

(7)

Doctrine. Defiance might ~~lead~~ into

Warfare. These are what people perceives about war.

I am not going to take into consideration such ~~a sort~~

~~of~~ Wars. What I mean in ^{the} World's ^{final} ~~territorial~~

warfare ^{is} not problems of mere interests of nations.

The long cherished common aspirations of humanity were

toward the unification of the world system, and the perpetu-

ation of peace. We all are heartily longing, ~~that~~ that

these ideals be brought about not through savage and

cruel measures like wars, but by peaceful procedures

without bloodshed. Man, however, is too imperfect

for that. Such a great task seems not attainable.

(8)

merely by reasoning debates and moral preachings.

Through a grave and serious contest among the teams

survived to the final championship, and by the resulting

issue of their strenuous fight, by that way only the

leading principles of the world's unification be esta-

blished. Therefore, the warfare, ^{which} we perceive

that we must expect to encounter in several decades,

is an inevitable sacrifice for the realization of

perpetual peace to mankind.

Now, assuming that we could have survived

the semi-final tournament in ~~the~~ East Asia, with

whom shall we were to fight next? These

(9)

might be some European team or American team with whom we must go into the final

contests. We are going to the arena of divine

judgement. If we were to appear in the

battlefields where cruel atrocities are being done,

we must not forget that we are fighting to win the

championship by fair play. Champions do not

fight for their interests nor from ^{hatred.} ~~hostilities.~~

We, the Eastern people, must keep the traditional

spirit of fair play. Slighting or hating

the rivals must absolutely ^{be} outside our considerations,

but we must fight always with respect to them.

Some one might say: What you say seems to be true; so do not announce aloud, that might make others prepare for. That is not the way of men of East Asia, ^{nor} the Easterner's ethics.

All right, we say, make them prepare well. We will also prepare. Isn't it ~~to~~ fair play?

What, then, I must say and conclude is that, those sagacious people that could understand the momentous significance of the present age and make preparations to face it, that will be the people gifted to survive as the fittest of the world. We perceive, therefore, it is our imminent duty to make known this spirit of

(11)

the age to our compatriots, and all the inhabitants of East Asia.

(concluded)

Reference to Soburo Kai testimony
by Yaneoka R 1961-1963
also 1966

Autonomous movement discussed
2032

See page R 1772 re
managers at Mumbden
Exhibit 172

ISHIHARA, Kanji

Excerpts from Record:

- R 1,959 TANAKA said that there were elements in the Army advocating Japanese occupation of Manchuria in those days. Also, that when diplomatic negotiations were of no avail, to drive the Chinese out of Manchuria and to set up a new regime under Japanese control.
- R 1,960 TATEKAWA, Chief of the 2d Section of the General Staff, favored this plan. Others advocating the plan were HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, and Capt. Cho, Isamu, who was a member of the Sakura Kai (Cherry Blossom Society). TANAKA said, also, that Colonel ITAGAKI, Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, and Staff Officer Lt Colonel ISHIHARA, Kanji, were the leaders of the Kwantung Army.
- R 1,975 ISHIHARA was a key figure in Kwantung Army.
- R 2,012 Referring to conversations with General TATEKAWA, TATEKAWA told TANAKA that the Manchurian Incident was planned and that ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA had strongly supported HASHIMOTO and Capt. CHO.
- R 2,015 Referring to conversations with Capt. CHO in June 1933, TANAKA said that CHO told him the Manchurian Incident had been planned beforehand and that ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA of the Kwantung Army were leading figures.
- R 2,017 As to the October Incident, Kwantung Army was opposed to it and that he (CHO) was reprimanded by ISHIHARA after the October Incident when ISHIHARA stopped over at Mukden on the way to North China.
- R 1,991 See testimony of TANAKA re Mukden Railway.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

21 April 1947


MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunigan
FROM : Mr. Lopez
SUBJECT : ISHIHARA, Kanji

1. Although not an ITAGAKI witness, ISHIHARA, Kanji, has interested us primarily because of his close association with ITAGAKI. On 3 April 1947 we sent in the following request to the Investigative Division:

"Ambassador Grew in his diary "Ten Years in Japan" (Defense Document No. 206-E (73)) wrote "at least one of the sources of the rumor was General ISHIHARA, retired because he had published an article advocating a Japanese attack on Singapore". Will you kindly secure a copy of the article?"

Attached hereto is a copy of Defense Document 206-E(73)."

2. Hereto attached is a copy of a memorandum submitted by Lt. Eric W. Fleisher in compliance with our request above.


Pedro Lopez
Associate Prosecutor

Attachment.
As described.

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Pedro Lopez
Associate Prosecutor

Attachment.
As described.

C
O
P
Y

21 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Pedro Lopez, Associate Prosecutor for the
Philippines

FROM : Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, Investigator, IPS

SUBJECT : Ishihara, Kanji

Pursuant to your memorandum, dated 3 April 1947 requesting a copy of an article presumably written by General Ishihara, Kanji according to Ambassador Grew's diary "Ten Years in Japan" (Defense Document No. 206-E (73)), the following information is submitted for your attention.

On 7 April this investigator contacted the Foreign Office requesting that either the desired document be procured or that information regarding where it was published and by whom be obtained. The Foreign Office made a thorough check through their files and reported on 15 April that no article was written by Ishihara advocating or stating that Japan should send forces to Singapore.

A search was, meanwhile, made by the Archives Section of the Home Ministry and some of the larger book stores were contacted, but with negative results.

The 1st Demobilization Bureau has no knowledge of such an article by Ishihara, and does not believe that Ishihara was forced to resign because of an article. Mr. Yoshio of the Historical Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau claims that Ishihara was forced to resign on 31 March 1941 because he was in disagreement with those who were formulating the policies of the Army. Taking Ishihara's background into consideration, with all his Kwantung Army service, it is unlikely that he would have written concerning southern expansion.

The attached volume entitled "A Dissertation on the Last World War" was written by Ishihara in 1940 and may mention Singapore. This book was borrowed from an individual and we would appreciate your returning it as soon as you are through with it.

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher
ERIC W. FLEISHER
2nd Lt., Inf
Investigator, IPS

24 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lester C. Dunigan

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - Tojo, Hideki

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Iichihara, Kanji

Record

Man. Sum.

3016 ✓

3020 ✓

2793

3016 ✓

p. 19

1971 ✓

p. 13

1960-61 ✓

p. 11

1966 ✓

Komai, Tokuzo

5119-5182

p. 80

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

EPM
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Name: ISHIHARA, Kanji

Record

Man. Sum.

3016

3020

Title: Lt. Col. Kwantung Army, 1931.

Source: Testimony of Morishima, Morito.

After Chang-Tso-lin incident, he became one of the leaders of militaristic clique of Kwantung Army who wanted to use force in Manchuria.

Name: ISHIHARA, Kanji

Record:
1971

Manchurian
Summary
Pg 13

Title: Lt. Col.

Source: Testimony of Tanaka, Ryukichi

(2) Aim of conspiracy of Sept. 18, 1931 was economic development of Manchuria under Army occupation.

Name: ISHIHARA, Kanji

Record
3016

Manchurian
Summary
Pg 19

Title: Lt. Col.

Source: Testimony of Morashima, Morito

(3) Named as one of conspirators in Sept 18, 1931 plot.

Name: Ishihara, Kanji

Record
1960-61,
1966

Manchurian
Summary
Pg 11

Title: Lt. Col.

Source: Testimony of Tanaka, Ryukichi

(1) Named one of conspirators of Sept 18, 1931 incident.

Name: ISHIMURA, Kazuji

Record

Man. Sum.

Name: Komai, Tokuzo

Record
5119-5182

Manchurian

Title: Col., Kwangtung Army 1934

Summary

Pg 80

Title: Testimony of Kasagi, Kyohei

Source: Interrogatories of Hoshino, Naoki
Self-Governing Guidance Board.

Was Chief of Manchurian General Affairs Board.

Name: ISHIHARA, Kanji

Record
2793

Man. Sum.

Title: Col., Kwantung Army 1932.

Source: Testimony of Kasagi, Ryomei

He was one of Army group which controlled the Manchurian
Self-Governing Guidance Board.

28 April 1947

SUGGESTED CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ISHIHARA, Kazuji

(Defense Document #886)

1. At the very end of page 1 to the top of page 2 you said, "So the Kuomintang influence made a steady inroad on the north-eastern area, instigating and organizing anti-Japanese campaigns." Why were they anti-Japanese? What was their purpose? And why did you say at the middle of page 13, "The Nanking Government . . . had no control over the North-easter Army." How did you reconcile these two statements?

Strongly spotted

Questionable

2. On the middle of page 2 you said the disposition of the Chinese Army "was re-arranged into an encircling position . . . along the South Manchurian Railway." Was it true that the disposition was really a measure to protect the railway?

What did Army do to that all

3. In the middle of page 2 you said that "Organized actions against or in contempt of Japan were committed," why the Kwantung army did not cause diplomatic actions to be taken? Why did the Kwantung army make a proposal to increase its forces instead?

4. On page 3 you stated the relation between the two forces "was on the verge of explosion as if sitting on top of a volcano." Was this situation as you saw it ever reported by you or anyone in the Kwantung Army to the Central authorities in Tokyo? Was it reported and the central authorities in Tokyo did not believe such report? When you saw that situation, did you realize that such explosion would mean international conflict of grave consequences? *if yes, all he did was to ask for increased forces.*

So over list of K Army on page 6

Had he or anyone else received news from Tokyo to that effect?

5. On page 4 you stated "the Chinese Army was not our original objective of operational preparations," but you were afraid of "the Soviet encroachment on the Manchurian territory." Were you assigned the duty to defend Chinese territory against another third power? In your original plan of operation how long did it take to occupy the important railway stations in South Manchuria? Did it take at least a week? But later, as a matter of fact, you did occupy them in two days, wasn't it?

R 19,907 C. ex. of Munam re Manchuria causing war with China by going thru Manchuria who was original objective

What do you mean that Japan be in better position against Russia if had Manchuria

6. You said on the middle of page 4 that Central Headquarters instructed you to execute the duty even by force, c Who issued the instruction? When was that instruction? Did the instructions say that in the event of using force, you had to apply for, at that time, an approval from the Central Headquarters? Was it within the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army to use force at the least provocation?

on its own initiative or least provocation

7. Continuing on the same page, you described that your army was ill-equipped and out-numbered as well as encircled, and at the bottom of page 4 you said, "concentrating all our strength to Mukden"

M.

to deal a fatal blow to the military centre of Mukden." So, was it true that your army in the pitiful condition you describe was quite capable to deal a fatal blow to the Chinese Army?

8. At the bottom of page 4 you stated, "Under such circumstances the Kwantung Army established an operational plan to settle whatever incident might happen preparations regarding education, training, transportation, etc." Was this war-like preparation reported to the Central Headquarters? Was this war-like preparation known to the Japanese ministers and consuls in China? Was the Army, instead of the diplomatic representatives of Japan, empowered to settle an international incident? Did the central authorities transfer the power of settling an international incident from the central office representatives to the Kwantung Army? Did you know that in September 1931 your Consul at Mukden was trying very hard to settle the HAKAMURA Incident? Was it true that while your Consul was negotiating your war-like preparations were ready? Was it true that your war-like preparations agitated the Chinese to an alarming degree? Was the Chinese army prepared? (If he answers "Yes", as the case probably will be, the next question will be: But you were able to occupy all the important railway stations within 48 hours, even when the Chinese army was prepared?)

Questionable

9. On the middle of page 5 you stated, "we should not allow the enemy to aggrandize the incident by despising us." What do you mean "to aggrandize the incident"? Do you mean by "aggrandize" even more "despising." Was "despising" one of the causes for you to take military preparations? Was "despising" one of the causes for you to take military actions?

See p 13 of affidavit where Japs aggrandize incident - Japs Govt as he said

Questionable

10. On page 5 you stated, Commander HOEJO "undertook an unexpected inspection with special reference to the operational preparations of every unit." Why was it unexpected? Was this unexpected inspection reported to Tokyo? (If so, what was the reaction of Tokyo?) Was this unexpected inspection with reference to operational preparations known to the Chinese? (If so, it will prove the secrecy of the Japanese preparations; if not, the next question should be: Did this unexpected inspection rather surprise and alarm the Chinese?)

Also that Tokyo thought no help was needed. That K.A. was in danger of being taken over.

11. At the bottom of page 5 you say you did not expect any "reinforcements from central military authorities." Was this a clear enough indication that Tokyo did not want any hostilities? Did this mean that even without the sanction of Tokyo the Kwantung Army would still go ahead?

12. You testified that two heavy guns were mounted at Mukden, as well as wall-attack materials. Was it true that the duty of the Kwantung army was to guard the railway? How would you justify the installation of heavy guns and wall-attack materials when the Republic of China was still in a friendly diplomatic relation with Japan. Was the installation a military secret? Was it known to the Chinese? Was it known to the Japanese Consul? Was it reported to Tokyo? Was ITAGAKI responsible for such installation? Why was it necessary to occupy the Chinese wall city if there were any incident on the railway which you were supposed to guard?

What was status of diplomatic relations at the time

Did he or setagaki try to find out why request was made that he knows nothing personally. Cant deny question R 1930. Well being sunk who ordered installation

13. On page 6, under item 3, you testify that "Colonel KANAMOTO . . . was obliged to be transferred following the death of Chang Tsou-lin by bombing." Why was he obliged to be transferred? Was it because he planned the bombing? Why was he only transferred instead of being punished? Was the death of Chang the cause of anti-Japanese attitude on the part of Chinese?

Questionable

14. At the bottom of page 6 you said "The chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ was Colonel DOIHARA." What was the function of that organ? Was it espionage? Did it come under the control of ITAGAKI? Later, the Kwantung Army created another Special Service Department, was that true? What were the differences between the Special Service Organ and the Special Service Department? What were their respective duties? (The Chinese, Division, IPS requests your special attention to these questions on account of a few documents ready to be introduced against DOIHARA in connection with the Special Service.)

15. In the middle of page 7, was it DOIHARA as Chief of Special Service who reported to you the "anti-Japanese atmosphere" of the Chinese. You said "in the face of the failure of various diplomatic negotiations" was it a fact that even on the very evening of 18 September 1931 the diplomatic negotiations were still going on? Was it true that the failure, or not failure, of a diplomatic negotiation should be decided by the diplomatic officials? You went on to testify that "in spite of our conciliatory attitude the whole army . . . entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable." Did you mean that the installation of heavy guns and wall-attack materials was a conciliatory attitude? (Did you mean that the request for the increase of military strength was a conciliatory attitude? Did you mean that the operation plan to deal a fatal blow to the Chinese army was a conciliatory attitude? (How did you manifest your conciliatory attitude to the Chinese while your Commander made an unexpected inspection with reference to operation plans?) Did you mean by "our conciliatory attitude" the attitude of the Japanese Consul? Did you still preserve your conciliatory attitude even when the whole army believed that armed conflict was inevitable? Did ITAGAKI, as Staff Officer, also entertain the idea of an inevitable armed conflict? Did DOIHARA entertain such, too? Was such idea, entertained by the whole Kwantung Army, ever reported to Tokyo? Was this situation known to the Japanese Consul? Was it true that a staff officer told the officers and men that an armed conflict was inevitable? (The probable answer would be "NO." The next question will be: Did you mean that even the enlisted men of your army independently came to the conclusion that an armed conflict was inevitable? Was your army, officers and men, strongly cautioned as to their behavior and attitude, since all of them and each of them entertained such idea? Was it true that at the least provocation your soldiers would immediately go into action because of such an idea? Was it because of such idea that you said previously on page 3 "the relation between the two forces was on the verge of an explosion as if sitting on top of a volcano?"

was Kw Army to decide if dip. relations were failure
Loaded Postal at head

Questionable

see Perfect Control by Itagaki P. of closhiba affidavit

who passed information on to mm He - Itagaki Wants/Way

without doubt
of suspicion
He does know then secret

with those things in mind did Itagaki & Doihara adopt conciliatory attitude
See battery affidavit

Itagaki & Doihara - you used the pretext of provocation to

believe that armed conflict was inevitable

also
Armored
Cars-
Explosives

16. At the bottom of page 7, you said "All the units did their best day and night in training and execution of their guard duties." Did the 2nd Battalion of the Mukden Independent Garrison, who had two heavy guns mounted, and other units, who had wall-attack materials prepared, also do their best day and night in such training? Was such training known to the Chinese? Was such training conducted in the firm belief that an armed conflict was inevitable?

17. At the bottom of page 7, you testified that "General SHIRAKAWA came to Manchuria to appease the army." Did you mean that he came because the army entertained the idea of an inevitable armed conflict? Did he come out to find out the truth because such idea entertained by the Kwantung Army was never reported to Tokyo?

Hashimoto
Cho

Did he talk
to other
circles or did
Setagaki

18. On the top of page 8 you testified "there were some civilians in the South Manchurian Railway and other circles, who had various opinions on the Manchurian Problems, but no member of the Kwantung Army including myself had ever conspired with them." Who were these civilians? Was OKAWA one of them? Who were the other circles? Were they secret societies? (Were they Army officers in Japan?) Was HASHIMOTO one of them? How did you know that there were such? How did you know that no member of the Kwantung Army ever conspired with them? Was it true that these civilians and these circles whom you mentioned also entertained the idea that an armed conflict in Manchuria was inevitable? Was it true that they also urged Japanese military preparations in Manchuria? Did they also advocate the dealing of a fatal blow against the Chinese army in Manchuria?

Setagaki
in charge?

19. On top of page 9, you said "we received the second telegram from the Mukden Special Service Organ." Was it DOIHARA who sent this telegram?

Did he
investigate
if that
who
did.

