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OPERATIONS IN THE SPACE BETWEEN PEACE
AND CRISIS**

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Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School

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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

CAPSTONE

**THE ROLE OF THE FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS
IN THE SPACE BETWEEN PEACE AND CRISIS**

by

Arto I. Hilden

December 2018

Thesis Advisor:
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**THE ROLE OF THE FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN THE
SPACE BETWEEN PEACE AND CRISIS**

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requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
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ABSTRACT

This study explores the role of Finnish Special Operations Forces (FINSOF) in the northern Europe's changing security environment by examining ways that FINSOF can become flexible enough to face rising hybrid threats from Russia. In order to become Finland's strategic-level first response force against hybrid threats, both at home and abroad, FINSOF will require some integration and reshaping of its structures and tasks. Using three scenarios situated in the Baltic Sea area, this study analyzes FINSOF according to its Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats in order to develop the force into a more efficient tool of the Finnish government. In order to develop new structures and tasks, FINSOF requires a SOF-specific doctrine with a vision and clear goals, which would lay out a path for FINSOF to follow as it evolves. FINSOF's ability to counter hybrid threats in the future will require flexibility, utilizing tailored forces and scalable command structures.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti Access/ Area Denial
BMCC	Baltic Maritime Component Command
CMWD	Countering weapons of mass destruction
DA	Direct Action
GSOC	Global Special Operations Consortium
ETO	Erikoistoimintaosasto (Finnish Navy SOF Unit)
ETYK	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EU	European Union
FDF	Finnish Defence Forces
FINSF	Finnish Special Forces
FINSOF	Finnish Special Operations Forces
FVS	The Functions Vital for Society
HRO	Hostage release operations
HVT	High-value target
IO	Information operations
JS	Joint support
LOO	Line of Operation
MA	Military assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PARP	NATO the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process
PSYOPS	Psychological operations
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RNSS	Russian National Security Strategy
RRU	Rapid Reaction Unit
SAC	NATO Strategic Airlift Capacity
SF	Special Forces
SO	Special Operations
SOA	Special Operations Air tasks
SOATU	Special Operations Air Task unit
SOCC	Special Operations Component Command

SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOM	Special Operations Maritime tasks
SOTF	Special Operations Task Force
SOTG	Special Operations Task Group
SR	Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
UDT	Underwater Demolition Team
UTJR	Utti Jaeger Regiment (Finnish Army SOF Regiment)

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I. INTRODUCTION

The warrior knows that he is free to choose his desires, and he makes these decisions with courage, detachment and—sometimes—with just a touch of madness.

—Paulo Coelho¹

The security environment in the northern part of Europe, especially near the Baltic Sea and neighboring areas, has moved in a less secure direction. In particular, Russia has announced that it considers the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a security threat. It has increased its military power near its western borders in response to NATO movements and troops in the Baltic area. Several times during the last decade, Moscow has used harder rhetoric against Western countries, especially after political discussions in Finland about NATO membership. Russia would not like it if Finland decides to submit its NATO membership application. In 2016, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said that Russia “will take all necessary military-technical measures at our Northern borders.”² In another 2017 media event, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated: “If Sweden joins NATO this will negatively affect our relations because we will consider that the infrastructure of the military bloc now approaches us from the Swedish side. We will interpret that as an additional threat for Russia, and we will think about how to eliminate this threat.”³ From Finland’s point of view, threats like these need to be taken seriously, and, if necessary, readiness structures, organizations, and procedures should be renewed.

NATO has mentioned Russia as a key factor affecting the security situation in the northern part of Europe. In a 2017 RAND report, *The Russian Way of Warfare*, Scott

¹ Paulo Coelho, “The Heart of the Warrior,” last modified August 31, 2016, <http://paulocoelhoblog.com/2016/08/31/the-heart-of-the-warrior>.

² Matti Huuhtanen, “Finnish Report Highlights Russian Threat of NATO Membership,” *The Seattle Times*, April 29, 2016, <https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/finnish-report-highlights-russian-threat-of-nato-membership>.

³ Damien Sharkov, “Russia Will Take Military Action and ‘Eliminate’ the Threat if Sweden Joins NATO,” *Newsweek*, June 2, 2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/vladimir-putin-vows-eliminate-nato-threat-sweden-joins-619486>.

Boston and Dara Massicot state that Russia does not have one standard way to operate; instead, it tailors its operations to different environments and strategic requirements. This ability allows Russia to be capricious and very unpredictable, and leads Finland to a fundamental principle: prepare for war.⁴ Non-predictable behavior in Finland's neighbor country requires a flexible response force. In Finland, there is such a structure, the Finnish Special Operations Forces (FINSOF), but is FINSOF flexible enough to respond to the Russian threat? Specifically, *how can FINSOF become flexible enough to cope with both internal and external missions in the face of rising hybrid threats from Russia, and what is Finnish Special Operations' role in this new security situation?*

In terms of *Flexibility*, the Finnish Defence Forces SOF and Ministry of Interior SOF need more integration, interoperability,⁵ and capabilities to carry out both internal and external missions in the different kinds of security situations they may encounter. Some integration and reshaping of the structures and tasks of FINSOF will be necessary so that it can function as Finland's strategic-level first-response force against hybrid threats.⁶ This study makes a number of recommendations for ways to accomplish this.

A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This capstone project focuses on Finland's special operations in different scenarios related to the security situation in Northern Europe. Specifically, it aims to investigate what

⁴ Scott Boston et al., *The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE231.html>.

⁵ According to NATO, *interoperability* means: "The ability for Allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Specifically, it enables forces, units and/or systems to operate together and allows them to share common doctrine and procedures, each others' infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate. Interoperability reduces duplication, enables pooling of resources, and produces synergies." "Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces," NATO, accessed August 28, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_84112.htm.

⁶ According to CoE, a hybrid threat is: "1) Coordinated and synchronized action, that deliberately targets democratic states' and institutions systemic vulnerabilities, through a wide range of means, 2) activities exploit the threshold of detection and attribution as well as the border between war and peace, and 3) aim is to influence different forms of decision making at the local, state, or institutional level to favor and/or gain the agent's strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting the target." "Countering Hybrid Threats," The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, accessed September 17, 2018, <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats>.

kinds of changes will be needed, if any, to confront the challenges that FINSOF and Finnish special operations will face in the future. As Marcus Aurelius wrote 2000 years ago, “Don’t fear the future. You will face it, if that is your fate, armed with the same reason that protects and guides you in the present.”⁷

The project aims to shape Finnish special operations so that they will be efficient and capable in the 21st century. Time-competitive warfare in the future will require rapid decision making. The National Command Authority’s ability to deliver strategic options will be judged, and the effective options will be separated from others as Robert Leonhard mentioned in his book, *The Principles of War for the Information Age*.⁸ Likewise, other Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway have changed their Special Operations Forces (SOF) structures and tasks recently to sharpen their abilities to respond to new rising threats against their nations’ sovereignty. Should Finland do the same?

SOF have implemented changes into today’s complex battlefield, based on lessons learned from fights, and command effectiveness. Special operations, the security environment, and the way that wars are conducted have changed, especially since September 11, 2001, and those changes continue. Conflicts are becoming local and complex, and need the right type of forces and capabilities to solve them. As a result of these overall changes in the battlefield, technological development, and Finland’s security environment, Finland must have the flexibility to change the Defence Forces’ structure and even its doctrine.⁹ Compounding these changes is the new threat posed by Russia’s unpredictable and somewhat aggressive behavior.

The overall modernization of the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) is an ongoing process in Finland; as part of that process, FINSOF need to take lessons learned and

⁷ Marcus Aurelius, *The Emperor’s Handbook*, trans. C. Scot Hicks and David V. Hicks (New York: Scribner, 2002), 78.

⁸ Robert R. Leonhard, *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 251.

⁹ Paul R. Norwood, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes, “Capturing the Character of Future War,” *Parameters* 46, no. 2 (June 22, 2016): 81–91. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Summer_2016/10_NJB.pdf.

implications from the current situation and develop their capability and tasks as part of Finland's security structure. Moreover, FINSOF lack doctrine, which is a situation that must be remedied soon. In 2016, recognizing the need for change, the Finnish Prime Minister's office released a new paper called *Government's Foreign and Security Policy Report (Valtioneuvoston Ulko- ja Turvallisuuspoliittinen Selonteko)* that gives the guidelines to Finland's defence policy.¹⁰ The FDF follow the defence guidelines from this paper and have already started a program focused on development, structure, and primary military acquisitions. Also, the Finnish Parliament began to prepare several laws that have influenced the Finnish Defence Forces' tasks. The main arguments in the *Government's Foreign and Security Policy Report* also offer basic guidelines, which point out where Finnish special operations should develop during the next decade. The government report argues that all defense security functions have to ensure the fulfillment of key responsibilities in all situations and, as resources permit, to support other authorities in their duties. The message is still clear that we have to be prepared for the worst-case scenario, continue on the path of deterring all possible attackers, and, overall, make Finland itself ready.

B. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE

This project examines Finnish special operations through three main scenarios reflecting Finland's security environment issues that focus on the northern part of the Europe. All of the scenarios are based on Russia's aggression in the Baltic Sea area, and these cases have been published in *Suomen Kuvalehti issue 9/2015* as: 1) Finland acting on its own: the Åland case; 2) Finland acting bilaterally with Sweden: the Gotland case, and 3) Finland acting multilaterally: the Narva case. Each of these cases concentrates primarily on the question whether Finland can face the worst-case scenario on its own, and whether any other countries would help Finland to survive in a crisis. Furthermore, these scenarios

¹⁰ The Council of State, *Valtioneuvoston Ulko-Ja Turvallisuuspoliittinen Selonteko* (Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office Finland, 2016), https://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10616/1986338/VNKJ072016_fi.pdf/9a3a074a-d97f-43c4-a1d8-e3ddb8d1da.

bring into focus the implications for FINSOF because each scenario follows Russia’s new military doctrine and Russian model of conflict known as Gerasimov model.¹¹ Development of troops, techniques, and tactics has raised Russia’s military to a new level with professionalized units. In these circumstances, a small country such as Finland is ill-suited for positional warfare without the ability to make changes.¹²

Figure 1 shows the outline of the overall study. The main purpose of this capstone project is to identify FINSOF responsibilities within the studied scenarios, which will be done using SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) to categorize the different findings.¹³ The final outcome from the SWOT consists of lists of *Advantages*, *Competencies*, *Strategies*, and *Risks*, which will help to create a mission and vision for FINSOF.




Figure 1. High-level outline of this capstone project.

Finnish special operations are the primary focus of this study. A comparison of special operations capabilities and possibilities in each scenario establishes basic principles

¹¹ Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” last modified July 6, 2018, <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war>. Galeotti clarifies hybrid warfare: “Call it non-linear war (which I prefer), or hybrid war, or special war; Russia’s operations first in Crimea and then eastern Ukraine have demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly focusing on new forms of politically-focused operations in the future.”

¹² Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy* (Boulder, CO: Eastview Press, 1992), 254.

¹³ G. Houben, K. Lenie, and K. Vanhoof, “A Knowledge-Based SWOT-Analysis System as an Instrument for Strategic Planning in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises,” *Decision Support Systems* 26, no. 2 (August 1999): 125–135, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9236\(99\)00024-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9236(99)00024-X).

for how to use FINSOF, and enables this study to create a recommendation for enhancing the special operations capability. Although all three scenarios have similar starting points, the threats and assessments specific to each of them can be very different; this would lead to differences in the SOF missions for each scenario due to the differences in capabilities required by each one. Table 1 shows the scenarios and some details about their purposes and implications.

Table 1. Scenario building.

Scenario	Type of Case Study	Purpose	Implications
Finland alone; Strategic meaning of the Finnish Island called Åland.	Political pressure and direct military threat	Show Russia strategy through Gerasimov model Show how to use FINSOF in every case	Finnish Special Operations mission analysis in different scenarios, Effectiveness-Efficiency and total Viability
Finland bilateral; Strategic meaning of the Swedish Island called Gotland.	Start of the conflict actions and crisis	Find the answers to the main questions of this study	FINSOF at home / FINSOF abroad
Finland multilateral; Crisis between Russia and NATO, actions happened near Finnish borders	Conduct of military operations and crisis		

C. MODIFICATIONS TO THE NATO SPECTRUM-OF-CONFLICT MODEL

In Finland has a crisis development model similar to the one used by NATO, based on its doctrines and defined as the Spectrum of Conflict.¹⁴ Because the NATO model does not cover details from the development of the crisis, I have modified it by adding the Pre-

¹⁴ See Figure 2, according to NATO, phases are: Peacetime, Crisis, Major combat operations, Stabilization and Peacetime. NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, AJP-3.5, Edition A (NATO Standardization Agency NSA, 2013), 1–3, <http://nso.nato.int/nso/zPublic/ap/AJP-3.5%20EDA%20V1%20E.pdf>. In the Finnish model the violence equilibrium uses the same form and it starts from Normal time (*Normaaliolot*), and the Crisis time is called emergency conditions (*Poikkeuolot*). The Finnish Defence Command, *Kenttäohjesääntö, Yleinen, KOYL*, official use version (Helsinki: The Finnish Defence Forces, 2014), Figure 11, 31.

Crisis and After Crisis times. Three other phases are Escalation, Crisis/War Time, and Stabilization. The violence equilibrium is the same as in NATO’s model, which is at its highest during the Crisis/War Time. Because FINSOF can act both abroad and at home, I placed the main task categories – Military Assistance (MA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA) – over all phases (see Appendix A for NATO SOF tasks).¹⁵ Only the priorities are different in each category; for example, in wartime FINSOF can do the full spectrum of special operations, but during the Pre-Crisis time, their focus is more on MA tasks. Using FINSOF, this spectrum is based on a combination of operations external (light blue color) and internal, across the spectrum of conflict (see Figure 2).




Figure 2. Basic layer to scenario build-up process based on the NATO Spectrum of Conflict model.¹⁶

Furthermore, there is a so-called *gray zone* between the Pre-Crisis time and Crisis/War times. This period causes uncertainty for political leaders and decision making

¹⁵ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 2-1 – 2-7.

¹⁶ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1-3.

structures, creating several vulnerabilities that the enemy can exploit in its operations. Because the gray zone line is not clear, we can say that this zone lies somewhere between peace and the enemy's clear attack that leads to a formal state of war.¹⁷ Dr. John Arguilla has said that the gray zone time, "confuses rather than clarifies the spectrum of conflict."¹⁸ In Finland, *gray zone* refers to the time before the nation has not implemented all the Crisis/War-time laws.

The gray zone means uncertainty, misunderstanding, and confusion, which can lead the hybrid-threat actors to exploit this situation.¹⁹ That is why I placed breakpoints on the picture in Figure 2 (indicated by the stars): the supposition is that some part of the FINSOF is abroad to do operations when the escalation of a crisis hits Finland. Because Finland does not have many specialized trained operators, the assumption is that the Finnish Government will need these men to be in Finland during the Crisis/War Time. This model raises the question of whether FINSOF's basic tasks are in the right place and allow the right response to the threats received. The results of the scenarios developed in this capstone project demonstrate that changes are required.

D. DEFINITIONS

This study uses the following definitions.

Special Operations: There is no clear definition of special operations in any Finnish field manuals. This is because special operations are considered part of the armed services and the joint effects, rather than as an independent operation. Therefore, I drew upon the

¹⁷ Phillip Lohaus, "Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational Framework for using Special Operations Forces in the Space between War and Peace," *Special Operations Journal* 2, no. 2 (December 15, 2016): 75–91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2016.1239989>.

¹⁸ Arguilla wrote also: "[T]oday's aggressors are most willing to accept insurgency, terror, subversion and covert action as war – right alongside increasingly rare occurrences of conventional conflict." John Arguilla, "Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained," *Prism* 2, no. 3 (May 9, 2018): 126. <https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/1507653/perils-of-the-gray-zone-paradigms-lost-paradoxes-regained/>.

¹⁹ Aapo Cederberg et al., *Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts* (Helsinki: Hybrid CoE, 2017), 5, <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/publications/regional-cooperation-support-national-hybrid-defence-efforts>.

definition for *Special Operations* from the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5 and from U.S. Doctrine for the Special Operations, JP 3–05 in order to create a new definition for Finnish special operations. My definition for Finnish special operations is as follows: *The Finnish Special Operations are strategic, operational, and tactical level effect-based combined Joint operations conducted by the specially selected, trained, organized, and equipped forces from the Ministry of Interior and the Finnish Defence Forces to achieve the desired end state using special techniques and procedures.*²⁰ (See Appendix B for the NATO and U.S. definitions).

Likewise, my definition for *Finnish Special Operations Forces (FINSOF)* also draws upon AJP-3.5 and JP 3-05. My definition for FINSOF is this: *The Finnish Special Operations Forces are active and reserve troops of the Services and from the Ministry of Interior, designated and specifically selected, equipped, trained, and organized to conduct special operations.*²¹

Finnish Special Forces (FINSF) must be defined differently from in the United States because of their structure and number. *Finnish Special Forces are professionals specifically selected, equipped, and trained to conduct special tasks in the homeland and abroad as part of the larger operations or special operations. Special Forces can operate in smaller teams as well as larger formations with highly professional capability, designated to act against strategically or operationally meaningful targets.*

In Finland, all Special Forces are Special Operations Forces that are supported by other specialized capabilities. Figure 3 contains a schematic representation of the ways that those forces and operations are connected. It should be noted that forces from Finland’s Ministry of Interior, including the Finnish Police and the Finnish Border Guard SOF units, are part of the FINSOF.

²⁰ See NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–1, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Special Operations*, JP 3–05 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), ix, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05.pdf.

²¹ See NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–1, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations 3–05*, ix.



Figure 3. Finland Special Operations and Finnish Special Operations Forces, developed by author.

Hybrid Warfare: Because the scenarios presented in Chapter IV use a certain model of hybrid warfare, it is important to define it here. Although NATO and the West have referred to Russia’s warfare in Crimea and elsewhere in Ukraine as hybrid warfare, there are several different definitions for this term. The following definition, which is a combination of those used by Hanna Smith of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats²² and by Frank Brundtland-Steder in his 2016 article “The Theory, History, and Current State of Hybrid Warfare,”²³ and it is as follows: *Hybrid Warfare is a way of conducting operations to achieve strategic goals before a declaration of war by using a combination of military and nonmilitary means. Hybrid warfare includes hybrid threat characteristics blended with old and new elements of tactics and strategy, which are used together during gray zone time.*

E. TRANSLATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Finnish are by the author.

²² Hanna Smith, *In the Era of Hybrid Threats: Power of the Powerful or Power of the “Weak?”* (Helsinki: Hybrid CoE, 2017), 2, <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Strategic-Analysis-October-2017.pdf>

²³ Frank B. Steder, “The Theory, History, and Current State of Hybrid Warfare,” *Combating Terrorism Exchange* 6, no. 4 (November, 2016): 7–19, <https://globalecco.org/ctx-vol.-6-no.-4-november-2016>.

II. FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

“We had the experience but missed the meaning.”

—T. S. Eliot²⁴

This chapter gives an overview of FINSOF’s history, doctrine, tasks, structures, and current limitations.

A. A BRIEF HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION TO FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

The Finnish military has a long tradition of conducting actions behind enemy lines. In Finnish, these traditions are called *sissitoiminta* (guerrilla-type activity), *kaukopartio* (long-range patrolling), and *sissi*, a soldier who operates behind enemy lines.²⁵ According to Marko Palokangas, soldiers (*sissi*) who engaged in long-range patrolling were *Guerilla Jaegers*.²⁶ These translations are not entirely precise because guerilla has a different meaning in English than in Finnish. In Finland, a guerilla belongs to the regular military force, which makes him a so-called legalized soldier.²⁷ The first guidance for actions against enemy supply lines and sabotage behind enemy lines was found in Finnish military field manuals in 1918 and 1931.²⁸

An understanding of the principles of management and leadership is important in the Finnish Army. Finnish officers brought the principles of *Auftragstaktik* and *Innere*

²⁴ T.S. Eliot, AZQuotes, Wind and Fly LTD, accessed October 18, 2018, <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/561420>.

²⁵ Palokangas highlights that “in modern Finnish, *sissi* refers to a soldier who belongs to regular army and operates in the enemy’s rear, bearing legal insignia.” Marko Palokangas, *Exploding Wilderness: Guerrilla-Type Activities in the Finnish Art of War*, Finnish Defence Studies 20 (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2015): 6–8, <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2808-0>.

²⁶ Marko Palokangas. “Räjätävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa” (Doctoral diss., National Defence University, Helsinki, 2014), 45, <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2548-5>.

²⁷ Convention of the Hague 1907, IV General Agreement, 1st Annex. Article 1, Geneva, SopS 11/1924, <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsviite/1924/19240011>.

²⁸ Paul von, Gerich, *Vapaajoukkojen ohjesääntö*, Turku 1918(b), and K.V.Grunn, *Kenttäpalveluksen opas kuvin ja sanoin I*, Otava 1931.

Führung from Germany at the end of World War I. Martin van Creveld has described *Innere Führung* like this: “To generate independence, freedom had to be granted. To train men toward responsibility, the authority had to be delegated. To create trust, reliability and long standing acquaintanceships had to be assured.”²⁹ The fundamental principle assigns each soldier the responsibility to do his or her job as well as he or she can do it. This principle also means trust between officers and basic fighters. According to the principle of *Auftragstaktik*, like mission-oriented tactics, processes should be as simple as possible, and decisions should be made as quickly as possible after a commander’s intention is known in every situation.³⁰

Finnish warfare and tactics developed a lot during World War II. We can say that FINSOF also took a long step forward during that time. They were able to use modern technology, aircraft, telecommunications, deception, and different vehicles during operations. Time and speed became the main elements of their warfare, and those elements needed coordination in third generation warfare. (See Appendix C for the historical timeline of FINSOF.)³¹

1. Finnish Army Special Operations Forces

The traditions of today’s Finnish Army Special Forces originate from the period of World War II, where the main adversary was the Soviet Union. During the Winter War of 1939–40 against the Soviet Union, the Finnish high command noticed a lack of intelligence concerning enemy formations in the deep area behind enemy lines.³² Consequently, the Finnish military leaders wanted to establish four long-range intelligence companies to

²⁹ Martin van, Creveld, *Fighting Power, German and U.S. Army Performance 1939–1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 165. See also Jukka Mälkki, “Tehtävätaktiikan olemus, Tehtävätaktiikan muodostuminen preussilais-saksalaisessa sotataidossa 1806–1945” (master’s thesis, Finnish Defence University, 2009), 116–117, <http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe201112316176>.

