

a member of the Upper Silesian Sejm. The Polish authorities openly accused Herr Ulitz of assisting conscripts to escape military service; but in his capacity as a deputy he enjoyed parliamentary immunity, and the Sejm refused to agree to proposals made by the Polish authorities that his immunity should be suspended in order that he might stand his trial on a charge of treason. On the 12th February, 1929, however, the Silesian Sejm was dissolved by order of the Polish Voivode, Monsieur Grazynski,¹ and on the following day Herr Ulitz was arrested. The *Volksbund* promptly appealed to the League Council against the action of the Polish authorities, and the Council dealt with the question during its session in March 1929 by recommending that the judicial proceedings which had already been initiated should be accelerated and by obtaining from Monsieur Zaleski an undertaking that Herr Ulitz would be given a public trial. Herr Ulitz was tried before the Katowice Court at the end of July and was found guilty, on very doubtful evidence, of having forged documents in order to enable conscripts and reservists to escape from Polish territory. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment, but the sentence was not to take effect during a probationary period of two years. Herr Ulitz appealed against this sentence—the extreme leniency of which, on a charge of treason, was considered to be virtually an admission of his innocence—and he was acquitted of the charge against him in April 1930, when the appeal was heard.

The irritation which had been produced among the German minority by the Polish accusations against the *Volksbund* had naturally not been diminished by the result of Herr Ulitz's first trial, but it subsided as soon as he was finally cleared of the charge against him. Indeed, his acquittal in April 1930, with its implication that justice for the German minority was, after all, obtainable in Poland, had for a short time a markedly reconciling effect upon the relations between the two sections of the population in Polish Upper Silesia. Unfortunately the acquittal of Herr Ulitz was followed in a few months' time by elections for a new Sejm and Senate in Warsaw and for a new Upper Silesian Sejm, and the election campaign was

¹ On the German side it was asserted that the reason for the dissolution of the Sejm was Monsieur Grazynski's desire to end Herr Ulitz's parliamentary immunity, but on the Polish side it was pointed out that the Sejm had been elected in 1923 for a period of five years, so that its dissolution was overdue. The Sejm had recently been showing an increasing lack of docility to instructions received from Warsaw, and a large proportion of the deputies (including Monsieur Korfanty, the leader of the insurrection of 1921) were hostile to Marshal Pilsudski and to Monsieur Grazynski as the Marshal's nominee and supporter.

the occasion for organized acts of violence against the German population which surpassed anything that had occurred since the Polish insurrection of 1921.

There had been comparatively few elections—either municipal or parliamentary—in Polish Upper Silesia since the time of the partition. The first municipal and communal elections took place in November 1926, and supplementary elections were held in the following May. Municipal elections took place again in December 1929 and March 1930. In March 1928 elections for the Sejm at Warsaw took place throughout Poland, including Upper Silesia, but the first elections for the Upper Silesian Sejm since 1923 were held in May 1930—the Sejm having been dissolved, as has been mentioned above, in February 1929. At the municipal elections of 1926-7 and 1929-30 there had been complaints of pressure on German candidates to withdraw and of intimidation of voters, and similar accusations of 'terror' and of the suppression of German names from voting lists had been made at the time of the general elections in March 1928. Instances of repression, however, seem to have been more or less isolated during these earlier elections, and not part of an organized campaign. The elections for the Upper Silesian Sejm in May 1930 passed off fairly quietly, and resulted in an increase in the number of German members from 14 to 16 and a corresponding decrease in the number of Polish members from 34 to 32. The Sejm thus elected was, however, dissolved on the 26th September, 1930 (in consequence of the continued conflict between the opposition, led by Monsieur Korfanty, and the Voivode, Monsieur Grazynski), and the elections were fixed to take place on the 23rd November, at the same time as the election for the Warsaw Senate. The election for the Warsaw Sejm was to take place on the 16th November.¹

The result of the election for the Upper Silesian Sejm on the 23rd November was to reduce the number of German seats from 16 to 9. This fact in itself indicated that there had not been liberty of voting, but the full extent of the anti-German pressure which had been exercised during the election campaign was not realized by the world at large until the whole question was ventilated as a result of German appeals to the Council of the League of Nations.

During the summer of 1930 the tension between Germany and

¹ It should be noted that the measures which were taken during the election campaign in Upper Silesia were not peculiar to that district, nor were they applied solely against the German minority. The elections were 'managed' throughout Poland, and the Government took steps to secure a majority by such measures as the arrest of opposition leaders and restriction on freedom of voting.

Poland—which had relaxed towards the end of 1929 sufficiently to permit of the conclusion of two important treaties¹—had increased once more to a dangerous extent. In August 1930 a German Minister, Herr Treviranus, dealt in an election speech with the possibility of a revision of the German eastern frontiers.²

This speech, in conjunction with a discussion of the revision of the frontiers in the international press as well as in that of the Reich, created a reaction in Poland. In speeches and articles, in interviews, at meetings, in the Press, in communal assemblies, &c., it was declared that the raising of the revision question meant war between Poland and Germany. It was in this atmosphere that the Warsaw Sejm, the Senate, and the Silesian Sejm were dissolved and that new elections for these bodies were ordered. The campaign against a revision of the frontiers now became a plank in election platforms.³

From the 19th to the 26th October, 1930, an 'anti-German week' was organized in Polish Upper Silesia. It was advertised in advance in the press and by means of posters⁴ which were put up in conspicuous places and in some cases in public buildings. The preparations for this week combined with the issue of election manifestoes to produce an increasingly bitter feeling against the German population; and the day before the 'anti-German week' was due to begin two former German deputies appealed to the Voivode to take measures for the protection of the German minority. The Voivode was said to have assured them 'that the police would prevent any excesses'. On the 1st November, 1930, the same two deputies sent a telegram to the Polish Minister of the Interior, informing him of the assurance given by the Voivode and declaring that 'since then many peaceable Germans have been assaulted publicly and in their dwellings, have been severely ill-treated and have gone in danger of their lives. . . . The general state of insecurity is rendered more acute by the daily threats of the Press. No police protection is forthcoming. The German population feels itself a helpless prey to terrorism.'⁵ The Minister of the Interior was accordingly requested 'to take immediate

¹ The liquidation agreement of the 31st October, 1929, (see sub-section (b) above), and the commercial agreement of the 17th March, 1930 (see sub-section c) above).

² See above, p. 320.

³ Quoted from the petition of the *Deutscher Volksbund* to the League of Nations, dated the 7th January, 1931 (*League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1931, p. 382).

⁴ Certain of these posters are reproduced in the *League of Nations Official Journal* for February 1931.

⁵ The telegram was reproduced in the *Volksbund's* petition of the 7th January, 1931, cited above.

and effective measures for the protection of the German population'. This appeal elicited no reply.

The members of the German minority who were subjected to terrorism during the 'anti-German week' and during the later stages of the election campaign asserted, in nearly every case, that their assailants were members of the 'Union of Silesian Insurgents'¹—an association whose name alone was calculated to keep alive in the minds of Poles and Germans alike memories of the anti-German excesses which had accompanied the Upper Silesian insurrection of 1921. Members of the Union were authorized to wear uniform and to carry arms, and, according to the German version, they received financial support from the Polish state and enjoyed privileged treatment in various other ways. Monsieur Grazyński, the Silesian Voivode, was Honorary President of the Union,² and was said to take a large part in its activities.

The campaign of intimidation conducted by the Union of Silesian Insurgents increased in intensity as the polling days grew nearer, with the result that 'the German minority in Upper Silesia was to a great extent deprived of its suffrage rights'.³ The accounts of the situation which reached Berlin were so serious that on the 27th November, four days after the elections for the Warsaw Senate and the Silesian Sejm, the German Government took the step of appealing on behalf of the minority to the League of Nations,⁴ and asking that the appeal should be placed, as a matter of urgency, on the agenda

¹ On the 19th May, 1928, the *Deutscher Volksbund* had already appealed to the League Council against the lack of public security in Upper Silesia, which imposed 'extreme moral and material hardship on the members of the German minority', and they had declared that it was the Union of Insurgents which was responsible for this state of affairs. The Council, on the 8th September, 1928, had noted the explanations given by the Polish Government and had accepted their assurance that suitable measures had been and would be taken against persons guilty of offences against Germans. Thereafter the situation had improved, apart from isolated instances.

² Monsieur Grazyński acted in this capacity not in virtue of his office but because he had been one of the chief leaders of the insurrection of 1921.

³ Quoted from the letter from the German Government to the League of Nations dated the 27th November, 1930 (*League of Nations Official Journal*, February, 1931, p. 371).

⁴ The German Government based their right to intervene on paragraph 2 of Article 72 of the Geneva Convention regarding Upper Silesia, the terms of which were identical with those of paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Polish Minorities Treaty:

'Poland agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.'

for the next session of the League Council. In their communication the German Government gave details of the methods which were alleged to have been used in order to prevent members of the German minority from recording their votes, and they supplemented their general accusations by a 'brief account of some of the most glaring cases' of intimidation which had been brought to their notice. In conclusion, they summed up the situation in Upper Silesia as follows:

Large sections of the German minority were deliberately prevented by arbitrary measures of the authorities from exercising their right of vote, and even where the minority was able to use that right it could not record its votes by secret ballot.

The reign of terror to which the German minority is subjected is due mainly to the 'Union of Insurgents' which deliberately planned and carried out a campaign against the German element. The Union works in concert with the authorities. The highest official in Polish Upper Silesia is the Honorary President of the Union, and many high officials are leading members. The police consistently neglect their duty by either not interfering at all or by taking very inadequate measures to prevent the acts of violence to which the minority is subjected, the reason being that the police either sympathize with the 'Insurgents' or do not dare interfere on account of the protection which the Union enjoys in high places.

On the 9th December, 1930, the German Government dispatched a second communication to the League enumerating certain other acts of violence of which the German Government had been notified since the 27th November.

These protests by the German Government were followed on the 7th January, 1931, by a petition from the *Deutscher Volksbund* in which further details were given. The *Volksbund* related the attempts which had been made to secure protection from the authorities,¹ explained the nature and activities of the Union of Silesian Insurgents and other 'promoters and agents of terrorism',² and examined the behaviour of the police and the attitude of the Government authorities. The petition concluded by asking the Council of the League 'to note and resolve the following:

1. Articles 75 and 83 of the Geneva Convention have been infringed.
2. The Polish Government shall take such steps against the authorities responsible for permitting the breaches of the treaty as will demon-

¹ See above, p. 360.

² The 'Westenmarkverein' was said to have been, together with the Insurgents' Union, 'the chief protagonist in the campaign against the German minority'; but the Government Party, 'which reaped the benefit of the activities of the two associations', was also said to have 'modelled its own methods on theirs'.

strate to the Polish and German populations that there can be no repetition of such offences.

3. The Polish Government shall examine whether the privileged position of the Union of Silesian Insurgents can be maintained.'

The documentary evidence which was attached to the petition included copies of posters, texts of election proclamations and of speeches, and numerous extracts from the press. Finally, details were given of 255 cases of terrorism in the five electoral divisions of Upper Silesia.

On the 6th January, 1931, the Polish Government forwarded to the League Secretariat their observations on the German Government's two communications of the 27th November and the 9th December, 1930. They took exception, in the first place, to the action of the German Government in lodging complaints with the Council and declared that the attitude of the German Government had given rise to 'an intense anti-Polish propaganda campaign'. They deplored 'the fact that certain regrettable incidents which occurred during the elections . . . should have served as a basis for action of a political character clearly going beyond the scope of minority questions'. While certain of the German allegations were answered in detail, the Polish Government did not attempt to deny that anti-German excesses had taken place, but they maintained that there had been no organized campaign of terrorism. Their main argument was that election campaigns in most countries were 'accompanied by struggles between parties' which produced 'an atmosphere of tension and excitement', and they made a pointed reference to the recent elections in Germany in which 'these struggles assumed a violent form and . . . many persons were killed and wounded'. They countered the German lists of acts of terrorism by appending a list of their own in which details were given of acts of violence suffered by members of the Polish majority during the election campaign, and they pointed out that only two persons had lost their lives during the disturbances and that both of them were Poles.¹ In conclusion they expressed their 'most categorical disapproval of all the excesses that may have occurred during the electoral period in the Voivodie of Silesia, whoever the authors of those excesses might be'; and they declared that 'strict measures' had been and would be

¹ The trial of eight Germans who were accused of participation in the assassination of a Polish police officer on the 2nd November, 1930, was concluded a few days after the Polish Government dispatched their note to the League. Extenuating circumstances were taken into account and the severest sentence that was imposed was of eighteen months' imprisonment.

taken 'to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in future and to ensure the inhabitants of the Voivodie ample protection'.

In the meantime the German Government, on the 17th December, 1930, had taken the further step of requesting that the Council at its next session should also consider the situation in the Polish Voivodeships of Poznań (Posen) and Pomorze (Pomerelia) where a series of incidents had occurred in connexion with the Polish elections which, they declared, constituted a breach of the provisions of the Polish Minorities Treaty.¹ The note stated that the German Government had for a long time past been

following with the utmost anxiety the development of the situation of the German minority in the Voivodeships of Posen and Pomerelia. Although no such outrages against the minority have occurred in these districts as in Upper Silesia, the systematic anti-German agitation carried on by certain sections of the population in Posen and Pomerelia under the eyes of the Polish authorities is increasingly inflaming the national passions of the Polish majority, and hence increasingly endangering the position of the German minority.

Since the beginning of the election campaign which preceded the elections to the Polish Sejm and Senate, the position of the minority has grown materially worse, particularly in Pomerelia. Anti-German outrages have become more and more frequent, and Germans have been severely hampered in the exercise of their electoral rights. All kinds of devices have been used to prevent the German minority from giving free expression to their political desires.

Details were given of cases in which members of the German minority had been prevented from canvassing or voting by various methods; and while the reports of intimidation or violence which had reached the German Government were not serious, compared with the situation in Upper Silesia, there was ample evidence of 'arbitrary action by the Polish authorities', and of the exercise of 'powerful pressure' to prevent the 'free expression' of the German minority's wishes.

These German protests came before the Council of the League during its sixty-second session in January 1931. The occasion was a particularly important one, for a number of reasons. The actions complained of—even allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration and for the difficulty of preventing incidents during an election in which national feeling was bound to run high—constituted glaring instances of the infraction of the provisions for the protection of minorities; and there was strong evidence of the collusion of the Polish authorities. The League's handling of minority problems had

¹ The German Government's right to bring these questions before the League Council was based on paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Polish Minorities Treaty (see p. 361, footnote 4 above).

been the subject of widespread criticism for some years past, and it was felt that this was a test case. If the Council could not succeed in satisfying the German Government and the German minority on this occasion that its influence was strong enough to ensure the redress of grievances and the prevention of further incidents, it would virtually have to admit its powerlessness to deal with any case of infraction of the minority treaties. The whole system for the protection of minorities would then, in fact, have broken down, and the minorities, and the Governments which were interested in their fate, would be thrown back on their own resources—with incalculable results for the future of Europe. An additional factor was the attitude of the German Government and the German people towards the League of Nations at this time. The development of German discontent with the League's work in the field of disarmament and security has been traced elsewhere;¹ and it is sufficient here to recall that that discontent had reached its highest pitch in December 1930, when the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference had concluded its labours. A campaign for the withdrawal of Germany from the League had been gaining force as the hope of securing equality of treatment in the matter of armaments through League channels had grown less, and the scale might well be turned if the Council failed to handle the question of the Upper Silesian minority in a manner which German opinion considered adequate. Since the possibility of Germany's resignation of her membership of the League was fraught with danger for Europe and for the world, the outcome of the sixty-second session of the League Council in January 1931 was awaited with an unusual degree of anxiety.

The difficult task of presiding over the sixty-second session of the Council fell to the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Arthur Henderson. The morning and afternoon sessions of the Council on the 21st January, 1931, were taken up entirely by speeches by Dr. Curtius and Monsieur Zaleski, the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Poland respectively. Dr. Curtius formulated his charges and his demands in firm but temperate language. He explained that the German Government had brought these minority grievances before the Council themselves because they considered that the case was an altogether exceptional one. There had been a wave of terrorism, and the Polish Government had done nothing to restrain the open partiality of their officials. Dr. Curtius singled out the conduct of the Voivode, Monsieur Grazynski, for special condemnation. He cited examples of the activities of the Union of Silesian Insurgents and of official condonation

¹ See the *Survey for 1930*, Part I, section (iv).

of those activities. In regard to Poznań and Pomorze (Pomerelia) he observed that 'the acts of terrorism were neither so widespread nor so serious as in Upper Silesia; on the other hand, the interference with the free exercise of the voting right was almost more serious'. He contrasted the treatment of the Polish minority in Germany with that of the German minority in Poland, and he also referred briefly to the vexed question of the revision of Germany's eastern frontier. While not repudiating the opinion, which, he said, had been held by every German Government, that revision of the frontiers was essential, he declared that the entire German people was at one in desiring to achieve its aim by peaceful means. In conclusion he raised the question whether the assurances given by the Polish Government that judicial proceedings had been instituted in consequence of the Upper Silesian incidents could be considered as an adequate reparation for the wrong done. The Council, he said 'must take all measures that the position may call for in order to ensure that reparation is actually effected. But, even if atonement is thus made for the past, the Council cannot let matters rest there. Precautions must be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents. . . . The Council will have to go thoroughly into the question of [the Insurgents'] Union and its relations with official circles.'

Monsieur Zaleski's reply to Dr. Curtius was also couched in moderate terms, though a comparison which he drew between the association of Monsieur Grazyński with the Insurgents' Union and the association of President von Hindenburg with the *Stahlhelm* drew an indignant rejoinder from Dr. Curtius. Monsieur Zaleski admitted that there had been infractions of the Geneva Convention, but he attempted to minimize their importance. He thought that only 28 out of the 255 cases of violence or threats of violence cited by the *Volksbund* were serious, and he asserted that some severe sentences had already been passed on persons found guilty, and that the Polish authorities were taking all the necessary steps to deal with other offenders. He attributed the trouble in Upper Silesia to the treatment of the Polish minorities in Germany and to the German attitude regarding the eastern frontier, and he remarked that what Dr. Curtius had said on the subject of the frontier was calculated to envenom German-Polish relations and to do harm to the cause of the minority. Finally Monsieur Zaleski accepted in principle the three points which had formed the conclusion of the *Volksbund's* petition;¹ but he held that the *Volksbund's* demands had been satisfied so far as concerned the punishment of persons guilty of violations of the

¹ See above, pp. 362-3.

Geneva Convention, while in regard to the third point—the privileged position of the Insurgents' Union—he denied that the Polish Government had ever granted, or would grant, privileges to that body. He concluded his speech with the assurance that the Polish Government would 'use every means to bring about peace and tranquillity in Upper Silesia. It has acted with severity and will continue to do so relentlessly, against all the instigators of disorder whatever their origin'.

The further exchange of speeches between Dr. Curtius and Monsieur Zaleski at the afternoon session on the 21st January added little to the arguments advanced in the morning, and the Council asked the Japanese member, Mr. Yoshizawa, to draw up a report on the question. Mr. Yoshizawa's report was submitted to the Council on the 24th January. He declared that the evidence showed articles 75 and 83 of the Geneva Convention to have been violated in numerous cases. In the case of electoral irregularities, such as the suppression of candidates and the removal of names from the electoral registers, there had been an appeal to the Polish Courts, and the *Volksbund* reserved the right to appeal to the Council again if satisfaction were not obtained through this legal procedure. The Council, therefore, need not go into this aspect of the matter more fully at the moment. Mr. Yoshizawa accepted the German point of view that the Polish local authorities and the Polish Government were indirectly responsible for the acts of violence against the minority. The report noted the measures already taken against offenders and called upon the Polish Government to submit to the Council, before its next session in May 1931, a complete and detailed report setting forth the results of the inquiries in the different cases, as well as the punishments inflicted and the compensation awarded for damage to persons and property.

In regard to the indirect responsibility of the Polish Government, Mr. Yoshizawa laid stress on the necessity of avoiding any action that would be likely to stir up passions; and he pointed out that the responsibility of the authorities in this respect was specially heavy. Above all, the authorities must be above any suspicion of taking part in political strife against the minority. The document submitted to the Council conveyed the impression that the Union of Silesian Insurgents was inspired by a spirit which was certainly not calculated to promote reconciliation between the two sections of the population. In regions with a mixed population, no association with marked nationalist tendencies ought to have a privileged position of a nature to impair the rights of minorities. The Polish Government

were therefore recommended to take the necessary measures to dissolve any special connexion between the authorities and associations, such as the Union of Insurgents, in order to restore the confidence of the minority, 'which seemed to have been profoundly shaken'. The report concluded by expressing the desire of the Council to know before its next session what decisions the Polish Government had taken in regard to the Union of Insurgents.

Mr. Yoshizawa's report, it will be seen, constituted a strong condemnation of the action and attitude of the Polish authorities and the Polish Government, and it said much for the *rapporteur's* skill and tact that he was able to induce Monsieur Zaleski to agree to its terms.¹ The report was adopted unanimously, and Mr. Henderson, as President, congratulated the Council, and especially the German and Polish members, upon the results obtained. He expressed great satisfaction that the system of minority protection had been so firmly upheld by the Council, and he declared his conviction that the Council's action on this occasion marked the beginning of a new and final effort to give permanent shape to the system established by the minority treaties and by the Upper Silesian Convention. He also appealed to the majority in Upper Silesia to realize that the suppression of the rights of the minority was not in accordance with its interests, and to the minority to realize that it was in its true interest to co-operate loyally with the Government of the country in which it lived.

It was obvious, of course, that the decisions of the Council would only be effective if the Polish Government fulfilled the obligations which they had undertaken in accepting Mr. Yoshizawa's report. For this reason, German opinion, while pleased at the complete vindication of the German case and gratified that the Council had taken a stronger line than it had ever been known to take before in a question relating to the protection of minorities, suspended final judgment until the efficacy of the Polish measures could be seen.

The Polish Government duly supplied the Council, at its session in May 1931, with a statement giving a summary of the measures which they had adopted,² and with detailed particulars concerning

¹ Monsieur Zaleski was in a delicate position. The publicity which had recently been given to events in Eastern Galicia had undoubtedly alienated many sympathies from Poland, and the Polish Government's consciousness of this fact probably made them unusually ready to admit that they were in the wrong in the matter of Upper Silesia. (The situation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland will be dealt with in a future volume.)

² In the middle of March, Monsieur Grazynski had held a special conference with the Starostas (heads of administrative districts) in order to impress upon them the need for strict observance of the provisions relating to the protection

the action which had been taken on each of the 255 cases of alleged attack on the persons or property of the minority that had been brought to the Council's notice. The Polish statement, however, did not reach Geneva until the Council was actually in session, so that the members had not adequate time at their disposal for its examination. On the 23rd May Mr. Yoshizawa presented a report in which he asked the Council to take note of the particulars furnished by the Polish Government in regard to the inquiries undertaken into cases of alleged attacks, and the penalties imposed and measures of compensation decided on as a result of such inquiries. In regard to 'the most delicate aspect of the matter'—the question of the indirect responsibility of the authorities for the events in Upper Silesia—he drew the Council's attention to the fact that 'the measures reported by the Polish Government did not include the one which, in the opinion of certain members of the Council, would have afforded the most appropriate and effective means of severing such special bonds as might exist between the authorities and the Insurgents' Union'. Mr. Yoshizawa noted, nevertheless, that there had been 'a real and definite relaxation of the tension, and a very marked improvement in the relations between the authorities and the minority'. He added that the Council should now 'consider its main object to be to secure, in the future, the permanence of normal relations between the Polish authorities and the German minority, and it can feel certain that the Polish Government, on its side, will not fail to take whatever action may be needed for the final consolidation of such a result'. Mr. Yoshizawa, accordingly, asked the Council to close its examination of the matter by taking note of the information supplied by the Polish Government.

Dr. Curtius, however, raised objections to this course, on the ground that he had not yet been able to study the Polish statement with due care, and he suggested that the question should be adjourned until the next session of the Council. The Polish representative, Monsieur Sokal, received considerable support for his view that the Council should adopt the report without further delay, but Mr. Henderson, who had taken Dr. Curtius's place in the chair when the discussion on the German minority began, agreed with Dr. Curtius that the matter was too important to be disposed of without proper consideration having been given by all the members of the Council to the Polish statement, although he regretted the delay in reaching a final settlement, which was bound to be attended by certain risks of minorities. This step, it was reported, was followed by a general feeling of conciliation and pacification.

of renewed friction. Mr. Henderson pointed out that, since the German member of the Council maintained his opposition to the adoption of the report, there was no course open to the Council save to adjourn the discussion until September.

The attitude of the German representative on this occasion was presumably determined by the suspicion that close examination of the Polish statement might reveal that the measures taken were not such as to satisfy German demands. Whether this suspicion proved to have been unfounded, or whether the German Government decided, in view of the improved situation in Upper Silesia, to let the matter drop, no further objections were raised by the German representative when the question came before the Council again in September 1931. With the unanimous adoption, on the 19th September, of a revised report by Mr. Yoshizawa, the Council's examination of the questions raised by the appeals from the German Government and the *Volksbund* in December 1930 and January 1931 was declared formally closed.

(iii) Poland and Danzig (1926-32)

In earlier volumes of this series¹ some account has been given of the special status which was conferred upon Danzig by the Peace Conference of Paris and of the situation in the Free City during the years 1920-5. The peculiar problems of Danzig arose out of the fact that a city which was predominantly German in character (in 1920, 97 per cent. of the population of about 200,000 were Germans²) was considered, at the time of the Peace Settlement, to be the only convenient outlet on the sea for Poland. Thus a population whose feelings of loyalty towards Germany had been stimulated by compulsory severance from the Reich found themselves obliged to live upon terms of the closest intimacy with Poland, with whose future the material interests of the Free City were inextricably bound up by the Peace Settlement.

The complicated arrangements for the administration of Danzig could only have worked satisfactorily if both Danzigers and Poles had approached the problem of co-operation with goodwill and with a genuine desire to make the experiment a success; but the will to agree seemed never to be present on both sides for a sufficient length

¹ The *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, section (ii) 3 (d); the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part II D, section (ii).

² The population of the actual city of Danzig in 1920 was 194,953, but the population of the whole territory included in the Free City numbered 356,740. By 1924 the figures had risen to 206,458 and 383,995 respectively.

of time to make progress possible. The local problems of Danzig would no doubt have found a solution without undue difficulty if they had not formed part of the general problem of German-Polish relations.¹ So long as Germans in the Reich and in the Free City continued their campaign for a revision of frontiers which would bring Danzig, as well as the Corridor and Upper Silesia, once more under German rule, Poles were not likely to forget that they too had a grievance because their original demand for the incorporation of Danzig in Poland had not been granted. It was a constant complaint on the Polish side that a pro-German and anti-Polish spirit in Danzig was fostered artificially by various means—especially by the creation of an excessive number of official posts, to which Germans who were not natives of the city were appointed,² and by the organization of frequent manifestations on the part of German patriotic associations. On the other hand, the Danzigers found an ever-increasing cause of resentment against Poland in the development of the Polish port of Gdynia—a project which owed its initiation, in large measure, to the reluctance of Poland to remain dependent upon Danzig for the supply of munitions and other essential supplies in case of an emergency.³

The history of Danzig during the early years of the post-war period was the history of a conflict between national sentiment and economic interest. While national sentiment impelled the Danzigers to turn their faces towards Germany and their backs to Poland, they were pulled simultaneously in the opposite direction by the hard economic fact that Poland—apart from any treaty provisions—formed the natural hinterland to Danzig. The conflict was reflected

¹ See sub-section (a) of the preceding section.

² The systematic appointment of German officials from the Reich was considered, with some justice, to be no less detrimental to the interests of the Danzigers themselves than it was to the interests of Poland. In October 1932 the Polish Government appealed to the League High Commissioner for a revision of the terms of a Polish-Danzig Convention of 1921 in regard to the acquisition of Danzig citizenship by civil servants who were not nationals of the Free City. The Polish Government expressed the opinion that a modification of the treaty would help to improve relations between Danzig and Poland and would also contribute towards the solution of the unemployment problem in the Free City by replacing a number of officials of German nationality by Danzigers.

³ In 1920, during the Russo-Polish war, and at a moment when the Russians were approaching Warsaw, the Danzigers had refused to unload munitions, destined for Polish use, which had arrived in the port. If it had not been for the intervention of Allied troops who were still stationed in the city, the transport of these indispensable supplies might have been delayed until it was too late. The question of competition between Gdynia and Danzig is dealt with below (p. 381 *seqq.*).

in the international field by the numerous disputes between Danzig and Poland which were brought to the notice of the High Commissioner of the League of Nations or of the League Council. In the field of internal politics it represented the main line of cleavage between the parties of the Right and of the Left in Danzig. Generally speaking, it may be said that all the political parties in Danzig (with the exception of the numerically insignificant group which represented the Polish minority) were anxious that the city should not lose its essentially German character; but while the parties of the Right manifested their solidarity with the Reich by adopting a policy of consistent opposition to Poland, the parties of the Left—at any rate during the earlier part of the period under review—were inclined to be more conciliatory towards Poland, in the hope of reaping some of the economic advantages which the Peace Settlement had been intended to bring to the Free City as well as to Poland. Accordingly, there was a definite connexion between the nature of Danzig's relations with Poland at any given moment during the years 1926 to 1932 and the political complexion of the Government which was in office in the Free City at that moment.¹

During the period under review the relations between Danzig and Poland passed through four phases. The first phase had opened in August 1925, with the defeat of the Nationalists, who had been in power in Danzig for a considerable time, and whose administration had been marked by constant difficulties and disputes with Poland.² The Nationalist Government were succeeded by a Coalition Government drawn from the Catholic Centre, the Liberals, and the Social

¹ The Constitution of the Free City, which came into force in May 1922 (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 262-80), provided that the functions of a Cabinet should be performed by a Senate of 22 members, eight of whom (including the President) were elected by the legislative body (a Volkstag of 120 members) for a term of four years, during which period they could not be removed from office except for breaches of the law or the Constitution. The other 14 members of the Senate were elected by the Volkstag for an indefinite term, were responsible to it throughout their tenure of office, and resigned on a vote of no confidence. The Volkstag itself was elected for four years and could not be dissolved during that period. An attempt to amend this Constitution which was made during 1928 met with no success—a plebiscite on alternative proposals having failed to produce a sufficient number of votes for either plan—but in 1930 the Volkstag passed a law reducing the number of its own members from 120 to 72, and the number of Senators from 22 to 12, all of whom were to be elected by the Volkstag for an indefinite period, and were to be responsible to it. The Volkstag could also be dissolved before the expiration of the four-year period, by its own decision or by a referendum. These amendments to the Constitution were approved by the League Council in September 1930.

² For an account of some of the more serious of these disputes, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, *loc. cit.*

Democrats.¹ This Government remained in power for rather more than a year, and the improvement of relations with Poland during that period was attested by a decrease in the number of the disputes which were referred to the High Commissioner or to the League Council. This first phase ended in the autumn of 1926, when the Nationalist Party returned to power as the leading component in another Coalition, and difficulties with Poland became the order of the day once more. The second phase lasted until November 1927, when a swing to the Left took place in the elections for the Volkstag, and the Social Democrats replaced the Nationalists as the strongest party in the Free City. In January 1928 the Social Democrats formed a Coalition Government with the participation of the Centre and the Liberal Parties, and this Government succeeded in coming to an agreement with Poland on a number of questions which had arisen during the preceding régime. The policy of conciliation was pursued with apparent success for some eighteen months, but although the Coalition Government retained office until the autumn of 1930, the second half of their period of office was marked by increasing friction with Poland. At the Volkstag elections in November 1930, as in the elections which had taken place in Germany two months earlier,² the 'Nazis' gained striking successes at the expense of the moderate parties, and political power reverted again to the anti-Polish group. From this time onwards relations between the Free City and Poland became more and more strained.

During the year 1926 the Coalition Government of Danzig were occupied mainly with questions of economics and finance. The Free City had suffered from the general economic crisis which had swept over Central Europe during 1925, causing widespread unemployment in Germany and Poland, and in particular it had felt the effect of the depreciation of the Polish zloty³ and the consequent decrease in the purchasing power of the Polish market.

At the beginning of 1926 the financial position was considered by the League High Commissioner, Dr. van Hamel,⁴ to constitute a

¹ See *op. cit.*, p. 246.

² See the *Survey for 1930*, p. 8.

³ In 1923 Danzig had appealed to the League of Nations for assistance in carrying out monetary reform, and the stability of Danzig's own currency, the gulden, had not been affected by the Polish monetary crisis.

⁴ Dr. van Hamel, a Dutch national, held the post of High Commissioner at Danzig from 1926 to 1929. He was succeeded by an Italian, Count Gravina, whose three years' mandate was renewed on its expiration by the unanimous decision of the League Council. Count Gravina, however, died at the beginning of his second term, in September 1932. Monsieur Rosting, a Danish national, was then appointed Acting Commissioner, but it was not until October 1933 that the post was filled permanently by the appointment of Mr. Sean Lester (Irish Free State).

serious danger to the Free City, and in July 1926 it came under the consideration of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations. The Financial Committee recommended certain measures for the restoration of budgetary equilibrium, which must precede the issue of a loan for the purpose of rehabilitating the Free City's finances. These measures included a reduction in the number of officials¹ and in salary rates and grants for relief of the unemployed, the introduction of a tobacco monopoly, and a modification of existing arrangements for the division of customs receipts between Poland and the Free City. The last two points in this programme involved negotiations with Poland. On the 20th September, 1926, an agreement on the division of custom receipts was signed, but the question of the organization of a company to exploit the tobacco monopoly had not been settled when difficulties in regard to the internal changes, on which the Financial Committee of the League insisted, brought about the fall of the Danzig Government. In the new Government which was formed in the middle of October the Nationalists were predominant, and although they succeeded in obtaining from the Volkstag full powers to carry out the required financial reforms, their return to power introduced additional complications into the negotiations with Poland. They reopened certain questions in connexion with the customs agreement of the 20th September, and they also put difficulties in the way of Polish participation in the consortium which was to operate the tobacco monopoly. With the assistance of the League Financial Committee, however, the difficulties which had arisen were smoothed out in the course of negotiations at Geneva during March 1927,² and the Financial Committee was then able to satisfy itself that the conditions which it had laid down had been fulfilled.³ On the 28th June, 1927, a loan for 40,000,000 gulden (£1,900,000), secured on the tobacco monopoly and on the excise on spirits, was issued in London and Amsterdam. The proceeds were to be used to repay the Free City's floating debt; to make payments due to the Reparation Commission, in accordance with the provisions of the Versailles Treaty,⁴ and to the Conference

¹ The reduction in the number of officials was to reach a total of 800 at the end of two years.

² Ratifications of the customs agreement of the 20th September, 1926, were exchanged on the 29th April, 1927.

³ The Financial Committee agreed that in addition to the loan which was to be floated under League auspices, the Danzig Harbour Board should raise independently a loan of 20,000,000 gulden for development works. This loan was issued at the beginning of August 1927. (For the constitution and functions of the Harbour Board, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, *loc. cit.*)

⁴ By articles 108 and 254 of the Treaty the Reparation Commission had to

of Ambassadors for costs of occupation; and to finance housing construction. Mr. C. E. ter Meulen was appointed by the League of Nations to act as trustee for the bondholders.

During the year 1927, while a Nationalist administration was in power in Danzig, the Council of the League of Nations was again called upon to decide a number of disputes between the Free City and Poland. In an earlier volume¹ some account has been given of the controversy over the selection of a site for a Polish munitions depot which ended with the assignment to Poland of a portion of the peninsula of Westerplatte, of which she took possession in October 1925. On the completion of the necessary works, negotiations were opened between the Free City and Poland regarding a number of technical questions, including the right of admittance of the Danzig authorities to the Westerplatte area, and the control and supervision of the observance of safety regulations. These negotiations failed to produce agreement, and both Danzig and Poland raised objections to regulations which were issued by the League High Commissioner in April 1927. The matter was then referred to the League Council, which discussed it during its forty-fifth session in June 1927. The main contention of the Danzig representative (Herr Sahm, the President of the Senate) was that the munitions depot was dangerously near to the city. The Council postponed the question for further examination, and, before it came up again at the September session, the Danzig Senate had taken the further step of requesting the Council to cancel its decision of the 14th March, 1924, by which the Westerplatte area had been assigned to Poland as a munitions depot. The Danzigers contended that it was no longer necessary for the Poles to have a depot for munitions within the territory of the Free City, since they could arrange in future for the transport of munitions through their own port of Gdynia.² The Council, after taking legal advice, decided on the 16th September, 1927, that no action could be taken in the matter, since the assignment of a munitions depot to Poland was in accordance with the terms of the Polish-Danzig treaty of 1921, and any modification of the stipulations of that treaty was impossible without the consent of both contracting parties. The technical questions concerning the utilization of the Westerplatte which had come before the Council at its preceding session were again adjourned in September for the examination of certain legal points.

determine 'the proportion and nature of the financial liabilities of Germany and of Prussia to be borne by the Free City of Danzig'. In 1927 these liabilities were finally assessed at £360,000.

¹ The *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part II D, section (ii).

² For the development of the port of Gdynia see p. 381 below.

The Council had also to consider two other questions concerning Danzig during its session in September 1927: the first relating to the jurisdiction of the Danzig Courts in actions brought by Danzig railway officials; and the second to the use of the port by Polish warships. The administration of the Danzig railways was in Polish hands and gave rise to considerable friction.¹ The question now at issue was whether the Danzig Courts were competent to hear pecuniary claims brought by Danzig railway officials against the Polish administration, when such claims were based upon an agreement of the 22nd October, 1921, which had regulated the position of Danzig officials. The Polish Government had maintained that the Danzig Courts were not competent in such cases, and the High Commissioner, in a decision of the 8th April, 1927, had upheld the Polish contention; but the Danzig Government had appealed to the Council against this ruling. The Council decided, with the consent of the representatives of Danzig and Poland, to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion on the question whether the High Commissioner's opinion of the 8th April, 1927, was well founded in law. The Permanent Court, in an opinion delivered on the 3rd March, 1928, answered this question in the negative, and thus decided the dispute in favour of Danzig.

The other question which came before the Council in September 1927 was more important and less easy to settle. On the 8th October, 1921, a provisional agreement had been concluded between Danzig and Poland, whereby Polish warships had free access to the harbour of Danzig and were not obliged to comply with the regulations which were in force for the naval units of other Powers. On the 2nd August, 1927, the Senate of the Free City informed the Council that it had given notice to terminate this agreement—again on the ground that the necessary facilities were now available at Gdynia, which port was said to be 'so far complete that Polish warships could use it for shelter in all weathers and more especially in winter'. The Senate asked the Council to examine the question anew and to give a definite decision upon it. The Council, at the suggestion of Poland, adjourned its examination of this question until its next session in December 1927. By that time the situation as between Danzig and Poland had been altered once more by the return to power in the Free City of the parties which were in favour of a *rapprochement* with Poland. At the December session of the Council, the representatives of Danzig

¹ For instance, much resentment was aroused in Danzig by a Polish order, which was issued in December 1926, to the effect that Danzig railway officials must be able to show a knowledge of Polish within a given time.

and Poland were recommended to seek a practical settlement by negotiation of their differences over the *port d'attache* and over the utilization of the Westerplatte, and in February 1928 negotiations began on these questions and on the question of unification of railway rates. On the 4th August, 1928, three agreements between Danzig and Poland were signed. The Danzig Government withdrew their denunciation of the agreement of 1921 relating to the use of Danzig by Polish warships, and consented to the maintenance in force of that agreement until at least July 1931. In return the Polish Government agreed to the provisional use of the Westerplatte basin by merchant ships (on the understanding that the area would be cleared temporarily when munitions were being handled); and they undertook to ensure that safety regulations were observed in the Westerplatte area and to grant the Danzig police access to the area at all times to verify that due precautions were being taken. The third agreement provided for the abolition of 'broken' railway rates between Poland and Danzig and for the introduction of Polish rates into the Danzig area.

These agreements represented a common-sense attempt to smooth out technical difficulties and to secure a greater measure of co-operation between Danzig and Poland in the working of the port. It was hoped that the economic situation of Danzig, which was again giving rise to anxiety,¹ would be improved by arrangements which extended the space available for shipping and cheapened passenger fares and freight rates.² It was largely because these hopes proved vain that the Nationalist parties gradually regained strength in Danzig until, in the autumn of 1930, they were able to return to power once more.

The *rapprochement*, however, was marked while it lasted. The highest point was reached at the end of February 1929, when Monsieur Bartel, the Polish Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Danzig. The speeches exchanged on this occasion between Monsieur Bartel and Herr Sahn, the President of the Danzig Senate, testified to the reality of the *détente*. It was the first time that a Polish Prime

¹ One symptom of this anxiety was the interest which the Danzig Government manifested in the negotiations for a commercial agreement between Germany and Poland, which had been proceeding intermittently since 1925, and which entered on a more active phase towards the end of 1928 (see section (ii) (c) of this part of the present volume). The Danzigers were concerned lest their industry should suffer from German competition if a trade treaty were concluded; but repeated attempts to induce Poland to permit a Danzig representative to take part in the discussions met with no success.

² It was estimated that Danzig freight rates were reduced by one-third as a result of the unification of railway tariffs.

Minister had visited the Free City, and the Danzigers welcomed Monsieur Bartel's visit as the first voluntary indication on the part of the Polish Government that they recognized the independent status of Danzig.¹ The absence of questions relating to Danzig from the agenda of the League Council throughout the year 1929 also bore witness to the improvement in relations between the Free City and Poland. In view of frequent complaints which had been made by Poland in the past on the subject of German Nationalist demonstrations at Danzig, it was also significant that the Danzig Senate should have prohibited a meeting of the *Stahlhelm* which had been arranged to take place in the territory of the Free City at the beginning of May 1929. By that time, however, the parties which were in favour of a *rapprochement* with Poland were beginning to lose their influence, and a minor incident at the end of June—when a Polish note of protest against a manifestation which had taken place on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles was resented in Danzig as an unwarranted intervention in the Free City's internal affairs—proved to be the prelude to another series of disputes and differences which continued until the tension had reached a point at which it was recognized to be an international danger.

The policy of conciliation and *rapprochement* was not definitely abandoned so long as the Government which had been formed in the Free City at the beginning of 1928 remained in office; but during the summer of 1930 the Government's hands were weakened by a prolonged political crisis, which was largely due to the failure of the policy of conciliation towards Poland to produce the results for which its supporters had hoped. The political parties of the extreme right gained ground in Danzig *pari passu* with the progress of Herr Hitler's 'Nazis' in Germany;² and in elections for the Volkstag which were held on the 16th November, 1930, the most striking successes were gained by the Nazis, who obtained 12 seats out of 72, compared with 1 out of 120 in the previous election

¹ The Danzigers occasionally laid claim to a greater degree of independence than was justified by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the Convention of Paris of the 9th November, 1920. In 1929, for instance, they applied for admission to membership of the International Labour Organization. The Governing Body of that organization asked the Permanent Court of International Justice to give an advisory opinion on the question whether Danzig's special legal status was such as to enable the Free City to become a member. On the 26th August, 1930, the Court ruled that in the absence of an agreement between Danzig and Poland which would ensure that no objection would be raised by Poland to any action of the Free City as a member of the I.L.O., it would not be possible for the Free City to participate in the work of the I.L.O.

² See the *Survey for 1930*, p. 8.

of 1927.¹ The Coalition Government which was formed in January 1931 did not include any Nazi members, but it was dependent upon Nazi support for a majority in the Volkstag, and thereafter Danzig became one of the recognized strongholds of Hitlerism. Since the restoration of Danzig to the Reich was one of the points in Herr Hitler's programme, it was natural that relations between the Free City and Poland should have become more and more strained as the influence of the Nazis increased. The Nationalist *Stahlhelm* were also particularly active in the Free City at this time, and the specifically anti-Polish character of some of their demonstrations was strongly resented in Poland. 'The animosity and antipathy of a large body of the population'² of Danzig towards the Poles was attested during this period both by such demonstrations and by a marked increase in the number of occasions on which Danzigers and Poles came to blows. Frequent complaints from the Polish side of discrimination against, or ill treatment of, Polish nationals culminated in April 1931 in the resignation of the Polish Commissioner-General in the Free City—an incident which caused the League High Commissioner to submit a special report to the League Council on the situation. Thereafter the tension relaxed to some extent for a few months; but new difficulties soon made themselves felt, and questions relating to Danzig reappeared with significant regularity on the agenda of the League Council during the years 1931 and 1932. During the spring and early summer of 1932 there were rumours that Poland contemplated cutting the knot by seizing Danzig, as she had seized Vilna in 1920, and by counter-rumours that a Nazi *coup* was in preparation. By the autumn of 1932, however there were signs that a rather more conciliatory spirit was making itself felt, and certain outstanding differences were disposed of by agreement between the two parties.

¹ The number of members of the Volkstag had been reduced in the revised Constitution which was approved by the League Council in September 1930 (see footnote 1 on p. 372 above). In the 1930 elections the Communists also gained at the expense of the moderate parties. They obtained 7 seats, which represented a considerably higher proportion of the total than the 8 seats which they had won in 1927. The Communists, generally speaking, followed the policy of 'sitting on the fence', and they were disliked and feared by the Social Democrats, whose position in the Volkstag after the 1930 elections would have been less weak if they could have counted on Communist support against the parties of the Right. In this connexion, it may be noted that the staff of the Soviet Consulate at Danzig appeared to be considerably larger than was justified by the commercial interests of the U.S.S.R. in the Free City.

² Quoted from the special report of the High Commissioner, dated the 25th April, 1931 (*League of Nations Official Journal*, July 1931).

In Poland there was a tendency to attribute the strained relations with the Free City during the years 1930-2 to the activities of the Nazis in disseminating anti-Polish propaganda—the implication being that if the Nazis could be suppressed difficulties would disappear.¹ It was in accordance with the natural swing of the political pendulum that the Government which took office in Danzig in January 1928 should have been succeeded, in due course, by an administration more to the Right, and less inclined than its predecessors to pursue a conciliatory policy towards Poland; but neither in the Free City nor in Germany could the startling progress made by the Nazis in 1930 be explained in purely political terms. In Danzig, as in the Reich, it was economic distress which filled the Nazi ranks, and in Danzig recruits came forward all the more readily because public opinion, rightly or wrongly, was practically unanimous in attributing the economic distress from which the city was suffering to the action of Poland. It was the steady deterioration in Danzig's economic situation² which was mainly responsible for the

¹ In the spring of 1932, after the ban on the wearing of uniform had been imposed on the Nazis in Germany (but not in the Free City), the Polish Government approached the High Commissioner on the subject of the disbanding of Nazi detachments in Danzig. The Poles advocated this course on the ground that the Nazi organizations were a danger to Polish citizens in the Free City. The High Commissioner, however, held that the League of Nations, whose representative he was, could not intervene in the internal affairs of Danzig unless public security was affected or the Statute of Danzig was infringed, and he did not consider that the activities of the Nazis were of a nature to require intervention.

² There was a deficit on the budget for 1929 amounting to 5,000,000 gulden, and at the beginning of 1930 it was estimated that the deficit on the 1930-1 budget would be between 9 and 10,000,000 gulden and that on the 1931-2 budget about 9,000,000 gulden. The problem of unemployment gave rise to great anxiety, not least from the point of view of the maintenance of public security. In this connexion the Danzigers felt that they had a grievance because the number of Polish nationals who were in employment in Danzig exceeded the number of Danzigers who were unemployed (in February 1930 the numbers were said to be 25,000 Polish workmen employed, compared with 15,000 Danzig unemployed). Early in 1930 negotiations took place on the question of restricting Polish immigration into Danzig, and provisional agreement was reached on certain points, though no definitive arrangement was concluded. A further series of negotiations on the same question took place in the late summer of 1931, with the object of improving the position in regard to unemployment in Danzig before the winter.

The economic situation of Danzig naturally became more serious as the general economic crisis developed. The abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain in September 1931 was a matter of special concern to Danzig, since the currency of the Free City was linked to sterling. The news of the British Government's decision was followed by a serious drain on the banks, which caused the Senate to decide that the connexion with sterling should be abandoned and the gulden based on gold as from the 21st September, 1932. This measure fulfilled its immediate object, but the repercussions of the

abandonment of the attempts at *rapprochement* which had been made during the years 1928-9. As the High Commissioner told the Council of the League of Nations in April 1931,¹ Polish policy had 'not succeeded in securing to a sufficient extent the support of those currents of opinion in the territory of the Free City which were definitely in favour of effective economic co-operation between Danzig and Poland'. The High Commissioner had 'personally had opportunities of observing that a regrettable change had taken place in this respect among influential representatives of financial and industrial circles in the Free City, and this change' was 'attributed by them not so much to the general economic depression as to disillusionment in consequence of the failure of their efforts to establish a form of co-operation between Danzig and Poland which would be advantageous, not only to Poland, but also to Danzig'.

The principal factor in the situation was the rapid growth of the Polish port of Gdynia, situated a few miles to the west of the territory of the Free City, on the strip of coast which was under Polish sovereignty. In 1919, Gdynia had been a fishing village with a few hundred inhabitants. Ten years later it had a population of 25,000, and the town was laid out on a scale which would ultimately accommodate 100,000 persons. By the middle of 1929 the traffic through the port already amounted to about a quarter of that which passed through Danzig, and the capacity of the port was increasing every month. In these circumstances it was comprehensible that Danzig should have attributed her own economic troubles to the competition of the new port. The Poles argued that the volume of their trade was sufficient to keep both the ports of Danzig and Gdynia fully employed, and they pointed to the fact that the development of Gdynia had not been accompanied by any marked decrease in the volume of traffic through Danzig. On the contrary, up to the end of the year 1928 there had been a steady increase, which had brought the Free City to the position of the third most important port in the Baltic, inferior only to Copenhagen and Stockholm; and although the total traffic through Danzig declined thereafter, the decrease was not in proportion to the increase in the traffic through Gdynia.² The

British financial crisis continued to give rise to much anxiety in commercial and financial circles in Danzig.

¹ See below, pp. 387-8.

² The total traffic through Danzig in 1913 had amounted to 2,112,101 tons. That figure was passed for the first time in 1924, when the total traffic amounted to 2,374,557 tons. In that year the traffic through Gdynia was only 10,167 tons; but in the year 1928, when the Danzig traffic reached its highest point at 8,615,682 tons the traffic through Gdynia already amounted to 1,957,799

Danzigers, in reply to the Polish arguments, maintained that the figures of total traffic were an inadequate indication of the prosperity of the port, which depended principally on the nature of the traffic. They pointed out that the activities of Danzig as a trading centre had been greatly curtailed, and that the transit trade on Polish account with which they were now principally concerned was relatively unprofitable. The greater part of the traffic through Danzig consisted of commodities such as coal and iron, which were handled in bulk, whereas the more profitable kinds of goods traffic and the passenger traffic were deliberately diverted from Danzig to Gdynia by various means.

The controversy was embittered by national sentiment on both sides. The Danzigers resented the existence of Gdynia not only because they feared its competition, but also because they felt that Poland, in thus creating for herself an alternative outlet on the sea, had modified fundamentally the conditions which had obtained at the time of the Peace Settlement and which had led to the severance of Danzig from Germany. It has been seen that in 1927, before the economic competition of Gdynia had become a serious menace, the Nationalist Government then in power in Danzig were already attempting to make the creation of Gdynia an excuse for the withdrawal of certain privileges which Poland enjoyed at Danzig. The rapid development of the rival port from 1928 onwards naturally stimulated the resentment against the terms of the Peace Settlement which was always latent in Danzig and provided a telling argument in favour of the severance of the special ties which bound the Free City to Poland. To the Poles, on the other hand, Gdynia came to stand more and more as a symbol of the Polish national spirit, an outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual grace which had achieved the translation into reality of the visions of restored greatness that had sustained the Polish nation during its time of adversity. The nation which conceived and carried through, in the space of a few years and in spite of formidable difficulties,¹ the project of trans-

tons. The figures for the two ports for the years, 1929, 1930, 1931, and for the first six months of 1932 were as follows:

	<i>Danzig</i>	<i>Gdynia</i>
1929	8,559,651	2,822,402
1930	8,213,094	3,625,748
1931	8,330,505	5,300,114
1932 (six months)	2,507,340	2,179,998

¹ The construction of Gdynia, and of the railways connecting it with the hinterland, was financed in part by foreign loans, and was carried out with the help of foreign engineers; but, as the following figures indicate, the Polish

forming a fishing village into a first-class port was indeed giving to the world at large an impressive proof that its faith in its great future was no less deeply rooted than its pride in its historic past. The enthusiasm of the Poles for Gdynia did not incline them, however, to look favourably upon the possibility of divesting themselves of their responsibilities towards Danzig. Apart from the fact that there appeared to be some basis for the argument that Poland's foreign trade had assumed proportions which were beyond the capacity of either Danzig or Gdynia to deal with singly,¹ any proposal for the severance of the special relations between Danzig and Poland raised the difficulty of the sacrosanctity of the Peace Settlement as a whole. Any modification of the status of Danzig would at once open the whole question of the revision of the German-Polish frontier—a matter on which Polish official opinion was strongly opposed to the smallest concession or attempt at compromise.²

The rivalry between Danzig and Gdynia lay at the root of most of the difficulties between the Free City and Poland which came before the High Commissioner or the Council of the League of Nations during the years 1930-2. These disputes often appeared to be trivial in substance, but they were difficult to settle, if only because they generally involved complicated questions of legal interpretation which necessitated recourse to legal experts or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The principal disputes which came before the Council of the League during this period had to do with the utilization by Poland of the port of Danzig; with the treatment

Government were less dependent than they were generally believed to be upon the financial support of France and other countries.