20. You said the Chinese army exploded the S. M. R. Railway. Did anyone of your army ascertain the actual damage? Did you know that the Japanese consul ascertained the damage and reported that it was only 1 meter and 20 centimeters of rails and two legs? This is based on IFS Document #1767, processed, but not yet introduced.)

Begin

21. You went on to testify that "a portion of Pei-tayin was occupied." How far was this place from the damaged railway? Why was it necessary to occupy it? Who authorized the attack? Was it also included in your operation plan as a part of your fatal blow dealt to the Chinese? You also said "that the company was in great difficulty and disadvantage." Did you mean that the place was occupied in great difficulty? Did the two heavy guns at that time go into action? Was the wall attack started?

22. On page 9 you testified that you reported to HONJO that "there is no time to lose. We must resolutely mobilize the whole strength of our military might to seal the fate of the enemy within the shortest possible time." Why was there no time to lose? Had you ascertained the damage? Had you verified the information from the Special Service Organ that there were five or six hundred enemies fighting against you? Why there was no time to lose when

*you testified tried to get increased pay as Tokyo said
to that effect, did you arrange for Koreans - when -
who did it.*

there were only five or six hundred enemies attacking you? And why was it necessary to mobilize the whole strength of your army? Was it true that the two heavy guns and other preparations were quite enough to check the Chinese army pending the clarification of the actual situation? Did you reach your conclusion that there was no time to lose by the conviction you had that an armed conflict was inevitable? Did you reach the conclusion because of your operation plan that you were sure you could seal the fate of the Chinese army? ~~The Mukden Special Service Organ was in charge of intelligence work, wasn't it? Did it inform you that five or six hundred enemies, and no other Chinese army, were involved in the fighting?~~ Did you believe at that time that the mobilization of your whole army was an act of self-defense? If so, why a self-defense should go as far as to seal the fate of the enemy? ~~Was it quite enough to defend yourself without occupying Hai-ta-yin. Without attacking the wall-city? Without occupying all the railway stations within the shortest possible time?~~

23. On page 10, you described all the operation campaigns after 18 September 1931. Did your ill-equipped army, pitifully encircled, succeed in occupying all these objectives? Was the fate of the enemy thus sealed? Was a fatal blow thus dealt to the Chinese? Was the Chinese army, which you stated was encircling you, completely defeated? Did any Chinese army, other than the 500 or 600 you stated, at Mukden or any place else, make any attack upon the Japanese army. Did the Chinese airplane which you mentioned go into action? (The fact is all the Chinese aircraft were captured by the Japanese on the field.) Were these operations carried out in a wall fighting spirit which you prepared? That was mentioned on the 7th line of page 6.

24. At the middle of page 10, you said, "get rid of the enemy in Yinkow." Was this a place on the railroad? Was it a fact that this place was not on the South Manchurian Railway. Was it true that this place was to the southwest of Mukden on a seashore? (This question which he can hardly deny the answer to it intends to show that the Japanese operations were not in self-defense. First, it was carried to beyond the railway; second, it was to the South of Mukden.) *See inter-
gation cl shu
file 229 - sur
43 p 3
(was this in
self defense)*

25. On the bottom of page 10 you said that officers and people "demanding a punitive measure against the Chinese troops." Were they Japanese? Were they the same civilians of the railway, who, you testified, had various opinions of the Manchurian problems?

26. Did you at that time agree with their demand? Did you at that time believe that such punitive measure was a self-defense? Was it true that your self-defense was as a matter of fact a self-defense in pursuit? A self-defense in punishing the Chinese army all around?

26. On the top of page 11 you said that reinforcements from Korean Army was a prearranged plan. Who arranged that? Was it General. you testified you tried to get increased pay as Tokyo said up - therefore did he ask for Koreans - when - who did it.

*where in
Yinkow*

*Grabbing
off territory*

Ask Ishihara where he was July 1, 1931
Date Minami made speech re sending more
divisions to Korea R 19817.

reported to Tokyo? Did you mean when you failed to get reinforcements
from Central authorities, which you previously testified, then you
arranged with the Korean army? Did you mean that the fatal blow
you dealt to the Chinese army was still insufficient for your self-
defense? Did you know that for the Korean Army to send reinforcements
across the border, it would receive an imperial sanction? Was
the request for an imperial sanction also included in the prearranged
plan? (A negative answer would show the contempt of the throne; a
positive answer should lead to the next question: You had that included
in the plan, but you did not report it to Tokyo? You had that
included in the plan, but you did not wait the imperial sanction?
You had that in the plan, but you did not ask Tokyo and asked the
Korean army directly?)

7 27. On the middle of page 13 you testified "even Chang Hwei-liang
could not control the confused movements of his regional forces." Was
it because a confusion caused by your fatal blow? ~~Was it because it
was completely driven from the railway?~~

28. You went on to testify that negotiations failed. Did the
negotiations fail on account of the fact that you occupied so many
points and you refused to withdraw? Was it because you still con-
tinued your punitive measures? *not army province to determine
if failed.*

29. On page 14 you mentioned the Tientsin Incident in November
1931. Do you know who started the Incident? Do you know that BOHARA
of the Kwantung Army went to Tientsin at that time? Do you know
that during this time Fu-yi was taken from there? Was BOHARA,
as the Chief of Special Service, entrusted with the liaison work
between the Kwantung Army and the Tientsin Army? *Anti Gop
propaganda*

Date Oct 18
After Sep 18
also where
is Chinchow
from Amoy
railway

30. On page 15 you testified about Japanese airplanes over
Chinchow and were fired upon by the Chinese, as a result they dropped
seventy-five bombs in self-defense. Why did they carry so many
bombs on these six airplanes? When they were fired upon, why could
they not fly away or turn back? Why was it necessary to release
seventy-five bombs?

All members
of Board
Japanese
Committee
Kasuga
Shimizu
Fu-yi
R 3990

31. At the bottom of page 17 you testified that "The founding
of Manchukuo was brought about as a result of the new political
revolution" and on the top of page 19 you again said it is "a
historical product of Manchuria." Was it true that Manchukuo was a
result of the Japanese military occupation? Was it true, as a matter
of fact, that there were many autonomous, or self-government guiding
Committee before its establishment? Was it true that Fu-yi was put
into the custody of the Kwantung Army, or stayed under the protection
of it, before he became the Chief of the new state? Was it true that
by the time Manchukuo was established all its territory was under occupation of
the Japanese army? *Boards under Army.*

See note 1
Ishihara
backed
Fu-yi (?)

32. At the middle of page 18 you said the army was not concerned
much in the politics and economy of the new state? What do you mean
by "much"? Was it considerably concerned? In what way was it concerned?

Wang
Scott
H 20-21

what do you mean by politics - industrial plantation
Hashino General Affairs Board (Board Under
Chief K9 (who was it - Muto) Affairs Board had

Great Power

Was the new state independent? Why should the foreign army be concerned more or less in the politics and economy of an independent state?

Use his affidavit (previously made) to admit the. if he says he never made statement, rebut his recollection - under oath both times - which statement true

C O P Y

Doc. No. 2546

Title: Affidavit of General ISHIHARA, Kanji

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHERS

AFFIDAVIT RE: ARAKI, Sadao and Others

I, Lieutenant General ISHIHARA, Kanji, born in Meiji 22/1889/, will make the following statement.

I served as an operations staff officer of the Kwantung Army from 1928 to 1932 (Showa 3 to Showa 7) and was attached to the General Staff Headquarters from 1932 to 1933 (Showa 7 to Showa 8). I held the post of Section Chief in the General Staff Headquarters from 1935 to 1937 (Showa 10 to Showa 12) and after March, 1937, I served as Chief of the First Section in the General Staff Headquarters. Moreover, I served as Vice-Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters from October, 1937, to December, 1938.

I hereby confirm that I have come to know the following facts during these periods which was in connection to my aforementioned duties.

The major duties of the First Section (operations) of the General Staff Headquarters were in the formulation of operation plans against the U.S.S.R. and the United States, which were then seen as being prospective enemy countries.

The plans of operations against U.S.S.R. in Showa 3 /1928/, Showa 4 /1929/ and Showa 5 /1930/ were of the same substance. I made these plans at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army by order of the Chief of the General Staff and later received the approval of the Chief of General Staff. The main objective of the plan of operations for these years (namely: 1928 - 1930) was to occupy Harbin and Tailai and thus to use these points as the bases for war against the U.S.S.R. This plan was not changed until 1931 -- when all of Manchuria was occupied by the Japanese troops as the result of the Mukden Incident.

The plan of operations against Russia in Showa 11 /1936/ was made by the First Section (operations) of the General Staff Headquarters. This plan has been scheduled to transfer almost the whole of the Japanese troops, namely 20 - 30 divisions, to Manchuria in the event war broke out between Russia and Japan. Troop transport was scheduled by ships to Fusan and Dairen, and then to the point of arrival by railways. All troops arriving were to be concentrated in the Harbin area, and thereafter the Kwantung Army Headquarters were to station them at the necessary points. Only after the military strength in Manchuria became sufficient would the attack begin;

the plan being to occupy the Soviet Far Eastern occupied territory. In order to assure the success of the operations as scheduled by the plan of Showa 11 /1936/, various measures have been adopted in Manchuria in areas destined for major operations.

Many railways, barracks and warehouses were constructed and the methods of communications were strengthened. Fortification constructions were carried out on points along the northern frontier; namely, in the various areas of Heiho, Suifenho and Tunkning. Numerous airfields were built, but among them the major ones being Mutanchiang, Chiamusi, Harbin, Suihua, etc. Thus, after being occupied by Japan, Manchuria gradually changed into a base for war against Russia.

The plan of operations in 1937 was unchanged to that of the above-mentioned plan of 1936.

In the plan of operations against Russia in 1938, the KWANTUNG Army planned to amass its forces in the first stages of the war along the Suifenho-Tunkning line and in Kulin on the opposite bank of the Iman River, leaving a part of the troops to remain at Hailar and Heiho and await the arrival of the main Japanese forces. When the main force arrive from the homeland, it was scheduled to have a military strength of 12 - 13 divisions in Suifenho area and two or three divisions in the Khailar-Heiho area.

All the troops amassed were to be used for the occupation of Soviet Primorye, excepting those few garrisons in Heiho and Khailar. It was planned to advance operations along the both shores of Hsingkaihu Lake and, after defeating the Russian frontier troops, to besiege and occupy Vladivostok. Similar to the plan of 1937, plans were made to attack Vladivostok and Kharbarovsk in the first phase of the war, and then to annihilate Russian troops in these areas together with the occupation of these cities.

What I have said, as aforementioned, regarding the plan of operations, is none other than an outline of the operations that was planned. Since the situation could not be perceived clearly until the outbreak of war, it seems that only an outline of the plan of operations was made.

The plan of operations of the Army was connected to the Navy's operations through the cooperation of the General Staff Headquarters and the Naval General Staff. The major duties of the Navy were the transportation of the Army and the blockade of Vladivostok.

The plan of operations was submitted for Imperial sanction annually. Prince Kanin, Chief of the General Staff Headquarters, reported the plan to the Emperor.

Signed and sealed by

ISHIHARA, Kanji

Notes page 1

① In connection with paragraph 31 of Cross-examination ask him about Yoshizawa setting up of independent state in Manchuria. Yoshizawa asked him if you'd be delayed because other nations idea that Kwangtung Army was pushing it - Ichihara said "impossible" everything is ready now. Ask him if Koiso & Iwano shared his view of Manchurian independence.

② Arrival Tatekawa (P 9 Ichihara affidavit) Etogaki met Tatekawa - ask him if he knew reason for Tatekawa coming (18 19.8.29) if he asked to Etogaki about it (S Diary p 9 - 2nd para) Tatekawa arrival kept secret - if you do you know why - any legitimate reason. See Ichihara affidavit middle page 11 where says Etogaki left without getting message from government to meet next day. Did Etogaki know of message - did he know message was from other additional questions. Re letter see last paragraph P 3 of diary (Maybe Koiso) Diary Part 3 of diary

③ Top page 9 of S Diary re Hays being confined to quarters - Compare top page 9 of Ichihara affidavit where says Miyaki, chief of staff called up Commander (at his official residence) (Was Hays confined to quarters)

④ Etogaki & 2 others boasting while drinking that incident was planned - Top page 9 of Diary

⑤ Ichihara P 8 - 5th paragraph of diary

SUGGESTED CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF
ISHIHARA

I. Kwantung Army -- Mukden Incident

1. In par. 2, p. 2 of his affidavit, witness laid stress on huge Chinese army and intensive military preparations threatening Kwantung Army.

a. Let witness get deeper into exaggerations, bearing in mind China at the time was hardly fifth power, with no army to speak of, no navy, no air force while Japan was already first-class power, one of finest armies in the world, and third largest navy. How could a David provoke a Goliath?

2. In par. 2, p. 11 of his affidavit witness endeavored to exculpate ITAGAKI by stating that ITAGAKI "was well-acquainted with Commander HONJO's intentions, and "so, every step he took in coping with the incident was in conformity with the Commander's intention."

a. Bring out fact that he was not with ITAGAKI all the time; when Mukden Incident happened, for example, ITAGAKI was at Mukden while HONJO and witness were at Port Arthur.

b. Kwantung Army's official history (IPS Doc. No. 2553) stated that he (ITAGAKI) gave, at his own discretion, military instructions to attack the Chinese in the North Barracks" (p. 3)

c. Toshio SHIRATORI (defendant)

(1) Let witness admit Shiratori his friend -- or at least not his enemy. Reason: Shiratori in his 19 Mar 46 interrogation stated that General Honjo was just a rubber stamp, that ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA told him what to do (IPS Doc. No. 2906)

d. In par. 1, p. 13 of his affidavit witness stated "Secondly, it is because the Nanking Government with whom our central authorities entered into negotiation had no control over the Northeastern Army, and failed to live up to its promise. Even Chang Hsin-liang could not control the confused movements of his regional forces."

(1) Did not witness say that tanks, planes, intensive training were being provided? (See par. 2, p. 2 of his affidavit)

p13
affidavit

- (2) How could the Nanking Government live up to its promise, if it had no control over Army? If it had no control over army, why did Japan's central authorities continue to negotiate with them?
- (3) Were they bandits? If so, why should they bother to negotiate with bandits?
- (4) "Confused movements" indicated weakness, lack of organization, is it not? Hence, something KA need not fear.
- (5) Yet, witness says on p. 16 of his affidavit that "The true situation then existing between Japan and China can be characterized as the conflict of opposing demands, the recovery of national prestige from the Chinese side and the preservation of the rights and interests from the Japanese side." He added: "We could hardly expect to maintain our rights and interests mainly through diplomatic negotiations." Thus, indicating force had to be used to compel China to yield.

3. Shumei OKAWA (former defendant)

a. On p. 6 of his 9 Mar 46 interrogation, Okawa stated

Q. But now, Doctor, is it not so that this Incident (Sept. 18) was planned by certain members of the so-called Control Group, Col. HASHIMOTO, SHIGETO, the General Staff here in Tokyo, in conjunction with CHO?

A. He was here at the time.

Q. Well, HASHIMOTO, SHIGETO and CHO planned with ITAGAKI and who else in Manchuria?

A. I think ISHIHARA.

II. Manchukuo Puppet Government

1. Kamei Ken-Ichiro's statement (p. 3, Case File 438): ITAGAKI with ISHIHARA, led a group which planned Manchurian independence

2. KIDO's Diary, 17 Nov. 1931: "As to Manchukuo, Staff Officers of the Army, such as ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, were very active and had full power." Here follow same line suggested with SHIRATORI.

III. North China

1. KIDO's Diary, File No. 5, Ser. 33-40, p. 224;
"In 1933 it was feared in Tokyo that the action of carrying
the Kwantung Army across the Great Wall into China would be
initiated by ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA."

2. KIDO's Diary, File No. 5, Ser. 50, p. 357: "ITAGAKI,
along with SAKAI and ISHIHARA, caused all the trouble in North
China during this period and were responsible for aggressive
expansion there."

C O P Y

Defense Document 206-B(73)

HUMORS OF A JAPANESE ATTACK ON SINGAPORE
GO THE ROUNDS

April 15, 1941

During my absence in Kawana a report was circulating in Tokyo that Japan intended to attack Singapore within a few days; even before Matsuoka's return. It became so persistent that some of the correspondents cabled it home and since the diplomats were all worked up about it, the Embassy had to cable the report to Washington. The rumor lasted for some three days, from the 12th to the 15th, but on the 15th Dooman met Ohashi at lunch and received from him a categorical denial "with great vigor." At Ohashi's suggestion we put Hill of the A.P. up to asking the question of Ko Ishii, who said, "I can absolutely flatly deny that Japan intends to send Army or Navy forces against or to Singapore," and he added that Japan's intentions in the south are entirely peaceful and exclusively economic as recently stated by Prince Konoye. He characterized the reports as the "work of warmongers." At least one of the sources of the rumor was General Ishihara, retired because he had published an article advocating a Japanese attack on Singapore.

Excerpt from Diary of Former U. S. Ambassador
Grew entitled "Ten Years in Japan."
Page 380

C O P Y

23 April 1947

Re ISHIHARA Affidavit

Ascertain:

1. What rights Japan had to station her troops in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War?
2. Find out facts of "Collapse of Ching Dynasty."
3. Get facts on Chan Tsuo-Lin -- also facts pertaining to his being killed by bombs.
4. Facts on Chang Hsui-Liang and the Kuomintang.
5. Find out if any information available concerning relative strength of Japanese and Chinese armies prior to Manchurian Incident.
6. Prepare summary of cross-examination of MINAMI relative to ITAGAKI and General TATEKAWA and the telegram sent to Baron SHIDEMARA (I believe, Prosecution Exhibit #181.)
7. Determine if possible places where ISHIHARA is mentioned in the Record.
8. Examine files to determine if there are any documents pertaining to ISHIHARA not introduced in evidence.
9. Re-check files regarding March and October Incidents, 1931; 2-26 Incident and 5-15 Incident to ascertain ISHIHARA's connections therewith.
10. Re-check SAKURA KAI documents pertaining thereto and ISHIHARA's connection, if any, therewith.
11. See testimony of Gill, Record 4,410, pertaining to TATESHITA who is mentioned in ISHIHARA's affidavit.
12. Check ISHIHARA's connection with the Five-Year Plan and the Japan-Manchuquo Economic League. (See his file.)

