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FORCES INFLUENCING THE JAPANESE CABINET

1885 - 1945

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4 April 1945

FORCES INFLUENCING THE JAPANESE CABINET

INTRODUCTION

It is often said that freedom of individual action or expression in Japan is traditionally subordinated to group action and expression. If we accept this statement, we must expect to find in existence, even today and after the war, various pressure groups whose influence in government is of paramount importance. Traditionally the Japanese express themselves through the particular group to which the individual gives his allegiance. Thus, the Government (Cabinet) in power, and other agencies of national government such as the Diet and Privy Council, have become sensitive throughout the years to pressure, not so much from individuals as from organized groups.

In recent years, the significant pressure groups have included the small land owners and farmers, small manufacturers and shop-keepers, industrial and merchant groups.1 However, the highly organized governing groups, in which category fall the Zaibatsu, or business and industrial monopolists, the militarists, the bureaucrats and the political parties, are the most powerful. It is chiefly with the relation between the organs of government and the interrelation between the groups in the Cabinet, as well as the forces causing the fall of Cabinets, that this paper deals.

The terminology used to designate these groups is more or less self-explanatory, with the possible exception of the Zaibatsu, which has exerted increasingly strong pressure on the Government since before the Constitution of 1889 was adopted. The industrialization of Japan from 1890 to 1920 resulted in the concentration of Japanese big business in the hands of a few firms. These concerns became a strong political force and eventually reduced the bureaucrats to a secondary position. The parties became subject to Zaibatsu influence due to their dependence upon the monopolists for election funds. By the nineteen twenties, the Zaibatsu's political power was so thoroughly represented in the parties that from time to time it had behind-the-scenes control of the majority party in the lower House and thereby of the Cabinet. It also became represented among the advisors close to the Throne and in the Privy Council and House of Peers. When the political parties lost control in the nineteen thirties, the militarists recognized the strength of the

Zaibatsu influence and invited an alliance with the result that, even during the past decade of increased military influence, the Zaibatsu has been able to hold the extreme militarists in check by securing representation in the Cabinet and extra-Cabinet agencies of the government. The alliance between the militarists and Zaibatsu has been further developed in Japanese wartime industrial reorganization in which the government has placed the monopolists in charge of the cartels or industrial Control Associations, which are responsible for Japan's war production.

It is felt that some discussion of national government in Japan, particularly interrelations between the Cabinet, Diet and Privy Council, is essential to an understanding of the part that public opinion and pressure groups play in Japanese government. An attempt will be made herein to point out that important decisions are made by a relatively small group operating behind the scenes and subject to a minimum of popular control.

Dr. Reischauer of Princeton University points out that it is unwise to describe the Japanese Government in terms of the executive, legislative and the judiciary, not only because no real attempt was made to differentiate among these organs of the government when the Constitution was written, but since Japanese politics is primarily concerned with men rather than with political institutions, the Japanese Government is most easily understood when described in terms of the law, the aristocrats, the bureaucrats, the militarists, the politicians, and the people, including the special classes of society that the latter represent. He classifies those belonging to these groups as follows: The aristocrats include the Emperor, the Imperial Family Council, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, and the House of Peers. The bureaucrats include the Imperial Household Ministry, the Privy Council, and the Civil Service. The militarists include the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals, the Supreme War Council, and the Army and Navy administration. The politicians include the House of Representatives and the political parties. The people include the local government, the press, and the protagonists of direct action.[2]

Japan is often spoken of as having a parliamentary form of government. Unless we qualify this statement somewhat, we might be led to believe that any well-organized group - comparable to Labor in the United States or England - could bring effective pressure on the Japanese Government by being adequately represented in the Diet. However, Japan does

not have a genuine parliamentary government. Even an overwhelming popular mandate can be, and often is, disregarded. The principle of ministerial responsibility as developed in England, in which the Government is responsible to the lower House and is permitted to remain in office only so long as it has the confidence of the legislature, does not hold in Japan. The Cabinet may fall by losing the confidence of the Diet, as will be discussed later. However, it does not possess the unrivaled direction of administration found in the genuine parliamentary system of England. In fact, the Japanese Constitution which authorized the Diet, ignored the Cabinet, the latter having been created by Imperial Ordinance in 1885, four years before the Constitution was adopted. The Constitution does, however, provide for Ministers of State as advisers to the Emperor, but not as chief advisers. The primary advisory function rests with the Privy Council which was created by Imperial Ordinance in 1888 for the original purpose of assisting Prince Ito in drafting the Constitution.[3]

RELATION BETWEEN THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT

The Japanese Diet consists of two houses, the House of Peers, composed largely of the nobility and prominent citizens appointed by the Emperor, and the House of Representatives which is elected by male citizens. The Diet is primarily a legislative organ which assists the Emperor in the making of laws pursuant to Article V of the Constitution, which states that "The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet." Putting it another way, the Emperor is the State, with administration of the government carried on by the Cabinet with the advice of the Privy Council and the consent of the Diet. The latter occupies the lowest rung on the ladder of government instead of having an equal voice in a horizontal structure where the powers of the executive, the judiciary and the legislative are separate; nor can the Diet change the system by initiating constitutional amendments. Only the Emperor can submit amendments to the Diet. This is a prerogative of the Throne which so far no Emperor's advisers have seen fit to exercise through him.

Legislation is of two types: statute and ordinance. The greater part of legislation is found in Imperial Ordinances rather than in statutory enactment. Legislation usually originates with the Government and is drafted by the Cabinet's Legislative Bureau, having first been approved by the Ministers and in most cases previously submitted to the Privy Council, Japan's "Supreme Court," for approval.[4] This means

that, as a practical matter, the Diet is the last in point of time and the least in terms of effect to express itself on legislation.*

Both sides of the Diet have equal authority to initiate and vote upon bills. In practice, few bills introduced by members become law. The number of bills introduced or enacted is insignificant in comparison to the thousands introduced in both houses of the United States Congress during each session.

The framers of the Japanese Constitution of 1889 apparently intended to give the people, through the Diet, some indirect control and responsibility over the Cabinet. Because the Cabinet finds it difficult to control legislation without a majority in both Houses, forcing the Government to respect the wishes of the Diet to some extent and to submit to some degree of supervision, the Diet uses the following Constitutional methods in bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear upon the Government: (1) Petitions, (2) Representations by the Diet, (3) Diet Interpellations, (4) Addresses to the Throne by the Diet, (5) Votes of Censure by the Diet, and (6) Comment of the Diet to the annual budget.

The Japanese people are traditionally accustomed to some form of grievance machinery, ineffective as it is. In feudal times, a peasant may have been cut down for handling the Daimyo a complaint as the latter passed through the countryside, but the petition was usually acted upon to some extent. In the 7th century an Emperor is said to have accorded the people the right to make known their grievances by depositing petitions in a box placed in front of the palace for that purpose. In modern times, Article L of the Constitution permits public opinion to be expressed in the form of petitions by citizens to the Emperor, to the Government and to the Diet. They are presented through a member of the Diet and may pass through committee action and be debated on the floor. If entertained by either House, a petition may be sent to the Cabinet accompanied by a memorial. In actual practice,

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*In 1925, under the most favorable conditions that have ever existed in Japan for democratic government, when Premier Kato was also leader of the Kenseikai, the majority party in the House, only four private members' bills became law. In the same session, fifty Government bills became law. See Kenneth Colegrove, "Powers and Functions of the Japanese Diet," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 6, Dec, 1933, p 892, and A. Morgan Young, Japan Under Taisho Tenno 1912-1926, London, 1928, pp. 316-336.

petitions are extensively employed but do not have a great deal of influence on the Government.* This is because the Cabinet is too far removed from the people and the Diet successfully initiates very little legislation.6 In contrast, members of the United States Congress devote a great deal of attention, individually and collectively, to the thousands of letters received annually from constituents, as well as to the many resolutions from pressure groups and to memorials from state legislatures. The prefectural assembly is the legislative in the United States, but it exercises no influence over national government and very little over local government, as the prefectural governor is a bureaucratic appointee of the national government and has absolute veto power over assembly activities.

Representations are formal expressions of legislative opinion addressed to the Government, but they lack effectiveness as they are too frequently used and no method of compelling compliance is provided. It would appear that their chief value might lie in the opportunity provided for the expression of public opinion during debate in the Diet.

Diet Interpellations are a more effective means of placing public issues squarely before the Government. Here Cabinet Ministers are questioned publicly in open session and required to answer the questions or give their reasons for failing to answer. As failure to answer is considered a sign of weakness, and constitutes a "loss of face," replies are usually readily obtainable. This is the only constitutional method by which the people have an influence over foreign policy. Critical speeches and resolutions are part of the procedure employed in an attempt to sway the Government. This method of influencing the Government is a step in the direction of true parliamentary government.

Debate over Diet Interpellation presents an opportunity for the individual member to rise to the heights of oratory "for the record," and for opposing factions to blow off steam. In this respect they are not a great deal unlike our own Congressmen. Even though the Japanese law-maker does not have as much voice in the government as the American Congressman - both literally and figuratively - he likes a good fight on the floor, and on many occasions, debates have

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*During one session, the House committee on petitions considered over 1000 petitions and reported 284. See Harold S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, The Century Company, New York, 1932, p. 187.

degenerated into just that. Knives, guns, canes and fists have been employed in both of these august constitutional bodies, but it was an exclusive Japanese trait that caused the introduction of a live snake into the Diet on one occasion for the purpose of intimidating an opposing speaker. They surely could not have "copied" that idea from our Congressional Record! Like our own politicians, they love to call each other names, but they do call a spade a spade and if Mr. Takahashi of the Minseito party is prompted to call the gentleman from Yamaguchi a fool, the rules of the House apparently do not require Mr. Takahashi to resort to such neat terminology as "I do not call you a fool," in order to get his point over.

