centralization program. The strength of individual Municipal Police Forces will be in accord with the police ratios established by the aforementioned Municipal Police Law.

Incl:
1. Proposed Distribution of Japanese Police
2. Chart 119 Local Autonomous Police Forces
3. Chart, Control and Coordination, National Police
4. Chart, Organizational Structure, National Police
5. Chart, Headquarters, National Police Force
6. Chart, Regional (District) Headquarters, National Police Force
7. Chart, Prefectural (Troop) Headquarters, National Police Force
8. Chart, Overall Organization, Municipal Police Force
9. Chart, Patrol Bureau Organization
10. Chart, Patrol Area Organization
11. Chart, Patrol Division Organization
12. Chart, Detective Bureau Organization
13. Chart, Traffic Bureau Organization
14. Chart, Juvenile Bureau Organization
15. Chart, Technical Services Bureau Organization
16. Chart, Personnel Bureau Organization
17. Chart, Training Bureau Organization
18. Chart, Chain of Command

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POLICE



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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

PROPOSED PERSONNEL STRENGTH

TOTAL —— 125,000 INCLUDING
RURAL POLICE 30,000

CURRENT PERSONNEL STRENGTH (15 OCT 46)
AUTHORIZED - 93,935
ACTUAL —— 89,022

NUMBER INSIDE PREFECTURE
INDICATES TOTAL PROPOSED POLICE STRENGTH

PROPOSED POLICE RATIOS

ONE POLICEMAN PER 585 POPULATION
ONE RURAL POLICEMAN PER 1,697 RURAL POPULATION



DISTRICT II
7,890 RURAL POLICE
16,373 TOTAL

DISTRICT III
7,200 RURAL POLICE
24,112 TOTAL

DISTRICT IV
6,600 RURAL POLICE
33,910 TOTAL

DISTRICT V
1,920 RURAL POLICE
4,597 TOTAL

DISTRICT VI
4,530 RURAL POLICE
15,975 TOTAL

LEGEND
COMMAND CHANNELS
HEADQUARTERS TO REGION
REGION TO TROOP

$$(\text{PROPOSED STRENGTH})_n = \frac{4}{3}(\text{AUTHORIZED STRENGTH})_n + \delta$$

$$(\text{PROPOSED RURAL POLICE STRENGTH})_n = \frac{[(\text{TOTAL POPULATION})_n - (\text{URBAN POPULATION})_n]}{\sum_{N=1}^{N=46} (\text{RURAL POPULATION})_N} \cdot \text{TOTAL PROPOSED RURAL POLICE STRENGTH} + \epsilon$$

N = PREFECTURE
δ, ϵ = CORRECTION FACTORS

GHQ · SCAP

NUMBER

119 LOCAL AUTONOMOUS POLICE FORCES CITIES OVER 50,000 POPULATION

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



Jul 2

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Outline of Japan's Internal Security Scheme with VALENTINE-OLANDER based Police Reorganization Plan



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



Proposed
NATIONAL RURAL POLICE
J A P A N

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009



20 Police Districts of 29 Districts in Chiba will be rural under the plan

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

Incl 5

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Due 6



NOTE:
* Sections will maintain files of information pertinent to district.

DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

Encl 7



NOTE:
* Number of sub-sectors to be determined in individual troops by number of policemen employed.
One Ass't Inspector to 50 Policemen suggested.

TROOP HEADQUARTERS
ORGANIZATION

'NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Incl 7



NOTE:
* Number of sub-sectors to be determined in individual troops by number of policemen employed.
One Ass't Inspector to 50 Policemen suggested.

TROOP HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL RURAL POLICE



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 77-5009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



CHART No. I

DEPARTMENT OVERALL

LINE AUTHORITY ———

LINE ACTIVITIES

STAFF ACTIVITIES

Incl 8

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009





CHART NO. 2

PATROL BUREAU OVERALL

Exh 7

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009



311 - Omori Division
312 - Higashi-Chofu Div.
313 - Kamata Division
314 - Tamagawa Division
315 - Himonya Division

321 - Setagaya Division
322 - Seijo Division
323 - Shibuya Division
324 - Harajuku Division
325 - Yoyogi Division

331 - Shinagawa Division
332 - Oi Division
333 - Osaki Division
334 - Meguro Division
335 - Ebara Division

CHART NO. 3

PATROL INSPECTION AREA

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



311 - Omori Division
312 - Higashi-Chofu Div.
313 - Kamata Division
314 - Tamagawa Division
315 - Himonya Division

321 - Setagaya Division
322 - Seijo Division
323 - Shibuya Division
324 - Harajuku Division
325 - Yoyogi Division

331 - Shinagawa Division
332 - Oi Division
333 - Osaki Division
334 - Meguro Division
335 - Ebara Division

CHART NO. 3

PATROL INSPECTION AREA

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

PATROL BUREAU
PATROL AREA 3
DISTRICT 32

DIVISION #324
Captain Commanding

DAY WATCH
8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
Lieutenant in Charge

RELIEF
LIEUTENANT

SERGEANT | SERGEANT | SERGEANT | SERGEANT

POLICEMEN Police Boxes | POLICEMEN Police Booths | POLICEMEN Foot Patrol | POLICEMEN Radio Patrol | POLICEMEN Temporary Assignmts

NIGHT WATCH
4:30 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Lieutenant in Charge

SERGEANT | SERGEANT | SERGEANT | SERGEANT | SERGEANT

POLICEMEN Police Boxes | POLICEMEN Police Booths | POLICEMEN Foot Patrol | POLICEMEN Radio Patrol | POLICEMEN Temporary Assignmts

MORNING WATCH
12:30 a. m. to 9 a.m.
Lieutenant in Charge



CHART NO. 4

PATROL DIVISION

Exh 11

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. 775009



each of 3 watches

HOMICIDE DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Homicides - Assaults
Rape - Kidnapping

ROBBERY DIVISION
Captain Commanding

BURGLARY DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Burglaries-Thefts
Pawnshop Supervision

FORGERY DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Forgery-Counterfeithg

PICKPOCKET & BUNCO
DIV. Captain Comdg

FUGITIVE DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Inter--Departmental
Apprehensions

