



Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504

(734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571
(616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386

**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**

Report to the
President

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Alvin J. ...

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

March 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT


B *MR7*

Secretary Kissinger has asked that I provide you with the following report concerning the outcome of the Israeli Government's deliberations:

"The Israeli Government has just completed its deliberations, and we have been given the results by Rabin and his colleagues. There were some modest modifications from the position that was conveyed to us this morning, which essentially does not change the situation in any substantial way.

"I am now leaving for Aswan to meet later this evening with Sadat. The odds are very much against Sadat accepting what I am bringing with me, and since I feel it is inadequate, I will present the Israeli position without encouraging acceptance on the part of Sadat. I do not, of course, absolutely preclude that Sadat will decide that there is enough in it to continue the negotiations but I think this is unlikely. I will report to you later this evening after I complete my talks with Sadat."

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, 5010.105
NOV 1999, 10/20/03
DR 10/02/03

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

CHECK LIST

ASWAN, MARCH 20

1. The main elements in the Israeli position to be presented to Sadat are:
- a. Non-use of force. The new formulation at Tab A.
 - b. Israeli concept of the line has these elements:
 - Israeli line through the "middle" of the passes to the Gulf of Suez north of the Sudr Pass road.
 - Line swings west around Israeli intelligence site.
 - Civilian enclave for the oil fields. Use of the road not excluded.
 - Egyptian occupation of present UN zone.
 - No increase in force between the Canal and the Egyptian line, and in a comparable area behind the Israeli line.
 - An Egyptian observation post in the UN zone is negotiable.
2. Other elements raised which you may prefer not to mention include:
- Duration: agree to renew UNEF 3-4 times.
 - Syria: You told the Israelis you prefer not to mention this.
3. If the negotiations were to continue, you would want to take back to Israel:
- Sadat's ideas on the line.
 - Ideas on thinning out of forces.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, 1995
STATE DEPT. RECORDS

HR MAR, 1995 10/02/03



-- Any interest in early warning site?

4. If the negotiations are to break off, you will want to cover the following:

-- Break-up scenario. Draft announcement at Tab B.

-- How to handle Syria?

-- What to tell Faisal?

-- What to say to the Soviets?

-- Where do we go from here? Geneva?

5. In addition, you will want to raise with Sadat the missile sites east of the Canal since the Israelis will now publicize them. This issue will be used to undermine the image Sadat has developed outside Egypt.

Also attached:

-- Tab C: The last Fahmy paper

-- Tab D: The basic Israeli paper

-- The map is in your folder



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

ANNOUNCEMENT

We have been seeking, in response to the desires of the parties, to help them achieve an interim agreement as a further step toward a peace settlement. We believe both sides have made a serious effort to reach a successful outcome. Unfortunately, the differences on a number of key issues have proven irreconcilable so far. We, therefore, believe a period of reassessment is needed so that all concerned can consider how best to proceed. Secretary Kissinger has accordingly informed the parties that he is returning to Washington to report to the President and the Congress on the present stage of the negotiations. He will remain in close touch with the parties and the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference during the period ahead.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, 2001, 6.5
STATE DEPARTMENT
BY HR DATE 10/02/03



Original
Egypt 3/18


Considering that the Middle East crisis will not ultimately be solved by military force but rather by peaceful means;

Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreements:

1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from the oilfields including the town of El Tor.

2- The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:

- a) the Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes;
- b) the Egyptian forces will move up to the



-2


western entrance of the passes;

c) the area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed;

d) the area between the new Israeli line and a line ten kilometers to the east of it will be limited in armament and forces;

e) the area between the new Egyptian line and a line ten kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces.

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant U N resolutions.



4- Israel should undertake not to resort to the use of force against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria.

5- Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

6- The President of the U.S. is expected to give his assurances to President Sadat that the U.S. will actively exert their efforts in order that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975.

7- The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its function and its mandate will be extended annually.

8- A committee under the auspices of the United Nations or the chairmanship of the UN Chief of Staff will be established in order that military representatives of

the parties discuss, in the zone of disengagement, problems arising from the implementation of this agreement.

9- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories.

10- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed timetable indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement.

11- Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the



earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 333.


- 12- The parties agree that no just and durable peace in the Middle East could be achieved without the participation of the Palestinians.
- 13- This disengagement agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement.
- 14- This disengagement agreement remains valid until superseded by a new agreement.



Separate
sheet at
end

New article 3

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement.



10
24

NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means.

They will refrain from permitting, encouraging, assisting, or participating in any military, paramilitary or hostile actions, from any warlike or hostile acts and any other form of warfare or hostile activity against the other Party anywhere.

Note: This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975

Y. A.



3.

NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves, not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions, from any warlike and hostile acts and any other forms of warfare.

