

6

844

CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief
Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby
certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese,
consisting of 24 pages and entitled "The Siam
Insident"
is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in
the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office
_____).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 12th day of March, 1947

HAYASHI, Kaoru

(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were
affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness:

URABE, Katsumi

(seal)

The (Q. Room) /
Sian Incident 744

(9. Jan. 1937. 1st Section East Asia
Bureau)

(Foregoing portions omitted)

IV Causes of the Incident

1. Chang Hsueh-liang's displeasure
with Chiang Kai-shek

First, Chang Hsueh-liang lost
Manchuria. Then he was driven

away from North China. And
since ^{the time} with his forces
he ~~removed~~ moved to the barren Shensi

area, he has been hard ^{pressed} ~~up~~
for lack
on account of ~~insufficient~~ ^{insufficient}

military funds allotted by

the central government. Besides
not only

he has always been laboring
under the pressure of Chiang
Kai-shek. At the time the

so-called 'Southwest Dispute'
arose in summer last year,

it seems that he planned to
join hands with the 'Southwest
Group'. But he failed.

← After the

'Suiquan Dispute' arose, he

tried to persuade Chiang

Kai-shek ^{at Sian} of the necessity of a

anti-Japanese - pro-communist

policy, which however the

latter rejected flatly. More-

over, on this occasion Chiang ³
pointed out to him the un-
satisfactory progress of his
campaign to exterminate bandits,
and strictly ordered him to
purge away the communist forces
within a limited period. Since
then the discontent of Chang, as
well as his staff, especially
the red elements (the so-called
'new group'), was further in-
tensified, and the anti-Japanese ^{Chiang}
atmosphere became more and
more pervading. Just at
this time, Chiang, being ^{growing} im-
patient of the unsatisfactory

of Chang's Army &
results of the campaign, to
exterminate the Communist bandits,
wanted to re-organize the
army and to place it under
the command of the central army.

For this purpose, he announced
on ^{the} 12th ^{the} to appoint Chiang Jiewen,
one of his direct disciples, to the post of
Front Supreme Commander of the
Northwest Anti-bandit Forces,
and Wei Lihuang to the post of
Supreme Commander of ^{the} Northwest
~~Army~~, and to ^{lead the} ~~remove the~~
Northwest Army ^{move} to Fukien
Province, thus clarifying
his intention to ignore Chang

Hsueh-liang. Thereupon

5

Chiang ^{finally} resolved to carry out

the coup d'état as ^{his} last resort.

His intention seems to ^{have been to} keep

Chiang as a hostage in order

to make the central government

recognize his own position.

2. Political reasons, Cooperation

with the Communist forces and

U.S.S.R.

Chang Hsueh-liang refers

to the rejection of his demand

for anti-Japanese-pro-Com-

munist policy as a reason of

his arresting Chiang Kai-shek.

In fact, the view prevails that, inasmuch as Chiang urged Chiang for the enforcement of the above policy at the time the latter flew in October last year

from Hangchow to Sian, and as he again emphasized the necessity

of the policy in Sian after the occurrence of the Sian Dispute, the wire-pulling hands of the

communists and consequently of U.S.S.R. must be at work in the

background of the present coup d'etat. (although there

is no conclusive evidence to support this view). Among

The materials suggesting Chang
Kueh-liang's connection with
the communist forces and U.S.S.R.,
the following may be mentioned
here:

(a) In spite of his official
duty to suppress the
communist forces, he has
taken no step during
the past few months to drive
away the (T.N. communist)
bandits. On the contrary
there are signs that he has
received bribes from
dubious quarters.

(b) It is reported:

(i) that ^(he) has been secretly

communicating with U.S.S.R since
last year; (ii) ^{that} he has often

urged the central authorities to
adopt anti-Japanese - pro-Soviet policy;

(iii) ^{that} there is a sort of under-
standing between him and
Shen Shih-tsai in Sinkiang;

(iv) that a compromise has been
reached between him and
the Communist army, etc.

(C.) On the other hand, it is
reported by the Communists:

(i) that late in November Chang's
army concluded a military
agreement with the Communist

army; (ii) that on 11th, that is
on the day just before the present

9
incident, approximately 2,000
people in Sian carried out a
big demonstration under the
leadership of communists and
under the slogan of 'anti-Japanese,
pro-Soviet and pro-communist
policy'; (iii) that immediately
after the coup d'état, many
communist chiefs, including
Chou Enlai, Liu Te etc, came to
Sian from the Soviet districts;
and that Chou Enlai met
Chiang Kai-shek three times;
(iv) that the communist forces
stationed at the frontiers of
Ningxia, Shensi, and Kansu

10

provinces began to move
southward after the coup d'état;
(V) that on ^{the} 17th the Associated
Patriots' League held a meeting
in Shanghai at which it was
decided to support Chiang
Kai-shek on the ground
that his assertions were the
voice of the masses, etc.

From the foregoing facts,
it may be inferred that,
although the coup d'état
was not directly suggested
by ^{the} U.S.S.R., there was a
certain connection with ^{the} U.S.S.R.

In short, it seems most probable that Chang's revolt was the outcome of his discontent regarding the treatment of the farmer of the North east Army, which, coupled with his anti-Japanese-pro-communist policy, which finally burst out at Chiang Kai-shek's order to remove the above army.

V. The policy of the Japanese Government.

1. Instructions to the government agencies in the localities of-

12
fected by the Incident

on the part of the Japanese Government, as
As soon as the Incident
broke out, ~~the Japanese Govern-~~
ment ^{on wire} sent the following in-
structions ^{were sent by wire} to its agencies in
the localities affected by it:

The Government has
decided for the time being to
collect reliable information,
while taking of course all
possible measures for the
protection of the Japanese
residents as well as the Japanese
rights and interests in China,
and to decide upon further
steps after the real circumstances

stances of the Incident come to light. However, inasmuch

as the protection of East Asia from bolshevizing influences forms the backbone of our national policy, the Japanese

Government will never ^{overlook} ~~continue~~ pro-communist or pro-Soviet at any attitude on the part

even of a local government of China, to say nothing of the Nanking Government.

Therefore, it is necessary for our government agencies to prevent the Chinese to assume such an attitude by constant watch as well as guidance.

But on the other hand ^{at the same time} we

must be cautious not to ~~make~~ ^{be} ¹⁴
too much haste in dealing with
the situation, for such haste
may put Japan in a dis-
advantageous position.

2. Conference between
Minister ARITA and Ambassador
Hsu.

^{the}
On 11th, Ambassador
Hsu visited Minister ARITA.

After proposing to the Minister
that he would although he
was not ordered by his Govern-
ment to do so, give in-
formation as far as he knew
about the Sian Incident.

155

since it seemed to him that
the entire Japanese nation
~~was~~ ^{was} vitally interested in it;
he told the minister to the
following effect:

(a) The Nationalist Government
maintains a very calm attitude
towards the occurrence of the
Siam Incident. On the other
hand among the provincial
chiefs ~~and~~ ^{and} generals
there are many people who
insist upon supporting the
central government and in
driving away Chang Hsueh-liang,

as is seen for example in
a telegram sent jointly by
Lin Chih and 36 others, or in
another telegram sent likewise
jointly by Hu Tsingnan and
235 others. Besides, all firms,
schools and all similar
institutions throughout the
country have ~~avowed~~ ^{declared}
their position against
Chang Hsueh-liang.

Normal conditions is still

(b) ~~There were no agitation in the mind~~
~~maintained~~ ^{exists} ~~throughout the country~~
~~of people of any province and city, and~~
~~there is~~
 no perceptible fluctuation in the money
 markets in Shanghai and other places.

In regard to ~~the~~ diplomatic policy, I
 have ^{as} yet been given no instruction

from my Government. But the radio
 from Nanking ^{radio} said that the Government

had resolved that its diplomatic policy

should not be changed and continued

that H6 Ying-chin ^{it} had been ^{decided at the} ^{central Political} ^{conference} ^{commissioned}

^{that} ^{be appointed} ~~as~~ Commander-in-chief of the punitive

expedition. According to a despatch ^{from} ~~(which)~~

~~(reached the Ministry of)~~ ^{the} ~~Foreign Affairs~~ ^{Department}
~~received at~~ ^{the}
~~at~~ midnight 16th, it was revealed

The Executive Board

that President of ~~(Execution Yuan)~~ CHIANG Kai-shek, was in good health when Donald ~~(Shaw)~~ met him at Siain.

have been told

(C.) I ~~(understand)~~ that Your Excellency stated that in regard to

~~(have opined about)~~ this Incident, the Japanese Government would assume a serene attitude strictly impartial to both sides.