NARCOTIC DIVISION
Captain Commanding

AUTO THEFT DIVISION
Captain Commanding

MISSING PERSONS DIV.
Captain Commanding
(Adults only)

HOSPITAL DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Psychopathic Cases

SCIENTIFIC CRIME LAB
Captain Commanding

DIVISIONS
111 112 113
114 115 116

DIVISIONS
121 122 123
124 125 126
127

DIVISIONS
131 132 133
134 135 136

DETECTIVE AREA 2
Inspector Commanding

DISTRICT 21
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
211 212 213
214 215

DISTRICT 22
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
221 222 223
224 225

DISTRICT 23
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
231 232 233
234 235 236

DETECTIVE AREA 3
Inspector Commanding

DISTRICT 31
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
311 312 313
314 315

DISTRICT 32
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
321 322 323
324 325

DISTRICT 33
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
331 332 333
334 335

DETECTIVE AREA 4
Inspector Commanding

DISTRICT 41
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
411 412 413
414

DISTRICT 42
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
421 422 423
424

DISTRICT 43
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
431 432 433
434 435

DETECTIVE AREA 5

DISTRICT 51
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
511 512 513
514 515

DISTRICT 52
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
521 522 523
524 525

DISTRICT 53
Captain Comdg
DIVISIONS
531 532 533
534 535

NOTE: A Detective Lieutenant is in charge of the Detective Sergeants assigned to each division.

CHART NO. 5

DETECTIVE BUREAU

Fld 12

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009



CHART NO. 6

Incl 13

TRAFFIC BUREAU

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009





CHART NO. 7

JUVENILE CONTROL BUREAU

Lieutenant in charge each UNIT
Lieutenant in charge each DISTRICT
Sergeant in charge each DIVISION

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

TECHNICAL SERVICES BUREAU
DEPUTY CHIEF
DIRECTOR

Deputy Chief Inspector
Assistant Director

COMMUNICATION DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Intra- and Inter-Departmental
Communications
Telegraph - Radio - Teletype
Telephone - Mail - Messenger

RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION
DIVISION
Inspector Commanding
Crime Reports Arrest Reports
Pawnshop Records
Correspondence Records
Warrant & Fingerprint Files
Criminal Identification Files
Lost and Found Files

STATISTICAL DIVISION
. Captain Commanding
Preparation of Statistical
Reports on crimes committed,
Arrests and Dispositions
Modus Operandi - Crime trends
Property loss and recoveries
Operation & Maintenance Costs

JAIL DIVISION
Inspector Commanding
Direct supervision of Housing
Feeding, Clothing, Medication
and Bedding of prisoners held
in principal jails. Staff
supervision of jails in the 78
geographic Divisions

RADIO TECHNICAL DIVISION
Radio Engineer Commanding
Construction, Installation
and maintenance of mobile
and stationary broadcasting
and receiving equipment

PROPERTY DIVISION
CAPTAIN COMMANDING
Custody of Physical Evidence
of Crimes
Custody of Found Property
Custody of Personal Property
of Prisoners

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Intra- and Inter-Departmental Communications
Telegraph - Radio - Teletype
Telephone - Mail - Messenger

RECORDS AND IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
Inspector Commanding
Crime Reports Arrest Reports
Pawnshop Records
Correspondence Records
Warrant & Fingerprint Files
Criminal Identification Files
Lost and Found Files

STATISTICAL DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Preparation of Statistical Reports on crimes committed, Arrests and Dispositions
Modus Operandi - Crime trends
Property loss and recoveries
Operation & Maintenance Costs

FINANCE DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Payrolls for Dep't Employees
Payment of Salaries
Preparation of Budget
Payment for Purchases

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
Inspector Commanding
Purchase, Maintenance, and Distribution of Mobile Equipment; of gas, oil, tires, auto parts, and batteries. Operation of repair and Storage garages, and service stations
Operation of wreckers, towcars and Maintenance vehicles

Inspector Commanding
Direct supervision of Housing Feeding, Clothing, Medication and Bedding of prisoners held in principal jails. Staff supervision of jails in the 78 geographic Divisions

RADIO TECHNICAL DIVISION
Radio Engineer Commanding
Construction, Installation and maintenance of mobile and stationary broadcasting and receiving equipment

PROPERTY DIVISION
CAPTAIN COMMANDING
Custody of Physical Evidence of Crimes
Custody of Found Property
Custody of Personal Property of Prisoners

SUPPLY DIVISION
Captain Commanding
Purchase, Storage, & Distribution of food, clothing, & other jail supplies; Stationery, forms, and office supplies; and of uniforms & personal equipment of policemen. Maintenance of police buildings. Purchase and distribution of all departmental equipment except Automotive

PRINTING DIVISION
MASTER PRINTER IN CHARGE
Printing of departmental forms
Police Publications
Multigraphing & Mimeographing

CHART NO. 8

TECHNICAL SERVICES BUREAU

Jul 15

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

PERSONNEL BUREAU
DEPUTY CHIEF
DIRECTOR

DEPUTY CHIEF INSPECTOR
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

DEPLOYMENT DIVISION
Inspector Commanding

ASSIGNMENT, TRANSFER, AND REASSIGNMENT OF ALL PERSONNEL TO THE VARIOUS UNITS OF THE DEPARTMENT ON BASIS OF LOCATION OF RESIDENCE AND DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

RECRUITMENT DIVISION
Inspector Commanding

RECRUITMENT OF NEW PERSONNEL POLICEMEN, POLICEWOMEN, CLERICAL AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES

PROMOTION OF PERSONNEL ON CIVIL SERVICE BASIS

PERSONNEL DIVISION
Inspector Commanding

PERSONNEL RECORDS
Individual
Achievements - Complaints
Commendations — Awards
Disciplinary Action Taken

EMPLOYEE RELATIONS DIVISION
Captain Commanding

PERSONAL ADVICE TO EMPLOYEES
Financial — Domestic Relations

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

DEPLOYMENT DIVISION
Inspector Commanding

ASSIGNMENT, TRANSFER, AND REASSIGNMENT OF ALL PERSONNEL TO THE VARIOUS UNITS OF THE DEPARTMENT ON BASIS OF LOCATION OF RESIDENCE AND DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