³⁰ Mälkki, Tehtävätaktiikan olemus, *Tehtävätaktiikan muodostuminen preussilais-saksalaisessa sotataidossa 1806–1945* (2009), 116–117.

³¹ Dennis Gyllensporre, “Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations Theory,” in *Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges*, ed. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson (Switzerland, Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 25.

³² Palokangas, “Räjähävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa,” 129.

collect information deep behind enemy lines. In addition, the high command wanted to attack enemy targets and supply lines.³³ In 1942, four units were organized as one battalion (Separate Battalion 4—Er.P 4) under General Headquarters, and it carried out more than 250 operations behind enemy lines. Some of these tasks were very brief operations of only a few days, while the longest patrol took over 50 days, during which the men walked more than 500 kilometers.³⁴ These long-range patrol units during the World War II laid the groundwork for the development of the Finnish Special Operations Forces (FINSOF).

Ralf Lillbacka, who has studied Finnish tactics and techniques from World War II, highlighted several findings of tactics used in the deep area behind enemy lines. Basic tactics were based on patrols, usually at the squad or platoon level, supported by occasional air drops. In the winter, patrols were conducted on skis, and in the summer, on foot, sometimes supported by seaplanes that would land on the numerous lakes. Large woodlands on Finnish borders created the possibility to secretly infiltrate behind enemy lines. Tactics remained the same during World War II; the Soviets even developed counter-tactics and counter-*sissi* units.³⁵

Separate Battalion 4 had its main working tools, the rangers, but it also included a signal company and an organic flight department, *Department Jauri*.³⁶ During World War II, Finnish Special Operations Forces had three main tasks: SOF air tasks, long-range patrolling, and guerilla-type actions.

³³ Palokangas, “Räjätävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa,” 61. Palokangas highlights that violence, combat, patrol, and long-range reconnaissance were closely related between 1939 and 1944.

³⁴ Lassi Saressalo, *Päämajan Kaukopartiot Jatkosodassa*, 2nd ed. (Juva: WSOY, 1987), 302–303.

³⁵ Ralf Lillbacka, “Parameters of Simplicity as a Principle of Special Operations,” *Special Operations Journal* 3 (November 14, 2017): 94–110, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2017.1383811>.

³⁶ Olavi Rantalainen, “Lento-Osasto Jauri: Muuratjärvi 06.08.-07.10.1944,” *Pilven Veikko*, November 2015, 57.

After World War II, Separate Battalion 4 was terminated and almost all specially trained soldiers left the Finnish military.³⁷ Their departure was due, at least in part, to a common fear that the Soviet Union would charge all specially trained servicemen as war criminals or spies for their actions behind Soviet lines, and some of these men had participated in *Operation Stella Polaris*, which was a recovery operation to get all sensitive intelligence material to Sweden.³⁸ Subsequently, some specially trained individuals were recruited into units in other countries, especially the U.S. Military.³⁹ Nevertheless, some of the men who had received training in specialized skills and guerilla-type activities remained in the Finnish Army.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Finnish Defence Forces reformed the national defence system according to the so-called “*Territorial defence*”⁴⁰ concept, which again involved guerilla-type activities. General Veikko Koppinen wrote two new field manuals 1956 and 1957, which provided instructions in guerilla-type fighting behind enemy lines as well as in the homeland if the troops were surrounded there.⁴¹ The main idea was that Finland could exploit paratroopers as part of guerrilla-type missions behind enemy lines.⁴² In 1962, the Finnish Defence Forces created the Parachute School at the Utti garrison, with the main task of preparing conscripts and commissioned soldiers to do long-range patrolling behind enemy lines.⁴³ The Utti garrison was a natural choice because Finnish

³⁷ For example, Bosiljevac describes the U.S. Navy UDT (Underwater Demolition Team) decommissioned process in his book. T.L.Bosiljevac, *SEALS, UDT/SEAL Operations in Vietnam* (New York: Ivy Books, 1990), 5.

³⁸ Vesa Tynkkynen, *Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen, Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa*, 2.edition (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2014), 299, <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2547-8>.

³⁹ Colonel Alpo Marttinen knew the value of the experiences of these men. Some of these former Rangers wrote training memos to the U.S. Army. Alpo Marttinen, *Long Distance Patrolling Under Subarctic Conditions: Experiences in Russo-Finnish War 1939–1944* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Heritage & Education Center, 1950).

⁴⁰ Vesa Tynkkynen, *Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen, Taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa*, 251–253.

⁴¹ Palokangas, “Räjähävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa,” 260.

⁴² Hannu Ahokanto, *Laskuvarjo Ja Sotilas. Punabaretit - Laskuvarjojääkärikoulu 1962–1996*, 2nd ed. (Hämeenlinna: Laskuvarjojääkärien tuki ja perinne ry., 2004), 12–13.

⁴³ Palokangas “Räjähävää tyhjyyttä. Sissitoiminta Suomalaisessa Sotataidossa,” 278.

Air Force transport planes were already there, and because it had been the site of several parachute courses during World War II.

The long-range units trained in Utti garrison were quite similar to those from World War II, but the size of the unit was quite big: each unit consisted of about 250 men, almost all of whom were reservists.⁴⁴ Each company had four jaeger platoons, with four teams and support, a communication platoon and command and control platoons. All members of these units were volunteers. Before they were accepted for training, they were required to pass tests, and only the best ones were chosen. Passing the tests, however, did not guarantee that the recruits would be able to get through the training course, which lasted a year and included infantry and guerilla-type tactics, as well as basic skills in gathering intelligence.⁴⁵ Conscripts were taught to use specialized skills and specific tactics with speed and surprise to achieve superiority in fighting situations.⁴⁶ Their tactics and equipment were developed for long-range patrolling, and thus were different from those used by the regular army.⁴⁷

After the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Finnish Defence Forces were restructured. Changes also came to the Parachute School, as the Defence Command decided to create a Special Forces training center at Utti. On January 1, 1997 the Parachute School, Helicopter Wing, Military Police School, and Support company were combined into a new organization, and so the Utti Jaeger Regiment (UTJR), home of the Finnish Army Special Forces, was born. At the same time, all Finnish military helicopters were assigned under the army echelon, and all fixed-wing airplanes moved elsewhere from Utti.

⁴⁴ Palokangas wrote: according to Ahokanto, “The training of Finnish paratroopers included guerilla-type activities from the very beginning; unlike foreign examples, the Finnish paratrooper was not a soldier of airborne troops but a patrolman with special training in long-range reconnaissance and guerilla-type activities.” Palokangas, *Exploding Wilderness: Guerrilla-Type Activities in the Finnish Art of War*, 158.

⁴⁵ Palokangas, *Exploding Wilderness: Guerrilla-Type Activities in the Finnish Art of War*, 278.

⁴⁶ See more about speed, surprise, and relative superiority from William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

⁴⁷ Many other Elite units in history had had the same kind of experience, for example, German Stormtroopers. See Bruce I. Gudmundsson, “Special Tactics Units” in *Stormtroop Tactics, Innovation in the German Army 1914–1918* (Westport, CT: Praeger 1989), 44–48.

After this move, it was quite easy to build up good relationships between Army SOF and the Helicopter Wing with its Mi-8 helicopters.

Basic specialized training of conscripts had been quite the same for decades. Soon after the regiment was established, it started Special Jaeger training beginning with the conscripts. In 1999, UTJR began to train a cadre of non-commissioned officers, called the Training and Standby Team (*Koulutus- ja valmiuosasto*),⁴⁸ in the most demanding tasks. The new era of the Finnish Special Forces had begun in Utti. In 2002, the Special Jaegers (both conscripts and non-commissioned officers) received their development program, which was initially a plan to buy equipment.⁴⁹ Later, the development program was expanded to include programs in how to develop SF personnel.

In 2004, Finnish Defence Minister Seppo Kääriäinen gave a speech in which he announced that the Special Jaeger Battalion would be established in Utti in 2005.⁵⁰ At the beginning of that year, there were organizational changes inside the UTJR and in the Finnish Defence Forces. The Special Jaeger Battalion was established, but command and control was dropped from the upper level in the Army Command. After two battalions were established under the regiment, there was discussion about how to lead these units. One problem was clear: there were only few persons in the higher commands to tell decision makers about FINSOF tactics, techniques, and procedures.

By the end of 2010, the helicopter battalion had enough personnel and money to become a modern, capable unit with new NH-90 helicopters.⁵¹ There was already a plan to develop helicopter tactics and techniques to respond to the threats and tasks of the new security environment. Later on, the helicopter battalion started to develop its own special aviation unit (the Special Operations Air Task Unit, or SOATU), with better-equipped helicopters.

⁴⁸ Seppo Kääriäinen, "Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa" (speech, 40-year celebration of Parachute Jaeger Club, in Finland, March 27, 2004). https://www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/puheet/2004/puolustusministeri_seppo_kaariainen_puhe_laskuvarjojaa_karikillan_40-vuotisjuhlassa.1969.news?1952_o=20.

⁴⁹ Seppo Kääriäinen, "Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa."

⁵⁰ Seppo Kääriäinen, "Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa."

⁵¹ Seppo Kääriäinen, "Puhe Laskuvarjojääkärikillan 40-vuotis juhlassa"

Between 2005 and 2013, the UTJR developed a suitable command and control (C2) structure and acquired the equipment to lead the Helicopter and the Special Jaeger Battalions in all the basic Finnish Defence Forces tasks. In the beginning of the 2000s, the challenging part was participation as an SOF in International Crisis Management. Nonetheless, this part has enabled the regiment to deploy its forces abroad, which will be a vital capability in the future as FINSOF takes on this new task of providing and receiving international assistance (see the Appendix D, Finnish Defence Forces Tasks.) Meanwhile, progress has been made in terms of tactical level directives, orders, and statements, which has raised the value of FINSOF.⁵²

2. Finnish Navy Special Operations Forces

The Finnish Navy divers started their underwater work with very heavy equipment during World War I. Over several decades, the jobs performed by these divers were primarily underwater repairs, construction work, and rescue missions. After World War II, there were 50 divers in the navy but their main jobs remained underwater work, not military operations.⁵³

Technological development and the need for divers capable of conducting military operations led to a new era in the Finnish Navy. The first Finnish military divers' course was held in 1954, focused on basic training methods, experiences, and information provided by Sweden in 1953.⁵⁴ Nowadays we can say that this was the starting point of the Finnish Navy's SOF development and training.

The Finnish Navy trained its first assault divers in their own courses beginning in 1963, with all students as trainers and with its first conscripts in 1964. Later on, these divers got the name combat divers and their training was mixed with diving techniques and special

⁵² Hans Ilis Alm, "Swedish Special Operation Forces: How It all Started," in *Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges*, ed. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson, (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 16–19. After participating in the EU operation *Artemis* 2003 in Congo, SWESOF received a lot of credibility, which raised their value.

⁵³ Matti Anttila and Antti Ellonen, *Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia*, 2nd ed. (Helsinki: Koala kustannus, 2016), 16.

⁵⁴ Anttila et al., *Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia*, 19–24.

operations in the coastal waters.⁵⁵ There were also mine clearance and work diver courses in the Finnish Navy, which served the needs of the Finnish Defence Forces. Development of the divers' training was done in response to the global tensions and military activities during the Cold War. When training of the combat divers needed more development in the late 1980s, the Finnish Navy sent one of its officers to U.S. SEAL training.⁵⁶ This training started a new era in the Finnish Defence Forces divers' development, especially with combat divers.

The Coastal Jaeger School needs a paragraph here because, during the time it existed, many ideas came alive about how to conduct special operations in the coastal and archipelago environment. A coastal battalion was established under the Finnish Army after World War II to conduct operations in the coastal water of Finland. Development in the Finnish Defence Forces during the 1970s led to the establishment of the Coastal Jaeger School to conduct special operations in the coastal areas of Finland. The Coastal Jaeger School trained its combat divers in cooperation with the combat diver courses and it shared the same base with them.⁵⁷ The Coastal Jaeger School disbanded in 1989 because there was no vision for how to develop this specially trained unit and because the unit was operating in the navy's backyard under the army organization. Furthermore, there was no guidance provided to the unit about who was responsible for what in the coastal areas. The time was not right for this kind of unit and the organization was wrong.

The first Finnish Navy Special Forces team started in 1993 with small number of operators as a test. In 2000, the professional unit was further developed under the Navy Diver School, and in 2009, it became its own Navy Special Forces Unit (*ETO=Erikoistoimintaosasto*).⁵⁸ Interoperability between the Finnish Army and the Navy SOF units has been good. Training, exercises, and operations abroad together, such as the

⁵⁵ Anttila et al., *Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia*, 39–40.

⁵⁶ Anttila et al., *Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia*, 55–56.

⁵⁷ M. Mökkönen, "Rannikkojääkäri on Valiosotilas, Suomalainen Commandomies," *Rannikon Puolustaja*, June 1980, 4.

⁵⁸ Anttila and Ellonen, *Vedenalainen Veljeskunta: Merivoimien Sukeltajakoulutuksen Historia*, 57–59.

multinational exercise Trident Juncture 2018, have developed the FINSOFF spirit between these two units.⁵⁹

3. Finnish Special Operations Forces of the Ministry of Interior

The Finnish police have nowadays one special operations qualified unit, called *Karhu*—the Bear, with its main base in the capital, Helsinki. This unit was established in 1972 to be the readiness and security team for the 1975 ETYK meeting (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Helsinki. One of the reasons for the unit's establishment was the terrorist strike at the Munich Olympics in 1972.⁶⁰ Although it had only 15 men at the time, the Bear did the work necessary to become a readiness unit with the new capability to take on high-risk situations. Given basic tasks was at first, it was responsible for counterterrorism missions and high-risk arrest missions in various security situations. The Bear soon became the unit Finnish police can use all over Finland and, if necessary, abroad. The unit was initially structured as a small military unit with elements of command team, technical team, terror bomb team, and operator teams.⁶¹

After 9/11, the Bear unit was strengthened and given more resources and equipment. The unit achieved a very professional level, with about 50 to 100 operators overall.⁶² The cooperation with the Finnish Army and Navy Special Forces started soon after 2001 at the unit level, and since then it has had good ties with other specialized units. In this work, I mention this unit among the Finnish Special Operations forces for several reasons: first, its operators are chosen from men and women who volunteered and were tested; second, its tasks are high-risk operationally and strategically, and are meaningfully

⁵⁹ Thomas Nilsen, "The Northern Sweden and Finland Play Key Role as NATO Kicks off Trident Juncture," *The Barents Observer*, last modified October 23, 2018, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2018/10/nato>.

⁶⁰ *Britannica*, s.v. "Munich Massacre," accessed August 11, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Massacre>. A Palestinian terrorist cell took Israeli athletes as hostages, but the event ended in a massacre and ten hostages died along with one police officer and five terrorists.

⁶¹ Poliisihallitus, "Karhu on Maan Toimintakykyisin Operatiivinen Poliisiyksikkö," *Poliisilehti*, no. 4 (2004), <http://www.poliisilehti.fi>.

⁶² Silva Laakso, "Näin Toimivat Suomen Poliisin Erikoisjoukot – Kun Poliisilla on Edessä Pahin Mahdollinen Tilanne, Paikalle Hälytetään Karhu-Ryhmä," *Ilta-Sanomat*, March 30, 2018, <https://www.is.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005623118.html>.

defined; third, the Finnish Police use the unit all over the operational area; fourth, it is capable of working and cooperating with other special forces from Finland and from other countries, too.

Both maritime and land Border Guard readiness teams were established in 1992. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was fear that refugees and crime would impact Finland's eastern border. There was a need for specialized trained units to strengthen security in the border areas. After a quick decision, seven units of the Border Guard Special Forces were established. Their tasks included counterterrorism and counter crime tasks with special tactics in the border areas. After several years of developing the original units, the Border Guard Special Forces themselves had become a professional cadre to handle difficult and high-risk situations in Finland's border areas.⁶³

The Border Guard established a specialized training center in the eastern part of Finland where it started to train selected conscripts as Special Jaegers in 2007. Nowadays the Border Guard has two special forces units and an SOF conscript training unit. Together these units of the Finnish Border Guard have become part of FINSOF.

4. Lessons Learned from History

The history of FINSOF has traced the roots of the SOF family. As we have seen, each unit within the different organizations was raised to meet the needs of its time. Tactics and techniques came from guerilla-type tactics behind enemy lines and long-range patrolling. These techniques were formulated by the first units and tasks in the army and navy. Units in the Ministry of Interior were established as well when there was a threat of violence caused by outside non-state attackers. The continuation of the training from World War II to these days has been an important link of the FINSOF. That training was connected directly to the required tasks (see Figure 4).

⁶³ Teemu Tumelius, *Rajavartiolaitoksen 5. Valmiusjoukkue: sisäisen ja ulkoisen turvallisuuden merellinen erikoisjoukko 1997-2017* (Helsinki: Nord Print Oy, 2017), 9.




Figure 4. FINSOF tasks' transformation, from World War II tasks to 2017.

The units are divided based on their operative use: the military was meant to operate during wartime while Ministry of Interior units were meant to be used during peacetime to provide interior security. Formerly, this divide was clear but nowadays the line between peace and war is not so clear. This gray zone time has brought units from the military and the Ministry of Interior closer to each other. Because the different kinds of units and their different traditions, there are still gaps in FINSOF that need to be fixed in the future. (See the Appendix E, Organization of the FINSOF Units.)

For a long time the Finnish Army and Navy SOF were mainly training units, which created a large number of usable reserves. Conscript service members and reservists gave FINSOF its unique capabilities and opportunities to use different kinds of experts from the civilian world as part of the SOF. This demonstrated *will* of the main population to defend its own country provides motivated conscripts every year to the training. The basic one-year training gives special operations forces three valuable benefits. First, it gives FINSOF the recruitment basis for the more advanced special operations operator and officer jobs as well as for jobs offered in the Ministry of Interior. Secondly, it gives special operations forces a reliable reserve structure and network, whose members can acquire specialized skillsets from the civilian world by, for example, training as surgeons. Third, it has created

a civilian network through reservists that ties the military closer to civilian society, which is useful for developing crisis-time plans and coordination with these people.

B. FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

Military doctrine gives guidelines to the troops and military organizations about the use of their capabilities. It provides baselines from which capabilities can evolve, and is important for future development. Yet, Finnish special operations have no specific Finnish doctrine to guide them.

The Finnish Defence Forces use an overall national defence doctrine, but with separate doctrines for Land, Naval, and Air operations. There are also some doctrines or guidelines for the separate capabilities within the FDF, such as information operations. The FDF view FINSOF as part of the Joint effects doctrine, an element of the kinetic effect-based operations that support the main operation. This lack of a specific SOF doctrine led FINSOF to look to NATO for doctrine. Beginning in early 2000, FINSOF adopted most of NATO's basic principles and tasks, using the baselines of Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.5.

According to AJP-3.5, the SOF are a strategic asset that can be used against strategical and operational level objectives to achieve high level goals.⁶⁴ In Finland, this principle has not been clear to all during the development of the FINSOF. Nonetheless, in Finland there needs to be ongoing writing process for an own SOF doctrine. This FINSOF doctrine should be tailored to Finnish national needs, the overall defence doctrine, and matters of a special nature, such as mandatory conscript service. As Colin Gray writes, “the strategic value of special operations forces depends not just on how well or poorly they perform, but also on how important for the war as a whole are their assigned missions.”⁶⁵

Dennis Gyllensporre recommends that doctrine should follow the principles of the small defensive state, and the special operations should focus on two different times, pre-

⁶⁴ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–1.

⁶⁵ Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 85.

war operations and wartime operations, because these two seem to be two different operation sets:

- During the pre-war with covert hostile actions, the strategic principle should be a deterrence to prevent escalated conflict, guided by direct defence measures to maintain asymmetry. Special operations would primarily be engaged in enhancing the nations' resilience and countering special enemy operations and covert action with direct defence. Support of national civilian authorities' capacity building is key. Later, the aim may change to induce a rapid conflict escalation by striking HVT's [High-value targets] to engage other states in the conflict.
- During the war with overt operations by the aggressor. At this point, the strategic principle transitions to attrition to exhaust the enemy, guided by guerilla warfare strategy measures to maintain asymmetry. Special operations support regular forces. Raids, in-country and at the enemy's home bases, will induce losses and friction and ultimately degrade the aggressor's will to sustain offensive actions. In late phases, Special Forces should facilitate resistance movements in occupied regions.⁶⁶

1. Finnish Special Operations Tasks

NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations assigned three main tasks to SOF: Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Military Assistance (MA).⁶⁷ It is important to note that these tasks are broadly defined. Special operations can be divided into the operations conducted on the land, in the air, at sea, or in combination. In addition, the approach in each of these operations can vary from direct to indirect, depending on the environment, adversary, end state, and conditions.

In Finland, FINSOF has used NATO tasks, based on AJP-3.5, as part of the Finnish Defence Forces' main tasks, and in figuring out how to apply these overall tasks to local situations and environment. For example, as part of the overall defence of Finland, DA can mean sabotage strikes, ambushes, boarding operations, and terminal guidance tasks as part

⁶⁶ Dennis Gyllensporre, "Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations Theory," in *Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges*, ed. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 35–36.