Your Excellency's view was ~~(conveyed)~~ ^{communicated} to the Chinese newspapers, ~~(learning that it)~~ ^{and} was

~~(agreeably)~~ approved by China's whole public. If Your Excellency's view is put

into practice, friendly relations between

China and Japan ~~(should)~~ ^{will} be greatly improved.

Minister ARITA replied to this as

follows:

I am very glad to hear President Chiang Kai-shek is in good health. The ~~present~~ ^{present} ~~existing~~ Incident will seriously affects Japan's situation, so ~~that~~ the Japanese Government is watching the developments of circumstances with keen interest. According to the press information Chang Hsueh-liang is said to have resorted to the ~~existing~~ ^{coup d'état} measure as he was ~~because~~ ^{rejected his demand} ~~for~~ ^{insisting} Chiang Kai-shek ~~(his insistence)~~ ^{for} ~~to~~ immediate declaration of war against Japan and ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~take~~ ^{take} a pro-communistic and ^{pro-Soviet} Russophilic policy. ~~Should~~ ^{of} ~~this is~~ it be true, the ~~existing~~ ^{present} Incident may be regarded as a big lesson for the National

Government. There are ~~very~~ ^{a great} many men who support pro-communistic policy and ^{are pro-Soviet} ~~Russophilism~~ among Kuomintang members in and outside the Government, so it ^{is} ~~should~~ be necessary ^{to} ~~decisively~~ purge them ^{from} off the Government, as I have often suggested to you. Through this Incident it has become clearer that there are some influential men in the Government who support anti-Japanese-pro-communistic policy. Bolshevization of ^{our} neighbor country is being watched with keen attention by Japan, for it will threaten ^{the} peace of East Asia as well as security of our Empire. Therefore, JAPAN requires

that any political power adhering to a pro-communistic policy and Russophilism should never even if ~~(shall not)~~ exist, ~~(though)~~ it is ^{but} a local government nothing ~~(needless)~~ to say of the central government.

Release

3. ~~(Issue)~~ of ~~(the)~~ Statement

In ^{the} ~~(the)~~ 18th, the Japanese Foreign Office informally disclosed ~~(issued)~~ a statement ~~in~~ regarding ~~to~~ the Japanese foreign policy to the following effect:

The

A Japanese Government wants calmly watch the ~~(await)~~ developments of the Siam ~~(SIAM)~~ Incident, because the truth has not yet been out. But in view of the grave

influence which will exercise upon ^{Japan,}
~~(JAPAN)~~ ~~through~~ the development of the
 Incident ^{the} Imperial Government is
 watching it most carefully. According
 to the press information, Chang Hsueh-
 liang supports anti-Japanese-pro-commu-
 nistic policy. If ^{this} it is true, the Japanese
 Imperial Government expects ~~that~~ the
 Chinese Government ^{to} will take a strict
 and suitable measure against this, ~~as~~
^{as the} ~~cause~~ bolshevization of our neighboring
 country will threaten ^{the} peace of East
 Asia as well as ^{the} security of our
 Empire.

~~VI. Suppression of ^{Chang} (CHANG) Hsueh-liang~~

by the National Government.

a. The Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang resolved on the 13th that CHANG Hsueh-liang should be subject to discipline and the Central Political Council of the Kuomintang which was held on the 16th issued an order of punitive expedition against CHANG Hsueh-liang.

~~Article~~

1.

The Policy

VII. Determination of the Nanking Government
~~for the suppression of~~ Chang Hsueh-liang.
to suppress

(a) As ~~is~~ mentioned above, the punishment of Chang Hsueh-liang was decided ^{upon} in the Permanent Central Committee ^{meeting on the 13th}. And accordingly ^{on the 16th at} the Central Political Committee ^{meeting it was} to suppress ~~(the suppression of)~~ Chang Hsueh-liang and to issue an order for ^{an} expedition ~~(the suppression)~~. The ^{the} Order was issued on 20th day, appointing Ho Ying-chin ^{Expeditionary} ~~(Suppression)~~ Commander, and Liu Chih, Front Commander respectively.

(b) ^{Although} step ~~(determination)~~ was likely to endanger ~~(make)~~ Chiang's life ~~(dangerous)~~, ~~but~~ it seems to have been taken, regardless of Chiang's person, as there accumulated in Nanking an expedition against Chang ~~(the suppression)~~ from every political,

2. and military bodies, and further ^{since} the urgent conditions at Szechwan and Kwangsi did not allow any delay.

(c.) The Chiang Kai-shek's followers (faction) at the centre of the Kuomintang were splitted into two groups (parties), one supporting the expedition (suppression) and the other, reconciliation. Ho Ying-chin, and Chu Cheng etc Chang-chun, and Tai Jen-chou, belonged to the former, and the Kung Hsiang-hsi, Sung Tzu-wen and Sung Mei-ling, ^{to} the latter. But in the Joint Committee expedition against of 12th (day) the opinion supporting the (suppression)

(of) Chang got the upper hand. (became powerful) (and) the Chen Kuo-fu brothers, Meanwhile in concert with Ho Ying-chin, seems to have

checked the claim of the Kung Hsiang-hsi and his group at the Central Political Committee of 6th day expedition (party) and made them issue the (Suppression) Order.

(d.) By the central (Until) about 18th (day) the army from

3. ^{had assembled} Nanking gathered ^{in the} at Hwayin area ^{enveloping} besieging Sian. The ^{actual} army headquarters ^{later} afterwards ordered by telegraph to cease advance temporarily ^{until} till 6:00 p.m. of 19th (day), ^{having} receiving ^{ed} ^(the) letter from Chiang Kai-shek.

brought by Chiang Jung-wen. But as Chiang did not return, their attitude ^(had) ^{more and more} stiffened, till they

occupied Chihshui, entering Shensi' through — kuan.

(TN: one character missing) ^{there} ^{seemed to} ~~(the part represented by, missed:)~~ And ~~(there arose)~~ be a threat of clash. ^{in the} ~~(the crisis of crunch)~~ ^(at) Weinan area.

(c) In the ^{meantime} ~~(other side)~~, it was said that the ^{forces} North-west army, which had been at northern Shensi and Kansu, advanced to ^{the} south, ^{one by one,} and gathered ~~(at)~~ somewhere near Sian.

(f) On 23th (day), Lin Sen ^{the} again ^{submitted to} ~~(produced in)~~

4. ^(al) ^(al) To punish the rebels
 the Central Political Committee ~~by~~ ^a ~~the~~ ^(punishment) plan ~~(of)~~
 and proposed to make
~~(the betrayal)~~ ~~(with a view to enforcing)~~ Ho Ying-chin
 carry out a speedy conquest in strict
~~(its sincere)~~ observance ~~(for the rapid suppression)~~
 of this plan.

The whole Committee approved it. It was said that
 step was taken

this ~~(was done)~~, because the military action, checked
 by Sung Tzu-wen and his ^{group} ~~(party)~~ who ^{insisted upon} ~~(claimed the)~~

reconciliation, did not make good progress, and
 such state of things, if prolonged, would
 they were afraid ~~(of the failure of Nanking's authority)~~
 lessen the prestige of Nanking and strengthen
~~(in case this condition would be prolonged)~~
 Chang's position.

(a) Further, the Central Political ^(al) Committee ^{meeting} held on the

16th recommended Yu Yu-jen as an envoy for the

consolation ^{of the} people and soldiers ^(in the) ~~(at)~~ North-west, with a

view to starting ^(a) campaign to break up the Yang Ho-cheng's

Troops

~~(was)~~. Yu left Nanking ^{on} 17th ~~(day)~~ for ~~—~~ Kuan ^(TN: unrec) ~~(missing)~~

5
 accompanying Chief Secretary, Wang Lu-i.

VII Measures taken by Nanking
 for Reconciliation.