28 April 1947

SUGGESTED CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ISEHARA, Kanji

(Defense Document #886)

1. At the very end of page 1 to the top of page 2 you said, "So the Kuomintang influence made a steady inroad on the north-eastern area, instigating and organizing anti-Japanese campaigns." Why were they anti-Japanese? What was their purpose? And why did you say at the middle of page 13, "The Nanking Government . . . had no control over the North-easter Army." How did you reconcile these two statements?
2. On the middle of page 2 you said the disposition of the Chinese Army "was re-arranged into an encircling position . . . along the South Manchurian Railway." Was it true that the disposition was really a measure to protect the railway?
3. In the middle of page 2 you said that "Organized actions against or in contempt of Japan were committed," why the Kwantung army did not cause diplomatic actions to be taken? Why did the Kwantung army make a proposal to increase its forces instead?
4. On page 3 you stated the relation between the two forces "was on the verge of explosion as if sitting on top of a volcano." Was this situation as you saw it ever reported by you or anyone in the Kwantung Army to the Central authorities in Tokyo? Was it reported and the central authorities in Tokyo did not believe such report? When you saw that situation, did you realize that such explosion would mean international conflict of grave consequences?
5. On page 4 you stated "the Chinese Army was not our original objective of operational preparations," but you were afraid of "the Soviet encroachment on the Manchurian territory." Were you assigned the duty to defend Chinese territory against another third power? In your original plan of operation how long did it take to occupy the important railway stations in South Manchuria? Did it take at least a week? But later, as a matter of fact, you did occupy them in two days, wasn't it?
6. You said on the middle of page 4 that Central Headquarters instructed you to execute the duty even by force, c Who issued the instruction? When was that instruction? Did the instructions say that in the event of using force, you had to apply for, at that time, an approval from the Central Headquarters? Was it within the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Army to use force at the least provocation?
7. Continuing on the same page, you described that your army was ill-equipped and out-numbered as well as encircled, and at the bottom of page 4 you said, "concentrating all our strength to Mukden

to deal a fatal blow to the military centre of Mukden." So, was it true that your army in the pitiful condition you describe was quite capable to deal a fatal blow to the Chinese Army?

8. At the bottom of page 4 you stated, "Under such circumstances the Kwantung Army established an operational plan to settle whatever incident might happen . . . preparations regarding education, training, transportation, etc." Was this war-like preparation reported to the Central Headquarters? Was this war-like preparation known to the Japanese ministers and consuls in China? Was the Army, instead of the diplomatic representatives of Japan, empowered to settle an international incident? Did the central authorities transfer the power of settling an international incident from the central office representatives to the Kwantung Army? Did you know that in September 1931 your Consul at Mukden was trying very hard to settle the HAKAMURA Incident? Was it true that while your Consul was negotiating your war-like preparations were ready? Was it true that your war-like preparations agitated the Chinese to an alarming degree? Was the Chinese army prepared? (If he answers "Yes", as the case probably will be, the next question will be: But you were able to occupy all the important railway stations within 48 hours, even when the Chinese army was prepared?)

9. On the middle of page 5 you stated, "we should not allow the enemy to aggrandize the incident by despising us." What do you mean "to aggrandize the incident"? Do you mean by "aggrandize" even more "despising." Was "despising" one of the causes for you to take military preparations? Was "despising" one of the causes for you to take military actions?

10. On page 5 you stated, Commander MOHJO "undertook an unexpected inspection with special reference to the operational preparations of every unit." Why was it unexpected? Was this unexpected inspection reported to Tokyo? (If so, what was the reaction of Tokyo?) Was this unexpected inspection with reference to operational preparations known to the Chinese? (If so, it will prove the secrecy of the Japanese preparations; if not, the next question should be: Did this unexpected inspection rather surprise and alarm the Chinese?)

11. At the bottom of page 5 you say you did not expect any "reinforcements from central military authorities." Was this a clear enough indication that Tokyo did not want any hostilities? Did this mean that even without the sanction of Tokyo the Kwantung Army would still go ahead?

12. You testified that two heavy guns were mounted at Mukden, as well as wall-attack materials. Was it true that the duty of the Kwantung army was to guard the railway? How would you justify the installation of heavy guns and wall-attack materials when the Republic of China was still in a friendly diplomatic relation with Japan. Was the installation a military secret? Was it known to the Chinese? Was it known to the Japanese Consul? Was it reported to Tokyo? Was ITAGAKI responsible for such installation? Why was it necessary to occupy the Chinese wall city if there were any incident on the railway which you were supposed to guard?

13. On page 6, under item 3, you testify that "Colonel KAWAMOTO was obliged to be transferred following the death of Chang Tsoo-lin by bombing." Why was he obliged to be transferred? Was it because he planned the bombing? Why was he only transferred instead of being punished? Was the death of Chang the cause of anti-Japanese attitude on the part of Chinese?

14. At the bottom of page 6 you said "The chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ was Colonel DOIHARA." What was the function of that organ? Was it espionage? Did it come under the control of ITAGAKI? Later, the Kwantung Army created another Special Service Department, was that true? What were the differences between the Special Service Organ and the Special Service Department? What were their respective duties? (The Chinese, Division, IPS requests your special attention to these questions on account of a few documents ready to be introduced against DOIHARA in connection with the Special Service.)

15. In the middle of page 7, was it DOIHARA as Chief of Special Service who reported to you the "anti-Japanese atmosphere" of the Chinese." You said "in the face of the failure of various diplomatic negotiations" was it a fact that even on the very evening of 18 September 1931 the diplomatic negotiations were still going on? Was it true that the failure, or not failure, of a diplomatic negotiation should be decided by the diplomatic officials? You went on to testify that "in spite of our conciliatory attitude the whole army, entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable." Did you mean that the installation of heavy guns and wall-attack materials was a conciliatory attitude? Did you mean that the request for the increase of military strength was a conciliatory attitude? Did you mean that the operation plan to deal a fatal blow to the Chinese army was a conciliatory attitude? How did you manifest your conciliatory attitude to the Chinese while your Commander made an unexpected inspection with reference to operation plans? Did you mean by "our conciliatory attitude" the attitude of the Japanese Consul? Did you still preserve your conciliatory attitude even when the whole army believed that armed conflict was inevitable? Did ITAGAKI, as Staff Officer, also entertain the idea of an inevitable armed conflict? Did DOIHARA entertain such, too? Was such idea, entertained by the whole Kwantung Army, ever reported to Tokyo? Was this situation known to the Japanese Consul? Was it true that a staff officer told the officers and men that an armed conflict was inevitable? (The probable answer would be "NO." The next question will be: Did you mean that even the enlisted men of your army independently came to the conclusion that an armed conflict was inevitable? Was your army, officers and men, strongly cautioned as to their behavior and attitude, since all of them and each of them entertained such idea? Was it true that at the least provocation your soldiers would immediately go into action because of such an idea? Was it because of such idea that you said previously on page 3 "the relation between the two forces was on the verge of an explosion as if sitting on top of a volcano?"

16. At the bottom of page 7, you said "All the units did their best day and night in training and execution of their guard duties." Did the 2nd Battalion of the Mukden Independent Garrison, who had two heavy guns mounted, and other units, who had wall-attack materials prepared, also do their best day and night in such training? Was such training known to the Chinese? Was such training conducted in the firm belief that an armed conflict was inevitable?

17. At the bottom of page 7, you testified that "General SHIRAKAWA came to Manchuria to appease the army." Did you mean that he came because the army entertained the idea of an inevitable armed conflict? Did he come out to find out the truth because such idea entertained by the Kwantung Army was never reported to Tokyo?

18. On the top of page 8 you testified "there were some civilians in the South Manchurian Railway and other circles, who had various opinions on the Manchurian Problems, but no member of the Kwantung Army including myself had ever conspired with them." Who were these civilians? Was OKAWA one of them? Who were the other circles? Were they secret societies? Were they Army officers in Japan? Was HASHIMOTO one of them? How did you know that there were such? How did you know that no member of the Kwantung Army ever conspired with them? Was it true that these civilians and these circles whom you mentioned also entertained the idea that an armed conflict in Manchuria was inevitable? Was it true that they also urged Japanese military preparations in Manchuria? Did they also advocate the dealing of a fatal blow against the Chinese army in Manchuria?

19. On top of page 9, you said "we received the second telegram from the Mukden Special Service Organ." Was it DOIHARA who sent this telegram?

20. You said the Chinese army exploded the S. M. R. Railway. Did anyone of your army ascertain the actual damage? Did you know that the Japanese consul ascertained the damage and reported that it was only 1 meter and 20 centimeters of rails and two logs? This is based on IPS Document #1767, processed, but not yet introduced.)

21. You went on to testify that "a portion of Pei-tayin was occupied." How far was this place from the damaged railway? Why was it necessary to occupy it? Who authorized the attack? Was it also included in your operation plan as a part of your fatal blow dealt to the Chinese? You also said "that the company was in great difficulty and disadvantage." Did you mean that the place was occupied in great difficulty? Did the two heavy guns at that time go into action? Was the wall-attack started?

22. On page 9 you testified that you reported to HONJO that "there is no time to lose. We must resolutely mobilize the whole strength of our military might to seal the fate of the enemy within the shortest possible time." Why was there no time to lose? Had you ascertained the damage? Had you verified the information from the Special Service Organ that there were five or six hundred enemies fighting against you? Why there was no time to lose when

there were only five or six hundred enemies attacking you? And why was it necessary to mobilize the whole strength of your army? Was it true that the two heavy guns and other preparations were quite enough to check the Chinese army pending the clarification of the actual situation? Did you reach your conclusion that there was no time to lose by the conviction you had that an armed conflict was inevitable? Did you reach the conclusion because of your operation plan that you were sure you could seal the fate of the Chinese army? The Mukden Special Service Organ was in charge of intelligence work, wasn't it? Did it inform you that five or six hundred enemies, and no other Chinese army, were involved in the fighting? Did you believe at that time that the mobilization of your whole army was an act of self-defense? If so, why a self-defense should go as far as to seal the fate of the enemy? Was it quite enough to defend yourself without occupying Fei-ta-yin? Without attacking the wall-city? Without occupying all the railway stations within the shortest possible time?

23. On page 10, you described all the operation campaigns after 18 September 1931. Did your ill-equipped army, pitifully encircled, succeed in occupying all these objectives? Was the fate of the enemy thus sealed? Was a fatal blow thus dealt to the Chinese? Was the Chinese army, which you stated was encircling you, completely defeated? Did any Chinese army, other than the 500 or 600 you stated, at Mukden or any place else, make any attack upon the Japanese army. Did the Chinese airplanes which you mentioned go into action? (The fact is all the Chinese aircraft were captured by the Japanese on the field.) Were these operations carried out in a wall fighting spirit which you prepared? That was mentioned on the 7th line of page 6.

24. At the middle of page 10, you said, "get rid of the enemy in Yinkow." Was this a place on the railroad? Was it a fact that this place was not on the South Manchurian Railway. Was it true that this place was to the southwest of Mukden on a seashore? (This question which he can hardly deny the answer to it intends to show that the Japanese operations were not in self-defense. First, it was carried to beyond the railway; second, it was to the South of Mukden.)

25. On the bottom of page 10 you said that officers and people "demanding a punitive measure against the Chinese troops." Were they Japanese? Were they the same civilians of the railway, who, you testified, had various opinions of the Manchurian problems?

26. Did you at that time agree with their demand? Did you at that time believe that such punitive measure was a self-defense? Was it true that your self-defense was as a matter of fact a self-defense in pursuit? A self-defense in punishing the Chinese army all around?

27. On the middle of page 11 you said the army was not concerned. 28. On the top of page 11 you said that reinforcements from Korean Army was a prearranged plan. Who arranged that? Was it

reported to Tokyo? Did you mean when you failed to get reinforcements from Central authorities, which you previously testified, then you arranged with the Korean army? Did you mean that the fatal blow you dealt to the Chinese army was still insufficient for your self-defense? Did you know that for the Korean Army to send reinforcements across the border, it should receive an imperial sanction? Was the request for an imperial sanction also included in the prearranged plan? (A negative answer would show the contempt of the throne; a positive answer should lead to the next question: You had that included in the plan, but you did not report it to Tokyo? You had that included in the plan, but you did not wait the imperial sanction? You had that in the plan, but you did not ask Tokyo and asked the Korean army directly?)

7 27. On the middle of page 13 you testified "even Chang Hsui-liang could not control the confused movements of his regional forces." Was it because a confusion caused by your fatal blow? Was it because it was completely driven from the railway?

28. You went on to testify that negotiations failed. Did the negotiations fail on account of the fact that you occupied so many points and you refused to withdraw? Was it because you still continued your punitive measures?

29. On page 14 you mentioned the Tientsen Incident in November 1931. Do you know who started the Incident? Do you know that DOIHARA of the Kwantung Army went to Tientsen at that time? Do you know that during this time Pu-yi was taken from there? Was DOIHARA, as the Chief of Special Service, entrusted with the liaison work between the Kwantung Army and the Tientsen Army?

30. On page 15 you testified about Japanese airplanes over Chinchow and were fired upon by the Chinese, as a result they dropped seventy-five bombs in self-defense. Why did they carry so many bombs on these six airplanes? When they were fired upon, why could they not fly away or turn back? Why was it necessary to release seventy-five bombs?

31. At the bottom of page 17 you testified that "The founding of Manchukuo was brought about as a result of the new political revolution" and on the top of page 19 you again said it is "a historical product of Manchuria." Was it true that Manchukuo was a result of the Japanese military occupation? Was it true, as a matter of fact, that there were many autonomous, or self-government guiding ^{committees} before its establishment? Was it true that Pu-yi was put into the custody of the Kwantung Army, or stayed under the protection of it, before he became the Chief of the new state? Was it true that by the time Manchukuo was established all its territory was under occupation of the Japanese army?

32. At the middle of page 18 you said the army was not concerned much in the politics and economy of the new state? What do you mean by "much"? Was it considerably concerned? In what way was it concerned?

Was the new state independent? Why should the foreign army be concerned more or less in the politics and economy of an independent state?

CONFIDENTIAL

The same idea was to be applied to industry, with the gradual nationalization of all means of production, an immediate increase of monopolies and government control, and a future exchange of private shares for government bonds. All means of communication and transportation were likewise to be brought within the nationalization plan. In commerce and trade, private retail and wholesale activities were to be supplanted by state control and planned distribution.

The agricultural reform did not call for nationalization but for village ownership and collective cultivation of land and sharing of crops according to labor. Cattle breeding, poultry raising, sheep culture, and forestry were to become communal village enterprises. Coastal fishing rights would be owned by the villages, "middle" fishing rights would fall to the prefectural governments, while deep sea fishing would be a matter of state ownership.

A Welfare Ministry was to be established (as was actually done latter) with a 3-point program: 1. Complete mobilization and control of labor, including farm labor. 2. Control of national health, with emphasis on the wiping out of tuberculosis. 3. Establishment of a throughgoing system of social insurance.

In education, all schools were to be under rigid, uniform government control. The system would include: Kindergartons (compulsory), lower schools (compulsory -- 8 years instead of 6). High Schools (4 years -- entirely vocational), Universities, Academics. After finishing Lower School, students were to be given examinations and assigned to appropriate vocational schools, with all free choice denied them. From High School on, all students would be housed in state-controller dormitories, with educational and living expenses paid by the state. On finishing school, they would be assigned to positions by a state employment agency. No foreign languages would be taught after High School, but Esperanto would be widely taught in lower and High School. Foreign books would be translated, printed and distributed by the state.

26 April 1947

ISHIHARA, Kanji

Interrogation of SHIRATORI, Toshio, 19 March 1946. IPS File #57, Serial #26. From the interrogation, it appears that General HONJO was more or less of a rubber stamp -- that the persons handling the situation were ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA. ISHIHARA was Lt. Colonel. It appears from SHIRATORI's examination that HONJO was more or less under the control of the younger officers.

(NOTE: See page 8, 5th paragraph, ISHIHARA-ITAGAKI at railroad station.)

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See TANAKA's testimony, Record page 1960-1961 (check to see if TATEKAWA was taken to rea room by ISHIHARA and ITAGAKI.).

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See Document #815, page 15.

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See interrogation of KATO, Masuo, 6 February 1946. KATO discusses the Five-Year Plan worked out for Manchuria -- he thought it was organized by General ITAGAKI and Lt. Colonel ISHIHARA. The purpose of the plan was to place Manchuria under Japanese control.

* * * * *

Interrogation of General MASAKI, Jinsebuo, 15 January 1946. (Case 60, Serial 21) On page 14, General MASAKI states that the leaders of the Manchurian Incident were, among other people, ISHIHARA, Kanji.

* * * * *

Case 182, Serial 37, pages 5, 6, 7, and top of page 8. Interrogation of OKAWA, Shumei, Dr., 9 March 1946.

"Q. And did you further say:

"So, SHIGETO and HASHIMOTO in the Army Headquarters in

ISHIHARA, Kanji - continued

Tokyo, ITAGAKI and HANATANI (or HANAYA) of the Kwantung Army, and from among civilians I and KAWAMOTO participated in the plan. Thus the Sept 18 Incident took place. It appeared that China invited that disaster by her own blunder. Commander JONJO delightedly said that the Sept. 18 Incident was skillfully met on the spur of the moment. But the Incident has been carefully prepared, planned and arranged."