RECRUITMENT DIVISION
Inspector Commanding

RECRUITMENT OF NEW PERSONNEL POLICEMEN, POLICEWOMEN, CLERICAL AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES

PROMOTION OF PERSONNEL ON CIVIL SERVICE BASIS

PERSONNEL DIVISION
Inspector Commanding

PERSONNEL RECORDS
Individual
Achievements - Complaints
Commendations — Awards
Disciplinary Action Taken
Personal Improvement Efforts
Physical Records

DISCIPLINARY ACTION
FINES — SUSPENSIONS - RESIGNATIONS
DISCHARGES - REPRIMANDS

JUDGE ADVOCATE FOR BOARD OF RIGHTS

PERSONNEL INVESTIGATORS

EMPLOYEE RELATIONS DIVISION
Captain Commanding

PERSONAL ADVICE TO EMPLOYEES
Financial — Domestic Relations

ASSISTANCE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF, AND OPERATION OF EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS
(Social — Financial - Insurance)
For maintenance of Employee Morale & Departmental Efficiency

HEAR AND ACT ON COMPLAINTS RE WORKING CONDITIONS, AND ANY OTHER MATTERS EFFECTING EMPLOYEE MORALE

CHART NO. 9

PERSONNEL BUREAU

Sept 16

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 77500





CHART NO. 10

TRAINING BUREAU

Jul 17

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
CHAIN OF COMMAND
AND POSITION TITLES

CHIEF OF POLICE

CHIEF INSPECTOR
Inspection Duties
Member of
Board of Inquiry
Board of Tactics
NO LINE AUTHORITY

ASSISTANT CHIEF

DEPUTY CHIEF

DEPUTY CHIEF INSPECTOR

INSPECTOR

ASSISTANT INSPECTOR

CAPTAIN



CHAIN OF COMMAND

POSITION TITLES

Exhibit 18

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG No. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

BRIEF OF THE VALENTINE REPORT

1. The Public Safety Division survey of Police organization and operation in Metropolitan Japanese cities (over 50,000 population) made by Mr. Lewis J. Valentine indicates a need in Japan for local police departments responsible to autonomous municipal governments, and capable of performing public safety and crime prevention function in accordance with local needs which vary with the size of each municipality and its geographic location.

2. Japanese police organizations subsequent to the occupation were responsible through prefectural governors to the Home Ministry. They entered into and largely controlled every phase of Japanese life, were highly paternalistic, and were keyed to enhancing the political welfare of high governmental officials.

3. The proposed reorganization of Metropolitan police departments in Japan follows the effective American standards as evidenced in the function, organization and operation of the New York City Police Department and encompasses the removal of police intervention from every phase of public and private life of the people, the evolving of a police organization to be the servants - not the masters - of the Japanese people, and the raising of the morale of the policeman wherein they become proud of their position in the community, respected by their fellow townspeople and instilled with a desire to adequately serve their community along democratic lines.

4. The objectives of reorganization can be secured through an adequate municipal civil service for administrative and operating personnel, a police commission responsible to the elected municipal government, provision for adequate recruit and inservice training, improvement in equipment and facilities and modernization of organization and techniques as specifically emphasized in the report.

5. It is therefore recommended:

a. That municipal metropolitan police departments be established in cities over 50,000 population, responsible through a police commission to the elected head of the municipality.

b. That the organization, operation and functions of the New York City Police Department be followed as a model for the reorganization.

c. That the Valentine report be approved as an implementing

become proud of their position in the community, respected by their fellow townspeople and instilled with a desire to adequately serve their community along democratic lines.

4. The objectives of reorganization can be secured through an adequate municipal civil service for administrative and operating personnel, a police commission responsible to the elected municipal government, provision for adequate recruit and inservice training, improvement in equipment and facilities and modernization of organization and techniques as specifically emphasized in the report.

5. It is therefore recommended:

a. That municipal metropolitan police departments be established in cities over 50,000 population, responsible through a police commission to the elected head of the municipality.

b. That the organization, operation and functions of the New York City Police Department be followed as a model for the reorganization.

c. That the Valentine report be approved as an implementing guide for the long range program of the reorganization and that the various changes so recommended be gradually placed in operation.

Tab C

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

BRIEF OF THE OLANDER REPORT

1. The Public Safety Division survey made by Mr. Oscar G. Olander proposes an organization for a rural police force (to include cities of less than 50,000 population). The organization as presented presupposes enactment of legislation authorizing a rural police force at either national, which is recommended, or prefectural level and metropolitan police forces for cities of over 50,000 population, and the establishment of agencies to absorb certain non-police activities.

2. Review of the existing police system indicated a low efficiency in the functioning of the police. They had "lost face" among their own countrymen, their equipment was in disrepair and they operated with inefficiency induced by extraneous and duplication of functions.

3. The recommended and proposed structural organization at national level would have a Headquarters with three major subdivisions under an appointed Director. Functional operation would be from National Headquarters through six Districts, further subdivided into Troop Areas contingent upon population and geographical boundaries, and operated by Civil Service personnel. Provision is made for a National Police Academy open to rural and metropolitan police; an adequate communication system to include voice radio equipment; a traffic safety bureau handling traffic control, accident prevention, licensing of drivers and traffic education; and a Criminal Investigation (detective) Division embracing all known specialized methods of crime detection and prevention.

4. If enabling laws limit rural police to prefectural level, the organization would be patterned after the proposed national system, but on a reduced basis. However, should the rural police be established at prefectural level, there should be established a National Police Academy, a National Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, a National Bureau of Identification, and a National Police Communication System for efficiency of operation.

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5. It is therefore recommended:

a. That a National Rural Police System be established to serve rural areas and cities of less than 50,000 population and with police power to operate anywhere in Japan.

b. That operation of a National Rural Police System be through an appointed head responsible to an elected government official and with career personnel under civil service.

c. That the organization, operation, and functions of a Rural Police System, as outlined in the Olander report, be adopted.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

BRIEF OF METROPOLITAN POLICE REPORT

1. The survey and study made by Public Safety Division, Civil Intelligence Section, G-2, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on the Metropolitan Police of Japan indicates that there is a definite need in Japan for a complete reorganization of the police system, in order that law enforcement may function properly under the new constitution, be free from the influence of local politicians, that public respect may be gained by the Japanese police for the first time and that the taxpayers may secure the utmost in protection of life and property for the money expended for this purpose.