Foreign Capital invested in Poland in January 1931

	zlotys
France	276,100,000
Germany	139,000,000
U.S.A.	46,700,000
Belgium	29,100,000
Great Britain	27,800,000
Austria	12,400,000
Czechoslovakia	9,300,000
Other countries	8,800,000
Total	549,200,000

(about £12,700,000 at par)

It may also be noted that of the public debt of Poland on the 1st January, 1931, which amounted to 4,414,000,000 zlotys, 66.8 per cent. was due to the United States and only 8.9 per cent. to France.

¹ See the figures quoted in footnote 2 on p. 381 above, which show that during the years 1929 to 1931, when the world economic crisis was growing in intensity, the volume of traffic through the two ports was steadily increasing.

² See sub-section (a) of the preceding section.

of Polish nationals in Danzig; with the question of a *port d'attache* for Polish warships; with the imposition by Poland of restrictions on the export of certain goods from Danzig into Poland, and with questions arising in connexion with the Danzig railway service.

In the dispute over the utilization of the port of Danzig by Poland, the Free City was making a frontal attack upon Gdynia. On the 9th May, 1930, the Danzig Senate appealed to the High Commissioner on the question of competition between the two ports. They referred to a decision of a previous High Commissioner, dated the 15th August, 1921, which had laid down that the Polish Government would 'engage to make full use of the port of Danzig, whatever other ports she might 'open in the future on the Baltic Coast'; and they asked the then High Commissioner, Count Gravina, to give a decision to the effect that the Polish Government was under obligation—

1. To take all necessary measures, more particularly in respect of railway tariffs, to ensure that the portion of the goods and passenger traffic to and from Poland which does not pass the land frontier and of the transit traffic through Poland is trans-shipped in the harbour of Danzig.

2. To make every effort to develop and improve the harbour of Danzig and the railway and inland waterway routes of access thereto, so that they can meet all requirements of the traffic referred to in (1).

3. To refrain from all measures in respect of other harbours whereby goods and passengers traffic would be diverted from Danzig. . . .

The Poles greatly resented this attempt on the part of the Free City to secure the monopoly of Polish traffic, and in a counter-memorandum to the High Commissioner they protested that Danzig was demanding, in fact, the suspension of Poland's economic activities. The High Commissioner decided to take legal advice on the questions raised, and a committee of jurists held two sessions in Geneva in January and February 1931 to examine the matter. On the basis of the jurists' opinion, the High Commissioner gave a decision on the 26th October, 1931, to the effect that Poland was obliged to make full use of the port of Danzig, but that this obligation did not affect the right of Poland to open other ports on the Baltic coast. It was not compatible with Poland's obligations that other ports should be encouraged by preferential measures to the detriment of Danzig, but neither was it compatible with Poland's right to open other ports that Danzig should demand a monopoly of all Polish sea-borne traffic. This decision did not satisfy either the Free City or Poland, and both appealed to the League Council against it. The Council, in January 1932, referred the question back to the jurists for further considera-

tion, and the jurists, in the following April, submitted another report, which elucidated certain points of detail. While upholding in general the High Commissioner's decision of the 26th October, 1931, the jurists left open the question on which the practical application of the decision turned, namely, whether Poland was in fact making full use of the port of Danzig in conformity with the decision of the 15th August, 1921. On the 10th May, 1932, the Council adopted the jurists' report, and asked the High Commissioner to collect further information in order that a definitive decision might be taken on the question whether Poland did or did not make full use of the port of Danzig in accordance with her obligations.¹ Another committee of experts, which had been appointed to advise the High Commissioner on this matter, met in Geneva in July and completed its task on the 14th September. The committee's report had not yet been made public when, at the turn of the years 1932 and 1933, the Polish Government were reported to have signified that they were willing to enter into direct negotiations with Danzig in regard to the competition between the Free City and Gdynia.²

This reported Polish offer appeared to justify the hope—which had no doubt been largely responsible for the delay of the League Council and the High Commissioner in coming to a decision in regard to this fundamental difference between Danzig and Poland—that the disputants, if given sufficient time, would themselves provide the only satisfactory settlement by concluding an arrangement for the equitable division of traffic between the two ports. So long as the dispute over the utilization of the port remained unsettled, however, the strained relations which were both the cause and the effect of the dispute continued unabated. One of the most serious symptoms of this tension was the increase in the number of incidents between Danzigers and Poles and of cases of alleged discrimination against Polish nationals in the Free City. During the first nine months of 1930 there were frequent complaints that Poles in Danzig were not receiving the treatment, especially in educational matters, to which they were entitled. In this connexion there was a long-standing difference of opinion between the Free City and Poland as to the exact nature of the rights enjoyed by Polish nationals in Danzig. While the Poles claimed that they were entitled to equal treatment with Danzigers, the Danzigers maintained that they were only bound

¹ In the month of May 1932 the total traffic through Gdynia exceeded, for the first time, the total traffic through Danzig.

² No steps to initiate negotiations appear to have been taken before relations between Danzig and Poland became seriously strained once more as a sequel to the advent of Herr Hitler to power in Germany at the end of January 1933.

to grant Poles most-favoured nation treatment.¹ On the 30th September, 1930, the Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig, Monsieur Strasburger, appealed to the League High Commissioner for a decision on a number of questions concerning the status of Polish nationals in Danzig.² On the 31st March, 1931, the High Commissioner drew the attention of the League Council to the desirability of obtaining from the Permanent Court of International Justice an advisory opinion on the legal points in regard to the treatment of Polish nationals on which the two Governments differed, which had been brought to his notice by Monsieur Strasburger's communication of the 30th September. On the 22nd May the Council adopted the High Commissioner's suggestion and asked the Permanent Court to interpret the relative treaty provisions. The Court did not give its decision on the questions referred to it until the 4th February, 1932, when it upheld the thesis of Danzig. Its opinion was that Polish nationals in Danzig were not entitled to equal treatment with Danzigers, but that their treatment must be in conformity with that laid down in the Polish minorities treaty for application to minorities in Poland. On the other hand, the Free City must abstain from any discrimination against Polish nationals as such.³

In the meantime, before the legal aspect of the matter had been referred to the Permanent Court, the friction between Danzigers and Poles in the Free City had resulted, in April 1931, in a crisis which had led the Polish Commissioner-General in Danzig to offer his resignation,

¹ By Article 33 of the Polish-Danzig Convention of Paris of the 9th November, 1920 (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 261-7), the Free City undertook to apply to minorities provisions similar to those contained in the Polish Minorities Treaty of the 28th June, 1919, and, in particular, to provide against 'any discrimination, in legislation or in the conduct of the administration, to the detriment of nationals of Poland and other persons of Polish origin or speech'. The failure of Danzig and Poland to agree on the interpretation of this article was recorded in two subsequent agreements, of the 24th October, 1921, and the 1st September, 1923, in which certain detailed questions arising were settled provisionally, without prejudice to the legal standpoints of the two parties, and it was expressly provided that, should occasion arise, either party would be entitled to call for a final decision on the points at issue.

² The questions included educational facilities, the use of the Polish language in offices and public buildings, and the rights of settlement and acquisition of Danzig nationality.

³ By an agreement with Danzig of the 26th November, 1932 (see below, pp. 393-4), Poland accepted the Court's ruling, and it was arranged that negotiations should take place on outstanding questions concerning the status of Polish nationals. In the middle of December the Polish Commissioner presented the Danzig Senate with a list of the questions which Poland desired to discuss, and at the end of the month the Government at Warsaw were reported to have prepared a draft agreement to serve as a basis for immediate negotiations.

and the High Commissioner to lay the whole situation before the League of Nations. During the early months of 1931 political disturbances were of constant occurrence in Danzig, and Monsieur Strasburger found frequent occasion to complain to the High Commissioner of attacks upon Polish nationals. The Danzig Government, for their part, maintained that the examination of such incidents by the competent authorities proved that the Poles were generally the aggressors. The immediate cause of Monsieur Strasburger's resignation was a misunderstanding over the retrial of a Danzig national named Gengerski who was accused of murdering a Polish railway official in January 1931, and who had been acquitted by the Danzig Court of Assize on the 12th March. On the 10th April, at an interview between Monsieur Strasburger and Dr. Ziehm, the President of the Danzig Senate¹ (i.e. head of the Government), which had been arranged by the High Commissioner in order that the already serious situation might be discussed, Dr. Ziehm had given an assurance that the Public Prosecutor had applied for the verdict against Gengerski to be reviewed. Monsieur Strasburger had received this assurance with satisfaction, and when he subsequently learnt, through the medium of the press, that the Public Prosecutor's application had already been withdrawn at the time of his interview with Dr. Ziehm, he offered his resignation, on the ground that he had tried by every means within his power to secure more effective protection for Polish nationals in Danzig territory, without success, and that he could no longer trust the official assurances of the President of the Senate. The Danzig Government explained that Dr. Ziehm had not been guilty of bad faith, since he had not been informed by the Public Prosecutor of his withdrawal of the application for review of the verdict; the Public Prosecutor resigned his office; and Monsieur Strasburger was persuaded by the Polish Foreign Minister, Monsieur Zaleski, to withdraw his resignation.² The situation was also somewhat eased by the action of the Danzig Senate in prohibiting

¹ Dr. Sahn, who had occupied this post since 1920, had incurred the opposition of the Right Parties, especially after the prohibition of the *Stahlhelm* rally in May 1929 (see p. 378 above), and in January 1931 his place had been taken by Dr. Ziehm, a leader of the German Nationalists. Although Dr. Sahn's political sympathies were also more with the Right than with the Left, he had not allowed his personal views to colour the policy of the Government when the more moderate parties were in power, and he was generally recognized to have carried out his difficult task with marked ability. On his retirement he became Chief Burgomaster of Berlin.

² Monsieur Strasburger remained in office until February 1932, when he again offered his resignation, which was accepted. He was succeeded by Monsieur Pappee, the Polish Consul-General at Königsberg.

processions and open-air meetings and warning the population of the Free City that breaches of the peace would be 'proceeded against with all the resources of the state'.¹ Nevertheless, the High Commissioner considered that 'the present strained state of relations [between Danzig and Poland] and the agitation which has been produced both in Polish and Danzig circles' might 'lead at any moment to further regrettable incidents'; and he therefore drew up a full report² upon the situation which he forwarded to the League Secretariat on the 25th April, 1931.

The Council considered this report on the 22nd May, during its sixty-third session. The British representative, Mr. Henderson, who acted as *rapporteur*, drew special attention to the effect upon Danzig-Polish relations of Nationalist demonstrations within the territory of the Free City, and the Council, in the report which it adopted, expressed its disapproval 'of all demonstrations or acts directed against the Statute of the Free City'. It also made a 'pressing appeal to the parties to take such action as may be required in order to re-establish a spirit of confidence and co-operation in the relations between Danzig and Poland and to calm public opinion in both countries'.³

This appeal was followed by a certain relaxation of tension during the summer months of 1931, but this improvement was offset by the

¹ In a resolution of the 22nd June, 1921, the League Council had expressed the opinion that the Polish Government were 'specially fitted to ensure . . . the maintenance of order in the territory of the Free City in the event of the local police forces proving insufficient', and had authorized the High Commissioner to make proposals for securing Polish assistance if he should think fit. The Polish Government were reported to have offered to send troops to the Free City during April 1931; but the High Commissioner did not consider it necessary or desirable to take advantage of the possibility indicated in the Council resolution of June 1921, since in his opinion the police authorities of the Free City were competent to keep order.

² Text in *League of Nations Official Journal*, July 1931.

³ The Council, at an earlier meeting of its sixty-third session, had expressed its confidence in Count Gravina, the High Commissioner, by inviting him to accept a renewal of his term of office for a further period of three years. It now asked him to submit a further report on the position in Danzig in time for its next session. Count Gravina duly complied with this request on the 15th August, 1931. He reported that special measures which had been taken by the Senate on his instigation had improved the general situation in regard to public security, and that such incidents as had occurred between Danzigers and Poles had had no serious consequences. He mentioned certain problems which continued to cause anxiety in connexion with the Free City's economic situation—particularly the question of unemployment—and he drew attention to the continuance of anti-Polish demonstrations. In a supplementary report, dated the 20th August, he dealt with the question of the *port d'attache*. The text of these two reports was printed in the minutes of the Council meeting (*League of Nations Official Journal*, December 1931).

revival of the dispute over the use of Danzig as a *port d'attache* for Polish warships. By the arrangement which had been concluded on this question in August 1928¹ the Free City had consented to an extension until the 1st July, 1931, of the provisional agreement of the 8th October, 1921, under which Polish warships enjoyed special facilities at Danzig. In April 1931, the Danzig Senate had again denounced this agreement, but in order to facilitate negotiations they had subsequently offered to maintain the provisions of the 1921 agreement in force until the 15th August, 1931. The negotiations having failed, the Senate had again extended the time limit to the 15th September, 1931, but they had notified the Polish Government and the High Commissioner that, if no agreement had been reached by that date, they would consider 'any use of the Port of Danzig by Polish warships which was not in strict conformity with the international regulations in force for the admission of foreign men-of-war as "direct action" within the meaning of the Council resolution of the 13th March, 1925'.²

The dispute over access to and anchorage in the Port of Danzig for Polish war vessels turned on the interpretation of treaties and decisions of the High Commissioner and the League Council. The Poles maintained and the Danzigers denied that the treaties and decisions in question gave Poland the right to claim special facilities for her warships at Danzig. Since the parties were not in agreement on the legal aspect, the League Council, to whom the High Commissioner had referred the dispute, dealt with the matter on the 19th September, 1931, by referring it to the Permanent Court for an advisory opinion, and requesting the High Commissioner to draw up provisional regulations for use pending the final decision. The opinion of the Court, which was given on the 11th December, 1931, was again in favour of Danzig. By eleven votes to three the Court held that the relevant treaties and the decisions of the League Council and High Commissioner did not 'confer upon Poland rights or attributions as regards the access to or anchorage in the port and waterways of Danzig of Polish war vessels'. Thereupon the Polish Government asked the League Council to give a decision which would confer upon Poland the rights which she had been proved not to possess under existing conditions. The Danzig Government, for their part, declared that they were ready to grant Poland certain special

¹ See p. 377 above.

² On that date the Council had adopted a report by Señor Quiñones de León in which 'direct action' was defined as 'an action . . . which might endanger or prove a serious obstacle to the maintenance of public security in Danzig or which might jeopardize good relations between Danzig and Poland'.

facilities for her warships in addition to the facilities which by international usage were accorded to warships of any nationality at Danzig, as at other ports. They offered to maintain the provisional regulations which had been issued by the High Commissioner (in accordance with the Council's decision of the 19th September, 1931) in force until the 1st April, 1932, in order to allow of negotiations with Poland in regard to special facilities.

The League Council, accordingly, recommended the two Governments in January 1932 to seek a direct settlement of the practical questions at issue. The negotiations, however, did not result in agreement within the time limit fixed by Danzig (which was extended until the 1st May, 1932), and while the Poles considered that the provisional regulations were still in force after that date, the Free City maintained that they had lapsed, and that Polish warships, like other foreign vessels, were not entitled to enter the harbour without having obtained the prior consent of the Senate. This state of affairs gave rise to an incident in June 1932, when a Polish destroyer insisted upon entering the harbour, in spite of the protests of Danzig, as an act of courtesy to a British destroyer flotilla which was visiting the port. Polish resentment against the attitude of Danzig on this occasion was increased by the reception which was given to a German cruiser and two destroyers which visited the port a few days later—according to the Poles, on the invitation of the Free City¹—in spite of representations which had been made by the Polish Government to the German Government to the effect that the time was not propitious for such a visit. In the following August this dispute over the *port d'attache* was settled by agreement. On the 12th August a protocol² was signed whereby Polish naval units were granted certain privileges in addition to those provided by international custom. It was agreed that for a period of three years there should be no restriction either on the number of Polish units entering the port simultaneously or on their length of stay, on condition that due notice was given to the Chief Pilot—an official of the joint Danzig-Polish Harbour Board.

The dispute over customs which came to a head during the year 1932 arose out of certain privileges which Danzig enjoyed, under her treaties with Poland, in regard to the importation from Germany of goods which were to be 'finished' in Danzig. The Polish contention

¹ The Danzig Senate denied that they had formally invited the German warships.

² The text of the protocol is printed in *League of Nations Official Journal*, January 1933, pp. 142-5.

was that the Free City abused this privilege in order to introduce into Poland, duty-free,¹ large contingents of German goods on which a high rate of duty would have had to be paid if they had come direct into Poland from Germany. On the 15th September, 1931, the Polish Government protested to the High Commissioner against the loss to the Polish Exchequer which was caused by these alleged abuses in connexion with the 'passive finishing trade'. On the 30th October, before a reply had been received from the High Commissioner, the Polish Minister of Finance instructed the Danzig customs administration to put an end to this trade within a specified time-limit. The customs authorities of the Free City (who were directly responsible to the Danzig Senate and not to the Polish Minister of Finance) did not comply with these instructions, and on the 9th January, 1932, the Polish Finance Minister issued an order establishing a system of supervision in order to prevent goods of certain specified classes from entering Poland. On the 29th January the Danzig Senate asked the High Commissioner to give a decision that this Polish measure constituted 'direct action' within the meaning of the League Council's resolution of the 13th March, 1925.² On the 29th March the High Commissioner, having failed to secure the approval of Poland for a compromise which he had suggested, gave a provisional decision in the sense desired by Danzig. The Polish Government appealed against this decision, after they had issued, on the 21st April, 1932, a law imposing financial penalties for the infringement of the Polish regulations relating to the passive finishing trade. When, however, the case came before the Council of the League during its sixty-seventh session in May 1932, the Polish Government withdrew their appeal against the High Commissioner's decision of the 29th March, 1932,—which had in the meantime been confirmed by a committee of jurists to whom the legal aspect had been referred. The Polish representative at Geneva also agreed that, pending a final settlement, the Financial Penalties Law should not be applied in such a way as to prejudice a solution, and the Council was able to leave the High Commissioner, with the assistance of experts, to settle the detailed questions arising out of the dispute. The Polish Government, which considered that the root of the trouble lay in the independence of the Danzig customs administration, proposed in May that the administration should be placed under Polish control, but this proposal was promptly rejected by the Danzig Senate. In the meantime, a considerable number of Danzig merchants and importers, headed by

¹ By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Danzig was included in the Polish customs area.

² See p. 389 above.

certain Jewish firms, had come to the conclusion that the anti-Polish policy involved too great a sacrifice of their own interests, and they had accordingly accepted supervision of their exports to Poland by Polish customs inspectors. Many of the leading commercial houses, however, had refused to accept the system of supervision and had been suffering severely from the ban on the importation of their goods into Poland. During the early summer months, also, a partially successful attempt was made by an unofficial Polish association to organize a boycott of Danzig and of Zoppot—a watering place within the territory of the Free City which was frequented by Poles.¹ As a result of these measures, the number of visitors to Danzig during the summer was considerably below the normal figure, and the resulting loss of income helped to convince the Senate of the desirability of coming to terms with Poland. By protocols signed on the 12th August, 1932 (at the same time as the agreement regarding the *port d'attache*²), both Danzig and Poland undertook to counteract as far as possible all manifestations and activities of an unfriendly nature, and to take 'vigorous action' against 'any economic propaganda' directed by either party against the establishments and products of the other party.

On the 10th November, 1932, negotiations began in Warsaw on questions relating to the 'passive finishing trade', but the discussions were broken off after a week without an agreement having been reached. Conversations then took place at Danzig, under the auspices of the acting High Commissioner, Monsieur Rosting, but these proved equally fruitless, and on the 21st November Monsieur Rosting gave arbitral decisions on three points arising out of the dispute. His decisions made certain concessions to the Polish point of view, but on the whole he upheld the arguments of Danzig. In particular, Poland was required to withdraw immediately the restrictions which she had placed on the import of goods finished in Danzig, and a claim which she had made for damages on account of alleged abuses by the Danzig customs officials was rejected. Both Danzig and Poland appealed to the Council of the League against certain sections of Monsieur Rosting's decisions, but on the 1st February, 1933, the Council upheld two of the decisions and postponed consideration of the third until various points had been examined by legal experts.³

¹ Protests from the Free City regarding this boycott were met by the retort that for a long time past the Nazis had organized a boycott of Poles and Jews in Danzig.

² See p. 390 above. For the text of these protocols see *League of Nations Official Journal*, January 1933, pp. 145-6.

³ The question at issue related to import quotas, and the High Com-

In the meantime, a dispute over railway questions had come to a head and had been settled satisfactorily. It has been mentioned¹ that the administration of the railway services in the Free City gave rise to considerable friction, and points in dispute were constantly being referred for decision to the High Commissioner or to the Council of the League. In May 1932 the League Council confirmed three decisions of the High Commissioner, against which one or both of the parties had appealed, dealing respectively with personnel of Danzig nationality in the Polish railway service, the supervisory authority within the meaning of the Danzig rail transport laws, and the organization of the railways situated in the territory of the Free City. In June the Polish Government were reported to have replied to a demand which the Danzig Senate had made for the withdrawal of the Polish railway administration from Danzig by declaring that they had intended for some time past to transfer the head-quarters of the administration into Polish territory on account of the expense which was involved by the difference between Danzig and Polish currency. This measure—which would not, of course, have met the desire of the Danzigers for the removal of Polish control over the railways—was not actually taken; but on the 25th October the Polish Minister of Transport issued a decree proclaiming that, as from the 1st December, 1932, all railway charges in the territory of the Free City must be paid in Polish currency. This action aroused strong resentment in Danzig, and the High Commissioner referred the question to the League Council as a matter of urgency. The Council dealt with the matter in the last week of November by appointing a small sub-committee to assist the High Commissioner in his efforts to promote an agreement between the parties. The mediators succeeded in attaining their object, and an agreement was signed on the 26th November at Geneva by Dr. Ziehm, for Danzig, and by Monsieur Beck, the new Polish Foreign Minister, for Poland. By this agreement the decree of the 25th October was withdrawn, and it was arranged that negotiations should take place, as soon as circumstances should permit, on the question of the unification of Danzig currency. The agreement also covered certain other matters. Both parties undertook to withdraw the prohibition which they had placed on certain journals. Poland accepted the decision of the

missioner's decision involved the revision of certain articles of the Danzig-Polish Convention of Warsaw of the 24th October, 1921. Other points relating to the terms of that convention, which had been submitted to Monsieur Rosting for decision, had been referred by him to legal experts, and the Council considered that the advice of the experts should also be sought on the question of import quotas.

¹ See p. 376 above.

Permanent Court of International Justice in regard to the status of Polish nationals in Danzig;¹ and she also undertook to contribute towards the cost of the education in Danzig schools of the children of Polish railway employees.

The conclusion of this agreement was warmly welcomed at Geneva, where it was regarded as a sign that a new atmosphere had been created between Danzig and Poland. This temporary improvement, however, was not sufficiently marked to withstand the new strain which was imposed upon relations between Germany and Poland—and therefore upon relations between Danzig and Poland—by political developments in Germany early in 1933. The crisis which arose in March 1933 over the question of the guard stationed at the Polish munitions depot on the Westerplatte will be dealt with in a later volume.

(iv) Relations between Germany and Lithuania over the Memel Territory

In a previous volume of this series,² the history of the town and district of Memel has been carried down to the signature, in May 1924,³ of a convention between the Principal Allied Powers and Lithuania which provided that the Memel territory should 'constitute, under the sovereignty of Lithuania, a unit enjoying legislative, judicial, administrative, and financial autonomy' within certain limits prescribed in a statute annexed to the convention. The city of Memel, which had been detached from Germany by the Peace Treaty, without any exact provision for its future being made, was no less German in character than the city of Danzig;⁴ but, like Danzig, its separation from the Reich was determined on because it was considered to form the only possible part for one of the new states created by the Peace Settlement—in Memel's case the Republic of Lithuania. None the less, the future of Memel remained uncertain for some three years after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, until Lithuania—inspired by the example set her by Poland at Vilna⁵—took the matter into her own hands in January 1923 and seized the city by

¹ See p. 386 above.

² The *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, section (ii) (3) (c).

³ The convention was signed by the Principal Allied Powers on the 8th May, 1924, and by Lithuania on the 17th May.

⁴ The strip of territory, running inland from the town of Memel along the river Niemen for about 70 miles, which was separated from East Prussia to form the district of Memel was inhabited mainly by Lithuanian-speaking peasants; but these peasants seem to have been hardly less German in sympathy than the townfolk.

⁵ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, section (ii) (3) (b).

force. The settlement of May 1924, which was only effected after prolonged and difficult negotiations, disappointed the hopes of the Lithuanian intransigents who had executed the *coup de main* of January 1923, but it could not be said to have deprived Lithuania of the fruits of her high-handed act, since her sovereignty over the town and district of Memel was definitively confirmed. Her free access to a port¹ was thus guaranteed, but at the same time the interests of the inhabitants of Memel were safeguarded by provisions for a large measure of local autonomy.

In the situation which was created by the Convention and Statute of May 1924, a certain amount of friction between the local and central authorities was perhaps inevitable. The arbitrary separation of Memel from Germany had increased rather than diminished the loyalty of the German inhabitants to the Reich, and this loyalty manifested itself both in a determination to preserve the German character of the city's culture and institutions, and in a readiness to suspect Lithuania of encroachments upon the autonomous rights and other privileges which had been conferred by the Memel Convention. On the other hand, the Lithuanians—who possessed their full share of the nationalist spirit which is natural to a new state and which had been stimulated, in their case, by their dispute with Poland and the loss of Vilna—were inclined to resent any restrictions on their sovereignty over their only port, and in this mood they were not likely to neglect such opportunities as might present themselves for strengthening their hold over the Memel territory. Thus there was a strong inherent probability that the application of the Memel Convention and Statute would give rise to difficulties and disputes.

While the position of Memel presented obvious analogies with that of Danzig,² there were also certain important differences. In the first place, Poland did not possess sovereign rights over Danzig, whose independent status as a Free City was guaranteed by the League of Nations; whereas the status of Memel as an autonomous district of Lithuania was guaranteed, not by the League, but by the signatories of the Memel Convention—Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

Moreover, the League of Nations was represented at Danzig by a

¹ Under the terms of the convention, Poland was also to enjoy special facilities in the port of Memel, but these arrangements were virtually nullified by the continuance of the 'state of war' between Lithuania and Poland (see the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, section (ii) (3) (b); the *Survey for 1927*, Part II D, section (iv)).

² See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part III, section (ii) (3) (d); the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, Part II D, section (ii); and section (iii) of this part of the present volume.

High Commissioner who resided in the City, but none of the four guaranteeing Powers had a permanent representative at Memel.¹ Thus Memel did not possess the ready access to the organs of the League of Nations of which Danzig made free use for the redress of her grievances. It was this last difference, presumably, which determined the attitude of the German Government towards Memel.² The inhabitants of both Danzig and Memel were sure of the sympathy and the moral support of the Reich in their efforts to preserve the German character of their cities and to maintain them as outposts of German culture, and on the numerous occasions when questions concerning Danzig were debated before the League Council, the representative of the Free City, from the end of 1926 onwards,³ could generally count on the backing of the German member. In the case of Memel, however, the German Government felt it incumbent upon them to protect the interests of their former nationals by more active intervention, and on several occasions they took the initiative in order to secure the ventilation of the grievances of Memel. Thus the Memel question took on the aspect of a dispute between Germany and Lithuania—two states which, in other respects, had more reasons for friendship than for hostility. Their common dislike of Poland was a bond of union between them, and their economic relations were such as to provide a strong motive, on the Lithuanian side at least, for the avoidance of causes of offence.⁴ In this connexion it may be noted that the dispute over Memel did not become acute until Germany had raised her customs duties on cattle and agricultural produce to a degree which crippled Lithuania's export trade.⁵

The troubles of Memel from 1924 onwards arose mainly in the

¹ There was a nominee of one of the League organs permanently stationed at Memel in the person of the neutral chairman of the Harbour Board, who was appointed by the Advisory Committee for Communications and Transit. (See the *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 260.) This official, however, was only concerned with the administration of the port; and Monsieur Kjelstrup, the Norwegian national who was the first occupant of the post, found occasion to complain to the League Advisory Committee, in 1926 and again in 1927, that his task was rendered virtually impossible by the opposition of the other two members of the Board, who represented Memel and Lithuania respectively, and who combined to vote against the chairman on most matters of importance.

² On this point, see footnote (2) on p. 398 below.

³ It was in September 1926 that Germany was finally admitted to membership of the League of Nations with a seat on the Council (see the *Survey for 1926*, Part I A, section (i)).

⁴ Up to and including the year 1930, about 50 per cent. of Lithuania's imports came from Germany, which took also about 50 per cent. of Lithuania's exports. Thus Germany was at the same time Lithuania's best customer and her principal source of supply of coal and manufactured goods.

⁵ See p. 400 below.

political and not in the economic field. It was true that the traffic in timber, which had constituted something like 95 per cent. of the exports through Memel before the War, declined rapidly—partly in consequence of the bad relations between Poland and Lithuania, which practically precluded the floating of Polish timber down the Niemen, and partly because the export trade in Russian timber diminished under the Soviet régime and most of what remained was diverted to Riga and Leningrad. But, in compensation for this loss, Memel developed a considerable import trade, and the saw-mills which had flourished before the War were gradually replaced by factories of various kinds designed to serve the needs of Lithuania. It was true, also, that considerable difficulty was experienced in connexion with the proportion of the Lithuanian revenue which was assigned to Memel;¹ but the friction over financial questions was less serious than that which arose out of the application of the political provisions of the Statute.

By the terms of that instrument, the Governor of the Memel Territory was appointed by the Lithuanian Government, and the Governor, in turn, appointed the President of the Directorate—a body of not more than five members who exercised the executive power in the territory. The President of the Directorate, who appointed the other four members, was entitled to hold office so long as he possessed the confidence of the local legislative body, the Landtag or Seimelis, and the Directorate as a whole was obliged to resign if the Landtag refused it its confidence. Throughout the period under review, the Landtag consisted of 29 members, the overwhelming majority of whom belonged to the German political parties. The method of appointment of the Directorate was intended to ensure that administrative authority should not be entirely in the hands of the Germans, to the possible detriment of Lithuanian interests; but in fact the Governor repeatedly used his powers in attempts to create a Lithuanian majority on the Directorate—attempts which invariably brought him and the Directorate into conflict with the predominantly German Landtag. Time after time a Lithuanian President of the Directorate received a vote of no confidence from the Landtag, and when the Governor tried to cut the knot either by maintaining the Directorate in office, in spite of the Landtag, or by dissolving the Landtag and postponing the

¹ The local authorities at Memel remained responsible for financial charges in connexion with educational, police, and judicial matters, but the revenue from the customs, excise, and postal services of the territory went direct to the Lithuanian Exchequer.

elections, he laid himself open to the charge of having infringed the terms of the Statute.¹

During the years 1924 to 1930 complaints regarding alleged infractions of the Convention and Statute were frequently addressed by Memel to the Council of the League of Nations. Elections for the Landtag were not held until October 1925, when they resulted in the return of 27 German members and 2 Lithuanians. The Memellanders complained to the League on several occasions regarding the postponement of the elections and regarding alleged interference with their religious, cultural, and judicial rights. In June 1926, after the Landtag had come into existence, a memorandum embodying a number of complaints—the most serious of which related to the question of finance—was placed on the agenda of the Council at the request of the Principal Allied Powers.² Before the Council had taken action, however, a direct settlement of the financial dispute was reached, and the other complaints were then withdrawn.

The next occasion for an appeal to the Council was provided by a political deadlock in the spring of 1927. Between October 1925

¹ Article 15 of the Statute gave the Governor, in agreement with the Directorate, power to dissolve the Landtag; but it stipulated that elections for the new Chamber must take place within six weeks from the date of dissolution.

² The procedure to be followed in connexion with petitions from Memel was the subject of prolonged discussion. Article 17 of the Convention provided that any member of the Council of the League of Nations should be entitled to draw the attention of the Council to any infraction of the terms of the Convention, but there was no provision for a direct appeal by Memel to the Council. In September 1925 the Council decided that communications from Memel alleging infraction of the Convention should be circulated by the League Secretariat to members of the Council, any one of whom might then request that the matter be placed on the agenda of the Council. This decision was not accepted by Lithuania, who protested against the action taken by the Principal Allied Powers in June 1926; and in the following September the question of procedure was referred to a committee of jurists. The jurists' opinion, which was accepted by the Council, was that Memel was not entitled to address complaints to the Secretariat of the League, but must communicate with a member or members of the Council, who would be expected, before bringing the matter to the notice of the Council, to make sure that there were good grounds for belief that an infraction of the Convention had actually been committed. The date of this decision coincided with the admission of Germany to the League of Nations, and it was natural that, thereafter, Germany should be the Council Member to whom the Memellanders addressed themselves. The Lithuanian Government continued to contest the right of Germany, who was not a signatory of the Memel Convention, to bring questions relating to Memel before the League; and their persistence in denying the competence of the Council to deal with questions which had been brought to their notice in this manner led to various suggestions that the Permanent Court should be asked to determine what was the proper procedure. These suggestions, however, were not adopted.

and January 1927 three successive Directorates were obliged to resign because they received votes of no confidence from the Landtag, and the Governor finally dissolved the legislative body—with the intention, apparently, of conducting the administration independently of it, by means of a Directorate formed of his nominees. No election for a new Landtag having been arranged, the position was brought to the notice of the League Council in May 1927 by Dr. Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister. In June, however, Dr. Stresemann succeeded in settling the matter out of court with Monsieur Valdemaras, the Lithuanian Prime Minister, who promised that elections should be held in the Memel Territory without delay. This promise was duly carried out in August (although there were complaints regarding the conduct of the elections),¹ and further German-Lithuanian conversations which began in October resulted in the signature of a number of agreements on the 29th January, 1928.

These agreements included an arbitration treaty and three conventions relating to the régime on the frontier, as well as an agreement regarding Memel. The basis was also laid for a new commercial treaty, to replace an agreement concluded in 1923, negotiations for the revision of which had been proceeding intermittently for some two years.² The new commercial treaty was finally signed on the 30th October, 1928, on terms which were not unfavourable to the Lithuanian export trade but which gave Germany, in return, extensive rights in the matter of domicile and settlement. According to Polish criticisms, indeed, the treaty practically converted Lithuania into a colony of Germany. The reason for Monsieur Valdemaras's conciliatory attitude towards Germany was not, of course, far to seek. Throughout his period of office, which lasted from December 1926 until September 1929, the main object of Lithuanian foreign policy was to score as many points as possible in the perennial dispute with Poland. In these circumstances it was obviously worth while for Lithuania to cultivate the friendship of Germany,³ whose

¹ The majority which the Germans had possessed in the Landtag was reduced by two, from 27 to 25.

² Apart from political complications, the fundamental difficulty in these negotiations was the same as in the case of the German-Polish economic negotiations (see section (ii) (c) of this part of the present volume), namely, German agrarian opposition to the granting of favourable terms to a country whose exports were mainly agricultural.

³ Lithuania had already made sure of the moral support of Poland's other potentially hostile neighbour, the U.S.S.R. Lithuania was the first of the Russian border-states to respond to overtures for a pact of non-aggression which were made by the Soviet Government in the spring of 1926, and in the agreement which was signed on the 28th September, 1926, the Soviet Government placed it on record that they had not ceased to recognize Lithuania's

own relations with Poland were anything but satisfactory, and whose support would be particularly useful to Lithuania when her dispute with Poland was discussed at Geneva.¹

The improvement in the general relations between Germany and Lithuania was reflected in the comparative tranquillity which reigned in Memel throughout the year 1928. During the following year, however, friction began to make itself felt again between the Directorate and the Landtag, and Monsieur Valdemaras's fall from power in September 1929 was followed within a few months by a recrudescence of political trouble in Memel Territory. This coincided with a renewal of tension in the economic relations between Germany and Lithuania, in consequence of an increase in the German customs tariff on agricultural produce which was brought into effect in April 1930 and which made it unprofitable for Lithuanian exporters to sell their goods in the German market.² In August 1930 the Governor of Memel again dissolved the Landtag, after two Directorates had fallen in rapid succession. Elections were fixed for the 10th October, but the Memellanders decided to appeal to the League Council against alleged restrictions on their liberty by the maintenance of martial law³ and by other means, as well as against infractions of the judicial and financial provisions of the Memel Statute. On the 20th September, 1930, the German Government forwarded this petition to the League Secretariat with the request that it might be placed on the agenda of the Council as a matter of urgency; but, once again, the intervention of the Council was rendered unnecessary by the result of conversations between Dr. Curtius and Dr. Zaunius, the Foreign Ministers of Germany and of Lithuania, who were representing their respective countries at Geneva. Dr. Zaunius promised the formation of a new Directorate immediately after the elections, in consultation with the members of the new Landtag, and the removal of any restrictions which might prevent the elections from being

right to the possession of Vilna, which had been conceded by the Russo-Lithuanian Peace Treaty of the 12th July, 1920. (See the *Survey for 1927*, p. 225.)

¹ The moral was pointed, no doubt, by the non-committal attitude which Germany adopted when the Lithuanian-Polish controversy came before the League Council in December 1927 (at a moment, that is, when Monsieur Valdemaras had not carried his negotiations with Germany beyond the stage of indefinite promises).

² For the effect of these German measures for agrarian protection on German-Polish commercial relations, see section (ii) (c) of this part of the present volume.

³ Martial law had been declared in Lithuania in 1927, in consequence of internal troubles, and had been extended to the Memel territory—according to the Memellanders, without due cause.

entirely free. Dr. Curtius then withdrew his request for discussion of the Memellanders' appeal by the Council.

The elections for the Landtag, which were held on the 10th October, 1930, resulted in the Lithuanians gaining one seat, which gave them a total of 5 members out of 29. The German inhabitants declared that Monsieur Zaunius's promise of freedom for the elections had not been kept, and in May 1931 another petition was submitted to the League Council by Germany complaining that martial law was still in force and that the difficulties over finance and over Memel's judicial rights had not been solved.¹ The Council decided on this occasion to arrange for an expert inquiry, on the spot, into the financial problem,² but they left the other points at issue to be dealt with by the four members of the Council who were signatories of the Memel Convention. In the middle of June the four Powers addressed a note to the Lithuanian Government in which they suggested that conditions in Memel did not justify the maintenance in the territory of the martial law which had been in force throughout Lithuania since 1927. They also upheld the standpoint of Memel in regard to the principal outstanding question in the judicial field—that is, the competence of the local courts to try officials.³

In the meantime, a solution which satisfied the German majority had been reached in regard to the composition of the Directorate. The elections of October 1930 had been followed by lengthy negotiations between the Governor and the political parties, which ended early in January 1931 in the nomination as President of the Directorate of Herr Böttcher, a German with agricultural interests who was in close relations with the majority parties, though he had not hitherto taken any active part in politics. Herr Böttcher appointed as his colleagues two Germans, and, for the twelve months during which this Directorate of three persons remained in power, Memel enjoyed a greater measure of political stability than had fallen to her lot for some time past. The Lithuanians, however, were not at

¹ In September 1930 the Council's *rapporteur* on the Memel question (Monsieur Hambro, of Norway) had been authorized by the Council to examine in greater detail the judicial and financial problems raised in the petition from Memel, but although the matter had come up again in the next session of the Council in January 1931, it had been postponed. In March 1931 the Supreme Court at Kovno decreed that the Memel courts should no longer try cases in which Lithuanian officials were concerned.

² The final outcome of this financial investigation was that an agreement was signed on the 18th August, 1932, which regulated the financial relations between the Lithuanian Government and Memel for five years.

³ This *démarche* does not appear to have produced much result. At all events, martial law was still in force in Memel eight months later.

all satisfied with an arrangement which gave them no representation on the Directorate, and the feeling gained strength among the Germans that the Governor was only awaiting his opportunity to overthrow Herr Böttcher. When the opportunity came at the turn of the years 1931 and 1932 it was promptly seized.

In the middle of December Herr Böttcher, accompanied by two members of the Landtag, travelled to Berlin to conduct certain negotiations with potash and nitrogen syndicates as the representative of an agricultural co-operative society of which he was president. Whilst in Berlin, he also had conversations with the authorities at the Ministry of Agriculture on questions relating to the export of agricultural produce from the Memel Territory to Germany. Throughout the dispute which followed Herr Böttcher and the German Government, which took up the cudgels on his behalf, consistently maintained that the visit of the Memel delegation to Berlin had been entirely private in character, and that in his conversations with the German authorities Herr Böttcher had not been acting in his official capacity. Nevertheless, it does not appear to have been denied, on the Memel side, that the cost of the journey to Berlin was defrayed from public funds. The Lithuanian authorities held that Herr Böttcher (who had not informed them of his intentions before leaving for Germany) had exceeded his functions as President of the Directorate and had trespassed upon the province of the Government at Kovno by negotiating with a foreign Power. On the return of the delegation to Memel, the object and scope of the mission were discussed between Herr Böttcher and the Lithuanian Governor of Memel, Colonel Merkys, between Colonel Merkys and the Government at Kovno, and also between the Lithuanian and the German Governments. The upshot was that on the 6th February, 1932, Colonel Merkys informed Herr Böttcher that he had forfeited the confidence of the Lithuanian Government and invited him to resign his office. Herr Böttcher refused to take this course, on the ground that he was entitled by Article 17 of the Statute to remain in office so long as he possessed the confidence of the Landtag, and that the Landtag had passed a vote of confidence in him in January, after his return from Berlin. Thereupon, Colonel Merkys placed Herr Böttcher under arrest,¹ and appointed a provisional Directorate composed entirely of Lithuanians to carry on the Government.

¹ He was detained for about 48 hours and was then allowed to return to his own house, on the understanding that he would not leave it without permission. It appears to have been the original intention of the Lithuanian authorities to take proceedings against him on a charge of high treason, but this intention was abandoned on legal advice.

The situation had been growing more and more strained throughout January, and with the arrest of Herr Böttcher the tension reached a dangerous pitch. The German majority in Memel considered that Colonel Merkys had violated the Statute by acting in contravention of Article 15 (which conferred immunity from arrest on members of the Landtag) as well as of Article 17, and they declared their sentiments with no uncertain voice. The excitement in Memel itself was hardly greater than that in Germany. Comparisons were drawn between the actions and intentions of Lithuania in Memel and those of Japan in Manchuria,¹ and the press gave publicity to rumours that demonstrations by members of an unofficial Lithuanian military organization in Memel were preparing the way for a 'march on Memel' on the 16th February (the day on which the Lithuanians celebrated their independence). On the other hand, the Lithuanians viewed with equal suspicion hostile manifestations on the part of Nazis and Nationalists in East Prussia, which only confirmed them in their belief that Herr Böttcher's journey to Berlin in December had been part of a deliberate campaign against Lithuania's sovereignty over Memel.² In fact, there were all the materials for a conflagration,

¹ The Lithuanian Government were subsequently acquitted by the highest international legal authority of the charge that they had violated the Statute by dismissing Herr Böttcher (see p. 408 below); but at the time there appeared to be good grounds for the supposition that Lithuania's action at Memel was the first symptom of the disastrous effects which Japan's defiant attitude was likely to have upon the whole post-war system of international security. On this supposition, Lithuania, like Japan, appeared to have effected a *coup* at a moment when the intervention of other Powers was rendered improbable by their preoccupation with urgent affairs (in Japan's case, the situation created by the departure of Great Britain from the Gold Standard; in Lithuania's case, the situation created by Japan's action). In this connexion it was recalled that Lithuania had selected a similar occasion for her *coup* at Memel in 1923. The 11th January, 1923, the day on which the Lithuanian rising took place in Memel, was also the day on which French and Belgian troops marched into the Ruhr; and the result of this earlier *coup* might appear to justify the calculation that, given the ability to choose the right moment, a small Power could set the Great Powers at defiance with relative impunity.

² For some time past there had been signs of growing uneasiness in Lithuania on the subject of the continued predominance of German influence in Memel. For instance, several attempts had been made to diminish the considerable number of German nationals who occupied official or judicial posts in the territory. (According to the Lithuanian version the salary which such officials received from the Lithuanian Government was not infrequently supplemented from German funds.) In February 1930 the German Government found occasion to protest against the refusal of the Lithuanian authorities to renew the residence permits of eleven teachers in Memel schools who were German nationals. At that time negotiations were in train on the subject of the status of previous German officials in Memel, and an agreement was signed in May 1930. In the following spring, however, the Lithuanian authorities evoked another protest from Berlin by expelling five Germans.

which a mere spark might set alight, but which might easily spread until the whole of the precarious political structure in North-Eastern Europe was in danger.¹

On the 8th February the German Government asked that the question of the situation in Memel should be placed on the agenda of the League Council. The Council, which was already in session in connexion with the Sino-Japanese dispute, was able to deal with the Memel question on the 13th and the 20th February. The case of Memel was pleaded by Herr von Bülow,² while Dr. Zaunius, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, defended his Government's action. Monsieur Colban, the representative of Norway, who was appointed *rappporteur*, endeavoured to effect a settlement by negotiation between the parties. This method had proved successful on most of the previous occasions on which questions regarding Memel had come before the Council; but this time the Lithuanian representative—whether he was inspired by a belief in the justice of his cause or by the example of Japan—was determined to stand his ground. Dr. Zaunius gave an assurance that the Lithuanian Government intended 'scrupulously to fulfil all its international obligations arising under the texts applicable to Memel', and he declared that the Governor was 'endeavouring to establish a Directorate according to the conditions laid down in the Statute'; but he refused to consent to the course of asking the Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion on the principal legal points at issue—namely, whether the Lithuanian Governor possessed the right, under the terms of the Statute, to dismiss a Directorate which had not lost the confidence of the Landtag, and whether, if that right were established, the circumstances were such as to justify its exercise in the case of Herr Böttcher.

Monsieur Colban's report to the Council, which was adopted on the 20th February, took note of the assurances given by Dr. Zaunius, and emphasized the 'absolute necessity' of the establishment, with-

¹ A clash between Germans and Lithuanians at Memel might not seem likely, at first sight, to involve Poland, who was not the ally of either disputant; but local conditions were such that the danger of a Polish *Putsch* at Danzig seemed no less real in German eyes than the danger of a Lithuanian *Putsch* at Memel, while the possibility of aggressive action by German Nazis presented itself as a menace to the Poles no less than to the Lithuanians. In this atmosphere of general suspicion, an example set in one city would be likely to be followed in the other, and a single rash step might have the most far-reaching consequences.

² It was an additional grievance that members of the Memel Landtag, who had wished to be present at Geneva in order to put their own case, had been refused passports by the Lithuanian authorities.

out delay, of a Directorate enjoying the confidence of the Landtag. The immediate steps which were required, if an aggravation of the situation was to be avoided, would not prejudice the question of the legality of Herr Böttcher's dismissal. Since Dr. Zaunius's opposition to a reference of this question to the Permanent Court precluded the possibility of a unanimous vote by the Council, Monsieur Colban contented himself with pointing out that, under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Memel Convention,¹ the Powers signatories of the Convention were 'entitled to deal with these questions of law as between themselves'. By adopting this report the Council virtually transferred to the guaranteeing Powers the responsibility for seeing that the Lithuanian Government fulfilled their promise in regard to the composition of the Directorate and for effecting a settlement of the dispute over Herr Böttcher's dismissal.

The guaranteeing Powers were naturally reluctant to use their power to summon Lithuania before the Permanent Court until other possibilities of a settlement had been exhausted, and they decided to postpone action until the position in regard to the composition of a new Directorate had become clearer. Negotiations between the Governor and the Landtag on this question had been impeded hitherto by the insistence of the majority parties that Herr Böttcher and his two colleagues were still legally in office, but after the conclusion of the discussion by the League Council Herr Böttcher put an end to the *impasse* by formally submitting his resignation.² At the end of February Colonel Merkys nominated a Lithuanian, Monsieur Simaitis, as President of the Directorate, but the persons whom Monsieur Simaitis proposed to nominate as his colleagues were unacceptable to the Landtag, and, the negotiations having failed, the composition of the Directorate was completed in the second week of March without the approval of the Landtag. The German Government protested to the Lithuanian Government and to the guaranteeing Powers,³ and on the 16th March the guaranteeing Powers

¹ Article 17, paragraph 2, ran as follows: 'In the event of any difference of opinion in regard to questions of law or of fact concerning these provisions between the Lithuanian Government and any of the Principal Allied Powers Members of the Council of the League of Nations, such difference shall be regarded as a dispute of an international character under the terms of Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Lithuanian Government agrees that all disputes of this kind shall, if the other party so requests, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.'

² Herr Böttcher died on the 16th June, 1932.

³ Lithuania, in her turn, protested to the guaranteeing Powers against the alleged intervention of the German Consul in the negotiations for the formation of the Directorate, and against a memorandum, demanding that a plebiscite should be held to determine the future of Memel, which had been forwarded

despatched a note to Lithuania drawing attention to the fact that the formation of a Directorate which did not possess the confidence of the Landtag was not in accordance either with the Statute or with the assurance given by Dr. Zaunius at Geneva. On the 19th March the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy at Kovno conveyed to the Lithuanian Government the warning that a dissolution of the Landtag would be considered an infraction of the obligations which Lithuania had accepted at Geneva and would oblige the guaranteeing Powers to refer the matter to the Permanent Court. Contrary to the general expectation, these *démarches* from the Great Powers produced no effect on Lithuania. On the 22nd March the Simaitis Directorate appeared before the Landtag to receive a vote of no confidence, and the Landtag was then dissolved by Colonel Merkys. The elections for a new Landtag were fixed for the 4th May.

On the 11th April the four guaranteeing Powers instituted proceedings against Lithuania before the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court was asked to give a decision on the following questions:

(1) Whether the Governor of the Memel Territory has the right to dismiss the President of the Directorate.

(2) In the case of an affirmative decision, whether this right only exists under certain conditions or in certain circumstances, and what those conditions or circumstances are.

(3) If the right to dismiss the President of the Directorate is admitted, whether such dismissal involves the termination of the appointments of the other members of the Directorate.

(4) If the right to dismiss the President of the Directorate exists only under certain conditions or in certain circumstances, whether the dismissal of Herr Böttcher, carried out on the 6th February, is in order in the circumstances in which it took place.

(5) Whether, in those circumstances, the appointment of the Directorate presided over by M. Simaitis is in order.

(6) Whether the dissolution of the Diet by the Governor of the Memel Territory on the 22nd March, when the Directorate presided over by M. Simaitis had not received the confidence of the Diet, is in order.

