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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MQ

From: Peiping via N.R.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 11:59 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

(*)

This /has made no secret of its intentions to profit

in every possible way from that victory, if it comes.

Four months ago Japanese agricultural interests, business-

men and liberals were still acting as a brake against

precipitate acts of aggression and opportunism, but

these elements have been momentarily submerged under the

current wave of pro-Axis enthusiasm. Japan has gone

frankly and starkly "realistic".

Germans in Tokyo, and they are numerous, are nevertheless not entirely satisfied with the pace at which Japan is turning toward the Axis, rapid though it seems to outsiders. German newspaper men with whom I have talked complain that the Japanese seem prone to delay decision until they are quite certain of ultimate German success. They claim that German diplomats have pointed out to the Japanese that the quicker they make some kind of a deal, the more generous the Germans will be

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1 in the final reckoning.

2 I was not able to learn whether the Germans want the
3 Japanese as active allies in the European conflict or
4 whether they are simply seeking some kind of a diplomatic
5 alignment which would give the Japanese a free but inde-
6 pendent hand against the British in the Far East.

7 (END SECTION TWO)

8 (*) Apparent omission. SMYTH

9 EMB

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11 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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MG
13 This telegram must be
14 closely paraphrased be-
15 fore being communicated
16 to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 1:45 a.m. Sep. 1

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Secretary of State,

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Washington.

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300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

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In any case German newspaper men told me that the
most important factors in any possible arrangement be-
tween Germany and Japan would be: (one) definite assur-
ances concerning the future German stake in the China
market which Germany regards as of great importance;
(two) some satisfactory solution of the East Indies and
other South Sea problems in which Germany has a deep
interest especially economically; and (three) utilization

rlk 3

1 of the Japanese as a means of keeping the United States
2 constantly worried and preoccupied with Pacific problems
3 so that Germany would have a freer hand in Europe.

4 Very few of the Germans with whom I have talked are
5 pro-Japanese at heart and some are doubtful of the extent
6 to which the Japanese could help them. Most of them
7 however, recognize that at worst the Japanese would have
8 a certain nuisance value and Germany would therefore like
9 to make allies of them. The Germans foresee of course that
10 Japan's exclusionist policy in the Orient will be applied
11 to all white people including themselves in the long run
12 if and when Japan becomes strong enough to enforce it.

13 (END SECTION THREE)

14 SMYTH

15 EMB

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17 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

18 MN

From: PEIPING VIA N.R.

19 This telegram must be
20 closely paraphrased before
21 being communicated to anyone.
(BR)

Dated August 31, 1940

Rec'd 5:30 a.m. Sept. 1

22 Secretary of State

23 Washington

24 300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR.)

25 I believe that a considerable part of the Japanese army
including War Minister Tojo is in favor of a closer

rlk 4

1 alignment with Germany. They are being stalled off for the
2 moment by other pro-Axis but cautious elements in the
3 Government who wish to be sure that they are on the winning
4 side. The reasons why Japan is hesitant to plunge boldly
5 forward on her policy of southward expansion are in order
6 of importance: (one) she wants to be sure which way the
7 war in Europe will go; (two) she wants to be sure that the
8 United States has no intention of taking up arms against her;
9 (three) she wants to be sure of at least a temporary respite
10 along the Soviet Manchurian frontier which is the Achilles
11 Heel of the Japanese Empire; and (four) failure to
12 wind up the China incident.

13 Meanwhile as Japan struggles to make up her mind she
14 may be expected to continue the nibbling policy she has
15 pursued ever since the Manchurian outbreak. She has
16 learned from experience that aggression by easy stages is
17 the easier way. She has discovered that many little
18 bites add up to the same thing as one big one and that
19 the victims seem to make much less noise about it.

20 (END OF SECTION FOUR)

21 SMYTH

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rlk 5

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 5:50 a.m. Sept. 1

Secretary of State,
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

In view of Japan's extremely difficult position I believe that she is in no position at the present time to wage a successful war alone against the United States or Russia although with allies her position would of course change. I feel sure, however, that the majority in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding a conflict with the United States. I might add that on my recent visit to the United States I was struck with the number of people who mistakenly believe that any strong show of strength by the United States would automatically plunge the United States into war. The trouble is that the Japanese know we feel this way and are making the most of it by flourishing the war scare in our faces. Actually I believe the Japanese have no intention of fighting us except as a last resort; in the face of this attitude I believe that firmness is the soundest and safest American Naval policy. The risks involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States. Of

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 course if Great Britain is defeated then we can expect
2 the Japanese to become more belligerent.

3 (END SECTION FIVE)

4 SMYTH

5 EMB

6 - - - - -
7 TELEGRAM RECEIVED

8 MG This telegram must be
9 closely paraphrased be-
10 fore being communicated
to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N.R.

Dated August 31, 1940.