2. The present Metropolitan Police law enforcement program and system is antiquated with a complicated functional organization existing at national, prefectural, and district levels. The Japanese police have operated under feudalistic concepts, enforcing the laws of the nation with the support of courts that dealt with the liberty of the Japanese in a merciless manner. It was not found necessary to advance police science in order to keep abreast of advancement in criminal techniques. Accordingly, there is a definite lack of transportation, modern communication, and investigative facilities, which in turn promotes poor police efficiency. The lack of adequate police salaries, retirement provisions, and employee benefits does not attract young men and women of higher intelligence to the police force.

3. It is recommended that:

a. The Metropolitan Police Departments in cities of over fifty thousand (50,000) population should be managed by a single head, assisted by a vice-administrator, operating through an established chain of command.

b. All duties now performed by the police that have no place in the accepted category of police responsibilities should be transferred to other agencies as agencies for the handling of such duties are organized and placed in operation.

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a. The Metropolitan Police Departments in cities of over fifty thousand (50,000) population should be managed by a single head, assisted by a vice-administrator, operating through an established chain of command.

b. All duties now performed by the police that have no place in the accepted category of police responsibilities should be transferred to other agencies as agencies for the handling of such duties are organized and placed in operation.

c. A separate civil service system should be established comparable with American standards, associated with an adequate pay scale, retirement, and sick benefits.

d. Police training, both recruit and in-service, should be strengthened and instruction in modern police methods be substituted in police school curriculums for subjects that are of no importance in developing efficient and well trained police officers.

Date

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

BRIEF OF

NATIONAL POLICE PLANNING GROUP REPORT

1. The existing Japanese Police System is a quasi-National-Prefectural organization, operating under the rather loose supervision of the Home Minister, with the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry functioning as a staff, major policy-making, coordinating body without actual line or operational control over the Prefectural Police Departments. Hence, clear-cut channels of command and responsibility are lacking.

2. The rules governing police operations, selection, promotion and removal of personnel, as well as salary scales, are not uniform, varying in the individual Prefectures.

3. The Japanese police are engaged in numerous extraneous activities that go far beyond the American conception of police functions.

4. A new Democracy is being created in which the people are inexperienced in self-government and not sure of their fundamental rights and privileges under the new system. Japan has no Army, Navy or Militia to control wide-spread lawlessness or serious domestic disorders. When the police of Japan fail, the opposition can take over, be they racketeers, gangsters or anarchists, and the people will be at their mercy. Crime is National in scope and must be approached on a uniform National basis.

5. To meet the present day police problems of Japan, a strong, well-trained, mobile, efficient and economical National Police Department, free from the ravages of local politicians, capable of effectively enforcing the laws, preserving peace and order, and of guaranteeing the people those rights and privileges incorporated in the new Constitution, is needed.

6. It is recommended that:

a. A National Police Department be created, using the present personnel, facilities and equipment as a nucleus, to be supervised by a qualified Executive Head, appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Diet.

b. The authority, jurisdiction, duties and responsibilities

inexperienced in self-government and not sure of their fundamental rights and privileges under the new system. Japan has no Army, Navy or Militia to control wide-spread lawlessness or serious domestic disorders. When the police of Japan fail, the opposition can take over, be they racketeers, gangsters or anarchists, and the people will be at their mercy. Crime is National in scope and must be approached on a uniform National basis.

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6. It is recommended that:

a. A National Police Department be created, using the present personnel, facilities and equipment as a nucleus, to be supervised by a qualified Executive Head, appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Diet.

b. The authority, jurisdiction, duties and responsibilities of the Police Department be clearly defined, and all extraneous duties transferred to other appropriate governmental agencies.

c. A modern pyramid-type organizational structure be set up with clear-cut channels of command and responsibility.

d. The personnel management system be revised and modernized to attract and keep men of character and ability in the police service.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009

BRIEF OF THE SAITAMA POLICE SURVEY REPORT

1. The survey of the Saitama Police, conducted with the aim of becoming thoroughly acquainted with a predominantly rural prefecture, resulted in compilation of information relative to police organization, operation, administration, personnel, equipment, installations and facilities as they exist in the rural areas of a typical prefecture.

2. It was found that terrain conformation, wherein 25% of the total area is mountainous, results in 92% of the population (over 1,500,000 people) centering in the remaining 75% (approximately 1113 sq. miles) or lowlands of the prefecture.

3. Police organization, administration and operations, as practiced in Saitama's twenty-seven (27) police districts, indicate a lack of uniformity in the police structure and wholesale duplications of effort, specifically in administrative matters. Motor vehicle equipment is for the most part reserved for transportation of higher police officials, while the major portion of police work is performed on foot or bicycle. Weapons are available for about 30% of the personnel, however, they are generally maintained in a reserve status. Communications when in repair, are adequate for the present type of organization but are not suited to a rural police force as such.

4. Police treatment of detained suspects, while not physically brutual, is, in combination with lock-up conditions, generally conducive to early confessions of guilt. Police chiefs exercise their summary power to levy fines up to ¥20 and/or to adjudge confinement up to 30 days. Procurators seldom exercise their legal control of the so-called "judicial police".

5. The individual policeman, technically on twenty-four hour duty, operates similarly to a small town policeman in the United States. He is required to perform duties connected with police station maintenance, i.e., night switchboard duty, lock-up duty, etc., for one-quarter to one-third of his time. During his absence the policeman's family, residing in the police box, constitute the only police contact

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Tab G

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

BRIEF OF REPORT OF FIRE BRANCH

1. The Public Safety Division surveys conducted by Mr. George W. Angell present a reorganization which presupposes legislation establishing a national Japanese fire defense system.

2. Japan's vulnerability to fire emulates from a fatalistic viewpoint placing fires among things inevitable. Existing water facilities, city planning, building laws, fire prevention codes, fire apparatus and equipment, administrative organization, training schools and personnel standards negate efficiency and make conflagrations ever imminent.

3. Need for an efficient fire defense, incorporating the broader phases of fire suppression and prevention, to curtail the losses now affecting the economic structure is evidenced by a loss equivalent to 4.8% of the 1946 national budget.