⁶⁷ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 2-1 – 2-7.

of the Joint fires behind enemy lines; SR can mean strategic intelligence tasks against an enemy's formations, target acquisition, and area assessment; MA can mean advice and training or support to conventional forces or other authorities. Military SOF have also done complementary Counter Terrorism (CT) tasks, air (SOF Air) tasks, and maritime tasks (SOF Maritime). CT in Finland is marked as a police job, but if we recognize the Police Special Forces as a part of the SOF family, then these tasks can be viewed as part of the SOF main tasks.

In operations abroad, MA has been the principal SOF core task, which has given the organization operational and tactical experiences, cooperation and collaboration with other units, and strategical visibility. A wide range of SOF capabilities have been included under the term Military Assistance, but the main effort through operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has been the Building Partner Nation capabilities. This experience can be used to train other national capabilities as well, such as teaching this specific skillset to conventional forces if necessary. Because the nature of MA is wide, it gives FINSOF several possibilities to develop SOF performance.

FINSOF uses NATO's special operations mission criteria to evaluate its tasks. These criteria address whether a task is *Permissible*, which means that FINSOF has the mandate to do the tasked operation within the rules of engagement (ROE). A task must be *Appropriate*, *Feasible*, and suitable for FINSOF, and FINSOF must have the capability to conduct the task with its available assets, who must have the special skills required; the operation must also meet the commander's objectives. The task must be *Sustainable*, which means that the target is appropriate to FINSOF and the operation itself is supported with available assets and capabilities. Finally, the task must be *Justifiable*, where the risks and benefits of the task are in balance and the task is suitable for FINSOF.⁶⁸

Due to a lack of dedicated resources, FINSOF needs help from other capabilities to be effective. This assistance may come from other authorities in Finland, from conventional troops, or from partner forces from other nations. As part of a comprehensive approach to defence, FINSOF must consider its cooperation and compatibility with other

⁶⁸ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–6.

units and organizations. In particular, the interoperability FINSOF gained from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is still valuable to maintain so that it can cooperate with NATO SOF units, giving and receiving support if necessary.⁶⁹

Furthermore, the organizational structure has been tailored by the task because a limited employment force must be optimized in a small country. Future conflicts will require strong flexible structures, as well as networks with advanced communication and personal ties to operate effectively, which is why the structure must be tailored at the tactical and sometimes the operational level.⁷⁰ FINSOF's structure has normally consisted of six main elements: command, action, action support, direct support, enablers, and the liaison element to the higher echelon (see Figure 5). This structure has formulated organizations according to each task, where every part has had a very important part in getting the job done. A task-related organization that involves more than 100 people is called as *Special Operations Task Group*, SOTG, while one involving fewer than 100 people is called a *Special Operations Task Force*, SOTF.




Figure 5. Finnish Special Operations Task Group and Task Force structure.

⁶⁹ FINSOF has been several times in Afghanistan with different tasks, most recently with Advise and Assist task. The latest operation was in Iraq in Operation Inherent Resolve and that was also Advise and Assist task. See more examples from The Finnish Defence Forces, "Irak OIR," Accessed October 23, 2018, <https://puolustusvoimat.fi/web/kansainvalinen-kriisinhallinta/irak-oir->.

⁷⁰ John Arquilla and David Ronfeld, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, MR1382 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), ix–xii, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.htm.

Capable information technology and information systems give this tailored structure the tools to reach its targets with sufficient information and situational awareness. The right structure has also provided for cooperation and communication between elements, so that even if computer and information systems fail, the organization can do its tasks to the end without them.⁷¹ The only feature this structure has lacked is the efficient or proper connections to the strategical level.

2. Finnish Special Operations Forces Limitations

The first major limitation for FINSOF is its peacetime strength. Only a small number of operators join each unit annually, and the overall strength of the units is not increased because there are always operators who quit each year. The Finnish office-holder structure allows some additions per year, but large changes need parliamentary preparations and legislative changes. Limits on the numbers mean that FINSOF Task Forces need support from other military units, other authorities, and civil agencies. For example, during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the FINSOTF was supported by individuals from the reserves, police, border guard and conventional units. Finland is currently able to keep one SOTF abroad and one task force in the homeland at the same time, provided there is no crisis at home.

International operations cannot become a priority for Finnish special operations, because the overall defence policy is based on the threat posed by Russia. Whenever there is a possibility for Finnish forces to participate in international operations, the value to Finland and its forces must be evaluated. As Ronny Modig states in his analysis in *The Utility of Special Operations in Small States*: “the effect when SO are employed is enhanced by the myth of a handful of heroes,”⁷² Which means that it will cost too much to

⁷¹ C. Kenneth Allard, “The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information Warfare,” in *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy*, ed. L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 188.

⁷² Ronny Modigs, “The Utility of Special Operations in Small States,” in *Special Operations from a Small State Perspective, New Security Challenges*, eds. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrika Pettersson (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 43–63.

send specially trained soldiers to the other side of the world if the job does not require special operators.

The second main limitation concerns the structures and command and control system of FINSOF. There is a working structure at the task force level to handle SOF missions together, but the lack of a coherent official operational or strategic command and control system causes misunderstanding and friction in practice. For example, coordination and cooperation as part of the Joint operation can be difficult to gain without unified command at the right level. As Espen Berg-Knutsen highlighted in his *Combating Terrorism Exchange* article, “Requirements for speed, security, and coordination also imply the need for a flat and flexible SOF organizational structure ... [as] reducing the number of bureaucratic, hierarchical layers between the special operator and decision maker means quicker decisions, reduced risk of miscommunication, better control, and increased operational security in both planning and execution phases.”⁷³ The recognition of a need to establish the permanent SOF Command structure as a part of the Finnish Defence Forces or some comprehensive Joint structures could be the answer to many coordination problems, and such a permanent structure could also allow FINSOF to be used if needed against hybrid threats. The decision making could then be connected to the Prime Minister’s Office if the question concerned the Nation’s security issues or using FINSOF abroad to assist other countries.

As mentioned previously, speed and time management are the essence of war. For the small state, these can be especially decisive during a crisis.⁷⁴ The FINSOF can use their flexibility and adaptability to increase their speed and gain the element of surprise against

⁷³ Espen Berg-Knutsen, “From Tactical Champions to Grand Strategy Enablers: The Future of Small-Nation SOF in Counter-Hybrid Warfare,” *Combating Terrorism Exchange* 6, no. 4 (November 2016): 66, <https://globalecco.org/documents/327413/327631/Vol+6+No+4.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Samuel Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 134.

an adversary.⁷⁵ Surprise requires situational awareness delivered by an effective intelligence structure.

Intelligence, on the other hand, characterizes the third limitation facing FINSOF. Although FINSOF missions produce intelligence, they also need support from intelligence. FINSOF has some tactical intelligence assets, but a lack of operational level assets and analysis capability can have a devastating effect. As Erwin Rommel said, “report observations rapidly, for delay lessens the value of any information.”⁷⁶ FINSOF needs at least cooperation and coordination with the intelligence community to share information.

The fourth limitation concerns SOF-dedicated aviation. FINSOF has only a small number of special helicopter aviators as part of the Army SOF, and they can work as a small unit inside the SOF structure, specifically as Special Operations Air Task Unit (SOATU) (rotary-wing). The Finnish Air Force lacks a SOATU as well; even they have fixed-wing pilots who work with SOF.

C. CONCLUSION

FINSOF has become a long way to the point what it is today, but there are still steps to take in the future. Putting together existed capabilities, FINSOF is capable of execute demanding operations. FINSOF could become more effective if certain functions, processes, and capabilities be renewed in the future.

Command and Control

The lack of unity within the FINSOF Command element is a challenging issue, but it can be fixed. Efficient command and control needs to understand and take into account the FINSOF as a whole, with the elements of its capabilities, its effects, and overall costs.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ McRaven finds in his study that relative superiority over an enemy can be achieved through Planning, Preparation, and Execution, and the key elements; what leads to the success are Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed, and Purpose. See William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare; Theory and Practice* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 8–11.

⁷⁶ Erwin Rommel, *Infantry Attacks* (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 6.

⁷⁷ Berndt Horn, “Operationalizing SOF Theory: A Function of Understanding SOF Power,” in *Special Operations Theory*, eds. Paul Lieber and Peter McCabe, Vol. 17–6 (McDill Air Force Base, FL: JSOU Press, 2017), 65.

At the same time there is a need to solve manning issues of the higher echelons. Capable staff needs training and basic skills to become an efficient FINSOF command and control structure.

Flexibility

The Finnish Army Special Operations Forces have been the main development engine in thinking about cooperation and integration between services and different ministries. Development and innovation have come from the bottom of the organization and worked their way up. The key to adapting to new situations has been flexibility of force, which Meir Finkel described in his book *On Flexibility* as a “combination of well-organized command, organizational, and technological elements supported by suitable doctrine.”⁷⁸ Flexibility itself is the key to the element of surprise.

Availability

FINSOF’s flexibility to operate in complex environments with little logistical assistance provides Finnish decision makers a capability that they can use quickly in missions at home or abroad.⁷⁹ The Finnish special operations need support from different partners at home, and if deployed abroad, from coalition or partner nations. Such operations need well-trained and dedicated staff to coordinate missions as part of the main operation.

Efficiency

During decades of hard work, the FINSOF have taken on more tasks as their “toolbox” has grown larger. Despite the growing amount of tasks and overlapping duties, the process itself has brought together services and ministries and barriers between them has eroded. Overlapping duties need to be reshape in the upcoming doctrine of FINSOF. Efficiency can be determined through specific core tasks assigned to each unit. Nevertheless, it is important to maintain complementary tasks because it is mandatory that these units can assist one another.

⁷⁸ Meir Finkel, *On Flexibility – Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield*. trans. Moshe Tlamin (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 2.

⁷⁹ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–3; “High tempo is normally essential to SOF’s ability to conduct special operations.”

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III. FINLAND'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

It's that things are being considered in advance and imagining the case aloud so that when it happens, the routes are clear, this is the one that has been harnessed for a long time, who is it, so be it, but there are two bad things in this race; it does not happen or it does happen differently. Anyone who guesses to take these into account, it's light around the world's edge...

—Veikko Huovinen⁸⁰

The most important external factor in Finland's security policy is its geographic location and the political impacts it brings with it—in other words, geopolitics. Its location in the northeast edge of Europe and the European Union has affected Finland's behavior in the international field, which has been struggling between Finnish border state policy issues and its neighbor, Russia (see Appendix F, Map of Europe with NATO and EU Boundaries). Finland's relations and security policy toward other countries and organizations can be revealed through its relations with Russia.⁸¹ Without Russia's presence and actions near Finland's borders and elsewhere, Finland's security policy would have been very different. This chapter focuses on Russian threats to Finland, and on Finland's security policy responding to those threats.

Russia is acting as a regional superpower and raising its military capacity with aggressive power politics and hard-line rhetoric. It has used this capacity and will together to threaten other states since 1997, notably with its latest cross-border territorial aggression occurring in Ukraine in 2014. These acts of aggression have combined different capabilities from various Russian authorities to conduct effective hybrid warfare. This Russian threat

⁸⁰ By fictional character Konsta Pylkkänen, Veikko Huovinen, *Havukka-Ahon Ajattelija* (Helsinki: WSOY, 1952), 83. Translation by the author, using help with Google translator October 18, 2018.

⁸¹ Linnéll writes about four factors, which are 1) the continued existence of a military capability in the area adjacent to Finland, 2) uncertainty about developments in Russia, 3) Finland's geographical location, and 4) the lessons of history. Jarmo Linnéll, *Finnish Threat Perception Policy in the Early Years of the 21st Century*, Finnish Defence Studies 19 (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2012), 135–137, <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2363-4>.

potential is the main yardstick against which Finland's defence capabilities are measured and evaluated.

Furthermore, Finland's security environment is affected by threats other than those from Russia. Besides the traditional military threats, issues concerning overall security policy include changing climate issues, scarcity of energy resources, population growth and refugee movements, global terrorism, organized crime, cyberattacks, and the increasing vulnerability of modern society.⁸² Therefore, Finland needs to invest in other safety-promoting and threat-preventing measures. Nevertheless, this study focuses on these security issues only insofar as they are involved in Russian threats against Finland.

A. FINLAND'S LINE OF LIFE, THE BALTIC SEA

The Baltic Sea has become as a stage of Russia's drama called: how to achieve Kremlin's geopolitical objectives. This small sea has important meaning to Finland. Next sub-chapter highlights this manner.

1. The Meaning of the Baltic Sea to Finland

The Baltic Sea is the key to Finland's ability to survive. Over 90 percent of Finland's trade moves via the Baltic Sea, highlighting the great importance of the sea and its islands in relation to Finland's economy and its ability to survive. This is commonly known in the Nordic countries as well in the Baltic States.⁸³ According to research from the Heritage Foundation, "The location of the Åland, Gotland, and Bornholm islands are strategically important to security in the Baltic Sea. Russia has long recognized the value

⁸² The Council of State, *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012* (Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office, March 15, 2013), 17–18, https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/07/FIN_Finnish_Security_Defence_Policy_2012_Government_Report.pdf.

⁸³ H. M. Tillotson, *Finland at Peace and War 1918–1993* (Great Britain: Michael Russell Publishing Ltd, 1993). Tillotson wrote: "Whatever the season, the islands and reefs make for difficult navigation, which favors a defender familiar with their hazards," 282.

of these islands and has even carried out military training exercises that simulated capturing them.”⁸⁴

In 2016, a RAND report stated that NATO’s eastern border lacks a defensive capability, especially in the Baltic States area, including the Baltic Sea, which has significant implications for Finland’s security.⁸⁵ The report has spurred a debate in Finland and Sweden about what NATO’s role in the Baltic Sea area should be and how the organization should reply if Russia were to begin hostile military actions in the same area.⁸⁶

Correspondingly, all scenarios in this study are based on potential acts of aggression by Russia against its neighboring countries. Russia’s aggression will use tools and elements of hybrid warfare and will follow the basics of the Russian military doctrine.⁸⁷ The Russian fleet in the Baltic Sea, which operates out of Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, has the key role. One of its tasks is to ensure Russia’s territorial integrity and deter NATO. From Finland’s point of view, the Russian fleet’s capability to do Anti Access/Area Denial (A2AD) operations can disrupt both the sea lines of communication in the Baltic Sea⁸⁸ and the critical trade lines to the Baltic Sea’s northern coasts (see Figure 6).⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “The Role of Sweden and Finland in NATO’s Defense of the Baltic States,” last modified April 28, 2016, No. 4554, 1–2, <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-role-sweden-and-finland-natos-defense-the-baltic-states>. Coffey and Kochis highlight also that “The countries in the Nordic region have direct and indirect roles in guaranteeing the security of the Baltic States.”

⁸⁵ David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank*, RR1253 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 1–2, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.

⁸⁶ Daniel J. Pedrotty, “Prospects for Finland and Sweden to Pursue Closer Defense Cooperation with NATO” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 56–57, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50465>.

⁸⁷ The Russian Federation, *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, trans. The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Russia: Russian Federation, 2014), <https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029>.

⁸⁸ Jan Brunberg, “Merisota 2030+, Tulevaisuus Itämerellä” in *Tuleva Sota: Tulevaisuuden sodan tulevaisuus*, ed. Jari Rantapelkonen (Helsinki: National Defence University, 2018), 133, http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/156899/Tuleva_sota_3.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

⁸⁹ Heather A. Conley, Jeffrey Rathke, and Matthew Melino, *Enhanced Deterrence in the North: A 21st Century European Engagement Strategy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 35–36, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/enhanced-deterrence-north>.




Figure 6. Three islands key to Baltic security.⁹⁰

2. Finland’s Relations with the Baltic Sea Western Military Powers

Finland’s relations with its neighbor Sweden have long been quite close. One of the reasons for this kind of extraordinary relationship is based on history; Finland was part of Sweden for over 400 years, from the 14th century to 1809. Another reason has been Sweden’s geopolitical status includes guarding the Baltic Sea sea-routes and allowing Finland based data flow to go through his region, and a third reason has been that both Finland and Sweden have had a policy of non-alliance towards military pacts like NATO.⁹¹

Finland also has a bilateral agreement with Sweden concerning military issues.⁹² This bilateral agreement does not provide the same kind of cover that NATO Article 5

⁹⁰ Luke Coffey et al., “The Role of Sweden and Finland in NATO’s Defense of the Baltic States,” 2.

⁹¹ Salonijs-Pasternak highlights: “in practice, Finland’s and Sweden’s chosen security and defence policies and actions are having mixed consequences for regional stability, and serve to both increase and decrease ambiguity at the same time.” Charly Salonijs-Pasternak, *Ambiguity and Stability in the Baltic Sea Region: Defence Cooperation between Finland and Sweden Increases Both*, Briefing Paper 241 (Helsinki: FIIA, 2018), 5. <https://www.fia.fi/en/publication/ambiguity-and-stability-in-the-baltic-sea-region>.

⁹² “Sweden and Finland have a close defence policy cooperation and share security policy starting points. The countries cooperate both bilaterally and within existing International forums. In-depth defence cooperation will strengthen the national capability of each country and generate increased security in the surrounding area.” “International Cooperation,” Government Offices of Sweden, November 29, 2016, <https://www.government.se/government-of-sweden/ministry-of-defence/international-cooperation/>.

promises, but the agreement gives Finland and Sweden more ties of military cooperation and partnership with the mentioned country. In addition, the bilateral agreement is based on UN Article 51 issues that every country has its basic right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN.⁹³ This cooperation raises the threshold for use of force against Finland.

Another military power in the Baltic Sea area is NATO. The cooperation between Finland and NATO developed after the Cold War when Finland wanted to join the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP)⁹⁴ to get access to NATO's standardization process. It is likely that a desire to buy military material from Western countries drove Finland's political leaders to negotiate with NATO leaders in the first place.

B. RUSSIA AS A THREAT

Russian military activity near Finland's borders has caused Finland to see Russia as a main threat. Next sub-chapter is about Russia's threat.

1. Russia's Deterrence

Finland's border with Russia is 840 miles long, and this border has seen several conflicts over the past 700 years. For centuries the border has moved in one direction or another. Since Finland gained its independence in 1917, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) has been a contentious neighbor.⁹⁵

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was overrun by black markets and criminals, and started to deteriorate. Tightened budget deficits and discipline under Boris Yeltsin in early 2000 turned the state in a more stable direction, and Russia started

⁹³ United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression* (June 26, 1945): Chapter VII, Article 51, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/>.

⁹⁴ NATO, "Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process," last modified November 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_68277.htm.

⁹⁵ Russia won the war against Sweden in 1809 and after the war Finland became a part of Russia until 1917, when Finland gained independence. For more information, see Martin Hårdstedt, *Suomen Sota 1808–1809* (WSOY 2007).

development programs to increase its military capacity. Consequently, Russian military development and capabilities have been significantly strengthened since the beginning of the 21st century, due to funding of programs supporting the military and other security ministries. (See Appendix G, Comparison of Defense Expenditure and Military Personnel with Countries adjacent the Baltic Sea). Conventional military capabilities deterrence refers to measures against those capabilities, which must adapt in response. Therefore, we can say that conventional Russian deterrence is aimed against conventional threats, which means non-nuclear weapons capacity with different types of platforms for its units and subunits.⁹⁶

These development programs are part of the Russian National Security Strategy (RNSS). The RNSS highlights political confrontation between Russia and the West, and it clearly indicates that Russia opposes the expansion of NATO and the presence of U.S. troops near its borders, especially in the Baltic States. The RNSS states that Russia will protect its national interests; this protection can be described as an aggressive defense policy. For example, Russia has improved its precision-guided missile systems to prevent escalation, but it can use these systems as necessary as protection tools.⁹⁷ Russia clarified its policy against the countries near its borders and directly informed the West that if there are any threats towards Russia, it will take action to neutralize that threat.⁹⁸

Furthermore, in the beginning of 2007, Russia began a series of joint exercises designed to develop its ability to lead large military operations and improve mobility and readiness. Figure 7 highlights one such exercise, Zapad2017, which Russia conducted with Belarus in September 2017. These exercises have included all dimensions of the battlefield and all arms and branches from the armed forces and supporting ministries. The exercises

⁹⁶ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, "Russian Strategic Deterrence," *Survival* 58, no. 4 (July 19, 2016): 13. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945>.

⁹⁷ "Russia: Defence budget by Category," Jane's by IHS Markit, July 17, 2018, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1327402>.

⁹⁸ Olli-Matti Mikkola et al., "Venäjän Nollasummapelin Valtapolitiikka," in *Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisen ratkaisun lähtökohtia*, ed. Fred Blombergs (Helsinki: The National Defence University, 2016), 201. https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/124431/Blombergs_verkkoversio_2016-2.pdf?sequence=2.

indicate that Russia is preparing to fight a high-tempo conventional war against a sophisticated opposing force.⁹⁹ This detail is meaningful in light of Russia’s overall capabilities.




Figure 7. Russia Zapad2017 exercise according to Germany’s *Bild* magazine.¹⁰⁰

Even though it still has its strategic nuclear capacity, Russia is preparing to use conventional weapons and hybrid warfare against opposing forces or capabilities. Ideas to focus on more local, smaller scale wars came from the Soviet time; it was already part of Russia’s military strategy.¹⁰¹ These methods inherited from Soviet times were shaped by Russia during its wars against insurgents near its southern border, in the Chechen wars,

⁹⁹ “Russia: Army, Executive Summary,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, July 17, 2018, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1319294>.

¹⁰⁰ Julian Röpcke, “Putin’s Zapad 2017 Simulated a War against NATO,” last modified December 19, 2017, <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/bild-international/zapad-2017-english-54233658.bild.html>. See Michael Kofman, “What Actually Happened during Zapad 2017,” last modified December 23, 2017, <https://news.err.ee/650543/michael-kofman-what-actually-happened-during-zapad-2017>.

