in the 20's and men in the 30's supported the Socialist Party.

Table 5.

<i>People's Coop.</i>		<i>Nationalist</i>		<i>Communist</i>		<i>Others</i>		<i>Independent</i>	
675	4%	127	1%	832	5%	168	1%	530	3%
374	3	108	1	782	5	100	1	400	4
387	3	209	1	1,600	10	122	1	476	3
278	4	222	3	344	5	60	1	244	3
133	4	29	1	376	11	37	1	140	4
148	4	29	1	204	6	50	1	173	5
116	5	34	1	49	3	34	1	90	4
377	3	142	1	396	3	107	1	449	4
311	7	67	2	63	1	46	1	145	3
1,848	7	453	2	609	2	250	1	967	4
1,323	7	403	2	1,298	6	216	1	692	3
115	6	58	3	116	6	22	1	79	4
135	4	45	1	430	13	56	2	204	6
1,026	3	469	1	1,144	4	254	1	1,420	5
49	4	20	2	56	4	37	3	81	6
7,295	5%	2,415	1%	8,299	5%	1,559	1%	6,090	4%

2. Draft of the New Constitution

The Mainichi Shimbun, one of the leading newspapers of this country, conducted a survey of public opinion in May 1946 on the "Draft of the New Constitution" (original draft of the new Constitution now in force, there being no essential difference from the present one).

Method of the survey—Two thousand intellectuals of both sexes were selected and questioned. The population ratios of the prefectures was not given consideration, emphasis being placed on the cultural level of the people questioned; the question as to whether or not the persons concerned suffered personal damages from the war was also considered. The questionnaires were sent to 200 persons in Tokyo, 120 each in Kyoto and Osaka, 70 each in Aichi, Hyogo, and Fukuoka prefectures, 60 each in Hokkaido, Kanagawa, Miyagi, Niigata, and Ishikawa prefectures, and 30 each in other prefectures. The other facts relative to the distribution of these questionnaires were:

- | | | | |
|--|----------------|------------|--------------|
| (1) Men..... | 1,738 (86.9 %) | Women..... | 262 (13.1 %) |
| (2) Educational consideration | | | |
| Graduates of universities | 786 (39.3 %) | | |
| " of senmon gakko, higher schools | 389 (19.5 %) | | |
| " of middle schools | 613 (30.7 %) | | |
| Others | 212 (10.6 %) | | |
| (3) Occupational consideration | | | |
| Public officials | 483 (24.2 %) | | |
| Company employees | 301 (15.0 %) | | |
| Scholars, educators..... | 269 (13.5 %) | | |
| Business men (enterprisers) | 176 (8.8 %) | | |

Agriculturalists	122 (6.1 %)
Private enterprisers	95 (4.8 %)
Judicials (judges, procurators, attorneys, etc.)..	88 (4.4 %)
Medical men.....	77 (3.9 %)
Writers (critics, authors, journalists, publishers, radio broadcasters, etc.).....	70 (3.5 %)
Students	50 (2.5 %)
Religious workers	43 (2.2 %)
Farm-labor movement workers.....	40 (2.0 %)
Miscellaneous (jobless, housewives, etc.).....	186 (9.3 %)

(No member of either of the two Houses of the Diet were included.)

(a) *The Emperor System*

Q (1) Do you recognize the Emperor system? (Articles 1 and 2, Chapter 1, of Constitution)

Q (2) Should we adopt a republican form of government by abolishing the Emperor system?

In regard to the first question, 1,702 persons (85 %) replied that they were in favor of the Emperor system, while 263 (13 %) were against the system. The supporters of the system were occupationally distributed as follows:

Private (personal) enterprisers	91 %
Business men (financiers).....	90 %
Medical men	90 %
Public officials	89 %
Miscellaneous	89 %
Agriculturalists	88 %
Religious workers.....	86 %

Company employees	82 %
Judicial men	82 %
Scholars, educators	81 %
Writers, etc.	70 %
Students	68 %
Farm-labor movement workers	55 %

As for the second question, the replies were:

Favoring abolition of the Emperor system.....	215 (11 %)
Opposing — " —	1,711 (86 %)
Undecided	74 (3.7 %)

Those favoring abolition of the Emperor system were occupationally distributed as follows:

Farm-labor movement workers.....	48 %
Students	20 %
Company employees, private enterprisers, writers, etc....	16 %
Medical men, agriculturalists	10 % each
Scholars, educators	9 %
Judicial men (judges, procurators, attorneys, etc.)	7 %
Public officials, miscellaneous	6 % each
Financiers, religious workers	5 % each

Comparing the figures on the replies to Q (1) and Q (2), we find that all of those who opposed the Emperor system did not necessarily favor a republican form of government. An analysis of the 48 persons (difference between 265 who favored abolition of the Emperor system, Q (1) and 215 who favored a republican form of government by abolishing the Emperor system) shows the following:

(1) About one-half of this number (48) said they would recognize the Emperor system in principle, and that they were opposed to placing sovereignty in the hands of the people.

2) Fifteen favored the Socialist Party's contention that the Emperor should be left only as "ceremonial existence," with no political powers whatever.

(3) Four supported the Liberal Party's contention that the Emperor should be made the "supervisor" of administration with sovereignty residing in the State.

(4) Two wanted sovereignty to be with the Ruler, as advocated by the Progressive Party.

(5) One other reply.

On the other hand, 14 persons advocated what they termed the "republican form of government under the Emperor system," in which the Emperor was only left for ceremonial purposes.

Thus a total of 1,738 persons (87 %) were in favor of the Emperor system in one form or another, distributed as follows:

Favoring Emperor system as per Government draft	1702
" " " as per own individual plan	22
" republican gov. under Emperor system.....	14
	<u>1,738</u>

The foregoing figures represent the views of the intellectual classes of the people, who are regarded as possessing more advanced opinion on political matters. Accordingly, if a general plebiscite were to be taken on this question, it is most likely that the supporters of the Emperor system would be far in excess of the above figures.

