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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 17, 1945.

FOR DEPARTMENT USE ONLY

NO. 110

SUBJECT: Rural Land Reform in Japan.

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Department of State

OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JAN 5 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a directive on the subject of Rural Land Reform issued by General MacArthur's headquarters to the Japanese Government on December 9, 1945, together with a copy of a memorandum of identic date prepared by a member of the staff of this Mission offering a number of comments on the directive.

A copy of Mr. Fearey's memorandum has been informally furnished to the chief of the appropriate section of General Headquarters.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures:

- 1. SCAP Directive AG 602.6 CIE, December 9, 1945.
- 2. Copy of Memorandum marked "For Department Use Only", December 17, 1945.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 110 of December 17, 1945,
from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan,
on the subject "Rural Land Reform in Japan".

134

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 602.6 (9Dec 45)CIE

9 December 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Rural Land Reform.

1. In order that the Imperial Japanese Government shall remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of man, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression, the Japanese Imperial Government is directed to take measures to insure that those who till the soil of Japan shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor.

2. The purpose of this order is to exterminate those pernicious ills which have long blighted the agrarian structure of a land where almost half the total population is engaged in husbandry. The more malevolent of these ills include:

a. Intense overcrowding of land.

Almost half the farm households in Japan till less than one and one half acres each.

b. Widespread tenancy under conditions highly unfavorable to tenants.

More than three-fourths of the farmers in Japan are either partially or totally tenants, paying rentals amounting to half or more of their annual crops.

c. A heavy burden of farm indebtedness combined with high rates of interest on farm loans.

Farm indebtedness persists so that less than half the total farm households are able to support themselves on their agriculture income.

d. Government fiscal policies which discriminate against agriculture in favor of industry and trade.

Interest rates and direct taxes on agriculture are more oppressive than those in commerce and industry.

e. Authoritative government control over farmers and farm organizations without regard for farmer interests.

Arbitrary crop quotas established by disinterested control associations often restrict the farmer in the cul-

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tivation of crops for his own needs or economic advancement.

Emancipation of the Japanese farmer cannot begin until such basic farm evils are uprooted and destroyed.

3. The Japanese Imperial Government is therefore ordered to submit to this Headquarters on or before 15 March 1946 a program of rural land reform. This program shall contain plans for:

- a. Transfer of land ownership from absentee land owners to land operators.
- b. Provisions for purchase of farm lands from non-operating owners at equitable rates.
- c. Provisions for tenant purchase of land at annual installments commensurate with tenant income.
- d. Provisions for reasonable protection of former tenants against reversion to tenancy status. Such necessary safeguards should include:
 - (1) Access to long and short term farm credit at reasonable interest rates.
 - (2) Measures to protect the farmer against exploitation by processors and distributors.
 - (3) Measures to stabilize prices of agricultural produce.
 - (4) Plans for the diffusion of technical and other information of assistance to the agrarian population.
 - (5) A program to foster and encourage an agricultural cooperative movement free of domination by non-agrarian interests and dedicated to the economic and cultural advancement of the Japanese farmer.
- e. The Japanese Imperial Government is requested to submit in addition to the above, such other proposals it deems necessary to guarantee to agriculture a share of the national income commensurate with its contribution.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,

/t/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 110 of December 17, 1945, from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Rural Land Reform in Japan".

(FOR DEPARTMENT USE ONLY)

December 17, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comment on SCAP Rural Land Reform Directive.

The following brief comments on the recent SCAP rural land reform directive are based on my studies of Japanese agrarian problems in Washington and in Japan over the past five years, and on material presented in a data paper "Japan: Agrarian Reform" prepared from notes compiled in Washington in consultation with Far Eastern experts of the Department of Agriculture and submitted to the Supreme Commander on October 26, 1945.

1. References are to paragraphs in the directive.

Paragraph 2, a -- Overcrowding on the land, the basic source of the Japanese farmer's plight, is not an evil which can be uprooted and destroyed through a program of agrarian reform. The only solution of this difficulty, beyond expectation in the foreseeable future, would be the migration of literally millions of cultivators from farming to industrial, commercial and professional occupations, made possible by a greatly expanded foreign trade.

Paragraph 2, c -- It is my impression, gained from conversations with Japanese farm experts, officials and cultivators, that rural indebtedness, which totalled six billion yen in 1937, has been entirely liquidated during the war as a consequence of exceptionally high farm incomes, lack of spending outlets, and currency inflation, and that many farmers now have substantial cash reserves. There is, of course, no assurance that they will retain those reserves for long.

Paragraph 2, d -- While interest rates are hardly a matter of fiscal policy, discriminatory tariff policies and discrimination in favor of industry and against agriculture in the expenditure of state funds have been among the leading causes of farm discontent.

Paragraph 3, b -- It is not clear how this provision differs from paragraphs 3, a and 3, c.

Paragraph 3, c -- Farm tenancy reforms in other countries providing for the long-term purchase of land by the tenants have invariably broken down in a brief period of years, and would almost inevitably come to naught in Japan, too, after the occupation forces leave. Even if the tenants succeeded in meeting the annual payments there would be no improvement in their position during the period of payment, set at 24 years in the Government bill now before the Diet. Experience indicates that there can be

only one

only one solution of the Japanese farm tenancy problem, namely, expropriation of all rented farm land by the Government for immediate transfer in full title to the tenants, compensation being provided the landlords in government bonds of enduring value in an amount equal to the productive value of the land expropriated. Such measure would have to be accompanied by other, subsidiary reforms if the tenants are to retain their land.

Paragraph 3, d -- In place of item 4 (effective machinery for the diffusion of technical and other information of assistance to the farmers has long existed, with Japanese crop yields among the highest in the world) the named safeguards should include elimination of discriminatory fiscal and tariff policies, equalization of the tax burden -- I recently obtained figures compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry which indicate that a farmer's tax liability remains more than twice that of a merchant or industrialist having the same income --, provision of fertilizers at cost-plus prices, and encouragement of subsidiary industries in the rural districts in partial replacement of the silk industry.

2. There were scattered reports before the issuance of the directive that landlords, fearful of being forced to dispose of their rented holdings under the Government land reform bill, were evicting their tenants and undertaking to cultivate such land themselves or with hired workers. It has been reliably reported that evictions of this type have increased since the publication of the directive, which, it is believed, should have been accompanied by an order freezing land ownership and tenancy as of the date of issuance.

3. The directive, no doubt deliberately, is drawn in very general terms. It should be entirely possible through the establishment of an effective working liaison between Japanese and Headquarters agricultural experts to work out a satisfactory reform program for submission by March 15.

Robert A. Fearey

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DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Dated December 17, 1945

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Brief TIMES editorial supports views expressed by MANCHESTER GUARDIAN (Embassy's 13082, thirteenth), approving General MacArthur's instructions to Japanese Government to reform system of land tenure. TIMES believes that if projected reforms can be carried into effect, they will initiate a new way of life for cultivating classes who make up nearly half Japan's population and lay foundation of a hitherto unknown system of peasants rights and privileges.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

December 18, 1945

JK - Mr. Martin

Mr. Acheson would appreciate having a memorandum prepared for his signature in reply to the attached memorandum of December 17, 1945 from Mr. Connelly concerning the desire of Mr. Howard F. Wehrle for a civilian position in the Orient. I discussed Mr. Connelly's memorandum with Mr. Penfield who suggested that as Mr. Wehrle is an engineer you might be the best person to consider his case. In this connection Mr. Penfield mentioned the Bunce Mission.

F. S. W.
Frances E. Willis

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 17, 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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MEMORANDUM FOR: HONORABLE DEAN Acheson
Under Secretary of State.

I am attaching herewith a letter addressed to me by Mr. Howard F. Wehrle, of Yonkers, New York, in which he expresses a desire to work as a civilian in the Orient. I am just wondering if you might have a suggestion which could be passed along to Mr. Wehrle.

Thank you.

Matthew J. Connelly
MATTHEW J. CONNELLY
Secretary to the President.

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Memorandum from
Acheson to Mr. Connelly.
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(Original returned to Mr. Matthew J. Connelly)

COPY

153 Park Hill Avenue,
Yonkers 5, New York.
December 1, 1945.

Mr. Mathew Connelly,
Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Connelly:

That proposed trip to Washington has not materialized due to the fact that I have been rather busy here and none of the business has to do with any of the offices in Washington.

My son has expressed a desire to spend some considerable time in the Orient and is now on duty in Seoul, Korea. He being a regular officer out of the Military Academy and a career soldier he will probably get the assignment.

It has occurred to me that I would like to see some service in that part of the world possibly in rehabilitation work as a civilian. My record in the War Department as an engineer and pilot in World War I is of course open to inspection. The President is also familiar with my efforts as an airport engineer, Kansas City being the first one I built after the last war.

I will appreciate it very much if you will advise me as to whom I should contact in Washington regarding this.

I would still like to see the President sometime but in the meantime I will appreciate it very much if you will convey my felicitations. He has an enormous problem or problems on his hands and about all most of us can do is to pray for heavenly guidance for him.

My best regards to you.

Most sincerely,

/s/ Howard F. Wehrle

DEC 29 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CONNELLY

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM
MR. HOWARD F. WEHRLE

I have received your memorandum of December 17, 1945 with respect to Mr. Howard H. Wehrle of Yonkers, New York. Although there is great need at the present time for civilians of various abilities to assist in carrying on the occupation of Japan and Korea, no personnel are now being employed by the State Department. Therefore, I have given Mr. Wehrle's name to the special State Department section which is assisting the War Department in its recruiting program, and have requested that appropriate application blanks be sent to Mr. Wehrle direct.

DEAN ACHESON

Enclosure:

From Mr. Wehrle,
December 17, 1945.

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Acting Secretary

A true copy of the signed original.

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OFFICE
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December 17, 1945

To: Colonel Vittrup, War Department

From: Mr. Penfield

The following is suggested for incorporation in a reply to CM-IN1486:

"State Department has been consulted in this matter and approves educational and training project in principle. Benninghoff who has State Department's outline and budget for its proposed information and education program in Korea is prepared to discuss this matter in detail. Request your comment on proposed program and suggestions as to how it might be instituted under MG in a manner which will minimize confusion and disruption when MG terminates.

"Your proposal to send Korean civilian group to the United States, named in your CM-IN-1486, approved, assuming purpose is to obtain funds for establishing technical training program. Upon arrival, group under the guidance of Commander G. Z. Williams should confer with Department of State which will welcome opportunity to cooperate and assist group in every way possible and put them in touch with other Departments concerned. In order to avoid possible local and international misunderstanding, purely technical aspects of mission should be stressed pointing out that such exchanges of technicians are for purposes of orienting Korea away from domination by Japan and not for purposes of formulating general political, economic and cultural policy."

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 18, 1945.

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NO. 114

SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the
Week Ending December 15, 1945.

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Division of
Special Services

9:46 JAN 4 1946

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

Office of Japanese Affairs
JAN 5 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 83 of December 3, 1945, and previous despatches transmitting weekly reports prepared at the request of the Supreme Commander on the general subject of developments of Japanese political parties.

There is transmitted hereunder a copy of a memorandum of identic date addressed to the Supreme Commander forwarding this Mission's report of developments of political parties during the week ending December 15, 1945, and making some comment on the present stage of Japanese political development.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson
George Atcheson

JAN 23 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Enclosure:

Memorandum to Supreme Commander,
December 18, 1945.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 114 of December 18, 1945 from the Acting United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Political Parties in Japan: Developments during the Week Ending December 15, 1945".

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 18, 1945.

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Supreme Commander.

SUBJECT: Developments of Political Parties in Japan for the Week Ending December 15, 1945.

There is transmitted hereunder our tenth weekly report on Japanese political parties submitted pursuant to the Chief of Staff's memorandum of October 3, 1945.

It is now six weeks since the inauguration of Japan's first post-war political party. During that time four principal parties, Progressive, Liberal, Social Democratic and Communist, have emerged and approximately thirty-five minor groups have announced their entry into the political arena. The present session of the Diet has provided a stage for action by present political leaders. The public, through the press and Diet interpellations, has thus had some opportunity to judge personalities and platforms.

It may then be not premature to take stock of the present political situation in Japan and to examine the role which the political parties are now playing and may be expected to play in the future.

Ideologies. Japan as a defeated nation is groping for a new ideology, for a new foundation to replace the shattered one constructed so carefully and deliberately during the years of military ascendancy. Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration has committed the nation to democracy and, it can be said, the Japanese are in general sincere in their desire to fulfill the terms which they have accepted. At the same time it is natural that each class of society will try to salvage its own particular interests or will try to reap advantage from the new situation. Political parties can be expected to represent these particular interests.

It is apparent that the economic revolution which Japan is experiencing will of itself bring about a complete social reorientation. The loss of colonial possessions, destruction of war industries, dissolution of the Zaibatsu, and removal of controls necessitate new thinking and a new ideology.

In this chaotic situation there is encouragement for the Socialists and Communists. With the old discredited, the untried new is attractive. Furthermore, Socialism and Communism are positive and concrete. Liberalism is vaguer, harder to define, and does not have the attractiveness of appearing to be a panacea.

This does not mean, however, that Japan is likely to experience a sudden surge of Communism, although Communism is certain to grow. The hold of the Emperor upon his people is still strong, and those who advocate his overthrow are not likely to exert great influence for some time to come. Large groups of the Japanese people, particularly the farmers, are still basically conservative in their outlook. The old line politicians are mostly representative of conservative groups and will certainly fight a rear-guard action against

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drastic reform, going no further than they feel compelled to. Finally, the strongly conservative bureaucrats cannot be summarily dismissed because their technical skill and experience is as yet irreplaceable.

The principal objective of the occupation is a reasonably swift but orderly development of genuine democratic ideology. It is to be expected that social legislation to this end will receive considerable attention during the next few years. The labor union and agrarian reform laws are a start. But for some time, because of American pressure, legislation will probably be ahead of the actual political development of the people.

At the present time the main deterrents to such a speedy and orderly development toward democracy seem to be: (1) economic insecurity; (2) general deterioration of morals; and (3) lack of leadership. So far the political parties have offered little hope of solving any of these three problems.

Economic Insecurity. Economic insecurity may be a deterrent to political development or it may, at a later stage, become a violent revolutionary force. At present the problems of livelihood on the level of bare existence absorb the activities of most of the as yet politically uneducated Japanese people to the exclusion of political thought. The shortage of food and coal affects the life of every Japanese. Furthermore, the Government has so far failed to give even the appearance of doing all possible to solve Japan's economic problems or to cope satisfactorily with such practical problems as housing for air raid victims. The political parties themselves have talked of security of livelihood more for the purpose of getting votes than on a practical basis of workable plans. The Japanese people have come more and more to look to SCAP for positive action.

This situation has great dangers for the future. Severe economic suffering without reasonable hope for future security is likely to breed unrest and violence and push democracy into the realm of pure theory. A desperate and hungry populace confronted with the obvious failure of the Government and older political leaders may provide a fertile ground for the demagogue and agitator for extreme views, either right or left.

Morale. It may be expected that a nation without experience of defeat should suffer moral collapse when a war has been lost. Until democracy or some new ideology takes root in the Japanese soil the people are lost creatures, their old faiths, religions and moral security broken. Crime is increasing. Disillusioned soldiers returned from an inglorious war turn quickly to black market operations instead of steady, constructive toil. The traditional Japanese sense of responsibility is shaken by the spectacle of Tojo-selected Diet members squabbling over the wording of a resolution to save their political skins on the issue of war responsibility. All thirty-five of the new political parties proclaim democracy from signboards and public halls, but not one has yet produced a testament of democratic faith to inspire the confidence of the people. The Asahi in an editorial commenting on the suicide of Prince KONOYE, after deploring the behaviour of Japan's public men, concludes on this pessimistic note: "The feeling gradually deepens that Japan is a doomed country without morals."

Leadership. Japan is bankrupt in leadership. Statesmen of pre-1931 days

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1931 days are superannuated, out-moded, lacking the flexibility of mind necessary to meet new, pressing and unprecedented problems. Statesmen with recent experience are either war criminals or to some degree involved in war responsibility.

Ideologically the political parties should produce the leaders of a new Japan. They should become the training schools for vigorous young Japanese rising to meet the challenge of the present day. Unfortunately, such time has not yet come nor is there faith in the nation that it will come soon.

For the present we must be satisfied with those leaders least tainted by war. If the wheels turn with relative smoothness, new talent may arise and men of Cabinet calibre should be more evident a year from now than today.

The Future. The present Diet session has revealed the inertia, lack of initiative and incapacity of the present Diet members. It is natural that a representative legislative body functions lamely and nervously with the axe of war criminal charges hanging over it. It is natural that politicians elected in 1942 to give all-out support to a war of Greater East Asia act inefficiently in 1945 when faced with the problems of defeat and the duty of establishing democracy.

Government in Japan has become increasingly a matter of directive from SCAP rather than acts initiated by the Japanese Cabinet or Diet. While the press has bitterly criticized the Government for failure to act on its own initiative, it has become evident that in the present negative political state directives from the Supreme Commander are welcomed by Japan's impotent leaders.