¹⁰¹ Vasilii D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans. Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gouré, and Thomas W. Wolfe (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1963), 288, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R416.html>.

and through the ongoing conflicts in Dagestan.¹⁰² Such capabilities could be used against Finland and its neighboring countries. As the exercise Zapad2017 clearly demonstrated, Russia also knows the importance of the Baltic Sea.

As a part of the RNSS, Russia continues its strategic-deterrence means against the West. These include economic, political, and ideological means, and scientific measures, which must coordinate with military means and non-military means. Military means with offensive and defensive capabilities include conventional weapons such as precision strike capabilities and units. One new deterrent ability that Russia has now is its ability to strike and fight with new remote-controlled weapons and platforms.¹⁰³ Non-military means such as influence and information operations are the keys to delivering strategic effects in order to further Russia's goals. We can conclude that non-military means can be effective without military means to get to the desired end state; at the least, these means can obscure the operational area, and give an advantage to the attacker.¹⁰⁴ Robert Leonhard wrote as early as 1998 that the next century would give leaders a new possibility to use information as a way to get an advantage over adversaries,¹⁰⁵ just as hybrid warfare does.

2. Russia's Hybrid Warfare

Russia places a lot of emphasis on the use of non-military measures instead of hard power measures to influence the population and to obscure the true meaning of an operation. To understand the methods of Russian hybrid warfare, it is important to be familiar with the principle of Sun Tzu, that "All warfare is based on deception"¹⁰⁶ or the

¹⁰² First Chechen War 1994–1996 and the second Chechen War 1999–2009, conflict in Dagestan is ongoing; see, for example: Yagil Henkin, "From Tactical Terrorism to Holy War: The Evolution of Chechen Terrorism, 1995–2004," *Central Asian Survey* 25, no. 1–2 (December 1, 2006): 193–203, <https://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/02634930600903270>; and Ariel Cohen, "A Threat to the West: The Rise of Islamist Insurgency in the Northern Caucasus and Russia's Inadequate Response," *Backgrounders*, no. 2643 (Mar 26, 2012), 1–17, <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/threat-the-west-the-rise-islamist-insurgency-the-northern-caucasus>.

¹⁰³ Bruusgaard, "Russian Strategic Deterrence," 13.

¹⁰⁴ Bruusgaard, "Russian Strategic Deterrence," 14–15.

¹⁰⁵ Leonhard, *The Principles of War for the Information Age*, 49.

¹⁰⁶ Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66.

Soviet term *Maskirovka*. According to David Glantz: “The Soviets categorize *maskirovka* as strategic, operational, and tactical ... by definition, *maskirovka* includes both active and passive measures designed to deceive and surprise the enemy.”¹⁰⁷ In Ukraine 2014, Russia used a broad range of deception from the concept of *Maskirovka* as well as hard military tools such as special operations forces, unmanned aerial vehicles and precision strike capabilities.¹⁰⁸ Concentrating the combined hybrid effects together, Russia achieved its goals rapidly.

Russia’s hybrid warfare method, based on a model developed by Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov, includes different phases and actions for the development of the crisis (see Figure 8: The Gerasimov model).¹⁰⁹ Phases start from Covert Origins and end with Restoration of Peace. The other phases are Escalation, Start of the Conflict Activities, Crisis, and Resolution. During the development of the crisis, the potential military threat rises to the military conflict level (indicated by light and dark orange in the upper triangle). Under the phases are two basic methods to use against adversaries: military (indicated by gray) and non-military (indicated by light blue) means, which are situated during certain phases; for example, non-military means of political pressure can be used during phases three to five.

¹⁰⁷ David M. Glantz, “The Red Mask: The Nature and Legacy of Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War,” *Intelligence and National Security* 2, no. 3 (1987), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431907>, 178–179.

¹⁰⁸ Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” 19.

¹⁰⁹ Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” originally from Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, originally published in his article “The Value of Science in Prediction” *Military-Industrial Courier*, February 27, 2013.




Figure 8. The Gerasimov model.¹¹⁰

The Gerasimov model of hybrid warfare is adapted from old ideas about ways to use different kinds of capabilities together to gain the desired effect or solution. A RAND report by Christopher Chivvis describes hybrid warfare as having three key characteristics:

It economizes the use of force. Recognizing Russia would stand little chance of winning a protracted conventional conflict with NATO, Moscow seeks instead to pursue its interests without overt use of military power if possible. Russia may still use its conventional and even nuclear threats as part of a Hybrid strategy, but in general, it prefers to minimize the actual employment of traditional military force. The use of cyber tools is an excellent example of one way in which Russia economizes on the use of force.

It is persistent. Hybrid war breaks down the traditional binary delineation between war and peace. The reality of Hybrid war is the ever-changing intensity of the conflict. Hybrid war strategies are always underway, although at certain moments they may become more acute and intense or cross over into conventional combat operations.

¹¹⁰ Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.”

It is population-centric. Russian military experts have watched as the United States and its allies fought in the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere over the course of the last quarter-century. They seized upon the importance of an approach that seeks to influence the population of target countries through information operations, proxy groups, and other influence operations. Russia uses Hybrid warfare to work within existing political and social frameworks to further Russian objectives.¹¹¹

These characteristics mean that Russia can use means and troops other than conventional forces to capture territory or other spaces. This does not mean that it cannot use conventional forces, but operations can be more asymmetric and Joint than before. These operations are supported heavily with influence operations and deception, which need more governmental actions and capabilities than just military to lead to success. Gerasimov himself has said that today's modern conflicts need four times more non-military means than military means.¹¹²

In addition, the lack of knowledge about Russian strategy leaves lots of room for wrong conclusions and speculation. This is why the Russian strategy seems based on given possibilities, and there is no single operational line of it to follow. Russia has broad opportunistic political objectives, which seek the vulnerabilities of other countries in order to, as Mark Galeotti suggests, distract, divide, and demoralize the other nations.¹¹³ Galeotti further mentions that operations can be coordinated, and can use basic military principles such as breaking the chains of command, jamming communications, and other means in order to gain success. Recognizing Russia's exact interests and strategy toward its adversaries remains a challenge.

¹¹¹ Christopher Chivvis, *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare" and What Can Be Done about It* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), 2, emphasis added.

¹¹² Chivvis, *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare" and What Can Be Done about It*, 2–3.

¹¹³ Mark Galeotti, "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine,'" *Foreign Policy Magazine*, March 5, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine>.

C. FINLAND'S STRATEGY AGAINST THREATS

Today's security threats are characterized by difficult predictability and short warning times. Many threats and risks to Finland are transboundary and have wide-ranging implications. In recent years Finland has faced the truth that there are several hybrid threats, which can change its security environment.¹¹⁴ Finnish society is more dependent on digitalized and automated systems than before, and such systems can be targeted by hybrid actions. As The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats highlighted in a working paper, "[t]argets of Hybrid influencing have been scattered across the whole society, as the Hybrid actors are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities and capability gaps existing in our technologically advanced societies."¹¹⁵

Finland has dealt with its national security issues quite well. It has developed its national security strategy to use a wide range of national capabilities under different kind of organizations and ministries. In Finland this strategy is called "The Security Strategy for Society," and its main principles are cooperation and coordination through the process of preparedness in order to, first, be prepared with planning and action including research and training, and second, get feedback from exercises and functions in order to develop the process and gain better cooperation.¹¹⁶

Finland's Functions Vital for Society (FVS), illustrated in Figure 9, are the basis of the preparation actions in society. These actions need cooperation between different authorities and ministries. *Leadership* covers all capable management actions needed to keep effective processes ongoing, and it requires clear roles and decisive actions between different authorities, situational awareness, information management, and the ability to cooperate. *International and EU Activities* are an integral part of the safety and security planning processes and are linked to every safeguarding activity in the nation. *Defence*

¹¹⁴ "Hybrid threats are at their very core interlinked, operating in a domain spanning activities that the threat actors, nation states or non-state actors, conduct in order to advance their agenda and attain their goals." Cederberg et al., *Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts*, 2.

¹¹⁵ Cederberg et al., *Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts*, 3.

¹¹⁶ The Council of State, *The Security Strategy for Society of Finland*, Government Resolution November 2, 2017 (Finland: The Security Committee, 2017), 9, <https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/security-strategy-for-society>.

Capabilities focus on developing and maintaining the pre-emptive threshold that an adversary would need to cross in order to use force against Finland (see further information in Appendix E, The Finnish Defence Forces tasks and Readiness structure). The defence capabilities are part of the society and other vital functions, because the main forces are based on reserves who are part of the civilian sector. By maintaining *Internal Security*, the society will prevent crimes against its population and humanity, and sustain the structures necessary to manage consequences of natural disasters and damage. *Economy, Infrastructure, and Security of Supplies* must be maintained during a crisis in order to secure society's vital functions and survival. *Functional Capacity of the Population and Services* aims to support the population's ability to function and stay well by maintaining core services. *Psychological Resilience* is meant to prepare individuals, communities, and society to withstand the mental pressure caused by crisis situations and to cope with their effects during the Pre-Crisis, Crisis, and Recovery times. The key to the effective measures is the population's trust in the government's ability to keep all of these structures functioning and to give hope to the people.¹¹⁷




Figure 9. The Functions Vital for Society in Finland.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ The Council of State, *The Security Strategy for Society of Finland*, 14–24.

¹¹⁸ The Council of State, *The Security Strategy for Society of Finland*, 14.

The FVS model can serve as an effective tool against Russian hybrid warfare, requiring the people's cooperation, working with each other, inside this model. First, the coordination and cooperation between different authorities and capabilities is important. Secondly, the intelligence collection and analysis from each branch has to be coordinated, and analysis must be presented together to political leaders so that they can have good situational awareness. For example, one of the recently released laws gives authorities more tools to monitor and search data from cyberspace.¹¹⁹ Thirdly, international relations and work forums have to be healthy; for a small country like Finland, this is the way to be a part of world politics. Finally, leaders and capabilities have to create a credible narrative with credible security to influence their citizens and, especially, to deter possible attackers.¹²⁰

The power to carry out the FVS is contained in the Finnish *Emergency Power Act 1552/2011*, which has been updated recently to respond to future threats. The main body of the law describes the situations when this act can be put into action. The act uses the word *exceptions* to describe situations that could lead to a crisis that would invoke the law:

- armed or aggressive assault on Finland and its immediate aftermath;
- the threat of a major armed or severely aggressive attack on Finland, the prevention of which requires the immediate introduction of the powers conferred under this Act;
- a particularly serious incident or threat to the population's livelihood or to the economic bases of the country as a result of which essential functions of society are substantially jeopardized;
- a particularly serious major accident and its immediate aftermath;

¹¹⁹ Rosendahl Jussi, "Finland Aims to Fast-Track New Intelligence Laws to Avert Terrorism," *Reuters*, April 19, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-security/finland-aims-to-fast-track-new-intelligence-laws-to-avert-terrorism-idUSKBN17L213>.

¹²⁰ The Council of State, *The Security Strategy for Society of Finland*, 33–35.

- a very widespread dangerous infectious disease, which is particularly serious for major accidents.¹²¹

All of these situations can be used as tools in a larger hybrid operation. The tools are called Comprehensive Security in Finland, and the defense-related part of it is the Comprehensive National Defence.¹²²

¹²¹ Emergency power Act, 1552, §3, (December 29, 2011), <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2011/20111552?search%5Btype%5D=pika&search%5Bpika%5D=valmiuslaki>, emphasis added.

¹²² The Council of State, *The Security Strategy for Society of Finland*, 7. See also Michael Aaronson et al., who explain that the NATO Comprehensive Approach concept has three themes: “1) coherent application of national instruments of power; 2) comprehensive interaction with other actors; and 3) comprehensive action in all domains and elements of crises.” Michael Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat,” *Prism* 2, no. 4 (April 2013): 117–118. http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_2-4/Prism_111-124_Aaronson-Diessen.pdf.

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IV. FINLAND'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SCENARIOS IN THE BALTIC SEA

It is not that they can't see the solution. It is that they can't see the problem.

—Gilbert K. Chesterton¹²³

This chapter focuses on the main question of this study, which is whether FINSOF is flexible enough to cope with both internal and external missions in the face of rising hybrid threats from Russia. The chapter uses three hypothetical scenarios focused on the northern Europe region and the Baltic Sea, all of which are based on worst-case possibilities.

The three scenarios in this chapter were created by Charly Salenius-Pasternak, James Mashiri, and Michael Moberg and first appeared in issue 9/2015 of *Suomen Kuvalehti*, published online February 27, 2015, in an article entitled “*Venäjä vaatii Suomelta laivastotukikohtaa, Gotlannin Saari miehitetään—voisiko näin tapahtua?*”¹²⁴ It was published subsequently online with the headline “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”¹²⁵ Such scenarios are important tools of assessment for every independent state. In my analysis, I begin by describing each scenario; then, I describe the readiness of the countries and their willingness to use military power in each case. After every scenario, I use SWOT to estimate the roles that FINSOF could play in each one. Because we do not know exactly how different countries will develop in

¹²³ Gilbert K. Chesterton, AZQuotes, Wind and Fly LTD, accessed November 12, 2017, <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/54521>.

¹²⁴ Charly Salenius-Pasternak, James Mashiri, and Michael Moberg, “*Venäjä Vaatii Suomelta Laivastotukikohtaa. Gotlannin Saari Miehitetään. Voisiko Näin Tapahtua?*” *Suomen Kuvalehti*, no. 9 (February 27, 2015): 32–39. <https://suomenkuvalehti.fi/digilehti/?vuosi=2015&numero=09/2015#>. Translation by author: Russia Demands Naval Base from Finland, Gotland Island Occupied – Could this Happen?

¹²⁵ Charly Salenius-Pasternak, James Mashiri and Michael Moberg, “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?” last modified March 4, 2015, <https://disciplescientist.wordpress.com/tag/hybrid-warfare/>.

the future, I assume that the strengths and politics of each country depicted in the scenarios remains quite the same as they are today.

In all of these scenarios, the main players are Russia, Finland, Sweden, and NATO.¹²⁶ Russia sees itself as a status quo state in Northern Europe and NATO as a challenger of that. Russia feels that NATO is moving too close to its sphere of influence, little by little, putting Russia in a situation in which it feels it must act.¹²⁷ These scenarios are all based on this assumption. It should also be noted that Russia has more conventional forces in the Baltic Sea region than NATO; furthermore, the geography of the region gives Russia the possibility to move toward escalation.¹²⁸

Daily life in these scenarios is assumed to be essentially the same as it was in 2017 after the Russian Zapad2017 exercise. Finland has remained outside of NATO; it is a member of the EU, and it has bilateral agreements with neighboring countries such as Sweden. The Finnish SOF has strengths and tasks similar to those described in Chapter II. All of these scenarios share the assumption that one of the SOF Task Forces, consisting of one platoon-size unit, is deployed in the Middle East, , one Task Force is training, and the last unit is at partial readiness and leave. Otherwise, the Finnish Defence Forces' workflow remains the same. The Finnish Air Force has its main task to secure Finland's airspace, and the Finnish Navy will do its surveillance tasks in nearby waters with the cooperation of the Finnish Border Guard, which is part of the Ministry of Interior.

These scenarios assume that Russia is at its normal peacetime strength and has not called its reservists into action. Furthermore, the scenarios follow the main "movements" that Russia rehearsed in its huge exercise Zapad2017. Finally, they assume that Russia's

¹²⁶ "The countries in the Nordic region have direct and indirect roles in guaranteeing the security of the Baltic States." Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, "The Role of Sweden and Finland in NATO's Defense of the Baltic States," last modified April 28, 2016, No. 4554, 1–2, <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-role-sweden-and-finland-natos-defense-the-baltic-states>.

¹²⁷ Ulrich Kühn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), 13, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/preventing-escalation-in-baltics-nato-playbook-pub-75878>.

¹²⁸ Kühn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook*, 25–26.

security considerations have stayed more vital than its economic efforts, and it has continued its military modernization programs as planned.

A. FINLAND'S UNILATERAL OPTION: THE ÅLAND CASE

The next sub-chapter describes events in the Scenario 1.

1. Events in Scenario 1

This first hypothetical scenario is based on the strategic meaning of Åland, a group of Finnish islands situated between Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea. It is a demilitarized zone based on an agreement of the League of Nations from the year 1921.¹²⁹

The very first situation goes like this:

A month ago an oil tanker with a full cargo was captured in the Baltic Sea. Two weeks later Russia announced that there had been an attempt at sabotage on the Nordstream undersea gas pipe 40 kilometers south of Helsinki. Only a faulty radio-controller unit prevented an explosion and catastrophe.¹³⁰

As described, the situation will be part of Russia's hybrid warfare operations, but no one knows that yet. Of course, the main international media are interested in this kind of situation, and there is much news about the sabotage attempt in the middle of the Baltic Sea. The Russians have entered the Escalation stage using both information warfare and strategic deterrence measures. This means that Russia had already made preparations with covert actions and formations without being discovered by the West (see Figure 10).

¹²⁹ League of Nations, "*Convention Relative a La Non-Fortification et a la Neutralisation Des Iles d'Åland*," Treaty No. 255, Geneva, October 20, 1921, https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=LON&id=575&chapter=30&clang=_en.

¹³⁰ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"




Figure 10. Scenario 1: Finland’s unilateral option, the Åland case.¹³¹

The actions were follow through social media:

Videos from a group called *Oil Fighters Front (OFF)* have been spreading in social media. In those, the reasons for OFF’s strikes against Russia’s oil export via the Baltic Sea is given. The leader of the organization who calls Åland, Finland, his home has publicly thanked a political party that is part of the Finnish government for their support. The Finnish prime minister denies any claims of support from the Finnish government.¹³²

¹³¹ This map is modified by the author from the Finnish Defence Forces added the information from the case: Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

¹³² Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

These actions in the Baltic Sea will raise questions of security in the international organizations and countries in the Baltic Sea region. Actions can be described as part of the opposition forces in the Gerasimov model (see Figure 11). In Ukraine in 2014, activities operating in the so-called gray zone were designed to avoid target detection capabilities, which is the same in this case.¹³³ A tracking process of security issues will start among the Finnish authorities.

In this phase, nobody knows what OFF is or where it is from:

Soon after news emerges that an attempt to capture another oil tanker has been made; Russia announces that it will step up patrolling in the Gulf of Finland and in the northern Baltic Sea. Despite the increased monitoring, an oil tanker that was returning to the Primorski oil port without cargo sends a distress signal late at night using international emergency frequencies: there has been a massive explosion below decks, and the ship is sinking. The crew is rescued, but the tanker is lost about 30 km south of the island of Jurmo. The Russian Baltic Fleet and the Western Military District begin a wide-scale readiness exercise the very next morning. A full combat unit of marines with all gear from vehicles to anti-aircraft missiles is loaded onto ships. On the next morning the international media is told of a Russian fisherman who has seen sea mines in the northern Baltic Sea. The information is corroborated by photos taken by the fisherman. Cargo ships immediately begin to change their routes, and by the afternoon all sea traffic in the region has ceased—and along with it 90% of Finnish imports and exports.¹³⁴

The tensions in the Baltic Sea region rise to the next level and at the same time, Russia moves its actions to the next phase: Start of the Conflict Actions, with a direct military threat supported by economic sanctions and information operations. This time Finland acts by sending its military vessel minesweeper *Katanpää* to the area. One of Finland's Coast

¹³³ Cederberg et al., *Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts*, 5.

¹³⁴ Saloniuss-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

Guard vessels in already patrolling near Åland, and perhaps another one is searching for the remnants of the lost tanker somewhere near the island of Jurmo.¹³⁵

International forums focus on Russia's reaction, and it makes an announcement:

Russian Federation is now forced to shoulder the main responsibility for the security of the Baltic Sea because terrorists supported by western governments are trying to destroy Russia by strangling its exports. The next morning, the captain of the minesweeper *Katanpää* receives a message directly from the commander of the Russian naval task force. It is a complete surprise: Finns are told to remain in the Turku archipelago. Russia will take care of identifying and dismantling the mines and will hunt for the terrorists. An hour later the intelligence chief of the Defence Forces gives his update to the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Committee that includes some ministers and the president. The chief of defence suggests enacting certain powers given in the emergency powers act and that Finland interprets the demilitarization treaty of Åland in a way that allows free access to the Defence Forces. The political leadership is not ready to accept the latter suggestion. They are afraid that it would send a wrong signal and could escalate the situation. On the matter of using emergency powers, the assembled ministers cannot agree whether the situation fits criteria for emergency conditions set in Chapter 1, Section 2, Paragraph 3, which states that emergency conditions include the threat of war [or] other specific conditions outside Finland having a comparable effect. Nevertheless, the level of readiness is raised for the military.¹³⁶

Because Finland has the scalable readiness law, this situation means that some parts of the Finnish Defence Forces now call their reservists into action. In the first phase, these reservists are normally experts, soldiers from the readiness units or reserve officers to

¹³⁵ The League of Nations agreement about the Åland allows Finland to take some actions inside the demilitarized zone if the situation requires those, as mentioned: "in the event of the neutrality of the zone being imperiled by a sudden attack either against the Aaland Islands or across them against the Finnish mainland, Finland shall take *the necessary measures* in the zone to check and repulse the aggressor until such time as the High Contracting Parties shall, in conformity with the provisions of the present Convention, be in a position to intervene to enforce respect for the neutrality of the islands." The League of Nations, *Convention Relative a La Non-Fortification Et a La Neutralisation Des Iles D'Åland*, in Article 10, Geneva, October 20, 1921.

¹³⁶ Salenius-Pasternak, Mashiri, and Moberg, "Venäjä Vaatii Suomelta Laivastotukikohtaa. Gotlannin Saari Miehitetään. Voisiko Näin Tapahtua?," 34.

support headquarters. Now it is clear that Finland is confronting a situation that can lead to escalation toward a larger crisis.