Among the supporters of the Government draft, 14 stated: "Although a republican form of government may be ideal, the Emperor system should be allowed to remain during the present transition period." This means that the overwhelming support that is now given the Emperor system does not, of necessity, continue to be so in the future.

(b) *Renunciation of War*

- Q (1) Is this provision necessary?
- Q (2) If not, what are your reasons?

Replies to Q (1)

Necessary.....1,395 (72 %)
 Unnecessary 568 (28 %)

By sex, the replies were:

Men: necessary 69 %, unnecessary 21 %
 Women: " 73 %, " 27 %

By occupation, those who replied that the provision was unnecessary were distributed as follows:

Public officials34 %
 Company employees29 %
 Financiers27 %
 Religious workers21 %
 Writers, authors, etc.19 %
 Agriculturalists, judicial men.....30 % each
 Students28 %
 Scholars & educators25 %
 Medical men25 %

Farm-labor movement workers20 %
Private enterprisers16 %

An examination of the reasons, given for considering the provision in question as being unnecessary, show:

101 persons..... There is no need of surrendering the right of self-defence, although aggressive wars should be abandoned.

72 persons..... This is too Utopian; such matters should be fixed by international treaties or after Japan declares permanent neutrality, or when the UNO guarantees our safety; otherwise, the provision is likely to end in a dead letter. A unilateral declaration is meaningless.

Even among the farm-labor movement workers, there were some who declared that "we must defend ourselves against aggressive attacks, with our own blood."

(c) *The National Diet*

- Q (1) Do you favor a bi-cameral system ?
Q (2) Is it necessary to give a veto power to the Government or the Emperor against the decisions of the Diet ?
Q (3) If the Diet acts against the will of the people, should it not be dissolved by plebiscite ?

Replies to Q (1) showed that 1,588 (79 %) wanted a bi-cameral system, while 345 (17 %) opposed it. The ratio among the two sexes-

was about the same. Those who advocated a single-chamber system were found among the more progressive elements, including farm-labor movement workers (45 %), writers and authors (30 %), company employees (19 %), and students (18 %).

To Q (2), those favoring a veto power for the Government or the Emperor number 934 (47 %), those opposing 1,039 (52 %).

As for Q (3), those favoring a dissolution by plebiscite numbered 1,592 (80 %), and those opposing 349 (17 %). No great differences were noticed between men and women in their respective ratios for yes and no.

Among the advocates of a veto for the Government or Emperor were: scholars and educators (65 %), religious workers (63 %), miscellaneous (55 %), financiers (53 %), public officials (47 %), mainly conservative in their views. Those opposing the granting of veto included; farm-labor movement workers (78 %), writers, authors, etc. (73 %), and students (64 %), representing the more progressive ideas.

In connection with Q (3), dissolution of the Diet was favored by farm-labor movement workers (100 %), writers and authors (95 %), students (92 %), religious workers (88 %), private enterprisers (86 %), scholars and educators (83 %).

Whereas replies to Q (2) indicated that the people were not so seriously concerned with the fear of "tyranny by a majority party," answers to Q (3) clearly show that this is causing some considerable anxiety among the voters. Many are opposed to giving veto power to the Government because they knew that in the future every Govern-

ment will be formed by a "majority party," and because to give it to the Emperor would be undemocratic. The only solution would be to dissolve the Diet in accordance with the results of a plebiscite.

(d) *On the Katayama Cabinet*

(Survey conducted by Mainichi Shimbun)

Between July 1 and 10, 1947, immediately following the formation of the Katayama Cabinet, this survey was carried out; questions were asked of 5,000 men and women throughout the country. The ratio of men to women receiving the questions was 8:2 (4,000 men and 1,000 women). This ratio was worked out after the figures on total votes cast in the general elections in April, 1947, were considered, the number of women's votes cast, the number of total candidates and that of women candidates, the number of total candidates returned and the number of women elected, etc.

Of the 4,000 men, to whom questionnaires were sent, 30 % were farmers and fishermen, 20 % (each) salaried people, laborers, and merchant-industrialists, and 10 % free workers. Of the 1,000 women, 30 % were farmers and 70 % non-farmers. Replies received numbered 4,803 or 96 %.

Q (1) Do you support the Katayama Cabinet?

Yes.....	3,300.....	68.7 %
No.....	1,503.....	31.3 %
Total.....	4,803.....	100.0 %

Thus it can readily be seen that the Cabinet was given support by a majority.

Table 6.

Supporting

<i>Occupation</i>	Policies good	Friend of laborers	No other suitable parties	Sincere in politics	Democratic	Proper constitutional practice
Farmers & Fishermen	28.8	15.9	8.0	8.4	6.1	4.3
Salaried people	26.8	20.0	11.0	9.1	3.8	3.8
Laborers	21.0	28.7	8.7	5.4	2.5	2.0
Merchants & Industrialists	23.7	11.8	13.6	10.0	4.5	5.9
Independent professional workers	32.1	12.6	13.7	8.2	1.4	6.5
Farmer-women	18.4	16.2	16.2	9.7	3.3	1.6
Non Farmer-women	19.5	18.3	11.3	6.6	5.4	3.9
Total	24.7	18.6	11.0	8.0	4.1	3.9

Not Supporting

<i>Occupation</i>	Not carrying out promises	No Political power	Opposed to Socialism	Opposed to Coalition	Excessive Control
Farmers-Fishermen	25.8	19.1	14.8	7.3	3.0
Salaried people	26.1	29.4	7.6	8.0	2.9
Laborers	26.7	19.0	11.3	6.3	3.2
Merchants & Industrialists	18.4	22.0	16.3	4.8	11.9
Independent professional workers	16.0	27.8	12.6	10.1	4.2
Farmer-women	23.3	13.7	15.0	5.5	9.6
Non Farmer-women	28.0	17.2	16.7	3.2	6.4
Total	23.7	21.6	13.6	6.3	5.9

Table 6.