Rec'd 5:45 a.m. Sept. 1

11 Secretary of State,

12 Washington.

13 300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

14 The Japanese appear to be so confident of a German
15 victory and are so hopeful that such a victory would per-
16 mit them to realize their ambitions in Asia that it
17 appears quite useless for the United States at the present
18 time to suggest any halfway measures of appeasement or
19 friendship. In fact the reception that has been accorded
20 such ideas recently by the Japanese press shows that the
21 tendency is to interpret them as signs of fear and weak-
22 ness. No form of appeasement short of American recog-
23 nition of the Japanese created new order in the Far East
24 would satisfy the Japanese at this time. It is obviously
25 pointless to attempt to reason with the Japanese until

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the course of events in Europe becomes clear. If Great Britain holds out against Germany contrary to present Japanese expectations Japan will then have to reconsider her whole policy for Japan today is a nation whose policy is dictated solely by expediency. (End Summary)

(END OF MESSAGE).

Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai.

Code text by air mail to Tokyo.

SMYTH

EMB

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2 Mr. Gesell: At transcript 1750 and 1751, a request
3 by Senator Ferguson for any information sent by the State
4 Department to Ambassador Grew regarding parallel action
5 with Britain in August, 1941.

6 This information was handed to Senator Ferguson at
7 page 1883 of the transcript.

8 At transcript 1752, a request by Senator Ferguson for
9 any information received by Ambassador Grew from the State
10 Department regarding American Volunteer Group.

11 No record has been found in the State Department files
12 that any such information was ever received from Ambassador
13 Grew, or sent to him.

14 At transcript 1781, a request by Senator Ferguson for
15 any answer Ambassador Grew may have received from the State
16 Department in reply to Grew's telegram on page 143 of
17 Volume II of Foreign Relations.

18 No record of any reply found by the State Department in
19 its files.

20 Now, the committee understands that this is only a
21 partial report on some of the requests. We have held
22 this group up so that General Marshall could finish his
23 testimony. We did not want to interrupt at that time.

24 We are just making this interim report, and we will
25 do the best we can in any remaining time on any other

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Ex77
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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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h2 2 requests pending, so the transcript will tie together.

3 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

4 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

5 Senator Ferguson: I understand counsel has gone
6 through the transcript and got all these requests, and
7 he is now just taking up a part of these requests, and he
8 will reply sometime later on any others.

9 Mr. Gesell: We are replying to the ones we have
10 ready, and as the other ones come in we will take care
11 of them, yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: These only apply to the transcript,
13 so the transcript will be tied together, to see what
14 happens to a request?

15 Mr. Gesell: That is right.

16 We felt we should not have a number of loose ends in
17 the transcript on these various questions.

18 There is one further request that has just been
19 brought to my attention.

20 Senator Ferguson, on page 2510 of the transcript, re-
21 quested any Japanese intercepts between the numbers 836
22 at page 178 of Exhibit 1, and 841 at page 185 of Exhibit 1.

23 We have the reply of the War Department giving the
24 additional intercepts that fall in those numbers to the
25 extent that they are available, and I would like to ask

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2 that the memorandum from the War Department, and the inter-
3 cepts be spread upon the record, and with the permission
4 of the committee we will strike from the intercepts the
5 code information, which we have been striking in the
6 past.

7 The Vice Chairman: So ordered.

8 (The matter referred to is as follows:)

9 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL

10 10 December 1945

11 At p. 2510 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested
12 the four Japanese messages from Tokyo to Washington between
13 No. 836 (p. 178 of Exhibit 1) and No. 841 (p. 185 of
14 Exhibit 1).

15 Copies of Nos. 837 and 838 are inclosed herewith.

16 No, 840 was not intercepted.

17 The records of Signal Intelligence Service indicate that
18 No. 839, dated 26 November 1941, was not decoded until about
19 13 December 1941. When it was decoded, the following sum-
20 mary of the message was prepared:

21 "Representations made to American Embassy here. Your
22 instructions follow. Evacuation from Panama according
23 to #322 from Panama. Please negotiate for assistance
24 from Canal Officials as well as for supplies, water,
25 fuel oil, and wharf facilities at Balboa. Negotiate
for granting of funds to return to Japan as quickly

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2 as possible. Transmit to each office concerned. Sent
3 to U. S. and Panama."

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SECRET

From: Panama (Akiyama)

To: Havana

November 26, 1941

Circular #34 Message from Tokyo to Washington #837.

Re my message #819^a.

The schedule for the Tatsuta Maru, as given in my #838^b,
is to leave Balboa on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January
15th. On the basis of conditions at the time, it may stop
at Los Angeles again on the way home, but try to have the
passengers from the United States board it on the outward
trip. As far as possible, have all those who wish to sail
from South America also come on the Tatsuta.

Transmit this message and my caption telegram to all
offices in the United States, as well as Canada, Vancouver
and Panama. From Panama send it to all Central and South
American ministers and ---.

a - See S.I.S. #26217

b - See S.I.S. #26216

Army

26218

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/13/41 (BR)

Secret.

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SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo)

To: Washington

November 26, 1941

#838

Tatsuta Maru Schedule:

Yokohama December 2

Los Angeles arrive December 14

Leave December 16

Balboa arrive December 24.

Army 26216 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (S)

SECRET

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The Vice Chairman: Anything further from counsel?

Mr. Gesell: That is all we have today, Mr. Congressman.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will stand adjourned until ten o'clock Monday morning, at which time Admiral Wilkinson will appear as a witness.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p. m., the committee recessed to 10 o'clock a. m., Monday, December 17, 1945.)