A. At that time I was in prison.

Q. You were not in prison in 1931.

A. I was in prison in 1936 and went out after the China Affair broke out.

Q. But I am talking about this statement made in 1931.

A. But I never met with all of these people at one time. General JONJO, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, was never much satisfied with this Incident --with the measures taken in disposing of the Sept. 18 Incident.

Q. How did you know - did he tell you so?

A. Yes, he did, and further, General HONJO had no knowledge of any such plans.

Q. But now, Doctor, is it not so that this Incident was planned by certain members of the so-called Control Group, Col. HASHIMOTO, SHIGETO, the General Staff here in Tokyo, in conjunction with CHO?

A. He was here at the time.

Q. Well, HASHIMOTO, SHIGETO and CHO planned with ITAGAKI and else in Manchuria?

A. I think ISHIHARA.

Q. DOIHARA too?

A. I don't know.

Q. But they planned to blow this railway track up and make it appear as if the Chinese had done it, isn't that right?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Don't you know so?

A. Yes.

(2)

ISHIHARA, Kanji - continued

- Q. You were in on it too, were you not? You knew about it before it happened, did you not?
- A. I knew of plans in Manchuria, but did not know the details.
- Q. What you mean by that is that you did not know it was going to be on the 18th?
- A. No.
- Q. But you knew that these certain people were going to do something?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In order to start the war with China?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long did you know it before it actually happened?
- A. More than three months.
- Q. And you knew that because you were seeing HASHIMOTO and SHIGETO and they were talking about it and planning it, and you gave them the benefit of your advice on some things, is that correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Then who left to go over there to do it --- who actually did it on the spot in Manchuria?
- A. That I don't know.
- Q. ISHIHARA?
- A. No, I don't know. I don't think so/ - I don't even know now.
- Q. HASHIMOTO?
- A. No, he was here -- therefore it must have been the KWANTUNG ARMY.
- Q. During the times that HASHIMOTO, SHIGETO and CHO were talking to you about this plot, they never indicated who was helping them on the other end from the KWANTUNG ARMY?
- A. I think ISHIHARA and ITAGAKI.
- Q. If you think back, don't you remember that HASHIMOTO and CHO mentioned these names and said they would take care of it over there?

ISHIHARA, Kanji - continued

A. Yes, Yes, Yes. I do remember it now. HASHIMOTO and CHO were here in Tokyo. They did not go to Manchukuo. ISHIHARA and ITAGAKI handled it there.

Q. And Gen. DOIHARA was a colonel at that time and he was going to help too?

A. I do not think Col. DOIHARA entered these discussions. The people who knew the details and the people who carried out the plan were different.

Q. Well, ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA were handling things in Manchuria?

A. They were the center in Manchuria, I think.

Q. Now, Doctor, we have an account of a statement HASHIMOTO made here in TOKYO before this happened. He said "An Incident will occur in Manchuria in regard to the railroad. The hostilities will occur and the General Staff knows about it and has agreed. Do you know about this statmenet?"

A. I do not remember this statement.

Q. Dr. OKAWA, I hand you a book mared for convenience Document No. 689. I ask you to look at it. This book is entitled "Various Problems of Reviving Asia." This book was published July 20, 1923. Did you write this book?

A. I did

ISHIHARA, KANJI -

NOTES FROM TESTIMONY OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

TANAKA's direct examination begins on R 1,945

- R 1948-
1952
- TANAKA, Ryukichi, says that an official investigation was conducted in connection with the assassination of Marshal CHANG TSO-LIN, who was killed June 4, 1928. TANAKA knew this because when the War Office was moved from Miyakeazka to Ichigaya ~~he~~ he (TANAKA) had occasion to read certain documents in the Urgent File of the Chief of the Military Service Bureau, War Office, and the report, according to TANAKA, had been made in August 1928, by Major General MINE who was Chief of the Tokyo MP Unit. The killing was planned by senior staff officer, Kwantung Army, Colonel KAWAMOTO. The purpose was to get rid of the Marshal and set up a new state separated from the Nanking Government with CHANG HSUEH-LIANG as leader. The dynamiting was carried out by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 20th Engineer Regiment. Colonel KAWAMOTO and ten others were involved according to the report (R 1953).
- R 1953
- Capt. OZAKI was to follow orders given by Col. KAWAMOTO to muster the forces in Mukden to open fire against the train carrying CHANG TSO-lin.
- R 1959
- TANAKA states that there were elements in the army advocating Japanese occupation of Manchuria and on page 1960 he was asked if there were any civilians who advocated the same thing. To this he answered OKAWA, Shumei.
- TANAKA states that among the military group one of the very strong advocates was the then Major General TATEKAWA who was Chief of the 2d Division, General Staff.
- R 1960
- Leaders of this policy in the Kwantung Army were ITAGAKI, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, and ISHIIHARA, Kanji, Staff Officer.
- 1961
- TANAKA says that the first meeting for the purpose of organizing the SAKURA KAI was held on October 1, 1930. A meeting of the SAKURA KAI on the first of December was called by the then Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO.
- 1962
- Size of SAKURA KAI: at first meeting there were about 50 or 60 officers, and membership increased.
- 1963
- Purpose of SAKURA KAI was two-fold. One, to carry out an internal revolution or renovation, and, second, to settle the Manchurian problem.

- 1965 Manchurian Incident -- TANAKA states that the Manchurian Incident was a planned incident. Leaders of the plan were TATEKAWA, HASHIMOTO and OKAWA (R1,966). From Kwantung Army: ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA.
- R 1969 TANAKA says HASHIMOTO told him Incident was planned by KWANTUNG ARMY and he (HASHIMOTO) would assist and support the Incident. HASHIMOTO told TANAKA that he (HASHIMOTO) and CHO had planned October Incident.
- R 1969 TANAKA says HASHIMOTO told him leaders were TATEKAWA, HASHIMOTO, CHO, OKAWA, ITAGAKI, ~~xxx~~
- R 1970 TANAKA says HASHIMOTO told him objectives of the plan were to Make Manchuria a base from which to bring about the revival of Asia.
- R 1971 TANAKA says HASHIMOTO stated that leaders of Kwantung Army (ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA) intended to occupy Manchuria, to destroy the influence of the war lords in that area, and to bring about the economic development of that territory under army occupation.
- R 1988 TANAKA states that before the outbreak of the Sept 18, 1931, Incident, NAGATA, Tetsuzan, Chief of the Military Affairs Section in the War Office, had sent two heavy guns to Manchuria to be set up in Mukden and one of these guns was used in the bombardment of the ~~Mukden~~ Mukden Airfield when the Incident ~~occurred~~.
- 1989
- 1940 — ^{occurred} installation of guns was completed on or about Sept 10, 1940. Shidehara's cable, TATEKAWA being sent to Mukden. (See next sheet)
- R 2016 TANAKA states that in conversation with CHO, CHO told him the leaders in the Manchurian Incident plan were ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA from the Kwantung Army; CHO (himself) ~~from the Army~~ and HASHIMOTO. OKAWA, a civilian, had cooperated with him.
- R 2016 TANAKA states that CHO said that as to the October Incident ISHIHARA WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED AND THAT HE (CHO) was reprimanded by ISHIHARA just after the October Incident when ISHIHARA stopped in Mukden en route to North China.
- R 2022 TANAKA states that he thought the Five-Year Development Plan of Manchukuo was established at the time ITAGAKI was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army

2017 after Oct Incident, Cho said that Japanese opinion, especially opinion among the central military authorities, was not in favor of Manchurian independence.

to be kept top secret
not to be
sent to
outside
should
say a
little
more
very
big

TANAKA, Ryukichi

R 2006

TANAKA states that on the 12th of September a cable was received from Foreign Minister SHIDAHARA from the Japanese Consul General in Mukden reporting the fact that a company commander of a patrol unit in Fushin had said that within a week a big Incident would break out. SHIDAHARA brought this to the attention of MINAMI. MINAMI ordered TATEKAWA to go to Mukden as a special emissary to put a stop to the contemplated action of the Kwantung Army.

TANAKA states that TATEKAWA told him that MINAMI had told him to stop the Incident at all costs but that it was his (TATEKAWA's) desire not to stop it. TATEKAWA told TANAKA that when ~~en~~ he arrived in Mukden on the evening of September 18 that the Kwantung Army thought he had come to stop the Incident had taken him (TATEKAWA) to a restaurant in Mukden to isolate him.

R 2007

TANAKA states that TATEKAWA said Major HANAYA had taken him to the restaurant and that he had gone with him because he had no desire to see other people in Mukden. At midnight the artillery was heard. TATEKAWA slept soundly until morning and by that time the Incident had occurred and he was unable to carry out his mission.

Notes from testimony of SHIMIZU, Kinosuke

- R 1404
1405
SHIMIZU states that after the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident in September he was arrested and spent three months in jail. When he got out of jail in December 1932 he saw ~~the~~ Dr. OKAWA several times. He was very busy organizing Jimmu Kai, an ultra-nationalistic, rightist society, the aims of which were to bring about a renovation in the Japanese Government with the ultimate purpose of expelling the white race from Asia and the liberation of Asiatic people under the leadership of Japan in August
- R 1404
SHIMIZU states that on one occasion/when OKAWA was drunk with saki, OKAWA told SHIMIZU that he and certain others, including ITAGAKI, vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, would bring about an incident in Mukden later on.
- R 1409
SHIMIZU states that the next year after the failure of the March Incident, OKAWA told him that some young naval officers were plotting a movement with the participation of a group of young farmers and OKAWA asked him to join the movement. He SHIMIZU, felt that Japan could not be saved by the illegal movement of a few people and urged OKAWA to stop the movement. Dr. OKAWA said he would give up the plot, which was known as the May 15 Incident. Later, SHIMIZU learned that Dr. OKAWA had been connected with the May 15 Incident.
- R 1411
SHIMIZU states that the March Incident of 1931 was a domestic problem, and had no connection with the present war (East Asia War).
- R 1415
SHIMIZU states that he was arrested on the basis of the suspicion that he had been acting in concert with Dr. OKAWA. (This was after the May 15 Incident.)
- 1402

SHIMIZU

R 1424

"The March Incident was purely internal renovation plan, and it did not have aggressive character."

R 1402

SHIMIZU states that for some time preceding March 1931 he and Dr. OKAWA were in the habit of visiting the Kinryutei Inn where OKAWA met many army officers, among whom was HASHIMOTO

R 1404

After the failure of the March Incident, SHIMUZU states that he continued to see OKAWA from time to time at the Kinryutei Inn.

APPENDIX B

THE JAPANESE-MANCHUKUO FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION SOCIETY
(NICHIMAN ZAISHI KEIZAI SHOSA KAI)

1. ISHIWARA, who was appointed Chief of Operations Section of the Army General Staff Office in August 1935 knew, after assuming his post, that there was a great difference between Japanese and Soviet war preparations in North Manchuria. Thereupon, he planned for the mechanization of the army, especially the completion of the war preparations through the intensification of the air force while attaining balance of military strength against the Soviet Union by quickly transferring a good deal of army force from Japan proper to North China. His plan was agreed upon by his senior officers. Finding, however, that there was no investigation organ, either civil or official, concerning the synthetic judgment on Japan's economic power, ISHIWARA felt very uneasy about the productive capacity which was the basis of establishing the above-mentioned plan to complete military preparations.

Hearing, by chance, that Mr. Masayoshi MIYAZAKI, an old friend of mine and member of the Economic Research Society of the Manchurian Railway Company, residing in Tokyo, had an intention to judge Japan's economic power by putting together his long continued studies, I ISHIWARA, made an earnest request of MIYAZAKI and established the Japanese-Manchukuo Financial and Economic Investigation Society in autumn in 1935. The society was only a private organ.
2. As soon as the Japanese-Manchukuo Financial and Economic Investigation Society was established ISHIWARA asked it to make a plan for the expansion of the productive capacity which was the basis of the military preparations repletion plan. Due to the extraordinary efforts made by MIYAZAKI, the first plan was already attained in summer in 1936. As the fundamental condition of the plan, at least ten years' peace was considered necessary.
3. After I, ISHIWARA, left the Army General Staff Office in September in 1937, MIYAZAKI continued his study. He

APPENDIX B - continued

emphasized that a serious critical situation would come if the Chinese Incident was not solved quickly, but the authorities did not pay attention to him. In 1940 he dissolved the Investigation Society of his own accord as he saw no significance in continuing with the investigation.

Appendix C

Excerpts from the statement of KAMEI, Ken-Ichiro
re ISHIHARA, Kanji

These have been broken down and numbered for ready reference, if necessary.

1. The Manchurian incident was planned and started by some younger Army officers with rather idealistic aspirations but they were later used by the Realistic element and within five (5) years the latter had expelled the former from Manchuria. The Realists then tried to expand their influence into China.
2. The invasion of Mongolia by the Japanese Army in Manchuria under the plan of the Realists represented by General TOJO and Lt. Col or Major MUTO was badly and sadly beaten by the Chinese Army, and then it is certain that TOJO and MUTO felt this to be a humiliation of their Japanese Army and were thinking of restoring their prestige by attempting a new undertaking. This is one cause of the China incident on the part of the army.
3. General ISHIHARA was the leader of the small group of Idealists who talked on the question of Manchuria with the Chinese people who had been very much impressed by the successive incidents at that time on the Russo-Manchurian border, and the Chinese Central Government's power was not enough to put an end to these kinds of incidents. The conclusion they reached in the beginning was the Autonomous Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty, but later the assassination of leading Chinese, including General YUANG by General CHANG-CHUE-LAING, caused a change of the original conclusion and they thought the plan of making Manchuria independent * * * * * but this Idealistic group was too powerless, and although they obtained some support from the Idealistic population, they failed to keep their plan being carried out * * * * * and were abused by the more Realistic Imperialistic group in the army. (Note: Professor KAMEI states that General ISHIHARA is thoroughly familiar with the plans of the Realistic group in the army during both the Manchurian and China incidents.)
4. At the time of the Manchurian independence, the officers connected with it were mainly those whose leader was General ISHIHARA. At that time ARAKI was not connected, but once he knew

(Excerpts from the statement of KAMEI, Ken-Ichiro re ISHIHARA, Kanji)

the success of Manchurian independence, he tried first to leave of the League of Nations to secure that independence. His opinion prevailed in the Cabinet and Japan left the League. Before MATSUOKA left to attend the League, I told him to see to it that Japan agreed to the Class A mandate for Manchuria and not to leave the League, in return for which I would see to his re-election as a Member of the House of Deputies. He agreed with me. ARAKI changed the nature of the Manchurian Government by exercising his authority as War Minister to appoint men under his authority in the Kwantung Army to the governing posts in Manchuria, and in doing that he deprived Manchuria of its independence. All of the successive Chiefs of Staffs of the Kwantung Army continued to deprive Manchuria of its independence and keep it under the control of the Japanese Army. ARAKI was solely responsible for the secret Manchurian-Japanese Army Pact which enabled the Chief of Staff to exercise the authority mentioned above.

5. At the time of the Chinese incident, General ISHIHARA was removed from his post in Kwantung Army in Manchuria and was casually placed in the post of Chief of Operations Department, Japanese Army General Staff, and General MUTO was also placed in the post as Chief of the First Section under ISHIHARA. The Chief of the Second Division was General KAWABE.

6. ISHIHARA opposed the sending of troops into China but MUTO pushed through his will to send the expedition with the collaboration of the War Minister, General SUGIYAMA and General KAGESA, Teisho, Chief of General Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Department. MUTO said he must send the expedition to punish Chinese and he also said ISHIHARA never concurred in his plan but finally with the help of the War Minister he caused ISHIHARA to yield.

7. ITAGAKI was the head of the group which planned the Manchurian independence with ISHIHARA. This was told to me by KONOYE and AKIYAMA was present. Their power grew afterwards and with their help KONOYE was able to push out SUGIYAMA. ITAGAKI was also a compromise because he was forced to have General TOJO as a Vice-Minister so ITAGAKI could do nothing because the Vice-Minister of War has under the Army regulations the sole power of appointing and discharging and was antagonistic to the Minister.

8. From this time on there developed two (2) factions in the army seeking power - one called "Kodoha" lead by Generals

(Excerpts from the statement of KAMEI, Ken-Ichiro re ISHIHARA,
Kanji)

ARAKI and MASAKI and the other called "Toseiha" lead by Generals
NAGATO, TOJO, and UMEZU.

9. In Manchuria ISHIHARA's Idealistic group tried to take
back power but by the coalition of "Kodoha" and "Toseiha" it was
unsuccessful. Here HOSHINO played an important part. He was the
Deputy General in Manchuria. He went there entirely in sympathy
with General ISHIHARA but once he was placed in the important
post he severed his relations with ISHIHARA's group and established
a close connection with TOJO. HOSHINO said that TOJO from the
administrative standpoint was more realistic.

Appendix D

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Report by H. C. Norton
Special Agent, CIC

FILE NO.: 22

RE : CHERRY BLOSSOM SOCIETY STATUS: Pending

DATE : April 22 1946

In conversation with Confidential Information this Agent obtained the following information. Groups within the military cliques were as follows:

1. Cherry Blossom Society (Sakura Kai) was motivated and stated by the Septmeber 1930's London Naval Disarmament Conference. However, it had been planned long before by the military fascists who were for reorganizing the nation and settling the Manchu-Mongolian problems by acquiring political power. (Actually the creation of a protectorate and colony in Manchuria and Mongolia was planned.)

