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Social Science Text-Books

EDITED BY RICHARD T. ELY

OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY

SOCIAL SCIENCE TEXT-BOOKS

EDITED BY RICHARD T. ELY

OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS

By RICHARD T. ELY, PH.D., LL.D. Revised and enlarged by the AUTHOR and THOMAS S. ADAMS, PH.D., MAX O. LORENZ, PH.D., ALLYN A. YOUNG, PH.D.

OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY

By FRANK W. BLACKMAR, PH.D., and JOHN LEWIS GILLIN, PH.D.

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PREFACE

WITH the growing interest in sociology both on the part of students in the colleges and universities and on the part of an increasing number of other people organized into study clubs there is need of a comprehensive outline of the subject. Moreover, the rapid growth of the subject makes a new book imperative every few years in order that students may keep up with the development. This book is intended to meet the requirements of teachers of the subject in the colleges and universities and also to provide a comprehensive survey of the field for the general reader as well as for the large number of clubs interested in the study of social questions of vital interest.

The writers have kept constantly in mind the teacher. The book is divided into parts, each of which deals with a particular aspect of the subject, thus assisting the instructor in the sometimes difficult task of making clear the main divisions of the subject. Thus, Part I defines the subject and points out the practical purpose of its study; Part II outlines the way in which some of the more important social ideas and institutions have come to be what they are; Part III and Part IV attempt to present an analysis of society from the genetic point of view, the former from the standpoint of the working of unconscious forces, the latter with reference to the part played by social ideals in social development; Part V deals with social pathology, a phase of social life which cannot well be omitted if the student is to be given an adequate conception of the nature of society; Part VI is an attempt to vitalize the study of sociology by giving the student an opportunity to make a first hand study of society and to supply a few simple principles to guide him in the making of such a study; Part VII rounds out the beginner's conception of the subject by briefly setting forth the essential differences between social philosophy and social science in the endeavor

to give the student a clear conception of the nature of social science and an acquaintance with the names of those who have had a part in its creation. The division of the book into parts has the added advantage that certain parts, for example, the last two Parts, may be omitted in a course where time will not permit covering the whole book.

It is hoped that the questions and exercises at the end of each chapter will serve to quicken the student's interest in the subject, as well as serve as a convenient means whereby the instructor may stimulate fruitful discussions in class. The questions are framed with the purpose of calling forth independent thinking. In many cases some additional reading, as well as independent thought, will be required. The references at the end of each chapter are not offered as a complete bibliography on the subject, but are intended to indicate supplementary reading for both the teacher and the interested student.

The authors are under special obligations to Professor Ely, the editor of the Series, and to Professor Ross, both of whom have read the book in manuscript and have given unstintedly of their time and thought in making many valuable criticisms and suggestions.

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PART ONE
THE NATURE AND IMPORT OF
SOCIOLOGY

OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL LIFE IN GENERAL

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Dependence of the Individual. — How dependent is the individual upon others, in spite of the fact that he often assumes that he can do as he pleases. He feels that his will is free to choose his course. So strong is this feeling of self-sufficiency that in moments when it most completely masters him he acts with a total disregard of the facts of his material environment and of the thoughts and feelings of his fellows. If physical material is in his way, he has but to remove it, his success being measured by his power to do so. If his fellows attempt to thwart his plans, he has but to thrust them aside and his purpose is accomplished. This ever present, persistent, self-assertive ego of man is constantly reminding him that he alone is to be consulted about his course of action. He considers, "Shall I do this or shall I do that?" or "I will do this," or "This is the most profitable for me," just as if he had the final settlement of the affairs of life which concern him. Yet the fact is that in the complex social life of our day his actions, — indeed, even his thoughts and feelings, — are influenced in large measure by a social life which surrounds him like an atmosphere. This conquering bent of man's nature, developed through long-continued race habits of conquest over both the material world, the world of savage beasts and of more savage men, deceives man by making him believe at times what is only partly true. It is true to a degree that man can bend things to his will. Human achievement is marked by his ability to do so to a more remarkable degree than any other animal. However, the converse is also true, that no man

really acts independently of the influences of his fellow men.¹ Everywhere there is a social life setting limitations and predominatingly influencing individual action. In government, in religion, in industry, in education, in family association — in everything that builds up modern life, men are coöperating. They work together, combine, and organize for specific purposes, so that no man lives to himself. It is this unity of effort that makes society.

Forms of Social Coöperation. — If an individual considers that he is managing his own business, regardless of others, let him pause to think of the people upon whom he is immediately dependent for the conduct of his business. If he claims to be an independent farmer, still he depends upon the miner, the manufacturer, the merchant, and the transporter, for his implements. He depends upon the coöperation of his fellow citizens for the protection of home and property, for the education of his children, for the building of roads, and the establishment of social order. His household furnishings and his clothing largely come from the toil of others. His whole surplus wealth is dependent upon the consumption of his products by others.

If a man assume that religion, the most sacred of all motives, is his individual affair, still we find him associating with his fellows to build a church for worship and employing a teacher paid by the membership. More than this, he meets with his fellows to worship and subscribes to a creed and ritual not established by himself but by thousands of his predecessors, directly or indirectly, and over which he has little individual control.

If he says, "I will educate myself," he begins by reading books written by others, containing the accumulated knowledge of centuries, or he enters a school supported by the contributions of thousands of his fellow men. The determination, the will, the ego, in this counts for much, but it is hedged in on all sides by the social life.

If a western farmer owes a man in Chicago for goods, he does

¹ Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chaps. I and II.

Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 4, 11.

Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, Chaps. I and II. For a contrary view see Fite, *Individualism*, pp. 3-6, 156-158, 233-235.

not take a back-load of corn or beef, the products of his toil, and walk to Chicago, but he sells his corn and his cattle to others and accepts money made by the combined action of thousands. If he wishes to pay a bill in Chicago, he might board a train made and operated by others, and carry the gold to Chicago, but he accepts the alternative and goes to a bank conducted by the coöperative work of others, buys exchange, and sends his money by an express company or by the postal service, two evidences of social coöperation. So that, turn whichever way he will, the ego finds another superior ego over which he has little personal control. Assuming that he is independent, he goes about doing as others do, thinking what others think, coöperating with them consciously and unconsciously in the work of life, frequently yielding to the will, or obeying the command of a general psychic force called society. He cannot escape it, except by searching in ships made by others for an uninhabited island of the sea, there to spend the remainder of his threescore years and ten, alone, until he perish and his works with him.

Forms of Society. — In considering any material body we recognize it by its physical properties and, if living, by its activities. For example, so familiar are we with the form and life of the tree or the horse that we require no description to separate it from other organisms. Recognition of the social body is more difficult; for while we realize that there is something called "society," it is not easy to determine its characteristic marks or to define its activities. But this is essential before we can have any scientific notion of society. How then shall we recognize society when we see it? Will it be by its form or its function, or both, or is society merely an abstract generic term used to give collective expression to a large number of diverse things which men do in common?

(a) *The Political Life.* — We shall find on examination that the most prominent characteristics of an organized group of people are present in the politically organized body. The institutions of the State afford a typical example of all social institutions. Executive, legislative, and judicial bodies, fulfilling the chief functions of political control, and each representing a large number of individuals, bring together all people within a given territory, uniting them into an interdependent

membership for the purposes of protection, justice, and progress. From township trustee, policeman, and police judge, to senate, chief executive, and chief justice of the supreme bench we find a group of men with well-defined relations, representing and carrying out the will of the people, not the will of any single person. There is a regularity in which they act and a universality of organization which is conclusive evidence that the whole community is united with definite bonds and that its parts are interdependent.

(b) *The Economic Life.* — From the foundation of human society man has coöperated with his fellows in obtaining food, shelter, and material comfort. This process is called the economic life. Perhaps there is no clearer evidence of the co-operative existence of society than in the organized efforts of man to satisfy his material wants. Here are groups of men engaged in agriculture supporting other groups, and in turn being supported by them. Here are giant corporations for the manufacture of material goods; here are great organizations for the transport of goods and men, and other great organizations for trade, commerce, and banking. Attendant upon these and growing out of them, are the labor organizations for the conservation and promotion of the common interests of the groups of wage earners. How helpless is the individual who strives alone, and how increasingly helpless as industrial organization continues to improve! The man out of bread and out of work quickly realizes how important is the organization of industrial life and the dependence of group on group as well as of the individual on the whole.

(c) *Voluntary Associations.* — If we take another view of the collective operations of men, we shall see large numbers forming themselves in *voluntary* associations for specific purposes. These organizations contribute to the general scheme of society and add particular lines of activity. Such are church societies, fraternal orders, benevolent and charitable associations, and social clubs. They bear less distinct relations to the whole mass than do the political groups, and unite only a part of the whole general group. Yet they have special services to perform and represent a large body of people working, thinking, and toiling in concert.

(d) *Educational Association.* — There are educational processes

which have much to do with the well-being and progress of humanity. Our public school system from the primary grade to the university represents another phase of the organic reality of society. This system aims to educate the child, not as a separate, independent individual, but as a member of society. It is supported by all propertied citizens, and in most instances by all who are not paupers. There are private schools of large foundations managed by voluntary associations, whose influences are less universal than the public schools but are essential to the organized community, and these schools bear well-sustained relations to the whole. There are scientific societies whose ultimate purpose is the extension of human welfare, which are, however, great forces as well in social control for social unity. These, and all educational institutions, give form and solidarity to society, help it to consider present needs, and to think and plan for future development.

(e) *Methods of Communication.* — Closely allied to education, political, religious, economic, and the purely social institutions, supporting and strengthening them all, are our various methods of communication: the postal service, the telephone, and the telegraph. These draw individuals closer together and give them convincing proof of their daily and hourly interdependence. No other phases of modern life have so quickened the activities of society and contributed to the oneness of purpose and to the common thinking, feeling, and willing together as these.

(f) *The Family.*¹ — Nor must there be omitted from this category the family life, the center from which flow many impulses of social life. Here is the vital institution for the propagation and perpetuation of the race. Genetically it is the whole social world in epitome evincing some of the elements of control, of industry, of education, of religion, and of benevolence. It has had its historical growth and is bound together by the most exact and rigid rules of social order. It is the most complete and perfectly organized group, the hearth at which are forged the strongest sympathies and the most finely tempered impulses of life. It is the center of the larger brotherhood of humanity.

The Nature of Society. — All these groups are forms or manifestations of society, but are they society itself? They are

¹ See Chap. V, Part II.

various organizations showing us somewhat of the morphology of society, but they are only the body in which society incarnates itself. As biology studies life in all its forms in order to find out what the principle of life is, and to make practical use of that knowledge, as the science of religion studies the manifestations of religion in every rite and ceremony, every creed, every trace of devotional or controversial literature among all the peoples of the earth, so sociology in order to understand society, studies that spirit which manifests itself in political, economic, religious, educational, cultural, and domestic organization; in public and private corporations, in customs and costumes, in imitations and oppositions, — briefly, in all the multitudinous ways in which men and women living in social relations manifest their social attitudes.¹ Society therefore may be said to be humanity, or any certain part of it, in its social relations. If men have certain definite economic relations with each other, we call them an industrial or economic society. If their relations are political in nature, we call the group a political society. If the motives of their relations are religious, we call the group a religious society. Or, if we think of the extension of relationship to all men, we call it a world society. *Society then may be defined as any group of sentient beings who are more or less alike, who recognize more or less clearly that fact, and who have recognized common interests in their social relationships.*²

So there is society and there are societies. The two terms belong to different categories. The one is a general term, the other a special. The one denotes the most general aspects of all kinds of societies, the necessary attributes of any society, the other suggests that there are various organizations belonging to this genus society which differ from each other in certain particulars. For example, the term "society" denotes all

¹ Cf. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, pp. 7-9. For a more complete discussion see the same author, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 9-15. Professor Ellwood has well emphasized the *mental interrelation* which produces a society, but he seems to be uncertain in both these books as to whether society is "association" or a group of individuals associating for certain reasons of mutual interdependence. It seems clear to the present writer that it is impossible to substitute the term "association" for "society," as against both Professor Small and Professor Ellwood. The term "association" describes the action of a society, but a society is certainly a group of beings — who are associating. Two things are necessary, — sentient beings and association.

² Cf. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 9.

kinds of groups which are based on any kind of social interests; the other term, "societies," at once implies that an adjective is needed to convey to the mind a definite idea of what is meant. The same difference is suggested by the contrast between the term "society" and "a society." The term "society" therefore connotes in the most general way men in any kind of associative relations.

Types of Societies. — Societies may be classified in various ways. Basing them upon their most significant characteristics, the psycho-social, Giddings has suggested eight different kinds of human societies. The following is an epitome of these eight types, with an indication of the social bonds which create them, and with concrete examples of each type :

1. Broadest groupings — animal and human.
2. Human societies.
 - (a) Ethnic — based on *kinship*.
 - (b) Civil — based on *propinquity*.
3. Groupings more instructive for the sociologist.
 - (a) Instinctive.
 - (b) Rational.

These two general types combined in varying degrees give us the following classification :

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| SPONTANEOUS
OR
NATURAL | } | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Sympathetic</i> — blood relatives, <i>e.g.</i>, the clan of an ethnic tribe. 2. <i>Congenial</i> — like spirits, <i>e.g.</i>, Pilgrim Fathers, Latter-Day Saints, Amana Society. 3. <i>Approbational</i> — lawless elements drawn together by economic opportunity, <i>e.g.</i>, frontier mining camps. A general approbation of qualities and conduct practically the only social bond. |
| MORE OR
LESS ARTI-
FICIAL RE-
SULT OF
THOUGHT
ABOUT
SOCIAL
ORDER | } | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. <i>Despotic</i> — combination of elements of unequal strength. <i>Social bonds</i>, despotic power and servile, fear-inspired obedience, <i>e.g.</i>, Norman England immediately following Conquest, or the South in early Reconstruction days. 5. <i>Authoritative</i> — despotic power long enough established to be identified with tradition and religion. <i>Social bond</i>, reverence for authority. <i>Examples</i>: England of the Tudor and Early Stuart periods; France of Louis XIV; Russia from days of Peter the Great up to a recent period. |

MORE OR
LESS ARTI-
FICIAL RE-
SULT OF
THOUGHT
ABOUT
SOCIAL
ORDER

6. *Conspiratorial* — results of the disintegration of a preëxisting social order. Adventurers become the leaders by means of bribery, patronage, and special privileges. *Social bond*, intrigue and conspiracy. *Examples*: Italy of the time of Dante; France of the Reign of Terror (to a less degree).
7. *Contractual* — result of perception of the utility of association, leading to the conscious betterment of the general welfare. *Social bond*, a covenant or contract. *Examples*: League of the Iroquois; Achæan League of Greece; American Confederation; Federal Union; Confederate States of America; Australian Commonwealth; Dominion of Canada.
8. *Idealistic* — result of a population collectively responding to great ideals and thus forming a society. *Social bonds*, mutual understanding, confidence, fidelity, and unselfish spirit of social service. *Examples*: U. S. of America (to a degree); some of our states; the Sylvania Association; the Theosophical Society at Point Loma, California.

Complexity of the Social Order. — Is it possible in this complexity of the social order to discover any constant social forces working for the building of the social structure? Can we formulate general laws which operate for the control of society? It is the study of this complex social order that constitutes the chief aim of the science of society. There are social phenomena more or less frequently recurring, and movements more or less regular which admit of study and classification. There must be some order in this process of society building. It could not all be referred to accident. Through it all runs a constant purpose, a social trend. There are laws controlling the movement of human society; there are forces in continual action impelling it forward in well-defined lines; there is a mass of phenomena which can be reduced to classification.

Need of Scientific Study. — Common as are the facts of society which we observe about us, the knowledge of their real natures and their reduction to system and order are difficult tasks. If there are forces at work, the laws controlling and limiting their action are not readily discovered. But there

are many reasons why it is essential to human welfare that a systematic study of society be encouraged. First, because the social life of man has been less carefully studied than other natural phenomena. It represents the class of phenomena last to be considered. Again, there is nothing which concerns human welfare more than the study of man in his social relations. The scientific and practical mastery of the lower forms of nature is in comparison far more advanced. We know much concerning the external world and its adaptation to our service. We have learned to adjust ourselves to the conditions of our physical environment whenever it is impossible to change the environment. But scientific knowledge of how men have learned to live together in harmony, each seeking his own interest, is very difficult to acquire. The art of social life is the most difficult of all arts to master and to comprehend. Witness the long lists of wars of tribes, nations, and races, caused by not knowing how to settle their social differences properly and justly! Consider the long struggle of man with his fellows for survival, a struggle continued in the competitive business world where it is a struggle, not so much for existence as for wealth. Observe the other numerous attempts that have been made in the world for a better system of justice. All these examples testify to the difficulties of social adjustment.

Formulation of a Science of Society. — Yet when we attempt to bring system into our knowledge of human society, we find that it is difficult to collect sufficient data to furnish the groundwork of science. There is not a sufficient number of generalizations proven to be universally true upon which might be established readily a well-defined body of principles of sociology. The laws that control society and the forces that operate it are not sufficiently understood to make the science of sociology easily determined or quickly mastered. Yet it is the task of sociology to compass within well-defined bounds a mass of social knowledge, to classify it, showing its order and logical sequence, to discover the forces that generate and move society and to determine and define the laws that control it. Its duty as a science is not done if it fails to point out the extent and manner in which society can be forced into certain lines of development or progress by the combined choice and action of mankind.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Compare Cooley's and Fite's contentions and state whether you can find any common ground.
2. Analyze the respective parts played by your individuality and by the various social influences around you in your determination to get an education.
3. Name all the characteristics which the following groups have in common: The state in which you live; a bank; a college; a sewing society; a dancing party; a political party; a church; a lodge; a railway company.
4. Discuss the following definitions of society: "The word society is used scientifically to designate the reciprocal relations between individuals." — ELLWOOD, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, p. 7.
 "The concept here outlined is that of society as a continuing adaptation, with instinctive and other physiological, subconscious processes at its beginning, and a self-conscious and self-determining mind, a group mind in the only real sense of the term, at its apex." — DAVIS, *Psychological Interpretations*, p. 79.
5. Criticize Giddings's classification of societies given in his *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, in the light of his exposition of the stages in the evolution of society in his *Elements*, pp. 231-330.
6. Classify according to Giddings's scheme the following groups: The James gang of outlaws; the German Confederation; Japan of to-day; the Christian Science Church; the Amana communistic society; a national bank; England of to-day.

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology Defined. — Definitions of sociology are many. While it would be hardly correct to say that there are as many as there are sociologists, it is safe to say that they are as numerous as the various points of view of the respective groups of sociologists.

Generally, sociologists, instead of giving a formal definition of sociology, have entered into an extended discussion of its nature. Some, however, have used a colorless definition like "Sociology is the science of society,"¹ or "the scientific study of society,"² or "the science of social phenomena."³ Others, using more words, add but little, as for example, "Sociology is the name applied to a somewhat inchoate mass of materials which embodies our knowledge about society."⁴ Other definitions somewhat more definite, yet unsatisfactory in many ways, are, "the science of social process"⁵ and "the science of social relation."⁶ Better than these are, "Sociology is the study of men considered as affecting and as affected by association,"⁷ or, "the study of human association, including whatever conduces to it or modifies it."⁸ Of the formal definitions that have been given by scientific men, none is more comprehensive than that of Professor Giddings, which follows: "Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure, and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, and psychical causes working together in a process of evolution."⁹ While it

¹ Ward, *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1902, p. 113.

² Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 9.

³ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 6.

⁴ Fairbanks, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 1.

⁵ Small, *General Sociology*, p. 35.

⁶ Wright, *Practical Sociology*, p. 1.

⁷ Small, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁸ Dealey and Ward, *Text Book of Sociology*, p. 2.

⁹ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 8.

is difficult to give a brief comprehensive definition of sociology that will prove entirely satisfactory through all of the changes of a developing science, Professor Giddings's definition is of great service to one who wishes a clear understanding and a precise view of the nature and purposes of the science. An adequate knowledge of the true nature and import of sociology, however, may be better obtained by a careful consideration of the underlying principles of the science, than by an attempt to follow any carefully formulated definition. *Sociology treats of the phenomena of society arising from the association of mankind.* It includes a body of classified knowledge relating to society and a number of principles and laws. It investigates causes and effects, discovers social forces, and formulates laws of control, or rules of action.

Sociology Treats of the Origin of Society. — It is possible to have a science of society without going back to its origin, yet there are certain advantages in studying, as far as we may, society in its primitive state. This is the rule in all scientific investigations, that complex forms are traced to simpler ones in order to discover laws and principles. Society to-day is so complex that the laws applying to it are high generalizations not easily discovered, while the simple movements of society in its earlier forms reveal the cause and effect of social action.

Just as the botanist includes in the description of a plant the nature of its development from the seed and traces the law of growth from the beginning, so the sociologist follows the growth of society from its primitive conditions. Biology's great advances began with Darwin's *Origin of Species*, a work characterized by the use of what has come to be known as the "genetic method," that is, the study of biological origins. So, sociology is given a sound basis by the study of the primitive social institutions and processes. Many present-day social institutions and processes cannot be understood without a knowledge of those ancient ones from which they have developed. Therefore sociology begins with a study of social origins.

Sociology Treats of the Growth of Society. — Beginning with a simple association, society has expanded or developed into a highly complex organization. Its growth is recognized by the addition of new forms and new functions and increased energy; by the greater systemization of its parts and the greater precision of its recurring actions. To show the gradual unfolding of

society, or as it is usually termed, "the building of society," how it developed from primitive forms to the forms found in highly civilized societies, is one of the tasks of sociology. By some this process has been called "social evolution." In the beginning of social life society was homogeneous. It had not become highly differentiated into groups with specialized functions and complex institutions. As time went on groups of individuals became interdependent. The parts of the whole mass became segregated and a specific function or service was given to each part. These parts gradually became more closely related and interdependent. From a state of simplicity, society grew more complex; it became heterogeneous. At first a mass or horde of people driven about by the influence of circumstances, following each other through imitation or led by their own indefinite desires, gradually took up new activities which were performed by separate individuals. This multiplication of services and duties in time brought about a high state of social complexity.

Social Activities. — But while historic development is of much value as a groundwork of sociology, giving the student a broad conception of society as well as instructing him in the elemental points of social order, nevertheless, the real work of the science is with the forms and activities of a completed society. By a completed society we understand one that has all the ordinary activities and organization necessary to make an independent social body. What men are doing in concert or in groups concerns the student more than how they began to work together, so that the social activities present the formal basis of the science. The operations of the various departments of government, the work of educational institutions, of the church, of social and philanthropic groups, as well as the organized industrial groups, must come under the close scrutiny of the student.

Social Forms. — It is quite impossible, however, to treat of social activities without treating specifically of the structure of society. In all development of social groups the function or the action always precedes the formal organization. The United States Senate, for example, if considered as to its structure, would be treated as an organization composed of a group of individuals chosen in a specific way for a definite purpose. These individuals meeting together complete their own organiza-

tion by choosing various officers. Thus far we have nothing but the *structure* of a group in society. If we consider what the senate does, its various duties, services, and privileges, as a representative body, we shall have the sociological *function* of an organic group of society. If we were to consider in detail each separate act of the senate, we should have its *history*. In this case we should be outside of the field of sociology.

Organic Conception of Society.—The early writers on sociology used many terms borrowed from physics and biology. It was observed that society represented various interrelated parts more or less dependent upon one another. Men saw that the social groups in their activity resembled to a certain extent the activities of the individual. Hence it happened that out of these analogies the new science received its principal terms of expression. As every new branch of knowledge must have an independent terminology, or else be expressed in the terms of other sciences, the writer of a new science must either coin new words, or put new meaning into old words. In the early history of sociology those sociologists who attempted to put new meaning into old words succeeded better in making a clear exposition of their science than those who attempted to coin a new terminology.¹

They saw first that there was an analogy between the organic structure of a biological body and the structure of society. As a result they wrote about the *social organism*, but the analogies were carried so far by some writers that they assumed identity of structure between the physical and social bodies.² This led to a revolt against what is known as "biological sociology." In this case, as in many others, the critics were as far away from a judicially balanced statement as were those criticized for their extreme assumptions. There is a social organism, having some analogies to the physical organism, but when we use the word "organism" in its application to society, it has a

¹ If possible, one should read Spencer's essay on "The Social Organism," in *Essays*, edition of 1891, and Lester F. Ward's criticism in his *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 49-63. Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 3; Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 420.

² See Schaeffle, *Bau und Leben des sozialen Koerpers*, *passim*; Lilienfeld, *Zur Vertheidigung des organischen Methods in der Sociologie* (1898). This conception is also at the basis of the social theories of Novicow and his French colleagues in L'Institut internationale de Sociologie.

somewhat different meaning than when applied to a physical body. With that understanding and in the absence of terms of wide acceptance among sociologists, it is sometimes helpful to use physical and biological terms to express the principles of a new science of society.

Comparison of the Biological with the Social Organism. — The tree has its roots, trunk, bark, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit. Each one of these parts is dependent upon the others for its existence. The activities of this physical organism are closely related. They are made up of groups of physical and chemical actions. The social organism is made up of groups of individuals more or less dependent for their existence upon one another. They perform certain reciprocal services which are essential to their respective existences. The analogy might be carried out much farther to show that the bioplast in the cell of the tree is living an independent individual existence similar to the individual in the social group. It might be shown that one group of bioplasts were building leaves, while another were making roots, and another the bark of the tree. So it might be shown that these correspond to groups of individuals, some working in one department of social life and some in another. But such extended comparisons generally lead to misconceptions. The characteristic work of the social organism is a psychical element which is lacking in the biological cell. The predominance of conscious effort in human society forever destroys the idea of making sociology merely a part of biological science. With this understanding of the phrase there is no harm, therefore, in using the term "social organism." It is not necessary to think of the tree or the human body, or any other organic structure, but to think of a social organism different from all of these. The only requisite is to assume that society is made up of interdependent individuals and groups more or less closely connected with one another. The psychic element in the social body makes it something more than an individual organism — it makes it an organization. Moreover, each individual and component group of society has its own life purpose to subserve, while the biological cell seems to live and function only for the organism of which it is a part.

Sociology Treats of the Forces which Tend to Organize and Perpetuate Society. — Wherever there is action or motion there

must be some force impelling or causing it. Part of the work of sociology, then, certainly is a consideration of the forces which are in operation in human society. What causes mankind to associate in groups? What forces brought about the establishment of the family and the perpetuation of the family life? What are the forces that give rise to the religious group and cause people to build churches and carry on religious association? What forces cause people to come together in large cities, to organize in industrial groups, to build a state or a nation, and to develop a government? In short, what are the forces that are working to create and perpetuate the social organization? These are questions that must be answered by the sociologist. One of the primary purposes of sociology is to discover these forces and to trace their operations.¹

Sociology Treats of the Laws Controlling Social Activities. — The forces referred to are not irregular and intermittent, or there could be no permanent organic development of society. There must be a regular order in their activity and certain laws and rules of action controlling them. If, for instance, it be considered that men are struggling to obtain wealth for the purpose of improving their material condition, we have in this struggle a positive social force. If we search for any regulating law, we shall discover among others that man seeks to obtain the largest possible return for the least sacrifice. Likewise, we shall find that everywhere there are forces impelling society forward, and with a description of these forces must go certain laws, describing how these forces operate. One of the specific services of sociology is to discover these laws and to formulate them.

Psychic Factors in Social Organization. — While many activities tend to create and perpetuate society, none are more prominent than the psychic forces. There are influences of physical

¹ Professor Hayes contends that the "social forces" concept is an error. See *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XVI, p. 613 (March, 1911).

Ward looked upon social forces as social causations. His conception of a social force, therefore, was a cause which influenced the origin, development, or activity, of society. So far as it goes, this conception was a valuable one and cannot be explained as an error. However, it would have been better had he used the term "socializing forces," as this concept conforms to what he actually described. The force which is social in its origin arises from the *fact of association*. It is social energy. It is an increment of power arising from two or more persons working together harmoniously above that which they would accomplish working separately. It is increased utilization of energy caused by group activity.

nature that compel men to coöperate and combine. There are certain physical characteristics of individuals that cause their association. But the individual characteristics which arise from the psychical nature of the associational process are among the chief causes of the creation of human society. All society represents the "feeling, thinking, and willing together" of people, and these elements are the most constant and permanent found in society. While the study of biology may come to the support of sociology in very many ways, social psychology is more than an analogy—it is a distinct branch of the science. After all, the strongest currents that draw society together when followed to their origin are psychical.

Sociology is Both Dynamic and Static.—These terms are borrowed from mechanics and in a measure have the same meaning in sociology as in mechanics. However, the meaning of these terms in sociology is modified to suit the requirements of a science dealing with human beings with will power as against a science dealing with inanimate matter. Dynamic sociology refers in general to development or progress while static refers to relationship. We should have the basis of the latter if we were to take an instantaneous view of all society with its various co-relationships in regard to structure or activity. If now we could consider society moving forward and its various relationships changing at each successive stage, we should have the dynamic conception. In the static conception the comparison of relationships might be referred to some ideal standard which would lead us to an ethical basis of society. Some writers, carrying over into sociology the terminology of physics, have introduced the terms "social kinetics" and "social statics" as subdivisions of social dynamics.¹ This terminology, however, as in the use of biological terms in sociology, is helpful only if clearly recognized as borrowed and not as exactly fitting social phenomena unless the terms are redefined. At the most they only serve to call attention to two different ways of looking at social phenomena. For, if we consider society at all, it is always developing or changing. Only for an instant do relationships continue until they are suddenly changed into new relationships by the process of social development. This constant changing

¹ For an incisive criticism of the general use of the terms "social statics" and "social dynamics" see Giddings, *Principles of Sociology* (1900), pp. 56-60.

of society enables us to establish general laws of social order, but not to determine a permanent status of society. Therefore, social statics would give us a picture of society at consecutive stages of its development, but considered together, this series of snap shots would be a moving picture of social development, that is, of social dynamics.¹ Therefore it seems better to speak of social dynamics, and then subdivide it into social statics and social kinetics, the former dealing with social movements which are not changing in rate or direction, and the latter with those which change in rate or direction or both.

The Cosmic and the Ethical Processes of Society. — Man is a part of the universe, and its laws also bear upon and move him. He is influenced by physical and mechanical as well as by vital forces. Certain writers have attempted to subject him entirely to the operation of natural law, giving him no position of independent activity. They have treated him as a particle of the universe being moved here and there by the various forces of nature and of his own being. This doctrine came as a reaction against the extreme theory of the freedom of the will and as the result of the study of natural evolution. Here, as elsewhere, the middle ground is safer and nearer the truth than either extreme, for while it is recognized that man is controlled by circumstances, his will operates with much power within certain limits.

The struggle for existence in the early history of mankind gives unmistakable evidence of man's common lot with other living organisms. As such, on the one hand, he was dependent for survival upon physical surroundings and, on the other, upon his own effort. At first this struggle was common with the beasts of the field. It was a wolfish struggle for life in which egoism

¹ For a statement quite similar, yet differing in some details, see Ward, *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 167-178. For a more complete statement of his position see Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chaps. VI, X, and XI. Cf. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 22-27. For a similar conception in Economics, in addition to citations by Ward, see Clark, *Essentials of Economic Theory*, pp. 128-132, and Chap. XII.

Every careful student of sociology will wish to compare these modern conceptions of the static and dynamic in sociology with those of Comte, who not only was the first to use the term "sociology," but first introduced the terms "social statics" and "social dynamics." See Comte, *Positive Philosophy* (Martineau), Bk. VI, Chaps. V and VI.

was the predominating characteristic. Then, faintly at the beginning were felt the first stirrings of altruism, which grew stronger, until now altruistic practices constitute a remarkable feature of modern society.¹

The Shifting of the Struggle from a Physical to a Psychological Basis. — Meanwhile, as the altruistic principles became ascendant, the competition between individuals of the same species became less severe, and changed from the physical to the intellectual. At first this change was shown by the individual directing his energy to some line of pursuit for the purpose of accumulating wealth instead of trying to insure survival by destroying real or supposed enemies. Each in the attempt to satisfy his desires learned to respect the rights of others. Subsequently, men learned to cooperate with one another in defense and in the pursuit of wealth. Gradually the altruistic principle became more important and each tended to seek the well-being of the group as well as his own safety, believing that his final success depended upon it.

The Survival of the Best. — Through the development of altruistic sentiments and the extension of the cooperative practices of mankind, the old struggle became modified and the survival of the fittest biologically gradually tended to become the survival of the best socially. The adaptability of the individual to his physical environment was followed by adaptability to his fellow men. Those who cooperated survived and those who failed to cooperate perished. One can scarcely estimate the importance of this social fact in the development of the human race. So it came about that those who were most interested in their fellow men became known as the best, or, in other words, the best included not only the physically and mentally strong, but those of the largest cooperative power and adaptability to social life. In this process of cooperative protection the virtuous as well as the vigorous survived. It is really nothing more than an extension of the idea of the survival of the fittest to social environment, that is, to associated human conduct, when once social relationships were established and survival became dependent not only upon fitting into the physical environment, but also fitting into a social life in such a way as made cooperation possible. Then the

¹ For a classic exposition of the change see Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, Chaps. VI, VII.

fit was he who could control his impulses in the interests of group coöperation for purposes of survival.¹

The Telic Process of Society. — As individuals become more unified in sentiment, thought, and action there is developed what is known as social consciousness, whereby society recognizes its own collective power. In its endeavor to use this for the benefit of all its members the society or group exercises its telic capacities. In other words, the attempt to force society through certain channels, to cause it to perform certain acts for the general well-being of the social body is a recognition of the conscious effort of society to change or reform itself. To a large extent society has been created by the effort of each individual to follow his own personal desires as they related to himself and his fellows, regardless of any attempt to build the structure of society. However, through the influence of social consciousness there is a realization of social ideals and social aims, as well as social defects, and there arises an attempt to remove the defects and attain to social well-being.

The Scientific Nature of Sociology. — The foregoing statements represent partially and in brief the complex material with which the science of society must deal. It must consider social facts of all kinds and arrange and classify these facts and deduce therefrom universal principles or laws relating to the growth and activity of human society. The difficulty in bringing such diverse groups of phenomena into logical order and giving a scientific basis to this order is not easily overcome. Sociology is the most difficult of all the social sciences. It deals with material which has existed from the beginnings of human association, but proposes to establish the most general fundamental truths concerning its existence. Sociology to-day represents the results of studies of different scientists sometimes along parallel lines, in other instances along converging lines and in still others, along trajectories which have crossed. Each science views society from a different standpoint, and sociology will not become a compact, well-defined science until sociologists are able to generalize the truths discovered by those approaching social phenomena from various points of view and to agree more or less closely upon the subject matter and the method of treatment.

¹ For the clearest exposition of this point see Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*, pp. 1-9.

The Place of Sociology among the Social Sciences. — This point involves the real nature and scope of sociology. It is one that has caused a vast deal of discussion among writers on sociology and one which, to a certain extent, is still unsettled. There is one group of writers who hold that sociology is a synthesis of all the social sciences, that the science is fabricated by running a thread through all the sciences and stringing them together in one mass. Others a little more discriminating hold that it is a synthesis or rather an amalgamation of the results of other social sciences. Herbert Spencer used the term "sociology" as a generic term to include all the other social sciences. From a scientific standpoint such a usage might be of value in showing that all are branches of one great science called "sociology" just as Spencer included the group of all natural sciences relating to life under the term "biology."

But the present writers hold that sociology is one of several coördinating social sciences, the most recent of the group, created for a special purpose and standing on an independent basis, and that while economics, political science, or ethics may deal with specific laws relating to parts of society, sociology deals with the general laws which apply to the whole structure.¹

The Differentiation of the Social Sciences. — Let us suppose that there are numerous phenomena of human society which continually increase with the development of social order. Society may go on developing from century to century without any scientific attempt to make an orderly arrangement of these phenomena. But gradually in the progress of knowledge scholars begin to realize that there are facts that constantly recur in the social process, for instance, those relating to the moral conduct of the individual. As a result there is developed the science of ethics. The classification of these phenomena and deduction of general laws and principles make this chronologically the first of the social sciences. Again, some observe that there are other groups of facts relating to government, and that there are certain principles involved in the development of social control. These facts are collected, classified, the principles established, and the science of government is brought forth. But there are other social phenomena unclassified and other purposes unsatisfied. The processes of obtaining and distribut-

¹ Cf. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 29-35.


ing wealth as independent activities may not be involved in either ethics or politics. And so a new science called political economy is created. These various sciences continue to expand in their natural order but there still exist, outside their legitimate boundaries, other social phenomena unclassified and other scientific purposes still unsatisfied. No one yet has shown the universal forces at work in the growth, development, and structure of society as a whole. The laws of social being have not yet been set forth. Political, religious, ethical, and economic life have been presented from specific standpoints, but the general laws of society, the regularities to be found in man's thoughts, feelings, and purposes when engaged in any of his social relationships, whether they be economic, political, ethical, or religious, have not been developed. Here, then, is the opportunity for a new science called sociology. It refuses to be included in any of the other social sciences, and the other social sciences refuse to be grouped under it or to be absorbed or assimilated by it. From scientific and pedagogical considerations it stands alone. It has a definite purpose and a specific body of classified knowledge, as well as a body of laws and principles of its own.¹

Characteristic Mark of Sociology. — Much of the confusion concerning this science has arisen from books whose writers fail to acknowledge that science has a subjective as well as an objective boundary. It is the aim of a science, the course of reasoning and the end to be sought as much as the phenomena with which it deals that give it its distinctive mark as a science. For instance, botany and chemistry may be dealing with the same material in a certain sense, but with entirely different aims. However, added to this is the fact that in the scientific sense the "material" with which each deals is quite distinct. The chemist is dealing chiefly, though not wholly, with inorganic matter and is interested primarily in molecules and atoms of different kinds and their relations to each other. The botanist, on the other hand, is interested in molecules and atoms only incidentally. He is studying organic matter primarily and is concerned with cells and the forms into which they build themselves. Both are studying matter, but quite different aspects

¹ See Stuckenburger, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, pp. 75-77, or Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, pp. 71-87.

thereof, and in widely varied relations. So with sociology, ethics, economics, politics, and history; while they all deal with the same thing in a broad sense, viz., human society, each is interested in a different aspect of social relationships. In the history of the natural sciences biology was the latest to develop. It is a general science, in the sense that it deals with facts and principles which underlie all the special sciences concerned with various forms of life, such as botany, zoölogy, anthropology, etc. While biology rests on all these special biological sciences in the sense that they provide facts and principles upon which larger generalizations can be made, yet its field is not precisely that of any of these special sciences. It deals with fundamentals common to them all. So with sociology. While economics, politics, history, anthropology, and all the rest deal with particular aspects of human association, sociology is the science which investigates the regularities of human association in all its varied aspects. The special social sciences take as presuppositions the general aspects which are the objects of sociology. Take, for instance, the trust and consider all the facts and phenomena of society that arise out of it. If we consider it from an economic standpoint, we shall be determining how the trust increases the development of wealth, its effect on wages or on general distribution of products, and many other economic questions. It is evident that we are working within the province of economics. If we consider the moral conduct of the individual interested in the trust, and its general effects on the morals of the community, we shall be studying ethics. If, however, we consider what legislation may be brought to control or regulate the trust, we shall be in the realm of political science. If, finally, we consider trust-phenomena in relation to their effects on the homes and migrations of people, the dispersion and concentration of social groups, in fact, the general effect on the social standard, we shall be in the realm of sociology. So we shall find, so far as the material field of operation is concerned, that all sciences cross each other more or less, and we must not forget that in reality there is but one science, — the science of the universe, — and that the division of this science into groups and individual branches is merely a matter of convenience and pedagogical relationships. Let, for instance in Figure I, — which is merely illustrative, not exhaustive, — the rectangle *A*, *B*, *C*, *D* represent all pos-

sible social phenomena, that of *E, F, G, H* all the phenomena of the science of ethics, *M, N, O, P* that of economics, *X, Y, Z, W* that of political science, *S, V, T, L* that of history, and *I, J, R, K* that of sociology, and they will have a tendency to overlap each other somewhat similarly to the arrangement represented in that figure. But the sciences themselves do not overlap for the reasons stated above.



Groups of Social Sciences.—The following schedule will represent a simple classification of the social sciences from a pedagogical standpoint. Only the principal subheads are given under each main group :

I. Ethics.

Principles of Ethics.

History of Ethics.

Social Ethics.

- II. Economics.
 - Economic Theory and Institutions.
 - Economic Politics.
 - Industrial History.
 - Labor Legislation.
 - Banking and Monetary Theory.
 - Taxation and Finance.
- III. Politics.
 - Political Theory.
 - Diplomacy and International Law.
 - National Administration.
 - Municipal Administration.
 - Constitutional Law.
 - Colonial Administration.
- IV. History.
 - Political History.
 - History of Institutions.
 - Social History.
 - Historical Geography.
- V. Sociology.
 - Descriptive Sociology.
 - Social Origins.
 - Social Evolution.
 - Social Pathology.
 - Socialization and Social Control.
 - Social Psychology.
 - History of Sociology.
- VI. Anthropology.
 - General Anthropology.
 - Ethnology.
 - Ethnography.
 - Somatology.
 - Archeology.
- VII. Comparative Religion.

This list of social sciences might be extended considerably, but for pedagogic reasons this classification is sufficient to show the relative position of each. It would seem absurd to attempt to combine all these into one and to make a synthesis of the group or to build up a science on the results of the group. This would be to assume that everything that related to social life should be classified within one science. It would be like attempting to classify everything that relates to inorganic bodies in one science

and classifying everything that relates to life in another. Nor will it answer to substitute in the place of the heading "Social Sciences" the term "Sociology," for this would necessarily eliminate number V from the category and leave a great gap in the scientific arrangement of social knowledge.

The Pedagogic Limits of Sociology. — For pedagogic reasons, if for no other, sociology should have a definite boundary. It should not attempt to displace or absorb either political economy, ethics, political science, or any other well-established social science. It should not attempt to be merely a generic term including them all in a group, nor indeed is it a science built up of the parts of the several social sciences. Much less is it a classification or coördination of the results of the independent social sciences. It is an independent science having a separate existence and its own methods of investigation. Nevertheless it does obtain data from economics, politics, and other social sciences. So, too, does it obtain material from biology and psychology, and yet no one would think of including these within the scope of sociology.

Sociology therefore occupies a very important place in the group of social sciences. As already stated, it occupies much the same position with reference to the social sciences that biology holds to the natural sciences dealing with organic phenomena. As Ward has well said, because of its general nature, "Sociology is a sort of a head to which the other social sciences are attached as a body and limbs." Therefore, its relation to other social sciences in the university curriculum must be very close.

The Relation of Sociology to Psychology and to Biology. — Biology studies the completed individual unit and seldom goes beyond this. Its object is to show the origin and development of life in all of its various forms, and in its study it pursues the history of the individual from the first protoplasmic germ to the completed organism. On the other hand, psychology deals with the mental powers and habits of the individual. Its whole aim is to discover normal and abnormal action of the mind. These two sciences dealing alone with the individual have completed the range of their scientific investigation when they have discovered and classified all the phenomena concerning the individual; the one, those manifested by him as a living being, the other, those manifested by him as a being who thinks, feels, and

wills. It is true that biology incidentally touches upon some phases of social life influenced by biological conditions, and also that psychology branches out occasionally into social psychology for the purpose of interpreting individual characteristics. But in neither case is there any aim or purpose to present systematically the phenomena of social life. On the other hand, sociology has to do with the association of the bio-psychical units. It does not inquire into the growth of the individual man, either as to his origin, structure, or evolution, but deals with the phenomena arising from his association with his fellows.

The Relation of Sociology to Political Economy. — Prior to the development of modern sociology, even before Spencer had written his monumental work and Ward had published his *Dynamic Sociology*, there was a tendency for political economy to expand from the old narrow bounds as laid down by Adam Smith, Ricardo, and others. This tendency grew with the expansion of industrial life until economics was reaching out to grasp a large group of phenomena which might be treated either from the economic or the purely social standpoint. The historical school of political economy brought into economic life many of the details of human society which are rather the effects of competitive economic processes on social well-being, than fundamental principles of economics. Indeed, some went so far as to weave into their economic writings much of ethics and politics, and also some characteristics of social life other than the purely economic. But as sociology developed rapidly and covered its own particular field, economics withdrew to its own natural boundaries. Political economy deals with the social phenomena that arise from the production and distribution of wealth. In a general way it may be said that wealth is its central problem, and only the social phenomena that are closely grouped about it may be considered as economic. It is true that economic relations are social relations, but the processes of economics are different from those of sociology. Yet sociology may use for its purpose certain conclusions of political economy, just as it may use the laws and principles discovered in any other scientific field which have social bearings, as data for broader generalizations.

The chief differences between sociology and political economy, then, are to be found in the fact that political economy works in a

specific, while sociology works in a general social field. Political economy has to do with the wealth phase of social life, both as it existed in the past and as it exists to-day, while sociology searches for the general laws controlling the entire structure and activity of society. Thus, their boundaries are clearly defined, their purposes are widely different, and their material fields of operation are separate except for certain overlappings, where they deal with the same social phenomena, but always look at them from a different angle.

The Relation of Sociology to Political Science. — Political science generally purports to be, as its name indicates, — the science of government, — which would include the classification and study of the methods of local, state, and national governments or, in America especially, the interpretation of government and methods of administration. The theory of politics, the development of the state, and state craft are subjects for its consideration. While political science is seeking to set forth the principles of government, sociology, on the one hand, is seeking for the universal elements of social activity to be found in political development, as in economic development, and, on the other hand, is studying the effects of those principles on society. Here, as elsewhere, sociology uses as data the product of another social science. There may be times when it is difficult to draw a line dividing the field work of the two sciences, although the respective aims of these sciences and the social facts studied in each case are clearly distinguished from each other. The history of the development of constitutions and systems of administration, while it records the progress of humanity in a given direction, is not strictly sociological, but it supplies raw material for sociology in that like every other special social science it furnishes a basis for generalization as to the way in which society as a whole originates and develops.

The Relation of Sociology to History. — History deals with the details of evidence, while sociology deals with general laws and principles. History would be interested in the narration of the various facts attendant upon the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, but after giving a full and complete description of every movement its service would be finished; on the other hand, sociology cares nothing about all of these details except as they lead to some general truths relating to the origin or progress of

society. However, certain treatments of history have approached nearer to the realm of pure sociology. Thus, for instance, recent philosophy of history, represented by Barth's writings in contrast with Hegel's, deals with the social causes and effects of nation building and furnishes general concepts concerning the development of single groups of known societies. A good deal that has been written under the title of sociology is nothing more than the philosophy of history interpreted in social and economic terms and frequently the philosophy of history has so broadened its scope as to be a social philosophy.¹ But the philosophy of society proceeds deductively while sociology works inductively. From this statement it must not be inferred that history does not deal with social facts. Among many historical writers this phase of history has been much neglected, but history is broadening its scope and is becoming more serviceable as a means of culture.² However, in its broadest aspect it fails to include the whole range of social phenomena. Facts about society do not, in themselves, make a social science.

The Relation of Sociology to Anthropology. — Anthropology in its broadest sense is the science of man, — physical, intellectual, and social. There is a sociological aspect to some parts of anthropology; for example, that which refers to sociological characteristics and to the natural habitat of man. But anthropology in its limited view should really only include the natural history of mankind. It does not include such sciences as biology, psychology, sociology, political science, or economics. Its chief purpose is to view man as an animal possessed of mental and physical characteristics, and in his normal habitat in comparison with other animals. Its purpose is somewhat different from that of any other social science, but it very nearly approaches sociology in the fields of social origins, social population, and certain fields of social reform, like criminology, and this gives it a position among the social sciences. If it were purely biological, as is one branch of it, somatology, treating of physical structure, — of anatomy and physiology, — it would be purely a branch of zoölogy. A large portion of this work must be given up to the description of the social life of primitive

¹ Cf. Paul Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*.

² See James Harvey Robinson's essay on *History*. Columbia University Press, 1908.

people in order to represent man in his true characteristics, individual and social. There are many divisions of the subject of anthropology, such as somatology, or the determination of physical characteristics, anthropometry, which relates to the system of measurement of mankind; ethnology, which treats of racial characteristics; and ethnography, which concerns itself with the origin, subdivision, and distribution of races over the earth's surface. But not one or all of these combined could be substituted for sociology. Here, again, is a special social science which supplies data for the general social science, sociology. The data furnished by anthropology are the bricks from which is constructed in part the temple of sociology.

Herbert Spencer, in his *Principles of Sociology*, and Letourneau in his *Sociology*, have dealt more with phases of anthropology in many instances than with pure sociology; they show the ethnic basis of society. Spencer's *Principles*, as presented in the first two volumes, would represent rather a preliminary survey of the groundwork of sociology so far as it relates to primitive people. Letourneau spends much time on the sociological description of primitive peoples. Both furnish a basic support to sociology, but they leave off about where sociology should begin.

Various Conceptions of Sociology. — While various writers have viewed sociology from many different standpoints, such as economics, philosophy of history, anthropology, biology, and political science, there are other writers who see sociology as a general science, distinct from any of these special sciences, and who seek to find some single unifying principle on which to base it. They differ, however, as to what is the fundamental social fact on which society is built up, and consequently as to the central principle or conception in sociology. For example, M. Tarde in his *Laws of Imitation*, has laid unusual stress upon a single feature of social action, viz., imitation. This is made to dominate everything else. Later, in his *Social Laws*, he has attempted to reduce sociology to three fundamental conceptions; namely, "repetition, opposition, and adaptation." Giddings, in his *Principles*, viewed sociology from a single fundamental principle, "The consciousness of kind." In his later works, however, Giddings has broadened out his structure of sociology and has reduced "consciousness of kind" to a subordinate place,

where, although it is a very important concept, it occupies its true position. Gumpłowicz, in his *Der Rassenkampf* (*War of Races*), has viewed society from the standpoint of the contact of races, group-struggles being the fundamental fact. Novicow, in his *Les Luttes entre sociétés humaines* (*Struggle Among Human Societies*), has approached this same idea from a different standpoint. And, finally, we have a new conception termed by Ward "unconscious social constraint," which represents a number of writers who try to show that society has been built through the moral or psychic action of individuals in association, and that this represents, indeed, an important characteristic — an idea which is essential to all rightly constructed society. This view prevails in special studies of sociologists rather than as the foundation of a completed system. Such works as Ross's *Social Control*, Spencer's *Ceremonial Institutions*, and Durkheim's *Laws and Methods of Sociology* are good examples of this concept of sociology, although each one sees it in a somewhat different light.

The Foundation of Sociology. — Notwithstanding the importance of all the above concepts of sociology, the science represents a much broader foundation than any one of them. A complete sociology must take all that is true in each one of these ideas and weave the whole matter into a logically constructed science. Such a work would be a monumental treatise of the subject. It would be beyond the range of possibility of an ordinary textbook to give it an adequate presentation. At present we must be content to direct the mind of the student along the highway of general development, pointing out certain movements of society and the laws that govern them.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What are the essentials of a good definition? See *Century Dictionary*.
2. Judged by these essentials, which is the best definition given in this chapter?
3. Can you cite any other sciences which have benefited by use of "the genetic method"?
4. How do survivals in clothing illustrate the point that it is impossible to understand certain things now in existence without knowing the origins from which they developed? Can you think of any other illustrations?
5. Write out a careful analysis of the social activities and the social structures through which the activities are carried on in your home or other community with which you are acquainted.
6. In what respects are a lodge, a bank, a state, like a tree or an animal? In what are they different?
7. State the general outlines of Spencer's theory of "the social organism." What corresponds to the digestive apparatus of an animal? What to the brain and other higher nervous centers?
8. In what sense can we legitimately speak of social forces in sociology?
9. What is meant by a law in sociology?
10. Name three influences of physical nature which cause men to cooperate and combine.
11. What physical characteristics of individuals cause them to associate together?
Name some physical differences which keep them from associating together.
12. Compare Comte's, Spencer's, and Ward's conceptions of the term "social statics" or static sociology, and of "social dynamics," or dynamic sociology.
13. Explain how a struggle based on destruction of others could result in a being whose guiding principle is love and service of his fellows and whose practice is to "turn the other cheek."
14. Explain how, when such a creature once appeared in the midst of a "Nature red in tooth and claw," he and his kind could possibly survive.
15. Criticize the assertion that sociology is only a hodgepodge of the various social sciences such as politics, economics, history, etc.
16. State clearly the differences between sociology and the following social sciences: economics, politics, ethics.

CHAPTER III

THE PURPOSE AND METHOD OF SOCIOLOGY

Purpose. — The foregoing chapter pointed out the position of sociology among social sciences and indicated the field in which it operates. Its scientific purpose is primarily to generalize what is known about society. In attaining this ultimate aim of the science, it is necessary for the student to search a wide realm of knowledge and to acquaint himself with sociological data. He must deal primarily with facts — not necessarily with material facts, although these should not be passed by, but psychical, economic, political, moral, and social facts which exist over and above the material world; for here, as elsewhere, the first scientific process is the assembling and classification of facts. In this process social relationships are of great importance. A knowledge of society as it actually exists is essential, and this cannot be obtained by philosophizing about what society ought to be, for the result of such a course would be to generalize about an ideal society. However, it may fairly be claimed that the full purpose of the science will not have been attained until it contributes to the social well-being and the individual happiness of mankind. Sociology has a practical purpose. Based upon a knowledge of how society has come to be what it is to-day, sociology can better point the way in which the social organization can more effectively adapt itself to the changing conditions of life. From a careful analysis of the social structures and processes of society as organized at present, sociology will derive that understanding of the nature of society which will suggest remedies for its ills. A sound social technology is based upon a careful study of the origin, development, and analysis of present-day social structure and processes.¹

¹ "It is vicious to encourage students to speculate about great questions of social reform before they have learned to know intimately the facts of social structures and functions." — SMALL and VINCENT, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 20.

The *ought* of social conduct, then, must be considered. The purpose of sociology is not fulfilled when it has classified and described social phenomena, discovered the social forces, and formulated laws of social being and growth. It should point the way to a better social life and to the improvement of the social mechanism. *In short, we may say that the purpose of sociology is, first, to understand society; then, to enable us to formulate a scientific program of social betterment.*

The Object of Society. — Originally and fundamentally society had for its aim the protection of a group of individuals from the influences which tend to destroy either the group or the individual. Some of these influences are those operating from without, others from within the group. On the one hand, the social organization operates to preserve and perpetuate the human stock by protecting it from its enemies — the ferocious animals, violent forces of nature, and savage mankind. It is organized, primarily, for the perpetuation of the group, and, secondarily, for the protection of the individual. On the other hand, by its beneficent organization, it deals out justice to those within the group and keeps them from destroying one another. For long ages this coöperation was probably quite unconscious as to definite purpose. From the coöperation to be seen in the social organizations of some of the lower forms of life, like ants and bees, the probabilities are that social coöperation was early established by natural selection weeding out those who did not develop the social tendencies leading to coöperation. Later the advantage which coöperation gave for survival became apparent first to a few leaders and then to wider circles of a population. Pleasurable results from coöperation — results experienced from the earliest days of association of like beings — were intensified as intelligence developed and as new methods of coöperation were devised. At first limited to economic and sympathetic coöperation, the field gradually widened to include an increasing number of subjects. Gradually coöperation became predominantly conscious, varied in method, and wider in scope, so that in developed societies the objects for which social organization exists have multiplied to include those finer satisfactions of life which are beyond the mere necessities of survival. Hence, the systematic study of a society to-day having such a purpose creates a science concerned not alone with social movements, but with

the well-being of man. This makes it one of the most important of the social sciences, for it appeals directly to everyday life. Its phenomena are the everyday activities of men. Its laboratory is the world of social life. Its interest is bound up with every human aspiration and hope.

The Problems of Sociology. — The numerous problems confronting the sociologist are of a varied nature. Perhaps the fundamental problem is a correct conception of the origin, structure, and activities of society. A correct knowledge of the parts and functions of society and their relation to one another is of prime importance to the student. It is essential that he understand not only social phenomena, but the causes producing them and the effects which grow out of their interrelations.

The demonstration of the regularity of recurring social phenomena is no less important, for without this no definite conclusions can be reached. If there are no regularities in social life, no general laws under which large bodies of social facts can be subsumed, then sociology has not reached the dignity of a science.

The question of the freedom of the human will in shaping social development is another vital problem. Can the conscious purpose of man control social events? In its solution is involved the relation of the so-called natural development of society to its development under the control of the social mind. It leads to the problem of social consciousness and social purpose. Moreover, it determines the position and influence of the individual in social activities. If man's purposive efforts for the changing of social conditions are useless, he might as well sit down and fold his hands while the slow but merciless process of natural forces work out the destiny of the race.

This problem is followed, on the other hand, by the question of the possibility of applying the principles of organic evolution to society. If man can control society, then what part is left to natural forces of the world in the shaping of social development?

Again, if progress is brought about through the struggle of individuals and races and the survival of the fittest, is peace or war of greater value to the human race?¹

In the wake of these fundamental philosophic problems con-

¹ See "The Problems of Sociology," by Gustav Ratzenhofer, *American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1904.

nected with sociology come many practical problems. There are the questions of the relation of ethical and religious culture to social development. Are they part of the *process*? Are they causes or are they effects, or each in turn? What kind of government should be sought in view of the history of social development? What should be society's attitude towards its waste products — the dependent, defective, and criminal classes? What message, if any, has sociology for the educational and business systems of society? Does it throw any light upon the measures to be taken to direct society along lines of future development in the interest of the highest type of social personality and of social group? All these and many more problems thrust themselves upon the sociologist for answer.

The Unit of Investigation in Sociology. — Each science has its unit of investigation, that is to say, its specific object of study. Thus, biology studies the living being, and anthropology man in his physical relations. Sociology studies the *socius*, or man in his social relations. As in the case of each of the sciences mentioned, processes and products are studied also, but these are studied in order to throw light upon the main problem, that of man's social activities.¹ Connected with man's social activity are all those products and processes which we call social phenomena. Social phenomena, as Ross reminds us, "are all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of one human being on another."² Moreover, these phenomena must not be exceptional, but must be so characteristic of a large group of people that they provide a basis for generalization. For example, the phenomena which arise when two people meet and associate have no social significance if they are peculiar to those two only and are not likely to occur when two other people meet and associate under the same circumstances. *Sociology studies man in his social relations, as affecting and as affected by association, together with all the products and processes consequent upon such association.*³

¹ See Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. IV, where he contends that there is no one unit of investigation, but many, such as products and processes of association, as well as the socius himself.

² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³ The position taken here is essentially that of Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 38, where he says: "It [sociology] does not really study men or the human race at all. That belongs to other sciences than sociology, chiefly to anthropology. It studies activities, results, products, in a word, achievement."

The Method of Sociology. — The method of sociology depends primarily upon its nature as a science and secondarily upon its position among other sciences. Being a general social science devoted to the broad field of human association, it must generalize upon the data furnished by other sciences bearing upon social life. Its place in the hierarchy of sciences demands the same general method as other sciences. On the other hand, owing to the fact that so many social phenomena have not been treated by any special social science, it has been necessary for sociology to collect the facts in certain fields of social activity, for example, that of the family, in order to have a basis on which to generalize, and in every field to use the essentially sociological data provided by the results of other sciences.¹ It is to-day a concrete science with a strong tendency to become a generalized science setting forth general principles based upon descriptive studies. Just as political economy began with the observation of special phenomena and rapidly became an abstract science, so sociology is moving in the same way as more general laws are discovered. But economics, even as an abstract science, never loses sight of concrete phenomena. Certain generalizations having been made, the economist proceeds with renewed vigor to the investigation of concrete phenomena. It is probable that sociology will, for many years to come, continue to be largely a concrete or descriptive science. The variations in the movements of society caused by the inventive genius of man will have a tendency to prevent the science from transcending the limitations of the concrete. Nevertheless the vital point of any science is "generalization," and while the accumulation of facts is essential to its proper study, sociology will grow only through generalization.

The Concrete Method. — The investigation of society will always be carried on by the observation of the life of parts of society and its movement as a whole. This will cause it to be descriptive and concrete and to reach its conclusions from the results of observation rather than from abstract reasoning. There has been too much philosophizing about society without an intelligent interpretation of the facts. Indeed, there is no social science that has not lost much through the neglect of concrete observation and through the cultivation of deductive

¹ See Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 81-82.

reasoning that has frequently ended in a vast amount of theorizing not always conducive to the development of science nor the advancement of mankind. Yet there are always general laws to be formulated, and it is the proper use of the facts, rather than the facts themselves, that makes a science. Hence, abstraction and generalization necessarily follow. The large number of social phenomena make it necessary for the student to collect, classify, and arrange them in logical order before he can reach definite conclusions. The best sociologists of to-day have not at their disposal a sufficient number of concrete data respecting the constitution and activities of society. Great as is the difficulty, the observation of concrete phenomena furnishes the only true basis for the construction of a formal science of society. There remains much work of this character yet to be done. We have only just begun the practice of studying intensively and comprehensively cross sections of our social life by means of the social survey.

The Data of Other Sciences. — While the sociologist carries on his investigation independently, he accepts the conclusions reached by other sciences and uses the data collected by them. It would be idle to ignore what biology has taught us concerning the physical system of man, the primary causes of association, or, indeed, the influence of heredity, for these must enter as primary causes of social development. We must not neglect what psychology has to teach us of the nature of the mind of the individual, for it is from this that we start in our efforts to understand the social mind. Political economy in the study of the economic life has given us many principles and laws and accumulated data which must be utilized in developing the science of sociology. And the same is the case with political science, ethics, and history; they have gained knowledge of certain aspects of social life, and it is idle for the sociologist to ignore their conclusions and attempt to do the work over again. But, as stated in the last chapter, sociology cannot become a synthesis of these sciences, nor is it a mental science simply because it studies the social habits of thinking people. Its scope is much wider than this.

As Ross has so well pointed out, the sociologist is not looking for the same things as the historian, the economist, the political scientist, or the psychologist. The sociologist is trying to rise

from particular cases to general terms. He wants not solitary or striking facts but recurrent phenomena, no matter how trivial they may seem to scholars in other fields. The only requirement is that these phenomena be social and that they show tendencies and reveal regularities of social activity. Sociology studies objective groups, relations, institutions, subjective imperatives and uniformities in society. All of them are products of the social process. It also studies the social processes by which these social products are produced.¹ Sociology differs from the other social sciences in two respects. It begins where they leave off, and its data are those growing out of association in all its aspects.

Sociology varies from Other Social Sciences chiefly on Account of its General Nature. — Sociology has its own independent purpose and its own definite scope, and therefore can accept what has been accomplished without interfering with the status of other sciences. In seeking to discover and present general laws it transcends the limited position of each of the other social sciences. The difficulty attending its generalization makes the development of the science slow.²

The scope of the sociological field as well as its differentiation from the fields occupied by the other social sciences is clearly indicated by Professor Ross's Map of the Sociological Field which is here added.³

The Course of Reasoning. — M. Comte, who first made a formal declaration regarding sociology, placed it in the category of descriptive and concrete sciences, but his own treatment of the subject in his *Positive Philosophy* was that of a social philos-

¹ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 90 sq.

² "Sociology is one of the abstract sciences. The sociologist aims to rise from particular cases to general terms which he can employ in formulating generalizations and laws. He wants not unique facts, but recurrent facts, for which he can frame a concept that shall neglect details and emphasize common properties. The facts he uses are in many cases too numerous and too insignificant to attract even the notice of the historian. . . . History is not, as many suppose, the quarry to which sociologists resort for their material. The records of the past — its monuments, survivals, legends, and documents are the common quarry for both historian and sociologist. The former explores them for *events*, *i.e.* things that occur only once, and are definite as regards date, place, and person. The latter prizes most the humble facts of repetition which interest the historian only at those rare intervals when he interrupts the current of his narrative to exhibit the *state or transformations* of domestic life, manners, industry, law, or religion." — Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 81, 82.

³ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 98.

MAP OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL FIELD

	PROCESSES	SUBJECTIVE PRODUCTS	OBJECTIVE PRODUCTS			
PRELIMINARY	Assimilation by environment.	UNIFORMITIES (OR PLANES)	RELATIONS			
	Assimilation by occupation.					
SOCIAL	Assimilation by mode of life.	Particular Ideas. Symbols. Beliefs. Knowledge. Valuations. Desires. Ideas. Opinions.	Fellowship. Reciprocity. Suretyship. Discipleship. Agency. Patronage. Clientage. Pupilage. Vassalage. Slavery.			
	Assimilation by "dialectic of personal growth."			Languages. Mythologies. Religions. Arts. Sciences. Manners. Customs. Standards of living.		
	Assimilation by education.				Combining into	
	<i>Genesis of Society</i> Multiplication.					GROUPINGS <i>Fortuitous Groups</i> Crowds. Publics.
	<i>Stratification</i> Differentiation.					
	Segregation. <i>Association</i> Subordination.					
	Communication.					
	Fascination.					
	Intimidation.					
	<i>Domination</i> Education.					
Exploitation.						
Forcible assimilation.	General The soul of the crowd. Group character. The <i>Zeitgeist</i> .					

<p>SOCIAL</p>	<p>{</p>	<p><i>Opposition</i> Class struggle. Competition. Discussion. <i>Adaptation</i> Toleration. Compromise. Amalgamation. <i>Coöperation</i> Mutual aid. Division of labor. Organization. Regulation.</p>	<p><i>Alienation</i> Estrangement. Antagonization. <i>Individualization</i> Diversification of culture. Liberalizing of control. Dissolution of social bonds. <i>Crystallization</i></p>	<p>IMPERATIVES Mandates. Injunctions. Rules. Conventions. Dogmas.</p> <p>INSTITUTIONS Domestic. Juristic. Political. Military. Ecclesiastical. Industrial. Professional.</p>	<p><i>Natural Groups</i> Families. Kindreds. Communities. <i>Likeness Groups</i> Castes. Classes. Sects. Parties. Professions. Nations. <i>Interest Groups</i> Tribes. States. Confederacies. Guilds. Corporations. <i>Functional Groups</i> Purposeful associations. Social organs. <i>Authorities</i> <i>Hierarchies</i></p>		
		<p>RECON- STRUCTIVE</p>	<p>{</p>	<p>Increase of numbers. Accumulation of capital. Incidental modification of environment. Selection. Urbanization. Migration. Cross-fertilization of cultures. Innovation.</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>	<p></p>

ophy rather than that of an inductive science. In the beginning it was very natural that sociology should be a philosophy in order that its place among the philosophic interests might be determined and its field so delimited as to show its possible value. However, recently emphasis has been given to inductive study. Facts or data have been observed, collected, and classified and general principles have been deduced. The substantial progress of the science has been along the lines of concrete investigation by establishing principles from constantly recurring regularities in the mass of data.

The experimental process of society building in which each new form of association or organization has tried to meet the exigencies of the case, and the consequent passing of customs, habits, and laws rendered obsolete by the "law of survival," would seem to indicate that no formal science based on axioms, postulates, and theorems capable of demonstration could be established on such a shifting experimental basis. But as no cycle of reasoning is complete without both methods, the deductive will always be used along with the inductive.

Scientific Method must be Observed. — It is very important, whatever process of reasoning is employed, that there should be a strict scientific method in all treatment of social phenomena. Comte made the first step in this direction by giving sociology an honored place in the hierarchy of sciences, and Spencer early acknowledged the need of more extended data, which in part accounts for his *Descriptive Sociology* and the large collection of social facts in his *Principles*. Ward, in his *Dynamic Sociology*, has approached his main topics from the concrete and rounded his argument with a deductive method. Yet how many writers on sociology have succeeded in doing little more than record impressions or, at least, expound theories from their respective points of view! Every science has made material advancement just in proportion as it has discovered facts and arranged them in scientific order. Therefore, sociology will develop in proportion as speculation ceases and thorough scientific investigation advances. Difficulties indeed present themselves at once when the endeavor is made to bring some classes of social facts under statistical control. It is difficult, for example, to measure the growth or decline of a custom, a belief, a tradition. We may be convinced that there has been an increase or decrease;

but the scientific determination of the quantitative differences is much more difficult in sociology than in the biological sciences, or even in psychology or education. Nevertheless, the sociologists have made a very creditable beginning. Dealing first with the measurement of the most easily controlled social facts, such as population, housing, wages, poverty, pauperism, crime, insanity, and feeble-mindedness, the sociologists have attempted to bring under control of exact scientific measurement the much more intractable social phenomena of the social mind.¹

Many Phases of Sociology. — The *descriptive phase* of the science of sociology must be made prominent, for it is only by such description that clearly defined notions of the subject matter can be obtained. Without it people are led into error. For example, many people wrote about the trust, disposing of it with summary methods when its real nature, as well as its origin and development, was unknown to them. They wrote in the dark, hence their conclusions were mostly worthless. Comparatively little of all that has been written about such subjects as "Money," "Marriage and Divorce," "Education," "Socialism," "Trusts," "Labor and Capital" is of real value because the facts were not known and the relations of the particular subject under discussion to other subjects were not understood.

Social statistics must occupy a large place in social science and its work will, so far as possible, include the whole range of social development. There is great need of careful statistical studies of many aspects of our social life. The studies in the Reports of the United States Census are valuable as far as they go. They give us a grasp of some aspects of our social life, such as population, its composition, and organization in family groups. The census has also contributed special studies on marriage and divorce, on religious bodies, on the colored people in certain employments, etc. Each decade some new aspects of our social life are studied statistically, but it leaves so much untouched that the sociologist feels how inadequately the Census as a whole represents our complex social life. From the standpoint of the novice in sociology, often a much better understanding of the nature of the subject is obtained by selecting a small unit like a rural township or one or more city blocks and study-

¹ Such a study is Giddings's "The Social Marking System," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, p. 721.

ing that unit intensively according to a definite plan mapped out by some competent person.

Social evolution contributes much to the understanding of social life besides making clear the forces that act in society building and the laws that govern it. Therefore the student of sociology studies carefully the development of civilization in different parts of the world. He goes to descriptions of the nature peoples, to folklore, and to the life of the classic peoples of the past, to medieval customs, and to survivals of all kinds in our modern life, in order to learn the steps in the development of social institutions and processes, in the hope that he may find regularities of social action and reaction common to them all and thus discover generalizations or laws of society.

While the normal society is the great object of study, one must not neglect the *obsolete forms of society*, for it is in the broken-down parts that we frequently discover the laws of social growth and social decay. Just as it was by the study of disease in the human being that we came to know about the normal body and normal mind, so by following up the evidence displayed in degenerate types of social groups, one is frequently led to the truths which underlie normal society. Such study must be thorough and scientific and far removed from all morbid sentiment or philosophic hysterics. Social pathology may have as an important result the determination of the *ought* of social action.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. How is the primary purpose of sociology related to its practical purpose?
2. If it should be established that the conscious purpose of man can have no influence upon social development, what would be the practical effect upon movements to improve social conditions?

3. Make out a broad, general outline of the things you would want to investigate, if you were going to study society so as to get a general idea of its nature.

4. In connection with the section on the problems of sociology, read Giddings's *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 70-76, and then write out in outline form a statement of the problems of sociology.

5. Why is it that statistics were not applied so early to the study of social phenomena as to the study of, let us say, the biological?

6. Name all the groups of social facts which you know have been treated statistically.

7. Name some social phenomena which have not yet been studied by the statistical methods.

8. Outline a study of your own home community, dividing the study into the various heads and subdivisions under which the facts concerning it would best be grouped in order to enable one to understand that community from a sociological standpoint.

PART TWO
SOCIAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL ORIGINS

Social Evolution. — By studying the various types of contemporary societies one may learn how society itself came into being. The student might begin by considering the evolution of several social groups which have grown up under his eyes. One might consider them in the order of their complexity, for example, first taking up the rural family, next, perhaps the farming community, then the village, and then the city.¹ On the other hand, an understanding of the simple processes in the formation of a society might be obtained by a study of existing social institutions, traditions, customs, and organizations in various societies in different stages of development. The latter method would show cross sections of societies in successive stages of evolution. Both methods are needed in order that the student may get a comprehension of the way in which societies come to be. The social institutions of to-day have had a history, have gone through phases of development. We shall know them only as we understand their respective origins and the course of their various developments. Some are survivals from a stage long since passed. They are fossils as much out of place in the present-day world as the skeleton of the dinosaur. The sanctions which once gave them vitality and significance have passed away. They remain only as traditions, anachronisms. Others are living, vital social institutions and processes, deeply rooted in the social necessities of the present.

The work of the biologists, beginning with Darwin, has made clear to us many features of early social life. This knowledge has been supplemented by the culture historians and archeologists, dealing with both the prehistoric and the historic peoples. Perhaps most illuminating of all has been the work of the com-

¹ Such is the method employed by Small and Vincent in *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Bk. II.

parative ethnologists, who have brought to our attention in the last few years the social organization, the language, customs, beliefs, and ideas of what are called the nature peoples of all lands. Their labors have made it almost possible for the student of society to retrace, step by step, the road along which society has progressed to its present stage.

In our study of social evolution we shall follow the method of the comparative ethnologists.¹

The purpose of the study of social evolution is to acquaint the student with social origins and the processes of social growth. He must bear constantly in mind that society has expanded from simple beginnings, part by part, and function by function. Moreover, society is always developing. It is changing in size, in character, in the complexity of its institutions, in the number of its interests, and in the diversity of methods by which it expresses its social purposes. This is not to deny that societies exist in a state of arrested development. There are such, but they too are phenomena of social evolution, for they have been different and have become what they are through reacting to certain definite social and environmental conditions. By reason of the fact, however, that arrested or degenerate societies are societies caught in the back eddies of the stream of human life, our chief interest is in those societies which are in a state of progressive development.

Perhaps it hardly needs to be said that in the study of social origins it is assumed that man has developed from a lower animal form. The work of the prehistoric anthropologists and archeologists has made it comparatively easy to retrace in some degree the steps in the physical evolution of man from a being which was neither man nor ape, but had characters similar to those of both. The remains of Dubois's *Pithecanthropus erectus*, of the Neanderthal man, and of the Heidelberg man give us our best conception of what that being was. The remains of prehistoric men found in the caves of France and Portugal represent the next higher step in evolution. The development in the art and industry of prehistoric men corresponds roughly with their physical evolution. What their social life was like we do not know. The fact, however, that man has developed from

¹ For a full statement of the reasons for following this method, see Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 231; Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 3-13.

animal-like ancestors, considered in connection with the social habits of certain higher animals, makes it highly probable that man's prehistoric ancestors had a social organization intermediate between that of the animals and that of lower types of living men. All these discoveries have made a little clearer for us that shadowy past out of which man emerged with some social organization and some social ideas.¹

Social evolution is difficult to present summarily, for society has not developed uniformly from a single idea, but rather from a group of ideas more or less interrelated. Hence, in its treatment we cannot follow through successive stages a clearly defined process like the growth of the tree from the seed, but must consider different phases of activity, such as religion, government, law, political organization, industrial activity, and the family life, each leading from a simple to a complex state of society and each contributing to the solidarity of society as well as to the enlarged number of its activities. An outline of origins followed by a brief survey of the development of important phases of social life is all that can be attempted here.

The Society of Animals. — While sociology deals with human society, it is well to note that the beginnings of social organization appear among animals lower in the scale of existence than man. This fact gives the student a ground plan for the superstructure of society. It indicates also how the informal beginning of society rests on a physical basis and develops in proportion to intelligence. It cannot be shown that there is an uninterrupted continuity of development from the social practices of animals to the social practices of human beings, but there is a similarity in many points between the lowest human societies and the highest animal societies. The chief difference is found in the variety and versatility of association. If we consider the law of conflict and survival, it applies alike to animal societies and to natural human groups; also the principle of association for protection is the same in both. The social instinct exhibited in the pure love of companionship is less pronounced in animal societies than in human societies. The sexual instinct plays

¹ For an introduction to the interesting and instructive discoveries of the past twenty years see Clodd, *The Story of Primitive Man*; Duckworth, *Prehistoric Man*; Keane, *Ethnology*; Starr, *Some First Steps in Human Progress*; Chapin, *An Introduction to Social Evolution*.

an important part in each group, but has less force in the former. The greatest difference is found in a rapidly growing altruism and larger mental power of the human group which permit a high state of coöperation and organization. In other words, animal societies show a few social qualities in embryo which never pass a low grade of development, while human societies show these and many others in a highly developed state.¹

We shall find roughly classified two great groups of animals, the non-social and the social, roughly corresponding to the carnivora and the herbivora. The former are highly individualistic, they hunt alone and live most of the year alone; the latter coöperate in defense, live in families, and develop in consequence elementary social qualities.

Some birds of different species work together unconsciously, each species seeking to help itself. Others of the same species develop a community life, they hold assemblages for migratory purposes, they mix out of pure sociability, and they have the family instinct. But, as Darwin clearly shows, in all animal association the moral sense seems to be wanting. There is no reflection on past acts and no comparison of past acts with present ones, no valuation of their relative importance — characteristics which give rise to morality.²

Herds of antelopes live in harmony and peace, the leaders giving warning of danger to the group. Elephants have been seen in herds numbering from five to a hundred and fifty. These groups are based on family relationships. Monkeys of the Old World live in troops composed of family groups. One species (*Cercopithecus*) engages in expeditions under the direction of a leader. He commands the troop, stations sentinels, and gives orders that are understood and obeyed. Another species (*Cynocephalus*), according to Brehm, exhibits a still higher state of organization.³

The Causes of Aggregation. — Many influences have caused individuals to associate in groups. Among the more important may be mentioned the desire for companionship, including

¹ Yet, how striking is coöperation among animals and how important a part it played in the evolution of animals and man has been most clearly shown by Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*. See also Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, Chaps. XVII-XIX.

² See Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Chap. IV.

³ See Topinard, *Science and Faith*, p. 121.

sexual attraction, the influences of climate, the physical conditions of the earth, the food supply, the consciousness of similarity, identity of interests, the necessity of protection against animals and men, the influence of controlling personalities, and coöperation in industry.

Responding to some or all of these influences, animals have formed social groups. Primitive men, moved by the same factors as the animals and often led by those with a more developed mentality and a keener social consciousness, formed themselves into groups in which social pleasure was fully awakened and in which various social and economic advantages appeared. Illustrations of how animals form into groups are given by the herds of buffaloes which once covered our West, by the beaver colonies to be found even yet in parts of our country, and by such social insects as the ants and the bees. In some of these cases the group is a temporary one, in others more lasting, and in some so stable that one almost wonders if they do not in the matter of stability surpass human social groups.

The Horde. — The simplest aggregation of people without formal organization is called a horde. It is less than the human equivalent of the animal "herd." Its leadership is natural, not formal. Its bonds are stronger in some ways, but very little different from those natural bonds of physical and mental superiority and deference to be observed in animal groups. It represents one of the phases of social development. Numerous examples of a horde are cited by Westermarck in his *History of Human Marriage*.¹ There is little organization among such peoples. The constituent families of hordes wander from place to place with no permanent dwellings; the group is large today and small to-morrow. There are some signs of temporary leadership, but no permanent organization. Life is largely subject to accident. Yet this group of people represents, to a certain extent, the foundation of human society, for it is out of this simple homogeneous assemblage that complex society has risen.

The Beginnings of Social Organization. — Within the human horde appear small, more closely related groups of people which form the primordial social organizations. Small industrial,

¹ Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, Chaps. XVII-XIX. See Thomas, *A Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 461-468.

family, and religious groups appear which gradually transform the rather indefinite mass into a social order. These small centers of organized power appear spontaneously. They are the radiating centers of organized social relationships. Here Vogue begins to establish its power. Here Tradition begins to lay down its sacred laws. In these centers social interests find their organized expression. The superior man finds here a way to forward his own ambitions through leadership. The weaker cleave to the stronger because thus they find protection and benefit. Finally, relationships are adjusted and the small groups become independent. Beginning in the differences of sex, at an early period of social life the division of labor causes the differentiation into inchoate industrial groups. As social classes are founded largely on industrial occupations, industrial specialization gives an impetus to the general organization of society. Yet one must not forget that some social classes grow up apart from occupational interests. For example, the ruling class springs in part from the lust for power and deference to the superior, the ecclesiastical from fear of the unknown, the secret societies so often found in primitive groups from the desire for acknowledged precedence, and those strange groups based on the sex taboo observed in some primitive communities,¹ from the mystery of reproduction and its allied phenomena. But in all of the changes that take place society is organized about small voluntary groups, springing up because of appreciation of the pleasure or advantage to be secured thereby. New groups are formed by a process analogous to budding, but they often branch off in consequence of the development of such motives as jealousy of the power of a leader, fear of a superior, consciousness of temperamental difference between persons and the clashing and occluding of interests.

Kinship. — In primitive society the family life was very different from what it is at present. It was more indefinite and irregular. But, beginning with the sympathy of the mother for her offspring, the unity of the family group grew as the bonds of common interest multiplied. Members of the family group were held together primarily by kinship or blood relationship. Whether through the close association of the family group or

¹ On the last see Jenks, *The Bantoc Igorot*; Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, pp. 33-58.

through the actual consciousness of blood relationship, the family group finally became a unit of social order. Kinship played an important part in all the early phases of social organization. Those of the same blood recognized and protected one another, uniting in offensive and defensive war with other tribes. Such temporary union grew into racial or tribal unity and led to the development of race aversion.

Adoption. — But the family group enlarged in other ways than that of natural increase. In the warfare which occurred among various tribes it frequently happened that one tribe was conquered, broken, and scattered, and its members who survived the shock of battle had no protection except when they joined themselves to other tribes. There was no state, no politics, no political government, but only the family or tribal organization. Hence, when an individual or a small family group was left alone, it was obliged to fight its own battles independently or else unite with some family for protection. It became a common custom for conquering tribes to adopt such stray survivors into their own tribes, the only conditions imposed being that of a strict compliance with the laws and customs of the tribe. Thus it was that the family group enlarged continually by natural increase and adoption. The adopted members became identified with the family, helping to fight its battles, following it through its migrations and engaging in the economic pursuits of the tribe.

The Consolidation of Groups. — There were always in early society certain tendencies to consolidate small groups into larger ones. Many causes contributed to this result. Among them may be mentioned the external pressure of the physical environment causing the various groups to unite for protection from the weather or from wild animals, the danger from stronger hostile groups which often forced weak groups to unite to resist a common enemy, the recognition of kind whereby like groups tended to unite and like individuals to associate with one another, and possibly, more than all, the industrial life demanding unity of effort. The attempt to satisfy a common hunger led to a common sympathy and a common coöperation. This unity of effort extended to other departments of life and had a tendency to consolidate groups which otherwise would have been separated and destroyed.

The Origin of Language. — Probably language grew out of the instinctive cries and sounds produced by primitive man under the stress of strong emotions excited by elemental joy, fear, love, and hate, or out of the sounds which he heard about him in a nature full of danger or beauty. These sounds became conventionalized and united with his facial expressions and gestures — his prelingual methods of conveying his thoughts and feelings to others. Doubtless, progress began to be rapid in the development of language when the satisfaction of his social instincts led him to play with his fellows. Out of this social fellowship grew the rhythmic dance and choral song. The excitement of the primitive dance, linked as it so often was with the deepest feelings he possessed, the sex and hunger impulses, the joyous exhilaration of the mock combat, the awe-inspiring ceremonies of tribal religion, quickened and heated the mind to the pitch of forging a language, which served to satisfy in a new way his desire for expression and at the same time tended to become a new sharp instrument of emotional stimulation.¹ Once language had developed under social stimulation to the point where signs and sounds had become independent and distinguished in thought from the objects they designated, humanity had speech. After this achievement man was able to make comparatively rapid progress. While association provided the stimulus which gave rise to speech, the latter in turn became a veritable fulcrum of Archimedes in lifting social life to a new complexity and perfection.²

Another important step was taken when language became written. Beginning with “reminders” like sticks stuck in the ground or holes dug therein or cords tied in knots, or strung with shells to assist the minstrel or medicine man of the group to recall certain important events, and proceeding through ideograms, signs standing for ideas, such as are still used by the Indians of our Southwest and as they were used by the Dakota Indians in Schoolcroft’s time, written language developed phonograms, or signs which stood for certain phonetic values, as in the Chinese and especially in the Japanese language of modern

¹ Darwin, *Descent of Man*, Chap. XIX; Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 66-72.

² On the development of animal language and its relation to human speech, see Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Man; Origin of Human Faculty*, pp. 51 ff., 163 ff. For the connection of the origin of speech with social excitement see Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 222-225.

times and in the ancient Egyptian language. The Phœnicians borrowed from the Egyptians certain of these phonograms, attached to them simple sounds and combined them variously in the different words in use and thus gave the world an alphabet. These probably in a general way are the steps in the development: "reminder," ideogram, phonogram, and letter. Written language had even greater importance for humanity in its social development than spoken language.¹

Language has always fulfilled an important function in social organization. Through it as a means of communication the small group has been developed and strengthened and other groups have been united. People of similar languages are attracted towards one another, while those of foreign languages have a tendency to repel one another. The difficulty of establishing social order among diverse groups of people, speaking different languages and having diversity of thought and sentiment, is very great. Even now this difficulty of socialization is observed in our large American cities with their heterogeneous populations. But though in such cases language causes separation, it originally caused association. It is the attempt to communicate thought that gives birth to language. One who seeks for the origin of society will find one of its causes and one of its effects in the action and reaction of language.

Physical Pressure. — Another of the important causes of the rise of social groups is the pressure of physical nature on the population. Apart from the fact that the food supply caused people to assemble in the localities where food was most plentiful and most easily obtained, the influences of climate and the physical surface of the earth forced people into groups. Wandering along the rivers in pursuit of fish and game, men came into contact with one another and learned to dwell together. The mountain ranges stayed their migrations and caused a denser population on their slopes or in the adjacent valleys. The shores of the ocean and inland seas and lakes caused them to pause for long periods and finally to establish permanent

¹ For a brief survey of the steps in the development of writing see Starr, *Some First Steps in Human Progress*, Chap. XXI. One of the earliest valuable contributions to the knowledge of the development of speech and writing was Tylor, *Anthropology*, Chaps. IV-VII. Perhaps the most incisive and discriminating discussions of the importance of the development of language on social development is supplied by Cooley, *Social Organization*, pp. 68-79.

homes. Violent storms caused them to seek shelter in caves where early associations were formed, and the ice flow from the north caused the population to assemble in the southern valleys. Thus the influence of physical nature everywhere tends to favor the aggregation of men and their association.

Social Pressure.— The movement of tribes and races over the earth has caused the extinction of some, the breaking up of others, but the consolidation of still others. The pressure of nomad tribes on the ancient civilization of the various Aryan groups in Europe, of the Huns upon the Teutons, of the various Greek and Roman tribes upon one another, caused a closer social union among the survivors of the struggle. This pressure forces the growth of social institutions as a hothouse forces the growth of plants. These institutions are the result of new ideas, the result of the group consciousness struggling with new situations forced upon it by the pressure of a hostile group. Two of many historic illustrations may be cited to show this. When the white man reached America and began to settle in the North Atlantic region, two great groups of Indians were struggling for the possession of the Atlantic seaboard and the fertile valleys which led down to it. The Algonquins were pressing down from Canada upon the Iroquois already in possession of these places. One result was a confederation known as the league of the Iroquois. An organization was devised whereby the various independent tribes were welded together for defensive purposes. A great development was taking place within these tribes when the coming of the whites interrupted the process. Another example may be seen in the Norman conquest of England. The more or less loosely organized elements of the British population, consisting of the ancient population elements, Celts, Angles, Saxons, and Danes, fused somewhat already in the early Saxon kingdoms and then developing under Danish rule into a larger and more solid organization, were finally welded into a demonic unity and a strongly organized whole under the Normans and their successors. The process culminated under the Tudors and early Stuarts. During the course of this development social structures were greatly multiplied in number. The aggregation of unlike population elements resulting in class conflicts forced the development of agencies of domination, status, and toleration. The instruments of justice, like the

courts, were improved, all kinds of judicial machinery were invented like the jury, grand and petit. The laws were greatly multiplied and changed to meet new conditions. Even the common law, the child of custom, was greatly elaborated. Every form of social life underwent readjustment. Social devices of all sorts multiplied.¹

Common Ethical Sentiment. — The union of various groups of people always depends to a considerable extent upon the existence of a common ethical sentiment, for ethics are deeply rooted in the emotions. In the beginning of society, as now, feeling played a much more important rôle than reason. The sociological basis of morality is custom. Custom is rooted in the feelings and in that mighty social force, social approbation. Therefore, tribal customs touching the relationship of man with man would tend to repel groups with different moral codes and attract those with similar.

The importance of moral sentiments in the formation of social groups rests on the fact that the moral codes of primitive peoples are very rigid and exacting, and therefore play a great part in the socializing process which makes for group unity. Hence, the origin of morality is of importance in any study of the origins of society.

Morality had one of its roots in mother love. At first it was purely instinctive, probably caused by blind natural selection. As such it brought in the wake of its manifestation its own emotional reward and thus became established in the feelings and habits of the creature.

The social root of actions which may come to have a moral value is to be found in custom, by which is meant an act adopted and practiced by a group of people.² Out of some customs grow moral acts. Which actions shall become customary, and which of the customary actions of a group shall become moral in their nature depends upon social considerations arising from the social life of the group rather than upon legal or economic considerations.

How an act may come to be customary and then moral may be illustrated best by a concrete example. A group of primitive

¹ For many of the facts of this illustration the writers are indebted to unpublished lectures by Professor Giddings.

² See Wundt, *Principles of Morality: Facts of the Moral Life*, Chap. III.

people come face to face with a new experience such as a pestilence or a famine. At once individuals in that group begin to struggle with the problem of how to avert the calamity. In the individuals' minds psychologically there arises the stress and tension induced by fear in the presence of a new danger. The tendency of the human mind under such conditions is to relieve itself by motor reactions of some kind. Instead of anticipating the modern adage, "When you don't know what to do, do nothing," the primitive mind tends to do something — or anything. What shall be the act which is to relieve the emotional tension depends much upon the character of the minds composing that group, and upon their previous experiences — what they did in previous more or less similar cases. Or, in the absence of any similar experiences some one will do the first thing that suggests itself to him as in any way appropriate. Others may follow his example. Perhaps the families of these men do not die. After the danger is past what they did is recalled, it is related to others and becomes a part of the group's traditions. In any recurrence of the same or a like danger this act will be performed by many imitators. Thus it will become established in the customs of that group. It is a psychological fact that custom, mere groupal habit, will soon attract to itself certain very definite and strong emotions, and these emotions will be strengthened when the act becomes traditional, fostered by forceful and dogmatic personalities and associated in the common consciousness with group safety.

Again, since some religious practices have their roots in similar emotional tensions,¹ the custom often will be adopted by religion and be still further strengthened by coming under religiously dominating influences such as the fear of punishment or the hope of reward by supernatural beings. In all such ways may custom be established.

Whether a customary action was considered moral, immoral, or unmoral was determined by such considerations as the relations of the act to the welfare of the group, and the relations of certain instincts of the individuals to the traditions of the group. The falling away of certain individuals from fixed customary standards aroused ethical questions. This is in accordance with

¹ King, *Development of Religion*, pp. 54, 101. For a slightly different emphasis see Wundt, *Principles of Morality; Facts of the Moral Life*, pp. 134-139.

the law of mental development, that matters come to our knowledge by our first becoming aware of the incongruity between the feelings we have enjoyed in the presence of the usual and the feelings aroused when the smooth current of our consciousness has been disturbed by the unusual. Therefore, originally morality was chiefly negative: "Thou shalt not" do this or that. Primitive life is largely a life of privation, a constant struggle against the forces of nature, against wild animals and hostile men. Suffering was the common lot. It was an economy of pain.¹ Hence, primitive ethics and primitive religion stressed negative acts of self-deprivation and suffering. This tendency, moreover, was in entire accord with the necessity of repressing the individual in the interests of the group. Only after the group had become consolidated and unified to a certain degree was it safe to emphasize and encourage individual acts positive, independent, and original in their nature. Such acts again were connected psychologically with the partiality of the mother for her child, leading her to sacrifice herself for its benefit, and strengthened by the fact that after a certain social development had been reached they were of advantage for the survival of the group, so that they finally became sanctioned by the whole group. Thus moral sentiment expressed itself in positive acts, and morality became conscious and rational.²

Beginning thus with self-sacrifice for the young, the altruistic act extended to self-sacrifice for the wider kindred within the group, then further with the growing consciousness of kind so as to include the nation, the Kingdom of God, and the whole world.

Origin of Public Control. — Leadership is implied in all movements of mankind where there is human concerted action. It may be only temporary or accidental leadership, but it must exist under all circumstances except where men are moved to act by common impulse. Wherever, then, there is social order there will be, to a certain degree, leadership. Whether the leader is the head of the household, the medicine man, the man rich in cattle and land, as in ancient Ireland, the chief of the tribe, or the temporary war chief, who leads the host in battle, social

¹ Patten, *Theory of the Social Forces*, pp. 75-80.

² See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 187-188. Cf. Ross, *Social Control*, Chaps. XXV, XXVI.

order is established in proportion as leadership becomes strong and permanent. As social development proceeds, leadership becomes more varied in its fields. At first the leader was only the strong man, or the man of superior cunning, as the medicine man. Out from these crude beginnings of social leadership, however, in response to growing complexity of social interests and specialization of functions sprang leadership in many lines of activity. Eventually this leadership may develop into a kingship, a parliament, a council, or a constitution; or into fashions and crazes; into educational, economic, and social orthodoxies; into vogues, philosophies, modes of thought, and varieties of the *Zeitgeist*; but it must appear somewhere as a representative of social authority. It becomes a great power for consolidating and unifying the group, tribe, or nation and then for enriching the social life of the particular group.

The Beginning of Justice. — While the establishment of justice is not the primary cause of social amalgamation, yet once the group has been established, it certainly hastens the process of socialization. In fact, wherever we find social order appearing there is an opportunity for the development of civil justice, for people cannot associate on a common basis without some means of enforcing justice. The social elements act and react against one another blindly before formal justice is established. Conflicts arise between individuals in the group which must be settled. At first might makes right — the stronger man overpowers his antagonist and makes a decision from his own standpoint. But soon civil justice brings in a third party who adjusts the relations between the two, allotting to each man his just dues. The first stirrings of a sense of social justice may even be observed in a herd of animals when one bullying member finally attracts the attention of a number of the herd who unite in meting out punishment to the offender and so secure a form of justice between the two individuals primarily involved. In the human group the origins are much more complex. Here the brute strength, impartial judgment, and finer sympathy of a third individual are supplemented by the weight of tradition as to moral rights and duties and the usages more or less applicable to the dispute, and by an appreciation of the necessity of smoothing out differences that imperil the welfare of the group. Moreover, the increased appreciation

of leadership and the growth of moral sentiments in even the lowest savages make for increased deference to the decision of the third party. Like moral sentiment justice began within the group. Within the confines of a blood-kindred would the moral sense first express itself most naturally and easily. Special impetus to the tendencies just noticed to secure formal means of settling disputes doubtless was given by the danger from a hostile group.

The Force of War. — Perhaps no other visible agency has accomplished so many and such great changes in the progress of society as war. Conflict of individuals has led to strength of individual character, just as conflict between tribes has led to social strength. True they may both end in the destruction of one or both parties, but those who survive are made stronger to cope with the opposing elements of social life. War has destroyed individuals, tribes, nations. Millions of lives and countless treasures have been sacrificed to war, and yet through it have developed many of the finer qualities of life. Through it man has been taught to obey the will of the stronger; through it he has been taught not to abuse the weak. War is great in discipline, preparing wild or savage people for the conduct of civil government. It is one of the most important factors in accounting for the origin of many social institutions.¹ War, however, gave rise to a firmer social structure chiefly by a rough-hewing selective process which threw out all unsound material, and, as Ward has shown,² by so multiplying social contacts between alien peoples as to stimulate the growth of rigid social structures. It was especially important in securing the transition from an ethnic to a civil society.³ On the other hand, in mutual aid, we have a social beginning of great importance.⁴ Arising in the animal group by natural selection mutual aid developed in the kinship group by reason of the heightened social pleasure it provided, and was firmly established in the war measures invented against enemies of the group.

¹ See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 202-215.

² Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 193, 215.

³ The best exposition of war's connection with this important step is by Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 473-480.

⁴ For a detailed presentation of the part which mutual helpfulness has played in the beginnings of society see Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*. Cf. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 201, 202, 215, 216. For a corrective discussion of Kropotkin, see Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, pp. 404-406.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Why should the student of sociology study social origins?
2. After reading Duckworth, Chaps. I and II, write a description of the probable physical appearance of the earliest man of which we have any remains.
3. What are the fundamental social institutions the origins of which go back to a very early time in the history of man?
4. Trace back to its beginnings in outline, one modern social institution, such as language.
5. What is the importance of language in the development of society?
6. Observe a group of animals, such as a herd of cattle in the pasture, and write a description of the society which they form. (Before writing this exercise read Darwin, *Descent of Man*, Chap. IV.)
7. How does a human horde differ from an animal herd?
8. Put down in tabular form the chief causes of the coming together of human beings into groups.
9. Read Giddings, *A Theory of Social Causation*, and state briefly the ways in which the physical environment affects the formation of human societies.
10. Name the agencies which originate common ethical sentiments in your home community.
11. What bearing on the peace movement has the view of war presented in the text?

CHAPTER II

THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE

Physical Nature and Social Development.—In the last chapter reference was made to the influence of physical nature on the origin of society. It is still more influential on social development. Everywhere we find man's possibilities limited by the conditions of his physical environment. It would almost seem as if man sprang out of the soil, so great is his dependence upon it. Always the lines of his development are determined in part by the nature of his contact with the soil, and his social progress is measured by his effective mastery of the forces of nature. For early man at least the character of social life is determined primarily by the manner in which the group attaches itself to the land. The compactly organized Oriental tribe that wanders in the desert is very different from the Teutonic village community, and the manorial group very different from the community settled in the United States on small independent farms. The prevalence of great estates means a peasant population and possibly a race of serfs.

Just what influence physical environment has upon intellectual and social development is a matter of controversy. Some, for example, Montesquieu and von Treitschke, have thought that climate and the topography of the country affect a people directly. The former thought frankness was produced by cold climates, the latter that the difference in artistic temperament between Switzerland and other Alpine regions and the more level regions of Swabia, Franconia, and Thuringia was due to the paralyzing effect of majestic mountains upon the minds of men. Buckle, Spencer, Ellen Semple, Giddings, and others have seen that the problem is not so simple.¹

¹ For a good brief review of the steps in the development of the conception of the influence of physical environment on a people see Giddings, "A Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V., No. 2, pp. 151, 152.

The Conflict with Nature. — Everywhere and at all times man appears to be in conflict with nature. He struggles against the wild animals of the forest, exterminating or subduing them; he seeks to avoid the winter's cold or summer's heat; he wrests from the forest, the stream, and the soil his means of subsistence. He turns the forces of nature from his destruction to his salvation. Water power and wind, steam and electricity finally become his servants. On the other hand, he is attacked by parasites and germs of disease. The deadly microbe causes his perpetual warfare for its extermination. Two theories prevail among philosophers, one that nature is niggardly and harsh; the other that she is bounteous and generous. There is truth in both. By his intelligence man arranges his life in conformity with the regularities of nature and by his effort he forces nature to yield her treasures. Nature is bounteous in the supply of all man's needs if only by intelligent effort he compels her to open her treasure house. Certainly the medial statement is true, that all man's wants are supplied from nature through intelligent and well-directed effort.

Character of the Land and the Development of Society. — By "land" is meant land, air, and water — the physical environment. Climate, soil, and humidity determine whether there shall be any society at all. Nine tenths of the globe's surface is not suitable for man's occupation. Parts of it are water, other parts are too high in altitude, some lack water, others have an impossible climate, and still others lack the plant food which we call fertility of soil.

One has but to reflect in order to appreciate how important are the influences of the physiography upon man and his social development. Oceans and mountain ranges have great influence upon climate. One ocean current makes Labrador, with the same latitude as England, uninhabitable, while another has made it possible for England to be an important seat of Western civilization. The contour of a coast together with an ocean current and the effects of ocean tides may make a harbor of one place while destroying the entrance to another. Mountain barriers, on the one hand, and rivers, the natural highways, on the other, determine the direction in which an inflowing tide of immigrants shall go. Witness the directions taken by the barbarian invasions of Europe. Moreover, it is

probable that those invasions were started partly by physical causes, the drying up of the central plateaus of Asia.¹ Coast lines much indented by the sea, thus offering harbors and abundant opportunities for man to reach the interior easily, have much to do with social development. Minor features of topography, such as lakes, waterfalls, mountain passes, cañons, and fertile plains, have determined where settlements of men should occur. Valleys, like rivers, are natural highways of communication. One has only to look at a map of our own country to see how important has been the influence exerted upon American society by the physical factors.²

Moreover, the primary and secondary sources of subsistence, as Giddings, following Buckle, calls them, have much to do in determining where human settlement shall occur and, to a degree the character of the society man creates.³ Out of these physical conditions grew man's economic relations, his social attachments, and many of his interests and animosities, forces so important to human society.

Man Touches Nature at an Increasing Number of Points. — In primitive society life was simple and the wants of man were supplied from a few sources of nature. But as civilization advanced man continually came in contact with nature at an increasing number of points. Thus, in primitive life when man obtained his subsistence from roots and berries, his shelter from rocks and caves, and his clothing from rushes and leaves, his command of the resources of nature was very slight. During all this period he was at the mercy of the elements. Subsequently when he had learned to hunt and to domesticate animals, and when the women had learned to keep a fire, other great steps forward were taken, but when he obtained a permanent relation to the soil and developed agriculture, he added to the momentum of his progress a thousand-fold. In the history of the race man has advanced the practical arts of civilization exactly in proportion as he multiplied the number of points of

¹ Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid, A Factor in Evolution*, New York, 1904, pp. 118-119. Pumpelly, *Explorations in Turkestan*, Vol. I, pp. 13, 16. Huntington, E., *The Pulse of Asia*, pp. 106-132.

² Gregory, Keller, and Bishop, *Physical and Commercial Geography*, Chaps. I-IX. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Secs. 6-21.

³ Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 68. Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, Chap. II, quoted in Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, Chap. X.

contact with nature, and utilized the possibilities of this contact for his advantage. The use of the streams and the seas for transportation, of the winds for propelling ships, of water power for turning machinery, of steam power in its numerous and extensive offices, of electricity in all of its varied services, of the commercial value of minerals, and of new articles of food made him independent. These things give evidence of the fact that man's progress is due to the utilization of all the forces and materials of nature. The story of civilization has been one of more and more complete understanding of nature, of man's adaptation to nature, and therefore the more perfect subjection of her powers for man's benefit.

Attachment to the Soil. — Beginning with a very loose attachment to the soil, man has come to an ownership of the soil in fee simple. At first the primitive man owned no land. It was merely the hunting ground of the group; each individual member of the group took from it what he wanted. There was only group ownership and for the wandering, pastoral Bedouin tribes that was so loose that it was often disputed. The group was here to-day and there to-morrow. Ownership focused now about a well-watered old glacial delta in a rapidly drying-up plateau, as in the case of the long-buried cities so recently brought to light in Eastern Turkestan,¹ now about a spring in a desert, as in the Arabia of the Nomads, and again about a clearing in the forest or a *tun* or hill easily defended. The pastoral or tillable land about this center was the group's possession so long as they could hold it by force. That was the beginning of a closer attachment to the soil. Feudal agrarian relations grew up partly on the basis of pastoral feudalism and partly on the newly developed emphasis upon cultivation of the soil.²

Through his permanent attachment to the soil man was enabled to develop a distinct and separate class of social services. It aided the tendency already strong towards the segregation of families into separate permanent homes and thus developed family life, which furnished the strongest element in social order. The close proximity of more people than could possibly

¹ Pumpelly, *Explorations in Turkestan*, Vol. I.

² Giddings, *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 467-473, and *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 267-269.

be supported by pastoral industry taught respect for mutual rights and established duties, for higher socialization takes place only when people are brought into close personal relationship. Under such circumstances custom changes into law; powers of government become differentiated and established; the division of labor in industry prevails; and society is divided into interdependent groups, each having a common relationship with the general social body. But so important is this attachment to the soil in determining the character of civilization that its history would reveal the fundamental characteristics of social life. Thus the tribal method of occupation, the village community, the feudal system, the manorial system, and the ownership of land in fee simple, are so many different economic bases of social relationships.

The Various Uses of Land. — In man's choice of land the three chief considerations are position, fertility, and mineral products. The first has reference to situation and also to sheer standing room. The relation of the population to the soil and its distribution give rise to many distinct social phenomena. It would seem at first thought that there would be ample room for the millions that inhabit the globe, but their distribution and the means of support afforded by natural features and resources cause the population to arrange itself in various centers, pressing more and more together on certain small territories until at length such cities as New York and Chicago are formed. This crowding of the population into congested groups has a vast influence in the development of social relationships. Villages in fertile valleys, the great cities of manufacture and trade, and the mining towns that spring up in a single night are made by people attracted by the lure of commonly appreciated advantages there to be found. The result of this is increased land values rising in some instances to enormous figures. Thus the land on lower Broadway in New York sells for hundreds of dollars per square foot simply because there is demand for it by many people for commercial and social purposes. On the other hand, in the Far West hundreds of acres may be bought for the price of a single foot on Broadway.

Because man may obtain from the soil the means whereby he may satisfy his wants, he seeks to possess it. Grain, vegetables, and live stock for food, trees and forests for houses and

furniture and various mechanical uses are all yielded from the riches of the soil. Likewise man obtains from beneath the soil gold and silver, iron and coal, and all the minerals for mechanical services. Thus a general human demand for the products of certain soils causes the aggregation of population and brings all types of society into accord with the uses made of the soil and its products. Every increase in population which causes an increase in demand for the products of the land augments the value of land and often leads to changes in the uses to which it is put.

Increase of Population. — In primitive society tribes were obliged to go where the food supply existed, and consequently when a tribe exhausted the food supply there was division, colonization, or migration. The increase in the food supply by the use of a new variety of food frequently changed conditions so that it was not necessary to migrate. The same effect was produced by the discovery of processes by which some natural product hitherto not fit for food could be used for food. Such a discovery was the use of fire by primitive man in the preparation of food. By that means not only was food made more palatable and more easily digested, as in the case of meats, thus releasing energy for social purposes, but it increased the food value of many products, such as the starchy foods, and rendered edible others which up until then had been almost, if not entirely, worthless as food.¹ Moreover, with the adoption of agriculture food supplies were increased. Domestication of animals leading gradually to breeding for a definite purpose was another step which increased the food supply and made certain semi-desert parts of the earth's surface available for human habitation. The development of transportation and the practice of exchanging the products of one part of the world for those of another part have further increased the ability of the world to support a larger population. New inventions, furthermore, in agriculture, stock breeding, and in manufacture, new methods of organization both on farm and in factory, have further increased the available food supply. These, and many similar facts, also explain the concentration of ever larger aggregations of people in one small area, as in New York and

¹ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Sec. 26. Starr, *Some First Steps in Human Progress*, Chap. III.

London, because each draws its sustenance from a large territory. If the population of New York City was limited for its food supply to the territory within one hundred miles, most of its people would starve within a few months.