However, the mysterious Oil Fighter Front remains unknown, and its acting against Russian tankers seems odd. What if the OFF is part of the larger operative plan from Russia? The very next day, Russia takes action in the Baltic Sea:

The main news in all countries around the Baltic Sea is about a new video that the Oil Fighters Front has published online. It says that the group will also use aircraft and submarines against Russia's oil exports. In the background of the video, there is a glimpse of the Åland islands. Russia immediately announces a no-flight zone up to 10 km that will be enforced from the sea and air. The Finnish military intelligence is informed by Sweden that the components of the [Russian] division ordered to participate in the readiness exercise are still in their ready positions in Kaliningrad. The Finnish Navy is then informed that three Ropucha-class landing vessels are moving to the sea.¹³⁷

Because of its good relationships with Sweden and other Baltic states, Finland will get quite good information about Russian movements through military intelligence cooperation. If the Russian fleet moves out from Kaliningrad, its movements will always be of interest to several other countries and NATO. The intelligence community supports the situational awareness in Finland, and finally, the best estimate comes from one of the Swedish submarines that have followed the Russians. The captain assesses that:

[t]he ships are filled to capacity with equipment and troops. After that, a brief telephone conversation between the Finnish and Swedish Chiefs of Operation confirms one thing: Russia has with its readiness exercise created the ability to conduct amphibious and airborne assaults anywhere in the Baltic Sea region within 24 hours.¹³⁸

If Russia decides to invade Åland with amphibian units, there will be no time to get to the island with conventional units.

¹³⁷ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?" An emphasis added.

¹³⁸ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

Even though Finnish military intelligence has presented alarming assessments for a long time, the political leadership has not dared to decide upon even a partial mobilization; only a few reservists have been called to the service. Because of these delays only the Air Force, some units from Finnish Navy have the immediate capability to defend the integrity of Finland's territory.¹³⁹

The upcoming threat from Russia puts the politicians into a difficult situation. If they authorize a partial mobilization, that could be a signal to Russia that Finland is ready for military conflict. Yet, if the politicians do nothing, it could be a signal that Russia can go farther in its demands without consequences. Russia will not be afraid of NATO intervention this time because Finland is not a part of NATO with its Article 5 security guarantee. Regardless, the next offer to the Finnish politicians comes from Sweden; it has had an amphibious battalion available for two days.

After a quickly called meeting of the Swedish government, they offer the battalion to the defence of Finland. The offer comes as a shock to the Finnish political leadership and Finland thanks Sweden for the offer but is not ready to accept it, yet. When the Foreign and Security Policy Committee adjourns, the prime minister is given another urgent message. Its main point is that Russia does not foresee improvement in the security of the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Therefore, it would be important that it would be given a base from where it could fight against the terrorists. Russia suggests a joint base with Finland and Sweden. The military port in Upinniemi or the Hanko port are presented as good choices. The message ends with a statement that Russia wishes for cooperation but is prepared to take independent actions to secure a base for the operations. The Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Committee is immediately reconvened.¹⁴⁰

2. Russian Hybrid Warfare in Scenario 1

The politicians in Finland had not realized how dangerous the situation in scenario 1 was. In this case, by rejecting help from Sweden, they have put Finland in a situation where it must respond by itself. Now, the political options are either to respond to the threat and

¹³⁹ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

¹⁴⁰ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

move toward the crisis alone, or to accept the demands from the Russian side and see what will happen.

The Russians’ use of hybrid warfare has led to the situation they wanted in this scenario. Finland is alone against Russia. Russia has used hybrid warfare to implement its actions against Finland according to a rapid timetable, and the phases of escalation can be seen clearly. In this case, Russia does not have to use all its capabilities from the model; it has picked the ones most suitable for this kind of operation. Russian actions in scenario 1 are indicated with red arrows and numbers in Figure 11, which shows that Russia is ready to start the fourth phase, the Crisis phase. In this case, it means that opposing forces and authorities should be ready before phase 4 is reached.




Figure 11. Russian actions in Scenario 1: Finland’s unilateral option.¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.” Additional information has been added by the author.

3. Implications to FINSOF

In this kind of scenario, the FINSOF offer capabilities Finland can use. On a tactical level, they already have the organization and structure to respond rapidly. FINSOF has a “crisis-ready” culture inside its structures and leadership, and the culture of challenging the optimism and credulity in this kind of situation to be prepared.¹⁴² Being prepared means having suitable overall plans against certain kinds of scenarios, available command and control structures, available communication lines and structures, and clear knowledge of responsibilities with regard to who is doing what with which responsibility.

FINSOF’s use in scenario 1 can be described by *viability* level. In this case, viability means that FINSOF has a chance of success and the capacity to operate in the situation described in scenario 1. If the total Viability score is less than zero, FINSOF is not viable for use in this scenario. A total Viability score of zero means that FINSOF’s viability must be evaluated based on the particular situation. A total Viability score of +1 indicates that FINSOF can be used in this scenario, and a total Viability score great than +1 indicates that FINSOF can be strongly viable in this scenario (see Table 2).

¹⁴² Tim Johnson, *Crisis Leadership: How to Lead in Times of Crisis, Threat and Uncertainty* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 19.

Table 2. FINSOF Viability in Scenario 1.

Item	Points	Explanations
Support from outside: NATO and bilateral.	0	FINSOF do not get support from the Sweden bilaterally when Finland rejects it in this scenario.
FINSOF can act directly against adversary.	+ 1	FINSOF have the capability to act directly against adversary inside its boundaries, if legislation approves actions.
FINSOF can act indirectly against adversary.	+ 1	FINSOF have the capability to respond to adversary indirectly, for example, through information operations.
FINSOF can do the task without large-scale mobilization.	0	FINSOF can start actions with peacetime strength.
FINSOF Strategic level Command and Control effect.	0	FINSOF's lack of Strategic level Command and Control in homeland case can be managed through Society Vital functions model.
FINSOF Intelligence support.	0	FINSOF need to be the reliable Finnish intelligence support in this case.
FINSOF Aviation support.	- 1	FINSOF's lack of Strategic airlift and SOF aviation can be problematic.
Total FINSOF Viability in operations in Scenario 1 during gray zone period.	+ 1	+ 1: FINSOF can be used in this scenario.

By comparing Gerasimov model phases (see Figure 11) to the model of Figure 12, Basic layer to scenario build-up process based on the NATO Spectrum of Conflict, we can see that the main courses of action happen during the two phases of Pre-crisis and Escalation. Asymmetrical warfighting with specialized skill units and SOF brings this threat to the area called the gray zone. This gray-zone period is challenging because no clear indicators signal that the nation is in crisis, but some actions are ongoing that will affect the nation's capabilities and survival. Also, it is difficult for a defender that requires legislative action to use its military. Unlike the United States, Finland has no doctrine regarding the use of general-purpose forces for conventional war and SOF for irregular war.¹⁴³ That is why the FINSOF structure needs to be flexible enough to respond to

¹⁴³ Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2016), 5.

situations like this, and decisions need to be made quickly to raise readiness and capabilities to be ready to respond if needed.




Figure 12. Basic layer to scenario build-up process on the NATO Spectrum of Conflict. Emphasis added from Scenario 1.¹⁴⁴

Clearly, the time to act with SOF in Scenario 1 is immediately after the first strike against the oil tanker and activation of the OFF. That strike can be seen as a terrorist act and responsibility for counterterrorism is in the Ministry of Interior. Because the conditions are in a difficult operating environment, the Ministry of Interior in Finland will need support from the Finnish Defence Forces, especially for transporting equipment by air and sea. This kind of situation near Finnish coastal borders should activate both situational awareness processes and the execution process of the special operations against possible terrorist networks. The structure needs to be immediately *Joint* and comprehensive because SOF need support from every service and all actors to conduct possible operations against the enemy in this case.

¹⁴⁴ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–3.

Because the main scenario happens in the Åland area, Finland needs to think how to manage its operations in the demilitarized zone. The answer is to use forces from the Ministry of Interior, supported in this particular case with equipment and supplies from the Finnish Defence Forces.¹⁴⁵ In this particular scenario the Finnish Defence Forces SOF can be used as a reserve and be prepared to enter optional targets outside of the demilitarized zone. The lack of manpower can be repaired with reservists if there are suitable structures and methods to do so quickly. In this specific case, the needed reservists would be the most valuable inside the commanding structures and the Finnish Border Guard SOF units.

In Finland, SOF never talked before clandestine operations,¹⁴⁶ but in this case, SOF need to do some preparations in the target area before the rest of the troops will arrive. Ministry of Interior FINSOF could conduct environmental reconnaissance to prepare the battlefield, create networks among the local people, support evacuation plans, and create resistance cells. This work can fit the MA criteria and the main work on the scene will be to advise and assist. Nevertheless, the situation affects the FINSOF tasks and operation, and they need to prepare to do full the spectrum of SOF tasks if necessary.

A quick reaction can show the adversary that the nation is willing to respond to the threat, and its immediate actions can deter the enemy and make it withdraw from its intentions. As Antonio J. Echevarria has written about nations' coercion-deterrence operations, actions can be non-kinetic and kinetic, with capacities including military, diplomatic, informational, and economic measures. In this case, the SOF actions can be part of the Finnish political and informational countermeasures against the adversary.¹⁴⁷ I analyzed the FINSOF performance in scenario 1 with SWOT (shown in Table 3).

¹⁴⁵ The Prime Minister's Office guide says that it is mandatory for Åland to plan their actions before and during the crisis time. Prime Minister's Office, "Ohje Valmiuslain mukaisten toimivaltuuksien käyttöönottamisesta -päätöksentekomenettely Valtioneuvosteossa", Appendix to VNK/939/61/2016, June 6, 2017, 9, https://api.hankeikkuna.fi/asiakirjat/d78f3b37-f964-435e-809f-a303651184d6/eeb7f704-bffe-4d5b-ba1f-f8b4bcbbb644/ASETTAMISPAATOS_20171212065000.PDF.

¹⁴⁶ According to Joint Publication 3-05, a clandestine operation is "an operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such way as to assure secrecy or concealment." Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Special Operations*, JP 3-05 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), GL-7, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_05.pdf.

¹⁴⁷ Echevarria II, *Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy*, 26.

Table 3. SWOT with FINSOF in scenario 1: Finland’s unilateral option.

	Strengths	Weaknesses
Internal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cooperation and coordination and communication systems among different authorities are already organized during peacetime. - Flexibility of SOF allows them use of Ministry of Interior troops in Åland without violating the demilitarized zone act. - Previous exercises have prepared the staff of different organizations to work together. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lack of special operations liaison officers in higher levels can cause unnecessary delay to launch operations. - Overall quantity of SOF operators is not high so every bigger situation of a certain size will need support from other authorities and/or reservists. - Adversary information operations can mislead the SOF, sending them in the wrong direction.
	Opportunities	Threats
External	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Legislation in Finland gives the possibility to raise readiness and structures, especially among the readiness units. - FINSOF’s information campaign response immediately creates deterrence against adversary. - Using SOF from Ministry of Interior in Åland leaves the FDF SOF in reserve, giving them time to prepare for possible escalation to a larger crisis. - Friendly population of Åland offers the possibility of exploiting conditions and taking advantage of the environment against adversary. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Speed of this scenario and blurred situation can delay the critical decisions concerning readiness and actions against threat. - Leaving Finland alone may affect the need of quick strategic airlift capability from abroad back home and special equipment might need to be left abroad if there is no plan to replace it. - Without international help, Finland is left alone and needs to prepare for a larger crisis.

It is important to note, however, that transportation to the operational area needs to be fixed. First, the one Finnish SOF task force that is abroad must return to the homeland, especially if this crisis will continue. In this case, there can be a situation in which manpower can be delivered but their equipment will be delayed.¹⁴⁸ Secondly, the cooperation between SOF units and civilian authorities and the local population needs to be activated before using transportation of equipment and possible troops to the target

¹⁴⁸ Finland is a part of the NATO Strategic Airlift Capacity Program, but it can use only 3.2 percent of the capacity. This means that planes can be used only a few times a year and these flights must be booked several months in advance. NATO, “The Strategic Airlift Capability,” accessed September 15, 2018, <https://www.sacprogram.org/en/Pages/The%20Strategic%20Airlift%20Capability.aspx>.

areas. Thirdly, all actions need to be conducted under great secrecy and operational security, and this might need a high level of deceptive actions. These movements need to be planned with great care, and the time to conduct infiltrations to the Åland Islands must be used wisely because of the threat of the Russian forces.¹⁴⁹

B. FINLAND'S BILATERAL OPTION: THE GOTLAND CASE

The next sub-chapter describes events in the Scenario 2.

1. Events in Scenario 2

The following scenario is based on another island situated in the middle of the Baltic Sea, Gotland. This island has the same kind of the strategic meaning to Sweden that Åland has to Finland. In this scenario tensions in the Baltic Sea have already risen because of Russia's exercises in the southern Baltic Sea (see Figure 13). It means that Russia has already taken the steps to escalate the crisis. From Finland's point of view, this scenario begins in the Pre-crisis phase and inside the so-called gray zone.

¹⁴⁹ NATO AJP-3.5 highlights the infiltration as: "a technique and process in which a force moves as individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection." NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations AJP-3.5*, LEX-4.



Figure 13. Scenario 2: Finland’s bilateral option, the Gotland case.¹⁵⁰

The scenario starts with tensions situated in the Baltic Sea area as follows: “for Sweden and NATO countries only a few diplomatic connections remain with Russia. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have partial mobilization in place, and the state of readiness has been raised for NATO’s new vanguard troops.”¹⁵¹ The assumption is that tensions in the Baltic Sea area have raised military readiness to its highest levels in many countries because of Russia’s exercises. These actions have not gone unnoticed in Finland.

¹⁵⁰ This map, modified by the author, is from the Finnish Defence Forces, with added information from the case: Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

¹⁵¹ Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland Or Invades a Swedish Island?”

The Russian troops in Kaliningrad are in a state of constant readiness, and they have had three readiness exercises within the last month. The battalion commander of *Hemvärnet* (national guard) of Gotland is kidnapped. This news has barely reached Swedish media when another news story breaks: the army storage buildings in Gotland have caught fire. The depot on fire is where all 14 tanks on the island are stored. A new entity called the *Gotlands folkrepublik* (Gotland's People's Republic) makes its first appearance on the Internet. Their official pages state that the republic has been formed because Sweden has not been willing to defend the island nor utilize the shale gas deposits in the close proximity to benefit the Islanders. Now Gotlanders are seizing the responsibility for their resources, economy, and government.¹⁵²

According to Gerasimov model, Russian forces started the Escalation phase using criminals, opposition groups, or their special forces to cause disorder and uncertainty, similar to the tactics Russia used in the Donbass area in 2014.¹⁵³ Russia moved rapidly through Escalation to the next phase, initiating Conflict activities. Its forces conduct covert asymmetrical actions against their targets, and use non-military means in support of active information operations to achieve strategic goals.¹⁵⁴

Years ago these types of actions were conducted mainly by the KGB, and the role of the Russian SOF was mainly to support Soviet Army intelligence and sabotage. Overall, the Russian SOF (*Spetsnaz*) proved its worth as a strategic tool, particularly during Russia's 2014 Crimean operation.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

¹⁵³ Paul Robinson, "Russia's Role in the War in Donbass, and the Threat to European Security," *European Politics and Society* 17, no. 4 (March 15, 2016): 511–514, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1154229>. He mentioned that "The transfer of Russian "volunteers" onto Ukrainian territory has in part been organized with the direct participation of the Russian authorities."

¹⁵⁴ Mark Galeotti and Johnny Schumate, *Spetsnaz: Russia's Special Forces*, ed. Martin Windrow (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2015), 50.

¹⁵⁵ USASOC, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2015), 43–46. This report defines Spetsnaz as follows, "Russian SPETSNAZ are irregular forces that operate covertly, providing the Russian government plausible deniability. They are found throughout the military, intelligence, and security services. The SPETSNAZ-GRU (military intelligence) featured prominently in the annexation of Crimea."

The next event, which occurs near the Swedish coast, endangers all Western countries in the Baltic Sea area.

A Swedish *JAS Gripen* fighter is shot down with shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. Russia announces that despite the increased tensions it will go on with its Zapad18 exercise. A large part of Russia's Baltic Sea navy is on its way from St. Petersburg along the Gulf of Finland, with the intention of passing Gotland. Russia begins another large-scale readiness exercise that involves the entire western military district.¹⁵⁶

Now it is obvious that Russia has started its military activities against a sovereign state and has entered a new phase of its operation. Besides shooting down the Swedish fighter, it uses military exercises to deter other Western countries and NATO. In this particular scenario NATO decides to stay out of this crisis because Sweden is not a NATO member. NATO focuses more on the Baltic security situation and it has a lot of work with that, though it will monitor and conduct surveillance actions on the Baltic Sea. The United States also leaves the Nordic countries alone with their problems in this case. The only effort from the U.S. side is to increase economic sanctions against Russia.¹⁵⁷

The Swedish government is having a crisis meeting when three large car bombs go off: one in Stockholm, another in Malmö and the third in Göteborg. SIA, *Svenska Islamistiska Arméen* (Swedish Islamic Army), an organization that Swedish Security Service *Säpo* (*Säkerhetspolisen*) has never heard of claims responsibility for the strikes. *Svenska Islamistiska Arméen* says that the bombs are the beginning of a fight against the Swedish Armed Forces; this includes strikes against reservists. Chaos spread rapidly; stores are emptied, and cash runs out of ATMs. The next morning helicopters of an airborne landing battalion appear above Gotland; they are from a Russian Vladivostok class vessel.

¹⁵⁶ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

¹⁵⁷ Ukraine was a good partner with the United States before Russia's invasion of its soil. The United States, however, did not give military forces as assisting troops to Ukraine in 2014. The main efforts from the U.S. side were driven with three vectors: 1) support Ukraine by means other than military, 2) reassure NATO allies, and 3) penalize Russia (with sanctions). Steven Pifer, "Ukraine, Russia and the U.S. Policy Response," Brookings, last modified June 5, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/ukraine-russia-and-the-u-s-policy-response/>.

Heavy *Ropucha* -class landing vessels bring additional troops to the shores carrying both S-400 and *Pantsir S-1* anti-aircraft systems.¹⁵⁸

As a part of hybrid warfare, Russia uses its forces from the Baltic fleet with other capabilities to seize Gotland. Using S-400 systems,¹⁵⁹ they block also airspace on the Baltic Sea and southern area of Sweden. These actions also affect Finland's shipping and flight lines, and the conflict immediately affects the Finnish economy. Although there may be some debate about whether Sweden and Finland do have a bilateral agreement,¹⁶⁰ this bilateral agreement requires them to aid each other militarily in the event of an attack. Furthermore, Finland is obligated to supply this military assistance if Sweden requests it. In addition to its agreements with Finland, Sweden is a member of the EU, which entitles Sweden to certain types of support. For example, according to the Solidarity Clause in the Treaty of Lisbon, if an EU member state is attacked by terrorists, that state can request aid from other EU states.¹⁶¹

Due to the heavy enemy force, Sweden is only able to partially repel the landing party. "The formidable vessel-borne anti-aircraft capability parked between the Swedish mainland and Gotland limits the operations of the Swedish Air Force. *Gripen* fighters and the navy's *HMS Visby* and *HMS Karlstad*, however, succeed in sinking the landing vessel *Ivan Gren* and the destroyer *Nastoychivyy*."¹⁶²

Sweden finds out that it is inside a full-scale crisis with Russia. The ongoing crisis reveals several problems with the logistics systems that are designed for smaller-scale international operations. "The logistic systems are not suited to handle the demands of the

¹⁵⁸ Salenius-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

¹⁵⁹ "Russia: S-400 Triumph" Jane's by IHS Markit, August 23, 2018, <https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jlad0593-jaad>. The missile can reach air targets up to 250 km but newer version of the missile can reach 400 km range.

¹⁶⁰ Government Offices of Sweden, "International Cooperation."

¹⁶¹ "Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union," European Union, Pub. L. TITLE VII, Article C 222 (2016), eur-lex.europa.eu.

¹⁶² Salenius-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

needed Swedish Air Force activity. There are enough aircraft but not enough mechanics nor pilots to keep them in the air around the clock. Russia announces that it will stop its use of force if the Swedish Navy with its submarines withdraws to its ports.”¹⁶³

The Finnish government is surprised by the quick escalation of the crisis. The Russian information operation has blinded the whole of Western Europe without showing its true intentions. The tensions in the Baltic Sea should have already raised readiness in Finland at all levels as the comprehensive approach requires.

The rapid military escalation catches Finland’s political leadership by complete surprise. Emergency powers have not been authorized, but the Defence Forces are in the highest state of readiness that is possible without enactment of the laws. The President has unofficially suggested that Finland should offer military support to Sweden. The Finnish government has not responded to the suggestion. By the evening news, the government announces that Finland will enact certain parts of the emergency powers act and will concentrate defence capabilities around Åland.¹⁶⁴

One lesson learned from this situation is that situational awareness needs to be kept high in the political sphere as well as in the military sphere, within the domestic intelligence system and with cooperation international intelligence and information systems.

The FDF readiness troops react quickly, and the Finnish Navy troops from Finland’s coastal brigade (Nyland Brigade) respond to the threat.