Once the war criminals have been arrested and removal completed of the influence upon Japanese life of militarists and ultra-nationalists responsible for the war, attention might increasingly be turned toward a gradual process of building in Japan a sound political foundation for the future. It is suggested that SCAP give careful consideration to sifting and investigating those Japanese who may be trusted to direct their nation in accordance with the objectives we have set for the occupation. It is suggested that the selection of such persons is of the utmost importance for the future. It is suggested that a systematic survey be conducted to determine those persons within and without the political parties who may be expected to contribute constructively to Japan's democratization. It is suggested that informal contact between responsible American officials and these Japanese be encouraged and that every effort be expended toward the education of these persons in the democratic ideals held out for Japan. The American Government now bears a great burden of responsibility for Japan. This responsibility will not be completely acquitted unless the destruction of the evil forces in Japan is counterbalanced by the construction of a sound political foundation upon which a hopeful future can be built.

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George Atcheson, Jr.
Minister
U.S. Political Adviser

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 15, 1945.

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CONFIDENTIALPOLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE
WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 15, 1945

Summary. The Social Democratic Party increased its representation in the Diet to seventeen members with the adherence of WATANABE Yasukuni, independent. Intra-party controversy on the Emperor question was aired in the press with the publication of an open letter to the Yomiuri-Hochi by ONO Shunichi, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and himself editor of the Minshu Shimbun. ONO objected to the recent decision by the Standing Committee to refuse a united front with the Communists and support the Imperial institution. Reply to ONO's letter was duly made in the columns of the Yomiuri upbraiding him for criticizing his own party publicly. It is as yet uncertain whether ONO will leave the party or whether left wing elements will split to join the Communists. The Progressives have still been unable to agree upon a president and it appears now that General UGAKI will definitely not accept party leadership, at least not until after the coming elections. Latest indications were that MACHIDA Chuji or SAITO Takao, both veteran parliamentarians, might be chosen. In the meantime the press has bitterly attacked the Progressives for their war responsibility and unfitness for leadership in the present situation. TOKUDA Kyuichi and SHIGA Yoshio, leaders of the Communist Party, stated to American correspondent Edgar Snow in an interview on December 12 that the present membership of their party was 1700 with an expected increase to 5000 within a year. Circulation of the fifth and latest issue of the Red Flag was said to be 90,000. The formation of one new party was announced during the week, the Peoples Cooperation Party (Kokumin Kyodo-to) organized by twenty independent Diet members. Plans for other parties included a party to represent Buddhist sects, the Long-Nosed Dragon Party (Tengu-to) proclaiming support of the Emperor and attack on the privileged classes, and the Holy Peace Party (Seiwa-to) to be organized in Osaka by rightist elements, followers of SASAKAWA Ryoichi who was recently arrested as a war criminal suspect. End of Summary.

Activities of the Social Democratic Party

The original group of fifteen Diet members affiliated with the Social Democratic Party has now been increased to seventeen with the joining this week of WATANABE Yasukuni, independent of Hokkaido.

A split within the Social Democratic Party over the Emperor question was threatened by an open letter published in the Yomiuri-Hochi by ONO Shunichi, member of the Central Executive Committee, protesting the action of the Standing Committee on December 14 in supporting the Imperial institution and rejecting the Communist proposal for a united front. At this time the Committee had referred to their platform approved at inauguration meeting on November 2 as authority for support

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of the Emperor. ONO, who is a well known physiologist and publisher of a newspaper of leftist tendencies, the Minshu Shimbun, insisted that the Standing Committee did not possess the right to decide such an important issue without consultation with members of the party. ONO demanded answers to three questions: (1) Is the Standing Committee authorized to take a decision on such an important issue without referring it to other representative organizations within the party and to compel members of the Central Executive Committee to follow the decision? (2) Does the Standing Committee hold the view that such members of the party as are opposed to the decision are thereby disqualified to remain in the party irrespective of the reasons for their opposition? (3) When, where and how did the party make the statement on the Emperor system to which the Standing Committee referred? ONO insisted that the only official statement made by the party which might be construed as referring to the Imperial institution was the phrase in the general platform announced at the inaugural meeting of the party stating that the party stands for "democratization of the Constitution on the basis of the total will of the people." ONO objected to what he termed the dictatorial methods of a few leaders trying to impose their will on the entire party.

A spokesman for the Social Democrats first announced that the party would ignore ONO's protest but this decision was later reversed and a letter signed by HARA Hyo, chairman of the investigation section of the Central Executive Standing Committee, appeared in the Yomiuri-Hochi on December 15. The letter did not offer specific replies to the three questions propounded by ONO but rather reproached him, as a member of the Central Executive Committee, for having used the newspaper as a medium for expressing his disagreement with a party policy. The Standing Committee's right to take decisions on all question, regardless of the degree of their importance, was defended and the example of orders in council in Great Britain was cited as a democratic precedent and practice.

The controversy has highlighted the discrepancy of view of the vital Emperor issue within the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. While efforts are being made to keep ONO in the party and to prevent a split just before the elections, there is no doubt that a number of party members sympathize with ONO's viewpoint and are not satisfied with the Standing Committee's decision to support the Emperor system and to reject cooperation with the Communists.

The press reported on December 14 that 213 members of the Social Democratic Party have notified party headquarters of their intention to run as candidates in the coming general election. Each candidate must be approved by the Standing Committee after recommendation by prefectural headquarters. After a meeting of the Election Committee on December 14, headed by KATAYAMA Tetsu and HIRANO Rikizo, it was announced that from 150 to 200 candidates would enter the elections for the party. In general the number of party candidates in each constituency will reach one third of the total number of Diet members to be elected. In districts where the party enjoys particular strength, such as Tokyo metropolitan district and Hyogo prefecture, candidates will number half the total to be elected from the district.

The Social Democratic Party has so far received more sympathetic publicity from the press than the other major political parties. For example, the Mainichi in editorial which foresees the bankruptcy of

capitalism

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capitalism in Japan stated on December 14 as follows:

"While both the Progressive and Liberal parties have pointed out the necessity for a reform of capitalism, they have scarcely touched upon any concrete policy for carrying out such reform. On the other hand the Social Democratic Party proposes the substitution of socialism for capitalism and advocates nationalization of heavy and other industries. While there numerous points in the party's policy which have not been clarified, still its general outlines seem to follow the inevitable demands of the present situation. However, its political future to be determined in the coming general elections will depend upon the personalities of its candidates, and how successfully its policies are impressed upon the masses of the nation."

Activities of the Progressive Party

The issue of a president for the Progressive Party continued to haunt the minds of its leaders. General UGAKI at one moment seemed to be a likely candidate but he is reported to have refused all offers. Both Tokyo Shimbun and Yomiuri-Hochi have in the past week editorialized on UGAKI, damning him with faint praise as a liberal and branding him as bearing responsibility for the war as a high ranking Army officer. The Tokyo Shimbun remarks that he is nearing eighty years of age and lacks the necessary qualifications for the problems of the present day.

Opinion has been gaining ground that either MACHIDA Chuji or SAITO Takao would become leader of the Progressives since no agreement had been possible on any other political figure. Needed for the presidency is a man with political prestige to maintain unity within the party and ability to raise campaign funds. Difficulty in finding a suitable occupant for the position has increased with growing uncertainty as to the party's future, in view of the war guilt and war responsibility questions. It has now been announced that the question of the presidency will be formally decided at a meeting of Progressive members of the Diet on December 17.

The press continued to aim its darts at the Progressives. The Asahi in an editorial on December 15 stated that the majority of Diet members, nominated by the TOJO Government in the "Imperial Rule Assistance" election of 1942, are in no way fitted to represent the people in a new democratic Japan. The editorial continued:

"It was natural that the Political Association of Great Japan should be dissolved, but the political parties formed by the majority of Diet members have simply repainted their signs and enjoy not the slightest confidence of the people as a whole. What classes of the people will support the so-called Progressive and Liberal parties is completely unknown. The position of the Social Democratic Party is a little clearer but it still does not represent the will of organized farmers or laborers.

The Yomiuri-Hochi on December 10 savagely attacked the Progressive Party as follows:

"The Progressive

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"The Progressive Party opposed the war responsibility resolution of the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties, pushing through with their majority power a weak-kneed, vague, escapist statement of 'repentant' responsibility. The fact that Allied Headquarters has named some of their important leaders as war criminals reveals fraudulence....They have been unable to select a leader. KONOYE could not be chosen after he was named as a war criminal suspect..SHIBUSAWA is one of the Zai-batsu tainted with war responsibility...UGAKI opposed certain of the military cliques but was a henchman of Field Marshal SUGIYAMA, who committed suicide, and General KOISO, arrested as a war criminal....This majority party charged with the honor of carrying out a democratic revolution takes such ill-considered action and takes no step to reform itself. The masses of the people are certainly determined to oppose such an attitude. The Progressive Party would do well to reflect deeply before the people take action themselves."

Activities of Other Parties

The Communist Party has announced that it has established a committee to investigate war crimes and to name war criminals. This committee will presumably add further names to the list of approximately 1300 designated at the recent Party Congress and duly presented to Headquarters.

Estimates of Communist Party membership increase at a rapid rate. SHIGA Yoshio stated to the writer on December 2 that the party had enrolled 1200 members; the press reports that on December 12, SHIGA and TOKUDA, in an interview with Edgar Snow, set the party membership at 1700. Circulation figures for the Communist publication, Red Flag, were, according to the Yomiuri, given to Snow as follows: First issue: 10,000; second issue: 11,000; ~~third~~ and fourth issue: 30,000; fifth issue: 90,000. No more than one-third the demand is said to be satisfied by the present circulation and SHIGA estimated that if sufficient paper supplies could be obtained, 200,000 copies could easily be disposed of.

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The press reports that Buddhist groups are interesting themselves in the coming elections and may form a political party or parties and offer candidates for Diet seats. Plans for the organization of the Long-Nosed Dragon Party (Tengu-to) have been announced. The party supports the Emperor system but wishes to abolish the Privy Council, the House of Peers, and the "privileged classes". Its leaders are nonentities and the actual nature of the party still remains obscure.

Undaunted by the arrest of SASAKAWA Ryoichi, rightist leader of the former Kokusui-to, followers of SASAKAWA in Osaka are said to be

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John K. Emmerson
Foreign Service Officer

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 114 of December 18, 1945 from
the Acting United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan,
on the subject "Political Parties in Japan: Developments
during the Week Ending December 15, 1945".

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Supreme Commander.

SUBJECT: Developments of Political Parties in Japan for the Week
Ending December 15, 1945.

There is transmitted hereunder our tenth weekly report on
Japanese political parties submitted pursuant to the Chief of
Staff's memorandum of October 3, 1945.

It is now six weeks since the inauguration of Japan's first
post-war political party. During that time four principal parties,
Progressive, Liberal, Social Democratic and Communist, have emerged
and approximately thirty-five minor groups have announced their en-
try into the political arena. The present session of the Diet has
provided a stage for action by present political leaders. The pub-
lic, through the press and Diet interpellations, has thus had some
opportunity to judge personalities and platforms.

It may then be not premature to take stock of the present poli-
tical situation in Japan and to examine the role which the political
parties are now playing and may be expected to play in the future.

Ideologies. Japan as a defeated nation is groping for a new
ideology, for a new foundation to replace the shattered one construc-
ted so carefully and deliberately during the years of military ascea-
dancy. Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration has committed the nation
to democracy and, it can be said, the Japanese are in general sincere
in their desire to fulfill the terms which they have accepted. At the
same time it is natural that each class of society will try to salvage
its own particular interests or will try to reap advantage from the
new situation. Political parties can be expected to represent these
particular interests.

It is apparent that the economic revolution which Japan is ex-
periencing will of itself bring about a complete social reorienta-
tion. The loss of colonial possessions, destruction of war indus-
tries, dissolution of the Emibatsu, and removal of controls neces-
sitate new thinking and a new ideology.

In this chaotic situation there is encouragement for the Social-
ists and Communists. With the old discredited, the untried new is
attractive. Furthermore, Socialism and Communism are positive and
concrete. Liberalism is vaguer, harder to define, and does not have
the attractiveness of appearing to be a panacea.

This does not mean, however, that Japan is likely to experience
a sudden surge of Communism, although Communism is certain to grow.
The hold of the Emperor upon his people is still strong, and those
who advocate his overthrow are not likely to exert great influence
for some time to come. Large groups of the Japanese people, parti-
cularly the farmers, are still basically conservative in their out-
look. The old line politicians are mostly representative of conser-
vative groups and will certainly fight a rear-guard action against

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drastic reform going no further than they feel compelled to. Finally, the strongly conservative bureaucrats cannot be summarily dismissed because their technical skill and experience is as yet irreplaceable.

The principal objective of the occupation is a reasonably swift but orderly development of genuine democratic ideology. It is to be expected that social legislation to this end will receive considerable attention during the next few years. The labor union and agrarian reform laws are a start. But for some time, because of American pressure, legislation will probably be ahead of the actual political development of the people.

At the present time the main deterrents to such a speedy and orderly development toward democracy seem to be: (1) economic insecurity; (2) general deterioration of morals; and (3) lack of leadership. So far the political parties have offered little hope of solving any of these three problems.

Economic Insecurity. Economic insecurity may be a deterrent to political development or it may, at a later stage, become a violent revolutionary force. At present the problems of livelihood on the level of bare existence absorb the activities of most of the as yet politically uneducated Japanese people to the exclusion of political thought. The shortage of food and coal affects the life of every Japanese. Furthermore, the Government has so far failed to give even the appearance of doing all possible to solve Japan's economic problems or to cope satisfactorily with such practical problems as housing for air raid victims. The political parties themselves have talked of security of livelihood more for the purpose of getting votes than on a practical basis of workable plans. The Japanese people have come more and more to look to SCAP for positive action.

This situation has great dangers for the future. Severe economic suffering without reasonable hope for future security is likely to breed unrest and violence and push democracy into the realm of pure theory. A desperate and hungry populace confronted with the obvious failure of the Government and older political leaders may provide a fertile ground for the demagogue and agitator for extreme views, either right or left.

Morals. It may be expected that a nation without experience of defeat should suffer moral collapse when a war has been lost. Until democracy or some new ideology takes root in the Japanese soil the people are lost creatures, their old faiths, religions and moral security broken. Crime is increasing. Disillusioned soldiers returned from an inglorious war turn quickly to black market operations instead of steady, constructive toil. The traditional Japanese sense of responsibility is shaken by the spectacle of Tojo-selected Diet members squabbling over the wording of a resolution to save their political skins on the issue of war responsibility. All thirty-five of the new political parties proclaim democracy from signboards and public halls, but not one has yet produced a testament of democratic faith to inspire the confidence of the people. The Asahi in an editorial commenting on the suicide of Prince KONOYE, after deploring the behaviour of Japan's public men, concludes on this pessimistic note: "The feeling gradually deepens that Japan is a doomed country without morals."

Leadership. Japan is bankrupt in leadership. Statesmen of pre-1931 days

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1931 days are superannuated, out-moded, lacking the flexibility of mind necessary to meet new, pressing and unprecedented problems. Statesmen with recent experience are either war criminals or to some degree involved in war responsibility.

Ideologically the political parties should produce the leaders of a new Japan. They should become the training schools for vigorous young Japanese rising to meet the challenge of the present day. Unfortunately, such time has not yet come nor is there faith in the nation that it will come soon.

For the present we must be satisfied with those leaders least tainted by war. If the wheels turn with relative smoothness, new talent may arise and men of Cabinet calibre should be more evident a year from now than today.

The Future. The present Diet session has revealed the inertia, lack of initiative and incapacity of the present Diet members. It is natural that a representative legislative body functions lamely and nervously with the axe of war criminal charges hanging over it. It is natural that politicians elected in 1942 to give all-out support to a war of Greater East Asia act inefficiently in 1945 when faced with the problems of defeat and the duty of establishing democracy.

Government in Japan has become increasingly a matter of directive from SCAP rather than acts initiated by the Japanese Cabinet or Diet. While the press has bitterly criticized the Government for failure to act on its own initiative, it has become evident that in the present negative political state directives from the Supreme Commander are welcomed by Japan's impotent leaders.

Once the war criminals have been arrested and removal completed of the influence upon Japanese life of militarists and ultra-nationalists responsible for the war, attention might increasingly be turned toward a gradual process of building in Japan a sound political foundation for the future. It is suggested that SCAP give careful consideration to sifting and investigating those Japanese who may be trusted to direct their nation in accordance with the objectives we have set for the occupation. It is suggested that the selection of such persons is of the utmost importance for the future. It is suggested that a systematic survey be conducted to determine those persons within and without the political parties who may be expected to contribute constructively to Japan's democratization. It is suggested that informal contact between responsible American officials and these Japanese be encouraged and that every effort be expended toward the education of these persons in the democratic ideals held out for Japan. The American Government now bears a great burden of responsibility for Japan. This responsibility will not be completely acquitted unless the destruction of the evil forces in Japan is counterbalanced by the construction of a sound political foundation upon which a hopeful future can be built.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Minister
U.S. Political Adviser

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 15, 1945.