I. Donald's ^(TH: phonetic) visit to Sian. Mr. Donald, who was
 once ~~(the)~~ advisor of Chang Hsueh-liang and ~~(now is (the) secretary~~
~~communicated~~ ^{with} Chang Hsueh-liang
 of Chiang Kai-shek, ~~(having got the allowance to enter)~~
 his wish to visit Sian in order to mediate
~~(into Sian, at his request for it to Hsueh-liang with)~~
between him ~~(a view to mediating) (Chiang)~~ and Chang. ~~visited~~ ^{On receiving Chang's}
^{acceptance, he}
 II
 on 14th ~~(day)~~ by plane. (It seems that Mr. Donald was
 recommended ^{to} ~~(his) visit (to)~~ Sian by the British Ambassador
 who consulted about it with Sung Tzu-wen.) Mr.
 Donald, after having made sure that Chiang Kai-shek
alive
 was ~~(living)~~ went to Hoyang by plane, and reported

6. There
~~was~~ it to Nanking that Chiang was still alive

2. Chiang Jing-wen's return to Nanking.

Chang Hsueh-liang ^{appeared to} seemed to plan ^{reconciliation} reconciliation, seeing

the steady attitude of Nanking; and the ^{unfavorable} situation of ~~the~~ ^{whole} China ~~(which echoed to)~~ his declaration by telegram,

~~From~~ ~~as~~ he sent Chiang Jing-wen, who had been captured by him, back to Nanking, ^{with a letter of Chiang Kai-shek.} Chiang Jing-wen, ^{as soon as he} came to

Loyang at noon, ^{on the 18th} ~~at~~ ^(say) from Sian by plane, reported to Nanking by telephone ^{from there} that Chiang Kai-shek was ^{alive} ~~(being)~~.

It was ^{ascertained} ~~(utterly cleared)~~ by this that Chiang Kai-shek was ^{still alive} ~~(being)~~.

(to Ho Ying-chun)

The Chiang's letter requested them ~~(that)~~ "Cease the attack ^{on} (of) Sian. ^{I believe} Because I will ^{be able to} return to Nanking"

^{by the} ~~(till)~~ 19th ~~(day)~~ In reply to this, it was said that the Nanking

7. Government ordered Chiang Jün-wen to send ^{as follows} message by telegraph to Sian: ~~(that)~~ "If you send Chiang Kai-shek southwards ^{the} before 6:00 p.m. of 19th day, we will cease our military actions."

3. Sung Tzu-wen's activity.

In Nanking, while ~~(there was)~~ ^{the plan was still in} ~~progressing~~ ^(the) ~~to suppress~~ ⁱⁿ ~~ance with~~ ^{suppression plan of} Hsueh-liang, according to ~~the~~ ^{policy,} ~~fixed~~ ^{because} ~~(plan)~~ ^{had} ~~(on the fact that)~~ Chiang ~~(did)~~ ^{not} returned ~~until~~ ^{by} 19th (day), there was another ^{group} ~~(faction)~~ ^{who were engaged in a movement} ~~(which was making)~~ ^{armed} ~~activity~~ against ~~(the)~~ ^(militaristic) solution. ^{the} On 20th (day) Sung Tzu-wen, ^{purely} ~~(quite)~~ ⁱⁿ the capacity of a private person, ~~(not due to)~~ ^{and without} any order of the Government, came to Sian by plane. ~~(and)~~ ~~He~~ after returning ^{on} to Nanking ^{the} on 21st ^{at} (day) for a

8. time, came again to Sian ^{by plane and} on ~~the 22th (day)~~ ^{and} accompanying

Sung Mei-ling, Donald and Chiang Tsin-wen with him.

and it is ~~It~~ was said that ~~(there)~~ ^{was} concluded an agreement

for ~~off~~ reconciliation ^{on the 29th} ~~(between him and the Sian)~~ ^{and}

On the 24th

Chiang Tsin-wen ~~(before their return)~~ ^{alone} came back to

^{alone} Nanking ahead of the others.

VIII ^{The} British Proposal ^{regarding} as regards Chang Houeh-liang's ^{getting out of} safely ~~(from)~~ China.

4. Memorandum

36

(1) ^{Circumstances} ~~Details~~ of the proposal.
England, in fear that the Central Government ^{would} be weakened after the outbreak of the incident, and desiring to give them strong support, ^{expressly showed} ~~(distinctly indicated)~~ her attitude for coming to aid, first of all, ^{the matter of} financial stability, by extending "moral support" ^{extended to} ~~the~~ ^{Then} ~~Donald~~ ^{was} the Bank of China. ~~(and)~~ recommended ~~(Donald)~~ to go to Liang. As soon as it was made sure that Chiang Kai-shek was ^{the} still alive, British Ambassador to China proposed to make

request to the Central Government

To make a request

As to the guarantee by which CHANG HSUEH

might give to the Powers for ^{his} safe

liberation.

(2) Interview between Vice-Minister

HORIUCHI and ^{the} British Ambassador.

On the 19th, the British Ambassador Clive, made a visit to Vice-Minister

HORIUCHI and verbally offered the above proposal. The following is

what the Ambassador brought in ^{offer} ~~as~~ ^{that}

reference ⁱⁿ of the interview on that occasion.

(3) Reply of Minister ARITA to the British Ambassador.

To the above, Minister ARITA verbally stated as follows to ^{the} British Ambassador who called on ^{him on} ~~for~~ ^{an} other business on ^{matter} the 24th!

The Imperial Government wishes to see Chiang Kaishek ^{returned} come back alive, but according to the reports, even among the official circles of Nanking Government, are at variance how to ~~(different)~~ ~~opinions~~ ~~is~~ ~~reigning~~ about ~~the~~ problem on CHANG HSUEH Liang. For example, deal with

Kung Shunghsi and his likes ³⁽⁴⁾
President Chiang
who are closely related to ~~CHIANG~~

~~President of Executive Yuan~~ in excessive
eagerness to help him out, may even
go, it seems likely, the length of accepting

a compromise with
Chang Hsueh-liang.

~~HSUEH LIANG~~ But another group

~~the other party~~ is said to be insisting
openly upon subjugation of ~~Chang~~.

And as to this problem Japan finds herself in

delicate situation on the ground that ~~HSUEH~~

Chang Hsueh-liang

^{is urging}
(LIANG ~~is enforcing~~) the Nanking Govern- 305
~~ment to follow the policy of admitting Com-~~
~~munism and resisting against Japan and~~ In
this respect our national ^{public} feeling also must
^{also} be taken into consideration. Be that as
it may, this affair depends ^{after all} ~~(as consequence)~~
upon the course of negotiation going on between
Nanking and Chiang Kwei-liang.

As to the above, ^{the} British Ambassa-
dor stated that England also had no
intentions to interfere with ~~the~~ Chinese
domestic affairs, adding that ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ case
of Chang Kwei-liang's ^{escape}, ^{should} ~~to~~ somewhere

About Tientsin on his own airplane, ³⁶
security from that time onwards would
be guaranteed.

(4) Request of British, American, French
and Italian Ambassadors made to
Chinese authorities.

The above proposal was communicated
by ^{the} British Ambassador (accredited to China
(respectively) to ^{the} American, French and
Italian Ambassadors, and they received,
it was reported, ^{it was reported,} instructions approving it in the main.

from their respective Governments. So the Italian
Ambassador on ^{the} 2nd 3rd made first a single

request to King Shang hsi, and on ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{following} next 24th, ~~(three)~~ Ambassadors
of England, France and ^{the} U.S.A.,
after consultation with each other about the
instructions ~~(brought in)~~ which they received from their
respective Governments, ~~three powers~~
^{separately} agreed to make to the Central Govern-
ment a request to the effect that "if
the Central Government demands,
Chang Hsueh hsiang will be ~~(taken care of to)~~
provided ~~(him)~~ with ^(safe conduct) Sauy Conduit in
case of his arrival at a treaty port
⁽ⁱⁿ⁾ ~~(as)~~ consequence of ^(the present) ~~(this time)~~ incident."

On the same day, a visit was made
 to King ^{alternately by the} ~~(in order of)~~ ^{British} ~~French~~ ~~England~~
^{Ambassadors} ~~in that order~~
 and Americans to make a request
 to the above effect,
~~(in the same intent)~~ King, for
 this, is ~~said~~ ^{only} said to have expressed
 his thanks, and nothing else.

(5) Interview between Consul General
 SUMA and Kou Tsungwen

On the 25th, Kou Tsungwen stated to
 SUMA as follows:

The real intention of the request made
 by ^{the} British, American, French and

49

Italian Ambassadors addressed to
Kung was nothing ~~(else)~~ other than
to show good will towards the National-
ist Government on the occasion
of the recent incident, and ^{only}
a little ^{slight} importance ^{to it} ~~(thereto)~~ ^{we} attached as
having no great difference with
~~the~~ an inquiry made by Ambassador
KAWAGOYE to Chang Chun. Such
being the case, no consideration is
being taken ^(into) ~~(at all as to)~~ ^{even}
~~that~~ ~~(wishes which)~~ ^{by} the Central Govern-
^{ment} ~~(and will express)~~ ^{eventually} to ~~(each)~~ ^{the} Powers.
to make the suggested request

4/10

Taking into account ^{the fact} that, as to the
above, not only the diplomatic circles
but also persons ~~related to~~ ⁱⁿ the Central
Political Congress have the same opi-
nion, ^{we desire that} Japan will ~~have to~~ watch
awhile the development of affairs
and ^{continue} take prudent attitude.