The promoters of this organization were as follows: Artillery Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro from the General Staff Office, Infantry Lt. Colonel SAKADA from the War Ministry and Infantry Lt. Colonel HIGUCHI from Defense Headquarters. The object of this organization was to reorganize the state and if necessary use military force. Active members in service who held the rank of Lt. Colonel or below having an ardent desire for reorganizing the state are listed here:

Lt Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro
Lt Colonel NEMOTO, Hiroshi
Lt Colonel NAGATA
Lt Colonel SAKATA
Lt Colonel HIGUCHI
OKAMURA
ISOTANI
ITAGAKI
INOUE

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	61	343
	62	383

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In the March Incident, namely a revolution (Coup d'Etat), the Sakura Kai acted as the mainspring and in addition to the members there were such high officers who acted as instigators and they are listed as follows:

General UGAKI, Kazushige
General MATSUI, Iwane
General KAWABE, Nobuyuki
General MINAMI, Jiro
General UMEZU
General KOISO, Kuniaki
Lt. General TATEGAWA
Vice Chief of the General Staff NINOMIYA
15th Term Graduates of the Military Officers' School

After the failure of the March Incident the Sakura Kai was divided into two groups. One group was called the legitimate controlled group (Gohoteki Tosee Ha) and the aim of which was to realize the reorganization of the state by legitimate and political measures. The other was the direct action group (Coup d'Etat Ha).

2. The legitimate control group (Gohoteki Tosee Ha) was organized by NAGATA, Tetsuzan. When NAGATA (Chief of the Military Affairs Section) was the military attache to Germany, he studied the total warfare organization by means of Ludden-dorff's general mobilization of the state. He tried to apply this principle for reorganizing the state and settling the Manchu-Mongolian problem. The military intelligence, including NAGATA, felt keenly that the direct action would only incite the ill feeling of the people and would be an unbeneficial method. The membership of this organization is as follows:

Lt. Colonel NAGATA, Tetsuzan
General ISOTANI
General ITAGAKI
General TOJO, Hideki
INOUE, Saburo

INOUE, Saburo acted as a liaison officer for keeping close connection with high personnel in the political circle, aides de camp and peers.

The object was to make Manchuria a colony of Japan by enlarging the Manchurian Incident and to make it a laboratory for trying out the total warfare organization and the establishment of a military fascist nation, at the same time to plan the gradual realization of reorganizing the state by creating and emphasizing the international crisis.

- 2 -

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It was also organized so that they would be in a position to seize lawfully the control of the Army. It planned to deprive opponents of Sakura Kai Group and Kodo Ha Group (Imperial Way), namely General ARAKI, Sadao, General MAZAKI, OBATA, Binshiro from the central controls of the Army and to monopolize the position of the Army Minister by plotting evil conspiracies, such as spreading rumors that the Kodo Ha Group was planning a military dictatorship or propagandizing that "May 15th Affair," "Shimpei Tai Incident," "Aizaira Incident" and "February 26th Affair" were believed to be Kodo Ha's activity. Thus by applying all sorts of evil tricks it had succeeded in expelling Kodo Ha from the Central Army Circle.

It incited radical movements of the Coup d'Etat group, which was formed after the Sakura Kai's dissolution by working behind the scenes and since the May 15th Affair it assisted the continuous outbreaks of fascist terrorizing incidents. However, outwardly it pretended to be anti-fascist by taking vigorous measures on the fascists and at the same time emphasizing both the international and national crises and made every effort to incite the politicians and the people to feel the impossibility of suppressing the fascism and reorganizing the state by the hands of party cabinets or coalition cabinets composed of parties and bureaucracy. Thus it steadily accomplished the interference in politics by military people and strengthened the fascist influence in the military circles.

After the Manchurian Incident this legitimate control group had broken up due to the struggling of powers between NAGATA and TOJO group (Chuo Gumi) and ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA group (Manchu Gumi) but after the provocation of the Chinese problem and about the tie of the China Affair (July 1937) it had been formed into the China and Soviet groups.

3. The China group was composed of the following personalities:

In the Central War Office:	General SUGIYAMA General UMEZU General MUTO, Akira Lt General KAGESA
In China :	General MINAMI, Jiro General KOISO, Kuniaki General TOJO, Hideki General ITAGAKI General TANAKA, Takashi General WACHI

- 3 -

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They opposed the curtailing policy of the China Affair and stressed the importance of dominating China by overthrowing Chiang Kai-Shek's Regime.

4. The Soviet group was composed of the following members:

In the Central War Office	General TADA, Susumu
In Manchuria	Lt Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro
In Manchuria	Lt Colonel <u>ISHIHARA</u> , Kannai

These members said that the war with Russia would decide the fate of Japan, therefore Japan should avoid war with China by all means and on the contrary should utilize China for a successful war with Russia.

5. The Coup d'Etat group was the 5th group and the leading members were Lt Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro and Lt Colonel NEMOTO, Hiroshi. The members of this group really took part in the "May 15th Affair" and "February 26th Affair" with the object of acquiring military autocratic government by coup d'etat (revolution) with the help of young military officers of high spirit but their objective ended in failure. They even failed in the act incited by the wise and evil conspiracy of the legitimate control group and met with stern measures finally losing their influence in the military world. However, it developed into a civilian right wing organization.

SOURCE: Confidential Informant.

PENDING.

Appendix E

ISHIHARA, Kanji

Excerpts from Record:

- R 1,959 TANAKA said that there were elements in the Army advocating Japanese occupation of Manchuria in those days. Also, that when diplomatic negotiations were of no avail, to drive the Chinese out of Manchuria and to set up a new regime under Japanese control.
- R 1,960 TATEKAWA, Chief of the 2d Section of the General Staff, favored this plan. Others advocating the plan were HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, and Capt. Cho, Isamu, who was a member of the Sakura Kai (Cherry Blossom Society). TANAKA said, also, that Colonel ITAGAKI, Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, and Staff Officer Lt Colonel ISHIHARA, Kanji, were the leaders of the Kwantung Army.
- R 1,975 ISHIHARA was a key figure in Kwantung Army.
- R 2,012 Referring to conversations with General TATEKAWA, TATEKAWA told TANAKA that the Manchurian Incident was planned and that ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA had strongly supported HASHIMOTO and Capt. CHO.
- R 2,015 Referring to conversations with Capt. CHO in June 1932, TANAKA said that CHO told him the Manchurian Incident had been planned beforehand and that ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA of the Kwantung Army were leading figures.
- R 2,017 As to the October Incident, Kwantung Army was opposed to it and that he (CHO) was reprimanded by ISHIHARA after the October Incident when ISHIHARA stopped over at Mukden on the way to North China.
- R 1,991 See testimony of TANAKA re Mukden Railway.

Doc 7521

1910 Feb 21 Granted the 8th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1913 Feb 3 Appointed as 1st Lt., Inf. (Cabinet)

1913 Apr 21 Granted the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1912 Aug 1 Granted the Memorial Medal for the Annexation of Korea

1915 Nov 29 Ordered to enter the Military Staff College

1918 May 20 Granted the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1919 Apr 15 Assigned Captain, Infantry (Cabinet);
Relieved of post and assigned company commander of the
65th Infantry Regiment (War Ministry)

1919 Jul 4 Assigned to be attached to the Department of Military
Education (War Ministry)

1920 Apr 9 Relieved of the above position;
Attached to Headquarters of the Middle China Detachment
Regiment (War Ministry)

1920 Aug 30 Decorated with the 6th Class Order of Sacred Treasures

1920 Nov 20 Given a money grant of ¥270 for services after the war
from 1915 to 1920

1921 Jul 20 Relieved of the post and attached to the Headquarters of
the Middle China Detachment Regiment (War Ministry);
Assigned as instructor of Military Science at the
Military Staff College (War Ministry)

1922 Jul 15 Relieved of the above position;
Attached to the Military Staff College (War Ministry)

1922 Sep 1 Relieved of the above position;
Assigned to station in Germany to study military affairs
(War Ministry)

1923 Jul 31 Granted the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1924 Aug 20 Appointed as Major, Infantry (Cabinet)

1925 Oct 5 Relieved of the station in Germany;
Assigned as instructor of Military Science in the Military
Staff College (War Ministry)

229-45

Doc 7521

1926 Jul 22 Decorated with the 5th Class Order of Sacred Treasures

1928 Aug 10 Appointed as Lt. Col., Inf. (Cabinet)

1928 Sep 1 Granted the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade

1928 Oct 10 ✓ Assigned Staff Officer of Kwantung Army (War Ministry)

1932 Jun 14 Decorated with the 4th Class Order of Sacred Treasures

1932 Aug 8 Appointed as Colonel, Infantry (Cabinet)

1932 Sep 1 Granted the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1932 Aug 8 Assigned to be attached to the Ordnance Main Department (War Ministry)

1932 Oct 12 ✓ Appointed as attendant for the Imperial delegates to a temporary conference of the general meeting of the International League of Nations held at Geneva (Cabinet)

1933 May 20 Relieved of the above (Cabinet)

1933 Aug 1 Assigned Commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment (War Ministry)

1934 Apr 29 Decorated with the 3rd Class Order of Golden Kite with an annuity of ¥700;
Decorated with the 3rd Class Order of the Rising Sun with Middle Cordon for services of the Incident from 1931 to 1934

1935 Aug 1 Assigned Section Chief of the General Staff Office;
Also member of the Research Department of Army Communications School (War Ministry);
Assigned also member of Naval General Staff Office (Navy Ministry)

1935 Sep 25 Appointed member of Army Munitions Inquiry Commission (Cabinet)

1936 Feb 27 Concurrently appointed Martial Law Staff Officer (War Ministry)

1936 Mar 7 Relieved of post as Martial Law Staff Officer (War Ministry)

1936 Jul 19 Relieved of post as member of Naval General Staff (Navy Ministry)

1936 Jul 27 Relieved of post as member of the Army Munitions Investigator Commission (Cabinet)

229-45

Copy for Mr. Lawrence

BIOGRAPHY OF ISHIHARA, KANJI

He was born in 1890. Attended Military Cadet School and Army Staff College. Served as member of China Section, Army General Staff, Instructor of Army Staff College and Military Attache of Japanese Legation in Paris. Noted for his profound study in Napoleon tactics. Has collection of books relating to Napoleon. The "Ishihara Strategy" includes "quick solution through sudden attack" (somewhat like Blitzkrieg) and "central or frontal attack". Asked to be transferred to Manchuria before September 18, 1931 and served as staff officer in the Kwantung Army and as chief of operations. He went to the League of Nations meeting and was one of those who insisted on withdrawal from the League. Later he served as Commander of Takada Brigade and as High Staff Officer in Kwantung Army. In January, 1937, he was transferred to Army General Staff as chief of operations. In August of the same year he was promoted to Director of Operations. A year afterwards he was promoted Lieutenant General. Later he was put on the reserved list. He has strong religious faith and never associated himself with dissipated life. Had studied in Germany and wrote "Criticism of the Organic Structure of the Japanese Government". He was liberal to his subordinates and always tried to be helpful to others. He advocated Alliance of East Asia and sponsored such magazines as "Association of East Asia Alliance" and "East Asia Alliance Monthly", etc.

Information from "Directory of Japan's Contemporary Persons", published 1942 in Nanking by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Wang Ching Wei "Government".

Doc 7521

1936 Dec 28 Relieved of additional posts (War Ministry)

1937 Mar 1 Appointed Major General (Cabinet);
Assigned Chief of the First Department in the Army General Staff Office (War Ministry)

1937 Apr 16 Assigned temporary member of the Horse Investigation Commission (Cabinet)

1937 May 1 Granted the 5th Class Court Rank, Senior Grade

1937 Sep 27 Appointed Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo (Cabinet)

1937 Nov 2 Relieved of post as temporary committee member of the Horse Investigation Commission (Cabinet)

1938 Dec 5 Relieved of additional post as Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo (Cabinet)

1938 Dec 5 Relieved of post as Vice Chief of the Staff of the Kwantung Army;
Assigned Commander of the Maizuru Fortress (War Ministry)

1939 Aug 1 Appointed Lt. Gen. (Cabinet);
Attached to Headquarters of the 16th Remaining Division Depot (War Ministry)

1939 Aug 30 Relieved of present post (War Ministry);
Assigned Commander of the 16th Division (Cabinet)

1939 Oct 26 Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of Sacred Treasure

1939 Sep 15 Granted the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade

1941 Mar 31 Placed on the Reserve List

1941 Apr 26 By the Special Order, promoted to 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade

P E N D I N G

- 4 -

229-45

Appendix 7

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX A

Nichiman Zaisei Keizai Kenkyukai (Japan-Manchuria Finance and Economic Research Institute).

From 1931 to 1938, Kanji Ishiwara was the most prominent person in the Japanese Army, exercising strong influence over economic and political as well as military affairs. He was responsible for the Manchurian Incident and afterwards organized the Nichiman Zaisei Keizai Kenkyukai. As related by Gisuke Aikawa to Shunkichi Ueda, Ishiwara asked Aikawa, Seihin Ikeda, and Shingo Touda (president of Kanebo) to take charge of finance and industry in Japan and Manchuria. When Ueda asked who had chosen them for this purpose, Aikawa replied, "The Army -- Kenji Ishiwara". Thereafter, Aikawa became president of the Manchuria Jukogyo Kaihatsu Kaisha (Manchurian Heavy Industries Development Company). Ikeda became governor of the Bank of Japan and acted for the Army, less as a representative of Mitsui than as an individual. Tsuda, representing HgL industry, co-operated with Ishiwara for a time but later partially withdrew from the Army Association.

Ishiwara's right-hand man and the Chief Secretary of the Japan-Manchuria Finance and Economic Research Institute was Masayoshi Miyazaki. He had spent two periods in Russia, first from 1908 to 1914, and later for several years including the time of the revolution, when he represented the South Manchuria Railway. Aikawa told Ueda that Ishiwara had said to him, "About military matters, I know everything, but on economics and political affairs, please confer with Miyazaki". Ueda was impressed by Aikawa's extreme deference to Miyazaki when he saw them together.

Ostensibly a private organization, the Institute was actually an organ of the General Staff, financed half by the General Staff and half by the South Manchuria Railway. Its first headquarters was in Manchuria, but when Ishiwara returned to Tokyo, it moved to Nomura Gindo Building, Nihonbashi, Tokyo. Among the advisers of the Institute were Konoye, Ikeda, and Aikawa. One of the most prominent members of the Institute was Kenzo Asahara, whose close association with Ishiwara was used to discredit the latter when Asahara was arrested about 1938. (The Asahara and Miyazaki as 'communists').

The Institute staff included twenty permanent research workers, more than half of whom were Tenkosha (Communists who endorsed the Emperor system). One of the principal activities of the Institute was the formulation of plans and projects for a "New Order" in Japan and Manchuria. Other authorities were called in

CONFIDENTIAL

from time to time to serve on special committees, without being initiated into the inner purposes of the Institute. Through clever manipulation of key figures in the Government, plans formulated in the Institute appeared to be the work of the planning Board of the Cabinet. Through a friend who served on several of the committees of this Institute. Ueda obtained access to three of the basic plans, (1) "Seiji Gyosei Kizo Kaizo An" (Political and Administrative Reform Program), (2) "Seisan Zokyo Kakuju Keikaku" (Plan for the Development of Productive Capacity): (5) "Senso Shido Keikaku Sho" (War Policy Plan).

Plan (1) was the most secret of all and was shown only to a small group of initiates. It was the blueprint for the "New Order" that they envisaged but was considered too "logical" to be introduced until other preparatory "reforms" had been effected. The Ueda, it appeared fascistic at first; on closer study he found it bore a closer resemblance to "communism". In either case, the retention of the Emperor was central to the plan.

Plan (2) was divided into two parts, one dealing with Japan and the other with Manchuria. It also included an annex called, "Kokusaku Yoko" (Outlined of State Policies), which received limited circulation among government officials.

Plan (3) was a war policy plan which envisaged war with Russia, China, Great Britain and the United States. Among those who helped to draw up the plan were Juichi Tsuchima, vice governor of the Bank of Japan; Seiki Nijikata, head of the Economics Department of the Imperial University, and influential members from the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Mitsui. After 1938, Ishiwara's influence began to decline but the Institute remained in existence until the Spring of 1941 and many of the plans guided the activities of the Tojo clique.

The key of all the activities of the Institute was found in Plan (1). This system involved the following political changes; 1. Retention of the Emperor System but abolition of the Genro System. 2. A smaller, more rationalized cabinet with all but virtually dictatorial power centered in the hands of the Prime Minister. 3. Representation in the Lower House on the basis of occupational groups rather than elective districts. 4. Single party dictatorship and restriction of all key positions to party members.

In banking and finance, the object was complete nationalization, but this was to be achieved by stages. Private ownership would be preserved for the time being, while control passed into the hands of the government, and eventually all private shares would be replaced by government bonds. The plan also called for centralization of banking and insurance companies and for a managed curancy.

24 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. W. H. Wagner, Screening Unit, Document Division
FROM : Lester C. Dunigan
SUBJECT: ISHIHARA, Kanji

I would appreciate it if you would have someone in your office take a quick look at the book entitled "A Dissertation on the Last World War", written by ISHIHARA, Kanji. The book has already been delivered to you.

I am interested particularly in any reference to ISHIHARA concerning the Manchurian Incident, movements of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and any reference to the Five-Year Plan in Manchuria.

LCD/nob

may questions

ISHIHARA

INDEX

78 other references

1. Summary of Interrogations of ISHIHARA, Kanji, and MAYAZAKI, Masayoshi
 2. Statement of East Asia League furnished by ISHIHARA when interrogated on 3 May 1946.
 3. Statement furnished by ISHIHARA on Japanese-Manchuquoan Financial and Economic Investigation Society when interrogated on 3 May 1946.
 4. Excerpts from statement of KAMEI, Ken-Ichiro.
 5. Report on Cherry Blossom Society.
 6. Excerpts from Record.
 7. Curriculum Vitae.
 8. Statement furnished by UEDA, Shunkichi, re Japan-Manchurian Finance and Economic Research Institute.
- 0.*

ISHIHARA, Kanji

Summary of interrogation, 24 May 1946 (Case #229, Serial #43)

1928 to August 1932 - Lt. Col. in Kwantung Army (page 1).