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POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE

WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 15, 1945

Summary. The Social Democratic Party increased its representation in the Diet to 17 members with the adherence of WATANABE Yasukuni, independent. Intra-party controversy on the Emperor question was aired in the press with the publication of an open letter to the Yomiuri-Hochi by ONO Shunichi, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and himself editor of the Minshu Shimbun. ONO objected to the recent decision by the Standing Committee to refuse a united front with the Communists and support the Imperial institution. Reply to ONO's letter was duly made in the columns of the Yomiuri upbraiding him for criticizing his own party publicly. It is as yet uncertain whether ONO will leave the party or whether left wing elements will split to join the Communists. The Progressives have still been unable to agree upon a president and it appears now that General UGAKI will definitely not accept party leadership, at least not until after the coming elections. Latest indications were that MACHIDA Chuji or SAITO Takao, both veteran parliamentarians, might be chosen. In the meantime the press has bitterly attacked the Progressives for their war responsibility and unfitness for leadership in the present situation. TOKUDA Kuichi and SHIGA Yoshio, leaders of the Communist Party, stated to American correspondent Edgar Snow in an interview on December 12 that the present membership of their party was 1700 with an expected increase to 5000 within a year. Circulation of the 5th and latest issue of the Red Flag was said to be 90,000. The formation of one new party was announced during the week, the Peoples Cooperation Party (Kokumin Kyodo-to) organized by 20 independent Diet members. Plans for other parties included a party to represent Buddhist sects, the Long-Nosed Dragon Party (Tengu-to) proclaiming support of the Emperor and attack on the privileged classes, and the Holy Peace Party (Seiwa-to) to be organized in Osaka by rightists elements, followers of SASAKAWA Ryoichi who was recently arrested as a war criminal suspect.

End of Summary.

Activities of the Social Democratic Party

The original group of 15 Diet members affiliated with the Social Democratic Party has now been increased to 17 with the joining this week of WATANABE Yasukuni, independent of Hokkaido.

A split within the Social Democratic Party over the Emperor question was threatened by an open letter published in the Yomiuri-Hochi by ONO Shunichi, member of the Central Executive Committee, protesting the action of the Standing Committee on December 4 in supporting the Imperial institution and rejecting the Communist proposal for a united front. At this time the Committee had referred to their platform approved at the inauguration meeting on November 2 as authority for support of the Emperor. ONO, who is a well known physiologist and publisher of a newspaper of leftist tendencies, the Minshu Shimbun, insisted that the Standing Committee did not possess the right to decide

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such an important issue without consultation with members of the party. ONO demanded answers to three questions: (1) Is the Standing Committee authorized to take a decision on such an important issue without referring it to other representative organizations within the party and to compel members of the Central Executive Committee to follow the decision? (2) Does the Standing Committee hold the view that such members of the party as are opposed to the decision are thereby disqualified to remain in the party irrespective of the reasons for their opposition? (3) When, where and how did the party make the statement on the Emperor system to which the Standing Committee referred? ONO insisted that the only official statement made by the party which might be construed as referring to the Imperial institution was the phrase in the general platform announced at the inaugural meeting of the party stating that the party stands for "democratization of the Constitution on the basis of the total will of the people." ONO objected to what he termed the dictatorial methods of a few leaders trying to impose their will on the entire party.

A spokesman for the Social Democrats at first announced that the party would ignore ONO's protest but this decision was later reversed and a letter signed by HARA Hyo, chairman of the investigation section of the Central Executive Standing Committee, appeared in the Yomiuri-Hochi on December 15. The letter did not offer specific replies to the three questions propounded by ONO but rather reproached him, as a member of the Central Executive Committee, for having used the newspaper as a medium for expressing his disagreement with a party policy. The Standing Committee's right to take decisions on all questions, regardless of the degree of their importance, was defended and the example of orders in council in Great Britain was cited as a democratic precedent and practice.

The controversy has highlighted the discrepancy of view of the vital Emperor issue within the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. While efforts are being made to keep ONO in the party and to prevent a split just before the elections, there is no doubt that a number of party members sympathize with ONO's viewpoint and are not satisfied with the Standing Committee's decision to support the Emperor system and to reject cooperation with the Communists.

The press reported on December 14 that 213 members of the Social Democratic Party have notified party headquarters of their intention to run as candidates in the coming general election. Each candidate must be approved by the Standing Committee after recommendation by prefectural headquarters. After a meeting of the Election Committee on December 14, headed by KATAYAMA Tetsu and HIRANO Rikizo, it was announced that from 150 to 200 candidates would enter the elections for the party. In general the number of party candidates in each constituency will reach one third of the total number of Diet members to be elected. In districts where the party enjoys particular strength, such as Tokyo metropolitan district and Hyogo prefecture, candidates will number half the total to be elected from the district.

The Social Democratic Party has so far received more sympathetic publicity from the press than the other major political parties. For example, the Mainichi in editorial which foresees the bankruptcy of capitalism in Japan stated on December 14 as follows:

"While both the Progressive and Liberal parties have pointed out the necessity for a reform of capitalism, they have scarcely touched upon any concrete policy for carrying out

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John K. Emerson
Foreign Service Officer

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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4-1-52 HCL*

FORM DS-507
3-5-47

REQUEST FOR DECLASSIFICATION OR DOWNGRADING

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECTION A

TO: 1. ORIGINATING OR ACTION DIVISION FE		EXTENSION 2951	BUILDING NS	ROOM NO. 3151
2. REQUESTER'S NAME Wilson C. Flake		DIVISION FE	EXTENSION 4834	BUILDING NS
3. DIVISION OF RECORD: DC/R, REF, PD, etc.		DC/R		

SECTION B

ATTACHED
THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED DOCUMENT APPEARS TO NO LONGER WARRANT ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE OF DOCUMENT
Despatch No. 114

TO:
The Secretary of State DATE
12-18-45

FROM:
George Acheson, Jr., USPOLAD TOKYO

SUBJECT:
Political Parties in Japan: Developments during the week ending 12-14-45.
File No. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-1845

PRESENT CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION C

THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.

RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION

CHANGE TO:
 TOP SECRET* SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIED
**(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).*

BY AUTHORITY OF:
U. Alexis Johnson *[Signature]* DATE 2/1/52 OFFICE OF ASS'T SECY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SECTION D

INSTRUCTIONS— (1) The requesting division will complete lines (1) and (2) of Section A and all of Section B of this form in duplicate.
 (2) Both copies of this form, with one copy of the document or documents to be downgraded or declassified, will be forwarded to the action or originating division concerned with the document attached where practicable.
 (3) The action or originating division will, if the contents warrant, declassify or downgrade the document by completing Section C of this form in duplicate and routing both copies to the division responsible for maintaining the official record copy.
 (4) The division that is the custodian of the record copy, upon receipt of this form, will file the original of Form DS-507, change the classification on the record copy of the document involved, and forward the duplicate copy of this form to the division initiating the request.
 (5) The division which initiated the request will note the action taken, make the necessary changes in classification of documents in its possession, and then route the duplicate of Form DS-507 to the Chief, Division of Security and Investigations (CSA).
 (6) In cases where the originating or action division wishes to initiate the declassification, the entire form will be completed and routed to the division maintaining the official record copy.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
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SECTION A	
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SECTION C	
THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH THIS FORM IS ADDRESSED OR A PERSON DESIGNATED BY HIM WILL REVIEW THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THE DESIRED CLASSIFICATION.	
RETAIN PRESENT CLASSIFICATION <input type="checkbox"/>	CHANGE TO: <input type="checkbox"/> TOP SECRET* <input type="checkbox"/> SECRET <input type="checkbox"/> CONFIDENTIAL <input type="checkbox"/> RESTRICTED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED <small>*(If reclassified to a higher classification explain on reverse side).</small>
BY AUTHORITY OF: U. Alexis Johnson <i>U. Alexis Johnson</i>	DATE 2/1/52
OFFICE OF ASS'T SECY FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS	
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-1945

DEC 19 1945

TOP SECRET

No. *38*

To the
Acting United States Political Adviser to
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
American Embassy Building,
Tokyo.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the
information of the Acting Political Adviser copies of
SWNCC papers, as listed below.

Enclosures:

1. SWNCC 16/8, copy no. 45.
2. SWNCC 92/1, copy no. 45.
3. Decision amending SWNCC 221/3, copy no. 45.
4. Minutes of Far East Subcommittee meeting of 17 December, copy no. 23.

A true copy of the original.

CR ✓ SKM
DEC 18 1945

FE:JKPenfield:hst
12-18-45

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JA

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Confidential File 740.00119 Control (Japan) / 12-1945



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Yokohama Branch of the Office
of the U.S. Political Adviser
% Hdqrs. Eighth Army, APO 343
Yokohama, Japan
December 19, 1945

Unrestricted

Subject: Request for Copies of Mimeographed Instructions

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington

Sir:

*DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dist. to Yokohama
File
mailed 1/14/46
Chief, Div. J.A.A.S.
Foreign Service Administration*

The Foreign Service Officer in charge has the honor to refer to his unnumbered despatch of December 11, 1945 requesting copies of mimeographed instructions subsequent to Diplomatic Serial 3393 of September 16, 1941.

This office has now received from the Department Foreign Service Serials 1 to 416 inclusive. Current Foreign Service Serials beginning with no. 458 of November 1, 1945 have also been received. It would therefore be appreciated if copies of nos. 417 to 457 inclusive, in particular no. 440 of September 28, 1945, were transmitted to this office by air pouch.

UAJohnson:kah

120.2

Distribution

Original and ozalid copy to Department
One copy for files

*Unit
12-19-45
JK*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)

112-1945

*740.00119 Control (Japan)
CS/D
JAN 22 1946
12-1945*

Yokohama Branch of the Office
of the U.S. Political Adviser
% Hdqrs. Eighth Army, APO 343
Yokohama, Japan
December 19, 1945

Unrestricted

Subject: Request for Copies of Mimeographed Instructions

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Washington

Sir:

The Foreign Service Officer in charge has the honor to refer to his unnumbered despatch of December 11, 1945 requesting copies of mimeographed instructions subsequent to Diplomatic Serial 3393 of September 16, 1941.

This office has now received from the Department Foreign Service Serials 1 to 416 inclusive. Current Foreign Service Serials beginning with no. 458 of November 1, 1945 have also been received. It would therefore be appreciated if copies of nos. 417 to 457 inclusive, in particular no. 440 of September 28, 1945, were transmitted to this office by air pouch.

UAJohnson:kah

120.2

Distribution

Original and ozalid copy to Department
One copy for files

JAN 16 1946

UNRESTRICTED

To the

Officer in Charge of the Yokohama Branch Office
of the United States Political Adviser,
Yokohama, Japan

The Acting Secretary of State refers to your
unnumbered despatch dated December 19, 1945, requesting
copies of Foreign Service Serial instructions Nos. 417 to
457 inclusive.

There are enclosed copies of the above requested
circular instructions.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/12-1945

Enclosures:

Copies of Foreign Service
Serial Instructions Nos.
417 to 457 inclusive.

740.00119 Control
Japan/12-1945
CS/6

Anal	DCR NE Unit
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Date	<i>[Signature]</i>
OR	<i>[Signature]</i>
JAN 15 1946	

A true copy of
the original
sent

PA:AATracewell/11

1/14/46

DEC 21 1945

In reply refer to
JK

Dear Mr. Atcheson:

I wish to express on behalf of myself and of the staff of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs our gratitude for the recently inaugurated "Weekly Summaries." They give us the rounded picture of important developments of the week, put in their proper setting, which we have missed so greatly in the daily miscellaneous tidbits in the radios from headquarters. Though primarily political in purpose, the economic paragraphs are of great assistance - don't stop them. This is time well spent from the viewpoint of JK.

XR 740.00119 Control (Harris)

Very sincerely yours,

Edwin M. Martin, Chief
Division of Japanese and
Korean Economic Affairs

DCR	NE Unit
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Cat.	<i>W</i>
Dist.	

The Honorable
George T. Atcheson, Jr.,
Acting Political Adviser to the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers,
Tokyo, Japan.

DEC 18 1945
DEC 21 1945

JK:EMMartin:lmc

JAWIT

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2145
2145

*740.00119 Control
12-2145*

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~JA~~
ACTION COPY

A-D
M. Decker

ACTION: FE
INFO:
S PFM -G
U No paraphrase necessary
C

9250

Tokyo via War

Dated December 21, 1945

Rec'd 2:27 p.m., 28th

A-D
A-C **SECRET**
A-B
SA/M
EUR-X Secretary of State,
DC/L-C


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Washington.

PRIORITY

216, Dec 21 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Thirtieth November through twentieth December



political summary.

LEGISLATURE (DIET): The government defended its policies strongly and shows up favorably compared with Diet. Though the press criticized both bitterly, the government for being dilatory and holding on to outworn concepts and the diet for being responsible for the war and shallow, a slight rise in stature by the government seemed evident and it is currently expected to survive the elections. There was real reluctance noticeable in a government spokesman to completely abandon the paternalistic, authoritarian elements of Japan's system of government, or according to genuine party government principles to give up to the new Diet all power. The

Premier

WMS
12/29/45
113
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF JAPAN AFFAIRS
DEC 29 1945

SECRET

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/12-2145

Confidential File

AM - 1016

SECRET

-2- #216, Dec 21 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Tokyo via War.

Premier implies that officials of the high court would continue to select future Premiers, and refused a promise that after elections the government would step down. There was a prediction by the Constitutional Commission of Revision chairman that the powers and technical sovereignty of the Emperor would go on unchanged, and stated that due to the danger of dictatorship by the majority inherent in a government of and by the people, Japan required one for the people which would reflect and respect the popular will. Although stating that revision was needed of points which might be misinterpreted, the opinion was repeated by the Premier that the present constitution was consistent to the democracy of Japan.

LEGISLATION: Labor, the election, lesser bills, and land were given consideration after wrangling about responsibility for the war, which ended in a weak resolution by the Progressive Party that his own conscience should guide the actions of each. Without any change of importance an amendment to the election law passed the Privy Council and both Houses. Apparently both the Agrarian and Labor bills are being intentionally deferred until the next session.

SECRET

SECRET

-3- #216, Dec 21 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Tokyo via War. session due to opposition is strengthened especially to the Agrarian bill, changed when SCAP issued reform order. A four day extension through 18 December was given the session, so that approval might be secured to the slightly changed form bill and unchanged labor bill.

It is expected that a Ministry of Labor will be established very soon. Among others passage was secured for bills on the silk industry, revision of agricultural organization, supplementary budget, and approval of provisions of accepting Potsdam Agreement ex post facto, as well as a resolution to reform the judiciary.

DIRECTIVES OF SCAP: Although the farm experts and press expressed grave doubt about possibility of solving basic problems of the farm, the order reforming land system was well received. The order making a private religion of Shinto was calmly received since it was expected in advance. Not long before, rebuilding was halted by Emperor of Ise Shrine, and Yasukuni Shrine transferred by government to private management. Encouragement to hasten conversion was given industrialists by an order that made clear those plants that do not need the approval

SECRET

SECRET

-4- #216, Dec 21 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Tokyo via War.
the approval of SCAP before production is resumed and those that do. In effort to secure maximum production of coal, a definite program was ordered from the government. Before any budget bill is turned over to the Diet in the future it must be approved by SCAP. Until their holdings are transferred, 326 companies allied with Z-ibatsu have had their activities restricted. Yen may not be issued or printed unless SCAP approves. A relief plan on war sufferers and unemployment must be submitted by the government for first six months of 1946. Persons which by directive of 4 October were released must be again made eligible to hold public office and to vote. Instructions have been given to scientists of Japan to once more seek a solution to nation's problems of peacetime economy.

Repeated to Moscow and Chungking.

ATCHESON

CAD

SECRET

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION: IN

INFO:

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V No paraphrase necessary

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8870

Tokyo via War

Dated December 21, 1945

Rec'd 10:23 P.M., 27th

Washington

216, December 21 (SECTION TWO)

PARTIES: Although embarrassed by war responsibility

charges, arrest of two leaders as war criminals, unremitting press criticism, and difficulty over selection president.

Progressives remained most likely to be returned as majority party. Machida Chuji finally selected as president following

refusals by Shibuzawa and Ugaki. Efforts by leaders to make Premier promise govt will resign following elections

interpreted as attempt to convince dissidents within party that Progressives will furnish new govt if they preserve

unity. Liberals remained quiet. Social Democrats gained two new members present Diet, rejected second Communist

proposal united front. Internal differences brought ^(forth?) fore through open letter by leftist Ono Shunichi protesting

action of standing committee in announcing party support of Emperor institution and declining Communist offer without

obtaining central committee concurrence. Communists

elected

SECRET

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-2-#216, December 21 (SECTION TWO), from Tokyo via War

elected officers at fourth party congress, except Chairmanship CEC, possibly reserved for Okano. Announced list of 1300 war criminals, including Emperor, Empress, Princes. Estimates of party membership rose to 1700. Circulation fifty issue RED FLAG 90,000. New minor political groups continue to appear.

