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Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

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December 17, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

WILKINSON, Admiral Theodore Stark

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Monday, December 17, 1945

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Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

The Chairman was called to the White House this morning and is detained for a few moments. We will proceed.

Will counsel announce the first witness.

Mr. Gesell: Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster: I would like to make a brief statement about a matter that came up during my absence in connection with my assistant here, Mr. Greaves.

I am sorry I had to be absent, and am very sorry there was anything which seemed disturbing to the committee. It was not a matter about which there need be any mystery.

Some weeks ago, at what I thought was a full press conference, certainly a dozen or 15 were in my office -- I stated that I had secured Mr. Greaves as my assistant and thought it would be very necessary, as far as I was concerned, to have an assistant of this character.

I was sorry that the committee hadn't found it practicable to allow the Minority some assistance, but thought that under the circumstances I would do the best I could.

I secured Mr. Greaves. I want to make it clear that he has not had for many months any connection whatsoever with



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the Republican National Committee. I think he is a very competent man.

In connection with the episode concerned with Senator Lucas, I have here a memorandum from Mr. Greaves which I would like to put in the record. Mr. Greaves is my assistant and is being paid by me.

The Vice Chairman: Being paid by you, did you say, Senator?

Senator Brewster: Yes, sir, being paid by me.

I have this memorandum which I would like to put in the record, in justice to everybody concerned. It is signed by Percy L. Greaves, Jr:

"Regarding the recent unpleasantry during your absence, (pp 3605-3608), I should like to say that there never was any intention on my part to insult or reflect on any Members of the United States Senate by thought, word or action. I have great respect for Members of both Houses of Congress. I am sure that the Senator from Illinois misconstrued an unconscious and which I thought was a silent smile that went unnoticed by anyone else.

"I am a registered Republican, but as you know I receive no compensation from Republic Party sources and had not for many months before I entered your service. My activities with you have not been of a partisan or a political nature.



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"I sincerely hope that my conduct has not caused you any embarrassment and that my services meet with your satisfaction."

I want to add my personal word, that if there had been any ground for any feeling, I very much regret it.

I thought the position of Mr. Greaves had been very clear throughout. He has been here as my assistant. I hope he may continue.

I certainly do not want him, or myself to do anything which would in any way impair the proper conduct of this very important investigation.

The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement?

Senator Brewster: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, at the proper time, in executive committee meeting I propose again to raise this question. I am not going to take the valuable time of the committee now to argue this question here this morning.

Not only do I propose in executive session to find out more about Mr. Greaves than has been told by the Senator from Maine, but there are two other gentlemen that I propose to find out something about also, who have sat here constantly at these hearings, and have, according to my



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best information, given considerable information to members of this committee.

I think this committee is entitled to know who every individual is, what his background is, what his motives and purposes are, how much he is being paid, and by whom.

If I had two or three people working for me, I would have told the committee all of these things long before this.

That is all that I care to say at this time.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster: In connection with that comment, if the usual consideration accorded by other committees, particularly by some of the standing committees of the Senate, and the committee which more than any other has established a record for investigation in the past four years, if the practice prevailing in those committees had been followed, I am sure the occasion for the comment of the Senator from Illinois would not have occurred.

Under the circumstances, other steps have been necessary.

If there is to be an investigation, as he suggests, there may also be an investigation of the associations and connections of those more actively identified with the committee, but I am sure we will be embarking on something that will carry us a rather long way.



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1 Senator Lucas: Yes.

2  
3 Senator Brewster: There are a good many things that  
4 have occurred which have not impressed the minority. They  
5 are matters of record. If we are going to start on that we  
6 will make a complete job of it.

7 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman --

8 The Vice Chairman: The Senator from Illinois.

9 Senator Lucas: One more word. There is no precedent  
10 for any special committee such as the Senator from Maine  
11 suggests. There is precedent on standing committees and those  
12 committees are presumed to be composed of Republicans and  
13 Democrats who look after partisan matters and look after the  
14 principles on which the parties operate.

15 This was presumed to be a non-partisan investigation.

16 Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield?

17 Senator Lucas: Just a moment.

18 This was presumed to be a non-partisan investigation  
19 and there is no precedent, according to my informants, where  
20 a special committee of this kind has had any minority repre-  
21 sentation, and that is especially true in view of the fact  
22 that everyone in the first instance agreed that General  
23 Mitchell should act as counsel here in this case for us all.

24 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman --

25 Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1  
2 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman --

3 The Vice Chairman: I hope we can proceed soon, Senator.

4 Senator Brewster: Yes.

5 I will be a little more specific in the comment which I  
6 made. Aside from the standing committees I did have reference  
7 to the special committee investigating the defense establish-  
8 ment which has been functioning throughout the past four  
9 years and which I thought had accumulated considerable reputa-  
10 tion, and which has always had minority assistants as members  
11 of its staff.

12 And, I might add, that it is a very significant, and I  
13 think of a very non-partisan character, in the whole four  
14 years of its history it has never had a minority report of  
15 any character or a divided report, and it never had any such  
16 difficulties as this committee has faced. That is what has  
17 reinforced my impression that if well-established practices  
18 of the Truman Committee had been followed much of the diffi-  
19 culty here would have been avoided. I say that in all  
20 kindness.

21 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

22 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy.

23 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, we have an Admiral of the  
24 Navy waiting, have had for ten minutes, while we have been  
25 discussing Mr. Greaves. I hope that we can proceed.



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3 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe, did you want recognition?

4  
5 Mr. Keefe: I was going to make the same suggestion that  
6 Mr. Murphy has made, but in view of the statement of the  
7 Senator from Illinois as to the purposes of his investigation,  
8 I simply wanted to say that I was very much impressed with  
9 the long newspaper account in the newspapers yesterday where  
10 the Senator from Illinois proposed to investigate the Dewey  
11 incident to its ultimate conclusion.

12 I wonder if that is prompted by a non-partisan attitude.  
13 I wonder whether we are investigating Pearl Harbor or Mr.  
14 Dewey. Are we going to go off on a lot of other matters?

15 The Vice Chairman: I hope that we don't get into a  
16 discussion of every newspaper article.

17 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman --

18 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

19 Senator Lucas: The Dewey letters were placed in the  
20 record here by General Marshall and they were thought to be  
21 pertinent and material to this investigation by counsel, at  
22 least certain portions of them were thought to be material  
23 and pertinent, and the thing that I want to find out in  
24 connection with Mr. Dewey, and the only thing I want to find  
25 out, if it can be found out, is who gave him this top secret,  
26 if it was given to him, and I think the country and this  
committee is entitled to know.



1  
2 Mr. Keefe: What has that to do with Pearl Harbor?

3 Senator Lucas: It has plenty to do with Pearl Harbor, if  
4 somebody is giving away top secrets that are the highest  
5 ever considered by this nation; much more than about 90  
6 percent of the questions that have been asked by the Congress-  
7 man from Wisconsin have to do with Pearl Harbor.

8 The Vice Chairman: Obviously that would not be a proper  
9 matter to go into at this time. The Chair hopes that we may  
10 proceed with the witness before us.

11 Anyone else?

12 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

13 The Vice Chairman: The Senator from Michigan.

14 Senator Ferguson: I just want to place on the record  
15 the comment that my silence does not mean that I agree with  
16 what has been said here by Senator Lucas this morning; and  
17 I think it would be of interest to go into the past employ-  
18 ment of each of the employees of the committee and their present  
19 salary on the committee; but that we may proceed with Pearl  
20 Harbor I am not going into that this morning.

21 The Vice Chairman: Of course, the Chair feels con-  
22 strained to make this statement in connection with the remarks  
23 of the Senator from Michigan. Every employee of this committee,  
24 so far as the Chair knows, was selected by unanimous action  
25 of the committee.

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WARD & BYRNE WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I am sure you do not  
 2 mean to put that in the record as a fact. The facts are that  
 3 Senator Barkley and the Congressman now presiding and myself  
 4 were members of a sub-committee which did have certain al-  
 5 leged powers, but aside from Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, the  
 6 selection of the other two members of the counsellor staff  
 7 was not known even to me as a member of the sub-committee.

8 I do not mean to be intimating a challenge of their  
 9 capacity but I never knew anything directly regarding their  
 10 terms of employment, their salary and, as a matter of fact, I  
 11 know even little at the present time.

12 The Vice Chairman: Well, I think the statement I  
 13 made is accurate and correct and certainly in no executive  
 14 session of this committee has any member of the committee,  
 15 raised any question or intimated any objection to any member  
 16 of the staff. I am confident that statement is absolutely  
 17 and technically accurate.

18 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, it was conceded that there  
 19 was a subcommittee named consisting of Senator Barkley, Congress-  
 20 man Cooper and the Senator from Maine and the Senator from  
 21 Maine had the responsibility as one member of that committee  
 22 with regard to hiring our staff.

23 I hope we will go on with Pearl Harbor now. There is an  
 24 Admiral waiting.

25 The Vice Chairman: Of course, it was the purpose of



1 the committee to try to conduct a non-partisan, non-political  
 2 investigation and all employes of the committee are employes  
 3 of the whole committee and as far as the chair is advised  
 4 and knows every employe of the committee has endeavored to  
 5 fully cooperate with every member of the committee.

6 It is my privilege to be a member of several joint com-  
 7 mittees. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Internal  
 8 Revenue Taxation. There is no minority or majority employes.  
 9 The staff is for the whole Joint Committee.

10 I am a member of the Joint Committee of the Reduction  
 11 of nonessential Federal expenditures headed by Senator Byrd.  
 12 So far as I know there has never been any minority or major-  
 13 ity employes. They are employes of the Joint Committee.

14 I am a member of the committee on Post-war Economic Policy  
 15 and Planning of the House and there has never been any min-  
 16 ority or majority employes. All employes serve the full  
 17 committee.

18 Now, Admiral, will you please be sworn?

19

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20 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON

21 (being first duly sworn by the vice-chairman)

22 Mr. Gesell: At the outset I think perhaps we can di-  
 23 rect attention to the principal exhibits which will be  
 24 covered in Admiral Wilkinson's testimony.

25 The first, of course, is exhibit 37, which is already



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 in evidence, the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches.

3 I would like to call attention to two matters in con-  
4 nection with that exhibit at this time. When the exhibit was  
5 prepared, for reasons of security as to which the committee  
6 is fully informed the word "purple" was eliminated from two  
7 dispatches. In view of developments since that date the  
8 word "purple" no longer has any security significance and for  
9 that reason we would like to amend the dispatches merely to  
10 put that word in at the appropriate place. It first appears  
11 at page 12 of the exhibit.

12 The Vice Chairman: This is exhibit number what?

13 Mr. Gesell: 37, basic Navy dispatches. At page 12,  
14 the first line of the dispatch should read, "Tokyo to Vichy  
15 No. 295." Insert "purple" "of 19th." So the word "purple"  
16 will appear in that dispatch.