He did not know that a plot was being planned in connection with Manchuria. Lt. General MIYAKE, Koji was his commander at the time of incident (page 2).

He wanted to see Manchuria become a part of Japan if an incident occurred (page 2).

The five-year plan was worked out by MIYAZAKI, Masayoshi in 1936 (page 2).

Referring to September 18, 1931 incident, he stated (page 2) "there were about 200,000 Chinese troops in Manchuria and about 50,000 of these were stationed at Mukden. Our troop strength was only 10,000 and these troops were scattered along the Manchurian Railroad. Because of the tension between the Chinese and Japanese troops, I worked out a plan for the protection of the railroad in the event an incident should break out. This plan was used from time to time and many people thought it was actually a part of the September 18, 1931 incident".

Referring to a telegram from HAYASHI, Kyujiro allegedly sent to Baron SHIDEHARA that the army was contemplating a conspiracy ISHIHARA said (page 3) "one of ~~my~~ company commanders by the name of KAWAKAMI in charge of a company at Bujun was instructed by me to take his troops up the railroad tracks toward Mukden and take the Mukden air strip if an incident occurred. Without orders from me KAWAKAMI, because he was worried about the tension in the air, decided to hold maneuvers resulting in the taking of the air strip. It was to be for practice only. Therefore, on the 10th of September, KAWAKAMI issued orders to take the Mukden air strip on the night of September 18th. Mr. CODO, head of the Coal Department of the Manchurian Railroad at Bujun, heard of this order and told his friend HAYASHI who in turn wired SHIDEHARA that the army was planning conspiracy".

He said it was purely coincidental that the maneuvers were planned for the same night that the incident occurred. (Page 3)

He did not know why TATEKAWA came to Mukden but he was to come on the 18th of September and was met by ITAGAKI. He did not know that ITAGAKI was in favor of the plot or that the Kwantung Army planned the incident because TATEKAWA was arriving.

(ISHIHARA, Kanji, Summary of Interrogation, 24 May 1946 (Case #229, Serial #43))

After the incident occurred HOSHINO wanted to make Manchuria a part of Japan and the Kwantung Army sanctioned his policy (page 4).

With reference to the invasion of Chahar Province in January 1935, ISHIHARA stated (page 4) that he was annoyed at the time because he was not notified of this maneuver - he did not know who gave the orders but the invasion went as far as Hyakuremaio. There the Japanese Army was defeated and retreated. (See statement of KAMEI, paragraph 2).

He said he did not know Chang-Tao-Lin and that his assassination occurred before he arrived in Manchuria.

Self Gov Board.
Summary of Interrogation, April 25, 1946, re Self-Government Guidance Board (Case #229, Serial #35)

The Self-Government Guidance Board in Manchuria was organized in October 1931 - was under the command of the Kwantung Army (page 2). All activity of the Board had to be sanctioned by the Kwantung Army. (Note: See testimony of KASAGI, Record 2791-2793.)

NAKANO, Koitsu (now dead) and KASAGI, Ryonei were "leaders of this organization".

ITAGAKI was not connected with the Board until after the incident (page 3).

He "also knew Mr. UYU CHUNG-HAN who aided this organization - ITAGAKI was not connected with UYU CHUNG-HAN until after the incident.

Referring to organization of the Board immediately after the September 18th incident, ISHIHARA said (page 2) "an organization of this type had been planned and studied by NAKANO and KASAGI some time previous to the incident. They organized the YU-HO-KAI (made up of young members of the Manchurian Railroad) and the MANCHU and SEINEN RENMEI (Young Men's Association of Manchuria). The members of these two organizations were made up mostly of Japanese. These organizations were in operation as early as 1938. After the Manchurian incident these two organizations were amalgamated to form the Self-Government Guidance Board".

He said the Self-Government Guidance Board was dissolved when Manchuria became independent (page 3).

RE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

ISHIHARA said (page 3) that the General Staff in Tokyo were very much in favor of it and hoped that it would go through because Russia had more troops on the Manchurian border than the Japanese. OSHIMA was the only one he knew of who carried out negotiations to form the Pact.

RE CHINA CAMPAIGN

ISHIHARA said (Page 4) "the General Staff made plans for the taking of Shanghai and handed them to the Emperor. The Emperor gave the plans to MATSUI personally in Tokyo and then he took them with him when he went to Shanghai to take over the army, and that then MATSUI carried out the plans for taking Shanghai. The plans for taking Nanking were made up during the Battle of Shanghai and were sent to MATSUI for him to carry out in this campaign."

Summary of Interrogation on May 3 and 4, 1946 (Case #229, Serial #41).

The interrogation is not in question and answer form.

Assigned to Kwantung Army as Chief of Tactics Section, October 1928 - remained there until August 1932, when he returned to Japan and became a member of the General Staff (page 2).

October or November 1932 assigned as a military advisor to MATSUOKA at the League of Nations in Geneva - was to assist MATSUOKA in explaining the Manchurian Incident to the League - MATSUOKA was well acquainted with the Manchurian problem and required little or no help from ISHIHARA (Page 2).

In 1935 made head of the Tactics Section of the General Staff - March 1937 promoted to Major-General and assumed the position of head of the Tactics Department (page 2).

Transferred to Kwantung Army as Vice-Chief of Staff in September 1937 under TOJO who was Chief of Staff (page 2).

Retired as a Lt. General 1941, and was never recalled to active duty (page 2).

ISHIHARA's only position after his retirement was that of Advisor to the East Asia League (Toa Renmei). (Note: Attached hereto is a copy of the statement furnished by ISHIHARA on April 26, 1946 concerning the organization and activities of the above-named group (page 2).

(Summary of Interrogation on May 3 and 4, 1936, (Case #229, Serial #41). (Contd)

When interviewed on April 26, 1946, ISHIHARA furnished a statement concerning his connection with the Japanese-Manchuquo Financial and Economic Research Society, a copy of which is attached hereto (page 2).

ISHIHARA said that the plan which he requested from the society for the industrial development of Manchuria could only be worked out if there was peace in China (page 2).

He thinks that one of the reasons for his transfer from the General Staff to the Kwantung Army in September 1937 was that he was opposed to enlarging the China Incident (page 2). (Note: Compare with paragraph 5 of KAMEI statement attached hereto).

ISHIHARA in discussing the Manchurian Incident stated that at first he was of the opinion that Japan should immediately seize all of Manchuria if an incident occurred. Following the actual incident, his views changed to where he felt that Manchuria should be set up as an independent country - He discussed this with ITAGAKI and in January 1932, the latter commenced negotiations which resulted in the New Manchuquo Empire in March 1932 (page 3). He said he was aware of the general opinion of the Japanese people that he and ITAGAKI planned the incident but that he had made no attempt to change public opinion in that respect (page 3).

He was head of the Tactics Department of the General Staff in Tokyo when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred on July 7, 1937 (page 4).

He was in favor of limiting the incident as war with China made it impossible to effectively develop Manchuria. He wanted to arrange a conference between the leaders of Japan and China and in July or August 1937, he suggested to Premier KANOYE, through his assistant KAZAMI, Akira that KANOYE proceed to Nanking and bring about a settlement of the incident. He wanted to go along as a Military Advisor, but received a letter from KANOYE advising that such conference was not possible - he was transferred then to the Kwantung Army in September 1937 - he was Vice-Chief-of-Staff under TOJO. He said that he and TOJO were never very close friends - that TOJO was a man of many opinions and a good man to coordinate ideas and carry out orders (page 4).

Summary of Interrogation of April 26, 1946 re Formation of the Manchuquo Empire. (Case 229, Serial 36)

ISHIHARA stated that he knew one YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi - that he met him in 1932 when YOSHIZAWA stopped in Mukden to visit with

~~(Summary of Interrogation of April 26, 1946, re Formation of the Manchuquo Empire. (Case 229, Serial 36) (Contd))~~

HONJO, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army - that YOSHIZAWA was returning to Japan from Geneva and was interested in learning the details of the Manchurian Incident (page 2).

He recalled that YOSHIZAWA stated that he was anxious to delay the formation of a New Manchurian Government as he wished to carry on further diplomatic conversations with members of the League of Nations - and that he advised YOSHIZAWA that delay in the formation of the New Manchurian Government could not be had because all preparations had been made. (page 2)

He said discussions concerning the New Manchurian Government had started in January 1932 - that by the first of February an agreement had been reached under which Manchuria was to be set up as an independent country - this agreement had been made by the Japanese with HENRY-PU-YI and the date had been set for March 1932. In view of this, he had advised YOSHIZAWA that a delay in the formation of the Manchurian Empire was not possible (page 2).

He said the persons active in the discussions for Japan were Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, at that time a member of the Staff of the Kwantung Army, and Mr. KOMAI, Civilian Advisor to General HONJO. (Note: KOMAI, Tokuzo has been subpoenaed by TOJO to testify regarding the political position of Manchuquo as an independent state.)

Mr. KOMAI, ISHIHARA said, had formerly been connected with the South Manchurian Railway, was a close friend of General KOISO and had been sent by him to General HONJO in October 1931, to act as an advisor on the Manchurian problem. ISHIHARA said that he did not personally engage in the discussions as he was active with the Kwantung Army (page 2).

RE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The following excerpt is taken from information furnished by UDEA, Shunkichi, in a series of conferences with him concerning the "Inner Group" in the Japanese Army from 1927 to 1945 (Case 102, Serial 11, page 6).

"Upon returning to Tokyo from Manchuria, TOJO began a struggle with ISHIWARA for control of the Inner Group. (Note: ISHIHARA is sometimes referred to as ISHIWARA.)

"In 1936, ISHIWARA engineered a secret meeting which included members of the government but which was controlled by the Inner Group; this meeting drew up a program called 'SEIJI OYSEI KAIZO AN' and also 'SEINSAN RYOKU ANNUJU AEIAKU' (plan for the development of productive capacity) which was a five-year plan for both Japan and Manchuria working then as a joint autarchy for war. This plan was begun by the HIROTA Cabinet, passed by the Cabinet Council of the HAYASHI Cabinet as a preparatory step to war."

One MYIAZAKI, Masayoshi, when interviewed on May 1st 1946 (Case 229, Serial 38) in reference to a previous interview on April 26, 1946 (Case 229, Serial 37) stated that ISHIHARA requested the Japanese-Manchurian Finance and Economic Research Institute to make research from time to time during 1935 and 1936. *(See statement of Ishihara in interrogation of May 24, 1946 re formation of Institute)*
MYIAZAKI stated that requests by ISHIHARA were concerned with the productive capacity of Japan and Manchuquo, there being the hope that 12,000,000 tons of steel could be produced annually, that production of magnesium, aluminum and other metals could be developed, that an increase of farm products could be accomplished; all in connection with the aim toward maximum use of all possible resources in Manchuquo (page 1).

The requests by ISHIHARA who was acting on behalf of the Army General Staff were made directly to the institute and not through the South Manchurian Railway.

ISHIHARA desired the formation of the institute because the General Staff had no facilities of its own for investigation and research (page 1).

The institute continued to do work requested by the Army General Staff after ISHIHARA ceased to be a member of that staff (page 1).

The Economic Research Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway still continued to function after the institute was ~~organized and~~ dissolved.

The amount set aside for the Economic Research Bureau of

(Re Five-Year Plan, contd)

the railway was 3,000,000 yen a year at one time. The amount furnished the institute was 100 ~~999~~ ⁹⁹⁹ yen a year (page 2).

Important
In 1938 the Army began to pay one-half of the expenses of the institute - checks were delivered for such purpose to the institute once or twice a year by an officer of the Army General Staff.

MYIAZAKI stated that one of the reasons for discontinuance of the Institute in 1940 was that operations could not be carried on as planned because the China Incident had expanded into a virtual war and that some members of the permanent staff of the institute were opposed to war. Colonel DOY, Akio, Chief of the Second Section of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff and others from the Army requested the institute continue to function stating that the work of the institute was very important.

MYIAZAKI stated that Plans 1 and 2 were concerned only with Japan and Manchuria while plan 3 was in prospect of further expansion in China.

Summary of Interrogation of MYIAZAKI, Masayoshi, April 26, 1946
(File 229, Serial 37)

From 1926 to 1932, he was a member of the Research Section of the South Manchurian Railway specializing in Russian Affairs (page 1).

From 1932 to October 1935, he was a member of the Manchurian Economic Research Bureau, which was an enlargement of the Research Section of the South Manchurian Railway.

He was connected with the Japanese-Manchurian Finance and Economic Research Institute from the time of its formation to October 1940. (Note: See interrogation of ISHIHARA where he states MYIAZAKI formed the institute.) (Page 2, 24 May 1946)

He could not name any certain persons who took the lead in forming the institute, but that ISHIHARA, Kanji initially suggested that it be formed.

The South Manchurian Railway, however, organized the institute without active participation of ISHIHARA.

The institute was formerly under the jurisdiction of the railway - ISHIHARA had no official position with the institute

(Summary of Interrogation of MYIAZAKI, Masayoshi, April 26, 1946,
(File 229, Serial 37) (Contd))

but requested research from time to time. The institute was dissolved in October 1940.

He stated that the war prevented operations from being carried out as planned (page 1).

The institute was financed at first by the South Manchurian Railway - but from 1938 to 1940, he believed that half of the expenses were furnished by the War Ministry. (Page 2)

In reference to the various plans (see attached). MYIAZAKI said that plan #1, SEIJI OYOSSI KIZO KAIZO AN (political and administrative reform program) was not a political plan but an economic and administrative reform program, that plan #2, SEISAN RYOKU KAKUJU KEIAKU (plan for the development of production capacity) was, and that plan #3, SENSO SHIDO SHO (war policy plan) was a war-time economic plan (page 2).

He said that due to the difficulty of trade between foreign nations and Japan, a plan had to be made to meet the war-time production needs (page 3). The plan did not contemplate the possibility of war with any foreign nation other than China (page 2).

The purpose of Plan #1 was to coordinate the economy of Japan and Manchuria. He said Manchuria being a new country, the economic administration was old and fixed and in order for trade to be transacted between the two countries Japan's economic administration had ~~to be~~ modernized (page 2). *being put into effect was practical but that Japan's*

He said that Plan #2 was in two parts - one dealing with Japan and the other with Manchuria (page 2).

He said that Plan #3 did not contemplate war with Russia, Great Britain or the United States, but contemplated expansion of the Chinese affair. Plan #3 was made because the Army requested it in case there was an expansion in China - that members of the institute opposed the plan and formulated it only because they were ordered to do so. (Page 3)

He said that the Army hoped that Plan #3 would help research on trade, commerce and foreign exchange, and included a study of actions of foreign nations after World War I on replenishing supplies, foreign exchange natural resources, etc. (Page 3)

(Summary of Interrogation of MYIAZAKI, Masayoshi, April 26, 1946,
(File 229, Serial 37) (Contd))

The dates of the three plans were, according to MYIAZAKI,
plan #2 formulated about 1936-1937, plan 1 about 1937, and plan
3, 1939. (Page 3)

He only requested plan 1 but ISHIHARA requested the second
plan and in order to carry out the second the first had to be
formulated (page 3).

He stated that at the time the institute was dissolved, the
Army wanted it to continue and was willing to pay its expenses.
(page 3)

APPENDIX A

EAST ASIA LEAGUE (TOA RENMEI)

I. The East Asia League was originated in connection with the establishment of Manchukuo. Our mental attitude before and after the establishment of Manchukuo, if we are allowed to describe it, was as follows:

1. The troubles between Japan and China in Manchuria were getting tense day by day before the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, and it was considered that there was no way for a peaceful solution but for Japan to make a general retreat politically and militarily. It was clear that after Japan's withdrawal China would not have defence power by itself against the southward advancement of the Soviet Union. Japan's withdrawal might bring about another sort of unrest to East Asia.

2. Although it was clear that it was a grave and violent attempt to separate Manchuria from China with an actual force by taking advantage of the Manchurian Incident, we believed, on the other hand, that we could clear off the unrest given in the preceding paragraph by this attempt and that an understanding could be reached before long with China and that we could sweep away the mutual lack of sincerity of the past long years, if Japan would reflect upon herself carefully and change her attitude on the establishment of Manchukuo as follows:

- (1) Give over to Manchukuo all her interests already occupied in Manchuria, and
- (2) Let each race have an equal treatment in Manchukuo to bring about a racial harmony.

3. The ideal of racial harmony strongly appealed to many of the Chinese in Manchuria but it was natural that they should think it difficult for them to cooperate with the founding of Manchukuo with an easy conscience unless Japan and China became reconciled. Accordingly, as the result of consultation and study made by those interested among the Japanese, Korean and the Chinese people, it was concluded that the ideal of racial harmony should be

APPENDIX A - continued

developed into the formation of the East Asia League based upon moral principles. It was agreed that if China would recognize the establishment of Manchukuo Japan should return all the interests to China. That is to say, Japan would not only withdraw her extra-territorial rights and retrocede her settlements, but also would withdraw her troops completely from China and cooperate with China for her complete independence.

The idea of the East Asia League was adopted by the Manchukuo Cooperative Society and an official statement was made in March 1933.