The Efforts to Satisfy Wants the Basis of Society. — Many different theories have been advanced regarding the basis of society. Some have tried to establish kinship or blood relationship as the foundation. Others have insisted that the race idea, which is only an extension of this, is the formal basis of society. Again, others have held that religion is the great motive resulting in the establishment of huge social bodies. Some others have held that conflict is the cause of social development, and still others that social contact is the basis of society. It must be apparent, however, that man is moved in social matters by two sets of factors, physical conditions either limiting or stimulating his organism, and emotional impulses arising from within his own organism, stimulated and given direction by the environing physical and social influences. Two great physical instincts man possesses in common with all animals, the hunger and the sex instincts. The physical environment plays an important part in giving direction to his activities. He has been forced here and there by physical influences and through their operation he has found himself associated with his fellows who were influenced in a similar manner. For example, the storm causes people to seek the same shelter, the stream draws them to the same spot, and they meet on the best hunting ground. In seeking to satisfy hunger and to avoid the discomforts of inclement weather, primitive men were forced together, sometimes into companies. The sex instinct and the desire for companionship operated powerfully upon primitive men to cause them to congregate together. Where they should gather depended largely upon physical conditions. Without forgetting that sometimes a land poor in food supplies forced men to separate into small groups, watercourses, teeming lakes and rivers, game-filled forests, and plains strewn with herds of animals good for food were attractions which often caused primitive men to converge. Mountain barriers, deserts, and broad seas determined bounds beyond which even hunted men could not go. Ever acting with the impulse of hunger were the social instincts, — the attraction of the novel in sex and the mys-

terious but alluring adventure of establishing companionship with the unknown stranger more or less like himself. Aggregations were thus easily formed, impelled by such instincts, and by the favoring influence of climate and soil, mountain, stream, and ocean.

The Survival of the Social Group. — The character of the group, however, is always dependent to a considerable degree upon the nature of the country within which it has been formed. The ultimate determinant of the composition of a group of people is the physical characteristics of the place where people congregate and form in social groups of a permanent character. In their bearing upon the nature of the social groups naturally nurtured by them the various physical environments may be divided into four different kinds, as pointed out by Giddings, viz., a poorly endowed region isolated by natural barriers, one poorly endowed but easy of access and egress, a richly endowed but isolated region and one richly endowed and readily accessible.¹ In the first the population will be formed by the natural birth rate rather than by immigration and therefore will be relatively homogeneous in blood. Whether it increases will depend on the relation of the birth rate to the death rate. In the second kind of country the vigorous, alert spirits will emigrate, but there will be few immigrants. The population, again, will be homogeneous in blood. In both cases there will be little or no group conflict, the result of intermixture. The tendency in the population in the first case will be inbreeding, but with a slower deterioration than in the latter; in the latter rather rapid degeneration both in stock and in culture will occur. Examples of the first may be seen in Greenland, Central Thibet, and Central Australia, and of the latter in many of the New England rural districts whence the former inhabitants emigrated to better lands. In the third kind of environment, such as is exemplified in the Hawaiian Islands and Central Africa, one finds again a genetic group of one blood, but large in numbers. It is a variety of this kind of environment which has furnished the migrations of history. Let such an environment change its character by reason of either a gradual desiccation or of a sudden

¹ Giddings, "A Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, Third Series, Vol. V No. 2, pp. 151, 152; *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 68, 118-121.

failure of crops, and the sturdier and more restless elements of the population will surge forth in search of better habitats. The fourth kind of environment, typified by such regions as the Nile valley, the Shenendoah valley of Virginia, and the fertile fields of our own Gulf States, or better still the great Mississippi valley, attracts people from everywhere. This makes for a highly mixed population, made up of the strongest and most venturesome spirits from all parts of the world.

After the social group had been fully formed so that it had a permanent identity and its numbers had increased sufficiently to crowd its habitat, it began its career of struggle for the soil with other groups. If the group represented a vigorous racial stock and was successful in locating under favorable circumstances, it had many opportunities for survival. The larger and stronger group was, by its vigor and foresight, sure to locate in the best territory. However, if through accident a strong racial stock was forced to remain for a period of time under less favorable circumstances, the opportunities for success were much decreased. On the other hand, if a race lacking in vigor of body or in intellect should locate in the most fertile district and with the most favorable environment, the opportunities for survival would be even less than that of the vigorous race which settled under unfavorable circumstances, because the well-directed effort of man is the prime factor in his survival. Hence, where a race of low vitality locates on a barren soil or is thrust back on poor hunting grounds its chance for survival is very small. The history of races shows how thousands of these groups are thrust aside by stronger races and perish, leaving no record of civilization. The results of land occupation, therefore, will depend largely on the size and activity of the social group which settles upon it. If the group be strong and vigorous, it moves more rapidly in subduing nature and bringing to its support her various bounties.

The Natural Races. — Everywhere we find in contrast the so-called natural races and the civilized races. By natural races we mean those which have not reached any high degree of civilization, although some of them may have the capacity for progress. Wherever races have developed and become civilized they have met in their migrations these natural races. Whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa, the migrations of the stronger tribes

have encountered a population of lower grade. The American continent was covered with these natural races which had not yet entered the pale of civilization when the Europeans landed there. Some of them, like the Peruvians, the Aztecs, the Pueblos, the Cliff Dwellers, and the Mound Builders, have left some records of the beginnings of culture,¹ Art and industry, religion and government had been developed to a considerable extent, but a great majority of the living tribes of the New World were either stationary or degenerating at the time of their first contact with European races. They occupied intermittently nearly all the land areas of America. They used them mostly for hunting purposes, so that their land tenure was of a very primitive sort, usually consisting of nothing more than temporary occupancy. Tribal ownership prevailed with the exception that in some small villages a family had the right, for the time being, to the soil on which it built its wigwam or hut. However, the beginnings of a settled agriculture were made among some of them, and the evolution of political organization was developing when the coming of the whites stopped the process of evolution. For example, the Iroquois, and probably some of the other American Indians, had developed a gentile confederacy of tribes.² They were undergoing the transformations through which the Greek tribes had gone in the prehistoric period. Had they been permitted to continue their development without interruption by the whites, it is probable that they would have developed, after a time, a civilization of a high type. The achievements of some of the Central and South American tribes in architecture certainly point in that direction.

During a long period the tribes continued to migrate or kept changing their locations. However, there was not so much real migration as is generally supposed, because the tribes had two methods of occupation. One was the territory where their villages, pasture lands, and permanent hunting grounds were located, and the other was the territory claimed by them for hunting purposes. At different seasons of the year they were found going from their villages to these hunting grounds and back. It was out of contention over these less permanent abodes

¹ *National Geographic Magazine*, Vol. XXI, pp. 596-621, 1002-1020; Vol. XXIV, pp. 315-338, 403-573.

² Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York, 1878, Chap. V.

that most of the Indian wars originated. In the migrations of tribes, often when the stronger invaded the territory of the weaker, the former settled down in tribal ownership of the soil, which it held for the good of all. This is true even among semi-civilized groups like the early Greeks, the Romans, or the Teutons, in their migrations.

Habitable Land Areas.—The lands of the world are considered either habitable or uninhabitable, but these are really relative terms, for the habitability of land areas depends upon the stage of civilization and the standard of life prevailing in the various countries of the world. There are unoccupied territories that could be made to support a meager population. Many low tribes lead a miserable existence on certain barren soils or on inferior hunting grounds. Some of the arid land west of the Mississippi River, generally considered uninhabitable, has been subdued and utilized through the science and indomitable efforts of a civilized race. The territory of New England supports a high civilization largely on account of the character and energy of the people who brought with them the arts and industries of a civilized life. Many of the mountain ranges and their approaches will not permit a thickly settled population and, indeed, in some instances, practically forbid the permanent habitation of man. On the other hand, the fertile valleys of the Mississippi and of other great rivers permit a gradually increasing population of great density. Mankind is constantly searching out such fertile spots and developing all their resources to support a large population.

The Settlement of Tribes.—The Indian tribes of North America had spread over nearly the whole territory. The great Algonquin tribe occupied nearly the whole of British America and extended into the boundaries of the United States, covering the New England states and the northern Mississippi valley; the Iroquois tribes occupied New York and a part of North Carolina, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia. On the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains was the great Siouan tribe, and the southwestern part of the United States was occupied by the Shoshonean tribe. The Athapascans occupied the northwestern part of North America and a part of the territory in the extreme southwest of the United States.

Other tribes were located on different territories of the United

States, a large number of them clustering along the Pacific coast. They all showed the effects of migrations and wars in the struggle for territory. While they occupied large areas their centers of population were along the streams and in the fertile valleys, following, like civilized man, the sources of food supply and the natural lines of travel. Very few of this vast body of natives could be considered sedentary. Most of them were located in Arizona and New Mexico. Possibly also a few of the Iroquois tribe and some of the ancient Mound Builders in the southern part of the United States occupied permanent habitations. When the Europeans came to America their migrations followed the same natural routes as those followed by the natives. Their most densely populated groups were located in the districts most densely populated by the Indians. The streams were followed, the valleys occupied, and subsequently the great plains.

In view, however, of the extensive migrations by individuals which have occurred in the last one hundred years among civilized nations one is tempted to say that the movements of the American Indian tribes or even the historic migrations of the Aryans in comparison were but pigmy affairs, and that these primitive peoples were relatively settled in their life as compared with modern peoples. Nevertheless, there is a great difference between the two migrations. The migrations of the Indians and of the peoples in Europe in historic times were group affairs, while modern migration is predominantly an individual matter. When comparing individuals, one can say that there is more movement to-day than at any previous time. When, however, we think of groups, we must say that the tribes of American Indians, of Arabian Bedouins, and of Aryan peoples were less settled on the land than are our modern peoples with their highly organized governments which give permanence to a population even when the individual constituents of that population are constantly and swiftly changing. The wit of man in the face of the loosening of the former immemorial bond of kinship has caught at the device of substituting for it settlement within a given geographic area combined with a sharpening of the consciousness of political unity. An absolute prerequisite of political stability is attachment of the social group to a definite territory.

Growth of Population in Relation to Land Areas. — The extent and character of the land has always been a controlling influence in the development of population, not only on account of the limitations of the food supply, but also on account of the union of various tribes and groups into a more compact and integrated body. Here, as elsewhere, the impelling forces of nature have a vast influence in advancing social union. If, for example, the land is broken by mountains and valleys so that people in the different valleys are kept apart from each other, social integration will be retarded. In fact, differentiation will set in. The language will vary in the different valleys in course of time, customs will become different, modes of thought and codes of conduct will grow up, varying within degrees in each of the isolated groups from those prevailing in the others. Good examples of such social variation are to be seen among the inhabitants of the various valleys of the German and Swiss Alps and of the Kentucky mountains.

But especially has population been limited by land areas when there was no room for expansion, for then it must be limited in its resources for supporting life. When the food supply, with the method of utilization in vogue, would support no larger population, either new methods of increasing the food supply were found, or the standard of living was lowered, or else the population expanded beyond its earlier boundaries. Colonization has usually grown out of the pressure of population upon food supply furnished by the area occupied in comparison with the real or reputed possible supply to be found elsewhere. The Greeks colonized when there was an overcrowding of the population, the barbarians of the North invaded the Roman territory when their own territory would not well support them with their existing mode of life. The great modern movement of elements in the populations of various countries of Europe offers a modern instance. On the other hand, the intensive agriculture of the Nile Valley in ancient times and of the valleys of Indian and Chinese rivers to-day has made it possible for a small area to support an enormous population. Often, however, as in the case of the Chinese and the inhabitants of India, a lowering of the standard of living and intensive farming have been the double alternative to emigration.¹

¹ Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, Chap. IV.

Various Forms of Land Tenure. — The history of land tenure reveals various prominent influences in social development. When the tribe settles down upon the soil and owns it and controls it without any individual ownership of the land, there is always a limitation placed upon man's individual effort. There is a tendency for all to hold the property in common and likewise a tendency toward democracy so far as property is concerned. It also develops a closely integrated social group that wields absolute authority. Forms and customs prevail and are perpetuated because of the dominance of tradition as a method of social control. In the old village life we find a little variation because permanent ownership of the home or house lot exists for the family and the small family group develops its independent life more truly than where tribal ownership prevails in its entirety. In both forms, however, community cultivation of the soil is involved. Under this system there is no incentive to the cultivator to do more than "skin" the land, for no one knows whether in next year's allotment he will have the same piece to cultivate as he had last year.¹ Before great progress in agriculture can be made some form of land tenure by which the land can be held and cultivated by the same individual year after year must arise. Two forms of such tenure did arise, tenancy for years and ownership in fee simple. The old Roman laws developed from land holding gave character to the entire Roman policy. The basis of feudal society rested upon the system of feudal land tenure. The great farms and estates of England and Scotland were conducive to the development of aristocratic government, while the small, individual holdings of America, if persisted in, would insure democracy forever.

Land tenure has usually been of a communal nature among primitive tribes, but the individual system early developed out of it. Wherever individual possession has been recognized, there has always existed a great diversity in the size of the holdings. Large and small holdings have existed side by side, although in "most instances the tendency has been to increase the large holdings and to develop a landed aristocracy.

¹ Gibbins, *Industry in England*, New York, 1906, p. 41. Warner, *Landmarks of English Industrial History*, London, 4th ed., p. 44.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Trace the origin and growth of the various settlements in your county, showing what physical and geographic features had to do with the establishment of the various villages and cities of the county.
2. Why was Virginia settled before Ohio?
3. What were the geographical features which determined the location of the railroad in your city or village?
4. Show how a "backwoods community" of which you may know has been made different by physical conditions so far as the character of the people is concerned.
5. Account for the backwardness of the Kentucky mountaineers on the basis of the influence of physical conditions.
6. Point out specific ways in which the White Man who dispossessed the Red Man was more closely attached to the soil.
7. What physical reason is there which helps to make land in New York City worth thousands of dollars per front foot, while land on a fertile prairie of the Central West is worth only a hundred dollars per acre?
8. Show what physical conditions predetermined America to be a country of a very composite population — a very "melting pot" of the nations.
9. Show that the physical factors alone are inadequate to explain social phenomena, by indicating the reasons why the White Man is able to sustain a very much larger population in the United States than was the Indian.
10. Why does individual tenure of land make for the betterment of a country rather than the communal tenure of Europe in the Middle Ages?
11. Take a city block and a rural square mile and compare them as to the proportion of the occupants who live in rented places in each and the proportion who own the places they occupy.
12. Compare the results as to exhaustion of the soil and careful farming in the modern rental tenure of farms with the same points in the communal tenure of land on a manor in Medieval Europe.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL ACTIVITIES

Social Forms Preceded by Social Action. — It is evident from every side that social forms have been developed from social action. Just as the tiny clam grows and builds his house over him in the form of a shell, so each social action creates a certain social form about it. No established law or rule of action appears until first the need for it has been occasioned by the action of individuals or groups. Indeed, in most cases the action precedes its formal acknowledgment as well as the formal establishment of an institution. The social activities, like those of an individual, result from the endeavor of the social group to adapt itself to its environment in order to secure the satisfaction of certain felt social needs. We judge of the composition of society by its activities, and of its organs or parts by the functions of such organs or parts. Ward asserts that the purpose of organization is function and thus he holds that the performance of social activities is the object of human institutions.¹ But primarily the social activities were merely to satisfy human desire and, incidentally, permanent human institutions composing the social structure were created. After the unconscious creation of the social structures the conscious social effort appeared and under its direction the structures were changed and improved by the conscious direction of society.

Feeling and Restraint. — The first general effort of man arises primarily from the sources of sensation. The sense of hunger causes him to make an effort to satisfy it. The pain of cold leads him to seek warmth by changing location, or else by making shelter. The desire for companionship induces him to seek associates. The emotions of fear and love prompt him to act

¹ "The function is the end for which a mechanism is constructed." — WARD, *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, pp. 180, 181. Cf. Cooley, *Social Organization*, New York, 1909, p. 21.

in certain directions to satisfy his desires. Primarily self-interest was the only point involved, but by a process of social selection or a conscious weeding out of excessively self-seeking individuals by the majority of the group,¹ this gradually developed into a general or social interest. Feeling came to be modified by social restraint, which represents one of the primary social activities. The socialization of the individual's egoistic feelings doubtless was also furthered by the advantage for group survival rendered by self-restraint in the interest of the group. Even in animals this restraint has been developed, partly the outgrowth of a prolonged infancy and partly of natural selection.² The instinct for the preservation and perpetuation of the individual was soon enlarged into the desire for the preservation and perpetuation of the social group. The ultimate justification of society as a whole can only be the superior advantages which association gives for survival and happiness. If association inevitably leads to the destruction of the individual, society and all its ways will cease to be. That it has flourished among human kind is a silent but cogent testimony that society means superior opportunities for social beings to live and perpetuate their kind.

While we now may look to the completed social structure with all its combined activities to find its ultimate purpose, this was not recognized by man in his primitive social activities. He went about following his natural desires and spent his efforts to satisfy his physical and social wants without any purpose to build a social structure. Viewed from the present standpoint, however, it is easy to perceive how these independent and individual activities, directed only to immediate ends, have worked together in a process which Ward calls "synergy"³ to produce a social structure with its various parts and accompanying activities.

Pleasurable sensation arose in a state of blind, non-purposive Nature because it served to stimulate the functioning processes necessary for the survival of the creature. However, so intense is such sensation, that, unless restraints are imposed, the

¹ See Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, pp. 344-348, or Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress*, pp. 641-646.

² Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, New York, 1894, pp. 230-318.

³ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 171.

process which it promotes — the functioning of the organism — is overdone to the disadvantage of that organism. For example, the pleasant taste of food was of advantage because on account of it the animal of too low intelligence to know that food was necessary to survival would perform the otherwise rather wearisome function of eating. But if a man continues to eat just because food has a pleasant taste and overeats, he will have dyspepsia, a sign that his digestive organs are not functioning properly.

So, to sum up, in the social world pleasant feelings arising from association under certain conditions promote the formation of social bonds which make for the survival of the group. However, those feelings unrestrained within certain bounds destroy their own ends — social functioning — hence the restraint of feeling brings about social order, and thus builds the social structure.¹

Preservation of the Social Group. — Gradually the preservation of the individual passes into concern for the preservation of the social group. A little nucleus of group-conscious individuals begins to work as a unit for the preservation of its own existence. Conscious social action by each individual of each group takes the place of instinctive action and is directed to group preservation. The community interest in the preservation of the group is seen in the development of war for defense, where all are united in a common enterprise. Such group concern may be seen also in the development of a government where individuals are working together in the preservation of common interests. The observance of custom causes them to act as a unit and each individual who comes into the group through birth or adoption is subjected to the customs and traditions of the group and finds himself controlled, not by one individual, but by a higher power — the will of the group — to which all must be subordinate. His feelings and desires are restrained, not only by the natural environment, but by a newly created social environment. Gradually this restraint is embodied in decrees, laws, or rules of action which are formally declared necessary for the preservation of the group.

Moreover, in economic activities also there appears a great development of conscious coöperation. The individual prima-

¹ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, pp. 119-135.

rily sought food independently and regardless of his fellows. The food supply at first instinctively and then consciously became a matter of social determination. Men hunt in groups and share the product of their combined labors. A whale found upon the shore or captured in the surf belongs to the family or tribe and not to the individual who discovers it. The field which is protected and defended by all belongs to the group, and consequently its products partake essentially of communal ownership. The building of the house is usually done with many hands, representing the entire group, and hence sometimes we have a communal ownership and use of the house. Although individual activity remains, group activities become increasingly important. Through this associated activity, and only through it, was man's present stage of development possible. In the course of social evolution these activities of social order and economic life expand until we now have a complex and highly differentiated form of political and economic life.

The Perpetuation of the Social Group. — The love of life and its converse, the fear of death, have been the two great motives at the basis of the evolutionary struggle. These instinctive attitudes, however, are not alone in their primacy as fundamentals which explain the survival of the human race. They give rise to flight and other methods common to animals and men and adapted to promote escape from death; they give rise to conflict with foes; to attack of prey for food, with its joy of battle; and to the activities which end in the satisfaction of immediate desires.

They are supplemented by another instinct necessary for the perpetuation of race, the sexual. It is doubtful whether, primarily, human beings desire offspring. But, following the desire for companionship which gradually develops in all social animals, and for sexual intercourse, the desire for offspring appears. There is evidence that low down in the scale of animal life the parents had no concern for the offspring. Yet in some species of such low forms as fishes, there appears a care for the nesting place, in certain higher animals maternal concern for the eggs and the young, but paternal concern is much weaker among many species of animals, as may be seen in the case even of cattle. In gregarious animals, however, a beginning of paternal regard is to be seen in the care which a gander and

certain other males take of their females and the young. Even among human beings there is a wide difference in father care between the lower grades of social development and the highest grades. This growth in parental care doubtless developed owing to a process of natural selection and resulted in the better survival of those for whom their parents had manifested concern. Obviously such concern in most cases was of advantage to the preservation of the species. Even yet sentiment, that child of instinct and tradition, rather than reason, is the most effective weapon of appeal for the care of the young.

This instinctive concern for the offspring has produced important results in the history of mankind. Undoubtedly the child is the real cause of the home. Its long period of helplessness has caused the building of shelter and the construction of a permanent habitation. Around the child have been grouped all the early social affiliations. Clustered about the home idea we discover a variety of motives for the perpetuation of the whole group. Living together develops a tender feeling and sentiment among all inmates of the home. This is followed by family pride, which seeks to perpetuate the group and to cause it to survive the attacks of other groups. The ethnic idea becomes prominent and out of it springs national life with patriotism.

In the course of social evolution there appears, finally, a conscious effort for the perpetuation of the species. Certain customs and laws regulate marriage relationships. In some instances individuals are forbidden to marry outside the larger ethnic groups and also are forbidden to marry near relatives within the group, but are forced to take wives from the larger social divisions within the society, although it is uncertain how much of such regulations was consciously prompted by the perception of the advantage such arrangements gave for survival and how much by accidental taboos of primitive religion. Doubtless, however, to-day such regulations as well as laws against infanticide, child labor, and neglect of children are consciously directed towards race welfare. In a thousand ways the social group seeks to protect itself and to perpetuate its existence. It must be constantly on the defensive against external foes who seek to destroy it and also watchful to seize every advantage to ward off disease and to establish such laws

and customs as will be conducive to the perpetuation of life. This social activity is absolutely essential to the existence of society and never ceases its operations in the highest and most perfected forms of social life.

The Advancement of the Group. — Many efforts are made in several directions to raise the plane of living and to increase the efficiency of the social group. Among these may be mentioned all attempts to improve the physical conditions of mankind. The increase of the food supply, the invention of means of storing and preserving food, and the improvement of its quality, lead to a more constant and regular supply of the necessities of physical life, do away with the loss of energy from hunger, and give the group leisure to improve itself in other ways.¹

Scientific discovery for the improvement of the material conditions of society represents one of its chief activities. Also the training of the physical man and the protection from disease involves another group of social activities making for social development.

Equally important for the advancement of society is the recreative life, the games and the amusements which were of great variety in primitive society as well as among civilized peoples. Through the ages not only of the human but also of the animal world, there has existed the joy of play. Only recently, however, has our philosophy found any justification for the "foolish" practice. At last it has been discovered that the play element is essential to the highest development and the best welfare of the community. Hence this phase of social activity is important for the advancement of the race.

Moral and Æsthetic Activities. — Every well-organized community has an unwritten code of moral law which has much to do with the unity and strength of society. Societies are organized for the express purpose of advancing the moral standard of the community. Such are temperance societies, those for the prevention of cruelty to animals, and the large number of rescue and charitable societies which seek the betterment of particular classes of unfortunates. Every movement which seeks to bring about a more socially efficient association of individuals and to increase the integrity and adjustment of the mass to better social ends elevates society to a higher plane and adds

¹ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Sec. 26.

to it strength and vigor. Such efforts not only make for a lessening of social waste, but add to the labor capacity of the community, increasing its longevity and offering greater opportunity for survival of the ethnic group.

Very closely allied to the moral are the æsthetic activities which seek to elevate taste and to inculcate a love of the beautiful. No doubt the general effect of the love of the beautiful is increased satisfaction in life. Moreover, the love of the beautiful has close connection with a passion for those social purposes and standards which we call the truth, and which work for the advancement of the race by promoting social adjustment to better ideals, while the general effect of ugliness is toward degeneration. Here, as elsewhere, however, it is the proper use of the instrument that yields the highest reward, for the use of art may be directed toward immorality as well as toward morality. It is said that in Hungary, one effect of music is to develop a lazy emotional life, and many people have held that the excess of music in Germany, with its perpetual play on the emotions, has a tendency to destroy the power of inventive and logical thought. This is psychologically what is to be expected, for any stirring of the emotions — those social engines of prime importance — which does not result in action results in the atrophy of that natural connection between the emotional life and activity, and therefore in social degeneration. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the popular "ragtime" music, although furnishing recreation to the faculties, has a beneficial effect upon the community. It usurps the function of good music. It also tends to appeal to such naïve and grotesque tastes that its effects soon pall. Further, it does not afford that diversification of satisfactions which best develops one's nature. However, the general effect of art is to improve the ideals, to motivate the social actions of the community, and to develop those activities which lead to the study of the beautiful in nature and art and which are essential to the progress of the social group.

Cultural Activities. — Culture has no standard definition, but in a sociological sense, besides implying the growth of our faculties with increased attainment of knowledge and appreciation of art, it implies an elevation of belief and a transformation of conduct. The social activities most directly enlisted in culture of the group are religious, educational, and scientific.

Of the many thousands engaged in religious propaganda, all are directly or indirectly attempting to change religious belief. Now religious belief has its most intimate connections with the emotions rather than with the reason. That gives it its peculiarly important function in society. It becomes a mighty dynamic force for social action. In all stages of social evolution it has played a very important part in society building. Religion, moreover, has to do primarily with belief and secondarily with conduct. To change the belief from a lower to a higher form, that is, from a less to a more socially efficient form, and to bring the conduct of society into subordination to a belief is the vital process of religion so far as its effect on society is concerned. Since belief has a most vital connection with action, in this capacity it is a powerful social organizer. While a society might exist without it, nevertheless it has always been an important element in the process of integrating the social life, and the periods of decline in positive belief of nations have been periods of decline of national greatness.

The educational activities are the most positive and direct agencies for the advancement of society through the process of culture. To persuade people to supplant ignorance by intelligence, to balance the emotions with reason and thus give them rational direction and control, to prepare the young for efficient industry and citizenship and to elevate the ideals of life, are the principal functions of the educational activities. It is in this field that the conscious activity of society is best seen. Through education society seeks to force its own conduct into new channels of action. In the highest types of modern society the organized educational forces represent the most universal social activity that may be discerned. They make for the unity and solidarity of society and are the chief methods to insure society's adaption to changing social conditions.

The scientific movement is a part of the educational; for while the object of science is to find out truth, its ultimate purpose is to make it useful to society. No sooner is a scientific truth discovered than great effort is made to bring it to a utilitarian basis. Science has thus become necessary to the material welfare of the human race. It is the handmaid of human betterment. When a tribe adopts modern civilization and fails to utilize the knowledge of life that science gives, it

declines rather than advances. This principle is observed in the contact of savage or barbarous tribes with modern civilization. Failing to master and employ the full force of modern science in their adopted mode of life, they degenerate in the presence of civilized arts. They learn the vices of civilization while refusing to adopt the teachings of civilized science and morals. The result is social downfall. Better that the rude savage have nature as a guide than come in contact with civilization without the application of scientific truth to the conduct of life.

Anti-social Activities. — As there are social activities which make for social advancement, so there are many activities which obstruct it, such as the activities of bands of thieves or burglars, street gangs, counterfeiterers, "thugs," "grafters," etc. As those activities which are social tend to result in social progress, these activities which we must denominate as "anti-social" tend to destroy group life, or thwart constructive social programs. Genetically many anti-social activities must be explained as survivals of past social practices which later social developments have rendered obsolete and harmful to the newborn social conscience. They illustrate that "the good is the enemy of the best," and provide evidence that clearer social vision has rendered "ancient good uncouth." Moreover, they may point to a lack of perfect adjustment in the later social activities and inventions to the needs of the people. The saloon, the low dance hall, with all their low and evil practices, the street gangs of city boys, and the neighborhood gangs of country boys with their pranks and fights illustrate this point. They show that some social needs of the people of the community are being met in anti-social ways by reason partly of the fact that there are lacking for the satisfaction of those needs means that are socially constructive in their results. Organizations grow out of these activities against which the social group in self-defense must exert its most potent, preventive, repressive, and curative methods.

Coöperative Association. — Much has been said previously in this volume about coöperation and it will suffice here to mention it in connection with the general social activities. It represents a unity of purpose and action in accomplishing ends. The working of people in groups for a particular purpose involves a

large number of social activities making for the advancement of society. Here one must distinguish the immediate from the ultimate end. A group of people organized for the purpose of developing a large body of iron ore are all desirous of making an income, but the real service to society is found in the production of a volume of useful metal which will improve the material and probably the social conditions of the whole community. When an entrepreneur borrows capital, hires men, and leases ground, he is bringing capitalists, laborers, and landowners into a combination of effort for his own profit. However, under proper economic conditions he and these other beings are working together, often unconsciously, but none the less truly, in a coöperative enterprise of great benefit to the whole of society.

Such coöperation is indirect, but coöperation for the improvement of society may be direct when a body of men organize themselves into a civic league, to advance the social and political interests of the community, or when a body of women form a club with social purposes. This kind of coöperation is common and represents a distinct group of social activities. Here we approach the idea of the social mind with its concert of feeling, thinking, and willing for the welfare of the community. This is the highest generalization of social coöperative activity. It depends upon public conscience and public will for its action. Social activities in their highest forms are psychological in nature. This subject will be further discussed in the chapter on Psychical Forces.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show how in the early history relief of the poor in your country social activities preceded social forms.
2. How would you explain the fact that in early Iowa history laws providing for poorhouses preceded the building of any such institutions? (See Gillin, *History of Poor Relief Legislation in Iowa*, p. 183.)

3. After reading Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 119-135, supply instances from your own observations in elections, church revivals, and church quarrels, in tariff and tax controversies, in the history of women's clubs, and in the conduct of nations showing how feelings furnish the motive power of social action.

4. Describe in your own community a social action inspired by intense feelings upon which serious restraints had to be placed in order to further the success of the action.

5. Describe some present-day laws which restrain the individual in the interests of the preservation of the group. Some customs.

6. What evidence does "race suicide" supply in support of the assertion that instinct rather than reason must be depended on for the perpetuation of the race? Point out the fallacy, if any, in such argument.

7. Make a list of all the activities in your community which have for their purpose the advancement of the group.

8. Classify the following activities: A church, a county fair, a temperance campaign, a social survey, a city planning exhibit, university extension work, a baseball game, a political campaign, a woman's club.

9. If love of the beautiful has a close connection with virtue and truth, show the social justification of the movement for city planning, housing laws, art galleries, training in domestic science and art, and good music.

10. Explain the origin of a boys' gang, showing how that organization satisfies a social need. Show how it often achieves an anti-social result.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Meaning of Social Organization. — Social organization is represented by the various parts of society in so far as they function with one another. When any group organized for a specific purpose becomes essential to social life or social order in the normal state of society, it becomes a part of the social organization. Thus, for instance, the church as an institution makes itself essential as an instructing and controlling body. So do all trades and businesses, such as the banking business, which perform an essential economic service to the community. Above and over all private social organizations is the state and the various subdivisions which, as a sort of a framework, hold the great social body together in a definite form. Just how this structure has been built up has been suggested in the chapters on social evolution. Each activity, beginning faintly at first, grows stronger and stronger until it builds about itself a definite organic group of people continuing its function in a systematic way.

The explanation just made applies more especially to societies which are somewhat developed. The term "social organization," however, must also be applied to the social relationships to be found in groups much less developed than civilized societies. It must also cover the crude beginnings of social organization. Any fixity of social relations whether the outgrowth of instinct, feeling of likeness, or of conscious social purpose must be characterized as a social organization. The essential idea in a social organization is permanency of social relationships. Sometimes such relations are produced by instinct, sometimes by the pleasurable feelings excited by being in the company of those whom we like, and at other times by the conscious appreciation of certain advantages of such relationships. They may grow out of fear and patronage, congeniality, or even force. Or,

they may develop from a contract entered into by superiors and inferiors or between equals. Social organization includes all sorts of permanent relationships upon any basis whatsoever.

Development of Groups out of Social Aggregations.— Granting that the primal condition of society is a loosely constructed horde, brought together through accident, from following the same desires, or from responding to the same stimuli, how did it happen that this loosely knit group finally became organized? Within this horde, smaller groups must have formed, clustering about a central interest or activity. Sometimes these social bonds centered about the sex interests, sometimes about a strong personality who established bonds of authority and obedience, such as may be seen in tribal and historic feudalism, and in the primitive religious or secret society, and sometimes about economic interests. When it was sexual attraction which brought more definite social relations, gradually the family and home life was built up, with their taboos, customs, and traditions. Likewise, the religious motive causing a repetition of ceremonies finally produced an organized group of people attending to religious services. In various industrial occupations individuals began to work together to secure means of subsistence, they combined in building homes, in games, and in other social activities. All this had a tendency to diversify the life of society.

Necessity of Social Integration.— Each of these small social groups, however, arising about various social interests, came into existence independently of other groups, and integration became necessary. They were often found working at cross purposes socially; the interests of one small group clashed with those of another. In this struggle the paramount interests of the whole body of people, which might be called an aggregation, were often placed in jeopardy, especially in the presence of a hostile aggregation. This made necessary the subordinating of small circles within the group to those interests which meant survival for the whole body of people closely allied. Hence, little by little independent social groups became merged or subordinated into a central organization. This integration brought many of the scattered elements of society into compact union well illustrated by that very highly centralized organi-

zation, the patriarchal family, in which almost complete control centered in one head, who represented the controlling power of the whole. Another example is to be found in the tribe which is formed by many clan groups united for the common purposes of religion, war, and association. The confederating of various tribes into still larger groups also is a continuation of the process of integration that went on through the centuries of development of human society. Nor is this integration, though it may have logically preceded other phases of social development, ever eliminated from the social process. It is a constant factor in society building, recurring in ever larger and larger ways as society becomes more extended. It represents the progress of race unity and solidarity.

Social Composition. — By the term “social composition” sociologists mean those natural divisions of society comprising all ages, sexes, marital conditions, and ethnic relationships which are each self-sufficient for their perpetuation. The term signifies the natural groups of people occupying a common territory, as contrasted with those groupings which are the results of conscious planning and for definite purposes. Examples of social composition are the family groups in modern societies, the kinship groups in primitive societies, the village — or community — groups which have grown up largely on the basis of blood relationship in both primitive and modern societies, the town, the neighborhood, and the state. Social composition predominates in the social organization of the primitive societies; the family, the horde, the tribe, and the village are the characteristic social organizations. On the other hand, in the modern civilized society the constituent society, or a group based upon likeness of interest, and formed for a definite purpose, such as partnerships, and industrial, cultural, and civil corporations, is in the ascendancy. The chief mark of a component society is that it is practically complete in itself, so that it could carry on an independent existence. In a constituent society the groups are interdependent. Under the old régime society was composed of a blood kindred, a development from the family group with the family relationships repeated in different forms and combinations. These various relationships held society together. Gradually the blood ties were supplanted by other social bonds, and society was composed of individuals, each of

whom was connected with the whole group regardless of family relationship. As Giddings has pointed out, this change took place when for blood relationship there was substituted propinquity in the same political area.¹ In both tribal and civil society the social composition may be observed.

It is easy to see that the so-called structure of society is represented by a body of people working for a definite purpose, bound together in psychological and social union with other bodies of people working for different purposes no less definite. The basis of their organization may be custom or tradition on the one hand, or, on the other, a written constitution. A social organization may be a playground group drawn together by a common play interest, a primitive tribe bound together by a common blood, or a highly organized state united together by a written covenant. A group organized consciously into smaller groups on the basis of common social likenesses and interests and these smaller groups in turn integrated by common social purposes into a larger social group like the city or the state represent a much more highly developed organization because the social bonds are purposive and deliberative as compared with the sometimes accidental bonds of the blood group. Both types, however, are included under the term "social organization."

Federated Groups. — All federated groups in primitive societies as well as those which spring up by the coalescence of family groups into hordes come under the category of the social composition rather than that of the social constitution. These various groups do not come together to supplement the work of each other and thus gain social advantages, but they are merely two groups of the same sort with similar purposes and near enough in race to make their union bearable in days when the blood bond was the important social tie. The union of the various Indian tribes about the lakes of central New York was such a federation.² Composition refers to the grouping and character of the population. Magnitude of population, however, is a question that becomes more interesting from the sociological point of view when it concerns a society that has grown out of the primitive state. There may be a conscious effort in com-

¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1900, p. 321.

² Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York, 1878, Chap. V.

ponent societies for social integration which has for its purpose the increase of the aggregation of individuals, and the amalgamation of these individuals into a mass through matrimonial alliances or general social union. Sometimes through alliances of a general economic or social nature several tribes or nations have been united into one society. Efforts have thus been consciously made for the union of elements, which have finally yielded to complete social unity through the processes of socialization. The new group remains largely a component society. The variety of differentiated small social groups within the society work for different aims, but each of these aims is complementary to the aims of the other groups. In this way society develops to the point where the social constitution becomes predominant over the social composition.

Conscious Integration. — The combination of smaller groups into larger ones and the consequent development of an integral society went on during an extended period. Early in the development such growth by the combination of groups was instinctive or at most the result of the recognition of an affinity between the groups. Usually this was based on racial relationships. A time came, however, in the development of every society when it began to become conscious of itself. It then acted as a unit and strove to build itself into a greater society by its own conscious efforts.

Illustration of this change from unconscious, non-purposive to conscious, purposive integration is afforded by the growth of the Hebrew people by the sympathetic coalescence of the various tribes which had settled in Caanan, at first all more or less closely related by blood, and then a little later by their becoming possessed of a conscious desire to form a stronger union and select a king.¹ Similar examples might be multiplied. In fact the history of every important nation in existence to-day as well as of those nations whose history is all that remains supplies illustrations of this process. In different ways each sought to enlarge its territorial boundaries, to defend itself against foreign foes, and to regulate its internal affairs. It enlarged its population by absorbing other families and tribes. This was accomplished usually through conquest or treaty, or perchance by the accidental union of groups.

¹ I Samuel 8: 4-6.

The So-called Social Organism. — By slow degrees there was developed what in the early history of sociology was known as the social organism, a social group made up of subgroups closely related, serving each its own purpose for which it was organized, but articulating with all others in coöperation for the accomplishment of common ends, and therefore forming a social whole. The term "social organism" is only an analogy to help the student to visualize this complex and invisible social reality called a society. It implies members or parts articulating with each other and forming a whole. But this articulation is psychological rather than physical in its nature. Its bonds of organization are common feelings, purposes, aims, and hopes. The articulate body is made up of men and women inspired and held by these purposes, feelings, and hopes. Individuals moving freely by their own volition are nevertheless formed into permanent groups that are perpetuated by a succession of individuals. Thus the group of people performing the banking service are essential to the continuation of the life of a modern society, just as are those who perform the service of exchanging or transporting goods. Those who are engaged in legislative halls, the police force, or the great body of religious teachers, are distinct groups that are working to carry out the activities of society as a whole. Individuals and groups are caught and molded to social purposes and ends by the complex of community interests much as the chemical elements composing the two cells which form the beginning of a new life are caught and built up into a new unity.

Social Organization. — But society is something more than a mere organism; it is an organization. It develops a social activity and exercises a social will in giving individuals their proper place and establishing the rights and privileges of groups, as well as of individuals. The individual man may be said to be a bio-psychic organism, but he is more, for he can organize his own mental and physical forces for a special purpose. The conscious mental effort of society exercised in organizing itself makes it a super-organism, an organization.

Differentiation of Organs or Parts. — After society has achieved a degree of unity it begins to differentiate or separate into new groups. This is noticed especially in the economic world, where it is marked by a division of labor. At first each

individual tries to do everything for himself, then he does only a part, allowing others to do the rest in exchange for what he does for them. Soon there are the hunters, the house builders, the housekeepers, and later the manufacturers and traders. Agriculturists, bankers, transporters, etc., appear and perform separate services. So, too, the medicine man is at first priest and doctor combined; later these services become differentiated and a group of physicians and a group of priests appear. The same differentiation is observed in government, until the legislative, executive, and judicial systems are clearly marked off with all their subdivisions. Thus the interrelated functions are developed.

The Social Constitution. — By this term is meant the organization of a society as made up of interdependent groups of people, each of which groups has a different purpose and each of which therefore serves a different social need. Examples are the economic, educational, religious, and æsthetic groups of a population. Usually these groups are artificial in their origin. Each serves but one social need, while a component society serves all the fundamental social needs necessary to the existence of the group. The constituent elements of society might be called social organs. If we observe society as it is and try to enumerate all the parts of society, we shall see what is meant by these interdependent groups called organs. Here, again, we must hold clearly in mind that the term "organs" is but a figure of speech to aid us in comprehending functions and relationships. According to Spencer, these constituent classes of society are as follows:

First, there is a large economic group which is called the sustaining group because it ministers directly to the physical sustenance of society.¹ It includes those branches of society engaged in producing all forms of goods for the satisfaction of human wants; those that are engaged in the exchanging and transporting of goods, as well as in the transforming industries.

In the second category we have the perpetuating groups, such as the family, whose primary service is to perpetuate the species, and all medical and sanitary societies which seek to preserve life. Then there is the communicating system, so essential in these days to the sustaining organs, including as

¹ See Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 498.

it does all the methods of conveying knowledge, such as the telegraph, the telephone, and the printing press. Books, newspapers, and magazines are primarily means of communicating knowledge.

Very important are those groups which may be recognized as cultural, such as the church, educational institutions, scientific, literary, æsthetic, and ethical societies.

In the making of such classification a group is classified according to its most important action, although it might be classified under several other headings.

Finally, we must mention the highly interesting and essential group known as the regulating and protecting system.¹ Its chief value is found in the creation and maintenance of social order. If we take the United States as an example, its systems would include the international system which establishes the relationship between our nation and others, and maintains an independent national life; the legislative, judicial, and executive institutions of the national government and of the various state governments, the municipal government, the standing army, and the police system. In addition to these we have state education, of which the primary service is not culture, but state protection or social order.

In this connection should be mentioned voluntary association, which has played an important part in establishing social order and protecting groups of people. Among these are labor organizations, insurance companies, fraternal societies, benefit societies, and charity organizations.

Constituent Parts of Society. — The following diagram of the constituent parts of society may be of suggestive value if we remember that the classification is based on the most important function or special service of each organ, although a single organ may have other widely distributed functions.

I. The sustaining organs — economic.

Producing groups.

Extracting.

Transforming.

Transporting.

Exchanging.

¹ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 519.

- II. The perpetuating groups.
 - The family.
 - Medical societies.
 - Sanitary societies.
- III. The communicating systems (essential to economic groups).
 - (a) The printing press and its auxiliaries, books, newspapers, magazines, etc.
 - (b) The telephone.
 - (c) The telegraph.
 - (d) The railways, tramways, motor vehicles, etc.
- IV. The cultural groups.
 - The church.
 - Educational institutions.
 - Scientific societies.
 - Literary, æsthetic, and ethical societies.
 - Social clubs and societies.
 - Recreative societies.
- V. The regulating and protective system.
 - International institutions.
 - The state.
 - Legislative institutions.
 - Judicial institutions.
 - Executive institutions.
 - Police system (broader than executive).
 - State education.
 - Voluntary association.
 - Labor organizations.
 - Insurance companies.
 - Fraternal societies.
 - Benefit societies.
 - Charitable societies and institutions.
 - Political parties.

This analysis might be carried much further by the student, but it serves the present purpose in the form here presented.

Differentiation an Evidence of Progress.¹ — This perpetual process of differentiation and multiplication of constituent groups is a mode of progress. Society grows by the development of a new activity and consequently of a new part. It shows its development in several ways; first, in the specialization of the regulating system in which there is a development of new groups which have for their purpose the establishment

¹ See Chap. VII, Part IV.

of social order and the protection of citizens. This is followed by the specialization of industries in which each group performs a particular service. There is a wider division of labor which continually separates workers into groups. New industries are rapidly developed which add to the number of groups. As culture increases there is a continually growing number of individuals engaged in social activities, who extend their operations in many directions. Thus society—the social body, the social complex—grows by adding new forms and new functions, and also by the development of each special organ. Take, for instance, the service of exchange. How weak and imperfect it was at first, but now in its developed state it represents a large and powerful machine. Or consider, as an example of regulation, that the popular assembly was once a very weak body with few advisory powers, having rather a right of sanction to what had been done without power to change. Its power increased until in such countries as England and the United States the popular assembly is the most important legislative body.

Changes from Homogeneity to Heterogeneity.—This social differentiation gradually changes society from a homogeneous body to a heterogeneous body, from a simple to a complex state, from an indefinite to a definite relationship. These are the essential characteristics of social evolution. The more carefully the functions of the various constituent groups are defined, and the more exact are their operations, the more perfect is the coöperation between these groups and the unity of society. Hence, as there is apparently no limit to this differentiation, society may be said never to be completed. It is enough to determine whether a society has a healthy growth and whether, as compared with other societies, it is making progress along the lines mentioned, viz., perfecting its functions and increasing their number. The test of completeness of social organization is the degree to which it promotes the welfare of the individual.

Each individual may fill many offices and may be a part of many organs, owing to the psychological nature of society. Thus, a very common citizen may be a member of the legislature (regulating), a member of the church (cultural), president of a bank (exchange), a member of a gas company (producing),

a member of the board of regents of a state university (regulative), a member of an insurance company (protective), and a member of a lodge (protective), and thus he may be organized many times over because of the power to adapt the body and the mind to different services in the social organization.

The individual occupies a peculiar position in relation to the social body.¹ He is a part of the organism, but as soon as he dies another takes his place, or, to speak more definitely, performs the service to society which he has given up. Thus society represents a stream of individuals passing through life and out of it, pushing and crowding, coöperating with others for common ends, then departing and being replaced by others.

The Relation of the Individual to the Group. — This serves to explain the peculiar nature of society. In the biological organism each separate bioplast working in the cell builds up one part of the structure in its own locality, but does no more. The particles of the body may die, and be eliminated, and so may the bioplasts, but others take their places and the body is kept in form. But the individual in society is not thus circumscribed as to his activity, hence he may form a part of many social groups. The analysis of society, then, shows that the individuals that compose it may pass from one organ to another on account of the numerous distinct services they may perform. Likewise, the social organization composed of a group of individuals may perform various distinct social services. Such facts as these make it evident that the organic conception of society is but an analogy, albeit a helpful one, especially for beginners in sociology. One must never forget, however, that the analogy between a biological organism and a social group is very imperfect and that society is primarily a psychical organization.

The Primary Group. — The first permanent group that existed and perpetuated itself was the sex, or kindred, group. One can call it the primitive family, though it was very different from our modern family. Durkheim has called this primitive group the "social protoplasm."² It was built primarily on the natural attractions of male and female, and secondarily upon the security insured by the solidarity of a kinship group,

¹ See Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 169.

² See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, New York, 1907, pp. 186, 199, 200.

whether that was metronymic or patronymic. When society had developed to the point where the father or oldest male was looked to as the dominant factor in the group there was the added security guaranteed by the property right of the husband and father in the wife and children. It also gave a permanent protection to the young and united all of the same "blood relationship." In the formal organization of the family the consanguineal attraction was perhaps the greatest force, while religion began, at latest, with the rise of the patriarchal family, to attract and hold the family together around a common altar.

Other Social Organs. — Although the family, understood as the kinship group, is well-nigh universal and brings into relationship nearly all the members of an expanded society, there are other groups representing the reorganization of the individual into separate occupations. In early societies one sees the beginnings of our later differentiation in secret societies, in religious and play groups, in military groups, and even in the small groups based upon sex so well described by Jenks in his *The Bantoc Igorot* and by Webster in his book on *Primitive Secret Societies*.¹ In more developed societies the same thing is seen in the combination of men according to social, business, and political ties. Around all these and many other interests grow up a long line of other special social groups.

Social Relationships. — Neither individuals nor groups make up a society, however, if they are in isolation. To have society social relationships are necessary. Individuals must be bound to each other in some sort of relations both mutual and friendly. Two people gripping each other in a death struggle for each other's life could not be described as a social group; nor could the mere fact that any number of people are grouped together give a basis for the assertion that here we have a society. However much internal dissension there may be, the predominant relations between the individuals and the small groups and cliques gathered together must be coöperative, in short, they must be social relations. The ties by which the various organs of an individual, or even the various parts of his brain, are connected are physical — nerve cells. In social relationships,

¹ Jenks, *The Bantoc Igorot*, pp. 50, 53. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, pp. 1-19

however, in those attenuated, spiritual, but none the less real bonds by which individuals are held together in "the social body," there is almost no physical basis of interrelation — at least, the physical is reduced to a minimum. Language, glances of the eye, worked up into the complex products called traditions, customs, codes, institutions, fashions, ceremonies, play, and constitutions, are the means by which this interchange of mental stimulation takes place and by which individuals are bound together into a living whole. True, there are physical means of communication. By touch, by the glance of the eye, by gesture, and by language transmitted by word of mouth, by writing or by electrical means, the feelings, thoughts, and wishes of the one are conveyed to others. However, the intercommunication and the consequent forming of relationships are no less real than if the means of intercommunication were more material in their nature. Moreover, the existence of a social body, that is, of a number of people held together in relations of coördination and direct or indirect coöperation for certain definite ends, is just as real as the existence of a man's physical body. The main point to be held in mind to prevent confusion of thought is that the relationships which hold the individuals of a social group together are predominantly psychic in nature rather than physical or chemical or biological.¹ On the other hand, in a study of social organization it must be remembered that we are concerned both with the relationships which bind men together and the forms which the social organization may take.

Social Forms. — Social relationships express themselves in what we call social forms. The term "form" is but a name for certain ways in which social relationships bind men together. Did any one ever see a social form? We see men acting in certain ways and from certain motives under the influence of definite forces. They are connected with each other in various relations. We say when they associate together in a certain way that we have one kind of social structure, and when they unite together in another way and from different motives, we call their social relationships by another name. What we really see is human beings associating together in various ways, acting under common influences, moved by similar motives.

¹ Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 140-142.

Only in our thought do we see a social form. It is a concept of relationships.

These social structures assume various shapes. Again we use a term to express an immaterial relationship. They are forms only in our thought. We could call them "kinds" or "types" of structures, and that term might be less liable to misunderstanding. However, sociology has used the term "form" so long that its use will do no harm with this explanation.

There have been several classifications of types of social organization. Spencer in his *Principles of Sociology*, after devoting a considerable part of the first volume to the Data of Sociology and the Inductions of Sociology, treats the remainder of the subject under the head of Institutions. In other words, his work is largely a study of social structure.¹ He treats all social forms as institutions. He has a classification of what he calls social types and constitutions. It is a double classification. He classifies societies as simple, compound, doubly compound, and trebly compound. Secondly, he classifies societies as militant or industrial, etc., according to their predominant activity.²

Another classification which has been proposed is that between sanctioned and unsanctioned forms of societies. The former would correspond with these institutions, or forms of social organization which have obtained the conscious approval of the group. Examples would be the monogamous family in Western Civilization, the state, and such voluntary organizations as have been recognized by the formal action of state authorities. The latter are exemplified by such forms of relationship as the polygamous family in the United States, mobs, gangs, and spontaneous groups. The drawback to this classification is that it is not complete and that it is not clear cut. One cannot easily place in their proper category such groups as the primitive horde and family, or the brothel and saloon of to-day. It is incomplete because there is a distinct difference between an unsanctioned society whose purposes and activities promote the social welfare, and those which are anti-social in their genius.³

¹ See Small, *General Sociology*, p. 112.

² *Principles of Sociology*, Secs. 256-258.

³ Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 345.

Professor Giddings has suggested a number of classifications. One of these is that according to component and constituent societies which we have already noticed. This classification is simple and has the advantage that the forms of societies fit into it in their genetic order of development.¹ Professor Giddings has also developed a psychological classification of methods of association under the categories "of presence" and "in activity." The former is based on common feeling, the latter on similar actions.² However, in his last work he supplemented these simple classifications by another. He divides societies into animal and human, the latter being subdivided into ethnic and civil groups. He prefers, however, a classification on a psychological basis, according to instinctive and rational societies, the former being characteristic of animal, and the latter to a preëminent degree of human societies. Rational societies he further divides into eight groups. See Part. I, Chap. I.

He has also a classification of forms of social organization: (1) The Private and the Public, (2) the Unauthorized and the Authorized (institutions), (3) the Unincorporated and the Incorporated, (4) the Component, and (5) the Constituent. The term "social organization" as thus used connotes much the same as the term "social structure," although it is more definitely limited to those structures in which human relationships have become habitual.³ It is evident that these cross classifications are based upon formal social action by a group or the lack of it. The Public, the Authorized, the Incorporated, and the Constituent are artificial creations by the conscious, associated actions of individuals. On the other hand, the Private, the Unauthorized, the Unincorporated, and the Component are spontaneous organizations on which deliberative and formal action by the group has not yet been taken.

Professor Ross has suggested a classification of associational forms, naming them in the order of their predominating mental characteristics. He considers emotion the characteristic of a lower order of organization than thought, and a group "with presence" much less likely to be deliberative and rational than one "without presence." Therefore, his classification is a cross classification as follows:

¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Chaps. III, IV.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 376, 377.

³ *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 429-432.

	<i>With Presence</i>	<i>Without Presence</i>	
In order of predomi- nance of emotion rather than of thought	Crowds Mass meetings Deliberative assemblies Representative assemblies	The public The sect The corporation	In order of effi- ciency of or- gani- za- tion

Crowds are more prone to undeliberative action, to fits of passion, to domination by the less thoughtful minds than other forms of organization. The crowd provides many conditions for the generation of intense feelings, but the minimum of conditions for the generation of deliberative wisdom. The mass meeting is more self-controlled, and much less liable to be dominated solely by feeling. Deliberative assemblies are supposed to have their machinery so adjusted by rules of order which are designed to inhibit the dominance of feeling and give thought the right of way in order that in them emotion may dominate still less and reason may hold sway — a theory not always realized in actual practice. In the representative assembly the calm deliberative thought of each person present is expressed by the vote, that feeling may be held in more complete subordination to reason.¹

In like manner those organizations which are without presence differ not only in their characteristic mental reaction, but also in the efficiency of their respective forms of organization. The public, sect, and corporation correspond closely in their mental characteristics with crowds, deliberative assemblies, and representative assemblies respectively. They differ from each other in the increasing definiteness and efficiency of their organization. The sect is less amorphous than the public and the corporation less than the sect. Likewise the efficiency of each varies directly with the increased definiteness of organization.

This classification has the advantage of being psychological and sociological in its basic principles. It is psychological in that the serial arrangement is in the order of genetic develop-

¹ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. VI. That such an ideal is not often reached in actual practice is urged by Ward, *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 278.

ment of mental characteristics. It is sociological by reason of its classification according to increasing social efficiency of organization. It is doubtful, however, whether the classification of societies "with presence" and "without presence" is valid. Is the sect, for example, one which can be placed in the second category? Both in their inception and for their continuance frequent personal contact between the members — and usually in masses — is necessary. Where in such a scheme, moreover, would be classified such a group as a "husking bee," a barn raising, or a regiment of soldiers? The classification, however, is suggestive, although incomplete.

The classification of social forms "with presence" or "without presence" is at the basis of Professor Cooley's division of social groups into primary and secondary. By primary groups he designates those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and coöperation. They are primary in the sense that they are the means by which the individual is given his earliest and completest experience of social unity and in the sense that they are more unchanging than others.¹ He cites as examples the family, the play groups of children, and the neighborhood or community group of elders. By the secondary he seems to indicate more elaborate groups resulting from more complex relations and springing out of the primary groups.²

Any one is privileged to propose any classification which seems to him to serve best the purpose of making clear the particular principle which he thinks it most important to have recognized in his presentation of the subject. To the writers the genetic point of view seems the most important. We understand things when we know how they came to be what they are. Therefore, it would seem best to have a classification of societies based upon the order of their development, supplemented by a cross classification making clear the transition from the stage when social groupings were predominately either instinctive or sympathetic, and therefore spontaneous, to that in which the groupings were consciously purposeful. From this point of view, that of Giddings, which divides human societies into instinctive and rational categories and the latter into eight types, offers a distinct advantage. It has the draw-

¹ Cooley, *Social Organization*, New York, 1909, pp. 23, 26, 27.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

back, however, that it places the psychological bond which characterizes each form in the forefront of attention rather than genetic order and form. The following classification presents in the probable genetic order of development a double classificatory scheme based upon Giddings's types in which the chief emphasis is laid upon the striking difference between tribal and civil society as structurally organized.

Ethnic — instinctive	Civil — despotic
Ethnic — sympathetic	Civil — authoritative
Ethnic — feudal	Civil — conspirital
Ethnic — authoritative — medicine man	Civil — approbational
	Civil — contractual
	Civil — idealistic

Without doubt there are forms of social structure, — using that term to designate groupings of human beings in social relationships, — in which the arrangements are instinctive, such as the family in the Andaman Islands among the Mincopis, where it is doubtful whether the reason of the native has much part in the temporary stay which the male makes with the female until after the child is weaned. There are other forms which have more of the rational element in their formation, yet the predominating element is sympathy based upon a sense of close kinship, supplemented by the instinctive reactions of association. Other ethnic societies take a transitory form based on approbation by leaders, as, for instance, the social structure formed when kin-wrecked men gather about some leader of more ability than the rest, and they and he bind themselves together by bonds of feudal vassalage and lordship. Their wealth is not in land, but in cattle. Examples may be found among the early Irish and the Kaffirs.

Still another form of social structure to be found among those tribally organized is the authoritative. It is based upon fear of authority hallowed by divine sanctions. Such authority is either that of medicine man, priest, or priest-chieftain.

Those in civil society need no further explanation beyond that given when naming Giddings's types.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. How does a social structure differ from a biological structure? Give an example of each.
2. What is the difference between an aggregation of human beings and a society? Give examples.
3. Supposing that the people settled along the Atlantic Coast before the American Revolution could be described as an aggregation and the same people fifty years later an integrated society, what was the essential difference?
4. Trace the development of social structures in your own community from the days when a people was settled there with a tribal organization to the present, naming all the changes which have taken place both in number and kinds of structure.
5. Illustrate what is meant by the process of integration in social matters.
6. Describe the social composition of the people in your town.
7. Describe the social constitution of the population in your village, block, or township.
8. Take the following groups and carefully analyze the social interests and influences which cause the individual members of them to enter into social relationships: a picnic party, a debating society, a church, a bank corporation.
9. Make a list of the names of the social structures represented in your own community and classify according to a suitable and, if necessary, an original scheme.

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATION AND LIFE OF THE FAMILY

The Family as a Social Unit. — The family frequently has been called a social unit because it is the smallest organized group of individuals and because it is the most constant factor among varying social organizations. It is an essential part of modern social life. In it the elements of the larger social life occur in such measure as to make it a means of training for social order.

Up to a very recent period everywhere, and even yet where the industrial revolution has not come with the introduction of machine industry, the family was producer of wealth, to a degree, also the distributing center for the goods made in the home, and in turn was the chief social agency concerned with the consumption of goods. The rights of property and person are learned and practiced in the family. Self-restraint, obedience, and service are taught, and each member knows by experience his relation to others and recognizes duties to be fulfilled and rights to be enjoyed. In the family, religion, morality, and general culture make their earliest and most lasting impressions. It matters not what form of general social order prevails, whether it be the loosely bound horde, the definitely organized patriarchal group, or the civil state, the family is a constant center from which issue influences tending at once to stimulate and to perpetuate social order.

The Primitive Family. — It is difficult to determine the beginnings of the family. So far as historical records are concerned, it has always existed in some form. Moreover, among the lowest types of human beings and also among the higher apes family relationships exist. Doubtless natural selection secured a more or less definite form of family life among some birds and among the higher mammals.¹ In the instinctive

¹ Parmelee, *The Science of Human Behavior*, Chap. XIX.

stage the survival value of the coöperation of both parents in the rearing of the young insured its establishment and continuance.

Probably, like all other social institutions, it has had a slow and irregular evolution. The natural hypothesis for the earliest relation of the sexes is a state of promiscuity. Yet there are no living tribes in which a complete state of promiscuity actually exists nor is there any historical record of such a state. In the tribes that approach most nearly to this state, pairing for indefinite periods occurs. Under such circumstances family organization lacks permanency, and family relationships are indefinite. Among all tribes there are occasions when the regularity of sexual relations in the family is disturbed. It seems, however, that such irregularity may have come about in the transition from an instinctive control of sex relations to control by the developing reason of man. Without a broad basis of human experience it is not surprising if the strong passions of primitive man without the steadying control of the inhibitory instincts of animals sometimes led to practices which we now see to have been socially injurious.

As the rearing of children is the central idea of family life, the form of family organization has always been modified to suit the conditions of ordered life. Hence, we find in the development of human society a great variety of matrimonial institutions and we observe that the modern monogamic family with its established home relations is a result of an evolution. So important for social development are the changes in family life that some have estimated the progress of civilization by its evolution.

The Metronymic Family. — Two chief systems of tracing descent are found in the history of society. They are the metronymic and the patronymic. In the former, descent is traced through mothers; in the latter, descent is traced through fathers. Until the appearance of Bachofen's great work, *Das Mutterrecht*, in 1861, it was generally held that the patriarchal form familiar to us in the Biblical records and in the classic nations of antiquity was the original form of family. He found evidence, as he thought, of an early period in human society when women rather than men dominated the family. His researches were supplemented by McLennan in 1876 and

by Morgan in 1877. The latter based his conclusions upon an extensive study of the American Indian tribes. McLennan and Morgan, however, were not interested so much as Bachofen in proving the existence of a matriarchate, — the dominance of the mother. But all the evidence they found pointed toward metronymy, or tracing descent through the mother, — quite a different thing from the matriarchate. Scholars generally agree now that among many primitive peoples a patriarchy either has never existed or else was preceded by a system of descent traced through mothers. Hence, rather than the term “matriarchate” for this state of family life the term “metronymic,” or maternal, family is preferred. In this form of family a child does not belong to the kindred of his father as in our patronymic form of the family, but to the kindred of his mother. On the other hand, control of the family rests not with the mother, but with the mother’s male kindred, although the women exercise much greater influence in the affairs of the group than under the patriarchal form of family.

The Patronymic Family. — The patronymic form of family, on the other hand, is characterized by tracing the descent of children through the father and following the kindred of the father. This type of family developed the patriarchy or rule of the family by the father. It is illustrated in the classic family of antiquity and the family among the early Hebrews. This type of family will be illustrated more fully in another section.

Genesis of These Forms of the Family. — The condition which gave rise to a metronymic form of family probably was not promiscuous sex relations among primitive peoples, as Morgan tried to show, but the fact that maternity was much more easily recognized than that of paternity.¹ Moreover, the attachment of the child to the mother during infancy made the tracing of relationships through the mother a most natural procedure. In addition to this was the fact that in all metronymic families the husband and father left his own kindred and went to live with his wife. She remained with her kindred. Where mates were selected from outside the kindred, the husbands, of course, were not of the same kin as the group into which they went. Many times, perhaps no two of the husbands of

¹ Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 150.

the women in that group were akin. Hence, in times when the social bond was kinship, control over the children naturally remained with the group in which they were born. Even more natural was it that they should be held to be akin to that group.

Once established, the practice of tracing kinship through the mother would continue long after the fact of paternity was recognized. In fact, to break down the metronymic system it was necessary that new and powerful motives should operate.

The development of a pastoral mode of life supplanting a hunting stage was the important economic influence in bringing about this change. To follow the flock the family had to separate from other groups. Moreover, the labor of as many as possible was desirable to look after the herds. The man was not obliged to be absent so long from the home. Regularity of relations took the place of the irregularity entailed by a hunting economy. The wife was no longer indispensable as family provider because of the more dependable source of food in the flock. Moreover, the labor of sons in tending the flock became more valuable.

War was another influence which broke down the metronymic family. Women were captured in war and of course were then under the control of their husbands. In fact, being spoils of war, they were now personal property. Children born to them were also the property of the captor. A modification of this plan is to be found in wife purchase. Similar results in relationships, however, were reached as in wife capture.

The dominance of the male once established, religion entered in as a mighty force to uphold it. The worship of ancestors was probably not unknown in the metronymic family. This is suggested by the worship of female divinities. In the patronymic family, however, ancestor worship gathered into a focus of mighty power all the potentialities of male self-aggrandizement. It debased woman, and gave rein to all the aggressive propensities of the male. Sons had been desired from the economic point of view as workers and to feed the flock; from the social point of view, they were valuable as fighters; now they were desired intensely in order to carry on the worship of the ancestral spirits. The woman was accursed who did not bear sons. She was not only useless to the group, but was

hated by the gods. Barrenness was the greatest curse that could befall a woman. Only less terrible was her fate who bore in her sorrow only females. The unchaste wife was not only a criminal in the eyes of the family and the group, but was a sinner in the sight of the gods. While ancestor worship survived, death was the only possible fate of the adulteress. One great thing it accomplished, however, albeit at great cost, — it established female wedded chastity.

The Early Forms of Marriage. — Family life existed before marriage ceremonies. Family life man has in common with the brutes. Marriage is a social institution strictly limited to human kind. It has been doubted whether certain tribes possess any positive marriage ceremonies; yet it is certain that among many of the lower tribes existing now, society tacitly approves very simple ceremonies, and every society thus far studied, however low in culture, regulates the family relationships. Marriage begins when a more or less formal assent must be secured by the groups most intimately concerned, as, for example, the families of the two persons concerned.

How marriage sprang up out of a situation in which man and woman cohabited as they pleased can only be conjectured. Did the habit of society interfering with one of the most powerful instincts grow up by reason of the fact that sons and daughters were looked upon as possessions which could not be taken away without consent? Or did it originate with the strong man imposing his dominating habit as a general law for all men of his tribe in their dealings with women? Or, was it the fruit of male jealousy? Or, again, did it arise, as Ward suggested, “to prevent incessant strife among men for the possession and retention of women” — the conscious necessity of intertribal peace for social survival — after man had become conscious of the need of a more permanent and satisfactory form than ephemeral marriage? ¹

Certain authors, like McLennan, have attempted to show the evolution of marriage from a state of promiscuity to the modern monogamic marriage. While such a regular order of development does not seem to be firmly established, yet all the forms of marriage from temporary pairing to monogamy have been found in human society. Many of the lower

¹ Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 617.

tribes living to-day have very indefinite family relationships and forms of marriage entirely different from our own, yet it is difficult to assume that all mankind has passed regularly through all these forms of marriage as Spencer seemed to assume in his *Principles of Sociology*. However, if we examine primitive society, we shall find instances of marriage with very little ceremony and, in some cases, a condition approaching promiscuity. At least conditions are found where people mingle rather freely with the minimum of social regulation of their relations. On the other hand, among some of the groups of human beings lowest in the scale of culture, we find arrangements for the care of the child by the group.¹ There are other evidences of the union of a pair for a given time, until the child is born or until he reaches the age of independence of his mother. Another type of marriage permits the man to live with the woman at his convenience, giving him the right to choose a new mate whenever he pleases. Often, however, this right is subject to rather strict limitations by the wife's relatives.² Also the later forms of polygyny and polyandry have been practiced by many tribes or nations at a certain stage of their development. Under certain customs men had the right of choosing more than one wife; under others women had more than one husband. In some instances a group of brothers married a group of sisters. Then in the process of development the system of concubinage sprang up. The elimination of all other forms finally left the marriage of one man to one woman for life, — a form of marriage which we find persisting along with the others from first to last. While it may not be possible to show that all humanity passed regularly through these various stages of matrimonial life, still it is true that the modern pure home life has been the result of an evolution, and that there is a wide difference between primitive and modern marriage.³

We may thus summarize the various forms of marriage: *A pairing arrangement* of short duration is perhaps the simplest form of family relationships. Such an arrangement is to be

¹ Howard, review of Malinowski, *The Family among the Australian Aborigines*, *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1914, pp. 670, 671.

² Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 443-447.

³ Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, Chaps. I-VI. Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. I, Chaps. I-III.

found among the Mincopis of the Andaman Islands. The father remains with the mother until the child is weaned. Relations lasting somewhat longer, but still temporary, have been observed among the Australian Aborigines, some of the Indians of Brazil, and the natives of northern Greenland.¹

Group marriage of a rather peculiar kind has been reported from the Hawaiian Islands. When first discovered by Captain Cook there were found there families made up of a group of brothers married to a group of sisters. Each man was the husband of every woman and each woman was the wife of every man in the family. A similar situation seems to exist among the Todas of India to-day.²

Polyandry, or the family relation in which one woman has more than one husband, has been described most carefully by travelers in Thibet and a section of India. In these two places two distinct types of polyandry have been observed. One or other of these forms with many variations has been observed elsewhere. Giddings has collected testimony showing a similar state of things in Ceylon, although much intermixed with the Thibetan form of polyandry and with polygyny.³

Polygyny is a better name than polygamy for that form of the family in which one man has several wives. Polygyny means many wives, while polygamy means many marriages. Polygyny is a term used in contrast with polyandry. In polygyny sometimes the wives are of equal rank; often, however, there is one principal wife and several subordinate wives known as concubines.

Monogamy is the term used to designate that form of family life in which one man and one woman form family relations for life. This form has tended to displace the other forms in societies advanced in culture and capable of conscious consideration of the effects of the various forms of family relationships as well as in the less developed societies where economic conditions have made it impossible for a man to support more than one wife.

While for purposes of clearness we have set forth these various types of family as isolated phenomena, in actual life they

¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 155, and authorities cited there.

² Giddings, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

³ *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 443-445.

generally exist side by side. Thus, polyandry often is found in bleak and inhospitable regions where men have difficulty in supporting each a family and where the economic conditions have made women of small economic value so that female infants are often killed. Sometimes, however, it probably arose from religious motives. Side by side with it often exist polygyny and monogamy, as in Ceylon, and even in Thibet. Polygyny also is never the only form in any society. It would be impossible to have it universal since the world over, so far as we know, about as many males are born as females. Usually the rich practice it while the poor are monogamous or polyandrous.

Conditions of Primitive Family Life. — In primitive society the food supply was limited and the protection against the climate through clothing and houses was meager, and only a few primitive industries were carried on by unskilled hands. Machinery and power derived from the forces of nature were not developed. The political organization was not well developed. Even where the beginnings of general social order appeared, there were no politics and no state as we know them to-day. Religion, in many instances, was an unorganized superstition without an ethical element. The family, existing under such circumstances, had no outside power or regulation to summon to its support. It stood alone, and bore all of the responsibility of the social order. It was the result of the blind forces of nature. Produced by natural selection rather than by the conscious purpose of man, its sanctions were either instinctive, superstitious, or economic.

The Ancient Monogamic Family. — The evidence among the Greeks and, in fact, among all the groups of the Aryan race, so far as their history can be determined, shows that the monogamic family was one of their cherished institutions. The pure home life consequent upon the union of one pair for life exercised a perpetual influence on the development of the character of the Aryan people. The little family group had its own religious life, its own social advantages, giving protection and care to the young and old alike. The family group was enlarged both by natural increase and by adoption. There was a tendency for grown-up children to remain within the family circle. Hence, this ancient organization represented a large group of relatives compactly organized.

The Patriarchal Family. — A peculiar form of the ancient family has become known as the patriarchal. It appears strongest among the Semites and Aryans. It represents the leadership of the eldest male member of the group. He was at the head of the family or group of families representing all the relatives by blood, marriage, or adoption. Holding it in trust, he virtually owned all the property of the whole family of which he was the supreme ruler. In some societies he had the power of life or death over each member. In others, even in primitive societies, among the Australian Aborigines, for example, as Malinowski points out, it is limited by the blood vengeance of the woman's relatives.¹ He was priest, judge, king, military leader, lawmaker, and chief executive of all social affairs. This family was not ruled by law or decree so much as by custom. Each member was born under status, not under law. Indeed, the patriarchal leader himself was bound by the customs of his fathers. Yet essentially there must have been a slow development of customs, otherwise law and the state could never have risen.

The Influence of Religion on Family Life.² — So close was the relation of religion to early family life that some authors have made it the foundation of the family. They are wrong, for the family rests primarily upon a biological rather than a religious basis. Yet in each stage of social evolution religion has strengthened the ties of the family and added to its power. In the development of matrimonial institutions religion has exercised an important influence. This is most clearly observed in the patriarchal family. Among the Aryan people we find an especially good illustration of the effect of ancestor worship. It tended to strengthen kinship, to give it unity, dignity, and power. Each family group had its private family altar and family worship, to which no stranger could be admitted. Each family group worshipped its patronym or hero, the eldest male member, the founder of the race. Libations were poured to his departed spirit, and prayers were uttered in his name. This custom established the unity of the family groups and developed their power to resist enemies in the struggle for existence.

¹ Howard in review of Malinowski, *The Family Among the Australian Aborigines*, in *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1914, p. 671.

² See Chap. XIII, Part II.

Association, too, came to be limited by religion. Those without the religious pale were considered unworthy of association, much less of close union. This was an incident of the integration of the family life. Intensity of feeling and narrowness often go together. Thus the Hebrew scorned the Gentile, the Greek and the Roman the Barbarian, the patrician the plebeian. The religious life, especially after tribal organization had been well developed, had much to do with the development of separate racial characteristics. It aided in the process of group unification. It made more apparent similarity within the group by making more apparent the difference between members of the group and those outside it. In the period when kinship was giving way to mental and moral likeness as the social bond, religion came to be the chief maker of groups.¹

The Psychological Influences in Family Organization. — The development of the sentiment of love within the family has had enormous consequences in the creation and preservation of social order. The propagation of the race has become the foundation of all the finer sentiments of human affection; the home and the family have fostered and developed love in the human race. While it cannot be said that the family and the home are the only bases for altruistic sentiments and coöperation, the highest developments of altruism have owed more to the family and the home than to any other influences. Remove the sentiments arising out of this idea and the fabric of society would not stand the strain of the savage instincts of mankind. The family relationships have brought to their present development the harmony of feeling, thought, and will which enables people to associate for innumerable purposes. The art of living together profitably and harmoniously has its foundation in the love sentiment brought about by family unity.²

The Economic Basis of Family Life. — As already observed, the family represents an early producing unit of society. In the definitely organized families of ancient times the product of the chase and the spontaneous products of the soil were brought to the homes to be held in common and to be distributed

¹ For a concrete illustration of the operation of this principle in a group, see Gillin, *The Dunkers, A Sociological Interpretation*, pp. 107, 108, 151, 152.

² Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, Chaps. VII-IX. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 610-613.

among the members of the household. Later, in the pastoral and agricultural periods, arose a communal ownership of property. Lands, herds, and flocks belonged to the household, or expanded family. The house and all the more directly personal goods and chattels belonged to the small family group or else to the individual members of the group. In every instance the home became an economic center. Although the income of a modern family generally flows through an individual who is the head of the family, others working faithfully in the preservation of that which is acquired and in its proper use, the family is not so economically united as it once was. The economic unity of the family is well illustrated, too, in Colonial times in America, when the weaving, spinning, and the making of garments were performed in the home and when, indeed, nearly all of the implements about the house and farm were of home manufacture. The early Colonial family showed to a large extent the character of the primitive home before division of labor and power manufacture had come into use. But even to-day there are many articles of wealth produced every year in American homes. This is seldom reckoned in the estimate of the wealth-producing power of the community, although the product of home manufacture amounts to millions of dollars a year, not to mention the fact that in our present factory system usually most, if not all, the adult members of the family are at work and share in the production of the family income.

Economic Changes and their Effects upon the Family.— The changes which have come into our economic life in the past fifty years have seriously affected family life. The increased earning capacity of women and the opportunities offered them to make their own living, by enabling them to be more independent, have impaired the old-time unity of the family group. Homes become places of domicile for individuals of the family, while each maintains his own share of the expenses and lives an independent economic life.

With the advent of factory life, however, and the consequent massing of laborers, the economic function of the home has become of steadily decreasing importance. Hence it has come to pass that seven millions of our women do their work outside the home. In mill, office, and shop they spend their days rather

than in the home. Industry itself has well-nigh destroyed the economic basis of the home. It has made the woman who has remained in the home more dependent economically. Her services are narrowed to the biological function of bearing children and the social function of rearing them. If she leaves the home in order to contribute to the support of the family (fulfilling again her primordial economic duty), under the new conditions, her functions as bearer and rearer of children are sadly interfered with. Moreover, even as affecting the male members of the family, modern industry has had serious results upon the family and the home. Often it has taken the husband and father away from the home so that he can no longer help to rear the family. He no longer is the important social factor in the home that he once was. Once he worked in his shop in the home. There his children played, or, when old enough, worked with him. His presence was constantly a restraining and guiding influence. Now he works away from his home. Furthermore, the influence of the family and home upon the children has been much interfered with by the change from the domestic to the factory system of industry. Once the children contributed to the support of the family by working with their parents in the home. Now, if they share in the economic burdens of the family, they must leave its fostering care. The home, after sixteen at latest, often becomes merely a boarding house. In 1909, in manufactures alone, 19.5 per cent of the wage earners of the United States were women, while 2.4 per cent of the wage earners were under sixteen years of age.¹ In 1900 only 18.4 per cent of the women bread earners were engaged in work which took them out of their homes. 18.8 per cent of all the women of the United States in 1900 were engaged in gainful occupations other than agriculture. This phenomenon is not confined to America, however. In fact, only Russia has a smaller percentage of her women engaged as bread winners. In the United States 14.3 per cent of the women are bread earners. In Great Britain 24.9 per cent, in France 33 per cent, in Germany 25 per cent, while in Austria it rises to 44 per cent.² Illustrating the tendency of modern industry to take from the home the man as well as the woman,

¹ *Abstract of the Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910*, p. 457.

² *New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, p. 845.

is the fact that in 1900 61½ per cent of the men in the United States were engaged in occupations other than agriculture, making it perfectly safe to assume that at least 65 per cent were engaged in work which took them away from home and family.

Effects of Other Social Changes upon the Home.—The school took out of the home for five days each week over eighteen millions of children in 1909.¹ Even play is often impossible in connection with the home in cities.

Moreover, the isolated home of former days has been undergoing serious changes in recent years. In 1890 in the United States 34.1 per cent of farm homes, 63.1 per cent of other homes, and 52.2 per cent of all homes were rented. In 1900 the percentages for each of these classes of homes were 35.6 per cent, 63.8 per cent, and 53.9 per cent. In 1910 the percentages showed that 37.2 per cent of farm homes, 61.6 per cent of other homes, and 54.2 per cent of all homes were rented by the occupants.² Thus, from 1890 to 1910 there was a steady increase in the number of rented farm homes. The increase in the number of other than farm homes which were rented went on from 1890 to 1900 but decreased in the decade between 1900 and 1910. The percentage of all homes in this country which are occupied by others than their owners has steadily risen. Increasingly we are losing that attachment to one spot which has helped to make the home a stable institution. Not only is there much truth in the maxim "three moves are as bad as a fire," but socially the constant moving which a rented house incurs is detrimental to family life. How much are the sentiments of loyalty to the home connected with constant attachment to one spot! Certainly, while mere physical contact with a pile of lumber or brick would not seem to engender the tender sentiments involved in love of home, yet in reality living in one spot, the sense of familiarity with a place, has something to do with the origin and strength of these sentiments. Pride of appearance, sense of ownership, and development of interest in family affairs have much better chance to develop when the family owns the home.

This movement away from ownership of the home is especially remarkable in the large centers of population. In fifty

¹ *Abstract of the Thirteenth Census, 1910, p. 219.*

² *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1295.*

cities of the United States in 1910 only one, Spokane, Washington, had less than half of its families living in rented houses. In thirty-nine of these cities fully three fifths of the homes were rented, in sixteen of them more than three fourths of the homes were rented. In New York City as a whole, nearly nine tenths (88.3 per cent) of the homes were rented. In the Borough of Manhattan alone of that city, less than 3 per cent of the families owned their homes.¹

Liberalization of Thought and its Effects upon Family Ideals.

— Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that the tendency of the changes in the form of industry just discussed to bring about a change in the nature of the family has been supplemented by other influences. Once political opinions were formed in the home. Each man was of the same political party as his father. In America, however, during the last few years, there has grown up a spirit of independence in politics. The recent rise of the "mugwump," the "insurgent," and the "progressive" show a growing independence in political opinion in our American life.

This same independence of thought about fundamentals has shown itself in religious matters. Within the past forty years there has taken place in the minds of religious people in the United States a "liberalization" of thought along theological lines which has manifested itself most markedly in the lessening of interdenominational strife and a growing tendency to emphasize common rather than mutually distinctive denominational doctrines. Yet, the individual freedom which made possible in this country such a number of religious sects as in no other country in the world has gone on multiplying sects in spite of the evident desire on the part of the older ones to get closer together. Both these tendencies have shown the freedom which has characterized our American life and thought. More than that, it is during the past forty years that the very foundations of belief have been put to question. There has occurred a veritable revolution in theological beliefs. The preaching of to-day is no more like that of a generation ago than the science of to-day is like that of the eighteenth century. Churches are revising their creeds, others, recognizing the far-reaching changes involved in the liberal tendency, are banning

¹ *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1298.*

liberalism in theology. Individual judgment in religious matters has gone so far that many people think that the very foundations of faith are being undermined.

In science also the most revolutionary changes have taken place in the past half century. Scarcely any opinion is held by scientists to-day which was the common teaching of science then. That is especially true of the biological sciences, but almost as true of the rest. Darwin gave an impetus to the scientific spirit which has not yet ended in its revolutionary results, but which already has swamped the old world of scientific notions. It has become the scientific attitude to treat with a critical spirit old theories as well as new ones. The critical spirit is the proper spirit of the scientific investigator. It is only by having an open mind that any progress is made in the discovery of new truth. During this time everything has been questioned. First it was "natural" science which fell under the light from the new point of view, and then every other phase of human life subject to investigation and speculation gradually fell under the spell of the spirit of doubt and inquiry. Once all was settled. Now much is still unsettled in spite of the work of more than fifty years.

Likewise, in education, great changes have come. Here, too, questions impossible a half century ago are being asked about our school system. The American school, for so many years the palladium of our liberties and the shibboleth of the orator, has fallen upon evil days. Once a sacred institution not to be questioned, but to be adored, now it is the football in the center of every educational scrimmage! Everywhere there is questioning and change in educational methods.

This same spirit is abroad in all spheres of life. Doubt of the old, and searchings for new foundations are everywhere manifest. It has reached even the family. That institution which we once thought was created in the Garden of Eden is said by travelers to exist in quite different forms in other and more primitive countries. Careful study has made it probable that there have gradually developed various forms of the family. These facts becoming known, it was easy to connect them with this questioning spirit of the age. These two influences, coupled with the change which has been going on in the economic basis of the family, and with the new freedom which has risen

on the horizon of the weaker sex, has produced dire results for the sanctions of the family tie.

Furthermore, within the family itself, great changes have been going on, as shown by the decreasing size of the family decade after decade. In all the United States the family has grown smaller and the number of persons for each dwelling less. The number of persons to a family in the last two decades, 1890 to 1910, decreased from 4.9 to 4.5 and from 1850 to 1910 from 5.6 to 4.5, while the number to a dwelling fell from 5.5 to 5.2. In certain parts of the country, especially in the large cities, however, the number per dwelling increased. For example, in New York City, Manhattan Borough, persons to a dwelling increased from 19.9 in 1890 to 30.9 in 1910,¹ pointing not only to larger families in cities, but to the presence of boarders. The isolated home in that city is fast losing ground. People are becoming cliff dwellers in tenement and apartment houses owned by others. Large families are the exception. The Twelfth Census reported that only 2,929,799 families had more than seven members.² And this is in New York City, where the presence of great numbers of the foreign born mask the prevailing tendency among American families.

The Small or the Large Family. — From the standpoint of the family's welfare, there are two different and seemingly opposing sets of circumstances which should be faced. The smaller the size of the family, the better the care and the more money that can be spent on the children. That means better clothing, food, education carried further, and a better chance to get the higher-paid jobs. Moreover, it means better training in the home. The mother will have more time and strength to lavish on each one. On the other hand, it is a question whether the child who is reared in the home with adults or with only one other child enjoys the same socializing influence which is the privilege of the child reared in a large family. The give

¹ *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1289.*

² *Twelfth Census of the United States, 1910, Vol. II, p. clxxi.* On the question of the reasons for the decrease of the size of the American family, see Commander, *The American Idea? passim.* A good brief survey of the facts concerning the decreasing size of the family in all civilized lands is to be found in Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, Boston and New York, 1912, Chap. V, "The Significance of a Falling Birth Rate." For a comprehensive discussion of the whole question with special reference to American conditions, see Ross, *Changing America*, Chaps. III-V.

and take of child democracy is often lacking in the small family. One has only to observe in rural districts the greater family affection manifested by the members of large families than that seen in families with few children. In this case, however, as in so many such, much depends on the conditions of life in the two kinds of families. Without a doubt, the child reared in the small needy family is better off than the children of a large family in similar circumstances. When they can all stay in the home, doubtless it is best for children to be reared in a large family. On the other hand, where there are so many that the older ones are driven to work in some shop or factory at the earliest possible age, huddled into small and ill-kept rooms called a home, forced to get their recreation and do their courting on the street, or at least outside the home, it is quite certain that the large family of children has no advantage over the only child.¹

No doubt the present tendency towards small families has a direct connection with the changed attitude towards the home and especially towards the family. When there were available in the United States free farms, and where there was great need for men to people and subdue the wilderness, and either farming or the domestic system of manufacture was the method of making a living, a large family was an asset. Moreover, large families had the benefit of a religious sanction. "Children of the youth are a heritage from the Lord; Blessed is the man that hath his quiver full of them," was Scripture, and also good economics. Moreover, it accorded well with the habits of the European peasants who had peopled the Colonies. Without a doubt there has developed a conscious recognition of the economic and social advantages of the small family and deliberate limitation of the number of children by American families in the last half century.

The Marriage Rate and the Family.— In connection with the smaller number of children per family should be considered the striking fact that the marriage rate has increased in the United States in the last thirty years. In 1890 it was 316 per ten thousand of adult unmarried population and in 1900 it was 321. The United States did not stand alone in that tendency. It characterized more than two thirds of the lead-

¹ Breckenridge and Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home*, Chap. VII.

ing countries of the world, according to statistics available in 1906.¹

Various factors may contribute to the decrease in the size of the family. It may be due to the later age at which people marry, or to voluntary limitation of the family, or both. Or it may be due to increasing physiological inability to have children due to vice or other causes. Mayo-Smith gives some figures which seem to show that a thousand women of the age group from fifteen to twenty generally have more children than the same number from any other five-year period.² If, therefore, there are any customs which make for a later marriage by women, we should expect the number of children to become smaller per family. The reports of the last Census, however, do not show any such postponement of marriage by the youth of the United States. Instead of that tendency, the figures show an increase from 1890 to 1910 in the proportion of married youths in the group from 15 to 19 years of age.³ A similar increase in percentage of married persons from 1890 to 1910 is to be seen in the age group, 20 to 24. These facts directly contradict the assumption sometimes made in discussions on race suicide that the marriage rate has been decreasing in the United States.⁴ On the contrary, in the fecund age classes at least, the marriage rate has been increasing. Therefore, the decrease in the size of the family must be due to other factors than postponement of marriage or cessation of marriage.

Race Suicide and the Family. — The following table, however, shows unmistakably that from 1870 to 1910 there has been a considerable decrease in the number of children in the United States.⁵

¹ *Marriage and Divorce*, Census Bulletin No. 96, 1908, p. 9. While the figures for the years previous to 1890 are not reliable, the census authorities computed, on the basis of reports from those counties in which the returns were ostensibly complete, that the rate per 10,000 population in 1870 was 98, 91 in 1880, 91 in 1890, and 93 in 1900. In percentages at the last three censuses, the proportion of the population which had been married was 43.7 per cent in 1890, 44.8 per cent in 1900, and 47.1 per cent in 1910. *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910*, Vol. I, p. 523.

² *Statistics and Sociology*, New York, 1904, p. 114.

³ *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910*, Vol. I, pp. 514, 515.

⁴ Emerick, "A Neglected Factor in Race Suicide," in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, pp. 638-655.

⁵ Compiled from the *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910*, Vol. I, p. 301.

AGE PERIOD	POPULATION					
	1910	1900	1890	1880	1870	
Under 5 years.	11.6	12.1	12.2	13.8	14.3	Percentage of total population
5 to 14 years	20.5	22.3	23.3	24.3	24.9	

The following table shows that the increasing limitation of number of children per family has characterized the urban to a greater extent than the rural population, although the tendency is clearly evident in both.¹

CITIES UNDER 25,000 AND RURAL DISTRICTS

	1910	1900	1890	
Under 5 years . .	12.4	12.6	12.6	Percentage of total population
5 to 14 years . .	22.1	23.4	24.5	
Cities of 25,000 to 100,000				
Under 5 years . .	9.7	10.0	10.2	
5 to 14 years . .	17.1	18.8	19.4	
Cities of 100,000 and over				
Under 5 years . .	9.7	10.6	10.9	
5 to 14 years . .	16.9	19.2	19.0	

These figures make it probable that social factors rather than physiological have played the important part in the reduction of the birth rate. It is impossible to say what part of the lessened birth rate may be due to vice or a weakened stock. All sorts of assumptions have been made, but so far we have no figures on which to base any very safe conclusions. It is said, for example, that 75 per cent of the special surgical operations on women and 80 per cent of all deaths due to inflammatory diseases peculiar to women are due to the results of venereal

¹ *Thirteenth Census of the United States*, Vol. I, p. 432. In considering these figures one must not forget that the large cities are the centers to which come the most of the immigrants, chiefly adults, whose large numbers would tend to lessen the percentage of children in those cities, nor, on the other hand, that the immigrant families are the most fecund in our population.

infection.¹ Dr. Prince A. Morrow estimates that 50 per cent of the women infected with the venereal disease are rendered sterile, and believes that a large proportion of the sterile marriages are such not from choice, but from incapacity. It has been argued, therefore, that the lessened fecundity of women is due to inability to bear children. Interesting though these suggestions are, there have been no careful investigations which enable us to be certain of the part which these physiological influences have had.²

Moreover, the question of the effect of certain poisons on the vigor of the children born of parents addicted to their use is unsettled. There is a general belief, however, held by many medical men that such poisons do tend to cause weakness of the offspring, if not sterility of the parents. These beliefs are based for the most part upon experiments on animals. Dr. Hodge found that cocker spaniels given a certain amount of alcohol each day showed a greater tendency to have deformed or weak progeny, than a pair to which no alcohol was given. Out of 23 puppies born to the alcoholic pair, only 17.4 per cent were viable, while out of 45 puppies born to the non-alcoholic pair, 90.2 per cent were viable. Moreover, of the 23 puppies of the alcoholic pair, 8 were born deformed and 9 were born dead, while of the 45 non-alcoholic dogs only 4 were deformed and none were born dead. In connection with the published results of these experiments, Dr. Hodge published the results of an investigation by Demme on alcoholic and non-alcoholic families, showing similar results on human progeny.³

Certainly the experiment on the dogs under strict scientific control is significant. One cannot be so sure with reference to the families reported on by Demme. It must be added, moreover, that some recent investigations by Pearson and his students and assistants at the Galton Laboratory at the University of London have not shown any positive relationship between alcoholism and weakness in the children.⁴

¹ Dr. Prince A. Morrow, "Social Diseases and the Family," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. III, p. 50.

² See Ross, "Western Civilization and the Birth-Rate," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XII, pp. 607-617; Ely, *Evolution of Industrial Society*, pp. 164-168.

³ Billings, *Physiological Aspects of the Liquor Problem*, Vol. I, pp. 373, 374.

⁴ Elderton, *A First Study of the Influence of Parental Alcoholism on the Physique and Ability of the Offspring*, Eugenics Laboratory Memoirs, University of London.

Much more important, however, from some points of view, are the social influences which play upon woman to reduce her effective fecundity. By that term is meant her ability, not only to bring children into the world, but to give them that measure of vitality and care which will enable them to reach maturity. It is certain that the occupation of women in factories, especially married women, results in great infant mortality, and thus reduces their effective fecundity. A birth rate is of no consequence in the discussion of this matter. The important thing is not the number born, but the number reared to maturity. That is why the figures last given are of more importance than birth rates. Four investigations have recently been reported bearing upon this problem. Dr. Rosalie S. Morton of New York City made an investigation in that city of the effect of work in stores, shops, and factories upon the health of women. She came to the conclusion on the basis of that investigation and of other investigations which she reviewed in her paper that "women may work in practically any field of modern industry, and not only retain but increase their standard of health. But they must be given hygienic and properly arranged buildings in which to work, and they and their employers taught the common sense of the laws of health."¹ Dr. George Reid, the county medical officer, Staffordshire, England, in reporting an investigation in six pottery towns in that county, showed that the deaths of children under one year of age born to "home mothers" was 146 per 1000 births, while of those born to mothers working in factories or away from home during the day the rate rose to 209. He also found that women working in lead works showed a much greater tendency to miscarriages and stillbirths.² Dr. John Robertson, health officer of Birmingham, England, in an inquiry covering the women in one of the poorest sections of Birmingham, where the population was of very much the same status economically and socially and where just half the married women of child-bearing age worked outside the home, found that 52 per thousand of the women employed before confinement gave birth to

¹ *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Washington, 1913, Vol. III, p. 941.

² *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, pp. 945, 946.

children prematurely, in comparison with 38 per thousand of those who were not thus employed. Yet the mortality of infants of employed mothers was less than that of those who were not employed. Bad condition of the infants a year old occurred in the proportion, however, of 57 in the case of the children of employed mothers to 63 among the children of unemployed mothers. He came to the conclusion, nevertheless, that unfavorable conditions growing out of poverty in the family were much more inimical to the welfare of the children of these people in that part of Birmingham than employment outside the home.¹ In America an investigation at Fall River, Massachusetts, showed that the proportion of deaths of the infants of working mothers in that city from diarrhea, enteritis, and gastritis — the diseases which caused more than two thirds of the deaths — was over 80 per cent in excess of that of infants whose mothers remained at home.² Moreover, those homes where the women do not work are better kept, the men are more sober — though that may mean either that the men are sober on account of the good home, or that women of intemperate husbands work in order to eke out a living for the family — and the children are better cared for, are healthier, and the family ties are stronger.³

It must not be forgotten, however, that the home from which the mother goes out to work does not stand alone in this story of family disorganization. Studies have been made which show that the comfortable home, with a mother who is not employed outside, furnishes its quota of derelicts.⁴ The spoiled child is to be found in such homes. Such homes are the fruits of the modern questioning of all things old already discussed. Even reverence for parents has not escaped question and as a result respect and reverence have given way to a rank individualism which has undermined the family at its very foundations.

¹ *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, pp. 949, 950.

² *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, p. 336.

³ *Transactions of the Fifteenth International Congress on Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. III, p. 952. Cadbury, et al., *Women's Work and Wages*, Chap. VIII. Breckenridge and Abbott, *The Delinquent Child and the Home*, p. 96.

⁴ Breckenridge and Abbott, *op. cit.*, Chap. X.

Education of Women and the Size of the Family. — Several studies have been made which purport to prove that the education of women has had a very serious influence on the decrease of the birth rate among such women. It has been shown, however, that the real state of affairs is not that the natural fecundity of college women is less than that of women in the same social class who have not gone through college, but that fewer of the college women marry and so the average number of children for college women is unusually low. In fact, college women who marry seem to be as fecund as other women who have not had a college education.¹

When all these things are said, however, there yet remains the most important consideration of all. The causes of the declining birth rate in this country and throughout the western world are twofold. People limit the birth rate voluntarily either because they do not want children or because they think they cannot afford to have them. Those who do not want them are the women and men who have social ambitions and plenty of money. Children are an interference with the social or business plans of the man and with the desire for selfish enjoyment of the woman. Such people cannot well do the things which they are wont to do or wish to do and have children. On the other hand, the working woman feels that she cannot have both children and a job. The job is essential. Therefore children are denied. That same motive actuates families of the middle class. Because of the style of living to which both the husband and wife are accustomed they feel that a family cannot be undertaken until such time as the business or profession has been established; therefore, the family is postponed, with the result that they have few children or none at all.

The Woman's Movement and the Size of the Family. — The woman's movement has had some effect probably in limiting the size of the family. Certain leaders have been loudly agitating for a limitation of the size of the family. Some have even gone so far as to urge that many women should not marry at all. Others have urged that a family should not have more than two children. Some of their arguments are due to a shrinking from the awful waste of life often involved in large

¹Emerick, "College Women and Race Suicide," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXIV, pp. 269-283.

families both for mothers and children who do not live, others are due to a reaction against the physical suffering of mothers involved in bringing children into the world. Pain of childbirth was once taken as a matter of course. It was the lot of woman. The new freedom of women in its reaction has sometimes gone to the point of saying that it is unfair that such an amount of suffering should be borne by one sex. This doctrine grows out of the doubts and questionings of the twentieth century. It has found an echo in the heart of many women. Why should they have children when so many more children will be born in any case by the lower classes? Her children are not needed to keep up the population of the world. Of course, it is hardly necessary to point out that such argument bears only on quantitative needs of the world with reference to population. It does not touch the question of quality.

Physical Degeneracy and the Size of the Family. — Some students of the decline of the birth rate in American families have assumed that the reason for it is a supposed degeneracy or running out of the stock. It is argued by some that the preservation of the weaker individuals, both men and women, by reason of the measures taken by modern hygiene in lessening a selective death rate which would have weeded out many people with weak constitutions, has preserved a stock which naturally is relatively infertile. It leaves unanswered the fundamental question as to what causes this degeneracy, even if the theory were correct. No positive evidence, however, has been adduced to show that the race is degenerating except that there is a declining birth rate in native-born Americans. The chief evidence relied on by this theory is the analogy between our people and the ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome. A law of civilization and decay of people is assumed which offers the easy but useless explanation that civilizations have periods of youth, old age, and decline, just as individuals. The difference is that in the case of the individual physiological causes can be invoked to explain the fact, while in the case of nations the causes are not only physiological, but social and therefore much more complex and difficult to bring under scientific control. The fact is certain enough that in certain states the native white stock has a birth rate that is insufficient to keep up the population. The causes, however, are probably such

economic and social causes as have been reviewed, rather than any inherent constitutional defects analogous to those which cause individual decline.

Thus it becomes probable that the causes which have affected the family in the last century in the United States are largely social and economic in their nature. While physiological causes may have affected the birth rate to a certain extent, psychological causes and social considerations have played a much more important rôle. So far as we have reviewed the evidence, the chief change in the family is in its decreasing size, not in any tendency to marry less or at a later age, except in particular classes. We shall now see that there is another change not yet touched upon which has come about in the family — the increasing instability of the family as registered in the increasing number of divorces.

Social Status of the Family. — It is evident from the foregoing that the family represents the unit of social order. Within it people are trained for the larger social life. Not only are they schooled in the art of producing wealth and trained in the rights of property, but also in the duties and privileges of individuals in association. Here they receive the elements of religious training, for it is in the home that the beginnings of all forms of culture appear. Politically the family and the state are entirely separated so far as civil rights and duties are concerned, yet the home gives instruction in political life. It is here that questions of public policy are discussed and members of the family receive their early training in political opinion. There was a time in the history of social order when a man became a citizen through his family relationship. Indeed, this is true in some of the Oriental nations like China, where ancient institutions stand like granite. Yet notwithstanding all this the individual gradually has come to have more and more a direct personal relation to the state regardless of family ties or family direction. In the modern democratic society all family relationships have become subordinate to the state so far as civil government is concerned.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is meant by the matriarchate? The patriarchate? Metronymy? Patronymy?
2. Find the best chapter in the Bible describing a patronymic family.
3. What is the distinction made between the uses of the word "form" in the terms "forms of the family" and "forms of religion"?
4. What effects did the rise of ancestor worship have upon the strength of family life?
5. Note the changes in the family which have followed changes in economic conditions.
6. Show in what respects family life was changed when industry began to be carried on outside the home.
7. What are the results on the social development of children of moving once a year?
8. What bearing have the changes in the bases of the family life upon race suicide?
9. Point out the social advantages of a declining birth rate. The drawbacks.
10. If the birth rate is decreasing only in correspondence with the decreasing death rate, what are the social consequences of the declining birth rate?
11. What are the effects upon the family of vice and its physical consequences?
12. Show what influence the employment of women in industry has upon the death rate of children. Suggest some measures that might alleviate these evil results without taking women out of industry.
13. Show how higher education might have a restraining influence upon the birth rate.
14. Analyze some small community which you know with reference to the size of family in different classes, and account for any differences you may find.

CHAPTER VI

DISORGANIZATION OF THE MODERN FAMILY

Increase of Divorces. — The remarkable decrease in the size of the families in Western civilization is one of the two striking things about the modern family. The other, as we have indicated, is the great increase in the number of divorces during the last fifty years. Do these two features have anything in common? Is one cause and the other effect? Or are they both effects of a common cause? Do the facts indicate any absolute increase of unhappiness between husbands and wives, or do they merely testify that it has become easier for uncongenial partners to separate? Such are some of the questions which arise on the contemplation of divorce statistics.

Divorce figures do not show whether there is or is not more marital unhappiness now than in the days of our grandfathers; but they do testify to our greater willingness to seek legal recognition of our infelicity. From 1870 to 1900 divorces per 100,000 of population increased almost threefold in the United States.¹ The number in 1880 represented an increase of 30.1 per cent over the number in 1870, in 1890 an increase of 25.5 per cent over that of 1880, in 1900 an increase of 20.7 per cent over that of 1890. A refined divorce rate based upon the married population is even more significant. Thus the number of divorces granted per hundred thousand of married population grew as follows:

1870	81
1880	107
1890	148
1900	200

Thus, in 1870, there were $1\frac{1}{2}$ divorces, in 1880 there were 2 divorces, in 1890 there were 3, and in 1900 4 divorces for each

¹ *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 17.

1000 married couples in the United States, or, in relation to married population, the divorce rate was $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as great in 1900 as in 1870. More divorces were granted to the husband (34.2 per cent) from 1867 to 1886 than from 1887 to 1906 (33.4 per cent). More divorces (46.9 per cent) were granted to the husband in the South Atlantic group of states than any other group. The geographical divisions granting the smallest proportions of divorces to the husbands were the North Central with only 28.3 per cent, and the Western with but 27.7 per cent of the total number of divorces. It is probable that this difference between the North and the West, on the one hand, and the South on the other, is due to the greater freedom and economic independence enjoyed by women in the former groups. The women of the South probably are not so accustomed to the idea of earning their own living. It has been shown that divorced women more largely than any other class of women studied by the Census officials are following a gainful occupation. Divorces granted to husbands, therefore, are relatively less numerous in the industrial North and West than in the agricultural South. The increasing economic independence of women probably throws light also upon the slightly growing tendency of women to seek divorce as revealed in the divorces granted to husbands and wives respectively in the two periods 1867-1886 and 1887-1906.¹

Distribution of Divorces. — (1) *Number of Years Married.* — The divorce rate seems to reach its maximum about the fifth year of married life. At the end of that year more than one half of the separations have taken place. This would seem to indicate that the perilous period in the history of a family is in the first few years of wedlock. That is but natural. If the adjustment of relations cannot be made within that time, separation and divorce registers the fact. Yet, 3.1 per cent of the total number divorced from 1887 to 1906 had lived together 25 years or more.

(2) *Families with and without Children.* — Divorces are much more common between couples without children than between those with two or three children. This may or may not indicate that there is more unhappiness in the childless home than in the home with children. It does indicate that people with

¹ *Marriage and Divorce*, Bulletin No. 96, *Twelfth Census*, 1908, pp. 12, 13.

children are less willing to permit the home to be broken up. Moreover, one of the very strong ties between husband and wife is lacking when there are no children. Selfishness thrives in the childless home. There are no helpless ones appealing constantly to the best in their parents — weakness appealing to strength, childhood to maturity, helplessness to ability, — teaching their parents to deal with each other in love and gentleness.¹

(3) *Differences in Occupations.* — The Census Report shows that there is a great difference as to the frequency of divorce among those in different occupations. The following table gives the facts :

HUSBANDS DIVORCED (1887-1906) FOR WHOM OCCUPATION WAS REPORTED	MARRIED MALES HAVING THE OCCUPATION DESIGNATED: CENSUS OF 1900
Agricultural pursuits 28.4 %	39.4 %
Professional service 5.5	3.9
Domestic and personal service 24.0	13.0
Trade and transportation 19.5	18.2
Manufacturing and mechanical pursuits 22.7	25.6

Certain occupations show an exceedingly high divorce rate. Thus, in 1900, divorced actors, professional showmen, etc., numbered one sixth of the total number in such occupations married. Commercial travelers show a ratio of one divorced man to every nine commercial travelers married during the twenty years 1887-1906. Musicians, physicians, bartenders, and telephone and telegraph operators show almost as high a proportion — one to about every 24 married. For farmers the ratio was 1 to 92 — a ratio much below the average.²

Some writers have held that the cities have a greater divorce rate than the country.³ Dr. Lichtenberger has thrown doubt upon the credibility of that generalization. He has shown that

¹ In 1911 in Great Britain 36 per cent of the couples divorced were childless. — *Hazell's Annual*, 1914, p. 438.


² *Marriage and Divorce*; Bulletin, No. 96 of the *Twelfth Census of the United States*, 1908, pp. 10-27.

³ *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, pp. 18, 19. Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Revised and Enlarged Edition, 1913, p. 142.

there are many cities which have rates lower than the country districts.¹ Professor Ellwood has suggested that where this is the case it is due to the presence of large numbers of Catholics and foreigners.² One would expect that the conditions of city life would affect the family stability unfavorably. The city is characterized by those nervous, dynamic conditions which have such an unsettling effect upon our institutions. This expectation is borne out by a comparison of the rates of counties containing cities with those of the state as a whole and also with those of counties having only small cities and rural counties.³

(4) *Difference in Divorce Rate between the Sexes.* — Two thirds of all the divorces in the United States are granted to the wife. This may mean that the men are more liable to give occasion for divorce than women. As we shall see, the chief cause alleged by the men who apply for divorce is adultery of the wife.

(5) *Divorce in the United States compared with Other Countries.* — The divorce rate is much higher in the United States than in



any other country in the world except Japan. Switzerland's, which is the highest rate in Europe, compared with that of the United States is as 3 to 7.⁴ While, however, the rates of other countries are much lower than that of the United States they show a like tendency to increase.


¹ *Divorce, A Study in Social Causation*, New York, 1909, pp. 81, 82.

² Ellwood, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, Revised Edition, 1913, p. 142.

³ *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

(6) *Geographic Distribution of Divorces in the United States.*— Certain sections of our country had a higher divorce rate than others. Thus, in 1906 the Western Division of states had a rate of more than four times that of the North Atlantic Division (168 to 41), and almost four times that of the South Atlantic (168 to 43). The North Central States had a rate two and two-thirds that of the North Atlantic (108 to 41), and the South Central two and three fourths that of the South Atlantic (118 to 43). In general it may be said that the rate increases as





AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100,000 MARRIED POPULATION, FOR STATES AND TERRITORIES: 1900.



one goes westward. Perhaps it will be more significant if one observes that it increases as one goes from the sections of country settled by foreigners, many of whom are Catholics, to those sections in which one will find the characteristic American elements of the population, people who have become thoroughly Americanized, if they are not of the old American stock. This will be more graphic in a map of the United States so printed as to show the differences and similarities in divorce rates in the various states in 1900.¹

Great changes have come about in the distribution of divorces among the several states as shown by the following maps indi-

¹ *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 16.



AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100,000 POPULATION,
FOR STATES AND TERRITORIES: 1870 AND 1880.



AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER OF DIVORCES PER 100,000 POPULATION,
FOR STATES AND TERRITORIES: 1890 AND 1900.

cating the distribution in 1870, 1880, and 1890. These maps should be compared with the ones above. It is apparent that in 1900 there were but three sections with a number of divorces below 75 per 100,000 population. One of these is of the Atlantic seaboard states with the exception of New England and Florida. Another is composed of the two states Wisconsin and Minnesota, and the third is the territory (then) of New Mexico. Moreover, by these maps the increase of divorce in this country is strikingly shown.¹

The Probability of Divorce. — The statistical probability of divorce has been investigated by the Census Bureau and some tentative figures were presented which, while not comparable in their reliability with the tables of expectancy of human life prepared by life insurance companies, are yet suggestive. The Census experts conclude that it is quite probable that the true rate of expectancy is about one in every twelve, and some think even as high as one in ten. The probabilities are that the divorce rate reveals less than the true state of marital infelicity. Almost 94 per cent of all the divorces granted from 1887 to 1906 were on grounds of five principal causes, adultery, cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, and neglect to provide. When these can be proved in so large a percentage of the causes in which divorce is granted, it is probable that there are many more cases in which these or other causes operated but which had not come to action for divorce or were not capable of proof.²

Grounds of Divorce. — While the causes alleged in the petitions for divorce are not always the real ones, they throw some light nevertheless on the subject. Thus, the legal ground most frequently alleged was desertion, being the ground stated in 38.9 per cent of all the divorces granted from 1887 to 1906. It was alleged in the case of almost half of the divorces granted to men (49.4 per cent) and just about one third of those granted to women (33.6 per cent). Of the divorces granted to husbands 28.7 per cent were on grounds of adultery of the wife and 10.5 per cent for cruelty by the wife. Of those granted to wives 27.5 per cent were for cruelty by the husband, and only 10 per cent for adultery by the husband — an almost exact reversal

¹ *Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906*, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 17.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23.

of relative proportions of these two grounds. Drunkenness as the sole ground was alleged in only 5.3 per cent of the cases granted to the wife and in but 1.1 per cent of those granted to the husband. It was the indirect cause in 13.8 per cent of the cases; in 4.7 per cent of the divorces granted to husbands and in 18.3 per cent of those granted to wives it was alleged as a contributory cause. Moreover, it was present as a contributory cause in 32.4 per cent of the cases in which the wife was granted a divorce on grounds of cruelty, and over one fifth of the cases (21.2 per cent) of those granted on grounds of neglect to provide.

One point in this enumeration of causes needs a word. It would appear from the statements made above that adultery was a more common ground in divorces granted to men than to women. Of the divorces granted on this ground alone 59.1 per cent of the offenses were committed by the wife and 40.9 per cent by the husband. The probability is, however, that the women are no more guilty in this matter than the men, but that evidence is more easily secured against women guilty of this offense than against men, the double standard of morality making the offense in the man more easily overlooked than in the woman, and the woman finding other grounds easier to prove.

It is also worthy of remark that adultery as a ground of divorce has been steadily decreasing since 1867 — a statistical fact regarding this moral delinquency which runs counter to popular belief. Thus the percentage of divorces granted for this cause has fallen as follows:

1867-1871	25.6%
1872-1876	20.7%
1877-1881	19.4%
1882-1886	19.2%
1887-1891	17.8%
1892-1896	17.3%
1897-1901	15.8%
1902-1906	15.3%

Cruelty as a cause, on the other hand, has nearly doubled from 1867 to 1906. Neglect to provide has risen during the same period from 1.7 per cent of the total causes to 3.8 per cent.¹

¹*Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1887-1906, Washington, 1909, Part I, p. 26.*

Whether there is an actual decrease in marital infidelity or whether adultery as a ground of divorce appears less frequently, because other causes are now grounds for divorce and therefore adultery need not be alleged, is a question concerning which no categorical answer can now be given.

Causes of the Growth of Divorce. — These causes just discussed are legal grounds. They do not always indicate the real causes of divorce. Down beneath these lie those intangible but none the less real and influential psychological and social causes which bring forth this harvest of legally acknowledged broken vows. Many of the same influences which we reviewed in seeking to understand the decrease in the size of the family must be invoked in order to explain the phenomena of divorce. Possessing greater economic opportunities than the women of former generations, modern women refuse to be bound for the sake of livelihood by ties which have come to be galling.

(1) *Economic Causes explain Divorce in Part.* — Poverty with its grinding toil and its strained relations between provider and housekeeper must be considered. On the other hand, there is wealth with its false demands for means to allay the ennui of an existence sated with the enjoyments of life. Moreover, while the marriage for money is perhaps less common than in some civilizations, there are of course marriages still to be found in which the monetary consideration is the real basis of the family. Sometimes such a consideration remains the basis and constitutes the chief reason for its continuance. Let, however, that consideration wane in its importance by reason of the loss of money, or from a growing appreciation of the falsity of such a bond for such intimate relations, and the breaking of the bond is quite certain to occur.

(2) *Changes in the Social Position of Women.* — Vastly more important are the changes which have come over the social status of woman in the last fifty years. With her change in economic independence, she can now free herself from bonds which once had to be endured in order that she might escape starvation. Once the power of tradition which visited with social ostracism the woman who revolted from a life made hard by a mate who was in no sense a companion held her bound and prevented the legal breaking of a bond which no longer was backed by love. Mohammedan countries and the countries of

Europe in which divorce is seldom permitted furnish plenty of evidence that there are other ways than divorce by which a woman may get rid of an undesirable husband.¹ Where the spirit of the woman was not of that desperate character, she suffered and lived a loveless life, a slave to a being she could not respect or love. Tradition has not yet been broken entirely. Many a woman still suffers and endures for the sake of the opinion of her relatives and friends or because of the attitude of her church towards divorce, or for the sake of her children. With woman's industrial enfranchisement, however, a great impetus has been given to divorce. With the breaking down of social tradition condemning divorce it will naturally grow in the absence of a better method of contracting marriages. With the increasing education of woman she is thinking upon the question of her relations to men. When she began to think, tradition's power began to break.

(3) *Mental Emancipation of Women.* — Out of an appeal to her reason has grown the emancipation of woman. The awakening rationality of the sex began to doubt the old sanctions. The doubts have raised questions which many women are not prepared to settle practically. One result, however, of this spirit of the age is woman's attempt to gain the ballot in England and America. A much more important effect, however, is woman's lessened respect for the traditional sanctions of an indissoluble marriage bond and hence an increase in divorce.² Woman's growing conviction that something is wrong with her lot in some cases was brought to expression by the movement for her emancipation. Political enfranchisement was the least of the burden she felt. She felt much more keenly her domestic bonds and therefore she desired the more intensely her emancipation from ties which she felt to be hateful.

Like all reformers, doubtless the advocates of woman's freedom have gone too far. To make their case perhaps the leaders have overstated her distress. Doubtless the agitation has stirred some excitable women to exaggerate their unhappiness. Reiterated declarations concerning women's "slavery" have without

¹ Lombroso, *Causes and Remedies of Crime*, English Translation, 1912, pp. 184, 185.

² For an interesting discussion of the feminist movement in Germany, see Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, pp. 87-112.

question worked as a suggestion to some who otherwise would never have thought of revolt against their position. Perhaps, therefore, we may reasonably anticipate after the agitation has quieted down a decline in divorce.

(4) *Irrational Methods of choosing Mates.* — When one contemplates the irrational way in which matches are made one wonders, not that one marriage out of every twelve ends in the divorce court, but that so few come to that conclusion. Two theories dominate in present-day thought as reflected in our modern novels centering about the tender passion. Either "marriages are made in heaven," or, according to the new theological version of that theory, people are intended for each other by that paganized, but none the less personal, something called Nature. The one is as metaphysical and as unscientific as the other. Both are prescientific statements of an actual situation less definitely determined, however, than the theories would make us believe. The elements of attraction between well-mated personalities have never been scientifically established. Sexual attraction rests partly on a physical basis. The popular belief is that people with unlike or complementary physical qualities attract each other, very much as the positive and negative poles of a magnet. Thus, light and dark, the slim and the stout, attract each other. Some sociologists think that the novel in one's experience attracts. Others think that each group of people forms an ideal of personal beauty corresponding to its degree of mental development and of civilization. Unquestionably this ideal, to a considerable extent, grows out of imitation of superiors in social status. However, the subject waits for more careful scientific study.

Moreover, certain mental and social qualities unquestionably affect the choice. Here, again, the principle of the attraction of the unlike has been invoked. Complementary temperaments attract each other, say the advocates of this theory. *A priori* such a thing is conceivable. Psychologically it is possible that the slightly novel mental characteristic might attract the attention and stir the interest of another, and lead to the development of love. A standard of mental qualities each of us possesses perhaps. What are its constituent elements and how these elements are selected and organized into an ideal has never been investigated.

The important point in this connection, however, is that choice of a mate is made ordinarily on an instinctive, or at least an irrational, basis. People choose marriage partners because they like them. Certain physical and mental qualities enter into the ideal of the loved one, without a doubt, but how often are those qualities clearly analyzed and considered in all their bearings upon the future of the home and family which may be established by the two who are sexually attracted? How seldom is as much attention given by the parties to even the physical characteristics of each other as is given by stock-breeders to the physical qualities of the dams and sires of their herd! Such questions are seldom considered even by the envious critics of the couple, not to mention the couple themselves. All too frequently these two persons most interested in the matter do not ask themselves the question as to whether the other party to the contemplated contract is fitted to be the father or mother of their children. The attachment is formed on a romantic basis. The all-important question is, Do they love each other? not, Have they the qualities, physical and mental, which make them suited to each other and so make possible the continuance of romantic love? Romantic love's young dream will fade. Is the basis there for love between the mature man and woman after the romance has vanished? In too many cases those questions are not considered; hence divorce.

Proposed Remedies. — (1) *Are Uniform Divorce Laws a Remedy?* — Uniform divorce laws have been suggested as a partial remedy for the present evils. It is often said that divorce is made easy for all by the fact that one state has laws providing for easy divorce, although others may have stringent laws. Those who do not find it possible to obtain a divorce in one state go therefore into the state where divorce can be easily obtained. If, on the other hand, these people argue, all the states had uniform laws modeled on a strict basis, it would be impossible for those who desire an easy divorce to obtain it. The inference is that if divorce were impossible or difficult, then the evil would cease. Is that inference justified?

No one doubts that in certain cases the law may be a stimulus to morals. There are other cases, however, in which the law is a challenge to immorality. The question as to just how far a law may go and yet be a brace to the moral sense of the com-

munity rather than a red rag flaunted in the face of a bull has not been very carefully determined. It is probable that strict divorce laws would prevent some divorces, — those which now result from mere childish caprice or ephemeral discord. Would strict laws, however, prevent the separation of those parties who have discovered between them an incompatibility which time could not overcome? Would it prevent the joyless life, and the frequent intrigues and faithlessness which history has shown can go on in despite of marriage bonds? Would it prevent the clandestine alliances and even poisonings, resort to which has been had in those countries and times in which divorce has been forbidden? If a mismating has occurred, such a proposal would not cure it, — in fact, it might even accentuate the differences. When two people are united in the bonds of marriage and cannot live together without the deepest unhappiness, is it not the best thing for them and for any children they may have to separate?

(2) *Stricter Regulation of Marriage.* — The much more important remedy for the divorce evil is a closer regulation of marriage. There are many good points to the banns. They are at least a recognition of the social character of marriage. They give opportunity for social regulation of a sort. If there is any real objection to the contemplated marriage, the banns give the opportunity to have such objections offered. Moreover, they put a check upon undue haste and give time for somewhat careful deliberation. On the other hand, the banns are not scientific in their nature. They do not put any emphasis upon such considerations as those suggested above. Based primarily upon religious conditions, they do not cover fundamental biological and mental and the wider social considerations. The religious banns are important for those in religious communions. It is of importance whether the people married are of the same religious persuasion, especially those of a zealous nature. The chief defects are that the banns are limited to religious people, they are based upon religious rather than social considerations, and the tests appealed to are not biological, mental, or sociological. In the absence of a more scientific method the banns of the church serve a splendid purpose for a limited part of the population who wish to get married.

(3) *Eugenic Marriage Laws*, as they are called, have been

passed by several states. In general they require a certificate of sound health and freedom from disease, especially from venereal disease. Before them there were laws forbidding marriage between certain mental defectives, such as idiots or imbeciles, insane, and those otherwise mentally diseased. The idea at the basis of these laws is most commendable. The practical difficulty with all measures so far proposed is in the lack of scientific methods of determining whether a person is unfit for marriage. As yet, in most states, unless the person is a manifest mental incompetent, he can get a license to wed. In some cases people who have been in insane asylums or other institutions for the mentally diseased or defective have had no trouble in securing the license. Until such time as public sentiment shall approve the introduction of careful examinations into both the physical and mental defect of people who intend to marry we shall have to be content to let the stream of human life be poisoned at its source, or have it controlled only by the rough methods which have been built out of a prescientific experience. In several states of the United States the law requires every person who applies for a license to marry to present a certificate from some reputable physician declaring that he has made a careful examination of the party named in the certificate and that such person is free from all venereal diseases. Great difficulty has been experienced in getting physicians who were willing to make such a declaration, especially in view of the fact that the law usually has set the price which should be charged by the physician for this examination, — a price for which the physician could not afford to make the most thorough examination known to medical science, the Wasserman test. Many physicians assert that even with the Wasserman test it cannot be known certainly that there is no disease of the kind intended to be discovered by the examination. The chief difficulty with this law is that the law requires an examination which for the common man is prohibitive in price if the regular price is charged, and which the conscientious physician cannot afford to make at the low price set in the law. As a result of these difficulties the attorney-general of Wisconsin has declared that the Wasserman test need not be applied, but that the physician may write the certificate after such examination as he can make for \$3.00 — the price the law allows him to charge. That interpre-

tation, of course, destroys much of the value of the law and opens the way for charlatans to make a business of granting certificates on easy terms. A simple change making it possible for physicians to have the test made at the State Hygienic Laboratory, or at the State Psychiatric Institute, and providing the institution designated by law with the men and equipment necessary would be one method by which the present difficulties could be obviated. Still another method which might be adopted would be a requirement that the Wasserman test be made but the cost of it paid for by the county and the applicant jointly. Against this policy, however, is the objection that there would not be the certainty that the test would be properly made, while uniformity of test and thoroughness would be insured in either of the state institutions just named. This test for physical disease should be supplemented, however, by requirements that not only venereal diseases, but certain others, like tuberculosis, should be sought for, and that tests of mentality should also be given so that those who are slightly feeble-minded should not be allowed to marry.

(4) *The Court of Domestic Relations.* — In a number of cities in the United States this novel and interesting kind of court has been established in the hope that thereby divorce may be diminished. It is based partly on the theory that many divorces are due to the fact that there is no disinterested party which has authority to review those differences which are not fundamental in a family where discord has risen and act as mediator between the two parties. The experience of this court has shown that many families on the verge of disruption can be saved by the exercise of wise counsel and kindly help.¹

(5) *Raising the Social Ideals of Marriage is Necessary.* — The measures just noticed, excellent as they are, merely touch the problem of divorce. They will make entrance into matrimony more deliberate, and by calling attention to some features which should be considered in selecting a mate will cause more careful thought on the whole question of fitness for such high responsibility. Vastly more important, however, are measures looking to the dissemination of information concerning the social responsibilities involved in the marriage relation and in the

¹ *Report of National Conference of Charities and Correction, 1911, pp. 408, 409. Ibid., 1912, pp. 5, 459-462. Ibid., p. 31.*

creation of a sentiment in favor of careful consideration of the physical and mental fitness of people for the high task of being the progenitors of the next generation. Let the taboo be lifted from this subject. People should consider these matters in the light of modern knowledge. At least, let it come to be the custom of men and women to ask themselves seriously whether they are mentally and physically fitted to be happy with the prospective partner and whether they are prepared to make the sacrifices involved in living intimately with another person for life so as to make that partnership enduring if not happy.

The state's chief concern with marriage is the question of the children. Where no children have been born to married persons, there is some doubt as to whether the state has a right to meddle with such intimate concerns as the family. Growing originally out of the state's concern for children as food for bullets or slaves for forced labor, the state has always exercised some care over the family by reason of its concern for the children. Now, with higher motives prompting the attitude, such as concern for men and women who shall be efficient citizens, strong in body and mind, adapted to the changing industrial and social conditions of our society, the state is interfering with the schooling and the working of the child. In the minds of many statesmen and social students the question is rising as to why the state should not go back one step farther and concern itself actively with the heredity of that child. Before such a program can be effective, however, the people must be educated up to the necessity of founding a family on the right biological basis. No less important is it that each individual be brought to an appreciation of the importance of considering psychological and social factors also in the choice of a mate. By the psychological factors I mean such things as the question of temperaments suitable to each other. Science will have to come to the aid of emotion in the selection of a temperamental mate. By the social considerations I mean such questions as social ideals, tastes, attitudes, and traditions. Unequal standards of living, or different ideals as to methods of bringing up children, are sometimes the entering wedges of divisive strife. Incompatible attitudes towards such things as amusements, drinking customs, personal habits, and family customs sometimes mar the peace of

the family. Above all these in importance are the ideals of what a family should be and what it is for. Ideals are products of social endeavor or of social neglect. If the ideals of the family relationship are wrong, they can be corrected by social action. Education, social ostracism, social emulation, can all be used to furnish ideals of family life. The press and the pulpit, the clubs and societies which address themselves to questions of public welfare, the schools and the family itself, are all instruments of the formation of family ideals. The schools to-day, so far as they touch the problem of the family, are concerned largely with the problem of food and clothing. Where is there one which deals with the much larger problem of social adjustments in the home? We teach our girls how to cook for a man and children, and how to manage a household. Why do we not teach them how to manage a home so as to secure peace and happiness, to make it an instrument of social betterment? The boys we do not teach even that much about homemaking. We have only begun to dabble at teaching the boy how to make a living. We have not even thought about teaching him how to make a life for himself and the woman he takes as his wife, and with whom he makes the most solemn covenant to "love, honor, and protect her, to cherish her in joy and sorrow, in health and sickness, in prosperity and adversity, to be faithful to her, and never to forsake her," — a task large enough in all conscience to warrant an intelligent, instructed assent, and one which is made only to be broken in spirit probably in more than one case out of ten. When one views all the factors carefully, it ceases to excite surprise that so many marriages find their way to the divorce court.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What in your judgment has been the influence upon the divorce rate in America of the modern legal facilitations for divorce?
2. Do you think that stricter divorce laws would solve the problem presented by divorce? Why?
3. Give your explanation of the fact that so large a proportion of the divorces occur in the first five years of married life. What bearing does this fact have upon the contention that stricter divorce laws will solve the problem?
4. State the psychology of the fact that children in the home prevents divorce.
5. Explain the differences in the divorce rate in different occupations.
6. Show that the differing geographic or physical conditions of various parts of the United States do not account for the differences in the divorce rates of these parts of the country.
7. Work out the statistics of divorce for your own state and account for the variations from the figures for the whole country. (*Special Reports of the Census Office: Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906*, Washington, 1909.)
8. Explain the changes which have come over many of the states of the Union in their divorce rates during the past forty years.
9. Suggest ways in which the mathematical probability of divorce can be modified by social measures.
10. Show that the legal grounds of divorce may not be the real causes.
11. State the main features of a eugenic marriage law.
12. What do you think of the French plan which requires the consent of the parents to a marriage until a certain age has been reached? Does this unduly emphasize the interest of the family and the social idea? Should fathers and mothers have any control? Should they be notified and should it be required that, say, six months elapse after their protest before a marriage may take place?
13. Suggest a constructive program for marriage which would lessen the number of divorces.

CHAPTER VII

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

Nature of the State.—The state is the political organization of the individuals of a community for the common good. It is the expression of political life. Its purpose is the protection and preservation of the group, and, incidentally, of the individual. Primarily, the state represents a group of individuals, each having an organic relation to the whole, and the whole group to other groups and individuals, and having for its purpose the regulation of relationships affecting vitally the welfare of the group. Concern for the preservation of the group is the most general motive inspiring that regulation of individual and group life which is the beginning of government. That characteristic explains why both in primitive and in developed societies the group's regulations are limited to those designed to promote this aim. These regulations differ both as to stringency and as to scope in societies at different stages of development. Sometimes it may seem best to the governing authorities to exercise closer regulation of individual and group action than at others, for example, in times of war, or of such a crisis as famine or plague. In certain stages of social evolution regulation by the governing authorities will extend to affairs which at other times are left to the regulation of the mores or to the individual interest.

Writers differ as to the essential characteristics of the state. Thus, Bluntschli names seven characteristics: (1) A number of men; (2) a fixed territory; (3) unity; (4) distinction between rulers and subjects; (5) an organic nature; (6) the state is a moral and spiritual organism, it is a personality; (7) the state is masculine as contrasted with the church, which is feminine.¹

Willoughby, on the other hand, says that the essential elements of a state are: (1) a community of people socially united; (2) a political machinery, termed a government, and administered

¹ Bluntschli, *Theory of the State*, 1901, pp. 15-23.

by a corps of officials termed a magistracy; and (3) a body of rules or maxims, written or unwritten, determining the scope of this public authority, and the manner of its exercise.¹

The state must be separated in mind from government, which is the organ through which the state expresses itself, the instrument by means of which the public will or judgment is executed. Whether the government is communistic, patriarchal, monarchical, or democratic, it is always a mere form of demonstrating the power of the state. As Giddings, following Burgess, has pointed out, there is a state behind the constitution and a state revealed in the constitution. The two are quite distinct. The former is composed of the people in a given geographic area speaking a common language and having common ideas as to the fundamental principles of rights and wrongs. The latter is the people expressing themselves in certain ways and defining and delegating certain powers which they wish to have exercised. The latter may be called the government. It is the subject of political science. The former is society in the general sense and is the subject-matter of sociology.² On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish the state from any mere social aggregation whether it be called people, tribe, or nation.

Doubtlessly for the origin of the state behind the constitution we must go back to primitive social institutions. This state organizing itself for the purposes of social control in order to secure benefits which could not be obtained by individuals alone finds its basis in primitive man's consciousness of group needs and in his appreciation of the necessity of limiting individual desires for the sake of the group. Its development cannot always be traced to a definite succession of forms, but it is rather a psychological tendency working through all forms. This expression of group coöperation and control began with the primitive family, then when families came together in hordes relations became more complex both within and between families. For wherever there is concerted action for the common good, however faint, there are the beginnings of that condition of the social mind which is one of the conditions for the develop-

¹ Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, p. 4.

² Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1901, p. 35. Cf. Burgess, "The American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 1, March, 1886, p. 13.

ment of this form of the state. As will be explained later, the state in the sense of that term which involves sovereignty did not develop as a matter of history until war, migration, and conquest had given a conqueror the right to impose his will upon the people of a certain geographical area.¹

The Origin of the State. — When men discuss the origin of the state, some mean the psychological motives which gave birth to the state, while others refer to the institutions out of which the state developed. Representative of the first class is Morley, when he says that society, by which he must be understood to mean the state, is grounded in “the acceptance of conditions which came into existence by the sociability inherent in man, and were developed by man’s spontaneous search after convenience.”²

Not ignoring the motives which gave rise to the state, but connecting those motives with the institutions in which they found their expression, are other writers, from among whom two representatives may be named. Wilson says, “Government must have had substantially the same early history among all progressive races. It must have begun in clearly defined family discipline.” And “What is known of the central nations of history reveals clearly the fact that social organization and, consequently, government (which is the visible form of social organization), originated in *kinship*. The original bond of union and the original sanction for magisterial authority were one and the same thing, namely, real or feigned blood-relationship.”³ Professor Commons looks to a different series of motives to explain the origin of the state. He says, “The state is the coercive institution of society. It is not an ideal entity, superimposed upon society, but is an accumulated series of compromises between social classes, each seeking to secure for themselves control over the institution of private property.” “The state is rather the creature and offspring of private property.”⁴ Yet the patriarchal family is one of the institutions in which sovereignty and so the state originated, because in that family only do

¹ Ward, “Sociology and the State,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XV, p. 679 (March, 1910).

² Quoted by Wilson, *The State*, p. 13.

³ *The State*, pp. 2, 3, 13.

⁴ “A Sociological View of Sovereignty,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, p. 683; Vol. VI, p. 88.

you have the possession of women and children as private property.¹ Thus, according to the writers represented by Wilson the state originated in the relations and institutions of kinship, while according to those represented by Commons it grew out of the institution of private property.

Ethnic Basis of the State. — The primitive family, or the horde composed of several primitive family groups, was the primordial social group. Naturally out of these simple relationships grew the first attempt at group control. The individual's social relations were within the group; he was connected with his fellows by blood bonds real or fictitious. In that homogeneous social group we must place the beginnings of control which eventually expressed itself in political government. When the society was metronymic, the mother and her kindred regulated the group. Among tribes in which the patriarchal system prevailed, there was a much stronger organization, the family was more closely integrated, the governed and governing were more clearly separated, and control was much stricter.

In the establishment and maintenance of social order the family frequently performed in a primitive way all the essential duties of the state. As the family multiplied in numbers through adoption and natural increase until it became a great tribe under the direction of the patriarch and chief, it became necessary to establish more elaborate methods of control. It became necessary for him to make certain rulings on new conditions that arose, as well as to carry out the practices and customs of the fathers, and then he became lawgiver. It was his custom also to pass judgment in order to settle the differences between members of the tribal family and thus he became the chief judge of the social group. Moreover, to the help of the patriarch as governor of the group, there was now added the force of the economic motive; he was not only the representative of the gods, but was actually the owner of the women and children and held in trust for the group its common possessions.² While later his authority became delegated to other officers,

¹ Commons, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, pp. 3, 12.

² Cf. Commons, "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, p. 12. For the view that the state could not originate from the family, see Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, p. 21.

just as the power to legislate eventually passed from the head of the tribe or nation to a body of people selected for that purpose, in this early state of affairs the judicial, legislative, and executive powers of government were all vested in one man, the patriarch of the family. In him, therefore, rested whatever authority existed; and in him we find one historical origin of political control. Here, then, in these primitive kinship organizations we have basic groups, the raw material out of which the state could develop when the new elements of a settled abode and a conqueror enforcing obedience were added — elements introduced by immigration and wars of conquest.¹

Race Conflict and Amalgamation. — But seldom if ever did a family expand into a tribe and the tribe into a civil unit without an intermixture of races. Once families or clans were well established and population increased, there began a struggle for existence. Tribal warfare brought about the extinction of some clans and the union of others. The union of the conquerors and the conquered occurred on the basis of the slavery of the latter. Sometimes, perhaps, assimilation of one group with another may have been attained by peaceful methods. Much more frequently, if not always, it was conquest that brought about the state. A conquered tribe was reduced to slavery, or at least to an inferior position in the conquering tribe. Then occurred the imposition of the will of the conqueror enforcing obedience by one method or another and later a compromise as to rights, duties, and privileges, and the regulation of the political status of the members of the united groups.² Athens and Rome, among the civilized nations, and the Iroquois, Hopi, Aztecs among the natural races, are examples of federated or united tribes. Many of these tribes passed through successive stages of union with others, each stage being followed by a period of integration. During these successive unions and amalgamations of racial stocks, the duty of the individual to the whole mass became more clearly defined. The growth of the state has been along the line of complete union of discordant racial elements, and full recognition of all classes.

Transition from Ethnic to Civil Society. — The origin of the state as revealed in the constitution is more easily described.

¹ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 206-216.

² Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 357-374.

We know how the civil state, the organization of civil society, came into existence among the ancient Greeks. Giddings has shown how various efforts to break down the gentile organization in order to meet the needs of society of that day were tried, but without success until in the time of Cleisthenes the simple expedient was adopted of enrolling all those who lived within the boundaries of a clan or tribe as members.¹ Giddings has clearly pointed out that while sovereignty usually is established first only by the conquest of one people by another, it gradually changes its forms in conformity with changes in the social mind of a people. At first the conquering race imposes its will upon the conquered by force. This method of securing obedience yields to others as the relation of sovereignty and obedience continues. Other forms of sovereignty are class sovereignty, which inspires obedience by the power of the mentally and morally superior aided by religion and tradition or exacts obedience through control of wealth; mass sovereignty, or the ability of an emotionally and fanatically unified majority to compel obedience; and general sovereignty, or the power of an enlightened and deliberative community by an appeal to reason and conscience to evoke obedience.² With these forms of sovereignty, the civil state comes into existence.

The Gentes as Political Units.³ — In the expansion of the patriarchal family, certain closely related groups called gentes performed the most important services in the formation of political order and law. The gens was composed of families of the same blood organized on the clan basis. Members of the gens had a common religious belief, a common god, and, consequently, a common religious ceremony. They had a common burying ground and held public property in common. There were many customs and a few laws which controlled the gens. For instance, it was well established that the individual should not marry within the gens, but that he must go outside to obtain a wife, and that she should renounce the laws and customs of her own gens and adopt those of the one into which she came. Women who went out of the gens to marry took their property with them, hence, an exception to the rule was made in the case

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, 1900, p. 321.

² *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, 1906, pp. 357-359.

³ Gens and clan are used in nearly the same sense by writers.

of an heiress, who was permitted to marry within the gens so as to retain her property.

In the development of government marriage was at first a custom, then became an institution. During the process of change from custom to law the heads of the gentes became the advisers of the leader of the tribe, who himself eventually became king. This council of the chief of the tribe finally became the senate, that is, the old men who were capable of advice. Hence, in law or government the heads of the gentes were the most conspicuous of all the individuals of the family group. The settlements of the gentes in some cases became the political units of the new civil state. Moreover, they represented the points of transition from the family life to the state government.

The Purposes of the Phratry.—The Greek phratry, or brotherhood, was organized for social purposes, especially for religious and political affiliations. It was composed of a group of nearly related gentes who dwelt in proximity to one another; hence, in part, it represented the territorial idea of government. From this phase of government, which was represented in the Roman curia, arose the modern local government, as represented in the wards of cities. While the members of the gens might dwell apart from one another, those of the phratry had to be localized. Members of the phratry had a common religious worship and a common political leadership. In one sense it represented local government, and though it was still an ethnic group, its territorial organization was the beginning of the departure from ethnic or family government, for it laid the foundation of territorial representation in all of the ancient nations. The phratry was strongly marked in the Greek social polity. It is observable also in the Iroquois and other Indian tribes. Thus, in the federation of the Iroquois tribes, usually known as the Six Nations, each tribe had two phratries in the perfected government. For instance, the Cayuga tribe had two phratries, the first having five gentes, namely, *bear*, *wolf*, *turtle*, *snipe*, and *eel*, while the second phratry had three gentes, namely, *deer*, *beaver*, and *hawk*. These various relationships were clearly marked by political and social duties and privileges. Beyond this the phratry was not important in the formation of the state, as it was entirely overshadowed by the gens and the tribe.

The Tribal Organization. — Divided into phratries, the tribe existed as a federation based chiefly upon military service and a religious service common to all. Military leadership was its chief purpose of organization. A chief or leader was chosen from among the heads of the gentes. In war he led all the clans as commander in chief, in peace he presided over the heads of the gentes as a sort of patriarchal president. Subsequently, as the organization became more perfect, he was called king. But always and in every way he had large executive, judicial, and legislative power. Even the religious service of the tribe was under his direction and control. Political and religious integration was secured thus in the tribe and universal tribal practices were observed. There was a generalization of political and religious practice, for the tribe could engage only in the most general phases of government and make only the most general laws.

The Polis or City-State. — A form of ancient government based upon tribal units was the polis or city-state. While its management grew out of the ancient family organization, it also developed the community idea of government. It represents the formal beginning of politics.

Perhaps the best illustration of this was the city of Athens, which originally was composed of a group of village communities located over an extended territory. It became first a center for the assembling of the various ethnic groups for the control and administration of local affairs. The ancient city originally contained the temples of the gods and represented a seat of family worship. There was the market place and center of trade of the rural district, and there were festivals, courts, councils, and sacrifices connected with these commercial and religious centers. It was at the city that people mustered in time of war; there dwelt the tribal chief and with him a few councillors, immediate followers and slaves; but the people dwelt elsewhere in clans, following the life of the ethnic group and living under its control. This ancient city represented only the beginning of the breaking up of the old family life. It eventually drew the elements of social and political life to itself, and around these elements came to cluster the majority of the people, until the city represented a democratic organization with family lines obliterated.

While the city was growing by degrees, becoming more and more important each succeeding generation, the organization of the clan or gens and the tribe continued. The hereditary chief or eldest male member of the group still ruled as priest, judge, and king. He was legislator, executor, and administrator of affairs. Finally, the city became a confederation of several family groups. It was not an assembled group of the people arranged in wards with local self-government, but a meeting place for the representatives of the various federated family groups. However, as the ethnic society secured a geographical location, the ancient city changed into a municipality or a city-state. The rise of the city government had weakened the family government in ways already indicated and the city had obtained the full supremacy. It represented a united body of people still arranged in ethnic groups for certain purposes, but containing many who were originally strangers and had been adopted into the clan or were considered members of the group who now lived within the bounds of the old clan territory, although the family government was subordinate to the city. Gradually political control by family groups faded out and the people became responsible as individuals to a central government of which they were a part.

The polis or city-state, as it originated among the Greeks, differs somewhat from the civitas as devised by the Romans. The former corresponds in some ways to our modern municipality, but it had absolute control; the latter corresponds more particularly to the modern state. The civitas is an expansion of the idea of universal government related to a central head or power and covering forms of local or subordinate government. The state of the Romans represented the government proceeding from the king to the people. It represented an imperialism, while the city-state, springing as it did from the representatives of the ethnic group, finally became a government of the people and tended toward a real democracy.

Prominent Forces in State Building. — Having indicated the early social groups out of which the state developed, let us now inquire what social forces account for the development of the state from these simpler groups.

One of these forces was religion. In ways detailed at length in another chapter religion helped in the consolidation of hetero-

geneous elements in an ethnic population by supporting the authority of the patriarch and in early civil society by supporting the iron law of the conqueror. To the fear of stern patriarch or conquering king religion added the fear of the more dreadful spirit of the dead ancestor or of transcendent Deity. In the transition from the tribal life to the state, a national religion was established. Thus, the family religion of certain tribes became the national religion of the Hebrew commonwealth, and so the expanded religion of the Aryan household became the national religion of the Greeks.

Another important influence in the origin and development of the state was the economic motive. After wealth ceased to consist solely of trinkets and arms and came to include flocks and slaves, conquest became desirable for the booty to be obtained thereby. Conquest gave rise to the state, and in all history has continued to have an important influence upon its development.

Still another factor in the origin and development of the state was the expanding consciousness of kind which came about as the size of kindreds grew and contacts within the group were multiplied, and as the number of independent groups increased and came into contact. Association thus induced kindled the intellectual and emotional nature of mankind, and made possible new pleasures. Then the desire for booty joined hands with the desire for strange wives; these two motives led on to conquest and political development.

With the enlargement of the kinship group there arose a desire for order and for protection among all members of the group. It is beyond the power of one man to regulate, control, and deal justly with a large body of people, as a father deals with his children. The social life becomes too complex for paternalism and so services and functions must be delegated to others. This delegation makes a perpetual differentiation of governmental functions, which differentiation marks the process of state building.

All these influences operated to prepare a group for that ethnic solidarity which is a necessary preliminary to the development of the civil state, and the sovereignty characteristic of civil societies. Much as we may regret to say so, without a doubt the most influential of the forces which resulted in the

making of a state was that motive — compounded of the desire for wealth and the desire for power over men — which may be termed the passion for domination which we see coming to expression in the tribal feudalism of the ancient Irish and the Modern Kaffirs. This motive, much tempered in the tribe by the bands of kinship and restricted by custom and the tradition of the elders, found outlet and stimulation in the little groups of kinwrecked men gathered about a virile and ambitious leader.¹ After chieftainship had developed, then followed war and conquest by a migrating people. The stern necessities of war further developed the chieftain, that forerunner of so many important functions in government, — ruler, judge, priest, and capitalist. Out of war and conquest as a first step, grew the assimilation of peoples, which, if not too different in their customs and manners, amalgamated sooner or later, and produced a more plastic-minded people. The larger and more complex developments of statehood grow out of the necessary arrangement made necessary by the inevitable relationship between a conquering and conquered people in close relationships which are new to both. War and conquest are self-limiting and necessarily lead to other things. The conquerors marry, or at least cohabit with, the women of the conquered. A mixed race appears usually with the religion of the mothers, yet not hostile to the ideas and service of the conquerors. Yet the laws which had risen in response to the necessity of regulating the intercourse of the two peoples are not repealed at once. Constantly new laws have to be enacted. Hence, lawmaking becomes a science. Wherever there are new laws and men's lives are regulated by law instead of by custom, there is need for interpretation of those laws and for settling disputes which arise over them. Courts, therefore, come into being under such conditions. Native customs and the customs of the conquerors conflict with each other, and each modifies the other. Language is modified, art develops, ideals clash and coalesce. In every realm of life there goes on modification. The chieftain of the invaders becomes a king, his adherents the body of chief advisers, and the holders of place and power. In these and a thousand other ways a great impetus is given to the construc-

¹ See Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 267-270: *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 469-473.

tive imagination of those who have the task of keeping order and holding securely what they have won by the sword.

The Differentiation of Political Organs and Functions. — In the development of these various forms of government there was a constant change in the titles and functions of officers and administrators. These changes varied according to the evolution of government itself. Kings were made by a social process, no less definite than the processes of nature which developed the plants of the field or the trees of the forest. As it was but natural that the father of the family in a patriarchal society should be the one to lead and control, so it was again the natural outcome of this leadership, when the family expanded into a tribe of many groups of people, that the father or oldest male should be the leader. It was evident that when religion became involved in government the family which could show the longest lineage and therefore fix its relationship most nearly to the gods had the most power. Hence, it came about that the hereditary principle prevailed in the choosing of the ruler of the tribe. As government became more complex and as tribes became federated, one of these hereditary chiefs or leaders who also had ability in war and government, became king, but the king could not bear his responsibilities without counselors, so it became customary for him to summon old men who were heads of the gentes, the eldest male members, to counsel with him in the proceedings of the primitive state. These counselors became the Senate, an institution which remains to this day as one of the important powers of government in our modern system. Now, as the king could not do everything, gradually his advisers were called on to do more and more of the administrative work of the government. Beyond this the king had special officers to assist him in the leadership of war and administration of religion, and, indeed, in the administration of all the minor affairs of the state. And thus the king became, finally, the head of a group of administrative, executive, judicial, and legislative bodies, and the chief executive and head of a group of officers, as well as ruler of the people.

It was impossible for the king to act as judge to all his people in person and so he appointed people to represent him, and this custom developed into a law, and the officers that represented the king became more and more important until finally

a judicial system was established in which grievous cases only were appealed to the king. But in the final development of government the king gave way to the supreme court as the final court of appeals.

Thus as the process of government became more complex and specialized, the people commanded greater and greater consideration. At first the power was given them to approve or disapprove what the Senate or the king had decreed. Later they had the privilege of voting on measures introduced by others, and, finally, they gained the right of originating laws and passing them. Primarily this was carried on by the whole group of people, but later by representatives of the people chosen for this specific purpose of legislation. Thus was developed the popular assembly so powerful in Greece and Rome, and the main power in the modern government of England and America. Thus, the family with its traditions and customs and its ethnic government expanded until a state was formed with no reference to family relationship, but in which the individual sustained a direct relationship to the whole body. Thus from a king or patriarchal president, who held within his grasp all the powers of government, was gradually differentiated the various departments of government as they exist to-day.

Beginnings of the Federation of States.—The various changes that took place in the development of the state left some tendencies which were influential in the development of certain forms of government. The federation of tribes and families and local groups in the building of a state would seem to suggest a continuation of the federal idea in the union of states. The Greeks attempted this in the ancient leagues, like the Ætolian, the Achæan, and the Lycian. These were attempts to unite many of the Greek states into one federal group, but Greek federation failed because of the strong influences of local self-government and the jealousies of states. In some respects it was unfortunate, for doubtless a united Greece would have been able to withstand the attacks of enemies. That federation was quite a natural step in the development of the state seems to be evident from the attempts already mentioned, of the Iroquois Indians to federate, and of the Aztecs of Mexico, and others that might be cited as examples. Federation is only a process of closer integration of various elements. Wherever it

has continued long, as in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States, the tendency has been to amalgamate the entire group of states into one national body. Integration in social and political development goes on constantly so far as the groups of individuals are concerned, while on the other hand, there is a constant differentiation of powers and functions and a constant change of conception of the relation of the individual to the state.

The Modern Social State. — The state is usually defined as a politically organized group occupying a specific territory. By politically organized we mean, of course, having a code of laws and a well-regulated government. It occupies a territory which belongs to it and which it assumes to defend against all others.

But in the modern state there is a growing tendency towards more complete democracy; hence, in this complex phase of its development we must consider it as a closely integrated collection of individuals and groups having widely different functions. The state to-day is a socially organized organic group with certain people chosen to control, while others agree to obey. But each individual has a distinctive place and performs a distinctive service. In the modern democracy the state cannot exist apart from the people, and the whole people are organized by mutual agreement, tacit or expressed, in industry, service, and self-control. In the evolution of the state from the family there have been represented all ideas of government, from the first bare life protection to the establishment of social order, and, in the final instance, to the conscious purpose of securing the social well-being of the whole people. So the state of to-day represents the conscious, living emanation of the multiple thoughts, sentiments, and will of the people concerning social order and social control, social well-being, and the rights, privileges, and duties of individuals in their relations to one another and to the social group as a whole.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Distinguish between the state and society. Give an example.
2. Would you call the condition of society which existed in one of the pioneer Western communities in the early days of this country a state? Give reasons.
3. Were the Indian tribes which the white man found in this country at the time of its discovery a state, or states? Give reasons.
4. Differentiate the state behind the constitution and the state as revealed in the constitution at the time of the establishment of the government of the United States.
5. Read Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 469-480, and then decide what you think is the most important step in the development from an ethnic society to a civil state.
6. What part did the conflict of tribal groups play in the origin and development of the state?
7. Describe the part which the clans played in the development of the state. What is the modern survival in England of the ancient clan?
8. Name the most important influences which originated the state, as set forth in the text. Compare this statement with the steps given by Oppenheimer in his *The State*, Chap. II (Bobbs, Merrill & Co.).
9. What political purposes did the phratry serve? Has the phratry any survival in modern political subdivisions?
10. Why did the city-state develop in Greece and Rome? Were there any city-states in medieval Europe? Why were there none in the development of the state in what is now the United States?
11. Describe the growth of political organs and functions in one of our new Western states. Why is the development of these functions in the United States not typical of the way in which they developed in, let us say, medieval Europe?
12. What evidence can you offer that the federation of the states of the United States is not yet complete?
13. In what general ways does the modern social state differ from England, let us say, of the time of William the Norman?

CHAPTER VIII

THEORY AND FUNCTION OF THE STATE

Social Evolution and the Theory of the State. — We have seen in the previous chapter how the state itself has its roots in the undifferentiated society of primitive peoples. Professor Commons says, "In primitive society sovereignty and its institution, the state, were blended homogeneously with all the other psychic motives and social institutions."¹ In form the state was a different thing in different stages of social development. Once the state and the family, or at least the kindred, were quite undifferentiated. To-day their spheres are clearly separate one from the other and their respective functions sharply differentiated. So the theory of the state has changed with the change in its form of organization. There has been an evolution of the theory of the state throughout the ages since men began to speculate concerning its nature and the reasons for its existence, with its power over the individuals subject to it. Had there been a political philosopher among the individuals composing a paleolithic horde during glacial times in Europe, doubtless his theory of the nature of the state, or what in some measure was the forerunner of what has come to be called by that name, would have been much different from the theory of our modern political philosophers. He had not the experiences in governmental matters which the last three thousand years have supplied on which to base his generalizations. The theory of the state possible when a king could say *L'état, c'est moi*, cannot possibly be the theory generally held when a majority of the people determine political issues. This is not to deny that political ideas persist from age to age and influence nations widely different in their political structure. Thus, Greece and Rome have contributed principles of government that have in-

¹ "A Sociological View of Sovereignty," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, p. 3.

fluenced all states organized since. The form of government affects the political theory held at the time, and on the other hand, the theory of the state influences the form of government. From the interplay of these two influences upon each other — society upon theory, and theory upon society — comes the development step by step which we see both in the forms of states and in the theory of the state.

State Theories. — The play of human reason upon the facts of political experience gives the world its theories of the state. When the inquiring mind of man began to question as to the origin of the state and its *raison d'être*, naturally his guesses were as far from the truth as the guesses of primitive man at the nature of the Universe. These theories range from the assumption of the divine origin of the state to the theory that men organized the state that they might survive and live together harmoniously. Types of the various theories of the state will be cited by way of illustration.

(1) *Divine Origin of the State.* — Farthest away from the real truth is the theory that government and law are the direct creations of God. According to this theory, lawgivers, statesmen, and rulers are the special agents or viceregents of God in establishing social order among His people. The results are seen in the assumption of power by the Louises of France and the Stuarts of England and in the theory of the Holy Roman Empire. No doubt the state is a divine institution in the same sense as a tree or a rock or the forces of nature are divine creations, but there appears to be no special order in the creation of the state more than in any other phenomenon. We see that the state evolved under the direction of man and in accordance with his needs. The religious theory led to the conclusion that a king was of a higher order of nature than his subjects, and while we find traces of this idea in modern life, the world has grown to recognize that the principal fact that gives the king or the chief executive of a government importance is that he represents the race or the nation. It is in him that the unity of the nation is symbolized and through him that the voice of the people is expressed.

The theory of the divine origin of the state has arisen where religion and government or the church and the state have been closely blended. In the ancient despotisms, where kings traced

their lineage to the gods, in the Hebrew theocracy where Jehovah was the recognized head of the commonwealth, and more than all, in the Medieval Period where the church assumed many of the functions of political government, the idea of the divine origin of the state appeared.

Man made his own capacity for government by his own effort in the establishment of social order. There seems to be no more direct divine agency in the making of the government than in the making of a steam engine or in the organization and management of a railroad.

(2) *Traditions of Lawgivers.* — Far different from the theory of a divinely instituted state was the tradition concerning ancient lawgivers who, it is assumed, laid the foundation of the state by formulating systems of government and codes of law for the regulation of social order. It was an easy way to account for the origin of the state to assume that Moses, or Lycurgus, or Solon, or Numa, or Alfred, by superior wisdom made the code of laws or founded the state. While it is evident that these ancient lawgivers formulated codes and systems of government very early in the history of national existence, yet prior to them each society had been growing into social order through custom, the decrees of kings, and the practice of justice and social control. These ancient wise men were formulators of laws and customs already practiced by the people and their originality consisted more in the modification and interpretation of laws than in the recognition of the state or in the creation of new forms of government.

(3) *Government Contract.* — The government contract is a theory that is based upon actual conditions that have existed at different times during the progress of civil government. The rights of rulers are secured by a contract between them and the people. The feudal government was based on this kind of contract. Indeed, somewhat earlier the practice of rulers holding their power through contract existed in many instances. The theory has never had much influence, although the principle at the foundation has worked itself out in other theories. It was really but a crude expression of the elective principle. It is an approach to the view that the right of government rested with the people, who, however, by an original contract, gave it over to rulers.

(4) *The Social Contract*. — Perhaps no theory of the state has given rise to greater controversy nor has had greater influence on political philosophy than what is known as the “social contract.” The principal advocates of this theory were Hooker,¹ Hobbes,² Locke,³ and Rousseau.⁴ Each one presented different views of the theory which culminated through a process of evolutionary thought in the *Social Contract* of Rousseau, who gave the most formal exposition of the subject. It is not possible here to follow the development of the theory through its different phases, and it will serve present purposes to state the main features of the doctrine as expounded by Rousseau.

The theory is based on the hypothesis that men are governed originally only by natural law and that each one should otherwise be free and independent in a state of nature. Men were brought together into political societies by mutual attraction, by the need of companionship, and in order to insure individual development. This companionship led to perpetual struggle for individual rights and supremacy, — a struggle which could only be abolished by a mutual contract of individuals to maintain social order by a surrender on the part of each of certain rights of independent action. This “contract” theory sought “To find a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which, coalescing with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before.” Expressed by Rousseau, the essence of this contract is, “Each of us puts in common his person and his whole power under supreme direction of the general will; and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole.”⁵ Thus, men agree to enter into one body politic and pass from natural to civil government. In this the citizen loses his natural liberty, but gains civil liberty by the social contract.

The principal defect of the theory as advanced by Rousseau is the ideal state of nature which he presents. The only natural right that exists is that born of the instinct or impulse to survive. There are no natural rights to be surrendered for civil rights.

¹ Richard Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*.

³ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*.

⁴ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*.

⁵ Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Bk. I, Chap. VI.

There was no first convention by which each one surrendered his rights to a common public. Nor is it correct to assume that man had inherent political rights, or even natural freedom and equality. These assumptions present an ideal state of society and an ideal compact. There are instances in which certain phases of the social contract seem to appear. Thus, in the compact entered into by the passengers on the *Mayflower*, and in the organization of communities and states on the Western frontier, where individuals submit to a constitution and government, we have suggestions of the social contract. Yet it must be remembered that the state had been in existence thousands of years before such a contract was ever heard of and that the forms of government used and the laws adopted were but the product of the evolution of civil society and have no reference to a first cause of government. The social contract theory, in seeking to find a reason for the state's existence, finds no real first convention, nor any later contractual rights of the citizen. There are many social causes that bring about the aggregation of mankind and many sources of order and government, but the individual has only such rights and privileges as society, of which he is a member, grants him. Yet, it remains true that social order is established by each yielding to a form of procedure, and by his willingness to make sacrifices of individual liberty for the well-being of the community.

(5) *Theories of Publicists*.—In the development of the theory of the state, many philosophers who have tried to view the state historically have worked far toward a proper understanding of it. They have prepared the way for the recognition of the true theory of the state, because they proceeded from the experience of humanity rather than from a *a priori* premise. Their arguments are not to prove the right of the state to exist, but rather an attempt to discover what the state is like and how it came into being.

Perhaps of all the ancient philosophers, Aristotle¹ has discussed the state with the greatest wisdom and skill. He holds primarily that "man is a political animal" with an instinct for government. This capacity for governing was the primal cause of the origin of government; its practice was the test of its quality in different peoples. Aristotle's *Politics* was based

¹ See Part VII, Chap. I.

upon the best practices of the most successful nations. He was the first to recognize the historical development of government and social order. However, he recognized a cycle of forms decidedly interesting, but not absolutely correct. In his analysis he holds that monarchy is the first essential form of political government. This was followed in the natural order by aristocracy or government of the best, and aristocracy passed into oligarchy, which led on to democracy, and democracy passed into the mob rule (ochlocracy). At this juncture the tyrant appears and social order is reestablished through the monarch. While this formal cycle of change has not been universal, it has been repeated many times in history. The three legitimate forms of government recognized by Aristotle are monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, all others being spurious. However, the democracy of Aristotle is a government of classes. The modern democracy was not discussed by him, although his "polity" was similar in some respects to modern forms. When once thoroughly established, the modern democracy disposes of his cycle theory. Aristotle developed the broad theory of human rights, but showed how the service of the individual must seek the well-being of the community. His rights as an individual are absorbed to a great extent in the rights of the whole community.

Among modern scholars no one has had wider influence than Bluntschli. A master of political science, he has given us a theory of the modern state in which he shows its progression from the family. He defines the state as "a combination or association of men in the form of government and governed, on a definite territory, united together in a moral organized masculine personality, or, more shortly, the state is the politically organized national person of a definite country."¹ He calls the state a living organism because it is "a union of soul and body, *i.e.* of material elements and vital forces," and because the organism has members "which are animated by special motives and capacities in order to satisfy in various ways the various needs of the whole itself." He says that "the organism develops itself from within outwards, and has an extreme growth." Having declared this, he proceeds to show how this organism came to be, how it grows, and the various causes of

¹ *The Theory of the State*, p. 23.

growth, and seeks to verify his conclusions by citations of the facts in the process of growth. This is a recognition of the evolution of the state. Bluntschli insists that definite territory is essential to the constitution of a state, while Woodrow Wilson points out, in his book on *The State*, that it is possible for a tribal state to exist while the people have no settled habitation. The Franks, before they had established themselves on a definite piece of territory, had some of the essential elements of the state. Also many of the Semitic tribes have many of the powers and activities of the state, although they are more or less nomadic. Yet these are examples of ethnic groups and not of demotic society. In modern life our conception of a state unquestionably includes the location of the people so organized on a definite territory.

The Evolutionary Theory.—The theorist asks, "What right have certain people who hold the power, to coerce others into regulated action through the machinery of government?" That is really a social question and must be answered by the sociologist who seeks to interpret the state by considering it as the outgrowth of the same social forces as have produced the other social institutions such as marriage, church, and economic organization. Although the practical outcome of state theory is of great importance to the sociologist who seeks to furnish a program for political action, to him the theory of the state must be based not "in the constitution of things," but in the nature of society. Sociology helps to determine the position of the state as a conscious agency for the improvement of human society, demonstrating its powers and limiting its functions in accordance with true evolution. State theory considers the rational basis of state right and statecraft.

The sociologist views the state as a gradual development brought about by the attempt of men to live together harmoniously. The state was not the beginning of human society, but one of the later devices to procure social welfare through definite and clearly defined methods of political control. Considered historically, the elements of the state were founded not by the plan of God or man, nor by the agreement of a group of individuals to live together with equality and justice, but is a by-product of the attempt of individuals to adjust their differences and to promote their welfare. Primarily, no one intended

to build a state, but it simply grew, incidentally, while men were attempting to satisfy their desires in other directions. Through a natural order, beginning with the family and extending through the gens or tribe, and finally emerging as the transition was made from custom to law, from status to political life, the state has slowly evolved. There is only a partial truth in each of the state theories advanced by philosophers, but there can be nothing truer than the sociological theory of the gradual development of laws and of social control, brought about by the natural evolution of society in response to conditions, physical, economic, and social.

Yet there must be added to this the constant choice of society in the establishment of social order, in the adoption of forms of government, and in the creation of wise laws to protect and guard human rights and privileges, as well as to impose social and political duties. This conscious choice of the social mind followed in order the unconscious growth of society. Any one who has read at all carefully the history of the struggle for civil liberty knows how out of the clash of opposing interests, principles of government which have been fundamental to our modern theories of the state were developed, such, for example, as the consent of the governed, or the principle of taxation only upon representation, or that of the voting of taxes only by the representatives of the people who pay them.

Nor must the formation of codes of laws as a means of producing social order be ignored. The expression of the best methods of government and the best laws for the control of man gave a great impulse toward the building of the state. No one can estimate the effect on social order of the publication of the first code of laws of a society. Yet the lawgivers did not make the state.

The Essential Functions of the State. — Recognizing that states continue to grow by enlarging their inherent powers and growing from without by adding to the number of functions, one may insist that there are certain characteristics and certain essential functions of a community to be observed before it can consistently be called a state. Adhering in part to the outline of Dr. Wilson,¹ the list of essential functions may be stated briefly as follows :

¹ *The State*, pp. 639-640.

(1) *Social Order.* — Were people all well intentioned and willing to observe the Golden Rule in their treatment of one another, still it would be necessary for some authority to establish and preserve the order of their going, that confusion might be prevented. The idealistic anarchists are wrong in assuming that if every one was willing to do right, there would be no need of government. While the real order of society may not be founded on coercion, it remains true that the regulative power of government is essential in order that people may have an acknowledged universal guide to determine their proper place in the social world.

(2) *To Provide for the Protection of Person and Property from Violence and Robbery.* — In the most highly developed societies there are those who do not observe the rights of person or property. They do not hesitate to take that which belongs to another or to attack others and do them injury if they so desire. Hence, it is essential in every well-regulated community that such persons be restrained. Such protection is perhaps the most fundamental of the services of government; for the economic and social life of the people depends upon it. Without the faithful exercise of this function of government, all others will fail to give justice and promote the well-being of the community.

(3) *The Defining of Legal Relations between Man and Wife and between Parents and Children.* — While the family precedes the state in the order of development, it has surrendered, in a measure, to the state the general definition and regulation of rights of its members. The marriage relation, so largely an individual matter, becomes a general social question when results are considered. So far as these relationships affect the whole social order they are regulated by the government. Likewise, the relation of children to parents is naturally a private one, but so far-reaching is this relationship in its effects on the social body that it must of necessity be regulated. While the state refrains from invasion of the sacred precincts of the home to regulate its internal affairs, yet so far as the rights of the individual permit, laws must be passed and executed for the establishment of social order in the home. The ignorance of many, the errors of judgment of others, and the mere viciousness of still others demand that the family life shall not be used as a means of working injury or injustice to any person; otherwise society

might be destroyed by the corruption of the family, the fundamental social unit.

(4) *The Regulation of the Holding, Transmission, and Interchange of Property.* — One can imagine a community holding all property without any formal individual ownership. This has been practiced to a certain extent by some communities. The communists advocate this and the anarchists have denied the right of individual ownership. Proudhon, leader of one school of modern anarchists, claimed that "property is robbery," and that property holders were robbers because they had seized that which belonged to all and held it as individual property. But in community holding, it would be necessary to have the use of such property regulated, and as the kinds and nature of possessions change, new laws must be instituted, from time to time, to avoid confusion and oppression. However, one of the bases of social life is the ownership of property. It has arisen through the practical needs of society and has been carefully defined and guarded by law. Even though it be conceded that the acquisition of property has resulted from the combined efforts of the members of the community, it is the acknowledged right of every one "to have and to hold" and the state must protect every one in this right. Consequently what an individual owns he may dispose of and the government again comes into its legitimate province in regulating the exchange of property, as well as the inheritance of property.

(5) *The Determination of Liability for Debt or Crime.* — After the fourth function the fifth follows as a necessary corollary. Otherwise, debts could be contracted and the persons contracting them could repudiate them. Without regulation, the business confidence would be so limited as to destroy the commerce and exchange of the nation. Indeed, those so disposed could practice confiscation and robbery without the restraint of government. So, too, as crime is a violation of law, individuals must be held responsible for it or otherwise no social order could be secured.

(6) *The Determination of Contract Rights between Individuals.* — Here we have again the enforced responsibility of an individual to his fellows. It would be impossible to have a well-regulated social order without it. While the stability of business rests to-day largely upon the voluntary honesty of

individuals in their dealings with one another, the opportunity for the irresponsible to repudiate obligations incurred makes it highly necessary for the government to guarantee, by well-conceived laws, the enforcement of obligations. Differences of opinion might also cause great confusion as to what constituted a contract and how it should be fulfilled. Hence a general regulation is necessary, and the state alone can make such a regulation.

(7) *The Definition and Punishment of Crime.* — Without law or regulation by the state, society would imperfectly adjust itself to a social usage. Certain things would be recognized as against the welfare of the community. There would naturally appear a consensus of social opinion which would determine what was right and what was wrong in society. But the law determines what is crime against society and demands a penalty for offenses. Originally the offense was only against the individual and it rested with the individual to settle with the offender. But it finally became the duty of the state to protect not only the individual, but also to protect itself, hence the offense is against society and the government must define the crime and institute the punishment therefor.

(8) *The Administration of Justice in Civil Causes.* — Disputes over rights of property and personal privileges are certain to arise in every community. The settlement of these contentions or disagreements must be made by some disinterested person. The state, being the only power that can operate independently of individual interest, becomes the natural judge and therefore the administrator of justice between all contending parties. It would be impossible to preserve social order or to establish social justice without such administration.

(9) *The Determination of the Political Duties, Privileges, and Relations of Citizens.* — What part the citizen shall take in the government depends upon the nature of the government instituted, but every state implies the governing and the governed. Sovereignty is the supreme authority of the state. Through its own will the state assumes and maintains the authority which may be expressed through king, parliament, or constitution. It is the sovereign will of the state that regulates political duties and privileges of citizens. In a republican form of government like our own, where it is assumed that people govern

themselves through their representatives, the sovereign power rests, for the time being, in the constitution which is created by the people, that is, the people define through constitutions, laws, and authorized administration their own political rights, duties, and privileges. The right to vote, to hold office, the duty of taxation, and the duty to bear arms in defense of the country, and the political limitations and duties of officers, must all be established by the government through well-defined laws and regulations.

(10) *The State must preserve its Life and maintain its Political Relationship with Foreign Powers.* — Every state stands as a unit in relation to other states and as such its individuality and independence must be maintained. Hence all intercourse with foreign powers must be conducted by the state. It must preserve the people from external danger or encroachment of other powers and must advance all the interests of the state in relation to foreign powers. It must see that the state's rights and privileges are maintained and that its citizens and their property are protected when involved in international affairs.

In the most limited conception of the state, its government must possess at least the powers enumerated above, in order to maintain itself and perform all of the necessary functions of statehood. Not one of the above-enumerated functions could be left out without crippling the power of the state, and every modern state attempts to perform these functions in one way or another.

Optional Functions of the State. — While the above list represents the minimum requirements of statehood, there are no limits placed upon the action of a state provided it advance the interests of all the people and increase the well-being of the public. Hence it is that states vary in the number of things they attempt to do for the people. There are many optional functions which at least some states have assumed. The following is a partial list.

(1) *The Regulation of Trade and Industry.* — Most modern governments find this essential to the welfare of the state. In fact, all nations have regulated trade and commerce to a considerable extent. It becomes necessary for the government to coin money, to establish standards of weights and measures, and to regulate certain trades through license. In a larger

way governments have regulated navigation and transportation and established tariffs for the regulation of industry and trade. This service of government increases in modern times. There is no limit to the action of the state in this matter except that of sound judgment and the possibilities of promotion of its own interest and the welfare of the people it represents. At various times in the history of the world states have gone too far in regulating industries, and at other times they have not gone far enough. The tariff, for instance, may be used to build up one industry at the expense of others and to interfere with the foreign commerce of the nation to its own detriment. Possibilities of this kind indicate that laws for the regulation of trade should be instituted with the utmost care.

(2) *The Regulation of Labor.* — All modern nations have attempted to regulate labor to a greater or less extent. Whether it was slave labor or free and independent, states have found it necessary to establish laws regulating master and slave, employer and employee, and to define the rights of the laborer. In the present industrial era this function of the state has grown large. If one were to consider the legislation of the various states of the Union in recent times, he would observe that a large body of law had been created for the regulation of labor. Indeed, the greater part of the legislation in the United States in the last twenty years has been in relation to the industrial life, including labor. Political rights and privileges have, in the main, long since been settled, but rights, duties, and privileges of a growing industrial world must be settled in accordance with the existing conditions.

(3) *The State Management of Industry.* — Under this heading we have a large group of varied services of the state, such as the construction of roads, the ownership or management of railways or canals, the building of harbors and docks, the improvement of land by drainage or irrigation, and the dredging of rivers for internal communication. Included in this list is the protection of forests and of game and the stocking of rivers with fish.

There is also another group which varies a little from the maintenance of thoroughfares, that is, systems of communication. These include the postal and telegraph and telephone systems. The government may own and control all of these.

As most governments have established their own postal system, there seems but little reason why the government should refrain from owning and managing the telegraph and telephone systems.

A third group is found in the ownership and distribution of public utilities. The distribution of water, of gas, and electricity by the government is among the important measures adopted by some municipalities.

(4) *Sanitation, including the Regulation of Trades for Sanitary Purposes.* — This is necessary to the social well-being of a community, and the state has good reason for performing this service, for the health of a community increases its labor power, prevents pauperism and crime, and develops happiness and prosperity. The selfishness of individual interests would neglect sanitation and would lead to the spread of disease, therefore it is essential that the government take a hand in regulating the sanitation of the community. It is a true saying that "public health is public wealth," and the comfort and convenience of individuals not only increase wealth, but are essential to the general prosperity of the community.

(5) *Education.* — Most states have much to do with public education. They have either encouraged it by granting privileges and subsidies or established and managed it on their own account. It is generally conceded that in a free government in which the people take part it is necessary that education should be universal. The only way to make it universal is to provide for the maintenance of schools by the state. In our own country, while the state may educate the individual for the individual's personal advantage, there is a deeper social foundation for education. The state exercises this function for the general defense and welfare of the people; through education it desires to make better citizens, better equipped men to fill the professions and departments of life, in order that the interests of the state may be conserved. While a state may exist without public education, education is essential to the highest forms of the modern state.

(6) *The Care of the Poor and Incapable.*¹ — This function has been practiced by states in varying degrees, but has never been considered universally necessary. In many instances the poor and incapable have been left to their

¹ See Part V, Chaps. II and VI.

own resources or to the tender mercies of individuals, or to private societies. The chief instances of the state care of the poor is found in the action of England through its well-known Poor Laws. The English government sought to care for everybody who needed help, and chiefly through maladministration increased the evil it sought to cure. It brought about a condition in which the poor were taxed into pauperism. Perhaps the people of the United States are more liberal in the care of the poor and incapable than any other nation. While we have thousands of private benevolent institutions caring for all classes of those who need help, nearly all the states of the Union have made provision for the welfare of dependents, defectives, and delinquents. It is even deemed necessary in modern times for the state to have a Board of Charities or a Board of Control to supervise these charitable institutions. While it is not the right of an incapable person to demand help of the state, it is deemed the duty of the state to help such person when his needs are discovered or made known to the state.

(7) *Laws Relating to the Manufacture, Sale, and Consumption of Certain Kinds of Food.* — These laws are sometimes called, very indefinitely, “sumptuary laws,” but they can scarcely be recognized as such except in cases where they forbid consumption. The regulation of the liquor traffic, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, has for its purpose the restriction of consumption, and the improvement of the moral and social condition of the people, but is not a direct sumptuary law. The inspection of food products, which tends to provide for pure foods, is not intended as a restriction on consumption. It seems wise for the state to regulate all matters of this kind which concern the health and permanent well-being of its citizens.

These are some of the more important optional functions of the state which governments, under some form or another, have undertaken, but they are very far from representing all that may be included in this class. Yet they show conclusively that there is variation in the conception of what a government should do, and variation in the method of procedure.

The Limits of the Powers of the State. — It would seem from the foregoing list of optional functions that there could

be no law regulating what should be assumed by the state and what should be left to private action. This can be determined by the public will, which follows the changing condition of the people and the progress of the state. Under such circumstances it may be safely assumed that the state may do anything which conduces to the highest well-being of the community. This, of course, is stated in a very broad way. In the United States, railroads, telephones, and the telegraph are owned and operated as private institutions, or at least by private corporations. Should it be deemed better for all the people that the state should own and manage these public utilities and the people should so decide, there is nothing to prevent their becoming essential state functions. There seems to be a tendency for the state to gain powers, and some think this will continue until the state owns and controls all the property and industries, and then we shall have a socialistic state. This, however, is not a necessary outcome of the increase in state powers, as the history of modern Germany shows. If in the past the state has been delinquent in exercising functions which legitimately belonged to it, or conditions have recently arisen which demand increased powers of the government, one need not jump to the conclusion that the state should own and control all industries. The growth of governmental functions for the social welfare corresponds very closely with three great developments in the complexity of our social life: first, the increasing complexity of population and social relationships; second, the development of our industrial life in scope and intricacy; third, the evolution of a social consciousness, a public opinion based upon considerations of social welfare for the whole group, roused to counteraction by the abuses that cluster like fungi upon an antiquated social order.

The State from a Sociological Point of View. — The sociologist is concerned with the nature and function of the state, for in proposing any reform, he must know what can and what cannot be accomplished by the government. Many reformers have seemed to think that all it is necessary to do is to pass a law and the reform will be accomplished. But thousands of laws have been passed which have not succeeded in accomplishing the intentions of their promoters. Indeed, some have been useless almost from the time of their passage. There are certain rec-

ognized normal tendencies in the development of society which must be considered before it can be determined what the state can do towards working a reform. It is found that acts of a state or government accomplish the purposes of their authors just in the proportion that the lawmakers take into consideration the stage of social growth reached by the people. There is a social mind which acts consciously, and it may change the affairs of the body politic; there is an individual mind which wills the future action of the individual, but these may both fail unless their choice be founded on an appreciation of the existing state of the social mind developed by their group. An example of a sociological tendency which has a practical bearing upon the making of laws is that law formulated by Giddings that a society which has few interests, but has these harmoniously combined, will be conservative in its choices, while one which has varied interests, but which are not yet harmoniously combined, will be radical in its choices. It is apparent that a program of policies to be enacted into law which would suit the one situation would not suit the other. Another sociological law also formulated by Professor Giddings is often acted upon by the practical legislator. It is that social action is less likely to be impulsive as society gets into the habit of attaining its ends by indirect and complex means.¹ The man who wants sudden action upon a proposal which will not stand the test of careful thought and investigation always argues the urgency of action. On the other hand, he who wants to defeat such a measure moves its reference to a committee or its postponement. Which method shall be adopted and what shall be the nature of the law proposed to meet a certain situation will depend largely upon the stage reached in the development of the social mind by a people. Moreover, what powers the state shall be given by the people depends much on the stage of development reached by the people in their collective life. If the population making up the state is relatively homogeneous in blood, or ideals, a democracy like the old New England town meeting will perhaps give the best results. But, let the population be made up of people gathered together from all parts of the world, who have not yet learned to know and appreciate each other's ideals and customs, and the democracy of the New England town meeting

¹ Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 177-181.

becomes the tyrannical bossism of our great cities. Or, again, a law which will be obeyed in "prohibition" Iowa, whose people have long been in America and have imbibed the Puritan ideals, will be broken in Wisconsin or Minnesota with their large foreign populations possessing other social customs and ideals. A republic in ignorant Mexico cannot be the same as in enlightened Canada or France. Sociology provides the foundations on which the political scientist may build his science of government, and the political philosopher his theory of the state.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Name and describe the two phases of the evolution of the state.
2. Which would you examine in order to determine whether the state is progressing, the machinery of government, or the principles of government?
3. What interest has the sociologist in the theory of the state?
4. Name and state the more important state theories.
5. What principle of government lies at the bottom of the theory of government contract?
6. How does the social contract theory differ from that of government contract?
7. According to Rousseau, why did men enter into a social contract and form a government?
8. In what stage of social evolution does the social contract appear?
9. What are the chief defects of the social contract theory as set forth by Rousseau?
10. Criticize the theory that the state came into being with certain law-givers.
11. What vicious conclusion was drawn from the assumption of the divine origin of the state?
12. What is Aristotle's theory of the origin of the state? Of the evolution of the state? Criticize the latter in the light of political development since his day.
13. Read Aristotle's *Politics* and estimate his influence on modern political philosophy.

14. State Bluntschli's theory of the state. What is Woodrow Wilson's criticism of that theory?
15. State the sociological theory of the origin of the state.
16. Name the essential functions of a state.
17. Name other optional functions of the state. What is the social justification of these functions?
18. What are the sociological limitations upon the powers of the state?
19. What is the criterion by which it should be determined whether a certain thing should be done by the state or by private initiative?
20. Of what value to practical statecraft may sociology be? Why are some laws impossible to enforce? Give examples.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOCIAL PHASES OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH

PERHAPS no other phase of social life shows so plainly the interdependence of individuals as does the production of wealth. Considered in its specific sense it belongs to political economy, but as a general social function it belongs to sociology. Here we need consider only the social phase of man's economic activities and the sociological bases of a theory of economics.

There are two great primal desires, the desire for food and the sex impulse, the one purely egoistic, the other a social craving. It is hard to say which of these is predominant. Sometimes the desire for food has checked the sex impulse. But on the whole it is doubtful whether, except in extreme instances, either one has permanently controlled the other. In fact, until society reaches a rather advanced stage in development reproduction goes on even though it means the gradual lowering of the standard of living, as in China. So important, however, do the economic motives based upon a later desire for wealth and the social prestige become in our modern, highly complex civilization that there are those who believe that the economic life underlies all other social relations.¹ In the past the economic motives have played much greater part than they are likely to play in the future.² Looking only at present-day society in our Western world, it often seems that the economic life underlying all other phases of social life represents the formal basis of society. As such it manifested itself to a degree in the beginnings of society and played an important part during its growth and development. Our best education, our religion

¹ Proponents of this view are known as economic interpreters of history, *i.e.* they assert that economic wants are the fundamental social forces and economic activities the primary social activities. Some of the more important names in this school of thought are Karl Marx, Loria, and Seligman.

² Ely, *The Evolution of Industrial Society*, pp. 447, 448.

and æsthetic culture, as well as all our moral relationships, depend to a great extent upon the development of the economic life — upon the industry that creates the goods for our material welfare. The evolution of our economic life touches indirectly all the social activities. This, however, is only one aspect of the matter; social customs and fashions in turn determine our economic development.

Economic Goods or Wealth produced to satisfy Desires. — There are material wants, the desire to satisfy which causes man to struggle perpetually. To satisfy hunger, to secure protection from cold, to satisfy artistic taste, to add to the conveniences of life, men are striving from the cradle to the grave, and the satisfaction of these desires is the immediate aim of the social group. The creation of wealth is one of the great activities of society. Wealth is formed by the creation of utilities, for man cannot create anything new, but he can transform useless material into useful articles.

The tree in the forest as it stands may be of little use, but transformed into furniture or houses it may satisfy desires. The mineral in the mountains in its native form may not minister to man's needs, but brought to the surface and transformed into instruments for man's use, it may supply many of our greatest wants and therefore become useful and desirable. While the mineral and tree untouched by the hand of man are wealth, yet they are so because of their prospective utility through transformation into things of beauty or use.

Slow Accumulation of Wealth. — The creation of wealth by primitive man was, in the beginning, a slow process. At first it took all his time to obtain sufficient food to perpetuate life, and clothing and shelter to protect him from the rigor of the climate. At times both food and shelter were insufficient to preserve life. The accumulation of wealth began with a surplus of food, clothing, implements, and ornaments. The increased food supply enabled individuals and tribes to spend more time in making a higher grade of implements, better homes, and enlarged the opportunity for the creation of wealth.

Wealth at any stage is measured more by power of production than by creation of permanent goods. Indeed, what is frequently called the accumulation of wealth is a multiplication of resources and a development of power and opportunity for

the creation of wealth, rather than a massing of economic goods. For it will be observed that a large proportion of what is called wealth has been created within recent years. Not until the discovery and use of the precious metals was the hoarding of wealth or its preservation for future generations possible to any large extent. But the power to accumulate, once well started, tends to increase in a geometrical ratio. This power when rightly used is a measure of material progress.

Complex Nature of Social Production.— In early times economic society was very simple and each individual, seeking his own welfare, survived or perished according to his efforts and opportunities or lack of them. But as common interests became apparent, small groups struggled together and worked for one another. Following this, the division of labor began, some procuring food and others cooking it, others building the home, others making garments, and still others making utensils. Later, trading was conducted by other groups and, finally, transportation by others. Thus, with the increase of work and wealth, society gradually became differentiated and resolved into groups working for definite purposes, the service of each group being necessary to the whole society.

The final social effect was to bring those who had similar or nearly related occupations into closer contact and to develop social relationships between groups. To-day people are arranged in social groups largely on account of their occupations. It is more natural for those in the same trade, whose business relationships are intimate, to associate, than for those who are widely separated, hence the basis of group formation to-day is industrial action. There are those engaged in the same occupation, however, who are widely separated, so that the economic classification does not always agree with the general social grouping. Some wage earners of one community, for instance, have less social contact with those of other communities than they have with merchants of the communities in which they live. Yet, in the same locality intimate social relationships usually follow business contact.

This point of view is essential to the study of the so-called class problem in the United States. The banker may have no enmity toward the laborer or distrust of him, nor does he refrain from association with him on an assumption of superior-

ity, but because of the natural social classification that appears from following different vocations. In general, men choose their associates in accordance with their economic relationships. And as wealth increases society becomes more or less stratified in accordance with the amount of wealth. The best examples of this tendency are found in fashionable society where individuals vie with one another in show of lavish expenditure.

Social versus Individual Wealth. — An important social feature of wealth production is observed in the difference between the aggregate of social wealth and individual holdings of wealth. The wealth of a community is found by adding to the public wealth the sum total of individual wealth. But in estimating social wealth care must be taken to exclude bonded indebtedness, and in the estimating of individual wealth credits must offset debits in such a way as to show the real wealth. Thus the promissory note is real wealth to the individual who holds it, but its existence does not increase the wealth of the community. The social inference from these facts is that the sum total of the wealth of a community may be an estimate of power, but the distribution of individual wealth is an estimate of social well-being. If, for instance, the wealth is in the hands of a few people and the remainder are struggling with oppressive mortgages, extortionate prices, or general poverty, the social character of the community is lowered.

Importance of Well-Being. — The communities that are the most progressive are those that secure the most economic justice between individuals. Indeed, social well-being cannot exist when individual economic well-being is lacking. Hence a community that has moderate wealth that is broadly distributed and widely used is far better than one of far greater wealth, in which multitudes receive little benefit of wealth, either from possession or use.

Social well-being, then, so essential to progress, should involve an element of justice to all the individuals of a community. It involves an ethical as well as an economic element. The question of how wealth is obtained is more important than the bare fact of attainment. Those nations that have grown wealthy by plunder fare worse in the long run than those that grow wealthy by honest industry. Thus, the Roman nation declined in proportion as it discouraged home labor and lived

on wealth obtained by conquest. Likewise, Spain destroyed her own industries and her prosperity when she attempted to live by plundering others. Further, a nation may have earned its wealth by honest labor, but the estimate of its progress will only be determined fully by the extent to which this wealth is made to administer to the well-being of all. Hence it is, that in considering wealth-getting, one of the greatest of social or individual activities, one must also consider weighty questions of methods of production, distribution, and use, before making a final estimate of social well-being.

Land or Nature as a Basis of Social Action.¹—In the consideration of wealth, land or nature is the first element to be considered. Not only its agricultural and mineral resources are to be considered, but also its extent. Room for work involves the relation of the population to the land, and social progress will be limited by the production of the soil, for it sometimes determines the size of population that may be supported. There has always been land enough for the population of the earth, but owing to its distribution, many districts at different periods of the world's history for the time being have been congested or overpopulated. While a sparse population is not capable of a high grade of social life, a very dense population may lead to social degeneration.

Theory of Malthus.—Malthus, observing the possibility of the rapid increase in population and the comparatively slow increase of the means of subsistence, asserted that unless there were checks on population, population would outrun the food supply and many would perish. He held that population tended to increase in geometrical progression and the best to be hoped for as regards food supply is arithmetical increase, hence, as a mathematical problem, population has a tendency to overtake the food supply. While the general statement is true, Malthus failed to give sufficient weight to certain compensatory conditions, such as intensive agriculture, which constantly increases the food supply per acre; the introduction of diversity of food products, which increases the power of nature to supply wants; the better preparation of food, which gives it greater power to support life; the temperate habits of the people; and, more than all, the enormous amount of productive lands to be brought

¹ See Part II, Chap. II.

increasingly under cultivation. He confined his discussion to the natural checks, vice and misery, and to the prudential checks, such as late marriage and small families, which would tend to keep the population within the limitation of the food supply.

Several considerations have been urged against Malthus's conclusions. While individuals have starved for want of food, and whole communities have suffered depletion for the same cause, the world at large has plenty of food, and there seems to be no probability within the range of human prophecy that it will be exhausted. It may be conceived that a condition will be reached when all land will be put to its most productive use, and population cease to increase from lack of food supply; and while such a state is, in point of fact, too remote for immediate consideration, yet such a possibility must be faced by the sociologist. So long as man continues to tap in new places the almost inexhaustible supply of nature's resources, the normal increase of population will receive sufficient support; yet, when invention ceases to keep ahead of human needs, as in China, the Malthusian law operates. Nor did Malthus at first foresee the modern tendency to restrict the size of the family discussed in a previous chapter. He assumed that the sex impulse would demand satisfaction either in normal or irregular relations. In the former case there would be an increase in population in a geometrical progression; in the latter population would be checked by vice. He did not make sufficient allowance for a check on population within normal family relations. This defect he corrected in later editions of his *Essay*.

Nevertheless, after all these optimistic considerations have been given due weight, it remains to be shown that the general conclusions at which Malthus arrived no longer are true fundamentally, and that we can afford to ignore the warning they bring to humanity. While our ever present poverty is due often to social maladjustments which are socially remediable, at bottom poverty goes down to the pressure of population upon food supply, and with every increase in the population of a country whose other economic factors remain the same, the pressure of population on food supply is bound to increase.

Labor as a Means of Wealth Production.—Other things being equal, the productivity of a community will be deter-

mined by its labor power. It will be determined first and foremost by its organization, then by the quantity of labor, that is, the number of laborers available, and still more by the quality of the labor force. Wherever there is a large body of laborers there is an opportunity for the creation of wealth such as does not exist in a sparse population. But the more essential elements are the strength, ability, zeal, happiness, intelligence, and physical condition of the laborers. A laboring population that is full of hope, thrift, happiness, and honesty will accomplish a vast deal more than degraded slave labor driven by the lash.

Again, the amount accomplished will depend upon the division of labor, for each laborer learning one thing well becomes more skilled and saves time and energy. The total laboring community thus becomes more proficient. In addition to this the power of directing labor, the organization of workmen, and the organization of business contribute greatly to productive power. All these conditions affecting the productivity of labor are in turn affected by social institutions, such as human organizations in the form of governments to secure peace, voluntary organization to direct in the most efficient manner, to organize capital, labor, and land in the productive process.

Social Effects of the Organization of Industry. — The social results of the division of labor and the organization of industry are to make people more dependent upon one another. If many groups of laborers are employed in making a sewing machine, a hat, or a coat, none of these articles can be created if any one of these respective groups fails to do its part. If forty men are employed to make a single boot, or twenty-three persons are engaged in making a single shirt, the work cannot go on if one workman drops out, unless his place can be filled. He is a cog in a complicated piece of machinery. Hence, in larger groups of society, each group is dependent upon other groups, each industry upon other industries. The system makes all members of society interdependent and makes the success of the whole depend upon the harmonious working of individuals in groups.

Service of Capital in the Production of Wealth. — Capital represents surplus wealth set aside for productive use. It originates from saving or refraining from consuming in a certain way, in order that what is produced may be used in produc-

tion. By means of capital the production of wealth is increased a hundredfold. The bare labor of hands and brain without capital, that is, without tools, machinery, and money, or free capital, can yield but little more than bare subsistence, while with the use of capital wealth may accumulate rapidly. By the proper combination of labor, capital, and directive energy more wealth of some kinds may be created in an hour than formerly in a year under other conditions.

Coincident with the use of great amounts of capital in the industrial life of the world are certain important social effects. The factory system with its class division between employers and employed, wage earners and entrepreneurs and capitalists, the class consciousness and class feeling which give us our labor problem, is one of the outcomes of the capitalistic régime. Certain political effects have come also in the train of great aggregations of capital. Legislators are bought, courts sometimes corrupted, and the rich sometimes have held the reins of government to their own advantage. A new aristocracy built upon wealth has often risen to displace the old aristocracies of blood and culture.

On the other hand, with this same capitalistic régime, there has come such an increase of public wealth that never as now has public education, free to the poor as well as to the rich, been supplied with such prodigal generosity. Perhaps more of the population of the countries industrially organized on the capitalistic basis are living in conditions of comfort than in the other countries of the world. Step by step the wealth of these countries is being socialized for the benefit of the whole population. Gradually social injustice is being corrected, conditions of labor improved, poverty prevented, and right living conditions secured.

Sociological Effects of Changes in Processes of Social Production. — A finished product seldom reaches the market that is not the result of the combined industry of many hands and the work of many agencies. As new forces are brought into use, there is a constant changing and development of industries and consequently of industrial life. When the transition of hand manufacture to power manufacture occurred in the last half of the eighteenth century, the entire composition of society was altered. It then began to arrange itself into industrial classes.

This social evolution has continued with accelerated force to the present time. The introduction of machinery, the development of new appliances of steam and electricity, the invention of new methods of business, cause a constant shifting of society from one form to another, and create changes in relationships. Amid these shiftings it is difficult to secure industrial liberty and industrial justice. Progress here, as elsewhere, is made at a considerable cost to individuals and frequently to groups.

Sociological Causes of Changes in Economic Processes. — On the other hand, it is no less true that social changes are followed by great revolutions in methods of industrial production. For example, the Industrial Revolution in England was not only a cause of social changes; it was itself dependent on great changes in population and in social ideals. The old customary relations were breaking down; the guilds were gone. The Napoleonic wars were giving England control of the seas, and through cutting off the supply of grain from the Continent and other sources, had resulted in higher rents and increased inclosures through increased demands for grain. Moreover, these wars caused a demand on the Continent for English manufactured products which could not be supplied by the old methods. Under a stable government capital increased, lending and borrowing were so regulated that the entrepreneur could profit. Thus, a premium was put upon enterprise. Large bodies of raw materials were made available to British industry through Britain's wide-extended merchant marine, connecting her with her colonies. The old methods of manufacturing and distributing England's goods were not adequate to meet the demands of the new and changed times which had come. Says Cheney, "And these antiquated methods of manufacture and transportation were all the more at variance with the needs and possibilities of the time because there had been, as already pointed out, a steady accumulation of capital, and much of it was not remuneratively employed. The time had certainly come for some improvement in the methods of manufacture."¹

Struggle of Classes. — While in the United States there are no classes based on noble blood and none at all as distinct as

¹ Cheney, *Industrial and Social History of England*, New York, 1906, pp. 193-206.

those of Europe at the close of the Middle Ages and the early modern period, yet as a result of the occupational division of labor, people have been arranged into strata more or less permanent. There is the capitalist and entrepreneur class on the one side and the laboring class on the other. The laboring class is further subdivided into the skilled and the unskilled workmen. However, it is still possible, on account of the opportunities offered, for the individual to pass from one group to another and from the conditions of poverty to a condition of wealth. The common laborer of to-day may pass to the rank of capitalist and manager of business to-morrow. The forms of social stratification may continue, but the individuals who compose the groups are constantly shifting in their relationships. Those who actually do pass from one class to the other are growing constantly less, relatively, in number. With the growth of industrial classes there is an increasing solidification of the groups and less opportunity to move from one to the other. While this industrial liberty and freedom is increasingly limited by lack of opportunity, still the so-called struggle of classes leaves the exceptional individual his freedom. Whether this will continue after labor has been completely organized and industry is entirely managed by great corporate concerns will depend upon the harmony of the parts of society in a common cause, and upon the regulation of laws securing industrial liberty to the individual. For the perfection of the social machinery the well-being of all classes must be considered. Social justice must be manifest in the economic as well as the political world.

Social Consumption. — Production has been much more thoroughly socialized than the consumption of goods, although much still remains to be done to make the productive processes, especially in so far as human relations are involved in them, such as will contribute as largely as possible to the welfare of all classes engaged in industry. The social aspects of the consumption of goods, however, have received very little attention. In fact, there prevail many erroneous opinions concerning the proper use of economic goods. It is still quite widely held that consumption of goods which gives work to Labor or employment to Capital must be commendable, no matter whether the use of the goods makes for human betterment or

otherwise. "Conspicuous waste" and "conspicuous leisure" are still approved in theory even by most of those who enjoy the privilege of neither.

The desires of individuals are the motors of progress. The production of material goods will cease when the desire for consumption fails. While the act of production logically precedes that of consumption, the unsatisfied desire for the latter is the real cause of the former. For the subjective desire of man is the real foundation of economic activity. So important is this phase of social life that the progress of the human race might be estimated by the number, variety, and intensity of desires. The full determination of this progress will not be reached until the extent of the satisfaction of these desires is measured. For, as Ward says, "Not only does civilization rest upon a material basis in the sense that it consists in the utilization of the materials and forces of nature, but the efficiency of the human race depends absolutely upon food, clothing, shelter, fuel, leisure, and liberty."¹ But the index of this efficiency is subjective, for it is only in the satisfaction of desires that man will put forth the effort necessary for the attainment of the objects that make efficiency possible.

It must not be forgotten, however, that the desires which move men to activity—even to economic activity—are not economic alone in their nature. The economic motives are very much strengthened and supplemented by other social desires. The desires for art, religion, approbation, liberty, justice, and social standing, and so forth, excite individual and social activity and establish social relations. If we compare a natural with a civilized race, the variety and character of the desires will in the latter make a striking contrast with the few simple desires of the former. As a race progresses the gradual changing of old desires and the creation of new desires will mark the evolution of society. It is because of this evolution of desire that the ideals of society constantly change. The endless attempt to approximate these receding ideals is only continued by a tremendous increase of individual and social effort.

Economy of Consumption.—In considering the well-being of society, the consumption of material goods is of great moment. Granting that the ideal is correct, and that the desires are cul-

¹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 289.

tivated and rational, the art of consumption is difficult to acquire. Few people know how to obtain the highest utility from material goods. The economy of consumption is usually deficient in individuals as well as in the community at large. How many material goods are wasted through imperfect consumption! Individuals are made bankrupt and society enervated through failure to utilize what is already possessed. How evident this is among the poor and ignorant! Thousands lose money, even to the slavery of poverty, because they do not understand and practice the art of economy. Leisure and independence might be theirs if they could utilize even what they have. This principle could be applied to society to show how public funds are wasted, and the community oppressed thereby, or to show how the lack of economy of social forces creates an imperfect social life and a waste of energy. Society at best is a very inefficient consumer of material goods. Social consumption lags far behind social production. The standard of life should be raised instead of lowered, and the rational desires should be multiplied. But useless expenditure, which brings no permanent improvement, and injurious expenditure, which deteriorates the individual or society, should be eliminated. Excessive food for the body, intoxicating beverages or certain drugs and narcotics are examples of waste and injury.

These things are mentioned here only to point the social observation that consumption, like production, is the result of social motives. It is subject to social control, therefore, and depends on social ideals. The present wasteful consumption of goods is due in large measure to certain social results desired, such as prestige, and the envy and emulation of one's fellows. On the other hand, such consumption has certain social consequences which do not contribute to social well-being. Standards are set which some cannot reach, social classes are formed which cut through our population and tend to destroy democracy. Often the advantages derived from the social striving thereby engendered are more than counterblanced by the destruction of that sense of social solidarity which is the foundation of social coöperation.

Luxury. — Wasteful consumption, however, does not characterize only the poorer classes. The rich are as wasteful and unsocialized in their consumption as the poor. "Conspicuous

waste" for the purpose of increasing other people's estimate of one's social status is a principle common to both. Luxury is a relative term as applied to individuals of a community or to communities of different periods of time. What may be considered a luxury to one individual may be a necessity to another, and what is a luxury to one age may be requisite to the normal life of another. Yet society is very imperfect in its coördination when one part suffers for necessities and another is engaging in lavish expenditure. There must be a social waste when, in the shadow of extravagant dinners, balls, and riotous living, a large part of the community is suffering for the comforts of life, some even to starvation, and are deprived of normal chances for individual or social development. Under such conditions it is idle to urge that lavish expenditure increases a demand for goods and furnishes occupation for many. The ravages of pestilence, fire, and wasteful consumption are in the same economic and social category so far as their destructive effect on society is concerned. The consumption of wealth and the exercise of power must yield a result proportionate to the sacrifice, in order to conserve the interests of society.

It can be easily demonstrated that the use of some things is wasteful as compared with the use of other things. For example, let us suppose that a certain person in order to display his wealth and thus increase his social prestige decides to give a ball. He decides that he will spend, let us say, \$100,000 on flowers. The florists will get the \$100,000. Part of that amount will remain with the florists as profits. A part will go to the owner of the land on which they were raised, as rent, some of it will be paid by the florists to money lenders as interest on the capital invested and a part, — perhaps the largest portion, — will be paid to laborers as wages. The host and his guests are given pleasure by the beauty and perfume of the flowers. The host probably enjoys an enhanced reputation and standing among those whom he wishes to impress with his wealth. It is his money he spends; who shall say that since he makes opportunity for labor as well as providing pleasure for his guests and a reputation for splendid prodigality for himself, that his expenditure is not the best for society he could make?

Let us cast up the account briefly. Suppose that the following sums were received by the producers:

Capitalists' interest	\$10,000
Landowners' rent	7,000
Entrepreneurs' profit	15,000
Laborers' wages	<u>68,000</u>
Total	\$100,000

Let us suppose that this person instead of spending his money on flowers invested it in an industry, let us say, the shoe or the milling industry, where there was just as great returns to each of the productive classes as in the case of the florists. Then from the side of production there will occur the distribution of the \$100,000 just as above. After the evening's ball in the case of the flowers, they have served their purpose. After a week at the most, the last possibility of their pleasing has been exhausted. They are withered and positively ugly. In the case of the shoes or flour produced by the other method of spending the money their usefulness has just begun. Moreover, the shoes increase the economic efficiency of the consumers who bought them. It is possible that the flowers also contribute something to the economic or social efficiency of those who enjoy them. But, as providing socially marginal satisfactions, it is at least doubtful whether they were productive of as much economic or social good to the consumers and to society in general as the flour or the shoes. By socially marginal satisfactions, is meant those which are not only less imperative to the individual users of the goods, but are less necessary to the well-being of society considered as a whole, — workers and capitalists, consumers of a more fundamentally necessary class of goods as well as consumers of luxuries. As a good which is less necessary to the productivity of an individual than another good may be called a socially unnecessary good to that individual, so a good or class of goods which contributes less than another to the economic efficiency of society as a whole may be socially unnecessary to that group of individuals or classes called society. Luxuries are socially marginal goods when they contribute less to social well-being than necessities. From the standpoint of society these goods are luxuries which are not so necessary as others to the well-being of society as a whole, — society conceived of as including the working classes as well as the monied classes. So long, therefore, as a class of society is suffering from the want

of such goods as will enable that class to increase its efficiency and the well-being of society as a whole, there is no social justification of the consumption of goods which contributes less to the well-being of the whole social group.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show that certain economic desires have a social, psychological base.
2. Criticize the conception that economics underlie all social activity.
3. Name some social conditions which have made it possible to accumulate wealth more rapidly recently than in the earlier stages of civilization.
4. Show that production is increasingly a social matter.
5. What is the difference between individual wealth and social wealth?
6. Show what social conditions effect an increase in the value of, let us say, an acre of ground; a ton of iron ore.
7. State Malthus's theory of population. In what respects does it hold true to-day? In what respects is it erroneous?
8. What economic facts did Malthus neglect in his theory? What changes in social attitudes in modern times have affected the Malthusian theory?
9. Name three important sociological effects of changes in the processes of production.
10. Name two important economic effects of changes in social customs and social ideals.
11. Show how consumption is a social matter.
12. State the arguments to show that luxuries for the few are not socially justifiable so long as there are lacking necessities for the many.
13. Analyze economically and socially the consequences of the expenditure by an individual of \$100,000 on a supper for four hundred guests from the fashionable society of a great city.

CHAPTER X

EXCHANGE AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION

Social Importance of Exchange. — In the short run contact may mean conflict. Ultimately, however, contact leads to acquaintance, which is the first step towards tolerance and co-operation. Anything, therefore, which increases the number of human contacts in the long run increases sociability and friendliness. This is especially true of contacts which have for their avowed purpose the advantage of each person. Exchange between different individuals in the same group and between different groups is carried on because all concerned believe that the exchange of articles is mutually of advantage. The primitive social motives are here supplemented by the economic.

Moreover, an important phase of wealth production, of far-reaching social consequences, is the exchange of commodities. The method of exchange is an indication of the stage of social development reached by a society. It is the beginning of a division of labor and is a means of the creation of wealth. In an exchange each party concerned gets something which he values more highly than that which he exchanged for it. For example, when I exchange an arrowhead for a moccasin, it is because I value the latter more highly than the former. He with whom I made the exchange evidently valued the arrowhead more highly than the moccasin, else he would not have parted with the latter for my arrowhead. Both of us are benefited by the exchange. Beginning in a small way, in the form of barter, exchange has expanded with the growth of industry to the present credit system. Its formal beginning was in the trading of surplus goods of a given kind for more desirable goods of another kind or, as it has been stated, "the exchanging of the relatively superfluous for the relatively necessary." In primitive society different articles of food, of wearing apparel, and of implements were bartered. This method continued

with all property until money was invented as a medium of exchange.

Social Effects of Exchange. — What concerns us most here are the social effects of exchange, for primarily it permits diversified industries. It allows each individual to follow a given occupation or to engage in the creation of a single commodity. Thus, a farmer can spend his energy in raising wheat, and, after saving enough of the product to supply his own needs, may exchange the rest for other kinds of food, clothing, implements, and furniture. He does this in modern times by the use of money, that is, he sells the wheat and with the money obtained from it he buys the other necessary articles. This permits him to follow a single pursuit with efficiency.

But exchange has a greater social function, — that of the development of social intercourse between individuals, groups, territories, and nations. This intercourse has much to do with the socialization of groups. It brings diversified food, adding many articles to the food supply and thus it increases the power to support life. Intercourse adds likewise to variety of clothing, making all means of protection and adornment of the body supplied by nature and art available to each community. This conduces to the comfort of the race and contributes another element of emulation between individuals. Moreover, exchange permits adaptability of different clothing to requirements of occupation and climate, thus increasing man's working capacity. Arts such as primitive methods of working stone and metals are thus disseminated throughout wide areas. For example, through barter between Indian tribes in America Lake Superior copper articles were found as far south as Florida and pipes made from the pipestone of southwestern Minnesota are found scattered throughout the Mississippi Valley.

Still more important, though less observable, is exchange of ideas, which always follows exchange of material things. Commerce has always been a great stimulus to intellectual development. Ideas of social life and education are easily transferred from community to community and from nation to nation through the interchange of goods. The thoroughfares of commerce have always been highways of learning and courses of intellectual development and means of distributing inventions to the world. The caravans of the Orient brought ideas of cul-

ture from the East and disseminated them wherever their lines of travel passed. The Phœnicians, in their attempts to carry on commerce, brought to the Western world the practical arts of Asia. Perhaps no more striking example of the influence of commerce on ideas is known than the trade of the Italian cities with the Eastern countries. Like unto it was the influence of the Hanseatic League which extended trade to northern Europe.

The moral and religious influences of nations are extended through the channels of commerce. Indeed, sometimes this means is more effective in introducing new customs than that of direct missionary effort. The habits and customs of one people are taken up by another almost unconsciously as they communicate and intermingle through trade. This is especially noticeable in the spread of immoral practices. Ethical religion, on the other hand, is much more slowly imitated, yet commerce furnishes a great opportunity for its propagation. How important commerce may be in supplying means whereby religious ideas and practices are spread may be seen by a study of the spread of the Christian religion in the first few centuries of its history throughout the Roman Empire. The traveling Christian artisan and peddler were the most numerous and successful early missionaries if we may trust the historians.¹ But religious doctrines alone will not develop civilization. If not followed by opening up the nations to trade and communication with civilized nations, little progress will be made. This is as true with reference to missionary effort to-day in Asia and Africa as it was in the Roman Empire in the first Christian centuries. Missionaries have discovered that they must teach the arts of civilization if they are to dispose of pagan religions and that these arts must be followed by intercommunication with the civilizations of the world. All the missionary efforts in China will be of little avail if that nation refuses the arts of civilized life and closes her ports to the civilized nations of the world. Otherwise the hydra of paganism will perpetually grow and recreate itself, overwhelming and destroying the milder influences of the Gospel. In accordance with this principle, railways and other highways of trade will be the best instructors of the inhabitants of the Philippines in the arts of civil life.

But trade also develops, on the one hand, thrift, and, on the

¹ Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*, New York, 1904, Vol. I, p. 460.

other, cupidity and avarice, for in a primitive land, where people have a surplus of one kind of goods and no means of exchange, there is no value attached to the goods and hence there can be no desire to accumulate or preserve. How often this has been illustrated by the growing of fruits and agricultural products in the development of the West. Ofttimes without a market, products of the soil have been rendered comparatively undesirable. With increased demand for articles created by the development of exchange, however, comes a desire for accumulation. This change in man's estimate of the value of things has, however, its good side. Out of the desire for better things, out of the emulation between people in the same community grows culture as well as jealousy and strife, new uses of wealth as well as miserliness.

While tribal and national warfare has risen on account of dissensions, jealousies, and desires for supremacy, conquest for plunder has been an ever potent cause of war. Indeed, warfare among civilized nations has seldom occurred without the desire to increase wealth in some form. The history of the Hebrews records the conquest and the despoiling of the enemy. The Oriental despots in their warfare encouraged the work of plunder and robbery. Even the Roman Empire in its conquests of foreign nations never lost sight of the wealth that was to be obtained by conquest, though it valued above all the glory of victory. Desire for wealth is often the cause of war to-day.

On the other hand, increasingly of late years the wish of the merchant and manufacturing classes of our Western countries has had an important bearing on the peace movement. For example, while some business men are desirous of war to protect their interests in Mexico at the present time, the great mass of the American people engaged in business are earnestly hoping that there may be no war. They realize by sad experience that war means the blocking of many of the regular avenues of trade. War results in the impairment of confidence in business conditions. It means loss of prospective profits. Moreover, increasingly the business men of all nations, except that class which is immediately interested in the production of munitions of war or any class which may see a gain for their immediate interests, keenly realize that the business of the nation must bear the brunt of the cost of the war.

Effects of Social Progress upon Methods of Exchange.— No less important than the effects of exchange upon social progress are the results of changes in society upon the methods and ethics of exchange. With the growth of complexity in the social structure the methods of exchange are altered. The simple exchange of various communities gives way to the intermediation of a fixed market under rigid rules and customs, as illustrated in the medieval markets and fairs. With the development of a social consciousness and unity of feelings and purposes there comes confidence and the use of a common commodity as a medium of exchange, or money, and later the whole system of credit exchange.

Moreover, what began as presents to hostile groups for some ulterior advantage becomes with the growth of a code of morals and a sense of social obligations first a battle of wits and cunning and then an exchange for the advantage of both. In modern times a great change in the ethics of exchange has come about. In contrast with the medieval practices business ethics not so long ago began to frown upon misrepresentation of goods in the efforts to dispose of them, but left untouched the question of whether it was right to defraud the corporation or the foreigner. Then succeeded the policy of selling or trading a commodity upon its appearances. The horse was taken at his apparent value, the suit of clothes upon what it seemed to the buyer to be actually worth. Then there grew up the practice of merchants offering only the best goods, goods which they could personally recommend and guarantee, or else different grades, but with the difference in value made clear to the prospective purchaser. Once to profit by juggling the affairs of a corporation was not questioned; to steal a railway was a gentleman's business. To defraud the common people was the sign of business greatness. There has begun to grow up in our Western countries an abhorrence of graft. It has come to consciousness as the interrelations of our common social life have developed. Only as we have come to appreciate that "we are members one of another," and that if "one member suffers, all the members suffer with it" has there grown up a reaction against the plundering of others in devious and surreptitious ways. Within the last few years there has risen a belief that the man or combination of men who get control of the public

streets for their own profit and without just compensation to the public, who "milk" a railway, who grab the public domain for the exploitation of the people and for the private advantage of this man or set of men are as bad as the man who sells at short weight or by short measure, as the farmer who put the spoiled potatoes in the middle of the sack, the small apples in the middle of the barrel, the musty hay in the center of the load, or the merchant who sells inferior goods by misrepresentation. The term "thief" has come to be applied to the man who gets control of water power, mineral resources, and franchise rights without due regard for the rights of the public almost as frequently as to him who steals a horse. This has come about partly because of economic reasons. It has been shown to be "poor business" to deceive. But supplementary to that motive for better business ethics is the ethical impulse and the social feeling of solidarity, as well as the dread of social reprobation, — a dread by no means of the least importance in influencing people to an ethical course of action.

The Use of Money to Facilitate Exchange. — Barter of commodities was an imperfect method of exchange before the use of money as a medium. Although the early forms of money were very crude and imperfect and the method of using it was but little above the old forms of barter, still, by degrees the system became perfected and money as an instrument of exchange greatly facilitated not only the accumulation of wealth, but also the progress of civilization. Instead of exchanging articles of all kinds, one well-known article, the value of which was well determined, was used to express the values of every other article. In the hunter-fisher stage cattle were used as money, and all values measured in terms of an ox or a part of an ox. Savage tribes have used shells or trinkets which became universally desirable. In the agricultural period frequently grains were used as a measure of value, but more and more people began to rely on metals as a medium of exchange. At first the baser metals were used, such as lead, iron, and copper; but, finally, on account of their durability and universality, gold and silver became the chief money metals. The law of the creation of money is that an article must be, first, desirable, and, second, well known in the community where it is to be used, before it can become money. Then out of all the desirable and univer-

sally known articles those which are the most adaptable to the storage of value, those which are durable, easily divisible, portable, and not easily counterfeited, are chosen. They are not chosen by the order of kings or governors so much as by the consensus of normal use.

While money rapidly increased the progress in civil arts, it too, finally became too clumsy for use in the larger transactions of exchange. Then the credit system came into use and by means of it transactions could be made so easily as to transform the processes of trade and industry. The invention of credit was to trade and commerce what the inventions of steam and electricity were to the development of the industrial arts. Credit is the perfect machine of exchange. By its introduction the methods of doing business were greatly changed, and consequently the habits of society were likewise influenced.

These developments in the methods of exchange are cited here because they are made possible by the development of social unity and because they have greatly modified the organization and grouping of society. They have had vast influence on social order and social activities. Credit instruments could not displace money until society had developed its organization to the point where men had confidence in each other. Credit is based upon belief in one's fellows. Confidence is a social creation. It is inspired by acquaintance with others, by the multiplication of social bonds making strangers known to each other and making it next to impossible, because unprofitable and undesirable, to be dishonest. With the growth of social organization and the multiplication of social bonds in ever widening reaches confidence in fellow-men was inspired and credit instruments became possible.

The Rise of Industrial Classes of Traders. — Many new groups of society have been formed on account of the practice of exchange; the first of these were merchants or traders. Occupational division of labor with all its benefits was given a powerful impetus. While in primitive society individuals might barter goods with each other personally, as society became more complex through the division of labor it became necessary for some one to act as an agent between those who were exchanging goods, that is, between the buyer and seller. First, as a mere peddler he bought certain lines of goods which he ex-

changed for other lines which were finally sold in the market for money. Later, great trading stations were established for the distribution of all kinds of goods and, finally, the great system of stores and storehouses has been developed, and with it the great army of tradespeople. The differentiation of this group becomes more marked each succeeding year as its services became more essential. Many shiftings of this group in modern life are constantly occurring. At present we have the manufacturers of goods as a separate class, the retailers as a third, and, finally, the commercial travelers and agents who serve the larger wholesale houses and form a distinct group of people. In recent years, owing to the increased confidence people have developed in our American society with the growth of easy communication and the waxing consciousness of social unity, there has been growing up a tendency for the manufacturer to sell his own goods directly to the consumer through the agency of the mails. In this way a close relation is brought about between the producer and the consumer. But even under the most favorable circumstances it is impossible to eliminate the intermediary groups. The social influence of the personal presentation of the merits of a good is still too strong for the economic desire for gain.

Another group of people arising on account of exchange are the bankers and commercial agents who facilitate the transactions of business. They furnish the ready money and the credit for carrying on trade and commerce. They represent the nervous system of the industrial world, and as such they have become essential to the modern methods of exchange, for just as the traders and merchants handle goods so they handle moneys and credits.