17 More important, perhaps, from the point of view of the  
18 hearing is the insertion of the word "purple" in two places  
19 on the dispatch which appears at page 41. That is the dis-  
20 patch of December 2nd from OPNAV to CINCAF and others con-  
21 cerning code destruction. The word "purple" should appear  
22 after the word "destroy" in the second line and again after  
23 the word "destroy" in the fourth line.

24 Also at page 10 the word of the dispatch should  
25 be "purple."



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 We would like to introduce other exhibits at this time  
3 which have been in the hands of the committee now for several  
4 weeks.

5 The first as exhibit 78, a folder designated "Dispatches  
6 on Kra Peninsula alert."

7 As exhibit 79 a folder designated, "Dispatches on Dutch  
8 alert."

9 As exhibit 80 a series of photostated documents, Fort-  
10 nightly Summaries on Current National Situations."

11 And as exhibit 81, a folder containing various special  
12 estimates made by the Office of Naval Intelligence on the Far  
13 Eastern situation in the period preceding Pearl Harbor attack,  
14 commencing with a special estimate dated February 15, 1941 and  
15 going up to December 6, 1941.

16 I might say these latter two exhibits, 80 and 81, com-  
17 prise data comparable to that contained in the basic exhibit  
18 of estimates which was introduced in connection with General  
19 Miles' testimony as exhibit 33.

20 Senator Brewster: Do I understand whether we have been  
21 given copies of these yet?

22 Mr. Gesell: Yes, I think several weeks ago, Senator.

23 The Vice Chairman: The exhibits will be admitted as  
24 indicated by counsel.

25



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by Mr. Gesell

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(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 78, 79, 80 and 81.)

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Mr. Gesell: Admiral, will you please state your name, your rank and present duty for the record, please, sir?

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Admiral Wilkinson: Theodore Stark Wilkinson, Vice-Admiral U.S. Navy, recently commander of the Third Amphibious Force of the Pacific Fleet and now awaiting the pleasure of the committee, subsequently to join the Navy Department for duty.

12

13

Mr. Gesell: During what period of time were you Chief of the ONI?

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Admiral Wilkinson: From October the 15th, 1941 until, as I recall, July the 20th, 1942. I will, of course, however, be glad to speak of anything within my knowledge of events before October 15th.

18

19

Mr. Gesell: What had been your duty immediately prior to your connection with ONI?

20

21

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23

24

Admiral Wilkinson: I had been commanding officer of the battleship Mississippi for some nine months and before that a year and a half Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Andrews, commander of the scouting force and of the Hawaiian detachment.

25

Mr. Gesell: How long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Admiral Wilkinson: Forty years and a half.

3

Mr. Gesell: During that time you have had duty at Hawaii,

4

have you not?

5

Admiral Wilkinson: Intermittently. My last and only

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tour of some length was with Admiral Andrews for about a year

7

and a half in Hawaii and then subsequently on the Mississippi

8

for six months additional.

9

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, that would leave you at Hawaii

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during what period of time?

11

Admiral Wilkinson: From October 1939 until May 1941.

12

Mr. Gesell: Were you stationed at Hawaii your whole time

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from October 1939 on, or did you go out there when the fleet

14

went out there?

15

Admiral Wilkinson: I was with the so-called Hawaiian

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detachment, which was a force of vessels, and my duties were

17

entirely at sea. We operated off Hawaii and from time to

18

time went in port. At no time was I on shore duty there, nor

19

have been.

20

Mr. Gesell: Prior to joining the ONI on October 15,

21

1941 had you had any experience in the field of naval in-

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telligence?

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Admiral Wilkinson: None other than attendance at two

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international conferences for limitation of armaments in

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1933 and 1934.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: Had you ever had any experience in the  
3 Navy's field of activities comparable to what the Army calls  
4 their War Plans Division?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. At sea, as Chief of Staff to  
6 Admiral Andrews and again as gunnery officer and assistant  
7 officer to Admiral Willard some ten years before, but not on  
8 shore.

9 Mr. Gesell: The precise title which you held in ONI  
10 was Director of Naval Intelligence, is that correct?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

12 Mr. Gesell: Do I understand that that was in the nature  
13 of a position comparable to that occupied by General Miles  
14 of the Army? That is to say, that you were a member of the  
15 immediate staff of the Chief of Naval Operations?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Comparable but not entirely similar  
17 in that the Chief of Naval Operations had under him not a  
18 general staff but an office composed of a number of divisions.  
19 His responsibilities were somewhat different from the Chief  
20 of Staff of the Army and the responsibilities of his several  
21 divisions were quite different from those of the General Staff  
22 of the Army.

23 Mr. Gesell: But the immediate advisers to the Chief of  
24 Naval Operations would be the various directors of the prin-  
25 cipal divisions?



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Ge sell

2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

3 Mr. Gesell: Now, can you indicate for us what the other  
4 principal divisions of the Navy organization are in addition  
5 to the Office Of Naval Intelligence?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: The Chief of Operations was by law  
7 charged with the operations of the fleet and the preparation  
8 and readiness of plans for use in war. By regulations he  
9 was charged with the coordination of efforts of all bureaus  
10 of the Department to maintain and make ready the fleet. He  
11 had to assist him in these duties several divisions, as you  
12 asked: The War Plans Division, the Central Division, the  
13 Communications Division, Ship Movements, Fleet Maintenance,  
14 Fleet Training, Naval Intelligence and possibly one or two  
15 others.

16 Mr. Gesell: Can you tell us who were during the period  
17 immediately preceding Pearl Harbor responsible as directors  
18 of those respective divisions?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner;  
20 Central Division, Captain Schuirman; Communications, Rear  
21 Admiral Noyes; Ship Movements, Rear Admiral Brainard; Fleet  
22 Maintenance, I believe Rear Admiral Farber; Fleet Training  
23 I forget at the moment, and Naval Intelligence myself.

24 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, will you give us some idea of  
25 what the responsibilities and functions and organization of



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 Naval Intelligence were?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Naval Intelligence had three princi-  
4 pal branches, the Administrative, Domestic Intelligence and  
5 Foreign Intelligence.

6 The Administrative carried out its routine duties with  
7 regard to personnel, and procurement and assignment of duty  
8 of personnel, finances, mail, the issue and forwarding of  
9 all reports, reproduction, printing and general files, a  
10 normal administrative office.

11 The Domestic division carried on the investigation of  
12 espionage and conspiratorial organizations and individuals,  
13 looked after coastal intelligence along the coast of the  
14 United States with respect to information that could be picked  
15 up from boats and otherwise, plant inspections to make sure  
16 that the plants in which the Navy was involved were safe both  
17 from a mechanical viewpoint as to fire and other hazards and  
18 safe from a security viewpoint as to national secrets; that  
19 is the plants, I am speaking of, in which confidential work  
20 was going on. This Domestic branch also investigated candidates  
21 for confidential Navy Department employment and candidates  
22 for employment with the Naval Intelligence Service itself.  
23 It organized and conducted in general schools for of-  
24 ficers and men to be assigned to intelligence. Its principal  
25 duties were those I first mentioned, the investigation of



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 espionage and conspiratorial or subversive organizations and  
3 individuals. They conducted a survey of the country in con-  
4 nection with FBI and Military Intelligence and marked down  
5 such suspects as were known by the contacts, by the large  
6 number of contacts we had. It was this work that enabled us  
7 to run in, as you might say, to get taken into custody im-  
8 mediately after the war some eight thousand suspects of  
9 various Axis nations and I think in large part contributed to  
10 the fact that at no time during the last war was there any  
11 serious sabotage in this country.

12 The Foreign Intelligence comprised a number of geographic  
13 sections, such as the British Empire, the Far East, Western  
14 Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Near  
15 East, American Republics, and then certain other sections such  
16 as foreign trade in merchant vessels, statistics in connec-  
17 tion with foreign navies and matters of trade and two sec-  
18 tions known as Special Intelligence and Strategic Information.

19 The duties of the office as a whole and of the foreign  
20 branch in particular and of each geographic section was to  
21 collect, evaluate and forward to interested agencies intelli-  
22 gence received from abroad or picked up from newspapers or  
23 otherwise with relation to the several foreign countries under  
24 each geographic section. The evaluation would consist of con-  
25 sidering the source, considering the reliability of the infor-  
mation which he had obtained and its consistency with other  
proven information that we had.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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In addition to those main sections there was a small section of Records and Library, Historical Section, and one of Censorship, which was held in the nucleus, ready to go into action when the national censorship was declared. That, of course, could not be declared before the war situation and there was no censorship in the United States prior to that time. That was the main office.

Mr. Gesell: Before you leave the main office, was there also a branch known as Fleet Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson: No. Upon the institution of Admiral King's Commander in Chief Office, he set up a Fleet Intelligence which was directly under his office and was related to the Office of Naval Intelligence, but at the time that we were operating before Admiral King came in, in I believe January or February of 1942, there was no specific office of Fleet Intelligence, as I recall.

Mr. Gesell: Did the Office of Naval Intelligence do the work with respect to keeping track of the movements of the Japanese and other potential enemy nation vessels?

Admiral Wilkinson: Very definitely.

Mr. Gesell: Where was that work done in this organization scheme?

Admiral Wilkinson: In each of the foreign sections.

Mr. Gesell: In other words, the Far Eastern branch of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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the Foreign Intelligence Section would keep track of the movements of the Japanese vessels?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. May I continue with the field?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir.

Admiral Wilkinson: That was the office. The personnel at the time of December 1st were 230 officers and 175 enlisted men and 300 civilians in the main office, including the branches I have spoken of, and the school which took a number. In the Naval Districts there were about 1,000. I have the figures for November 15 and December 15, and I am interpolating between the two. There were about 135 agents who were civilian employees of considerable detective and analytical skill; 900 enlisted men and 100 civilians. These were the Naval Districts throughout the country and in Hawaii, Panama and the Philippines.

In the foreign posts there were 133 officers and 200 enlisted men, and no civilians. In the foreign posts there were naval attaches and naval observers throughout the world. The naval attaches were at the capitals, and naval observers, a naval equivalent of a Consul, at a number of ports. We were obtaining our information in large part from these naval attaches in the foreign nations, from the naval attaches and observers in these ports, and in part from the State Department



1  
2 officials and in part radio intercepts which we received  
3 from the Radio Communications Office.

4 Mr. Gesell: Going back to your organization for a moment  
5 more, there was an assistant director of the division, was  
6 there not?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: There was an assistant director who  
8 at the time was awaiting relief, as the Director of the Domestic  
9 Branch. He was doubling at the time and subsequently became  
10 relieved, and became full-time Assistant Director.

11 Mr. Gesell: What was his name?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: That was Captain, now Rear Admiral  
13 Howard Kingman.

14 Mr. Gesell: Who was in charge of the Foreign Intelligence  
15 branch?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Captain W. A. Heard.