NOTE : This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975



ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

21

- (1) This agreement will remain in force until superseded by a peace agreement.
- (2) Undertakings regarding the duration of the agreement.
- (3) The parties recognize that the conflict between them cannot be solved by force.

Other Formulations to be included :

- (a) This is not a peace agreement it is a significant step towards just and lasting peace between them (in accordance ...etc.)
- (b) References in the agreement to some of the practical steps agreed.

March 17, 1975



PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

(1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.



- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva


The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently, after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75



3

~~SECRET~~ NODIS CHEROKEE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: GOE SIDE:

 PRESIDENT SADAT
 FOREIGN MINISTER FAHMY
 GENERAL GAMASY

 US SIDE:

 SECRETARY KISSINGER
 UNDER SECRETARY SISCO
 AMBASSADOR EILTS

PLACE: ASWAN, EGYPT

DATE: MARCH 20, 1975

TALK WITH KING FAISAL

The Secretary said he and his associates had a hectic time on this round. First, however, he would recount briefly his talk with King Faisal. He had given the King both possibilities: success or failure. If the current effort fails, he had told him we will continue a major effort to move toward a settlement. He would go back to the US to reassess our policy on the assumption that we want ultimate success. He had also told Faisal about President Sadat's insistence on no non-belligerency pledge and moving into the passes. On Syria, he had told the King of his talk with Asad. Faisal responded that he preferred simultaneity, but whatever the President and the Secretary judge best is agreeable to him.

The President expressed appreciation.

TALKS IN ISRAEL

The Secretary related that he had met with the Israeli negotiating team on Tuesday evening to inform them of the President's views. The Israeli Cabinet had then met all day Wednesday, March 19, and again this morning. This morning the Israelis had again insisted on the Rosenme-drafted statement

~~SECRET~~ NODIS CHEROKEE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY LR, NARA, DATE 10/02/03



in lieu of non-belligerency and on other political demands. The Secretary had refused to accept them. He had cautioned that, in the event of breakdown, there will have to be a reassessment of our policy vis-a-vis Israel.

On the political side, the Secretary continued, the positions of the two Parties are very close. There are minor differences. Thus, for example, the Israelis wish to reaffirm Article I of the initial Disengagement Agreement, having to do with the cease-fire. They would like something along those lines. Fahmy recalled that there had been something like this in para 3 of the Egyptian draft.

The Secretary then gave the President a paper containing three Israeli-drafted formulations, indicating the Israelis would like all three. While noting that most of the formulations are based on previous Egyptian drafts, he pointed out that the final sentence is additional. President Sadat, after looking at the document, indicated that the additional formulation poses a problem. There is no objection to the reaffirmation of the cease-fire. The President continued that he agrees in principle, but it will be a matter of phrasing. The Secretary observed that the Israelis had in effect dropped the paragraph he had brought back the last time (Rosenne-drafted paragraph) and substituted for it new language. The first two paragraphs of the new language are those of the Egyptians, along with the reaffirmation of Article I of the Disengagement Agreement. The other main elements, the Secretary continued, we can work out.

The Secretary then turned to the military concept, noting that this may be difficult. The Israelis had not yet given him a firm military line. As he understood the Israeli position, the Egyptians would move forward to the UN line. The Israelis, on their part, would withdraw their forward line to a position roughly in the middle of the passes. In the Abu Rodais area, there would be an Egyptian enclave. In the buffer zone between the two forward lines, Egypt might place a radar station on some high mountain to monitor against surprise attack. Behind the Israeli forward line there would be a zone of limited armaments equivalent to the distance between the Suez Canal and the Egyptian forward line. This zone of limited armaments would be the same for both sides. The Israelis would also be prepared to work out any assurance against surprise



attack. So far as the Lance missiles are concerned, they would not deploy them if Egypt does not position its Scuds so that they are in range of the cities.

President Sadat asked about the eastern entrance of the passes? The Secretary said the Israelis will be in the eastern entrance of the passes, which would be in the limited armaments zone. The President asked if Egypt would then move to the western entrance?

The Secretary said the matter had been discussed for the first time that morning. He had believed that Rabin had the same authority as Mrs. Meir. Rabin wants to move toward peace. If there were an agreement, the Secretary expressed his belief that Rabin would use it as a platform toward peace. Rabin knows that the next two years must be used to move toward peace. Even Peres had stated that Israel cannot always live with a moving frontier. The Cabinet, however, is "demented." It had refused three times in a row various American suggestions. The Secretary thought we could move their line back a bit, but also opined that a point will be reached where they cannot put it to their Cabinet. Enormous efforts had been expended to persuade the Israelis to drop non-belligerency. He noted the Israeli position in the passes will be part of the thinned-out zone. They say they cannot attack out of the passes.