Extensive Exchange Dependent upon Transport. — As articles of goods which are to be exchanged cannot all be produced in the same neighborhood or, indeed, in the same country, it becomes necessary to establish some means of transport before trading on any large scale can exist. Among primitive people the individual trader travels from tribe to tribe carrying his trinkets with him. In the trade of the Orient, great caravans were first used, by means of which goods were transported on the backs of camels from one country to another. After the introduction of navigation, goods were transported in ships

across seas, along rivers, and over the ocean to different countries. Here a new social group of transporters came into existence, and as it became necessary to market the surplus goods in foreign countries the carriers represented a separate social and commercial group. Where there were no means of water communication, canals were built to carry goods through inland countries. The building of roads and highways also became necessary as a means of transporting goods for people. In modern life the great steamship companies formed for carrying people and goods across the ocean, and the great railway companies which transfer millions of persons and millions of tons of freight each year across the Continent represent the highest development of transport groups.

Perhaps there is no better illustration of the development of an economic social group than in the comparatively recent rise of the railway systems of the world. Here are great organized groups engaged in a specific work of carrying freight and human beings from one place to another. So essential has the railway system of the nation become, that should they cease to operate for ten days, business would stagnate. Cut off railway communication from one of our large cities, and in thirty days people would starve for want of the necessaries of life. Not only has the transport system become essential to business and life, but it represents one of the most compact and well-organized social groups. A market is impossible on any extensive scale, such as we have in our large cities, without such a system.

Advertising and Exchange.—No matter how perfect the transport system may be, exchange depends also on that important socio-economic instrument, advertising. The freight rates may be so low that they will not pay the actual cost of transporting the goods, and yet because the goods have not been brought to the attention of people there may be no exchange. A sufficiently strong demand must be created for the goods that people will pay the price necessary to secure their transportation to the place of exchange. Advertising creates a demand. It stirs the curiosity of people as to the goods advertised, and makes them see real or imagined merits in that particular consumption good. People thus get into the habit of using it, they are imitated by others, and thus the circle of demand widens, creating the fundamental basis for a market and ex-

change of commodities — desire for the goods — sufficiently intense to compete successfully in the judgment hall of the mind for first choice.

The Improvement of Social Organization. — But on account of the increased diversity of life, there is great need of improved industrial and political methods. That is, the organization must become articulated as society becomes more complex. As a great and complicated machine may depend upon the service of one little cog, so the complex organization of society will depend for its successful operation upon one part or group of people, and just as the clumsy machinery of the past must be perpetually abandoned for better models, so the machinery of social order must continue to improve if it is to bear well the extra burdens of society which it assumes. If, for instance, a group of people undertakes to furnish the coal necessary for the fuel of a nation, they must not fail, or manufactures will cease and people will freeze and starve. If a group undertakes to furnish the agricultural products necessary for the support of the nation, it will not do for them to remain idle for a year, otherwise the people will perish. If the railways and their employees have difficulties which result in cessation of traffic, some method whereby such interruptions shall cease must be devised in the interest of the people who depend on transportation for their existence and comfort. No *laissez-faire* theory can be allowed to stand in the way of social interference for the benefit of the public. Social organization must be devised to adjust such difficulties. Railway rates and service, control of natural resources like coal, oil, gas, and water are quasi public matters. Social arrangements must be made which will protect the consumers of these products. If railway rates are such that the products of one part of the country, such as apples, for example, rot in the fields or on the trees, while in another part there are other products, for instance grain, which can hardly be given away in that locality, it is evident that there is maladjustment either in freight rates on those commodities, or the advertising agencies and methods have not yet created a desire intense enough in consumers to create an effective demand for them. More than this, there must be perfection of the social machinery within the group. That is, if a company undertakes to furnish artificial light for a community and

through the imperfection of their manufacturing plant, or through the imperfect method of administration they fail to furnish light at a reasonable rate, the people will devise other methods. These are illustrations of the integration of society which must work simultaneously with differentiation, otherwise the social organization becomes defective and unwieldy.

Likewise the political machinery must continue to improve or antiquated methods of administration and laws would interfere with the progress of social and industrial life. The political life exists for the protection of all classes and groups of people. Should it fail to give protection or promote harmony of interests, it would seriously interfere with the production and distribution of wealth, and consequently with social order and social progress. For instance, the regulation of the government respecting the tariff may interfere with industries to such an extent as to prevent the normal industrial progress of the people. It is possible, also, for a nation to make arbitrary rulings or to neglect to make regulations in regard to the use of money and the regulation of trade to the detriment of normal progress.

Approved Modes of Acquiring Wealth. — In the improvement of the industrial system certain established modes for acquiring wealth are considered normal. Among these may be enumerated the discovery of desirable articles, the adaptation of land to various services, the transformation of products of nature into useful articles, and, in fact, the furnishing of any desirable article obtained by legitimate effort, or by value given on account of service rendered. All society is organized to the end of mutual service, and he who performs a given service without interfering with the rights of his fellows is entitled to the reward of such service. It is only through this means of normal service that people should become wealthy.

Disapproved Modes of Acquiring Wealth. — In this connection it may be important to mention several anti-social modes of acquisition. Among these, gambling, robbery, theft, certain forms of speculation, the exploitation of the weak, catering to vicious cravings, fraudulent bankruptcy, and class legislation may be enumerated. In each instance the object is to obtain that which belongs to others by illegitimate means, that is, without returning any service or value in exchange.

The robber who breaks into a house is not intending to increase the wealth or well-being of a community, but merely to get, by foul means, a share of the wealth already created. When two men play at the gaming table and one wins, the wealth of the community is neither increased nor diminished, nor is the community in any way served by the transaction. The men are not only non-producers in the transaction of gambling, but each is trying to take from the other what he possesses without giving anything in return. When speculation is carried beyond a certain limit, it is upon the same moral and economic basis as gambling or robbery. It seeks to exploit humanity and obtain by chance or foresight a portion of the wealth already created, without giving any return in value or service. When legislation is influenced to build a railway in a certain direction to benefit a few persons at the expense of many, or when the city council is influenced to perform a service for one at the expense of others, the general public is not served; it is exploited. In such cases the people's money is used for the benefit of a few. It is like collecting money from each of a group of individuals and giving it to one without any return.

Such methods are common where the political world first comes in contact with the industrial and confuses it. The perfect adjustment of society will eliminate them. This is one of the difficulties of modern society, for while it is generally conceded that political and civil government should be carried on for the mutual benefit of all members of society, the theory that a man has a right to accumulate and use wealth as he pleases, regardless of the well-being of others, has permitted the perpetuation of ancient forms of piracy and brigandage under new forms of industrial life, which men excuse by calling them "business." Or, to take a more debatable example, a man or company buys up lands and does nothing but hold them until society by creating a demand for the products and services of these lands greatly increases their value. It must not be forgotten, of course, that by holding the lands from a period when they are only slightly in demand to a time when they are more in demand the speculator has given to them what is known in Economics as "time utility." That is, he has invested his money in them and is entitled to interest on that money. He took some risk, moreover, when he bought what no one else

wanted, and therefore is entitled to a speculative profit for having taken that risk for the sake of society. In order that people should be induced to take such risks, the man who foresees what is going to happen must be more liberally rewarded than he who takes very little risk. However, after all these legitimate allowances are made, it is a question whether the unearned increment obtained by speculative investors should go to the investor entirely. Should not society which has created the value take a part of that increase in value? The same question arises with respect to other natural resources such as water power, timber, and mineral resources.

A similar principle is in question in the case of so-called "high finance" as seen in the manipulation of railway and industrial stocks and bonds by individuals who are shuffling the cards for their own advantage at the expense of the legitimate investor and of the public. The promoter and reorganizer undoubtedly are entitled to a rather large return for their services in bringing together capital for legitimate enterprises when the money is honestly used in industrial production. They are not, however, entitled to use such an opportunity to "milk" the enterprise for the benefit of the insiders and to the detriment of the stockholders and the public dependent on that enterprise for their welfare. Public policy is against such a procedure, and the laws should make it impossible. That society has tolerated such anti-social policies is due partly to ignorance of the public concerning the evil, and partly to the indifference characteristic of American life concerning large public policies which involve the whole people of the United States and partly to the dominance of the economic doctrine of *laissez faire*. The investigations which have been or are being carried on by the various states and the Federal government will dissipate the ignorance. American provincial indifference to national problems will disappear with the progress of social unification of the population of our large territory. A new theory of economics is rapidly displacing the old classical system, and when finally completed will be found to be an economics shot through and through with the social idea that economic conditions can be altered by human endeavor.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What inconvenience was there inherent in the exchange of commodities themselves, which was obviated by the introduction of money?
2. Show how exchange increases the value of an article.
3. Set out clearly the effects of exchange upon social life.
4. In what ways does social development affect exchange?
5. Trace the various steps in the development of exchange in the history of the United States.
6. What social classes exist in your community as a result of the organization of exchange?
7. Why is the mail order house able to compete with the local merchant for trade? Which of these reasons are economic and which are social in their nature?
8. What evils are to be seen in our economic and social life as a result of maladjustment in our organization of exchange?
9. Show that a strike is due to lack of adjustment of social machinery to prevent it.
10. Give illustrations from the history of the United States tending to show that development of ethical sentiments by a society makes certain businesses and some methods of doing business impossible.
11. What changes are just now under way in this country in methods of doing business due to the development of new social standards?

CHAPTER XI

THE EVOLUTION OF ETHICS

The Nature of Ethics. — The subject in general seems simple enough until we begin to define it or set its limitations. Ethics concerns the moral life which involves thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions, relating to the association of man with his fellows. It demarcates right and wrong and sets the question of duty by the highest standards of the community.

Each community has its own moral standards and its own moral code. In every society there may be many individual variations from these standards and from the recognized code. Primarily this code is unwritten, but represents all those relationships of individuals which are usually designated as moral.

The recounting of the various moral systems of the world as set forth by the philosophers would be called the history of ethics. This does not mean a history of the various changes in the ethical practice of individuals so much as a history of the opinions of philosophers and the theories of moral standards. Evolutionary ethics, with which we are here concerned, is a social science and has to do with the origin and development of moral practice. It treats of the various relationships of individuals in primitive society, the origin of altruism and its slow and painful development. While sociology has to do with the question of practical morals in all the various relationships of modern life, — in business, politics, or in purely social intercourse, vague in its nature, but none the less important for that, — it is also interested in the evolution of moral practice, for only as one understands how morals originated and developed does one obtain a clear conception of the structure and activities of modern society. It is through a study of this phase of ethics that the moral status of a society may be truly estimated.

The Social Importance of Ethics. — A study of the development of ethical conduct is important to the student of sociology

for several reasons. In the first place, ethical actions are socially conditioned, the people who act are involved in social relations, and their actions are described as ethical or non-ethical, or unethical, primarily according to their bearing on the welfare of others. We must study them, therefore, in order that as students of society we may see how such social institutions as ethical codes and standards came to be what they are to-day. As some one has said, we do not know anything save as we understand how it came to be. The student of social institutions is interested then in the origin and development of morals.

In the second place, the student of sociology is interested in ethics because of the ethical questions which arise in connection with the problems of practical sociology. We talk sometimes about the ethics of individual conduct as if such an ethics is complete in itself. Is an ethics of any account which does not have for its basis the welfare of the group? And is not the ethics of individual conduct to a large degree determined by social considerations? Certainly the only important ethics for the student of sociology is social ethics. As such it possesses great importance, for our chief concern in any study apart from an understanding of the nature of the subject is its value toward the realization of a social ideal.

With the development of the organization of society, the spread of education and the rise of moral ideals in our social relationships, there has been an increasing demand for the application of ethical principles to public affairs. We hear about business ethics and political ethics. Our papers and magazines are filled with discussions concerning the trust problem, the regulation of railways, the practices of those in charge of railways and industrial combinations. Those who in newspapers and elsewhere are writing seriously about these socio-economic problems are discussing also their ethical phases. What do these discussions signify except that the conscience of the whole group is exercising itself upon these problems from the ethical standpoint? Ethical conduct is so essentially a part of all normal social activities that it furnishes the key for social progress. We cannot understand our social life and ideals at present unless we study the development of social ethics.

Again, a study of the social aspects of ethics is important

because ethical customs, standards, and codes are very effective methods of social control.¹

The Genesis of Ethics. — That there was a dawn of moral consciousness in the human race is certain. We assume that there must have been a time in the history of the human race when men were non-moral. This assumption cannot be directly proved, for we know of no human beings who have no ideas of ethical practice. The assumption is based on a number of indirect evidences. One of these is the lack of morality in the young child, another is supplied by the fact that there are many tribes of people found whose morality is quite different from other moralities and who on certain subjects have no code of ethics or any ethical scruples. Whether, however, the time when there was absolutely no ethical code belongs to man's history or to that of his animal ancestor we have no way of determining. We certainly can go so far as to say that there was a time in the history of mankind when there was very little if any conscious morality. So far as we can judge of the matter to-day we may conclude that the earliest morality was an almost if not quite instinctive group morality concerned with the survival of the members of that group. It is highly probable that group morality preceded individual morality in order of development. Race morality was a morality of restraint enforced by the sanctions of custom, tradition, and sometimes of religion, and was established partly by instinctive animal reactions and partly by a dimly perceived advantage in such restraints. With the growth of reason and the development of the emotions, perception of the advantage of certain standards of moral conduct and an increase of pleasurable results as well as a refinement of emotional effects appeared. In the earlier stages of its development it is probable that certain instinctive actions which were of advantage for survival established themselves by natural selection. These were confirmed by the pleasure which they afforded, as, for example, in the case of the mother who denied herself that she might serve her child. Tradition and custom further strengthened the action and finally reason developed to the point where the advantage of such unselfishness became apparent. All of these forces established in the individual's mind the *ought* of modern ethics.

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXVI.

Modern theories as to the origin of moral sentiments range themselves in a general way into two groups. The earlier theories were based upon sympathy. The classic work on this subject is by Adam Smith, who is better known to the world because of his authorship of *The Wealth of Nations*, and by reason of the influence of that book has been called the father of political economy.¹ In the first two chapters of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* Smith points out that no matter how selfish a man may be there are evidently some principles in his nature which make it imperative that he interest himself in the happiness of others, and that a man's happiness is increased by the sympathy of his fellows. Man therefore desires the approval of his fellow men that he may enjoy greater pleasure himself, according to Smith. Morals, according to this view, are due to sympathy, which is almost instinctive in its nature. Smith was followed in much the same vein by Bain.² While sharing the same general view of the fundamental characteristic out of which ethical action grew, with that breadth of vision which characterized him in so remarkable a fashion, Darwin said that there were other elements which had to be taken into account if one would give the complete natural history of the moral sense. He criticized Smith and Bain for their contention that the basis of sympathy lay "in our strong retentiveness of former states of pain or pleasure." He urged that this theory does not explain why sympathy is excited in such immeasurably stronger degree by a beloved person than by one for whom we do not care. He believed that no matter how it originated, sympathy has now become an instinct. In man sympathy, he believed with Professor Bain, has been supplemented by selfishness, experience, and imitation. It is much strengthened by habit, and has been increased by natural selection. He was not certain whether man's social characteristics are instinctive or whether they are the indirect result of other instincts and faculties like sympathy, reason, experience, and a tendency to imitation, or to long-continued habit. We possess them, however gained, and they form, especially, sympathy and habit, supplemented in man by reason, the basis of ethical action. The most important of all such characteristics, according to

¹ Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Bohn edition, 1892, Chaps. I, II.

² Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*, 1868, pp. 244, 275-282.

Darwin, is fear of the disapprobation, and desire of the approval of our companions. He added, "Actions are regarded by savages, and were probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they affect in an obvious manner the welfare of the tribe — not that of the species, nor that of man as an individual member of the tribe. This conclusion agrees well with the belief that the so-called moral sense is aboriginally derived from the social instincts, for both relate at first exclusively to the community."¹ Thus, Darwin has added to sympathy habit, reason, and the influence of our fellows upon our actions. Furthermore, he made the fruitful suggestion that natural selection had something to do with the origin of these social characteristics.

The second group of theories is based upon habit or custom. These theories, to state them briefly and in general terms, proceed upon the assumption that the moral is the habitual for the group. Perhaps the leader of this school of thought is the great German scholar, Wundt. The habitual for the individual, when it becomes the customary for the group, and is sanctioned by tradition and superstitious reverence, becomes a social norm and thus obligatory. Darwin, as can be seen from an outline of his thought just presented, invoked habit to explain the origin of morals. He did not believe, however, that habit was the only factor.

Baldwin has stated succinctly the chief objection to the "habit" basis of morals in the words, "The theory of habit does not afford an adequate account of the sense we have, in our acutest ethical experiences, that what we ought to do may run counter to our habitual tendencies."² Another objection to this bald statement of the theory is that it does not account for reflective morality. Without a doubt, habit and custom play an important part in the genesis of morals; but their influence has its limitations.

While these two groups include most of the theories which have been offered to explain the origin of morals, there are numerous variations. Westermarck postulates moral emotions as the basis of moral concepts which, he says, form the predicates of moral judgments. These moral emotions are akin to

¹ Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 1871, Vol. I, Chap. III.

² Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1908, p. 46.

gratitude and revenge, and are essentially generalizations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval.¹ Yet, to him "Society is the birth place of the moral consciousness," and the first moral judgments expressed not the private emotions of the isolated individuals, but emotions which were felt by the community at large.² In general, therefore, it may be said, that Westermarck bases moral conduct, so far as the individual is concerned, on the emotions, but these emotions in their genesis are socially conditioned.

Baldwin approaches the matter from the standpoint of genetic psychology. It is a part of the process which he has so happily denominated the "dialectic of personal growth." In the child and in the race the ethical sense develops, according to Baldwin, in the give and take of the conflict between the individual's own instinctive and habitual tendencies and the accommodations which he is constantly making by imitating an ideal, realized in some one who by the prestige of his character or his social position or his mental superiority is able to impress others. This other person gives him a conception of a socius, which awakes in him, in addition to his two other selves — those of habit and accommodation, — that of obedience to a command. This other person supplies a law of social relations which lies above all individuals. This being, who with prestige lays down commands and receives obedience, himself obeys a law of action that puts restraints upon impulses which the child universalizing his own feelings and desires attributes to him. There, says Baldwin, you have the birth of moral ideals. When this has become a part of the child's mental furniture of a self, he gets into the habit of obeying the impulse to realize that ideal in his own personal characteristics by acting like the concrete personification of his ideal, and he may thus form the habit of violating former habits, a fact which to Baldwin explains why morality often overrides an established habit.³

Generalizing upon these various theories from the standpoint of sociology, we can say that ethical conduct arises from the interplay of the individual's developing personality and the

¹ Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, 1908, Vol. II, p. 738.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 740.

³ In the above is given a very brief interpretation of what Baldwin has worked out rather thoroughly. For the details see Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1908, pp. 40-65.

surrounding social conditions including social personalities. Baldwin's analysis is simply an explanation of the process by which a human being is socialized and so becomes an ethical person. It is an admirable interpretation of the mental adjustment through which the individual becomes a socius. The factors in the development of that moral personality are the individual mind with its inherited instincts and tendencies, whatever these may be, the physical conditions in the midst of which he lives, and, most important of all, perhaps, the social atmosphere of habits, customs, ideals, institutions, and sanctions prevailing where he lives.

This act of the moral consciousness is a means of selecting the best in life. How important this selection is in the advance of the race may be determined by considering the social choices. The ideals of life are determined by a process of exclusion of all those things which are improper and deleterious, and inclusion of those which are supposed to be of the highest advantage to the individual or the race. These ideals are ever present in all tribes and races where social consciousness has dawned and ever present in the individual in whom moral consciousness has appeared.

If, however, these ethical ideals are born from the womb of society, how does it happen that they are higher ideals than the ideals possessed by the individuals composing that society? How can that be possible when it is a well-known principle of sociology that the group mind is more feeble than that of the average individual in the group? These perplexing questions have been best answered by Professor Ross. He says that the ethical ideals of society are higher than those of individuals because of a conscious or unconscious hypocrisy on the part of individuals. Tom, Dick, and Harry are willing to give assent to ideals which are to govern others, but which, as they in their mental reservations believe, are not necessarily binding on themselves. They are unwilling to admit that they do not personally intend to be governed by such principles because they wish to be thought as high minded as any one. Yet, in their own practices they do not apply these principles. Thus the higher ethical principles become established by a consent that is based upon an unwillingness in most people to acknowledge to others their own inferior principles. How this uncon-

scious hypocrisy works may be seen in the man who, hearing a moral ideal set forth, applies it to his neighbor or acquaintance, entirely forgetting that it is intended for him as well as for his neighbor. He assents to the ideal, but deflects its application from himself to another.¹

This explanation accounts for the establishment in the traditions of society of a high moral ideal, but how shall we account for the origin of the higher ideal in the first place? Here the moral genius must be sought as the explanation. Out of the moral consciousness of some man or woman must come the fructifying ideal which will lift a race or a nation.² What spark set aflame that choice spirit with a new thought destined to lift a world, who can say? What challenge of physical environment to the soul of man stirred to inspiration his slumbering thought, — what desert solitude, or burning sky or awe-inspiring firmament or crashing storm? Or was it contact with perverse circumstance of life, — death of a loved one wringing the elemental emotions, or destiny turning the promise of joyous victory to the certainty of bitter defeat? Or, again, was it the strife of conflict with other human beings, perhaps depraved, immoral, flaunting the established decencies of society? Who can analyze the subtle influences which stir the soul of an Amos to that white heat of moral enthusiasm into which the dross of sensuality and perfunctory offerings to God are cast, to come forth again as an ideal new to the world, — the ideal of a God of social righteousness who desired justice rolling down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream rather than burnt offerings, meal offerings, and peace offerings; rather than songs of praise and the music of viols?³ Doubtless all these influences must be reckoned when the final explanation of the great man is made. But our task is to give due place to the moral genius who flings out his inspirations to our startled ears with a challenge and an appeal which demands attention and insures the assent of our inmost thought. Given the moral prophet and this tendency of humanity to assent to more than it is willing itself to practice; given convention and tradition; given the coöperation in things which arouse no conflict and

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXV.

² *Ibid.*, Chap. XXVI.

³ Amos 5: 23.

which all can enjoy; and the development of morals has started which will go on towards perfection. The soul of the genius wrought upon by the influences of Nature and Man creates the ideal; the conscience of the individual ashamed to acknowledge his own preference for a lower standard sanctions it; and convention, sympathy, custom, and tradition establish it.

The Moral Evolution of Man. — But the standards of right, the ideals of man and society, and the social choices perpetually change in the progress of social life. There has been an evolution of morality. People feel differently and act differently towards each other from generation to generation. The notions of right and wrong change from time to time. There are varying standards of morality, not only in different races, but in the same race, from age to age. The racial morality of the Sioux Indians is far different from the racial morality of the French nation. In the former, in order to preserve the tribe, instruction is given in the art of killing, hence the young brave is not worthy of the esteem of his fellows until he wears one or more scalps in his belt. In the latter, legislation and civil justice backed by education and religion are the means of preservation, and the ideal type is the man of letters and diplomacy. If we were to follow, however, the history of the French people from the life of the Gauls to the present time, we should find a constantly changing standard of morality, and especially a constant change in moral practice. Whatever impulses or feelings may occur to determine the action of individuals there is always the social standard by which to make measurements. Customs are established, the unwritten moral code, always in evidence, congeals into traditional usage, and, more than this, the statute laws founded on custom and usage appear.

This is so evident that the influence of social environment on individual moral conduct is strongly marked. Whatever may be an individual's feelings of right or wrong, his actions are influenced by the ethical standard of the community, although in this there is a great difference between pure morality and conventionality. Many individuals act conventionally, while in their inmost feelings they are inclined to act otherwise. There are cases in which morality becomes conventionality, when certain moral acts of the individual coincide with the form of social action. A person may feel that so far as his own conscience is

concerned, he may indulge in certain practices without injury to his life or character. But if this interferes with the conventional forms of society so as to cause a confusion of social order and otherwise affect the relations of his fellow men in a deleterious way, it may be considered immoral. For instance, if one in a church should decide for himself that he could rise in the congregation and ask the minister questions concerning his sermon, believing thereby that he could make clearer to the congregation the subject under discussion, it might be, so far as individual action is concerned, a perfectly moral act. But when we consider the effect on the congregation and upon the religious service, viewed from the standpoint of conventionality, evil results might follow. Hence in this case a violation of conventionality may be immoral conduct.

On the other hand, the conventional may become tinged with a moral quality. For example, in the course of ages it became conventional for civilized people to wear clothes which on most occasions cover most of the body. In the course of time this practice became a part of the moral code of society, so that if a person in our Western world goes with as little clothing as a savage, he is looked upon as an immoral person. So also with styles of dress. A new style comes in, like the slit skirt or the V-shaped collar in women's dress to-day. At first it is looked upon as immoral because it violates the conventional. When closely analyzed, such feelings concerning these innovations are seen to be due to our conventional ideas upon the subject of exposure of the person, for under certain circumstances, such as a formal social function, the exposure of much more of the person is considered perfectly proper. Let the custom of wearing clothes in a certain way become common, and any thought of immorality in connection with it will fade away. The conventional makes the moral in many cases.

Progress of Ethical Practice through Sympathy. — Doubtless the moral forces which arise from the feelings of the individual have at least one source of their origin in the beginnings of sympathy of the mother for her offspring.¹ This sympathy extended

¹ Wallis has held that the altruistic feeling does not originate with mother love alone but with father love, with conscious desire for the safety and good of the loved person, from the sex relation of men and women, from the relations occurring during youth of brotherhood and sisterhood, and from the relation between adult males and children. See his *The Great Society*, Chapter 9.

from the mother to the immediate associates and relatives in the home, and finally extended to the whole group who were permanently associated with one another. This widening range of sympathetic action finally extended to the whole social group located upon a given territory and united by bonds of social control. This represents the origin of patriotism, which is a love of the land, of its people, and of its institutions. And patriotism has given some of its best qualities to the relief of suffering man, no matter of what country or race he came. Altruism has extended until a universal sympathy for suffering is recognized. A flood in China or a famine in India, as well as a drought in Nebraska, or an earthquake in San Francisco, call out our compassion and help. There is to-day a world ethics which passes around the globe, although limited sadly among some nations, recognizing the rights and privileges of all and relieving the sufferings of many.

Egoism versus Altruism in Social Development. — The law of struggle for survival has always shadowed the individual existence and happiness of man. From the very beginning he has been obliged to struggle against the forces of nature for existence. His physical environment has to be subdued in order to permit him to exist. When he cannot subordinate natural forces to his own life, he finds it necessary to adapt his life to meet their conditions. But in every instance it is only a method of struggle for mastery, for the purpose of survival, which characterizes his work. Truly, effort, — persistent effort, — has made man. Nor has his effort been confined to the mastery of the forces of nature; he struggles also with his fellows for supremacy. Indeed, frequently this struggle has been for life itself, few of the great mass being able to survive. Egoism has characterized man's early struggle, and his life has ever been influenced by it.

While egoism predominated in the early or primitive history of man, altruism, at first a faint tremulous line of conduct, has attracted his course of life, growing stronger and more universal, exercising an ever widening influence. Side by side then have existed the struggle of man for his own existence and his struggle for the existence of his fellows. The former was at first relatively the stronger, but the latter gradually developed and overshadowed it, until to-day altruism, or interest in the welfare and happiness of others, has become an essential part of our

modern social life in ever widening circles. Self-interest has been supplemented by social interest. Therefore, while we consider the evolution of man through his individual struggle for existence it must be remembered that his power to associate and to defend mutual human rights and interests has been the primary means of his mastery of the beasts of the fields and the powers of nature. Without this association man must have been overwhelmed and become an extinct species. Hence altruism has been a factor in the evolution of human society, and it now is as much a part of the general scheme of the struggle for existence, as is egoism, and its course of development has been continuous from the minute beginnings of simple society to the complexity of modern life.

However, society as a whole sympathizes with the individual, for no man can suffer without the sympathy and attention of the group. No man's life is abused or destroyed without his cause being espoused by a large part of the community. This altruistic motive is interwoven with the entire social life. There must be a harmony of social and individual interests. On the one hand, the individual must meet all social requirements. On the other hand, society must give the individual opportunity for his own development and survival. The proper balancing of these two interests determines the lines along which our modern social practices run. The harmony of individual and social interests is the essential characteristic of a perfect society.

How a moral ideal develops out of the interaction of leading spirits and environing physical or social conditions is to be seen in the period when some great change comes over a people. It may be an economic change, like the industrial revolution in England or America, or the introduction of great numbers of continental immigrants into Puritan America, or the introduction of a new method of Biblical interpretation. There is first a period of hesitation. People know not how to adjust themselves ethically to the new situation. Children from the poorhouses of England were worked in the mills until Mrs. Browning and moralists like her set up a new moral ideal adapted to meet the needs of the changed conditions. Germans revolted against the temperance sentiment of the United States. The conflict of moral ideals has gone on for a quarter of a century and more. Out of the turmoil there begins to appear an adjustment between

two moral ideals which is neither the one nor the other. Out of the changing conditions of the present time there are emerging new social ideals of morality. The owners of factories are evolving a conscience as to hours of labor for their workers. Child labor is being tabooed. The labor of women is condemned under certain conditions of factory life. The morality of an honest day's work by the worker begins to appear. Our morals have changed in the past forty years to meet the changed economic and social conditions. In international affairs the binding obligation of "a scrap of paper" is recognized by the conscience of an unprejudiced world opinion. Society, led by its choice spirits and in response to the goads of maladjustment felt everywhere, is constantly creating new moral ideals to express more perfectly its sense of relationships which will conduce to the happiness of the greatest number of its constituent individuals.

The Development of Justice. — Justice, like altruism, has its origin in sympathy. Primarily it is a feeling of suffering, pain, or pleasure that gives rise to a sentiment of justice. We believe a thing is right or wrong concerning ourselves, and the same feelings are extended to our fellows. We wish to measure them by the same rule by which we measure ourselves. If an individual perceives that an injustice is being done toward himself, a sentiment of resentment is aroused in him. If he observes the same injustice toward any one of his fellows, the same feeling of resentment is aroused. Thus, justice has its origin in fellow suffering. But in its more developed state it is an outcome of the passion for self-preservation, together with a perception that my preservation is involved in the preservation of my group. It is a question of giving each man his just dues, rights, and privileges, that all may be preserved thereby. While it may have its origin in sympathy, it was early influenced by the normal form of intellectual action. It was an attempt to regulate the practice of deception.

It is urged by Ward and conceded by others that deception is a normal mode of intellectual action. Self-preservation, the strongest instinct in the animal man, has been supported by the process of deception. As Ward says, "The ruse is the simplest form of deception, and this brings out the vital truth that in so far as mind deals with sentient beings deception is its essential

nature.”¹ This universal principle of all animal life is readily observed in the deception displayed in predatory animals in their attempt to catch their prey. The rabbit could outrun the fox, or by burrowing elude his pursuit, hence it is necessary for the fox to move stealthily and slyly upon his game. The cat could not catch the mouse or the eagle his prey without deception. Man in his attempt to fish and hunt practices the same ruse or deception, a little higher in order than that of the lower animals. He baits the hook to catch the fish, and drives the animals into snares. In this capacity he is a “predatory, carnivorous animal.” The next step is the preservation of animals for service. In order to train them for domestic service, it is necessary to take them while young, and by food and proper training they may be led to work the will of man. In the management of man the same principle is discernible, for while slavery, to a certain extent, may have been the result of force, deception has been used as a means of establishing it. But in the later forms of society through priestcraft or monarchy or nobility a certain favored few, through the arts of deception, have made the many serve them. In the business world where competition has been strong, deception has flourished. While to-day business is regulated to a certain extent by laws, by the moral code, and a general sense of fairness, we still find men succeeding and growing wealthy at the expense of their fellows through the art of deception. The secret of the success of a great business enterprise has frequently been sharp practice. It is not only by securing advantageous conditions and by controlling the resources of nature, but by bargaining secretly, by deceiving as to the amount of profits, and by many other similar means that many people win success in the world.

Nor is the deception frequently practiced in politics very different from this. It is a struggle, a warfare with all the rights and privileges of deceiving the enemy. To deceive this man, to dupe another, to take advantage of the opposing party, by foul means or fair, may insure success in modern as well as in ancient politics. In the higher forms of government, what more is war or diplomacy than a systematized and orderly method of deception? Likewise, in ordinary social contact, in order to preserve their individuality and to protect their per-

¹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 484.

sonality, people deceive each other in small matters, and cultivate the art. To what extent this should be carried is an open question. There are those who preach against the art of deception and rule it out absolutely as a legitimate practice, the while they themselves, in one form or another, are constantly practicing it. The mother takes advantage of the simplicity of the child in order to control it for its good. The priest takes advantage of the ignorance of his parishioners or penitents to lead them in the right way. The lawyer tries to win his case though he may feel that he could have pleaded the other side of the case more easily. Such deception has led to the development of justice.

The Origin of Natural Justice. — Much has been said by political philosophers of a system of natural justice. A part of what they have said is true, but much is false and misleading, for there is no natural justice but the law of force. The so-called state of nature is merely a state of egoistic struggle for existence in which might makes right. The individual gets and keeps what he can. Under natural justice there is no individual ownership of property except when a man is able to hold and possess goods or lands against all comers. This is natural justice.

That, however, is not what those who originally used the term meant. They conceived that somehow in the nature of things there existed an undiscovered ideal law of social relationships which was of universal application to all men. It was assumed to be the rational basis of all conduct. It was a *jus natura*.¹ What they thought they might find in the *jus natura* was a delusion. No such basis of moral conduct exists in Nature, or anywhere outside their imagination. The concept was a part of the old metaphysic which postulated an unalterable ideal, the very image of perfection. Such a conception belongs to the day preceding the birth of the theory that all things are in a state of change. What is perfect to-day is imperfect to-morrow. *Perfect justice is perfect adjustment of relations between groups, between individuals and groups, and between individuals.* Let the adjustment be ever so perfect to-day, if a new invention be made, this perfect justice gives way to-morrow to injustice.

So long as relations between men are governed by social

¹ Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, 1900, p. 330.

sanctions or social disapprovals, we call the code of these sanctions and disapprovals ethics or morals. When, however, the political organization undertakes to establish these relations with civil sanctions, then we have a legal code and a standard or code of justice. *In other words civil justice is ethical relations sanctioned by the state.* In the sense of unsocialized adjustment of differences to the advantage of the strong, "natural" justice always exists until the conflict of interests has been adjusted and the strong has been curbed by the gentle but none the less effective methods of social control, in the interests of society.

Transition from Natural to Civil Justice. — The transition from natural to civil justice was very gradual. It came about primarily through the widening influences of sympathy. The growth of intelligence and all the social machinery previously discussed greatly aided. Correct conduct is obtained not by sympathy alone, but through regulation by the intellect. The growing intelligence perceives the economic loss of a long-standing injustice like slavery, or the degradation of woman. "Natural" justice regards not the sufferings of individuals nor the consequences of predatory activity. It is only through sympathy and intelligence that these can be observed. Not only the consideration of the consequence of actions, but the knowledge of what can be accomplished and what cannot, leads to restraint, to preservation of the group for the sake of preservation of the individual. For example, if it be observed that under a state of anarchy the social group is in danger of extinction, civil justice will prevail to regulate the rights and duties of the members of the community. This intelligence and appreciation of results gradually restricts the acquisitive powers and brings about a social harmony. Out of the struggle for survival comes the establishment of civil law; out of the natural struggle of the savage for his own existence comes the civil regulation for the preservation and prosperity of the individual and society. Moreover, the development of social bonds, the refinement of feelings and tastes destroys the possibility of enjoyment of former activities and creates a demand for new satisfactions which can be satisfied only by the establishment of justice.

The Development of Civil Justice. — Once the individual relinquished his unrestricted right to do as he pleased, and

depended upon the custom or law controlling the whole group for his guidance, civil justice grew rapidly. The moral judgments of the social group became crystallized into law, and soon the individual had no rights except those that society chose to grant. The social group by intelligent regulation sought to benefit each individual throughout the whole community. Both ethical conduct and social justice, its product, are consciously designed by society to accomplish certain clearly perceived advantageous results. Thus, ethics and justice become the results of intelligent purpose.

On the other hand, there are many influences which retard the perfection of civil society through intelligence. For instance, while intelligence increases the knowledge of cause and effect, it also increases temptation because of the multiplication of desires and the increasing number of opportunities for a personal enjoyment. The growth of reason is accompanied by an atrophy of instinct. And reason is not by any means so reliable a guide in ordinary relations as instinct. Consequently, in new situations if the instincts have ceased to function while reason is deliberating, passion decides, and often the wrong choice is made. But equilibrium is maintained by the increased power to overcome temptation which intelligence brings. If increased sympathy or altruism appears, the restraint will be sufficient to improve the civil relations of individuals. However, it must be considered that neither immediate nor ultimate individual interests are not always social interests. For an individual may seek his immediate salvation at the expense of the general welfare, but all may not do this without the destruction of society.

On the other hand, in the long run, when each is seeking to conserve the best interests of the whole, individual interests will ultimately be protected. Yet, in the application of civil justice to society, survivals of the old savagery, that is, of natural justice, constantly manifest themselves. For instance, there is a tendency to evade laws, both moral and civil, as the pressure of social usage increases and causes the morally weak to disobey the will of the majority. Thus the morally weak become criminals. Things that were formerly allowed are now forbidden because the complexity of social life necessitates the more exact observance of individual conduct. This causes the

non-socially inclined to resist or evade the law. Hence in the development of society the line of criminality constantly rises to include more and more of those who in a previous stage of social evolution would not have been considered criminal.

However, there is less of the action of brute force than formerly and more resort to cunning. The struggle is for domination rather than for mere survival. Domination gradually becomes intellectual rather than physical. The mental struggle for supremacy goes on in spite of the repression of violent measures. This process is observed most frequently to-day in trade and commerce where competition in the acquisition of wealth is keen, where each man strives to get ahead of the other. Many of the practices of modern business are questionable when measured by the ethical standard of the times. It is only through a government seeking justice to all, which has formulated moral principles into laws, that individuals may be protected from the evils of this latter-day cunning.

But, after all, the practical application of ethical principles to all the affairs and relations of life, and the legal punishment of any lapse from these principles, in short, the establishment of justice, is the chief aim of government, and its duty will not be completed until it offers protection to all in the industrial world and represses the predatory habits of man in the acquisition of wealth. Industrial or economic justice is as essential to the happiness of mankind as political justice, and at present of more vital consequence. For we live to-day in the last period of a great reform movement which began in the Renaissance, when the right of independent thought was declared. It continued in the Reformation which secured freedom of religious belief. It led on to political revolution and political liberty. Now we are engaged in the fourth phase of the struggle, the phase of industrial liberty. In this will come the final triumph of ethical society.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Of what importance to the student of sociology is the study of the origin and development of ethics?
2. Describe the origin and development of our ethical ideas regarding private property.
3. Explain the psychological process by which a boy attains the conception of obligation and responsibility.
4. Give an illustration of a moral ideal developing through custom.
5. What part does genius play in the development of morality?
6. Describe how primitive moralities and primitive ethical ideals are raised and refined; how they are enlarged so as to dominate new spheres.
7. Give an illustration showing how an ethical ideal may originate in sympathy.
8. Why was it that our fathers had no ethics upon the subject of trusts?
9. Explain the difference between the ethical ideals and practices of the eighteenth century and those of the twentieth century in America in the matter of sex morals. In what sense does society determine moral ideals?
10. What is the relation of morality and justice?
11. Explain the parts played by ruse and deception in the development of morality and justice.
12. Explain the hesitation in regard to the proper code of morality for the new woman; why some men feel no compunction in cheating a railway company or a corporation; why a corporation has no conscience.
13. What is the relation of a developing morality to the regulation of trusts, railroad rates, insurance rates, and such subjects?
14. Read Wallis, *The Great Society*, Chap. IX, and then show in what other feelings than mother love altruism may originate.

CHAPTER XII

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION

The Influence of Religion on Social Development. — The importance of religion as a factor in social evolution, particularly in tribal organization and race differentiation, has been acknowledged by nearly all students of sociology. Some have placed so much emphasis upon its importance as to lead to the conclusion that it is the primal influence in securing primitive social unity. Others have either ignored it or insisted that it has retarded social progress. Neither of these views is correct. While it has had a strong influence in cementing the social group, in bringing about its unity, and in developing social forms and social order, nevertheless it is not the fundamental factor of social organization in primitive society. On the other hand, it has been asserted that it retards the progress of social life and that it is possible for philosophers to devise some better agency than religious organization for the advancement of civilization. Whatever may be the degree of truth in these assertions, it must not be forgotten that the careful student of the historical growth of society will find religion an ever present factor, indeed a force that must be reckoned with everywhere. In this respect it works peculiarly, for, while, on the one hand, it has favored differentiation between the races and between the independent growth of certain groups, on the other hand, it has been a potent force in increasing the unity of the group; that is, it has brought the interior life of the group or tribe into harmonious unity. When we consider how strong religion has been in the primitive culture of early society, it is easy to infer its great power as a society builder.

The Origin of Religion and Revelation. — The question of the origin of religion has no bearing upon the question of whether there was or was not a revelation by which man became conscious of the will of God. The scientific and philosophical in-

quiry concerning the origin of religious sentiment is a matter quite apart from the inquiry which might be raised as to whether God has revealed His will to men. This chapter concerns itself solely with the natural history of the way in which the religious feelings, ideas, and practices arose in human society. Its question is, What natural conditions in man's early history induced in him the religious attitude? What facts in the history of his mental development determined the form of his religious expression? What conditions in his physical and social environments shaped his early religious ideas and practices?

Historic Theories of the Origin of Religion. — The question of the natural origin of religion before the time of the English Deists was raised first by the Roman skeptical philosopher-poet, Lucretius, who in his *de Rerum Natura* characterized all belief in gods as an illusion and ascribed its genesis to fear. Hume, in 1755, in his *Natural History of Religion*, took essentially the position of Lucretius, saying that fear of the forces of nature led man to ascribe the phenomena of nature to powerful gods whom he hoped to bring to his side by proper attention such as would avail with persons.¹

Modern scholars have been influenced by these suggestions, yet not finding them adequate, have sought other natural explanations of the origin of religion.

Sir John Lubbock, in his *Origin of Civilization*, published in 1870, has given considerable evidence to show that primitive man personified nature and also that he worshiped the ghosts of ancestors. More than that, he indicated that the worship of the ghosts of ancestors often grew out of his worship of living beings.² Indeed, long before that time Comte had a theory of animism. He said, "The theological period of humanity could begin no otherwise than by a complete and usually very durable state of pure fetishism, which allowed free exercise to the tendency of our nature by which man conceived of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own with differences of their intensity."³ In concluding his argument he said, "Thus fetishism is the basis of the theological philosophy, deifying every substance or phenomenon which

¹ Morris Jastrow, Jr., *The Study of Religion*, 1902, pp. 173-175.

² Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, pp. 189, 133, 221, 222.

³ *Positive Philosophy*, Martineau's translation, Vol. II, p. 186.

attracts the attention of humanity and remaining traceable through all its transformations to the very last."¹

Edward E. Tylor had a large influence upon the scholars of his time. He developed his theory most completely in his work on *Primitive Culture*. In a word, the theory is that primitive man attributed conscious life like his own to natural phenomena such as trees, stones, rivers, the sky, and the mountains. Seeking a cause for the phenomena that he saw about him, he began, according to Tylor, with the belief that each one was the action of some conscious personality. Knowing nothing about impersonal causes, he attributed to all the striking phenomena of nature a soul or spirit resembling his own. According to Tylor, out of this fact has grown religion. Tylor regarded this form of religion as the earliest type found among men, and traced its development from its inception to its survivals among civilized men. According to this theory, primitive man personified all nature with a spirit much like that which he and his fellows possessed.

The criticism made of this theory is that, while at a certain stage of culture animism is almost universal among primitive men, it is not necessarily the earliest form of religion. Anthropologists have learned that not all peoples with a backward civilization have Tylor's animistic conception. Before primitive men came to that state in their mental and social development when it seemed to them that all the world was teeming with active unseen spirits, they had a mere jumble of ideas concerning the mysterious in nature and man.

Giddings rightly says that all interpretations of religion which start from the assumption that either fetishism, animal worship, nature worship, or ancestor worship was the primitive form from which all later forms were derived, are destined to be overthrown. He adds that the earliest belief was a jumble of ideas and it was long before the different elements of religion were discriminated in those ideas. His suggestion that the primitive man first believed in a Great Dreadful, an impersonal power or something, before he learned to identify it with a spirit form of any sort is worthy of consideration.²

¹ *Positive Philosophy*, Martineau's translation, Vol. II, p. 189.

² Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 249. See also Giddings, "Darwinism in the Theory of Social Evolution," *Popular Science Monthly*, July, 1909. To one

Dr. King has suggested a term for the object of religious regard in this stage of man's development, which seems very much better. He denominates it more vaguely "The Mysterious Power." Probably the vagueness of the term corresponds very closely with the vagueness of the idea in the mind of primitive man who held in awe and fear that Something which he did not understand, but of which he was cognizant. Among the Algonquins of North America the term "Manitou" was the synonym for this Something. Many other people, among them the Japanese, have this same idea of a vague Something pervading the universe.¹

After a certain stage had been reached, doubtless primitive man began to read into the universe his own experiences and feelings and thoughts. Then he began to personalize nature. Out of that animism arose. It was a crude philosophy and, at the same time, a crude religion.

Tylor's work on *Primitive Culture* appeared in 1871. In 1876 Spencer's first volume of *The Principles of Sociology* was published. In that volume he developed a theory of the origin of religion, as well as a theory of the origin of primitive man's notions concerning the universe. Spencer's theory of the origin of religion was somewhat different from that of Tylor. Spencer traced all religious practices back to fear of the ghost of an ancestor. He did not ignore Tylor's theory of animism; he supplemented it with his "ghost" theory. He laid the basis of his theory in the experiences of primitive men in sleep and dreams, echoes, shadows, reflections in the water, swoons, epilepsy, and death. These experiences Tylor had used as the basis for his doctrines of animism. Tylor had also referred to the worship of ghosts. He had, however, not given it the primary place in the development of religion which it occupied in Spencer's opinion. According to Spencer, these experiences led primitive man to conclude that he was

word in that suggestion of Giddings exception must be taken, and that is the word *impersonal*. One finds it difficult to understand how primitive man, before he has arrived at the mental and social development necessary to have our ideas of the impersonal, could conceive such an idea as our modern connotation of "impersonal" would imply. Rather, did he not feel a fear of the great, mysterious Something? Whether personal or impersonal probably did not occur to him to inquire. It was something which he did not understand, and of which therefore he had to beware.

¹ King, *The Development of Religion*, Chap. VI.

a double personality. Out of these and other experiences grew his belief in a life after death. He connected with this continuance of personality after death his fear of the dead ancestors. The ancestor revered in life was awe inspiring in death. Any calamity which happened to the individual after the death of an ancestor was an indication of the latter's displeasure. He must be placated in death as he had been in life. Hence arose sacrifices to the dead.¹

Spencer illustrated his theory with a wealth of material which indeed made it seem plausible. His chief difficulty came when he attempted to explain the worship of plants, animals, and other objects of nature. Here his theory became labored. He accepted the animistic conception formulated by Tylor, but, differing from Tylor, he held that the spirits inhabiting natural objects like mountains, springs, heavenly bodies, plants, and animals were conceived by primitive man in all cases to be the ghosts of dead ancestors. He gave definiteness and completeness of form to the animistic theory of the origin of religion by this suggestion.

But while the hypothesis is attractive, one feels that Spencer has failed to be convincing when he attempted to explain nature worship by the "ghost theory." On the other hand, every new piece of evidence obtainable makes it perfectly apparent that when a people once reaches a stage of social development in which either the mother group or the patriarchal family is the characteristic social organization, ancestor worship may arise in much the way Spencer has suggested.² This same evidence, however, indicates that among many primitive people existing to-day, as well as in certain historic peoples, religion existed before ancestor worship arose. For example, Sven Hedin's description of the present-day Thibetans, who are not ancestor worshipers, but fetish worshipers, makes it perfectly plain that religion does not always arise from the worship of ghosts of ancestors. Like Tylor's animistic theory, Spencer's "ghost theory" is incomplete. Moreover, it was overworked by Spencer.

Max Müller, not content either with Tylor's or with Spencer's

¹ Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Sections 24-204.

² The worship of female divinities makes it probable that ancestor worship arose in metronymic societies as in patriarchal.

suggestions, and approaching the problem not from the side of history but of ontology, proposed that the source of religion in the human heart is "the perception of the Infinite" aroused in man's mind by his experiences with the world about him. The steadfastness of nature in contrast with his own ephemeral existence and his sense of the power of nature in contrast with his own weakness, according to Müller, stirred this perception of the Infinite within his mind.¹

Tiele, the Dutch philosopher of religion, is at one with Müller in searching for the origin of religion not in its historical beginnings, but in some spiritual fact in primitive man's life, — in some philosophical basis. This ontological basis he finds, not in Max Müller's theory of man's "apprehension of the Infinite," but in *the Infinite within man*. "The origin of religion consists in the fact that man *has* the Infinite within him, even before he is himself conscious of it, and whether he recognizes it or not." "It is man's original, unconscious, innate sense of infinity that gives rise to his first stammering utterances of that sense, and to all his beautiful dreams of the past and future. These utterances and these dreams may have long since passed away, but the sense of infinity from which they proceed remains a constant quantity. It is inherent in the human soul. It lies at the root of man's whole spiritual life."²

Both these scholars are dealing with a different phase of the origin of religion from that considered by Spencer and Tylor. Tylor, in seeking the origin of religion, was endeavoring to get a clear view of the natural history of religion. He emphasized the psychology of the experience only that he might explain the genesis of the religious attitude. His chief interest was not philosophical, but historical and anthropological. He sought to ascertain the earliest form of religion and to explain the way in which that form arose. His problem was quite different from that set themselves by the philosophers of religion such as Müller, Tiele, and more recently by Jastrow. For the morphological sociologist interested in the evolution of forms, Tylor and Spencer will have superior value. To the sociologist

¹ Hibbert Lectures, 1880, *On the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India*, p. 23; *Theosophy*, Gifford Lectures, Fourth Series, p. 480.

² Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Gifford Lectures, 1898, Vol. II, pp. 208, 209, 230, 233.

with his chief interest in the philosophy or the psychology of religion, the other method of approach will appeal more strongly.

Before leaving the history of the subject, two other writers more recent than any of these mentioned may be cited. One of these, Professor J. Mark Baldwin, approaches the subject of the origin of religion from the standpoint of psychological development; the other, Dr. King, views the origin of religion from the standpoint of group psychology with illustrations from anthropology and sociology.

In approaching the inquiry concerning the origin of religious sentiment, Baldwin asks, "How do these sentiments arise and develop in the process of the personal growth of a child?" In general, his answer is that these sentiments arise in the child from the reverence, love, devotion, trust, and dependence which he feels towards those with whom he is immediately associated.¹ Out of these attitudes towards persons grow his feelings and sentiments towards an ultimate religious ideal. According to Baldwin, the development of the religious sentiments follows the development of personality. In the development of the child's personality there is opened a facet that reflects other persons. In the interplay of his own personality and that of these other persons in his immediate environment there grows up what Baldwin calls "the ejective personality" or ideal. That is, as he looks upon these other persons, he tends to ascribe to them characteristics and qualities which perhaps they do not possess, but which he feels they should possess. He finds in them some elements of his ideal. He feels that somewhere there must be a personality which contains all of these elements and characteristics. Consequently, out of this feeling there gradually develops the ideal personality in his own thoughts. On the other hand, just as the real person whom he knows here in life manifests to him attitudes which he does not expect, and yet which, when they are manifested, appeal to him as something better than he has ever thought of, so he comes to feel that this ideal personality will manifest attitudes which he does not expect, and with which he is not prepared to cope. This gives him the sentiments of awe, reverence, and fear. In this way, says Baldwin, the two elements in the religious sentiment de-

¹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1913, p. 337.

velop, — the feeling of dependency and the feeling of mystery. Both are the result of his contact and experience with other persons.

In this same process, or, as Baldwin calls it, "dialectic of personal growth," both in the child and, Baldwin thinks, also in the race, the struggle of the human spirit with physical environment also arouses both the religious sentiment and religious ideas.¹ Whether it be in the child, dreadful of the dark, or in the primitive man, awed by the majestic display of the storm, the trembling of the earthquake, or the belching smoke and fire of the volcano, there is the same consciousness of the awe-inspiring fact pressing itself in upon the mind and stirring both the feeling of dependence and the feeling of mystery. Here are the feelings out of which may develop religious ideas and religious practices. Both in the child and in the race, says Baldwin, this fearsome stage is characterized chiefly by the sense of mystery and awe, and lasts only so long as these feelings are predominant over thought. When the child, or the primitive man, begins to question the rationale of these and other strange phenomena, ideas arise which may be described as at once philosophical, scientific, and religious.

"What are these mighty forces in comparison with which I am such a pygmy?" thinks the child and the primitive man. "What is their nature; how may I deal with them?" The only cause that either can understand is a personal cause. Therefore, to primitive man, these phenomena must seem to be the effects of personal volitions like those of himself and of his fellows. Consequently, he reads into these phenomena of nature, personality. His conception of this personality will be no different from his conception of other persons. He will interpret it largely in terms of activities and desires. The tumult of the heavens must denote anger, especially since he finds that out of the tumult come death and disaster. Strange mysterious sounds which fill the woods and plains about him must also be caused by beings like himself and his fellows. He personalizes, therefore, every strange, unknown force in nature which he identifies as the cause of some fear-inspiring phenomenon.

Dr. King approaches the problem from the standpoint of

¹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 336-363.

group psychology. He analyzes the evolution of the consciousness of value in the mind of primitive man. Briefly stated, his theory is that the consciousness of value seems to be closely associated with, if not conditioned by, the various active attitudes of persons or groups of persons associated with active life processes developing or modified by social life. Among these are included all complications of activity whether due to chance variations accumulated mechanically, or to conscious adaptation to situations of stress or conflict.¹ The religious attitude, according to King, is simply one phase of the result of the consciousness of value, "a special development of the valuational attitude," as he puts it. Starting from the postulate that the social body has been at least an important factor in the process of the development of valuational attitudes, he argues that many of the so-called highest religious conceptions, like those of God, Freedom, and Immortality, owe their existence to the influence of the social group upon the simpler values. As the atmosphere of the social group was an important aid in the development of language, so social surroundings influenced the development of religion. In general, his theory is that religion grew out of certain activities in which the group was interested, those activities which cluster about the problems and crises which affect the group as a whole. In proof of this, he cites Robertson Smith, who says that the primitive family thought of their gods as caring only for the tribe and not for the individual. Moreover, only those values which have the sanction of the group would be of permanent value to the individual. In accordance with this theory, therefore, King argues that wherever the social organization of a group is loose and ill defined, there the idea of religion will be indefinite and vague. Furthermore, the religious values of the group and of the individuals supporting it will be very closely connected with the life activities of that group. In groups where the problem of securing food is of serious interest there the religious attitude will be connected with that activity, for example, with the fruiting of the date palm; or it is connected with a water course or a spring upon which the very existence of the group depends. He says, "We may hold that the religious aspects of a people's life are special differentiations of the social

¹ King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 60.

order which appear under certain favoring conditions.”¹ At the close of harvest, moreover, or the end of a long winter, there is that intensity of feeling in the group that leads to certain functional activities. In the course of time these functional activities come to have religious value, because they bear upon the welfare of the group. Special customs, therefore, and habits of practical value to the welfare of the group often tend to establish themselves as religious practices. As an example he cites the connection of the care of milk with religious ritual among the Todas. He says that much of the dairy ritual has grown up as a means of counteracting the danger involved in giving the sacred substance milk to peoples whom they regard as inferior beings. This same people, the Todas, have other ceremonies which are directly connected with seasons of stress or of emotional tension. They are distinctly social in character and they may be supposed, says King, to be the outcome of such psychological conditions rather than to have been caused by any original religious motive.

Summing up the discussion of certain of these religious features of the Todas and of the Semites, he says, “In other words, the fundamental expedients of the life process, because they are of necessity carried on by groups of people, naturally gained many accretions from these people’s social and play impulses, and these accretions may become of almost more importance than the fundamental acts about which they gather even to the extent of obliterating them.”² In other words, then, according to King, the accumulation of habits in various directions is one of the first steps in the evolution of Religion. Now on the basis of this development of the consciousness of value in the minds of primitive men King builds his theory of “the Mysterious Power.” Belief in this Mysterious Power he holds to be the real significance of the forms of worship as found among primitive men. He believes that savages conceived it as an impersonal force filling the universe of which they must beware. It was something which they did not understand, and against which they stood on guard, frightened, curious, and fascinated.³

¹ King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ *Ibid.*, Chap. VI.

In summarizing the development of thought concerning the origin of religion up to the present time, we may note that beginning with Lucretius, followed by Hume, we have the general theory of fear, — *Primos in orbe deos fecit timor*. Tylor said that religion originated in fear of the spirit or spirits inhabiting all nature. Spencer specified the form of fear as the fear of the ghosts of ancestors. Baldwin adds the element of reverence developing in the process of growth by reason of the unexpected in other people. Giddings roots the origin of religion in awe of the Great Dreadful. King finds the origin in the psychological development of the consciousness of value growing out of the emotional stress connected with some crisis bearing upon survival. In this evolution of thought there has developed two distinct methods of approach, the one from the standpoint of anthropology, the other from the standpoint of psychology. The significance of King's contribution is that it combines both of these methods of approach and adds still another, namely, the social. These various methods of approach have helped greatly in tracing out the many ways in which religion has developed. We are certain of this, that religion developed from the interplay of the human mind and the external universe. The phenomena of the universe falls into two categories so far as they affect the human mind. The one is the world of un-reasoning nature, and the other is the world of men.

The Origin of Religion. — Let us now synthesize the suggestions concerning the manner in which religious activities and ideas arose from man's struggle with the problems presented by this external universe. These problems are extremely complicated and their interrelations delicate. The human mind, struggling to find its way through the maze presented by the phenomena of nature, and the yet stranger and more intractable phenomena of human beings, creates the situation out of which grew religious practices, sentiments, and ideas. We may suggest, therefore, that in its origin religion pursued some such course as the following: Primitive man, just emerging from the animal world with a mind not much above that of the animal, looked out upon this universe with its savage forces, and its savage men, and was afraid. What he was afraid of he did not define. Its nature was unknown. He feared because he did not understand the Great Dreadful which pressed

itself upon him and demanded that he take some attitude towards it. How should he interpret it, how should he act towards it?

Even as an animal man had learned the meaning of superiority and inferiority, of prestige and submission. Some things, like his fellows, he had learned to understand. He had learned how to get on with his fellows. What more natural than that he should extend this method of understanding and of adjustment with his fellows to the natural phenomena around him which he did not understand, yet desired to propitiate? Therefore, he explained every strange, unknown thing in his experience by his own feelings and the feelings of his fellow men. He treated these unknown things in the same way in which he had been able to get on with his fellow men.

Moreover, man had the experience that the same methods which availed in securing the coöperation of his fellow men had secured the coöperation of animals. The process of domesticating certain of these animals had taught him that. His constant conflict with the wild animals about him even before domestication had begun, taught him also that the minds of these animals were somewhat like the minds of the men with whom he had to deal. If, therefore, he could live with men and deal with animals by following certain principles, what more logical than to conclude that the same methods would avail in his endeavor to understand and to propitiate other equally incomprehensible things about him in the universe?

This attitude is preserved through man's whole life and all his activities. Without a conception of impersonal causation he necessarily personalized every real and supposed cause. If the thing that produces this result is a person, it must necessarily be a person like those he knows. It is a person of love and of hate, a strange, mysterious power with which he must deal in some way. If angry, this power must be placated. The only way that suggests itself is the method which placates human beings when angry. Hence all nature is conceived by man as being filled with spirits like himself. His own personality is no less a mystery to him than the phenomena and events of nature. He shouts; a voice mocks him from the hills or forests; he leans down over the pool to drink, and behold, out from its depths there looks up at him a face like his

own or like that of his fellows who may be with him. He sleeps and dreams, and in those dreams he goes far away and performs various actions. He awakes, behold, he is where he lay down to sleep. On other occasions he sleeps and walks about in his sleep until he strikes some object and awakes. Therefore, these dream experiences, he argues, in which he walks and talks are real experiences. How can this be? How can one both sleep and walk abroad at the same time? His only explanation is a conviction gathered from all these observations that he is a double personality. One of his selves remains, while he sleeps, and the other walks abroad. He has a spirit, therefore. This spirit, when he is awake, is his constant companion. When sleeping or in an ecstasy or a swoon, this double departs from his body and walks abroad. It is invisible; seek howsoever hard he may, he cannot find it; yet here is the incontestable evidence of its existence. It is a spirit more or less like this that inhabits all nature, he concludes. It is a person with personal characteristics like himself and his fellows. It loves, it hates, it has appetites and passions, it becomes angry, it desires gifts, it is subject to caprices like himself, therefore it is something of which to stand in awe and with which to come to terms.

Then there is the strange, mysterious fact of death. Every evidence we can gather from primitive peoples who have reached the stage when they reflect upon events at all shows their concern about death. Constantly in the midst of savage forces which civilization has either destroyed or shackled and tamed for the service of man, primitive man seldom died a natural death. When he did live to die such a death, it was a strange phenomenon and was to be explained by some occult means.¹ Usually he died before the evil days of old age had come when he could say he had no pleasure in them, while life was still sweet, and death seemed not a relief, but a calamity. Wild animals, or still wilder men, lay in wait for him at every turn. The natural, instinctive fear of death was ever upon him. When he thought of these things the question naturally arose, What is death? Where could he look for an answer but to other experiences which seem very like death? He slept and awoke. Sometimes a man was smitten in fight and lay unconscious for a time and revived again. Occasionally one fell in a swoon or ecstasy

¹ Lubbock, *Origin of Civilization*, p. 133.

and when he revived he told of the things he had seen and heard. Was not death like sleep, swoon, or ecstasy, except that the absence of the soul from the body was more prolonged? In death man's other self was alive elsewhere, seeing, enjoying, knowing, and with the same appetites and passions, likes and dislikes, as when present in the body.

Then some untoward event occurred which had no apparent cause. Some dead person must be displeased. When alive such a person had wreaked vengeance when offended; now dead, he had become angry and must be appeased in the same way as when living. Perhaps the dead man had been some great chief. If society had become strongly centralized and control was rigid, the person to be appeased was naturally supposed to be an ancestor, the natural ruler of the group. He was feared in death as much as he had been honored in life, — even more, because less was known about him when dead than when living, and therefore he was more mysterious and awful. Thus ancestor worship arose.

In these ways the first incongruous religious ideas struggled to expression. They are full of contradiction like the thoughts of primitive man or like the thoughts of the child who is just beginning to think. These ideas, like the sentiments and emotions aroused by his contact with the universe of things and men, are not clearly defined, but often are a jumble. They are, however, the first struggling efforts to relieve an unpleasant situation by activity of some sort, the first gleams of an explanation of the world in the midst of which man lives and the first blundering attempt at a method whereby he may bring it under his control. As already suggested, they are reflections of the social universe of which he was a part. Their patterns are to be found in his own soul and in the souls of those with whom he is in contact — the group of which he is a part. The gods that he makes for himself are like unto himself and his fellows, only greater, more powerful, more wise, and less understandable than they.

Summarizing the way in which *religious practices* arise, we may say that the practical results of this contact of primitive man with nature and men was the invention of religious practices. They begin with men. As a child grows and comes in contact with other personalities, he learns to accommodate himself to

them. By doing certain deeds he comes to terms with these personalities. He finds that certain things please them, while others displease them. Out of this perpetual surprise of experience, he learns what to do when he wishes the favor of the other person. On the basis of this experience he generalizes and adopts a code of practice which suits all persons. Now, believing as he does that natural phenomena are caused by persons, he will adopt the same practice in dealing with the spirit of the mountain or the spirit of the storm as he does in dealing with men. The beings who control these phenomena must be like the beings with which he is acquainted, therefore he adopts certain attitudes toward them, placates them by gifts, assuages their anger or pleases their vanity and secures their favor by praise and prayer.

The Complexity of the Problem. — This survey has certainly made it apparent that the endeavor to find the origin of religion in some one simple fact such as the desire for union with the deity as suggested by Ross is like the quarrel as to whether man is material or spiritual. Light is thrown upon the way in which religious sentiments develop by a genetic study of its development in the child and in the race. The process is further illuminated by a psychological analysis of this sentiment into awe and reverence, feeling of dependence, affection, etc. The forms of religious practice and their accompanying sentiments found among various primitive people make it quite possible to reconstruct the early religious feelings, ideas, and practices, and to retrace essentially the paths along which they have developed. Are the religious ideas attributed to primitive man indefinite? Do they lack the transparency of meaning which we demand? They were the first crude efforts of mankind, it must be remembered, to come to an understanding of the universe. How often the thoughts of even the cultivated man, when they first struggle forth to birth, are vague and lack clearness. Animism is a philosophy of the world which very well fits the mental equipment of primitive man and his lack of that precious heritage of civilized man, the treasured-up discoveries of the ages of civilization. Ancestor worship is most natural after a certain mental development has been reached, and certain social relationships, like a strong family tie, have been established. Sacrifices to the ancestral spirits with all their social consequences,

like female infanticide, early marriage, and overpopulation, are natural and fitting rites when the center of social control is a dominating personality.

The Genius and the Origin of Religion. — In discussing religious origins, the far-seeing man must not be forgotten. We know that historic religions have owed very much to their "founders," those prophets and seers to whom was revealed the vision denied to their fellows. What would the Hebrew religion have been without the prophets Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah? What would Christianity have been without its Jesus, its Paul, its St. Augustine, its Cyprian, its Calixtus, its St. Francis of Assisi, its Wesley, its Luther, its Cardinal Newman, and Pope Leo XIII? Can you imagine the rise of Islam without Mohammed, or of Buddhism without Gautama? Doubtless the time was ripe in each case, the age was awaiting the man who saw the harvest ripening. But the man who among the thousands of those days thrust in the sickle to the golden grain — what would have happened without him? Without a doubt the age would have declined and passed on into another without a crisis and without the dramatic evolution which each of these leaders put in motion. The world would have waited for a leader.

Now, while the facts lie hidden in the dim mists of the prehistoric, is there much probability that the man of genius assumed an importance in social attention and leadership only after history had lifted the curtain from the unknown past? No, for out of those shadows of the prehistoric dim figures of leaders in those days appear in fables and myths which have survived. There is Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods and shared it with men, and for his high presumption was condemned to spend his eternities chained to the fastnesses of Asia Minor, with the eagle forever tearing at his vitals. Out of the shadows of Hebrew memories there flits for a moment the heroic figure of Tubal-Cain, the first worker in metals. These and a few others mentioned in folk legends show that in the morning of social development there existed the leader at least in the arts and religion. We must assume the work of gifted individuals to explain the origin of religious ideas, emotions, and practices. They led the way and quickened the pace for whole peoples. Every people had its great men, but some had

superior leaders in religion and their history was meteoric as compared with that of others. Israel is an example. In pre-prophetic times the religion of Israel was much like that of her neighbors — a compound of nature worship and ancestor worship, celebrated under every green tree and upon every high hill by a cult that was largely ceremony and in which was mingled much that from our point of view was sensual and unethical. She had her seers who were but little, if at all, removed from the medicine men of modern savage tribes. Her priests served for hire and supported the reigning house no matter what its sins. Into that religious world burst the prophet Amos, with a voice that was entirely new, with a message that scandalized the nation and that found no response at the time save in a few hearts. Followed by men like Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, he turned the whole current of religious life into new channels. Without the prophets of that time the teachings of Jesus and Paul, humanly speaking, would have been impossible. We hear that Israel had a genius for religion! If she had, it was born of the work of those eighth-century prophets and their followers, and fostered by the circumstances of her later history. It was a legitimate offspring of prophetic vision and national suffering. Similar men of lesser vision, but of greater significance, have appeared elsewhere. Who can deny that the animistic interpretation of the universe and the religious awe that accompanied it arose from keen-witted primitive men who saw better than their fellows! Or, again, what more natural than that with the change in the form of the family, some brooding savage should visualize the dead ancestor's spirit hovering near with good or ill intent as in life. The presumption, from all that we know of history, is that the great man, the religious genius, was there in the beginning as in the later development.

Given, therefore, untutored man, knowing only his relationships with his fellows, growing up in the midst of a nature which he did not understand, but having some conception of social relationships and feeling an absolute necessity of understanding, and coming to terms with the world in which he lived, and, finally, given the superior person, the superior mind, we have the elements out of which could naturally grow that awe and reverence and, finally, that love, that make religion.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Of what social importance is the study of the origin of religion?
2. If possible, observe a little child and note carefully how its conceptions of religion originate and develop.
3. Converse with a half dozen children of different ages in the public schools or among your acquaintances, and ascertain and write down their conception of God. Notice what are the conceptions which seem to be derived from the teaching of others and what are those that they naturally reason out for themselves.
4. How does the conception of the Deists in regard to the origin of religion differ from that of modern scholars?
5. By introspection try to retrace the steps in the development of your own religious conceptions, apart from what you were taught by others.
6. Write out a clear definition of what Tylor meant by animism.
7. How did Herbert Spencer's theory of the origin of religion differ from Tylor's?
8. Try to ascertain the religious conceptions of a number of your friends or acquaintances among people of ordinary intelligence, but without any advanced education. Which of these ideas can you trace as being survivals from primitive originals?
9. In what senses is religion a reflection of social usages and practices?
10. Note the religious ideas and practices current in some one church with which you are acquainted and estimate which of these are survivals from an earlier type of religion.
11. Make a list of the things that children fear in the dark. Explain why they fear these things.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION

Crude and Meager Nature of Primitive Religious Practice. — Religion expresses itself in slowly evolving institutions. While in some form it was a persistent accompaniment of early human association, its first expressions were crude and lacking in definite organization. Yet no tribes have been found without religious ideas. Certain explorers have visited tribes and after a superficial investigation have declared them without religious ideas or practice. But afterwards, upon more careful investigation, this has been found false. Deception being the normal practice of tribal life, it is quite impossible to find out the religious life of a savage or barbaric people upon a short acquaintance. Indeed, after long study of the tribal life of the savage, by people who have resided among them, it has been difficult to define clearly their religious views and practices.

An early religious notion is found in the conception of a spiritual life or being.¹ Arising in the ways indicated in the previous chapter, the religious attitude worked itself out through multitudinous forms in the history of man's development. To begin with, this attitude was a practical one, growing out of the necessity felt by primitive man to control his environment in the interests of his own safety. Convinced that each individual had a dual life, primitive man made that belief the undifferentiated starting point for a long and varied development of both religious ideas and practices and of a theory of the world. Once having determined that the individual was a dual personality and that natural objects had, like man, a spirit which caused them to move and have their being, it was easy to account for all the various effects in nature, whose causes could not be observed, by attributing them to an unseen power, namely, to this *spirit*. The influence of the belief in this imaginary being upon the thoughts and sentiments of individuals

¹ See Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, p. 22.

was very great. It influenced the individual in his actions and in his relations to his fellow beings. The relation of this spirit to natural objects finally led to a rude form of nature worship. The spirits were multiplied with a growing keenness of perception as to differences between the various kinds of natural objects and the different phenomena connected with each, in accordance with the activities of nature and the things that were conceivable to be done. The savage mind rapidly passed from a state of unorganized superstition to that of an organized superstition. With the growth of social organization and activities primitive man likewise developed his pantheon. When one group conquered another or amalgamated peacefully with another, there occurred also a coalescence of the religious notions. If it was a case of conquest, the gods of the conquerors were exalted above those of the conquered and the latter became lesser deities in the pantheon or were outlawed and became the gods of secret cults and sectarians. An example is furnished of the former case by what occurred when the Latins conquered the adjacent tribes, of the latter by the history of Israel on the establishment of the Davidic kingdom. Finally, wherever the development went on to completion one god stands out supreme. How closely it may come to be associated with the earthly ruler is shown by the fact that sacrifice to the genius of the emperor, not to Jupiter, was the supreme test to which persecuted Jews and Christians ultimately were forced to submit. In the case of the later Hebrews, owing to the peculiar circumstances of the Exile and to a few choice spirits among the Exilic prophets, monotheism pure and simple developed. Among most other peoples the development never went beyond *henotheism*, or a belief that there was only one god for each nation, but that each nation had a different god.

In the early stages of religious development it was but natural for primitive man to think that if these spirits had power to do so much for the destruction or salvation of man, they must be sought out and managed. Hence came the idea of manipulating or exorcising the spirits for man's welfare. Offerings were chosen and actions observed that were supposed to please the spirit. Food was given, ceremonies performed, and the conduct of the tribe modified to please these unseen powers.

Then it appeared that there were good spirits who had the

preservation of the tribe in view, and others who desired its destruction. The former must be worshiped and praised for their goodness and the latter appeased by gifts and offerings and turned away from their intended destruction. Out of this idea come the subsequent conception of bright and happy spirits and a happy eternal home into which man would be conducted after death, and the idea of evil, destructive spirits who would attempt to lead man into a land of darkness and torture.

The Services of Medicine Man and Priest. — Out of the belief in unfriendly spirits grew one of the most remarkable influences in primitive social control, the medicine man or priest. In the management of spirits some men pretended to have more power than others. Once recognized as having superior power, these assumed a monopoly of influence over the spirits. Owing to the fact that it was thought that disease was an affliction of an evil spirit, the person who managed the evil spirit was the only one who could cure the disease, and so the services of priest and doctor were united in one person, the medicine man. Later these functions became divided and the priest attended to the affairs of religious worship and the medicine man to the cure of disease. But this separation came about very slowly, for the belief of the connection of disease with evil spirits has been very persistent in social evolution, as the belief in demon possession and witchcraft not only in New Testament times, but down through the ages to a very recent period, demonstrates.

The most significant fact concerning it in this connection is that the medicine man had power to control the whole tribe through his supposed connection with unseen forces or spirits of the air. Whatever he declared the spirits had ordered had to be performed. He always had the first claim on the food supply of the tribe and learned early to cause others to attend to his wants. This method of social control increased with the development of religion until in barbaric and semicivilized nations it became the most important ruling power in the government. Priestcraft in Egypt, in Assyria, in Palestine, and in Medieval Europe became the most potent force in social order. Even in modern civilization the power of priests and clergy has manifested itself in the government of nations.

Out of this functionary has grown the minister of religion, the statesman, the educator, the physician, and the judge. Once the medicine man was all these and more. More skillful than others in legerdemain, ventriloquism, and in thought reading, he obtained great power over the people in every way. He was a master of sorcery at first, having power to help or injure those who sought his aid or to injure those against whom he directed his machinations. Later one by one his many functions were assumed by others. Priest and healer he long remained. Many survivals of his power still remain with us. Clairvoyance and fortune telling, as well as the nobler and entirely Christian act of intercessory prayer, are examples.

Religious Forms and Ceremonies. — Religious rites, though influenced to a certain extent by individuals of superior gifts and extraordinary shrewdness, developed independently of them, as a social institution. The fact of death had great influence upon the development of religious ceremonies. The belief in the continued journey of the spirit after death led to the practice of burial ceremonies, and this practice aided development of social order. The custom of placing clothing and implements in the grave for the departed spirit, and the bringing of food to the grave for its sustenance brought the members of a community to a common meeting place, gave them a common social ideal, and developed more or less a regular order of procedure.

Whether originating in reverence and awe for some striking natural object, animal, or some natural function closely connected with the survival of the group, like a symbolic fruit or the reproductive process and organs, or in reverence rendered to the spirit of a departed ancestor, the group's religious activities were centered about a common object by means of common interests and therefrom developed common feelings and actions in other than religious concerns. Gradually these customs brought about permanent religious services because of the connection which the controlling spirit had with these ordinances. The idea of fear on the one hand and of worship on the other arose in the attempt to favor the spirit. In the case of ancestor worship an appeal to the spirit or god for safety of the departed led to prayer and the attempt to please him in order to receive favors gave rise to worship, while the attempt to manage an

evil spirit led to necromancy. Sometimes the spirit of the mountain was identified with the spirit of a dead ancestor. Comparatively simple acts grew more and more into ceremony and were attended with increased pageantry. With the development of pomp and ceremonies in approaching the ruler and securing favors from him went growth in the richness of religious rites. The psychology of "the majesty that doth hedge a throne" has not yet been carefully worked out, but there is no doubt that very early in the history of social development the chief learned its practical value, how to create and enhance it in the eyes of his subjects, and the latter found ways of flattering the great by devising somewhat more elaborate forms of reverence and ever more extravagant terms of praise.

Sacred Places and Natural Phenomena. — Animism, or the belief that the spirit life manifested itself in natural phenomena, led to the supposition that all the various forces appearing in nature were in activity in response to the will of various spirits, and was one idea from which developed the theory of sacred places. The worship of the several forms of nature was merely a worship of the spirits that dwelt in these forms, for nature worship was nothing more than spirit worship localized in the various objects of nature. Sometimes it was localized in a high mountain or hill, again it was a lonely or majestic tree, in other cases in a rock standing out alone or of peculiar formation, and sometimes in an animal from which the tribe was supposed to be descended. First there developed clan sanctuaries, then a central sanctuary, and when the nation evolved there grew up the national sanctuary. There were also family sanctuaries out of which later evolved household worship. These meeting places were the foundations of the church or temple. Cabrillo relates that while on his voyage in 1542 he saw the Indians of the Pacific coast come in their bands around a small inclosure. The inclosure was made by driving stakes in the ground, a partition was made in the center, and on this partition was a sort of shelf where feathers of sacred birds were deposited. The Indians came leaping around this inclosure in a sort of ceremonial order. Finally, one of them, the priest or medicine man, left their ranks and went within the inclosure and adjusted the sacred feathers and placed more there, at the same time going through certain ceremonial acts. This represented the

primitive meeting place of the spirits that the Indians came to worship. The ceremony over, they all went away to other pursuits.

It is in accord with the habits of early man that Abraham, when he came out of Haran to Bethel, erected an altar of stones and placed thereon the burnt offering. It was a "house of God" where he came to commune with the spirit of God and to worship him. When he returned out of Egypt he came to this place to meet God. Gradually the stone or tree was replaced by a tent sheltering some sacred casket containing sacred objects, and then an immovable chapel or temple located over or beside a sacred stone or spring or other holy object. So, too, the Greeks had their temples and the Egyptians their meeting places with the gods. Perhaps the best illustrations furnished by historic peoples of this evolution of the sacred place with all that it meant for the development of rite and ceremony, as well as of ideas of deity, are to be found in the evolution of the sanctuary in Ancient Israel and in Rome. The people of Israel who as clansmen worshiped one very high hill and under every green tree, under the influence of the priests of the royal chapel and, finally, of the eighth-century prophets came finally to concentrate their worship in the national sanctuary at Jerusalem so that ultimately sacrifice was permitted only there. The development among the Roman people is almost as clear and instructive. This primitive worship was at first merely an attempt to please God in order to receive his favor, or to appease his wrath in order to prevent the destruction of the tribe. Later it developed into worship, through prayer an appeal for strength and aid, not only for the individual, but for the tribe and nation. Primitive people prayed to their gods to give them victory in war, bountiful harvests, and prosperity in every way. Even yet most prayers have such "practical" ends in view. With the development, however, of an appreciation of the relation of religion to ethical conduct, less emphasis has been laid on the attainment of "material" benefits and more on character growth.

Complexity of Belief and Ceremony. — Religious beliefs and religious ceremonies grow more complex with the development of social relationships and complexity of social organization. This is strikingly observed in the development of mythol-

ogy and polytheism. It became necessary to account for every act of the tribe or race by reference to the deeds of ancestral spirits and every phenomenon of nature as produced by some spiritual being controlled by a spiritual power. The origin of the earth and the universe had to be accounted for, and there was no other way except by attributing it to the workings of an unseen power. This developed numberless gods with different powers, capabilities, and services. Numerous stories or myths concerning the actions of gods and their relations to mankind arose. These stories occupied the minds and influenced not only the beliefs but the actions of men. Following the development of polytheistic religions came the more recent ethical religions. In these the relations of individuals and groups to each other are most strongly developed. In the non-ethical religion the relation of the tribe or the individual to the gods was the important feature. While the ethical religion does not ignore this relationship, it goes farther and establishes moral relationship of individuals with each other. To the prophets of the eighth century Israel owed the development of an ethical religion. It was they who declared that Jahweh, their God, was more pleased with them for restoring the pledge to the poor, ceasing oppression, doing justice with lovingkindness, and walking in humbleness than for giving their first-born to redeem their transgressions, the fruit of their bodies for the sin of their souls. With an assurance that carried conviction and an insistence which brooked no gainsaying, Amos urged Jahweh's ethical claims with, "Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols. But let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream."¹ The same conviction inspired Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah.² Growing out of the insistence of these prophets and their followers we have the development of the legal-ethical religion of the Hebrew, in which the duty of individuals one to another finally is formally stated in the law of the nation. Growing out of the prophetic Hebrew religion has come a humanitarian, ethical religion in which the law of love prevails. In its recent development, the humanitarian idea seems to grow relatively stronger and the relationship of man

¹ Amos 5: 23, 24.

² See Hos. 2: 11, 4: 1-3, 10: 12; Is. 1: 10-17; Mic. 3: 9-12, 6: 6-8.

to God less important. Whether that is a permanent or merely a passing phase of religious development, it is too early yet to say.

Religion and Social Progress. — There has been a wide difference of opinion as to the influence of religion on the progress of civilization, but scholars are coming to an agreement that this influence has been a strong factor in the development of society. If we look to the early forms of culture, we shall find every one of them closely interwoven with religious beliefs. Being associated with every time of crisis in the life of primitive man, religion has been a most important spur to mental and physical activity. It provided a working hypothesis to his groping mind and thus introduced order into the chaos of his thought. It bound the energies of the savage which were being expended in anti-social ways, on the one hand, and on the other loosed those energies in activities, mental and physical, which ministered to the welfare of the group. For example, by causing him to act in a crisis religion spurred him to a series of experiments with nature which has not yet been exhausted. While the hypothesis with which it supplied man has been modified many times, by proceeding upon it he laid in experience the basis of a better. It provided him, furthermore, a basis upon which he began his significant attempts to alter the environment for the welfare of his group and himself, and to bend other men to his will, not by physical force, but by spiritual devices. While from the modern standpoint it enthralled him in activities which later impeded his progress, in his early history it gave spur to his otherwise undeveloped tendencies to help his fellows. The feelings, thoughts, and activities of primitive people clustered around religious life. The well-established customs of primitive society were all founded on religion. While we may consider much of this religious belief as false, and, in many instances, degrading, nevertheless, it called forth feeling and mental action in the struggle for existence. Simple as this life may appear, still it served as a stimulus to the simple mind of primitive people. Besides aiding in the establishment of ordinary custom it had a powerful influence in the development of intellectual and moral character. In the first place the mind was strengthened by positive belief. Belief led to more definite relationships of the life of the individual and society. Also, in the attempt of the individual to contemplate

the phenomena of an unknown world, religion became a positive necessity. Imagine an individual suddenly brought into contact with the activities and appearances of natural life without any knowledge or experience or instruction. The effects are startling and appalling, he sees the flash of lightning, he hears the thunder, observes the storm and the destructiveness of the roaring torrent, the change of seasons, the movement of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants and animals, and all the manifestations of sun and air and moisture, and yet he understands not one of all these phenomena. The moment his mind begins to inquire, his childish nature is satisfied by attributing these activities to the doings of an unseen power, a spirit, a god. The beginnings of speculation as to the nature of the universe which has its fruitage in modern science, originated in primitive religion. And so in the childhood of the race religion served a similar purpose to that of science in the more developed social life of the present. It is poor food for the mind of the fully developed man, but it was a fitting food to the ignorant, superstitious creature of primitive times.

Religion a Strong Factor in Society Building. — What concerns the sociologist most is the influence of religion in the development of social organization.¹ In the first place religion has always been connected with social order. The control of families, tribes, groups, and even nations, has been brought about through religious influence. Religion has lent a powerful sanction to virtue and morality, for it has established the relationship of individuals in the home as well as in matrimonial life. Long before politics and civil law could be established, religion had made the customs that preserved the equilibrium of the social group. It has always fostered a vague belief in immortality. Whether in its crude form as held by the primitive savage or in its perfected state, it has had more or less influence in the control of human society. In its early form it inspired fear and thus controlled social action, while in its later development the idea of immortality inspires hope and faith and courage, — strong elements, indeed, in the development of man. Again, it has strengthened patriotic feeling on account of its local character. The religion of the family developed family pride and glory, relating ancestors to gods.

¹ See Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 279.

When the tribes expanded into a national life the god of the nation led the hosts in battle, preserved their lives and integrity. And thus the idea became an inspiration to patriotic life. In upholding the central authority of the head of the family social order was developed. There was established on one side the governing class, on the other the governed. Thus people learned to rule and to obey, to command and to serve. By surrounding them with formal ceremonies, religion tended to purify the family and other domestic institutions and to preserve the family intact.

On the other hand, in modern times religion has at times been a coercive weapon of reaction, and has opposed the newer developments in society which had for their aim the betterment of society. What aspirations of earnest souls struggling to express a newly discovered truth has it not tried to crush! How often have religious institutions been found on the side of reaction in the struggle for freedom! Even in ancient Israel, as Cornill¹ has remarked, the outcome of the Prophetic religion was to crush the free spirit of the common people and to bind upon them the rites and ideas of the religion of the narrow party of Jerusalem. It paved the way for the priestly domination of the following centuries, and had a share in preparing for the hateful spirit of the Pharisee. In early Christian times ecclesiasticism crushed the free spirit of the Montanist, drove into ecclesiastical exile that early forerunner of untrammelled thought, the Gnostic, under the leadership of such men as Cyprian and Calixtus narrowed the church to a sect, and bound it with the hard bonds of a party domination. It throttled free inquiry in the Middle Ages, making independent thinking a heresy, and laid the foundation of a revolt which has rent the world into hundreds of warring factions. It forced Galileo to recant his carefully established convictions that the earth moves round the sun, retarded the development of science, threw water upon the flaming aspirations of scholars and stifled the democratic longings of the common people. Clothed with the garments of ecclesiasticism in more recent times men anathematized such truth seekers as Darwin and Huxley and belittled God's records written in the rocks and in the bodies of animals and men. Too often through its well-

¹ *The Prophets of Israel*, 1904, pp. 83-90.

meaning but benighted representatives, religion has mocked the findings of careful and conscientious scholars, stood with the representatives of arrant wrong against those who in love of the truth have battled for the rights of the people. Nevertheless, such an attitude represents but one side of the work of religion, the conservative side. Even that side is needed in society, as a stabilizing force. One must never forget, moreover, that some of the mightiest revolutions have been inspired by religious innovators. The Hebrew prophets, Jesus and Paul, Mohammed and Buddha, — who shall say of them and of the movements they inspired that they did not give the race a great impetus toward progressive development?

The chief influence of religion on the individual was largely subjective. In the first place it gave him an ideal. It pointed out something towards which he might direct his energies and gave him inspiration to reach this well-defined goal. Finally, when he had clothed the spirit he feared with certain attributes of power, he strove to become like it. But more than all, on account of service to an authority and to a superior, he trained himself in the arts of social life. For each individual that improves must learn first to serve. It may be to serve an individual, or a human desire, or an ideal. In all service he subdues and masters himself through effort, and that effort made man.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Trace the development of religious ideas, religious practices, and changes in the organization of some one denomination or religion with which you are acquainted.
2. What changes, if any, have you observed occurring in the nature of the public meetings in the church which you attended in childhood?
3. What part did the Hebrew prophets of the eighth century B.C. play in the development of the Hebrew religion?
4. In what respects does the medicine man differ from the modern minister of religion? How does he differ from the physician?
5. Trace the development of prayer from its origin in flattery to a superior to its highest form known to-day.
6. What survivals from ancestor worship may be found in religious ideas to-day?
7. Trace the evolution of the sacred place into the church.
8. Why are some people afraid to go into a dark church at night?
9. Show how religion has affected human progress both as a favoring influence and as a hindrance to progress. Give concrete historic instances.
10. State the ways in which religion is a help to social progress at the present time. In which it is a hindrance.
11. What steps could the churches of your town take to hasten social progress? What problems could the church be most useful in attacking with the hope of solving?

PART THREE

SOCIALIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL

CHAPTER I

PROCESSES OF SOCIALIZATION

THE processes by which society is changed from a simple, unorganized state to an organic, complex, heterogeneous body may be enumerated as aggregation, communication, association, coöperation, combination, and organization.¹ They are here named in order of their initial sequences. But for the purposes of analysis they are taken up in the order of their beginnings.

Aggregation. — By aggregation is meant the collection or massing of individuals, the coming together of the population. There are many causes for human aggregation, most of which are also common to animal societies. First among these are the impelling forces of physical environment, discussed in an earlier chapter.² People gather together because of a warm climate and the repulsion of a cold one, or because of an abundant food supply, as illustrated by tribes of Indians who, during the fishing season on the Columbia River, assemble from the surrounding valleys and camp near the banks of the river, or by people who assemble where there are quantities of shell fish, or plenty of wild game, wild fruits, and berries. A supply of good water, forests sought for their protection, or shunned because their density diverts a migratory group, determine to a degree where aggregations of people shall occur. When pastoral and agricultural pursuits began, the tribes were obliged to seek the open glades. Sea coasts and mountains have proved barriers preventing the dispersion of the race and confirming its habitation within limits.

But there were subjective influences as well that caused people to assemble. Foremost among these was the simple desire for companionship. Only preying animals like the lion and tiger spend a great deal of their lives alone. Feared by

¹ See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 13.

² See Part II, Chap. II.

people, they are avoided as dangerous companions. Moreover, under certain conditions of food supply, only solitary animals can survive. Man is both carnivorous and herbivorous by nature, and therefore he had in the beginning larger resources for survival than other animals. Yet his preservation has not been due so much to fleetness of foot, or savageness of attack, as to coöperative ingenuity in enlisting the forces of nature to fight his enemies, and serve his need. The individual could not cope single-handed with his enemies, nor, indeed, could his mind be developed without association.

After the peaceful stage of early human society had passed into the age of conflict,¹ in which each group struggled with all others for survival, aggregation was increased by social pressure. Many of the smaller groups were forced to unite for the sake of protection. Social integration began and continued with increasing power throughout the entire process of socialization. The sexual instinct became a powerful force in the close relationships of the groups and caused a continuous and permanent association. The physical influences, also, creating individuals of the same type and temperament, made the aggregation more compact and unified. The people of similar characteristics and desires were inclined to go the same way and to be influenced by like satisfactions.

Communication. — While aggregation could scarcely be separated from the development of communication, yet communication naturally follows aggregation. Moreover, the expression of wants and desires by individuals to each other sets in motion psychical currents which are veritable social causes in the sense that they produce results in social phenomena. Through communication different individuals come to have like feelings and ideas, — the *sine qua non* of common activities. A group of people may be assembled at a fire or at a public meeting, or, indeed, in an open park without any effective influence upon each other until there is an interchange of feeling or thought through forms of communication. An expression of want or desire may unite people into a common organization. There is, then, a difference between the mere grouping of people together and intercommunication, for out of the latter comes the development of a common sentiment and a common intel-

¹ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 199, 200.

ligence. In modern life our special methods of communication are the human voice and such mechanical contrivances as the post, the telephone, and the telegraph. An adjunct to these is the newspaper, and, in general, the printing press. By means of these methods of communication millions of people may have the same knowledge, think the same thoughts, and perform the same deeds at the same time. There is nothing more powerful in binding a community together into one social body than this common knowledge and common thought brought about by rapid communication.

Communication always leads to the exchange of commodities, and the use of the same articles has a tendency to develop homogeneity of social life. Moreover, the practice of trading has a tendency to develop unity of sentiment among groups. Savage tribes always express social good feeling to other tribes or to foreigners by the exchange of articles of value. These may be mere trinkets or shells, bits of cloth, or weapons, but they establish good feeling between those who exchange the gifts. Wherever nations or tribes will not exchange commodities, there is little opportunity for social unity.

When tribes have reached the stage of development where communication is possible and desirable, they are ready to adopt the customs and habits of one another through imitation. This is done more or less unconsciously at first, then a later stage is reached when it is recognized as advantageous to adopt foreign customs. When once people adopt the same social custom, they become more alike from day to day, not only in their personal habits, but also in their larger social life.

Association. — While the term "association" might in general apply to all acts of socialization, still there is a particular use to which it properly belongs. People may be collected in a body and communicate with one another without having community of residence, but permanent association can scarcely take place without it. Community of residence leads to an association in which persons regard each other as permanent members, having acquired many social relationships as a result of habitual companionship. Among settled forms of association that of family relationship should be mentioned first. Here we have represented intimate relationship in thought, sentiment, and feeling, as well as practical coöperation in all

forms of social life. This could not come about without more or less permanent association. This idea is exemplified in the fact that people closely related by blood or marriage frequently lose their interest in one another after years of separation, while perhaps their next-door neighbors may be taken into a close social relation because of their proximity. We have many evidences to show that the love and affection exhibited in the family life depend largely upon close association in the home.

Common religious belief, a great force in the establishment of social order and in the establishment of unity of thought and feeling, springs up through association. As religion is a social rather than a personal matter, it is doubtful whether any religious system would prevail for any length of time without community of worship. For an example, it is observed that as soon as any group ceases to worship together, its religion declines. It is evident from this and other observations that religion is much more a social function than we are generally willing to admit. The church in which exists a common sentiment thrives, but it declines when its members begin to hold diverse religious beliefs.

Gathered together in a common territory and living in close association, people naturally played together. With the stimulus of social games the process of socialization went rapidly on. We have but recently come to have a proper appreciation of the social value of recreation. Not all peoples have had educational systems, but all have had games. The process of socialization — that process whereby the many are welded together into a unity — goes on most effectively in play. Games connected by mimicry with the most important vicissitudes of savage life stir the deepest emotions. Such games are usually imitations of the critical moments in chase or battle and as such call forth the liveliest emotional stimulation. They relieve and relax the nervous organism and at the same time lift people out of the dead monotony of their humdrum lives. In the stir and emotional tension of such critical moments in games men throw off the reserve which usually separates them from each other as if by a wall. Their association becomes more intimate for the time being; they understand each other better. They are released from their narrowed selves and

enjoy the expansion of personality which the emotional "spree" provided by the game affords. In the pleasure experienced during these games the basis of social coöperation is laid.¹

Not only association in active games, but association around the camp fire at night in the groupal settlement, did much to solidify the feelings of the group. Stories were told and songs were sung recounting the deeds of famous heroes and mighty warriors, and group actions were set forth in the lyric dance. Moreover, household and community meals did much to cultivate that common feeling and idealism which makes possible coöperation. Among every primitive people of which we have any evidence feast days were very numerous and played an important part in the formation of social unity. So ingrained in the very roots of the race is the habit of eating together and so effectively does it, even in our highly artificial society, conduce to the cultivation of sociability, that no great project is launched, no occasion for securing coöperation among men, who to begin with may not be agreed upon a program, is complete without a dinner or a luncheon or a banquet. With primitive men the feast counted even more in the development of a social mind.

Furthermore, in connection with games and feasting there was usually to be found another influence making for coöperation. Primitive man made such gatherings the occasion for breaking over the ordinarily accepted sex taboos which sexual jealousy had established. Wife lending and a promiscuity of sex relations prevailed at such times to a degree which was not tolerated at other times. This liberality, while abhorrent to our sense of the proprieties, was in the nature of a social release from the rigidity of established custom for the individuals and at the same time cultivated friendliness between those of the same sex who otherwise might not have been brought into social relations with each other. Moreover, as Giddings has pointed out, genetic relationships in consequence of these irregularities became complicated.² This at a time when blood relationships counted much in social relations made for social coöperation.

¹ See Gillin, "The Sociology of Recreation," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1914, Vol. XIX, pp. 825-834. Patrick, "The Philosophy of Recreation," *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1914.

² *Principles of Sociology*, p. 261.

Coöperation. — This must have begun very soon after people began to assemble into groups. Unconsciously they acquired the habit of working together in procuring food and shelter. After social order was well established in the community, each individual seeking his own immediate interest was, in a measure, ministering to the welfare of all. It must have been very early in the development of group life, perhaps even before man had developed from the animal precursor, that individuals united in the hunt. Bands of animals like wolves hunt in packs. Even pelicans have been observed to fish in bands, some of them stationing themselves at riffles in the river, while others form a segment of a circle and drive the fish towards the riffles.¹ It seems certain that prehistoric man assisted the members of his group in capturing the larger animals upon which he lived. The bones of extinct species of animals were found near the bones of the prehistoric man recently exhumed in France; and it is more than probable that the cave dwellers of this period worked together to capture such animals as wild horses, cave bears, and mammoths.

Moreover, in the offense and defense of war primitive men found it necessary to work together. The strife which prevailed so universally in the age of conflict made it necessary for an individual to attach himself to a group and join with his fellows in defense, or perish. Community of interests in war essentially led to coöperation in other affairs. When the division of labor first appeared it was between the sexes, the women doing certain things and the men following different pursuits. Thus the immediate care of children, the care of the home, the preparation of the food, the making of the clothing, and frequently the building of the home fell to the lot of woman. On the other hand, men did most of the hunting, fishing, and fighting. But as industries became diversified, as new pursuits sprang up, there gradually appeared a more general division of labor. Some killed the game, and still others cooked it. Some carried water, some brought the timbers for the building of the home, while others completed the structure. Then came new occupations, such as the keeping of flocks and herds, and later, agricultural pursuits which caused people to divide into groups. These separate groups were all worked for the

¹ Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid; A Factor in Evolution*, p. 23.

common good of the community. Our modern economic life, so complex and so universally organized, is but a result of the simple, unconscious coöperation of individuals in a community. There came a time, however, in primitive development, when groups were organized for a specific purpose, such as the building of highways, the carrying on of commerce, the making of tools and weapons, and there is some evidence that there were sometimes guilds of citizens, such as arrowhead makers. Many of these methods find full expression in modern coöperation.

Combination. — Naturally, growing out of these coöperative activities combinations of groups developed in some cases. While conflicts sometimes arose in the occasional meetings mentioned above, on the whole the social feeling developed was such that normally there grew up closer relations and ultimately a combination of the two or more groups concerned. Sometimes a combination of different groups, which had come into contact in friendly relations, was made permanent by an exchange of women begun in the festivities referred to above. Often an eponymous ancestor was invented to account for the fact of union.¹ The groups arising under such conditions coalesced into a group both larger and more closely organized. It is probable that in the earliest times before conflict was produced by pressure upon food supplies, many such simple groupings arose out of the sheer social enjoyment as well as the greater social protection afforded by large numbers.

The more important combinations, from the standpoint of social evolution, however, developed in quite another way. Such groups were the result of conflict. Whenever multiplication of the number of the population once reached the point where there was a pressure upon the food supplies, then migration had to begin either amicably or by force. Such numbers necessitated the conquest of other food supplies, the enslavement of the conquered and their subsequent amalgamation by degrees with the conquerors. This amalgamation commenced in the taking of the women of the conquered as wives

¹ As in the case of the two Hebrew groups, possibly clans, as Barton thinks, which later became the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh, the reputed descendants of the two sons of Joseph. Joshua 16, 17. See Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, p. 271; Gunkel, *Legends of Genesis*, pp. 18-23.

and concubines of the conquerors and the production of a class of half-breeds, who later became, first, slaves, then trusted inferiors, and then were admitted to all the privileges, forming thus a new race.¹ In this way all the great historic peoples were formed. A part of this great process is revealed to us when the curtain of history rises. It has been continuing ever since. There is no reason to suppose that it had not been going on for a long period anterior to the time when written records were made. In fact, all the ethnological and anthropological evidence we have points to such a process long continued before the historic races were formed. So intermixed had become the various peoples at the dawn of history that it is now almost impossible to say what the human race, or races, were like which developed in the original home, or homes, of the race.²

Very much later in the development of social order came the combination of different groups by agreement for the establishment of government. For government, being a form of social order, is also a method of coöperation. It is easy to see that this combination must have been an implied or real contract for the protection of the whole group, for, through the process of integration, when distinct groups became united for either particular or general purposes, there must have been a tacit or formal agreement between them.

Organization. — Out of even the natural combination of groups on the basis of blood kinship and social sympathy there developed organization. An example may be seen in the organization of the tribes of the interior of Australia.³ After conquest had taken place organization proceeded very rapidly. Organization must begin at once in order to determine the relations of the two groups, the conquerors and the conquered, and fix the status of each for the advantage of the former. This occurred piecemeal and rather slowly at first. However, gradually the organization was perfected, the adjustments went on in both legal and in customary relations, until finally

¹ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 202, 203. Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 272, 273; *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 473-480.

² Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 230-239.

³ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, and *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*. Each of these works shows how complex may become the organization of groups which probably are not the result of migration and conquest, but of friendly contact.

there developed a complete social machinery for the regulation of the two groups. Sovereignty and obedience were established, formal institutions appeared and customs and ideals were modified to meet the changes consequent upon the amalgamation of the two peoples, until, if the process worked out to its logical social conclusion, democracy developed. Together with these more formal expressions of organization there went on at the same time the development of private voluntary organizations within each group, and that more subtle, but none the less real, organization of relationships, in the sense in which Cooley uses the term, which expresses itself in customs and social relationships in the more general sense of the term. In more recent periods, as government has grown into a system, organization has found its largest field in industry. In this field large bodies of men have combined to accomplish certain economic results. To a degree these developments have made socialization possible, for they have united large groups of people into a common economic life. Nevertheless, one must not shut his eyes to the fact that the modern system of industry which combines labor and capital in the productive process has also made for the formation of classes which are to a degree antagonistic to each other. The industrial conflicts which are a feature of our day are not without significance for social development. They also teach the members of each group organization of government and thus make them more efficient. That modern industry has solidified each of the various economic classes, the capitalists, the landowners, the entrepreneurs, and the laborers, once scattered and not conscious of their common interests and of the value of their united coöperation, is undeniable.

While organization was inevitable, brought about by all the processes enumerated above, its development also owed much to leaders. As soon as society divided itself into two groups, those who led and those who followed, or, as it might be more formally stated, those who governed and those who were governed, it had gone a long way toward permanent organization. The status of the individual in the home was determined, and also the relation of the slave to the master was recognized. Likewise, the social position of those supposed to be nobly born was firmly established. The development of leadership, which appeared in most striking manner in tribal and civil

feudalism, gave a decided spur to what Mallock has called "the struggle for domination," and greatly hastened the growth of organization. Consider what motives leadership, based upon ability, enforcing the domination of others, brought to bear upon human endeavor — not only the motive of aristocratic prestige, but hope of the more substantial rewards of primitive wealth, ease, and sensuous enjoyment. These motives aroused with tenfold greater power the desire to emulate and surpass in achievement. They gave a decided impetus to the inventive spirit of man, to his capacity for organization, and to the modern spirit of cunning that reaps where others have sown. They gave direction to the latent energies of large numbers of men. They secured a development of the division of human labor and made each man more efficient in his social relationships. Men who were not spurred by them were forced to labor under the stern whip, not of natural need, but of fear of a directing mind. While this autocratic organization and direction had its dark side, it was a beneficent phase in the development of social coöperation, appearing dark only because it has so often survived into an age when it has ceased to be consonant with developed democracy. Out of it has grown the more humane and democratized organization of our day, and it will end in the more complete democracy of which the best minds of the present dream.

Differentiation. — In the processes which we have described no mention has been made of a phenomenon which often appears in modern societies as they grow from inchoate groups into a real community. Side by side with the development of social unity there is generally seen the growth of groups closely united in opposition to some important individual or another group. In the mixing of ideas and ideals in a new aggregation of people there is bound to be some clashing. Sometimes in the early days of a community this strife of groups within the neighborhood is so sharp that the development of a community spirit is very difficult and may be long delayed. Sometimes it takes a considerable lapse of time to heal the wounds made by such quarrels. Examples are to be seen in frontier and mountainous communities where communication is interrupted and association is difficult. It appears, also, however, in communities sometimes by reason of close contact. People who might be

on fairly friendly terms together if they were not brought into close association will on closer contact reveal essential differences. This serves the useful purpose of diversification of the mental and social ideals of their community. Before the end is reached in the process thus started there will be compromise and the amalgamation of the two ideals. Out of the conflict will come toleration and a new ideal with a broader outlook than would have been possible otherwise.

Moreover, in older communities there is constantly going on a process of differentiation growing up out of the fact that some people in that community go out of it and come back with new ideas. The young people go away to school, or to the neighboring city to business, sometimes to return with a stock of new ideas which start the process of social leavening of the community ideals. The same thing occurs when men go off to war. They return with new ideas and a new outlook. Again, it occurs when from any community there is an exodus to a new mining field or a new agricultural community, and for some reason the emigrants return to the home community. If the returning members of the community are aggressive, the old process of debate, the ranging of people on different sides, and the old conflict of ideas takes place all over again, but on a different plane.

Now out of this social differentiation which occurs constantly in all dynamic societies, there results social selection. Some tire of the conflict and move away. Some, because of it, are ready to listen to the call of opportunity elsewhere. The struggle for more culture or wealth leads them to choose permanently some other field for their endeavors. In their places others from elsewhere come into the old community. In the end a social ideal becomes established in the customs of the place; traditions are set forth as the criterion of conduct and opinion. Old age upholds old customs. Established wealth secures a large following. The result is that unless the newcomer and the iconoclast is very well entrenched in social prestige, or wealth, or unless he is unusually persistent, what is established will remain undisturbed and he will go where his talent finds more congenial fields of endeavor. Nevertheless, the mingling of new ideas with old by reason of the change in the population is bound to continue in all places where ingress

and egress is easy and where the economic opportunity is inviting.¹ In this way variety is added to the stock of ideas and ideals of a community, culture becomes broader, the spirit of the community more tolerant, and personalities with the widest social interests are developed.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What difference is there between the motives inducing people to congregate together in the formation of hordes and those which induce people to gather into large groups to-day in our cities and in new countries?
2. Work out the development of the processes of socialization of people gathered together into a new community, by showing how one by one the ties which knit the various families together into a social unity came into being.
3. Show what definite results, if any, in the development of social unity in some community of which you know followed the introduction of the telephone; the interurban; the organization of a literary society in the neighborhood schoolhouse or church; the organization of a farmers' club.
4. Select some rural neighborhood and trace the marriages of people in that community for two or three generations in order to see how interrelated the families of the neighborhood tend to become.
5. Select some community and describe the various organizations which have developed in that place. Show which are general and which are for only a certain selected group.
6. Tabulate the various forms of coöperation which may be found in some neighborhood with which you are acquainted, or may become acquainted.
7. Show how in the process of socialization there develop hostilities and small groups and cliques in a neighborhood. What social purpose do these serve?