4. To provide for an adequate Japanese fire defense, it is necessary that: (1) fire departments be a distinct component part of government, (2) water supplies be increased, (3) transmission of fire alarms be reliable and prompt, and (4) properly equipped apparatus be provided.

5. A review of implementing requirements disclosed that divided, overlapping and dual enforcement of fire responsibilities by unqualified police officials presents no valid reason for maintenance of status quo; that the basic principles of democracy suggests municipal controls; and that accrued advantages of national control in mass purchasing power, simplification in dealing with a single government agency and establishing essential mutual aid plans between cities is essential.

6. The proposed organization coordinates under a National Fire Defense Board all related fire defense functions and provides for effective enforcement of fire regulations; standardization of facilities, apparatus and equipment; and uniformity of fire suppression techniques.

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6. The proposed organization coordinates under a National Fire Defense Board all related fire defense functions and provides for effective enforcement of fire regulations; standardization of facilities, apparatus and equipment; and uniformity of fire suppression techniques.

7. It is therefore recommended:

a. That a National Fire Defense Board, which will consolidate under civil service reforms all activities pertinent to Japan's fire security, be established within the Home Ministry.

b. That present facilities be remodeled to insure adequate fire flow and an ample rapid response of fire apparatus.

c. That a program be initiated which will provide all Japanese fire departments with sufficient modern fire apparatus.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

BRIEF OF COMMUNICATIONS REPORT

1. The survey made by the Public Safety Division of the existing Japanese Police Communications System (radio and wire nets) indicates that definite readjustments are necessary to provide more adequate police communications coverage for all of Japan within the aims of the occupation.

2. The Japanese Police Communications System has little in common with accepted police communication standards as it carries non-police traffic concerning control of health, welfare and general National problems. Little maintenance has been exercised on the wire or wire systems terminal equipment (switchboards, repeaters, telephones) since Japan went on a full-war basis. Consequently, there is evidence of disintegration of preventative maintenance routine. The police wire system is separate from any other agency and is completely government owned. The fairly new radio system, intended as a war adjunct to the badly damaged wire system, is in good working order, and operates with a satisfactory degree of operational efficiency. It is Nationally owned and controlled by the Home Ministry. Plans for the expansion of the radio net have been ready for months with two hundred and thirty-seven (237) tertiary (3rd level) stations ready to operate upon SCAP authorization. There are also one hundred and twenty-seven (127) tertiary stations now in the planning stage.

3. A good police communications system should be fast, dependable and accurate, with a considerable degree of secrecy. The Japanese system has the basic principals to supply all these factors.

4. Accordingly, it is recommended that:

a. A program of general repair, replacement and maintenance of present wire facilities be inaugurated.

b. Steps be taken to place in satisfactory operation, wire communications between all police installations within the system, and the supervising police district stations, and the advisability investigated of leasing commercial lines rather than reconstructing certain independent lines of the wire system now in disrepair.

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b. Steps be taken to place in satisfactory operation, wire communications between all police installations within the system, and the supervising police district stations, and the advisability investigated of leasing commercial lines rather than reconstructing certain independent lines of the wire system now in disrepair.

c. The police be permitted to put into operation the tertiary radio stations that are now completed and equipped, and that they further develop and complete this radio net-work.

d. That the Communication Report be approved as an implementing guide in the long range program of reconstructing the Japanese communication system.

Tab I

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 77509

BRIEF OF JAPANESE POLICE TRAINING REPORT

1. The Public Safety Division Survey and Report on Training the Japanese Police indicates that police methods will have to be changed to meet the aims of the Occupation. Policing under a democratic system is more complex and requires many more skills than were formerly required under an autocratic system.

2. The present Japanese training is neither uniform nor coordinated. Present instructors do not understand or teach democratic police methods. All police training should be stopped except in certain basic subjects because it is doing more harm than good.

3. The overall efficiency of police must be raised for effective democratic law enforcement. This can be accomplished through the coordination of selection, promotion, training, and welfare activities, by the establishment of a personnel agency within the police system on national and prefecture levels and the adoption of a long range training program based on a job analysis of police duties.

4. It is therefore recommended that:

a. Present police training be stopped until a key group of instructors and administrators can be trained to form the nucleus of training instructors necessary to accomplish this mission.

b. All 93,000 police personnel be retrained in democratic police methods.

c. A central personnel agency be established within the police system to coordinate selection, training, promotion, and welfare of employees.

d. Police Administrators from Public Safety Division skilled in modern police training methods advise, observe and study the training program in operation in order to correct deficiencies that develop, meet new problems, and recommend such changes in personnel as conditions indicate.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
Public Safety Division

APO 500
5 August 1947

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Democratic Stable Government and Internal Security Power Implements

1. The purpose of this paper is to point out to proponents of complete decentralization of government the impracticability of universal application of such a principle. Also, that full consideration should be given all factors to include the years of recorded historical precedent in states government before final judgement is made to deny Japan the proper internal security power implements.

2. The post war surrender policies adopted by the Far Eastern Commission state in part as follows:

a. "Japan is not to have any army, navy, airforce, secret police organization, gendarmerie, or any civil aviation, but may have adequate civilian police forces".

b. "The judicial, legal and police system shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies adopted by the FEC, and it shall be the duty of all judicial, legal and police officers to protect individual liberties and civil rights".

c. "According to the judgement and discretion of the Supreme Commander the Japanese Government may be permitted to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration".

3. Government Means Power

a. The basic functions of government are simple in essence and are characterized in most states in a three com-

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

2. [illegible] Eastern Commission state in part as follows:

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c. "According to the judgement and discretion of the Supreme Commander the Japanese Government may be permitted to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration".