Before the Permanent Court gave its decision on these questions the situation in the Memel Territory underwent a surprising change. The election campaign naturally gave rise to much excitement. The first step taken by the Lithuanian authorities—the arrest of several members of the Memel Labour Party (which was composed mainly of Germans) and of a German national suspected of espionage—

to President Hindenburg by the Memel Landbund. Lithuania also took exception to expressions used by Dr. Brüning, the Reich Chancellor, when the Memel Question was under discussion in the Reichstag.

strengthened the belief that no stone would be left unturned in the effort to increase Lithuanian representation in the Landtag. According to the German version, the interference with political meetings and the censorship of the press which had been features of previous elections were supplemented on this occasion by a determined attempt to swell the number of Lithuanian voters by unconstitutional means. The Germans accused the Lithuanian authorities of arbitrarily cancelling the rule that no Lithuanian could become a naturalized citizen of Memel until he had resided in the territory for a year, and of permitting the naturalization of large numbers of Lithuanians who crossed the border for the purpose of voting in the elections. According to the information which was supplied to the German Government, between 9,000 and 10,000 new votes were created in this way during the fortnight following the dissolution of the Landtag. The guaranteeing Powers, at the instigation of the German Government, sent a further note to Lithuania at the end of April on the subject of the conduct of the elections. If the Lithuanian authorities really took the measures attributed to them they must have been highly disappointed with the results. On the polling day, which passed off without disturbance, votes were recorded by an unprecedentedly high proportion of the electorate, but the Lithuanians again obtained only five seats.¹

This decisive victory for the German parties seems to have convinced the Lithuanian Government that the German predominance in Memel could not be shaken by any methods that it was open to them to employ, and they decided to change their tactics. The elections of the 4th May were followed immediately by the resignation of the Lithuanian Governor, Colonel Merkys,² which was accepted by the Government at Kovno. A fortnight later, a new Governor was appointed in the person of Monsieur Gylys, the Lithuanian Consul-General in London. At the beginning of June Monsieur Gylys, after consulting the Lithuanian Government, nominated a German, Dr. Schreiber, as President of the Directorate, and Dr. Schreiber had no difficulty in selecting colleagues who were acceptable to the majority of the members of the Landtag. A further symptom of the conciliatory

¹ It depended, of course, on the answer given by the Permanent Court to the last of the questions put to it by the guaranteeing Powers whether the elections of the 4th May were valid, or whether the old Landtag had legally remained in existence.

² Colonel Merkys had occupied this post since the end of 1925. His military outlook, and the manner in which he had applied the martial law that had been in force in the territory since 1927, had made him specially obnoxious to the German civilian population.

intentions of the Lithuanian Government was the release of the German national who had been arrested at the end of March on a charge of espionage.

It was in these improved circumstances that the proceedings before the Permanent Court of International Justice were opened on the 8th June, 1932. The Court had first to dispose of a Lithuanian objection to its competence, and its opinion on the substance of the dispute was not delivered until the 11th August. On that date the Court, by 10 votes to 5, answered the questions of the guaranteeing Powers by giving a ruling—

That the Governor of Memel is entitled for the protection of the interests of that Territory to dismiss the President of the Directorate, or local government.

That such dismissal does not involve the termination of the appointments of the other members of the Directorate.

That as Herr Böttcher, the President of the Directorate, in having negotiated in Berlin about the foreign relations of Memelland had violated the Statute of Memel which reserves the control of the foreign affairs of Memelland exclusively to the Lithuanian Government, his dismissal by the Governor, M. Merkys, on the 6th February, 1932, was in order.

That the Governor was justified in appointing a new Directorate under M. Simaitis as President of the Directorate in succession to Herr Böttcher.

That the Governor was not in order in dissolving the Diet on the advice of M. Simaitis before his Directorate had received a vote of confidence from the Diet.

Thus on the main point at issue—the legality of the Governor's dismissal of Herr Böttcher—Lithuania was vindicated; and although the Landtag was now shown to have been improperly dissolved in March, the fact that the elections of the 4th May had not modified the position of the parties in the previous Landtag made this point of little practical importance. Thereafter, down to the time of writing, the course of events in Memel was not such as to call for international attention.

PART V

THE FAR EAST

(i) Introduction: Internal Developments in China and Japan.

THE year 1932 witnessed a continuance and intensification, but no solution, of the crisis which had been precipitated by the opening of the Japanese military operations at Mukden on the night of the 18th–19th September, 1931.¹

From the outset, the issue raised by the outbreak of this conflict between Japan and China had lain much deeper, and ramified much wider, than the local and superficial clash of tempers and aims and interests between the two combatants. In the first place, the collision between the two principal Far Eastern nations had affected in a direct and tangible way the material interests of every other Power that had any substantial stake in the Far East: first and foremost the U.S.S.R.;² in the next degree the United Kingdom and the United States; and in the third degree France and the Netherlands—not to mention a longer list of countries which were interested in some measure in the international trade which flowed through the International Settlement at Shanghai. In the second place and in another way—on the point of principle and precedent—the Sino-Japanese conflict had raised an issue which, in this 'post-war' age, was of profound political interest to every country in the world. This oecumenical issue of a political order was the question whether the international system of collective security, which had been built up by mankind under the impression of the terrible experience of 1914–18, would survive 'the acid test' of a breach of the peace on the part of a naval and military Great Power. This was an issue which was acutely felt in all the small countries of the world, since their peoples believed that their own national destinies depended on the decision whether 'the collective system' should succeed or fail. From this point of view, the outcome of the conflict in Manchuria and at Shanghai was a matter of deep concern to the people of land-locked European countries like Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, whose material interests in the vicissitudes of Far Eastern politics could be written off as negligible.³

¹ See the *Survey for 1931*, Part IV, section (iii) (b).

² See pp. 533–7 below.

³ For the attitude in the small countries, see the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 503–4, and the present volume, pp. 517, 575–7, below.

As the crisis arising from the Sino-Japanese conflict persisted through the year 1932, its oecumenical character became more and more apparent on every plane. On the military plane, the fighting spread from Manchuria, where the only directly interested party, besides China and Japan themselves, was the U.S.S.R., to Shanghai, which was one of the busiest and most cosmopolitan centres of international trade on the face of the earth. On the diplomatic plane, the field of action expanded from Geneva to embrace first Washington and then Moscow. The most important positive diplomatic event of the year was the re-statement in Mr. Stimson's note of the 7th January, and the elaboration in his letter of the 24th February, of an American doctrine of international law: the non-recognition of changes brought about by violence in breach of treaty.¹ The next most important positive event was the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.S.R. on the 12th December.² The two corresponding negative events were the failure of the Soviet Government's tentative move for the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact,³ and the diminution of cordiality in Anglo-American diplomatic relations owing to the apparent rebuff, by the Government of the United Kingdom, of tentative overtures from the Government of the United States for Anglo-American co-operation in asserting the new non-recognition doctrine in the face of Japanese militarism.⁴

It will be seen that in 1932, even more decidedly than in 1931, a survey of Far Eastern international affairs has to cover at least two fields: the field of military and political events in the Far East, and the vaster field in which these events produced their world-wide repercussions. But it is hardly possible to gain an intelligible view of the former of these two fields without making a preliminary reconnaissance into yet a third field: that is to say, into the internal affairs of the two principals. In the surveys of Far Eastern affairs that have been given in previous volumes, it has already been found impossible to extricate the international transactions relating to this region from the internal upheavals in one Far Eastern country: China. In surveying the year 1932, it is necessary to take some account of internal

¹ See pp. 540-51, below. The gist of the doctrine had been enunciated by one of Mr. Stimson's predecessors in office in the American note of the 13th May, 1915, addressed to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, regarding the Japanese 'Twenty-One Demands' of that year.

² For the breaking-off of diplomatic relations in 1927 see the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, section (ii). For subsequent relations between China and the U.S.S.R. see the *Survey for 1928*, Part IV, section (ii) (d); the *Survey for 1929*, Part IV A, section (iv); and the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 358-60.

³ See pp. 435 and 535 below.

⁴ See section (iv) (b) below.

developments not only in China but in Japan. Indeed, in this year the internal condition of Japan was perhaps the most important single factor that went to the making of the international situation.

In China, in 1932, there were changes of proportion and perspective, without any real change of scene, in the familiar features of a depressing landscape.

These familiar features were the lack of an effective Central Government in the western sense; the conflicts between the individuals, or the local cliques, who claimed to represent this dim central authority; the depredations and campaigns of war-lords; the grim reign of famine and banditry (the two indisputably effective sovereign powers in the country, who set the war-lords and politicians an example in the harmony with which they worked hand in hand!); and last, but not least, the progressive extension of the area which was given over to 'Communism'¹ (a name which, in its Chinese application, perhaps demands inverted commas because, like 'Manchukuo', it was perhaps not in fact precisely what it purported to be in theory).

The most conspicuous change in proportion was the diminution in vigour—and therefore in importance—of the struggles between one war-lord and another or between the war-lords and the Kuomintang or between the different factions and leaders within the Kuomintang itself (whose contentions for the mastery over the party-machine and over the Central Government had perpetuated the old struggles between the war-lords under a new 'slogan'). In 1932 these evils did not cease. There were remote provinces like Szechuan (a country with a population which was probably larger than that of the United Kingdom, though smaller than that of Japan) in which the old struggles between war-lords went on as they had gone on during the chapter of revolutionary history which had closed in other parts of China in 1928 with the military triumph of the Kuomintang.² As for the Kuomintang itself, the momentary reunion between the right and left wings of the Party, and between the local cliques at Nanking and Canton, proved less durable than the Japanese menace which had evoked it. In accordance with the agreement which had been reached in the last days of December 1931,³ the Kuomintang Government at Canton was formally dissolved at the turn of the years 1931 and 1932;

¹ See T. A. Bissón: 'The Communist Movement in China' = *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. ix, No. 4 (New York, 26th April, 1933, Foreign Policy Association). This study traces the past history of the movement, besides describing its position at the time of writing.

² See the *Survey for 1928*, Part IV, section (i).

³ *Survey for 1931*, p. 416.

but its existence was apparently re-proclaimed before the middle of January 1932 by the military governor of Canton, General Chan Chai-tong, while at Nanking the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eugene Chen (who had made his name in 1926-7),¹ and the new President of the Executive Yuan, Mr. Sun Fo, both resigned in despair before the end of the month, within a few days of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's return to Nanking and to power.² Chiang's return re-inflamed the personal jealousies and rancours that had momentarily been allayed by his temporary withdrawal; and although the Cantonese Nineteenth Army entered into a comradeship-in-arms with Chiang's *corps d'élite* in the resistance to the Japanese during the campaign of the 28th January-3rd March, 1932, in the hinterland of Shanghai,³ the *union sacrée* between the Chinese politicians had virtually broken down before this new Japanese offensive was launched. Nor did the Kuomintang Central Government succeed in rallying nation-wide support by the dramatic gesture of withdrawing from Nanking to Loyang—the historic eastern capital of the Later Han and of the *fainéant* Chou before them—as a retort to the shelling of Nanking by Japanese warships on the Yangtse on the 1st February.⁴ This withdrawal, which lasted nominally from the 31st January to the 1st December, was followed up by the assemblage, in the refugee capital, of a National Emergency Conference; but this assembly, which sat from the 7th to the 12th April, only served to demonstrate the unrepresentative character of the Government which had convened it. The absence of about two-thirds of the delegates was more conspicuous than the attendance of the residue.⁵

Nevertheless, this rapid recession of the mirage of national unity under the aegis of the Kuomintang was not followed, in 1932, by the recrudescence of civil war in the heart of China on any considerable scale between rival factions of the Kuomintang or between rival war-lords. When the return of April ushered in the usual campaigning season of the Chinese civil war, a local war-lord made a motion to revolt in the Chefoo district of Shantung, while in Fukien the commander of a roving army (a former unit of Fêng Yü-hsiang's Kuomintang, which had been transferred by the Nanking Government from

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, sections (vii) and (xii); the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, section (iii).

² See the *Survey for 1931*, p. 418.

³ See section (iii) (b) of this part of the present volume.

⁴ See pp. 485-6 below.

⁵ The poor attendance at the Loyang Conference cannot be put down to the remoteness of the meeting-place; for in 1932 Loyang was accessible by railway—via the Lunghai line—from Nanking, Hankow, Peiping, and Tientsin (subject, of course, to the interruption of travel by the activities of brigands and Communists).

Shantung to the anti-Communist front south of the Yangtse) threatened to make provision for his derelict force by swooping down upon Amoy. These two movements, however, came to nothing, and there were no major conflicts either between Nanking and Canton or between Nanking and Peiping. However deeply disillusioned 'the Young Marshal' Chang Hsüeh-liang and the other potentates in the northern intra-mural provinces might actually be with the Kuomintang and with Chiang Kai-shek, they could not afford a breach with Nanking when the Japanese were holding a pistol at their heads from Chinchow and Shanhaikwan. As for the potentates in Canton, who had no such considerations to deter them, they were prevented, in 1932, from launching another northern military expedition¹—partly by their own local dissensions (which went, if possible, to further extremes than those which were simultaneously paralysing the Nanking Government) and partly by the widening zone of Communist territory on either side of the water-shed between the Yangtse Basin and the Southern Seaboard: a barrier which was now insulating Canton and Nanking more and more effectually from one another.

Communism and banditry (in so far as a clear distinction could be drawn between them) were the twin features that were dominant, in 1932, over the Chinese scene; and these two scourges, again, had increased in intensity without any substantial change in their character. Since they were simply the aftermath of anarchy and civil war and famine, they were bound to increase so long as these efficient causes persisted.

The prevalence of brigandage can best be indicated by a mention of a few typical outrages against foreigners—with the annotation that these are merely a few illustrations taken at random from a long list, and that the foreign victims of brigandage were insignificant in numbers compared with the statistics (if these had been forthcoming) of the Chinese victims of Chinese predatory activities.

In Szechuan, on the 7th December, 1931, the Anglican Bishop of Western China, Dr. Mowll, was held up by bandits, and robbed, while he was travelling by boat from Chungking to Chengtu with his wife and a party of fellow-workers. On the 15th January, 1932, an American citizen, Captain James Baker, in the service of the Yangtse Rapid Steamship Company, was carried off by bandits, together with six Chinese members of his crew, from the vessel of which he was master, when she was moored for the night at a point

¹ For the abortive Cantonese northern military expedition of 1931, see the *Survey for 1931*, p. 413.

on the Yangtse 160 miles above Hankow. The French Catholic missionaries in Szechuan had an even worse experience in the spring of 1932 than their English *confrères* had had at the end of the previous year. A local war-lord presented the Mission with a demand for a 'loan' of \$1,500,000 (Mexican); and, though the Bishop managed to take hiding, the Provincial was seized and held as security. On the 26th June ten American citizens (missionaries and their families) were seized by Communists at Kikungshan, on the Peiping-Hankow Railway, where they were spending their summer holidays.

Such outrages against foreigners, though they naturally attracted more attention in the countries to which the victims belonged, were in no way comparable in scale with the sufferings of the Chinese population from the same scourge. It was reckoned, for example, that in the single province of Hupeh, in the course of the two years 1930 and 1931, the toll taken by banditry had been 164,551 deaths, 946,000 persons reported missing, 7,800 persons held to ransom, and 310,000 houses burnt down.

Chinese and foreigners alike were exposed to the perils of banditry when they were working in the service of the Flood Relief Commission, whose agents had to hazard their lives—without regard to the local social and political conditions—wherever there were dykes to be repaired against time, before the next seasonal rise in the waters of the Yangtse and its backwaters and tributaries. In the course of the Commission's work large numbers of its workers were killed or taken captive by bandits or Communists at one time or another.¹

The relations between the Commission and the Communists were quaintly chequered. For example, the release of the captive American ship-master, Captain Baker, was secured, without ransom, on the 1st June, 1932, by a foreign missionary, Mr. G. F. Andrew, who was in the service of the Flood Relief Commission, with the help of two of his Chinese colleagues named Chao and Hsüeh. 'Although at one time the bandits demanded \$40,000, owing to their eagerness to see strong dykes erected in their territory they were ready to treat with Mr. Andrew as Sir John Hope Simpson's representative, and agreed to release Mr. Baker in return for an undertaking by the Flood Relief Commission to continue supplying food to labourers on the dykes.' Mr. Andrew's two Chinese colleagues actually volunteered, in exchange for Captain Baker's release, to remain as hostages in the Communists' hands, and they only recovered their liberty in the autumn, when the discomfiture of the local Communists by the Nanking

¹ See an article by Sir John Hope Simpson, summing up the work of the Commission, in *The Times*, 12th September, 1932.

Government's forces led to their release, together with eight of their comrades.

On the 12th May, 1932, the forces of a Communist Government whose home territory was in Honan Province swooped down upon the local headquarters of the Flood Relief Commission at Chengyangkwan in Anhwei, 'dispersed or removed all its resources in grain and in cash, took the staff prisoner, including the local superintendent, Mr. Ferguson, of the China Inland Mission, and broke up the reconstruction work over a total length of 120 miles. Yet, when the army retreated, the Commission began the work again at once, with a staff newly recruited, and the revised programme provided that these dykes on the Hwai River should be completed by the 15th August.

'The points at which Soviet territory adjoined territory under the provincial Governments gave cause for great anxiety. Soviet troops were constantly executing workmen as Whites. Government troops retaliated by shooting others as Reds. It is estimated that at least 1,000 workmen on the north bank of the Yangtze lost their lives in this manner in one summer month.'¹

At the same time, the Flood Relief Commission—as the bargain struck over the release of Captain Baker shows—did not find it impossible to come to an understanding with the Communist authorities. The Communist captors of Mr. Ferguson at Chengyangkwan were not moved by the prayers of the local population, who knelt before them, to the number of 200, 'vainly begging for his release as the only person interested in keeping the starving folk alive.'² Yet they treated their prisoner kindly and set him free after a few days.

With the separate Communist Government which controlled the north bank of the Yangtse for a stretch of 150 to 200 miles beginning a few miles above Hankow, the Commission entered into regular negotiations, since 'it was essential to the completion of the Commission's task that the dykes on the north bank of the Yangtse should be repaired in addition to those on the south bank', and 'this could only be done in agreement with the Soviet authorities. A convention was in fact concluded, and the work in Soviet territory organized and supervised by the Commission's engineers. These all took their lives in their hands and jeopardized and in 30 cases lost their liberty. But the main dykes in Soviet territory' were made 'as solid as any other dykes along the Yangtze'.³

¹ Sir John Hope Simpson, *loc. cit.*

² *The Times*, 24th May, 1932.

³ Sir John Hope Simpson, *loc. cit.* See also a series of articles contributed to *The North China Daily News* in November and December 1932 by a special correspondent who visited Western Hupeh shortly after the Communists had been driven out by Chiang Kai-shek's troops.

The frontier of this particular Communist Government in Hupeh (the so-called King Li Government) was marked by a notice-board planted on the north bank of the Yangtse, above Hankow, in a prominent position;¹ and this Government issued its own coinage and stamps from its local capital.² Nor was this degree of organization unusual, as will appear from the authoritative picture of Chinese Communism in 1932 which is painted in the *Lytton Report*.

Large parts of the provinces of Fukien and Kiangsi, and parts of Kwangtung, are reliably reported to be completely sovietized.³ Communist zones of influence are far more extensive. They cover a large part of China south of the Yangtse, and parts of the provinces of Hupeh, Anhwei, and Kiangsu north of that river.⁴ Shanghai has been the centre of the Communist propaganda. Individual sympathisers with Communism may probably be found in every town in China. So far, two provincial Communist governments only have been organised in Kiangsi and Fukien, but the number of minor Soviets runs into hundreds. The Communist Government itself is formed by a committee elected by a congress of local workers and peasants. It is, in reality, controlled by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, which sends out trained men for that purpose, a large number of whom have been previously trained in the U.S.S.R. Regional Committees, under the control of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in their turn control provincial committees and these, again, district committees, and so on, down to the Communist cells organized in factories, schools, military barracks, &c.⁵

When a district has been occupied by a Red army, efforts are made to sovietize it, if the occupation appears to be of a more or less permanent nature. Any opposition from the population is suppressed by terrorism.⁶

The programme of action consisted in the cancellation of debts, the distribution among landless proletarians and small farmers of land forcibly seized, either from large private owners or from religious institutions, such as temples, monasteries and churches. Taxation is simplified; the peasants have to contribute a certain part of the produce of their lands. With a view to the improvement of agriculture, steps are

¹ Sir John Hope Simpson, *loc. cit.* See also an interesting article in *The New York Times*, 26th July, 1932.

² *The Times*, 2nd June, 1932.

³ For details, see Bisson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.—A.J.T.

⁴ For details, see Bisson, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-2.—A.J.T.

⁵ For the rôle of the political bureaux of the Chinese Red armies, see Bisson, *op. cit.*, p. 42.—A.J.T.

⁶ According to Bisson, however, in *op. cit.*, on p. 43, this hierarchical organization was theoretical rather than operative. 'The weight of evidence would seem to indicate that the inland soviet régimes operate almost entirely on their own responsibility, directed neither by Shanghai nor Moscow.' At the same time, Bisson agrees with the *Lytton Report* in the opinion that, in the local soviet governments of the interior, 'the Chinese Communist leaders . . . had retained control of certain key positions', and that the power there had not passed entirely into the hands of the emancipated agricultural proletariat.—A.J.T.

taken to develop irrigation, rural credit systems, and co-operatives. Public schools, hospitals and dispensaries may also be established.¹

Thus the poorest farmers derive considerable benefit from Communism,² whereas the rich and middle-class landowners, merchants, and local gentry are completely ruined, either by immediate expropriation or by levies and fines, and, in applying its agrarian programme, the Communist Party expects to gain the support of the masses. In this respect, its propaganda and action have met with considerable success, notwithstanding the fact that Communist theory conflicts with the Chinese social system. Existing grievances resulting from oppressive taxation, extortion, usury, and pillage by soldiery or bandits were fully exploited. Special slogans were employed for farmers, workmen, soldiers, and intellectuals, with variations specially adapted to women.

Communism in China is not by any means, as in most countries other than the U.S.S.R., either a political doctrine held by certain members of existing parties, or the organization of a special party to compete for power with other political parties. It has become an actual rival of the National Government. It possesses its own law, army, and government, and its own territorial sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country.³

It will be seen that, by the year 1932, Communism in China had become an organized and effective political power exercising exclusive administrative authority over large stretches of territory, and that the Chinese Communists were in some degree affiliated to the Communist Party in Russia. In view of the resumption of diplomatic relations, on the 12th December, 1932, between the Russian Communist Government at Moscow and the Kuomintang Central Government of the Chinese Republic at Nanking, it is pertinent to inquire how close the affiliations between the Chinese and the Russian Communists were, and how far Communism stood for the same things in China as in the Soviet Union. For at the end of 1932 the Nanking Government was in unusual straits; and its resumption of relations with Moscow—a step which it had persistently declined to take in spite of the Russian pressure which had been exercised during the three previous years, ever since the signature of the Protocol of Khabarovsk⁴—looked like a confession of its own weakness, of its loss of faith in salvation through the League of Nations, and of the inexorable necessity of finding for China some

¹ For further details of the programme of action, see Bisson, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-3. 'The agrarian reforms instituted by the Communist régime form the crux of its economic programme and the basis upon which its political power is consolidated'.—A.J.T.

² The 'immediate effects have undoubtedly been to create a more widely distributed set of vested interests, for whose protection the beneficiaries will fight fiercely'.—Bisson, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³ *Lytton Report*, pp. 22-3.

⁴ See the *Survey for 1929*, pp. 367-8.

'very present help' in the sore trouble of Japanese aggression. If Communism in China were really bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of its Russian homonym, then, at the turn of the years 1931 and 1932, the world was faced with the possibility that the renewal of relations between Moscow and Nanking might be followed by an elimination of the discomfited Nanking Government and the discredited Kuomintang, in order to make way for an alliance between the Russian Soviet Union and a Chinese Soviet Union of the same colour. A geographical corridor between Russia and the Chinese Communist domain in the Yangtse Basin was offered by the Soviet Republic of Outer Mongolia, which was under Moscow's aegis, and by the Chinese province of Shensi: the stronghold of Fêng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchün, with its Russian proclivities. The possibility that Chinese and Russian Communism might join hands was thus to be reckoned with if Chinese Communism were Communism in the Russian sense.¹ On the other hand, it was little more than theoretical, if the common ground between the Russian and the Chinese movements did not extend beyond the mere community of name; and from the passage here quoted from the *Lytton Report* it will be seen that this, also, was a tenable view. The so-called Chinese Communism, as far as its character was known to the outer world in 1932, might plausibly be interpreted as a mere agrarian revolt against intolerable mis-government—a revolt which had sought prestige in the unwarrantable adoption of a dreaded name. This view was put forward by one distinguished British observer—the Dean of Canterbury, Dr. Hewlett Johnson—who travelled extensively in China in the course of this year.² In the light of such information as existed at the

¹ This possibility seems to have exercised the mind of President Chiang Kai-shek; for, in the summer and autumn of 1932, he bent all his military strength—and this time, with some success—to the task of overthrowing the Communist régime and re-establishing the authority of the Nanking Government in the provinces of Anhwei, Hupeh, and Honan.

² The Dean of Canterbury's travels in China in 1932 were a remarkable feat, considering the state of the country. In the company of Major Todd, the Chief Engineer of the China International Famine Relief Commission, Dr. Hewlett Johnson travelled 1,600 miles by motor lorry westward from Tungkwan (the railhead of the Lunghai Railway, which was already 700 miles from the coast) until he penetrated right into Tibet. See his own accounts of this journey in *The Manchester Guardian*, 18th July, and *The Times*, 26th and 27th July, 1932. Dr. Hewlett Johnson's account of Chinese Communism, as he saw it, is given in the following passage in his interview with the representative of *The Manchester Guardian*:

'You must be careful,' he said, 'to describe it as "so-called" Communism, for one must distinguish it from what I think is a highly scientific experiment in Russia. In this area of China it is an agrarian revolt against military despotism. For this reason I found very little echo of Russian thought in

turn of the years 1932 and 1933, it was hardly possible to judge which of these two alternative estimates of the nature of Chinese Communism was the nearer to the truth.

In any case, the vision of a China on the verge of slipping, in 1932, over the precipice of mis-government into the abyss of Communism might be viewed with a certain prudent scepticism by observers who were well enough acquainted with Chinese life and Chinese history to make due allowance for the remarkably wide discrepancy between appearance and reality which was one of the well-known optical effects of the Chinese psychological atmosphere. If China appeared to be *in extremis* in 1932, the wary critic would pause to ask himself whether he could remember any year in which she had seemed to be in any better condition since the beginning of the Revolution twenty-one years back. Year after year China had escaped, by a hair's-breadth, an apparently inevitable doom because the folly and wickedness and disorder on the surface of life were counterbalanced by a saving element of common sense and steadiness and industriousness

the parts of China I was mainly in. On the coast, however, among the students, I did find more traces of Russian influence. Among the thoughtful students there I found a readiness to consider Communism. It was a readiness very carefully expressed, because it is death to talk Communism. The authorities are ruthless in suppressing it. My chief criticism, perhaps, of the Nanking Government would be that it does not allow free expression of opinion because it is terrified of the agrarian revolt, which is an entirely different thing to Communism proper.'

The distinction here drawn by Dr. Hewlett Johnson is challenged, however, by another English observer on the following grounds:

'Communism, according to its own theorists, requires a revolutionary upheaval of workers and peasants, to be steered and directed by a small nucleus of disciplined party men, who need not be at all numerous if only the situation itself is revolutionary. It is not required that the masses should be conscious adherents of Marxist doctrine, but only that they shall be bitterly discontented. Not many of the workers, and very few of the peasants, who made the Russian Revolution were Communists in the doctrinal sense; they merely responded to the slogan of "Land, Peace and Bread" which the Bolsheviki proclaimed. Since then of course they have been continuously indoctrinated with Marxism, but the number of Russian peasants who knew anything about materialist dialectic in 1917 cannot have been much greater than that of Chinese peasants who can give an account of it at the present day. Chinese Communism is still in the insurrection-and-civil-war phase which the Russian has passed through and left behind, but I do not see that for that reason it has no right to the name of Communism. Of course, as China is much more backward industrially to-day than Russia was in 1917, the agrarian side of the revolution is much more important relatively than it was in Russia, and this somewhat weakens its Communist character, but the Communists hold that, even though advanced industrialization is essential to full Communism, backward, pre-industrial countries may nevertheless be "sovietized", preserved from capitalism and gradually led on to a socialist economy by Marxist-trained rulers.'

in the busy private lives of all but an infinitesimal percentage of the four hundred and fifty millions. After describing his own escapes from bandits in Kansu in the year under review, Dr. Hewlett Johnson acutely observes that—

It is easy to make too much of the bandit menace. Bandits are only an incident: they do not occupy the whole field. A bigger factor is the orderly industrious life of the community. Farmers at their toil in the field, children at their play; village and city streets with blue-gowned merchants resting elbows on high shop counters, and the sundry processes of manufacture—clothing and shoes, carpets, umbrellas, rice, tobacco, and combs—all proceeding in picturesque profusion at open-fronted, windowless shops along the narrow, crowded streets: this and not bandits is the essential reality of life in Western China.¹

And what was true of the interior of China, where the leaven of an exotic civilization from overseas was only just beginning to ferment, was not untrue even in the neighbourhood of the treaty-ports and the railways. The fashion in which it was possible to arrive at a working accommodation with bandits and Communists is illustrated by the adventures of the Flood Relief Commission which have been cited above; and the stupendous scale of the constructive work which this Commission was able to carry out in 1932, under social and political and technical difficulties which would seem prohibitive *a priori*, is summed up in the following passage from a summary account of this work by the skilled and experienced public administrator who directed it.

By the end of December 1931, the land was sufficiently dry and the organization complete for work on the dykes. Their repair and reconstruction were a gigantic task. The damaged main dykes alone extended to 3,000 miles in length. There were thousands of miles of private and subsidiary dykes in addition, the repair of which was equally necessary. The Commission undertook responsibility for all work on the main dykes. It gave a subsidy, in no case exceeding 20 per cent. of the cost of work done, to all owners who undertook the repair of their private dykes. Once the work had been organized its progress was very rapid. Refugees flocked to the dykes in their tens of thousands. By the month of March, in the Hankow area alone, 350,000 were at work, and in May, on the day of greatest activity, the returns from the main dykes showed over 1,400,000 men at work. It is a tribute to the Chinese that the whole of the technical staff in control was Chinese. On the whole this staff showed great resource and organizing ability, and extraordinary courage. By the end of June the great bulk of the work was complete.

Relief for the able-bodied was provided by the dyke work. The sufferers who could not work were granted relief in their own villages. Lists were published and posted in the village concerned, and these lists provided an effective check on peculation. The scale of the work of

¹ *The Times*, 27th July, 1932.

relief was colossal. It is safe to say that not less than 6,500,000 persons received relief in one form or another. It is probable that the number will prove to be much larger.¹

In Dr. Hewlett Johnson's narrative, again, the peril of banditry is a less prominent feature than the progress of road-building. And the roads were being built not only by the International Famine Relief Commission but by the Chinese and Provincial Governments. In one sense the building of new roads was a more important event than the repair of old dykes. For while the latter simply protected Chinese Society against a recurrence of the immemorably ancient ravages of Physical Nature, every improvement in the internal communications of China brought her a step nearer towards the cure of her modern human scourges: disunity and banditry and civil war.²

Another symptom of Chinese vitality was the perceptible recuperation of Shanghai from the havoc which had been wrought there by the Japanese invaders between the 28th January, 1932, and the 3rd March. As early as the 12th July, 1932, the United States Commercial Attaché at Shanghai was actually able to report that the favourable changes had apparently outnumbered, and proved slightly more important than, the unfavourable changes in the economic life of China during the preceding month.

The internal aspect of China in 1932, as depicted above, was almost exactly the inverse of that of Japan. The deplorable national impotence of China, which placed her at the mercy of Japan, or of any other Power that might choose to attack her in defiance of the treaties, was co-existent, as has been indicated, with a surprising national reserve-power of vitality. And it might have been supposed, *a priori*, that the latent strength of Japan exceeded that of China in the measure of the contrast between China's superficial impotence and Japan's superficial potency. In the year 1932 this apparent Japanese potency was indeed impressive, and this not only when it was thrown into relief against a Chinese foil. While with one hand Japan was coercing China by military force, with the other hand she

¹ From the article (cited above) by Sir John Hope Simpson, in *The Times*, 12th September, 1932.

² At this time it was a common saying that the apparently insoluble problem of effecting a durable political union between the Yangtse Valley and the Southern Seaboard would be solved on the morrow of the completion of the railway between Hankow and Canton. Sceptical critics remarked, however, that the trunk lines already in existence in other parts of China had not led to political union, but had rather provided facilities for civil wars, and that the building of railways before roads in China was one example of the disequilibrium into which her life had been thrown by the impact of the West.

was holding at bay, by diplomatic intransigence, the entire world, including the United States and the U.S.S.R. as well as all the States Members of the League of Nations. Though there were probably no Powers in the World in 1932 which did not politically deplore and morally condemn Japan's behaviour in their heart of hearts, there was certainly no Power bold enough to translate its disapproval into action—not even into the negative action of breaking off diplomatic relations or financial and economic intercourse. Japan's show of strength seemed to proceed from a national unity which at first sight was as remarkable as China's national discord. Yet in Japan, as in China, in the year 1932, a closer inspection gave a different impression from the first glance; and there was this significant difference between the aspects of the two countries, that on this closer inspection the appearance of China perceptibly improved while, under the same magnifying lens, the appearance of Japan deteriorated.

In the preceding volume our examination of the antecedents of the Japanese military *coup* of the 18th–19th September, 1931, in Manchuria has brought out the fact that the *volte face* in Japanese policy, which this *coup* proclaimed, was a political reaction to economic stress.¹ Some pathological condition is indeed almost certain to come to light when an individual or a nation runs amok; and in the course of the year 1932, while Japan was running amok with at least temporary impunity both in China and at Geneva, the pathological symptoms were multiplying in the Japanese body-social. Their most sensational manifestations were in politics, their gravest in economics and in finance.

In the preceding volume² it has been mentioned that on the 13th December, 1931, the Minseito Cabinet of the day was replaced by a Seiyukai Cabinet, with Mr. Inukai as Prime Minister, and that the new Government placed an embargo upon the export of gold on the day on which it assumed office. The late Government, which had been in office since July 1929 and had been re-confirmed in office by the results of a general election held in February 1930, still commanded its old majority in the Diet; and the Diet was not even in session when it fell. The replacement of the Liberal by the Conservative Party in these circumstances was an indication that in Japan, as in China, parliamentary government was still an unacclimatized and tender exotic,³ but the demonstration was soon to take a violent form; for the financiers and industrialists who were the nucleus of

¹ See the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 399–405.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 459.

³ See an article from the Tokyo correspondent of *The Times* which was published on the 16th January, 1932.

the Seiyukai Party were not the driving force behind the new movement in Japanese politics. The departure from the Gold Standard, by which they had promptly signalized their unexpected advent to power, was no doubt advantageous to the interests which they represented, but their actual or supposed success in turning this measure of public finance to their private profit was counted against them for unrighteousness by the new political force which was rapidly rising to power in Japan on the wings of the economic storm that was sweeping over the world at this time—Japan included. And the return of the Seiyukai with a majority in the Diet of 136 over all other parties, as the result of a general election which was held on the 20th February,¹ did not save the Conservative parliamentarians from going the way of their Liberal *confrères* less than three months later.

The new driving force which was forcing its way to the front—or, rather, to the surface, since it was rising from below upwards—was hostile to parliamentary politicians of all complexions; and it was also hostile to the bourgeois urban civilization of the industrial and financial 'capitalists', for which this parliamentarism was conceived to stand. This force was the Japanese Army; and the Army regarded itself as the champion of the Peasantry,² which had been reduced to the condition of a desperate rural proletariat by the recent catastrophic fall in the world-prices of its crops in combination with the economic recoil of an over-population and over-cultivation of the Japanese countryside that had already been showing itself in the shape of diminishing returns. Since the rural population still constituted 52 per cent. of the population of Japan at this time, notwithstanding the recent rapid increase in the urban population of industrial workers, and since the Japanese Army was recruited by universal conscription, the rising generation of the rural proletarians formed the backbone of the rank and file. The straits of the soldiers and their families were well known to the junior ranks of the corps of officers (who, to their credit, were in humane relations with their men, and who, for that matter, were themselves drawn from a relatively humble stratum of society); and the political movement which the spectacle of agrarian misery evoked among the young officers had the tacit sympathy and approval of their superiors. The senior officers of the Japanese Army were as ready as the rank and file to profit by the fruits of the younger officers' zeal; but since

¹ The figures were: Seiyukai 301; Minseito 149; Labour 5; others 11.

² Compare the relations between the peasants and the soldiers in the Russian Revolution of A.D. 1917 and in the Roman Revolution in the third century of the Christian Era.

the seniors kept themselves in the background out of prudence, while the rank and file remained passive through helplessness and inexperience, it was left to the younger officers to play the part of spearhead (or, in less romantic language, to use the assassin's knife or bomb or bullet) in the military-agrarian outbreak.

In Western terms this outbreak was a 'Fascist' or a 'National-Socialist' movement. The foundation of a Japanese National-Socialist Party, consciously formed on these Western models, was in fact proclaimed on the 16th April, 1932, by the *ci-devant* secretary of the Japanese Social-Democratic Party, Mr. Akamatsu. And this imitation of Western models by a Japanese movement which dreamed, in its more exalted moments, of breaking with the Westernizing policy of the past three-quarters of a century and reverting to the Tokugawa policy of isolation, showed in a flash how muddle-headed—though apparently well-intentioned—this Japanese 'youth movement' was. A more glaring exhibition of the same intellectual inconsequence was the insistence of the new military masters of Japan upon an ambitious expansion of Japanese armaments—in apparent ignorance of the fact that, in committing themselves to this policy, they were binding their poor country with still heavier chains than before¹ to that Western system of 'capitalism' and industrialism which they were denouncing in the same breath as their country's bane. For those who had eyes to see, this commitment was manifest in the figures, and the expedients, of the next Japanese national budget.²

Had these young 'Fascist' Japanese officers been merely muddle-headed idealists, the havoc wrought by their advent to power would still no doubt have been very great; but unhappily in Japan the tradition of the Samurai taught that political crimes of violence were not inconsistent with either idealism or honour so long as the criminal was inspired by patriotic motives and was prepared to sacrifice his own life as the price of fulfilling his murderous intent.³ Accordingly, the military *pronunciamento* which was carried through in Japan, in fact though not in form, between the 18th September, 1931, and

¹ In Japan, as in a number of other Oriental countries (e.g. Turkey, Egypt, India, Russia), the adoption of the Western military system (in sheer self-preservation in face of the imperialism of Western Powers) had been the thin end of that wedge of Westernization which had subsequently penetrated to the heart of the Oriental body-social.

² See pp. 429-30 below.

³ Such ideas would still be rife in Japanese minds in 1932, since the popular reading of the Japanese people at this time (e.g. the stuff of the *feuilletons* in the daily press) was the blood-and-thunder history of Japanese feudalism in the Middle Ages—a régime which, after all, had not become obsolete in Japan until A.D. 1868.

the 26th May, 1932, was sped on its way by a succession of political murders.¹

These murders, which were perpetrated by Japanese desperadoes against their own countrymen, must be distinguished from the contemporary outrages committed by Koreans—the attempt to blow up the Emperor of Japan at Tokyo on the 8th January, 1932, and the more successful bomb outrage at Shanghai on the Emperor's birthday (the 29th April).² These Korean crimes were ordinary examples of a well-known form of political retaliation to which a few misguided members of oppressed nationalities have been apt to resort in all times and places. The political murders of Japanese by Japanese, of which there was an outbreak in 1932, were a peculiar manifestation of the Japanese national *éthos*.³

The first victim in this series was Mr. Hamaguchi, the statesman who had formed the Minseito Government in July 1929. Mr. Hamaguchi was desperately wounded by an assassin, while he was in office as Prime Minister, on the 14th November, 1930, and he died from the injuries which he had then received on the 27th August, 1931, on the eve of the military *coup* at Mukden on the 18th-19th September of the same year. Thereafter, a 'Death Band', founded by a Nichiren Buddhist priest and a naval airman who had become acquainted with each other during the London Naval Conference of 1930, successfully assassinated Mr. Junnosuke Inouye (the Minister of Finance in the fallen Minseito Cabinet) on the 9th February, 1932, and Baron Takuma Dan (the General Director of the Mitsui Firm) on the 6th March. These crimes were particularly dastardly, since in each case the actual deed was done by a peasant boy whom the two founders of the band had instigated and armed.⁴

These two crimes might have been regarded as the shocking results of moral aberration in the souls of two individuals if the series had ended there; but it was crowned by other outrages in which young officers were implicated in larger numbers.

It was reported, for example, that on the 4th March, 1932, Dr. Inazo Nitobe, a distinguished Senator and man of letters who had

¹ These have been mentioned, by anticipation, in the *Survey for 1931*, on p. 401, footnote 6.

² See section (iii) (d), p. 511, below.

³ A third category of political crime was represented by an assault which was made upon the United States Consul at Harbin by a Japanese military patrol on the 3rd January, 1932, and an attempt to set fire to the American Consulate at Nagasaki on the 9th May by means of an incendiary bomb.

⁴ The naval airman, who was killed in action at Shanghai on the 5th February, 1932, must bear equal responsibility with the Buddhist priest for having plotted the murder of Mr. Inouye, at any rate.

been an Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Nations at Geneva from 1919 to 1926, was haled out of a hospital in Tokyo, where he was at that time a patient, by five officers in uniform and was carried off to the headquarters of the Army Reservists' Association, where he was compelled to explain away a statement (alleged to have been made by him in a lecture) that militarism was as dangerous as Communism by declaring that he had intended to refer to the Chinese war-lords and not to the Japanese Army. Thereafter, Dr. Nitobe was permitted to leave Japan on a prolonged propaganda tour in the United States; and he was not numbered among the distinguished Japanese Liberals who, in 1932, were done to death.

In the culminating crime of the series, which was perpetrated on the 15th May, 1932, the Prime Minister of the Seiyukai Government of the day, Mr. Inukai, was shot down and mortally wounded in his official residence, and five important buildings in Tokyo were bombed, by members of a band of six young naval officers and eleven students, or ex-students, of the Military Academy.¹ The criminals were all wearing their uniforms; and they entitled themselves 'Young Officers of the Army and the Navy and the Farmers' Death-Band' in a sheaf of handbills that was scattered in the streets by the bombing-parties, several of which did their business in motor-cars. The five places bombed were the Headquarters of the Seiyukai Party, the Headquarters of the Metropolitan Police, the Bank of Japan, the Mitsubishi Bank, and the house of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Abortive attacks on power stations in Tokyo were made by civilian members of 'The Farmers' Death-Band' simultaneously.² Eight persons in all received injuries in this day's outbreak besides Mr. Inukai, though the Prime Minister himself was the only victim whose injuries were fatal.

These scenes conformed to Japanese tradition in every respect. The assassins, on their side, preserved their personal honour, according to Japanese conventions, by voluntarily presenting themselves for arrest, after they had done their business, at the Headquarters of the Military Gendarmerie.³ And the utmost bravery and dignity was shown by Mr. Inukai and his household when the murderous assault was made. Six out of the eight persons wounded, apart from the

¹ One of the naval officers was a second-lieutenant and the other five were sub-lieutenants. The ex-students of the Military Academy were young men who had been rejected, before the end of their course, as unsuitable for being commissioned.

² Seven arrests on this account were made on the 18th May and ten more on the 5th November, 1932. The reputed leader of this enterprise surrendered voluntarily on the 14th July.

³ According to some accounts, the number of young men who gave themselves up was 18 and not 17.

Prime Minister himself, received their injuries in trying to oppose the entry of the nine desperadoes who were seeking Mr. Inukai's life; and these six included a maid-servant and a visitor who was in conversation with Mr. Inukai at the moment, as well as four policemen. When the noise of the mêlée and the shooting and the breaking-in of doors penetrated, in advance of the assailants, to the drawing-room where the Prime Minister was sitting, his daughter-in-law, who was in the room, implored Mr. Inukai to take hiding. His response was to open the door for his murderers, face them as they burst in, take them to task, and dare them to fulfil their purpose. And it was in this posture of a Roman Senator confronting the *furor Gallicus* that the Prime Minister of Japan was ruthlessly shot down by a Japanese hand.

On the same afternoon, a retired Army officer who had once been associated with the Death Band responsible for the murders of Mr. Inouye and Baron Dan, and who had latterly severed his connexion with his former associates, was shot and seriously (though not fatally) wounded by a young man who was believed to be a member of the organization.

Baron Makino escaped injury when his house was bombed, because he happened at the moment to be in an inner room. In the small hours of the morning of the 16th, two infantry lieutenants and one second-lieutenant, together with three officers in mufti, presented themselves, armed, at the War Office and demanded an audience with the Minister for War, General Araki. Their demand was refused; and they were interviewed—but not detained¹—by the Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

Upon receipt of the news, the Cabinet resigned *en bloc*, whereupon Ministers were commanded by the Emperor to remain at their posts pending further orders. Stock exchange transactions were suspended not only in Tokyo but also at Osaka, Kobe and Nagoya. Instructions to suppress any symptoms of agitation in the fighting services were issued by Admiral Osumi, the Minister for the Navy, to the Fleet, and by General Araki, the Minister for War, to all Divisional Commanders of the Army.

This official condemnation of the outrages of the 15th May, 1932, did not mean, however, that the Naval and Military High Commands were unwilling to take political advantage of the resulting situation.

¹ This complacency, on the part of the military authorities, towards military bravadoes contrasted unfavourably with the severity which was shown on May Day, 1932, towards demonstrators of the Left. Some three hundred arrests were made on that day in Tokyo alone.

Their actual intentions were foreshadowed in an inspired article which appeared on the following day in the *Asahi* newspaper of Tokyo:¹

The fact that no military officers were involved in yesterday's incidents shows that the leaders retain the confidence of all ranks, but as the young officers are aware of the country's sufferings, it is doubtful if discipline could be maintained if the high officers were associated with the politicians who lack the country's confidence. The nation should therefore get rid of corrupt party governments and demand a strong national government able to cope with the present situation. The Army cannot approve a continuation of the Seiyukai Cabinet nor a party coalition.

In the ensuing negotiations for the reconstruction of the Government the Army did, in fact, impose a veto upon even the formal return to power of the politicians of either party; and they were able to make this veto effective, not only *de facto* but also *de jure*, in virtue of the requirement in the Japanese Constitution that the Minister for the Navy and the Minister for War must be officers on the active list who had been recommended for ministerial office by their respective services. Nor was the Army's intervention in politics at this juncture merely negative, for it also laid down the condition that whatever new Government took office must take energetic and effective steps for the relief of the agricultural proletariat. The Army had its way. For, on the 22nd May, on the recommendation of Prince Saionji, the last survivor of the Elder Statesmen, the Emperor commanded Admiral Saito, a former Governor-General of Korea, to form a Ministry, and the Admiral accomplished his task, in a manner satisfactory to the Army, on the 26th. In his previous post in Korea, the Admiral had stood for a relatively moderate and liberal-minded policy; but in his new and officially more exalted office at Tokyo it was his rôle to mask, without aiding, the inauguration of a military régime.

The Japanese Army found it easier to seize political power than to achieve the purposes for which they had sought it.

A conference of Prefectural Governors which was convened in Tokyo by Admiral Saito's Government in July 1932 to discuss the problem of rural distress was apparently inconclusive; and in August public feeling was excited by the announcement of a threat on the part of Count Koken Tanaka (an ex-Minister of the Imperial Household, who was at this time ninety years old) that he would commit suicide unless the Government dealt with this problem effectively. Thereafter, on the 25th August, 1932, Admiral Saito, and his Finance Minister gave notice in the Diet² of rural relief measures which were to cost the Government 175,000,000 yen and the Prefectures 87,000,000

¹ English translation as given in *The New York Times*, 17th May, 1932.

² An extraordinary session of the Diet had been convened for the purpose.

yen—the Government's share to be raised by public loan, and the Prefectures' share to be advanced to the Prefectures by the Government at low rates of interest. The plight of the rural population was, in fact, going from bad to worse; and it was significant that an improvement in the export trade of Japan, resulting from the depreciation of the yen, which declared itself in the second half of the year 1932, was accounted for by an increase in the products of the cities—e.g. cotton goods and artificial silk—while there was a continuous decline in the export of raw natural silk which, before the onset of the world-wide economic depression, had been the economic mainstay of the Japanese countryside. Nor could it be considered sound finance that the rural relief, when granted, should be covered by loans instead of being provided out of current revenue—but on this head Japanese finances were already past praying for, since the Government had already been presenting supplementary estimates, and arranging to cover its additional expenditures by loans, during the eleven months which had elapsed since the beginning of the military adventure on the Continent. On the 14th June, 1932, a supplementary Budget was passed by the Diet providing for an expenditure of 83,000,000 yen, and this did not include the cost of military operations in Manchuria and at Shanghai. Between March and November 1932 special 'Manchurian incident bonds' were issued to a total of 323,701,000 yen. On the 4th September the issue of a loan of 784,000,000 yen was sanctioned, but only part of this loan was floated during the year 1932. New bond issues during the autumn included two issues, of 9,000,000 and 13,594,000 yen respectively, allocated to Korea, and an issue of 30,000,000 yen for railways.

These figures reveal the mounting cost of Japanese naval and military expenditure during a year which saw Japanese military commitments on the Continent extended from the Japanese Railway Zone in Manchuria to the whole of 'the Three Eastern Provinces' of China, not to speak of the still more costly, but only temporary, commitments at Shanghai. In order to estimate the total financial cost to Japan of her continental military adventure up to date, the additional public expenditure on the Army and the Navy has to be taken together with the private losses which were incurred through the consequent Chinese boycott of Japanese trade.¹ It was evident that the losses imposed upon the Japanese national income, and the burdens imposed upon the national Budget, by the Continental military adventure were so heavy that, if there had ever been any

¹ See p. 470 below, footnote, for an estimate of the loss resulting from the boycott down to January 1932.

prospect of effective relief measures for the rural population of Japan before the 18th September, 1931, there was hardly a vestige of any such prospect a twelve-month later. In fact, the Army, in seeking to save the agricultural proletariat *manu et more militari*, had actually dealt it the *coup de grâce*; and in this achievement of the exact opposite of its purpose the Army made manifest its own utter lack of understanding in the economic and the financial sphere.

This economic and financial blindness of the Japanese fighting services was so extreme that, in the economic and financial situation of Japan in 1932, they actually used their lately established control over the Civil Government in order to demand staggering increases in the Naval and Military estimates when the draft Budget for the coming financial year 1933-4 was under consideration in the autumn. After the civil element in the Cabinet had resisted these demands to the utmost of their ability, the Cabinet still found itself constrained, on the 25th November, 1932, to pass a draft Budget which contemplated a total expenditure of 2,237,000,000 yen (as against a figure, in the preceding Budget, of 1,397,000,000 yen). In this new Budget, the allocation to the Army was 447,000,000 yen (as against 189,000,000 yen in the preceding year), to the Navy 372,000,000 (as against 211,000,000), and to the relief of distress at home 207,000,000 yen. The increase of more than 100 per cent. in the Army Estimates was accounted for by an item of 105,000,000 yen for mechanisation (the lowest figure, under this head, to which the Army could be beaten down), in addition to 140,000,000 yen for Continental military operations. The increase in the demands of the Navy, whose requirements for its share in the operations against China were relatively modest, was accounted for in large part by projects for the improvement of naval equipment. The total allocation to the fighting services of 719,000,000 yen may be compared with the total estimated deficit of 896,000,000 yen on a total estimated revenue of 1,341,000,000 yen. The Cabinet proposed to meet the whole of this estimated deficit for the year 1933-4 by borrowing, in addition to the borrowing of 322,000,000 yen which had already been sanctioned in order to cover the actual deficit on the Budget for 1932-3. On the 1st October, 1932, the United States Commercial Attaché at Tokyo reported that, in order to meet their accumulated and anticipated Budget deficits provisionally, the Japanese Government were expected to place bonds to the extent of about 2,400,000,000 yen upon the market.¹

¹ In January 1933 there were five new bond issues, as follows: telephone and telegraph, 15,715,000 yen; roads, 21,306,000 yen; earthquake readjustment, 7,570,000 yen; Budget deficit, 121,066,000 yen; Saghalien, 1,655,000 yen.