¹ Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 67, 104-122.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL FORCES

PHYSICAL science has accustomed us to look for the causes of phenomena in forces. It has taught us that wherever there are effects of any kind in the physical world there must be forces producing them. The discovery of physical forces so simplified the difficulties of understanding the physical universe that we naturally ask in the presence of social phenomena, What forces have produced these results? Accepting the term "forces" as a helpful analogy, but recognizing that when used with reference to social phenomena it is but an analogy, we may designate the causes of social phenomena as "social forces." By this term we mean strictly speaking the forces which influence individuals in their social relations. While strictly interpreted, the term should be applied only to those psychical products called desires, which influence men in their relations one with another.¹ It is worth while to consider those influences also arising outside of man and society which modify social action. These forces which condition social processes should be clearly differentiated from the social forces. Baldwin has called these external factors "the socionomic forces," including in the meaning of this term, however, not only the influence of the physical environment, but also the influence of other groups.² With this understanding of the nature of these environing conditions we may properly discuss them here.

Classification of Social Forces. — Various classifications of social forces have been proposed. Below is a parallel conspectus of a number of such classifications.

¹ Ward first called attention to the important place desire holds in social motivation and it is he who first worked the matter out carefully. Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 33, 34, 103-110; cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. VII.

² Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 1913, pp. 484-491.

<i>Small</i> ¹	<i>Ratzenhofer</i> ²	<i>Ward</i> ³
Health.	I. Primitive Interests :	Physical, — (function bodily)
Wealth.	Race interests (re-	Ontogenetic Forces, —
Sociability.	production).	Positive, attractive (seek-
Knowledge.	Physiological (hun-	ing pleasure).
Beauty.	ger, etc.).	Negative, protective
Rightness.	II. Following rise of	(avoiding pain).
	Consciousness :	Phylogenetic Forces, —
	Egotic interests	Direct, sexual ; Indirect,
	(self-regarding).	consanguineal.
	Social interests	Social, — (function psychic)
	(other-regarding).	Sociogenetic Forces, —
	III. Following awaken-	Moral (seeking the safe
	ing of feeling of	and good).
	dependence :	Æsthetic (seeking the
	Transcendental in-	beautiful).
	terests (religion	Intellectual (seeking the
	and philosophy).	useful and true).

*Stuckenberg*⁴*Ross*⁵

I. Fundamental.	I. Desires, the primary forces —
1. The economic.	Natural Desires :
2. The political.	(a) <i>Appetitive</i> . Hunger, thirst, and
II. Constitutional.	sex appetite.
3. The egotic.	(b) <i>Hedonic</i> . Fear, aversion to pain,
4. The appetitive.	love of warmth, ease, and sen-
5. The affectional.	suous pleasure.
6. The recreative.	(c) <i>Egotic</i> . These are demands of the
III. Cultural.	<i>self</i> rather than of the <i>organ-</i>
7. The æsthetic.	<i>ism</i> , — shame, vanity, pride,
8. The ethical.	envy, love of liberty, of power,
9. The religious.	and of glory. Ambition, the
10. The intellectual.	type of these.
	(d) <i>Affective</i> . Desires terminating on
	others, — sympathy, sociability,
	love, hate, spite, jealousy, anger,
	revenge.

¹ Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, pp. 174-177; Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 443-467; *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, pp. 177-199.

² *Sociologische Erkenntniss*, pp. 54-66.

³ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, p. 261.

⁴ Stuckenberg, *Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 207.

⁵ Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 169.

Ross

(e) *Recreative*. Play impulses, love of self-expression.

Cultural Desires :

(f) *Religious*. Yearning for ecstasy.

(g) *Ethical*. Love of fair play, sense of justice.

(h) *Æsthetic*. Desire for the pleasures of perception, — enjoyment of the beautiful.

(i) *Intellectual*. Curiosity, love of knowing, of learning, and of imparting.

II. Interests, those complexes of desire “which shape society and make history”: —

(a) Economic interests.

(b) Political interests.

(c) Religious interests.

(d) Intellectual interests.

An incisive criticism of certain of these schemes has been made by Professor Ross. He objects to Professor Small's classification on the ground that it classes together demands which are specific and not logically included under the categories given, and cites in support of that criticism hunger and love, which are not a desire for health. He also objects that desire for wealth is secondary to desire for the things money will buy, and that under sociability are grouped such different desires as the affective craving for companionship and the egotic desire for appreciation.

Ratzenhofer's classification of the forces which impel living beings is comprehensive, but Ross criticizes this classification of the desires operative in human societies, since it is not satisfactory to group impulses solely with reference to their concrete objects, such as species, organism, self, society, and the cosmos.

Ross pronounces Ward's the best for philosophic purposes, but prefers one based more immediately upon the nature of the desires than upon the functions which they prompt.

Stuckenberg's classification would be satisfactory if the so-called “fundamental” forces were omitted. Ross says that it

is an error to call the desire for wealth one of the original social forces, urging similar objection to it here as in the case of Small's classification. Moreover, Ross objects to political interests being classified as fundamental, inasmuch as the state appeals to no one group of desires. In fact the desires that later cause political activities manifest themselves first in other ways; almost every group of social forces seeks expression through the state only after it has already come to be used for cultural purposes. Ross prefers to arrange the springs of action in two planes, desires and interests. He relegates the study of natural wants to anthropology, reserving to sociology only the cultural wants in connection with association and the presence of culture.

Professor Ellwood in his recent work has treated the subject of the classification of the social forces. His classification briefly presented is as follows:¹

- I. *The physical factors*: passive factors operating over long periods and only indirectly:
- (a) Geographic environment, — climate, topography, water-courses, rainfall, fauna, flora, etc.
 - (b) Biological factors, — selection, variation, heredity, etc.
- II. *The psychical factors*: active factors operating directly and at once:
- | | | | |
|----------------|------------------------|---|------------------------|
| (a) Impulses. | (a) Primary forces — | { | 1. Original. |
| (b) Feelings. | impulses. | | 2. Acquired. |
| (c) Beliefs. | (b) Secondary forces — | { | 1. Pleasant. |
| (d) Interests. | | | 2. Unpleasant. |
| (e) Desires. | | | feelings. |
| | | | 4. Attached to habits. |

Ellwood properly points out that the physical factors must be included in any comprehensive list of the forces which influence society. These forces have an influence on society in the long run. While they act only indirectly upon the impulses, desires, feelings, and beliefs of the individual, which are the active social forces, nevertheless, in the long run they are of considerable influence on the type. While Ellwood does not include a dis-

¹ Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. XII.

cussion of these factors in his book, he omits them simply because he is dealing only with the psychological aspects of the subject.¹

In a text of this character, we shall include the physical factors in the belief that the student should have as comprehensive a conception of the various forces which influence the formation and development of society as possible. The task is to set forth clearly the various influences which affect social life. The difficulty is to get a classification which at once takes into account the subjective forces driving the individual to social action, and which at the same time makes room for a clear exposition of the functions they perform in society. With the practical purpose in view of making clear to the student the forces that coöperate in the building of society and with a keen appreciation of its many shortcomings, we venture to submit a classification which owes much to those which have preceded it.

I. *External Conditions of the Physical Environment² affecting man's impulses, feelings, thoughts, and actions.*

- (a) Climate.
- (b) Soil.
- (c) Physical configuration, — mountains, valleys, watercourses, etc.
- (d) Water supply.
- (e) Flora.
- (f) Fauna.

II. *External Social Factors affecting man as a social being.*

- (a) Presence or absence of other groups.
- (b) Attitude of other groups, — hostility or friendliness.

¹ Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 280. The quarrel as to whether the physical conditions are social forces arises chiefly from the loose use of the word "social." Those who oppose the inclusion of physical conditions in the category of social forces use the term with reference to the way in which those forces originate. By "social forces" they mean forces which are social in their origin. The others mean those forces, whatever their origin, which are socializing in their effects, forces which produce social results; in other words, socializing forces. The term is used in the latter sense in this text. The following scheme takes into consideration, however, that some socializing forces are social in their origin, while others are physical and still others biological.

² Semple, *Influence of Geographic Conditions, passim*. See also Gen. 26: 12-22.

III. Forces in Man's Psychical Nature.

INSTINCTIVE IN ORIGIN	}	(a) <i>Appetitive</i> , — hunger, thirst, and sex appetite.
		(b) <i>Hedonic</i> , — fear, aversion to pain, love of warmth, ease, and sensuous pleasure.
INSTINCTIVE — SOCIAL IN ORIGIN		(c) <i>Egotic</i> , — ambition, shame, envy, pride, vanity, love of liberty, of power, and of glory.
		(d) <i>Affective</i> , — sympathy, sociability, love, hate, spite, jealousy, anger, revenge.
		(e) <i>Recreative</i> , — play impulses, desire for self-expression.
INSTINCTIVE — CULTURAL IN ORIGIN		(f) <i>Religious</i> , — desire for relationship with the Unknown either through ecstasy or through relations of patronage and submission.
		(g) <i>Ethical</i> , — love of fair play, sense of justice.
		(h) <i>Æsthetic</i> , — desire for enjoyment of the pleasures of perception, or the beautiful.
		(i) <i>Intellectual</i> , — curiosity, love of knowing, learning, and teaching.

IV. *Interests growing out of combinations of human desires in large part socially conditioned and directed towards the objects presented by physical stimuli and the external social factors.*

- (a) The wealth interests, — directed towards securing wealth.
- (b) The political interests, — looking towards protection in the exercise of complete, individual self-expression.
- (c) The religious interests, — looking toward alliance with the Unknown for release, protection, or advantage.
- (d) The intellectual interests, — yearnings for diversified experience, for interpretation of the mysterious, release from fear and control through understanding.
- (e) The welfare interests, — centering on measures intended to conserve the group and contribute to its welfare.¹

Natural Conditions that Influence Society. — In an earlier chapter of this book, certain physical conditions which affect society have been treated at length, and in the previous chapter, those which condition the formation of social aggregates

¹ This classification is built upon that of Ross, with the addition of certain factors which he does not place in independent classes, preferring to include them in certain of his wider categories. For example under III the religious desire is not so simple as he would indicate. This necessitates a change in the content of the religious interests. Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 169-181.

have been mentioned. The factors dealt with before were water, food, topographical features, and climate.¹

In addition to water, food, and climate, the natural resources of the earth, such as forests, mines, water power, and means of transportation, have been important influences in causing people to settle on a certain territory. Consequently these resources have been instrumental in the development of social order. Upon the whole, the direction taken by the social life, the forms of industry, and to some extent the nature of the social bonds and even the forms of thought are conditioned by the physical surroundings. Again, the physical influences on life and character in the creation of like temperaments and the inspiration of the same desires have made people alike and caused them to go in the same way, and thus have established social order. Racial characteristics, while dependent entirely upon this group of causes, have been developed largely by differences of environment. The ancient Greek owed something of his character to the climatic conditions of the little peninsula on which he lived. The small fertile valleys, the soft air, influenced by proximity to the sea, the sunny skies, together with the semitropical vegetation, lent a charm to his life and influenced his character. Likewise, the valley of the Nile, where the river overflows the desert, made Egypt and largely determined the Egyptian character as well. The Sphinx and the Pyramids could not have existed in Greece, Italy, or Switzerland. India, with its lofty mountains, extensive plains, great rivers, fearful storms, and terrible droughts which parched the vegetation, causing famines and pestilences, has had a vast influence on the character and the mind of the native. It was a land of fear and "a land of regrets." Indian philosophy, literature, and the Indian gods, creations of the mind of this people, depended largely for their character on physical environment.² So it might be shown that the freedom-loving Swiss owes something to his mountain home, that the Scotch character is influenced by the climate, and that even the American character as well owes much to sunshine and ozone, to mountain and

¹ See Part II, Chap. II, and Part III, Chap. I.

² See Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, p. 29; George Adam Smith, *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 29, and Chaps. II, III; Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia*, pp. 106-132; Mill, *International Geography*, Chaps. VIII and IX; Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 405-424.

plain, and the diversified resources of the nation. The result of this influence is that people subjected to the same physical environment to a degree tend to become similar in type of mind and character, to develop similar reactions to stimuli and to develop similar ideas and institutions.

The Influence of the Social Environment.— Even more important in conditioning the development of society are the other social groups with which an aggregate of people come into contact. If the contact is not hostile in its nature, there is interchange of goods, ideas, and customs, pleasurable communication and imitation of one by the other. In most cases, however, contact with another group has meant conflict. Therefore, hostile groups have much the same effect as the unfriendly desert or wilderness and hostile beasts, except that greater intellectual efforts are excited in the attempt to outwit them. The presence of an enemy demands close organization on the part of the group, submission to the war-leader, and gives rise to the beginnings of government and division of labor. Moreover, hostility often begets reaction against the ideas, customs, and institutions of the enemy, except such of them as appear to be really necessary to survival. The latter are borrowed — but usually are made to appear as an invention. The presence of other groups determine in what directions the group shall develop, where it shall settle, and to a degree the forms of its industry, and its ideals of a social personality. The gods of the enemy are said to be demons, their ethics perverse, their culture barbaric, and their social customs degrading. All opposition affects the direction which the social forces shall take and to a degree the ways in which they shall express themselves.

Individual Desires Instinctive in Origin.— Those social forces that arise from individual desires operating in social relations are considered by some to be the real social forces, — forces originating in the social organism, as well as operating upon it.¹

(a) *Appetitive Desires.*— Primary among these in order of action are the desire to satisfy *hunger*. The attempt to satisfy hunger caused people to work together in obtaining food. This simple act has had tremendous results in the development of social and economic life. So important is this that were it not

¹ They are a part of what Ross calls the "natural" desires, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 169.

for the impelling force of hunger, one half of the industries would suddenly disappear.

(b) *Hedonic Desires*. — Not less fundamental than the desire to appease hunger is the *sexual appetite*. This is a true animal instinct, universal in all, and powerful in its influence in the development of social order. Although primarily an animal instinct, it gives rise to all the love sentiments and the refined sexual relationships which lie at the foundation of the home. Only a physical passion in its primary consideration, it may become a generalized sentiment stimulating the whole emotional life of man.

The sexual appetite is the method of nature for the perpetuation of the species, but the reproductive forces resulting therefrom become varied and widely differentiated from the original purpose. While the home is primarily for the production and rearing of children, it has given rise to the family, and has formed the basis of the gens and the historical foundation of states. The sociological importance of children extends beyond the mere idea of perpetuating the race. They form the center of social activity and cause intense effort in their rearing and culture. Nor does this influence decline in the progress of civilization, but grows greater, generation after generation, until to-day the child stands at the center of civilization. For him we work and save, we sacrifice and struggle, that he may be better developed than his ancestors and that he may have opportunities equal to his abilities. The ideal society is always in the future, and men spend their lives largely for future generations. It is this careful preparation for those who follow that causes much of the increasing industrial activity of each succeeding generation.

Moreover, the effect of the love sentiment on the individual — the love of husband and wife, of father and mother, of family and home — is great, making man a new creature of sympathy and coöperation. The social life improves just to the extent that the love sentiment extends beyond mere physical passion and becomes diffused through the entire being as a psychical activity as well as a physical passion.¹

There is also a deep significance in the gradual changing of the characteristics of individuals through the operation of sexual

¹ Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 157, 179, 180.

selection. The differentiation of races has been strongly influenced by this change and the social as well as the physical characteristics probably have been varied by the force of selective mating. After conflict had made the warrior the admired man, the women, so far as they exercised a choice, selected as a mate the man who was most warlike, or the most battle scarred. In times of peace other ideals of virility came to dominate, and the women selected mates more or less according to these newer ideals. Thus, with the passing of war as an occupation and the coming of industry and the arts of peace the fathers of the families were chosen in accordance with peaceful, industrious, and home-loving characteristics. Thus was laid the biological basis whereby the love forces expanded beyond the family and extended to the larger social world. The parental love which is the source of sympathy for others extends at first to the kindred and establishes a unity of the group. When the family expands into the tribe, while there is primarily a unity arising through the demands of protection, the love of kindred still dominates and expands until it becomes a patriotic sentiment for the race. When the tribe has a permanent location, this sentiment extends to the land. So that the love of family, of home, of tribe and people, and of the land of birth makes the universal sentiment of patriotism. While this restraint never dies out in normal national life, it frequently is transformed into humanitarianism extending to all members of the human race regardless of geographic and national boundaries.

Next to this in importance among the hedonic desires is the avoidance of pain, fear of enemies, love of warmth, ease, and sensuous pleasure. These desires lead men to build homes, devise shelter in cave and tree and house, to make clothing, and to coöperate together for purposes of defense against a common enemy. The desire for shelter and for protection of the body has been very strong in the development of social unity. It has caused the introduction of artificial heat, with all of its mechanical devices; by the demand for fuel it created the great industry of coal mining. It has grouped people together under the same roof, necessitating social order, resulting in an increased sociability on the one hand, and on the other it has separated them into households and made the household the unit of early social groups. The social activities of the home led to the

establishment of the rights of property, and a development of the family life with the consequent great growth of social tradition, example, and suggestion. Its influence is observed in the development of language, in the creation of special communication, and in the beginnings of economic and social life. It has been far-reaching in its direct consequences, for the attempt to secure protection from cold has led to the development of architecture and home decorations. In coöperating against a common enemy man learned to widen his sympathies and to work with fellow man.

Individual Desires: Instinctive-Social in Origin. — (c) *The egotic desires* are directed towards the satisfaction of self-centered interests also, but in contrast with the appetitive and hedonic desires, the egotic draw their intensity from their social value. In a world where there was no one else but a lone individual, a Crusoe, these desires would never arise. They have their origin in the emulation, ambition, envy, pride, vanity, love of liberty, of power, and of glory, which are possible only in the presence of others. We prize certain things only because they give us distinction in comparison with the possessions of others. Much of the value of clothing comes from the feeling of superiority to others which its possession confers. Clothing of the body originated in the desire for ornament, but this soon came to be supplemented by the wish to protect the person against cold, storm, or heat. Later the need of clothing was felt through the sense of modesty, arising from conformity to what had become conventional and to which had been attached a sex taboo. To-day, while the idea of protecting the body from the influence of climate is primary in importance, much more attention and time are devoted to the artistic effect of clothing and to ornamentation than to the utilitarian results. While a coarse garment costing but a few dollars would sufficiently protect the wearer against wind and storm, there is worn in the place of it an artistic gown which costs hundreds of dollars. While the extent of ornamentation is somewhat dependent upon economic and social station, some of the poorer classes of humanity wearing the simplest garments, the richer people only dressing in silks, satins, and laces and wearing costly jewels, yet, to a certain degree, the ornamental motive still survives everywhere. The savage began by scarifying, tattooing,

or painting the body. Then he inserted various articles, such as coarse ornaments of shells, bones, or stones into various parts of his person — his nose, his lips, or his ears. The first garments woven from leaves or the bark of trees were inartistic; later these were colored with some degree of artistic effect, or cut in fanciful shapes. No matter how poor people may be to-day, the desire for adornment is very strong, and they will frequently spend much more time on the trimmings and decorations of the garment than on the original cost of the garment itself. A man may wear a thirty-dollar suit of clothes, but a hundred-dollar diamond ring.

(d) *Affective Desires.* — The affective desires, rooted partly in the same soil of craving for social superiority as the egotic, differ from the latter in that they terminate upon others, instead of upon one's self. They include sympathy, sociability, love, hate, spite, jealousy, anger, and revenge. Primarily the desire for sociability is a causal force in society building. There is an individual satisfaction, a pleasure in mere association. Whatever dispute there may be concerning the social qualities of man, it must be assumed that he has always had a desire for companionship, and while the desire for association may have been comparatively weak in primitive society, it has always existed and it increases with the development of civilization. The desire for sociability has led man to seek after pleasure and to strive for position in order to reach a desired standard of social life. This striving has had great influence in the arrangement of people in groups.

Originally growing out of sympathy, the craving for companionship develops a number of derivative desires. On the one hand the cravings for love, esteem, and the approval of sympathetic souls, and on the other the desire to vent upon despicable or hostile individuals a feeling of spite, jealousy, anger, hate, and revenge grows out of the craving for sympathy from one's fellows. As the desire for sociability develops association and coöperation, so the wish to vent the feelings of anger, spite, etc., upon others leads to the formation of classes, and to social differentiation, which lends variety to social groups and stimulates the making of devices for social control and coöperation, and thus tends in the end to promote conscious socialization. Out of the desire for sociability develops a special phase of it,

viz., the desire for the approval of our fellows, — what Giddings calls “desire for recognition.”¹

While it is difficult to estimate to what extent the desire for the approval of our fellows influences our lives, we know that it is one of the strongest motives of human action. Take away the recognition of our actions by our fellow men from our life, and it is reduced to a dull monotony without charm or object of existence. Granting, even, that man does all things because he desires to do them or because he thinks they are right and ought to be done, yet we shall find a source of this desire and of this “ought” in the approval or disapproval of others. How this is exemplified in every simple act of life! One scarcely buys a garment or toils at any occupation, or pursues any course of life without thinking how others will look upon it. Perhaps this influence is most strikingly observed in the choice of companions and associates. A man seeks the companionship of those who approve his conduct rather than those who disapprove it. Or, having chosen associates whose life and character he admires and who satisfy his desire for companionship, he will seek to do that which is approved by them.

In the choice of a course of life or profession, social approval or disapproval is also important. The struggle for wealth is greatly modified by the approbation of our fellows. Men follow literary pursuits because they wish to meet with the approval of the community. A striving after political preferment is often to be explained by the fact that man desires to be before the public eye and receive the admiration and plaudits of the state or nation. It is true that this desire is more powerful in some people than in others, but for that very reason it has its strong influence in determining the life course of the individual and in segregating people into groups. There is no greater evidence that man has a social nature and that he is a social being in sympathy with his social life and surroundings than the fact that he borrows ideals from others and allows his own ideals to be modified by those current in his group.

(e) *Recreative Desires.* — The play impulse occupies a larger place in the list of social forces than we have been accustomed to admit. The desire roots itself physically in the pleasure

¹ Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 98.

derived from the stimulation of unused muscles and nerves; biologically in the fact that multiplication of activities gives a larger number of trials at adaptation to the conditions of the environment, thus improving the chances of survival; psychologically in the emotional response to all activities, whether they be old and familiar in the experience of the race, and hence restful to the organism, or novel, providing intenser reaction by reason of diversity of satisfaction and rest from the weariness induced by the habitual overwork of other muscles and nerves. The factor, however, which gives the desire to play its greatest scope and intensity is that play is not solitary, but social. Consider the play of a Crusoe, — how limited would be its diversity, how dwarfed the emotional returns to the player! As a matter of fact, play has developed in groups. Only in groups does it get its compelling and socially useful intensity. The presence of the other players greatly stimulates the activity and increases the pleasure experienced. Add to that the presence of the spectators and the stress of the emotional tension induced by the desire for their approval and fear of their disapproval. Complete the machinery for the stimulation of nervous effort with rhythmic yells and calls, the pulsations of stirring music, the massing of banners with shibboleths concentrating the hopes and fears of a whole community, and you have an emotional result to which no individual effort could possibly approach. A person may have an alcoholic "spree" all by himself, but an emotional "spree" such as can be experienced at a football game or a boat race requires a crowd.¹

Who that has ever played or witnessed games can doubt that the recreative desires have a specific and powerful socializing effect? Releasing the pent-up emotions and the stress and strain of vocational effort, breaking up the monotony of life incident to close confinement to a task, and stimulating the age-long impulses to active physical or mental activity, play opens up the fountains of human nature and gives opportunity to the passion for self-expression in pleasant contact with one's fellows in the delightful land of make-believe, where the actual failures

¹ See Professor G. T. W. Patrick, "The Psychology of Football," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XIV, pp. 114-117; "The Psychology of Relaxation," *Popular Science Monthly*, June, 1914. Gillin, "The Sociology of Recreation," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX, No. 6, May, 1914.

of life are forgotten in the successes of the game, and where all things become possible. Moreover, with the stimulation of the emotions it makes possible relationships which, under different circumstances, could not be formed. It provides that fellowship which builds attachments bridging over into the serious business of life, and which lies at the basis of democracy. It breaks down the reserve by which we shut ourselves off from each other for self-defense in the ordinary business relationships of life. By stirring the emotions it lifts us over national boundaries and levels for us race prejudices. From primitive times down to the present play has developed sociability and paved the way for understandings and covenants. It breaks down "the middle wall of partition" between the "Greek and Barbarian," Irish and German, Italian and American, as may be seen by a visit to any municipal playground in any of our large cities.

Moreover, labor apart from that which is necessary to secure the wherewithal to satisfy the simplest natural wants historically began in play. Says Bücher, "Labour among primitive peoples is something very ill-defined. The further we follow it back, the more closely it approaches in form and substance to *play*." He points out that the taming of animals by the primitive man begins with those which he keeps for his amusement. He says, further, "All regularly sustained activity finally takes on a rhythmic form and becomes fused with music and song in an indivisible whole." It is in play that technical skill is developed, according to this author. Even among the more highly developed primitive peoples when work and play begin to be differentiated from each other the dance still precedes or follows important pieces of work, like war, the hunt, and the harvest. He concludes, with these striking words, which show how even economic wants are based in developed society upon social functions, "But even our wants, considered from an economic point of view, exist only in very small part naturally; it is only in the matter of bodily nourishment that our consumption is a necessity of nature; all else is the product of civilization, the result of the free creative activity of the human mind."¹

Surviving among many peoples to this day are labor songs,

¹ Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, translated by Wickett. New York, 1912, pp. 27-29.

significant testimony to the part which rhythmic play has had in the development of industrious activity. In ancient times these labor songs alleviated the labor of the toiler. Aristophanes quotes one of these songs,¹ the song of a miller, thus:

“Grind, grind, my good mill, grind;
Pittacus turns a mill as we all find.
Grind, grind, my good mill, grind,
This miller-king, oh, he’s the man to my mind.”

It is said that negro laborers laying rails on a railroad in West Virginia chanted a song as they worked together in moving and placing the rails. Sven Hedin, the Asiatic traveler, says that the Thibetan boatman, as he rowed him across Lake Amchoktso, cried out “in time with the oars, ‘Shubasa, ys aferin, bismillah, ya barkadiallah’ — to cite only a few words of his inexhaustible repertoire.” He heard the workmen who stir the tea in the giant caldrons in the monastery at Shigatse, Tibet, singing a rhythmical song.² Kidd describes the Kaffirs at Cape Town, South Africa, seemingly a lazy lot, when called to their work of moving railway rails from one heap to another, thus: “The natives all advance in a well-dressed line to the first rail, and then begin to chant a droning tune. At a certain note in the song all twenty natives stoop down and take hold of the rail, chanting as they stoop. When this is done they continue the chant, and, at another note, all raise the rail with great merriment and fun. They then continue the chant, and, at another note, all raise their right feet, and when the chant comes to the next period they advance one step and laugh again. Continuing the chant, they lift their left leg this time, raise it high in the air, laugh, chant, and take a step forward. When they have moved the rail to the new position they chant till they come to a certain phrase or ‘Motif’ in their Wagnerian song, and with a yell and a volley of sound, drop the rail into its place, and then look at one another and laugh.”³

Individual Desires: Instinctive-Cultural in Origin. —
(f) *Religious Desires.* — Having in mind the sectarianism of

¹ Aristophanes, *Clouds* (Everyman’s Library), footnote, p. 168.

² *Trans-Himalaya*, Vol. I, p. 362; Vol. II, pp. 38, 115, 124, 126.

³ Kidd, *The Essential Kaffir*, p. 395. For the origin of the labor song, see Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 615-617.

the last four centuries one might think that religion is essentially a divisive factor. Like all the other desires of which mention has been made, the religious desires under certain circumstances inspire division and make for social differentiation. It must not be forgotten, however, that social differentiation is as important in the development of society as social unification. Nevertheless, on the whole the desires which find satisfaction in religion have played an important part in the development of social unity.

By the religious desires is meant the craving for intimate relationship with the Unknown either through ecstasy or by means of rites of propitiation and submission. These relations have for their end release from the limitations of human weakness and ignorance through the help of the Unknown.

The desires which give us the religious interests affect almost every phase of man's life, especially during the early stages of social development. At first religion provides a means of defense against the unknown and dreadful powers of the Universe. With the growth of groupal life religion becomes a means of group defense against its enemies. Then public worship develops. Bound up with man's economic interests through his endeavors to bring his god to his aid in wresting a subsistence from a grudging nature, religion instituted feasts and the rites of communion. As soon as children became an asset either to the group or to the individual, the god was looked to for defense against childlessness. Hence, the religious feasts became sexual orgies, continued long after the belief which gave rise to them was forgotten, and after a quickened ethical conscience had begun to condemn such practices.¹

Moreover, with the rise of ancestor worship, and the increased importance which that belief gave to sons, religion became a stay of the family and of the authority of the father, thus strengthening social control through another avenue, the family,² in addition to that through the group.

After ethics and religion had joined hands, the latter supplied new and powerful sanctions to conduct. On the other hand, ethics transformed religion from being the instrument whereby the gods were made to minister to the lust and greed of men

¹ Cf. 1 Sam. 1: 1-20 with Am. 2: 7, 8.

² See Part II, Chap. XII.

into an instrument of socialized personality. Not blessings in basket and store, but "clean hands and a pure heart" now became the subject of prayer. Finally in such men as Socrates, Amos, Jesus, and Paul, religion became a socializing influence which moved them to sacrifice themselves in the interest of the state, and of humanity. It still remains one of the most potent sources of inspiration for lofty deeds, for quiet endurance of hard conditions, and for tasks at once heroic and seemingly hopeless.

(g) *Ethical Desires.* — Growing out of group sanctions and developing in the individual through the "dialectic of personal growth," as already explained, the ethical desires remain an important factor in the building of society. From the standpoint of society the ethical desires, expressing themselves chiefly as a passion for justice and a curbing of the egoistic impulses, make for social solidarity and stability of social relationships. They supply those less sordid motives which contribute to the perfection of social relationships. Ideals of service to others, of unselfish coöperation, and of abstract idealism in social relationships take the place of the greed of gain, fear of enemies, and of "looking out for number one." Joined with religion the ethical desires give to religion such content as is implied in "the Kingdom of God," an ideal society. They cut through the other social forces and modify them. For example, the ethical desires curb the appetitive both by curbing hunger and love and by placing strict limits on the craving for wealth, that complex of appetitive and egotic desires. They triumph over the hedonic desires for the soft enjoyments of the senses, and send men out into adventures of daring which can be accomplished only by overcoming fear and aversion to pain. They turn play into "fair play," without which the recreative desires would find but poor satisfaction. They changed ancient religion into something different from a cheap form of life insurance, and transform modern religion from a spiritual "fire escape" into a mighty engine of social regeneration through a purging of the choked springs of human endeavor for social righteousness. They redeem the æsthetic desires from the curse of aristocratic snobbery by making art unconsciously minister to the solution of the deep problems of social relationships, for example, the saving of childhood and motherhood, the stimulation of sym-

pathy for the poor and the vicious. Who that has ever looked upon the picture of a Madonna and Child has gone away with the same ideal of motherhood and the same feeling about childhood? Who can read Hood's *Song of the Shirt*, or Mrs. Browning's *Cry of the Children*, and fail to feel sympathy for the overworked seamstress and for the poor children driven to work in the factories in order that Greed might have its dividends? Finally, the ethical desires have mellowed the keen enjoyment of the exercise of the intellect with the tender feelings of sympathy and given them value and proportion.

(h) *Æsthetic Desires*. — Ward has shown how the æsthetic desires are grounded in animal life where they are real biotic forces working through selection and heredity.¹ There they manifest themselves in love of glorious plumage, of beautiful flowers, of sweet perfume, and of attractive fruits. The significance of beauty lay originally in the survival advantage which it conferred upon its possessors whether in plant or animal. Then the æsthetic desires became ideals with all connection lost with their utilitarian origin. As ideals working their way out into all realms of human life they became social, or what Ward calls "sociogenetic," forces. We say that an ideal concerning a form of government or a plan of education is beautiful. We thus testify that we have carried the æsthetic over into the intellectual and the practical realms of life.

The æsthetic desires among primitive men are largely what they are among animals, a means whereby sexual selection secures a race suited to meet the conditions of survival. Their satisfaction led to an increase of the slowly diminishing birth rate of the *genus homo* as compared with that of most of the lower animals. With a dawning reason, however, mankind undertook to assist the slow and devious ways of nature. Hence arose the cuttings, paintings, and ornamentations of primitive peoples. Hence arose clothing with all its benefits and drawbacks. As soon as there arose artificial methods of stimulating the love of the beautiful by such means as those just mentioned, great impetus was given to man's inventive powers. When one thinks of the amount of pain suffered by the people of every age in order to satisfy their cravings for what to them is beautiful, the mighty power of this set of desires becomes apparent

¹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 433.

And when one remembers that this ideal of beauty is backed by two such sanctions as the appeal of the novel and the weight of the customary combined, one is prepared to appreciate its force as a socializing agency.

Beginning with personal beauty, the craving for satisfaction was stimulated by what it fed upon. It could not stop with the person. It must extend to all other things with which man came into contact. The boat in which he worked or played must be adorned. The cave or the hut in which he dwelt, the weapons and tools, however crude, all felt the touch of his creative imagination and of his passion to realize in wood and stone, in color and form, his ideals of beauty. Moreover, often his religion gave the *motif* for his ideals of the beautiful, and thus two powerful desires found at once satisfaction in his creations.

From the standpoint of social achievement two results appeared, — each man's intellect was stimulated and directed toward distinctively individual creative effort, whereas the group ideals were unified. And so two seemingly incompatible results were obtained from the attempt to satisfy his æsthetic passions, — tremendous growth of the activity of his intellect with corresponding increase of independent practical activity and at the same time a new growth of social activities in which he was forced to conform to the manners of his neighbors.

Who can enumerate the social results of the attempts of man to satisfy these cravings? What cathedrals and temples have risen at the behest of these dominant desires! The architecture of cities, the pictures of a thousand galleries, the music of unnumbered symphonies, the literature of all the nations, in short, art in all its forms would not be even a name without the magic potency of the originally sexually conditioned æsthetic desires. The rhythm of the millions of looms that weave the beautiful fabrics with which our bodies are clothed would never have been heard. We all would still be cave dwellers or animals of arboreal habits living for the day without knowledge of the beauties of Nature or care for them.

(i) *Intellectual Desires.* — If our interpretation of the origin of religion presented in a previous chapter is correct, it throws light also upon the development of intellect. Primitive man in the presence of forces which he did not understand first feared

instinctively, then acted impulsively, and, after the danger was past, thought. As an animal he may not have been able to do the last. As a man his developing mind was not content that danger no longer threatened. It first asked, What was it? and then, Why was it? His first "guesses at the riddle of existence" we have already referred to in connection with the development of religion. His religion was shot through and through with a rude philosophy and adumbrations of science. He answered these questions of his developing curiosity in the only way possible to him, in terms of personality. In a way analogous to the nascent curiosity of the growing child and especially like the gormandizing interest in facts manifested by the pubescent youth the primitive man who had developed to the animistic stage of culture hungered and thirsted for knowledge of this world in which he at last had come to have an intellectual interest. It gave him pleasure to guess at what all these phenomena meant which his observation had collected. He found a joy now not only in getting away from the danger which nature held, but in explaining in his way its mystery.

Once a single individual had reached the stage of finding his curiosity satisfied by an explanation which he had himself created in his own mind, he was marked as a superior man. Long before that stage was reached the medicine man, who acted as though he knew what to do in a crisis, had appeared upon the scene and because of his superior magic had secured the prestige which comes in every age to the man who does not hesitate when all others falter, but decides quickly, grasps the oars and pulls the sinking boat to safety. In a crisis which demanded action of some kind, to relieve the emotional tension of inaction and hesitation, he acted and secured such release. Probably it was the same man, although that is not certain, who offered the first explanation to awakening curiosity about the phenomena of this puzzling old world. At that stage any explanation served, as in the case of the awakening intellect of the child. The hungering souls about him were glad for any solution.

Since intellectual efforts brought their own reward at such a time, a great spur was thereby given to all struggling human intellects apart from the joy which such creation gave to its author. With a certain type of mind the pleasure experienced

from such feats added to the range of enjoyments, — none too many, — of primitive man, and added a refinement of pleasure not to be found in the satisfaction of any other of his desires. This pleasure consisted in part of the rich emotional reaction following the resolution of his own bewildered mind. Where before had been confusion was now order; where had been uncertainty now was the clear, peaceful confidence of infallible truth. In part the pleasure consisted of the joy he experienced in resolving the uncertainties and confusion of others who had been in a like state of bewilderment with its emotional stress. His explanation was the trigger which released the spring of intellectual interest long held back. In this case, however, his pleasure came to him through the representative reconstruction of his own previous emotional stress of uncertainty and his own release. Again the satisfaction of his desires gave him pleasure and at the same time brought him social prestige.

Moreover, every development of his mind which such exercises accomplished made for survival. Man's intellect gave him dominion over Nature, over "the fish of the sea, the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."¹ Not only could he outwit them in the contest for survival, but he was enabled to capture them and by domestication subject them to his service. He now perceived more clearly advantageous relationships. Natural selection was supplemented and accelerated by rational selection. Now he could quicken cuts in his development by his own will. Conscious rather than sympathetic social relationships became possible. Inventions in coöperation and social organization now arose with all the social and economic results which have followed intellectual activity in the history of mankind. Every other desire of man was now modified by reason of its being made the subject of rational thought. The gods in the heavens above or in the earth beneath and in the forest and mountain now changed their characters. Ethics and æsthetics now underwent transformations revolutionary in their nature. Reason took the place of instinct, at first to the detriment of mankind in many ways, but in the end to its advantage, bringing every instinct and appetite under the control of rationalized social standards.

¹ Gen. 1 : 28.

Out of these various desires grew by the formations of complexes of desires of various kinds certain great interests. They are the economic or wealth interests, the health interests, the political interests, the religious interests, and the intellectual interests.

The Wealth Interests. — Compounded of certain appetitive, hedonic, egotic, and affective desires the wealth interests are among the most prominent that influence social life. As before related, we have passed from the struggle for mere existence to the struggle for wealth. Men desire wealth for the power or comfort it will bring them in the use of material goods. There are all degrees of desire for wealth and its uses. In some instances it amounts to pure avarice, the hoarding and worshipping of gold. In others it is a desire to satisfy the pleasures of the fleeting hour. Between these two extremes there are all degrees and varieties of desire. In most instances wealth is wanted for what it will do, that is, for what it will give in pleasure or profit to the one who possesses it. It brings means of learning, of gratifying æsthetic taste, of travel, of satisfying the appetite for food or drink, of possessing the works of art and industry; and, perhaps most important of all from the social point of view, it furnishes the means whereby is gained social prestige. For it men toil and make sacrifices and temporarily deny themselves privileges and pleasures. For it men organize themselves into companies and shape their social life to meet the demands of the wealth-getting process. It is a marvelous social force modifying all the social processes of man.

The Political Interests. — Under certain conditions political organization originated in the opportunity it offered to man's desire for economic gain.¹ Historically not only the hope of gain, but also the fear of enemies, did much to bring government into being. Then there combined with these two the ambition of the masterful leader with his love of power and display. Thus greed, fear, ambition, and vanity all combined to provide those interests which we call political.

More recently the state is coming to be looked upon as the socialized means whereby the power of the few and rich may be curbed in the interests of the many. The state is the guar-

¹ Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 267-269; cf. Ross, *The Foundations of Sociology*, p. 175.

antee to the common man as well as to the powerful that he shall have opportunity for the richest possible self-expression. It is the ideal not only of a benevolent but of a wise and rational father who presides over his growing and therefore immature and selfish children in order to see that they develop a socialized personality in the interest of the common good.

What stupendous results these interests have wrought in human history! The social organization, which in the early period of social development became so all-inclusive that it engulfed for the first time tribes and races entirely diverse, cast a spell over the imagination of man which he has never escaped. The very bigness of it has made even the lust for empire of social significance in the development of society. Rooted in the love of booty and in the ambition of the leader, the passion for empire has drawn men together into closer social bonds, started the process of race amalgamation by the violent but effective methods of tyranny and oppression, and has tended towards the socialization of the world by developing a consciousness of kind among men as men. In the struggle for domination which characterized the nation-building age social organization has been perfected and men have learned how to conform to one another even though by compulsion.

How the idea of the state as a social organization has affected all social organization! The idea of world dominion which found expression in the Roman Empire survived long after the Empire itself had forever vanished, and this idea gave shape to that loose confederation of states known as the Holy Roman Empire, which Voltaire characterized as neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.¹ Long before that, however, the idea had taken possession of the Western Christian church and had begun to transform it into an organization modeled upon the earlier Roman Empire. Furthermore, the subtle influence of its glory on some of the modern European states is to be seen in the corrupted names of Czar and Kaiser, by which these states have paid tribute to the magic name of its rulers, the Cæsars. In so doing, however, both the modern nations of Europe and the medieval church but followed the earlier example of the Jewish and Christian churches. Even after return from the Exile the Jews could not forget that they were descendants of

¹ Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, 1904, p. 216.

those who once knew a Hebrew kingdom. To the early Christians following the example of their Master, the new society of Christians was a kingdom. On the other hand, in this republic, the United States, what voluntary organizations apart from certain religious denominations are not organized in theory at least upon the representative republican basis?

If that is true of the influence of the form of political institutions, how much more true is it of the spirit. There was no real basis in the Roman Empire for a democracy of men, and for that reason, the simple democracy formed by Jesus and the early disciples could not continue out in the Roman world. Consider the difference, for example, between the theory of equality of the sexes held by St. Paul and his actual practice in the face of views held by the members of his churches.¹ The Gentile Christians had no basis in their experience for such a democracy as the theory demanded, and therefore in the course of three centuries the church in the thought of Augustine became "the City of God," instead of a brotherhood, and the city which was the prototype of the church was not Jerusalem, but Rome.² The close analogy between the type of government in an early New England church and in the town meeting has often been remarked. More often than we think, unless we stop to consider, the political interests have influenced our social forms and our essential social spirit.

The Religious Interests. — Developing from the desire of the soul for alliance with the Unknown in order to secure protection, advantage, or release from the uncertainties of life, religion has played a great rôle in the building of society. While religious organizations took their form from the type of current political organization, religion in turn exerted an influence upon the social structure and the social ideals. Fear and ambition, chiefly, the affective, recreative, and religious desires, secondarily, combine to form that group of social interests known as the religious interests.

As a method whereby the safety and preservation of the group were insured, religious rites and ceremonies contributed to the

¹ Cf. Gal. 3: 28 and 1 Cor. 11: 3-12.

² See Augustine, *The City of God*, *passim*. On the influence of political structures and ideals upon the Christian Church, see Sohm, *Outlines of Church History*, translation by Sinclair, New York, 1901, pp. 44-48. Moeller, *History of the Christian Church*, translation by Rutherford, New York, 1898, Vol. I, pp. 315-319. Hatch, *The Organization of the Early Christian Churches*, London, 1882, pp. 213-222.

formation of habits of coöperation. Once a priesthood had grown up, the basis of an organization was laid, which, with its political connections, its control of the supernatural sanctions, and its alliance with the ruler of the group, greatly increased submission to a leading spirit and led on to social unity. Worship at a common shrine stimulated common feelings and the generation of common sentiments. The first great artistic impulse finding permanent expression was aroused by religion. Temples and shrines growing out of graves perhaps were the world's first architecture. As has been indicated before, religion and philosophy to begin with were undifferentiated.

The influence of religion has varied at different times in the history of society. In its origin it was the child of the doubt, and of mystery born of a crisis, of hope deferred, and of oppression. The human soul refused to believe that it was destined for defeat either at the hands of men or the forces of Nature. Religion has continued to be the handmaid of those whose lot it has been to sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, and of those who had no helper. Its gods have been the helpers summoned by the unconquered human spirit, against the enemy and against those powers of Nature which were seen to be hostile. Religion has ever been exercised because it "giveth power to the faint." As an instrument armed with which the natural powers of men may prove equal to a need or crisis it has survived. Otherwise how has it happened that, if religion is a useless thing, if it plays no part in the means whereby survival is secured, that it has itself survived the shock of skepticism, the changes of form made necessary by the vicissitudes of social and intellectual readjustments throughout the ages? More and more religion has ceased to be a philosophy of the universe. It ceases to be what it was to primitive man, a means whereby he thought to understand a puzzling world. Science reigns over that sphere. Does Religion remain only a means whereby the things Science has not yet conquered may be explained? If so, is it not doomed to extinction? Is it merely a confession of the limitations of the human intellect in the presence of unsolved mysteries of life, death, and the Universe? Does it remain merely a limbo of the unexplained? If it is merely that, its task is nearly done, for Philosophy and Science have not labored in vain.

On the other hand, is its usefulness limited to the softening of the rigors of continued human oppression? Is it only a solace of the downtrodden in the place of social justice? Is it merely an angel of hope pointing a wistful finger from earth to heaven? If so, again, its task is nearly done. If it is only a poor substitute for social adjustment, what will happen to it when social justice shall have taken the place of oppression, when no longer hungry children shall cry for bread, and naked bodies shiver from cold, and when the oppressed of all nations shall have found a way to have their wants satisfied here on earth? True, that glorious state of affairs does not seem to be imminent, but there are those — and they are not a few — who labor in the faith that such a state of things is possible. But when that state comes, where, then, will be the place for religion?

Let us begin by accepting all that Science has to teach — certainly scientific people can do no less. Let us confess that Religion — the faith that there is “a power that makes for righteousness not ourselves” in the world — is merely the result of man’s experience with the world. Even so, can we not say at least that man believes that good will triumph over evil because such a belief has made him better able to survive? Let us say that man believes in a god because such belief has made him better able to bear “the buffetings of outrageous fortune,” better able to survive in a world of brutal and sometimes hostile forces by calling out the exertion of his best efforts in this struggle, by making him invoke not only the coöperation of the higher powers of his nature, but also the help of his fellows, and that he believes this because through natural selection those who had not that faith, who had not the belief that unlocked the hidden resources of their souls and released the unknown powers of their beings, were exterminated as a general type.¹

Then the question arises, Why has the world as constituted selected that attitude rather than the irreligious? What is it in the nature of things which makes faith a better characteristic from the standpoint of survival than doubt, belief better than skepticism, confidence that righteousness is stronger than wrong better than the contrary belief, a belief in the possibility

¹ James, “The Powers of Men,” *American Magazine*, Nov., 1907, Vol. 65, pp 6-65.

of progress better than a philosophy of despair? Why does not the Universe, if it is a chaos of blind forces, governed by the law of chance distribution, implant in man by the process of natural selection a working belief that the dominating power of the world is bad rather than good, that progress is impossible, that faith is vain and that all is vanity? Why has such a postulate never produced a conquering people? Pessimism has won no victories. Why? Perhaps that is a question we cannot answer at this time. It may, however, be suggestive to observe that the nature of man is such that a belief that something better than he has now reached is possible, has made him that irresistible, ever struggling being who has become to a degree lord of the world. Religious faith may be a delusion, but if so, it is a beneficent one. It has made the common man struggle on when there was no earthly hope, it has stirred his flagging energies even by admitting that only heaven was left to him, making him a fighting, struggling being to the very end, in the face of despair and of certain death.

When faith has ceased to hold out for him any hope of material advantage, it has inspired in him the hope of a nobler personality. After social adjustment of happy chance has made him independent of the help of the gods for material blessings, religion has held out to him the hope of a clean heart and an unselfish life and called him to the useless but inspiring work of building a character. Religion has at least the advantage that it has proved to be a working philosophy of life. Moreover, it has drawn together into coöperation by means of the two most powerful social motives, compelling fear and deathless hope, men who could not be moved by conscience and who possessed no ability to secure their survival alone. Without it what would society be? What victories it has won in spurring on the tired spirit!

The Intellectual Interests. — Modern social life demonstrates over and over again that knowledge is useful in every department of life and therefore must be attained if man is to reach what is called "success." Acquaintance with the world surrounding man, both physical and social, is absolutely necessary to the attainment of the desired end of life. But there is a love of knowledge for its own sake which causes people to spend hours of toil and sacrifice and which yields to them great happiness

and pleasure. These two ideas, namely, the desire of knowledge for practical purposes and the love of learning, have caused the building of our universities and colleges and the creation of our literature as well as the accumulation of scientific knowledge, all of which are powerful in influencing our social life. Besides this there are many wants arising from the activity of the intellect which are far reaching in their influence on the social life.

Welfare Interests. — Numerous desires, some of them belonging to the class we have called instinctive as to origin, like the fear of pain, desire for food, fear of enemies, and others belonging to the group, denominated instinctive-social in origin, such as the desire for sympathy and sociability, love and hate, and the desire for self-expression, and still others from the last group in our classification, the instinctive-cultural group, like the religious and the ethical desires, combine to form what may be called the welfare interests of society. These interests modify the social activities in many ways, not only in modern civilization, but to a less extent also in all social groups as soon as the leaders of the group come to see, if only in a dim way, the bearing of these interests on the welfare of the community.

An important group of welfare interests is the health interests, which very early are recognized as of vital concern to the community. The preservation of the body, its protection from cold and heat, and other detrimental climatic effects occupies the attention of man to a considerable extent. The desire to increase physical well-being becomes not only an individual, but a social, function. It develops all forms of housing and clothing and city building which pertain to the health of the community. Sanitation and sanitary societies, the art of medicine and medical societies, are all based upon this desire for health. It has a vast influence, too, on the advancement of knowledge and causes scientific investigation and the development of scientific societies. In our educational institutions it develops athletic sports, and provides systems of physical exercise in the gymnasium. It lies at the basis of the eugenics movement. In these and many other ways these interests cause the development of social activities.

Akin in many ways is the group of moral interests which serve to satisfy a desire for righteousness. It is based upon ideals of human conduct. People are influenced in their con-

duct in the satisfaction of this desire. It becomes a social force and as such enters into social ideals, thus furnishing a standard of action. It helps to determine social choices and social aims, and leads the community forward toward a standard of excellence.

Yet another group of interests which may be classed here are the educational interests. They lie partly in the realm of intellectual interests, but serve also the general welfare. When education is looked at from the social point of view rather than from that of individual culture, there is then seen to be a basis for making education a social matter. The welfare of the group politically depends on the development of the citizens of the country. Economic prosperity of the group demands that the educational process take into consideration the vocational needs of the youth of society. It is coming to be held by many that even the moral development of society must be attended to in part by the school system. Thus, our educational interests are welfare interests and play an important rôle in giving shape to social ideals and social structures.

Conscious Social Effort. — Besides the forces of physical nature and those arising from individual desires, society as a unit exercises a general influence in causing its own development. There has always been a social pressure causing aggregation, combination, and organization. While there is no "transcendent *ego*" called the social mind, the members of a community slowly learn to feel, think, will, and act together. This unity of feeling and action was at first an unconscious force impelling society to do certain things, to observe customs, law, and order. In the beginning there was no conscious concerted action to build society according to certain ideals or cause it to move in a certain direction. But, impelled by the influences of physical nature and by the effort of each individual to satisfy his own desires, society developed, became more and more settled in habit and custom, and acted increasingly as a unit. Finally, as customs became more regular and more universally observed, there developed a public sentiment which the individual was obliged to follow or else be denounced as working against the whole community. As this social judgment became more clearly defined, and the sentiment became more clearly expressed, public action was manifested so that the

whole community observed the same habits and customs, and unconsciously acted together for the advancement of the whole social body. There sprang up an unwritten code of ceremonies, forms, and customs that was rigidly adhered to as a natural expression of social unity and coöperation. Also the economic conditions forced people through a certain course or along certain lines of conduct and modified all of the crude social activities of the group. Habituated to act together, there finally arose an instinctive social choice whereby all members of the group who became subjected to the same conditions of life went the same way. That is, they made the same choices regarding self-preservation and social order, and observed the customs of their predecessors. In all this there was no formal attempt to regulate or reconstruct society.

The process by which a group of social interests developed from the instinctive to socially conscious stage is illustrated by the welfare interests discussed above. At first concern for the general welfare was probably instinctive. Probably this concern grew up unconsciously by a process of natural selection. Rather early, however, the cleverest minds began to perceive the advantage of taking thought about certain measures for the welfare of the whole group. At first such minds were few in number, and often they perceived its importance only in a dim fashion. Perhaps some of these now clearly perceived interests were but chance discoveries from activities inspired by superstitions arising from activities in the face of a crisis. Gradually, however, out of the jumble of actions and ceremonies thus arising there were selected by the growing intelligence of man certain ideals and activities which were perceived to have survival value. That is the beginning of social consciousness. The social mind then recognized itself and its power to modify and control social action. The telic idea of progress then appeared. Public opinion found expression in public decrees and laws for the order of social conduct. Social aims were made clear and the will of society was invoked to accomplish them. As public law became the organized force of public opinion, society was made subservient to a coercive rule of action. The government now became the active agent for the enforcement of the will of the community. Gradually the question of the well-being of society became prominent as the goal

of conscious social effort. Behind the government that was instituted to enforce the law or public judgment was the standing army to support it. Society was determined to direct its own course even though it might be necessary to use physical force to accomplish its purposes.

Besides this general social force that exercises social control arose many minor expressions of social order, such as private and voluntary organizations of religious societies, labor organizations, and fraternal orders, whose purposes are to impel society in a chosen direction. Public education also became a positive force in improving the types of liberty and in perpetuating the institutions of the state, while the religious organization had its societies for the propagation of doctrines and its educational institutions for the promotion and perpetuation of belief.

As the forces of society became more exact they showed a tendency to return to more or less automatic social action. Organic society becomes to a certain degree a self-acting body, moving forward with its own momentum. Hence conscious effort was always limited in what it might do to change or modify social action. The social structure has been built and cannot be rebuilt in a day though society should will it. A law may be passed by the representatives of the people, but if it is not in accordance with the existing social forces or the normal progress of society, it will become useless and obsolete. Those who set out to reform society in accordance with a formula soon find they can do very little against the tide of social opinion or the underlying forces of social growth, because all reforms consist in the slow evolution of society and are dependent upon the action of constant social forces and well-established social laws.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is the difference between a physical force and a social force?
2. Classify the social forces, *i.e.* the forces which cause people to cooperate together in their social relationships, in a small community of say 500 people. Estimate the importance of each of these forces in that community. If possible make a better classification than any of those proposed, but be prepared to defend your classification against those given in the text.
3. What social force or forces give rise to the formation of a bank? A woman's club? A literary society? A political party? A farmers' marketing coöperative association? An art society? A sewing society?
4. What social forces, if any, may be cited to account for a decreasing birth rate?

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL LAWS

To one accustomed to the use of the term "law" in physical sciences, a word of caution is necessary with respect to the term when it is used in sociology. By the term "social law" we mean *a statement of the relation which exists between social phenomena; between orders of social phenomena; or between social phenomena and other phenomena.* This relation may be one of coexistence, one of sequence, or one of cause and effect. These laws, however, differ from the laws, for example, of physics in that they are less exact; for, since human beings possess thought and will, their actions are not so definitely determined as are those of atoms. Human beings exercise purpose; they act with reference to perceived ends. Thus, while they react to given stimuli with more or less regularity, there is less certainty that all will act in the same way than there is in the case of atoms subjected to some one of the simple forces.¹

While it is an easy matter to discern the operation of the social forces that have brought about the origin and growth of society and caused its activities, it is difficult to discover the laws according to which these forces act; that is, the social laws. That there are laws which describe the movement and results of social forces is evident from the recurring regularity of social movements; but to define and formulate these laws is, indeed, a difficult matter. Considerable progress, however, has been made by some of the more recent writers on sociology.

Laws of M. Tarde. — M. Tarde, in his work on *Social Laws*, has tried to show that the laws which describe the action of the social forces may be reduced to the following three great movements: "repetition, opposition, and adaptation." He proceeds

¹ Cf. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 73-81. Ward draws a distinction between "law" and "principle." A law, in his view, explains nothing, while a principle is an explanation. See *Pure Sociology*, p. 169.

to show that it is through the repetition of phenomena in a given group that the law or rule of action appears; that it is through opposition that comparison evolves; and, finally, that it is by the adaptation of ideas and ideals, customs and traditions to others that homogeneity is brought about.

The scientist, no doubt, lays the foundation for a new truth when he discovers repetitions of the phenomena under consideration. He observes, for instance, a certain movement of the heavenly bodies. If it is not repeated, he can make no deductions; but by means of a series of repetitions, he discovers that the process is not accidental, but in accordance with certain laws. Again, the scientist is quick to observe in all organic life, differences or oppositions; the struggle for existence presents a constant differentiation. Finally, in studying the adaptation of one part to another, the scientist takes the third step toward the formation of a new law. In the same way, the initial step in the shaping of social laws, is the discovery of constantly recurring phenomena. The first view of society, it is true, shows a heterogeneous mass of phenomena in which there appears little order; it is only by careful study and observation that an orderly arrangement and movement are discovered. But just as the whole universe at first seems to be a mass of unrelated objects and phenomena and subsequently yields to order and symmetry, so the whole mass of apparently unrelated social phenomena discloses an orderly arrangement to the scientific mind. Thus, while no one can doubt the constancy of "repetition, opposition, and adaptation," there are, within these three great fundamental movements, more specific kinds of action, operating within more limited areas. Some of these will be briefly discussed.

Laws of Individual Choice. — These laws are universal and thoroughly demonstrated by practical life. Beginning with the simplest principles relating to individual life, we have the following: *Each individual seeks the largest return for the least sacrifice.* What is meant by this is that whether we consider wealth getting or wealth using, religion or art, culture or learning, or, indeed, life in any of its various important phases, the individual is seeking his highest good or best interests so far as his powers or capacities will permit. The laborer seeks the highest wage he can command; the professional man strives for the position

that will yield him the largest return for his efforts; and the business man enters the field which will most rapidly increase his wealth. The expression "largest return" includes, to be sure, a number of things; it involves physical health, mental development, material welfare, and social well-being. But the truth is a universal one and manifests itself in all our services; even a man engaged in missionary work would endeavor to seek the largest results possible from the smallest amount of work in order that he might do the most possible for those for whom he was laboring.

Another of these laws is: *Each individual has a schedule of choices ranging from the most desirable objects to the least desirable.* This law, observed primarily in economic life, serves as the basis for market valuation, and furnishes the opportunity for exchange. The demand schedule for articles of utility is manifested in the practical affairs of life; but the law operates with no less exactness in other departments of human activity, for individual motives vary in proportion to their valuations of the various objects of life. Of two men, both laying stress on the material objects of life, one may put food first and then clothing, books, works of art, and furniture, while another may, under different circumstances, give the following order: books, works of art, food, furniture, and clothing. Again, others may make schedules like this: wealth, virtue, learning, public approbation, and leisure; or like this: virtue, learning, wealth, leisure, and public approbation.¹

This leads to another well-established principle; namely, that *Individual minds respond similarly to the same or like stimuli.*² This law is a recognition of the universality of certain characteristics of the human mind; but it must not be carried too much into detail, or it will conflict with the one previously stated. Nor is it best to presume too much upon the constancy of human nature; for, while the stimulus of hunger or cold may in general affect individual minds in the same way, the actions resulting from these may be of entirely different nature. One may labor in order to reach given results, whereas another may steal to satisfy his wants. Or if a flood renders many people homeless, most of those not afflicted will respond, in one way

¹ See Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 147.

² See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 60.

or another, to a call for help; but there are, at times, some who will give no assistance whatever.

The Laws of Social Choice. — Similar to the laws of individual choice are the laws of social choice, for the latter are only the generalization and unification of the former. There is, therefore, a schedule of social choices by means of which the social mind chooses its ideals and types and establishes the bases of social action.

According to Giddings, the most important ideals of social choice, in their relative order of influence, are as follows: (1) force or power, (2) utilitarian virtues, (3) integrity, and (4) self-realization.¹ That the public mind values force or power above all other things, seems, at first, to be untrue; but a little reflection on the judgments of society will convince one, albeit against one's will, that such is the case. While the utilitarian virtues, that is, the quality of usefulness, generally precede integrity in the schedule of the normal society, there are communities which choose integrity as a higher ideal. There can be no doubt that self-realization is properly the last in the category; for, while society recognizes the importance of the individual and his prosperity, his well-being, as a direct aim, is not uppermost in the social choice.

It may be inferred from the foregoing that whether the choices of a society are radical or conservative depends, in a large measure, upon the variety of interests of such a society and the degree of harmonious combination of the same. The society having a variety of interests will be radical in its choices, and the society that has harmonized its interests will be conservative. Hence it is that "*only the population that has many, varied, and harmonious interests is consistently progressive in its choices*";² for, where the radical and conservative element is nearly balanced, society is likely to be freed, on the one hand, from impulsive action, and, on the other, from inertness.

The Laws of Social Aims. — Primarily, normal progress, rather than a perfected system, is the social ideal. The constant changes of society make it highly probable that an automatic system which acts with perfect precision will never appear. The perfect society is always just beyond, in the next century or centuries. But when the next century comes, the plan is

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, p. 181.

changed; and what was formerly desired is now found to be useless. Hence if a society is normal in its parts and if it is progressive, — that is, if it is constantly moving toward its ideals, even if these ideals are constantly undergoing change, — then that society is fulfilling the highest aims.

The greatest good to the greatest number, or social well-being, is the aim of social action. This aim, according to Benjamin Kidd, looks to the future as well as to the present. In his *Western Civilization*¹ Kidd has elaborated this idea under what he terms "Projected efficiency." He shows that in our attempts to realize the present we are living for future good; in building the social structure, we are looking always to the superstructure which is to be built in the future. Hence the greatest good to the greatest number must apply even to generations yet unborn. It is probable, however, that "projected efficiency" — when it occurs at all — is largely an unconscious by-product of society's effort to survive under the difficulties of the here and now.

The Laws of Imitation. — M. Tarde has shown us how important, in the development of social life, is imitation. Perhaps there is no other medium through which we receive more than we do through this practice of imitation. In the first few years of its life the child acquires nearly all of its habits, and a considerable part of its knowledge, by means of imitation, and it is the imitative child that makes the most rapid advancement. Among primitive races, too, the beginnings of civilization are marked by this influence; nor have we ever, for that matter, lost sight of it in the higher development of civil life. The customs and habits of a single people are soon imitated the world over; the spread of the industrial arts, the advancement of science and learning, and the use of modern appliances, all point to the importance of imitation in the practical affairs of life.

M. Tarde has given us two laws which seem to be thoroughly established in all processes of association. The first one, "*In the absence of interferences, imitation spreads in geometrical progression,*" assumes that there must be social contact. If an individual imitates another, there are two sources for the spreading of the idea. If one individual imitates each of these, there are four sources, then sixteen, and so on in geometrical progression. In a large social group where many may imitate the one,

¹ Benjamin Kidd, *Western Civilization*.

imitation may proceed very rapidly; the psychology of the mob demonstrates the rapidity in which social action proceeds through imitation. This law is important in accounting for the rapid spread of news, the adoption of new customs and language — especially of slang phrases.

The other important law is that "*Imitations are refracted by their media.*" The term, borrowed from physics, is very appropriate in its application. The individual who attempts to imitate his neighbor in walk, speech, dress, and personal habits, will never exactly represent the original; the nation that attempts to use the civilization of another will yet find differences between itself and the original — differences for better or for worse. These differences demonstrate that the individual or community that attempts to imitate is, in itself, an original source of power and will change what it borrows to suit its own accepted ideas or its own environments. If one hundred people, standing just close enough together for each to hear what his next neighbor says, should attempt, one after another, to recite a given passage, each one getting his version from the one who has last spoken, the passage would frequently become so changed as to be unrecognizable. In the same way, the degree to which the tales of the neighborhood enlarge or become distorted depends upon the character of the media through which they pass.¹

The Law of Sympathy. — *The degree of sympathy increases as the resemblance increases.*² Sympathy is strongest among those groups that have many activities in common. For example, there is, in general, more sympathy of man for man than of man for the dumb animals. Common interests, common sentiments and feeling, draw people close together and increase their sympathy with one another. The races that have the same degree of culture develop a common interest and hence a common sympathy. And among individuals who associate on the same plane, or are engaged in the same pursuits, the bond of sympathy is much stronger than it is when differences in character, culture, or occupation are clearly recognized.

The Law of Conscious Resemblance. — *The consciousness of resemblance and of sympathy causes people to be mutually attracted.* The recognition that people are like ourselves in

¹ Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation* (translation by Elsie Clews Parsons).

² See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 108.

feeling, thought, tastes, and sympathies, causes us to draw near them and to be attracted to them. To know that people feel as we feel and think as we think is the foundation of socialization. Giddings has named this principle "consciousness of kind." In his explanation he has attempted to show, though not always quite conclusively, it is true, that consciousness of kind is the primal social *force* by which people are attracted to one another, and through which they become socialized. While we may object to its being called a primal social force, it is true that groups of people are joined in social union by sympathy and a recognition of like-mindedness. Yet, however strongly people are attracted by mutual likeness, we must recognize the importance of mutual interests of various kinds for the perpetuation of the association. And as the individual instinctively chooses his companions upon the recognition of some common thought or feeling, some material or social condition, so the religious societies, fraternal orders, clubs, and social gatherings, are all influenced in their development, by this principle. Indeed, the stability of our nation depends upon the consciousness that we advocate certain principles concerning the rights, duties, and privileges of citizens — that we hold the same ideals of freedom, liberty, and public order. This consciousness is a universal condition of all social processes.

Laws of Impulsive Social Action. — "*Impulsive social action tends to extend and to intensify in a geometrical progression.*"¹ There is a similarity between this law and the first law of imitation. While imitation and impulsive social action may be widely different, they have a tendency to act at the same time and, to a large extent, in the same way. The social mind is made up of individual minds which think, feel, and will together. Impulsive social action, therefore, must occur from the instantaneous movements in the same way and for the same purpose, of the individuals of a group; but how rapidly these impulses may be transmitted from one to another through imitation cannot be measured. A glance of the eye, a movement of the hand, may communicate an impulse from one mind to another. The utterance of a single sentence may not only bring every mind to the same attitude, but it may cause the immediate action of all.

¹ See Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 176.

*“Impulsive social action, as a rule, varies inversely with the habit of attaining ends by indirect and complex means.”*¹ The more complex society becomes, the less it is subservient to impulsive action. The child has a simple and direct method, — action follows at once upon suggestion, — while the adult tends more often under ordinary circumstances to deliberate and arrives at a conclusion and attains results by a circuitous path. The society which has no deliberative assembly often will be stampeded into action by an impulsive individual; that society which has developed deliberative devices like parliamentary rules, will give time for further reflection before it acts. Here, as elsewhere in social life, changes always move from a center in every direction; hence the ratio of change will be by squares. But it must be remembered that social forces seldom move in a straight line, but are always deflected by other forces.

Laws of Tradition. — Tradition had, in primitive society, a wonderful influence over the lives of men, and to some extent, it continues to exercise this influence; but as the world becomes scientific, the power of tradition declines. This fact may be reduced to the following law: *“Tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion as its subject matter consists of belief rather than of critically established knowledge.”*² It is a long road from tradition to critical history, but it is a very sure one in the destruction of the authority of tradition. Again, *“Tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion to its antiquity.”*³ The ancient good is that which appeals to the minds of people who are not ready or willing to submit to the régime of critical knowledge. Belief in traditions will not yield readily to the formal test of rational processes; but conceptions of things that happened last year are much more easily eradicated from the social mind than are those concerning things that happened thousands of years ago — conceptions which have received the sanction of succeeding generations through centuries. The chief service of science to the modern world consists, therefore, in bringing people to accept things which can be demonstrated to be true either by rational deductions or by a formidable array of facts. Just as, in the words of the poet, “Time makes ancient good uncouth,” science makes much of tradition valueless.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

² *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³ *Ibid.*

The Law of the Development of Social Structures. — One phase of this law has been pointed out by both Gumpłowicz and Ratzenhofer.¹ As they stated the law, it ran something like this: *Whenever two societies conjugate, through a process of conquest of one by the other, a great and rapid evolution of structure succeeds.* This law needs very little elucidation; it is based upon historic induction. Famous examples of its working are to be found in the subjugation of the Canaanites by the Israelitish tribes and in the Norman Conquest of England. And always when victorious people face the question as to what they shall do in the new circumstances which a conquest has forced upon them, they at once begin to make some adjustment of relations between the conquered and themselves. In the first place, sovereignty is imposed, and the sovereign commands the conquered. It is not long, however, before questions of relationship must be enacted into law. At first the will of the conqueror, then later the will of the conquering people, regulates the life of the conquered. As the relationships become increasingly complex, more and more adjustments have to be made. The amalgamation of the two peoples, begun, as a rule, by the conquerors, who took the women of the conquered as wives and concubines, creates many difficulties — religious as well as industrial. At first the conquered are a servile class attached to the land; but when the half-breeds come to the age when work must be done by them, the early regulations become unsatisfactory, and adjustments must be modified. Moreover, the children of the conquerors by the women of the conquered usually follow the religion and language of the mothers. This fact necessitates regulations concerning the use of language and the practice of religion as between the two peoples. In all these ways, therefore, and for these and other obvious reasons, the social structure becomes increasingly complex.

But is not this law, as stated, only a part of a wider generalization? Not only in case of conquest do structures multiply and social regulation and institutions rapidly increase; but whenever there is a conflict between different cultures, or when classes with widely different interests clash with each other, the same thing occurs. Witness the tremendous increase of

¹ Gumpłowicz, *Der Rassenkampf*, Secs. 34, 35. Ratzenhofer, *Sociologische Erkenntnis*, Chaps. XIII, XIV.

social structure in Great Britain, in the days since the Industrial Revolution; yet there was no conquest as in the days of William the Norman and his successors. But conquest or no conquest, the last century has witnessed a most remarkable increase of social machinery for adjusting the relations between classes of Great Britain's population whose interests have come to be recognized as antithetical to each other as never before. Laborer and Capitalist, and, to a less degree, Landowner and Tenant, have become class conscious. The one has endeavored to exploit the other as truly as ever Norman king or baron tried to exploit the conquered Saxons. But as a result, there has followed that remarkable series of laws and institutions which has, in the last century, made England the pioneer, in many ways, in the adjustment of social relations. Consider, too, the great increase of social machinery in this country — machinery for making possible what we call social justice. At first the railroads and every kind of industry were favored; the laborer and the public were given no rights by the law. Gradually the interests of the laboring and consuming classes became more and more prominent; and recently there has been great activity in remaking laws and institutions in the interests of these classes. Another illustration of the same sort, but in a different realm, is to be found in the growth of tenement-house regulation following upon the influx of great hordes of Europeans into our Eastern cities. Sanitary regulations are due, in part, at least, to an arousal of class consciousness by this contact with unfamiliar peoples. An even more striking illustration is supplied by the laws by which California aimed at the regulation of the Japanese in that state. Can we not say, therefore, that *whenever two or more peoples, or class-conscious groups, come into contact with each other in one geographic unity, social structures and institutions will experience rapid development, provided one party struggles to dominate the others?*

The Law of Spiritual Development. — This law, formulated by Tiele and cited by Ross, points out the importance to mental and social progress, of the mental contact of people in different stages of development. Leaving out of account, then, the natural capabilities of men and peoples, we may say that *all development in spiritual matters depends on the stimulating effects of contact with a different stage of culture upon the self-*

*consciousness of a people.*¹ Illustrations of this law can be found in abundance. It has often been remarked that, as soon as the Civil War was over, a new spirit manifested itself in both the North and South, but especially in the North. The soldiers of the North had been living for a term of years in the South. There they had become acquainted with a slightly different culture and stage of social development; there they had found social institutions which had grown up out of slavery. To those who returned, therefore, the war was a liberal education. They had traveled and had observed new scenes; they had come in contact with new social and industrial situations and had had their minds stirred by contrasts. A similar thing happened after our recent war with Spain. Travel over seas and among strange peoples, contact with new institutions, have had a most wonderfully stimulating effect upon our people. Immigration has done the same thing. It is no accident that a country receiving a constant supply of new immigrants, provided they are not too dissimilar, comes to have a plastic mind. Our tolerance of European dances and foods, our interest in such European political and social experience as the various social insurance schemes, are due, in great part, to our acquaintance with European institutions, either through the immigrants or through our tourists and writers. Every one who has traveled appreciates how new scenes and new customs stir the mind and generate tolerance.

The Law of Survival and Progress. — That law of survival which applies to the physical development of the individual animal structure, we can extend to social institutions as follows: *Institutions become strong through use, and become weak or extinct through disuse.* The track of social progress is strewn with the ruins of social institutions that have lost their usefulness. When a society at a given stage of progress adopts certain customs, habits, or institutions, it retains these only so long as they perform normal functions of social life; when they are no longer useful, they are cast off. The statute books are filled with laws once alive, now dead; the habits of life to-day are far different from those of centuries past; and as society unfolds itself in human progress, there is a constant elimination of the unfit. Old forms and functions give way to new ones; those that are

¹ Tiele, *Elements of the Science of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 239.

inadaptable to the normal life of society will pass away through non-use, just as biological forms or functions have become extinct through atrophy.

The increasing importance, in social progress, of the developing human mind is indicated by a law formulated by Ward. It is, in essence, that *the spontaneous progress which one finds in the more undeveloped societies gives way to telic or purposive progress, and individual telic or direction of progress gives way, on the whole, to collective telic.*¹

The foregoing laws are not, by any means, all that have been formulated; but so far as they have been presented, they may be assumed to be general. And they may be taken as typical of the social laws thus far formulated.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What is the difference, if any, between a physical law and a social law? See Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 43-48.
2. State the difference between a law and a principle in sociology. See Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 169 ff.; Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 74-81.
3. Read Ross, *Foundations*, pp. 43-44, and criticize the statement that each individual seeks the largest return for the least sacrifice.
4. Of what value to the student of society is the law that each individual has a schedule of choices ranging from the most desirable objects to the least desirable?
5. Give an illustration of the law that individual minds respond in the same way to like stimuli. What is the importance of this law to the student of society?
6. What bearing upon the law of social preference has the fact that you can get more people out to see what promises to be a "good" prize fight or a football game than to hear the discussion of a welfare project?

¹ Cited by Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 64.

7. If it is true that a society made up of diverse elements of population is likely to be radical in its choices, what are likely to be the social choices of a population like that on the East side of New York?

8. The slit skirt first appeared on Fifth Avenue. Within a year or two a modified form of it might be seen, worn by the poor, on the street cars of Second Avenue. What social law does that fact illustrate?

9. In accordance with what law do deliberative societies forbid the passing of a law with one reading, or the passing, on the day it is proposed, of an amendment to an important instrument like a constitution?

10. What illumination does the law of the development of structures throw upon the fact that "grandfather clauses" occur only in the constitutions of the Southern States of the United States of America?

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL MIND

Primary Result of Association. — Society has grown because of association; for it was the coming together of people that made it possible for society to exist. One of the primary results of this association is “interstimulation and response,” as Giddings calls it, between the various individuals of the group. Whenever there exists such reciprocal influence of one mind upon another, whether the minds agree or not, then you have the conditions antecedent to the formation of the social mind.¹ The end of the process is the development of sufficiently similar feeling, thinking, and willing, on the part of these associated individuals, to enable them to continue their association. With this growing likeness, however, there always develops mental differentiation — the rise of new thoughts, feelings, and volitions.²

Ellwood has said, “The term social mind, in other words, is a convenient term to express the mental unity of our social life. This unity is a very real thing; and even though the term social mind is open to many objections because of possible misunderstandings, it is certainly convenient to have such a term to describe the functional unity which arises from interaction between many minds.”

This mental unity, then, is what goes by the name of the social mind. There is no transcendental *ego* over and above the action of individual minds; nevertheless, there are mental results arising from interstimulation and response. These results manifest themselves in the unity of thought, sentiment, and feeling of the individual minds which come into contact in a community, and in the diversity of feeling, thought, and purpose just referred to. The popular expression for the results of this social mind is “the moral sense of the community,” public

¹ Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 330, 331.

² Cf. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, pp. 67, 68; *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 184-185; with Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 4.

will, or public opinion. While there is no independent and greater mind which somehow includes the individual minds, there is a relationship between each separate individual which conditions his thinking, feeling, and willing, and frequently coerces him into a certain line of action. This mind is brought into being by means of concerted action; and once having developed, and once having been organized, it adds to society's present volitions the fund of experimental knowledge. This fund of "capitalized experience" produces steadiness and constancy of the social mind and makes us sometimes feel that its results are so like those of the individual mind, though grander and more impressive, that we are likely to think of the social mind as something separate and apart. As Cooley remarks, however, there are not "two kinds of mind, the social and the individual mind. When we study the social mind, we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations, rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology."¹

In the case of the social mind, the process of formation, or "integration," as Giddings calls it, is very like the process of making up one's individual mind. The social mind, however, results not from the activity of an organism, — the brain, in the case of the individual, — but of an organization, — society. The connections are not organic connections — nerves — but organized methods of communication. For example, when the flood burst upon the inhabitants of the Kansas River Valley, every one was surprised. The feeling of surprise was universal, not only with the afflicted, but with those who were in sympathy with them. Next came a feeling of consternation as loss of life and damage of property seemed imminent; the feeling of sympathy for all those who suffered was universal, and the whole community felt as one man. After the expression of sympathy came the planning for relief. There were many diverse opinions as to methods to be pursued; but, finally, through discussion at public gatherings, people came to an agreement as to the best course to pursue. This common thought about what was to be done was finally shared by a large majority of the community. Then came the will to put this plan into execution. Officers were elected, committees appointed, and funds raised, for the accomplishment of the desired relief. Thus

¹ Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 4.

was the social mind made up, or "integrated," in feeling, thought, and purpose; and thus was social action produced. If, here and there, a different feeling prevailed in an individual, or different thoughts concerning methods appeared, these were lost sight of in the final result. Any opinion that was expressed entered into the sum total of considerations on which the final decision was based; but it was modified by the weight of other feelings or opinions. Thus the social mind represents the organization of individual minds, and its products the organization of the feelings and thoughts of individuals. But the stimulation of the thoughts of individuals, in addition to making it more maturely deliberate, intensifies the social mind; for the purposes of individuals are more firmly held by reason of the common consciousness that like feelings, thoughts, and purposes are held by others.

Social Consciousness. — While the social mind is composed of reflex activities of the individual minds of which society is composed, there is a marked difference between the conscious effort of the individual and the conscious efforts of society; the former may, in fact, exist without the latter. Each individual may go about his vocation, knowingly seeking his own interests, — interests which may be for or against those of society at large. Yet the individual always constitutes a part of the social life; and a large number, choosing the same economic life, are working together to build up a given part of society or to exercise a special function. Most of the industries, for example, have been built up without regard to the welfare of the community. There is, indeed, no general judgment of society limiting the number of goods in a given line that shall be manufactured within a stated period of time, there are no laws limiting the number of railroads that shall be built or the number of stores that a town shall have; but there are general laws of supply and demand, rather indefinite to be sure, which tell the manufacturer or the merchant what he shall do for his own interest. While he is serving society in a general way, therefore, his primary object is, of course, to increase his income. And the fact that individuals seek their own interests, regardless of the general effect of their actions on social relations, has given rise to a sort of unconscious development of social institutions. In fact, society has been built largely by this unconscious co-

operation. But society reaches a state in which it is conscious of what the whole group does for its welfare or its detriment; and being conscious, it seeks to shape the general course of social action by such carefully devised means as legislation, education, and police regulation. De Greef has shown that nearly all the human wants which have to do with economic production and distribution and with the perpetuation of the race, have risen through unconscious social conditions. Thus it is easy to infer that the activities dependent upon social consciousness are those having to do with the regulation of society and those relating to education. These two departments of social activity should be considered in their broadest conceptions.

To illustrate the processes of social consciousness, it may be well to refer to the growth of the boy. When he partakes of food, he has no idea of doing it for the purpose of growing into manhood; he does so because he is hungry. When he engages in play he does so to satisfy a desire for amusement rather than any desire to strengthen his body or his faculties. But a time may come when he will realize that he has a body to control and a mind to develop; and he will then try to force his life in a certain direction, for a specific purpose. He may desire knowledge in order to change the character of his mind; and finding that his habits are undesirable, he forces upon himself new ones. Thus by the aid of teachers, and by contact with the social world, he reconstructs his own life by the conscious efforts of his will. In the same way, society begins by performing certain acts in common, such as visiting retribution upon the criminal, stoning the adulteress, or by means of initiation ceremonies teaching to the young certain traditions of the group; but these acts are not performed with the desired end of building a society, changing a society, or even modifying its action. A time comes, however, when society discovers itself and its conditions, its defects and its power to overcome them. And it is then that there comes the conscious effort for the reconstruction of social life or the modification of that which already exists; for society does not attempt to tear down and build anew, but to modify and improve that which already exists. This tendency to move slowly may be observed in the public judgments of society concerning right and wrong,

social acts, the laws which are formed to force society through certain channels, and the propaganda of doctrines by certain sects of reformers. We find, therefore, that *the movements consequent upon social consciousness are slower than those dependent upon individual consciousness*, because the various parts of society are not so closely articulated and coördinated as are the parts of the individual. Hence it is necessary to develop social consciousness by agitation, education, and methods of rapid communication — in short, by organization of the group towards a conscious end. And if this consciousness is rather uncertain at first, it gradually becomes surer and more exact.

But since social direction cannot be given to all of the complex details of life, many of these are, through reflex action, left to the more economical operations of *social automatism*. That is, social life becomes automatic and does not need direction from the combined will of members of society. The socialists maintain, it is true, that this automatic action is a defect and that social organizations could be so perfected as to carry out minute details of the economic and social life — a system which would leave comparatively little for the individual to do of his own free will. And after all, it is to be doubted whether there would be any improvement of the present system of economic life, were the government to order the number of bushels of corn, the amount of live stock, or the amount of wheat that could be raised in a given year, and were it to appoint certain groups of people to attend to the various crops. It is doubtful whether the government could, as an agent of the people, make the market any more exact or economical, by a formal attempt to regulate products and prices, than it is made under the voluntary activity of individuals who seek to obtain the largest return for the least sacrifice. Without any attempt to regulate them, therefore, society turns over the larger number of details to the unconscious coöperation of the individuals of a community. Systematically and consciously, however, the social mind occupies itself with the larger problems of the organization of society and devotes its energies to changing the trend of social movements — movements, for example, toward the economic and social emancipation of women, the regulation of the liquor traffic, the control of the trusts, the elimination of vice, and, finally, the movements toward a better

understanding of the problems of immigration and eugenics, in order that we may control the quality of our population.

Steps in the Formation of the Social Mind.¹ — The process by which the social mind is formed, or "made up," may now be analyzed more closely.

(a) *Stimulation and Response.* — The first step in the process is *stimulation*, of some sort, and *response* thereto by the individuals composing the group. Ever acting upon individuals and producing social as well as individual activity, are stimuli from the physical world about, such as cold and heat, seasons and climate, day and night. Added to these are the stimuli provided by the presence and activities of other individuals, both those of the same group and those of other groups. Finally, there is the stimulation to mental and physical activity which is provided by the thoughts, ideals, and feelings of others.

(b) *Likenesses and Differences Appear as a Result of Stimulation.* — All these stimuli excite some kind of response on the part of the stimulated individuals, some of whom will act alike, others not. While, therefore, by means of a similar response, there is formed a group of individuals who naturally act, feel, and think alike, there are, at the same time, some others who make a different response to the same stimulus. Sometimes all of these, though acting differently from the first group, form a second group, which, within itself, acts, feels, and thinks alike. Then there are, of course, still others who, in response to the given stimulus, will vary from both the groups described. And it is this difference in the response which produces in society variation in the activities, feelings, and thoughts which make up the social mind. Thus types of mind and types of character are formed; and people separate or combine according to these differences or resemblances.

(c) *Mutual Consciousness of Likeness and Difference.* — The social mind is not formed until the interrelations of the people in the group develop to the point where all become mutually conscious of the fact that some resemble others and some do not.² This consciousness of likeness and unlikeness may not be shared to the same degree by all individuals in the

¹ Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 124-185.

² Cf. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, pp. 68, 69.

group — it probably never is. Throughout the group, nevertheless, there is a consciousness — in this individual clear and certain, and in that dimly perceived — that certain ones in the group act, feel, and think alike, while certain others do not.

This process in epitome may be actually observed to-day when boys come together who have not hitherto known each other. At first there is reserve and caution; each is closely observing the others. Then each makes up his mind provisionally that he likes certain of the group and that he dislikes others. The boy who is first to come to such a conclusion approaches another boy, perhaps, and proposes a game. If the other agrees to the proposal, stratification of the group begins. In the process of play, the stratification proceeds even further, perhaps. Concurrently, however, there goes on a further sifting. New discoveries of likeness and difference are made, and new alignments occur, as new angles of personality are observed, and the primary antipathies are perhaps softened. A process of socialization, of growing likeness, sets in. More and more, through the give-and-take of social intercourse, similarities are discovered, great enough to warrant coöperation; and such adjustments are made that finally the members of the group can perhaps play together without a quarrel. The boys have not only discovered and developed like tastes, feelings, ideals, and ambitions, but they have become conscious of the fact that they are alike. They end, perhaps, by reporting to their parents that they like the other boys. Again, there is a similar process in the development of the social mind whenever people from many different places gather together in a new country and begin to associate with one another.

(d) *A Common Purpose Develops.* — Once the group has become conscious of likenesses and differences, — the former greater than the latter, — once common sentiments, feelings, and thoughts are *consciously* held and enjoyed by members of the group, the dynamic condition of the development of the social mind has been reached. It is “made up” and ready for action. Common feelings and sentiments consciously held inevitably lead to common purposes directed toward certain ends. Public opinion has been formed; public feeling has been aroused; and now the public will can express itself.

We have not analyzed the possible ways in which the “mak-

ing up" of the social mind may be brought about. There is space only to suggest that it may occur as a result of an appeal to the intelligence by means of deliberate debate, covering a long period of time; or it may be precipitated suddenly by some event which stirs the common feelings, such as the blowing up of the *Maine* in Havana harbor, or the shooting of the Austrian crown prince. In the one case you have the expression of public opinion, in the other of public feeling.

The Readjustment of Society. — Just as the individual adapts himself to the conditions of nature and his social surroundings, so the social mind is ever alert to readjust society and adapt it to the requirements of nature and the will of man. Thus while the social organization represents a close interdependence and a continuity of parts, still there is a constant readjusting of these parts to each other and of the whole to the natural environment. This adaptation is the chief function of the social mind. It finds expression in the common feeling, general will, public opinion, and moral sense of the people, as well as in formulated law and rules of action.

Formal Expressions of the Social Mind. — Everywhere we find evidences of this action of the social mind, whether we consider the whole national life or its important parts. There are public policies that become so well established that they are stronger in their influences than they would be if they were formulated in public law, with penalties attached. There are policies of political parties which are expressions of the common thought and will of those parties. There are creeds of church organizations, there are types and ideals of society in general, which have been built up by means of a common expression of the social mind. The ideal of "liberty, equality, and fraternity," the ideal of "justice," and the ideal of "economic independence," are all products of the social mind, having the force of law without its sanctions. The estimate of social values and their arrangement in relative degrees of desirability are expressions of the social mind; they are the combined product of the community. And the notion of a common Bible, a common religion, or a common country gives rise to the universal sentiments or actions of individual minds. Thus does the social mind, through action and reaction, demonstrate its superiority to the individual.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make a table of the differences between the individual mind and the social mind. Make one of the similarities.
2. Explain what Ellwood means when he says that "The mental life of groups is unified only functionally." See Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 330.
3. Describe the steps by which the United States made up its mind to declare war on Spain; to build the Panama Canal; to revise the tariff.
4. Is the process by which we secure enough food to supply the needs of one hundred millions of people in this country the result of social consciousness? State your reasons.
5. Is the process by which we keep up our population a socially conscious one?
6. Is the process by which we defend our country from possible invasion, by building forts and battleships, and by training an army, a sign of social consciousness?
7. Analyze the steps by which a state "makes up" its mind to regulate railroad rates.
8. Observe a group of college students recently come together in a hall or rooming house, and analyze the steps in the development of a social mind among them.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHICAL ACTIVITIES

Psychic Forces. — In the last two chapters we have emphasized the psychological aspects of social life. Since mind, in so far as it affects his social relations, is man's most important possession, the psychical relations are by far the most constant of all the factors in the organization and development of human society. In coöperation, coördination, or organized effort of any kind, it is the psychological relationships that hold men together. It is, therefore, easy to recognize that social psychology is an important part of general sociology. Now we have seen that the social mind has a positive influence in directing the members of the social body; but the social mind is really something more than the sum of the combined minds of the individuals in the group. It is the coördination of the feelings, thoughts, and purposes of all the individuals associated together — either intensified by the consciousness of the agreement of many minds or subdued as a result of the recognition of some disagreement among them. Thus while, as has been before stated, there is no distinct *ego* entirely disconnected from the individual *ego*, this restraining or inspiring influence of the social mind operates forcefully upon the individual. The social mind, therefore, acting as an independent self-constituted power, and regarding not the single individual, but the community as a whole, is a force whose effects we can observe and describe. And the psychical activities of society are an expression of this social force.¹

Feeling. — The socio-psychic activities manifest themselves through much the same channels as do the activities of the individual mind. We may call them the social feelings, the social thoughts, and the social will.

The emotional element expresses itself in a variety of ways.

¹ Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, pp. 75-79.

In the feelings of a community concerning its own life, the emotional element is strong, but it is in the relations of one society to another that social emotion is most clearly manifested; for, in its contact with other groups, a community has a double reaction. Baldwin has pointed out, from the psychological, and Ross and Tarde from the ethical and social, point of view, the important function of "opposition" or reaction against the idea of another or that of a group of strangers.¹

By forcing definition and stimulating an interest in points of contrast, such opposition clears thought. Then, too, a reaction of this sort greatly stimulates the feelings; for, strangely enough, hate of others generates affection for one's own fellows and gives rise to that racial feeling which is such a persistent force in the social affairs of men. As a matter of fact, the chief cause of conflicts between two peoples is a difference in feeling about matters in which both are interested, but from different points of view. Thus contact always stimulates emotion, but what emotion is stirred — whether it be that of sympathy and fellowship or that of hate — depends upon likeness or unlikeness, identity, or difference of interests. Yet not only is it true that opposition clears the thought and stimulates the feelings of two groups; the very feeling of one group toward another has great influence on this second group. And the reaction from the feelings of different groups or tribes brings about a reciprocal relationship which modifies the conduct of both.

Since, therefore, feeling is the driving force among the psychical elements affecting social life, we must not be surprised to find that social activities are more often affected by the feelings than by careful deliberation. Moreover, as we shall see, the will is more closely allied to the feelings than to the intellect. And, finally, the very fact that social activity is *social* provides the circumstances in which feeling may dominate over reason. Now it is a well-known fact that the action of groups of people — unless they are carefully organized to prevent mob-action — is less moral, less rational, than the actions of individuals who are not carried along by a crowd. In that social activity, which is spontaneous or instinctive, therefore, the element of

¹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 5th ed., pp. 236-244. Ross, *Social Control*, p. 72. Cf. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, "Social Opposition."

feeling is quite certain to predominate. Thus it is that the emotional element prevails in their united action, when people are brought together in a large, heterogeneous mass, since their united action depends more upon feeling than upon reason or judgment. The crowd is, to all purposes, a young, undeveloped society, in which, as in the young, undeveloped individual, the emotional element prevails — ruled by an impulse as instinctively fierce and strong as the instinct of a savage beast. But the moment a crowd begins to respond to reason it is ready to disperse and go about its business if it does not organize itself into a more or less permanent group ruled by deliberate judgment. All mobs, therefore, are dangerous elements in a community; and in spite of the fact that they sometimes act with precision and rapidly moving justice, they should be repressed because they do not represent a high order of social purpose and are very apt to be characterized by antisocial acts.

The mob has, it is true, a keen sense of justice and the courage to execute it; the rapidity with which it passes judgment on an outrage committed against individual or society proves its possession of these qualities. The evil of mob action consists in the method of procedure which the mob employs. If only, along with its desire to administer justice, it could substitute self-restraint for violence and patience for impulse, it would accord to every offending individual the right to an impartial trial before the law. Thus the tremendous social importance of feeling as a dynamic force can be judged by its work in a mob; but this mighty social impulse must be directed for the welfare of society, for, unrestrained by reason and calm judgment, it is an agency of destruction rather than of constructive social activity.

Feeling, however, as Ward has so well demonstrated, is essential to normal social action; ¹ it is the great motive power which sends society forward toward a given end. Without feeling, there could be, in truth, no positive work for social well-being. And if it is sympathy for one another that is the chief contributor to the betterment of a community, hatred of others has been only less powerful in producing social activity and developing social coöperation and organization. Was it not, for example,

¹ Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chaps. VI, VII.

hatred of her oppressors that made a unity out of the few gathered remnants of exiled Israel? It is this "ethical dualism," as Professor Ross styles it, which, striving at the same time to promote sympathy for the members of a group and hatred for its enemy, has had so much to do with the development of social consciousness and the creation of social sentiment. Thus, while we honor reason, knowledge, and judgment and realize that no well-ordered society can exist without the proper exercise of each, still we must not ignore that emotional side of life which gives us both good and bad impulses. Without these impulses, reason and judgment would have little cause to act. Without feeling, there is not — there never has been — any social unity.

In its relation to social activity, social feeling manifests itself in two ways; through certain beliefs and through tradition. Beliefs have an emotional foundation. Let us first take up the consideration of individual beliefs. A boy hears other boys telling about their exploits in swimming or fighting — desirable achievements to the listening boy. Soon feeling within himself untried capabilities, the boy ventures to believe that he, too, can do these desirable things, and acting upon the courage engendered by this belief, he tries. Sometimes he succeeds. Then is his desire achieved; his belief justified. And his consequent satisfaction generates in him such an emotional state as will serve to create in him, when the occasion arrives, the belief that he can do other desirable things. What is true of a boy is true of a man. Because of experiences which began in early boyhood, he has believed in himself; and acting upon what he has believed, he has often succeeded. And as a result of action which accomplishes what he desires and what he believes himself capable of doing, he experiences a fine emotion. Nor does he lose confidence in himself because, at times, he did not succeed in accomplishing what he believed possible to himself, for these occasions are soon pushed beyond the horizon of memory.

In much the same way, social beliefs, such as a belief in the "manifest destiny" of a people, or the coming greatness of the "fatherland," are developed by groups of men. These beliefs grow by precept upon precept, by shibboleths, and by the other vague symbols of deep emotion; they grow until they sweep a

whole nation or a whole race, into the range of their profound emotional appeals. They call to their aid feelings based on reverence for the past or aroused by glorious hopes for the future. They appeal to emotions belonging to the historic activities of the past; they lure men to war by suggesting glory, plunder, perhaps undying fame. Finally, it is social emotions, stirred to reality in some such ways, that develop into those impelling forces which we call the "spirit" of a country, forces which so often enable a tyrant or a puppet king to hoodwink the common people and anæsthetize them with the specious argument of those who must get others to fight their battles for them: "*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*" And how often is the name of God upon the lips of the militarist! It is no accident, as Giddings has pointed out, that an age of militarism is ever an age of strong beliefs.

Closely allied with belief, as a means whereby emotion is intensified in its expression, is tradition and reverence for authority. Because of the necessity for social order, tradition and reverence have a secure foundation in the emotions. Tradition has all the glamour of the illusively distant past, in which, somewhere, the golden age lies buried. And only as we return to something approaching the ideals of the past, so we say, shall we ever have a civilization worth while. The norms of conduct, of social relations, were established in that long ago by wise men, who are never to return to this earth. In their words lies authority; and it is tradition that preserves those words for us. "The greatness that once was Rome" lays its dead hand upon the living present and offers certain guidance; and in sharp contrast to the vices of the leaders of to-day, are the vague virtues of the dead. But coupled with man's reverence for the mysterious is his natural wish for the certainty which only dogmatic assertion can supply. In his restless struggle with new forces and new situations he finds great release from the strain of attention, in a return to the attitude of submission to authority. What emotions, then, do tradition and authority call forth? They arouse awe for the authoritative and aged; they give peace to the struggling and wearied spirit, for, with the release from doubt, most powerful inhibitor of action, comes the certainty of faith and the emotions which action, in the face of uncertainty, always

brings. And what more than these feelings of confident certainty can be desired? Yes, there is something more — the certainty of critically tested truth, the joy of victory through struggle. But these only the heroic soul can know.

The reverence for authority is, in fact, one of the prime influences in the development of concerted social action. A member of a community who knows a given subject and has a reputation for authority can influence the whole community by the expression of his judgment. But the influence of authority is not confined to an individual; it sometimes exerts its influence from certain parts of a community. Thus, in the states of the Federal Union, the opinion of people from certain regions in regard to the choice of a President, the decision of a court, or the passing of a law, would have much greater weight than that of others. While the way in which tradition, authority, and custom affect social ideals and institutions will be treated in the chapter on social control, it should be observed at this point that this trinity of influences are products of man's mind struggling with the problem of how to secure psychical and social adjustments in a community composed of "men of many minds." The reverence for the traditional and the customary, to be found so universally in early society, is, as Bagehot has remarked, "the cement of society" which holds it together.¹ Even science, with its well-earned reputation, to give the exact truth, has a strong influence on the community; speaks for it with the authority of knowledge.

Knowledge. — Knowledge becomes the directing power of the mind. If feeling is the dynamic social agent — the social steam — knowledge is the great throttle which regulates the flow of this energizing power. The contemplation of facts will have a tendency to calm impulsive social action, provided all the varied conditions are brought into view. Contemplation has this tranquilizing effect because, by allowing all sides of a question to be considered, by calmly facing consequences, it inhibits activity, the natural expression of emotion; and feeling cools quickly, once its outflow in activity has been interrupted. Important as feeling is, therefore, it is sometimes a dangerous social agent when unchecked; knowledge and calm delibera-

¹ *Physics and Politics*, International Scientific Series, New York, 1898, pp. 184, 185.

tion are, indeed, essential to the concerted action of the various parts of society.

Social knowledge is dependent upon communication for its dissemination throughout the social group. If the community is so sparsely settled as to render individuals, or even small groups, isolated in their life, there can be no concerted social activity of the whole group. Indeed, many of the difficulties of socialization are due simply to a lack of understanding; we cannot, therefore, estimate the power of universal knowledge in the development of common thought. The influence of the telegraph has often been commented upon. That a message can now be flashed around the world in nine and one half minutes, giving the happenings of the Orient to the Occident almost as soon as they occur, and causing people to think the same thoughts at the same time, is of inestimable value in making social knowledge universal. Not less remarkable is the influence of the telephone, which spreads knowledge of all kinds so thoroughly that anything which goes on in a community may quickly be known by every one. Through the influence of these great inventions, together with the postal system and wireless telegraphy, a community is receiving the same information at the same hour; and to a large extent each individual is forming the same judgment about any important movement. Moreover, in such methods of communication as the telegraph, telephone, and newspaper, the stimulation of personal contact — especially the mass stimulation of the crowd — is lacking. Each member of a community receives the information and can calmly consider it. These means of communication, then, give an opportunity for the rapid and exact formation of social judgments and manifestation of the social will.

Before the time of modern inventions, however, when new and sparsely settled communities had little or no communication with each other, things were different indeed. It took months, sometimes even years, to communicate with the distant parts of a community. And when such conditions prevailed, there could be no common social knowledge.¹ But since the introduction of the rural free delivery system and the

¹ For an illustration of the social effects of this isolation upon a religious denomination see Gillin, *The Dunkers — A Sociological Interpretation*, New York, 1906, pp. 159, 160, 164-166.

telephone the farming communities of the West are responding to a new life. These new methods of communication increase the size of the social group which may now share the same opinions and feelings — that is, they enlarge the social mind — and make the common sentiments more rational than they could otherwise have been. Much still remains to be done to perfect the machinery whereby the North and the South, the East and the West, shall have the same mind; yet that possibility is much nearer to-day than ever before. And increased travel, made possible by cheap railroad fares and the automobile and motor cycle, and the increase in student migrations from one section of the country to another, will gradually supply the personal contact which the newspaper cannot supply.

The effect of this widespread knowledge, in the interaction and reaction of the individuals of a social group, is very great. Let the market report that wheat has advanced five cents a bushel, and many a farmer will start for the market to dispose of his surplus grain. Acting independently of others, the individual may forget that others are possibly doing what he is; but if, perchance, each farmer should stop to think that others may be influenced by the same idea, he would remember that the sudden rushing to market of so much grain would cause the price to fall. Again, if a farmer acquires a new quality of seed, a new method of cultivating the soil, or a new machine, his neighbor will desire to have the same knowledge and the same advantage; and what he acquires will soon be desired by yet another. In this way does knowledge, passing from one to another, influence the whole group. For its dissemination broadens the consciousness of kind; and the realization that all possess the same knowledge stimulates not only individual action, but also the action of the group. Widespread knowledge of a thing is, therefore, most important in the establishment of a social judgment, the starting point of rational social action.

Social Will. — Social will arises primarily out of social feeling. It is an expression of choice, combined with persistent desire to accomplish a given object. If “the will is the active expression of the soul’s meaning,” the social will is an assertion of the determination of society to perform certain actions, which it believes in. And wherever there is a general determination —

instinctive, dimly conscious, or clearly conscious — to promote the interests of society at large, to avoid evil influences, and to adopt the forms of progress necessary to advance the social life, we have an expression of the social will. In the primal movements of society, will asserted itself as a result of a blind impulse; but in modern society it is guided by knowledge, and finds expression in a thousand ways through public law. Sometimes, even now, however, the social will, incited to action by mob stimulation, results in mob action — rushing to its object in a blind fury, and as swiftly dissolving when the fury is past. But science has made it more and more possible to the social will to turn the whole force of society toward the accomplishment of a great social end, for the scientific spirit has introduced patient search for facts before a decision is reached, diligent and careful consideration of these facts, and deliberate purpose formed only upon the findings. Thus the whole rational mental process of each individual has a chance to act. The whole tendency of civilization is, in fact, to impose upon action such checks as will make for deliberation, for the curbing of unrestrained feeling by careful thought. To take one kind of example, assemblies have devised safeguards against the results of mob psychology like the parliamentary devices of motions to table, to adjourn, to refer matters to a committee, and to require several readings of a bill — and on different days — before its final passage. The sole purpose of these various devices is to secure deliberation, in order that the social will, instead of being stimulated by uncontrolled feeling, may be directed by deliberate thought and calm judgment.

The Power of Psychological Forces. — We find, then, by close observation of society as it exists to-day, that the psychological forces are the essential bonds of union and those to which we must look for all of our higher social culture. Thus the conservation of these psychic forces and their proper direction are of the utmost importance. Professors Small and Vincent have pointed out that at a given moment in any community, psychological force is a fixed quantity.¹ That is, if we take a statical view of the relationships of society in all of its varied parts, we observe that there is only a certain amount of power being exerted; and if this energy is directed at one point, it will be with-

¹ Small and Vincent, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 332.

drawn from another. If social attention is concentrated on war, commerce and culture must be neglected; if it is centered on money getting, the spiritual interests must suffer. The physicist's principle of the conservation of energy and the transmutation of power can therefore be applied to the psychical forces of society. These writers further maintain that psychical energy cannot long be concentrated on a single object. As this theory has been demonstrated to be true of the individual mind, it is probably true of the social mind. Yesterday tuberculosis, to-day the vice problem, and to-morrow infant mortality absorbs the popular attention. At any rate, in the history of social life we find a constant succession of centralization and decentralization of this social energy. If it flows steadily in one direction for a given time, it is not long before the ebb tide sets in; and while it is thus centered in one point temporarily, it is withdrawn from other points. There is a possibility, too, that the moral energy of man is subjected to these same laws of constant quantity and of centralization. It would be well, therefore, if reformers and legislators would devise more methods to cure a trouble while interest is aroused. If the movement can be institutionalized with a large enough constituency to support it, after the popular enthusiasm wanes, the social emotion aroused will not be in vain.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make a list of the social feelings which operate to produce social action in your community. Which one, if any, is predominant?
2. Name three instances in the history of the United States of social action in each of which feeling, rather than thoughtful consideration, led to the action.

3. Cite four cases of social action by a nation in which reason predominated.

4. Show, by citing and analyzing, an instance in which belief stirred strong emotions and led to social action.

5. What type of leader appears when the mental condition of a people is such that it is moved by feeling rather than by reason?

6. Cite an instance showing how tradition or reverence for authority stirred deep feelings and incited social action.

7. What effect upon the quality of the social mind will the coming of large numbers of immigrants have upon a country? That is, will it tend to be moved more by feelings than by reason, or *vice versa*?

8. What bearing would the development of social centers used as places for the discussion of public questions, probably have upon the character of the social mind and upon social action?

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL CONTROL¹

The Meaning of Social Control. — The orderly movement of society could not be brought about by accident or maintained without regulative forces; it is not an automatic machine which runs without directive agencies, or at the behest of the blind forces of a physical environment. Nor does it develop and function merely by reason of the unconscious social forces at work in its constituent members, each individual more or less blind to the social interests of the group and intent only upon his own selfish interests. In the chapter on Social Organization there were enumerated different constituent parts of society called, after Spencer, the regulating organs. In his regulating system Spencer points out the necessity of this great social function of control. And in Ross's admirable book on *Social Control* we find a special and complete presentation of the subject.

The blind social forces do, of course, play a certain part in the control of society. Ward has designated the process by the happy term "synergy," or the working together of unconscious individual forces towards a common end.² But, although social control is sometimes automatic and unconscious, society is moved in part by conscious purpose; indeed, a directive agency plays an increasingly prominent part in society as social evolution proceeds. Thus while most of the elements of social control are to be found in the reactions of individual life, still we find that there must be a larger agency representing the social mass — that is, a social mind to give to society an orderly arrangement. Even if every individual loved his neighbor as himself and observed conscientiously the Golden Rule, there

¹ Professor Ross has made this field peculiarly his own. His book, *Social Control*, is the best contribution to the subject. For much of what is best in this chapter we are indebted to his brilliant chapters.

² Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 171-184.

would still be necessity for a central controlling force to keep people in order; for each individual, moving, as he does, in a direction of his own, and seeking to satisfy his own particular wants, would constantly find himself in opposition to his fellows. If, for example, two well-intentioned people should desire to occupy the same land at the same time, the right of the matter might be a difficult question for individuals to decide; but the public mind, as embodied in the law and the courts, is prepared to settle the question. Take, for a moment, the figure of a procession.¹ Some one must tell individuals how and when to enter the procession, how to keep step with one another; some one must give them place, direction, and time of movement.

In its beginnings, at least, social control is largely negative; the people are taught that certain things are tabooed. And to the very last, social control remains — to a greater or less degree — a restraint. When population is widely scattered, as it was, for instance, in the pioneer settlements of the United States, the theory of public social regulation is that the best government is that in which there is the least government. With a growing population, however, the consequent multiplication of contacts, and the mingling of different nationalities and races, the questions requiring regulation increase; and, in the absence of common traditions, a common religion, the ties of kinship, and similar unofficial and spontaneous regulative agencies, such regulation must perforce be more largely public and official.

In social control there are two elements. One belongs to the unconscious, disinterested activities of society; the other arises directly out of man's conscious desire for a controlling force. The church, for example, was instituted rather for culture than for control; but it became incidentally — and sometimes with conscious intent — a powerful agent of control. On the other hand, the king, the standing army, the police force, and in fact, the entire political government, are instituted for the purpose of control.