17 Mr. Gesell: Who was specifically responsible for the  
18 Far Eastern section of that branch?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Commander, now Captain McCollum.

20 Hook  
21 follows



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Admiral, I have in my hand a three-sheet mimeographed document entitled "Intelligence Division (OP 16). Duties:"

Does that document correctly summarize the duties of the Intelligence Division as it was set up and operating immediately prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: In general, yes. You will note on page 2, sub-paragraph (c) they speak of duties of the public relations branch. That had been a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence, but in the middle of the year 1941, I believe it was detached and placed directly under the Secretary's office, and in consequence that entire sub-paragraph was no longer effective.

Mr. Gesell: Does that document correctly state the duties of the Foreign Intelligence Branch?

Admiral Wilkinson: In general, yes. In item (a)(2), thereof, "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable," the definition of "evaluation" which has been advanced in connection with General Miles' testimony is somewhat in conflict with that in the Navy in that in G-2 evaluation of information included the determination of the probable or prospective intentions of the enemy.

That, however, was not one of the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: I want to return to that in a moment.

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Gesell: I would like to offer this three-page  
5 statement of the duties of the Intelligence Division as  
6 the next exhibit, Exhibit 82.

7 The Vice Chairman: It will be so received.

8 (The document referred to was  
9 marked Exhibit No. 82.)

10 Mr. Gesell: I ask you, Admiral, to read the duties  
11 of the Foreign Intelligence Branch.

12 Admiral Wilkinson: "The Foreign Intelligence Branch  
13 will:

14 "(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information con-  
15 cerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval  
16 and maritime matters, with particular attention to the  
17 strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign  
18 naval forces.

19 "(2) Evaluate the information collected and dissemi-  
20 nate as advisable.

21 "(3) Direct the activities of U.S. Naval Attaches.

22 "(4) Maintain liaison with naval missions."

23 Naval missions were special bodies sent to various  
24 countries on their request in order to train their navy.  
25



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 "(5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attaches  
3 accredited to the United States.

4 "(6) Maintain liaison with other Government depart-  
5 ments for the exchange of foreign information."

6 Mr. Gesell: Now, under item (a)(1), it is clear that  
7 one of the duties of the ONI was to secure or collect  
8 information concerning the disposition and probable inten-  
9 tions of foreign naval forces, was it not?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. We were to secure every-  
11 thing we could which was factual, and which would be of  
12 value in determining those intentions.

13 Mr. Gesell: Now, is it also clear that under item (2)  
14 ONI had the responsibility of disseminating such information  
15 to all concerned?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: You will note that term "as advis-  
17 able," which means as may have been directed from time to  
18 time. There were directions which we had received in that  
19 connection.

20 Mr. Gesell: I want to be sure I understand you. I under-  
21 stand you to testify on that point thus far, as follows, that  
22 it was the responsibility of ONI to assemble the information  
23 as to the disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval  
24 naval forces.

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Entirely.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: That the responsibility of evaluating  
3 such information was not the responsibility of ONI.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. With respect to its  
5 accuracy, very definitely. With respect to the determina-  
6 tion of probable intentions of itself, it was not.

7 Mr. Gesell: In other words, ONI simply indicated  
8 when it had collected the information, whether it con-  
9 sidered it reliable or not, and if so, what degree of re-  
10 liability it attached to the information.

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and to the best of our guess  
12 we would advise the Office of Chief of Naval Operations  
13 what we thought it meant.

14 Mr. Gesell: But you did not have, as one of your func-  
15 tions, the responsibility of determining what the probable  
16 intentions of the foreign naval forces would be?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: No. I was advised by my predecessor  
18 that he had been told by the Chief of Naval operations,  
19 the Assistant Chief, and Director of War Plans, that the  
20 Office of Naval Intelligence would not prepare the estimate  
21 or probable intentions of the enemy, as had been done in  
22 the War Department, but that War Plans would assume that  
23 duty.

24 I have subsequently consulted Admiral Ingersoll on that  
25 same subject, and I stated that I felt we had considerable



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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talent in the office that might be prepared to do that, but that I understood this from my predecessor, and Admiral Ingersoll confirmed it.

Mr. Gesell: These duties that I have just introduced as Exhibit 82, were established by the order of the Chief of Naval Operations on October 23, 1940, were they not?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe so.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know of any formal written amendment of those duties, Admiral?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. For instance, I know of no amendment that removed the Public Relations Branch from that office, but perhaps that has been overlooked in the general corrections.

Mr. Gesell: So that by word of mouth, and discussion, the responsibilities of ONI under this general statement of its duties were qualified, and amended; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: I would not say amended. I would say qualified, because there is nothing in the specific text that would require us to disseminate the probable intentions of the enemy, as I read it.

Mr. Gesell: Are we clear thus far, that it was your duty to assemble the information; it was your duty to determine its degree of reliability, and it was the duty of someone else to determine what the probable intentions of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 the enemy would be?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: That was my understanding, except,  
4 of course, I was willing and anxious that the efforts and  
5 abilities of our office should contribute our view of the  
6 enemy intention to the Office of Naval Operations.

7 Mr. Gesell: I am talking, you understand, though,  
8 Admiral, as to your duties, as to your responsibilities.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: Quite right.

10 Mr. Gesell: It was not your responsibility or duty to  
11 determine the probable intentions of the enemy?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not so understand, and I have  
13 the information, as I said, from my predecessor, my discus-  
14 sion with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Opera-  
15 tions, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my  
16 predecessor.

17 Mr. Gesell: You recall a conversation with Admiral  
18 Kirk to that effect?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

20 Mr. Gesell: I understand he talked about the matter  
21 with Admiral Ingersoll and he also advised you.

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gesell: Did you ever discuss the matter with Admiral  
24 Stark?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Now, with respect to the responsibility for dissemination, I understood you to testify that your responsibility for dissemination was qualified by the words "as advisable," and that you had orders instructing you as to what type of information should be disseminated. Is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval forces.

In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information which I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situa-



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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tion, and the operations for which he was responsible.

Mr. Gesell: In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some specific action to the recipient, then you felt you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson: Exactly.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: I have just been handed, at the opening of this hearing, Admiral Wilkinson, a memorandum which I wanted to read to you and ask you if you are familiar with this memorandum or have ever seen it. It is:

"Confidential Memorandum, December 12, 1940.

"From the Chief of Naval Operations.

"To: The Director, Naval Intelligence Division.

"Subject: Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations.

"Enclosure: (A) Distribution List.

"1. In view of present world conditions, the Chief of Naval Operations believes that there is a need for keeping responsible Fleet and Force Commanders, and important Navy Department executive agencies, in closer touch with important aspects of the situation which may affect decisions on the nature and direction of initial war operations of the Naval Forces. It is, therefore, requested, that the Director of Naval Intelligence prepare fortnightly for limited distribution a confidential and condensed summary of the current situation under headings as follows:

"A. The diplomatic situation.

"Japanese, German, Italian, French, Russian, Latin American.

"B. The Japanese military situation.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 "C. The Japanese naval situation.

3 "D. The Chinese military situation.

4 "E. The German military, naval, and air situations.

5 "F. The Italian naval and air situations.

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7 "2. Under each general heading a condensed and broad  
8 view of the situation should be summarized, with paragraphs  
9 following in necessary detail to give recent diplomatic,  
10 military, or naval trends.

11 "3. It is desired that no information be included per-  
12 taining to the United States, British or Dutch military or  
13 naval disposition and strengths; nor should reference be made  
14 to United States war plans or secret diplomatic conversations."

15 Signed, "H. R. Stark."

16 The distribution list shows substantial distribution  
17 both in the field and within the Navy Department, including  
18 the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, Commander in Chief,  
19 Asiatic Fleet.

20 Do you remember having seen that memorandum of December  
21 12, 1940?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not see it until this morning,  
23 but I was fully aware of its terms as conveyed to me, and I  
24 was issuing, or my office was issuing such a fortnightly  
25 bulletin throughout my tenure of office.

As you will note, the operations of the anti-Axis nations



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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were not to be included in it, and when Russia came into the war that was also added to the list of operations we should not discuss, and also our own operations were not included.

(6)

The distribution was materially expanded. The original sheet there shows distribution of something less than 20, I believe. Eventually, at the time of the first of December, that distribution list was up around 120, going to all flag officers, or the commands of all flag officers in the field, in the Naval Districts and in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Gesell: Now we have introduced some of these fortnightly summaries, the ones immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, and they are contained in Exhibit 80.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

What I am particularly concerned with now, Admiral, is the instruction from Admiral Stark that these fortnightly summaries should not contain information concerning secret diplomatic conversations.

Did you understand that you were under orders from Admiral Stark not authorized to send to send to the field information concerning secret diplomatic conversations?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, because of the general security attached to the code-breaking activities.

Mr. Gesell: Do you know whether the recipients of these fortnightly summaries had ever been apprised or advised that you were not going to submit to them information concerning



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 secret diplomatic conversations?

3       Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know. Of course in each  
4 bulletin there was a diplomatic section, and everything that  
5 could be obtained outside of the secret material was in there,  
6 and possibly some reflection, in guarded terms, on the secret  
7 material and its bearing in the diplomatic sections of this  
8 bulletin.

9       Mr. Gesell: That is just what concerns me. You have  
10 a diplomatic section in your fortnightly summary and you have  
11 instructions limiting the nature of the information you can  
12 place in that section.

13       Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

14       Mr. Gesell: Just what is secret diplomatic information  
15 or what are secret diplomatic conversations? What did you  
16 understand that to exclude?

17       Admiral Wilkinson: As I say, I had not seen the text  
18 of that bulletin, but I found it a going concern and my general  
19 instructions were I was not to put anything in there, anything  
20 derived from what was known as "ultra" or "magic". We thought  
21 the general trend of the diplomatic conversations which might  
22 be indicated in magic as being adverse would be so indicated  
23 in the bulletin, but specific quotations, or specific facts  
24 known only to the diplomatic magic was not to be placed in  
25 there.



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: In other words, it referred to conversations at least in which our Government was participating, did it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Information which we might obtain from our naval attaches or other sources, so long as it was not the product of code-breaking activity. We got a great deal of information from State Department dispatches which we were privileged to examine, and we got quite a little from our attaches and naval observers from abroad.

Mr. Gesell: Your functions with respect to the dissemination of information, which we have been discussing here, remained the same under the various War Plans, did they not? That is, the Naval Intelligence had, under the different War Plans, the similar responsibility of collecting and disseminating information, if advisable?

Admiral Wilkinson: I should say so. I do not recall any mention of Naval Intelligence specifically in any of the War Plans.

Mr. Gesell: I notice in War Plan 46, and in War Plan 52, in each instance a chapter and section under the Assignment of Tasks, which specifies that the Office of Naval Intelligence, either alone or in cooperation with the other participating Governments, would secure and disseminate as advisable whatever information was necessary in carrying out the plan.

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall that specifically,



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 but I take it as a routine entry.