The Address to the Throne has no legal effect. A motion for such must be supported by thirty members before it can be made the subject of debate. It was employed the first time as a prayer to the Emperor for an interpretation of the Constitution when disagreement arose between the Government and the Diet.[7] Its chief effectiveness would appear to be as a method of giving adverse publicity to Cabinet shortcomings. In this respect, the threat of its use would appear to be an efficient weapon in securing concessions from the Cabinet.

Votes of Censure include: (1) Resolutions of Non-confidence in the Diet, (2) Resolutions of Censure, and (3) Resolutions of Impeachment. These are all non-constitutional methods of influencing the Government which, under the Constitution, is not responsible to the Diet. The Ministers attempt to avoid their occurrence; otherwise, it shows that the Government has lost control of the Diet and is on the defensive. Votes of Censure have not been very effective because the use of any of these methods by the Diet to exert pressure upon the Cabinet is usually followed by dissolution of the lower House by the Government, followed by a General Election. Government control over elections is so strong that it can nearly always be sure of the return of a more amenable House.[8] More will be said about this subject later.

The Diet has little influence on the greater part of Japanese legislation, which consists mostly of ordinances issued under the Emperor's sweeping power. These fall into three categories: (1) Those issued exclusively under the Emperor's prerogative, which include Military Ordinances. This class of ordinance is exempt from Cabinet as well as Diet control. The Emperor retained this power for himself when he granted the Constitution. (2) The second type is the Emergency Imperial Ordinance, found in Article VIII of

the Constitution, authorizing the Emperor to proclaim emergency legislation when the Diet is not in session. These ordinances are invalid unless approved by the Diet at its next session. As a matter of practice the Diet seldom fails to approve them.9 (3) The third type is the Administrative Ordinance and is also an exercise of the legislative power by the Government without the consent of the Diet. This kind of ordinance is authorized by Article IX of the Constitution ".....for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects." It is under this type of ordinance that Executive Orders and Police Orders are issued.

The Imperial Emergency Ordinance may be used by the Government to secure legislation in opposition to public opinion or to be known will of a hostile Diet. An emergency ordinance issued in 1928, about a month after the Diet adjourned, is illustrative of the fact that Japan does not have a genuine parliamentary form of government. This particular ordinance amended the Peace Preservation Law by authorizing the death penalty for "dangerous thoughts."10 By the time the Diet met again in regular session, a strong Cabinet was able to overcome the opposition in the Diet and secure approval of the Emergency Ordinance. Although this incident occurred at a time in Japanese history when the people occupied a strong position, still public opinion was thwarted. Political parties were at the peak of their strength and the Premier was leader of the majority party in the House. The Manhood Suffrage Act had just been passed extending the franchise to all men over twenty-five. The use of an Emergency Ordinance at a time like this, when popular pressure was stronger than usual, is illustrative of the case with which the Government may by-pass the people.

The Diet has no war or peace-making power and plays no part in the ratification of treaties. Treaties are referred by the Government to the Privy Council only, for advice as to ratification. Because a treaty may determine legislation, an early House which was jealous of its Constitutional prerogative regarding legislation, adopted a Representation to the Government demanding that treaties affecting legislative matters be submitted to the Diet. On this occasion, the people's voice was quieted by immediate dissolution of the House, and that question was settled once and for all.*

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*6th Diet, June 2, 1894. Sixteen Diets were dissolved by the Government between the years 1891 and 1937. See Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book, 1939, Tokyo, 1939, p. 75.

In spite of Japan's having one of the highest literacy rates in the world, and of its people being avid newspaper readers, it is doubtful if Japanese voters, or even the average Diet, are competent to participate in treaty ratification. Their knowledge of foreign affairs as read through the papers has ordinarily been colored by Government treatment and an appreciation of the problems involved in foreign relations would not be widespread even if the people had access to the facts. A somewhat similar lack of faith in the ability of the average citizen to cope with intricate foreign relations problems is evidenced by the fact that the framers of the United States Constitution vested supreme authority in the field of foreign relations in the Executive and gave treaty ratification power to the Senate only.

The Privy Council was created in 1888 by Imperial Ordinance, a year before promulgation of the Constitution. Its purpose was to be that of acting as the highest advisory body to the Emperor, but it was prohibited from interfering with the Cabinet. Article LVI of the Constitution confirmed the Council's existence by authorizing its members to "deliberate on important matters of State, when they have been consulted by the Emperor."

The Privy Council is usually formed of old and distinguished conservatives, - representatives of the old order in Japan - the bureaucrats, militarists, clansmen and peers, as contrasted with the Cabinet which appears to be more free of the Council. It might be said that the Privy Council is the least popular with the Japanese people of any organ of central government. This body is just far enough below the Emperor on the ladder of State to be unable to demand a similar degree of respect and is too far up the ladder to be influenced greatly by public opinion. Throughout the years, it has gradually encroached upon the authority of the Cabinet and the Diet until it has become known as the "Third House."11 It has probably received this label because of the Cabinet's practice of submitting bills to the Council, where they may be amended, where their constitutionality may be adjudged, or where they may be blocked entirely before they are submitted to the Diet. It also approves Emergency Ordinances when the Diet is not in session. It will be illustrated later in this paper that the Privy Council may bring about the fall of a Cabinet by refusing to approve proposed legislation and by refusing to recommend the proclamation of Emergency Ordinances at the request of the Government.12

Originally, the Council was intended to be an impartial Imperial advisory body and was not to supervise the Cabinet. However, about 1922, the former became increasingly

vigorous politically and began to interfere with the latter. As a consequence of this action and of its traditional conservatism, the Council has been increasingly in conflict with the Government.13 As the pressure for genuine parliamentary government increased in Japan, the Cabinet found itself more and more under the influence of the people through the medium of political parties and the Diet, even though the Cabinet is not constitutionally responsible to the Diet. A similar relationship of unofficial responsibility does not exist between the Council and the Diet. This growth of strength and superior position of the Council, at the expense of development of representative government, places the Council in a poor light in the eyes of the people by making that body appear as if it were blocking representative government and political efficiency.14

While the Council might be characterized as the most unpopular organ of government, far removed from the people, and the Diet as the weakest organ and closest to the people, the Cabinet stands half-way up the ladder of State but on the strongest rung. It is the most important branch of government in Japan, and the Premier is the most powerful single figure, despite the fact that the Cabinet is the battleground of the aristocrats, bureaucrats, militarists, politicians and big business.

Before the death of Prince Saionji, the last of the Genro, in 1940, it was customary for the Emperor to consult that body - which was composed of the leaders of the Meiji Restoration - on the selection of a new Premier.* Since these Elder Statesmen have died, it has been the practice for the Senior Statesmen, or Jushin, to nominate the Premier. The Jushin is made up of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the President of the Privy Council and all ex-Premiers. After the Premier is selected by the Emperor, he is commanded to form a Cabinet. In selecting Minister, the Premier's choice is limited by the advisability of winning the support of the Diet. In filling the Army and Navy posts, he is at the mercy of those two groups and, if they refuse to name a qualified officer for each post, the Premier will be unable to form a Government.

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*An interesting comment regarding the Genro by a Tokyo editorialist states: "In the United States they are called political bosses; in Japan the term used is the Genro. But the political boss of the West and the Genro of Japan differ in at least one important respect. The boss manipulates votes and thereby gains control of the offices; the Genro manipulates offices and thereby renders the power of the ballot virtually nil." See Trans-Pacific, Vol. X, No. 11, p. 3, Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1924.

In one respect the power of the Cabinet is seriously limited. The Japanese Constitution separates civil and military affairs, placing the latter entirely in the Emperor's hands. Article XI gives him supreme command, and Article XII retains to him the determination of military organization and peace time standing. These two provisions exclude the Cabinet from any control over military actions, except for military appropriations included in budgets the Cabinet submits to the Diet. The Ministers of the Army and Navy and both Chiefs of Staff enjoy direct access to the Emperor, a privilege not accorded to the Premier or other members of the Cabinet.* As a result, both service Ministers are not subject to Government decisions and may completely ignore the Premier if they so desire. This independence of action constitutes a serious obstacle to the development of Cabinet responsibility, and often has the effect of nullifying Cabinet decisions. It will be illustrated later in this paper that when an Army or Navy Minister resigns, and resignation is followed by the refusal of any other qualified officer to take the vacant post, the Cabinet is brought down automatically.

Short tenure of office is one of the characteristics of Japanese Cabinets. During Japan's first fifty years of Cabinet Government, there were thirty-three different ministries, exclusive of ad interim Ministries.[15] During the same period England had fourteen. The average life of a Japanese Cabinet from Ito's first Cabinet in 1885 through Tojo's in 1944, was about seventeen months. During these years, there were forty-one Cabinets.

The tendency of short tenure of office to make for inefficiency and lack of continuity of policy is probably counteracted in Japan by the existence and application of certain well-recognized traditions characteristic of the Japanese people. These include the rotating of responsibility among qualified personnel, paying deference to age and experience in the selection of advisors and officials to the Throne, and the tradition of group responsibility.

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*Radio Tokyo announced that the Premier had been empowered by the Emperor to participate in meetings of the Japanese General Staff because of the grave war situation. This announcement was made on March 16, 1945. It would indicate that the Emperor has modified the system known to the Japanese as Niju Seifu, or Dual Government, which gave the military leaders superiority over the Cabinet in military affairs, and by the same token would indicate that, as a wartime measure, the Premier has equal access to the Emperor along with the military.