Trust in Premier Katayama	New Political feeling	Coalition	Middle-of-the-Road Course	Socialist Nucleus	Others	No replies	No. of Replies
3.4	2.2	5.1	1.0	1.7	5.0	10.1	100
2.5	4.2	2.2	3.4	1.2	3.5	8.5	100
2.3	2.5	2.0	3.0	3.8	3.5	13.7	100
3.9	3.0	4.5	2.7	1.6	7.3	7.5	100
3.7	3.4	2.0	1.4	1.7	3.7	9.6	100
1.6	4.8	2.7	0.6	1.6	5.4	13.0	100
5.3	4.3	2.7	2.1	2.3	5.5	12.8	100
3.6	3.3	3.1	2.3	2.1	4.7	10.6	100

Too theoretical	High Gt. Service Charges	Same as Yoshida Cabinet	No Confidence	No plans for unemployment	Others	No replies	No. of Replies
3.9	4.6	3.9	4.6	—	9.1	3.9	100
5.0	2.1	4.6	1.7	0.4	4.2	8.0	100
3.2	4.5	4.1	2.3	1.8	7.2	10.4	100
6.5	3.3	2.5	2.7	0.6	6.5	4.5	100
5.9	3.3	3.3	2.5	—	5.9	8.4	100
2.7	2.7	4.1	6.9	—	9.6	6.9	100
1.6	7.5	3.2	3.2	1.1	3.8	8.1	100
4.4	4.0	3.6	3.1	0.6	6.6	6.6	100

Those receiving the questionnaires were asked to state their reasons for either supporting or opposing the Katayama Cabinet, and the replies were as *Table 6*.

Among the reasons given by the supporters of the Katayama Cabinet, "Socialistic policies" tops the list with 815 persons out of the total supporters numbering 3,300 or 24.7 %.

The second reason in the list is "friend of the laboring people" (615 persons, 18.6 %), while the third prominent reason is "because there are no other suitable parties." (11 %).

On the other hand, among the reasons for not supporting the Katayama Cabinet, the first is "failure to carry out the promises" (made at election time). Out of the total of 1,503 non-supporters, 356 (23.7 %) gave this for their reason in opposing the present Cabinet. The next reason is "lack of political power" (21.6 %), while 13.6 % of the non-supporters openly declared they were opposed to socialism.

Included in this survey was a supplementary questions: "Which party would you vote for in the next general election?" The replies were as follows:

<i>Parties</i>	<i>No. of replies</i>	<i>Supporting</i>	<i>Not supporting</i>
Socialist.....	2,266	87.3 %	12.7 %
Democratic (ex-Progressive) ..	740	63.8 %	36.2 %
Liberal	966	32.9 %	67.1 %
People's Cooperative	120	67.5 %	32.5 %
Communist	137	54.7 %	45.3 %
Others	574	65.3 %	34.7 %
	4,803		

The above table indicates that even among those who would cast their votes for the Socialist Party, there are 12.7 % of "rebel" elements; the majority of these gave for their reason: "because the Party has failed to carry out its promises made at election time."

Supporters and non-supporters of the Katayama Cabinet, grouped by occupations, were lined up as follows:

<i>Occupations</i>	<i>Supporters</i>	<i>Non-supporters</i>
Farmers & fishermen	12.2 %	6.9 %
Salaried people	14.2 %	4.3 %
Laborers	12.5 %	4.6 %
Merchants & industrialists.....	9.1 %	7.0 %
Free workers	6.1 %	2.5 %
Farming women	3.9 %	1.5 %
Non-farming women	10.7 %	3.9 %
	<hr/> 68.7 %	<hr/> 31.3 %

Contrary to general belief, farmers and fishermen, as well as merchants and industrialists, supported the Cabinet in greater proportion than their respective opponents. The salaried people and the laborers, of course, were expected to give their support to the Cabinet. In general, the percentage of supporters far exceeds that of non-supporters.

Another question asked was: "What do you wish to be done first by the Katayama Cabinet?" Replies covered more than 30 items, of which the following were the more important:

Measures for food crisis	39.3 %
Stabilization of living	27.3 %

Securing of bounty-articles (for farmers).....	4.4 %
Do not expect much	3.9 %
Fulfilment of public promises	3.4 %
Increase of production	2.4 %
Elevation of people's morals.....	2.0 %
Reform of taxation.....	1.9 %
Removal of controls.....	1.5 %
Convening of peace conference.....	1.4 %
Increase of prices of agricultural products	1.1 %
Cleaning-up of officialdom	1.1 %
Fairer delivery quotas of rice	1.1 %
Fair distribution of foodstuffs	1.1 %
Promotion of foreign trade.....	0.8 %
More living quarters.....	0.5 %
Others	6.8 %
	<u>100.0 %</u>

The above clearly reveals that the greatest concern of the Japanese people today is to get more food and their living stabilized, involving the question of inflation. Requests for the calling of the peace conference or the reopening of foreign trade apparently are regarded secondary.

Grouped by occupations, those clamoring for food and the stabilization of living stood as follows:

<i>Occupations</i>	<i>For Foodstuffs</i>	<i>For Stabilization of Living</i>
Salaried people.....	42.7 %	31.4 %
Laborers.....	47.0 %	27.7 %
Merchants & industrialists	39.2 %	22.8 %
Farmers & fishermen	23.7 %	24.2 %
Farming women	22.4 %	23.2 %
Non-farming women	50.8 %	30.5 %

These figures speak eloquently how strong is the cry for food today.

III. Economic Problems

Measures to Combat Inflation and the People's Life Under the Inflation

On November 10, 1946, the Asahi Shimbun sent out the following questionnaires to 107,184 households (1 out of every 150 households in the country, based on population statistics prepared by the Home Ministry as on April 16, 1946):

- Q (1) What measures do you think would be the best to prevent the inflation?
- Q (2) On what sources of income is your family living?

The survey was conducted just when the labor offensive was growing in intensity centering around the question of demands for increase in wages, and when the need for reorganizing the nation's economy and individual living was strongly voiced among various sections of the people.

Statistics on farmers and non-farmers prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (as on April 1, 1946) were used to decide the distribution of occupations for the questionnaires. The farmers were grouped into land owners, independent farmers, and tenant farmers. The distribution of non-farming population was fixed by relying on figures possessed by the various prefectures.