Soon after the act, the Nyland brigade sends a company of volunteer coastal rangers towards Åland. The conscripts that had nearly completed their service were officially released from their remaining duties, enabling them to volunteer immediately. The transport ships are guarded by a navy vessel and a flight of *F-18 Hornet* fighters. One hour after the announcement, a deserted Finnish highway acts as a runway for six arriving [*Swedish*] *JAS Gripen* fighters. They are met by a group of Finnish aircraft mechanics who have received training on servicing

¹⁶³ Salenius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

¹⁶⁴ Salenius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

Gripens. The Swedish mechanics are on a private plane flying towards the closest Finnish civilian airport.¹⁶⁵

Next the Finnish located a massive, low-flying squadron that seems to indicate a formidable bombing strike is being prepared. *F-18 Hornets* are sent to make identification flights in preparation for Swedish *Gripens* to strike above the Gulf of Finland. Ballistic missile tracking systems operated by the United States and NATO detect eight *Iskander* missiles being fired. The information reaches Swedish operational headquarters near Stockholm only minutes before the first missile strikes the main building. The Swedish air force battle headquarters, *StriC Grizzly*, and military signals intelligence (FRA) centers are also struck by the ballistic missiles.¹⁶⁶

In this case, Finland chooses its side very clearly; military cooperation between the two countries can be seen as a pact and Russia knows this. Open actions can deter Russia because it knows that its support bases are located nearby Finland's borders and within striking distance. On the other hand, Finland needs to monitor carefully what is happening in other areas near Finland's borders. If Finland decides to help Sweden with SOF capabilities, it might leave a security gap in Finland. The situation gets worse by the next morning:

Russia's S-400 anti-aircraft systems in Gotland are positioned in a way that flying anywhere over the Baltic Sea is very risky. The United States could take out the S-400's, but for now, it is only observing and waiting. The Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Committee is facing its greatest dilemma to date. The government is split between two choices. Some are in favor of complete and open military support for Sweden, in effect a full joint defence. Russia would surely react to that. However, Russia knows that Finland is capable of striking strategic targets and neutralizing its activity around the Gulf of Finland, for example, by striking Luga from where the *Iskander* missiles were launched. On the other hand, some believe that Russia does not yet see Finland as being an open party to the conflict. Could Finland be the peace maker?¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

¹⁶⁶ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

¹⁶⁷ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

2. Russian Hybrid Warfare in Scenario 2

Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the scenario in which Finland is drawn into the crisis with Sweden. Russian aggression surprises all in the Baltic areas and international forums, and the United States seems to have no will to react quickly to regional conflict. We can say that the basic layer of the graphic in Figure 14 is based on the main principles described in a USASOC report: “use of proxies, denial to deflect international criticism and domestic political reaction, information and cyberwarfare, and political preparation of populations.”¹⁶⁸

Russian actions in Scenario 2 are indicated with red arrow and numbers in Figure 14, which shows that Russia is already in the Escalation phase when the situation in this scenario begins. Scenario 2 ends in the Crisis phase with military conflict and Russian military presence on Sweden’s soil. The scenario seems to show that Russia has completed its military goals, taking the Gotland Islands. This move takes Russia closer to the next phase; that is, the Resolution phase.

¹⁶⁸ USASOC, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014*, 14.




Figure 14. Russian actions in Scenario 2: Finland’s bilateral option.¹⁶⁹

3. Implications to FINSOF

It is obvious that the situation starts rapidly but the first indicators should alert decision makers in Sweden and Finland. If Russia uses the same model as before, the indicators can be found in the overlay of the Russian mist created by *Maskirovka*. Finding the indicators requires a continuing analysis process and situational awareness from the states. The importance of the intelligence community, intelligence cooperation, and precise reports and analysis to the nations’ leaders is high. In this case, Gerasimov model is very true: “military actions start by groups of troops during peace-time, war is not declared at all.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.” Additional information added by the author.

¹⁷⁰ Gyllensporre, “Contemporary Hybrid Warfare and the Evolution of Special Operations Theory,” 30.

In scenario 2, the FINSOF viability level raises the high likelihood that FINSOF will be used to help Sweden’s SOF if needed. The score indicates that FINSOF can be strongly viable in this scenario (see Table 4).

Table 4. FINSOF Viability in Scenario 2.

Item	Points	Explanations
Support from outside: NATO and bilateral.	+1	FINSOF get support from Sweden bilaterally when it is willing to help Sweden, and that move pits Finland against Russia.
FINSOF can act directly against adversary.	0	FINSOF has limited capability to act directly against adversary in Sweden, but it is a possibility.
FINSOF can act indirectly against adversary.	+1	FINSOF has the capability to act against adversary indirectly, for example, through Information operations.
FINSOF can do the task without large-scale mobilization.	0	FINSOF can act in Sweden with peacetime strength, but will need reservists and abroad units to prepare for possible upcoming crisis in homeland.
FINSOF Strategic level Command and Control effect.	- 1	FINSOF’s lack of Strategic level Command and Control mechanism hampers the interoperability and cooperation.
FINSOF Intelligence support.	+ 1	Sweden provides intel support in this case.
FINSOF Aviation support.	0	FINSOF’s lack of Strategic airlift and SOF aviation can be problematic if Sweden’s own capability is in use all the time.
Total FINSOF Viability in operations in Scenario 2 during gray-zone period.	+ 2	+ 2: FINSOF can be used in this scenario.

FINSOF's task force can be used in this situation to help Sweden. FINSOF's flexibility allows these troops to custom-tailor tasks for rapidly deployed teams with pre-plans or with mission and situation-related plans.¹⁷¹ Deployment as a response force requires situational awareness, which has to be coordinated with Swedish intelligence. Using SOF also indicates to Russia that Finland is ready to act to support Sweden according to the agreements between the two countries. Finland can transfer, for example, the SOTF situated in the Middle-East to Sweden (see Figure 15). Using SOF also creates deterrence against Russia and compels Russia to prepare counter-strikes against targets on its own soil.




Figure 15. Basic layer to scenario build-up process on the NATO Spectrum of Conflict. Emphasis added from Scenario 2.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Horn, "Operationalizing SOF Theory: A Function of Understanding SOF Power," 65.

¹⁷² NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–3.

Finland's decision makers are buying time to answer the attacker's operations by supporting Sweden. Even more important, effecting surprise may impact the minds of the attacker's leaders, creating friction within its activities in the operational area.¹⁷³ The element of surprise is one of the basic principles for use of SOF.

Assisting a foreign country with forces needs prior planning, cooperation, rehearsals, and interoperability. The speed at which the crisis developed in this scenario surprised the decision makers. From FINSOF's point of view, there was no time left to do large rehearsals with accompanying forces after the decision to support Sweden. One lesson learned concerns readiness, which places demands on troops (including military, agencies, and troops from other Ministries) but also on structures and networks with international partnerships. Exercises with these partnership countries need to be added at every level, according to the strategic level. Exercises and operations together are the only way to get familiar with each nations' tactical principles and learn how to solve the crisis or situations that need support with other countries' forces.

Another big lesson learned from this scenario is that other nations can be in a crisis situation while the supporting country is still at the pre-crisis phase. From FINSOF's point of view, this means that it is not necessary to have any reservists or wartime structures available when the operation in Sweden starts. An analysis of FINSOF's performance from scenario 2 is provided in Table 5.

¹⁷³ Jan Hanska, "Times of War and War over Time" (PhD diss, Military Sciences Dept., The National Defence University, Helsinki, 2017), 251, <http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-2881-3>.

Table 5. SWOT with FINSOF in scenario 2: Finland’s bilateral option.

	Strengths	Weaknesses
Internal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Using the flexible Swedish and Finnish SOF capabilities with both troops’ strengths and know-how leaves both sides’ an important reserve to prepare for the next phase. - Flexibility of SOF allows Finland to use its Joint SOF task force from the Defence Forces in the operational area so it leaves the Ministry of Interior troops focusing on Finland. - Previous exercises with Swedish SOF, incl. their aviation, has prepared the troops to work together.¹⁷⁴ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overall quantity of SOF operators and planners is not high so this kind of situation needs deep analysis of what can be done and with what forces. - FINSOF need to rely on Swedish intelligence and information on the situation in the target area because Gotland is not one of our “focus” areas. - Mobilization to get more FINSOF operators and planners gives an indication to the adversary, which can lead to undesirable situation.
	Opportunities	Threats
External	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Finland’s bilateral agreement with Sweden allows FINSOF to do operational planning, execution, and cooperation against <u>crisis situation</u>. - Good cooperation with Swedish companions allows Finland to work together with Swedish capabilities that are deficient in Finland, such as submarines. - Intelligence cooperation with Sweden gives Finland a better picture from the Baltic Sea area to help decision makers analyze the upcoming situations better. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cooperation with Sweden drives Finland toward the same crisis, in this case, against Russia. - Using FINSOF forces in Finland’s southwestern flank leaves a gap in its eastern flank if the crisis escalates to war in the east. - Lack of fixed-wing Finnish Air SOF capability can make it difficult to conduct this operation if there is no help from Sweden.

Scenario 2 does not tell us which kind of warfare the Swedish forces will launch against the attacker in Gotland. Because the adversary is stronger, we can assume that a smaller state will use an indirect approach against the attacker. In this case, for example, the indirect approach can mean an irregular warfare type of resistance on the island.¹⁷⁴ FINSOF capabilities in MA or SR can be used in this kind of warfare if necessary, but local

¹⁷⁴ Irregular warfare can be defined as MMI states: “the overarching method used in an indirect strategy in order to win the war by other means than conventional warfare.” MMI, “Irregular Warfare - A Strategy for Small States,” in *Special Operations in Small State Perspective*, eds. Gunilla Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 146.

knowledge and support from the local population are required.¹⁷⁵ Besides MA and SR, FINSOF can also support Sweden with available counterterrorism, SOF Air, and SOF Maritime capabilities.

Insertion and extraction of forces in this scenario need to be done cautiously and with high degree of secrecy. Finland must determine whether it wants to reveal to Russia every supportive movement it makes toward Sweden? If the answer is yes, then we can act openly and use overt operations. If the answer is no, however, then FINSOF will need to act as a covert force.¹⁷⁶ Covert operation can require a different kind of status for the troops inside Swedish boundaries. First, FINSOF troops must be clearly identified, both to Swedish forces and also to their own compatriots in order to avoid blue-on-blue situations.¹⁷⁷ Second, every action needs to be done under high secrecy and control. Thirdly, covert operations need clear and precise goals with overall military deception¹⁷⁸ plans, and in this case, with the Swedish planning process.

C. FINLAND'S MULTILATERAL OPTION AS PART OF A LARGER CRISIS: THE NARVA CASE

The next sub-chapter describes events in the Scenario 3.

1. Events in Scenario 3

The following scenario is based on a crisis between Russia and Europe that takes place in Estonia and near Finland's borders, both in the northern Baltic Sea region and near

¹⁷⁵ Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, Indian edition ed. (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012). Liddell Hart speaks about unification and meaning of the balance on the ground, 366–372.

¹⁷⁶ Covert operation is “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Special Operations*, GL-7.

¹⁷⁷ During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan coalition forces hit each other a couple of times causing unacceptable losses with friendly fire. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Blue on Blue Deaths Raises Tough Questions for MoD,” *The Guardian*, last modified Aug 24, 2007, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/25/military.iraq>.

¹⁷⁸ Military deception is defined in the United States as “actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), 152, <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/dictionary.pdf>.

Arctic waters. The actions for this scenario can be found in Figure 16. As Ulrich Kuhn has written in the NATO playbook: “The regional imbalance between NATO’s and Russia’s conventional forces, NATO’s own deterrence loopholes, and the geography of the Baltics all make both deliberate and inadvertent escalation possible.” In this scenario, the escalation leads to a bigger crisis involving several countries and NATO.¹⁷⁹




Figure 16. Scenario 3: Finland’s multilateral option, the Narva case.¹⁸⁰

Since the Crimea and Ukraine events, the gap between Russia and the West has deepened, and in this scenario, Escalation turns to crisis and it starts inside Estonia.

In Narva, Estonia, various non-governmental organizations have emerged, all united in their demands that all rights belonging to citizens should also be granted to minorities. The alternative the NGOs present is Narva’s separation from Estonia and joining with Russia. Estonia has raised the readiness of its armed forces and has organized [Joint] exercises for different governmental branches in eastern Estonia (Ida-

¹⁷⁹ Kühn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook*, 25.

¹⁸⁰ This map, modified by the author, is from the Finnish Defence Forces, with added information from the case: Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

Viru). Two weeks ago there was an incident near Narva: three men and one woman were killed, and two people were wounded by shots fired by the *Kaitseliit* (national guard). According to Russia, three of the killed were Russian citizens living in Estonia. Estonian sources state that a *Kaitseliit* patrol was suddenly fired upon while conducting a drill, the schedule of which was public knowledge.¹⁸¹

One of the main issues in the Baltic States is the presence of ethnic Russians, and Russia has announced several times that it has the mission to protect all Russian citizens, whether at home or abroad. In Estonia the Russian-speaking population is nearly 25 percent (in Narva almost 95 percent), and Russia can use this population both as a justification for taking actions to “protect” these people, and as a coercive tool against the Estonian government.¹⁸²

There have been numerous reports in the Baltic Sea region of Russian behavior violating airspace.¹⁸³ In most of the cases, jet fighters from NATO, Finland, or Sweden fly close to these violators to force them to turn back into international airspace. The behavior and aim of these Russian pilots is to test readiness and show their military power. These tactics can be called risky, and could lead to accidental escalation. To prevent this kind of risky behavior, the communication relations with Russia are important.¹⁸⁴ In this scenario, communication with Russia fails and one event leads to the next one.

Russia is appealing to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU so that the rights of the citizens of Russia and of the Russian ethnic minority are secured. Demonstrations in Narva, as well as many in social media, are promoting the benefits of separation from Estonia. Earlier demands for civil rights have morphed into accusations of government officials’ systematic control efforts and arrests among the Russian population. At the same time, Russia is

¹⁸¹ Salonius-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

¹⁸² Henrik Praks, “Hybrid or Not: Deterring and Defeating Russia’s Ways of Warfare in the Baltics - the Case of Estonia,” in *NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats*, eds. Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 2015), 219–241.

¹⁸³ Kontinen highlights that during the years 2005–2017, Russia was the violator of Finland’s airspace on 17 occasions. “Suomen Ilmatilaa on Loukattu 35 Kertaa Yhdessätoista Vuodessa - Asialla Pääosin Venäjän Koneet,” last modified August 1, 2017, <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9751748>.

¹⁸⁴ Kühn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook*, 38–39.

publishing on its government-controlled media stories saying that “Lithuanian, Latvian and Polish fascists” have been recruited to strengthen Estonian defence forces. According to the media stories, these units are already operating with NATO special forces in Ida-Viru.¹⁸⁵

Russia’s ongoing information campaign strengthens its narrative that the Russian population needs to be supported abroad. This narrative based on Russian strategy was put forth by the Russian government in 2015. This information campaign is a part of Russia’s doctrine against NATO and strengthens the support of its own population against NATO.¹⁸⁶ Russia using its proxies wanted to spread more chaos in the border areas organizes demonstrations in Narva. Because of the tensions of the area these demonstrations turned into riots, as Russia calculated. The main goal could be developing an apparently inadvertent event that could lead to escalation and then to crisis.¹⁸⁷

The situation becomes extremely tense when the local police chief is kidnapped and an officer of the Estonian armed forces is publicly executed. Two days later the main government buildings in Narva are in the control of armed men who call themselves Narva’s self-defense troops (*Narva enesekaitsevägi*). Their commander announces that they will not allow any aircraft into the area, to protect civilians from the terrorism of the Estonian fascist military. The Latvian and Lithuanian governments call emergency meetings when news of the no-flight zone are carried by the media. That afternoon Finnish news broadcast that both Latvia and Lithuania have started mobilizing.¹⁸⁸

Russia’s actions resemble those from the 2007 Estonian Bronze-statue riots that accompanied a large information campaign and cyber-attacks. In 2007, moving the Soviet era monument commemorating the defeat of Nazis as a remainder of Soviet occupation

¹⁸⁵ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

¹⁸⁶ The Russian Federation, *Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy*, trans. The Spanish Ministry of Defense (Kremlin, Moscow, 2015), 9, section 44.

¹⁸⁷ Kühn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook*, 47–48.

¹⁸⁸ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

caused violence between the Russian-speaking population and Estonians.¹⁸⁹ The Bronze-statue riots soon turned into vandalism and looting in Estonia, and the situation took a dangerous direction when it was obvious that Russia was behind the operation.¹⁹⁰

Activities near the Finnish borders and military mobilizing in several Baltic States should activate the readiness processes in Finland¹⁹¹ as follows:

The Finnish defence minister announces later that evening that even though the Finnish Defence Forces have raised their level of readiness, there are no other measures being taken due to the situation in the Baltics. Finland is not considering offering support to the Baltic countries, nor have there been any official requests to do so. Estonia demands consultations under the fourth article of the Washington Treaty, and NATO ambassadors in Brussels are called together. Estonia is also facing broad-scale attacks on its information and electric networks, causing Estonia to consider the call for the activation of article 5 collective defence. Also, Sweden suggested to Finland two days ago, that they could step up monitoring in the Baltic Sea and as part of an agreement regarding the shared use of the airspace and territorial waters. The new Finnish law on Defence Forces and territorial monitoring makes this possible as of January 2016.¹⁹²

NATO's ability to send large formations to the Baltic States will take some time. Russia can exploit this time to move its troops into better positions, and with these movements, it can deter NATO from making quick decisions.¹⁹³ This means that crises have to be faced with the forces that each country already has available. In recent years

¹⁸⁹ Martin Ehala, The Bronze Soldier: Identity Threat and Maintenance in Estonia, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 40:1, March 13, 2009, 139–158, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01629770902722294>.

¹⁹⁰ See for example: Francis Tapon, “The Bronze Soldier Explains Why Estonia Prepares for A Russian Cyberattack,” *Forbes*, last modified July 7, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/francistapon/2018/07/07/the-bronze-soldier-statue-in-tallinn-estonia-give-baltic-headaches/#303a873d98c7>.

¹⁹¹ The Ministry of Defence for Finland, “Framework Arrangement for Estonian-Finnish Defence Cooperation,” January 18, 2018, https://www.defmin.fi/files/3642/FI-EE_Framework_Arrangement.pdf. Finland signed a defense cooperation agreement with Estonia in 2017. Its main topic was the strengthening of Nordic-Baltic defense cooperation and striving for a common understanding of strategic defense policy issues.

¹⁹² Saloniuss-Pasternak et al., “What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?”

¹⁹³ Kühn, *Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook*, 47.

NATO has put some efforts into strengthening the cooperation between NATO and non-NATO members in the Baltic Sea area; one example is the maritime operational cooperation through the treaty organization's Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC).¹⁹⁴ Perhaps Maritime SOF operations can be coordinated through this forum.

Finnish leadership was surprised that Sweden made this request publicly, and Finland refused almost immediately. The President emphasized restraint and keeping channels of communication open. He said he would travel to Moscow before the EU emergency meeting. After three armored personnel carriers carrying the first group of volunteers from Russia crosses the Estonian border, Estonia announces that it is under an attack from Russia. The demand for collective defence is a bolt of lightning in an otherwise rainy Brussels morning. In a separate message, Estonia reminds Finland and Sweden of the Lisbon treaty-based responsibility for defence and support about all EU countries. It requests armed support from both to repel the attack it is facing.¹⁹⁵

Because Finland only accepted this new task to support other countries in the summer of 2017, it has no experience with how such support should be organized and with which kind of capabilities. Given Sweden and Finland's bilateral agreement, this leaves open the question of whether either country would automatically help the other if Swedish or Finnish forces are attacked in Estonia.¹⁹⁶

In this particular case, the situation in Estonia is confusing. Russian-supported volunteer forces inside Estonia's borders violated the sovereignty of the nation, but is the Estonian situation still an internal problem? Russia's information operation prevents the neighboring countries from understanding what is happening. Without "ground truth" from the area, it is difficult for the Finnish

¹⁹⁴ Heather A. Conley, Jeffrey Rathke, and Matthew Melino, *Enhanced Deterrence in the North: A 21st Century European Engagement Strategy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 38, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/enhanced-deterrence-north>. The study highlights that Germany can play a key role in bridging the institutional divide between NATO and non-NATO members through its Baltic Maritime Component Command (BMCC), which will also include the national Maritime Operations Center. The BMCC is designed to command and control future operations in the Baltic Sea region.

¹⁹⁵ Salenius-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?."

¹⁹⁶ Salenius-Pasternak, *Ambiguity and Stability in the Baltic Sea Region: Defence Cooperation between Finland and Sweden Increases Both*.

government to decide on sending military formations across the Gulf of Finland. Instead of sending FDF, Finland can send a small number of SOF. Within this small footprint, perhaps drawn from the Border Guard's SOF unit, FINSOF can offer advice and assistance.

Sweden responds immediately and announces that it will support Estonia and NATO with all possible means. Units of U.S. Air Force and Marines that have earlier been at Norway's bases in Bodö and Tromsø begin arriving in Såtenäs and Ronneby in Sweden. Russia makes a statement that this is a provocation and claims a right to pre-emptive strikes against Sweden if the allied troops do not leave Swedish territory. Russian forces are also regrouping elsewhere. They advance closer to the Finnish border on the Karelian peninsula and near the Arctic Circle, from the Alakurtti and Pechanga military bases.¹⁹⁷

Assuming that readiness to act in Finland is already ongoing and the FDF have the power to make preparations, the FINSOF has already focused on operational planning and readiness actions to reflect that. Nevertheless, in this case, Russia's movements nearby Finland's borders do not mean a crisis itself. In this scenario, a large-scale multinational crisis has become a real possibility, and the FDF must now focus on the national defense, using elements from international help if necessary.

An anonymous high-level source leaks that Sweden is negotiating directly with the U.S. about its status were started when Finland had repeatedly rejected Swedish requests for enacting components of joint defence plans. According to the source, Finland forsook the joint defence fearing to endanger its special relationship with Russia. The Finnish government calls all ministers and high-level officials to return to Finland. The prime minister announces that the Foreign and Security Policy Committee will meet immediately to discuss the situation in Estonia. In the meeting, the President relays a message he has received: Russia says that should Finland become involved in the situation with Estonia, this would force Russia to take direct countermeasures. Involvement includes military cooperation with third-party countries. Finally, the committee decision is formulated in a way that it will be

¹⁹⁷ Salenius-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

unanimous. Preparations for the expected responses to the decision are begun immediately.¹⁹⁸

2. Russian Hybrid Warfare in Scenario 3

The multinational scenario leads to a larger crisis where Finland will be involved somehow, whether it wants to be or not. Becoming involved would be tricky for Finland; making the decision to become involved would be equally tricky for Finland's decision makers. Still, Russia used the same kind of actions during the Ukraine situation in 2014, and these events led to the occupation of eastern Ukraine.¹⁹⁹ The Russian actions described in this scenario are depicted using Gerasimov model in Figure 17.