ELECTION: Rescript proclaiming election Jan 20 held up last minute by General MacArthur's order pending review of amended election law. Approximately half present Diet expected to be returned under present conditions eligibility. Progressives, who served virtually as the govt party in Diet session just closed, expected to maintain numerical superiority, challenged by substantial increase Liberals and Social Democrats. Communists expected to acquire two or three seats. Only one woman, Fukuchi Fumino, member Japan Peoples Party, has announced candidacy but other expected. November census revealed 20.9 million women eligible to vote, and 18.9 million men eligible to vote, with fragmentary polls indicating only one-third eligible women planning to exercise new privilege. Little indication increasing interest political development

SECRET

SECRET

-3-#216, December 21 (SECTION TWO), from Tokyo via War

development on part of general public.

FOOD: Removal price ceilings on perishables resulted in marked increases in supply. City and town consumers cooperatives, utilizing the neighborhood associations structure, linked to producers cooperatives in farming and fishing villages, are proving effective in alleviating food distribution difficulties. Official estimate current rice crop revised downward to 42.9 million koku with possibility further reduction rice ration if farmers continue withhold rice from market. Govt stated prepared provide goods worth 478,000,000 yen this year, 2,522,000,000 yen next year as collateral for food import. Understanding reached with SCAP for charter 21 American vessels aggregating 61,800 tons for food imports from Far East ports. Rightist National Federation of Toilers proposed estimated 5 million holders gold, silver, jeweled decorations surrender same toward purchase of food. Agriculture Minister announced plans to settle 100,000 families on 535,000 acres of former army and private land by March 31.

COAL: Coal shortage became more acute with further depletion

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SECRET

-4-#216, December 21 (SECTION TWO), from Tokyo via War

depletion stocks and only slight increase in production and had serious effects on production and distribution essential products. Railroad reduced passenger service by half, freight by two-thirds December 15. 7,000 employees railways and various industrial concerns volunteered for work in mines but labor shortage only slightly alleviated and govt was reluctant to adopt labor draft as recalling military methods. Govt sought SCAP permission to import 100,000 koku rice solely for coal miners as production incentive.

REPARATION: Pauley interim reparation removals program considered severe by Japs, especially use of 1930 production figures as basis national requirements, but generally admitted fair and valued as concrete indication Allied intentions and industrial control plans. Govt reported planning appeal to SCAP for permission retain 400,000 tons minimum essential shipbuilding capacity. Plans for establishment Reparation Liaison Commission under chairmanship Foreign Minister, and draft of reparation law to enforce payments in kind, expected next Diet.

PRESS AND RADIO: 10-week YOMIURI employee strike ended with capitulation President Shoriki ~~stomping~~ prior to his entering

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-5-#216, December 21 (SECTION TWO), from Tokyo via War

his entering taint as war criminal suspect, heralded as
~~Victory for Free Press and Labor Movements~~. Settlement
included formal recognition of striking employees union and
establishment of management council including employee
representatives. Baba Tdunego, columnist of liberal reputa-
tion, became new president. Semi-tabloid peoples daily
(MINPO) established in Tokyo with editorial policy somewhere
between Socialists and Communists. Main sheet editorial
indicated intention to support Social Democratic Party.

THRONE: Imperial Household Council decided demobilized
member imperial family, previously restricted to military
careers, might enter any reputable occupation. MINPO argued
war responsible Emperor should abdicate. Minister Matsumoto
stated in Diet govt not considering Emperor abdication
because he has no war responsibility. Shidehara declared
Emperor indispensable as conductor great orchestra. Educa-
tion Ministry official declare students in accordance Shinto
directive will no longer be told to regard Emperor as
divinity but may be object of reverence. Free Lawyers
Association head opposed govt plan to replace portraits of
Emperor

SECRET

SECRET

-6-#216, December 21, (SECTION TWO), from Tokyo via War

Emperor in military uniform. Justice Minister stated people free to advocate abolition Emperor system but derogatory remarks regarding person of Emperor would be prosecuted under lese majeste laws. Procedures established whereby nobles feeling responsibility for the war can renounce their titles. Polls indicate support of Emperor institution, unchanged or variously modified, by all except extreme left wing groups.

PUBLIC ATTITUDE: Past three weeks have produced indications renewed hope and energy on part of Jap people. Change appears attributable partly to the passage of time since shock and discouragement of defeat, partly to assurance food imports and partly to clarification of outlines of not hopeless future. Sports have been revived. Clearing and reconstruction have markedly accelerated. The new year, to which Japs attach particular importance as the time for fresh start, may witness noticeable further revival of Jap spirit and industry.

END OF MESSAGE.

. ATCHESON

WTD

SECRET

NOTE: Delay due to non-receipt.

184

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

File
7-2-46
JA
EA
EE
CC

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT:

Occupation forces in Japan

DATE: December 26, 1945. A-D

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
JUL 2 - 1946
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
A-D
DEC 27 1945
MR. DUNN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PARTICIPANTS:

Colonel Dziuban, OPD, War Department
Mr. Durbrow, EE
Mr. Penfield, FE

DIVISION OF CHINESE
AFFAIRS
DEC 28 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPIES TO:

FE, A-D

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DISTRIBUTION OFFICE
DEC 28 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 27 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Colonel Dziuban called this morning to discuss occupation forces in Japan. He said that the War Department is in a very difficult position because, having no information regarding possible Chinese and Russian participation in the occupation, it is unable to make plans for the number of American troops which will be required in Japan. He explained that it is estimated that by July 1946 a total of about 140,000 men will be required for the occupation, which, under the JCS policy of maintaining a number of American forces at least equal to all other powers combined, would mean a total of 70,000 US troops. It appears that General Northcote (the Australian who is in command of the British Commonwealth forces) in his conversations with General MacArthur has indicated a desire to send slightly over 40,000 Commonwealth troops to Japan. Colonel Dziuban pointed out that if this proposal is accepted and the Russians and Chinese eventually participate on a similar basis there would be well over 100,000 troops in Japan other than American, which would necessitate a substantial increase in the planned American participation.

Colonel Dziuban handed me the attached memorandum and asked whether we could give him answers to the various questions listed. We replied orally along the following lines, emphasizing that our answers were tentative and informal:

a.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
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74000119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2245

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
185

a. I promised to draft a telegram to Chungking immediately instructing the Embassy there to make an approach to the Chinese on a governmental level regarding Chinese military participation in the occupation.

b. We said that any answer regarding Russian participation would have to await the return of the Secretary from Moscow.

c. We recalled that last week a brief statement had been made to the press to the effect that we had invited Russian participation in the occupation and said that we saw no reason why we should not make public full information regarding our position on this matter.

d and e. We stated that we saw no objection to a US-British Empire occupation of Japan provided it was publicly made clear that our other Allies had been invited to participate on the same basis as the British Commonwealth.



FE:JKPenfield:hst

TOP SECRET

186



22 December 1945

File
7-2-46

MEMORANDUM

The following points should be discussed with the State Department and something definitive obtained from them:

- a. When are we going to approach the Chinese on a governmental level on the matter of forces for Japan.
- b. When are we going to get a firm understanding with the Russians on this matter.
- c. Are we going to publish a and b.
- d. Is it desirable to have mass British participation of the type envisaged completed or even public announcement thereof without something being determined and published with reference to at least the Chinese.
- e. Does the State Department consider it desirable or undesirable from their standpoint to be put in a position where before the world we have a U.S.-British Empire occupation of Japan. In fact, that is the situation we are approaching when almost 1/3 of the force in Japan becomes British and no other country is represented.
- f. When the Filipino Scouts begin to be effective then the force might be $\frac{1}{2}$ Filipino, $\frac{1}{4}$ British Empire and $\frac{1}{4}$ U.S.

In order to make a reply to MacArthur we need to know:

- a. Are the Chinese and the Russians coming in and if so, when.
- b. If the Chinese and the Russians are not coming in or if their participation is to be postponed for sometime, say beyond the middle of 46, what is the State Department view on the aspect that the occupation presents a U.S.-British stand vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

G. A. L.

JUL 2 - 1946

FILED

Confidential File
740.00119 Control
(Japan) 12-2245

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2245

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION - JA
INFO:

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FC-14

London via War

Dated October 22, 1945

Rec'd 2:19 a.m., 23rd.

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Secretary of State,

PL
A-B
SPA

Washington.

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SA/M-2


11063, Twenty-second.

Sunday OBSERVER October 21 carries long article by Gordon Walker from Tokyo critical of General MacArthur's handling of occupation of Japan. Demobilization of Japanese Army and Navy and disbanding of General Staff is said to be "only one solid and clearcut achievement". On adverse side is the retaining in power of Japanese war leaders, the lack of clearcut dealing with economic problems and finally no apparent effort to abolish or limit the unusual powers of the Emperor.

Greatest stress is laid on fact that same leaders who ruled Japan before and during war are not only still in power "but are now getting a firm foothold on a postwar basis". Walker says still too early to tell whether this is result of definite policy or

merely

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 10-2245

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OCT 23 1945

PLAIN

-2-11063, Twenty-second, from London via War

merely ineptness coupled with inability to appreciate scope of job to be done. He says: "It is almost impossible to fit the measures taken by the occupation authorities into any policy or pattern approaching the objectives outlined by the Potsdam Declaration."

General MacArthur and his principal staff officers are said to believe that Japan is so badly crushed that there is no longer danger and therefore occupation is either unnecessary or at most necessary for only short time.

Walker then states: "Such things as these, together with the fact that the American State Department representatives sent out to play a major advisory role have been relegated to a role approaching that of an office boy, raise the question whether there is not a vast difference between the United Nations plan for occupation and the way it is being run inside Japan".

Walker believes demobilization of army is like cutting off limb of tree but leaving the trunk and roots. He points out that Japanese Cabinets may come and go but the permanent officials keep on and says: "The most significant aspect of this system is that

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PLAIN

-3-11063, Twenty-second, from London via War

that the permanent officials who are actually governing postwar Japan are, with few exceptions, the same men who were doing the job under Tojo's Cabinet and other wartime governments".

Same situation is said to exist in economic field and while feeble efforts are being made to inspire self-dissolution of Zaibatsu, Walker states "no action has even been hinted at here for dealing with the medieval agrarian system which is just as much a part of Japan's feudal economy as the Zaibatsu". He says Japanese economists admit that rural and urban phases of Japanese feudal economy are indivisible and that lower officials in the agrarian adjunct of the Zaibatsu are untouched by the occupation efforts.

With regard to the Emperor Walker says there is little question that imperial household system should be abolished, "yet in a recent visit to the Imperial Palace I ascertained that the mechanism which has kept the Emperor a puppet for any dominant group is still in operation. Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who was responsible for advising the Emperor on the appointment of Tojo in 1941, told me that he is advising the Emperor on the present constitutional reform, which is supposed to convert Japan into a democracy overnight".

GALLMAN

JMS



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 22, 1945. 136

6
DIVISION OF CULTURAL COOPERATION
FEB 4 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

file
DIVISION OF EAST AND KOREAN
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 1 1946

4-1-52
CER
DC/R

NO. 119

SUBJECT: Conversation with Japanese University Students.

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of an informal conversation between Mr. Emmerson and a group of Japanese university students on a number of subjects, including the occupation and the political situation in Japan. It is realized that student opinion is frequently extreme, irresponsible, and perhaps not representative of general public opinion. Nevertheless, there is a frankness and freshness of viewpoint often not found in the conversations of Japanese bureaucrats, business and professional men. Some of the critical remarks, for example, may suggest attitudes held among fairly wide sections of people but not often expressed directly to American officials.

The group whose opinions have been summarized represented several universities and a variety of interests, including music, architecture, law, and agriculture. None of the students had experienced military service overseas but several had spent considerable time in training camps, both Army and Navy. Resentment against military training methods and bitterness toward the professional officer class were deep. The conversation, which lasted four hours, was exceedingly frank on the part of the students who seemed to be expressing their personal opinions without restraint nor attempt to produce any particular impression.

Summary. All problems in Japan revolve around economic distress. Until some security of food, shelter, and clothing is obtained, democratic reform will not take root. The occupation policy of SCAP has been too soft; the Japanese would welcome complete American control for a period of at least two years and many would willingly extend the period to ten or twenty years. There is no faith or confidence in the Japanese Government or Diet. Japanese respect power and authority and they know these are possessed only by SCAP. Direct orders by SCAP to deal with the blackmarket and other economic problems would succeed where Japanese Government attempts are futile. Resentment of demobilized soldiers against their officers has increased through their observation of the fairness of American Army life

and discipline.

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2245

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12-2245

MAR 6 1946

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FEB 20 1946
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES

Office of
EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JAN 25 1946
Department of State

Division of Japanese Affairs
JAN 5 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ICU

- 2 -

and discipline. The professional officer class is dangerous and may form the nucleus of a dangerous underground. SCAP was in error in permitting former students of military and naval academies to enter ordinary schools, since their influence will be dangerous. The Japanese people accept the arrest of war criminals and the abolition of State Shinto as natural acts of the occupation forces. They are puzzled by some of the names included in the war criminals list but realize that they have been without access to information for many years and are incapable of passing judgment. Only evidences so far of democracy are the newspapers and radio which are quite alienated from popular thinking. The political parties and next election offer little hope for democracy. There are many able potential leaders in Japan but they must devote themselves to eking out a living and cannot take part in politics or government. There is a danger that militarism may revive in Japan; militaristic thought is suppressed now but does not cease to exist. Japan will naturally want arms in an armed world. The only hope for world peace is a strong international organization and world disarmament. End of Summary.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

Memorandum of Conversation with
Japanese Students, December 19, 1945.

Original and hectograph, to Department.

Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP

800

JKEmmerson:anl

Enclosure to Despatch No. 119, of December 22, 1945
from the Acting United States Political Adviser, Tokyo,
Japan, on the subject "Conversation with Japanese Uni-
versity Students".

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH JAPANESE
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

December 19, 1945.

Mr. MATSUO, an employee of this Office, called at my hotel room on December 18 with four Japanese university students to discuss informally present conditions in Japan. The students were from Tokyo Imperial University, Tohoku University and the Japan Conservatory of Music. One is a student of agriculture, another of law, a third of architecture, and the fourth a student of piano. The opinions expressed in the course of a four hour conversation may not necessarily represent Japanese public opinion in general or even general student opinion. However, the students were exceedingly frank and the group an intelligent one. A brief summary of the highlights of their remarks follows.

Occupation. Two Japanese in a street car were discussing the respective occupation methods of the Russians and the Americans. One remarked that the Russians are tough in the beginning and their policy works great hardships on the people but they gradually relax and the situation improves. The Americans start out softly and cautiously but as the occupation develops they toughen up and it begins to hurt. One of the Japanese remarked that the Russian policy after all might be better.

The occupation policy of SCAP should be much stricter than it is at present. The Japanese respect might and authority. They have no confidence in their present Government, including the Cabinet and the Diet. They realize that the only power in Japan is that possessed by SCAP.

To accomplish the solution of Japan's pressing problems SCAP should give direct orders. The Japanese authorities can never solve the blackmarket question. However, SCAP could order the arrest of blackmarket dealers, could set prices and could abolish the blackmarket entirely by directive.

The Japanese would welcome complete control by the Americans. The United States should run Japan for at least two years. Some Japanese would be glad of an occupation lasting ten or twenty years. During that period some form of democracy might develop through education.

Economic Situation. At present the Japanese people are thinking only of food, shelter and clothing. They have no capacity for democracy and without a full stomach they cannot be expected to take any constructive step toward effecting democracy.

Those worst off are the students and salaried men. They do not have funds to buy necessary food on the blackmarket. Most students lie in bed on Sundays to save strength. None of them eats more than two meals a day. However anxious they may be to read good books, study or to organize themselves in political movements, they have no desire so long as they can think only of their own hunger.

The farmers are well off. In spite of the system of "compulsory contribution"

- 2 -

contribution" (kyoshutsu) of rice, they retain large amounts for themselves and for sale on the blackmarket. SCAP should directly order a requisition system to be enforced and thereby stop this practice. Only MacArthur directives will be obeyed.

Factory owners and business men who made profits during the war are well off. They have ample funds to make blackmarket purchases.

Air raid victims now living in improvised shacks must use funds from insurance to supplement their salaried incomes. For example, a family living in a dugout has monthly expenses of ¥500 and an income of ¥300. Fifty yen goes for rent and ¥450 for necessities bought on the blackmarket. The ¥200 discrepancy is made up from savings and payments from insurance.

Blankets destined for air raid victims are being sold at ¥40 each. Most burned-out victims cannot afford to buy a blanket at this price. However, they can sell the right to purchase the blanket for as much as ¥500. Thus in actual fact most of these blankets are being purchased by people who are not air raid sufferers but who have the necessary funds.

Demobilized Soldiers. Enlisted men demobilized from the Japanese army possess a violent hate for their officers, especially professional officers. This has been increased by their observation of the attitude of American officers and men. The Japanese have been deeply impressed by the friendliness, consideration and light heartedness of the American GI's. The hate for the American enemy whipped up during the war has been suddenly transferred to the officer class.