Alluding to the Abu Rodais enclave, Gamasy asked how Egypt could move people into the enclave? They will have to go through Israeli lines and be under Israeli guns. The Secretary indicated that he discussed with them that the Egyptians move to Abu Rodais only through the UN. Gamasy said there must be a UN zone around the oilfield. The President said he could not send his people to Abu Rodais to be under the Israelis.

The Secretary said he wanted the Egyptian reaction to the above concept. Gamasy responded that the Israeli forward line should be east of the passes. The Secretary reiterated that the Israeli forward line, as they conceive it, will be in the passes. Their main line will be east of the passes. The President observed that this means we have not agreed that the passes will be free of all troops. Gamasy added that if the Israelis give up part of Mitla



pass, they will never do so in the case of Giddi or Sidr passes. The Secretary said that the Israelis claim they are giving up hundreds of billions of dollars of defense positions by going back. President Sadat countered that the Israelis will still be holding the passes. The Secretary also noted the Israelis say Egypt has an assurance against an Israeli surprise attack because of the UN forces positioned in front of the forward lines. Gamasy responded that the same is true for the Israelis. If the Israelis hold the eastern end of the passes, how can Egypt conduct reconnaissance operations in the mountains?

Fahmy asked why the line (between the enclave and the northern positions) is cut? The Secretary responded that the Israelis do not want to man a very long line. Fahmy and Gamasy argued that the line will be just as long in either event.

Sadat pointed out that the enclave will be isolated. The only road to it is along the shore, which the Israelis would still hold. Egyptians cannot ask the Israelis for permission to go to the oilfields. This is simply not a practical matter for the Egyptian side. Let us agree, the President continued, that there be no forces from either side in the passes. Only the UN and civilians will be in the oilfield. If we agree in principle, it should facilitate things. Gamasy demurred, but the President overruled him.

The Secretary asked whether, if the President has the road (leading to the enclave), he would then agree to demilitarization. Sadat said no demilitarization. He said there should be no military forces, only UN forces, i.e. just observers. The Israelis would be south of Abu Rodais. Gamasy added it should be south of el-Tur.

President Sadat added that we should be frank. The Israelis hold the Aqaba Gulf. Egypt should have the oilfield areas, taking into account that Egypt will be opening the Suez Canal.

On the matter of el-Tur, the Secretary noted that the Israelis say this is the last strong point between the Egyptian positions and Sharm el-Shaikh. If there were no forces there, it would be a difficult situation. Gamasy asked if there might be a limited armaments zone between Abu Rodais and el-Tur. The President said he would agree to civilian administration in that area. The Secretary



said he did not know what the Israeli response might be. The President said he is trying to make it easier for the Secretary.

The Secretary observed that the Israelis are "unbelievable." It was a monumental task getting them to agree to anything. The President again said police forces and UN forces in the enclave. He could not send his people (to Belaiyim) under Israeli eyes. He needed the road. The President agreed that the approach between el-Tur and Sharm al-Shaikh is easy and, much to Gamasy's distress, accepted the fact that al-Tur need not be held.

The President said that he cannot agree to the Israelis being in the middle of the passes. The passes should be free. Both eastern and western entrances should be left to the UN.

Gamasy noted that, given the different lengths of the passes, the buffer zone at Giddi would be about 6 kilometers, where the other two would be about 20. In the north, the buffer area would have to be discussed.

The Secretary noted that the Israelis do not want to give up Bir Jifjafah.

The President observed that he had agreed on some political terms and now the Israelis are being difficult on the military side. Fahmy thought the problem was difficult, but not insoluble. The Secretary said the Israelis argue that they are withdrawing large distances. Their main line is going back to the other side of the passes. Sadat responded that the Israelis will still be holding the middle of the passes, hence their withdrawal is not substantial.

Fahmy recalled his impression that the original Israeli proposal had been to take eastern end of the passes if Egypt holds the western end of the passes. The Secretary responded in the negative: If Egypt agrees to non-belligerency, the Israelis will leave the passes. Now the Israelis say there is no adequate political content (to the agreement), hence it is difficult on the military side.

Fahmy observed that the linkage between the political and military aspects constitutes the problem. The President



again asked what could he say to his people? The Israelis would still be holding half the passes. The Secretary pointed out that the President could show a considerable withdrawal of Israeli forces. Sadat responded that withdrawal will be for no more than 20-25 kilometers.


Gamasy observed that the Israelis could, from their main line, attack the Suez Canal area with 175 mm guns. The President commented that he could not guarantee the safety of navigation in the Suez Canal if the Israelis are in their proposed positions. The Secretary said something can be worked out whereby artillery is positioned out of range (of the cities) in peacetime. Gamasy countered that whenever there is a period of tension, the Israelis will move artillery forward. The Secretary noted Israel (artillery) should not even be in the eastern end of the passes under such an agreement.