3. Government Means Power

a. The basic functions of government are simple in essence and are characterized in most states in a three compartmented structure as LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL and EXECUTIVE. These expressions broadly define the powers which people in modern democratic states have found it expedient to delegate to government, for the purpose of relieving the people of these responsibilities which must be provided for, in order that individuals may pursue their normal vocations without undue fear of oppression or violation of individual rights and liberties.

b. In order to establish and perpetuate representative government, it is necessary that the form of government, laws and activities by which the people are governed, be determined and crystalized in a basic document usually termed a Constitution. Implementation of the basic principles thus established come under periodic scrutiny by elected representatives of the people. These activities are known generally by the term "politics". All forms of government involve politics. The words GOVERNMENT and POLITICS are inseparable, and by the same token, the words GOVERNMENT, POLITICS and POWER bear great analogy each to the other.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

Memo, subj: "Democratic Stable Gov't & Internal Security Power Implements", dtd 5 Aug 47.

c. States and governments exist to exert power for the maintenance of order, the administration of justice, the defense of the community against aggression and the government against violent usurpation of its delegated power.

d. In theory, democratic governments always use delegated power solely for the best interests of the governed. One of the major premises in a syllogistic attack on Communism is that the communist state does not use power for the best interests of the governed. The democratic concept of good in government can only mean good for individual liberty and happiness. The communistic concept of good in government means only good for the state. But that power, be it little or great is always in government and will be used toward some end, be it good, bad, or indifferent. In every state the government is strong or weak. In the world at large there are Major Powers and Minor Powers. In each state and in the world at large is a stable balance of power or an unstable balance of power or no balance of power at all. But there is always power. POWER NEVER VANISHES. IF A STATE DOES NOT CHOOSE TO RETAIN OR WIELD THIS POWER, SOME FACTION OR GROUP WILL.

4. Forces of Democracy

a. Modern economic life involves group struggle in any sovereign state. Sharecroppers against landowners, farmers against milk distributors, industrial unions against trade unions, labor unions against employers, industrial corporations among themselves and in recent years, unions against government. Such strife is one of the basic aspects of life and an element of all relations between individuals, groups and states. A world without struggle or a country without struggle would be a world or a country in which life had ceased to exist. An orderly world or an orderly state is not a world or state in which there is no conflict, but one in which strife and struggle are led into political and legal channels and away from the clash of arms. In effect, transferred from the battlefield or labor front to

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

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b. Groups which operate within the state must conduct their external policy within the limits of the permissible methods. IN THEORY THE STATE RESERVES TO ITSELF THE LEGAL MONOPOLY OF PHYSICAL FORCE, and only those forms of coercion which are free from physical violence are permitted internal opposing groups. When we accept the theory that physical violence among opposing democratic forces within the state is to be prohibited, we admit the necessity for a preponderance of power in the state government. Such preponderance of power among nations is THE BALANCE OF POWER. The treaty of Westphalia, 1648, which brought to a close the Thirty Years War, defined this as the modern state system, based upon the Balance of Power concept between nations. It was not a new concept. Hammurabi was fully aware of these potentialities within and without the state when he established the Babylonian Empire. That there must be a balance of power within the state is basic. That the government should wield the balance of power within a democratic state is irrefragable.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

Memo, subj: "Democratic Stable Gov't & Internal Security Power Implements", dtd 5 Aug 47.

c. A government with delegated powers presupposes a MEANS OF ENFORCING THIS POWER to express the will of the people as conceived by the Legislative Body, interpreted by the Judicial Body, and enforced by the Chief Executive.

5. Balance of Power Within the State

a. The delegation of power to the state requires checks and balance against abuse. Democratic peoples have been so reluctant to delegate the NECESSARY POWER IMPLEMENTS to their government that they have been frequently very vulnerable from within and from without. In the case of the First French Republic the people emasculated the police power of their government to such an extent that they destroyed it. In the case of the United States, the first Washington Administration was hailed by many world powers as evidence of the republic's forthcoming failure. The first Federal administration actually demonstrated the necessity for power and implements of power in the central government.

b. The mandate of power delegated to government by the people of a state, or to the international state by sovereign nations, is useless if no device is created to assist the Executive Group to enforce the will of the people or the will of the nations. This implement of government is POLICE POWER. History does not reflect that any government has endured without police power consisting of forces organized and available for use under the chief executive. As surely as WAR lurks in the background of the international scene, Revolution lurks in the background of the domestic scene. There are few European or Asiatic countries where, at some time during the past thirty years, potential revolution has not been an important factor in politics.

6. Historical Examples of Power Implements and Their Employment in Government

a. History is replete with examples of failure and

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

as evidence of the republic's forthcoming failure. The first Federal administration actually demonstrated the necessity for power and implements of power in the central government.

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6. Historical Examples of Power Implements and Their Employment in Government

a. History is replete with examples of failure and success in national and international scenes which were dependent upon the recognization and enlightened employment of power implements within states and between nations. Analysis of the success of the weak states of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, who preserved themselves through centuries by recognizing and implementing the principle of power and power implements in government. The failure of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues to recognize this principle in dealing with the menace of Macedonia caused Carthage, Egypt and Macedonia to fall to Rome. Genghis Kahn in China; the initial success of Caesar Borgia against the Italian States; the dominant position of the House of Hapsburg under Charles V; Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler in their march to power, all furnish enlightening evidence of the importance of adhering to sound established principles history has recorded through centuries of experience.

b. The classical story of all time, and one that has had far reaching effects upon the history of peace among nations, is that of the League of Nations. Conceived

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

by idealists who closed their minds to the realities of the practical world in which they lived. The effort pursued a course which historical experience indicated was foredoomed to failure. Had the idealists been not so overmuch given to mawkish sentimentality over the individual rights of man, a basic error of the French philosophers, or had they been more lucid of the practical considerations in a world of eternal conflict, they could have created an enduring edifice for world peace. At the time of creating the League of Nations and during its early history when it was still expected that the new organization may develop into an important agency of international government, there were many struggles for control between the large and the small powers and competition between individual states for seats in the council and on the important committees. It appeared for a while as if the struggle for power on the battlefield might in fact, be transformed into a struggle for power in the council room. When it became clear, however, that the council room was merely a place for deliberation and the League only a forum for debate, interest began to deteriorate. IT WAS FUTILE TO TRY TO CONTROL A GOVERNMENT THAT HAD NO IMPLEMENT OF POWER.