(6) Motif of the above proposal
made by England.

As it was feared that the death of
Chang Kai-shek would give rise to
confusion in China and ^{to} ~~the possibility of~~
a great change in the British relations ^{with} to

China, England is considered Q12
to have intended to put China under
obligation for her sympathetic action
in bringing about a state of affairs
favorable ^{in saving} ~~perhaps to~~ help Chiang
out by all means and, this, utterly
regardless of the situation.

IX Return of Chiang Kaishek

- (1) Return of Chiang Kaishek and the
terms ~~conditions~~ of compromise.

M. Nishi 93

Owing to ^(efforts made) ~~activities~~ by Sung Tzu-wen

a compromise between Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Hsueh-liang

seems to have been concluded. On ^{the} 25th

at 7 p.m., Chiang Kai-shek, with ~~three members~~

~~of~~ Sung Tzu-wen, Sung Mei-ling and Donald, ^{were} ~~was~~

^{escorted} ~~sent~~ to Loyang by plane and at noon

of ^{the} 26th ^{the} following day, he ^{returned} ~~came~~ back to

Nanking by himself.

Although the terms of compromise ^{were} ~~are~~ ^{made known} not certain, it is reported that,

besides the term to guarantee Chiang Hsueh-liang's

life, ^{there were} (1) strengthening of anti-Japanese policy,

- (2) reorganization of the Central Government,
 - (3) termination of internal war, (4) improvement
- in treatment
 of the north-eastern army, ~~treatment~~ and etc.,
 were concluded.

(11) Reason why ^{Chiang} Hsueh-liang ^{released} ~~emancipated~~ Chiang.

Prior to the return of Chiang-Kai-shek,

in the ^{the} early morning of 24th, Chiang Hsueh-liang ^{is} reported

^{to have} sent a telegram to Wu Tieh-cheng as follows:

" I, Chiang Hsueh-liang, express likewise my respect to ^{the} efforts which has been made by Chiang Kai-shek towards the unification, but if ~~the~~ matters ^{should be left} would go

to take the ^{present} course, it is feared that
~~as they are now~~, the life of

Chiang Kai-shek's ^{political career} ~~in political field~~

would ^{come to an end.} ~~die away.~~ Therefore,

I am now confining Chiang Kai-shek
to ^{ask him once more to take} ~~require his reflection~~ as regards the

anti-Japanese policy ^{into consideration.} If the

Nanking Government would establish

an anti-Japanese policy ^{and} ~~to~~ carry ^{it} out,

I would, at once, ^{send} ~~get~~ back Chiang Kai-shek

to Nanking safely. After that, I

myself ^{would} ~~should~~ gladly undergo even

the ~~(extreme)~~ ^{severest} punishment. I ask

no ^{other} terms whatsoever than those which I have already

mentioned ^{alluding to} ~~indicating~~ (pro-communism.)

As for the revolt by Chiang Hsueh-liang, putting aside its motive a little while, ^{its} ~~the~~ aim of which seems ^{to have consisted in the calculation} ~~to call up~~ that once ^{Chiang} Hsueh-liang should rise to action all the radical elements and dissatisfied ^{cliques} ~~cliques~~ of ^{throughout the} ~~all~~ nation ^{would join his standard,} ~~would join him by~~ his own introduction, as ^{the} anti-Japanese idea was ^{permeated} ~~permeating~~ everywhere ^{throughout} ~~in~~ the country. The local cliques, however, did not ~~correspond~~ respond to Chiang Hsueh-liang and, to make the matter worse, ^{the} public opinion attacked him all at once, so Chiang Hsueh-liang, perceiving that the situation was unfavorable to him,

Changed his opinion ^{to adhere} ~~with~~ ^{persistently} ~~that~~ ^{exclusively} of
~~the~~ resistance ^{towards} ^{Japan} ~~stubborn anti-japanese,~~ and ~~to~~ ^{send}

subsequently a telegram showing

^{his} ~~a~~ compromising attitude. Then he

^{sent} ~~got~~ back Chiang Kai-shek alive,

and took, ^{according to our observation,} ~~regarded~~ ^{as} measures to

be exempted from death by pretending

^{to show} his ^{allegiance} ~~heartful~~ obedience.

III) Reasons ^{for} of compromise on the part
of the Central Government,

On the part of the Central Government,

as Tai Tien-chou and Chu Cheng, who were
of opinion to suppress ^{the rebel} by arms, became

active due to the fact that Kung Hsiang-fei

and Sung Mei-ling opposed ^{to} ~~the~~ ^{resol} ~~ution~~ ^{ed}

~~the~~ ^{to} suppression by arms, and as Sun Ko

and Feng Yu-hsiang were both genuine

pro-communist ^{to} ~~the~~, the pendulum was

gradually swinging to the opinion opposing

^{the} ~~to~~ suppression ^{by arms} of Chiang Hsueh-liang.

On ^{the} 23^d, as was stated above, Han Fu-chu

and Sung Che-yuan jointly dispatched a

telegram stating that they opposed

^{the} ~~to~~ suppression of Chiang Hsueh-liang by arms,

asserting it was a Chinese internal ^{(within China's own} ~~affair~~ ^{territory)} ~~affair~~ ^{strife},

and that they proposed to settle

the Sian Incident by means of political

compromise. Accordingly the ~~first~~

^{primarily supported} assertion by the Central Government to

49

settle it ^{immediately} ~~by instant~~ ^{arms} ~~battle~~ ^{came} ~~ways~~ gradually to be encountered

~~becoming~~ ^{with} ~~more~~ difficulties.

4) Chiang Kai-shek's speech to Chiang & Yang

^{the} On 25th, Chiang Kai-shek, before his departure from Sian, delivered a speech to Chiang and Yang, and its summary was as follows:

^{present} The Sian Incident of this time was a ^{serious} ~~great~~ ^{affair} ~~incident~~ which ~~would surely have~~ imperiled ~~influence upon~~ the very existence ^{of} China. But your resolution, ^{made from a broader} ~~taking a large view~~ ^{under} of the nation, to let me go back Nanking, without issuing any command

or asking anything special by force,

^{embodies} ~~represents~~ the lofty ^{character} personality and culture
of ^{the} Chinese people ^{manifesting the idea} who ~~would say~~ that

gentlemen do not hesitate to mend ^{their} his ways

as soon as he ^{they learn of} finds an error. You

are well worthy of my subordinates.

^{were instigated by the reactionists and}
You, I think ^{made a} ~~have~~ ^{good} misunderstanding

that ^{as if} I ^{was} ~~were~~ not impartial ⁱⁿ to your

treatment and ^{was} ~~were~~ not sincere

to ^{towards the} ~~the~~ revolution, owing to instigation

~~made by reactional members.~~ Investigate,

^{in details} ^{the last one} ^{consisting of}
my diary ~~for~~ a year with some 60,000

words, ^{my} official as well as private telegrams
with 40,000, or 50,000 words, ^{dispatched in the last} ^{two months} and those ^{papers}

regarding ^{my} policy ^{of more than} with 100,000 words,

to be sure whether there ~~was~~ ^{is} a single word or phrase which aimed to exploit my own interest at the expense of

our nation. I am sure that you ^{will} find not ~~no sign of it~~ (you could

even a ^{single} word implying any such intention. ~~find there~~

~~I, to men under me, have~~ ^{always} ~~instructed~~ ^{my subordinates on} two points, that is to say,

(1) ~~first~~ ^{to} ~~that~~ kill me as an offender ^{against the nation} of ~~national~~ ^{crime}

~~when~~ I ~~would~~ ^{should} exploit ^{for} myself at the expense of my country, ^{and} (2) ~~secondly~~ ^{to} ~~that~~ kill me as

an enemy ^{should} ~~when~~ my speech or behavior ~~would not be~~ ^{disloyal} loyal to ^{the} national command.

If you ^{can} ~~could~~ find any such ^{words} letters among ^{the previously mentioned documents} them, ^{if} kill me at once by ~~shooting~~ ^{rifle fire}

as I am still in ^{your} the hands of yours.

K. Hattori 52

(1)

The responsibility of this incident is by ^{naturally} no means
at to be assumed by the Central Government.