This was the political and financial plight of Japan towards the close of the year 1932; and, in contemplating it, a Japanese observer could not console himself by reflecting that at any rate this was nothing compared to the contemporary plight of China, while shrinking from the ordeal of hazarding a comparison between Japan and the Western Powers. The truth was that the contemporary state of the Western Powers, and not the contemporary state of China, was the standard by which Japan had to be judged in 1932, since by this time Japan had gone very far in the process of placing her national life upon a Western basis. Having successfully accomplished this profound—and possibly irrevocable—social transformation, Japan was courting mortal danger in allowing herself to drift into political and financial and economic disorders which might sooner or later prove incompatible with the maintenance of a healthy Western régime. On the other hand China, being still on the threshold of the process of Westernization, was able at this time to commit far greater social follies with far less danger to her national future than was possible for Japan, who had already given her hostages to Fortune.¹

The national prospects of Japan in 1932, as they appeared in the eyes of the world, were indicated in the depreciation of the Japanese currency and in the fall in the prices of Japanese stocks on the world market. When the newly installed Seiyukai Government placed their embargo on the export of gold from Japan on the 13th December,

¹ The English observer already quoted above on p. 419, footnote, comments on the present passage as follows:

'Is not the crux here in the word "Western"? As a Japanese once remarked to me with regard to this term, there are now three widely divergent "Wests"—the Liberal-capitalist, the Fascist-capitalist and the Soviet-socialist. The Japanese, moreover, have seen in post-war Europe nations surviving external debt-repudiation (Russia; also France—of War Debt), internal wiping-out of debts by inflation, "freezing" of credits &c., &c.; the "West" in fact has presented Japan with a wide choice of more or less disreputable emergency devices in addition to its models of financial orthodoxy. I should not be surprised to see a "Fascist" Japan going far on the path of default and confiscation before yielding to any sort of "economic pressure" exerted from outside. If Japan is ruined in terms of capitalist economics, it does not necessarily mean that she is done for, even though her population suffered severely; under stress of war conditions a people will endure privations inconceivable in peace time—as the Germans did in the Great War. By peace standards the financial situation you describe is no doubt appalling, but hardly so by war-time standards, and it has to be remembered that, whatever they say, the Japanese know themselves to be a nation at war and anticipate more war in the near future. It is unfortunately useless in practice to prove that war is unprofitable, because "war-mindedness" is a condition which, more than any other, seems to have the effect of making most men indifferent to ordinary considerations of profit.'

1931, the yen immediately depreciated to 83·7 per cent. of its gold value; the murder of Mr. Inukai on the 15th May, 1932, was followed by a heavy fall of Japanese values on the stock markets; and by the 25th November, 1932, when Admiral Saito's Cabinet passed the draft Budget for the year 1933-4, the standing of the yen, in terms of its gold value, was no more than 43 per cent. This remorseless downward movement of values, which reflected the opinion of the world, could not be arrested by anything that it was in Japan's power to do: not by victories in the field or by occupations of territory in China; not by political assassinations or by changes of Government at home; not by intransigence at Geneva or by satirical replies to American state papers. For any Japanese who could read the signs of the times, the figures which registered the downward curve in the rate of the Japanese exchange and in the quotation of Japanese stocks must have been just as terrifying as the hapless Belshazzar once found the angel's Writing on the Wall.

(ii) The Year in Manchuria

(a) INTRODUCTORY

DURING the first quarter of the year 1932 Manchuria was eclipsed, in the eyes of the world, by Shanghai as the most important of the local Far Eastern theatres of events in the world-wide disturbance that had been produced by the outcome of the Japanese military *coup* at Mukden on the night of the 18th-19th September, 1931. The Japanese military operations at Shanghai were more wanton, more barbarous, more destructive of life and property (notwithstanding their relatively short duration), and, above all, more prominent in the public eye than all the Japanese activities in Manchuria from September 1931 to December 1932. The warfare at Shanghai, however, proved to be an episode which had no immediate result except the negative result of devastation on a large scale; and although the use of the International Settlement by the Japanese naval and military forces as a base of operations for an offensive against Chinese forces in adjoining Chinese territories which were under Chinese administration was doubtless fraught with momentous consequences for the ultimate future of both the foreign settlements at Shanghai, these consequences had not begun to work themselves out before the year 1932 came to an end. Accordingly, during the latter part of the year, Manchuria resumed its place as the principal focus of action and interest in the Far East; and the action in this region in this

year flowed in several distinct channels which it may be convenient to explore in succession.

In the first place, there was a series of Japanese military operations (in continuation of those of the last quarter of 1931, which have been recorded in the *Survey* for that year). These operations completed the Japanese military occupation of the principal cities and lines of communication in 'the Three Eastern Provinces' (though this did not carry with it any effective control over the mountains and steppes and forests, or even over the agricultural countryside, of a region which was equal in area to the combined areas of Germany and France as determined by the Peace Treaty of Versailles). One incidental effect of the northward extension of Japanese military activities on the Continent was to bring the Japanese Army into dangerous proximity to Soviet Russian interests in Manchuria and to Soviet Russian territory adjoining Manchuria, both in the Maritime Province and in Transbaikalia.¹ The second stream of action in Manchuria in 1932 was the reaction of the various elements in the local population—Chinese, Manchus, Koreans, Mongols and White Russians—to the Japanese aggression. Our survey of the year's events in Manchuria will be completed when we have examined the political action of the Japanese in erecting, and eventually recognizing, the so-called independent state of Manchukuo—a political enterprise which was put in hand long before the military operations were completed and before the suppression of banditry was begun. This political farce was played through within the limits of the calendar year. It remains to deal with these several topics in the order in which we have introduced them here.

(b) JAPANESE MILITARY OPERATIONS

In the preceding volume² the history of the Japanese military operations in Manchuria, in their progressive radiation outwards from the South Manchurian Railway Zone, has been carried down to the occupation of Tsitsihar, in a northerly direction, on the 19th November, 1931, and of Chinchow and the outer face of the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan,³ in a south-westerly direction, on the 3rd and the 4th January, 1932. At the opening of the year 1932 the Japanese

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were in occupation of all three capitals of 'the Three Eastern Provinces'—i.e. Mukden the capital of Liaoning or Fengtien, Kirin the capital of the province of the same name, and Tsitsihar the capital of Heilungkiang—and they were also in occupation of the greater part of the network of Chinese-owned railways in Manchuria south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. On the other hand, they had so far bestridden the C.E.R. itself at one point only, that is, at Angangki, where it was intersected by the Chinese system of railway-communications between Ssuping kai and Tsitsihar; and they had not yet occupied Harbin, which was the headquarters of the C.E.R. and the stronghold of White Russian as well as Soviet Russian settlement and influence in Manchuria. In fact, the Japanese had so far only trespassed upon the fringes of the two interior provinces of Manchuria—namely Kirin and Heilungkiang—and they had not yet trespassed at all upon the Eastern Inner Mongolian Province of Jehol, which had formerly been united with the three Manchurian provinces under the rule of 'the Young Marshal' Chang Hsüeh-liang. The only province in which they were in general occupation of the railways and cities (though not, even here, of the countryside) was the metropolitan province of Liaoning containing Chang's former capital, Mukden.

The occupation of the pass of Shanhaikwan on the 4th January, 1932,¹ placed the Japanese Army in Manchuria in possession of a point of vantage on their south-western front, with the result that they were able forthwith to liberate part of their forces on the Continent for fresh offensive movements in other directions.² The first advantage of this opportunity that was taken by the Japanese General Staff was to send an expeditionary force to Harbin—a Russian foundation which was already the second city of Manchuria and which was probably destined to surpass Mukden itself in population and importance as the northern part of the country was gradually colonized and opened up.

The Japanese found the occasion for this new military advance in an outbreak of local fighting between their own principal partisan in Kirin Province—a Chinese notable of Manchu extraction, named Hsi Hsia—and those elements of the former provincial army which were still maintaining their resistance to Japanese aggression. By the beginning of the last week of January 1932, General Hsi Hsia

¹ See the *Survey for 1931*, p. 460.

² The relation between the occupation of Shanhaikwan and the expedition to Harbin is brought out in the *Lytton Report*, on p. 78. The account of Japanese military operations, down to August 1932 inclusive, which is given in this section is mainly taken from this authoritative source.

was advancing upon Harbin (which lay within the limits of Kirin Province, the provincial boundary between Kirin and Heilungkiang being the Sungari River); the anti-Japanese forces were standing between Harbin and General Hsi Hsia, with a view to intercepting his advance; and in these circumstances the Japanese and Korean colonies in Harbin, which amounted respectively to 4,000 and 1,600 souls, were declared to be in danger. Thereupon, the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria decided to send a force to Harbin by rail from Changchun, the railhead of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway; and they demanded transport from the Management of the Chinese and Russian jointly-owned Chinese Eastern Railway, to which the Changchun-Harbin line belonged. When the Management of the C.E.R. demurred, the Japanese Army organized and sent forward three military trains over the C.E.R. system without waiting for permission. The advance of this small force was checked by Chinese resistance at Shuangcheng on the 1st February. Thereupon, Japanese reinforcements were brought up, and the Chinese resistance was broken in a decisive engagement on the southern outskirts of Harbin on the 4th and 5th. The city itself was occupied by the Japanese forces on the latter day. In the meantime the Japanese military authorities had reached an agreement with the Management of the C.E.R. that the transport of the Japanese forces over the C.E.R. system should be allowed on the understanding that they were proceeding with the sole object of giving protection to the Japanese nationals in Harbin, and in consideration of their fares being paid in cash. Notwithstanding this agreement, the Japanese occupation of Harbin inevitably increased the strain upon the already strained relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R.

The whole course of Japanese policy and conduct in Manchuria since the 18th September, 1931, had aroused alarm in the U.S.S.R., which was the country most closely affected, next to China herself. Soviet Russian suspicions of Japanese intentions had been further intensified by the unwillingness of the Japanese Government to entertain a suggestion for the negotiation of a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact—a suggestion which had been submitted by the Soviet Government to Mr. Yoshizawa when that Japanese diplomatist was passing through Moscow on the 31st December, 1931, en route from Europe to Japan in order to take up the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tokyo. Accordingly, when the Government at Moscow received a report that the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria had asked the Management of the C.E.R. for seventeen trains of fifty wagons each for transporting Japanese troops eastward

along the main line of the C.E.R. from Harbin to the frontier station of Pogranichnaya at half-price, they asked, on the 24th February, 1932, for an explanation from the Japanese Ambassador; and authorization was not granted until the Japanese Government had given assurances that they only desired to transport a limited number of troops—and this not to the frontier but only to Imienpo or to Hailin at the furthest—for the local protection of Japanese nationals, and that the Japanese Army would not violate the rights of the Soviet Government on the C.E.R.

The Soviet Government had not forgotten that, in the year 1918, Japanese troops had penetrated into Russian territory as far west as Lake Baikal, and that, while the other Allied and Associated Powers had withdrawn their military forces from Russian territory in the Far East by September 1920, it had required the combined diplomacy of the English-speaking Powers at the Washington Conference to induce the Japanese to evacuate the Russian Maritime Province on the Pacific Seaboard by November 1922.¹ Now that the Japanese had resumed an aggressive policy on the Continent on the grand scale, it was inevitable that the Soviet Government should fear that the Japanese Army might seek to round off its successive occupations of Southern and Northern Manchuria by overrunning the Russian Maritime Province into the bargain; for Vladivostok, the administrative capital of the Province, was also the maritime terminus of the C.E.R. and therefore the principal port for the northern half of the Manchurian hinterland. Moreover, the Japanese policy of officially masking Japanese Imperialism behind a political façade of native autonomy—a policy which was already being put into practice in the erection of a so-called 'Manchu' republic in Manchuria,² was applicable with greater ease and greater plausibility in the Russian Maritime Province, since there was a substantial Ukrainian element in the population of the Province, while Northern Manchuria harboured some 100,000 White Russian refugees, whose straitened circumstances in exile, and bitter hostility to the Communist régime in Russia, might make them ready to serve as tools in Japanese hands if the Japanese military authorities should decide to use them for the purpose of establishing a pendent to 'Manchukuo' in the shape of an anti-Communist Russian or Ukrainian republic in the Maritime Province under a Japanese military aegis. These fears led the Government at Moscow to strengthen their forces in the Maritime Province during the winter months of 1932 as

¹ See the *Survey for 1920-3*, Part VI, section (ii).

² See section (ii) (d) below.

an insurance against the risk of a Japanese invasion in the spring.¹ In a speech to the troops which was delivered at Khabarovsk on May Day 1932 by General Blücher (Galentz), the commander of the Soviet Russian forces in the Far East, the speaker was reported to have said that 'the flames of a real war are beginning to flicker near our frontiers' and that the Red Army would 'prevent any alien foot from trampling on the soil of the collective farms'.² Meanwhile, the Japanese military authorities had evidently decided not to try conclusions with the U.S.S.R., at any rate for the time being. For, in a public statement of the 18th April, 1932,³ the Japanese Commander-in-Chief on the Continent, General Honjo, declared that so far Russia had 'not attempted to upset conditions within Manchuria nor to foment disturbances there', and that the Japanese would 'take no steps antagonistic towards the Soviet[s] unless Russian agents' meddled 'with internal affairs in Manchuria'. In the last week of May, the same assurances were repeated in more emphatic terms by Mr. Matsudaira, the Japanese Ambassador in London, in an interview which he gave at Geneva to the correspondent of a German newspaper.⁴

In the event, the Japanese Army in Manchuria employed its energies in other directions during the next few months. In the latter part of March and the early part of April, an expeditionary force based on Harbin was operating down the Sungari River as far as Sanhsing, while only minor operations were being carried out along the line of the C.E.R. in the direction of Hailin. In the early part of May the Japanese Fourteenth Division was transferred to Manchuria from Shanghai;⁵ and part of this reinforcement was used for the penetration of the Mutan Valley, between Sanhsing on the Sungari and Hailin on the C.E.R. But the principal operation on which the Fourteenth Division was employed was a spring campaign, in the plains north of Harbin, against the forces of General Ma Chan-shan.⁶ This campaign was opened towards the end of May and culminated early in August 1932 in the momentary dispersal of General

¹ The policy of the Soviet Russian military authorities in this matter seems to have been to increase the mechanical equipment of their Army in the Far East—aeroplanes and tanks and lorries—to the utmost possible extent, while keeping the personnel as small as possible in order not to aggravate unnecessarily the difficulty of maintaining the food-supply in this remote district. (See *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th May, 1932.)

² *The New York Times*, 5th May, 1932.

³ See *The New York Times*, 16th May, 1932.

⁴ For Mr. Matsudaira's interview with Dr. M. J. Larsons of the *Dortmunder Generalanzeiger*, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th May, 1932.

⁵ See p. 513 below.

⁶ For the previous hostilities between the Japanese and General Ma, see the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 450-3.

Ma's forces and the reported death of their commander. General Ma, however, was to display, in the sequel, as remarkable a capacity for resurrection as his less amiable contemporary, Simko the Kurd.¹

In July and August, there was also some desultory fighting on the south-western front in the fringes of the Province of Jehol. The operations were represented in the Chinese version as having been on a larger scale than the Japanese version admitted; and the Chinese also accused the Japanese of having taken the offensive without provocation, whereas the Japanese declared that their action had been provoked by the kidnapping of a Japanese staff-officer named Ishimoto in Jehol territory, on the Chinchow-Peipiao Railway, on the 17th July, 1932. In the light of 'the Nakamura Incident' of the preceding year,² this apologia for an extension of Japanese military activities in this quarter might seem ominous. In the event, however, the year closed without any Japanese occupation either of Chinese territory in Jehol or of Russian territory in the Maritime Province or in Transbaikalia.

There was, however, another Japanese campaign in Manchuria towards the close of the year 1932 which brought the Japanese forces into direct proximity to the Manchurian-Transbaikalian frontier at the point of junction between the C.E.R. and the Siberian railway-system at Manchuli. In this direction, the Japanese Army itself had not yet advanced beyond Angangki and Tsitsihar; and the region between the Great Khingan Mountain Range and the Sino-Russian frontier, which here followed the course of the River Argun, was in the hands of a certain General Su Ping-wen, who was ruling it in the name of the Manchukuo. On the 27th September, 1932, General Su's troops threw off their allegiance to the Manchukuo, made themselves masters of the Manchurian frontier town of Manchuli, and seized some 200 Japanese residents in Manchuli, including the Japanese Consul, as hostages.

Su's action placed the Japanese in a quandary; for they were deterred from attacking him out of consideration for the safety of their nationals whom he held in his power and in view of the remoteness of the region from their base of operations, but above all, perhaps, by an unwillingness to arouse the alarm and hostility of the Soviet Government still further by a Japanese military advance into a territory that bordered on the heart of Siberia. On the other hand, if they allowed Su's act of defiance to pass unrequited, they ran the

¹ For the successive avatars of Simko, see the *Survey for 1925*, Vol. I, pp. 538-9; the *Survey for 1928*, p. 343, and the *Survey for 1930*, p. 331.

² See the *Survey for 1931*, p. 437 and n.

risk of losing 'face' and of seeing this part of Northern Manchuria become—as the adjoining Chinese dependency of Outer Mongolia had already become—a Russian protectorate. The Soviet Government, on their part, were equally unwilling to see the Japanese Army given a pretext for crossing the Great Khingan Range; and accordingly the Soviet Russian authorities on the spot took steps to ease the situation. Before the end of October the Soviet Russian Consul at Manchuli persuaded General Su to release the women and children—110 persons in all—among his Japanese captives and to allow them to cross the frontier into Russian territory—whence they were eventually repatriated via Vladivostok. Thereafter, in November, the Soviet Government allowed the Japanese Government to send a mission by air to Dauria, in Russian territory, with a view to negotiating there, on neutral ground, with General Su for the release of the remainder. This mission, however, was abortive, since General Su did not put in an appearance; and thereupon the Japanese resolved at last to resort to military measures. The Japanese advance north-westward from Fularchi (a station on the C.E.R. just west of the Nonni River) began in the first days of December; and it met with as little resistance as the Russian military movement in the same region, but in the opposite direction, had encountered three years earlier.¹ By the 5th December the leading Japanese armoured train had rushed the tunnel through which the C.E.R. traversed the Khingan Range; and by the same date General Su and his troops had fled by train from Manchuli into Russian territory, where they were duly interned.² The remaining Japanese hostages arrived safely in Russian territory at the same moment. By the end of the first week in December traffic was resumed on the north-western section of the C.E.R. after an interruption that had lasted rather more than two months.

This was the end of the last resistance to the Japanese in Manchuria on the part of the regular Chinese military forces. On the other hand, the Japanese were still being successfully held at bay by irregulars in the forest-clad, mountainous eastern half of Kirin Province; and bandits, well trained to their profession and sometimes also well equipped, were springing up all over the country in the Japanese Army's rear. This new guerrilla warfare was the most important of the reactions of the various elements in the population of Manchuria against the Japanese occupation; and its nature and its strength can best be gauged when it is examined in this setting.

¹ See the *Survey for 1929*, pp. 359-63.

² A Japanese demand for the extradition of General Su Ping-wen was rejected by the Soviet Government.

(c) THE REACTION OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN THE POPULATION OF MANCHURIA TOWARDS THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

At the time of the Japanese military occupation of 'the Three Eastern Provinces' of the Chinese Republic in the years 1931-2, the total population of the country was estimated to be about 30,000,000; and of these about 28,000,000 were estimated to be either Chinese or Sinified Manchus.¹

The southern part of Manchuria, in the lower basin of the River Liao, had been inhabited by a Chinese population since time immemorial. The Chinese colonization of the centre and the north had begun in the last quarter of the nineteenth century of the Christian Era; and it had been accelerated by the construction of railways, which provided easy and rapid transport, and by the removal of a political ban that had been designed to hold the populations of Manchuria and of intra-mural China apart from one another in order that the former might remain a ruling and the latter a subject race under the Manchu régime. The latter-day Chinese immigration into the interior of Manchuria, which flowed principally from the populous province of Shantung, just across the Gulf of Chihli, had reached its height in the years 1927 and 1928, when the contrast between the peace and prosperity of Manchuria and the anarchy and misery of intra-mural China—a contrast which had been conspicuous since the early days of the Chinese Revolution—was particularly acute.² Thereafter, the inflow of intra-mural Chinese immigrants into Manchuria had been sharply checked by the political uncertainty and economic set-backs which were the consequences of the Sino-Russian conflict in Manchuria in 1929.³ A further set-back was caused by the onset of the world-wide economic depression, which was felt severely in countries like Manchuria that depended for their economic well-being upon the export in bulk of one or two raw materials or food-stuffs. The last blow was the Japanese military *coup* of the 18th-19th September, 1931, which had the immediate effect of converting the Chinese inflow into an exodus. But the Chinese *émigrés* from Manchuria in 1931-2 were mainly people of substance and position, whose importance was out of proportion to their numbers; and these numbers were not sufficient to affect perceptibly the numerical ratio between the various elements in the population of Manchuria, which remained, as before, overwhelmingly Chinese.

The non-Chinese minority of the population, which amounted,

¹ *Lytton Report*, p. 25.

² See the *Survey for 1928*, p. 435.

³ See the *Survey for 1929*, Part IV A, section (iv).

even in the aggregate, to no more than a fifteenth of the whole, was further weakened by being divided among no less than five distinct, and in some cases mutually hostile, communities: the unassimilated Manchus (in so far as these survived at all); the White Russians (about 100,000) and Soviet Russians (about 50,000), who were at daggers drawn; the Japanese (about 230,000) and Koreans (about 800,000) who were estranged from one another by Korean resentment at the domination of Korea by Japan, though in Manchuria the two peoples were brought together to some extent by their common fear of the Chinese majority;¹ and lastly the Mongols, who held aloof from all the rest.

These minoritarian communities were distinguished from one another not only by differences of race and nationality, but also by differences of social type and economic occupation.

The Koreans were the only non-Chinese community that was in serious competition with the Chinese for the agricultural occupation of the Manchurian countryside. The competition was not yet serious in terms of numbers; for although the Koreans in Manchuria were considerably the largest of the non-Chinese communities, their numerical ratio to the Chinese was only about 1 to 35. They were formidable competitors, nevertheless, in virtue of a technique of rice-cultivation which the Northern Chinese immigrants were unable to emulate, and which was capable of supporting a denser agricultural population than the cultivation of other cereals. The hostility between Koreans and Chinese in Manchuria, and the part played by this factor in precipitating the Japanese military *coup* of the 18th-19th September, 1931, has been touched upon in the preceding volume.²

The Japanese and the Russian communities (both White and Red) in Manchuria were almost exclusively urban; and they were concentrated geographically in the railway-zones and railway-towns. The hostility between the local Japanese and the Chinese was greater than it was between any two other communities in the country, not excluding the White and Red Russians. On the other hand, between the Russians and the Chinese, in spite of the much greater difference in physical race, there was more mutual tolerance and even understanding, and more give and take, both in manners and customs and in mingling of blood, than between any two other local communities except the Chinese and the Manchus.

The Manchus were originally a hunting and rudimentarily agricul-

¹ For the three-cornered relations between Chinese, Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria, see the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 432-4.

² See the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 434-5.

tural tribe of barbarians, living in the forests and mountains of Eastern Kirin, who had shown a strong proclivity towards the Chinese Civilization ever since they first began to be irradiated by it. They were already largely Sinified before they began to conquer intra-mural China in A.D. 1628, and indeed before they annexed the ancient Chinese domain in Southern Manchuria in 1616. In fact, the ease and rapidity with which they achieved the greater part of their conquest of intra-mural China was largely due to their statesmanship in taking their Manchurian Chinese neighbours into partnership on an equal footing with themselves and enlisting the military and political services of these extra-mural Chinese for the subjugation and domination of China Proper. Since the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty at Peking in A.D. 1911, the Manchu-Manchurian and Chinese-Manchurian 'Banner-men' of the fallen régime had alike forfeited their social and political privileges; and the Japanese policy, in 1932, of calling their fictitious independent republic in Manchuria 'Manchukuo', and procuring Mr. Henry Pu Yi, the *ci-devant* Manchu Emperor of China who had been deposed in 1911, to be this fictitious republic's executive head, was intended to win the support of the Manchus for the Japanese occupation. But except, perhaps, in respect of one or two Manchu notables (e.g. the General Hsi Hsia who has been mentioned above)¹ this intention was not fulfilled. For the Manchus had had no quarrel with the Manchurian Chinese, who had been their neighbours for two thousand years and their partners in the domination of intra-mural China for three centuries. And, while they would doubtless have been gratified if, by some miracle, the Manchu régime in China could have been revived, they were content, as a *pis aller*, with the *de facto* autonomy which the Manchurian provinces had enjoyed since the Chinese Revolution; and it was no consolation to them at all to see their country fictitiously compensated for the loss of its former dominion over China by falling, in its turn, under the domination of Japan.

The only two communities in Manchuria whose support the Japanese had any prospect of enlisting were the White Russians and the Mongols; and even these two communities, so far as they committed themselves to the Japanese at all, were being driven by *force majeure* rather than led by any sense of a genuine and enduring common interest.

The White Russians were at the mercy of the temporary masters of Manchuria, whoever these might be, because they were helpless exiles, with no country of their own to fall back upon. It was as

¹ See p. 434 above.

difficult for them to rebuff Japanese overtures or reject Japanese demands (had this been their desire), as it was for the Anatolian Circassians to offend the Greeks during the Greek military occupation of Western Asia Minor in 1919-22, or for the Syrian Circassians and Armenians to offend the French during the French military occupation of Syria, under the Mandate, which began in 1920.¹

As for the Manchurian Mongols, they were in the same position as the Manchus in having been lords and masters of China at an earlier date. And although the Mongol Empire was a less recent memory than the Manchu—the Mongol Dynasty at Peking having fallen in A.D. 1368 and the Manchu only in A.D. 1911—nevertheless the Mongol memory of an imperial past was hardly less vivid, because the Mongol Empire had been so much greater than the Manchu Empire in its day.² For the rest, the respective histories of Mongol and Manchu relations with China and with the Chinese Civilization had been utterly different. The Manchus had readily become Sinified because, at the time when they encountered the Chinese, they were still indeterminate barbarians with no distinctive social system of their own. The Manchus, in fact, were mere backwoodsmen in whose lives the Chinese culture filled a social and spiritual vacuum. The Mongols, on the other hand, at the time of their first encounter with the Chinese, were already ancient converts to an alien and antipathetic civilization—the nomadism of the Eurasian Steppe—which is one of the most rigid and distinctive social systems in the world.

When nomadism collides with a sedentary civilization, there is seldom or never any assimilation or even any give and take. The usual outcome is for the stronger party, whichever that may be at the time, to drive the weaker off the field. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of the Christian Era, the nomads, under Mongol leadership, had prevailed simultaneously over all the sedentary societies round the coasts of the great Eurasian Steppe: in China, in the Islamic World and in Russia alike. Thereafter the tide had turned; and the domain of the nomads in Eurasia had been cut short by a converging movement of the surrounding peoples. In this encroachment of agriculture upon nomadism, the lead had been taken by the peasantry of Russia and China; and Manchuria was the place where these two great movements of agricultural colonization had completed their encirclement of the Steppe. When the Japanese appeared upon the

¹ On this point, see the *Survey for 1925*, Vol. I, pp. 435-7.

² The Manchu Empire had never extended west of the Pamirs and the Altai, whereas the Mongols had carried their Empire to the Indus and the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates and the Halys and the Danube and the Carpathians and the Baltic.

scene as military conquerors in 1931-2, a Russian and a Chinese (or Sinified Manchu) peasantry marched with one another in the basin of the Amur. The ploughman was driving out the herdsman even from the plains which the Mongols had formerly monopolized for their cattle-pastures; and this process was taking place perhaps more rapidly than ever before during the decades immediately preceding the Japanese military occupation. Down to the fall of the Manchu Empire in A.D. 1911, the Mongols had remained masters of the plains on the south-eastern as well as on the north-western flank of the Great Khingan, right up to the Willow Palisade which had once defended, and then still defined, the ancient Chinese Pale in the lower basin of the Liao River, round Mukden. By the year 1932 the northward and westward advance of Chinese peasant colonization had reduced the Mongol domain in 'the four North-Eastern Provinces' of the Chinese Republic to three isolated enclaves: the reserves of the Chosatu and Chaotu Leagues in Jehol, of the Cherim League in northern Liaoning (or Fengtien), and of the Barga League¹ in north-western Heilungkiang, on the western flank of the Great Khingan. Of these surviving local Mongol communities, the Cherim League was perhaps the weakest; for its pasture-lands lay right in the path of the Chinese agricultural colonization, and the northward extension of Liaoning Province since the beginning of the Chinese Revolution had been carried out almost entirely at the Cherim Mongols' expense. For converse reasons, the Barga Mongols were perhaps the strongest community of the four in question, since they were the furthest removed from the Chinese thrust and the most closely in touch with the main body of the Mongol people in Outer Mongolia.

It will be seen that, at this time, the Mongols, at any rate in Manchuria, had their backs to the wall; yet they could not altogether be left out of political calculations as a negligible quantity. Though they were numerically weak and technically ill-equipped (if technique be measured on the standards of our Western Civilization), they were still strong in the traditional practice of a distinctive way of life which was nicely adapted to the physical environment in which they lived. Though they were not armed with modern Western weapons, they had a traditional military organization and discipline which gave them social cohesion. And the psychologically depressing effect of their present political adversity was at least partially counteracted in their minds by the living memory of a great political past. In the stubbornness of their temperament, the Mongols were the equals of

¹ For the Barga Mongols and their rôle in the Sino-Russian conflict of 1929 see the *Survey for 1929*, p. 368.

the Japanese. It remained to be seen how the Japanese intrusion upon the Manchurian scene would be taken by these Mongol children of Ishmael. They might welcome the Japanese as allies; or they might prefer to hold aloof and fight for their own hand while the various representatives of the sedentary civilizations pursued their internecine warfare on the Mongols' stolen pasture-grounds.

These, in outline, were the positions and attitudes of the several communities in Manchuria in 1932. We have now indicated to what extent, if at all, the Japanese might expect support from the non-Chinese minority.¹ We have next to trace the course of the reaction of the Chinese majority in Manchuria, which accounted, as we have seen, for fourteen-fifteenths of the population of the country.

The feeling of the Chinese population was one of the main questions which the Lytton Commission set themselves to study.² A frank expression of genuine opinion was, no doubt, difficult to obtain from a population which was living, at the time, at the mercy of the Japanese Army; yet, in spite of the difficulty of conducting their investigation,³ the Commission succeeded in obtaining a mass of first-hand evidence and arriving at a clear conclusion. The upshot of their inquiry is summed up in the fact that, out of 1,550 letters received from Manchurian Chinese 'farmers, small tradesmen, town workers and students', in which the writers described their feelings and experiences, 'all . . . except two were bitterly hostile to the new "Manchukuo Government"⁴ and to the Japanese.' And 'they appeared to be sincere and spontaneous expressions of opinion'.⁵

The feelings of the principal classes of the Chinese population in Manchuria—particularly as these feelings were revealed by the 'acid test' of the attitude towards 'Manchukuo', were analysed by the Commission as follows:

The Chinese business-men and bankers who were interviewed by us were hostile to 'Manchukuo'. They disliked the Japanese; they feared for their lives and property, and frequently remarked: 'We do not want to become like the Koreans'. After September 18th, there was a large exodus of business-men to China, but some of the less rich ones are now returning. Generally speaking, the smaller shopkeepers expect to suffer less from Japanese competition than do the larger merchants and manufacturers, who often had profitable relations with the former officials. Many shops were still closed at the time of our visit. The increase in banditry adversely affected business in the countryside, and the machinery of credit has largely broken down. The announced Japanese

¹ The foregoing sketch of the attitude of the minoritarian communities is largely based on the *Lytton Report*, pp. 110-11.

² See *op. cit.*, p. 107.

³ See section (ii) (d) below.—A.J.T.

⁴ See *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ The *Lytton Report*, *loc. cit.*

intention to exploit Manchuria economically, and the numerous visits of Japanese economic missions to Manchuria in the last few months, have caused apprehension among Chinese business-men, in spite of the fact that many of these missions are reported to have returned to Japan disappointed.

The professional classes, teachers, and doctors are hostile to 'Manchukuo'. They allege that they are spied upon and intimidated. The interference with education, the closing of Universities and some schools, and the alterations in the school text-books, have added to their hostility, already great on patriotic grounds. The censorship of the Press, post and opinion is resented, as is also the prohibition of the entry into 'Manchukuo' of newspapers published in China. There are, of course, Chinese who have been educated in Japan who are not included in this generalization. Many letters were received from students and young people directed against 'Manchukuo'.

Evidence regarding the attitude of farmers and town workers is divergent and naturally difficult to obtain. Opinion among foreigners and educated Chinese was to the effect that they were either hostile or indifferent to 'Manchukuo'. The farmer and worker is politically uneducated, usually illiterate, and normally takes little interest in the Government. The following reasons were advanced by witnesses for the agricultural population being hostile to 'Manchukuo', and were confirmed in some of the letters received from this class of person. The farmers have good grounds for believing that the new régime will lead to an increased immigration of Koreans, and possibly of Japanese. The Korean immigrants do not assimilate with the Chinese, and their methods of agriculture are different. While the Chinese farmer mainly grows beans, kaoliang and wheat, the Korean farmer cultivates rice. This means digging canals and dykes and flooding the fields. If there are heavy rains, the dykes built by the Koreans are liable to burst and flood neighbouring Chinese land, ruining the crops. There have also been constant quarrels in the past with Koreans over land ownership and rents. Since the establishment of 'Manchukuo' the Chinese allege that the Koreans have often ceased to pay rent, that they have seized lands from the Chinese, and that the Japanese have forced the Chinese to sell their lands at an unfavourable price. The farmers near the railways and towns have suffered from orders forbidding the planting of kaoliang—a crop which grows to ten feet in height and favours the operations of bandits—within five hundred metres of railway lines and towns. The falling-off of the seasonal migration of labourers from China proper, due to the economic depression and accentuated to some extent by the political disturbances, continues. The public lands, usually available on terms to immigrants from China, have now been taken over by 'Manchukuo'.

Since 18th September, 1931, there has been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in the countryside, partly due to disbanded soldiery and partly due to farmers who, having been ruined by bandits, have to take to banditry themselves for a living.¹ Organized warfare,

¹ The ruin which was thus brought upon the Chinese farmers in Manchuria by political causes in the year 1932 was aggravated by the disastrous floods

from which Manchuria, compared to the rest of China, had been free for many years, is now being waged in many parts of the Three Provinces between Japanese and 'Manchukuo' troops and the scattered forces still loyal to China. This warfare naturally inflicts great hardships on the farmers, especially as the Japanese aeroplanes have been bombing villages suspected of harbouring anti-'Manchukuo' forces. One result has been that large areas have not been planted, and next year the farmer will find it harder than ever to pay his taxes. Since the outbreak of disorders, large numbers of the more-recently-established immigrants from China have fled back inside the Wall. These material reasons, when added to a certain ingrained dislike of the Japanese, caused many witnesses to tell us that the Chinese farmers, who constitute the overwhelming mass of the population of Manchuria, suffer from and dislike the new régime, and that their attitude is one of passive hostility.

As regards the townspeople, in certain places they have suffered from the attitude of Japanese soldiers, gendarmes, and police. Generally speaking, the behaviour of the Japanese troops has been good, there being no wide-spread lootings or massacres, though we have received in our letters complaints of individual brutality. On the other hand, the Japanese have been vigorous in suppressing elements that they believed to be hostile. The Chinese allege that many executions have taken place, and also that prisoners have been threatened and tortured in Japanese gendarmerie stations.¹

The warfare and the banditry which are referred to in the last paragraph but one of the passage here quoted from the *Lytton Report* were the principal reactions in which the hostility of the local Chinese population to the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria declared itself.² And it was significant that, as the remaining Chinese regular forces in Manchuria were progressively driven off the field by the Japanese Army on the Continent, the vigour and success of the Chinese guerrilla operations steadily increased. There was, indeed, a relation of cause and effect between the two phenomena; for, in chasing Generals Su and Ma and their like out of the bounds of Manchuria and then attempting to garrison the vast new territories thus occupied, in order to prevent their elusive opponents' return, the Japanese were, perforce, immensely extending their lines of communication in a country where the great majority of the civilian population wished them ill. And this gave the Chinese guerrillas in Manchuria ideal conditions for conducting their campaign.

After the dispersal or expulsion of the greater part of the Chinese regular forces in Manchuria in the course of the year, the ensuing

which made havoc, in the August of this year, in the valleys of the Sungari and Nonni Rivers.—A.J.T.

¹ *Lytton Report*, pp. 108-9.

² For the different kinds of Chinese armed forces that were in the field against the Japanese in 1932, see the *Lytton Report*, pp. 81-3.

intention to exploit Manchuria economically, and the numerous visits of Japanese economic missions to Manchuria in the last few months, have caused apprehension among Chinese business-men, in spite of the fact that many of these missions are reported to have returned to Japan disappointed.

The professional classes, teachers, and doctors are hostile to 'Manchukuo'. They allege that they are spied upon and intimidated. The interference with education, the closing of Universities and some schools, and the alterations in the school text-books, have added to their hostility, already great on patriotic grounds. The censorship of the Press; post and opinion is resented, as is also the prohibition of the entry into 'Manchukuo' of newspapers published in China. There are, of course, Chinese who have been educated in Japan who are not included in this generalization. Many letters were received from students and young people directed against 'Manchukuo'.

Evidence regarding the attitude of farmers and town workers is divergent and naturally difficult to obtain. Opinion among foreigners and educated Chinese was to the effect that they were either hostile or indifferent to 'Manchukuo'. The farmer and worker is politically uneducated, usually illiterate, and normally takes little interest in the Government. The following reasons were advanced by witnesses for the agricultural population being hostile to 'Manchukuo', and were confirmed in some of the letters received from this class of person. The farmers have good grounds for believing that the new régime will lead to an increased immigration of Koreans, and possibly of Japanese. The Korean immigrants do not assimilate with the Chinese, and their methods of agriculture are different. While the Chinese farmer mainly grows beans, kaoliang and wheat, the Korean farmer cultivates rice. This means digging canals and dykes and flooding the fields. If there are heavy rains, the dykes built by the Koreans are liable to burst and flood neighbouring Chinese land, ruining the crops. There have also been constant quarrels in the past with Koreans over land ownership and rents. Since the establishment of 'Manchukuo' the Chinese allege that the Koreans have often ceased to pay rent, that they have seized lands from the Chinese, and that the Japanese have forced the Chinese to sell their lands at an unfavourable price. The farmers near the railways and towns have suffered from orders forbidding the planting of kaoliang—a crop which grows to ten feet in height and favours the operations of bandits—within five hundred metres of railway lines and towns. The falling-off of the seasonal migration of labourers from China proper, due to the economic depression and accentuated to some extent by the political disturbances, continues. The public lands, usually available on terms to immigrants from China, have now been taken over by 'Manchukuo'.

Since 18th September, 1931, there has been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in the countryside, partly due to disbanded soldiery and partly due to farmers who, having been ruined by bandits, have to take to banditry themselves for a living.¹ Organized warfare,

¹ The ruin which was thus brought upon the Chinese farmers in Manchuria by political causes in the year 1932 was aggravated by the disastrous floods

from which Manchuria, compared to the rest of China, had been free for many years, is now being waged in many parts of the Three Provinces between Japanese and 'Manchukuo' troops and the scattered forces still loyal to China. This warfare naturally inflicts great hardships on the farmers, especially as the Japanese aeroplanes have been bombing villages suspected of harbouring anti-'Manchukuo' forces. One result has been that large areas have not been planted, and next year the farmer will find it harder than ever to pay his taxes. Since the outbreak of disorders, large numbers of the more-recently-established immigrants from China have fled back inside the Wall. These material reasons, when added to a certain ingrained dislike of the Japanese, caused many witnesses to tell us that the Chinese farmers, who constitute the overwhelming mass of the population of Manchuria, suffer from and dislike the new régime, and that their attitude is one of passive hostility.

As regards the townspeople, in certain places they have suffered from the attitude of Japanese soldiers, gendarmes, and police. Generally speaking, the behaviour of the Japanese troops has been good, there being no wide-spread lootings or massacres, though we have received in our letters complaints of individual brutality. On the other hand, the Japanese have been vigorous in suppressing elements that they believed to be hostile. The Chinese allege that many executions have taken place, and also that prisoners have been threatened and tortured in Japanese gendarmerie stations.²

The warfare and the banditry which are referred to in the last paragraph but one of the passage here quoted from the *Lytton Report* were the principal reactions in which the hostility of the local Chinese population to the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria declared itself.³ And it was significant that, as the remaining Chinese regular forces in Manchuria were progressively driven off the field by the Japanese Army on the Continent, the vigour and success of the Chinese guerrilla operations steadily increased. There was, indeed, a relation of cause and effect between the two phenomena; for, in chasing Generals Su and Ma and their like out of the bounds of Manchuria and then attempting to garrison the vast new territories thus occupied, in order to prevent their elusive opponents' return, the Japanese were, perforce, immensely extending their lines of communication in a country where the great majority of the civilian population wished them ill. And this gave the Chinese guerrillas in Manchuria ideal conditions for conducting their campaign.

After the dispersal or expulsion of the greater part of the Chinese regular forces in Manchuria in the course of the year, the ensuing

which made havoc, in the August of this year, in the valleys of the Sungari and Nonni Rivers.—A.J.T.

² *Lytton Report*, pp. 108-9.

³ For the different kinds of Chinese armed forces that were in the field against the Japanese in 1932, see the *Lytton Report*, pp. 81-3.

guerrilla warfare arose in two distinct theatres and in two distinct forms.

One theatre was the forest-covered mountain country of Eastern Kirin, where the Chinese irregulars were able to keep the Japanese Army at bay so effectively that large districts remained outside the sphere of Japanese control altogether.¹ This region was not large compared to the total area of 'the Three Eastern Provinces'; but it was geographically important because it was traversed by the two lines of railway—the long since completed C.E.R. and the still incomplete parallel line from the north-eastern extremity of the Korean coast to Changchun via Kirin—which were the existing and the projected line of communication between the interior of Manchuria and the Sea of Japan. Both these lines afforded a much shorter route between the interior of Manchuria and the outer world—and particularly between Manchuria and Japan—than the route which was served by the Japanese-owned S.M.R. from Changchun to Dairen. The importance of these short cuts was likely to increase as the centre of population and production in Manchuria gradually shifted northwards from Liaoning Province into Kirin and Heilungkiang. And, for political reasons, the more southerly of the two alternative routes was of particular interest to Japan, since this Changchun-Rashin Railway, when completed, would run entirely through territory that was either Manchurian (whatever the future juridical status of Manchuria might be) or Japanese (in the maritime section of the line in Korea, which was juridically an integral part of the Japanese Empire). The completion of the Changchun-Rashin Railway in the still unbuilt sector, between Tunhua and Laotuku, would thus give Japan a through route between the interior of Manchuria and the Sea of Japan by a short cut that was entirely under her own control; whereas the control over the C.E.R., which she had assumed by enforcing her will upon its Chinese and Russian joint owners, was only of limited value to Japan so long as the extension line which linked the C.E.R. with the coast, between Pogranichnaya and Vladivostok, remained in Russian hands. Since this vital section of railway ran through Russian territory, Japan could not obtain

¹ It may be noted, as one of the curiosities of history, that this district—which was the one district in Manchuria that the Japanese failed to subjugate, in 1932, in the name of their fictitious 'Manchukuo'—was the homeland of the Manchus and the nucleus of the Manchu Empire which had fallen in A.D. 1911. By an equally dramatic historical accident, the decisive battles in the Ottoman Turks' struggle for life and death against the Greeks in 1921 were fought in a district on the north-western rim of the Anatolian Plateau which had been the nucleus of the Ottoman Empire six centuries before.

possession of it without involving herself in a war with the U.S.S.R.—a risk which the Japanese Government shrank from incurring, even in their present reckless mood. Accordingly, the completion of the Changchun-Rashin Railway was one of the first economic enterprises in Manchuria on the Japanese agenda; and the retardation of this Japanese project was perhaps the most important practical result that was achieved by the successful resistance of the Chinese irregular forces in this area.¹

The other theatre in which the Japanese had now to cope with Chinese guerrilla operations was the whole network of railways in Manchuria so far as these were now under Japanese control—not excluding the Japanese-owned S.M.R., which the Japanese railway guards had never failed to preserve from molestation until Japanese policy drove the whole Chinese population of Manchuria into active hostility to the Japanese régime by the *coup* of the 18th-19th September, 1931. In this theatre of guerrilla warfare the conditions were not the same as in Eastern Kirin. In the railway zone there was no district which was altogether in the hands of Chinese armed forces and out of Japanese control. In this theatre, therefore, the Chinese operations took the form of intermittent raids; but these raids were formidable on several accounts. The field of operations was vast; the raiders were mobile and elusive; a certain number of their bands were equipped with machine-guns and even with light artillery; and they boldly attacked the Japanese at vital and conspicuous points where the mere delivery of an attack, even if it was eventually beaten off, was a serious blow to Japanese military prestige.

On the 10th January, 1932, for example, within a week of the Japanese occupation of Chinchow and the pass of Shanhaikwan up to the line of the Great Wall, detachments of Japanese troops were successfully attacked and cut to pieces by Chinese raiders at Lienshan, between Shanhaikwan and Chinchow, and at Tahushan, between Chinchow and Mukden. Simultaneously, a company of Japanese infantry and a party of railway engineers were destroyed at Hsinlintun (a station on the connecting line between the Peiping-Mukden and the Ssuping-kai-Taonanfu Railways). Again, on the 29th August, 1932, a daring and largely successful attack upon the Japanese military air-base at Mukden was made by a Chinese guerrilla band with trench-mortars and machine guns. And, in the neighbourhood of the C.E.R., between Harbin and Anganki, was temporarily occupied by raiders on the 29th August, 1932, and the walled city of Fushun

¹ The Japanese had succeeded in completing the construction of this railway by the time when the present volume went to press in 1933.

next day. For the Japanese, Fushun was a sensitive spot, not merely on account of its proximity to Mukden, but because it was the site of the most productive Japanese-owned coal-mine on the Continent. These are characteristic examples of a host of Chinese raids upon Japanese posts in Manchuria which were kept up vigorously throughout the year with a frequency that makes it impossible, within the limits of this *Survey*, to attempt an exhaustive catalogue. Another activity of the raiders was the wrecking and robbing of railway-trains. A typical case was the 'hold-up', on the night of the 11th September, 1932, of a passenger-train *en route* for Harbin on the Changchun-Harbin branch of the C.E.R. A full and vivid record of this particular incident has been preserved because the passengers who underwent the experience happened to include Mr. J. M. Penlington, the Tokyo correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* of London, and Mr. Henry W. Kinney, an American citizen who for a number of years had occupied the post of adviser to the South Manchuria Railway Company.¹

As the year advanced, the bandits turned their attention with increasing frequency to non-Japanese foreigners as well as to Japanese. On the 7th September, 1932, for instance, three British subjects—Mrs. Pawley, Mr. Corkran, and Mr. McIntosh—were kidnapped on the old race-course at Mukden. Mr. McIntosh managed to escape, but the other two captives remained in the bandits' hands until the 20th October, and were only released after protracted negotiations on terms which the bandits presumably considered to be worth their while. After this incident of the 7th September, the British Consul-General at Mukden issued instructions to British subjects in Manchuria forbidding them to venture outside 'the safety zones'; and on the 15th of the same month the Foreign Office in Whitehall announced that, in view of the prevailing conditions in Manchuria, British subjects going to or from the Far East would be well advised, for the time being, not to incur the risks attendant upon travelling by the Manchurian-Siberian route. Thereafter, on the 12th October, 1932, in Harbin, a British subject, Mrs. C. T. Woodruff, the wife of an official of the British-American Tobacco Company, was shot dead

¹ Mr. Penlington's narrative will be found in *The Daily Telegraph* of the 15th September, 1932; Mr. Kinney's in *The Manchuria Daily News* (published at Dairen) of the 17th September, 1932. The bandits encountered by Messrs. Penlington and Kinney on this occasion did their work thoroughly; for they not only robbed Mr. Kinney of his trousers but they relieved him, into the bargain, of a typescript draft of the Far Eastern Part of *The Survey of International Affairs* for 1931. If the bandits, or their principals, could read English, they may well have found this typescript more agreeable reading than it can have been for their unfortunate victim.

in broad daylight in the principal street of the city while defending her two children against an attempt to kidnap them.

The motives which inspired these aims against non-Japanese foreigners may be presumed to have been partly economic and partly political. On the one hand, criminals driven to desperation by the misery which had descended upon Manchuria in the course of the year may have calculated that Europeans and Americans offered the most promising field for kidnapping operations because they were likely to command the highest ransoms. At the same time, the Chinese kidnapers doubtless took pleasure in 'blackening the faces' of the Japanese in Manchuria by demonstrating, in this sensational fashion, the falsity of the Japanese official claim to have bestowed upon the occupied territories the blessings of law and order.

One of the greatest difficulties which the Japanese encountered in their attempts to cope with banditry and guerrilla warfare was the temper of the Chinese police and Chinese troops who had been enrolled and organized by Japanese officers in the service of the fictitious 'Manchukuo'.

The 'Manchukuo' Police are partly composed of members of the former Chinese police, partly of new recruits. In the larger towns, there are actually Japanese officers in the police, and in many other places there are Japanese advisers. Some individual members of the police who spoke to us expressed their dislike of the new régime, but said they must continue to serve to make a living.

The 'Manchukuo' Army also consists in the main of the former Manchurian soldiers reorganized under Japanese supervision. Such troops were at first content to take service under the new régime provided they were merely required to maintain local order. But, since they have on occasions been called upon to engage in serious warfare against Chinese forces and to fight under Japanese orders side by side with Japanese troops, the 'Manchukuo' Army has become increasingly unreliable. Japanese sources report the frequent defection of 'Manchukuo' forces to the Chinese side, while the Chinese claim that one of their most reliable and fruitful sources of warlike supplies is the 'Manchukuo' Army.¹

The reason for this temper and this conduct on the part of the Chinese armed forces of the 'Manchukuo' will become apparent when we examine, in the next section, the manner in which this fictitious state was erected by the Japanese. We may bring the present section to a close by observing that the position in which the Japanese found themselves in Manchuria at the end of the year 1932 was accurately

¹ *Lytton Report*, p. 108. See also an article in *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th November, 1932, from their correspondent in Japan, and an article, headed 'Khingon, August 1932', by Mr. A. R. Lindt, the special correspondent of the *Journal de Genève*, which was published on the 1st September, 1932.

conveyed to the observer's eye by the continuous lines of barbed wire entanglements and trenches and block-houses which now flanked the permanent way of the railways, and encircled the towns, not only in those parts of Manchuria which had lain outside the Japanese sphere of occupation before the 18th September, 1931, but also in the zone of the South Manchuria Railway, which had previously been in the undisturbed possession of the Japanese for more than a quarter of a century.

(d) THE ERECTION AND RECOGNITION OF 'MANCHUKUO'
BY THE JAPANESE

In the foregoing chapters, the fictitious independent Government in Manchuria which was erected, and finally recognized, by the Japanese, in the course of the year 1932, under the name of 'Manchukuo', has been mentioned from time to time in connexion with the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria and with the reaction which this evoked among the various elements in the population of the country. The record of these affairs makes it evident that this Japanese political make-believe in Manchuria had little effect upon the local situation *de facto*. Throughout the year 1932, as during the last quarter of the year 1931, the Japanese activity which was of paramount importance in Manchuria was the action of the Japanese Army. The erection and recognition of 'Manchukuo' were really only of importance in so far as they were taken by the Japanese Government as a pretext for further encroachments on the spot or for continued intransigence towards the rest of the world; and the Japanese did in fact exploit their own creation in both these ways. Locally, the Japanese authorities made the erection of 'Manchukuo' into an occasion for putting a forcible end to the operations of certain All-China public services—notably the China Maritime Customs, the Salt Gabelle, and the Post Office—in those parts of Manchuria that were under Japanese military control, and also in the Japanese leased territory of Kwantung. In the wider field of international diplomatic negotiations over the Sino-Japanese dispute, the Japanese Government deliberately gave formal recognition to their puppet in Manchuria—and this at a moment when the whole dispute was *sub judice*, pending the publication of the Lytton Report—in order to establish a *fait accompli* which Japan could refuse to reconsider, on the ground that any compromise on this point would be inconsistent with Japanese national dignity. The diplomatic capital which the Japanese thus sought to make out of 'Manchukuo'

is dealt with below in another chapter. In the present chapter, some account is given of the fashion in which 'Manchukuo' was erected, and of the consequent further encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria for which the fiction of a spontaneous local independence movement was made to serve as an excuse.