- II. Not a year after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, those who held responsible posts in the Kwantung Army were all transferred and the policy of Manchukuo suddenly took a turn toward the monopoly by Japan entirely contrary to the principle mentioned above. Though the efforts made by those who took part in the founding of Manchukuo gave a hope for improvement, it was impossible to restore the general situation to the end, and this became a fuse to the current world war. We apologize to the whole world for our lack of judgement from the bottom of our heart and are ready to take the whole responsibility.
- III. Owing to the change of the interior situation in Manchukuo, the Cooperative Society could not develop the East Asia League movement positively but the office of the Cooperative Society in Tokyo exerted itself for the propagation of the East Asia League within Japan. Especially after the China Incident broke out, it devoted itself entirely to this end. When this movement finally came to draw public attention, the gendarmes unjustly inspected the office of the Cooperative Society in the Manchukuo Embassy and arrested most of the people belonging to the office, whom they held in custody for six months.
- IV. As the movement of the East Asia League in Japan proper came to a complete deadlock, the East Asia League Association (TOA RENMEI KYOKAI) was established in autumn of 1939 and advocated the entire solution of the China Incident according to the principle of the East Asia League.

The founder of the association was Takeo KIMURA, member of the House of Representatives.

APPENDIX A - continued

- V. With the delay in the solution of the China Incident, the nation became more concerned with the East Asia League and at the end of 1940 a considerable number of the members of the House of Representatives expressed intention of inspecting the actual places in China guided by the League, whereupon War Minister TOJO was very much embarrassed and interfered with this attempt. At last on 14 January 1941, he tacitly showed his opinion to break up the East Asia League in a cabinet announcement.
- VI. The East Asia League did not yield to the above-mentioned pressure and the government dared not order the dissolution of the League. Finally, the government established an official association called the Asia Developing League (KOA DOMEI) and tried to absorb the East Asia League in it. The East Asia League did not yield to that attempt either, but changed its name to the East Asia League Comrade Society (TOA RENMEI DOSHI KAI). Prior to this Kei WADA took up his post in place of Takeo KIMURA.
- VII. I, ISHIHARA, who had been placed on the reserve list in March 1941 consented to become an adviser to the Comrade Society, being unable to refuse the members' request. In complying with their demand, I expressed my opinion in speech meetings and other meetings held in various places.
- VIII. Owing to the fact that the Comrade Society did not receive financial support from the outside at all, the organization of the head office was poor. Aside from announcing the guiding principle, it had no power to control the movement. According to the guiding principle, the movement was left to the voluntary activity of each branch office.

As to the control of the branch offices, many of them had no branch chiefs, in accordance with the consultation held by the leading members. The principle of the movement of the head office was decided upon by the conference of the representatives from the branch offices, and there was no head for the society.

The adviser was in no position to participate in the management of the society of his own accord.

APPENDIX A. - continued

- IX. As the pressure of the government and especially of the army was becoming stronger the East Asia League Comrade Society keenly felt the necessity of propagandizing for the peace between Japan and China to the general public. The movement was gradually spreading in the farming villages. The number of the members came to be remarkably increased when, in 1942, the technique of the producing of fertilizer by means of ferment and of manufacturing food came to be adopted.

As the method of cultivating ferment was not scientific yet it had to be cultivated by intuition so that the technique required a careful training and a thorough supervision, which fact made it rather difficult to spread. But a remarkable result was attained from about 1944, owing to the training of superior technicians and a strict management of the ferment and the number of the members increased suddenly.

- X. The order to dissolve the society was given on 4 January 1946 when we were encouraging the nation, which was in a state of stupor after the surrender and were doing our utmost for increased production.

The members could not understand the reason. They asked the government but they were told of nothing that was to the point. Therefore, we could not but make an appeal directly to the headquarters of the occupation forces, but the reason for our being obliged to break up has not been indicated to us.

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF ISHIHARA, KANJI,
By Mr. Mattice.

- 22095 Exhibit No. 2584, report of Mr. Justice Northcroft, Commissioner appointed to take evidence of ISHIHARA, was received in evidence. The Commission was appointed on April 25, 1947, and the testimony was taken on May 1 and 2, 1947, in Sakata.
- 22098 * At the hearing, the witness stated that he
22099 lived in Yamagata Prefecture. * He identified exhibit A attached to the report as his affidavit, and corrected and verified it.
- 22108 * The affidavit stated that the witness was in charge of operations as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from October 1928 to August 1932, and was concerned with the Manchurian Incident. When Japan obtained the right to station troops in Manchuria after the Russian War, the Chinese forces in the northeastern provinces were so meagre that Japan could defend the whole railway to protect her residents with the small force allowed by treaty. After the collapse of the Ching Dynasty, Chang Tso-lin grew powerful and became ambitious for things within the Great Wall, and gradually increased his forces. His policy was influenced by the campaign then prevailing for recovery of lost national rights and tended to aim at driving out Russo-Japanese influences from Manchuria. The movement of his forces was a considerable * factor in considering Manchurian affairs.
- 22109

After Chang was killed, his successor, Chang Hsui-liang, declared allegiance to the Kuomintang, and that influence made a steady inroad on the northeast area, instigating and organizing anti-Japanese campaigns until it affected the whole Northeastern Army and could no longer be ignored.

Chang Hsui-liang was appointed Vice-Commander of the Kwantung Army on his declaration of allegiance to Nanking. He attempted to reorganize his forces and reinforce their armament in both quantity and quality, so as to have a standing strength of 220,000. There was an enlargement of munitions factories in Mukden. The forces were equipped with tanks, airplanes, and other modern arms, and there was a strengthening of training.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 May 14, 1947
 DEFENSE - Division III - China
 ISHIHARA - Direct

Page

22110

This army was superior in number and equipment to Japan's forces in Manchuria, and were elated with anti-Japanism. They were disposed in an encircling position so as to besiege the areas occupied by Japan along the railway. In the face of such a challenge, the scattered Kwantung Army was in a dangerous position militarily. * Organized actions against or in contempt of Japan were committed under the leadership of the army authorities while railway guards were on duty or training. In view of the various types of interruptions and accidents and the distress of the Japanese residents, the Kwantung Army was driven to the extreme limit of indignation.

To cope with this threatening situation, the Kwantung Army proposed to increase the numbers and rearrange its forces. The Central Military Authorities did not accept, and the Japanese forces remained in peace-time disposition and were exposed to a superior Chinese force. On the other hand, no effective diplomatic steps were taken except lip service. The relations between the two forces was like sitting on top of a volcano.

22111

Besides its usual duty of guarding the railway and defending Kwantung Province, * the Kwantung Army was in charge of covering the concentration of Japan's main forces in Manchuria, in the event of hostilities between Russia and Japan, which might be touched off by Soviet encroachment on Manchuria. Necessary preparations were always made for such duty, which was defensive in nature, so as to give a blow to the advancing enemy in the northern part of South Manchuria. The Chinese Army was not the original objective of operational preparations. However, the northeastern situation was growing worse, and it came to be feared that the Chinese Army might clash with Japan's forces. According to orders and instructions from central headquarters of the Supreme Command, preparations for the worst had been made for the preceding several years to execute the duty, even by force. The ill-equipped forces remained in their usual disposition, dispersed along a thousand kilometers of the railway and encircled by Chinese forces of 200,000.

Page

22112

* There were thousands of Chinese forces in Mukden and other places, and the commander's notice was posted in every barrack of the Wang I-che's Brigade announcing his firm resolution against Japan. Under these circumstances the Kwantung Army set up an operational plan to settle whatever incident might happen, in the shortest possible time, and finished all preparations. The tactics were to forestall the enemy from concentrating the entire strength on Mukden to deal a fatal blow to the military center and the pick of the Northeastern Army if Japan's force should be obliged to take action in a conflict between Japan and China regardless of the place of the conflict.

It requires scrupulous planning and preparation, strong unity and careful training to discharge this difficult duty with so small a force, so every unit was required to maintain strict discipline and unity and to conduct training to the point adaptable to actual fighting.

22113

HONJO, when he assumed command in August, 1931, understood the gravity of the situation in view of the NAKAMURA case, * Wan Pao-shan affair, and other conflicts over guard duty. He issued an order that the forces abstain from rashness and impatience and take a positive resolute action in discharging their duties, especially in the case of a small unit once a clash actually occurred, and not to allow the enemy to enlarge the incident. In his first inspection he simultaneously undertook an unexpected inspection with a special reference to operational preparations. Since the Kwantung Army was inferior and could not expect reinforcements from the central military, it tried to increase its fighting strength by making the most of available operational materials. Two heavy guns were mounted on the 2nd Battalion's Barrack of the Mukden Independent Garrison, several armored cars were attached to part of an infantry force, and explosive and other materials were prepared. However, it was not in a position to carry out extensive operations for a long time.

22114

For transportation, * they had complete confidence of being able to start in an hour after the alarm is received, but it actually took four hours at the time of the Incident.

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In view of the enemy's superiority in armament, the forces devoted themselves to training in their favorite night or wall-attack, with such an intensity so as to develop a fighting spirit strong enough to meet the greatest odds.

22115

HONJO's Chief of Staff at the time was General MIYAKE. The senior staff officer was ITAGAKI, who succeeded KAWAMOTO after the latter was transferred following the death of Chang Tso-lin. The witness was operational staff officer. There were other staff officers, majors or captains. The Chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ was DOIHARA, who succeeded General * SUZUKI in August, 1931. The military adviser to Chang Hsui-liang was Lt.-Col. SHIBAYAMA. There were other military instructors with the Chinese. The Commander of the 2nd Division was General TAMON, and the commander of the Independent Garrison was General MORI.

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* None had any connection with the March Incident, and none were members of the Sakurakai. The witness had no opportunity to speak intimately with HASHIMOTO or OKAWA before the Manchurian Incident. Since sharp criticisms had been made in Japan on actions of the Kwantung Army, leaders of the Kwantung Army, including its former commanders, gave strict warning against rash actions. ITAGAKI, as senior staff officer, had perfect control over the staff officers, and he was confident that no one dared to try any irregular conduct.

22117

In view of China's anti-Japanese atmosphere and in the face of the failure of diplomatic negotiations despite the conciliatory attitude of the whole army, officers and men felt that armed conflict was inevitable. The Kwantung Army continued to study in great earnestness its peculiar operational preparations for the worst, as well as measures to be taken for peace and order, so that there * was no staff officer at Port Arthur who could be away on private business even on Sundays. All units did their best night and day in training and execution of their guard duties.

When the October Incident took place after the Manchurian Incident, Tokyo suspected that the Kwantung Army might declare independence and trouble might be caused with the Kwantung Army.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 May 14, 1947
 DEFENSE - Division III - China
 ISHIHARA - Direct

Page

Telegrams were received in violent tone, and SHIRAKAWA came to Manchuria to appease the army. Forces in the field could not help sneering at the confusion in the central authorities. There were some civilians in the Railway and other circles who had various opinions on Manchurian problems, but no member of the Kwantung Army including the witness had ever conspired to cause the incident.

22118

On September 18, 1931, HONJO ended his inspection at Liaoyang and was delivering an address when a telegram came to him from his Chief of Staff * at Port Arthur, requesting him to ask ITAGAKI or ISHIHARA to stay in Mukden, as TATEKAWA was to arrive there from Tokyo. HONJO ordered ITAGAKI to go to Mukden, and returned to Port Arthur with other members of the staff, including the witness. At midnight the witness was called by NAKANO, to come at once to the official residence of the Chief of Staff. At once he went there, where he found the whole staff, including TAKESHITA. He was shown the first military top secret telegram, stating that the 2nd Infantry Battalion at Mukden was moving to the field on receiving a report that after 10 p. m. that night Chinese troops destroyed the railway at a point in Mukden, and had attacked the guards. The Chief of Staff called the Commander and had him come to headquarters, where they went to work on remedial measures. At about 0028 they received the second telegram from Mukden Special Service, stating that the enemy with three or four companies had exploded the S.M.R. Railway; that * a company was fighting with some 5 or 6 hundred enemy; that a certain portion of Pei-tayin was occupied by the Japanese; the enemy was increasing in machine and infantry guns; and the company was in great difficulty. Lt. NODA had been seriously wounded.

22119

HONJO, after careful study of the whole staff, came to the conclusion that this had unfortunately come owing to outrageous acts on the part of China, and that the limit of patience was reached. There was no knowing how the situation might aggravate unless they took resolute measures to chastise the enemy. There was no time to lose, and they must utilize the whole strength of their military might to seal the fate of the enemy within the shortest possible time.

Page

22119

When the witness expressed his opinion as operations officer to HONJO, the latter meditated and then made a final decision, stating that it should be done on his responsibility. Despite their usual operational plans, HONJO ordered * the forces not to concentrate in Mukden, but to remain in Chang-chun in preparation against the enemy from Kuan-chengtzu and Nanling, or from Kirin. In view of the situation around Mukden, he took the course of gradually increasing the strength to make an attack instead of concentrating the main forces in Mukden. According to this decision and the general principle of disposition of units indicated by HONJO, the usual operations plans were altered and orders were issued by telephone between 1.30 and 2.30 a. m. on September 19. The 2nd Division had to make an attack on Mukden. The Independent Garrison at Kungchuling was to concentrate its 1st and 5th battalions near Mukden; the 3rd battalion was to get rid of the enemy in Yinkon; the 4th Battalion was to sweep the enemies from Fenhuangcheng and Antung; the 6th Battalion was to go to Mukden with two companies and await orders. The commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in Changchun * was to guard Changchun with the 4th Infantry and 2nd Cavalry. The 30th Infantry and the heavy gun battalion at Port Arthur were ordered to move.

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HONJO, accompanied by the greater part of his staff, including the witness, left Port Arthur for Mukden shortly after 3 a. m. on the 19th, leaving MIYAKE temporarily in Port Arthur. On the way they heard the cries of officials and people on the railway line demanding punitive measures against the Chinese, and received battle reports. On arriving at Mukden at noon on the 19th, HONJO set up his command immediately at the railway station. In the meantime he sent reports to Tokyo and requested the Korean Army to send reinforcements in accordance with the pre-arranged plan of operations. He also requested a part of the second overseas fleet to be sent to Yingkow.

22122

On September 18, HONJO had learned that TATEKAWA was coming by way of Mukden, * and sent ITAGAKI that afternoon to get in touch with him and to contact the Special Service Organ and the Consulate-General on the NAKAMURA case.

Page

22122

ITAGAKI had seen TATEKAWA, who arrived late that night, but had left without obtaining the details of the message under agreement to meet the next day. Since the incident took place that midnight, he gave certain directions concerning the war situation in Mukden. As senior staff officer, ITAGAKI knew HONJO's intentions, and the inspection of operational preparations just before the Incident disclosed his ideas clearly. Every step he took to cope with the incident was in conformity with HONJO's intentions, and as such were approved by HONJO.

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* The Japanese Government decided on the principle of non-enlargement on September 19. The * Kwantung Army thoroughly understood the intention and policy of the government and of the general staff; that is, the policy of non-aggrandizement through the telegrams from the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff. However, the actuality of an armed clash in the field was contradictory to the policy of non-aggrandizement, and severe reprimands were often received from Tokyo. The central authorities failed to understand the real situation in the field. The Kwantung Army strove to act in conformity with general policy, but it was necessary to forestall the Chinese by dealing with them immediately, since the Japanese were inferior in number and scattered. The central authorities failed to understand the psychology of the forces in the field and Chinese movements, and intended to treat the matter with optimistic observation or consideration of purely diplomatic convenience. In the second place, the Nanking Government had no control over the Northeastern Army, and failed to live up to its promise. Even Chang Hsui-liang could not control his regional forces. * Negotiations at Tokyo, Nanking, and Peiping failed to be timely, and there was no other way than to settle the situation regionally in the field.

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Toward the end of September the Kwantung Army concentrated its forces along the railway and watched the situation. Enemies in Chinchou and Lungkian were showing signs of counter-attacks by superior strength. When the Nonkian-chao Bridge was destroyed toward the end of October, 1931, they negotiated with the Executive Council of the Chinese Eastern Railway through the consul-general in Harbin, and with Ma through the consul in Tsitsihar and, with their understanding, began to repair the bridge.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 May 14, 1947
 DEFENSE - Division III - China
 ISHIHARA - Direct

Page

22125

The Chinese Army started to fire at the repair unit, and the covering force was obliged to return the fire. Ma failed to make any concession despite the negotiations, until the central authorities recognized the situation and took action to meet Ma's forces.

22126

When the Kwantung Army was obliged to send its main forces to Chichihaerh, leaving only two companies in Mukden, the Chinese concentrated a great force in Chinchou. Anti-Japanese propaganda from China was constantly made, * and the advance of the reinforced enemy forces was a great menace to the South Manchurian Army and an irritant to the Kwantung Army. The opinion was entertained that they must sweep out the source of disturbance in Chinchou. In the second Tientsin Incident at the end of November, the Tientsin Army asked for help from the Kwantung Army, but in view of the basic policy not to stimulate the Soviet after the collapse of Ma's forces they were ready to send forces to Chinchou by any means, even though they may be obliged to call back forces from the north. This attempt was checked by the Supreme Command. Through the medium of Chinese diplomatic authorities, a proposal was made to Japan's diplomatic circles to establish a neutral area around Chinchou. The Chinese attitude was that if Japan withdrew her forces, China would immediately withdraw this proposal. It was necessary to have the small force situated in an extremely disadvantageous position to take the initiative increasing the war-like intention of the enemy at the start.

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HONJO, though a mild man, took a wide view of * things in listening to his junior staff officers, and took whole responsibility for his duties abroad and to issue orders. The Kwantung Army did not hesitate to make positive suggestions to Tokyo and sometimes had heated arguments with them, but it never acted against an Imperial Order or instructions so long as the Supreme Command was involved.

The only actions taken by HONJO without instructions from Tokyo were two. One was the movement of the main forces at the sudden outbreak of the Mukden Incident, but in view of the prevailing military situation HONJO exercised his authority under Article 3 of the Kwantung Army and usual operational preparations in peace time.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
 May 14, 1947
 DEFENSE - Division III - China
 ISHIHARA - Direct

Page

22127

The second was the bombing of Chinchou on October 8. Six scout planes and five seized planes were flying to reconnoitre the conditions of the Northeastern Army in Chinchou when they were fired at, and in self-defense dropped 75 bombs on the

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* Communications University, where there was the Office of the Military Government, the barracks of the 28th Division, and Chang's private residence. The bombs were 7 cm. mountain-gun balls, and were dropped by hand.