3 Mr. Gesell: I want to turn to a discussion of Japanese  
4 intercepts with you at this point, Admiral, and see if we can  
5 get a clear understanding of what the functions of ONI were  
6 in respect of the Japanese intercepts.

7 Who, or what department in the Navy, was responsible for  
8 intercepting the Japanese messages?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: The Division of Naval Communications  
10 arranged for interception and for decryption.

11 Mr. Gesell: Now the Division of Naval Communications  
12 you stated was under Admiral Noyes, did you not?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

14 Mr. Gesell: That was not a division which went through  
15 your chain of command?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: No, it was a parallel division in  
17 our operations.

18 Mr. Gesell: Did that division also have the responsi-  
19 bility for decoding and translating messages?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, except we furnished them, as  
21 best we could, translators whom we had scoured the country  
22 for, and in finding an inadequate number we had actually  
23 started, on the first of October, two schools for Japanese  
24 translators, one in California and one in Harvard.

25 Mr. Gesell: But the responsibility for reception, re-



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 responsibility for decoding and responsibility for translation  
3 all rested in the Division of Communications?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Certainly intercepting and certainly  
5 decoding. I am not quite clear in my mind about translation.  
6 I think the translation was done under that same central  
7 office by translators who were assigned to that duty and who  
8 had been found by us and in part were paid by us but were told  
9 to report to that office.

10 Mr. Gesell: You understand I am again talking now in  
11 terms of chain of command.

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

13 Mr. Gesell: Rather than whether or not you had cooperated  
14 by helping them through the loan of personnel, and so forth.

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I think the translation itself  
16 was in that chain of command, but of course the cooperation  
17 between Admiral Noyes and myself and our officers was, I think,  
18 quite complete, and certainly very friendly.

19 Mr. Gesell: Did you then receive the message for the  
20 first time, any particular message, after it had been inter-  
21 cepted, decoded and translated and was in an English text  
22 form?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

24 Mr. Gesell: Now who in the Navy received the intercepted  
25 Japanese messages during the period that you were director of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 CSE preceding Pearl Harbor?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: In the finished form that you just  
4 mentioned?

5 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

6 Admiral Wilkinson: They were sent according to their  
7 application to the Foreign Section to which attributable.  
8 Speaking specifically of the Far Eastern matters which we are  
9 now concerned with, they went to the Far Eastern section,  
10 Captain McCollum.

11 Mr. Gesell: Now was it his responsibility to distribute  
12 them to certain officers in the Navy Department?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: No, it was his responsibility only  
14 to arrange for such distribution, but it was my over-all  
15 responsibility to see that it was done, and we had Commander,  
16 now Captain Kramer, who was charged with the distribution.

17 Hook  
18 follows



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: With the physical distribution?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: The physical distribution.

4 Mr. Gesell: Now who, in the Navy Department was on  
5 the distribution list?

6  
7 Admiral Wilkinson: The Secretary of the Navy, the  
8 Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval  
9 Operations, Director of War Plans, and myself.

10 Mr. Gesell: Can you give us the names of those  
11 officers at that time?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark,  
13 Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself.

14 Mr. Gesell: Did Admiral Noyes, the Chief of the  
15 Division which was intercepting, decoding, and translating  
16 them, get them?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: He got them before they came to  
18 me, or to my secretary.

19 Mr. Gesell: Then he was on the list, was he not?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: He was not on the formal distribu-  
21 tion list, but he passed on them before they were sent  
22 to me.

23 Mr. Gesell: In other words, he passed on them as part  
24 of his administrative responsibilities?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. He may or may not have  
actually seen each one. He may have delegated that



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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1 Mr. Gesell: With the physical distribution?

2 Admiral Wilkinson: The physical distribution.

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4 the distribution list?

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6 Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval  
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22 of his administrative responsibilities?

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24 actually seen each one. He may have delegated that  
25



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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authority at times when he was not in his office, but in general he sighted them all, I believe.

Mr. Gesell: Did the Navy make any distribution outside of the Navy Department of the texts of these intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, to the White House.

Mr. Gesell: To any place else?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my knowledge. Some months before it had gone to the State Department intermittently with the Army, but more recently the Navy take the White House direct and the Army take the State Department direct.

Mr. Gesell: Now, as I understand it, the interception and translation and decoding of these messages was worked out between the Army and Navy, so if the Navy intercepted and translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Army and if the Army intercepted, and translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Navy?

Admiral Wilkinson: Both services were supposed to have a full file of the intercepts made by either or both together.

Mr. Gesell: Did you personally see all of the messages intercepted?

Admiral Wilkinson: No. A number of them were excluded in the Office of Communications from further transmission,



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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if they were purely trivial, such as ordering a dozen pair of trousers, or something of that sort, for instance, but those which were of any importance were sent to the Naval Intelligence, and were then placed in a book, and I saw all of those.

I might not have read those to which my attention was not called, because sometimes they were very bulky, but they were available there for me to see.

Mr. Gesell: Did anyone in the Office of Naval Intelligence make any selection from that complete file of the messages which were to be sent to the other officers on the distribution list?

Admiral Wilkinson: Captain Kramer, who was primarily in our chain of command, but had additional duties with Communications, usually I believe saw them all, even those of the trivial nature which he excluded.

Those which were then placed in the book and brought to us, he usually marked them as more important, with clips or otherwise. That marking was checked afterwards by Captain McCullom and myself, and we both scanned through the book.

Mr. Gesell: By the time it had gotten to you, the book had on it, by a clip or other designation, some means of calling particular attention to the more important messages?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Furthermore, when matters were particularly interesting, or the messages were particularly interesting, Captain Kramer would point out to the recipient by his finger, or by turning to the page, particularly what he thought they would be interested in.

Mr. Gesell: I gather you used a system of a book rather than a locked pouch, such as they had in the Army, is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Will you explain just how that was done? Was there one book which contained these messages which went to the various people on the list, or did each receive a list of the messages that he should examine?

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure which went to the White House. I am sure they had a separate copy which went to the Naval Aide, and he used that, and prepared his own brief of that for the President, but as to the addressees in the Navy Department, it was all in the same book.

Mr. Gesell: And when that book had been distributed around through the various Navy Department recipients, it went back to the officers who originally initiated and prepared the book, did it not?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, except one copy, I believe, was retained in the Geographical Section concerned, and in this case it was the Far Eastern Section. In fact, the book would have in there matters concerning the German or whatever foreign intercept was broken down, and proved to be interesting.

Upon its return, those appertaining to those other geographic sections would be taken out and filed in their respective sections, and the Far Eastern intercepts filed in the Far Eastern Section.

Mr. Gesell: But you, or Admiral Stark, or Admiral Tagersoll, and the other recipients did not have any means of keeping your own files of those intercepts?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: You examined the book and returned it?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: What opportunity was given to those officers to study and appraise, and read over more than once, if you will, the various messages in the book?

Admiral Wilkinson: They might hold the book as long as they wished, or send for it to come back again, but in the interest of security, we did not like to send out individual copies for retention.

Mr. Gesell: Under your system, if one of the officers



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 chose to hold the book he delayed the other officers from  
3 receiving this important information?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: They did, but the bearer of the  
5 book was waiting outside and might remind them to return  
6 it.

7 Mr. Gesell: So as a matter of general practice, I  
8 take it, the book went rapidly through the officers, the  
9 officers permitted to read it, and then leafed through  
10 the pages, reading matters of particular interest?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: I would not say so. I know Captain  
12 Kramer often said he was busy pretty near all day long  
13 carrying the book around at times. So they took time to  
14 read the messages, they did not scan them too hastily.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: Are you familiar with Exhibit 1 and Exhibit  
3 ? in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military Japanese  
4 intercepts?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

6 Mr. Gesell: Can you tell us whether or not you personally  
7 saw all of the messages contained in those two exhibits?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I naturally cannot, of my own re-  
9 collection, speak for all of them and of course those sent  
10 just before October 15 I had no opportunity to see, but I  
11 should say roughly that presumably I did see them all.

12 Mr. Gesell: All translated subsequent to the 15th of  
13 October?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

15 Mr. Gesell: I was going to ask you whether you made  
16 any effort to examine any intercepts which were in the file  
17 for the period prior to your becoming Director of Naval  
18 Intelligence?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not, except as occasion to  
20 refer to them might come up, in which case I would ask Captain  
21 Kramer to please give me the references.

22 Mr. Gesell: Of course, as the evidence here shows,  
23 the situation was becoming quite tense by October 15, 1941,  
24 when you took over the job, and I was wondering what means  
25 were taken to acquaint you with what had been taking place?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2           Admiral Wilkinson: I spent several hours, perhaps a  
3 whole day, in the Far Eastern section before I took over the  
4 office, getting the picture from their point of view, and  
5 talking to the officers there, and Captain McCullom particularly,  
6 and then Admiral Kirk as well told me something of it.

7           So I was informed by word of mouth rather than the  
8 examination of many documents.

9           Mr. Gesell: Well, when you became Director of Naval  
10 Intelligence did you give instructions to send the texts of  
11 these messages, or the gist of the messages to the various  
12 commanders in the field?

13           Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my knowledge. I carried  
14 out the existing system, and I know there was every emphasis  
15 on the importance of security because of the value of this  
16 method of intelligence.

17           Mr. Gesell: What do you mean by the "existing system"?  
18 In this Exhibit 37, which the committee has before it, there  
19 are a substantial number of dispatches sent to Hawaii prior  
20 to October 15, 1941, which are directly based upon magic,  
21 and in fact some of the dispatches actually quote the text  
22 of the intercepted message verbatim, and as I think we  
23 pointed out in the beginning this morning, some of them re-  
24 fer even to the purple code. I have in mind particularly  
25 the messages on pages 4 to 12 which were sent out almost



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 in the month of July, 1941, to the Commander in Chief of  
3 the Asiatic Forces, and to the Commander in Chief of the  
4 Pacific Forces.

5 Now what do you mean by "practice"? It looks as though  
6 there had been a practice of sending out these messages to  
7 the theaters concerned.

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I was told, and understood, that  
9 such messages were not to be sent. I believe, although I am  
10 not at all sure, that the messages you speak of as examples  
11 were in July and none subsequent until we come to that critical  
12 message with respect to burning the codes.

13 Mr. Gesell: I think that is a fair statement, Admiral,  
14 that most of them were in July, until the code burning messages  
15 which you sent out in the very last days.

16 Admiral Wilkinson: I think it is a question too of the  
17 overlapping responsibilities of Naval Intelligence and  
18 Communications. If I may dwell on that a moment, the Navy  
19 had established in Pearl Harbor and in Corregidor sub-units  
20 for the collection of radio information and for the breaking  
21 of such codes as, with the limited personnel and limited  
22 facilities they had, they might be able to do.