The scenario starts from the Escalation phase with the "accidental" shooting in Estonia and ends at the very beginning of the Crisis phase, with an immediate military threat caused by Russian strategic deployments. This scenario highlights the Russian threat of the Arctic areas, which needs consideration in further studies.

¹⁹⁸ Salonijs-Pasternak et al., "What if Russia Demands a Naval Base in Finland or Invades a Swedish Island?"

¹⁹⁹ Robinson, "Russia's Role in the War in Donbass, and the Threat to European Security," 511.




Figure 17. Russian actions in Scenario 3: Finland's multilateral option.²⁰⁰

3. Implications to FINSOF

In this third scenario, from the first indicators that something is happening time moves quickly. Finland needs to have systems in place and troops ready to handle a situation that evolves quickly. The early and low-level presence of NATO and U.S. SOF²⁰¹ in Estonia may help the FINSOF create a good cooperation-based network to keep track of what is going on in the region. It is also important for Finland to become a part of the global

²⁰⁰ Galeotti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War." Additional information added by the author.

²⁰¹ Thomas S. Szayna and William IV Welser, *Developing and Assessing Options for the Global SOF Network*, RR340 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR340.html. Low level presence can mean activities with a liaison, small-scale building partner capacity and shaping with surveillance, 2.

SOF network (that is, the Global Special Operations Consortium, or GSOC).²⁰² Such connections would allow the FINSOF and the Finnish government to show support for Western allies, show their willingness to defend their own soil against adversary, gain operative experience for FINSOF, and create a cooperation and intelligence network through NATO SOF structures.

FINSOF's viability in this scenario can be divided in two parts. The first part concerns the actions at home and in preparation for the upcoming crisis. The second part consists of the actions helping Estonians with advice and assistance. Both these actions can support each other in the scenario. The coordination between the two operational lines can perhaps be handled via NATO SOF structures or in the maritime through the BMCC. The viability level for scenario 3 is shown in Table 6.

²⁰² Walter L. Christman, *Enhancing the Global SOF Enterprise: A Consortium Concept* (Tampa, FL: JSOU Press, 2017), <http://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications/2017#s-lg-box-17432534>. GSOC means "...international collaboration in developing a global and integrated virtual education, training, simulation, and gaming capability as a better way to fulfill the vision of a Global SOF Network GSN." GSN was meant "...to provide the nexus between regional historical/cultural understandings and language capabilities, while providing a means to engage fellow SOF organizations and interagency partners worldwide through regional coordination centers and ... built trust and confidence while operating forward by maintaining a small, low-cost footprint," 2.

Table 6. FINSOF Viability in Scenario 3.

Item	Points	Explanations
Support from outside: NATO and bilateral.	+1	FINSOF get max support from NATO and bilaterally when it is willing to help Estonia.
FINSOF can act directly against adversary.	-1	FINSOF has limited capability to act directly against adversary in Estonia.
FINSOF can act indirectly against adversary.	+1	FINSOF has capability to respond to adversary, for example, through Information operations, and psychological operations at homeland.
FINSOF can do the task without large-scale mobilization.	0	FINSOF can do limited actions in Estonia with peacetime strength, but need reservists and abroad units to prepare for upcoming crisis in homeland.
FINSOF Strategic level Command and Control effect.	-1	FINSOF's lack of Strategic level Command and Control mechanism hampers interoperability and cooperation.
FINSOF Intelligence support.	+1	NATO provides intel support in this case.
FINSOF Aviation support.	+1	FINSOF's lack of Strategic airlift and SOF aviation do not affect this case.
Total FINSOF Viability in operations in Scenario 3 during gray-zone period.	+2	+ 2: FINSOF can be used in this scenario.

International connections and relations through networks and meetings can keep FINSOF aware of what is going on. Situational awareness in this case helps Finnish troops re-form and prepare for mobilization. In this case the indicators were clear, at least in that phase when Russian troops entered the city Narva. FINSOF operational success is enhanced by having pre-established relationships with international counterparts in the right places abroad and at home. Also, relationships with the intelligence community are needed. Communications and connections mean having that FINSOF liaison teams be prepared to go to the NATO Special Operations Component Command (SOCC), for example, to coordinate with tasks that are tailored to the needs of the Estonian government.

The help to Estonians is depicted in Figure 18, marked in light blue, and that help will continue until the Crisis phase is complete or there is a radical change in the situation. This scenario requires the FINSOF Task Force is called back home from the Middle East.




Figure 18. Basic layer to scenario build-up process on the NATO Spectrum of Conflict. Emphasis added from Scenario 3.²⁰³

Events in Estonia are reflected immediately in the overall security situation in the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe. In Finland the intelligence structures need to focus on indicators inside Finland that could lead to the same kind of situation that happened in Estonia in this scenario. From FINSOF's perspective, the SOF from the Finnish Police and from the Finnish Border Guard units need to prepare to conduct counterterrorism operations; meanwhile, the FDF SOF need to prepare both to support the counterterrorism operation and to carry out operations behind enemy lines with the full spectrum of SOF tasks. The tricky part in this scenario is that the main goal was left unrevealed. Russia is not a sitting target here; its intentions may not be what were expected. Moreover, it has the ability to adapt its tactics if necessary.²⁰⁴

Analysis about FINSOF is provided in Table 7.

²⁰³ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–3.

²⁰⁴ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 9.

Table 7. SWOT with FINSOF in scenario 3: Finland’s multilateral option.

	Strengths	Weaknesses
Internal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Being a part of the international and global SOF network, interoperability, and cooperation with other SOF units is easier when facing the same threat together. - Involving NATO in this crisis supports Finland to secure its essential lines of communication via the Baltic Sea. - Flexibility allows FINSOF to change the <i>modus operandi</i> from operations abroad to high intensity conventional war. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overall multinational scenario needs overarching intelligence and analysis systems interoperable with Western countries. - Being able to raise readiness secretly needs complete military deception plan.
	Opportunities	Threats
External	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International cooperation can help FINSOF get capabilities from abroad if needed. - Operations abroad have taught FINSOF how to work with other troops and capabilities. - Continuation of operational planning gives several possibilities to re-position FINSOF in Finland. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Overreacting to the happenings abroad may cause errors in the decision to use FINSOF in the homeland. - Russia sees Finland is supporting NATO troops and allowing them to be based in Finland, and so Russia launches strikes against. - Riots in Narva can spread to Finland and cause the same situation in Finland’s eastern border as in Estonia.

The aftermath from scenario 3 gives the idea that FINSOF can be used in this kind of large multinational crisis traditionally with the full spectrum of SOF tasks. The Finnish government response in case of a multinational crisis also creates the psychological effect back home that Finland does not face this crisis alone. Furthermore, from the SOF perspective, there is the possibility of getting help from outside, either in the form of equipment and capabilities or even troops to do specific missions. In this case, one example would be an outside country providing close air support capabilities or providing air support to deliver FINSOF back home from abroad.

Demonstrating FINSOF’s readiness can send a political message to Russia that Finland is ready if something happens. At the same time, FINSOF can control the possibility of escalation with preventive actions, and can, at a low cost, distract and disrupt any networks the enemy might establish in Finland.

D. ANALYSIS

In every scenario Russia used the same model to achieve its political goals. Using the same model Russia makes its actions predictable. Every case starts from the defender's side during the gray-zone period when the aggressor, Russia, uses different methods to disguise its true intentions and uses deception to cover its actions. Russia also uses political pressure and direct threats to affect the defender's readiness and mobilization systems. Military action starts with surprise from available troops from their home base or from exercises near target areas. The goal of all these actions is to achieve the element of surprise and mislead the defender into being unprepared when the Escalation phase of Gerasimov model starts.

Russia was able to find vulnerabilities within its targets. Scenarios showed that Russia has information from each nation's internal security situations, vital functions, defense capabilities, and international cooperation. Finding vulnerabilities from these areas, it was able to create an offensive hybrid operation by using Gerasimov model to implement operations execution.

All three scenarios showed that the FINSOF are the strategic level force suitable to use from the very beginning of the pre-crisis situation and during the gray-zone period. The overall viability of using FINSOF was high (over 0) in each of the scenarios, but each scenario used different variables. Lack of certain capabilities reduced the maximum values, but still those values remained (see Table 8). The values also show that SOF alone cannot do these operations. FINSOF needs support and cooperation from other authorities, armed services, and from civil society, as well as from other capabilities, such as psychological operations, electronic warfare capabilities, cyber capabilities, and counterintelligence.

Table 8. FINSOF's Viability in each scenario.

Item	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3
FINSOF Viability	Viability	Strong Viability	Strong Viability
Interoperability and Cooperation need.	Interoperability and Cooperation with Finnish authorities and Services	Interoperability and Cooperation with Swedish SOF.	Interoperability and Cooperation with NATO.

Even though the FINSOF peacetime force is not big, it is still an effective and low-cost tool to use in difficult situations in the homeland and abroad. The main takeaways from *strengths*, *opportunities*, *weaknesses*, and *threats* from the three scenarios' SWOT tables can be summarized as follows:

Strengths

- The changing post-Cold War security situation in Northern Europe has required ongoing upkeep to the *operational planning* in FDF, which has given the FINSOF basic tasks in MA, DA, and SR; tactical level structures and principles allow FINSOF to defend the homeland.
- Operations and exercises abroad have given the FINSOF operational experience to face difficult situations in different operational environments; operations have also developed FINSOF *interoperability* with other allied forces.
- The *flexibility to use forces* from different ministries together has strengthened Finland's ability to better confront hybrid threats.

Opportunities

- International *cooperation* can help FINSOF get capabilities from abroad if needed, and to provide help to other countries using FINSOF capabilities, if necessary.

- Continuation of *operational planning* gives several possibilities to repositioning FINSOF because the home bases in the southern part of Finland are inside the perimeter of the Russia's precision-guided capabilities.
- Finland's *bilateral agreements* with Sweden and the United States allow FINSOF to carry out operational planning, execution, and cooperation against hybrid threats in crisis situations.
- *Intelligence cooperation* with Sweden gives Finland a better picture of the Baltic Sea area to help decision makers analyze better upcoming situations.

Weaknesses

- Lack of Finnish special operations fixed-wing *aviation* organizational structures and strategic airlift capability weakens FINSOF capabilities.
- The overall *quantity* of FINSOF operators is not high, which reduces the Finland's ability to use them against hybrid threats in several at the same time.
- There are very few official connections between FINSOF and Finnish Military Deception planning, which decreases the possibility of using FINSOF in *covert or clandestine* operations.

Threats

- The *speed* of the nascent crisis can surprise decision makers so the vital functions of preventive actions may be delayed.
- A crisis anywhere in *the Baltic Sea* area can drag Finland into the same crisis.
- Using FINSOF in several locations abroad at the same time *leaves gaps* in homeland security.

In Table 9, a summary of the main takeaways from each scenario is provided using the SWOT technique to compare: 1) *Strengths* to *Opportunities* to find *Advantages*, 2) *Strengths* to *Threats* to find *Strategies*, 3) *Weaknesses* to *Opportunities* to find *Competencies*, and 4) *Weaknesses* to *Threats* to find *Risks*.

Table 9. Analysis from SWOTs.

Strengths – Opportunities	Strengths – Threats
<p><u>Advantages</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conscript service has provided Finland with an important link to civil society that gives a comprehensive defense approach more possibilities. - Operations abroad have given FINSOF incentives for developing basic interoperability with foreign units abroad and also benchmarks for how to handle complex situations. 	<p><u>Strategies</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Renewing the FINSOF <i>structure</i> and <i>tasks</i> toward a comprehensive approach to respond to hybrid threats will give the FINSOF better response ability and operational benchmarks needed to fulfill political goals. - Continuing a cooperation strategy with Western allies and vital partners allows FINSOF to respond more quickly to requests for help.
Weaknesses – Opportunities	Weaknesses – Threats
<p><u>Competencies</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Using FINSOF with a small footprint in the right place and at the right time can be effective in fighting against “hybrid threats” and other threats. - FINSOF’s small size can be supplemented with reserves. - Flexibility inside the FINSOF allows the use of a tailored task force in different situations. 	<p><u>Risks</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The speed of modern warfare can mean decision makers do not have enough time to decide to use FINSOF. - Lack of strategic airlift capability can lead to the situation in which FINSOF Task Force is stuck abroad when a crisis hits Finland.

E. CONCLUSION

After all three scenarios, we can conclude that FINSOF started its response actions by supporting somebody else as part of the comprehensive response against a threat. Support to other nations’ authorities, local people, or another local authority seems to be the trend to counter hybrid threats. FINSOF alone cannot fight against various hybrid threats, but it can offer useful tools in difficult situations where readiness, specialized skills, and strike capability are needed. A combination of the FINSOF element and supportive capabilities, such as information operations, can be called hybrid actions against hybrid threats. In most of these cases, there is a need to establish some sort of liaison element with the right personalities and competencies to decide which information should be distributed and what actions must be taken.

The lack of a FINSOF doctrine may mean that decision makers do not have enough information about when and how, or even whether, to use FINSOF. This lack of doctrine can lead to a situation in which valuable capability is useless when it is most needed.

Use of FINSOF capability against hybrid threats needs first of all situational awareness, risk assessment, and readiness. Preparedness of FINSOF creates resilience and needs training, exercises, interoperability, equipment, and a mobilization system. Capability use also requires processes of planning and tasking, but also the training of decision makers in how to use FINSOF in proper and effective ways.

Another meaningful finding is that Finland will be dragged into a crisis that escalates somewhere in the Baltic Sea due to the necessity to protect its lines of shipping and communication. The Baltic Sea area is crowded and cramped, and new technologies and A2/AD capabilities can allow an adversary to control the sea from the land, as from Gotland, for example. Moreover, it also means that the Escalation phase of Gerasimov model can already be underway while Finland's decision makers are still in the Pre-crisis phase and the origins of the crisis have gone unnoticed for a long (see Figure 19). These findings are important for two reasons: 1) they show that the nation's supplies are dependent on these shipping lines in the Baltic Sea and those lines may deteriorate during a crisis, and without support from somebody else, Finland cannot survive the crisis alone; and 2) Finland's readiness process needs to be adjusted so that it can react to a crisis more rapidly, and at the same time, Finland needs to decide more quickly which laws should be activated in times of crisis.




Figure 19. FINSOF capability to countering hybrid threats during the development of a crisis.²⁰⁵

In the very beginning of this work, I noted that FINSOF include specialized troops from the Finnish Police and Border Guard, whose primary task is counterterrorism. Since counterterrorism played a major role in these scenarios, this means that counterterrorism must become part of FINSOF’s basic doctrine. During an ongoing crisis period FINSOF can do the full spectrum of tasks, but the line is often not clear for when a crisis starts and when it will end; the unpredictable development of crises involving hybrid warfare requires readiness, flexibility, and available structures of the countering forces, such as FINSOF. The full spectrum of special operation tasks is available to use depending on the situation and its different phases, the countries involved, and the limited by the Rules of Engagement (ROE). In addition to deciding when FINSOF should be used, decision makers also need to decide how to handle a crisis when parts of FINSOF are overseas.

²⁰⁵ Figure 20 uses Gerasimov model and the NATO Spectrum of Conflict together. NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1–3; and Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War.”

V. FUTURE ROLE OF FINNISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Mankind has had ten-thousand years of experience at fighting and if we must fight, we have no excuse for not fighting well.

—T. E. Lawrence²⁰⁶

A. DISCUSSION

FINSOF are a cost-effective tool for achieving strategic goals. This means flexibility to use force and capabilities in demanding special operations in demanding situations and environments all over the world. Development of FINSOF started several decades ago, and now it is time to take the next step towards the new decade.

This work addressed two main topics: the changing of Finland’s security environment and the development of Finnish special operations. The operating environment has changed since the end of the Cold War. Hybrid warfare is here to exploit all dimensions in the battlefield. It allows adversaries to use both conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve their goals. Some examples of hybrid warfare include the use of non-military or military armed groups during peacetime without a declaration of war; the use of short-time precision strike capabilities against important military and civilian infrastructure and capabilities; the use of indirect and asymmetric methods; and the use of information warfare techniques to deceive and mislead the opposition about the true purpose of an operation.

To address hybrid threats and security issues, FINSOF need an apparatus and strategy that are accepted as part of Finland’s political goals. According to Leo Blanken, “strategy works like a bridge between political goals and the military machine’s operational benchmarks.”²⁰⁷ FINSOF has the information to build an apparatus and it has incentives to

²⁰⁶ T. E. Lawrence, AZQuotes, Wind and Fly LTD, accessed October 10, 2018, <https://www.azquotes.com/quote/407985>.

²⁰⁷ Leo Blanken, “Assessing War” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 1, 2018).

create this machine. Lack of the special operations doctrine puts the units in a situation where those units are doing the “dirty work,” but their relationship to the bigger picture and other units requires doctrine to shape that work and interoperability at a higher level. Because FINSOF has a small number of troops, their training and focus areas need to be evaluated and studied in the future.

FINSOF is perfectly suited to cooperate with and support other actors and allies, including in the planning and execution of missions in the operating environment. For example, FINSOF can operate in a regional context around Finland and the Baltic Sea area, but it has the ability to carry out operations abroad if needed. An environment that is too complex, dangerous, or inaccessible to be handled by other forces can be handled by FINSOF. Using a small number of professional operators for a mission creates less political risk for a leader than does sending a large formation of conventional troops with reservists or conscripts.

Furthermore, the Finnish defence policy should maintain the security situation as it is in the Baltic Sea area and Scandinavia. It can rely on a working process among its security apparatus, its working defense structures, and its international relations. Finland needs those mechanisms because its supply security depends on outside help if a crisis in the Baltic Sea area starts to take time. In that light, the Finnish Government Defense Report 2017 guides defense policy as follows:

- The National defense capability maintained and developed against threats and complex nature of conflicts.
- Defense readiness will be improved.
- International defense cooperation will continue deepen, highlighting cooperation with the United States and Sweden.
- Conscript and reservist training system will stay as a cost-effective way to maintain credible defense forces.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁸ The Finnish Government Program, *Government's Defence Report*, 5–6.

According to the same report, “The capability of the Special Forces to carry out reconnaissance and raids will be retained. Mid-life updates on the helicopter fleet will guarantee the mobility and reaction capability of Special Forces and readiness units, and the provision of support to the services’ other forces.”²⁰⁹ This means that the Finnish Government sees FINSOF as an important part of the national defense structure and readiness forces. FINSOF needs to build its capability to handle future threats, and that requires strategy and doctrine.

B. SUMMARY

This capstone project finds that FINSOF can achieve the flexibility it needs to conduct internal and external missions in a variety of security situations. In order to accomplish this, FINSOF must develop more integration and interoperability with units from Ministry of Interior but also with units from other parts of the military, government agencies, and units from partner nations. FINSOF must also acquire the structures, equipment, and capabilities that will allow them to support these operations in the homeland and abroad. FINSOF’s ability to conduct missions abroad is aided by several international agreements and Finland’s international cooperation. Finland’s comprehensive approach to defense, newly edited laws, and an understanding of FINSOF’s role will enable them to better perform their tasks.

Integrating specialized troops to counter hybrid threats requires renewing or reviewing FINSOF’s core tasks. This study views the FINSOF’s role as part of Finland’s strategic level first response to threats. FINSOF can provide kinetic means to decision makers while strike effects can also be non-kinetic effects as psychological effects of both friends and enemies. Hybrid threats and actors affect both the crisis itself and the gray-zone time before the crisis, and these actions are multidimensional. While FINSOF cannot work full-time in all-dimensions of warfighting, it can be a useful tool in most of the cases.

²⁰⁹ The Finnish Government Program, *Government’s Defence Report* (Helsinki: Prime Minister’s Office, 2017), 25.

FINSOF provide decision makers with a tool, but the time when the decision is made to use SOF is the key (Means) that leads to action (see Figure 20). Using SOF upfront is better than not using it at all. This idea fits well with the new definition of FINSOF in which Police and Border Guard SOF units' basic operating principles are based on response speed. Furthermore, the desired end state (Ends) of operation and behavior of the adversary impose requirements, assessments, risks, and opportunities on the decision to use SOF. Understanding the adversary and hybrid warfare as well as finding certain indicators will help Finland's leaders to make the right decisions in a timely manner, and to direct the planning, intelligence, situational awareness, and command and control processes (Ways) in the right direction. At the strategic level, the choice of whether or not to use SOF is part of the decision makers' information campaign. Using SOF may trigger the beginning of other operations, such as psychological operations, or SOF can be a part of those operations.




Figure 20. Simplified decision-making process for when to use special operations.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Developing technologies have changed the way we fight. This study examined the strategies, advantages, competencies, and risks that might occur if FINSOF were to renew its structures and tasks in order to better repel hybrid threats more effectively and efficiently. A Proper strategy needs to be a part of the process as Finnish special operations build their capability toward a “known” unknown future. There will always be unknown indicators that can affect the desired end state in the future, but at some point we must start this process. Hybrid warfare uses a wide range of capabilities in its operations, and the lessons learned from recent situations must be analyzed and taken into consideration for capability building. Capability building needs long-time planning of the costs and human resources required to provide highly trained and capable personnel to face demanding circumstances on the battlefield and in equivocal situations.