Of the households receiving the questionnaires, 85,963 (roughly

80 %) sent in their replies. Among the replies from the farming groups, those from the land owners and independent farmers exceeded those from tenant farmers. Of the non-farming groups, replies from fishermen were fewer than expected, while those from salaried people were heavier proportionately than the others.

The replies to Q (1) were as follows:

Table 7.

<i>Occupations</i>	<i>Valid Replies</i>	<i>Drastic Measures</i>		<i>Moderate Measures</i>		<i>No View</i>	
Enterprisers	1,857	435	23%	1,238	67%	184	10%
Medium & smaller-class merchants, & industrialists	11,096	2,476	22	6,724	61	1,896	17
Salaried people	27,445	12,237	45	11,909	43	3,299	12
Laborers	6,452	2,236	35	2,460	38	1,756	27
Free workers	2,884	1,043	36	1,476	51	365	13
Land owners	2,398	676	28	1,388	58	334	14
Independent farmers	13,515	2,980	22	8,210	61	2,325	17
Tenant farmers	9,450	2,459	26	4,558	48	2,433	26
Fishermen	1,247	286	23	625	50	336	27
Jobless	3,812	1,426	37	1,449	38	937	25
Others	982	346	35	425	43	211	22
Total	81,138	26,600	33%	40,462	50%	14,076	17%

1) As may be seen from the above table, those advocating drastic measures (such as re-freezing of the new yen or imposition of heavier taxes) reached only 33 %, while those favoring moderate measures

(such as promoting savings) were 50 %; 17 % had no views. Since this was a financial question requiring some expert knowledge, many were naturally unable to give off-hand replies.

2) Those favoring drastic measures were mainly of the intellectual classes; 45 % of the salaried people favored such measures, followed by the jobless, free workers, laborers, land owners, tenant farmers, enterprisers, etc. in the order mentioned. The last in this group were the medium and smaller-class merchants and industrialists, as well as the independent farmers (22 % each).

3) Among those who wanted moderate measures to fight the inflation were:—enterprisers (67 %), followed by medium and smaller merchants and industrialists, independent farmers, land owners, free workers, fishermen, tenant farmers, in the order named. The last of this group were the jobless and the laborers (38 % each).

Replies to Q (2) were as *Table 8*.

1) From this table, it is clear that 51 % of the households (to whom questionnaires were sent) are living only on incomes from fixed occupations, and that the remaining 49 % are living by "red ink" accounting.

2) By occupation, 76 % of the independent farmers, followed by fishermen, merchants and industrialists, tenant farmers, enterprisers, and free workers were supporting themselves without selling their clothes or whatever other items of property they happened to possess. Among those who were in the "red ink" category, 68 % of the salaried people (so-called white-collared job classes) were suffering

under the inflation.

Table 8.

<i>Occupations</i>	<i>On fixed wages</i>	<i>On wages & by selling goods on hand</i>
Enterprisers	1,232 66%	625 34%
Medium & smaller class merchants & industrialists	7,489 67	3,607 33
Salaried workers	8,891 32	18,554 68
Laborers	2,885 45	3,567 55
Free professional workers	1,812 63	1,072 37
Land owners	1,018 42	1,380 58
Independent farmers	10,318 76	3,197 24
Tenant farmers	6,335 67	3,115 33
Fishermen	875 70	372 30
Jobless	204 5	3,608 95
Others	407 41	575 59
Total.	41,466 51%	39,672 49%

IV. Labor Problems.

The February 1 General Strike (abortive)

On January 31, 1947, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, issued a directive ordering the stoppage of the general strike scheduled for February 1 (the following day) by the 2,600,000 members of the All-Government and Public Worker's Unions. Negotiations had been going on since January 18, when these workers decided to call a general strike if their demands could not be met, between the Government and the central executive committee of the Unions. The mediation of the Central Labor Relations Board was ineffective. Only SCAP's timely order stopped this threatened nation-wide strikes.

The Jiji Shimpo conducted a survey of public opinion on this great issue between the Government and its employees. Was the use of this weapon (general strike) justified in view of the critical economic conditions prevailing? The results of the survey revealed the general attitude of the people on this question, as well as on labor movement in general.

Method of Survey—Four thousand men and women were questioned, this figure being based on population statistics as on April 26, 1946, and the questionnaires were sent out during the middle of February 1947.

Q (1) Although the general strike of Government employees and school teachers has been averted, which side, do you think,

was unreasonable?

Replies to this question were as follows:

Table 9.

	Total	21-30	31-40	41-50	51 and over
<i>Total</i>	3,933(100%)	1,680(100%)	804(100%)	793(100%)	655(100%)
Men	1,974(100%)	972(100%)	432(100%)	435(100%)	135(100%)
Women	1,958(100%)	708(100%)	372(100%)	358(100%)	520(100%)
<i>Government Unreasonable</i>					
Total	1,037(26.4)	493(29.3)	244(30.3)	200(25.2)	100(15.3)
Men	614(31.1)	316(32.5)	146(33.8)	124(28.5)	28(20.7)
Women	423(21.6)	177(25.0)	98(26.3)	76(21.2)	72(13.8)
<i>Unions Unreasonable</i>					
Total	1,731(44.0)	784(46.7)	356(44.3)	358(45.1)	233(35.6)
Men	993(50.3)	476(49.0)	214(49.5)	228(52.4)	75(55.6)
Women	738(37.7)	308(43.5)	142(38.2)	130(36.3)	158(30.4)
<i>Not Interested</i>					
Total	336(8.6)	111(6.6)	67(8.3)	79(10.0)	79(12.1)
Men	128(6.5)	63(6.5)	23(5.3)	33(7.6)	9(6.7)
Women	208(10.6)	48(6.8)	44(11.8)	46(12.8)	70(13.5)
<i>Don't know</i>					
Total	828(21.0)	292(17.4)	137(17.1)	156(19.7)	243(37.0)
Men	239(12.1)	117(12.0)	49(11.4)	50(11.5)	23(17.0)
Women	589(30.1)	175(24.7)	88(23.7)	106(29.7)	220(42.3)

1) As may be observed from the above table, the number of those who thought that the labor unions were unreasonable reached 1,731 (44%) of the total replies (3,932); those who thought that the Government was unreasonable numbered 1,037 (26.4%); those who said they were not interested numbered 336 (8.6%); while 821 (21%) answered that they did not know. Those who blamed the labor unionists were almost one and a half times the number who blamed the Government.