23 In connection with the work back and forth between those  
24 agencies and the Washington Office of Communications there  
25 were certain messages sometimes interchanged with relation

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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no codes, and I believe, although this again is information that was told me, that these messages of July were more or less of that nature. They had a trick name known as "Jonab". I think that those were more a discussion of that, in a way, and then again they were messages or information of what they had learned from the codes.

Mr. Gesell: You say that you were told not to send such messages to the field. Who told you that?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall the specific informant. I think it was my predecessor. It may have been Captain McCullom.

Mr. Gesell: Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom?

Admiral Wilkinson: Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom.

Mr. Gesell: Now I have been talking about the actual texts of the intercepted messages.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: What was the situation with respect to sending out a gist or summary of the intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: There was always the danger that the action that we took might have come from no other source than code-breaking, and in consequence.

If I might diverge a little, in the South Pacific we received one time, when Admiral Halsey was in Australia and I was his Deputy Commander, we received a message from Admiral



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 Nimitz that Admiral Yamamoto would be coming down to Buin  
3 and would be following a very definite schedule, and in  
4 Admiral Halsey's stead I arranged for an interception. Of  
5 course that story is now well-known, there being two days  
6 to spare, I sent word back to Admiral Nimitz that we were  
7 doing this, but I invited attention to the fact that this  
8 would give suspicion that we had broken the code and we knew  
9 what the schedule was.

10 In this instance Admiral Nimitz sent down his best  
11 wishes and said, "Go to it", that he would take a chance on  
12 the inferences to be drawn from that.

13 That is an example of acting upon a code-breaking  
14 activity even without repeating the text of the message.

15 Mr. Gesell: Well, then, what you said so far, you were  
16 concerned about the question of security, which we have dis-  
17 cussed in the hearings. My question was, however, first,  
18 whether or not you were under any instructions which in  
19 any way limited your sending out to the commanders in the  
20 field gists or summaries of the messages; not why you didn't  
21 do it.

22 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I don't recall any specific  
23 instructions to that effect.

24 Mr. Gesell: When you took over you didn't get from  
25 Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom, or from the Chief of Naval

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Operations, or anybody else, instructions that you were not to summarize this information from the intercepts and send it to the theater commanders?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall any specific instructions except the general preservation of security.

Mr. Gesell: You came to the conclusion, I gather, that you would not do so for reasons of security?

Admiral Wilkinson: I either came to that conclusion myself or found that that was the practice in other divisions of operation.

Mr. Gesell: You see, I am anxious to know which it was. Was it because you found there were some orders in effect and you complied with them, or because you yourself made the decision, for the reasons you have indicated, not to do it?

Admiral Wilkinson: Well, I think it was, as I think I earlier said, it was an existing practice, and that I continued it in the interest of security. I do not know that I had any specific instructions. I would have acted similarly with or without instructions.

Mr. Gesell: Did you know these messages had gone out in July, for example?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: Did you ever discuss this matter with any other officers, Admiral Stark or the chiefs of other divisions



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2  
3 concerned, as to whether you should or should not send out  
4 summaries or gists of intercepted messages?

5  
6 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I don't recall specifically any  
7 instances.

8  
9 Mr. Gesell: You don't recall any discussion of that  
10 matter with anyone?

11  
12 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. Not with respect to my  
13 own sending out. I may have had, and I think I did have from  
14 time to time, discussions as to information we had, as to  
15 whether that information should be further sent out. I re-  
16 member a discussion on the first of December with respect to  
17 the evident Japanese moves in the South China Sea. I do not  
18 believe, however, that that was concerned largely with code  
19 breaking activities.

20  
21 Mr. Gesell: I am limiting my questions now to the sending  
22 out of information obtained from the intercepted messages.

23  
24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

25  
26 Mr. Gesell: I understand you to say that you don't recall  
27 any discussions with any officers concerning whether or not  
28 summaries or gists of the messages should be sent out?

29  
30 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not so recall, no.

31  
32 Mr. Gesell: Had you ever heard that any particular  
33 commander in the field, at Hawaii or any other place, had  
34 requested such information be sent him?  
35



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I now know, but I did not  
3 know then.

4 Mr. Gesell: What do you mean you now know?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I think I have seen a transcript  
6 of a letter from the Commanding Chief, Pacific Fleet, request-  
7 ing that he be kept advised of diplomatic activities.

8 Mr. Gesell: You are referring to Admiral Kimmel's re-  
9 quest to Admiral Stark that he be advised concerning diplomatic  
10 matters?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I did not know of it then  
12 and only recently in connection with this hearing have I seen  
13 it.

14 Mr. Gesell: You recall no discussion concerning that  
15 letter with anyone?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

17 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall ever having discussed the  
18 matter with Admiral Kirk at the time you took over your  
19 duties?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I am not sure he was aware  
21 of it.

22 Mr. Gesell: I have in my hand, Admiral, a memorandum  
23 by Admiral Kirk dated March 11, 1941, Memorandum for the  
24 Chief of Naval Operations, written on the stationery of the  
25 Office of Naval Intelligence, referring to Admiral Kimmel's



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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23 by Admiral Kirk dated March 11, 1941, Memorandum for the  
24 Chief of Naval Operations, written on the stationery of the  
25 Office of Naval Intelligence, referring to Admiral Kimmel's



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

letter, which contains this paragraph, paragraph 4:

"The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States."

I want to show you that memorandum and ask you if you have ever seen it?

Admiral Wilkinson: Very recently I have seen it but I think that is a general statement of the duties of the Naval Intelligence and it does not refer specifically to the inquiry which you asked me, which was diplomatic activities, as I recall.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: So far as you were aware, you had no specific responsibilities toward Admiral Kimmel or any other commander in the field to apprise him or them of diplomatic material obtained from intercepted Japanese messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, and my understanding was that the material from intercepted messages would in general be kept highly secret.

Mr. Gesell: Well now, whose responsibility was it in the Navy Department to advise Admiral Kimmel or other commanders of information which came from the intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: If it was purely a question of diplomatic activities, I am not sure that there was any responsibility to so advise him.

Mr. Gesell: On the part of anyone, you mean?

Admiral Wilkinson: On the part of anyone. When it came to the question of enemy intentions, derived from diplomatic activities, I would say that it was that of the Office of War Plans, but I do not know whose responsibility it was to keep him advised of diplomatic negotiations of themselves.

Mr. Gesell: I understand you to say that as far as sending out such information as a matter of information, to Admiral Kimmel and others, you recall no discussion of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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7  
8 it, you recall no instructions concerning it, and you  
9 recall no requests from him concerning it?

10  
11 Admiral Wilkinson: I did not know of the requests. I  
12 don't recall as to the discussion. I do know that in our  
13 foreign fortnightly summary that we had a section of diplo-  
14 matic activities, and we endeavored to place in there  
15 everything that we could without compromising the inter-  
16 cepted messages, and to that extent it was the responsi-  
17 bility of my office to place in there everything with re-  
18 gard to diplomatic activities.

19  
20 With regard to the intercepted messages, there was a  
21 conflict of security versus the dissemination and I would  
22 say that there was no responsibility to furnish the inter-  
23 cepted messages unless they were directly related, or  
24 from them could be derived intentions of the enemy with  
25 respect to activities prejudicial to our fleet.

26  
27 Mr. Gesell: In other words, if the intercepted messages  
28 reached the point that it was apparent that some directive  
29 or order was necessary, then there was a responsibility,  
30 and you say that responsibility, in your opinion, rested in  
31 the War Plans Division under Admiral Turner?

32  
33 Admiral Wilkinson: It was my responsibility to call  
34 his attention to it, but his responsibility to send it out  
35 because of the directive phase of it as you mention.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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I am not attempting to say I had no interest, but I didn't have the authority to do it.

Mr. Gesell: Did you ever have any discussions with the Army concerning their practice in sending out summaries or gists of these intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: I was in very close touch with General Miles, and frequent conferences and meetings with him informally in his office and mine; we had weekly meetings with the FBI, Mr. Hoover, and General Miles and myself, on the Presidentially inspired committee set up by the President, we talked over secret matters of this sort, and both General Miles and I, I believe, were very anxious to guard the code-breaking activities to the greatest degree.

I do not recall specifically any conversation with him specifically on the question of sending out messages, except that we, from time to time discussed the matters that had turned up in magic.

Mr. Gesell: You mean as to what the information meant, but not what should be done with it?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, I would like to take up with you the question of what the commanders in the field may have known concerning the interception of these messages.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Let's take first of all Admiral Hart at Manila.

General Miles testified, and I believe there has been some other reference to it, perhaps in your testimony, that there were certain facilities at some point in the Philippines, under naval command and direction which permitted the interception, translation and the decoding of these Japanese messages; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: There were two radio intelligence stations, one at Pearl Harbor and one at Corregidor. They were primarily set up to intercept all of the information they could get and to study out from the ship calls that were used by the Japanese, and the types of messages and the frequency of the traffic, and so on, to figure out what they could from those rather than the code breaking proper.

It became desirable, however, that Admiral Hart -- it apparently became desirable, -- I am speaking from hearsay -- that Admiral Hart be able to do his own breaking down without the necessity of referring back to Washington and so on, and his section was enlarged somewhat and some of the facilities, which I would prefer not to describe, with relation to code breaking, were sent to him. So that he had out there facilities for breaking some code, including, I believe, the diplomatic code.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: If I may interrupt --

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: That meant that Admiral Hart had at Corregidor facilities for intercepting, translating and decoding messages of the type which appear in Exhibit 1, and Exhibit 2 here?

Admiral Wilkinson: I would say partial facilities. I don't think he was as well equipped as we were here.

Mr. Gesell: You mean he wasn't as well equipped in terms of manpower?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and experienced manpower.

Mr. Gesell: Experienced manpower, or, I suppose, the ability to intercept as many messages, because he hadn't so many intercepting stations under his control, fewer of these stations?

Admiral Wilkinson: He had a very limited number.

Mr. Gesell: But he was in a position to translate and decode any messages which he himself intercepted; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: No. In many codes, he couldn't touch them, but in the so-called purple code he was to a degree enabled to translate. In fact, there were many codes we never got into ourselves here in Washington.

Mr. Gesell: But the purple code was the code in which



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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many of these messages which we have in volumes 1 and 2 were sent?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think practically all of volume 1 and some few in volume 2. I am not certain.

Mr. Gesell: Was he in a position to decode messages sent in other codes of the type contained in volume 2?

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure. Again, I have been speaking entirely from hearsay and would prefer that the specific degree of his ability be answered by a communications officer.

Mr. Gesell: You were about to discuss the situation at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: I am sorry I interrupted.

Admiral Wilkinson: Similarly in May of 1941, an agency of the same type was set up in Hawaii. Captain Rochefort was, then Commander, was sent out, and half a dozen former language students who had recently been evacuated from Japan because of the growing crisis were sent to join him, and he had perhaps 20 or 30 enlisted men. They were working mainly on the radio intelligence proper. That is, the calls and the traffic analysis that I have just described.