The official Japanese version of these events was that 'Manchukuo' was the outcome of a spontaneous local movement to fill a local political vacuum; and it is true that there was a political vacuum in 'the Three Eastern Provinces' of the Chinese Republic at the turn of the years 1931 and 1932. But, in order to state the whole truth, the historian must add that this vacuum was the result of Japanese action in overthrowing the previous local régime by force, and that the filling of the vacuum was likewise a Japanese act and was in no wise the work of the local population.

It must also be stated, by way of preface, that Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang's Government, which the Japanese had overthrown by military force on the 18th–19th September, 1931, had been 'a going concern'. It had been in control of 'the Three Eastern Provinces' (outside the economically and politically important but territorially insignificant area which was included in the Japanese Railway Zone), and also of 'the Special Administrative District' (i.e. the former Russian Railway Zone) and the fourth north-eastern province: that is to say, the Eastern Inner Mongolian Province of Jehol. This local Chinese administration had worked—in a fashion which was alien to the Western administrative and ethical tradition and which was therefore partly puzzling and partly scandalous to Western minds—by a system of personal understandings: between 'the Young Marshal' and the governors of the provinces; between the governors and the local officials; between the officials and the notables; and between the officials and the notables of the one part and the peasants and the brigands of the other. This network of relations was maintained by the traditional Chinese arts of compromise and adjustment and 'give-and-take';¹ and if it is judged empirically by its fruits, and relatively by comparison with contemporary Chinese practice elsewhere, and not *a priori* on the basis of Western practice and of Western preconceptions, its performance will appear appreciably better than it was represented to have been in the retrospective Japanese statement of the case.

On a comparative view, the Mukden Government's standard of

¹ For an illuminating characterization of the difference between the Chinese and the Western method of conducting public affairs, see O. Lattimore: *Manchuria Cradle of Conflict* (New York, 1932, Macmillan), pp. 132–49.

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attainment was perhaps as high as that of any other contemporary local Chinese Government with the possible exception of the Shansi Government under the régime of 'the model tüchün' Yen Hsi-shan and the Central Government of Nanking within the radius of its effective authority in the Lower Yangtse Valley. And, in absolute terms, the Mukden Government had substantial achievements to its credit in the settlement of immigrants from intra-mural China upon the land and in the promotion of education—two public activities which, under this régime in Manchuria, were both conducted, and that successfully, on a large scale. In the fundamental matter of law and order it would appear that Manchuria under Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang's régime, and before the Japanese military occupation, had been more or less free from that species of brigandage which, since the beginning of the Chinese Revolution, had become endemic in large parts of intra-mural China as an inevitable corollary of chronic civil war. In this Chinese civil war, Manchuria was one of the few regions of China that had escaped the disaster of becoming a theatre of military operations. It is true that the civil war had not left 'the Three Eastern Provinces' unscathed; for Chang Hsüeh-liang's father and predecessor Chang Tso-lin (though not Chang Hsüeh-liang himself) had several times succumbed to the temptation of intervening in the conflicts south of the Wall;¹ and the price of these

¹ For Chang Tso-lin's interventions in the civil war in intra-mural China, see the *Survey for 1925*, Vol. II, pp. 310 *seqq.*; the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 249-53, 300; the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 323 *seqq.*; the *Survey for 1928*, pp. 375 *seqq.* For Chang Hsüeh-liang's more pacific and constructive policy towards intra-mural China, see the *Survey for 1930*, Part IV, section (i); the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 406 *seqq.* The Japanese appear to have deprecated Chang Tso-lin's military adventures south of the Wall, and to have made it clear that they would not tolerate any counter-offensive, on the part of Chang Tso-lin's intra-mural opponents, into the Manchurian war-lord's extra-mural domain. To this extent, the Japanese could claim part of the credit for the relatively orderly régime which prevailed in the Chinese-administered territories in Manchuria until this régime was overthrown by the Japanese themselves on and after the 18th-19th September, 1931.

An English student of Far Eastern affairs puts the case as follows in a personal communication to the writer of this *Survey*:

'The Japanese up to 1928 favoured the consolidation of the Chang power and discouraged its opponents by their policy. Thus, in 1925 they frustrated the revolt of Kuo Sung-lin by proclaiming a neutral zone along the S.M.R. (see the *Survey for 1925*, Vol. II, p. 346) and in 1928 they precluded a Nationalist invasion of Manchuria by declaring they would not allow the "Northern Expedition" to pass Shanhaikwan (see the *Survey for 1928*, p. 377). This policy kept the situation much more stable than it was elsewhere in China, quite apart from the abilities of the Changs, and the Japanese would probably have continued it had not Chang Junior gone over to the Nationalists in December 1928 and admitted Kuomintang committees, &c., into Manchuria. In a sense "Manchukuo" is a restoration of the *status quo*

intra-mural military adventures of the Manchurian Army had been exacted from the people of Manchuria in an inflation and depreciation of the local currencies. This evil was serious enough; but it was at any rate a lesser evil than a direct visitation of war with all its attendant calamities: the destruction of buildings, plant and stock; the paralysis of agriculture; and the conversion of farmers into brigands out of sheer desperation. These calamities did descend upon Manchuria, in her turn, after the Japanese military coup of the 18th-19th September, 1931, as has been recorded in the previous chapter; but before that date, under the régime of Chang Hsüeh-liang and his father, Manchuria had not been plagued with brigandage of either the kind or the degree that were characteristic of intra-mural China during the same years. The brigandage that was rife in Manchuria at this period was concentrated on the fringes of settlement; and it was not different in character from the brigandage that had accompanied the advance of a frontier into the wilderness in other times and places: for example, in the nineteenth-century United States and in nineteenth-century Australia.¹

The measure of the effectiveness of Marshal Chang's régime in Manchuria can be gauged by the extent of the social disturbance that was produced when this régime was suddenly swept away by Japanese military action.

As a result of the events of September 18th, 1931, . . . the civil administration of Mukden City and of the Province of Liaoning (Fengtien) was completely disorganized and even that of the other two provinces was affected to a lesser extent. The suddenness of the attack on Mukden, which was not only the political centre of all Manchuria but, next to Dairen, also the most important commercial centre of South Manchuria, created a panic among the Chinese population. Most of the prominent officials, and the leading members of the educational and commercial communities who could afford to do so, left immediately with their families. During the days following September 19th, over 100,000 Chinese residents left Mukden by the Peiping-Mukden Railway, and many who could not get away went into hiding. The police, and even the prison warders, disappeared. The municipal, district and provincial administrations at Mukden completely broke down, and public utility companies for the supply of electric light, water,

ante 1928: that is, Manchurian autonomy with Japanese protection and no Kuomintang. Of course "Manchukuo" is much more of a Japanese protectorate than the pre-1928 régime ever was, but it is not so much of an innovation as it seems; what was really an innovation was the "kuomintangizing" (forgive the word!) of Manchuria from 1929 on.'

¹ According to Lattimore, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-35, the Manchurian frontier brigands were recognized by the local Chinese authorities as having a certain social value as pioneers.

&c., the buses and tramways, and the telephone and telegraph services, ceased to function. Banks and shops kept their doors closed.¹

It was in this vacuum of their own creation that the Japanese proceeded to erect their fictitious 'Manchukuo'. Their method, throughout, was to coerce the most prominent local Chinese notables who proved amenable to coercion into taking action nominally on their personal initiative, but actually at Japanese dictation and under Japanese control. The attitude of the Chinese population of Manchuria towards the Japanese seizure of the country has been indicated above,² and it has been noticed that this attitude was shared by the Chinese who took service in the 'Manchukuo' Police and the 'Manchukuo' Army.³ There is no reason to believe that there were any different feelings towards Japan in the hearts of the Chinese notables and officials who lent their names to 'Manchukuo' in more prominent roles. And if it is asked why these Chinese notables were willing to serve Japanese purposes in this more prominent way, the answer is that they were amenable to coercion in proportion to the wealth and the position which they had to lose.⁴

The ostensible steps by which 'Manchukuo' was brought into being, and its ostensible organization when the process was complete, are described in detail in the *Lytton Report*.⁵ A recapitulation of this authoritative account is beyond the compass of this *Survey*; and it will be sufficient to record the principal stages in the formalities.

The first steps taken were local. A nominal Chinese municipality was erected at Mukden on the 20th October, 1931; and a nominal Chinese provincial government in Liaoning Province (which was now re-invested with its original name of Fengtien) on the 7th November,

¹ *Lytton Report*, p. 88.

² See pp. 455-7, especially the passage there quoted from the *Lytton Report*.

³ See the passage quoted from the *Lytton Report* on p. 451 above.

⁴ For the attitude of the Chinese officials in the Manchukuo service, as it appeared to the Lytton Commission, who were in Manchuria from the 20th April to the 4th June, 1932, see the *Lytton Report*, pp. 107-8. The English student of Far Eastern affairs, who has been quoted above, remarks that 'the French could not find any Germans of eminence to join their Rhineland Separatist movement, whereas the Japanese were able to retain the services of a considerable number of generals and high officials of the former régime: e.g. Hsi Hsia, Chang Ching-hui, Tsang Shih-yi, as well as the ex-Emperor of China, for "Manchukuo". If the Chinese had opposed "Manchukuo" with the same passive resistance as the Germans showed towards the French "Rhineland Republic", the Japanese would have had either to abandon the attempt altogether or else to annex Manchuria outright.'

⁵ *Lytton Report*, pp. 88-101. For the documents in which these steps were announced or embodied, see *Proclamations, Statements and Communications of the Manchukuo Government*, Series No. 1 (Hsinking, i.e. Changchun, October 1932, Department of Foreign Affairs).

1931, in Kirin Province on the 30th September,¹ and in Heilungkiang on the 25th January, 1932. These local structures were then crowned by an All-Manchuria Government which was built in the same fashion out of the same materials. The chief instrument employed in this last stage of the work was a 'Self-Government Guiding Board which had its central office in Mukden' and which 'was stated . . . by reliable witnesses . . . to have been organized, and in large part officered, by Japanese, although its chief was a Chinese, and to have functioned as an organ of the Fourth Department of the Kwantung Army Headquarters'.² Through this organization, a 'Conference of Provincial Governors' was staged at Mukden on the 16th-17th February, 1932; a 'Supreme Administrative Council' or 'North-Eastern Administrative Committee' was set up on the latter day; a 'Declaration of Independence'³ was published on the 18th of the same month; and on the 19th it was decided to establish a republic and to ask Mr. Henry Pu Yi (the *ci-devant* last Manchu Emperor of China, Hsuan Tung, who had been induced by the Japanese to transfer his residence from the Japanese Concession at Tientsin to the Japanese leased territory of Kwantung on the 11th November) to become the Chief Executive. 'Societies for the acceleration of the foundation of the new state' were now conjured into existence in the provinces; resolutions and declarations from the provinces were procured through these agencies; and an 'All-Manchuria Convention' was held at Mukden on the 29th February.⁴ By a resolution conceived in the name of this 'Convention', the 'Provisional Presidency' of the nascent state was conferred upon Mr. Henry Pu Yi; the President Designate yielded to the importunities of a delegation which waited upon him at Port Arthur; and on the 9th March, 1932, at Changchun (which had been selected to be the capital of 'Manchukuo' in place of Mukden, and had been renamed Hsinking), the new state was officially inaugurated with Mr. Pu Yi as Regent. In a declaration of the same date, the Regent undertook to found the policy of the new state upon the basis of 'morality, benevolence and love'.⁵

These were the formalities by which 'Manchukuo' was brought upon the scene. The realities are appreciated in the following terms in the *Lytton Report*:

Since September 18th, 1931, the activities of the Japanese military authorities, in civil as well as in military matters, were marked by

¹ The Japanese found their task easier, and therefore accomplished it more rapidly, in Kirin than in Fengtien.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

³ Text in *Proclamations, &c.*, pp. 1-2.

⁴ See *op. cit.* for a proclamation in the name of the Manchukuo Government, dated the 1st March, 1932.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

essentially political considerations. The progressive military occupation of the Three Eastern provinces removed in succession from the control of the Chinese authorities the towns of Tsitsihar, Chinchow and Harbin, finally all the important towns of Manchuria; and, following each occupation, the civil administration was re-organized. It is clear that the Independent Movement, which had never been heard of in Manchuria before September 1931, was only made possible by the presence of the Japanese troops.

A group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired, . . . conceived, organized and carried through this movement, as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of September 18th.

With this object, they made use of the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals, and took advantage of certain minorities among the inhabitants, who had grievances against the former administration.

It is also clear that the Japanese General Staff realized from the start, or at least in a short time, the use which could be made of such an autonomy movement. In consequence, they provided assistance and gave direction to the organizers of the movement. The evidence received from all sources has satisfied the Commission that, while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of 'Manchukuo', the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which, in our judgement, the new State could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials both civil and military.

For this reason, the present régime cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement.¹

This authoritative judgment in regard to the part played by the Japanese in the establishment of 'Manchukuo' is confirmed by the rôle which was being played in the sequel by Japanese officials and advisers on the evidence of the same distinguished neutral observers, who visited Manchuria from the 20th April, 1932, to the 4th June.

In the 'Government of Manchukuo', Japanese officials are prominent, and Japanese advisers are attached to all important Departments. Although the Premier and his Ministers are all Chinese, the heads of the various Boards of General Affairs, which, in the organization of the new State, exercise the greatest measure of actual power, are Japanese. At first they were designated as advisers, but more recently those holding the most important posts have been made full Government officials on the same basis as the Chinese. In the Central Government alone, not including those in local governments or in the War Office and the military forces or in Government enterprises, nearly 200 Japanese are 'Manchukuo' officials.

Japanese control the Board of General Affairs and the Legislative and Advisory Bureaux, which in practice constitute a Premier's Office, the General Affairs Department in the Ministries and in the Provincial

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

Governments, and the Self-Government Directing Committees in the Districts, and the police departments in the Provinces of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. In most bureaux, moreover, there are Japanese advisers, counsellors and secretaries.

There are also many Japanese in the railway offices and in the Central Bank. In the Supervisory Council, Japanese hold the posts of Chief of the Bureau of General Affairs, Chief of the Control Bureau, and Chief of the Auditing Board. In the Legislative Council, the Chief Secretary is a Japanese. Finally, some of the most important officials of the Regent are Japanese, including the Chief of the Office of Internal Affairs and the Commander of the Regent's bodyguard.¹

It will be seen that 'Manchukuo' was in reality a tool of Japanese forging which was being wielded by Japanese hands for the furtherance of Japanese policies on the Continent. These policies can be summed up under two heads: first, to drive a wedge between the non-Chinese communities in Manchuria and the Chinese majority; in the second place, to lay Japanese hands upon all public utilities and administrative organizations in the occupied territory.

The first of these policies is apparent in the geographical re-organization of the country. 'Manchukuo' was officially divided into five provinces and two special districts. In addition to Liaoning (re-named Fengtien), Kirin and Heilungkiang, the domain of 'Manchukuo' included in theory the fourth Chinese north-eastern province of Jehol (though this was not yet under Japanese military occupation, but was still *de facto* under the rule of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang). The fifth province of 'Manchukuo' (called Hsi-an or Hsingan) was erected out of the Mongol enclaves, and it theoretically included the domains of the Chosatu and Chaotu Mongol Leagues in Jehol, as well as those of the Cherim League in Fengtien and of the Hulunbuir League in Heilungkiang. The two special districts were the former 'Special Administrative District' which had once been the Russian Railway Zone, and a new district carved out of Kirin Province in the region of Chientao, which adjoined the northern border of Korea and which was inhabited by a predominantly Korean population.² How far the political purposes of the Japanese in thus re-drawing the administrative map of Manchuria were likely to be achieved is a question that must be examined in the light of the respective attitudes of the non-Chinese communities in Manchuria towards the Japanese occupation.³

In any case, this Japanese policy of playing off the non-Chinese

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 99.

² It may be added that Chientao also lay athwart the route of the still uncompleted railway from Changchun to the Korean port of Rashin on the Sea of Japan.

³ For these attitudes, see section (ii) (c) above.

against the Chinese elements in the population of Manchuria was of secondary importance compared with the policy of using 'Manchukuo' as a tool for bringing the whole life of the country under Japanese control. This second policy, which was put in hand from the beginning of the occupation was pushed forward energetically thereafter in every sphere.¹ The methods by which control was established over banks and business enterprises, over the railways and the Customs and Salt Administrations, and over the postal, telegraph and telephone services are described in some detail in the *Lytton Report*² and cannot, for reasons of space, be recapitulated here. The nature and the extent of the Japanese control which was thus established over Manchuria, through the instrumentality of the 'Manchukuo', was summed up by the Lytton Commission in the following terms:

As regards the 'Government' and the public services, although the titular heads of the Departments are Chinese residents in Manchuria, the main political and administrative power rests in the hands of Japanese officials and advisers. The political and administrative organization of the 'Government' is such as to give to these officials and advisers opportunities, not merely of giving technical advice, but also of actually controlling and directing the administration. They are doubtless not under the orders of the Tokyo Government, and their policy has not always coincided with the official policy either of the Japanese Government or of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army. But in the case of all-important problems, these officials and advisers, some of whom were able to act more or less independently in the first days of the new organization, have been constrained more and more to follow the direction of Japanese official authority. This authority, in fact, by reason of the occupation of the country by its troops, by the dependence of the 'Manchukuo Government' on those troops for the maintenance of its authority both internally and externally, in consequence, too, of the more and more important rôle entrusted to the South Manchuria Railway Company in the management of the railways under the jurisdiction of the 'Manchukuo Government', and finally by the presence of its consuls, as liaison agents, in the most important urban centres, possesses in every contingency the means of exercising an irresistible pressure. The liaison between the 'Manchukuo Government' and Japanese official authority is still further emphasized by the recent appointment of a special ambassador, not officially accredited, but resident in the capital of Manchuria, exercising in his capacity of Governor-General of the Kwantung Leased Territory a control over the South Manchuria Railway Company and concentrating in the same

¹ For the far-reaching progress on the road towards their ultimate objective in Manchuria, which the Japanese had achieved by so early a date as the 17th December, 1931, see a despatch from the correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian* in Manchuria which was published on the 9th January, 1932.

² pp. 96-105.

office the authority of a diplomatic representative, the head of the Consular Service, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Occupation.¹

The appointment of General Muto to this combination of offices was in fact approved by the Government of Tokyo on the 26th July, 1932; and his installation duly took place on the 8th August. In a letter of the 27th August, which was addressed to the Lytton Commission by their Japanese assessor, it was announced that General Muto had left Tokyo for Manchuria on the 20th; that, on his arrival, he would 'commence negotiations for the conclusion of a fundamental treaty concerning the establishment of friendly relations between Japan and Manchuria'; and that the Japanese Government would regard the conclusion of this treaty 'as a formal recognition of "Manchukuo"'.²

A public agitation for the recognition of 'Manchukuo' by the Japanese Government had been on foot in Japan since the erection of the so-called independent Government at Changchun; but the Japanese Government had gone through the form of holding their hand until they could profess to have satisfied themselves that 'Manchukuo' was both *bona fide* independent and *de facto* effective. In February 1932, the Japanese Government had informed the British Ambassador in Tokyo officially that 'if, as' was 'probably true, an independent Government' had 'been proclaimed by the Chinese in Mukden, the Japanese Government was no more likely to recognize it than any other Government'.³ And when 'Manchukuo' asked the Powers for recognition in a circular communication of the 12th March, 1932,⁴ the Japanese Government replied on the 21st with a mere acknowledgement of receipt. On the other hand, the Japanese Government's decision to accord this recognition to 'Manchukuo' at some future date which was not yet fixed was announced by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Uchida, on the 18th July (immediately after a visit which the Lytton Commission had paid to Japan on the 4th-15th July, when Count Uchida had been one of the persons with whom they had conferred). This intimation was repeated by Count Uchida in a speech which he delivered before the Diet at Tokyo on the 25th August, in which

¹ *Lytton Report*, p. 106. For an anticipation of this judgment, see a despatch of the 26th April, 1932, from the correspondent of *The New York Times* in Manchuria, which was published on the 27th April, 1932, and also a longer despatch from the same correspondent which was written on the 21st April, 1932, and published on the 23rd May.

² Statement made by Sir John Simon on the 22nd February, 1932, in the House of Commons at Westminster in answer to a parliamentary question.

³ For this communication, see p. 554 below.

he went so far as to say that the Japanese Government regarded the recognition of 'Manchukuo' as being 'the sole effective means of solving the Manchurian problem'.¹ In the same speech, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that the Japanese people could 'never consent' to 'a solution by patching up matters for the moment by investing China Proper in one form or another with authority over Manchuria' on the lines of 'a plan' which was 'being considered in certain quarters' (i.e. by the Lytton Commission).

After this, the creation of a diplomatic *fait accompli* on the Japanese Government's part was no longer delayed. On the 13th September, 1932, at Tokyo, the draft text of a protocol to be signed by representatives of Japan and 'Manchukuo' was approved by the Japanese Privy Council in the presence of the Emperor of Japan; and on the 15th this instrument was duly signed at Changchun by General Muto of the one part and Cheng Hsiao-hsu, 'Prime Minister of Manchukuo', of the other. The essential paragraphs read as follows:

Whereas Japan has recognized the fact that Manchukuo, in accordance with the free will of its inhabitants, has organized and established itself as an independent State; and

Whereas Manchukuo has declared its intention of abiding by all international engagements entered into by China in so far as they are applicable to Manchukuo:

Now the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo have, for the purpose of establishing a perpetual relationship of good neighbourhood between Japan and Manchukuo, each respecting the territorial rights of the other, and also in order to secure the peace of the Far East, agreed as follows:

1. Manchukuo shall confirm and respect, in so far as no agreement to the contrary shall be made between Japan and Manchukuo in the future, all rights and interests possessed by Japan or her subjects within the territory of Manchukuo by virtue of Sino-Japanese treaties, agreements, or other arrangements or Sino-Japanese contracts, private as well as public;

2. Japan and Manchukuo, recognizing that any threat to the territory or to the peace and order of either of the High Contracting Parties constitutes at the same time a threat to the safety and existence of the

¹ This proposition was elucidated by Count Uchida as follows:

'With regard to the question of finding a solution for the Manchurian problem, the Japanese Government attach the greatest importance to the following two points:

'First, that, in seeking a satisfactory solution we should aim at the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the Manchurian people, at adequate guarantees for the rights and interests of Japan, at prevention—in order to make Manchuria a safe place to live in, alike for Manchurians and foreigners—of any recrudescence of erstwhile anti-foreign policy and movements, and, finally, at bringing not only stability to Manchuria, but permanent peace to the Far East. Second, that such solution should be effected by rejecting all sentimental propositions and abstract theories and arrived at upon the solid basis of realities of the situation.'

other, agree to cooperate in the maintenance of their national security; it being understood that such Japanese forces as may be necessary for this purpose shall be stationed in Manchukuo.

The present Protocol shall come into effect from the date of its signature.¹

The Japanese Government's motives for taking this particular step at this juncture are revealed in the passage quoted from Count Uchida's speech of the 25th August, 1932, in which the Japanese Foreign Minister referred to the Lytton Commission's forthcoming proposals. In deliberately forestalling the publication of the *Lytton Report* by clinching the erection of 'Manchukuo' through a diplomatic *fait accompli* from which Japan could hardly recede without some 'loss of face', the Japanese Government were, as it were, 'nailing their colours to the mast' as a preliminary to 'going into action' at Geneva. They were intentionally creating a state of affairs in which they would not be able to abandon their puppet without evoking an overwhelming opposition in the hearts of the Japanese people. Within these limits, the Japanese Government's motives are easily discerned; but there is no such obvious answer to the previous question why it was that the Japanese had elected in the first instance, and continued to the bitter end, to play out this elaborate political farce.

Assuming that the ultimate aim of the Japanese was to make themselves masters of Manchuria, it is not immediately evident that this aim was being served by the erection of 'Manchukuo'; for it was not the fiction of 'Manchukuo' that was placing the realities of power in Manchuria in Japanese hands. On the contrary, the power to play the farce of 'Manchukuo' on the Manchurian stage, as well as the power to seize control over the Manchurian railways and Salt Gabelle and Customs and banks and business enterprises, had been acquired by the Japanese *manu militari*. The military conquest and occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese Army was the real foundation of the Japanese position in Manchuria in 1932; and the whole world was aware that this was the fact. The Japanese were apparently prepared to defy the world's opinion and to risk the consequences of the world's disapproval in order to keep their ill-gotten gains. Why, then, did they not simply proclaim, out of hand, the annexation of Manchuria to the Japanese Empire instead of persisting in a farce which nobody in the world was taking seriously? An outright annexation would hardly have been a grosser violation of

¹ An official Japanese apology for this protocol was published simultaneously. The text of the apology will be found in *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th September, 1932.

Chinese sovereign rights in Manchuria than the denial of these rights which was involved in the erection and recognition of 'Manchukuo'. On the point of principle, the breach of international law was equally beyond condonation in whichever of the two alternative forms it was effected. And, on the point of fact, the Japanese insistence that the farce was sober earnest, and that 'Manchukuo' was a genuine expression of 'the general will' of the Manchurian people, was calculated to exasperate the public opinion of the world even more sorely than a cynical avowal on Japan's part that she was doing what she was doing by sheer violence. How, then, is this Japanese policy of 'Manchukuo' to be explained?

One explanation is to be found in the native Japanese political tradition; for a study of Japanese constitutional history shows a persistent tendency for sovereignty *de jure* and sovereignty *de facto* to be divorced from one another and to find their way into different hands. Indeed, in Japan this divorce between constitutional form and political reality had been carried to even greater lengths than it had ever been carried in England, which was the classic home of constitutional fictions in the West. Theoretically, in Japan, as in England, the reigning sovereign of the dynasty was a being of divine descent¹ who was the source of all sovereign power. In practice this sovereignty had been delegated since an earlier date in Japan than in England. Sometimes the holder of the delegated power had been a shogun who paraded on the forefront of the stage—at Kamakura or at Yedo or even in the Imperial Capital of Kyoto itself—while the juridically sovereign Emperor remained discreetly in the background. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the juridical source of sovereignty was so utterly eclipsed by the actual holder of it that, until the eve of the Imperial Restoration of A.D. 1868, the existence of the Imperial Court at Kyoto was hardly realized in the West, and it was commonly assumed that the potentate who governed Japan from Yedo was the lawful sovereign of the country. At other periods in Japanese history the same constitutional comedy was performed with the postures and positions of the performers reversed—the divine being who was the nominal fountain-head of sovereignty being thrust into the forefront of the stage, while the actual holder of power pulled the strings from a covert in the background. This was the

¹ The reigning Emperor of Japan, Hirohito, was mythically descended from the Japanese Sun-Goddess Ama-Terasu; King George V of England was mythically descended from the Teutonic weather-god Woden through the two equine divinities Hengist and Horsa. The English sovereign had the advantage over the Japanese of being nearer to his divine ancestors by a considerable number of generations.

situation in the age when Japan was ruled *de facto* by 'the Cloistered Emperors', who only began to govern when they ceased to reign in virtue of abdicating from the Imperial Throne in favour of their sons, and then retiring into a monastery whence they dictated the policy of their successors in the Imperial Office, who were constrained by the obligation of filial obedience to reign without governing. In essence this régime was revived after the Restoration of A.D. 1868, when the Imperial Power was restored, and was supplemented, *more occidentali*, by a Cabinet and a Diet, in order that the whole of this constitutional apparatus might be controlled in the last resort by 'the Elder Statesmen' who had brought about the Restoration. It was not unnatural that this traditional method of constitutional procedure should be applied by the Japanese to their foreign conquests. They had in fact attempted to govern Korea in this indirect fashion in the first instance, after their victory over Russia in 1905 had brought Korea within their grasp. It was only after five years' trial of indirect rule, from 1905 to 1910, that the Japanese Government had been constrained to annex Korea to the Japanese Empire outright owing to the difficulty of governing through native puppets a nation which was so unanimously hostile to Japanese domination. In erecting and recognizing 'Manchukuo', the Japanese were again attempting to apply their traditional native method of government to a foreign conquest.

Thus the political farce of 'Manchukuo' can be explained in the light of the native Japanese constitutional tradition to a very large extent; but it is probable that it must also be attributed in part to an anxiety to imitate Western behaviour—an anxiety which had become an *idée fixe* in Japanese minds since the beginning of the Meiji era. A candid Western historian cannot ignore this probability when he remembers how painstaking and how literal the Japanese manner of imitating Western fashions was apt to be, and when he considers that the policy of constitutional humbug was just as prominent in the colonial history of the modern Western World as it had been in the domestic history of medieval Japan.

Was it not Western Imperialism that had coined the word 'protectorate' as a euphemism for 'annexation'? And had not this constitutional fiction served its Western inventors in good stead? Was not this the method by which the Government of the French Republic had stepped into the shoes of the Sultan of Morocco, and by which the British Crown had transferred the possession of vast tracts of land in East Africa from native African to adventitious European hands? And if the ex-victors in the General War of 1914-18 should

protest that, since the War, they had experienced a conviction of sin and had replaced the tarnished word 'protectorate' by the brand-new word 'mandate', would not the Japanese be able to cite American and Russian, as well as German, opinion in support of the view that this latest change of name had introduced a distinction without a difference?¹

Moreover, a Japanese apologist might discover precedents for almost every use that Japan had made of 'Manchukuo' in Western post-war as well as pre-war practice. Conceivably, for example, it might be considered hypocritical on the part of the Japanese to have connived at the action of 'the Manchukuo Government' in seizing the China Maritime Customs House at Dairen,² and then to have disclaimed all responsibility for this breach of a Sino-Japanese agreement on the ground that 'the problem did not concern Japan but was an issue solely between "Manchukuo" on the one hand and the Government of China and its Dairen Commissioner on the other'.³ But if this incident was to be judged on the 'practical' basis of precedent and not by the merely 'idealistic' touchstone of Right-

¹ There are also certain nineteenth-century American precedents that have been suggested to the writer of this *Survey* by an American student of international affairs:

'You might cite the creation of a West Florida Republic in 1810 by citizens of the United States, the creation of the Republic of Texas in 1836, and a similar attempt by an American naval officer to create a Republic of California in 1842, as other illustrations of Western methods now being copied by Japan. In fact, the Mexican Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lucas Alaman, in a report addressed to the Mexican Congress in 1830, analysed the "American method" of expansion in terms which might be precisely applied to the Japanese methods in Manchuria. This quotation is given in Carl Russell Fish: *American Diplomacy* (New York, 1923, Henry Holt and Company), pp. 243 *seqq.*'

² 'Until 7th June, the Dairen Customs revenue was remitted to Shanghai at intervals of three or four days, but, under date of June 9th, the "Manchukuo Government" gave notice that these remittances should no longer be made. When no further funds reached Shanghai, the Inspector-General of Customs took up the matter by telegraph with the Japanese Commissioner at Dairen. As a result, the Commissioner refused to send on the Customs receipts on the ground that the chief of the Foreign Section of the Government of the Japanese Leased Territory had advised him that the remittance of the Customs revenue might severely affect Japanese interests. The Inspector-General therefore, on June 24th, dismissed the Dairen Commissioner for insubordination. The "Manchukuo Government", on June 27th, appointed the dismissed Commissioner and the members of his staff as "Manchukuo" officials to serve in their former positions.' (The *Lytton Report*, p. 104). The China Maritime Customs station at Dairen was on a different footing from the stations in the territory over which the 'Manchukuo' Government claimed jurisdiction, since Dairen was part of the Japanese Leased Territory of Kwantung. The Dairen Customs were controlled by the Chinese Maritime Customs Administration in virtue of a special Sino-Japanese agreement of the 30th May, 1907.

³ The *Lytton Report*, *loc. cit.*

and-Wrong, was it not open to the Japanese to point out that they were here following, with almost pedantic exactitude, a precedent which had been set by the French in 1923-4 when they had engineered the fictitious 'Separatist Movement' in the Rhineland in the hope of achieving through this instrument a breach of the Peace Treaty of Versailles which they preferred not to perpetrate with French hands?¹ Though the Japanese failed to make the most of these Western precedents in stating their case for performing the farce of 'Manchukuo', it may legitimately be conjectured that Western as well as Japanese precedents had in fact suggested, and commended, this line of policy to Japanese minds.

These considerations go far towards explaining 'Manchukuo'. Yet, when all is said, it is difficult altogether to comprehend the state of mind in which a piece of make-believe is obstinately defended as being genuinely what it purports to be, long after its fraudulency has been conclusively exposed to the public eye. It can only be pointed out that this curious state of mind was at any rate not peculiar to the Japanese. It was also displayed, in this self-same post-war age, by the French, when they protested, as we have recalled, that 'the Separatist Movement' in the Rhineland was a spontaneous expression of Rhenish aspirations with which the French Army of Occupation had nothing to do. And it was likewise displayed by the Russians, when they protested that the Government of the U.S.S.R. had nothing to do with the Third International.² The state of mind which is illustrated in each of these instances must be regarded as one of those relics of an 'archaic' psychology which lingered on in the field of international relations and which constituted one of the most formidable obstacles to the progress of civilization in this particular sphere of social life.

Additional Note

On the question of the motives of the Japanese in erecting 'Manchukuo', the English student quoted above comments as follows:

The explanations you give are wholly convincing as far as they go, but I think you underestimate the practical advantages of the 'puppet State' device for the purpose it serves. The device may be only a legal fiction and the state of mind it implies a relic of 'archaic' psychology; but then, as long as most men retain this 'archaic' psychological make-up and live as much by legal fictions as they do, it will be good practical politics to use such devices. Tactically there is a very great difference

¹ For this so-called 'Separatist Movement' in the Rhineland under the French military occupation, see the *Survey for 1924*, Part II A, section (iii).

² See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C, section (i).

between direct annexation and promotion of a bogus independence movement, because the latter type of policy throws the whole burden of proof on the other side. If a new State is in being, it is up to its opponents to prove that it was not self-determined, and the issue is thus transferred from the realm of admitted fact—for in a case of annexation there is no question but that territory has been taken—to a sphere of infinite detail in which rigorous disproof of the thesis advanced—that of a spontaneous independence movement—is very difficult, if not impossible. It is true that the Lytton Commission were unanimous in coming to the conclusion that Manchukuo was bogus, that the League has adopted their view, and that nobody is really taken in by this 'self-determination'; nevertheless, Japan can still make a case, which is good enough at any rate for her own public, by disputing the verdict on the question of fact, which by its nature is not capable of being irrefutably determined. If a separatist movement in any country created a new state *de facto*, it would sooner or later be recognized on precedents going back to Canning's recognition of the South American republics, without this being held to run counter to international law. For a *de facto* separation to be ruled illegal and unrecognizable, it is necessary to prove that the separatist movement was entirely fictitious and due to the machinations of a foreign Power. In this case the proof consists in the fact that the members of the Lytton Commission were convinced, mainly by correspondence from unnamed persons, that there was no Chinese support for the movement, all evidence given publicly being discounted owing to the presence of Japanese and the exposure of witnesses to intimidation. I do not suggest at all that the Commission were wrong or that there *was* any general Chinese support for 'Manchukuo', but I do say that the sort of evidence on which the denial is based is of an unsatisfactory nature, and lies open to retorts from the Japanese side which are at any rate effective for Japanese home consumption. This is of primary importance, for in so far as an Imperialist Government can persuade its own public of the rightness of its action, it can make a stand against 'world opinion' with good hope that the latter will give way sooner than the former. Had Japan declared that she would annex Manchuria, it would not have been possible for the average Japanese to disbelieve in his country's aggressiveness, and none but the 100-per cent. mailed-fisters would have approved the policy; as it is, Japanese generally are able to persuade themselves that they have been misunderstood or misrepresented, and that the findings of the Lytton Commission on Manchukuo are quite arbitrary and unwarranted. Japanese opinion, even of the more intelligent sort, is not impressed by the *Lytton Report*, and holds that, if it has been adopted by the League, that is chiefly on *a priori* grounds or for the sake of a gesture. The Japanese maintain further that, as the members of the Commission did not know any Chinese, they were necessarily in the hands of their expert advisers who, as experts on China, tended to be pro-Chinese.

With regard to the Lytton Commission's statement that there never was any independence movement in Manchuria before the Japanese Army overran the country, the Japanese point out that Chang Tso-lin's Government performed all the functions of a sovereign state, including

the making of regular treaties with foreign Powers (e.g., the Sino-Russian Agreement of 1924 made by Chang Tso-lin after he had explicitly declined to recognize the treaty previously made with Russia by the then internationally recognized Government of China), and that Chang Hsüeh-liang's policy of submission to Nanking in return for powers in North China was strongly opposed by a party among his generals, notably by Yang Yu-ting, his father's Chief of Staff, who was murdered by Chang for that reason. The Japanese claim that, with the forcible ejection of Chang, Manchuria merely reverted to its pre-1929 status, only that this was now regularized by an assertion of *de jure* sovereignty.

As for the *Lytton Report's* recommendations, a Japanese criticism runs: 'The Commissioners themselves say that it would not do to restore the Chang régime. But if the people are in favour of it, why not? Surely one cannot deny the will of the people simply because it may be inconvenient! And if the people are not in favour of the Chang régime, what becomes of the argument that Japanese machinations are the only reason why it was expelled?' (*Contemporary Japan*, Dec. 1932.)

I do not mean this as a justification for Japanese action, but I think it is important to realize how 'Manchukuo' has really complicated the issue, which would have been so straightforward if Japan had merely annexed the country. We may be quite sure that 'Manchukuo' is a fake; but there is just enough reality in it to make the *Lytton Report* controversial and enable most Japanese to salve their consciences!

The American student of international affairs, who has been quoted above, makes the same point independently in his correspondence with the writer:

I think perhaps you do not do complete justice to the occasional value of fictions as devices of politics and law. I have in mind the chapter on fictions in Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law*. I might also refer to Bagehot on the 'Dignified' Institutions of the British Constitution as opposed to the 'Efficient' Institutions. Fictions, it seems to me, have a very definite value in adjusting human emotions to change, a value which is inherent in the characteristics of human nature. They also, I think, sometimes have a rational value as artificial aids to thinking. Thus, while the instances of the particular uses of fictions which you suggest would perhaps warrant your language, it seems to me that the general castigation is a little too energetic.

A further consideration is suggested by the same American commentator:

I think there is an economic explanation for the creation of 'Manchukuo' rather than annexation of the territory. The Japanese industrialists, who are for the time being somewhat overwhelmed by the military and agrarian groups, obviously do not wish to have completely free trade with Manchuria, as that would mean a great advantage to industrial enterprises set up in Manchuria as against their own industrial enterprises in Japan proper; and consequently they wish Manchuria to be a colonial area outside of the Japanese domestic market. This perhaps could be more easily effected by keeping Manchuria as an 'independent'

state. On the other hand, the military and agrarian groups in Japan probably wish to incorporate the territory eventually. A struggle between these two groups in Japan seems to me not unlikely, but for the time being the maintenance of 'Manchukuo' may be a sop offered by the militarists to the industrialists.

An English commentator, who was resident in the Far East at the time, suggests yet another consideration that may have been in Japanese minds. The Japanese probably could not, and knew that they could not, find anything approaching the requisite number of Japanese nationals with the proper character and experience for staffing an all-Japanese administration of Manchuria.

(iii) The Japanese Naval and Military Operations at Shanghai.

(a) THE IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS AT SHANGHAI OF THE JAPANESE OPERATIONS

IN the section of the preceding volume¹ in which an account was given of the Chinese reaction, in Chinese territory inside the Great Wall, to the Japanese action in Manchuria during the three and a half months ending on the 31st December, 1931, it was indicated that the principal form which the Chinese reaction took was the organization of an anti-Japanese boycott; that the boycott inevitably found its headquarters in Shanghai; and that it was for this reason that Shanghai became the scene of the new chapter of the Sino-Japanese conflict which opened on the 28th January, 1932. The nature of the boycott and its effect on Japanese interests were also described in the preceding volume,² and in this place it need only be said that, as the weeks passed with no relaxation of the movement and with no possibility of obtaining redress through the Courts,³ the 'demands'

¹ *The Survey for 1931*, Part IV, section (iii) (3).

² *Op. cit., loc. cit.* In the third week of January 1932 a survey issued by the Chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai stated that the total loss resulting from the boycott to Japanese industrial and commercial interests up to date was approximately 185,000,000 taels (about £18,000,000). In Shanghai alone the Japanese products owned by Chinese and placed under the seal of the boycott movement were valued at 60,000,000 taels. These figures did not take into account the thousands of tons of Japanese merchandise held up in Japan, nor the contributory losses, directly or indirectly attributable to the boycott, which were suffered by Japanese internal commerce.

³ On the eve of the crisis of the 28th-29th January, 1932, the Shanghai Municipal Council was reported to be considering independent measures for enforcing the law, in view of the fact that pickets charged with the illegal seizure of goods within the boundaries of the Settlement were invariably acquitted by the Chinese Courts. (For the transfer to Chinese jurisdiction of the Provisional Court in the International Settlement and the Mixed Court in the French Settlement at Shanghai, see the *Survey for 1929*, pp. 325-30 and 334-5; and the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 427-8.)

made by Japanese nationals in Shanghai 'to their Government to take direct action to put an end to an intolerable situation became insistent'.¹ While the Government at Tokyo were considering in what manner they should respond to these demands,² the state of tension at Shanghai was becoming daily more acute, and the danger was becoming correspondingly greater that the Japanese on the spot would take the law into their own hands.

The 'spirit of bitter hostility' which had developed between Chinese and Japanese at Shanghai manifested itself during the first three weeks of January in every possible way. The Japanese were specially 'infuriated' by 'derogatory references to the Emperor of Japan' which were contained in an article published by a Chinese newspaper on the 9th January.³ 'Incidents of violence' were of frequent occurrence, and a more than usually serious incident of this kind, which took place on the 18th January, proved to be the spark that fired the train. On that day 'five Japanese, some of them being

¹ Unless otherwise stated, the words and passages in quotation marks in the following account of the situation at Shanghai up to the 20th February are taken from one of the reports of the Consular Committee of Inquiry which was set up at Shanghai at the request of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations (see below, p. 562). The first report, dated the 6th February, 1932, dealt with the background and antecedents of the Japanese action of the 28th January and with the events of the 28th-31st January. The second report covered the period 31st January to 12th February; and the third report described the situation on the 18th-20th February. These three reports were published as annexes to the minutes of the sixty-sixth session of the League Council; as the separate League publication *VII. Political. 1932. VII. 4*; and as the British White Papers *Cmd. 4021* and *Cmd. 4040*. These reports of the Consular Committee, which represent the most authoritative description of the events in Shanghai from neutral eye-witnesses, have been used as the basis of the record of events given in this *Survey*, but, owing to the inevitable brevity of telegraphic reports, it has occasionally proved necessary to supplement the information given by the Consuls from other sources. (In quoting these reports, prepositions and articles and other unessential words omitted in the telegraphed versions have been supplied for convenience in reading.)

In response to a further request from the Secretary-General, the Consuls submitted a fourth report to the Special Session of the League Assembly. This report, which was dated the 5th March, covered the period 20th February to 3rd March. It was printed in the *Records of the Special Session of the Assembly* (pp. 204-5) and in the British White Paper *Cmd. 4040* of 1932.

² On the 8th January, 1932, an 'official spokesman' at Tokyo gave to representatives of the foreign press a forecast of certain 'more decisive steps' which were contemplated by Japan if the boycott continued. These steps included, apparently, a blockade of the principal Chinese ports as well as the landing of Japanese marines. On the 4th January, 100 marines had already been landed at Foochow, and three destroyers had been ordered to proceed to that port, in consequence of an anti-Japanese outbreak on the previous day, in the course of which a Japanese teacher and his wife had been killed, and two naval officers had been assaulted.

³ *Cmd. 4021*, p. 1.

Buddhist monks, whilst passing in front of the Sanye Towel Factory in Chapei, were attacked by Chinese, some of the assailants being probably members of the organized anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps. The Chinese police arrived too late to arrest the culpables. Two Japanese were seriously wounded¹ and one of them, a Buddhist monk, succumbed to his wounds on the 24th January. On the 20th January, in reprisal for this incident of the 18th, 'about 50 members of the Japanese Youth Protection Society, armed with knives and clubs, proceeded to the Sanye Towel Factory and set the building on fire. On the way home they clashed with the Settlement Municipal Police.'² Three Chinese policemen were seriously wounded in this affray and three Japanese were shot by the police. One policeman and one Japanese died subsequently from the wounds which they had received.

On the same day (the 20th January), a 'mass meeting of Japanese residents which was held at the Japanese Club protested against the attack against the monks and against disparaging references by the press to the Japanese Emperor. The meeting passed a resolution asking the Japanese Government to send war vessels and military units for the complete suppression of the anti-Japanese movement. About half of them proceeded first to the Japanese Consulate and then to the naval headquarters in order to present the resolution. After seeing the Japanese Consul, who asked them to leave the matter with him, they clashed with the International Settlement police on the way to naval headquarters.'³

During the afternoon of the 20th January, the Chinese Mayor of Greater Shanghai, Mr. Wu Te-chen, received from the Japanese Consul-General, Mr. Murai, a communication containing five demands. The first three, which related to the incident of the 18th January, required a formal apology by the Mayor, the immediate arrest of the assailants, and the payment to the injured persons of an indemnity and the cost of their treatment in hospital. The last two of the demands were of wider scope. The Mayor was required to make himself responsible for the 'adequate control of the anti-Japanese movement' and for the 'immediate dissolution of all anti-Japanese organizations actively engaged in fostering hostile feelings and anti-Japanese riots and agitation.'⁴ These demands placed Wu Te-chen in an unenviable position. He could expect little support or direction

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* One member of the police force, a British national on probation, was wounded. The Japanese authorities expressed regret for this incident to the Municipal Council and 'seven Japanese subsequently surrendered to the Japanese authorities'.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

from Nanking, where the Government was virtually in a state of paralysis;¹ and, since the events of the last few days had fanned Chinese, as well as Japanese, passions to a white heat, if he yielded to Japanese pressure, he would risk an explosion of Chinese mob anger which might precipitate a catastrophe no less serious than that which was threatened by Japanese 'direct action'. Moreover, even if all the Japanese allegations regarding the direct official inspiration of the boycott had been proved to be true, the movement had long since passed the point at which action by the authorities could bring it to a sudden halt.

On the following morning (the 21st January) Wu Te-chen informed Mr. Murai that he was ready to consider the first three points, but that he would have difficulty in complying with the last two. Thereupon, Rear-Admiral Koichi Shiozawa, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters, took the first step along the path which was to lead to the destruction of Chapei and to the 'war in everything but name'² which raged in and around Shanghai for some five weeks. During the afternoon of the 21st January a communication from Admiral Shiozawa was published in the press³ stating that 'should the Mayor of Greater Shanghai fail to give a satisfactory reply to the Japanese and fulfil their demands without delay, the Admiral was determined to take the necessary steps in order to protect Japanese Imperial rights and interests'.⁴ The Admiral did not make it clear what precise steps he had in mind, and speculations regarding his intentions intensified the general feeling of uncertainty and insecurity.⁵

During the next few days rumours were current that the Chinese troops in Chapei (the Cantonese Nineteenth Route Army)⁶ were being strongly reinforced, but at the same time the Mayor, 'who had expressed to neutrals his intention of making every possible concession to avoid clashes, was trying to induce the leaders of the local

¹ See section (i) of this part of the present volume.

² Quoted from the statement made by Mr. J. H. Thomas at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on the 2nd February, 1932. (See p. 563 below.)

³ Copies were also sent to the authorities in the International Settlement and to the Public Safety Bureau of Greater Shanghai.

⁴ *Cmd.* 4021, p. 4.

⁵ At one moment the press credited Admiral Shiozawa with the intention of seizing the Chinese municipal buildings, the headquarters of the Kuomintang, the Kiangwan Arsenal and other vital points; at the next moment, he was reported to be hesitating between the occupation of the Whangpoo forts and the native city of Shanghai and the declaration of a 'peaceful blockade' against Chinese shipping.

⁶ For the reason for the presence of these Cantonese troops at Shanghai, see the *Survey for 1931*, p. 414.

Chinese to stop the anti-Japanese boycott associations.¹ In a statement to the press on the 27th January, Wu Te-chen committed himself to the suppression of illegal activities and appealed to law-abiding citizens to co-operate with him. As a result of his efforts the [? anti-Japanese boycott] 'association was closed and various offices were seized by Chinese police'² during the night of the 27th/28th January.

In the meantime Japanese naval reinforcements had arrived at Shanghai. On the 21st January (that is, on the day on which Admiral Shiozawa's threat to take direct action was made public) a cruiser, an aircraft carrier and four destroyers were ordered to Shanghai. These vessels, which arrived on the 24th, brought the number of warships under Admiral Shiozawa's command at Shanghai up to ten, and the number of marines available for landing parties up to about 1,300. Further reinforcements, consisting of a cruiser and twelve destroyers, were despatched on the 26th and arrived at dawn on the 28th. The marines at Admiral Shiozawa's disposal then numbered about 3,000.

On the 24th January (the day on which the Buddhist monk who had been wounded on the 18th died in hospital and the first Japanese reinforcements arrived), Mr. Murai notified Wu Te-chen 'that if no reply was forthcoming within a reasonable time or if the reply was unsatisfactory, the Japanese Government reserved the right to take action as required by the circumstances'.³ So far, no time limit for the Chinese reply had been fixed; but on the 27th January Mr. Murai informed Wu Te-chen that, 'without fixing a definite day', he would expect a preliminary reply 'by the 28th January'.⁴ Later in the same day Wu Te-chen received yet another communication from Mr. Murai declaring 'that he must have a satisfactory reply to the demands by 6 p.m. next day, failing which the Japanese would take the necessary steps in order to enforce them'.⁵ Thus, on the evening of the 27th January, the Chinese were faced with a definite ultimatum expiring at 6 p.m. on the 28th January, but the nature of the sanctions which the Japanese intended to take in case of non-compliance with their demands had not been made clear.

At 7.30 a.m. on the 28th January Admiral Shiozawa 'notified the

¹ The first report of the Consular Committee also mentioned that Wu Te-chen tried to persuade the leaders to 'agree to delete the words "anti-Japanese" from the title of the other body, these words being considered by the Japanese as a national offence'. The context does not make it clear what this 'other body' was.

² *Cmd.* 4021, p. 4.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

commanders of the other national defence forces¹ that he proposed to take action on the following morning if no satisfactory reply had been received from the Chinese. The Municipal Council of the International Settlement held a meeting during the morning and decided that a state of emergency should be declared as from 4 p.m.² The reasons which led the Municipal Council to make this decision were subsequently³ explained, as follows, by the Consuls of the neutral Powers who were present in Shanghai at the time: 'When the state of emergency was declared the Council had in mind that either (a) the Chinese would not accept the Japanese terms, in which case the Japanese would take some action and there might be rushes of excited refugees and possibly of disorganized military elements attempting to enter the Settlement; or (b) that the Chinese would accept the Japanese terms, in which case there might be a storm of protest on the part of the Chinese population, resulting in riot and disorder both inside and outside the Settlement. The Mayor himself was apprehensive of this. Therefore, although there was reason to expect trouble, it was not known from what direction it would come, and the declaration of a state of emergency was merely a precautionary measure not directed against any particular party.'

¹ On the 28th January, an official statement gave the number of foreign troops, other than Japanese, at Shanghai as 2,306 British, 1,253 Americans and 1,050 French. There were also some Italian troops. These forces were additional to the Municipal Police, and to the members of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. (For the Volunteer Corps, see the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 367-8 n.) In the harbour there were twenty-three Japanese, five British, and two French warships and one American warship. During the next few days British, American and French, as well as Japanese, reinforcements were despatched to Shanghai. On the 1st February the British cruiser *Suffolk* and four American destroyers arrived; and on the 3rd H.M.S. *Berwick*, with a battalion of infantry and a battery of artillery on board, reached Shanghai from Hongkong. On the same day the U.S. cruiser *Houston*, the flagship of Admiral Taylor, arrived from Manila, together with four more destroyers. The only French cruiser in Eastern waters, the *Waldeck-Rousseau*, was ordered from Saigon to Shanghai on the 31st January, and a battalion of French troops was sent from Tientsin. On the 5th February H.M.S. *Kent*, the flagship of Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, commanding the British fleet in Chinese waters, arrived from Batavia, and the 31st regiment of the U.S. Army, which had been sent from Manila, landed on the same day. The Italian cruiser *Libia* had arrived before the 23rd February, on which day it was struck by Chinese shells (see footnote on p. 500 below). By a fortuitous coincidence, the United States Battle Fleet was due to leave the Pacific Coast of the Continental United States for Hawaii on the 31st January, with a year's stores on board, in order to carry out manoeuvres in mid-Pacific. This long-standing plan was duly executed without incident.