The President reiterated that the eastern and western entrances of the passes should be under the UNEF as a buffer zone. Egypt will move to the UN line. In the north, the Egyptian zone might be wider. The Secretary said he had not discussed this.

Fahmy observed that the Israelis should not expect to discuss military apart from political considerations. The Secretary said the Israelis will respond that from a military viewpoint, the Egyptians are gaining; therefore they want something political. For non-belligerency they would do much. The Israelis must also show their people something. The President responded, "We have given much."

The Secretary said he is trying to find something to bring them from here. On Syria, we could give them an assurance against any preemptive attack on Syria. In turn, the Israelis want a commitment that if Syria attacks them, Egypt will not support Syria. The President agreed. He recalled that after the first Disengagement Agreement, the Syrians had begun a war of attrition, but Egypt had not moved. He authorized the Secretary can say this to the Israelis. The Secretary said he assumed this is so if UNEF finds the Syrians initiated the action. The President agreed.

In another area, the Secretary said that on the eight points (concession areas), it might help if he could have something concrete on the boycott to tell to the Israelis. Fahmy responded that Egypt will begin with Ford. Egypt




will be condemned by the Arabs for this, but Egypt will do so. Moreover, when the Suez Canal is reopened, Israeli cargoes will go through.

The Secretary asked if vessels that deliver cargo to Egyptian ports could go on to Israeli ports (without danger of being boycotted). The President said no. Israeli cargoes could go only through the Suez Canal. For 20-25 kilometers, he noted, the Israelis want everything. What about the remaining 185 kilometers that they will continue to occupy? The President asked if the Secretary had seen the Soviet statement of the previous day expressing readiness to assist in the peacemaking process? The Secretary said he had.

The President continued -- what will be left for a later stage if all that the Israelis are demanding comes now? The Israelis will still hold 185 kilometers and still say they will not go back to the '67 borders. He described them as "spoiled children."

The Secretary asked where, if the Israelis should give up the eastern entrance to the passes, they might go. Gamasy noted they could go to a mountain line behind the passes, with their main line behind this. Such positions would offer them both mobile and static defense. Sadat again said he cannot accept the middle of the passes. The Secretary asked if the President could accept an Israeli monitoring installation, provided Egypt also has one in the buffer zone? (Gamasy here pointed out on the map the Israeli monitoring station on a mountain just north of the Giddi pass.) The President responded in the negative. He reiterated that if both sides give up the passes to the UN, this will be agreeable to him. The Secretary said the Israelis would agree to Egypt also building a monitoring station. The President replied in the negative, saying this is not practical. Gamasy pointed out that the Israelis could, if they wish, build another monitoring station on a mountain behind the passes. Apart from this, he noted that the Egyptian forward line should not simply be the UN line, but further to the east.

The Secretary said he will have to talk further with the Israelis. He could not think of anything more to ask the Egyptians. He asked if there is anything more possible on the matter of duration?



Fahmy commented that Egypt wants to facilitate the Secretary's job, but does not see the logic of linkage. The logic of linkage, the Secretary pointed out, is that the Israeli Cabinet is out of control and the Knesset must also be satisfied. Sadat opined that the Israelis are deliberately prolonging the talks without making decisions.

The Secretary said he now has the bare outline of an agreement. The only decision now is the military line. After that, an agreement could be written quickly.

The President said he would give the Secretary a map as Egypt believes the line has to be. We must make it a tight agreement, he indicated, or people will "mock at us."

(Two maps were provided by Gamasy the following morning: one shows the proposed Egyptian line; the other that same line along with what the Egyptians believe would be a proper Israeli line.

13
AMB:HFrKilts:ajc - 3/23/75



March 21

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

March 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass on to you the following report on his meeting with Sadat.

"I have just completed a two hour conversation with Sadat at which I presented the latest Israeli ideas. As I expected, he was strongly insistent that he could not accept the line to be drawn through the middle of the passes and reiterated strongly that the Egyptian forward line must be at the western entrance of the passes while the Israeli line could be at the eastern entrance of the passes. In short, he insists on the principle that neither side will occupy the passes, but that rather they will be supervised by the UN force.

"As you know, with respect to the oil fields, the Israelis have indicated willingness to provide for an enclave in which presumably there would be some cooperative agreement worked out between Egypt and Israel. Under the Israeli proposal, the oil fields would be totally undefended and be surrounded by Israeli forces. Sadat's counter proposal as conveyed to us this evening would establish a broad United Nations zone in the area of the oil fields in which neither side would maintain armed forces and in which there would only be civilian and ordinary police under Egyptian administration. Moreover, the Egyptians will insist on an increase of the number of forces from the present 7,000 east of the canal, whereas the Israelis will want to maintain this limit.