The Basis of Social Order. — The basis of social order is found in individual desires and actions and the reactions resulting therefrom. We have discussed elsewhere the power of sympathy; this power, by making an individual recognize the

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, p. 1.

position of others, so modifies his actions toward his fellows that he hesitates to take a position which is positively detrimental to others. The desire for sociability is another controlling force; only non-social creatures can exist without some degree of social order. Carnivorous animals that hunt alone and desire to be alone have no need, of course, of a social order; but should they desire sociability and prepare to perpetuate it, they would have to change their method of life. So, too, in primitive human groups, sociability cannot exist without at least the beginning of social order. But in civilized society, while sociability plays, on the whole, a comparatively unimportant part, it does, in the minor associations of life, exert a wholesome restraint upon man's combative nature. The boss and his gang, the social club, the church, the playground, and the neighborhood, all testify to its power, even yet.¹

The Sense of Justice.—From the individualistic standpoint, perhaps, one of the strongest influences for social control is that exerted by a sense of justice. Originating as it does in the sense of sympathy, it later develops positive characteristics of its own. And were there no other law-inducing influences, the sense of justice would be sufficient to establish some sort of social order.² Justice is, in fact, the fundamental principle in all good government and, for that matter, in all phases of normal social life. Even in the social give-and-take of the child, this sense of fair play develops naturally as the child begins to form a conception of self.³ To a very limited degree a sense of justice is to be found among the lowest tribes; but in the highly civilized nation, it is a full expression of the moral sense combined with the sense of power. What was an instinct in early childhood becomes later a strong controlling force. That is, a sense of justice exerts this influence when the members of a group are equals; but where there arise social classes, either by reason of conquest or exploitation, it fails. It is just these class differences, however, which, in the regulation of the class relationships, give rise to positive law, the formal expression of social control.⁴ Modern democ-

¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. III.

² For a different view see *ibid.*, p. 34.

³ Baldwin, *Ethical and Social Interpretations*, 1913, pp. 15-30.

⁴ See Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. IV. This is a slight expansion of Ross's exposition with emphasis upon the historic development.

racies, it is true, have taught a great deal about equality and fraternity; but when one searches for the basis of their practical government, one finds — especially where there are diverse racial characteristics among the governed — that justice founded on positive regulation is the dominant controlling influence. Fraternity and equality, as sentiments in the national life, may be of some service in developing friendly feeling; but justice is the only formal and well-established principle of social action. And just in proportion as modern governments emphasize the development and maintenance of justice among all members of the nation, will they settle those difficulties which arise from the attempt to socialize different races in the same community.

The Resentment of Injustice. — The resentment of injustice, or the individual reaction, is also essential to the development of social order. Even after the law of natural justice expressed in “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” is softened by the sentiments of civil justice, the right is still maintained to resent injustice to any degree and in any manner whatever. It is, indeed, that very resentment against injustice which has helped to make so many of our laws. Man encroaches, for example, upon the rights of his fellows; and knowing that we should resent such an injustice toward ourselves, we resent it for others because of our sympathy for them. If there were no resentment, there would be no strife; and without strife, the weak would perish because society took no notice of them.¹

Thus, through the interplay of the activities of separate individuals, there is an opportunity to work out a natural order of society. And were no other agency to appear than the simple methods arising out of the normal activities of human society, there would still be established a social life with a more or less orderly arrangement.²

Control through Belief. — The agencies of social control now dominant are a development. Some of them did not exist among men's first devices to regulate their relations to one another. Law and even public opinion developed late. Ceremony, custom, and superstitious beliefs were the first agencies working toward social control.

The belief in supernatural sanctions to conduct arose early.

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. V.

² *Ibid.*, Chap. VI.

Legal and social sanctions are paralyzed sometimes by the superior power of the offender; they are expensive and, after all, only reach the outward deed; and finally they do not control the motives of the heart.¹ But the chief reason, perhaps, for the development of supernatural sanctions is that, as has been indicated in a previous chapter,² when man reached the animistic stage of culture, religious practices became fundamental life activities. First the spirits inhabiting natural objects and later the gods or god of the tribe were interested in the doings, in the very life processes of the individuals of the group. Here was a tremendous force brought to bear upon the inadequately socialized impulses of men. Their belief in these gods, more potent, more wise than they, went to the very foundations of conduct and seriously modified the motives of primitive men.

These sanctions, as Professor Ross has pointed out, may be divided into five classes. The elementary belief controlling conduct is that there is a supernatural being, or beings, who follows men's doings, rewards the good, and punishes the bad. A second group of sanctions is to be found in the beliefs typified by the Hindu doctrine of transmigration of souls. The souls are reborn in this world — the bad into the bodies of animals or low caste men, the good into the bodies of Brahmins, Devas, or kings. Every motive of the Hindu is colored by the belief in these definite rewards for approved social conduct. A third kind of sanction rests upon the belief in an after life, spent, as the case may warrant, either in an everlasting heaven of delights or a perpetual hell of torture. One has only to read medieval theology or see medieval paintings to appreciate the strength of these sanctions in deterring certain classes of people from socially undesirable acts. A fourth type of sanction is dependent upon the penances exacted by ecclesiastics. The sinner's punishment does not wait for another life; it begins here and now. He is banished from communion; he is avoided; he is denied confession, connubial rights, and the ordinary companionship of associates. These are punishments which make amends for evil conduct and in some unexplained way purify the soul from sin. The fifth type appears when the person to be controlled is bound by tender ties with deceased relatives

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 127.

² Part II, Chap. XII.

or friends. The spirits of these loved ones look down from heaven and see the actions of those who remain on earth; the mother her erring, but beloved, boy or girl; the wife her husband; the child its parent, who is resisting the appeals of the church. Thus the love for the departed, combined with a belief that the deceased lives and knows and cares, constitutes a controlling force of great strength.

Control by Social Suggestion. — But control by means of legal penalties, social opinion, and belief in supernatural sanctions are not the only methods by which the wills of men have been brought into subjection. Sanctions are quite conscious in their operation and depend for much of their power upon the fear of consequences which they are able to instill. Social suggestion, though none the less effective, works much less in the open. Somewhat resembling hypnosis, social suggestion operates subconsciously, for the most part, because the individual, while awake and conscious of his acts, does not understand clearly from what motives he is performing them. His response to social suggestion, therefore, is mute, but eloquent, testimony to the strength of his social impulses. At all times we are doing things, when in the company of others, which we should not do when alone. This social atmosphere which we breathe presses upon us with a force often unrecognized, but which really moves us almost whithersoever it listeth.

Social suggestion varies in its force with the bodily and mental condition of the person upon whom it operates; one who is fatigued, diseased, or nervously worn out is most readily controlled. It varies also with the prestige and authority of him who offers the suggestion; it varies with the mass or volume of suggestion, which wears down resistance by the sheer force of authority, or by means of the familiarity which reiteration brings; and finally it varies with the effectiveness of the social provisions designed to prevent the entrance of conflicting suggestions into the mind of the individual.

Suggestion secures its results by a number of methods and devices, example being one of the important means. We elevate to a pedestal and crown with a wreath the man who displays desirable social qualities. We build shafts to the memory of the brave, the heroic, and the successful; we canonize the recluse and apotheosize the martyr. The glamour round

their deeds stirs the emotions of the young and creates in them certain social desires; but in the interests of social welfare, the vices of these same heroes, martyrs, and saints are forgotten.

Faith in the unrealized potentialities of men is another method of social suggestion. Many are those who had courses of conduct suggested to them by some one who expected great things from them; many are those who have been spurred on to live up to another's faith in them. The very secret of the power of the Gospel is to be found in its sublime faith in the universal capacity of men to achieve salvation from their weaker and baser selves. Prophet, apostle, and modern evangelist, as well as statesman, admiral, and king, well know the force of suggestion conveyed through an expression of faith in a man's ability to do the seemingly impossible. Again, social suggestion operates through the force of ideals conveyed by the written and the spoken word. Vicious reading matter is tabooed; descriptions of lewd, brutal, and criminal acts are forbidden; seditious speech or writing is suppressed. And not only is literature censored so that the noble idealism of youth may not too soon be shattered by acquaintance with the hard facts of life, but even conversation is directed in the interests of social purity. All these precautions are based upon the acknowledged truth that Vice

"too often seen, familiar with its face
We first endure, then pity, then embrace."

The most striking example of suggestion for the control of men is to be found in that combination of all these various methods which we employ in our systems of education. By means of example, reiterated precept, stern discipline, the emotional stimulation of play, and the rough-and-tumble democracy of the playground, and through faith in their capabilities expressed by one for whom they have either high regard or great fear, the plastic minds of the young are molded into a more or less uniform type.

Not less potent is the social suggestion exercised by custom and tradition — a molding process that is commenced long before a child begins his schooling. By reason of their connection with the home life, with all of the deepest and most

lasting emotions, custom and tradition show a strength second to no other influence. How often the language learned and the habits formed in early childhood sticks to one like burs from the forest jungle! Certainly if custom dominates in such socially insignificant matters, how much greater an influence has it on the customs affecting social policies and ideals! Moreover, the traditions handed down at the crisis-periods of human development — the period when the child hungers and thirsts for facts and explanations more even than for his more than welcome daily bread, and the period of adolescence with its house of dreams — exercise an influence, the potency of which can best be estimated on the religious side. Endowed with all the prestige of age these traditions are passed on from one generation to the next. And those customs and traditions having to do with social control are enforced by the conscious recognition of the wise that such customs and traditions constitute the very props of social order.¹

Control of Social Religion. — After society reaches a certain stage of development, the legalistic foundations of religion give way. In the latter days of the Roman Empire the gods of Greece and Rome faded into myths. Their penalties no longer inspired fear; their rewards no longer tempted man to curb his selfish and anti-social desires. And legal religion, in many countries to-day, is undergoing the same process of decay; it has ceased to be the right hand of social control, and in increasing numbers men refuse to be curbed in their propensities by the fear of a god whose laws they desire to break.

In Rome, the period of decaying belief in the old gods and their sanctions was also the beginning of national decay. The stern morality of the earlier days disappeared; in the higher circles of society the sanctity of the home and of family relationships vanished. One of the very reasons for the success of Christianity in the Roman Empire was the fact that it supplied a living faith in place of the dying faiths of the Romans. It supplied, it is true, a legal religion in the place of a legal religion; but it supplied more than that. Along with its legality there went the inconsistent but closely amalgamated element of fraternalism — a fraternalism which was already to be found in the various guilds and fraternities of the Empire, but which

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, Chaps. XII-XV.

lacked, in these, the emotional content of fraternity under the Fatherhood of one God.

The sense of brotherhood that came with the belief in a god who was represented as a merciful father to his children gave to early Christianity a remarkable controlling power; for the wild natures of men were just released from the superstitious fear of gods who did not feel with them in their miseries. The one saving force in the Roman Empire, therefore, was the Christian church. That that church learned to rule from the Empire and changed its form in order that it might rule the more easily the disorganized masses of uncontrolled people within and without the confines of that ancient state only testifies to the lack of religious insight in its leaders, not to the inability of social religion to control its adherents. And even after this ecclesiastical machinery had well-nigh choked the spiritual life of the church, she still remained a fraternity that gripped men with great power; she was still the instrument of a social religion; she still opened up the wells of emotion in the soul of men hungry for peace with the Infinite.

That, without adulteration of any sort, this social religion would have become an efficient method of social control cannot be proved from history; for, except in the isolated cases of individuals like St. Augustine, Luther, and St. Frances of Assisi, the experiment has never been tried. That, with a more completely developed social consciousness among men, a more highly socialized population, and the proclamation of such a religion by men earnest and sincere in their faith, it would meet the needs of men and prove an efficient means of bringing the will of men into subjection to the social necessities of our day, is the belief of an increasing number of thoughtful souls in our generation. Is it, indeed, without significance that the struggling, downtrodden classes of to-day hail the name of Him who was the first to proclaim a social religion of brotherhood for all men under one common Father? ¹

Control by Personal Ideals. — In society men can lift themselves by their bootstraps. The ideals which prevail in a man's group have immense power to mold his animal and egoistic impulses as well as his coldly calculating intellectual processes. He is moved by the power of ideals which appeal

¹ Cf. *ibid.*, Chap. XVI.

to his self-respect or which are forced upon him by his class or party.

Thus we have, according to Ross, a separation of these personal ideals into two classes. There is the group-ideal of conduct, which may in time be made a personal ideal by each individual in the group; and there is the personal ideal which a man creates for himself out of regard for his self-respect, for the sake of his honor, or, if he does not realize his ideal, from the contemplation of his shame. It is the control of type which causes men in different classes to be governed by different ideals. For example, the minister might be guilty of conduct unbecoming a minister while doing what would be considered proper for the laborer or the policeman. It may even happen that a man's own ideals are much lower than those to which society holds him; but he is true to the higher ideals because of the consciousness that he is a member of a class which he must not disgrace. Custom and habit rule him. On the other hand, the man who is critical of self, who has escaped from an unthinking subservience to social custom or to class ideals, asks himself what kind of conduct he ought to require of himself in order to retain his own sense of moral and personal worth. He is coerced into a course of conduct, not by the opinion of others, but by his own judgment of what his conduct will mean to himself, and to society. His conscience is not determined by fear of the reprobation of his fellows or of his class, but by the sufferings which he will undergo from the whip of his own moral judgment. This personal ideal, it is true, may not control as many people as does the fear of the disapprobation of their class; but the type and the personal ideal together exert enormous influence in the determination of men's conduct in society.¹

Social Control by Ceremony. — Who among us, even in this democratic country and in this rationalistic age, has not felt the spell of ceremony? Every act of unusual significance is surrounded by mysterious rites, whether among the primitive savages of Australia or the highly civilized peoples of Europe or America. And it is not only the imagination of the child or of the ignorant man that is enthralled; ceremony stirs elementary emotions even in the souls of the cultivated, who

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, Chaps. XVII, XVIII.

understand its motive and have seen through its mystery, as if by the force of some dim memory of paths once trodden by innumerable ancestors. This mysterious and complicated series of unintelligible acts hushes into awe and reverence the wild surgings of elemental passion. And under the spell of these elementary emotions, the will is dominated by the insinuating suggestions of those in charge of the ceremony and the whole person is subjected to the influence of the presiding personality or group.

Ceremony gathers about our most sacred institutions and tinges them with an impressiveness they do not naturally possess and which they sorely need, if they are to withstand the shock of unrestrained human impulses and desires. Marriage, the institution which bridles for us one of the most ungovernable passions of man and brings it into subjection to the welfare of society; initiation among primitive folk into the responsibilities of manhood and womanhood; entrance into the church, or lodge, or business corporation; the disposition of the dead, that act by which man is reminded of his connection with other beings and with the supernatural sanctions which are attached to the dead — all these are occasions when it is important for the welfare of society that each onlooker be most impressively reminded that he has important social duties.¹

Control by Means of Art. — By means of poetry, eloquence, painting, sculpture, music, and its various other forms, art has power to control man through the domination of his feelings. When men must be quickly fused into a living unity, the emotions are always appealed to; and nothing moves the emotions like art. Take, for example, the Psalm-singing of Cromwell's Ironsides and the songs of the German soldiery as they marched to the front in the present war. Art, moreover, arouses social sympathy. It is like play, which really began as an art; for, by exciting their emotions it loosens the restraints which separate men and it binds them together by a common feeling. Its appeal is universal; the sentiments which it arouses are common to all men. It is used in war, in religion, and in the establishment of a new order of things. Everywhere is the æsthetic sense exploited in the interests of society. Saints and heroes are painted with beatific countenances, while devils and their

¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. XIX.

human disciples are given the most detestable forms. And whereas moral excellence is described in such æsthetic terms as to make the quality intelligible and desirable to all, anti-social conduct, on the other hand, is stigmatized by adjectives and pictured in colors which are associated with the undesirable things of everyday life.

There is still another way in which art fastens upon our common longings and converts them to social purposes. The soul oppressed with the pettiness, the brevity, and the insufficiency of life's endeavors is given hope for the fulfillment of its vast desires; for art points to the stability of the nation, the immutability of the group, and the mightiness of the human race. All may be fleeting, so far as the individual is concerned; but the lofty buildings, the vast territory, or the achievements of a state give to the individual a sense of security and permanence.

Another thing that art does for us is to glorify our social symbols. The flag becomes a thing of great beauty; and the splendor of precious metals and jewels is used to draw men's attention from the suffering and self-abnegation of the individual for the sake of the group. War, missions, and individual sacrifices for public service are all thus glorified. Again, art pictures the worker as the happiest of all men. He is "God's nobleman," the "bulwark of the state"; and his pains and deprivations are "heroic joys." The nation for which he is asked to die, or to live through days of painful toil, is a fair maiden or matron appealing to the deepest and strongest feelings in man, the emotions stirred by thought of wife, sweetheart, or mother. Thus, national types like the Gibson girl in physical appearance spring up and moral types like that of Christian in *Pilgrim's Progress*.¹ Thus the artist fascinates our imaginations with new types of conduct to which we naturally may be alien and pictures saint and hero in such a way that they become models to which we are irresistibly drawn. Thus does art lure men on to the great and noble deeds from which they naturally recoil, yet which are so necessary for society's welfare.

Control through the Influence of Personal Suggestion. — Probably the first steps in social control were taken by dominant

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, p. 276.

personalities. Leadership and submission are to be observed even in animal life. And although the influence of what we call personality is especially noticeable in primitive societies where the social structure, being much less developed, plays a subordinate part in social control, yet the influence of example is not to be despised, even among a people with the most highly evolved social structures. The great man plays his part in society to-day just as always; although democracy has transformed him from a captain of armies to a captain of industry or a leader in education and thought, she still has need of him.

The conditions favoring the control of a group by a strong personality are, as stated by Professor Ross, great excitement, the aggregation of individuals in mobs and masses, and "times of alarm and stress." But the causes of his authority are to be found, in part, at least, in the natural qualities which the leader himself possesses. He has a fine physique, unusual mental qualities — for example, strength of will and imagination — an ecstatic temperament, eloquence, faith in himself and his cause, courage and persistence, coolness in excitement, generosity and love, or a number of these in combination. And the force of such qualities is supplemented by the admiration aroused in men by the social distinction which a leader has either inherited or achieved through his abilities.

In the natural development of leadership, now some of these conditions and personal qualities count most and now others. In primitive societies, where control is by persons rather than by social institutions, the emphasis is upon natural ability. And in these early societies, control is based upon fear, trust, and either a selfish or a disinterested admiration. With the growth of disinterested admiration, there develops "a charm of persons" which seizes upon the very citadel of man's being — the imagination and the feelings.

And, just as in a society which is military in its organization conditions themselves are very favorable to the ascendancy of personal influence, so, too, does racial stratification favor hero-worship. Again, feudal relations, in which the conquered at least so far yield to the conquerors as to accept the inferior position, promote the power of personal suggestion. It is democracy, indeed, which is least favorable to the control of

the many by a single leader. With the formation of social devices which make for the wide dissemination of culture, with the opening of the doors of opportunity to every capable man, there goes a lessening of those social conditions which give artificial emphasis to natural differences between men. Leadership now becomes preëminence of ability — a leadership which we shall never cease to need. For democracy in political, religious, industrial, and social life raises the dignity of the average man, develops to the utmost his responsibility, and therefore diminishes the value of prestige. Thus does democracy, in emphasizing the importance of the common man, destroy the bonds of the old social control and bring into operation other forces of quite a different character.

It may excite surprise that society should command the services of leaders for purposes of social control; for the strong man, in seeking his own ends, may wish to control other men in the interest, not of society, but of himself. Now, just what are the motives which lead the powerful personality to link himself with those tendencies which make for social control?

He does so because he is usually a man of remarkable mental discernment and sees that the issues of his own life are wrapped up in the larger issues of the group to which he belongs. If he has noble enthusiasm and ambitions, if he loves power and achievement, he perceives, for one thing, that the objects and achievements of society are so much more worth while than anything which he might desire for his own selfish purposes. And, too, he realizes that, by controlling others in the interests of society, he can accomplish infinitely more than he ever could alone. The constituted authorities of State and Church, the ideals which possess the soul of a people, and the customs of unnumbered generations, yield slowly to any one man, be he never so powerful. If he oppose them, he can accomplish but little, but with them he can move the nation. Moreover, the comparative immortality of society impresses his imagination; his deeds, standing alone, will probably perish from the memory of men, but linked with the fortunes of the community, they are assured undying fame. And rare is the great leader who does not crave a share in the eternal character of the group's achievements. Hence, in degrees varying with both the character of the great man and the prevailing conditions of society,

the influence of his personality is devoted to the interests of society.¹

Social Control through Intellectual Factors. — An appeal to the feelings is not the only method of controlling individuals; another way is to influence the reason and the will. This intellectual influence may be secured by offering enlightenment, by creating an illusion, or by influencing social valuations.

(a) A man is often influenced in his conduct by having the consequences of his acts presented to him; for considerations of prudence determine the actions of most of us. The social group, by disseminating information as to the physical consequences of personal habits and actions, for example, may control a man by showing him the effects of vice upon his own welfare and happiness. Thus the modern war against vice and the present health campaigns are both largely an appeal to a man's appreciation of his own welfare or the welfare of those with whom he is most intimately connected. Or society tries to bring home to the individual the psychical results of individual conduct. We inform the individual that an action, repeated often enough, becomes a habit, that one kind of vice often drags another in its train, and that mental delinquency in one line brings certain other mental consequences in its train. We say, "Sow a thought and reap an act; sow an act and reap a habit; sow a habit and reap a character; sow a character and reap a destiny."

But besides showing a man the physical or psychical consequences upon himself, the organized agencies of social control may inform him of the social consequences of ill-advised conduct. From the reaction of individuals whose rights he has infringed, or from the reaction of society which, like a kind of superparent, cares for the interests of all its children by curbing the excessively egoistic conduct of some, he suffers loss of social esteem, the respect of his fellows, and the honor which society loves to bestow upon the deserving. These reactions are a means of teaching a man that his individual actions affect others than himself — a lesson but slowly learned by the best of us. This sense of social solidarity the group tries, at a very early stage, to develop in its members; and gradually each member learns to consider his own welfare in terms of the wel-

¹ Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXI.

fare of the community. Says Ross, "History records the reflections of the Elite upon the conduct of life, but neglects the forces that held in their humble social orbits the yeoman and the artisan. Yet it is safe to surmise that in all free communities there was an exudation of proverb and aphorism, gnome and parable, legend and moral tale, tending to bring about a canny adjustment of men to the requirements of life in common. That underground growth we call folklore was full of salty maxims and pithy counsels which gave shape to multitudes of obscure, unhorizoned lives."

In all these ways does enlightenment assist in that socializing process which we call social control. These methods have their drawbacks, it is true; for social morality and personal welfare are sometimes at variance. There is war, for example, or self-sacrifice to disease in order that the group may be saved; and, too, education does not always supply motives strong enough to control people of ordinary mental caliber; knowledge of the truth does not always induce that emotional impulse which constitutes the motive power of action. On the whole, however, the more enlightened the people are, the better does this method of social control work; as society comes to the point in its intellectual development where reason rules, rather than fear or impulse, control by information becomes more effective. The method has the double advantage, therefore, that, as society becomes group conscious, enlightenment is increasingly effective and that, on the other hand, as enlightenment grows in influence, society becomes more conscious of itself and of its needs. Thus control becomes less and less a matter of instinct and sympathy and more a matter of rational consideration.

(b) Another device by which the judgment of the individual is swayed is illusion. When information and intelligence will not secure social control, some other method must be found. One of these is to employ deception and misrepresentation, to use half-truths and prejudices concerning, not only the supernatural realm of religion, but the everyday experiences of men. And because most people are neither strictly logical in their thinking nor scientific in their criticism of what purports to be truth, because men seldom are entirely free from prejudices of one sort or another, this method has considerable chance of

success. A few examples will suffice to show how common and widespread are the illusions which still exercise control over men. The theory is still prevalent that the righteous will never be found forsaken, that his children will never need to beg bread. Originally, when there was a religious sanction for right conduct, such a theory had some significance; but as interpreted in modern times, it is pseudorational. In spite of our desire to make it the truth, we are forced to admit that this axiom of conduct does not always correspond with the hard facts of life. But our heroes of the drama, of song, of story, and of theology, all triumph. The worthy man succeeds; the mean man suffers. The soldier's widow and orphans will be bountifully cared for. And he who dies in the morning of his life gains fame and immortality.

"The brave
Die never. Being deathless, they but change
Their country's arms for more, their country's heart."¹

*O, fortunata mors, quæ naturæ debita pro patria est potissimum reddita!*² (Happy the death of him who pays the debt of nature for his country's sake.) On such illusions are built most of the superstructure of militarism.

Of a similar stripe are the political illusions of a group somewhat more developed than is the military society. The doctrine of the divine right of kings, so long dominant in history, and still surviving in the undeveloped nations, is a semireligious, semirational sanction with which to soothe nascent thinkers back into somnolent obedience. Nor does a democracy escape political illusions. Much of the solicitude for the people, much that is done in the name of political progress, is pure buncombe on the part of candidates. A study of the discussions for the last twenty years of the tariff question or the liquor problem, here in the United States, will show how the politicians seize upon certain phases of these questions in order to secure popular favor.

Another illusion that has worked in the interests of social control is asceticism, so often employed by the church to tame

¹ Bailey, P. J., *Festus*, V.

² Cicero, *Philippics*, IV, 12, 31.

men. Whether Catholic or Puritanic, it finds its real explanation in its power to catch the imagination of men, appeal to their desire for release from the evils of a bad social order, and bring them into some semblance of social regularity and usefulness. Asceticism fits in with an economy of pain, as Patten puts it. Based on an illusion impossible save as pain-wrought ideals dominate men's minds, it pretends to be absolutely self-renouncing, when, as a matter of fact, it is only another form of selfishness; for it offers security and rest to the disturbed soul in the midst of the unrest of social disturbance.

But it is not only in militancy, politics, and certain stages of religion, that illusion has been used to subdue the individual for the good of society. Illusion holds sway in industry as well. Do the anthracite coal workers strike for certain demands, they and the freezing or overcharged public are given to understand that there is such a thing as the divine right of coal barons. If workers demand collective bargaining, they are met with the almost unchallenged illusion of "freedom of contract" and the contention that every man has a right to work. By such half-truths do the lords of industry endeavor to cudgel into submission the rising judgment of the workers. And any economic theories, once they have served the purpose of economic liberation, are repeatedly invoked in the interest of social control. Thus *laissez faire*, once the shibboleth of the English industrial revolution, is now seen to have been an illusion with which industry whipped into uniformity and reduced to control the social heterogeneity of the eighteenth century.

Even in education, half-truths survive and dominate the minds of men. What does it signify that the professors in some of our colleges and universities insist so strenuously on the recognition of an aristocracy of letters? Why do they accept with such alacrity and satisfaction the adulation and reverence of the multitudes? With the exception of those few who foster this attitude from purely selfish motives, they do it because such a view of education serves as a most excellent instrument for control of the multitudes.¹

(c) The social valuations which are a man's social heritage

¹ Cf. Ross, *Social Control*, Chap. XXIII, for a somewhat different emphasis on details of the process.

are potent in swaying his judgment. Standards of conduct and ideals of character are created by society. And since these standards and ideals are intended to be applied to others than the makers of them, they are usually higher than those possessed by the leaders who make them. But their nature is such that men are willing to take them for their own.

These social valuations are placed on the things that make for group safety, such as courage, honesty, and faithfulness; they are given to the things which are coöperative in nature, such as play and sociability; they are given to music and art, to the love of money and women, to all things which do not consume strength or clash with the interests of others. By means of example, exhortation, suggestion, and the quoting of tradition and custom these valuations are crowded home upon the individual with almost irresistible power. And, yielding to this pressure, he makes his social choices in accordance with the valuations made by society, almost unconscious that they are being handed to him ready-made. By means of song and story they are suggested even to the child; they permeate our table conversation and the talk of the street; they are preached from pulpit and platform; they are embedded in the homely wisdom of proverb and epigram. Finally, they are enforced by the social sanctions of esteem, social distinction, and by the penalties of disfavor, disgrace, and blame. Strong, indeed, is the character who can rise above these social valuations — or subnormal in his mental processes.

There are many ways, therefore, in which the unstable, egoistic individual can be molded into some semblance of uniformity with his fellows and be made to follow lines of conduct compatible with the definite, common ends of social life. And be the appeal an emotional one — through belief, through social suggestion, through a social religion, through ceremonies, art, or the influence of dominating personalities — or be it an intellectual one, society controls the individual in the interests of the group, and transforms his variant impulses, his selfish desires, and his antisocial ambitions into social forces, or curbs them in the interests of social safety.

Means of Control arising from Voluntary Association. — Many of the institutions which have been potent influences in the orderly arrangement and progress of society were created

for specific purposes other than those of the establishment and regulation of social order. The church, for instance, has culture for its aim, the transformation of the individual from one mode of thought to another. But to carry out this purpose, it requires a great organization extending over all parts of the community and thus reducing to social order a large number of people. It is, therefore, one of the most powerful socializing influences that can be named. In the same way, although to a less degree than the church, have scientific societies, fraternal orders, and recreation societies of all sorts a wonderful socializing power.

Means of Control through Public Opinion and Law. — Public opinion is a general means of control which supplements formal law and government. On rather a moral than a legal basis, it moves with less exactness than law and government; and being more flexible in its nature, it is less definite in its immediate results. In the long run, however, its service in social control is of a highly important nature. It anticipates violations of the law and uses its influence before as well as after a crime has been committed. Without president, secretary, or board of control to dictate its actions, and without any prerogative or legal sanction, it yet has the full force of public authority to act immediately and informally. Law is the formal means of control, by means of which people's lives are regulated, their rights, duties, and privileges defined, the offenses against individuals and society determined, and the punishments for violators provided. And the government, instituted for the enforcement of law, is able, by exercising a police control over the community, to maintain social order. Without the regulating power of the government it would be impossible to carry on any of the functions of society.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Name some individual characteristics which make social control necessary.
2. What social ends are in danger of defeat at the hands of individual activities which are not socially controlled?
3. What fundamental fact in society makes social control necessary?
4. Name, under the following classes, the agencies of social control in a community with which you are acquainted: (a) organized institutions for control; (b) institutions not organized specifically for control, but serving that purpose incidentally; (c) other agencies.
5. Show why social control is more necessary in a dense than in a sparse population; in times of war than in peace; in a mixed than in a homogeneous population; in a society stratified into classes than in one unstratified.
6. Suggest reasons for thinking that social control will become more necessary in America; that social control may become less necessary in America.
7. Name some means which are not now in use, but which were employed by society to control individuals in the Elizabethan age. Name some methods peculiar to our day.

PART FOUR
SOCIAL IDEALS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

CHAPTER I

THE AIMS OF SOCIETY

Social Ideals. — Social ideals are programs for the improvement of human association. It is a necessary outcome of its mode of evolution that society is perfect neither in structure nor in action; and because of the imperfect articulation of its parts, there is a tremendous waste of mental and physical energy in the adjustment of its relationships. Since education is frequently defective, legislation partial, and religion tainted with bigotry, hypocrisy, and superstition, absolute justice is unknown except in theory; perfect coöperation does not exist; and liberty frequently is but the opportunity for a man to enslave himself. Society, however, is never wanting in reformers who, seeing these defects, raise and advance the standard of perfection by pointing out the ideal of social action. And although his plans may not always be adaptable to the conditions surrounding them, the service of the idealist is most valuable in demonstrating how far social practice falls short of ideal aims.

Revolutions, political upheavals, social agitation, and the propaganda of special systems or creeds all are backed by social ideals; for somewhere in the midst of the movement, or behind it, is a prophet or philosopher pointing out the defects and calling the group to adopt a new plan. But these very agitations and programs of reform raise such questions as the following: What is the purpose or aim of society? What conscious purpose should society set for itself, towards which its leaders are to direct the social development? There have been a number of answers to these questions.

The Greatest Good. — It has often been stated that the aim of society is to promote social well-being; and if we can reach a proper conclusion in regard to social well-being, we shall be satisfied with the statement as it stands. Now, granted that social well-being results from the most efficient exercise of the functions of society and the harmonious development of its

members, it does not necessarily follow that social well-being means the largest amount of wealth, the greatest intellectual development, the most advanced religious thought, the best æsthetic culture, or the greatest moral force. But possibly all of these in certain combinations are included in the idea.

If we accept the oft-quoted statement that "the aim of society is the greatest good to the greatest number," we are, until we define what constitutes the greatest good and the greatest number, still as far from the truth as before. The greatest number must, of necessity, apply to the future as well as to the present; for society is a continuous quantity perpetuating itself by the replacement of individuals as they disappear. As for the greatest good, the term may mean physical well-being, happiness, usefulness, culture, or the wealth of a community; but no one of these things, taken singly, can insure the greatest good to society. Under certain conditions, moreover, the greatest good may mean one thing; and under other conditions, entirely different things may seem the desirable ones. At one time, for example, the greatest good for the greatest number will be gained by an extension of economic opportunity; at another, by political security; at still another, by advance in culture. And in obedience to this principle, the freedom of the individual will be curbed in the interests of group solidarity at such times, for instance, as in war; yet under other conditions, the individual will be permitted to express his individuality. In the ideal society, therefore, the term means all these things.

The Utilitarian Theory. — The doctrine that the object of moral conduct is to promote utility began with the Greek moralists, who identified utility with happiness. Since that time, as its different advocates have approached it from different points of view or considered it under varying conditions of society, the theory has undergone many changes. First it was considered merely from the standpoint of the individual, but later the idea was extended to include social utility. In its modern conception it is defined in terms of social progress. But as a perfect society cannot be considered apart from individual activity, of what value is utility of any sort unless it increases the happiness of the individual and gives greater freedom of active service? If the utility theory is to be accepted, therefore, it must be considered as both individual and social.

Nature of Happiness. — If by the word happiness we mean the happiness of individuals that compose society, then the term, considered in its nobler sense of social adjustment, must rise above mere pleasure, as defined in the doctrine of hedonism. But since the keenest enjoyment of life must be one of the accompaniments of a perfect society, happiness, which is based on contentment alone, is not the true aim of society; for many of the non-progressive peoples who have scarcely entered the pale of civilization are far more contented with their lot than are the cultured races who have the very highest degree of social development. If, however, in the idea of happiness we include a multiplicity of desires for a higher life and the means of satisfying them, we have a tolerably correct expression of the aim of society.

Is the Aim of Society Fixed and Unchangeable? — In the discussion of social aims, we can find no fixed ideals of social life or structure to which we may conform. Society never becomes entirely conventionalized nor wholly petrified; its growth is never completed. Since, therefore, so long as men will utilize the forces at hand, society will perpetually reproduce itself, the real, the final aim of society is normal progress. If there is an equilibrium of social forces, if society is balanced in all of its parts, if the social organs are well developed and well articulated so as to afford each individual the greatest freedom and at the same time the largest opportunity possible, and if the whole is moving steadily toward a more harmonious condition of things, society is progressive. And this normal progress is all we can hope for or be sure of, and indeed, all that we really desire. For if we were to have a completed society, growth would cease; and not long after the cessation of growth, decay would set in. Although people sometimes act as if society had reached a stage where it could maintain itself without any effort on the part of its component individuals, there has as yet been discovered no process by which society will run itself according to hard and fast rules. There are many forces, it is true, which are seemingly more or less constant. But we must always be prepared for the shifting of these forces; for the bringing forth of new standards of law, government, morality, religion, and, indeed, life; and for society's constant adaptation to these various ideals or standards. Moreover, one of the most potent

of these forces is the individual with initiative, who may turn the stream of social development into entirely new channels in a lifetime. And when society begins to realize itself, when it becomes conscious of satisfying its own desires and aims, it has advanced very far in the higher development of social life.

The Immediate Social Aim. — Society's aims change with its development. Growing, as it did, out of primitive man's instinctive feeling, or conscious perception that association aided in his individual survival, it was society's early aim to survive as against competing groups. That aim remains dominant even yet; the immediate aim of every society is survival. Who has ever heard of a state, a church, or a political party, which, after saying to itself, "Now my work is done; the purpose for which I was organized can be better served by my death than by my continuance," then proceeded to put itself out of existence?

But the determination of a society to survive as an organization depends for its strength upon how fully its component members believe that its continuance insures their welfare. This feeling, while of primary importance, is greatly strengthened by many others, which, having their origin in love of home, familiar institutions, customs, and ideals, it is to society's interest carefully to foster. Such, for example, is the tender sentiment for "the fatherland," for "the land of the free and the home of the brave." Society's first incentive, then, for providing for survival is the desire among its members for the undisturbed enjoyment of their particular mode of life, customs, ideals, and the realization of their national and individual ideals.

From the more strictly functional point of view, however, the purpose of society is to provide the objective conditions under which the individual may secure the most adequate self-expression — that is, to insure for him his most perfect adjustment to his social environment. These conditions Giddings has called the "proximate ends" of society. They include provisions, by the political system, for the security of life and property; they include provisions for insuring to each member equal political rights, equal justice before the law, equal economic opportunities, and similar cultural advantages.

The Ultimate Aim of Society. — But the securing of these objective social conditions is not, after all, the ultimate social aim. The ultimate aim of society is the creation of social per-

sonality. Says Giddings: "In thus creating personality, society converts mere evolution into progress. Evolution is integration and differentiation; it is correlation and coördination; it is not necessarily a betterment of conscious existence. Evolution is also progress when each unit of the integrated mass or group becomes an end as well as a means."¹ This social personality enables an individual to fit in perfectly with the objective conditions of existence, enables him to coöperate with others in so molding the social structure that the self-realization of each is assured. Society, therefore, gives the individual the guardianship of government. It does not aim, of course, to make all individuals equal; but it does aim, as far as the establishment of social order will permit, to give the same opportunity to all. Society may, indeed, go a step farther. It may furnish the individual with the means for self-improvement; it may offer him help and encouragement in his own redemption. Under such circumstances, society will not only promote justice among men; but by providing means for education and various forms of coöperative help, it will enable the individual to reach a high state of culture.

Nor must society neglect man's development through association. It is difficult to estimate the extent to which man draws his culture or development from others. His mental capacity, his material prosperity, his religion and his art, come largely from association. Thus while we are working to build up the individual by giving him room for action, we must not forget that we are also providing for his increased development by promoting various social activities.

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¹ Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 522, 523, 526-528; see also Giddings, *Sociology*, New York, 1909, pp. 42, 43.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Point out the aims of the following societies in your community: a church, a social club, a commercial club, a literary circle, a debating society, a political party. Point out the aims of the United States government.
2. Show how a government which did not help to increase the wealth of its citizens would be justly looked upon as inefficient.
3. Under what circumstances might its policies, while not increasing the wealth of the nation, yet increase the general welfare of society?
4. Suppose a society, like that of these United States, should pursue a policy which would deny to the poor the opportunities that it accords to the rich. Would its aim be the general welfare? Why? Suppose that it denied to the rich man the same opportunity to exercise his abilities that it affords to the poor man. Would it be advancing the general welfare? Why?
5. Show why our ideals of what a society should be lead us to oppose "graft" in government.
6. Indicate how the spending of such vast amounts of money on education contributes to the welfare of society.
7. What social aim is satisfied by the provision of public playgrounds and social centers?
8. Carefully examine the government of your village or city and indicate as clearly as possible just what social aims it is trying to realize.
9. Why, since they afford pleasure to some people, do gambling and vice not accord with the aims of society?
10. Cite two instances that show how social ideals rather than economic interests or physical environment dominate social development. (See the reference to Ellwood.)

CHAPTER II

IDEALS OF GOVERNMENT

An Attempt to realize a Perfect Social State through Government. — Many attempts have been made, through the machinery of practical government, to realize ideal social states. Most familiar to us, of those of antiquity, is the Jewish ideal commonwealth, in which lawgivers and priests sought to secure justice and equal rights for all members of the community, not only by establishing social control in public affairs, but by developing a code of laws which should severely regulate the moral life and the social life, to the very minutest details. It was, indeed, a theocratic commonwealth, with religion, politics, and social usage all combined in one system. While this ideal commonwealth, as set forth with special fullness in the later Jewish codes, was far in advance of what was actually realized by the Jews, because the Jewish people were dispersed and the dream of an ideal commonwealth was not realized, yet many of the principles set forth in these writings have had great influence upon legislation among all peoples where the Bible has been taken seriously. Especially good examples of this influence are Calvin's government of Geneva, Switzerland, and some of the legislation of the English Commonwealth of Cromwell.

The Athenian democracy represents another great attempt to institute justice through practical government. It sought to regulate all the political affairs of the community by laws instituted in the interests of the people. It is true that it was, to a certain extent, a government of classes; for the government did not include all the people. Nevertheless, the development of the civic state, with the power of the senate and with the privilege of the people to take part in the government, even if those privileges were comparatively small, brought forth a new era in the development of politics. To establish the principle that every free man had a right to be heard was a long

way from the Oriental monarchy, where such rights were denied, except as it suited the whim of the Oriental prince. This declaration of human rights has since found its way into nearly all forms of government.

Again, the Roman Republic, based upon a control almost imperial in its nature, sought to work out the problem of harmony between the different grades of people, giving to all a fair representation in the government. The whole system failed, however, because of the ruling power of the senate, which, through its aristocratic influence, sought to domineer over the so-called lower classes. Thus, while the Republic developed law, and familiarized men with the rights of government, it remained for the Empire to universalize this system of recognition of the individual wherever he was under the dominion of the imperial power. But just as the democracy had to give way before imperialism, so was imperialism finally overthrown; and the effort to establish the political and social rights of man came to naught.

So, too, the Swiss Federation, the United Netherlands, and the United States have attempted to work out ideal systems of government founded on freedom and equal rights. And the French nation, struggling for a century under the blighting influences of imperialism, injustice, and anarchy, finally, under the "third republic," managed, in a measure, to establish the rights of men.

Ideals of Philosophers. — Besides these practical attempts to build up government through the influence of lawgivers, politicians, and wise statesmen, there have been attempts of philosophers, who, evincing a lack of faith in the power of the existing government to reform social evils, have set forth ideal systems of government. The first great monument of this kind was Plato's Republic. It varied widely from the actual condition of the republic of Athens of his time; as in the case of all other utopias, it was written in a period of social unrest. In the Republic of Plato the community system of society is the one recommended. The government goes into details in the regulation of all social and family relationships, and defines minutely the duties and privileges of all individuals who, in the scheme, are made subservient to the state. But while Plato, apparently, thoroughly believed in the ideas set forth in his Republic, he

probably had no hope that such a government would be instituted in his own time — perhaps none that it ever would. It is, in fact, this very idealism of Plato which is severely criticized by Aristotle, who, in his *Politics*, advances a theory of government founded upon the practices of the best governments that history had up to that time known.¹

Then there are certain of the Old Testament Prophets who set forth, in considerable detail, their dreams of the ideal social state. All through the denunciations of Amos runs an ideal which involves social justice to the poor and helpless classes;² and Isaiah, in his statesmanlike duties of counseling the King of Judah and his task of upbraiding the rulers of his time, finds opportunity to set forth changes which, in his opinion, would make Judah and Jerusalem an ideal community under the special favor of God.³ Yet while many others of these Hebrew counselors of the nation suggested changes which would secure the favor of Jehovah, the condition *sine qua non* of national life, it remained for Ezekiel and the Post-Exilic prophets and writers, who were no longer embarrassed by an actually existing Hebrew state, to set forth in detail their ideals of a state to be based upon theocratic principles.⁴ Scattered all through Ezekiel's prophecy are many passages outlining his ideas of the nature of the restored Hebrew state; and in chapters thirty-seven to forty-eight he presents a unified picture of the whole. Moreover, from the book of Daniel to the Revelation, the apocalypticists simply reveled in pictures of the Kingdom of God to be realized here on earth.⁵

But besides Plato and the reformers of both the Old and the New Testament, there are writers from the last years of the Roman Empire, from the Middle Ages, and from the early modern period, who have advanced theories and plans of government. Among these are St. Augustine, with his *City of God*; Campanella, with his *City of the Sun*; Thomas More, with his *Utopia*; Bacon, with his *Atlantis*; and in more modern times Cabet, with his *Icaria*, and Bellamy, with his *Looking Backward*. The utopias of Plato, More, Campanella, and

¹ See Loos, *Studies in the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato*, Iowa City, 1899.

² Am. 2: 6-12; 5: 7, 10-13.

³ Isa. 28: 14-22; 32: 1-8.

⁴ See especially Isa. Chaps. 40-66; Zeph. 3: 8-20; Ezek. Chaps. 37-48.

⁵ Zech. Chaps. 1-6; Dan. Chaps. 7-12; Rev. Chaps. 11, 21: 1-22: 5.

Bacon are, perhaps, the most important; but since to describe each one would require too much space, we must content ourselves with the observation that each one pictured a perfect government where human wants ceased to be troublesome, and where harmony, happiness, justice, and love prevailed. If these utopias accomplished nothing more, they at least pointed out, by way of contrast, the evils of existing governments.

The Advocates of Socialistic Theories.¹ — Of a slightly different character were the ideals of certain French communists and socialists of the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries. Babœuf and his followers desired to abolish private property and to establish equality and fraternity by organizing a state of pure communism; and for this purpose they organized, in 1796, a band of equals, who attempted to overthrow the state. Maintaining that the aim of society was the happiness of all, and that happiness depended on equality, they emphasized governmental ideals chiefly as a means for securing absolute economic equality.

Cabet, while he believed in pure communism, thought that the transition should be gradual, that people, by organizing communistic societies at will, could thus slowly transform the whole community into a fraternity. He was perhaps the first and greatest communist of France and Icaria the most ideal community ever proposed. Saint-Simon, on the other hand, was a socialist who held that the natural inequality between men should be the basis of association. Rejecting the idea of the community of goods, he advocated that all should be rewarded according to their capacity and that this capacity should be estimated according to works. And Fourier, though holding doctrines similar to those of Saint-Simon, considered the benefit of humanity the highest aim of each individual. Among other things there were, according to his theory, certain natural rights belonging to each individual, which entitled him to the protection and care of the whole community.

Modern Socialism. — The foregoing are a few of the principal exponents of early socialistic theories. If space would permit, many others might be named who have expounded complex ideas of social, political, and economic readjustment. As compared with the earlier theories, modern scientific socialism has

¹ See Chap. I, Part VII.

more particular reference to economic production and distribution. Karl Marx, a social democrat and one of the earlier advocates of socialistic production, insisted on the political organization of industry. He emphasized the great service of labor in production and maintained that because of the excessive demands of capital, labor did not receive a fair share of the product. Social democracy, of which Marx may be called the founder, includes, among other theories, the collective ownership of land and capital, the abolition of competitive industry, and, consequently, the social production of wealth. And while Karl Marx was advocating social democracy in Germany, Louis Blanc was founding state socialism in France. Opposing equality, he set forth a system of distributive justice, by which, after each had labored according to his abilities, he was to receive a reward in proportion, not to capacity or product, but to his need.

Modern so-called scientific socialism, while in its results at least it may involve many of the early doctrines, centers on collective ownership of the agents of production, and associate management of industry. It is opposed to the competitive system and private ownership of the means of production; and although different exponents of the theory vary as to the extent to which it should be carried and the manner of its application, its objective point is distribution of income. Dr. Ely's excellent definition expresses the general spirit of "scientific" socialism: "Socialism is that contemplated system of industrial society which proposes the abolition of private property, in the great material instruments of production, and the substitution thereof of collective property; and advocates the collective management of production, together with the distribution of social income by society, and private property in the larger proportion of this social income."¹

Modern Socialistic Experiments. — Various groups of people have attempted to carry out experiments in government for the benefit of human society; and there have been many individuals who have organized themselves into societies for the propagation of socialistic doctrines. These societies have been of three different kinds: anarchistic, socialistic, and communistic. The theoretical anarchist, believing that modern government is a burden, maintains that, if it could be dissolved, men and

¹ *Socialism and Social Reform*, p. 19.

women would form themselves into small groups which would conserve their interests by spontaneous social order. So far as discontent with present systems of government is concerned and with modern forms of social order, the anarchist's point of view is really the same as that of the socialist; but anarchism and socialism are widely different in their plans for the reorganization of society. While the anarchists hold that there is too much government and that it should be reduced to a minimum, the socialists insist that government could and should be greatly extended so as to cover all of the modern industrial operations. Thus, while the one party lays special stress on political ideals, the other has for its principal ideal a system of artificial economic distribution by which each receives according to his ability or, as in some instances, according to his need.

Then there are the communistic societies, all representing a species of socialism. They hold all property in common and advocate the absolute equality of all members of the community, so far as the rights of property and social life are concerned. Many of these societies have attempted practical experiments in government, such as the "Oneida Communists" of New York, the "Amana Society" and the "New Icaria" of Iowa, and the several Bellamy societies of California. These experiments have been of such a varied nature, extending from pure communism to pure industrial coöperation, that it is quite impossible to classify them, no two of them being exactly alike. The nearest that we can approach to a classification would be a division into these three: first, those whose chief principle was reward according to ability or service rendered; second, those which required service according to ability and gave rewards according to need; and finally, those that had industrial coöperation for their chief aim. But because, in part, of the impracticability of their plans, and, in part, because the people who have gone into them have been lacking in coöperative qualities, nearly all of these experiments have failed.

There is still another group and one that belongs in a class by itself. The people of this group have always advocated what is known as Christian socialism, by which they meant the making over of the whole political and industrial systems and the general social system into a unified society, based upon the teachings of Christ. No particular experiments have been tried

on this ground, though the propaganda has existed since the time of F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley.

The coöperative communities have established two forms of coöperation. The one, known as distributive coöperation, has reference to the exchange and distribution of goods; and the other, called productive coöperation, looks after their production. Many of these coöperative communities have failed; but a few have succeeded. It took a long time to learn the coöperative art; and until it was learned, and until a group of coöperative people could be brought together, all such experiments proved failures. In England, distributive coöperation has now become a strong movement. It was successfully inaugurated by the Rochdale Pioneers in the year 1844; and there are, at present, hundreds of societies which do a large coöperative business. Productive coöperation, by far the more difficult to establish of the two, was begun on a small scale in England in about 1850; it has now reached quite extensive proportions and has become one of the solid institutions of the nation. The numerous and successful coöperative marketing associations for farm and dairy products in Denmark are types of distributive coöperation, as are the Grange and Farmers' Alliance in America, the California Fruit Growers' Association, and in the Middle West of the United States the more recent organizations for coöperative marketing of such products as cheese and potatoes. On the other hand, the coöperative companies of Minneapolis and the coöperative creameries and cheese factories in some of the dairy sections of the United States are good examples of productive coöperation. Finally, the system of profit sharing, so well illustrated in the management of the Pillsbury Mills of Minneapolis, the Proctor and Gamble Company of Cincinnati, the N. O. Nelson Company of St. Louis, and the Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, is an attempt to promote a community of interests between employer and employee and bring about new social conditions of the laboring class.

Individualism versus Socialism. — Individualism in politics, borrowed, for the most part, from the English system, has been so very strong in America that any innovation looking toward state control of industries or, indeed, toward a community of interests in any special way, has not been received with great

favor. Always jealous of their individual liberty, the people have frequently objected to having their industrial affairs controlled by laws which would have been to their real and lasting benefit. As a matter of fact, the radical theories advanced by socialists have so threatened the individualistic system that people have been overcautious about the regulation of industries. We have seen, nevertheless, the gradual enlargement of the powers of the state in, for example, the management of railways, through the state railway commissions and the Federal Interstate Commerce Commission, and in the control of other great corporate industries by state industrial commissions. Thus, while the socialistic state is a long way off and probably will never be, in practice, what it is in theory, community of interests seems to be better understood and more desired by all classes of people than it ever was in the past; and the state now does infinitely more for the individual than at any previous period. Yet while the state is continually establishing general laws to control industries and to improve the general welfare of the community, the individual seems to have as much liberty as ever. Never before have we seen such public activity on behalf of the individual citizen. The food he eats, the milk he buys, the clothing he wears, are all carefully inspected to see that he gets only those products which have not been exposed to contamination by disease. The factories in which he works, the houses where he dwells, even the condition of his garbage can, are looked after in the interest of his health and efficiency. And not only is the schooling of his children provided for by a special board, but at public expense opportunities for his recreation are offered to him. It is not, however, so much a function of the state to produce as it is to regulate.

Ideals of Equality. — One of the important influences in modern social life has been the ideal of equality advanced by certain theorists. The practices of the Christian church have, to a certain extent, set forth this ideal; but more especially has it been advocated by radical democrats and radical socialists. Taken all in all, that system should be considered an ideal government which advocates the utmost liberty of the individual and at the same time yields the greatest well-being to the community at large. Ideals of fraternity, liberty, and equality are valuable in pointing out many of the best elements of govern-

ment; but the sure foundation of an enlightened government is justice. And the sooner this becomes the aim of society, the greater the progress that will be made; for such an ideal, we are sure, can be approximated in government. Above all is the extension of a system of justice to industrial affairs one of the pressing problems of modern society.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Read the reference to Ezekiel and then read More's *Utopia*. Write out your impressions of the difference between the two and the similarities.
2. As revealed in the Federal Constitution, what were the ideals which the fathers held for the government of the United States when the nation was founded?
3. How do these ideals differ from the ideals held by the English government at that time?
4. Show in what respects the ideals of government held by the framers of our Constitution have changed during the interval between 1786 and 1914.
5. How has the agitation for industrial democracy affected governmental ideals in this country?
6. What ideal is back of the demand for Old Age Pensions, for Industrial Insurance? What ideals prompt the demand for the curbing of trusts, the regulation of railroads, the care of children, and the democratization of education?

CHAPTER III

CONTROL BY FORCE

The Ideal of Force in Government. — The authority of government is so well recognized and so ever present that it is common to accept it as the ideal of social order, or at least as a force from which there is no escape and no appeal. Occasionally, it is true, the voice of the anarchist cries out against it and offers to substitute a new system of social order. To the average citizen, however, it is but natural that force should seem to be the essence of government and the cause of social order; for every law has its penalty, every government has its standing army, and every community its police. Even in our best forms of democracy, the final appeal of government is to force. And in the organization of campaigns and the control of government, indeed, the leaders of political parties rely upon coercion rather more than on coöperation — a coercion not much better at times than brigandage.

But while force is an essential element of government, it is not the ideal of social control. The authority and power to enforce order must rest somewhere, or government is a failure; but the state cannot long exist when based upon force alone. The highest type of government brings the military and police into requisition as little as possible; for government is, after all, but a temporary restraint upon the actions of individuals until the real elements of social order can assert themselves. Hence it is that the law comes in direct contact with only a few, and the police force apprehends but a small number of the offenders of justice.

Origin of Control by Force. — The idea of control by force has an historic origin; for, in primitive society, where natural justice prevailed, the battle was always to the strong. Might made right; and that individual survived and succeeded who

could adjust his own affairs, defend himself and property, or, indeed, take the offensive to enlarge his personal power or his property rights. Naturally, he who could not, perished or became subordinate to him who possessed the greater force. And what was true of individuals was also true of tribes. Then, as social life became more complex, this power to survive passed into the power to rule. People became divided into those who governed and those who submitted to their domination, those who had obtained the superior position continuing to control by force those whom they had subdued in war, by strategy, or through necessity.

Ancient Leadership. — Through physical vigor, unusual will power, or extraordinary resourcefulness, the individual became a leader. Tradition, prestige, and superstition increased his influence; religion and war were his servants. Gradually adding to his power, and assuming, in war, in the council, or in religious ceremony, to represent the interests of the tribe or clan, he became king in fact before he was made so by custom or law. But while leading the people in the interests of the tribe, he was really creating a community of subjects. Not able to keep up a display of force and manage all the affairs of the tribal state himself, he associated with him, by making it to their interest to assist him, a large number of people who were interested in government and who worked together with him for the control of the tribe or nation. Thus, although theoretically the people assumed the right to choose their leader and king, the king practically arranged to have himself chosen.

The Rise of the Governing Class. — The step from feudal rule, founded on leadership and service, to aristocratic rule, founded on class distinction, was taken when conquerors imposed their will upon a conquered people. From the conquerors arose a governing class, known as an aristocracy, a class distinctly separate from the great mass of the people. As the ruling class, they were supposed to be better and nobler than others; and their claim to this supposed superiority and nobility they based on force. Having its origin in feudalism, where superior ability and native shrewdness counted for everything, this governing class established its authority by conquest, usually in some other region; and in every succeeding form of monarchy, either absolute or constitutional, such a governing class has continued to

exist. Wherever nations have continued to grow, however, there has been a development of other independent means of social order, such as religion, justice, intelligence, industrial organization, altruism, freedom of speech, and freedom of meeting; thus control by force has become less essential, and the governing class more useless. But out of all the surviving nations, a few were at an early period so impregnated with imperialism and so dominated by the governing class as to be unable, even now, to rid themselves of the ancient ideals. It is true enough that dukes and grand dukes were once necessary to the king and of service to the people; but in the natural process of evolution a highly socialized and closely integrated society, with the true national spirit, will eliminate archaic forms. For people do not exist for the sake of a governing class, nor yet for the government.

The Idea of Control in a Democracy. — Even in a pure democracy this element of force appears, at certain times, to control the public. It is known as the telic force, or that by which society moves itself forward to a certain end. In fact, the control by democracy, in which every one is supposed to be a sovereign, is, in some respects, a fiction; in reality there are, in every community, ruling ideas, ruling thoughts, and, indeed, ruling individuals. And in the nature of things, there must be; for, because of a diversity of opinions and prejudices, our democracy would not always be able to carry out successfully the general will of the people. Indeed, so far as governmental mechanism is concerned, enlightened absolutism is the surest and most economical form of government; its plans to govern for the public it carries out with a will and authority which render justice to all. Most democratic governments are, in contrast, wasteful governments. There is, in the first place, an immeasurable loss of power in the attempt to give every man a hearing or a part in the government. And, too, if we but turn our attention to the dilatory methods, the short-sighted business policies, of the common council of a city government, we are forced to admit that the democratic form of government has its drawbacks. Not only city councils, however, but even legislatures, only too frequently fall short of doing what is for the advancement of the community. Above all, the people themselves are frequently so short-sighted that they do not know

what is best for them; hence they are as liable to take the advice of a demagogue as of a statesman.

But most of the difficulties of self-government arise from imperfect socialization or incomplete social machinery. Government is a great art which but few have learned well. Since successive groups of individuals take their turn at being law-makers, our legislative bodies are but schools for the practice of the untutored; and because any one may aspire to office and take his place as an administrative official, if he can but get the votes or receive the appointment, it frequently occurs that many are elected who are ill prepared for civil service. Yet, after all, the safeguard of self-government is the perpetual opportunity of the people to choose their own rulers and officers. The judgment of the people is said, in the main, to be correct. And if through lack of care they have an imperfect and expensive government, they have, since the control rests ultimately with them, only themselves to censure for the burdens which they heap upon themselves. To make social control what it should be, therefore, universal intelligence and a developed capacity for self-government should obtain.

The Social Will of Democracy. — When once aroused and in full action, the will of democracy is as intolerant and absolute as the power of the monarch. Its redeeming quality is that, although it acts intermittently and represents a series of mistakes, these are followed by corrections which point toward a steady, if slow, progress. Its real success, therefore, depends upon educating the great majority of the people into an independent moral integrity which will enable them to live above the law. And when people have attained to this attitude, there is a species of social control which cannot be destroyed by the defects of governmental machinery and the machinations of all of the demagogues, nor yet by the "hungry incapacity" of office seekers.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Read Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 357-359, and point out the difference between the power to compel obedience and the power to command obedience.
2. What survivals of control by force exist to-day in our government?
3. What proportion of men conform to a course of conduct conducive to the social welfare, from a fear of the force of the state?
4. In the origin of social control, what part does the use of force play?
5. Read Green's *Short History of the English People*, Chap. II, Sec. V, and note what part force played in the origin of Norman control in England.
6. Show how, following William's conquest, a governing class grew up in England.
7. Give illustrations, from the history of the United States, of control by force.
8. Why is there need for forceful control in a democracy?
9. Is there any social justification for the employment of troops in an industrial dispute, like that in Chicago in 1893, or in Colorado in 1913-1914?

CHAPTER IV

THE EDUCATIONAL METHOD

Force a Temporary Check on Insubordination. — Inasmuch as social order has been developed by slow degrees, control by force has, at times, been necessary as a temporary check upon insubordination ; but it is always soon replaced by other agencies. Gradually the idea has grown that other forms of control are cheaper and more easily administered ; and gradually other methods have become the usual ones. Since, however, the conscious effort of society to govern itself demands a recognition of the laws of social development and requires, among the component members of society, some ability to control themselves in the interests of the group, society cannot do better than to adopt the educational method as a means of establishing that high degree of intelligence necessary for democratic social control.

The Idea of Self-Government Demands Intelligence. — We hear a great deal about the natural rights of self-government ; but if there are such rights, they must have their source in intelligence. All so-called natural rights must, after all, yield to the social choices of the community ; for no human being has the right to engage in practices detrimental either to himself or to others. Unfortunate, therefore, is the society that chooses popular government when its citizens have not a sufficient degree of intelligence to maintain it. As history shows us, every people that has succeeded in governing itself has been of general intelligence ; and each republic that has failed may, in large part, trace the cause of such failure to the general ignorance of its people. As a matter of fact, where a few citizens are intelligent and strong and the great mass lacking in intelligence, the conditions fit an oligarchy rather than a democracy ; and if such conditions obtain for long, the ignorant many will be forced to yield to the intelligent few. When, therefore, the rulers of an ignorant people are sufficiently wise to consider the best interests

of their subjects, a strong central government, founded on force, yields to its people larger immediate return of privilege and benefit than does any other form.

Public Opinion Must Be Improved by the General Education of All Members of Society. — If the general intelligence is low, public opinion will, of necessity, be wrong in its premises; and the type of political and social life which develops will then be undemocratic. It is, of course, possible for a community to maintain order on a low standard of social responsibility; but only that society will be progressive and self-controlled in which public opinion is permeated with social idealism. And notwithstanding that, in any community, public opinion may sometimes be created by a few of the more intelligent, the fact remains that unless the majority has sufficient intelligence to understand the ideas of the leaders and make them its own, society will be controlled, not by public opinion, but by the opinions of a dominant few. For it is only when the members are in intelligent and harmonious sympathy with one another that public opinion can receive full expression — a condition involving, not only individual capacity, but the perfection of social machinery as well.

The Improvement of the Type of Government by Education. — As education grows more and more general, the critical faculty of individuals, becoming stimulated, gradually raises the governmental ideal. But the development is, indeed, gradual; for even when people have determined what is right, they sometimes find it very difficult so to perfect the machinery of legislation and justice as to carry out their ideals. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in human experience that requires more foresight, ability, and harmonious social action than does the creation of laws for the government of a free people. And it is because the governmental machinery is so imperfect that self-government is both a wasteful and an expensive form of government. Each year our statute books show us new laws, useless or even detrimental to the best interests of the community. Then, while, on the one hand, our courts of justice are slow to reach their decisions, on the other, our rapid industrial development is constantly creating conditions that require new legislation and new judicial decrees. An enlightened absolutism, therefore, which could anticipate the future needs of the people

and by its mandates secure them at once, might, at first thought, seem preferable to the present unenlightened control by political demagogue and selfish trickster. But since there is no way of making sure that an absolutism will be socially enlightened, we are forced to choose the patent evils of a democracy rather than fly to others that we know not of; and in a democratic form of government we can at least hope that a general diffusion of knowledge will raise the social ideals.

To What Extent Must All Laws Be Supported by Education or Training? — Through impulsive social action, or the imperfection of legislative machinery, it is possible to place upon the statute books laws which do not receive the support of the people whom they are intended to govern. In the first place, people may not have been prepared for them by sufficient preliminary discussion. Then, too, even after a new law has been enacted, the governmental machinery is often slow to come to its full support. During this period of lukewarm enforcement of the law, however, there is an educative process going on among the citizens; and if the law has sufficient backing from the courts, the people may possibly become educated to its full and free support. But if the law is obnoxious to a large proportion of the people, a continual agitation will be kept up by the dissatisfied ones until the law is repealed by their representatives. There is now, for instance, a great cry for tax reform; yet the adjustment to a new tax law would not be easy. If the courts declared it to be a good and just law, and a sufficient number of the people were inclined to obey it, the public could gradually, through the process of education, be brought up to its standard of requirements. But it can safely be said that no law can succeed without the support of public opinion.

On the other hand, the law is an educator in itself. When once established by the will of any considerable part of the people, it is the expression of an ideal, a program of procedure; and since all people look to it for guidance, it influences them to reach a uniform conclusion of right and wrong. A good example of this educative process of the law is found in the prohibition law of the state of Kansas. Because of certain political circumstances, this law was passed before a majority of the people of Kansas really desired it. To keep this statute in force, therefore, it has been necessary for temperance workers to be con-

stantly in the field, educating the public against the evils of drink and emphasizing the necessity of restrictive measures. But the fact that the public had, by legislative enactment, committed itself to the prohibitive measure was of great value to the temperance workers in their educative work. In spite of all efforts to the contrary, however, in those communities where the majority do not desire the enforcement of this law, it is violated to such an extent as not really to be enforced at all. And even in those communities where it is enforced, the constant vigilance of right-thinking people is necessary. Either before or after its enactment, therefore, there must be public discussion of a measure in order to get a majority of the people to assent intelligently to its enforcement.

Specific Training for Social Life. — Thus the state that is to be perpetuated through self-government must see to it that its citizens are well educated; and since a clumsy mode of procedure might destroy the best efforts of popular government, something more than a general intelligence is necessary. Beginning in the grammar grades and continuing with increased force, through the high school and the university, special training should be given in all the subjects that pertain to social order and social control. It is not the place here to state specifically what subjects should be taught and what methods should be used to bring about the desired end. Yet it may be said that everything that leads to an acquaintance with the political and industrial history of the nation, with its social and economic conditions, with its forms of government, its constitutional and common law, and, indeed, with its social relations, should be taught in its public schools.

Yet while the educating process should begin with the children and continue with the youth of the country, the work is not finished with the training of these. And although discussion of public questions and some little dissemination of information is secured through the press and the platform, these agencies are really inadequate to meet the growing need. A realization of this inadequacy has recently led to the fruitful suggestion that the present public forum, furnished by newspapers, books, periodicals, public lectures and addresses, be supplemented by neighborhood gatherings of adults in the community building, the schoolhouse, for the discussion of

questions of common interest.¹ The suggestion has received the hearty indorsement of men of every political party and such leading educational and social bodies as the National Education Association, the National Federation of Woman's Clubs, the National Municipal League, the American Federation of Labor, the American Prison Congress, and three of the national political parties. And Wisconsin has already placed upon her statute books a law requiring that, upon the request of a certain number of citizens, the educational authorities shall open the doors of the schoolhouses for just such purpose.² In carrying out this project, there are, of course, such practical problems to be met as that of gaining a sufficient number of the people of a community to take an interest in the discussion of public questions and that of centering the responsibility for requisite leadership. But the suggestion is certainly most significant and most worthy of an honest endeavor to make the public school more effective in promoting the intelligence and social efficiency of that ninety odd per cent of our people who never get beyond the grammar grades of our schools. More than this, special technical schools preparatory to civil service should be maintained for those who expect to make government their vocation; for if a state provides education for its own protection and general social well-being, and neglects the training of its officials, it is failing to use the best means it has for conscious development and social control.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show why education, custom, tradition, religion, social suggestion, and all such methods, soon displace force in the government of a people.
2. Why is it more essential that the United States, for example, secure intelligence among her population than, let us say, Russia?

¹ Ward, E. J., *The Social Center*, New York, 1913.

² Laws of Wisconsin, 1911, Chap. 514.

3. Why cannot self-government long remain unintelligent?
4. If education is for the purpose of securing an intelligent citizenship, what purpose is subserved by education in the classics? Industrial education?
5. State the arguments in favor of thorough preliminary discussion of a measure before it is enacted into law. Against such a procedure.
6. What arguments can be advanced in favor of putting the law on the statute books at the earliest possible date? Against such a method?
7. Cite examples of legislation enacted without much preliminary discussion.
8. Read, in *Municipal Affairs*, Vol. III, pp. 462 sq., and in *The World's Work*, Vol. V, pp. 3339 sq., the account of Dr. Leipziger's work in the public schools of New York City. Estimate the value of such work in a democracy.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL INEQUALITIES

The Social Classification of Individuals.—The provision for securing for all both equal rights and equal social opportunities does not eliminate the possibility of social inequalities; for the status of an individual in society is, to a certain extent, measured by his individual ability and the application of that ability in an effort to improve himself. Thus, while in democratic society there may be a general tendency to make of individuals a homogeneous mass and destroy the graded orders of ethnic grouping, there yet exists sufficient variety among individuals to bring about inequalities in capacity and social position. There is a movement of society, but there is more than one "level of social motion"; consequently society is left in strata, and people are grouped about the centers of their own activity. We see laborers in the machine shop brought together by their particular industry; we find those of the teaching profession in another group; and we discover bankers in a third. The character of the work done influences the social grouping and, to a certain extent, determines the social status of an individual. And not only is there a division into groups; but within the group there is a secondary classification based on ability or position. A great factory, for instance, will have managers, overseers, clerks, operators, and helpers. Thus, while there is no determined assumption of superiority, these natural industrial groups form the centers of social grouping.

Inequalities Arising from Individual Characteristics.¹—Wherever the word "equality" is used in reference to individuals of a community, it refers to freedom in the choice of opportunities, the chance for a man to use his capacities either in the

¹ For a category of social inequalities, see Kelley, *Government or Human Evolution*, pp. 337-338.

coöperative or the competitive market; but it has no reference to the equalizing of powers or conditions, nor to the insurance of results. All the world is a market; and in it men make the best possible exchange of their personal powers or services for services of another sort. Now this trading capacity, if we may so call it, may be superior physical strength, intellectual power, moral character, religious nature, or personal attractiveness. And it stands to reason that the individual with a pleasing personality can easily obtain an industrial or social position which the one of forbidding personality can acquire only by proving his natural handicap to be outweighed by other and stronger forces, such as will power and intellectual acumen.

Some of these inequalities of powers arise from natural sources. For example, people who are born with some physical defect are handicapped when they compete with those who, having strong physiques, possess greater trading capacity. And just as the man who is endowed with superior brain power may, if he use it to advantage, outstrip another of meaner intellectual capacity, so, too, will a man naturally possessed of high moral qualities have less to overcome and more to work with than one born with a strain of moral obliquity in his nature. Finally, there are the qualities of determination and perseverance, which none of those other capacities can compete against; for an individual who has each one of those prime qualities in excess may yet be outstripped by one who has power to organize his resources, and the force of will to apply his powers. Thus the individual who has a strong physical, intellectual, and moral nature, together with a pleasing personality, has the opportunity to acquire a superior position with comparative ease.

Inequalities Arising from the Natural Environment. — Many a tribe or ethnic group has, by settling on sterile soil, condemned itself to perpetual poverty. And not only has it lived a dull, unprogressive life, but it has sometimes become extinct because of the pressure of physical environment. Next in importance to infertility of soil are climate influences, for they tend to destroy the health of individuals, to limit their labor power, to reduce their general vitality. These climatic conditions may arise out of poor drainage, excessive heat or excessive moisture, great variations in temperature, or generally unhealth-

ful conditions. For instance, the struggle to overcome climatic conditions in the Tropics will not permit of a high degree of civilization in that region. As another illustration, the writers have in mind a group of people who settled on a river bottom in a Western state. In the period of melting snows, this river, after plunging furiously down the mountain side, spread out into sloughs and bayous full of stagnant water, excellent breeding grounds for mosquitoes. And because the malaria carried by these mosquitoes kept the people sick for a large part of the year, their power to labor was curtailed at the same time that their expenses were added to. And after they had mortgaged their farms to perpetuate life, they were finally obliged to leave the lowlands and flee into the foothills, where a healthy climate permitted them to live.

Then there are the parasite enemies of plants, which must necessarily be enemies to man as well. The codling-moth, the boll-weevil, the phylloxera or chinch-bug, and the army worm sometimes make such ravages on vegetation as to destroy all the economic products of a community and reduce the people to poverty. Such a calamity may, by giving them unequal chances with others, determine their economic and social position in the world.

Or bacteria, the greatest modern enemies of human life, may, through disease, destroy a man's chances for physical, intellectual, or social supremacy. Nearly 750,000 preventable deaths occur annually in the United States alone. It is estimated that \$460,000,000 is the annual cost of illness and death in the families of our American working men, or \$960,000,000 a year, if to the first sum are added loss of wages through sickness and death. The sad part of the matter is that at least \$500,000,000 of this expense is unnecessary. Hookworm in our Southern states decreases the annual earning capacity by \$50,000,000; and every year tuberculosis, by throwing thousands out of work, drops them from the race for self-support and advancement in economic and social welfare.¹

Only, therefore, as science and economic organization are

¹ Fisher, "Report on National Vitality," *The Report of the National Conservation Commission*, Vol. III, pp. 620 sq.; Stiles, "Economic Aspects of Hookworm Disease in the United States," *Transactions of the 15th Congress of Hygiene and Demography*, 1913, Vol. III, p. 757.

brought to bear upon these enemies of humanity, will the inequalities of life be reduced. A short time ago a discovery was thought to be made concerning yellow fever bacteria; and yet more recently the yellow fever germ seemed to be found in a minute animal parasite carried by a species of mosquito. The diphtheria germ has been isolated; and it is now destroyed by means of the injection of a serum into the veins of the sufferer. Then, too, the fight to aid man in his battle with the natural enemies of his plants and animals becomes, each succeeding year, more energetic, more certain of success. Nor is this all. Science is gradually discovering the causes and preventives for diseases due to bad climatic conditions. And as a result, great natural resources, hitherto unavailable, are now being devoted to the advancement of civilization.

Inequalities Arising from Accident. — Many people lose their normal position in the social and economic scale through earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, droughts, railway wrecks, fires, and the common accidents of industrial life. These accidents naturally have a vast influence over the lives of their victims; for they often render people unfit to struggle along in the rank and file of humanity. Some, of course, having an inherent power of sudden recovery from misfortune, are enabled to regain their former position; but there are others who go down in the struggle. For example, a certain family owned a piece of land along the Kansas River, which for years had yielded them a handsome income. But there came a flood which destroyed their growing crops, washed away large portions of the farms, and ruined or depreciated others. After the flood had subsided, they moved back into their home and began, with earnest efforts, to till remaining portions of the soil and restore their lost fortunes. Unfortunately, however, typhoid fever so prostrated the entire family that they were soon thrown upon the care of the public. Thus, within six months, a well-to-do family group had been reduced to poverty by accident. Nor is such an experience an unusual one. Accident, health, life, industrial insurance, and old age insurance schemes promise to do much, however, to alleviate such misfortunes as these; for when the economic results of these disasters are spread over the entire community, equality of economic opportunity will, to a certain degree, at least, be secured. So, too, are the inequalities

due to natural conditions reduced by thrift agencies, such as savings banks, — both private and governmental, — safe investment companies for the man of small means, and schemes like the small allotment plan of Great Britain, by which a man has the help of the government to secure a little home of his own.

Inequalities Arising from Social Environment. — Besides the natural forces which render unequal the struggle for life and wealth, there is a certain social pressure which arises from artificial conditions. There are, in the first place, the great inequalities of wealth which we meet at every turn of life and which, though somewhat dependent upon individual characteristics and the workings of natural forces, are, after all, largely due to social conditions. If, for instance, a few people have absorbed the wealth of the community and used it arbitrarily, then all the others have an unequal chance with them in the struggle for independence. The fact is that, in the modern economic life, the use of capital in production is so essential that the man without it cannot compete with the one who possesses it. Then, too, the man born in a hovel, surrounded by squalor and poverty, has an unequal chance with the man born in a mansion, surrounded by culture and luxury; for although it is true that the individual born in poverty may rise above his condition, it is with great effort and against fearful odds that he does so. On the other hand, it is also true that the man born in the palace may fail to use his opportunities and consequently make a wreck of life. Yet these various statements are not inconsistent with the general proposition that wealth and poverty bring people into the world with unequal opportunities for position and power.

Industrial conditions may also have much to do with the success of some and the failure of others. When there is great prosperity in a community, it is easier for people to succeed than where there is great trade depression or where there are bad conditions generally. But as these business conditions are constantly shifting, it happens that even men of foresight and shrewdness are frequently ruined by unexpected industrial changes. On the other hand, there are men who, associating in business with men of industrial power, have the good fortune to enter industrial enterprises which succeed on account

of the favorable shifting of social conditions. And finally there is always that struggling and unlucky majority — men who cannot successfully compete with the more fortunate few.

There is, indeed, an incompleteness of business organization which leaves a large number of people outside of the general opportunities for business success. Some of the difficulty arises from uncoördinated individual effort in the modern business life; but this defect is rapidly being atoned for by the organization of men in groups for the purposes of production and distribution. And should business ever become completely organized on a coöperative basis, opportunities would be more nearly equalized, and wealth would, to a certain extent, be redistributed.

Nor is inequality of power much less a fact in the political world than it is elsewhere in society; for, although it has been the boast of the United States that the American people have equal opportunities for political and civil power, we know that even here there are not only unequal capacities, but unequal opportunities as well. Liberty of action may, to a certain extent, have been secured; but political equality has not been an essential outcome of this liberty of action. Money and prestige can still secure place and power, can still blind the eyes of justice. And although efforts are being made to secure the social equality of every man, both at the ballot box and in the courts, the wisdom of man has not yet been equal to the task. The corrupt practices acts, it is true, are the attempts of various states to correct the inequalities of the ballot box; but up to the present, our systems of court procedure have not been so perfected that the rich and powerful secure as summary justice as do the poor and politically friendless. After all, law alone cannot force men to recognize the social rights of others. Such recognition must be acquired by the slow process of political and social development, the growth of a sense of social justice, and a passion for the general welfare.

But not only are there inequalities of wealth and industrial conditions; for even religious belief may be the cause of certain definite inequalities. A man, for example, of a strong religious nature, may owe his prominence to what he has accomplished in his church; or in his struggle for success, he may be supported by some powerful religious organization. He has,

in either case, an advantage over the man who has influence neither in a church nor in a religious society.

And finally, although here in the United States we have assumed that every child has the chance to choose his own vocation in life, such is not the case. Because of the complexity of our social life, the passing of our empire of free land, the increasing economic and social stratification of our people, and the lack of intelligent guidance of our children and youth, many a man is as much "born to" a low plane in our modern economic and social life as was the serf of medieval Europe to serfdom on some particular estate. The chief occupation must of necessity be modified by environment. The public mind, by the creation of social conditions, sets the limitations for individual choice. No less powerful, on the other hand, in the regulation of social position, are the inequalities arising from family distinction. A man who, for example, is related to the best families of a community has a greater opportunity to succeed than the man who is related to its worst families. To the term "best family" we do not, of course, give the arbitrary, and artificial, meaning accorded to it by polite society; the term "best families" is used by us in contradistinction to "worst families." Indeed, it only too often happens that a man who, under ordinary circumstances, would succeed admirably, fails to gain a position of usefulness and power because of the weakness or wickedness of members of his own family.

The Modification of Inequality. — Education, as it is conducted by the various states in the Union, represents perhaps the greatest power for the reduction of the inequalities of social life. The fact that the great mass of the people are associated in the same schools and given the same education, suggests that a leveling force is constantly being applied to the various social inequalities. It must be remembered, however, that the strong in mind and body still have the opportunity to outdistance their weaker competitors; for those with will and brain power can, by availing themselves of the opportunities of higher education, gain power and influence over their fellows. And while we ought not to wish to diminish such inequality in capacity, we ought to try to educate our people to a sense of social responsibility for their superior natural endowment. For we have passed from that old idea of education, — the elevation of one class

above another, or to give the popular conception, the preparation of a man for an idle life. We now look at education as a means for elevating society at large and for creating the power to do a larger amount of work in a shorter time, to do it better, and to make it count in the welfare of society.

Thus we have seen that there is an insurmountable diversity in individual lives which leads from inequality of opportunity to inequality of power. This diversity we have, indeed, no desire to destroy. It should, however, be the aim of society to provide for the development of each separate power and capacity by removing or modifying natural inequalities so far as science and legislation can. For example, the inequalities of life could be greatly reduced by a positive program for better sanitation; the removal of causes of disease; protection against accident; the destruction of dangerous microbes, bacteria, and predatory animals; the curbing of the activities of predatory men and corporations; and provisions for proper recreation. Moreover, the removal or modification of artificial inequalities might, in a measure, be obtained by better instruction concerning the rights, duties, and privileges of individuals and by the establishment of laws regulating civil service, universal suffrage, and equality in the use of public highways, buildings, and conveyances. Great care should be exercised to give equality before the law and in the making of the law. Such instruction and such privileges, together with freedom in the choice of position and service and the opportunity for universal education, would, indeed, reduce social inequalities to a minimum and make social control rather less necessary than it is now.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Take a social unit, such as a village, a country township, or a city, and make a classification showing the inequalities characteristic of the individuals therein.
2. Give an illustration of how social inequality is brought about by natural ability; by environment; by social circumstances into which one may be born.

3. Show how the extension of the franchise in England made for political equality; how the invention of street cars and the production of such things as the cheap sewing machine, the postal savings bank, and the building and loan association, iron out the economic and social inequalities between classes.

4. What effect has such a device as the joint stock company had upon social inequality?

5. Show how popular education works for equality; how it produces inequality.

6. Why is it not desirable from the standpoint of the social welfare to have a dead level of human equality?

7. Is it socially desirable to have equality of natural capacity? Of economic opportunity? Of educational privileges?

8. What bearing has the fight against disease had on the problem of human equality? The agitation for industrial education? For compulsory school laws? For workmen's compensation laws? For employers' liability acts? For pensions for widows with children? For juvenile courts? For scientific relief of the poor?

CHAPTER VI

THE IDEAL OF JUSTICE

The Nature of Justice.— Civil justice, through authority expressed in public opinion of law, defines and secures the rights of the individual and imposes upon him obligations to society. It gives a fair opportunity to every man in the group; it determines what belongs to him and what he owes to other individuals and to the community. And when a government has established justice, there is nothing important left for it to do which the individual cannot better do for himself. "Justice" says Madison, "is the end of government; it is the end of civil society."¹ Not equality, not fraternity, for perhaps these cannot be secured by government, but justice is the end for which organized government is established. Nor is this idea of justice based upon any natural right or law, but upon the judgment of society. Its psychological beginning may be found, doubtless, in that sense of fairness which arises in the mind of an individual when he is brought in contact with others; but its final declaration is a social judgment. Since, then, it is an artificial, socially determined right, it may vary with the conditions of social order or individual environment.

So-called natural justice is the attempt on the part of an individual to secure his self-determined rights without the interposition of a third party. Existing only in an anarchistic condition where might makes right; it is the animal struggle for survival, the application of a biological law to human endeavor. A survival of natural justice may be observed in the family feud, and in a larger way, in the selfish and arbitrary struggles for power which nations enter into at the expense of others. And expressions of natural justice are the arbitrary measures of trusts and monopolies when they are uncurbed by social regulation.

¹ *The Federalist*, II, p. 241.

The Arbiter of Justice. — Civil justice implies at least two contending parties, or opposing principles, and a third party that decides between them. And since, in all social order, there must be this authority to decide right and privilege, the government takes it upon itself to represent the third party and establish justice between contending individuals or factions. And just as in the ancient régime the king could say, *L'état; c'est moi*, so in democracy, that summation of the ideals and will of the people, the government, can say *Le roi; c'est moi*.

In the evolution of the state, the governing power may take many forms; but civil justice develops along with the state rather than in accordance with the form of government. The horde shows few signs of civil justice; but wherever there is self-constituted leadership, there is need for some sort of social justice. For that matter, the self-constituted leader maintains his position in part by means of his service as arbiter in disputes. And, in fact, whether the leadership be self-imposed, established by custom, or based on heredity or the choice of the people, the leader has always, directly or indirectly, been a judge between differing individuals or clashing factions of the group. Wherever government exists, however, the leader is but its executor; back of the government is the supreme will of the sovereign community. If that sovereign happens to be a small group, as is sometimes the case just after a conquest, then the king represents the oligarchy. If, however, the sovereignty rests with all the people, then he represents democracy. Kings, rulers, and officers may be its agents, and constitutions, laws, and government its mode of expression; but the organized social will of the group is the court of last resort, the final arbiter of justice. Justice cannot, after all, rise higher than its source. Thus, although the character of the organs of justice will determine its effectiveness, the knowledge of relationships, the conception of right and wrong, and the standards of right conduct held by a community will determine the quality of justice.

The Relation of the Individual to the Mass. — In all forms of government the individual bears a certain relation to the social group at large. This relationship varies in proportion, on the one hand, to the degree to which government has developed, and to the passion for individual liberty, on the other. The extreme example of the subjection of the individual to

the mass is found in socialism, which requires a complete subordination of each to the many. Plato's *Republic* gives us a vivid picture of this sort of government. And, indeed, the practical government of ancient Greece shows the absorption, to a considerable extent, of the individual by the government, the subjection of the individual to society. But the modern ideal democracy insists on political and social coöperation in such a way as to give the individual a large freedom of choice; that is, individual liberty really prevails, although it is secured by the coöperation of many individuals who are seeking the same end.

The extreme of individualism is exhibited in the political theory of the survival of the fittest. When carried too far by unscrupulous people, this political individualism leads to a constantly recurring despotism. When, however, it seeks the highest good of the majority, when it bends its energies to the improvement of society, it will be regulated by a political coöperation which involves the development of individual powers and capacities. And as the group becomes increasingly homogeneous in feelings and thoughts, the restraints on the liberty of the individual are lessened; for with uniformity of mental and social characteristics, sympathy increases between individuals and hostility decreases. Thus is the individual really governed by himself.

Ideal Democracy. — When reduced to its ultimate analysis, the declaration that men are created free and equal, with certain inalienable rights, indicates nothing more than the right of men to make the laws that are to govern them and the right to choose the officers that are to rule over them; and do the rulers assume, for a time, the rôle of sovereignty, they are, after all, but acting as servants of the people. In our search for the ultimate authority, therefore, we must not carry too far that idea of natural right which received its initial impulse from the French philosophers. For it is only by means of coöperation of his fellows, who are impressed with the same idea, that the individual determines his right to govern; hence, both the right to govern and the right to freedom of individual action come from the judgment of society. In other words, the individual of to-day may do just what society grants him the privilege of doing and no more — that is, whatever he, with the coöper-

ation of his fellows shall determine to be right and just and for the general welfare. The right to govern, therefore, is determined by the capacity for self-government; and the real freedom comes from the right established by coöperative association. The only natural right of the individual is the biological right to existence manifested in the law of survival; it is not biological fact, however, but social fitness that determines his right to share in the government. If, then, there is any natural right of government, it is a natural social right rather than a natural individual right. Man is born under existing laws and social institutions which, as an individual, he cannot overthrow; he is heir to conditions which are the fruit of a thousand generations of men. These conditions may be wrong, but they have been established by combined social action, active or passive; and the only manner in which he can influence or change these ideals, rules, and customs of society, is through combined social action, and whatever society determines to be right or just will be the source of individual liberty.

The Rational Choice of the People. — The social will of the people seeks, then, to establish justice among the individuals who compose the body politic. And when the social mind, after determining what is just and right among the people, carries out this social judgment, government has done its ultimate service to society. Although not the popular idea of equality, this plan for social coöperation nevertheless insists that each individual shall have the opportunity, so far as is compatible with social justice, to develop his individual capacity and exercise his individual powers. But if laws are needed to secure political freedom and civil justice, they are also needed to secure industrial freedom and economic justice. For just as free competition in political affairs, unlimited by social regulation, leads to anarchy, the outcome of which is a species of despotism, so, too, freedom of competition in the industrial life, when unlimited by social justice, leads to industrial anarchy, whose final outcome is industrial despotism.

Of course, the ideals of justice held by a community will vary from time to time, in accordance with changing circumstances. For example, social justice looked with favor on the ideal of *laissez faire* before great corporations had so far developed as to imperil the liberty of non-incorporated individuals.

Now, however, governmental interference in the interests of justice between corporations and individuals has become necessary. Again, there was a time when society believed that justice in education was done when "the little red schoolhouse," built at public expense, gave the merest elements of an education to those who chose to come. But now social justice is satisfied with nothing less than compulsory attendance, up to a certain age, at a school where not only the three R's are taught, but where the pupil is trained in the sciences and in certain practical subjects as well. It is beginning to be perceived that, in the interests of social justice, a vocational training must be provided for each; that the youth must be taught which vocations hold out the best prospects of success; and that the adult should be provided a chance to redeem his lost educational opportunities.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. In what sense is a vigilance committee in a frontier settlement an instrument of justice? The social will of what part of the community does it represent?
2. Show how modern social legislation — juvenile court laws, probation laws, pure food laws, and legislation for the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors, "dope," patent medicines, etc. — are attempts to secure social justice.
3. In what sense is the "personal liberty" argument, as applied to liquor legislation, inconsistent with justice?
4. When the manager of a great corporation says that he will "run his own business," why is his attitude antisocial?
5. What light is thrown upon the relation between justice and forceful methods of social control by the fact that isolated and homogeneous settlements of people often have no officers of civil justice, such as constables, justices of the peace, etc.? What light is thrown upon the more unseen restraints?

6. Make a list of the various methods by which justice between man and man is secured in a certain hamlet, village, or neighborhood which you know.
7. Show how the school playground prepares children and youth for social justice.
8. What effect upon the development of social justice would a social center have — a common meeting place for the discussion of questions?

CHAPTER VII

ESTIMATION OF PROGRESS

Change versus Progress.— Inasmuch as civilization is made up of many complex elements, it is difficult to get a standard for the measure of progress. A thousand changes may be taking place in society, whose final results are so difficult to estimate that it is uncertain whether they are progressive or non-progressive.

Observation and historical retrospect at once convince us that change is not always progress. Just as, according to the accepted doctrine of evolution, there is not only a development of life, but also a regressive action, so in society, there is a working downward as well as upward. And before we may finally determine whether society is progressing, we must consider the aims of society and we must determine the standard by which progress is measured. The question of aims we considered in a previous chapter; the matter of standards is still to be discussed. What is the correct measure of art, literature, moral action, and political usage? Of course, if our ideals were constant, it would be an easy matter to determine progress by a comparison of the reality with the ideal. But since these are constantly shifting, we are forced to examine the *results* of social action to see whether, as time passes, society is more or less able to protect and develop man. There are, however, certain unmistakable results of growth which may, at the start, be enumerated.

Closer Integration of Society.— As society develops, it becomes more and more closely integrated; the individual has a more definite, hence closer, relation to the mass. In our own day, for example, people of many different racial types, assembled under one government and one national life, become one in thought and sentiment in a comparatively short space of time. And because of the increased harmony of thought and feeling, this process of integration brings about more rapid and

more effective social action. When it comes to social action, indeed, each of the ethnic groups of the world now has a much greater solidity than when men were born under status rather than under law; for although there are classes even yet, they are based not so much on status as upon ability and occupation, and it is easier for a man to go from one class to another.

Differentiation of Society in Structure and Function. — Since society began to develop from the protoplasmic or homogeneous state represented by the horde, there has been a continuous differentiation into activities and structures; for society grows, not only by the enlargement and solidification of the mass, but in the separation of the mass into interdependent organs, each of which has a function of its own. In government, for example, there was first a concentration of all powers in one individual; but gradually there was a differentiation into senates, assemblies, courts of justice, military organizations, and ecclesiastical orders. And this differentiation still goes on; new ministries, new commissions, and boards, or any other new organs of government are created whenever they are needed. Society gains immensely in power and social effectiveness by this growth, which is one of the signs of progress. Nor is this method of development confined to matters of government; for, in the economic world, we find each new industry demanding a new group of trained people to carry it on, each new invention demanding a new division of specifically trained labor.

Closer Articulation of Parts. — And not only do the old organs of government become more perfectly developed, but by change and practice, they are made to fit into one another like the parts of finely adjusted machinery. Thus we observe that society grows in efficiency by increasing its number of functions and organs, by perfecting these organs, and by fitting these into a more perfect social mechanism.

Has Each Succeeding Generation Better Life Conditions? — Another method of estimating progress is to observe whether the present generation has better life conditions than the preceding — that is, greater resources, better methods of service, and in a given time, with a given amount of energy, larger results. For, if we are to believe the theory of Weismann that permanent characteristics may be transmitted from generation

to generation, and that acquired individual characteristics are not so transmitted, the hope of civilization depends upon bringing each successive group into a better environment and making certain that the social heritage of civilization is, without loss, transmitted by such social machinery as the educational system. That is, there must be an accumulation of energy, materials, and the fruits of civilization; and if there is to be progress, better methods of using social achievements must be developed. The real service of education is measured by its success in aiding a people to accomplish these objects; the real progress of society is determined by conditions such as these. And judged by this standard the world is certainly ahead of its achievements of a hundred years ago.

The Improvement of Race or Stock. — Through the accumulation of wealth, through invention and scientific discovery, man is protected from disease, his physical welfare is increased, and his life is prolonged for service. But does the racial stock gradually grow better or worse as disease is eliminated and controlled? To lower the death rate of a community by even two per cent is immediately to increase its labor power, both by creating a healthier state of society and by prolonging the life of the individual. But may not such conservation of life mean also the perpetuation of those unfit to propagate their kind? Not in the long run; for the scientific care of the weak should not develop weakness, but strength. Society has, it is true, many evil effects of degeneracy to overcome; but better food, better habits of life, and greater protection from disease ought to develop a better racial stock. Furthermore, with the growth of science and our knowledge of the principles of heredity, we shall take care against the possible weakening of the race through the saving of those who, under harsher conditions, would not live to perpetuate their kind. Thus will human selection, guided by science, come to the support of natural selection, turning the survival of the *fittest* into the elevation and perpetuation of the *best*.

The Equalization of Political Opportunities. — The changes in political methods and the development of government have brought about a democratic society in which the individuals all bear the same relation to the whole body politic. It is only natural that, in a government by the people, each individual

should have a right not only to participate in choosing legislators to make the laws, and officers to execute them, but even the opportunity to win such political distinction as his merits or ability will permit. Sometimes, it is true, a few, gaining the ascendancy by machinations, intrigue, and corruption, may deprive people of their political liberty and their political opportunities; but these conditions are not lasting. For, although wealth and prestige still play a considerable part in securing political preferment, we find a growing measure of freedom, an equalization of individual opportunity in political life, which show us that society has progressed. And in spite of the fact that the political boss still flourishes in our cities, his power, dependent in these days on the imperfect assimilation of our foreign population, is part of an outgrown political system doomed to pass away. The old class-rule, by means of which a few assumed and maintained a monopoly of government, is giving place to a government in which the majority decides.

The Equalization of Industrial Opportunities. — The feudal system gave every man a place; it permitted him to change neither from one place to another nor, as a rule, from one class to another. Now there is no doubt that the class system of Europe, with its opportunities for one class and not for another, was detrimental to the freedom and mobility of labor. These barriers of humanity, however, have been gradually broken down, and each individual has an ever increasing opportunity to choose his own industrial life. And yet it is beginning to be a question whether modern corporate industry, with its strict classification of workers on the basis of an almost microscopic division of labor, has not set a current running in the opposite direction. Up to the present time, the large amount of free lands in America has insured the greatest freedom of choice in occupation; if an individual was not satisfied with his calling or his salary, he could obtain a farm for the asking and begin a new industrial life. On the other hand, the accumulation of wealth and the organization of industry during recent years would seem, in a measure, to preclude the universal opportunity of individuals to rise. Yet, in another way, the accumulation of wealth and the organization of industry have, by developing the resources of nature, multiplied the opportunities of all members of the industrial group; for while one individual

may be limited by the power of organization or the initiative of wealth, he has, as a matter of fact, a thousand choices of occupation where formerly he had but a few. Inasmuch as the industrial life demands skill and ability of widely different kinds, it provides for the greatest efficiency and happiness of all by giving to each the chance to do that work for which, both by nature and training, he is best fitted. The multiplication and equalization of industrial opportunities is, therefore, a gauge for determining the rate of progress of a nation.

Increased Service of Wealth in Behalf of Humanity. — More and more the surplus wealth of a community is devoted, either by direct gift of the possessor or through enlightened methods of taxation and public expenditure, to the advancement of the people. Through individual management, wealth increases the conveniences of life; and by the establishment of schools, churches, libraries, gymnasiums, parks, and recreation grounds, all the members of society are given the opportunity for improvement. The telephone, telegraph, means of rapid transportation, and all forms and conveniences of travel, show what wealth can do to advance the interests of mankind. The machinery used in manufactures, mining, and agriculture enables people to accomplish more and to accomplish it more easily than was possible in the days of hand work. Wealth, in fact, if properly distributed, brings increased leisure for mental, moral, and social improvement. And the progress of society is clearly indicated by the service of wealth in the development of better houses, a better grade of clothing, a more adequate food supply, rational means of spending leisure time, and, in fact, all the conveniences and pleasures of life. Those nations which have not accumulated wealth, therefore, have no formal basis of progress; there is no opportunity for them to advance, because they have nothing with which to work. It is by the accumulation of wealth, and through the well-directed use of it, that political and social progress is made possible. More and more do men who have accumulated large fortunes realize that they are but the trustees of the surplus wealth created by a community; and more and more is the effort being made to have this wealth bear its proper share in the public expenditures for the common welfare and in the general advancement of humanity.

Progress by Adaptation of the Forces of Nature to Man. —

There is no more definite kind of advancement than is shown by the gradual mastery of nature by man. As among animals, so, too, in the lower human societies, the organism lived and developed by adjusting itself to nature; but the development of civilized man is marked by his increasing ability to bend nature to his wishes and make it serve his needs. Indeed, many of the milestones in the progress of humanity are at points where man touches and uses the forces of nature for his own benefit, be it a new food discovered, or a new use of one of the elements of nature, like electricity, steam, or radium. By the application of scientific activity to industrial life, man is able to increase the amount accomplished without increasing his effort; for a growing intelligence and an increasing variety of wants so whet man's ambitions that the tendency is toward more work, rather than less, and work that shows an increase in power. Thus there is a tremendous addition to the product of labor. When steam power is brought into practical use, when electricity begins to be applied to everyday things, when the producer and consumer are brought close together by cheap transportation, and whenever the discovery of a new scientific principle in medicine or chemistry points the way toward the preservation of health and the prolongation of life, society advances with enormous strides. In every instance we have nothing more than the bending of nature to the service of man; and just to the extent to which man has mastered nature and turned it to his use, a nation may be said to be civilized. Thus is the progress of humanity measured by its utilization of the forces of nature.

Social Direction of Society in the Interests of the Individual.

— Another criterion of progress is the comparative welfare of the individual. Society exists only that it may advance the welfare of all its component members, so far as the welfare of each individual is consistent with that of every other. To secure this general welfare, society sets bounds to the activities of the individuals who trespass upon the rights of the defenseless. For example, it protects women and children against soulless corporations and ruthless men; and at all times, for that matter, it protects the weak against the strong, in the interest of what is, in the long run, the greatest measure of welfare for each.

To secure this aim, society must continually readjust its machinery to meet new conditions and to offset and cure new maladjustments brought about by calculating and antisocial men. The whole process is a conscious direction of social development by those who have at heart the welfare of society at large. The activities of those, therefore, who look upon the social machinery as a means whereby to further their own selfish interests must be controlled by society as a whole. The completeness with which this artificial adjustment is made is the final test of social progress. Civilized society is a highly artificial affair; so delicate are its relationships that the machinery easily gets out of order. Thus it is the duty of the social engineer to find satisfactory methods for keeping the machinery going — a task none too easy; for, since precedents are few or lacking entirely, much of this effort must necessarily be in the nature of an experiment. The real statesman, therefore, as well as the sociologist, can never lose sight of this social purpose; and all suggestions for social reform are made with reference to their probable usefulness in securing this adjustment.

But all of these social inventions are for the sole purpose of developing social personality; for the individual is the unit for which society exists. Society must never lose sight of the fact that all its machinery exists to help men to become happy and fruitful personalities. We may define this ideal social personality as one characterized by high vitality, a well-developed mentality, a generously endowed moral nature, and a social nature capable, on the one hand, of "cheerful and efficient participation in the normal comradeship and coöperation of society," and, on the other, of "sympathetic and positively helpful" altruism.¹ Or, to put the matter in terms of the psychology of social development, the purpose of society is to aid in the development of those institutions and ideals which will allow the individual to "particularize," to use Baldwin's term, on the basis of his social experiences, and thus produce innovations which society may "generalize" and make available for the whole group.²

Judged by this test, is society progressing? There can be no doubt that, in democratic societies, at least, the individual

¹ Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, p. 259.

² Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 539-542.

has now more freedom of self-expression, and society more rapid and complete command of the contributions of the individual, than ever before. The give-and-take between individuals, the influence, on the one hand, of genius upon the less highly endowed portion of society, and the psychical and social interactions which make up what we call the social mind, would naturally bring about these results. And with the growth of free institutions, the coming of a more perfect education, the gradual discontinuance of war, a growth of international conciliation of disputes between nations, and the regulation of class conflicts, the individual will be more than ever at liberty to give rein to his genius, and society more able than ever before to direct all its powerful agencies towards a more perfect socialization of the individual.

It is, of course, true that, in a highly dynamic state, society may sometimes seem to show retrogression rather than progress. It must not be forgotten, however, that, in the midst of rapidly changing conditions, it is not always possible to measure the degree of success attending any particular piece of social legislation or any specific device intended to lessen maladjustment. He who walks a steamer's deck must not judge his progress by his relation to the sea gull flying in the air, but by some landmark, by the stars, by the complicated system of navigation in use by the navigator. After all, and in spite of war, poverty, and crime, in spite of the ruthless oppression of the weak by the strong, does not society, in the most civilized countries to-day, more truly answer to the test of progress than ever before? One has but to project himself back into Roman or Grecian society, in the days of their highest development and compare the lot of the ordinary man of those days with his chances in ours, to grasp the real significance of our present state of society.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Show that evolution of society does not necessarily mean progress.
2. After reading the foregoing chapter and the assignments in Giddings, make a list of the things which would serve as a test of progress.
3. Analyze some small community or group of people with which you are quite familiar; compare its achievements now with those of, say, ten years ago. On the basis of this comparison, decide whether it is a progressive or a retrogressive community.
4. Show that, while material betterment may mean progress for the community, it does not necessarily signify progress.
5. Outline a situation in which increase of culture might mean retrogression rather than progress.
6. Why may increase of such parts of the social structure as boards and commissions signify social progress? Under what circumstances would such increase mean the opposite?
7. If acquired characteristics are not inherited, explain how there can be better physical types of men and women. Show what is meant by "our social heritage." How are the social achievements transmitted from one generation to the next?
8. What evidence can you give that political opportunity is as great to-day as it was a generation ago or even greater?
9. Is there any evidence that there is greater educational opportunity to-day than there was a generation ago?
10. Is there any evidence that there is greater social application of wealth to-day than there was fifty years ago?
11. What bearing have antitrust laws, railroad regulation, and regulation of corporations, upon the social use of wealth and upon industrial opportunity for the people?
12. Compare the statement in the text, p. 419, that progress is measured by the mastery of man over nature, with Keller's statement on p. 22 of his *Societal Evolution*.

PART FIVE
SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY

Normal Distinguished from Abnormal Society. — It is difficult to determine and define a perfectly normal society. Possibly the difficulty rests chiefly in the fact that there is no universally acknowledged standard of correctness. A society with all of its functions perfect, with all of its structure complete in every part, is in the nature of things an ideal society; for the real society is never completed. The same difficulty occurs, though perhaps to a less degree, when we search for an individual who is perfect physically, intellectually, and morally. Physical perfection, of course, although difficult enough to determine, is much more readily measured than mental or moral excellence. If, for example, in gauging a man's moral capacity, we accept the Golden Rule for our guide, how shall we determine who comes the nearest to its observance? And since, on the other hand, even when we have a general standard of perfection, we find that different intellects display different characteristics of strength, it is difficult to test the powers of mind in sufficiently accurate manner to determine whether one mind is more perfect than another.

Nevertheless, there is a normal body, a normal mind, and a normal moral nature which we are able to distinguish from the abnormal; and just as there are abnormal individuals, so is there an abnormal society. We have learned that society is composed of many interdependent parts, each with its particular function. It is easy to see, therefore, that, if one of these component units in any way fails in its normal function, thus forcing extra burdens upon other portions of society, such society is abnormal. In such a condition of affairs, however, the whole structure is not necessarily defective, but only those parts which fail to perform their legitimate or normal functions. When, on the other hand, men have learned to live together

in harmony and so to coöperate that, in the exercise of his own peculiar powers, each has all the freedom consistent with the same degree of liberty on the part of every other individual, society may be said to be, not only normal, but well-nigh perfect.

Standards of Social Activity Differ in Different Communities.

— There is such variety in social life that a minimum of requirements is to be expected in a normal society. Means of subsistence should be assured by fairly close connection with the soil and the resources of nature in general. There should, on the one hand, be coöperation of all individuals in the production and distribution of wealth, no group of individuals being relieved from the privilege and responsibility of performing its share of the service; and on the other, the wealth created should be sufficient to afford leisure for other than industrial pursuits. Furthermore, not only should each individual feel secure in person and property, but there should be universal opportunity for the most socially useful intellectual development, as well as means for promoting and perpetuating a high degree of morality. These are, perhaps, sufficient to indicate the necessary characteristics of a normal society; yet the highest type of society, in addition, would be conspicuous for its religious and æsthetic culture, for its absence of poverty, pauperism, vice, and crime, and for the exclusion of such defective classes as fail to respond to the demands of social life. These latter conditions, however, can only be approximated; for defects are incidental to social development.

Characteristics of Social Pathology. — Social pathology may treat of a general defect which spreads throughout the entire social structure; but more frequently the term applies to a particular class of people within a social group or to a defective function of government.

There are, in the first place, the unbalanced conditions of wealth and poverty. An excess of wealth may render some individuals useless to the community, just as its lack renders others dependent. These two groups, therefore, each failing to perform its normal service to society, become social parasites. Poverty, when its victims are slaves to the conditions which it imposes, is one of the worst forms of social disease; for, stunted in body and mind as are the hopelessly poor, they can

receive but small return for their meager services. The prevention of poverty, on the one hand, and on the other, the utilization of wasted effort, have long been problems for reformer and social philosopher. In the case of the idle rich the opportunity for service is, of course, more apparent than in that of the inefficient poor; yet both groups are inefficient in social coöperation because of a failure rightly to understand and use opportunities, or because of social maladjustment which permits idleness to the rich and forbids employment or permits parasitism to the poor.

Pauperism. — Following closely upon poverty is pauperism, which, passing beyond a mere pathological condition, is a social disease having its seat in the individual; hence it cannot, like poverty, be cured by changing conditions, although, to be sure, a change of conditions is among the means for preventing pauperism. Pauperism, when it seizes the social body, is like a parasite receiving its sustenance from the animal on which it lives and returning no service for its life. And normal society, while attempting to check the growth of pauperism that it may not become a curse, has learned to treat the pauper like a parasite, and to place absolutely no dependence upon him in carrying out its legitimate functions. But pauperism is even worse than it appears; for, because of the various diseases, defects, and evils which it engenders and supports, it tends to weaken society by destroying not only its productive, but its moral force, and is, in reality, one of the worst forms of social pathology. Pretending to want to be respectable members of society, but at heart unwilling to pay the price, paupers may well be designated as pseudo-social.

Crime. — Crime is the very worst phase of social pathology; for, of all defects in society, it is the most directly abnormal. Openly attacking the fundamental idea in social life — coöperation in the interests of the whole group — the criminal becomes the deliberate enemy of social order; for he attempts to take without giving service in return, to destroy the individual with whom he should coöperate, or at least to live from the products of his toil. Not only does crime fall heavily upon its victims, whose property and means of service are destroyed, but since it costs much to provide the machinery for the prevention and punishment of crime, the burden is also heavy on society as a

whole. And although it is true that the tendency in recent years has been to cause criminals under punishment to engage in productive labor, they are still, to a large degree, non-coöperative, and they never quite pay to society the cost of their care.