² *Cmd.* 4021, p. 5.

³ In a telegram dated the 13th February, 1932, which was sent in reply to a request from the Chinese representative at Geneva for further information on certain points raised in the Consuls' first report. The telegram is printed in *opp. cit.* in footnote on p. 471 above.

During the early afternoon of the 28th January, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai transmitted to the Japanese Consul a reply accepting entirely the Japanese demands. At 4 p.m., the Japanese Consul informed the consular body of the receipt of this reply, which, he said, was entirely satisfactory. He added that it remained to be seen whether the Mayor would be able to enforce the terms accepted, but he admitted that the demands had been carried out to a large extent and, for the time being, no action would be taken. In spite of this change in the diplomatic situation, there was a popular belief that the Japanese naval authorities were determined to take direct action in any event.¹ Inflammatory statements were appearing in the Japanese Press Union Bulletin to the effect that the Chinese did not intend to carry out their promise and that they were preparing to attack the Japanese. It was also anticipated that there might be a revolt amongst the Chinese population against acceptance by the Mayor of the Japanese demand. These considerations made it advisable in the eyes of the Defence Committee that the state of emergency should be nevertheless enforced as from 4 p.m.²

The declaration of a state of emergency by the Municipal Council brought into operation the defence scheme, the purpose of which was '(i) to protect the foreign area from internal disorder, and (ii) to defend it against external aggression'. The declaration was 'effective notice to the commanders of the various national forces that they' were 'expected to be prepared to defend their sections'.³ These sections had already been allocated, on the 27th January, by the International Settlement Defence Committee. This Committee, which was presided over by the senior garrison commander,⁴ was composed of the garrison commanders, the chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, the Commissioner of the Municipal Police, and the Commandant of the Volunteer Corps. Its function was not to 'give orders to the various commanders as to the detailed measures they' were 'expected to take in defending their sections', but to 'allot

¹ There seems to have been an impression among the foreign (non-Japanese) community in Shanghai that the feelings of the Japanese naval officers, as they watched recent developments in Manchuria, had not been free from professional jealousy, and that Admiral Shiozawa aspired to the part played by General Honjo in Manchuria, and had been awaiting a suitable opportunity to 'teach the Chinese a lesson'. According to press reports, the Cabinet at Tokyo, on the 26th January, authorized the naval forces at Shanghai to take 'positive action' in the event of no satisfactory reply being returned to the Consul's demands, but it was believed that the action contemplated covered only such minor steps as the closing of Anti-Japanese Boycott Associations (see *The Times*, 27th and 28th January, 1932).

² *Cmd.* 4021, p. 5.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Brigadier Fleming, who was in command of the British force.

the sections', help 'in co-ordinating the action taken by the various commanders', and fix the 'main principles of defence'.¹

In allocating the sections on the 27th January, 1932, the Defence Committee appears to have departed, in an important respect, from the precedents which had been set on the previous occasions when it had been deemed necessary to arrange for the protection of the International Settlement at Shanghai against possible aggression. At the beginning of 1927, as on two earlier occasions in 1924 and 1925, the military cordon which encircled the International Settlement had not followed the boundaries of the Settlement throughout its course, and in certain sectors the line had trespassed on to Chinese territory.² In 1927, the line had been extended westwards from the boundary of the International Settlement as far as the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway line, to include a section of Chinese territory which was bounded on the north-west by Soochow Creek and Jessfield Park, on the west by the railway line, and on the south by a line running south-eastwards from the railway and joining the French Settlement at about the middle of its western boundary. This district was included within the cordon both for strategical reasons and because the inhabitants included a large number of foreigners; but the area adjoining Hongkew Park beyond the Settlement boundary on the north-east, where there were many Japanese residents, was not included, although Japanese troops appear to have been stationed there in order to protect their nationals.³ The northern line of defence in 1927 followed the Settlement boundary eastwards to the Point at Yangtsepoo.⁴ In 1932, however, the Defence Committee appears to have decided—presumably because the Japanese were the foreigners whose lives and property were in the greatest danger—that the scheme of defence must be enlarged to cover the Hongkew Park salient as well as the western area outside the boundaries of the Settlement.

This salient in the neighbourhood of Hongkew Park, outside the boundaries of the Settlement, projected 'like a promontory' into the Chinese area of Chapei and 'the jurisdiction was partly Chinese and partly international in a very complicated manner'.⁵ Hongkew Park, and the two principal roads running through the district—North Szechuan Road and Dixwell Road—were the

¹ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

² See the *Survey for 1927*, p. 379.

³ See *The Times*, 22nd March, 1927.

⁴ These particulars regarding the line of defence in 1927 are taken from the *Annual Report of the Shanghai Municipal Council for that year*.

⁵ Statement by the Japanese representative, Mr. Matsudaira, at the Special Session of the League Assembly on the 3rd March, 1932.

property of the Shanghai Municipal Council.¹ Along these roads and in their vicinity lived a large number of Japanese nationals,² and although the Municipal Police were normally responsible for the maintenance of order along the roads which were the property of the Council, Japanese marines had 'always maintained posts along the . . . municipal roads . . . for the protection of their nationals, and their naval headquarters were situated towards the end of this salient'.³

In 1932, as in 1927, all the principal Powers which had interests at Shanghai were required to take part in the arrangements for the defence of the Settlements, and in allocating the zones the general principle followed was that as far as possible a section in which the interests of any one Power predominated should be assigned to that Power to guard. On this principle, the north-eastern sector of the International Settlement, together with the Hongkew Park salient, was assigned to Japan.⁴ The limits of the Japanese sector were described as follows by the Consuls of the neutral Powers. It 'consisted of the whole north-eastern area of the Settlement, limited on the western side by North Honan Road. It comprised also, from the point of view of the Shanghai Defence Committee, an area outside the Settlement limited on the west by North Kiangsi Road and the Woosung Railway, on the north by the northern border of Hongkew Park, on the east by a line joining roughly the north-east corner of Hongkew Park and Harbin Road Police Station.'⁵ It should be noted

¹ On the question of these 'extension roads', see the *Survey for 1926*, p. 370.

² About 10,000, or a third of the total Japanese population of Shanghai, according to Mr. Matsudaira (*loc. cit.*), about 6,000 according to Mr. Sato (statement to the Council of the League of Nations on the 29th January, 1932).

³ *Cmd.* 4021, p. 6.

⁴ The section outside the Settlement on the west was divided between Great Britain and Italy. (See the map of Shanghai which was prepared for the Lytton Commission and which was published as Map No. 11 annexed to their report.)

⁵ *Cmd.* 4021, p. 5. It will be seen that the testimony of the Consuls supports the Japanese contention that Admiral Shiozawa, in attempting to occupy the Hongkew Park salient as he did during the night of the 28th January, was not going beyond the instructions of the Defence Committee. (The Japanese did not deny that Admiral Shiozawa's subsequent proceedings were taken on his own responsibility.) It should be noted, however, that the Chinese did not accept this contention as valid. See, for instance, a telegram from the Nanking Government to the Chinese delegation at Geneva, dated the 1st February, 1932, and printed in Annex XVII to the minutes of the sixty-sixth session of the League Council, in which Wu Te-chen was declared to have reported that the Japanese Consul-General had admitted, in the presence of the British and American Consuls, 'that the penetration of the Japanese troops into the Chinese district had not been in conformity with the original decision reached

that, while the population of the Hongkew district was mixed Chinese and Japanese, there was no clear-cut boundary between that district and the densely populated maze of narrow lanes and alleys which constituted the Chinese urban area called Chapei, and that the Woosung Railway line, which formed the western limit of the sector assigned to Japan by the Defence Committee, lay well within the Chinese area.

Thus the decision of the Municipal Council to declare a state of emergency as from 4 p.m. on the 28th January, 1932, meant, in effect, that at that hour Japanese troops would be authorized, by a body representing all the foreign Powers with interests at Shanghai, to go outside the boundaries of the International Settlement and to occupy a portion of Chinese-administered territory which formed part of an area that was believed to be held by a strong force of Chinese troops.¹ In view of the state of extreme tension which existed between the Chinese and the Japanese at Shanghai on the 28th January, 1932, it can hardly have been anticipated that this Japanese occupation of Chinese territory could be effected without encountering opposition. The danger of a clash might perhaps have been diminished if the Chinese Mayor (who had shown himself genuinely anxious to avoid trouble) had been warned in advance that a Japanese occupation of the Hongkew Park salient formed part of the defence scheme which would come into operation simultaneously with the declaration of a state of emergency. It appears, however, that the authorities of the International Settlement did not notify the Chinese authorities of the plan in regard to this 'extra-settlement' sector²—an omission which was the more surprising in view of the fact that this sector had not been included in the defence scheme in 1927.³

at the International Settlement Defence Conference, but was an action taken under the initiative of the Japanese troops for the protection of their nationals, and that Japan would bear the whole responsibility'.

¹ See p. 473 above.

² On this point the Consular Committee reported as follows: 'It does not appear that the Chinese authorities previous to the events starting at 11 p.m. on the 28th January had received any communication about this outside Japanese section.' (*Cmd.* 4021, p. 6.) The Chinese stated categorically that the result of the Defence Committee's deliberations regarding the demarcation of areas for defence 'was not announced and not communicated to the Chinese authorities'. (Communication dated the 31st January, 1932, from the Chinese delegation to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.)

³ A possible explanation of this omission was that the Defence Committee may have decided on the occupation of the extra-settlement section only as an emergency measure. This explanation would tally with the Consular Committee's statement (quoted on p. 483 below) regarding the arguments used by the Japanese authorities in defence of their action on the 28th-29th January.

(b) JAPANESE OPERATIONS IN AND ROUND SHANGHAI
(28TH JANUARY-3RD MARCH, 1932)

Soon after 4 p.m. on the 28th January, British and American troops began to occupy the sectors assigned to them for defence, including, presumably, the western district outside the Settlement which had been allocated to Great Britain;¹ but the Japanese 'made no attempt to occupy the extra-settlement section when the state of emergency came into force'.² During the night of the 27th January, an influx of Chinese into the Settlement from Chapei had begun, and during the 28th, according to the Japanese version, 'there was much confusion in the neighbourhood of North Szechuan Road and Dixwell Road. . . . Agitators and soldiers in disguise . . . mingled with the crowd. Several of these were discovered and arrested. . . . In the night the Chinese policemen in the Japanese quarter left their posts.'³ It was 'in view of the critical situation in which Japanese nationals thus found themselves'⁴ that Admiral Shiozawa decided to occupy the extra-settlement portion of the Japanese zone of defence. At 11 p.m. on the 28th, Admiral Shiozawa 'issued two proclamations, copies of which were served on the Mayor, who declared he had received them at 11.15 p.m.'⁵ These two proclamations ran as follows:⁶

I. General restlessness prevails in and outside the International Settlement in Shanghai and there are signs that the situation is being further aggravated. In view of this state of affairs, the Shanghai Municipal Council has proclaimed a State of Emergency in the Settlement and the military and naval forces of various countries have respectively taken their positions for the defence of the Settlement.

The Imperial Navy, feeling extreme anxiety about the situation in Chapei, where Japanese nationals reside in great numbers, has decided to send out troops to this section for the enforcement of law and order in the area.

In these circumstances I earnestly hope that the Chinese authorities will speedily withdraw the Chinese troops now stationed in Chapei to the west of the railway⁷ and remove all hostile defences in the area.⁸

¹ Italian troops occupied a small north-eastern sector of this district on the 29th January.

² *Cmd. 4021*, p. 6.

³ Statement by Mr. Sato to the League Council on the 29th January, 1932.

⁴ Mr. Sato, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Cmd. 4021*, p. 6.

⁶ English translation from the Chinese text.

⁷ i.e. the Shanghai-Woosung Railway.

⁸ This proclamation does not clear up the question of Admiral Shiozawa's exact intentions during the night of the 28th/29th January, which remain a matter for conjecture. The text indicates that his declared object was to reach

II. In accordance with the state of emergency declared by the Council of the International Settlement, the Japanese Navy has assumed the duty of preserving directly peace and order within the garrisoning area assigned to it.

During the state of emergency all meetings deemed as constituting a hindrance in the current situation shall be prohibited, and actions considered necessary for the proper execution of the duties involved in the state of emergency shall be taken.

Subsequent events were described by the Consuls of the neutral Powers in the following terms: 'Japanese marines and armed civilians having mobilized¹ . . . at naval headquarters, the forces advanced along North Szechuan Road, dropping parties at entrances to alleyways as they went along, and, at midnight, at a given signal, all these parties advanced westwards and northwards in the direction of the railway. The final party of about 100 marines, accompanied by armoured cars, attempted to pass through the gates dividing the Settlement from Chinese territory at the end of Honan Road, but were prevented by the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, in whose section the gate is situated. This gate leads to the railway station.'²

'The Chinese military authorities had not complied with the Japanese Admiral's demands to withdraw their troops. It would appear, moreover, that even had they decided to comply with this demand, it would have been impossible in the short time at their disposal to arrange for the actual withdrawal of Chinese troops in that area. One should take into account also the tension created by the situation of the previous days, which would induce the Chinese authorities to interpret the measures taken by the Japanese naval authorities as representing part of larger military operations. Japanese marines consequently met with resistance on the part of Chinese regular troops. They succeeded in reaching the railway line so far south as Paoting Road, but they do not appear to have succeeded in reaching the line south of that point and their line then ran east of

the Shanghai-Woosung Railway line, which had been fixed as the western limit of Japanese occupation by the Defence Committee, but not to cross the line. On the other hand, the extremely short notice which he gave to the Chinese authorities of his intended action bears out the supposition that the prospect of coming to blows with the Chinese was not unwelcome to him.

¹ One word was undecipherable at this point in the Consul's report.

² The Consuls, at the request of the Chinese delegation at Geneva, subsequently gave the following supplementary information in regard to this incident: 'The Honan Road Gate gives access from the Settlement to Chinese territory not comprised in the defence scheme, and strict instructions, based on the principle that the duties of the defence force are defensive and not offensive, had been given by the Commandant of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, in whose section it is situated, that in no circumstances was it to be opened to permit of either entrance or exit.'

the railway until it reached the Settlement boundary between North Honan and North Szechuan Roads. The Japanese were harassed by a Chinese armoured train, which issued from the station and patrolled the Woosung line. Subsequently, it took refuge in the station, which was also strongly defended by Chinese troops. Thereupon the Japanese, during January 29th, bombarded the station and destroyed the train by aeroplanes. Other buildings along Paoting Road¹ were also burned by incendiary bombs, and it is generally thought this was done deliberately in order to destroy vantage posts overlooking the Japanese lines.'

At the beginning of these operations at midnight on the 28th/29th January, the Japanese marines engaged appear to have numbered no more than 1,500, but during the night reinforcements were landed from the warships in the harbour, bringing the total force up to 3,000. The order to bomb the North Railway Station and other points where Chinese troops were believed to be concentrated was apparently given by Admiral Shiozawa at about 4.30 a.m. on the 29th. The Japanese maintained that care was exercised in the selection of objectives in order to avoid injury to the civilian population, but, according to some eye-witnesses, the Japanese seaplanes flew too high for accuracy to be possible. In any case, the fires which were started by the incendiary bombs spread rapidly until the greater part of Chapei, as seen from the International Settlement, appeared to be in a blaze.² This bombing of a crowded area, without warning, was bound to cause great loss of life and material damage, and it struck terror into the hearts of the hundreds of thousands of harmless civilians whose homes were in Chapei. It was this feature of the Japanese operations which made the most painful impression upon international public opinion. Admiral Shiozawa could plead that the disproportion between the Japanese and Chinese forces engaged³

¹ Paoting (or Paohsing) Road ran in a north-westerly direction from the Woosung Railway through Chapei. The Chinese Commercial Press, the foremost Chinese printing establishment in the world and the largest, either Chinese or foreign, in China, which contained a valuable library, was situated at the south-eastern end of this road, near the railway. It was completely destroyed.

² According to Reuter's correspondent, by 5.30 a.m. on the 29th January 'Chapei had the appearance of one blazing bonfire' which seemed to be creeping gradually towards the International Settlement. The flames were 'leaping 75 to 100 feet into the air, and the roar of the conflagration' was 'audible at a great distance'. (*The Manchester Guardian*, 30th January, 1932.)

³ The number of Chinese troops who were actually in Chapei and the outskirts of Shanghai during the night of the 28th/29th January cannot be exactly determined. The Japanese declared that there were over 30,000, and, although this was probably an over-estimate, there seems to be no doubt that the Japanese were very heavily outnumbered.

made air action inevitable, but he convicted himself thereby of a fatal error of judgment in the tacit admission that he had undertaken operations which could hardly fail to lead to bloodshed with totally inadequate forces.

During the 29th January the Mayor of Greater Shanghai lodged with the consular body a protest against the Japanese action, which had been taken in spite of the fact that his complete acceptance of the Japanese demands had been declared by the Japanese Consul to be 'entirely satisfactory'. The Japanese authorities, in reply, 'contended that their action was not connected with the demand which they had made and which had been accepted, but was based on the necessity of protecting the Japanese population living in part of the area occupied.'¹ They also maintained that their action, which met with armed resistance, and for which they took full responsibility, was within the limits admitted, if necessity arose, by the International Settlement defence plans.² The Mayor also appealed to the consular body for assistance in bringing about a cessation of the fighting, which continued throughout the 29th, and in response to this appeal the British and American Consuls-General, during the afternoon, had an interview with Admiral Shiozawa and obtained from him a promise that he would order his troops to 'cease fire' if the Chinese would do likewise. Wu 'Te-chen gave orders accordingly to the commander of the Chinese forces, General Tsai Ting-kai, and an 'agreement to refrain from further firing'³ came into force at 8 p.m. on the 29th.

This agreement was observed, more or less, until about midday on the 2nd February, but a 'complete truce never really existed'.⁴ There was intermittent firing throughout the period of the truce, and during the 31st January Japanese aeroplanes 'flew over Shanghai and the Chinese positions, but without any bombardment'.⁵ Each side accused the other of breach of the truce; but, as the Consuls of the neutral Powers pointed out in their second report, 'in the absence of foreign observers in the fighting lines, it was impossible to establish which side should be held responsible for breaking the truce. Individual units on either side, or even "agents provocateurs", may have been responsible.'⁶

¹ Compare the statement made by Mr. Matsudaira at the Special Session of the League Assembly on the 3rd March, 1932: 'It was entirely contrary to every intention of ours that a collision should have come to pass, and it is to be specially noted that it occurred from a cause entirely independent of the incident of the Buddhist priests, which had been closed by the Mayor's acceptance of our demands.'

² *Cmd.* 4021, p. 7.

³ *Op. cit., loc. cit.*

⁴ *Cmd.* 4021, p. 9.

⁵ *Op. cit., p. 8.*

⁶ *Op. cit., p. 9.*

The situation in the Japanese sector during these few days was described by the Consuls as follows:¹ 'From the beginning of the Japanese movement on the night of January 28th, the Japanese section was invaded by Chinese plain-clothes troops, who concealed themselves inside, or on the roofs of, houses, whence they fired on the Japanese patrols in the streets with automatic pistols. It should be mentioned that the Japanese, who seem to have had insufficient regular forces for the defence of the area they occupied, had mobilized and armed all their so-called reservists, who wore civil clothes distinguished by brassards.'²

'Marines and reservists responded to the sniping of the Chinese plain-clothes soldiers by machine-gun fire, and also by house-to-house search in order to locate snipers, in the course of which very considerable damage was done, houses even being set on fire in order to get rid of snipers.

'The Japanese naval authorities took complete control of the Hongkew district inside the Settlement, barricaded streets, disarmed the police, and paralysed all the other municipal activities of the Settlement authorities, including the fire brigade. Police posts were prevented from all communication with their headquarters. The Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to evacuate schools and hospitals. Numerous excesses, including summary executions, were committed by marines, reservists and³ . . . the last mentioned, who had no official standing, being actuated probably merely by a spirit of revenge against the Chinese for earlier anti-Japanese activities. A reign of terror resulted, and almost the entire non-Japanese population of the area ran away.'⁴

¹ *Op. cit., loc. cit.*

² The Japanese delegation at Geneva commented as follows on this passage of the Consuls' second report: 'It is not quite correct to speak of the mobilization of reservists. No general measure of this kind was adopted. A small number of volunteers armed with pistols was deputed to take action against Chinese snipers and to assist the police.' (Observations of the Japanese delegation on the second report of the Consular Committee, printed in *opp. cit.* in footnote on p. 471.)

³ One or more words were undecipherable at this point in the Consuls' report.

⁴ By the 1st February it was estimated that a quarter of a million Chinese refugees had entered the Settlement. In their second report, which was dated the 12th February, the Consuls stated that, on the 5th February, 'owing to the large number of Chinese who were believed to have been arrested or put to death by the Japanese, and of whom no trace could be found, the Municipal Council asked the Consular Body to approach the Japanese authorities with a view to inquiry. The Japanese Consul admitted that excesses had been committed by his nationals at a time when feeling was running high and chaotic conditions prevailed, but the situation was greatly

During this period of nominal truce at Shanghai an incident took place¹ which 'created much excitement and alarm, even outside China'. This was the 'short bombardment of Nanking' by Japanese warships. This bombardment 'happened on the late evening of the 1st February, but did not last for more than an hour. The incident was probably caused by a misunderstanding, but had the important consequence of a temporary removal of the Chinese Government from Nanking to Loyang.'

'Chinese and Japanese versions both of the origin and of the facts' were 'widely divergent. Two justifications were given . . . from Japanese sources. The first was that, since the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai, the Chinese had extended the Lion Hill Forts, constructed trenches and established artillery positions at the gates near the river and on the opposite side of it, thus making military preparations on a scale sufficient to arouse concern amongst the Japanese, who had warships on the river. The second was that the vernacular papers had spread untruthful stories of Chinese victories at Shanghai, which had caused great excitement among the Chinese population of Nanking. In consequence, Chinese employed by Japanese were, it' was 'alleged, forced by threats to give up their situations, and Chinese merchants refused to sell even the necessary food supplies to Japanese residents, including the Consular staff and the crews of warships.

'The Chinese did not comment on these complaints. They' asserted 'that the general uneasiness and tense atmosphere prevailing were caused by the fact that the Japanese, after the Shanghai outbreak, increased the number of their warships at Nanking from two to five, and subsequently to seven (the Japanese authorities give the number as six, these being three old gunboats and three destroyers); that the Commander of the warships landed a certain number of sailors and put them on guard duty before the wharf of the *Nisshin Kisen Kaisha*, where the Japanese Consular staff and all the Japanese residents had taken refuge on a hulk. With the events of Shanghai fresh in their memories, such measures may well have filled the minds of the already-excited population at Nanking with fears of a similar experience.'

improved and he agreed that persons arrested as suspect by the naval authorities within the Settlement should be handed over to the Municipal Police. This was accordingly done, but the number of Chinese still unaccounted for is very large. The Municipal Police have already collected details of about 100 cases.' (*Cmd.* 4021, pp. 9-10.)

¹ The following account of the Nanking Incident of the 1st February, 1932, is taken from the Report of the Lytton Commission (League of Nations: *Appeal of the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of Inquiry* [Geneva, 1932]), pp. 87-8.

It was known 'from a report of the Police Commissioner of Nanking to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the authorities at Nanking who were solely responsible for the protection of their own subjects and of foreign nationals at that place greatly resented the landing of Japanese naval forces. They addressed representations to the Japanese Vice-Consul, who replied that he was unable to do anything in the matter. At the same time, special instructions were given to the local police-station at Hsiakwan, where the warships were anchored and the above-mentioned wharf was situated, to prevent, if possible, any contact between Chinese and Japanese in this area, especially at night-time. According to the Japanese official reports, their refugees were taken on board a steamer of the name *Nisshin Kisen Kaisha* during the days following the 29th January, and a considerable number were transported to Shanghai. On the late evening of the 1st February, the Japanese asserted 'that three gunshots were suddenly fired, apparently from the Lion Hill Forts. At the same time, Chinese regulars fired on the Japanese naval guards on the river banks, causing two casualties, of which one was fatal. The fire was returned, but directed only at the immediate neighbourhood of their landing-place and stopped as soon as the firing from the shore had ceased. Such' was 'the Japanese version. The Chinese, on the other hand, stoutly' denied 'that any firing at all took place, but' alleged 'that eight shells in all were fired at the forts, at Hsiakwan station and at other places, accompanied by machine-gun and rifle firing, and that during this time search-lights were directed at the shore. This caused considerable panic amongst the inhabitants, who rushed in o the interior of the city; but no casualties were reported and the material damage was not great.'

It was 'also possible that the incident was first started by the firing of crackers by the excited Chinese population, celebrating a supposed victory at Shanghai'.

During the period 29th January-2nd February, reports were current of the continual arrival of fresh Chinese troops in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, and the Japanese marines were also reinforced. On the 29th January, the Japanese Consul-General appears to have telegraphed to Tokyo that the naval forces available were not adequate to cope with the situation;¹ and on the 31st January a Japanese cruiser, with an additional force of marines on board, arrived at Shanghai. On the 2nd February, at a meeting between the Japanese

¹ The Consul-General's view seems to have had the support of the Japanese Military Attaché, but Admiral Shiozawa was said to have informed the Government that he did not need reinforcements.

Ministers for War, the Navy and Foreign Affairs, a provisional decision was taken to despatch an army division to Shanghai, and this decision was confirmed by the Cabinet on the 4th February,¹ after attempts made by the representatives of the other Shanghai Powers to establish a neutral zone between the Chinese and Japanese forces had broken down,² and any pretence that a truce was in force at Shanghai had been abandoned.

According to the Consuls of the neutral Powers, Admiral Shiozawa, on the 2nd February, had 'again alleged breach of truce by the Chinese on the previous days, adding that, as it seemed clear that the Chinese were assembling forces with a view to surrounding the Japanese, he was going to send up aeroplanes to reconnoitre. About midday, Japanese aeroplanes flew over Shanghai and over the Chinese positions. They were fired upon by the Chinese, whereupon the aeroplanes dropped bombs, and in a short time general firing by both sides recommenced.'³ On the following day the Japanese naval authorities announced that, 'as the Chinese authorities had consistently failed to display sincerity in the carrying out of their engagements, the Chinese troops must be withdrawn a sufficient distance from Chapei, and to effect that object Japanese aeroplanes might be forced to bombard the Chinese positions. Later on the same day, the Japanese Consul-General informed the Consular authorities that three Japanese destroyers had been fired upon from the Woosung forts,⁴ and the Japanese therefore intended to occupy the forts.'⁵ From the 3rd February onwards, a 'state of open war' existed. 'Firing' continued 'intermittently, both in the Chapei and the Woosung area, with the use of artillery and, on the side of the Japanese, of aerial bombardment. The offensive' was 'entirely in the hands of the Japanese, whose declared object' was 'to capture the Woosung forts and to drive all Chinese troops a considerable distance from Shanghai'.⁶

The Japanese found both these objectives unexpectedly difficult to attain. The Japanese marines, though reinforced, were still not in sufficient strength to dislodge the Cantonese troops from the smoking ruins of Chapei. The Chinese clung tenaciously to their positions, in spite of heavy bombardment from the air⁷ and from

¹ See p. 506 below. ² See pp. 503-4 below. ³ *Cmd.* 4021, p. 8.

⁴ This was denied by the Chinese. A circumstantial report had been current in Shanghai on the 29th January that Japanese warships had bombarded the Woosung forts and landed a dismantling party during the previous night; but this report proved to be entirely unfounded.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

⁷ On the 5th and 6th February Japanese aeroplanes dropped bombs on one of the camps of flood refugees, which had been established by Sir John Hope

Japanese artillery; and although the Japanese gained a little ground from time to time they were generally forced to retire again by Chinese counter-attacks. In the Woosung area, the Chinese resistance was no less stubborn;¹ and there, as at Chapei, the Japanese were hampered by the nature of the terrain. The Woosung fort, which commanded the mouth of the Whangpoo River and was thus in a position seriously to inconvenience, by its fire, Japanese warships and transports on their way to Shanghai, stood on an island formed by the rivers Yangtse and Whangpoo and the Woosung Creek. The area between Woosung and Chapei was a marshy plain, intersected in every direction by canals and creeks.² At Woosung itself, the Chinese, in addition to holding the forts, entrenched themselves in the village to the north of the creek, and were able to withstand for nearly a month³ the attack of increasing numbers of Japanese marines and soldiers, whose superiority in the modern equipment of war was rendered of little avail by the nature of the ground, and who found, contrary to their expectations, that the Chinese were not to be intimidated either by long-range shelling from warships in the Whangpoo or by bombardment from the air. The Japanese attack both at Chapei and at Woosung became more vigorous in the second week of February, when detachments of the Ninth Army Division began to arrive. On the 8th February, Vice-Admiral Nomura, who had been appointed to take over the command of the Japanese naval Simpson near Chapei. (Sir John Hope Simpson had been appointed Director-General of the National Flood Relief Commission by the League of Nations Council at the request of the Chinese Government—see the *Survey for 1931*, p. 397.) Over 50 people were killed by the bombs or died of fright. The camp was bombed again on the 7th February, but by that time the refugees had been evacuated. On the 11th February, Sir John Hope Simpson telegraphed to the League of Nations, protesting 'in the name of humanity' against this Japanese action, which he characterized as 'wanton, inhuman, and from the military standpoint, useless'. The Japanese expressed their 'deep regret' for this incident, which was said to be due to a 'deplorable mistake'. (Communication, dated the 15th February, from the Japanese delegation at Geneva to the Secretary-General, printed on p. 425 of the *League of Nations Official Journal* for March 1932. For Sir John Hope Simpson's telegram, see *op. cit.*, p. 400.)

¹ The Woosung fort, like Chapei, was held by a portion of the Cantonese Nineteenth Route Army.

² 'The land is soft and marshy, suitable for rice fields, which are sunken quadrangles of land, filled, in the early rice season, with water in which the seeds and young shoots grow. The narrower creeks and canals are employed for irrigating the rice fields; the wider and deeper ones for navigation by the small sampans which are the only means of transportation. Swamp in summer and winter, never with more than a thin layer of ice in winter, without an elevation in any direction, the terrain is flat and desolate.' (Mr. G. E. Sokolsky in *The New York Times*, 20th February, 1932.)

³ The Japanese crossed Woosung Creek on the 14th February, but they did not take the fort until the 3rd March.

forces from Admiral Shiozawa,¹ reached Shanghai, and on the following day the first contingent of troops landed at the Japanese docks in the International Settlement.² In spite of these reinforcements, the Japanese made little or no progress during the next few days, and it became evident that if they were to attain their object of driving the Chinese from Chapei and Woosung they would have to await the arrival of additional forces.

On the 11th February it was reported in Shanghai that two army divisions instead of one were on their way from Japan; on the 13th General Ueda, who had been appointed to command the Japanese land forces, arrived at Shanghai; and during the two following days Japanese troops belonging to the Ninth Division and a mixed brigade drawn from the Twelfth Division were landed in or near Shanghai or at Woosung, to the number, it was believed, of nearly 20,000.

During this period of virtual stalemate the Chinese had been entrenching themselves along an eight-mile line stretching from Chapei to Woosung. The military ardour of the Chinese people had been greatly stimulated as a result of the gallant resistance of the Cantonese troops, whose successes had been considerably exaggerated in Chinese versions; and for a time it looked as though Japanese aggression might have done more, in a few days, towards reconciling rival war-lords and parties than could have been achieved by the effort of years under the ordinary conditions of Chinese politics.³ On the other hand, Japanese national sentiment had also been strongly roused by the check which the marines had encountered; and it was clear that this loss of prestige would only be wiped out, in Japanese eyes, by some change in the situation which could be represented as a Japanese victory. There was thus a grave danger not only that the operations round Shanghai might develop on an increasingly serious scale until the superiority of Japanese armaments had produced its inevitable local result, but also that a temporary Chinese retreat might prove to be merely the prelude to a war of

¹ Admiral Shiozawa was not superseded, but continued to serve under Admiral Nomura.

² For the protests made by the representatives of other Powers against this continued military use of the Settlement on the part of the Japanese, see p. 500 below.

³ On the 8th February a newly created Military Affairs Committee of the Government, which now had its headquarters at Loyang, was reported to have issued a manifesto calling upon the people to support a prolonged struggle against foreign aggression and declaring that domestic complications and divisions were forgotten. This manifesto bore the signatures of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, Fêng Yü-hsiang, Chang Hsueh-liang, Yen Hsi-shan and eight other leaders.

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attrition between the Chinese nation and a Japanese Expeditionary Force—a war in which the Japanese, however great their superiority in technique and material and their expenditure in men and in money, could never hope to inflict a decisive defeat upon their enemy. These considerations, as well as the immediate danger to the foreign inhabitants of Shanghai of a pitched battle in the neighbourhood, prompted the representatives of the foreign Powers not to relax their efforts to bring about a suspension of hostilities.¹ Their intervention, however, proved ineffective so long as the Japanese were unable to claim that they had attained their objectives, nor did the despatch, on the 16th February, of a strongly worded note from the members of the League Council (other than China and Japan)² avail to turn the Japanese from their purpose.

On the 16th February the Japanese War Office announced that General Ueda had been authorized to hand to the Chinese Commander an ultimatum requiring him to withdraw his troops from Shanghai within twenty-four hours, and last-minute efforts to avert the delivery of this ultimatum met with no success. At the suggestion of the neutral diplomatic representatives at Shanghai, a meeting between the Chiefs of Staff of the Chinese and Japanese Commanders was held on the morning of the 18th February. The Japanese representatives presented their terms, which the Chinese representatives declared were unacceptable. After two hours' fruitless discussion the Japanese representative said that the Japanese side would send in a written communication of their terms before 9 p.m., and he hoped that the Chinese would return a reply as soon as possible. The meeting then broke up. At about 9 p.m. a separate despatch containing the Japanese terms was delivered to the Mayor and to the Commander of the Chinese Nineteenth Army.³ The terms of this Japanese ultimatum were as follows:⁴

1. The Chinese troops shall withdraw from all the points within a distance of twenty (20) kilometres from the boundary of the International Settlement to the north of the following lines—namely, the northern boundary line of the Settlement; a line connecting the north-

¹ See sub-section (d) below.

² See pp. 565-6 below.

³ Quoted from the third report of the Consular Committee. (*Cmd.* 4040, p. 7.)

⁴ More than one version of this ultimatum was current in Shanghai, and the different texts did not correspond exactly in certain particulars—for instance, in regard to the limits of the zone to be evacuated. The version here given is a translation from the official Japanese text, which was appended to the observations of the Japanese delegation at Geneva on the third report of the Consular Committee.

westernmost end of the Settlement, Tsaochiatuchen, Chouchiachiao and Pusungchen and running outward from the last-named position; and on the right of the Whangpoo River a line connecting Lannitu and Changchia Louchen and running outward from these positions respectively;¹ the aforesaid withdrawal of the Chinese troops shall be effected by completing the withdrawal of the forefront by 7 a.m. on February 20th, 1932, and that of the remainder by 5 p.m. on the same day. All the forts and other military equipments of China shall be removed from and shall not be reinstalled or newly erected within the aforesaid distance of twenty kilometres. The Shitzulin forts² shall be deemed to be within the same distance.

The Chinese authorities shall protect the lives and property of the Japanese subjects in districts around Shanghai other than the aforesaid area evacuated by the Chinese troops; in the event of the protection accorded by the Chinese authorities being unsatisfactory, the Japanese authorities may take such measures as they consider necessary. The Chinese authorities shall completely suppress all the activities of plain-clothes gunmen.

2. Upon having ascertained the withdrawal of the Chinese troops, the Japanese forces will maintain only the Extension Road area in the Hongkew district including the area around the Hongkew Park. The Japanese forces will not engage in attacks, shooting or bombardments after the commencement of the withdrawal of the Chinese troops but may carry on reconnoitring flights.

3. After the withdrawal of the forefront of the Chinese troops, the Japanese forces will despatch their representatives accompanied by bodyguards to ascertain the completion of the withdrawal.

4. Further negotiations shall be made with regard to the protection of foreign residents in districts around Shanghai, including the area evacuated by Chinese troops.

On the following day, the 19th February, 'a reply was delivered by the Mayor to the Japanese Consul and by the Chinese Commander to the Japanese Commander. The Mayor stated that the grave situation in Shanghai was due to the invasion of Chinese territory and the brutal murders of Chinese people by Japanese troops in violation of all international treaties and law. Inasmuch as the measures called for in the Consul-General's letter had a direct bearing on the general relations between China and Japan, they should be dealt with by the diplomatic authorities of the two countries, and he had therefore transmitted the Consul-General's letter to his Government for consideration and reply to the Japanese Minister through

¹ The line was described as follows in the third report of the Consular Committee (*op. cit.*, p. 7): 'The line formed by the north border of the Settlement and the Soochow Creek to Pusungchen and on the east of the Whangpoo a line from Lannidu to Changchiachiao. This is practically the line of the Soochow Creek extended eastward.'

² The Shitzulin or Szetzulin forts were situated on the southern bank of the Yangtse estuary, six or seven miles north-west of Woosung.

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He pointed out, further, that Chinese indignation had been daily intensified by continued acts of provocation by Japanese troops, and it was natural, therefore, that so-called anti-Japanese activities should fail to cease. The Chinese Commander's reply was to the effect that his troops were part of the national forces and subject to the directions of the National Government, to whom accordingly he had submitted the Japanese commander's letter.'

The 'Chinese Foreign Minister's reply to Japan, which was despatched on the 20th February, took the form of a vigorous protest lodged with the Japanese Minister in China against the action of the Japanese Commander and the Consul-General in delivering their identical note to the Commander of the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army and the Mayor of Greater Shanghai. The . . . note stated that . . . the local Chinese garrison forces were constrained to resist the onslaught of the Japanese forces as a measure of self-defence. . . . It concluded by declaring that should the Japanese forces attempt to renew their attack, the Chinese troops would not hesitate to resist to the best of their ability.'¹

Before this note from the Chinese Foreign Minister was delivered, the Japanese offensive had begun. During the night of the 19th/20th February, 'Japanese reinforcements were moved from their base in the International Settlement to the Japanese lines, and after a preliminary aerial reconnaissance which satisfied the Japanese that the Chinese had not evacuated their lines in conformity with the demand, the Japanese opened their attack on the 20th February at 7.30 a.m. in the Kiangwan and Woosung areas.'²

During this final phase of the operations, which lasted from the 20th February until the 3rd March, the aim of the Japanese was to compel the Chinese to withdraw from the Shanghai area without making a direct attack in force on Chapei (which would almost certainly involve complications with the other foreign Powers who had interests at Shanghai). Accordingly their offensive was directed in the first-place mainly against Woosung, the capture of which would enable them to turn the Chinese flank, and against Kiangwan, a large village some four miles from the northern border of the International Settlement at Shanghai, which marked the centre of the Chinese line. The operations against Chapei were confined to intermittent bombardment from the air and to occasional artillery fire, and it was round Kiangwan that the battle raged most fiercely for over

¹ Quoted from the third report of the Consular Committee, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

a week—the Chinese once more displaying powers of resistance which astonished the whole world. The Japanese were enabled by their superior armaments to minimize the casualties on their side, but the Chinese clung tenaciously to their positions in spite of the ordeal of heavy gunfire and bombing from the air to which they were repeatedly subjected. On the 28th February representatives of the two belligerents, meeting under the auspices of a British Admiral, agreed provisionally on conditions for the cessation of hostilities;¹ but these conditions were not carried into effect, and the fighting continued until the Japanese had attained their object, and the Chinese had withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Shanghai.

This final phase of the conflict may be described in the words of the Lytton Commission.² The attack which opened on the 20th February 'brought no marked success to the Japanese troops, despite the fact that it was continued on the following days, but it enabled them to learn that parts of the so-called Chinese Bodyguard Army—viz., the eighty-seventh and eighty-eighth Divisions—were now fighting against them as well as the nineteenth Route Army. This fact, together with the difficulties which the nature of the country presented, decided the Japanese to reinforce their troops by two more divisions—namely, the eleventh and fourteenth.

'On the 28th February, the Japanese troops occupied the western part of Kiangwan, which had been evacuated by the Chinese. On the same day, the Woosung fort and fortifications along the Yangtse River were again bombed from the air and from the sea, and bombing-planes operated over the whole front, including the aerodrome at Hungjao and the Nanking Railway. General Shirakawa, who was appointed to the supreme command of the Army, arrived in Shanghai on the 29th February. From this date onwards the Japanese

¹ See pp. 507-8 below.

² *Lytton Report*, pp. 84-5. The Lytton Commission arrived in Tokyo on the 29th February, and when they reached Shanghai on the 14th March the fighting was over. The members of the Commission were therefore not eye-witnesses of the military operations, and they did not as a commission officially investigate the situation at Shanghai. But they 'heard the views of both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments on the Shanghai affair, and were the recipients of a large amount of literature from both sides on the subject'. They 'also visited the devastated area and heard statements from Japanese naval and military officers on the recent operations. In an individual capacity, too, they 'had conversations with the representatives of many shades of opinion on matters which were fresh in the memory of every one living in Shanghai.' In their report they 'expressed no opinion upon the disputed points connected with' the Shanghai affair, but, 'for purposes of record', they completed 'the story of the operations from the 20th February' (the date of the third report of the Consular Committee) 'until the final withdrawal of the Japanese troops' (*Lytton Report*, p. 84).

headquarters announced substantial progress. In the district of Kiangwan they advanced slowly, and the Naval Headquarters stated that the opposing forces at Chapei showed signs of giving way as a consequence of the daily bombardment. On the same day the aerodrome at Hangehow, which is 100 miles distant from Shanghai, was bombed from the air.

'On the 1st March, as the frontal attack had advanced but slowly, the Japanese Army Commander initiated a wide enveloping movement by landing the main force of the eleventh Division at some distance on the right bank of the Yangtse River, in the vicinity of Tsiyakow, for the purpose of making a surprise attack on the left flank of the Chinese Army.' On the 2nd March, 'bombing operations' were 'extended as far as seven kilometres east of Quinsan station on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, with the alleged object of preventing the transportation of reinforcements to the Chinese front'.¹

The landing of Japanese troops at Tsiyakow, within a day's march of the Chinese left rear, finally convinced the Chinese Commander that the time had come to evacuate his first line. The withdrawal of the Chinese troops began during the night of the 1st/2nd March; and when the Japanese renewed their attack at dawn on the 2nd they found that their enemy had already slipped through their fingers. The Chinese retreat appears to have been executed in good order, with occasional rearguard actions and under the cover of fires which were deliberately lighted in Chapei and in the principal villages along the line of march. By the 3rd March the Chinese had withdrawn well outside the twenty-kilometre limit mentioned in the Japanese ultimatum of the 18th February, and the Japanese had taken up a line which stretched in a curve from the western border of Shanghai to the right bank of the Yangtse below Chienching, with its centre at Chiating.² Woosung Fort was found to have been evacuated by the Chinese when the Japanese finally entered it on the 3rd March. On the afternoon of that day the Japanese Commander gave the order to cease fire, and a similar order was issued by the Chinese Commander on the following day. Occasional skirmishes were reported thereafter, but hostilities were not formally renewed, and the Shanghai 'war in everything but name' may be said to have

¹ On the 29th February, the Japanese Consul-General had conveyed a warning to the Chinese authorities that the Shanghai-Nanking Railway would be bombed unless the Chinese ceased to use the line for the transport of reinforcements.

² See the Map (No. 12) annexed to the *Lytton Report*, which shows the position of the combatants at various stages of the operations from the 20th February to the 3rd March.

ended, so far as the actual fighting was concerned, on the 3rd March—the day on which the special session of the League Assembly, which had been called, at China's request, to consider the Sino-Japanese dispute in all its bearings, held its first meeting at Geneva.¹

(c) THE QUESTION OF THE USE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT AS A BASE OF JAPANESE OPERATIONS

As a result of the fighting between Japanese and Chinese forces at Shanghai which began during the night of the 28th/29th January, 1932, the authorities of the International Settlement and the foreign Powers, other than Japan, who had treaty rights at Shanghai found themselves in a position for which there was no precedent in the past history of the International Settlement and the French Settlement. It had become recognized by use and wont that the Settlements were neutral ground in regard to any neighbouring hostilities between Chinese armies engaged in civil war, and that the interested Powers had a right to protect this neutrality, when it was in jeopardy, by landing armed forces. On the previous occasions on which a military cordon had been placed round the Settlements, the problem before the international authorities had been how best to organize defence against possible Chinese aggression or internal disturbances, and the sole concern of the foreign Powers had been to protect the lives and property of their nationals by taking every possible precaution for the maintenance of peace and order. In this police action all the foreign Powers with interests at Shanghai had taken their share as a matter of course; and the difficulties which the Municipal Council and the Powers encountered in 1932 arose out of the fact that Japan, also, was one of the Lord's Anointed and enjoyed in that capacity the same prescriptive right as other Powers to land troops, in an emergency, for the defence of her nationals. The State of Emergency which the Municipal Council declared as from 4 p.m. on the 28th January, 1932, was the direct consequence of a Japanese act: the delivery of Admiral Shiozawa's ultimatum. But the international authorities could not for that reason prevent Japan from exercising her right to land troops, even though they had reason to apprehend that Admiral Shiozawa would take action exceeding the limits of the defensive measures necessary for the protection of Japanese nationals—either as a result of the rejection of his ultimatum, or, if the ultimatum were accepted, in order to 'teach the Chinese a lesson'.² It has been seen that the International Defence Committee carried the principle of the equal rights and responsibilities of all the Powers

¹ See section (iv)(c)(2) below.

² See p. 476 above.

to the point of assigning to Japan an even larger share than usual in the defence scheme, in spite of the strong probability that the Japanese marines would either take the offensive themselves or would provoke a Chinese attack by their presence on Chinese territory.

Japan could argue, of course, that in so far as she took the offensive at Shanghai on and after the night of the 28th/29th January, she was only acting in accordance with the maxim that attack is sometimes the best defence, and that there was no fundamental difference between her policy and actions in 1932 and those of Great Britain in 1927, when a British Defence Force had been despatched to Shanghai for the protection of British lives and interests.¹ In support of this contention, she could point to the fact that the British Government, in 1927, had envisaged the possibility of a 'grave emergency' in which British troops might have to take action outside the borders of the International Settlement.² In 1927, however, the British Government had acted throughout in co-operation with the other Powers and had notified the Council of the League of Nations, in advance, of the despatch of the British Defence Force. Moreover, the British Defence Force, on its arrival at Shanghai, became an International Defence Force under British command;³ and the British Commander—whether by good policy or by good fortune⁴—succeeded

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, section (xii) (f); the *Survey for 1927*, pp. 336, 338 n, 369-70.

² See the statement which was made by Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Minister in the British Government of the day, in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 10th February, 1927, which is quoted in the *Survey for 1926*, pp. 375-6.

³ Major-General Sir John Duncan, who commanded the British Defence Force in 1927, told a British audience on the 22nd February, 1932, that 'practically all . . . the international troops asked to come under' his command. 'The only troops that did not do so were the Japanese, and they stated publicly that if they did come under me they would be at war with China in a month. They obviously thought that I should adopt the same sort of attitude as they have adopted to-day.' (Extract from a speech by Sir John Duncan at a discussion on 'The Shanghai Crisis' at Chatham House on the 22nd February, 1932, as reported in *International Affairs*, March 1932.)

⁴ On this point Major-General Sir John Duncan testified as follows on the 22nd February, 1932:

'In Chapei in 1927 I had two men killed and six or seven wounded in a couple of days . . . I was terrified that in consequence of the outrages in Chapei I should have been compelled to use force, as the Japanese have used it, however much I disliked doing so. I say that on behalf of the Japanese. . . . The Japanese have constantly referred to the despatch of the Shanghai Defence Force as the justification of what they are doing to-day. . . . The object for the despatch of the two forces, on the face of it, is identical—to defend and protect our own nationals. But there the similarity ends. My object was to carry out this purpose as peacefully as possible and to use force only in the last resort. The policy adopted by the Japanese

in avoiding a serious clash with the Chinese and in preserving the neutrality of the International Settlement. In 1932, on the other hand, one of the foreign Powers with treaty rights at Shanghai, acting independently of the other Powers for the first time, made use of its privileges for the purpose of conducting military operations against Chinese troops in Chinese-administered territory.¹ By so doing, Japan compromised the security of the International Settlement and the French Settlement and struck a blow at the whole juridical status of those Settlements, which had been successfully safeguarded since their first establishment nearly a century earlier.

Before the actual crisis of the 28th-29th January, the dangers to other foreign interests at Shanghai which might result from independent Japanese action had been occupying the minds of the authorities concerned. There was a grave risk that the Chinese might hold all the foreign Powers concerned in the Settlement responsible for the actions of one of them, and might retaliate by an extension of the boycott or even by a direct attack upon the Settlement as the Japanese base of operations. Even if the other Powers did not become embroiled with China, fighting between Chinese and Japanese forces in or round Shanghai was bound to involve a certain degree of peril to the foreign inhabitants of the city, who would be exposed to the risk of becoming targets for hostile bombs or shells; and there was also the danger that disturbances might be created inside the Settlement by Chinese refugees, an influx of whom was to be expected as soon as the Japanese showed signs of translating their threats into deeds. The Shanghai Municipal Council and the Governments concerned did their best to impress these considerations upon Japan both before and after the night of the 28th/29th January; and, although their restraining influence did not suffice to avert the catastrophe, the Japanese Government showed by their replies to these *démarches* that they were not blind to the desirability of avoiding the additional complications which would be created by an overt disregard of the interests of the other Shanghai Powers.

Commander has been entirely different. He has used force with very little provocation. . . . He and I were free to act as we liked in accordance with the instructions of our Governments. My instructions were to keep the peace if I could.' (Sir John Duncan, *loc. cit.*)

On the general question of British policy in 1927 and especially on the relation between the despatch of the Defence Force and the 'December Memorandum' of 1926, see the speech made by Sir Frederick Whyte during the same discussion at Chatham House; and the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, especially pp. 243-4.

¹ The last occasion on which foreign troops had landed at Shanghai for purposes of offence and not of defence appears to have been during the 'Taiping Rebellion' in 1854, when a mixed company of British and Americans routed some 10,000 Chinese at the Battle of Muddy Flat.

On the 22nd January, following the publication of Admiral Shiozawa's threat to take sanctions if the Japanese demands were not accepted, the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council was reported to have sought and obtained an assurance from the Japanese naval and consular authorities that any action which they might take would not affect the Settlement, and that Japanese troops would not be moved into the Settlement without previous consultation with the Municipal Council. The Japanese, however, appear to have insisted that the Municipal Council, in return, must co-operate actively in the suppression of anti-Japanese activities; and Admiral Shiozawa was said to have indicated that the fulfilment of his promise of non-interference with the Settlement would depend on the extent to which the authorities were able to carry out their part of the bargain. During the week of the 21st-28th January, an exchange of views on the subject of the danger which the Japanese attitude constituted to foreign interests at Shanghai took place, on American initiative, between the U.S. and British Governments, and between those Governments and the Governments of France and Italy.¹ On the 27th January the U.S. Government asked the Japanese Government for specific information in regard to the steps which they contemplated taking at Shanghai, and made representations to the effect that 'in view of the efficient police and other sources of protection already available in the International Settlement, there should be no military occupation of that Settlement by Japan unless the municipal force became clearly inadequate to protect life and property'.² By the morning of the 29th, the U.S. Government had received an answer from Japan assuring them 'that the international rights and interests in Shanghai would not be interfered with'.³ On the 28th January, the British Government received from the Japanese Government the information 'that in order to check anti-Japanese movements in Shanghai some drastic measures might be necessary'. Thereupon the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, 'sent immediate instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo' and himself saw the Japanese representative in London in order to express his 'grave concern, and to draw the attention of the Japanese Government to the international issues and obligations involved'.⁴ During

¹ On the 1st February the State Department at Washington received assurances from the French and Italian Governments of their full support for the policy of opposition to Japanese action in the International Settlement.

² Statement by the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, on the 29th January, 1932.

³ Mr. Stimson, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Statement by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 15th February, 1932.

the next two or three days the representatives at Tokyo of the United States and of Great Britain made repeated *démarches* to the Japanese Government, emphasizing the gravity of the situation at Shanghai and making it clear that their Governments 'could not approve of the use of the Settlement except for defensive purposes'.¹ These representations, with which the French Ambassador also associated himself, elicited the reply that Japan had no intention of using the Settlement as a base of operations against the Chinese troops.