"These are the key issues in the military aspect of the agreement and I remain very doubtful that these differences can be bridged. I have agreed at Sadat's urging to make a further substantial effort with the Israelis, while reiterating my judgment to him that it is unlikely that the Israelis will agree to the latest proposal on the military aspect of the problem. In this connection, I noted that

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

NOV MEMO, 11/24/80, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY: HR DATE: 10/10/03

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

Gamasy was very happy with Sadat when the latter suggested a UN zone around the oil fields, rather than drawing the line so that there would be Egyptian forces there.

"Another important concession which Sadat made this evening is that he is willing to give me an oral assurance which I may transmit to the Israelis that in the event Syria attacks Israel, and this is confirmed by the UN observers, he would not attack Israel.

"I have sent word to Rabin that I will wish to meet with the negotiating team in the early afternoon on Friday and that I have agreed to stay through next Sunday in order to give him the opportunity to call another Cabinet meeting on the latest Egyptian ideas.

"The basic problem remains that Israel is dealing with this issue largely as a matter of domestic politics. They have nailed themselves to propositions they could not fulfill and are jeopardizing our entire position in the Middle East in the pursuit of entirely marginal points."

SECRET/SENSITIVE



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime
Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to
Israel
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, March 21, 1975
1:45 - 4:00 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

Kissinger: I am expecting a phone call from Scowcroft.

Rabin: How was your trip to Aswan?



~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*
E.O. 10883 SEC. 3.5 SF 9/17/03

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
DATE 10/10/03

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

Kissinger: I will talk about it in a minute. How long can it take for a phone call to come through?

Rabin: Since I am not any more the Minister of Communications, since yesterday

Peres: They handed it over to the Prime Minister, and it went down.

Rabin: Have you read General Brown's statement?

Kissinger: About Jews? [Laughter]

Rabin: About Israel.

Kissinger: In this country it is true that the banks and newspapers are run by Jews. [Laughter]

[Kissinger goes out to take a call from Scowcroft.]

Sisco: Motta [Gur], your counterpart said to us again that if you and he sat down together, you would settle it.

Gur: I know. I said that.

[Kissinger returns.]

Kissinger: Can I hear what General Brown said?

Rabin: I am not sure. I just read something in the paper, where he said that after Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel should draw certain conclusions -- and he didn't mean we should give in.

Allon: It might be another general.

Rabin: I just read it in the papers. I didn't pursue it.

Kissinger: Let me just tell you what happened. What we wanted to prevent was to have you think everything was happening there to break it up.

On the Syrian point, he gave us an oral assurance that if Syria launches either a war of attrition or a preemptive war, Egypt would not participate.



He told us we could give it to you. Sisco and Eilts were with me and I asked them both to write it down for our files. [Tab A]

On non-use of force he substantially accepted your formulation, except for the phrase you added to what is otherwise a reconfirmation of the disengagement agreement -- the language about "assisting in military or paramilitary actions." [Israeli formulation of March 20 at Tab B.]

With respect to the line, they rejected it in every detail. So I have to convey to you Sadat's proposal.

With respect to the oil fields, he said he can't accept enclaves surrounded by Israeli territory.

Rabin: Israeli-controlled territory.

Kissinger: Israeli-controlled territory, or a land corridor. He has to have access by land.

The reason he wanted El Tor is because it and El Arish are the two big towns in the Sinai, and since he is not raising El Arish, it would give him political symbolism. On the other hand, I pointed out to him what was raised here, that is, that once you are there, there is no obstacle between there and Sharm el Sheikh. He proposed the complete demilitarization of the whole area -- no forces, no police.

Rabin: From Suez to El Tor, all demilitarized? [He indicates on a map.]


Kissinger: That's right.

Rabin: No forces?

Kissinger: Under UN control.

Rabin: Ah.

Kissinger: They would carry only personal arms; it would not be a zone of limited armaments. This produced a monumental explosion from Gamasy and Fahmy, who said it concedes the principle of demilitarization which they have never conceded. Gamasy said "I am a General; I carry out orders."



Rabin: The principle is, it is along the seashore.

Kissinger: Well, El Tor is what they want, with only police, UN forces, and no military forces. I said as a joke: "You will probably put soldiers in police uniforms." Gamasy was indignant. Sadat said there would be no arms.

Rabin: In 1971 you once said there would be only porters in hotels.

Kissinger: And I have never lived it down.

Sisco: And it would be under Egyptian administration.

Kissinger: The big problem is in another direction.

I have contingency instructions in place in both Washington and Aswan for a breakup of these talks. I didn't want you to do it here.

This is his proposal. He thinks it is a major concession. It think it is a concession once I have left Israel.