THE GROUPS WITHIN THE CABINET

The characteristic of group responsibility in the Japanese Cabinet is not one of political party responsibility as we think of it in the United States and England, nor is it the responsibility of any one of the four governing groups mentioned early in this paper, i.e. Zaibatsu, militarists, bureaucrats and political parties. Control of the Cabinet is not expressed exclusively through a single governing group within the Cabinet but through a coalition of the four main groups. Within the coalition one group usually predominates. In recent years this has been either the Zaibatsu or the military, but no one group is dominant enough to control the Government without the support of one or more of the three other groups within the coalition. It might be said that a powerful Japanese Cabinet is a coalition within a coalition, the latter being composed of the War and Navy Departments, the Privy Council, the Jushin, the advisors close to the Throne, the aristocrats, - which include the nobility in the House of Peers - and the House of Representatives. Each of these groups has enough power to prevent the Cabinet from operating effectively unless it has a working agreement with all of them.

The general tendency has been not only to avoid placing absolute supremacy in the hands of any one group within the Cabinet coalition, but also to keep the weaker of the groups from becoming too weak. In other words, a balanced coalition follows more or less of a conventional pattern, avoiding extremes of strength in either direction.*

There have been exceptions to this tendency when one group - the parties for instance - has been completely submerged. There have also been occasions when a group obtained near-dictatorial powers - for instance, the Tojo Cabinet.

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*Bisson, an authority on Japanese politics, recently stated that the conventional pattern is for the militarists to hold two Ministries, the Zaibatsu interests to hold one or more of the economic Ministries, the party leaders to hold at least two of the following: Railways, Communications, Agriculture and Forestry, and Interior. He also stated that, with the exception of the Foreign Ministry, Cabinet posts held by the bureaucrats are not clearly defined. See T. A. Bisson, "Japan as a Political Organism," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Dec. 1944.

As distinguished from the Tojo Cabinet, the present Koiso Cabinet can probably be considered as being in balance as far as the distribution of Cabinet Ministries along conventional lines is concerned. Of the fourteen men who hold sixteen ministerial posts in the present Cabinet - excluding those of the Premiership and Deputy Premiership - two are definitely militarists; at least two, because of their background, may be considered as representing business interests; at least two are definitely career men who have held various government posts for years; and three others were leaders of the Seiyukai and Minseito parties before the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society. It is not easy to define the conventional groups into which the remaining members fit. In several instances, present Cabinet Ministers may be classified as belonging to more than one of the four groups within the coalition. It is the Cabinet following this pattern that retains control with greater ease than one which is out of balance.

It must be stressed that the decisions of the coalition are not too amenable to public opinion or popular control. However, the influence of each group depends to some extent on public opinion and nearly every Cabinet seeks a working agreement with the Diet. The Koiso Government at its second Cabinet meeting admitted its need for popular support when it included the promotion of public opinion among the four fundamental points set forth as the guiding principles of the Cabinet.

COLLAPSE OF CABINETS

It is difficult to enumerate definitely the forces causing the fall of individual Cabinets in Japan. The politicians, the bureaucrats, the militarists, and the aristocrats operating within the House of Peers, can always collectively - and often separately - overthrow the Cabinet if the latter's policy does not meet with their approval. The influences of big business may also be effectively present within any or all of these groups. One might classify the reasons for Cabinet collapse as follows:

1. Opposition from the Diet.
2. Opposition from the Services.
3. Internal dissension.
4. Public opinion.
5. Death of the Premier.
6. Opposition from the Privy Council.
7. Defeat in elections.
8. Miscellaneous.

Inasmuch as that overworked term "saving face" is in such popular usage these days in the United States to describe these actions of the Japanese which we have difficulty in understanding, we might generalize and classify the demise of those falling for "Miscellaneous" reasons under such a category. A closer analysis will show that in most instances the Cabinet has fallen as a group and "face" was not involved.

In the brief treatment given to each Cabinet in the following pages, the Governments are not grouped according to the reasons or forces behind their collapse. Rather, they are enumerated chronologically in the hope that such treatment may be of some value. An analysis of the treatment given to them in this paper will show that eight fell because of opposition from the Diet; six resigned because of difficulties with the Army or Navy; six collapsed because of dissention within the Government or Government party; five fell because of popular clamor; four Governments went out of office when the Premier died; two were forced out by the Privy Council; one was defeated in a General Election; and eight ceased to exist because of reasons which are not clear.

1. ITO December 1885 - April 1888:*

When the Privy Council was created in 1888, Prince Ito, maker of the Constitution, resigned as Prime Minister of Japan's first Cabinet in order to accept the Presidency of the first Privy Council and guide it at the final deliberation on the draft of the Constitution of 1889. Ito retained office in the Cabinet during this time but as a Minister without Portfolio.[16]

2. KURODA April 1888 - October 1889.

As the second Prime Minister, Kuroda sat as a member of the Privy Council during the deliberations on the text of the Constitution. His Cabinet fell in October 1889, prior to the first session of the Diet, when a fanatic, enraged at the inability of Count Okuma, Foreign Minister, to secure complete extinguishment of extra-territoriality by the removal of foreign courts, threw a bomb, which destroyed Count Okuma's right leg. Public opinion from all directions had been very critical of Count Okuma's policy of separate negotiations for treaty revision, and the Cabinet was not unanimous on the question. As a result of the attempt on Okuma's life, the entire Cabinet resigned. Prince Ito, who was President of the Privy Council, and shared responsibility with the Cabinet for foreign affairs, also tendered his resignation.[17]

3. YAMAGATA December 1889 - May 1891.

Nearly half the members of the first House, which convened November 25, 1890, were opposed to the Government. For this reason, a successor to Kuroda was hard to find. Yamagata, a Samurai and Home Minister in the previous Cabinet, was persuaded to accept the post. Opposition and criticism in the Diet, chiefly over the budget and treaty revision, and the pressure of public opinion forced his resignation.[18]

4. MATSUGATA May 1891 - August 1892.

The second session of the Diet was dissolved by the Government on December 25, 1891 for rejecting the budget and naval construction legislation. The Government "went to the country" and was defeated at the General Election in February 1892. The election was characterized by bribery, violence and interference by the Government. This resulted in the

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*The Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book 1939, p. 80; Kenneth Colegrove in The American Political Science Review, Vol. XXX, No. 5, Oct. 1936, p. 915; and R. K. Reischauer, Japan, Government-Politics, 1939, p. 110, all list Ito's first tenure as ending in 1889. The original sources cited under bibliographical reference No. 16, this paper, indicate that Ito resigned the Premiership a year earlier.

third session of the House passing a Resolution of Non-confidence, criticizing the Government for its interference. In response to the pressure of public opinion and attacks in the Diet, the Cabinet resigned in August 1892.[19]

5. ITO August 1892 - September 1896.

When Prince Ito took the Premiership for the second time, he attempted to soothe public opinion by dismissing many of the worst offenders among prefectural governors. They had been instructed by the Minister of Home Affairs to "deliver" their districts for the Government in the 1892 election. Ito's second Government was marked by stormy controversies with the Diet over naval expansion, the budget and foreign policy. The Diet was still in an ugly mood over the election and two Houses were dissolved during this period: December 30, 1893 and June 2, 1894. The Government was impeached for its action of December 30, 1893 in dissolving the Diet, but retaliated by dissolving the impeaching Diet on June 2, 1894, the third dissolution in six sessions. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on August 1, 1894, put an end, for the time being, to domestic controversies. After the treaty of peace was signed in April 1895, the old struggle between an independent Cabinet and party opposition was renewed. Ito resigned as the result of popular disapproval of the peace treaty but resumed his duties at the Emperor's request. He abandoned the principle of independent Cabinets during the latter part of his second tenure in office and allied himself with the Jiyuto party.* However, with nearly half of the members of the lower House critical of the Government's financial policy and of its management of affairs in Formosa and Korea, and with the country clamoring for his downfall because Liaotung Peninsula had been returned to China, Ito resigned in the latter part of August 1896.[20]

6. MATSUGATA September 1896 - January 1898.

Matsugata, a non-party bureaucrat, formed his second Cabinet on September 18, 1896. He was opposed to all political parties and to party responsibility in the Government. His Cabinet became involved in public controversies with the Diet, and was accused of bribing the Diet to gain support and of having introduced the spoils system into Japan. The Diet was dissolved because the lower House passed a Resolution of Non-confidence in the Ministry for

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*The first political parties in Japan date back to 1880. At the first General Election in 1890, ten parties were represented. All early Cabinets down to June 1898 were formed of bureaucratic clan statesmen with no obligations to the political parties in the Diet. It has been characteristic of Japanese parties to lack the political sense or unity to limit their candidates for the Diet in proportion to party strength. See N. Kitazawa, The Government of Japan, Princeton University Press, 1929, pp.103-113.

causing dissatisfaction at home, loss of prestige abroad and confusion in the national finances. His resignation was the direct result of a newspaper account of a secret meeting held with the Opposition for the purpose of discussing a reform program.[21]

7. ITO January 1898 - June 1898.

When the second Matsugata Cabinet fell, Prince Ito formed the third Ito Government. It had no party affiliations. It presented a program to the Diet for Civil Code enforcement, a new election law and an increase in taxation. When the program was defeated, the Government dissolved the House and resigned, but not before Ito had made it clear to the Genro that the time was coming when a Cabinet must definitely ally itself with a party and give up the fiction of independent action. Upon resigning, he recommended to the Emperor that Okuma and Itagaki, party men, be called upon to form a party Cabinet. The proponents of parliamentary government referred to this unsuccessful tenure in office as "demonstrating incontestably the impracticability of 'independent Cabinets'."[22]

8. OKUMA June 1898 - November 1898.

When the third Ito Government fell, Count Okuma and Itagaki, leaders of the Jiyuto and Shimpoto parties, temporarily subdued their differences to uphold the common cause of party politics and organized a new party, the Kenseito. They formed a coalition Cabinet headed by Okuma, who was also a member of the House of Peers. This Government stood for Cabinet responsibility to its party and entered office with great popular approval. The party was poorly organized though, and was held together only by its common enmity to the clan oligarchy. It won 259 out of 300 seats in the lower House. However, disputes arose between the two sections of the party over the distribution of Cabinet offices and patronage and, after remaining in office only four months, the Government was forced to resign because of internal dissention.[23]

This was the first party Government in Japan, and was followed by other party Cabinets that governed Japan a total of twenty years between the fall of Okuma's first party Cabinet in 1898 and the rise of the Militarists in 1932.