In the meantime the local situation at Shanghai had been developing in a way which could not fail to intensify the apprehensions of the international authorities on the spot. An incident which occurred during the night of the 28th/29th January, when Japanese marines attempted to enter Chinese territory by way of the sector held by the Volunteer Corps,² confirmed the suspicion that Admiral Shiozawa's undertaking not to interfere with the Settlement was likely to be forgotten in the heat of action. During the following days, several instances occurred of the intrusion of armed Japanese, singly or in small groups, into other sectors, and a certain number were said to have been arrested by American and British troops and handed over to the Japanese Consul. On the 2nd February a protest was made, through the Consuls, against the interference by Japanese marines with patrols in sectors assigned to other foreign troops, and by midday on the 4th February all Japanese marines had been withdrawn from the British and American sectors.

During the following weeks repeated protests were made by the Consular Body against action on the part of the Japanese or the Chinese forces which imperilled the security of the Settlements.³ From time to time bombs from Japanese aeroplanes or shells from Chinese guns landed inside the boundaries of the International Settlement—fortunately without causing extensive damage or loss of life.⁴ During the earlier phases of the operations, the Japanese

¹ Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 9th February, 1932.

² See p. 481 above.

³ On the 4th February the Consuls also transmitted to the Japanese authorities a protest from the Municipal Council against Japanese interference with public services in districts within the Council's jurisdiction. The Council declared that members of the Municipal Police Force had been deprived of their arms by Japanese marines, that members of the Fire Brigade had been forcibly prevented from executing their duty; and that Japanese patrols had obstructed the conduct of food and hospital services. The Japanese Consul-General replied to the protest, in conciliatory terms, on the 8th February, but by that time the resumption of municipal police control over the Hongkew district had already begun.

⁴ The most serious incidents of this kind occurred on the 11th February, when Japanese aeroplanes engaged in bombing railway sheds just beyond the

air base was in the Yangtsepoo sector of the International Settlement, and aeroplanes flew over the Settlement on their way to drop bombs upon Chapei. The Consular Body repeatedly drew the attention of the Japanese authorities to the danger of this proceeding, which attracted Chinese fire in the direction of the Settlement. The Japanese promised in return that aeroplanes would cease to fly over the Settlement, and though these promises were not scrupulously fulfilled, from about the middle of February onwards the appearance of Japanese aeroplanes over the Settlement was only occasional. The Chinese, however, still made attempts from time to time to hamper Japanese operations by shelling the wharves and the warships in the harbour, and on such occasions the International Settlement lay in the line of fire. Protests to the Chinese authorities on this account and on account of anti-aircraft fire were met by the obvious retort that, so long as the Japanese used the Settlement as a base for their attacks, the Chinese could not be answerable for the consequences.¹

The risk of Chinese action which might endanger foreign lives and property was increased when, in the second week of February, Japanese troops began to arrive at Shanghai, where they disembarked at the Japanese wharves in the Yangtsepoo sector of the Settlement and marched through the Settlement on their way to Hongkew. The landing of the first contingent on the 9th February was followed by representations from the Consular Body; but on the 14th February about half of the Eleventh Division, with guns and tanks, were disembarked at the Japanese wharves at Shanghai. The Consuls then protested again against the continued use of the Settlement as a Japanese base, and the Chinese Foreign Minister also lodged a formal protest with the representatives of the British and American Governments. On the 26th February, when additional Japanese reinforcements were known to be on their way to China, the Ambassadors of Great Britain, the United States, France and Italy called separately upon the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo and requested that

boundary of the Settlement dropped two bombs on a Chinese mill in the American sector, killing five of the Chinese employees and wounding fifteen; on the 17th February, when two British sailors who were guarding wharves in the Hongkew district were fatally injured by shells from Chinese guns; and on the 23rd February, when shells from Chinese guns, directed against the Japanese flagship which was moored at the Japanese wharf in the International Settlement, struck the Italian cruiser *Libia* which was lying close by.

¹ On the 29th January the Commander of the Chinese forces was reported to have addressed to the Municipal Council a formal protest against the use of the Settlement as a Japanese base of operations, and to have accompanied the protest by a hint of possible reprisals against the Settlement.

any further troops who might be sent to Shanghai should not land in the Settlement and that any other necessary measures should be taken in order to avoid danger to the Settlement.¹ Mr. Yoshizawa replied that, although Japan had 'the right to land troops in the Settlement and to anchor ships of war in their present position, she' was 'earnestly desirous of minimizing danger to the Settlement and to foreign interests, and that, accordingly, the military and naval authorities' had 'decided to give the matter as favourable consideration as possible.'² Thereafter, until the fighting had ceased, only reliefs appear to have been landed in the Settlement.³

On the whole, the immediate effect of the Sino-Japanese military operations upon the interests of the other foreign Powers was less serious than might have been feared. The most dangerous time from the point of view of the Settlement was perhaps during the first few days of the operations, when the Chinese troops were at once elated by their success in checking the Japanese penetration into Chapei and maddened by the bombardment of their positions from the air. It was by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that the Chinese, in this mood, might attempt to rush the International Settlement at its weakest point—that is, in the northern sector facing Chapei, where the boundary between the Settlement and Chinese territory was purely artificial.⁴ This danger persisted to some degree throughout the period of the operations in and round Shanghai; but, once the first critical hours had passed, the resentment of the Chinese against the use of the Settlement as a base of operations came to be balanced by the calculation that it would be impolitic for China to alienate the foreign Powers, other than Japan, at this crisis of China's fate by deliberately inflicting damage upon the persons or property of non-Japanese foreign nationals.

¹ According to press reports, the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Italy expressed appreciation of the efforts made by Japan to keep the fighting away from the International Settlement, but the American Ambassador did not associate himself with this part of the representations.

² Statement by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden, in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 1st March, 1932.

³ Mr. Eden, *loc. cit.*

⁴ This was the sector which had presented the most serious problem in 1927, when it had been the scene of the only fighting that took place between the International Defence Force and Chinese troops (see Major-General Sir John Duncan, *loc. cit.*, in footnote 4 on p. 496 above). In 1932 this sector was held by the Volunteer Corps and by British and American troops. The danger that the Chinese might attempt to break through the defences of the Settlement at this point was increased by the fact that the northern sector formed the shortest route from Chapei to the Japanese wharves and the Japanese air base in Yangtsepoo.

The days which preceded the expiry of the Japanese ultimatum on the 20th February were also an anxious time for the authorities in the two Settlements, since it was impossible to forecast with any accuracy the results of the major offensive which was expected to be launched if the ultimatum were rejected. Preparations were made for evacuating foreign women and children if the need should arise,¹ and the Consular Body appealed on the 19th February to both sides to respect the neutrality of the Settlements. They received assurances that the Commanders of both armies had given orders that artillery fire should not be directed towards the Settlement; and, as has been seen, it was the area north of Shanghai rather than Shanghai itself which was the scene of most of the fighting that took place between the 20th February and the 3rd March. The Japanese enveloping movement, which ultimately forced the Chinese to retire from the neighbourhood of Shanghai, endangered the Settlements less than if the same object had been attained by concentrating the attack upon Chapei; and the Japanese were perhaps entitled to claim that the necessity of sparing Shanghai as far as possible had been one of the factors which determined the nature of their operations throughout the period from the 29th January to the 3rd March, 1932. It was doubtless true, for instance—as the Japanese Minister in China, Mr. Shigemitsu, pointed out on the 2nd February²—that the Chinese might have been forced to evacuate their position at a far earlier stage if the Japanese warships in the Whangpoo, firing over the narrow strip of the International Settlement, had brought their heavy guns to bear upon Chapei. It was fortunate for Shanghai that the Japanese Navy was not prepared to take quite such extreme measures as that—impervious though it appeared to be to the odium which the aerial bombardment of Chapei had earned for Japan in the eyes of the world.

(d) NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE JAPANESE AND CHINESE TROOPS
FROM SHANGHAI

On the 29th January, 1932, when Japanese aeroplanes were bombing Chapei, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai appealed to the Consuls of

¹ On the 23rd February, the Japanese Residents' Association, after consultation with the Consul-General, advised all Japanese residents in Shanghai to leave for Japan. This step was not calculated to calm the apprehensions of other foreign residents, but in the event such apprehensions proved to have been unfounded. It was announced on the 9th March that 15,000 Japanese civilians had left Shanghai while the fighting was in progress.

² In an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times*.

the foreign Powers, other than Japan, to use their influence in order to bring about the suspension of the Japanese operations, and on the same day a request for friendly intervention was transmitted to the Government of the United States by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. Two days later, on the 31st January, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Yoshizawa, appealed in his turn to the British, American and French Ambassadors in Tokyo, asking that their Governments should endeavour to persuade the Chinese authorities to withdraw their troops to a safe distance from Shanghai.¹ Thus the repeated attempts of the Great Powers, through their representatives on the spot and through diplomatic channels, to secure the cessation of the fighting at Shanghai, were made at the request of both parties to the dispute.

The first step which was taken in this direction—the arrangement by the American and British Consuls of a truce on the evening of the 29th January²—was only partially successful; and on the 31st January the Consuls renewed their endeavours. On that day they arranged a meeting at the British Consulate between Wu Te-chen, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai, together with Tsai Ting-kai, the Commander of the Cantonese troops, on the Chinese side, and Mr. Murai, the Japanese Consul-General, together with Admiral Shiozawa, on the Japanese side. At this meeting the American and British Consuls put forward suggestions for the creation of a neutral zone between the Chinese and the Japanese forces. The first proposal was, apparently, that both the Chinese and the Japanese troops should withdraw a certain distance—the Japanese troops to their original positions under the defence scheme, and the Chinese troops out of rifle range. The area east of the railway, after its evacuation by the Japanese, was to be policed by neutrals and the area west of the railway by Chinese police. This proposal proved impracticable because the zone between the original Japanese positions and the railway line would have been too narrow for a neutral force to occupy; and this led to a second proposal that the Japanese should withdraw to the boundary of the International Settlement. This second proposal was rejected by the Japanese, who made the counter-

¹ This Japanese appeal seems to have been made after the Government had been informed, rightly or wrongly, that Chiang Kai-shek had ordered the Nineteenth and the Third Divisions of his National Guards to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, in addition to the 30,000 Cantonese troops who were believed to be there already. The Ambassadors had already had several interviews with Mr. Yoshizawa and had made representations on the subject of the Japanese operations at Shanghai, with special reference to the position of the other Powers concerned in the Settlements (see p. 499 above).

² See p. 483 above.

proposal that the neutral zone of the necessary width should be created by a withdrawal of the Chinese only. The notion that the Japanese marines' function of defending the Hongkew Park salient should be taken over by neutral troops offended Japanese national pride, which was already smarting under the knowledge that the Chinese had successfully prevented the attainment of Admiral Shiozawa's objective during the night of the 28th/29th January. Admiral Shiozawa undertook, with some reluctance, to refer the Consuls' proposal for a neutral zone to his Government, and it was agreed that until the Japanese reply had been received the truce should be observed. At about 3 p.m. on the 2nd February (after fighting had re-opened at Shanghai) the Japanese Consul-General informed the Consular Body that the Japanese Government had rejected the proposal for a neutral zone.¹

Meanwhile, the American and British Governments had been in communication with one another, and with the Governments of France and Italy,² in regard to other measures which might be taken with the object of converting the temporary and partial truce into a definite cessation of hostilities. As a result of these deliberations, on the evening of the 2nd February the American and British Ambassadors at Tokyo made a joint *démarche* to the Japanese Government, with the support and approval of the French and Italian Governments, and a similar communication was made at the same

¹ During February there was a good deal of informal discussion, especially in the United States, regarding a proposal, which the Japanese Government were believed to contemplate putting forward, for the creation of a permanent neutral zone round Shanghai and possibly round other Chinese treaty ports (Canton, Hankow, Tsingtao and Tientsin). American opinion was strongly opposed to any project of this kind, and the suggestion does not seem ever to have been formulated officially by the Japanese Government. It was first aired (undisguisedly under official inspiration) by Mr. Shiratori, the head of the Gaimushu Press Bureau, in an interview which he gave to foreign newspaper correspondents at Tokyo on the 8th February.

² On the 2nd February, the British Government had notified the House of Commons at Westminster, through the mouth of Sir John Simon, and the Council of the League of Nations, through the mouth of Mr. J. H. Thomas, that the proposal for a neutral zone which had been put forward by the American and British Consuls-General had their full support; that they had urged the Chinese and Japanese Governments to accept the proposal; and that instructions had been given for British troops to co-operate in patrolling the zone if it could be established. The French and Italian representatives on the Council stated that their Governments had taken steps similar to those mentioned by Mr. Thomas. The Council had resumed its discussion of the Sino-Japanese dispute, at China's request, on the 25th January, and on the 29th the Chinese Government had invoked Articles 10 and 15 of the Covenant, in addition to Article 11, under which the Sino-Japanese dispute had originally been referred to the League. (See section (iv) (c) (1) below.)

time to the Chinese Government. The proposals put forward by the Powers contained the following five points:

- (1) Cessation of all acts of violence on both sides forthwith on the following terms:
- (2) No further mobilization or preparation whatever for further hostilities between the two nations;
- (3) Withdrawal of both Japanese and Chinese combatants from all points of mutual contact in the Shanghai area;
- (4) Protection of the International Settlement by the establishment of neutral zones to divide the combatants; these zones to be policed by neutrals; the arrangements to be set up by the consular authorities;
- (5) Upon acceptance of these conditions prompt advances to be made in negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between the two nations in the spirit of the Pact of Paris and the resolution of the League of Nations of the 10th December,¹ without prior demand or reservation and with the aid of neutral observers or participants.

Unfortunately, in the course of the 2nd February, before these proposals were communicated to the Governments concerned, the situation at Shanghai had changed for the worse, and any attempt to observe the truce which had been arranged on the 29th January had been abandoned.² This change in the position appears to have convinced the Japanese Government that it would no longer be possible for a solution to be reached by negotiation at Shanghai without a serious loss of Japanese 'face'; and this conviction, combined with resentment at the attempt of the Powers to link up the questions of Shanghai and Manchuria, determined the Japanese Government to return a stiff reply to the Anglo-American proposals. Accordingly, while the Chinese Government accepted the proposals unconditionally on the 3rd February, the Japanese reply, which was presented on the 4th February, rejected outright the second and the fifth of the Powers' points, and accepted the others in terms which made acceptance of little practical value. The note ran as follows:

1. The Japanese forces will cease hostile acts if it is assured that the Chinese forces will immediately and completely stop their disturbing and menacing activities. If, on the contrary, the Chinese (including both regular and plain-clothes soldiers) persist in such activities, the Japanese Government must reserve full freedom of action for its military forces.

2. In view of the unreliability of the Chinese in the past and of the gravity of the present situation, the Japanese Government finds it impossible to renounce mobilization or preparations for hostilities.

3 and 4. The Japanese Government has no objection to its Consul-General and Commander entering into negotiations for an agreement concerning the separation of the respective forces and the establishment, if necessary, of a neutral zone in the district of Chapei.

¹ See the *Survey for 1931*, pp. 501-2.

² See p. 487 above.

5. While it is to be presumed that 'all outstanding controversies' between Japan and China include the Manchurian question, the Japanese Government regards this latter as entirely a separate question from the Shanghai affair, and, moreover, it is covered by the League resolution of the 10th December. Furthermore, it is the settled policy of the Japanese Government not to accept the assistance of neutral observers or participants in settlement of the question concerning Manchuria. For these reasons the conditions in Paragraph 5 of the Powers' note are not acceptable to the Japanese Government.¹

The Japanese Government lent added weight to their rejection of the second of the Anglo-American proposals by deciding, on the same day (the 4th February), to send an army division to Shanghai to replace the marines who were holding the Japanese sector;² but, at the same time, they attempted to minimize the effect of the despatch of troops to Shanghai on international opinion by issuing a statement explaining their aims and policy. This statement, which was published in Washington and London, as well as in Tokyo, on the 7th February, laid stress on Japan's desire for peace, recounted the incidents which had preceded the events of the 28th/29th January, and declared that it was the Chinese who had opened fire on the Japanese marines when the latter were 'proceeding to their assigned sector in Chapei'. The reason for the despatch of an army division to Shanghai was said to be that the marines were outnumbered by more than ten to one, while 'the predicament of Japanese residents' was 'beyond description'. There was 'no intention whatever' that the Japanese troops should 'enter upon an aggressive campaign', unless the Chinese, 'by continuing hostilities or by obstructing' the Japanese forces, should compel them 'to take necessary action'. The Japanese Government cherished 'no political ambitions in the region of Shanghai nor any thoughts of encroaching on the rights and interests of any other Power'.

This statement seems to have had a reassuring effect upon public opinion in the United States, and the Government at Washington, which had taken the initiative in the earlier *démarches*, decided to await developments before making any further direct representations to Japan. The representatives of the neutral Powers at Shanghai, however, continued, with the approval of their Governments, to make every effort to mediate between the combatants, and in particular to secure agreement on the establishment of a neutral zone. In their labours for peace the Consuls were reinforced by Admiral Sir Howard Kelly, the Commander of the British squadron, after

¹ Quoted from *The New York Times*, 5th February 1932.

² See p. 487 above.

his arrival at Shanghai on the 5th February,¹ and by the American, British and French Ministers in China, all of whom visited Shanghai in the middle of February, after they had discussed the position and the possibilities of mediation with Wang Ching-wei, the President of the Executive Yuan, at Nanking. Renewed attempts to establish an internationally guaranteed neutral zone failed because the Japanese refused to withdraw their troops at all until the Chinese had retired, voluntarily or under Japanese pressure, to a considerable distance from Shanghai, while the Chinese would only agree to a simultaneous evacuation of the disputed area. The arrival of General Ueda to take command of the Japanese armed forces on the 14th February, and the announcement that he was about to deliver an ultimatum to the Chinese Commander, were followed by an urgent appeal from the League Council to Japan to recognize her 'very special responsibilities for forbearance and restraint',² and by fresh activity on the part of the neutral diplomatic representatives at Shanghai. The American, British and French Ministers succeeded in arranging a meeting between Chinese and Japanese delegates, but their hope that the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum might thereby be averted was doomed to disappointment. The negotiations, which took place on the 18th February, broke down because the Japanese continued to insist upon the unconditional withdrawal of the Chinese troops, and the Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France, having failed to achieve their purpose of restoring peace by direct intervention on the spot, returned to Nanking and resumed their discussions with the Chinese Government.

The next attempt at mediation at Shanghai was made by Admiral Sir Howard Kelly. On the 28th February Admiral Kelly arranged a meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders,³ on board his

¹ Admiral Kelly had interviews with the Chinese leaders on the 7th February and with the Japanese on the 8th. At the interview on the 7th, the Chinese appear to have accepted a proposal for a bilateral withdrawal and for the occupation of a neutral zone by a neutral force—but this on condition that simultaneously the Japanese should agree to open negotiations for the settlement of the whole dispute, including the Manchurian question, with neutral participants. It was pointed out that Japan had already rejected point 5 of the Anglo-American proposal of the 2nd February (see p. 505 above). The Chinese then reduced their demand to a request for a conference, with neutrals present, for the discussion of the Shanghai question 'as a first step towards dealing with the whole problem'. On the 8th the Japanese Minister said that his Government insisted that the Chinese troops should be withdrawn to a distance of 15 or 20 miles out of gun range before they could consider a truce or discuss local questions.

² See p. 565 below.

³ Dr. Wellington Koo and General Wang (General Tsai's Chief of Staff) represented China, while Admiral Nomura and Mr. Matsuoka represented Japan.

flagship, the *Kent*, at which he proposed the immediate cessation of hostilities and the simultaneous withdrawal under neutral supervision of the Chinese and Japanese troops in two stages.¹ Admiral Kelly reported to his Government that 'the discussion was most friendly throughout' and that 'the principle of mutual and simultaneous withdrawal on either side was agreed to'.² The terms of the understanding which had been reached were referred to the two Governments for approval, and on the following day the Chinese Government declared, in a message to their representative at Geneva, that they found the proposals 'reasonable and acceptable'. On the same day (the 29th February) the Chinese and Japanese representatives at Geneva undertook to transmit to their Governments a proposal—for the assembly of an international conference at Shanghai to bring about a 'final conclusion of fighting'—which had been made by Monsieur Paul-Boncour, as President of the Council,³ on the assumption that the meeting on the *Kent* would result in the suspension of hostilities. On the 1st March the Japanese representative at Geneva announced that his Government accepted the principle of a conference at Shanghai; but in the meantime the conditions to which both sides were reported to have agreed provisionally on the 28th February were not being carried out at Shanghai.⁴ On the contrary, the arrival of a new Japanese Commander-in-Chief, General Shirakawa, on the 29th February, was the signal for an even more vigorous Japanese offensive; the Chinese troops began to retreat on the night of the 1st/2nd March; and the Japanese troops continued to advance until, on the 3rd March, they occupied a line to the north-west of Shanghai.⁵

On the 2nd March, after the Chinese had begun their retreat, the Japanese authorities at Shanghai handed their conditions for peace to Admiral Kelly; and on the following day, after the Japanese order to cease fire had been given, another Sino-Japanese Conference took place on board the *Kent* to consider the Japanese 'basic terms'. These were reported to be as follows:

(1) Should the Chinese forces withdraw a distance to be determined by both parties, Japan will agree to a cessation of hostilities for a period

¹ The Chinese troops were first to withdraw to Chenju (a village to the west of Chapei), while the Japanese were to retire inside the boundary of the Settlement. The Chinese troops would then retire to Nanzhang on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, while the Japanese troops would embark for Japan.

² Statement by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, to the League of Nations Council on the 29th February, 1932. ³ See p. 568 below.

⁴ The Lytton Commission noted (on p. 85 of their report) that the conference on board the *Kent* 'was not successful, owing to the differing opinions of the two parties as to the basis of the negotiations'. ⁵ See p. 494 above.

to be agreed on, and, pending subsequent arrangements, both forces shall hold their present positions.

(2) During the cessation of hostilities a round-table conference shall be held at Shanghai, in which representatives of the principal Powers shall participate, the conference to discuss the methods of mutual withdrawal, together with measures for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in and around Shanghai and for safeguarding the Settlement, the French Concession, and foreign lives, property, and interests therein.

(3) Withdrawal shall begin by the Chinese troops to the specified distance, after which the Japanese forces will withdraw to the Shanghai and Woosung areas. As soon as normal conditions prevail the Japanese shall withdraw altogether.

(4) Should either party infringe any of the terms of the truce, the other party shall have freedom of action. Both parties to have the same freedom of action on the expiration of the period agreed on under the first paragraph.¹

These terms were referred to the Chinese Government and were rejected by them on the ground that they differed in two vital respects from the conditions which had been discussed, and provisionally accepted, at the previous conference on board the *Kent*. The Japanese now stipulated that the Chinese troops should withdraw first, instead of the withdrawal being simultaneous; and they declared themselves ready to withdraw only to the Shanghai-Woosung line instead of into the International Settlement.

During the next few days the tension at Shanghai remained very high, and reports were constantly received that fighting had broken out again and that both sides were massing reinforcements.² Actually, it appears that nothing more serious than minor skirmishes occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops after the 3rd March, but the danger that fighting would be resumed on a serious scale could not be eliminated so long as the two armies continued to face one another along a 25-mile line to the north-west of Shanghai. Accordingly, the representatives of the Great Powers, with the approval and authority of the members of the League of Nations who were assembled at Geneva for the purpose of finding a solution of the difficulties between

¹ This was the version published by the Chinese and reproduced in *The Times*, 4th March, 1932.

² The Japanese Fourteenth Division, which had been ordered to China at the end of February (together with the Eleventh Division, whose landing at Tsiyakow on the 1st March had been the principal cause of the Chinese retreat), was landed at Shanghai between the 7th and the 13th March; but some of the troops who had been earlier in the field began to re-embark for Japan on the 20th, so that the Japanese force was not actually increased for any length of time.

China and Japan,¹ spared no effort to assist the Chinese and Japanese authorities in coming to an agreement which would render the cessation of hostilities definitive and would be followed by the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory.

The leading part in the work of mediation was taken by the British Minister in China, Sir Miles Lampson, and it was he who finally devised a formula which was acceptable to both parties. Formal negotiations for a truce agreement began on the 9th March, when the Japanese authorities made use of Sir Miles Lampson's good offices to inform the Chinese authorities that they were ready 'to make a definite agreement for the complete cessation of hostilities, and then to discuss and determine an arrangement for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces'. A conference on the cessation of hostilities was opened on the 24th March and continued until the second week of April, when a deadlock appeared to have been reached.² The difficulties which were encountered arose out of the fact that the main object of the Chinese was to secure the unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese troops, whereas the main object of the Japanese was to obtain guarantees that the situation in Shanghai would not revert to that which had existed before the 28th January as soon as the Japanese troops were withdrawn. Accordingly, the Japanese insisted that their forces must remain in their present position until they considered that conditions at Shanghai had become normal—to which the Chinese retorted that conditions would never become normal so long as Japanese forces occupied Chinese soil. In these circumstances, the task of the 'honest brokers' was far from easy, and no solution appeared to be in sight when the negotiations were suspended on the 11th April. The Japanese were prepared to withdraw to a line stretching from Shanghai to Woosung as soon as an armistice agreement had been concluded, but they were still insisting that the responsibility for deciding that 'normal conditions' had been restored

¹ The Special Assembly of the League of Nations which had been convened at China's request held its opening meeting on the 3rd March. On the 4th it adopted a resolution calling upon the Governments of China and Japan 'to take immediately the necessary measures to ensure that the orders . . . for the cessation of hostilities shall be made effective' and requesting the Powers with interests at Shanghai to assist in 'the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definite the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces'. On the 11th March the Assembly appointed a Committee of nineteen members, whose first function was 'to report as soon as possible on the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of arrangements which shall render definitive the said cessation and regulate the withdrawal of the Japanese forces'. (The proceedings at Geneva are described in greater detail in section (iv) (c) below.)

² The conference had announced on the 30th March that an agreement for the cessation of hostilities had been reached, but further difficulties supervened.

and that their troops could be withdrawn into the International Settlement must rest with them. The Chinese held that a definite time-limit for the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops must form part of the armistice agreement, and they appealed to the League of Nations to give a ruling that the Japanese standpoint was not in accordance with the terms of the resolutions which had been adopted at Geneva.¹ On the 19th April the League Assembly's Committee of Nineteen adopted a resolution² in which they recommended that the diplomatic representatives of the neutral Powers should be made responsible for deciding, at the request of one of the parties, and if necessary by a majority vote, that the time had come when the Japanese troops might reasonably be withdrawn into the Settlement. This recommendation was not acceptable to Japan, who adopted her usual tactics of delaying her reply to the League's proposals. On the 26th April, however, Sir Miles Lampson succeeded in finding a formula which both sides could accept. This was that the neutral diplomatic representatives should not decide when the time had come for complete Japanese evacuation of Chinese territory, but should confine themselves to advising the Japanese military authorities that, in their opinion, normal conditions had been sufficiently restored to justify the withdrawal of the Japanese troops into the Settlement. This compromise was accepted by the Chinese and by the Japanese on the 27th April, and enabled them to conclude a formal armistice agreement which would put an end officially to the hostilities that had opened on the night of the 28th/29th January.

The signature of the agreement was delayed for a few days, however, owing to an outrage which occurred on the 29th April, when a bomb was thrown by a Korean during a review of Japanese troops which was held in the Hongkew Park in honour of the Japanese Emperor's birthday. Practically all the Japanese military and naval leaders then in Shanghai, including Admiral Nomura and Generals Shirakawa and Ueda, received serious injuries, as did the Japanese Minister, Mr. Shigemitsu, and the Consul-General, Mr. Murai. Fortunately, since the assailant was a Japanese subject, the Japanese Government decided to treat this outrage as an independent incident which had no connexion with the situation in Shanghai, and on the 5th May the armistice agreement was duly signed.³

¹ See the preceding footnote, and pp. 574 and 578-80 below.

² See p. 581 below.

³ Two of the Japanese signatories—Mr. Shigemitsu and General Ueda—were confined to bed in hospital as a result of the injuries which they had sustained on the 29th April, and Mr. Shigemitsu had his leg amputated a few hours after affixing his signature. The principal Chinese signatory, Kuo

The agreement ran as follows:

Article 1. The Japanese and Chinese authorities having already ordered the cease fire, it is agreed that the cessation of hostilities is rendered definite as from the 5th May, 1932; the forces of the two sides will, so far as lies in their control, cease around Shanghai all and every form of hostile act. In the event of doubts arising in regard to the cessation of hostilities, the situation in this respect will be ascertained by the representatives of the participating friendly Powers.

Article 2. The Chinese troops will remain in their present positions pending later arrangements upon the re-establishment of normal conditions in the areas dealt with in this Agreement. The aforesaid positions are indicated in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

Article 3. The Japanese troops will withdraw to the International Settlement and the extra-settlement roads in the Hongkew district as before the incident of the 28th January, 1932. It is, however, understood that, in view of the numbers of Japanese troops to be accommodated, some will have to be temporarily stationed in localities adjacent to the above-mentioned areas. The aforesaid localities are indicated in Annex 2 to this Agreement.

Article 4. A joint commission, including members representing the participating friendly Powers, will be established to certify the actual withdrawal. This commission will also collaborate in arranging for the transfer from evacuating Japanese forces to the incoming Chinese police, who will take over as soon as the Japanese forces withdraw. The constitution and procedure of this commission will be as defined in Annex 3 to this Agreement.

Article 5. The present Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature thereof.

The present Agreement is made in the Chinese and Japanese and English languages. In the event of there being any doubt as to the meaning or any difference of meaning between the Chinese and Japanese and English texts, the English text shall be authoritative.¹

There were three annexes to the agreement: the first two set out the exact positions of the Chinese and Japanese troops, while the third dealt with the constitution and functions of the Joint Commission. The second annex provided that 'the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the localities indicated will commence within one week of the coming into force of the agreement and will be completed in four weeks from the commencement of the withdrawal'. In the

Tai-chi, was also in hospital, having been assaulted three days earlier by students who were opposed to the armistice terms.

¹ Text issued as a British White Paper (China No. 1, 1932, *Cmd.* 4077). The Chinese signed the agreement subject to two reservations. 'The first declared that nothing in the agreement was to imply permanent restriction of the movement of Chinese troops in Chinese territory, and the second that it was to be understood that, even in areas temporarily provided for the stationing of Japanese troops, all municipal functions, including that of policing, would remain with the Chinese authorities.' (*Lytton Report*, p. 86.)

third annex it was laid down that 'all matters of procedure will be left to the discretion of the Commission, whose decisions will be taken by a majority vote', and that 'the Commission will, in accordance with its decisions, watch in such manner as it deems best the carrying out of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this agreement, and is authorized to call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of the three articles mentioned above'. The American Consul-General at Shanghai was subsequently appointed chairman of the Commission.

This agreement was satisfactory in so far as it ensured the separation of the Chinese and Japanese armies, which had hitherto remained facing one another, but it did not fix a definite time-limit for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the Settlement, nor did it provide any guarantees against the resumption of anti-Japanese activities as soon as the troops had retired. There was room for apprehension, therefore, lest the Japanese should insist on maintaining troops on Chinese soil for an indefinite period on the ground that the situation had not become sufficiently normal to justify their reduction to a number that could be stationed inside the Settlement.¹

In the event, however, the withdrawal of all the Japanese troops from the neighbourhood of Shanghai was effected within the time-limits mentioned in Annex 3 of the armistice agreement. The Eleventh Division and the Twenty-fourth Mixed Brigade had already been withdrawn before the end of March, and embarkation proceeded rapidly when once the armistice agreement had been signed. On the 11th May the Cabinet in Tokyo decided to withdraw all troops from Shanghai within a month, on the understanding—as the Foreign Office spokesman explained in announcing the decision—that Japan would hold the other Powers and world opinion responsible if the withdrawal resulted in a fresh menace to Shanghai. The last of the troops left Shanghai on the 31st May, and there remained only 2,500 marines for garrison duties. The areas evacuated by Japanese troops 'were turned over to the Chinese Special Police Force between the 9th and 30th May'. Certain difficulties arose at this stage, however, over the question of compensation for damage done to Chinese property during the fighting. 'It was but natural that, when the Chinese owners of houses and factories, officials of railways and companies and others began to re-enter the evacuated areas, numerous complaints concerning looting, wilful destruction and

¹ The Committee of Nineteen had these considerations in mind when they submitted to the Assembly on the 30th April (that is, before the actual signature of the agreement), a resolution declaring, *inter alia*, that the Assembly's resolution of the 4th March would 'only have been fully complied with when the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn'. (See p. 582 below.)

carrying away of property should have been addressed to the Japanese military authorities. In the opinion of the Chinese, the whole question of reparations' remained 'for further negotiations'. They estimated 'the casualties in killed, wounded and missing as 24,000 officers, men, and civilians, and the total material loss at 1,500,000,000 Mexican dollars'.¹

Towards the end of May the Japanese Government initiated a 'confidential discussion'² with certain of the foreign Ambassadors in Tokyo in regard to the possibility of holding a conference at Shanghai to discuss what measures might be taken in future for the protection of foreign lives and property in China.³ The Japanese seem to have intended that the Chinese Government should not be represented at this Conference, and in the United States they were again credited with the intention of bringing forward proposals for the establishment of a permanent neutral zone round Shanghai and possibly round other Chinese cities.⁴ The Governments of the United States and of Great Britain both made it clear that they could not contemplate such a conference without Chinese participation, and the suggestion then lapsed.

It remains to state that the Japanese attempt to cut the knot at Shanghai with the sword did not achieve its purpose. Anti-Japanese activities continued; and at the end of August 1932, simultaneously with the Japanese recognition of 'Manchukuo', there were rumours of further trouble impending at Shanghai and of the despatch of a Japanese naval squadron to the Whangpoo for the protection of Japanese nationals in case the continued boycott should lead to further outbreaks of violence. Something like a panic took place in Shanghai, and a certain number of Chinese abandoned their homes in Chapei in the belief that another Japanese attack was imminent. On the 1st September, however, the Mayor of Greater Shanghai issued a proclamation declaring that he was 'determined to suppress

¹ *Lytton Report*, p. 86. The Chinese Government announced at the end of May that their military losses amounted to 4,274 killed and 1,770 wounded. The Shanghai Bureau of Social Affairs estimated in the middle of March that 6,080 Chinese civilians had been killed and over 2,000 wounded, while there were 10,040 missing. The number of families driven from their homes was estimated at 160,000. As for Japanese casualties, it was announced in Tokyo on the 11th May that there had been 634 killed and 1,791 wounded during the five weeks' fighting round Shanghai.

² Mr. Eden in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th May, 1932.

³ The Japanese appear to have based this suggestion on the proposal, which had been made by Monsieur Paul-Boncour at the League Council on the 29th February, that an international Conference should be set up at Shanghai 'for the purpose of bringing about a final conclusion of fighting and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the Shanghai area'. ⁴ See footnote on p. 504 above.

lawlessness with all the lawful means at his disposal' and urging the Chinese public and press to discourage the circulation of sensational rumours. This proclamation was apparently the outcome of a frank interchange of views between the Chinese and Japanese authorities in view of the increased tension which had been noticeable during the past few days. As a result of the precautions which were taken, the 18th September, the anniversary of the Japanese occupation of Mukden, which was observed as a day of national humiliation in Shanghai, passed off without serious disturbance; and thereafter the situation between Chinese and Japanese in Shanghai was not such as to give rise to special anxiety.

(iv) The Diplomatic Repercussions

(a) THE ATTITUDES OF THE POWERS

IN the preceding volume some account has been given of the diplomatic repercussions that were produced during the last quarter of the year 1931 by the Japanese military operations in Manchuria which began on the 18th/19th September of that year. At the turn of the years 1931 and 1932 the diplomatic situation was still inconclusive; but two features had emerged, one of which boded ill and the other well for the prospects of an eventual vindication of international law and order.

The ominous feature was the hesitation and pusillanimity which were manifest in the counsels of the world now that it was a question of putting restraint upon an aggressor which happened to be one of the five great naval and military Powers of the day.¹ The hopeful feature was the prospect of effective international solidarity which was opened up—for the first time since the non-ratification of the Peace Treaty of Versailles by the Senate at Washington on the 19th March, 1920—in view of a marked change of temper and attitude which had declared itself in the United States under the shock of the Japanese *coup* and under the anxiety of the protracted crisis to which that *coup* had given rise.

¹ This hesitation and pusillanimity were accounted for to some extent by certain recent and perhaps temporary features in the international situation. One such feature of a world-wide range was the World Economic Crisis. Another, of European range, was the recent tendency for the states of Continental Europe to re-divide into two hostile camps with France and her satellites in the one camp and with Germany and Italy and their satellites in the other. Undoubtedly these considerations sapped the vitality of statesmanship by depriving the statesmen of the necessary margin of power and security and ways and means for incurring lesser immediate risks in order to exorcise the greater risks of a slightly more distant future.

In the preceding volume some account has been given of this new tendency in the United States to welcome, and even to solicit, co-operation with other Powers individually, and with the League of Nations as a whole, in upholding the 'post-war' collective system of security, which was now exposed, in a quarter towards which the American people were particularly sensitive, to the most serious challenge that it had yet been called upon to encounter. This new American inclination to regard international solidarity as a safeguard rather than an entanglement was still, no doubt, fitful and precarious. The measure of co-operation with the League to which the United States Government committed themselves when they accepted the invitation to send a representative to attend the session of the Council on the 16th-24th October, 1931, was not maintained at the next session of the Council on the 16th November-10th December, 1931, when an American representative sat in an hotel in the same city but did not appear in the council chamber. On the whole, however, by comparison with the international history of the preceding twelve years, the salient feature in the last quarter of 1931 was the tendency of the United States to follow the path of co-operation, while the inevitable reaction of repenting this temerity was secondary and subordinate in American hearts and minds.

By the turn of the years 1931 and 1932 the diplomatic crisis arising from the Sino-Japanese conflict had lasted long enough for the attitudes of the countries that were not direct parties to the dispute to become more or less clearly defined. By this time the countries of the World, other than China and Japan, could be classified, on this criterion, into at least four distinct groups. The first group consisted of a single Power: the United States. The second group, which was the largest in numbers and in moral though not in military strength, consisted of the small countries of the world, and particularly of those small countries in Europe which had preserved their neutrality during the General War of 1914-18. The attitude of this group was apparently shared by one European Great Power, namely Italy, in so far as she showed her hand. The third group consisted of the remaining European Great Powers, namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The fourth group, like the first, consisted of a single Power: in this case, the U.S.S.R.

The respective attitudes of these several groups may be described as follows.

The United States was sincerely desirous that effective international action should be taken to guard against any permanent and irrevocable alteration of the *status quo* in the Far East as a result of the

Japanese Government's resort to force. In desiring this the Americans were inspired by two motives, one general and one particular, which reinforced one another. The general motive was a desire to salvage the collective system of security, and above all the Multilateral Pact of Paris ('The Kellogg-Briand Pact'), which the Americans cherished as their own creation. The particular motive in American minds was to prevent an unwarrantable change, through unlawful means, in the local Balance of Power in the Far East: a region in which the United States had a territorial stake in the shape of the Philippines and a prospective commercial stake of still greater value in the expectation of an increasing American share in a growing Chinese market. It may be added—for this was a psychological factor of some importance—that American intervention in the international affairs of the Far East was not inhibited by the traditional American horror of 'foreign entanglements'; for this horror was confined, in effect, to entanglements in Europe, which was the quarter to which the original warning had applied. The chill which never failed to strike American hearts at the bare notion of embarking upon a foreign policy which might eventually involve the United States in sending troops to the Old World by way of the Atlantic was not induced with the same poignancy by the thought of sending the same troops to the other side of the same Eurasian Continent by way of the Pacific.

As for the small countries they cherished the same desire as the United States, though they were actuated by the first American motive only, without the second. None of these countries had territorial stakes in the Far East—with the two exceptions of Portugal, who had a little territory to lose there, and the Netherlands, who had great possessions adjoining the Philippines in Indonesia. Otherwise, the small countries shared the American desire to see force deprived of profit in the Far East because they desired the preservation of the collective system of security; and they desired this even more keenly than it was desired by the Americans, since they were aware that this was the only form of security that stood between them and some lawless assault on the part of a great military Power in the manner of Japan's assault upon China in September 1931 or of Germany's assault upon Belgium in August 1914.¹

The attitude of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

¹ The attitude of the small countries in this matter has been touched upon in the *Survey for 1931* on pp. 503-4; and in the present volume it is discussed again below on pp. 575-7, *à propos* of the stand which was taken by the representatives of a number of these countries when the convocation of the Special Assembly of the League of Nations on the 3rd March, 1932, gave them an opportunity of speaking their minds in public.

differed markedly both from that of the small countries and from that of the United States. Concern for the preservation of the collective system was not a conspicuous element in either French or German or British policy in dealing with the Far Eastern crisis. On the contrary, all three Powers alike were actuated by motives of their own which approximated in character to the second of the two American motives rather than to the first—but with this unfortunate difference that whereas, in the case of the United States, self-interest and public spirit pointed in one and the same direction, in the case of these three European Powers their self-interest—or supposed self-interest, as envisaged on a short view—appeared to point in the opposite direction to their international obligations.

Germany showed an inclination to give Japan support and countenance in her defiance of the world—or at any rate to abstain from joining hands with other Powers in seeking to bring Japan to reason. In taking this line, Germany was, perhaps, partly moved by the hope of some day receiving favours from a powerful country in return for German complacency in a matter in which Germany felt no direct interest of her own to be at stake; while her attitude was also perhaps determined in part by a more creditable, though not more rational, motive: that is to say, by an instinctive fellow-feeling for any country that was being placed in the position (from which Germany herself had suffered so acutely within recent memory) of being a moral outlaw in the world's eyes.¹

This German sympathy towards Japan had been revealed at a meeting of the League Council on the 15th October, 1931, when the Japanese delegate's German colleague had cast the sole vote, beside the Japanese delegate's own, which was recorded in favour of a certain Japanese proposal.²

The attitude of Germany, as it has been sketched above, was closely

¹ This German 'post-war' impulse to cherish a fellow-feeling for a fellow-outlaw had, of course, been particularly conspicuous in the German attitude towards Russia since the time when the respective outcomes of the Russian Revolution and the General War had brought Russia and Germany into a common disgrace in the eyes of the victorious Allied and Associated Powers. This sympathy for Russia as a fellow-outlaw was felt quite strongly in Germany, even in circles which were bitterly hostile to the Communist creed for which the Soviet Government stood. In these German circles, the community of outlawry counted for more than the difference of political faith, and this sentiment was an important factor in determining the course of German-Russian relations during the post-war years. (See the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 30-1; the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 63-6; the *Survey for 1927*, Part II E, section (v); the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 125-7.) A faint touch of the same sentiment can perhaps be detected behind the German attitude towards Japan in 1931-2. ² For this incident see the *Survey for 1931*, p. 492, footnote 2.

reproduced in the attitude of France; and it was a characteristic mark of the perversity that was in the ascendant at this time in international affairs that this inclination, in face of the Far Eastern crisis, to make favour with Japan and to leave the collective system of security to take care of itself should have been one of the rare coincidences in which the French and the Germans saw eye to eye. The motives in the minds of the two nations were largely the same. Like the Germans, the French felt that no direct interest of their own was at stake in Manchuria; and, feeling this, they yielded to the same inclination to practise the policy that is attributed to the Unjust Steward in the Parable.

Thus, in general, the French and the German attitudes were the same; but the French attitude was more positively pronounced—partly, no doubt, because at this time the action or inaction of France counted for more than that of Germany in international affairs; and partly because, since the General War of 1914-18, France had retained her pre-war territorial stakes in the Far East, whereas Germany's insular possessions in the Pacific and leased territory of Kiao-chao, in the Chinese province of Shantung, as well as the German concession at Hankow, had been forfeit in the Peace Settlement.¹ In her Indo-Chinese possessions and protectorates, France had a territorial stake in the Far East which was comparable to the stake of the United States in the Philippines; but the respective workings of this consideration in French and in American minds were very different. The American concern for the Philippines reinforced the American concern for the collective system of security in impelling the United States to oppose the aggrandizement of Japan in Manchuria. On the other hand, the French concern for Indo-China impelled France to display herself to Japan, on the issue of Manchuria, in the light of a friend—presumably on the calculation that if France struck this attitude in Japan's hour of need, Japan might be disposed, in return, at least to exclude the French possessions and leased territories and concessions and settlements in the Far East from the field of Japanese territorial ambitions.

French diplomacy may also have entertained the idea that Japanese friendship would be a valuable asset to France in the event of any threat to the position of France in the Far East, either in the form of an external attack by some foreign Power other than Japan, or else in the form of a rising against French rule on the part of any of the Far Eastern populations that were subject to French colonial government.

¹ See *The History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. vi, pp. 382-3.

Whatever the respective weight of these various considerations in French minds may have been, there is no doubt that, at the turn of the years 1931 and 1932, Japan was receiving tacit support from the French Government and overt support from the French press. The one effective limiting factor which kept this French policy within bounds was a feeling that, in view of the immense power of the United States, it would be imprudent to allow French complaisance towards Japan to go to an extreme at which it would be in flagrant contradiction with the policy of the State Department at Washington.

This tentative appreciation of the French attitude may perhaps appear at first sight to credit French minds with a scarcely credible narrowness of vision. If not only the people of the United States, but also the peoples of the small countries, were actuated in their Far Eastern policy, at least to some extent, by concern over the large issue of the collective system of security, is it really credible that the policy of France was not influenced by this consideration at all? The interdependence between this general issue of security and the local issue of the Sino-Japanese conflict can hardly have been obscure to French minds when it was plain to American minds, since the French boasted themselves (and this with justice) to be the most intellectual and the most logical-minded nation in the world. Nor can it be supposed that the French divined the interdependence of these two issues, but regarded the fact with indifference; for, so far from being indifferent to the question of 'security', the French were notoriously obsessed by it. How, then, was it that, in this supreme ordeal of the 'post-war' collective system of security, France held her peace and left the cause of security to be championed by the United States and by the small countries (including France's own ally, Czechoslovakia)?

This pertinent query in regard to French policy is partly answered by the statement that the framework within which France envisaged her problem of security was not oecumenical but European. Both for the small countries and for the United States, security was fundamentally a matter of vindicating a principle by enlisting a world-wide public opinion on its behalf. For France, on the other hand, security was primarily a matter of maintaining a preponderance of military power on the continent in which France herself happened to be located.

Within the limits of this Continental European framework, French minds took the wide and logical view that was to be expected of them; and whenever the problem of security in Europe was discussed between French and British statesmen or diplomatists or experts, the French

were perpetually amazed at the narrowness and the illogicality of a British state of mind which stolidly refused to acknowledge the patent fact that, under 'post-war' conditions, the whole of Europe was an indivisible strategic and diplomatic unity, and which accordingly consented to swallow the Locarno Pacts while it strained at the Geneva Protocol. To French minds, the Geneva Protocol was essentially a Pan-European instrument.¹ Yet an observer who concurred with the French view of the British attitude towards Europe might apply the moral to France herself by pointing out that in reality the Protocol was not merely Pan-European but oecumenical; and that, if the British vision of the security problem in Europe was to be condemned as myopic because it saw no further than the Rhine, then French eyes, too, were open to the charge of being afflicted with the same malady if they failed to see beyond the parochial framework of Europe in attempting to envisage a problem which, in the last analysis, was patently world-wide. In the strange insensitiveness of French opinion to the bearing of Japanese aggression in the Far East upon French security in Europe, this French myopia was signally demonstrated. The same French minds that instinctively apprehended international questions in general terms, when these questions arose in Europe, were apparently unable to see the capital question which had arisen in the Far East in other terms than those of the local French interests in Indo-China.

Even so, it might have been supposed that France would have rallied instinctively to the defence of the sanctity of treaties. For was not Japan flagrantly violating the Multilateral Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty for the preservation of the integrity of China? And was not France a signatory of all these instruments—not to speak of her equal claim with the United States to the authorship of the first-named instrument of the three (a claim which was acknowledged in its popular short title: 'the Kellogg-Briand Pact')?

On this point, it must be observed that treaties, in this post-war age, fell into two distinct classes. In the one class there were general treaties which asserted the rights of all states equally by vindicating general principles for the government of international relations; and this was the class to which the three instruments above-mentioned all belonged. There was, however, another class of treaties which was more old-fashioned and therefore more familiar: the class of treaties which asserted the particular rights of particular countries

¹ See the *Survey for 1924*, pp. 36-64; the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 2-25; the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 138-9.

in particular fields of interest. The Sino-Japanese group of treaties and agreements relating to South Manchuria were instruments of this second class; and while the public opinion of the world was arraigning Japan for her violation of the three general treaties aforesaid, the Japanese were seeking to excuse themselves on the ground that they were simply acting in self-defence, inasmuch as they were defending their local Japanese treaty-rights. In appreciating the French attitude towards this Japanese plea, it must be borne in mind that the treaties which Japan had imposed on China in 1915 belonged to the same class, and had been brought into force by the same means, as the peace treaty which France had compelled Germany to sign at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919. When the Chinese disputed the validity of the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915 on the ground that they were signed under duress, and the Japanese retorted that, if these treaties were voided on this ground, then there would be very few treaties in the world that would retain their validity,¹ the Japanese argument was assuredly not lost on French minds—to which, of course, it was deliberately directed. And when the Japanese pleaded, in their turn, that, in their military occupation of Chinese territory in Manchuria outside the Japanese Zone, they were perforce employing the only effective means for defending their treaty-rights against a deliberate attempt to nullify them on the other signatory's part, a French audience could not fail to remember that this very maxim—

The same arts that did gain
A power, must it maintain.

—had been acted upon by the French Government in the French military occupation of the Ruhr some nine years earlier.²

Having now found some explanation of the attitudes of France and Germany, we have to inquire how it came about that a similar attitude was adopted by the United Kingdom; and, here again, we may find our explanation in the convergence of a variety of considerations and motives.

¹ See the *League of Nations Official Journal*, December 1931, pp. 2516-17.

² The Japanese apologia for the military occupation of Manchuria as a necessary and therefore legitimate act of self-defence against attempted violations of Japanese treaty-rights was in fact more convincing than the similar French apologia for the military occupation of the Ruhr. For the alleged German breaches of treaty which the French adduced were merely passive (consisting in the non-payment of debts and non-fulfilment of other German treaty-obligations), whereas the Japanese alleged that the Chinese were not merely failing to carry out their own treaty-obligations, but were making a deliberate assault upon Japanese treaty-rights.

From the very beginning of the international crisis which was precipitated by the Japanese *coup* of the 18th/19th September, 1931, opinion in the United Kingdom was sharply divided on the question of what the policy of the British Government ought to be; and this division—unlike the usual alignment of British opinion on questions of foreign policy—showed a tendency to follow the domestic lines of division between political parties and social classes. The British 'governing class'¹ (which had come back into power in the United Kingdom on the 25th August, 1931, twenty-five days before the Japanese launched their offensive in Manchuria) revealed an instinctive sympathy for Japan which is traceable to several distinct sources.

One of these sources was the spirit for which the name 'Imperialism' had been coined by its critics. During the 'post-war' years, British 'Imperialism' had been steadily retreating in the great Asiatic dependency of the British Empire in India; and while it was true that, even in imperialistic-minded circles, the wisdom of this political strategy in India had been recognized by all but a small and unrepresentative minority, it was also true that, in these same circles, the new policy had been accepted somewhat grudgingly, with a certain resentment and misgiving, as a painful and humiliating necessity rather than as a desirable and promising step forward in political progress. In these British eyes it seemed as though the historic mission of the British Raj in India were in the act of being destroyed and not in the act of being fulfilled; and it also seemed somehow unnatural that, in the relations between the English and the Indians, it should now be the English that were making concessions and the Indians that were having their way. In fact, in these circles in the United Kingdom, the policy of raising India, by progressive stages, to Dominion status had been accepted with the head but not with the heart. The psychological outcome was a residual grievance, in these circles, against the 'uppishness' of 'under-dog' in Asia; and the more thoroughly and steadily this feeling was repressed in the field of responsible political action, the more insistently it demanded some irresponsible emotional vent. This vent was half-unconsciously, but none the less effectively, supplied by the spectacle of the Japanese turning and rending the Chinese, first in Manchuria and then at

¹ This conventional term was perhaps strictly obsolete now that a Government representing 'the Working Class' (in the conventional sense) had twice held office in the United Kingdom. At the same time, the old terminology held the field, pending its replacement by some other. In the present chapter, the term 'Governing Class' is used in its widest sense to include 'the City' and 'Big Business' as well as 'the Professions' and 'the Services' and the rapidly dwindling category of 'gentlefolk of independent means'.