Students drafted as cadets were often the first to be sent into action. Many of them died while casualties among the officers were much lighter. Treatment of enlisted men in the army was cruel, resulting often in death from disciplinary action, malnutrition, tuberculosis and other causes.

Demobilized officers, especially professional officers, are now performing various commissions, disposing of military property and engaging in blackmarket operations. There is a feeling among students that this class represents a potential underground movement of considerable danger. Some of them feel that these professional officers with extreme ideas might at some point come to cooperate with the Communists, also extremists.

SCAP was in error in permitting students of former military and naval academies to attend regular schools. Students of these academies are steeped in military tradition and indoctrination. In Japan the profession of a soldier is handed down from generation to generation and becomes a matter of family pride. These students will not change their militaristic ideas quickly and they represent a great danger when they associate with students in regular schools. Some special provision should be made for them where they would receive democratic indoctrination supervised by the American occupation forces.

The Emperor. There is a difference in the feeling of the Japanese toward the Emperor himself and toward the Imperial institution. The Emperor is like the tokonoma which is part and parcel of a Japanese room, a decoration always there. The Japanese feel more or less the same way about the Emperor. They would not feel comfortable without

him.

- 3 -

him. However, they want a complete change in the Emperor system so that it cannot be utilized as it has been in the past.

Japanese reverence for the Emperor as a divine being has been greatly exaggerated abroad. Educated Japanese have no illusions on this subject and during their school days have discussed frankly and exhaustively the Emperor question—always, of course, out of hearing of the police or gendarmes.

There is a difference between divesting the Emperor of his powers and destruction of the system, as advocated by the Communists. The Communists have made a mistake, from their own point of view, in taking this extreme attitude.

Education. Primary school teachers in the present situation are completely baffled. They understand that what they have been teaching before the surrender should no longer be taught, but they have nothing to offer in place of the old material. On the other hand, university professors are delighted with their new found academic freedom. Most of them are bursting to talk of many things long prohibited.

During the war the universities disintegrated. Teachers and students went into the country and educational functions stopped.

Students and teachers are now returning to the campuses but the shortage of living accommodations, the desperate poverty of the students and the lack of food make it very difficult for a university to function efficiently.

Shinto. SCAP's recent directive abolishing state Shinto comes as no particular shock to the Japanese people. They regard it as a natural development. There may be some elderly people, especially in rural districts, who will be bewildered by this sweeping degree, but certainly the educated classes will bear no resentment toward the Americans for the action.

Shinto has never been a religion but is a superstition with no deep meaning for the average Japanese. In the western sense the Japanese have no religion. They can be Buddhists and Shintoists at the same time and take neither very seriously.

The Americans may have overemphasized the hold of Shinto on the Japanese people. It admittedly contributed to nationalism. However, very few Japanese ever understood the meaning of such phrases as Hakko-Ichiu (Eight corners of the Universe under One Roof) and Yamato Damashii (Japanese spirit).

Feudalism. Feudalism is the strongest reactionary influence upon Japanese life. Militarism was made possible by the existence of a feudal system. Land reform will not solve Japan's agrarian problem. Japanese farmers are backward not because of the land system but because of the imprint of feudal ideas upon them. These can only be removed through a long process of education.

There are fantastic remnants of feudalism and superstition in modern Japanese life. For example, the Mitsubishi Company has as its "patron saint" Inari, the fox god. Every worker at a Mitsubishi factory was required to bow before the fox shrine each morning as he entered the premises. The fox shrine can be found on top of the

Mitsubishi

- 3 -

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Mitsubishi

- 4 -

Mitsubishi building in Tokyo.

War Criminals. The Japanese expect SCAP to name war criminal suspects. There has been no feeling of antagonism against the naming of war criminals so far. Japanese wonder about certain individuals, but their eyes and ears have been closed for so long that they have no basis on which to judge war responsibility. SCAP would do well, however, to state clearly the reasons for arresting individuals as war criminal suspects. A statement of such facts would be excellent propaganda and would produce a favorable reaction among the Japanese. For example, many people are at a loss to understand why Prince NASHIMOTO should have been arrested. He is regarded as a doddering old man with few brains and little ability.

The Japanese should make a separate war criminal list of their own. This would include war profiteers, blackmarket dealers, spies and others who had committed crimes against the Japanese themselves.

Public Opinion. There is no such thing as public/in Japan. The people in general have no knowledge or interest in politics. So far the only things which have been democratized in Japan have been the newspapers and radio and these are mere surface manifestations quite far from the real thoughts and attitudes of the people.

Democratic propaganda by radio and newspaper is poorly done at present and is ineffective. The people want the Government or SCAP to solve their economic problems. Until they see some concrete action to give them food, shelter and jobs they will take no interest in elections, constitutional reforms or democracy in general.

SCAP should concentrate its attention upon solving these economic problems. After two years of improved livelihood and economic security the propaganda being dispensed at the present time might begin to take effect.

Election and Political Parties. The Social Democratic Party is the most popular among intellectuals. It has, however, not yet presented a sufficiently concrete economic program. The Progressives and Liberals will come out ahead in the next election because they have the money.

Giving women suffrage is like putting a dog in a tree. It won't climb. The women will vote as their husbands direct. They have no political conscience and no desire to exercise their rights. A jar of cold cream would buy the vote of any one of them.

Reparations. The United States should collect reparations from Japan by establishing industrial enterprises here and draining off all profits to the account of reparations. For example, it might be advisable for the United States to operate Japanese railways for a period of ten or twenty years. All profits would go out as reparations. The average Japanese citizen would not suffer and the internal economy of the nation would be stimulated.

Democracy. Students are pessimistic about democracy in Japan. Many Japanese are sincere in their desire to build a democratic form of government, but they have no experience, ability or education to do it. Political education will take a long time.

There are many able potential leaders in Japan. Young men between
thirty-five

- 5 -

thirty-five and forty are promising, but they are thinking now only of economic security and of earning a livelihood for themselves and their families. They have neither time nor inclination to consider politics.

Those persons now enjoying economic security are war profiteers, bear some responsibility for the war and have ideas unsuitable to the present times. No hopeful leaders can be expected to emerge in Japan until the economic situation improves.

International Relations. The Japanese have always held generally friendly feelings toward the United States, They have looked down on China, however, and now either ignore Great Britain or think of it only as a third rate power. Enmity toward Soviet Russia is very strong. Most people are pessimistic about future world peace. They believe the only solution to be a strong international organization.

Communism has no strong hold in Japan now. The Communists lose respect by denying any connection with Soviet Russia. Since their ideology is obviously Soviet they should say frankly and openly that they favor the Soviet Union instead of denying it in an attempt to flatter the Americans.

Militarism. There is a danger that militarism will develop again in Japan. A man may separate from his wife but if he meets her again after ten years his affection is likely to be revived. The Japanese may appear to have forgotten militarism and their military education, but many of them will remember it. The fact that all ideas favorable to militarism have disappeared from the surface does not necessarily mean that they cease to exist.

It is difficult to conceive of a country totally without arms. It is natural to feel that one's own country should have arms and an army so long as other countries are armed. The ideal situation is, of course, world disarmament, but until that is achieved there will be a desire in Japan for weapons of self-defense.

John K. Emmerson
Foreign Service Officer

ACTION COPY
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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ACTION COPY

PLAIN

London

Dated December 24, 1945

Rec'd 9:48 p.m.

Full

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DEPARTMENT OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
DEC 26 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PW51 LONDON 377 24 2356

PRESS SECSTATE WASHINGTON

13579 TWENTYFOURTH DAILY TELEGRAPH CARRIES DESPATCH FROM ITS
CORRESPONDENT CORNELIUS RYAN IN TOKYO COMMA DECLARING THAT
DELIBERATE ATTEMPT IS BEING MADE BY CERTAIN MEMBERS OF JAPANESE
CABINET COMMA HEADED BY FOREIGN MINISTER YOSHIDA COMMA TO INF-
LUENCE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN FORCING UNITED STATES TO
SOFTEN ITS POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN PERIOD DESPATCH STATES COLON
QUOTE THE THEME OF THE CAMPAIGN IS THAT THERE ARE TOO MANY AMERIC
EXPERTS IN JAPAN COMMA THAT SUBQUOTE SOONER OR LATER THERE MUST
COME A BREAK END SUBQUOTE COMMA THAT RIOTS WILL BREAK OUT IF
FOOD DOES NOT COME SOON COMMA AND THAT SUBQUOTE DIRECTIVES BEING
ISSUED ARE BEING WRITTEN BY PEOPLE WHO KNOW NOTHING ABOUT JAPAN
END SUBQUOTE PERIOD THE INFERENCE BEIND THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS
BEING MADE IS THAT SUBQUOTE IF THE BRITISH WERE HERE THINGS WOULD
BE MUCH DIFFERENT SEMICOLON THEY UNDERSTAND THE FAR EAST END
SUBQUOTE PERIOD UNQUOTE CORRESPONDENT STATES THAT HE AND
A COLLEAGUE WERE INVITED ON SATURDAY TO LUNCH AT HOME OF YOSHIDA
COMMA AND THAT ON THEIR ARRIVAL THEY WERE QUOTE DISCREETLY TOLD
UNQUOTE BY QUOTE YOSHIDAS UNOFFICIAL SECRETARY AND JAPANESE
FISHING MAGNATE COMMA IN THE PRESENCE OF YOSHIDA AND HIS DAUGHTER
UNQUOTE COMMA THAT QUOTE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS HAVE HEARD COMMA
PLAIN

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2445

Wms
12-26-45
HS (fund)

JAPAN - 1049

PLAIN

-2- #13579, Twenty-fourth, from London.

IF YOU ARE ASKED COMMA THAT THE INVITATION CAME FROM THE FOREIGN
MINISTERS DAUGHTER AND THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER JUST HAPPENED
TO BE PRESENT UNQUOTE PERIOD RYAN STATES THAT DESPITE FACT THAT
MOST OF CONVERSATION WAS TO EFFECT THAT JAPANESE PEOPLE WERE
STARVING COMMA LUNCHEON WAS ON LAVISH SCALE PERIOD HE QUOTED
YOSHIDA AS DECLARING COLON QUOTE THE EMPEROR IS WORRIED PERIOD
MACARTHURS DIRECTIVES BECOME STERNER PERIOD NO RICE MEANS RIOTS
PERIOD ONE DIRECTIVE WAS SO CONFUSEDLY WORDED THAT THE JAPANESE
PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT RELIGION HAS BEEN ABOLISHED PERIOD BUT WE HAVE
FULLEST CONFIDENCE IN MACARTHUR PERIOD UNQUOTE RYAN REPORTS THAT
YOSHIDA ALSO ASKED HIM IF THERE WAS ANY ANTIAMERICAN FEELING IN
BRITAIN COMMA FRANCE OR GERMANY PERIOD ON YOSHIDAS DEPARTURE
COMMA HIS ASSISTANT SHIRASU IS REPORTED TO HAVE CONTINUED HIS PRO-
PAGANDA LINE PERIOD RYAN ENDS BY STATING THAT HE HAD REPORTED
MATTER TO MACARTHURS HEADQUARTERS COMMA AND BEEN TOLD THAT INCI-
DENT REPRESENTED AN ATTEMPT TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE ALLIES
WHICH PERFECTLY FITS INTO MENTAL PATTERN OF PRESENT CABINET

PLAIN

WINANT

RM/854P

24 DECEMBER 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Division of Chinese Affairs
DEC 28 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FC-KA
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Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 27 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

OPD 336.2 China (5 Dec 45)

24 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
(ATTN: Director of Far Eastern Affairs)

SUBJECT: Augmentation of Staff Personnel of Chinese Liaison Officer,
Wang Chih

1. Attention is invited to your memorandum dated 5 December 1945 concerning the augmentation of the staff personnel of Chinese Liaison Officer, Wang Chih, who is attached to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.

2. The Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific, has advised that there is no objection to increasing the staff of Major General Chih Wang, Chinese Liaison Officer, by three (3) additional officers and one (1) clerk.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

R. L. Vittrup
FOR R. L. VITTRUP
Colonel, G.S.C.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) (Japan) / 12-2445
740.00119 Control / 12-2445
CS / LE

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
JAN 3 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 5 - 1946
FILED

DCR NE Unit
DEC 26 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ANAL. *W*
Rev. *26*
Cat. *BA*
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES ^{file} GOVERNMENT

TO : Liaison Section, OPD

DATE: October 1, 1945.

FROM : Office of Far Eastern Affairs

SUBJECT: Status of neutral diplomatic missions in Japan 149

The following is suggested as a basis for reply to General MacArthur:

a. It is believed that it would be inadvisable to attempt to dictate to neutral diplomatic missions in Japan the channels through which they should conduct their legitimate activities. Should any action become necessary in this regard, the approach should be by the State Department to the neutral governments concerned, and not by the occupation authorities to the neutral diplomatic missions.

b. If the Allied Supreme Commander should find that the continuance of relations of neutral diplomatic missions with the Japanese Government is proving inimical to the accomplishment of his mission, he should require the Japanese Foreign Office to inform him in advance of each projected visit of a neutral diplomat to that office and of the purpose of the visit, and subsequently to inform him of the substance of the conversation held.

c. No objections are perceived to the use by neutral diplomatic missions of Japanese communications facilities (over which it is assumed that the Allied Supreme Command has established control and censorship) unless such use should prove to be inimical to the purposes of occupation.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

RESTRICTED

Tokyo, Japan, December 26, 1945

DC/R

No. 124

SUBJECT: Views of MATSUMOTO Shigeharu Regarding Emperor,
Constitutional Revision, and Other Current
Japanese Political Issues.

RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
GENERAL SERVICES
9/6 JAN 4 PM 1 10

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JAN 5 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum of conversation dated December 21, 1945, between Mr. MATSUMOTO Shigeharu and Mr. Fearey of this Mission regarding the pre-war and war-time relationships and activities of the Emperor and certain other key Japanese governmental figures, and regarding the current situation. Presently editor of the new semi-tabloid People's Daily (Minpo), Matsumoto was a close friend of Konoye, and recently worked with him and Drs. TAKAGI Yasaka and SASAKI Soichi on constitutional revision. He is about forty, has considerably international background, and spent a year or more at Yale University. During the war, and for some time before, he was managing editor of Domei News Agency.

Summary. The Emperor, according to Mr. Matsumoto, could have prevented the war if he had been sufficiently determined, as he later succeeded in bringing it to a close. During the war the Emperor relied entirely on General TOJO, until succeeded by General KOISO, and Marquis KIDO for information regarding the course of developments. Not until February, 1945 was Prince Konoye permitted to give him an accurate picture of the situation. Mr. Matsumoto was of the opinion that Articles 1-4 of the Constitution should be changed, although he considered it unimportant where technical sovereignty should lie if the substance of representative government could be achieved. It was his guess that under present conditions of eligibility two-thirds of the present Diet would be returned in the coming elections. End of Summary.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2645

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

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Enclosure: *at*

Copy of Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. MATSUMOTO on December 21, 1945.

HECTO SENT TO FR

Original and hectograph to Department.
Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP
800 RAFearey:jwb

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 124 dated December 26, 1945, from George Atcheson, Jr., United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject: "Views of MATSUMOTO Shigeharu Regarding Emperor, Constitutional Revision, and other Current Japanese Political Issues".

(COPY)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

RESTRICTED

December 21, 1945.

Participants: Mr. MATSUMOTO Shigeharu
Mr. Fearey

Subject: The Emperor's War Responsibility,
Constitutional Revision and the
Current Political Situation.

The following is a resumé of remarks made by Mr. Matsumoto to Mr. Fearey at dinner on the above date:

1. The Emperor, in Matsumoto's opinion, could have prevented the war if he had been sufficiently determined, even after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet. Before that time he had taken the greatest interest in the negotiations and had fervently hoped that they would succeed. He waited up every night until eleven o'clock to read a daily telegraphic summary sent from Washington by a certain Kato and relayed to the Emperor by Matsumoto, then attached to Domei. After Konoye's fall he was not so accurately informed of developments, but nevertheless could have prevented the war if he had taken a decisive stand. Matsumoto stated there is nothing in the view that the Emperor would have been deposed by the military if he had opposed them too strongly. In evidence of the Emperor's power when he wished to exercise it, Mr. Matsumoto cited the Emperor's decision to conclude peace last August (although admitting he could count on stronger support among his Ministers for the August decision than a peace stand in 1941).

2. From "Pearl Harbor" until February 1945, according to Matsumoto, the Emperor relied entirely on General Tojo (later General Koiso) and Marquis Kido for information about the war. He saw no one but these two, except for brief visits of not more than five or ten minutes by Ministers to discuss particular business. Only in February was Konoye allowed to see him. In an interview of over an hour Konoye painted a very pessimistic picture of the situation, which greatly shocked the Emperor. While Kido had obtained his start in life through Konoye, and had always been on excellent terms with him, he mistakenly decided after Pearl Harbor to go it alone, and only in February did he permit Konoye to enter the picture again.