9. YAMAGATA November 1898 - October 1900.

The downfall of the first party Ministry brought the clan statesmen back to power. When the Okuma party Cabinet fell, Prince Ito was in China. The militarists in the clan oligarchy, fearing that Ito would return and secure the formation of a party Cabinet, forestalled such a move by forming a Government under Yamagata, head of the military section under

the clan oligarchy. Yamagata, a non-party man, secured the support of a reorganized Kenseito party in the Diet. As soon as this Government carried out its projects, it turned against the Kenseito.

In the meantime, Ito toured the country speaking in favor of party Governments. He then accepted leadership of the Kenseito party and reorganized it as a new party, adopting the name of Seiyukai. His purpose was to overthrow Yamagata's military clique. In view of the Government's unfriendly relation with the Diet and the organization of Ito's new party, Yamagata's position became untenable, and as there was little prospect of surviving another Diet session, he resigned. It was Yamagata who founded the modern army of Japan and it was while he headed the Government in 1900 that the Imperial Ordinance was adopted which required that officers on the active list only might be appointed as Army and Navy Ministers.[24]

10. ITO October 1900 - June 1901.

Upon Yamagata's fall, Prince Ito formed his fourth and final Cabinet and the bureaucratic statesmen were again forced to relinquish their power to a political party. This was the first Seiyukai party Cabinet and the second party Government in Japan's history. All but three Ministries were given to members of Ito's party. The Seiyukai was still a young party and not very well organized as yet. Its members were inexperienced in party politics and were unable to prevent dissention within party ranks. Hoshi, a party leader in the Cabinet, was attacked daily in the press as "the fountainhead of corruption in national and local politics". The fall of this Ministry after only eight months in office was chiefly due to party dissentions. Even if all had been well within the Cabinet, it probably could not have been saved from the power of the military clique headed by Yamagata of the Genro, which operated through the nobility in the House of Peers and the bureaucrat-aristocrat advisors close to the Throne. This event ended Ito's career as a parliamentarian.[25] Later he became Resident-General of Korea and was assassinated there in 1909 by a Korean. He probably wielded more influence in Japan's political history than any other person of that era. After Ito's death, the militarist, Yamagata, became the most influential individual in Japan until his death in 1922.

11. KATSURA June 1901 - June 1905.

The downfall of the second party Cabinet again brought the bureaucrats into power. General Katsura, a protege of Yamagata, was Premier when the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 was negotiated and also when the Portsmouth Treaty, ending the Russo-Japanese War was negotiated in 1905. The treaty was satisfactory to the Elder Statesmen, advisors to the Emperor and to the Cabinet, but, the Minister of Foreign

Affairs was so violently denounced by the populace who had entertained ambitious ideas of what Japan would win at the peace table, that the Government was forced to resign after there had been riots and martial law had been proclaimed. This was the first all second-generation Cabinet and contained none of the original group of Meiji statesmen. Lack of harmony between the Government and people during this tenure was marked by the dissolution of two Diets.[26]

12. SAIONJI June 1905 - July 1908.

Saionji succeeded Ito as head of the Seiyukai party in 1903 and occupied that position until the end of the Meiji Era. He was a liberal, a believer in party Government, a bureaucrat, a President of the Privy Council, a nobleman of the highest rank, and was destined to spend the remainder of his life in service to the Throne as an advisor. During his tenure as Prime Minister, his party commanded a majority in the lower House but when he accepted the Premiership he did not fill the Cabinet with party members. This was partially due to the hostility of the House of Peers to party Government. Toward the end of 1907, Inouye, who represented the money interests of the Mitsui family, brought pressure on the Genro to get rid of the Saionji Ministry on the ground that its financial program had not satisfied the nation. The Ministry resigned the following year, ostensibly because of Saionji's illness. However, it is believed that the Emperor, as the result of Zaibatsu pressure, intimated to the Government that it no longer enjoyed his confidence. In this case, as in others, even though the Government's party was strong in the lower house, the Cabinet was unpopular and the people welcomed its downfall. Saionji's plea of ill-health was a subterfuge and was generally recognized as such.[27]

13. KATSURA July 1908 - August 1911.

When Saionji resigned as Premier, he recommended General Katsura as his successor. Katsura formed a Cabinet composed mainly of members of the Yamagata military clique. The Seiyukai party, in obedience to its leader, Saionji, supported the Cabinet and the latter body experienced unusually good relations with the Diet. The tenure of this Government was noteworthy for the annexation of Korea in 1910 and for the successful conclusion of many important national undertakings. Katsura had remained as Premier much longer than the average and, having guided a successful Government for three years, was wise enough to withdraw before he became unpopular. In resigning his post, he acknowledged that it would be an easy matter to re-occupy it at any time. When he retired in August 1911, he recommended Saionji as his successor.[28]

14. SAIONJI August 1911 - December 1912.

The 1911 Saionji Cabinet contained three party members, but in the main, the posts were filled from the ranks of the clan oligarchy. This tenure was noteworthy for renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the revision of commercial treaties. For the most past, relations with the Diet were amicable because Saionji's Seiyukai party controlled the House. A controversy with the militarists arose and the War Minister, General Uyehara, resigned because the Cabinet, which was pledged to reduced governmental expenditures, refused to ask the Diet fro the necessary appropriation to send additional troops to Korea for garrison duty. Prince Yamagata, who first established the custom of appointing officers on the active list only to the War and Navy Ministries, was sufficiently influential to prevent any general from accepting the vacancy. Hence, the Prime Minister was unable to fill his Cabinet and it was forced to resign in spite of its majority in the House. This occurred years before the Army controlled public opinion as it does today, and its defiance of the government provoked a popular demand for constitutional reform. Up until then, at no time in Japanese political history had the strength of the military clique stood out more conspicuously.

15. KATSURA December 1912 - February 1913.

It was several weeks after the fall of Saionji's second Ministry before the Genro settled on a new Premier. In the meantime the press was very critical of the clan system and denounced the militarists. When Prince Katsura took office for the third time, he had difficulty in filling the Cabinet posts and it was necessary for the Emperor to issue an Imperial Order to Admiral Saito, commanding him to retain his office as Minister of the Navy. As a result of his feeling against his old friend General Prince Yamagata, General Prince Katsura repudiated the clan system and professed his faith in party Government. Since 1905, Katsura's bureaucratic Ministry and Saionji's party Ministry had been in office in turn upon the understanding that the majority party in the House, Saionji's Seiyukai, would support the Katsura Ministry. However, Katsura's 1912 Government could not get the support of the party because he favored the militarists and bureaucrats too much to suit the party.

A month after taking office, in January 1913, Katsura formed his own party, the Doshikai. As a result, the stronger parties in the Diet, as well as public opinion, turned against him, and his position in the next Diet was hopeless. When the Diet opened, he prorogued it once for ten days, and immediately again for five. This infuriated the Diet as well as the public and when the Diet reopened, a mob assembled and demonstrated its hostility against the Government. Riots broke out in Tokyo and elsewhere, and

many Government supporters were attacked. The Cabinet's resignation which followed, once again demonstrated that no Government could remain in office long when faced with a hostile Diet and adverse public opinion.[30]

16. YAMAMOTO February 1913 - April 1914.

When Katsura's ministry was howled out of office after being in only fifty-three days, it was interpreted by some as a personal affront to the Genro. They immediately nominated Admiral Yamamoto, a military bureaucrat from the Satsuma clan, and he assumed office with a Cabinet formed mostly of military bureaucrats but allied with Prince Saionji's Seiyukai party. The parties were strong enough at this time to enable the Government to do away with the ordinance of 1900 requiring the Navy and War Ministers to be chosen from the active lists. The militarists vigorously opposed this change but were ineffective in the fact of party strength. In 1914, members of the Diet exposed a ship-building bribery scandal involving German and British firms. Great public indignation was expressed regarding the disclosure and troops had to be called out to quiet the mobs. The lower House reduced the naval appropriations bill by 30 million yen and the House of Peers reduced it by 70 million yen. This had the effect of rejecting the budget as the two Houses were unable to effect a compromise. As a result the Cabinet resigned.[31]

17. OKUMA April 1914 - October 1916.

Count Okuma, who had been Premier of Japan's first party Government in 1898, again became head of a party Cabinet in 1914. His Government was in office when Japan entered the World War in August 1914. His party, the Doshikai, was in control of the Diet, but his Government was sharply criticized by the people for its policy of aggression in China. Public opinion became still more hostile to this Government when a scandal came to light in connection with a General Election conducted by the Government, and when it was further disclosed that a member of the Cabinet had distributed 10,000 yen among Diet members in order to make sure of the vote for two new Army divisions. Count Okuma resigned, ostensibly due to old age, after the leader of the Seiyukai instituted a vigorous campaign of criticism, and introduced a Resolution of Non-confidence in the House. It is interesting to note that Okuma was an uncompromising critic of the Genro system and, although invited by the Emperor to serve on that body, he never attended their meetings.[32]