Only that, I as an individual, cannot
be said to be utterly free from responsibility
when looking into the core of the affair. The chief
cause of the incident lies in the fact

that my heedless activity gave chance
to the reactionists to turn the situation to their
advantage. I have always insisted that a

fault committed by one's subordinates is,

in other words, one's own fault and

that therefore the superior is in the

first place to blame. Needless to say,

that we cannot be so lenient as to

overlook your faults, ^{is obvious, but I personally} ~~I am intended~~

(2)

first of all, to ask the Central Government to hold myself responsible for the affair. As to your part, I will try my utmost to explain that you acted upon ^{the} others instigation and that you were not late in correcting your error, thus being able to localize the incident. I believe that the Central Government will surely show clemency in dealing with you. Furthermore, I wish you will communicate to your subordinates that there will be nothing to worry about, since I intend, as a superior, to hold myself solely to blame.

3

57

In spite of your persistent demand, I have refused to sign ~~on~~ every one of your demands, only, from my firm belief, ~~to~~ of saving our country. As a matter of fact, I deemed that it would incur the ruin ^{of the character} ~~of personality~~ of the Chinese ^{people} ~~nation~~, should I, representing the ^{entire} ~~total~~ 4 hundred million of our people, yield to corrupt ways of my subordinates. I wish you would also inform your subordinates thoroughly ^{on this meaning.} ~~of my intentions,~~ thus ~~mentioned above.~~

In short, I may affirm that every one of you has fully understood

(4)

my assiduous efforts to save the country.

It, more than enough, shows - your

respect of the country that you were

early in mending your ways.. ^{Further} ~~like~~

once you have acknowledged your

faults, you should obey absolutely ~~to~~ the

orders of the Central Government, act

upon their decision, and thus ~~should~~

endeavor, in co-operation with them, to

restore, at this moment of emergency,

the prosperity of our country. This,

in other words is the way to turn a

misfortune into a blessing.

(5)

5). The release of Chiang Kai-shek's statement.

Chiang Kai-shek announced the following statement at 3.p.m. on the 26th.

" I ~~felt~~^{am} fatigued to some extent, owing to the rolling I experienced during the flight. My views on the Sian Incident are ~~is~~ wholly ~~made~~ clear in my instructions given to Chang ^{and Yang} Chi-ang at Sian. I

intended to decide everything in accordance with orders of the Central Government. It is ~~to be~~ greatly regretted

that I, ^{despite} being in the position of high command, could not resort to appropriate means and ~~had~~^{as a result thus allowed} ~~this~~ incurred the outbreak.

(6)

57

of such an affair. ^{as this} Especially ~~as~~ for
to my comrades and soldiers who met
with their death in this deplorable affair,
I cannot ~~but~~ help expressing my deepest
and most hearty ^{felt} sympathies for them. Fortunately,
to my great pleasure, by dint of timely
measures taken by the Central Government,
the local military government authorities
were enabled to carry out their duties
most faithfully ^{and} whereby the security of our
nation was restored to normal ~~condition~~. And especially
the fervent sympathy of our compatriots and
comrades at home and abroad, and the
unanimous support of public opinion ^{of the entire} throughout
~~our~~ friendly nations, and the world, all of
which have been shown upon us during

⑦ the ^{entire} ~~whole~~ period of the incident, ~~is~~ ~~are~~, ~~hereupon~~, most ^{deeply} ~~highly~~ appreciated.

by Chiang Kai-shek

b) Telegram despatched to compatriots at home and abroad.

Chang Kai-shek sent telegrams to compatriots at home and abroad, on the 26th, as follows:
~~which read to the following effect.~~

" I cannot find ^{adequate} ~~any~~ words to apologize for ^{having brought about} ~~incurring~~ such an incident, the outbreak of which ^{was} ~~is~~ wholly attributable to my poor ^{leadership} ~~guidance~~ and instruction and I am intended to hold myself responsible to the Central Government. Owing to this incident, we were able to realize

(8)

the great power of unity displayed by our people in protecting our country.

It is this mighty power that chiefly enabled us to bring the affair to a settlement and will secure the recovery of our nation in the future.

There lies the reason, why I, though feeling ashamed within myself, venture to express my hearty congratulations for the sake of our country.

I wish everyone of you to make strenuous efforts all together ----- "

⑨ 3) Conclusion.

We cannot be too hasty in prejudging the influence of this Sian Incident upon China's internal affairs and upon the trend of the Nanking Government towards our country. But, so far as the affair ~~was~~ restricted to the nature of an internal strife between military cliques, which is a case often to be seen in China, we may not be missing the point in saying that questions of money and influential spheres were the decisive elements in settling the matter. While, as regards the conditions set forth ^{formally} in Chang Hsueh-liang's demands, we may not be going too far in concluding that an agreement

10)

61

~~10)~~ was reached, finally, on the one

point to resist Japan.

前略

四 事件ノ原因

(一) 學良ノ蔣ニ對スル不滿

學良ハ先ニ滿洲ヲ失ヒ次テ華北ヲ追ハレ更ニ不毛ノ陝西ニ移駐後ハ中央ヨリノ軍費ノ支給モ甚タ不充分ナルノミナラス事毎ニ蔣介石ノ壓迫ヲ受ケ昨年夏西南問題發生當時學良ハ西南側ニ策應セシト計畫シタルカ如キモ其ノ機會ヲ逸シタル模様ナル處綏遠問題發生後西安ニ於テ蔣介石ニ對シ抗日容共政策ノ必要ヲ力説シタルカ蔣ノ一蹴ニ逢ヒ却テ剿匪軍事ノ進捗セサルコトヲ指摘セラレ期限附ニテ共產軍ノ肅清ヲ嚴命セラレタリ爾來學良及其ノ部下將領殊ニ赤化分子(所謂新派)ハ益々不滿ヲ抱キ反蔣ノ空氣漸次濃厚トナリタル際蔣ハ學良軍ノ共匪討伐ノ成績擧カラサルニ業ヲ煮ヤシ同軍ヲ改編シ中央軍ノ配下ニ置カントシ十二日ノ發表ヲ以テ蔣介石直系ノ蔣鼎文ヲ西北剿匪前敵總司令ニ、衛立煌ヲ西北總指揮ニ任命シテ東北軍ヲ福建省ニ移駐セシムルコトトナリ張學良ヲ無視

スルノ意圖愈々明ニナリタルヲ以テ學良ハ遂ニ非常手段ヲ斷行セ
ルモノニシテ蔣ヲ人質トシ中央ニ對シ其ノ主張ヲ貫徹セントキル
モノト觀察セラレ

(二) 政策上ノ理由、共產黨軍乃至蘇聯トノ提携

學良ハ抗日容共ノ實行ニ關スル要求ノ容レラレサルヲ蔣監禁ノ理
由トナシ居リ事實昨年十月蔣カ杭州ヨリ西安ニ飛ヒタル際蔣ニ對
シ右方針ノ實行方ヲ迫リ又西安問題發生後西安ニ於テ同政策ノ必
要ヲ力説シタル點ヨリ見テ今次兵變ノ背後ニ共產黨從テ蘇聯等ノ
觸手動キ居ルヘシトノ觀測有力ナリ（尤モ之ヲ的確ニ裏書スルモ
ノナシ）學良ノ共產黨軍乃至蘇聯トノ連絡ヲ推知セシムル材料ヲ
舉クレハ左ノ如シ

イ、學良ノ職責カ共產黨軍ノ討伐ニアルニ拘ラス過去數箇月間全
然剿匪ヲ實行シ居ラス又何レヨリカ金品ヲ得居ルカ如キ形跡アリ

ロ、(1)昨年頃ヨリ竊カニ蘇聯ト連絡シ居ルコト(2)屢々中央ニ對シ
抗日聯露ヲ主張シ來リタルコト(3)新疆ノ盛世才トノ間ニ或ル種
ノ諒解存シ居ルコト(4)共產軍トノ間ニ妥協成立セルコト等ノ情
報傳ハリタリ

ハ、更ニ兵變前後共產黨側ヨリハ

(1)十一月末學良軍ハ共產軍トノ間ニ軍事協定ヲ締結セリ(2)西安
ニ於テハ兵變前日ノ十一日共產黨員指導ノ下ニ約七千ノ民衆抗
日聯露、容共ノ「スローガン」ヲ掲ケ大「デモ」ヲ行ヒタリ(3)
事變直後「ソヴィエト」區域ヨリ周恩來、朱德等ヲ始メ共產黨
領袖多數西安方面ニ集リ而シテ周恩來ハ三度蔣介石ト會見セリ
(4)寧夏、陝西、甘肅、省境ニアリタル共產軍ハ兵變後南下ヲ開
始セリ(5)十七日全國各界救國聯合會ハ上海ニ於テ會議ヲ開キ學
良ノ主張スル所ハ民衆ノ聲ナリトシ學良ノ支持ヲ決議セリ等種
々ノ情報傳ヘラレタリ