Shanghai; for the equation of the Chinese with the Indians and the Japanese with the British presented itself irresistibly to British minds that were imperialistically inclined. These British minds had long been convinced by their native common sense that, in India, it was no longer 'practical politics' for 'top-dog' to deal with 'under-dog' in this drastic fashion. But, on this very account, they nursed a strong feeling that 'under-dog' stood in need of receiving from somebody the lesson which British hands in India were not able any longer to administer to him. And now, here at last, in the Far East, 'under-dog' was receiving this salutary lesson from the Japanese. Was not 'gallant little Japan' here fighting a battle which was really the battle of every Imperial Power in Asia?

If this was the general sentiment of the British governing class at the turn of the years 1931 and 1932, it was reinforced, in the hearts of certain influential sub-groups within that class, by certain additional considerations.

In those mercantile circles, for example, that were engaged in the China trade, it needed no emotional analogy between Britain and Japan or between the Indians and the Chinese to awaken the feeling that the Japanese were fighting a British battle. For these British circles were not merely hostile to the Chinese in their symbolic capacity as representatives of an insurgent Asiatic 'under-dog'. They were exasperated with the Chinese themselves as the result of a long-drawn-out encounter in circumstances similar to those which had aroused an exasperation against the Indians among wider circles of English people of the same class. For, on a smaller scale, the policy of the British Government in China, and the reaction to this policy on the part of those English people who were personally concerned, had been following much the same course as the contemporaneous British policy and British reaction in India. In China, as in India, British policy had been executing a calculated political retreat which British hearts resented, notwithstanding its approval by British heads; the resultant psychological situation was very similar; and the emotional satisfaction which the action of Japan supplied was, of course, all the stronger in this case because it was direct.

In order to understand the attitude of the British business community interested in the China trade towards the Sino-Japanese conflict which broke out on the 18th/19th September, 1931, it must be remembered that, during the six years and more that spanned the interval between that date and the Shanghai and Shameen shooting incidents of the 30th May and the 23rd June, 1925,¹ British interests

¹ For these incidents, see the *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii, pp. 381-7.

in China had suffered fully as much, in the aggregate, as Japanese interests in China from the Chinese 'anti-foreign movement',¹ while the policy of Great Britain in China in the face of provocation and injury to British nationals had been at least as forbearing as the policy of Japan during the same years.² At the turn of the years 1931 and 1932, when Japan was handling China with the mailed fist instead of the velvet glove, while British policy still remained what it had been, it was perhaps human—though probably short-sighted and unquestionably unedifying—that a certain section of the British trading community which had had unpleasant experiences of Chinese hostility or unreasonableness in previous years should remember old scores and should take a malicious pleasure in seeing them paid off by the Japanese Army on behalf (as they saw it) of the whole foreign trading community in China, European as well as Japanese. In any case, this feeling was not only rife in these particular British circles, but was openly displayed; and since those Englishmen who had personal dealings with China were apt to be taken as oracles on Far Eastern affairs by the rest of their fellow-countrymen, this temper in these circles was a not unimportant factor in the formation of British public opinion at a time when the manifest gravity of the Sino-Japanese conflict was arousing an unusually widespread interest in the Far Eastern problem in the United Kingdom.³

Another influential sub-group within the British governing class which had special reasons for adopting and advocating a 'pro-Japanese' point of view was the element conventionally described as 'naval and military circles'. The responsible representatives of 'the fighting services', and especially the representatives of the Navy, were naturally alive to the fact that the total effect of the Washington Treaties of 1921-2 had been to leave Japan physically supreme in the Far East on land and sea and in the air. The strategic position was such that the Japanese Empire with its insular and continental dependencies, including the newly occupied territory in Manchuria, was virtually immune from any serious attack on the part of any foreign Power, whereas a number of important foreign holdings in

¹ For the Chinese 'anti-foreign movement' and its effects on British and Japanese interests in China during these years, see the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, section (xii); the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, section (iii); the *Survey for 1928*, Part IV, section (ii).

² For Japanese policy towards China in this phase, see the *Survey for 1931*, p. 401.

³ There was, it is true, another section of the British trading community in China which was sympathetic towards the Chinese; but unfortunately this section consisted, for the most part, of the less aggressive and less vociferous of the merchants, whose voices were drowned by the chorus of the 'Die-hards'.

the Far East were potential hostages in the hands of Japan. In the event of hostilities, the Japanese had it in their power to strike at Russia by attacking the Maritime Province, and at the United States by attacking the Philippines, and at France by attacking Indo-China, and at the British Empire by attacking Hongkong and Malaya, and at all the world by attacking the two foreign settlements at Shanghai, in which almost every trading nation in the world had a certain stake. This strategic consequence of the Washington Treaties had of course been foreseen, and deliberately incurred, at the Washington Conference as a *quid pro quo* for the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The intention had been to assure Japan that she was not threatened with an aggressive anti-Japanese combination on the part of the English-speaking Powers; and the indispensable guarantee that Japan would not abuse the regional immunity, thus conferred upon her, for the purpose of regional aggression had been the Japanese signature of the Nine-Power Treaty which provided for the integrity of China. The 'gentleman's agreement' which was thus implicit in the Washington Treaties had been thrown to the winds by the Japanese on the night of the 18th/19th September, 1931; but the strategic consequences of the Washington settlement remained; and accordingly it was not only the right, but the duty of responsible naval and military experts in countries which were under an obligation to uphold the collective system of security, to scrutinize anxiously any collective policy which might conceivably lead to hostilities between their own country and Japan, and to point out plainly to their own countrymen what the naval and military implications were likely to be.

The question remains: Why was it that these warning voices were raised more loudly—or at any rate heard more audibly—in this crisis from the lips of British naval and military experts than from those of their American colleagues?

The fact seems to be that, in addition to the professional anxieties in regard to the strategic situation in Far Eastern waters which must have been shared at this juncture by all the naval experts of all the naval Powers other than Japan herself, the British naval experts were also affected by another consideration which was a psychological legacy of recent history. For the policy of judicious concession which the British Government had pursued towards India in consenting to the progressive introduction of Dominion self-government, and towards China in rendering back the British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang and in negotiating for the surrender of extraterritoriality, had likewise been pursued by the British Government towards the

United States in the successive naval negotiations which, in the London Naval Treaty of the 22nd April, 1930, had reached their intended conclusion in the establishment of a thorough-going Anglo-American naval parity. In all these great and statesmanlike transactions, the course of psychological events had been the same. The British governing class had been convinced intellectually of the expediency of the line which the British Government were taking; but, nevertheless, the sacrifices of power and prestige (in the traditional sense) which all these concessions entailed had gone against the grain with them and had left a feeling of soreness behind. In the matter of naval parity, this residual feeling of soreness in the hearts of the British governing class was naturally sorest in 'naval circles'; and their resentment was inevitably directed against the United States—whose Admirals were thenceforth to have exactly as large a fleet to play with as their British playmates had—and not against Japan, who had perforce accepted a ratio which was appreciably lower than the level at which the Anglo-American parity was to stand. With this residual grievance from ten years of delicate and sometimes acrimonious negotiations still fresh in their minds, British 'naval circles' had a further motive for practising and preaching complacency towards the Japanese. They not only viewed with professional concern even the remote possibility of the British Navy becoming involved in hostilities with Japan in Far Eastern waters, they also contemplated with a certain personal distaste the corollary which, from the strategic standpoint, might have been regarded as reassuring: the contingency, that is to say, that, in the event of such hostilities breaking out, the British Navy would not only have the Japanese Navy for its enemy, but would also have the American Navy for its ally.¹

¹ This imponderable but important element in the feeling of British 'naval circles' at this time is illustrated in the following passages from the record of a discussion on the Shanghai crisis which took place at Chatham House on the 22nd February, 1932 (the full text will be found in *International Affairs*, vol. xi, No. 2, March 1932):

Sir Arthur Salter: 'I think that from the very beginning the right policy of this country would have been to direct all its efforts to securing world action, partly through the League of Nations, and also with the signatories of the Kellogg Pact, particularly the United States, to exercise persuasive influence (followed up if necessary by suitable economic pressure) to stop Japan from proceeding from one step to another as she has done, first in Manchuria and then in Shanghai, in breach of her obligations under three Treaties. . . .

'I realize that at this moment, even with complete unanimity, some risk is involved. Personally, in view of the risks involved in the alternative, I would take that risk; but on one condition, which I should like to make perfectly clear—the condition that you do get collective world action,

It will be seen that at least three distinct grievances—only one of which was a direct grievance against China and the Chinese—

including American action, and that each country is inescapably linked in and publicly engaged to stand together and take the consequences. . . .

'If we cannot now effectively secure world action, including the United States, I would suggest that we and other members of the League of Nations should not gloss over the matter, but should state frankly that the particular conditions of the Far Eastern situation are such that we cannot control it at the present time, but that in any case we do not recognize as valid any settlements arrived at at the point of the sword. If the time is not now, the time may well come later when we shall be able to give such a statement of non-recognition a practical effect.'

'Admiral Sir Sydney Fremantle said that anybody who advocated a particular policy should take into full consideration what the consequences of that policy were likely to be. . . . Where a policy involving military or naval operations was projected, the views of the General Staffs should be consulted, and it was very doubtful whether the advice which would be given by the Staffs to anybody proposing the policy suggested by Sir Arthur Salter would not be of such a nature as to make the proposal entirely impracticable.

'The policy which appeared to be advocated was that of economic blockade. This presumably meant the cutting off of all commercial intercourse. How was this to be done? It could not be done by legislation. The enterprise of people connected with commerce was far too great. The difficulties were especially great when the blockade under consideration was that of an island. The whole thing was impracticable. The United States, with her ideas of the freedom of the seas, would be ready to turn any war to her own advantage. An economic blockade would have to be supported by a military blockade—an extremely difficult operation of war—which in the case of an island Power would have to be carried out by sea. When international sea forces were required the British Navy did ninety per cent. of the work—leaving the United States out of the question. The British Navy would be called upon to conduct this extremely difficult operation against our old ally, under strategical conditions much to our disadvantage, and necessarily involving our bringing Great Britain into the most undesirable contact with the United States.

'Those who advocated this policy of economic pressure, which in his view would infallibly lead to war, were leaving out of consideration the position of the Navy and Army—the people who would have the fighting to do. These men were treated as pawns in the political game. In war they were called upon to endure hardships, discomforts of every kind, and to run considerable risk of their lives. It was their duty to do so, of course, and they did it willingly so long as national interests were concerned; but to expect soldiers and sailors to do this in furtherance of an international object with which they might or might not agree was a very different matter.'

'Sir Arthur Salter replied that Admiral Fremantle had conclusively shown the unwisdom of two proposals which he himself had not made. He had never for a moment suggested that any action should be taken which would risk the British Navy being involved without the American Navy. On the contrary, he had said deliberately that if such agreement was impracticable, Great Britain should turn to the other policy, involving no use of economic action whatever, and declare that she did not recognise any agreements arrived at at the point of the sword.

'Secondly, if the United States did co-operate, he did not suggest an economic blockade in Admiral Fremantle's sense. He would be content that

conspired to make the British governing class regard with disfavour any suggestion that the obligations of the United Kingdom to do her part in upholding the collective system of security in a time of crisis might conceivably require her to incur the risk of coming into collision with Japan. There were, of course, people in Great Britain at the time who regarded the preservation of the collective system, even at a considerable risk, as the paramount national interest of their country as well as her plain international duty; but those who took this view were in a minority, and the domestic political situation at the moment made their political influence count for even less than was warranted by their numbers.

The scales of British foreign policy were still further inclined in the other direction by a personal factor. Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary of the day, had assumed this particular Secretaryship of State (for the first time in his long and distinguished political career) on the 5th November, 1931, to find himself confronted from the outset with the gravest crisis in international affairs that had arisen since the close of the General War of 1914–18. In playing a new rôle of the highest responsibility, under anxious and exacting conditions, Sir John Simon employed all the vigour and subtlety of a brilliant and practised legal mind in the pursuit of a diplomacy which was perhaps more in keeping with the international conditions of a past century than with those of the epoch in which Fate had summoned this English statesman on to the international stage. In saving the Government which he represented from being committed to any course of action which might involve it in any risk, or which, even short of that, might be resented officially as unfriendly by any other Power, Sir John Simon showed, throughout, a marvellous address, while in his most brilliant moments he emulated the virtuosity of a Talleyrand or a Metternich. At the same time, 'it might be the subject of an academic doubt' (to parody the elegant phrases of a contemporary Japanese state paper)¹ whether, in Sir John Simon's case, the virtuosity 'of means necessarily and always' avoided 'the ends secured'. For the ends which were actually secured by Sir John Simon's diplomacy (on the concordant testimony of British and foreign observers alike) were a disquieting uncertainty in regard to

the United States and other countries in the League of Nations should simply prohibit the entry of Japanese goods into their territory for a certain time. That would be quite sufficient, if it ever came to that, though he did not believe it would, and the operations suggested by Admiral Fremantle would not be involved at all.

¹ The Japanese note which was addressed to the Government of the United States on the 16th January, 1932. (For this note, see further, pp. 545–6 below.)

British objectives, and a corresponding mistrust of British intentions, in the minds of Sir John Simon's foreign colleagues at Washington and at Geneva; and this diminution of confidence and good will was inevitably accompanied by a cooling-off of old friendships to a degree which could scarcely be recompensed by the utmost adroitness in the avoidance of new enmities.

The truth would appear to be that, in the year 1932, a diplomacy whose conception of national interest and criterion of professional success was essentially negative and unconstructive was really an anachronism in the sense that it was inadequate for dealing effectively with the problem of international intercourse under the social conditions of this age. In the foregoing age, which had begun in the generation of Machiavelli and had come to a close in the generation of Bismarck, the web of international relations had been of so loose a texture that 'the good old rule' of 'each for himself and God for us all'¹ had been a feasible foundation for diplomatic practice; and it is evident that, so long as this was the diplomatist's principal rule of thumb, *finesse* was the diplomatist's principal virtue. This rule, however, had ceased to apply in an age when the effects of the Industrial Revolution had knit together the whole habitable and navigable surface of the Planet and the entire living generation of Mankind into a single 'Great Society', in which the 'sovereign independent states' of the *ancien régime* were reduced to the status of subordinate parts whose welfare was inseparably bound up with the welfare of the whole. Under these new conditions the only feasible foundation for diplomatic practice was the principle that 'no man liveth to himself and no man dieth to himself'²—a maxim which was not the less relevant to this later age because it could claim a more venerable antiquity than Canning's.

In 1932 the world was still awaiting the advent of the statesman who would save Society by inaugurating a new diplomacy in keeping with the new conditions; and, pending his appearance, it was paying one penalty after another for the continued conduct of its affairs on the principles of the old diplomacy long after these principles had passed out of date. The first signal penalty had been the General War of 1914-18; the next was the world-wide economic crisis which had begun in 1929 and which in 1932 was still at its height. Since it was one of the notorious difficulties of human affairs that psychological changes always lagged behind those periodical changes in

¹ For the occasion on which this famous remark was made by Canning, see the *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. x, p. 37.

² Romans xiv. 7.

external conditions which called for psychological adjustments, it was impossible, in 1932, to foresee how long the tale of world-disasters was to be. It could only be declared with assurance that at this time the master-statesman of the age had not yet made his appearance in the international council chamber.

After this survey of the factors which gave the policy of the United Kingdom the direction that it actually followed during the year 1932, we may pause to inquire how it was that a contrary motion was not imparted to this policy by the influence of the Self-Governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth Overseas.

In 1932 this influence, when exercised, was abnormally potent owing to the coincidence of a number of causes: the return to power in the United Kingdom of the class which was the most susceptible to Imperial sentiment; and the world-wide paroxysm of Nationalism, which commended, in these circles, the ideal of British Imperial solidarity both as a means of enlarging the national life of the United Kingdom and as a means of defence against the militancy of other Nationalisms in other countries. Had the Self-Governing Dominions taken a strong line over the Sino-Japanese conflict at this juncture, their attitude would assuredly have had its effect upon the policy of Downing Street. And, *a priori*, it might have been expected that the Dominions would react to the Far Eastern crisis with some violence, and that their reaction would be identical with that of the other small countries of the world. It might have been expected, that is to say, that the Dominions would have exerted their influence in Downing Street in favour of resolutely upholding the collective system of security against Japanese aggression.

The grounds for this expectation were that three out of the five Self-Governing Dominions—namely Australia, New Zealand and Canada—were countries which had seaboard on the Pacific, and that in Australia and New Zealand, especially, there was a traditional dread of 'the Yellow Peril'. This dread was not difficult to account for in the minds of young White communities with an abnormally low pressure of population at home who found themselves the neighbours of old Oriental communities in whose homes the pressure of population was abnormally high. In these circumstances it was natural to surmise that the automatic tendency towards an equalization of population pressures would be difficult, in the long run, to resist. This consideration had accustomed the New Zealanders and Australians to gaze at Asia with anxious eyes; and latterly their nervous watchfulness had come to be concentrated upon Japan, as the Asiatic Power which was at once the most sorely in need of finding

an outlet for its population and the most effectively equipped for securing such an outlet by force. In such circumstances, it might have been expected that, in these countries, a cry of alarm would have been raised when, on the night of the 18th/19th September, 1931, the Japanese Army went upon the war-path, and that the alarm would have increased as it became apparent that, in this reversion to militancy, the Japanese Army was sweeping the Japanese nation along with it. Such *a priori* expectations, however, were falsified by the event; for, when the Far Eastern crisis arose, public opinion in the South Sea Dominions paid little attention, and, in so far as it did attend, it showed itself in favour of giving Japan her head.¹

The lack of interest in the Sino-Japanese conflict is readily explained by the urgency of the troubles with which the peoples of these countries were having to contend at home. For Australia and New Zealand belonged to that raw-material-producing and foodstuff-producing category of countries in which the incidence of the world-wide economic depression was peculiarly severe.² In 1932 their peoples were ruefully 'licking their wounds', and were too deeply engrossed in this dismal occupation to find much leisure for looking abroad.³ It is not so easy to understand the view which Australians and New Zealanders took of the Japanese adventure on Chinese soil when they did give their minds to it. Their predominant mental reaction appears to have been a sheer sense of relief that the Japanese tiger, now that he had made, at last, his long-expected spring, had chosen to leap the Yellow Sea and bury his claws in the flesh of China, instead of attempting to leap the Pacific and seek his prey in New

¹ In so far as the people of Canada showed any interest in the Sino-Japanese dispute, their attitude resembled that of the small European nations and of South Africa more closely than that of the South Sea members of the British Commonwealth. The 'Yellow Peril' was less of an obsession in the minds of Canadians than it was in the minds of Australians and New Zealanders, and Canadian opinion on the Far Eastern question was inevitably coloured to a certain extent by the policy of the United States. It was significant that at the special session of the League Assembly in March 1932, when the majority of the representatives of the smaller Powers declared their views on the Sino-Japanese dispute with no uncertain voice, the delegates of Australia and New Zealand held their peace, while the Canadian delegate, like his South African colleague, took his stand with the majority, whose interest in the dispute arose out of its repercussions upon the collective system of security, and whose main object was to defend the integrity of the Covenant and of the Kellogg Pact. (See p. 517 above, and pp. 575-7 below.)

² For the economic difficulties encountered by these countries in the preceding year, and for the social and political repercussions, see the *Survey for 1931*, Part I, section (i).

³ This is how the situation was described to the writer of this *Survey*, in the year 1932, by a New Zealander.

Zealand or Queensland. They reckoned, apparently, that, for the moment, Japan had 'bitten off as much as she could chew', and that eventually she would emerge from her Chinese adventure either satiated or exhausted, and in either event less formidable to her other neighbours than she had been before. They do not appear to have reflected that it is not so easy to set limits to a tiger's range if once he has been permitted to break out of his cage, and that, if he proves a 'man-eater', his appetite becomes insatiable when he has had his first taste of human blood. Ignoring these considerations, they were apparently inclined to regard the break-down of the collective system of security as a cheap price for the privilege (accorded in the fairy-tale to Odysseus by the Cyclops) of being eaten last.¹

It is evident that this attitude of the South Sea Dominions, in so far as it was conveyed to Downing Street, must have reinforced the effect of the other factors, determining British policy, which have already been surveyed.

Some account has now been given of the respective attitudes of all four groups of Powers except the fourth and last, which consisted solely of the U.S.S.R.

The policy of the Soviet Government towards the Japanese military adventure in Manchuria can be summed up in a few words. It was a policy of invincible restraint and impenetrable reserve. The Soviet Government did take the precaution, in the course of the year 1932, of strengthening the Russian garrison in the Maritime Province, as has been recorded above;² but, as far as concerned their rights and interests and assets on Manchurian soil, they steadfastly responded

¹ The attitude which has been attributed to the South Sea Dominions of the British Commonwealth in the foregoing paragraph is illustrated by the following passage from the record—already quoted above—of a discussion which took place on the 22nd February, 1932, at Chatham House:

'Major A. H. Horsfall said that, as an Australian, he would like to voice the British Empire point of view in its larger aspects. Nothing had been said during the discussion as to the vital interests of the British living in Australia and New Zealand—nearly ten millions of them—with the potentialities, under peaceful development, of the United States of America. Australia had been founded after the destruction of the first British Empire for the purpose of raising a second British Empire. Japan, like every other force in nature, would take the line of least resistance. With a million increase in population in that country every year, she must have expansion somewhere. Let it not be south! Let it be west towards Asia! The high policy of Great Britain should strive as far as it could to direct the energies of Japanese expansion towards Asia instead of south towards the Australian Commonwealth.'

The gist of the policy which is advocated in this passage is pithily conveyed by Edward Lear in the well-known rhyme which celebrates the 'sacred egoism' of a young lady of Smyrna.

² See p. 436 above.

to Japanese encroachments by turning the other cheek; and their settled policy *vis-à-vis* Japanese aggression was evidently a policy of peace at any price short of an actual Japanese invasion of Russian soil. This policy was no doubt due in large measure to the great military, and even greater naval, inferiority of the Soviet Union to Japan in the Far East. But this cannot have been the whole explanation, since on the European side, on which the Soviet Union was relatively strong, the Soviet Government's policy at this time was markedly pacific likewise. It may be conjectured that Soviet Russian statesmanship in 1932, as in 1918, was also deliberately playing a waiting game, in the belief that the militant policy of its aggressive neighbour contained the seeds of its own destruction, and that this destruction was likely to work itself out if only it were given time.

This Russian policy appears the more remarkable the more clearly it is realized exactly what the situation of the Soviet Union was. To begin with, Russia was affected territorially by the Sino-Japanese conflict to a vastly greater extent than any other Power apart from the two combatants themselves. The Soviet Union marched with 'the Three Eastern Provinces' of China, which were the field of Japanese military operations, for nearly 2,000 miles, from a point just north-west of Manchuli to a point just south-west of Vladivostok. The two largest of the three provinces, namely Heilungkiang and Kirin, combined to form a huge salient of Chinese territory, under Japanese occupation, which projected into the Soviet Union's domain. The direct line of communication between the main body of the Union and its Pacific port of Vladivostok traversed these two provinces in the shape of the Chinese Eastern Railway; and even the circuitous alternative all-Russian railway, from China to Vladivostok via Khabarovsk, skirted the Chinese frontier so closely—especially in its southernmost section along the right bank of the Ussuri—that it would be difficult to guard it against being cut by a first-class military Power which had Manchuria at its command. It must be added that the Chinese Eastern Railway was one of the Russian assets in Manchuria over which the Japanese had seized control; that this railway had originally been built by Russian enterprise; and that it had remained Russian property under the terms of the Russo-Japanese peace treaty of 1905, when its southern branch, from Changchun to Port Arthur, was ceded to Japan to be transformed into the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway. By a Sino-Russian agreement of the 31st May, 1924, which had been freely negotiated between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Chinese Republic (the respective heirs of the

Romanovs and the Manchus), the Russians had voluntarily ceded to the Chinese a half-share of the ownership of the railway and a half-share of the management; but when, in 1929, the Chinese had sought to rob the Russians of this half-share by tearing up the agreement and seizing the entire control of the railway by force, the Russians had refused to give way and had eventually secured a restitution of their rights through a military demonstration when diplomatic representations had proved, after patient trial, to be of no avail.¹ Having thus vindicated their cherished rights in the C.E.R. against Chinese aggression in 1929, the Russians now saw these same rights trampled upon by the Japanese, with equal roughness, only two years later. And yet, in these trying circumstances, they kept their heads and held their hands.

The first diplomatic reaction of the Soviet Government to the somewhat alarming situation which had been created for the U.S.S.R. by Japanese action in the Far East was an attempt to secure the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact. This idea was broached by the Soviet Government to Mr. Yoshizawa in December 1931, when that Japanese statesman was passing through Moscow *en route* from Europe to Tokyo, where he was to take up the post of Foreign Minister. This Russian overture was rebuffed by Japan, who was at pains to represent herself in Western eyes as a bulwark against the penetration of Communism into the Far East by way of Manchuria; and although rumours of an impending Russo-Japanese understanding were current from time to time in the course of the year 1932, Mr. Matsuoka's conversations with Russian statesmen at Moscow in November 1932, when he was on his way from Tokyo to Geneva,² led to no more result than the conversations in which Mr. Yoshizawa had taken part in the same capital eleven months earlier. The next straw which gave some indication of the way that the wind of Russian policy was likely to blow thereafter was the announcement, on the 12th December, 1932, that the formal re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic had been consummated on that day.

These relations had been broken off, as will be remembered, in the year 1927, and this on Chinese initiative, as a retort to the alleged propagandist activities of Russian Communists in Chinese territory.³

¹ See the *Survey for 1929*, Part IV A, section (iv).

² See, in *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th December, 1932, the outspoken and interesting interview on his conversations at Moscow which Mr. Matsuoka gave, after his arrival at Geneva, to a correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian* in that city.

³ See the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, section (ii).

The breach had been accompanied in China by the expulsion of Soviet Russian officials and the liquidation of Soviet Russian institutions; these precautionary measures had been carried out in a drastic fashion which was calculated to produce the greatest possible soreness on the Russian side; and thereafter the Chinese had shown themselves obstinately unwilling to undo what they had done. The Soviet Government, on their part, had made no secret of their desire to see their diplomatic relations with China restored; and one of the conditions of the Khabarovsk Protocol of the 22nd December, 1929, which had been imposed by the Soviet Government upon Chang Hsüeh-liang's Government in 'the Three Eastern Provinces' after the Russian military demonstration had brought 'the Young Marshal' to his knees, had been the inclusion of 'the full restoration of diplomatic relations' among the agenda of a Sino-Russian conference that was to open in Moscow in January 1930.¹ In the event, the Moscow Conference had been rendered abortive by the Russian insistence and the Chinese intransigence on this very point. Accordingly, the ultimate resumption of relations between the two Powers on the 12th December, 1932, marked a notable concession on the Chinese side and a notable success for Russian diplomacy. Yet the diplomatic history of the previous years suggests that the Soviet Government might have had to wait long indeed before achieving this success if Japanese policy had not played into Russian hands in this matter.

The consideration which induced the Chinese Government to reverse their policy towards the Soviet Union was, of course, a feeling that Japanese pressure upon China had reached a pitch at which it was even more formidable than the Soviet Russian menace. It was a similar reaction against the pressure of 'the Capitalist World' that had led Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in 1923, to enter into relations with the Russian Communists and to introduce Monsieur Michael Borodin into Canton as an adviser to the Kuomintang Government, which was at that time established in that city. Considering the immense effect which, in these circumstances, the Russian Communist connexion had exerted upon Chinese internal affairs, and upon China's foreign relations, in the ensuing years, it is evident that the renewal of Sino-Russian relations at the close of the year 1932 was fraught with momentous possibilities—occurring, as it did, at a time when China was being subjected to foreign pressure of a more violent kind than any that she had yet experienced since the beginning of the Revolution, more than twenty years back.

The Japanese Government took the news seriously, and did not

¹ See the *Survey for 1929*, p. 369; the *Survey for 1930*, pp. 358-60.

attempt to conceal their feelings. On the 13th December, 1932, the official spokesman at Tokyo declared that the news was 'most unwelcome'. 'The elements most disturbing to the peace of the world have now joined hands', he said; and 'Japan', he added, 'stands squarely against these forces'.¹

A public statement on the subject was also made, on the 12th December, by the Kommissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow, Monsieur Litvinov, and in this statement the following passage occurred:

The policy of the Soviet Government dictates the establishment and maintenance of normal relations with all States, and does not consider the rupture or refusal of relations to be a suitable means of regulating international questions. It is unlikely that any State which in the past has had recourse to this method can boast of any successes in settling questions in dispute with the Soviet Union. It is most unlikely that anyone in China to-day can think that the regrettable events which led to the rupture of relations between the U.S.S.R. and China were of any benefit to the latter. But it is beyond doubt that the beginning of the present troubles in the Far East was in no small degree due to the fact that not all the States situated on the shores of the Pacific Ocean have been maintaining diplomatic relations one with another.²

This passage was manifestly addressed not only to China but also to the United States, and the quotation may serve to bring this chapter back to its starting point, and to lead on to the next.

In view of the respective attitudes of the several groups of Powers, as these attitudes have been outlined above, it is evident that the United States would be likely to take the initiative in seeking to vindicate the collective system of security and to render the Japanese military aggression in Manchuria of no effect; and it is further evident that, in pursuance of this policy, American diplomacy would seek to obtain the support of the widest possible circle of interested parties. Our survey further indicates that the Soviet Union and the galaxy of small countries were the two groups towards which the Government at Washington would naturally turn most confidently in the expectation of finding a sympathetic response. But here, again, the natural course of events was impeded by the perversity which reigned at this time in international affairs; for American diplomacy now found itself handicapped by obstacles of its own creation.

In the Far Eastern crisis which had arisen since the 18th September, 1931, the United States was hindered from entering into co-operation with the U.S.S.R. (as Monsieur Litvinov justly pointed out) by its

¹ *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th December, 1932.

² *The Times*, 13th December, 1932.

long and obstinately maintained refusal to recognize, and to enter into diplomatic relations with, the Soviet Government; and at the same time the United States was hindered from entering into co-operation with the small countries by its equally long and obstinate refusal to become a member of the League of Nations, since the League was the only forum in which it was open to the small countries at this time to make their combined diplomatic and moral influence felt effectively. In face of these two obstacles, American diplomacy in the year 1932 appears to have made little effort to achieve co-operation with the Soviet Government; but it did set itself seriously to co-operate with the small countries through the League of Nations, and it attempted this in the only way open to it in the circumstances. It sought for a partner among the Great Powers members of the League who would be likely to agree with the United States upon a common policy and who would also be able to act, in parliamentary language, as 'the leader of the house' in advocating this policy, and enlisting support on its behalf, in the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations.

In seeking for this indispensable partner, the United States Government looked to the United Kingdom rather than to France or Italy or Germany, and this for several good reasons. The United Kingdom had greater material interests in the Far East than any other Western Power; it was one of the three Oceanic or Principal Naval Powers of the World in the trinity which included the United States and Japan; and as a matter of fact the British Government had taken positive steps on previous occasions during the 'post-war' years when the situation in the Far East had been critical or delicate. In 1927, for example, when the Kuomintang (at that time in Russian Communist leading strings) was sweeping across the Yangtse Basin, in the hinterland of Shanghai, in the course of its victorious march from Canton to Peking, the British Government had sent a British Defence Force to Shanghai to ensure the safety and neutrality of the International Settlement.¹ And before that, throughout the Washington Conference

¹ See the *Survey for 1926*, Part III A, section (xii) (f); the *Survey for 1927*, Part III, section (iii) (b); the *Survey for 1929*, pp. 324-5 n. It was not publicly known at the time that the British Government had urged the Japanese Government, without success, to undertake the expensive and invidious duty of defending the International Settlement at Shanghai in 1927, before the decision was taken in London to send a British force to perform the task. This unpublished chapter of diplomatic history doubtless handicapped the British Government when they had to deal with the military action of Japan at Shanghai in 1932 (though, of course, Japan's action at Shanghai in 1932 was something entirely different from what Great Britain had invited Japan to do, and had eventually done herself, in 1927).

of 1921-2, the British had worked hand in glove with the Americans in undoing the results of the encroachments which Japan had made in the Far East, during the General War of 1914-18, at Chinese and Russian expense. The outcome of this Anglo-American co-operation at Washington, ten years back, had been one of the outstanding diplomatic successes of the 'post-war' period. Without any breach of amicable relations, or even any serious or lasting strain, Anglo-American diplomacy had induced Japan to accept a re-settlement in the Far East and the Pacific on a basis which was equitable and reasonable in itself and which had effectively served thereafter to keep the peace in that quarter of the world until Japan had eventually overthrown it by her high-handed unilateral action on the 18th/19th September, 1931. In view of this antecedent chapter of diplomatic history, it was eminently natural that, in 1931 and 1932, the United States should look once more to the United Kingdom, first and foremost, as the Power which would be the most likely to see eye to eye with her in the new Far Eastern crisis and would also be the most potent in helping to put into effect, both in the Far East and at Geneva, any common policy on which London and Washington might agree.

This American expectation was not unreasonable, and, had it been fulfilled, it may be conjectured that the course of international affairs in 1932 would have run more smoothly than it actually did run in the Far Eastern field. On the British side, however, the desired and anticipated response did not prove to be forthcoming. Instead of welcoming the American overtures for co-operation as a heaven-sent opportunity for securing a notable and lasting improvement in the international situation—not only through a satisfactory solution of the immediate crisis, but through a permanent *rapprochement* between the United States and the League of Nations—British diplomacy appears to have flattered itself that a lucky turn of fortune had now placed the United Kingdom in a key position which could be turned to advantage in the old-fashioned manner, in accordance with the old-fashioned conception of international values. At any rate, British diplomatists proceeded to act as though this were their state of mind. The American overtures for co-operative international action to vindicate the collective system of security were neither accepted on the British side with the cordiality that was requisite if they were to be effective, nor again were they rejected with such brusqueness as to give the State Department at Washington sufficient ground for officially taking offence. In fact, throughout the year 1932, the Foreign Office in Whitehall took advantage of its key

position between the United States and the small states members of the League on the one hand, and between the United States and Japan on the other, to finesse in the manner of those eighteenth-century diplomatic virtuosi who sought to save their own countries and 'to preserve the Balance of Power' by deftly playing off one neighbour against another at the least possible risk to themselves.

This revival of a bygone art would have been more agreeable to the spectators (whose own lives and fortunes were at stake in the game) if the conditions had remained what they had once been at the time when the art of eighteenth-century diplomacy was originally elaborated. Actually, however, this art was the fine flower of an age in which international affairs were not yet a serious business because the sister art of war had not yet been turned into a form of social suicide by the advent of the two titanic forces of Democracy and Industrialism. In the Democratic and Industrial Age, which was at its zenith in the year 1932, the diplomacy of the eighteenth century could no longer be practised with impunity. The diplomatic history of the Far Eastern Question in this year, which is recorded in the following sections, demonstrates this proposition by an empirical proof.

(b) THE ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES

In the *Survey for 1931*, some account has been given of the diplomatic consultations concerning the Far Eastern crisis, and the pleas and protests against successive steps in the Japanese campaign of military aggression, which fell to be recorded between the 18th September, 1931, and the close of the calendar year. It was not until after the turn of the year that a positive policy, based on a considered principle, for dealing with the Far Eastern situation was put forward by any Government; and when this counter-step was taken at last, it was taken by the Government of the United States.

On the 7th January, 1932, the Secretary of State at Washington, Mr. Henry Stimson, sent an identic note to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, in which the most important passage was to the following effect:

In view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto* nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between these governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence or the territorial and

administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open Door Policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of the 27th August, 1928, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.¹

Copies of this note were handed simultaneously to the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the other six Powers that were co-parties to the Nine-Power Treaty with China and Japan and the United States. This communication might be regarded as a virtual invitation to the six Governments in question to take similar action on their own part; and no secret was made of the United States Government's hope that such action would in fact follow. This hope, however, was disappointed.

In making his *démarche* of the 7th January, Mr. Stimson seems not only to have set the greatest store by the support of His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as the Government whose co-operation would be likely to produce the greatest results both in the Far East and at Geneva; Mr. Stimson seems also actually to have cherished greater expectations of support from this quarter than from any other—partly on the strength of a passage in the joint *communiqué* which Mr. Hoover (who was still President of the United States) and Mr. MacDonald (who was still Prime Minister in the United Kingdom) had issued on the 9th October, 1929, during Mr. MacDonald's visit to the United States.² In this passage, the executive heads of the American and the British Government had declared jointly that—

both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact [i.e. the Pact of Paris now invoked in Mr. Stimson's note of the 7th January, 1932] not only as a declaration of our good intentions, but as a positive obligation to direct our national policy in accordance with its pledge.

Notwithstanding this resolution, the response which the American invocation of the Pact of Paris on the present occasion actually evoked from the Government of the United Kingdom was the following *communiqué*, which was issued by the Foreign Office in Whitehall on the 9th January, 1932:

His Majesty's Government stand by the policy of the open door for international trade in Manchuria, which was guaranteed by the Nine-Power Treaty at Washington.

¹ The full text will be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1932*. The opening passage, here omitted, deals with the Japanese occupation of Chinchow and with the appointment of the Lytton Commission by the Council of the League of Nations.

² See the *Survey for 1929*, p. 48.

Since the recent events in Manchuria, the Japanese representatives at the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva stated on the 13th October that Japan was the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity and the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Further, on the 28th December, the Japanese Prime Minister stated that Japan would adhere to the Open Door policy, and would welcome participation and co-operation in Manchurian enterprise.

In view of these statements, his Majesty's Government have not considered it necessary to address any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's note, but the Japanese Ambassador in London has been requested to obtain confirmation of these assurances from his Government.

The most conspicuous feature in this *communiqué* was its silence in regard to all the vital issues—the sovereignty, independence and integrity of China, the violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, and the assertion of the principle of the non-recognition of the illegal results of force—which had just been raised in an American note which was manifestly the most important state paper relating to the Sino-Japanese conflict that had yet seen the light. In taking up the relatively unimportant issue of 'the Open Door'—a question of private interest of the kind which had been the principal concern of 'the Old Diplomacy' in the pre-war age¹—the Government of the United Kingdom were inevitably interpreted as intending to intimate to the Japanese Government that, as far as all the other issues raised in the Stimson Note were concerned, Japan might do virtually what she willed in Manchuria for all that the British Government cared. The perfunctoriness of the British Government's action (such as it was) was further underlined by the fact that, on the one point which the British Government had elected to raise, the formality of a Japanese assurance had been given twice over already, as the British *communiqué* itself pointed out. In France this was hailed as an example of 'British humour';² but there is no hint of humour in a leading article which was published in *The Times* of the 11th January, 1932, on the theme that 'in declining to address a communication to the Chinese and Japanese Governments on the lines of Mr. Stimson's Note, the British Government have acted wisely'.

¹ In the spirit of 'the Old Diplomacy', the Government of the United Kingdom had actually lodged a protest at Tokyo on the 7th January, 1932, that is, on the very date of the United States Government's note to Japan. The subject of this British protest on this date was the detention at Mukden, by the Japanese military authorities, of receipts (deposited in local Chinese banks) which belonged to the Peking-Mukden Railway, a Chinese concern of which the bondholders were British subjects.

² See a despatch from the Paris correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian* which was published on the 11th January, 1932.

In the circumstances it was fully justified in limiting its action to a request for a confirmation of the assurances given by Mr. Yoshizawa to the League Council in October and by the new Japanese Prime Minister a fortnight ago, to the effect that Japan would adhere to the principle of the 'open door' which her Government claims to be defending in Manchuria. There is no doubt that these assurances will be repeated—all the more readily since the principle of equal opportunity for foreign commerce and industry in China has been challenged by the Chinese Nationalists on several occasions since 1922, while the party which organized the boycotts, first of British and subsequently of Japanese commerce, is now in nominal control of China. Nor does it seem to be the immediate business of the Foreign Office to defend the 'administrative integrity' of China until that integrity is something more than an ideal. It did not exist in 1922, and it does not exist to-day.

The reference in this passage to the Chinese boycotts of British as well as Japanese trade reflects the attitude of the British commercial community which has been touched upon in the preceding chapter. The last two sentences of the passage reproduce an argument which was repeatedly heard at this time from Japanese lips and which depended upon an ambiguity of meaning in the phrase 'administrative integrity'. In the abstract, the phrase might be interpreted alternatively as meaning either 'immunity from foreign administrative encroachment' or 'effective administrative control on the part of the national administrative authorities'; and the second of these interpretations was adopted in the Japanese argument here reproduced. But the context of the phrase in the text of the Nine-Power Treaty, the circumstances in which that treaty had been negotiated and signed, and the purpose—explained above¹—which it had been intended to fulfil in the Washington settlement, all showed conclusively that the protection of China from foreign encroachment was the sense in which the phrase was used by the treaty-makers, and that they had made the treaty in order to ensure China of this protection precisely because, as far as her own national administration was concerned, she was in a state of confusion which exposed her as a helpless victim to the danger of a foreign aggression which could only be exorcized by a self-denying ordinance on the part of her neighbours.

In the article above quoted, *The Times* also expressed the opinion—which reads strangely in retrospect—that the Foreign Office in Whitehall did not share the apparent apprehension of the United States Government 'that the Japanese authorities would set up a virtually independent administration in Manchuria which would favour Japanese interests to the detriment of the commerce of other nations'. It further defended the British Government's policy of

¹ See p. 526.

non-co-operation with the United States on the ground that, 'although the Nine-Power Treaty provides for consultation between the interested Powers,' the Government at Westminster 'was not in fact consulted before the Note was communicated to Nanking and Tokyo'. The article closed with the suggestion that the Stimson Note was not only 'drafted without consultation with other Governments' but that it was also conceivably 'influenced to some extent . . . by . . . considerations of domestic politics'.

This article in a prominent London newspaper has been quoted at some length because of its historic importance. For it was undoubtedly read abroad—in the United States, in Japan, and in the small states members of the League—as meaning that the Government of the United Kingdom, in receiving Mr. Stimson's overture as they had received it in public, were correctly interpreting the wishes of those elements in the country which were politically paramount at the time.

The foregone conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese *entr'acte* which the British Government had staged can be told in a word. On the 15th January, 1932, the Foreign Office in Whitehall was able to announce that, 'as a result of the conversation between Sir John Simon and the Japanese Ambassador on the 8th January, the Japanese Ambassador' had 'called at the Foreign Office' on the 14th 'and conveyed from his Government express assurances in reference to Japan's disclaimer of territorial ambitions in Manchuria and of her intention to respect the principles of the Open Door and of the Nine-Power Treaty'.

Thus the Japanese Government, with equal promptness and courtesy, actually furnished the British Government with two more assurances than they had been asked to give. This was perhaps a proper return for the British Government's tact in having confined their request to the re-affirmation of a Japanese assurance which they had received from the Japanese Government twice already. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had in fact voluntarily assumed the role which, in Lewis Carroll's story, was thrust upon Alice in Wonderland willy-nilly, when the Dodo made her a formal present of her own thimble. But the Japanese Government afterwards showed their own ability to seek inspiration from the Victorian literature of their ancient ally by providing themselves with a Mr. Jorkins in the shape of 'Manchukuo'. In a telegram despatched from Changchun on the 20th March, 1932,¹ a representative of *The Daily Telegraph* informed the British public that—

In an exclusive statement given me this afternoon, Cheng Hsiao-hsu, the new Premier of Manchukuo, announced that the historic term 'Open

¹ The full text will be found in *The Daily Telegraph*, 21st March, 1932.

Door' required a new definition. The new Republic was determined to adhere to all its treaty obligations, but would interpret 'the Open Door' within the limits of her [sic] sovereign rights. Cheng is . . . full of zeal for the welfare of the new nation. . . . Hitherto, he said, the term 'Open Door' connoted an obligation upon Japan to permit unrestricted trade with Manchuria. But the new régime maintained that 'the Open Door' did not prevent the State [i.e. 'Manchukuo'] giving preferential treatment to nations giving diplomatic recognition to the Changchun Government, and who were willing to enter into trade agreements. Manchukuo insisted that she retained a free hand to open her door widely and quickly to those nations which knocked and presented their credentials.

This was the aspect which the question of 'the Open Door' was to assume in the next act of the Manchurian drama. In the meantime, the British Government's negative lead in rejoinder to Mr. Stimson's first overture had been followed by at least two other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty. On the 13th January the Government of the Netherlands informed the Government of the United States that they did not consider it necessary to send a note on the situation in Manchuria to Japan and China. The Belgian Government confined themselves, in answering Mr. Stimson on the 19th January, to the observation that they had particularly noted the passage in the Stimson Note in which the American Government stated that they had no intention of recognizing any situation created in Manchuria by methods contrary to the obligations arising out of the Pact of Paris. These two small countries might be pardoned for hesitating to rush in where the British Government feared to tread—and this hesitancy was particularly pardonable in the Dutch Government's case, since the Dutch colonial possessions which lay within the range of action of the Japanese Navy were considerably larger and more valuable than the British colonial possessions within the same radius, while the Dutch Navy would have been wholly incapable of putting up any effective defence against a Japanese attack.

The delivery of the Japanese Government's reply to Mr. Stimson's note of the 7th January, 1932, was delayed until the 16th of the month; and the document was conceived in a vein of elegant irony which came within an ace of insolence. The following passages reveal its tenor:¹

The Government of Japan were well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied on to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure the full and complete fulfilment in every detail of the Treaties of Washington and the Kellogg

¹ The full text will be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1932*.

Treaty for the Outlawry of War. They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact. . . .

They take note of the statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the Treaty of the 27th August, 1928. It might be the subject of an academic doubt, whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always avoids the ends secured, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise.

It may be added that the treaties which relate to China must necessarily be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country, and that the present unsettled and distracted state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the high contracting parties at the time of the Treaty of Washington. It was certainly not satisfactory then; but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does to-day. This cannot affect the binding character of the stipulations of treaties; but it may in material respects modify their application, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist. . . .

While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yet, as Your Excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of the deepest interest and of quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people. That the American Government are always alive to the exigencies of Far Eastern questions has already been made evident on more than one occasion. At the present juncture, when the very existence of our national policy is involved, it is agreeable to be assured that the American Government are devoting in a friendly spirit such sedulous care to the correct appreciation of the situation.

In a leading article published in *The Times* newspaper of London on the 18th January, 1932, this Japanese note was received in a very different spirit from the tone of the comment on Mr. Stimson's note which has been quoted above from the same journal. The Japanese reply to the American Secretary of State was described in this article in this English newspaper as 'courteous in tone' and 'reassuring', and also as 'informative', on the ground that it left 'no possible doubt' (an unconscious reminiscence of a Gilbertian phrase) 'about the Japanese Government's attitude towards the international treaties invoked by the American Government and towards their application'.

Nevertheless, a doubt of at least an 'academic' kind does appear to have still lingered in the minds even of those Governments which had not seen their way to giving the American Secretary of State the support for which he had asked; for before the end of January the twelve members of the Council of the League of Nations other than

China and Japan drafted, in private session, a declaration which referred to Mr. Stimson's note of the 7th January and stated that it would be impossible for the League to endorse a settlement secured by methods at variance with the obligations arising under the treaties referred to in the American note, or under Article 10 of the Covenant.¹ And thereafter, when the Japanese military operations at Shanghai² had supervened upon those in Manchuria, the Twelve went so far as to address to Japan (and this time to Japan alone, without the solemn farce of making an identic communication to China) a note³ containing the following passage:

The twelve members of the Council recall the terms of Article X of the Covenant, by which all members of the League have undertaken to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of other members. It is their friendly right to direct attention to this provision, particularly as it appears to them to follow that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no change in the political independence of any member of the League brought about in disregard of this article ought to be recognized as valid and effectual by the members of the League of Nations.

To this tentative echo of Mr. Stimson's language the Japanese Government responded, in their reply of the 23rd February, in the same style in which they had answered Mr. Stimson himself:

As Japan does not contemplate any attack on the territorial integrity or the independence of a member of the League of Nations, it is superfluous to say that the bearing of the observation that attacks of such a character made in defiance of Article X of the Covenant cannot be recognized as valid and effective is notably obscure to the Japanese Government.

The course of the warfare at Shanghai, which lasted from the 28th/29th January, 1932, to the 3rd March of the same year, has been described above, including its diplomatic repercussions,⁴ and in this place it is only necessary to touch upon these quite briefly.

In view of the sudden and serious accentuation of the Far Eastern crisis which the threat of Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai portended, the United States Government had the largeness of mind to ignore considerations of 'face' and to make overtures for co-operation to the British Government once again. These fresh overtures appear to have been made as early as the 25th January, 1932, when Mr. Stimson discussed with the British Ambassador in Washington the desirability of representations being made to Japan, in regard to Shanghai, on the part of the American and British Governments.

¹ See p. 560 below.

² See p. 490 above and pp. 565-6 below.

³ See section (iii) of this part of the present volume.

⁴ See section (iii) (b) above.

Mr. Stimson's statesmanship in not standing on his dignity was justified by the event; for this time the British Government openly came into line with him;¹ and there was an interlude of Anglo-American co-operation which culminated in Mr. Thomas's dramatic gesture at Geneva on the 2nd February² and in the—unhappily abortive—proposal³ which was made on the same date to the Japanese Government by the British and American Governments with French and Italian support.

While the outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai had momentarily diverted the attention of all parties from the general problem of the Sino-Japanese conflict to this new local manifestation of it, the American note of the 7th January, 1932, was not allowed by Mr. Stimson to fade out of the public consciousness.

In China the note had been received with mixed feelings. The Chinese Government, who were naturally pleased with the note as far as it went, had made the most of it in replying on the 12th January.⁴ On the other hand, Chinese observers whose unofficial position absolved their tongues from restraint had described the document, with quaint felicity, as having 'the head of a dragon but the tail of a rat'.⁵ Mr. Stimson's next state paper, however, revealed the fact that, whatever kind of creature his new doctrine of non-recognition might prove to be, its tail was barbed with at any rate a scorpion's sting.

This next state paper took the form of a letter, dated the 23rd February, 1932, from Mr. Stimson to Senator Borah, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate.

In the text of this letter,⁶ the doctrine of non-recognition, which had been enunciated in the note of the 7th January, 1932, was reaffirmed in the following terms:

On the 7th January last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by those Governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other Governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action

¹ See pp. 498-9 above.

² See p. 504 above, footnote, and pp. 563-4 below.

³ See pp. 504-5 above.

⁴ The text of this Chinese note of the 12th January, 1932, will be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1932*.

⁵ Despatch from the correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*, at Peking (Peiping), published on the 11th January, 1932.

⁶ The complete text will be found in *Documents on International Affairs, 1932*.

which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

This passage in Mr. Stimson's letter was led up to by a masterly *exposé* of the diplomatic history of the policy and principles embodied in the Washington Nine-Power Treaty. Mr. Stimson was able to show that this history went back to the time of the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1900 and that the policy and principles in question had been publicly endorsed by the British Government as well as by the Government of the United States. Lord Salisbury, for example, had expressed himself 'most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the United States' at the time (in 1899) when the principle of the preservation of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity had originally been laid down by the then Secretary of State at Washington, Mr. John Hay; and he was also able to cite, *à propos* of the Nine-Power Treaty itself, a statement made in the course of the Washington Conference by Lord Balfour which was as emphatic and explicit as any declaration that was made at the time by Lord Balfour's American colleague the Secretary of State of the day, Mr. Charles Evans Hughes. Mr. Stimson went on to point out in his letter that the principle established in the Nine-Power Treaty with particular reference to China had afterwards been reinforced and generalized in the Kellogg-Briand Pact. On these premisses, he laid down two propositions.

One of these propositions was that—

It is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot under any circumstances be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value of the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

As far as this proposition went the Japanese might perhaps feel themselves able to regard the new American non-recognition doctrine with equanimity, on the ground that diplomatic non-recognition was impotent, after all, in itself to undo military *faits accomplis*, and that Japan, on Mr. Stimson's own showing, could break the treaties with impunity on her part in the assurance that they would not be broken on that account on the part of the United States. On the other