On the other side, the position hasn't changed. He feels he is totally publicly committed to acquiring the passes. So to permit the UN to take it is already a step back. To concede that you stay there. . . Gamasy says he will bet that by the "middle" of the passes, you mean all of the Mitla and half of the Giddi.


Gur: It is quite a long time since he has seen them!

Rabin: Eight years by now.

Kissinger: So he feels he can't give up the position that you not be there. His preferred position is that nobody be there.

On the UN zone, I first had the impression that Sadat was agreeable, but then Gamasy raised such a storm that I felt it was left somewhat confused. I have the impression they will want some movement forward of that line too. But the distance is negotiable.

Rabin: To move beyond?



Kissinger: Certainly to move beyond and to restore most of the zone of limited arms. What Gamasy has in mind is . . .

Rabin: That is something.

Kissinger: . . . about a kilometer away from the mouth of the passes.

Peres: That his army can move.

Kissinger: Yes. Gamasy seemed very attracted by the idea. Both of them made the proposition that if you could move beyond the passes in nonbelligerency, what makes it insecure in conditions of non-resort to force?

Peres: Belligerence.

Kissinger: You are getting the non-use of force part of it.

Rabin: But if it is the same, why didn't he give it?

[Food is served]

Rabin: We have been meeting eight hours here in this room with the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Parliament. I went over what we proposed. I am losing my credibility. Since I said in the Parliament that we won't give the oil and the passes without nonbelligerency, they say, "Now you give Abu Rudeis and half of the passes." I said, "I'll change my statement in Parliament." I have to say they behaved seriously, recognizing the problem we face.

Kissinger: I must say the Jerusalem Post was very serious. Very good. I must say I was afraid of what would appear after our meeting yesterday. They were very fair articles.

Rabin: The press is confused. Ben-Gurion used to say we would never withdraw, and within 48 hours he withdrew from the Sinai. And I said it on ABC, and I was dragged to the Parliament to say it again.

Kissinger: Now ABC is against you.

Rabin: I was forced to make that statement in Parliament. Now Sadat says he is committed publicly to get the passes and the fields.



Peres: Sadat couldn't get it through his own Parliament?

Rabin: He has no problem.

Kissinger: This morning there, Fahmy said they could discuss elements of nonbelligerency, and even some formulations, in greater detail, at the El Arish - Ras Mohammed line, coupled with the intention to give nonbelligerency. But I gave him no encouragement on that.

Rabin: May I sum it up? About the lines. What is there about duration?

Kissinger: Only to say that they consider what they gave as open-ended and they reaffirm their commitment to extend it annually but can't say a specific period.

Rabin: [Goes to the map on the wall] El Tor is here, over 200 kilometers over from the present line. What they want is control over the fields. From Abu Rudeis to the oil fields is over 30 kilometers. They want it controlled by the UN, no Egyptian personnel.

Kissinger: My judgment is if they get the fields, they will not . . .

Rabin: Go as far as Tor.

Kissinger: I have that impression, but no authority to say it.

Rabin: South of Belayim, it is 200 kilometers, so it must be 250 to Tor. With Egyptian civil administration. Here he'd like to move forward from the blue line.

Kissinger: Again, my estimate is he would settle for substantially token Egyptian forward movement.

Rabin: Token?

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Under Egyptian military control.

Kissinger: No question.

Rabin: The passes have to be under the UN zone, totally.



Kissinger: Correct.

Rabin: The distance between the passes and our forces are to be the same distance.

Kissinger: My estimate is, if he can say you are out of the passes, one kilometer might be enough. That is Sadat, not Gamasy.

Rabin: Some minimal distance, but out of the passes. If it is one kilometer or three kilometers doesn't make any difference. Therefore, the line should be here [due north] for the UN zone.

Kissinger: I had the impression they were thinking not of a line due north from Tor, but following the coast, then to the third pass, then north.

Rabin: It's not a Cabinet decision, but I tell you frankly what I think. I -- to me -- it is totally unacceptable, and I will do my best not to recommend it to the Cabinet. Because I believe that Israel cannot, in present circumstances, in return for what is offered, withdraw from the passes, and the oil fields, and accept Egyptian movement forward of the blue line. For nonbelligerency, I talked about the passes and the oil fields. But under the present circumstances, for Israel to settle for both, it is new negotiations.

Kissinger: We will not participate in any further negotiations between Egypt and Israel.

If you won't recommend it to the Cabinet, there is no sense waiting around for the Cabinet.


Rabin: But the Cabinet decided yesterday any cut in the negotiations had to be a Cabinet decision.

Kissinger: So what do you recommend? That I wait for a Cabinet decision?

Rabin: Can we have a break? I don't want there to be any illusions about what we could accept. Because of our relationship, we should be frank.

Kissinger: Can you tell us before you call a meeting?