Mr. Gesell: Ship locations?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Admiral Wilkinson: Ship locations, and so on. And he did not have the facilities for the purple code, nor originally facilities for any code.

Later he was asked by the department to specialize on one or two codes, and what success he had, I am not sure.

Mr. Gesell: He was in a position at Hawaii to intercept but he was not in a position to decode and hence to translate messages that were sent in the purple code?

Admiral Wilkinson: Correct. There was a certain amount of interchange between Corregidor, Hawaii, and Washington, particularly on ship movements. In fact Corregidor became our control and authority on ship movements, but there was not much, as I understand, and I again defer to the Communications witness, there was not much transfer through Hawaii of the purple code messages translated in Washington and at Manila.

Mr. Gesell: Well, as far as you were aware, they had not then facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating and decoding those messages there through which Admiral Kimmel or any other officer could have gotten the information?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: Were summaries prepared in the Navy Department of the intercepted messages, daily summaries of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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kind?

Admiral Wilkinson: In the morning, I forget whether it was 9 or 9:30, the Secretary of the Navy had a conference at which the Director of Naval Intelligence would discuss the news from all over the world, chiefly, of course, the Naval activity, the progress of the war. At that special items in connection with it which might have been dug out of a code word were sometimes mentioned. But in view of the size of that conference, there were about 20 officers in it, the references to the intercepted messages were rather few and far between.

Mr. Baecher has just invited my attention to this --

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, while we are waiting, I might direct counsel's attention to the fact that on page 31 of the volume 1, of the narrative, there is a difference between that and the Admiral's testimony.

Senator Ferguson: I can't hear the Congressman.

Mr. Murphy: I might direct counsel's attention that on page 31 of the narrative, there is a difference. It may be that it could be cleared up now and we would save time later.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1 Mr. Gesell: I don't even have a copy of that narrative.

2 Admiral Wilkinson: Here you are.

3 (Document handed to counsel.)

4  
5 Admiral Wilkinson: My attention has been invited to a  
6 summary as of the 10th of October listing the number of approxi-  
7 mately 12 dispatches which are briefed, but I don't recall  
8 ever having made any of those in my time or seeing them, and I  
9 am not sure who made this particular one. I did have, initially,  
10 a little summary, daily summary of the Japanese situation,  
11 which contained information as to what activities were apparent  
12 as to Japan, from all sources, including intercepts, and I  
13 thought that was continued through Pearl Harbor Day, but I  
14 have been since informed that it was discontinued on the 24th  
15 of October, 9 days after I came in. I don't recall why it  
16 was discontinued. In fact, my recollection was that I had  
17 continued it.

18 Mr. Gesell: We had been addressing our inquiries to those  
19 summaries and the daily analysis to the Navy Department,  
20 Admiral, particularly from the point of view of seeing whether  
21 either the daily summary or the daily situation reports, as  
22 they were sometimes called, were continued after you became  
23 Director of Naval Intelligence, and we could find none beyond  
24 October 24.

25 Admiral Wilkinson: The 24th is what I have been informed.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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I don't recall having stopped them or why they were stopped. In fact, my recollection, when I was at sea and somebody asked about it, was that we had continued to use them.

Mr. Gesell: Is it your present information that those summaries were not used beyond October?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, and Captain McCullom so advises me, as well as the information you have.

Mr. Gesell: Those summaries did contain information from Japanese intercepts, as I understand it.

Admiral Wilkinson: Not in the form of quoting the intercept, I don't think, but just mentioning the fact that the negotiations are continuing, and that some objection, apparently, was made by Tokyo to some terms, or something of that sort.

Mr. Gesell: Were those daily summaries prior to October sent out to the field at all, to the theater commanders?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe not. They were purely for internal consumption. Very small. Only two or three paragraphs a day.

Mr. Gesell: Do you feel that the information that was available to Commander Rochefort and others concerned with Naval Intelligence at Hawaii was sufficient for them to know at least in a general way that we were in a position not only to intercept but to translate and decode these Japanese



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 THE MESSAGES in the purple and other high codes?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say so, particularly as  
4 Captain Rochefort was an expert in that line, and was familiar  
5 with the latest developments up to the time that he left in  
6 May. Then also we had three intelligence agencies out there --  
7 we had two. Captain Rochefort, who belonged to the Communica-  
8 tions Division of operations, and was assigned to duty with  
9 the 14th Naval District, but was available to the Commander  
10 in Chief, and we had directly under Naval Intelligence the  
11 District Intelligence Officer at Honolulu, and he was given  
12 information at times with respect to individuals that might  
13 have appeared in codes intercepted in South America, or even  
14 in these codes here, but it was carefully guarded at the time.

15 Mr. Gesell: Was either the District Intelligence Officer  
16 or Commander Rochefort under any restriction or inhibition  
17 which would have prevented them from advising Admiral Kimmel  
18 that these messages in these high codes were in fact being  
19 decoded and translated in Washington?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't think so. They were in close  
21 contact with his Intelligence Officer, which was the third  
22 agency I spoke of, Captain Layton, who was Intelligence Officer  
23 on his staff. He was in full contact continually with  
24 Captain Rochefort and frequently, I believe, with Captain  
25 Mayfield of the District Intelligence Office.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2  
3 Mr. Gesell: Did Captain Layton himself have the informa-  
4 tion that we were decoding and translating these messages?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't know. I think probably he  
6 did.

7 Mr. Gesell: What precisely was the relationship that  
8 existed between the Office of Naval Intelligence here in  
9 Washington and these various Naval Intelligence agencies in  
10 Hawaii? Could you describe the organization to us so we  
11 understand?

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 Admiral Wilkinson: The Navy Department does not deal  
3 in general with any subordinate forces in the fleet or a  
4 unit. In other words, there was no relation between the  
5 fleet intelligence officer and the Office of Naval Intelli-  
6 gence. The matters went direct to the Commander-in-Chief of  
7 the Fleet and were handled there or he could handle it with  
8 his intelligence officer or his gunnery officer or whoever  
9 he saw fit, but we did not have the direct chain between  
10 fleet and office that was existent in the Army between the  
11 head of G-2 and the G-2 of the division. So much for the  
12 fleet.

13 Mr. Gesell: That means that ONI communicated directly  
14 with the commander of the fleet on all intelligence mat-  
15 ters?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Either with our division of communi-  
17 cations or in more important matters either directly with  
18 Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant.

19 Mr. Gesell: And always directly to the commander of the  
20 Fleet?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. With respect to all of the  
22 other agencies the intelligence officer was under the command  
23 of the district officer, Admiral Bloch. Administratively he  
24 checked in with us, or we would send him such information as  
25 hwe and such requests that we might have to make, but we had



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 no authority to order him to do anything and he was directly  
3 on the staff of the commandant of the District.

4 The same thing I would say would apply to Captain Roche-  
5 fort except that his administrative parent in Washington  
6 was not ourselves, ONI, but rather the Communications Divi-  
7 sion, but he likewise was on the staff of Admiral Bloch and  
8 primarily his officer and under his command and only related  
9 to communications, as Mayfield was to us for matters of ad-  
10 ministration, finance, general technique; technical matters  
11 largely.

12 Mr. Gesell: But matters of intelligence and information  
13 of importance to Admiral Bloch in his command, that went in  
14 through either Mayfield or Rochefort through to Admiral Bloch  
15 himself?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Most any --

17 Mr. Gesell: I say from you or from Admiral Stark. I  
18 am talking about non-administrative matters.

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. I was just thinking. The Di-  
20 strict Intelligence Officer, as you recall, was a member of  
21 the Domestic Intelligence side, which had to do with suspects  
22 and there was an unending chain of information being exchanged  
23 about Jim Smith or Hashihaha Tadikama or whatever you like.  
24 That sort of information, that intelligence went directly  
25 from the District Intelligence Officer to our Domestic branch.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 For any major matters we would be likely to communicate di-  
3 rect to the Fleet rather than to the District fellow, because  
4 the District fellow's activities were on the domestic side  
5 and not on the foreign side. He had nothing to do with Japan  
6 as a nation or with the Japanese Fleet.

7 Mr. Gesell: So that means, in effect, to wind it all  
8 up, that all communications concerning diplomatic matters or  
9 major Japanese developments would be communicated to Hawaii  
10 directly through the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet,  
11 Admiral Kimmel?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gesell: Now, you referred a moment ago to this  
14 question of the translation of the intercepted messages. I  
15 understood you to testify that you made available certain of  
16 the personnel and may have paid part of their salaries, to  
17 assist in the translation.

18 You were aware, were you not, that there was a very sub-  
19 stantial delay, sometimes as much as twenty-eight days, some-  
20 times quite a bit less than that, between the date of inter-  
21 ception and the date of translation of these Japanese mes-  
22 sages?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall the specific delays  
24 but I knew that for various reasons there were at times de-  
25 lays of some periods. Those reasons might, of course, be



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 transmission times, they might be due to the necessity of  
3 breaking a new code, they might be the difficulties in break-  
4 ing the cipher. I am not too familiar with the mechanics,  
5 but I think most of us understand that you have to have cer-  
6 tain material, a certain amount of material in the code be-  
7 fore you can begin to break it. Now, if somebody sends in  
8 a ten word message, that might lay aside for some time before  
9 a longer message and two or three others would come in to  
10 give you enough material to attack it, but coming back to  
11 your question yes, I was aware that there were delays.

12 Mr. Gesell: Precisely. Looking at these messages, just  
13 as any of us from day today, you can see that the transla-  
14 tion date was frequently later than the date the message was  
15 sent.

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. I just wanted to mention what  
17 I did because I think General Miles has emphasized the delays  
18 in translation and transmission of the intercept to the head  
19 office, but he has not mentioned the mechanical delays which  
20 were inherent there even if there had been as much personnel  
21 as we would have liked. There wasn't much we could do about  
22 it. Both Admiral Noyes and I were concerned about it be-  
23 cause I think we were trying to pick up all the Japanese and  
24 English speaking people we could find in the country.

25 Mr. Gesell: That is what I wanted to get at. Conscious,



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 as you must have been, of some of these delays, some of which  
3 might have been of a nature which you could cure by manpower  
4 and steps of that nature, what did you do to encourage or  
5 speed up translation, if anything?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Admiral Noyes and I were both con-  
7 cerned about it. His primary difficulty was in getting peo-  
8 ple actually to work on the mechanics of it, and I endeavored  
9 to assist him by procuring translators and we found, I think,  
10 some half a dozen translators that we could produce and we  
11 scoured the country for more and finally started a school to  
12 make more, because there were none in the country that  
13 either could or would take the job with us.

14 Then, also, we endeavored to expedite and speed our  
15 investigations of the personnel that Admiral Noyes wanted to  
16 have employed because, obviously, we could not go blind and  
17 have somebody in there without knowledge of who he was be-  
18 cause the whole thing might be blown sky high, so we inves-  
19 tigated all the applicants for the code breaking work and  
20 part of my efforts, as you asked, was to expedite those in-  
21 vestigations. That was done through the Domestic branch.