2) According to age and sex, the number of those blaming the labor unions increased steadily with the advance in age among the men: the reverse is noted among the women, this probably due to the fact that the older women showed a tendency of indifference or replied that they did not know.

3) Those blaming the Government numbered most among the young groups for both sexes (most is the 30's and next in the 20's).

Table 10.

	Total	Govern- ment Un- reasonable	Labor Uni- on Un- reasonable	Not in- terested	Don't know
Total	3,932(100%)	1,037(26.4)	1,731(44.0)	336(8.5)	828(21.1)
Farmers	1,962(100%)	364(18.6)	867(44.2)	174(9.9)	537(27.3)
Fishermen	109(100%)	24(22.0)	51(46.8)	24(22.0)	10(9.2)
Medium & smaller mer- chants & in- dustrialists	391(100%)	83(21.2)	201(51.4)	35(9.0)	72(18.4)
Enterprisers	79(100%)	13(16.5)	62(78.5)	1(1.3)	3(3.7)
Laborers	384(100%)	192(50.0)	111(28.9)	25(6.5)	56(14.6)
Salaried peo- ple	366(100%)	144(39.3)	165(45.1)	12(3.3)	45(12.3)
Officials	136(100%)	67(49.3)	55(40.4)	3(2.2)	11(8.1)
Students & Teachers	104(100%)	62(59.6)	37(35.6)	1(1.0)	4(3.8)
Free profes- sional workers	87(100%)	24(27.6)	40(46.0)	9(10.3)	14(16.1)
Jobless	187(100%)	37(19.8)	86(46.0)	18(9.6)	46(24.6)
Others	127(100%)	27(21.3)	56(44.1)	14(8.9)	30(23.6)

By occupations, 78.5 % of the enterprisers, 51.7 % of the medium and smaller merchants and industrialists, as well as 35.6 % of the school teachers and students, and 40.4 % of the officials blamed the labor unions. Those blaming the Government included: school teachers and students (59.6 % , laborers (50.0 %), public officials (49.3 %), etc.

Q (2) Is it right or wrong for public officials and school teachers, who are in public service, to resort to general strikes?

To this, the replies were as follows:

Table 11.

	Total	21-30	31-40	41-50	51 and over
<i>Total</i>	3,932(100%)	1,680(100)	804(100)	793(100)	655(100)
Men	1,97 (100 %)	972(100)	432(100)	435(100)	135(100)
Women	1,958(100 %)	708(100)	372(100)	358(100)	520(100)
<i>Unavoidable</i>					
Total	1,291(32.8)	641(38.2)	306(38.1)	216(27.2)	128(19.5)
Men	719(36.4)	377(38.8)	178(41.2)	132(30.3)	32(23.7)
Women	572(29.2)	264(37.3)	128(34.4)	84(23.5)	96(18.5)
<i>Wrong</i>					
Total	2,275(57.9)	925(55.1)	437(54.4)	496(62.5)	417(63.7)
Men	1,167(59.1)	543(55.9)	243(56.3)	286(65.7)	95(70.4)
Women	1,108(56.6)	382(54.0)	194(52.2)	210(58.7)	322(61.9)
<i>Not interested</i>					
Total	126(3.2)	39(2.3)	30(3.7)	25(3.2)	32(4.9)
Men	36(1.8)	23(2.4)	6(1.4)	5(1.2)	2(1.5)
Women	90(4.6)	16(2.3)	24(6.5)	20(5.6)	30(5.8)
<i>Do not know</i>					
Total	240(6.1)	75(4.4)	31(3.8)	56(7.1)	78(11.9)
Men	52(2.7)	29(2.9)	5(1.1)	12(2.8)	6(4.0)
Women	188(9.6)	46(6.4)	26(6.9)	44(12.2)	72(13.8)

1) A total of 2,275 persons thought that the general strike was wrong (57.9%); 1,291 (32.8%) said it was unavoidable and thus justified it; 126 were indifferent (3.2%); while 240 (6.1%) did not know.

2) Those who disapproved the general strike were mostly older people, both men and women. Of those who were 51 or more in age, 70.4% of the men and 61.9% of the women disapproved the general strike.

3) Those approving the general strike, both sexes in the thirties number the most, the number decreasing with the advance of age.

Table 12.

<i>Occupations</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Unavoidable</i>	<i>Wrong</i>	<i>Not interested</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Farmers	1,962(100%)	487(24.8%)	1,234(63.9%)	78(4.0%)	163(8.3%)
Fishermen	109(100)	33(30.2)	61(55.9)	7(6.4)	8(7.5)
Medium & smaller merchants, & industrialists	391(100)	113(28.9)	253(64.7)	12(3.1)	13(3.3)
Enterprisers	79(100)	14(17.7)	63(79.7)	1(1.3)	1(1.3)
Laborers	384(100)	223(58.1)	128(33.3)	10(2.6)	23(6.0)
Salaried people	366(100)	164(44.8)	184(50.3)	4(1.1)	14(3.8)
Officials	135(100)	69(50.7)	67(49.3)	—	—
Teachers & Students	104(100)	67(64.4)	33(31.7)	4(3.9)	—
Free professional workers	87(100)	23(26.4)	60(69.0)	1(1.1)	3(3.5)
Others	127(100)	41(32.3)	78(61.4)	2(1.6)	6(4.7)
Jobless	187(100)	57(30.5)	114(61.0)	7(3.7)	9(4.8)
Total	3,932(100%)	1,291(32.8%)	2,275(57.9%)	126(3.2%)	240(6.1%)

According to occupations, enterprisers (79.7%), free workers (69.0%), farmers (63.9%), school teachers and students (31.7%), laborers (33.3%), expressed disapproval of the strike. Those approving the strike included school teachers and students (64.4%), laborers (58.1%), and public officials (50.7%).