Peres: Can you tell us what the scenario will be if there is no agreement?



Kissinger: I will make a brief statement announcing that I am returning to Washington. I gave you a brief outline of the statement, which would not assess blame. I have given it to you.

Allon: Did he say anything about an early warning system?

Kissinger: He won't accept an Israeli early warning system in the neutral zone. He may accept one for himself, but not for you.

Rabin: Can we have a brief break?

[At 2:25 p.m., the Israeli side moves to the Prime Minister's private office. At 2:26, the Prime Minister stepped out and asked to see the Secretary. Rabin and Kissinger conferred privately inside until 2:45. The group then reconvened.]

Kissinger: I have nothing to add to what I said yesterday. The President has asked me to point out to you that the record that leaves no doubt that the U.S. has been proceeding on the basis of the passes and the oil. And the record leaves no doubt that the U.S. has always maintained that non-belligerency is unattainable. And on this basis we committed ourselves to a seven-month effort. And the President wants me to make it clear this was made clear to both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

Rabin: I am not aware it was made clear.

Kissinger: The record was clear.

Rabin: We can compare.


The President said there had to be some movement; I said fine.

Allon: The President asked me, "Can Henry go out there and try for an agreement on the basis of the passes and the oil fields?" And I said . . .

Kissinger: You said there was no Cabinet decision. That is what you said.

It is a question of how American involvement was used. It is a question we will have lots of time to discuss.

Rabin: May I ask a question? What would you prefer -- a Cabinet meeting today or tomorrow night?



Kissinger: How long will it take? Ten minutes?

Peres: Three hours.

Kissinger: What will be the outcome? That you announce the suspension of the talks?

Rabin: We will coordinate with you. I will put to them that we stick to the proposal we made, and anything less cannot be done.

Kissinger: You will announce the suspension?

Rabin: We will coordinate with you.

Kissinger: What will the Cabinet say?

Rabin: We made it clear in Yigal's visits to the U.S. that our decision was 30-50 kilometers. This was the Cabinet decision. I believe it can be that some thought this was the starting point of the negotiation. In my discussions I believe I said the fields can be, but it depends on the quid pro quo.

I remember I said the fields were an enclave, and the western passes would be evacuated. On demilitarization, you said, I believe, that demilitarization of the areas evacuated could be. And elements of non-belligerency, some elements. What we got was only nonuse of force.

Kissinger: There is no sense debating it.

Rabin: Because we all appreciate, really, how you conducted the negotiations. We, all of us, feel admiration for you and how you did.

I tell you with all frankness that the Cabinet has taken a decision that first, will make the Prime Minister very unpopular. But this isn't important. I have considered what is the merit of the issue.

I tell you, when the three of us decided on the lines including the oil fields, we didn't go to the Cabinet. We decided to push to the limits. And we were criticized that we practically went out of our authorization.



I would like to show you the map we prepared. And we think under present circumstances we went almost beyond what we were committed to do. Frankly, we did it not vis-a-vis Egyptians; we did it bearing in mind our special relationship with you. There was no justification to do it for Egypt.

To ask us to do what Sadat proposed -- I don't see any justification, including our relationship with the United States. And I am not putting the question of prestige, as I would be criticized by people in this country that I was ready to back out of what I said in Knesset. But there are limits.

Kissinger: It depends. I can suspend my mission and you can have a Cabinet meeting afterwards.

Rabin: No, I am committed. Before I can say it is a final decision, there must be a Cabinet decision. I am not empowered to tell you this is a final Cabinet decision.


Kissinger: I am 100 percent certain I know what the Cabinet decision will be.

There is no sense reviewing it. It could not be a secret what the President's views were. As late as January 22, he told Max Fisher: "I'm convinced Israel has to give up the passes and the oil fields -- not to Egypt, but to make it a demilitarized zone Unless there is an agreement along this line, there will be a stalemate and the chance of conflict is greatly increased." Knowing Fisher was coming here, I deliberately avoided attending it. You didn't accept it but you knew the President's views.

Allon: When Max Fisher was here he told us the President said there had to be a return from the Egyptians of something substantial.

Kissinger: I recommend you call a Cabinet meeting right away, announce that you have received the latest Egyptian proposals, that you ask the Cabinet to keep quiet. And after we assemble again, we can announce that we've suspended the talks.

Rabin: With all due respect for Max Fisher -- he is my great friend . . .



Kissinger: No, there is no sense -- there is no doubt what was told. We should have had this discussion in October. If we didn't think it was bridgeable, I wouldn't have come here.

Rabin: Just for the record, I would like to show the line we were prepared to move to.

Gur: [He unrolls a map and hangs it up on the wall.] This doesn't include the 50-kilometer line, but it would have been here [to the right of the blue line]. All the northern sector.

Rabin: A significant part.