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* In all other matters the Kwantung Army thoroughly exchanged views with Tokyo and never started operations without receiving Tokyo's instructions. In operations in North Manchuria, general relations with the Soviet were considered, and the forces were restricted in their movements despite operational advantage, lest the Soviet suspect aggressive intention by Japan on Soviet's rights and interests in North Manchuria. The true situation between Japan and China can be characterized as a conflict of opposing demands. On the one hand there was the recovery of national prestige by the Chinese, and on the other the preservation of rights and interests from the Japanese. It was exceedingly difficult to settle the issue unless one party conceded or a compromise be reached on the terms. They could hardly expect to maintain rights and interests merely through diplomatic negotiations. To enable the Japanese to engage in peaceful economic activities in Manchuria, * there seemed to be no other way of solution than to give up all special rights and interests, unless China agreed to compromise.

22130

Judging from SHIDEHARA's statement in the Diet on October 31, or WAKATSUKI's statement in April, Japan could not carry out such a drastic policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia, and public opinion would not permit such a course. If Japanese forces had been entirely withdrawn, not only her rights and interests would have been imperilled but the safety of her residents, and the Soviet Union would have encroached upon Manchuria. In view of the Soviet's traditional policy, Manchuria would have become a basis of Communistic propaganda, and the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria would have been impossible, imperilling Japan's national defense and that of China.

Page

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This was clear from conditions after the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. * The reason why Britain and the U. S. supported Japan in the war with Russia was to check Russian encroachment on the Far East.

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* While the Kwantung Army was not concerned in demanding or commenting on Japan's diplomacy, it was concerned with the establishment of peace and the defence of Manchuria to save the situation caused by the collapse of the Northeastern Army. In the face of this the Kwantung Army could not but consider the advisability of establishing a defensive military disposition against the Soviet. This meant only the establishment of a defensive position, and they had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union with Manchuria as its base of operations. They tried to make the most of this favorable disposition from a strategic point of view, in concert with China to prevent the Soviet from expanding south, and to make silent assistance to Japan's delegate in negotiation. The founding of Manchukuo was brought about as a result of a political revolution in Northeastern China, following the collapse of the military clique. * It was not the means or object of Japan's military movements, though her military action may have given an opportunity for it. It was regretted that Manchuria was separated from China as a means of settling the Incident, but it was thought that they must understand the various races in Manchuria before they could cut the root of disturbances for many years to establish equilibrium in the East.

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They had to seek the co-prosperity of the races through cooperation, which would terminate war and achieve Sino-Japanese cooperation. The Kwantung Army was devoted to the speedy establishment of peace and order, expecting the situation to be improved by the officials and people themselves, and they did not enforce military administration in the occupied areas.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
May 15, 1947
DEFENSE - Division III - China
ISHIHARA - Direct

Page 3376

Page

22,135

The army was not concerned much in politics and economy of the new state, but they were confident that to exterminate disturbances and to realize co-existence and co-prosperity with China, Japan should set an example by abandoning her claims to rights and interests. They, therefore, instructed officers and men to watch over their conduct with great self-restraint. Since the new state was founded successfully, later some people, military and civilian, claimed credit for its founding, saying that they had planned it themselves with the Kwantung Army. * However, the founding of Manchukuo was nothing more than an historical product of Manchuria.

22,136

DIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. T. Okamoto,
Counsel for MINAMI

22,138

The witness stated that while staff officer of the Kwantung Army he made research concerning the military preparations of Chang Hsueh-liang. * His total army was from 200,000 to 250,000, but the equipment of his forces outside of Mukden, numbering about 150,000, was not of the best. At Mukden, forces of 100,000 under the direct control of Chang had excellent equipment, far superior to the Japanese in Manchuria. While the Japanese there did not have a single airplane, the Mukden forces had a considerable number of them. The same was true for tank units.

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The plan of the Kwantung Army against Chang Hsueh-liang's army was that if a collision should occur, that is, if the Chinese should attack the Japanese, no matter where the attack * occurred, the Kwantung Army would concentrate all its strength against Mukden. There were no plans concerning the Mukden arsenal and there were no special plans about the airfield.

In August 1931 after HONJO's arrival, new plans were set up and forces stationed at Fuhkien were to make a surprise attack. He was aware that several problems had arisen because of instructions to the company at Fuhkien. The plans were very narrow. This particular plan was sent to the company toward the end of August. Several days after the capture of Mukden the captain of the company made several

Page

22,141 explanations. He stated * that he felt great anxiety because the plan required him to leave Fuh sien, an important point to attack the airfields. He wished to insure the defense of the place by utilizing police and extra servicemen and wanted to consult with the people. But since he was unable to divulge to them the plan, he told them of a certain hypothesis and had them gather as though it was a maneuver.

The hypothesis was that on September 18th an untoward event was to occur in Mukden which would necessitate the commander leaving. He asked them what they would do in those circumstances. Immediately after the consultation he sent notes to the people concerned, saying this was a complete hypothesis and calling it off. However, the report was sent from the Consul-General in Mukden to the Foreign Office and caused considerable embarrassment to the army. The commander apologized deeply because of his own light-headed judgment. HONJO and others thought the incident had created a great problem.

22,142 The choice of September 18th * was purely a coincidence. This is true when one realizes that on the actual date this company commander was extremely excited and forgot to attack the airfields as planned and rushed to Mukden with his forces incompletely armed. This commander's name was KAWAKAMI and the witness did not know whether he was living.

22,143 He knew of Wang Iche as a brigade commander in Chang Hsueh-liang's army and he had met him once. Wang's forces were stationed in the north barracks * and his brigade was one of the strongest and most anti-Japanese. When the witness's chief of staff arrived to take his post he wanted to pay a courtesy call to Wang and the witness went with him. Wang was then giving a summary of maneuvers being conducted by the brigade.

They were taken to his aide's room and found a copy of Wang's instructions printed and hung on the wall. This instruction stated that in the near future they would receive an attack from a strong neighboring power and they must resist it with all means at their disposal.

Page

This Wang Iche force carried out obstructionistic tactics again and again on the railway lines west of the north barracks. One week before the Manchurian incident, a Japanese patrol found several Chinese soldiers laying large rocks on the tracks one evening. When a member of the patrol tried to take one of the Chinese to the guard post, several Chinese soldiers came back and started fighting. The two groups almost shed blood.

22,147

After the north barracks had been captured, the Japanese forces discovered the instructions which the witness had seen in Wang's room in every room of the north barracks and also found publicly printed the words - seize railway lines to the west of the north barracks - on a poster. Wang's men * carried out demonstration flights over Japanese barracks and houses frequently and despite protests they were not discontinued.

22,148

In August and September the Kwantung Army never consulted with the central military authorities on its operational plans. The witness stated that the occasion of changing the plans of operations of the Fuhkien company was carried out on HONJO's arbitrary decision. * The Kwantung Army did receive instructions from Tokyo on how to settle the incident after the incident had broken out. This was in complete accordance with the Kwantung Army plan since it tried to restrict military operations to the minimum. * While the ideas coincided, he regretted to say there were many points on which the actions taken by the Kwantung Army did not coincide with the policies of the central authorities.

22,149

DIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. T. Okamoto,
acting as Counsel for KIDO

22,150

The witness stated he met KONOYE in January 1938 and KONOYE asked him his opinion on the China problem and the witness stated his opinion. * KONOYE did not talk on this occasion about his plans to ask ITAGAKI to become War Minister.

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD
May 15, 1947
DEFENSE - Division III - China
ISHIHARA - Direct

Page 3379

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. T. Okamoto,
acting as Counsel for ITAGAKI

22,153

The witness stated he was chief of the First Section of the General Staff from March 1937 to the end of September 1937. He did not conduct any important direct negotiations with the War Minister. This was the duty of the vice Chief of Staff. He was in charge of setting up operational plans. He said it was not possible for the War Minister to have anything to do with these plans. * It was the responsibility of the Chief of Staff to set up operational and strategic plans and the War Minister had no authority on this. However, when the plans were completed and had been approved by the Emperor, they are shown to the War Minister.

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He and ITAGAKI were staff officers of the Kwantung Army together. Until the afternoon of September 18th, ITAGAKI was on an inspection tour with HONJO and on the afternoon of that day was in Liaoyang. That night he returned to Mukden. He was aware that when the incident broke out ITAGAKI, HIRATA and SHIMAMOTO took * common action, but he believed that they must exercise great care in using words such as instruct or guide. By instructing or guiding, he understood it to mean the direction of the activities of subordinates by a superior having certain authority. ITAGAKI himself had no authority to give orders to the other two. He might be able to guide them by conveying to them clearly the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief.

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The actions taken by ITAGAKI around September 18th were in accord with the policy of HONJO. HONJO had completed that afternoon a tour of the division south of Hsinking * and that afternoon had given his comments and a summary to the divisional commander at Liaoyang. At the end he stated that the situation was extremely tense and no one could predict what might happen. If matters took a turn for the worse suddenly, each unit should speedily take appropriate action and he stressed speedy action. The staff officers commented on the forcefulness of HONJO's remarks, since he was a very moderate man. These instructions did not reach HIRATA when the incident broke out.

It was rational that ITAGAKI, understanding HONJO's instructions, should guide HIRATA to take speedy appropriate action. However, HIRATA was a very brave officer and the

Page

22,156 witness believed that even if ITAGAKI had not give him special guidance and instructions HIRATA would have taken appropriate action. * While under the circumstances ITAGAKI was entitled to guide HIRATA, since HIRATA was a man who would take speedy action, the actions of the two coincided.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Dunigan

22,157 The witness stated in October 1928 he was a Lieutenant
22,158 Colonel; in August 1932 he was promoted to Colonel; from October 1928 to 1932 * so far as the operations of the Kwantung Army were concerned, the witness knew about them. ITAGAKI was a staff officer in the Kwantung Army and likewise knew of its operational plans. There was not much going on so far as operations were concerned in the Kwantung Army that the witness and ITAGAKI did not know about. In operations and strategy the witness was aware of whatever was going on.

22,159 He knew hardly anything of how things in Tokyo were
going on so far as the military was concerned. Since ITAGAKI
had never held any position for a long period of time in Tokyo,
the witness did not think he was fully conversant with everything
in Tokyo. In so far as they affected the duty of the Kwantung
22,160 Army, the witness received reports from time to time on the Tokyo
situation. * He read the home papers every day, but in prin-
ciple the papers did not write up anything about Japanese mil-
itary preparations or status. The newspapers carried more in-
formation with respect to the Navy and the witness read them.
What he knew about Japan's position in the world, militarily
and navally, was from his professional work rather than what he
got from the newspapers.

22,161 As a naval power at that time Japan was permitted to
have 60 percent of the capital ships possessed by Britain and
the United States, and 70 percent of auxiliary vessels. Japan
was then considered a great naval power. He would, however,
say she was only a middle class military power so far as army
strength went.

22,162 While doing research on the China situation, * he
learned a great deal of knowledge about Chinese military
might. Its navy was insignificant.

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22,163

Asked how he could reconcile his statements in his affidavit that Kuomintang influence had made steady inroads in the northeastern area, and another statement that the Nanking government had no control over the northeastern army, the witness stated it was a question of degree. Until the Kuomintang Army entered Manchuria, the latter was semi-independent. After it entered the liaison between the party in Manchuria and China was strengthened, and when Chang Hsui-liang found it convenient to do so, he acted with the central authorities, but his position in China * was entirely different from a subordinate in an ordinary country. He had semi-independent status.

Asked how he reconciled his statement that Chang Hsui-liang was equipping his army and that his army had great spirit with his statement that the Nanking government had no control over the army, the witness said he did not believe there was any inconsistency in the fact that Chang Hsui-liang's army was strong and that the Nanking government had no control over it. When asked whether he did not say the Nanking government had no control when it served his purpose, he said he was not stating things in a certain light when it served his purpose and in another light when it did not. He was stating the facts objectively as he saw them. * Chang Hsui-lang obeyed Nanking when it served his purpose and did not obey when he did not want to do so.

22,165

One could not place much trust in a declaration of allegiance used by a former military war lord such as Chang Hsui-lang. The word allegiance is the one used in China. * When asked whether the central government would have appointed Chang Hsui-lang as Vice Commander of the Northeastern Army if it doubted his allegiance, the witness stated that even if they did doubt his allegiance, so long as they could not unseat him by force it was the Chinese policy to overlook any seeming disloyalty. Chiang Kai-shek * does not trust the Chinese communist party, but presently neither does he completely reject cooperation with it. * When Chang Hsui-liang was appointed Vice Commander of the Kuomintang Army, he believed that the Chinese did not place much confidence in his allegiance, but that was only his supposition.

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22,168 When asked what the Kwantung Army did to the organized action under the leadership of the northeastern army, he stated it did not take any steps at all. The organized action against Japan was in instances like the Wanpaoshan incident. While the army did not take any steps in regard to such incident, in regard to the NAKAMURA incident the army directly conducted an investigation. * All negotiations regarding incidents came under the province of the Foreign Office, but since NAKAMURA was a military officer the army was forced to investigate. There was another incident in which a Japanese woman, while in a truck, received great insults. * Except in the NAKAMURA case the Kwantung Army took no action at all.

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22,170 With respect to these incidents they were in continual contact with the Foreign Office, but he understood the question to mean what direct steps the army had taken and this * was the reason for his answer. They contacted the Foreign Office on every incident which they found out about. The army did not contact the Foreign Office directly on the question but through the representative of the Foreign Office in Mukden.

22,171 In light of the experience with the consul-general in Mukden after the Manchurian incident, he did not believe that the consul-general and his officials had a good feeling toward the army. Prior to the Manchurian incident they had sent repeated requests to Tokyo, not only for reinforcements but also for a change in disposition of forces. Very few of these requests were accepted. * They had stated their reasons for demanding increased forces.

22,172

22,173 The witness himself personally never reported that the relations between the two forces were on the verge of explosion. However, the General Staff repeatedly made such reports. The situation gradually became more tense, but the requests for increased forces were denied. He did not believe that this was due to the fact that Tokyo did not believe the reports. When he saw the situation as likely to be one of explosion, he did not believe that it meant that it would give rise to an incident of world consequence. * All they did was to ask for an increase in forces.

May 15, 1947

DEFENSE - Division III - China

ISHIHARA - Direct

Page

22,174

At the time, Manchuria was a part of China. He stated that the Kwantung Army had been assigned the duty of defending Chinese territory against another power. However, since the Russo-Japanese War, the defense of Manchuria had been a natural duty for Japan. The Kwantung Army was assigned the duty of covering the advance of Japanese troops into Manchuria * should the Soviet invade it.

22,175

When asked whether the Kwantung Army felt it would be in a better position in the event of a war with Russia if they were in possession of Manchuria, the witness stated that as a result of the Russo-Japanese War Japan obtained the right to station troops in Manchuria, and if Soviet troops should invade Manchuria the Japanese troops were in a convenient position. Legally, the duty of the Kwantung Army was to guard the railway and to defend the leased territory. In view of the international situation prevailing, the whole world realized that if the Soviet should invade, Japan would attack. He believed that Japan had duties as well as rights in Manchuria. The only legal right * that Japan had was guarding the railway and defending the leased territory.

Japan had an unwritten right to defend it against third powers, similar to that right which various powers of the world hold in third countries because of special rights and interests. The instructions to execute the duty even by force were issued by the Chief of Staff, acting on orders of the Emperor. They did not come from the War Minister. The instructions came under the scope of operational plans.

22,177

It was customary to take into consideration the plan of the previous year and not consider any of the plans of years previous to that. When the witness assumed charge in 1928, he learned of the plan for 1927 and 1928. * He received no reports on plans previous to 1927. However, from 1927 on operational plans against China began to be considered. Up to two or three years before that there were no operational plans against China, he heard.

It was not written that they had to apply for approval to use force to the central authorities, but that was taken for granted. Whenever action is taken against a third power, it

Page

must be taken after receiving Imperial sanction. The order was not to use force against force. It was an order from the central authorities to prepare for an eventuality, for something that might happen.

Because of the bad equipment, the one and only chance for Japan was to concentrate all her forces against Mukden on the theory of nothing ventured, nothing gained. Since reinforcements had been rejected this was the only course they could take and he believed that even if the army was outnumbered numerically, if intensive training was carried out and the army strongly unified and its strategy well planned, there was nothing to fear. In the Pacific War Japan's forces were far inferior to the American ones, but if its strategy had been well planned and carried out, it might not have suffered defeat like it did.

22,179

Preparations of education, training and transportation in the operational plan were reported to the central authority, but in principle the Japanese consuls in China were not told. Since plans of strategy required the utmost secrecy, they were divulged only to a limited number of persons. All the consul had to know was that in case an incident should break out, the army would be prepared to meet it. In what manner the army would meet it was a question of strategy which the consuls did not need to know, and if divulged to them * it would be a great source of leakage of military secrets. It was neither because of forgetfulness or negligence that they did not tell the consuls. It was a matter not to be told. It was not because the Kwantung Army felt it should decide whether or not diplomatic relations had failed. The divulgence of strategic plans is a matter decided by military law and consuls do not fall into that category. If they had told the consuls they would be subject to discipline under military law.

22,180

22,181

It was true that in September 1931 the consul at Mukden was conducting friendly negotiations to try to settle the NAKAMURA case. * At the same time, all these war plans were going on, but they had nothing to do with the NAKAMURA case. Wherever an army is stationed in a third country, it is a matter of strategy to be prepared for the worst and to be able to do one's best in any event.