3. Mr. Matsumoto disputed the popular view that Konoye had a weak personality. He said that Konoye was strong-willed and courageous, and went just as far as he could in

support

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- 2 -

support of peaceful policies with the limited support he was able to secure. As the head of the first family of Japan with a thousand years' tradition to maintain, Konoye felt he had no alternative but suicide after being named with a man like Tojo. He would have felt the same whether he had been placed under house arrest or sent to prison. (Mrs. Aso, the Foreign Minister's daughter, told Mr. Fearey on December 19 that they had been fully aware Konoye was contemplating suicide and had tried to dissuade him.)

4. Mr. Matsumoto believed that Articles 1-4 of the Constitution should be changed and stated that most liberal-minded Japanese were of that opinion, but felt it unimportant where technical sovereignty lay if the substance of representative government was achieved.

5. In comparison with Foreign Minister Yoshida, who told Mr. Fearey the other day that he and other Japanese with whom he was in contact estimated that about half the present Diet would be returned, Mr. Matsumoto estimated two-thirds, under present conditions of eligibility. Matsumoto believed that the Social Democrats, with their long experience of failure through internal strife, would almost certainly maintain their unity through the election. In his view the Progressives, if returned as the majority party, would surely insist on MACHIDA Chuji forming a new government, and would not adopt the Shidehara Government.

6. Matsumoto stated that the recent farm directive had been the most favorably received of any yet issued, except, of course, by the landlords. He was sure that a Progressive Government would be unwilling to carry it out.

7. Asked who he personally would favor as next Prime Minister, Matsumoto answered HATOYAMA Ichiro, YOSHIDA Shigeru, or ISHIGURO Tadaatsu. He said Hatoyama had both good and bad associations but was a genuine liberal. He considered Ishiguro (Agriculture Minister in the second Konoye Cabinet) an honest and capable man of progressive views.

8. Matsumoto stated that his paper, Minpo, supported some of the Communists' program, much of the Socialists', and the more progressive elements of the Liberal Party, but found no party completely to its liking.

R.A.F.

RAFearey:dm

207193



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 26, 1945. *DC/N*

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 125

SUBJECT: Suggestion by Mr. TOKUGAWA Narihiro that Prince HIGASHI-KUNI Become Prime Minister in Event of Emperor's Abdication.

File
DEC 30 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward copy of a memorandum dated December 19, 1945, to the Supreme Commander transmitting a memorandum of conversation with Mr. (formerly Count) TOKUGAWA Narihiro in which Mr. TOKUGAWA suggested (1) that the elections should be postponed and (2) that the Emperor is prepared to abdicate and that when he does so only Prince HIGASHI-KUNI as Prime Minister would have the confidence of the Japanese people and be able to give adequate leadership to the Government.

The Department may wish in this connection to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 3 October 8, 1945.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures: *att m*

1. Memorandum dated December 19, 1945.
2. Memorandum of Conversation December 19, 1945.

Original and hecto to Department.

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JSService:vs

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JAN 14 1946
Department of State

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JAN 5 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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RECORDS BRANCH

2

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch no. 125 of December 26, 1945, from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Suggestion by Mr. TOKUGAWA Narihiro that Prince HIGASHI-KUNI Become Prime Minister in Event of Emperor's Abdication."

144

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 19, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. TOKUGAWA Narihiro.

There is attached a memorandum of conversation with Mr. TOKUGAWA Narihiro on the subject of the date of the Japanese Diet elections and the qualifications of Prince HIGASHI-KUNI as Prime Minister until the signing of the Peace Treaty. Mr. TOKUGAWA made two points: (1) that the elections should be postponed; and (2) that the Emperor is prepared to abdicate the throne and that when he does so, only Prince HIGASHI-KUNI, as Prime Minister, would be able to secure the confidence of the people and give adequate leadership to the Japanese Government.

While there may be merit in Mr. TOKUGAWA's suggestion that the time remaining before the January elections is too short to permit adequate political education or an effective election campaign, it is doubtful that Prince HIGASHI-KUNI would command the respect and confidence of the Japanese people in the way Mr. TOKUGAWA suggests. The prestige of the Emperor institution and the Imperial Household has waned considerably since defeat and it is unlikely that the Japanese people would at this time place deep trust in the leadership of Prince HIGASHI-KUNI.

Furthermore, it is obvious that so long as the question of the Prince's war guilt remains unclarified, especially the allegation of his responsibility for the execution of American fliers, he would be unfitted for any position of responsibility in the Japanese Government.

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.
Minister
U. S. Political Adviser

Enclosure:
Memorandum of conversation dated December 19, 1945.

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JKEmmerson:dm

740.00119 Control (Japan) 112-2645

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch no. 125 of December 26, 1945, from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Suggestion by Mr. TOKUGAWA Narihiro that Prince SHIGASHI-KUNI Become Prime Minister in Event of Emperor's Abdication."

145

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 19, 1945.

Participants: Mr. TOKUGAWA Narihiro;
Mr. David KATAGIRI (who acted
as interpreter).

Mr. Atcheson;
Mr. Emmerson.

Subject: Postponement of the Date of Elections and
Recommendation of Prince HIGASHI-KUNI as
Prime Minister.

Mr. TOKUGAWA, who is a member of the well-known noble TOKUGAWA family and stated he had given up his former title of Count, called without previous appointment on December 18 and asked to speak to Mr. Atcheson on a political matter. He said that he was an intimate friend of Prince HIGASHI-KUNI and that he wished to present his views regarding the present political situation in Japan and his suggestions for the future.

Mr. TOKUGAWA's first point was that the coming Diet elections are scheduled too soon to permit political education of the people and an effective electoral campaign. He cited the shortage of paper and the difficulties of transportation, especially the fact that heavy snows in north Honshu and Hokkaido would make it very difficult for candidates to travel through their constituencies. He contended that the election date should be postponed until at least March to permit an additional period of preparation. Otherwise, he said, the same reactionary Diet will be re-elected.

Mr. TOKUGAWA commented that present Diet members are unfitted to represent the people in carrying out democratic reforms. They cannot escape war responsibility. The present Cabinet members are likewise unfitted for political leadership at the present time. The Emperor is prepared to abdicate and will do so in due course. In such a situation it is necessary that someone with unquestionable prestige and enjoying wide popular confidence should assume the reins of government. The only person who can fill that role is Prince HIGASHI-KUNI.

Mr. TOKUGAWA said that Prince HIGASHI-KUNI had been unable to accomplish more during his premiership following surrender because he had been surrounded by persons tainted with war responsibility. He should be made Prime Minister at the time of the coming elections, in which case he would select his Cabinet from among

the leaders

the leaders of the majority party to emerge from the elections. Prince HIGASHI-KUNI should then continue as Prime Minister until the signing of the Peace Treaty, at which time another election should be called. By that time the political education of the people will have progressed and a democratic responsible government can then be formed by the majority party according to the results of the election.

Mr. TOKUGAWA said that in the event of the Emperor's abdication the people of Japan would receive a great shock and that Prince HIGASHI-KUNI, being a member of the Royal Family, would, as Prime Minister, be able to maintain unity within the country and prevent disturbances which might result from the abdication. At such a critical time he alone would be able to give Japan the leadership which it would need.


Mr. Atcheson stated that he was glad to have the benefit of Mr. TOKUGAWA's views.

JOHN K. EMMERSON
J. K. EMMERSON

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JKEmmerson:dm

~~Trans - to -~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 3, 1945

U - Mr. Acheson:

With regard to the question of neutral missions in Tokyo having relations with the Japanese Government, it might not be the best course to permit such relations, but I do not think we can base the argument on the possibility that other nations such as the Soviet Union, China, and the United Kingdom might take this as a precedent for establishing Embassies for conducting direct relations with the Japanese Government. The three nations named are bound by the Declaration of the United Nations "not to make separate armistice or peace with the enemies". The establishment of an Embassy by any one of the three powers would have to be preceded by a peace treaty and recognition of the Japanese Government. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union might "jump the traces" but if they did decide to do so the whole scheme of cooperation in the Far East would "go by the boards" and I feel that any attitude we take towards the present neutral nations (Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal) having relations with the Japanese Government would have little or no bearing on Soviet action.

The question presented here is a fundamental one for which we have not yet produced an answer. Prior to the Potsdam Proclamation it was generally thought that there would be no Japanese Government and that the Allied military administration for control of Japan would in effect be the government of Japan. Potsdam, however, altered this situation. There is a Japanese Government "subject" to General MacArthur. It has now diplomatic representatives abroad in Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal which have relations with the Governments to which they are accredited. The unanswered question is whether the Japanese Government is to be considered purely as an "administrative instrument" for General MacArthur or whether it is to be considered a government, while not sovereign, yet capable of operating in much the same manner as the government of a protected country or the government of a country under military occupation. If it is purely an "administrative instrument" then the neutral missions should, it seems to me, have relations only with MacArthur's headquarters. If it is a government then it would seem to me that the neutral missions should be permitted to have relations with it. General MacArthur is in a position to exercise complete control over the Japanese Government and can therefore supervise, direct, modify, or prevent negotiations by the Japanese Foreign Office with neutral missions.

Quite

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(JAPAN) / 12-2745

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(Japan) / 12-2745

Handwritten initials/signature

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JAN 22 1946

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Quite aside from the merits of the case, I understand from War Department people that General MacArthur would prefer not to be faced with the necessity of setting up a "Foreign Office" in his headquarters to conduct relations with the neutral missions.

Finally, it seems to me, if we do not wish neutral nations to continue relations with the Japanese Government, we should, on a government-to-government level, request the nations concerned to break off diplomatic relations with Japan on the ground that the Japanese Government is not sovereign and is not capable of conducting foreign relations.

J.C.V.

FE:Vincent:ALM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

To: U, Mr. Acheson
From: FE, Mr. Vincent

OCT 1 1945
October 1, 1945.

Subject: Status of neutral diplomatic
missions in Japan

The Swedish Legation has inquired of General MacArthur's headquarters as to what extent neutral diplomatic missions are to continue relations with the Japanese Foreign Office. The War Department (OPD) has put three questions to us. The essence of our reply is that we should not interfere with neutral diplomatic missions having relations with the Japanese Foreign Office but that General MacArthur should, if he deems it necessary, exercise his authority over the Japanese Government by having the Foreign Office inform his headquarters in advance of discussions or business with neutral missions and also inform him subsequently of the results of the discussions. I do not believe we should endeavor to prevent neutral missions in Tokyo approaching the Japanese Foreign Office. I believe that the necessary control can be exercised over the Japanese Foreign Office by General MacArthur in his position as Supreme Commander.

Do you object to the proposed memorandum to OPD?


FE:JCVincent:hst

J.C.V.

152

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY



Mr. Vincent

I am very doubtful about
this paper. There seems to me no
special value in neutrality for this
purpose. Do we want Russians
British, Chinese etc., etc. establishing
diplomatic missions & dealing
with the Jap foreign office.

I should think not and that
we might begin now with a
good precedent as to the
methods. Perhaps I miss
something here - Do I?

D.A.

SUBJECT OR FILE NO.		740.00119 Cont (Japan) / 12-2645		DATE DUE	9/13/52
DATE OF DOC.	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED		
12/26/45	D-123		3/13		
TO/FROM		ENCLOSURES			
fr Tokyo		✓			
CHARGE TO		(Signature)		OFFICE SYMBOL	
		JK Emmerson		FE	
Form DS-933a (9-1-51)		16-6887-1 GPO		DEPARTMENT OF STATE	



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 26, 1945

9273
DIVISION OF CULTURAL COOPERATION
JAN 14 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 123

Subject: Japanese Student Activity Since American Occupation

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit a copy of a memorandum dated December 11, 1945, prepared by Dr. Karl C. Leebrick, of the staff of this Mission, on the subject "Japanese Student Organizations".

Summary. Student activities, resulting in some cases in strikes, which began shortly after occupation, seem to be a natural corollary of general unrest in political, economic, and cultural fields and to indicate a desire to do away with war-time regimentation. This activity has been mostly local or institutional and attempts to create nationwide organizations are still without much success. Education Ministry officials, generally, show conservative opposition to most of this activity which, however, does not appear either excessively radical or violent. It is expected that as administrative reforms in the educational system are carried out, student movements will turn toward formation of cooperative societies to improve food and other conditions.
End of summary.

Dr. Leebrick, who has been making contacts with Japanese educationalists during the two months he has been attached to this Mission, visited Japan in 1924 at the invitation of the Japan-America Society and the Japanese Government, for consultation on the bill for expatriation of Japanese and in the interest of the formation of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He is, as the Department is aware, a well-known educationalist.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att or*

- 1. Copy of memorandum dated December 11, 1945.

Original and hectograph to Department
Copy to General Headquarters, SCAP

REOTO SENT TO

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JAN 11 1946
Department of State

DIVISION OF JAPAN AFFAIRS
JAN 5 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DCR NE Unit
BA

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 123 dated December 26, 1945, from George Atcheson, Jr., United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Japanese Student Activity Since American Occupation".

Copy

MEMORANDUM

December 11, 1945.

SUBJECT: Japanese Student Organizations.

The pattern and activities of Japanese student organization appears to be sufficiently revealed so that a current analysis is justified.

Student meetings and strikes began within a month of occupation. The students were influenced by adult movements which resulted in the creation of new organizations on local and on national scale in politics, in labor and in cultural fields. The announced purposes of these groups were to better existing conditions and to make changes from the repression and regimentation of the long years of war effort. In a sense, this activity was a vague reaching out to achieve some of the blessings of democracy which it was understood were to be a part of the new program for Japan.

The students in universities, colleges, higher schools and middle schools and even in the Peer's School met to consider their situation. Some of these meetings were spontaneous, others were stimulated by school alumni or by faculty members. A little later leaders of the newly organized political parties took an interest. It was under these circumstances that attempts were made to set up local, regional, and national student organizations. These movements have not been very successful to date except on a local scale.

The newspapers, also experiencing their first steps toward freedom, published accounts of these student meetings and gave an outlet for student writers who did not always faithfully report the affair in its correct setting. In one instance student-faculty discussions held as a part of the university administration program were reported as a student organization meeting. Some of the topics discussed were written up as though they were an ultimatum from an organized student group to the university administration.

Another account is quoted:

"School Strike"

"I was astonished by an article in the 5 December issue of a certain newspaper describing the details of our 4 December student conference. It was a thorough fabrication that I intend to correct in the following summary of the actual proceedings".

"We proposed the establishment of a new alumni association,

already

- 2 -

already authorized at a faculty meeting the day before. We merely debated our future attitude".

"On matters pertaining to revision and strengthening of the faculty we discussed the means of securing good teachers, and drafted a resolution emphasizing the necessity of faculty changes, urging the president to consider it. We did not go so far as to name faculty members whose retirement we desired".

"We discussed the desirability of publication of the school budget so that we may make necessary corrections by insertion or deletion. Student opinion should be expressed in the board of directors' meetings".

"It is obvious, then, that the student conference was held merely to promote harmonious relations between the faculty and student body, and not, as the newspaper article stated, to air disputes or call strikes. Our purpose is to foster new educational traditions". (From a student of the Musashi Higher School. Tokyo Shimbun, December 10, 1945).

The following summary from Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 1945, gives further information on student opinion and is evidence of the interest newspapers are taking in student affairs.

"Twelve letters concerning student strikes have been received thus far. Of these, ten have opined that the strikes are not justifiable, and of these ten, one further insisted that the College Union Plan of the NIPPON University Students is utterly incompatible with conditions. The remaining two letters supported strikes. The following is a summary of some of their opinions:

"The student movement which began with the strikes at the UENO Girls' Middle School and the MITO High School spread until it succeeded in bringing democracy to several colleges and high schools. There have been strikes demanding dismissal of militaristic and incompetent professors, rehiring of dismissed professors, change of curricula, and establishment of autonomous student associations. But I fear, as in the past, they are merely jumping on the bandwagon. They mustn't forget that these are means employed in the search for truth, and are therefore applicable in any generation. True learning cannot be achieved merely by listening to the lectures of professors whose popularity is fashionable at the time. We must concentrate on the real nature of circumstances since the defeat". - NODA, Minoru, TOKYO Student.

"Recently, demands have been made in some schools for a "democracy in the school" by such means as student representation on the Faculty Committee. We students must consider these matters in relation to the actual purpose of students, which is pursuit of truth. Students are merely aping other institutions in a democracy whereas the student's position is one peculiar to the educational field. For example, student participation in faculty committees

is

- 3 -

is nothing more than an installation of laborer's position in management. Clearly the situation in schools differs from that in industry. Surely no one believes that the relationship between the teacher and the pupil resembles that of capital and labor. Teachers impart the valuable fruits of their efforts in the field of learning. It is inconceivable that such proposals can be introduced logically in schools". - OTA, Tatsuro, KEIO University Student.

"That strikes occur with such frequency in schools is regrettable. Don't these students realize that such activities harm both the honor of the school and their own characters? The disputes may be attributed partly to the degeneration of their characters as a result of wartime service in factories, and to general wartime living conditions. Moreover, their judgement has suffered as a result of the reduced wartime educational standards. As a result of having been defeated, no clear enunciation of educational objectives has been advanced. But the universities should continue in the search for truth regardless of generation. All students in the nation must realize this at once and rapidly busy themselves regaining a serious attitude". - NAKAJIMA, Tetsuro, TOKYO Student.