Vice. — Vice works as a slow disease in destroying the vital energy of society; no matter what form it takes, it develops a pathological condition. Primarily it affects the individual; yet the whole social fabric may become so tainted with vice as to have its normal activity destroyed. Vice and crime go hand in hand; and laws are usually so carefully framed that vice shades off into crime. It is difficult to cure vice; for, insidiously laying hold of elemental passions and perverting them, as it does, it contaminates by degrees all who come in contact with it, so weakening them that they cannot carry on the normal activities of society.

Defectives. — The large number of defectives, such as imbeciles, such as the deaf, dumb, blind, and insane, must be considered from the social standpoint, because their existence concerns society at large. Not only are they dependent upon society for their support, but in a large measure, society is responsible for the increase of these classes. The defects become social diseases and their prevention a social necessity. In fact, many of the most grievous problems of social improvement have to do with these classes of defectives. In another chapter, the treatment of some of them will be handled more in detail.

The Pathology of the Family. — As has been stated before, the family is, both historically and structurally, the primary social group. Its fundamental purpose is to provide a place where the offspring may be reared under favorable conditions; but incidentally it represents many different phases of social life, such as the biological, the economic, and the educational. And even when it is more or less defective in all of these, the family life may still be normal. The abnormal or pathological condition of society arises from imperfect social relations between man and wife, between parents and children, and among children themselves.

Perhaps the first requirement for a normal household is that the parents be in good mental and physical health. Lack of health in one or both parents often leads to pathological conditions, not only in the children, but in the home relations. Simi-

lar results arise from those who, by moral nature and temperament, are "unequally yoked," for incompatibility is as fatal as bodily or mental disease. There is, indeed, perhaps no other phase of social life in which defects have such lasting consequences, and are so difficult to overcome or prevent. The fact is that family life is so sacred and the customs of matrimony and matrimonial life so delicate and of such long standing that it is difficult to make any general law controlling them. However, a step has been taken in the direction of regulating matrimony by those of our states which have within recent years introduced bills into legislatures forbidding the issuance of marriage certificates to those seriously afflicted with disease; and without doubt, it would be to the benefit of the community at large to have yet more stringent legislation in the matter. Indeed, as part of an ideal system which might be gradually approximated, the following provisions might be suggested: No persons shall be permitted to marry who have not sound minds; thus will the insane and the imbecile be excluded. All persons shall be required to show health certificates stating that they are not afflicted with certain hereditary diseases. Persons having no assurance of means of support shall not be granted marriage certificates. Persons shall not receive marriage certificates who have not attended certain courses of lectures on physiology and hygiene, the lectures being provided for in each county by the properly constituted authorities, either in regular or special evening school. A system of instruction for prospective homemakers, both men and women, shall be established in connection with our public school system. The subjects covered shall not merely be those now given in the courses on home economics, which are intended for only one sex and which cover only one class of duties, but shall include training in the duties of husband and wife, in the technique of mental and moral adjustment in the home, in the rearing of children, and for the men, in the economics of household management as it relates to their share of the task. Finally, there shall be kept in every county a system of registration for all residents, said registration including statistics of age, birth, occupation, ancestry, and so forth. It would require great care to put such provisions into operation; but if it were possible to have them satisfactorily administered, they could not fail to improve present conditions.

Divorce, because of the division it creates in families, indicates a pathological condition. Nor is it easy to see how it can be improved without improving the conditions which are antecedent to and attendant upon the marriage relation. The highest and best form of matrimony is, of course, a coöperative companionship. In a spirit of love, sympathy, and helpfulness man and woman agree to live together for life; and in this spirit they build a hallowed place, called home, for the rearing and culture of children. But there are many baser motives in matrimony. Some men, for example, marry to gratify passion; some, desiring a good housekeeper or servant, secure a wife much as they might a horse; some, in their advanced years demand a nurse; and some marry for money. On the other hand, many women marry merely for the sake of gaining a home or support, regardless of what the man may be or of their attitude toward him; some marry because it is considered unfashionable or unfortunate to remain single; and still others marry against their will because of the pressure of relatives. Finally, there are many who, dazzled by the glamour of romantic love, enter the bonds of matrimony hastily and lightly, only to repent of their folly when it is too late for any assistance but that to be gained from loose divorce laws. For conditions such as these a uniform divorce law throughout the United States, neither weak nor excessively stringent, would be of immense service; but for remedying this phase of family pathology, final dependence must be placed upon education in home economics and home sociology and upon carefully developed laws regulating matrimony.

Again, inadequate support of the family, inadequate shelter, an insufficient amount of wholesome food, improper sanitation, and bad family discipline lead to pathological conditions. Where the moral status is not high and the socialization is not perfect, the evil tendency of the home is so great as to be overcome with great difficulty. It is, in fact, almost impossible to train children for the discipline of the larger social life when they have been corrupted by their home influences or at least have been allowed to go undisciplined.

Pathology of the State.—Turning our attention to the state as it exists in a federal republic like the United States, we find that there is a great departure from the ideal govern-

ment, that the real practice is far from what it ought to be. Many of the defects of government are due, of course, to an imperfect socialization; liberty is at best an expensive thing, and a government by the people an unwieldy government difficult to establish and difficult to maintain. There is no science of legislation, not even a well-learned art. Only a few states have adopted the plan of a legislative reference library, with a department devoted to drafting bills by a comparative study of legislative experience. The authority to make the laws is delegated, for the most part, to an inexperienced body; and before the members of one legislature have fairly learned how to provide for the needs of the people, they are turned out to make room for others. As a result our statute books are covered with obsolete laws — laws that have been of little or no benefit to the public, as well as some that are a positive injury. And when, in addition to the other difficulties, are added the evils of political corruption and the machinations of the demagogue, the imperfections and misrule are sufficient to warrant us in complaining of decided maladjustment in politics and government.

Pathology of Education. — Again, our educational systems, forgetting to adapt means to ends, frequently fail to provide for a wide citizenship. Much of our training in the schoolroom is imperfect, unbalanced, and on account of its evil social results, decidedly pathological; for, by overtaxing the intellect, such training develops a highly nervous people without sufficient bodily support. Moreover, there are many positive defects, such as bad methods of instruction, an incompetent teaching force, a poorly coördinated system, and curricula that fail to produce the desired results.

The education provided by literature is also pathological. From all the various books which are published and placed at the disposal of the public, it chooses those which interest and amuse. And since much of our cheap literature is positively bad; since in its character of communication of knowledge it sets forth falsehood for truth and generally wrong ideals of life; and since, by arousing uncouth or irrational desires, it causes people to deceive themselves, its perusal leads to degeneration. The pipe line may be perfect, but it may carry germs of disease.

The newspaper, because of like imperfections, has its patho-

logical side. Pretending to be a leader of thought and a teacher of men, it frequently sells its services, becomes commercial, and publishes that which pleases its patrons, regardless of the truth or the evil effects on a community. The newspaper has, therefore, become to a large extent a purely commercial affair, which seeks to supply the demands of the news market; and some of the viler sort go to the length of depending upon a species of blackmailing, through which they receive advertising material as a sort of "hush money." Hence, while we concede the great service and great usefulness possible to the newspaper, we have to acknowledge that it has unguessed possibilities of evil.

Many newspapers publish sensational material which gives incorrect impressions and wastes time with its long explanations about unimportant events; and some color news to suit their purposes. It is really difficult to point out a remedy for these conditions; for, since the present feverish state of society demands lively news, a dull paper will not be read. The attempt of Charles H. Sheldon to remodel the modern newspaper on a Christian basis was a failure. It had many good features, such as the reduction of descriptions of crime to a bare statement of fact, and the elimination of spurious advertising material; yet, as a newspaper, it did not satisfy the public. A modern newspaper must, to succeed, be bright, racy, and "newsy"; if it fail to be interesting, few will want it. After all, the proprietor of a paper furnishes the kind of wares that are salable in the market; and nothing but a thoroughly socialized public opinion can regulate the educational influence of the newspaper. Nevertheless, each succeeding year shows fewer newspapers of the baser sort — evidence of the improving moral tone of the community; and it must be acknowledged that there are some fearless newspaper editors who are voices crying in our social wildernesses.

The Non-social Group. — One of the less obvious conditions of social pathology is to be found in the non-social groups. There are, of course, some individuals who would spend all their time and thought for the welfare of others; with natures practically devoid of selfishness they are always solicitous for the success and happiness of individuals or earnestly working for the highest well-being of society. They are, in fact, so extremely social as to be almost pathological. But there is the other

extreme case, that of individuals so selfish that they take no interest in their fellow-men. The lives of such are one perpetual struggle for survival and advancement; nor do they hesitate to advance their own interests at the expense of others. But a perfect social group demands coöperation and harmonious activity; it is easy to assume, therefore, that this non-social class is pathological, or that at least it presents a case of arrested development.

Again, in our large cities, where there is a dense population of different nationalities, where, on account of the differences of language, habits of life, customs, traditions, and ideals, coöperation is slight and socialization imperfect, we have evidence of social defects which, from their intensity, amount to social disease. As a matter of fact, the social condition of our large cities demands a constant warfare with vice and degeneration in all its forms. Nor is the country always pure; for, while it supplies the cities with vigorous manhood, it contributes also its quota of vice and crime.

These various social maladjustments by no means exhaust the list that might be made of what constitutes pathological conditions in our social structure. And since it would be impossible to discuss all the various forms of social disease, three have been selected for discussion within the limits of this treatise — namely, poverty, crime, and degeneracy. These will serve to give concrete illustration of the nature of the problems with which society must deal in her efforts to secure a more perfect adjustment of her machinery for producing the social individual; and they will serve to indicate some of the methods which experience has shown may be used in securing that adjustment.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Define biologically a normal individual.
2. Criticize the following definition of a normal member of society, or a socius: A member of a social group who functions in his social relationships so as to forward the social aims of the group.
3. Would a normal member of a society of savages necessarily be a normal member of a civilized society? Why?
4. Give reasons why a society in the Middle Ages might be considered normal, and one with the same ideals, organization, and methods might be abnormal in this century.
5. Apply your conclusion to the criticism of a society organized on a military basis to-day. Apply it to one organized on the basis of the doctrine of *laissez faire*.
6. Since brigandage was once an honorable occupation, why is it called a crime to-day?
7. Why is pauperism considered an indication of social pathology?
8. Vice was once such a normal condition that it was attached to the temples of the gods; why is it looked upon to-day as antisocial?
9. What light does the position of this chapter throw upon the contention that crime is an atavism, *i.e.* that it is a sign of reversion to an earlier type of conduct?
10. A man once had as many wives as he could afford to support; why is it that now the polygamous family is looked upon as abnormal?
11. Why is it that the recent war is looked upon by the conscience of our country as dangerous to the welfare of the world, when, until recently, war was the usual thing between nations?

CHAPTER II

POVERTY: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES

The Extent of Poverty. — One can better come to an appreciation of a problem if he can have a few figures, rather than general statements, to assist his imagination. In 1905 85,290 individuals were reported in almshouses in the United States, and 80,346 more in permanent homes for adults, these latter being chiefly aged and incurable dependents. Besides these there were 92,289 in orphanages and homes for children and 25,466 in municipal lodging houses and temporary homes.¹ As long ago as 1890 a number of authorities estimated that at least 3,000,000 people in the United States, or one twenty-fifth of the population, were receiving aid which was reported. And Professor Bushnell estimated that the annual cost of supporting this army of dependents was not less than \$200,000,000 or an amount equal to one tenth of the total wages paid by all the manufacturing plants of the country.²

Robert Hunter estimated, in 1904, that, in addition to those dependent, there were 10,000,000 of our population who were "much of the time underfed, poorly clothed, and improperly housed," who were, in other words, in poverty. This is, of course, only an estimate, but it is based upon such indications as the following: in 1897 29 per cent, and in 1899 24 per cent of the people of New York State applied for relief. After excluding one half of those who applied for dispensary help, the statistician still finds the percentages mounting up to 19 per cent and 18 per cent respectively for those two years; and if all dispensary cases are omitted, still 12 per cent of the population of the state of New York applied for relief. In Boston, in 1903, 20 per cent of that city's population were aided by public relief authorities alone; and in that same year 14 per cent of the

¹ Devine, *Misery and its Causes*, pp. 43, 44.

² Henderson, *Modern Methods of Charity*, p. 390.

families living on Manhattan Island were evicted from their houses for non-payment of rent. Statistics showed, furthermore, that 10 per cent of those who die in the borough of Manhattan are buried in the potter's field. And the United States Census for 1900 demonstrated that about 100,000 persons in New York were unemployed from four to six months of the year. On the basis of these figures it was estimated that 14 per cent of the people of New York State are in distress.¹

Yet, if in this country the situation as suggested by these figures is bad, the figures available for Great Britain show a condition fully as bad or worse.²

Immediate and Remote Causes of Poverty. — The causes of poverty are not easily discovered for the reason that they may extend over a long period of time in their operations and may arise from many sources. Indeed, such is the case as regards all sociological phenomena. There may be immediate causes which are easily discernible; but there are always other deep-seated causes, that, through a chain of events, reach back to remote or primary forces. Nevertheless, by statistical determination or case counting, we can obtain sufficient data to classify most of the primary causes of poverty.

Characteristics of the Individual. — First, there are characteristics of the individual which, arising from hereditary influences, always indicate weakness of some sort, although the extent of hereditary influence in inducing poverty has not been fully determined. Recent studies, however, throw a very interesting, though somewhat uncertain, light upon the relation between poverty and both physical and mental degeneracy. For example, Goddard, in his study of the Kallikak Family, showed that a considerable number of the descendants of the feeble-minded Martin Kallikak, Jr., were also shiftless and more or less dependent on others for support; and on the basis of some study of the question, Goddard estimates that 50 per cent of the inmates of almshouses are feeble-minded.³ While this is

¹ Hunter, *Poverty*, pp. 20-65.

² Space will not permit the inclusion of the figures, but they are readily accessible in such intensive studies as Booth's *Life and Labor of the People of London*, and Rowntree's *Poverty*, and in an extensive report, a Blue Book by the British Government, entitled *Public Health and Social Conditions and The Separate Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress* by Wakefield, Chandler Lansbury, and Mrs. Sidney Webb, 1909.

³ Goddard, *Feeble-mindedness, Its Causes and Consequences*, 1914, p. 17.

the estimate of one who, because he deals constantly with one particular defect, may be somewhat biased, and while the estimate must be held subject to the correction of further investigation, it is the opinion of a man who has studied feeble-mindedness more closely, perhaps, than any other in this country, and it stands as a challenge to anybody to disprove it by an independent investigation. Miss Kite's *The Pineys*, Dugdale's older study of *The Jukes*, McCulloch's *The Tribe of Ishmael*, Blackmar's *The Smoky Pilgrims*, Danielson and Davenport's *The Hill Folk*, and Gesell's *The Village of a Thousand Souls* are reports of other investigations which supply indications that degeneracy may be a potent cause of poverty.

It must not, however, be understood that poverty is a defect which can be inherited. The suggestion is that poverty may be a result of some hereditary defect like feeble-mindedness, insanity, or some other inheritable trait of a degenerate character, but there are certain influences of environment which, at the present stage of social science, seem very much stronger than those of heredity, so far as inducing poverty is concerned. What is the relative importance of the two factors it is impossible to state at this time except in very general terms. A broken-down nervous system, certain diseases like syphilis, and such characteristics of individuals as are inheritable, cause failure in the struggle for existence and certainly are not to be overlooked in search for the causes of poverty. Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence is in favor of external conditions as the greater cause of poverty; for causes of this sort are much more numerous and, as far as present knowledge goes, seem to affect many more people than do the inheritable defects. But how environmental conditions may affect the production of inheritable degeneracy we are not able to say absolutely, although there is some evidence pointing to the fact that degeneracy is induced by bad natural and social conditions. These two classes of influences often operate together; and they enter into each of the causes to be discussed in the following sections.

Undervitalization and Indolence.¹— There are many people who, because of certain biological characteristics, are undervitalized and who, in consequence, have an indolent nature.

¹ For outline of causes of poverty see Warner, *American Charities*, Revised Edition, p. 37, and Devine, *Principles of Relief*, p. 155.

Such people have great difficulty in overcoming obstacles to be met in the struggle for wealth or for mere existence, and it would be impossible for such people, without complete change of physical and mental characteristics, to overcome the inertia which leads to poverty.

There is no way as yet known to science by which people who are born deficient in vitality may have this defect remedied. Negative eugenics have been proposed as a method by which the birth of abnormal individuals may in the future be prevented by keeping such living individuals from having offspring. This end could be gained either by an operation to render impotent their generative organs, by life segregation, or by some manner of inducing them to refrain voluntarily from parenthood. Positive eugenics, on the other hand, endeavors, by the promotion of selective mating, to secure a new generation produced by parents who answer to the tests of such vigor and mental alertness as are desirable in social beings. These suggestions are interesting; and negative eugenics, as applied to the manifestly abnormal classes, deserves serious consideration. It is doubtful, however, whether we know as yet enough concerning heredity to warrant our going further with selective mating than the education of people to the importance of clean, strong parenthood.

Disease. — In his tables in *American Charities*, Warner has given us sufficient evidence to show that sickness is the greatest single cause of poverty. Devine says that 75 per cent of all poverty is immediately due to disease¹ — not 25 per cent as is usually supposed. And investigations carried on in Buffalo, Boston, New York, and other large cities show that sickness is the prime cause of poverty. Thus, while we still need to know the social conditions causing sickness, it is of value to know the extent of this proximate cause. However independent a family may hitherto have been, if sickness leaves the wage earners unable to work for their daily bread, to say nothing of being unable to pay for medicines, doctors, and nurses, the family may perhaps never recover from its calamity. And not only may disease leave the bread earners unfitted for work for many months or years, but by causing death, it may leave a dependent family helpless. Perpetual poverty accompanies such unfortunate conditions.

¹ *Misery and its Causes*, p. 54.

Many things can be done, however, to diminish the importance of this grave cause of poverty. The conditions, for example, which produce undervitalization, such as bad housing and unsanitary conditions about a city or a rural home, can be changed; and by means of education, the conditions under which people work may be improved. There should be wise factory laws and fair hours, a minimum wage law in the unorganized industries, and carefully devised laws regulating the employment of women and children. Moreover, there should be dissemination of information concerning the causes of disease, protection against diseases by proper vaccination and quarantine regulations, and early attention to the first signs of disease and the prompt removal of their causes. There should be many safeguards and measures such as these.

Lack of Judgment. — Many people, though well-meaning and industrious, fail to exercise a wise economy in applying their earnings to the purchase of food, clothing, and implements of general use. And since they are but poor managers of their own affairs, they are unable to cope with the difficulties that beset them in the world about them. There is nothing truer in the world of poverty than the sentiment, long ago expressed, that "Poor men have poor ways." On the other hand, there are many who, for a time, have felt the grinding heel of poverty, and by means of courage or skill in management, have risen to a position of independence. Wise in choice, thrifty in management, and careful in the use of articles in their possession, such as these are possessed of characteristics which go far towards the maintenance of their independence and the gradual increase of their wealth even on comparatively small incomes. In strong contrast are those, who, with opportunities for advancement, either fail to seize them, or in attempting to take advantage of them, find themselves unable to manage; for, no matter how many good things come their way, their poor methods will counteract all their efforts to rise. People who have had much to do in attempting to relieve the poor have found it impossible to help individuals of this class without furnishing some method of supplementing this lack of poor judgment. To such an extent is money squandered, are opportunities neglected, and the wrong choice made, that all attempts toward independent existence are neutralized.

The introduction into the schools of compulsory home economics will do much for the cure of this evil. To-day the wives are the spenders of the incomes; and up to the present wise training has been lacking. Often too busy in their school years to study household management at home, and deprived of any such training in the schools, our housekeepers are often wasteful in their household management. Nor is the thing to be wondered at. And even if they have had some experience at home, how often has that home training included proper instruction in buying?

Safe and sound investments for small investors would, of course, help in the solution of the problem. The Postal Savings Bank provides opportunities for the investment of savings, as do the enterprises of many banking institutions and certain building and loan associations. Such encouragement given to the man working for small wages does much to promote thrift. But these agencies for saving need to be increased in number and improved in the strength of their appeal to the poor; and to supplement them, there is need of an educational campaign and the creation of a social ideal and social customs which will check the present tendency towards wasteful expenditure and will tend to promote saving. Indeed, the place to begin is at the top, among the upper classes of society; for we are a nation of wasteful spenders.

Unhealthful Appetites. — People who have unhealthful appetites are not lacking in formidable enemies to thrift and independence. These unhealthful appetites are usually cultivated, although the hereditary influence sometimes appears in a system so weakened that the body and mind are susceptible to all evil influences. While the influence of intoxicating liquors has been entirely overestimated as an actual cause of poverty, it is nevertheless a strong factor in destroying an individual's power of independent action. Many families live in squalor, want, and helplessness, because the bread-earner persists in spending his income at the saloon, where he daily lessens his earning capacity and his chances to compete with his fellows. Liquor, as a beverage, is always a waster, and often a destroyer, of mental, moral, and physical capacity; it interferes, in the long run, with industrial efficiency and is increasingly a cause for discharge from employment.

Alcohol in excess attacks the seat of the will power in a peculiar way; for it destroys moral courage, a quality highly essential to success. Narcotics in excess are like drugs; for, while tobacco, for example, may not be considered as vitally destructive to the human system, it affects the nervous system and in many cases destroys the efficiency of individuals — especially when taken in excess by the young. And since it is likely to be more expensive than either the drug or the liquor habit, it rapidly absorbs the surplus cash of the individual addicted to it. On the other hand, the use of morphine, opium, cocaine, and similar drugs, taken for the purpose of drowning trouble or relieving pain, quite frequently leads to poverty and a long train of attendant evils.

Laws regulating the number and conduct of saloons, and provisions aimed, like those of the Gothenberg system of Norway, toward removing the profit from the sale of strong drink, would do something to cure these evils. But even more important are educational measures for teaching people the facts as to the effects of alcohol and narcotics — not, of course, the pseudo-science now taught in most of our schools, but the results of careful scientific investigations. Along with these measures must go the removal of the causes of drink, both physical and social. Unstable neurotic conditions in men and women often induce a craving for drink, just as bad nutrition, overwork, and worry may. In order to remove the causes, therefore, attention must be paid to the conditions under which people live and work. Again, people drink for social reasons; for alcohol and narcotics promote genial flow of sociability. But the substitution of other means of social stimulation, as furnished by recreation and social centers, will, it is believed, do much toward displacing the demand for artificial stimulation now furnished by alcohol and other drugs.

A depraved sex appetite is no less conducive to poverty than the love of rum. Still as true as in the days of the Hebrew Sage are the words, "For on account of a harlot a man is brought to a piece of bread."¹ The recent report of the Vice Commission of Chicago estimates that 5,540,700 visits to prostitutes are made annually by men in Chicago alone, and at a total estimated expenditure, on the part of these men, of \$15,699,449.

¹ Prov. 6: 26.

It may be noted in passing, however, that these millions of visits are made by an estimated 200,000 of Chicago's men.¹ From these figures some idea may be gained of the enormous waste in money alone which is imposed upon this class of men by uncontrolled sex appetite. And of course, these enormous figures take no account of the expense involved in dealing with diseases arising from vice, of loss of earning capacity, of the suffering and death that falls to the lot of innocent wives and children, as well as to the guilty husbands and fathers.

What part uncontrolled sex impulses, exercised in normal relations, may play in reducing physical efficiency, we have no means of knowing until physicians make public the knowledge they are able to obtain in their practice. Nor do we know how great are the inroads of private vice upon growing children. In both these ways, doubtless, unfettered natural impulse lays a heavy tax upon the physical and mental efficiency of the race, because what is controlled in the animal by instinct is supposed to be controlled in man by reason; and the sanctions of reason are less powerful and more uncertain in their operations than are those of instinct.

Forbidding Personal Appearance. — Many people have a great deal to overcome on account of a something called personality, which depends not merely upon physical structure or mental attitude, nor entirely upon clothing or personal habits, but is a combination of all these in making one man an agreeable personality and another the opposite. To a certain extent, of course, a personality may be cultivated or improved; but in a large measure it depends upon hereditary characteristics and early training. However, he who is afflicted with a disagreeable one, can, to a certain degree, be taught to have a pleasant address and a neat appearance; and he may possess a genuineness and sincerity which will make up for the lack of many other things. Yet the fact remains that one man will apply for a position and be turned away, while another will easily succeed in obtaining it; and there may be no other reason than that the second has a pleasing personality, and the first has not. But it sometimes happens that, after a man with unprepossessing personal appearance is once employed, his really pleasing character comes to the front and overcomes first impressions. But such is not

¹ *The Social Evil in Chicago*, pp. 106-115.

always the case. When it becomes necessary to reduce the force of laborers, although skill may seem to be the first consideration, it frequently occurs that the disturbing, disagreeable person is the first to go. The quarrelsome, unsocial individual, by creating a perpetual disturbance, destroys labor power and is, therefore, not wanted; the one who survives to-day is the one who has a strong, socially coöperative nature, who can work uncomplainingly with others and for others.¹

Shiftlessness and Idle Habits. — Arising from certain individual characteristics, shiftlessness becomes a sort of habit. Sometimes these characteristics are inherited, but often they are the result of disease. The shiftless, indolent "poor white trash" of the South were once looked upon as inherently lazy; but recent investigations have shown that two millions of people in this country are suffering from hookworm, and as a consequence of decreased efficiency, are causing an economic loss of at least \$50,000,000 a year.² Again, in other sections, malaria has so depleted the vitality of the inhabitants that they have the reputation of being lazy. The shiftless man does his work poorly and half-heartedly; and he avoids, or at least delays, any excessive labor, wasting his time because of his inertness. He leaves the windowpanes out and thus increases the expense of fuel; he leaves the vegetables unprotected in the garden, so that the frost comes and destroys them. The furniture deteriorates for the lack of care; and, in fact, everything is lost because of this lack of economy and thrift. Individuals of this sort cannot help being poor so long as such habits control them.

There is no cure known for the person who is inherently lazy and shiftless. If he is such by reason of disease, because he lives in bad conditions, or because he has become discouraged, something can be done to help. A thoroughgoing fight against the disease which saps his vitality will repay the effort; the removal of a family from bad sanitary and housing conditions will sometimes supply the incentive to stir them to industrious habits; and their removal to a community where their bad habits will not be popular will sometimes stir their sluggish spirits to action.

¹ See Devine, *Principles of Relief*, p. 155.

² Stiles, "Economic Aspects of Hookworm Disease in the United States," *Transactions of the 15th Congress of Hygiene and Demography*, 1913, Vol. III, p. 757.

Unwholesome and Poorly Cooked Food. — Many people have been rendered poor through the use of poor food; many may attribute their failure through life to the dyspepsia or other maladies acquired through the lack of proper diet. It has been demonstrated it is possible to keep a laboring man in good health on food that costs fifteen cents a day. It is frequently true, however, that a good steak is rendered unpalatable and unnutritious by the cooking, and it not infrequently occurs that laboring men who use a poor quality of poorly cooked food revert to stimulants in order to counteract the evil effects. Poor food leads to malnutrition and engenders weakness or disease. Moreover, it is only recently that another test than the appetite has been suggested as to what to eat. Investigations by Professor Atwater showed that people do not as a rule buy those articles of food which have the highest nutritive value relative to their cost.¹ Domestic Science is now working on the problem of ascertaining the food value of different articles of diet and the twin problem of how to combine different articles in menus so that the maximum of satisfaction in taste and the greatest nutritive value may be combined in a meal. This will do much to assist the poorer classes in reducing the high cost of living and contribute to the reduction of this cause of poverty.

The Disregard of Family Ties. — Disregard of family ties has contributed directly and indirectly to poverty. Many people have become poor through broken families. Frequently the father deserts the wife and children, leaving them in a helpless condition, or less frequently the mother deserts the father and children. Sometimes by separation through divorce the children are scattered and rendered homeless and helpless. Moreover, it sometimes happens that the bickerings of husband and wife render home a place of wretchedness. Such conditions represent a dissipation of individual and social forces and render all concerned less efficient as bread earners, and lead to social maladjustments out of which grows poverty. Nor must it be forgotten that the home is the original economic unit. It is the center whence radiates into the lives of the coming generation economic ideals and methods, which, if the home is broken up or is not what it should be, are learned much less thoroughly elsewhere. A good system of family desertion laws will help

¹ Atwater, *Farmers' Bulletin*, No. 142, United States Department of Agriculture.

solve the problem of poverty due to desertion, but the other cannot be reached without giving much more attention by society to the art and science of home making from every point of view which affects the economic efficiency of the workers and of the managers of business and of those who preside in the homes of the country. Schools of domestic economy will do much for the women, but they will not touch seriously the side of the problem pertaining to the men, and for neither the women nor the men will they give that intimate touch of emotion which makes the ways learned in childhood hold with vise-like grip. The home must also be preserved for the inculcation of the virtues of industry, perseverance, and adaptability to circumstances and those moral and spiritual qualities which have no small part in the making of efficient economic and social personalities.

Influences of the Physical Environment.— A good many causes of poverty are wrapped up in bad physical or natural conditions. Among these may be enumerated the inadequate natural resources, such as the poor soil, lack of water, or other means of support. With the growth of means of easy and cheap transportation and the development of the habit of migration, this cause of poverty can be partly remedied. The migrations from the crowded and often infertile regions of Europe to America, Australia, and South America are illustrations of one way in which the difficulty can be met.

Again, there are bad climatic conditions which affect the health, strength, and prosperity of individuals. Sometimes these conditions may not be overcome. Often, however, the wit of man combined with capital can change such conditions. Climate, as it affects crops, is manageable by adaptation of kind of crop to the climate. Once it was thought impossible to raise corn in Minnesota and Wisconsin. By the production of new varieties a corn has been found which can be raised successfully in those northern states. Then there are plant and animal parasites which frequently destroy the means of wealth production and leave the people impoverished thereby. So wonderful has been the advance of science, however, that there is hope now that every plant inimical to man's prosperity will either be so changed that he can make use of it, or that it will be exterminated. The success of agricultural experts during

the past quarter of a century has been so great that the task appears by no means to be hopeless. Every year now sees some new process invented to check the ravages of pests which ravage the farmer's fields and destroy his crops. Again, accidents are caused by natural forces, such as floods, earthquakes, storms, and drought, which give individuals such severe reverses as to destroy their independence. Defective drainage, also, leaving swamps that produce disease, may impoverish a whole community through sickness and frequent death.

Many of these causes are dependent more or less upon the judgment of individuals in presuming to reside where Nature will not give them sufficient support or where she destroys them through her violence. Yet, on the whole, many of them can be remedied by society. Accidents caused by natural forces are now being lessened by the campaign of "Safety First," by the invention and adoption of safety devices, and when they do occur the loss involved is distributed over society by various kinds of insurance against accident. Drainage, while yet in its infancy so far as great tracts of land are concerned, is bound to become more general as land becomes more valuable and the population denser. The recent agitation concerning the evil effects of undrained pools and swamps on health together with the growing popular concern for health which has resulted from the newer medical discoveries relating to the causes of disease will do much to secure further work in reducing this cause of poverty. At the same time it will make available for cultivation an area of new land which will help much to provide people with cheap land, homes, and an opportunity for economic independence.

Influence of Social Environments. — Poverty may be developed through bad associations. The crowding of the poor into large tenement houses where there is insufficient light and air breeds and intensifies poverty. The evil influence of improper housing cannot be overcome by ordinary charity to the individual, for it has been found that if bad home surroundings cannot be changed, it is idle to hope for any permanent improvement in the inmates. Evil associations in general beget idleness, shiftlessness, and evil habits, and induce the conditions favorable to poverty. The defective sanitation usually found in such overpopulated districts adds to the

general evil effect. Overcrowding breaks down the ordinary decencies of life, demoralizes the family life, induces vice, undermines the health, and destroys hope. When the overcrowding becomes as great as in some of the great cities, like London and New York, land values go up, and the type of house changes from the small, inexpensive cottage to the large costly tenement. Consequently the man of small means finds it impossible to own his own home. In all of Greater New York City in 1910 only 11.7 per cent of the homes were owned by those who occupied them, while in the borough of Manhattan only 2.9 per cent were owned by the occupants.¹ He lacks that fine incentive to save in order to pay for a home — a tangible thing appealing to some of the most fundamental feelings. Much is being done in recent years to build good homes and tenements for the people. Rapid transit systems with cheap fares, allowing people to live at a distance from the crowded centers of business and manufacture, and the distribution of manufacturing plants away from the crowded centers of population yet near enough to enable them to command a sufficient supply of labor and to secure the requisite shipping facilities will do much to prevent the overcrowding now so frequent in our great cities. The large tenements were built to enable men to rent cheap dwelling places and yet get an adequate return upon their investments. They have failed, however, in that they provide barracks instead of homes.

Even more important in producing poverty are the evil associations provided for children and adults. Not only do "evil communications corrupt good manners," but they sow the seeds of inefficiency by promoting bad habits and false ideals. The most debasing influence of the saloon is perhaps not the alcoholic liquors sold there, but the conversation, the contact with loafers, criminals, and degenerates who find there their refuge. Combine such associations with the influence of alcohol and you have a potent engine for the debasement of manhood, for the promotion of false ideals of home and family life, and for the production of industrial inefficiency.

Almost as bad is the lack of measures and methods for the fruitful, constructive employment of people's leisure time in recreation of an uplifting nature. Must men and children be

¹ *Thirteenth Census of the United States, 1910, Vol. I, p. 1313.*

worn down towards inefficiency and poverty even in their pleasures? Yet, until recently there was no thought given to the production of agencies for rendering men more efficient through their recreation.

The playground provisions of some of our large cities are doing much to take away the curse of depraving influences from people's leisure time. Much yet remains to be done, however.¹ Along with their further development both in extent and in provision for the adults, there must go repressive or regulative measures for the saloons, bad dance halls, amusement parks, vicious theaters and moving picture shows. Along with these measures must go the development of the social centers.

Defective Government. — Legislation in favor of one individual or class may be to the detriment of other individuals or classes and may lead indirectly to poverty. In many instances we find defects in the judicial machinery, having a tendency to render injustice to very many people, and causing them to lose their position in the industrial and social life. Again, improper and unjust penalties sometimes are imposed which in themselves are detrimental to the progress of the individual. Legislation and its interpretation by the courts may be a very efficient means for the advancement of the material interests of society, by removing conditions which lead to poverty, and by developing conditions of industry and thrift. It may also shape the economic development of a nation in a measure and influence the wealth-creating power of individuals or groups.

The remedy for bad legislation is said to be better legislation. "Aye, but there's the rub." What constitutes better legislation? What shall be the test? And how shall we get it?

Whatever else better legislation may secure, it will provide less for special interests and more for the interests of all the people. It will, indeed, not overlook the material development of society, but it will see that in that development the interests of the public are not forgotten or bartered away forever for a song. On the other hand, it will not forget that "man does not live by bread alone"; it will keep constantly in mind those large interests which we include sometimes under the general

¹ Mallery, "The Social Significance of Play," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 25, pp. 368-373.

term "the social welfare" — education, recreation, and "the pursuit of happiness."

We shall not get such legislation by the present practice of political jobbery and the prevailing haphazard methods, — political products of an imperfectly socialized group mind. Growing out of an extreme individualism in political theory the present system of lawmaking with its ever present log-rolling is based upon the social theory that as each lawmaker representing the interests of his part of the state strives to secure the enactment of laws favorable to his community, each part of the state will secure the legislation which is best for it and so the interests of the whole state will best be served. To a degree the theory is true. The theory is, however, false in that it assumes that there are no general state interests which may conflict in a measure with the interests of certain communities, and yet are vital to the welfare of the state. Before general state interests can predominate over local interests there must arise a state consciousness as opposed to a merely local consciousness, and the welfare of the state as a whole must sit at the center of attention in the lawmaker's mind. A wider dissemination of information as to the interests of the state as a whole will generate a state consciousness. The political theorists have suggested certain measures which will help to secure better laws, such as having fewer legislators, fewer bills introduced, and more mature consideration given to each one. The second of these we are beginning to secure in a clumsy fashion by a provision that no new bills may be introduced after a certain day of the session has been reached. The first has yet to win its way to an established position in political theory. The last named can be secured in part by securing the first two, by a lengthening of the session if necessary, but best by the establishment of a legislative reference library with a staff of experts to make a comparative study of legislation in other states and in foreign countries so that the administrative experience of previous experiments may be available on which a sane judgment concerning any proposed measure may be based, and with other experts to draft bills, so that less of the business of our supreme courts will be to throw on the junk heap of unconstitutionality much of the legislation passed at each session of the lawmaking body.

Misdirected and Inadequate Education. — Education to be of the greatest service should have reference to the conditions of life of those to be educated and their prospective future. All education should aim, among other things, to train the individual for self-support. It is not intended here to suggest that all education be made up entirely of the so-called vocational subjects and simply prepare for the commercial and industrial life, but the industrial element should be made universal in all education, for the first business of a good citizen is to be a producer and thereby a bread-earner. Until recently a boy could not get an education in a trade at public expense unless he committed a crime and was sent to the industrial school or the reformatory. While the sociologist would be the last to exalt the making of a living over the making of a life, he believes that the making of a decent living for himself and family is the *sine qua non* of making a life which is worthy of the name. Happily, a beginning towards supplying this lack in our school system has been made. Much, however, remains to be done to make education do its full share in the prevention of poverty.

Furthermore, how many of our paupers are such because they have some physical defect which might have been corrected had it been discovered in time! Recent studies have shown that some children who fail in school are suffering from poor eyes, poor nutrition due to bad teeth, deafness due to adenoids and enlarged tonsils, and other physical defects easily corrected. Other investigations indicate that there are more of the retarded and dull pupils who are mentally defective than we ever suspected. While these cannot have the defect removed, they can be discovered, and special educational treatment given them in special classes, or in special institutions, and they can be segregated so as not to entail their defect upon the next generation. Medical inspection in the schools, though only quite recently introduced in the United States, in contrast with its long establishment in some of the countries of Europe, has spread widely and is doing much to teach us some of the causes of the failure of the schools to prepare pupils for life.¹ Tragic in its significance is the fact brought out by some recent studies of the occupations chosen by pupils who left school at the end of the compulsory school age to earn a living. Large numbers were found in

¹ Gulick and Ayres, *Medical Inspection of Schools*, Chap. XII.

“blind alley occupations” — messenger, bell boy, cash girl, clerk and common laborer — in which they were earning their maximum at twenty years of age. From that time they slowly gravitated down toward dependency. Vocational guidance in the schools, based upon a close study both of the youth’s aptitudes and upon the prospects in the various trades and vocations, has been proposed to correct this defect of our educational system. Certainly every youth, ignorant often of his own capacities and generally quite unacquainted with the comparative opportunities offered by the various vocations, has the right to expect some one in this great society of which he is a part, to give him counsel on these vital questions. He has a right to know something of the nature and promise of different occupations for his own sake. Society owes it to herself to give him that guidance. In many places it is being done with considerable show of success.¹ Coupled with this defect is the frequency of inadequate education. Children are allowed to be out of school, either at work or in idleness, when they should be preparing more thoroughly for the work of life. Many of these pupils could have accomplished much more and become industrially independent, had longer training been given them. Stricter compulsory education laws, courses better adapted to their needs, and continuation schools, will do something to aid in correcting these defects of the educational system.²

Bad Industrial and Economic Conditions. — Frequently a community has such bad industrial conditions that they are conducive to the wealth of a few and the poverty of many. When the control of the sources of wealth falls into the hands of comparatively few people, there are indications that a certain number of individuals will fail to have sufficient income for their support. Moreover, there are various changes that occur through the shifting of economic society, either through what might be called natural or arbitrary social causes, which induce conditions of poverty. Among these might be named the variations in the value of money; trade depressions, like those of 1870, 1893, and 1907; changes in trade and industry, brought

¹ Bloomfield, *Vocational Guidance*.

² Miles, H. E., *Industrial Education*, No. 3, Bulletin of the Wisconsin State Board of Industrial Education.

Reber, Louis E., *Industrial and Continuation Schools*, No. 5, Bulletin of the Wisconsin State Board of Industrial Education.

about by improved machinery, such as occurred in England following the industrial revolution; the shifting of industry caused by invention and discovery, an example of the former being supplied by the displacement of hand-weavers by machines after the invention of the power loom, and of the latter by the impoverishment of the New England farmers upon the opening up of the rich farming lands of the Mississippi Valley; excessive or ill-managed taxation, as in the pre-Revolutionary days in France; the undue power of class over class, well illustrated by the supremacy of the aristocracy in Russia, and of the "coal barons" in the United States; and the immobility of labor, much more noticeable in former times than now and in a country like Russia than in the United States. Enforced idleness of wage-earners is a potent cause of poverty and the most difficult of all to overcome.¹ All of these have, at various times and in different degrees, influenced the social population, causing it to degenerate.

Each of these conditions in varying degrees is amenable to correction. Variations in the value of money are not under absolute control, especially over long periods of time. If a new discovery of a basic metal like gold is made or if through war or some similar catastrophe an enormous waste of capital occurs, the value of money is bound to vary. With every increase in the amount of gold available the influence of new discoveries of the metal is diminished unless the demand for gold increases equally with the new supply discovered. On the other hand, any monetary device which makes gold less necessary as a base, unless the base is thereby made less stable, would tend to make less likely fluctuations in its value due to this cause. The abolition of war by arbitration and international conciliation would remove a very important agency of waste, and would therefore make the value of gold more stable.

Commercial crises, economists tell us, are the result sometimes of an over-extended credit, often of an unsound money system, sometimes of an interruption of the ordinary channels of trade by war, or the fear of war. Anything which disturbs the ordinary course of national or international commerce when industrial conditions are strained helps to precipitate a panic. Measures, therefore, which prevent frequent and profound changes

¹ See Hunter, *Poverty*, pp. 318-340; Devine, *Principles of Relief*, p. 151.

of commercial policy within a nation, and between nations, make less likely the crises which ruin people and press most heavily upon the poor. If the time ever comes when war and the fear of it no longer paralyze business and turn the laborers in shop and on farm into destroyers of life and property, one of the important causes of poverty will be removed.

There seems no way at present to obviate entirely the often terrible cost of progress incident to the introduction of new machinery and methods, which often means the displacement of workers by a machine and their consequent poverty because they find themselves unable to adapt themselves to a new occupation. A more general education in youth, thus making the individual more adjustable to changed conditions, has been suggested as a measure that would help solve the problem. The present tendency, however, is towards making the worker merely a cog in a machine and therefore the less able to adjust himself to a new situation. Sometimes the workers have organized and resisted the introduction of labor-saving machinery, but that means greater cost of the article to the consumer.

A like situation exists relative to the hardships involved for some in inventions and discovery. Unless society is willing to sacrifice all progress inventions cannot be repressed. These must go on, for they mean ultimately better conditions for the greater number. This kind of poverty is a cost of progress which society must pay. Society can prevent, however, the burden falling entirely upon a single class. By means of a system of pensions and social insurance the cost could be spread out over the whole social group.

By the ironing out of fluctuations in trade and industry, as suggested above, much of the enforced idleness of laborers would cease. A practical system of employment bureaus would take care of others. A system of insurance against unemployment, along lines similar to the systems existing in Germany and England, would help to distribute the burden over society more equitably.

Thus, by such measures society is struggling with these socially caused maladjustments which involve the poverty of many.

Unwise Philanthropy.—One of the greatest causes of pauperism is unwise philanthropy, for it induces people who are poor to

become dependent. As is stated in the next chapter, wise charity seeks to teach people to help themselves and to develop independence and thrift through material and spiritual aid. Much that is called charity is nothing more than almsgiving. An indulgence in a maudlin sentiment which destroys the spirit of independence and undermines self-help is antisocial. Scientific charity will relieve distress and teach people to help themselves by making it impossible to become habitually dependent upon others. It will make every effort to prevent pauperism. It aims to take such measures as will enable people to remain independent, or, if dependent upon others for a time, to make that period as short as possible. Real charity does not try to relieve of their responsibility those upon whom the burden of support naturally falls. It endeavors to help the natural supporters, however, to carry their burdens as easily as possible. Modern charity believes that relatives rather than the state should support dependents, but it will do all it can to help those relatives to secure work by which they may do the task with honor and independence. Giving to a beggar on the street probably will confirm him in dependency; he will learn that a living may be obtained more easily that way than by labor. Giving to a family without knowing their circumstances may determine a career of pauperism for them. Investigation, careful records to enable others to whom such a family appeals to know their history and what is being done for them by others, and efforts at securing them an opportunity to earn an honest living are absolutely essential in our complex civilization in our great cities where few people know their neighbors, would we give helpfully. Service as well as immediate material help is imperative. The world has been slow to recognize these principles, but at the present an increasing number of people are becoming aware of their existence and believe in their possibilities.¹

To remedy the evils growing out of unwise philanthropy principles of scientific charity, — principles, while not final, because they are developing, which are based upon the experience of those who have dealt most extensively with these problems, — have been adopted. They have been most thoroughly worked out by what is called organized charities and certain German

¹ See Devine, *Principles of Relief*, pp. 185-266.

municipal experiments in dealing with poverty to be described in the next chapter. These principles to succeed must be applied both by private and public relief officials and receive the enthusiastic moral support of every private organization which gives relief and of every philanthropic individual. They must be worked into our public relief system, which for the most part to-day in America is actually medieval in its methods, — no investigation, scarcely any records worthy of the name, and little coöperation with the private agencies which are trying to introduce constructive methods. Some of the experiments of foreign cities might well be tried here with certain modifications. The vagrant and those unwilling to work must be made to work. Combined with these measures must go the preventive social devices described in the preceding sections. We have only just begun to attack the problem of poverty. To some it seems hopeless, but to those who are in the closest touch with this grave problem and who know most about the failures of our best methods, but who also know that these modern methods have never had a fair chance, there is nothing but promise. It is they who talk of “the cure of poverty.”

Summary. — As the causes of poverty are numerous and varied in nature so attempts to prevent it must come from many sources. To sum up the matter, we may conclude that among other things are improvements in industrial conditions through the process of social evolution and governmental influence, such as steadiness of employment at a fair remuneration, stability of industrial and financial conditions, justice in taxation, government, and legislation. Again, improvement in modes of living, such as better housing, good home surroundings, improved sanitation, better care of the personal health, and profitable recreation and amusement. The change in personal characteristics through education by developing thrift, energy, prudence, sound judgment, and the power to labor, is a means of the prevention of poverty. So likewise, the change in personal habits, the disuse, or at least temperate use, of liquor, tobacco, narcotics, and the abolition of selfishness and the promotion of love in the home, with purity of life, all tend to develop the character of man and to remove him from a possible state of dependence. As sickness is one of the chief causes of poverty the removal of disease through science and legislation

are important measures of prevention. Add to the foregoing, scientific charity, which helps persons at the right time and in the right way, and poverty will gradually grow less as the years pass.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Make an estimate of the extent of poverty in your own community. (If a small place you can get the information by going to the town and county relief officers and from common report as to who has received help.)
2. Make a list of the evil social consequences of poverty among families of which you know, e.g. how many boys never had a chance at a proper education, how many girls "went wrong" because of poverty, etc.
3. Classify the poor families with which you are acquainted in your community under as many of the heads in the chapter as you think are necessary to account for their poverty.
4. What is your community doing to remedy or prevent poverty? (Make a definite list of the things.)
5. What is your community not doing that it might do to cure and prevent poverty?
6. Suggest any other methods of meeting the poverty problem than those mentioned in the text.

CHAPTER III

CHARITIES AND CHARITY ORGANIZATION

The Philosophy of Charity. — The common meaning of charity is the giving of alms to the poor or the help of the sick. What is popularly known as charity in modern times is called alms in the Scripture and in other ancient writings. What is called charity in the Scripture is merely love or a wide human sympathy. It may apply in its widest sense to all classes of people, whatever their condition, to whom sympathy and aid may be given. In its more modern and scientific sense charity means the help of the poor, the weak, the sick and helpless. Charity organization signifies the means of administering relief by a coöperative method. Charity has become in modern times a social rather than a merely individual function as well as an individual matter. It has become chiefly a means of protecting society at large and of encouraging normal social health and growth. Society seeks to protect itself by caring for the weak in order to prevent social disease and degeneration. The normal healthy social structure is made stronger by warding off pauperism, by preventing insanity, epilepsy, imbecility, blindness, and deafness, as well as by caring for the afflicted. Certain philosophers, Herbert Spencer among the number, have advocated the development of the strong by making them stronger and neglecting to care for the weak and decrepit. They hold strictly to the doctrine of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Hence, properly to enforce this principle of natural evolution, the efforts of humanity should be devoted to the improvement of the best of the stock, rather than to an attempt to uplift the defective, out of which nothing strong and normal can come. They go so far as to say that if the weak and diseased members of society were all left to perish, the strong would then perpetuate the race, and thus gradually the weak would be replaced by the strong.

This is a good evolutionary principle in the absence of a conscious agency to supplement Nature's selection. Nature's chief method of securing a more perfect adjustment to existing conditions, so far as modern science has come to definite conclusions, is by the elimination of the ill-adapted. As soon, however, as Intelligence appears upon the scene Nature's slow methods are supplemented by conscious adaptation to natural conditions. Nature by eliminating the hairless animals produced after millenniums long-haired animals to withstand the glacial cold. It is man, however, since the domestication of animals, who by the introduction of intelligence into the breeding process has, to put it from the standpoint of results rather than of method, bred the legs off and put hams on the hog, developed the race horse on the one hand and the draft horse on the other, brought forth the spineless cactus, produced the numberless varieties of various kinds of fruits and cereals. It is still done by elimination in part, but elimination has been supplemented and hastened by conscious selective breeding instead of by Nature's tardy processes. What man has actually done to secure these results so speedily is to select those varieties for breeding which show the qualities he wishes and to prevent the propagation of the undesirable kinds. The slow and wasteful method of Nature, therefore, should not be allowed to work out its results in humanity without some restrictions. Society is so closely organized and the relations of its members so intimate that the strong to protect themselves must be mindful of the weak. As well may the head say that it cares not if the hand is diseased so long as body, heart, and head remain, for indeed the disease may spread until head, heart and body are involved. Hence, if for no other reason than its own protection, society must care for the weak and the defective. Also, because if society practiced utter selfishness, it would lose interest in humanity, and altruism, and even sympathy would decline and the human race be weakened on account of the loss of its best social qualities. Charity, then, when properly administered, may protect and help the weak, prevent the spread of weakness, and make the strong stronger by unselfish activity.

Universality of Charity among Nations. — Charity or almsgiving is a very ancient practice, common to all nations after a more or less permanent social life was established. The

Hindu, Egyptian, Persian, Hebrew, and Chinese philosophers have all uttered lofty and humane sentiments in regard to the consideration of the poor, and means of relief are recognized in many of their laws. In Athens a poor tax was regularly levied and collected. Aristotle advocated the relief of the poor, not by a tax but by a more permanent method of distributing the land in small parcels among the needy, that they might become self-supporting. While most savage tribes care little for the poor or for the aged, the Aztecs of Mexico and the Incas of Peru made provision for these classes. The former taught that the poor should be helped and the latter provided homes for the care of orphans. The Jewish synagogue was a center for the distribution of alms and the Hebrew commonwealth had wise provisions for the care of the poor. As the synagogue at first was the meeting place of the Christians it continued to be a center for the distribution of alms, and its successor, the church, followed its example. It is noteworthy that one of the earliest officers to be appointed in the primitive Christian organizations was the "deacon" whose chief duty was to look after the poor in the church.¹

Many of the problems that confront us to-day in regard to the administration of the charities, troubled the ancient nations, although it must be admitted that, with all of the fine precepts of philosophers, real charity was sadly wanting, in most instances, when it came to the practice of genuine help to the needy. The sayings of the wise in charity as well as in religion were far different from the doings of the people. And in the ancient nations, as in many modern, the practices of government and social order were such as to create the conditions of poverty more rapidly than they could be relieved, even under the best administration.

The main defect of the ancient methods of charity was that the chief motive to almsgiving was personal interest. Through superstitious fear, men were urged to give, that they might thereby enjoy the favor of the gods. "He that giveth to the poor lendeth to the Lord," are the words of the Hebrew Sage. This sentiment was repeated a thousand times in the writings of the Fathers of the Christian Church. In fact, it remained

¹Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums*, translated as, *The Expansion of Christianity*, Vol. I, p. 194.

the chief motive down to very recent times and has not lost its power even to-day. The motive being egoistic did not create an earnest desire to help the poor, and led the people to careless and indiscriminate giving, thereby creating paupers and beggars. The poverty-stricken wretch of ancient society excited the pity of benevolently disposed people, but through the teachings of the church he became "God's pauper," and giving to him opened to the giver the doorway to heaven. Temporary relief was usually the extent of the aid given, and no systematic efforts were made to give man a permanent help. Hence, no organization was attempted. To give alms was to throw a piece of money to a beggar with the hope that he would soon be out of sight and out of mind. While this was one of the chief characteristics of ancient almsgiving, it has not entirely departed from modern charity. Many seem to give to relieve their consciences or to get rid of the importunate solicitor, with the vague hope that the person may be benefited. And by some, giving in the abstract is still considered a means of grace.

Giving among the Romans. — As the Roman system was widespread at the time of the appearance of Christianity, it is necessary to refer briefly to the condition of affairs especially subsequent to the foundation of the Empire. The history of the separation of the people of the Republic into two classes, one made up of the nobility and the patricians representing all of the wealth and political power, and the other representing the plebeians, is too familiar to need repetition. As the former class possessed all of the wealth and controlled the means of wealth, the latter came to expect alms or support from the former. As the former maintained their power through political position, the latter paid for support by means of their votes. The mob finally became large and dangerous and difficult to manage; yet he who sought power in Rome must reckon with its demands, for there was no middle class to maintain the equipoise of social and political life. All labor had been degraded by the introduction of slavery until it was considered ignoble to engage in any pursuit except politics and the proprietorship of a landed estate. There was no other alternative than that one class should be supported by the other, and, hence, the poorer class expected gifts from the rich and powerful.

After the establishment of the Empire these conditions be-

came greatly exaggerated. At the time of Augustus, it is estimated that 580,000 persons received relief in the city of Rome. The custom of the emperors, when elevated to the throne, to give large gifts to the people became general among all those who held political position.

When it became known throughout the Empire that gifts of corn and wine were scattered freely many flocked to the City to be fed. While pauperism was not general through the provinces, Rome became overburdened with people seeking alms.

To allow the poor to live, attempts were made to regulate the price of corn, and Caius Gracchus succeeded in making the price of a Roman bushel five *asses*, or less than the cost of production. This, of course, caused a falling off in the production and shipment of corn, and as a consequence corn was distributed gratis to the populace. Then followed a careless or indiscriminate distribution of corn, and later of oil and wine as well, which increased from year to year and reign to reign. To give some estimate of the extent of these gifts by politicians, demagogues, and public officials a few general statements will suffice. In 73 B.C. it is estimated that gifts amounting to \$438,500 in value were distributed; in 46 B.C. it had increased to \$3,375,000; in Augustus Cæsar's time 320,000 men received aid or grants of corn, and the number increased from this on. The annual distribution from Nero's time to the end of Severus's reign rose to a value of \$1,500,000. This was, of course, done by the officials representing the State. But this amount was greatly augmented by office seekers and demagogues who could keep their places at the public crib only by dividing the spoils with the mob. It is estimated that Nero, during his reign, disposed of food, etc. valued at \$96,500,000 to the people and that Hadrian gave food, etc. valued at about \$165 per capita to the people of Rome. It is difficult to ascertain the exact amounts, but even though these estimates are only approximate they give us some notion of the enormous expenditure. But this could not be called charity in its best sense, but rather a systematic method of developing pauperism. It established the right of the needy citizen to demand and receive help from the state. The Romans did something to provide protection to all people who resided within their territory, and especially those who were Roman citizens, but there was really little sympathy for people who

were in distress. Even in ancient Rome the exposure of infants who were deformed was advocated, and it was considered better that the aged should die and not prove a burden to the community.

Philanthropy was by no means unknown, however, among the Greeks and Romans. We must not permit Uhlhorn's prejudiced position in his thorough but unfair work, *Christian Charity in the Ancient Church*, to blind our eyes to the fact that the people among whom Christianity entered as a "gospel of love and charity," as Harnack calls it, had cared for the poor from sympathy for them before charity was polluted by political motives. Human sympathy is not limited to Christianized peoples; it lies at the basis of all societies in every age, as we have seen. It was the mainspring of charity in Greece and Rome before it gave way to the passion for political domination in the period of the disintegration of the early, efficient social bonds. Doubtless the contrast between the charity of the Greek and Roman cities of that day and that to be seen among the early Christians aflame with the passion of a new brotherhood and with a heightened sense of membership in a new and heavenly society was striking enough. The charity of the Christian Church, however, was fine enough not to need the factitious splendor of a false contrast.¹

Charity of the Christian Church. — The early Christian associations had for one of their cardinal points the care of the poor of their own membership. The teaching that all men were brethren made it necessary that brotherly love should abound. The Church found itself diametrically opposed to the Roman doctrine and system which it found in existence when it entered the Roman Empire.

With a widely extended sympathy for all humanity the Church began its work of permanent help to the poor, the suffering, and the downtrodden. Against the calculating political nature of the Roman politicians, it set forth the warm heart-love of fellowmen. Upon the downfall of the Roman Empire the Church soon absorbed all of the charitable work of the time.

With the passing of time, however, and the Church's succession to the place of power occupied hitherto by the Empire, the

¹ Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christenthums*, translated as, *The Expansion of Christianity*, Vol. I, Chap. III.

ethical motive was contaminated by the selfish motive of thus securing the favor of Heaven for the giver of alms, and thus forging one more chain with which to bind men to the Church. Instead of the old political motive of the Roman statesmen, the Church substituted the commercial motive of securing by almsgiving a treasury of grace. The foundations of such a doctrine are to be found, in truth, as early as the writings known as the *Shepherd of Hermas* and the *Second Epistle of Clement*. Cyprian, the bishop of Carthage, wrote that alms are the means by which we wash off any stains contracted subsequent to the cleansing of baptism.¹ Christianity in her conflict with barbarism attempted to bring all men within her fold by appealing to motives already familiar to them, and did not scorn to appeal to such motives in order to secure gifts for the poor.

This was a kind of giving which existed for the benefit of the giver alone. According to theory, all gifts to the poor were gifts to God, and those who furnished the gifts received their reward in heaven. Therefore, giving became a means of direct salvation to Christians, a part of their religion. This is a vicious principle, for when carried far enough it makes religion irreligious and charity uncharitable. When it comes to turning over lands and estates to be given to the poor, for the sole benefit of the giver, it results in a system of selfishness. Nor is that all, for it leads to corruption of the society which obtains funds on the pretense of insuring the salvation of souls in return for the loan.

Yet, it must be added, the Church cared not only for members of its own little societies but also for those with whom it came in contact, especially after the establishment of monasteries. These it established throughout its realm, and they became asylums for the poor and oppressed. It built hospitals and prepared homes for the care of the poor, and preached to the whole world the lesson of charity and brotherly kindness, with a new earnestness born of the most powerful sanctions.

Results of the Charity of the Church. — The power which the Church obtained through the decline of the Roman Empire came to her in part legitimately through well-rendered service. In part, the service rendered was for the selfish purpose of securing adherents. Consequently with that power came the responsibility of caring for all of the subjects within the realm of the

¹ *De opere et eleemosynis*, i, quoted by Harnack, *op. cit.*, Vol. I., p. 191.

Church's authority. The result was a burden too great to be easily borne.

On account of the indiscriminate giving on the part of the Church, which believed in treating all people alike, thousands took advantage of it and grew up in indolence and became veritable paupers, willing to draw a large part of their living from public sources. So during the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the modern period, the results of the lavish hand of the Church began to appear in the thousands of all classes of every description who clung to ecclesiastical and lay associations and institutions for their own support. No one could censure the Church for indiscriminate giving, if he granted the premises upon which almsgiving was based. Moreover, there was no careful consideration of the effects of this indiscriminate charity. The need was great. There was no strongly organized government, and the Church was practically the only existing agency of help. When one considers the dense ignorance still prevailing concerning the true principles of charitable relief, he is prepared to deal leniently with the one institution of the Middle Ages which was attempting in any organized way to meet the needs of men.

Charity of the State. — When society became thoroughly feudalized, each person had his place and his support, such as it was, and there was little need of almsgiving. On the decay of this system of government the number of poor increased enormously and the burdens of the Church became so heavy as not to be borne without the assistance of the state. Gradually the nascent nations of Europe began to adopt measures of relief. First to do so on a large scale was England.

At first laws were passed for the regulation of labor with the object of keeping the laborer in the state of servitude which the feudal system had created. Among these laws passed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was one whose object was to repress vagrancy. (12 Richard II.) When Henry VIII dissolved the monasteries, vagrancy increased and laws were enacted intended to diminish it. Subsequently vagrancy laws were made more severe (Ed. VI) and provision was made to raise funds for the poor by appointing collectors in each parish. The Church was still the dispenser of charity. It was not until Elizabeth's reign, however, that the state took a vigorous interest

in charity and that the power of administering it was shifted from the ecclesiastical to the civil authorities. A series of laws was passed which finally culminated in the statute of 1601 (43 Elizabeth), known as the foundation of the English Poor Law. Laws followed, from time to time, which modified and improved this act until a complete state system of poor relief was established. These laws in many respects were salutary but their unwise administration had a tendency to increase pauperism and consequently enlarge the expenditures for its relief. In the care of the poor the state had reached the conclusion that all of the needy poor should receive help and as nearly all laborers were needy the conclusion was inevitable that they should receive aid. Expenditures increased, until in 1783 the amount for poor relief was, according to Fowle,¹ £2,004,238; in 1803 it had increased to £4,267,965, and in 1818 it reached its high tide in the sum of £7,870,801, the population at this time being only 11,000,000.

In 1834 the Poor Law was revised and the administration was reformed. Subsequent acts have continued to modify and improve it. The nation still suffers from the evils of a previous short-sighted policy. Although it possesses the most elaborate state poor relief system in existence, no nation has greater burdens to bear from pauperism.

Hamburg-Elberfeld System. — In striking contrast with the comparative failure especially of outrelief in England is an experiment first tried in a Prussian city. About 1765 there arose in Hamburg a new method of dealing with paupers and poverty-stricken people. During the middle of the eighteenth century and toward its close the number of helpless and wretched people had increased greatly throughout Europe. A movement for the assistance of these people arose. A general wave of benevolence and charity spread over Europe. While it caused the relief of the helpless, it was so lacking in intelligence and system as to be a detriment rather than a help to society. Hamburg was a rich city, having been engaged in trade with the East and West for many years. It was cosmopolitan in nature and attracted thousands to the city, either for work or for a living without work. The streets were lined with beggars, thousands of people receiving help from all sources. Finally, a

¹ *The Poor Law*, p. 73.

society was organized in Hamburg among the citizens, whose chief aim was to promote a better system of government. To this society a certain Professor Büsch presented a novel plan for the care of the poor, which was finally put into operation. He organized a central bureau, and divided the city into districts, appointing an overseer in each district. The helpless were taught to help themselves, work being supplied where they could not find it; people were forbidden to give alms at the door; an industrial school was provided for the children; hospitals for the sick; and in fact a general system was established for the care of every one according to his needs and deserts. It worked a complete revolution in Hamburg. It drove out the paupers or put them to work. It relieved the distress of children and educated them to industry and self-support. It cared for the sick, and repressed begging on the streets. The transformation was quite complete. Thirteen successful years were followed by a decline for a time.¹ The system was revived, however, and the idea spread to Elberfeld, a small German town, which applied the system with some modifications in 1852 so that the Elberfeld system, so well known among charitable workers, was in reality the original Hamburg system slightly improved.

A summary of the Elberfeld system here may be of service. The city is divided into 564 sections. Within the confines of each section are included about 300 people, but with not more than four paupers in any one section. Over each of these sections is placed an almoner, as he is called. The almoner is the official with whom each needy person comes into first-hand contact. To him the needy of that section make application for help. He then inquires carefully into all the circumstances of the case. If convinced that the family needs relief he gives it himself. He must, however, keep in close touch with the family by a visit at least once in two weeks. He gives relief according to a minimum standard set down by law. Any income the family may have is deducted from this minimum so as to make sure that it is not getting more than enough to supply the bare necessities of life. He not only supplies relief, but also is supposed to keep a general oversight over his district and act as adviser to any whose circumstances may indicate the possibility of falling into dependence. He helps secure employment for

¹ For details and causes see Henderson, *Modern Methods of Charity*, pp. 9-12.

the unemployed, medical help for the sick, and offers advice to the improvident and dissipated, or in case of the incorrigible, reports them for prosecution. He loans sewing machines and tools belonging to the municipality to those who may thus be kept from want. These almoners are appointed for three years and service is compulsory, on pain of loss of the franchise from three to six years and an increased rate of taxation. The best citizens are thus secured for this work. They serve for a long term of years, being reappointed again and again, society thus securing experienced men. For example, among 600 almoners recently appointed one had served 49 years, 19 over 30 years, 81 over 20 years, and 268 over 10 years. The office is considered such an honor that it is frequently sought by the best citizens, being considered the first step on the ladder to political office in the municipality. These almoners are usually unpaid, although in some places where the system is in use, some of the officers are paid.

Fourteen of these sections are organized into a district over which is an overseer whose business it is to preside at the fortnightly meetings of the almoners, where the reports of all these almoners are considered and a minute book prepared for the Central Committee of nine which is over the whole system in the city. This committee meets fortnightly also but on the night following the meeting of the district meetings. Indoor relief also is controlled by this Central Committee, the overseers and almoners having no connection with that. In many places both men and women serve as almoners. These almoners are chosen from all classes of the population, not from the upper class alone.

In every city where the system is in existence a large army of men and women of at least average intelligence are interested in the problem of poverty, not after dilettante fashion, but by first-hand acquaintance.

Efficient service is secured because it is personal and intimate. With no more than four cases to look after it is possible to show true neighborliness.

Constructive philanthropy is possible not only because the system supplies personal treatment for those who already have fallen into poverty, but because it makes the almoner an instrument of prevention. He is a father to the fatherless,

an adviser to the foolish, and serves as the connecting link between the inefficient individual and society which so often is only a lifeless abstraction or a heartless automaton to the poor.

The value of the system, however, is indicated in these figures: In spite of the fact that the population of Elberfeld increased from fifty thousand in 1852 to one hundred sixty-two thousand in 1904, the number of those receiving either temporary or permanent help increased from 4000 to only 7,689, or a decrease from 8 per cent of the population to 4.7 per cent. The cost of relief per capita of population in 1852 was 89 cents; in 1904 it was 88 cents including expense of supporting the almshouse, orphanage, and kindred institutions.

It may be added incidentally that the system as administered in most of the cities of Europe at present has some defects. The almoners, although not trained for the work, make their own investigations. It is quite likely that it is not done as well or as tenderly as the trained worker would do it. They give relief themselves, — a practice which organized charity on the basis of long experience elsewhere condemns. The Elberfeld system will not work even in Germany without the aid of carefully devised poor laws. As Mr. Almy has remarked, however, these defects are not inherent in the system, and could easily be remedied. Certainly the results in lessened poverty justifies the hope that its essential features may, perhaps in modified form, be introduced into this country.¹

That the Elberfeld system is not adapted without some change to cities of all sizes and conditions is shown by the experience of Hamburg. As the relief system was originally organized at Hamburg there were a number of defects which account for its failure. The number of cases looked after by one almoner was from twenty to as many as eighty; the duty of the almoner was consequently limited to receiving applications for relief and more or less careless granting of aid at first without frequent enough reinvestigation; and the records and materials bearing upon the cases and their administration were not collected in one central office. In 1892 a reorganization was begun. An

¹ *New Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, p. 438; Almy, "The Use of Volunteers by Public Aid Officials," in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1904, pp. 113-134.

expert was employed to assist in the reorganization of the system. As a result of this reorganization requirements were adopted making the visitors more independent of the central office than before, and making the districts not only independent but also giving them such rights as the nomination of superintendents of districts and of new helpers, and considerable power to vote aid. Hamburg dropped the small district system of the Elberfeld system because it had been found in Hamburg that with its rapidly shifting population some districts would soon come to have no needy and others would have many. Hence, the new Hamburg system also did away with committing a given needy person to one almoner. A district is laid out with a superintendent at its head. He selects his helpers in number according to the need of the district. He receives the applications for aid. He assigns the cases to the person who he thinks will best fit that particular case. That case may be left in the hands of this person or after some trial it may be given to another better fitted to deal with it. This plan also enables him to give to the man of leisure more cases than he gives to the busy man, and to adapt the helpers to the particular case in hand. This system differs also from the Elberfeld system in granting relief for a longer period. In the Elberfeld system relief is granted for only two weeks. In the new Hamburg system the dependents are divided into classes, one of these containing the aged and the sick and such others as are in a condition not likely to change soon may be granted an allowance for six months, all others for not more than a month, until the next session of the council. The new Hamburg system has another feature not found in the Elberfeld system, a body composed of the superintendents of the districts and called a *Kreis*, or circuit. These constitute an appeal board to hear appeals from the districts, to discuss matters of concern to all the districts in their circuit, and to consider and care for cases which need institutional care. The chairmen of these circuits are members of the central board. The central board has much the same duties as the Central Committee of the Elberfeld system. It is the court of final appeal, conducts investigations into conditions in the city bearing upon poverty, makes general rules and regulations under which the various poor officers operate, and decides the larger and more general policies. It has as its clerical agency a busi-

ness management. Through this central agency all applications for relief must pass.

The system has worked remarkably well in Hamburg and has been adopted with success in a number of the larger cities of Germany.¹

The Indiana System. — While space will not permit a full description of the system of poor relief which has done so much to make that state a leader in the administration of poor relief, especially out-door relief, in the United States, a brief outline will serve the purpose, perhaps, of indicating what can be done with a carefully devised plan of administration based upon the old discredited system of county and township relief.

The jail, poorhouse, county hospital, and children's home are the institutions under the control of the county authorities in Indiana. In addition to the board of county commissioners who in most states have sole charge of these county institutions, the legislature in 1899 provided for the appointment by the circuit court judge of six persons to act as a board of county charities. The appointment is mandatory on petition of fifteen reputable citizens of the county. They are required to visit each of the charitable and correctional institutions in the county receiving public monies, and to report their findings to the county commissioners at least quarterly and to the circuit judge annually. Copies of their reports are to be furnished the newspapers and the Board of State Charities. As a result of these provisions and the excellent supervision given the poorhouses by the Board of State Charities, the poorhouses of that State have been made more nearly into what they should be, — homes for the aged and respectable poor, instead of dumping grounds for the refuse of humanity. The following table tells its own story on this point:

	1891	1909
Inmates under 16 years of age	13.3%	1.2%
Inmates 16 and under 60	52.7	47.8
Inmates 60 and over	34.0	51.0

The Indiana plan of managing township charities has been even more striking because out-door relief is included. Under

¹ For this summary we are indebted to the splendid outline of the system given by Professor Henderson in his *Modern Methods of Charity*.

the old system of unsupervised relief the township trustees in 1895 were spending annually \$630,168.79 without any record being kept to show who were helped and for what reason. In that year a law was enacted at the suggestion of the Board of State Charities which revolutionized matters. The trustees as overseers of the poor were required by that law to file with the respective boards of county commissioners reports which must contain certain information concerning every family and person aided, a duplicate of which report was to be sent to the Board of State Charities. That provided supervision not only by the county commissioners, but also by a state body. Two years later a law was passed requiring the trustees to levy a tax against the township to cover the cost of poor relief granted to persons in that township. This supplied the other element lacking in the previous law, that of putting upon the people where the poor were the burden of their relief instead of paying the cost out of the general funds of the county. Each trustee was now responsible directly to his constituents for whatever expenditure was made. Two years later a law applying the principles of organized charity to the relief of the poor was passed and put the final element needed into the laws governing out-door relief for a whole state. Thus are provided supervision by a state board, local financial responsibility, and the application of the principles of scientific charity to the relief system of a state. This system also affords an opportunity to the State Board to study the whole problem of poverty in that state and get at the real causes of poverty.

The results of this system are shown by the fact that while in 1897 one out of every thirty-one of the inhabitants of the state were receiving public relief, ten years later only one out of seventy-one were receiving such relief, although the amount given each person had risen from \$4.72 to \$5.13. In 1897 there were thirty-eight counties in the state in which one out of every thirty or less inhabitants was receiving aid, while ten years later there was not a county where so many of the inhabitants were being aided at public expense. Furthermore, the expense of public relief had fallen from \$388,343.67 in 1897 to \$279,967.31 in 1907;¹ thus fewer persons were receiving relief, but those

¹ *The Development of Public Charities and Correction in the State of Indiana, 1792-1910*, 1910, Board of State Charities, Indianapolis, pp. 118-127.

who were receiving it were getting more adequate relief. This example of a state which by a few very simple changes in her public relief system made it really efficient shows what can be done if brains and perseverance are applied to the problem here in the United States.

The Rise of the Charity Organization Movement. — The reform of public charities after the methods of the Hamburg-Elberfeld often modified in some respects to meet local conditions, extended to many of the principal cities of Europe. Paris, Vienna, and Berlin inaugurated systems of charity organization, which had for their purpose the systematic helping of the poor, and the repression of pauperism. The influence of all this work for the reformation of public outdoor relief was felt everywhere, its results were made known and began to show results in private relief work. This influence began to tell on the ideals prevailing in non-public relief associations both on the Continent and in England about the middle of the nineteenth century. About this time the charities of London were very imperfect and inadequate. A large number of societies existed having no particular coördination or coöperation. They were relief societies pure and simple. However, in 1869, the Charity Organization Society of London was formed. It had for its purposes the harmonious coöperation with each other and with the poor law authorities, of the various charitable agencies in the district, the checking of the evil of overlapping relief, the repression of mendicity, the furnishing of help to the needy, and the repression and prevention of pauperism by thorough investigation and by means of self-help.

Charity Organization in the United States. — It was not until the year 1877 that the Buffalo Society of Charity Organization was established, and it was the forerunner of all such movements in American cities. It was based upon that modified form of Hamburg-Elberfeld system which had been adopted in London and elsewhere. Its principles, as announced, were to reduce vagrancy and pauperism and ascertain their true causes; to prevent indiscriminate and duplicate giving; to secure the community from imposture; to see that all deserving cases of destitution were relieved; to make employment the basis of relief; to elevate the home life, health, and habits of the poor; and to prevent children growing up as paupers.

The means employed to bring about these results were cooperation of charitable agencies; thorough investigation of all applicants and all conditions of poverty; a careful registration of all those asking for help; and giving the kind of help that suited the exact need of each individual. The society also advocated the study of poverty and pauperism in order to better understand the causes. In this way they hoped to improve the condition of the poor and to reduce almsgiving to a system of scientific charity.

The Indorsement of Charities.—The organization of societies giving relief into an association whereby overlapping of relief could be eliminated and coöperation between the various relief agencies secured aimed to cure one kind of ills besetting the philanthropic impulse. There is another sort of malady, however, which that movement does not as yet touch. There may be three or there may be a thousand relief agencies associated in an associated charities' organization. The associated charities, except in a few instances, has not been in a position to say that another relief agency is not needed and therefore may not enter the field and appeal to the public for support. As a consequence of the multiplication of relief agencies in response to the great growth of the desire to relieve the suffering to be seen in the midst of our plenty, and in response to the opportunity provided by the philanthropic sentiment to thus graft upon the public, there has been an enormous development of institutions and organizations appealing to the public for support. So great has this tendency become, and in some places so numerous the organizations appealing for support, that it is impossible for the busy business man to discriminate between the claims of the various organizations appealing to him for help. With a willingness to help any real need and a desire to spend his money only where it will do the most good and not contribute to the development of institutions which are unnecessary, he has been tossed about in his mind as to what he should do. The commercial organizations of the larger cities finally took hold of the problem and decided that they would look into the various organizations to which the business men were asked to contribute and have a special force organized in their office to investigate each organization. Each member of the commercial body was then invited to coöperate with the

commercial organization in this work by placing in his place of business a card stating that those in that business house or office were members of the board of commerce, or whatever the body was called, and that they would contribute to no organization which did not have the indorsement of that organization. At the same time that this was done publicity was given to the fact that a special committee to investigate the claims of philanthropic institutions had been organized, and the various charitable organizations were asked to submit to the commercial body information on certain points which would show their methods of financial management, the field they covered, and a number of other matters bearing upon the usefulness of the organization in the community. In this way these organizations are carefully examined by the commercial body and the contributing public has the advantage of whatever skill that body commands in investigating the merits of the various philanthropic organizations. This method is intended to catch the useless organizations and the imposters. It also serves to prevent the organization of societies which would duplicate the work of others already in existence. In Cleveland, where the movement originated, it has gone so far as to enlist the commercial organization with the philanthropic societies in an endeavor to gather the money necessary to carry on the work of these societies which are indorsed and divide it among them on the basis of what they spent the year previous, or some such basis as may seem equitable to the board.

The results of charities' indorsement have been fully up to expectations in cutting down the number of institutions receiving their support from the public. It has also given an impetus to the movement to have institutions carry on their work with more care for the financial methods employed, and for the results obtained. They know that they will be judged by results and that if these results do not commend themselves to the investigating committee, their support will be cut off by the refusal of this body to indorse their work. The campaign for funds in the Cleveland plan is centered in a week and each giver knows that when he has given once he will not be asked for gifts by other organizations. The result has been a great increase in the amount given by each man and therefore a greater amount to be used by the institutions approved.

The system of indorsement has not received the unanimous approval, however, of social workers and students of the question. There has been a fear expressed that the investigating committee may not be intelligent enough to correctly judge of the real merits of an organization. They are usually business men, it is claimed, who are not familiar with the needs of the people along philanthropic lines and therefore are likely to think that an organization is unnecessary when it is really needed. There was also a fear expressed by some that this system would mean the control of charities by big business. The debate is not yet settled, but wherever the plan has been tried apparently it has worked well. In New York City, where there is a strong charity organization society, that organization does this investigating and indorsing. This plan in most places where the associated charities' movement is less well established in the confidence of the people would probably not work, inasmuch as the various relief societies would object to investigation and indorsement by an association which is supposed to coördinate the various relief agencies in the task of succoring the needy of the community. It is probable that those cities which have strong commercial bodies and have not a very strong associated charities will use the former method, and those which have their charities organized well and are strongly intrenched in the confidence of the people will manage it as New York does. It is certain that the time has come when the waste of effort due to institutions which duplicate efforts in a field already well occupied and leave untouched other fields suffering from the lack of help will be stopped. Some agency must have oversight over the whole field of philanthropic endeavor and direct the efforts of the community to meet its needs systematically, cultivating each part thereof according to the needs of each.¹

Principles of Scientific Out Relief. — Out of the confusion of indiscriminate giving and haphazard methods of administering charities, which have sometimes tended to increase rather than to decrease dependency, there have evolved a few funda-

¹ Baldwin, "Committee Report on the Relation of Commercial Organizations to Social Welfare," *Proceedings, National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1913, p. 73; Williams, "A Chamber of Commerce Militant," *ibid.*, p. 84; Stewart, "Charities Indorsement in Retrospect and Prospect," *ibid.*, p. 100.

mental principles of charity based on scientific methods. Among them the following may be enumerated: the helpless must be taught to help themselves; the work test should be applied to all persons to the extent of their working power; indiscriminate giving is dangerous and should be prohibited; every gift should be for the purpose of permanently helping the recipients; relief, when given, should be adequate but should be carefully supervised; the rehabilitation of the dependent family — nothing less — should be one of the ultimate aims of scientific charity; the other ultimate aim should be the prevention of poverty. Thus, scientific charity is a study of how to relieve, how to rehabilitate the dependent, and how to prevent poverty and pauperism.

Gradually it has dawned upon the communities that the most difficult thing to do is to help others without at the same time doing an injury. Promiscuous giving is no longer considered a virtue. To be generous and careless may lead to more trouble than to be penurious. One should not refrain from giving and should not repress generosity, but the duty does not end with the giving, it extends to the insurance of good results from the gift. Scientific charity seeks not to relieve the public from the burdens of the poor, but seeks to lay increased responsibility by doing more for the poor and doing it in a better way. It is easy to give without responsibility, but it is a very difficult matter to follow up the gift with the responsibility of its effectiveness. "The gift without the giver is bare." The last quarter century in American charities has brought about a general reform in methods of dealing with the poor and the helpless. Much, however, still remains to be done. The public must be educated to a sense of the importance of the principles which experience has suggested. Workers both salaried and volunteer must be trained. The principles wrought out in the experience of private philanthropy must be introduced into public relief in the United States; in only one state, Indiana, has that been done to any appreciable extent. The experiments of other lands in the cure and prevention of poverty need to be adopted and tried out in our country.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. State arguments for and against Mr. Spencer's contention that by charity we do an injury to society by saving alive the weaker people.
2. List the motives which lead people to give to the poor to-day.
3. Show the similarity of motives between the alms distributed by political bosses, say the Tammany leaders on the East Side of New York and the motives of the politicians of Ancient Rome in giving "corn and games" to the populace.
4. In the light of what happened in Rome when the wealth was concentrated in few hands and the bulk of the people had little chance at independence, what would you say would be good social policy with respect to the problems of poverty in this country with its manhood suffrage, by which votes may be exchanged for a living?
5. Are large sums spent on the poor necessarily good evidence of proper care of the poor? Why? Are small amounts? Why?
6. In what respects was the charity of the church of the Middle Ages a good thing? Wherein was it open to criticism?
7. Compare the charity of the churches to-day and public charity in their results.
8. Compare the aims of public charity as administered to-day in the United States and the charity administered by a Society for Organizing Charity, or an Associated Charities.
9. Outline the plan of public relief provided for in the laws of your state.
10. Criticize these laws and suggest changes for the better.

CHAPTER IV

CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND PREVENTION

Nature of Crime. — Crime is an offense against the law of the land. It varies in character and degree on account of the act itself and also on account of the law. A mild offense against the law is called a misdemeanor. A serious offense is called a crime. The only difference between a crime and a misdemeanor is in the gravity of the offense, and, since the estimate of the seriousness of an act varies from place to place, these are not the same in different communities. In early society, when natural justice prevailed and each man settled his own difficulties with his fellows, crime in a legal sense was unknown. Cruelty, savagery, and bestiality might have existed, but they did not become criminal until the judgment of society pronounced them so in formal law. Even after society began to recognize certain acts as criminal, they were treated solely as offenses against the person involved and not as against society at large. But now every criminal act is considered an offense against society. In a sociological sense a serious offense against society may be a social crime, even though the law has not been passed defining such act as criminal.

The Extent and Cost of Crime. — In the United States it is impossible to obtain more than a mere guess at the extent of crime. The United States Census supplies some figures which are suggestive, although they do not measure the amount of criminality in the country. As between states a comparison is unfair because the various states do not have the same laws. There is the same difficulty when one tries to compare different countries with respect to criminality. With these limitations, however, some statistics of crime in different countries will be suggestive of the extent of this social malady.

On June 30, 1904, there were in the prisons of the United States 81,772 prisoners, 77,269 males, and 4503 females, 55,111 white, and 26,661 colored. Of these 53,392 were in state

penitentiaries, 7261 in reformatories, 18,544 in county jails, and 2675 in city jails. During the year ending June 30, 1904, there had been sentenced to imprisonment in prisons, 149,691. Besides these numbers there were in juvenile reformatories, 23,034.¹ Thus, in 1904 there were more prisoners in the penitentiaries of the country (81,772) than there were undergraduate and graduate students in all the public universities, colleges, and technological schools of the United States (79,579), and almost as many as there were men undergraduates in both public and private universities, colleges, and technological schools of the country (82,877).²

Inasmuch as the Census of 1890 included those who were in prison awaiting trial, it is impossible to compare the number sentenced in the two decades. The *Special Report* of 1904 referred to above gives some comparative figures which, while inexact and misleading perhaps, are worth consideration. As nearly as the statisticians employed on that report could ascertain there were per 100,000 population in the United States in 1850, twenty-nine prisoners, in 1860, sixty-one, in 1870, eighty-five, in 1880, one hundred seventeen, in 1890, one hundred thirty-two, or corrected by deducting prisoners not yet sentenced, one hundred six, and in 1904, one hundred. These figures may or may not indicate an increase of crime. Besides the inaccuracy inhering in the figures themselves there is the fact that during all these decades new statutes have been put upon the statute books and immigrants not used to the language or the laws of the country have been arriving in unheard-of numbers. While they perhaps break the laws and thus get into trouble, they are not always culpable. The list of homicides and suicides compiled by the *Chicago Tribune* shows in the twenty-one years from 1885 to 1906 an increase from 32.2 homicides per million inhabitants to 108.9, and of suicides during the same period from 978 to 10,125, while executions arose from 108 only to 123. The number of murders and homicides to each execution rose during that period from 17 to 76. On the other hand, lynchings fell from 181 to 69. One must not forget that it was during this

¹ *Special Reports of the Census: Prisoners and Juvenile Delinquents in Institutions*, 1904, pp. 29, 229.

² *Report of the Commissioner of Education of the United States*, 1913, Vol. II, p. 180.

period that this country in common with most others has seen a great increase in substitutes for imprisonment and the death penalty. Certainly, however, these figures do not give us any assurance that crime is diminishing.

Not much better is the showing of the European countries. Aschaffenburg, in his scholarly and temperate work, after giving many tables of figures comparing crime in Germany at different times, says, "Hence, the conclusion is unavoidable that brutality, recklessness, and licentiousness are spreading more and more in the growing generation."¹ Recidivism in that country is increasing as everywhere else. He says, "Of the 98,411 persons, who at the time of their conviction, in the years 1894 to 1896, had already served five or more sentences, 72.7 per cent recidivated in the course of the five years following their last conviction."²

This gloomy picture is not relieved by a consideration of the expense involved in this fact of criminality. Mr. Eugene Smith, before the National Prison Association in 1900, estimated that there are 250,000 persons in the United States who make their living in whole or in part by crime, costing the country \$400,000,000 a year, besides another charge of \$200,000,000 a year in taxes to catch, try, and punish them. These enormous figures take no account of the property destroyed, the time, life, and labor lost and the private expense involved in running down criminals, to say nothing of the expense of locks, burglar alarms, and other devices to prevent criminality. An interesting estimate of the direct and indirect cost of crime in the United States has been made by the chaplain of the Prison Evangelist Society of New York, which, while only an estimate, gives some idea of the items which must be taken into consideration. It is as follows:

Aggregate cost to the various states	\$774,000,000
Aggregate cost to the Federal Government	80,000,000
Criminal losses by fires	100,000,000
Custom house frauds	60,000,000
Wages of 100,000 in states' prisons	28,000,000
Wages of 150,000 in jails	<u>33,000,000</u>
Total	\$1,075,000,000

¹ *Crime and its Repression*, p. 218.

² *Ibid.*, p. 221.

The situation is similar in Germany. Aschaffenburg reports that in 1909 in Germany there were 248,648 thefts, frauds, and embezzlements, and adds, "Unfortunately we have no idea, even approximately, how great the average damage was in each case, but there can be no doubt that national prosperity sustained a tremendous injury through these crimes against property." Taking as a measure his findings as to the time-loss sustained by those who were gravely injured by assault in Worms, 7.3 days for each act, he estimates that for such crimes alone in Germany there was a loss of time amounting to 2308.8 years in that single year in Germany from that crime alone.¹

The Causes of Crime.—Among those causes which are prominent may be noted *hereditary characteristics of the individual*. His organic constitution, including the structure of the skull, brain, and vital organs, and his degree of sensibility—in fact, all bodily characteristics—may be of such nature as to induce criminal acts. Moreover, in the mental constitution of the criminal are often observed anomalies of intelligence and feeling. The moral sense is frequently blunted or deficient. This amounts sometimes to what is known as "moral insanity," or the absence of moral sense. While defects of this nature may not insure criminal action, they predispose the individual to crime. Criminality due to hereditary defect is a combination of weakness and viciousness. Some inherited defect of mind or body, or both, furnishes the individual basis for criminal conduct. Under some social conditions such a person would not become criminal. But under social conditions which give the opportunity or furnish the social incentive to criminality, such an individual will not have the will power to resist temptation to commit a crime, or will not be conscious of the gravity of the act, or, finally, will not be moved by the usual prudence which a socially normal person possesses. Some recent studies indicate that most of the criminality due to hereditary defect is the result of feeble-mindedness. Pinel, Morel, and many others² have pointed out that many people are frequently characterized by what is called moral insanity, that is, seeming lack of any moral sense from their earliest days. Lombroso, taking

¹ *Crime and its Repression*, pp. 225, 226.

² Ferrero, *Lombroso's Criminal Man*, p. 53.

the cue from them, found, as he thought, a very close connection between the characteristics of the morally insane and the criminal, especially what he called the "born criminal."¹ He also called attention to the close relations which crime has to epilepsy, coming to the conclusion that moral insanity, epilepsy, insanity, and crime committed by the born criminal are all of one piece.² The labors of Lombroso stimulated inquiry both for and against his position and resulted in finer discriminations than he made. More careful studies made by others have, however, made clear that insane persons are often criminals. Indeed, the figures seem to indicate that the number of insane among those who commit serious crime is unduly large. Thus, Aschaffenburg found of those prisoners committed to the penal prison in Halle who had been guilty of sexual crime, only 45 out of 200 were entirely normal.³ Leppmann found only 30 normal mentally out of 90 committed to the penitentiary at Moabit for rape or for assaulting children.⁴ Of the beggars and tramps examined by Bonhöffer 75 per cent were more or less abnormal mentally.⁵ Of the young criminals incarcerated at Elmira the Superintendent and the Board of Managers report that to the unpracticed eye of the layman at least a third of them are mentally defective, while the physicians of the institutions put it at a much higher figure.⁶ Sutherland, the English student of recidivism, is authority for the statement that fully one third of the recidivists of England are suffering from physical and mental degeneracy characterized by mental warp, instability, and feeble-mindedness. He estimates that fully two thirds of the petty offenders who are recidivists are pathological in the same sense.⁷ Healy, in his Psychopathic Institute in Chicago, found that of 620 youthful recidivists, 26 per cent of them were distinctly below the class which he calls poor in native ability.⁸ Dr. Frank Moore, Super-

¹ Ferrero, *Lombroso's Criminal Man*, pp. 52-57.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³ Aschaffenburg, *Crime and its Repression*, pp. 190, 191.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 191, 192.

⁶ *Report of the State Board of Managers of Reformatories of New York, 1912*, pp. 15, 16.

⁷ Sutherland, *Recidivism*, p. 50, quoted by Healy, "Mental Defects and Delinquency," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction, 1911*, p. 60.

⁸ Healy, "Mental Defects and Delinquency," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction, 1911*, p. 60.

intendent of the Rahway Reformatory in New Jersey, found that at least 46 per cent of the boys there were mentally deficient.¹ Goddard, of the Vineland, New Jersey, Institution for the Feeble-minded, estimates that 25 per cent of all delinquents are feeble-minded.² In his last book he estimates that from 25 to 50 per cent of all our prisoners are mentally defective and incapable of managing their affairs with ordinary prudence.³ Just what proportion of crimes are committed by those who are mentally unbalanced or deficient it is impossible at this time to say, but the studies thus far made do indicate that inherited or acquired mental defect is responsible for much more of the criminality than we have been accustomed to suppose.

Evil habits also are conducive to criminal action by gradually destroying normal action. Also the use of narcotics, liquors, and drugs, by weakening the will power and destroying the moral sense, leads towards crime. Giving vent to wrath in a violent manner often weakens the self-control and distorts the judgment, and thus sometimes prepares the way for criminal action, should conditions arise favorable to it.

This class of causes were once thought to be beyond human control. God had made people so. They were endowed by Him with certain evil propensities which were a part of the naturally depraved nature of man. God's work, while beyond understanding, must not be meddled with; it must be borne. Many criminals employ the very same reasoning to-day in extenuation of their crimes.⁴ With our growth of knowledge concerning man's natural history and the laws of heredity, we know this reasoning is wrong. Whatever theory we may hold on the subject of creation, we now know that heredity in animals can be controlled to a remarkable extent. Why can it not be controlled in man, we naturally ask. No stock breeder would expect to raise race horses from draft-breed sires and dams. Heredity here, as in the case of paupers, should be more subject to social control than at present. The arguments for this are given in the chapter on Degeneracy and need not be repeated here.

¹ "Mentally Defective Delinquents," in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1911, p. 66.

² "The Treatment of the Mental Defective who is also Delinquent," in *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1911, p. 64.

³ Goddard, *Feeble-mindedness, Its Causes and Consequences*, p. 7.

⁴ See Ellis, *The Criminal*, 3d ed., 1907, p. 238.

Influences of Physical Nature on Crime.— Besides those causes of crimes arising from personal characteristics there are a large number of influences found arising from physical nature. Among these may be enumerated *climatic conditions*. It is observed that crime varies with the change of seasons or with the alternation of excessive heat and excessive cold. Crimes against the person are much more frequent in a hot climate or in a hot season, while crimes against property occur much oftener in a cold climate or in the winter season. Various explanations of this observed fact have been offered. Some have suggested that the heat irritates people and makes them more inclined to violence, while cold has the contrary effect, but coincides with the time of year when food is naturally scarce and so induces crimes against property. Probably the frequent opportunities offered by hot weather and warm climates for social contact have more to do with crimes of violence than the effect directly of the heat. The relative length of day and night in part limits the kind and determines the nature of crime. Meteoric conditions, storms, and sudden climatic changes affecting the nervous and mental conditions of men are conducive to crime. What influence electrical disturbances have on criminal action has never been scientifically determined, although there are specific indications that there are positive relations between the two.

Little can be done to remove the causes of crime which reside in the physical environment. Were the time given for it, man would naturally become adapted to his environment by the elimination of those who are moved to antisocial conduct by the physical conditions. But human beings are migratory. A people does not remain long enough in one place to permit this slow process of adaptation by natural selection to work out its results. Doubtless the repressive measures of society have ever stimulated those most easily affected by the physical conditions to adapt themselves and restrain their impulses. Moreover, these influences are the most regular of all the causes of crime in their action and can be foreseen and provided for to a certain extent. Probably they also are the group of causes accounting for the smallest amount of crime.

Social Causes of Crime.— Social conditions have much to do with criminal action. The person somewhat weak in

character might never be guilty of criminal action if he had the right kind of social environment. On the other hand, a person of strong character will have sufficient power of resistance to remain uninfluenced by bad social or physical conditions.

The *density of population* in large cities is conducive to bad social conditions and supplies strong incentives to criminal action. Crowded conditions in the home break down decency and modesty and lead to sexual crimes. The intense crowding multiplies human contacts, thus provoking conflict. Poverty is ever there with her debasing influence, ever crowding the weak soul to criminality to make a living. There are the glaring contrasts between poverty and wealth leading to the development of class feeling and class conflict. There also criminal "gangs" with their baleful influence upon the innocent have their paradise.

Isolated community life has, in an opposite way, an effect on crime. The very vacuity of life in such places makes for crime. In the absence of the more refined excitements of the normal social community, people in these places resort to the elemental and primitive. Violence, either lustful or predatory, stalks abroad here with small chance of discovery. Vice and sexual irregularities find many who have nothing better to do. Feuds thrive where the bonds are chiefly those of kinship. The normal society is one of sufficient density to permit all social advantages and proper social regulation without the evils of overcrowding.

The moral attitude of a community has considerable to do with the amount of crime committed. Where the standard is high and public opinion severe against crime there is much less of it than where the standard is low and public opinion not condemnatory. Likewise, it may be said that law may increase the apparent amount of crime without increasing the actual criminal conditions of a community. Thus, criminality always seems to increase, following the enactment of a strong prohibitory liquor law. That seeming increase, however, is often due solely to men's reaction against a new and unpopular law. Also where the police force is active in the apprehension of crime and the judicial system very efficient in its operations, the recorded amount of crime will be higher, although the tendency

in the long run will be to decrease crime. The customs and religion of a community, the nature of industrial pursuits, as well as the financial and economic conditions, have much to do with the increase or decrease of crime. For example, let the religion lay no or little emphasis upon morality and regard for law and you will have much crime. Let financial and industrial depression come; thousands will be thrown out of work; some will be ruined; and thefts and robberies will increase.

Defective legislative, judicial, and punitive machinery may actually increase the crime of a community. Consider what happens when there is a corrupt or unjust judge. Criminals believe they can buy the judge's favor, and crime is increased. Let the legislature pass a law which makes it impossible to secure swift and certain justice; criminals will gamble upon the chance, and crime will increase. Let the police take bribes and collect graft, crime will flourish, for criminals will be protected against society by the paid officers of the law, as every investigation involving police departments for the last twenty years unmistakably shows.

The social causes of crime probably bulk largest in their influence upon criminality. Yet they are the most hopeful because perhaps the most subject to control by society. If bad social conditions are the result of social neglect, why may not better social conditions be secured by careful conscious planning by society? Every movement which relieves the density of population — cheap transportation, suburban planning, removal of factories from great centers to suburbs, garden cities, good housing, which provides a normal outlet to social instincts, normal recreation, stimulation of interest in books, art, clean, healthful sport, social religion, scientific legislation, just judges, and a criminal procedure which secures equal justice to all and speedy and certain action to apprehend the guilty; an education which prepares for the useful life — all will make good conditions for people to live in, and tend to lessen crime.

Classification of the Causes of Crime. — Arranged according to the influence operating to produce crime, perhaps the briefest and yet a fairly comprehensive classification of the causes of crime is proposed by Professor Henderson, which we have ventured to summarize as follows:

- (1) Causes in the External World.
- (a) Climate } Hot climates and seasons cause crimes against
 - (b) Seasons } person; cold, crime against property.
 - (c) Meteorological changes — electric conditions, barometric changes, humidity and heat, day and night.
- (2) Social Conditions.
- (a) Conjugal relation — more crime among single than among married.
 - (b) Social position — lower classes furnish more than upper classes.
 - (c) Density of population — crime increases with density.
 - (d) Customs — begging, causing mutilation of children to produce sympathy for child by public; carrying concealed weapons; dueling and fighting; public torture.
 - (e) Economic conditions — poverty, industrial changes.
 - (f) Food and famine — theft and robbery — not definitely determined.
 - (g) Beliefs — “property is robbery”; the whole product of industry belongs to labor; “scabs” have no right to work, etc.
 - (h) Lack of industrial education — no chance to earn an honest living.
 - (i) Political factors — spoils system, bribery.
 - (j) Bad associations and evil suggestion — “gangs” of boys dominated by bad men; “yellow” newspapers and novels; public scandal and crime in newspapers, etc.
 - (k) Lynching — brutality and violence engenders crime.
 - (l) Immigration — not much directly, but indirectly through race and industrial conflict.
 - (m) The negro factor — race prejudice, unskilled labor, social ostracism.
- (3) Physical and Psychological Nature of the Individual.
- (a) Sex — five times as many male as female convicts.
 - (b) Age — youth is the criminal age.
 - (c) Education — training in trades and morals decreases crime.
 - (d) Occupation — those which attract rude untrained men show most crime; semicriminal occupations like saloons, gambling, etc., increase crime; kind of crime varies with occupation.
 - (e) Alcoholism — weakens inhibitory powers, dulls the conscience, excites anger and lust; leads to bad associations.
 - (f) Hereditary and individual degeneration.¹

¹ Henderson, *Dependents, Defectives and Delinquents*, 1901, pp. 238-253.

Classifications of Crime. — Stephen, in his *History of Criminal Law in England*, has given the following classifications of crimes: “(1) Attacks upon the public order, (2) abuses or obstructions of public authority, (3) acts injurious to the public in general, (4) attacks upon the persons of individuals or upon rights annexed to their persons, (5) attacks upon the property of individuals or rights connected with, and similar to rights of property.” Perhaps in a more practical way we might speak of political crimes, such as treason and counterfeiting; of public crimes not political, such as lynch law, mob violence and arson; crimes against persons, such as assault and battery, rape, murder, manslaughter; and crimes against the property of persons, such as theft, robbery, embezzlement, and forgery.

The Classification of Criminals. — Criminologists have studied long and hard to discover a criminal type. Thus far they have not succeeded in demonstrating that there is a universal type which is essentially criminal. But their investigations have been rewarded in showing that certain criminals, especially those known as “instinctive,” have an aggregation of defects or characteristics, which, taken together, show their possessor to be an abnormal individual and help to explain his criminality. These defects are in part physical anomalies. Among those noticed more often in criminals than in non-criminals, according to the criminal anthropologists, are skulls of the average size with frequent extremes. Thieves have small heads, murderers large heads. The pointed skull is frequent, the lower jaw is unusually heavy, an asymmetrically shaped head occurs often, the orbit of the eye is unusually large, the zygomatic arch unusually high and prominent. Defects of brain are very frequent in what Lombroso called the “born criminal.” There is an extraordinary tendency to vary from the racial type of head form. If he belongs to a long-headed race, the criminal’s is likely to be unusually long. The physiognomy is said to betray criminality — sullen looks; furtive eyes in the thief, a stare in the murderer. Abnormalities of organs occur more often than among non-criminals — unusually long arms, left-handedness, or ambidextrousness, pointed ears, scanty beard in men and beard in women, extra fingers, toes, and teeth, defective lungs, heart, and nervous system. Many

others have been suggested by students of the matter. It must be added, however, that all these stigmata of degeneracy which have been found only go to show that an unusual number of degenerates become criminals, and therefore the greater number of these signs of degeneracy appear among prisoners than among non-criminals. The finding of these stigmata of degeneracy was what led Lombroso at first to declare the criminal an atavism, then broaden the generalization and say that the criminal is an insane person, and later to further declare that he is an epileptoid.¹

Likewise, abnormalities have been observed in the intellectual characteristics of criminals. They are declared to be lacking in moral sensibility, do not dream so readily as other people — a condition found also among idiots and epileptics of long standing. In intelligence they are stupid, inexact, imprudent, yet having a cunning which leads to hypocrisy and lying. On the whole they are distinctly below non-criminals in intelligence. They are emotionally unstable, often very sentimental, usually religious after a superstitious, unethical fashion, and manifest a debasing tendency in all their literature and art. They are anti-social, not in the sense that they do not love companionship, but that they hate society and its ways, having a code of their own, when they are not distinctly defective mentally.

These anthropological characteristics of the criminal are not agreed upon by all criminologists. The Germans especially have contended that the Italian school has failed to establish many of its generalizations.² While we must record the judgment that the Germans have in many cases shown the Italian case "not proven," yet there can be no doubt that the Italian school has done an invaluable service in pointing out the close relationships undoubtedly existing between degeneracy and crime in a considerable number of cases. The debate, however, is leading to the conclusion that crime has links connecting it not only with physical degeneracy, but with bad social conditions in even a larger number of cases.

While it may be contended that crime, not the criminal, is

¹ For a full discussion, in a friendly spirit, of these findings of criminal anthropology, see Ellis, *The Criminal*, 4th ed., 1910, Chaps. III and IV.

² For a summary of the German position, see Aschaffenburg, *Crime and its Repression*, pp. 168-186.

the pathological social phenomenon, and therefore less attention should be given to a classification of criminals than of crime, it must be remembered that so far as the treatment of crime is concerned, no progress was made until after the theory that the punishment must fit the crime gave way to the theory that the punishment must fit the criminal. Bearing in mind the practical aim of the study of crime — how to treat it — we venture to classify the criminals as well as their crimes.

Dr. Dugdale has given the following typical classes of criminals who have come within his observation:¹ (1) Those who are essentially non-criminal but by force of circumstances or accident have broken the law. (2) First offenders who fall through vanity or self-indulgence and the influence of evil women. (3) First offenders who are led into crime by bad associates. (4) Convicts of low vitality born under evil conditions who have drifted into crime from lack of care. (5) Illegitimate children born of intemperate, vicious, and criminal parents, who bring them up to a life of crime. (6) Promoters of crime as a regular business. (7) Criminals who seek to retire from active service and become criminal capitalists. (8) Those who pander to the vices of criminals and thus become the active abettors to crime. (9) Criminals through epilepsy, insanity, and perverted minds. (10) Those affected with nervous diseases which cause them to lose control of themselves and commit crime.

Henderson classifies criminals as: (1) accidental, (2) eccentric, (3) insane, (4) moral imbecile, (5) instinctive, (6) criminals by acquired habit, (7) criminals by passion, and (8) criminals by occasion.²

Ellis has a simpler classification as follows: (1) political, (2) by passion, (3) insane, (4) instinctive, (5) occasional, and (6) habitual.³

Draehms has proposed a classification which is too simple. He divides criminals into classes as follows: (1) instinctive, (2) habitual, and (3) single offender.⁴

From the standpoint of the social welfare rather than from

¹ *The Jukes*, pp. 110-111.

² Henderson, *Dependents, Defectives and Delinquents*, 1901, pp. 219-224.

³ Ellis, *The Criminal*, 4th ed., Chap. I.

⁴ Draehms, *The Criminal*, Chap. III.

that of legal status, which considers what the person charged with crime has actually done, the accidental criminal is in no sense a criminal. His act was the result of accident and his conduct was not antisocial. For example, in the prison of one of our states in the Central West was a man sentenced under the law for several years for causing the death of a man under the following circumstances: The man condemned to prison and his wife were sitting on a bench in a park on a summer's evening attending a band concert, when a drunken man came jostling through the crowd. Because the wife of this man happened to be in his way he struck her with his fist. The woman's husband struck back at the drunken man and struck him a blow in the temple which killed him. This man who killed the other had never been a quarrelsome person and did only what any man would have done in defense of his wife. From the standpoint of sociology, therefore, the accidental criminal should be excluded from the category of criminals. So, the moral imbecile is either insane or mentally defective in some other way and should not be classified separately. He belongs either under the category of the insane or of the instinctive. Nevertheless, since the law still is tinged with the social theory of an earlier day, such crimes may be retained in a comprehensive classification. We venture, therefore, to suggest the following classification: (1) political; (2) occasional, including (a) accidental, (b) eccentric, (c) by passion, (d) single offender; (3) natural, including, (a) moral imbecile, (b) insane, (c) feeble-minded, (d) epileptic; and (4) habitual, including, (a) the natural criminal, (b) the criminal by acquired habit.