Gur: Now the Egyptians move the red line to what is now our blue line.

Our line cuts west of Bardawil, down through all this terrain, west of our installations, but comes to the Giddi and Mitla.

Any talks of the impossibility of cutting those passes is wrong. Tell Gamasy.

Kissinger: He didn't say that; he said any line due north of where you cut the Mitla would include the Giddi.

Gur: Then down to Ras Sudr and then to the sea.

Now [in the north] it's 40 kilometers; it was 50 before our move; it cuts now in the middle of the passes. We were talking about 50 without the passes.

According to the Government decision, we go eastward into the passes, and we go to Ras Sudr.

In other places it was possible to move further, but once the Egyptians move after us, we have to take better defensive positions. We thought that for the Egyptians the main issue was the western side of the passes, if they have only defensive intentions. But we need these positions from our point of view, of course.

It could still be 50 kilometers if they don't move.

Kissinger: No.



Gur: If they really think only of defensive measures, there is a very good possibility for them -- the Egyptians -- to be quite safe in the Canal zone with that line. Any other line can only be with offensive aims in mind. It is a very good defensive line.

Sisco: What about the oil fields?

Gur: About the oil fields, about the enclave, here is the town of Abu Rudeis, and the fields are stretching from the town to an area of about 32-33 kilometers. Here, there are no installations, nothing of value from Abu Rudeis to the north. The shipping area is here. All other thoughts about the UN, the use of the road -- this will be discussed.

And this is a very good defensive line.

Kissinger: All right, are we agreed you will call the Cabinet?

Rabin: I have called the Cabinet.

Kissinger: And they will not say anything.

Rabin: There will be nothing not coordinated with you. Do you want to go to Aswan?

Kissinger: I left it with Sadat. I told him you would not accept it but I left it somewhat open so he wouldn't start a propaganda campaign. I told him that after I arrived here it might break up.

Peres: Wouldn't it be better to announce it from Aswan?

Kissinger: It wouldn't hold. You can't control our newsmen running around this time. I have no desire to go to Aswan under these circumstances. I think the chances are 50-50 that he will ask me to go straight home. I don't think he has much interest.

Keating: Mr. Prime Minister, may I ask what time you have called the Cabinet meeting?

Rabin: 4:30.



Kissinger: You estimate it will last how long?

Rabin: Three hours. I give no commitment.

Kissinger: You will say you received the Egyptian proposals.

Rabin: I will say nothing about coordinating with you.

Kissinger: In any case, the Cabinet will not announce the suspension.

Allon: If there is a suspension, it should . . .

Kissinger: There is a suspension.

Allon: Shouldn't it be in Egypt?

Rabin: We will not do anything not coordinated with you as long as you are here.

Dinitz: You will announce the suspension . . .

Kissinger: Here. Right after your meeting. I assume that after the Cabinet meeting, you will ask me to come over here.

Rabin: Yes.

Kissinger: And after our meeting here, we can announce the suspension, either at the King David, or by our spokesman, or personally.

Gazit: Personally would be better.

Kissinger: I think we will let our spokesman announce it. But we will discuss it.

Rabin: We will discuss it.

Kissinger: [To Sisco] Is there anything else we need to discuss now?

Sisco: No.

Kissinger: What do we say to the press now?



Peres: That you reported to us the Egyptian proposals and we will inform the Cabinet.

Rabin: To report.

Sisco: If we are suspending, it's the Sisco Plan!

Allon: If it fails!

[The meeting ended]





EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(A)

Aswan, Egypt

March 21, 1975

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

My notes reflect that on the matter of Syria, the President indicated that in the event of a Syria-initiated action against Israel and the UN confirms this, the Egyptians would not assist Syria.

This also applies to a Syrian-initiated war of attrition. The President and Fahmy recalled that the Syrians had adopted such a tactic of attrition just prior to the Disengagement Agreement and the Egyptians did not come to their help. The President recognized in principle the Israelis' right to retaliate if the Syrians initiate action and the UN confirms this. However, if the Israelis initiate action against Syria, then Egypt is obligated to assist Syria.

This concept was mentioned by the President on March 18 and briefly yesterday.

Joe Sisco has checked his records and they are consistent with the above.

Sincerely,


Hermann Frederiek Eilts

SECRET NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, 13527
DATE 10/02/03

HR 10/02/03



7
(B)

Egypt and Israel resolve that the conflict between them shall not be solved by military means and can only be solved by peaceful means.

They hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. The Parties will give written assurances to the USG to this effect.

They ^{re-}confirm their obligation to scrupulously observe the ^{ce-}asefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other and from assisting in military or para-military actions against the other party.

(Non-use of force)

March 20, 1975





Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504

(734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571
(616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386

**The documents in this
folder continue into the
next folder.**