Talks with faculty members and administrators indicate that there is little apprehension that many student groups will make unreasonable demands or seek to participate in the administration of the schools and universities to a greater extent than they did in the pre-war years.

The official statements given below are indicative of the attitude of the highest educational authorities.

"It is very regrettable that troubles had to occur recently at schools. Schools are domestic societies tied by Love and Teaching. The importance of the Code between Teachers and Pupils will always be the same regardless to time. Whenever a trouble occurs, it should be solved in a domestic and self-governing manner, it will always be a shame for the school to expose the inside troubles outward. The students are requested not to misunderstand the true meaning of Freedom". Mr. TANAKA K., Director of the Bureau of Education, Education Ministry (Nippon Newsreel, October 25, 1945).

Reporters of the Tokyo Shimbun (November 27, 1945) questioned officers of the Education Ministry as to their attitude toward student strikes. The reply is quoted: "Students should not participate in the administration of their schools. If they don't agree with the school's policy they should leave the school, which would be the honorable thing to do. They (the students) had the right to select the schools they wanted to enter and they should have studied the school's policy before enrolling. (Tokyo Shimbun, November 27, 1945).

Education Minister, MAEDA Tamon, replying in the House of

Peers

- 4 -

Peers to the interpellation of Diet member NAGAOKA Ryuichiro of the Kyo Club, said: "the school authorities are in no position to deal firmly with the agitating students; that school authorities can not be considered right in all disputes with students bodies, and that they are expected to reform where they are found in the wrong". "Students, however", he went on "are minors. They have yet to learn to govern themselves. Their capabilities are limited. Thus they cannot be left to themselves. For this reason the authorities are determined to deal firmly with students going beyond their proper functions". (Nippon Times, December 1, 1945).

The student meetings have discussed the food situation, hours of study, especially in relation to the food shortage, student housing, the addition of courses to the curriculum especially the restoration of courses dropped during the war. The courses most frequently mentioned are social science and cultural courses. Several meetings resulted in requests for the change in the president of the institution, for the dropping of certain faculty members and for the return of dismissed members of the faculty. This can be understood in the light of the war-time military administration of the institutions. The students frequently became impatient, or thought that the Minister of Education or local school authorities were not intending to act. It must be admitted that they had some reason for these beliefs. Student groups did force action, at least earlier than it would otherwise have taken place. Other subjects acted upon, by students were co-education, requests for courses in democracy, changes or elimination of examinations. The special position of graduates from the military schools came under discussion. Official action at national and local levels has remedied most of the things objected to by the student groups.

Several special situations have resulted in student protest or action. One group protested the abuse of a student by the police. The police administration made official apology for the unjustified action.

The students asked for, and apparently have won the right, of representation in the proceedings of investigation of school teachers and administrators for militaristic ideas and actions. It is reported that one TAKEDA Takeshi, a Communist leader, is taking an active part in student affairs by acting as counsellor for the Zenkoku Gakusei Rengokai (Association of all the Students of Colleges and Universities). He is assisted by CHO Masamiti, a member of the Socialist Party. This group claims a membership of about 300 students and is working to unite all student associations. Mr. TAKEDA gave the program of this group to be:

1. To democratize the colleges and universities in Japan through self-governing student bodies.
2. To solve the food and shelter problems of students.

3. To

- 5 -

3. To oust the militaristic and reactionary professors and to reinstate ousted democratic teachers.
4. To establish freedom of study, of meetings of political activities.
5. To provide for equal opportunities in education for women.

This political promotion of student organization and the expectation of party affiliation should be watched. It is worth repeating that apparently little progress has been made, to date, in the organization of national Japanese student organizations.

The student organizations listed below are those about which the writer has some information. No attempt is made to name the local organizations which have taken the name of their own school or university. About 20 of these could be listed.

Zenkoku Gakusei Rengo Kai (Entire Japan Student Federation) discussed above.

The Nippon Gakusei Renmei (Japanese Student's Cultural League) formed at the end of August 1945 claims a membership of some 500 boys and girls whose average age is 19. A rightist organization, it has experienced a rapid change in leadership. Its announced aim is to practice democratic principles and to raise the academic standards of students groups. A move is afoot to organize this league on a nation-wide basis in all specialized and technical universities and higher schools; to that extent, its representatives have already established contact in Yokohama and Kanazawa.

Minshishugi Seinen Kaigi (Democratic Association of the Youth) reports a membership of 250. It publishes a monthly paper.

The Seinen Bunka Domei (Young Men's Cultural Association) was established September 1, 1945. It claims a membership of 300, of which 100 are women. Its announced aim is the education of young men and women who are interested in art, literature, motion pictures, drama, philosophy, and religion. Its leaders, SAITO Kuniharu and MURAMATSU Otohiko, are desirous of making this association nation-wide.

"The New Life Movement", (American Club of Japan) is an association with a proposed ten-year plan for the rebirth of Japan. NOMURA Shizuo, Japanese silk exporter in Kyoto, is taking an active part in its formation.

The Zaigai Fukei Kyushitsu Gakusei Domei (Student League for Relief of Parents Living Abroad) is being financed by the Zaigai Doho Kyugo-Kai (The Society for Relief of Japanese Residents Overseas). It is understood that this latter society was formerly the Tekkoku Zairyu Doho Kyugo Kai (Society for Relief of Japanese People Residing in Enemy Country). Members of this

organization

- 6 -

organization recently sought assistance in drafting a petition to General MacArthur to request him to take measures to assist Japanese parents living in Soviet-occupied territory.

An interview was held on November 7, 1945, with ten university students, two instructors and a representative from the Preparation Committee for a national student organization. The students were from Nippon, Keio, Commerce, Imperial and Waseda universities, all of Tokyo.

The following information was gained:

Students in various universities are now organizing themselves into "Study Circles". Although they are adopting similar names as the ones in existence during the liberal period (1926-1933) they are different in that they do not intend to limit themselves to study of political ideologies. They seem interested in more immediate problems, such as food, housing, etc.

Moves have been initiated to form nation-wide student organizations, unifying various local student groups.

The program for the national body as outlined by the Preparation Committee include:

1. Solution of housing problem for students.
2. Student participation in creased food production.
3. Formation of self-governing student bodies in each school and elimination of obstacles to student organization.
4. Student participation in school management.
5. Freedom of expression in school.
6. Suffrage and student participation in political movements.
7. Student's use of books banned during the war.
8. Democratization of school education.
9. Publication of student papers.

The student meetings and the organization formed are a natural, not an abnormal, manifestation of the present situation in Japan. So far little that is unusual to such movements have been manifested. Pre-war students made use of student meetings and strikes much as they are doing now.

KCLeebrick:ms

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O.P.D. 147

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

file

27 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LIAISON SECTION, OPD:

SUBJECT: Status of Neutral Diplomatic Missions in Japan

1. It is requested that you obtain from the State Department information on the basis of which early reply might be made to General MacArthur's radio CAX 52301 (CM-IN 20671). It is clear that General MacArthur has full authority to issue whatever instructions may be necessary; what he requires is guidance as to the proper instructions.

2. In order that General MacArthur may be given the clearest possible advice in this matter, it would seem necessary to include specific answers to the following questions:

a. What is the policy of the U.S. with reference to relations between neutral diplomatic missions in Japan and the Japanese Foreign Office and other Japanese Government offices?

b. Are special instructions to the Japanese Government or, particularly, to neutral diplomatic missions in Japan required to give effect to such U.S. policy?

c. Does the U.S. have any political objections to action by General MacArthur to require neutral diplomatic missions in Japan to use American rather than Japanese communication channels for diplomatic communications?

X R 701.0094

740.00119 CONTROL
(JAPAN) / 12-2745

John S. Gray
for: G. A. LINCOLN
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief, Strategy & Policy Gp, OPD

Routing slip with handwritten initials and dates: *Dec 26*, *Dec 26*, *Dec 26*

JAN 2 1946

*740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 12-2745
CS/VJ*



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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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(To Keep)

RESTRICTED IVI
PRIORITY 148

~~SECRET~~
Put straight to
state

Request info from S/D upon
which to base reply.

From: Advanced Echelon, General Headquarters
Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo, Japan

To: War Department
will send to Swneel.
Information:

Commander in Chief, Army Forces Pacific,
Administration, Manila, Philippines

Nr: CAX 52301 25 September 1945

From CINCAFPAC Advn to WARGOS info CINCAFPAC CG
XXIV Corps passed cite CAX 52301.

Swedish Legation has inquired as to what extent
neutral diplomatic missions here are to continue relations
with Japanese Foreign Office and other Japanese Government
officers. Request comprehensive definition United States
policy on which to base reply to Swedish Legation and any
necessary instructions to Japanese Government and all neutral
diplomatic missions in Tokyo.

Neutral diplomatic missions here are continuing to
use Japanese radio facilities for communications to home
governments. We consider it desirable release neutral
diplomatic communications through American, rather than
Japanese channels and request policy directive in this
respect.

ACTION: JC/S

End.

INFO : Adm Leahy, CG AAF, OPD (For State), G-2, Adm King,
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CM-IN-20671 (26 Sept 45) DTG 25/1403Z vp

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AIRMAIL

Yokohama, Japan

Date sent: December 27, 1945

Date Received: ((9:02 a.m.
Jan 8, 1946

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ACTION: PD
INFO:
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SPECIAL PROJECTS
DIVISION
JAN 21 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Recd 1/18/46

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
JAN 15 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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RESTRICTED
SECURITY
TRAINING ON

4-6 December 27

Several persons of the Japanese race born in the United States and repatriated to Japan either during the war on one of the voyages of the SS GRIPSHOLM or included among the Japanese returned to Japan from the United States during recent weeks have applied to the American Army for positions as American citizens and to this office for registration.

note
130
Japanese

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Such persons have alleged that while in the United States they did not in any way renounce their American citizenship. It would therefore be helpful if this office were informed whether such persons repatriated prior to the passage of the Act of July 1, 1944 (8 U.S.C. 803) renounced their American citizenship in any way or under what provisions of existing legislation they are considered to have lost their American citizenship, if such is the case. Information would also be appreciated as to whether such persons being repatriated to Japan subsequent to the passage of the Act of July 1, 1944 have in all cases renounced their American citizenship under subsection (i) of Section 401 as amended by the above mentioned Act, including information with regard to the status of minor children accompanying those persons to Japan. It is assumed that if such minor children have not by their own act renounced or

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A-6 DECEMBER 27, 1946⁻²⁻

lost American citizenship under subsections (h) to (j), inclusive, of Section 401 they retain their American citizenship in accordance with subsection (b) of Section 403 until reaching the age of 18 years and six months whereupon they will ordinarily become subject to the presumption of expatriation under Section 402 if they continue to reside in Japan.

If available, it is thought that it would be helpful to this office as well as to the Army authorities concerned with employment to have a list of such persons who have been or are being returned to Japan and who have renounced or are otherwise considered definitely to have lost their American citizenship as it is assumed that all such persons indicated their loyalty to Japan during the war or were considered by the American authorities to be definitely disloyal to the United States.

JOHNSON

U. J/kah

Copy to US POLAD, Tokyo

AIRGRAM

3/1/6

No. A

Time

Yokohama Branch,
Office of the United States Political Adviser,
Yokohama, Japan.

Your A-6, December 27.

In order to effect exchanges of nationals with Japan Department accepted any repatriate, regardless of nationality considerations, who was willing to go to Japan and who was on preference lists made up by the Japanese Government. It is therefore possible that some repatriates were American citizens. Under law existing at time of two voyages of the Gripsholm, an American citizen could not expatriate himself while in the United States or any of its outlying possessions. While citizenship could have been lost under provisions of subsections (g) and (h) of Section 401 of the Nationality Act, by conviction for offenses mentioned in the two subsections, the Department is aware of no such convictions. Subsection (i) under which formal renunciation of nationality could be made in the United States did not become law until July 1, 1944 and did not become operative until the Attorney General prescribed regulations on October 6, 1944. Department understands that the American military authorities have copies of lists of its Japanese, whether American citizens or not, who have returned to Japan with the termination of hostilities. Department could, if necessary, furnish you with Gripsholm passenger lists. It is believed however that it would be desirable, if time permits, to place before the Department in the form of application for registration the case of any person of the Japanese race who returned to Japan after the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan and who claims to be an American citizen.

Loss of citizenship on part of parent does not result in loss of citizenship by child under 18 years of age except where subsection (a) of Section 401 or Section 407 of Nationality Act is applicable. Section 407 will not become effective until October next. Section 402 of Nationality Act applicable in general to children referred to in your telegram when they reside in Japan for period of six months after attaining the age of 18 years.

-2-

Department considers it desirable that you place before it in form above suggested the case of any person who you feel may have renounced American citizenship under Section 401 of Nationality Act rather than to endeavor to furnish you with names of persons who have renounced American nationality under the section of law just mentioned and are now in or in the future may return to Japan.

In an emergency, facts in any case may be presented to Department by telegraph for determination of citizenship.

740.00119 Control (Japan)/15-2745

PD:JJScanlan:cy
1-31-46

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

AIRGRAM
TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
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CLEAR
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Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

532

No. A -8

Feb. 5, 1946

Time

Yokohama Branch,
Office of the United States Political Adviser,
Yokohama, Japan.

Your A-6, December 27.

In order to effect exchanges of nationals with Japan Department accepted any repatriate, regardless of nationality considerations, who was willing to go to Japan and who was on preference lists made up by the Japanese Government. It is therefore possible that some repatriates were American citizens. Under law existing at time of two voyages of the Gripsholm, an American citizen could not expatriate himself while in the United States or any of its outlying possessions. While citizenship could have been lost under provisions of subsections (g) and (h) of Section 401 of the Nationality Act, by conviction for offenses mentioned in the two subsections, the Department is aware of no such convictions. Subsection (i) under which formal renunciation of nationality could be made in the United States did not become law until July 1, 1944 and did not become operative until the Attorney General prescribed regulations on October 6, 1944. Department understands that the American military authorities have copies of lists of its Japanese, whether American citizens or not, who have returned to Japan with the termination of hostilities. Department could, if necessary, furnish you with Gripsholm passenger lists. It is believed however that it would be desirable, if time permits, to place before the Department in the form of application for registration the case of any person of the Japanese race who returned to Japan after the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan and who claims to be an American citizen.

Loss of citizenship on part of parent does not result in loss of citizenship by child under 18 years of age except where subsection (a) of Section 401 or Section 407 of Nationality Act is applicable. Section 407 will not become effective until October next. Section 402 of Nationality Act applicable in general to children referred to in your telegram when they reside in Japan for period of six months after attaining the age of 18 years.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

*note
130 Japanese*

xx Japan

*Noted in
Subject file
Date 5/8/46
file 388*

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)
/12-2745
CS/D

*740.00119 Control
(Japan) / 12-2745*

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Airgram
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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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RESTRICTED
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Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Department of State

Washington,

Charge to

\$ **A-8 Feb. 5, 1946, Yokohama**

-2-

Department considers it desirable that you place before it in form above suggested the case of any person who you feel may have renounced American citizenship under Section 401 of Nationality Act rather than to endeavor to furnish you with names of persons who have renounced American nationality under the section of law just mentioned and are now in or in the future may return to Japan.

In an emergency, facts in any case may be presented to Department by telegraph for determination of citizenship.

Byrnes

Byrnes
R.S.

740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-2745

PD:JJScanlan cy
1-31-46

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

~~JA~~
ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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INCOMING TELEGRAM
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London
Dated December 27, 1945
Rec'd 10:07 p.m.

HB Copy of memo
by [unclear] 12/28/45
file
DEC 28 1945
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WTT

WASHINGTON

13611 TWENTYSEVENTH TIMES CARRIES EDITORIAL ON FORTHCOMING VISIT OF FAR EAST ADVISORY COMMISSION TO JAPAN COMMA AND LOOKS FORWARDS TO ITS RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CONTINUANCE OF THE EMPERORS POSITION PERIOD IT DECLARES THAT VISIT WILL GIVE OPPORTUNITY TO ESTIMATE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN EFFECTED BY MEASURES TAKEN AS RESULT OF CAIRO AND POTSDAM MEETINGS PERIOD EDITORIAL SAYS THAT LIBERATION OF FAR EAST FROM THREAT OF FUTURE JAPANESE AGGRESSION DEPENDS ON SUCCESS OF THESE MEASURES COMMA AND THAT FEARS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED THAT THEY HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN ADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES PERIOD IT DELCARES THAT RECENT DIRECTIVE DIVORCING SHINTOISM FROM JAPANESE STATE IS A CASE IN POINT COMMA AND GOES ON TO EXPLAIN COLON QUOTE ((THIS MEASURE AFFORDS COMMA AND GOES ON TO EXPLAIN COMMA QUOTE THE MEASURE AFFORDS AN EXCELLENT ILLUSTRATION FO THE WEAKNESS OF THE POLICY WHICH THE UNITED STATES COMMA WITH THE MOST LAUDABLE OF PLAIN

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 12-2745

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-2- #13611, Twenty-seventh, from London.