22 Mr. Gesell: Now, there is one question that was asked  
23 of the Army side in that connection and perhaps we ought to  
24 have the corresponding Navy figure if we can. How many peo-  
25 ple, if you know, were actually engaged at this time in the



Witness Wilkinson.

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 business of intercepting and translating and decoding these  
3 messages and messages of a similar type?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I have no real knowledge about that.  
5 I know it grew into very large numbers and I would say offhand  
6 at that time it was somewhere between three and five hundred,  
7 but I would defer to the testimony of the communicator.

8 Mr. Gesell: Well, perhaps before you leave the stand  
9 you can get some check made and get that figure for us, Ad-  
10 miral.

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Surely.

12 Mr. Gesell: I am sure, also, I did not ask you one  
13 other question concerning the transmission of these inter-  
14 cepted messages or their text to the theaters. I have been  
15 discussing with you Hawaii. Did you send information concern-  
16 ing the intercepted messages to Admiral Hart, or to any other  
17 commander overseas, which was more detailed in any respect  
18 than the information you sent Admiral Kimmel?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my knowledge. There may have  
20 been some interchange between the communications officers in  
21 attempting to straighten out their respective translations of  
22 certain intercepts, but there was nothing from my office.

23 Mr. Gesell: You did not undertake, for example, to  
24 supply Admiral Hart with the text of intercepted messages  
25 which he had not himself intercepted but which you had picked



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 up here through your facilities in Washington?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Not from my office. That might have  
4 been done in the communications office in an endeavor to  
5 straighten out their code work.

6 Mr. Gesell: Would you know whether or not that was done?  
7 Do you have any information on that?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not.

9 Mr. Gesell: Admiral, we have had a great deal of dis-  
10 cussion here concerning some of these messages which are con-  
11 tained in volume 2. They are the so-called military instal-  
12 lations and ship movement intercepts. I first want to get  
13 straight concerning the message that appears at page 12,  
14 which sometimes has been referred to here as the bombing plot  
15 message, or something of that sort.

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

17 Mr. Gesell: Now, that was sent prior to your becoming  
18 Director of Naval Intelligence, since it is dated September  
19 24, 1941 and it was translated October 9, 1941. I understood  
20 you to testify that you assumed your post on October 15, 1941.

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

22 Mr. Gesell: But I gather that you had been at least  
23 around the Division a bit beforehand before you formally took  
24 over the job to find out what it was all about?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 Mr. Gesell: I want to ask you when this message first  
3 came to your attention?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall whether it came to  
5 my attention before or on my taking over, or when a later  
6 message may have come in referring back to it, but I was aware  
7 of it at some time during the fall.

8 Mr. Gesell: You were aware of it prior to the attack?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

10 Mr. Gesell: And were you similarly aware of various  
11 messages which other witnesses have had called specifically to  
12 their attention, I think sometimes when you have been sitting  
13 here in the room, you might say implementing this message,  
14 giving reports of ships broken down by areas and asking for  
15 later detailed reports or asking for reports when ships were  
16 not moving, were not making any movements and other messages  
17 of that concern?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I was aware of most but not all of  
19 them. I couldn't say positively all.

20 Mr. Gesell: What evaluation did you give to those mes-  
21 sages at the time as far as their tending to indicate in any  
22 way the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: The Japanese for many years had the  
24 reputation and the fact bearing out that reputation of being  
25 meticulous seekers for every scrap of information, whether by



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 photography or by written report or otherwise.

3 We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and  
4 I think three Japanese naval officers on the West Coast mak-  
5 ing investigations of Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach and  
6 San Diego. In the reports that we had gotten from them there  
7 had been indications of movements and locations of ships;  
8 in the papers that they had there were instructions for them  
9 to find out the movements and locations of ships except in  
10 Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these  
11 fellows that were planted in America, these naval officers,  
12 were not to be responsible for movements in Hawaii and the  
13 Philippines because there were agencies finding that informa-  
14 tion there.

15 My general impression of adding all this reputation and  
16 this fact and these data together was that these dispatches  
17 were part of the general information system established by the  
18 Japanese. We knew also that certain information had been  
19 sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did not, I regret  
20 now, of course attribute to them the bombing target signifi-  
21 cance which now appears.

22 Mr. Gesell: These officers of the Japanese Navy who were  
23 apprehended on the West Coast you said were getting informa-  
24 tion concerning the movement and location of ships?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 Mr. Gesell: Do you mean to tell us that those officers  
3 had instructions to break down the harbors at Seattle and  
4 other points on the coast by areas and to designate the loca-  
5 tion of ships in those areas with particular reference to  
6 which were at wharves and which were tied to buoys?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No, because there are no wharves,  
8 as I recall, in San Pedro except for one or two used by naval  
9 vessels, at San Diego, and Bremerton to a limited extent. I  
10 do recall or have been informed that one of the reports on  
11 Lieutenant Commander Raarda with reference to Bremerton  
12 specified what ships were at anchor and which ships were  
13 alongside of a dock.

14 Mr. Gesell: Could we see that report?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I will endeavor to find it.

16 Mr. Gesell: Generally, those fellows were simply get-  
17 ting ship movement reports, weren't they, what ships came into  
18 the harbor and which ones went out and what their destination  
19 was and whether or not they were moving in convoy and the  
20 type of general ship movement information that is spread  
21 throughout this volume 2?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: In general, yes, but the location  
23 of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or elsewhere,  
24 did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would  
25 be of value to the question of when she might be moved, what



1 her state of readiness was and the inference that we drew from  
2 this was that they wanted to know everything they could not  
3 only about the movement of the ships and those that were pre-  
4 sent and, therefore, accounted for and not a threat to them  
5 in some other waters, but also with reference to those that  
6 were present where they were located with reference to state  
7 of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in  
8 Pearl Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea,  
9 whereas those at anchor in the stream would be ready, or would  
10 be so on short notice. Those at double banked piers might not  
11 be, particularly the inside one might take some time to go  
12 out.

13 Mr. Gesell: Well, you recognize, don't you, that that  
14 is not the type of information that this message was designed  
15 to get. Looking at the message now in the cold light of the  
16 hearing room it is apparent that they were trying to spot the  
17 vessels there so as to determine their state of repair or  
18 readiness for battle at sea.

19 Admiral Wilkinson: It would seem so now since the loca-  
20 tions might be of value not only as a bombing target but also  
21 for submarine attack or midget submarine attack.

22 Mr. Gesell: In an attack made from either above or under  
23 the water.

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

25 Mr. Gesell: And it is quite apparent that this message



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

2 was not designed to get information concerning the likelihood  
3 of certain vessels department from the harbor or the state of  
4 their repair or ordinary ship movement information. It is  
5 just what we have been calling it, is it not, Admiral?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

7 Mr. Gesell: A bombing plot message.

8 Admiral Wilkinson: In general, yes. There are other  
9 things of conceivable technical matters and interest. The  
10 ships that are in various harbors at the time might be an in-  
11 dication of what the capacity of this section of the harbor  
12 was with respect to taking a large fleet in, but those are  
13 technical interpretations which are hardly germane to the  
14 purposes as we now see it.

15 Mr. Gesell: Well, they are not the technical interpre-  
16 tations that you gave the message at the time either, are  
17 they?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't know that we did.

19 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall discussing this message with  
20 anyone in the Navy Department at the time prior to the attack  
21 on Pearl Harbor?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, I think I mentioned to one or  
23 more officers that the Japs seemed quite curious as to the  
24 lay-out in Pearl Harbor and at the time I thought that that  
25 was an evidence of their nicety of intelligence.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Now, who do you recall discussing that with?

Admiral Wilkinson: Captain McCollum particularly, possibly with Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner. I cannot say specifically who.

The Chairman: It is now twelve o'clock and the committee will recess until two o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON

(Resumed)

Mr. Gesell: Just as we were recessing, Admiral Wilkinson, you said you had talked to Admiral Turner, you thought, and to Captain McCullom, concerning this plat dispatch of September 24 we have been discussion.

Do you recall your conversation with them?

Admiral Wilkinson: Only, as I think I said, that I mentioned it showed as an illustration of the nicety of detail of intelligence the Japanese were capable of seeking and getting.

Mr. Gesell: What did they say to you?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall --

Mr. Gesell: Did they agree with you?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall an agreement of that sort. Of course, it must be remembered that all during this year, 1941, there was some exchange of letters to and from Pearl Harbor and Hawaii on both the Army and Navy side emphasizing the fact that the first priority of risk or hazard to Pearl Harbor was a bombing attack, next an air torpedo attack and third a submarine attack. This information they were getting there, while substantiating that fear, was being obtained, in some degree at least, everywhere that we



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 know of -- Panama, the West Coast, Manila.

3 Mr. Gesell: You are in agreement with General Miles  
4 that there is not another message like this one that appears  
5 in this document or which was intercepted prior to Pearl  
6 Harbor, is there?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my recollection. I explained  
8 that the other harbors were, perhaps, smaller and need not  
9 have so much of a differentiation.

10 Mr. Gesell: When you pointed this out to Admiral Turner  
11 and Captain McCullom as an example of the nicety of Japanese  
12 espionage, you don't recall what they said?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall except, perhaps, to  
14 agree with me. I am not even sure in recollection that I  
15 pointed it out to Admiral Turner.

16 Mr. Gesell: What evaluation did you place upon the  
17 document? Did you think it had some significance that required  
18 your bringing it to their attention?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: Not particularly.

20 Mr. Gesell: Did you recommend that it be sent to the  
21 field?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

23 Mr. Gesell: Was there a discussion of whether it should  
24 or should not be sent to the field?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my recollection.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: So that your testimony amounts to, if I understand it, a statement that you somewhat casually pointed this out and said this was an example of the nicety of their espionage?

Admiral Wilkinson: Exactly.

Mr. Gesell: I would like to discuss with you now, Admiral, for a few moments some of the alert or warning messages which were sent by the Navy Department, the first at page 18 of Exhibit 37, the basic dispatch, dated October 16, 1941.

The Vice Chairman: What page?

Mr. Gesell: Page 18.

I will read it:

"THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION. IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI-AMERICAN. IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A STRONG POSSIBILITY. SINCE THE U.S. AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTIONS NOR CONSTITUTE  
3 PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN. SECOND AND THIRD ADEES  
4 INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL DISTRICT AUTHORITIES.  
5 ACKNOWLEDGE."

6  
7 That is addressed to the Commander in Chief in the  
8 Atlantic and the Pacific and the Asiatic Fleet. That appears  
9 to have been sent the day after you took over as Director  
0 of Intelligence.

10 Were you consulted concerning it?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No. Purely an operational matter.

12 Mr. Gesell: You do not recall having participated in  
13 any discussions concerning it?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

15 Mr. Gesell: Did you have knowledge that it was sent?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Not until after it was sent.