右ニ依リ今次ノ兵變カ蘇聯ノ直接ノ示唆ニ係ルモノニ非ストス
ルモ蘇聯トノ間ニ何等カノ連絡アリタルモノト推定スルヲ得ヘ
シ
之ヲ要スルニ學良ノ叛亂ハ舊東北軍ノ待遇問題ニ關聯スル不滿
カ其ノ抗日容共ノ主張ト掘ミ舊東北軍移駐命令ヲ機會ニ勃發セ
リト見ルカ妥當ナルヘシ

ニ帝國政府ノ方針

(一) 出先官憲ニ對スル訓令
帝國政府ニ於テハ事件發生スルヤ出先官憲ニ對シ「政府トシテ
ハ差當リ在支居留民ノ保護並ニ權益ノ擁護ニ專念スルト共ニ適
確ナル情報ノ把握ニ努メ真相ノ判明スルヲ俟チテ方策ヲ決定ス
ルコトトセリ尤モ東亞ニ於ケル赤化勢力ノ進出防止ハ我カ國策
ノ根幹ヲナスヲ以テ南京政府ハ勿論地方政權ニシテ容共聯露ヲ
標榜スルカ如キコトアラハ帝國トシテモ之ヲ默過シ得サル所ナ

リ仍テ是カ監視乃至指導ニ付テハ出先官憲ニ於テモ萬遺漏ナカラシムルト共ニ問題ノ急速解決ヲ圖ラントスルカ如キハ却テ帝國ノ立場ヲ不利ナラシムル虞アルニ付此點ニ關シテハ十分ノ注意ヲ以テ對處スルヘキ旨訓電セリ

(二) 有田大臣、許大使會談

十七日許大使有田大臣ヲ來訪シ國民政府ノ訓電ニ依ル次第ニハ非ルモ今次西安事件ニ對シテハ日本ハ上下共多大ノ關心ヲ有スルコトト存スルニ付本使ノ知ル限りノ情報ヲ傳フヘシト前提シタル後大要左ノ如キ會談ヲナセリ

イ、西安事件ノ發生ニ對シ國民政府ハ極メテ冷靜ナル態度ヲ持シ居ル處例ヘハ劉峙以下三十七名、胡宗南以下二百三十六名連名ノ通電等各省主席、綏靖主任將領等ニシテ中央擁護乃至ハ學良討伐ノ意嚮ヲ表明セル者極メテ多キノミナラス各地ノ商會、學校、言論機關等何レモ學良反對ヲ聲明シ居レリ

ロ、各省市ノ人心ハ依然平穩ナルノミナラス上海等ノ金融狀態
モ殆ト從來ト變化ナク又外交方針ニ關シテハ未タ政府ノ訓電
ハナキモ南京ノ「ラヂオ」ハ外交方針不變更ヲ決議セルコト、
中央政治會議ニ於テ何應欽ヲ耐逆總司令ニ任命セルコト等ヲ
放送シ居レリ尙昨十六日深更接到セル外交部來電ニ依レハ「
ドナルド」ハ西安ニ於テ蔣院長ニ面會シタルカ蔣ハ健在ナル
趣ナリ

ハ、貴大臣ハ新聞記者ニ對シ日本政府トシテハ事態ヲ靜觀スル
旨竝ニ今次事件ニ對シテハ飽迄公正ナル態度ヲ持ストノ意見
ヲ發表セラレタル趣ニテ右ハ支那ノ新聞ニモ傳ハリ支那輿論
ハ何レモ之ニ贊意ヲ表シ居ル處右御趣旨ヲ貫徹セラルルニ於
テハ日支國交ノ改善ニ寄與スル處極メテ大ナルヘシ
右ニ對シ有田大臣ヨリ

蔣院長ノ御健在ナルヲ聽クハ極メテ欣快トスル處ニシテ今次

事件ハ日本ニ取り影響スル處甚タ大ナルヲ以テ日本政府ニ於テハ重大關心ヲ以テ事態ノ推移ヲ注意シ居ル譯ナルカ新聞報道ニ依レハ張學良ハ蔣院長ニ對シ對日即時開戦、容共聯露等ヲ主張シ右カ容レラレサリシ爲今回ノ舉トナリタル趣ノ處是カ事實ナリトセハ今次ノ事件ハ國民政府ニ取り一大教訓ヲ與ヘタルモノト云フヘシ國民政府ノ内外ニハ容共聯露ヲ主張スル者極メテ多キニ付此ノ際一大決心ヲ以テ是カ肅清ヲ圖ルノ要アルヘシトノコトハ豫テ屢々御話シタル所ナルカ今回ノ事件ニ依リ政府部門ニ容共抗日ノ有力ナル分子ノ存在スル事實カ一層明トナレル次第ナリ東亞ノ平和及帝國ノ安全ノ爲隣邦ノ赤化ハ日本ノ關心措ク能ハサル處ニシテ容共聯露ヲ主張スル者對シテハ中央政權タル場合ハ勿論地方政權タル場合トシテ日本トシテハ是カ速ニ壊滅センコトヲ希望スル次第ナリトノ趣旨ヲ述ヘタリ

8

(三) 聲明書ノ發表

帝國ノ方針ニ關シ十八日外務省ヨリ非公式ニ左ノ趣旨ノ聲明ヲ發表シタリ

今次西安事件ニ關シテハ真相未タ判明セサルヲ以テ日本政府トシテハ暫ク事態ヲ靜觀セントスルモノナルカ本事件ノ歸趨如何ハ日本ニトリ影響スル所極メテ大ナルヲ以テ帝國政府ハ重大關心ヲ以テ之カ推移ヲ注視シ居レリ新聞報道ニ依レハ張學良ハ容共抗日ヲ標榜シ居ル趣ナルカ隣邦ノ赤化ハ帝國ノ安全延テハ東亞ノ平和ニ多大ノ危險ヲ與フルモノナルニ付右報道ニシテ事實ナリトセハ帝國政府トシテハ支那側カ之ニ對シ嚴重適切ナル措置ヲ講スヘキコトヲ期待スル次第ナリ

六 南京政府ノ學良討伐方針

イ、前題ノ如ク十三日中央常務委員會ニ於テ學良ノ懲罰ヲ決議シタルカ十六日ノ中央政治會議ハ張學良討逆明令ヲ發出シ愈々學

9

良ノ討伐ヲ決議シ何應欽ヲ討伐總司令、劉峙ヲ前敵總司令ニ夫
夫任命シ二十日附ヲ以テ右討逆明令ヲ發シタリ

ロ、右措置ニ依リ蔣ノ生命ハ自然危險トナリタルモ中央ハ軍政各
部ヨリノ討張請願アリ一方四川、廣西方面ノ形勢逼迫シ遷延ヲ
許ササル狀勢ニ立至リタルヲ以テ蔣ノ身邊ヲ顧慮スル遽ナク遂
ニ右討伐令ヲ發出スルニ至リタルモノノ如シ

ハ、中央黨部内ニ於ケル蔣介石派ハ討伐、妥協ノ兩派ニ分レ何應
欽、張群、戴天仇、居正等ハ前者ニ屬シ孔祥熙、宋子文、宋美
齡等ハ後者ニ屬セシカ十二日ノ聯席會議ノ結果討張令發出說有
カトナリタル處陳果夫兄弟ハ何應欽ト聯絡シ十六日ノ中政會ニ
於テ孔祥熙一派ヲ押へ遂ニ討伐令ヲ發出スルニ至リタルカ如シ

ニ、十八日頃ニ至リ中央ノ軍隊ハ華陰地方ニ續々集中シツツ西安
包圍ノ姿勢ニ出テ其ノ後中央軍ハ蔣鼎文ノ持參セル蔣介石書翰
ノ次第モアリ十九日午後六時迄一時攻撃停止ヲ電令セルモ依然

10
蔣ノ歸還ナキヲ以テ益々強硬ナル態度ヲ採リ 關ヨリ入陝シテ
赤水ヲ占領シ更ニ渭南方面ニ於テハ衝突ヲ免レサルカ如キ氣勢
ヲ示シタリ

ホ、一方陝西北部、甘肅方面ニ在リシ東北軍ハ逐次南下シ西安方
面ニ集結セリト傳ヘラレタリ

ヘ、廿三日中央政治委員會ニ於テハ林森ヨリ叛逆處置案ヲ再提出
ノ上討逆總司令何應欽ヲシテ切實之ヲ遵奉セシメ急速ニ平定セ
ンコトヲ提議シ滿場一致贊成セリ右ハ宋子文等妥協派ノ運動ニ
牽制セラレ軍事行動迅速ニ進展セス事態長引ケハ中央ノ威信ヲ
害シ學良ノ地位ヲ強カラシムル惧アリタルヲ以テ行ハレタル趣
ナリ