18. TERAUCHI October 1916 - September 1918.

When Count Okuma resigned, he recommended his Foreign Minister, Viscount Taka-akira Kato, as his successor. The Genro refused to nominate Kato because he had failed to heed their advice on foreign relations. The Genro was still dominated by Prince Yamagata, the militarist and foe of party

government, and nominated General Terauchi instead, holding that the Cabinet should be above parties in the conduct of government and that a strong bureaucratic Ministry was required to meet the serious situation caused by the war. Although Terauchi was without experience as a diplomat, he assumed the Foreign Affairs Ministry along with the Premiership. The press was so hostile to him that he gave up the Foreign Office in six weeks. His tenure as Premier was noteworthy for two things: (1) The negotiation of the Nishihara loans to China which have figured high in political and military history and which resulted in the dissolution of a hostile Diet, and (2) the nation-wide rice riots caused by high prices, led by women, in August 1918. The latter event shook the entire country and is an outstanding example of pressure, exerted by a force wholly outside the national governmental structure, which caused the collapse of a Cabinet.33

19. HARA . October 1918 - November 1921.

In 1918, Terauchi's bureaucratic Cabinet was displaced by a Seiyukai party Cabinet with Mr. Hara, who succeeded Saionji as leader of the Seiyukai party, as the Premier. He was a journalist-politician and the first untitled man to become Premier. The Government dissolved the House in February 1920, on the Manhood Suffrage Bill, owing to increase in "dangerous thought", and in the following General Election obtained an absolute majority, which it held until Hara was assassinated for "being the foremost man in a state in which there was something rotten". The Hara Ministry was criticized both at home and abroad for the alleged duplicity of its policy in keeping expeditionary forces in Siberia.34

20. TAKAHASHI November 1921 - June 1922.

After Premier Hara's assassination, his Ministry was succeeded by a Cabinet of the same party under the Premiership of Viscount Takahashi, the new leader of the Seiyukai party, but this Ministry was destined to be short-lived because of internal trouble. It was a time of great industrial and commercial depression. The administration was under fire for its financial policy. The demand for womanhood suffrage was strong. A disorderly Diet was critical of the militarists' right of direct appeal to the Throne. Political disruption claimed the better part of the Cabinet members' attention, thus making it impossible for them to determine an effective policy. The Government was finally forced out when the Premier was unable to secure the resignation of the two most unpopular Ministers.35

21. ADMIRAL KATO June 1922 - September 1923.

Takahashi's Seiyukai party Cabinet was succeeded by a new Ministry formed by Admiral Kato, who was famous as head of the Japanese delegation to the Washington Disarmament Conference and also as Admiral Togo's Chief of Staff in the

Russo-Japanese War. This Government was a bureaucratic as distinguished from a party Cabinet although it had been formed with the support of the Seiyukai party. It experienced a good deal of farmer-labor trouble and was not a successful Government. When Kato died in office his Cabinet resigned.[36]

22. YAMAMOTO September 1923 - January 1924

When Admiral Kato died in the fall of 1923, he was succeeded by a "transcendent" or non-party Cabinet headed by the militarist, Admiral Yamamoto, who had not proved a very distinguished Premier in 1913-1914. Yamamoto was an old man by this time. It was said the Genro were afraid to nominate anyone young enough to be in danger of getting a new idea. This Government went into office immediately after the great earthquake. It experienced strong opposition from both parties in the House but the immediate cause of its fall was the attempt of a political reformist to assassinate the then Prince Regent, the present Emperor, who was about to be married. This is a clear-cut case of a Ministry falling for reasons entirely beyond its control. An outside "incident" took place, an incident of such a nature that no Government could remain in office in a country such as Japan where the doctrine of extensive responsibility is traditional.[37]

23. KIYOURA January 1924 - June 1924.

Viscount Kiyoura, President of the Privy Council and a non-party man was selected to succeed Admiral Yamamoto in January 1924. He formed another non-party Ministry drawn entirely from the House of Peers. The Seiyukai, which had controlled the majority in the lower House, was now divided into two parties, the Seiyuhonto, which supported the Government, and the Seiyukai, which, together with all other parties, opposed the Government and refused to cooperate. Public opinion turned against this Cabinet and when the Government dissolved this unwilling Diet, the people showed their dissatisfaction with the Kiyoura Government by returning only a small number of Seiyuhonto candidates, who had supported the Government, thus forcing a resignation of the Cabinet. The decision of the Government to resign was described in Tokyo's Trans-Pacific weekly as representing "decisive victories for the Japanese Press and an overwhelming majority of the politically minded public of this country".[38]

24. and 25. VISCOUNT TAKA-AKIRA KATO
June 1924 - August 1925
August 1925 - January 1926

When the opposition parties won the General Election of 1924 and the Cabinet resigned, Viscount Kato, the leader of the Kenseikai party, which was now the majority party in the House, formed a coalition Cabinet with the support of other friendly parties. Business interests were so well represented in Cabinet selections that the Ministry was often referred to as the "Mitsubishi Government". This

Government was noted but criticized by the militarists for inaugurating the most liberal policy towards China that had been seen for many years. The party coalition was successful in passing the Manhood Suffrage Act which increased the electorate from three to thirteen million; however, Dr. Okada, Minister of Education in the same Government, led an element which succeeded in securing passage of the 1925 Peace Preservation Law, which was directed chiefly against Communism. Internal dissension later disrupted the Zaibatsu-allied party factions within the Cabinet and the Seiyukai party withdrew its support. This caused the resignation of the Premier and all Cabinet officers. However, the Premier was immediately reappointed and formed a new Cabinet eliminating all members of the Seiyukai and definitely breaking up the coalition upon which much of his power had been based. With the support of the Seiyuhonto party, this Cabinet held office until Kato died in the last days of 1925. It had been predicted that this Cabinet would fall when the next Diet met due to Kenseikai and Army criticism of the Government's liberal policy toward China.[39]

26. WAKATSUKI January 1926 - April 1927.

On Kato's death, Mr. Wakatsuki became President of the Kenseikai party and formed a party Cabinet. During the 1927 financial depression while the Diet was not in session, the Cabinet proposed by means of Emergency Imperial Ordinance to grant two hundred million yen to the Bank of Formosa to guarantee against further bank failures. The Privy Council, which approves all statues, Imperial Ordinances and treaties, advised the Emperor not to sanction this plan. It was said that the Council's decision in this matter was influenced by the Cabinet's failure to adopt a more "positive" policy toward China. Such advice to the Emperor from the Council was equivalent to Imperial disapproval of the views of the Cabinet and the latter tendered its joint resignation despite the fact that it held a majority in the House and had not been defeated on any important measure.

It is interesting to note that the Tanaka Cabinet which followed called the Diet into session and secured a guarantee of seven hundred million yen for the Formosa banks. Illustrative of the Privy Council's unpopularity is the fact that the House passed an Impeachment Resolution censuring the Privy Council for its "unprecedented" conduct. The consequences of the Council's conflict with the Cabinet were such as to discredit the Council with the public and to arouse popular clamor for curtailment of its power.[40]

27. TANAKA April 1927 - July 1929.

Wakatsuki's Cabinet was replaced in April 1927 by a Seiyukai party Cabinet under the Premiership of General Baron Tanaka, the new leader of that party. His assumption of office was followed by wholesale removal of prefectural

governors to be replaced by Seiyukai men to aid the party in the first General Election under the Manhood Suffrage Law. Tanaka was a militarist and a former War Minister and a leading figure in the Choshu Military oligarchy which, along with the Seiyukai party, favored a "positive" policy against China. Tanaka personally assumed the Foreign Ministry. The Government's attitude against China alarmed the more liberal section of the general public. It was on the issue of its policy against China and a struggle between the Privy Council and Cabinet over the ratification of the Kellogg Peace Pact that the Government finally fell. The words in the Kellogg Pact providing that the contracting parties had concluded the agreement "in the names of their respective people" was balked at by the Council as being disloyal to the Emperor and of having a democratic ring. This struggle so weakened the Cabinet's prestige when linked with the disclosure of unsavory conditions in the Japanese military occupation of China, better known as the "Manchurian Incident", that Tanaka personally took the responsibility and resigned at the Emperor's suggestion.[41]

28. HAMAGUCHI July 1929 - April 1931.

Shortly after General Tanaka became leader of the Seiyukai party, disintegration took place within the Seiyuhonto party, one part joining the Seiyukai, while the other, together with the Kensiekai, formed a new party called the Minseito. This party, under Hamaguchi, who had helped in ousting Tanaka, took office in July 1929 at the height of the Post-war boom. The Wall Street crash and the spreading world depression followed immediately. The Government promised a return to the gold standard, retrenchment and deflation, but found it impossible to improve the economic situation and affairs gradually became worse. It was also the responsibility of this Government to shoulder the Manchurian Incident, which it failed to do. The ratification of the London Naval Treaty in April 1930 embittered the militarists against the Government, which, on this occasion established an unprecedented victory over the Privy Council, for the principle of responsible Cabinet government, in one of the bitterest contests ever fought between the Council and Cabinet. When an attempt was made on Hamaguchi's life by an assassin in November 1930, he was incapacitated for performing his duties and the Minseito party became completely demoralized and in April the Cabinet resigned. Hamaguchi's death, as a result of wounds received in the attempt on his life, followed in August 1931, and foreshadowed the eventual triumph of the military and collapse of the parties.