Q (3) What are your views on the general strike, especially now when it is generally believed that increasing production is essential in raising the living standard of the people?

Replies to this question were as follows:

Table 13.

	Total	21-30	31-40	41-50	51 and over
<i>Total</i>	3,932(100)	1,680(100)	804(100)	793(100)	655(100)
Men	1,974(100)	972(100)	432(100)	435(100)	135(100)
Women	1,958(100)	708(100)	372(100)	358(100)	520(100)
<i>Stop the strike temporarily</i>					
Total	2,200(56.0)	952(56.7)	427(53.1)	462(58.3)	359(54.8)
Men	1,180(59.8)	564(58.0)	243(56.3)	274(63.0)	99(73.3)
Women	1,020(52.1)	388(54.8)	184(49.5)	188(52.5)	260(50.0)
<i>Unavoidable</i>					
Total	1,076(27.4)	517(30.8)	260(32.3)	197(24.8)	102(15.6)
Men	602(30.5)	297(30.6)	154(35.6)	125(28.7)	26(19.3)
Women	474(24.2)	220(31.3)	106(28.5)	72(20.1)	76(14.6)
<i>Not interested</i>					
Total	193 (4.9)	64 (3.8)	41 (5.1)	36 (4.5)	52 (7.9)
Men	73 (3.7)	50 (5.1)	9 (2.1)	12 (2.8)	2 (1.5)
Women	120 (6.1)	14 (2.0)	32 (8.6)	24 (6.7)	50 (9.6)
<i>Do not know</i>					
Total	463(11.7)	147(8.7)	76(9.5)	98(12.4)	142(21.7)
Men	119(6.0)	61(6.3)	26(6.0)	24(5.5)	8(5.9)
Women	344(17.6)	86(12.1)	50(13.4)	74(20.7)	134(25.8)

The majority favored the suspension of the general strike while efforts were being made to increase the nation's output, this number reaching 2,200 (56.0 %). Those who said that the strike was unavoidable numbered 1,076 (27.4 %); those who were indifferent numbered 193 (4.9 %); and those who said they did not know numbered 463 (11.7 %).

Those disapproving the strike were numerous among men of 51 and over (73.3 %) and women in the 20's (54.8 %). Among those who thought the strike was unavoidable were men in the 30's and women in the 20's (most numerous).

By occupations, as shown in *Table 14*, enterprisers (78.5 %), free workers (66.7 %), medium and smaller-class merchants and industrialists (62.7 %), jobless (60.4 %), farmers (59.7 %), were in favor of stopping the strike. Laborers (57.0 %), school teachers and students (51.0 %) and public officials (44.9 %) said that the strike could not be helped.

All of these figures show that Japanese public opinion shouted "No!" to the use of the general strike by workers in public utilities as means of attaining their economic objectives, although permitted legally. Furthermore, public opinion put stress upon the need of speeding up economic recovery, as one of the urgent tasks in post-war Japan (although admitting that there were causes for strikes to break out) and thus voiced its disapproval of the abortive general strike of February 1, 1947. Finally, it placed the blame upon the labor unions for leading the controversy into a general strike.

Table 14. (Occupations)

<i>Occupations</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Stop strike</i>	<i>Unavoid- able</i>	<i>Not in- terested</i>	<i>Do not know</i>
Total	3,932 (100)	2,200 (55.9)	1,076 (27.4)	193 (4.9)	463 (11.8)
Farmers	1,962 (100)	1,172 (59.7)	348 (17.7)	121 (6.2)	321 (16.4)
Fishermen	109 (100)	55 (50.5)	21 (19.3)	9 (8.3)	24 (21.9)
Medium & small mer- chants & industrialists	391 (100)	245 (62.7)	96 (24.6)	16 (4.1)	34 (8.6)
Enterprisers	79 (100)	62 (78.5)	13 (16.5)	—	4 (5.0)
Laborers	384 (100)	126 (32.8)	219 (57.0)	12 (3.1)	27 (7.1)
Salaried people	366 (100)	181 (49.5)	159 (43.4)	12 (3.3)	14 (3.8)
Officials	136 (100)	74 (54.4)	61 (44.9)	1 (0.7)	—
Teachers & Students	104 (100)	47 (45.2)	53 (51.0)	—	4 (3.8)
Free professional wor- kers	87 (100)	58 (66.7)	23 (26.4)	1 (1.1)	5 (5.8)
Others	127 (100)	67 (52.8)	33 (26.0)	8 (6.3)	19 (14.9)
Jobless	187 (100)	113 (60.4)	50 (26.7)	13 (7.0)	11 (5.9)

V. Social Problems

On the Revised Civil Code.

The Mainichi Shimbun conducted a survey of public opinion on the revisions effected in the Civil Code—abolition of the "house" and the equality of the sexes. For this, 5,000 questionnaires were sent out, distributed among all the prefectures in proportion to the population statistics of the Cabinet. Those receiving the questionnaires consisted of (a) *Men*: salaried class 20 %, laborers 10 %, farmers 35 %, merchants and industrialists 20 %, students 5 %, and others 10 %; (b) *Women*: housewives 50 %, working women 30 %, students 5 %, and others 15 %. In both sexes, the ratio of married to unmarried persons was 50-50.

This survey was carried out during the period of a month beginning January 8, 1947. In all, 4,757 replies were obtained (95.1 %). Replies from unmarried persons, who are believed to be more progressive, as well as the farmers and fishermen, regarded conservative in thought, were less than expected.

1. Abolition of the "House"

Q (1) What do you think of the abolition of the "house" in the revised Civil Code?

NB. The "house", according to the old Civil Code, consists of members of a family controlled by the "head of the house" who ex-

ercise various legal rights, including those of designating the place of residence, marriages, adoption of sons or daughters, entry or exit of members of the house, etc. It is the legal unit in official family registers.