ト、尙十六日ノ中政會ハ于右任ヲ西北軍民宣慰使ニ推薦シ楊虎城
部下ノ切崩シ工作ニ當ラシムルコトトシ于ハ十七日祕書長王陸
一ヲ從ヘ南京發 關ニ赴ケリ

七 南京側妥協工作

(一) 「ドナルド」ノ西安行

曩ニ學良ノ顧問ニシテ最近ハ蔣介石ノ秘書タル「ドナルド」ハ學良ニ對シ蔣、張妥協斡旋ノ目的ヲ以テ西安行ヲ通シタル處承諾シ來リタルヲ以テ十四日「ド」ハ西安ニ飛來セリ（「ド」ノ西安行ハ英國大使カ宋子文等ト相談ノ上勸說セルニ依ルモノノ如シ）「ド」ハ蔣ノ生存ヲ見届ケ十五日洛陽ニ飛來シ同地ヨリ南京ニ蔣ノ生存中ナルヲ報告セリ

(二) 蔣鼎文ノ歸京

學良ハ中央ノ態度強硬ナルノミナラス通電ノ反響意外ニ不利ニシテ全國ノ形勢極メテ非ナルヲ知り妥協ヲ策セントセシモノノ如ク監禁中ノ蔣鼎文ニ蔣介石ノ書翰ヲ持參歸寧セシメタリ蔣鼎文ハ十八日正午西安ヨリ洛陽ニ飛來シ同地ヨリ南京ニ電話ヲ以テ蔣介石ノ無事生存ヲ報告セリ之ニ依リ蔣ノ生存ノ事實全ク判

12
明スルニ至レリ

蔣ノ書簡（何應欽宛）ハ「十九日迄ニハ歸京シ得ヘキ見込ナルニ付西安攻撃ヲ中止スヘシ」トノ趣旨ナリシカ之ニ對シ中央政府ハ蔣州文ヲシテ「十九日午後六時迄ニ蔣介石ヲ南送セハ軍事行動ヲ停止セシムルモ可ナル」旨電報セシメタル趣ナリ

（三）宋子文ノ活動

十九日ニ至ルモ蔣介石ノ歸還ナカリシヲ以テ南京政府ハ既定方針ニ依リ學良討伐ヲ進メタルカ一方軍事的解決反對派ノ策動アリ宋子文ハ二十日政府ノ命ニ依ラス全ク個人ノ資格ナル建前ニ於テ西安ニ飛來シ二十一日一旦歸寧シタル後翌二十二日宋美齡「ドナルド」、蔣州文等ヲ伴ヒ再ヒ西安ニ飛行セルカ二十四日妥協成立セリト傳ヘラレ蔣州文ハ一行ニ先ンシ二十四日歸寧セリ

ハ學良安全出國ニ關スル英國側申出

13
(一) 提議ノ経緯

英國ハ事件發生後中央政府ノ衰弱スルヲ惧レ極力之ヲ支持セシトシ先ツ支那銀行ニ對スル「モーター」ニヨリ財界安定ヲ援助スヘキ態度ヲ明示シタルカ次テ「ドナルド」ニ西安行ヲ勸メ蔣介石ノ生存ヲ確ムルヤ在支英國大使ハ列國側ノ學良ノ安全出國保障ヲ中央政府ニ對シ申入ルヘキコトヲ提議セリ

(二) 堀内次官、英大使會談

十九日英國大使「クライプ」ハ堀内次官ヲ來訪シ口頭ヲ以テ右提議ヲ申入レタルカ左記ハ其ノ折同大使カ會談ノ參考トシテ持參セルモノナリ

14
23
Yuan
Kung Shing-Hsi
有田大臣ノ英大使ニ對スル回答

右ニ對シ有田大臣ハ廿四日他用ヲ以テ來訪セル英國大使ニ對シ
口頭ヲ以テ左記趣旨ヲ述ヘタリ

帝國政府トシテハ蔣介石ノ生還ヲ希望シ居ル次第ナルカ情報
ニ依レハ南京政府部内ニ於テモ學良問題ニ付テハ意見一致シ
居ラス孔祥熙一派ノ蔣院長近親者ニハ蔣救出ニ熱心ナル餘リ
學良トノ妥協ヲモ辭セサルカ如キ氣配アルヤモ知レサルカ他
ノ一派ハ正面ヨリ學良討伐ヲ主張シ居ル趣ナリ又此ノ問題ニ
付テハ日本トシテ機微ナル關係ニアルコトハ學良カ容共抗日
ヲ南京政府ニ強要シ居ルコトニシテ此ノ點ニ關スル我カ國民
的感情モ考慮セサルヘカラス何レニスルモ本件ハ結局南京ト
學良ノ交渉ノ經過如何ニ係ルヘシ

右ニ對シ英國大使ハ英國側トシテモ支那ノ内政ニ干涉セントス
ル意嚮ハナク唯學良カ自己ノ飛行機ニテ天津邊ニテモ逃ケ來レ

ル時ハソレヨリ先キノ安全ヲ保護セントスルモノナル旨ヲ述ヘ
タリ

(四) 英、米、佛、伊大使ノ支那側ニ對スル申入

右提議ハ在支英國大使ヨリ夫々米、佛、伊大使ニ申入レラレタ
ル處本國政府ヨリ大体贊同ノ訓令ニ接シタル趣ニテ廿三日先ツ
伊國大使ヨリ孔祥熙ニ對シ單獨申入レヲナシ翌二十四日英、佛
米ノ三大使モ本國政府ヨリ接受セル訓令ヲ持合セ商議ノ結果中
央側ニ對シ三國別々ニ「中央政府ノ要請アルニ於テハ今次事件
ノ結果トシテ學良カ開港場ニ達シタル場合之ニ「ソーフ、コン
ドール」ヲ與フルノ用意アル」旨申入ルル事トナリ同日午後四
時佛、英、米ノ順序ニ孔ヲ往訪シ同趣旨ノ申入レヲナシタリ孔
ハ之ニ對シ單ニ感謝ニ堪ヘサル旨ヲ述ヘタル趣ナリ

(五) 須磨總領事、高宗武會談

廿五日高宗武ハ須磨ニ對シ

「英、米、佛、伊大使カ孔ニ申入レタル趣旨ハ各國カ今次事變
ニ際シ國民政府ニ好意ヲ示シタル迄ニテ曩ニ川越大使ノ張群
ニ對シテナシタル見舞申入レト大差ナキ位ノ極メテ輕キ意味
ニトリ居リ自然政府ヨリ各國ニ對シ要望ヲ申出ツル事ニ付テ
ハ全然考慮シ居ラス右ハ外交部内ノミナラス中央政治會議關
係者モ同様ノ考ナルニ付日本側ハ暫ク形勢ヲ見テ慎重ナル態
度ヲトラレ度シト述ヘタリ

(六) 英國側ノ右提議理由

右英國ノ提議ハ蔣介石ノ死亡ハ支那ノ混亂ヲ來シ從テ英國ノ對
支關係モ一大變化ヲ免レサルヘキヲ以テ何トカ蔣ヲ救ヒ出スニ
都合ヨキ形勢ヲ作り形勢何レニセヨ支那ニ對シ英國ノ行爲ヲ賣
付ケントスル趣旨ニ出テタリト觀ラル

六 蔣介石ノ歸還

(一) 蔣介石ノ歸還、妥協條件

宋子文ノ活動ニヨリ蔣張間ノ妥協ナリタルモノノ如ク廿五日午後七時蔣介石ハ宋子文、宋美齡及「ドナルド」ノ三名ト共ニ飛行機ヲ以テ洛陽ニ護送セラレ翌廿六日正午單獨ニ南京ニ歸還セリ

妥協條件ハ不明ナルモ學良ノ生命ノ保障條項ノ外(1)抗日政策ノ強化(2)中央政府ノ改組(3)内戰停止(4)東北軍ノ待遇改善等ナリト傳ヘラル

(二) 學良ノ蔣釋放理由

蔣介石ノ歸還ニ先立テ廿四日早朝學良ハ吳鐵城宛左ノ通り電報セル趣ナリ

「學良ハ蔣介石ノ是迄ノ統一努力ニ對シテハ御同様敬意ヲ表スルモ今日ノ儘進ムニ於テハ蔣ノ政治的生命モナクナル次第ニ付此ノ際抗日ニ關スル蔣ノ反省ヲ求ムル爲監禁シ居ルモノナル處若シ南京政府ニ於テ抗日方針ヲ確立實行スルニ於テハ直