MOTIVES COMMA HAS HITHERTO PURSUED IN JAPAN PERIOD THAT POLICY SUFFERS FROM ONE FATAL DEFECT COLON IT IS IN ATTEMPT TO EFFECT A MORAL AND MATERIAL REVOLUTION IN JAPAN THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNING CLASSES PERIOD SO LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN POWER COMMA THE SOCIAL SYSTEM FOR WHICH THEY STAND WILL ENDURE PERIOD THEY MAY BOW TO THE STORM FOR THE MOMENT COMMA BUT ALL THE TIME THEY RETAIN THE LOYALTY OF THE MASSES SEMICOLON AND WHEN THEY BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO CHANGE THEIR COURSE THE MASSES WILL FOLLOW THEM PERIOD IT IS TRUE THAT JAPAN MAY FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT THAN OTHER POWERS TO REBUILD HER WAR POTENTIAL AFTER ITS SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION BY THE ALLIES SEMICOLON BUT SO LONG AS JAPAN RETAINS A SOCIAL SYSTEM OF WHICH MILITARY AGGRESSION IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE OUTCOME COMMA THE MEANS TO MAKE WAR WILL ASSUREDLY BE FORTHCOMING PERIOD UNQUOTE TIMES DECLARES THAT BOTH IN BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES OFFICIAL OPINION QUOTE HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF TRANSFORMING THE EMPEROR INTO A DEMOCRATIC MONARCH SO LONG AS THE MYTH OF HIS DIVINITY PERSISTS COMMA AND HAS BEEN RASHLY DISPOSED TO BELIEVE THAT THE IMPERIAL OFFICE COMMA LIKE ITS PRESENT OCCUPANT COMMA IS A HARMLESS SURVIVAL COMMA DANGEROUS ONLY IF EXPLOITED BY MILITARIST AMBITIONS PERIOD YET A STUDY OF JAPANESE HISTORY SINCE THE MEIJI ERA PLAINLY SHOWS THAT THE PERSONALITY OF ANY INDIVIDUAL

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-3- #13611, Twenty-seventh, From London.

EMPEROR MATTERS LITTLE COMMA WHILE THE IMPERIAL OFFICE IS THE
PIVOT UPON WHICH THE ENTIRE SOCIAL SYSTEM TURNS PERIOD
ITS EXISTENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE INDOCTRINATION OF THE JAPANESE
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SUFFICIENTLY RADICAL TO DESTROY FOR EVER THE IMPERIAL INSTITUTION
LYING AT ITS ROOT PERIOD THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FAR EAST
ADVISORY COMMISSION UPON SUCH
PROBLEMS AS THIS WILL BE OF GREAT SERVICE TO THE UNITED NATION

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-4- #13611, Twenty-seventh, from London.

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DECEMBER 27, 1945

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 27, 1945.

~~SECRET~~
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NO. 128

SUBJECT: Political Parties in Japan: Developments
During the Week Ending December 22, 1945.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 24 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

HB
JAN 24 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 114 December 18, 1945, and previous despatches transmitting weekly reports prepared at the request of the Supreme Commander on the general subject of Japanese political parties.

LR 894.00

There is transmitted hereunder a copy of a memorandum of December 24, 1945, addressed to the Supreme Commander, forwarding this Mission's report on the development of political parties for the week ending December 22, 1945, and recommending that, in view of current speculation and uncertainty, it would be advisable for the Supreme Commander to take action in the very near future to ban certain categories of persons from candidacy for the Diet; and that in connection with the clarification of this issue, it would be advisable to postpone the elections for at least one month beyond the date, January 22, which had been originally contemplated.

As an appendix to the report there is forwarded a list of the present Diet membership, classified by present party affiliation, as was suggested in a memorandum from Mr. Charles B. Fahs, Far East Division, Interim Research and Intelligence Service dated December 10, 1945, to this Mission.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *att m*

Memorandum to the Supreme
Commander, December 24,
1945, transmitting report
on Japanese Political Parties
for Week Ending
December 22, 1945.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 128 of December 27, 1945 from the United States Political Adviser, Tokyo, Japan, on the subject "Political Parties in Japan: Developments During the Week Ending December 22, 1945".

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 24, 1945.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff.

There is transmitted hereunder our eleventh weekly report on Japanese political parties submitted pursuant to the Chief of Staff's memorandum of October 3, 1945. Attached as an appendix to the report is a list of the members of each party in the recently dissolved House of Representatives.

A bombshell was thrown into political circles with the report published in all Japanese newspapers on December 21 that SCAP would take steps to disqualify from the candidacy to the House of Representatives former leaders of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and its successor organizations. It was also reported as an alternative that all members of the past Diet "recommended" by the TOJO Government would be disqualified.

In accordance with previous recommendations made by this office, it is believed that action by SCAP to ban from candidacy for the Diet persons in certain categories is necessary and would be welcomed by a large percentage of the Japanese people. As rumor of such contemplated action has now appeared in the Japanese press, we submit the recommendation that the directive should be issued with the minimum delay. Until such action is taken—or decision not to take it is announced—candidates cannot with certainty be selected by the various parties, campaign issues remain confused, and the constructive process of activating a democratic form of representative government cannot begin. In making this recommendation, we are also inclined to favor postponement of the elections for at least a month beyond the date contemplated in order to give the parties and prospective candidates time to adjust themselves to the new situation and to organize their campaigns.

George Atcheson, Jr.
Minister
U. S. Political Adviser

Enclosure:

Political Parties in Japan:
Developments During the Week
Ending December 22, 1945.

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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan, December 24, 1945.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAPAN: DEVELOPMENTS DURING

THE WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 22, 1945

With the dissolution of the Diet on December 18, most representatives who expect to be candidates for election scattered to their home province to begin their campaigns. The future of the political parties was suddenly clouded with uncertainty with the publication in the press of rumors that SCAP had insisted upon postponement of the election date, which had been reported as on or about January 24, and would issue a directive prohibiting persons in certain categories from becoming candidates for Diet seats in the coming elections. If, as rumored, members or officers of the IRAA, IRAPS, and Political Association of Great Japan, would be banned from running for office, the Progressive Party would receive an almost fatal blow. Therefore, it appeared that campaign activity on the part of members of the dissolved Diet would remain at a standstill until clarification of SCAP's intentions was obtained.

In the meantime the parties began to announce the lists of their candidates. The Progressives would enter 250 or 300, the Liberals 250, the Social Democrats a possible 300, and the Communists approximately 100. The Japan Cooperative Party, latest political party to enter the ring, announced that it would support 120 candidates. Numerous minor parties continued to appear and to announce candidates.

Observers believe that, unless the rumored directive from SCAP materializes, the Progressives will emerge with a strength of 200 or more seats. Liberals and Social Democrats may win from 100 to 150 seats each. In such case, the Liberals and Social Democrats would have a combined strength greater than the Progressives. If party strength should be considered in the selection of the next Prime Minister a coalition Cabinet might be formed, with HATOYAMA as Liberal leader, standing a good chance to head the government.

Progressive Party

The thorny question of a president for the Progressive Party was finally decided on December 18, the day of the Diet's dissolution, by the selection of MACHIDA Chuji, octogenarian Minseito politician. Certain party leaders such as, for example, SAITO Takao were said to be dissatisfied with the choice but realized that the party must maintain its unity through the coming elections in order to survive.

From 300 to 350 candidates are expected to represent the Progressives in the coming election. Most observers are agreed that, unless a directive should be issued by SCAP qualifying eligibility for election, the Progressive Party will win the largest number of seats in the elections. In spite of widespread criticism in the press and in the Diet for war responsibility, the Progressives are favored by organization and financial support which are likely to prove decisive factors.

In a press statement, TSURUMI Yusuke, secretary general of the

party,

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party, announced the slogans of the Progressives to be: 1) protection and maintenance of the national polity (Imperial institution); 2) guarantee of people's livelihood through thorough enforcement of a social welfare policy; and 3) recovery of international confidence. He attacked the Communist Party and said the Progressives would seek a social welfare policy more thorough than the American New Deal. According to Jiji Press, TSURUMI admitted that his party had no effective solution for the food supply problem "except to appeal to the Supreme Allied authorities to help us tide over this food supply crisis".

Liberal Party

One of the weaknesses of the Liberal Party is its reputation as a one-man party. People refer to it as "HATOYAMA's Party" as frequently as they call it by its rightful name. HATOYAMA's record during the war years is clean; he did not associate himself with TOJO's policies nor with the Political Association of Great Japan (Dai Nippon Seiji-Kai). Nevertheless his reputation as a liberal political leader has not improved since the formation of his party and since the Diet session. His speeches at political rallies and in the Diet have been uninspiring. He has been unable to explain away satisfactorily his action in 1933 in removing certain professors at Kyoto Imperial University when he was Minister of Education. However, he is generally conceded to be an able politician with generally liberal ideas. He is mentioned frequently as the next prime minister in a Government in which the Liberal Party might hold the balance of power in the Diet.

The Liberal Party expects to place approximately 250 candidates in the field. Since the distribution of Liberal strength parallels that of the Progressives, there will be direct competition between candidates of the two parties in most constituencies. Liberals hope to return at least 150 members to the House of Representatives, although this may be an optimistic prediction. Their greatest efforts are expected to be put forth in Tokyo, Kanagawa prefecture (Yokohama), and Hokkaido.

The Liberals, like the Progressives, are emphasizing maintenance of the national polity and the Imperial institution as the cornerstone of their policy. They are advocating a daily rice ration of 2.5 go, imports of foodstuffs and unemployment relief. They are proposing public works projects, such as construction of dams, ports, and harbors, as a solution to unemployment. They are making special appeals to the commercial classes by talking of free trade, international trade, and aid to small and medium scale industries.

Social Democratic Party

The Social Democratic Party announced on December 21 a list of 148 candidates for seats in the House of Representatives. The party has stated that additional lists will be issued and that the total number of candidates may reach 300. Among the candidates already announced is one woman, YAMAZAKI Michiko, wife of YAMAZAKI Kenji, present Diet member from Shizuoka Prefecture.

Social Democrats expect that approximately 100 of their candidates

will be

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will be successful in the coming elections. In a statement to the press, KATAYAMA Tetsu, secretary general of the party, said that his party alone was capable of shouldering responsibility in the present situation, that Japan's plight was the result of "capitalistic politics". He stated that the Social Democratic Party would not suffer a disadvantage because its candidates were relatively unknown men, that the Japanese voters now would attach more importance to parties than to individuals.

Although repercussions of the ONO incident (described in this office's report "Political Parties in Japan: Developments during the week ending December 15, 1945") have subsided, speculation is still rife as to the ability of the Social Democratic Party to prevent a secession of its left wing group. Many of these members are said to favor close cooperation with the Communist Party but still fear the "Red" label. Farthest to the left in the Social Democratic Party is said to be TAKATSU Seido, incidentally the author of a book published on November 25 entitled "Causes of Soviet Victory and German Defeat" (Soren no Shoin to Doitsu no hain). Both TAKATSU and MATSUMOTO Jii-chiro are said to advocate a united front with the Communists.

SHIGA Yoshio, Communist Party leader, in an interview with officers of GHQ and the writer on December 20, quoted a recent statement by NISHIO Suehiro that the Liberal and Progressive Parties but not the Communist Party are the enemies of the Social Democrats. NISHIO is said to belong to the "Center" faction within the Social Democratic Party and to have been previously strongly anti-Communist in sentiment. SHIGA attributes NISHIO's present favorable attitude and that of other Social Democrats to a fear of being named war criminals by the Communist Party. He believes that increasing numbers of Social Democrats would like to affiliate with the Communists but their feeling of subservience to the Emperor is still too strong to permit them to change allegiance. SHIGA cited two examples of members of Social Democratic Party local branches having left their own party to join the Communists. He asserted that in Ibaraki prefecture the local branch of the Social Democrats had gone over completely to the Communists and that in Tochigi prefecture at a meeting of delegates of the Social Democratic Party, 70% of those in attendance had walked out of the meeting announcing their intention to join the Communist Party.

The Communist Party

The Communist Party by December 22 had presented a list of 66 candidates for seats in the House of Representatives in the coming elections and states that at least 103 persons will finally be named to represent the party. The 66 candidates are distributed through 30 prefectures; the party states that it expects to enter candidates in at least 33 prefectures. One of the Communist candidates is SUZUKI Tonin, former chief of the Foreign Department of Yomiuri-Hochi newspaper and leader of the recent strike against the paper's owner, SHORIKI Matsutaro.

In the interview of December 20 mentioned above, SHIGA Yoshio stated that the Communist Party was making steady progress in Japan. He said that evidences of the party's gaining strength could be found in the trade union movement, the peasant movement, and the increasing signs of pro-Communist sentiment within the ranks of the Social Democratic Party. He stated that the trade union movement was progressing

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toward the "One Big Union" idea in which the Communists were cooperating. Two agrarian organizations, the Peasants Committee (Nomin Iin-kai), sponsored by the Communists and the Peasants Union (Nomin Kumisi) sponsored by the Social Democrats, were beginning to cooperate and their eventual union is expected. Efforts are being made in local districts to unite the delegates from both groups and upon this basis, the calling of a National Peasants Representatives Congress (Zenkoku Nomin Daihyosha Kaigi) is contemplated.

SHIGA stated that the Communist Party was anxious to cooperate with the Social Democrats in both the trade union and agrarian movements and that it was hoped unity could be achieved. He specified that Communist support would be conditional upon maintenance of democratic principles by these groups. As an example of the desire of certain Social Democrats to cooperate with the Communists he remarked that three of the Socialist leaders, HIRANO Rikizo, KURODA Hisao, and OKADA Sojo, had proposed a meeting with SHIGA to talk over these problems.

According to SHIGA, the Communist Party is likewise willing to cooperate with other political groups in achieving democratic reforms in Japan. He states that such cooperation might take the form of a "Democratic League" growing out of the present "People's Emancipation League" (Jinmin Kaiho Kenmei) and that the party is ready to leave aside the controversial Emperor question in forming such an organization, believing that a process of political education will gradually win adherence to the Communist support of a people's republic in place of a monarchy.

The Communist Youth Movement, inaugurated at the time of the Party Congress in early December, appeals to Japanese youth under the age of 26. It is its principle deliberately to omit from discussion the Emperor system but to work toward the propagation of communism among youth. A publication to be called Flag of Youth is scheduled to appear at the end of December and the establishment of a school is contemplated.

News of the arrival in Seoul, Korea of NOSAKA Sanji (alias NOSAKA Tetsu, OKANO Susumu) and his group of Japanese Communists from Yen-an, North China, has been greeted with elation by the party headquarters in Tokyo. In a statement issued to the press on December 20, the party expressed a wish for the speedy arrival in Japan of NOSAKA and his group and again denied rumors of a disagreement in policy between the Yen-an and Tokyo organizations.

Japan Cooperative Party

On December 18, day of the dissolution of the Diet, a new party was formed by Diet members who have remained independent up to the present time. It was called the Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyodo-to) and with 26 members in the dissolved House of Representatives became the third strongest party from the point of view of representation in the past Diet. Leaders are KUROSAWA Torazo, butter manufacturer of Hokkaido long active in the cooperative movement, FUNADA Naka (Chu), and SENGOKU Kotaro, member of the House of Peers and former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Marquis TOKUGAWA Yoshichika served notice on December 19 that he was resigning his membership in

the Social

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the Social Democratic Party in order to join the newly formed Cooperative Party.

The party advocates maintenance of the Imperial institution, establishment of a democratic political system, autonomy for labor, and the reconstruction of industry, economy, and culture on the basis of the cooperative principle. The group is apparently composed of persons who desire social reform but are not prepared to advocate the substitution of socialism for capitalism. At the same time they are not attracted by the platforms or the personalities of the Progressive and Liberal Parties.

The Cooperative Party has announced that it will sponsor 120 candidates in the forthcoming elections. Until more is known of the party's program and membership, it is difficult to evaluate its popular appeal or its future in Japanese politics.

Other Parties

The appearance of new parties continued unabated. On December 15, representatives of several organizations which have been endeavoring to sponsor the political emergence of General UGAKI Kazushige met to form a new party to be called the Democratic Party (Minshu-to). General UGAKI has apparently refused to become president of the party, at least for the time being, and the position is being left vacant with the hope that he will see fit to occupy it at a later time.

On December 19 the People's Rights Cooperative Association was forced under the leadership of MITAMURA Takeo, Diet member from Gifu Prefecture. Thirty candidates to run in the coming elections have been announced.

Also on December 19 was formed the Japan Bright Life Party (Nippon Minsei-kai) headed by TAKAHASHI Kensuke. This party supports the "establishment of a government of all the people under the Emperor".

The platform of the Japan People's Party (Nihon Minto), to be inaugurated shortly, was announced on December 19. The party proposes a cooperative society organized on democratic principles under the Emperor, advocates the guarantee of human rights, international democracy, democratization of finance, industry, education, the socialization of the rationing system, autonomous management of labor, and farmers cooperatives. 16 candidates for seats in the House of Representatives have been announced, including ISHIKAWA Tatsuzu, well-known novelist. Organizers of the party are reported to be principally journalists and persons without previous experience in politics.

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