7. Power Implement for the United Nations

a. General Marshall, Secretary of State for the United States, is striving to save the United Nations from the ignominous fate of the League of Nations by providing A WORLD POLICE FORCE under the direct control of the United Nations Security Council. Soviet Russia seeks to prevent the organization of such a formidable implement of power. Such a course would interfere with the communist tactics of infiltrate, alienate, divide and conquer procedure. They prefer such implements of power to remain under control of the local autonomous nations where this power cannot be employed without time consuming maneuver.

b. The communist saboteurs in the United Nations are employing the same technique which they have evolved for procedure within a sovereign state. In the former as in the latter they disrupt the central government coordinating unit and deny, destroy or wrest from it the police power. A government thus weakened finds itself unable to

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

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8. Power Devices Within Democracies

a. The essential difference between the international community and the national community as conditioning environments for group behavior, is the absence in the former of a governmental organization capable of preserving order and enforcing law.

b. The power implements of a democratic state are essentially the same as those within any state. The chief executive in a democratic state cannot employ the major implements of power in war without consent of the legislative

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 775009

branch. Major implements of national power are Army, Navy and Militia. Minor implements of power, employed constantly for internal security and the maintenance of law and order, consists of the civil police forces of all echelons of government. The trend in the U.S., brought about by necessity for additional Federal police, has made increases so enormous that it has been thought expedient to refrain from disclosing the actual number.

c. Recourse to power implements by the Federal Government in United States has occurred more and more frequently within the past decade. This is due to the opposition forces flowering into full strength in an adult republic. Labor unions and every other group within the democratic state devote themselves not merely to the pursuit of their objectives but also the constant improvement of their strength. Should any of the groups become so preponderantly strong that they could successfully oppose the will of the people expressed through the government, they would thereby gain the balance of power and become, in fact if not in word, the government.

9. An Example of Power Group Defiance of Government

a. In the United States the labor unions have become predominately stronger under the pro-labor policies of the Roosevelt Administration. Members of the Comintern, recognizing in the mushroom growth of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, a device which could be used to overturn the balance of power within the state, infiltrated the organization in force. The result, the forces which were carefully built up during the years of World War II, has been open defiance of the central government. The Federal Government, finding its laws inadequate to fully maintain the balance of power, passed the Taft-Hartley Labor Law designed to curb and control generally the power of labor unions by increasing its own power of maneuver. Should the unions succeed in defying the central government of this world power, the Comintern will have succeeded in

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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10. Basic Premises Deduced from Human Conduct Patterns Considered

a. The following premises deduced from study, research and analysis of the historical record of government and people, appear to be basic in concept, pertinent and applicable in regard to the weight that should be given internal security implements in formulating a stable democratic government:

(1) Government is power designed to regulate the affairs of human conduct.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

Memo, subj: "Democratic Stable Gov't & Internal Security Power Implements", dtd 5 Aug 47.

(2) The balance of power concept has been the recognized working hypothesis upon which the relations within the state and between major powers has been conducted since the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648.

(3) The principal failure of the balance of power concept has been due to the fluctuating strength of nations involved (productivity and armed potential) which overturned the existing balance.

(4) That the balance of power concept is applicable and practical to peaceful control of opposing forces within a democratic state.

(5) That the balance of power within the state is constant since it rests in the government and is not dependent upon a system of bi-lateral or uni-lateral treaties.

(6) A Democratic Government is the controlled essence of delegated regulatory power stemming from the people. If the government is to endure it must hold the balance of power sufficiently implemented to enforce the will of the people regardless of the desires of any minority group or combination of groups within the state, which represent less than a majority of the adult franchised citizens of the state.

b. Conclusion:

THE BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN A STATE IS PROPERLY VESTED IN THE GOVERNMENT WHICH CANNOT ENDURE WITHOUT INTERNAL SECURITY POWER IMPLEMENTS.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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11. Japanese Government

a. The above conclusion is basic in principle and applicable in the formulation of a stable government and the democratization of Japan. It is obvious from the adopted policies of FEC that there is no intent to limit the initiative of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in determining the civilian police forces adequate for a democratic Japan.

b. Plans for reorganization of the Japanese police force have been developed on the presumption that it is the intent of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to establish enduring democratic government in Japan. These plans steadfastly hold to the basic needs for adequate law enforcement, a stable government and an implement for internal security.

c. Recommendations

(1) THAT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE BALANCE OF

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

Memo, subj: "Democratic Stable Gov't & Internal Security Power Implements", dtd 5 Aug 47.

POWER CONCEPT TO THE DEMOCRATIC STATE STRUCTURE OF JAPAN BE RECOGNIZED AND APPLIED.

(2) THAT THE DEMOCRATIC STATE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN BE PROVIDED WITH AN ADEQUATE INTERNAL SECURITY POWER IMPLEMENT.

12. The above analysis has a direct bearing upon the composition of future Japanese police forces. Therefore, it is of vital importance that this analysis be considered and given due weight before decision is announced as to whether or not basic principles incorporated in PSD Police Reorganization Plan will be followed. The situation has developed two schools of thought, viz:

a. Decentralization of the police to prefectural level is a necessary adjunct to democratization of Japan. The central government cannot be permitted to have direct control over the civil police forces; that all law enforcement controls, both local and national, should be delegated to prefecture and below in consonance with Japanese law concerning Local Autonomy (Diet Law No. 67, 17 April 47).

b. Decentralization of the police force should be accomplished through severance of municipal forces from the national force. That the residue of the national force plus a reasonable increase, should constitute a National Rural Force under control of the Prime Minister. That the national government must have an internal security power implement if the nation is to endure.

13. This paper explains fully the concept upon which the PSD, CIS, G-2, Police Reorganization Plan has been developed.

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H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Public Safety Division

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

DRAFT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500

AG 091.1 ( )CIS/PSD
( )

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force

1. Reference is made to letter, Premier's Office, 3 September 1947, transmitting the basic reform plan of the Japanese Government on the police system.

2. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers approves the increase in strength of the Japanese Police Force to 125,000, and the basic reform plan as amended in Annex attached hereto.

3. The responsible agencies of the Japanese Government will communicate directly with Public Safety Division, Civil Intelligence Section, G-2, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on all matters pertaining to the explanation, interpretation or implementation of this directive.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Annex 1 - Police Reorganization Plan.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

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DRAFT

Tab L

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ANNEX I

to

Memorandum for the Japanese Government, file AG 091.1 (47)CIS/PSD (SCAPIN), dated , subject: "Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force".