The term "political criminal" is used to indicate those who commit a crime against the established government. It includes those who are guilty of trying to kill public officials, in order the better to overturn the government. They were formerly called regicides for the reason that they usually attacked the king as the chief representative of the hated social order. It includes also the rebel against the established government. The term also includes what has come to be termed the regicide, or magnicide, who is also an anarchist, such as Caserio, who killed Carnot, president of France, and Czolgosz, the assassin of McKinley. Sometimes such a person

is insane, as in the case of the man who made an attempt on the life of ex-President Roosevelt at Milwaukee in the autumn of 1912, and sometimes he is perfectly sane, as in the case of Czolgosz.¹

The occasional criminal includes four different varieties. He may commit an offense against the law by accident, as in the case of the man who struck the drunken fellow without intent to kill. While such a man is a criminal in the sight of the law, he scarcely presents a problem for criminology. He may commit crime because he is out of tune with the times in which he lives. If dissent from the established church is a crime, as it has been in many countries in times past and still remains so in some of the more backward countries, then the heretic is a criminal. Socrates was such a criminal. These men are eccentric according to the thought of their times and they are therefore criminals. Again, the occasional criminal may include him who in a burst of passion commits crime, but when he is calm suffers remorse for the act committed. Usually the act was done under the spur of insult or severe provocation or under the stimulation of wild companions in youth. These may become criminals if they are thrown into prison with hardened criminals or are not allowed to have a chance to redeem themselves. They may, however, under favorable conditions become good citizens. A variety of the occasional criminal is to be found in what is called the single offender. Sometimes he is a criminal by passion. He learns his lesson by that one experience and ever after controls his impulses. He may, however, be one who had got into bad company and had set out on a criminal career with the avowed purpose of warring against society, but who was caught in time and came out of his experience with the law with sobered mind and a social attitude.

What is here called the natural criminal is what the Italian school calls "the criminal born." The term "natural" is preferable because it does not beg the question as to whether crime as such is inheritable. It includes all those persons who become criminals largely because of the inheritance of defects which sometimes incline them towards antisocial acts. Included in this class is the moral imbecile, who by reason of inherited mental

¹ For a good summary of the post-mortem and ante-mortem examinations of Czolgosz see Ellis, *The Criminal*, 4th ed., pp. 415-417.

defect, has no sense of the value of different acts. It also includes the feeble-minded of the higher types, who, under favorable circumstances, would probably remain perfectly normal in conduct. In this class must be placed the epileptic who, in a seizure, commits a crime, but who is not conscious of his acts.

The last class, the habitual criminal, is subdivided into the habitual criminal who is a mental defective and who has continued so long in crime that it has become habitual with him and no amount of favorable influences will now keep him in correct ways. It also includes those unfortunate persons who, while young, have fallen into bad ways, and who, because of being refused a chance by society or because of bad associates, while being punished, have lost all hope of a decent life, and have finally decided that a life of crime is the only one open to them.

Ferri has made an interesting estimate of the numbers of criminals in the different classes. He estimates that insane and criminals by passion constitute only from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the convicts; the natural, or instinctive criminals from 2 per cent to 3 per cent; the habitual criminals from 37 per cent or 38 per cent to 47 or 48 per cent, and the occasional criminals from 40 to 55 per cent. If this estimate is true, it is apparent that the criminals by habit and by occasion form by far the largest part of the criminal population. It must be remembered, however, that in these classes are some who are also defective and only by careful segregation can be kept from preying upon society. However, the showing is hopeful by reason of the fact that so large a proportion of the whole are criminals because of wrong social conditions.

Why do we classify criminals? Only that we may know how to treat them. He who is a criminal by passion needs to be treated much differently from him who is a moral imbecile. He who is a criminal by accident cannot be treated in the same way as he who has lost all hope and has become an habitual criminal. It is in the interests of individualization of penal measures. Just as physicians classify disease that they may know how to give the proper treatment to each kind of disease, so the social physician tries to classify crime so that he may understand it and know how to provide measures that will prevent and cure it.

The Punishment of Crime. — In former times the punishment of crime always carried with it the spirit of revenge, and criminals were thrown into prisons and dungeons with something of the idea of getting even with them or hurrying them out of the sight of the community. Under the more enlightened conditions of modern society the objects of punishment are clearly defined as (1) the protection of society, (2) the prevention of crime, (3) the reform of criminals. The whole object of punishment is to improve the conditions of society.

Various methods of exercising this punishment have been instituted, such as capital and corporal punishment, imprisonment, confiscation of property, banishment, and a deprivation of civil and political rights. While perhaps retributive justice still receives the approval of most people who have not thought carefully about the matter and of some students of penology either as a deterrent or as a satisfaction of what is sometimes called "our natural sense of the fitness of things," but which is really a survival in our thought of the old sanction of revenge, correction of individual action, and the prevention of crime are to-day considered the more important phases of the purpose of criminal law. The humanity of modern society, and the aim to improve society, demand that reform shall be made very important in the treatment of the criminal. So bad have been the results of prison life and labor and so great has been the growth of sentiment in favor of giving even prisoners a chance to live their lives under the best possible circumstances, and, if possible, to reform, that a number of important movements have recently risen above the horizon of public attention. One is outdoor work for prisoners not only in reformatories, but also in the penitentiaries; sometimes on farms adjoining, sometimes upon the roads. The purpose is to get the men out into the open sunlight and fresh air, where their health is bettered and their conduct much improved. The other is a movement in the interest of the families dependent upon these men for support. This takes two directions, the one in favor of parole for long-term and even life prisoners, the other looking towards the establishment of a wage for the families, this wage to be paid by the state from the earnings of the man. These earnings are supposed to be in excess of what it takes to support him in the prison. The prison farm and road work have been introduced

in a number of states. It has been possible in certain states for some time for prisoners to earn some money by overtime work. Earnings out of the actual production of the man in excess of what it costs to keep him are a dream thus far in the experience of prison management. These movements, however, are experiments which will probably suggest better ways of treating those who must be shut away from society. As yet the problem is by no means solved.

Reformation. — The reformation of the criminal is accomplished by the application of the various methods of prison management. In the first place a careful study, both physical and mental, by the most exact methods known, should be made of all prisoners with a view to their proper classification. The hardened and hopeless criminals should be separated from the first offenders, and insane, feeble-minded, and epileptic criminals should be segregated by themselves in special institutions for the care of these classes. Adult offenders guilty of a misdemeanor should be placed either in a farm colony or on probation, young adult criminals in a reformatory or on probation, and hardened criminals in a penitentiary. Industrial labor of all kinds should be instituted as a means of discipline, and, in hopeful cases not in for life, as preparatory to the independent life of the individual on release. In the case of hopeless recidivists, labor should be provided which will help to defray the expenses of their maintenance, and to support their families. Academic instruction should be given to all prisoners capable of profiting thereby during certain hours in the day. Opportunities should be given for moral and religious instruction as well. Within the prison walls careful classification of all inmates should be made, and only those allowed to associate together who will be mutually helpful. All evil association should be avoided. Some have advocated the unicellular system, in which solitary confinement is the only rule, as in the Pennsylvania system. While this has its advantages in discipline, it is lacking in the methods of reform inasmuch as it gives no opportunities for association. On the other hand, where the group system is allowed it requires great care and skill in classification and management.

One of the best methods of reform is found in the indeterminate sentence, which treats the prisoner as susceptible of reform

under punishment. The law usually fixes the term of imprisonment from a minimum to a maximum sentence, for instance, from two to six years. When found guilty the judge sentences the prisoner to the penitentiary or the reformatory without stating the exact length of time. Then, through the administration of the prison board or the warden, he is kept in confinement only so long as it seems necessary to complete a reform, but within the maximum sentence; he is then allowed to go free. Usually, in connection with the indeterminate sentence is the parole system, under which a person is allowed to leave the prison on parole, reporting monthly to the warden concerning his location, condition, and success. If he fails to report while on parole, or commits any crime or misdemeanor he is returned to the prison to work out his full time of service. The parole system has been a success in reformatories, industrial schools, and penitentiaries wherever tried, even though in none of our states has anything but the limited indeterminate sentence — that is, with a maximum limit — ever been tried. A modification of the indeterminate sentence, as it prevails in New York and upon which most indeterminate laws are based, is that in force in Massachusetts, applying only to women. Instead of the time spent while out on parole counting on the maximum time of sentence, only that spent in the reformatory counts, so that it is impossible for a woman to behave herself for a few months after release on parole until her sentence expires and then do as she pleases. That unexpired time hangs over her for two years if a misdemeanant, and for five if a felon, while out on parole.¹

But the best method of social reform is prevention, and therefore industrial education, care of boys in towns through recreation grounds and social centers, and the prevention of the spread of the criminal suggestion and example, are of great value. To this end the juvenile court, which has recently been instituted in a large number of the States, is proving an important means of prevention. It has long been known that our jails are conducive to the development of crime. The careless association of all classes, the herding of the young and old together, and the lack of reformatory measures, have made the modern jail nothing more or less than a breeder of crime. The juvenile court comes to the rescue and says to the boy who has

¹ Mrs. Barrows in Henderson, *Penal and Reformatory Institutions*, p. 146.

committed his first offense, "The jail is awaiting you, you are guilty, but I am going to send you back to your home and to the school and you must report to me regularly for a term of six months or a year of what you are doing. This report must be signed by your teacher or your parents." Or the judge may say, "I will send you to a good home or to the industrial school or some other place, but I will keep you out of jail." A juvenile court thus instituted to try all cases of children under sixteen is an important means for the prevention of crime.

Program of Reform. — The program of reform, then, should begin with the improvement of the condition of homes and tenements of people of the poorer classes, the institution of free kindergartens, and the development of industrial education. The jail should be remodeled and created into an institution of reform by the proper classification of the inmates and the establishment of industrial and educational processes. The farm colony plan has worked with signal success in Washington, D. C., and Cleveland, Ohio.¹ Great stress should be laid on reformation in the industrial and reform schools, the reformatory, and the penitentiary. But the best work that is done is that which educates towards independent manhood and keeps people out of institutions. Prevention of crime is the only certain cure of crime.

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¹ "Farm Treatment of Misdemeanants," Jackson, *Proceedings of National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1911, pp. 70 sq.; "The Farm Colony," Cooley, *ibid.*, 1912, pp. 191 sq.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. State the difference between crime in the legal sense and crime in the sociological sense.
2. Attempt to ascertain the cost of crime in your county.
3. Pick out a half dozen cases of crime in your community and ascertain the causes operating in each case.
4. In the light of the discussion in the text carefully analyze the laws of your state for dealing with murder and criticize them, pointing out the admirable characteristics and the defects.
5. What plans has your state for the reformation of criminals?
6. Make an outline of a system of laws governing the punishment of the crime of homicide inspired by the aim to reform those that are probably subject to reformatory influences and to protect society from those who are hopeless. Give your reasons for each measure proposed in this scheme.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL DEGENERATION

Nature of Social Degeneration. — Social degeneracy is often discussed but rarely defined. Nordau's large book upon degeneration lacks definiteness as to what is social degeneration. His thesis is that the nervous diseases that curse society to-day, the literary and artistic monstrosities which appear ever and again, and the moral and religious crazes which arise from time to time are symptoms of degeneracy.¹

Morel made a learned study of individual degeneracy and its causes and results, but it has a bearing only as individual degeneration affects society. Social degeneration as such he does not treat. So, many others with Morel, for example, Feré, Talbot, Lange, and a host of geneticists and eugenists, have written extensively upon certain aspects of degeneracy in the individual. Only indirectly do these studies bear upon the question of social degeneration.

Ward in his *Pure Sociology* touches the question of race degeneration. He treats it from the analogical point of view, drawing the parallel between the extinction of the highly specialized forms of animal and plant life, like the dinosaurs and the giant sequoias, respectively, and races and nations, citing as examples the conquest of Troy by Greece, the yielding to Spain in the fifteenth century of the torch of civilization borne by Italy up to that time. To Ward, "race and national degeneration are nothing more than this pushing out of the vigorous branches or sympodes at the expense of the parent trunks." He makes the term degeneration synonymous with decadence.²

We know what biological degeneracy is. It is the degeneracy of the individual in one or more of a number of ways. Genetically it may be described as a variation from the type in the direction of less complexity of physical organization, with the

¹ Nordau, *Degeneration*.

² Ward, *Pure Sociology*, pp. 77, 78, 227-229.

result that the organism is illy adapted to meet the conditions of life. In the parasite it is adaptation of the organism in order that the creature may the more easily adjust itself to the struggle for existence in accordance with the law of parsimony, or least effort, and a consequent simplification of structure. It is doubtful whether the plants and animals which have succeeded the old, highly specialized forms are degenerations from the latter. Rather they seem to be cases of arrested development of unspecialized forms better adapted to the conditions of existence under a suddenly and greatly changed environment. So the races and peoples which occupy highlands or those which are found in out-of-the-way places like the interior of Africa or of Australia are probably cases of arrested development rather than degenerate races. If social degeneration is to be interpreted in this way, then examples are to be found in the decadent Roman Empire, the Italian city states in the days of their decadence, and in the Spain of to-day.

Social degeneration is the breaking up of the coördination existing between the various social elements, — individuals and the subgroups which coöperate in the social process, — by the growth of so many antisocial elements that social unity is destroyed. This comes about by the growth of degeneracy among the individuals who make up society. Therefore, individual degeneracy has a direct bearing upon social degeneration, for degenerate individuals are either unsocial, or antisocial and are unable to coöperate in the aims and purposes of society.

Social degeneration, then, arises from the decline of the individual who fails to perform his part in the social activity. This causes a breakdown in the social mechanism and a decline in social activity. So long as each individual may be replaced by another as he fails or declines, society may be perpetuated, if not destroyed by outside influences. Just as a diseased member of the body may eventually destroy the individual, so a diseased part of society may be the cause of the destruction of the whole body. Social degeneration, then, is an evidence of social disease.

Degeneration through Intemperance. — Wherever intemperance of any kind exists social degeneration certainly and physical degeneration probably will result. The parent who is given over to the excessive use of intoxicating liquors may not

beget drunkards, but he probably will hand down to his children the enfeebled germ plasm which made him a drunkard, still further weakened by his excesses, and thus he may be the cause of the development of epilepsy, or imbecility, in his offspring. Continue this to a sufficient degree and society finally becomes extinct. On the other hand, the sober, industrious, temperate people, the stock being untainted with degeneracy, not only give forth the ideas which are the motors of development and normal progress, but perpetuate a stock which increases in vigor and is able to seize and use the opportunities for advancement. Under this law temperate people eventually possess the material wealth of the community, control the social forces, and discover the truth, essential to social advance. Hence, it is not merely the sapping of the physical vitality of the race that constitutes the principal effect of intemperance; it is the destruction of normal coöperative society. Intemperance is against all normal progress and therefore involves decay.

There is no doubt that intemperance is often the result of degeneracy in the individual. The enfeebled intellect has no restraining power. It drifts as a ship without a rudder. The feeble-minded, the epileptic, and the insane, as well as the neuropath in general, often find in alcohol a substitute for the emotional satisfaction furnished normal beings in other ways — a crutch for their unstable nerves. Dr. Branthwaite studied 2277 inebriates as to their mental condition and found 16.1 per cent insane, 62.6 per cent imbeciles, degenerates, and epileptics in a marked degree, defective but to a less degree manifesting defectiveness in eccentricity, silliness, dullness, senility, or periodical fits of ungovernable temper, while but 37.4 per cent were of average mental capacity. He estimated that at least 62 per cent of these cases were inebriate by reason of their mental condition.¹ Of the 774 men committed to the Iowa State Institution for Inebriates in 1906-1908 the parents of 13 were defectives and of 94 were diseased. The fathers of 26 and the mothers of 21 were tuberculous and the mothers of 11 and the fathers of 12 had heart disease. One or both of the parents of 427 of them were intemperate in the use of liquor. In the two years 1910-1912 the figures are even more striking. Of 665 inmates of that institution 8 had defective fathers or mothers,

¹Quoted by Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., 1908, pp. 79, 80.

116 diseased fathers or mothers, while 250 had fathers or mothers who were intemperate. The parents of only 88 were known to be non-users of liquor.¹

On the other hand we are uncertain how great is the influence of liquor in producing inheritable degeneracy. In an investigation made for the American Medico-Psychological Association published in 1903, 5145 insane persons were investigated. Thirty per cent were total abstainers, while the insanity of twenty-four per cent was considered due directly to the influence of liquor. Dr. Billings in commenting upon these and other figures of like nature said, "In any case where there is a tendency to psychic or nervous instability or abnormal action either inherited or acquired, the excessive use of alcohol may act as the exciting cause like a torch to inflammable material, but the same result may be produced with any excess creating a strain on the nervous system."² Professor Hodge of Clark University conducted some experiments upon cocker spaniel puppies, 1896-1898, to determine the effect of alcohol upon them. He carefully controlled the experiments so that they would be as nearly free from error as possible. He came to the following conclusions:

(1) On the side of general intelligence the alcoholic dogs were in nowise inferior to their mates.

(2) The alcoholic dogs manifested extreme timidity when the others showed no signs of it. Commenting upon this characteristic Dr. Hodge said, "Fear is commonly recognized as a characteristic feature in alcoholic insanity, and delirium tremens is the most terrible fear-psychosis known."

(3) The reproductive capacity of the non-alcoholic dogs was much greater, and the viability of the progeny of the non-alcoholic dogs was 90.2 per cent, while of the puppies of the alcoholic dogs it was 17.4 per cent.³

The author, while admitting that the experiments were too few to serve as a basis for very definite general conclusions, says, "Possibly the most important of our results relates to the vigor and normality of offspring."

¹ *Second Biennial Report of the State Hospital for Inebriates, Knoxville, Iowa*, 1908, p. 14; *Ibid.*, 1912, p. 21.

² Billings, *Physiological Aspects of the Liquor Problem*, Vol. I, p. 341 sq.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 371-375.

These experiments were with dogs, not with human beings. An investigation by Demme, however, throws some light upon the human problem of degeneracy and alcohol. Demme found that in the progeny of 10 alcoholic families, 17 per cent were normal, the rest suffering either from physical deformities, idiocy, epilepsy, or early death, while in the 10 non-alcoholic families, 88.5 per cent were normal. Twenty-five out of 51 children in the former families and only 3 out of 61 in the latter were non-viable.

Degeneracy of other sorts is closely connected with intemperance. Thus, Koren estimated 37 per cent of the pauperism in this country due directly or indirectly to drink.¹ Devine says more than 16 per cent of pauperism is due directly to drink.² Koren found intemperance the principal cause of crime in over 21 per cent of 13,402 convicts investigated.³ Dugdale found that 45 per cent of 176 habitual criminals were from intemperate families, and 42 per cent were habitual drunkards.⁴ Sullivan estimates that 60 per cent of homicidal offenses in England and a slightly smaller percentage of crimes of lust are caused by alcohol.⁵

The very close relation of alcoholism and degeneracy has often been remarked. Some writers think that their influence is reciprocal. Sometimes alcoholism is the result and at others the cause of degeneracy.⁶

Goddard has recently reported on the most careful and extensive study yet made of feeble-mindedness. He sums up an analysis of his inquiry as to the relation of alcohol to feeble-mindedness thus, "It looks evident that alcohol almost doubles the number of feeble-minded children in a family. But are we sure that alcohol is a cause and not merely a symptom?" He points out that while "the percentages are very high for the feeble-minded children of alcoholic parents and at first glance it appears that alcohol has greatly increased the number of feeble-minded, yet the argument is not complete." In these

¹ Koren, *Economic Aspects of the Liquor Problem*, p. 120.

² Devine, *Misery and its Causes*, p. 211. Cf. Lindsay's 15 per cent plus in *Proceedings, National Conference of Charities and Correction*, 1899, pp. 369 sq.

³ Koren, *Ibid.*

⁴ *The Jukes*, p. 187.

⁵ Sullivan, *Alcoholism*, pp. 164-169.

⁶ See Sullivan, *Ibid.*, p. 182, for remarks on this point.

investigations he properly points out they were dealing only with feeble-minded children of alcoholics. To make the case complete, the normal children of alcoholic parents in otherwise normal families should be investigated. On the basis of his study he concludes that alcohol instead of being a cause of feeble-mindedness, so far as his studies show, is simply a symptom of degeneracy, that it occurs for the most part "in families where there is some form of neurotic taint, especially feeble-mindedness." So far as the evidence goes on the influence of alcohol in producing physical degeneracy the findings are negative. All we can say is that the evidence is not conclusive that the intemperate use of alcohol by drunken parents directly affects the germ plasma in such a way as to produce that form of degeneracy which we call feeble-mindedness.¹ Goddard's figures seem to show that some degeneracy is caused by drink; they do not make it absolutely certain.

This conclusion leaves untouched the problem of whether alcohol in any way either directly or indirectly affects man's relations to his fellows so that he becomes pseudo- or anti-social. Doubtless there are many cases where drink has induced pauperism. The wages or savings have been spent for drink. The family has come to want. Indirectly, doubtless, by inducing irregular habits of industry, inefficiency in industry and business, drink has contributed to dependency. The associations connected with the saloon have frequently been the means whereby the sturdy independence of the worker has been undermined and his descent to social parasitism has been started.

The same is true with respect to alcohol's relation to criminality. Some crimes are incited by drink. Alcohol seems to paralyze the higher inhibitory brain centers and thereby favors the formation of habits clearly antisocial in their results. It seems to incite brutal and lustful passions at the same time that it perverts the judgment. Socially it seems to stimulate fellowship, for drinking is closely connected with the love of companionship. Nevertheless, really it makes for lawlessness and the breaking up of society into antagonistic groups, by its close alliance often, especially in temperance countries, with criminal groups. Alcohol is ever indissolubly linked up with antisocial and vicious activities. Without a doubt, from the standpoint

¹ Goddard, *Feeble-mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences*, 1914, pp. 490-492.

of social degeneration, drunkenness bears a heavy share of responsibility.

The Effect of Immorality.—Leading to sexual excesses, immorality saps the physical, intellectual, and vital strength of a community, thus dissipating the energy which ought to be used in social action. As society develops by the enlargement of activities on one hand and the accurate adjustment of its organs or parts on the other, immoral influences destroy normal functions and lead to decay.

Immorality, while often it is bound up in a tangled skein with intemperance, is at least as fruitful a source of degeneracy as intemperance in the use of alcohol. This stands out in such degenerate families as those of the Jukes, the Rooneys, the Ishmaels, and the Zeros. Whether they are intemperate or not, they are usually immoral. They may not be criminals, but they are immoral. The most hideous thing about the awful stories of these families is the frightful depths to which they descend in their sexual relations.

Immorality, considered as indiscriminate sexual relationships, operates to produce degeneracy through the spread of disease. Goddard found out of 40 children in what he calls the Hereditary Group of feeble-minded, from 10 matings where the parents were syphilitic, 42.4 per cent were feeble-minded, 4.9 per cent normal, 27.7 per cent died in infancy, and 10 per cent were miscarriages. In this group, however, there was feeble-mindedness in the parents. The terrific proportion of these children who died in infancy or miscarried—nearly two fifths—as compared with an average of 12.9 per cent of all classes of feeble-minded is significant.¹ No conclusive study of the relation of syphilis to epilepsy has yet been made. It is suspected, however, that they are closely connected. Recent studies in the Wisconsin Psychiatric Institute show that nearly a fifth of the male inmates of the Wisconsin Hospital for the Insane are insane because of syphilis. Goddard does not believe that syphilis is a potent cause of feeble-mindedness, although he admits his cases do not prove that it is not.

Moreover, the share of vice in producing human misery is appalling. To say nothing of the cost of treating those afflicted with the so-called social diseases and the loss of time and de-

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 494, 495; 518-521.

crease of physical and mental efficiency by the victims of these diseases, consider the unhappiness, domestic discord, and ruined homes incident to vice. The most important cause of divorce after desertion, which is a symptom rather than a cause and probably is usually preceded by unfaithfulness, is marital infidelity.¹ There immorality strikes at the very foundation of social life. The family relations are broken up. The most important center for the development of helpful social relations — the home — is destroyed. Children are thrown into new relationships and forced to new adjustments often with disaster to them. Instead of promoting social coördination and that social control which makes for cohesion and social progress, there arises disorder through disregard of social bonds. Pauperism, crime, and vice flourish as the result. Society comes to lack that close-knit coördination and orderly functioning which is necessary to social progress.²

Hereditary Influences. — The influence of heredity on individual life has not yet been fully determined. The studies already made indicate that through physical heredity one generation influences the next to a great extent. Disease is probably not transmitted from parent to offspring, but the characteristics of physical structure conducive to the development of the disease are probably handed down from generation to generation through the germ plasm. It may even happen that certain poisons may so affect the somatoplasm and the germ plasm of the parent, that the germ plasm has less resistance to that poison, such as alcohol, for example, in a future generation. The consensus of opinion among biologists and pathologists to-day is that disease germs as such cannot be transmitted through the germ plasm from parent to child.³ Recent studies have supplied some evidence to show that one thing which is probably invariably inherited according to the Mendelian law is feeble-mindedness.⁴ If so, then the presence of that defect in the stock tends to social degeneration, for the feeble-minded are unable to perform their social duties and thus the social group is injured and progress is by so much impeded. It is also

¹ *Census Bulletin, No. 96: On Marriage and Divorce*, 1908, p. 13.

² Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., 1908, pp. 81-90.

³ Walter, *Genetics*, 1914, pp. 92-94.

⁴ Goddard, *Feeble-mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences*, 1914, Chap. VIII.

true that many old families like the Edwards, or the Dwights, show the perpetuation of a strong, vigorous stock, mentally and physically, and also show an increase in social adaptation and influence.

Examples, however, like that of the Jukes family,¹ the Smoky Pilgrims, or the Tribe of Ishmael, show how disease, vice, and crime may be transmitted socially from generation to generation, for the transmission of social characteristics comes through early contact, training, and environment. If a family group is criminal and vicious their children are liable to be the same through early association. Certain it is that not only families, but whole communities, become weakened and degenerate, growing worse from generation to generation — an evolution downward so to speak — by reason of a bad social heritage of customs, ideals, traditions, etc., which are socially disintegrating. It thus sometimes happens that a hardy stock or race gradually declines, degenerates, and even becomes extinct on account of the failure to receive and use accumulated social achievements. To such as these Lowell refers in his "Interview with Miles Standish":

"They talk about their Pilgrim blood,
Their birthright high and holy!
A mountain stream that ends in mud
Methinks is melancholy."

However, just to the extent that we ward off disease and develop a higher degree of physical and mental life, to that extent will social life be improved, for a high type of social life comes essentially from the association of high-grade normal individuals.

While the two kinds of inheritance — inheritance through the physical transmission of characteristics by means of the germ plasm, and the transmission from one generation to another by social means of communication, example, ideals, etc., of the mental and social possessions must be kept clearly separated in our thought, yet both work together in the process of evolution and of degeneration. Poor physique, poor mentality biologically transmitted, bears very directly upon the kind of social product in the way of ideals, customs, traditions govern-

¹ These are studies in social degeneration, *The Jukes*, by Dugdale, *The Smoky Pilgrims*, by Blackmar, and *The Tribe of Ishmael*, by McCulloch.

ing men's relations with each other which a group will furnish and use. The feeble-minded, the insane, the epileptic, and the neuropathic do not make good members of society, but on the contrary contribute to its stock elements which are unable to associate together in any helpful and constructive way. They add to the social burden which society must bear — a very costly burden upon the labor and thought of the social. Moreover, they contribute directly to the pauper and criminal classes which set up ideals and generate customs and habits which eat like a canker into the very vitals of society.

On the other hand, there is an increasing amount of evidence that social conditions have a great deal to do with the production of physical and mental weakness. We know that bad housing conditions, poverty, bad habits and customs, unsanitary factories and dwellings, and social neglect of certain poisons break down the physical efficiency of people, destroy ideals of correct home life, cut the root of ambition and of hope, divide society into suspicious and warring classes, put a strain upon the minds of some which ends in insanity and makes impossible the realization of ideals of cleanliness and health.¹ Whether these conditions affect the germ plasm by which some forms of degeneracy like feeble-mindedness are transmitted we do not know, but the fact that this defect and bad social conditions are so often found together, and the further fact that these conditions reduce the physical efficiency of people both physically and mentally, lead to the natural presumption that they may also affect the germ plasm and thus cause defect. That, however, remains to be determined.

The Non-social Being. — There are survivals of the wolfish disposition in men. This disposition manifests itself more in the attempt of the individual to associate on his own terms with his fellows rather than in refusal to associate. The predatory instinct is evinced to a high degree in many members of society. It is a survival into modern society of the barbaric "passion for domination," as Mallock has called it. Very few, if any, however, reach such an unsocial condition that they are willing to have society destroyed and all social intercourse cease. They lack the wide social interest which considers the welfare of all the people in the group. They form groups within

¹ See Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., 1908, pp. 66-90 and Chap. IV.

society. Such social degeneration is exemplified by the societies of beggars, criminals, and predatory exploiters of the people who mask under the guise of legality in their financial operations. They are social within their own little group; they are anti-social when the whole society of which they are naturally a part is considered. Thus, there are very many individuals who fail to perform their social part in a community, either through weakness or viciousness. And wherever each individual fails in this respect society is rendered degenerate.

Social Causes of Degeneration.— When discussing the influence of individual degeneracy in producing social degeneration it was suggested that anything that breaks down the workings of the social organism or renders ineffective the social machinery leads directly to degeneration. We have very many causes that work to destroy normal social action. They may do nothing more than retard progress in general, though they may so seriously affect organs as to eventually destroy the whole group. An example is furnished by the effect of accidents on the adjustment of social relations in industrial life through dangerous occupations. The explosion in a mine may kill a hundred people and thus destroy the earning capacity of a hundred families. These families may resort to various expedients for support, but there can never be the independent, normal, social life that existed before. Homes are broken, individuals die through want or excessive toil, others become sick and hopeless, and some go down to vice or crime. Society may push on through normal agencies and overcome the evil effects arising from such accidents, but the social maladjustment thus engendered must be overcome or society will perish. A hundred cases similar to this, like the influence of disease from social groupings, unsanitary surroundings, improper employment of men, women, and children, enforced idleness through the shifting of industrial life, and conditions which produce a high death rate, all have a decided effect in producing social degeneration. If all such defects should be massed at a given time, and also vital causes should arise through lack of the food supply, a community must grow weaker and weaker until there is no social feeling, thought, or will power, no social coöperation. The same effect is produced if the sum total of social maladjustment, though scattered over long periods of time, has a cumulative

effect, so impoverishing the normally social individuals with the burden of taxation necessary to support the defective and delinquent, or of so burdening them with social duties made heavy because some refuse or are unable to bear them.

Social Types. — Each social group has its own type which determines its degree of progress. The ideal of such a social group is ever above the average of what is actually achieved. Through the momentum of social forces this ideal gradually changes and consequently the social type varies from one period to another. Whenever the agencies which are at work to maintain the social standard or to improve the environment cease to act, the social life reverts to the old type, and the acquired characteristics of generations disappear. This may occur by the loss of the proper ideal or the failure to put forth sufficient will power to approximate the ideal. Luxury, idleness, or shiftlessness destroys the thinking and working forces of society and causes it to lose its acquired characteristics.

Separate groups have widely different views of the right and wrong of social action and put in practice far different social usages. The ideals of the Bantu negroes, the Thlinklets, the Ainu, and the Sioux are very different and their social types vary, and yet how widely different is any one of these from the social ideal and practice of the civilized American. Degeneration is a breakdown of not only the social ideals of the group, but of the typical social relationships already achieved. What would be social degeneration for a highly civilized people might represent advancement of a tribe of Sioux Indians.

The Survival of Society. — The hope of society consists in making the social relationships ever more complex and more closely coördinated. But in order to accomplish this it is necessary to bring each succeeding generation into ever increasing control of the accumulated products of civilization. In the general order of society the fit must be given ample opportunity to demonstrate their strength and the unfit must be gradually eliminated. But the elimination of the unfit is a social process and refers not so much to individuals as to characteristics. It is therefore essential that the strong should protect the weak and give them an opportunity to overcome their weakness. While protecting the weak, nevertheless, society must take measures to make certain that their weakness is not transmitted

from generation to generation. In the case of defectives, for example, who transmit their defect by reproduction, they must be segregated or be so treated otherwise that they cannot produce their kind. The criminals must be put apart where their bad example and influence cannot contaminate others. The whole community must therefore be trained in industry, sanitation, domestic habits, and social life in order to perpetuate its normal growth. Vice and crime must be suppressed, poverty relieved, and pauperism prevented. More than this, all must be given the advantages of an education which will fit them for an honest, independent individual life and prepare them for their social duties. Society thus has the power, through the selection of ideals and types and the ordering of social activities, to perpetuate itself. The strong must give opportunities of improvement to the weak and teach the weak to use them to their best advantage. This must be done constantly because there is no state of automatic society running from generation to generation. The nearest approach to a social *continuum* corresponding to the germ plasm in the body consists of the traditions, customs, and ideals of a society. They, however, seem to be very much more easily affected both for ill and for good than the biological bearer of physical characteristics, the germ plasm. All efforts for the improvement of society must be as perpetual as the taking of food for the nourishment of the body. Society's work is never finished because society itself is never completed. The hopeful part of it is that while acquired physical characteristics cannot be transmitted by heredity, acquired social qualities, ideals, traditions, and customs are the major part of our social heritage.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Criticize the definition of social degeneration given in the text by formulating a better and giving reasons for the points of difference.

2. Distinguish between social degeneration and individual degeneracy.

3. Pick out one case of degeneracy in an individual and trace its history, seeking to find out the causes, its heritability, and some of its social consequences, like drunkenness, illegitimacy, disease, etc.

4. Show how, even if intemperance cannot be inherited, the use of alcohol to excess produces social degeneration.

5. State the objections to sterilization of degenerate persons.

6. Give the arguments in favor of that method of treating degenerates.

7. What other methods can be suggested to adequately deal with the problem of such a degeneracy as feeble-mindedness, if, as recently stated by the Vineland, New Jersey, authorities, there are thirty thousand such in New York, eighteen thousand in Pennsylvania, fourteen thousand in Massachusetts, over nine thousand in Michigan, and eight thousand (estimated) in New Jersey?

8. Why should not degenerates be kept in poorhouses?

9. Why should they not be left at large in the families of the country?

10. Suggest a plan by which marriage laws might be made to prevent the spread of degeneracy.

11. What is a moron? What is the danger of having him at large in society?

CHAPTER VI

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHARITABLE AND CORRECTIONAL AFFAIRS

Necessity of Care. — The foregoing chapter makes clear how necessary it is that the strong and normal should care for the weak and the abnormal. But to do this in such a way as to increase the strength and sanity of society requires great skill. If it were merely an individual matter, the unfit would probably be weeded out by natural selection in the struggle for existence. But in society it is impossible to permit natural selection to do its work in the old brutal fashion and at the same time preserve our sentiments of pity for the weak — sentiments produced in the course of hundreds of generations. It is impossible for the same reason to apply a stern method of social selection which would eliminate the socially unfit. It is neither possible nor desirable to behead people who are unfit for coöperative life, or even to commit them to a painless lethal chamber. Hence, all that society can do is to endeavor to make people fit for social life and to prevent the increase of unfitness. There is less objection to measures which would insure the dying out of a degenerate stock like the feeble-minded or the insane, although voices are raised against even such suggestions. In doing this, great care must be taken that the weak and the vicious are not perpetuated, and also that they do not become a burden to the strong whose vitality might thereby be sapped.

The reformation of the reformable is highly desirable. So costly is it to raise a human being that society can ill afford to destroy one of whom there is any hope. We find it difficult, however, to train even normal people into good social usage. It is far more difficult to train the abnormal. Greater care is needed, therefore, to train those who are educable and to care-

fully segregate and care for those who are not, for the sake of society as a whole. Because of the lack of scientific care in the treatment of the weak and the vicious, crime, insanity, epilepsy, pauperism, and degeneracy are increased.

Methods of Administration. — Charitable and correctional institutions may be classified in two general divisions, namely, private charities and public charities. The care of the poor was for a long time left to private charitable agencies. Gradually, however, it has come to be recognized as a part of the duties of the state. In other words, society is conscious that all its members should be responsible for the care of the few weaker ones. So also in the early history of society crime was a personal matter and individuals were allowed to punish those who wronged them, or, in case of death, the relatives of the deceased were bound to pursue the murderer and destroy him. Gradually, however, it became the duty of the state to punish criminals. To-day the hand of the individual is restrained by law from punishing those who wrong him. On the other hand, he has the right to demand that the state protect him and his property and punish all offenders. In like manner gradually it is coming to be seen that both relief and correction, not in alleviation and repression alone, but also in the doing of constructive remedial work as well as providing preventive agencies, must come under the management of public authorities as fast as private agencies by experiment point the way in which it may best be done. There is need of the private agency, but to assert that it is impossible for public relief agencies to command the men, means, and methods necessary to do the needed work is a counsel of despair which democracy is not ready to accept. Each type of work has its peculiar advantages and drawbacks. Each has its field of work. Each must supplement the work of the other.

So far as charity is concerned, private administration has the advantage of sympathy, enthusiasm, and independent action, but it lacks unity and comprehensiveness. Public charities, on the other hand, have the advantage of complete supervision within a given territory, and are always open to public inspection. Their dangers are failure to get full return for the money expended and the interference of politicians in work which can be well done only by experts. Public charities, being supported by taxation, have a more stable income than most private

charities which are dependent upon the contributions of individuals. Nevertheless, there is frequently more humanity in the private charity than in the public, which is liable to become a cold, formal machine of administration. Private charity can attempt more experiments than public. Its constituency is smaller, more compact, probably more intelligent as to needs and methods to meet those needs. It can respond more quickly to an emergency. Public charity is less scientific, more wasteful, and less efficient. These shortcomings, however, are not inherent, but are incidental to the lack of an enlightened public opinion. What is needed is more public interest in the care of the poor, and a general appreciation of the relation of poverty to social welfare. Does any one doubt that if the general public were as well informed as to the ideals and methods of proper relief of the needy as the small body of constituents of the private organization, the public could do it as well as the private organization? The probabilities are that it would do the job much better.

Methods of Public Administration. — There are various methods of public administration of charities and correction which have risen largely under different conditions. The states have, therefore, different laws and varying methods of procedure. Some states have a separate board for each institution, leaving the oversight to the legislature, which usually commits it to a special committee to visit the institution and report. A state board of charities, with supervisory powers, each institution having a local board, is also quite common. In a few states, such as Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, has been established a state board of control which manages all the charitable and penal institutions. In these cases there usually is no supervising body aside from the board of control. In Kansas a board of control has charge of all charitable institutions, but the penitentiary and industrial reformatory are each under separate boards.

While the state board of control represents the most complete method of supervision, it is in danger of the formality of machinery, and lacks the independent judgment as to how administration might be made better afforded by a board of state charities purely advisory in its capacity. On the other hand, the state board of charities that visits, inspects, and has ad-

visory powers only, is usually more progressive in the determination of the best systems of conducting charitable institutions and in the scientific care of the unfortunate. In the latter case usually the penal institutions are conducted by a separate management. However, the state board of control as instituted in Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and Kansas is growing in favor in the West.

In Massachusetts there is a state board or commission on lunacy, which has special supervision over all the insane, epileptics, and weak-minded. There is supposed to be some advantage in having a special board for a specific institution or group of institutions. It is claimed that it gives an opportunity for members of the board to become proficient in a given line. Moreover, it is claimed that when a single board attempts to manage all the charitable and penal institutions of a large state, while its administration may be perfect, it is in danger of failing to understand all the institutions under its control, and therefore the best methods of caring for the wards of the state are not obtained. On the other hand, it is held that when a board is provided for such institution, the members usually do not give all their time to the work and therefore the management of the institution falls naturally into the hands of the paid superintendents, as the experience of Iowa has shown.¹ There is the further difficulty that each institution endeavors to obtain from the legislature more than its just share of the state's money without regard to the needs of the other institutions of similar character. The legislature has neither the time nor experience necessary to judge between these claims. A state board of some kind is needed to study the whole situation, make recommendations to the legislature, and thus secure an orderly and symmetrical development of the state's charitable and correctional institutions in accordance with the just needs of each institution. It has been suggested that the penal institutions of a state should constitute one group; the charitable institutions, such as care for orphans, insane, epileptics, and imbeciles, another group under a separate supervision. Schools for the blind and the deaf and dumb should be placed under the department of public instruction. In this way the state would not be burdened with the multiplicity of

¹ See Gillin, *A History of Poor Relief Legislation in Iowa*, 1914, Chap. XVII.

boards and the work would be subdivided so as to produce the best results. Where the population of the state is large and the number of charitable and correctional institutions grows, some such division of labor is best. On the other hand, in a state with but few institutions a paid board of members devoting all their time to the institutions seems to be best.

Segregation of Wards of the State into Separate Institutions. — The first important thing in dealing with dependents and delinquents is a careful segregation of these in different institutions. There should be a penitentiary for the hardened criminals, a reformatory for younger criminals susceptible to reform, and industrial schools for incorrigible boys and girls. Great care should be exercised in sending each individual to the proper institution. While this general plan is being carried out in the United States, there is much neglect in specific instances of the proper classification. Often insane are kept in county poorhouses or sent to prison, and epileptics are found in insane asylums and institutions for the feeble-minded. Sometimes this is due to lack of adequate provision for one or more of these classes. Often it is due to failure to apply scientific tests to determine to which class a person belongs. The epileptics, the insane, the feeble-minded, and the habitual drunkards should be treated in separate institutions. The modern almshouse or county poor farm often has no classification whatever. There we find the pauper, the victim of misfortune, the imbecile, the insane, the epileptic, the criminal, and sometimes those afflicted with chronic diseases. By careful classification each one could be helped in accordance with his specific needs, and much time and money saved. From the standpoint of the social welfare the placing of young offenders with old criminals in the jail or penitentiary is utterly inexcusable. Next to it is the collection of broken parcels of humanity in the county almshouse. The mingling of the insane and epileptics in the same institution is a palpable error. The first principle of good administration is classification. Each individual must be treated according to his characteristics as well as his needs. Men cannot be reformed in phalanxes, much less in a heterogeneous mass.

The Classification of Inmates. — Classification should extend further. The inmates of each institution should be classified

according to sex, age, health, temperament, habits, etc. Good or evil may arise from association in any of these institutions. Only those should be thrown together who are mutually helpful, or at least those who are not mutually harmful. As man is a social being, it is useless to ignore the helpfulness of proper association. Human beings of the unfortunate classes, or those of a vicious character may be made to help each other, if the proper classification and the right method be used. For example, it has been found that in many cases feeble-minded women take great pleasure in caring for the young children in the institution. So a careful study of the different people in a poorhouse often will enable the authorities to put people together who are congenial in their tastes and habits. Mrs. Coolidge reports that the matron of the San Francisco almshouse for women contrived to solve the problem of bad snorers by ingeniously putting them with deaf persons.¹

The Merit System among Employees and Officials. — Appointment of officers and attendants should be made with the greatest of care as to the fitness of the applicant. The using of positions in the charitable and penal institutions as rewards for party workers is extremely pernicious. Men who have served their party must have a place, or they have friends who must have positions as rewards for such service. The world is full of "hungry incapacity" seeking an office, and many appointees to public service are "mere pegs to hang an office on." Men or boards with appointive power are besieged by this class, and it requires great skill, patience, and courage to secure the right person for the right place.

Civil service has its advantages as a means of securing efficient servants of the people. Civil service, however, is not an automatic process by which capable officials are secured; it is only a method which may be useful if great care be exercised. The merit system should have much flexibility, and if the appointing power is intelligent and conscientious and brave enough to resist political pressure, it is usually better than the hard and fast rules of a formal civil service system. Since these qualities are often lacking in the high officials, civil service has been found a defense — perhaps a rather poor one — to prevent the institutions from being delivered over to the tender mercies of the politicians.

¹ Warner, *American Charities*, Rev. Ed., p. 217 n.

In actual practice the heads of the institutions and of the boards are usually appointed, while the subordinates are chosen from the civil service lists.

But it is preposterous to make sweeping changes in officials and attendants every two years as the party in power changes, as has been done in some instances. The best economy is to find the best officials that can be had anywhere for the positions, and to keep them as long as they are the best. After all, it depends upon the character of the men in the business, whether a high degree of success is possible or not.

The public administration of charities is of great importance to the welfare of society in general. For if the dependent, delinquent, and defective classes are not well cared for, either within institutions or without, there is a tendency to increase the number of the defective and criminal classes. This makes society more abnormal and adds to its burdens. The enormous sums spent for the care of the weak and the vicious cannot be justified unless the world grows better thereby. The socially constructive point of view must dominate all charitable and penal affairs, or we but add to the misery and degradation by our efforts to care for the helpless. It would be better to let nature take her course in weeding out the unfit than through improper methods and defective administration to increase and perpetuate a stock of degenerates.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. What would be the effect upon normal society if the number of dependents were multiplied fourfold?
2. Why is it not cheaper to allow the poor to get along as they may and relief to be given as any one wishes to have it done rather than to have supervision?
3. Outline the method of supervision practiced in your state by public authorities with reference to the public charities and the correctional institutions. With reference to the private charities.
4. Outline clearly the scheme of a state board of supervision, or, as it is commonly called, a board of state charities. Of a board of control. What is the essential difference between the two plans?
5. Give arguments in favor of each of the two systems.
6. What arguments can be advanced in favor of the supervision of private charities by public authorities? Against it?
7. What classification is possible in your state of the defective, dependent, and delinquent classes? State the reasons why they should be cared for in separate institutions.
8. What classification of inmates is practiced in your insane asylums? In the jails of your state? In the poorhouses of your county?
9. State the reasons in favor of careful classification of inmates of institutions.

PART SIX
METHODS OF SOCIAL INVESTIGATION

CHAPTER I

THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

Human Society. — The field of sociological investigation is very broad, covering the phenomena of human society, *i.e.* of human association. The laboratory method involving the same principles as those used in the physical sciences in this field is exceedingly difficult to apply. Human society cannot be controlled for study as a frog, an insect, or a plant. Fortunately, in studying society the microscope and the telescope are not needed. The sociologist's laboratory is the world of men and women in their social relations. These, however, he must carefully and patiently observe under all kinds of changing circumstances.¹ He must observe and recount the facts of society, classify them in proper categories and on the basis of careful comparisons thus made possible draw generalizations. Therefore, the student should begin early to make observation of the character of social structure and movements. Wherever people are associated there will appear facts of social relations to be observed and classified.

But in this only certain phenomena should be observed. We are concerned only with the social relationships which produce association or grow out of association. The human relationships which arise in response to a special set of motives, like the economic, is the business of the economist, those arising from the political motive, of the political scientist, but those fundamental facts of association, the processes by which society develops from one stage to another and the groupings and their causes which operated previous to special motives, belong to the field of sociology. While all society may be its field of operation, sociology seeks only certain facts of society which

¹ Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, Chap. I. An application of scientific method in the treatment of social phenomena is illustrated in an address by Giddings on "The Social Marking System," delivered before the American Sociological Society in New York. See *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. IV, 1909, p. 42.

pertain to its scope as a science. The boundary of the science indicates the kind of facts that may be useful for its purpose. There are phases of ethics, politics, and economics which, although they are social, do not come within the special province of sociological investigation, but belong to their respective sciences. But when necessary for its purpose, sociology may consider the same phenomena as other social sciences in a different way and for a different purpose, just as biology uses certain facts in the fields of plant life and animal life as the raw materials of its broader generalizations.

The Use of the Library. — A well-selected library is absolutely essential for well-directed investigation, for the student must know what others have accomplished and recorded before he can succeed in the field of practical investigation. While one might begin to investigate the facts of society by personal observation, nevertheless it would be idle not to profit by the experience of others. He will want to know their methods that he may not experiment with methods already proven useless. He will not wish to waste time on problems solved by others. Hence, the facts that have been gathered, classified, and recorded and the principles which have been established through the use of these facts call for thorough library research.

The reports of government departments and commissions, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Census Bureau, the United States Bureau of Labor, the Department of Commerce and Labor, and the various state commissions on railroads, labor, charities, and correction, as well as numerous reports of special investigations, such as those of the industrial commission, represent to a certain extent the field of investigation. The results of the investigation of such men as Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, and others are invaluable to the student. Not less valuable, from a sociological standpoint, are the standard writers on sociology, such as De Greef, Ward, Tarde, Gumpowicz, Small, Ross, Giddings, Thomas, Simmel, Ratzenhofer, Tönnies, and others.

It is necessary for the student to distinguish between the facts of society and the theories about society, and to classify sources and authorities as primary and secondary. For one of the first principles of sociology is to learn to estimate values. As soon as the student begins to follow the text and the lecture course

with collateral reading, he should be given some specific subject to follow out in the library and to report on it. These subjects should be selected at first with a view to giving the student practice in the methods of investigation rather than to adding to the sum of human knowledge. There are thousands of topics suggested by writers and investigators which have not been worked out carefully, and which present a fruitful field of investigation for the student.

Field Work. — But the social investigator must go beyond the library. Just as the chemist must experiment in his laboratory, the geologist reconnoiter the earth, or the biologist study the forms of life, so sociologists must enter and study society at first hand. It must, however, be a process of observation rather than of experimentation.

While many general social problems seem to baffle every effort to bring them under scientific methods, there are many which await only the investigator of insight and resource. The patient gathering of facts concerning the social life and activities of the backward nature-peoples has gone on apace. Begun by Spencer in his encyclopedic, but rather one-sided, *Descriptive Sociology*, the collection of ethnographic and sociological material since his time has gone on with startling rapidity. Observation of social life among various peoples is gradually being made with increasing care and scientific precision. While still much remains to be done in gathering such material and verifying reports of previous observers in that field, the major task remains of carefully digesting for sociology the mass of information already secured. Aside from this formal side of social structure and process, there remains the great field of social psychology. The ground in this field has been cleared by the psychologists and the social psychologists. There remains the task of devising methods by which the data in this field can be carefully gathered and treated by scientific methods on a large scale. Sociologists cultivating this field need to apply more vigorously the scientific method to the now chaotic and seemingly unmanageable mass of material in the realm of social motive. The field has been roughly charted, and the categories suggested. What is needed now is a regiment of workers to scientifically control the wealth of material, to classify and to interpret it.

The problems awaiting solution are many and varied. Such problems as whether the tall, the dark-haired, dark-eyed members of one sex choose the short, light-haired, blue-eyed of the other sex for mates, and if they do, whether they do so instinctively or from social motives; whether the motive which leads people from the country to the city is social or economic or both, and if the motives are mixed, which is dominant; whether the basis of social choice is a biological, or a sociological factor await the sociologist. We need careful statistical work in the field of social theory. In the field of applied sociology we need less theorizing on the basis of individual observation and more careful gathering of facts in order that we may be more certain of our generalizations. We prate about the causes of poverty, for example, when as a matter of fact we do not know even its extent. As for causes we are in the midst of a somewhat heated dispute as to whether drunkenness is a cause of poverty or poverty a cause of drunkenness. Which is cause and which effect? Is each now cause, and now effect? Or are both caused by nervous instability? These are questions about which we can debate until doomsday without result unless we get more facts. In this and many other fields of social life, they wait for the patient scholar to gather and interpret them.

In general there are two separate lines of work or divisions of the subject for investigation, namely those which tend to show the normal development of society and those which have for their purpose the determination of abnormal conditions. In the former the phases of coöperate social life, as found in industry, the church, education, the family, and social life in general, represent the field of research. The study of a rural district, of a mining town, of a large manufacturing plant, including all forms of the labor and life of the people, are examples of studies of normal types of social action. On the other hand, the search for the defects of society, with a view to their correction, is of great value. The pathological condition of different classes of labor, such as miners, laborers in factories, clerks in stores, farm laborers, and kitchen help, should be studied. Care should be taken to inquire into the housing of the poor, methods of employment, and the various evil influences of promiscuous drinking saloons and of the liquor traffic in general. The evil influences of the herding of boys together without proper supervi-

sion, the conditions of jails and lockups, the social life of our public schools, truancy, and a hundred other questions involving social problems, furnish fields of social investigation in the other field.

The aim of social investigation is, first, to furnish exact knowledge of conditions and, second, to provide means of remedying evil conditions so that social life may be improved. To this end the student should acquaint himself with all the special movements like social settlements, children's home-finding societies, local charity organizations, industrial schools, free kindergartens, and other similar movements that tend to better the condition of human society. One of the primary purposes of investigation to the young student of sociology, however, is to vitalize his work. Human society being his laboratory, his knowledge from books should be a guide to his actions, furnish a normal standard of life and normal types of social institutions. But since library work without practical observation has a tendency to give students unreal conceptions of life, some study of actual social conditions is needed to vitalize one's knowledge gained from books and lectures.

But the more mature sociologist must extend his work much farther than this and with a more definite object. He must secure accurate data to verify his hypotheses. He is forced to determine the form, structure, and operations of society by actual observation. Having obtained sufficient data of this nature, he is prepared to classify, combine, and generalize, and thus obtain general principles of sociology. Without this he cannot establish a science.

The Data of Other Sciences. — The sociologist will be free to use any data relating to the origin, growth, processes, motives, and structures of society which will answer his purpose of investigation. While sociology is an independent science with a special field of work, the data and the generalizations of other sciences may be of great assistance. A large amount of material obtained from biology, anthropology, economics, ethics, history, and psychology must be worked over by the sociologist to enable him to reach his conclusions. For example, some of the conclusions drawn by prehistoric archæology, for instance that the Swiss Lake Dwellers probably had bridles for horses and therefore we know had domesticated them, throw light upon the origins of social life and coöperative activities. Or that

feeble-mindedness is inherited according to the Mendelian Law, should such a fact be firmly established, would enter at once into the presuppositions of sociology and into consideration in the formation of any theory of social degeneration. This opens up a wide field of research and puts the investigator in the attitude of a generalizer of the knowledge of human relationships. But one must not infer from this that sociology includes all social sciences, nor is it made up of a synthesis of them, nor is it a general amalgamation of the results of other social sciences. Sociology no more includes all the social sciences than architecture includes metallurgy, geology, physics, and chemistry. Sociology is no more an amalgamation of the results of other social sciences like economics, political science, and history, than landscape art is made up of botany, civil engineering, and agriculture. The data of other sciences, however, are used by the sociologist for his specific purposes.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. List the subjects which might be investigated in your own community which are strictly sociological in their nature.
2. Show that while the investigation of the motives which lead to a particular sort of activities among men, such as the economic motives and activities, is not sociological, the findings of such an investigation may serve as data for the sociologist who is trying to formulate the regularities of all kinds of social motives and activities and thus establish generalizations concerning human motives and activities in all kinds of associated life.
3. Go through the volume of the Census on Population and show one thing which the sociologist may find of value therein.
4. Read one good elementary text on sociology and point out what parts of it represent social philosophy and what parts belong to social science.
5. Choose some one social problem in your community, such as the recreation facilities, vice, the customs of courtship prevailing there, etc., and make a careful sociological study of it according to the strictest scientific methods.
6. Make a study of feeble-mindedness in your community, being careful to indicate what part of that study is strictly biological and what sociological.

CHAPTER II

METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

Sociological Purpose. — Whatever methods are employed in investigation, a sociological purpose is necessary in order to obtain satisfactory results. In natural science, a beginner may be sent into the field or laboratory to see what he can find, with a view to training his observation. But what he discovers will never be of permanent value until he goes into the field or laboratory to find out certain things or to test certain hypotheses. The complexity of social phenomena and the wide range of observation make it idle for him to waste his energies in a purposeless search for the facts of human society. He may have, indeed, a very broad subject, such as the unity of the human mind, which will oblige him to study the mental types of different tribes and races. Nevertheless, without this definite purpose he could study psychical phenomena of tribes and races forever without reaching any definite conclusion. It may be a somewhat narrower subject, like the labor problem of America that he is studying, but even in that he should limit his subject to the closed shop, the pathology of the strike, or the effect of the union label, in order to reach results of value. The purpose having been once determined, all facts relating to it should be used, and all others for the time being excluded.

On the other hand, one must ever guard himself against allowing his bias or even his hypothesis to blind him to any relevant facts. Sometimes, after sufficient experience has been gained in first-hand study of a social subject, one may well begin the study of a certain field without any previous hypothesis. A definite sociological purpose will not hinder careful scientific work by the trained worker, but may prove to be a pitfall for the beginner. In either case, whether he starts with a theory or without one, his scientific interest should dominate any religious or social motive which he may have. For example,

one may start out to ascertain what function the saloon serves. He may begin with a theory that it serves a useful purpose in providing a place where the poor man may meet his fellows on terms of equality and where the process of socialization may take place, or that the saloon is entirely antisocial in its tendencies, and serves no useful social purpose, or he may seek to get all the facts without any hypothesis as to whether it functions as a social agent or not. In either case he will endeavor to get all the facts and make up his mind from his findings, not from his beliefs.

Limitation of the Subject of Study. — To succeed in sociological investigation, it is necessary to consider only the relevant facts. Take, for instance, a subject such as the relation of the colored to white children in mixed schools. A great many facts may be gathered concerning both of these classes of pupils, but it would be better to narrow the work to relative progress of the two races. Even this would require a wide range of research. The vital object of such study would be a fair test of relative mental ability of the two races. The sociological purpose being narrowed down to the determination of racial mental capacity, it would be necessary to consider all the environments — in fact the entire social life — of the respective races. Beginning with the kindergarten it will be found, perhaps, that children of the colored race are as bright, and learn as rapidly as those of the white race. In the grades, the former begin to decline in relative ability and progress. In order to determine whether this is due to environment or racial characteristics, it will require an investigation into the home surroundings and the wider social life. By a careful study of his nature the relative mental powers may be determined. While all of the data of every kind that relate to the subjects well may be considered, all else will be excluded.

Selection of Facts Bearing upon the Problem. — There must be a perpetual selection of the right data or nothing will be accomplished. Certain facts must be cast away and the remainder carefully compared as to relative values. It would be idle if one were investigating the subject of apples to gather in his basket cherries, pears, grapes, and peaches along with the apples, simply because they may all be classified under the term fruit, and so for every subject in statistics the necessary data

vary from those of any other subject. Take, for example, the labor problem. If one were to consider the whole subject of labor in a descriptive way he might consider all of the facts in connection with its history and progress. But, should he desire to determine one point only, that of the relative rate of wages between two communities, occupations, or groups, he need not consider all of the numberless facts about strikes, boycotts, the closed shop, injunctions, non-union labor, the walking delegate, etc. All this matter he would exclude and confine himself strictly to the fact of real and nominal wages, within the respective groups compared. Every beginner in the scientific study of a subject must throw away much material which at first sight seems to bear upon the problem, but which on careful examination and further study is seen to be irrelevant, although perhaps interesting in some other connection.

General Investigation. — Perhaps the simplest method of investigation is found in a general subject, about which the student collects all of the available data concerning a given group or society and classifies them. The investigator in such a study seeks to present the nature of the society described as a whole rather than to deduce any principles relating to its existence. A town, a rural community, a city, a communistic society, or a special community of laborers may be taken. All of the sociological characteristics of the group must be enumerated and recorded. Occupation, income, religion, education, amusements, general social characteristics, political organization, and government should be carefully noted and described. A mining camp in Colorado or Nevada would furnish an inviting study of this nature. A careful description of society in a foreign country offers great possibilities for this kind of scientific work. Examples are to be found in Nansen's *The Esquimos* and Ross's *The Changing Chinese*. Moreover, such studies are sadly needed to supply sociological material supplied at present too often by the reports of untrained observers or persons interested in other than sociological facts. Soon many of the customs, practices, ideals, institutions, etc., of these backward and isolated people will pass away. Unless the trained sociologist observes and describes them the world will lose some of the most valuable data bearing upon the problem of social origins. If only the early Spanish writers who described the customs and

rites of the Aztec Indians had been trained in sociology! Such work is especially valuable to beginners because it is descriptive rather than analytical in its nature, and because it shows them what society really is and how it has developed. While the results of the novice may not be of permanent value and his descriptions will always have to be checked up by the trained observer, the value of such studies to the student himself is such that he may well begin with such descriptive labor. Thus he learns to observe correctly and to describe accurately what he sees. He is led to see the significant things in social life and to set them forth in their proper relations.

Special Investigation.—Following the above method of investigation a very limited subject, extending over a wide range of facts, may be taken by the student. Feeble-mindedness as a cause of poverty in the United States, the relation of the volume of circulating money to prices, or some such subject may be chosen. A more difficult subject than either of the above mentioned would be a specific subject covering a very narrow field, such as the effect of the beef trust on prices, the relation between the procedure of juvenile courts and child psychology, the conditions of jails in a state, and popular education. In order to accomplish anything in a field of this nature it is necessary to obtain all the facts relating to the specific subject with great accuracy and comprehensiveness, to make a very careful comparison of them, and to deduce conclusions by rational processes.

Specific Methods.—All investigation of social phenomena before it is of any service to science involves both the inductive and the deductive methods. Sociology has gained just in proportion as it has followed the inductive methods of the natural sciences. Gathering and classifying phenomena with a distinct purpose in view is the foundation of the sociological method. But this knowledge is of no use until it is arranged, classified, generalized, and the principles deduced therefrom.

The statistical method is a scientific device to ascertain the facts about society and the relations between groups of facts. It is an attempt to measure social forces or values in terms of number. Its fundamental principle is accurate counting. The first movement is to determine the given unit, and the second to notice its recurrence within a given time or given space. To

use a simple illustration, if one were to break a piece of chalk into very many pieces by a blow from a hammer and then were to ask, "How many pieces of chalk are there as a result of the blow?" the first thing to be considered would be what constitutes a piece of chalk, for there are pieces of all sizes, from the particle of dust so small as to be scarcely visible to the naked eye, to those of the size of a marble.

In the enumeration of social phenomena the unit of enumeration is more difficult to determine. For example, if you are enumerating the Negro race or the Indian race in the United States, it is important to determine the distinguishing mark of the Negro or the Indian. How should an individual having one thirty-second part Negro or Indian blood in his veins be classified? If you are investigating the wage system it is necessary to determine who are the wage earners — those who work by the day, the week, the month, or the year, or whether all of these shall be so included. Having determined the unit, one must find its recurrence within a given time and space.

Social forces may be measured by the statistical method as to what is accomplished in a certain time and space and in a given direction. The increased productiveness of a given working population by the use of a new invention may be determined. The market reports have a purpose of this kind in the estimation of prices and crops.

There are various specific purposes to be served by a statistical treatment of social phenomena. The principal ones are the static and the dynamic. The first seeks to see society or any part of it in its various relationships at a given time. It has no reference to progress or change, but seeks an instantaneous view of social relationships covering a given social mass. As society is never without change, and as it takes time to carry on an investigation, the purpose is never exactly realized. A very good illustration of an attempt to secure a static conception of society is the taking of the United States census. Take, for example, the subject of population alone. Working as rapidly as possible, the director of the census must spend some months in obtaining an accurate enumeration of the population. During this time society has changed by emigration, immigration, birth, and death, and the compilation of the census represents not the present but the past. So it is with every attempt to get a static

view of relationships, the constant movement of society, always shifting, changing, progressing or retarding, renders it impossible to obtain an exact, instantaneous view of society. Perhaps if one could invent a social kinetoscope he might obtain such a picture of society.

The dynamic purpose supplements the static by recognizing the constant change of society. It seeks to show the movement of social forces and their results. It represents a series of static views of relationships put together in natural sequence. It involves the investigation of such questions as the increase in wages, the rise and fall of prices, the increase or decrease of population, the increase or decrease of crime or suicide, the development of morality, the decline or growth of the war spirit, or, in fact, any subject moving over a given period of time. Its success depends a good deal upon the accuracy of the successive static views which one may take of the subject. Since most societies are actually changing, one cannot fully understand society without investigation with the dynamic purpose in mind.

Analysis. — Facts collected are of little value unless intelligently used. A careful analysis is necessary before they are made of service in determining social relationships or social progress. Even the best results that may be had will possess only a high degree of probability. The difficulty of getting exact information, the failure to get universal returns, and the numerous processes involved before the final deduction is made, give it only a degree of certainty. In proof of this it will be found that the United States census, although of great value in many ways, gives only approximate rather than mathematical accuracy.

Nevertheless, the closer the student gets to the real mechanism of society, the better acquainted he becomes with the real forces of society through personal observation and the more vital and serviceable will be his work.

The Social Survey. — A good illustration of the application of the statistical method is to be found in what has come to be called the social survey. This new application of an old method, to which the name social survey has been given, has been characterized as follows by Paul U. Kellogg, who conducted the Pittsburgh Survey in 1907-1908. It takes its unit of work from the

surveyor in that it is limited to social conditions within a given geographical area, a city, a county, etc. It takes from the physician his art of applying to the problems at hand standards and experience worked out elsewhere, such as what good ventilation and good sanitation are. It takes from the engineer his working conception of the structural relation of things. It deals with the various problems of the community not as isolated problems but as integral parts of one problem, the welfare of the community. Again, the social survey borrows from the charity organization movement its case-counting method of bringing the problem down to human terms. It deals with actual human beings, their needs and conditions. And finally it borrows from the newspaper the art of graphic presentation of the truth as found by investigation.¹ Therefore, it may be said that a social survey is an application of the statistical method to a study of the social problems of a community confined within certain geographical limits, and the publication of the results in such a way as to lead to the information of the whole community concerning itself.

The history of the social survey movement takes us back to the great work of Mr. Charles Booth, who devoted his fortune and a great part of his later life to a study of social conditions in London, the results of which are published in his *Life and Labor of the People of London*. Mr. Rowntree's study of York set forth in his *Poverty, A Study of Town Life*, is another example of the application of the statistical method to the study of a phase of a city's life. Other studies by individuals and groups which approximated the methods of the social survey are Jane Addams's *Hull House Maps and Papers*, Mr. Woods's *South End House Studies, The City Wilderness, Americans in Process*, etc., Mr. Roberts's *The Anthracite Coal Communities*, and various other studies of specific communities. Phases of a community's life were furnished by Hunter's *Tenement House Conditions in Chicago*, and *The First Report of the Tenement House Department of the City of New York, 1902-1903*. The first social survey in the sense of our definition given above ever attempted in this country, however, was the Pittsburgh Survey, promoted by the Charities Publication Committee and financed

¹ *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, Vol. II, pp. 477-480.

by the Russell Sage Foundation, the results of which are published in a series of volumes. Since then a number of places have introduced this method of social stock taking. Buffalo undertook to study the Polish section of that city and financed the undertaking itself. Mrs. Caroline Bartlett Crane made a preliminary survey of a group of smaller communities of Kentucky under the supervision of the State Board of Health and the Federation of Women's Clubs of that state. Various cities have been surveyed since then, among them, to name only a few, were Providence under the leadership of Mr. Aronovici, Newark, New Jersey, and Sag Harbor, under Mr. St. John, and Mr. Stelzle of the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions. Since then the Russell Sage Foundation has organized a Department of Surveys and Exhibits with a director and staff which undertakes to survey communities which are in a position to finance the undertaking. The Department of Church and Country Life has been organized within the Presbyterian Board of Home Missions and has made a number of surveys of rural communities throughout the eastern and middle western parts of the United States. Some of the state universities are taking up the matter of social surveys within their respective states, among them being the University of Minnesota, the University of Kansas, and the University of Wisconsin.

There is danger that the making of social surveys may become a fad and degenerate into dilettanteism. There is great need of a standardization of methods and a perfecting of technique which will preserve the good in social surveying. If the universities will take hold of it, as they have of civil, mechanical, and mining engineering, the dangers mentioned will be minimized because the commercial element will be eliminated. As practiced at the present time by the professional, social, and educational surveyor, it is liable to be brought into disrepute. Too often it is made with a destructive bias by the surveyor, on the theory, conscious or unconscious, that unless he finds something wrong with the place or institution surveyed he will have no reason for his existence. Moreover, it is tending in some quarters to degenerate into an attempt to apply to such matters as methods of education, standards of efficiency which may be useful in checking clerks or workers in a factory, but which when applied to testing the work of people who are dealing

with the more delicate matters of education and religious instruction are like trying to mend a watch with a crowbar. The limitations of this method must be clearly recognized by those who are its friends. Its application to certain problems in connection with all kinds of institutions will prove beneficial, but to try to bend all kinds of social phenomena to its stiff and undeveloped methods is to distort the facts out of all semblance to reality and make them the instrument of error rather than of truth.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Look over a volume of the Census, Volume I of Booth's *Life and Labor of the People of London*, Volume I of *The Pittsburgh Survey*, and state the sociological purpose in each.
2. Would the study of family life among the Bantoc Igorotes of the Philippines be a special or a general sociological study?
3. Cite a book aside from those mentioned in the text which is a descriptive sociological study.
4. Let the class organize itself for a complete survey of some community or some one social problem therein. There is great need of a careful looking into the situation with respect to the means of social recreation in most communities. Other subjects will naturally suggest themselves.
5. When the Census Report on Marriage and Divorce sets forth the number of marriages in the United States in a certain year, is it following the static or the dynamic method? Which is illustrated when it compares the number of divorces in 1887 with the number in 1906?
6. Are Riis's books, *How the Other Half Lives*, *The Battle with the Slum*, and *The Children of the Poor* sociological investigations? If so, what kind?

PART SEVEN
THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Historical Development of Sociology. — A knowledge of the development of sociology is essential to a full comprehension of the subject. It is a history of the speculations touching the origin and development of society, and of the steps in the process by which sociology is becoming not only social philosophy, more or less closely applied to political philosophy, but also a science with its own methods and norms, with its generalizations based primarily upon a wide induction from social facts. In a brief sketch the ideas of the principal contributors to the science may be reviewed, even though an analysis of all their theories and systems of thought is not possible.

Although the evolution of society has been in progress since an early period, the development of sociology began at a comparatively recent date. However, wherever society has developed so that there has been leisure for thought, men have speculated about society. Hebrew prophet and Attic sage has each contributed something to social theory, the one emphasizing the purpose of the state from the standpoint of religious idealism, the other stressing the philosophical nature and function of the state. Plans of association, of government, law, religion, or general social order have been set forth by leaders in thought and action during the course of human history. Many of the early suggestions were concrete plans for the practical regulation of a particular social group or nation. General theories were seldom advanced. Yet these practical experiments were of service in developing a program of social action and preparing the way for more general theories and systems. In the history of sociology there will be found, then, three distinct classes of ideas, namely: (1) those arising from ideal systems set forth by philosophers, (2) those arising from plans of practical social changes, and (3) those coming from the scientists who have through investigation and logical construction laid the founda-

tions of a scientific sociology. These classes of ideas do not necessarily follow each other but are more or less blended from age to age. It will be possible to allude to only a few of the prominent epoch-making examples of each class.

Ancient Philosophers. — The ancient philosophers who constructed elaborate theories of government and social organization have had much influence in awakening thought on the nature of society and forms of social order. In this particular connection, perhaps the philosophy of Plato has been more extensive in its influence than any other idealistic system. While the methods of social organization set forth in *The Republic* were never put into practice, that book was the first great utopian scheme conceived by man and has influenced modern thought in many ways.

In quite a different way has the *Politics* of Aristotle modified social thought. It was rather a scientific treatise on government than an ideal system of social order. Discussing the philosophical foundations of social order it could not fail to influence men's thoughts about social relations. As a critical analysis of the bases of government it modified the thought of Western Europe from the time of its introduction into the current of political discussion among the nations which slowly arose from the ruins of the Roman Empire in the Middle Ages. It was an original philosophy of government based upon the best examples in history. Wherever read, it created thoughtfulness as to the nature of society and the power and duty of government.

Likewise, Cicero in his philosophy of the State and Justinian in his *Codex*, from the Roman standpoint gave a new direction to social philosophy. The Romans were intensely practical in governmental affairs, and were so successful in creating law and establishing social order, that the impress of their deeds upon subsequent philosophy was tremendous. Not only was their theory of the law and their form of government followed closely by succeeding generations, but their conception of society and social order have colored the discussions of jurists, historians, and philosophers of medieval and modern times. Especially to be noted is the Roman interpretation of property rights and systems of administration which dominated the early states founded among Teutonic peoples.

Among the Teutonic peoples, before they were influenced by Roman law, there was comparatively little constructive work. Their codes of laws were tribal customs and their social life very simple, although Alfred may have devoted some thought to a plan for the better government of his Saxons. The Roman law found in the Teutons and Celts a people prepared both by their previous history and by the new problems raised by their recent social development.

Medieval Philosophers. — While early philosophers and practical reformers sought to make a transition from the ethnic to the demographic society, those of medieval times were crying out against the corruption of a system of government that was established through the rise of kingship immediately following the dissolution of the feudal system. The Roman idea of imperialism entered the Teutonic nations just as they were emerging from the tribal into demotic society. On the decay of feudalism the Roman idea of government, suggested both by the students of Roman law and by the example of the Church, came into practical operation. The Christian Church had already by the fourth century so thoroughly established its system of brotherhood and so completely adopted the Roman idea of government in its organization that it became a formidable opponent to the rapidly decaying Roman Empire. On the fall of the Western Empire in 476 A.D. the Church was prepared to take up in a measure the reins of government struck from the nerveless grasp of the ancient City. The one first to give this aim convincing literary expression and so to establish it in the minds of succeeding generations of churchmen was Augustine, who in order to contrast the ideal workings of the Christian Church with the corrupt practices of the world, wrote his *City of God*. It was a presentation of the ideas of a Christian state founded on the doctrine of brotherly love and perfect equality, under the headship of the Catholic clergy.¹ In subsequent years a series of able popes realized in concrete and definite form the main lines of his ideal of this divine system. St. Augustine was a virile writer and had a great influence, not

¹ See Augustine, *The City of God*, Bk. XX; Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Vol. V, pp. 151-155; *Monasticism and Confessions of St. Augustine*, p. 121; Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, Rev. Ed., 1904, Chaps. IV, X. The Genevan state at a much later date bears a close resemblance to this ideal city of God, so far as it could be carried out by human endeavor.

only on subsequent theology, but on the medieval church as a temporal state. Writers of the medieval period followed Augustine in seeking to reform the government on what they believed was the Christian basis.

Several writers who would scarcely be classified as medieval, but with much less propriety may be considered modern, such as Sir Thomas More, Campanella, Dante, and Machiavelli, presented ideal systems of government in contrast with the corrupt and defective medieval system which was prolonging itself beyond its stage of usefulness. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli makes an attempt to unify these scattered elements of governmental practice and philosophy into a new imperialism. Its chief influence arises from its recognition of the need of reform rather than from the definite remedy suggested. Likewise, in the *De Monarchia* of Dante, imperialistic ideas are not wanting, but the evil characteristics of government are to be eliminated through the light of Christian doctrine. But neither Machiavelli nor Dante had so great an influence on social philosophy as Thomas More. While More's *Utopia*, the most remarkable of all the ideal commonwealths after Plato's *Republic*, comes at the opening of the modern period, its chief aim is the criticism of the medieval system then obtaining in England. In contrasting the corrupt and defective methods of government then in vogue with an ideal community based on political, industrial, and social equality, he created a new conception of social organization and suggested new aims of association and of government. Campanella's *City of the Sun*, written about the beginning of the seventeenth century, formulated for the first time a complete socialistic system. While not so great a book in many ways as the *Utopia* of More, it emphasized the communistic ideal of society. It presented an ideal city carefully organized and thoroughly disciplined. The basis of government was equality and the sacrifice of the individual to the community. Campanella was opposed to the philosophy of Aristotle, and his work was the counterpart of Plato's *Republic*. It furnished a scientific basis for communistic socialism.¹

These systems of ideal governments, projected by thoughtful minds, helped to suggest scientific principles of government and

¹ See *supra*, Chap. II, Part IV.

showed the world how far the regnant ideals of the time were from the ideals of social justice, and from social aims terminating in the general welfare of the people. They called attention to the changes in economic and social life consequent on the rise of a broadened commercial and industrial horizon and suggested that these new conditions demanded the consideration of the state. While the works of Campanella and More represent only a dream of government which could never be realized as pictured, they embodied an ideal of justice which, if states and societies are to be perpetuated, must eventually be approximated. Further, they demonstrated that the methods of social life were worthy of the study of philosophers.

Modern Philosophers. — The difference between medieval and modern philosophy is a difference in fundamental ideas rather than in chronology. It is difficult, therefore, to say when the former ended and the latter began. Perhaps *The New Atlantis* of Bacon, written early in the seventeenth century, should be classified along with the *Utopia* of More and the *City of the Sun* of Campanella. However, as *The New Atlantis* was a fragment of the philosophy of Bacon which stands at the beginning of the modern era it may be considered as a part of modern philosophy. Its purpose is rather to awaken an interest in philosophy and show the duty of the state towards science than to stimulate governmental experiments. Bacon hoped to ameliorate the conditions of society through the advancement of knowledge, and he attempted to show that it is, therefore, the state's duty to take an interest in all affairs that affect the physical well-being of man, as well as those that perfect the organization of human society.

The approach to the social order through philosophical means was finally changed to the political point of view. Harrington's *Oceana*, written in 1656 and dedicated to Cromwell, was a serious consideration of a written constitution for the purpose of limiting monarchy. This was followed by Hume a century later in his *Essays Moral and Political*, in which he presented his idea of a perfect commonwealth. From this time a strong current of English thought set in toward a liberal spirit in government.

In France the same spirit of liberty was stirring in the seventeenth century. Vairasse d'Allais pictured an ideal monarchy

in which the state owned the land and the people dwelt in semi-communistic groups. Fenelon's *Télémaque* also describes a perfect monarchy ruled by a perfect king. These were but hints of an ideal system in strange contrast with the government then in vogue.

The eighteenth century in France witnessed a serious consideration of the so-called natural rights of men and the relation of civil government to natural law. Montesquieu gave a philosophical discussion of the three sorts of government, the despotic, the monarchical, and the republican, which he examined with great care, and thereby gave an impetus to the study of political science. Rousseau's *Social Contract* appeared in 1762, which set forth the peculiar doctrine that government existed through voluntary compact, to be dissolved at will. While it was extreme in its views, being inspired by reaction against the French monarchy and the theory of the divine right of kings, then supreme, it has had enormous influence on social philosophy. This was followed by Mably, who in a series of writings denounced private property, the right of inheritance, methods of commerce and credit, as well as all forms of culture. He was iconoclastic in the extreme, almost revolutionary in his utterances. He was a strong advocate of poverty as the mother of virtues, and of equality and community of goods as the basis of the state. These writers prepared the way for the French Revolution and its socialistic philosophers.

Babœuf, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Cabet, Louis Blanc, and Proudhon advocated various ideal systems which ranged all the way from state socialism to a system of anarchy. These schemes were the attempts of dreamers to eliminate the harsh and unjust, social and political systems of Europe by the establishment of an ideal social order. Impractical as many of their schemes were in detail, their writings were highly serviceable in pointing out the evil of existing affairs and suggesting many means of improvement which were brought about later by less radical measures.

Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* gave a great impetus to thought concerning the commonwealth. John Stuart Mill's *Political Economy* and his political philosophy embodied in others of his writings were important contributions to the subject of political science. Mill points out the need of a social

science or sociology as a more complete study of human society. Malthus, in his study of the relation of the food supply to the population, startled the world by his conclusions and stimulated interest in statistical inquiry into the condition of human society. All of these writers, as well as others, directed human thought towards social affairs, but formulated no science of society and suggested no synthetic method for its study.

Experimental Social Philosophers. — While the number of persons who have given us ideal systems of government is great, comparatively few in number are those who have attempted practical experiments for the improvement of the social order. In some cases experiments in social reform by means of laws and ideals grew out of the practical necessity of coming to terms with an existing situation. In other cases, especially in later times, social experiments were inaugurated in response to utopias presented by the social philosophers of their time or of earlier days. Among those who stand out from all the rest among the ancients in suggesting practical social improvement are Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, Servius Tullius, and Charlemagne; while among the moderns are the French revolutionists, the American revolutionists, and men like Robert Owen, Louis Blanc, and Etienne Cabet. While the great lawgivers used the practices of common law and social order already in existence before them as a foundation of their systems, still they were masterful organizers who set forth new plans and forced society to adopt them. For example, the early Hebrew kingdom was built up on a social basis of tribal customs and laws existing long before but modified by the exigencies of settlement among a hostile people, the Caananites, and connected by tradition with the earlier hero and lawgiver, Moses. Upon that basis layer after layer of law and rule was laid down from age to age by lawmaking prophets and priests, from the Deuteronomic Code, the work of the disciples of the great eighth century prophets, down through the so-called Priest's Code to the legislation of the Talmud. The earlier codes aimed at political, social, and industrial justice, and, dealing as they did with a semicivilized race, they regulated morals and religion as well as civil affairs. They represent the transition from ethnic to demographic society. They recognized classes and defined the rights of each class and gave each individual a place in the

social organization. Perhaps no collection of laws in existence ever illustrated more fully the sociological development of law and government than the various codes of the Hebrew and Jewish peoples. All the social relations in existence at the time were recognized and clearly defined by law. While the rights of the individual were acknowledged, they were always subordinated to the general social order. It was recognized that the individual could not go far in any direction without coming into conflict with the rights of his fellows. They all reflect the social order of the times for which they were intended and set forth an ideal towards which the people were urged by formal enactments ostensibly handed down by an ancient lawgiver of peculiar endowment and authority. The so-called Mosaic codes, therefore, represent not only the collected laws relating to the Hebrew people, but also ideal societies and practical experiments in social life. These laws have had great influence on subsequent forms of government and legislation and especially on the philosophy of government and social usage.¹

The laws of Lycurgus, while representing the usages of the Spartans, had for their purpose the carrying out of the new practical plan of government in which the individual was largely subjected to the social order. Likewise, the laws of Solon represent the transition from the old forms of ethnic society to a newer democracy and as such are somewhat experimental in their nature, although like all others his laws rested upon the best usages of the people.² Yet many of them, based upon existing laws as a foundation, instituted such practical reforms as resulted in the transformation of social order. Of a similar character were the laws of Servius Tullius of Rome, who organized the Roman society on a military basis — the first formal departure of the Romans from the old groupings of ethnic society. Subsequent attempts at the reform in the land laws of Rome represent practical experiments in government. All attempts to reform society through such experiments have had great influence in shaping the practices and theories of government. The conquest and reorganization of Western

¹ On the development of the Hebrew and Jewish codes, see Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, Art. "Hexateuch"; Cheyne, *Encyclopedia Biblica*, Art. "Hexateuch"; Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, Chaps. VII and VIII; Mitchell, *The World Before Abraham*, pp. 1-72.

² Goodspeed, *History of the Ancient World*, p. 100.

Europe by Charlemagne was accompanied by an attempt to establish educational and civil reforms which, though not lasting or continuous in subsequent development, stand out as historical landmarks and possibilities of what may be done by government to modify society.

Robert Owen sought to reestablish society on an industrial basis and his experiment at New Lanark was a theory of society put to the acid test. While it eventually failed, he left an influence making for coöperation which was both important and permanent. The modern experimenters, like Cabet and Louis Blanc, and the various communistic societies are important in demonstrating what may *not* be done by way of social reorganization, rather than what may be accomplished. All of these practical experiments have been useful in lighting up the nature of human society and the peculiar limitations which surround it. Practical experiments like these testify to a sense of social unity in a nation, and are indicative of the growth of social consciousness. More than this, they give evidence of a telic force in society — the socialized human mind — aiming to guide it towards a clearly perceived goal. They have inspired social study and helped to establish principles of social order, through a critical discussion of aims of society.

Recent Philosophy. — Recent philosophers following in the line of thought started by the writers mentioned above began to philosophize as to the origin, development, and constitution of society. Somewhat dogmatically, perhaps, they reached lofty conclusions concerning the nature and destiny of society, which they approached usually from the standpoint of social reform. The Christian socialists of England through the leadership of Charles Kingsley and F. D. Maurice protested against the hard determination of the dominant *laissez-faire* theory, and advocated the development of the social side of Christian life. They emphasized the social element as essential in the building of a Christian state. The problems of politics and economics, and the peculiar relations of rich and poor were to be settled on the basis of a Christian philosophy. The preaching by Carlyle, Ruskin, and William Morris of the gospel of a life of the true and the beautiful had a tendency to elevate social ideals. If their social points of view were not always properly taken, their impulses were good and their suggestions

of the value of conscious social activity for the common good bore fruit in philanthropic endeavors.

More recently J. S. MacKenzie, in *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, defined in a broad and general way the scope and limits of the application of philosophical principles to social questions. He brought the world of thought a little nearer to a social science. With a keen insight he presented the elements of social order and by his superior analysis of society showed what might be accomplished in the adaptation of social organization to social needs. Nevertheless, it was a critical philosophy rather than a science that he presented to the world. Its service, however, in establishing clearness of thought on social questions cannot be overestimated. Benjamin Kidd, in his *Social Evolution*, emphasized religion and the power of the emotions in human progress. But his work is rather a philosophy of civilization and progress than a scientific treatment of the evolution of society. It would scarcely claim to be scientific in premises, analysis, or conclusion, yet it served to arouse thought respecting certain phases of social development. Lotze, in his *Microcosmus*, brings history to view the social life of the people and lays down some scientific principles for the movement of civilization. Grozier, in his *Civilization and Progress*, and Nash, in *The Genesis of the Social Conscience*, brings us close to the organic conception of society.

All these are but philosophies about society, based more or less upon general facts. For the most part they are philosophic generalizations about society and social functions. While taken as a whole they give an exposition of certain aspects of social life, not one or all combined could rise to the dignity of a science of society. Yet their influence in shaping thought and in bringing general philosophy to the service of the science of society must be recognized.

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ELY, R. T. *French and German Socialism*.
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The student is especially urged to read the authors mentioned in the previous chapter.

QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. By what three movements was sociology prepared for?
2. Read Exodus 20: 23-26; 21: 2-16, 18-37; 22: 1-23, 33, and make an outline of the state of society contemplated by this Mosaic code.
3. Compare with this code the Code of Hammurabi in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, Extra Volume, pp. 599-608.
4. Read More's *Utopia* and show its bearing on the problem of social relations.
5. How does social philosophy differ from social science?
6. In what ways does social philosophy prepare for social science?

CHAPTER II

THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY

Basis of Sociological Thought. — In the last chapter a brief review was made of the early attempts to provide a theoretical basis of social relations. Conscious of the defects of society and seeing some ways in which these shortcomings could be remedied, social reformers and philosophical thinkers formulated a philosophy of society. These theories, although mere guesses at the riddle of social life, made necessary a well-defined and comprehensive science of society. As guesses they had value in calling attention to the necessity of a theory of society based upon a broader study of social facts and less influenced by individual and party prejudice. The ultimate fulfilment of these various social philosophies, however, is social science.

In the present chapter it is desired to present very briefly the principal elements which have entered into sociology and the successive steps in its development. The foundations rest primarily upon (1) the organic conception of society, (2) a recognition of the conscious, collective action of its members, and (3) upon the scientific analysis of the structure and the activity of the social body. Every systematic study of society involving one of these phases of thought, even though it be limited in scope, contributes to the formation of the science.

Forerunners of Sociology. — Many writers approaching society from a religious, political, economic, ethical, or psychological standpoint have contributed something to the study of social relationships. Wherever they have supported their theories by scientific data they have prepared the material for the construction of sociology. These writers may be called the forerunners of sociology, for their lines of thought prepare for a scientific conception. Perhaps five lines of thought, sometimes distinct and again blending in more or less confusion, have promoted scientific sociological study. These are the

study of the biological sciences, the scientific conception of history, and the modern method of studying economics, philosophy, and ethics. Writers who have followed these lines, viewing society as a whole, have brought the thinking world into a semiscientific attitude respecting the activities of society.

Prominent among the men who have influenced this new attitude in some of these lines of study is Vico, who, declaring that history is governed by laws as fixed and regular as those which control the material world, gave a new direction to that study; Montesquieu, who, in his *Spirit of Laws*, applied the new methods to a study of politics; Turgot, in his evolutionary exposition of finance, economics, and politics; Condorcet, who recounted the progress of the human mind and insisted on the indefinite perfectibility of social institutions; Adam Smith, whose philosophical and economic writings emphasized the interdependence of individuals and classes; and John Stuart Mill, who asserted that there was need of a new science called sociology. The recognition by all these philosophers and writers that society presents a group of phenomena worthy of study, and that there exists a social organization needing adjustment, paved the way for sociology.

The Founders of Sociology.—August Comte coined the name “sociology,” and laid the corner stone of its foundation. His work was that of a builder who should make the plans for and clear a place for a building, lay a stone in the foundation, and leave it for others to complete. Others had been contributing material of different sorts, not dressed for the builders, to be sure, but material which could be used when prepared. Comte’s great merit lay in his gathering up these materials ready to hand in the shape of historical and scientific studies and outlining the method by which they could be built into the new temple which he first called sociology. In his “hierarchy of sciences,” set forth in *The Positive Philosophy*, he gave an important place to sociology, for universal knowledge would not yield to classification without it. Social physics or sociology was given as one of the five fundamental natural sciences. Moreover, he perceived it was the latest addition to the hierarchy of ordered knowledge. The corner stone of the new science was the evolutionary conception of society.

Comte has been called a “herald” of sociology, and indeed,

he was little more. Nevertheless, in insisting on classification and in making rules for that classification he left plans for the builders who followed him. His generalizations are suggestive, far reaching, and valuable, although the details of his system are incomplete and sometimes seriously out of place. As Ward, referring to Comte, well says: "He seems to possess the rare power, everywhere manifest through his work, of weaving upon a warp of truth a woof of error. . . . He is a great general in the army of thinkers; but when he descends, as he continually does, to meddle with the brigades, regiments, and platoons, he throws them into confusion by the undue severity and amazing stupidity of his commands."¹

But as Spencer, who built his sociology in part upon the corner stone laid by Comte, says: "We must not overlook the greatness of the step made by M. Comte. His mode of contemplating facts was truly philosophical. . . . Apart from his sociological doctrines his way of conceiving social phenomena is much superior to all previous ways."² Comte's conception was all-embracing. To have pointed out the relation between biology and sociology, and to have outlined the plan of a science and suggested how to complete it was of incalculable service. In the accumulated, heterogeneous mass of social theory and speculation already in existence, unclassified, undifferentiated and without a general purpose, he established a fixed point about which the phenomena of society could be organized. In doing these things he can safely be considered the founder of sociology.

But in the beginning of a science, as in the beginning of a state, there is frequently more than one founder. Herbert Spencer built upon the foundation laid by Comte. Differing in many points as to philosophical doctrine, Spencer elaborated further the main principles of Comte, modifying them in accordance with new knowledge and restating them in terms of his evolutionary philosophy. He gave the new science an impetus and demonstrated by inductions from a wide collection of facts its possibility. Though his system is one sided, sociology, viewed from the present standpoint, owes more to Spencer than to any other sociologist. True, he constructed his theory of society upon the analogy of an animal organism, and carried

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 129.

² *The Study of Sociology*, p. 329.

too far the comparison between the biological and the sociological organism. Yet his main thesis, that the social organism grows like a biological organism by differentiation, was helpful in the beginning of an attempt to apply the scientific methods to society which has accomplished such wonders in the natural sciences. His error is easily accounted for when one considers that at the time he wrote his *Principles of Sociology* all eyes were fixed upon the great change which was occurring in biology and that his sociology is essentially a study of social structure alone. In pressing the biological analogy, Spencer overlooked the importance of integration, which has been correctly emphasized by later sociologists. He rightly insisted on the collection of social data and the construction of sociology from an inductive study of society. In the development of sociology his emphasis proved an excellent thing for sociology, but he failed to carry the investigation beyond a study of social structure, and he did not give proper emphasis to the psychological element of society.

Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology* is but a classified collection of social facts based on social activities and social structures. It furnished the basis of his *Principles of Sociology* which appeared later. These, together with an introductory book on *The Study of Sociology* comprise his formal contributions to the science of sociology, although many premises are laid down in *First Principles* and *Social Statics*. Sociology has advanced along so many lines since Spencer's labors that much of his work appears as a study of institutions and a description of ethnic society.

Progress of Sociology. — Since the writings of Comte and Spencer appeared, the main development of the science of sociology has been secured by the application of a scientific method to the study of human society. The progress of its development has been exceedingly irregular because each investigator has approached the subject from his own point of view, and has, therefore, contributed to the science according to his own peculiar theories, doctrines, and preconceived notions. Hence we find a large number of men — many of them of tremendous power — who have been trying to construct the science of sociology. But there has been little synthetic development. Even now there is just arising a consensus of opinion among

sociologists as to the scope, boundaries, and essential principles of sociology. No one has offered a system that would be accepted by all. Yet there is sufficient agreement, as to methods, enough data have been collected, enough principles have been demonstrated, and conclusions reached to promise rapid progress henceforth. In recent years the points of view are closer and the lines of thought converging. It is becoming clear that each of the great workers in this vast field has been studying a certain part of it and a synthesis of the results of their labors is at hand.

The Organic Conception of Society. — Comte recognized the unity of society and in a certain way its organic nature. But to Comte the structure was physical rather than biological. Spencer, as we have seen, based his sociology on biology and therefore conceived society as a physical organism. It is evident, however, in the unfolding of his thought concerning the development of society, that he changed his viewpoint from time to time. Sometimes he treated society as merely analogous to a biological structure and at others he asserted that it is more than an organism. But while upon the whole he recognized the physical unity of society, in considering the functions of the state, he seems at times to lose sight of his conception of society as an organic whole and to relapse into a crass individualism.

The Austrian economist, August Schaeffle, in 1874, began to publish his monumental work on structural sociology, called *The Structure and Life of the Social Body* (*Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers*). As the title suggests, it describes the organs or parts of the social body and analyzes their functions or activities. It is a more complete exposition of the biological idea of sociology than that given by Spencer. Yet, it is quite remarkable that Schaeffle discussed the form of society with reference to its functional activity. For, in showing the activities of the respective organs or parts of society, he recognized and classified the social forces which are, to a great extent, psychological, which would seem to indicate that the psychological principle underlay the formal structure which he elaborated. Essentially, nevertheless, Schaeffle must be classed among the biological sociologists. In the same group, although of less importance, are Jacques Novicow, René Worms, and de Roberty.

Influence of Economists.—The lines between political economy and sociology are sharply drawn, yet many of the methods used by economic writers, as well as their investigations, have influenced the development of a theory of society. This is especially true in regard to their use of the historical and statistical methods. The so-called historical school of economists have emphasized the development of economic ideas in connection with the industrial development of particular nations. While generalization has usually been one sided in that emphasis has been placed upon the economic life as a thing apart, the study of the origin and growth of one field of human activity has been of great service in interpreting social life in general. These economists have also shown the relation of classes and groups, and of economic organs and activities. In so doing they have set forth some of the motives actuating men to conflict and to coöperation, and thus have supplied concrete illustration for more general social principles. Roscher, Hildebrand, Knies, and Schmoller in Germany, Wolowski in France, and Cliffe Leslie and Posnet in England are the principal representatives of this school.

Le Play, in his *Social Reform in France*, used the *statistical method* with great skill. The possibilities of the statistical method were thus shown for sociological as well as for economic studies. He has been followed by Quetelet, Mayo-Smith, Bailey, Levasseur, and Leroy-Beaulieu chiefly in studies of the social population but with a decided tendency to extend the method to other fields of sociological investigation as illustrated by Galton and Karl Pearson in the field of eugenics and by Professor Benini of Pavia, Italy, and Professor Giddings, in the field of social psychology.¹

Durkheim, in *De la division du travail social*, expands the economic idea of the division of labor in society and makes it the basis of his system of sociology. He holds that socializa-

¹ Pearson, *Grammar of Science*, 2d ed., Chap. XI; Galton, *Hereditary Genius*; Bailey, *Modern Social Conditions*; Leroy-Beaulieu, P., *La question de la population*, 2d ed., Paris, 1913; Levasseur, Émile, *La population française: histoire de la population avant 1789 et démographie de la France comparée à celle des autres nations au siècle 19^e*, Paris, 1889-1892, 3 vols.; Quetelet, L. A. J., *Physique sociale*, Bruxelles, 1869, 2 vols.; Mayo-Smith, *Sociology and Statistics*; Giddings, *Sociology*, p. 37; "The Social Marking System," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. IV, p. 42.

tion comes about because men broken into groups by diverse social interests find themselves dependent on each other for social completeness. The pressure of necessity for the preservation of the interests of each group leads to coöperation between them. While his work is sociological, it has been greatly influenced by the work of the economists.

This brief catalogue of writers who have indirectly influenced sociological thought must not omit the name of Thorstein Veblen, whose three books, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, *The Enterprise of Business*, and *The Instinct of Workmanship*, have thrown a clear light upon the social motives which affect the economic life of man. Here economic results are shown to be produced, not alone by those motives which were dear to the classical economists, but by motives less simple and concerned with quite other things than getting enough to eat and wear — motives of social distinction, motives born of the social passions to excel and to dominate.

The study of industrial development in recent years has been of service to sociology in working out the processes of change and the principles of evolution in this particular field of associated life. Ely's *Evolution of Industrial Society*, is a good example. Professor Ely always having been an ardent student of society, his studies of economic development have supplied principles of development of much wider social significance. Likewise, Bücher's *Industrial Evolution* and Ashley's *English Economic History* throw light upon the development of society.

Recent Development of Sociology. — With all due credit to the earlier writers in this field, its really scientific development has occurred since sociologists have ceased to pursue the biological analogy, and viewing social phenomena without either biological or economic prejudices, have endeavored to apply scientific methods to them. From many sources and by a multitude of writers, each seeking the truth from his own point of view, the contributions to the science of sociology have been made. Only a few of the main lines of thought and, consequently, but a few of the chief writers may be mentioned here. The formal beginning of sociology in the United States was made by Lester F. Ward, in his monumental work, *Dynamic Sociology*, which appeared in 1883. Previous to the appearance of Ward's book, social science was considered by scholars as a

collection of ideas on social reform. So little was the educational world prepared for the introduction of a new science that the *Dynamic Sociology* was received with much misgiving by those who paid any attention to it. It has grown in influence steadily since its introduction. Representing the dynamic aspect of sociology, it covers only a part of the subject, but it was unique in clearly delimiting the field of sociology and suggesting helpful divisions of the subject. Further, Ward's work was a rigid application of the scientific method to this limited field. Trained as a paleobotanist, fanciful analogies had no charm for his scientific spirit. While Ward sees human life as a part of the great whole of life, he insists that the basis of social activity is really psychological, and that the social forces are psychic forces. Ten years later Ward brought out *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, in which he elaborated his social psychology, and developed his thesis that society is fundamentally psychical. Another ten years passed before the appearance of his *Pure Sociology*, which was followed by a volume on *Applied Sociology*. In the *Pure Sociology*, Ward makes the word "Pure" signify an account of the origin and development of society due to spontaneous, non-conscious causes. Indeed, the secondary title to this volume is *The Origin and Spontaneous Development of Society*. Upon this foundation is built the theory of social improvement by "telesis," or purposeful social action.

In 1886 appeared the first part of *Introduction à la sociologie* by the Belgian sociologist Guillaume De Greef. This part treated of *Elements*, and was followed in 1889 by the second part on *Fonctions et organes*, and later by a third part on *Structure général*. A part of it has appeared serially in *The American Journal of Sociology*, translated into English by Eben Mumford. It is a systematic outline of social systems, organs, and functions. In the last part he uses the statistical method. The central idea in his system is social "contract," or as Small points out social "contact."

In 1894 a textbook was published with the title *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, written by A. W. Small and George E. Vincent. While sociology has made much progress since this book appeared, it has proved to be a valuable and suggestive working manual. However, Small's service to sociology is better represented by his discussions in *The American Journal*

of *Sociology* on the nature of sociology and on methodology, and in his larger systematic work, *General Sociology*, published in 1904. Vincent previously had published his *Education and the Social Progress*.

Giddings's *Principles of Sociology* first appeared in 1896. The foundation of his system of sociology rests on the instinctive theory implied in Aristotle's dictum that man is a political animal. To him sociology is both a natural history of society and a psychological analysis of the structure, processes of growth, and the functions of society. He places "consciousness of kind" as the basic social force and the cause of human relationship. The recognition of kind, or mutual attraction, has built society through the processes of differentiation and integration. His critics insist that he has made too much of consciousness of kind. In his *Inductive Sociology*, which was published in 1901, Giddings has apparently given consciousness of kind a less important place, but really has analyzed its workings much more completely than in his previous work. In 1908 he published his *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*. In this work his system was further elaborated and some points developed which had been merely implied in his previous writings. Thus, his analysis of the kinds of societies went much farther than in any of his previous books, and the social differentiations and resemblances which grow up in the formation of the social mind were traced and illustrated much more completely than in his previous works. The treatment of the stages in the evolution of society which marked his *Principles* and *Elements* and which many think the most important contribution he has made to the study of society, was worked in as a minor feature in the part devoted to social organization. Perhaps his most important contributions to sociology are his theory that society has risen from the operation of the consciousness of kind, which in his use of the term includes not only consciousness of likeness, but also of difference, and his theory of social evolution. Consciousness of likeness makes for social integration, recognition of differences for social variation.

Professor Ross's *Social Control*, published in 1901, is a brilliant and original exposition of the influence of instinctive and conscious social restraint in the process of socialization. He followed this work with his *The Foundations of Sociology*, and his

Social Psychology. Later Professor Ross has turned his attention from systematic sociology in one or more of its special fields to descriptive sociology in *The Changing Chinese*, *Changing America*, *The Old World in the New*, a sociological study of immigration, and *South of Panama*.

This brief catalogue of American sociologists would be incomplete without reference to the brilliant work of Professors Cooley and Ellwood. In his first work, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Professor Cooley pointed out how those qualities of the mind which are distinctively human are socially conditioned, and the bearing of these qualities upon society. In his last book, *Social Organization*, he has analyzed the social mind with the primary emphasis upon its functioning in social relationships. Here we are shown how the social mind works itself out through certain primary groups in social ideals, how it develops through communication, giving rise in the end to the democratic mind. Yet, in that development the mind of a community operates through social classes, leveling some and causing others to emerge, sometimes leading to the disorganization of the social institutions characterizing a society which has not yet developed unity of opinion, and finding expression at last in the public will for the general welfare. In his recent book, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, Professor Ellwood has made a systematic study of the field of social psychology, with special reference to the bearing of psycho-social principles upon social structure and function.

Much more than can be allowed here might well be written of the work of Thomas, who, in his *Sex and Society*, showed the part played by the difference between the sexes in social development, and whose monumental work, *A Source Book for Social Origins*, with its brief but lucid criticisms, has cast a great light upon that hazy group of primitive activities and ideas which underlie and condition later social development.

Space will not permit more than the mere mention of a number of recent European sociologists, who have made important contributions to sociology. Gumplowicz,¹ the Austrian Darwinist, and Ratzenhofer,² the Austrian, both of whom saw in the struggle of groups or races the fundamental social fact

¹ *Der Rassenkampf; Grundriss der Sociologie.*

² *Die sociologische Erkenntnis.*

out of which grew social order and progress; Tarde,¹ the great French jurist, whose emphasis upon invention, imitation, and opposition as the important factors in the origin and development of social relations made sociology his debtor; Le Bon,² to whom we owe the theory of mob psychology and mob activity; Simmel,³ who has worked out most completely the psychology of differentiation of groups and their subordination to a dominant ideal represented by a valued common possession such as a common country, by a symbol of common feelings such as a flag or a shibboleth, by a common ruler, or by a common ethical and social code of action such as a code of honor;—these are the names of a few of the most prominent men who recently in Europe have attracted world-wide attention in sociology.

The study of social pathology and the administrative care of "dependents, defectives, and delinquents" has contributed to the development of a true social science. The work of such scholars as Emminghaus, Warner, Henderson, Devine, Hunter, Kellor, Booth, Münsterberg, and scores of others in Europe and America, who have attempted to find out the true nature of society by studying the outcroppings of the ledge of character or the defects of socialization, and who have endeavored to apply sociological principles to the correction of social maladjustments, has been of great service to students working on the normal development of society. Aside from the field of descriptive sociology, in these fields more careful scientific work has been done in the endeavor to find out the exact social situation than in any other. Some studies of pauperism and crime have been alluded to in a preceding chapter, which are of the highest importance to the study of human relationships. Rapidly the practical interest of the administrator is being supplemented by the scientific interest of the sociologist in the questions of the extent and cause of these social phenomena.

The influence of the sociological journals and reviews must not be passed without brief mention. *The American Journal of Sociology*, edited by Professor A. W. Small, has done more to promote education in sociology than any other agency in the

¹ *Les lois de l'imitation; Social Laws; L'opposition universelle.*

² *Psychologie des foules; translated The Crowd.*

³ *Über soziale Differenzierung.*

United States. Likewise, the foreign journals are performing a similar service in Europe. Of these the *Revue internationale de sociologie*, the *Année sociologique*, *The Sociological Review*, and the *Revista Italiana Sociologia* are especially worthy of mention. Popular journals and the newspapers are gradually adding this field to the wide range of subjects they cover. In fact, sociology has a wider hearing to-day than ever before. While some of this interest is superficial, it signifies that the public realizes that the sociologist is no longer a creature who speaks and writes in a lingo beyond the comprehension of educated people, but one who has something vital to say about the social life of to-day, — how it came to be, its essential principles, its shortcomings, and whither it is tending.

Sociology is progressing rapidly as a science, especially as the points of agreement of different writers become more numerous and the varied nomenclature is reduced to an intelligible system. In closing this brief sketch of the foundation and growth of sociology, the following inventory of synthetic progress is quoted from Vincent: ¹ "Sociologists have by no means reached a consensus comparable, for example, with that of the economists, but when variations in terminology have been eliminated a considerable and everwidening area of agreement emerges from the apparent confusion. Thus as to society in general all agree that it is (1) a product of physical and psychical forces, (2) working in an evolutionary process in which (3) at first predominantly instinctive activities later yield in some measure to (4) reflective and purposeful policies. This view regards society as (5) organic in the general, not specific, sense of the term. As to the social group as a type of common mental life it is further agreed that (1) individuals in their very personal growth unconsciously incorporate the standard of their group, by which they are, furthermore, (2) coerced into conscious conformity. The uniforming influence of imitation and group ascendancy is counteracted by (3) leaders or authorities who initiate new ideas and activities to be selected and appropriated by all. Between such leaders with their followers a (4) struggle for ascendancy ensues. This results ultimately in (5) a relatively permanent body of customs, and institutions embedded

¹ "The Development of Sociology," in *The American Journal of Sociology*, Sept., 1904.

in feeling; *i.e.*, group tradition or character. When the members of this group are aware of common ideals and purposes a (6) social consciousness is developed.”

While some of these writers manifest the influence of the biological and psychological biases, the tendency has risen to study society without the help of that broken reed, the social organism, or that perhaps only less errant prejudice, that sociology is only a sublimated psychology. Not at all blind to the bearings of the biological and psychological sciences, and to the scientific methods developed in the natural sciences generally, especially in those which touch more specifically human relationships, the sociologists are trying to look the varied and complex social phenomena about them squarely in the face and to interpret them as a distinct class of phenomena, the social. Each may be investigating a particular field. One perhaps is interested in the psychological aspects of the social process, another in the biological which come out in a study of birth and death rates, of immigration, the age and sex classes, and still another may find his work in studying the social institutions and structures in which society embodies its ideals. Less and less do logical schemes dominate. Increasingly the workers in this field of complex relationships are finding that they secure results worth while only as they observe, describe, and interpret the facts of society without reference to any far-fetched analogy or any bias which their previous training in an older science or philosophy may have established.

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QUESTIONS AND EXERCISES

1. Read Adam Smith's chapter on Instinct in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* and show in what sense in that chapter he was a forerunner of sociology.
2. Look over Martineau's translation of Comte's *Positive Philosophy* and show in what sense he was the founder of sociology.
3. Compare Spencer's system of sociology in its essentials with that of Comte.

4. Show what is meant in the text when it is said Spencer's sociology is a study of social structure.
5. What is the fundamental social fact which is emphasized in his system of sociology by Spencer; by Giddings; by Tarde; by Le Bon?
6. What criticism can be made of the effort to find some one fact in social life on which to base a system of sociology?
7. What is meant by descriptive sociology? What is its value in the development of the science of sociology?

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