17 Mr. Gesell: How soon after?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall. Perhaps the next day.

19 Mr. Gesell: Was it the practice for messages, when you  
20 were not in on their drafting and transmission, for them to  
21 be sent to you afterwards for your information?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Not as a frequent practice. Occasionall  
23 yes. Occasionally I would hear of them in conversation and  
24 look them up.

25 Mr. Gesell: If they weren't sent to you, how would you



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 be in a position to know whether the information you had  
3 been obtaining as Director of Naval Intelligence was being  
4 properly evaluated?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I had confidence in the officers  
6 comprising the War Plans Divisions. But there was no back  
7 check in their consultation with me to see if I thought it  
8 was properly evaluated.

9 Hook  
10 follows

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: That confidence, I can see, might give you a degree of personal assurance, but it didn't give you any information, did it, as to precisely what evaluation was being made. Without having that information, how could you properly conduct your office?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't know that it affects the conduct of my office, because I would give the information that we collected, and frequently advised on what my own inferences were from it, but what action was taken as a result, I do not think was necessarily involved in the conduct of my office.

Mr. Gesell: I understand your testimony to be that you recommended evaluations from time to time in transmitting this information to War Plans and to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson: In discussion, yes. Sometimes in writing, but seldom.

Mr. Gesell: But they didn't inform you of what action they took?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not as a matter of routine, no.

Mr. Gesell: You might find it out from talking to somebody, and then you would look it up?

Admiral Wilkinson: They might tell me, as a matter of interest, but I was not an information addressee, as it



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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were. It was not a matter of established routine.

Mr. Gesell: How did you know what information to send out to the theatre commanders if you didn't know what evaluation had been placed upon the information you had already transmitted?

Admiral Wilkinson: The information I sent to the theatre commanders was of a static nature. There was a fortnightly summary, of which you speak, which was partly action, partly static. There were in the course of the year 1941, for instance, some 62 or 70 so-called Far Eastern serials, two and three-page discussions of specific items, which might range from a new type of torpedo to Japanese aircraft production, things of that matter.

We also supplied to the Fleet a so-called Japanese monograph, ONI 49, a full description of all the information we had been able to obtain concerning Japan.

Mr. Gesell: My question was whether it would not have aided you in pointing up the information to know what evaluation was being placed on the information you were sending.

Admiral Wilkinson: I am mentioning the types of information I sent which, of itself, was not the type that was involved with the evaluation of the current situation. As I have earlier mentioned, the matters concerning operations



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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I did not send to the Fleet except on reference to the Operations Office or War Plans of themselves.

The Chairman: Will counsel suspend for a moment?

I am compelled to leave because since last Saturday I have been suffering with a very high temperature, and with what looks like a severe case of the flu, and I am out against the advice of the doctor, and am compelled to leave now and do what he told me to do.

I had intended to have an executive session this afternoon, but that is impossible. Therefore, I ask to be excused for the rest of the day. I hope to be back tomorrow.

Mr. Gesell: We are sorry you are ill, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: The Vice Chairman will preside.

Mr. Gesell: The next warning message which I wish to inquire concerning is that appearing at page 32, the message of November 24, 1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic, Pacific and certain other districts, 11, 12, 13, and 15, reading as follows:

"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COOPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS OF THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Jesell

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PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADDRESSEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY."

Did you have anything to do with the sending of that message?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

The Vice Chairman: What page is that?

Mr. Gesell: Page 32.

Did you know it was sent at the time?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not until after it was sent.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 Mr. Gesell: How long after did you know about it?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure; a day or two.

4 Mr. Gesell: You were not consulted concerning this,  
5 concerning its wording or whether or not it should be sent?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

7 Mr. Gesell: The next message of a warning nature ap-  
8 pears on page 36 and is the message of November 27, 1941.  
9 It is the same message, it is the message sent at the same  
10 time the Army warning messages of that date, from the Chief  
11 of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific  
12 and Asiatic Fleets, reading as follows:

13 "This despatch is to be considered a war warning.  
14 Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of  
15 conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive  
16 move by Japan is expected within the next few days.  
17 The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the or-  
18 ganization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious  
19 expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra  
20 Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate  
21 defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the  
22 tasks assigned in WPL46. Inform District and Army au-  
23 thorities. A similar warning is being sent by War De-  
24 partment. Spenavo inform British. Continental Di-  
25 stricts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

against/sabotage."

Were you consulted in connection with the sending of that message?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: When did you first know it had been sent?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think two later, perhaps three.

I might explain, of course, that these were highly secret messages and the Chief of Operations was anxious to confine the knowledge of them to the minimum and that since I was not directly concerned in them once I had proffered the information upon which they were based, that he thought that neither he nor his instructions carried the necessity of advising me about it. I do not feel, in other words, that I was neglected by not being consulted because I had proffered the giving of the information and I am sure that it was well used.

Mr. Gesell: And when you say you learned of these messages you meant that you learned it informally by hearing of them rather than hearing of them in a direct way as a matter of office organization?

Admiral Wilkinson: As I recall them.

Mr. Gesell: Is your testimony with respect to the message on page 38 transmitting the Army warning message of November 27th and containing instructions concerning overt



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

acts?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: That takes us up to November 27th, Admiral. Now, from the period from November 27, 1941 to December 7, 1941 the only other messages of a warning nature that one finds here directed to Hawaii were the messages concerning the destruction of codes. Did you have anything to do with those messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, we initiated those after a reference to the Chief of Operations.

Mr. Gesell: You are referring to the messages that appear at 40 and 41?

Admiral Wilkinson: 40 particularly. 41 I believe was initiated by the communications officer.

Mr. Gesell: You initiated the message on page 40?

Admiral Wilkinson: That is my recollection.

Mr. Gesell: Will you read that, please, sir?

Admiral Wilkinson: (Reading)

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents."



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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3 Mr. Gesell: That was addressed to the Commander-in-  
4 Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleet, to Com 14 and to Com  
5 16?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Gesell: You say you initiated that dispatch. Will  
8 you tell us --

9 Admiral Wilkinson: That is, to my recollection. Let  
10 me check one moment, sir. Yes, I believe that to be the case.

11 Mr. Gesell: Well, will you state for the committee,  
12 please, what the circumstances were as you recall them under  
13 which that message was sent?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: I think Captain McCollum advised me  
15 that intelligence had been received through the magic source  
16 as to this and I think there had been other confirmatory evi-  
17 dences by reports by cable as to signs of burning. I am not  
18 sure of that last. I know there were such reports but whether  
19 they occurred before this dispatch was sent or not I do not  
20 know, but the primary basis I think was the magic.

21 Captain McCollum recommended its being sent and I agreed,  
22 of course, and after consultation with either the Chief or  
23 the Assistant Chief of Operations it was so sent.

24 Mr. Gesell: Did you approve the dispatch then? I mean  
25 did you draft the plan then?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe Captain McCollum drafted



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 it.

3 Mr. Gesell: And then after it was drafted you approved  
4 it or initialed it before it went out?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I think I probably presented that in  
6 person to Admiral Ingersoll. I may have actually released it.  
7 The record may show.

8 Mr. Gesell: I have here what purports to be a photostatic  
9 copy of the original message, which shows it was released by  
10 you and an initial which appears to be Admiral Ingersoll's  
11 initials after your name.

12 Admiral Wilkinson: That would seem to bear out my state-  
13 ment.

14 Mr. Gesell: You have seen that photostatic copy of the  
15 dispatch, have you?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

17 Mr. Gesell: I want to show it to you and call your at-  
18 tention to the following words which appear on the dispatch  
19 as stricken following the words at the end of the message,  
20 "Secret document":

21 "From foregoing infer that Orange plans early ac-  
22 tion in Southeast Asia."

23 Do you recall that?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not but if it occurs in the  
25 original dispatch it was doubtless so drafted by Captain



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1  
2 McCollum and approved by me. Whether I struck it out or  
3 whether Admiral Ingersoll struck it out, I cannot recall.

4 Mr. Gesell: You cannot recall which of you struck it  
5 out?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: I have no recollection which.

7 Mr. Gesell: I would like to have this dispatch marked  
8 as an exhibit. It will be exhibit 83, Mr. Chairman.

9 The Vice Chairman: It will be so received.

10 (The document referred to was  
11 marked Exhibit No. 83.)

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I may state that we had every in-  
13 ference and evidence for the preceding two weeks that orange  
14 was contemplating action in Southeast Asia and did in fact  
15 so act.

16 Mr. Gesell: Well, will you state to us at this time,  
17 Admiral, what was the considered conclusion and evaluation  
18 reached by you and your staff in the Office of Naval Intelli-  
19 gence prior to the receipt of the one o'clock message as to  
20 where and when the Japanese would attack?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I think our conclusion was that  
22 every evidence indicated an attack in the South China Sea  
23 on either Siam or the Kra Peninsula. Those evidences were  
24 almost indisputable. There were possibilities of attack  
25 elsewhere ranging, in fact, from Panama on the Pacific Coast



Witness Wilkinson

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to Hawaii, Guam, Wake and the Philippines. The nearer each of these objectives was to Japan, to our mind the greater the probability of their attack. As it happened we all know that they attacked all of those on the far side of the Pacific Coast, Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines.

Mr. Gesell: Well, did you have any information, written or oral, prior to the actual attack which specified Hawaii as a point of attack?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not the slightest.

Mr. Gesell: You say there were indications that they might attack Hawaii and other points in the Pacific. What were those indications?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't think I said "indications". I said possibilities.

Mr. Gesell: I beg your pardon.

Admiral Wilkinson: That was within the range of practicability that they should so attack.

Mr. Gesell: Well, my question was directed as to what information and evidence you had on that point. Did you have any evidence or information to show that Hawaii was a possible point of attack or a probable point of attack?

Admiral Wilkinson: - Not that it was a probable point. There was every possibility that it was a possible point of attack in that the Japanese Navy's steaming radius and their



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1 capabilities, as the Intelligence people say, and I am learn-  
2 ing to say, and their probable capabilities indicated that  
3 they could come there. It was possible. So in fact was  
4 Seattle possible.

5 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, I would like to review with you  
6 for a moment some of the information you had of a naval na-  
7 ture to see whether we can get, perhaps, a more specific  
8 understanding of what you had before you.

9 You knew, did you not, for example, on the 25th of  
10 September that the combined home fleet of the Japanese had  
11 undergone extensive personnel changes and that that personnel  
12 reorganization, which was not normal for that time of year,  
13 was interpreted by your people to mean that preparations were  
14 being made for an emergency?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

16 Mr. Gesell: You also knew, did you not, on the 1st of  
17 November that the Japanese Navy, according to statements  
18 made of its own people, was ready for any immediate eventu-  
19 ality; that mobilization plans had been carried out including  
20 not only changes in commands but increase in ship crews to  
21 full war complement?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, the ships had been docked as  
23 well.

24 Mr. Keefe: Right there may I ask what was the date of  
25