Replies to this question were as follows:

Favoring abolition	57.9 %
Opposed to abolition	37.4 %
Do not know.....	4.7 %
	100.0 %

Percentages of approval or disapproval differ according to sexes, occupations or family status (married or single). By sexes the replies were:

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Favoring abolition	55.7 %	60.1 %
Opposed to abolition	41.9	33.1
Do not know.....	2.4	6.8

By occupations, the following results were obtained:

	<i>Favoring</i>	<i>Opposing</i>	<i>Do not know</i>
Salaried workers.....	62.0 %	36.3 %	1.7 %
Laborers	58.7	33.8	7.5
Farmers & fishermen.....	43.3	54.6	2.1
Merchants & industrialists..	53.3	44.8	1.9
Students	78.2	21.8	0
Jobless	57.5	39.1	3.4
Free workers	58.3	41.7	0

These figures show that students lead those favoring the abolition of the "house" (78.2 %), followed by laborers (58.2 %), free workers (58.3 %) etc. Those opposing the abolition included farmers, fishermen, merchants and industrialists as shown above.

Opinion among the women on this subject was reflected as follows:

	<i>Favoring</i>	<i>Opposing</i>	<i>Do not know</i>
Housewives	53.4 %	38.7 %	7.9 %
Working women	66.0	27.9	6.1
Students	68.2	24.5	7.3
Others	66.4	28.7	4.9

Since working women, students, and others do not form the central groups in any "house," the majority favor such abolition, unlike the housewives.

Reasons given by those favoring the abolition of the "house" may be grouped as follows: (percentage worked out on 2,753 replies favoring abolition).

1) The head of the "house" will no longer exercise absolute rights over the questions of domicile, marriages, property transfers, etc.....54.6 % (second in percentage).

2) The excessive responsibility hitherto imposed upon the head of the "house" (obligation to support members of the "house") will be removed.

3) All children will be able to share equally in the inheritance of property (as against the old system whereby only the eldest got the property upon the father's death).....less than 40 %.

4 Marriages of children (only daughters and widows, included) can be decided by their own free will...less than 4%.

5) Conceptions regarding family honors or family's social standing will be removed and national life will become more cheerful.... 55.5 % (first in percentage).

It is interesting to note that reason 5) was listed by so many in the replies favoring the abolition of the "house," while reason 1, occupied only second place.

Those opposed to the abolition of the "house," gave the following reasons:

1) The good practices of tradition will be gone... 64.2 % (first)

2) There will be no responsible person to support grand-parents or parents.... 53.5 % (second).

3) There will be no one to carry on the festivals of the ancestors.... 36.1 % (third).

4) The eldest son, who is responsible for carrying on the festivals of the ancestors, should receive a larger portion of the family property than the other children.

5) Preservation of the ancestors' memories, family lineage, blood, and family name will become impossible.

6) Farm lands and other property will be scattered.... 33.5 % (last in list).

7) Even though a man or woman reaches maturity, he or she requires direction of the head of the "house" in matters relating to marriage or living.....33.3 % (fourth).

It is to be noted that the strongest reason for disapproving the abolition of the "house" consists in the desire to preserve the good practices or customs of the traditional house. Material considerations, such as the scattering of the property (farm land) occupy a lesser position.

2. *Equality for Men and Women*

Q (2) What is your opinion on the abolition of the inequality of the sexes ?

Favoring equality of sexes	64.5 %
Opposing equality of sexes	31.8 %
Do not know.....	3.7 %
	100.0 %

By sexes, the above replies were distributed as follows:

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Favoring equality	54.7 %	74.4 %
Opposing equality	41.8 %	21.8 %
Do not know.....	3.5 %	4.0 %
	100.0 %	100.0 %

If grouped into married and unmarried peoples, the two sexes reacted as follows:

A) *Men*

	<i>Married</i>	<i>Unmarried</i>
Favoring equality	52.7 %	60.1 %
Opposing equality	43.8 %	36.6 %
Do not know.....	3.5 %	3.3 %
	100.0 %	100.0 %
	(668)	(1,731)

B) *Women*

	<i>Married</i>	<i>Unmarried</i>
Favorin equality	70.2 %	80.3 %
Opposing equality	25.0 %	16.8 %
Do not know.....	4.8 %	2.9 %
	100.0 %	100.0 %
	(987)	(1,371)

Reasons for favoring equality given by 3,067 persons may be grouped into two:

- 1) Because wives will be able to have the same social and legal rights and positions as their husbands.....72.0 %
- 2) Because women will be able to enjoy the same social and legal positions as the man.....53.1 %

On the other hand, reasons for opposing equality advanced by 1,512 persons included:

- 1) It is still too early.....58.0 % (first).
- 2) The good custom (wife obeying the decisions advocated by

husband) will be lost....46.3 %.

These reasons were given by about 50 % of the women.

3) It is wrong for a wife to seek divorce just because of the husband's infidelity....8.5 %.

Detailed tabulations of these reasons are given below:

Table 15. (Reasons for Favoring and Opposing Sex Equality)

A). Favoring Sex Equality.

	Men			Women		
	Single	Married	Total	Single	Married	Total
Total	912	401	1,313	962	792	1,754
a) Because wives can enjoy equal social, legal rights and position as husbands	476	184	660	589	378	967
b) Because women can enjoy equal social, legal rights and position as men	665	299	964	656	599	1,255
c) Because husbands will be duty-bound to be faithful	324	125	449	506	382	888
d) Because divorced wives can receive compensation	171	45	216	238	110	348
e) Because wives, besides children, can inherit property	342	82	424	332	154	486
f) Because wives can dispose of their property without husbands' permission	127	36	163	226	85	311
g) Others	55	33	88	36	29	65

B). *Opposing Sex Equality.*

	Men			Women		
	Single	Married	Total	Single	Married	Total
Total	758	245	1,003	343	116	509
a) Because the good custom (wife obeying husband's decisions) will be gone	356	84	440	182	79	261
b) Because men and women are naturally unequal	331	86	397	133	42	175
c) Because it is wrong to make husband's infidelity reason for divorce	51	18	69	40	19	59
d) It is still too early	430	145	575	199	106	302
e) Because the disposition of property should be decided by men who have better judgment	234	56	290	62	23	85
f) Others	25	15	40	8	3	11
g) Do not know	61	22	83	66	29	95

3. *"Wife Obeys What Husband Advocates"*

The Mainichi Shimbun conducted a survey to find out the degree of political consciousness possessed by the Japanese women, particularly the housewives. The revision of the Civil Code will definitely remove legally one of the traditional virtues of Japanese womanhood, namely that the wife should obey what the husband tells her. In spite of this revision, will not this virtue remain for some time yet among the Japanese women? The results of Mainichi's survey give the answer to this query.