1. FINSOF Doctrine

As discussed earlier, addressing the lack of FINSOF doctrine is the key to efficient and proper use of force. Doctrine should lead to FINSOF doing optimal tasks and should define the factors needed for successful special operations. This study found some of the factors, which need to be described in the doctrine:

- Clear strategy and objective of FINSOF
- Command, Control, and Communications structures to support FINSOF
- Operational planning procedures for effective task execution
- Organization and structure of FINSOF, including reserves and training paths
- Interoperability and cooperation with international and domestic partners

2. Strategy and Capability

This study finds that the strategy of FINSOF need to renew by creating a suitable doctrine. The proper strategy needs also long-term goal which gives the roots of the development planning and operational benchmarks (see Figure 21). This goal can be

achievable within the context of the right *vision* which helps to find right path to the *mission*. The Finnish special operations mission is the basis for FINSOF support to Finnish defence wherever needed. The FINSOF mission statement defines the forces' mission and reflects the evolution of FINSOF with information and incentives. Because the mission statement needs more study and large acceptance from the FINSOF, I do not try to write the mission statement in this study.

Finnish special operations *vision* pictures the successful FINSOF organization in the future. Finnish special operations core values are the ethical guidelines that define the code of conduct for operations in the future, which helps to find operational benchmarks after the job is done. Special operations align with FINSOF's culture and vision to define SOF identity. Conclusion of this study: *FINSOF's vision is to become Finland's most respected branch of service. It will do so by serving as an interoperability strategic-level tool for countering hybrid threats in cooperation with other authorities, military units, and international allies.*



Figure 21. FINSOF's idea of creating mission and vision.

FINSOF needs the trust of decision makers and international communities. Trust can be achieved through information sharing and teaching others what FINSOF are, and showing them how FINSOF have conducted operations abroad and in the homeland. Far

too few people know FINSOF's history. But, like every other military unit, FINSOF's roots lie in their history, and that history must remain part of FINSOF even as they develop and evolve. History defines FINSOF's core values, which lead to the vision of what FINSOF will be in the future. In this study, I have recognized a few of the core values of FINSOF as follows:

- “No one left behind” attitude: FINSOF members do better together. No one person can do his or her job without the support of the SOF family. Together as a team, FINSOF members are strong.
- Commitment: FINSOF recognized and valued any given task and purpose for the Finnish Defence. FINSOF owns a collective responsibility to serve as efficiently as possible toward the final goal.
- Flexibility: FINSOF's structure and mindset stays flexible to cope with any situation to achieve operational excellence.
- Readiness: FINSOF maintain high readiness and capabilities to respond to tasks and threats.
- Partnership: FINSOF build strong relationships with their valued partners in the homeland and abroad.

An organization that is building its capability requires certain essential elements in order to become an effective tool in the future. In Finland, capability building uses NATO's method known as DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership,

Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability).²¹⁰ However, in order to be able to develop its new capabilities, FINSOF needs to incorporate different perspectives.

Limitations on this study prevented a deeper dive into such areas as psychological operations, military deception, and the human factor in special operations. These limitations create avenues for further research and questions. How will FINSOF train capable, technically adept, and internationally interoperable special operator at all levels? Are there ways to build a common special operators' basic training systems or specialized tactical modules depending on specific subjects? (See Appendix H, FINSOF Training Categories.) It is clear that every FINSOF unit needs to know and do overlapping tasks in the future. This will require an increased level of knowledge and training.

3. Use of Capability

Building a capability is not enough. The capability must be tested in order to prove its strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities in operations at home, abroad, and in some combination of the two. Furthermore, FINSOF also needs a plan to recall troops back home if the security situation requires it. But FINSOF do need to serve abroad when called upon to do so. There are strategic reasons for this. First, doing so would show possible adversaries that FINSOF can conduct effective operations. Second, it would show Finland's allies that Finland will be a part of the Western community, which could open politically important strategic doors. (See Appendix I, National Cooperation of FINSOF.)

Furthermore, capability building requires interoperability among FINSOF, conventional forces, and interagency ministries, as well as international allies. Interoperability provides the equipment, communication, methods, and ways to conduct operations together with allied forces. To be interoperable requires regular exercise

²¹⁰ Jacqueline Eaton, John Redmayne, and Marvin Thordsen, *Joint Analysis Handbook* (Lisbon, Portugal: NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, 2016), 44–46, http://www.jallc.nato.int/products/docs/Joint_Analysis_Handbook_4th_edition.pdf. Through the DOTLMPFI process FINSOF can ask important questions to develop its doctrine. As mentioned in the handbook, for example: “Does new doctrine need to be developed which would provide a solution to the issue?, Where are the organizational problems occurring?, Are there issues caused by lack of competency on existing systems or training?, Can increases in performance be achieved without development of a new system? Do the issues affect a headquarters’ ability to conduct operations? Are the used technology and processes interoperable?”

activities and information sharing programs, especially with developed liaison teams. In FINSOF, this has been a good way to develop the troops, and maintain abilities to conduct operations abroad and in the homeland. These aforementioned interoperability issues need more study, such as how FINSOF can better integrated themselves into psychological warfare or how FINSOF can work together with cyber forces.

The use of FINSOF requires suitable personnel and care for their welfare. This means career management and development. Experienced personnel with education needs career paths from operators to officers. To be able to create these paths, FINSOF requires branch suitable to handle personnel, training and education issues.

4. Developing the Structures of FINSOF

In order to remain a relevant tool for national leaders, Special Operators must develop their critical thinking and improve their critical skills by adapting to new kinds of technology and learning how hybrid threats behave. FINSOF as a tool can be reorganized and structured better to respond to hybrid warfare to support Finland's comprehensive approach to defense. They need a solid command structure at the right level to plan and execute operations; we can call this structure a strategic apex. The operating core can be tailored as needed with supporting staff and technologies, as Figure 22 shows. This structure can be called the FINSOF Combined Joint Task Force.




Figure 22. FINSOF Combined Joint Task Force. Adapted from Joint Publication 3–05 and reformulated by the author.²¹¹

This Combined Joint Task Force structure at the tactical and operational levels needs a Combined Joint Staff to organize at the upper level. Sometimes this staff will be structured as a part of the military organization, and sometimes as a part of the national organization. In either case, solid structure, even a small one, is needed at the right level with the authority to approve operations and cooperation with others if needed. This structure type gives the decision makers a suitable tool box for a variety of situations. There needs to be further study concerning what new technologies and capabilities should adapt to these structures; for example, what will be the role of female operators in FINSOF?

²¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations 3–05*, III-5.

5. Developing the FINSOF Tasks

The FINSOF tasks mentioned several times during this study need to be developed. During the study the counterterrorism task was raised among the SOF core tasks. Other support tasks can be also added to the FINSOF “task pie.” This study has already recognized the need for SOF Air and Maritime tasks. Some type of Joint support-specific task set is also required, which would allow FINSOF to, for example, support the Joint fires tasks or be part of the task of countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) as part of the national defence or part of the multinational tasks (see Figure 23). Because technological developments demand more and more specific skills from special operations, the specific details of these tasks will require further study. To be a part of the Finnish doctrine, these tasks must be well organized to support FDF tasks, the FINSOF, and international partners. Examples of such tasks are presented in Appendix J, Future FINSOF Tasks.




Figure 23. FINSOF tasks in 2030.

To summarize this study, it does not take a lot of effort to determine that the key to FINSOF's success is the ability to renew itself, which needs flexibility and adaptability. Changing security threats, new tactics, and new technologies keep the development process constantly ongoing, even though the violence of war remains unchanged in the asymmetric battlespace.

APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASKS IN NATO

Definition of Special Operations Tasks in NATO AJP 3.5

Direct Action (DA)

DA is a precise offensive operation conducted by SOF which is limited in scope and duration in order to seize, destroy, disrupt, capture, exploit, recover, or damage high value or high pay-off targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of risk, techniques employed, and the degree of precision utilized to create a specific effect, and usually incorporates a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. DA is focused on specific, well-defined targets of strategic and operational significance, or in the conduct of decisive tactical operations. SOF may conduct DA independently, with support from conventional forces, or in support of conventional forces.

Special Reconnaissance (SR)

SR is conducted by SOF to support the collection of a commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) by employing unique capabilities or Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) assets. As part of the Allied theatre INTEL collection process, SR provides specific, well-defined, and possibly time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. It may complement other collection methods where constraints are imposed by weather, terrain-masking, hostile countermeasures, or other systems' availability. SR places persistent "eyes on target" in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive territory. SOF can provide timely information by using their judgment and initiative in a way that technical JISR cannot. SOF may conduct these tasks separately, supported by, in conjunction with, or in support of other component commands. They may use advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques, JISR assets and equipment, and collection methods, sometimes augmented by the employment of indigenous assets.

Military Assistance (MA)

MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through organizing training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations. The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. SOF conduct MA within their field of expertise.

SOF Activities within Allied Joint Operations:

Counter Insurgency (COIN)

SOF can effectively complement the overarching application of diplomatic, economic, military, and information Alliances' instruments of power, applied in a COIN role. When preparing for COIN, SOF can provide area assessments and an early command, control, and communications capability. During COIN, SOF could conduct MA, SR, DA, or a suitable combination of these principal tasks, to support Allied Joint operations in order to accomplish the defined political and strategic objectives. The success of these operations can be enhanced by the conduct of technical exploitation operations (TEO).

Counter Terrorism (CT)

CT is an overarching umbrella of offensive measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of Allied interests, their forces, individuals, and property to terrorism, to include counter-force activities and containment by military force and civil agencies. SOF should be utilized when there is high risk, a need for special capabilities, or a requirement to conduct covert or clandestine operations. These forces can operate in concert with other Joint force efforts or operate independently by conducting DA (while minimizing collateral damage), SR, or MA. The success of these operations can be enhanced by the conduct of TEO.

Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as well as Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Materials

SOF are a significant part of Allied capabilities to support NATO's counter proliferation and trafficking objectives related to WMD and CBRN related materials, including the ability to conduct, with other specialized elements, WMD disablement missions. WMD disablement is generally described as operations whose aim is to systematically locate, secure, characterize, eliminate, or dispose WMD, CBRN weapons, CBRN devices and CBRN materials, and/or a potential adversary's capability to research, develop, test, produce, stockpile, deploy, or employ such weapons, devices, and materials. Activities designed to conduct WMD disablement missions are inherently complex and generally necessitate the employment of specially trained and equipped personnel. In the context of a NATO operation, NATO SOF involvement in the WMD disablement missions will generally be deferred to the members of the Alliance possessing these specialized capabilities. In extremis, however, where specialized forces cannot be brought in sufficient time to prevent the employment of WMD and/or CBRN materials, or their immediate interdiction is required, the authority to utilize other NATO forces, to include NATO SOF, to capture, deter, secure, or assist in WMD disablement mission, might be sought.

Hostage Release Operation (HRO)

NATO SOF may be involved in an HRO, under certain circumstances

Faction Liaison

In order to gain a better understanding of the operating environment, situational awareness, and to collect information, SOF can liaise with many factions in a Joint Operational Area (JOA). The information available at the different host actors is often vital in support of full spectrum special operations. The assignment of capable liaison officers can be especially relevant in supporting MA tasks. They are important for INTEL partnering/mentoring which should improve the information collection in remote areas in using indigenous elements. The information has to be integrated in the INTEL process/cycle in order to develop joint INTEL preparation of the battle space, disseminate assessments and reports, and support the operations planning process.

SOF Air Missions (SOA)

SOF air operations conduct and support each of the principal tasks assigned to NATO SOF. The primary mission of special operations air forces is enhanced air mobility—specialized air transport activities via fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or tilt-rotor aircraft. Other special air warfare activities may include air to land integration (ALI), close air support (CAS), close combat attack (CCA), air-to-air refueling (AAR), personnel recovery (PR), and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for special operations air, land, and maritime forces.

SOF Maritime Operations (SOM)

Maritime SOF tasks include any of the principal SOF tasks, provided that the SOF units conducting those tasks are similarly organized as ground SOF units. Maritime SOF primarily conduct operations in the coastal, riverine, and maritime environments. They utilize small, flexible, mobile units operating under, on, and from the sea. These operations are characterized by stealth, speed, and precise application of force. They may be focused on, but not restricted to, the following activities: a) Insertion/extraction by sea, b) Discreet beach reconnaissance (hydrographic survey) in advance of an amphibious operation, c) Discreet assault route preparation in advance of an amphibious operation, d) Recovery or protection of ships and maritime oil installations, e) Coastal reconnaissance, f) Other activities performed in support of an amphibious operation or any other maritime operation.²¹²

²¹² NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 2-1 – 2-7.

**APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN
NATO AND THE UNITED STATES**

Definition of Special Operations	
NATO AJP 3.5	U.S. Joint Publication 3-05
<p>Special operations are military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces, manned with selected personnel, using unconventional tactics, techniques, and modes of employment. These activities may be conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or with conventional forces, to help achieve the desired end-state. Politico-military considerations may require clandestine or covert techniques and the acceptance of a degree of political or military risk not associated with operations by conventional forces. Special Operations deliver strategic or operational-level results or are executed where significant political risk exists.²¹³</p>	<p>Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk. Special operations provide joint force commanders (JFCs) and chiefs of the mission with discrete, precise, and scalable options that can be synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve United States Government (USG) objectives.²¹⁴</p>

²¹³ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 1-1.

²¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Special Operations*, Ix.

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APPENDIX C. THE HISTORICAL TIMELINE OF FINSOF




Figure 24. Finnish Special Operations Forces with main trainings since 1915.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ In Figure 24, different colors represent the main elements of the forces: Green=Land and Army SOF, Dark Blue=Marine and Naval SOF, Orange/Green=Border Guard SOF, Light Blue=Air capable SOF, Medium/Sapphire Blue= Police SOF.

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APPENDIX D. FINNISH DEFENCE FORCES' TASKS AND READINESS STRUCTURE

The main purpose of the Finnish national defence is to guarantee Finland's independence and defend its sovereignty, secure its people, and maintain Finland's ability to survive crises. Overall defence in Finland has related to the population's *will* to defend their own country, general *conscript service*, and international cooperation. According to this thinking, the FDF got quite broad main tasks. These primary duties are: 1) the military defence of Finland; 2) supporting other authorities; 3) providing and receiving international assistance; and 4) taking part in international military crisis management.²¹⁶ The main purpose of the defence is to guarantee Finland's independence and defend its sovereignty, secure its people, and maintain Finland's ability to survive crises.




Figure 25. The FDF's main structure, according to the Finnish *Government Defence Report 2017*.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Act on the Defence Forces 551, §1 (May 11, 2007), renewed June 28, 2017, by 427/2017, <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2007/20070551?search%5Btype%5D=pika&search%5Bpika%5D=laki%20puolustusvoimista>.

²¹⁷ The Finnish Government Program, *Government's Defense Report* (Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office, 2017), 20, https://www.defmin.fi/en/publications/the_governments_defence_report_2017, Additional information added by the author.

At the top of the Figure 25 can be seen the most effective and modern systems equipped forces in Finland, which can be used to prevent the escalation of a situation against Finland. These are the Readiness formations and units and Rapid Reaction Units (RRU). FINSOF is part of these units and formations, and FINSOF can also increase manpower with reservists from Readiness forces. The main body of the Finnish military units is based on build-up forces, which need mobilization activities before operational use. Troops can be divided into maneuver, regional, and local troops, which together increase Finland's wartime strength to 280 000 troops.²¹⁸

²¹⁸ The Finnish Government Program, *Government's Defence Report*, 19–21.

APPENDIX E. ORGANIZATION OF THE FINNISH SOF UNITS




Figure 26. Organization of FINSOF.

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APPENDIX F. MAP OF EUROPE WITH NATO AND EU BOUNDARIES




Figure 27. Map of Europe with NATO and EU boundaries.²¹⁹

²¹⁹ Aleks Buczkowski, *Top 30 Maps and Charts that Explain the European Union*, GEO Awesomeness, 2017, <http://geoawesomeness.com/top-30-maps-charts-explain-european-union/>.

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APPENDIX G. COMPARISONS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL OF COASTAL COUNTRIES OF THE BALTIC SEA

Table 10. Comparisons of defense spending and numbers of military personnel.²²⁰

COUNTRY (the Baltic Sea coastline)	Defence Spending, current US\$ m			Defence Spending, per capita (current US\$)			Defence Spending, % of GDP			Active Armed Forces	Estimated Reservists	Active Paramilitary
	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017	2015	2016	2017	2018	2018	2018
Russia	52,201	44,470	45,600	367	312	321	3.82	3.47	3.10	900,000	2,000,000	554,000
Finland	3,074	3,100	3,191	561	564	578	1.32	1.30	1.27	22,000	216,000	3,000
Sweden	5,723	5,738	5,962	584	581	599	1.15	1.12	1.10	30,000	0	1,000
Total (FI+SWE)	8,797	8,838	9,153							52,000	216,000	4,000
NATO countries												
Denmark	3,516	3,514	3,807	630	628	679	1.17	1.15	1.17	16,000	46,000	0
Estonia	467	498	543	369	396	434	2.07	2.14	2.11	6,000	28,000	0
Germany	36,589	37,943	41,734	453	470	518	1.08	1.09	1.14	179,000	28,000	1,000
Latvia	238	407	507	142	207	261	1.05	1.47	1.68	5,000	8,000	0
Lithuania	471	637	816	163	223	289	1.14	1.49	1.75	18,000	7,000	11,000
Poland	10,128	9,101	9,837	263	236	256	2.12	1.94	1.93	105,000	0	73,000
Total	51,409	52,100	57,244							329,000	117,000	85,000

²²⁰ “Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons and Defense Data,” *The Military Balance* 118, no. 1 (2018): 499–508, <https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416987>.

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APPENDIX H. FINSOF TRAINING CATEGORIES

Table 11. Examples of FINSOF training categories.

Unit	Priority task	SR	DA	MA	CT	JS
Army Special Forces	SR	4	3	3	2	3
Navy Special Forces	DA	3	4	2	2	3
Border Guard Special Forces	CT	2	1	2	4	3
Police Special Forces	CT	1	0	2	4	4
FDF SOF reserve	SR	2	2	1	0	0
Border Guard SOF reserve	SR	2	2	1	0	0

Categories:

- 4 = Master level
- 3 = Knowhow level
- 2 = Knows the basic
- 1 = Know how to do it, but needs practice
- 0 = Informative level

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APPENDIX I. NATIONAL COOPERATION OF FINSOF




Figure 28. National cooperation of FINSOF.²²¹

²²¹ Klaus Luotola, "National Co-Operation of FINSOF," Helsinki, 2015, unpublished slides of FINSOF, author's notes.

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APPENDIX J. EXAMPLES OF FUTURE FINSOF TASKS

Definition of Special Operations Tasks from NATO AJP 3.5, converted to serve FINSOF²²²

Offensive Actions (OA)

OA can be conducted by FINSOF are limited in scope and duration in order to destroy, seize, exploit, recover, damage, or capture and recover high value targets. OA can be focused on specific targets with strategic and operational significance, using activities such as raids ambushes, assaults, and precision destruction operations. OA can include guerilla-type activities such as sabotage, and can disrupt the enemy if necessary. As part of the Joint effects operations, FINSOF can conduct terminal guidance operations against precise targets. As part of the maritime operations, FINSOF can conduct opposed boarding operations to take control of a maritime vessel, platform, or islet.

Strategic Reconnaissance (SR)

SR can be conducted by FINSOF using its unique intelligence capabilities to support commander critical information requirements (CCIRs). As part of the Intelligence collection process, FINSOF could provide well-defined, specific, and timely or time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance with advanced reconnaissance and surveillance techniques with, for example, exploitation operations (TEO). FINSOF can conduct SR tasks separately, supported by, or with other troops and these tasks can be a part of the Joint operations with activities of environmental reconnaissance, threat and target assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

Military Assistance (MA)

MA can be conducted and purposed to support and influence friendly capabilities, forces and capability building. The broad MA category can allow FINSOF to train designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills with tactics, techniques, and procedures. MA can include advising, mentoring, and guidance to improve the performance of designated actors, units and leaders to achieve strategic or operational objectives.

Counter Terrorism (CT)

CT can be designed to reduce the vulnerability of individuals, interests, forces, and property to terrorism and specific hybrid threats, by using special capabilities to conduct covert, overt or clandestine operations. CT activities can be designed to eliminate threats and neutralize networks, violent individuals, non-state actors, insurgents or members of local extremists groups who threaten or use unlawful violence to instill fear among society. Hostage release operations (HRO) can be a part of CT when there is need to rescue individuals who have been captured by terrorists, whether at home or abroad.

In addition to these core tasks, FINSOF will also need to be prepared to engage in supportive actions with partners both at home and abroad:

SOF Activities within Joint Operations:

Joint Support (JS)

JS tasks will be conducted by FINSOF when there is need for them to support Joint activities, Joint fires, conventional capabilities and authorities with specific skills and techniques. These tasks can include countering of weapons of mass destruction (CMWD) and Chemical, Biological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials as well as liaison tasks in areas where there is a high need for understanding the operating environment

²²² NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 2-1 – 2-7. Text describing tasks modified by the author.

and situational awareness in order to develop Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) or support to psychological (PSYOPS), information (IO) and cyber operations (CYBER).

SOF Air Missions (SOA)

SO Air Tasks (SOA) can be conducted special ways to employ air operations to provide innovative support conventional troops as well as other authorities. Activities can include specialized air transport, insertion/extraction, airlift, evacuation/recovery, fire support, and reconnaissance missions, with unmanned aerial vehicles, fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or tilt-rotor aerial vehicles.

SOF Maritime Operations (SOM)

SOM would be conducted by FINSOF units capable of operating in coastal, archipelago, riverine, maritime, and lake-covered environments by special capabilities. Activities can include insertion/extraction under or on the water, reconnaissance activities in coastal areas, hydrographic surveys, and support activities to amphibious operations, such as advance route preparation.²²³

²²³ NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*, 2-1 – 2-7.

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