Hamaguchi's Government was the strongest and most liberal party Government which ever ruled Japan and was in office at the height of the period of party politics. However, the public was becoming disgusted with corrupt

elections and political scandals.* Hamaguchi pointed out that the public was being shown the evils of party politics before learning its merits. The increasing tendency to regard democracy with suspician later culminated in the February 26, 1936 Incident, when a group of extremists among the young officers staged a mutiny in which three key men of the Government were killed, with attempts made on the life of the Premier and several others.[42]

29. WAKATSUKI April 1931 - December 1931.

Baron Wakatsuki, who had been ousted as Premier in 1927 as the result of a dispute with the Privy Council, became Premier of the second Minseito party Government in April 1931. The first Minseito retrenchment program, started under Hamaguchi, failed during Wakatsuki's tenure. Foreign trade was falling off, industry was becoming paralyzed, unemployment reached a new high level and food shortages existed in the rural areas. The Cabinet lost the confidence of its supporters, and the Zaibatsu element within the coalition demanded currency inflation, which was a policy directly opposed to that of the Minseito party.

The military also flouted the Cabinet by sending troops to Manchuria contrary to the Government's "friendly policy" toward China. The occurrence of the Mukden Incident - alleged blowing up of a section of South Manchuria Railway track, on September 18, 1931 - resulted in the League of Nations passing a resolution on December 10 to send a commission to the Far East to investigate the matter. The Wakatsuki Government resigned the day after this resolution was adopted; however, its downfall had previously been precipitated by a financial scandal in which the Home Minister had allegedly received a large fortune from the Zaibatsu for facilitating departure from the gold standard. There had also existed dissention with the Cabinet resulting from a movement launched by Home Minister Adachi, President of the Minseito, to form a coalition with the Seiyukai,

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*"The period of Diet greatness was 1929 to 1931. . . The passing of the Manhood Suffrage Law of 1925 had given the chance to the public to express its views and in the elections of 1927 and 1930, the voters were conscious of choosing not only legislation but also their governments, and more and more the influence of the Diet was being felt. Then came the Manchurian outbreat and the May 15th affairs, (May 15, 1932 when Premier Inukai was assassinated by Army officers) whereupon powers behind the scenes took charge of affairs to the discredit and discomfiture of the Diet, which has steadily lost prestige and influence ever since." Quoted from Trans-Pacific, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Jan. 6, 1936, p.4.

which further weakened the Cabinet. When Adachi's movement failed, he refused to attend Cabinet meetings and would not resign. The deadlock thusly created was the immediate cause of the fall of the Cabinet.[43]

30. INUKAI · December 1931 - May 1932.

With the fall of Wakatsuki's Minseito Government, the Seiyukai was returned to power under the Premiership of Inukai, a professional politician who had succeeded Tanaka in 1929 as President of the Seiyukai. It proved to be the last one-party Government to hold office. In the following election little real interest was shown by the people as they were starting to realize that the military were beginning to direct Japan's foreign policy. As a result, the Seiyukai won a sweeping victory at the polls. The Inukai party Government was to mark the end of parties as the controlling factor in government. The parties had been occupied in a struggle among themselves for power for too long and did not possess the strength of courage to throw off the increasingly strong military leadership, which, in addition to other motives, was eager to be avenged for the humiliating treatment it had received at the hands of the parties. The Cabinet was severely criticized for failure to resign in acceptance of responsibility for an attempt on the life of the Emperor. When Premier Inukai was assassinated on May 15, 1932 at his official residence by a group of twenty-five Army and Navy officers as a gesture against "corrupt politics" and "impotent administration", it marked the end of political parties as an influence in national affairs, and the Army took over.[44] Trans-Pacific, Tokyo weekly, attributed the assassination to "social unrest and dissatisfaction" bred by "rural distress. . . which is part of a world wide depression".*

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*This publication estimated that over 70% of the Army came from among the peasants and farmers and that it was natural that the agricultural population should look to the Army to take up their cause. The same article continued: "In addition the people at large appear to have lost faith in politics and politicians who are accused of placing their interest above those of the nation and of corruption. The Japanese Army, on the other hand, has a clean and honest record and constitutes an organization in which the people feel they can place their trust. (Army authorities) view with sympathy the motive which inspired these young officers to resort to direct action and are apparently determined to see that those conditions against which the young officers rose and for which they are prepared to face punishment, having voluntarily surrendered, shall be remedied." See Trans-Pacific, Vol. XX, No. 21, May 26, p. 3.

31. SAITO May 1932 - July 1934.

When Inukai was murdered, Prince Saionji of the Genro advised the establishment of "national Cabinet" to be led by a non-party men but to include party representatives. He nominated Admiral Saito, who formed a coalition Cabinet, placing members of three parties in five posts. Of the remaining seats, three went to members of the House of Peers, two to bureaucrats and three to militarists. The Zaibatsu was represented in the Cabinet by General Takahashi, the Minister of Finance, who tried to keep down the budget and check military expansion. Count Uchida, the former President of the South Manchuria Railway was Foreign Minister. General Araki was the leading militarist in the coalition. The seiyukai held about three-fourths of the seats in the House but was politically powerless as the party system was on the wane and was forced to support the Government in self-protection as any crisis might be blamed on its representatives in the Government.

Saito's Government may be characterized as im potent and dominated by the Army. During its tenure, this Cabinet was faced with a series of crises including that of making the decision as to whether Japan should withdraw from the League of Nations or discontinue its policy of expansion. Disputes over relieving the farmer's tax burden at the expense of the Zaibatsu and charges of alleged bribery in the Finance Ministry threatened the Cabinet's existence for some time, and several Ministers resigned. The Government finally collapsed when the Finance Minister and four officials of the Banking Bureau were arrested on bribery charges for which the Premier and Finance Minister assumed direct responsibility.[45]

32. OKADA July 1934 - February 1936.

When Admiral Okada formed a national Cabinet in 1934, the parties refused to give it their support. Two Minseito members were given posts. Three posts were given to Seiyukai men but only after they had resigned from the party. Of the remaining seven posts, two went to militarists and five to bureaucrats, with Zaibatsu interests well represented among the latter. When the Okada Government set up the Cabinet Inquiry Council and Bureau in 1935, the Minseito cooperated but the Seiyukai boycotted it and expelled anyone from the party who accepted positions on it. The Diet generally was suspicious of an executive attempt to steal their legislative prerogatives.

It was during this Government's tenure that Dr. Tatsukichi Minobe, the well-known authority on the Japanese Constitution, was forced to resign his seat in the House of Peers because of pressure brought against him by reactionaries for books that he had written years before a Professor of Constitutional Law at Tokyo University. In these books he had advanced the theory that the Emperor was only an organ of the State. Following his resignation,

the Government issued a statement that the Constitution placed sovereignty in the Emperor only and that the State was not a repository of such.

The Government dissolved the Diet in January 1936 on the national polity question and "went to the country" the following month on the issue as to whether Okada's national Government would continue with Minseito help or whether a Seiyukai party Cabinet should be formed. The Government won the election as the Seiyukai lost its Diet majority to the Minseito, and it appeared assured of an easy future until the February 1936 Incident drew attention to the need for a powerful national Cabinet. This, the most violent explosion of all on the part of the extremists in the Army, occurred on February 26 when Lord Keeper Saito, Finance Minister Takahashi and Inspector-General of Military Education, Lieutenant-General Watanabe were assassinated by junior Army officers in an attempt to overthrow the Government.* Some 1400 troops participated in this revolt. Premier Okada was marked for assassination, was reported as killed and a new Government was in the process of being set up when it was discovered that Okada was still alive and that his brother-in-law, who bore him a marked resemblance, had been assassinated. Prince Saionji of the Genro, Count Makino, former Lord Keeper, and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki, all "moderates," were also marked for assassination but escaped. The latter was severely wounded. Premier Okada accepted the responsibility and resigned on February 27th, at the same time apologizing for the anxiety which the incident had caused the Emperor.[46]

33. HIROTA March 1936 - January 1937.

When the Okada Government fell, Prince Konoye refused to form a Cabinet and the task fell to Mr. Koki Hirota, a bureaucrat. Two posts each were filled by members of the

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*Regarding this incident, the Japanese War Office made the following announcement: ".....according to written documents of these officers the purpose of the uprising was to eliminate those perpetrating destruction of the national polity, such as the Genro, the statesmen close to the Throne, financial magnates, the military clique, bureaucracy and the political parties, at this moment of serious crisis at home and abroad in order to clarify treat principles and to protect and make manifest the national polity." See Trans-Pacific, Vol. XXIV, No. 9, Feb. 27, 1936, p. 8.

Seiyukai and Minseito parties. Hirota tried to form a moderate Government at the expense of the militarists but was thwarted in his attempt by the refusal of General Terauchi to serve as War Minister. The Army won out and Terauchi accepted the War Ministry along with a Cabinet acceptable to the militarists. This Government's program called for stronger pressure on China.

In 1936 the Government reenacted the ordinance of 1900, which had been repealed in 1913, requiring that War and Navy Ministers be appointed from the active lists. The militarists further showed their growing strength at this time by attempting legislation limiting the already weak influence of the Diet and electorate in government. In January 1937, the Seiyukai party led a revolt against the militarists by bringing the Government under fire in Diet Interpellations. It accused the Government of having achieved no tangible results in administrative reforms; of having failed in its foreign relations program; of having caused instability in national life by its tax and budget increases; and, last but not least, of having completely failed as a Government, by not imposing stricter discipline on the Army for staging the February 1936 officers' revolt. The attackers termed the Cabinet as the least popular regime in thirty years of parliamentary government.