Mainichi's survey was carried out through direct personal contacts or interviews with the people concerned. Three typical areas were selected; *first* a block or district in one of Tokyo's 22 wards—Yamato-cho, Nakano ward—considered to be the area where the percentage of intellectual inhabitants is the highest (and consequently, the intensity of political consciousness the deepest); *second* a town in the suburbs of Tokyo—Ome; and *third*, a village in Yamanashi prefecture, Yuzurihara village.

1) The Yamato-cho block has a population of about 10,000, composed mostly of salaried classes and their families, who escaped war devastations. One hundred couples received the questionnaires; the educational level of these 100 men and women was as follows:

Husbands....

Graduates of secondary schools	37 %
" " universities, colleges, higher schools.....	48 %
Others	15 %
	<u>100 %</u>

Wives....

Graduates of secondary schools	63 %
" " univ. coll, higher schools	2 %
Others	35 %
	<u>100 %</u>

2) Ome town has a population of about 15,000, 80 % of whom belong to the merchant class. This town was not damaged by the air raids during the war. Interest in politics among the citizens of this town was considered to be of medium degree.

3) Yuzurihara village has a population of 3,800, 90 % of whom are farmers and their families (with charcoal-making and lumbering as avocations). Of the 100 couples chosen, only 4 men and 2 women had gone through secondary schools.

The dates of the surveys were:

Yamato-cho (Nakano)April 3- 6, 1947.
 Ome town.....April 19-20, 1947.
 Yuzurihara villageApril 10-13, 1947.

Two questions were asked of all these 300 couples. They were:

- Q (1) Which party will you support in the coming election?
- Q (2) Which party do you think your husband (or wife) will support?

The first question was asked by the interviewers on the spot and replies were demanded at once (wives were questioned first), while the replies to the second question were collected the following morning. The results showed the following:

1) *Those unable to answer the first question at once*

	<i>Husbands</i>	<i>Wives</i>	<i>Average</i>
Yamato-cho.....	14 %	47 %	31 %
Ome town	19 %	54 %	37 %
Yuzurihara village	30 %	72 %	51 %
Average	21 %	58 %	39 %

2) *Those unable to reply to the second question*

	<i>Husbands</i>	<i>Wives</i>	<i>Average</i>
Yamato-cho.....	7 %	9 %	8 %
Ome town	2 %	3 %	2.5 %
Yuzurihara village.....	6 %	8 %	7 %
Average	5 %	7 %	6 %

Why was there such a sharp difference in the percentages between the first and second replies? In the case of the first, answers were demanded at once and those questioned had no time to ponder over. In the case of the second, however, there was more time given for the couples to "talk it over." *Reasons* for being unable to reply to Q 1), in the case of women were:

	<i>Yamato-cho</i>	<i>Ome</i>	<i>Yuzurihara</i>
Undecided yet	19 %	54 %	25 %
Don't know.....	21 %	11 %	55 %
Will ask husband	4 %	9 %	7 %
Various others	56 %	26 %	12 %
	100 %	100 %	100 %

We shall take Yuzurihara village to illustrate to what degree the "wife obeys what her husband advocates," by analyzing the replies.

1) In 87 cases, the husband and wife supported the same party, while in 13 cases, they differed in their supports. This means that in 87 cases, the wife simply followed the husband's suggestions.

2) There were 42 cases wherein the wife and husband supported the same party on both the first and second days of the survey, showing that the wife obeyed the husband throughout. In two cases, however, the husband followed the wife's decision.

3) Of the 42 cases mentioned 2) above, there was naturally no cases wherein the husband followed the suggestion or decision of the wife.

4) There were 11 cases in which the motives were not clear in their replies to the first and second questions.

		<i>Yamato-cho</i>	<i>Ome</i>	<i>Yuzurihora</i>	<i>Average</i>
<i>Wife Obeying Husband</i>	Clear	21	29	42	31
	Supported	33	33	32	32
	Total	54	62	74	63
<i>Husband Obey- ing Wife</i>	Clear	2	5	2	3
	Supported	0	1	0	0
	Total	2	6	2	3
Wife's Own Decision		39	27	13	26
Unknown		5	5	11	7

The foregoing three samples may be said to be representative of the whole country. Similar results will probably be obtained if the survey were expanded to cover the entire nation.

日本に於ける世論の動向

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DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Tokyo, June 17, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL
(For Use of Department Only)

JUN 29 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Observations Concerning Government, Democracy and Education,
and Military Government in Kyushu.

894.00/6-1748

*KR
894.42*

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

*KR
740.00119
control (Korea)*

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 321 of June 3, 1948 concerning observations on economic matters in Kyushu and to enclose a copy of an additional memorandum prepared by Foreign Service Officer W. Henry Lawrence, Jr. regarding governmental, educational, and Military Government matters observed during his recent orientation visit to four prefectures in that area. The information is useful as being a cross section of both American and Japanese opinion.

As in the case of the previous memorandum, much of the material is corroborative in nature, but it brings into focus the basic need for augmenting efforts at educating the Japanese people in democratic ways and for continuing such endeavors over a long period of time. In addition, it emphasizes the need to divorce Military Government from its tendency to direct the detailed operation of Japanese affairs if Japanese leaders and people are to manage their own affairs in consonance with the aims of Allied policy when it is possible to discontinue the Occupation.

In summarization the following are the high-lights of Mr. Lawrence's findings:

Government

Education of the public and of government officials and workers is needed if government is to function democratically. The public's interest in political affairs is still dormant; government officials are primarily interested in their own welfare rather than that of the governed. Progress is hampered by the inefficiency of government workers and by the duplication of central and local government offices. Despite efforts at

decentralization

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