POLICE REORGANIZATION PLAN

1. Responsibilities of the police will be confined to (1) prevention of crime, (2) suppression of criminal activities, (3) detection and apprehension of criminals or violators of the criminal laws, (4) protection of life and property, (5) preservation of peace and order, (6) control of traffic and traffic safety, and (7) serving of warrants, subpoenas and other court instruments as directed by competent authority. Extraneous functions currently being performed by the police will be transferred to other governmental agencies. The removal from the police department of the Sanitation Section, Fire Department, Census Bureau, Economic Controls and many others, presently thoroughly enmeshed in the police structure, will be accomplished. Functions of civil police personnel will not include special guard activities such as railway guard, bank guard, occupational guard, etc.

2. The present Police System will be reorganized into a National Police Force and approximately 119 independent municipal police forces.

3. The National Police Force will employ a perpendicular organizational structure as follows:

a. A Ministry of Public Safety will be established for the sole purpose of administering the National Police Force and the National Fire Defense Board.

(1) Control and coordination of the National Police Force shall be established as indicated in the attached chart (Incl 1) and shall be properly delineated in the laws thereunto appertaining.

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(2) The organizational structure of the National Police Force shall be developed in consonance with the attached chart (Incl 2) and shall be properly fixed in the laws thereunto appertaining.

b. A National Headquarters in Tokyo, headed by a Director General who will be responsible to the Minister of Public Safety for the administration, operation, control and performance of the department and shall have authority commensurate with his responsibilities.

c. Regional Headquarters at not less than six nor more than eight strategically located points in Japan. Regional Directors will be in charge of regional districts and responsible to the Director General for proper law enforcement and for the performance and activities of police units within the regional jurisdiction. They will coordinate the prefectural police divisions relative to current police problems and promote uniformity

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

BASIC: Annex I to Memo for the Japanese Govt, file AG 091.1 (47) GIS/PSD (SCAPIN), dated , subject: "Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force".

of activity and procedure. Close liaison will be maintained with the Prefectural Governors and other Prefectural officials, cooperating with them in consonance with national policies, laws, rules and regulations in carrying out local policies concerning police problems.

d. Forty-six Prefectural Divisions with headquarters in the capital of each prefecture and administered by a Prefectural Superintendent responsible to the Regional Director for all law enforcement and the proper management and performance of police duties and personnel under his jurisdiction. Close liaison will be maintained with the Prefectural Governors and other Prefectural officials.

e. Each Prefectural Division is divided into a number of Police Districts; from the District the responsibility is further and finally delegated to Police Boxes, the lowest echelon of responsibility. Police Districts as they now exist will be headed by a Police Captain responsible to the Prefectural Superintendent for general law enforcement in the respective areas and for the proper control and performance of police duties and personnel under his jurisdiction.

4. a. Decentralization of police power to cities will be in accord with the following table:

Decentralization Phasing Table

Phase	Population Criteria of Cities Affected	Date	How Determined
I	Over 200,000	Immediate	By Cabinet Order
II	150,001-200,000	1 June 1948	*Local Option
III	100,001-150,000	1 June 1949	*Local Option
IV	50,000-100,000	1 June 1950	*Local Option

*Cities having the right of local option may choose to take advantage of that right at any time after promulgation of the Municipal Police Law, but in any event, the Mayors of such cities

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

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*Cities having the right of local option may choose to take advantage of that right at any time after promulgation of the Municipal Police Law, but in any event, the Mayors of such cities shall place the subject of local option for independent municipal police before the Assemblies of the local autonomous bodies prior to the dates set forth in the above tabulation.

b. Organization of the independent municipal police forces will be established with the technical advice of police experts in the Public Safety Division, Civil Intelligence Section, G-2, SCAP. This Division will assist the Government in the establishment of these forces.

5. a. The National Police Force shall have the authority to direct city police forces in the guard and protection of objects of national importance, in certain stipulated national offenses, and in any situation involving national disaster. The legally established National Police power will be unlimited when:

(1) Assistance is requested by competent local authority.

(2) When pursuing investigations having to do with specified national crimes, or when such investigations have to do with the suppression and

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BASIC: Annex I to Memo for the Japanese Govt, file AG 091.1 (47) CIS/PSD (SCAPIN), dated , subject: "Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force".

detection of crime and apprehension of criminals whose operations originate in, or materially affect, the areas under the immediate control of the National Police.

b. The authority of the National Police shall at all times be exercised in conformance with the Code of Criminal Procedure.

c. The powers, duties and responsibilities of the Municipal Police shall conform to those of the National Police within their several spheres of influence. A Municipal Police Law shall be prepared by the Japanese Government in coordination with the police experts of the Public Safety Division, Civil Intelligence Section, G-2, SCAP, and the legal experts of Government Section, SCAP. This law shall fix the powers, duties, responsibilities, and police ratios of each of the several cities which have the right of local option in regard to independent municipal police forces.

6. The over-all strength of the Japanese Civil Police shall not exceed 125,000 police personnel. The strength of the National Police will be fixed finally at 30,000 or 40% of the total over-all police strength for Japan, whichever is greater. The interim strength for Japan, whichever is greater. The interim strength of the National Police Force will decrease contingent upon the progress of the decentralization program. The strength of individual Municipal Police Forces will be in accord with the police ratios established by the aforementioned Municipal Police Law.

Incls
1. Chart, Control & Coordination, National Police.
2. Chart, Orgamizational Structure, National Police.

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6. The over-all strength of the Japanese Civil Police shall not exceed 125,000 police personnel. The strength of the National Police will be fixed finally at 80,000 or 40% of the total over-all police strength for Japan, whichever is greater. The interim strength for Japan, whichever is greater. The interim strength of the National Police Force will decrease contingent upon the progress of the decentralization program. The strength of individual Municipal Police Forces will be in accord with the police ratios established by the aforementioned Municipal Police Law.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

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Outline of Japan's Internal Security Scheme with VALENTINE-OLANDER based Police Reorganization Plan



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

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

Control ——

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

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

Proposed
NATIONAL RURAL POLICE
J A P A N

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

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

20 Police Districts of 29 Districts in Chiba will be rural under the plan

Jul 2

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