As a result of the Diet's attack on the Army, General Terauchi insisted on dissolution of the Diet. Because the Cabinet would not agree to this procedure, the General compelled its resignation by threatening to resign individually. This action would have achieved the same result, as the Army would not have named his successor and the Government could not have continued for lack of a War Minister. When the Premier resigned, he made a public statement that, following the February 1936 incident, the complicated political situation was one with which he was not qualified to deal. The fall of the Hirota Government is another clear demonstration of the fact that the military can make or break a Cabinet.47

34. HAYASHI February 1937 - June 1937.

When Hirota resigned, General Ugaki who was retired and had long been friendly to political parties, was named to form a new Government but was unable to fill the War Ministry because his selection as Premier was opposed by the Army on the grounds that Army discipline could not be restored if Ugaki were to form a Government. The Army's success in preventing formation of a Government in this instance was a

fairly clear indication that they controlled the nation. General Hayashi, selected by the Army, was then given the task of forming a Cabinet and in doing so he openly condemned and antagonized the parties by allowing no Ministers to retain their party affiliations while in office. The Zaibatsu were well represented in this Government by the appointment of Mr. Yuki, former President of the Industrial Bank and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, as Finance Minister, and the appointment of Mr. Ikeda, a Mitsui man, as Governor of the Bank of Japan. This Government had difficulty, however, in filling all the posts and three went vacant throughout the short four-month tenure, with the result that some of the Ministers occupied more than one post and were unable to perform their duties properly.

The steps taken by this Government toward a "war-time economy" met with bitter opposition from the parties and even more from the public at large. On March 31, the Government dissolved the lower House over a budget dispute and "went to the country" to hold an election in the face of increasing opposition. The Government received an overwhelming defeat at the April 30 election, one of the few times in Japanese history where a Government was defeated at the polls.* When the Government shortly resigned, liberal newspapers claimed that adverse public opinion as manifested at the polls was the cause, but it is more likely that it fell because the Army concluded that it should go and consequently withdrew its support.[48]

35. KONOYE June 1937 - January 1939.

The military had been quick to profit from political disturbances following every national crisis, and gradually they acquired more power. When the Hayashi Cabinet fell, Prince Konoye, then President of the House of Peers and desirable to the military, was nominated to organize a new Government. He formed a coalition Cabinet which was further detached from the parties than any Government in recent years and constituted an outstanding example of a "balanced cabinet,"

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*Trans-Pacific, Vol. XXV, No. 23, June 10, 1937, p.3 states that this is the only occasion on which a government was defeated at the polls, but see W. W. McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era, 1867-1912, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1916, pp. 211-217; and R. K. Reischauer, Japan Government-Politics, Thomas Nelson and Sons, New York, 1939, p. 112.

representing the bureaucrats, militarists, Zaibatsu and parties. It included Nagai and Nakajima from the Minseito and Seiyukai respectively, not as party men but as individuals; Hirota, the leader of the bureaucrats, as Foreign Minister; Baba, a bureaucrat, as Home Minister; Koya, a bureaucrat, as Finance Minister; Yoshino, a bureaucrat, as Minister of Commerce and Industry. The new Cabinet was extremely nationalistic as well as bureaucratic. Konoye's appointment of Parliamentary Vice-Ministers and Councillors from among party men showed his desire to eliminate internal friction. However, after the outbreak of hostilities in China in July 1937, the militarists had a better chance than ever to dictate policy and, in face of the new crisis, any potentially liberal members of the Gobernment were soon silenced and the Cabinet became a strong national one. In order to reconcile opposing factions among the Government and the public, Konoye reinforced the Cabinet by organizing the Cabinet Advisory Council in October 1937. This council was to participate in Cabinet discussions and planning. It was his purpose to appoint representatives from all the factions to the council in order to widen the scope of group responsibility in national government.

In spite of bringing the leaders of opposing factions into the Government, internal dissension centering on Japan's policy of expansion and China's refusal to accept a dictated peace caused the Premier to resign in the closing days of 1938 with the public statement that he was unable to "carry on his duties as Premier." A contributing cause was the split created within the Cabinet concerning the application of Japan's wartime reorganization act, the National Mobilization Law, which the Diet was forced to pass under threat of dissolution.49

36. HIRANUMA January 1939 - August 1939.

When the Hiranuma Cabinet replaced Konoye's first Government in January 1939, Konoye succeeded Hiranuma as President of the Privy Council, and at the same time continued to sit in the new Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio. It was thought that this arrangement was for the purpose of strengthening the new Cabinet with the Privy Council and House of Peers.

The signing of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact wrecked the Hiranuma Government. The Cabinet had decided on a policy of strengthening the Japanese-German anti-Comintern axis, which policy was referred to a Five-Minister

Conference of the Cabinet. This was generally composed of the Premier and the Army, Navy, Finance, and Foreign Affairs Ministers. While the Conference was deliberating the matter, however, Germany suddenly concluded her non-aggression pact with Russia, thus failing to live up to her agreement with Japan under the anti-Soviet pact. Naturally, the German move caused the Five-Minister Conference to suspend deliberations on strengthening the tie with Germany. The responsibility of Premier Hiranuma was involved and his Government was discredited. He resigned en bloc with the other members of his Cabinet.[50]

37. ABE August 1939 - January 1940.

General Abe replaced Hiranuma as Premier in August 1939. He welcomed party cooperation and limited party representation in the Cabinet. His policy was one of strengthening rather than opposing the trend toward centralized government control, although his Government urged political reform to aid in the rehabilitation of the Diet in public opinion. When his Government went into office, like other recent Cabinets, it promised to bring about speedy settlement of the China affair, but Abe's Government was destined to be short-lived because it stood for a policy of getting the Army back out of most of China. The principal cause of the downfall of the Abe Cabinet was the Diet's Resolution of non-confidence in the Government in December 1939 with a suggestion that it resign. The immediate cause was the opposition of the Army and Navy to Abe's plan to dissolve the Diet. Behind the principal cause of the fall of this Cabinet also lies the fact that Abe expected outspoken criticism of his Government when the next Diet met because he had withdrawn the ceiling price which his Government had previously established on rice.[51]

38. YONAI January 1940 - July 1940.

When Admiral Yonai replaced General Abe as Prime Minister, he formed a Cabinet that was to see the last of the political parties, which were soon "voluntarily" disbanded and replaced by Konoye's Imperial Rule Assistance Association. However, Yonai's Cabinet was formed with party cooperation and representation. The President of the Minseito party was given a Cabinet seat. Before the war Yonai was something of a "moderate" and was the first Premier since 1936 who was permitted to form a Cabinet without undue interference by the Army. This was interpreted by some to indicate that the Army was relinquishing its strong nationalistic leadership, but, six months later, when it appeared that some elements of

the Cabinet were not aligned with the political aims of the Army, the latter took a determined stand and War Minister Hata resigned, leaving the Government with no alternative but to step out, since the Army would not furnish a successor.[52]

39. KONOYE July 1940 - July 1941.

Prince Konoye resigned the Presidency of the Privy Council in June 1940 in order to organize his movement to replace the parties with a new nationalistic organization, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. Before this movement was well underway, the Yonai Cabinet fell and Konoye was called upon to form a new Government, the second Konoye Cabinet. It is reported that he agreed to do so providing the Army and Navy promised to reach an agreement on all important matters of government policy. The new Cabinet contained no active party members for all the important parties were being dissolved. As a result, the Army guaranteed the new Government full cooperation. The cooperation of the military was further guaranteed when the Premier, after appointing an "inner cabinet," which included the Premier and Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs, commissioned this select group to determine the policy of the Cabinet and to select the other Ministers. The final selection, with the exception of party leaders, represented a well-balanced coalition of military, business and bureaucratic representatives, and included former party members. Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, former President of the South Manchuria Railway Company and long an advocate of a positive foreign policy, was Foreign Minister in this Cabinet. In March 1941, contrary to the Cabinet's advice, he took a trip to Moscow, Berlin and Rome, returning with a treaty with Stalin pledging peace, and with Hitler's assurance that the Axis would win the war. Being confident of Japan's position, he adopted a strong policy toward the United States. When Hitler suddenly attacked Russia, definitely placing that country in the Allied camp, it became evident to the Japanese Government that Matsuoka lacked comprehension of foreign affairs, especially with regard to an understanding of Hitler's aims. It was Matsuoka's duty to anticipate such developments as the attack on Russia and the steady step-by-step intervention of the United States, and he had placed his judgment ahead of that of the rest of the Government in refusing to consider such probabilities. In order to get rid of him politely, the Cabinet resigned. All the important posts except Matsuoka's were immediately filled again by the same men who resigned.[53]

50. KONOYE July 1941 - October 1941.

When Japan moved troops into southern Indo-China and threatened Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and Singapore, the United States retaliated by freezing Japanese assets in the United States and discontinuing scrap and other shipments. The Dutch and British soon followed suit and Japan's overseas commerce came to an end. Not having the natural resources to live with or carry on in Asia, she faced the alternative of war or capitulation. Konoye's third Cabinet saw that it would have to obtain a lifting of the sanctions imposed upon Japan or resign in favor of a War Cabinet. Therefore, he sent a message to President Roosevelt in April 1941 asking for a meeting somewhere in the Pacific. Roosevelt's answer was to the effect that there would be no value in such a meeting unless an agreement was reached in advance. In order to come to terms with Japan it would have meant that the United States would have to agree to "sell China down the river" and reestablish full trade relations with Japan. This would have meant victory for Japan without war. When it became apparent to Konoye that President Roosevelt would not meet him unless Japan made concessions, which Konoye dared not make, he began to arrange for his Cabinet to step out in favor of a War Cabinet. Konoye was not qualified to head a War Cabinet and knew it. Preparation for such a change took several weeks because it was not an ordinary shift where the affairs of state could be carried on temporarily by an ad interim Cabinet. It was not until October 16 that the official announcement was made and that Tojo's carefully selected War Cabinet, top-heavy with militarists, took office and began war preparations against the United States.[54]

41. TOJO October 1941 - July 1944.

The collapse of Tojo's War Cabinet was announced to the world on July 20th, two days after the fall of Saipan. It may be attributed to two concurrent chains of events, namely defeat in the field and defeat on the home front.* As War

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*At the University of Chicago Round Table discussion on Japan, July 30, 1944, participated in by Thoburn Brumbaugh, Harley MacNair and Harold Quigley, all of whom are authorities on the subject, the following interesting observations were made. Mr. MacNair stated that Tojo's fall was "...nothing but a sacrifice of a victim following a defeat for which he may personally have been little, or not at all responsible." Mr. Brumbaugh added that "Japan has been at war for ten years and ....this war has not always been popular with the people. They held the leadership responsible, and, to some extent, this is a gesture of the people of Japan." See The University of Chicago Round Table, "Japan," 544th Broadcast, No. 332, University of Chicago, July 30, 1944.