ニ蔣ヲ南京ニ安全ニ護送スヘク其ノ上ハ自分ハ極刑ニ處セラ
ルルモ怨ム處ナシ而シテ右以外ニハ何等ノ條件ナシ（蘇聯容
共ヲ指スモノノ如シ）

學良ノ叛亂ハ其ノ動機ノ如何ハ暫ク措キ其ノ狙ヒ所ハ全國ニ瀰
漫スル抗日思想ニシテ學良一度立タハ全國ノ急進分子及不平軍
閥ハ其ノ傘下ニ參スヘシトナシタルニアリタルカ如キモ地方軍
閥モ學良ニ策應セス輿論ハ一齊ニ學良ヲ攻撃シ形勢非ナルヲ見
テ抗日一點張リニ看板ヲ塗り換ヘ右電報ヲ發シ妥協的態度ヲ示
シ蔣介石ヲ生還セシメ專ラ恭順ヲ表シ死ヲ免レントスル方針ニ
出テタルモノト觀ラル

(三) 中央側ノ妥協理由

中央側ニ於テハ孔祥熙、宋美齡等武力討伐ニ反對シタル結果歐
天仇、居正等ノ討伐派モ消極的トナリ又孫科、馮玉祥ハ元來容
共論者ナレハ形勢漸次討張ニ反對ニ赴キタル際ニモアリ又前顧

ノ如ク二十三日韓復榘及宋哲元ハ連名ヲ以テ學良ノ武力討伐ハ
支那ノ内戦ナルニ付絶對反對ナリ西安事件ハ政治的妥協工作ニ
依リ解決スヘキ旨ノ通電ヲ發シタル次第モアリ中央當初ノ主張
タル即戰解決ハ漸次困難トナリタルニ依ルモノノ如シ

(四) 蔣介石ノ張及楊ニ對スル訓話

廿五日蔣ハ西安出發前張及楊ニ訓話ヲ與ヘタルカ其ノ要領左ノ
通りナリ

今回ノ西安事件ハ實ニ中華民國存亡ニ懸ル大事件ナリ然ルニ
今日汝等既ニ國家ノ大局ニ醒メ命令ノ發出乃至何等特殊ノ要
求ヲ強行セス余ヲ歸京セシメント決心セルハ過ヲ知テ改ムル
ハ君子ナリトノ中華民族ノ人格ト文化ノ高尚ヲ表現セルモノ
ニシテ余ノ部下タルニ恥チス汝等ハ反動派ノ煽動ニ依リ余ノ
汝等ニ對スル待遇不公平又革命ニ對シ不誠實ナルカ如ク誤解
シタルカ如キ處余ノ一年以來ノ日記約六萬餘言、二箇月以來

20

ノ公私電文手配四五萬言又政策ニ關スルモノ十餘萬言ニ及フ
處其ノ中一言一句國家ヲ棄テ私ノ爲ニ計リタルモノアルヤ仔
細ニ檢閲セヨ一毫一糸人ヲ欺ク所ナカルヘシ余ハ常ニ部下ニ
對シ(一)余カ國家ヲ棄テ私利ヲ計リタル場合ハ國家ノ罪人トシ
テ我ヲ殺セ(二)余ノ言動ニシテ苟モ國命ニ不忠實ナルモノアラ
ハ我ヲ敵トシテ直ニ殺害セヨトノ二點ヲ訓示シ居レリ前記各
書面中若シ右ノ如キモノアラハ余ハ猶汝等ノ手中ニ在リ直ニ
我ヲ統殺セヨナリ汝等ハ此ノ言ヲ聞キテハ如何ニ爲スヤ
今回事變ノ責任ハ當然何等中央ニ於テ負フヘキナシ但シ其ノ
原因ヲ究ムレハ余モ亦責任ナシト言フヲ得シ蓋シ余ノ行動餘
リニ輕卒ナリシ爲反動派ニ乘スルノ機ヲ與ヘタルカ其ノ根本
ナレハナリ余ハ常ニ部下ノ過失ハ上官ノ過失ナリ先ツ上官ヲ
罰セサルヘカラスト主張シ居レリ汝等ノ過失ヲ看過シ得サル
ハ勿論ナルモ余ハ先ツ余自身中央ニ向ヒ引責罪ヲ請ヒ汝等ニ

付テハ他人ノ煽動ニ依リタル點竝ニ汝等カ早キニ及テ過ヲ改
メ事變ヲ擴大セシメサリシ點ヲ充分説明スヘシ中央モ必ス寬
大ノ沙汰ニ出ツヘシ尙汝等部下ニ對シテハ余カ上官トシテ罰
ヲ負フヘキニ付何等懸念スル要ナキ所以ヲ傳ヘヨ

余カ汝等ノ強要ニ拘ラス總テノ要求ニ署名ヲ拒ミタルハ唯國
家ヲ救ハントノ一念ニ出テタル處ナリ蓋シ四億ノ人民ヲ代表
スル余カ部下ノ非道ニ屈スルハ中華民族人格ノ滅亡ヲ意味ス
ルモノナレハナリ汝等ハ此ノ意味ヲモ充分部下ニ傳ヘヨ
要スルニ今ヤ汝等ハ余ノ救國ノ苦心ヲ充分了解セリ汝等今回
悔悟ノ速ナリシハ尙國家ヲ重ンスルヲ知ルニ足ル然ル以上絶
對ニ中央ニ服從シ其ノ決定ニ從ヒ共ニ非常時的ノ國運挽回ニ
努ムヘシ是即チ禍ヲ轉シテ福ト爲スノ途ナリ

(五) 蔣介石ノ「ステートメント」發表

蔣介石ハ二十六日午後三時左ノ「ステートメント」ヲ發表セリ

「飛行機動搖ノ爲些カ疲勞ヲ感シタリ余ノ西安事件ニ對スル見
解ハ余カ西安ニ於テ張及楊ニ與ヘタル訓話中ニ明カナリ一切
ハ總テ中央ノ命ニ依リ決定セントス余ハ統帥ノ身ニアリ乍ラ
其ノ法ヲ得サリシ爲今回ノ如キ事變ノ發生ヲ見タルハ眞ニ遺
憾ニ堪ヘス殊ニ殉難ノ同志及官兵ニ對シテハ氣ノ毒ノ至リナ
リ幸ヒ中央機宜ノ措置ニ依リ全國軍政當局其ノ職責ヲ盡シ國
家ノ安全ヲ常態ナラシメタルハ深ク幸トスル所ナリ而シテ事
變中海内外同胞同志ノ熱烈ナル同情及友邦朝野竝ニ世界一致
輿論ノ支援ハ殊ニ余ノ感謝措ク能ハサル所ナリ」

(六) 蔣介石ノ海内外同胞ニ對スル通電

蔣介石ハ廿六日海内外同胞ニ對シ

「自分ノ教導至ラサリシ爲今回ノ如キ事件ノ發生ヲ見タルハ申
譯ナシ自分ハ中央ニ對シ引責スヘシ今回ノ事變ニ依リ國民ハ
一致國家ヲ愛護スルノ偉大ナル力ヲ發現セリ此ノ威力コソ今

23

同ノ事變ヲ無事經過セシメタル主因及將來我民族復興ノ保障
ニ對シテ是余ノ心坎シキ中ニモ敢テ國家ノ爲ニ慶祝スル所ナリ共

今次ニ努力ヲ望ム云々及南京政府ノ對日勸告ニ及ボスハ形
勢トハ趣旨ノ通電ヲ發セリヤサルモ事件夫レ事變カ敢テ支那一
流ノ繁榮國ノ強國ナル限リ之カ安穩ニ當リテモ自給、地盤固固
等亦重要的要素ナリヤトハ時々疑ナカルヘク一方華島ノ正式
要求實現中ニ於テハ始終注意ノ點ニ於テ合意成立セラルトス
テ大過ナカルヘシ

24

(三) 結論

今次西安事件ノ支那内政及南京政府ノ對日動向ニ及ホスヘキ影響ニ付テハ輕々ニ豫斷ヲ許ササルモ事件夫レ事態カ飽迄支那一流ノ軍閥間ノ抗爭ナル限り之カ妥結ニ當リテモ金錢、地盤問題等カ決定的要素タリシコトハ略々疑ナカルヘク一方學良ノ正式要求條項中ニ於テハ結局抗日ノ點ニ於テ合意成立セルモノト觀テ大過ナカルヘシ

No. 244

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分、林 馨ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレニテ四頁ヨリ成ル西安事件ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(外務省)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年三月十一日 於東京

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人

浦部 勝 昌

林 馨

233

307