Minister and Chief of the Army General Staff, he had been defeated in the South Pacific, the North Pacific, the Central Pacific, and finally at Saipan, within bomber distance of Tokyo. China-based bombers were already attacking the home land. Tojo's grand strategy, that of seizing and trying to hold the outer bastion of islands extending in a great circle from the Aleutians to the Dutch East Indies, undoubtedly had placed him on the defensive at home ever since the loss of Guadalcanal. He had promised the people that the Navy could keep the Army supply lines open. His Navy Minister and Chief of the Naval General Staff had fallen down on the job of keeping the Army channels of communication open to forward areas and had resigned on July 17 in what was the first visible sign of a Cabinet shake-up.

Not only had the fleet backed up every time it had been challenged, but the Army had also met with constant reverses in every island campaign it fought, and thousands of troops had been left to starve in by-passed island garrisons. All this indicated serious short-comings in the over-all planning and strategy of the high command. Following each major Japanese reverse on the war front, Tojo had been forced to make adjustments within the Government or resign. These shifts in the Government had not resulted in an improvement of Japan's war status. Promised offensives failed to materialize.

Tojo had failed as head of the Government and the Army and, because he had taken on too many jobs, he also had to accept the responsibility for failure on the home front. Production had fallen down and stock piles were not inexhaustible. He had promised the people that his newly created Munitions Ministry would solve armament and aircraft production problems. The Regional Administrative Block system had not been a success and had not resulted in the proposed economic self-sufficiency of the Nine Administrative Districts. The Zaibatsu monopolists were still in competition with one another over raw materials and labor, and their conflicting interests in the flow and use of goods within the Regional Districts had not been eliminated. Failure on the home front was inseparable from failure on the military front. The responsibility for each rested in the same place: Tojo's Cabinet.*

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*This paper was written before the fall of the Koiso Cabinet on April 5. Additional military defeats and criticism at home were the apparent causes of the Cabinet's resignation. Almost simultaneously, Moscow announced its denunciation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Domei announced that,

CONCLUSIONS

From the above considerations it emerges that Cabinets are made and unmade by a composite and varied series of forces, in which popular sentiment plays a large and important part. The simplicity and efficiency of Japanese government institutions might be increased, of course, if public sentiment could be made manifest through the ordinary channels of democratic politics, but the fact remains that its influence is actually exercised and may be exercised to a much greater extent than it has been if and when the people arrive at a sense of political awareness and are given an opportunity to learn and develop the fundamentals of democracy.

It was stated above that for the first few years of constitutional government in Japan, political parties, which appeared in the first session of the Diet, were prevented by the militarists, bureaucrats, and clansmen from being represented in the Cabinet. When the parties become strong in the Diet, it became apparent to the Cabinet, through bitter experience, that working agreements with the Diet were necessary. In 1898, bureaucratic monopolization of the Cabinet gave way to the first party Government. From then until the militarists captured the control in 1932, fifteen party Cabinets ruled Japan at intervals. Their control was never complete, however, because of the power of the bureaucrats, militarists, Privy Council and the nobility in the House of Peers.

The ability of the leading parties and the lower House to reflect, at least in part, the will of the people began to disappear as Japan became involved in the "China

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(Footnote continued from preceding page)
upon receipt of the resignation of Koiso's Cabinet, the Emperor immediately called upon Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, to conduct the customary consultation among the former Premiers, the Jushin, to obtain their recommendation for a new Prime Minister. Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki, President of the Privy Council and a "moderate," who had been in semi-retirement for eight years, was selected. Suzuki was marked for assassination by the extremists of the military clique in the February 26, 1936 Incident and barely escaped with his life. (see p. above) Observers predict that since Suzuki has given no public intimation of sympathy with the Army extremists, his Government will probably be a liberal one that might project peace feelers to the United States. See Chicago Tribune, Vol. CIV, No. 83 c, April 6, 1945.

Incident." As her economic crisis developed, it became necessary for the militarists to adopt a policy of suppressing outlets of popular feeling. This resulted in the parties' becoming "voluntarily disbanded" in 1940 in favor of the nationalistic government-sponsored Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which actually exerts no political power and is merely an agency of government propaganda. Its parliamentary arm, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, organized in 1942, is now the only legal political party in Japan and has complete political control of the Diet.

From 1924 until 1932, during the period when party Cabinets were on top, the liberal elements in Japan liked to think of themselves as part of a true western-style constitutional government. The people rallied around the parties and, even though they lacked confidence in them, the people resented anything which interfered with what they were fond of deluding themselves into believing was a constitutional party government. The parties might have remained in control had they been able to obtain and hold popular confidence. As the franchise expanded in Japan, so did bribery and governmental interference in elections. Distrust in political parties were involved, and by the well-known connections between the parties and the Zaibatsu and the knowledge that party leaders depended upon big business to finance Diet elections.

James Bryce has said, "Parties are inevitable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them."[55] The lack of willingness or ability of the party leaders to recognize that they represented the voice of the people in the government and had a solemn obligation to discharge for the people if the latter were to share in government, are the main reasons Japan has not developed a government by the people and why the latter were ripe to be sold a bill of goods by the military when they took over in the nineteen thirties. The world depression of 1929 left the Japanese people in such a desperate situation, economically speaking, that they were willing to follow the leadership of any group offering relief. The only groups offering anything were the militarists and secret societies. In the past when the people were dissatisfied with the government or political parties and were sincerely desirous of a change, they joined various societies and groups, some of them secret, which believed in direct action and assassination to bring about change. These societies are still potent but the militarists predominate because they have been able to offer a change without forcing their adherents underground.

It may be argued that the people do not want popular government and that it would be impossible under the Japanese Constitution. The Throne has granted a Constitution and to withdraw it or detract from it after so many years would certainly invite a revolution. Although the Constitution is often referred to as a "gift" from the Emperor, there is ample evidence to lead one to the conclusion that it was a forced gift granted as the result of pressure by the people.[56] The fact that only the Emperor can initiate a Constitutional amendment does not preclude the people, under proper leadership, from bringing as much pressure upon the advisors of the Emperor as would be necessary to accomplish their desires. The "brains" in every organ in the Japanese structure of government realize that the degree of control which that organ is able to exercise in government depends more upon the support it receives from public opinion than it does upon Constitutional sources. Nor should the people's devotion to the Imperial Throne prevent public opinion from playing the leading role in government. The Throne is an institution and not a person despite the theory of unbroken divine inheritance. The people have the ability to replace the Emperor with another more to their liking if they choose, and would readily do so if he ruled contrary to the advice of those close to him. This is not saying that the fiction of divine inheritance need be disturbed to accomplish such an end. The Japanese system is flexible. It has no "Nazi" party and has never had a dictatorship under the Constitution. The recent swing from Tojo's near-dictatorship back to a Cabinet of conventional pattern is illustrative of the flexibility of the Japanese system. Such flexibility invites the participation of public opinion. It is argued that the people have even less to say about their government today than the people of Nazi Germany. This may be true on the surface but it is a rough generalization and such a comparison leads to fallacious thinking. Japan still has a Diet and, as far as we can determine, the Diet is still able to bring pressure on the Premier, while in Germany, Hitler has not been bothered by a Reichstag. Furthermore, governments all over the world have swung toward centralization of power in the past generation and our own is no exception. Japan has the machinery to permit public opinion to become effective. Illustrations have been given in this paper to lead one to the conclusion that public opinion in Japanese government can be exerted to a far more effective degree in the future than it was in its heyday of the twenties, providing it is given the proper leaders imbued with proper motives, and can be manifested in a coherent system of political parties under such conditions as to insure the participation of the entire electorate.

Many suggestions have been made by qualified authorities as to what the policy of the United Nations should be with regard to changes in the Japanese political structure at the conclusion of hostilities, assuming that the problem will have to be dealt with. These range all the way from a complete destruction of the political system, including the Emperor, down to minor changes in the Constitution accompanied by a purge of the militarists. Any changes that we foster in her system should be with a view of encouraging further development toward democracy. Before any policy along these lines is adopted, considerable thought aught to be given as to just how much should be done by the Allies and how much should be left to the Japanese. The more changes made by the Japanese themselves the better it will be for the United Nations because further developments in Japan toward parliamentary government, or government by the people, are more likely to succeed as the result of motivation from within rather than as a result of ready-made solutions from the outside, regardless of the United Nations policy for the occupation of Japan or for changes in the Japanese political structure. Any democratic developments motivated from within Japan may well rest upon the impression created by the occupying forces and civilian agencies, if any, that might follow, which will give to millions of Japanese their first glimpse of western democracy in operation and thus possibly determine the relations between Japan and the rest of the world for generations to come.

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